{"doc_id": "093d4835876fdfd54e885f446f907fea", "text": "Monetary Policy\nReview\n \n \n May 2009\nMonetary Policy\nReview\nMay 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\n© South African Reserve Bank\nAll rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in\nany form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without fully\nacknowledging the Monetary Policy Review of the South African Reserve Bank as the source. The contents of\nthis publication are intended for general information only and are not intended to serve as financial or other\nadvice. While every precaution is taken to ensure the accuracy of information, the South African Reserve Bank\nshall not be liable to any person for inaccurate information or opinions contained in this publication.\nEnquiries relating to this Review should be addressed to:\nExecutive General Manager and Chief Economist\nResearch Department\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nP O Box 427\nPretoria 0001\nTel. 27-12-3133668\nhttp://www.reservebank.co.za/mpr\nISSN: 1609-3194\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nContents\nMonetary Policy Review\nIntroduction...........................................................................................................................\n1\nRecent developments in inflation...........................................................................................\n1\nThe evolution of indicators of inflation..............................................................................\n1\nFactors affecting inflation.................................................................................................\n7\nMonetary policy.....................................................................................................................\n21\nThe outlook for inflation.........................................................................................................\n24\nInternational outlook........................................................................................................\n24\nOutlook for domestic demand and supply ......................................................................\n27\nIndicators of inflation expectations ..................................................................................\n29\nThe South African Reserve Bank inflation forecast ..........................................................\n35\nAssessment and conclusion..................................................................................................\n36\nStatements issued by Mr T T Mboweni, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n11 December 2008...............................................................................................................\n37\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n5 February 2009 ...................................................................................................................\n40\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n24 March 2009 .....................................................................................................................\n43\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n30 April 2009 ........................................................................................................................\n46\nBoxes\n1\nAdministered prices in the consumer price index........................................................\n5\n2\nRecent conventional and unconventional policy measures adopted by monetary \nauthorities in response to the global financial crisis .....................................................\n10\n3\nThe South African inflation-linked bond market and break-even inflation rates............\n31\nFigures\n1\nConsumer price inflation: Targeted inflation ................................................................\n2\n2\nTargeted inflation and food inflation.............................................................................\n3\n3\nFood prices in the PPI and CPI...................................................................................\n7\n4\nPrice of Brent crude oil ...............................................................................................\n9\nB2.1 Policy rates .................................................................................................................\n11\n5\nExchange rates of the rand.........................................................................................\n14\n6\nHouse prices...............................................................................................................\n16\n7\nShare prices indices and non-resident net purchases of shares..................................\n17\n8\nRemuneration per worker, labour productivity and unit labour cost in the formal \nnon-agricultural sector ................................................................................................\n19\n9\nGrowth in money supply and credit extension.............................................................\n20\n10\nBanks’ loans and advances by type ...........................................................................\n20\n11\nThe repurchase rate and other short-term interest rates .............................................\n21\n12\nSelected indicators of global economic activity ...........................................................\n27\n13\nRMB/BER Business Confidence Index........................................................................\n28\n14\nBreak-even inflation rates............................................................................................\n30\n15\nNominal, inflation-linked and break-even yields...........................................................\n31\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nB3.1 Liquidity ratios (annualised) .........................................................................................\n32\nB3.2 Liquidity of inflation-linked government bonds in issue................................................\n32\nB3.3 Net purchases and sales on BESA by sector..............................................................\n33\nB3.4 Yields on inflation-linked government bonds ...............................................................\n34\n16\nTargeted inflation forecast ...........................................................................................\n35 \nTables\n1\nContributions to CPI inflation.......................................................................................\n2\n2\nThe effect of food, petrol and electricity prices on headline inflation............................\n4\n3 \nCPI: Goods and services inflation ...............................................................................\n4\n4 \nAdministered prices ....................................................................................................\n4\nB1.1 Change in weights of administered prices within various inflation measures \naccording to the classification of individual consumption by purpose...........................\n5 \nB1.2 Basket of regulated prices in the CPI for all urban areas.............................................\n6\nB1.3 Basket of administered prices that are not regulated in the CPI for all \nurban areas.................................................................................................................\n6\n5\nAnnual percentage change in real GDP and consumer prices.....................................\n8\n6\nSelected central bank interest rates ............................................................................\n10\n7\nGrowth in real GDP and expenditure components ......................................................\n15\n8\nReal value of building plans passed and buildings completed in larger municipalities...\n17\n9\nPublic finance data .....................................................................................................\n18\n10\nIMF projections of world growth and inflation for 2009 and 2010................................\n25\n11\nBER survey of CPI inflation expectations: First quarter 2009.......................................\n29\n12\nReuters survey of CPI forecasts: March 2009.............................................................\n30\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n1\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nMonetary Policy Review\nIntroduction\nGlobal output and trade have contracted sharply in the period since the previous\nMonetary Policy Review was published in November 2008. Financial markets remain\nunder stress, despite the introduction of extensive fiscal and monetary policy measures\nby governments and central banks, and falling asset prices and disruptions to credit\nmarkets have impacted powerfully on consumer demand. There is growing uncertainty\nabout the depth and duration of the economic slowdown, which is generally viewed as\nthe most severe of the post-war period. \nThe South African economy has not escaped the impact of these developments.\nDomestic production has contracted as a result of weak domestic demand and a\nsignificant decline in export demand. Real gross domestic product (GDP) contracted at\nan annualised rate of 1,8 per cent in the final quarter of 2008, largely as a result of a\nmarked slowdown in the manufacturing sector, and there is a general expectation that\ndomestic growth will remain lacklustre in 2009. Inflation is expected to continue to trend\ndownwards, although the volatility of developments in global markets and elevated levels\nof uncertainty subject inflation forecasts to higher risk than usual. \nThis Monetary Policy Review begins with an analysis of inflation developments and the\nfactors that have impacted on inflation, followed by an assessment of recent monetary\npolicy developments and a discussion of the outlook for inflation. Three topical issues\nare focused on in the boxes. The first box notes the impact on the administered prices\nindex of the recent changes to the consumer price index (CPI) announced by Statistics\nSouth Africa (Stats SA), while the second discusses the policy measures adopted by\nmonetary authorities in various countries in response to the global financial crisis. The\nthird box discusses the inflation-linked bond market in South Africa with a view to\nfacilitating the interpretation of break-even inflation rates. \nRecent developments in inflation\nThis section reviews recent trends in the main inflation indices and analyses\ndevelopments in the main factors impacting on inflation in South Africa.\nThe evolution of indicators of inflation\nThe inflation measure targeted by the South African Reserve Bank (the Bank) until the\nend of 2008 was specified in terms of the consumer price index excluding mortgage\ninterest costs for metropolitan and other urban areas (CPIX). As Figure 1 shows, the\nyear-on-year CPIX inflation rate peaked at 13,6 per cent in August 2008 and then\ndeclined continuously to 10,3 per cent in December. The main drivers of inflation over\nthe last quarter of 2008 were food prices, fuel and power (electricity prices), and\ntransport (petrol prices). The upward bias included in the year-on-year CPIX as a result\nof the treatment of non-discounted clothing and footwear averaged 0,29 percentage\npoints over the September–December 2008 period.1 Average CPIX inflation for \nthe calendar year 2008 was 11,3 per cent, with the upward bias averaging \n0,24 percentage points. \n1\nFrom January 2008,\nStats SA no longer included\nsale items in the clothing and\nfootwear prices collected for\nthe CPI. This change in the\ntreatment of clothing and\nfootwear prices, together with\nthe policy of not revising the\nCPI and CPIX indices, created\nan upward bias in the annual\nrates of change of the indices\nfor the period January–\nDecember 2008.\n2\nSince the release of the January 2009 CPI data, the targeted inflation measure has been\nthe headline CPI (CPI for all urban areas). The new CPI includes a number of significant\nchanges when compared to the previous CPI in terms of the methodology of data\ncollection, classification and weighting (these changes were discussed in the November\n2008 Monetary Policy Review). The year-on-year CPI inflation rate was 8,1 per cent in\nJanuary 2009. It then rose to 8,6 per cent in February before declining marginally to \n8,5 per cent in March (Figure 1). Inflation in the first quarter of the year was driven mainly\nby increases in food prices, alcoholic beverages, household maintenance and repair,\nelectricity, and in financial services. \nTable 1\nContributions to CPI inflation\nPercentage change over twelve months* and percentage points\n2009\nJan\nFeb\nMar\nTotal*...................................................................\n8,1\n8,6\n8,5\nOf which:\nFood and non-alcoholic beverages......................\n2,4\n2,4\n2,3\nAlcoholic beverages and tobacco........................\n0,6 \n0,6\n0,6\nHousing and utilities.............................................\n2,1\n2,0\n1,8\nHealth..................................................................\n0,1\n0,1\n0,2\nTransport .............................................................\n0,0\n0,3\n0,2\nEducation ............................................................\n0,2\n0,2\n0,2\nMiscellaneous goods and services ......................\n1,4\n1,6\n1,6\nOther ...................................................................\n1,3\n1,4\n1,6\nSource: Statistics South Africa\nTable 1 examines the contributions to the CPI inflation rate. In January 2009 the main\ncontributors to the year-on-year inflation rate of 8,1 per cent were food prices \n(2,4 percentage points), housing and utilities (2,1 percentage points), and miscellaneous\ngoods and services (1,4 percentage points). In February a similar pattern is observed,\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nPercentage change over twelve months\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n2003\n2004\n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\nFigure 1 \nConsumer price inflation: Targeted inflation*\n* CPIX for metropolitan and other urban areas until the end of 2008; CPI for all urban areas\n thereafter\nSource: Statistics South Africa\nalthough there were increased contributions from transport (0,3 percentage points) and\nfrom miscellaneous goods and services (1,6 percentage points), driven by increases in\nthe insurance as well as health services components. March saw a decline in the\ncontribution of housing and utilities (1,8 percentage points) due to lower inflation in\nrentals for housing and owners’ equivalent rent (surveyed quarterly). The movements in\nthe contribution of transport in Table 1 were driven by changes in the price of petrol. The\nGauteng price of 95 octane unleaded petrol, which had declined from R10,70 per litre\nin July 2008 to R6,01 per litre in January 2009, rose to R6,61 per litre in February and\nR7,07 per litre in March.\nThe rates of increase in the prices of food items in the consumer price basket generally\nslowed in the period under review (Figure 2). The year-on-year inflation rate for all food items\nslowed from 19,2 per cent in August 2008 to 16,1 per cent in January 2009 and a still-high\n14,9 per cent in March. This trend has been driven by slowly declining, albeit persistently high,\ninflation in bread and cereals (36,5 per cent in August 2008 to 19,9 per cent in March 2009),\nand meat (11,9 per cent to 10,8 per cent over the same period). Vegetable price inflation\nhas been one of the factors limiting the decline in food price inflation, increasing sharply\nfrom a low of 0,5 per cent in September 2008 to 19,3 per cent in February 2009 before\nrecording 18,6 per cent in March.\nThe effect of excluding petrol, food and non-alcoholic beverages, and electricity prices from\nthe CPI inflation measure is considered in Table 2. Since petrol prices have provided\ndownward pressure on CPI inflation during 2009, despite rising in recent months, excluding\nthem from the CPI results in higher inflation rates for this core measure than the 8,5 per cent\nrecorded for headline CPI in March. Excluding petrol prices, the inflation rate for the\nremaining items in the headline CPI was 9,5 per cent in March. Food and non-alcoholic\nbeverages, by contrast, have provided upward pressure on CPI inflation. If these items had\nbeen excluded, headline inflation would have been lower at 7,5 per cent in March, although\nnotably higher than the 6,6 per cent recorded for this core measure in January. If both petrol\nprices and food and non-alcoholic beverages had been excluded from the CPI, inflation\nwould have been 8,6 per cent in March. Finally, if energy had been excluded along with the\nother categories, an inflation rate of 8,0 per cent would have been recorded in March 2009. \nSouth African Reserve Bank\n3\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nPercentage change over twelve months\n-10\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n2003\n2004\n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\n \nAll food items\n \nMilk, cheese and eggs \n \nBread and cereals\n \nVegetables \n \nMeat\n \nTargeted inflation measure\nFigure 2 \nTargeted inflation* and food inflation\n* CPIX for metropolitan and other urban areas until the end of 2008; CPI for all urban areas\n thereafter\nSource: Statistics South Africa\n4\nTable 2\nThe effect of food, petrol and electricity prices on headline inflation\nPercentage change over twelve months\n2009\nJan\nFeb\nMar\nHeadline CPI ..............................................................\n8,1\n8,6\n8,5\nCPI excluding petrol prices..........................................\n9,1\n9,5\n9,5\nCPI excluding food and NAB* prices ...........................\n6,6\n7,4\n7,5\nCPI excluding food, NAB and petrol prices..................\n7,8\n8,2\n8,6\nCPI excluding food, NAB, petrol and energy prices.....\n7,3 \n7,8\n8,0\n*\nNAB: Non-alcoholic beverage\nSource: Statistics South Africa\nThe inflation rates for the goods and services categories of the CPI in 2009 are presented\nin Table 3. Measured over twelve months, goods prices increased by 7,9 per cent in\nJanuary, and by 8,7 per cent in February and March. Within the goods category, inflation\nfor non-durable goods has been far higher (11,8 per cent in March) than for semi-durable\n(6,6 per cent in March) and durable (2,9 per cent in March) goods. Services prices rose\nby 8,2 per cent in January, by 8,5 per cent in February and by 8,4 per cent in March. \nTable 3\nCPI: Goods and services inflation\nPercentage change over twelve months\n2009\nJan\nFeb\nMar\nHeadline CPI.....................................................\n8,1\n8,6\n8,5\nGoods prices ....................................................\n7,9\n8,7\n8,7\nDurable goods...............................................\n1,7\n2,5\n2,9\nSemi-durable goods ......................................\n4,9\n5,7\n6,6\nNon-durable goods........................................\n11,6\n12,3\n11,8\nServices prices..................................................\n8,2\n8,5\n8,4\nSource: Statistics South Africa\nAdministered prices play a potentially important role in the inflation process. The changes to\nthe CPI made by Stats SA have also impacted on the administered prices index, as\ndiscussed in Box 1. Table 4 shows that the year-on-year inflation rate for administered\nprices was 1,4 per cent in January 2009 and 2,8 per cent in February and March. The\ninflation rate for regulated items increased from -0,7 per cent in January to \n1,5 per cent in February before slowing to 0,6 per cent in March, largely as a result of\nmovement in the petrol price. The inflation rate for unregulated items was constant at 5,0 per\ncent in January and February, and then increased to 6,8 per cent in March, largely as a\nresult of increases in the cost of schooling, tertiary education and university boarding fees. \nTable 4\nAdministered prices\nPercentage change over twelve months\n2009\nJan\nFeb\nMar\nTotal..................................................................\n1,4\n2,8\n2,8\nRegulated .........................................................\n-0,7 \n1,5\n0,6\nUnregulated .....................................................\n5,0 \n5,0\n6,8\nSource: Statistics South Africa\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n5\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nBox 1 Administered prices in the consumer price index\nAn ‘administered price’, as reported in the consumer price index (CPI) published by Statistics South\nAfrica (Stats SA), is defined as “the price of a product which is set consciously by an individual\nproducer or group of producers and/or any price, which can be determined or influenced by\ngovernment, either directly or through a government agency/institution without reference to market\nforces”.2 This group of prices is of particular interest to monetary policy-makers as they constitute a\nsignificant portion of the CPI that may not be influenced by monetary policy implementation. \nStats SA reports the administered price index (API) as having a total weight of 14,66 per cent in the\ncurrent CPI for all urban areas. This is lower than the previous weights of 20,01 per cent in the\nconsumer price index excluding mortgage interest costs (CPIX) for metropolitan and other urban\nareas and 17,91 per cent in the CPI for metropolitan and other urban areas (Table B1.1).3 As Table\nB1.1 shows, most components of the API have a lower weighting in the new CPI when compared to\nboth the previous CPI and CPIX measures that were used until the end of 2008. \nTable B1.1 Change in weights of administered prices within various inflation\nmeasures according to the classification of individual consumption\nby purpose\nPer cent\nWeights (2000)\nWeights (2008)\nCPIX for\nCPI for\nCPI for\nmetropolitan and\nmetropolitan and\nall urban\nother urban areas\nother urban areas\nareas\nAdministered prices..............................\n20,01\n17,91\n14,66\nHousing.................................................\n7,98\n7,17\n5,16\nAssessment rates ..................................\n1,64\n1,49\n2,07\nSanitary fees ..........................................\n0,27\n0,24\n0,06\nRefuse removal ......................................\n0,37\n0,33\n0,09\nWater .....................................................\n1,81\n1,63\n1,10\nElectricity ...............................................\n3,55\n3,18\n1,68\nParaffin...................................................\n0,34\n0,30\n0,16\nTransport...............................................\n5,42\n4,82\n4,16\nPetrol .....................................................\n5,08\n4,55\n3,93\nPublic transport: Trains ..........................\n0,16\n0,14\n0,04\nPublic transport: Municipal buses ..........\n0,09\n0,05\n0,00\nMotor licences ......................................\n0,09\nMotor registrations.................................\n0,09\n0,08\n0,10\nCommunication.....................................\n3,11\n2,79\n2,75\nTelephone fees.......................................\n1,62\n1,46\n1,26\nTelephone rent and installation ...............\n0,34\n0,30\n0,00\nPostage ................................................\n0,02\n0,02\n0,02\nCellular telephone calls .........................\n0,89\n0,79\n1,47\nCellular telephone connection fees ........\n0,24\n0,22\n0,00\nRecreation and culture..........................\n0,26\n0,23\n0,13\nTelevision licences..................................\n0,26\n0,23\n0,13\nEducation..............................................\n2,97\n2,67\n2,18\nSchool fees ...........................................\n1,72\n1,55\n1,28\nUniversities/technikons/colleges.............\n1,25\n1,12\n0,90\nRestaurants and hotels.........................\n0,16\n0,14\n0,28\nUniversity boarding fees.........................\n0,16\n0,14\n0,28\nHealth ...................................................\n0,11\n0,09\n0,00\nPublic hospitals .....................................\n0,11\n0,09\n0,00\nSource: Statistics South Africa\n2\nStatistics South Africa,\n2009. “Consumer price index:\nJanuary 2009”, Statistical\nrelease P0141. Pretoria:\nStatistics South Africa, \n25 February.\n3\nThe reason for the differing\nweights of the API in the CPIX\nand CPI for metropolitan and\nother urban areas is the result of\na reweighting that occurs in the\nindex when the interest\ncomponent is removed. This\nensures that the total weight of\nboth indices is 100 per cent and\nhence all components remaining\nin the CPIX have a higher\nweighting than in the CPI.\n6\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nThe exceptions to this are assessment rates, motor licence and registration fees, cellular telephone\ncall charges, and university boarding fees. These changes are largely the result of changes in\nspending patterns captured in the Income and Expenditure Survey conducted in 2005/06. \nThe API is divided into a regulated component and an unregulated component, which are both\nreported in the CPI publication. Regulated administered prices are those that are set according to\ngovernment’s policy objectives and may or may not have an economic regulator. The products and\nservices included in regulated administered prices, as well as their weight in the CPI for all urban areas\nare shown in Table B1.2. Table B1.3 shows the products and services included in the unregulated\nportion of the API.\nTable B1.2 Basket of regulated prices in the CPI for all urban areas\nPer cent\nGroup\nProducts and \nReasoning for inclusion\nWeight\nservices\nHousing\nTotal\n2,94\nWater\nSet by local government within Department of \nWater Affairs and Forestry guidelines\n1,10\nElectricity\nSet by local government and regulated \nby National Electricity Regulator\n1,68\nParaffin\nRegulated by Department of Minerals and Energy\n0,16\nTransport\nTotal\n3,93\nPetrol\nRegulated by Department of Minerals and Energy\n3,93\nCommunication Total\n2,75\nTelephone fees\nRegulated by Independent Communications \nAuthority of South Africa (ICASA)\n1,26\nPostage\nRegulated by government\n0,02\nCellular telephone Regulated by Independent Communications \ncalls\nAuthority of South Africa (ICASA)\n1,47\nTotal\n9,62\nSource: Statistics South Africa\nTable B1.3 Basket of administered prices that are not regulated in the CPI for\nall urban areas\nPer cent\nGroup\nProducts and \nReasoning for inclusion\nWeight\nservices\nHousing\nTotal\n2,22\nAssessment rates\nA tax set by local government\n2,07\nSanitary fees\nSet by local government\n0,06\nRefuse removal\nSet by local government\n0,09\nTransport\nTotal\n0,23\nPublic transport: Trains\nSet by government agency\n0,04\nMotor licences\nSet by provincial government\n0,09\nMotor registrations\nSet by provincial government\n0,10\nRecreation and \nculture\nTotal\n0,13\nTelevision licences\nSet by government agency\n0,13\nEducation\nTotal\n2,18\nSchool fees\nSet by government agencies (schools)\n1,28\nUniversities/technikons/\nSet by government agencies \ncolleges\n(universities, technikons)\n0,90\nRestaurants and \nhotels\nTotal\n0,28\nUniversity boarding fees\nSet by government agencies (universities)\n0,28\nTotal\n5,04\nSource: Statistics South Africa\nInflation measured in terms of the year-on-year change in the headline producer price\nindex (PPI) continued to decline in the period under review, from 14,5 per cent year on\nyear in October 2008 to 5,3 per cent in March 2009. Focusing on the food component\nof the PPI, Figure 3 plots the inflation rates for the agricultural food and food at the\nmanufacturing-level components, alongside that for food in the CPI. The figure shows\nthat upward pressure on food price inflation at the consumer level from food production\nprices has been easing for some time. The inflation rate for the agricultural food PPI has\ndeclined since the end of 2007, falling below that of food in the CPI in April 2008 and\nPPI inflation for food at the manufacturing level has been slowing since July 2008, falling\nbelow the CPI food inflation rate in October 2008.\nFactors affecting inflation\nThis section reviews recent developments in some of the main drivers of inflation in\nSouth Africa. These include the external environment and the exchange rate, domestic\ndemand and output, fiscal policy, and monetary conditions. A discussion of the outlook\nfor these variables and their likely impact on inflation is presented in a later section.\nInternational economic developments\nWorldwide economic growth slowed significantly in 2008, buffeted by the deep\nfinancial crisis, sharp run-ups in energy and food prices, and declines in many\ndeveloped economies’ housing markets. According to the most recent International\nMonetary Fund (IMF) data, the global economy recorded growth of 3,2 per cent in\n2008, compared with 5,2 per cent in 2007 (Table 5). Global real GDP fell at an\nunprecedented annualised rate of 5 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2008.\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n7\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nPercentage change over twelve months\n2007\n2008\n2009\nSource: Statistics South Africa\nFigure 3 \nFood prices in the PPI and CPI\n-15\n-10\n-5\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\nPPI – food at agricultural level\nConsumer prices – food\nPPI – food at manufacturing level\n8\nTable 5\nAnnual percentage change in real GDP and consumer prices \nShare of global\nConsumer\nreal GDP*\nReal GDP\nprices**\n2008\n2007\n2008\n2007\n2008\nWorld ............................................................\n100,00\n5,2\n3,2\n4,0\n6,0\nAdvanced economies....................................\n55,3\n2,7\n0,9\n2,2\n3,4\nUnited States............................................\n20,7\n2,0\n1,1\n2,9\n3,8\nJapan ......................................................\n6,4\n2,4\n-0,6\n0,0\n1,4\nEuro area ..................................................\n15,7\n2,7\n0,9\n2,1\n3,3\nUnited Kingdom........................................\n3,2\n3,0\n0,7\n2,3\n3,6\nOther advanced economies......................\n7,4\n4,7\n1,6\n2,0\n4,3\nOther emerging-market and \ndeveloping countries ....................................\n44,7\n8,3\n6,1\n6,4\n9,3\nAfrica ........................................................\n3,1\n6,2\n5,2\n6,3\n10,1\nCentral and eastern Europe ......................\n3,5\n5,4\n2,9\n6,1\n8,0\nCommonwealth of Independent States ....\n4,6\n8,6\n5,5\n9,7\n15,6\nDeveloping Asia ........................................\n21,0\n10,6\n7,7\n5,4\n7,4\nChina ....................................................\n11,4\n13,0\n9,0\n4,8\n5,9\nIndia ......................................................\n4,8\n9,3\n7,3\n6,4\n8,3\nMiddle East ..............................................\n3,9\n6,3\n5,9\n10,5\n15,6\nWestern hemisphere ................................\n8,6\n5,7\n4,2\n5,4\n7,9\n*\nGDP shares based on the IMF’s purchasing-power-parity valuation of country GDPs for 2008\n**\nZimbabwe excluded\nSource: IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2009\nThe slide in global growth has proved to be far more severe than most forecasters had\nprojected prior to the failure of Lehman Brothers and the intensification of uncertainty in its\nwake. The business cycle dating committee of the United States (US) National Bureau of\nEconomic Research determined that a peak in economic activity occurred in the US\neconomy in December 2007. The peak marked the end of the 73-month expansion that\nbegan in November 2001 and the beginning of a US recession. For the US, economic\ngrowth of 1,1 per cent was recorded for the year 2008 compared with 2,0 per cent in 2007.\nHowever, growth in the US had weakened considerably by the second half of 2008 and\ndeclined at an annualised pace of 6,3 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2008 – the largest\nnegative value since 1982. Consumer spending, which comprises about 70 per cent of total\nexpenditure in the economy, declined at the fastest pace in almost three decades.\nJapan is in a sounder financial position than most advanced economies, but the country’s\ngrowth depends heavily on exports, which have been hit hard by declining foreign\ndemand. Thus, despite Japanese banks’ lower exposure to US mortgage-backed\nassets, Japan slipped into a recession as international trade diminished rapidly. Japan’s\neconomy shrank in the final quarter of 2008 at an annualised rate of 12,1 per cent – the\nfastest since the 1974 oil shock. The sharp fall in output reflects plunging net exports and\nbusiness investment, and faltering private consumption. Consequently, the economy of\nJapan shrank by 0,6 per cent in 2008, compared with real growth of 2,4 per cent in 2007. \nFor the euro area, economic growth of 0,9 per cent was recorded for the year 2008\ncompared with 2,7 per cent in 2007. First estimates show that real output had\ndeclined rapidly in the final quarter of 2008 – contracting the most in nearly 13 years\nas real GDP fell by 6,3 per cent at an annualised rate. Overall eurozone consumer\nprice inflation of 3,3 per cent in 2008 was well above the target ceiling of the European\nCentral Bank (ECB). \nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nIn the United Kingdom (UK), real GDP grew by 0,7 per cent in 2008 compared with 3,0 per\ncent in 2007 as further weakening in the housing market continued to impact negatively on\nthe components of final demand. Inflation in the UK rose from 2,3 per cent in 2007 to \n3,6 per cent in 2008.\nThe confluence of weakening external demand, tightening financing constraints and\ndeclining commodity prices led to much weaker growth outcomes in a broad swath of\nemerging economies. For developing Asia, recent economic data indicate that real\noutput growth moderated to 7,7 per cent in 2008 from 10,6 per cent in 2007. Growth\nin China and India is slowing, albeit from high rates, but domestic demand is being\nsupported by a strong policy stimulus. The Chinese economy recorded growth of 9 per\ncent in 2008, while India’s economy recorded growth of 7,3 per cent. \nGrowth in Africa remained relatively strong in 2008, with an expansion in real GDP of \n5,2 per cent but commodity prices fell sharply in 2008 from mid-year highs, causing an\nespecially large loss of income for commodity exporters. The severe deterioration in\nexternal growth not only reduced demand for African exports, but also began curtailing\nworkers’ remittances and the downturn was most pronounced in oil-exporting countries\nand other commodity-exporting countries. The 10,1 per cent inflation rate in 2008 was\nsignificantly higher than the rate of 6,3 per cent recorded the previous year. \nOil prices\nOil markets have been severely affected by the rapid slowdown in global economic\nactivity in the second half of 2008. With supply exceeding demand, substantial inventory\naccumulation occurred and international oil prices declined sharply. The price of Brent\ncrude oil fell from record highs of above US$145 per barrel in July 2008 to below US$35\nby the end of the year (Figure 4). After the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting\nCountries (OPEC) announced in December 2008 a reduction in production quotas of \n4,2 million barrels per day with effect from January 2009, oil prices fluctuated around\nUS$45 per barrel during the period from mid-February to mid-March 2009. In recent\nweeks prices have risen and have fluctuated around the US$50 per barrel level. \nSouth African Reserve Bank\n9\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nFigure 4 \nPrice of Brent crude oil \n2004\nJ M M J S N\n2005\nJ M M J S N\n2006\nJ M M J S N\n2007\nJ M M J S N\n2008\nJ M M J S N\n2009\nJ M M J S N\nUS dollar per barrel\nSource: Bloomberg\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\n140\n160\n10\nInternational monetary policy developments\nThe backdrop to international monetary policy developments in recent months was the\ncontinued weakening of the global economy and financial markets with inflation beginning\nto trend downwards in many countries. Consequently, central banks around the globe\ncontinued to ease their monetary policy stance aggressively. Since September 2008,\npolicy rates have been reduced by central banks in most countries (Table 6), including\nAustralia, Brasil, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Sweden, the euro area,\nHungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, South Korea, Taiwan,\nThailand, Turkey and the UK.\nTable 6\nSelected central bank interest rates\nPer cent\nLatest decision\n(change in \nCountries\n1 Sep 2008\n30 Apr 2009\npercentage points)\nUnited States ....................................\n2,00\n0,00–0,25\n29 Apr 2009\n(0,00)\nJapan................................................\n0,50\n0,10\n30 Apr 2009\n(0,00)\nEuro area ..........................................\n4,25\n1,25\n02 Apr 2009\n(-0,25)\nUnited Kingdom ................................\n5,00\n0,50\n09 Apr 2009\n(0,00)\nCanada ............................................\n3,00\n0,25\n21 Apr 2009\n(-0,25)\nDenmark ..........................................\n4,60\n2,00\n03 Apr 2009\n(-0,25)\nSweden ............................................\n4,50\n0,50\n21 Apr 2009\n(-0,50)\nSwitzerland........................................\n2,75\n0,00–0,75\n12 Mar 2009\n(-0,25)\nAustralia ............................................\n7,25\n3,00\n07 Apr 2009\n(-0,25)\nNew Zealand ....................................\n8,00\n2,50\n30 Apr 2009\n(-0,50)\nIsrael ................................................\n4,25\n0,50\n27 Apr 2009\n(0,00)\nChina ................................................\n7,47\n5,31\n22 Dec 2008\n(-0,27)\nHong Kong........................................\n3,50\n0,50\n30 Apr 2009\n(0,00)\nIndonesia ..........................................\n9,00\n7,50\n03 Apr 2009\n(-0,25)\nMalaysia ............................................\n3,50\n2,00\n29 Apr 2009\n(0,00)\nSouth Korea ......................................\n5,25\n2,00\n12 Mar 2009\n(0,00)\nTaiwan ..............................................\n3,63\n1,25\n26 Mar 2009\n(0,00)\nThailand ............................................\n3,75\n1,25\n08 Apr 2009\n(-0,25)\nIndia ..................................................\n9,00\n4,75\n21 Apr 2009\n(-0,25)\nBrazil ................................................\n13,00\n10,25\n29 Apr 2009\n(-1,00)\nChile..................................................\n7,75\n1,75\n09 Apr 2009\n(-0,50)\nMexico ..............................................\n8,25\n6,00\n17 Apr 2009\n(-0,75)\nCzech Republic ................................\n3,50\n1,75\n26 Mar 2009\n(0,00)\nHungary ............................................\n8,50\n9,50\n20 Apr 2009\n(0,00)\nPoland ..............................................\n6,00\n3,75\n29 Apr 2009\n(0,00)\nRussia ..............................................\n11,00\n12,50\n24 Apr 2009\n(-0,50)\nTurkey ..............................................\n16,75\n9,75\n16 Apr 2009\n(-0,75)\nIceland ..............................................\n15,50\n15,50\n08 Apr 2009\n(-1,50)\nSource: National central banks\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nBox 2 Recent conventional and unconventional policy measures adopted\nby monetary authorities in response to the global financial crisis\nWith inflation concerns waning and risks to the economic outlook deepening, monetary\nauthorities in various countries have used a range of conventional and unconventional policy tools\nto support their economies and ease credit market conditions. As inflation fears have receded,\ncentral bankers in many countries have been at the forefront of attempts to sustain demand in\nthe face of severe financial disruptions. In an attempt to stabilise their financial systems,\ngovernments in many developed countries have also implemented additional policy measures. \nSouth African Reserve Bank\n11\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nCentral banks in some developed countries have reacted pre-emptively to the rising threat of\ndeflation. Policy rates in many countries are nearing the zero interest rate floor after having been\ncut sharply – bringing them to 0,5 per cent or less in some countries (Canada, Japan, the United\nKingdom (UK) and United States (US)) and to unprecedented lows in others (including the euro\narea and Sweden). Central banks in developed countries have attempted to maximise relief in\ndislocated markets – increasing credit availability and lowering spreads – while minimising\npossible longer-term instability. The European Central Bank (ECB) cut the margin between its\nbenchmark rate and the cost of borrowing from its standing facility from 100 to 50 basis points.\nThe margin between the benchmark rate and interest paid on banks’ deposits was also\nnarrowed to 50 basis points. Furthermore, the ECB broadened the pool of eligible collateral\nsignificantly and introduced additional longer-term central bank operations. Monetary authorities\nin some developed countries have followed multiple strategies involving continued provision of\nliquidity and extended guarantees of bank liabilities. Major banks in the US, the UK and Europe\nwere provided with new capital and guarantees against losses from holdings of legacy (formerly\nknown as ‘toxic’) assets. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in the US announced\nprogrammes to guarantee selected liabilities of FDIC-insured depository institutions and their\nholding companies. It later also expanded its guarantees of bank liabilities temporarily to include\nunsecured obligations and non-interest-bearing transaction deposits. \nA number of central banks have introduced a range of new instruments, including purchases of\nlong-term government securities and more direct measures to support intermediation. In the US\nthe nearing zero floor has constrained room for further cutting, and lower interest rates have been\nsupported by the use of less conventional approaches, using both the size and composition of\nthe Federal Reserve’s (the Fed) balance sheet to support credit intermediation. The “credit-\neasing” strategy announced by the Fed is aimed at providing direct support to credit markets by\nproviding funding and guarantees to financial intermediaries in, for example, the US commercial\npaper and residential mortgage-backed securities markets. The Fed established new lending\nfacilities and expanded existing facilities by jointly establishing with the US Treasury the Term\nAsset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) that lends against asset-backed securities\ncollateralised by student loans, credit card and other loans. The Fed’s programmes to purchase\nup to US$300 billion in longer-term Treasury securities and a combined US$1,45 trillion in agency\nand agency-backed mortgage-backed securities are aimed at lowering key borrowing costs for\nhouseholds and companies. \nPer cent\n2004\n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\nFOMC: Federal funds target rate\nECB: Main refinancing rate\nUK: Repo rate\nJapan: Uncollateralised overnight \ncall rate\nFigure B2.1 \nPolicy rates\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\nSource: National central banks\n12\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nCentral banks in the UK and Japan have also commenced purchasing long-term government\nsecurities to provide direct support to illiquid credit markets. In March 2009 the Bank of England\nannounced that it would buy £150 billion of government and corporate bonds as part of an\nunprecedented attempt to revive the UK economy. The Bank indicated that it would favour buying\nassets from institutions other than banks, and would focus on medium and long maturities. As an\nadditional step to increase the availability of corporate credit, the Bank of England had previously\nset up an asset purchase programme implemented through a specially created fund and the\nbank’s commercial paper facility had already become operational in February 2009. As some\ncentral banks have become key intermediaries in the credit process, their balance sheets have\nexpanded rapidly. For example, the Fed’s balance sheet has expanded from less than US$1 trillion\nin September 2008 to over US$2 trillion at the end of March 2009. Including TALF, the Fed’s\nbalance sheet could expand to over US$3 trillion – or more than 20 per cent of GDP in the US.\nTo put the scale of its most recently announced quantitative easing into perspective, the \nUS$1,25 trillion in agency mortgage-backed securities the Fed now plans to purchase in 2009\nrepresents about one-quarter of the market. Moreover, the US$300 billion in US Treasuries the Fed\nplans to purchase in the next six months represents nearly 10 per cent of marketable notes and\nwould bring its total ownership to roughly one-quarter of the market. The TALF programme is also\ngaining momentum and could be expanded to US$1 trillion and eventually include a wide variety\nof financial assets (possibly including legacy assets). Having already reduced the key interest rate\nthat it controls to nearly zero, the central bank has increasingly turned to alternatives such as\nbuying securities. The interventions on 18 March 2009 were the biggest to date, almost doubling\nall of the Fed’s measures in the past year. \nCentral banks in emerging economies have been confronted by the need to sustain external\nstability in the face of highly fragile financing flows. Given the current global economic outlook,\nemerging-market financing is potentially more vulnerable than in the case of advanced economies\ndue to the possibility of “sudden stops”. Emerging economies that have borrowed heavily in foreign\ncurrency are also more vulnerable to exchange rate depreciation. Governments in developing\ncountries have in general provided fiscal support on a much smaller scale than in developed\ncountries, with China and Saudi Arabia being the important exceptions. China’s central bank has\nensured sufficient liquidity to sustain economic growth by implementing a moderately loose\nmonetary policy. The government has encouraged banks to lend in support of the stimulus,\nimplemented after the global recession had led to a collapse in exports that dragged economic\ngrowth in China to the weakest pace in seven years. In November 2008 the People’s Bank of China\nannounced that it would lend Rmb100 billion (US$14,6 billion) to banks by the end of December to\nstave off a slowdown in growth. In December 2009 the central bank cut its key lending rate for the\nfifth time in three months and, once again, lowered its reserve requirement for the country’s banks.\nMany developing countries, especially in Asia and Latin America, have used policy buffers to\nalleviate pressures. In some countries exchange rates have been allowed to adjust downwards\nand in others stockpiles of reserves have been significantly depleted in an attempt to counter\nvolatile exchange rate movements. In some instances reserves have been applied to augment\nprivate credit and sustain trade finance in particular. The Fed offered bilateral currency swap\nfacilities to 14 systemically important countries and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)\nprovided assurance to markets that external funding would be available if required by countries\nthat had been implementing sound macroeconomic policies. In emerging Europe and the\nCommonwealth of Independent States countries policy responses have been complicated by\ngreater vulnerabilities and less flexible exchange regimes. Some of these countries have been\nconfronted by severe external financing shortages and mismatches on borrowers’ balance\nsheets. Authorities in these countries have tightened macroeconomic policies, and have\napproached the IMF and other official sources for external financial support. \nThe rapid, and in some instances unorthodox, policy responses in many countries to the extreme\nfinancial market conditions that arose after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the US in\nThe US Federal Reserve (the Fed) eased its stance further in December 2008 by adopting\na target range for the federal funds rate of zero to 0,25 per cent per annum. More recently,\nit intensified its efforts to bolster the economy. Although the Fed left the federal funds target\nrate unchanged at 0–25 basis points at its most recent meeting, it still eased policy, as it\nmoved towards a quantitative easing strategy (Box 2 discusses this in more detail). On \n18 March 2009 it announced that it would inject an extra US$1 trillion into the financial\nsystem by purchasing Treasury bonds and mortgage securities. The Fed announced that\nit would further expand its balance sheet by purchasing up to an additional US$750 billion\nof agency mortgage-backed securities and up to an additional US$100 billion of agency\ndebt this year (bringing total purchases to US$1,25 trillion and US$200 billion respectively).\nIt also decided to purchase up to US$300 billion of longer-term (2- to 10-year) Treasury\nsecurities over the next six months. Finally, the Fed anticipates that the range of eligible\ncollateral for the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) is likely to be expanded\nto include other financial assets.\nThe ECB is providing enhanced credit support and has allowed the interest rate it pays on\nits deposit facility, used by banks to place funds overnight, to become a benchmark for\nmarket rates. While the main policy rate has been cut to 1,25 per cent – the lowest ever –\nthe deposit facility rate stands at just 0,25 per cent. The Bank of England’s Monetary Policy\nCommittee cut the official Bank Rate to a record low 0,50 per cent on 5 March 2009, and\nreached consensus on the adoption of a quantitative easing programme.\nAs widely anticipated, the Bank of Japan left its key policy rate unchanged at \n0,10 per cent at its most recent meeting. However, it did increase the size of its monthly\ngovernment bond purchases (rinban operations) from ¥1,4 trillion to ¥1,8 trillion.\nMoreover, it unveiled plans to provide as much as ¥1,0 trillion of subordinated loans to\nlarge commercial banks, in order to shore up the capital bases of institutions hit by\nportfolio losses.\nExchange rate developments\nThe foreign-exchange rate of the South African rand has generally strengthened in the\nperiod since the publication of the November 2008 Monetary Policy Review (Figure 5).\nThe nominal effective exchange rate (NEER), which measures the value of the rand\nagainst a basket of 13 currencies, appreciated by 31 per cent; from a recent low of\n52,57 on 27 October 2008 to 69,06 on 30 April 2009. Over the same period, the rand\nappreciated from R11,31 to R8,43 against the US dollar, and from R14,04 to \nR11,26 against the euro.\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n13\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nSeptember 2008 have thus far failed in aggregate to arrest the downward spiral in global\neconomic activity. Policy responses have helped to alleviate financial market conditions, but\nfinancial markets have yet to stabilise. The additional stimulus measures announced by the G-20\nin April 2009 represent a further substantial co-ordinated attempt by policy-makers to break the\nfinancial sector’s negative feedback loop with the real economy.\nReferences\nInternational Monetary Fund. “Global Prospects and Policies”. World Economic Outlook. \n22 April 2009. \nWall Street Journal. “Bernanke: Fed Actions Help Lending”. 3 April 2009.\nNational central banks’ websites.\n14\nHowever, as is evident in Figure 5, the exchange rates of the rand have recovered\nfrom the sharp depreciation experienced in October 2008 that was largely due to\nlower commodity prices and increased global risk aversion. The risk aversion was\nmost starkly felt in October when close to R50 billion worth of domestic bonds and\nshares were sold by non-residents; this was more than double the combined sales\nof bonds and equities by non-residents in any other month in 2008. The strength-\nening in the value of the rand during April 2009 was largely fuelled by improved\ninvestor sentiment around the world.\nDemand and output \nThe South African economy contracted at an annualised rate of 1,8 per cent in the fourth\nquarter of 2008 (Table 7), the first quarterly decline in aggregate real production since\nthe third quarter of 1998. Following successive growth rates of 1,7 per cent, 5,0 per cent\nand 0,2 per cent in the preceding three quarters of 2008, this resulted in real GDP\ngrowth of 3,1 per cent in 2008, compared with 5,1 per cent in 2007. \nThe deceleration in growth in the fourth quarter of 2008 can be attributed mainly to a\nmarked deterioration in real value added by the secondary sector, particularly by\nmanufacturing. The real value added by the manufacturing sector contracted at an\nannualised rate of 21,8 per cent in the fourth quarter, having recorded a contraction of \n9,4 per cent in the third quarter. By contrast, the annualised growth in real value added by\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nIndex: 2000 = 100 (foreign currency per rand)\nRand per euro\nRand per US dollar\nFigure 5 \nExchange rates of the rand\n2007\nMar May\nMar May\nJul\nSep\nNov\nJan\n2008\n2009\nMar May\nJul\nSep Nov\nJan\nJan\n \nNominal effective exchange rate of the rand (NEER)\n \nRand per US dollar \n \nRand per euro (right-hand scale)\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\n6\n7\n8\n9\n10\n11\n12\n7\n8\n9\n10\n11\n12\n13\n14\n15\nthe primary sector accelerated to 6,0 per cent in the final quarter of 2008 from 3,3 per cent\nin the third quarter, reflecting an improved growth performance by the mining sector and\ncontinued strong growth in the agriculture sector. The mining sector recorded annualised\ngrowth of 0,5 per cent in real value added in the fourth quarter after contracting by 8,8 per\ncent in the third quarter, while growth in real value added by the agriculture sector was \n31,6 per cent in the third quarter and 16,7 per cent in the fourth quarter. \nTable 7\nGrowth in real GDP and expenditure components\nPer cent*\n2007\n2008\nYear\n1st qr\n2nd qr\n3rd qr\n4th qr\nYear\nFinal consumption expenditure:\nHouseholds ......................................\n6,6\n3,0\n1,3\n-0,9\n-2,7\n2,3\nGeneral government ........................\n4,8\n12,3\n-2,1\n10,2\n3,6\n5,0\nGross fixed capital formation ..............\n16,3\n10,4\n5,2\n7,3\n3,0\n10,2\nChanges in inventories (R billions)** ....\n4,2\n11,1\n-4,7\n-11,2\n-21,1\n-6,5\nGross domestic expenditure..............\n6,0\n12,5\n-1,7\n0,7\n-3,9\n3,1\nExports of goods and services............\n7,5\n-30,1\n42,5\n4,0\n-16,4\n1,7\nImports of goods and services............\n10,0\n3,9\n7,9\n4,7\n-19,0\n2,2\nGross domestic product ....................\n5,1\n1,7\n5,0\n0,2\n-1,8\n3,1\n*\nQuarterly data refer to quarter-on-quarter growth at annual rates of seasonally adjusted data \n**\nConstant 2000 prices\nReal gross domestic expenditure declined at an annualised rate of 3,9 per cent in the\nfinal quarter of 2008, after increasing by a modest 0,7 per cent in the third quarter. This\nperformance was the result of a contraction in final consumption expenditure by\nhouseholds over the period, a notable decline in inventory levels, and slower growth in\ngross fixed capital formation and final consumption expenditure by general government.\nFinal consumption expenditure by households declined at annualised rates of 0,9 per\ncent in the third quarter and 2,7 per cent in the final quarter of the year. The annual\ngrowth rate for final consumption expenditure by households slowed from 6,6 per cent\nin 2007 to 2,3 per cent in 2008, which was the lowest rate recorded this decade.\nIn the external sector of the economy, real exports of goods and services grew by an\nannualised 4,0 per cent in the third quarter of 2008 before declining by 16,4 per cent in\nthe final quarter. Real imports of goods and services rose by 4,7 per cent and declined\nby 19,0 per cent in the corresponding quarters, with the result that the trade deficit\nnarrowed from R36,7 billion in the third quarter of 2008 to R19,6 billion in the fourth\nquarter. This outcome was supported by a narrowing of the shortfall on the service,\nincome and current transfer account with the rest of the world in the fourth quarter of\n2008, mainly as a result of lower interest and dividend payments to non-resident\ninvestors. As a consequence of these developments, the deficit on the current account\nof the balance of payments expressed as a ratio of GDP shrank from 7,8 per cent of\nGDP in the third quarter of 2008 to 5,8 per cent in the fourth quarter. \nSouth Africa’s gross gold and other foreign reserves declined marginally from \nUS$34,4 billion at the end of September 2008 to US$34,1 billion at the end of March 2009.\nThe international liquidity position decreased from US$33,6 billion to US$33,5 billion over\nthe same period. The changes in the reserve positions were mainly the result of exchange\nrate-induced revaluation effects.\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n15\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\n16\nReal-estate and equity prices \nThe adverse economic conditions that enveloped developed countries around the globe\nduring 2008 inevitably filtered through to developing countries such as South Africa. As\nin many other emerging markets, South African property and share markets weakened\nconsiderably from the second half of 2008. Negative and uncertain conditions in global\nmarkets, lower commodity prices and less favourable economic growth prospects\ngenerally contributed to the weaker performance of the South African share market,\nwhile the property market also extended its downward trend.\nMeasured by the Absa House Price Index (Figure 6), the year-on-year rate of change in\nnominal house prices continued to trend downwards from the high of 15,7 per cent\nreached in March 2007, reaching negative levels of growth from December 2008. This is\nthe first occurrence of a decline in the index since 1987. The year-on-year rate of increase\nin the First National Bank House Price Index also continued to move downwards,\nrecording a decline of 10,2 per cent in April 2009, while the year-on-year change in the\nStandard Bank House Price Index recovered from -3,6 per cent in January 2009 to \n-2,5 per cent in April.\nThe declining level of economic activity in the real-estate sector is also evident from the\nbuilding statistics published by Stats SA and reproduced in Table 8. While growth in the\nvalue of buildings completed decelerated during the course of 2008, the value of building\nplans passed recorded an even sharper deceleration, providing an indication that future\nconstruction activity may remain subdued. However, positive growth was displayed in\nplans passed for non-residential buildings. The real value of building plans passed for the\nresidential sector contracted by 27,2 per cent in 2008 after decreasing by 3,2 per cent in\n2007, while that for the non-residential sector expanded by 0,8 per cent in 2008 after\ncontracting by 5,9 per cent in 2007. In the first two months of 2009, year-on-year growth\nin the value of buildings completed remained positive, while the value of plans passed\ncontracted sharply for both residential and non-residential buildings.\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nPercentage change over twelve months\n2004\n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\n-15\n-10\n-5\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n35\n40\n \nAbsa House Price Index\n \nStandard Bank House Price Index\n \nFirst National Bank House Price Index\nSources: Absa, Standard Bank and First National Bank\nFigure 6 \nHouse prices \nTable 8\nReal value of building plans passed and buildings completed in \nlarger municipalities\nAnnual percentage change\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009*\nBuilding plans passed\nTotal ..............................................................\n8,1\n-2,4\n-18,1\n-48,9\nResidential.................................................. \n2,7\n-3,2\n-27,2\n-53,4\nNon-residential .......................................... \n31,7\n-5,9\n0,8\n-41,4\nAdditions and alterations .......................... \n5,0\n1,9\n-12,7\n-46,4\nBuildings completed\nTotal ..............................................................\n21,5\n9,5\n1,2\n10,2\nResidential ..............................................\n16,7\n1,2\n-8,8\n0,2\nNon-residential ........................................\n30,6\n48,6\n18,5\n26,6\nAdditions and alterations..........................\n34,0\n6,1\n15,6\n19,6\n*\nFigures for January and February 2009 compared with the corresponding months of 2008\nSource: Statistics South Africa\nShare prices on the JSE Limited (JSE) trended downwards during the second half of\n2008, effectively mirroring developments in international markets. As Figure 7 shows, the\nFTSE/JSE All-Share Index (Alsi) declined by 46 per cent from a record high on 22 May\n2008 to 20 November, led by a steep fall in resources shares which lost more than half\ntheir value after the commodity boom had come to an abrupt end. Similar, although\nsomewhat less pronounced, declines were recorded by industrial and financial shares\nover the same period. Financial shares have been on a downward trend since the end\nof 2007, partly as a result of investor concerns about the impact of rising domestic\ninterest rates on the profitability of these companies, and the negative perceptions\nglobally regarding banking and credit markets in general. \nSouth African Reserve Bank\n17\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nIndices\nR billions\n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\nFTSE/JSE Resources Index\nFTSE/JSE Industrials Index\nNon-resident net purchases (cumulative since January 2005, right-hand scale)\nFigure 7 \nShare price indices and non-resident net purchases \n \nof shares\n10 000\n20 000\n30 000\n40 000\n50 000\n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\nFTSE/JSE All-Share Index\nFTSE/JSE Financials Index\nSource: JSE Limited\n18\nThe decline in domestic share prices during 2008 coincided with a sell-off of South\nAfrican shares by non-resident investors. Towards the end of 2007 non-residents\nreassessed their investments in the light of the turbulence in global financial markets\nand, after four consecutive years of net purchases of South African shares, substantial\nnet sales of R54 billion were recorded in 2008. However, early indications are that \nnon-residents again purchased shares to the net value of R19 billion in the first four\nmonths of 2009.\nAlthough share prices remained somewhat volatile during the first months of 2009, the\nAlsi rebounded by 16 per cent from 20 November 2008 to the end of April following a\nmodest recovery in commodity prices, the lowering of the repurchase rate and improved\nconditions on global equity markets.\nFiscal policy \nThe adverse developments in the global economy impacted markedly on the budget\npresented by the Minister of Finance on 11 February 2009 (Table 9). According to the\nBudget Review 2009, the estimated budget balance for 2008/09 is a deficit of \nR22,8 billion (or 1,0 per cent of GDP), a significant revision to the surplus of R14,3 billion\nthat was estimated at the time of the 2008 budget. As a percentage of estimated GDP,\nthe medium-term budget balances are projected to be deficits of 3,9 per cent in\n2009/10, 3,1 per cent in 2010/11 and 2,3 per cent in 2011/12. The structural budget\nbalance, which adjusts for the effects of the economic cycle, averages -3,2 per cent of\nGDP over the next three fiscal years.\nTable 9\nPublic finance data \nR billions and per cent\n2006/07\n2007/08 \n2008/09 \n2009/10 2010/11 2011/12\nFeb 2008\nRevised\nActual\nActual\nbudget\nestimates\nMedium-term estimates\nNational government\nDeficit (–)/surplus (+)........\n+11,0\n+18,3\n+14,3\n-22,8\n-95,6\n-83,3\n-67,7\nRevenue..........................\n481,2\n559,8\n625,4\n611,1\n643,0\n709,1\n781,2\nExpenditure.....................\n470,2\n541,5\n611,1\n633,9\n738,6\n792,4\n849,0\nAs a percentage of GDP\nDeficit (–)/surplus (+)........\n+0,6\n+0,9\n+0,6 \n-1,0\n-3,9\n-3,1\n-2,3\nState debt cost ...............\n2,9\n2,6\n2,2\n2,4\n2,2\n2,2\n2,3\nTotal net loan debt ..........\n26,4\n23,4\n19,7\n22,6\n25,6\n27,1\n27,4\nPSBR*.............................\n-0,3\n-0,6\n1,2\n3,9\n7,5\n6,5\n5,3\n*\nPSBR: Public-sector borrowing requirement\nSource: National Treasury Budget Review 2009\nThe weaker economic environment has resulted in a revised main budget revenue total\nof R611,1 billion for fiscal 2008/09, representing R14,3 billion less than originally\nbudgeted. Expenditure has been revised upwards by R22,8 billion to R633,9 billion for\nthe same period. Debt-service costs as a percentage of GDP are projected to decline\nslightly over the medium term, from 2,4 per cent in 2008/09 to 2,2 per cent in 2009/10\nand 2010/11, and 2,3 per cent in 2011/12. \nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nThe public-sector borrowing requirement (PSBR), which represents the funds needed by\nthe public sector to cover any deficit in financing its own activities, has moved from \n-0,6 per cent of GDP in 2007/08 to a revised estimate of 3,9 per cent of GDP in\n2008/09. The PSBR, bolstered by the public corporations’ and governments’ capital\nexpenditure, is projected at 7,5 per cent of GDP in 2009/10, before contracting slightly\nto reach 5,3 per cent of GDP in 2011/12.\nLabour markets\nFigure 8 shows that wage inflation, measured by the year-on-year rate of increase in the\nnominal remuneration per worker in the non-agricultural sectors, accelerated from \n7,1 per cent in the third quarter of 2007 to 13,7 per cent in the third quarter of 2008,\nbefore slowing to 12,4 per cent in the fourth quarter. The combination of these changes\nin wage inflation and generally declining labour productivity growth resulted in the growth\nin unit labour cost rising from 4,6 per cent to 12,8 per cent during the same period.\nAccording to the outcome of the Andrew Levy Wage Settlement Survey, the average\nlevel of wage settlements amounted to 10,2 per cent in the first quarter of 2009, after\nrecording 9,8 per cent in 2008 and 7,3 per cent in 2007. The settlements in the first\nquarter of 2009 ranged from 7 per cent in the metal/manufacture sector to 12,3 per cent\nin the food/agriculture sector. \nMonetary conditions\nMonetary data, and particularly growth in credit extension, continued to reflect tighter\nconditions in the period under review, affected by higher interest rates, decelerating\neconomic activity and tighter lending criteria applied by banks (Figure 9). Year-on-year\ngrowth in banks’ loans and advances to the private sector decelerated from 23,8 per\ncent in January 2008 to 14,0 per cent in December and 7,3 per cent in March 2009.\nSimilarly, growth in broad money supply (M3) decelerated from 24,5 per cent in January\n2008 to 14,8 per cent in December and further to 10,6 per cent in March 2009. \nSouth African Reserve Bank\n19\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nPercentage change over four quarters\n2003\n2004\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2005\nFigure 8 \nRemuneration per worker, labour productivity and \n \nunit labour cost in the formal non-agricultural sector\n \nNominal unit labour cost\n \nRemuneration per worker\n \nLabour productivity\n-2\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n16\n20\nMortgage advances dominate the bank loans and advances aggregate, with more\nthan 50 per cent of outstanding loans falling in this category (Figure 10). Of the\nremaining categories, approximately one-quarter consists of general loans, while\noverdrafts (7 per cent), credit card advances (3 per cent) and instalment sales and\nleasing finance (13 per cent) make up the remainder. Growth in all the loan categories\ndecelerated during 2008 and the early months of 2009. Year-on-year growth in\nmortgage advances decelerated from, on average, 27 per cent in 2007 to 19 per cent\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nPercentage change over twelve months\n2006\n2004\n2003\n2005\n2007\n2008\n2009\nFigure 9 \nGrowth in money supply and credit extension\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\nM3\nLoans and advances to the\ndomestic private sector\nPercentage change over twelve months\nOutstanding balance in R billions\nFigure 10 Banks' loans and advances by type\n-20\n-10\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n0\n500\n1 000\n1 500\n2 000\n \nMortgages\n \nInstalment sale and leasing finance\n \nCredit card advances\n \nGeneral advances\n \nOverdrafts\n2003\n2004\n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\nin 2008 and 12 per cent in the first three months of 2009. Growth in other loans and\nadvances, which include general loans, overdrafts and credit card advances,\ndecelerated from 30 per cent in 2007 to 24 per cent in 2008 and 9 per cent in the first\nthree months of 2009.\nMonetary policy \nSince the publication of the previous Monetary Policy Review there have been four\nmeetings of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). The severe downturn in the global\neconomy in the final months of 2008, and the speed with which it spread to virtually all\nparts of the world, created new challenges for monetary policy-makers generally. It was\ndecided that, in the light of these developments, it would be appropriate for the time being\nto meet more frequently in order to assess these rapidly changing circumstances in a\ntimeous manner and to be able to act appropriately when necessary. Accordingly, the\nMPC is scheduled to meet every month, apart from July, for the remainder of 2009.\nFor much of 2008, the MPC had been concerned about the more generalised nature of\nthe inflation dynamics that were brought about primarily by the succession of supply-\nside shocks such as food and oil price increases. As outlined in this Review, the global\neconomic landscape changed dramatically in the later part of the year, and these global\ndevelopments have had a significant impact on the South African economy and on\nmonetary policy in particular. The economy has experienced a marked slowdown and a\nconsequent widening of the output gap, while pressures on inflation have subsided as a\nresult of declining demand and lower commodity prices. These developments allowed\nfor a change in the monetary policy stance. As Figure 11 shows, the repurchase rate\nwas reduced by 50 basis points in December and by a further 100 basis points at each\nof the subsequent three meetings.\nThese interest rate reductions were effected despite the fact that inflation was still\nabove the upper end of the inflation target range. As explained in previous Reviews,\ngiven the lag in the reaction of inflation to interest rate changes, the focus of\nmonetary policy is on the medium- to longer-term expected trajectory of inflation,\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n21\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nPer cent\n2004\n2003\n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\nPrime overdraft rate\nRepurchase rate\nThree-month NCD rate\nFigure 11 The repurchase rate and other short-term interest rates\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n16\n18\n22\nrather than on the current outcomes. It is also the case that an inflation-targeting\nframework allows for flexibility in the time horizon for achieving the inflation target.\nThe MPC also has to assess the risks to the inflation outlook, as the forecast is not\nfollowed mechanistically. During the past months, the view of the committee was that\nthe balance of risks to the outlook, which for most of 2008 had been viewed as being\non the upside as a result of oil and food price developments, had changed\nsignificantly. The widening output gap was increasingly seen as a downside risk to\nthe inflation outlook. While the exchange rate was initially seen as a source of upside\nrisk, the recent appreciation of the rand reduced this risk somewhat.\nAt the December MPC meeting the inflation forecast generated by the Bank’s forecasting\nmodel showed an improvement in the inflation outlook, with inflation expected to return\nto within the target range by the third quarter of 2009. Although inflation was forecast to\nincrease again in the first quarter of 2010 as a consequence of base effects, it was\nexpected to remain within the target range for the remainder of the forecast period. The\nforecast presented to the February 2009 meeting was similar, but both these forecasts\nwere subject to heightened uncertainty as a result of the reweighting and rebasing of the\nCPI that was due to be implemented by Stats SA in January 2009. \nThe new CPI measure for January was available at the March 2009 MPC meeting and it\nrevealed that the previous forecasts had slightly overestimated the degree to which the\ninflation rate would decline. This then resulted in a near-term deterioration in the inflation\noutlook, but a more favourable trend was forecast for the medium term, with inflation\nexpected to average 5,3 per cent in the final quarter of 2010. At the April meeting, the\nforecast again deteriorated slightly, with inflation now expected to average 5,4 per cent at\nthe end of the forecast period. The most recent forecast is discussed in more detail later\non in this Review. The MPC, however, emphasised the fact that the higher levels of\nuncertainty and the pace of change of global developments made these forecasts subject\nto higher risk than was usually the case. \nInflation expectations, which had been deteriorating in the course of the year, appeared\nto have improved somewhat in the longer term in the fourth quarter of 2008. According\nto the inflation expectations survey conducted on behalf of the Bank by the Bureau for\nEconomic Research (BER) at Stellenbosch University, inflation expectations for 2009 as\nmeasured in the fourth quarter of 2008 reflected a slight deterioration when compared\nwith those measured in the previous quarter. However, expectations for 2010 improved,\nwith average expected inflation of 7,2 per cent, compared with 7,4 per cent in the\nprevious survey. In the survey conducted in the first quarter of 2009, average inflation\nexpectations for 2009 showed an improvement, but there was a marked deterioration for\n2010 with CPI inflation now expected to average 8 per cent. However, the survey was\ncharacterised by divergent views between the different groups of respondents.\nDuring the review period, international developments had an impact on the domestic\ninflation outlook. At each MPC meeting, the international economy was characterised by\nprogressively worse outcomes as the advanced economies experienced negative\ngrowth, and emerging-market economies also showed signs of slowing. The forecasts\nfor global growth were also revised downwards over time. The falling global demand and\ndeclining commodity prices meant that world inflation pressures eased, despite\nsignificant monetary and fiscal policy stimuli in many countries.\nFood and petrol prices continued to warrant special attention. At the time of the\nDecember meeting North Sea Brent crude oil was trading at around US$40 per barrel,\ncompared with a peak of almost US$150 per barrel in August 2008. A similar level was\nrecorded at the time of the February meeting, but by the April meeting international\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nprices had risen to above the US$50 per barrel level. The impact on the domestic petrol\nprice was also affected by exchange rate developments and domestic tax increases.\nWhereas domestic petrol prices declined by around R4,40 per litre between September\n2008 and February 2009, successive increases in the following months resulted in a\ncumulative increase in petrol prices of R1,37 per litre. The committee nevertheless noted\nthat under conditions of low global growth the risk posed to domestic inflation by\ninternational oil prices had subsided to a large extent.\nThe committee also concluded that the risk posed by food prices had moderated\nsomewhat. The price of a number of agricultural commodities had declined in global and\ndomestic markets, and this was reflected in price declines in some of the agricultural food\ncategories in the PPI. However, up to the April 2009 meeting food price increases at the\nconsumer price level, although declining, had remained stubbornly high and the MPC noted\nthat the expected decline in inflation might be delayed by the continued high rates of\nincrease in food prices, despite marked declines in producer price food inflation.\nThe MPC paid particular attention to the output gap that had been widening over the\npast quarters. The output gap, measured as the difference between actual and potential\noutput growth, is an important determinant of inflation. At the time of the December\nmeeting, the committee noted that the 0,2 per cent GDP growth rate recorded in the\nthird quarter of 2008 represented a significant widening of the output gap. Other high-\nfrequency data, observed at the December 2008 and February 2009 meetings,\nindicated that the fourth-quarter growth outcome was likely to be lower than that\nrecorded in the third quarter. By the March meeting the fourth-quarter contraction of \n1,8 per cent was confirmed, and the outlook for the first quarter of 2009 remained bleak\nin the light of contractions in mining, manufacturing and retail sales as observed in the\nmonthly data releases. The RMB/BER Business Confidence Index and the Investec/BER\nPurchasing Managers Index (PMI) also indicated that growth, particularly in the manu-\nfacturing sector, was likely to remain under pressure in the coming months.\nExpenditure in the economy also remained subdued over the period under review, in part\ndue to the tighter stance of monetary policy that had been adopted until the middle of\n2008, but also due to the impact of other factors related to the global financial crisis. At\nall the meetings of the MPC during this period, the sharp decline in real household\nconsumption expenditure was noted, particularly with respect to durable goods\nconsumption. In the fourth quarter of 2008, household consumption expenditure\ndeclined at an annualised rate of 2,7 per cent, mainly as a result of a 20 per cent\ncontraction in consumption of durable goods.\nThe weak trends in global and domestic demand were also seen to have an impact on\nthe current account of the balance of payments. The lower international price of oil,\nalong with declining demand for goods and services generally, allowed for a decline in\nimports in the final quarter of 2008. This trend, coupled with lower net income and\ndividend payments to non-residents, more than offset the decline in the volume and\nvalue of exports during that quarter. Consequently, the deficit on the current account of\nthe balance of payments narrowed to 5,8 per cent of GDP in the final quarter of 2008,\ncompared with a deficit of 7,8 per cent in the previous quarter.\nTrends in credit extension also exhibited a steady deceleration over the period. Credit\nextension to households continued to moderate in line with the lower levels of\nconsumption expenditure, while credit extension to firms also decelerated. The\ncommittee also noted that the downward trend in the growth of credit extension was not\nonly a result of lower demand, but also of the more stringent lending criteria applied by\nbanks. Asset prices also remained under pressure: by April the various house price\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n23\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\n24\nindices showed that house prices were falling and equity prices on the JSE had declined\nsubstantially in the wake of the global credit crisis since September 2008. These factors\nwere seen by the committee as factors constraining a near-term increase in expenditure.\nEvidence that households were rebuilding their impaired balance sheets was also seen\nin the declines in the ratio of household debt to disposable income that were observed\nin the final two quarters of 2008. \nWhile the above factors generally contributed to the moderation in inflation and in some\ninstances were seen to impart a downside risk to the inflation outlook, a number of upside\nrisks were also observed. In particular, the behaviour of the rand exchange rate in the\nwake of the financial crisis was a cause for concern for the committee, because of the\npotential impact of the exchange rate on inflation. At the December 2008 and February\n2009 meetings, the rand was seen to pose the main upside risk to the inflation outlook.\nThe rand had been trading at levels of around R8,00 to the US dollar in early September\n2008. However, as risk aversion increased following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in\nmid-September, the rand depreciated against the US dollar along with most other\nemerging-market currencies. At the time of the December meeting, the rand was trading\nat around R10,20 to the US dollar, having reached a level of R11,80 at one stage. The\nrand remained volatile during the subsequent months, but by the March 2009 meeting it\nhad appreciated to levels of around R9,45 to the US dollar and to around R8,50 in April.\nWhile the risk to the inflation outlook emanating from the exchange rate had subsided\nsomewhat, the committee recognised that the volatile and uncertain international\nenvironment meant that the outlook for the rand remained uncertain.\nAt the March and April meetings, the main upside risks to the inflation outlook were\nidentified as emanating mainly from cost-push pressures, particularly from administered\nprices. These included possibly higher-than-expected electricity tariff increases.\nThe improved outlook for inflation, in part a result of the declining economic growth, and\nthe change in the balance of risks to the outlook have allowed for a 350 basis point\nreduction in the repurchase rate by the MPC since December 2008. Unlike in a number\nof other countries, monetary policy in South Africa has not had to focus directly on\nfinancial stability issues as the domestic banking system has remained sound. Monetary\npolicy, which continues to be conducted within a flexible inflation-targeting framework,\nhas remained focused on bringing inflation down to within the inflation target range over\na reasonable time period, while being sensitive to growth variability issues. \nThe outlook for inflation\nThe outlook and uncertainties relating to some of the international and domestic factors\nthat are considered by the MPC in setting monetary policy, including indicators of\ninflation expectations and the fan chart representation of the Bank’s forecast, are\ndiscussed below.\nInternational outlook\nThe global economy has continued to weaken significantly in recent months and the\ndecline in global demand has resulted in a marked contraction in international trade.\nThere is growing uncertainty about the depth and duration of the economic slowdown.\nThe IMF, which in January 2009 was forecasting global growth to average 0,5 per cent\nin 2009, has downgraded its outlook for the global economy for the third time in five\nmonths and now expects a contraction of 1,3 per cent in 2009 (Table 10). This would\nbe the first decline in the nearly 40-year history of the series.\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nTable 10\nIMF projections of world growth and inflation for 2009 and 2010*\nPer cent\nReal GDP\nInflation rates**\n2009\n2010\n2009\n2010\nWorld ......................................................................\n(3,0)\n-1,3\n1,9\n(4,6)\n2,5\n2,4\nAdvanced economies ............................................\n(0,5)\n-3,8\n0,0\n(2,0)\n-0,2\n0,3\nUnited States ....................................................\n(0,1)\n-2,8\n-0,1\n(1,8)\n-0,9\n-0,1\nJapan ................................................................\n(0,5)\n-6,2\n0,5\n(0,9)\n-1,0\n-0,6\nEuro area ..........................................................\n(0,2)\n-4,2\n-0,4\n(1,9)\n0,4\n0,6\nUnited Kingdom ................................................\n(-0,1)\n-4,1\n-0,4\n(2,9)\n1,5\n0,8\nOther advanced economies ..............................\n(2,5)\n-4,1\n0,6\n(3,3)\n0,6\n1,5\nOther emerging-market and developing countries....\n(6,1)\n1,6\n4,0\n(7,8)\n5,7\n4,7\nAfrica ................................................................\n(6,0)\n2,0\n3,9\n(8,3)\n9,0\n6,3\nCentral and eastern Europe ..............................\n(3,4)\n-3,7\n0,8\n(5,8)\n4,6\n4,2\nCommonwealth of Independent States..............\n(5,7)\n-5,1\n1,2\n(12,6) 12,6\n9,5\nDeveloping Asia ................................................\n(7,7)\n4,8\n6,1\n(6,2)\n2,8\n2,4\nChina ..............................................................\n(9,3)\n6,5\n7,5\n(4,3)\n0,1\n0,7\nIndia ................................................................\n(6,9)\n4,5\n5,6\n(6,7)\n6,3\n4,0\nMiddle East........................................................\n(5,9)\n2,5\n3,5\n(14,4) 11,0\n8,5\nWestern hemisphere..........................................\n(3,2)\n-1,5\n1,6\n(7,3)\n6,6\n6,2\n*\nIMF projections for 2009 as at October 2008 in parenthesis\n**\nZimbabwe excluded\nSource: IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2009\nThe IMF projects a severe 3,8 per cent contraction in the advanced economies and\nrelatively meagre growth of just 1,6 per cent in the emerging economies. Moreover, it\nprojects an anaemic recovery in 2010 with global growth of only 1,9 per cent. The IMF’s\nApril 2009 World Economic Outlook economic growth projections for all countries are\nlower than their September 2008 counterparts due to the sudden and steep declines in\nglobal production and world trade. Notwithstanding these significant downward\nrevisions to the IMF forecast, risks to the growth outlook are heavily skewed to the\ndownside. Consumer price inflation also continues to trend downwards in most\ncountries and world inflation is projected to be restrained by declining demand and lower\ncommodity prices, which are expected to remain subdued under conditions of negative\nor low growth.\nThe IMF has warned that the US recession may last into 2010 unless policy-makers can\nstabilise the financial system. For the US economy, the IMF projects contractions of 2,8 per\ncent in 2009 and 0,1 per cent in 2010. The contraction in economic activity is expected to\npush the output gap to levels reached in the early 1980s. Growth in the US is only\nexpected to turn positive in the third quarter of 2010, based on the assumptions that\nfinancial market conditions improve relatively rapidly in the second half of 2009 and that\nsustained policy support bolsters domestic demand.\nThe economy of the 16-nation euro region is expected to contract by 4,2 per cent in\n2009, worse than the 2 per cent slump that the IMF forecast in its January 2009 update.\nRecord declines in exports and production in the first half of this year are expected to\nshrink the economy significantly and a further marginal contraction of 0,4 per cent is\nprojected for the region in 2010. The projected decline in economic activity in 2009\nreflects the significant contraction in external demand, the corrections in housing\nmarkets in certain member states and increasing financing constraints.\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n25\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\n26\nJapan is expected to experience the sharpest contraction among the G-7 economies in\n2009, with real GDP projected to fall by no less than 6,2 per cent as net exports,\nbusiness investment and private consumption weaken simultaneously. The financial\nsector in Japan has also begun to weigh on growth prospects.\nIn Africa regional growth is expected to slow sharply to 2,0 per cent this year, less than\nhalf the rate of the past five years, but the IMF warns that the projection may be too\noptimistic. Even though the crisis has been slow in reaching Africa’s shores, the IMF\nexpects the combined impact of economic and financial shocks to be severe. Financial\nflows have become scarce, trade financing even scarcer and more expensive, and\nforeign investment in Africa’s stock and bond markets has fallen. As growth around the\nworld declines, demand for Africa’s products is expected to fall significantly further and\ncommodity export prices to remain lacklustre. Tourism revenue is also expected to\ndecline further as consumers around the world tighten their belts.\nAmong major emerging economies, China appears to be best positioned to weather the\nglobal slowdown. Although export growth has weakened substantially, China has a large\nbudget surplus that gives the government considerable flexibility to boost consumer and\nbusiness spending. China’s financial system has a limited connection to foreign banks and\nthe country’s foreign-exchange reserves are approaching US$2 trillion. India’s banking\nsystem is also relatively insulated from international financial turmoil and the country’s\neconomic growth has generally relied more on domestic demand than on exports. \nThe IMF warns that a further deterioration in the financial markets in advanced\neconomies could lead to a deeper and longer downturn, and that the deflation risk in\nadvanced economies could reinforce such an outcome. Emerging economies may also\nfind it increasingly difficult to secure external financing, and the spectre of trade and\nfinancial protectionism is also a concern for the overall global economic outlook.\nHowever, the global growth outlook could improve significantly once the monetary and\nfiscal policy measures announced in various countries begin to bear fruit, especially if\npolicy measures are strengthened credibly.\nThe composite leading indicator compiled by the Organisation for Economic \nCo-operation and Development (OECD) projects a continuing slowdown in economic\nactivity in the major OECD countries (Figure 12). The OECD composite leading\nindicator continued to fall, recording a decline of 9,7 per cent in February 2009\ncompared with the same month of the previous year. The percentage change over\ntwelve months in the OECD industrial production index declined further to a negative\n15,4 per cent in January 2008, compared with a decline of 12,0 per cent recorded\non the same basis for the previous month. Although the JPMorgan global\nmanufacturing PMI increased for a third straight month to 37,2 in March 2009 from\n33,7 in December 2008, it is still at a level that is indicative of continued broad\ncontraction in global manufacturing.\nWhereas inflation is expected to remain subdued due to lower commodity prices and\nweakening economic growth, deflation risks have arisen in some of the advanced\ncountries. Headline inflation in the advanced economies fell below 1 per cent in\nFebruary 2009. Inflation has also moderated significantly across the emerging\neconomies, although in some cases falling exchange rates have dampened the\ndownward momentum. Sustained deleveraging and tight credit availability are likely to\ncontinue to weigh heavily on the global economy in 2009. The world economy is\ntherefore expected to stagnate for most of 2009, with a slow recovery commencing\nonly during 2010.\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nThe magnitude of the global slowdown in 2009 will, to a large degree, depend on the\nseverity of the financial crisis and the effectiveness of government policy initiatives\naround the world. Considerable time could pass before financial institutions’ losses are\nfully recognised, leverage is reduced and market confidence recovers. A decisive\ncommitment to multilateral concerted and co-ordinated efforts is therefore deemed\ncrucial by the IMF to achieving a nearer-term global recovery. The colossal global\nstimulus package has continued to expand in recent months and President Obama’s US\nprogramme began taking effect in April 2009. The US Congressional Budget Office\nestimates that the programme will add up to 4 percentage points to US real GDP growth\nrates in the second and third quarters of 2009. Stimulus programmes are also expected\nto bolster a number of other major economies across the world. However, overall, the\nglobal economic situation for 2009 remains extremely uncertain and significant\ndownside risks remain a palpable threat to the global growth outlook.\nOutlook for domestic demand and supply\nThere is a general expectation that domestic growth will be quite disappointing in the\nfirst two to three quarters of 2009 due to weaker domestic and international economic\nconditions, before improving moderately in 2010 and 2011. Although annual growth in\nfinal consumption expenditure by government remained relatively unchanged, growth in\ngross final expenditure by households and in gross fixed capital formation decelerated\nbetween 2007 and 2008. In particular, growth in households’ real disposable income,\nwhich fell from a seasonally adjusted and annualised rate of -0,8 per cent in the third\nquarter of 2008 to -1,9 per cent in the fourth quarter, is expected to remain subdued,\nwith recovery only expected later in 2009. The main source of growth in 2009/10 from\nthe demand side is likely to be the increased public-sector investment in infrastructure\nthat will be supported by a deficit of 3,8 per cent deficit of GDP, as announced in the\nNational Treasury’s 2009 Budget Review.\nAccording to the latest Reuters consensus forecasts surveyed in March 2009, the South\nAfrican economy is expected to contract by 0,3 per cent in 2009, with the second\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n27\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nPercentage change over twelve months \nIndex points\n30\n35\n40\n45\n50\n55\n60\n \nOECD composite leading indicator\n \nOECD industrial production index\n \nJPMorgan global manufacturing PMI (right-hand scale) \nSources: OECD and JPMorgan\nFigure 12 Selected indicators of global economic activity\n-20\n-15\n-10\n-5\n0\n5\n10\n15\n1999\n2001\n2003\n2005\n2007\n2009\n28\nquarter of the year expected to show an annualised contraction of 0,8 per cent, followed\nby positive growth of 0,7 per cent in the third quarter and 1,8 per cent in the fourth\nquarter. Growth in 2010 and 2011 is expected to recover to 2,7 per cent and 3,9 per\ncent respectively. \nAs far as the quarterly analysis of manufacturing activity is concerned, the first-quarter\n2009 BER survey revealed that the net majority of respondents rating current business\nconditions worse than those of a year ago increased from 50 per cent to 56 per cent.\nOn the supply side, production volumes have declined sharply due to declining sales\nvolumes and high levels of finished goods inventories. In addition, the net majority of\nrespondents expecting a deterioration in business conditions in the coming twelve\nmonths increased from 28 per cent to 34 per cent. On the demand side, net majorities\nof 41 per cent reported declines in domestic order volumes and 25 per cent reported\ndeclines in export order volumes. \nSurveys of consumer and business confidence indicate that confidence levels in the\neconomy remain at low levels. Consumer confidence, measured by the First National\nBank/Bureau for Economic Research (FNB/BER) Consumer Confidence Index (CCI) as\nthe percentage of respondents expecting an improvement in conditions less the\npercentage expecting deterioration, rose from -4 in the fourth quarter of 2008 to \n+1 during the first quarter of 2009. Improvement in the consumer confidence was\nsupported by, among other factors, significant declines in petrol and diesel prices\nbetween November 2008 and February 2009, a 150 basis point cut in official interest\nrates up to the time the survey was conducted, the easing of CPI inflation, and a positive\nresponse to the national budget announced in the 2009 Budget Review. \nThe level of business confidence, measured in terms of the Rand Merchant\nBank/Bureau for Economic Research (RMB/BER) Business Confidence Index, declined\nto its lowest level in a decade, registering 27 index points in the first quarter of 2009,\nwhich was preceded by 33 points in the fourth quarter of 2008 (Figure 13). The index\nmeasures business confidence on a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 indicating an extreme lack\nof confidence, 50 neutrality and 100 extreme confidence. The decline in business\nconfidence occurred in the midst of the deteriorating global landscape. Manufacturers’\nconfidence declined from 31 to 16 index points on the back of declining domestic and\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nPercentage\n1980\n82\n84\n86\n88\n90\n92\n94\n96\n98 2000 02\n04\n06\n08\n0\n25\n50\n75\n100\nSources: Rand Merchant Bank and Bureau for Economic Research\nFigure 13 RMB/BER Business Confidence Index\nNet positive\nNet negative\nexport orders, and of slow-moving inventories. Wholesaler confidence registered 31 index\npoints, following 44 index points registered in the fourth quarter of 2008. Building\ncontractor confidence declined from 42 to 33 index points due to a sharp contraction in\nbuilding activity. Retailers’ confidence rose marginally from 49 to 52 index points on the\nback of strong sales of non-durable goods such as food and beverages. However, the\nhigh confidence among retailers was limited to dealers in non-durable goods.\nThe Investec/BER PMI, a barometer of manufacturing activity, registered a historical\nlow of 35,6 index points in April 2009, marginally down from 36,0 index points in\nMarch. On a seasonally adjusted basis, the inventories index fell to 28,7 points in April,\nand the purchasing commitments index declined to a record low of 29,9 points. The\nbusiness activity index showed a slight improvement in April to 32,8 from 31,2 points\nin March, and new sales orders increased to 33,7 from 32,6 points. Business\nexpectations regarding economic conditions six months ahead adjusted upwards\nfrom 46,6 index points in March 2009 to 48,3 points in April. Since the index is still\nbelow 50, this indicates that the manufacturing sector continues to expect\nunfavourable conditions in the short term due to the weak domestic and global\neconomy, but that some improvement is expected in the second half of the year.\nThe FNB Building Confidence Index, which measures the business confidence of the\nmajor role players and suppliers involved in the building industry, dropped from an index\nvalue of 40 in the last quarter of 2008 to 28 in the first quarter of 2009. All sub-\ncomponents of the index showed significant generalised deterioration in the first quarter\nof 2009. The business confidence of residential contractors slipped from an index value\nof 34 in the fourth quarter of 2008 to an index value of 26 in first quarter of 2009. The\nbusiness confidence of non-residential building contractors dropped from an index value\nof 59 in the fourth quarter of 2008 to 51 in the first quarter of 2009.\nIndicators of inflation expectations\nEstimates of inflation expectations for the forecast period from 2009 to 2011 obtained\nfrom the BER survey conducted during the first quarter of 2009 show that average\nannual CPI inflation expectations are expected to decline over the forecast years,\nalthough they are expected to remain above the upper limit of 6 per cent of the CPI\ninflation target. As depicted in Table 11, average CPI inflation expectations for 2009 are\n8,3 per cent, followed by 8,0 per cent for 2010, and 7,8 per cent for 2011. Among the\ngroups surveyed, only the financial analysts expect CPI inflation to fall within the target\nrange during 2010 and 2011. By contrast, business and labour expect CPI inflation to\nexceed the upper end of the target range by a considerable margin. \nTable 11\nBER survey of CPI inflation expectations: First quarter 2009\nPer cent\n2009\n2010\n2011\n1. Financial analysts ...................................................\n6,1\n5,4\n5,5\n2. Business ................................................................\n9,2\n8,6\n8,3\n3. Trade unions ..........................................................\n9,7\n10,1\n9,6\nAverage 1–3 ................................................................\n8,3\n8,0\n7,8\nSource: Bureau for Economic Research, Stellenbosch University\nThe March 2009 Reuter’s survey of long-term forecasts for the South African economy,\nwhich surveys a group of financial market analysts, reports that targeted CPI inflation is\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n29\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\n30\nexpected to fall within the official target range of 3 to 6 per cent from the third quarter\nof 2009 and is expected to stay within the target range until the end of the forecast\nperiod in 2011 (Table 12). It is expected that CPI inflation will average 6,7 per cent in\n2009, decline to 5,6 per cent in 2010, and reach 5,3 per cent in 2011. \nTable 12\nReuters survey of CPI forecasts: March 2009*\nPer cent\n2009\n2010\n2011\n1. Mean....................................................................\n(6,4)\n6,7\n(5,7)\n5,6\n(5,5)\n5,3\n2. Median ................................................................\n(6,5)\n6,7\n(5,7)\n5,7\n(5,5)\n5,5 \n3. Highest ................................................................\n(7,0)\n7,4\n(6,5)\n6,6\n(6,7)\n6,8\n4. Lowest ................................................................\n(5,5)\n6,0\n(4,7)\n4,0\n(4,3)\n4,1\nNumber of forecasters..............................................\n(21)\n20\n(21)\n20\n(15)\n14\n*\nFebruary 2009 survey results in parentheses\nSource: Reuters\nExpectations derived from break-even inflation rates, measured as the difference\nbetween the yields on South African CPI inflation-linked bonds and conventional nominal\nbonds of similar maturity, suggest that inflation expectations trended downward from the\nbeginning of July 2008 until the end of the year (Figure 14). In 2009 break-even inflation\nrates obtained from the R189 inflation-linked bond maturing in 2013 show that short-\nterm market inflation expectations initially fell below longer-term break-even rates\nassociated with the R197 bond maturing in 2023. In the second week of March 2009\nthe R189 spread was around 4,2 per cent, down from a high of 9,0 per cent at the\nbeginning of July 2008. During the same period the R197 break-even rate was 5,0 per\ncent, down from 8,3 per cent in the first week of July 2008. \nMore recently, break-even inflation rates have again moved higher. This is partly the result\nof the rally in the inflation-linked bond market, particularly the shorter-term inflation-linked\nbonds, which resulted from the windfall effect of the revised base index values (Figure 15).\nBox 3 provides more detail regarding this. On 30 April 2009 break-even inflation \nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nPercentage points\n2006\n2007\nFigure 14 Break-even inflation rates\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\n10\n \nSpread between R189 and R206 bonds (4-year maturity)\n \nSpread between R197 and R186 bonds (14-year maturity)\n2008\n2009\nat the four-year maturity had risen to 5,8 per cent, a level similar to that at the fourteen-\nyear maturity.\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n31\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nBox 3 The South African inflation-linked bond market and break-even\ninflation rates\nInflation-linked bonds are bonds that have their redemption value and coupon payments linked\nto a price index. They provide investors with an inflation hedge, while reducing uncertainty about\nthe real cost of borrowing. In South Africa, inflation-linked bonds were first issued by the South\nAfrican government during March 2000, when the R189 bond with a coupon rate of 6,250 per\ncent maturing in March 2013 was launched. In the subsequent years government issued\ninflation-linked bonds of various maturities with the intention of developing a yield curve of\ninflation-linked bonds of up to 30 years. There are currently four inflation-linked government\nbonds in issue, varying from the R189 to the R202, with a coupon rate of 3,450 per cent and\nmaturing in December 2033. As at the end of 2008, the total value outstanding of government\ninflation-linked bonds comprised approximately 15 per cent of the overall government bond\nmarket. In recent years inflation-linked bonds have also been issued by various public and\nprivate-sector institutions (mostly banks).\nPrices of inflation-linked financial securities are often used to infer market-based measures of\nexpectations of future inflation and attitudes to inflation risk. The difference in the yield between\nconventional and index-linked bonds of similar maturity, referred to as the ‘break-even inflation\nrate’, provides information about market participants’ views regarding average expected inflation\nfor the reference price index over the period to maturity of the bonds. This measure is a useful\nsupplement to surveys and econometric forecasts of future inflation. However, as is regularly\nnoted in this Review, movements in break-even inflation rates may be affected by factors such\nas inflation risk premiums, the liquidity of the bonds, the demand and supply balance, and other\nmarket developments. Since these factors may influence their reliability, break-even rates should\nbe used cautiously in the assessment of capital market players’ inflation expectations. This box\nprovides information about the South African inflation-linked bonds market that facilitates the\ninterpretation of break-even inflation rates. \nLiquidity\nSouth African inflation-linked bonds are generally not very liquid instruments, as they are traditionally\nbought as long-term investments by investors. As a ratio of the nominal value of inflation-linked\nPer cent\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\nR206 – conventional government bond yield\nBreak-even inflation R206/R189 \nR189 – inflation-linked government bond yield\nFigure 15 Nominal, inflation-linked and break-even yields\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n32\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nbonds in issue, the turnover in the secondary market for inflation-linked bonds is far lower than\nthat of conventional bonds. In 2008 the annualised liquidity ratio of all listed bonds on the Bond\nExchange of South Africa (BESA) averaged around 24, that is, in a year bonds generally traded\n24 times their amount in issue. By comparison, inflation-linked bonds traded at an average ratio\nof only twice their amount in issue. In the first three months of 2009 the annualised liquidity ratio\nof all bonds came to 19, while that of inflation-linked bonds came to 1.\nOf the different inflation-linked bonds in issue, the R210, issued in 2007 and expiring in 2028,\nhas been the most liquid inflation-linked bond since 2007, trading at around three times per year\nits nominal value in issue. Prior to that, the R198 was the most liquid of the inflation-linked\nRatio\nFigure B3.2 \nLiquidity of inflation-linked government bonds \n \nin issue\n \nR198: 2008-03-31\n \nR197: 2023-12-07\n \nR202: 2033-12-07\n \n \n* January to March, annualised\nSource: BESA and own calculations\n2009*\n2008\n2007\n2006\n2005\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\nR189: 2013-03-31\nR210: 2028-03-31\nRatio\n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\nAll bonds\nInflation-linked government bonds\nFigure B3.1 \nLiquidity ratios (annualised)\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\nSource: BESA and own calculations\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n33\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nbonds in issue, before it expired in 2008. In recent years the liquidity of the longer-term \nR202 bond, first issued in 2003, has dwindled.\nFigure B3.3 indicates the more active participants in secondary market trading of inflation-\nlinked bonds. The South African Reserve Bank (the Bank), acting as an agent on behalf of the\nNational Treasury, is generally the net supplier or seller of inflation-linked bonds. The main\nbuyers are banks and other financial institutions. The Public Investment Corporation (PIC) is\nalso usually a net buyer, while insurers and pension funds, who generally buy to hold, are less\nactive participants in the secondary market. To try and promote greater liquidity in inflation-\nlinked bonds, the National Treasury initiated a Reverse Repurchase Agreement Transactions\nFacility, operated by the Bank, from 31 August 2006. However, thus far this measure has had\na very limited impact on liquidity.\nDemand and supply\nNew issuances of inflation-linked government bonds declined from around R22 billion in 2005\nand R17 billion in 2006, to around R8 billion and less in 2007 and 2008. This coincided with a\ngeneral decline in goverment bond issuance as well as a decline in demand as the bid-to-cover\nratio4 declined from, on average, four times the amounts auctioned in 2005 to twice the amounts\nauctioned in 2007 and 2008. However, this ratio has since improved in the early part of 2009.\nHolders of inflation-linked bonds in issue\nA substantial portion of inflation-linked bonds in issue is held by the PIC, which acts as the asset\nmanager for the government pension funds. As at the end of 2008, the PIC held more than 80 per\ncent of the inflation-linked government bonds in issue. The retirement funds managed by the PIC\nwould, understandably, show a preference for holding long-term inflation-hedged instruments. \nThe impact of the new headline CPI\nThe reference inflation measure used for South African inflation-linked bonds is the headline\nCPI. This was the CPI for metropolitan areas until January 2009, when it became the CPI for\nR billions\nFigure B3.3 \n Net purchases and sales on BESA by sector\n \n2005\n \n2007\n \n \nSource: BESA and own calculations\nOther\nNon-\nfinancial\nprivate\nsector\nOther\nfinancial\ninstitutions\nUnit\ntrusts\nInsurers\nand\npension\nfunds\nPIC\nBanks\nMonetary\nauthority\nNon-\nresidents\n-15\n-10\n-5\n0\n5\n10\n2006\n2008\n4\nThe ratio of the number\nof bids received in a security\nauction compared to the\nnumber of accepted bids.\n34\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nall urban areas as a result of the changes implemented by Statistics South Africa. On \n20 March 2009 the National Treasury clarified the pricing of inflation-linked bonds based on\nthe new headline CPI for all urban areas. In essence, the holders of inflation-linked bonds may\nreceive higher returns than the official inflation rate due to base effects in the changeover to\nthe new index for 2009. This resulted in a rally in the yields in all the categories of inflation-\nlinked bonds, with sharper declines recorded in the yields on shorter-term inflation-linked\nbonds (Figure B3.4).\nIn addition to the beneficial impact of the new index values, the decline in inflation-linked bond\nyields also resulted from higher demand due to rising inflation expectations. The downward trend\nin interest rates has also improved the relative return on inflation-linked bonds compared to that\nof term bank deposits. \nThe rally in the inflation-linked bond market, which resulted from the windfall effect of the revised\nbase index values, exaggerated the upward movement in break-even rates towards the end of\nMarch 2009. At the same time the short-term break-even rate realigned itself with movements\nin longer-term rates. On 30 April 2009 break-even inflation in the four-year maturity range had\nrisen to 5,76 per cent, while that over fourteen years indicated expectations of 5,77 per cent.\nThe break-even rate for the nineteen-year maturity range stood at 5,87 per cent, while that of\nthe twenty-four-year-maturity range, at 6,07 per cent, exceeded the upper band of the inflation\ntarget range. It is possible that break-even rates over the different categories would have been\nsignificantly lower, were it not for the recent revision in the base index values that followed from\nthe implementation of the new headline CPI. \nReferences\nMageza, M. Room for Continued Real Yield Rally. Research by ABSA Capital, affiliated with\nBarclays Capital, 24 March 2009.\nNational Treasury. 2000 to 2009. Various press releases.\nScholtes, C. On Market-based Measures of Inflation Expectations. Bank of England Quarterly\nBulletin, Spring 2002.\nPer cent\n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\nR189\nR210\nFigure B3.4 \nYields on inflation-linked government bonds\n1,5\n2,0\n2,5\n3,0\n3,5\n4,0\nR197\nR202\n20 March: National \nTreasury announces \nnew base index \nvalues\nThe South African Reserve Bank inflation forecast\nThe most recent projections of the Bank’s quarterly inflation forecasting model,\npresented to the MPC meeting on 29 and 30 April 2009 are reproduced in the form of\na fan chart in Figure 16. According to these projections, the inflation outlook for 2009\nhas deteriorated since the forecast presented to the previous MPC meeting, largely as\na result of a higher administered price inflation outlook and the higher-than-anticipated\nFebruary inflation outcome, but the forecast for 2010 remains fundamentally the same. \nThe central projection, conditional on an unchanged repurchase rate, is for the average\nquarterly CPI inflation rate to decelerate further to 6,2 per cent in the third quarter of\n2009. Thereafter inflation is expected to increase marginally to 6,4 per cent in the first\nquarter of 2009, before resuming its downward trajectory to reach 5,4 per cent by the\nend of the forecast period in the fourth quarter of 2010. \nThe heightened levels of uncertainty and the rate of change in global developments make\nrecent forecasts subject to higher risk than is usually the case. Alternative scenarios for\nmovements in the foreign-exchange rate of the rand and oil prices generate more optimistic\nor pessimistic outcomes than the central projection. Larger-than-anticipated electricity price\nincreases and their second-round effects pose an upside risk to the forecast, as do higher-\nthan-expected salary and wage settlements. Conversely, the risks arising from the\npossibilities of a deeper and more prolonged global slowdown or a more significant\nmoderation in domestic growth generally tend to exert a downward bias on the forecast.\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n35\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nPer cent\n2005\n2004\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\nFigure 16 Targeted inflation* forecast\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n* CPIX for metropolitan and other urban areas until the end of 2008; CPI for all urban\n areas thereafter\nNote:\nThe fan chart uses confidence bands to depict varying degrees of\ncertainty. The darkest band of the fan chart covers the most likely 10 per\ncent of probable outcomes foreseen for inflation, including the central\nprojection. Each successive band, shaded slightly lighter and added on\neither side of the central band, adds a further 10 per cent to the probability,\nuntil the whole shaded area depicts a 90 per cent confidence interval (see\nBox 4 “Understanding the fan chart” on p. 27 of the March 2001 Monetary\nPolicy Review).\n36\nAssessment and conclusion\nThe turmoil that erupted in the financial markets in the later part of 2008 has had a\nprofound impact on the growth prospects in many countries. Most economies are either\ncontracting or slowing significantly and these adverse conditions are likely to persist for\nsome time. Financial markets are likely to remain volatile as risk aversion and optimism\nabout growth prospects fluctuate in response to emerging data and conflicting signals.\nThe uncertainty created by these developments makes it a difficult environment for\nmonetary policy-making. Most countries have responded to the banking and real-sector\ncrisis with monetary and fiscal policy stimuli, in order to offset the decline in demand and\nencourage new demand. \nThe South African economy has also been impacted by these developments and in the\nfinal quarter of 2008 the economy experienced its first quarter of negative growth since\n1998. Recent indicators suggest that the economy, and the manufacturing sector in\nparticular, is likely to remain under pressure for some time. While the prospects for \nthe economy are linked to global developments, the infrastructural expenditure\nprogramme that is currently under way will go some way towards underpinning\ninvestment expenditure.\nThe global and domestic economic slowdown has had a significant moderating impact\non the inflation outlook. The widening output gap, weak domestic demand and lower\ncommodity prices have all contributed to the revised outlook, although administered\nprice developments and, to a lesser extent, uncertainties relating to the exchange rate\nprovided some countervailing pressure. Nevertheless, the improvement in the overall\ninflation outlook and the perceived downside risk to the medium-term inflation outlook\nhas allowed for a more accommodative stance, and the repurchase rate has been\nreduced by 350 basis points since December 2008. The continued stability of the\ndomestic banking system meant that the MPC could maintain its focus on its mandate\nto achieve price stability within a flexible inflation-targeting framework.\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n11 December 2008\nIssued by Mr T T Mboweni, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, at a meeting\nof the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) in Pretoria\nIntroduction\nSince the previous meeting of the MPC, domestic inflation has moderated and is\nexpected to decline further over the coming months. At the same time, the South African\neconomy has been affected by the significant global slowdown that has intensified\nrecently. The domestic economy experienced negligible growth in the third quarter, while\na number of sectors contracted. Moreover, while there has been some improvement in\nthe inflation outlook, risks posed by uncertainty with regard to the exchange rate, in\nparticular, remain.\nThe data releases over the past weeks have shown that the international economy is\nslowing down faster than previously expected and that global inflation pressures are\nsubsiding. This has resulted in the recent global interventions by policy-makers.\nDomestic monetary policy remains guided by local conditions. Monetary policy always\ntakes into consideration the possible impacts of global developments on the South\nAfrican economy, in general, and on inflation, in particular.\nRecent developments in inflation\nCPIX inflation (headline inflation excluding mortgage interest cost) measured 13,6 per\ncent in August 2008 and subsequently declined to year-on-year increases of 13,0 per\ncent and 12,4 per cent in September and October respectively. Food, petrol and\nelectricity prices were the main contributors to the inflation outcomes, despite the petrol\nprice reductions in September and October. Food prices increased at a year-on-year\nrate of 17,2 per cent in October, while petrol and electricity prices increased by 31 per\ncent over the same period. If food and petrol were excluded, CPIX inflation would have\nmeasured 8,4 per cent in October, compared with 8,5 per cent in September. \nProducer price inflation also showed signs of moderating in the past two months despite\nsignificant electricity price increases. Producer price inflation increased at a year-on-year\nrate of 19,1 per cent in August, but moderated to 14,5 per cent in October. Agricultural\nfood prices declined for the third successive month in October when the year-on-year\nrate declined to 10,4 per cent. Manufactured food prices increased by 15,6 per cent in\nOctober, compared with 20,5 per cent in August.\nThe outlook for inflation\nThe most recent central forecast of the South African Reserve Bank (the Bank) shows a\nfurther improvement in the inflation outlook since the previous MPC meeting. With an\nunchanged stance of monetary policy, inflation is expected to continue its downward\ntrajectory and to return to within the inflation target range in the third quarter of 2009.\nInflation is then expected to breach the upper end of the target range marginally in the\nfirst quarter of 2010 as a result of technical base effects associated with the decline in\npetrol prices at the end of 2008. However, the downward inflation trend is forecast to\ncontinue thereafter.\nInflation is expected to average 6,2 per cent and 5,6 per cent in 2009 and 2010\nrespectively, and to average 5,3 per cent in the final quarter of 2010. The forecasts are\nsubject to a greater degree of uncertainty than usual, given the highly volatile global\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n37\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\n38\nenvironment, and the uncertainty related to the impact of the rebasing and reweighting\nof the CPI basket to be introduced by Statistics South Africa in January 2009.\nInflation expectations as measured by the yield differential between conventional\ngovernment bonds and inflation-linked bonds declined from just over 9 per cent in \nJuly 2008 to around 5,1 per cent in early December. The yield curve has remained\ninverted at the longer end and has declined since the previous meeting, particularly in\nthe one-to-five year maturity range.\nInflation expectations as reflected in the inflation expectations survey conducted on\nbehalf of the Bank by the Bureau for Economic Research (BER) at Stellenbosch\nUniversity deteriorated marginally for 2009, but then improved slightly for 2010. Average\ninflation expectations for 2009 measured 8,2 per cent compared with 8,1 per cent in the\nprevious quarter, while inflation expectations for 2010 measured 7,2 per cent compared\nwith 7,4 per cent in the previous survey. This was the first time since the first quarter of\n2006 that expectations for any forecast year had declined. \nUnit labour cost in the third quarter of 2008 increased by 12,5 per cent compared with\nthe same quarter last year. However, the improved inflation expectations, coupled with\nthe lower actual trend in inflation, may have a moderating impact on unit labour costs,\nwhich will most likely be influenced by the weaker state of the economy. \nThe exchange rate remains the most significant upside risk to the inflation outlook. Since\nthe previous meeting of the MPC, the rand exchange rate has depreciated against the\nUS dollar by about 11 per cent. At the time of the previous meeting, the rand was at a\nlevel of R9,15 to the United States (US) dollar. The currency subsequently depreciated to\na level of R11,80 but recovered soon after, and for the past few weeks has traded in a\nrelatively narrow range of between R10,00 and R10,50. On a trade-weighted basis, the\nrand has depreciated by around 7,6 per cent since the previous meeting. The rand, along\nwith other emerging-market currencies, is influenced by the risk aversion prevailing in the\nuncertain global environment.\nInternational crude oil prices have declined further. North Sea Brent crude oil is currently\ntrading at around US$40 per barrel, compared with US$83 per barrel at the time of the\nprevious meeting of the MPC. The lower international oil price has resulted in a\ncumulative decline in domestic petrol prices of R3,35 per litre since August, and by\nR2,06 since the previous MPC meeting. If current levels of international oil prices and\nexchange rates persist, a further sizeable decline in the domestic petrol price can be\nexpected in January.\nThe trend in international food prices has also followed that of other commodities, and\nsince June 2008 there has been a 30 per cent decline in the Economist Food Price Index.\nThese developments have contributed to the year-on-year declines in the agricultural food\ncomponent of the producer price index mentioned above, and to the significant fall in\ndomestic spot prices of maize and wheat, despite the depreciation of the rand over the\npast weeks. Food price increases at the consumer price level remain elevated, but the\nspot price developments are expected to impact on these prices in the coming months.\nSouth Africa’s economic growth rate also declined significantly in the third quarter of 2008\nwhen real gross domestic product (GDP) increased at an annualised rate of 0,2 per cent.\nThis represented a significant widening of the output gap. The slowdown was a result of\ncontractions in mining, manufacturing and the retail and wholesale trade sectors.\nManufacturing output declined further in October. The Bank’s leading indicator of\neconomic activity has been trending downward for some time, and more recently the\ncoincident indicator has followed this trend. The Investec/BER Purchasing Managers’\nIndex declined to its lowest level since its inception to reach a level of 39,5 – a level similar\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nto that prevailing in a number of other countries. The RMB/BER Business Confidence\nIndex also reflects a negative outlook.\nGross fixed capital formation held up relatively well in the third quarter when it grew at a\nrate of 10,0 per cent, mainly as a result of investment by public corporations and general\ngovernment. However, growth in private-sector gross fixed capital formation declined to\n2,6 per cent. This was particularly the case in investment in private residential buildings\nwhere the real value of residential and non-residential building plans continued to decline.\nHousehold consumption expenditure contracted in the third quarter for the first time\nsince 1998. Consumption of durable goods in particular declined by almost 10 per cent,\nwhile non-durable goods consumption also contracted. Motor vehicle sales continued\nto decline in October and November, while real retail trade sales declined further in\nOctober. The FNB/BER Consumer Confidence Index showed a further deterioration in\nthe fourth quarter of 2008. \nThe rate of growth of credit extension to the private sector continued to moderate. Year-\non-year growth in total loans and advances to the private sector declined to 17,1 per\ncent in October, while growth in mortgage advances and instalment sale credit and\nleasing financed decline to 16,1 per cent and 10,5 per cent respectively. There are also\nindications of tighter credit standards being applied by banks to both households and\nthe corporate sector. The lower rate of credit extension to households contributed to the\nfurther moderation of household indebtedness. Household debt as a percentage of\ndisposable income measured 75,3 per cent in the third quarter, compared with 78,5 per\ncent in the first quarter of 2008.\nThe current-account deficit, which measured 7,9 per cent of GDP in the third quarter of\n2008, is likely to moderate in the coming months as a result of the lower international oil\nprice and lower dividend payments to non-residents, among other factors.\nThe turmoil in the international financial markets has also been reflected as well in\ndomestic asset prices. The all-share index on the JSE Limited has followed global equity\nmarket trends and has exhibited a high degree of volatility over the past months. Since\nthe previous meeting, the index has declined by about 1,5 per cent, but at one stage it\nhad declined by about 15 per cent. The housing market remains subdued, with prices\nfalling in real terms, and in some instances in nominal terms as well. These negative\nwealth effects are likely to weigh on household expenditure in the coming months.\nGlobal developments are also expected to contribute to downward inflation pressures.\nApart from sharply declining commodity prices, the decline in the volume of world trade\nhas also lowered transport costs significantly. Growth forecasts have been revised down\nsignificantly, particularly in the advanced economies, and the expected protracted\nslowdown is likely to lower prices of other goods as well, as the pricing power of firms\ndissipates. The possible stimulus to growth provided by more accommodative monetary\npolicies and fiscal stimuli are likely to take some time to filter through, given the fragile state\nof the banking systems and the marked declines in business and consumer sentiment.\nMonetary policy stance\nThe Monetary Policy Committee considered recent developments in the South African\neconomy and the risks to the inflation outlook against the backdrop of conditions\nprevailing in the global economy and international financial markets. The MPC has noted\nimprovements in the inflation outlook in South Africa since its previous meeting in October\n2008. However, risks to the inflation outlook remain and will be monitored closely. The\nMPC has therefore decided to reduce the repurchase rate by 50 basis points to 11,5 per\ncent per annum with effect from 12 December 2008.\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n39\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\n40\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n5 February 2009\nIssued by Mr T T Mboweni, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, at a meeting\nof the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) in Pretoria\nIntroduction\nSince the previous meeting of the MPC, domestic inflation has continued on its\ndownward trend. A further decline is expected in the January data when the reweighting\nand rebasing of the consumer price index (CPI) implemented by Statistics South Africa\n(Stats SA) comes into effect. With respect to economic growth, the domestic economy\nis being adversely affected by the continuing turbulence in the global economy. The\nwidening domestic output gap and declining international commodity prices are\nexpected to exert further downward pressure on inflation going forward. Nevertheless,\nsome risks to the inflation outlook remain and the MPC had to assess these conflicting\nrisks against the backdrop of a highly uncertain and volatile international environment.\nRecent developments in inflation\nCPIX inflation (headline inflation excluding mortgage interest cost) has been moderating\nconsistently since August 2008 when it measured 13,6 per cent. In November and\nDecember 2008 inflation had declined to 12,1 per cent and 10,3 per cent respectively.\nElectricity, food, and clothing and footwear prices were the main contributors to the\ninflation outcomes in these months, having increased at year-on-year rates in excess of\n15 per cent. Petrol prices increased by 25,8 per cent in November, but declined by \n1,8 per cent in December. If food and petrol were excluded, CPIX inflation would have\nmeasured 8,7 per cent in December. \nProducer price inflation also moderated in the past two months, declining to a year-on-\nyear rate of 11,0 per cent in December. Food price increases continued to moderate:\nagricultural product prices were unchanged in December, while manufactured food price\ninflation declined to a year-on-year rate of 12,8 per cent in the same month. \nThe outlook for inflation\nThe most recent central forecast of the South African Reserve Bank (the Bank) is similar to\nthat presented to the MPC in December. Partly as a result of the reweighting and rebasing\nof the new targeted inflation index, CPI inflation is expected to decline further and average\n7,5 per cent in the first quarter of 2009, and to decline to below the upper end of the\ninflation target range during the third quarter of the year when it is expected to average \n5,2 per cent. Inflation is then forecast to increase again and to breach the upper end of the\ntarget range in the first quarter of 2010, mainly as a result of technical base effects.\nThereafter, inflation is expected to return to within the target range and remain there until\nthe end the forecast period when it is expected to average 5,5 per cent. The simulation\nresults of the model make provision for the most recent trends of actual and preliminary\ndata that have become available from Stats SA since the previous MPC meeting.\nMarket indicators also reflect a moderation in expected inflation. Inflation expectations\nas measured by the yield differential between conventional government bonds and\ninflation-linked bonds have remained within the inflation target range. The Reuters\nconsensus survey conducted in December indicates that analysts expect inflation to\naverage 6,4 per cent in 2009 and 5,8 per cent in 2010. \nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nThe volatile exchange rate of the rand continues to pose the main upside risk to the\ninflation outlook. The rand is currently trading against the United States (US) dollar at levels\nsimilar to those prevailing at the time of the previous MPC meeting. During December 2008\nthe rand appreciated against the US dollar and reached a level of R9,30 in the first week\nof January. This move was mainly a result of a weaker US dollar, which depreciated to\nUS$1,47 against the euro. Renewed risk aversion in international markets and a stronger\nUS dollar in January resulted in the rand returning to current levels of around R10,00. The\nrand has appreciated marginally on a trade-weighted basis since the previous meeting.\nThe risks to the inflation outlook posed by oil and food prices appear to have subsided\nsomewhat. Food prices continued to moderate at the production price level, but these\nfavourable developments have not yet been seen at the consumer price level. Spot and\nfutures prices of maize and wheat remained well below the average price level in 2008\nand some relief at the consumer price level is expected in the coming months.\nThe price of Brent crude oil, which reached a low of US$34 per barrel during December\n2008, averaged around US$41 for the month. This, along with the termination of the\nslate levy, allowed for a further reduction in domestic petrol prices of R1,34 per litre in\nJanuary. However, international oil prices recovered somewhat in January and\naveraged almost US$45 per barrel during that month. As a consequence, the domestic\nprice of petrol was increased by 61 cents per litre in February. The outlook for oil prices\nremains uncertain, but prices are expected to remain relatively subdued as a result of\nweakening global growth.\nThe domestic economy continues to show signs of slowing, following the 0,2 per cent\nannualised growth recorded in the third quarter of 2008. The composite leading and\ncoincident business cycle indicators of the Bank point to a continuation of this trend. Other\nhigh-frequency indicators are consistent with this outlook. The physical volume of manu-\nfacturing production declined at a year-on-year rate of 4,4 per cent in November 2008,\nwhile the latest Investec/BER Purchasing Managers Index indicates that the outlook for\nthe manufacturing sector remains negative. The utilisation of production capacity in\nmanufacturing declined by 3,4 percentage points in the fourth quarter of 2008 to 82 per\ncent. Mining output contracted by 6,1 per cent in November compared with the previous\nyear, while the real value of total building plans approved declined by 25,3 per cent over\nthe same period.\nHousehold consumption expenditure also remains under pressure. Real wholesale trade\nsales increased slightly in the year to November 2008, but real retail sales declined by \n4 per cent over the same period. Motor vehicle sales contracted at a year-on-year rate\nof 35,4 per cent in January, with commercial vehicle sales declining by 41 per cent.\nMotor vehicle exports, which remained strong in 2008, also moderated and the industry\nexpects larger declines in the coming months. Exports in general are expected to remain\nunder pressure, given the adverse global conditions. However, preliminary data indicates\nthat the deficit on the trade account of the balance of payments probably contracted\nduring the final quarter of 2008.\nHousehold consumption expenditure may also be affected by remuneration trends and\nemployment growth. According to Andrew Levy Employment Publications, the level of\nwage settlements for the year 2008 amounted to 9,8 per cent, compared with an\naverage inflation rate of 11,3 per cent. Nominal unit labour cost increases in the third\nquarter of 2008 measured 12,4 per cent. Employment growth has also been impacted\nby the slowing economy. In the third quarter of 2008 non-agricultural employment\nincreased by one per cent, compared with 3,9 per cent in the first quarter of that year.\nPrivate-sector employment contracted in the second and third quarters.\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n41\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\n42\nThe subdued trend in household consumption expenditure and the stricter credit criteria\napplied by banks to both households and corporates have been reflected in a further\nmoderation in the growth of credit extension to the private sector. Growth over 12 months\nin total loans and advances by banks to the private sector declined to 14,4 per cent in\nDecember 2008. Most categories of loans have exhibited declines in growth.\nHigh consumption expenditure is expected to remain under pressure from negative\nwealth effects resulting from adverse asset price developments. The all-share index on\nthe JSE Limited remained volatile in line with global market turbulence. The housing\nmarket has also remained subdued, with the various house price indices indicating real\nprice declines.\nThe outlook for the world economy has deteriorated further as a result of the continued\ndifficulties being experienced by the global financial system. The International Monetary\nFund significantly downgraded its forecast for global growth in 2009 to 0,5 per cent.\nMany of the advanced economies are expected to experience negative growth rates in\nthe coming months, while growth prospects of emerging market and developing\neconomies have also deteriorated. As a result of these widening output gaps and\ndeclining commodity prices, world inflation pressures have subsided. \nMonetary policy stance\nThe MPC has decided to reduce the repurchase rate by 100 basis points to 10,5 per\ncent per annum with effect from 6 February 2009. The MPC will continue to monitor\ndomestic and global developments in order to decide on the most appropriate\nmonetary policy stance going forward.\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n24 March 2009\nIssued by Mr T T Mboweni, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, at a meeting\nof the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) in Pretoria\nIntroduction\nThe global economy has continued to weaken significantly in recent months as a result\nof the turmoil in the financial markets. There is growing uncertainty regarding the depth\nand duration of the economic slowdown. The South African economy has not escaped\nthe impact of these developments, and domestic production has contracted as a result\nof weak domestic demand and a significant decline in export demand. Against this\nbackdrop of widening domestic and global output gaps, the balance of risks to the\ninflation outlook has changed somewhat. \nRecent developments in inflation\nInflation as measured by the reweighted and reconstituted consumer price index (CPI) for\nall urban areas (which is the new target measure) measured 8,1 per cent in January 2009.\nFood and non-alcoholic beverages prices, which increased at year-on-year rates of\n15,7 per cent in January, contributed 2,4 percentage points to total inflation. The\nhousing and utilities category contributed 2,1 percentage points, and together with\nfood accounted for more than half of the measured inflation increase. The transport\ncomponent had a minimal impact on the overall CPI as a result of the 20,3 per cent\nreduction in petrol prices during January. Producer price inflation, which reached 19,1 per\ncent in August 2008, continued its downward trend, measuring 9,2 per cent in January\n2009. Despite the depreciation of the rand during 2008, producer prices of imported\ngoods declined at a year-on-year rate of 5 per cent in January.\nThe outlook for inflation\nThe most recent central forecast of the Bank shows a near-term deterioration in the\ninflation outlook, but a more favourable trend is forecast for the medium term, which is\nthe relevant time frame for monetary policy. Consumer price inflation is expected to\naverage 8,1 per cent in the first quarter of 2009 and then to decline to below 6 per cent\nin the third quarter of the year. As a result of technical base effects, inflation is then\nexpected marginally to exceed the upper end of the inflation target range, before returning\nback to within the range in the second quarter of 2010 and to remain there until the end\nof the forecast period in the fourth quarter of 2010, when it is expected to average \n5,3 per cent. The heightened levels of uncertainty and the rate of change of global\ndevelopments make these forecasts subject to higher risk than is usually the case. \nExpectations by analysts are similar to those of the Bank, with the Reuters consensus\nforecast showing a moderate upward revision of inflation in 2009 and a relatively\nunchanged forecast in 2010, when inflation is expected to average 5,5 per cent in the final\nquarter. Most forecasters expect inflation to have increased moderately in February 2009\nbefore resuming its downward trend. Inflation expectations, as reflected in the yield\ndifferential between inflation-linked bonds and conventional government bonds, have\nincreased slightly since the previous meeting of the MPC, but remain within the inflation\ntarget range.\nThe inflation outlook has been dominated by the continued weakening of the global\neconomy and financial markets, notwithstanding significant monetary and fiscal\nmeasures introduced by central banks and governments. The decline in global demand\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n43\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\n44\nhas resulted in a marked contraction in international trade. The International Monetary\nFund, which in January was forecasting global growth to average 0,5 per cent in 2009,\nnow expects the global economy to contract by up to 1 per cent in 2009. Numerous\nindustrialised and developing countries are already experiencing negative growth. World\ninflation is being restrained by declining demand and lower commodity prices, which are\nexpected to remain subdued under these conditions of negative or low growth. \nThe weak global demand has been reflected in the export performance of the South\nAfrican economy. However, the decline in the value of exports in the final quarter of\n2008 was more than offset by a lower value of imports, mainly due to declining\ninternational oil prices. Combined with a narrowing of the deficit on the services,\nincome and current transfer account of the balance of payments, this resulted in a\nnarrowing of the deficit on the current account from 7,8 per cent of GDP in the third\nquarter of 2008 to 5,8 per cent in the final quarter. However, the published January\ntrade data, which showed a further considerable decline in the value of merchandise\nexports, suggest that the improvement in the trade deficit may not be sustained to the\nsame extent seen in the fourth quarter. The deficit on the current account of the\nbalance of payments measured 7,4 per cent of GDP for the 2008 calendar year.\nDomestic demand conditions have also deteriorated further. In the fourth quarter of\n2008, gross domestic expenditure and domestic final demand contracted by 3,9 per\ncent and 0,4 per cent respectively. Final consumption expenditure by households\ndeclined by 2,7 per cent, mainly as a result of a 20 per cent contraction in\nconsumption of durable goods. The growth in gross fixed capital formation moderated\nfurther, recording an annualised growth rate of 3 per cent. Motor vehicle sales, which\nhave been under pressure for some time, declined at a year-on-year rate of 35,6 per\ncent in February. In January real retail sales increased at a year-on-year rate of 1,7 per\ncent – the first year-on-year increase in 9 months – while wholesale trade sales\ndeclined by 4,5 per cent over the same period. \nDomestic demand conditions are expected to remain under pressure as a result of\ndeclining disposable incomes, tighter credit conditions and negative wealth effects.\nCredit extension to the private sector has continued its downward trend as a result of\nlower demand and more stringent lending criteria being applied by banks. In January\n2009 growth in total loans and advances to the private sector measured 11,4 per cent.\nThe slower rate of credit extension has resulted in a further moderation of the ratio of\nhousehold debt to disposable income to 76,4 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2008,\ncompared with a peak of 78,2 per cent in the first quarter of that year. \nDomestic output has been impacted appreciably by these external and domestic\ndemand developments, resulting in a further widening of the domestic output gap. In the\nfinal quarter of 2008 GDP contracted at an annualised rate of 1,8 per cent, mainly due\nto a 22 per cent decline in manufacturing-sector output. The high frequency data\nindicate that these adverse conditions may have persisted in the first quarter of 2009.\nManufacturing and mining output contracted at year-on-year rates of 11,1 cent and \n8,7 per cent respectively in January, while the Investec/Bureau for Economic Research\n(BER) Purchasing Managers Index reached a new low in February, reflecting continued\nstrain on the manufacturing sector. The latest BER manufacturing survey indicates\nextreme and broad-based weakness in this sector in the first quarter of 2009. The\nRMB/BER Business Confidence Index surveyed in the first quarter of 2009 reached its\nlowest level since 1999, particularly in the manufacturing, wholesale and construction\nsectors. The confidence of retailers of non-durable goods increased somewhat.\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nOn a trade-weighted basis, the rand has been relatively stable since the beginning the\nyear and has appreciated by about 2,5 per cent since the previous meeting.\nMovements in the rand exchange rate in recent weeks have been mainly reflecting\nvolatile international currency developments. After the previous meeting of the MPC,\nthe rand first depreciated to around R10,60 against the US dollar, as the dollar\nstrengthened against most currencies. Since then the US dollar has weakened\nsomewhat and the rand is currently trading at levels of around R9,45 per US dollar. \nThe upside risks to the inflation outlook emanate primarily from cost-push pressures,\nparticularly from administered prices. These include possible higher-than-expected\nelectricity tariff increases. The decline in inflation may also be delayed by continued high\nrates of increases in food prices, despite marked declines in producer price food\ninflation. \nMonetary policy stance\nAgainst the background of a slowing global and domestic economy and an improved\nmedium-term outlook for inflation, the MPC has decided to reduce the repurchase rate\nby 100 basis points to 9,5 per cent per annum with effect from 25 March 2009. \nSouth African Reserve Bank\n45\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\n46\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n30 April 2009\nIssued by Mr T T Mboweni, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, at a meeting\nof the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) in Pretoria\nIntroduction\nThe global economy continues to be in the midst of a severe synchronised downturn\nwith a number of countries already experiencing recession. The G-20 countries,\nincluding South Africa, have committed themselves to a programme of action in order\nto contribute towards the earliest possible global economic recovery. Despite a\ngenerally positive response to the G-20 summit in April, it has become increasingly\naccepted that the slowdown is likely to be severe and protracted, and that the global\nrecovery is likely to be gradual. \nDomestic output and expenditure growth are declining or negative, and the growth\noutlook is dependent to a significant extent on a broader global recovery. Despite the\nwidening domestic output gap, inflation remains sticky, but is expected to continue on\nits downward path. \nRecent developments in inflation\nThe year-on-year inflation rate as measured by the consumer price index (CPI) for all\nurban areas increased to 8,6 per cent in February 2009 and then moderated to 8,5 per\ncent in March. Food price inflation continued its downward trend, increasing at a year-\non-year rate of 14,7 per cent in March, compared with 15,8 per cent in the previous\nmonth. Food prices remained the largest contributor to the inflation outcome,\ncontributing 2,3 percentage points. The largest price increase was recorded by\nelectricity and other fuels, which increased by 30,1 per cent. Significant increases were\nalso recorded in the prices of tobacco, housing maintenance and repairs, health,\nrecreation and culture, and education. Countervailing pressure came from petrol prices,\nwhich declined by 14,9 per cent, despite the petrol price increase of 45 cents per litre\nin March.\nProducer price inflation, which reached 19,1 per cent in August 2008, continued its\ndownward trend, measuring 7,3 per cent and 5,3 per cent in February and March 2009\nrespectively. Prices of agricultural food products declined at a year-on-year rate of 2,1 per\ncent in March, while manufactured food price inflation moderated to 9,4 per cent.\nThe outlook for inflation\nThe most recent central forecast of the Bank shows a near-term deterioration in the\ninflation outlook, but inflation is expected to follow a downward trend and to average\n5,4 per cent at the end of the forecast period in the final quarter of 2010. The slightly\nhigher expected trend is a result of revised assumptions about administered prices and\nthe higher-than-anticipated inflation outcome for February.\nInflation expectations show a mixed picture. The inflation expectations survey, which is\nconducted on behalf of the Bank by the Bureau for Economic Research (BER) at\nStellenbosch University, reflects somewhat divergent inflation expectations between\nthe different groups of respondents. In the survey conducted in the first quarter of\n2009, average CPI inflation expectations for 2009 declined from 8,6 per cent to 8,3 per\ncent. Expectations ranged from 6,1 per cent for analysts, to 9,7 per cent for trade\nunionists. Inflation is expected to average 8,0 per cent in 2010, up from the 7,5 per\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\ncent measured in the previous survey. While analysts expect inflation to average 5,4 per\ncent in 2010, business executives and trade union officials expect inflation to average\n8,6 per cent and 10,1 per cent respectively. Inflation is expected to moderate to 7,8 per\ncent in 2011. \nWage settlements, which generally follow inflation trends with a lag, have also edged\nup slightly. According to Andrew Levy Employment Publications, the level of wage\nsettlements increased by 10,2 per cent in the first quarter of 2009, compared to the\n2008 average of 9,8 per cent. Nominal unit labour cost increased over four quarters by\n12,8 per cent in the final quarter of 2008. Nominal wage settlements are expected to\nmoderate somewhat as the inflation rate declines. According to the Quarterly\nEmployment Statistics Survey conducted by Statistics South Africa, in the fourth\nquarter of 2008 employment levels showed their first decline in four years. \nThe risks to the inflation outlook as assessed by the MPC have remained relatively\nunchanged since the previous meeting of the committee, although the recent\nappreciation of the rand exchange rate, if sustained, may have reduced the degree of\nthe upside risk to the inflation outlook. The rand exchange rate remains affected by\nchanges in global risk aversion, but there has been a decline in the degree of volatility.\nSince the positive market reaction to the G-20 summit in early April, sentiment towards\nemerging-market economies in general has improved and most emerging market\ncurrencies have appreciated against the US dollar. \nAs noted earlier, the global economy remains under pressure despite fiscal and\nmonetary stimuli in many countries. In January 2009 the International Monetary Fund\n(IMF) forecasted global growth of 0,5 per cent and 3,0 per cent for 2009 and 2010\nrespectively. The IMF now expects global output to contract by 1,3 per cent in 2009,\nbefore recovering gradually to 1,9 per cent in 2010. The advanced economies are\nexpected to contract by 3,8 per cent, while the emerging and developing economies\nare expected to experience positive growth of 1,6 per cent, with China and India\nexpected to grow by 6,5 per cent and 4,5 per cent respectively. The growth forecast\nfor Africa has been reduced from 3,4 per cent to 2,0 per cent. The risks to these\nforecasts are seen to be on the downside, given the current heightened levels of\nuncertainty. World trade has also declined and is expected to contract by a further \n9,5 per cent in 2009.\nWorld inflation is expected to remain subdued as a result of these growth trends and\nlower commodity prices. World inflation is expected to average 2,5 per cent in 2009\nand 2,4 per cent in 2010. Although a number of commodity prices have recovered\nsomewhat from their lows in the fourth quarter of 2008, they are expected to be\nrestrained by the weak global demand. The price of North Sea Brent crude oil declined\nto around US$35 per barrel in late December 2008, but has been trading at around the\nUS$50 per barrel level for most of April 2009. During this month, the higher international\noil product prices have been more or less offset by the appreciation of the rand against\nthe US dollar, and the domestic price of petrol is expected to remain relatively\nunchanged in May.\nThe outlook for domestic economic growth remains subdued, with no indications of a\nquick recovery. The high-frequency data continue to suggest that the negative\nconditions recorded in the final quarter of 2008 persisted in the first quarter of 2009.\nThe physical volume of manufacturing production declined at a year-on-year rate of\n15,0 per cent in February, following an 11,1 per cent contraction in the previous month.\nThe outlook for manufacturing remains negative, with the Investec/BER Purchasing\nManagers Index declining further in March. Total mining production declined at a year-\non-year rate of 12,8 per cent in February, while the real value of building plans approved\ndeclined by 42,7 per cent over the same period.\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n47\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\n48\nThe sluggish domestic demand conditions also appear to have persisted. Wholesale\ntrade sales declined at a year-on-year rate of 8,9 per cent in February, while retail sales\ndeclined by 4,5 per cent following a modest increase in January. Total new vehicle sales\ndeclined by 30,3 per cent in March, reflecting the continued weak demand for durable\ngoods. However, the FNB/BER Consumer Confidence Index, while still at low levels,\nshowed an increase in the first quarter of 2009. Falling house prices and weak asset\nmarkets are also expected to restrain consumption expenditure. \nDomestic credit extension continues to reflect the declining trend in domestic\nexpenditure, as well as more stringent credit criteria being applied by banks with\nrespect to loans to both households and companies. Year-on-year growth in total loans\nand advances to the private sector declined to 10,2 per cent in February and 7,3 per\ncent in March 2009. The quarterly growth declined from 6,2 per cent in the fourth\nquarter of 2008 to 0,1 per cent in the first quarter of 2009. Instalment sale credit and\nleasing finance reflected the weak demand for durable goods, with increases of 3,1 per\ncent in February and 1,6 per cent in March. \nIn line with the previous MPC statement, the committee assesses the main risks to the\ninflation outlook to emanate from cost-push pressures, particularly administered prices,\nwhich include the risk of higher-than-expected electricity tariff increases. Food price\ninflation at the consumer price level, which has remained relatively unresponsive to\nlower inflation at the producer price level, appears to show signs of moderation. Should\nthis downward trend accelerate, it could have a significant downward impact on the\ninflation trajectory. \nMonetary policy stance\nThe MPC considered the severe synchronised downturn in international and domestic\neconomic conditions and noted their potential future downward impact on inflation,\nnotwithstanding the higher-than-expected recent domestic inflation outcomes. The\ncommittee is of the view that the adverse economic conditions continue to tilt the\nbalance of risks to the inflation outlook to the downside over the medium term and has\ntherefore decided to reduce the repurchase rate by 100 basis points to 8,5 per cent\nper annum with effect from 4 May 2009.\nMonetary Policy Review May 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/Monetary_Policy_Reports/mprmay09.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "0f8c1ccc13dd78943706c3a0906df080", "text": "MONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW \nFEBRUARY 2014 \nSelected Economic Indicators \n2 \nStock Market Developments \n3 \nInflation \n6 \nNational Payments System \n7 \nStatistical Tables \n9 \n \n \nMonetary Developments \n5 \nINSIDE THIS ISSUE \n \nPAGE \nSELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS \n2 \n \n2014 \nJanuary \n2014 \nFebruary \nZ.S.E. Mining Index1 \n35.40 \n39.24 \nZ.S.E. Industrial Index1 \n189.25 \n189.45 \nMoney Supply (Total Bank Deposits) (US$)2 \n3.89 billion \n4.02 billion \nMoney Supply (M3) Annual Growth2 \n2.11% \n5.46% \nYearly Inflation3 \n0.41% \n-0.49% \nSources: \n1 Zimbabwe Stock Exchange \n2 Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe \n3 ZIMSTAT \n \n \n \nMonth on \nMonth \nChange \n10.85% \n0.11% \n3.34% \n3.34% \n0.05% \n \nSTOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS \n \nGlobal risk appetite was on a rise in February \n2014 underpinned by better than expected \nearnings in most United States companies. \nThis was so despite weak economic data \nbeing recorded in the US economy. With the \nexception of the Nigerian Stock Market, \nwhich registered a decline largely due to \ndeclines in banking counters, most African \nstock markets, including the Zimbabwe \nStock Exchange (ZSE) registered positive \nperformance in the period under review. \n \nThe key industrial index broke its declining \ntrend and recovered by a marginal 0.11% \nbetween January and February 2014, ending \nFebruary at 189.45 points, compared to \n189.25 points in January. On a year to date \nbasis, however, the industrial index lost \n6.21%. \n \nThe mining index also recovered, to close \nthe month under review at 39.24 points, up \nfrom 35.40 points in January. This increase \nreflected a 10.85% month-on-month gain, \nagainst a year-to-date loss of 14.30%. \n \nThe volume of shares traded declined by \n16.29%, from 162.64 points in January 2014 \nto 136.16 points in February 2014. Total \nturnover also declined by 55.33%, due to the \nabsence of special bargain deals, to close the \nmonth under review at US$25.82 million. \n \nMarket capitalization rose by 0.51% to \nUS$4.91 billion, at the end of February \n \n2 3 \n0.00\n0.50\n1.00\n1.50\n2.00\n2.50\n3.00\n3.50\n4.00\n4.50\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\nValues Traded (US$ Millions)\nVolumes Traded (Millions)\nZSE: Daily Volumes and Values \nTraded\nVolume\nTurnover\n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\n140\n160\n180\n200\n220\n240\n260\n28-Mar-12\n28-Apr-12\n28-May-12\n28-Jun-12\n28-Jul-12\n28-Aug-12\n28-Sep-12\n28-Oct-12\n28-Nov-12\n28-Dec-12\n28-Jan-13\n28-Feb-13\n28-Mar-13\n28-Apr-13\n28-May-13\n28-Jun-13\n28-Jul-13\n28-Aug-13\n28-Sep-13\n28-Oct-13\n28-Nov-13\n28-Dec-13\n28-Jan-14\n28-Feb-14\nZSE Indices\nIndustrial\nMining\n \n2 4 \n2014, from US$4.89 billion at the close of \nJanuary 2014. \n \n \nMONETARY DEVELOPMENTS \n \nThe sluggish performance of the economy \ncontinued to hamper robust growths rates in \nthe broad money. The main sources of \nliquidity under the multicurrency system are \nexports, external lines of credit and Diaspora \nremittances, given that the Central Bank \ncannot inject liquidity into the economy. \nThese have not managed to generate enough \nliquidity to support economic activity and \nachieve desirable levels of money supply \ngrowth. \nConsequently, broad money registered a \nmodest 5.46% annual growth in February \n2014, compared to 12.91% over the same \nperiod last year. This reflected an increase \nof US$208.96 million in broad money, from \nUS$3 813.62 million in February 2013, to \nUS$4 021.78 million in February 2014. The \ngrowth in broad money was sustained by an \nexpansion in aggregate deposits during the \nperiod under review. \nSupported \nlargely \nby \ninflows \nfrom \nparastatals and partly reflecting limited \nalternative low risk investments, long term \ndeposits registered a 33.75% annual growth \nduring the period under review. Over the \nsame period, demand and savings deposits \n3.1 \n3.2 \n3.3 \n3.4 \n3.5 \n3.6 \n3.7 \n3.8 \n3.9 \n4.0 \n4.1 \n-2\n3\n8\n13\n18\n23\n28\n33\n38\nUS$ Billions\n%\nMoney Supply\nM3\nM3 Annual Growth\nUnder 30-\nday, 18.8\n%\nLongterm \n, 18.8%\nDemand, 5\n0.3%\nSavings, 1\n2.1%\nBanking Sector Deposits \nFebruary 2014\n \n3 5 \nrecorded annual growths of 2.21% and \n16.19%, respectively. Maturities in short \nterm deposits resulted in this class of \ndeposits declining by 11.07%, during the \nperiod of analysis. \n \nOn the sources side, annual broad money \ngrowth was mainly driven by bank credit to \nGovernment during the period under review. \nThis was largely due to the Government’s \naggressive issuance of Treasury Bills and \nbonds through private placements. \n \nThese instruments are of varied tenors, \nranging from 92 days to 1 461 days. \nUnanticipated \ndeclines \nin \nGovernment \ndeposits also worsened the net credit to \nGovernment position. On an annual basis, \nGovernment deposits declined by 89.35% in \nDecember 2013, 3.60% in January 2014 and \n0.89% in February 2014. Net credit to Gov-\nernment consequently rose from US$153.16 \nmillion in February 2013 to US$415.05 mil-\nlion by February 2014. \n \nGrowth in commercial banks’ credit to the \nprivate sector fell significantly, from an \nannual growth of 28.77% in February 2013 to \n1.50% in February 2014. Tighter credit \npolicies, as a result of rising nonperforming \nloans, as well as a slowdown in the growth of \nthe deposit base, resulted in a slump in private \nsector credit developments. \n \nClaims on the private sector were in the form \nof loans and advances, 78.22%; mortgages \nadvanced by building societies, 10.64%; bills \ndiscounted, 2.08%; bankers’ acceptances, \n1.54%; and other investments, 7.53%. \n \nThe outstanding loans and advances were \nmainly to households (19.40%); agriculture \n(19.26%); distribution (17.34%); and services \n(15.29%). \n \nCredit to the private sector was mainly util-\nized for asset purchases (42.88%) as well as \ninventory build-up (34.12%). Loans and ad-\nvances utilized for fixed investment activity \nhave remained low, with the procurement of \nplant and equipment accounting for 3.82% \nand pre and post shipment financing at 0.83%, \nof total loans and advances. \n \n \n \nLoans and \nAdvances\n78%\nBills \nDiscounte\nd\n2%\nBankers \nAcceptanc\nes\n2%\nMortgages\n11%\nOther \nInvestmen\nts\n7%\nCredit to Private Sector\nTotal credit to the private sector as at the end of \nFebruary 2014 was US$3 626.99 million.\n4 \n \n6 \nINFLATION DEVELOPMENTS \n \nAnnual Inflation \n \nThe annual headline inflation decelerated to \n-0.49% in February, from 0. 41% in January \n2014, marking the onset of a deflationary \neconomic environment. The decline was on \naccount of a slowdown in both food and \nnon-food inflation. \nAnnual food inflation slowed down to \n-3.26% in February, from -2.08% in January \n2014, while non-food inflation also receded \nto 0.93% from 1.67% during the same \nperiod. \nThe decrease in annual food inflation was \nlargely driven by sugar, jam, honey, \nchocolate and confectionery, vegetables, \nmeat, fruits and mineral waters, soft drinks \nand fruit juices, fish and sea food, milk, \ncheese and eggs; oils and fats, as well as \nbread and cereals sub-categories. \nAnnual non-food inflation was driven by \neducation; housing, water, electricity, gas \nand other fuels; hotels and restaurants; \ntransport; alcoholic beverages and tobacco; \nand health services. The decline in annual \nnon-food inflation can be attributed to the \ndecreases in communication, recreation and \nculture, \nand \nfurniture \nand \nequipment \ninflation. \n \nMonth-on-Month Inflation \nMonth-on-month inflation declined by 0.1 \npercentage points to 0.05%, from the January \n2014 rate of 0.14%, following decreases in \nthe prices of food and non-alcoholic \nbeverages. \nMonthly food inflation stood at 0.18% in \nFebruary, down from 0.44% in January 2014. \nDecreases were recorded for sugar, jam, \nhoney, chocolate and confectionery, oils and \nfats, and mineral waters, soft drinks and fruit \njuices items. \nMonthly non-food inflation was -0.01% in \nFebruary, up from -0.08% in January 2014. \n-4\n-3\n-2\n-1\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\nDec-11\nFeb-12\nApr-12\nJun-12\nAug-12\nOct-12\nDec-12\nFeb-13\nApr-13\nJun-13\nAug-13\nOct-13\nDec-13\nFeb-14\nAnnual Inflation \n(%)\nHeadline Inflation\nFood\nNon Food\n7 \nDeclines in the prices of water, electricity, \ngas and other fuels as well as furniture and \nequipment depressed non-food inflation in \nFebruary 2014. \n \nInflation Outlook \n \nThe rise in international oil prices from an \naverage of US$107.44 per barrel in January \nto about US$108.69 per barrel in February \n2014, if sustained, is expected to increase \ninflationary pressures in the economy. \nHowever, the expected bumper harvest \nfollowing a favorable agricultural season is \nexpected to exert downward pressure on food \nprices from May 2014, with the effect of \nfurther reducing inflation. \n \nNATIONAL \nPAYMENTS \nSYSTEM \nDEVELOPMENTS \n \nZimbabwe Electronic Transfer Settlement \nSystem (ZETSS) \n \nThe value of transactions processed through \nthe \nRTGS \nsystem \nin \nFebruary \n2014 \ndecreased by 4% to US$3 billion, from \nUS$3.1 billion in January 2014, while the \nvolume of transactions also registered a \ndecrease of 4% from 182 479 to 175 092 in \nthe same period. \nCard Systems \nThe total value of card based transactions \ndecreased by 13.48% to US$290.17 million in \nFebruary 2014, from US$335.36 million in \nJanuary 2014. \nMobile and Internet Based Transactions \n \nThe value of mobile and internet based \ntransactions decreased by 5.06%, from \n-\n0.5 \n1.0 \n1.5 \n2.0 \n2.5 \n3.0 \n3.5 \n4.0 \n4.5 \n-\n50 \n100 \n150 \n200 \n250 \nOct-11\nJan-12\nApr-12\nJul-12\nOct-12\nJan-13\nApr-13\nJul-13\nOct-13\nJan-14\nValue in US$ Billions\nVolume in Thousands\nZETSS Volumes and Values\nValue\nVolume\n8 \nUS$296.56 million in January 2014 to \nUS$281.56 million in February 2014. \nCheques \n \nThe value of cheque transactions, however, \nincreased to US$10.73 million in February \n2014, from US$5.24 million in January \n2014. \n \nReserve Bank of Zimbabwe \nMarch 2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n9 \nSTATISTICAL TABLES \nCONTENTS \n \nTable \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nPage \n \n \n1. Monetary Statistics \n \n \n1.1 Monetary Aggregates \n \n \n \n \n \n11 \n \n1.2 Broad Money Survey \n \n \n \n \n \n12 \n \n1.3 Analysis of Monthly Changes in Money Supply \n \n13 \n \n1.4 Analysis of Yearly Changes in Money Supply \n \n \n14 \n \n \n2. Sectoral Analysis of Bank Loans and Advances and Deposits \n \n \n2.1 Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks Loans and Advances 15 \n \n2.2 Sectoral Analysis of Merchant Banks Loans and Advances \n16 \n \n2.3 Sectoral Analysis of Merchant Acceptances \n \n \n17 \n \n2.4 Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks Deposits \n \n18 \n \n2.5 Sectoral Analysis of Merchant Banks Deposits \n \n19 \n \n3. External Statistics \n \n \n3.1 Total External Debt Outstanding by Debtor \n \n \n20 \n \n4. Interest Rates \n \n \n4.1 Lending Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n21 \n \n4.2 Banks Deposit Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n22 \n \n5. Inflation \n \n \n5.1 Monthly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n23 \n \n5.2 Yearly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n24 \n \n6. Exchange Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n25 \n \n \n \n \n \nSTATISTICAL TABLES \nCONTENTS \n \nTable \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nPage \n \n \n7. Commercial Banks \n \n \n7.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n26 \n \n7.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n \n27 \n \n8. Accepting Houses \n \n \n8.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n28 \n \n8.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n \n29 \n \n 9. Building Societies \n \n \n9.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n30 \n \n9.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n \n31 \n \n10. Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Statistics \n \n \n \n \n32 \n \n11. Savings with Financial Institutions \n \n \n \n \n33 \n \n12. Analysis of Liquid Assets of Monetary Banks \n \n \n \n34 \n \n13. ZETSS, Cheques and Cards Activity \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n13.1 Values of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n35 \n \n13.2 Volumes of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n36 \n10 \n11 \nJanuary\nFebruary\nMarch\nApril\nMay\nJune\nJuly\nAugust\nSeptember\nOctober\nNovember\nDecember\nJanuary\nFebruary\nRBZ Demand Deposits\n78.6\n \n78.3\n \n77.3\n \n78.6\n \n74.5\n \n73.0\n \n73.5\n \n71.9\n \n72.8\n \n73.3\n \n72.6\n \n71.9\n \n69.7\n \n71.1\n \nComm. Banks Dem. Deposits\n1,924,517.4\n \n1,875,465.4\n \n1,860,664.0\n \n1,979,220.0\n \n1,932,968.1\n \n1,874,568.0\n \n1,926,968.4\n \n1,901,793.3\n \n1,952,024.0\n \n1,971,838.8\n \n1,821,288.9\n \n1,825,413.5\n \n2,039,955.9\n \n1,974,493.8\n \nMerchant Banks Dem. Deposits\n106,935.2\n \n102,797.7\n \n104,281.4\n \n107,324.1\n \n112,173.4\n \n114,560.5\n \n111,261.1\n \n109,449.6\n \n111,153.9\n \n112,536.2\n \n122,639.2\n \n134,494.8\n \n36,792.2\n \n47,555.9\n \nM1\n2,031,531.2\n \n1,978,341.4\n \n1,965,022.7\n \n2,086,622.6\n \n2,045,215.9\n \n1,989,201.5\n \n2,038,303.0\n \n2,011,314.8\n \n2,063,250.8\n \n2,084,448.30\n \n1,944,000.70\n \n1,959,980.2\n \n2,076,817.8\n \n2,022,120.8\n \nComm. Banks Savings Deposits\n193,007.6\n \n192,683.5\n \n201,459.2\n \n194,873.4\n \n221,622.3\n \n229,386.7\n \n201,667.8\n \n187,394.4\n \n227,599.9\n \n209,966.7\n \n201,724.6\n \n281,785.8\n \n215,665.0\n \n230,541.1\n \nBuilding Soc. Savings Deposits\n159,093.7\n \n168,605.4\n \n168,484.1\n \n170,975.7\n \n192,634.8\n \n189,753.8\n \n195,606.6\n \n189,953.1\n \n191,553.5\n \n187,410.7\n \n200,415.2\n \n204,200.7\n \n196,806.6\n \n195,707.7\n \nP O S B Savings Deposits\n55,832.5\n \n56,274.2\n \n57,860.7\n \n55,236.9\n \n56,544.5\n \n60,117.8\n \n60,162.5\n \n51,322.2\n \n58,974.0\n \n50,457.7\n \n60,845.4\n \n62,044.0\n \n58,314.5\n \n58,920.4\n \nComm. Banks U-30 Day Deposits\n632,215.7\n \n708,500.6\n \n734,849.5\n \n786,076.0\n \n637,041.1\n \n629,544.6\n \n663,617.3\n \n643,559.0\n \n606,360.8\n \n614,427.6\n \n605,429.9\n \n489,493.1\n \n552,134.9\n \n596,106.0\n \nMerchant Banks U-30 Day Deposits\n91,671.2\n \n65,975.9\n \n62,324.3\n \n64,604.1\n \n67,104.2\n \n56,223.1\n \n82,650.4\n \n80,569.1\n \n82,581.6\n \n80,368.8\n \n59,721.1\n \n56,379.8\n \n47,277.8\n \n48,250.7\n \nBuilding Soc. U- 30 Day Deposits\n60,885.9\n \n77,091.9\n \n82,098.1\n \n81,944.4\n \n122,672.1\n \n119,217.4\n \n121,325.5\n \n99,842.7\n \n138,431.2\n \n113,495.4\n \n118,360.9\n \n155,932.2\n \n107,130.3\n \n112,927.5\n \nM2\n3,224,237.8\n \n3,247,472.9\n \n3,272,098.6\n \n3,440,333.1\n \n3,342,834.9\n \n3,273,444.8\n \n3,363,333.0\n \n3,263,955.2\n \n3,368,751.9\n \n3,340,575.20\n \n3,190,497.80\n \n3,209,815.8\n \n3,254,146.90\n \n3,264,574.20\n \nComm. Banks O-30 Day Deposits\n351,356.6\n \n297,613.9\n \n249,558.5\n \n223,799.1\n \n387,930.6\n \n268,082.1\n \n219,826.9\n \n223,258.1\n \n257,854.4\n \n308,773.8\n \n328,511.0\n \n496,391.7\n \n352,689.2\n \n468,960.6\n \nMerchant Banks O-30 Day Deposits\n21,339.0\n \n55,714.0\n \n52,841.7\n \n56,349.4\n \n54,361.5\n \n52,329.5\n \n27,019.2\n \n25,199.0\n \n19,024.4\n \n14,876.1\n \n19,965.3\n \n6,900.3\n \n5,665.1\n \n-\n \nBuilding Soc. O- 30 Day Deposits\n192,823.3\n \n194,226.7\n \n203,912.9\n \n226,550.8\n \n212,044.5\n \n222,591.8\n \n222,795.8\n \n264,539.8\n \n242,907.0\n \n264,867.2\n \n244,283.7\n \n197,343.9\n \n253,060.8\n \n264,395.8\n \nBuilding Soc. Other Share Deposits\n10,141.6\n \n10,141.6\n \n11,266.6\n \n11,266.6\n \n11,266.5\n \n11,266.6\n \n11,266.6\n \n11,266.6\n \n11,266.6\n \n11,266.6\n \n11,266.6\n \n11,266.6\n \n11,266.6\n \n11,266.6\n \nP O S B Time Deposits\n8,497.2\n \n8,447.9\n \n8,845.8\n \n8,443.5\n \n9,703.5\n \n10,492.4\n \n10,680.2\n \n8,018.0\n \n10,855.2\n \n11,324.0\n \n12,586.1\n \n10,606.9\n \n11,816.7\n \n12,582.4\n \nM3\n3,808,395.5\n \n3,813,616.9\n \n3,798,524.1\n \n3,966,742.5\n \n4,018,141.5\n \n3,838,207.3\n \n3,854,921.7\n \n3,796,236.7\n \n3,910,659.4\n \n3,951,682.90\n \n3,807,110.40\n \n3,932,325.1\n \n3,888,645.3\n \n4,021,779.6\n \n2013\nTABLE 1.1 : MONETARY AGGREGATES\n US$ Thousands\n2014\n12 \nJANUARY\nFEBRUARY\nMARCH\nAPRIL\nMAY\nJUNE\nJULY\nAUGUST\nSEPTEMBER\nOCTOBER\nNOVEMBER\nDECEMBER\nJANUARY\nFEBRUARY\nNET FOREIGN ASSETS \n-485,643.4\n-478,669.1\n-627,094.5\n-477,210.6\n-488,616.3\n-770,401.9\n-822,415.5\n-884,443.1\n-814,488.4\n-850,336.4\n-1,001,798.9\n-810,172.3\n-846,622.1\n-799,433.7\n Assets\n994,812.7\n988,575.6\n867,399.6\n983,189.5\n1,065,690.2\n994,502.1\n967,794.1\n931,989.0\n1,075,508.0\n994,326.1\n856,654.9\n1,042,166.0\n1,009,920.7\n1,032,518.9\n Reserve Bank (RBZ)\n454,346.1\n421,879.3\n367,092.8\n412,155.0\n471,664.8\n461,797.0\n362,306.8\n287,616.2\n344,785.1\n322,450.3\n264,826.8\n338,487.8\n354,820.2\n365,075.8\n Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) \n507,151.4\n529,296.5\n469,834.9\n537,446.4\n547,557.0\n488,238.1\n536,681.8\n567,196.5\n663,455.7\n600,622.7\n531,059.0\n643,560.1\n610,318.8\n619,567.7\n Other Banking Institutions (OBIs) \\\n33,315.2\n37,399.9\n30,471.9\n33,588.1\n46,468.4\n44,467.0\n68,805.5\n77,176.2\n67,267.3\n71,253.1\n60,769.1\n60,118.1\n44,781.8\n47,875.4\n Liabilities \\2\n-1,480,456.0\n-1,467,244.7\n-1,494,494.1\n-1,460,400.2\n-1,554,306.5\n-1,764,904.0\n-1,790,209.6\n-1,816,432.1\n-1,889,996.4\n-1,844,662.6\n-1,858,453.8\n-1,852,338.3\n-1,856,542.9\n-1,831,952.5\n RBZ\n1,149,023.6\n1,141,623.5\n1,135,073.4\n1,140,521.7\n1,134,105.5\n1,138,062.0\n1,143,126.7\n1,139,865.9\n1,146,634.4\n1,150,527.4\n1,147,979.0\n1,150,150.8\n1,148,693.8\n1,151,300.5\n DMBs\n311,214.1\n303,476.1\n337,091.1\n293,394.4\n393,575.8\n600,126.4\n625,430.1\n655,728.1\n722,521.0\n673,156.2\n689,480.9\n671,435.2\n681,744.6\n655,537.7\n OBIs\n20,218.4\n22,145.2\n22,329.6\n26,484.0\n26,625.2\n26,715.6\n21,652.8\n20,838.1\n20,841.0\n20,979.0\n20,993.9\n30,752.3\n26,104.5\n25,114.4\nNET DOMESTIC ASSETS \n4,294,038.7\n4,292,286.0\n4,425,618.6\n4,443,953.2\n4,506,758.0\n4,608,609.2\n4,677,337.2\n4,680,679.8\n4,725,147.8\n4,802,019.3\n4,808,909.2\n4,742,497.4\n4,735,267.5\n4,821,213.2\nDOMESTIC CREDIT\n3,777,967.9\n3,781,756.5\n3,845,110.1\n3,808,385.3\n3,871,013.0\n3,936,046.1\n3,966,266.5\n3,988,814.6\n4,006,290.9\n4,079,215.4\n4,091,310.4\n4,068,697.5\n3,954,914.2\n4,102,727.4\n Claims on Government (net) \n166,842.3\n153,164.0\n170,638.1\n180,007.9\n212,221.9\n206,189.6\n232,272.7\n234,118.0\n228,614.8\n299,686.0\n331,797.8\n357,997.4\n327,805.9\n415,048.8\n RBZ\n-1,225.8\n-1,192.4\n-1,179.6\n-1,180.8\n-1,179.7\n-1,828.4\n-3,487.6\n-1,242.0\n-1,196.6\n-1,468.9\n-1,188.2\n-1,182.3\n-1,181.7\n-1,181.8\n DMBs\n167,834.5\n154,122.7\n151,543.0\n160,538.4\n192,880.2\n187,784.4\n215,526.7\n215,126.4\n209,577.8\n280,921.3\n292,752.3\n319,016.2\n288,824.0\n376,067.1\n OBIs\n233.6\n233.6\n20,274.7\n20,650.2\n20,521.4\n20,233.6\n20,233.6\n20,233.6\n20,233.6\n20,233.6\n40,233.6\n40,163.5\n40,163.5\n40,163.5\n Claims on Public Enterprises \n52,261.1\n53,708.5\n54,091.4\n58,973.6\n63,604.9\n63,628.7\n62,174.3\n60,363.0\n59,809.8\n59,424.2\n60,844.8\n60,645.0\n60,553.0\n60,689.3\n RBZ\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n DMBs\n52,261.1\n53,708.5\n54,091.4\n58,973.6\n63,604.9\n63,628.7\n62,174.3\n60,363.0\n59,809.8\n59,424.2\n60,844.8\n60,645.0\n60,553.0\n60,689.3\n Agri-PEs\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n Other\n52,261.1\n53,708.5\n54,091.4\n58,973.6\n63,604.9\n63,628.7\n62,174.3\n60,363.0\n59,809.8\n59,424.2\n60,844.8\n60,645.0\n60,553.0\n60,689.3\n OBIs\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n Claims on Private Sector\n3,558,864.5\n3,574,884.1\n3,620,380.6\n3,569,403.8\n3,595,186.2\n3,666,227.8\n3,671,819.5\n3,694,333.6\n3,717,866.2\n3,720,105.1\n3,698,667.8\n3,650,055.2\n3,566,555.3\n3,626,989.2\n RBZ\n41,014.1\n41,015.1\n41,014.1\n41,014.1\n40,128.8\n40,128.8\n36,146.1\n36,147.1\n36,112.7\n35,120.1\n35,116.1\n35,116.1\n35,116.1\n35,116.1\n DMBs\n3,057,321.2\n3,065,133.7\n3,111,948.8\n3,058,690.9\n3,063,681.6\n3,125,352.0\n3,133,523.7\n3,159,392.5\n3,142,391.3\n3,141,641.5\n3,106,195.8\n3,053,645.3\n2,955,033.9\n3,016,585.0\n OBIs\n460,529.2\n468,735.3\n467,417.7\n469,698.7\n491,375.8\n500,747.0\n502,149.7\n498,794.1\n539,362.2\n543,343.5\n557,355.9\n561,293.9\n576,405.3\n575,288.2\nOTHER ITEMS (NET) \n516,070.8\n510,529.5\n580,508.5\n635,567.9\n635,745.0\n672,563.1\n711,070.7\n691,865.2\n718,856.9\n722,804.0\n717,598.9\n673,799.9\n780,353.3\n718,485.9\nBROAD MONEY (M3) \n3,808,395.4\n3,813,616.9\n3,798,524.1\n3,966,742.5\n4,018,141.5\n3,838,207.3\n3,854,921.7\n3,796,236.7\n3,910,659.4\n3,951,682.9\n3,807,110.4\n3,932,325.1\n3,888,645.3\n4,021,779.6\n2014\n2013\nTABLE 1.2 : BROAD MONEY SURVEY\nUS$ Thousands\n$\n13 \nJANUARY\nFEBRUARY\nMARCH\nAPRIL\nMAY\nJUNE\nJULY\nAUGUST\nSEPTEMBER\nOCTOBER\nNOVEMBER\nDECEMBER\nJANUARY\nFEBRUARY\nNET FOREIGN ASSETS \n-50,114.5\n6,974.3\n-148,425.4\n149,883.9\n-11,405.7\n-281,785.6\n-52,013.6\n-62,027.6\n69,954.8\n-35,848.0\n-151,462.4\n191,626.5\n-36,449.8\n47,188.5\n Assets\n-94,995.8\n-6,237.1\n-121,176.0\n115,789.9\n82,500.7\n-71,188.1\n-26,708.0\n-35,805.2\n143,519.1\n-81,181.9\n-137,671.2\n185,511.0\n-32,245.2\n22,598.1\n Reserve Bank (RBZ)\n6,357.3\n-32,466.8\n-54,786.5\n45,062.2\n59,509.8\n-9,867.8\n-99,490.2\n-74,690.6\n57,168.9\n-22,334.8\n-57,623.5\n73,661.0\n16,332.4\n10,255.6\n Deposit Money Banks (DMBs)\n-92,123.2\n22,145.1\n-59,461.6\n67,611.5\n10,110.6\n-59,318.9\n48,443.7\n30,514.8\n96,259.1\n-62,833.0\n-69,563.6\n112,501.1\n-33,241.3\n9,248.9\n Other Banking Institutions (OBIs) \\1\n-9,229.8\n4,084.6\n-6,928.0\n3,116.2\n12,880.3\n-2,001.4\n24,338.5\n8,370.6\n-9,908.9\n3,985.9\n-10,484.1\n-651.0\n-15,336.3\n3,093.6\n Liabilities \\2\n44,881.3\n13,211.3\n-27,249.4\n34,093.9\n-93,906.3\n-210,597.5\n-25,305.6\n-26,222.5\n-73,564.3\n45,333.9\n-13,791.2\n6,115.5\n-4,204.6\n24,590.3\n RBZ\n-137.6\n-7,400.1\n-6,550.1\n5,448.4\n-6,416.2\n3,956.5\n5,064.8\n-3,260.9\n6,768.6\n3,892.9\n-2,548.3\n2,171.8\n-1,457.0\n2,606.7\n DMBs\n-40,904.2\n-7,738.0\n33,615.1\n-43,696.7\n100,181.4\n206,550.6\n25,303.6\n30,298.0\n66,792.9\n-49,364.8\n16,324.7\n-18,045.7\n10,309.4\n-26,206.9\n OBIs\n-3,839.4\n1,926.8\n184.4\n4,154.5\n141.2\n90.4\n-5,062.8\n-814.7\n2.9\n138.0\n14.9\n9,758.4\n-4,647.8\n-990.1\nNET DOMESTIC ASSETS \\3\n-28,162.2\n-1,752.7\n133,332.6\n18,334.6\n62,804.8\n101,851.2\n68,728.0\n3,342.6\n44,468.0\n76,871.5\n6,889.9\n-66,411.8\n-7,230.0\n85,945.8\nDOMESTIC CREDIT\n-10,500.6\n3,788.6\n63,353.6\n-36,724.9\n62,627.7\n65,033.1\n30,220.4\n22,548.1\n17,476.3\n72,924.5\n12,095.0\n-22,612.8\n-113,783.4\n147,813.2\n Claims on Government (net) \n-9,216.1\n-13,678.3\n17,474.1\n9,369.8\n32,214.0\n-6,032.3\n26,083.2\n1,845.2\n-5,503.1\n71,071.2\n32,111.8\n26,199.6\n-30,191.5\n87,242.9\n RBZ\n9,872.0\n33.4\n12.8\n-1.2\n1.1\n-648.7\n-1,659.1\n2,245.5\n45.4\n-272.3\n280.7\n5.8\n0.7\n-0.1\n DMBs\n-18,088.0\n-13,711.8\n-2,579.8\n8,995.5\n32,341.8\n-5,095.8\n27,742.3\n-400.3\n-5,548.6\n71,343.5\n11,831.0\n26,263.8\n-30,192.1\n87,243.1\n OBIs\n-1,000.0\n0.0\n20,041.1\n375.5\n-128.8\n-287.8\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n20,000.0\n-70.1\n0.0\n0.0\n Claims on Public Enterprises \n544.3\n1,447.3\n382.9\n4,882.2\n4,631.3\n23.8\n-1,454.4\n-1,811.3\n-553.2\n-385.6\n1,420.6\n-199.9\n-91.9\n136.3\n RBZ\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n DMBs\n544.3\n1,447.3\n382.9\n4,882.2\n4,631.3\n23.8\n-1,454.4\n-1,811.3\n-553.2\n-385.6\n1,420.6\n-199.9\n-91.9\n136.3\n Agri-PEs\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-5,259.3\n-5,260.3\n-5,261.3\n-5,262.3\n-5,263.3\n-5,003.2\n-5,004.2\n-5,005.2\n-5,006.2\n Other\n544.3\n1,447.3\n382.9\n4,882.2\n4,631.3\n5,283.1\n3,805.9\n3,450.0\n4,709.1\n4,877.7\n6,423.8\n4,804.3\n4,913.3\n5,142.5\n OBIs\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n Claims on Private Sector\n-1,828.7\n16,019.6\n45,496.5\n-50,976.8\n25,782.4\n71,041.6\n5,591.7\n22,514.2\n23,532.6\n2,238.9\n-21,437.3\n-48,612.5\n-83,500.0\n60,434.0\n RBZ\n377.8\n1.0\n-1.0\n0.0\n-885.3\n0.0\n-3,982.7\n1.0\n-34.4\n-992.6\n-4.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n DMBs\n-7,832.6\n7,812.5\n46,815.1\n-53,257.8\n4,990.7\n61,670.4\n8,171.7\n25,868.8\n-17,001.2\n-749.8\n-35,445.7\n-52,550.5\n-98,611.4\n61,551.1\n OBIs\n5,626.0\n8,206.1\n-1,317.5\n2,281.0\n21,677.1\n9,371.2\n1,402.7\n-3,355.6\n40,568.2\n3,981.3\n14,012.4\n3,938.0\n15,111.4\n-1,117.1\nOTHER ITEMS (NET) \n-17,661.6\n-5,541.3\n69,979.0\n55,059.4\n177.1\n36,818.1\n38,507.5\n-19,205.5\n26,991.7\n3,947.0\n-5,205.1\n-43,799.0\n106,553.4\n-61,867.4\nBROAD MONEY (M3) \n-78,276.7\n5,221.5\n-15,092.8\n168,218.4\n51,399.0\n-179,934.2\n16,714.4\n-58,685.0\n114,422.8\n41,023.5\n-144,572.5\n125,214.7\n-43,679.7\n133,134.2\n Broad Money (M3) \n-2.0%\n0.1%\n-0.4%\n4.4%\n1.3%\n-4.5%\n0.4%\n-1.5%\n3.0%\n1.0%\n-3.7%\n3.3%\n-1.1%\n3.4%\n Domestic Credit \n-0.3%\n0.1%\n1.7%\n-1.0%\n1.6%\n1.7%\n0.8%\n0.6%\n0.4%\n1.8%\n0.3%\n-0.6%\n-2.8%\n3.7%\n Claims on Private Sector\n-0.1%\n0.5%\n1.3%\n-1.4%\n0.7%\n2.0%\n0.2%\n0.6%\n0.6%\n0.1%\n-0.6%\n-1.3%\n-2.3%\n1.7%\n2014\nTABLE 1.3 : ANALYSIS OF MONTHLY CHANGES IN MONEY SUPPLY (M3)\n US$ Thousands\n2013\n14 \nJULY\nAUGUST\nSEPTEMBER\nOCTOBER\nNOVEMBER\nDECEMBER\nJANUARY\nFEBRUARY\nMARCH\nAPRIL\nMAY\nJUNE\nJULY\nAUGUST\nSEPTEMBER\nOCTOBER\nNOVEMBER\nDECEMBER\nJANUARY\nFEBRUARY\nNET FOREIGN ASSETS \n-89,936.3\n-190,761.0\n-131,411.5\n-100,210.8\n-19,830.8\n-139,041.9\n-211,017.8\n-408,762.5\n-268,481.4\n-146,235.3\n-116,519.4\n-395,149.4\n-456,065.7\n-425,304.4\n-366,815.7\n-432,496.1\n-660,899.2\n-374,643.5\n-360,978.8\n-320,764.6\n Assets\n-42,038.0\n-142,367.4\n-71,725.6\n-81,928.2\n36,818.4\n33,821.1\n-99,644.3\n-321,764.7\n-149,564.2\n-66,182.3\n50,744.2\n-13,526.8\n-43,201.5\n13,716.9\n123,202.2\n29,959.1\n-206,756.1\n-47,642.5\n15,108.1\n43,943.2\n Reserve Bank (RBZ)\n-47,146.3\n-77,953.3\n-5,234.1\n-34,371.4\n-34,330.1\n33,849.9\n23,562.1\n-129,087.9\n-120,111.9\n-97,956.8\n15,270.3\n22,548.6\n-81,223.8\n-105,297.0\n-86,234.8\n-80,364.6\n-121,084.8\n-109,501.0\n-99,525.9\n-56,803.4\n Deposit Money Banks (DMBs)\n-5,809.4\n-76,767.0\n-84,133.7\n-68,113.2\n53,083.1\n-22,552.6\n-134,496.9\n-207,670.1\n-38,404.5\n23,160.4\n16,001.4\n-59,281.2\n-6,421.5\n69,476.4\n172,539.7\n73,331.5\n-104,318.2\n44,285.5\n103,167.4\n90,271.2\n Other Banking Institutions (OBIs) \\1\n10,917.8\n12,352.8\n17,642.1\n20,556.4\n18,065.4\n22,523.8\n11,290.5\n14,993.3\n8,952.2\n8,614.1\n19,472.4\n23,205.8\n44,443.8\n49,537.5\n36,897.4\n36,992.2\n18,646.9\n17,573.0\n11,466.5\n10,475.5\n Liabilities \\2\n-47,898.3\n-48,393.5\n-59,685.9\n-18,282.6\n-56,649.1\n-172,863.0\n-111,373.4\n-86,997.8\n-118,917.3\n-80,053.1\n-167,263.6\n-381,622.6\n-412,864.3\n-439,021.3\n-490,017.9\n-462,455.2\n-454,143.1\n-327,001.0\n-376,086.8\n-364,707.8\n RBZ\n-28,246.4\n-27,498.9\n-21,730.4\n-33,783.9\n-20,811.3\n-2,908.6\n-9,155.5\n-20,012.2\n-23,389.5\n-17,346.3\n-10,305.8\n-7,088.6\n804.6\n-4,310.9\n-3,016.5\n3,294.4\n659.3\n989.6\n-329.7\n9,677.0\n DMBs\n78,373.3\n79,089.8\n89,568.8\n53,504.6\n79,315.3\n177,406.0\n121,978.0\n105,662.9\n140,952.3\n92,713.4\n172,628.6\n383,811.9\n408,225.7\n439,507.9\n489,247.4\n462,114.0\n456,163.5\n319,316.8\n370,530.4\n352,061.6\n OBIs\n-2,228.6\n-3,197.3\n-8,152.6\n-1,438.0\n-1,854.9\n-1,634.4\n-1,449.1\n1,347.1\n1,354.5\n4,686.0\n4,940.8\n4,899.3\n3,834.0\n3,824.3\n3,786.9\n-2,953.2\n-2,679.8\n6,694.5\n5,886.1\n2,969.2\nNET DOMESTIC ASSETS \\3\n880,494.1\n827,621.5\n830,303.8\n860,964.8\n755,911.5\n925,312.7\n874,388.8\n844,811.7\n628,387.0\n659,222.6\n554,475.7\n643,086.0\n613,427.0\n632,242.7\n549,291.7\n570,215.1\n643,352.8\n420,296.5\n441,228.7\n528,927.2\nDOMESTIC CREDIT\n864,860.4\n822,357.3\n802,510.0\n795,755.7\n873,159.5\n990,341.7\n986,989.4\n963,317.9\n842,942.1\n786,202.9\n731,055.8\n708,713.7\n603,624.8\n592,398.4\n536,322.4\n576,565.6\n470,358.2\n280,229.0\n176,946.2\n320,970.8\n Claims on Government (net) \n81,808.4\n75,191.5\n74,845.9\n82,122.6\n82,338.1\n177,893.2\n168,720.9\n154,920.0\n81,055.3\n91,424.1\n133,685.7\n123,996.4\n152,935.2\n160,962.3\n155,400.1\n219,466.4\n251,087.3\n181,938.9\n160,963.6\n261,884.9\n RBZ\n948.3\n533.5\n116.6\n-9,441.8\n-9,407.1\n-9,262.9\n652.8\n562.6\n582.2\n537.9\n553.3\n277.7\n-1,964.9\n260.4\n318.0\n9,875.8\n9,846.6\n9,915.4\n44.1\n10.6\n DMBs\n80,860.2\n74,658.0\n74,729.3\n90,330.7\n90,511.6\n185,922.5\n167,834.5\n154,123.7\n60,198.4\n70,439.5\n112,834.8\n103,688.6\n134,666.5\n140,468.3\n134,848.5\n190,590.5\n202,240.7\n133,093.6\n120,989.5\n221,944.4\n OBIs\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n1,233.6\n1,233.6\n1,233.6\n233.6\n233.6\n20,274.7\n20,446.7\n20,297.6\n20,030.1\n20,233.6\n20,233.6\n20,233.6\n19,000.0\n39,000.0\n38,929.9\n39,929.9\n39,929.9\n Claims on Public Enterprises \n5,300.2\n7,279.8\n-3,179.6\n49.8\n9,427.1\n6,792.4\n7,557.9\n9,665.0\n24,122.0\n27,528.6\n31,812.4\n14,317.4\n12,558.6\n11,073.2\n13,749.2\n9,782.8\n9,380.3\n8,928.1\n8,291.9\n6,980.8\n RBZ\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n DMBs\n5,300.2\n7,279.8\n-3,179.6\n49.8\n9,427.1\n6,792.4\n7,557.9\n9,665.0\n24,122.0\n27,528.6\n31,812.4\n14,317.4\n12,558.6\n11,073.2\n13,749.2\n9,782.8\n9,380.3\n8,928.1\n8,291.9\n6,980.8\n Agri-PEs\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-1.0\n0.0\n-1.0\n-1.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-1.0\n-4,771.8\n-4,772.8\n-4,773.8\n-4,774.8\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n Other\n5,300.2\n7,279.8\n-3,179.6\n49.8\n9,427.1\n6,793.4\n7,557.9\n9,666.0\n24,123.0\n27,528.6\n31,812.4\n14,318.4\n17,330.4\n15,846.0\n18,523.0\n14,557.6\n9,380.3\n8,928.1\n8,291.9\n6,980.8\n OBIs\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n Claims on Private Sector\n777,751.7\n739,886.0\n730,843.7\n713,583.3\n781,394.3\n805,656.0\n810,710.6\n798,733.0\n737,764.8\n667,250.2\n565,557.7\n570,399.9\n438,131.0\n420,363.0\n367,173.2\n347,316.4\n209,890.6\n89,362.0\n7,690.8\n52,105.1\n RBZ\n665.0\n1,765.1\n-9,455.1\n-9,387.2\n-3,975.5\n-3,903.1\n-5,788.8\n-7,388.1\n-6,693.9\n-3,088.9\n-7,047.9\n-3,630.4\n-2,646.2\n-5,176.5\n-6,435.5\n-7,002.0\n-6,405.5\n-5,520.2\n-5,898.0\n-5,899.0\n DMBs\n616,003.9\n597,497.2\n617,287.4\n574,157.1\n654,515.1\n687,696.6\n691,818.1\n687,296.3\n627,797.4\n545,532.3\n441,516.4\n461,613.7\n336,118.8\n335,446.9\n244,506.0\n250,995.0\n109,936.4\n-11,508.5\n-102,287.3\n-48,548.7\n OBIs\n161,082.9\n140,623.7\n123,011.4\n148,813.5\n130,854.7\n121,862.5\n124,681.3\n118,824.8\n116,661.3\n124,806.8\n131,089.3\n112,416.6\n104,658.3\n90,092.6\n129,102.7\n103,323.4\n106,359.7\n106,390.7\n115,876.1\n106,552.9\nOTHER ITEMS (NET) \n15,633.7\n5,264.2\n27,793.8\n65,209.1\n-117,248.0\n-65,029.0\n-112,600.7\n-118,506.2\n-214,555.1\n-126,980.3\n-176,580.1\n-65,627.7\n9,802.2\n39,844.3\n12,969.3\n-6,350.4\n172,994.5\n140,067.4\n264,282.5\n207,956.4\nBROAD MONEY (M3) \n790,557.9\n636,860.5\n698,892.3\n760,753.9\n736,080.7\n786,270.8\n663,371.0\n436,049.2\n359,905.6\n512,987.3\n437,956.1\n247,936.6\n157,361.3\n206,938.3\n182,476.0\n137,719.1\n-17,546.4\n45,653.0\n80,250.0\n208,162.6\nGROWTH RATES\n Broad Money (M3) \n27.2%\n21.6%\n23.1%\n24.9%\n23.8%\n25.4%\n21.1%\n12.9%\n10.5%\n14.9%\n12.2%\n6.9%\n4.3%\n5.8%\n4.9%\n3.6%\n-0.5%\n1.2%\n2.1%\n5.5%\n Domestic Credit \n34.6%\n31.9%\n30.1%\n29.4%\n31.8%\n35.4%\n35.4%\n34.2%\n28.1%\n26.0%\n23.3%\n22.0%\n18.0%\n17.4%\n15.5%\n16.5%\n13.0%\n7.4%\n4.7%\n8.5%\n Claims on Private Sector\n31.7%\n29.2%\n27.9%\n26.8%\n28.9%\n29.2%\n29.5%\n28.8%\n25.6%\n23.0%\n18.7%\n18.4%\n13.5%\n12.8%\n11.0%\n10.3%\n6.0%\n2.5%\n0.2%\n1.5%\n2013\n2012\n$ Thousands\nTABLE 1.4 : ANALYSIS OF YEARLY CHANGES IN MONEY SUPPLY (M3)\n2014\n15 \nTABLE 2.1 : SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS LOANS AND ADVANCES \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ Thousands \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAGRICULTURE \nCONSTRUCTION \nCOMMUNICA-\nTION \nDISTRIBU-\nTION \nFINANCIAL \n& \nFINANCIAL \nMANUFAC-\nTURING \nMINING \nSERVICES TRANSPORT \nINDIVIDUALS \nCONGLOMER-\nATES/1 \nTOTAL \nEND OF \n \n \n \n \nINVEST-\nMENTS \nORGANISA-\nTIONS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n450,170.0 \n31,073.4 \n38,762.3 \n426,050.9 \n11,967.9 \n31,547.4 \n417,961.3 \n144,645.1 \n237,323.7 \n33,906.5 \n300,841.1 \n9,373.1 \n2,133,622.7 \nFREBRUARY \n494,536.6 \n33,786.9 \n28,372.0 \n439,556.7 \n14,811.4 \n33,948.5 \n409,692.7 \n128,242.7 \n303,269.9 \n38,235.9 \n298,171.5 \n3,685.5 \n2,226,310.2 \nMARCH \n467,873.97 \n41,532.7 \n68,987.2 \n433,337.1 \n16,118.8 \n34,704.7 \n471,204.9 \n159,925.7 \n307,134.7 \n44,413.57 \n370,123.5 \n4,491.7 \n2,419,848.6 \nAPRIL \n455,178.9 \n43,628.2 \n23,433.4 \n428,381.7 \n14,997.8 \n35,589.1 \n444,798.7 \n135,046.2 \n288,857.6 \n45,643.6 \n377,037.0 \n7,693.7 \n2,300,585.8 \nMAY \n484,635.0 \n38,637.2 \n27,795.2 \n455,737.9 \n14,699.1 \n35,106.1 \n465,890.2 \n115,457.8 \n301,547.9 \n52,075.2 \n382,172.8 \n5,034.0 \n2,378,788.7 \nJUNE \n489,730.1 \n37,474.3 \n38,198.7 \n425,521.3 \n7,310.7 \n53,815.0 \n454,368.5 \n110,349.9 \n295,432.3 \n51,453.6 \n385,769.7 \n11,033.4 \n2,360,457.5 \nJULY \n483,103.7 \n40,342.5 \n33,494.3 \n464,921.7 \n6,869.2 \n38,522.6 \n541,025.9 \n116,557.1 \n307,117.5 \n48,218.0 \n426,582.7 \n4,455.3 \n2,511,210.5 \nAUGUST \n521,743.0 \n38,889.1 \n43,894.5 \n425,531.4 \n7,260.6 \n39.087.2 \n451,871.2 \n110,041.8 \n346,006.0 \n40,216.0 \n374,587.1 \n9,914.6 \n2,409,042.5 \nSEPTEMBER \n496,289.3 \n39,446.9 \n38,856.6 \n447,247.2 \n13,953.5 \n43,006.7 \n437,211.9 \n118,873.7 \n330,709.6 \n40,046.6 \n373,596.8 \n9,790.6 \n2,389,029.4 \nOCTOBER \n491,610.6 \n38,871.5 \n39,766.0 \n471,966.2 \n8,023.3 \n40,835.3 \n420,445.3 \n110,778.3 \n417,411.6 \n36,334.1 \n376,463.1 \n9,861.9 \n2,462,367.3 \nNOVEMBER \n487,289.4 \n40,321.7 \n42,332.0 \n488,637.3 \n3,116.5 \n36,852.0 \n417,162.5 \n117,050.8 \n389,727.1 \n39,126.4 \n369,190.3 \n17,960.5 \n2,448,766.4 \nDECEMBER \n533,165.2 \n42,285.1 \n17,617.9 \n435,613.1 \n5,047.0 \n62,165.8 \n389,181.2 \n115,404.6 \n379,809.3 \n37,409.1 \n369,838.8 \n18,252.9 \n2,405,790.0 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n489,585.3 \n43,743.8 \n18,574.7 \n464,097.6 \n5,467.4 \n48,086.1 \n362,554.0 \n116,635.5 \n412,901.1 \n37,722.2 \n367,126.2 \n16,773.1 \n2,383,267.1 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFEBRUARY \n519,154.6 \n38,918.1 \n24,765.4 \n460,528.2 \n10,397.3 \n47,488.6 \n385,038.1 \n116,670.5 \n401,619.6 \n32,978.1 \n396,800.8 \n8,542.7 \n2,442,902.1 \n1. These are large corporation with business operations covering across a number of sectors. \nTABLE 2.2 :SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF MERCHANT BANKS LOANS AND ADVANCES \n \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ Thousands \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAGRICULTURE \nCONSTRUCTION DISTRIBUTION \nFINANCIAL \nFINANCIAL \nMANUFACTUR-\nING \nMINING \nSERVICES TRANSPORT INDIVIDUALS CONGLOM-\nERATES \nTOTAL \nEND OF \n \n \n \nINVESTMENT ORGANISATIONS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n67,517.6 \n16,163.5 \n56,807.8 \n18,616.7 \n58,326.4 \n78,419.6 \n89,890.9 \n106,553.9 \n18,590.6 \n144,497.3 \n15,986.5 \n671,370.7 \nFEBRUARY \n58,292.9 \n21,826.4 \n56,104.4 \n18,101.2 \n62,883.5 \n78,714.5 \n89,292.0 \n117,785.5 \n17,680.2 \n128,827.9 \n9,967.9 \n668,578.1 \nMARCH \n69,856.5 \n16,673.4 \n60,104.1 \n16,684.4 \n58,510.5 \n72,517.4 \n97,158.1 \n88,814.4 \n14,831.7 \n173,486.3 \n17,657.4 \n686,294.1 \nAPRIL \n63,793.8 \n17,080.4 \n63,074.6 \n20,726.0 \n58,308.4 \n70,475.5 \n89,412.8 \n87,962.4 \n15,412.2 \n174,072.5 \n18,871.2 \n680,189.8 \nMAY \n67,425.0 \n17,232.4 \n66,358.3 \n21,534.7 \n59,449.7 \n72,998.8 \n89,738.5 \n84,961.5 \n15,028.8 \n189,089.0 \n18,888.7 \n702,705.4 \nJUNE \n68,762.1 \n16,928.9 \n64,967.8 \n11,199.2 \n57,389.1 \n72,983.6 \n94,193.4 \n98,762.3 \n13,866.1 \n176,186.3 \n18,800.0 \n694,038.7 \nJULY \n66,851.1 \n15,061.8 \n64,398.0 \n11,134.2 \n34,750.7 \n77,551.0 \n100,908.8 \n109,118.2 \n14,701.2 \n162,459.7 \n15,995.4 \n672,930.0 \nAUGUST \n67,246.9 \n15,177.5 \n68,887.7 \n11,071.0 \n34,241.2 \n77,411.5 \n122,491.8 \n120,661.7 \n13,212.7 \n137,335.6 \n15,655.4 \n683,393.0 \nSEPTEMBER \n69,700.0 \n15,202.1 \n67,723.0 \n10,981.1 \n34,026.9 \n77,338.7 \n103,272.3 \n106,398.8 \n16,871.0 \n173,866.8 \n15,558.8 \n690,939.6 \nOCTOBER \n72,224.8 \n17,189.6 \n64,266.5 \n11,000.2 \n34,072.5 \n67,425.8 \n95,019.2 \n125,049.4 \n15,931.7 \n172,834.8 \n17,401.5 \n692,416.0 \nNOVEMBER \n68,628.1 \n15,194.8 \n61,488.3 \n11,456.3 \n33,491.0 \n71,854.0 \n101,230.0 \n129,298.4 \n41,690.2 \n133,954.5 \n11,348.1 \n683,329.3 \nDECEMBER \n67,626.4 \n9,691.4 \n50,354.1 \n11,629.3 \n29,200.1 \n70,093.2 \n101,301.5 \n100,507.4 \n15,301.2 \n174,918.3 \n14,748.0 \n645,370.9 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n24,456.9 \n6,122.0 \n33,734.0 \n9,856.2 \n23,491.2 \n42,349.6 \n55,948.1 \n35,302.4 \n15,083.5 \n153,861.9 \n1.893.8 \n402,099.6 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFEBRUARY \n28,842.8 \n5,882.2 \n32,873.4 \n9,361.7 \n22,320.3 \n44,904.2 \n55,857.3 \n33,373.4 \n11,068.1 \n182,690.8 \n0.0 \n427,174.2 \n16 \n17 \nTABLE 2.3 :SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF MERCHANT BANKS ACCEPTANCES \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ Thousands \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAGRICULTURE \nDISTRIBUTION \nFINANCIAL \nFINANCIAL \nMANUFACTURING \nMINING \nSERVICES \nTRANSPORT \nINDIVIDUALS \nCONGLOMERATES \nTOTAL \nEND OF \n \n \nINVESTMENT ORGANISATIONS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n70.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n3,641.0 \n18,088.3 \n1,189.0 \n11,190.4 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n34,178.7 \nFEBRUARY \n100.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n8,000.0 \n14,889.0 \n1,569.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n24,558.3 \nMARCH \n70.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n7,860.0 \n0.0 \n154.0 \n0.0 \n15,400.0 \n0.0 \n23,484.0 \nAPRIL \n5,100.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n7,620.0 \n14,889.0 \n278.0 \n0.0 \n15,200.0 \n0.0 \n43,087.0 \nMAY \n5,100.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n7,500.0 \n6,330.8 \n2,109.4 \n0.0 \n1,000.0 \n0.0 \n22,040.2 \nJUNE \n5,100.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n5,760.0 \n0.0 \n212.0 \n0.0 \n15,210.0 \n0.0 \n26,282.0 \nJULY \n5,100.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n7,000.0 \n0.0 \n212.0 \n0.0 \n15,110.0 \n0.0 \n27,422.0 \nAUGUST \n5,100.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n6,000.0 \n0.0 \n1,065.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n12,165.0 \nSEPTEMBER \n5,000.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n5,800.0 \n0.0 \n165.0 \n0.0 \n900.0 \n0.0 \n11,865.0 \nOCTOBER \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n5,150.0 \n0.0 \n5,135.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n10,285.0 \nNOVEMBER \n5,000.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n8,000.0 \n0.0 \n2,035.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n27,595.6 \nDECEMBER \n4,745.3 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n6,750.6 \n12,304.4 \n1,992.3 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n25,792.6 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n19,047.7 \n826.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n3,000.0 \n12,673.6 \n359,6 \n0.0 \n1,809.9 \n0.0 \n37,357.2 \nFEBRUARY \n5,000.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n1,107.5 \n12,573.7 \n373.2 \n0.0 \n3,445.9 \n0.0 \n22,500.3 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n18 \n TABLE 2.4 : SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS DEPOSITS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ Thousands \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nEND OF \nAGRICUL-\nTURE \nCONSTRUC-\nTION \nCOMMUNI-\nCATIONS \nDISTRIBU-\nTION \nFINANCIAL \n& \nFINANCIAL MANUFACTUR-\nING \nMINING \nSERVICES TRANSPORT \nINDIVIDUALS \nCONGLOMERATES \nTOTAL \n \n \n \n \n \nINVEST-\nMENTS \nORGANISA-\nTIONS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n137,919.4 \n35,324.8 \n106,812.5 \n296,807.8 \n116,945.8 \n277,304.7 \n268,525.2 \n119,278.5 \n515,754.9 \n21,989.9 \n431,208.6 \n14,582.8 \n2,342,454.9 \n FEBRUARY \n132,404.53 \n36,283.33 \n110,794.26 \n341,462.75 \n99,165.46 \n288,834.34 \n264,450.53 \n104,923.38 \n577,378.61 \n22,873.9 \n467,084.94 \n14,234.06 \n2,459,890.1 \nMARCH \n121,233.1 \n38,555.4 \n124,038.5 \n348,687.2 \n93,320.0 \n263’552.7 \n276,941.5 \n76,084.4 \n629,624.3 \n24,984.1 \n468,608.5 \n14,756.2 \n2,480,386.1 \nAPRIL \n127,168.8 \n39,606.6 \n115,033.7 \n331,306.5 \n83,707.8 \n289,829.1 \n276,208.7 \n75,855.9 \n644,979.8 \n24,822.5 \n465,129 \n14,829.3 \n2,488,477.6 \nMAY \n124,277.7 \n43,333.7 \n142,130.1 \n370,561.1 \n93,500.0 \n249,454.2 \n299,116.6 \n86,314.7 \n648,511.1 \n28,279.3 \n516,523.0 \n16,891.5 \n2,618,892.9 \nJUNE \n84,589.8 \n51,354.0 \n132,428.7 \n351,179.8 \n98,785.6 \n375,613.6 \n214,696.7 \n76,370.1 \n727,955.7 \n36,208.4 \n456,454.4 \n18,727.6 \n2,624,364.4 \nJULY \n106,470.8 \n47,401.0 \n131,489.0 \n345,036.3 \n70,487,9 \n397,969.7 \n213,370.5 \n89,915.4 \n726,447.6 \n46,000.4 \n505,054.1 \n29,735.3 \n2,709,378.0 \nAUGUST \n99,151.6 \n49,226.4 \n116,820.6 \n363,080.1 \n382,619.4 \n71,775.9 \n216,433.0 \n73,978.5 \n737,065.6 \n48,183.8 \n488,183.8 \n28,785.3 \n2,663,379.8 \nSEPTEMBER \n113,907.6 \n43,671.0 \n125,801.3 \n276,363.0 \n177,790.6 \n429,596.7 \n228,342.2 \n82,777.7 \n651,389.2 \n48,764.9 \n517,788.8 \n29,019.9 \n2,725,213.0 \nOCTOBER \n101,122.4 \n48,716.9 \n155,798.3 \n313,982.4 \n257,300.6 \n409,730.0 \n245,131.8 \n83,995.5 \n661,217.2 \n48,396.8 \n534,643.6 \n26,158.0 \n2,886,193.5 \nNOVEMBER \n104,695.1 \n53,233.8 \n151,359.5 \n348,390.4 \n185,802.5 \n464,782.4 \n269,513.8 \n85,906.9 \n962,840.9 \n47,647.2 \n548,847.7 \n23,130.6 \n3,246,150.7 \nDECEMBER \n96,098.4 \n50,492.7 \n126,343.5 \n379,068.0 \n198,323.3 \n509,241.6 \n280,975.4 \n95,457.1 \n582,286.2 \n41,852.2 \n538,135.2 \n26,491.3 \n2,924,764.8 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n91,648.8 \n48,329.1 \n128,426.0 \n351,566.7 \n212,401.7 \n494,823.6 \n252,389.7 \n93,470.0 \n658,260.1 \n44,091.4 \n512,289.8 \n32,145.9 \n2,919,842.6 \nFEBRUARY \n96,796.5 \n48,491.5 \n147,571.5 \n360,757.9 \n 147,995.9 \n 578,306.4 \n284,603.8 \n64,530.5 \n679,554.8 \n41,983.6 \n516,431.2 \n25,275.3 \n2,991.999.1 \nMARCH \n96,752.8 \n44,883.3 \n139,327.8 \n354,627.8 \n155,915.2 \n610,758.4 \n290,072.8 \n87,143.0 \n594,397.7 \n38,345.5 \n523,913.8 \n141,404.6 \n3,077,542.7 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAPRIL \n98,671.0 \n49,093.8 \n152,390.8 \n350,269.2 \n166,578.5 \n545,118.2 \n311,310.8 \n105,766.9 \n638,341.8 \n39,837.1 \n533,691.3 \n99,053.9 \n3,090,123.4 \nMAY \n114,053.3 \n55,427.4 \n142,023.3 \n389,384.7 \n255,352.1 \n484,429.7 \n318,129.4 \n92,777.2 \n700,668.7 \n46,593.8 \n578,509.2 \n32,297.7 \n3,209,646.5 \nJUNE \n116,635.2 \n58,578.8 \n147,313.8 \n447,394.5 \n183,146.3 \n352,600.3 \n366,824.2 \n96,685.8 \n701,195.7 \n46,578.5 \n597,373.1 \n104,843.6 \n3,219,169.8 \nJULY \n108,086.6 \n46,449.5 \n120,982.3 \n380,448.8 \n178,341.4 \n677,700.7 \n301,575.9 \n97,583.8 \n710,856.1 \n39,395.9 \n487,954.4 \n102,531.4 \n3,251,906.9 \nAUGUST \n137,107.1 \n48,726.1 \n135,788.5 \n319,106.0 \n174,593.9 \n637,190.7 \n333,255.3 \n99,194.1 \n639,401.6 \n41,996.5 \n417,762.6 \n93,772.1 \n3,077,894.4 \nSEPTEMBER \n100,028.3 \n57,039.8 \n145,652.5 \n380,781.4 \n207,379.2 \n612,131.5 \n408,359.1 \n103,872.8 \n795,047.6 \n46,982.9 \n435,912.4 \n90,265.8 \n3,383,453.4 \nOCTOBER \n94,346.3 \n52,722.4 \n141,401.4 \n338,625.9 \n223,223.8 \n754,145.4 \n339,305.6 \n99,583.3 \n754,116.1 \n41,527.2 \n440,197.9 \n97,771.1 \n3,376,966.4 \nNOVEMBER \n114,178.7 \n47,740.9 \n128,399.3 \n312,639.2 \n241,628.8 \n741,885.4 \n283,426.0 \n80,507.6 \n727,492.5 \n42,901.0 \n458,479.9 \n89,292.5 \n3,268,571.8 \nDECEMBER \n113,914.2 \n51,981.7 \n142,938.1 \n342,785.1 \n213,125.2 \n755,299.4 \n327,658.1 \n83,103.1 \n762,884.4 \n41,827.9 \n432,436.3 \n61,038.7 \n3,328,992.1 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n130,154.6 \n53,292.9 \n146,876.1 \n353,793.8 \n259,569.6 \n731,703.3 \n304,033.2 \n93,776.7 \n770,435.4 \n40,085.9 \n485,573.1 \n60,897.7 \n3,430,192.5 \nFEBRUARY \n138,812.3 \n55,092.2 \n134,813.9 \n420,181.0 \n262,183.8 \n786,295.6 \n270,062.5 \n131,134.8 \n779,640.3 \n39,169.2 \n508,813.7 \n61,822.3 \n3,588,021.6 \n19 \n TABLE 2.5 : SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF MERCHANT BANKS DEPOSITS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ Thousands \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAGRICUL-\nTURE \nCOMMUNICA-\nTIONS \nCONSTRUC-\nTION \nDISTRIBU-\nTION \nFINANCIAL \n& \nFINANCIAL MANUFACTUR-\nING \nMINING \nSERVICES \nTRANSPORT \nINDIVIDUALS \nCONGLOMER-\nATES \nTOTAL \nEND OF \n \n \n \n \nINVEST-\nMENTS \nORGANISA-\nTIONS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n11,744.1 \n8,250.4 \n7.1 \n3,238.1 \n129,742.5 \n80,306.4 \n17,664.5 \n9,146.5 \n158,059.3 \n1,650.5 \n113,108.8 \n3,038.0 \n535,956.3 \nFEBRUARY \n14,684.8 \n5,815.5 \n6.8 \n23,523.2 \n131,181.2 \n95,143.4 \n21,911.4 \n22,184.5 \n131,968.5 \n1,350.6 \n149,680.8 \n3,038.0 \n600,488.7 \n MARCH \n 46,519.8 \n 5,039.7 \n1,662.6 \n4,119.3 \n127,903.5 \n 91,695.5 \n 17,886.8 \n 39,142.1 \n143,818.6 \n 4,669.7 \n 83,525.1 \n28,564.2 \n594,546.8 \nAPRIL \n24,233.2 \n8,046.5 \n1,868.8 \n27,036.4 \n121,160.1 \n109,064.2 \n36,456.3 \n30,240.9 \n151,505.2 \n4,892.5 \n75,547.7 \n29,200.4 \n619,252.1 \nMAY \n10,329.7 \n6,452.6 \n1,765.0 \n12,678.2 \n115,998.5 \n103,213.2 \n35,266.7 \n25,989.8 \n183,915.3 \n6,141.2 \n63,313.3 \n39,110.5 \n604,173.9 \nJUNE \n10,271.8 \n7,330.0 \n1,698.4 \n9,186.1 \n134,312.0 \n129,103.5 \n26,823.0 \n22,693.9 \n173,514.3 \n4,286.6 \n62,007.9 \n30,818.9 \n612,046.3 \nJULY \n4,473.9 \n5,298.2 \n270.1 \n27,217.9 \n132,809.8 \n98,744.9 \n30,365.9 \n21,415.7 \n217,331.4 \n2,077.4 \n57,143.0 \n33,601.7 \n630,749.9 \nAUGUST \n6,744.1 \n6,765.6 \n288.6 \n26,394.2 \n123,569.3 \n83,662.1 \n33,578.1 \n18,015.7 \n222,325.8 \n2,979.2 \n92,733.9 \n33,058.9 \n650,115.6 \nSEPTEMBER \n16,997.7 \n8,628.2 \n300.8 \n27,315.7 \n124,411.1 \n85,232.7 \n50,279.5 \n27,896.5 \n208,113.3 \n2,000.9 \n85,429.2 \n34,840.8 \n671,446.4 \nOCTOBER \n4,473.9 \n5,298.2 \n270.1 \n3,119.1 \n124,342.3 \n115,774.8 \n30,524.5 \n21,415.7 \n191,204.2 \n2,077.4 \n153,329.1 \n32,049.8 \n683,879.0 \nNOVEMBER \n12,872.8 \n10,868.0 \n13,414.5 \n1,649.6 \n174,107.7 \n60,405.7 \n18,484.7 \n35,828.3 \n188,441.9 \n4,251.7 \n203,879.7 \n27,745.0 \n751,949.6 \nDECEMBER \n12,164.3 \n5,900.3 \n14,197.9 \n3,080.8 \n173,009.4 \n60,501.2 \n17,631.4 \n137,537.4 \n198,977.5 \n2,664.8 \n79,504.3 \n32,534.7 \n737,703.9 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n11,723.2 \n6,581.0 \n10,921.0 \n751.4 \n180,889.6 \n64,042.8 \n16,845.3 \n28,513.2 \n215,563.4 \n2,547.7 \n113,832.1 \n34,578.4 \n686,789.2 \nFEBRUARY \n10,020.1 \n7,034.4 \n11,383.1 \n1,419.4 \n196,108.5 \n51,751.6 \n16,973.1 \n28,365.1 \n187,610.2 \n6,432.7 \n70,211.6 \n34,798.8 \n622,108.3 \n MARCH \n58,914.7 \n8,588.1 \n7,605.8 \n1,590.7 \n142,308.7 \n90,728.3 \n28,015.0 \n25,273.9 \n185,705.5 \n1,965.0 \n164,230.8 \n29,295.2 \n744,221.5 \nAPRIL \n31,659.0 \n5,702.7 \n18,835.7 \n1,538.1 \n177,040.5 \n97,838.1 \n22,611.8 \n28,606.2 \n187,727.7 \n3,883.5 \n139,589.7 \n31,245.5 \n746,278.5 \nMAY \n17,827.5 \n5,756.6 \n18,786.2 \n1,258.9 \n187,857.9 \n99,688.5 \n19,315.6 \n44,794.2 \n197,568.8 \n3,436.3 \n132,325.5 \n31,463.1 \n760,079.2 \nJUNE \n4,255.3 \n6,236.6 \n10,753.7 \n1,131.2 \n156,052.6 \n105,613.0 \n18,935.8 \n59,790.7 \n184,390.9 \n3,652.3 \n107,354.6 \n30,017.1 \n688,183.8 \nJULY \n6,597.9 \n9,544.9 \n22,034.9 \n17,579.6 \n155,178.3 \n101,057.7 \n5,786.5 \n25,167.1 \n139,688.0 \n2,369.4 \n102,677.4 \n25,029.7 \n612,711.4 \nAUGUST \n1,770.3 \n9,723.1 \n17,643.5 \n1,553.8 \n150,874.9 \n71,592.0 \n19,054.2 \n10,779.0 \n169,881.2 \n2,644.4 \n113,074.5 \n29,546.0 \n598,137.0 \nSEPTEMBER \n40,766.9 \n9,757.2 \n17,595.4 \n10,209.6 \n157,646.1 \n87,504.2 \n20,864.5 \n12,486.3 \n173,696.6 \n1,527.2 \n125,919.4 \n29,482.7 \n687,456.0 \nOCTOBER \n43,179.4 \n7,366.8 \n2,258.4 \n11,060.8 \n118,559.1 \n159,315.4 \n45,674.2 \n11,973.6 \n164,560.7 \n744.6 \n98,580.9 \n29,513.7 \n692,787.6 \nNOVEMBER \n24,169.8 \n8,708.3 \n2,551.4 \n12,523.2 \n165,553.2 \n155,945.5 \n43,847.5 \n13,222.0 \n132,189.4 \n552.7 \n138,372.4 \n29,491.4 \n727,126.8 \nDECEMBER \n8,574.8 \n9,071.2 \n2,371.6 \n8,068.6 \n169,324.2 \n150,460.6 \n39,469.1 \n90,808.8 \n155,859.5 \n944.4 \n104,850.7 \n29,324.4 \n769,127.9 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n15,879.0 \n8,509.2 \n1,960.3 \n9,793.9 \n125,257.8 \n76,835.2 \n39,381.2 \n27,399.4 \n62,806.6 \n1,704.9 \n63,106.3 \n3,976.3 \n436,610.0 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFEBRUARY \n14,501.9 \n7,870.0 \n1,650.8 \n11,407.6 \n119,069.4 \n60,798.1 \n39,576.4 \n31,886.5 \n57,670.9 \n894..0 \n93,028.3 \n3,768.6 \n441,228.5 \n20 \nTABLE 3.1: ZIMBABWE: EXTERNAL DEBT OUTSTANDING BY DEBTOR (INCLUDING ALL \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nEnd Period \n1999 \n2000 \n2001 \n2002 \n2003 \n2004 \n2005 \n2006 \n2007 \n2008 \n2009 \n2010 \n2011 \n2012 \n2013 \n(US$ millions) \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nLong-Term External Debt \n3,530 \n3,227 \n3,255 \n3,327 \n3,644 \n3,927 \n3,805 \n3,965 \n4,032 \n4,464 \n4,951 \n5,175 \n6,096 \n6,607 \n7,370 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nGovernment \n2,461 \n2,249 \n2,328 \n2,376 \n2,617 \n2,844 \n2,895 \n3,024 \n3,054 \n3,464 \n4,037 \n4,095 \n4,638 \n4,929 \n5,012 \nBilateral Creditors \n935 \n1,050 \n1,115 \n1,107 \n1,255 \n1,455 \n1,438 \n1,520 \n1,520 \n1,863 \n2,308 \n2,325 \n2,597 \n2,694 \n2,928 \nMultilateral Creditors \n1,235 \n1,199 \n1,213 \n1,269 \n1,362 \n1,389 \n1,457 \n1,504 \n1,524 \n1,592 \n1,729 \n1,770 \n2,041 \n2,235 \n2,084 \nPrivate Creditors \n291 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n10 \n10 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \nPublic Enterprises \n543 \n534 \n568 \n616 \n698 \n714 \n709 \n766 \n790 \n825 \n857 \n938 \n1,092 \n1,198 \n1,356 \nBilateral Creditors \n316 \n301 \n315 \n351 \n403 \n442 \n439 \n464 \n474 \n497 \n453 \n238 \n711 \n703 \n858 \nMultilateral Creditors \n224 \n233 \n253 \n265 \n295 \n272 \n270 \n302 \n316 \n327 \n403 \n700 \n382 \n495 \n498 \nPrivate Creditors \n3 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \nMonetary Authorities \n364 \n292 \n292 \n279 \n288 \n291 \n144 \n130 \n137 \n140 \n140 \n138 \n127 \n125 \n125 \nMultilateral Creditors - IMF \n364 \n292 \n292 \n279 \n288 \n291 \n144 \n130 \n137 \n140 \n140 \n138 \n127 \n125 \n125 \nPrivate \n162 \n152 \n67 \n56 \n41 \n78 \n57 \n45 \n51 \n35 \n57 \n142 \n366 \n480 \n1,002 \nShort-Term External Debt \n532 \n298 \n167 \n183 \n169 \n144 \n173 \n281 \n387 \n226 \n1,198 \n1,382 \n1,289 \n890 \n1,564 \nSupplier's Credits \n150 \n42 \n13 \n26 \n51 \n69 \n107 \n122 \n178 \n41 \n193 \n286 \n134 \n30 \n0 \nReserve Bank \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n642 \n642 \n618 \n614 \n614 \nPrivate \n382 \n256 \n154 \n157 \n118 \n75 \n66 \n159 \n209 \n185 \n363 \n454 \n537 \n246 \n950 \nTotal External Debt \n4,062 \n3,525 \n3,422 \n3,510 \n3,812 \n4,071 \n3,978 \n4,246 \n4,607 \n4,690 \n6,289 \n6,695 \n7,385 \n7,497 \n8,934 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nGross Domestic Product \n5,990 \n6,107 \n10,887 \n6,715 \n5,037 \n4,299 \n2,918 \n6,645 \n4,000 \n3,175 \n6,133 \n7,433 \n8,865 \n8,865 \n12,973 \nExternal Debt / GDP \n68% \n57.7% 31.4% 52.3% 75.7% 94.7% 136.3% \n63.9% \n110.5% 147.7% 102.5% \n90.1% \n83.3% \n84.6% 68.9% \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSOURCE: Ministry of \nFinance and Reserve Bank \nof Zimbabwe \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n21 \nTABLE 4.1 LENDING RATES (percent per annum)1 \n \nCommercial Banks \nMerchant Banks \n \n \n \n \nWeighted Average Lending \nRates3 \n \nWeighted Average Lending \nRates3 \n \n \nEnd Period \nNominal \nLending \nRates2 \nIndividuals \nCorporate \nNominal \nLending \nRates2 \nIndividuals \nCorporate \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n10.00-35.00 \n15.58 \n10.81 \n13.00-25.00 \n17.96 \n14.42 \n \n \nFeb \n10.00-35.00 \n14.83 \n10.53 \n13.00-25.00 \n17.93 \n14.36 \n \n \nMar \n6.00-35.00 \n14.32 \n10.19 \n14.00-25.00 \n17.80 \n14.35 \n \n \nApr \n3.00-35.00 \n14.58 \n9.66 \n14.00-25.00 \n17.77 \n14.35 \n \n \nMay \n9.00-35.00 \n14.25 \n9.89 \n13.00-23.00 \n17.66 \n17.02 \n \n \nJun \n9.00-35.00 \n14.29 \n9.46 \n15.00-22.50 \n17.78 \n16.89 \n \n \nJul \n6.00-35.00 \n14.39 \n9.65 \n15.00-28.00 \n17.70 \n16.97 \n \n \nAug \n6.00-35.00 \n13.82 \n9.32 \n15.00-23.00 \n18.32 \n16.92 \n \n \nSep \n6.00-35.00 \n14.03 \n9.37 \n15.00-22.50 \n18.31 \n16.94 \n \n \nOct \n6.00-35.00 \n13.95 \n9.25 \n15.00-23.00 \n18.67 \n17.66 \n \n \nNov \n6.00-35.00 \n14.18 \n9.40 \n15.00-23.00 \n18.84 \n17.72 \n \n \nDec \n6.00-35.00 \n14.13 \n9.35 \n15.00-23.00 \n18.84 \n17.76 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n6.00-35.00 \n14.09 \n9.30 \n15.00-23.00 \n18.88 \n17.74 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nNotes \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1. Table revised, to separate weighted lending rates for individuals and corporate bodies. \n \n2. Nominal Lending Rates depict the range of rates quoted by banks. \n3. Lending rates exclude rates on staff loans. \n \n \n \n \nFeb \n6.00-35.00 \n14.08 \n9.32 \n15.00-23.00 \n18.88 \n17.73 \n \n \n22 \nTABLE 4.2 : BANKS DEPOSIT RATES (percent per annum)1 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCOMMERCIAL BANKS \nACCEPTING HOUSES \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nEND OF \nSAVINGS \n3 MONTHS \n3 MONTHS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n20122 \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n0.15-5.00 \n5.00-18.00 \n10.00-17.00 \nFEBRUARY \n0.15-5.00 \n5.00-18.00 \n10.00-17.00 \nMARCH \n0.01-12.00 \n5.00-20.00 \n7.00-17.00 \nAPRIL \n0.00-12.00 \n5.00-20.00 \n8.00-17.00 \nMAY \n0.00-12.00 \n5.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nJUNE \n0.00-12.00 \n5.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nJULY \n0.00-12.00 \n5.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nAUGUST \n0.00-12.00 \n5.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nSEPTEMBER \n0.00-12.00 \n5.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nOCTOBER \n0.00-12.00 \n5.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nNOVEMBER \n0.15-8.00 \n4.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nDECEMBER \n0.15-8.00 \n4.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n0.15-8.00 \n4.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nFEBRUARY \n0.15-8.00 \n4.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nMARCH \n0.15-8.00 \n4.00-20.00 \n8.00-12.00 \nAPRIL \n0.15-8.00 \n4.00-20.00 \n8.00-12.00 \nMAY \n0.15-8.00 \n4.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nJUNE \n0.15-8.00 \n4.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nJULY \n0.15-8.00 \n3.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nAUGUST \n0.15-8.00 \n3.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nSEPTEMBER \n0.15-8.00 \n3.00-20.00 \n11.00-12.00 \nOCTOBER \n0.15--8.00 \n3.00-20.00 \n11.00-12.00 \nNOVEMBER \n0.15--8.00 \n3.00-20.00 \n11.00-12.00 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1. \nThe range of rates qouted by banks during the period. \n2. \nThree (3) months deposit rates revised to exclude rates on inactive or dormant \naccounts. \n \n \nDECEMBER \n0.15--8.00 \n3.00-20.00 \n11.00-12.00 \n \n \n \n \n2014 \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n0.15--8.00 \n3.00-20.00 \n11.00-12.00 \nFEBRUARY \n0.15--8.00 \n3.00-20.00 \n11.00-12.00 \n23 \nTABLE 5.1 : MONTHLY INFLATION -- PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \\1 \n( DECEMBER 2012 = 100) \n1. Source: ZIMSTATS. To reflect changing expenditure \npatterns, ZIMSTAT introduced a revised CPI basket and \nrebased CPI figures to December 2012=100. \n \nNON-FOOD INFLATION \nFOOD \nINFLA-\nTION \nALL \n \nALCO-\nHOLIC \nBEVER-\nAGES \nCLOTH-\nING \nHSING, \nWATER, \nFURNITURE \nHEALTH TRANSPORT \nCOMMUNI-\nCATION \nRECREATION & EDUCATION \nRESTAU-\nRANTS & \nMISC. \nTOTAL \nNON \nFOOD & \nITEMS \n \n& TO-\nBACCO \nFOOT-\nWEAR \nELEC-\nTRICTY, \nGAS \nAND \n \n \n \nCULTURE \n \nHOTELS \nGOODS & \nFOOD \nNON \nALCO-\nHOLIC \nBEVER-\nAGES \n \n \n \n \n& OTHER \nEQUIPMENT \n \n \n \n \n \nSERVICES \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFUELS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nWEIGHTS \n4.38 \n6.05 \n17.74 \n9.91 \n2.16 \n9.76 \n3.41 \n2.1 \n5.67 \n1.38 \n3.91 \n66.47 \n33.53 \n100 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJUNE \n0.17 \n-0.03 \n-0.01 \n-0.02 \n-0.05 \n-0.14 \n-0.33 \n0.12 \n0.00 \n-0.15 \n0.06 \n-0.03 \n-0.33 \n-0.13 \nJULY \n-0.16 \n0.11 \n-0.01 \n-0.20 \n-0.04 \n0.31 \n-0.04 \n-0.11 \n0.00 \n0.02 \n-0.04 \n0.00 \n-1.14 \n-0.38 \nAUGUST \n-0.42 \n-0.34 \n0.79 \n-0.27 \n0.29 \n0.07 \n-0.14 \n-0.10 \n1.23 \n0.97 \n-0.43 \n0.23 \n-0.90 \n-0.15 \nSEPTEMBER \n0.02 \n0.04 \n0.39 \n0.11 \n-0.22 \n0.15 \n-0.01 \n-0.07 \n0.01 \n0.19 \n0.42 \n0.17 \n-0.18 \n0.05 \nOCTOBER \n1.21 \n0.00 \n-0.01 \n-0.36 \n0.06 \n-0.32 \n-0.07 \n-0.15 \n0.02 \n-0.08 \n-0.20 \n-0.04 \n0.04 \n-0.01 \nNOVEMBER \n0.38 \n-0.19 \n-0.01 \n-0.37 \n0.10 \n-0.13 \n-0.01 \n-0.13 \n5.57 \n1.08 \n-0.27 \n0.43 \n-0.60 \n0.09 \nDECEMBER \n0.14 \n-0.01 \n0.37 \n-0.29 \n0.12 \n0.27 \n0.05 \n-0.22 \n0.00 \n0.00 \n-0.46 \n0.08 \n-0.41 \n-0.08 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n0.20 \n-0.07 \n0.00 \n0.01 \n-0.23 \n0.01 \n0.00 \n-0.07 \n0.02 \n0.16 \n-0.09 \n0.00 \n0.44 \n0.14 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFEBRUARY \n-0.01 \n-0.09 \n-0.11 \n-0.08 \n0.09 \n0.08 \n0.00 \n-0.04 \n0.23 \n-0.08 \n0.07 \n-0.01 \n0.18 \n0.05 \n24 \nTABLE 5.2 : YEARLY INFLATION -- PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \\1 \n(DECEMBER 2012 = 100) \n1. Source: ZIMSTATS. To reflect changing expenditure \npatterns, ZIMSTAT introduced a revised CPI basket and \nrebased CPI figures to December 2012=100. \n \nNON-FOOD INFLATION \nFOOD \nINFLATION \nALL \n \nALCO-\nHOLIC \nBEVER-\nAGES \nCLOTHING \nHSING, \nWATER, \nFURNI-\nTURE \nHEALTH \nTRANSPORT \nCOMMU-\nNICATION \nRECREA-\nTION & \nEDUCA-\nTION \nRESTAU-\nRANTS & \nMISC. \nTOTAL \nNON \nFOOD & \nITEMS \n \n& TO-\nBACCO \nFOOTWEAR \nELEC-\nTRICTY, GAS \nAND \n \n \n \nCULTURE \nHOTELS \nGOODS & \nFOOD \nNON ALCO-\nHOLIC \nBEVER-\nAGES \n \n \n \n \n& OTHER \nEQUIP-\nMENT \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSERVICES \n \n \n \n \n \nFUELS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nWEIGHTS \n4.38 \n6.05 \n17.74 \n9.91 \n2.16 \n9.76 \n3.41 \n2.1 \n5.67 \n1.38 \n3.91 \n66.47 \n33.53 \n100 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nMAY \n5.88 \n-0.38 \n3.95 \n0.66 \n3.60 \n6.85 \n-13.13 \n-0.83 \n12.56 \n1.44 \n1.04 \n1.54 \n3.54 \n2.20 \nJUNE \n5.40 \n-0.50 \n2.65 \n0.16 \n3.03 \n6.85 \n-13.40 \n-0.33 \n7.75 \n1.35 \n1.22 \n1.35 \n2.90 \n1.87 \nJULY \n4.83 \n0.14 \n2.54 \n-0.05 \n2.84 \n4.96 \n-13.47 \n-0.61 \n12.70 \n0.71 \n1.00 \n1.00 \n1.74 \n1.25 \nAUGUST \n4.44 \n0.30 \n3.04 \n-0.39 \n2.79 \n5.04 \n-13.57 \n-0.70 \n8.83 \n1.60 \n0.81 \n1.44 \n0.94 \n1.28 \nSEPTEMBER \n4.36 \n0.61 \n3.70 \n-0.37 \n2.10 \n5.06 \n-13.66 \n-1.01 \n5.74 \n1.23 \n0.93 \n1.45 \n-0.32 \n0.86 \nOCTOBER \n5.23 \n0.25 \n2.96 \n-0.70 \n2.21 \n1.40 \n-13.76 \n-0.73 \n9.05 \n0.83 \n-0.20 \n1.25 \n-0.74 \n0.59 \nNOVEMBER \n5.94 \n-0.07 \n3.51 \n-1.03 \n2.42 \n-7.04 \n-13.83 \n-0.92 \n11.19 \n2.06 \n-0.35 \n1.58 \n-1.51 \n0.54 \nDECEMBER \n4.26 \n0.09 \n3.63 \n-1.08 \n2.11 \n1.61 \n-13.99 \n-1.03 \n11.29 \n2.03 \n-0.87 \n1.61 \n-2.20 \n0.33 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n5.03 \n0.03 \n3.63 \n-1.07 \n1.87 \n1.62 \n-14.00 \n-1.12 \n11.30 \n2.18 \n-0.43 \n1.67 \n-2.08 \n0.41 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFEBRUARY \n2.21 \n-0.43 \n3.09 \n-1.35 \n0.44 \n0.05 \n-13.86 \n-1.08 \n11.47 \n1.32 \n-1.45 \n0.93 \n-3.26 \n-0.49 \n25 \n TABLE 6 : SELECTED INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE RATES \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSA \nBW \nJAPANESE \nEUROPEAN \nPOUND \nEND OF \nRAND/1 \nPULA/1 \nYEN/1 \nCURRENCY/2 \nSTERLING/2 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJUNE \n8.38 \n7.77 \n79.42 \n1.25 \n1.56 \nJULY \n8.18 \n7.74 \n78.23 \n1.23 \n1.57 \nAUGUST \n8.45 \n7.80 \n78.47 \n1.25 \n1.58 \nSEPTEMBER \n8.23 \n7.65 \n77.50 \n1.29 \n1.63 \nOCTOBER \n8.64 \n7.88 \n79.78 \n1.30 \n1.61 \nNOVEMBER \n8.78 \n7.95 \n80.94 \n1.30 \n1.60 \nDECEMBER \n8.48 \n7.88 \n86.06 \n1.32 \n1.62 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n9.03 \n8.05 \n90.90 \n1.36 \n1.58 \nFEBRUARY \n8.84 \n8.04 \n92.36 \n1.31 \n1.52 \nMARCH \n9.26 \n8.30 \n94.13 \n1.28 \n1.51 \nAPRIL \n8.98 \n8.10 \n97.76 \n1.31 \n1.55 \nMAY \n10.08 \n8.65 \n100.85 \n1.30 \n1.52 \nJUNE \n9.94 \n8.60 \n98.74 \n1.31 \n1.53 \nJULY \n9.83 \n8.49 \n98.31 \n1.33 \n1.53 \nAUGUST \n10.33 \n8.75 \n98.18 \n1.32 \n1.55 \nSEPTEMBER \n10.10 \n8.58 \n97.92 \n1.35 \n1.62 \nOCTOBER \n9.95 \n8.50 \n98.28 \n1.37 \n1.60 \nNOVEMBER \n10.19 \n8.64 \n102.33 \n1.36 \n1.64 \nDECEMBER \n10.43 \n8.72 \n105.02 \n1.38 \n1.65 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n11.21 \n9.09 \n102.47 \n1.35 \n1.65 \nFEBRUARY \n10.71 \n8.85 \n101.74 \n1.37 \n1.67 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1. Foreign currency per US Dollar. \n \n \n \n \n2. US Dollar per unit of foreign currency. \n \n \n \n \n26 \nTABLE 7.1: COMMERCIAL BANKS - ASSETS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ Millions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nLiquid Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSecurities \n \n \nLoans & Contingent \nOther \nNon Financial \nTotal \nEnd of \nNotes \n \n \n \n \n \n \nTotal \nOther Balances Advances \nAssets \nAssets \nAssets \nAssets \n \n& \nBalances \nBalances \nBalances \n \n \n \n Liquid \nwith RBZ \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCoin \nwith \nwith Other \nat \nTrade \nTreasury Agric PEs \n Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nat Banks \nRBZ \nBanks \nForeign \nBanks \nBills \nBills \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Jan \n323.4 \n378.5 \n103.4 \n182.3 \n247.8 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n1,235.5 \n52.2 \n2,694.9 \n386.1 \n205.7 \n386.7 \n4,961.1 \nFeb \n292.2 \n357.7 \n120.5 \n234.6 \n239.9 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n1,244.9 \n27.7 \n2,289.3 \n328.8 \n208.0 \n388.3 \n4,887.0 \nMar \n271.6 \n345.7 \n196.1 \n198.9 \n265.3 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n1,277.6 \n26.1 \n2,715.8 \n367.2 \n228.8 \n388.0 \n5,003.5 \nApr \n263.8 \n383.6 \n201.1 \n272.9 \n289.9 \n75.3 \n5.2 \n1,491.7 \n26.3 \n2,595.8 \n341.3 \n207.0 \n382.1 \n5,044.2 \n May \n250.9 \n400.9 \n198.2 \n296.7 \n253.5 \n75.4 \n5.3 \n1,480.8 \n25.8 \n2,673.2 \n389.8 \n208.0 \n382.9 \n5,160.5 \nJun \n227.2 \n416.4 \n171.9 \n257.5 \n271.8 \n75.5 \n5.3 \n1,425.8 \n26.0 \n2,698.3 \n364.1 \n217.8 \n384.6 \n5,116.5 \nJul \n266.5 \n352.8 \n164.2 \n266.1 \n263.8 \n110.2 \n6.4 \n1,429.9 \n26.5 \n2,701.3 \n337.1 \n229.8 \n387.0 \n5,111.7 \n Aug. \n322.8 \n277.9 \n136.4 \n242.5 \n237.8 \n61.1 \n6.4 \n1,285.0 \n26.2 \n2,813.0 \n367.0 \n218.3 \n385.2 \n5,094.7 \n Sep \n334.1 \n336.0 \n178.0 \n327.8 \n226.3 \n111.5 \n6.0 \n1,519.7 \n26.9 \n2773.3 \n298.8 \n234.7 \n386.4 \n5,239.8 \nOct \n379.4 \n387.5 \n137.1 \n219.7 \n260.9 \n99.4 \n5.0 \n1,489.0 \n17.3 \n2,809.1 \n316.7 \n257.3 \n371.5 \n5,260.9 \nNov \n333.3 \n312.7 \n160.2 \n197.1 \n261.1 \n108.6 \n6.5 \n1,379.5 \n26.6 \n2,789.7 \n291.3 \n235.4 \n369.8 \n5,092.3 \nDec \n 354.8 \n367.8 \n135.5 \n 287.3 \n199.9 \n118.0 \n6.6 \n1,469.9 \n28.4 \n2,799.5 \n490.8 \n259.5 \n347.6 \n5,395.7 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Jan \n356.9 \n395.3 \n134.1 \n253.1 \n153.0 \n119.2 \n5.4 \n1,417.0 \n27.9 \n2,866.4 \n516.1 \n362.2 \n353.9 \n5,543.5 \nFeb \n334.3 \n387.0 \n130.5 \n285.0 \n195 \n193.2 \n5.4 \n1,530 \n32.8 \n2,718.1 \n534.5 \n502.9 \n351.1 \n5,669.5 \n27 \nTABLE 7.2: COMMERCIAL BANKS - LIABILITIES \nUS$ Millions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nDeposits \n \n \n \nAmounts Owing to \nCapital \nContingent \nOther \nTotal \nOf which \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nand \nLiabilities Liabilities Liabilities Liabilities \nto the \nEnd of \nDemand \nSavings and \nShort-term \nLong-term \nTotal \nForeign \nLiabilities \nRBZ \nOther Banks Reserves \n \n \n \nPublic \n \n \n \n \n Deposits \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n2,032.2 \n866.1 \n552.4 \n3,450.7 \n266.1 \n0.0 \n27.8 \n623.9 \n386.1 \n206.5 \n4,961.1 \n3,450.7 \nFeb \n1,987.8 \n933.3 \n491.5 \n3,412.5 \n258.1 \n0.0 \n32.4 \n631.9 \n328.8 \n223.3 \n4,887.0 \n3,417.9 \nMar \n1,960.1 \n976.3 \n451.1 \n3,387.3 \n290.9 \n0.0 \n32.8 \n687.7 \n367.2 \n237.6 \n5,003.5 \n3,387.3 \nApr \n 2,074.5 \n1,046.3 \n379.5 \n3,500.3 \n 247.6 \n0.0 \n37.9 \n667.2 \n341.3 \n249.8 \n5,044.2 \n3,500.3 \nMay \n2,066.0 \n913.0 \n479.9 \n3,459.0 \n346.5 \n0.0 \n81.8 \n674.4 \n389.8 \n209.0 \n5,160.4 \n3,459.0 \nJun \n2,013.9 \n919.6 \n298.9 \n3,232.4 \n553.0 \n0.0 \n74.1 \n702.3 \n364.1 \n190.6 \n5,116.5 \n3,232.4 \nJul \n2,054.1 \n916.2 \n245.9 \n3,216.2 \n578.3 \n0.0 \n77.5 \n699.7 \n337.1 \n202.9 \n 5,111.7 \n3,216.2 \nAug \n2,017.4 \n879.5 \n253.2 \n3,150.1 \n608.2 \n0.0 \n63.8 \n694.9 \n367.0 \n210.8 \n5,094.7 \n3,150.1 \nSep \n2,082.1 \n899.3 \n294.5 \n3,275.8 \n674.6 \n0.0 \n 74.0 \n708.8 \n298.8 \n207.7 \n5,239.8 \n3,275.8 \nOct \n2,125.9 \n880.0 \n349.3 \n3,355.2 \n611.4 \n0.0 \n68.5 \n703.0 \n316.7 \n206.0 \n5,260.9 \n3,355.2 \nNov \n1,953.4 \n861.2 \n 371.6 \n3,186.2 \n627.8 \n0.0 \n75.8 \n689.7 \n291.3 \n221.6 \n5,092.3 \n3,186.2 \nDec \n 1,980.4 \n813.6 \n 517.1 \n3,311.1 \n614.0 \n0.0 \n65.0 \n730.9 \n490.8 \n 184.0 \n 5,395.7 \n3,311.1 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n2,153.6 \n802.7 \n403.5 \n3,359.8 \n661.3 \n0.0 \n55.9 \n592.9 \n516.1 \n357.5 \n5,543.5 \n3,359.8 \nFeb \n2,111.8 \n878.8 \n494.6 \n3,485.2 \n630.0 \n0.0 \n51.1 \n609.5 \n534.5 \n359.0 \n5,669.5 \n3,485.2 \n28 \nTABLE 8.1 : ACCEPTING HOUSES - ASSETS \nUS$ Millions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nLiquid Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nLoans & Contingent \nOther \nNon Financial \nTotal \nEnd of \nNotes \n \n \n \n \n \nTotal \nOther \nBalances Advances \nAssets \nAssets \nAssets \nAssets \n \n& \nBalances Balances Balances \n \n \nLiquid \nwith RBZ \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCoin \nwith \nwith Other \nat \nTrade \nTreasury \n Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nat Banks \nRBZ \nBanks \nForeign \nBanks \nBills \nBills \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFeb \n4.7 \n1.5 \n18.4 \n0.0 \n4.5 \n0.0 \n26.9 \n0.0 \n245.7 \n34.8 \n63.9 \n28.9 \n398.2 \nMar \n2.5 \n1.1 \n7.3 \n-3.1 \n1.2 \n0.0 \n8.9 \n0.0 \n260.3 \n34.2 \n50.4 \n28.8 \n382.6 \nApr \n2.7 \n1.3 \n20.1 \n-1.9 \n1.2 \n0.0 \n23.4 \n0.0 \n254.9 \n34.2 \n51.7 \n27.7 \n392.0 \nMay \n2.4 \n4.1 \n18.6 \n-2.4 \n4.5 \n0.0 \n27.3 \n0.0 \n253.4 \n34.6 \n63.0 \n12.7 \n391.0 \nJun \n2.4 \n3.6 \n7.9 \n1.1 \n9.1 \n0.0 \n24.1 \n0.0 \n260.3 \n34.6 \n51.4 \n35.2 \n405.6 \nJul \n1.9 \n1.3 \n2.8 \n2.2 \n3.4 \n0.0 \n11.6 \n0.0 \n264.0 \n34.8 \n51.7 \n35.5 \n397.6 \nAug \n1.4 \n1.7 \n0.4 \n0.6 \n3.4 \n0.0 \n7.4 \n0.0 \n265.6 \n34.5 \n45.5 \n37.3 \n390.3 \nSep \n1.2 \n0.8 \n0.0 \n0.3 \n3.4 \n0.0 \n5.7 \n0.0 \n233.7 \n35.8 \n46.6 \n38.6 \n360.4 \nOct \n0.9 \n0.5 \n0.4 \n0.6 \n2.5 \n0.0 \n4.8 \n0.0 \n234.8 \n35.6 \n41.3 \n38.7 \n355.2 \nNov \n0.4 \n0.6 \n0.1 \n0.2 \n2.5 \n0.0 \n3.9 \n0.0 \n231.9 \n35.5 \n39.6 \n38.3 \n349.2 \nDec \n1.1 \n0.5 \n0.1 \n0.4 \n2.5 \n0.0 \n4.6 \n0.0 \n232.7 \n35.5 \n29.2 \n40.5 \n342.5 \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n0.1 \n0.5 \n0.0 \n0.2 \n1.8 \n0.0 \n2.6 \n0.0 \n81.3 \n10.0 \n23.5 \n34.7 \n152.1 \nFeb \n0.2 \n0.4 \n0.1 \n0.1 \n1.8 \n0.0 \n2.5 \n0.0 \n77.6 \n9.0 \n24.1 \n34.6 \n147.9 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n29 \nTABLE 8.2 : ACCEPTING HOUSES - LIABILITIES \nUS$ Millions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nOf which \n \n \nDeposits \n \n \n \nAmounts Owing to \nCapital \nContingent \nOther \nTotal \nLiabilities to the \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nand \nLiabilities \nLiabilities \nLiabilities \nPublic \nEnd of Demand Savings and \nShort-term \nLong-term \nTotal \nForeign \nLiabilities \nRBZ \nOther \nBanks \nReserves \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Deposits \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n106.9 \n91.7 \n21.3 \n220.0 \n44.8 \n0.0 \n2.7 \n-72.4 \n34.8 \n167.2 \n397.0 \n220.0 \nFeb \n102.8 \n66.0 \n55.7 \n224.5 \n45.3 \n0.0 \n2.7 \n-77.8 \n34.8 \n168.7 \n398.2 \n224.5 \nMar \n104.3 \n62.3 \n52.8 \n219.5 \n45.8 \n0.0 \n1.2 \n-97.3 \n34.2 \n179.3 \n382.6 \n219.5 \nApr \n107.3 64.6 \n56.3 \n228.3 \n 45.4 \n0.0 \n1.2 -98.1 \n34.2 \n 181.1 \n392.0 \n228.3 \nMay \n112.2 \n67.1 \n54.4 \n233.6 \n46.7 \n0.0 \n1.2 \n-99.4 \n34.6 \n174.3 \n391.0 \n233.6 \nJun \n114.6 \n56.2 \n52.3 \n223.1 \n46.7 \n0.0 \n1.2 \n-91.2 \n34.6 \n191.2 \n405.6 \n223.1 \nJul \n111.3 \n82.7 \n27.0 \n220.9 \n47.1 \n0.0 \n1.2 \n-94.1 \n34.8 \n187.8 \n397.6 \n220.9 \nAug \n109.5 \n80.6 \n 25.2 \n215.2 \n47.5 \n0.0 \n1.2 \n-101.7 \n34.5 \n 193.6 \n390.3 \n 215.2 \nSep \n111.2 \n82.6 \n19.0 \n212.8 \n47.9 \n0.0 \n1.2 \n-114.9 \n35.8 \n177.8 \n360.4 \n212.8 \nOct \n112.5 \n80.4 \n14.9 \n207.8 \n48.3 \n0.0 \n1.2 \n-114.3 \n35.6 \n176.7 \n355.2 \n207.8 \nNov \n122.6 \n59.7 \n20.0 \n202.3 \n48.2 \n0.0 \n1.2 \n-118.2 \n35.5 \n180.2 \n349.2 \n202.3 \nDec \n134.5 \n56.4 \n6.9 \n 197.8 \n48.9 \n0.0 \n1.2 \n-127.6 \n35.5 \n186.7 \n342.5 \n 197.8 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n36.8 \n57.7 \n5.7 \n100.1 \n11.7 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.7 \n10.0 \n29.6 \n152.1 \n100.1 \nFeb \n47.6 \n48.3 \n0.0 \n95.8 \n11.7 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n-10.9 \n9.0 \n42.3 \n147.9 \n95.8 \n30 \nTABLE 9.1 : BUILDING SOCIETIES - ASSETS \nUS$ Millions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nLiquid Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nNotes \nBalances \nTrade \nTreasury \nTotal \nMortgage \nOther \nOther \nNon Finan-\ncial \nTotal \nEnd of \n& \nwith Other \nBills \nBills \nLiquid \nAdvances \nAdvances \nAssets \nAssets \n Assets \n \nCoin \nBanks \n \n \n Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \nat Banks \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n20.4 \n125.5 \n0.2 \n0.0 \n146.1 \n283.2 \n118.5 \n36.1 \n121.4 \n705.3 \nFeb \n20.2 \n164.3 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n84.5 \n291.8 \n117.9 \n35.3 \n121.4 \n734.2 \nMar \n18.8 \n129.1 \n0.2 \n20.0 \n168.1 \n291.4 \n116.9 \n39.5 \n121.4 \n737.3 \nApr \n16.9 \n159.8 \n0.2 \n20.2 \n197.2 \n294.8 \n115.5 \n39.5 \n122.1 \n769.1 \nMay \n30.2 \n179.6 \n0.2 \n20.3 \n230.0 \n307.3 \n120.3 \n40.4 \n121.9 \n820.0 \nJun \n28.6 \n178.8 \n0.0 \n20.0 \n227.3 \n314.2 \n122.4 \n44.6 \n121.8 \n830.3 \nJul \n26.1 \n207.4 \n0.0 \n20.0 \n253.5 \n312.4 \n123.1 \n48.6 \n121.6 \n859.2 \nAug \n34.7 \n204.1 \n0.0 \n20.0 \n258.8 \n320.6 \n123.0 \n46.4 \n124.1 \n872.9 \nSep \n36.4 \n204.9 \n0.0 \n20.0 \n261.3 \n353.4 \n122.7 \n52.2 \n124.6 \n914.2 \nOct \n39.3 \n186.8 \n0.0 \n20.0 \n246.1 \n358.4 \n128.2 \n51.8 \n122.4 \n906.9 \nNov \n39.7 \n163.1 \n0.0 \n40.0 \n242.8 \n361.6 \n135.8 \n43.6 \n122.9 \n906.7 \nDec \n34.8 \n158.8 \n0.0 \n40.0 \n233.6 \n381.5 \n127.7 \n55.2 \n123.0 \n920.9 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n30.9 \n147.5 \n0.2 \n40.0 \n218.6 \n384.5 \n136.4 \n64.4 \n125.3 \n929.1 \nFeb \n30.2 \n165.0 \n0.2 \n40.0 \n235.3 \n385.8 \n132.0 \n65.4 \n125.4 \n943.9 \n31 \nTABLE 9.2 : BUILDING SOCIETIES - LIABILITIES \nUS$ Millions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nOf which \n \nDeposits \nCapital \nOther \nTotal \nLiabilities to the \n \n \n \n \nand \nLiabilities \n Liabilities \nPublic \nEnd of \nSavings and \nShort-term \nLong-term \nTotal \nReserves \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Deposits \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Jan \n201.3 \n94.2 \n295.5 \n127.3 \n95.7 \n518.5 \n295.5 \n Feb \n209.9 \n115.3 \n325.2 \n129.9 \n96.7 \n551.8 \n325.2 \n Mar \n182.1 \n152.2 \n334.3 \n129.6 \n76.7 \n540.7 \n334.3 \n Apr \n205.3 \n126.2 \n331.5 \n131.9 \n90.5 \n554.0 \n331.5 \n May \n242.1 \n93.4 \n335.5 \n136.3 \n70.4 \n564.0 \n335.5 \n Jun \n260.1 \n109.7 \n369.7 \n141.8 \n82.7 \n594.3 \n369.7 \n Jul \n233.2 \n156.1 \n389.3 \n145.7 \n79.3 \n614.3 \n389.3 \n Aug \n231.0 \n170.1 \n401.2 \n150.0 \n79..8 \n630.9 \n401.2 \n Sep \n247.3 \n172.8 \n420.0 \n153.1 \n80.0 \n653.0 \n420.0 \n Oct \n263.2 \n165.4 \n428.6 \n159.8 \n27.5 \n675.1 \n428.6 \n Nov \n246.8 \n179.5 \n426.3 \n165.5 \n28.2 \n694.3 \n426.3 \n Dec \n255.8 \n184.6 \n440.3 \n177.8 \n28.1 \n716.9 \n440.3 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Jan \n230.0 \n192.8 \n422.8 \n180.3 \n102.3 \n705.3 \n422.8 \n Feb \n255.7 \n194.2 \n449.9 \n183.7 \n100.6 \n734.2 \n449.9 \n Mar \n250.6 \n203.9 \n454.5 \n187.2 \n95.7 \n737.3 \n454.5 \n Apr \n252.9 \n226.6 \n479.5 \n190.6 \n22.3 \n769.3 \n479.5 \n May \n315.3 \n212.0 \n527.4 \n193.3 \n23.4 \n820.0 \n527.4 \n Jun \n309.0 \n222.6 \n531.6 \n198.3 \n100.4 \n830.3 \n531.6 \n Jul \n339.1 \n222.8 \n561.9 \n202.0 \n95.3 \n859.2 \n561.9 \n Aug \n298.4 \n270.1 \n568.4 \n206.3 \n98.2 \n872.9 \n568.4 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Sep \n336.1 \n246.9 \n583.0 \n209.2 \n122.0 \n914.2 \n583.0 \n Oct \n310.9 \n264.9 \n575.8 \n212.0 \n119.4 \n907.2 \n575.8 \n Nov \n328.9 \n244.3 \n573.1 \n214.8 \n118.8 \n906.7 \n573.1 \n Dec \n370.3 \n197.3 \n567.6 \n219.6 \n133.9 \n921.0 \n567.6 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n313.9 \n253.1 \n567.0 \n225.9 \n136.2 \n929.1 \n567.0 \nFeb \n318.7 \n264.4 \n583.1 \n228.6 \n132.2 \n943.9 \n583.1 \n32 \nTable 10: ZIMBABWE STOCK MARKET STATISTICS \n \n \n \n \n \nIndices \nUS$ Millions \n \nIndustrial \nMining \nMarket Capitalisation \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJun \n131.96 \n75.70 \n3,341.46 \nJul \n132.92 \n112.12 \n3,445.93 \nAug \n132.27 \n89.04 \n3,434.00 \nSep \n146.00 \n96.00 \n3,822.80 \nOct \n154.47 \n93.66 \n4,033,76 \nNov \n150.16 \n68.74 \n3,890.9 \nDec \n152.40 \n65.12 \n3,963.50 \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n179.34 \n84.07 \n4,700.33 \nFeb \n182.3 \n72.01 \n4,748.24 \nMar \n183.88 \n66.21 \n4,726.34 \nApr \n189.66 \n71.98 \n4,894.68 \nMay \n212.72 \n73.99 \n5,471.22 \nJun \n211.19 \n73.29 \n5,436.57 \nJul \n232.87 \n66.77 \n5,9136.78 \nAug \n181.67 \n48.73 \n4,682.27 \nSep \n200.05 \n49.90 \n5,157.20 \nOct \n209.74 \n52.68 \n5,407.42 \nNov \n213.04 \n47.02 \n5,482.03 \nDec \n202.12 \n45.79 \n5,203.13 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) \n \n \n \n \n \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n189.25 \n35.40 \n4,882.11 \nFeb \n189.45 \n39.24 \n4,906.94 \n33 \nTABLE 11 : SAVINGS /1 WITH FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ Millions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCommercial \nMerchant \n \nBuilding \n \nEnd of \nBanks \nBanks \nOther/2 \nSocieties \nTOTAL \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJanuary \n1,418.5 \n113.0 \n64.3 \n422.8 \n2,018.6 \nFebruary \n1,424.8 \n121.7 \n64.7 \n449.9 \n2,061.1 \nMarch \n1,427.3 \n115.2 \n66.7 \n454.5 \n2,063.6 \nApril \n1,425.8 \n121.0 \n63.9 \n479.5 \n2,090.1 \nMay \n1,393.0 \n121.5 \n66.2 \n527.4 \n2,108.0 \nJune \n1,218.4 \n108.6 \n70.6 \n531.6 \n1,929.2 \nJuly \n1,162.1 \n109.7 \n70.8 \n561.9 \n1,904.5 \nAugust \n1,132.7 \n105.8 \n70.4 \n568.4 \n1,877.2 \nSeptember \n1,193.8 \n101.6 \n69.8 \n583.0 \n1,948.2 \nOctober \n1,229.3 \n95.2 \n69.3 \n575.8 \n1,969.7 \nNovember \n1,232.8 \n79.7 \n73.4 \n573.1 \n1,959.0 \nDecember \n1,330.7 \n63.3 \n72.7 \n567.6 \n2,034.3 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1/ Comprises all deposits other than demand deposits. \n2/ Includes People’s Own Savings Bank (POSB). \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJanuary \n1,206.2 \n63.3 \n70.1 \n567.0 \n1,906.7 \nFebruary \n1,373.4 \n48.3 \n71.5 \n583.1 \n2,076.3 \n34 \nTABLE 12 : ANALYSIS OF LIQUID ASSETS OF MONETARY BANKS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ Millions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCommercial Banks \nAccepting Houses \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nLiquid \nPrescribed \nExcess \nLiquid \nPrescribed \nExcess \n \nassets \nliquid \nliquid \nassets \nliquid \nLiquid \nEnd of \nheld \nassets/1 \nassets \nheld \nassets/1 \nassets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJanuary \n1,235.5 \n1,035.2 \n200.3 \n36.2 \n66.0 \n-29.8 \nFebruary \n1,244.9 \n1,025.4 \n219.5 \n26.9 \n67.3 \n-40.4 \nMarch \n1,277.6 \n1,016.2 \n261.4 \n8.9 \n65.8 \n-57.0 \nApril \n1,491.7 \n1,050.1 \n441.6 \n23.4 \n68.5 \n-45.1 \nMay \n1,480.8 \n1,037.7 \n443.1 \n27.3 \n70.1 \n-42.8 \nJune \n1,425.8 \n969.7 \n456.0 \n24.1 \n66.9 \n-42.8 \nJuly \n1,429.9 \n964.9 \n465.1 \n11.6 \n66.3 \n-54.7 \nAugust \n1,285.0 \n945.0 \n340.0 \n7.4 \n64.6 \n-57.2 \nSeptember \n1,519.7 \n982.7 \n536.9 \n5.7 \n63.8 \n-58.1 \nOctober \n1,489.0 \n1,006.6 \n482.5 \n4.8 \n62.3 \n-57.5 \nNovember \n1,379.5 \n955.9 \n423.7 \n3.9 \n60.7 \n-56.8 \nDecember \n1,469.9 \n993.3 \n476.6 \n4.6 \n59.3 \n-54.7 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1/ With effect from May 2012, the prescribed liquid asset ratio was reviewed to 30% of liabilities to the public. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJanuary \n1,417.0 \n1,007.9 \n409.0 \n2.6 \n30.0 \n-27.4 \nFebruary \n1,466.6 \n1,045.6 \n421.0 \n2.5 \n28.7 \n-26.2 \n35 \nTABLE 13.1 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS TRANSACTIONAL ACTIVITY \nValues of Transactions (US$ in millions) \nMONTH \nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS \nATM \nMOBILE \n INTERNET \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n3,563.84 \n5.24 \n80.72 \n173.71 \n115.53 \n89.67 \nFeb \n2,968.02 \n5.52 \n103.88 \n156.66 \n118.70 \n80.56 \nMar \n3,339.98 \n15.21 \n134.33 \n178.08 \n118.47 \n102.05 \nApr \n3,535.58 \n16.58 \n140.28 \n187.85 \n160.61 \n123.03 \nMay \n3,915.31 \n15.42 \n129.20 \n203.37 \n211.75 \n152.24 \nJun \n3,544.35 \n13.65 \n117.11 \n181.35 \n146.64 \n121.98 \nJul \n3,955.45 \n12.31 \n132.61 \n205.37 \n164.08 \n139.13 \nAug \n3,351.13 \n10.45 \n138.05 \n203.41 \n189.48 \n128.68 \nSep \n3,409.17 \n13.34 \n120.41 \n190.44 \n173.13 \n142.32 \nOct \n3,641.98 \n13.75 \n121.55 \n206.51 \n201.51 \n156.26 \nNov \n3,134.35 \n11.40 \n102.19 \n229.52 \n222.18 \n57.34 \nDec \n3,438.08 \n4.04 \n130.15 \n265.80 \n268.94 \n68.58 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAnnual Total \n41,797.24 \n136.91 \n1,450.48 \n2,382.07 \n2,091.02 \n1,361.84 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n3,093.01 \n5.24 \n102.26 \n233.10 \n228.25 \n68.31 \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFeb \n2,954.93 \n10.73 \n96.27 \n193.90 \n217.14 \n64.42 \n36 \nTABLE 13.2 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS TRANSACTIONAL ACTIVITY \nVolumes of Transactions (in thousands) \nMONTH \nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS \nATM \nMOBILE \n INTERNET \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n181.68 \n21.18 \n761.09 \n691.18 \n6,950.84 \n47.53 \nFeb \n172.41 \n21.95 \n811.83 \n620.06 \n6,835.89 \n30.75 \nMar \n179.44 \n37.01 \n1,377.65 \n743.82 \n7,042.27 \n33.69 \nApr \n182.87 \n37.31 \n954.80 \n760.46 \n9,908.41 \n34.73 \nMay \n215.20 \n37.09 \n954.18 \n793.43 \n12,146.90 \n38.68 \nJun \n185.80 \n34.36 \n968.54 \n731.17 \n9,110.97 \n36.87 \nJul \n205.85 \n35.41 \n1,052.26 \n822.57 \n10,099.72 \n42.74 \nAug \n187.25 \n30.29 \n1,114.86 \n825.75 \n11,551.94 \n41.78 \nSep \n201.22 \n33.17 \n1,003.98 \n799.62 \n8,701.56 \n44.48 \nOct \n212.66 \n35.69 \n1,073.88 \n873.19 \n9,769.81 \n48.59 \nNov \n186.64 \n31.74 \n904.27 \n927.93 \n14,753.35 \n24.04 \nDec \n180.80 \n11.82 \n1,033.73 \n1,042.32 \n12,273.02 \n23.56 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAnnual Total 2,291.82 367.02 12,011.07 \n 9,631.50 \n 119,144.68 447.44 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n182.48 \n29.41 \n973.79 \n815.89 \n11,141.19 \n24.19 \nFeb \n175.09 \n32.95 \n991.91 \n799.12 \n10,631.60 \n25.10", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/MPC_Statements/February2014.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "3ba5249127c46f0cffe2f930f4b85873", "text": "Vol. 25 No. 42 \n \n \nWeek Ending \n20th October 2023 \nWeekly Economic \nHighlights \nTABLE OF CONTENTS \n \n1. \nOVERVIEW ................................................................................................ 1 \n2. \nINTEREST RATES .................................................................................... 1 \n3. \nCLEARING AND SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY ...................................... 3 \n4. \nINTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICE DEVELOPMENTS ......... 5 \n5. \nEQUITY MARKETS.................................................................................. 8 \n6. \nBEYOND INFLATION NUMBERS - THE CASE OF \nSKIMPFLATION ..................................................................................... 11 \n \n \n \n \n 1 \n1. OVERVIEW \n \nThis report provides an analysis of the developments in the money and capital markets for the \nweek ending 20th October 2023. The report also covers an article on Skimpflation which is a \ntrend where businesses reduce the quality of products or services for the same price. \n \nThe Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) exhibited bullish sentiment, while the Victoria Falls Stock \nExchange (VFEX) was characterised by bearish sentiment, during the week under analysis. The \ncountry’s National Payment Systems (NPS) processed transactions valued at ZW$5,4 trillion \nduring the reporting week, up by 6.01% from the value of transactions processed during the week \nending 13th October 2023. \n \nMinimum and maximum deposit rates for foreign currency deposits remained unchanged, during \nthe week ending 20th October 2023. In the same week, international commodity prices for gold, \nplatinum, and crude oil increased, while those for palladium, copper, nickel, and lithium \ndecreased. \n2. INTEREST RATES \n \nLocal Currency (ZW$) Deposit Rates \n \nDuring the week ending 20th October 2023, minimum and maximum deposit rates for all deposit \nclasses remained largely unchanged. The average deposits rates are shown in Table 1. \n \nTable 1: Average Deposit Rates (per annum) \nDate \nSavings deposits \n \n1- Month deposit \nrates \n \n3- Month deposit \nrates \n \n6- Month deposit \nrates \n \n12- Month deposit \nrates \n \nMinimum \n(%) \nMaximum \n(%) \nMinimum \n(%) \nMaximum \n(%) \nMinimum \n(%) \nMaximum \n(%) \nMinimum \n(%) \nMaximum \n(%) \nMinimum \n(%) \nMaximum \n(%) \n22-Sep-23 \n38.14 \n38.80 \n59.00 \n70.11 \n65.59 \n61.67 \n \n59.17 \n68.64 \n59.33 \n68.79 \n29-Sep-23 \n34.29 \n35.60 \n59.00 \n70.00 \n61.67 \n69.33 \n59.17 \n68.64 \n59.33 \n68.79 \n6-Oct-23 \n34.29 \n35.60 \n59.00 \n \n70.00 \n61.17 \n69.33 \n59.17 \n68.64 \n59.33 \n68.79 \n13-Oct-23 \n34.29 \n35.60 \n59.00 \n69.33 \n61.67 \n70.35 \n59.17 \n68.64 \n59.33 \n68.79 \n20-Oct-23 \n34.29 \n35.60 \n59.00 \n69.33 \n61.67 \n70.35 \n59.17 \n68.64 \n59.33 \n68.79 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2023 \n \n \n \n \n 2 \n \n \nLocal Currency (ZW$) Lending Rates \n \nMinimum lending rates for both individual and corporate clients decreased, during the week \nunder analysis. Maximum lending rates for individual clients registered a marginal increase of \n0.09 percentage points to 101.61%, while those for corporate clients marginally declined by 0.4% \nto 165.53%. The lending rates are shown in Table 2. \n \n \nTable 2: Lending Rates (per annum) \nDate \nMinimum (%) \nMaximum (%) \nMinimum (%) \nMaximum (%) \n \nIndividual Clients \n \n Corporate Clients \n \n22-Sep-23 \n76.59 \n100.04 \n92.67 \n167.36 \n29-Sep-23 \n76.49 \n100.20 \n92.69 \n166.00 \n6-Oct-23 \n75.58 \n100.41 \n94.51 \n164.75 \n13-Oct \n74.11 \n101.52 \n93.91 \n165.93 \n20-Oct \n71.66 \n101.61 \n93.37 \n165.53 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2023 \n \nForeign Currency (USD) Deposit Rates \n \nDuring the week under review, minimum and maximum FCA deposit rates for all deposit classes \nremained unchanged. The average foreign currency deposits rates are shown in Table 3. \n \nTable 3: Average Foreign Currency Deposit Rates (per annum) \nDate \nSavings deposits \n1- Month deposit \nrates \n \n3- Month deposit rates \n \n6-Month deposit rates \n \n12- Month deposit \nrates \n \nMinimum \n(%) \nMaximum \n(%) \nMinimum \n(%) \nMaximum \n(%) \nMinimum \n(%) \nMaximum \n(%) \nMinimum \n(%) \nMaximum \n(%) \nMinimum \n(%) \nMaximum \n(%) \n22-Sep-23 \n1.27 \n1.81 \n3.15 \n4.62 \n3.33 \n5.00 \n3.35 \n5.27 \n3.43 \n5.50 \n29-Sep-23 \n1.27 \n1.81 \n3.15 \n4.62 \n \n3.33 \n5.00 \n3.35 \n5.27 \n3.43 \n5.50 \n6-Oct-23 \n1.27 \n1.81 \n3.15 \n4.56 \n3.33 \n5.00 \n3.35 \n5.27 \n3.43 \n5.50 \n13-Oct-23 \n1.27 \n1.81 \n3.15 \n4.56 \n3.33 \n5.00 \n3.35 \n5.27 \n3.43 \n5.50 \n20-Oct-23 \n1.27 \n1.81 \n3.15 \n4.56 \n3.33 \n5.00 \n3.35 \n5.27 \n3.43 \n5.50 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2023 \n \n \n \n \n 3 \nForeign Currency (USD) Lending Rates \nMinimum and maximum foreign currency lending rates for individual clients registered marginal \nincreases, during the week under analysis. Minimum foreign currency lending rates for corporate \nclients softened marginally, while maximum lending rates for the same category of customers \nregistered a marginal increase, during the week under analysis. \n \nTable 4: Lending Rates (per annum) \n \nMinimum (%) \nMaximum (%) \nMinimum (%) \nMaximum (%) \n \nIndividual Clients \nCorporate Clients \n \n22-Sep-23 \n11.19 \n13.32 \n8.19 \n14.28 \n29-Sep-23 \n11.26 \n12.98 \n7.84 \n15.06 \n6-Oct-23 \n10.94 \n13.84 \n8.29 \n13.63 \n13-Oct-23 \n11.15 \n13.35 \n8.27 \n14.20 \n20-Oct-23 \n11.16 \n13.36 \n8.24 \n14.28 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2023 \n3. CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY \n \nThe total value of transactions processed through the National Payment Systems (NPS) stood at \nZW$5.41 trillion, during the week ending 20 October 2023, representing an increase of 6.01% \nfrom the previous week. Transactions processed through the Real Time Gross Settlement \n(RTGS) system rose by 8.3% to ZW$4.6 trillion, during the reporting week. The distribution of \nNPS transactions, in value terms, was as follows: RTGS, 85.17%; Mobile, 5.34%, Point of Sale \n(POS), 5.31% and Automated Teller Machines (ATM), 4.18%, as shown in Figure 1. \n \nFigure 1: Composition of NPS Transactions in Value Terms \n \n Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2023 \n \n \n \nRTGS\n85.17%\nPOS\n5.31%\nATM\n4.18%\nMOBILE\n5.34%\nRTGS\nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\n \n 4 \nThe volume of transactions processed through the NPS decreased by 6.22% to close at 11.53 \nmillion, largely due to decreases in RTGS and mobile transaction volumes. The NPS transaction \nvolumes were distributed as follows: Mobile, 80.71%; POS, 16.57%; ATM, 1.34%; and RTGS, \n1.38%, as shown in Figure 2. \n \n Figure 2: Composition of NPS Transactions in Volume Terms \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2023 \n \nTable 5: National Payment Systems Activity \nPAYMENT \nSTREAM \n WEEK ENDING \n13 OCTOBER 2023 \n WEEK ENDING \n20 OCTOBER 2023 \n% CHANGE \nFROM LAST \nWEEK \nPROPORTION \n \nVALUES IN DOLLARS \n \nRTGS \n4,251,805,045,483.88 \n4,604,138,729,789.45 \n8.29% \n85.17% \nPOS \n287,266,250,525.41 \n287,192,503,594.00 \n-0.03% \n5.31% \nATM \n179,870,673,429.88 \n226,184,705,222.41 \n25.75% \n4.18% \nMOBILE \n380,497,740,156.47 \n288,621,379,652.69 \n-24.15% \n5.34% \nTOTAL \n5,099,439,709,595.64 \n5,406,137,318,258.55 \n6.01% \n100% \n \nVOLUMES \n \nRTGS \n177,537 \n159,049 \n-10.41% \n1.38% \nPOS \n1,847,872 \n1,909,936 \n3.359% \n16.57% \nATM \n133,743 \n154,548 \n15.56% \n1.34% \nMOBILE \n10,131,581 \n9,302,420 \n-8.18% \n80.71% \nTOTAL \n12,290,733 \n11,525,953 \n-6.22% \n100% \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2023 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nRTGS, 1.38%\nPOS, 16.57%\nATM, 1.34%\nMOBILE, 80.71%\nRTGS\nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\n \n 5 \n4. INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICE DEVELOPMENTS \n \n \nDuring the week under review, international commodity prices for gold, platinum, and crude oil \nincreased, while palladium, copper, nickel, and lithium prices decreased, as shown in Table 6. \n \n`Table 6: Metal and Crude Oil Prices for the week ending 20th October 2023 \n \nGold \nPlatinum \nPalladium \nCopper \nNickel \nCrude Oil \nLithium \n2023 \nUS$/ounce \nUS$/ounce \nUS$/ounce \nUS$/tonne \nUS$/tonne \nUS$/barrel \nUS$/tonne \n \nWeekly Average \n(09 - 13 Oct) \n1,870.69 \n884.00 \n1,151.80 \n8,049.50 \n18,703.00 \n87.78 \n24,380.00 \n16-Oct \n1916.35 \n884.00 \n1143.00 \n7925.00 \n18555.00 \n89.61 \n24000.00 \n17-Oct \n1925.98 \n895.00 \n1132.00 \n8039.00 \n18680.00 \n91.53 \n23800.00 \n18-Oct \n1949.78 \n903.00 \n1136.50 \n7958.50 \n18505.00 \n91.07 \n23700.00 \n19-Oct \n1951.10 \n885.00 \n1105.00 \n7961.50 \n18480.00 \n93.31 \n23600.00 \n20-Oct \n1986.35 \n899.00 \n1108.00 \n7890.50 \n18575.00 \n91.21 \n23500.00 \nWeekly Average \n(16 - 20 Oct) \n1,945.91 \n893.20 \n1,124.90 \n7,954.90 \n18,599.00 \n91.35 \n23,720.00 \nWeekly Change (%) \n4.02 \n1.04 \n-2.34 \n-1.18 \n-0.77 \n4.06 \n-2.71 \nSource: BBC, KITCO and Bloomberg 2023 \n \nPrecious Metals \nDuring the week under review, there were upward and downward movements in prices of \nprecious metals. Gold and platinum prices increased by 4.02% and 1.04%, respectively, in large \npart, due to geopolitical tensions in the Middle East arising from the Israel-Hamas conflict. In \naddition, heightened demand and investor anticipation of a potential interest rate pause by the \nU.S. Federal Reserve, in the forthcoming November 2023 meeting, also boosted prices of gold \nand platinum. \n \nPalladium and lithium prices declined by 2.34% and 2.71%, respectively, during the reporting \nweek. The decrease in palladium prices followed the reduction in use of the precious metal within \ncatalytic converters, primarily driven by the expanding market presence of electric vehicles. \nSimilarly, the drop in lithium prices was attributable to the decline in demand for fully electric \ncars in China and other markets, primarily due to the impact of increasing interest rates and \ninflationary pressures. The weekly precious metal price developments are shown in Figure 3. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n 6 \nFigure 3: Weekly Precious Metals Price Developments (14 Oct. 2023 - 20 Oct. 2023) \n \n \nSource: Kitco,2023 \n \nSource: Kitco,2023 \n \nSource: Kitco,2023 \n \nSource: London Metal Exchange,2023 \n \nBase Metals and Brent Crude Oil \nDuring the week ending 20 October 2023, prices of copper and nickel decreased by 1.18% and \n0.77%, respectively. However, Brent crude oil prices rose by 4.06%, during the same week. The \ndecline in base metal prices was largely due to increased inventories, indicating that production \nwas surpassing demand. Brent crude oil prices maintained a positive momentum, supported by \ntensions in the Middle East. Figure 4 illustrates the daily movements of copper, nickel, and crude \noil prices, during the week under review. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1,700\n1,750\n1,800\n1,850\n1,900\n1,950\n2,000\n2,050\nUS$/ounce\nGold\nGold\nLinear (Gold)\n800\n820\n840\n860\n880\n900\n920\n940\nUS$/ounce\nPlatinum\nPlatinum\nLinear (Platinum)\n1,000\n1,050\n1,100\n1,150\n1,200\n1,250\n1,300\nUS$/ounce\nPalladium\nPalladium\nLinear (Palladium)\n22,000\n22,500\n23,000\n23,500\n24,000\n24,500\n25,000\n25,500\n26,000\n26,500\nUS$/tonne\nLithium Hydroxide\nLithium Hydroxide\nLinear (Lithium Hydroxide)\n \n 7 \nFigure 4: Daily commodity price developments for copper, nickel and brent crude oil (14 \nOct. 2023 - 20 Oct. 2023) \n \nSource: London Metal Exchange,2023 \n \nSource: London Metal Exchange,2023 \n \nSource: BBC,2023 \n \n \n \n \n7,600\n7,800\n8,000\n8,200\n14-Oct\n15-Oct\n16-Oct\n17-Oct\n18-Oct\n19-Oct\n20-Oct\nUS$/tonne\n13-Oct\n16-Oct\n17-Oct\n18-Oct\n19-Oct\n20-Oct\nCopper\n7994.50\n7925.00\n8039.00\n7958.50\n7961.50\n7890.50\nCopper\nCopper\nLinear (Copper)\n18,200\n18,400\n18,600\n18,800\n14-Oct\n15-Oct\n16-Oct\n17-Oct\n18-Oct\n19-Oct\n20-Oct\nUS$/tonne\n13-Oct\n16-Oct\n17-Oct\n18-Oct\n19-Oct\n20-Oct\nNickel\n18765.00\n18555.00\n18680.00\n18505.00\n18480.00\n18575.00\nNickel\nNickel\nLinear (Nickel)\n86.00\n88.00\n90.00\n92.00\n94.00\n14-Oct\n15-Oct\n16-Oct\n17-Oct\n18-Oct\n19-Oct\n20-Oct\nUS$/barrel\n13-Oct\n16-Oct\n17-Oct\n18-Oct\n19-Oct\n20-Oct\nBrent crude oil\n90.92\n89.61\n91.53\n91.07\n93.31\n91.21\nBrent crude oil\nBrent crude oil\nLinear (Brent crude oil)\n \n 8 \nExchange Rate Developments \nInterbank Market \nDuring the reporting week, the Zimbabwe dollar (ZW$) depreciated by 1.31% against the US \ndollar on the interbank market. The average exchange rate rose from ZW$ 5,577.17 per US$1 \nduring the week ending 13 October 2023 to ZW$ 5,650.45 per US$1 for the week ending 20 \nOctober 2023. Table 7 shows the movement in the ZW$ exchange rate against selected \ncurrencies. \n \nTable 7: Selected Exchange Rates (ZW$ per unit of foreign currency) \n2023 \nUSD \nZAR \nGBP \nBWP \nEURO \nWeekly Average (09 - 13 Oct) \n5,577.1735 \n291.5854 \n6,766.324 \n403.0806 \n5,862.8719 \n16-Oct \n5,335.7917 \n303.0303 \n6,852.2773 \n410.8492 \n5,931.6708 \n17-Oct \n5,638.3415 \n303.0303 \n6,877.6489 \n413.8542 \n5,947.3226 \n18-Oct \n5,639.2352 \n303.0303 \n6,872.5359 \n413.3559 \n5,966.8748 \n19-Oct \n5,668.2204 \n303.0303 \n6,871.5836 \n412.3630 \n5,970.6199 \n20-Oct \n5,670.6816 \n303.0303 \n6,882.1607 \n412.5809 \n5,997.8712 \nWeekly Average (16 - 20 Oct) \n5,650.4541 \n303.0303 \n6,871.2413 \n412.6006 \n5,962.8718 \nAppr (-)/Depr (+) (%) of the ZWL \n1.31 \n3.9 \n1.6 \n2.4 \n1.7 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2023 \n \n \n5. EQUITY MARKETS \n \nDuring the week ending 20th October 2023, the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) exhibited \nbullish sentiments for the fourth consecutive week, while the Victoria Falls Stock Exchange \n(VFEX) was characterised by bearish sentiment. As a result, the ZSE All Share index increased \nby 4.79% to close at 145 265.26 points, while the VFEX All Share index shed 4.48% to 68.21 \npoints. \n \nZimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) Developments \nThe Top 10, Top 15, Medium and Small Cap indices added 5.10%, 4.82%, 4.32% and 30.50% \nto close at 64 233.90 points, 86 766.93 points, 590 667.03 points and 4 925 114.22 points. \n \nFigure 5 shows developments on the ZSE’s All Share, Top 10 and Mining indices for the period \nfrom 21st October 2022 to 20th October 2023. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n 9 \nFigure 5: ZSE All Share, Top 10 and Mining Indices \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2023 \n \nThe growth in the mainstream index resulted from share price increases for First Mutual \nHoldings Limited (46.23%), Truworths Limited (30.91%), Willdale Limited (30.91%), CBZ \nHoldings Limited (22.56%) and Meikles Limited (17.88%). \n \nDeclines were registered in the share prices of NMBZ Holdings Limited (8.82%), British \nAmerican Tobacco Zimbabwe Limited (6.35%), Edgars Stores Limited (5.29%), Zimre Holdings \nLimited (5.05%) and Turnall Holdings Limited (25.18%). The resource index remained \nunchanged at 125 531.67 points, during the week under analysis. \n \nMarket Turnover \nThe cumulative volume and value of shares traded on the ZSE fell by 25.31% and 33.92% to \n7.13 million shares and ZW$3 324.52 million, compared to 9.54 million shares and ZW$5 031.41 \nmillion recorded in the prior week, respectively. \n \nFigure 6 shows the trend in daily market turnover for the period from 21st October 2022 to 20th \nOctober 2023. \n \n \n \n \n \n10,100\n20,100\n30,100\n40,100\n50,100\n60,100\n70,100\n80,100\n90,100\n100,100\n110,100\n120,100\n130,100\n0\n20,000\n40,000\n60,000\n80,000\n100,000\n120,000\n140,000\n160,000\n180,000\n200,000\n21-Oct-22\n04-Nov-22\n18-Nov-22\n02-Dec-22\n16-Dec-22\n30-Dec-22\n13-Jan-23\n27-Jan-23\n10-Feb-23\n24-Feb-23\n10-Mar-23\n24-Mar-23\n07-Apr-23\n21-Apr-23\n05-May-23\n19-May-23\n02-Jun-23\n16-Jun-23\n30-Jun-23\n14-Jul-23\n28-Jul-23\n11-Aug-23\n25-Aug-23\n08-Sep-23\n22-Sep-23\n06-Oct-23\n20-Oct-23\nMining Index\nAll Share and Top 10 Indices\nAll Share Index (ZSE)\nTop 10 Index\nMining Index\n \n \n10 \nFigure 6: Market Turnover \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2023 \n \nMarket Capitalization \nThe ZSE added 6.90%, or ZW$739.28 billion worth of capitalization to close at ZW$ 11 454.92 \nbillion, during the week under analysis, from ZW$10 715.64 billion registered in the prior week. \n \nFigure 7 shows the evolution of ZSE market capitalization for the period from 21st October 2022 \nto 20th October 2023. \n \nFigure 7: Market Capitalization \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2023 \n \n0\n5,000\n10,000\n15,000\n20,000\n25,000\n30,000\n35,000\n40,000\n45,000\n50,000\n21-Oct-22\n04-Nov-22\n18-Nov-22\n02-Dec-22\n16-Dec-22\n30-Dec-22\n13-Jan-23\n27-Jan-23\n10-Feb-23\n24-Feb-23\n10-Mar-23\n24-Mar-23\n07-Apr-23\n21-Apr-23\n05-May-23\n19-May-23\n02-Jun-23\n16-Jun-23\n30-Jun-23\n14-Jul-23\n28-Jul-23\n11-Aug-23\n25-Aug-23\n08-Sep-23\n22-Sep-23\n06-Oct-23\n20-Oct-23\nZW$ (Million)\nNegotiated Deal: 241 million \nFirst Mutual Holdings \nLimited shares exchanged \nhands at ZW$196/share\n0\n1,800\n3,600\n5,400\n7,200\n9,000\n10,800\n12,600\n14,400\n16,200\n21-Oct-22\n04-Nov-22\n18-Nov-22\n02-Dec-22\n16-Dec-22\n30-Dec-22\n13-Jan-23\n27-Jan-23\n10-Feb-23\n24-Feb-23\n10-Mar-23\n24-Mar-23\n07-Apr-23\n21-Apr-23\n05-May-23\n19-May-23\n02-Jun-23\n16-Jun-23\n30-Jun-23\n14-Jul-23\n28-Jul-23\n11-Aug-23\n25-Aug-23\n08-Sep-23\n22-Sep-23\n06-Oct-23\n20-Oct-23\n$ Billions\n \n \n11 \nVictoria Falls Stock Exchange (VFEX) Developments \nThe decline in the VFEX mainstream index emanated from share price losses for Innscor Africa \nLimited (13.35%), Bindura Nickel Corporation (BNC) (12.31%), SeedCo International VX \n(10.83%), Simbisa Brands Limited (9.22%) and Zimplow Limited (0.27%). \n \nGains were recorded in the share prices of First Capital Bank Limited (17.50%) and African Sun \nLimited the (5.25%). \n \nVFEX Market Turnover \nThe cumulative volume and value of shares traded on the VFEX, rose by 29.04% and 121.74% \nto 2.92 million shares and US$1.21 million, respectively. \n \nVFEX Market Capitalization \nDuring the week under analysis, the VFEX capitalization declined by 4.48% to US$1.17 billion, \ncompared to US$1.22 billion recorded in the previous week. \n \nFigure 8 shows the trend in the VFEX All Share Index (ASI) for the period from 14th September \n2022 to 20th October 2023. \n \nFigure 8: VFEX All Share Index \n \nSource: Victoria Falls Stock Exchange (VFEX), 2023 \n. \n6. BEYOND INFLATION NUMBERS - THE CASE OF SKIMPFLATION \n \nThe weekly report of 13th October 2023 discussed shrinkinflation, which is a scenario where \ncompanies reduce either the size or quantity of products, while maintaining prices. The \ncounterpart of shrinkinflation is referred to as skimpflation. Skimpflation is a trend where \n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\n100\n110\n120\n130\n140\n150\n21-…\n04-…\n18-…\n02-…\n16-…\n30-…\n13-…\n27-…\n10-…\n24-…\n10-…\n24-…\n07-…\n21-…\n05-…\n19-…\n02-…\n16-…\n30-…\n14-…\n28-…\n11-…\n25-…\n08-…\n22-…\n06-…\n20-…\n \n \n12 \nbusinesses reduce the quality of product or services for the same price. In essence, some \nbusinesses strategically reduce or “skimp” the quality of services or products to maximise profits \nor to manage the profit margins on the back of rising costs. Businesses skimp by spending less \non services or materials to remain profitable. \n \nThis practice is often done secretly to escape detection by regulatory authorities, consumer \nprotection advocates and law enforcement agents. Skimpflation can be low in highly regulated \nmarkets but if left undetected can have negative consequences, particularly on value for money \nfor the consumers and can obscure the fine details about inflation. An example of the occurrence \nof skimpflation is when a baker produces bloomers - a confectionary product and sells them at \nthe same price of a standard loaf of bread in order to benefit from a higher profit margin. A \nbloomer typically has lower weight compared to a standard loaf of bread. Similarly, hotels and \nrestaurants can skimp on quality by replacing more-expensive foods with cheaper foods, to cut \ncosts. \n \nWhile consumers may notice a change in the taste of a particular food item, skimping on quality \nis harder to detect in some products. A typical example includes the dilution of petroleum \nproducts such as diesel and petrol by unscrupulous retailers and selling the product to \nunsuspecting consumers at the standard regulated price, among others. The regulatory authority \nin the petroleum industry in the country has, however, played a big role in conducting inspections \non petroleum retailers to maintain the quality of the petroleum products that are sold in the \ncountry for the benefit of consumers. \nConsumers should remain vigilant in detecting skimping tendencies and avoid being \nshortchanged before making spending decisions. This can be achieved by paying particular \nattention to the standards of products sold in the country. \n \n \n \nRESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE\n \n \n APPENDIX 1: FOREIGN EXCHANGE AUCTION RESULTS FOR WHOLESALE FX1 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2023 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1 Wholesale Foreign Currency Auction (Wholesale FX) is normally conducted on Tuesday every week. The RBZ MPC resolutions dated 6 June 2023 resolved that with effect \nfrom 7 June 2023, the Bank shall sell foreign currency at the market-determined exchange rate through banks to support and strengthen the foreign exchange interbank market, \nand banks shall in turn sell the foreign currency to their customers. \n \n \n \n26-Sep-23 \nWHOLESALE FX \n \n \n03-Oct-23 \n \n \n \n10-Oct-23 \n \n \n \n18-Oct-23 \nTotal \nBids (US$ dollars) \n18,893,948.0 \n18,682,426.00 \n18,106,845.96 \n17,658,597.00 \nAmount Allotted (US$ \ndollars) \n18,693,948.80 \n18,682,426.00 \n18,106,845.96 \n17,658,597.00 \nHighest Rate \n5,305.0000 \n5,700.0000 \n5,780.00 \n5,800.00 \nLowest Bid Rate Allotted \n5,200.000 \n5,562.0000 \n5,595.00 \n5,641.00 \nWeighted Average Rate \n5,252.6558 \n5,591.9615 \n5,633.83 \n5.668.22 \nNumber of Bids Received \n20 \n20 \n17 \n19 \nNumber of Bids Rejected \n1 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n \n \nAPPENDIX 2: SUMMARY OF FOREIGN CURRENCY AUCTION ALLOTMENTS BY PURPOSE \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2023 \n \n \n \n \n26-Sep-23 \n \n03-Oct-23 \n \n10-Oct-23 \n \n18-Oct-23 \nRaw Materials \n391,921.75 \n367,723.31 \n552,534.69 \n606,955.63 \nMachinery and Equipment \n230,878.25 \n360,374.56 \n468,099.85 \n448,704.28 \nConsumables \n(Incl. Spares, Tyres, \nPackaging) \n157,183.97 \n68,499.06 \n209,539.75 \n148,892.99 \nPharmaceuticals and \nChemicals \n8,732.67 \n- \n41,647.17 \n19,751.15 \nServices (Loans, Dividends \nand Disinvestments) \n236,196.24 \n196,775.97 \n323,296.26 \n283,645.29 \nRetail and Distribution \n33,776.97 \n145,978.12 \n175,616.40 \n306,868.37 \nFuel, Electricity and Gas \n- \n- \n- \n97,253.60 \nPaper and Packaging \n14,445.74 \n63,521.36 \n48,423.39 \n25,107.33 \nTOTAL \n1,123,944.44 \n1,202,872.38 \n1,868,427.23 \n1,937,178.64", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/Weekly_Economic_Highlights/WEEKLY_ECONOMIC_HIGHLIGHTS_20_OCT_2023_Vol_25_Number_42.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "589d10a1498c1ec89cc55794f27ffa8b", "text": "MPC Statement 22 September 2022 \nPage 1 \n \n \n \nPRESS STATEMENT \n22 September 2022 \n \n \nSTATEMENT OF THE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE \n \nIssued by Lesetja Kganyago, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank \nIn the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic and heightened geo-political tensions, the \nglobal economy has entered a period of persistently high inflation and weaker \neconomic growth. Many developing economies exited the pandemic with less than full \nrecovery and high debt levels. \nRussia’s war in Ukraine continues to impair production and trade of a wide range of \nenergy, food and other commodities. The supply of energy to the Euro Area is limited \nas winter approaches, placing immense strain on households, businesses and \ngovernments. With rapid inflation and monetary policy normalization, the United States \nmay also experience slower economic growth. While China’s recovery from the Covid-\n19 lockdowns has strengthened, economic growth is expected to remain below longer-\nterm trends. \n \nMPC Statement 22 September 2022 \nPage 2 \n \nTaking these and other factors into account, the SARB’s forecast for global growth in \n2022 is revised down from 3.3% in the July meeting to 3.0%, and is lowered to 2.0% \n(from 2.5%) for 2023.1 \nAlthough policy settings in advanced economies remain accommodative, policy \nnormalization has accelerated, and higher yields are tightening global financial \nconditions. Asset values in major markets have declined sharply, and investor \nappetite for riskier assets has weakened further. \nThis year the SARB expects the South African economy to grow by 1.9%, (from 2.0%). \nGrowth in the first quarter of this year surprised to the upside, at 1.7%. In the second \nquarter, flooding in Kwa-Zulu Natal and more extensive load-shedding contributed to \na contraction of 0.7%. Growth in the third and fourth quarters is forecast to be 0.4% \nand 0.3%, respectively. \nThe economy is forecast to expand by 1.4% in 2023 and by 1.7% in 2024, above \nprevious projections.2 Private investment has strengthened on the back of the \nrecovery, but public sector investment remains weak. Household spending remains \nsupportive of growth, but is likely to soften next year. Tourism, hospitality and \nconstruction should see stronger recoveries as the year progresses. \n \n1 Global growth in the QPM model is a trade-weighted average of South Africa’s trading partners. Global \ngrowth in 2024 is revised down to 2.4% from 2.5% at the time of the July meeting. The International Monetary \nFund’s (IMF) July forecast expected global growth of 3.2% in 2022 and 2.9% in 2023. An update to the World \nEconomic Outlook will be released in October. \n2 The growth forecast includes expected changes in the policy rate as given by the QPM. \n \nMPC Statement 22 September 2022 \nPage 3 \n \nWith a low rate of potential, our current growth forecast leaves the output gap broadly \nunchanged.3 The output gap is still expected to turn positive in the second quarter of \n2023. \nAfter revisions, the risks to the medium-term domestic growth outlook are assessed to \nbe balanced. While negative global shocks and loadshedding will continue to create \nheadwinds to growth, household spending and investment are more supportive. \nCommodity price movements in recent months have been mixed. The export price of \ncoal has increased alongside oil, while prices for metals have declined. While oil \nprices currently sit at around US$91 per barrel, we expect them to stay higher than we \ndid in July, and to average US$105 per barrel for 2022, US$92 per barrel in 2023 and \nUS$85 per barrel in 2024.4 \nSouth Africa’s export commodity price basket has come down from earlier peaks and \nis now forecast to rise by 2.3% for the year as a whole (down from 3.2%), before falling \nin 2023 by about 17.6% and by a further 10.0% in 2024. As a result of these export \nand import developments, the current account balance is expected to register a \nsurplus of 0.2% of GDP this year, falling to a deficit of 1.0% in 2023 and 1.6% in 2024.5 \nAlthough near term fiscal risk has eased on the back of better tax revenue, financing \nconditions for rand-denominated bonds have worsened. Ten-year bond yields \ncurrently trade at about 11.0%. \n \n3 Potential growth for 2022 is unchanged at 0.5%, 0.8% in 2023 and 1.1% in 2024. \n4 The Brent crude oil assumptions in July were US$108, US$92, and US$85, respectively. \n5 In July, the current account surplus for 2022 was expected to be 2.0% of GDP, 0.4% in 2023 and -0.4% in \n2024. \n \nMPC Statement 22 September 2022 \nPage 4 \n \nPolicy normalisation in major economies and the slowdown in China have contributed \nto rand depreciation in recent months. The implied starting point for the rand forecast \nis R16.91 to the US dollar, compared with R16.10 at the time of the previous meeting.6 \nWhile economic growth is slowing globally, inflation continues to surprise to the upside. \nSustained policy accommodation, supply shortages and other restrictions have \nsharply increased the prices of many goods, services and commodities.7 Producer \nprice increases continue to pass-through to wages and consumer prices globally. Our \nestimate for inflation in the G3 is revised higher to 7.0% in 2022 (from 6.9%), up to \n3.5% in 2023 (from 3.0%), and slightly higher at 2.1% in 2024.8 \nSince the previous meeting, the easing of global oil prices has contributed to a less \naggressive rise in fuel price inflation for this year, at 33.7% (down from 38.8%). Further \nmoderation in fuel price inflation is expected in 2023, averaging 1.7% (down from \n5.7%). Local electricity price inflation is slightly lower at 10.9% in 2022, 8.9% in 2023, \nand is unchanged at 10% in 2024. \nDespite reduced global food price inflation, local food price inflation is revised up and \nis now expected to be 8.1% in 2022 (up from 7.4%). Food price inflation is revised \nlower to 5.6% (down from 6.2%) in 2023 and remains unchanged at 4.2% in 2024. \nThe Bank’s forecast of headline inflation for this year is unchanged at 6.5%. For 2023, \nheadline inflation is revised lower to 5.3% (down from 5.7%), as a result of lower food, \n \n6 The rand has depreciated by about 6.3% to the US dollar since the May meeting and 7.2% year to date. \n7 The UN FAO food index declined sharply in July, falling by 8.6% month to month, largely on the back of an \nagreement to reopen Black Sea ports. Consequently, the assumption used for the forecast for USD-\ndenominated world food prices in 2022 was revised lower from 22.3% to 17.8%. \n8 The G3 comprises the United States, the Eurozone, and Japan. The latest CPI inflation in the respective \ncomponents sits at 8.3%, 9.1% and 3.0%. \n \nMPC Statement 22 September 2022 \nPage 5 \n \nfuel and core inflation forecasts for next year. Headline inflation of 4.6% is expected in \n2024 (down from 4.7%). \nOur forecast for core inflation is unchanged at 4.3% in 2022, and lower than previously \nexpected at 5.4% (down from 5.6%) in 2023. The forecast for 2024 is also slightly \nlower at 4.8% (from 4.9%). Services price inflation is broadly unchanged. Core goods \nprice inflation however is forecast lower in each year, largely due to a lower starting \npoint for vehicles and non-alcoholic beverages inflation.9 Average salaries are \nforecast to rise by less than at the time of the July meeting, at 5.1% in 2022, 6.7% in \n2023 and 5.6% in 2024.10 \nThe risks to the inflation outlook are assessed to the upside. While global producer \nprice and food inflation has eased, Russia’s war in the Ukraine continues, with \nadverse effects on global prices. Oil prices increased strongly from the start of the war, \nto around US$130 per barrel, and may rise again from today’s level as stresses in \nenergy markets intensify. Electricity and other administered prices continue to present \nclear medium-term risks. Given below-inflation assumptions for public sector wage \ngrowth and high petrol and food price inflation, considerable risk still attaches to the \nforecast for average salaries. \nHigher than expected inflation has pushed major central banks to accelerate the \nnormalisation of policy rates, tightening global financial conditions and raising the risk \nprofiles of economies needing foreign capital. G3 interest rate levels for the forecast \n \n9 Core goods refers to total CPI goods excluding food and NAB, fuel and energy, whereas services include all \nsurveyed services within the CPI basket. Core goods inflation is expected to be 4.8% in 2022 (down from \n5.2%), 5.5% in 2023 (down from 5.9%), and 4.9% in 2024 (down from 5.1%). \n10 Average salaries were expected to be 5.6%, 7.3%, and 5.7% at the time of the July meeting. \n \nMPC Statement 22 September 2022 \nPage 6 \n \nperiod are now expected to be somewhat higher than in July.11 On balance, and with \nfew exceptions, capital flows and market volatility will be elevated for emerging market \nassets and currencies. The rand depreciated by about 3.0% to the USD since the July \nmeeting, and additional tightening of global conditions will present further risks to the \ncurrency. \nThe risks to inflation identified over the past year have been realized, pushing up South \nAfrica’s headline inflation rate and inflation expectations. Average surveyed \nexpectations of future inflation have increased to 6.5% for 2022 and 5.9% for 2023.12 \nExpectations for inflation based on market surveys have increased to 6.7%.13 Long-\nterm inflation expectations derived from the break-even rates in the bond market have \nmoderated slightly to about 7%.14 \nIn the second quarter of this year, headline inflation breached the target range and is \nexpected to remain above it until the second quarter of 2023. By the fourth quarter of \n2024, we expect headline inflation to revert to the mid-point of the target range, on the \nback of declining fuel and food inflation. The forecast takes into account the policy rate \ntrajectory indicated by the Bank’s Quarterly Projection Model (QPM). As usual, the \nrepo rate projection from the QPM remains a broad policy guide, changing from \nmeeting to meeting in response to new data and risks. \n \n11 The weighted average of G3 policy rates is forecast to be 3.1% in 2023 (up from 3.0%) and 3.2% in 2024 (up \nfrom 3.1%). \n12 For 2024, the BER survey of inflation expectations in Q3 moderated to 5.4% (from 5.6%). The Q2 survey had \n2022 expected inflation at 6.0% and 5.6% for 2023. \n13 Market analysts (Reuters Econometer) in September at the median expect inflation to be higher at 6.7% \n(from 6.5% in July) in 2022, 5.4% (5.0% from July) in 2023 and 4.6% in 2024 (4.4% from July). \n14 Market-based rates are calculated from the break-even inflation rate, which is the yield differential between \nconventional and inflation-linked bonds. These now sit at about 6.90% for the 5-year and 6.92% on the 10-year \nbreakeven. 15-year break-even inflation sits at 7.0%. \n \nMPC Statement 22 September 2022 \nPage 7 \n \nAgainst this backdrop, the MPC decided to increase the repurchase rate by 75 basis \npoints to 6.25% per year, with effect from the 23rd of September 2022. Three members \nof the Committee preferred the announced increase. Two members preferred a 100 \nbasis points increase. \nThe level of the repurchase rate is now closer to the level prevailing before the start of \nthe pandemic. The revised repurchase rate path remains supportive of credit demand \nin the near term, while raising rates to levels more consistent with the current view of \ninflation risks. The aim of policy is to anchor inflation expectations more firmly around \nthe mid-point of the target band and to increase confidence of hitting the inflation target \nin 2024.15 \nGuiding inflation back towards the mid-point of the target band can reduce the \neconomic costs of high inflation and enable lower interest rates in the future. Achieving \na prudent public debt level, increasing the supply of energy, moderating administered \nprice inflation and keeping wage growth in line with productivity gains would enhance \nthe effectiveness of monetary policy and its transmission to the broader economy. \nEconomic and financial conditions are expected to remain more volatile for the \nforeseeable future. In this uncertain environment, monetary policy decisions will \ncontinue to be data dependent and sensitive to the balance of risks to the outlook. The \nMPC will seek to look through temporary price shocks and focus on potential second \nround effects and the risks of de-anchoring inflation expectations. The Bank will \ncontinue to closely monitor funding markets for stress. \n \n15 The forecasted trajectory for the repurchase rate implies a rise in the inflation-adjusted repo rate from -1.7% \nfor 2021 to -1.7% for 2022, 1.4% for 2023, and 2.2% in 2024. The real repurchase rate calculation here is based \non the 1-quarter ahead inflation forecast and are annual average rates. \n \nMPC Statement 22 September 2022 \nPage 8 \n \n \nLesetja Kganyago \nGOVERNOR \nThe next statement of the Monetary Policy Committee will be released on 24 \nNovember 2022. \n \nContact person: \nThoraya Pandy \n0824168416 \nmedia@resbank.co.za", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/MPC_Statements/Statement of the Monetary Policy Committee September 2022.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "faff84366602e52294d793a47a0b0d82", "text": "Vol. 27 No. 30 \n \n \nWeek Ending \n25th July 2025 \nWeekly Economic \nHighlights \nTABLE OF CONTENTS \n \n1. \nOVERVIEW ............................................................................ 1 \n2. \nINTEREST RATES ................................................................ 2 \n3. \nEQUITY MARKETS .............................................................. 3 \n4. \nCLEARING AND SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY .................. 5 \n5. \nENERGY PRICES .................................................................. 5 \n6. \nGOLD PM FIX, MOSI-OA-TUNYA GOLD COINS AND \nGOLD BACKED DIGITAL TOKENS (GBDT) .................. 5 \n7. \nEXTERNAL SECTOR ........................................................... 6 \n8. \nTOBACCO SALES ................................................................. 8 \n \n \n \n \n1 \n1. OVERVIEW \nThis report outlines key developments in the domestic monetary and financial sectors of the economy for the \nweek ending 25 July 2025. It includes updates on the money and capital markets, national payment systems, \nexchange rates, international commodity prices and tobacco market developments. \nDuring the week ending 25th July 2025, local currency savings and deposit rates declined across all tenors, \nexcept for 3-month minimum rates, which increased, and 1-month minimum rates, which remained \nunchanged. Similarly, foreign currency savings and deposit rates decreased across all tenors during the week \nunder review, except for 1-month minimum and maximum rates, which increased; 3-month minimum and \nmaximum rates, which increased and decreased respectively; and 6-month maximum rates, which remained \nunchanged. Meanwhile, local currency lending rates rose for both individual and corporate clients. In contrast, \nforeign currency lending rates generally declined, apart from individual maximum rates which registered an \nincrease during the reporting week. \nThe Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) and the Victoria Falls Stock Exchange (VFEX) showed bullish \nsentiments. Consequently, the All-Share indices gained by 1.31% and 5.08% to close at 200.70 points and \n116.13 points, respectively. The ZSE market turnover volume and value of shares traded decreased by 64.78% \nand 43.12% respectively, reversing the previous week trend of a surge in both metrics. \nDuring the week ending 25th July 2025, the total value of transactions processed through the National Payment \nSystems platforms declined by 6.99% to ZiG40.76 billion from ZiG43.83 billion recorded in the previous \nweek. The decrease can be primarily attributable to the decline in the transaction value of RTGS and mobile \nmoney systems. \nThe average Zimbabwe Gold (ZiG) exchange rate appreciated by 0.08% against the US dollar on the interbank \nmarket strengthening to ZiG26.79 per US$1 from ZiG26.81 per US$1 in the prior week. \nThe average prices for all the selected international commodities increased over the week. Nickel prices \nincreased due to the heightened market expectations of upcoming Indonesian policy changes that may limit \nfuture supply. Gold prices increased on account of escalating trade tensions and geopolitical conflicts, boosting \ndemand for safe haven assets. Lithium prices rebounded as optimism grew over Chinese supply-side reforms \naimed at addressing industrial overcapacity. The increase in platinum prices was driven by a worsening \nstructural supply deficit, fuelled primarily by the sharp decline in production, particularly in South Africa, and \nconstrained recycling efforts. Similarly, palladium prices surged due to depreciation in the U.S. dollar. \nAs of the 99th day of the 2025 tobacco selling season, a total of 350.01 million kilograms were sold, \nrepresenting a 52.51% surge from 229.56 million kilograms sold during the same period in 2024. Sales value \nrose by 47.84% to US$1.16 billion during the period under review, from US$0.79 billion recorded during the \nsame period in 2024. The average price of the golden leaf was US$3.33 per kg, compared to US$3.43 per kg \nrealised in the same period in 2024. \n \n \n \n2 \n2. INTEREST RATES \n \nAverage commercial bank deposit rates (Local Currency (ZiG) (%) \nZiG Deposit rates \n04 July 2025 \n11 July 2025 \n18 July 2025 \n25 July 2025 \nSavings \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n3.81 \n3.94 \n3.94 \n 3.67 \nMaximum \n4.14 \n4.28 \n4.28 \n3.78 \n1-month deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n5.66 \n5.79 \n5.79 \n5.79 \nMaximum \n8.77 \n9.24 \n9.24 \n9.13 \n3-months deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n5.95 \n6.07 \n6.07 \n6.21 \nMaximum \n9.21 \n10.01 \n9.73 \n9.37 \n6-months deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n5.56 \n5.67 \n5.67 \n5.39 \nMaximum \n8.23 \n9.03 \n9.03 \n8.48 \n12-months deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n5.57 \n5.68 \n5.68 \n5.41 \nMaximum \n8.24 \n9.04 \n9.04 \n8.49 \nOver 1 year \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n5.58 \n5.69 \n5.69 \n5.42 \nMaximum \n8.25 \n9.06 \n9.06 \n8.50 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n \nAverage commercial bank deposit rates (Foreign Currency (US$) (%) \nUS$ Deposit rates \n04 July 2025 \n11 July 2025 \n18 July 2025 \n25 July 2025 \nSavings \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n1.67 \n1.67 \n1.67 \n1.61 \nMaximum \n1.86 \n1.86 \n1.86 \n1.69 \n1-month deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n3.72 \n3.78 \n3.78 \n3.94 \nMaximum \n5.75 \n6.11 \n6.11 \n6.26 \n3-month deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n4.38 \n4.32 \n4.32 \n4.44 \nMaximum \n6.53 \n6.92 \n6.92 \n6.40 \n6-month deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n4.18 \n4.12 \n4.12 \n3.90 \nMaximum \n6.82 \n6.60 \n6.60 \n6.60 \n12-Month deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n4.25 \n4.19 \n4.19 \n3.97 \nMaximum \n6.44 \n6.78 \n6.78 \n6.22 \nOver 1 year \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n4.36 \n4.31 \n4.31 \n4.03 \nMaximum \n6.61 \n6.94 \n6.94 \n6.39 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n3 \nCommercial bank weighted lending rates (Local Currency (ZiG) (%) \nZiG Lending rates \n04 July 2025 \n11 July 2025 \n18 July 2025 \n25 July 2025 \nIndividuals \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n42.25 \n42.34 \n42.45 \n42.50 \nMaximum \n48.01 \n48.08 \n48.19 \n48.23 \nCorporates \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n40.53 \n40.52 \n40.43 \n40.46 \nMaximum \n46.65 \n46.80 \n46.29 \n46.43 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n \nCommercial bank weighted lending rates (Foreign Currency (US$) (%) \nUS$ Lending rates \n04 July 2025 \n11 July 2025 \n18 July 2025 \n25 July 2025 \nIndividuals \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n13.43 \n13.43 \n13.46 \n13.45 \nMaximum \n17.52 \n17.61 \n17.57 \n17.65 \nCorporates \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n10.26 \n10.29 \n10.29 \n10.27 \nMaximum \n15.84 \n15.81 \n15.83 \n15.80 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n \nCommercial banks and building societies mortgage lending rates (%) \nMortgage Lending rates \n04 July 2025 \n11 July 2025 \n18 July 2025 \n25 July 2025 \nZiG Lending rates \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n25.00 \n25.00 \n25.00 \n25.00 \nMaximum \n50.00 \n50.00 \n50.00 \n50.00 \nUS$ Lending rates \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n10.00 \n10.00 \n10.00 \n10.00 \nMaximum \n18.00 \n18.00 \n18.00 \n18.00 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n \n3. EQUITY MARKETS \n \n \nZSE Indicators \n \n \nAll \nShare \nIndex \n(points) \nTop 10 \nIndex \n(points) \nTop 15 \nIndex \n(points) \nMedium Cap \n(points) \nSmall Cap \n(points) \nMining \nIndex \n(points) \nGrand \nMarket Cap \n(ZiG \nbillion) \nMarket \nTurnover \n(ZiG \nmillion) \nVolume of \nShares \n(million) \n04-July-25 \n197.09 \n196.34 \n196.58 \n237.76 \n100.11 \n145.40 \n60.68 \n60.64 \n89.22 \n11-July-25 \n195.90 \n189.72 \n195.35 \n241.85 \n100.11 \n145.40 \n60.64 \n71.12 \n19.85 \n18-July-25 \n198.11 \n192.16 \n198.41 \n241.14 \n100.11 \n144.85 \n61.49 \n397.50 \n267.29 \n25-Luly-25 \n200.70 \n194.19 \n200.80 \n246.67 \n100.11 \n144.85 \n62.85 \n226.11 \n94.14 \nWeekly \nChange (%) \n1.31 \n1.06 \n1.20 \n2.29 \n0.00 \n0.00 \n2.21 \n(43.12) \n(64.78) \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2025 \n \nVFEX Indicators \nDate \n \nAll Share Index \nPoints \nGrand Market Capitalisation \n(US$ billion) \nMarket Turnover (US$ \nmillion) \nVolume of Shares (million) \n04-July-25 \n108.69 \n1.27 \n0.70 \n4.50 \n11-July-25 \n107.33 \n1.25 \n0.94 \n3.51 \n18-July-25 \n110.52 \n1.29 \n1.52 \n3.06 \n25-July-25 \n116.13 \n1.35 \n0.25 \n0.91 \nWeekly Change (%) \n5.08 \n4.65 \n (83.55) \n(70.26) \nSource: Victoria Falls Stock Exchange, 2025 \n \n \n \n \n \n4 \nFigure 1: ZSE and VFEX Indicators \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange and Victoria Falls Stock Exchange, 2025 \n \n \n \n90\n110\n130\n150\n170\n190\n210\n230\n250\n270\n25-Apr-25\n02-May-25\n09-May-25\n16-May-25\n23-May-25\n30-May-25\n06-Jun-25\n13-Jun-25\n20-Jun-25\n27-Jun-25\n04-Jul-25\n11-Jul-25\n18-Jul-25\n25-Jul-25\nIndices\nZSE Indices \nAll Share Index (ZSE)\nTop 10 Index\nMining Index\n95\n100\n105\n110\n115\n120\n25-Apr-25\n02-May-25\n09-May-25\n16-May-25\n23-May-25\n30-May-25\n06-Jun-25\n13-Jun-25\n20-Jun-25\n27-Jun-25\n04-Jul-25\n11-Jul-25\n18-Jul-25\n25-Jul-25\nIndex\nVFEX All Share Index \n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1000\n1200\n1400\n1600\n1800\n2000\n25-Apr-25\n02-May-25\n09-May-25\n16-May-25\n23-May-25\n30-May-25\n06-Jun-25\n13-Jun-25\n20-Jun-25\n27-Jun-25\n04-Jul-25\n11-Jul-25\n18-Jul-25\n25-Jul-25\nUS$ Thousand\nVFEX Market Turnover \n1,1\n1,15\n1,2\n1,25\n1,3\n1,35\n1,4\n25-Apr-25\n02-May-25\n09-May-25\n16-May-25\n23-May-25\n30-May-25\n06-Jun-25\n13-Jun-25\n20-Jun-25\n27-Jun-25\n04-Jul-25\n11-Jul-25\n18-Jul-25\n25-Jul-25\nUS$ Billion\nVFEX Market Capitalisation \n40\n45\n50\n55\n60\n65\n70\n75\n80\n25-Apr-25\n02-May-25\n09-May-25\n16-May-25\n23-May-25\n30-May-25\n06-Jun-25\n13-Jun-25\n20-Jun-25\n27-Jun-25\n04-Jul-25\n11-Jul-25\n18-Jul-25\n25-Jul-25\nZiG Billion\nZSE Market Capitalisation \n0\n50 000\n100 000\n150 000\n200 000\n250 000\n25-Apr-25\n02-May-25\n09-May-25\n16-May-25\n23-May-25\n30-May-25\n06-Jun-25\n13-Jun-25\n20-Jun-25\n27-Jun-25\n04-Jul-25\n11-Jul-25\n18-Jul-25\n25-Jul-25\nZiG Thousands\nZSE Market Turnover \n \n \n5 \n4. CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY \n Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n5. ENERGY PRICES \n \nEnergy Prices \n \n04-July 2025 \n11 July 2025 \n18 July 2025 \n25 July 2025 \nDomestic Energy Prices \nUS$ \nUS$ \nUS$ \nUS$ \nDiesel 50/ litre \n1.55 \n1.55 \n1.55 \n1.55 \nPetrol Blend E5/ litre \n1.56 \n1.56 \n1.56 \n1.56 \nLP Gas / kg \n1.57 \n1.57 \n1.57 \n1.57 \n \n \n \n \n \nInternational Energy \nPrices (Weekly average) \nUS$/barrel \nUS$/barrel \nUS$/barrel \nUS$/barrel \nCrude Oil Prices \n67.55 \n69.34 \n68.53 \n68.30 \n Source: Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory Authority and BBC 2025 \n \n6. GOLD PM FIX, MOSI-OA-TUNYA GOLD COINS AND GOLD BACKED DIGITAL TOKENS \n(GBDT) \n \nGold PM Fix and Gold Backed Digital Token Prices \nDate \nGold PM Fix \nGBDT ZiG Price per Mg \nGBDT US$ Price per Mg \nUS$/oz \nBuy \nSell \nBuy \nSell \n21-July-25 \n3,355.10 \n2.75 \n3.04 \n0.1025 \n0.1133 \n22-July-25 \n3,386.20 \n2.77 \n3.06 \n0.1034 \n0.1143 \n23-July-25 \n3,409.34 \n2.79 \n3.08 \n0.1041 \n0.1151 \n24-July-25 \n3,413.55 \n2.79 \n3.09 \n0.1043 \n0.1152 \n25-July-25 \n3,365.85 \n2.75 \n3.04 \n0.1028 \n0.1136 \nSource: London Bullion Market Association and Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n \n \n \nPAYMENT STREAM \nWEEK ENDING \n18 July 2025 \nWEEK ENDING \n25 July 2025 \nWEEKLY \nCHANGE (%) \n \nVALUES \n \nRTGS \n36,209,498,880.33 \n31,203,440,471.16 \n (13.83) \nOf which ZiG \n13,834,254,957.26 \n11,858,028,176.67 \n 14.29 \nOf which US$ transactions \n(ZiG Equivalent) \n22,375,243.923.07 \n19,345,412,294.49 \n(13.54) \nPOS \n2,360,720,143.13 \n3,705,070,382.59 \n56.9) \nATM \n1,521,377,285.92 \n1,901,117,974.05 \n24.96 \nMOBILE BANKING \n178,935,028.00 \n372,910,547.21 \n108.41 \nMOBILE MONEY \n3,300,716,125.37 \n3,141,737,752.56 \n (4.82) \nZIPIT MOBILE \n254,590,405.70 \n436,961,946.71 \n71.63 \nTOTAL \n43,825,837,868.46 \n40,761,239,074.28 \n(6.99) \n \nVOLUMES \n \nRTGS \n169,775 \n265,445 \n56.35 \nOf which ZiG \n68,750 \n112,538 \n63.69 \nOf which US$ \n101,025 \n152,907 \n 51.36 \nPOS \n1,438,715 \n2,773,946 \n 92.81 \nATM \n144,760 \n260,502 \n 79.95 \nMOBILE BANKING \n220,840 \n418,312 \n 89.42 \nMOBILE MONEY \n11,207,505 \n11,521,787 \n 2.80 \nZIPIT MOBILE \n184,701 \n364,319 \n 97.25 \nTOTAL \n13,366,296 \n15,604,311 \n 16.74 \n \n \n6 \nMosi-oa-Tunya Gold Coin Prices \nGold Coin \nPrice \n21-July-25 \n22-July-25 \n23-July-25 \n24-July-25 \n25-July-25 \n1.00Oz \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ \n3,522.86 \n3,555.51 \n3,580.34 \n3,584.23 \n3,534.14 \nZiG \n94,435.06 \n95,248.91 \n95,911.65 \n95,968.41 \n94,646.10 \n0.50Oz \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ \n1,761.43 \n1,777.76 \n1.790.17 \n1,792.11 \n1,767.07 \nZiG \n47,217.53 \n47,624.46 \n47,955.82 \n47,984.20 \n47,323.05 \n0.25Oz \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ \n880.71 \n888,88 \n895.09 \n896.06 \n883.54 \nZiG \n23,608.77 \n23,812.23 \n23,977.91 \n23,992.10 \n23,661.53 \n0.10Oz \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ \n352.29 \n355.55 \n358.03 \n358.42 \n353.41 \nZiG \n9,443.51 \n9,524.89 \n9,591.16 \n9,596.84 \n9,464.61 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n \n7. EXTERNAL SECTOR \n \n \nExchange Rate Developments (ZiG per Unit of foreign currency) \n \n \nUSD \nZAR \nGBP \nBWP \nEURO \nWeekly Average \n(14 July - 18 July) \n26.8093 \n1.5000 \n36.0029 \n1.9117 \n31.2113 \n21-July \n26.8064 \n1.5142 \n35.9718 \n1.9018 \n31.1786 \n22-July \n26.7891 \n1.5195 \n36.0970 \n1.8747 \n31.3124 \n23-July \n26.7884 \n1.5251 \n36.2408 \n1.9294 \n31.4335 \n24-July \n26.7752 \n1.5274 \n36.3595 \n1.9326 \n31.5305 \n25-July \n26.7805 \n1.5168 \n36.1431 \n1.9311 \n31.4417 \nWeekly Average \n(21 July – 25 July) \n26.7879 \n1.5206 \n36.1624 \n1.9139 \n31.3793 \nAppr (-)/Depr (+) (%) of the \nZWG \n(0.08) \n1.37 \n0.44 \n0.12 \n0.54 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n \nInternational Commodity Prices \n \nGold \nPlatinum \nPalladium \nNickel \nLithium \n \nUS$/oz \nUS$/ounce \nUS$/ounce \nUS$/tonne \nUS$/tonne \nWeekly Average \n(14 July –18 July) \n3,347.28 \n1,416.60 \n1,246.00 \n15,110.00 \n8,002.00 \n21-July \n3,387.40 \n1,450.00 \n1,267.00 \n15,523.00 \n8,020.00 \n22-July \n3,419.00 \n1,439.50 \n1,283.00 \n15,528.00 \n8,040.00 \n23-July \n3,379.60 \n1,413.00 \n1,272.00 \n15,572.00 \n8,050.00 \n24-July \n3,358.00 \n1,401.50 \n1,233.00 \n15,464.00 \n8,060.00 \n25-July \n3,333.15 \n1,414.00 \n1,245.50 \n15,245.00 \n8,100.00 \nWeekly Average \n(21 July – 25 July) \n3,375.43 \n1,423.60 \n1,260.10 \n15,466.40 \n8,054.00 \nWeekly change (%) \n0.84 \n0.49 \n1.13 \n2.36 \n0.65 \nSource: BBC, KITCO and Bloomberg, 2025 \n \n \n \n7 \nFigure 3: Weekly International Commodity Price Developments (9th May 2025– 25th July 2025) \n \n \n \n \n \nSource: BBC, KITCO and Bloomberg, 2025 \n \n \n0,00\n200,00\n400,00\n600,00\n800,00\n1000,00\n1200,00\n1400,00\n9-May\n16-May\n23-May\n30-May\n6-Jun\n13-Jun\n20-Jun\n27-Jun\n4-Jul\n11-Jul\n18-Jul\n25-Jul\nPalladium\n2 900\n3 150\n3 400\n3 650\n3 900\n09-May\n16-May\n23-May\n30-May\n06-Jun\n13-Jun\n20-Jun\n27-Jun\n04-Jul\n11-Jul\n18-Jul\n25-Jul\nUS$/oz\nGold\n50\n55\n60\n65\n70\n75\n80\n9-May\n16-May\n23-May\n30-May\n6-Jun\n13-Jun\n20-Jun\n27-Jun\n4-Jul\n11-Jul\n18-Jul\n25-Jul\nUS$/barrel\nCrude oil \n880\n930\n980\n1 030\n1 080\n1 130\n1 180\n1 230\n1 280\n1 330\n1 380\n1 430\n1 480\n1 530\n9-May\n16-May\n23-May\n30-May\n6-Jun\n13-Jun\n20-Jun\n27-Jun\n4-Jul\n11-Jul\n18-Jul\n25-Jul\nUS$/tonne\nPlatinum\n7 500\n7 800\n8 100\n8 400\n8 700\n9 000\n9 300\n9 600\n9-May\n16-May\n23-May\n30-May\n6-Jun\n13-Jun\n20-Jun\n27-Jun\n4-Jul\n11-Jul\n18-Jul\n25-Jul\nUS$/tonne\nLithium \n14 000\n14 200\n14 400\n14 600\n14 800\n15 000\n15 200\n15 400\n15 600\n15 800\n16 000\n16 200\n16 400\n16 600\n16 800\n9-May\n16-May\n23-May\n30-May\n6-Jun\n13-Jun\n20-Jun\n27-Jun\n4-Jul\n11-Jul\n18-Jul\n25-Jul\nUS$/tonne\nNickel\n \n \n8 \n8. TOBACCO SALES \n \nWeekly Cumulative Tobacco Sales: Day 99 (25th July 2025) \n \n2025 \n2024 \nVariance (%) \nCumulative Quantity Sold (Kgs) \n350,094,186 \n229,555,981 \n52.51 \nAverage Price (US$/kg) \n3.33 \n3.43 \n(2.92) \nCumulative value (US$) \n1,164,545,554 \n787,701,917 \n47.84 \nSource: Tobacco Industry and Marketing Board (TIMB), 2025 \n \n \nRESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE \nJULY 2025", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/Weekly_Economic_Highlights/WEEKLY_ECONOMIC_HIGHLIGHTS_25_July_2025_Volume_27_Number_30.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "8fd136f163b9ec194dcbf31832773a02", "text": "QUARTERLY \nECONOMIC \nREVIEW \n \n \n \nJune 2020 \n \n \n \n \n2 \nCONTENTS \n1. OVERVIEW ....................................................................................................... 5 \n2. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS ................................ 6 \n3. DOMESTIC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS ...........................................14 \n4. MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS .................................................................23 \n5. STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS ........................................................24 \n6. PAYMENT, CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES ................26 \n7. FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS ..........................................................................30 \n \n \n \n \n3 \nList of Figures \nFigure 1: Precious Mineral Prices (US$/ounce): Mar 2019 – June 2020 ...................................... 8 \nFigure 2: Base Metal Prices (US$/ton): Mar 2018 – June 2020 .................................................... 9 \nFigure 3: Brent Crude Oil Prices (US$/Barrel) ............................................................................... 9 \nFigure 4: Exchange Rate Developments: February 2019 – March 2020 ...................................... 10 \nFigure 5: Quarterly Merchandise Total Trade (US$ m) ............................................................... 10 \nFigure 6: Quarterly Merchandise Exports (US$ m) ...................................................................... 11 \nFigure 7: Major Export Destinations second quarter 2020. .......................................................... 12 \nFigure 8: Quarterly Merchandise Imports..................................................................................... 12 \nFigure 9: Major Merchandise Import Sources (% of Share)......................................................... 13 \nFigure 10: Merchandise Trade Balance ........................................................................................ 14 \nFigure 11: Quarterly Fresh Milk Output (litres) ........................................................................... 17 \nFigure 12: Quarterly Trends in Gold output (kg) and average international prices (US$/ounce) 18 \nFigure 13: Sectorial Contribution to Gold Output in Q2 2019, Q1 2020 and Q2 2020................ 18 \nFigure 14: Quarterly output of Platinum and average international prices (US$/ounce) ............. 19 \nFigure 15: Quarterly output of Palladium and average international prices (US$/ounce) ........... 19 \nFigure 16: Quarterly output of Nickel and average international prices (US$/tonne) .................. 20 \nFigure 17: Quarterly Chrome Ore Sales Volume and Average Prices ......................................... 20 \nFigure 18: Quarterly HCF Sales volumes and Average Prices ..................................................... 21 \nFigure 19: Quarterly Inflation Profile (%) .................................................................................... 22 \nFigure 20: Monthly Inflation Profile (%)...................................................................................... 22 \nFigure 21: Broad Money Developments ....................................................................................... 23 \nFigure 22:Distribution of Private Sector Credit ............................................................................ 24 \nFigure 23: ZSE All Share and Top 10 Indices .............................................................................. 25 \nFigure 24: Industrial and Mining Indices...................................................................................... 25 \nFigure 25: Market Capitalisation .................................................................................................. 26 \nFigure 26: ZSE Market Turnover ................................................................................................. 26 \nFigure 27: Values and Volumes of RTGS Transactions ........................................................... 27 \nFigure 28: SWIFT Quarterly Foreign Currency Transactions ...................................................... 28 \nFigure 29: Over the Counter Cash Withdrawals ......................................................................... 28 \nFigure 30: Retail Transaction Values ........................................................................................... 29 \nFigure 31: Retail Transaction Volumes ........................................................................................ 29 \nFigure 32: Collateral Amounts from December 2018 to June 2020 ............................................. 30 \nFigure 33: Government Revenue Structure .................................................................................. 31 \nFigure 34: Budget balance ZW$ Billion in Q2 2020 .................................................................... 32 \n \n \n \n4 \nList of Tables \n \nTable 1: Global Economic Growth & Outlook (%) ........................................................................ 6 \nTable 2: International Commodity Prices: ...................................................................................... 7 \nTable 3: Quarterly Merchandise Exports ...................................................................................... 11 \nTable 4: Quarterly Merchandise Imports (US$m) ....................................................................... 13 \nTable 5: Revised Growth estimates .............................................................................................. 15 \nTable 6: Estimated field crop output (tons) .................................................................................. 15 \nTable 7: Cumulative Tobacco Sales in 2019 and 2020 ................................................................ 16 \nTable 8: Maize production trends ................................................................................................. 16 \nTable 9: Cattle Slaughters ............................................................................................................. 17 \nTable 10: Quarterly Pig Slaughters ............................................................................................... 17 \nTable 11: Quarterly Mineral Output Statistics: Q2 2019, Q1 2020 and Q2 2020 ........................ 18 \nTable 12: Total Electricity Output (GWh) .................................................................................... 21 \nTable 13: First Half Electricity Output ......................................................................................... 22 \nTable 14: Key Stock Market Developments ................................................................................. 25 \nTable 15: Consolidated Transactional Activities .......................................................................... 27 \nTable 16: Payment Systems Access Points and Devices .............................................................. 30 \nTable 17: Summary of First and Second Quarter 2020 Fiscal Position (ZWL$ Million) ............ 31 \nTable 18: Summarised Government Spending ............................................................................ 32 \n \n \n \n \n \n5 \n1. \nOVERVIEW \n \nThe global economy is reeling from the negative \nimpact of strict and relatively lengthy lockdowns, \nimplemented to contain the spread of the COVID-\n19 pandemic. In this regard, the International \nMonetary Fund (IMF), in its June 2020 World \nEconomic Outlook (WEO), projected the global \neconomy to contract by 4.9% in 2020, before \nrecovering to a growth of 5.4% in 2021. On the \ndomestic front, the containment measures put in \nplace by Government to limit the spread of the \nCOVID-19 pandemic, coupled with other \neconomic challenges, slowed down economic \nactivity. As a result, the domestic economy is now \nexpected to contract by 4.5% in 2020. \nThe quarter under review saw annual headline \ninflation accelerate from 676.39% in March 2020 \nto 737.26% in June 2020. This, notwithstanding, \nthe Bank continued to put in place measures to \nstabilise the exchange rate and anchor inflation \nexpectations. \n \nAs a consequence of the negative impact of \nCOVID-19 restrictions, total merchandise trade \ndeclined by 16.2% to US$1,822.6 million in the \nsecond quarter of 2020, from US$2,175.4 million \nrecorded in the corresponding quarter in 2019. \nMerchandise exports stood at US$829.2 million, \nagainst merchandise imports of US$993.4 \nmillion, culminating in a trade deficit of \nUS$164.2 million, for the second quarter of 2020. \n \n1 From November 2017, broad money was adjusted by a \nreclassification of “lines of credit” that were incorrectly \nclassified as deposits included in broad money. This \nDevelopments in the monetary sector culminated \nin a 106.2% growth in broad money1, from \nZW$48.40 billion in March 2020 to ZW$99.82 \nbillion in June 2020. The increase largely \nreflected valuation changes owing to the \ndepreciation of the exchange rate, from ZW$25 \nper US$1 as at end March 2020 to ZW$ 57.4 per \nUS$1 by end June 2020. \nDuring the second quarter of 2020, the Zimbabwe \nStock Exchange (ZSE) was characterised by \nbullish sentiments, as investors sought a safe \nhaven for their wealth, in light of limited \ninvestments options. The All Share and Top 10 \nindices grew by 773.63% and 232.52%, to close \nat \n1,788.75 \npoints \nand \n1,232.79 \npoints, \nrespectively, in June 2020. As a result, ZSE \nmarket capitalisation surged by 289.98%, from \nZW$58.61 \nbillion \nin \nMarch \n2020 \nto \nZW$228.57 billion in June 2020. \n \nActivity on the National Payment system (NPS) \nwas buoyant, with the value of transactions \nprocessed through the NPS amounting to \nZW$353.2 billion in the second quarter of 2020, \nup from ZW$278.13 billion in the first quarter. \nNPS transaction volumes, however, registered a \ndecrease of 14% to 465.5 million in the second \nquarter. Transactions processed through the Real \nTime Gross Settlement (RTGS) system increased \nby 32.0% to close at ZW$198.1 billion, during the \nquarter under review. \n \nreduced the stock of money and at the same time reduced \nthe net foreign assets of Other Depository Corporations. \n \n \n \n6 \n2. INTERNATIONAL \nECONOMIC \nDEVELOPMENTS \n \nProspects for global economic activity for 2020 \nremain considerably weak, mainly on account of \nthe coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, which \nrapidly intensified in a number of emerging \nmarket and developing economies. Stringent \nlockdown measures put in place resulted in larger \ndisruptions to economic activity than forecast. \nThe pandemic negatively impacted on economic \nactivity in the first half of 2020 at a more than \nexpected scale, with economic recovery now \nexpected to be more gradual than previously \nanticipated. The IMF indicated that consumption \ngrowth, in particular, has been revised downwards \nfor most economies, reflecting heightened risks \nposed by disruptions to economic activity. \n \nAccordingly, in its June 2020 update of the World \nEconomic Outlook Report, the IMF projects the \nglobal economy to sharply contract by -4.9% in \n2020, much worse than the earlier projection in \nthe April 2020 update. The global economy is, \nhowever, expected to grow by 5.4% in 2021. The \nrebound in 2021 will depend critically on the \nprospects of a reduction in the rates of infection \nby the pandemic in the second half of 2020; \nallowing containment efforts to be gradually \nscaled back, and restoring consumer and investor \nconfidence. Table 1 shows the Fund’s revised \nglobal growth prospects for 2020 and projections \nfor 2021. \n \n2 Growth rates projections for Zimbabwe are from \nTreasury, Reserve Bank & actuals from Zimstat \nTable \n1: \nGlobal \nEconomic Growth & \nOutlook(%) \n \n \n2019 \n2020 \n(Projection) \n2021 \n(Projection) \nWorld Output \n2.9 \n-4.9 \n5.4 \nAdvanced \nEconomies \n1.7 \n-8.0 \n4.8 \n US \n2.3 \n-8.0 \n4.5 \n Euro Area \n1.3 \n-10.2 \n6.0 \n Japan \n0.7 \n-5.8 \n2.4 \nEmerging \nMarket \n& \nDeveloping \nEconomies \n3.7 \n-3.0 \n5.9 \n China \n6.1 \n1.0 \n8.2 \n India \n4.2 \n-4.5 \n6.0 \nSub-Saharan \n3.1 \n-3.2 \n3.4 \n Zimbabwe2 \n-6.0 \n-4.5 \n 7.4 \nNigeria \n2.2 \n-5.4 \n2.6 \nSouth Africa \n0.2 \n-8.0 \n3.5 \nSource: IMF World Economic Outlook: June 2020 \nThe IMF projects advanced economies as a group \nto contract by 8.0% in 2020, with the United \nStates economy also projected to decline by 8.0%, \nmore than twice the rate of decline experienced, \nduring the 2008 financial crisis. The rate of \neconomic growth in the Euro area is projected to \ndecline by 10.2%, while developing and emerging \neconomies are projected to decline by 3.0%, \nreflecting tightening global financial conditions \nand falling global trade and commodity prices. \n \n \n \n7 \nIn contrast, China is projected to experience a \nsmall but positive rate of economic growth of 1% \nin 2020. The IMF also argued that recovery of the \nglobal economy could be weaker than projected, \nas a result of lingering uncertainty about possible \ncontagion, lack of confidence, and permanent \nclosure of businesses and shifts in the behaviour \nof firms and households, due to the COVID 19 \npandemic. \nThe Sub-Saharan African region (SSA) is also \nfacing similar challenges and according to the \nJune 2020 World Economic Outlook, the region’s \ngrowth forecast was revised from an initial growth \nof -1.6% in the April 2020 update to -3.2% in the \nJune 2020 update. In particular, South Africa’s \neconomy is projected to slow down by -8.0% in \n2020, due to the adverse effects of the COVID-19 \npandemic \nand \nthe \nlockdown \nmeasures \nimplemented by government to curb the spread of \nthe virus. \nINTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICE \nDEVELOPMENTS \n \nDuring the second quarter of 2020, international \nprices for precious metals exhibited a mixed \ntrend, as the safe-haven demand for gold was \nrobust, while the demand for platinum was \nweaker. Copper and nickel prices remained \ndepressed mainly due to the effects of COVID-19 \npandemic, which dampened the demand outlook \nfor base metals. Similarly, Brent crude oil also \nrecorded huge losses during the second quarter of \n2020, amid a collapse in global demand. \nTable 2 shows the evolution of international \nprices for selected commodities, during the \nsecond quarter of 2020. \nTable 2: International Commodity Prices: \nQ1 2020 \n \nGold \nPlatinum \nCopper \nNickel \nBrent \nCrude Oil \n \nUS$/oz \nUS$/oz \nUS$/tonne \nUS$/tonne \nUS$/Barrel \n2020 Q1 \nAverage \n1,584.19 \n904.7 \n5,627.76 \n12,701.54 \n50.94 \nApr-20 \n1,680.18 \n755.45 \n5,039.45 \n11,741.43 \n26.54 \nMay-20 \n1,718.19 \n795.89 \n5,243.42 \n12,151.00 \n32.14 \nJun-20 \n1,733.14 \n821.16 \n5,742.39 \n12,702.05 \n40.70 \n2020 Q2 \nAverage \n1,710.50 \n790.83 \n5,341.75 \n12,198.16 \n33.13 \n2020 Q1-\nQ2 \nChanges \n(%) \n8.0 \n-12.6 \n-5.1 \n-4.0 \n-35.0 \n Source: Bloomberg, BBC, 2020 \nPrecious Metals \nDuring the second quarter of 2020, precious metal \nprices exhibited a mixed trend, with gold \nquarterly average prices increasing, whilst \nplatinum prices decreased. Gold prices were \nbolstered by safe-haven demand, as investors \nshifted from riskier assets. Muted industrial \ndemand negatively impacted platinum prices. \n \nQuarterly average prices of gold increased by 8% \nto US$ 1,710.50 per ounce in the second quarter, \nfrom US$ 1,584.19 per ounce recorded in the first \nquarter of 2020. On the other hand, quarterly \naverage prices for platinum declined by 12.6%, \nfrom US$904.70 per ounce recorded in the \nprevious quarter, to US$790.83 per ounce \nrecorded in the second quarter of 2020. Figure 1 \nshows the evolution of gold and platinum prices \nfor the period from March 2019 to June 2020. \n \n \n \n8 \nFigure \n1: \nPrecious \nMineral \nPrices \n(US$/ounce): Mar 2019 – June \n2020 \n \nSource: Bloomberg, 2020 \nBase Metals \nBase metal prices somewhat recovered during the \nperiod under review, owing to improved demand \nfrom China, the world’s top consumer. Prices \nwere also supported by tight supply conditions in \nkey \nsource \ncountries. \nExpectations \nof \ninfrastructure-led recovery in China and the UK \nand the announcement of a new green deal3 in \nEurope improved investor confidence. Signs of \nrising demand was evidenced in declining \ninventories of scrap metal. The outbreak of \ncoronavirus in Chilean and Peruvian mines, the \nworld’s top two copper producers, supported \nprices from the supply-side. \n \nLikewise, the price of nickel got support from \nIndonesia’s on-going ban on nickel ore exports to \n \n3 The European Green Deal aims to transform the 27-\ncountry bloc from a high- to a low-carbon economy, \nwithout reducing prosperity and while improving \nChina. Notwithstanding the signs of recovery, \nsubdued global economic activity continued to \nweigh down prices. Record low prices levels were \nregistered in April 2020 due to lockdowns across \nthe globe, with the price of copper at US$5 039 \nper tonne and nickel at US$11 741 per tonne. \n \nOn a quarterly basis, the price of copper increased \nby 11.01%, from US$5 168 per tonne in the first \nquarter of 2020, to an average of US$5 742 per \ntonne recorded in the second quarter. Similarly, \nnickel prices rose by 7.2%, from US$11 848 per \ntonne in first quarter to US$12 702 per tonne, \nduring the second quarter. \n \nFigure 2 shows the monthly trends for base metal \nprices for the period from March 2018 to June \n2020. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \npeople's quality of life, through cleaner air and water, \nbetter health and a thriving natural world \n700\n750\n800\n850\n900\n950\n1000\n1050\n1100\n1200\n1300\n1400\n1500\n1600\n1700\n1800\nMar-19\nJun-19\nSep-19\nDec-19\nMar-20\nJun-20\nGold\nPlatinum (RHS)\n \n \n \n9 \nFigure 2: Base Metal Prices (US$/ton): \nMar 2018 – June 2020 \nSource: Bloomberg, 2020 \nBrent Crude Oil \nThe international price of Brent crude oil slumped \nby 35.0%, from US$50.96 per barrel in the first \nquarter of 2020 to US$33.13 per barrel in the \nsecond quarter. The marked slowdown was \nunderpinned by a dearth in demand and excess \nglobal supply, particularly in April 2020, when \nmost \neconomies \nimplemented \nCOVID-19 \ncontainment and lockdown measures. Oil prices \nhave, however, exhibited signs of recovery on the \nback of record production cuts by OPEC and non-\nOPEC members, that took effect in May 2020. \n \nFigure 3 shows the monthly evolution of crude oil \nprices for the period from March 2018 to June \n2020. \n \n \n \n \n \nFigure 3: Brent Crude Oil Prices (US$/Barrel) \n \nSource: Bloomberg, 2020 \n \nEXCHANGE RATE DEVELOPMENTS \n \nOn the 23rd of June 2020, the Bank introduced the \nForeign Exchange Auction System, replacing the \nfixed exchange rate regime that was introduced \nduring the first quarter of 2020. Auctions are held \nweekly on Tuesdays to determine the exchange \nrate for the week. The inaugural auction saw the \nvalue of the Zimbabwe dollar (ZW$) depreciate \nfrom ZW$25.00 per US$1 to ZW$57.36 per \nUS$1. The exchange rate premium which had \npeaked at 320%, collapsed to 74.3%. Figure 4 \nillustrates exchange rate developments since the \nintroduction of the interbank market in February \n2019. \n 8,000\n 10,000\n 12,000\n 14,000\n 16,000\n 18,000\n 20,000\n 5,000\n 5,500\n 6,000\n 6,500\n 7,000\n 7,500\nMar-18\nJun-18\nSep-18\nDec-18\nMar-19\nJun-19\nSep-19\nDec-19\nMar-20\nJun-20\nCopper\nNickel (RHS)\n0.00\n10.00\n20.00\n30.00\n40.00\n50.00\n60.00\n70.00\n80.00\n90.00\nMar-18\nJun-18\nSep-18\nDec-18\nMar-19\nJun-19\nSep-19\nDec-19\nMar-20\nJun-20\n \n \n \n10 \nFigure 4: Exchange Rate Developments: \n \n \n (February 2019 – June 2020) \n \nSource: RBZ & Bank Market Intelligent Surveys, 2020 \n \nMERCHANDISE \nTRADE \nDEVELOPMENTS \nTotal merchandise trade amounted to US$1,822.6 \nmillion in the second quarter of 2020, a 21.6% \ndecline from US$2,324.7 million recorded in the \nfirst quarter, as shown in Figure 5 \nFigure 5: Quarterly Merchandise Total Trade \n(US$ m) \nSource: Zimstat, 2020 \nThe slowdown in total merchandise trade was \nattributable to declines in both exports and \nimports, particularly in April 2020. This was on \nthe back of the corona virus induced containment \nmeasures implemented by the country’s major \ntrading partners such as South Africa and China. \nSimilarly, on a quarter - on - quarter basis, total \nmerchandise trade declined by 16.2%, from \nUS$2,175.4 million in the second quarter of 2019 \nto US$1,822.6 million in the second quarter of \n2020. \nMerchandise Export Developments \nMerchandise exports amounted to US$829.2 \nmillion in the second quarter of 2020, \nrepresenting a 19.9% decline from US$1,035.3 \nmillion recorded in the previous quarter. \n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\n140\n160\n180\n28-Feb\n30-Apr\n30-Jun\n31-Aug\n31-Oct\n31-Dec\n29-Feb\n30-Apr\n30-Jun\n2020Q2\nINTERBANK RATE\nPARALLEL RATES\n2,324.7 \n1,822.6 \n0\n500\n1,000\n1,500\n2,000\n2,500\n2020Q1\n2020Q2\n \n \n \n11 \nCompared to the corresponding quarter in 2019, \nmerchandise exports recorded a decline of 3.6%, \nfrom US$860.0 million to US$829.2 million, as \nshown in Figure 6. \nFigure 6: Quarterly Merchandise Exports \n(US$ m) \n \n Source: Zimstat, 2020 \nThe general downward trajectory in merchandise \nexports was largely underpinned by disruptions in \nsupply chains as a result of the COVID-19 \npandemic. \nTable 3 shows developments on quarterly \nmerchandise exports by commodity. \n \n \n \n \n4 Including flue-cured tobacco, stemmed tobacco and \ncigarettes) \nTable 3: Quarterly Merchandise Exports \n(US$ m) \n Commodity \n2020Q1 \n(US$ m) \n2020Q2 \n(US$ m) \n2020Q1-\nQ2 \nChanges \n(%) \n2020Q2 \nShare \nof \nTotal \n(%) \nTotal Exports \n1,035.3 \n829.2 \n-19.9 \n100.0 \nOf Which: \n \n \n \n \n Gold \n227.3 \n250.5 \n10.2 \n30.2 \n Nickel mattes \n188.7 \n238.8 \n26.5 \n28.8 \n Nickel \nores \nand \nconcentrates \n101.7 \n99.6 \n-2.1 \n12.0 \n Industrial \ndiamonds \n30.7 \n30.6 \n-0.4 \n3.7 \n Tobacco 4 \n221.9 \n39.3 \n-82.3 \n4.7 \n Ferro-\nchromium \n48.5 \n27.5 \n-43.4 \n3.3 \nUnwrought \nPlatinum \n17.8 \n21.2 \n19.2 \n2.6 \n Chromium \nores \nand \nconcentrates \n8.6 \n12.9 \n49.0 \n1.6 \n Cane \n21.2 \n23.1 \n9.0 \n2.8 \nCoal (Coke and \nsemi-coke \nof \ncoal) \n10.2 \n11.6 \n13.6 \n1.4 \n Source: Zimstat, 2019 & RBZ Calculations, 2020 \n \n \n1,035.3 \n829.2 \n2020Q1\n2020Q2\n \n \n \n12 \nMajor Merchandise Export Destinations \nDuring the second quarter of 2020, the country’s \nexports were mainly destined for the United Arab \nEmirates \n(27.1%); \nSouth \nAfrica \n(20.6%); \nMozambique (10.4%); Belgium (3.6%); Uganda \n(1.6%) and Zambia (1.4%), respectively, as \nshown in Figure 7. \nFigure \n7: \nMajor \nExport \nDestinations \nsecond quarter 2020. \n \nSource: Zimstat, 2020 \n \nMerchandise Import Developments \n \nTotal merchandise imports for the second quarter \nof 2020 amounted to US$993.4 million, a 24.5% \ndecline from US$1,315.4 million recorded in the \ncorresponding period in 2019. \nFigure 8 shows quarterly merchandise imports for \nthe second quarters of 2019 and 2020. \nFigure 8: Quarterly Merchandise Imports \n (US$ m) \nSource: Zimstat, 2020 \nOn a quarter-on-quarter basis, merchandise \nimports for the second quarter of 2020 were \n22.9% lower, compared to US$1,288.8 million \nrecorded in the previous quarter. The decline in \nimports was also attributed to the COVID-19 \ninduced \nlockdowns, \nwhich \ndisrupted \nthe \ntransportation of goods. During the period under \nreview, diesel and petrol imports slowed down \nmarkedly, reflecting waning demand and supply. \n \nTable 4 shows the merchandise imports for the \nfirst and second quarters of 2020. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n27.1\n20.6\n10.4\n3.6\n1.6\n1.4\n1.3\n1.0\n0.0\n20.0\n40.0\n60.0\n UAE\n South Africa\n Mozambique\n Belgium\n Uganda\n Zambia\n Hong Kong\n Kenya\n1,315.4\n993.4\n2019Q2\n2020Q2\n \n \n \n13 \nTable 4: Quarterly Merchandise Imports \n(US$m) \n \n \n2020 \nQ1 \n(US$m) \n2020 \nQ2 \n(US$m) \n2020 \nQ12 \nChanges \n(%) \n2020Q2 \nShare \nof Total \n(%) \n Total \nImports \n1,288.8 \n993.4 \n-22.9 \n100.0 \n Of \nWhich: \n \n \n \n \n Diesel \n186.4 \n103.5 \n-44.4 \n10.4 \n Maize \n(Excludin\ng Seed) \n135.2 \n94.4 \n-30.2 \n9.5 \n Unleaded \npetrol \n90.2 \n50.5 \n-44.0 \n5.1 \n Electrical \nenergy \n39.1 \n41.4 \n5.9 \n4.2 \n Crude \nsoya bean \noil \n17.7 \n35.3 \n99.9 \n3.6 \nRice \n19.8 \n23.6 \n19.1 \n2.4 \n \nMedicines \n23.3 \n27.3 \n17.2 \n2.7 \n Wheat \n8.7 \n17.2 \n96.7 \n1.7 \n Vaccines \n(for \nhuman \nmedicine) \n11.3 \n14.1 \n24.1 \n1.4 \n Surgical \nInstrumen\nts \n3.4 \n10.7 \n215.8 \n1.1 \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Computations \n \nMajor Import Sources \n \nThe country’s imports in the second quarter of \n2020 were mainly sourced from South Africa \n(45.65%); Singapore (15.50%); China (9.46%); \nIndia \n(4.44%); \nMauritius \n(3.35%); \nand \nMozambique (2.50%), as shown in Figure 9. \n \n \n Figure 9: Major Merchandise Import \nSources (% of Share) \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Computations, 2020 \n \nTRADE BALANCE \nThe merchandise trade developments in the \nsecond quarter of 2020 resulted in a trade deficit \nof US$164.2 million. This was a significant \nimprovement from the deficit of US$253.4 \nmillion which was recorded in the first quarter of \n2020, as shown in Figure 10. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n0.0\n45.7\n15.5\n9.5\n4.4\n3.4\n2.5\n1.2\n1.2\n1.2\n1.0\n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\n50.0\n South Africa\n Singapore\n China\n India\n Mauritius\n Mozambique\n United Kingdom\n Zambia\n Pakistan\n UAE\n \n \n \n14 \nFigure 10: Merchandise Trade Balance \n(US$ m) \n \nSource: Zimstat, 2020 & RBZ Computations, 2020 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n3. \nDOMESTIC \nECONOMIC \nDEVELOPMENTS \n \nREAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS \n \nGross Domestic Product \n \nThe real GDP growth projection for 2020 was \nrevised downwards from 3.0% to -4.5%, largely \non \naccount \nof \nsubdued \nperformance \nin \nagriculture, mining and manufacturing, and the \nadverse impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. \nDrought, in particular, affected agriculture, water \nand energy sectors, with spill-over effects to the \nrest of the economy. \n \nThe COVID-19 pandemic lockdown measures \nhad a debilitating effect on sectors such as \ntourism, \nnon-food \nmanufacturing, \nmining, \nfinancial services, transport and distribution and \neducation. On the other hand, health services and \ncommunications experienced some gains. Table 5 \nsummarises the revisions to the sectoral growth \nprojections for 2020. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1,035.3 \n829.2 \n1,288.8\n993.4\n(253.4)\n(164.2)\n2 0 2 0 Q1\n2 0 2 0 Q2\nExports\nImports\nTrade Balance\n \n \n \n15 \nTable 5: Revised Growth projections \n2019 \nRev \n2020 \nRev \nOverall GDP growth \n-6.0 \n-4.5 \nAgriculture and forestry \n-17.8 \n-0.2 \nMining and quarrying \n-12.4 \n-4.1 \nManufacturing \n-8.7 \n-10.8 \nElectricity and water \n-19.2 \n-7.9 \nConstruction \n-13.9 \n-11.4 \nDistribution, Hotels and restaurants \n-8.2 \n-7.4 \nSupportive services \n5.3 \n-0.5 \nTransportation and communication \n12.9 \n3.2 \nFinancial, banking and insurance \nactivities \n-6.1 \n-7.1 \nAdministrative and support service \nactivities \n1.5 \n-0.5 \nEducation and training \n0.9 \n-7.2 \nHuman health and social work \nactivities \n2.7 \n7.8 \nPrivate’s education and health \n1.3 \n-3.5 \nHouseholds-related services \n-2.6 \n-2.1 \nReal estate activities \n-1.6 \n-1.8 \nOther service activities \n-3.7 \n-2.0 \nSource: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, \nRBZ, Zimstat, 2020 \nAGRICULTURE \nThe agriculture sector is expected to contract by \n0.2% in 2020, on account of the poor rainfall \noutturn as well as increasing costs and low \navailability of inputs. Tobacco, beef, poultry, \nmilk and soyabean outputs, are expected to \ndecline significantly in 2020. \n \nThough remaining low, output for other key \nsummer crops increased in 2020, with combined \ncereal output increasing significantly to 1 060 143 \ntonnes, from 851 844 tonnes in the previous \nseason. This culminated in a cereal deficit of 1 \n167 639 tonnes, given the national requirement of \n2 227 782 tonnes. Table 6 compares output of \nmajor food crops in 2019 and 2020. \n \nTable 6: Estimated field crop output (tons) \nCrop \n2019/20 \n2018/19 Variance % \nMaize \n907 629 \n776 635 \n17 \nSorghum \n103 684 \n40 215 \n158 \nPearl Millet \n39 032 \n28 047 \n39 \nFinger Millet \n9 799 \n6 947 \n41 \nGroundnut \n87 479 \n70 902 \n23 \nRound Nut \n23 832 \n29 396 \n-19 \nSweet Potato \n114 558 \n88 248 \n30 \nSugar Beans \n12 650 \n9 528 \n33 \nCowpeas \n18 430 \n12 655 \n26 \nSource: Ministry of Lands, Agriculture, Water, and Rural \nResettlement, 2020 \n \nTobacco \nTobacco was adversely affected by excessive \nmoisture stress experienced during the cropping \nseason, resulting in lower output. \n \nAs at 30th June 2020 about 112.5 million \nkilogrammes of tobacco, worth US$265.44 \nmillion, had been sold. This was 3.4% lower than \nthe 116.46 million kilogrammes, valued at \nUS$211.07 million, sold in the comparable period \nin 2019. The prices offered for the crop improved \nfrom an average of US$1.81 to US$2.36, due to \nbetter leaf quality, compared to the previous \nseason. Table 7 shows the tobacco sales outturn \nas at end June 2020. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n16 \nTable 7: Cumulative Tobacco Sales in 2019 \nand 2020 \n \n2020 \n2019 \nVariance \n(%) \nTotal Quantity \nSold (million Kgs) \n112 \n116 \n-3.40 \nTotal Value \n(US$ million) \n265 \n211 \n25.76 \nAverage \nPrice \n(US$)/Kg \n112 \n116 \n-3.40 \nSource: Tobacco Industry and Marketing Board, 2019. \nWheat \nWheat output is expected at around 100 000 \ntonnes in 2020, marginally higher than the 94 700 \ntonnes produced in 2019. The command \nagriculture programme accounted for about 80% \nof the area planted, up from about 75% in the \nprevious season. The production of wheat \nbenefitted \nfrom \nthe \ncommand \nagriculture \nprogram and the generally stable power supply \nfor irrigation. \n \nMaize \nMaize output increased by 17% to 907 629 tonnes \nin 2020, from 776 635 tonnes produced in 2019 \nattributable to an improvement in yield in the \n2019/20 season. This followed a slightly better \nrainfall outturn during the second half of the \nseason, which offset the decline in hectarage. \n \nTable 8 summarises the performance of the maize \ncrop over the past two seasons. \n \n \n \n \n \nTable 8: Maize production trends \nSeason \nArea \n(ha) \nOutput \n(ton) \nYield \n(t/ha) \n2018/19 \n1 623 757 \n776 635 \n0.48 \n2019/20 \n1 582 766 \n907 628 \n0.57 \nSource: Ministry of Lands, Agriculture Water, and Rural \nresettlement, 2020. \nCotton \nSeed cotton output is expected to surge by 32%, \nfrom 76 687 tonnes in 2019 to 101 000 tonnes in \n2020, boosted by crop yield gains resulting from \nthe use of a high yield hybrid seed variety. \n \nNational seed cotton sales at end of June 2020 \nstood at 22.35 million kilogrammes, 20% lower \nthan the 27.87 million kilogrammes sold during \nthe same period in 2019. The Cotton Company of \nZimbabwe (Cottco) continued to dominate the \nindustry, accounting for 99.2% of purchases by \nvirtue of being the implementing arm of \nGovernment’s input scheme. \n \nLivestock \nAccording to the Second Round Crop and \nLivestock Assessment Report of 2020, the \ncondition of all livestock classes was observed as \nfair to good. While grazing and water were \ngenerally available at the time of the assessments \nthere is a high likelihood of shortages occurring \nas the year progresses in the traditionally drier \nparts of the country. \n \nOf note is the drought and disease induced \nincrease in cattle mortality rate, which rose from \n5% in the previous season to 9% in the 2019/2020 \nseason. The high mortality rates contributed to the \nreduction of the national herd from 5 774 525 \n \n \n \n17 \nhead in 2019 to 5 443 770 head in 2020. \n \nThe second quarter of 2020 saw a decline in \nlivestock slaughters, due to the impact of \nCOVID-19 lockdown restrictions on abattoir \noperations, and livestock movement. \n \nCattle \nCattle slaughters in the formal sector stood at 42 \n446 head, about 21.5% lower than the 54 073 \nrecorded in the previous quarter. The slaughters \nwere also 34.6% lower than the 64 946 head in the \nsame period in 2019. This was partly due to the \nCOVID-19 induced restrictions, which adversely \naffected effective demand for beef, during the \nperiod under review. \n \nCumulatively, 96 519 cattle were slaughtered \nduring the first half of 2020, down from 122 620 \ncattle slaughtered during the same period in 2019. \nTable 9 shows quarterly cattle slaughters in 2019 \nand 2020. \n \nTable 9: Cattle Slaughters \n \n2019 \n2020 \n% Change \nQ1 \n57 674 \n54 073 \n-6.24 \nQ2 \n64 946 \n42 446 \n-34.64 \nTotal \n122 620 \n96 519 \n-21.29 \nSource: Ministry of Lands, Agriculture, Water, and Rural \nResettlement, 2019 \nPigs \nQuarterly pig slaughters declined by 16.5% in the \nsecond quarter of 2020, due to low demand. The \nhigh cost of stock- feeds continued to negatively \naffect pig production during the quarter. The \ndecline in slaughters in the second quarter \nresulted in a 7.7% fall in cumulative slaughter \nstatistics compared to 2019. \n \nTable 10: Quarterly Pig Slaughters \nPigs \n2019 \n2020 \n% Change \nQ1 \n46 128 \n47 198 \n2.32 \nQ2 \n52 598 \n43 918 \n-16.5 \nTotal \n98 726 \n91116 \n-7.71 \nSource: Ministry of Lands, Agriculture, Water and Rural \nResettlement, 2019. \n \nDairy \nMilk output fell to 18.34 million litres in the \nsecond quarter of 2020, down from 19.22 million \nlitres in the preceding quarter and 19.61 million \nlitres in the same period last year. Figure 11 \nshows quarterly milk output in 2020. \n \nFigure 11: Quarterly Fresh Milk Output \n(litres) \n \nSource: Ministry of Lands, Agriculture, Water and Rural \nResettlement, 2020 \nMINING \nThe mining sector recorded mixed performance \nduring the period under review. PGMs, diamond \nand coal registered strong positive growth \ncompared to the same period in 2019, whilst gold \n17.00\n17.50\n18.00\n18.50\n19.00\n19.50\n20.00\n20.50\n21.00\nMillions\n \n \n \n18 \nand nickel underperformed during the same \nperiod, as shown in Table 11. \n \nTable 11: Quarterly Mineral Output Statistics: \nQ2 2019, Q1 2020 and Q2 2020 \n \nq2 2019 \nq1 2020 \nq2 2020 \nGold (kg) \n6261.4 \n6,151.67 \n5,408.09 \nPlatinum (kg) \n3695.3 \n3,543.74 \n4,460.93 \nPalladium (kg) \n3085.3 \n2,956.96 \n3,779.63 \nRhodium (kg) \n326.7 \n316.70 \n399.07 \nIridium (kg) \n228.1 \n215.79 \n298.60 \nRuthenium (kg) \n211.3 \n205.01 \n224.11 \nDiamonds \n(‘000carat)* \n617.04 \n540.94 \n634.61 \nChrome (MT)** \n366978.3 \n292,672.52 \n179,243.28 \nNickel (MT) \n4524 \n3,935.99 \n3,818.33 \nCoal (MT) \n620435 \n417,675 \n970,483.50 \nSource: Ministry of Mines, 2020 \n* Figures are only for April & May 2020 \n** Figures are only for April 2020. \n \nThe performance of the mining sector was \nadversely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic \ninduced lockdown measures in source and transit \nmarkets; shortages of foreign currency, unstable \npower supply; and high operational costs. \n \nGold \nDuring the second quarter of 2020, gold output \nstood at 5 408.09 kg, about 13.6% less than in the \ncomparable period in 2019 and 12.1% lower than \nin the previous quarter. This was despite the fact \nthat international average prices in Q2 2020 were \n30.6% above those recorded in same period last \nyear and, 8.1% more than in the previous quarter. \n \nFigures 12 and 13 shows quarterly trends in gold \noutput by sector, and sectoral contribution to Q2 \n2020 gold output, respectively. \n \nFigure 12: Quarterly Trends in Gold output \n(kg) and average international \nprices (US$/ounce) \n \n \nSource: Ministry of Mines, Chamber of Mines, FPR, 2020 \n \nFigure 13: Sectoral Contribution to Gold \nOutput \n \nSource: Ministry of Mines, Chamber of Mines, FPR, 2020 \n \n \n0\n500\n1000\n1500\n2000\n0\n500\n1000\n1500\n2000\n2500\n3000\n3500\n4000\nQ1 2020\nQ2 2020\nq2 2019\nUS$\nOutput Kg\nPrimary producers (kg)\nASM (Kg)\nSecondary Producers (Kg)\nAverage international Prices (US$/ ounce)\nQ2\n2019\nQ1\n2020\nQ2\n2020\nPrimary\nproducers (kg)\n43.1\n35.0\n44.6\nASM producers\n(kg)\n49.3\n58.1\n45.8\nSecondary\nProducers (Kg)\n7.6\n7.0\n9.6\n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\n50.0\n60.0\n70.0\n% Contribution\n \n \n \n19 \nPGMs \nThe output of key PGMs in Q2 2020 exceeded \nboth the output that was produced in same period \nin 2019 and in the first quarter of 2020, as shown \nin Figure 14 and 15. \n \nFigure 14: Quarterly output of Platinum and \naverage \ninternational \nprices \n(US$/ounce) \n \n \nSource: Ministry of Mines, 2020 \nFigure 15: Quarterly output of Palladium and \naverage \ninternational \nprices \n(US$/ounce) \n \n \n \nSource: Ministry of Mines, 2020 \nPlatinum prices, were, however, 8.9% and 14.9% \nlower than those recorded in the same period in \n2019 and the previous quarter, respectively. \nPalladium prices were 14.2% below those \nobtaining in Q1, 2020, although 41.6% higher \nthan in the comparable period in 2019. \n \nNickel \nNickel output in Q2, 2020 was 15.6% and 3.0% \nlower than output registered in the comparable \nperiod in 2019 and in the previous quarter of \n2020, \nrespectively. \nSimilarly, \naverage \ninternational prices of nickel were 2.5% and 5.9% \nlower than in Q2, 2019 and Q1, 2020, \nrespectively. \n \n700\n750\n800\n850\n900\n950\n0\n1000\n2000\n3000\n4000\n5000\nq2 2019\nq1 2020\nq2 2020\nUS$/ounce\nOutput (kg)\nPlatinum (kgs)\nAverage International prices (US$/ ounce)\n0\n500\n1000\n1500\n2000\n2500\n0\n500\n1000\n1500\n2000\n2500\n3000\n3500\n4000\nq2 2019 q1 2020 q2 2020\nUS$/ ounce\nOutput (kg)\nPalladium (kgs)\nAverage International prices (US$/\nounce)2\n \n \n \n20 \nFigure 16: Quarterly output of Nickel and \naverage \ninternational \nprices \n(US$/tonne) \n \n \nSource: Ministry of Mines, 2020 \nNickel was adversely affected by the COVID-19 \ninduced demand cuts in industrialized countries, \namong them, China. \n \nDiamonds \nDiamond output in Q2, 2020 was 2.8% more than \noutput recorded in the same period in 2019 and \n17.4% above Q1, 2020 output. This was largely \ndriven by increased throughput from the \nZimbabwe Consolidated Diamond Company \n(ZCDC). \n \nThe persistence of COVID-19 induced travel \nrestrictions, border closures and quarantine \nmeasures across the major consumers of diamond \nrelated products worldwide led to a fall in demand \nfor diamond. There are hopes that demand will \npick up as major markets start recovering, \nfollowing the relaxation of lockdown measures. \n \nChrome \nChrome ore output stood at 275 301 tonnes in Q2, \n2020, about 25% lower than in the comparative \nperiod in 2019, and 6% below production levels \nregistered in the first quarter of 2020. The Covid-\n19 pandemic induced lockdown in the major \nconsumers of chrome and related products; \nnamely Spain and Italy, and China, weighed down \ndemand for these commodities, pulling prices to \nshut-down levels. \nIn addition, supply disruptions forced most \nsmelters to scale down operations as most of them \nutilize \nChinese \ntechnology. \nConsequently, \nmajority of key players have been under care and \nmaintenance since the first quarter of 2020. \nFigures 17 and 18 shows chrome ore and high \ncarbon ferro-chrome sales volumes and prices. \nFigure 17: Quarterly Chrome Ore Sales \nVolume and Average Prices \n \nSource: Ministry of Mines, 2020 \n11400\n11600\n11800\n12000\n12200\n12400\n12600\n12800\n3750\n3800\n3850\n3900\n3950\nQ2 2019\nQ1 2020\nQ2 2020\nUS$/ tonne\nOutput in Tonnes\nNickel Output (MT)\nAverage International Price (US$/ tonne)\n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\n140\n0\n20000\n40000\n60000\n80000\n100000\n120000\n140000\n160000\n180000\nQ2\n2019\nQ3\n2019\nQ4\n2019\nQ1\n2020\nQ2\n2020\nUS$/tonne\ntonnes\nChrome ore\nAverage Price (US$/tonne)\n \n \n \n21 \nFigure 18: Quarterly HCF sales volumes and \naverage Prices \n \n \n Source: Ministry of Mines, 2020 \n \nELECTRICITY \n \nTotal power generated during the second quarter \nof 2020 amounted to 1,412.15 GWhs, 6% up from \nthe 1,331.90 GWhs produced in the preceding \nquarter. This was, however, 39% below the \nperformance in the comparable period in 2019. \nThe increase in electricity output for the second \nquarter of 2020 was largely due to a 14% increase \nin output from Kariba Hydro, which more than \noffset declines in all the other power stations, \nincluding independent power producers (IPPs). \nTable 12 shows the quarterly power output from \nthe various plants in 2020 and the second quarter \nof 2019. \n \n \nTable 12: Total Electricity Output (GWh) \n \nQ2 2019 \nQ1 2020 \nQ2 2020 \n Kariba \n1388.13 \n654.56 \n747.69 \n Hwange \n801.56 \n627.63 \n618.44 \n Bulawayo \n19.26 \n6.21 \n5.95 \n Munyati \n27.86 \n3.97 \n2.60 \n Harare \n19.6 \n2.06 \n10.20 \n IPPS \n64.51 \n37.49 \n27.27 \nTotal \n2 320.92 \n1 331.90 \n1 412.16 \nSource: ZERA, ZPC, 2020 \nCumulatively, energy sent out amounted to \n2 679.3 GWh in the first half of 2020, comparing \nunfavourably to the 4 714.21 produced in the first \nhalf of 2019. All power producers recorded \ndeclines, with Kariba being the most affected due \nto the stringent water rationing by the Zambezi \nRiver Authority. \n \nThe poor performance of thermal power stations \nwas attributable to the frequent machinery \nbreakdowns and shortage of spares. Low \nthroughput from IPPs was largely due to zero \nproduction at Triangle and Hippo Valley in 2020. \nSimilarly, low water levels on the Pungwe River \naffected production at the small hydros along the \nwater course. Table 13 compares the performance \nof the power producers in the first half of 2019 \nand 2020. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n700\n800\n900\n1000\n0\n10000\n20000\n30000\n40000\n50000\n60000\n70000\n80000\n90000\nQ2\n2019\nQ3\n2019\nQ4\n2019\nq1\n2020\nq2\n2020\nUS$/tonne\ntonnes\nHCF\nAverage Price (US$/tonne)2\n \n \n \n22 \nTable 13: Electricity Output: Jan-June 2020 \nPower \nStation \nH1:2019 \nH1:2020 \nVariance \n% \nKariba \n2 987.19 \n1 402.25 \n-53.06 \nHwange \n1 603.85 \n1 246.07 \n-22.31 \nBulawayo \n28.15 \n12.16 \n-56.81 \nMunyati \n54.89 \n6.57 \n-88.03 \nHarare \n40.13 \n12.26 \n-69.46 \nIPPs \n106.45 \n64.76 \n-39.17 \nTotal \n(GWhs) \n4 714.21 \n2 679.31 \n-43.17 \nSource: ZERA, ZPC, 2020 \nINFLATION DEVELOPMENTS \n \nAnnual headline inflation accelerated from \n676.39% in March 2020 to 737.26% in June 2020, \nattributable to increases in both food and non-\nfood inflation. Inflationary pressures were also \nstoked by the transitory short supply of goods and \nservices, due to the effects of the COVID-19 \ncontainment measures. \n \nAnnual food inflation rose from 807.35% in \nMarch 2020 to 835.56% in June 2020, largely \ndriven by increases in prices of meat; vegetables; \nfish and sea food. Bread and cereal prices, \nhowever, recorded a decline of 13.14%, during \nthe period under analysis. \n \nYear-on-year non-food inflation also accelerated \nfrom 616.11% at the end of the first quarter of \n2020 to 678.29% in June 2020. Housing, water, \nelectricity, gas and other fuels had the largest \ncontributions to annual non-food inflation during \nthe quarter, following upward adjustments of \nadministered prices of municipal charges and \nfuels. \nFigure \n19 \ndepicts \nthe \ninflation \ndevelopments since March 2019. \nFigure 19: Quarterly Inflation Profile (%) \n \nSource: Zimstat 2020 \nMonth-on-month inflation rose to 31.66% in June \n2020, from the 26.59% recorded in March 2020. \nThis was driven by increases in both food and \nnon-food components. Figure 20 shows the \nmonthly inflation profile. \n \nFigure 20: Monthly Inflation Profile (%) \n \nSource: Zimstat 2020 \n \n \n \n \n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n700\n800\n900\nALL ITEMS\nFOOD INFLATION\nNON-FOOD INFLATION\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n35\n40\n45\n50\nJul-19\nAug-19\nSep-19\nOct-19\nNov-19\nDec-19\nJan-20\nFeb-20\nMar-20\nApr-20\nMay-20\nJun-20\nFOOD INFLATION\nNON-FOOD INFLATION\nALL ITEMS\n \n \n \n23 \nBlended Consumer Price Inflation \n \nThe Zimbabwe National Statistical Agency \n(ZIMSTAT) commenced publication of the blended \nCPI inflation in June 2020. The blended CPI \ninflation combines the average changes in price of \ngoods and services sold in the two main currencies \nin circulation, namely; the ZW$ and the US$. \n \nThe annual blended CPI inflation stood at 457.19% \nin June 2020, while the monthly blended CPI \ninflation rate was measured at 29.44%. \n \n \n4. MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS5 \n \nBroad money (M3) stood at ZW$99.82 billion as \nat 30th June 2020, compared to ZW$48.40 billion \nat the end of March 2020 The growth largely \nreflected an increase in the foreign currency \ncomponent of broad money, from ZW$20.91 \nbillion in March 2020 to ZW$57.70 billion as at \nend June 2020. The expansion in the foreign \ncurrency component largely reflected valuation \nchanges, owing to the depreciation of the \nexchange rate during the quarter under review. \nTime deposits and currency in circulation also \nrecorded quarterly increases of 70.82% and \n15.78%, respectively, over the same period. \nForeign currency deposits accounted for 57.81% \nof the total money stock, while local currency \ntransferable deposits constituted 36.09%. Time \n \n5 All monetary numbers are in ZW$ since the adoption of \nthe inter-bank foreign exchange market in February 2019. \ndeposits, currency in circulation and NCDs \naccounted for the remainder. \nFigure 21 shows annual broad money supply \ncomponents in nominal terms as well as growth \nrates. \n \nFigure 21: Broad Money Developments \n \nSource: RBZ, 2020 \n \nDomestic Credit \nDomestic credit stood at ZW$50.11 billion as at \nend June 2020, reflecting a quarter-on- quarter \ngrowth of 47.16%. The growth was largely driven \nby an increase of 145.34% in credit to other \nfinancial corporations, credit to the private sector, \n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n700\n0\n20,000\n40,000\n60,000\n80,000\n100,000\n120,000\nMar-18\nJun-18\nSep-18\nDec-18\nMar-19\nJun-19\nSep-19\nDec-19\nMar-20\nJun-20\nGrowth (%)\nZ$ Million\nNCDs\nTime Deposits\nLCY Transferable Deposits\nFCAs\nCurrency in Circulation\nAnnual Growth\n \n \n \n24 \n84.29%; and credit to the public non-financial \ncorporations, 77.58%. \nNet claims on Government, however, declined by \n12.84% to close the period under review at \nZW$11.29 billion. This was largely on the back \nof a 147.29% growth in Government deposits held \nby depository corporations, from Z$4.59 billion \nas at end of first quarter to ZW$11.36 billion as at \nend of June 2020. This reduced Government’s net \nborrowing from the banking system. \n \nCredit to the private sector, which increased from \nZW$17.46 billion in May 2020 to ZW$32.19 \nbillion in June 2020, was largely utilised by \nagriculture, \n26.16%; \nhouseholds, \n11.65%; \nfinancial organisations, 17.59%; manufacturing, \n12.07%; mining, 13.91%; and distribution, \n10.32%, as shown in Figure 22. \n \nFigure 22:Distribution of Private Sector Credit \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020 \nPrivate sector credit was mainly channelled \ntowards inventory build-up, 35.74%; other \nrecurrent expenditures, 32.51%; fixed capital \ninvestment, 19.34%; consumer durables, 9.46%; \nand pre and post shipment financing, 2.96%. \nInterest Rates \nNominal lending rates quoted by banks, ranged \nbetween 5% and 65%, during the quarter under \nreview. \nInterest rates on time deposit of 60-day and 90-\nday tenors registered maximum averages of \n7.12% and 7.70%, compared to 5.89%, and \n6.16%, respectively, in the previous quarter. \nAverage maximum savings rates, also increased \nfrom 4.74% in the first quarter to 5.19% in the \nsecond quarter. \n \n5. STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS \n \nThe larger part of the second quarter of 2020 saw \nthe Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) exhibit \nbullish sentiments, as investors sought a safe \nhaven for their wealth, in light of limited \ninvestments options. This culminated in the All \nShare Index registering a new high of 1 794.25 \npoints on 24th June 2020, reflecting a year to date \ngrowth of 679.84%. \n \nOn an annual basis, the All Share index went up \nby 773.63%, from 204.75 points recorded in June \n2019. As a result, ZSE market capitalisation \nsurged by 289.98%, from Z$58.61 billion \nrecorded in the quarter ended March 2020, to \nclose at Z$228.58 billion in the quarter under \nreview. \nHouseholds\n11.65%\nAgriculture\n26.16%\nMining\n13.91%\nManufacturing\n12.07%\nDistribution\n10.32%\nConstruction\n0.57%\nTransport & \nCommunicat\nions\n1.29%\nServices\n6.30%\nFinancial \nOrg. & \nInvestments\n17.59%\nOther\n0.15%\n \n \n \n25 \nTable 14: Key Stock Market Developments \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2020 \n \nDuring the same period, all the other indices \nrecorded positive growths, with the Top 10, \nMedium Cap and Small Cap indices gaining \n232.52%, 394.35% and 329.60% to close at 1 \n232.79 points, 3 302.89 points and 5 558.15 \npoints, respectively. \n \nThe quarter under review \nwitnessed \nthe \nmainstream \nand \nresource \nindices \ngaining \n288.13% and 454.57%, to close at 5 870.36 points \nand 3 995.48 points, respectively. On a year-on- \nyear basis, the industrial and mining indices grew \nby 758.86% and 1 465.26%, from 683.51 points \nand 255.26 points recorded in June 2019, \nrespectively. \nFigure 23 shows the developments of the ZSE All \nShare and Top 10 Indices for the period June 2019 \nto June 2020. \n Figure 23: ZSE All Share and Top 10 Indices \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange 2020 \nFigure 24 shows industrial and mining indices \ndevelopments for the period June 2019 to June \n2020. \n \nFigure 24: Industrial and Mining Indices \n Source: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2020 \n \n \n \n0\n250\n500\n750\n1000\n1250\n1500\n1750\n2000\nAll Share Index\nTop 10 Index\n0\n450\n900\n1,350\n1,800\n2,250\n2,700\n3,150\n3,600\n4,050\n0\n600\n1,200\n1,800\n2,400\n3,000\n3,600\n4,200\n4,800\n5,400\n6,000\n26-Jun-19\n26-Jul-19\n26-Aug-19\n26-Sep-19\n26-Oct-19\n26-Nov-19\n26-Dec-19\n26-Jan-20\n26-Feb-20\n26-Mar-20\n26-Apr-20\n26-May-20\n26-Jun-20\nMining Index\nIndustrial Index\nIndustrial Index\nMining Index\nZSE Indicator \n \nMar-20 \n \nJun-20 \n \nChange \n(%) \nAll Share Index (points) \n456.21 \n1,788.75 \n292.09 \nTop 10 Index (points) \n370.74 \n1,232.79 \n232.52 \nMedium \nCap \nIndex \n(points) \n668.13 \n3,302.89 \n394.35 \nSmall \nCap \nIndex \n(points) \n1,293.80 \n5,558.15 \n329.60 \nIndustrial Index (points) \n1 512.46 \n5 870.36 \n288.13 \nMining Index (points) \n720.47 \n3 995.48 \n454.57 \nVolume of shares traded \n(m) \n589.91 \n706.07 \n19.69 \nMarket Turnover ($m) \n1 090.23 \n2 745.81 \n151.86 \nZSE Capitalization ($m) \n58 612.10 \n228 577.11 \n289.98 \nNet Foreign Position \n($m) \n-160.65 \n-404,75 \n-151.94 \n \n \n \n26 \nMarket Capitalisation and Turnover \nFollowing heightened speculative behavior, the \nlocal bourse gained ZW$169.96 billion, or \n289.98% worth of capitalization to ZW$228.58 \nbillion during the quarter under review, from \nZW$58.61 billion recorded in March 2020. The \ncumulative turnover volume and value rose by \n19.69% and 151.86% to 706.07 million shares and \nZW$2.75 billion, respectively, during the quarter \nunder analysis. \n \nFigure \n25 \nshows \nmarket \ncapitalization \ndevelopments for the period 26 June 2019 to 26 \nJune 2020. \n \nFigure 25: Market Capitalisation \n \n Source: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2020 \n \nFigure 26 shows developments in market turnover \nvolumes and values for the period from June 2019 \nto June 2020. \n \nFigure 26: ZSE Market Turnover \n \n \nForeign investor sentiments were bullish as \nevidenced by the contribution to value of shares \ntraded, which increased by 10.35%, compared to \n9.54% recorded in the first quarter of 2020. The \nnet foreign position, however, worsened by \nZW$404.75 million during the quarter under \nreview. This partly reflected exchange rate \ndepreciation, as well as the impact of COVID-19 \non foreign investor sentiment. \n \n6. PAYMENT, \nCLEARING \nAND \nSETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES \n \nThe value of transactions processed through the \nNational Payment Systems increased by 27% to \nUS$353.2 billion in the quarter ending June 2020, \nfrom US$278.14 billion recorded in the quarter \nending March 2020. Transaction volumes, \nhowever, decreased by 14% to 465.5 million from \n541.7 million, during the same period. \n \n4\n21\n38\n55\n72\n89\n106\n123\n140\n157\n174\n191\n208\n225\n$ Billions\n-100\n100\n300\n500\n700\n900\n1,100\n1,300\n1,500\n1,700\n1,900\n2,100\n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\n300\n350\n400\nJun-19\nAug-19\nOct-19\nDec-19\nFeb-20\nApr-20\nJun-20\nValue ($Millions)\nVolume (Millions)\nVolume\n \n \n \n27 \nTable 15 provides the statistical information on \nvarious payment streams for the quarters ending \nMarch 2020 and June 2020. \n \nTable \n15: \nConsolidated \nTransactional \nActivities \nValues in ZWL$ Million \n \nQ1 \nQ2 \nChange \nProporti\non \n2020 \n2020 \nRTGS \n150,283.07 \n198,107.88 \n32% \n56.09% \nCASH \n3,802.23 \n6,079.09 \n60% \n1.72% \nCHEQUE \n13.0771609 \n0.00130678 \n-100% \n0.00% \nPOS \n17,921.27 \n21,944.11 \n22% \n6.21% \nATMS \n521.8984594 \n958.1176602 \n84% \n0.27% \nMOBILE \n71,906.00 \n69,193.73 \n-4% \n19.59% \nINTERNET \n33,694.00 \n56,917.35 \n69% \n16.11% \nTOTAL \n278,141.54 \n353,200.29 \n27% \n100.00% \nVolumes \nRTGS \n2,927,863 \n2,096,942 \n-28% \n0.45% \nCASH \n4,813,370 \n1,934,972 \n-60% \n0.42% \nCHEQUE \n25,064 \n0 \n-100% \n0 \nPOS \n67,890,050 \n40,168,920 \n-41% \n8.63% \nATMs \n630,773 \n556,836 \n-12% \n0.12% \nMOBILE \n463,468,139 \n417,650,402 \n-10% \n89.72% \nINTERNET \n1,981,858 \n3,093,717 \n56% \n0.66% \nTOTAL \n541,737,117 \n465,501,789 \n-14% \n100.00% \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020 \n \n \n \n \n \nLARGE VALUE PAYMENTS \n \nZimbabwe \nElectronic \nTransfer \nand \nSettlement System \nThe value of transactions processed through the \nRTGS system increased by 32% to ZW$198.11 \nbillion in the second quarter of 2020, from \nZW$150.28 billion recorded in first quarter. The \nvolume of transactions, however, registered a \ndecrease of 28% to 2.1 million transactions from \n2.9 million transactions, during the same period, \nas shown in as shown in Figure 27. \n \nFigure 27: Values and Volumes of RTGS \nTransactions \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020 \n \n \n \n \n0\n500\n1,000\n1,500\n2,000\n2,500\n3,000\n3,500\n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\n2019\nQ1\n2019\nQ2\n2019\nQ3\n2019\nQ4\n2020\nQ1\n2020\nQ2\nRTGS Values in Billions\nRTGS Volumes in Thousamds\nValues\nVolumes\n \n \n \n28 \nSWIFT Foreign Currency Transactions \n \nSWIFT foreign currency payments increased by \n10% to $935 million for the quarter ending June \n2020, from $853 million in the quarter ending \nMarch 2020. During the same period, SWIFT \nforeign currency receipts increased by 20% to \n$909 million, from $758 million, as shown in \nFigure 28. \nThe net foreign currency position in the quarter \nunder review was an outflow of $27 million, from \na net outflow of $96 million recorded in the \nsecond quarter, as shown in Figure 28. \n \nFigure \n28: \nSWIFT \nQuarterly \nForeign \nCurrency Transactions \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020 \n \n \nCASH \nOver the Counter Cash Withdrawals \nThe value of cash withdrawals increased by 60%, \nfrom ZW$3.80 billion in the first quarter of 2020 \nto US$6.08 billion recorded in second quarter. \nCorresponding volumes also decreased by 60%, \nfrom 4.81 million transactions in the first quarter \nof 2020 to 1.93 million transactions in the second \nquarter, as shown in Figure 29. \n \nFigure \n29: \nOver \nthe \nCounter \nCash \nWithdrawals \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020 \n \nRetail Payments \nThe aggregate values of retail transactions \nincreased by 21% to ZW$155.09 billion in the \nquarter under review, from ZW$127.85 billion \nrecorded in the quarter ended March 2020. Retail \nvolumes decreased by 14% to 463.40 million \n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n0.50\n0.55\n0.60\n0.65\n0.70\n0.75\n0.80\n0.85\n0.90\n0.95\n1.00\nQ1\n2019\nQ2\n2019\nQ3\n2019\nQ4\n2019\nQ1\n2020\nQ2\n2020\nVolumes in Thousands\nValue in US$B\nValue of Receipts\nValue of Payments\n Volumes of Payments\n Volumes of Receipts\n0.00\n1.00\n2.00\n3.00\n4.00\n5.00\n6.00\n7.00\n2019\nQ1\n2019\nQ2\n2019\nQ3\n2019\nQ4\n2020\nQ1\n2020\nQ2\n0.0\n1.0\n2.0\n3.0\n4.0\n5.0\n6.0\nUS$ BILLIONS\nVOLUMES IN MILLIONS\nVolumes\nValues\n \n \n \n29 \ntransactions in the quarter ended June 2020, from \n538.81 million transactions reported in the quarter \nended March 2020. \n \nFigures 30 and 31 show the trend in the values and \nvolumes of retail transactions for the period from \nthe first quarter of 2019 to the second quarter of \n2020. \n \nFigure 30: Retail Transaction Values \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020 \n \n6 The local collateral figure comprises of Cheque, Zimswitch, \nChengetedzai Deposit Corporation settlement systems. \nFigure 31: Retail Transaction Volumes \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020 \n \nCollateral6 \nThe \nvalue \nof \ncollateral \nincreased \nto \nZW$1, 053.35 million in the first quarter of 2020, \nfrom ZW$446.26 million recorded in the second \nquarter ending, as shown in Figure 32. \n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n2019\nQ1\n2019\nQ2\n2019\nQ3\n2019\nQ4\n2020\nQ1\n2020\nQ2\nMobile in Billions\nOther Retail Values in Billions\nCHEQUE\nPOS\nATMS\nINTERNET\nCASH\nMOBILE\n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\n2019\nQ1\n2019\nQ2\n2019\nQ3\n2019\nQ4\n2020\nQ1\n2020\nQ2\nMobile Volumes in Millions\nOther Retai Volumes in Millions\nCHEQUE\nPOS\nATMs\nINTERNET\nCASH\nMOBILE\n \n \n \n30 \nFigure 32: Collateral Amounts from December \n2018 to June 2020 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020 \n \nAccess Points and Devices \nMobile banking agents increased to 73,281 in the \nsecond quarter of 2020, from 71,054 reported in \nthe first quarter. \n \nThe point of sale (POS) population increased to \n126,696 in the second quarter of 2020, from \n122,138 recorded in the first quarter. \n \nThe number of active mobile financial subscribers \nregistered in the quarter under review stood at \n5.31 million, down from 5.39 million subscribers \nregistered in the previous quarter. \n \nTable 16 shows payment access points and \ndevices for the last quarter of 2019 and the first \nand second quarters of 2020. \nTable 16: Payment Systems Access Points and \nDevices \n \nQuarter \nending \nDec 2019 \nQuarter \nending \nMar \n2020 \nQuarter \nending \nJun \n2020 \nMobile \nBanking agents \n59,219 \n71,054 \n73,281 \nATMs \n542 \n539 \n539 \nPOS \n121,413 \n122,138 \n126,696 \nPAYMENT SYSTEM ACCESS DEVICES \nDebit Cards \n5,625,031 \n5,358,746 \n5,837,878 \nCredit Cards \n18,089 \n18,060 \n17,431 \nPrepaid Cards \n99,278 \n116,143 \n120,433 \nMobile \nBanking \nsubscribers \n6,543,758 \n5,394,816 \n5,307,515 \n \nInternet \nBanking \nsubscribers \n415,901 \n360,850 \n \n410,724 \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020 \n \n7. \nFISCAL DEVELOPMENTS \n \nDuring the second quarter of 2020, Government \nrevenue amounted to ZW$19.6 billion, against \nexpenditures of ZW$15.2 billion, culminating in \na budget surplus of ZW$4.4 billion. Table 17 \nshows the summarised fiscal positions during the \nfirst and second quarters of 2020. \n \n \n \n \n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n700\n800\nQ4\n2018\nQ1\n2019\nQ2\n2019\nQ3\n2019\nQ4\n2019\nQ1\n2020\nZW$ MILLIONS\n \n \n \n31 \nTable 17: Fiscal Position: Q1 and Q2 2020 \n(ZWL$ millions) \n \nQ1 \nQ2 \nRevenue \n14 181.91 \n19 631.45 \nTax revenue \n13 859.09 \n19 094.72 \nNon-Tax Revenue \n322 82 \n536.74 \nExpenditure \n13 750.89 \n15 214.60 \nCurrent \nexpenditure \n8 762.29 \n10 917.55 \no/w employment \ncosts \n3 818.24 \n5 059.75 \nCapital \nExpenditure \n4 988.59 \n4 297.05 \nOverall Balance \n430.62 \n4 416.85 \nSource: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, \n2020 \nGovernment Revenue \nGovernment revenue collections during the \nsecond quarter of 2020 amounted to ZW$19.63 \nbillion, surpassing the target by 36.9%. Tax \nrevenue amounted to ZW$19.09 billion of total \nrevenue, whilst non-tax revenues at ZW$536.7 \nmillion accounted for the remaining 2.7%. \nThe high inflationary environment experienced \nduring the period under review, accounted for the \nincrease in nominal revenues. In addition, upward \nadjustment in employee remuneration; higher \nnominal \ncompany \nprofits; \nand \nimproved \ncompliance due to measures instituted by \nZimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) also \ncontributed to the improvement in revenue \ncollections, during the second quarter of 2020. \nStructure of Government Revenue \nTax on income and profits continued to dominate \nGovernment revenues, with the tax revenue head \ncontributing ZW$7.84 billion, about 39.9% of \ntotal revenue. Value added tax (VAT) accounted \nfor 19.4%; followed by excise duty, 13.5%; \nfinancial and capital transfers, 11%; tax on gross \nrevenue, 7%; and custom duties, 6%. \nFigure 33: Structure of Government Revenue \n \nSource: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, \n2020 \n Expenditure Developments \nCumulative government spending amounted to \nZW$15.2 billion in the second quarter of 2020. It \ncomprised of recurrent expenditure, ZW$10.9 \nbillion; interest on debt, ZW$0.10 million; and \ncapital expenditure including net lending, \nZW$4.2 billion. \nTable 18 shows a comparison of Government \nexpenditure in the first and second quarters of \n2020. \n \nTax on Income \nand Profits\n40%\nCustoms duties\n6%\nExcise duties\n14%\nTaxes on \nSpecific \nServices\n0%\nValue Added \nTax (VAT)\n19%\ntax on gross \nRevenue\n7%\nTaxes on \nfinancial and \ncapital \ntransactions \n11%\nOther Indirect \ntaxes \n0%\nNon-tax \nRevenue\n3%\n \n \n \n32 \nTable 18: Government Expenditure: Q1 and \nQ2 2020 (ZW$ billion) \n \nQ1 \n2020 \n% of \nTotal \nQ2 \n2020 \n% of \nTotal \nEmployment cost \n4.61 \n33.5 \n6.24 \n41.0 \nOperations \n3.85 \n28.0 \n4.57 \n30.1 \nInterest On debt \n0.31 \n2.2 \n0.10 \n0.7 \nCapital \nExpenditure \n4.99 \n36.3 \n4.30 \n28.2 \nSource: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, \n2020 \nFiscal Budget Balance \nThe fiscal developments in the second quarter of \n2020 culminated in a budget surplus of ZW$4.4 \nbillion, up from ZW$0.4 billion in the first \nquarter. Figure 34 shows monthly developments \nin the fiscal budget balance in 2020. \n \nFigure 34: Fiscal budget balance: Q2 2020 \n(ZW$ billions) \n \n \nSource: \nMinistry \nof \nFinance \nand \nEconomic \nDevelopment, 2020 \n \n \nRESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE \nSEPTEMBER 2020 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n-2\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\nJanuary\nFebruary\nMarch\nApril\nMay\nJune\nRevenue\nExpenditure\nOverall Balance\nSTATISTICAL TABLES \n \n1. Depository Corporation Survey S1 \n2. Central Bank Survey S2 \n3. Other Depository Corporation Survey S3 \n \n4. Liabilities and Assets of the Central Bank \n4.1.Reserve Bank: Assets \n \n \n \n S4 \n \n4.2.Reserve Bank: liabilities S5 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n5. Other Depository Corporation \n5.1.Other Depository Asset S6 \n5.2.Other Depository Liabilities S7 \n \n6. Commercial Banks \n6.1.Commercial Banks: Assets \n \n S8 \n6.2.Commercial Banks: Liabilities \n S9 \n7. Building Societies \n \n \n \n \n \n \n7.1.Building Societies: Assets \n \n S10 \n \n7.2.Building Societies: Liabilities S11 \n \n \n \n8. Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks \n8.1.Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks’ Loans and Advances S12 \n8.2.Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Bank’s Deposits \n \n S13 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n9. National Payment Systems \n \n \n9.1.Values of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS14 \n9.2.Volumes of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS14 \n \n10. Interest Rates, Security Yields and Prices \n10.1. Lending Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS15 \n10.2. Deposit Rates S15 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n11. Stock Exchange Indices \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS16 \n \n12. Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n12.1. Monthly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS17 \n12.2. Quarterly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS18 \n12.3. Annual Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS19 \n \n \n \n \n34 \n13. Balance of Payments \n13.1. Cross Border Payments \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS20 \n13.2. Cross Border Receipts \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS21 \n \n14. External Sector \n14.1. External Debt Outstanding By Debtor \n \n \n \n \nS22 \n14.2. External Debt Outstanding by Source \n \n \n \n \nS23 \n14.3. External Debt Service and Service Ratios \n \n \n \n \nS24 \n \nJun-19\nJul-19\nAug-19\nSep-19\nOct-19\nNov-19\nDec-19\nJan-20\nFeb-20\nMar-20\nApr-20\nMay-20\nJun-20\nNet Foreign Assets\n-12,704,437.39\n-19,915,608.51\n-23,599,341.26\n-33,219,232.58\n-38,974,813.91\n-39,899,004.55\n-40,662,175.37\n-41,890,476.47\n-41,693,753.23\n-64,413,672.15\n-89,046,879.04\n-97,000,590.99\n-234,278,568.81\nCentral Bank(net)\n-14,602,968.79\n-23,287,056.52\n-27,352,064.33\n-39,349,960.03\n-46,395,160.21\n-48,267,748.85\n-50,285,843.15\n-51,596,769.75\n-51,659,786.89\n-78,356,892.58\n-104,544,431.97\n-114,377,001.26\n-275,623,563.54\nForeign Assets\n2,917,765.26\n3,402,652.93\n4,334,171.18\n6,464,247.45\n5,444,857.74\n5,552,951.79\n5,504,939.77\n5,234,031.88\n5,504,836.03\n4,948,927.35\n4,516,675.83\n5,054,120.38\n17,845,745.97\nForeign Liabilities\n17,520,734.04\n26,689,709.45\n31,686,235.51\n45,814,207.48\n51,840,017.94\n53,820,700.64\n55,790,782.92\n56,830,801.63\n57,164,622.92\n83,305,819.93\n109,061,107.80\n119,431,121.65\n293,469,309.50\nOther Depository Corporations(net)\n1,898,531.40\n3,371,448.01\n3,752,723.07\n6,130,727.45\n7,420,346.30\n8,368,744.30\n9,623,667.78\n9,706,293.27\n9,966,033.66\n13,943,220.42\n15,497,552.93\n17,376,410.27\n41,344,994.73\nForeign Assets\n3,814,622.33\n5,390,485.00\n6,120,479.23\n9,382,906.26\n10,478,858.26\n11,622,874.19\n12,948,416.33\n13,153,007.07\n13,344,846.71\n18,827,846.39\n20,437,584.87\n22,510,950.77\n53,130,231.08\nForeign Liabilities\n1,916,090.93\n2,019,036.99\n2,367,756.16\n3,252,178.80\n3,058,511.96\n3,254,129.88\n3,324,748.55\n3,446,713.79\n3,378,813.04\n4,884,625.96\n4,940,031.94\n5,134,540.50\n11,785,236.35\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n27,472,328.14\n36,991,644.76\n43,293,406.54\n56,770,962.37\n67,904,876.25\n71,719,556.15\n75,680,355.31\n78,162,546.08\n80,030,632.68\n112,816,570.52\n141,032,021.98\n156,475,813.43\n334,099,369.96\nDomestic Claims\n15,645,411.46\n18,228,356.09\n20,234,819.47\n21,168,772.43\n24,743,158.13\n28,575,556.98\n27,819,807.93\n28,569,680.55\n30,260,777.76\n34,054,407.09\n32,574,364.29\n39,063,809.71\n50,113,139.15\nClaims on Central Government(net)\n9,422,173.55\n11,519,440.01\n12,964,643.80\n13,061,889.35\n14,409,797.90\n15,813,415.72\n14,062,737.58\n12,724,160.31\n12,697,777.62\n12,949,759.72\n10,305,498.64\n14,278,461.16\n11,286,874.74\nClaims on Central Government\n10,630,234.88\n13,077,256.67\n14,949,077.76\n16,410,748.86\n16,955,759.46\n17,933,911.03\n15,580,358.19\n16,676,243.01\n16,838,781.22\n17,542,397.05\n17,458,577.62\n18,059,689.23\n22,643,966.48\nCentral Bank\n7,707,833.00\n9,591,038.53\n11,538,930.29\n12,831,965.83\n13,205,609.13\n13,782,384.33\n11,338,532.85\n12,298,711.08\n12,540,517.65\n12,762,386.66\n12,737,251.42\n13,476,066.34\n16,374,954.71\nODCs\n2,922,401.88\n3,486,218.14\n3,410,147.47\n3,578,783.04\n3,750,150.34\n4,151,526.70\n4,241,825.34\n4,377,531.93\n4,298,263.57\n4,780,010.39\n4,721,326.20\n4,583,622.89\n6,269,011.77\nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n1,208,061.33\n1,557,816.66\n1,984,433.95\n3,348,859.52\n2,545,961.56\n2,120,495.31\n1,517,620.61\n3,952,082.70\n4,141,003.60\n4,592,637.32\n7,153,078.98\n3,781,228.06\n11,357,091.74\nCentral Bank\n1,163,537.70\n1,507,260.60\n1,925,235.84\n3,294,387.73\n2,477,362.61\n2,021,412.86\n1,399,114.53\n3,859,448.40\n4,062,791.73\n4,183,646.73\n6,636,736.42\n3,150,547.32\n9,877,720.74\nODCs\n44,523.63\n50,556.06\n59,198.12\n54,471.79\n68,598.95\n99,082.45\n118,506.08\n92,634.30\n78,211.87\n408,990.60\n516,342.56\n630,680.74\n1,479,371.00\nClaims on Other Sectors\n6,994,312.91\n6,708,916.08\n7,270,175.67\n8,106,883.08\n10,333,360.23\n12,762,141.26\n13,757,070.35\n15,845,520.24\n17,563,000.14\n21,104,647.37\n22,268,865.65\n24,785,348.54\n38,826,264.41\nOther Financial Corporations\n180,349.24\n174,910.96\n151,317.02\n152,985.99\n162,263.79\n160,062.11\n186,506.15\n202,429.27\n281,264.28\n307,104.48\n290,091.57\n356,669.90\n753,439.03\nState and Local Government\n31,319.18\n31,193.91\n30,689.81\n30,341.36\n28,130.16\n28,347.69\n26,320.30\n32,308.50\n31,704.96\n30,621.46\n27,844.50\n26,575.69\n23,225.26\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n1,653,927.27\n957,335.21\n988,381.20\n1,048,058.46\n2,322,563.84\n2,861,071.05\n2,431,172.28\n2,564,682.98\n2,591,284.85\n3,301,602.89\n3,508,675.95\n2,824,122.73\n5,863,041.63\nPrivate Sector\n5,128,717.22\n5,545,476.00\n6,099,787.63\n6,875,497.28\n7,820,402.44\n9,712,660.41\n11,113,071.62\n13,046,099.50\n14,658,746.06\n17,465,318.54\n18,442,253.62\n21,577,980.23\n32,186,558.49\nCentral Bank\n23,154.78\n33,310.97\n125,702.15\n86,780.68\n89,898.41\n65,420.53\n75,911.82\n78,069.12\n174,180.02\n182,998.11\n182,226.89\n182,856.59\n185,977.83\nODCs\n5,105,562.43\n5,512,165.03\n5,974,085.48\n6,788,716.60\n7,730,504.03\n9,647,239.89\n11,037,159.81\n12,968,030.37\n14,484,566.04\n17,282,320.43\n18,260,026.74\n21,395,123.64\n32,000,580.66\nOther Items(Net)\n-11,826,916.67\n-18,934,333.82\n-23,517,846.42\n-35,602,189.94\n-43,161,718.12\n-43,143,999.17\n-47,860,547.38\n-49,592,865.53\n-49,769,854.91\n-78,762,163.43\n-108,457,657.69\n-117,412,003.72\n-283,986,230.81\nShares and Other Equity\n-9,810,341.46\n-18,099,228.93\n-22,440,397.72\n-32,505,897.24\n-39,007,159.14\n-41,160,941.61\n-44,544,759.40\n-43,829,432.91\n-44,342,348.31\n-71,119,022.50\n-98,326,925.77\n-108,187,301.34\n-265,536,483.62\nLiabilities to Other Financial Corporations\n43,639.00\n27,408.22\n27,999.41\n23,286.81\n24,632.93\n50,514.35\n119,397.64\n140,072.14\n154,917.78\n339,909.43\n233,181.06\n365,355.02\n348,181.06\nRestricted Deposits\n363,411.77\n1,123,177.17\n1,290,893.19\n1,546,424.26\n1,881,910.27\n1,980,372.79\n1,147,967.31\n1,346,272.48\n1,119,306.34\n1,947,438.89\n1,501,573.14\n845,775.37\n3,417,797.70\nDeposits and Securities Excluded from Base Money\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nOther Items(net)\n-2,423,625.98\n-1,985,690.29\n-2,396,341.30\n-4,666,003.77\n-6,061,102.18\n-4,013,944.69\n-4,583,152.93\n-7,249,777.25\n-6,701,730.71\n-9,930,489.25\n-11,865,486.12\n-10,435,832.78\n-22,215,725.96\nBroad Money-M3\n14,767,890.75\n17,076,036.26\n19,694,065.28\n23,551,729.79\n28,930,062.34\n31,820,551.60\n35,018,179.94\n36,272,069.61\n38,336,879.45\n48,402,898.37\n51,985,142.94\n59,475,222.44\n99,820,801.15\nSecurities Other than Shares Included in Broad Money\n171,667.83\n168,169.20\n202,928.98\n219,889.50\n205,671.08\n235,117.26\n243,976.57\n255,563.69\n260,055.92\n476,793.67\n337,556.97\n359,194.93\n863,206.40\nBroad Money-M2\n14,596,222.92\n16,907,867.06\n19,491,136.30\n23,331,840.28\n28,724,391.26\n31,585,434.34\n34,774,203.37\n36,016,505.92\n38,076,823.53\n47,926,104.70\n51,647,585.97\n59,116,027.50\n98,957,594.75\nOther Deposits\n1,428,886.89\n1,640,846.54\n1,619,775.77\n1,662,956.26\n1,854,294.19\n1,835,730.85\n1,887,924.83\n2,026,599.28\n2,194,313.07\n2,351,990.85\n2,522,855.18\n2,842,782.22\n4,017,695.39\nNarrow Money-M1\n13,167,336.03\n15,267,020.52\n17,871,360.53\n21,668,884.03\n26,870,097.07\n29,749,703.49\n32,886,278.54\n33,989,906.64\n35,882,510.46\n45,574,113.84\n49,124,730.79\n56,273,245.28\n94,939,899.37\nTransferable Deposits\n12,695,789.56\n14,802,212.01\n17,310,786.11\n20,977,141.17\n26,157,975.38\n28,913,109.34\n31,978,710.26\n33,036,665.86\n34,932,660.39\n44,529,936.02\n48,082,573.35\n55,147,175.33\n93,730,970.73\n Of which Foreign Currency Accounts\n3,887,787.41\n4,049,120.88\n5,737,719.98\n9,859,484.27\n11,155,597.09\n11,472,035.58\n11,938,732.84\n12,458,349.93\n12,476,934.91\n20,909,726.92\n19,463,088.16\n24,984,322.48\n57,701,775.14\nCurrency Outside Depository Corporations\n471,546.47\n464,808.51\n560,574.42\n691,742.86\n712,121.69\n836,594.15\n907,568.29\n953,240.77\n949,850.07\n1,044,177.82\n1,042,157.43\n1,126,069.95\n1,208,928.64\nMemorandum Items\nReserve Money\n3,282,131.58\n3,769,321.37\n5,747,625.57\n4,682,715.46\n6,810,750.63\n8,114,953.04\n10,327,816.88\n9,251,024.10\n9,380,944.48\n11,704,943.82\n12,459,746.60\n13,815,364.85\n12,651,566.81\nFCAs as a Percentage of Deposits in M3\n27.2%\n24.4%\n30.0%\n43.1%\n39.5%\n37.0%\n35.0%\n35.3%\n33.4%\n44.2%\n38.2%\n42.8%\n58.5%\nEnd Period Exchange Rate\n6.62\n9.19\n10.71\n15.20\n16.12\n16.26\n16.77\n17.35\n17.95\n25.00\n25.00\n25.00\n57.36\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 2020\nNotes:\nNotes:\n(i) Depository corporations survey - formerly Monetary Survey.\n(ii) Broad money redefined using IMF's Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual of 2000. Major changes include exclusion of Government deposits held by banks from broad money.\n(iii) Transferable deposits made up of demand and savings deposits.\n(iv) NCDs are also referred to as securities included in broad money.\n(v) All classes of time deposits, short and long term are classified as time deposits, which are also termed other deposits.\n(vi) Credit to the private sector now excludes claims on other financial corporations, as well as claims on state and local government (local authorities)\n(vii) Depository corporations made up of the Central Bank and other depository corporations\n(viii) Other depository corporations (ODCs) - Commercial banks, merchant banks, building societies and POSB.\n(ix) In December 2017, the statistics were adjusted in restrospect by reclassifying Securities issued under Aftrades from claims on government to claims on central bank\n(x) In December 2017, the statistics were adjusted in restrospect by reclassifying amounts accessed by banks under the Aftrades from liabilities to Other Depository corporations and Other Financial Corporations to liabilities to Central Bank \n(xi) In December 2018, statistics were revised from November 2017 due to reclassification of lines of credit (foreign liabilities) that were initially classified as deposits included in broad money\n(xii) All monetary and financial statistics are valued in ZWL$ since the introduction of the interbank foreign exchange market in February 2019\nTABLE 1: DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS SURVEY (ZWL$ '000)\n \n \nS2 \n \n \n \nJun-19\nJul-19\nAug-19\nSep-19\nOct-19\nNov-19\nDec-19\nJan-20\nFeb-20\nMar-20\nApr-20\nMay-20\nJun-20\nNet Foreign Assets\n-14,602,968.79\n-23,287,056.52\n-27,352,064.33\n-39,349,960.03\n-46,395,160.21\n-48,267,748.85\n-50,285,843.15\n-51,596,769.75\n-51,659,786.89\n-78,356,892.58\n-104,544,431.97\n-114,377,001.26\n-275,623,563.54\nClaims on Non Residents\n2,917,765.26\n3,402,652.93\n4,334,171.18\n6,464,247.45\n5,444,857.74\n5,552,951.79\n5,504,939.77\n5,234,031.88\n5,504,836.03\n4,948,927.35\n4,516,675.83\n5,054,120.38\n17,845,745.97\nOfficial Reserves Assets\n1,399,462.47\n1,401,366.80\n1,964,853.83\n1,511,299.58\n1,937,457.59\n1,915,477.05\n2,537,103.33\n2,888,945.28\n3,104,642.81\n1,759,943.91\n1,340,523.61\n1,452,620.38\n9,522,205.82\nOther Foreign Assets\n1,518,302.79\n2,001,286.13\n2,369,317.36\n4,952,947.87\n3,507,400.15\n3,637,474.74\n2,967,836.45\n2,345,086.60\n2,400,193.22\n3,188,983.44\n3,176,152.22\n3,601,500.00\n8,323,540.15\nLess Liabilities to Non Residents\n17,520,734.04\n26,689,709.45\n31,686,235.51\n45,814,207.48\n51,840,017.94\n53,820,700.64\n55,790,782.92\n56,830,801.63\n57,164,622.92\n83,305,819.93\n109,061,107.80\n119,431,121.65\n293,469,309.50\nShort Term Liabilities\n14,024,443.68\n18,833,457.18\n22,284,382.58\n32,602,281.08\n33,501,054.49\n34,223,789.11\n35,686,123.01\n39,597,730.68\n41,112,190.47\n55,611,921.72\n54,593,528.76\n54,707,783.64\n134,067,700.58\nOther Foreign Liabilities\n3,496,290.36\n7,856,252.27\n9,401,852.93\n13,211,926.40\n18,338,963.45\n19,596,911.53\n20,104,659.91\n17,233,070.95\n16,052,432.45\n27,693,898.21\n54,467,579.05\n64,723,338.01\n159,401,608.92\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n17,885,100.37\n27,056,377.90\n33,099,689.90\n44,032,675.49\n53,205,910.84\n56,382,701.89\n60,613,660.02\n60,847,793.85\n61,040,731.37\n90,061,836.40\n117,004,178.58\n128,192,366.11\n288,275,130.35\nDomestic Claims\n7,344,238.48\n8,736,761.70\n10,057,820.09\n10,567,049.53\n12,972,537.88\n14,525,637.67\n12,259,697.53\n10,746,256.31\n10,973,320.90\n11,480,169.17\n9,144,133.05\n12,736,347.09\n10,707,313.49\nNet Claims on Central Government\n6,544,295.30\n7,912,732.78\n9,154,435.10\n9,537,578.10\n10,728,246.52\n11,760,971.47\n9,939,418.32\n8,439,262.68\n8,477,725.92\n8,578,739.93\n6,100,515.00\n10,322,164.33\n6,497,233.96\nClaims on Central Government\n7,707,833.00\n9,419,993.38\n11,079,670.93\n12,831,965.83\n13,205,609.13\n13,782,384.33\n11,338,532.85\n12,298,711.08\n12,540,517.65\n12,762,386.66\n12,737,251.42\n13,472,711.66\n16,374,954.71\nOf which: Securities Other than Shares\n5,922,355.91\n7,222,007.40\n8,308,198.93\n9,491,988.13\n9,617,665.33\n9,771,722.53\n6,828,363.47\n6,784,907.24\n6,729,080.00\n6,635,562.28\n6,568,167.46\n6,515,431.76\n6,441,291.52\nLoans\n0.00\n171,045.15\n620,748.19\n1,795,917.79\n1,930,201.39\n2,084,258.59\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n Loans and Advances\n1,785,477.10\n2,197,985.98\n2,771,472.00\n3,339,977.70\n3,587,943.80\n4,010,661.79\n4,510,169.38\n5,513,803.84\n5,811,437.65\n6,126,824.37\n6,169,083.96\n6,957,279.90\n9,933,663.19\n Legacy Debt\n114,667.21\n368,837.75\n568,020.15\n835,231.09\n1,110,375.86\n1,262,301.22\n1,199,032.23\n1,611,254.61\n1,808,444.47\n2,123,588.25\n2,165,988.51\n2,954,184.45\n5,927,212.09\n Export Incentives\n309,057.44\n405,543.61\n404,773.69\n414,023.05\n381,741.08\n382,025.83\n376,260.18\n371,310.28\n391,427.33\n391,670.28\n391,529.61\n391,529.61\n394,885.26\nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n1,361,752.45\n1,423,604.62\n1,798,678.16\n2,090,723.55\n2,095,826.85\n2,366,334.74\n2,934,876.98\n3,531,238.96\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\nOf which: Deposits\n1,163,537.70\n1,507,260.60\n1,925,235.84\n3,294,387.73\n2,477,362.61\n2,021,412.86\n1,399,114.53\n3,859,448.40\n4,062,791.73\n4,183,646.73\n6,636,736.42\n3,150,547.32\n9,877,720.74\nOther \n1,163,537.70\n1,507,260.60\n1,925,235.84\n3,294,387.73\n2,477,362.61\n2,021,412.86\n1,399,114.53\n3,859,448.40\n4,062,791.73\n4,183,646.73\n6,636,736.42\n3,150,547.32\n9,877,720.74\nClaims on Other Sectors\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nOther Financial Corporations\n799,943.18\n824,028.92\n903,384.99\n1,029,471.42\n2,244,291.36\n2,764,666.21\n2,320,279.21\n2,306,993.64\n2,495,594.98\n2,901,429.23\n3,043,618.05\n2,414,182.75\n4,210,079.53\nState and Local Government\n125,389.20\n109,687.61\n112,349.24\n118,657.17\n122,348.15\n122,367.95\n114,216.39\n123,637.97\n185,777.12\n190,538.80\n197,799.53\n198,980.02\n198,722.36\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nPrivate Sector\n651,399.20\n681,030.34\n665,333.60\n824,033.57\n2,032,044.80\n2,576,877.72\n2,130,151.01\n2,105,286.54\n2,135,637.84\n2,527,892.32\n2,663,591.64\n2,032,346.15\n3,825,379.33\n23,154.78\n33,310.97\n125702.15\n86780.68\n89898.41\n65420.53\n75911.82\n78069.12\n174180.02\n182998.11\n182226.89\n182856.59\n185977.83\nClaims on Other Depository Corporations\nOf which: Loans\n363,908.20\n339,280.92\n348,501.79\n385,543.38\n429,889.74\n875,893.44\n1,247,758.47\n1,418,055.93\n1,537,977.10\n1,747,842.08\n2,004,400.25\n2,363,408.58\n2,836,488.36\nOther Liabilities to ODCs\n363,908.20\n339,280.92\n348,501.79\n385,543.38\n429,889.74\n875,893.44\n1,247,758.47\n1,418,055.93\n1,537,977.10\n1,747,842.08\n2,004,400.25\n2,363,408.58\n2,836,488.36\nOf which: Aftrades Balances\n2,846,011.57\n2,756,773.68\n3,094,984.02\n4,129,952.46\n4,009,051.66\n5,433,469.12\n7,563,514.16\n8,461,698.70\n9,792,726.83\n9,684,173.41\n9,131,313.79\n12,393,411.08\n20,777,523.67\n Securities\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n2,200,323.26\n2,004,097.96\n2,145,531.30\n2,824,669.92\n2,966,155.20\n2,939,654.78\n4,579,216.20\n5,320,924.19\n5,467,251.69\n5,944,214.63\n6,089,528.73\n6,941,755.11\n11,137,597.35\nOther Items(Net)\nShares and Other Equity\n-13,022,965.26\n-20,737,108.96\n-25,788,352.03\n-37,210,035.04\n-43,812,534.88\n-46,414,639.90\n-54,669,718.18\n-57,145,180.31\n-58,322,160.20\n-86,517,998.56\n-114,986,959.06\n-125,482,666.85\n-295,508,852.17\nOther Items(Net)\n-12,940,837.81\n-21,517,328.05\n-26,390,209.56\n-37,895,629.34\n-44,802,824.15\n-47,413,029.48\n-54,656,738.27\n-55,918,839.02\n-56,770,197.78\n-85,756,440.85\n-113,862,068.88\n-124,140,506.17\n-296,849,225.12\nLiabilities to Other Resident Sectors\n-445,539.22\n-342,958.09\n-689,035.65\n-860,829.96\n-891,621.00\n-981,983.21\n-1,160,947.22\n-2,572,613.77\n-2,671,268.75\n-2,708,996.60\n-2,626,463.31\n-2,187,936.05\n-2,077,424.75\nDeposits and Securities Excluded from Base Money\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n363,411.77\n1,123,177.17\n1,290,893.19\n1,546,424.26\n1,881,910.27\n1,980,372.79\n1,147,967.31\n1,346,272.48\n1,119,306.34\n1,947,438.89\n1,501,573.14\n845,775.37\n3,417,797.70\nMonetary Base Incl. foreign currency clearing balances\nMonetary Base \nBond Coins\n3,282,131.58\n3,769,321.38\n5,747,625.57\n4,682,715.46\n6,810,750.63\n8,114,953.04\n10,327,816.88\n9,251,024.10\n9,380,944.48\n11,704,943.82\n12,459,746.60\n13,815,364.85\n12,651,566.81\nBond Notes\n87,606.55\n87,843.40\n87,844.15\n87,847.30\n87,845.55\n93,158.32\n99,010.30\n99,714.26\n99,712.42\n99,712.71\n99,710.76\n99,712.72\n99,710.08\nLiabilities to ODCs\n510,197.39\n609,392.70\n657,100.48\n728,411.73\n768,566.52\n872,222.06\n978,393.54\n1,036,938.66\n1,117,198.96\n1,208,072.64\n1,240,929.09\n1,356,393.24\n1,570,979.64\n Reserve Deposits\n2,583,805.05\n2,945,382.52\n4,679,680.86\n3,772,389.39\n5,535,717.81\n6,219,757.79\n8,352,572.72\n7,253,578.67\n7,089,397.08\n8,789,318.37\n10,198,688.17\n12,082,367.03\n10,419,558.83\n Exess reserves \n434,435.93\n497,763.67\n586,218.84\n625,173.97\n758,953.25\n861,489.70\n918,034.34\n1,040,852.24\n1,082,852.88\n1,205,004.05\n1,213,756.71\n1,386,675.05\n890,125.59\n Of which USD RTGS Revaluations\n2,149,369.12\n2,447,618.85\n4,093,462.02\n3,147,215.41\n4,776,764.57\n5,358,268.10\n7,434,538.38\n6,212,726.43\n6,006,544.20\n7,584,314.32\n8,984,931.47\n10,695,691.98\n9,529,433.25\nPrivate Deposits\n100,522.60\n126,702.75\n323,000.08\n94,067.04\n418,620.75\n929,814.87\n897,840.31\n860,792.52\n1,074,636.02\n1,607,840.10\n920,418.59\n276,891.86\n561,318.26\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2020\nTABLE 2: CENTRAL BANK SURVEY (ZWL$'000)\n \n \nS3 \n \n \n \n \nJun-19\nJul-19\nAug-19\nSep-19\nOct-19\nNov-19\nDec-19\nJan-20\nFeb-20\nMar-20\nApr-20\nMay-20\nJun-20\nNet Foreign Assets\n1,898,531.40\n3,371,448.01\n3,752,723.07\n6,130,727.45\n7,420,346.30\n8,368,744.30\n9,623,667.78\n9,706,293.27\n9,966,033.66\n13,943,220.42\n15,497,552.93\n17,376,410.27\n41,344,994.73\nClaims on Non Residents\n3,814,622.33\n5,390,485.00\n6,120,479.23\n9,382,906.26\n10,478,858.26\n11,622,874.19\n12,948,416.33\n13,153,007.07\n13,344,846.71\n18,827,846.39\n20,437,584.87\n22,510,950.77\n53,130,231.08\nOf Which: Foreign Currency\n882,204.61\n968,769.48\n1,150,434.08\n2,108,450.56\n1,905,985.69\n2,243,113.59\n2,526,205.54\n3,176,598.38\n3,136,431.39\n3,607,624.65\n3,642,933.80\n3,581,769.90\n9,729,549.76\nDeposits\n2,921,840.60\n4,408,575.22\n4,954,935.41\n7,254,079.84\n8,551,844.58\n9,358,131.61\n10,399,832.16\n9,953,357.06\n10,175,380.89\n15,179,403.50\n16,753,404.99\n18,887,749.91\n43,314,001.39\nOther\n10,577.12\n13,140.31\n15,109.74\n20,375.85\n21,027.99\n21,628.98\n22,378.63\n23,051.63\n33,034.42\n40,818.25\n41,246.08\n41,430.97\n86,679.92\nLess Liabilities to Non Residents\n1,916,090.93\n2,019,036.99\n2,367,756.16\n3,252,178.80\n3,058,511.96\n3,254,129.88\n3,324,748.55\n3,446,713.79\n3,378,813.04\n4,884,625.96\n4,940,031.94\n5,134,540.50\n11,785,236.35\nOf Which: Deposits\n769,197.36\n857,462.40\n938,762.40\n1,334,410.99\n1,141,821.51\n1,377,452.16\n1,457,271.39\n1,591,189.46\n1,285,842.52\n1,574,950.88\n1,667,098.42\n1,860,609.63\n3,767,028.56\nLoans\n1,146,893.57\n1,161,574.59\n1,428,993.76\n1,917,767.81\n1,916,690.45\n1,876,677.72\n1,867,477.16\n1,855,524.33\n2,092,970.52\n3,309,675.09\n3,272,933.52\n3,273,930.87\n8,018,207.80\nOther\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n12,297,290.28\n13,113,076.98\n15,057,767.71\n16,635,192.44\n20,378,973.60\n21,685,398.27\n23,589,103.57\n24,751,743.05\n26,346,359.69\n31,807,660.02\n34,525,013.99\n40,695,850.36\n56,705,559.53\nDomestic Claims\n9,072,247.98\n9,320,549.24\n9,717,740.03\n10,601,722.91\n11,770,620.25\n14,049,919.30\n15,409,570.92\n17,823,424.24\n19,287,456.86\n22,574,237.92\n23,430,231.24\n26,324,107.94\n39,405,825.66\nNet Claims on Central Government\n2,877,878.25\n3,435,662.08\n3,350,949.35\n3,524,311.24\n3,681,551.38\n4,052,444.25\n3,972,779.78\n4,284,897.63\n4,220,051.70\n4,371,019.79\n4,204,983.64\n3,952,942.15\n4,789,640.77\nClaims on Central Government\n2,922,401.88\n3,486,218.14\n3,410,147.47\n3,578,783.04\n3,750,150.34\n4,151,526.70\n4,091,285.86\n4,377,531.93\n4,298,263.57\n4,780,010.39\n4,721,326.20\n4,583,622.89\n6,269,011.77\nSecurities\n2,918,508.31\n3,484,041.96\n3,409,103.10\n3,577,410.30\n3,749,000.52\n4,150,152.74\n4,089,956.15\n4,372,420.71\n4,293,116.08\n4,775,618.52\n4,716,858.96\n4,579,097.46\n6,264,725.96\nLoans\n3,893.57\n2,176.18\n1,044.37\n1,372.73\n1,149.81\n1,373.97\n1,329.70\n5,111.21\n5,147.49\n4,391.86\n4,467.24\n4,525.43\n4,285.81\nOther \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n \n-\n \n -\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n44,523.63\n50,556.06\n59,198.12\n54,471.79\n68,598.95\n99,082.45\n118,506.08\n92,634.30\n78,211.87\n408,990.60\n516,342.56\n630,680.74\n1,479,371.00\nOf which: Deposits\n44,523.63\n50,556.06\n59,198.12\n54,471.79\n68,598.95\n99,082.45\n118,506.08\n92,634.30\n78,211.87\n408,990.60\n516,342.56\n630,680.74\n1,479,371.00\nOther \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nClaims on Other Sectors\n6,194,369.73\n5,884,887.16\n6,366,790.67\n7,077,411.66\n8,089,068.87\n9,997,475.05\n11,436,791.14\n13,538,526.61\n15,067,405.16\n18,203,218.14\n19,225,247.60\n22,371,165.79\n34,616,184.88\nOther Financial Corporations\n54,960.04\n65,223.35\n38,967.78\n34,328.82\n39,915.64\n37,694.15\n72,289.76\n78,791.30\n95,487.15\n116,565.68\n92,292.05\n157,689.88\n554,716.67\nState and Local Government\n31,319.18\n31,193.91\n30,689.81\n30,341.36\n28,130.16\n28,347.69\n26,320.30\n32,308.50\n31,704.96\n30,621.46\n27,844.50\n26,575.69\n23,225.26\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n1,002,528.07\n276,304.88\n323,047.60\n224,024.88\n290,519.04\n284,193.32\n301,021.27\n459,396.43\n455,647.01\n773,710.57\n845,084.31\n791,776.58\n2,037,662.29\nPrivate Sector\n5,105,562.43\n5,512,165.03\n5,974,085.48\n6,788,716.60\n7,730,504.03\n9,647,239.89\n11,037,159.81\n12,968,030.37\n14,484,566.04\n17,282,320.43\n18,260,026.74\n21,395,123.64\n32,000,580.66\nClaims on the Central Bank\n4,644,902.11\n \n5,448,316.23\n8,140,877.50\n9,252,623.62\n11,757,301.08\n11,546,508.94\n14,163,886.14\n13,400,742.47\n14,084,026.73\n16,430,721.57\n18,224,911.62\n21,706,416.06\n29,919,616.89\nCurrency\n126,257.461\n \n232,427.59\n184,370.21\n124,516.17\n144,290.37\n128,786.22\n169,835.56\n183,412.14\n267,061.31\n263,607.53\n298,482.41\n330,036.01\n461,761.08\nReserves\n4,518,644.646\n \n5,215,888.64\n7,956,507.29\n9,128,107.45\n11,613,010.71\n11,417,722.72\n13,994,050.58\n13,217,330.33\n13,816,965.42\n16,167,114.04\n17,926,429.21\n21,376,380.05\n29,457,855.81\nSecurities\n-\n \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00 - - \n - \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nOther Claims\n-\n \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00 - - \n - \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nLiabilities to the Central Bank\n150,275.70\n \n151,973.32\n155,014.53\n155,934.06\n159,104.77\n175,255.53\n179,468.01\n185,829.15\n189,591.37\n258,425.60\n346,363.87\n536,691.85\n887,577.50\nOther Items(Net)\n1,269,584.10\n \n1,503,815.17\n2,645,835.28\n3,063,220.03\n2,989,842.96\n3,735,774.45\n5,804,885.48\n6,286,594.51\n6,835,532.53\n6,938,873.87\n6,783,765.00\n6,797,981.79\n11,732,305.51\nShares and Other Equity\n3,130,496.35\n \n3,418,099.11\n3,949,811.84\n5,389,732.10\n5,795,665.01\n6,252,087.86\n10,111,978.87\n12,089,406.11\n12,427,849.47\n14,637,418.35\n15,535,143.11\n15,953,204.84\n31,312,741.50\nLiabilities to other ressident sectors\n43,639.00\n \n27,408.22\n27,999.41\n23,286.81\n24,632.93\n50,514.35\n119,397.64\n140,072.14\n154,917.78\n339,909.43\n233,181.06\n365,355.02\n348,181.06\nOther Items(Net)\n(1,904,551.24)\n \n-1,941,692.17\n-1,331,975.97\n-2,349,798.88\n-2,830,454.98\n-2,566,827.76\n-4,426,491.02\n-5,942,883.74\n-5,747,234.71\n-8,038,453.91\n-8,984,559.18\n-9,520,578.07\n-19,928,617.05\nDeposits and Securities Included in Broad Money\n14,195,821.68\n \n16,484,524.99\n18,810,490.79\n22,765,919.89\n27,799,319.90\n30,054,142.57\n33,212,771.35\n34,458,036.32\n36,312,393.36\n45,750,880.45\n50,022,566.92\n58,072,260.63\n98,050,554.25\nDeposits Included in Broad Money\n14,024,153.85\n \n16,316,355.79\n \n18,607,561.81\n \n22,546,030.38\n \n27,593,648.82\n \n29,819,025.32\n \n32,968,794.78\n \n34,202,472.63\n \n36,052,337.44\n \n45,274,086.77\n \n49,685,009.94\n \n57,713,065.69\n \n97,187,347.86\n \nTransferable Deposits\n12,595,266.96\n14,675,509.25\n \n16,987,786.03\n \n20,883,074.13\n \n25,739,354.63\n \n27,983,294.46\n \n31,080,869.95\n \n32,175,873.35\n \n33,858,024.37\n \n42,922,095.92\n \n47,162,154.77\n \n54,870,283.47\n \n93,169,652.47\n \n of which FCAs\n3,887,787.41\n4,049,120.88\n \n5,737,719.98\n \n9,859,484.27\n \n11,155,597.09\n \n11,472,035.58\n \n11,938,732.84\n \n12,458,349.93\n \n12,476,934.91\n \n20,909,726.92\n \n19,463,088.16\n \n24,984,322.48\n \n57,701,775.14\n \nOther Deposits\n1,428,886.89\n \n1,640,846.54\n1,619,775.77\n1,662,956.26\n1,854,294.19\n1,835,730.85\n1,887,924.83\n2,026,599.28\n2,194,313.07\n2,351,990.85\n2,522,855.18\n2,842,782.22\n4,017,695.39\nMoney Market Instruments\n171,667.83\n \n168,169.20\n \n202,928.98\n \n219,889.50\n \n205,671.08\n \n235,117.26\n \n243,976.57\n \n255,563.69\n \n260,055.92\n \n476,793.67\n \n337,556.97\n \n359,194.93\n \n863,206.40\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2020\n TABLE 3 : OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS\n \n \nS4 \n \n \n \nZWL$ Thousands\nEnd of\nGold\nOther\nTotal\nTreasury Bills\nCentral\nBanks\nOther\nGovt.\nOther\nOther Assets\nTOTAL\nGovernment\nStock\n2018\nJan\n542.7\n295,704.1\n296,246.8\n1,481,110.3\n2,521,699.7\n204,516.4\n392,457.4\n0.0\n53,297.6\n399,281.0\n5,348,609.1\nFeb\n535.0\n293,095.9\n293,630.9\n1,479,552.8\n2,594,224.0\n207,966.8\n405,996.7\n0.0\n53,426.7\n400,019.5\n5,434,817.4\nMar\n537.7\n253,084.5\n253,622.2\n1,546,995.9\n2,769,969.5\n215,726.1\n404,906.7\n0.0\n53,455.4\n403,745.5\n5,648,421.3\nApr\n533.3\n257,036.5\n257,569.8\n1,560,622.2\n2,950,232.6\n160,379.8\n426,520.6\n0.0\n53,595.8\n397,829.6\n5,806,750.3\nMay\n524.9\n313,482.0\n314,006.9\n1,597,939.7\n3,089,176.3\n270,870.8\n401,679.8\n0.0\n53,595.8\n398,836.7\n6,126,105.9\nJun\n505.0\n509,850.3\n510,355.4\n1,655,951.6\n3,305,339.2\n289,295.0\n447,654.5\n0.0\n53,610.6\n396,067.8\n6,658,274.0\nJul\n493.8\n527,813.6\n528,307.4\n1,767,971.0\n3,718,408.4\n301,846.4\n450,384.5\n0.0\n131,483.5\n395,874.7\n7,294,275.9\nAug\n483.2\n290,113.1\n290,596.3\n2,124,232.2\n3,825,308.4\n306,132.8\n469,976.6\n0.0\n131,983.5\n396,593.0\n7,544,822.7\nSep\n478.3\n237,372.4\n237,850.7\n2,107,570.8\n4,195,635.1\n306,155.6\n430,437.7\n0.0\n134,281.4\n380,807.0\n7,792,738.3\nOct\n494.5\n254,988.4\n255,482.9\n2,109,129.0\n4,327,555.6\n316,177.1\n462,486.6\n0.0\n134,282.6\n404,339.5\n8,009,453.3\nNov\n494.8\n247,185.3\n247,680.1\n2,073,611.9\n4,546,327.0\n379,173.9\n476,986.3\n0.0\n133,495.7\n410,630.5\n8,267,905.4\nDec\n516.1\n295,449.5\n295,965.7\n2,062,178.2\n4,962,474.6\n393,736.0\n481,858.2\n0.0\n133,506.7\n455,810.2\n8,785,529.5\n2019\nJan\n527.5\n281,743.9\n282,271.4\n2,011,373.8\n5,274,987.0\n417,911.6\n455,916.0\n0.0\n146,554.7\n479,670.8\n9,068,685.3\nFeb\n1,331.3\n851,954.0\n853,285.3\n1,962,432.4\n5,285,993.7\n330,900.1\n441,122.2\n0.0\n146,554.7\n501,209.3\n9,521,497.8\nMar\n1,570.1\n995,034.8\n996,604.9\n1,910,408.7\n5,309,582.8\n339,662.1\n460,940.2\n0.0\n147,416.8\n500,377.5\n9,664,992.9\nApr\n527.5\n281,743.9\n282,271.4\n1,835,171.9\n5,325,339.6\n332,906.5\n512,590.1\n0.0\n147,416.8\n1,138,901.7\n9,574,598.0\nMay\n1,331.3\n851,954.0\n853,285.3\n1,793,430.0\n5,406,793.3\n339,094.2\n549,282.9\n0.0\n148,416.7\n2,189,714.3\n11,280,016.7\nJun\n1,570.1\n995,034.8\n996,604.9\n5,480,531.5\n1,785,477.1\n363,908.2\n651,524.0\n0.0\n148,419.2\n3,060,526.9\n12,486,991.8\nJul\n1,668.6\n930,998.2\n932,666.8\n5,489,742.5\n2,197,986.0\n339,280.9\n674,702.3\n0.0\n149,326.6\n4,822,117.0\n14,605,822.1\nAug\n2,713.7\n2,415,015.7\n2,417,729.4\n5,479,729.3\n2,771,472.0\n348,501.8\n754,058.4\n0.0\n149,326.6\n5,627,355.2\n17,548,172.7\nSep\n3,755.3\n2,914,009.9\n2,917,765.3\n5,488,348.9\n3,339,977.7\n385,543.4\n878,502.6\n0.0\n150,968.8\n8,641,331.5\n21,802,438.2\nOct\n5,271.7\n3,397,381.3\n3,402,652.9\n5,479,742.5\n3,587,943.8\n429,889.7\n2,093,322.6\n0.0\n150,968.8\n7,496,844.7\n22,641,365.0\nNov\n6,641.6\n4,327,529.6\n4,334,171.2\n5,479,742.5\n4,010,661.8\n875,893.4\n2,606,915.9\n0.0\n157,750.3\n6,924,599.9\n24,389,735.1\nDec\n9,113.6\n6,455,133.8\n6,464,247.4\n6,828,363.5\n4,510,169.4\n1,247,758.5\n2,162,528.9\n0.0\n157,750.3\n706,808.9\n22,077,626.8\n2020\nJan\n9,413.0\n5,435,444.8\n5,444,857.7\n6,784,907.2\n5,513,803.8\n1,418,055.9\n2,161,612.4\n0.0\n145,381.3\n3,077,991.1\n24,546,609.5\nFeb\n9,518.4\n5,543,433.4\n5,552,951.8\n6,729,080.0\n5,811,437.6\n1,537,977.1\n2,289,690.3\n0.0\n205,904.7\n3,345,628.1\n25,472,669.6\nMar\n10,226.2\n5,494,713.6\n5,504,939.8\n6,635,562.3\n6,126,824.4\n1,747,842.1\n2,695,524.5\n0.0\n205,904.7\n2,787,290.2\n25,703,888.0\nApr\n32,549.9\n4,484,125.9\n4,516,675.8\n6,568,167.5\n6,169,084.0\n2,004,400.3\n2,837,713.3\n0.0\n205,904.7\n3,414,571.8\n25,716,517.4\nMay\n32,829.0\n5,021,291.4\n5,054,120.4\n6,515,431.8\n6,960,634.6\n2,363,408.6\n2,208,278.0\n0.0\n205,904.7\n2,989,468.8\n26,297,246.8\nJun\n77,699.9\n17,768,046.1\n17,845,746.0\n6,441,291.5\n9,933,663.2\n2,836,488.4\n4,004,174.8\n0.0\n205,904.7\n4,229,035.8\n45,496,304.3\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\nTABLE 4.1: RESERVE BANK - ASSETS\n Foreign Assets\nLoans and advances\nInvestments\n \n \nS5 \n \n \n \n \n TABLE 4.2 RESERVE BANK: LIABILITIES\nCapital\nand\nForeign\ngeneral\nEnd of\nBond Notes in \nCirculation\nBond Coins in Circulation\nBond Notes and\nBankers Deposits \nOther Deposits\nGovt. Deposits\nTotal Deposits\nLiabilities\nreserve\nOther Liabilities\nTOTAL\ncoins* issued\n2018\nJan\n291,017.0\n63,474.1\n354,491.1\n2,071,823.2\n561,090.2\n71,168.0\n2,704,081.5\n1,480,423.5\n331,769.0\n477,844.0\n5,348,609.1\nFeb\n289,315.0\n62,494.4\n351,809.4\n1,908,121.6\n531,290.0\n93,049.2\n2,532,460.8\n1,531,644.2\n339,808.3\n679,094.7\n5,434,817.4\nMar\n289,183.1\n68,055.2\n357,238.3\n1,920,236.4\n526,523.4\n42,096.2\n2,488,856.0\n1,722,990.1\n340,070.8\n739,266.1\n5,648,421.3\nApr\n289,120.9\n73,367.3\n362,488.2\n1,813,681.7\n528,811.0\n41,970.4\n2,384,463.1\n1,712,066.4\n350,685.4\n997,047.2\n5,806,750.3\nMay\n288,935.3\n79,420.3\n368,355.6\n1,924,872.4\n546,965.7\n41,858.0\n2,513,696.0\n1,782,605.2\n351,770.3\n1,109,678.9\n6,126,105.9\nJun\n307,595.1\n80,593.6\n388,188.8\n2,112,051.3\n570,387.8\n41,699.1\n2,724,138.2\n1,727,806.5\n360,766.4\n1,457,374.1\n6,658,274.0\nJul\n366,738.9\n80,812.7\n447,551.6\n2,294,108.1\n605,257.7\n41,707.7\n2,941,073.5\n1,803,751.9\n433,728.6\n1,668,170.2\n7,294,275.9\nAug\n399,951.6\n84,872.5\n484,824.1\n2,406,600.9\n670,605.2\n41,789.6\n3,118,995.7\n1,804,460.5\n444,671.0\n1,691,871.3\n7,544,822.7\nSep\n422,933.7\n86,177.9\n509,111.6\n2,296,266.8\n682,494.6\n41,694.9\n3,020,456.3\n1,793,136.7\n454,134.9\n2,015,898.8\n7,792,738.3\nOct\n434,935.7\n86,521.3\n521,457.0\n2,282,181.1\n704,720.4\n41,685.6\n3,028,587.2\n1,710,536.2\n466,363.6\n2,282,509.3\n8,009,453.3\nNov\n436,225.7\n86,507.8\n522,733.5\n2,545,140.2\n710,595.5\n41,331.0\n3,297,066.6\n1,788,555.6\n467,391.7\n2,192,157.9\n8,267,905.4\nDec\n435,985.1\n86,558.3\n522,543.5\n2,718,472.2\n587,797.4\n41,321.1\n3,347,590.7\n2,053,648.8\n475,653.2\n2,386,093.4\n8,785,529.5\n2019\nJan\n436,131.6\n86,671.1\n522,802.7\n2,431,429.7\n687,033.1\n41,366.4\n3,159,829.3\n2,069,786.9\n464,456.2\n2,851,810.2\n9,068,685.3\nFeb\n436,825.6\n86,794.2\n523,619.7\n2,620,801.4\n243,862.1\n103,759.1\n2,968,422.7\n5,530,259.3\n-2,402,232.5\n2,901,428.5\n9,521,497.8\nMar\n442,551.2\n86,775.2\n529,326.4\n2,556,061.1\n253,590.5\n130,917.9\n2,940,569.5\n7,106,925.2\n-3,873,725.3\n2,961,897.2\n9,664,992.9\nApr\n449,762.9\n87,096.2\n536,859.1\n2,410,617.8\n305,453.8\n160,540.0\n2,876,611.6\n2,069,786.9\n-4,589,274.7\n8,680,615.1\n9,574,598.0\nMay\n476,656.0\n87,423.3\n564,079.3\n1,861,836.1\n414,514.4\n246,390.3\n2,522,740.8\n5,530,259.3\n-9,310,271.3\n11,973,208.6\n11,280,016.7\nJun\n510,197.4\n87,606.5\n597,803.9\n2,877,247.3\n803,273.0\n276,635.3\n3,957,155.6\n7,106,925.2\n-12,647,395.6\n13,472,502.6\n12,486,991.8\nJul\n609,392.7\n87,843.4\n697,236.1\n3,233,425.2\n1,711,703.4\n379,351.4\n5,324,480.0\n7,690,837.8\n-21,058,240.2\n21,951,508.4\n14,605,822.1\nAug\n657,100.5\n87,844.1\n744,944.6\n5,381,620.4\n1,858,313.6\n441,622.1\n7,681,556.2\n13,772,962.7\n-25,229,010.7\n20,577,719.9\n17,548,172.7\nSep\n728,411.7\n87,847.3\n816,259.0\n4,764,143.1\n1,949,291.2\n626,345.4\n7,339,779.7\n17,520,734.0\n-36,903,875.7\n33,029,541.0\n21,802,438.2\nOct\n768,566.5\n87,845.5\n856,412.1\n6,528,467.6\n2,345,066.3\n646,639.5\n9,520,173.4\n26,689,709.4\n-44,802,824.2\n30,377,894.2\n22,641,365.0\nNov\n872,222.1\n93,158.3\n965,380.4\n7,287,217.4\n4,330,028.3\n662,159.7\n12,279,405.5\n31,686,235.5\n-47,413,029.5\n26,871,743.2\n24,389,735.1\nDec\n978,393.5\n99,010.3\n1,077,403.8\n9,987,301.1\n3,387,893.1\n692,865.5\n14,068,059.7\n45,814,207.5\n-54,656,738.3\n15,774,694.1\n22,077,626.8\n2020\nJan\n1,036,938.7\n99,714.3\n1,136,652.9\n8,559,782.6\n4,031,311.7\n715,936.5\n13,307,030.8\n51,840,017.9\n-55,918,839.0\n14,181,746.9\n24,546,609.5\nFeb\n1,117,199.0\n99,712.4\n1,216,911.4\n8,434,752.2\n5,161,938.2\n715,936.5\n14,312,626.9\n53,820,700.6\n-56,770,197.8\n12,892,628.5\n25,472,669.6\nMar\n1,208,072.6\n99,712.7\n1,307,785.4\n10,592,446.0\n5,479,019.6\n1,336,922.6\n17,408,388.2\n55,790,782.9\n-85,756,440.8\n36,953,372.4\n25,703,888.0\nApr\n1,240,929.1\n99,710.8\n1,340,639.8\n12,242,950.5\n3,406,630.5\n3,669,765.1\n19,319,346.2\n109,061,107.8\n-113,862,068.9\n9,857,492.4\n25,716,517.4\nMay\n1,356,393.2\n99,712.7\n1,456,106.0\n14,238,158.4\n4,405,076.0\n1,059,003.3\n19,702,237.7\n119,431,121.6\n-124,140,506.2\n9,848,287.7\n26,297,246.8\nJun\n1,570,979.6\n99,710.1\n1,670,689.7\n15,136,849.3\n8,883,539.7\n2,420,562.6\n26,440,951.6\n293,469,309.5\n-296,849,225.1\n20,764,578.6\n45,496,304.3\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\n*Bond coins first issued in December 2014\n* Bond Notes issued on 28 November 2016\nZWL$ Thousands\nDeposits\n \n \nS6 \n \n \n \n \n \nForeign\nTOTAL\nEnd of\nNotes\nBond\n&\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \nLocal\nOther \n Notes &\nCoin\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment1\nGovernemt\nOther2\nGovernment\nLocal \nPublic \n Institutional \nOther cliams\nContigent Assets\nOther Assets\nNon Financial \nCoins\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\nGovernment\nEnterprises\nUnits\nAssets\n2018\nJan\n23.4\n \n66.9\n \n2,528.5\n \n291.2\n \n111.9\n \n81.9\n2,336.0\n34.5\n23.5\n65.9\n26.3\n20.6\n155.3\n3,461.2\n74.6\n501.0\n457.8\n700.8\n10,961.1\nFeb\n20.0\n \n46.8\n \n2,516.8\n \n347.6\n \n114.2\n \n96.2\n2,313.4\n33.5\n23.5\n66.1\n24.3\n21.1\n145.4\n3,527.1\n22.2\n507.8\n434.5\n697.8\n10,958.3\nMar\n16.7\n \n57.9\n \n2,457.7\n \n312.8\n \n139.2\n \n99.5\n2,434.8\n32.8\n23.5\n66.7\n19.2\n15.9\n127.5\n3,637.8\n24.2\n504.1\n487.4\n710.3\n11,168.1\nApr\n14.9\n \n61.9\n \n2,423.5\n \n337.0\n \n120.8\n \n78.5\n2,558.9\n32.0\n24.7\n67.0\n13.4\n20.9\n121.2\n3,674.0\n22.1\n532.0\n459.2\n715.7\n11,277.5\nMay\n14.2\n \n71.7\n \n2,543.0\n \n477.8\n \n138.6\n \n85.7\n2,814.9\n30.9\n25.0\n66.9\n8.4\n20.9\n134.4\n3,740.3\n12.0\n458.9\n457.2\n718.2\n11,819.1\nJun\n9.0\n \n58.5\n \n3,081.0\n \n509.8\n \n120.0\n \n84.1\n2,865.3\n30.1\n26.2\n66.5\n7.4\n19.4\n196.4\n3,829.3\n38.6\n551.4\n448.1\n730.7\n12,671.8\nJul\n20.6\n \n61.9\n \n3,450.6\n \n466.4\n \n111.6\n \n95.4\n3,291.4\n33.3\n0.0\n67.5\n4.5\n21.0\n182.0\n3,500.6\n153.9\n611.4\n472.5\n732.0\n13,276.5\nAug\n23.1\n \n72.3\n \n3,475.7\n \n377.8\n \n105.3\n \n66.3\n3,362.8\n32.2\n0.0\n67.3\n7.1\n20.6\n186.7\n3,585.1\n102.0\n647.7\n489.9\n736.1\n13,358.0\nSep\n18.2\n \n61.5\n \n3,781.6\n \n398.1\n \n159.1\n \n78.0\n3,145.7\n31.2\n45.2\n68.1\n5.4\n20.4\n212.2\n3,734.2\n119.7\n637.4\n527.8\n742.6\n13,786.4\nOct\n39.9\n \n70.4\n \n3,771.3\n \n368.3\n \n185.5\n \n51.4\n3,105.9\n30.2\n45.2\n68.4\n4.6\n9.4\n188.8\n3,838.0\n132.0\n647.5\n537.8\n743.0\n13,837.7\nNov\n30.6\n \n84.6\n \n3,696.3\n \n300.6\n \n209.8\n \n63.9\n3,172.9\n28.9\n45.2\n68.7\n7.0\n8.1\n217.7\n3,813.2\n141.9\n633.2\n581.9\n742.4\n13,846.8\nDec\n20.5\n \n94.5\n \n3,949.5\n \n439.6\n \n235.5\n \n74.8\n3,044.1\n28.0\n43.4\n69.2\n6.2\n9.2\n204.3\n3,870.5\n151.2\n573.8\n612.5\n812.4\n14,239.0\n2019\nJan\n49.0\n \n113.4\n \n3,901.0\n \n401.9\n \n261.6\n \n46.1\n3,038.3\n27.3\n94.6\n68.7\n4.4\n8.1\n189.2\n3,773.5\n109.1\n517.2\n592.3\n827.7\n14,023.5\nFeb\n59.7\n \n256.8\n \n3,764.8\n \n357.1\n \n570.4\n \n205.7\n3,076.4\n26.5\n60.5\n2.0\n5.8\n7.7\n208.3\n3,991.5\n100.5\n490.7\n669.1\n880.0\n14,733.6\nMar\n62.5\n \n263.2\n \n3,891.0\n \n432.9\n \n739.3\n \n55.1\n3,028.8\n25.5\n61.5\n4.5\n4.3\n9.5\n340.7\n3,845.0\n129.0\n523.7\n954.5\n1,205.2\n15,576.2\nApr\n45.2\n \n363.5\n \n4,153.9\n \n578.9\n \n1,031.9\n \n91.7\n2,921.3\n25.0\n61.8\n4.0\n4.0\n9.6\n407.8\n3,899.7\n131.9\n620.5\n1,135.4\n1,304.8\n16,790.9\nMay\n98.7\n \n484.2\n \n4,089.2\n \n694.1\n \n1,890.1\n \n154.1\n2,912.7\n23.9\n62.1\n4.2\n3.9\n9.4\n636.8\n4,303.9\n144.3\n910.1\n2,031.0\n1,532.3\n19,985.1\nJun\n126.3\n \n882.2\n \n4,518.6\n \n560.2\n \n2,383.0\n \n538.9\n2,918.5\n22.6\n63.1\n6.6\n3.9\n8.7\n929.4\n5,011.5\n163.0\n1,606.5\n1,621.9\n2,120.4\n23,485.3\nJul\n232.4\n \n968.8\n \n5,605.6\n \n370.4\n \n3,738.0\n \n801.9\n2,962.9\n22.2\n103.4\n5.5\n2.2\n9.0\n164.6\n5,364.7\n228.7\n1,587.7\n2,124.1\n2,345.3\n26,637.3\nAug\n184.4\n \n1,150.4\n \n7,956.5\n \n527.8\n \n3,904.2\n \n1,050.7\n3,409.1\n21.5\n103.9\n6.8\n1.0\n9.2\n212.5\n5,764.9\n263.2\n2,614.6\n2,149.5\n2,623.2\n31,953.4\nSep\n124.5\n \n2,108.5\n \n9,128.1\n \n874.0\n \n5,678.3\n \n1,575.7\n3,577.4\n20.9\n27.0\n6.5\n1.4\n9.4\n187.5\n6,456.9\n389.5\n3,707.8\n3,665.5\n3,549.9\n41,088.9\nOct\n144.3\n \n1,906.0\n \n11,613.0\n \n2,511.0\n \n7,644.9\n \n907.0\n3,749.0\n20.2\n27.1\n5.3\n1.1\n7.9\n254.8\n7,393.9\n400.9\n4,081.1\n2,230.5\n3,580.5\n46,478.4\nNov\n128.8\n \n2,243.1\n \n11,417.7\n \n2,236.3\n \n8,417.4\n \n940.7\n4,150.2\n19.6\n27.1\n11.8\n1.4\n8.7\n248.8\n9,260.2\n442.8\n3,148.3\n2,272.9\n4,208.0\n49,183.9\nDec\n169.8\n \n2,526.2\n \n13,994.1\n \n1,254.7\n \n8,415.7\n \n1,984.1\n4,090.0\n18.2\n24.7\n20.7\n1.3\n8.1\n268.6\n10,562.1\n556.7\n4,867.7\n3,517.6\n8,485.9\n60,766.3\n2020\nJan\n183.4\n \n3,176.6\n \n13,217.3\n \n1,073.2\n \n8,142.0\n \n1,811.4\n4,372.4\n20.1\n125.5\n15.0\n5.1\n12.2\n326.1\n12,115.8\n946.9\n2,965.9\n4,191.6\n9,691.7\n62,392.3\nFeb\n267.1\n \n3,136.4\n \n13,817.0\n \n1,504.5\n \n8,642.5\n \n1,532.9\n4,293.1\n20.1\n117.4\n15.5\n5.1\n11.6\n329.5\n13,632.6\n973.7\n5,441.7\n12,758.8\n10,338.7\n76,838.2\nMar\n263.6\n \n3,607.6\n \n16,167.1\n \n2,214.4\n \n12,681.9\n \n2,497.5\n4,775.6\n19.2\n0.1\n20.8\n4.4\n11.4\n765.8\n16,323.6\n1,103.1\n7,917.3\n7,042.4\n11,309.5\n86,725.4\nApr\n298.5\n \n3,642.9\n \n17,926.4\n \n1,523.3\n \n13,697.1\n \n3,056.3\n4,716.9\n18.1\n0.1\n18.4\n4.5\n9.7\n834.7\n17,280.6\n1,104.9\n7,642.8\n8,200.2\n11,988.1\n91,963.5\nMay\n330.0\n \n3,581.8\n \n21,376.4\n \n1,749.6\n \n15,757.4\n \n3,130.4\n4,579.1\n17.0\n0.1\n45.8\n4.5\n9.6\n768.0\n20,291.6\n1,280.4\n7,042.0\n8,823.5\n12,139.9\n100,927.2\nJun\n606.6\n \n9,584.7\n \n29,457.9\n \n3,974.7\n \n35,786.5\n \n7,527.5\n6,264.7\n13.8\n0.1\n90.1\n4.3\n9.4\n2,010.8\n30,567.5\n2,011.1\n24,299.3\n17,433.0\n23,843.0\n193,485.0\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2020\nNotes\n1.Government securities includes treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households and other financial corporations.\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\nPublic \nEnterprises\nTABLE 5.1: OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS -ASSETS\nZWL$ millions\n \n \nS7 \n \n \n \n \nDebt Securities Foreign Liabilities\nCapital\nContigent\nOther\nTOTAL\nand\nLiablities\nLiablities\nEnd of\nDemand\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nReserves\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\n2018\nJan\n4,640.2\n1,008.1\n1,454.0\n7,102.2\n406.5\n107.3\n7,616.1\n65.1\n444.8\n115.1\n49.1\n2.6\n1,645.3\n501.0\n522.1\n10,961.1\nFeb\n4,633.7\n989.2\n1,458.8\n7,081.7\n418.7\n101.2\n7,601.7\n75.4\n435.4\n111.2\n92.8\n2.9\n1,620.1\n507.8\n511.0\n10,958.3\nMar\n4,732.9\n1,007.5\n1,491.0\n7,231.4\n365.0\n114.7\n7,711.0\n77.3\n460.8\n140.5\n89.2\n6.9\n1,654.7\n504.1\n523.4\n11,168.1\nApr\n4,907.7\n1,066.6\n1,374.6\n7,349.0\n387.8\n95.6\n7,832.3\n84.0\n453.1\n82.4\n68.8\n16.1\n1,641.9\n532.0\n567.0\n11,277.5\nMay\n5,172.9\n1,138.2\n1,442.5\n7,753.6\n442.8\n107.4\n8,303.8\n88.0\n554.0\n101.5\n94.9\n19.9\n1,671.5\n458.9\n526.5\n11,819.1\nJune\n5,650.6\n1,274.7\n1,459.1\n8,384.4\n438.0\n89.2\n8,911.6\n66.8\n554.0\n119.8\n173.4\n21.6\n1,707.5\n551.4\n565.7\n12,671.8\nJuly\n5,902.3\n1,415.3\n1,501.5\n8,819.1\n424.4\n33.1\n9,276.7\n89.5\n545.1\n118.9\n132.9\n32.6\n1,846.0\n611.4\n623.4\n13,276.5\nAug\n6,005.7\n1,362.6\n1,524.2\n8,892.5\n399.6\n32.4\n9,324.5\n66.5\n535.4\n137.0\n119.5\n33.3\n1,882.9\n647.7\n611.2\n13,358.0\nSep\n6,281.7\n1,421.8\n1,489.0\n9,192.4\n439.0\n44.6\n9,676.1\n52.4\n559.4\n142.2\n129.1\n46.6\n1,913.4\n637.4\n629.7\n13,786.4\nOct\n6,345.7\n1,390.0\n1,427.8\n9,163.5\n435.2\n52.2\n9,650.8\n61.7\n581.4\n147.6\n93.4\n42.0\n1,957.6\n647.5\n655.7\n13,837.7\nNov\n6,419.8\n1,329.4\n1,430.4\n9,179.6\n366.8\n48.7\n9,595.1\n50.9\n543.1\n213.7\n74.8\n42.3\n1,991.6\n633.2\n702.1\n13,846.8\nDec\n6,601.1\n1,322.2\n1,508.9\n9,432.2\n394.5\n41.3\n9,868.0\n58.6\n524.7\n229.6\n187.8\n39.0\n2,057.7\n573.8\n699.7\n14,239.0\n2019\nJan\n6,626.6\n1,155.9\n1,466.8\n9,249.4\n381.0\n42.2\n9,672.5\n59.3\n530.5\n239.5\n188.3\n39.2\n2,047.0\n517.2\n729.8\n14,023.5\nFeb\n7,168.7\n1,155.1\n1,473.2\n9,797.1\n387.8\n44.5\n10,229.3\n71.8\n782.0\n158.9\n151.7\n42.6\n2,145.1\n490.7\n661.5\n14,733.6\nMar\n7,435.2\n1,127.0\n1,437.1\n9,999.2\n372.7\n47.9\n10,419.9\n74.5\n933.8\n165.8\n140.9\n42.7\n2,349.0\n523.7\n925.8\n15,576.2\nApr\n7,968.0\n1,243.3\n1,795.8\n11,007.1\n390.9\n55.9\n11,453.8\n90.8\n652.7\n148.3\n173.5\n28.8\n2,551.4\n620.5\n1,071.0\n16,790.9\nMay\n9,316.8\n1,379.0\n1,932.4\n12,628.2\n462.9\n48.9\n13,139.9\n139.4\n1,053.9\n148.8\n206.7\n46.5\n2,556.6\n910.1\n1,783.2\n19,985.1\nJun\n11,021.9\n1,573.5\n1,737.2\n14,332.6\n422.0\n44.5\n14,799.2\n171.7\n1,607.6\n150.3\n216.7\n43.6\n3,240.7\n1,606.5\n1,649.0\n23,485.3\nJul\n13,014.4\n1,661.3\n1,949.2\n16,624.9\n432.6\n50.6\n17,108.1\n168.2\n1,710.5\n152.0\n225.8\n27.4\n3,522.6\n1,587.7\n2,135.1\n26,637.3\nAug\n15,189.7\n1,798.7\n1,922.5\n18,910.9\n639.1\n59.2\n19,609.3\n202.9\n2,064.4\n155.0\n116.2\n28.0\n4,061.0\n2,614.6\n3,102.0\n31,953.4\nSep\n18,834.0\n2,049.2\n1,925.3\n22,808.5\n549.2\n54.5\n23,412.2\n219.9\n2,989.7\n155.9\n182.3\n23.3\n5,510.0\n3,707.8\n4,887.7\n41,088.9\nOct\n23,441.5\n2,298.0\n1,891.9\n27,631.4\n526.0\n68.6\n28,226.0\n205.7\n3,020.7\n159.1\n211.3\n24.6\n5,937.5\n4,081.1\n4,612.3\n46,478.4\nNov\n25,114.5\n2,868.9\n2,123.8\n30,107.2\n878.6\n99.1\n31,084.9\n235.1\n2,966.0\n175.3\n275.5\n50.5\n6,404.3\n3,148.3\n4,844.2\n49,183.9\nDec\n27,842.2\n3,238.9\n2,192.0\n33,273.1\n1,067.2\n118.5\n34,458.8\n244.0\n3,020.4\n179.5\n326.4\n119.4\n10,212.4\n4,867.7\n7,337.7\n60,766.3\n2020\nJan\n28,570.4\n3,605.9\n2,358.3\n34,534.5\n1,299.1\n92.6\n35,926.3\n255.6\n3,114.7\n185.8\n336.1\n140.1\n12,285.7\n2,965.9\n7,182.1\n62,392.3\nFeb\n37,082.9\n3,939.6\n2,215.0\n43,237.5\n1,674.9\n78.2\n44,990.7\n260.1\n3,357.7\n189.6\n767.7\n154.9\n12,930.2\n5,441.7\n8,745.6\n76,838.2\nMar\n37,923.6\n4,998.7\n2,361.6\n45,283.9\n1,721.0\n409.0\n47,413.9\n476.8\n4,874.8\n258.4\n314.6\n339.9\n15,172.3\n7,917.3\n9,957.3\n86,725.4\nApr\n42,102.4\n5,060.0\n2,530.7\n49,693.1\n1,805.2\n516.3\n52,014.6\n337.6\n4,931.9\n346.4\n312.9\n233.2\n16,105.4\n7,642.8\n10,038.7\n91,963.5\nMay\n48,595.9\n6,274.7\n2,847.3\n57,717.9\n1,840.2\n630.7\n60,188.8\n359.2\n5,129.7\n536.7\n469.1\n365.4\n16,562.4\n7,042.0\n10,273.9\n100,927.2\nJun\n86,454.7\n6,715.3\n4,040.8\n97,210.8\n2,277.4\n1,479.4\n100,967.5\n863.2\n11,761.8\n887.6\n959.9\n348.2\n32,058.2\n24,299.3\n21,339.3\n193,485.0\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2020\nTABLE 5.2 : OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS - LIABILITIES \nZWL$ millions\nDeposits\nAmounts Owing to\n \n \nS8 \n \n \n \n \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nForeign\nBond\nNotes\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \nLocal\nPublic\nOther \nContigent \nNon Financial \n Notes &\n&\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment1\nLocal Governemt\nPublic Enterprises\nOther2\nGovernment\nGovernment\nEnterprises\n Institutional Units3\nOther claims\nAssets\nOther Assets\nAssets\nCoins\nCoin\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\n2018\nJan\n22.4\n \n64.1\n \n2,294.5\n \n192.1\n \n103.4\n \n81.9\n \n2,143.2\n \n-\n \n23.5\n \n65.9\n \n26.3\n \n20.6\n \n154.8\n \n2,451.1\n \n28.7\n \n501.0\n \n294.2\n \n538.9\n \n9,006.6\n \nFeb\n18.3\n \n44.0\n \n2,296.8\n \n223.7\n \n108.3\n \n96.2\n \n2,109.3\n \n-\n \n23.5\n \n66.1\n \n24.3\n \n21.1\n \n145.0\n \n2,461.5\n \n28.7\n \n507.8\n \n290.6\n \n536.3\n \n9,001.5\n \nMar\n14.8\n \n53.6\n \n2,238.8\n \n240.7\n \n124.5\n \n99.5\n \n2,164.0\n \n-\n \n23.5\n \n66.7\n \n19.2\n \n15.9\n \n127.1\n \n2,535.8\n \n30.4\n \n504.1\n \n325.8\n \n552.3\n \n9,136.6\n \nApr\n13.5\n \n56.7\n \n2,207.9\n \n275.0\n \n116.7\n \n78.5\n \n2,314.9\n \n-\n \n24.7\n \n67.0\n \n13.4\n \n20.9\n \n120.8\n \n2,519.8\n \n28.3\n \n532.0\n \n299.0\n \n554.9\n \n9,244.0\n \nMay\n12.9\n \n62.8\n \n2,309.0\n \n339.5\n \n130.1\n \n85.7\n \n2,562.4\n \n-\n \n25.0\n \n66.9\n \n8.4\n \n20.9\n \n134.0\n \n2,556.2\n \n23.9\n \n458.9\n \n307.9\n \n555.3\n \n9,659.8\n \nJune\n7.5\n \n52.6\n \n2,848.5\n \n331.8\n \n117.3\n \n84.1\n \n2,538.3\n \n-\n \n26.2\n \n66.5\n \n7.4\n \n19.4\n \n196.0\n \n2,662.2\n \n25.5\n \n551.4\n \n302.9\n \n563.4\n \n10,401.0\n \nJuly\n17.9\n \n54.3\n \n3,189.6\n \n281.1\n \n109.3\n \n95.4\n \n2,949.2\n \n-\n \n-\n \n67.5\n \n4.5\n \n21.0\n \n182.0\n \n2,414.6\n \n26.0\n \n611.4\n \n322.5\n \n565.1\n \n10,911.4\n \nAug\n21.0\n \n67.8\n \n3,196.7\n \n232.3\n \n102.5\n \n66.3\n \n3,014.9\n \n-\n \n-\n \n67.3\n \n7.1\n \n20.6\n \n186.7\n \n2,491.0\n \n29.8\n \n647.7\n \n329.4\n \n566.3\n \n11,047.4\n \nSep\n16.3\n \n58.2\n \n3,487.9\n \n305.3\n \n137.8\n \n78.0\n \n2,789.8\n \n-\n \n45.2\n \n68.1\n \n5.4\n \n20.4\n \n212.2\n \n2,577.1\n \n36.7\n \n637.4\n \n357.4\n \n571.8\n \n11,405.0\n \nOct\n33.1\n \n68.0\n \n3,505.8\n \n272.1\n \n173.1\n \n51.4\n \n2,728.8\n \n-\n \n45.2\n \n68.4\n \n4.6\n \n9.4\n \n188.8\n \n2,697.4\n \n38.7\n \n647.5\n \n353.2\n \n569.2\n \n11,454.9\n \nNov\n25.8\n \n81.4\n \n3,384.4\n \n264.6\n \n198.2\n \n63.9\n \n2,793.9\n \n-\n \n45.2\n \n68.7\n \n7.0\n \n8.1\n \n217.7\n \n2,672.3\n \n46.1\n \n633.2\n \n406.6\n \n569.8\n \n11,486.9\n \nDec\n18.2\n \n89.9\n \n3,737.0\n \n317.3\n \n224.4\n \n74.8\n \n2,633.7\n \n-\n \n43.4\n \n69.2\n \n6.2\n \n9.2\n \n204.3\n \n2,707.6\n \n53.7\n \n573.8\n \n406.2\n \n633.9\n \n11,802.7\n \n2019\nJan\n42.05\n \n106.91\n \n3,766.70\n \n338.09\n \n249.77\n \n46.14\n \n2,621.20\n \n-\n \n61.02\n \n68.66\n \n4.41\n \n8.06\n \n189.15\n \n2,594.53\n \n33.84\n \n517.24\n \n428.82\n \n649.94\n \n11,726.5\n \nFeb\n52.63\n \n238.67\n \n3,601.94\n \n293.36\n \n549.59\n \n205.65\n \n2,675.29\n \n-\n \n60.52\n \n2.00\n \n5.84\n \n7.71\n \n208.31\n \n2,784.17\n \n31.04\n \n490.74\n \n472.78\n \n696.82\n \n12,377.1\n \nMar\n59.17\n \n244.62\n \n3,729.81\n \n393.22\n \n712.08\n \n55.05\n \n2,635.68\n \n-\n \n61.52\n \n4.53\n \n4.27\n \n9.53\n \n340.66\n \n2,660.90\n \n25.33\n \n523.72\n \n755.57\n \n971.53\n \n13,187.2\n \nApr\n40.82\n \n331.97\n \n3,876.83\n \n492.10\n \n981.80\n \n91.75\n \n2,590.97\n \n-\n \n61.79\n \n3.95\n \n3.98\n \n9.62\n \n407.85\n \n2,721.57\n \n24.55\n \n620.52\n \n935.27\n \n1,002.47\n \n14,197.8\n \nMay\n94.59\n \n444.70\n \n3,886.07\n \n571.50\n \n1,747.69\n \n154.08\n \n2,508.43\n \n-\n \n62.12\n \n4.20\n \n3.93\n \n9.43\n \n636.78\n \n3,056.86\n \n34.46\n \n910.14\n \n1,832.95\n \n1,142.77\n \n17,100.7\n \nJun\n119.69\n \n810.71\n \n4,104.17\n \n413.18\n \n2,244.98\n \n538.88\n \n2,596.97\n \n-\n \n63.09\n \n6.62\n \n3.89\n \n8.73\n \n929.36\n \n3,667.45\n \n37.02\n \n1,606.53\n \n1,374.23\n \n1,621.33\n \n20,146.8\n \nJul\n224.75\n \n791.31\n \n5,081.19\n \n275.44\n \n3,602.89\n \n801.93\n \n2,640.55\n \n-\n \n103.36\n \n5.49\n \n2.18\n \n9.00\n \n164.58\n \n4,043.75\n \n32.65\n \n1,587.68\n \n1,873.44\n \n1,722.66\n \n22,962.9\n \nAug\n178.74\n \n1,054.06\n \n7,123.10\n \n461.83\n \n3,778.75\n \n1,050.74\n \n3,106.90\n \n-\n \n103.86\n \n6.78\n \n1.04\n \n9.21\n \n212.50\n \n4,430.78\n \n37.42\n \n2,614.64\n \n1,744.16\n \n1,989.27\n \n27,903.8\n \nSep\n108.51\n \n1,915.41\n \n8,246.09\n \n676.17\n \n5,563.16\n \n1,575.75\n \n3,240.85\n \n-\n \n26.96\n \n6.47\n \n1.37\n \n9.40\n \n187.53\n \n4,993.71\n \n42.30\n \n3,707.80\n \n3,074.10\n \n2,440.63\n \n35,816.2\n \nOct\n138.01\n \n1,702.35\n \n10,537.81\n \n2,437.08\n \n7,376.80\n \n906.98\n \n3,416.23\n \n-\n \n27.05\n \n5.29\n \n1.15\n \n7.94\n \n254.84\n \n5,859.32\n \n41.94\n \n4,081.09\n \n1,658.19\n \n2,434.21\n \n40,886.3\n \nNov\n113.92\n \n2,078.54\n \n10,430.55\n \n2,073.35\n \n7,977.27\n \n940.70\n \n3,737.72\n \n-\n \n27.15\n \n11.83\n \n1.37\n \n8.74\n \n248.79\n \n7,670.96\n \n42.07\n \n3,148.28\n \n1,627.27\n \n3,059.40\n \n43,197.9\n \nDec\n158.44\n \n2,300.01\n \n12,821.54\n \n934.73\n \n7,898.48\n \n1,984.08\n \n3,716.31\n \n-\n \n24.75\n \n20.65\n \n1.33\n \n8.11\n \n268.61\n \n8,976.00\n \n61.84\n \n4,867.67\n \n2,740.16\n \n6,935.56\n \n53,718.3\n \n2020\nJan\n165.80\n \n2,845.62\n \n12,018.43\n \n708.00\n \n7,706.57\n \n1,811.38\n \n4,029.43\n \n-\n \n125.52\n \n14.97\n \n5.11\n \n12.17\n \n326.11\n \n10,766.91\n \n77.59\n \n2,965.93\n \n3,395.90\n \n8,058.15\n \n55,033.6\n \nFeb\n251.70\n \n2,756.57\n \n12,731.97\n \n889.16\n \n8,264.76\n \n1,532.87\n \n3,877.19\n \n-\n \n117.45\n \n13.99\n \n5.15\n \n11.56\n \n329.47\n \n11,656.91\n \n88.37\n \n5,441.70\n \n11,907.90\n \n8,653.69\n \n68,530.4\n \nMar\n242.41\n \n3,063.92\n \n14,545.58\n \n1,948.14\n \n12,381.17\n \n2,497.47\n \n4,373.76\n \n-\n \n0.08\n \n20.23\n \n4.39\n \n11.39\n \n765.82\n \n14,041.67\n \n127.46\n \n7,917.31\n \n5,718.53\n \n9,244.62\n \n76,904.0\n \nApr\n263.29\n \n3,147.75\n \n16,673.44\n \n1,287.51\n \n13,285.14\n \n3,056.32\n \n4,235.96\n \n-\n \n0.08\n \n18.39\n \n4.47\n \n9.75\n \n834.72\n \n14,864.30\n \n129.90\n \n7,642.80\n \n6,534.14\n \n9,703.93\n \n81,691.9\n \nMay\n284.33\n \n3,144.57\n \n19,827.46\n \n1,553.68\n \n15,003.29\n \n3,130.38\n \n4,160.50\n \n-\n \n0.12\n \n45.79\n \n4.53\n \n9.61\n \n768.01\n \n17,762.27\n \n143.44\n \n7,042.04\n \n6,012.40\n \n9,845.09\n \n88,737.5\n \nJun\n515.11\n \n8,372.39\n \n26,368.55\n \n3,570.85\n \n34,550.44\n \n7,527.46\n \n5,841.98\n \n-\n \n0.12\n \n90.14\n \n4.29\n \n9.41\n \n2,010.79\n \n26,638.87\n \n215.56\n \n24,299.33\n \n14,590.26\n \n18,983.05\n \n173,588.6\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\nTABLE 6.1: COMMERCIAL BANKS -ASSETS\nZWL$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \nS9 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nZWL$ millions\nEnd of\nDemand\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nCapital\nContigent\nOther\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\nand\nLiablities\nLiablities\nTOTAL\nReserves\n2018\nMar\n4,732.9\n368.8\n930.7\n6,032.4\n244.7\n92.4\n6,369.5\n61.1\n419.5\n140.5\n54.8\n6.4\n1,196.4\n504.1\n384.3\n9,136.6\nApr\n4,907.7\n394.4\n874.8\n6,176.9\n243.4\n72.8\n6,493.1\n67.4\n413.5\n82.4\n35.2\n15.7\n1,201.5\n532.0\n403.4\n9,244.0\nMay\n5,172.9\n416.2\n917.2\n6,506.3\n246.2\n85.2\n6,837.7\n66.8\n514.1\n101.5\n63.7\n19.4\n1,224.6\n458.9\n373.2\n9,659.8\nJun\n5,650.6\n504.3\n897.4\n7,052.2\n254.8\n66.9\n7,373.9\n45.0\n514.7\n119.8\n116.5\n21.1\n1,259.1\n551.4\n399.5\n10,401.0\nJul\n5,902.3\n527.0\n901.0\n7,330.3\n296.0\n12.2\n7,638.4\n72.0\n507.6\n118.9\n102.5\n16.8\n1,380.1\n611.4\n463.6\n10,911.4\nAug\n6,005.7\n540.8\n930.8\n7,477.3\n266.6\n11.5\n7,755.3\n46.4\n501.5\n137.0\n101.3\n15.4\n1,408.6\n647.7\n434.3\n11,047.4\nSep\n6,281.7\n556.4\n927.2\n7,765.3\n273.0\n23.5\n8,061.8\n40.9\n503.5\n142.2\n108.4\n21.1\n1,434.8\n637.4\n454.9\n11,405.0\nOct\n6,340.3\n509.5\n898.1\n7,747.9\n284.2\n31.1\n8,063.2\n49.3\n525.1\n147.6\n72.2\n16.5\n1,461.0\n647.5\n472.6\n11,454.9\nNov\n6,411.0\n503.9\n861.0\n7,775.9\n232.8\n27.6\n8,036.4\n41.2\n487.5\n213.7\n58.6\n17.8\n1,490.0\n633.2\n508.4\n11,486.9\nDec\n6,582.3\n495.0\n910.9\n7,988.3\n255.0\n19.7\n8,262.9\n43.3\n469.5\n229.6\n147.5\n15.6\n1,551.3\n573.8\n509.2\n11,802.7\n2019\nJan\n6,603.6\n440.8\n919.5\n7,964.0\n240.5\n20.5\n8,225.0\n42.6\n475.0\n239.5\n130.2\n14.4\n1,545.2\n517.2\n537.2\n11,726.5\nFeb\n7,129.0\n426.7\n923.8\n8,479.6\n248.9\n22.8\n8,751.4\n57.3\n647.5\n158.9\n119.1\n14.4\n1,626.6\n490.7\n511.1\n12,377.0\nMar\n7,350.5\n451.8\n915.0\n8,717.3\n225.9\n26.4\n8,969.6\n56.8\n778.3\n165.8\n108.4\n17.0\n1,804.3\n523.7\n763.2\n13,187.2\nApr\n7,861.8\n447.1\n1,280.5\n9,589.3\n260.3\n34.4\n9,884.1\n76.0\n487.7\n148.3\n145.3\n14.8\n1,935.7\n620.5\n885.4\n14,197.8\nMay\n9,143.2\n544.3\n1,412.7\n11,100.2\n309.4\n27.5\n11,437.1\n126.8\n789.2\n148.8\n164.7\n16.0\n1,916.9\n910.1\n1,591.0\n17,100.7\nJun\n10,758.5\n567.5\n1,279.7\n12,605.8\n290.5\n23.1\n12,919.4\n159.0\n1,271.1\n150.3\n161.8\n16.5\n2,409.1\n1,606.5\n1,453.0\n20,146.8\nJul\n12,675.9\n672.2\n1,367.7\n14,715.9\n357.4\n29.4\n15,102.7\n146.4\n1,254.8\n152.0\n205.6\n10.4\n2,583.9\n1,587.7\n1,919.4\n22,962.9\nAug\n14,591.5\n825.3\n1,330.1\n16,747.0\n592.1\n38.0\n17,377.1\n182.4\n1,525.0\n155.0\n88.0\n24.5\n3,065.7\n2,614.6\n2,871.4\n27,903.8\nSep\n18,105.1\n947.3\n1,354.6\n20,407.1\n504.3\n33.3\n20,944.7\n205.7\n2,120.6\n155.9\n115.4\n23.3\n3,933.6\n3,707.8\n4,609.2\n35,816.2\nOct\n22,636.1\n1,003.6\n1,292.7\n24,932.3\n489.1\n47.4\n25,468.8\n200.2\n2,159.7\n159.1\n135.3\n24.6\n4,347.1\n4,081.1\n4,310.3\n40,886.3\nNov\n24,297.0\n1,057.2\n1,633.8\n26,988.0\n843.6\n78.9\n27,910.5\n227.7\n2,089.7\n175.3\n154.3\n48.0\n4,931.5\n3,148.3\n4,512.6\n43,197.9\nDec\n26,909.1\n1,184.4\n1,638.8\n29,732.2\n823.2\n102.9\n30,658.3\n231.6\n2,097.0\n179.5\n209.4\n119.4\n8,414.9\n4,867.7\n6,940.7\n53,718.3\n2020\nJan\n27,276.4\n1,787.3\n1,876.0\n30,939.8\n1,026.0\n76.3\n32,042.1\n232.1\n2,170.0\n185.8\n236.2\n140.1\n10,357.6\n2,965.9\n6,703.8\n55,033.6\nFeb\n35,796.5\n1,869.8\n1,712.8\n39,379.1\n1,404.1\n62.2\n40,845.3\n238.9\n2,391.2\n189.6\n209.2\n154.9\n10,877.8\n5,441.7\n8,181.8\n68,530.4\nMar\n36,078.2\n2,458.2\n1,884.9\n40,421.2\n1,430.6\n393.1\n42,245.0\n468.8\n3,731.4\n258.4\n181.2\n339.9\n12,487.9\n7,917.3\n9,274.0\n76,904.0\nApr\n40,156.4\n2,457.6\n2,078.8\n44,692.9\n1,514.8\n496.9\n46,704.6\n333.2\n3,779.7\n346.4\n172.1\n233.2\n13,105.1\n7,642.8\n9,374.8\n81,691.9\nMay\n46,306.1\n2,502.0\n2,405.7\n51,213.8\n1,399.0\n611.4\n53,224.1\n324.9\n3,968.6\n536.7\n319.4\n365.4\n13,454.1\n7,042.0\n9,502.3\n88,737.5\nJun\n67,548.1\n17,859.0\n3,562.0\n88,969.1\n1,931.1\n1,453.1\n92,353.3\n856.9\n9,116.9\n887.6\n681.7\n348.2\n24,773.8\n24,299.3\n20,270.9\n173,588.6\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\nTABLE 6.2 : COMMERCIAL BANKS - LIABILITIES\nDeposits\nAmounts Owing to\n \n \nS10 \n \n \n \nForeign\nOther Assets\nNon Financial \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nNotes\nAssets\nBond\n&\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \n Notes &\nCoin\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment1\nLocal Governemt\nPublic Enterprises\nOther2\nMortgages\nGovernment\nOther\nCoins\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\n2018\nJan\n0.9\n \n2.3\n \n197.4\n \n98.7\n \n7.8\n \n-\n \n129.8\n \n34.5\n \n-\n \n-\n \n413.2\n \n-\n \n508.7\n \n144.9\n \n136.1\n \n1,674.3\n \nFeb\n1.5\n \n1.8\n \n172.4\n \n123.5\n \n5.5\n \n-\n \n141.3\n \n33.5\n \n-\n \n-\n \n414.8\n \n-\n \n507.9\n \n125.7\n \n135.7\n \n1,663.6\n \nMar\n1.4\n \n3.4\n \n175.9\n \n72.1\n \n14.1\n \n-\n \n212.6\n \n32.8\n \n-\n \n-\n \n411.4\n \n-\n \n539.4\n \n142.8\n \n132.3\n \n1,738.2\n \nApr\n1.1\n \n4.3\n \n185.5\n \n61.9\n \n3.6\n \n-\n \n184.4\n \n32.0\n \n-\n \n-\n \n413.3\n \n-\n \n582.7\n \n141.6\n \n135.2\n \n1,745.7\n \nMay\n1.0\n \n7.6\n \n196.3\n \n138.2\n \n8.1\n \n-\n \n191.0\n \n30.9\n \n-\n \n-\n \n415.0\n \n-\n \n608.4\n \n128.1\n \n137.4\n \n1,862.0\n \nJune\n1.2\n \n4.9\n \n188.6\n \n177.8\n \n1.9\n \n-\n \n266.2\n \n30.1\n \n-\n \n-\n \n413.9\n \n-\n \n614.3\n \n124.0\n \n141.5\n \n1,964.5\n \nJuly\n1.8\n \n6.6\n \n207.1\n \n185.1\n \n1.7\n \n-\n \n283.2\n \n33.3\n \n-\n \n-\n \n423.5\n \n-\n \n636.1\n \n128.2\n \n141.1\n \n2,047.7\n \nAug\n1.6\n \n3.7\n \n224.7\n \n145.3\n \n2.4\n \n-\n \n288.9\n \n32.2\n \n-\n \n-\n \n428.2\n \n-\n \n579.4\n \n139.1\n \n143.7\n \n1,989.2\n \nSep\n1.9\n \n2.9\n \n245.6\n \n92.6\n \n20.8\n \n-\n \n291.1\n \n31.2\n \n-\n \n-\n \n430.3\n \n-\n \n650.2\n \n148.1\n \n144.4\n \n2,059.1\n \nOct\n4.9\n \n2.1\n \n220.0\n \n95.8\n \n11.9\n \n-\n \n318.9\n \n30.2\n \n-\n \n-\n \n427.7\n \n-\n \n639.8\n \n154.2\n \n147.0\n \n2,052.5\n \nNov\n3.6\n \n2.9\n \n243.3\n \n35.7\n \n10.4\n \n-\n \n320.7\n \n28.9\n \n-\n \n-\n \n433.5\n \n-\n \n635.7\n \n148.0\n \n145.8\n \n2,008.5\n \nDec\n2.3\n \n4.3\n \n157.4\n \n121.3\n \n10.4\n \n-\n \n339.4\n \n28.0\n \n-\n \n-\n \n444.8\n \n-\n \n645.9\n \n179.7\n \n151.9\n \n2,085.6\n \n2019\nJan\n6.3\n \n4.6\n108.2\n \n63.5\n10.9\n \n-\n \n343.8\n \n27.3\n33.6\n \n-\n \n438.0\n \n-\n \n649.3\n \n136.7\n151.2\n \n1,973.3\n \nFeb\n5.4\n \n17.6\n120.6\n \n62.8\n18.1\n \n-\n \n339.6\n \n26.5\n-\n \n-\n \n416.1\n \n-\n \n696.1\n \n171.1\n156.7\n \n2,030.8\n \nMar\n2.6\n \n18.0\n126.3\n \n38.6\n23.9\n \n-\n \n331.7\n \n25.5\n-\n \n-\n \n415.1\n \n-\n \n710.1\n \n172.1\n207.4\n \n2,071.2\n \nApr\n3.7\n \n30.6\n220.3\n \n85.0\n47.6\n \n-\n \n271.6\n \n25.0\n-\n \n-\n \n414.1\n \n-\n \n705.0\n \n169.0\n276.2\n \n2,247.8\n \nMay\n3.9\n \n38.4\n162.2\n \n115.4\n139.0\n \n-\n \n345.5\n \n23.9\n-\n \n-\n \n406.2\n \n-\n \n776.6\n \n165.7\n363.4\n \n2,540.1\n \nJun\n6.3\n \n69.8\n361.6\n \n144.5\n132.4\n \n-\n \n265.8\n \n22.6\n-\n \n-\n \n421.7\n \n-\n \n873.6\n \n210.5\n473.0\n \n2,981.8\n \nJul\n6.5\n \n174.7\n473.9\n \n89.7\n131.1\n \n-\n \n258.3\n \n22.2\n-\n \n-\n \n416.0\n \n-\n \n934.6\n \n203.1\n565.6\n \n3,275.8\n \nAug\n5.5\n \n94.5\n758.0\n \n60.6\n115.5\n \n-\n \n247.4\n \n21.5\n-\n \n-\n \n418.1\n \n-\n \n970.6\n \n345.1\n567.6\n \n3,604.2\n \nSep\n15.8\n \n180.3\n831.8\n \n195.4\n104.2\n \n-\n \n267.6\n \n20.9\n-\n \n-\n \n499.1\n \n-\n \n1,137.6\n \n528.8\n1,042.2\n \n4,823.6\n \nOct\n6.2\n \n198.7\n997.2\n \n72.2\n243.7\n \n-\n \n268.8\n \n20.2\n-\n \n-\n \n429.8\n \n-\n \n1,286.7\n \n503.4\n1,069.3\n \n5,096.2\n \nNov\n11.9\n \n156.1\n872.3\n \n159.7\n426.0\n \n-\n \n338.6\n \n19.6\n-\n \n-\n \n443.5\n \n-\n \n1,357.4\n \n575.8\n1,068.7\n \n5,429.6\n \nDec\n9.2\n \n223.9\n1,016.9\n \n317.4\n492.3\n \n-\n \n308.3\n \n18.2\n-\n \n-\n \n454.5\n \n-\n \n1,413.5\n \n700.6\n1,470.0\n \n6,424.9\n \n2020\nJan\n16.3\n \n322.3\n1,106.8\n \n361.8\n421.8\n \n-\n \n283.0\n \n20.1\n-\n \n-\n \n478.2\n \n-\n \n1,498.8\n \n717.5\n1,552.8\n \n6,779.5\n \nFeb\n14.5\n \n368.2\n977.2\n \n612.5\n370.5\n \n-\n \n357.1\n \n20.1\n-\n \n1.5\n \n503.6\n \n-\n \n2,097.7\n \n735.9\n1,538.8\n \n7,597.4\n \nMar\n20.1\n \n529.4\n1,423.7\n \n261.8\n282.6\n \n-\n \n341.6\n \n19.2\n-\n \n0.6\n \n526.4\n \n-\n \n2,406.4\n \n1165.6\n1,914.1\n \n8,891.5\n \nApr\n33.1\n \n493.1\n914.2\n \n232.1\n384.9\n \n-\n \n424.3\n \n18.1\n-\n \n-\n \n525.9\n \n-\n \n2,568.2\n \n1528.5\n2,134.4\n \n9,256.8\n \nMay\n39.7\n \n434.7\n1,248.4\n \n192.3\n725.0\n \n-\n \n382.4\n \n17.0\n-\n \n-\n \n517.6\n \n-\n \n2,793.4\n \n2669.6\n2,146.1\n \n11,166.3\n \nJun\n88.7\n \n1167.9\n2,857.8\n \n395.9\n1,222.0\n \n-\n \n385.4\n \n13.8\n-\n \n-\n \n653.4\n \n-\n \n4,663.9\n \n2688.0\n4,712.1\n \n18,848.8\n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\nNotes\n1.Government securities include treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households and other financial corporations, \nTABLE 7.1: BUILDING SOCIETIES -ASSETS\nZWL$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \nS11 \n \n \n \n \nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nCapital\nOther\nTOTAL\nand\nLiablities\nEnd of\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nReserves\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\n2018\nMar\n535.1\n507.8\n1,042.9\n120.3\n16.5\n1,179.7\n27.5\n41.3\n0.0\n34.5\n0.5\n378.2\n76.5\n1,738.2\nApr\n568.0\n452.6\n1,020.5\n144.4\n17.0\n1,181.9\n27.9\n39.7\n0.0\n33.6\n0.4\n358.5\n103.7\n1,745.7\nMay\n613.8\n475.1\n1,089.0\n196.6\n16.4\n1,302.0\n32.4\n40.0\n0.0\n31.2\n0.5\n363.1\n92.8\n1,862.0\nJune\n658.5\n507.9\n1,166.5\n183.2\n16.4\n1,366.0\n33.1\n39.3\n0.0\n56.9\n0.4\n363.5\n105.2\n1,964.5\nJuly\n770.2\n542.9\n1,313.1\n128.5\n15.0\n1,456.6\n28.7\n37.5\n0.0\n30.4\n15.8\n378.9\n99.8\n2,047.7\nAug\n703.4\n534.7\n1,238.0\n133.0\n15.0\n1,386.0\n31.3\n33.9\n0.0\n18.3\n17.9\n385.8\n116.0\n1,989.2\nSep\n749.8\n502.3\n1,252.2\n166.0\n15.1\n1,433.2\n22.8\n55.9\n0.0\n20.7\n25.5\n388.6\n112.3\n2,059.1\nOct\n772.5\n471.9\n1,244.4\n151.0\n15.1\n1,410.5\n23.7\n56.3\n0.0\n21.2\n25.5\n389.9\n125.4\n2,052.5\nNov\n699.9\n511.9\n1,211.9\n134.0\n15.1\n1,360.9\n21.0\n55.6\n0.0\n16.2\n24.5\n396.1\n134.2\n2,008.5\nDec\n713.2\n540.0\n1,253.1\n139.6\n15.1\n1,407.8\n26.5\n55.3\n0.0\n40.2\n23.4\n400.1\n132.3\n2,085.6\n2019\nJan\n633.8\n490.2\n1,124.0\n140.5\n15.0\n1,279.6\n27.9\n55.5\n0.0\n58.1\n24.8\n392.8\n134.7\n1,973.3\nFeb\n661.3\n492.3\n1,153.6\n138.8\n15.0\n1,307.4\n25.8\n134.5\n0.0\n32.6\n28.2\n366.7\n135.6\n2,030.8\nMar\n655.2\n473.9\n1,129.1\n146.8\n15.0\n1,290.9\n29.0\n155.6\n0.0\n32.5\n25.7\n391.4\n146.2\n2,071.2\nApr\n782.3\n460.0\n1,242.3\n130.5\n14.9\n1,387.7\n26.0\n165.0\n0.0\n28.2\n14.1\n457.7\n169.2\n2,247.8\nMay\n895.0\n464.3\n1,359.4\n153.5\n15.0\n1,527.9\n23.9\n264.7\n0.0\n41.9\n30.6\n477.5\n173.6\n2,540.1\nJun\n1,154.3\n406.8\n1,561.1\n131.5\n15.0\n1,707.7\n23.9\n336.5\n0.0\n54.8\n27.1\n664.7\n167.0\n2,981.8\nJul\n1,192.2\n538.1\n1,730.3\n75.2\n14.9\n1,820.4\n33.0\n455.7\n0.0\n20.2\n17.0\n739.6\n189.9\n3,275.8\nAug\n1,424.7\n542.9\n1,967.6\n47.0\n15.0\n2,029.6\n31.8\n539.4\n0.0\n28.2\n3.5\n777.8\n193.9\n3,604.2\nSep\n1,686.2\n524.9\n2,211.1\n44.9\n15.0\n2,271.0\n25.5\n869.0\n0.0\n66.9\n0.0\n1,352.0\n239.1\n4,823.6\nOct\n1,920.1\n548.8\n2,468.8\n36.9\n15.0\n2,520.7\n16.7\n861.0\n0.0\n76.0\n0.0\n1,362.8\n259.0\n5,096.2\nNov\n2,394.7\n441.2\n2,835.9\n35.0\n15.0\n2,886.0\n18.6\n876.3\n0.0\n121.1\n2.5\n1,246.7\n278.3\n5,429.6\nDec\n2,713.3\n481.5\n3,194.7\n244.0\n15.0\n3,453.8\n23.7\n923.5\n0.0\n117.1\n0.0\n1,563.0\n343.9\n6,424.9\n2020\nJan\n2,894.8\n398.4\n3,293.3\n273.1\n15.0\n3,581.4\n34.7\n944.7\n0.0\n100.0\n0.0\n1,699.9\n418.8\n6,779.5\nFeb\n3,118.5\n419.8\n3,538.4\n270.9\n15.0\n3,824.3\n32.5\n966.5\n0.0\n558.5\n0.0\n1,714.1\n501.5\n7,597.4\nMar\n3,978.7\n384.4\n4,363.1\n290.4\n15.0\n4,668.5\n19.3\n1,143.4\n0.0\n133.4\n0.0\n2,335.6\n591.3\n8,891.5\nApr\n4,097.6\n354.9\n4,452.5\n290.4\n15.0\n4,757.9\n15.6\n1,152.3\n0.0\n140.8\n0.0\n2,628.1\n562.1\n9,256.8\nMay\n5,615.0\n370.0\n5,985.0\n441.2\n15.0\n6,441.2\n45.6\n1,161.2\n0.0\n149.8\n0.0\n2,708.1\n660.4\n11,166.3\nJun\n7,327.5\n405.9\n7,733.4\n346.2\n15.0\n8,094.6\n17.6\n2,644.8\n0.0\n278.2\n0.0\n6,867.2\n946.4\n18,848.8\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\nAmounts Owing to\nTABLE 7.2: BUILDING SOCIETIES -LIABILITIES\nZWL$ millions\n \n \nS12 \n \n \n \n Table 8.1: SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS LOANS AND ADVANCES\n$ ('000)\n \nAGRICULTURE\nCONSTRUCTION\nCOMMUNICATION\nDISTRIBUTION\nFINANCIAL &\nFINANCIAL\nMANUFACTURING\nMINING\nSERVICES\nTRANSPORT\nINDIVIDUALS\nCONGLOMERATES\nTOTAL\nEND OF\n \n \n \nINVESTMENTS\nORGANISATIONS\n \n \n \n \n2018\nJan\n479,109.6\n59,336.8\n9,442.4\n289,531.3\n20,569.7\n258,035.0\n271,453.8\n106,425.1\n390,052.9\n32,328.6\n617,303.0\n14,394.7\n2,547,982.8\nFeb\n488,203.1\n59.,977.6\n9,271.6\n315,569.6\n20,133.1\n258,263.6\n285,045.1\n108,649.0\n393,604.9\n31,636.6\n618,377.4\n15,010.6\n2,543,764.6\nMar\n484,764.7\n64,826.5\n11,050.5\n344,731.3\n15,203.3\n274,150.2\n303,649.2\n114,431.9\n363,449.4\n32,793.4\n640,496.9\n19,893.1\n2,669,440.4\nApr\n485,790.0\n63,948.2\n10,904.2\n344,532.1\n15,015.2\n271,071.8\n294,270.8\n112,692.1\n333,633.8\n31,103.5\n631,920.5\n22,066.0\n2,616,948.2\nMay\n501,783.7\n63,555.3\n10,933.5\n362,939.6\n15,079.8\n358,553.4\n317,666.7\n117,123.0\n338,846.3\n31,523.1\n651,444.0\n24,226.4\n2,793,674.8\nJun\n475,105.7\n66,796.8\n13,907.7\n385,583.3\n15,079.8\n344,917.3\n323,212.1\n117,146.6\n335,216.9\n34,457.6\n655,427.0\n34,163.4\n2,801,014.3\nJul\n463,286.3\n70,905.2\n18,924.1\n383,314.7\n14,976.4\n140,624.6\n274,507.8\n113,776.3\n309,209.5\n37,474.0\n652,652.7\n34,402.1\n2,514,053.7\nAug\n470,756.1\n79,237.1\n15,167.3\n331,672.8\n15,021.9\n144,100.7\n271,000.5\n111,960.2\n306,022.7\n37,341.2\n666,649.4\n34,402.1\n2,483,332.1\nSep\n451,745.3\n79,055.7\n15,021.6\n341,851.7\n15,021.9\n144,799.6\n263,994.2\n112,656.6\n320,788.5\n36,914.6\n666,971.5\n64,407.1\n2,513,228.2\nOct\n453,068.3\n74,931.8\n16,036.5\n389,851.7\n15,156.8\n165,252.7\n268,933.2\n111,956.6\n313,376.8\n36,118.6\n680,445.7\n12,855.7\n2,537,984.3\nNov\n444,130.8\n133,137.6\n14,884.1\n313,733.0\n15,156.8\n165,419.8\n269,459.9\n149,908.1\n316,738.8\n45,693.2\n679,403.7\n12,265.4\n2,559,931.1\nDec\n492,669.9\n78,176.7\n15,958.0\n340,422.7\n14,425.5\n165,648.7\n253,354.3\n113,596.5\n347,242.2\n40,695.4\n669,879.6\n12,254.3\n2,544,323.9\n2019\nJan\n525,176.7\n80,480.9\n20,199.4\n349,755.6\n15,294.0\n158,458.9\n255,380.4\n123,772.8\n358,554.2\n42,355.5\n666,797.1\n16,335.7\n2,612,561.3\nFeb\n521,988.1\n79,066.7\n10,931.1\n352,797.8\n14,699.0\n80,894.7\n253,027.0\n124,474.7\n389,523.0\n40,923.5\n644,320.9\n11,446.6\n2,524,093.1\nMar\n538,072.7\n87,791.3\n18,211.5\n379,233.1\n14,556.7\n205,466.5\n270,360.1\n133,324.8\n407,638.0\n43,541.4\n731,600.3\n11,476.6\n2,841,272.8\nApr\n584,205.3\n96,516.9\n22,430.9\n421,676.7\n15,968.0\n236,000.3\n310,449.7\n193,315.8\n387,730.2\n44,465.7\n788,749.6\n14,486.6\n3,115,995.7\nMay\n712,661.5\n98,826.6\n27,802.4\n466,620.0\n17,425.9\n317,055.8\n368,550.6\n250,912.5\n441,731.0\n43,682.6\n901,283.4\n14,096.6\n3,660,649.0\nJun\n940,505.8\n82,926.8\n30,534.7\n566,391.1\n169,400.8\n876,820.4\n354,648.6\n331,070.0\n404,941.1\n49,207.3\n898,523.5\n14,258.9\n4,719,228.9\nJul\n1,060,152.4\n108,889.3\n38,005.8\n685,729.8\n22,484.8\n470,421.8\n497,581.3\n333,137.4\n643,722.0\n51,560.7\n1,111,698.0\n7,683.2\n5,031,066.5\nAug\n1,163,054.3\n117,882.9\n40,904.6\n720,937.6\n15,289.6\n524,650.1\n575,937.1\n378,008.7\n742,674.6\n51,710.4\n1,202,415.1\n5,830.8\n5,539,295.7\nSep\n1,379,203.2\n101,683.9\n20,216.2\n755,828.9\n15,563.7\n1,430,322.3\n520,659.8\n487,089.9\n594,143.3\n59,974.6\n1,004,073.3\n6,055.4\n5,087,524.4\nOct\n1,917,349.8\n103,709.0\n20,826.5\n798,377.2\n24,574.7\n1,447,865.7\n603,692.2\n541,020.3\n618,349.6\n61,677.9\n1,112,873.3\n4,322.0\n7,530,493.2\nNov\n1,916,599.1\n103,450.1\n22,381.7\n878,695.3\n24,749.4\n1,566,329.2\n623,341.5\n554,037.1\n623,064.8\n61,153.1\n1,152,340.0\n4,351.8\n7,530,493.2\nDec\n3,260,641.3\n140,783.7\n27,127.1\n1,114,871.8\n48,155.6\n1,504,624.8\n1,027,373.9\n821,797.2\n823,237.5\n84,684.8\n1,428,029.4\n7,328.2\n10,288,655.3\n2020\nJan\n4,084,551.9\n155,581.9\n40,879.9\n1,241,096.7\n54,212.8\n1,614,135.9\n1,136,124.9\n905,568.2\n799,835.7\n83,887.6\n1,594,904.4\n3,435.4\n11,714,215.3\nFeb\n4,492,412.3\n157,892.1\n54,850.8\n1,305,056.3\n51,575.2\n1,667,016.0\n1,328,895.1\n875,096.3\n827,340.4\n103,240.6\n1,837,059.2\n1,195.4\n12,701,629.5\nMar\n5,400,573.8\n137,553.1\n109,432.3\n1,355,737.8\n60,656.4\n2,181,804.5\n1,514,365.3\n1,743,391.4\n911,568.0\n129,647.8\n2,083,395.0\n30,867.0\n15,658,992.1\nApr\n5,497,243.2\n144,302.2\n94,782.2\n1,298,701.4\n50,563.1\n2,200,545.8\n1,762,996.4\n1,756,962.2\n1,057,031.7\n149,805.9\n2,211,133.9\n33,524.9\n16,257,593.1\nMay\n6,753,987.6\n152,161.1\n176,776.3\n1,688,453.5\n61,403.0\n2,272,323.3\n2,155,232.1\n2,018,291.5\n1,335,664.7\n161,892.6\n2,646,269.6\n56,873.3\n19,479,328.7\nJun\n8,233,748.4\n178,010.1\n127,961.9\n3,248,219.4\n64,989.9\n5,469,986.1\n3,799,659.7\n4,379,017.7\n1,983,339.3\n277,602.3\n3,665,408.8\n46,385.0\n31,474,328.4\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\n/1 Including the only merchant bank still in operation.\n \n \nS13 \n \n \n \nEND OF\nAGRICULTURE\nCONSTRUCTION\nCOMMUNICATIONS\nDISTRIBUTION\nFINANCIAL&INV\nESTMENT\nFINANCIAL ORG\nMANUFACTURING\nMINING\nSERVICES\nTRANSPORT\nINDIVIDUALS\nCONGLOMERATES\nTOTAL\n2019\nJan\n505,422.9\n391,022.0\n497,976.2\n1,034,948.2\n411,945.9\n1,187,606.7\n882,289.7\n322,030.3\n2,154,902.3\n135,871.6\n763,189.5\n63,064.3\n8,350,269.7\nFeb\n512,602.3\n374,750.6\n394,709.1\n936,123.6\n449,800.9\n904,919.4\n855,348.4\n347,405.5\n2,355,866.1\n138,685.8\n776,949.7\n63,097.1\n8,110,258.7\nMar\n526,564.2\n343,684.3\n376,205.6\n937,743.4\n393,489.3\n1,317,757.7\n861,574.9\n380,295.4\n2,099,331.1\n141,677.2\n773,726.4\n63,094.9\n8,215,144.4\nApr\n632,972.5\n255,945.6\n1,010,978.7\n90,282.6\n462,133.1\n1,535,772.6\n890,606.5\n325,814.6\n2,413,535.6\n320,213.5\n876,646.5\n90,282.6\n9,963,832.2\nMay\n832,073.6\n305,410.9\n1,321,039.7\n1,177,925.1\n522,764.9\n1,646,358.6\n1,142,369.6\n372,594.9\n2,765,341.2\n371,372.0\n965,202.7\n93,188.9\n11,515,642.2\nJun\n1,001,633.6\n309,108.9\n1,124,005.3\n1,337,171.0\n546,572.5\n2,210,293.9\n1,319,789.8\n562,858.0\n3,493,214.3\n434,828.2\n1,070,319.7\n52,118.6\n13,461,913.9\nJul\n1,171,245.4\n353,388.5\n1,504,911.5\n1,241,910.1\n654,904.7\n2,553,878.7\n1,383,215.2\n585,108.2\n4,131,588.8\n463,161.9\n1,304,402.7\n71,943.6\n15,419,659.2\nAug\n1,313,462.5\n477,215.8\n1,795,905.4\n1,687,246.4\n804,316.2\n2,591,386.5\n1,647,680.2\n1,114,306.0\n3,872,187.0\n503,541.6\n1,532,441.9\n75,829.3\n17,413,139.2\nSep\n1,581,141.7\n321,121.4\n1,934,554.4\n1,728,390.1\n952,548.3\n3,086,893.1\n1,638,855.1\n1,375,546.6\n5,961,405.3\n589,939.6\n1,848,708.4\n76,775.9\n21,272,162.4\nOct\n1,744,905.8\n796,996.5\n2,217,888.5\n2,626,316.7\n768,125.2\n3,204,019.2\n2,287,076.1\n1,889,144.7\n7,536,588.6\n510,151.5\n1,942,195.1\n48,142.7\n25,571,550.5\nNov\n1,783,345.3\n813,506.5\n2,257,181.8\n2,618,010.3\n1,287,013.8\n3,544,459.5\n2,082,447.8\n1,787,923.6\n7,794,026.0\n491,371.8\n1,920,297.4\n57,897.5\n26,437,481.4\nDec\n1,877,764.1\n950,348.8\n2,917,087.2\n3,126,494.5\n1,421,969.0\n4,411,638.4\n2,605,023.1\n1,664,547.7\n8,410,964.0\n554,937.3\n2,477,474.0\n116,789.4\n30,535,037.6\n2020\nJan\n2,173,633.0\n972,609.2\n3,182,087.1\n4,279,565.8\n1,757,297.1\n4,791,990.6\n2,791,625.2\n2,223,774.1\n9,875,803.5\n609,781.7\n2,838,775.9\n81,735.2\n35,578,678.4\nFeb\n2,492,591.8\n1,191,731.7\n3,340,863.8\n8,721,475.9\n1,919,428.5\n5,869,104.2\n3,481,495.5\n2,729,162.0\n10,202,203.6\n760,155.3\n3,574,134.5\n82,845.8\n44,365,192.6\nMar\n2,678,262.7\n1,449,645.9\n3,231,059.0\n11,715,273.9\n2,114,093.0\n6,507,000.0\n4,576,971.8\n3,048,053.5\n11,490,205.2\n947,918.2\n4,257,117.7\n72,082.9\n52,087,683.7\nApr\n2,854,374.8\n1,118,295.5\n3,492,330.5\n5,271,473.4\n1,999,901.1\n6,191,170.7\n4,276,817.2\n3,727,579.4\n14,060,717.8\n713,407.0\n4,444,924.9\n83,109.3\n48,234,101.6\nMay\n3,866,781.1\n1,163,944.9\n4,713,727.6\n7,932,403.4\n1,991,042.6\n7,151,451.5\n5,858,495.1\n5,031,912.5\n13,907,794.8\n944,318.1\n5,060,401.3\n88,613.6\n57,710,886.5\nJun\n7,228,784.4\n1,963,030.9\n5,393,404.5\n14,526,855.6\n3,997,135.7\n12,452,202.5\n11,386,156.5\n9,507,719.1\n22,807,615.5\n1,630,544.9\n9,798,261.2\n121,561.2\n100,813,272.0\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2020\n TABLE 8.2: SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS DEPOSITS \n$ ('000)\n \n \nS14 \n \n \n \nEnd of\nZETSS \nCHEQ UE \nPO S\nATM\nMO BILE\n INTERNET\nEnd of\nZETSS \nCHEQ UE \nPO S\nATM\nMO BILE\n INTERNET\n2018\n2018\n Jan \n 5,548.05 4.89 \n663.45\n 21.29 2,318.80 1,006.05 \n Jan \n 548.13 22.73 20,981.21 449.60 100,593.90 501.80 \n Feb \n 4,706.60 4.50 \n594.00\n 13.90 2,015.11 831.05 \n Feb \n 457.19 22.48 \n18,869.05\n 292.22 89,584.32 463.78 \n Mar \n 6,300.40 4.50 \n654.20\n 12.50 2,657.10 864.83 \n Mar \n 545.18 23.68 \n21,996.85\n 268.41 116,119.95 510.51 \n Apr \n 5,786.75 3.28 \n640.94\n 11.46 3,002.63 822.58 \n Apr \n 505.50 17.38 \n21,170.05\n 253.60 117,616.79 456.96 \n May \n 7,298.41 4.25 \n819.74\n 10.51 3,550.07 968.58 \n May \n 611.14 21.22 \n23,278.20\n 213.17 137,422.97 496.62 \n Jun \n 7,997.28 4.70 \n779.37\n 8.29 3,724.31 1,135.49 \n Jun \n 553.60 22.46 \n23,790.00\n 175.19 156,609.78 502.22 \n Jul \n 8,290.00 3.96 \n790.00\n 9.39 4,446.68 1,262.53 \n Jul \n 560.15 20.07 \n25,075.47\n 223.13 169,416.76 559.58 \n Aug \n 7,762.86 2.88 \n811.19\n 13.98 4,558.54 1,254.96 \n Aug \n 553.01 15.15 \n25,249.87\n 317.35 164,917.97 518.70 \n Sep \n 7,155.04 3.97 \n842.48\n 17.01 4,462.40 1,393.08 \n Sep \n 542.96 19.37 \n24,918.01\n 300.81 161,289.50 511.27 \n Oct \n 8,230.50 4.20 \n821.30\n 17.90 4,607.38 1,428.20 \n Oct \n 571.60 20.40 \n21,025.40\n 345.50 161,427.40 495.99 \n Nov \n 7,922.50 3.70 \n657.50\n 19.90 3,964.78 1,026.70 \n Nov \n 477.40 16.70 \n17,845.40\n 334.90 133,862.10 430.60 \n Dec \n 8,355.20 2.80 \n917.20\n 14.60 4,833.80 1,102.90 \n Dec \n 478.60 13.00 \n27,419.10\n 236.20 161,540.70 409.10 \n2019\n2019\n Jan \n 6,903.02 2.89 \n1,294.05\n 16.92 3,608.83 1,056.16 \n Jan \n 401.51 12.20 \n40,613.79\n 232.61 135,481.07 413.39 \n Feb \n 8,336.98 4.04 \n1,330.58\n 17.21 3,594.51 1,093.64 \n Feb \n 456.54 16.35 \n27,811.17\n 226.77 119,081.12 463.62 \n Mar \n 9,881.49 3.90 \n1,399.50\n 18.27 4,080.65 1,250.55 \n Mar \n 525.91 15.42 \n30,417.55\n 248.88 142,597.83 441.02 \n Apr \n 10,321.38 3.14 \n1,590.10\n 13.97 4,949.34 1,408.53 \n Apr \n 535.02 13.65 \n32,092.53\n 168.79 157,348.28 390.08 \n May \n 14,670.32 4.19 \n1,397.48\n 11.83 6,692.55 1,897.82 \n May \n 642.59 14.66 \n15,542.62\n 121.44 166,491.56 494.29 \n Jun \n 17,881.21 3.73 \n1,464.66\n 30.14 7,130.02 2,539.84 \n Jun \n 705.96 13.34 \n18,012.05\n 79.60 160,873.03 486.81 \n Jul \n 23,309.86 3.70 \n1,806.45\n 36.55 9,137.36 3,295.81 \n Jul \n 983.53 13.59 \n20,465.37\n 99.56 170,823.27 638.17 \n Aug \n 23,596.62 2.37 \n2,181.56\n 38.47 11,077.65 3,493.56 \n Aug \n 872.91 8.99 \n21,919.77\n 85.24 179,281.20 542.28 \n Sep \n 30,328.13 3.80 \n3,029.87\n 51.94 15,112.00 5,337.71 \n Sep \n 1,010.70 11.88 \n22,749.60\n 62.44 200,441.85 679.42 \n Oct \n 39,413.72 3.87 \n3,621.64\n 67.08 16,588.28 6,237.03 \n Oct \n 1,079.40 12.66 \n23,191.58\n 65.00 206,621.48 1,099.30 \n Nov \n 40,871.80 3.53 \n4,199.30\n 67.41 13,537.77 7,200.30 \n Nov \n 982.10 10.32 \n25,737.50\n 225.22 152,919.89 2,044.08 \n Dec \n 49,579.82 2.76 \n5,695.39\n 97.22 19,356.74 8,724.02 \n Dec \n 1,003.81 7.64 \n27,800.46\n 385.47 146,316.57 1,273.62 \n2020\n2020 \n Jan \n 47,841.35 1.85 \n5,236.31\n 115.20 21,247.93 9,646.84 \n Jan \n 943.30 4.56 \n23,649.03\n 199.88 139,278.20 671.73 \n Feb \n 41,637.65 4.66 \n5,431.81\n 136.93 22,589.66 9,633.79 \n Feb \n 916.12 8.87 \n21,652.22\n 196.62 149,671.48 647.84 \n Mar \n 60,804.08 4.06 \n7,252.88\n 267.95 27,993.61 14,411.35 \n Mar \n 1,068.45 7.35 \n22,588.12\n 234.27 173,042.15 661.19 \n Apr \n 47,525.48 \n - \n4,150.63\n 82.57 18,299.23 11,481.82 \n Apr \n 515.07 \n - \n11,036.39\n 36.36 131,189.97 998.03 \n May \n 59,271.13 \n - \n7,426.04\n 349.82 24,851.46 19,593.20 \n May \n 674.11 \n - \n14,711.60\n 231.19 150,936.13 705.32 \n Jun \n 91,311.28 \n - \n9,752.73\n 516.61 26,042.54 25,842.33 \n Jun \n 907.77 \n - \n14,420.93\n 286.06 135,524.31 1,390.39 \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2020\nTABLE 9.1 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS TRANSACTIONAL ACTIVITY\nValues of Transactions (ZWL$ in millions)\nTABLE 9.2 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS TRANSACTIONAL ACTIVITY\nVolumes of Transactions (in thousands)\n \n \nS15 \n \n \n \nEnd of\nNominal Lending \nRates 2\nIndividuals \nCorporate\nSavings\n3 Months2\n2018\n2018\nJan\n4.45-18.00\n9.33\n6.99\nJan\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nFeb\n4.45-18.00\n9.57\n6.93\nFeb\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nMar\n4.45-18.00\n9.64\n6.98\nMar\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nApr\n4.00-18.00\n9.32\n7.08\nApr\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nMay\n4.00-18.00\n9.28\n7.09\nMay\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nJun\n4.00-18.00\n9.32\n7.14\nJun\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nJul\n4.00-18.00\n9.75\n6.97\nJul\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nAug\n4.00-18.00\n9.87\n7.10\nAug\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nSep\n4.00-18.00\n9.56\n7.11\nSep\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nOct\n4.00-18.00\n9.47\n7.38\nOct\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nNov\n4.00-18.00\n9.49\n7.38\nNov\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nDec\n4.00-18.00\n9.48\n7.39\nDec\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-6.75\n2019\n2019\nJan\n4.00-18.00\n9.47\n7.40\nJan\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nFeb\n4.00-18.00\n9.23\n7.30\nFeb\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-6.75\nMar \n4.00-18.00\n9.23\n7.31\nMar \n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nApr\n4.00-18.00\n9.3\n7.38\nApr\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nMay\n4.00-22.00\n9.31\n7.33\nMay\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nJun\n4.00-22.00\n9.15\n7.67\nJun\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nJul\n4.00-35.00\n9.54\n8.4\nJul\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nAug\n5.00-55.00\n14.37\n18.43\nAug\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nSep\n5.00-65.00\n14.64\n19.81\nSep\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nOct\n5.00-65.00\n15.59\n19.66\nOct\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nNov\n5.00-65.00\n15.06\n18.00\nNov\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nDec\n5.00-65.00\n16.08\n18.31\nDec\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\n2020\n2020\nJan\n5.00-65.00\n16.56\n17.2\nJan\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nFeb\n5.00-65.00\n16.92\n16.68\nFeb\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nMar \n5.00-65.00\n19.65\n17.21\nMar \n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nApr\n5.00-65.00\n18.57\n18.69\nApr\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nMay\n5.00-65.00\n18.06\n18.07\nMay\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nJun\n5.00-65.00\n20.04\n17.38\nJun\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2020\nNotes\n3. Lending rates exclude rates on staff loans. \n TABLE 10.2 : BANKS DEPOSIT RATES (percent per annum)1\n1. The range of rates qouted by banks during the period.\n2. Three (3) months deposit rates revised to exclude rates on inactive \nor dormant accounts.\nTABLE 10.1: LENDING RATES (percent per annum)1\n1. Table revised, to separate weighted lending rates for individuals and \ncorporate bodies. \n2. Nominal Lending Rates depict the range of rates quoted by banks.\nWeighted Average Lending Rates 3 \nCommercial Banks\nCommercial Banks\nEnd of \n \n \nS16 \n \n \n \nEnd of\nAll Share\nIndustrial\nMining\nVolume of Shares\nMarket Turnover\nMarket Capitalisation\n2018\nJan\n91.32\n305.35\n130.42\n55.03\n31.40\n8,652.85\nFeb\n88.03\n294.55\n124.91\n138.14\n63.74\n8,385.97\nMar\n86.98\n291.00\n125.10\n109.00\n40.33\n8,290.41\nApr\n98.71\n330.70\n124.40\n206.34\n44.43\n9,405.34\nMay\n108.3\n361.53\n151.53\n129.16\n59.28\n10,393.24\nJun\n102.87\n342.79\n161.30\n234.83\n72.99\n9,792.18\nJul\n114.32\n384.25\n163.99\n624.26\n114.94\n10,969.72\nAug\n117.33\n394.64\n161.34\n142.15\n50.49\n12,475.45\nSep\n115.12\n386.97\n163.76\n197.40\n61.11\n12,265.51\nOct\n163.82\n549.81\n217.34\n316.06\n449.60\n17,960.00\nNov\n160.4\n538.66\n208.56\n153.87\n118.00\n17,316.60\nDec\n146.24\n487.13\n227.71\n144.48\n92.97\n19,189.50\n2019\nJan\n157.54\n525.90\n213.13\n110.28\n122.78\n20,888.43\nFeb\n148.11\n494.31\n206.91\n295.84\n229.94\n19,773.37\nMar\n121.66\n405.57\n193.98\n70.81\n123.40\n16,084.87\nApr\n133.69\n446.52\n186.47\n116.52\n134.39\n17,502.73\nMay\n188.06\n628.41\n225.81\n193.52\n237.33\n24,919.96\nJun\n204.75\n683.51\n255.26\n235.49\n293.14\n27,017.17\nJul\n187.12\n624.41\n244.58\n191.05\n163.56\n24,636.14\nAug\n166.36\n553.59\n269.55\n109.03\n117.69\n21,742.20\nSep\n232.52\n774.55\n317.75\n166.56\n335.37\n30,527.18\nOct\n232.86\n777.48\n276.31\n208.40\n203.00\n30,390.04\nNov\n240.81\n801.38\n344.42\n130.00\n129.89\n31,226.28\nDec\n230.08\n766.34\n316.66\n194.20\n190.88\n29,767.09\n2020\nJan\n332.90\n1,112.27\n344.92\n304.86\n179.56\n43,426.48\nFeb\n473.13\n1,564.98\n826.73\n360.13\n172.68\n60,987.46\nMar\n456.21\n1,512.46\n720.47\n425.24\n237.67\n58,612.10\nApr\n488.60\n1,617.24\n826.64\n269.66\n107.31\n63,387.90\nMay\n1,180.14\n3,919.50\n1,582.86\n568.96\n218.83\n152,719.68\nJune*\n1,788.75\n5,870.36\n3,995.48\n379.93\n519.90\n228,577.09\n**As at 26 June 2020\nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE), 2020\n$ Millions\nTABLE 11: ZIMBABWE STOCK MARKET STATISTICS\nIndices\n*All Share index was introduced in \n \n \nS17 \n \n \n \nFOOD \nINFLATION\nALL\nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES \nCLOTHING\nHOUSING, \nWATER,\nFURNITURE\nHEALTH\nTRANSPORT\nCOMMUNICATION\nRECREATION &\nEDUCATION\nRESTAURANTS \n&\nMISC.\nTOTAL \nNON\nFOOD & \nITEMS\n& TOBACCO\nFOOTWEAR\nELECTRICTY, \nGAS\nAND\nCULTURE\nHOTELS\nGOODS &\nFOOD\nNON \nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES\n& OTHER\nEQUIPMENT\nSERVICES\nFUELS\nWEIGHTS\n4.9\n4.3\n27.6\n5.3\n1.4\n8.4\n2.7\n2.3\n4.3\n1.1\n6.5\n68.7\n31.3\n100\n2018\nJan\n0.17\n0.67\n0.02\n0.55\n0.10\n0.00\n-0.04\n1.78\n0.00\n-0.16\n0.64\n0.26\n0.39\n0.30\nFeb\n0.26\n0.91\n0.01\n0.43\n0.00\n-0.02\n0.15\n0.90\n0.00\n0.01\n0.21\n0.19\n-0.18\n0.08\nMar\n0.13\n-0.34\n-0.74\n0.46\n0.18\n-1.29\n-1.60\n1.58\n0.01\n-0.14\n-0.55\n0.09\n-0.03\n-0.25\nApr\n0.20\n0.34\n-0.01\n0.00\n0.10\n-0.32\n-0.21\n-0.10\n0.63\n1.85\n0.26\n0.11\n0.02\n0.08\nMay\n-0.03\n0.10\n0.00\n-0.12\n0.03\n0.14\n-0.01\n0.08\n0.00\n0.05\n0.33\n0.03\n0.02\n0.03\nJun\n0.60\n0.14\n-0.16\n-0.48\n0.38\n0.19\n0.10\n-0.25\n0.00\n0.26\n1.00\n0.04\n-0.23\n-0.05\nJul\n0.43\n0.38\n0.00\n0.40\n0.31\n0.17\n0.08\n0.65\n7.16\n3.20\n0.75\n1.09\n0.74\n0.98\nAug\n0.13\n0.45\n0.00\n0.91\n0.24\n0.47\n0.00\n-0.23\n0.00\n0.11\n0.34\n0.28\n0.62\n0.39\nSep\n0.22\n1.35\n0.53\n2.79\n1.90\n0.51\n0.32\n0.22\n0.00\n0.28\n0.07\n0.85\n1.05\n0.92\nOct\n7.89\n45.88\n2.94\n26.86\n12.94\n19.13\n1.39\n27.66\n0.00\n9.86\n13.64\n14.66\n20.12\n16.44\nNov\n7.21\n10.63\n4.80\n9.12\n3.36\n2.31\n0.18\n16.33\n0.35\n9.29\n15.42\n6.50\n14.53\n9.20\nDec\n10.22\n8.07\n2.77\n8.07\n8.49\n28.61\n1.26\n3.19\n0.00\n13.84\n10.07\n9.01\n9.07\n9.03\n2019\nJan\n13.35\n1.04\n4.35\n9.46\n11.64\n47.25\n1.12\n11.01\n0.10\n11.73\n6.72\n12.83\n6.94\n10.75\nFeb\n2.94\n5.94\n2.77\n2.73\n2.93\n-7.70\n0.14\n3.42\n0.02\n2.20\n4.34\n0.70\n3.56\n1.67\nMar\n14.29\n5.56\n2.34\n5.20\n2.30\n3.06\n0.14\n3.92\n3.66\n4.54\n5.16\n4.05\n5.10\n4.38\nApr\n12.05\n6.57\n0.65\n5.84\n19.90\n3.40\n3.50\n5.36\n6.93\n19.74\n5.35\n4.45\n7.85\n5.52\nMay\n21.57\n11.89\n2.54\n11.51\n16.85\n16.18\n31.21\n29.81\n3.05\n6.67\n8.96\n10.12\n17.63\n12.54\nJun\n40.94\n59.89\n18.11\n63.80\n46.53\n41.90\n2.32\n35.38\n0.06\n28.71\n36.63\n31.23\n55.07\n39.26\nJul\n23.72\n27.68\n9.19\n27.01\n43.32\n26.39\n7.48\n36.17\n11.05\n30.51\n39.79\n21.72\n19.90\n21.04\nAug\n18.09\n10.81\n13.65\n11.18\n7.47\n32.66\n67.86\n12.65\n4.09\n8.67\n18.77\n17.79\n18.55\n18.07\nSep\n11.01\n17.47\n15.52\n14.73\n18.68\n16.83\n1.29\n18.03\n4.10\n8.42\n35.01\n16.63\n19.55\n17.72\nOct\n42.80\n37.15\n38.63\n35.12\n34.80\n26.55\n9.15\n31.78\n5.47\n37.99\n30.03\n32.90\n48.35\n38.75\nNov\n16.54\n18.35\n5.83\n25.67\n18.49\n9.68\n13.01\n20.59\n17.10\n36.46\n23.89\n13.94\n22.63\n17.46\nDec\n11.51\n13.48\n31.25\n17.51\n12.74\n11.82\n1.43\n5.70\n0.17\n15.52\n18.28\n17.14\n15.75\n16.55\n2020\nJan\n1.83\n3.84\n0.60\n1.50\n5.32\n2.24\n2.77\n2.01\n9.39\n2.72\n1.86\n1.99\n2.55\n2.23\nFeb\n8.48\n10.01\n2.27\n7.00\n21.56\n9.62\n220.04\n17.96\n94.95\n2.92\n30.86\n18.41\n6.81\n13.52\nMar\n28.76\n37.12\n57.14\n29.35\n27.28\n18.10\n4.26\n58.79\n0.66\n17.49\n22.67\n32.44\n17.69\n26.59\nApr\n26.21\n13.46\n3.05\n24.06\n25.07\n8.87\n3.05\n9.42\n1.13\n21.08\n15.12\n11.38\n28.37\n17.64\nMay\n28.90\n18.99\n3.42\n21.36\n18.30\n22.97\n4.22\n10.04\n0.02\n29.69\n23.31\n15.41\n14.72\n15.13\nJun\n35.25\n48.84\n7.52\n38.21\n43.77\n32.48\n23.24\n39.46\n0.87\n32.46\n29.51\n27.61\n37.73\n31.66\n Source :ZIMSTATS, 2020\nNON-FOOD INFLATION\nTABLE 12.1 : MONTHLY INFLATION -- PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX\n( FEBRUARY 2019 = 100)\n \n \nS18 \n \n \n \nFOOD \nINFLATION\nALL\nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES \nCLOTHING\nHOUSING, WATER,\nFURNITURE\nHEALTH\nTRANSPORT\nCOMMUNICATION\nRECREATION &\nEDUCATION\nRESTAURANT\nS &\nMISC.\nTOTAL NON\nFOOD & \nITEMS\n& TOBACCO\nFOOTWEAR\nELECTRICTY, GAS\nAND\nCULTURE\nHOTELS\nGOODS &\nFOOD\nNON \nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES\n& OTHER\nEQUIPMENT\nSERVICES\nFUELS\nWEIGHTS\n4.90\n4.35\n27.62\n5.29\n1.42\n8.39\n2.65\n2.27\n4.25\n1.08\n6.46\n68.70\n31.30\n100.00\n2018\nJan\n0.7\n2.0\n-0.3\n2.3\n0.5\n0.6\n-0.1\n3.7\n-1.4\n-0.4\n2.5\n0.8\n3.5\n1.6\nFeb\n0.7\n2.3\n-0.4\n1.4\n0.1\n0.3\n0.1\n3.5\n0.0\n0.3\n1.6\n0.7\n1.5\n0.9\nMar\n0.6\n1.2\n-0.7\n1.4\n0.3\n-1.3\n-1.5\n4.3\n0.0\n-0.3\n0.3\n0.5\n0.2\n0.1\nApr\n0.6\n0.9\n-0.7\n0.9\n0.3\n-1.6\n-1.7\n2.4\n0.6\n1.7\n-0.1\n0.4\n-0.2\n-0.1\nMay\n0.3\n0.1\n-0.7\n0.3\n0.3\n-1.5\n-1.8\n1.6\n0.6\n1.8\n0.0\n0.2\n0.0\n-0.1\nJun\n0.8\n0.6\n-0.2\n-0.6\n0.5\n0.0\n-0.1\n-0.3\n0.6\n2.2\n1.6\n0.2\n-0.2\n0.1\nJul\n1.0\n0.6\n-0.2\n-0.2\n0.7\n0.5\n0.2\n0.5\n7.2\n3.5\n2.1\n1.2\n0.5\n1.0\nAug\n1.2\n1.0\n-0.2\n0.8\n0.9\n0.8\n0.2\n0.2\n7.2\n3.6\n2.1\n1.4\n1.1\n1.3\nSep\n0.8\n2.2\n0.5\n4.1\n2.5\n1.1\n0.4\n0.6\n7.2\n3.6\n1.2\n2.2\n2.4\n2.3\nOct\n8.3\n48.5\n3.5\n31.6\n15.4\n20.3\n1.7\n27.7\n0.0\n10.3\n14.1\n16.0\n22.1\n18.0\nNov\n15.9\n63.6\n8.5\n42.3\n19.0\n22.5\n1.9\n48.8\n0.3\n20.4\n31.3\n23.2\n39.0\n28.3\nDec\n27.5\n74.4\n10.9\n49.6\n26.7\n56.7\n2.9\n53.2\n0.3\n36.7\n44.4\n33.1\n50.1\n38.6\n2019\nJan\n33.9\n20.8\n12.4\n29.1\n25.2\n93.8\n2.6\n33.2\n0.4\n39.0\n35.6\n31.0\n33.6\n31.9\nFeb\n28.6\n15.7\n10.2\n21.5\n24.7\n74.8\n2.5\n18.5\n0.1\n30.0\n22.6\n23.9\n20.8\n22.8\nMar\n33.4\n13.0\n9.8\n18.3\n17.6\n40.1\n1.4\n19.3\n3.8\n19.4\n17.1\n18.2\n16.4\n17.5\nApr\n31.8\n19.2\n5.9\n14.4\n26.3\n-1.6\n3.8\n13.2\n10.9\n27.9\n15.6\n9.4\n17.4\n12.0\nMay\n55.7\n25.9\n5.6\n24.2\n43.3\n23.8\n36.0\n42.1\n14.2\n33.5\n20.7\n19.7\n33.3\n24.0\nJun\n92.0\n90.7\n21.9\n93.3\n105.3\n70.5\n39.0\n85.2\n10.3\n64.4\n56.8\n50.9\n96.7\n65.4\n2020\nJan\n32.3\n39.5\n39.7\n31.0\n40.7\n25.4\n17.8\n30.0\n28.3\n61.9\n49.3\n36.1\n45.6\n40.0\nFeb\n23.2\n29.6\n35.0\n20.9\n44.3\n25.3\n233.6\n27.2\n113.6\n22.1\n57.7\n41.5\n26.8\n35.3\nMar\n42.2\n56.6\n61.7\n40.5\n63.0\n32.4\n242.9\n91.1\n114.7\n24.2\n63.5\n59.9\n28.9\n46.9\nApr\n76.3\n71.2\n65.6\n71.7\n93.5\n40.9\n243.9\n105.0\n98.5\n46.4\n84.8\n74.7\n61.4\n69.1\nMay\n109.5\n85.1\n67.5\n94.8\n88.3\n58.1\n12.0\n91.2\n1.8\n84.5\n74.1\n70.3\n73.3\n71.5\nJun\n120.0\n100.9\n14.6\n108.1\n112.7\n77.4\n32.4\n67.9\n2.0\n108.0\n83.8\n64.0\n102.8\n78.3\n Source :ZIMSTATS, 2020\nTABLE 12.2 : QUARTERLY INFLATION -- PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \n(FEBRUARY 2019 = 100)\nNON-FOOD INFLATION\n \n \nS19 \n \n \n \nF OOD \nIN F LA TION\nA LC OHOLIC \nC LOTHIN G\nHOUS IN G, \nWA TER ,\nF UR N ITUR E\nM IS C .\nF OOD & \nB EVER A GES \n& \nELEC TR IC TY, \nGA S\nA N D\nR EC R EA TION \n&\nR ES TA UR A N TS \n&\nGOOD S &\nTOTA L N ON\nN ON \nA LC OHOLIC \nA LL\n& TOB A C C O\nF OOTWEA R\n& OTHER\nEQUIP M EN T\nC ULTUR E\nHOTELS\nS ER VIC ES\nF OOD\nB EVER A GES\nITEM S\nF UELS\nWEIGHTS\n4.90\n4.35\n27.62\n5.29\n1.42\n8.39\n2.65\n2.27\n4.25\n1.08\n6.46\n68.70\n31.30\n100\n2018\nJan\n1.83\n4.12\n-0.52\n9.00\n1.82\n1.30\n0.41\n7.95\n-2.25\n1.63\n6.64\n2.45\n6.17\n3.52\nFeb\n2.04\n5.21\n-0.65\n8.71\n1.84\n1.17\n0.56\n8.96\n-2.25\n1.45\n6.31\n2.41\n4.35\n2.98\nMar\n2.02\n4.81\n-1.32\n8.52\n1.91\n-0.35\n-1.03\n10.48\n-2.24\n1.30\n5.35\n2.37\n4.54\n2.68\nApr\n2.34\n5.14\n-1.36\n8.45\n2.06\n-0.67\n-1.28\n10.36\n-3.58\n2.84\n5.70\n2.26\n4.94\n2.71\nMay\n2.18\n5.15\n-1.36\n8.30\n1.96\n-0.58\n-1.30\n10.67\n-3.58\n3.29\n6.14\n2.28\n4.89\n2.71\nJun\n2.58\n5.27\n-0.70\n7.36\n2.38\n-0.20\n-1.20\n10.20\n-3.58\n3.26\n6.85\n2.48\n5.12\n2.91\nJul\n2.83\n5.66\n-0.71\n7.86\n2.68\n0.20\n-1.04\n10.86\n6.31\n5.42\n7.53\n3.94\n6.35\n4.29\nAug\n3.15\n6.03\n-0.77\n8.78\n2.89\n0.67\n-1.07\n10.47\n6.31\n5.53\n7.84\n4.22\n7.52\n4.83\nSep\n3.35\n6.98\n-0.47\n10.60\n4.77\n1.49\n-0.89\n10.00\n6.31\n5.77\n7.79\n4.83\n7.94\n5.39\nOct\n10.81\n53.83\n2.20\n35.57\n17.08\n19.61\n0.11\n36.24\n6.31\n15.68\n19.31\n18.71\n26.78\n20.85\nNov\n18.47\n69.14\n7.04\n46.01\n20.56\n22.02\n0.34\n56.70\n8.23\n27.34\n36.21\n26.02\n42.71\n31.01\nDec\n30.21\n81.48\n10.48\n57.08\n30.80\n56.47\n1.61\n60.45\n8.22\n44.26\n48.82\n37.08\n53.68\n42.09\n2019\nJan\n47.34\n82.13\n15.27\n71.00\n45.88\n130.41\n2.79\n75.00\n8.32\n61.45\n57.81\n54.26\n63.71\n56.90\nFeb\n51.28\n91.22\n18.46\n74.92\n50.16\n112.71\n2.78\n79.38\n8.34\n64.99\n64.31\n55.04\n69.84\n59.39\nMar\n72.67\n102.55\n22.14\n83.18\n53.34\n122.10\n4.59\n83.51\n12.30\n72.72\n73.75\n61.19\n78.55\n66.80\nApr\n93.08\n115.13\n22.94\n93.88\n83.66\n130.40\n8.49\n93.54\n19.33\n103.06\n82.56\n68.17\n92.52\n75.86\nMay\n134.80\n140.46\n26.07\n116.47\n114.54\n167.32\n42.36\n151.04\n22.97\n116.49\n98.28\n85.94\n126.43\n97.85\nJun\n228.95\n283.96\n49.13\n256.29\n213.17\n278.58\n45.52\n240.71\n23.05\n177.91\n168.24\n142.84\n251.94\n175.66\n2020\nFeb\n710.29\n629.57\n603.89\n254.34\n523.95\n785.04\n498.64\n946.38\n604.12\n262.80\n507.72\n839.15\n462.64\n540.16\nMar\n807.36\n721.94\n814.31\n444.09\n667.21\n1001.14\n585.97\n989.48\n975.94\n252.31\n582.94\n995.50\n616.11\n676.39\nApr\n980.03\n825.86\n873.49\n456.99\n799.24\n1048.61\n622.22\n984.76\n1017.34\n233.23\n590.62\n1097.13\n663.66\n765.57\nMay\n953.34\n881.65\n935.22\n461.76\n878.64\n1062.84\n664.43\n761.68\n847.15\n223.43\n739.67\n1254.79\n700.38\n785.55\nJun\n842.04\n863.68\n411.42\n725.77\n1040.97\n613.71\n937.83\n875.68\n226.03\n764.10\n1184.15\n678.29\n835.56\n737.26\nSource:Zimstat, 2020\nTABLE 12.3 : YEARLY INFLATION - % CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \n(February 2019 = 100)\nC OM M UN IC A TION\nTR A N S P OR T\nHEA LTH\nED UC A TION\nN ON -F OOD IN F LA TION\n \n \nS20 \n \n \n \nEnd of\nJun-19\nJul-19\nAug-19\nSep-19\nOct-19\nNov-19\nDec-19\nJan-20\nFeb-20\nMar-20\nApr-20\nMay-20\nJun-20\nTotal \n(Q2 2020)\nMerchandise Imports (excl. energy)\n168.6\n \n222.3\n \n182.1\n \n232.9\n \n209.0\n \n226.1\n \n216.0\n \n164.4\n \n170.7\n \n178.2\n \n153.1\n \n162.0\n \n221.1\n \n536.3\n \n- Consumption Goods\n62.6\n \n97.3\n \n73.3\n \n85.4\n \n87.8\n \n97.3\n \n94.4\n \n75.1\n \n90.2\n \n82.2\n \n76.6\n \n86.3\n \n116.4\n \n279.3\n \n- Capital Goods\n70.6\n \n87.4\n \n73.4\n \n118.4\n \n91.1\n \n89.0\n \n90.8\n \n64.9\n \n60.3\n \n61.5\n \n52.8\n \n47.5\n \n72.4\n \n172.7\n \n- Intermediate Goods\n35.5\n \n37.6\n \n35.4\n \n29.0\n \n30.2\n \n39.9\n \n30.8\n \n24.4\n \n20.1\n \n34.5\n \n23.7\n \n28.3\n \n32.3\n \n84.3\n \nEnergy (Fuel & Electricity)\n54.2\n \n55.7\n \n50.9\n \n46.1\n \n67.8\n \n39.1\n \n39.4\n \n43.9\n \n53.2\n \n50.7\n \n27.0\n \n40.3\n \n34.9\n \n102.3\n \nService Payments\n58.6\n \n46.7\n \n50.4\n \n44.6\n \n51.5\n \n52.6\n \n37.4\n \n43.3\n \n40.0\n \n67.3\n \n36.6\n \n33.8\n \n52.7\n \n123.1\n \n- Technical, Professional & consult\n30.9\n \n21.6\n \n22.0\n \n17.7\n \n17.4\n \n19.1\n \n16.9\n \n17.7\n \n17.9\n \n39.1\n \n16.7\n \n11.8\n \n32.9\n \n61.4\n \n- Software\n9.3\n \n6.4\n \n3.5\n \n4.1\n \n5.8\n \n5.2\n \n2.8\n \n5.7\n \n3.4\n \n4.5\n \n5.1\n \n6.8\n \n9.0\n \n20.8\n \n- Other (tourism, edu, freight etc)\n18.4\n \n18.7\n \n24.9\n \n22.8\n \n28.4\n \n28.3\n \n17.7\n \n20.0\n \n18.7\n \n23.7\n \n14.8\n \n15.2\n \n10.9\n \n40.9\n \nIncome Payments (Profits, Dividends)\n14.7\n \n38.3\n \n14.3\n \n24.4\n \n6.8\n \n14.7\n \n15.4\n \n18.7\n \n28.1\n \n17.4\n \n26.4\n \n11.1\n \n14.8\n \n52.4\n \nCapital Remittances (outward)\n36.2\n \n44.9\n \n49.7\n \n55.6\n \n74.5\n \n39.9\n \n73.3\n \n38.7\n \n30.1\n \n62.1\n \n34.8\n \n16.1\n \n20.3\n \n71.3\n \n- External Loan Repayments \n31.9\n \n39.3\n \n46.8\n \n53.2\n \n70.7\n \n38.5\n \n71.5\n \n35.3\n \n27.2\n \n60.9\n \n34.2\n \n16.0\n \n17.5\n \n67.7\n \n- Disinvestments\n2.2\n \n4.0\n \n0.8\n \n2.4\n \n3.8\n \n1.5\n \n1.6\n \n1.0\n \n1.7\n \n1.2\n \n0.6\n \n0.1\n \n1.7\n \n2.4\n \n- Cross Border Investment\n2.0\n \n1.7\n \n2.1\n \n-\n \n0.0\n \n0.0\n \n0.2\n \n2.5\n \n1.2\n \n0.0\n \n-\n \n0.0\n \n1.2\n \n1.2\n \nOther Payments\n4.6\n \n11.9\n \n6.3\n \n15.4\n \n11.0\n \n24.3\n \n15.7\n \n13.7\n \n13.3\n \n10.3\n \n4.6\n \n3.4\n \n6.0\n \n13.9\n \nTOTAL\n336.9\n \n419.9\n \n353.8\n \n418.9\n \n420.6\n \n396.8\n \n397.3\n \n322.8\n \n335.3\n \n386.0\n \n282.5\n \n266.7\n \n349.9\n \n899.2\n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\nTable 13.1: Monthly Cross Border Payments (US$ Millions)\n \n \nS21 \n \n \n \nAgriculture\nHorticulture\nManufacturing\nMining\nTobacco\nTourism\n Transport & \nOther Services\nTotal\nEnd of \nTelecom\n2018\nJan\n7.4\n2.2\n7.2\n259.2\n52.8\n9.0\n30.0\n4.2\n372.0\nFeb\n12.4\n2.8\n10.5\n131.0\n75.7\n9.5\n29.7\n0.3\n272.0\nMar\n20.6\n3.0\n16.8\n201.5\n72.2\n12.8\n16.0\n1.7\n344.6\nApr\n7.8\n2.5\n10.8\n305.4\n17.2\n12.7\n13.8\n0.7\n370.9\nMay\n14.5\n2.2\n19.7\n359.4\n28.0\n13.9\n16.7\n2.8\n457.1\nJun\n7.9\n2.6\n16.6\n285.7\n10.3\n14.0\n12.8\n25.9\n375.8\nJul\n8.4\n2.5\n10.3\n200.0\n23.1\n18.7\n14.6\n1.9\n279.5\nAug\n9.6\n5.1\n16.8\n264.1\n29.3\n21.6\n12.6\n1.8\n361.0\nSep\n16.4\n3.0\n15.2\n343.1\n22.5\n19.8\n21.7\n2.1\n443.9\nOct\n22.0\n3.6\n23.6\n210.5\n34.4\n17.2\n15.2\n1.6\n327.9\nNov\n15.7\n4.9\n18.0\n263.2\n28.8\n8.6\n24.6\n0.9\n364.6\n2019\nJan\n12.3\n1.7\n10.5\n109.3\n55.6\n8.4\n16.9\n0.3\n215.1\nFeb\n11.3\n1.6\n11.6\n111.5\n44.0\n8.5\n18.5\n0.1\n206.9\nMar\n12.1\n1.5\n14.1\n67.4\n37.5\n9.7\n24.7\n0.8\n167.8\nApr\n15.3\n2.6\n10.2\n470.8\n27.8\n19.7\n20.3\n0.2\n20.3\nMay\n19.6\n2.3\n13.8\n256.8\n43.7\n21.2\n18.0\n1.3\n18.0\nJun\n9.9\n1.9\n13.4\n224.1\n24.5\n24.6\n14.9\n3.9\n14.9\nJul\n6.3\n3.5\n25.9\n104.1\n16.0\n44.0\n15.1\n2.6\n15.1\nAug\n13.8\n9.5\n72.6\n371.5\n15.7\n31.8\n13.2\n5.0\n13.2\nSep\n7.7\n3.7\n46.1\n130.2\n19.0\n27.4\n16.0\n6.4\n16.0\nOct\n14.7\n2.6\n22.5\n267.1\n23.4\n28.6\n15.4\n4.7\n15.4\nNov\n12.4\n2.3\n14.4\n128.2\n25.7\n17.1\n21.6\n26.2\n21.6\nDec\n12.7\n3.4\n16.0\n311.0\n32.8\n1.4\n23.7\n1.3\n23.7\n2020\nJan\n28.2\n2.2\n42.2\n214.1\n41.4\n13.9\n16.9\n1.0\n359.9\nFeb\n10.9\n2.8\n51.4\n113.5\n34.9\n14.8\n24.9\n4.4\n257.7\nMar\n8.6\n1.9\n37.1\n199.5\n16.5\n6.0\n12.2\n2.4\n284.1\nApr\n1.4\n0.5\n3.2\n229.6\n9.1\n0.3\n6.3\n0.2\n250.5\nMay\n8.0\n1.4\n37.3\n89.8\n16.1\n0.0\n15.1\n0.1\n167.8\nJun\n10.4\n3.3\n17.3\n534.1\n27.6\n3.7\n36.2\n3.1\n635.7\n Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\nTable 13.2: Monthly Cross Border Receipts (US$Millions)\n \n \nS22 \n \n \n \nEnd of\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\n2014\n2015\n2016\n2017\n2018\n2019\nEst\nLong-Term External Debt\n6,326\n6,556\n7,713\n8,125\n8,655\n10,234\n9,341\n9,305\n9,555\n9,827\n10,526\nGovernment\n5,304\n5,039\n6,128\n6,321\n6,172\n6,192\n6,097\n6,015\n6,200\n6,306\n6,930\nBilateral Creditors\n3,703\n3,402\n4,087\n4,087\n4,088\n4,115\n4,115\n4,129\n4,194\n4,261\n4,861\nMultilateral Creditors\n1,591\n1,627\n2,041\n2,235\n2,084\n2,078\n1,982\n1,886\n2,006\n2,045\n2,069\nPrivate Creditors\n10\n10\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPublic Enterprises\n825\n825\n1,092\n1,198\n1,356\n1,661\n1,220\n1,370\n1,406\n1,426\n1,165\nBilateral Creditors\n497\n497\n711\n703\n858\n1,155\n760\n779\n843\n898\n783\nMultilateral Creditors\n327\n327\n382\n495\n498\n506\n460\n591\n562\n528\n381\nPrivate Creditors\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nMonetary Authorities\n140\n550\n127\n125\n125\n120\n110\n0\n0\n0\n0\nMultilateral Creditors - IMF\n140\n550\n127\n125\n125\n120\n110\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPrivate\n57\n142\n366\n480\n1,002\n2,261\n1,913\n1,920\n1,949\n2,095\n2,431\nShort-Term External Debt\n1,348\n2,040\n1,286\n891\n1,564\n2,394\n2,258\n2,304\n2,299\n2,374\n3,799\nSupplier's Credits\n193\n286\n134\n30\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nReserve Bank\n998\n1,300\n615\n615\n614\n587\n587\n573\n507\n441\n2,463\nPrivate\n156\n454\n537\n246\n950\n1,807\n1,671\n1,731\n1,792\n1,933\n1,336\nTotal External Debt\n7,674\n8,596\n8,999\n9,016\n10,219\n12,628\n11,599\n11,610\n11,854\n13,134\n14,324\nGross Domestic Product\n10,735\n12,847\n14,670\n16,988\n17,455\n17,870\n18,188\n18,326\n19,188\n19,846\n18,555\nExternal Debt / GDP\n71%\n67%\n61%\n53%\n59%\n71%\n64%\n63%\n62%\n66%\n77%\nSource: Ministry of Finance & Economic Development, 2020; & Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\nTABLE 14.1: ZIMBABWE: EXTERNAL DEBT OUTSTANDING BY DEBTOR (INCLUDING ALL ARREARS)\n \n \nS23 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nEnd of\n2000\n2001\n2002\n2003\n2004\n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\n2014\n2015\n2016\n2017\n2018\n2019 Est\n(US$ millions)\nTotal Medium to Long-Term External Debt\n6,921\n6,855\n6,948\n7,141\n7,243\n7,175\n7,269\n7,391\n7,343\n7,518\n8,142\n8,462\n8,770\n9,269\n10,821\n9,928\n9,878\n10,062\n11,201\n10,526\nPublic and Publicly Guaranteed Debt \n6,769\n6,787\n6,892\n7,100\n7,165\n7,118\n7,224\n7,340\n7,308\n7,461\n8,000\n8,096\n8,290\n8,267\n8,560\n8,015\n7,958\n8,113\n9,106\n8,095\nBilateral Creditors\n5,003\n5,017\n5,053\n5,105\n5,144\n5,140\n5,165\n5,176\n5,199\n4,201\n3,899\n4,797\n4,790\n4,946\n5,269\n4,875\n4,908\n5,038\n5,159\n5,644\nMultilateral Creditors\n1,724\n1,758\n1,813\n1,945\n1,952\n1,871\n1,936\n1,976\n2,059\n2,059\n2,505\n2,550\n2,855\n2,707\n2,704\n2,553\n2,477\n2,568\n2,573\n2,450\nPrivate Creditors\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n10\n10\n10\n10\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPrivate Non-Guaranteed Long term\n152\n67\n56\n41\n78\n57\n45\n51\n35\n57\n142\n366\n480\n1,002\n2,261\n1,913\n1,920\n1,949\n2,095\n2,431\nShort-Term External Debt\n42\n13\n26\n51\n69\n107\n122\n178\n41\n1192\n1586\n749\n645\n614\n587\n587\n573\n507\n441\n3,799\nPublic and Publicly Guaranteed Debt\n42\n13\n26\n51\n69\n107\n122\n178\n41\n193\n286\n134\n30\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nReserve Bank\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n998\n1300\n615\n615\n614\n587\n587\n573\n507\n441\n2,463\nPrivate\n256\n154\n157\n118\n75\n66\n159\n209\n185\n-37\n168\n404\n216\n950\n1,807\n1,671\n1,731\n1,792\n1,933\n1,336\nTotal External Debt\n7,177\n7,009\n7,105\n7,259\n7,318\n7,241\n7,428\n7,600\n7,528\n7,481\n8,309\n8,866\n8,986\n10,219\n12,628\n11,599\n11,610\n11,854\n13,134\n14,324\nGross Domestic Product\n6,107 10,887\n6,715\n5,037\n4,299\n2,918\n6,645\n4,000\n3,175\n10,735\n12,847\n14,670\n16,988\n17,455\n17,870\n18,188\n18,326\n19,188\n19,846\n18,555\nExternal Debt / GDP\n117.5%\n64.4% 105.8% 144.1% 170.2% 248.1% 111.8% 190.0% 237.1%\n69.7%\n64.7%\n60.4%\n52.9%\n58.5%\n70.7%\n63.8%\n63.4%\n61.8%\n66.2%\n77.2%\nSource: Ministry of Finance & Economic Development, 2020 ; Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\nTABLE 14.2: External Debt Outstanding by Source\n(US$ millions)\n \n \nS24 \n \n \n \nEnd of\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\n2014\n2015\n2016\n2017\n2018\n2019\nGovernment\n170\n188\n170\n172\n240\n240\n173\n193\n133\n139\n158\nCapital\n131\n154\n142\n136\n156\n156\n130\n144\n93\n103\n135\nInterest\n39\n34\n28\n36\n84\n84\n43\n50\n40\n36\n23\nParastatals\n43\n36\n30\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nCapital\n34\n29\n25\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nInterest\n8\n7\n5\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPrivate\n51\n50\n239\n359\n360\n315\n418\n364\n366\n395\n375\nCapital\n45\n43\n178\n281\n315\n270\n255\n280\n268\n280\n276\nInterest\n6\n8\n60\n78\n45\n45\n163\n84\n97\n115\n99\nTotal\n264\n274\n438\n530\n600\n555\n591\n558\n498\n534\n976\nCapital\n211\n226\n345\n417\n471\n426\n385\n424\n361\n383\n854\nInterest\n53\n48\n94\n114\n129\n129\n206\n134\n137\n151\n122\nExports of Goods\nand Services\n1839\n3522\n4859\n4288\n4146\n4018\n3954\n4031\n4640\n5178\n5267\nDebt Service ratio\n14%\n8%\n9%\n12%\n14%\n14%\n15%\n14%\n11%\n10%\n19%\nCapital Service Ratio\n11%\n6%\n7%\n10%\n11%\n11%\n10%\n11%\n8%\n7%\n16%\nInterest Service ratio\n3%\n1%\n2%\n3%\n3%\n3%\n5%\n3%\n3%\n3%\n2%\nNote: Figures reflect scheduled debt service.\n \nSource: Ministry of Finance & Economic Development, 2020 ; Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\nTABLE 14.3: EXTERNAL DEBT SERVICE AND DEBT SERVICE RATIOS\n (US$ MILLIONS)", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/Quarterly_Economic_Reviews/QUARTERLY-ECONOMIC-REVIEW-JUNE-2020.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "532398d065f40951dd84f3d4ae80d96d", "text": "MPC Statement 21 January 2021 \nPage 1 \n \n \n \n \nPRESS STATEMENT \nEMBARGO DELIVERY \n 21 January 2021 \n \n \n \nSTATEMENT OF THE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE \n \nIssued by Lesetja Kganyago, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank \nSince the November meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), a second \nwave of Covid-19 infections has peaked in South Africa and in many other countries. \nIt is expected that these waves of infection will continue until vaccine distribution is \nwidespread and populations develop sufficient immunity to curb virus transmission. \nAlthough the virus will continue in new waves, the rollout of vaccines is expected to \nboost global growth prospects generally. We have therefore revised global growth for \n2021 higher.1 However, global distribution of vaccines is likely to be slow, creating an \nuneven pace of global economic recovery in 2021. The International Monetary Fund \n(IMF) had forecast global gross domestic product (GDP) to have contracted by about \n \n1 Global growth in the QPM model is a trade-weighted average of South Africa’s trading partners. For 2020 this \nis now at -3.6% (up from -3.9% in November) and revised up to 5.0% for 2021. Based on the October 2020 \nWorld Economic Outlook, the IMF expects global growth of 5.2% in 2021. \nMPC Statement 21 January 2021 \nPage 2 \n \n4.4% in 2020 and to expand by 5.2% in 2021 -- their new forecasts will be released on \nthe 26th of January. \nWhile financial asset prices were volatile for much of the past year due to pandemic-\nrelated developments and geopolitical events, recent months have seen markets \nstrengthen. Capital flows to emerging markets have generally picked up when \ncompared to the outflows experienced in March and April last year. Although global \npolicy rates look set to remain accommodative, risk aversion is likely to persist through \n2021, particularly where economies fail to take advantage of improved global \nprospects or run large macroeconomic imbalances. \nIn the third quarter of 2020, the South African economy grew by 66.1% quarter on \nquarter, seasonally adjusted and annualised, compared to the Bank’s expected 50.3% \ngrowth. The growth rate for the full year is now expected to be -7.1%, compared to the \ncontraction of 8.0% expected at the time of the November meeting. However, our \nprojection for the 4th quarter of 2020 is expected to be lower than previously forecast. \nAnd while lockdown restrictions currently in place are considerably less restrictive than \nin 2020, we expect growth in the first quarter of 2021 to remain muted. \nDespite very robust terms of trade and stronger exports, getting back to pre-pandemic \noutput levels will take time. Sharply lower public and private investment last year and \ncontinued weakness in 2021 will weigh on growth prospects. GDP is now expected to \ngrow by 3.6% in 2021 and by 2.4% in 2022.2 GDP growth of 2.5% is expected in 2023. \nOverall, risks to the domestic growth outlook are assessed to be balanced. Global \ngrowth, vaccine distribution, a low cost of capital and high commodity prices are \nsupportive of growth. However, new waves of the Covid-19 virus are likely to \nperiodically weigh on economic activity both globally and locally. In addition, \nconstraints to the domestic supply of energy, weak investment and uncertainty about \nvaccine rollout remain serious downside risks to domestic growth. \nAccommodative policies in many advanced economies and the improved economic \noutlook continue to support recovery in global financial markets and some \nstrengthening in international capital flows. So far this has resulted in a trickle of fresh \n \n2 Compared to 3.5% and 2.4%, respectively, in November. \nMPC Statement 21 January 2021 \nPage 3 \n \ncapital flows to South Africa, and financing conditions remain uncertain as reflected in \nthe exceptionally steep yield curve.3 \nThese favourable global conditions saw the rand appreciate by 1.7% since the \nNovember meeting. Since January 2020, the rand has, however, depreciated by 8.0% \nagainst the USD and remains below its estimated long-run equilibrium value. The \nimplied starting point for the rand forecast is R15.70 to the US dollar, compared with \nR16.50 at the time of the previous meeting. \nHeadline consumer price inflation averaged 3.3% in 2020, in line with the Bank’s \nexpectation, and is the lowest rate since 2004. The Bank’s forecast for 2021 is slightly \nhigher at 4.0% (up from 3.9%) and is 4.5% (up from 4.4%) for 2022. The forecast for \n2023 is 4.6%. Core inflation averaged 3.3% in 2020. The forecasts for 2021 and 2022 \nare unchanged at 3.4% and 4.0%, respectively. In 2023, core inflation is expected to \nbe 4.3%. \nDespite an upward revision to potential growth, higher growth in 2020 and in 2021 \nimplied a small narrowing of the output gap over the forecast period, compared to the \nNovember meeting. Global producer price inflation, food price inflation and oil prices \nhave risen.4 A more appreciated nominal exchange rate in recent months is expected, \nhowever, to moderate some inflationary pressure. \nThe overall risks to the inflation outlook appear to be balanced in the near and medium \nterm. Local food price inflation is higher but expected to remain broadly contained. The \nCommittee additionally notes the significant but likely temporary reduction in medical \ninsurance price inflation this year. Given low pass-through, risks to inflation from \ncurrency depreciation are expected to stay muted. However, additional exchange rate \npressures could result from fiscal risks. While there are no demand side pressures \nevident, electricity and other administered prices remain serious concerns. \nExpectations of future inflation appear more stable after sustained moderation last \nyear, although those of households continue to moderate from quite high levels. \n \n3 Measured by the EMBI+ premium over emerging market averages and as an absolute value over time. \n4 Our assumptions are now for oil prices to average about $50 per barrel in 2021, rising to $55 per barrel in \n2022 and $57 per barrel in 2023. \nMPC Statement 21 January 2021 \nPage 4 \n \nMarket-based expectations for short and medium-term inflation have eased slightly, \nwhile longer-term inflation expectations remain higher.5 \nThe Committee notes that the slow economic recovery will help keep inflation below \nthe midpoint of the target range for this year and next. Unless risks outlined earlier \nmaterialise, inflation is expected to be well contained in 2021, before rising to around \nthe midpoint in 2022 and 2023. \nAgainst this backdrop, the MPC decided to keep rates unchanged at 3.5% per annum. \nTwo members of the Committee preferred a 25 basis point cut and three preferred to \nhold rates at the current level. \nThe implied policy rate path of the Quarterly Projection Model (QPM) indicates two \nincreases of 25 basis points in the second and third quarters of 2021. \nMonetary policy has eased financial conditions and improved the resilience of \nhouseholds and firms to the economic implications of Covid-19, and continues to be \naccommodative. The steps taken by the Bank have ensured adequate liquidity in \ndomestic markets. In addition, regulatory relief provided to banks has sustained \nlending to households and firms. \nWhile monetary policy will continue to support the economic recovery, a faster growth \nrate depends on implementing prudent macroeconomic policies and structural \nreforms. Lower administered prices and productivity-adjusted wage settings aligned \nto projected inflation would also generate important macroeconomic gains. Such steps \nwill enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy and its transmission to the broader \neconomy. \nEconomic and financial conditions are expected to remain volatile for the foreseeable \nfuture. In this highly uncertain environment, policy decisions will continue to be data \n \n5 The latest Bureau for Economic Research (BER) survey expectations for 2020 are 0.1ppt higher at 3.7%, \nunchanged in 2021 at 4.2% and 0.1ppt lower in 2022 at 4.5%. Household inflation expectations have eased \nfurther to 5.3% from 5.9%. Market analysts (Reuters Econometer) expect inflation to remain unchanged at 3.3% \nfor 2020, lower at 3.8% in 2021 and at 4.2% in 2022. Inflation is expected to be 4.5% in 2023. Market-based \nrates are calculated from the break-even inflation rate, which is the yield differential between conventional and \ninflation-linked bonds. These sit at 3.2% for the 5-year and 5.0% on the 10-year breakeven. 15-year breakeven \ninflation sits at 6.2%. \nMPC Statement 21 January 2021 \nPage 5 \n \ndependent and sensitive to the balance of risks to the outlook. The MPC will seek to \nlook through temporary price shocks and focus on second round effects. As usual, the \nrepo rate projection from the QPM remains a broad policy guide, changing from \nmeeting to meeting in response to new data and risks. \n \nLesetja Kganyago \nGOVERNOR \nThe next statement of the Monetary Policy Committee will be released on 25 March \n2021 \nContact person: \nThoraya Pandy \n0824168416 \nmedia@resbank.co.za", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/MPC_Statements/Statement of the Monetary Policy Committee January 2021.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "5a21427e4ae150a29f02dd2f2286be07", "text": "MPC Statement 14 April 2020 \nPage 1 \n \n \n \nSouth African Reserve Bank \n \nPRESS STATEMENT \nEMBARGO DELIVERY \n14 April 2020 \n \n \nSTATEMENT OF THE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE \n \nIssued by Lesetja Kganyago, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank \nSince the March meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), the Covid-19 \npandemic has spread globally and its impact is being felt through all economies. \nCurrent estimates from the IMF show global growth contracting this year by about \n2.9%.1 Economic contractions are expected to be deepest in the second quarter of \n2020, with some recovery expected in the third quarter of the year. The strength of \nthe recovery into the fourth quarter and 2021 will depend on how quickly countries are \nable to open up for economic activity safely, requiring sustainable social distancing \nrules, safety processes put in place by businesses and public institutions, and capacity \nof hospitals to accommodate those in need. Current indications from the World health \n \n1 Global growth in the QPM model is a trade-weighted average. For 2020 this is now at -2.6% and 4% for 2021. \nMPC Statement 14 April 2020 \nPage 2 \n \nOrganisation are that the pandemic is unlikely to end quickly, with shorter, less virulent \nwaves hitting over time. \nThe uncertainties of the crisis have led to extremely high volatility in financial asset \nprices, with sharp and deep market sell-offs followed by a partial recovery. At this \nstage, the sustainability of that recovery remains uncertain, and global markets remain \nin risk-off mode. This has implications for emerging markets and South Africa in \nparticular, as investor appetite for rand-denominated equities and bonds is expected \nto remain weak. \nPolicy responses to the crisis have generally been robust, with the magnitudes \ndependent on the degree of policy space available to countries. The US Federal \nReserve has taken further steps to expand its balance sheet. The European Central \nBank (ECB) has made similar commitments. Emerging and developing economies \ngenerally have less policy space available and credit is more expensive, and for this \nreason, the International Financial Institutions (the IMF, the World Bank) and others \nhave made available extraordinary levels of emergency financial support. \nThe Covid-19 outbreak will have a major health and social impact, and forecasting \ndomestic economic activity presents unprecedented uncertainty. With that in mind, \nthe Bank expects GDP in 2020 to contract by 6.1%, compared to the -0.2% expected \njust three weeks ago. GDP is expected to grow by 2.2% in 2021 and by 2.7% in 2022. \nSouth Africa’s lockdown has been extended by an additional 14 days, bringing the \ntotal lockdown period to 35 days. Both the supply and demand effects of this extension \nreduce growth and deepen it in the short-term, as businesses stay shut for longer and \nhouseholds with income spend less. This will likely also increase job losses, with \nMPC Statement 14 April 2020 \nPage 3 \n \nfurther consequences for aggregate demand. The impacts will be particularly severe \nfor small businesses, and individuals with earnings in the informal sector. \nSome factors will support growth, including where businesses are able to open under \nthe current rules, new jobs being created to service more needs under the lockdown, \nand sustained government spending, both through normal operations and crisis-\nrelated spending and programmes. The faster the global economy recovers from the \ncrisis, as China appears to be gradually doing now, the more positive growth spillovers \nwill strengthen for South Africa, including healthy price levels for commodity exports. \nNonetheless, prices for many commodities have fallen as a result of weaker demand \nglobally. The spot price for Brent crude oil is currently around $31 per barrel, despite \na new agreement reached by Opec and other producers to make large oil production \ncuts. For our forecast, the Brent crude oil price is expected to average $42 per barrel \nin 2020 and $45 per barrel in 2021, very close to the March forecast. \nAs noted earlier, while advanced economies conduct exceptionally accommodative \npolicies, global financing conditions are no longer supportive of emerging market \ncurrency and asset values. Credit risk has risen back to 2008 levels and about R100 \nbillion of local assets have been sold by non-resident investors. The rand has \ndepreciated by 22.6% against the USD since January and by 17.3% since the March \nmeeting of the MPC. The implied starting point for the rand forecast is R17.80 to the \nUS dollar, compared with R15.40 at the time of the previous meeting. \nSlightly lower oil prices and sharply lower domestic growth pulls down on the inflation \nforecast, while negative global sentiment and fiscal risks have led to equally \naggressive currency depreciation and upside pressure on inflation. The timing and \nsize of these contradictory impulses suggests that they are not perfectly offsetting, \nMPC Statement 14 April 2020 \nPage 4 \n \nwith weaker inflation in the near term likely giving way to higher inflation later in the \nforecast period. \nThe Bank’ s headline consumer price inflation forecast averages 3.6% for 2020, 4.5% \nfor 2021, and 4. 4% in 2022. The forecast for core inflation is lower at 3.8% in 2020, \n4.0% in 2021, and 4.2% in 2022. \nThe overall risks to the inflation outlook at this time appear to be to the downside. \nElectricity pricing remains a concern but has moderated somewhat. Risks to inflation \nfrom recent currency depreciation are expected to be muted as pass-through is slow. \nGlobal producer price inflation has decelerated. Lower oil prices will reduce petrol \nprices in the near term. International food prices have eased and local food price \ninflation is expected to remain low, in part due to higher domestic production levels. \nExpectations of future inflation broadly remain around the mid-point of the band, \nalthough market-based expectations have recently ticked up in response to the \ndepreciation of the currency.2 \nWeaker domestic growth and greater fiscal risks have resulted in a downgrade by \nMoody’s credit rating agency and confirmation of a negative outlook by Fitch, a weaker \ncurrency and higher borrowing costs for government, banks and firms. South Africa’s \nrisk profile has increased. \nDespite this rise in country risk, the Committee notes that the more prolonged \nlockdown and slower recovery creates downside risk to inflation and allows further \n \n2 The latest Bureau for Economic Research (BER) survey has expectations for 2020 down by 0.4ppts to 4.4% and to .4.6% (from 5.0%) for \n2021. Five-year-ahead inflation expectations also eased to 4.7% (from 4.9%). Market analysts (Reuters Econometer) expect inflation to be, \n4.2% (from 4.4%) for 2020, 4.6% (from 4.7%) in 2021 and 4.5% (from 4.6%) for 2022. Market-based rates are calculated from the break-even \ninflation rate, which is the yield differential between conventional and inflation-linked bonds. These sit at 4.7% for the 5-year and well over \n6% on the 10-year breakeven. \nMPC Statement 14 April 2020 \nPage 5 \n \nspace for monetary policy to respond to the virus-induced demand shock to the \neconomy. Barring severe and persistent currency and oil shocks, inflation is expected \nto be well contained, remaining below the midpoint of the target in 2020 and close to \nthe midpoint in 2021. \nAgainst this backdrop, the MPC decided to cut the repo rate by 100 basis points. This \ntakes the repo rate to 4.25% per annum, with effect from 15 April 2020. The decision \nwas unanimous. \nThe implied path of policy rates over the forecast period generated by the Quarterly \nProjection Model indicates five repo rate cuts of 25 basis points extending into the first \nquarter of 2021. \nMonetary policy can ease financial conditions and improve the resilience of \nhouseholds and firms to the economic implications of Covid-19. In addition to \ncontinued easing of interest rates, the Bank has taken steps to ensure adequate \nliquidity in money and government bond markets and to ease capital requirements to \nfree capital for onlending by financial institutions. Each of these steps make more \ncapital available to households and firms. \nMonetary policy however cannot on its own improve the potential growth rate of the \neconomy or reduce fiscal risks. These should be addressed by implementing prudent \nmacroeconomic policies and structural reforms that lower costs generally, and \nincrease investment opportunities, potential growth and job creation. Such steps will \nfurther reduce existing constraints on monetary policy and its transmission to lending. \nGlobal economic and financial conditions are expected to remain highly volatile for the \nforeseeable future. In this highly uncertain environment, future decisions will continue \nMPC Statement 14 April 2020 \nPage 6 \n \nto be highly data dependent, sensitive to the balance of risks to the outlook and will \nseeks to look through temporary price shocks. As usual, the repo rate projection from \nthe QPM remains a broad policy guide which can change from meeting to meeting in \nresponse to changing data and risks. \nLesetja Kganyago \nGOVERNOR \n \nThe next statement of the Monetary Policy Committee will be released on 21 May \n2020. \n \nContact person: \nThoraya Pandy \n012 313 3066/ 082 416 8416 \nmedia@resbank.co.za", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/MPC_Statements/April-2020-MPC-statement.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "93e5c12eb2e94cd431ecf084bf9ec8a4", "text": "Vol. 26 No. 47 \n \n \nWeek Ending \n22nd NOVEMBER 2024 \nWeekly Economic \nHighlights \nTABLE OF CONTENTS \n \n1. \nOVERVIEW ............................................................................ 1 \n2. \nINTEREST RATES ................................................................ 2 \n3. \nEQUITY MARKETS .............................................................. 3 \n4. \nCLEARING AND SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY .................. 5 \n5. \nENERGY PRICES .................................................................. 5 \n6. \nGOLD PM FIX, MOSI-OA-TUNYA GOLD COINS AND \nGOLD BACKED DIGITAL TOKENS (GBDT) .................. 5 \n7. \nEXTERNAL SECTOR ........................................................... 6 \n \n \n \n 1 \n1. OVERVIEW \n \n \n \nThis report provides an overview of weekly monetary and financial developments from domestic and \ninternational markets including money and capital markets, national payment systems, commodity prices and \nexchange rates for the week ending 22nd November 2024. \nDuring the week under review, local currency minimum and maximum deposit rates for savings deposits \nremained unchanged, while minimum and maximum deposits rates for all tenors declined. Foreign currency \ndeposit rates for all tenors also decreased during the same period. \nMinimum and maximum local currency lending rates for both individual and corporate clients increased, \nduring the week under review reflecting tight local currency liquidity conditions in the market. Minimum \nforeign currency lending rates for both individual and corporate clients, however, declined during the same \nweek. Maximum foreign currency lending rates for corporates also declined. \nOn the capital markets, the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) exhibited bullish trends, resulting in a 0.80% \nincrease in the All-Share Index, which closed at 272.61 points. The Victoria Falls Stock Exchange (VFEX), \nhowever, traded negatively, with the VFEX All-Share Index decreasing by 0.42% to close at 108.38 points. \nThe value of transactions processed through the National Payment Systems platforms surged by 24.97% to \nZiG30.29 billion, from ZiG24.24 billion recorded in the previous week. The increase was largely driven by a \nrise in transaction values recorded through RTGS, Zipit mobile, mobile banking, POS and ATM payment \nplatforms. \nOn the interbank market, the Zimbabwe Gold (ZiG) appreciated by 0.3% against the greenback, from an \naverage of ZiG25.37 per US$1 in the previous week to an average of ZiG25.29 per US$1, during the week \nunder review. \nInternational commodity prices for all selected commodities increased, compared to the previous week. Gold \nprices firmed, driven by increased demand for safe-haven assets amid the ongoing escalation of tensions \nbetween Russia and Ukraine. Similarly, the growing use of platinum in the semiconductor and sensor \nindustries has further boosted demand for platinum, contributing to the rise in prices for the metal. Lithium \nprices rebounded, underpinned by increased demand for the metal. Brent crude oil prices also increased amid \nescalating tensions between Russia and Ukraine, which raised concerns about potential disruptions to crude \noil supply. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n 2 \n2. INTEREST RATES \n \nAverage commercial bank deposit rates (Local Currency (ZiG)(%) \nZiG Deposit rates \n1 November 2024 \n8 November 2024 \n15 November 2024 \n22 November 2024 \nSavings \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n3.75 \n3.75 \n3.75 \n3.75 \nMaximum \n3.80 \n3.88 \n3.88 \n3.88 \n1-month deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n5.21 \n5.21 \n4.91 \n4.63 \nMaximum \n6.61 \n6.61 \n6.36 \n5.75 \n3-months deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n5.41 \n5.41 \n5.09 \n4.82 \nMaximum \n7.14 \n7.58 \n7.27 \n6.63 \n6-months deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n5.34 \n4.74 \n4.42 \n4.14 \nMaximum \n7.34 \n6.11 \n6.07 \n5.24 \n12-months deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n5.36 \n4.76 \n4.43 \n4.16 \nMaximum \n7.36 \n6.13 \n6.08 \n5.25 \nOver 1 year \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n5.37 \n4.77 \n4.44 \n4.16 \nMaximum \n7.40 \n6.17 \n6.11 \n5.28 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024 \n \n \nAverage commercial bank deposit rates (Foreign Currency (US$)(%) \nUS$ Deposit rates \n1 November 2024 \n8 November 2024 \n15 November 2024 \n22 November 2024 \nSavings \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n1.67 \n1.43 \n1.38 \n1.24 \nMaximum \n2.05 \n1.65 \n1.54 \n1.29 \n1-month deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n3.31 \n3.17 \n2.94 \n2.83 \nMaximum \n5.26 \n4.81 \n4.71 \n4.49 \n3-month deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n4.02 \n3.85 \n3.57 \n3.29 \nMaximum \n6.02 \n5.68 \n5.53 \n5.14 \n6-month deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n4.24 \n3.61 \n3.30 \n2.99 \nMaximum \n6.97 \n5.81 \n5.61 \n5.08 \n12-Month deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n4.53 \n3.78 \n3.44 \n3.08 \nMaximum \n6.78 \n6.03 \n5.81 \n5.11 \nOver 1 year \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n4.56 \n3.89 \n3.53 \n3.11 \nMaximum \n7.33 \n6.11 \n5.86 \n5.17 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n 3 \nCommercial bank weighted lending rates (Local Currency (ZiG))(%) \nZiG Lending rates \n1 November 2024 \n8 November 2024 \n15 November 2024 \n22 November 2024 \nIndividuals \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n36.95 \n38.23 \n37.97 \n38.02 \nMaximum \n43.87 \n44.58 \n43.47 \n43.52 \nCorporates \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n36.25 \n36.89 \n33.01 \n33.05 \nMaximum \n44.57 \n45.16 \n38.83 \n39.15 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024 \n \n \nCommercial bank weighted lending rates (Foreign Currency (US$))(%) \nUS$ Lending rates \n1 November 2024 \n8 November 2024 \n15 November 2024 \n22 November 2024 \nIndividuals \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n11.88 \n13.02 \n12.85 \n12.84 \nMaximum \n17.22 \n17.44 \n17.16 \n17.16 \nCorporates \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n10.45 \n11.61 \n10.65 \n9.81 \nMaximum \n16.63 \n16.97 \n14.89 \n14.29 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024 \n \n \nCommercial banks and building societies mortgage lending rates(%) \nMortgage Lending rates \n1 November 2024 \n8 November 2024 \n15 November 2024 \n22 November 2024 \nZiG Lending rates \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n25.00 \n20.00 \n20.00 \n20.00 \nMaximum \n50.00 \n30.00 \n30.00 \n30.00 \nUS$ Lending rates \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n10.00 \n10.00 \n10.00 \n10.00 \nMaximum \n22.00 \n18.00 \n18.00 \n18.00 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024 \n \n \n \n3. EQUITY MARKETS \n \n \nZSE Indicators \n \n \nAll Share \nIndex \n(points) \nTop 10 \nIndex \n(points) \nTop 15 \nIndex \n(points) \nMedium Cap \n(points) \nSmall Cap \n(points) \nMining \nIndex \n(points) \nGrand \nMarket Cap \n(ZiG billion) \nMarket \nTurnover \n(ZiG million) \nVolume of \nShares \n(million) \n1-Nov-24 \n285.22 \n297.07 \n294.05 \n268.38 \n100.11 \n251.68 \n88.40 \n222.97 \n31.67 \n8-Nov-24 \n276.26 \n280.00 \n277.96 \n279.61 \n100.11 \n235.38 \n85.02 \n56.90 \n14.67 \n15-Nov-24 \n270.45 \n273.81 \n270.82 \n274.08 \n100.11 \n235.38 \n82.79 \n42.43 \n9.34 \n22-Nov-24 \n272.61 \n274.77 \n274.33 \n278.98 \n100.11 \n235.38 \n83.22 \n135.37 \n35.39 \nWeekly \nChange (%) \n0.80 \n0.35 \n1.30 \n1.79 \n0.00 \n0.00 \n0.52 \n219.04 \n278.91 \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2024 \n \nVFEX Indicators \nDate \nAll Share Index \nPoints \nGrand Market Capitalisation \n(US$ billion) \nMarket Turnover \n(US$ million) \nVolume of Shares \n(million) \n1-Nov-24 \n104.51 \n1.26 \n0.86 \n2.17 \n8-Nov-24 \n106.85 \n1.29 \n0.89 \n5.55 \n15-Nov-24 \n108.84 \n1.31 \n0.38 \n3.44 \n22-Nov-24 \n108.38 \n1.31 \n1.75 \n4.54 \nWeekly Change (%) \n(0.42) \n0.00 \n360.53 \n31.98 \nSource: Victoria Falls Stock Exchange, 2024 \n \n \n \n 4 \nFigure 1: ZSE and VFEX Indicators \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange and Victoria Falls Stock Exchange, 2024 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n140\n160\n180\n200\n220\n240\n260\n280\n300\n320\n30-Aug-24\n06-Sep-24\n13-Sep-24\n20-Sep-24\n27-Sep-24\n04-Oct-24\n11-Oct-24\n18-Oct-24\n25-Oct-24\n01-Nov-24\n08-Nov-24\n15-Nov-24\n22-Nov-24\nIndices\nZSE Indices \nAll Share Index (ZSE)\nTop 10 Index\nMining Index\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\n100\n30-Aug-24\n06-Sep-24\n13-Sep-24\n20-Sep-24\n27-Sep-24\n04-Oct-24\n11-Oct-24\n18-Oct-24\n25-Oct-24\n01-Nov-24\n08-Nov-24\n15-Nov-24\n22-Nov-24\nZiG Billion\nZSE Market Capitalisation \n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1000\n30-Aug-24\n06-Sep-24\n13-Sep-24\n20-Sep-24\n27-Sep-24\n04-Oct-24\n11-Oct-24\n18-Oct-24\n25-Oct-24\n01-Nov-24\n08-Nov-24\n15-Nov-24\n22-Nov-24\nUS$ Thousand\nVFEX Market Turnover \n1.2\n1.22\n1.24\n1.26\n1.28\n1.3\n1.32\n1.34\n1.36\n1.38\n1.4\n30-Aug-24\n06-Sep-24\n13-Sep-24\n20-Sep-24\n27-Sep-24\n04-Oct-24\n11-Oct-24\n18-Oct-24\n25-Oct-24\n01-Nov-24\n08-Nov-24\n15-Nov-24\n22-Nov-24\nUS$ Billion\nVFEX Market Capitalisation \n95\n100\n105\n110\n115\n30-Aug-24\n06-Sep-24\n13-Sep-24\n20-Sep-24\n27-Sep-24\n04-Oct-24\n11-Oct-24\n18-Oct-24\n25-Oct-24\n01-Nov-24\n08-Nov-24\n15-Nov-24\n22-Nov-24\nIndices\nVFEX All Share Index \n0\n20,000\n40,000\n60,000\n80,000\n100,000\n120,000\n30-Aug-24\n06-Sep-24\n13-Sep-24\n20-Sep-24\n27-Sep-24\n04-Oct-24\n11-Oct-24\n18-Oct-24\n25-Oct-24\n01-Nov-24\n08-Nov-24\n15-Nov-24\n22-Nov-24\nZiG Thousands\nZSE Market Turnover \n \n 5 \n4. CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY \n Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024 \n \n \n5. ENERGY PRICES \n \nEnergy Prices \n \n1 November 2024 \n8 November 2024 \n15 November 2024 \n22 November 2024 \nDomestic Energy Prices \nUS$ \nUS$ \nUS$ \nUS$ \nDiesel 50/ litre \n1.50 \n1.50 \n1.52 \n1.52 \nPetrol Blend E20/ litre \n1.49 \n1.49 \n1.51 \n1.51 \nLP Gas / kg \n1.81 \n1.81 \n1.83 \n1.83 \n \n \n \n \n \nInternational Energy Prices \n(Weekly average) \nUS$/barrel \nUS$/barrel \nUS$/barrel \nUS$/barrel \nCrude Oil Prices \n72.73 \n74.76 \n71.92 \n74.49 \n Source: Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory Authority and BBC 2024 \n \n \n6. GOLD PM FIX, MOSI-OA-TUNYA GOLD COINS AND GOLD BACKED DIGITAL TOKENS \n(GBDT) \n \n \n \nGold PM Fix and Gold Backed Digital Token Prices \nDate \nGold PM Fix \nGBDT ZiG Price per Mg \nGBDT US$ Price per Mg \nUS$/oz \nBuy \nSell \nBuy \nSell \n18-November-24 \n2,571.80 \n1.99 \n2.20 \n0.0786 \n0.0868 \n19-November-24 \n2,606.85 \n2.01 \n2.23 \n0.0796 \n0.0880 \n20-November-24 \n2,623.20 \n2.03 \n2.24 \n0.0801 \n0.0886 \n21-November-24 \n2,640.55 \n2.04 \n2.25 \n0.0807 \n0.0891 \n22-November-24 \n2,665.30 \n2.06 \n2.28 \n0.0814 \n0.0900 \nSource: London Bullion Market Association and Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024 \n \n \n \n \nPAYMENT STREAM \nWEEK ENDING \n15 November 2024 \nWEEK ENDING \n22 November 2024 \nWEEKLY \nCHANGE (%) \n \nVALUES \n \nRTGS (ZiG) \n17,890,470,531.58 \n24,109,430,787.77 \n34.76 \nOf which ZiG \n7,188,223,760.32 \n8,380,709,415.05 \n \nOf which US$ \n421,716,635.22 \n621,757,897.41 \n \nPOS \n1,396,706,144.75 \n2,273,641,083.02 \n62.79 \nATM \n1,121,999,857.80 \n1,239,937,460.22 \n10.51 \nMOBILE BANKING \n93,543,656.48 \n115,348,175.40 \n23.31 \nMOBILE MONEY \n3,589,098,731.86 \n2,353,457,480.37 \n(34.43) \nZIPIT MOBILE \n144,317,061.04 \n195,128,979.13 \n35.21 \nTOTAL \n24,236,135,983.51 \n30,286,943,965.92 \n24.97 \n \nVOLUMES \n \nRTGS \n102,065 \n184,402 \n80.67 \nOf which ZiG \n40,553 \n87,547 \n \nOf which US$ \n61,512 \n96,855 \n \nPOS \n1,441,556 \n1,696,931 \n17.72 \nATM \n140,865 \n162,435 \n15.31 \nMOBILE BANKING \n200,656 \n256,827 \n27.99 \nMOBILE MONEY \n11,498,735 \n9,881,045 \n(14.07) \nZIPIT MOBILE \n192,378 \n203,642 \n5.86 \nTOTAL \n13,576,255 \n12,385,282 \n(8.77) \n \n 6 \nMosi-oa-Tunya Gold Coin Prices \nGold Coin \nPrice \n18-November-24 \n19-November-24 \n20-November-24 \n21-November-24 \n22-November-\n24 \n1.00Oz \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ \n2,700.39 \n2,737.19 \n2,754.36 \n2,772.58 \n2,798.57 \nZiG \n68,277.20 \n69,209.09 \n69,659.42 \n70,130.13 \n70,894.93 \n0.50Oz \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ \n1,350.20 \n1,368.60 \n1,377.18 \n1,386.29 \n1,399.28 \nZiG \n34,138.60 \n34,604.55 \n34,829.71 \n35,065.06 \n35,447.46 \n0.25Oz \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ \n675.10 \n684.30 \n688.59 \n693.14 \n699.64 \nZiG \n17,069.30 \n17,302.27 \n17,414.85 \n17,532.53 \n17,723.73 \n0.10Oz \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ \n270.04 \n273.72 \n275.44 \n277.26 \n279.86 \nZiG \n6,827.72 \n6,920.91 \n6,965.94 \n7,013.01 \n7,089.49 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024 \n \n \n7. EXTERNAL SECTOR \n \n \nExchange Rate Developments (ZiG per Unit of foreign currency) \n \n \nUSD \nZAR \nGBP \nBWP \nEURO \nWeekly Average \n(11-15 Nov) \n25.3664 \n1.4057 \n32.3967 \n1.8735 \n26.9139 \n18-November \n25.2842 \n1.3935 \n31.9327 \n1.8508 \n26.6457 \n19-November \n25.2842 \n1.4065 \n32.0358 \n1.8597 \n26.7601 \n20-November \n25.2847 \n1.3988 \n32.0849 \n1.8601 \n26.7790 \n21-November \n25.2906 \n1.3947 \n32.0012 \n1.8567 \n26.6804 \n22-November \n25.2942 \n1.3965 \n31.8457 \n1.8634 \n26.5094 \nWeekly Average \n(18-22 Nov) \n25.2876 \n1.3980 \n31.9801 \n1.8581 \n26.6749 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024 \n \n \nInternational Commodity Price Developments \n \nPlatinum \nPalladium \nNickel \nLithium \nCrude oil \n2024 \nUS$/ounce \nUS$/ounce \nUS$/tonne \nUS$/tonne \nUS$/tonne \nWeekly Average \n(11-15 Nov) \n951.60 \n955.00 \n15,778.80 \n8,653.00 \n71.92 \n18-November \n957.50 \n981.00 \n15,729.00 \n8,600.00 \n73.34 \n19-November \n967.00 \n1,018.00 \n15,866.00 \n8,650.00 \n73.24 \n20-November \n1,038.00 \n1,038.00 \n15,906.00 \n8,700.00 \n72.97 \n21-November \n958.00 \n1,026.00 \n15,714.00 \n8,850.00 \n74,24 \n22-November \n963.00 \n1,022.00 \n15,970,00 \n8,950.00 \n78.42 \nWeekly Average \n(18-22 Nov) \n976.70 \n1,017.00 \n15,803.75 \n8,750.00 \n74.49 \nSource: BBC, KITCO and Bloomberg, 2024 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n 7 \n \nFigure 3: Weekly Precious Metals Price Developments (18th November -22nd November 2024) \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSource: BBC, KITCO and Bloomberg, 2024 \n \n \n2,500\n2,550\n2,600\n2,650\n2,700\n2,750\n2,800\nUS$/oz\nGold\n70\n72\n74\n76\n78\nUS$/barrel\nCrude oil \n920\n940\n960\n980\n1,000\n1,020\n1,040\n1,060\n20-Oct\n23-Oct\n26-Oct\n29-Oct\n1-Nov\n4-Nov\n7-Nov\n10-Nov\n13-Nov\n16-Nov\n19-Nov\n22-Nov\nUS$/tonne\nPlatinum\n900\n930\n960\n990\n1,020\n1,050\n1,080\n1,110\n1,140\n1,170\n1,200\n1,230\nUS$/tonne\nPalladium\n15,000\n15,500\n16,000\n16,500\n17,000\n17,500\n11-Oct\n18-Oct\n25-Oct\n1-Nov\n8-Nov\n15-Nov\n22-Nov\nUS$/tonne\nNickel\n8,500\n8,600\n8,700\n8,800\n8,900\n9,000\n9,100\n9,200\n9,300\n9,400\n9,500\n9,600\n9,700\n20-Oct\n23-Oct\n26-Oct\n29-Oct\n1-Nov\n4-Nov\n7-Nov\n10-Nov\n13-Nov\n16-Nov\n19-Nov\n22-Nov\nUS$/tonne\nLithium", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/Weekly_Economic_Highlights/WEEKLY_ECONOMIC_HIGHLIGHTS_22_NOVEMBER_2024_Volume_26_Number_47.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "b822f7052a1e40ecb1eeb1e797517bfb", "text": "i \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJULY 2021 \n \n2 \n \nTABLE OF CONTENTS \n \nSELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS ................................................................................. 3 \nINTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICE DEVELOPMENTS ........................................... 4 \nPrecious Metals .......................................................................................................................... 4 \nBase Metals ................................................................................................................................ 4 \nMONETARY DEVELOPMENTS .............................................................................................. 5 \nSTOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS ..................................................................................... 6 \nINFLATION OUTTURN ............................................................................................................. 7 \nAnnual Inflation ........................................................................................................................ 7 \nMonthly Inflation ...................................................................................................................... 8 \n \nNATIONAL PAYMENTS SYSTEM .......................................................................................... 8 \nZimbabwe Electronic Transfer Settlement System (ZETSS) ............................................... 8 \nCash Transactions ..................................................................................................................... 9 \nMobile and Internet Based Transactions ................................................................................ 9 \nCard Based Transactions ......................................................................................................... 9 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n3 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2021 \n \nJune \n \n2021 \n \nJuly \n \nMonth-on- \nMonth Change \n(%) \n \nReserve Money2 (M0) (ZW$ millions) \n24,844.80 \n \n24,944.72 \n0.40 \nMoney Supply2 (M3) (ZW$ millions) \n302,934.41 \n \n330,656.85 \n9.15 \nAnnual Inflation1 (%) \n106.64 \n56.37 \n \n-50.27a \n \nBlended Annual Inflation1 (%) \n40.91 \n21.61 \n \n-19.30a \nMonthly Inflation1 (%) \n3.88 \n2.56 \n \n-1.32a \n \nBlended Monthly Inflation1 (%) \n4.49 \n0.67 \n \n-3.82a \nNational Payment System Transactions2 \n(ZW$ billions) \n597.08 \n613.25 \n2.71 \nNominal Lending Rate2 \n(% per annum) \n6.00-85.00 \n6.00-85.00 \n \nSources: \n1. Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency. \n2. Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. \na- Percentage point. \nSELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS \n \n \n \n4 \n \nINTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICE \nDEVELOPMENTS \n \nInternational commodity prices for gold, \nplatinum and copper retreated in July 2021. \nHowever, nickel and Brent crude oil prices \nfirmed during the same month. Developments in \ninternational commodity markets were largely \ninfluenced by a strengthening US dollar, and a \nsurge in Covid-19 infections, which continued \nto pose downside risks on prospects for global \neconomic recovery. \n \n Precious Metals \n \n Gold \nGold prices retreated by 2.2%, from a monthly \naverage of US$1,846.27 per ounce in June 2021 \nto US$1,806.45 per ounce, during the month \nunder review. The price of the yellow metal was \nheavily weighed down by a stronger US dollar \nand elevated U.S. Treasury yields. This, \ntogether with the Fed’s decision to keep interest \nrates unchanged, dampened the appeal of gold \nas a safe haven asset. The decline in the price of \nthe yellow metal was, however, moderated by \nconcerns that the rapid spread of the Delta \nvariant of the coronavirus could reduce the pace \nof global economic recovery. \n \nPlatinum \nDuring the month under analysis, platinum \nprices were subdued on account of a low \ninvestment demand outlook for the metal due to \na stronger US dollar and higher U.S. Treasury \nyields. In addition, slackening global demand in \nthe automotive and jewellery industries, amid \nfears about rising cases of the Delta variant of \nCovid-19, weighed down on the price of the \nmetal, which is also widely used in industrial \napplications. Accordingly, prices declined by \n3.9%, from an average of US$1,131.82 per \nounce in June 2021 to U$1,088.05 per ounce in \nJuly 2021. Figure 1 shows the evolution of \nprecious metal prices for the period from \nJanuary 2020 to July 2021. \n Figure 1: Precious metal prices (US$/oz.) \nSource: Bloomberg, 2021 \n \nBase Metals \n \nCopper \nCopper prices remained subdued, amid fears of \ntepid demand in China, following signs of \nslowing economic recovery in the economy of \nthe Asian giant. China is also the world’s \nbiggest consumer of base metals. Prices \ndeclined by 2.4%, to a monthly average of \nUS$9,433.59 per tonne, from US$9,667.28 per \ntonne recorded in the previous month. \n \n \n \n600\n800\n1000\n1200\n1400\n1600\n1800\n2000\n2200\nJul-20\nAug-20\nSep-20\nOct-20\nNov-20\nDec-20\nJan-21\nFeb-21\nMar-21\nApr-21\nMay-21\nJun-21\nJul-21\nUS$/oz.\nGold\nPlatinum\n \n \n \n5 \n \nNickel \nNickel prices continued on an upward \ntrajectory, supported by supply concerns, \nfollowing Russia’s announcement of possible \nexport taxes and Indonesia’s plan to restrict \ninvestment in nickel pig iron and Ferro-nickel \nsmelters. Furthermore, the increase in demand \nin spot markets, particularly from alloy makers, \nalso \nbolstered \nprices. \nReflecting \nthese \ndevelopments, prices gained by 5.2%, from a \nmonthly average of US$17,883.38 per tonne in \nJune 2021, to close the month under analysis at \nan average of US$18,817.05 per tonne. \n \nFigure 2: Base metal prices (US$/ton) \nSource: Bloomberg, 2021 \n \n \nBrent Crude Oil \nBrent crude oil prices increased by 1.2% to a \nmonthly average of US$74.07 per barrel in July \n2021. Prices firmed as crude stockpiles in the \nUS, the world's top oil consumer, fell to their \nlowest levels since January 2020. Global \n \n1All monetary numbers valued in ZW$ since the adoption \nof an interbank market determined exchange rate in \nFebruary 2019. \ndemand for oil was also holding up, in spite of \nincreasing Delta variant infection cases. \nFigure 3 shows developments in Brent crude oil \nprices for the period from July 2020 to July \n2021. \nFigure 3: International crude oil prices \n(US$/barrel) \n \nSource: Bloomberg, 2021 \n \n \nMONETARY DEVELOPMENTS1 \n \nBroad money (M3) amounted to ZW$330.66 \nbillion in July 2021, a 9.15% increase from \nZW$302.93 billion recorded in June 2021. The \nmoney stock was composed of local currency \ntransferrable deposits, 49.16%; foreign currency \ndeposits, 42.7%, time deposits, 6.97%; currency \nin circulation, 0.72%; and negotiable certificates \nof deposits, 0.46%. \n \nForeign currency deposits in broad money \nregistered an annual growth of 78.53%, from \nZW$79.08 billion in July 2020 to ZW$141.17 \n5,000\n7,000\n9,000\n11,000\n13,000\n15,000\n17,000\n19,000\n21,000\n4,000\n5,000\n6,000\n7,000\n8,000\n9,000\n10,000\n11,000\nJul-20\nSep-20\nNov-20\nJan-21\nMar-21\nMay-21\nJul-21\nNickel US$/ton\nCopper US$/ton\nCopper\nNickel (RHS)\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\nJul-20\nAug-20\nSep-20\nOct-20\nNov-20\nDec-20\nJan-21\nFeb-21\nMar-21\nApr-21\nMay-21\nJun-21\nJul-21\nUS$/barrel\n \n \n \n6 \n \nbillion in July 2021. The increase largely \nreflected \nexpansion \nin \nforeign \ncurrency \naccounts (FCA) deposits in the banking system. \nLocal currency deposits in broad money also \nregistered a growth of 261.99%, over the year to \nJuly 2021, while currency in circulation \nincreased by 96.70%. \nFigure 4: Composition of Money Supply \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2021 \n \nBroad money registered a year-on-year increase \nof 150.01% in July 2021, compared to a peak of \n674.5% in July 2020. The annual growth largely \nreflected \nincreases \nin \nother \nfinancial \ncorporations, 338.97%; credit to private sector, \n253.18%; and net claims on Government, \n115.88%. \nMonth – on - month, domestic claims increased \nby 9.41%, to ZW$186.19 billion, largely driven \nby increases in net claims on government, \n32.02%; credit on the private sector, 7.50%; and \nother financial corporations, 4.82%. \nCredit to the private sector was mainly extended \ntowards \nagriculture, \n30.70%; \nhouseholds, \n17.7%; \ndistribution, \n12.98%; \nfinancial \norganizations, 10.81%; and manufacturing, \n9.87%, as shown in Figure 10. \n \nFigure 5: Distribution of Private Sector Credit \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2021 \n \nCredit to the private sector was largely \nchanneled towards inventory build-up, 35.55%; \nother recurrent expenditures, 29.17%; and fixed \ncapital investment, 18.85%. \n \n \nSTOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS \n \nDuring the month of July 2021, the Zimbabwe \nStock Exchange (ZSE) continued on a bullish \ntrajectory, for the ninth consecutive month, as \nreflected by gains in all major indices. \n \nThe All Share, Top 10 and Medium Cap indices \ngained 10.06%, 15.39% and 2.71% to close at \n6 818.29 points, 3 639.99 points and 17 739.47 \npoints, respectively. The resource index gained \n6.60% to close at 4 188.45 points. \nLocal \nCurrency \nTransferable \ndeposits\n49.16%\nForeign \nCurrency \nDeposits\n42.70%\nTime \nDeposits\n6.97%\nCurrency in \nCirculation\n0.72%\nNCDs\n0.46%\nHouseholds\n17.70%\nAgriculture\n30.70%\nMining\n6.72%\nManufacturing\n9.87%\nDistribution\n12.98%\nConstruction\n1.00%\nTransport & \nCommunicati\nons\n1.75%\nServices\n8.40%\nFinancial Org. \n& Investments\n10.86%\nOther\n0.01%\n \n \n \n7 \n \nFigure 6: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange All \nShare and Top 10 Indices \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2021 \n \nAs a consequence of mixed trading activity on \nthe ZSE, during the period under analysis, the \ncumulative volume and value of shares traded \ndeclined to 181.01 million shares and ZW$2.92 \nbillion, respectively. \n \nThe proportion of foreign purchases to the value \nof shares traded improved to 7.70%, compared \nto 3.36% recorded in the previous month. \nConcomitantly, \nthe \nnet \nforeign \nposition \nimproved to an outflow of ZW$232.85 million, \nfrom a net outflow of ZW$1.81 billion recorded \nin June 2021. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFigure 7: ZSE Monthly Volumes and Values \nTraded \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2021 \nNotable demand for some selected blue-chip \ncounters resulted in the ZSE gaining ZW$58.72 \nbillion, or 7.88% worth of capitalization, to \nZW$803.90 billion. \n \nINFLATION OUTTURN \n \nAnnual Inflation \n \nAnnual \ninflation \ndeclined \nsharply, \nfrom \n106.64% in June 2021 to 56.37% in July 2021. \n \nContinued stability in the exchange rate, on the \nforeign exchange auction market, continued to \nkeep inflation under check. Both food and non-\nfood inflation registered declines. \n \nFood inflation slowed down from 108.64% in \nJune 2021 to 55.09% in July 2021, reflecting \nimproved agricultural output compared to the \nprevious year. \n \nAnnual non-food inflation also decelerated to \n57.33% in July 2021, from 105.12% in June \n2021. \n \n0.00\n2,100.00\n4,200.00\n6,300.00\n8,400.00\n10,500.00\n12,600.00\n14,700.00\n200\n1200\n2200\n3200\n4200\n5200\n6200\n7200\n31-Jul-20\n31-Aug-20\n30-Sep-20\n31-Oct-20\n30-Nov-20\n31-Dec-20\n31-Jan-21\n28-Feb-21\n31-Mar-21\n30-Apr-21\n31-May-21\n30-Jun-21\n31-Jul-21\nAll Share Index\nTop 10 Index\nMining Index\n0\n500\n1,000\n1,500\n2,000\n2,500\n3,000\n3,500\n4,000\n4,500\n5,000\n0\n400\n800\n1,200\n1,600\n2,000\n2,400\n2,800\nJul-20\nAug-20\nSep-20\nOct-20\nNov-20\nDec-20\nJan-21\nFeb-21\nMar-21\nApr-21\nMay-21\nJun-21\nJul-21\nValues Traded (ZW$ millions)\nVolumes Traded (milions)\nVolume\nTurnover\n \n \n \n8 \n \nAnnual blended CPI inflation2 decelerated \nsharply to 21.61% in July 2021, from 40.91% in \nJune 2021. \n \nMonthly Inflation \n \nThe ZW$ monthly inflation declined from \n3.88% in June 2021 to 2.56% in July 2021, on \naccount of both food and non-food inflation. \n \nMonthly food inflation slowed down from \n3.21% in June 2021 to 2.51% in July 2021, \nweighed down by declines in food categories \namong them, meat, oils and fats and fruits. \nIncreases were, however recorded for bread and \ncereals, vegetables, fish and seafood, and coffee, \ntea and cocoa. \n \nNon-food inflation declined from 4.38% in June \nto 2.6% in July 2021. \n \nFigure 8: Month-on-Month Inflation (%) \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2021 \n \n2The Zimbabwe National Statistical Agency (ZIMSTAT) \ncommenced publication of the blended CPI inflation in June \n2020. The blended CPI inflation combines the average changes \nMonthly blended inflation also retreated \nsignificantly, from 4.49% in June 2021 to 0.67% \nin July 2021, due to declines in both food and \nnon-food inflation. \n \nNATIONAL PAYMENTS SYSTEM \n \nThe total value of transactions processed \nthrough the National Payments System (NPS) \nincreased by 2.71% to close at ZW$613.25 \nbillion in July 2021, from ZW$597.08 billion in \nthe previous month. NPS transaction volumes \nalso increased by 2.98% to close at 120.96 \nmillion, during the same month. \n \nZimbabwe Electronic Transfer Settlement \nSystem (ZETSS) \n \nReal Time Gross Settlement System (RTGS) \ntransactions increased from ZW$388.76 billion \nin the previous month, to close at ZW$379.66 \nbillion in July 2021. The volume of RTGS \ntransactions stood at 1.03 million in July 2021, \ncompared to 1.08 million transactions in June \n2021. \nFigure 9: ZETSS Volumes and Values \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2021 \nin price of goods and services sold in the two main currencies in \ncirculation, namely the ZW$ and the US$. \n0.00%\n10.00%\n20.00%\n30.00%\n40.00%\n50.00%\n60.00%\nJun-20\nJul-20\nAug-20\nSep-20\nOct-20\nNov-20\nDec-20\nJan-21\nFeb-21\nMar-21\nApr-21\nMay-21\nJun-21\nJul-21\nFood\nNon-Food\nOverall\n -\n 100.0\n 200.0\n 300.0\n 400.0\n 500.0\n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1000\n1200\nJul-20\nAug-20\nSep-20\nOct-20\nNov-20\nDec-20\nJan-21\nFeb-21\nMar-21\nApr-21\nMay-21\nJun-21\nJul-21\nValue in ZW$ Billions\nVolume in Thousands\nVolume\nValue\n \n \n \n9 \n \nCash Transactions \n \nCash based transactions declined by 10.18% to \nclose at ZW$13.58 billion in July 2021, from \nZW$15.12 billion in the previous month. \nMobile and Internet Based Transactions \n \nMobile \nand \ninternet-based \ntransactions \nincreased from ZW$166.58 billion in June 2021, \nto close at ZW$185.40 billion in July 2021. \nCard Based Transactions \n \nDuring the month of July 2021, card-based \ntransactions rose by 15.44% to close at \nZW$48.18 billion, from ZW$41.47 billion \nrecorded in the preceeding month. \n \nRESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE \n \n10 \n \nStatistical Tables \n \nMonetary Statistics \n 1. Depository Corporations Survey \n \n \n \n12 \n 2. Central Bank Survey \n \n \n \n \n \n \n13 \n \n3. Other Depository Corporations Survey \n \n \n \n \n14 \n Other Depository Corporations \n \n4.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n15 \n 4.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n16 \n Commercial Banks \n 5.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n17 \n 5.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n18 \n Building Societies \n 6.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n19 \n 6.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n20 \n Sectoral Analysis of Bank Loans and Advances and Deposits \n \n7.1 Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks Loans and Advances \n21 \n \n7.2 Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks Deposits \n \n \n22 \n Interest Rates \n \n8.1 Lending Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n23 \n \n8.2 Banks Deposit Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n24 \n \n Inflation \n \n9.1 Monthly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n25 \n \n9.2 Yearly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n26 \n External Statistics \n \n10. Total External Debt Outstanding by Debtor \n \n \n \n27 \n 11. Exchange Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n28 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n11 \n \n12. Zimbabwe Stock Market Statistics \n \n \n \n \n 29 \n \n 13. National Payments System Statistics \n \n \n \n \n13.1 Values of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n 30 \n \n13.2 Volumes of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n 31 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n12 \n \n \n TABLE 1: DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS SURVEY ($'000)\nJul-20\nAug-20\nSep-20\nOct-20\nNov-20\nDec-20\nJan-21\nFeb-21\nMar-21\nApr-21\nMay-21\nJun-21\nJul-21\nNet Foreign Assets\n-309,340,585.00\n-323,918,937.77\n-317,370,813.35\n-327,434,598.03\n-322,916,992.61\n-316,766,634.64\n-328,526,094.64\n-340,106,496.40\n-327,297,184.10\n-319,268,915.42\n-328,642,322.20\n-303,317,411.71\n-290,181,081.59\nCentral Bank(net)\n-366,357,650.73\n-391,303,802.50\n-386,104,783.47\n-398,503,742.75\n-398,165,536.09\n-392,036,907.50\n-406,631,588.87\n-411,000,792.44\n-404,663,451.67\n-402,310,198.93\n-418,533,821.61\n-408,677,935.81\n-412,168,208.49\nForeign Assets\n23,630,101.57\n27,645,575.83\n24,043,853.69\n24,017,722.16\n23,436,187.04\n14,624,495.02\n18,687,105.42\n17,867,062.65\n23,240,104.56\n18,115,014.41\n20,334,177.22\n33,139,183.22\n21,826,441.05\nForeign Liabilities\n389,987,752.30\n418,949,378.32\n410,148,637.16\n422,521,464.91\n421,601,723.13\n406,661,402.52\n425,318,694.30\n428,867,855.10\n427,903,556.24\n420,425,213.34\n438,867,998.83\n441,817,119.03\n433,994,649.54\nOther Depository Corporations(net)\n57,017,065.73\n67,384,864.72\n68,733,970.12\n71,069,144.72\n75,248,543.48\n75,270,272.86\n78,105,494.23\n70,894,296.04\n77,366,267.57\n83,041,283.51\n89,891,499.41\n105,360,524.10\n121,987,126.91\nForeign Assets\n72,022,862.19\n84,210,291.97\n83,986,978.02\n85,970,018.68\n90,081,991.05\n89,458,700.13\n93,882,385.99\n86,920,278.98\n92,405,865.60\n98,837,092.48\n106,013,344.18\n120,848,426.81\n138,070,452.02\nForeign Liabilities\n15,005,796.46\n16,825,427.25\n15,253,007.90\n14,900,873.96\n14,833,447.57\n14,188,427.27\n15,776,891.76\n16,025,982.94\n15,039,598.02\n15,795,808.97\n16,121,844.77\n15,487,902.71\n16,083,325.11\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n441,599,870.68\n470,066,520.53\n471,206,354.87\n497,207,430.71\n507,265,762.28\n521,691,490.51\n549,010,656.62\n566,288,275.77\n561,575,884.82\n581,351,630.28\n610,249,806.36\n606,251,821.19\n620,837,934.22\nDomestic Claims\n59,894,402.15\n62,852,286.66\n63,493,587.42\n80,786,149.78\n88,712,115.98\n101,159,726.29\n108,399,214.96\n127,374,579.36\n124,267,139.59\n149,907,978.82\n158,719,727.00\n170,177,222.61\n186,187,386.15\nClaims on Central Government(net)\n14,475,978.36\n11,939,163.62\n9,165,660.28\n16,233,346.76\n18,766,373.80\n23,276,846.68\n15,698,011.65\n25,682,635.40\n19,242,767.82\n28,124,843.48\n29,989,668.04\n23,670,319.48\n31,250,109.35\nClaims on Central Government\n25,495,963.30\n25,856,421.22\n24,510,261.70\n26,940,376.62\n28,442,906.62\n37,789,748.86\n34,941,802.63\n43,864,745.10\n43,295,379.13\n47,281,011.39\n47,535,251.17\n42,113,825.79\n45,934,145.83\nCentral Bank\n18,731,582.60\n18,958,846.78\n17,824,429.35\n18,854,638.49\n19,461,417.62\n25,693,679.77\n24,602,411.40\n24,790,733.37\n25,677,529.11\n27,876,847.35\n28,316,386.84\n24,485,145.35\n22,756,201.65\nODCs\n6,764,380.71\n6,897,574.44\n6,685,832.35\n8,085,738.13\n8,981,489.00\n12,096,069.09\n10,339,391.23\n19,074,011.73\n17,617,850.02\n19,404,164.04\n19,218,864.33\n17,628,680.44\n23,177,944.18\nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n11,019,984.94\n13,917,257.60\n15,344,601.42\n10,707,029.86\n9,676,532.82\n14,512,902.18\n19,243,790.98\n18,182,109.70\n24,052,611.30\n19,156,167.92\n17,545,583.13\n18,443,506.31\n14,684,036.48\nCentral Bank\n9,288,102.23\n13,066,429.55\n13,813,071.38\n8,907,284.36\n8,106,585.00\n10,172,875.57\n13,790,121.07\n13,393,897.55\n19,176,804.49\n13,773,623.14\n10,713,013.71\n12,148,239.95\n9,633,323.77\nODCs\n1,731,882.71\n850,828.05\n1,531,530.04\n1,799,745.50\n1,569,947.81\n4,340,026.60\n5,453,669.91\n4,788,212.16\n4,875,806.82\n5,382,544.78\n6,832,569.42\n6,295,266.36\n5,050,712.71\nClaims on Other Sectors\n45,418,423.79\n50,913,123.04\n54,327,927.14\n64,552,803.02\n69,945,742.18\n77,882,879.61\n92,701,203.31\n101,691,943.96\n105,024,371.77\n121,783,135.35\n128,730,058.96\n146,506,903.14\n154,937,276.80\nOther Financial Corporations\n1,010,123.42\n298,579.49\n338,002.03\n1,398,438.67\n1,450,895.49\n606,276.57\n396,273.97\n881,815.56\n2,676,383.43\n4,857,921.34\n2,161,647.81\n4,230,396.18\n4,434,113.69\nState and Local Government\n25,961.37\n27,859.83\n35,174.26\n34,462.77\n28,449.36\n37,924.29\n28,196.82\n31,854.73\n30,050.30\n20,366.90\n23,547.12\n84,251.94\n73,757.06\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n5,154,947.39\n3,941,697.68\n4,796,976.15\n6,006,655.50\n5,000,659.17\n2,578,274.18\n8,366,572.13\n8,849,870.48\n7,837,908.59\n9,126,830.60\n9,187,412.56\n12,075,547.93\n10,556,580.34\nPrivate Sector\n39,227,391.60\n46,644,986.05\n49,157,774.70\n57,113,246.08\n63,465,738.17\n74,660,404.58\n83,910,160.40\n91,928,403.19\n94,480,029.44\n107,778,016.50\n117,357,451.47\n130,116,707.10\n139,872,825.71\nCentral Bank\n184,094.09\n184,679.11\n185,814.45\n1,223,752.47\n697,643.23\n703,343.34\n744,529.53\n755,476.31\n910,752.95\n1,181,305.42\n1,264,177.93\n1,489,123.82\n1,556,259.01\nODCs\n39,043,297.50\n46,460,306.94\n48,971,960.25\n55,889,493.61\n62,768,094.94\n73,957,061.25\n83,165,630.87\n91,172,926.88\n93,569,276.49\n106,596,711.09\n116,093,273.55\n128,627,583.28\n138,316,566.70\nOther Items(Net)\n-381,705,468.53 -407,214,233.87 -407,712,767.45 -416,421,280.93 -418,553,646.30 -420,531,764.21 -440,611,441.66 -438,913,696.40 -437,308,745.22 -431,443,651.46 -451,530,079.36 -436,074,598.58 -434,650,548.07\nShares and Other Equity\n-359,843,502.38\n-393,275,806.44\n-386,761,250.11\n-392,085,071.73\n-397,700,402.79\n-390,151,578.46\n-408,061,464.88\n-410,347,885.65\n-411,006,941.09\n-396,650,639.28\n-415,482,334.99\n-421,159,006.94\n-420,923,101.54\nLiabilities to Other Financial Corporations\n348,728.32\n422,486.38\n372,163.87\n441,747.71\n423,616.80\n292,018.63\n376,668.85\n609,870.31\n408,850.46\n409,882.68\n429,002.92\n462,598.19\n552,817.90\nRestricted Deposits\n1,726,243.32\n4,057,817.74\n1,036,012.77\n1,208,834.37\n2,648,204.14\n835,126.11\n718,690.98\n252,287.94\n71,982.41\n72,859.61\n67,378.71\n73,532.53\n85,289.04\nDeposits and Securities Excluded from Broad Money\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nOther Items(net)\n-23,936,937.79\n-18,418,731.56\n-22,359,693.99\n-25,986,791.29\n-23,925,064.43\n-31,507,330.50\n-33,645,336.61\n-29,427,969.01\n-26,782,637.00\n-35,275,754.48\n-36,544,126.00\n-15,451,722.36\n-14,365,553.48\nBroad Money-M3\n132,259,285.68\n146,147,582.76\n153,835,541.52\n169,772,832.69\n184,348,769.67\n204,924,855.86\n220,484,561.98\n226,181,779.37\n234,278,700.72\n262,082,714.87\n281,607,484.16\n302,934,409.48\n330,656,852.64\nSecurities Other than Shares Included in Broad Money\n1,024,311.11\n1,111,664.44\n1,083,907.10\n1,231,944.90\n1,237,340.99\n1,436,202.84\n1,422,437.87\n1,457,355.54\n1,641,213.33\n1,503,791.55\n1,525,849.38\n1,559,661.34\n1,523,179.12\nBroad Money-M2\n131,234,974.57\n145,035,918.32\n152,751,634.42\n168,540,887.79\n183,111,428.68\n203,488,653.02\n219,062,124.11\n224,724,423.83\n232,637,487.38\n260,578,923.31\n280,081,634.78\n301,374,748.14\n329,133,673.52\nOther Deposits\n6,047,153.88\n5,431,611.26\n6,935,433.58\n8,397,139.11\n8,997,813.50\n9,906,844.70\n11,351,477.37\n13,946,713.28\n14,168,053.71\n13,701,776.00\n18,359,658.93\n21,395,598.04\n23,035,262.46\nNarrow Money-M1\n125,187,820.69\n139,604,307.06\n145,816,200.84\n160,143,748.68\n174,113,615.18\n193,581,808.32\n207,710,646.74\n210,777,710.55\n218,469,433.68\n246,877,147.31\n261,721,975.85\n279,979,150.10\n306,098,411.06\nTransferable Deposits\n123,981,130.10\n138,523,712.90\n144,756,556.77\n159,085,591.39\n173,047,801.52\n192,383,729.76\n206,490,526.41\n209,569,292.32\n216,776,481.85\n245,066,101.47\n259,978,003.99\n277,785,152.96\n303,724,801.01\n Of which Foreign Currency Accounts\n79,076,606.18\n86,014,194.25\n92,191,134.58\n97,621,848.10\n102,185,943.24\n103,728,205.33\n108,593,568.84\n109,661,714.64\n115,035,082.24\n117,770,638.10\n127,553,941.47\n133,630,862.77\n141,174,811.64\nCurrency Outside Depository Corporations\n1,206,690.59\n1,080,594.16\n1,059,644.06\n1,058,157.28\n1,065,813.65\n1,198,078.56\n1,220,120.33\n1,208,418.23\n1,692,951.82\n1,811,045.84\n1,743,971.86\n2,193,997.15\n2,373,610.05\nMemorandum Items\nReserve Money\n16,145,434.53\n12,383,054.95\n12,732,319.53\n15,522,125.70\n18,424,345.96\n18,762,395.12\n21,824,780.59\n22,377,634.26\n19,248,051.52\n22,620,090.06\n26,215,258.96\n24,844,800.65\n24,944,722.36\nFCAs as a Percentage of Deposits in M3\n60.3%\n59.3%\n60.3%\n57.9%\n55.8%\n50.9%\n49.5%\n48.7%\n49.5%\n45.2%\n45.6%\n44.4%\n43.0%\nEnd Period Exchange Rate\n76.76\n83.40\n81.44\n81.35\n81.82\n81.79\n82.68\n83.89\n84.40\n84.50\n84.73\n85.42\n85.64\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2021\nNotes:\n(i) Depository corporations survey - formerly Monetary Survey.\n(ii) Broad money redefined using IMF's Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual of 2000. Major changes include exclusion of Government deposits held by banks from broad money.\n(iii) Transferable deposits made up of demand and savings deposits.\n(iv) NCDs are also referred to as securities included in broad money.\n(v) All classes of time deposits, short and long term are classified as time deposits, which are also termed other deposits.\n(vi) Credit to the private sector now excludes claims on other financial corporations, as well as claims on state and local government (local authorities)\n(vii) Depository corporations made up of the Central Bank and other depository corporations\n(viii) Other depository corporations (ODCs) - Commercial banks, merchant banks, building societies and POSB.\n(ix) In December 2017, the statistics were adjusted in restrospect by reclassifying Securities issued under Aftrades from claims on government to claims on central bank\n(x) In December 2017, the statistics were adjusted in restrospect by reclassifying amounts accessed by banks under the Aftrades from liabilities to Other Depository corporations and Other Financial Corporations to liabilities to Central Bank \n(xi) In December 2018, statistics were revised from November 2017 due to reclassification of lines of credit (foreign liabilities) that were initially classified as deposits included in broad money\n(xii) All monetary and financial statistics are valued in ZWL$ since the introduction of the interbank foreign exchange market in February 2019\n \n \n \n13 \n \n \nJul-20\nAug-20\nSep-20\nOct-20\nNov-20\nDec-20\nJan-21\nFeb-21\nMar-21\nApr-21\nMay-21\nJun-21\nNet Foreign Assets\n-366,357,650.73\n-391,303,802.50\n-386,104,783.47\n-398,503,742.75\n-398,165,536.09\n-392,036,907.50\n-406,631,588.87\n-411,000,792.44\n-404,663,451.67\n-402,310,198.93\n-418,533,821.61\n-408,677,935.81\nClaims on Non Residents\n23,630,101.57\n27,645,575.83\n24,043,853.69\n24,017,722.16\n23,436,187.04\n14,624,495.02\n18,687,105.42\n17,867,062.65\n23,240,104.56\n18,115,014.41\n20,334,177.22\n33,139,183.22\nOfficial Reserves Assets\n12,511,281.83\n15,651,918.68\n12,374,572.35\n12,357,598.03\n11,668,298.64\n2,786,278.07\n6,677,598.06\n5,651,394.24\n11,051,852.30\n7,205,335.48\n9,390,079.67\n22,273,252.21\nOther Foreign Assets\n11,118,819.74\n11,993,657.14\n11,669,281.34\n11,660,124.13\n11,767,888.40\n11,838,216.95\n12,009,507.37\n12,215,668.41\n12,188,252.26\n10,909,678.93\n10,944,097.54\n10,865,931.01\nLess Liabilities to Non Residents\n389,987,752.30\n418,949,378.32\n410,148,637.16\n422,521,464.91\n421,601,723.13\n406,661,402.52\n425,318,694.30\n428,867,855.10\n427,903,556.24\n420,425,213.34\n438,867,998.83\n441,817,119.03\nShort Term Liabilities\n179,874,148.53\n193,114,218.14\n190,611,160.64\n190,817,851.33\n189,287,948.45\n187,885,613.69\n192,806,142.21\n194,818,587.99\n195,017,951.26\n196,412,895.15\n215,118,073.59\n219,691,932.32\nOther Foreign Liabilities*\n210,113,603.77\n225,835,160.18\n219,537,476.52\n231,703,613.58\n232,313,774.68\n218,775,788.84\n232,512,552.09\n234,049,267.11\n232,885,604.97\n224,012,318.18\n223,749,925.24\n222,125,186.70\n of which blocked funds\n171,686,088.39\n184,824,435.01\n179,488,881.37\n191,557,287.91\n191,564,844.22\n177,624,192.87\n190,969,111.27\n191,664,044.89\n191,174,087.59\n181,636,605.52\n181,088,588.70\n179,118,601.53\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n382,503,085.26\n403,686,857.45\n398,837,103.00\n414,025,868.46\n416,589,882.06\n410,799,302.62\n428,456,369.46\n433,378,426.70\n423,911,503.19\n424,930,288.99\n444,749,080.57\n433,522,736.46\nDomestic Claims\n13,930,835.24\n9,173,375.62\n8,137,864.08\n16,330,004.87\n15,975,321.34\n17,721,762.12\n18,864,046.83\n20,211,944.02\n14,624,071.75\n24,589,033.83\n28,240,574.97\n25,962,204.03\nNet Claims on Central Government\n9,443,480.36\n5,892,417.23\n4,011,357.97\n9,947,354.13\n11,354,832.62\n15,520,804.20\n10,812,290.33\n11,396,835.82\n6,500,724.62\n14,103,224.21\n17,603,373.13\n12,336,905.40\nClaims on Central Government\n18,731,582.60\n18,958,846.78\n17,824,429.35\n18,854,638.49\n19,461,417.62\n25,693,679.77\n24,602,411.40\n24,790,733.37\n25,677,529.11\n27,876,847.35\n28,316,386.84\n24,485,145.35\nOf which: Securities Other than Shares\n6,348,432.53\n6,274,326.46\n6,194,697.32\n6,101,509.11\n6,051,655.92\n6,035,224.38\n6,165,262.55\n6,095,109.16\n5,962,815.29\n5,871,229.64\n5,850,605.06\n5,809,922.68\nLoans\n12,383,150.07\n12,684,520.32\n11,629,732.03\n12,753,129.37\n13,409,761.69\n19,658,455.39\n18,437,148.85\n18,695,624.21\n19,714,713.82\n22,005,617.72\n22,465,781.78\n18,675,222.67\n Loans and Advances\n8,377,024.21\n8,672,446.67\n7,617,711.22\n8,740,654.93\n9,388,431.71\n15,645,165.82\n14,425,116.65\n14,682,354.29\n15,701,443.90\n17,997,932.14\n18,458,096.20\n14,666,539.96\n Legacy Debt\n394,560.01\n400,507.80\n400,454.97\n400,908.59\n409,764.14\n401,723.73\n400,466.35\n401,704.08\n401,704.08\n396,119.73\n396,119.74\n397,116.86\n Export Incentives\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n9,288,102.23\n13,066,429.55\n13,813,071.38\n8,907,284.36\n8,106,585.00\n10,172,875.57\n13,790,121.07\n13,393,897.55\n19,176,804.49\n13,773,623.14\n10,713,013.71\n12,148,239.95\nOf which: Deposits\n9,288,102.23\n13,066,429.55\n13,813,071.38\n8,907,284.36\n8,106,585.00\n10,172,875.57\n13,790,121.07\n13,393,897.55\n19,176,804.49\n13,773,623.14\n10,713,013.71\n12,148,239.95\nOther \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nClaims on Other Sectors\n4,487,354.87\n3,280,958.40\n4,126,506.11\n6,382,650.74\n4,620,488.72\n2,200,957.92\n8,051,756.50\n8,815,108.19\n8,123,347.12\n10,485,809.62\n10,637,201.84\n13,625,298.64\nOther Financial Corporations\n199,979.99\n200,871.01\n194,092.65\n191,304.06\n192,148.23\n188,349.05\n204,933.06\n703,425.29\n703,645.95\n1,533,608.33\n1,602,101.94\n1,591,946.54\nState and Local Government\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n4,103,280.79\n2,895,408.28\n3,746,599.01\n4,967,594.21\n3,730,697.26\n1,309,265.53\n7,102,293.92\n7,356,206.59\n6,508,948.22\n7,770,895.87\n7,770,921.98\n10,544,228.28\nPrivate Sector\n184,094.09\n184,679.11\n185,814.45\n1,223,752.47\n697,643.23\n703,343.34\n744,529.53\n755,476.31\n910,752.95\n1,181,305.42\n1,264,177.93\n1,489,123.82\nClaims on Other Depository Corporations\n2,971,403.60\n3,064,656.78\n2,842,129.71\n2,887,258.50\n2,988,284.32\n3,684,021.80\n2,564,013.70\n2,678,324.79\n2,055,511.30\n2,433,322.77\n3,018,822.69\n3,426,911.18\nOf which: Loans\n2,971,403.60\n3,064,656.78\n2,842,129.71\n2,887,258.50\n2,988,284.32\n3,684,021.80\n2,564,013.70\n2,678,324.79\n2,055,511.30\n2,433,322.77\n3,018,822.69\n3,426,911.18\nOther Liabilities to ODCs\n31,484,074.13\n36,504,621.50\n37,868,889.89\n35,078,524.21\n43,158,130.62\n53,880,036.70\n52,386,928.65\n59,780,016.83\n67,223,250.63\n68,479,829.04\n74,078,427.51\n91,366,745.03\nOf which: Aftrades Balances\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n Securities\n13,291,243.49\n14,580,745.12\n13,851,775.48\n9,084,137.29\n11,687,723.67\n22,262,484.07\n29,594,641.97\n31,870,831.11\n32,826,932.93\n33,556,990.26\n41,514,984.85\n45,976,776.82\nOther Items(Net)\n-397,084,920.55\n-427,953,446.54\n-425,725,999.11\n-429,887,129.29\n-440,784,407.01\n-443,273,555.40\n-459,415,237.58\n-470,268,174.72\n-474,455,170.78\n-466,387,761.43\n-487,568,110.43\n-495,500,366.27\nShares and Other Equity\n-396,135,173.94\n-433,060,072.45\n-427,106,363.79\n-433,463,716.88\n-441,933,638.10\n-442,191,359.79\n-459,147,547.11\n-467,159,156.05\n-471,095,071.67\n-458,343,431.18\n-477,762,942.16\n-486,305,203.47\nOther Items(Net)\n-2,675,989.93\n-2,358,189.93\n-3,416,387.63\n-3,309,230.72\n-3,537,819.62\n-3,242,652.80\n-1,473,280.48\n-4,426,426.77\n-4,965,601.97\n-9,430,994.41\n-10,971,526.97\n-9,911,933.75\nLiabilities to Other Resident Sectors\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nDeposits and Securities Excluded from Base Mon\n1,726,243.32\n7,464,815.83\n4,796,752.30\n6,885,818.31\n4,687,050.70\n2,160,457.19\n1,205,590.01\n1,317,408.10\n1,605,502.86\n1,386,664.16\n1,166,358.70\n716,770.95\n0.17\nMonetary Base \n16,145,434.53\n12,383,054.95\n12,732,319.53\n15,522,125.70\n18,424,345.96\n18,762,395.12\n21,824,780.59\n22,377,634.26\n19,248,051.52\n22,620,090.06\n26,215,258.96\n24,844,800.65\nBond Coins\n99,709.22\n99,709.27\n99,709.34\n99,709.54\n99,709.66\n2,375,925.99\n99,709.66\n99,709.73\n99,709.87\n99,709.99\n99,710.09\n99,710.14\nBond Notes\n1,797,797.97\n1,955,979.19\n2,044,143.53\n2,022,625.16\n2,029,709.06\n99,709.69\n2,603,693.97\n2,847,426.23\n3,050,378.36\n3,152,287.93\n3,550,401.56\n3,797,075.30\nLiabilities to ODCs\n11,457,457.43\n10,063,539.06\n10,250,353.16\n13,378,590.41\n15,910,190.58\n16,386,469.12\n19,121,376.95\n19,430,498.30\n16,097,963.29\n19,368,092.13\n22,565,147.30\n20,948,015.21\n Reserve Deposits\n1,049,647.55\n1,237,283.94\n1,401,898.97\n1,678,661.09\n2,008,569.51\n2,199,092.20\n2,444,129.79\n4,799,500.58\n5,160,139.38\n5,730,094.93\n6,659,921.67\n7,269,076.19\n Exess reserves \n10,407,809.87\n8,826,255.12\n8,848,454.19\n11,699,929.32\n13,901,621.07\n14,187,376.93\n16,677,247.16\n14,630,997.72\n10,937,823.91\n13,637,997.20\n15,905,225.63\n13,678,939.03\nPrivate Deposits\n2,790,469.91\n263,827.44\n338,113.50\n21,200.60\n384,736.66\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2021\n Provisional until audit is completed\n NB: * Other Foreign Liabilities include blocked funds amounting to USD2.2 billion assumed by the Central Bank on behalf of Government.\nTABLE 2: CENTRAL BANK SURVEY ($'000)\n \n \n \n14 \n \n \n TABLE 3 : OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS SURVEY ( $ '000)\nJul-20\nAug-20\nSep-20\nOct-20\nNov-20\nDec-20\nJan-21\nFeb-21\nMar-21\nApr-21\nMay-21\nJun-21\nNet Foreign Assets\n57,017,065.73\n67,384,864.72\n68,733,970.12\n71,069,144.72\n75,248,543.48\n75,270,272.86\n78,105,494.23\n70,894,296.04\n77,366,267.57\n77,366,267.57\n77,366,267.57\n105,360,524.10\nClaims on Non Residents\n72,022,862.19\n84,210,291.97\n83,986,978.02\n85,970,018.68\n90,081,991.05\n89,458,700.13\n93,882,385.99\n86,920,278.98\n92,405,865.60\n92,405,865.60\n92,405,865.60\n120,848,426.81\nOf Which: Foreign Currency\n18,357,028.29\n28,776,016.24\n30,217,561.04\n32,235,029.76\n34,673,918.84\n39,886,775.04\n42,733,946.30\n41,025,473.91\n40,953,342.99\n40,953,342.99\n40,953,342.99\n30,255,551.49\nDeposits\n53,559,656.10\n55,319,393.27\n53,657,586.61\n53,623,468.12\n55,308,353.64\n49,426,810.30\n50,993,755.75\n45,711,660.09\n51,250,447.13\n51,250,447.13\n51,250,447.13\n90,381,891.07\nOther\n106,177.81\n114,882.47\n111,830.36\n111,520.80\n99,718.57\n145,114.78\n154,683.94\n183,144.98\n202,075.48\n202,075.48\n202,075.48\n210,984.25\nLess Liabilities to Non Residents\n15,005,796.46\n16,825,427.25\n15,253,007.90\n14,900,873.96\n14,833,447.57\n14,188,427.27\n15,776,891.76\n16,025,982.94\n15,039,598.02\n15,039,598.02\n15,039,598.02\n15,487,902.71\nOf Which: Deposits\n5,065,144.06\n5,996,405.81\n4,800,281.08\n4,449,027.74\n4,387,729.22\n3,826,796.90\n4,683,800.54\n4,962,383.04\n4,425,775.68\n4,425,775.68\n4,425,775.68\n4,258,022.10\nLoans\n9,940,652.40\n10,829,021.44\n10,452,726.81\n10,451,846.22\n10,445,718.35\n10,361,630.37\n11,093,091.22\n11,063,599.89\n10,613,822.34\n10,613,822.34\n10,613,822.34\n11,229,880.61\nOther\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n71,245,059.44\n74,011,298.35\n79,943,074.31\n91,947,346.14\n105,610,829.31\n127,131,173.37\n140,672,048.38\n153,013,944.93\n153,685,960.87\n153,685,960.87\n153,685,960.87\n194,736,649.82\nDomestic Claims\n45,963,566.91\n53,678,911.04\n55,355,723.35\n64,456,144.91\n72,736,794.64\n83,427,964.18\n89,535,168.13\n107,162,635.34\n109,643,067.84\n109,643,067.84\n109,643,067.84\n144,215,018.58\nNet Claims on Central Government\n5,032,498.00\n6,046,746.39\n5,154,302.32\n6,285,992.63\n7,411,541.18\n7,756,042.48\n4,885,721.32\n14,285,799.58\n12,742,043.20\n12,742,043.20\n12,742,043.20\n11,333,414.08\nClaims on Central Government\n6,764,380.71\n6,897,574.44\n6,685,832.35\n8,085,738.13\n8,981,489.00\n12,096,069.09\n10,339,391.23\n19,074,011.73\n17,617,850.02\n17,617,850.02\n17,617,850.02\n17,628,680.44\nSecurities\n6,760,053.73\n6,883,528.44\n6,676,225.73\n8,068,172.39\n8,961,484.35\n12,072,773.09\n10,322,702.11\n19,049,865.62\n17,602,682.71\n17,602,682.71\n17,602,682.71\n17,610,769.74\nLoans\n4,326.98\n14,046.00\n9,606.62\n17,565.74\n20,004.65\n23,296.00\n16,689.12\n24,146.11\n15,167.30\n15,167.30\n15,167.30\n17,910.70\nOther \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n1,731,882.71\n850,828.05\n1,531,530.04\n1,799,745.50\n1,569,947.81\n4,340,026.60\n5,453,669.91\n4,788,212.16\n4,875,806.82\n4,875,806.82\n4,875,806.82\n6,295,266.36\nOf which: Deposits\n1,731,882.71\n850,828.05\n1,531,530.04\n1,799,745.50\n1,569,947.81\n4,340,026.60\n5,453,669.91\n4,788,212.16\n4,875,806.82\n4,875,806.82\n4,875,806.82\n6,295,266.36\nOther \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nClaims on Other Sectors\n40,931,068.91\n47,632,164.65\n50,201,421.03\n58,170,152.28\n65,325,253.46\n75,671,921.69\n84,649,446.81\n92,876,835.77\n96,901,024.65\n96,901,024.65\n96,901,024.65\n132,881,604.50\nOther Financial Corporations\n810,143.43\n97,708.48\n143,909.38\n1,207,134.60\n1,258,747.26\n407,927.51\n191,340.91\n178,390.27\n1,972,737.48\n1,972,737.48\n1,972,737.48\n2,638,449.64\nState and Local Government\n25,961.37\n27,859.83\n35,174.26\n34,462.77\n28,449.36\n37,924.29\n28,196.82\n31,854.73\n30,050.30\n30,050.30\n30,050.30\n84,251.94\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n1,051,666.60\n1,046,289.40\n1,050,377.14\n1,039,061.29\n1,269,961.90\n1,269,008.65\n1,264,278.21\n1,493,663.89\n1,328,960.37\n1,328,960.37\n1,328,960.37\n1,531,319.65\nPrivate Sector\n39,043,297.50\n46,460,306.94\n48,971,960.25\n55,889,493.61\n62,768,094.94\n73,957,061.25\n83,165,630.87\n91,172,926.88\n93,569,276.49\n93,569,276.49\n93,569,276.49\n128,627,583.28\nClaims on the Central Bank\n54,830,533.49\n55,843,634.83\n57,763,783.89\n68,012,702.35\n74,300,828.81\n77,254,382.86\n79,477,691.43\n74,589,859.15\n84,489,214.72\n84,489,214.72\n84,489,214.72\n77,498,004.69\nCurrency\n690,816.60\n975,094.30\n1,084,208.81\n1,064,177.41\n1,063,605.07\n1,177,847.43\n1,483,283.31\n1,738,717.73\n1,457,136.40\n1,457,136.40\n1,457,136.40\n1,702,788.29\nReserves\n54,139,716.89\n54,868,540.52\n56,679,575.08\n66,948,524.94\n73,237,223.74\n76,076,535.42\n77,994,408.12\n72,851,141.43\n83,032,078.32\n83,032,078.32\n83,032,078.32\n75,795,216.40\nSecurities\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nOther Claims\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nLiabilities to the Central Bank\n1,387,934.10\n1,837,109.59\n1,863,123.11\n1,812,655.13\n1,489,512.69\n1,318,615.34\n391,146.93\n409,213.89\n75,373.50\n75,373.50\n75,373.50\n662,275.52\nOther Items(Net)\n28,161,106.86\n33,674,137.93\n31,313,309.81\n38,708,845.99\n39,937,281.45\n32,232,558.32\n27,949,664.25\n28,329,335.68\n40,370,948.20\n40,370,948.20\n40,370,948.20\n26,314,097.93\nShares and Other Equity\n36,291,671.56\n39,784,266.01\n40,345,113.68\n41,378,645.15\n44,233,235.31\n52,039,781.33\n51,086,082.23\n56,811,270.41\n60,088,130.57\n60,088,130.57\n60,088,130.57\n65,146,196.53\nLiabilities to other ressident sectors\n348,728.32\n422,486.38\n372,163.87\n441,747.71\n423,616.80\n292,018.63\n376,668.85\n609,870.31\n408,850.46\n408,850.46\n408,850.46\n462,598.19\nOther Items(Net)\n-8,479,293.02\n-6,532,614.47\n-9,403,967.74\n-3,111,546.88\n-4,719,570.65\n-20,099,241.64\n-23,513,086.84\n-29,091,805.04\n-20,126,032.83\n-20,126,032.83\n-20,126,032.83\n-39,294,696.79\nDeposits and Securities Included in Broad Money\n128,262,125.18\n141,396,163.08\n148,677,044.43\n163,016,490.87\n180,859,372.79\n202,401,446.22\n218,777,542.62\n223,908,240.98\n231,052,228.44\n231,052,228.44\n231,052,228.44\n300,097,173.91\nDeposits Included in Broad Money\n127,237,814.07\n \n140,284,498.63\n \n147,593,137.33\n \n161,784,545.97\n \n179,622,031.80\n \n200,965,243.38\n \n217,355,104.75\n \n222,450,885.44\n \n229,411,015.11\n \n229,411,015.11\n \n229,411,015.11\n \n298,537,512.57\n \nTransferable Deposits\n121,190,660.19\n \n134,852,887.37\n \n140,657,703.75\n \n153,387,406.86\n \n170,624,218.30\n \n191,058,398.68\n \n206,003,627.38\n \n208,504,172.16\n \n215,242,961.41\n \n215,242,961.41\n \n215,242,961.41\n \n277,141,914.54\n \n of which FCAs\n79,076,606.18\n \n82,607,196.16\n \n88,430,395.05\n \n91,944,864.16\n \n100,147,096.67\n \n102,824,762.68\n \n108,386,216.00\n \n109,466,728.50\n \n114,435,612.97\n \n114,435,612.97\n \n114,435,612.97\n \n133,608,092.81\n \nOther Deposits\n6,047,153.88\n5,431,611.26\n6,935,433.58\n8,397,139.11\n8,997,813.50\n9,906,844.70\n11,351,477.37\n13,946,713.28\n14,168,053.71\n14,168,053.71\n14,168,053.71\n21,395,598.04\nMoney Market Instruments\n1,024,311.11\n \n1,111,664.44\n \n1,083,907.10\n \n1,231,944.90\n \n1,237,340.99\n \n1,436,202.84\n \n1,422,437.87\n \n1,457,355.54\n \n1,641,213.33\n \n1,641,213.33\n \n1,641,213.33\n \n1,559,661.34\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2021\n \n \n \n \n15 \n \n \nForeign\nTOTAL\nEnd of\nNotes\nBond\n&\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \nLocal\nOther \n Notes &\nCoin\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\n1\noca\nGovernemt\nOther2\nGovernment\nLocal \nPublic \n Institutional \nOther cliams\nContigent Assets\nOther Assets\nNon Financial \nCoins\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\nGovernment\nEnterprises\nUnits\nAssets\n2018\nJan\n23.4\n \n66.9\n \n2,528.5\n \n291.2\n \n111.9\n \n81.9\n2,336.0\n34.5\n23.5\n65.9\n26.3\n20.6\n155.3\n3,461.2\n74.6\n501.0\n457.8\n700.8\n10,961.1\nFeb\n20.0\n \n46.8\n \n2,516.8\n \n347.6\n \n114.2\n \n96.2\n2,313.4\n33.5\n23.5\n66.1\n24.3\n21.1\n145.4\n3,527.1\n22.2\n507.8\n434.5\n697.8\n10,958.3\nMar\n16.7\n \n57.9\n \n2,457.7\n \n312.8\n \n139.2\n \n99.5\n2,434.8\n32.8\n23.5\n66.7\n19.2\n15.9\n127.5\n3,637.8\n24.2\n504.1\n487.4\n710.3\n11,168.1\nApr\n14.9\n \n61.9\n \n2,423.5\n \n337.0\n \n120.8\n \n78.5\n2,558.9\n32.0\n24.7\n67.0\n13.4\n20.9\n121.2\n3,674.0\n22.1\n532.0\n459.2\n715.7\n11,277.5\nMay\n14.2\n \n71.7\n \n2,543.0\n \n477.8\n \n138.6\n \n85.7\n2,814.9\n30.9\n25.0\n66.9\n8.4\n20.9\n134.4\n3,740.3\n12.0\n458.9\n457.2\n718.2\n11,819.1\nJun\n9.0\n \n58.5\n \n3,081.0\n \n509.8\n \n120.0\n \n84.1\n2,865.3\n30.1\n26.2\n66.5\n7.4\n19.4\n196.4\n3,829.3\n38.6\n551.4\n448.1\n730.7\n12,671.8\nJul\n20.6\n \n61.9\n \n3,450.6\n \n466.4\n \n111.6\n \n95.4\n3,291.4\n33.3\n0.0\n67.5\n4.5\n21.0\n182.0\n3,500.6\n153.9\n611.4\n472.5\n732.0\n13,276.5\nAug\n23.1\n \n72.3\n \n3,475.7\n \n377.8\n \n105.3\n \n66.3\n3,362.8\n32.2\n0.0\n67.3\n7.1\n20.6\n186.7\n3,585.1\n102.0\n647.7\n489.9\n736.1\n13,358.0\nSep\n18.2\n \n61.5\n \n3,781.6\n \n398.1\n \n159.1\n \n78.0\n3,145.7\n31.2\n45.2\n68.1\n5.4\n20.4\n212.2\n3,734.2\n119.7\n637.4\n527.8\n742.6\n13,786.4\nOct\n39.9\n \n70.4\n \n3,771.3\n \n368.3\n \n185.5\n \n51.4\n3,105.9\n30.2\n45.2\n68.4\n4.6\n9.4\n188.8\n3,838.0\n132.0\n647.5\n537.8\n743.0\n13,837.7\nNov\n30.6\n \n84.6\n \n3,696.3\n \n300.6\n \n209.8\n \n63.9\n3,172.9\n28.9\n45.2\n68.7\n7.0\n8.1\n217.7\n3,813.2\n141.9\n633.2\n581.9\n742.4\n13,846.8\nDec\n20.5\n \n94.5\n \n3,949.5\n \n439.6\n \n235.5\n \n74.8\n3,044.1\n28.0\n43.4\n69.2\n6.2\n9.2\n204.3\n3,870.5\n151.2\n573.8\n612.5\n812.4\n14,239.0\n2019\nJan\n49.0\n \n113.4\n \n3,901.0\n \n401.9\n \n261.6\n \n46.1\n3,038.3\n27.3\n94.6\n68.7\n4.4\n8.1\n189.2\n3,773.5\n109.1\n517.2\n592.3\n827.7\n14,023.5\nFeb\n59.7\n \n256.8\n \n3,764.8\n \n357.1\n \n570.4\n \n205.7\n3,076.4\n26.5\n60.5\n2.0\n5.8\n7.7\n208.3\n3,991.5\n100.5\n490.7\n669.1\n880.0\n14,733.6\nMar\n62.5\n \n263.2\n \n3,891.0\n \n432.9\n \n739.3\n \n55.1\n3,028.8\n25.5\n61.5\n4.5\n4.3\n9.5\n340.7\n3,845.0\n129.0\n523.7\n954.5\n1,205.2\n15,576.2\nApr\n45.2\n \n363.5\n \n4,153.9\n \n578.9\n \n1,031.9\n \n91.7\n2,921.3\n25.0\n61.8\n4.0\n4.0\n9.6\n407.8\n3,899.7\n131.9\n620.5\n1,135.4\n1,304.8\n16,790.9\nMay\n98.7\n \n484.2\n \n4,089.2\n \n694.1\n \n1,890.1\n \n154.1\n2,912.7\n23.9\n62.1\n4.2\n3.9\n9.4\n636.8\n4,303.9\n144.3\n910.1\n2,031.0\n1,532.3\n19,985.1\nJun\n126.3\n \n882.2\n \n4,518.6\n \n560.2\n \n2,383.0\n \n538.9\n2,918.5\n22.6\n63.1\n6.6\n3.9\n8.7\n929.4\n5,011.5\n163.0\n1,606.5\n1,621.9\n2,120.4\n23,485.3\nJul\n232.4\n \n968.8\n \n5,605.6\n \n370.4\n \n3,738.0\n \n801.9\n2,962.9\n22.2\n103.4\n5.5\n2.2\n9.0\n164.6\n5,364.7\n228.7\n1,587.7\n2,124.1\n2,345.3\n26,637.3\nAug\n184.4\n \n1,150.4\n \n7,956.5\n \n527.8\n \n3,904.2\n \n1,050.7\n3,409.1\n21.5\n103.9\n6.8\n1.0\n9.2\n212.5\n5,764.9\n263.2\n2,614.6\n2,149.5\n2,623.2\n31,953.4\nSep\n124.5\n \n2,108.5\n \n9,128.1\n \n874.0\n \n5,678.3\n \n1,575.7\n3,577.4\n20.9\n27.0\n6.5\n1.4\n9.4\n187.5\n6,456.9\n389.5\n3,707.8\n3,665.5\n3,549.9\n41,088.9\nOct\n144.3\n \n1,906.0\n \n11,613.0\n \n2,511.0\n \n7,644.9\n \n907.0\n3,749.0\n20.2\n27.1\n5.3\n1.1\n7.9\n254.8\n7,393.9\n400.9\n4,081.1\n2,230.5\n3,580.5\n46,478.4\nNov\n128.8\n \n2,243.1\n \n11,417.7\n \n2,236.3\n \n8,417.4\n \n940.7\n4,150.2\n19.6\n27.1\n11.8\n1.4\n8.7\n248.8\n9,260.2\n442.8\n3,148.3\n2,272.9\n4,208.0\n49,183.9\nDec\n169.8\n \n2,526.2\n \n13,994.1\n \n1,254.7\n \n8,415.7\n \n1,984.1\n4,090.0\n18.2\n24.7\n20.7\n1.3\n8.1\n268.6\n10,562.1\n556.7\n4,867.7\n3,517.6\n8,485.9\n60,766.3\n2020\nJan\n183.4\n \n3,176.6\n \n13,217.3\n \n1,073.2\n \n8,142.0\n \n1,811.4\n4,372.4\n20.1\n125.5\n15.0\n5.1\n12.2\n326.1\n12,115.8\n946.9\n2,965.9\n4,191.6\n9,691.7\n62,392.3\nFeb\n267.1\n \n3,136.4\n \n13,817.0\n \n1,504.5\n \n8,642.5\n \n1,532.9\n4,293.1\n20.1\n117.4\n15.5\n5.1\n11.6\n329.5\n13,632.6\n973.7\n5,441.7\n12,758.8\n10,338.7\n76,838.2\nMar\n263.6\n \n3,607.6\n \n16,167.1\n \n2,214.4\n \n12,681.9\n \n2,497.5\n4,775.6\n19.2\n0.1\n20.8\n4.4\n11.4\n765.8\n16,323.6\n1,103.1\n7,917.3\n7,042.4\n11,309.5\n86,725.4\nApr\n298.5\n \n3,642.9\n \n17,926.4\n \n1,523.3\n \n13,697.1\n \n3,056.3\n4,716.9\n18.1\n0.1\n18.4\n4.5\n9.7\n834.7\n17,280.6\n1,104.9\n7,642.8\n8,200.2\n11,988.1\n91,963.5\nMay\n330.0\n \n3,581.8\n \n21,376.4\n \n1,749.6\n \n15,757.4\n \n3,130.4\n4,579.1\n17.0\n0.1\n45.8\n4.5\n9.6\n768.0\n20,291.6\n1,280.4\n7,042.0\n8,823.5\n12,139.9\n100,927.2\nJun\n606.6\n \n9,584.7\n \n29,457.9\n \n3,974.7\n \n35,786.5\n \n7,527.5\n6,264.7\n13.8\n0.1\n90.1\n4.3\n9.4\n2,010.8\n30,567.5\n2,011.1\n24,299.3\n17,433.0\n23,843.0\n193,485.0\nJul\n690.8\n \n18,357.0\n \n54,139.7\n \n5,578.7\n \n42,159.7\n \n11,399.9\n6,760.1\n13.4\n0.0\n74.6\n4.3\n12.6\n1,025.8\n36,840.5\n3,070.4\n28,551.1\n14,418.6\n24,902.0\n247,999.1\nAug\n975.1\n \n28,776.0\n \n54,868.5\n \n4,623.1\n \n41,100.2\n \n14,219.2\n6,883.5\n13.1\n0.0\n39.1\n14.0\n14.7\n1,046.3\n43,502.9\n3,130.9\n25,354.6\n14,240.7\n26,391.3\n265,193.4\nSep\n1,084.2\n \n30,217.6\n \n56,679.6\n \n4,426.6\n \n39,530.8\n \n14,126.8\n6,676.2\n12.9\n0.0\n107.8\n9.6\n22.3\n1,050.4\n45,297.5\n3,822.4\n28,289.4\n20,662.0\n27,055.5\n279,071.4\nOct\n1,064.2\n \n32,235.0\n \n66,948.5\n \n4,457.3\n \n40,092.7\n \n13,530.7\n8,068.2\n12.3\n20.1\n222.0\n17.6\n22.2\n1,019.0\n53,116.5\n3,869.6\n29,764.7\n19,044.4\n27,327.7\n300,832.8\nNov\n1,063.6\n \n34,673.9\n \n73,237.2\n \n4,211.3\n \n41,173.6\n \n14,134.7\n8,961.5\n11.6\n0.0\n268.2\n20.0\n16.8\n1,269.9\n60,179.7\n3,678.7\n29,821.2\n19,694.9\n27,426.0\n319,842.9\nDec\n1,177.8\n \n39,886.8\n \n76,076.5\n \n5,771.7\n \n38,623.2\n \n10,803.6\n12,072.8\n11.2\n0.0\n252.2\n23.3\n26.8\n1,269.0\n69,691.0\n4,566.9\n29,608.0\n15,822.0\n36,808.1\n342,490.8\n2021\nJan\n1,483.3\n \n42,733.9\n \n77,994.4\n \n13,109.2\n \n40,071.8\n \n10,922.0\n10,322.7\n10.2\n0.0\n212.4\n16.7\n18.0\n1,264.3\n77,984.0\n5,315.2\n25,036.2\n15,951.2\n41,028.5\n363,474.0\nFeb\n1,735.4\n \n41,180.7\n \n76,140.3\n \n17,748.1\n \n39,141.4\n \n6,341.4\n15,612.1\n9.2\n0.0\n238.0\n24.1\n22.7\n1,493.7\n84,845.3\n5,413.6\n28,339.2\n19,441.2\n42,761.3\n380,487.7\nMar\n1,457.1\n \n40,953.3\n \n83,032.1\n \n6,945.5\n \n42,516.8\n \n8,733.6\n17,602.7\n8.4\n19.2\n449.7\n15.2\n21.7\n1,400.3\n90,291.7\n4,912.2\n32,908.1\n22,849.5\n40,104.9\n394,221.9\nApr\n1,699.7\n \n40,964.4\n \n85,330.2\n \n6,844.8\n \n49,733.4\n \n7,679.0\n19,384.3\n7.7\n19.2\n571.8\n19.9\n12.7\n1,336.7\n104,118.1\n5,432.6\n34,537.9\n25,207.8\n41,034.6\n423,934.8\nMay\n1,906.1\n \n30,579.1\n \n94,330.9\n \n7,907.2\n \n63,644.8\n \n11,582.4\n19,197.1\n7.0\n152.7\n611.0\n21.8\n16.6\n1,263.7\n111,185.7\n5,063.0\n35,592.3\n24,975.4\n40,256.6\n448,293.6\nJun\n1,702.8\n \n30,255.6\n \n75,795.2\n \n25,605.9\n \n72,780.6\n \n17,601.3\n17,610.8\n6.5\n19.5\n1,385.2\n17.9\n77.8\n1,511.9\n125,592.3\n5,203.8\n26,856.5\n29,616.4\n42,418.7\n474,058.5\nJul\n2,139.9\n \n30,509.1\n \n104,983.5\n \n17,817.9\n \n82,032.9\n \n25,314.3\n23,160.6\n6.0\n290.8\n1,264.1\n17.3\n67.8\n1,351.1\n135,107.8\n5,762.2\n26,869.2\n33,897.2\n42,726.7\n533,318.3\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2021\nNotes\n1.Government securities includes treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households and other financial corporations.\nPublic \nEnterprises\nTABLE 4.1: OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS -ASSETS\n$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \n \n16 \n \n \nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nCapital\nContigent\nOther\nTOTAL\nand\nLiablities\nLiablities\nEnd of\nDemand\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nReserves\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\n2018\nJan\n4,640.2\n1,008.1\n1,454.0\n7,102.2\n406.5\n107.3\n7,616.1\n65.1\n444.8\n115.1\n49.1\n2.6\n1,645.3\n501.0\n522.1\n10,961.1\nFeb\n4,633.7\n989.2\n1,458.8\n7,081.7\n418.7\n101.2\n7,601.7\n75.4\n435.4\n111.2\n92.8\n2.9\n1,620.1\n507.8\n511.0\n10,958.3\nMar\n4,732.9\n1,007.5\n1,491.0\n7,231.4\n365.0\n114.7\n7,711.0\n77.3\n460.8\n140.5\n89.2\n6.9\n1,654.7\n504.1\n523.4\n11,168.1\nApr\n4,907.7\n1,066.6\n1,374.6\n7,349.0\n387.8\n95.6\n7,832.3\n84.0\n453.1\n82.4\n68.8\n16.1\n1,641.9\n532.0\n567.0\n11,277.5\nMay\n5,172.9\n1,138.2\n1,442.5\n7,753.6\n442.8\n107.4\n8,303.8\n88.0\n554.0\n101.5\n94.9\n19.9\n1,671.5\n458.9\n526.5\n11,819.1\nJune\n5,650.6\n1,274.7\n1,459.1\n8,384.4\n438.0\n89.2\n8,911.6\n66.8\n554.0\n119.8\n173.4\n21.6\n1,707.5\n551.4\n565.7\n12,671.8\nJuly\n5,902.3\n1,415.3\n1,501.5\n8,819.1\n424.4\n33.1\n9,276.7\n89.5\n545.1\n118.9\n132.9\n32.6\n1,846.0\n611.4\n623.4\n13,276.5\nAug\n6,005.7\n1,362.6\n1,524.2\n8,892.5\n399.6\n32.4\n9,324.5\n66.5\n535.4\n137.0\n119.5\n33.3\n1,882.9\n647.7\n611.2\n13,358.0\nSep\n6,281.7\n1,421.8\n1,489.0\n9,192.4\n439.0\n44.6\n9,676.1\n52.4\n559.4\n142.2\n129.1\n46.6\n1,913.4\n637.4\n629.7\n13,786.4\nOct\n6,345.7\n1,390.0\n1,427.8\n9,163.5\n435.2\n52.2\n9,650.8\n61.7\n581.4\n147.6\n93.4\n42.0\n1,957.6\n647.5\n655.7\n13,837.7\nNov\n6,419.8\n1,329.4\n1,430.4\n9,179.6\n366.8\n48.7\n9,595.1\n50.9\n543.1\n213.7\n74.8\n42.3\n1,991.6\n633.2\n702.1\n13,846.8\nDec\n6,601.1\n1,322.2\n1,508.9\n9,432.2\n394.5\n41.3\n9,868.0\n58.6\n524.7\n229.6\n187.8\n39.0\n2,057.7\n573.8\n699.7\n14,239.0\n2019\nJan\n6,626.6\n1,155.9\n1,466.8\n9,249.4\n381.0\n42.2\n9,672.5\n59.3\n530.5\n239.5\n188.3\n39.2\n2,047.0\n517.2\n729.8\n14,023.5\nFeb\n7,168.7\n1,155.1\n1,473.2\n9,797.1\n387.8\n44.5\n10,229.3\n71.8\n782.0\n158.9\n151.7\n42.6\n2,145.1\n490.7\n661.5\n14,733.6\nMar\n7,435.2\n1,127.0\n1,437.1\n9,999.2\n372.7\n47.9\n10,419.9\n74.5\n933.8\n165.8\n140.9\n42.7\n2,349.0\n523.7\n925.8\n15,576.2\nApr\n7,968.0\n1,243.3\n1,795.8\n11,007.1\n390.9\n55.9\n11,453.8\n90.8\n652.7\n148.3\n173.5\n28.8\n2,551.4\n620.5\n1,071.0\n16,790.9\nMay\n9,316.8\n1,379.0\n1,932.4\n12,628.2\n462.9\n48.9\n13,139.9\n139.4\n1,053.9\n148.8\n206.7\n46.5\n2,556.6\n910.1\n1,783.2\n19,985.1\nJun\n11,021.9\n1,573.5\n1,737.2\n14,332.6\n422.0\n44.5\n14,799.2\n171.7\n1,607.6\n150.3\n216.7\n43.6\n3,240.7\n1,606.5\n1,649.0\n23,485.3\nJul\n13,014.4\n1,661.3\n1,949.2\n16,624.9\n432.6\n50.6\n17,108.1\n168.2\n1,710.5\n152.0\n225.8\n27.4\n3,522.6\n1,587.7\n2,135.1\n26,637.3\nAug\n15,189.7\n1,798.7\n1,922.5\n18,910.9\n639.1\n59.2\n19,609.3\n202.9\n2,064.4\n155.0\n116.2\n28.0\n4,061.0\n2,614.6\n3,102.0\n31,953.4\nSep\n18,834.0\n2,049.2\n1,925.3\n22,808.5\n549.2\n54.5\n23,412.2\n219.9\n2,989.7\n155.9\n182.3\n23.3\n5,510.0\n3,707.8\n4,887.7\n41,088.9\nOct\n23,441.5\n2,298.0\n1,891.9\n27,631.4\n526.0\n68.6\n28,226.0\n205.7\n3,020.7\n159.1\n211.3\n24.6\n5,937.5\n4,081.1\n4,612.3\n46,478.4\nNov\n25,114.5\n2,868.9\n2,123.8\n30,107.2\n878.6\n99.1\n31,084.9\n235.1\n2,966.0\n175.3\n275.5\n50.5\n6,404.3\n3,148.3\n4,844.2\n49,183.9\nDec\n27,842.2\n3,238.9\n2,192.0\n33,273.1\n1,067.2\n118.5\n34,458.8\n244.0\n3,020.4\n179.5\n326.4\n119.4\n10,212.4\n4,867.7\n7,337.7\n60,766.3\n2020\nJan\n28,570.4\n3,605.9\n2,358.3\n34,534.5\n1,299.1\n92.6\n35,926.3\n255.6\n3,114.7\n185.8\n336.1\n140.1\n12,285.7\n2,965.9\n7,182.1\n62,392.3\nFeb\n37,082.9\n3,939.6\n2,215.0\n43,237.5\n1,674.9\n78.2\n44,990.7\n260.1\n3,357.7\n189.6\n767.7\n154.9\n12,930.2\n5,441.7\n8,745.6\n76,838.2\nMar\n37,923.6\n4,998.7\n2,361.6\n45,283.9\n1,721.0\n409.0\n47,413.9\n476.8\n4,874.8\n258.4\n314.6\n339.9\n15,172.3\n7,917.3\n9,957.3\n86,725.4\nApr\n42,102.4\n5,060.0\n2,530.7\n49,693.1\n1,805.2\n516.3\n52,014.6\n337.6\n4,931.9\n346.4\n312.9\n233.2\n16,105.4\n7,642.8\n10,038.7\n91,963.5\nMay\n48,595.9\n6,274.7\n2,847.3\n57,717.9\n1,840.2\n630.7\n60,188.8\n359.2\n5,129.7\n536.7\n469.1\n365.4\n16,562.4\n7,042.0\n10,273.9\n100,927.2\nJun\n86,454.7\n6,715.3\n4,040.8\n97,210.8\n2,277.4\n1,479.4\n100,967.5\n863.2\n11,761.8\n887.6\n959.9\n348.2\n32,058.2\n24,299.3\n21,339.3\n193,485.0\nJul\n113,233.5\n7,957.5\n6,089.8\n127,280.8\n2,997.8\n1,731.9\n132,010.5\n1,024.3\n14,962.8\n1,387.9\n2,114.7\n348.7\n37,319.8\n28,551.1\n30,279.2\n247,999.1\nAug\n126,039.2\n8,814.1\n5,476.0\n140,329.3\n2,942.4\n850.8\n144,122.5\n1,111.7\n16,780.7\n1,837.1\n3,844.1\n422.5\n40,894.6\n25,354.6\n30,825.6\n265,193.4\nSep\n130,929.6\n9,728.6\n6,981.5\n147,639.7\n2,655.6\n1,531.5\n151,826.9\n1,083.9\n15,206.4\n1,863.1\n2,956.8\n372.2\n42,400.0\n28,289.4\n35,072.8\n279,071.4\nOct\n141,293.3\n12,094.6\n8,429.2\n161,817.1\n2,769.1\n1,799.7\n166,385.9\n1,231.9\n14,868.4\n1,812.7\n4,513.6\n441.7\n43,466.4\n29,764.7\n38,347.5\n300,832.8\nNov\n156,892.5\n13,732.4\n9,029.7\n179,654.6\n2,622.0\n1,569.9\n183,846.6\n1,237.3\n14,800.8\n1,489.5\n5,726.8\n423.6\n46,209.7\n29,821.2\n36,287.5\n319,842.9\nDec\n174,270.2\n16,788.9\n9,949.2\n201,008.3\n2,806.1\n4,340.0\n208,154.4\n1,436.2\n14,145.4\n1,318.6\n757.0\n292.0\n54,752.7\n29,608.0\n32,026.4\n342,490.8\n2021\nJan\n188,337.3\n17,667.3\n11,376.7\n217,381.3\n2,730.8\n5,453.7\n225,565.8\n1,422.4\n15,750.7\n391.1\n600.9\n376.7\n58,123.9\n25,036.2\n36,206.3\n363,474.0\nFeb\n189,154.3\n18,991.1\n14,072.8\n222,218.2\n2,959.1\n4,788.2\n229,965.5\n1,457.4\n15,908.6\n409.2\n581.4\n609.9\n63,583.8\n28,339.2\n39,632.7\n380,487.7\nMar\n193,674.2\n21,569.9\n14,209.4\n229,453.4\n4,691.2\n4,875.8\n239,020.5\n1,641.2\n14,997.2\n75.4\n1,378.2\n408.9\n67,061.8\n32,908.1\n36,730.7\n394,221.9\nApr\n219,936.5\n23,818.3\n13,746.7\n257,501.5\n2,725.1\n5,382.5\n265,609.2\n1,503.8\n15,748.4\n176.5\n939.0\n409.9\n68,812.8\n34,537.9\n36,197.4\n423,934.8\nMay\n232,585.8\n26,296.1\n18,415.5\n277,297.4\n2,205.9\n6,832.6\n286,335.9\n1,525.8\n16,063.1\n654.2\n540.1\n429.0\n69,567.0\n35,592.3\n37,586.2\n448,293.6\nJun\n249,167.5\n27,977.7\n21,449.6\n298,594.8\n2,906.1\n6,295.3\n307,796.2\n1,559.7\n15,430.6\n662.3\n939.0\n462.6\n72,403.8\n26,856.5\n47,947.9\n474,058.5\nJul\n271,359.4\n31,671.3\n23,074.4\n326,105.1\n3,016.7\n5,050.7\n334,172.4\n1,523.2\n16,041.4\n706.9\n750.8\n552.8\n76,406.3\n26,869.2\n76,295.4\n533,318.3\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2021\nTABLE 4.2 : OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS - LIABILITIES \nDeposits\nAmounts Owing to\n$ millions\n \n \n \n17 \n \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nForeign\nBond\nNotes\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \nLocal\nPublic\nOther \nContigent \nNon Financial \n Notes &\n&\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment1\nLocal Governemt\nPublic Enterprises\nOther2\nGovernment\nGovernment\nEnterprises\n Institutional Units3\nOther claims\nAssets\nOther Assets\nAssets\nCoins\nCoin\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\n2018\nJan\n22.40\n \n64.10\n \n2,294.49\n \n192.08\n \n103.42\n \n81.91\n \n2,143.23\n \n-\n \n23.45\n \n65.90\n \n26.32\n \n20.59\n \n154.85\n \n2,451.11\n \n28.68\n \n500.96\n \n294.22\n \n538.92\n \n9,006.6\n \nFeb\n18.34\n \n43.97\n \n2,296.76\n \n223.72\n \n108.28\n \n96.17\n \n2,109.34\n \n-\n \n23.45\n \n66.10\n \n24.29\n \n21.11\n \n145.03\n \n2,461.49\n \n28.67\n \n507.82\n \n290.62\n \n536.35\n \n9,001.5\n \nMar\n14.81\n \n53.62\n \n2,238.77\n \n240.67\n \n124.48\n \n99.51\n \n2,164.00\n \n-\n \n23.45\n \n66.69\n \n19.16\n \n15.90\n \n127.10\n \n2,535.82\n \n30.40\n \n504.13\n \n325.78\n \n552.34\n \n9,136.6\n \nApr\n13.47\n \n56.67\n \n2,207.91\n \n274.97\n \n116.75\n \n78.50\n \n2,314.90\n \n-\n \n24.75\n \n66.97\n \n13.44\n \n20.89\n \n120.77\n \n2,519.81\n \n28.31\n \n531.98\n \n298.96\n \n554.95\n \n9,244.0\n \nMay\n12.85\n \n62.77\n \n2,308.95\n \n339.50\n \n130.13\n \n85.74\n \n2,562.36\n \n-\n \n24.97\n \n66.94\n \n8.44\n \n20.88\n \n134.01\n \n2,556.25\n \n23.90\n \n458.93\n \n307.90\n \n555.31\n \n9,659.8\n \nJune\n7.48\n \n52.61\n \n2,848.51\n \n331.76\n \n117.26\n \n84.05\n \n2,538.32\n \n-\n \n26.19\n \n66.55\n \n7.44\n \n19.43\n \n196.00\n \n2,662.21\n \n25.46\n \n551.39\n \n302.93\n \n563.41\n \n10,401.0\n \nJuly\n17.85\n \n54.25\n \n3,189.62\n \n281.13\n \n109.31\n \n95.43\n \n2,949.15\n \n-\n \n-\n \n67.49\n \n4.51\n \n21.01\n \n181.99\n \n2,414.59\n \n26.03\n \n611.36\n \n322.53\n \n565.15\n \n10,911.4\n \nAug\n21.01\n \n67.83\n \n3,196.71\n \n232.34\n \n102.46\n \n66.26\n \n3,014.90\n \n-\n \n-\n \n67.29\n \n7.05\n \n20.62\n \n186.74\n \n2,490.99\n \n29.82\n \n647.67\n \n329.42\n \n566.33\n \n11,047.4\n \nSep\n16.25\n \n58.19\n \n3,487.91\n \n305.30\n \n137.84\n \n78.01\n \n2,789.78\n \n-\n \n45.21\n \n68.09\n \n5.42\n \n20.39\n \n212.17\n \n2,577.06\n \n36.68\n \n637.41\n \n357.43\n \n571.83\n \n11,405.0\n \nOct\n33.06\n \n67.98\n \n3,505.83\n \n272.14\n \n173.15\n \n51.45\n \n2,728.83\n \n-\n \n45.21\n \n68.41\n \n4.59\n \n9.35\n \n188.83\n \n2,697.37\n \n38.71\n \n647.52\n \n353.24\n \n569.20\n \n11,454.9\n \nNov\n25.84\n \n81.42\n \n3,384.38\n \n264.64\n \n198.18\n \n63.91\n \n2,793.90\n \n-\n \n45.21\n \n68.65\n \n6.99\n \n8.13\n \n217.69\n \n2,672.32\n \n46.06\n \n633.21\n \n406.55\n \n569.81\n \n11,486.9\n \nDec\n18.17\n \n89.91\n \n3,736.98\n \n317.34\n \n224.44\n \n74.84\n \n2,633.69\n \n-\n \n43.37\n \n69.16\n \n6.20\n \n9.18\n \n204.31\n \n2,707.60\n \n53.75\n \n573.76\n \n406.16\n \n633.85\n \n11,802.7\n \n2019\nJan\n42.05\n \n106.91\n \n3,766.70\n \n338.09\n \n249.77\n \n46.14\n \n2,621.20\n \n-\n \n61.02\n \n68.66\n \n4.41\n \n8.06\n \n189.15\n \n2,594.53\n \n33.84\n \n517.24\n \n428.82\n \n649.94\n \n11,726.5\n \nFeb\n52.63\n \n238.67\n \n3,601.94\n \n293.36\n \n549.59\n \n205.65\n \n2,675.29\n \n-\n \n60.52\n \n2.00\n \n5.84\n \n7.71\n \n208.31\n \n2,784.17\n \n31.04\n \n490.74\n \n472.78\n \n696.82\n \n12,377.1\n \nMar\n59.17\n \n244.62\n \n3,729.81\n \n393.22\n \n712.08\n \n55.05\n \n2,635.68\n \n-\n \n61.52\n \n4.53\n \n4.27\n \n9.53\n \n340.66\n \n2,660.90\n \n25.33\n \n523.72\n \n755.57\n \n971.53\n \n13,187.2\n \nApr\n40.82\n \n331.97\n \n3,876.83\n \n492.10\n \n981.80\n \n91.75\n \n2,590.97\n \n-\n \n61.79\n \n3.95\n \n3.98\n \n9.62\n \n407.85\n \n2,721.57\n \n24.55\n \n620.52\n \n935.27\n \n1,002.47\n \n14,197.8\n \nMay\n94.59\n \n444.70\n \n3,886.07\n \n571.50\n \n1,747.69\n \n154.08\n \n2,508.43\n \n-\n \n62.12\n \n4.20\n \n3.93\n \n9.43\n \n636.78\n \n3,056.86\n \n34.46\n \n910.14\n \n1,832.95\n \n1,142.77\n \n17,100.7\n \nJun\n119.69\n \n810.71\n \n4,104.17\n \n413.18\n \n2,244.98\n \n538.88\n \n2,596.97\n \n-\n \n63.09\n \n6.62\n \n3.89\n \n8.73\n \n929.36\n \n3,667.45\n \n37.02\n \n1,606.53\n \n1,374.23\n \n1,621.33\n \n20,146.8\n \nJul\n224.75\n \n791.31\n \n5,081.19\n \n275.44\n \n3,602.89\n \n801.93\n \n2,640.55\n \n-\n \n103.36\n \n5.49\n \n2.18\n \n9.00\n \n164.58\n \n4,043.75\n \n32.65\n \n1,587.68\n \n1,873.44\n \n1,722.66\n \n22,962.9\n \nAug\n178.74\n \n1,054.06\n \n7,123.10\n \n461.83\n \n3,778.75\n \n1,050.74\n \n3,106.90\n \n-\n \n103.86\n \n6.78\n \n1.04\n \n9.21\n \n212.50\n \n4,430.78\n \n37.42\n \n2,614.64\n \n1,744.16\n \n1,989.27\n \n27,903.8\n \nSep\n108.51\n \n1,915.41\n \n8,246.09\n \n676.17\n \n5,563.16\n \n1,575.75\n \n3,240.85\n \n-\n \n26.96\n \n6.47\n \n1.37\n \n9.40\n \n187.53\n \n4,993.71\n \n42.30\n \n3,707.80\n \n3,074.10\n \n2,440.63\n \n35,816.2\n \nOct\n138.01\n \n1,702.35\n \n10,537.81\n \n2,437.08\n \n7,376.80\n \n906.98\n \n3,416.23\n \n-\n \n27.05\n \n5.29\n \n1.15\n \n7.94\n \n254.84\n \n5,859.32\n \n41.94\n \n4,081.09\n \n1,658.19\n \n2,434.21\n \n40,886.3\n \nNov\n113.92\n \n2,078.54\n \n10,430.55\n \n2,073.35\n \n7,977.27\n \n940.70\n \n3,737.72\n \n-\n \n27.15\n \n11.83\n \n1.37\n \n8.74\n \n248.79\n \n7,670.96\n \n42.07\n \n3,148.28\n \n1,627.27\n \n3,059.40\n \n43,197.9\n \nDec\n158.44\n \n2,300.01\n \n12,821.54\n \n934.73\n \n7,898.48\n \n1,984.08\n \n3,716.31\n \n-\n \n24.75\n \n20.65\n \n1.33\n \n8.11\n \n268.61\n \n8,976.00\n \n61.84\n \n4,867.67\n \n2,740.16\n \n6,935.56\n \n53,718.3\n \n2020\nJan\n165.80\n \n2,845.62\n \n12,018.43\n \n708.00\n \n7,706.57\n \n1,811.38\n \n4,029.43\n \n-\n \n125.52\n \n14.97\n \n5.11\n \n12.17\n \n326.11\n \n10,766.91\n \n77.59\n \n2,965.93\n \n3,395.90\n \n8,058.15\n \n55,033.6\n \nFeb\n251.70\n \n2,756.57\n \n12,731.97\n \n889.16\n \n8,264.76\n \n1,532.87\n \n3,877.19\n \n-\n \n117.45\n \n13.99\n \n5.15\n \n11.56\n \n329.47\n \n11,656.91\n \n88.37\n \n5,441.70\n \n11,907.90\n \n8,653.69\n \n68,530.4\n \nMar\n242.41\n \n3,063.92\n \n14,545.58\n \n1,948.14\n \n12,381.17\n \n2,497.47\n \n4,373.76\n \n-\n \n0.08\n \n20.23\n \n4.39\n \n11.39\n \n765.82\n \n14,041.67\n \n127.46\n \n7,917.31\n \n5,718.53\n \n9,244.62\n \n76,904.0\n \nApr\n263.29\n \n3,147.75\n \n16,673.44\n \n1,287.51\n \n13,285.14\n \n3,056.32\n \n4,235.96\n \n-\n \n0.08\n \n18.39\n \n4.47\n \n9.75\n \n834.72\n \n14,864.30\n \n129.90\n \n7,642.80\n \n6,534.14\n \n9,703.93\n \n81,691.9\n \nMay\n284.33\n \n3,144.57\n \n19,827.46\n \n1,553.68\n \n15,003.29\n \n3,130.38\n \n4,160.50\n \n-\n \n0.12\n \n45.79\n \n4.53\n \n9.61\n \n768.01\n \n17,762.27\n \n143.44\n \n7,042.04\n \n6,012.40\n \n9,845.09\n \n88,737.5\n \nJun\n515.11\n \n8,372.39\n \n26,368.55\n \n3,570.85\n \n34,550.44\n \n7,527.46\n \n5,841.98\n \n-\n \n0.12\n \n90.14\n \n4.29\n \n9.41\n \n2,010.79\n \n26,638.87\n \n215.56\n \n24,299.33\n \n14,590.26\n \n18,983.05\n \n173,588.6\n \nJul\n577.99\n \n16,536.53\n \n49,470.13\n \n4,219.81\n \n40,259.84\n \n11,399.93\n \n6,357.84\n \n-\n \n-\n \n74.57\n \n4.33\n \n12.61\n \n1,025.78\n \n33,054.99\n \n229.06\n \n28,551.07\n \n10,247.64\n \n19,646.49\n \n221,668.6\n \nAug\n821.16\n \n26,519.73\n \n49,165.59\n \n4,265.44\n \n38,763.72\n \n14,219.24\n \n6,484.68\n \n-\n \n-\n \n39.07\n \n14.05\n \n14.74\n \n1,046.29\n \n38,741.31\n \n231.00\n \n25,354.64\n \n9,460.49\n \n19,961.16\n \n235,102.3\n \nSep\n891.26\n \n27,646.41\n \n51,169.67\n \n3,898.65\n \n38,420.20\n \n14,126.83\n \n6,354.19\n \n-\n \n-\n \n107.40\n \n9.61\n \n22.30\n \n1,050.38\n \n41,088.91\n \n228.95\n \n28,289.36\n \n17,608.70\n \n19,375.08\n \n250,287.9\n \nOct\n896.48\n \n29,309.79\n \n60,589.19\n \n3,602.58\n \n38,877.31\n \n13,530.74\n \n7,763.97\n \n-\n \n20.06\n \n109.83\n \n17.57\n \n22.18\n \n1,019.00\n \n48,440.92\n \n268.07\n \n29,764.70\n \n15,978.22\n \n19,616.63\n \n269,827.2\n \nNov\n919.42\n \n31,596.89\n \n67,899.10\n \n3,494.87\n \n39,693.38\n \n14,134.74\n \n7,098.29\n \n-\n \n0.02\n \n110.37\n \n20.00\n \n16.81\n \n1,269.94\n \n54,496.74\n \n259.90\n \n29,821.16\n \n16,683.48\n \n19,526.70\n \n287,041.8\n \nDec\n1,019.76\n \n36,507.59\n \n70,392.07\n \n4,949.48\n \n37,346.17\n \n10,803.58\n \n9,985.57\n \n-\n \n-\n \n1.18\n \n23.30\n \n26.76\n \n1,269.01\n \n62,953.03\n \n718.16\n \n29,608.01\n \n12,793.91\n \n28,230.82\n \n306,628.4\n \n2021\nJan\n1,237.43\n \n39,565.64\n \n71,463.64\n \n12,288.89\n \n39,092.85\n \n10,921.99\n \n8,281.80\n \n-\n \n-\n \n1.18\n \n16.67\n \n18.01\n \n1,264.28\n \n71,090.96\n \n718.83\n \n25,036.22\n \n12,333.21\n \n32,123.11\n \n325,454.7\n \nFeb\n1,320.27\n \n38,100.03\n \n69,341.48\n \n16,867.76\n \n38,108.83\n \n6,341.39\n \n12,518.15\n \n-\n \n-\n \n1.26\n \n24.15\n \n22.69\n \n1,493.66\n \n77,324.34\n \n774.89\n \n28,339.17\n \n15,953.14\n \n33,612.14\n \n340,143.4\n \nMar\n1,244.16\n \n38,369.53\n \n76,479.44\n \n5,317.61\n \n41,401.24\n \n8,733.65\n \n15,889.61\n \n-\n \n19.21\n \n34.56\n \n15.17\n \n21.67\n \n1,309.75\n \n80,607.03\n \n878.97\n \n32,908.13\n \n19,302.34\n \n30,861.86\n \n353,393.9\n \nApr\n1,430.83\n \n38,008.89\n \n79,592.64\n \n5,639.40\n \n48,564.03\n \n7,679.05\n \n18,267.01\n \n-\n \n19.23\n \n62.89\n \n19.86\n \n12.71\n \n1,336.70\n \n91,062.16\n \n956.75\n \n34,537.88\n \n21,214.88\n \n32,383.77\n \n380,788.7\n \nMay\n1,648.09\n \n28,677.21\n \n87,611.51\n \n6,479.66\n \n59,745.10\n \n11,582.44\n \n18,846.75\n \n-\n \n152.75\n \n93.37\n \n21.77\n \n16.58\n \n1,263.75\n \n94,790.46\n \n990.41\n \n35,592.28\n \n21,398.95\n \n31,307.45\n \n400,218.5\n \nJun\n1,419.27\n \n28,452.53\n \n69,413.26\n \n24,215.35\n \n70,835.98\n \n17,601.31\n \n17,152.75\n \n-\n \n19.46\n \n92.91\n \n17.91\n \n77.79\n \n1,511.86\n \n106,954.15\n \n1,247.08\n \n26,856.45\n \n26,444.57\n \n33,288.94\n \n425,601.6\n \nJul\n1,794.72\n \n29,100.73\n \n97,429.50\n \n15,901.02\n \n79,937.02\n \n25,314.30\n \n21,665.10\n \n-\n \n290.76\n \n47.39\n \n17.32\n \n67.80\n \n1,351.13\n \n117,348.16\n \n1,301.18\n \n26,869.18\n \n29,079.64\n \n33,587.68\n \n481,102.6\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2021\nNotes\n1.Government securities include treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households and other financial corporations, \nTABLE 5.1: COMMERCIAL BANKS -ASSETS\n$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \n \n18 \n \n \nZWL$ millions\nEnd of\nDemand\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nCapital\nContigent\nOther\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\nand\nLiablities\nLiablities\nTOTAL\nReserves\n2018\nJan\n4,640.2\n369.3\n903.3\n5,912.7\n301.3\n85.0\n6,299.0\n53.6\n418.7\n115.1\n26.2\n2.4\n1,205.0\n501.0\n385.6\n9,006.6\nFeb\n4,633.7\n375.8\n920.2\n5,929.7\n298.5\n78.6\n6,306.8\n58.1\n409.1\n111.2\n59.1\n2.4\n1,174.8\n507.8\n372.1\n9,001.5\nMar\n4,732.9\n368.8\n930.7\n6,032.4\n244.7\n92.4\n6,369.5\n61.1\n419.5\n140.5\n54.8\n6.4\n1,196.4\n504.1\n384.3\n9,136.6\nApr\n4,907.7\n394.4\n874.8\n6,176.9\n243.4\n72.8\n6,493.1\n67.4\n413.5\n82.4\n35.2\n15.7\n1,201.5\n532.0\n403.4\n9,244.0\nMay\n5,172.9\n416.2\n917.2\n6,506.3\n246.2\n85.2\n6,837.7\n66.8\n514.1\n101.5\n63.7\n19.4\n1,224.6\n458.9\n373.2\n9,659.8\nJun\n5,650.6\n504.3\n897.4\n7,052.2\n254.8\n66.9\n7,373.9\n45.0\n514.7\n119.8\n116.5\n21.1\n1,259.1\n551.4\n399.5\n10,401.0\nJul\n5,902.3\n527.0\n901.0\n7,330.3\n296.0\n12.2\n7,638.4\n72.0\n507.6\n118.9\n102.5\n16.8\n1,380.1\n611.4\n463.6\n10,911.4\nAug\n6,005.7\n540.8\n930.8\n7,477.3\n266.6\n11.5\n7,755.3\n46.4\n501.5\n137.0\n101.3\n15.4\n1,408.6\n647.7\n434.3\n11,047.4\nSep\n6,281.7\n556.4\n927.2\n7,765.3\n273.0\n23.5\n8,061.8\n40.9\n503.5\n142.2\n108.4\n21.1\n1,434.8\n637.4\n454.9\n11,405.0\nOct\n6,340.3\n509.5\n898.1\n7,747.9\n284.2\n31.1\n8,063.2\n49.3\n525.1\n147.6\n72.2\n16.5\n1,461.0\n647.5\n472.6\n11,454.9\nNov\n6,411.0\n503.9\n861.0\n7,775.9\n232.8\n27.6\n8,036.4\n41.2\n487.5\n213.7\n58.6\n17.8\n1,490.0\n633.2\n508.4\n11,486.9\nDec\n6,582.3\n495.0\n910.9\n7,988.3\n255.0\n19.7\n8,262.9\n43.3\n469.5\n229.6\n147.5\n15.6\n1,551.3\n573.8\n509.2\n11,802.7\n2019\nJan\n6,603.6\n440.8\n919.5\n7,964.0\n240.5\n20.5\n8,225.0\n42.6\n475.0\n239.5\n130.2\n14.4\n1,545.2\n517.2\n537.2\n11,726.5\nFeb\n7,129.0\n426.7\n923.8\n8,479.6\n248.9\n22.8\n8,751.4\n57.3\n647.5\n158.9\n119.1\n14.4\n1,626.6\n490.7\n511.1\n12,377.0\nMar\n7,350.5\n451.8\n915.0\n8,717.3\n225.9\n26.4\n8,969.6\n56.8\n778.3\n165.8\n108.4\n17.0\n1,804.3\n523.7\n763.2\n13,187.2\nApr\n7,861.8\n447.1\n1,280.5\n9,589.3\n260.3\n34.4\n9,884.1\n76.0\n487.7\n148.3\n145.3\n14.8\n1,935.7\n620.5\n885.4\n14,197.8\nMay\n9,143.2\n544.3\n1,412.7\n11,100.2\n309.4\n27.5\n11,437.1\n126.8\n789.2\n148.8\n164.7\n16.0\n1,916.9\n910.1\n1,591.0\n17,100.7\nJun\n10,758.5\n567.5\n1,279.7\n12,605.8\n290.5\n23.1\n12,919.4\n159.0\n1,271.1\n150.3\n161.8\n16.5\n2,409.1\n1,606.5\n1,453.0\n20,146.8\nJul\n12,675.9\n672.2\n1,367.7\n14,715.9\n357.4\n29.4\n15,102.7\n146.4\n1,254.8\n152.0\n205.6\n10.4\n2,583.9\n1,587.7\n1,919.4\n22,962.9\nAug\n14,591.5\n825.3\n1,330.1\n16,747.0\n592.1\n38.0\n17,377.1\n182.4\n1,525.0\n155.0\n88.0\n24.5\n3,065.7\n2,614.6\n2,871.4\n27,903.8\nSep\n18,105.1\n947.3\n1,354.6\n20,407.1\n504.3\n33.3\n20,944.7\n205.7\n2,120.6\n155.9\n115.4\n23.3\n3,933.6\n3,707.8\n4,609.2\n35,816.2\nOct\n22,636.1\n1,003.6\n1,292.7\n24,932.3\n489.1\n47.4\n25,468.8\n200.2\n2,159.7\n159.1\n135.3\n24.6\n4,347.1\n4,081.1\n4,310.3\n40,886.3\nNov\n24,297.0\n1,057.2\n1,633.8\n26,988.0\n843.6\n78.9\n27,910.5\n227.7\n2,089.7\n175.3\n154.3\n48.0\n4,931.5\n3,148.3\n4,512.6\n43,197.9\nDec\n26,909.1\n1,184.4\n1,638.8\n29,732.2\n823.2\n102.9\n30,658.3\n231.6\n2,097.0\n179.5\n209.4\n119.4\n8,414.9\n4,867.7\n6,940.7\n53,718.3\n2020\nJan\n27,276.4\n1,787.3\n1,876.0\n30,939.8\n1,026.0\n76.3\n32,042.1\n232.1\n2,170.0\n185.8\n236.2\n140.1\n10,357.6\n2,965.9\n6,703.8\n55,033.6\nFeb\n35,796.5\n1,869.8\n1,712.8\n39,379.1\n1,404.1\n62.2\n40,845.3\n238.9\n2,391.2\n189.6\n209.2\n154.9\n10,877.8\n5,441.7\n8,181.8\n68,530.4\nMar\n36,078.2\n2,458.2\n1,884.9\n40,421.2\n1,430.6\n393.1\n42,245.0\n468.8\n3,731.4\n258.4\n181.2\n339.9\n12,487.9\n7,917.3\n9,274.0\n76,904.0\nApr\n40,156.4\n2,457.6\n2,078.8\n44,692.9\n1,514.8\n496.9\n46,704.6\n333.2\n3,779.7\n346.4\n172.1\n233.2\n13,105.1\n7,642.8\n9,374.8\n81,691.9\nMay\n46,306.1\n2,502.0\n2,405.7\n51,213.8\n1,399.0\n611.4\n53,224.1\n324.9\n3,968.6\n536.7\n319.4\n365.4\n13,454.1\n7,042.0\n9,502.3\n88,737.5\nJun\n67,548.1\n17,859.0\n3,562.0\n88,969.1\n1,931.1\n1,453.1\n92,353.3\n856.9\n9,116.9\n887.6\n681.7\n348.2\n24,773.8\n24,299.3\n20,270.9\n173,588.6\nJul\n89,092.1\n20,865.7\n5,595.6\n115,553.4\n2,671.5\n1,702.4\n119,927.3\n1,014.3\n11,100.4\n1,387.9\n1,907.7\n348.7\n28,563.5\n28,551.1\n28,867.6\n221,668.6\nAug\n102,750.2\n20,005.2\n4,891.9\n127,647.3\n2,577.9\n824.8\n131,049.9\n1,101.5\n12,302.3\n1,837.1\n3,658.1\n412.5\n30,713.4\n25,354.6\n28,672.9\n235,102.3\nSep\n104,770.7\n24,130.0\n6,488.3\n135,389.0\n2,548.1\n1,496.4\n139,433.5\n1,063.5\n11,363.7\n1,863.1\n2,831.0\n372.2\n32,694.4\n28,289.4\n32,377.1\n250,287.9\nOct\n114,057.9\n26,079.1\n7,702.2\n147,839.2\n2,666.6\n1,767.2\n152,273.0\n1,089.2\n11,137.3\n1,812.7\n4,232.9\n441.7\n33,811.1\n29,764.7\n35,264.5\n269,827.2\nNov\n129,129.6\n26,871.0\n8,262.1\n164,262.8\n2,369.5\n1,538.3\n168,170.5\n1,100.4\n11,019.9\n1,489.5\n5,403.8\n423.6\n36,278.2\n29,821.2\n33,334.7\n287,041.8\nDec\n146,151.8\n27,804.4\n8,926.9\n182,883.1\n2,547.6\n4,309.9\n189,740.6\n1,239.9\n10,924.0\n1,318.6\n316.6\n292.0\n43,984.3\n29,608.0\n29,204.3\n306,628.4\n2021\nJan\n158,888.8\n28,456.6\n10,150.2\n197,495.5\n2,580.8\n5,423.4\n205,499.8\n1,142.5\n12,732.6\n391.1\n519.6\n376.7\n50,147.7\n25,036.2\n29,608.5\n325,454.7\nFeb\n162,092.2\n26,146.3\n12,239.7\n200,478.2\n2,809.1\n4,762.5\n208,049.7\n1,150.4\n12,833.2\n409.2\n540.7\n609.9\n54,930.3\n28,339.2\n33,280.7\n340,143.4\nMar\n165,101.1\n30,313.5\n12,276.4\n207,691.0\n4,541.2\n4,845.3\n217,077.6\n1,331.7\n11,620.2\n75.4\n1,136.7\n408.9\n58,208.9\n32,908.1\n30,626.5\n353,393.9\nApr\n191,923.5\n31,441.3\n11,549.5\n234,914.3\n2,195.0\n5,346.7\n242,455.9\n1,190.1\n11,503.5\n176.5\n757.1\n409.9\n60,361.3\n34,537.9\n29,396.5\n380,788.7\nMay\n194,108.9\n40,921.9\n15,896.4\n250,927.2\n1,705.9\n6,802.1\n259,435.2\n1,186.9\n11,783.3\n654.2\n145.2\n429.0\n61,202.0\n35,592.3\n29,790.4\n400,218.5\nJun\n211,950.0\n40,878.5\n18,536.0\n271,364.4\n2,696.6\n6,202.3\n280,263.2\n1,211.8\n11,575.5\n662.3\n368.5\n462.6\n63,417.5\n26,856.5\n40,783.7\n425,601.6\nJul\n226,860.1\n48,928.9\n19,775.4\n295,564.4\n2,991.7\n5,012.2\n303,568.3\n1,169.2\n12,552.8\n706.9\n476.2\n552.8\n66,514.1\n26,869.2\n68,693.1\n481,102.6\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2021\nTABLE 5.2 : COMMERCIAL BANKS - LIABILITIES\nDeposits\nAmounts Owing to\n \n \n \n19 \n \n \nForeign\nOther Assets\nNon Financial \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nNotes\nAssets\nBond\n&\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \n Notes &\nCoin\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment1\nLocal Governemt\nPublic Enterprises\nOther2\nMortgages\nGovernment\nOther\nCoins\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\n2018\nJan\n0.9\n \n2.3\n \n197.4\n \n98.7\n \n7.8\n \n-\n \n129.8\n \n34.5\n \n-\n \n-\n \n413.2\n \n-\n \n508.7\n \n144.9\n \n136.1\n \n1,674.3\n \nFeb\n1.5\n \n1.8\n \n172.4\n \n123.5\n \n5.5\n \n-\n \n141.3\n \n33.5\n \n-\n \n-\n \n414.8\n \n-\n \n507.9\n \n125.7\n \n135.7\n \n1,663.6\n \nMar\n1.4\n \n3.4\n \n175.9\n \n72.1\n \n14.1\n \n-\n \n212.6\n \n32.8\n \n-\n \n-\n \n411.4\n \n-\n \n539.4\n \n142.8\n \n132.3\n \n1,738.2\n \nApr\n1.1\n \n4.3\n \n185.5\n \n61.9\n \n3.6\n \n-\n \n184.4\n \n32.0\n \n-\n \n-\n \n413.3\n \n-\n \n582.7\n \n141.6\n \n135.2\n \n1,745.7\n \nMay\n1.0\n \n7.6\n \n196.3\n \n138.2\n \n8.1\n \n-\n \n191.0\n \n30.9\n \n-\n \n-\n \n415.0\n \n-\n \n608.4\n \n128.1\n \n137.4\n \n1,862.0\n \nJune\n1.2\n \n4.9\n \n188.6\n \n177.8\n \n1.9\n \n-\n \n266.2\n \n30.1\n \n-\n \n-\n \n413.9\n \n-\n \n614.3\n \n124.0\n \n141.5\n \n1,964.5\n \nJuly\n1.8\n \n6.6\n \n207.1\n \n185.1\n \n1.7\n \n-\n \n283.2\n \n33.3\n \n-\n \n-\n \n423.5\n \n-\n \n636.1\n \n128.2\n \n141.1\n \n2,047.7\n \nAug\n1.6\n \n3.7\n \n224.7\n \n145.3\n \n2.4\n \n-\n \n288.9\n \n32.2\n \n-\n \n-\n \n428.2\n \n-\n \n579.4\n \n139.1\n \n143.7\n \n1,989.2\n \nSep\n1.9\n \n2.9\n \n245.6\n \n92.6\n \n20.8\n \n-\n \n291.1\n \n31.2\n \n-\n \n-\n \n430.3\n \n-\n \n650.2\n \n148.1\n \n144.4\n \n2,059.1\n \nOct\n4.9\n \n2.1\n \n220.0\n \n95.8\n \n11.9\n \n-\n \n318.9\n \n30.2\n \n-\n \n-\n \n427.7\n \n-\n \n639.8\n \n154.2\n \n147.0\n \n2,052.5\n \nNov\n3.6\n \n2.9\n \n243.3\n \n35.7\n \n10.4\n \n-\n \n320.7\n \n28.9\n \n-\n \n-\n \n433.5\n \n-\n \n635.7\n \n148.0\n \n145.8\n \n2,008.5\n \nDec\n2.3\n \n4.3\n \n157.4\n \n121.3\n \n10.4\n \n-\n \n339.4\n \n28.0\n \n-\n \n-\n \n444.8\n \n-\n \n645.9\n \n179.7\n \n151.9\n \n2,085.6\n \n2019\nJan\n6.3\n \n4.6\n108.2\n \n63.5\n10.9\n \n0.0\n343.8\n \n27.3\n33.6\n \n0.0\n438.0\n \n0.0\n649.3\n \n136.7\n151.2\n \n1973.3\nFeb\n5.4\n \n17.6\n120.6\n \n62.8\n18.1\n \n-\n \n339.6\n \n26.5\n-\n \n-\n \n416.1\n \n-\n \n696.1\n \n171.1\n156.7\n \n2,030.8\n \nMar\n2.6\n \n18.0\n126.3\n \n38.6\n23.9\n \n-\n \n331.7\n \n25.5\n-\n \n-\n \n415.1\n \n-\n \n710.1\n \n172.1\n207.4\n \n2,071.2\n \nApr\n3.7\n \n30.6\n220.3\n \n85.0\n47.6\n \n-\n \n271.6\n \n25.0\n-\n \n-\n \n414.1\n \n-\n \n705.0\n \n169.0\n276.2\n \n2,247.8\n \nMay\n3.9\n \n38.4\n162.2\n \n115.4\n139.0\n \n-\n \n345.5\n \n23.9\n-\n \n-\n \n406.2\n \n-\n \n776.6\n \n165.7\n363.4\n \n2,540.1\n \nJun\n6.3\n \n69.8\n361.6\n \n144.5\n132.4\n \n-\n \n265.8\n \n22.6\n-\n \n-\n \n421.7\n \n-\n \n873.6\n \n210.5\n473.0\n \n2,981.8\n \nJul\n6.5\n \n174.7\n473.9\n \n89.7\n131.1\n \n-\n \n258.3\n \n22.2\n-\n \n-\n \n416.0\n \n-\n \n934.6\n \n203.1\n565.6\n \n3,275.8\n \nAug\n5.5\n \n94.5\n758.0\n \n60.6\n115.5\n \n-\n \n247.4\n \n21.5\n-\n \n-\n \n418.1\n \n-\n \n970.6\n \n345.1\n567.6\n \n3,604.2\n \nSep\n15.8\n \n180.3\n831.8\n \n195.4\n104.2\n \n-\n \n267.6\n \n20.9\n-\n \n-\n \n499.1\n \n-\n \n1,137.6\n \n528.8\n1,042.2\n \n4,823.6\n \nOct\n6.2\n \n198.7\n997.2\n \n72.2\n243.7\n \n-\n \n268.8\n \n20.2\n-\n \n-\n \n429.8\n \n-\n \n1,286.7\n \n503.4\n1,069.3\n \n5,096.2\n \nNov\n11.9\n \n156.1\n872.3\n \n159.7\n426.0\n \n-\n \n338.6\n \n19.6\n-\n \n-\n \n443.5\n \n-\n \n1,357.4\n \n575.8\n1,068.7\n \n5,429.6\n \nDec\n9.2\n \n223.9\n1,016.9\n \n317.4\n492.3\n \n-\n \n308.3\n \n18.2\n-\n \n-\n \n454.5\n \n-\n \n1,413.5\n \n700.6\n1,470.0\n \n6,424.9\n \n2020\nJan\n16.3\n \n322.3\n1,106.8\n \n361.8\n421.8\n \n-\n \n283.0\n \n20.1\n-\n \n-\n \n478.2\n \n-\n \n1,498.8\n \n717.5\n1,552.8\n \n6,779.5\n \nFeb\n14.5\n \n368.2\n977.2\n \n612.5\n370.5\n \n-\n \n357.1\n \n20.1\n-\n \n1.5\n \n503.6\n \n-\n \n2,097.7\n \n735.9\n1,538.8\n \n7,597.4\n \nMar\n20.1\n \n529.4\n1,423.7\n \n261.8\n282.6\n \n-\n \n341.6\n \n19.2\n-\n \n0.6\n \n526.4\n \n-\n \n2,406.4\n \n1165.6\n1,914.1\n \n8,891.5\n \nApr\n33.1\n \n493.1\n914.2\n \n232.1\n384.9\n \n-\n \n424.3\n \n18.1\n-\n \n-\n \n525.9\n \n-\n \n2,568.2\n \n1528.5\n2,134.4\n \n9,256.8\n \nMay\n39.7\n \n434.7\n1,248.4\n \n192.3\n725.0\n \n-\n \n382.4\n \n17.0\n-\n \n-\n \n517.6\n \n-\n \n2,793.4\n \n2669.6\n2,146.1\n \n11,166.3\n \nJun\n88.7\n \n1167.9\n2,857.8\n \n395.9\n1,222.0\n \n-\n \n385.4\n \n13.8\n-\n \n-\n \n653.4\n \n-\n \n4,663.9\n \n2688.0\n4,712.1\n \n18,848.8\n \nJul\n109.1\n \n1780.7\n3,878.9\n \n1342.9\n1,879.4\n \n-\n \n346.6\n \n13.4\n-\n \n-\n \n585.7\n \n-\n \n5,648.0\n \n3879.5\n4,927.7\n \n24,391.8\n \nAug\n142.9\n \n2175.5\n4,799.3\n \n341.7\n2,310.6\n \n-\n \n294.6\n \n13.1\n-\n \n-\n \n688.7\n \n-\n \n6,552.1\n \n4480.3\n6,104.6\n \n27,903.4\n \nSep\n179.8\n \n2469.9\n4,547.1\n \n504.6\n1,027.7\n \n-\n \n218.3\n \n12.9\n-\n \n0.4\n \n741.5\n \n-\n \n6,518.3\n \n2774.9\n6,503.8\n \n25,499.1\n \nOct\n149.1\n \n2787.0\n5,056.1\n \n778.9\n1,182.4\n \n-\n \n206.5\n \n12.3\n-\n \n112.2\n \n772.3\n \n-\n \n6,874.4\n \n2795.4\n6,537.1\n \n27,263.4\n \nNov\n104.3\n \n2935.7\n4,448.9\n \n691.0\n1,412.8\n \n-\n \n1,666.7\n \n11.6\n-\n \n157.8\n \n930.4\n \n-\n \n7,498.6\n \n2571.1\n6,712.9\n \n29,141.9\n \nDec\n116.2\n \n3210.3\n5,085.9\n \n802.0\n1,183.4\n \n-\n \n1,830.2\n \n11.2\n-\n \n251.1\n \n1,008.4\n \n-\n \n8,562.3\n \n2559.4\n7,352.9\n \n31,973.2\n \n2021\nJan\n188.7\n \n2943.3\n5,986.5\n \n793.8\n843.5\n \n-\n \n1,783.8\n \n10.2\n-\n \n211.3\n \n1,091.3\n \n0.0\n \n9,329.1\n \n2980.3\n7,685.1\n \n33,846.9\n \nFeb\n345.7\n \n2762.9\n6,004.8\n \n811.1\n984.2\n \n-\n \n2,731.0\n \n9.2\n-\n \n236.8\n \n2,089.3\n \n-\n \n8,950.2\n \n2949.2\n7,790.6\n \n35,665.0\n \nMar\n168.3\n \n2278.9\n6,313.1\n \n1594.4\n1,028.2\n \n-\n \n1,341.7\n \n8.4\n-\n \n415.1\n \n1,242.4\n \n-\n \n10,867.7\n \n3027.5\n7,841.0\n \n36,126.8\n \nApr\n206.9\n \n2702.1\n5,302.6\n \n1156.7\n1,085.4\n \n-\n \n871.7\n \n7.7\n-\n \n508.9\n \n1,581.5\n \n-\n \n14,233.6\n \n3431.1\n7,237.9\n \n38,326.2\n \nMay\n210.3\n \n1687.6\n5,962.2\n \n1250.9\n3,847.1\n \n-\n \n116.9\n \n7.0\n-\n \n517.7\n \n1,568.8\n \n-\n \n17,154.9\n \n2927.9\n7,532.9\n \n42,784.2\n \nJun\n249.6\n \n1649.7\n6,202.6\n \n1163.8\n1,866.7\n \n-\n \n204.6\n \n6.5\n-\n \n588.0\n \n1,851.9\n \n-\n \n18,795.4\n \n2580.9\n7,701.1\n \n42,860.7\n \nJul\n283.7\n \n1212.2\n7,193.4\n \n1892.7\n1,875.4\n \n-\n \n1,143.4\n \n6.0\n-\n \n447.3\n \n1,963.2\n \n-\n \n18,280.3\n \n3923.5\n7,695.6\n \n45,916.5\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2021\nNotes\n1.Government securities include treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households and other financial corporations, \nTABLE 6.1: BUILDING SOCIETIES -ASSETS\n$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \n \n20 \n \n \nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nCapital\nOther\nTOTAL\nand\nLiablities\nEnd of\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nReserves\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\n2018\nJan\n544.7\n497.1\n1,041.7\n105.2\n16.4\n1,163.3\n22.8\n26.1\n0.0\n22.9\n0.2\n362.1\n77.0\n1,674.3\nFeb\n512.0\n480.5\n992.5\n120.3\n16.8\n1,129.5\n28.5\n26.3\n0.0\n33.6\n0.5\n366.0\n79.2\n1,663.6\nMar\n535.1\n507.8\n1,042.9\n120.3\n16.5\n1,179.7\n27.5\n41.3\n0.0\n34.5\n0.5\n378.2\n76.5\n1,738.2\nApr\n568.0\n452.6\n1,020.5\n144.4\n17.0\n1,181.9\n27.9\n39.7\n0.0\n33.6\n0.4\n358.5\n103.7\n1,745.7\nMay\n613.8\n475.1\n1,089.0\n196.6\n16.4\n1,302.0\n32.4\n40.0\n0.0\n31.2\n0.5\n363.1\n92.8\n1,862.0\nJune\n658.5\n507.9\n1,166.5\n183.2\n16.4\n1,366.0\n33.1\n39.3\n0.0\n56.9\n0.4\n363.5\n105.2\n1,964.5\nJuly\n770.2\n542.9\n1,313.1\n128.5\n15.0\n1,456.6\n28.7\n37.5\n0.0\n30.4\n15.8\n378.9\n99.8\n2,047.7\nAug\n703.4\n534.7\n1,238.0\n133.0\n15.0\n1,386.0\n31.3\n33.9\n0.0\n18.3\n17.9\n385.8\n116.0\n1,989.2\nSep\n749.8\n502.3\n1,252.2\n166.0\n15.1\n1,433.2\n22.8\n55.9\n0.0\n20.7\n25.5\n388.6\n112.3\n2,059.1\nOct\n772.5\n471.9\n1,244.4\n151.0\n15.1\n1,410.5\n23.7\n56.3\n0.0\n21.2\n25.5\n389.9\n125.4\n2,052.5\nNov\n699.9\n511.9\n1,211.9\n134.0\n15.1\n1,360.9\n21.0\n55.6\n0.0\n16.2\n24.5\n396.1\n134.2\n2,008.5\nDec\n713.2\n540.0\n1,253.1\n139.6\n15.1\n1,407.8\n26.5\n55.3\n0.0\n40.2\n23.4\n400.1\n132.3\n2,085.6\n2019\nJan\n633.8\n490.2\n1,124.0\n140.5\n15.0\n1,279.6\n27.9\n55.5\n0.0\n58.1\n24.8\n392.8\n134.7\n1,973.3\nFeb\n661.3\n492.3\n1,153.6\n138.8\n15.0\n1,307.4\n25.8\n134.5\n0.0\n32.6\n28.2\n366.7\n135.6\n2,030.8\nMar\n655.2\n473.9\n1,129.1\n146.8\n15.0\n1,290.9\n29.0\n155.6\n0.0\n32.5\n25.7\n391.4\n146.2\n2,071.2\nApr\n782.3\n460.0\n1,242.3\n130.5\n14.9\n1,387.7\n26.0\n165.0\n0.0\n28.2\n14.1\n457.7\n169.2\n2,247.8\nMay\n895.0\n464.3\n1,359.4\n153.5\n15.0\n1,527.9\n23.9\n264.7\n0.0\n41.9\n30.6\n477.5\n173.6\n2,540.1\nJun\n1,154.3\n406.8\n1,561.1\n131.5\n15.0\n1,707.7\n23.9\n336.5\n0.0\n54.8\n27.1\n664.7\n167.0\n2,981.8\nJul\n1,192.2\n538.1\n1,730.3\n75.2\n14.9\n1,820.4\n33.0\n455.7\n0.0\n20.2\n17.0\n739.6\n189.9\n3,275.8\nAug\n1,424.7\n542.9\n1,967.6\n47.0\n15.0\n2,029.6\n31.8\n539.4\n0.0\n28.2\n3.5\n777.8\n193.9\n3,604.2\nSep\n1,686.2\n524.9\n2,211.1\n44.9\n15.0\n2,271.0\n25.5\n869.0\n0.0\n66.9\n0.0\n1,352.0\n239.1\n4,823.6\nOct\n1,920.1\n548.8\n2,468.8\n36.9\n15.0\n2,520.7\n16.7\n861.0\n0.0\n76.0\n0.0\n1,362.8\n259.0\n5,096.2\nNov\n2,394.7\n441.2\n2,835.9\n35.0\n15.0\n2,886.0\n18.6\n876.3\n0.0\n121.1\n2.5\n1,246.7\n278.3\n5,429.6\nDec\n2,713.3\n481.5\n3,194.7\n244.0\n15.0\n3,453.8\n23.7\n923.5\n0.0\n117.1\n0.0\n1,563.0\n343.9\n6,424.9\n2020\nJan\n2,894.8\n398.4\n3,293.3\n273.1\n15.0\n3,581.4\n34.7\n944.7\n0.0\n100.0\n0.0\n1,699.9\n418.8\n6,779.5\nFeb\n3,118.5\n419.8\n3,538.4\n270.9\n15.0\n3,824.3\n32.5\n966.5\n0.0\n558.5\n0.0\n1,714.1\n501.5\n7,597.4\nMar\n3,978.7\n384.4\n4,363.1\n290.4\n15.0\n4,668.5\n19.3\n1,143.4\n0.0\n133.4\n0.0\n2,335.6\n591.3\n8,891.5\nApr\n4,097.6\n354.9\n4,452.5\n290.4\n15.0\n4,757.9\n15.6\n1,152.3\n0.0\n140.8\n0.0\n2,628.1\n562.1\n9,256.8\nMay\n5,615.0\n370.0\n5,985.0\n441.2\n15.0\n6,441.2\n45.6\n1,161.2\n0.0\n149.8\n0.0\n2,708.1\n660.4\n11,166.3\nJun\n7,327.5\n405.9\n7,733.4\n346.2\n15.0\n8,094.6\n17.6\n2,644.8\n0.0\n278.2\n0.0\n6,867.2\n946.4\n18,848.8\nJul\n10,284.7\n427.7\n10,712.4\n326.2\n15.0\n11,053.7\n21.3\n3,862.4\n0.0\n207.1\n0.0\n8,010.7\n1,236.7\n24,391.8\nAug\n10,984.4\n502.7\n11,487.1\n364.5\n15.0\n11,866.6\n21.4\n4,478.3\n0.0\n186.1\n10.0\n9,438.3\n1,902.7\n27,903.4\nSep\n10,408.2\n403.5\n10,811.8\n107.5\n15.0\n10,934.3\n31.7\n3,842.7\n0.0\n125.8\n0.0\n8,069.6\n2,495.1\n25,499.1\nOct\n11,881.7\n628.7\n12,510.4\n102.5\n15.0\n12,627.9\n154.0\n3,731.0\n0.0\n280.6\n0.0\n7,991.8\n2,478.1\n27,263.4\nNov\n13,173.5\n668.5\n13,842.1\n252.5\n15.0\n14,109.6\n148.2\n3,781.0\n0.0\n323.0\n0.0\n8,200.8\n2,579.4\n29,141.9\nDec\n15,585.8\n797.7\n16,383.5\n258.5\n15.0\n16,657.0\n207.5\n3,221.3\n0.0\n440.4\n0.0\n9,002.7\n2,444.3\n31,973.2\n2021\nJan\n17,060.5\n985.1\n18,045.7\n150.0\n15.0\n18,210.7\n291.2\n3,018.1\n0.0\n81.3\n0.0\n6,054.0\n6,191.6\n33,846.9\nFeb\n18,610.7\n1,047.5\n19,658.2\n150.0\n15.0\n19,823.2\n318.2\n3,075.5\n0.0\n40.7\n0.0\n6,533.5\n5,874.0\n35,665.0\nMar\n18,562.7\n1,070.5\n19,633.2\n150.0\n15.0\n19,798.2\n320.8\n3,377.0\n0.0\n241.5\n0.0\n6,727.5\n5,661.8\n36,126.8\nApr\n19,021.2\n1,353.2\n20,374.5\n500.0\n15.0\n20,889.5\n325.0\n4,244.8\n0.0\n181.9\n0.0\n6,267.0\n6,418.0\n38,326.2\nMay\n22,332.1\n1,453.5\n23,785.6\n500.0\n15.0\n24,300.6\n350.2\n4,279.9\n0.0\n394.8\n0.0\n6,067.1\n7,391.6\n42,784.2\nJun\n22,784.4\n1,675.4\n24,459.8\n209.5\n70.5\n24,739.8\n359.1\n3,855.1\n0.0\n570.4\n0.0\n6,623.0\n6,713.2\n42,860.7\nJul\n25,425.9\n1,997.8\n27,423.7\n25.0\n15.0\n27,463.7\n365.2\n3,488.6\n0.0\n274.6\n0.0\n7,194.2\n7,130.1\n45,916.5\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2021\nAmounts Owing to\nTABLE 6.2: BUILDING SOCIETIES -LIABILITIES\n$ millions\n \n \n \n21 \n \n \n \nAGRICULTURE\nCONSTRUCTION\nCOMMUNICATION\nDISTRIBUTION\nFINANCIAL &\nFINANCIAL\nMANUFACTURING\nMINING\nSERVICES\nTRANSPORT\nINDIVIDUALS\nCONGLOMERATES\nTOTAL\nEND OF\n \n \n \nINVESTMENTS\nORGANISATIONS\n \n \n \n \n2018\nJan\n479,109.65\n59,336.80\n9,442.40\n289,531.26\n20,569.74\n258,034.97\n271,453.81\n106,425.09\n390,052.89\n32,328.60\n617,302.95\n14,394.66\n2,547,982.83\nFeb\n488,203.10\n59.,977.6\n9,271.60\n315,569.60\n20,133.10\n258,263.60\n285,045.10\n108,649.00\n393,604.90\n31,636.60\n618,377.40\n15,010.60\n2,543,764.60\nMar\n484,764.71\n64,826.47\n11,050.47\n344,731.34\n15,203.35\n274,150.22\n303,649.15\n114,431.85\n363,449.40\n32,793.42\n640,496.88\n19,893.14\n2,669,440.41\nApr\n485,790.00\n63,948.20\n10,904.16\n344,532.06\n15,015.25\n271,071.77\n294,270.80\n112,692.09\n333,633.78\n31,103.49\n631,920.52\n22,066.04\n2,616,948.15\nMay\n501,783.67\n63,555.32\n10,933.54\n362,939.63\n15,079.82\n358,553.35\n317,666.65\n117,123.00\n338,846.30\n31,523.13\n651,443.97\n24,226.37\n2,793,674.76\nJun\n475,105.71\n66,796.85\n13,907.73\n385,583.32\n15,079.82\n344,917.25\n323,212.12\n117,146.59\n335,216.91\n34,457.61\n655,427.02\n34,163.40\n2,801,014.33\nJul\n463,286.30\n70,905.22\n18,924.14\n383,314.68\n14,976.42\n140,624.55\n274,507.82\n113,776.27\n309,209.52\n37,473.99\n652,652.69\n34,402.12\n2,514,053.73\nAug\n470,756.06\n79,237.13\n15,167.31\n331,672.76\n15,021.94\n144,100.73\n271,000.50\n111,960.21\n306,022.68\n37,341.23\n666,649.40\n34,402.12\n2,483,332.08\nSep\n451,745.26\n79,055.66\n15,021.57\n341,851.68\n15,021.94\n144,799.61\n263,994.22\n112,656.60\n320,788.50\n36,914.64\n666,971.46\n64,407.07\n2,513,228.20\nOct\n453,068.26\n74,931.80\n16,036.47\n389,851.74\n15,156.78\n165,252.71\n268,933.16\n111,956.57\n313,376.79\n36,118.55\n680,445.74\n12,855.74\n2,537,984.32\nNov\n444,130.81\n133,137.60\n14,884.08\n313,732.96\n15,156.79\n165,419.77\n269,459.88\n149,908.15\n316,738.77\n45,693.19\n679,403.72\n12,265.36\n2,559,931.07\nDec\n492,669.93\n78,176.72\n15,958.03\n340,422.71\n14,425.48\n165,648.71\n253,354.25\n113,596.48\n347,242.19\n40,695.42\n669,879.64\n12,254.30\n2,544,323.87\n2019\nJan\n525,176.71\n80,480.87\n20,199.44\n349,755.63\n15,294.02\n158,458.90\n255,380.42\n123,772.79\n358,554.22\n42,355.54\n666,797.13\n16,335.67\n2,612,561.33\nFeb\n521,988.10\n79,066.70\n10,931.07\n352,797.81\n14,699.04\n80,894.67\n253,027.00\n124,474.74\n389,522.96\n40,923.52\n644,320.94\n11,446.61\n2,524,093.15\nMar\n538,072.74\n87,791.29\n18,211.46\n379,233.06\n14,556.67\n205,466.51\n270,360.07\n133,324.78\n407,637.99\n43,541.36\n731,600.28\n11,476.62\n2,841,272.85\nApr\n584,205.29\n96,516.86\n22,430.89\n421,676.71\n15,968.00\n236,000.25\n310,449.68\n193,315.77\n387,730.25\n44,465.66\n788,749.65\n14,486.65\n3,115,995.66\nMay\n712,661.52\n98,826.58\n27,802.41\n466,619.97\n17,425.91\n317,055.80\n368,550.63\n250,912.54\n441,731.01\n43,682.62\n901,283.38\n14,096.64\n3,660,649.01\nJun\n940,505.81\n82,926.78\n30,534.65\n566,391.10\n169,400.79\n876,820.36\n354,648.58\n331,070.01\n404,941.11\n49,207.29\n898,523.53\n14,258.87\n4,719,228.88\nJul\n1,060,152.38\n108,889.32\n38,005.81\n685,729.84\n22,484.81\n470,421.82\n497,581.30\n333,137.40\n643,721.98\n51,560.67\n1,111,698.00\n7,683.18\n5,031,066.50\nAug\n1,163,054.33\n117,882.86\n40,904.57\n720,937.57\n15,289.60\n524,650.14\n575,937.12\n378,008.67\n742,674.56\n51,710.40\n1,202,415.06\n5,830.84\n5,539,295.71\nSep\n1,379,203.16\n101,683.93\n20,216.16\n755,828.88\n15,563.75\n1,430,322.28\n520,659.81\n487,089.86\n594,143.27\n59,974.64\n1,004,073.32\n6,055.40\n5,087,524.40\nOct\n1,917,349.77\n103,708.96\n20,826.53\n798,377.18\n24,574.74\n1,447,865.67\n603,692.16\n541,020.28\n618,349.57\n61,677.92\n1,112,873.33\n4,322.02\n7,530,493.20\nNov\n1,916,599.14\n103,450.14\n22,381.71\n878,695.26\n24,749.38\n1,566,329.25\n623,341.53\n554,037.12\n623,064.80\n61,153.08\n1,152,340.02\n4,351.76\n7,530,493.20\nDec\n3,260,641.29\n140,783.74\n27,127.10\n1,114,871.76\n48,155.61\n1,504,624.78\n1,027,373.94\n821,797.19\n823,237.53\n84,684.83\n1,428,029.37\n7,328.19\n10,288,655.30\n2020\nJan\n4,084,551.94\n155,581.93\n40,879.89\n1,241,096.72\n54,212.81\n1,614,135.86\n1,136,124.87\n905,568.16\n799,835.71\n83,887.62\n1,594,904.42\n3,435.36\n11,714,215.29\nFeb\n4,492,412.28\n157,892.05\n54,850.75\n1,305,056.27\n51,575.18\n1,667,015.97\n1,328,895.13\n875,096.28\n827,340.38\n103,240.64\n1,837,059.21\n1,195.35\n12,701,629.50\nMar\n5,400,573.75\n137,553.14\n109,432.30\n1,355,737.76\n60,656.39\n2,181,804.45\n1,514,365.26\n1,743,391.37\n911,567.97\n129,647.77\n2,083,395.02\n30,866.95\n15,658,992.12\nApr\n5,497,243.24\n144,302.16\n94,782.20\n1,298,701.43\n50,563.13\n2,200,545.77\n1,762,996.43\n1,756,962.25\n1,057,031.75\n149,805.94\n2,211,133.89\n33,524.86\n16,257,593.05\nMay\n6,753,987.64\n152,161.11\n176,776.32\n1,688,453.47\n61,403.01\n2,272,323.33\n2,155,232.06\n2,018,291.52\n1,335,664.72\n161,892.59\n2,646,269.59\n56,873.34\n19,479,328.70\nJun\n8,233,748.36\n178,010.08\n127,961.90\n3,248,219.37\n64,989.86\n5,469,986.07\n3,799,659.67\n4,379,017.69\n1,983,339.32\n277,602.32\n3,665,408.84\n46,384.96\n31,474,328.45\nJul\n8,927,920.73\n256,440.30\n209,123.91\n4,249,101.81\n34,055.90\n7,106,442.23\n5,125,740.57\n5,385,837.14\n2,413,677.93\n418,160.11\n4,321,918.71\n46,630.64\n38,495,049.96\nAug\n9,773,178.50\n269,675.36\n194,537.60\n5,470,092.50\n33,043.10\n7,946,261.68\n6,723,930.20\n5,651,838.11\n3,103,883.15\n446,084.37\n5,291,100.20\n48,922.44\n44,952,547.19\nSep\n10,508,860.18\n202,928.95\n203,610.78\n4,810,727.31\n29,975.80\n1,041,079.17\n7,136,261.66\n4,099,760.81\n3,255,496.85\n517,871.73\n6,526,576.15\n48,754.08\n38,381,903.47\nOct\n12,296,430.45\n302,589.49\n251,238.66\n9,053,118.05\n28,434.20\n8,136,185.80\n6,305,609.42\n6,351,785.61\n3,855,757.60\n649,444.55\n7,243,034.96\n49,339.03\n54,522,967.83\nNov\n14,705,718.28\n553,426.67\n299,226.19\n10,178,453.66\n26,676.82\n9,457,279.18\n7,442,871.42\n6,834,160.25\n4,193,059.76\n959,134.44\n7,919,442.36\n50,802.65\n62,620,251.69\nDec\n19,070,900.24\n557,071.84\n265,529.08\n10,043,351.16\n24,925.66\n9,451,197.42\n8,214,424.44\n7,599,398.94\n4,750,996.82\n1,556,410.92\n9,213,845.68\n46,489.85\n70,794,542.04\n2021\nJan\n23,978,167.35\n610,696.11\n267,400.20\n9,997,383.02\n66,046.86\n9,811,097.63\n7,641,910.42\n7,176,322.97\n4,807,054.16\n1,685,871.14\n10,092,630.46\n47,525.58\n76,182,105.93\nFeb\n24,581,772.22\n653,205.48\n285,830.69\n10,330,772.00\n65,231.37\n10,024,935.09\n7,949,013.06\n6,754,180.16\n5,018,015.84\n1,766,077.92\n10,905,948.39\n47,678.08\n78,382,660.29\nMar\n28,741,816.74\n737,140.48\n320,102.45\n10,604,119.56\n76,828.95\n10,517,753.11\n9,428,559.85\n8,179,722.05\n5,701,289.52\n1,822,019.95\n12,528,176.45\n33,915.52\n88,691,444.62\nApr\n31,859,146.34\n675,080.87\n347,881.04\n12,101,683.31\n205,760.21\n12,046,268.54\n10,788,214.39\n8,802,924.25\n6,559,969.13\n1,831,534.43\n14,724,055.16\n36,984.33\n99,979,501.99\nMay\n34,645,328.64\n713,518.48\n292,339.75\n13,012,546.01\n70,347.70\n10,160,360.67\n11,287,317.39\n8,318,871.52\n7,438,997.57\n1,831,015.12\n17,169,532.74\n10,879.19\n104,951,054.78\nJune\n36,527,537.18\n993,308.60\n357,200.72\n14,622,859.32\n69,173.21\n12,832,747.32\n12,635,012.94\n7,938,660.25\n9,226,503.32\n1,903,845.82\n19,986,300.49\n40,765.72\n117,133,914.90\nJuly\n39,160,305.59\n1,280,558.68\n411,253.92\n16,562,010.52\n62,624.82\n13,792,648.82\n12,583,048.87\n8,567,557.82\n10,717,151.04\n1,820,088.91\n22,581,130.29\n13,756.78\n127,552,136.06\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2021\n/1 Including the only merchant bank still in operation.\n TABLE 7.1 : SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS LOANS AND ADVANCES\n$ ('000)\n \n \n \n22 \n \n \nEND OF\nAGRICULTURE\nCONSTRUCTION\nCOMMUNICATIONS\nDISTRIBUTION\nFINANCIAL &\nFINANCIAL\nMANUFACTURING\nMINING\nSERVICES\nTRANSPORT\nINDIVIDUALS\nCONGLOMERATES\nTOTAL\nINVESTMENTS\nORGANISATIONS\n \n2018\nJan\n380,283.82\n151,435.95\n257,298.19\n918,787.62\n365,354.65\n1,050,097.69\n652,999.03\n248,932.99\n1,757,391.82\n141,913.19\n669,049.81\n67,904.67\n6,661,449.43\nFeb\n455,217.00\n224,070.10\n263,961.90\n897,453.20\n399,016.20\n949,795.60\n674,828.40\n354,052.80\n1,701,611.40\n107,779.50\n680,060.20\n67,686.40\n6,775,532.70\nMar\n451,992.51\n142,332.94\n296,310.00\n825,805.46\n376,592.97\n1,001,674.30\n597,436.81\n253,127.37\n1,827,464.32\n163,971.73\n597,436.81\n63,604.30\n6,597,749.51\nApr\n476,448.12\n144,564.55\n310,795.64\n806,144.74\n364,824.61\n988,527.16\n649,893.01\n255,761.79\n1,892,415.24\n179,252.35\n712,565.91\n65,398.24\n6,846,591.36\nMay\n494,612.84\n152,567.38\n350,409.17\n874,140.46\n374,089.94\n1,097,970.70\n700,891.90\n271,891.95\n1,913,394.86\n186,192.54\n745,592.74\n64,970.70\n7,226,725.18\nJun\n465,983.99\n164,242.33\n391,142.28\n948,703.01\n368,260.11\n1,140,652.88\n754,981.07\n324,355.75\n2,160,400.44\n200,774.28\n779,012.77\n64,786.27\n7,763,295.19\nJul\n445,779.96\n226,432.96\n413,409.06\n955,925.58\n420,416.63\n1,120,834.75\n760,588.21\n321,078.39\n2,192,743.25\n200,523.55\n822,857.62\n64,786.27\n7,945,376.24\nAug\n429,439.90\n189,497.97\n386,595.64\n980,354.11\n429,659.69\n1,091,202.85\n782,008.68\n297,412.27\n1,968,724.01\n196,068.83\n836,719.06\n64,786.27\n7,652,469.29\nSep\n447,556.40\n206,194.07\n382,491.52\n1,186,453.67\n444,599.06\n1,070,365.05\n811,296.21\n302,579.34\n2,059,093.14\n247,105.73\n906,767.58\n84,514.52\n8,149,016.28\nOct\n445,484.37\n199,531.06\n391,968.41\n984,701.54\n469,891.89\n1,153,855.95\n846,453.28\n315,808.54\n2,110,864.21\n260,816.90\n817,328.26\n67,915.25\n8,064,619.66\nNov\n489,192.86\n194,869.35\n391,442.38\n925,081.31\n441,534.28\n1,248,555.80\n827,349.43\n316,945.54\n2,059,370.14\n261,756.52\n825,642.20\n66,458.68\n8,048,198.50\nDec\n494,011.34\n201,871.01\n531,888.27\n1,034,592.52\n428,738.69\n1,196,503.19\n823,081.93\n331,251.28\n2,063,550.83\n278,658.99\n802,507.57\n63,361.27\n8,250,016.89\n2019\nJan\n505,422.91\n391,022.03\n497,976.19\n1,034,948.23\n411,945.87\n1,187,606.66\n882,289.74\n322,030.27\n2,154,902.32\n135,871.63\n763,189.54\n63,064.29\n8,350,269.66\nFeb\n512,602.33\n374,750.61\n394,709.15\n936,123.62\n449,800.94\n904,919.42\n855,348.41\n347,405.51\n2,355,866.05\n138,685.82\n776,949.70\n63,097.10\n8,110,258.67\nMar\n526,564.16\n343,684.28\n376,205.62\n937,743.43\n393,489.35\n1,317,757.66\n861,574.88\n380,295.40\n2,099,331.11\n141,677.24\n773,726.38\n63,094.90\n8,215,144.40\nApr\n632,972.52\n255,945.64\n1,010,978.65\n90,282.62\n462,133.05\n1,535,772.61\n890,606.53\n325,814.57\n2,413,535.63\n320,213.46\n876,646.50\n90,282.62\n9,963,832.23\nMay\n832,073.61\n305,410.92\n1,321,039.68\n1,177,925.14\n522,764.91\n1,646,358.64\n1,142,369.59\n372,594.90\n2,765,341.17\n371,372.04\n965,202.73\n93,188.88\n11,515,642.20\nJun\n1,001,633.56\n309,108.92\n1,124,005.29\n1,337,171.04\n546,572.53\n2,210,293.95\n1,319,789.76\n562,858.02\n3,493,214.31\n434,828.17\n1,070,319.72\n52,118.63\n13,461,913.89\nJul\n1,171,245.37\n353,388.45\n1,504,911.45\n1,241,910.11\n654,904.72\n2,553,878.66\n1,383,215.20\n585,108.25\n4,131,588.83\n463,161.90\n1,304,402.72\n71,943.58\n15,419,659.24\nAug\n1,313,462.50\n477,215.84\n1,795,905.44\n1,687,246.36\n804,316.21\n2,591,386.51\n1,647,680.21\n1,114,306.03\n3,872,186.95\n503,541.56\n1,532,441.90\n75,829.26\n17,413,139.20\nSep\n1,581,141.69\n321,121.36\n1,934,554.37\n1,728,390.05\n952,548.31\n3,086,893.14\n1,638,855.09\n1,375,546.56\n5,961,405.34\n589,939.57\n1,848,708.36\n76,775.90\n21,272,162.40\nOct\n1,744,905.76\n796,996.55\n2,217,888.47\n2,626,316.66\n768,125.17\n3,204,019.21\n2,287,076.12\n1,889,144.71\n7,536,588.58\n510,151.50\n1,942,195.06\n48,142.75\n25,571,550.52\nNov\n1,783,345.29\n813,506.51\n2,257,181.82\n2,618,010.26\n1,287,013.83\n3,544,459.53\n2,082,447.78\n1,787,923.65\n7,794,025.96\n491,371.84\n1,920,297.35\n57,897.54\n26,437,481.36\nDec\n1,877,764.11\n950,348.83\n2,917,087.22\n3,126,494.51\n1,421,969.01\n4,411,638.37\n2,605,023.12\n1,664,547.67\n8,410,964.03\n554,937.30\n2,477,474.04\n116,789.37\n30,535,037.60\n1,000.00\n2020\nJan\n2,173,633.03\n972,609.19\n3,182,087.13\n4,279,565.75\n1,757,297.12\n4,791,990.63\n2,791,625.15\n2,223,774.14\n9,875,803.48\n609,781.65\n2,838,775.94\n81,735.21\n35,578,678.43\nFeb\n2,492,591.77\n1,191,731.68\n3,340,863.80\n8,721,475.95\n1,919,428.47\n5,869,104.19\n3,481,495.51\n2,729,161.98\n10,202,203.60\n760,155.34\n3,574,134.47\n82,845.83\n44,365,192.59\nMar\n2,678,262.66\n1,449,645.90\n3,231,058.97\n11,715,273.88\n2,114,093.03\n6,507,000.01\n4,576,971.82\n3,048,053.49\n11,490,205.21\n947,918.17\n4,257,117.74\n72,082.86\n52,087,683.73\nApr\n2,854,374.82\n1,118,295.51\n3,492,330.52\n5,271,473.36\n1,999,901.13\n6,191,170.71\n4,276,817.19\n3,727,579.43\n14,060,717.80\n713,406.98\n4,444,924.89\n83,109.30\n48,234,101.64\nMay\n3,866,781.11\n1,163,944.89\n4,713,727.59\n7,932,403.43\n1,991,042.58\n7,151,451.48\n5,858,495.15\n5,031,912.53\n13,907,794.76\n944,318.05\n5,060,401.34\n88,613.61\n57,710,886.51\nJun\n7,228,784.40\n1,963,030.85\n5,393,404.53\n14,526,855.63\n3,997,135.72\n12,452,202.49\n11,386,156.55\n9,507,719.09\n22,807,615.50\n1,630,544.88\n9,798,261.20\n121,561.20\n100,813,272.04\nJul\n9,091,726.77\n2,629,847.13\n6,043,418.97\n19,096,889.49\n4,988,887.74\n15,446,649.70\n15,274,687.36\n7,918,819.51\n31,916,392.56\n2,035,354.71\n15,762,315.16\n147,865.97\n130,352,855.06\nAug\n9,462,082.74\n2,865,950.88\n6,582,519.60\n19,234,703.99\n5,333,846.88\n16,821,248.59\n17,017,042.14\n7,304,595.82\n35,312,317.72\n2,217,425.46\n16,548,990.51\n134,271.10\n138,834,995.43\nSep\n9,832,514.38\n3,139,646.07\n7,166,350.39\n20,531,087.56\n5,145,328.35\n9,505,277.06\n17,311,149.20\n10,234,597.66\n39,731,086.51\n2,011,372.45\n16,155,747.87\n148,612.60\n140,912,770.08\nOct\n9,923,335.07\n3,346,982.41\n9,919,999.10\n22,567,492.87\n6,180,403.26\n21,021,376.92\n20,667,754.18\n10,950,177.78\n41,131,626.19\n2,597,408.09\n18,072,164.45\n176,961.04\n166,555,681.37\nNov\n10,683,513.83\n3,732,868.95\n9,809,491.39\n28,228,980.99\n6,029,490.43\n17,343,347.49\n23,027,365.97\n14,471,556.33\n47,870,360.42\n2,986,050.60\n19,045,412.04\n209,168.81\n183,437,607.25\nDec\n10,252,495.91\n4,965,472.75\n12,171,250.70\n30,987,168.50\n5,959,867.34\n19,653,397.02\n25,666,591.10\n13,188,851.04\n55,454,341.21\n3,901,504.33\n22,313,591.00\n519,773.38\n205,034,304.27\n2021\nJan\n12,195,945.09\n4,725,946.72\n13,067,828.56\n32,314,625.60\n6,804,952.50\n19,638,789.03\n27,577,248.19\n13,566,042.79\n60,234,250.60\n3,993,814.34\n22,146,327.53\n314,523.37\n216,580,294.30\nFeb\n12,215,925.38\n4,335,293.23\n13,268,343.18\n31,820,079.48\n6,327,338.72\n19,480,197.75\n27,088,789.92\n11,873,767.24\n62,647,881.89\n3,583,509.91\n23,594,651.47\n323,276.77\n216,559,054.94\nMar\n12,086,596.94\n5,009,117.91\n15,457,881.64\n33,668,114.17\n7,879,623.60\n17,019,379.33\n29,927,193.06\n12,664,366.44\n68,761,992.24\n4,513,060.17\n25,352,486.13\n371,874.60\n232,711,686.23\nApr\n14,293,712.79\n6,264,137.34\n17,624,611.65\n35,860,252.53\n7,955,587.69\n18,411,151.82\n32,890,743.11\n11,445,151.89\n81,410,668.87\n4,248,558.67\n27,176,673.47\n411,001.01\n257,992,250.84\nMay\n14,731,869.47\n5,542,211.64\n19,231,383.69\n37,283,237.74\n7,903,622.65\n19,756,317.30\n33,027,214.88\n22,796,168.05\n84,596,653.48\n4,504,355.67\n28,445,264.85\n378,185.06\n278,196,484.46\nJun\n15,628,935.51\n6,154,316.52\n20,722,752.27\n39,604,431.48\n7,861,552.67\n21,455,061.82\n36,502,664.43\n23,449,074.86\n92,196,178.85\n4,756,434.86\n29,731,644.54\n415,508.64\n298,478,556.45\nJul\n14,899,561.10\n6,742,913.66\n25,082,739.85\n39,720,936.02\n9,580,503.84\n24,570,675.98\n38,875,306.10\n31,312,003.24\n94,151,108.53\n5,021,547.73\n32,324,374.53\n568,402.62\n322,850,073.17\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2021\n TABLE 7.2: SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS DEPOSITS \n$ ('000)\n \n \n \n23 \n \n \nEnd of\nNominal \nLending \nRates 1\nIndividuals \nCorporate\n2019\nJan\n4.00-18.00\n9.47\n7.40\nFeb\n4.00-18.00\n9.23\n7.30\nMar\n4.00-18.00\n9.23\n7.31\nApr\n4.00-18.00\n9.30\n7.38\nMay\n4.00-22.00\n9.31\n7.33\nJun\n4.00-22.00\n9.15\n7.67\nJul\n4.00-35.00\n9.54\n8.40\nAug\n5.00-55.00\n14.37\n18.43\nSep\n5.00-65.00\n14.64\n19.81\nOct\n5.00-65.00\n15.59\n19.66\nNov\n5.00-65.00\n15.06\n18.00\nDec\n5.00-65.00\n16.08\n18.31\n2020\nJan\n5.00-65.00\n16.56\n17.20\nFeb\n5.00-65.00\n16.92\n16.68\nMar\n5.00-65.00\n19.65\n17.21\nApr\n5.00-65.00\n18.57\n18.69\nMay\n5.00-65.00\n18.06\n18.07\nJune\n5.00-65.00\n20.04\n17.38\nJuly\n5.00-65.00\n18.87\n20.11\nAug\n6.00-65.00\n19.14\n18.99\nSep\n6.00-65.00\n20.65\n25.09\nOct\n6.00-65.00\n26.04\n26.68\nNov\n6.00-65.00\n30.32\n27.67\nDec\n6.00-65.00\n32.11\n26.91\n2021\nJan\n6.00-65.00\n32.65\n24.77\nFeb\n6.00-85.00\n36.67\n21.36\nMar\n6.00-85.00\n35.83\n22.61\nApr\n6.00-85.00\n35.22\n22.59\nMay\n6.00-85.00\n34.84\n21.76\nJun\n6.00-85.00\n36.25\n22.46\nJul\n6.00-85.00\n36.56\n21.66\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2021\nNotes\nTABLE 8.1: LENDING RATES (percent per annum)\n1. Nominal lending rates depict the range of rates quoted by banks.\nCommercial Banks\nWeighted Lending Rates\n \n \n \n24 \n \n \nTABLE 8.2 : BANK DEPOSIT RATES (percent per annum)\nEND OF\nSAVINGS\n3 MONTHS\n2019\nJan\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nFeb\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-6.75\nMar\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nApr\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nMay\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nJun\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nJul\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nAug\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nSep\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nOct\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nNov\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nDec\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\n2020\nJan\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nFeb\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nMar\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nApr\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nMay\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nJun\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nJul\n0.22-12.00\n1.33-14.00\nAug\n0.50-15.00\n1.00-20.28\nSep\n0.50-15.00\n1.00-20.28\nOct\n0.50-15.00\n1.00-20.28\nNov\n0.50-15.00\n1.00-20.28\nDec\n0.50-15.00\n1.00-20.28\n2021\nJan\n0.22-12.00\n2.00-21.50\nFeb\n0.22-12.00\n2.00-21.50\nMar\n0.22-12.00\n2.00-21.50\nApr\n0.22-12.00\n2.00-21.50\nMay\n0.22-12.00\n2.00-21.50\nJun\n0.25-12.00\n2.00-26.00\nJul\n0.50-12.00\n2.00-26.00\n Source:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2021\n* Deposit rates depict the range of rates qouted by banks. \nCOMMERCIAL BANKS\n \n \n \n25 \n \nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES \nCLOTHING \n&\nHOUSING, \nWATER,\nFURNITURE\nHEALTH\nTRANSPORT\nCOMMUNIC\nATION\nRECREATION \n&\nEDUCATION\nRESTAUR\nANTS &\nMISC.\nTOTAL NON\n& TOBACCO\nFOOTWEAR\nELECTRICTY, \nGAS\nAND\nCULTURE\nHOTELS\nGOODS &\nFOOD\n& OTHER\nEQUIPMEN\nT\nSERVICES\nFUELS\nWEIGHTS\n4.90\n4.35\n27.62\n5.29\n1.42\n8.39\n2.65\n2.27\n4.25\n1.08\n6.46\n68.70\n31.30\n100\n2018\nJan\n0.17\n0.67\n0.02\n0.55\n0.10\n0.00\n-0.04\n1.78\n0.00\n-0.16\n0.64\n0.26\n0.39\n0.30\nFeb\n0.26\n0.91\n0.01\n0.43\n0.00\n-0.02\n0.15\n0.90\n0.00\n0.01\n0.21\n0.19\n-0.18\n0.08\nMar\n0.13\n-0.34\n-0.74\n0.46\n0.18\n-1.29\n-1.60\n1.58\n0.01\n-0.14\n-0.55\n0.09\n-0.03\n-0.25\nApr\n0.20\n0.34\n-0.01\n0.00\n0.10\n-0.32\n-0.21\n-0.10\n0.63\n1.85\n0.26\n0.11\n0.02\n0.08\nMay\n-0.03\n0.10\n0.00\n-0.12\n0.03\n0.14\n-0.01\n0.08\n0.00\n0.05\n0.33\n0.03\n0.02\n0.03\nJun\n0.60\n0.14\n-0.16\n-0.48\n0.38\n0.19\n0.10\n-0.25\n0.00\n0.26\n1.00\n0.04\n-0.23\n-0.05\nJul\n0.43\n0.38\n0.00\n0.40\n0.31\n0.17\n0.08\n0.65\n7.16\n3.20\n0.75\n1.09\n0.74\n0.98\nAug\n0.13\n0.45\n0.00\n0.91\n0.24\n0.47\n0.00\n-0.23\n0.00\n0.11\n0.34\n0.28\n0.62\n0.39\nSep\n0.22\n1.35\n0.53\n2.79\n1.90\n0.51\n0.32\n0.22\n0.00\n0.28\n0.07\n0.85\n1.05\n0.92\nOct\n7.89\n45.88\n2.94\n26.86\n12.94\n19.13\n1.39\n27.66\n0.00\n9.86\n13.64\n14.66\n20.12\n16.44\nNov\n7.21\n10.63\n4.80\n9.12\n3.36\n2.31\n0.18\n16.33\n0.35\n9.29\n15.42\n6.50\n14.53\n9.20\nDec\n10.22\n8.07\n2.77\n8.07\n8.49\n28.61\n1.26\n3.19\n0.00\n13.84\n10.07\n9.01\n9.07\n9.03\n2019\nJan\n13.35\n1.04\n4.35\n9.46\n11.64\n47.25\n1.12\n11.01\n0.10\n11.73\n6.72\n12.83\n6.94\n10.75\nFeb\n2.94\n5.94\n2.77\n2.73\n2.93\n-7.70\n0.14\n3.42\n0.02\n2.20\n4.34\n0.70\n3.56\n1.67\nMar\n14.29\n5.56\n2.34\n5.20\n2.30\n3.06\n0.14\n3.92\n3.66\n4.54\n5.16\n4.05\n5.10\n4.38\nApr\n12.05\n6.57\n0.65\n5.84\n19.90\n3.40\n3.50\n5.36\n6.93\n19.74\n5.35\n4.45\n7.85\n5.52\nMay\n21.57\n11.89\n2.54\n11.51\n16.85\n16.18\n31.21\n29.81\n3.05\n6.67\n8.96\n10.12\n17.63\n12.54\nJun\n40.94\n59.89\n18.11\n63.80\n46.53\n41.90\n2.32\n35.38\n0.06\n28.71\n36.63\n31.23\n55.07\n39.26\nJul\n23.72\n27.68\n9.19\n27.01\n43.32\n26.39\n7.48\n36.17\n11.05\n30.51\n39.79\n21.72\n19.90\n21.04\nAug\n18.09\n10.81\n13.65\n11.18\n7.47\n32.66\n67.86\n12.65\n4.09\n8.67\n18.77\n17.79\n18.55\n18.07\nSep\n11.01\n17.47\n15.52\n14.73\n18.68\n16.83\n1.29\n18.03\n4.10\n8.42\n35.01\n16.63\n19.55\n17.72\nOct\n42.80\n37.15\n38.63\n35.12\n34.80\n26.55\n9.15\n31.78\n5.47\n37.99\n30.03\n32.90\n48.35\n38.75\nNov\n16.54\n18.35\n5.83\n25.67\n18.49\n9.68\n13.01\n20.59\n17.10\n36.46\n23.89\n13.94\n22.63\n17.46\nDec\n11.51\n13.48\n31.25\n17.51\n12.74\n11.82\n1.43\n5.70\n0.17\n15.52\n18.28\n17.14\n15.75\n16.55\n2020\nJan\n1.83\n3.84\n0.60\n1.50\n5.32\n2.24\n2.77\n2.01\n9.39\n2.72\n1.86\n1.99\n2.55\n2.23\nFeb\n8.48\n10.01\n2.27\n7.00\n21.56\n9.62\n220.04\n17.96\n94.95\n2.92\n30.86\n18.41\n6.81\n13.52\nMar\n28.76\n37.12\n57.14\n29.35\n27.28\n18.10\n4.26\n58.79\n0.66\n17.49\n22.67\n32.44\n17.69\n26.59\nApr\n26.21\n13.46\n3.05\n24.06\n25.07\n8.87\n3.05\n9.42\n1.13\n21.08\n15.12\n11.38\n28.37\n17.64\nMay\n28.90\n18.99\n3.42\n21.36\n18.30\n22.97\n4.22\n10.04\n0.02\n29.69\n23.31\n15.41\n14.72\n15.13\nJun\n35.25\n48.84\n7.52\n38.21\n43.77\n32.48\n23.24\n39.46\n0.87\n32.46\n29.51\n27.61\n37.73\n31.66\nJul\n33.30\n35.93\n12.07\n32.45\n27.35\n50.65\n118.89\n17.13\n1.14\n37.84\n34.77\n33.76\n37.99\n35.53\nAug\n9.71\n7.52\n2.82\n7.83\n7.02\n11.02\n19.57\n7.75\n79.86\n8.40\n11.19\n10.03\n6.30\n8.44\nSep\n2.53\n1.71\n3.01\n1.52\n2.59\n1.69\n19.84\n5.79\n23.42\n0.33\n7.26\n5.08\n2.08\n3.83\nOct\n5.68\n2.51\n15.42\n0.95\n1.12\n3.02\n3.78\n1.59\n4.91\n4.22\n4.46\n5.33\n3.00\n4.37\nNov\n3.70\n3.73\n3.35\n2.02\n0.66\n3.60\n0.39\n1.74\n0.71\n4.36\n2.09\n2.63\n3.39\n3.15\nDec\n4.58\n3.08\n0.52\n3.26\n1.73\n3.61\n1.17\n1.26\n0.18\n2.12\n3.82\n2.63\n6.54\n4.22\n2021\nJan\n4.43\n1.15\n4.84\n3.35\n8.08\n3.87\n0.71\n1.72\n0.06\n8.48\n4.67\n3.70\n7.84\n5.43\nFeb\n3.27\n0.94\n3.21\n1.77\n2.48\n4.22\n0.01\n-0.51\n0.13\n1.94\n4.81\n2.73\n4.42\n3.45\nMar\n1.45\n0.57\n1.61\n1.45\n3.68\n1.32\n5.08\n1.18\n0.54\n3.50\n3.14\n2.06\n2.52\n2.26\nApr\n3.38\n2.21\n2.01\n4.06\n4.60\n1.86\n0.07\n2.09\n0.59\n4.67\n3.52\n2.60\n2.51\n2.56\nMay\n2.01\n1.25\n0.97\n5.35\n2.91\n1.99\n0.35\n19.13\n0.00\n24.14\n6.26\n3.75\n0.95\n2.54\nJun\n2.76\n3.05\n9.71\n4.36\n3.19\n3.40\n1.57\n1.87\n5.60\n1.84\n4.09\n4.38\n3.21\n3.88\nJul\n3.38\n2.21\n2.01\n4.06\n4.60\n1.86\n0.07\n2.09\n0.59\n4.67\n3.52\n2.60\n2.51\n2.56\nSource:Zimstat, 2021\nFOOD & NON \nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES\nALL \nITEMS\nTABLE 9.1 : MONTHLY INFLATION - % CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \n(February 2019 = 100)\n \n \n \n26 \n \nFOOD \nINFLATION\nALCO HO LIC \nCLO T HING\nHO US ING , \nW AT E R,\nFURNIT URE\nMIS C.\nFO O D & \nB E VE RAG E S \n& \nE LE CT RICT Y, \nG AS\nAND\nRE CRE AT IO N &\nRE S T AURANT S \n&\nG O O DS &\nT O T AL NO N\nNO N \nALCO HO LIC \nALL\n& T O B ACCO\nFO O T W E AR\n& O T HE R\nE Q UIP ME NT\nCULT URE\nHO T E LS\nS E RVICE S\nFO O D\nB E VE RAG E S\nIT E MS\nFUE LS\nWEIGHTS\n4.90\n4.35\n27.62\n5.29\n1.42\n8.39\n2.65\n2.27\n4.25\n1.08\n6.46\n68.70\n31.30\n100\n2018\nJan\n1.83\n4.12\n-0.52\n9.00\n1.82\n1.30\n0.41\n7.95\n-2.25\n1.63\n6.64\n2.45\n6.17\n3.52\nFeb\n2.04\n5.21\n-0.65\n8.71\n1.84\n1.17\n0.56\n8.96\n-2.25\n1.45\n6.31\n2.41\n4.35\n2.98\nMar\n2.02\n4.81\n-1.32\n8.52\n1.91\n-0.35\n-1.03\n10.48\n-2.24\n1.30\n5.35\n2.37\n4.54\n2.68\nApr\n2.34\n5.14\n-1.36\n8.45\n2.06\n-0.67\n-1.28\n10.36\n-3.58\n2.84\n5.70\n2.26\n4.94\n2.71\nMay\n2.18\n5.15\n-1.36\n8.30\n1.96\n-0.58\n-1.30\n10.67\n-3.58\n3.29\n6.14\n2.28\n4.89\n2.71\nJun\n2.58\n5.27\n-0.70\n7.36\n2.38\n-0.20\n-1.20\n10.20\n-3.58\n3.26\n6.85\n2.48\n5.12\n2.91\nJul\n2.83\n5.66\n-0.71\n7.86\n2.68\n0.20\n-1.04\n10.86\n6.31\n5.42\n7.53\n3.94\n6.35\n4.29\nAug\n3.15\n6.03\n-0.77\n8.78\n2.89\n0.67\n-1.07\n10.47\n6.31\n5.53\n7.84\n4.22\n7.52\n4.83\nSep\n3.35\n6.98\n-0.47\n10.60\n4.77\n1.49\n-0.89\n10.00\n6.31\n5.77\n7.79\n4.83\n7.94\n5.39\nOct\n10.81\n53.83\n2.20\n35.57\n17.08\n19.61\n0.11\n36.24\n6.31\n15.68\n19.31\n18.71\n26.78\n20.85\nNov\n18.47\n69.14\n7.04\n46.01\n20.56\n22.02\n0.34\n56.70\n8.23\n27.34\n36.21\n26.02\n42.71\n31.01\nDec\n30.21\n81.48\n10.48\n57.08\n30.80\n56.47\n1.61\n60.45\n8.22\n44.26\n48.82\n37.08\n53.68\n42.09\n2019\nJan\n47.34\n82.13\n15.27\n71.00\n45.88\n130.41\n2.79\n75.00\n8.32\n61.45\n57.81\n54.26\n63.71\n56.90\nFeb\n51.28\n91.22\n18.46\n74.92\n50.16\n112.71\n2.78\n79.38\n8.34\n64.99\n64.31\n55.04\n69.84\n59.39\nMar\n72.67\n102.55\n22.14\n83.18\n53.34\n122.10\n4.59\n83.51\n12.30\n72.72\n73.75\n61.19\n78.55\n66.80\nApr\n93.08\n115.13\n22.94\n93.88\n83.66\n130.40\n8.49\n93.54\n19.33\n103.06\n82.56\n68.17\n92.52\n75.86\nMay\n134.80\n140.46\n26.07\n116.47\n114.54\n167.32\n42.36\n151.04\n22.97\n116.49\n98.28\n85.94\n126.43\n97.85\nJun\n228.95\n283.96\n49.13\n256.29\n213.17\n278.58\n45.52\n240.71\n23.05\n177.91\n168.24\n142.84\n251.94\n175.66\n2020\nFeb\n710.29\n629.57\n603.89\n254.34\n523.95\n785.04\n498.64\n946.38\n604.12\n262.80\n507.72\n839.15\n462.64\n540.16\nMar\n807.36\n721.94\n814.31\n444.09\n667.21\n1001.14\n585.97\n989.48\n975.94\n252.31\n582.94\n995.50\n616.11\n676.39\nApr\n980.03\n825.86\n873.49\n456.99\n799.24\n1048.61\n622.22\n984.76\n1017.34\n233.23\n590.62\n1097.13\n663.66\n765.57\nMay\n953.34\n881.65\n935.22\n461.76\n878.64\n1062.84\n664.43\n761.68\n847.15\n223.43\n739.67\n1254.79\n700.38\n785.55\nJun\n842.04\n863.68\n411.42\n725.77\n1040.97\n613.71\n937.83\n875.68\n226.03\n764.10\n1184.15\n678.29\n835.56\n737.26\nJul\n914.97\n925.92\n424.89\n761.12\n913.86\n750.68\n2013.62\n739.27\n196.93\n812.65\n1138.04\n755.27\n976.73\n837.53\nAug\n842.90\n895.39\n374.89\n735.12\n909.62\n611.88\n1405.52\n702.75\n413.11\n810.44\n1058.99\n698.90\n865.48\n761.02\nSep\n770.81\n761.81\n323.45\n638.97\n772.72\n519.65\n1681.32\n619.53\n508.37\n742.51\n820.76\n619.77\n724.40\n659.40\nOct\n544.43\n544.11\n252.56\n452.09\n554.64\n404.46\n1593.73\n454.72\n505.13\n536.36\n639.65\n470.47\n472.40\n471.25\nNov\n473.41\n464.54\n244.29\n385.99\n456.13\n376.50\n1404.55\n368.00\n420.46\n386.63\n509.46\n413.85\n385.02\n401.66\nDec\n437.80\n412.80\n163.67\n350.75\n401.81\n341.52\n1400.70\n348.33\n420.53\n330.15\n434.93\n350.17\n346.40\n348.59\n2021\nJan\n451.53\n399.55\n174.78\n358.95\n414.96\n348.54\n1370.61\n347.06\n376.10\n354.29\n449.65\n357.69\n369.43\n362.63\nFeb\n425.04\n358.36\n177.30\n336.52\n334.15\n326.47\n359.53\n277.07\n144.52\n349.97\n340.25\n297.07\n358.96\n321.59\nMar\n313.69\n236.18\n79.30\n242.33\n253.65\n265.87\n363.15\n140.26\n144.23\n296.40\n270.14\n206.00\n299.81\n240.55\nApr\n231.12\n201.33\n76.01\n178.83\n185.47\n239.16\n349.55\n121.37\n180.66\n238.80\n226.98\n178.93\n216.60\n194.07\nMay\n162.05\n156.40\n71.83\n142.05\n148.33\n181.30\n332.85\n139.66\n180.59\n224.31\n181.76\n150.75\n178.60\n161.91\nJune\n99.10\n77.51\n75.32\n82.76\n78.24\n119.54\n256.74\n75.07\n193.77\n149.35\n126.46\n105.12\n108.76\n106.64\nJuly\n54.42\n33.47\n59.60\n43.58\n46.40\n48.44\n63.09\n52.59\n192.16\n89.35\n73.95\n57.33\n55.09\n56.37\nSource:Zimstat, 2021\nTABLE 9.2 : YEARLY INFLATION - % CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \n(February 2019 = 100)\nNON-FOOD INFLATION\nHE ALT H\nT RANS P O RT\nCO MMUNICAT IO N\nE DUCAT IO N\n \n \n \n27 \n \n \n(US$ MILLIONS)\nEnd Period\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\n2014\n2015\n2016\n2017\n2018\n2019\nEst\nLong-Term External Debt\n6,326\n6,556\n7,713\n8,125\n8,655\n10,234\n9,341\n9,305\n9,555\n9,827\n10,557\nGovernment\n5,304\n5,039\n6,128\n6,321\n6,172\n6,192\n6,097\n6,015\n6,200\n6,306\n6,930\nBilateral Creditors\n3,703\n3,402\n4,087\n4,087\n4,088\n4,115\n4,115\n4,129\n4,194\n4,261\n4,892\nMultilateral Creditors\n1,591\n1,627\n2,041\n2,235\n2,084\n2,078\n1,982\n1,886\n2,006\n2,045\n2,069\nPrivate Creditors\n10\n10\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPublic Enterprises\n825\n825\n1,092\n1,198\n1,356\n1,661\n1,220\n1,370\n1,406\n1,426\n1,165\nBilateral Creditors\n497\n497\n711\n703\n858\n1,155\n760\n779\n843\n898\n783\nMultilateral Creditors\n327\n327\n382\n495\n498\n506\n460\n591\n562\n528\n381\nPrivate Creditors\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nMonetary Authorities\n140\n550\n127\n125\n125\n120\n110\n0\n0\n0\n0\nMultilateral Creditors - IMF\n140\n550\n127\n125\n125\n120\n110\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPrivate\n57\n142\n366\n480\n1,002\n2,261\n1,913\n1,920\n1,949\n2,095\n2,431\nShort-Term External Debt\n1,348\n2,040\n1,286\n891\n1,564\n2,394\n2,258\n2,304\n2,299\n2,374\n3,799\nSupplier's Credits\n193\n286\n134\n30\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nReserve Bank\n998\n1,300\n615\n615\n614\n587\n587\n573\n507\n441\n2,463\nPrivate\n156\n454\n537\n246\n950\n1,807\n1,671\n1,731\n1,792\n1,933\n1,336\nTotal External Debt\n7,674\n8,596\n8,999\n9,016\n10,219\n12,628\n11,599\n11,610\n11,854\n13,134\n14,324\nSource: Ministry of Finance & Economic Development, 2020; & Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\nTABLE 10: ZIMBABWE: EXTERNAL DEBT OUTSTANDING BY DEBTOR (INCLUDING ALL ARREARS)\n \n \n \n28 \n \n \nUSA\nSOUTH ARFICAN\nBOTSWANA\nJAPANESE\nEURO\nPOUND\nEND OF\nDollar\nRAND\nPULA\nYEN\nSTERLING\n2019\nMar\n3.0120\n0.2064\n0.2789\n0.0272\n3.3832\n3.9363\nApr\n3.2614\n0.2275\n0.3031\n0.0292\n3.6490\n4.2209\nMay\n5.2635\n0.3550\n0.4831\n0.0483\n5.8585\n6.6391\nJun\n6.6220\n0.4673\n0.6231\n0.0615\n7.5245\n8.3906\nJul\n9.1900\n0.6494\n0.8621\n0.0846\n10.0000\n11.1111\nAug\n10.512\n0.6833\n0.9458\n0.0940\n11.6288\n12.8226\nSep\n15.200\n1.0234\n1.3883\n0.1415\n16.5699\n18.7643\nOct\n16.120\n1.0804\n1.4721\n0.1491\n17.5217\n20.4051\nNov\n15.970\n1.0800\n1.4600\n0.1500\n17.6600\n20.5800\nDec\n16.530\n1.1400\n1.5400\n0.1500\n18.3700\n21.6900\n2020\nJan\n17.100\n1.1883\n1.5922\n0.1564\n19.0000\n22.5000\nFeb\n17.680\n1.1779\n1.6073\n0.1608\n19.2174\n22.9610\nMar\n21.160\n1.2709\n1.8384\n0.1970\n23.5111\n26.1235\nApr\n25.000\n1.3448\n2.0542\n0.2321\n27.1739\n30.8642\nMay\n25.000\n1.3736\n2.0695\n0.2333\n27.1739\n30.8642\nJun\n32.350\n1.8876\n2.7638\n0.3007\n36.4229\n40.5346\nJul\n68.943\n4.1073\n5.9515\n0.6457\n79.5784\n87.2651\nAug\n81.604\n4.7435\n7.0151\n0.7697\n96.5746\n107.2191\nSep\n82.250\n4.9133\n7.1482\n0.7790\n97.0112\n106.6580\nOct\n81.370\n4.9403\n7.1042\n0.7734\n95.7690\n105.5999\nNov\n81.679\n5.2531\n7.3127\n0.7827\n96.6100\n107.8000\nDec\n81.815\n5.4767\n7.5022\n0.7878\n99.5164\n109.9537\n2021\nJan\n82.070\n5.4208\n7.4794\n0.7914\n99.9148\n111.9300\nFeb\n83.461\n5.6470\n7.6491\n0.7927\n100.9497\n115.5931\nMar\n83.996\n5.5989\n7.6072\n0.7732\n100.0262\n116.3990\nApr\n84.503\n5.8973\n7.8165\n0.7766\n102.4094\n117.7721\nMay\n84.726\n6.1449\n7.9642\n0.7720\n103.3021\n120.1879\nJun\n85.423\n5.9577\n7.8205\n0.7730\n101.6496\n118.3071\nJul\n85.637\n5.8616\n7.7630\n0.7816\n101.7414\n119.4212\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2021\n TABLE 11 : SELECTED INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE RATES\n1. ZWL$ dollar per unit of foreign currency\n \n \n \n29 \n \n \nMarket Capitalisation\nEND OF\nAll Share*\nZWL$ millions\n2018\nJan\n91.3\n130.4\n31.4\n55,032,220\n8,652.9\nFeb\n88.0\n124.9\n63.7\n138,142,187\n8,386.0\nMar\n87.0\n125.1\n40.3\n108,997,097\n8,290.4\nApr\n98.7\n124.4\n44.4\n206,342,675\n9,405.3\nMay\n108.3\n151.5\n59.3\n129,155,586\n10,393.2\nJun\n102.9\n161.3\n73.0\n234,834,368\n9,792.2\nJul\n114.3\n164.0\n114.9\n624,256,160\n10,969.7\nAug\n117.3\n161.3\n50.5\n142,150,599\n12,475.4\nSep\n115.1\n163.8\n61.1\n197,401,341\n12,265.5\nOct\n163.8\n217.3\n449.6\n316,060,000\n17,960.0\nNov\n160.4\n208.6\n118.0\n153,874,660\n17,316.6\nDec\n146.2\n227.7\n93.0\n144,479,601\n19,424.4\n2019\nJan\n157.5\n213.1\n110.3\n122,778,938\n20,888.4\nFeb\n148.1\n206.9\n295.8\n229,935,122\n19,773.4\nMar\n121.7\n194.0\n70.8\n123,398,632\n16,084.9\nApr\n133.7\n186.5\n116.5\n134,394,898\n17,502.7\nMay\n188.1\n225.8\n193.5\n237,334,372\n24,920.0\nJun\n204.8\n255.3\n235.5\n293,138,775\n27,017.2\nJul\n187.1\n244.6\n191.0\n163,556,663\n24,636.1\nAug\n166.36\n269.6\n109.0\n117,688,558\n21,742.2\nSep\n232.52\n317.8\n166.6\n335,373,041\n30,527.2\nOct\n232.86\n276.3\n208.4\n203,004,611\n30,390.0\nNov\n240.81\n344.4\n130.0\n129,886,035\n31,226.3\nDec\n230.08\n316.7\n194.2\n190,880,245\n29,767.1\n2020\nJan\n332.9\n344.9\n304.86\n179,559,446\n43,426.5\nFeb\n473.13\n826.73\n360.13\n172,678,984\n60,987.5\nMar\n456.21\n720.47\n425.24\n237,667,043\n58,612.1\nApr\n488.60\n826.64\n269.66\n107,308,931\n63,387.9\nMay\n1180.14\n1582.86\n568.96\n218,832,930\n152,719.7\nJune*\n1788.75\n3995.48\n379.93\n519,901,300\n228,577.1\nAug\n1389.23\n3709.15\n1,026.76\n164,501,200\n175,678.4\nSep\n1638.17\n4128.52\n4,640.88\n1,093,040,821\n206,502.5\nOct\n1476.87\n3792.35\n986.70\n397,006,127\n179,690.0\nNov\n1595.59\n3322.22\n4,103.78\n470,899,659\n193,270.8\nDec\n2636.34\n4134.09\n2,734.50\n316,737,200\n317,879.3\n2021\nJan\n3600.82\n4356.74\n3,513.59\n2,477,166,688\n434,856.23\nFeb\n4154.37\n6683.44\n1,529.25\n149,031,800\n501,184.95\nMar\n4489.47\n5315.39\n4,517.14\n203,633,747\n531,742.64\nApr\n4641.11\n5061.28\n3,075.98\n223,494,202\n540,745.24\nMay\n5428.28\n6820.54\n3,917.41\n188,748,200\n634,011.15\nJune\n6194.88\n6211.49\n4458.87\n248,500,624\n745,175.95\nJuly\n6818.29\n6621.17\n2921.32\n181,010,800\n803,900.15\nSource:Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2021\n*All Share index was introduced in January, 2018\n**As at 26 June 2020\nTABLE 12: ZIMBABWE STOCK MARKET STATISTICS\n Market Turnover \nZWL$ million \nVolume of Shares\nMining\nIndices\n \n \n \n30 \n \n \nEND OF\nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\n INTERNET\n2018\nJan\n5548.1\n4.9\n663.5\n21.3\n2318.8\n1006.1\nFeb\n4706.6\n4.5\n594.0\n13.9\n2015.1\n831.0\nMar\n6300.4\n4.5\n654.2\n12.5\n2657.1\n864.8\nApr\n5786.8\n3.3\n640.9\n11.5\n3002.6\n822.6\nMay\n7298.4\n4.2\n819.7\n10.5\n3550.1\n968.6\nJun\n7997.3\n4.7\n779.4\n8.3\n3724.3\n1135.5\nJul\n8290.0\n4.0\n790.0\n9.4\n4446.7\n1262.5\nAug\n7762.9\n2.9\n811.2\n14.0\n4558.5\n1255.0\nSep\n7155.0\n4.0\n842.5\n17.0\n4462.4\n1393.1\nOct\n8230.5\n4.2\n821.3\n17.9\n4607.4\n1428.2\nNov\n7922.5\n3.7\n657.5\n19.9\n3964.8\n1026.7\nDec\n8355.2\n2.8\n917.2\n14.6\n4833.8\n1102.9\n2019\nJan\n6903.0\n2.9\n1294.0\n16.9\n3608.8\n1056.2\nFeb\n8337.0\n4.0\n1330.6\n17.2\n3594.5\n1093.6\nMar\n9881.5\n3.9\n1399.5\n18.3\n4080.7\n1250.6\nApr\n10321.4\n3.1\n1590.1\n14.0\n4949.3\n1408.5\nMay\n14670.3\n4.2\n1397.5\n11.8\n6692.5\n1897.8\nJun\n17881.2\n3.7\n1464.7\n30.1\n7130.0\n2539.8\nJul\n23309.9\n3.7\n1806.5\n36.6\n9137.4\n3295.8\nAug\n23596.6\n2.4\n2181.6\n38.5\n11077.6\n3493.6\nSep\n30328.1\n3.8\n3029.9\n51.9\n15112.0\n5337.7\nOct\n39413.7\n3.9\n3621.6\n67.1\n16588.3\n6237.0\nNov\n40871.8\n3.5\n4199.3\n67.4\n13537.8\n7200.3\nDec\n49579.8\n2.8\n5695.4\n97.2\n19356.7\n8724.0\n2020\nJan\n47841.3\n1.8\n5236.3\n115.2\n21247.9\n9646.8\nFeb\n41637.6\n4.7\n5431.8\n136.9\n22589.7\n9633.8\nMar\n60804.1\n4.1\n7252.9\n268.0\n27993.6\n14411.4\nApr\n47525.5\n-\n4150.6\n82.6\n18299.2\n11481.8\nMay\n59271.1\n-\n7426.0\n349.8\n24851.5\n19593.2\nJun\n91311.3\n-\n9752.7\n516.6\n26042.5\n25842.3\nJul\n127743.2\n-\n14741.1\n1028.7\n26033.3\n35199.7\nAug\n143042.1\n-\n14953.6\n1547.5\n27217.6\n34505.0\nSep\n203172.0\n-\n18252.3\n1963.0\n26441.0\n41958.4\nOct\n198863.6\n-\n22482.3\n2163.3\n42767.7\n46270.4\nNov\n236231.6\n-\n23936.7\n2151.6\n36475.7\n54797.8\nDec\n302661.2\n-\n30061.0\n1935.3\n45278.1\n67038.2\n2021\nJan\n255551.3\n-\n21042.2\n4532.1\n35306.3\n64996.4\nFeb\n226335.8\n-\n22882.6\n2288.9\n36383.0\n61941.7\nMar\n320422.1\n-\n28569.9\n3316.6\n44524.0\n86463.9\nApr\n288958.8\n-\n30071.5\n2807.0\n44131.6\n90580.4\nMay\n361427.1\n-\n36765.1\n3193.7\n49745.8\n89471.3\nJun\n388757.5\n-\n38540.1\n3200.0\n51437.4\n115145.7\nJul\n379659.9\n-\n44873.9\n3311.1\n57558.5\n127846.0\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2021\nTABLE 13.1 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS \n Values of Transactions (ZWL$ millions)\n \n \n \n31 \n \n \nEND OF\nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\nINTERNET\n2018\nJan\n 548.1 \n22.7\n20981.2\n449.6\n100593.9\n501.8\nFeb\n 457.2 \n22.5\n18869.0\n292.2\n89584.3\n463.8\nMar\n 545.2 \n23.7\n21996.8\n268.4\n116120.0\n510.5\nApr\n 505.5 \n17.4\n21170.0\n253.6\n117616.8\n457.0\nMay\n 611.1 \n21.2\n23278.2\n213.2\n137423.0\n496.6\nJun\n 553.6 \n22.5\n23790.0\n175.2\n156609.8\n502.2\nJul\n 560.2 \n20.1\n25075.5\n223.1\n169416.8\n559.6\nAug\n 553.0 \n15.1\n25249.9\n317.4\n164918.0\n518.7\nSep\n 543.0 \n19.4\n24918.0\n300.8\n161289.5\n511.3\nOct\n 571.6 \n20.4\n21025.4\n345.5\n161427.4\n496.0\nNov\n 477.4 \n16.7\n17845.4\n334.9\n133862.1\n430.6\nDec\n 478.6 \n13.0\n27419.1\n236.2\n161540.7\n409.1\nAnnual Total\n 6,404.4 \n234.6 271,618.6 3,410.1 1,670,402.1 \n 5,857.13 \n2019\nJan\n401.5\n12.2\n40613.8\n232.6\n135481.1\n413.4\nFeb\n456.5\n16.4\n27811.2\n226.8\n119081.1\n463.6\nMar\n525.9\n15.4\n30417.6\n248.9\n142597.8\n441.0\nApr\n535.0\n13.7\n32092.5\n168.8\n157348.3\n390.1\nMay\n642.6\n14.7\n15542.6\n121.4\n166491.6\n494.3\nJun\n706.0\n13.3\n18012.1\n79.6\n160873.0\n486.8\nJul\n983.5\n13.6\n20465.4\n99.6\n170823.3\n638.2\nAug\n872.9\n9.0\n21919.8\n85.2\n179281.2\n542.3\nSep\n1010.7\n11.9\n22749.6\n62.4\n200441.9\n679.4\nOct\n1079.4\n12.7\n23191.6\n65.0\n206621.5\n1099.3\nNov\n982.1\n10.3\n25737.5\n225.2\n152919.9\n2044.1\nDec\n1003.8\n7.6\n27800.5\n385.5\n146316.6\n1273.6\n2020\nJan\n943.3\n4.6\n23649.0\n199.9\n139278.2\n671.7\nFeb\n916.1\n8.9\n21652.2\n196.6\n149671.5\n647.8\nMar\n1068.5\n7.4\n22588.1\n234.3\n173042.2\n661.2\nApr\n515.1\n-\n11036.4\n36.4\n131190.0\n998.0\nMay\n674.1\n-\n14711.6\n231.2\n150936.1\n705.3\nJun\n907.8\n-\n14420.9\n286.1\n135524.3\n1390.4\nJul\n918.4\n-\n15786.5\n251.4\n121072.4\n791.9\nAug\n789.4\n-\n13536.2\n248.2\n127308.6\n702.1\nSep\n911.9\n-\n15524.1\n309.8\n125059.2\n783.2\nOct\n990.2\n-\n19138.6\n398.8\n191148.8\n735.8\nNov\n971.3\n-\n17584.9\n430.0\n101305.8\n755.6\nDec\n1100.0\n-\n19404.0\n453.0\n115290.2\n820.1\n2021\nJan\n720.0\n-\n9849.3\n229.0\n94691.4\n872.2\nFeb\n806.0\n-\n12309.3\n527.8\n90078.0\n754.9\nMar\n1112.8\n-\n15178.8\n751.0\n105272.0\n1003.7\nApr\n951.7\n-\n15185.0\n605.5\n97253.3\n1040.1\nMay\n1029.8\n-\n16511.3\n664.4\n103708.7\n994.8\nJun\n1076.9\n-\n14797.9\n581.9\n99349.6\n982.1\nJul\n1028.2\n-\n15217.6\n551.0\n102587.6\n980.8\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2021\nTABLE 13.2 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS \n Volumes of Transactions (000's)", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/Monthly_Economic_Reviews/Monthly-Economic-Review-July-2021.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "9f18a74927285f3ef5054330165544fd", "text": "MPC Statement 21 May 2020 \nPage 1 \n \n \n \nSouth African Reserve Bank \n \nPRESS STATEMENT \nEMBARGO DELIVERY \n21 May 2020 \n \n \nSTATEMENT OF THE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE \n \nIssued by Lesetja Kganyago, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank \nSince the April meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), the Covid-19 \npandemic continues to spread globally, with wide-ranging and deep social and \neconomic effects. Current forecasts from the IMF show global gross domestic product \n(GDP) decreasing by about 3.0% this year.1 Economic contractions are expected to \nbe deepest in the second quarter of 2020, with gradual recoveries in the third and \nfourth quarters of the year. The strength of the global economic recovery will depend \n \n1 Global growth in the QPM model is a trade-weighted average. For 2020 this is now at -3.4% and 4.3% for \n2021. \nMPC Statement 21 May 2020 \nPage 2 \n \nin part on how quickly countries are able to open up for economic activity safely, and \nin particular how effectively societies comply with social distancing rules. The World \nHealth Organisation advises that further complications from the virus are being \nidentified and the pandemic is unlikely to end quickly, with the virus coming in waves \nover time. \nThe crisis has caused extreme volatility in financial asset prices with sharp and deep \nmarket sell-offs followed recently by a partial recovery. Investor interest in higher-\nyielding assets has improved somewhat in recent days, but the general environment \nreflects pronounced levels of risk aversion, in particular for emerging market \ncurrencies, equities and bonds. Uncertainty about future global economic prospects, \ntrade relationships and supply chains has increased again. \nPolicy responses to the crisis have generally been robust, with the magnitudes \ndependent on the degree of policy space available to countries. The US Federal \nReserve has taken further steps to expand its balance sheet and the European Central \nBank (ECB) has made similar commitments. Emerging and developing economies \ngenerally have less policy space available and credit is more expensive. The \nInternational Financial Institutions (IFIs) have made available extraordinary levels of \nemergency financial support to respond to Covid-19.2 \nThe Covid-19 outbreak has major health, social and economic impacts, presenting \nchallenges in forecasting domestic economic activity. The compilation of accurate \neconomic statistics will also remain severely challenged. The Bank currently expects \nGDP in 2020 to contract by 7.0%, compared to the 6.1% contraction forecast in April. \nEven as the lockdown is relaxed in coming months, for the year as a whole, \n \n2 About 57 countries have been granted funds from the IMF’s Rapid Financing Instrument and the Rapid Credit Facility. \nMPC Statement 21 May 2020 \nPage 3 \n \ninvestment, exports and imports are expected to decline sharply. Job losses are also \nexpected to be widespread. \nEasing of the lockdown will support growth in the near term and some high frequency \nactivity indicators show a pickup in spending from extremely low levels. However, \ngetting back to pre-pandemic activity levels will take time. GDP is expected to grow by \n3.8% in 2021 and by 2.9% in 2022. \nSouth Africa’s terms of trade remain robust. Commodity export prices have eased in \nrecent weeks, but are still at healthy levels. Oil prices remain generally low. The spot \nprice for Brent crude oil is currently around $34 per barrel, and is expected to remain \naround these levels in coming months, contributing to reduced petrol price inflation. \nFor our forecast, the Brent crude oil price is expected to average $37 per barrel in \n2020 and $45 per barrel in 2021. \nExceptionally accommodative policies and the relaxation of lockdowns in many \nadvanced economies have supported a partial recovery in global financial markets, \nbut financing conditions for emerging markets remain uncertain. Domestically, credit \nrisk associated with public borrowing needs remains very high, contributing to non-\nresident investors’ sales of about R149 billion of local-currency denominated assets. \nThe rand has depreciated by 22.9% against the USD since January and by 0.7% since \nthe April meeting of the MPC. The implied starting point for the rand forecast is R18.40 \nto the US dollar, compared with R17.80 at the time of the previous meeting. Resident \ninvestors have increased purchases of long-term bonds, helping to ease yields in \nrecent days, but the yield curve remains exceptionally steep.3 \n \n3 Measured by the spread between the R2036 and R2048 to the R186 bonds. \nMPC Statement 21 May 2020 \nPage 4 \n \nThe Bank’s headline consumer price inflation forecast averages 3.4% for 2020 and \n4.4% in 2021 and 2022. The forecast for core inflation is lower at 3.5% in 2020, 3.8% \nin 2021, and 4.1% in 2022. \nThe overall risks to the inflation outlook at this time appear to be to the downside, but \nless clearly so compared to conditions in March and April. Global producer price and \nfood inflation appear to have bottomed out. Oil prices remain low but have recovered \nsomewhat. Local food price inflation is also expected to remain contained. Risks to \ninflation from currency depreciation are expected to stay muted while pass-through \nremains slow. However, electricity and other administered prices remain a concern. \nUpside risks to inflation could also emerge from heightened fiscal risks and sharp \nreductions in the supply of goods and services. \nExpectations of future inflation continued to soften but broadly remain around the mid-\npoint of the band. Market-based expectations for short and medium-term inflation have \nfallen, while long-term inflation expectations remain higher.4 \nDespite sustained higher levels of country financing risk, the Committee notes that the \neconomic contraction and slow recovery will keep inflation well below the midpoint of \nthe target range for this year. Barring inflation risks outlined earlier, inflation is \nexpected to be well contained over the medium-term, remaining close to the midpoint \nin 2021 and 2022. \n \n4 The latest Bureau for Economic Research (BER) survey has expectations for 2020 down by 0.4ppts to 4.4% and to 4.6% (from 5.0%) for 2021. \nFive-year-ahead inflation expectations also eased to 4.7% (from 4.9%). Market analysts (Reuters Econometer) expect inflation to be 3.5% \n(from 4.2%) for 2020, 4.1% (from 4.6%) in 2021 and to remain unchanged at 4.5% for 2022. Market-based rates are calculated from the \nbreak-even inflation rate, which is the yield differential between conventional and inflation-linked bonds. These sit at 2.5% for the 5-year and \n5% on the 10-year breakeven. 15-year breakeven inflation sits at 6.4%. \nMPC Statement 21 May 2020 \nPage 5 \n \nAgainst this backdrop, the MPC decided to cut the repo rate by 50 basis points, taking \nit to 3.75% per annum, with effect from 22 May 2020. Three members preferred a cut \nof 50 basis points and two preferred a cut of 25 basis points. \nThe implied path of policy rates over the forecast period generated by the Quarterly \nProjection Model indicates two repo rate cuts of 25 basis points in the next two quarters \nof 2020. \nMonetary policy can ease financial conditions and improve the resilience of \nhouseholds and firms to the economic implications of Covid-19. In addition to \ncontinued easing of interest rates, the Bank has eased regulatory requirements on \nbanks and has taken important steps to ensure adequate liquidity in domestic markets. \nThese actions are intended to free up more capital for lending by financial institutions \nto households and firms. \nMonetary policy however cannot on its own improve the potential growth rate of the \neconomy or reduce fiscal risks. These should be addressed by implementing prudent \nmacroeconomic policies and structural reforms that lower costs generally, and \nincrease investment opportunities, potential growth and job creation. Such steps will \nfurther reduce existing constraints on monetary policy and its transmission to the \nbroader economy. \nGlobal economic and financial conditions are expected to remain volatile for the \nforeseeable future. In this highly uncertain environment, future decisions will continue \nto be data dependent and sensitive to the balance of risks to the outlook. \nMPC Statement 21 May 2020 \nPage 6 \n \nThe MPC will seek to look through temporary price shocks and focus on second round \neffects. As usual, the repo rate projection from the QPM remains a broad policy guide, \nchanging from meeting to meeting in response to new data and risks. \n \nLesetja Kganyago \nGOVERNOR \n \nThe next statement of the Monetary Policy Committee will be released on 23 July \n2020. \n \nContact: \nThoraya Pandy \n0824168416 \nmedia@resbank.co.za", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/MPC_Statements/Monetary-Policy-Statement-21-May-2020.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "96f8e13638ba806db292550ccfaccf25", "text": "QUARTERLY \nECONOMIC \nREVIEW \n \n \n \nJUNE 2019 \n \n \n \n \n \n2 \nCONTENTS \n1. OVERVIEW ....................................................................................................... 5 \n2. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS ................................ 6 \n3. EXCHANGE RATE DEVELOPMENTS .....................................................13 \n4. DOMESTIC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS ...........................................14 \n5. MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS .................................................................22 \n6. STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS ........................................................24 \n7. PAYMENT, CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES ................25 \n8. FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS ..........................................................................30 \n \n \n \n \n \n3 \nList of Figures \nFigure 1: Precious Minerals Prices (US$/ounce): February 2018 – June 2019 .............................. 8 \nFigure 2: Base Metal Prices (US$/ton): February 2018 – June 2019 ............................................. 8 \nFigure 3: Brent Crude Oil Prices (US$/Barrel) January 2018 – June 2019 .................................... 9 \nFigure 4: Quarterly Merchandise Total Trade (US$m) .................................................................. 9 \nFigure 5: Quarterly Merchandise Exports (US$) ...................................................................... 10 \nFigure 6: Quarterly Merchandise Imports..................................................................................... 11 \nFigure 7: Major Merchandise Import Sources (% Share) ............................................................. 12 \nFigure 8: Merchandise Trade Balance (US$m) ............................................................................ 13 \nFigure 9: Exchange rate Developments ZWL to US dollar .......................................................... 13 \nFigure 10: Quarterly Fresh Milk Output (million litres) ............................................................... 17 \nFigure 11: Quarterly Trends in Gold Output (Kg) and Average International Prices (US$/ounce)\n....................................................................................................................................................... 18 \nFigure 12: Quarterly Platinum and Palladium Production Developments.................................... 18 \nFigure 13: Coal Output (tonnes) by Producer: 2018 and 2019 ..................................................... 19 \nFigure 14: Chrome Ore production developments 2018 -2019 .................................................... 20 \nFigure 15: Electricity Energy Sent Out (GWh):2018 – 2019 ....................................................... 21 \nFigure 16: Annual Inflation Profile (%)........................................................................................ 21 \nFigure 17: Annual Broad Money Supply Growth Rates and Levels ............................................ 22 \nFigure 18: Sectoral Distribution of Credit .................................................................................... 23 \nFigure 19: ZSE All Share and Top 10 Indices .............................................................................. 24 \nFigure 20: Market Capitalization .................................................................................................. 24 \nFigure 21: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Indices ............................................................................ 25 \nFigure 22: Market Turnover Value ............................................................................................... 25 \nFigure 23: Values and Volumes of RTGS Transactions ............................................................... 26 \nFigure 24: SWIFT Quarterly Foreign Currency Transactions ...................................................... 27 \nFigure 25: Over the Counter Cash Withdrawals ........................................................................... 27 \nFigure 26: Retail Transaction Values from March 2018 to June 2019 ......................................... 28 \nFigure 27: Retail Transaction Volumes from March 2018 to June 2019 ..................................... 28 \nFigure 28: Collateral Amounts from March 2018 to June 2019 ................................................... 29 \nFigure 29: Payment Access Points from March 2018 to June 2019 ........................................... 30 \nFigure 30: Payment Access Devices from March 2018 to June 2019 .......................................... 30 \nFigure 31: Access Devices from March 2018 to June 2019 ......................................................... 30 \nFigure 32: Government revenue structure in the second quarter of 2019. .................................... 31 \n \n \n \n \n4 \nList of Tables \n \nTable 1: \nGlobal Economic Growth & Outlook (%) .................................................................... 6 \nTable 2: International Commodity Prices: April - June 2019 ......................................................... 7 \nTable 3: Quarterly Merchandise Exports (US$m) ........................................................................ 10 \nTable 4: \nMajor Export Destinations 1st Quarter 2019............................................ 11 \nTable 5: \nQuarterly Merchandise Exports (US$m) .................................................................... 12 \nTable 6: Estimated and projected crop output (tons) .................................................................... 14 \nTable 7: Cumulative Tobacco Sales: Jan –June 2018 and Jan –June 2019 ................................. 15 \nTable 8: Cattle Slaughters ............................................................................................................. 16 \nTable 9: Quarterly Pig Slaughters ................................................................................................. 16 \nTable 10: Quarterly Mineral Production Statistics: 2018-2019 .................................................... 17 \nTable 11: Total Electricity Output ................................................................................................ 20 \nTable 12: Consolidated Transactional Activities .......................................................................... 26 \nTable 13: Payment Systems Access Points and ............................................................................ 29 \nTable 14: Summary of first and second quarter 2019 Fiscal Positions......................................... 31 \nTable 15: Summary of Government Spending ............................................................................. 32 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n5 \n1. OVERVIEW \n \nAccording to the IMF World Economic Outlook \nreport for July 2019, global economic growth is \nanticipated to slow down to 3.2% in 2019, from \nthe April 2019 projection of 3.3%. Global \neconomic activity remained subdued in the first \nhalf of 2019, mainly on account of the protracted \nUS-China trade wars and heightened geopolitical \ntensions. \n \nOn the domestic front, growth prospects in 2019 \nhave been adversely affected by drought, power \noutages, foreign currency constraints and weaker \naggregated demand. Agriculture output was \ndepressed on account of the El-Nino induced \ndrought during the 2018/2019 rainfall season. \nMining and manufacturing were adversely \naffected by power outages, during the quarter \nunder review. \n \nAnnual inflation rose from 66.8% in March 2019 \nto 175.7% in June 2019, attributed to increases in \nboth food and non-food inflation. The increase in \nprices mainly reflected a depreciating exchange \nrate and negative inflation expectations. The \nexchange rate, however, gained relative stability, \nfollowing the removal of the multicurrency \nsystem on 24th June 2019 and the re-introduction \nof the local currency. \n \nTotal merchandise trade for the second quarter of \n2019 \namounted \nto \nUS$2,170.6 \nmillion, \nrepresenting \na \n20.3% \ndecline \nfrom \nthe \nUS$2,722.1 \nmillion, \nrecorded \nin \nthe \n \n1 From November 2017, broad money was adjusted by a \nreclassification of “lines of credit” that were incorrectly \nclassified as deposits included in broad money. This \ncorresponding quarter in 2018. This was on \naccount of declines in both exports and imports. \n \n \nBroad money1 increased from $10 627.38 million \nin March 2019, to $14 767.89 million in June \n2019. The growth, in part, reflected valuation \nchanges in foreign currency deposits included in \nbroad money, in line with exchange rate \ndevelopments. \n \nThe Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE), was \nbullish during the second quarter of 2019. \nResultantly, the All Share and Top 10 indices \ngained 83.09 points and 82.60 points, to close at \n204.75 points and 197.21 points, respectively. \nZSE market capitalization rose from $16.08 \nbillion as at the end of the first quarter to $27.02 \nbillion, at the end of the second quarter of 2019. \n \nThe value of transactions processed through the \nNational Payment Systems (NPS) increased by \n64% to $73.85 billion in the quarter ending 30th \nJune 2019, from $44.96 billion recorded in the \nquarter ending March 2019. Similarly, NPS \nvolumes increased by 11% to 559.20 million in \nthe second quarter of 2019, from 503.76 million \nin the first quarter. Compared to the quarter \nending March 2019, all payment streams \nrecorded increases in values and volumes for the \ncurrent quarter, with the exception of POS, \nCheque and ATMs. \n \n \n \nreduced the stock of money and at the same time reduced \nthe net foreign assets of Other Depository Corporations. \n \n \n \n \n6 \n2. INTERNATIONAL \nECONOMIC \nDEVELOPMENTS \n \nGlobal economic activity remained subdued in \nthe first half of 2019, mainly on account of the \nprotracted trade dispute between the US and \nChina and continued uncertainty related to the \nultimate form of the Brexit deal. In addition, \nadvanced and emerging market economies \nexperienced subdued investment and demand for \nconsumer durables, as firms and households held \nback on long-term spending. \n \nAgainst \nthis \nbackdrop, \nthe \nInternational \nMonetary Fund (IMF), in its July update of the \nWorld Economic Outlook (WEO) for 2019, \nrevised the global growth projection downwards \nto 3.2% in 2019, from the initial projection of \n3.3% announced in the April WEO. \n \nTable 1 summarizes global economic growth \ndevelopments and prospects for selected regions \nand countries. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nTable 1: Global \nEconomic \nGrowth \n& \nOutlook (%) \n \n \n2017 \n2018 \n \nInitial \n2018 Pro-\nApril \n2019 \nWEO \n2019 \nJuly Proj. \nWorld Output \n3.8 \n3.6 \n3.3 \n3.2 \nAdvanced \nEconomies \n2.4 \n2.2 \n2.0 \n1.9 \n US \n2.2 \n2.9 \n1.8 \n2.6 \n Euro Area \n2.4 \n1.9 \n2.3 \n1.3 \n Japan \n1.9 \n0.8 \n1.0 \n0.9 \nEmerging \nMarket \n& \nDeveloping \nEconomies \n4.8 \n4.5 \n4.4 \n4.1 \n China \n6.8 \n6.6 \n6.3 \n6.2 \n India \n7.2 \n6.8 \n7.3 \n7.0 \nSub-Saharan \n2.9 \n3.1 \n3.5 \n3.4 \nLatin America \n& \nthe \nCaribbean \n1.2 \n1.0 \n-2.1 \n0.6 \nSource: IMF World Economic Outlook: July 2019 \nThe downward revision of growth forecasts for \nChina and emerging Asia are broadly consistent \nwith the simulated impact of intensifying trade \ntensions. For advanced economies, growth is \nprojected at 1.9% in 2019, marginally higher than \nthe April 2019 projection, mostly reflecting an \nupward revision for the United States. \n \nIn the United States, 2019 growth is expected to \nbe 2.6%, moderating to 1.9% in 2020, on account \nof the unwinding of the fiscal stimulus by the \nFederal Reserve Bank. Growth in the Euro area \nis projected at 1.3% in 2019, while emerging \nmarket and developing economies are expected \nto grow by 4.1% in 2019. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n7 \nIn sub-Saharan Africa, growth is expected at \n3.4 % in 2019, as a result of strong growth in non-\nresource-intensive countries. This will offset the \nlackluster performance of the region’s largest \neconomies. The 2019 growth projection for \nSouth Africa was revised downwards from the \nApril WEO Report, following weaker first \nquarter \nperformance. \nThe \nrevision \nwas \nnecessitated by a larger-than-anticipated impact \nof strike action and energy supply constraints in \nmining sector. \n \nConsistent with global developments and \nregional growth prospects for sub-Saharan \nAfrica, Zimbabwe’s economic growth prospects \nwill be subdued in 2019. The local economy’s \ngrowth prospects for 2019 have also been dented \nby the impact of the El-Nino induced drought, the \ndevastating effects of Cyclone Idai and foreign \ncurrency shortages. \n \n \nINTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICE \nDEVELOPMENTS \n \nWith global economic activity generally subdued \nin the first half of 2019, developments in supply \nconditions continued to dominate commodity \nprice movements. Notably, oil price hikes were \ndue to civil strife in Venezuela and Libya as well \nas US sanctions on Iran. Precious metal prices, \nhowever, strengthened as investors awaited cues \non the future trajectory of monetary easing by the \nFed Reserve. \n \nTable 2 shows international prices for selected \ncommodities for the first and second quarters of \n2019. \nTable 2: International Commodity Prices: \nApril - June 2019 \n \nGold \nPlatinum \nCopper \nNickel \nBrent \nCrude Oil \n \nUS$/oz \nUS$/oz \nUS$/tonne \nUS$/tonne \nUS$/barrel \n \n2019 Q1 \nAverage \n \n1,303.08 \n \n820.69 \n \n6,229.50 \n \n12,394.17 \n \n63.71 \n \nApr-19 \n \n1,287.04 \n \n886.85 \n \n6,444.38 \n \n13,800.11 \n \n71.45 \n \nMay-19 \n \n1,283.86 \n \n833.64 \n \n5,987.27 \n \n11,992.76 \n \n70.28 \n \nJun-19 \n \n1,358.75 \n \n807.9 \n \n5,885.72 \n \n11,954.79 \n \n63.13 \n \n2019 Q2 \nAverage \n \n1,309.88 \n \n842.80 \n \n6,105.79 \n \n12,582.55 \n \n68.29 \n \n% \nQuarterly \nChange \n \n0.5 \n \n2.7 \n \n-2.0 \n \n1.5 \n \n7.2 \n Source: Bloomberg, BBC, 2019 \nPrecious Metals \nQuarterly average international prices for \nprecious metals were higher for the second \nquarter of 2019, than those in the previous \nquarter. This was mainly driven by a weaker US \ndollar. The US dollar was weighed down by \ninvestor expectations that the U.S. Federal \nReserve and other major central banks would \nadopt a dovish approach to monetary policy. \nInvestors shifted to non-interest bearing assets, \nbolstering the appeal for precious metals as \nalternative investment assets. Platinum prices \nwere also propelled by strong industrial demand \nfrom the car manufacturing industries in Europe, \nas well as growing demand from jewellers. \n \n \n \nAgainst this backdrop, gold and platinum prices \nrose by 0.5% and 2.7%, to respective quarterly \n \n \n \n \n8 \naverages \nof \nUS$1,309.88/ounce \nand \nUS$842.80/ounce, during the period under \nreview. Figure 1 shows the evolution of selected \nprecious metals for the period from February \n2018 to June 2019. \n \nFigure \n1: \nPrecious \nMinerals \nPrices \n(US$/ounce): February 2018 – June \n2019 \n \n \nSource: Bloomberg, 2019 \nBase Metals \nCopper prices declined by 2.0%, from a quarterly \naverage of US$6,229.50/tonne in the first quarter \nto US$6,105.79/tonne, during the second quarter \nof 2019. Prices continued to be weighed down by \nthe protracted US-China trade dispute, which has \ndampened demand prospects for the red metal in \nChina, the world’s largest consumer of the base \nmetal. Investor sentiment on the on-going trade \nwars points to a prolonged period for the dispute \nthan earlier anticipated. \nOn the contrary, nickel prices rose by 1.5%, from \na quarterly average of US$12,394.17/tonne in the \nfirst quarter of 2019 to US$12,582.55/tonne, \nduring the quarter under review. This was \nunderpinned by a positive demand outlook for \nthe metal, which is used in the manufacturing of \nelectric vehicle batteries. The positive investor \nsentiments followed reports of expansion plans \nby the BHP Group, on their nickel sulphide \noperations. \nFigure 2: Base Metal Prices (US$/ton): \nFebruary 2018 – June 2019 \nSource: Bloomberg, 2019 \n \nBrent Crude Oil \nCrude oil prices firmed for the second quarter of \n2019, compared to the previous quarter, on \naccount of global tight supply conditions as a \nresult of involuntary supply cuts from Venezuela \nand Iran and the conflict in Libya. \n \n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1000\n1200\n1150\n1200\n1250\n1300\n1350\n1400\nFeb-18\nApr-18\nJun-18\nAug-18\nOct-18\nDec-18\nFeb-19\nApr-19\nJun-19\nGold\nPlatinum (RHS)\n8000\n9000\n10000\n11000\n12000\n13000\n14000\n15000\n16000\n5000\n5500\n6000\n6500\n7000\n7500\nFeb-18\nApr-18\nJun-18\nAug-18\nOct-18\nDec-18\nFeb-19\nApr-19\nJun-19\nCopper\nNickel (RHS)\n \n \n \n \n9 \nThe increase was, however, moderated by \nunexpected increase in US stockpiles during the \nperiod under review. Prices rose by 7.2%, from \nUS$63.71/barrel in the previous quarter, to \nUS$68.29/barrel in the second quarter of 2019. \n \nFigure 3 shows the monthly evolution of crude \noil prices for the period from January 2018 to \nJune 2019. \nFigure 3: Brent Crude Oil Prices (US$/Barrel) \nJanuary 2018 – June 2019 \n \n \n Source: Bloomberg, 2019 \n \nMERCHANDISE \nTRADE \nDEVELOPMENTS \nTotal merchandise trade for the second quarter of \n2019 \namounted \nto \nUS$2,170.6 \nmillion, \nrepresenting a 20.3% decline from US$2,722.1 \nmillion, recorded in the corresponding quarter in \n2018. This followed declines in both exports and \nimports. Total merchandise trade, however, \nincreased by 6.3%, from US$2,042.1 million in \nthe first quarter of 2019 to US$2,170.6 million in \nthe second quarter of 2019, due to the growth in \nimports. \n \nFigure 4: Quarterly Merchandise Total Trade \n(US$m) \n \n \nSource: Zimstat, 2019 \n \nMerchandise Export Developments \nMerchandise exports for the second quarter of \n2019 amounted to US$860.0 million, a 12.4% \ndecline from US$981.5 million realized in the \ncorresponding quarter in 2018. Compared to the \nfirst quarter of 2019, merchandise exports for the \nsecond quarter were lower by 8.3%, as shown in \nFigure 5. \n \n45\n50\n55\n60\n65\n70\n75\n80\n85\nFeb-18\nApr-18\nJun-18\nAug-18\nOct-18\nDec-18\nFeb-19\nApr-19\nJun-19\nCrude Oil\n2,042.0 \n2,170.6 \n0\n500\n1000\n1500\n2000\n2500\n2019 Q1\n2019 Q2\n \n \n \n \n10 \nFigure 5: Quarterly Merchandise Exports \n(US$) \nSource: Zimstat, 2019 \n \nThe decline in exports was largely on account of \na slowdown in export revenues for nickel mattes, \ncane sugar and flue-cured tobacco, during the \nquarter under review, as shown in Table 3. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2 Nickel ores and concentrates, nickel mattes and \nunwrought platinum are components of the platinum group \nof metals (PGMs). \nTable 3: Quarterly Merchandise Exports \n(US$m) \nCommodity \n2019 \nQ1 \n2019 \nQ2 \n2019Q1-\n2019Q2 \n2019Q2 \nChanges \n(%) \nShare of \nTotal (%) \nGold \n231.6 \n234.0 \n1.0 \n27.2 \n*Nickel \nores \n& \nconcentrates2 \n113.0 \n159.3 \n41.0 \n18.5 \n*Nickel \nmattes \n153.6 \n135.6 \n-11.7 \n15.8 \n*Ferro-\nchrome \n53.1 \n60.2 \n13.4 \n7.0 \nFlue-cured \ntobacco \n168.7 \n47.6 \n-71.8 \n5.5 \nIndustrial \ndiamonds \n25.7 \n29.4 \n14.2 \n3.4 \nUnwrought \nPlatinum \n12.1 \n13.7 \n12.9 \n1.6 \nChromium \nores \n& \nconcentrates \n12.4 \n13.3 \n7.3 \n1.5 \nCane sugar \n22.1 \n9.0 \n-59.0 \n1.1 \nCoke \n5.5 \n6.7 \n23.7 \n0.8 \nMacadamia \nNuts \n0.9 \n6.1 \n592.0 \n0.7 \nOther \n 139.5 \n 145.1 \n4.0 \n16.9 \nTotal \n 938.0 \n 860.0 \n-8.3 \n100.0 \nSource: Zimstat, 2019 & RBZ Calculations, 2019 \n \nGold exports, which constituted a significant \nshare of exports at 27.2% of total merchandise \nexports in the second quarter of 2019, recorded a \nmarginal increase of 1.0%, compared to the first \nquarter of 2019. \n \n938.0 \n860.0 \n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1,000\n2019 Q1\n2019 Q2\n \n \n \n \n11 \nMajor Merchandise Export Destinations \nThe country’s exports were mainly destined for \nthe region, with South Africa absorbing 42.9% of \nthe country’s total exports, followed by the \nUnited Arab Emirates (18.8%); Mozambique \n(9.0%); Belgium (2.1%); Zambia (1.9%) and \nBotswana (1.3%). \n \nTable 4 shows the country’s major export \nmarkets, during the period under analysis. \n \nTable 4: Major \nExport \nDestinations \n1st Quarter 2019 \nCountry \nUS$ millions \n2019 Q2 Share \n(%) \nSouth Africa \n368.6 \n42.9 \nUnited \nArab \nEmirates \n161.3 \n18.8 \nMozambique \n77.7 \n9.0 \nBelgium \n18.3 \n2.1 \nZambia \n16.4 \n1.9 \nKenya \n7.2 \n0.8 \nBotswana \n11.1 \n1.3 \nNamibia \n3.1 \n0.4 \nSwaziland \n3.2 \n0.4 \nSingapore \n0.9 \n0.1 \nOther \n192 \n22.3 \nTotal \n860.0 \n100.0 \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Computation \n \nMerchandise Import Developments \n \nMerchandise imports for the period April to June \n2019 stood at US$1,310.7 million, representing a \n24.7% decline from US$1,740.6 million, \nrecorded in the corresponding period in 2018. \n \nFigure 6 shows quarterly merchandise imports \nfor the first and second quarters of 2019. \nFigure 6: Quarterly Merchandise Imports \n(US$ m) \n \n \nSource: Zimstat, 2019 \nMerchandise imports for the second quarter of \n2019 were 18.7% higher than those for the first \nquarter. The significant increase was mainly \nattributed to a rise in imports of diesel (33.4%); \npetrol (17.6%), crude soya bean oil (91.9%); and \nmedicines (425.9%). \n \nThe country’s import bill was mainly composed \nof diesel, unleaded petrol, crude soya bean oil, \nmedicines, Jet A1, electricity, road tractors, \namong others, as shown in Table 5. Notably, \ndiesel and petrol imports collectively constituted \nabout 30.4% of total imports, during the period \nunder analysis. \n \n \n \n1,103.9\n1,310.7\n2 0 1 9 Q1\n2 0 1 9 Q2\n \n \n \n \n12 \nTable 5: Quarterly Merchandise Exports \n(US$m) \nCommodity \n2019 \nQ1 \n2019 \nQ2 \n2019Q1-\n2019Q2 \n2019Q2 \nChanges \n(%) \nShare of \nTotal (%) \nDiesel \n 206.1 \n 274.8 \n33.4 \n21.0 \nUnleaded \nPetrol \n 105.3 \n 123.8 \n17.6 \n9.4 \nCrude Soya \nBean Oil \n 14.0 \n 26.8 \n91.9 \n2.0 \nMedicines \n 4.7 \n 24.9 \n425.9 \n1.9 \nMedicines \n(Chronic \nIllnesses) \n 7.2 \n 18.8 \n160.7 \n1.4 \nJet A1 \n 9.7 \n 14.7 \n52.6 \n1.1 \nElectricity \n 9.6 \n 13.7 \n42.5 \n1.0 \nRoad \nTractors \n 15.5 \n 12.4 \n-19.5 \n0.9 \nAmmonium \nNitrate \n 7.9 \n 11.3 \n42.9 \n0.9 \nWheat \n 13.0 \n 9.5 \n-26.9 \n0.7 \nMotor \nVehicles \n(Goods) \n 14.2 \n 9.2 \n-35.8 \n0.7 \nOther \n 696.9 \n 770.8 \n10.6 \n58.8 \nTotal \n1,103.9 1,310.7 \n-8.3 \n100.0 \n \n \nMajor Import Sources \nSouth \nAfrica \naccounted for the highest \nproportion of the country’s imports at 36.1%, \nduring the second quarter of 2019, followed by \nSingapore, 30.8%; China, 7.6%; India, 2.9%; \nMauritius, 2.2%; and the United Kingdom, 1.7%; \nas shown in Figure 7. \nFigure 7: Major Merchandise Import Sources \n(% Share) \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Computations, 2019 \nTRADE BALANCE \nThe country’s trade balance widened from a \ndeficit of US$165.9 million registered in the first \nquarter of 2019, to a deficit of US$450.7 million \nin the second quarter of 2019, as shown in Figure \n8. This followed the disproportionate increase in \nimports, against subdued exports. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n36.1 \n30.8 \n7.6 \n2.9 \n2.2 \n1.7 \n1.6 \n1.6 \n0.9 \n1.1 \n0.8 \n -\n 10.0\n 20.0\n 30.0\n 40.0\nSouth Africa\nSingapore\nChina\nIndia\nMauritius\nUnited Kingdom\nMozambique\nZambia\nUnited States\nHong Kong\nRussia\n \n \n \n \n13 \nFigure 8: Merchandise Trade Balance (US$m) \n \n \n \nSource: Zimstat, 2018 & RBZ Computations, 2019 \n \n \n \n \n3. EXCHANGE RATE DEVELOPMENTS \n \nActivity on the interbank foreign exchange \nmarket increased, since the introduction of the \ninterbank foreign exchange market in February \n2019. Foreign currency reforms, which started \nwith the separation of accounts in October 2018 \nand the introduction of the local currency in June \n2019, have now been fully achieved. \nThe introduction of the Zimbabwean dollar \ntogether with the fine tuning of the interbank \nmarket resulted in increased foreign currency \ntrading in the formal system and narrowing of the \npremiums between interbank market and parallel \nmarket foreign currency rates. \nThe \ninterbank \nexchange \nrate \nstood \nat \nZWL$6.02/US$ as at end of June 2019, \ncompared to ZWL$2.74/US$ as at end of March \n2019. \nFigure 9 shows movements in the interbank \nexchange since the introduction of the interbank \nmarket in February 2019. \nFigure 9: Exchange rate Developments ZWL \nto US dollar \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe \n \n \n \n \n \n \n938.0 \n860.0 \n1,103.9\n1,310.7\n(165.9)\n(450.7)\n-600\n-400\n-200\n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1,000\n1,200\n1,400\n1st Quarter 2019\n2nd Quarter 2019\nExports\nImports\nTrade Balance\n0.00\n1.00\n2.00\n3.00\n4.00\n5.00\n6.00\n7.00\n8.00\n9.00\n24-Feb\n3-Mar\n10-Mar\n17-Mar\n24-Mar\n31-Mar\n7-Apr\n14-Apr\n21-Apr\n28-Apr\n5-May\n12-May\n19-May\n26-May\n2-Jun\n9-Jun\n16-Jun\n23-Jun\n30-Jun\nZWL$/USD\n \n \n \n \n14 \n4. DOMESTIC \nECONOMIC \nDEVELOPMENTS \n \nREAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS \nGross Domestic Product \nThe economy faced several challenges in the first \nhalf of the year, with a projected adverse impact \non overall GDP growth for 2019. A poor \n2018/2019 \nrainfall \nseason, \nhigh \ninflation \nenvironment \nand \nlow \naggregate \ndemand \nnecessitated the downward revision of growth \nrates for major sectors. Consequently, the growth \nrate for agriculture was revised from 3.1% to \n-10.1%; mining, 7.5% to 1.1% and electricity and \nwater, 2.6% to -2.3%. The downward revisions \nweighed down on expected performance of \ndownstream service sectors. \n \nAGRICULTURE \nGrowth in the agriculture sector is expected to \ndecline to -10.1% in 2019, due to negative effects \nof the El-Nino induced drought that affected the \nproduction of most crops. \n \nThe output for key summer crops fell in 2019, \ncompared to the previous season, as shown in \nTable 6. Combined cereal production declined by \n46%, from 1 836 145 tonnes in 2018 to 851 844 \ntonnes in the current season. This resulted in a \ncereal deficit of 1 352 381 tonnes, against the \nnational requirement of 2 204 225 tonnes. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nTable 6: Estimated and projected crop output \n(tons) \nCrop \n2017/18 \nEst \n2018/19 \nProj \nVariance% \nMaize \n1 700 702 \n776 635 \n-54 \nSorghum \n77 514 \n40 215 \n-48 \nPearl Millet \n48 844 \n28 047 \n-43 \nFinger Millet \n9 085 \n6 947 \n-24 \nGroundnut \n127 202 \n70 902 \n-44 \nRound Nut \n47 594 \n29 396 \n-38 \nSweet Potato \n321 662 \n88 248 \n-73 \nSugar Beans \n21 320 \n9 528 \n-54 \nSoya Bean \n59 772 \n60 068 \n1 \nCowpeas \n16 380 \n12 655 \n-23 \nSource: Ministry of Lands, Agriculture, Water, \nClimate and Rural Resettlement, 2019 \n \nTobacco \nDespite the tolerance of tobacco to drought \nconditions, the crop was adversely affected by \nexcessive moisture stress experienced during the \nseason, resulting in lower output as well as poor \nquality leaf. \n \nAs at end June 2019 about 204.95 million \nkilogrammes \nof \nthe \ngolden \nleaf, \nworth \nUS$392.74 million, had been sold under both \ncontract sale and at auction floors. This was 7% \nlower than the 220.31 million kilogrammes, \nvalued at US$642.54 million, sold in the \ncomparable period in 2018. Table 7 shows the \ntobacco sales outturn as at end June 2019. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n15 \nTable 7: Cumulative Tobacco Sales: Jan –\nJune 2018 and Jan –June 2019 \n2019 \n2018 \nVariance \n(%) \nTotal Quantity Sold \n(million Kgs) \n205 \n220 \n-7 \nTotal Value (US$ \nmillion) \n393 \n643 \n-39 \nAverage Price \n(US$)/Kg \n1.92 \n2.92 \n-34 \nSource: Tobacco Industry and Marketing Board, \n2019. \n \nMaize \nAdverse weather conditions resulted in a decline \nin maize output, which fell by 54% from the 1.7 \nmillion tonnes produced in 2018 to 776 635 \ntonnes in 2019. Resultantly, the country needs to \nimport over 700 000 tonnes of maize to cover the \ndeficit in 2019. \n \nGiven the status of maize as a staple food in \nZimbabwe, more effort is required to transform \nmaize production from being largely rain-fed to \nan irrigated crop to ensure the sustained \nproduction of sufficient grain for domestic \nrequirements and eventually for the export \nmarket. \n \nCotton \nIn line with developments in the production of \nother summer crops, seed cotton output is also \nprojected to decline to levels of below 100 000 \ntonnes in the 2018/2019 season, from 144 000 \ntonnes produced in the previous season. Total \nnational seed cotton seasonal sales as at end June \n2019 stood at 27.82 million kilogrammes, 67% \nlower than the 49.14 million kilogrammes sold \nduring the comparable period in 2018. \nGovernment continued to support cotton crop \nproduction through the Cotton to Clothing Value \nChain Initiative, by providing critical inputs to \nsmallholder \nfarmers \nin \ntraditional \ncotton \nproducing areas. \n \nWheat \nTotal area under wheat declined to 23 820 \nhectares in 2019 from 34 686 hectares planted in \n2018. This fell short of the targeted area of 77 \n000 hectares, expected to yield over 350 000 \ntonnes of wheat. The command agriculture \nprogramme accounted for about 75% of the area \nplanted with the remaining hectarage being \nprivately financed. \n \nPower outages are disrupting irrigation cycles, \ntherefore, threatening the yield potential of the \nplanted crop. Wheat output is, thus, projected to \ndecline to levels of below 100 000 tonnes in \n2019, from about 160 000 tonnes produced in \n2018. \n \nLivestock \nThe condition of all livestock classes were \nobserved as fair to good in the second quarter of \n2019, supported by adequate water and grazing \nacross the country. There is, however, a high \nchance of shortage of grazing pastures and water \nas the year progresses in some districts of \nMatabeleland North, Matabeleland South and \nMasvingo, which were most affected by the \ndrought. \n \nThe second quarter of 2019 saw an increase in \nslaughter figures for cattle, pigs, sheep and goats, \nsurpassing performance in the same period last \nyear and the preceding quarter in 2019. The \n \n \n \n \n16 \nincrease in the offtake suggests the recovery of \nlivestock, following the re-stocking exercise by \ndairy companies in 2017. \n \nCattle \nCattle slaughters in the formal sector stood at \n64 946, during the second quarter of 2019, an \nincrease of 12% from first quarter 2019. This \nwas, however, 7% lower than the 70 194 \nslaughters in the corresponding period in 2018. \nOn a cumulative basis, 122 620 cattle were \nslaughtered during the first half of 2019, \ncompared to 136 767 cattle in the first half of \n2018, representing a 10.34% decline. \n \nTable 8 shows the total number of cattle \nslaughters in the first and second quarters of 2018 \nand 2019. \n \nTable 8: Cattle Slaughters \n \n2018 \n2019 \n% Change \nQ1 \n66 573 \n57 674 \n-13.37 \nQ2 \n70 194 \n64 946 \n-7.48 \nTotal \n136 767 \n122 620 \n-10.34 \nSource: Ministry of Lands, Agriculture, Water, \nClimate and Rural Resettlement, 2019 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nPigs \nPig slaughters continued to increase, with the \noutturn in the second quarter of 2019 surpassing \nboth the preceding quarter and the corresponding \nperiod in 2018, as shown in Table 9. Challenges \nrelated to high cost and unavailability of stock-\nfeeds resulted in high offtake, as farmers were \nforced to reduce herd size. \n \nTable 9: Quarterly Pig Slaughters \nPigs \n2018 \n2019 \n% Change \nQ1 \n37 324 \n46 128 \n23.59 \nQ2 \n42 813 \n52 598 \n22.86 \nTotal \n80 137 \n100 745 \n25.72 \nSource: Ministry of Lands, Agriculture, Water, \nClimate and Rural Resettlement, 2019. \n \nDairy \n \nMilk output increased to 19.87 million litres in \nthe second quarter of 2019, from 19.37 million \nlitres produced during the first quarter of 2019. \nFigure 9 shows the quarterly milk production \noutturn for the period from the first quarter of \n2018, to the second quarter of 2019. The increase \nin milk output reflected the recovery of the dairy \nherd, as a result of restocking exercise which \nbegan in 2017. \n \n \n \n \n17 \nFigure 10: Quarterly Fresh Milk Output \n(million litres) \n \nSource: Ministry of Lands, Agriculture, Water, \nClimate and Rural Resettlement, 2019. \n \nMINING \nMost key minerals underperformed in the second \nquarter of 2019, compared to the same period in \n2018. Declines were recorded for gold (39.6%), \ncoal (36.2%), diamond (33.9%), black granite \n(30.5%), and chrome ore (26.8%). The strong \npositive growth registered by most of the PGMs, \namong them, platinum, palladium, rhodium and \niridium, however, partially offset the decline in \nother minerals, as shown in Table 10. \n \n \n \n \nTable 10: Quarterly Mineral Production \nStatistics: 2018-2019 \nQ2 2018 \nQ1 2019 \nQ2 2019 \nQ2 2019 \nvs \nQ2 \n2018 (%) \nGold (kg) \n10372.5 \n6965.4 \n6261.4 \n-39.6 \nPlatinum (kg) \n3437.6 \n3416.6 \n3695.3 \n7.5 \nPalladium \n(kg) \n2815.8 \n2825.0 \n3085.3 \n9.6 \nRhodium (kg) \n312.6 \n306.4 \n326.7 \n4.5 \nIridium (kg) \n127.5 \n210.0 \n228.1 \n78.9 \nRuthenium \n(kg) \n276.4 \n189.1 \n211.3 \n-23.6 \nDiamonds \n(cts) \n933784.7 \n461347.9 \n617043.6 \n-33.9 \nChrome (MT) \n501286.6 \n419486.0 \n366978.3 \n-26.8 \nNickel (MT) \n4018.3 \n4420.7 \n4524.0 \n12.6 \nCoal (MT) \n972004.0 \n374753.0 \n620435.0 \n-36.2 \nPhosphate (T) \n14988.0 \n11136.0 \n10337.0 \n-31.0 \nGranite (MT) \n58442.7 \n37772.4 \n40609.8 \n-30.5 \nSource: Chamber of Mines, Ministry of Mines & \nFPR 2019 \n \nThe worsening power outages, against the \nbackdrop of persistent fuel challenges, foreign \ncurrency shortages and rising inflation, among \nother factors, adversely affected mining sector \nperformance, during the period under review. \n \n \n \n10.00\n12.00\n14.00\n16.00\n18.00\n20.00\n22.00\nQ1:2018\nQ2:2018\nQ3:2018\nQ4:2018\nQ1:2019\nQ2:2019\n \n \n \n \n18 \nGold \nGold output stood at 6 261 kg in second quarter \nof 2019, about 40% lower than 10 373 kg \nproduced in the same quarter in 2018. This was \n10% below the output for the first quarter of \n2019. \nThe decline in gold output was exacerbated by \npower outages, despite the firming international \nprices, as shown in Figure 11. \n \nFigure 11: Quarterly Trends in Gold Output \n(Kg) and Average International Prices \n(US$/ounce) \n \nSource: Chamber of Mines, FPR, 2019 \n \nGold output has also been weighed down by \nforeign currency challenges, fuel shortages as \nwell as escalating production costs. Gold \ndeliveries to Fidelity Printers and Refiners (FPR) \nalso declined as a result of increased smuggling \nand diversion of gold to the parallel market. \nPGM \nMajor PGM minerals, namely; platinum and \npalladium registered growths, during the second \nquarter of 2019. Platinum output, at 3 695.3 kg in \nsecond quarter 2019, was 8.2% above the output \nfor the first quarter of 2019 and exceeded output \nin second quarter of 2018 by 7.5%. Similarly, \npalladium output stood at 3 085.3 kg in second \nquarter of 2019, about 9.2% more than first \nquarter of 2019 output and 9.6% above output \nrealised in same quarter in 2018, as shown in \nFigure 12. \nFigure 12: Quarterly Platinum and Palladium \nProduction Developments \n \nSource: Chamber of mines, Kitco.com, World \nBank, 2019 \n \nNickel \nNickel output stood at 4 524 tonnes in second \nquarter of 2019, up from 3 816 tonnes in first \nquarter of 2019. Output during the second quarter \nof 2019 was higher by12.6%, compared to the \nsame quarter in 2018, largely driven by increased \n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n0\n5000\n10000\n15000\nQ2 2018\nQ1 2019\nQ2 2019\nLarge Scale (kg)\nSmall Scale (kg)\nSecondary (kg)\nTotal Gold (kg)\nAverage Price (US$/ounce)\n0\n500\n1000\n1500\n2000\n0.0\n1000.0\n2000.0\n3000.0\n4000.0\n5000.0\nQ2\n2018\nQ3\n2018\nQ4\n2018\nQ1\n2019\nQ2\n2019\nAverage International prices \n(US$/ounce)\nKg\nPlatinum (Kg)\nPalladium (kg)\nAverage platinum Price (US$/Ounce)\nAverage Palladium Price (US$/Ounce)2\n \n \n \n \n19 \nproduction from both the primary and secondary \nproducers. \nDiamond \nDiamond output increased by 33.7%, from \n461 348 carats in the first quarter of 2019, to \n617 044 carats in the second quarter of 2019. The \nsecond quarter output was, however, 34% lower \nthan output produced in the same period in 2018. \nThe decline was mainly due to reduced \nthroughput at ZCDC, where output declined by \n42%, compared to the same period in 2018. The \nZCDC was adversely affected by working capital \nchallenges, during the period under review. \n \nCoal \nCoal output stood at 0.62 million tonnes in \nsecond quarter of 2019, about 36% below the \noutput produced in the same period in 2018. The \nsecond quarter of 2019 coal output, however, \nsurpassed the 0.305 million tonnes produced \nduring the first quarter of 2019. Prices of coal that \nprevailed during second quarter of 2019, were \nbelow the cost of production, thus, effectively \ndiscouraging production. \n \nResultantly, output at major producers, namely \nHCCL and Zambezi Gas was 65% and 27% \nlower in second quarter in 2019 than in the \ncomparable period in 2018, respectively, as \nshown in Figure 13. \n \n \nFigure 13: Coal Output (tonnes) by Producer: \n2018 and 2019 \n \nSource: Ministry of Mines, Chamber of Mines, \n2019 \n \nChrome \nChrome output stood at 0.367 million tonnes in \nthe second quarter of 2019, about 26.8% lower \nthan output produced in the same period in 2018. \nThe output of chrome during the second quarter \nof 2019, at 0.367 million tonnes, was 12.4% \nbelow the 0.419 million tonnes produced during \nthe first quarter of 2019. As shown in Figure 14, \nchrome \nproduction \ncontinued \nto \nmimic \ndevelopments in the international prices of both \nchrome ore and high carbon ferrochrome (HCF). \n \n \n \n \n \n \n0\n100,000\n200,000\n300,000\n400,000\n500,000\n600,000\n700,000\n HCCL\nMAKOMO RES.\nZAMBEZI GAS\nQ2 2018\nQ1 2019\nQ2 2019\n \n \n \n \n20 \nFigure \n14: \nChrome \nOre \nproduction \ndevelopments 2018 -2019 \n \nSource: Chamber of Mines, Ministry of Mines 2019 \n \nChrome ore prices, which have been declining \nsince the third quarter of 2018, retreated further \nto an average of about US$125.12 per tonne in \nthe second quarter of 2019. HCF prices which \ndeclined from Q2 2018, however, bottomed out \nin first quarter 2019 and surged during second \nquarter 2019, thereby supporting chrome ore \nmining in the country. \n \nELECTRICITY \nElectricity output for the second quarter of 2019 \nstood at 2 256.4GWh, 8% down from the 2 \n494.60 GWh produced in the first quarter of \n2019. The declined in electricity output was \nlargely due to lower output at Kariba, attributed \nto water rationing, as lake levels decline. Despite \nthe decline in output by 13% at Kariba, on a \nquarter to quarter basis, the station continued to \ndominate power generation, accounting for 60% \nof total energy sent out in the second quarter of \n2019. \nOutput from Hwange, at 802GWh, was \nmarginally lower than the performance in the \nprevious quarter. The combined output from the \nsmall independent power producers, however, \nrose by 54% in the second quarter, due to higher \noutput from Chisumbanje, Triangle and Hippo \nvalley’s bagasse thermal stations, which more \nthan offset output declines at small hydropower \nstations. \n \nTable 11: Total Electricity Output \nPower \nStation \nTotal \n2018 Q2 \nTotal \n2019 Q1 \nTotal \nQ2 2019 \nVariance \nQ2 2019 \nand Q2 \n2018 \nVariance \nQ1 and \nQ2 2019 \nKariba \n1254.39 \n1599.06 \n1388.13 \n11% \n-13.2% \nHwange \n819.99 \n802.29 \n801.56 \n-2% \n-0.1% \nBulawayo \n33.13 \n8.90 \n19.26 \n-42% \n116.4% \nMunyati \n37.19 \n27.02 \n27.86 \n-25% \n3.1% \nHarare \n26.68 \n20.53 \n19.60 \n-27% \n-4.5% \nIPPS \n69.37 \n36.81 \n64.51 \n-7% \n75.3% \nTotal \n(GWhs) \n2240.75 \n2499.73 \n2320.93 \n4% \n-7.0% \nSource: ZERA, ZPC, 2019 \nAs a result of the subdued power generation, the \ncountry experienced severe shortages since May \n2019, which led to an aggressive load shedding \nprogramme. The power situation was made more \nsevere by lower electricity imports from the \nSouthern African Power Pool, which hitherto \nsupplemented local supply to cover local \nelectricity demand. \n \n \n \n \n \n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1000\n0\n100000\n200000\n300000\n400000\n500000\n600000\nq2 2018 q1 2019 q2 2019\nChrome ore & HCF prices \n(US$/tonne)\nTonnes\nChrome ore\nChrome Ore Prices\nHCF Prices\n \n \n \n \n21 \nFigure 15: Electricity Energy Sent Out \n(GWh):2018 – 2019 \n \n \n Source: ZERA, ZESA, 2019 \n \nINFLATION DEVELOPMENTS \n \nInflation pressures continued to mount in the \neconomy, during the period under review. Year-\non-year inflation accelerated from 75.86% in \nApril 2019, to end the quarter at 175.66%. The \nrise \nin \nprices \nreflected \nexchange \nrate \nadjustments, following a phased approach to \ncurrency reforms, which culminated in the \nabolishment of the multicurrency regime and the \nre-introduction of the Zimbabwe dollar in June \n2019. \n \nThe increase in inflation was also attributable to \nadverse self-fulfilling inflation expectations that \nresulted in speculative pricing and benchmarking \nof prices to the US dollar. \n \n \n \n \nFigure 16: Annual Inflation Profile (%) \nSource: Zimstat, 2019 \nAnnual Food Inflation \n \nAnnual food inflation accelerated from 78.55% \nat the end of the first quarter of 2019 to 251.94% \nby end June 2019. The rise in food inflation was \nattributed to increases in prices of bread, cereals, \nvegetables, meat and oils and fats and sugar, jam, \nhoney, chocolate and confectionery. \n \nAnnual Non-Food Inflation \nAnnual non-food inflation also accelerated from \n61.19% in March 2019 to 142.84% in June 2019, \ndriven \nby \ntransport; \nfurniture, \nhousehold \nequipment and maintenance; clothing and \nfootwear; and housing water electricity gas and \nother fuels, among others. The increase in the \nprice of fuel, following the removal of subsidies \non petroleum products partly resulted in the \nincrease in transport inflation and a general \nincrease in production costs across all the \nproductive sectors of the economy. \n \n \n1704.94\n2240.75\n2652.842741.06\n2499.73\n2320.93\n1000\n1200\n1400\n1600\n1800\n2000\n2200\n2400\n2600\n2800\n3000\n2018:Q1\n2018:Q2\n2018:Q3\n2018:Q4\n2019:Q1\n2019:Q2\n0.0\n50.0\n100.0\n150.0\n200.0\n250.0\n300.0\nJan-18\nFeb-18\nMar-18\nApr-18\nMay-18\nJun-18\nJul-18\nAug-18\nSep-18\nOct-18\nNov-18\nDec-18\nJan-19\nFeb-19\nMar-19\nApr-19\nMay-19\nJun-19\nFood Inflation\nNon-Food Inflation\nAll Items\n \n \n \n \n22 \nMonthly Inflation Developments \n \nMonth-on-month inflation surged to 39.3%, in \nJune 2019, from 4.39% recorded in March 2019, \nreflecting increases in both food and non-food \ncomponents. \n \nFood inflation was attributed to increases in \nprices of bread and cereals and meat and \nvegetables. Monthly non-food inflation was \nmainly driven by housing, water, electricity, gas \nand other fuels, transport, furniture, household \nequipment and maintenance. \n \n \n5. MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS3 \n \nBroad money4 increased from $10 627.38 million \nin March 2019, to $14 767.89 million in June \n2019. Expansions in negotiable certificates of \ndeposits, \n130.42%; \ntransferrable \ndeposits, \n46.79%; and currency in circulation5, 1.01%, \nexplained the growth in money supply. \n \nGrowth in broad money also reflected valuation \nchanges in foreign currency deposits included in \nbroad money, in line with exchange rate \ndevelopments. \nForeign \ncurrency \naccounts \nincluded in transferable deposits, recorded a \nquarter on quarter growth of 174.21%, largely \n \n3 All monetary numbers are in ZWL$ since the adoption of \nthe inter-bank foreign exchange market in February 2019. \n4 From November 2017, broad money was adjusted by a \nreclassification of “lines of credit” that were incorrectly \nclassified as deposits included in broad money. This \nowing to the depreciation of the local unit, from \nZWL$2.74/US$ as at end March 2019 to \nZWL$6.02/US$ as at end June 2019. \n \nFigure 17 shows annual broad money supply \ncomponents in nominal terms as well as growth \nrates. \nFigure 17: Annual Broad Money Supply \nGrowth Rates and Levels \n \nSource: RBZ, 2019 \n \nreduced the stock of money and at the same time reduced \nthe net foreign assets of Other Depository Corporations. \n5 Currency in circulation implies bond notes and coins \noutside the banking system. \n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n0.5\n1.5\n2.5\n3.5\n4.5\n5.5\n6.5\n7.5\n8.5\n9.5\n10.5\n11.5\n12.5\n13.5\n14.5\n15.5\nDec-15\nMar-16\nJun-16\nSep-16\nDec-16\nMar-17\nJun-17\nSep-17\nDec-17\nMar-18\nJun-18\nSep-18\nDec-18\nMar-19\nJun-19\nANNUAL GROWTH %\nUS$ Billion\nTransferable Deposits\nTime Deposits\nNCDs\nCurrency in Circulation\nBroad Money Growth\n \n \n \n \n23 \nDomestic Credit \nDuring the quarter under review, net domestic \ncredit grew by 12.04%, compared to a \ncontraction of 2.20%, recorded in the previous \nquarter. In nominal terms, net domestic credit \nincreased from $14 652.41 million in March \n2019 to $16 416.49 million in June 2019. \nThe growth in net domestic credit, largely \nreflected growth of 29.75% in credit to the \nprivate sector, from $3 952.66 million in March \n2019 to $5 128.72 million in June 2019. Partially \noffsetting this growth, was slowdown in net \nclaims on Government of 2.17%. The decline in \nnet credit to Government, reflected fiscal \nconsolidation measures being pursued under the \nTransitional Stabilization Program (TSP). \n \n \nCredit to the private sector was distributed as \nfollows: \nhouseholds, \n19.68%; \nagriculture, \n20.59%; distribution, 12.40%; services, 8.87%; \nmanufacturing, 7.77%; financial organisations \nand investments, 19.20%; mining, 7.25%; \nconstruction, \n0.67%; \nand \ntransport \nand \ncommunications, 1.75%, during the second \nquarter of 2019. \n \n \nFigure 18 shows the sectoral distribution of \nprivate credit for the period to June 2019. \n \n \n \n \n \nFigure 18: Sectoral Distribution of Credit \n \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2019 \nPrivate sector borrowing was mainly for \ninventory build-up, 22.84%; consumer durables, \n17.19%; fixed capital investment, 14.84%; and \npre and post shipment financing, 1.71%. Other \nrecurrent expenditures accounted for 43.42%, \nduring the quarter under review. \n \n \n \n \n \n \nHouseholds\n19.68%\nAgriculture\n20.59%\nMining\n7.25%\nManufacturing\n7.77%\nDistribution\n12.40%\nConstruction\n1.82%\nTransport \n&Communic\nations\n1.75%\nServices\n8.87%\nFinancial \nOrg.&Invest\nments\n19.57%\nOther\n0.31%\n \n \n \n \n24 \nInterest Rates \nDuring the second quarter of 2019, the range of \nnominal lending rates changed from 5% to 18% \nto 5% to 23%. Average maximum interest rates \nfor \nsavings \ndeposits, \nhowever, \nremained \nunchanged at 4.16%. The average maximum 60-\nday and 90-day time deposits, increased \nmarginally from 3.71% and 4.09% to 3.94% and \n4.27%, respectively. \n \nThe increase in the interest rates, was in line with \nthe \nadjustment \nof \nthe \nCentral \nBank \naccommodation rate from 15% to 50% per \nannum. The adjustment reflects the tightening of \nthe monetary policy stance, a move necessitated \nby rising inflationary pressures. \n \n6. STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS \n \nThe Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, was bullish \nduring the second quarter of 2019. The All Share \nand Top 10 indices gained 83.09 points and 82.60 \npoints to close at 204.75 points and 197.21 \npoints, respectively, as shown in Figure 19. \n \nFigure 19: ZSE All Share and Top 10 Indices \n \n \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2019 \nResultantly, market capitalization increased from \n$16.08 billion at the end of the first quarter, to \n$27.02 billion at the end of the second quarter of \n2019. \n \nFigure 20: Market Capitalization \n \n \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2019 \n \nIndustrial and Mining Indices \n \nIndustrial and mining indices increased by \n277.94 points and 61.28 points to end the second \nquarter of 2019 at 683.51 points and 255.26 \npoints, respectively. The developments on the \nlocal bourse reflected increased demand for \nlisted stocks, as an investment destination, to \nhedge against local currency depreciation and \ninflationary pressures. \n20.00\n60.00\n100.00\n140.00\n180.00\n220.00\n30-Jun-18\n31-Jul-18\n31-Aug-18\n30-Sep-18\n31-Oct-18\n30-Nov-18\n31-Dec-18\n31-Jan-19\n28-Feb-19\n31-Mar-19\n30-Apr-19\n31-May-19\n30-Jun-19\nAll Share Index\nTop 10 Index\n4,000\n6,000\n8,000\n10,000\n12,000\n14,000\n16,000\n18,000\n20,000\n22,000\n24,000\n26,000\n28,000\n30,000\n32,000\n34,000\n30-Jun-18\n31-Jul-18\n31-Aug-18\n30-Sep-18\n31-Oct-18\n30-Nov-18\n31-Dec-18\n31-Jan-19\n28-Feb-19\n31-Mar-19\n30-Apr-19\n31-May-19\n30-Jun-19\n$ Millions\n \n \n \n \n25 \nFigure 21: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Indices \n \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2019 \n \nMarket Turnover \nThe bullish activity on the local bourse was \nreflected in increased demand for low value \ncounters, as investors sought to hedge against \ninflation and local currency depreciation. As a \nresult, the volume of shares traded increased, \nwhile the value of shares traded declined. \n \nThe volume of shares traded increased by \n39.65% to 664.87 million shares in the second \nquarter of 2019, from 476.11 million shares \ntraded in the first quarter. The value of shares \ntraded, however, fell from $476.93 million in the \nfirst quarter, to $181.85 million in the second \nquarter of 2019. \n \nForeign investor interest, however, declined, as \nreflected by a decrease in the net foreign position, \nfrom $2.20 million to negative $6.47 million in \nthe second quarter of 2019. \nFigure 22: Market Turnover Value \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2019 \n \n \n7. PAYMENT, \nCLEARING \nAND \nSETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES \n \nThe value of transactions processed through the \nNational Payment Systems (NPS) increased by \n64% to $73.85 billion, in the quarter ending June \n2019, from $44.96 billion recorded in the quarter \nending March 2019. Similarly, NPS transaction \nvolumes increased by 11% to 559.20 million, \nfrom 503.76 million, during the same period. \n \nAll payment streams recorded increases in values and volumes for the current quarter with the exception of POS, Cheque and ATM volumes when compared to the quarter ending 31 March 2019. \n \nCompared to the first quarter of 2019, all \npayment streams recorded increases in values \nand volumes during the quarter under review, \nwith the exception of POS, Cheque and ATM \nvolumes. \n \nTable 12 provides the statistical information on \nvarious payment streams for the second quarter \nending June 2019. \n \n0\n80\n160\n240\n320\n400\n0\n90\n180\n270\n360\n450\n540\n630\n720\n810\n900\nJun-18\nJul-18\nAug-18\nSep-18\nOct-18\nNov-18\nDec-18\nJan-19\nFeb-19\nMar-19\nApr-19\nMay-19\nJun-19\nMining\nIndustrial\nIndustrial Index\nMining Index\n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\n30-Jun-18\n31-Jul-18\n31-Aug-18\n30-Sep-18\n31-Oct-18\n30-Nov-18\n31-Dec-18\n31-Jan-19\n28-Feb-19\n31-Mar-19\n30-Apr-19\n31-May-19\n30-Jun-19\nUS$ Millions\n \n \n \n \n26 \nTable \n12: \nConsolidated \nTransactional \nActivities \nValues in ZWL$ Million \n \nQ1 \nQ2 \n2019 \nChange \nProportion \n2019 \nRTGS \n25121.5 \n42872.9 \n71% \n58.05% \nCASH \n1064.3 \n1819.6 \n71% \n2.46% \nCHEQUE \n10.8 \n11.1 \n2% \n0.01% \nPOS \n4024.1 \n4452.2 \n11% \n6.03% \nATMS \n52.4 \n55.9 \n7% \n0.08% \nMOBILE \n11284 \n18771.9 \n66% \n25.42% \nINTERNET \n3400.3 \n5868.2 \n73% \n7.95% \nTOTAL \n44957.5 \n73851.9 \n64% \n100.00% \nVolumes \nRTGS \n1384 \n1884 \n36% \n0.34% \nCASH \n4305 \n5120 \n19% \n0.92% \nCHEQUE \n44 \n42 \n-5% \n0.01% \nPOS \n98843 \n65647 \n-34% \n11.74% \nATMs \n708 \n370 \n-48% \n0.07% \nMOBILE \n397160 \n484713 \n22% \n86.68% \nINTERNET \n1318 \n1426 \n8% \n0.25% \nTOTAL \n503762 \n559201 \n11% \n100.00% \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2019 \n \nLARGE VALUE PAYMENTS \nZimbabwe \nElectronic \nTransfer \nand \nSettlement System \nThe value of transactions processed through the \nRTGS system increased by 71% to $42.87 \nbillion, in the quarter ending June 2019, from \n$25.12 billion recorded in the quarter ending \nMarch 2019. In tandem, the volume of \ntransactions registered an increase of 36% to \n1,883,561, from 1,383,960, as shown in Figure \n23. \n \nFigure 23: Values and Volumes of RTGS \nTransactions \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2019 \nSWIFT Foreign Currency Transactions \nSWIFT foreign currency payments decreased by \n5% to US$0.69 billion for the quarter ending \nJune 2019, from US$0.72 billion in the quarter \nending March 2019. During the same period, \nSWIFT foreign currency receipts decreased by \n6% to US$0.69 billion from US$0.74 billion, in \nthe previous quarter. \n \nNet foreign currency inflows amounted to \nUS$9.55 million in the quarter ending June 2019, \nfrom a net inflow of US$22.42 million recorded \nin the first quarter of 2019, as shown in Figure \n24. \n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1,000\n1,200\n1,400\n1,600\n1,800\n2,000\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n35\n40\n45\n50\n2018 Q1\n2018 Q2\n2018 Q3\n2018 Q4\n2019 Q1\n2019 Q2\nRTGS Values in Billions $\nRTGS Volumes in Thousands\nValues\n \n \n \n \n27 \nFigure \n24: \nSWIFT \nQuarterly \nForeign \nCurrency Transactions \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2019 \n \nCASH \nOver the Counter Cash Withdrawals \nThe value of cash withdrawals increased by 71% \nfrom $1.06 billion in the first quarter of 2019, to \n$1.82 billion in the second quarter of 2019. \nCorresponding volumes increased by 19%, from \n4.31 million in the first quarter, to 5.10 million in \nthe second quarter of 2019, as shown in Figure \n25. \n \nFigure \n25: \nOver \nthe \nCounter \nCash \nWithdrawals \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2019 \nRetail Payments \n \nThe value of retail transactions increased by 56% \nto $30.98 billion in the quarter under review, \nfrom $19.84 billion recorded in the first quarter \n2019. Similarly, retail volumes increased by \n10.9% to 557.31 million during the second \nquarter of 2019, from 502.38 million reported in \nthe quarter ending March 2019. \n \nFigures 26 and 27 show the trend in the values \nand volumes of retail transactions from the \nquarter ending March 2018 to the quarter ending \nJune 2019. \n \n \n \n \n \n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n35\n40\n0.50\n0.60\n0.70\n0.80\n0.90\n1.00\n1.10\n1.20\n1.30\nQ1 2018\nQ2 2018\nQ3 2018\nQ4 2018\nQ1 2019\nQ2 2019\nVolumes in Thousands\nValue in US$B\nValue of Receipts\nValue of Payments\n Volumes of Payments\n Volumes of Receipts\n0.00\n0.20\n0.40\n0.60\n0.80\n1.00\n1.20\n1.40\n1.60\n1.80\n2.00\n2018\nQ1\n2018\nQ2\n2018\nQ3\n2018\nQ4\n2019\nQ1\n2019\nQ2\n0.0\n1.0\n2.0\n3.0\n4.0\n5.0\n6.0\n$ BILLIONS\nMILLIONS\nVolumes\nValues\n \n \n \n \n28 \nFigure 26: Retail Transaction Values from \nMarch 2018 to June 2019 \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2019 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n6 The local collateral figure comprises of Cheque, Zimswitch, \nChengetedzai Deposit Corporation settlement systems. \nFigure 27: Retail Transaction Volumes from \nMarch 2018 to June 2019 \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2019 \nCollateral6 \nThe local collateral figure comprises of Cheque, \nZimswitch, Chengetedzai Deposit Corporation \nsettlement systems. It increased by 23% to \n$160.20 million in the second quarter of June \n2019, from $130.24 million recorded in the first \nquarter, as shown in Figure 28. \n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n16\n18\n20\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n2018 Q1\n2018 Q2\n2018 Q3\n2018 Q4\n2019 Q1\n2019 Q2\nMobile in Billions\n$ Billions\nCHEQUE\nPOS\nATMS\nINTERNET\nCASH\nMOBILE\n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n0.0\n20.0\n40.0\n60.0\n80.0\n100.0\n120.0\n2018 Q1\n2018 Q2\n2018 Q3\n2018 Q4\n2019 Q1\n2019 Q2\nMobile Volumes in Millions\nOther Retai Volumes in Millions\nCHEQUE\nPOS\nATMs\nINTERNET\nCASH\nMOBILE\n \n \n \n \n29 \nFigure 28: Collateral Amounts from March \n2018 to June 2019 \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2019 \n \nAccess Points and Devices \nThe number of mobile banking agents increased \nto 51,415 in the quarter under review, from \n47,638 reported in the first quarter of 2019. \n \nSimilarly, the POS population increased to \n112,523 from 107,067 in line with the promotion \nof electronic means of payment. The ATM \npopulation, however, decreased to 548 in the \nsecond quarter, from 549 in the first of quarter \n2019. \n \n \nThe number of active mobile financial services \nsubscribers declined from 637 million, registered \nsubscribers in the first quarter of 2019, to 610 \nmillion in the second quarter. \n \nTable 13 shows payment access points and \ndevices, for the fourth quarter of 2018 and the \nfirst and second quarters of 2019. \n \nTable 13: Payment Systems Access Points and \nDevices \n \nQuarter \nending \nDec \n 2018 \nQuarter \nending \nMar \n 2019 \nQuarter \nending \nJun \n 2019 \nMobile \nBanking \nagents \n50,740 \n47,638 \n51,415 \nATMs \n551 \n549 \n548 \nPOS \n99,395 \n107,067 \n112,523 \nPAYMENT SYSTEM ACCESS DEVICES \nDebit \nCards \n4,734,299 \n5,116,115 \n4,762,042 \nCredit \nCards \n17,204 \n17,948 \n17,625 \nPrepaid \nCards \n88,406 \n80,544 \n93,277 \nMobile \nBanking \nsubscribers \n6,139,160 \n6,369,172 \n \n6,095,412 \nInternet \nBanking \nsubscribers \n353,103 \n364,990 \n \n382,203 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2019 \n \nFigure 29 shows the number of Access Points, \nand Figures 30 and 31, the number of access \ndevices. \n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\n2018 Q1\n2018 Q2\n2018 Q3\n2018 Q4\n2019 Q1\n2019 Q2\nMILLIONS\nCheque\nZimswitch\nCDC\n \n \n \n \n30 \nFigure 29: Payment Access Points from \nMarch 2018 to June 2019 \n \nFigure 30: Payment Access Devices from \nMarch 2018 to June 2019 \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2019 \nFigure 31: Access Devices from March 2018 to \nJune 2019 \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2019 \n \n8. FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS \n \nFISCAL DEVELOPMENTS \n \nGovernment revenues amounted to $3 065.1 \nmillion, during the second quarter of 2019, \nagainst total expenditure of $2 704.7 million. \nThis resulted in a fiscal surplus of $360.4 million, \nwhich reflected the fiscal consolidation efforts by \nGovernment, which have been implemented \nsince the beginning of 2019. \n \n \n \n \n \n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\n2018 Q1\n2018 Q2\n 2018 Q3\n2018 Q4\n2019 Q1\n2019 Q2\nThousands\nPOS Population\nATM Population\nMobile Banking Agents\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n2018 Q1\n2018 Q2\n2018 Q3\n2018 Q4\n2019 Q1\n2019 Q2\nMillions\nDebit Cards\nMobile Active Subcribers\n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\n300\n350\n400\n450\n2018 Q1\n2018 Q2\n2018 Q3\n2018 Q4\n2019 Q1\n2019 Q2\nThousands\nCredit Cards\nPrepaid Cards\nInternet\n \n \n \n \n31 \nTable 14: Summary of first and second \nquarter 2019 Fiscal Positions \n \n \nQ1 \n \nQ2 \n \nRevenue \n1 926.60 \n \n3065.06 \n \n \n \n \nTax revenue \n1 877.43 \n \n3002.59 \n \nNon-Tax \nRevenue \n49.17 \n \n62.47 \n \n \n \n \nExpenditure \n1 483.48 \n2704.66 \nCurrent \nexpenditure \n1 310.27 \n1936.56 \no/w employment \ncosts \n1 015.04 \n1142.48 \nCapital \nExpenditure \n364.92 \n726.85 \nOverall Balance \n443.12 \n360.40 \nSource: \nMinistry \nof \nFinance \nand \nEconomic \nDevelopment, 2019 \n \nGovernment Revenue \n \nGovernment \nrevenues \namounted \nto \n$3 065.1 million, against a target of $2 371.80 \nmillion, during the second quarter of 2019. The \nhigh performance of Government revenue \nfollowed the higher than anticipated collections \nunder both tax and non-tax revenues. \n \nTax revenue, at $3 002.6 million, accounted for \n98% of total revenue. Non-tax revenue \ncontributed $62.47 million, which was \nequivalent to 2% of total revenue. Figure 32 \nshows the structure of government revenue in the \nsecond quarter of 2019. \n \nFigure 32: Government revenue structure in \nthe second quarter of 2019. \nSource: Ministry of Finance, 2019 \n \n \nDuring the period under review, taxes on income \nand profit continued to dominate tax revenues, \naccounting for 29% of total tax revenues. Taxes \non income and profits also surpassed the targeted \n$662.81 million by $195.9 million, mainly as a \nresult increases in wages and salaries. \n \nValue added tax amounted to $758.00 million in \nthe second quarter, surpassing the target of \n$632.10 million by $125.9 million. The \nsignificant increase in VAT was mainly \nattributed to the impact of rising prices for both \nlocally produced and imported products. \n \nTax collections under excise and customs at \n$707.8 million and $231.9 million during the \nsecond quarter of 2019, were above targets of \nCustoms \nduties\n8%\nExcise \nduties\n23%\nValue \nAdded Tax \n(VAT)\n25%\nOther indirect \ntaxes\n14%\nNon-tax \nRevenue\n2%\nTax on Income and \nprofits\n28%\n \n \n \n \n32 \n$493.24 \nmillion \nand \n$182.63 \nmillion, \nrespectively. \n \n \nGovernment Expenditure \nCumulative government expenditures amounted \nto $2 704.66 million in the second quarter of \n2019, \nexceeding \nthe \ntarget \nof \n$1 958.92 million by $745.74 million. Current \nexpenditure amounted to $1 936.56 million, \nequivalent to 71.60% of total expenditure, during \nthe quarter under review. The balance of $726.85 \nmillion was allocated to capital expenditure and \nnet lending. \n \nTable 15 shows the summary of Government \nexpenditure, during the first and second quarters \n2019. \n \nTable 15: Summary of Government Spending \n \n \nQ2 2018 \nQ2 2019 \n \nZWL$ \nmillion \n% of \nTotal \nExpenditure \nZWL$ \nmillion \n% of \nTotal \nExpenditure \nEmployment \ncosts \n1000.3 \n42.3 \n1142.5 \n42.2 \nGoods and \nservices \n299.9 \n12.7 \n698.0 \n25.8 \nInterest \non \ndebt \n57.5 \n2.4 \n96.0 \n3.6 \nCapital \nExpenditure \n1008.3 \n42.6 \n726.9 \n26.9 \nTransfers to \nProvincial \nCouncils \n0.0 \n0 \n41.2 \n1.5 \nTotal \nExpenditure \n2366.0 \n100 \n2704.7 \n100 \n \nSource: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2019 \n \nAs shown in the Table 16, employment costs \nremained the highest charge on Treasury, \namounting to $1 142.48 million during the \nsecond quarter of 2019. This represented 42% of \ntotal expenditure, in the quarter under review. \n \nCapital \nexpenditures \nat \n$670.20 \nmillion, \nexceeded the target by $197.07 million, largely \ndue to over-performance of capital transfers, \nduring the quarter under review. \n \n \nBudget Balance \n \nThe fiscal developments in the second quarter of \n2019 culminated in a positive budget balance of \n$360.40, down from $443 million recorded in the \nfirst quarter. The surplus was mainly used for \nextinguishing maturing domestic debt. \n \n \n \n \nRESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE \n \nSeptember 2019 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n33 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSTATISTICAL TABLES \n \n1. Depository Corporation Survey S1 \n2. Central Bank Survey S2 \n3. Other Depository Corporation Survey S3 \n \n4. Liabilities and Assets of the Central Bank \n4.1.Reserve Bank: Assets \n \n \n \n S4 \n \n4.2.Reserve Bank: liabilities S5 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n5. Other Depository Corporation \n5.1.Other Depository Asset S6 \n5.2.Other Depository Liabilities S7 \n \n6. Commercial Banks \n6.1.Commercial Banks: Assets \n \n S8 \n6.2.Commercial Banks: Liabilities \n S9 \n7. Building Societies \n \n \n \n \n \n \n7.1.Building Societies: Assets \n \n S10 \n \n7.2.Building Societies: Liabilities S11 \n \n \n \n8. Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks \n8.1.Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks’ Loans and Advances S12 \n8.2.Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Bank’s Deposits \n \n S13 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n9. National Payment Systems \n \n \n9.1.Values of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS14 \n9.2.Volumes of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS14 \n \n10. Interest Rates, Security Yields and Prices \n10.1. Lending Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS15 \n10.2. Deposit Rates S15 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n11. Stock Exchange Indices \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS16 \n \n12. Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n12.1. Monthly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS17 \n12.2. Quarterly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS18 \n12.3. Annual Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS19 \n \n \n \n \n \n35 \n13. Balance of Payments \n13.1. Cross Border Payments \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS20 \n13.2. Cross Border Receipts \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS21 \n \n14. External Sector \n14.1. External Debt Outstanding By Debtor \n \n \n \n \nS22 \n14.2. External Debt Outstanding by Source \n \n \n \n \nS23 \n \n \n \n \nJun-18\nJul-18\nAug-18\nSep-18\nOct-18\nNov-18\nDec-18\nJan-19\nFeb-19\nMar-19\nApr-19\nMay-19\nJun-19\nNet Foreign Assets\n-1,508,217.61\n-1,499,686.15\n-1,804,600.44\n-1,815,294.15\n-1,728,377.38\n-1,725,016.98\n-1,876,758.58\n-1,895,402.31\n-4,424,467.92\n-5,983,620.49\n-6,226,059.55\n-10,192,415.69\n-12,704,437.39\nCentral Bank(net)\n-1,217,451.12\n-1,275,444.50\n-1,513,864.28\n-1,555,285.99\n-1,455,053.24\n-1,540,875.47\n-1,757,683.09\n-1,787,515.46\n-4,676,973.98\n-6,110,320.34\n-6,756,572.48\n-11,352,535.79\n-14,602,968.79\nForeign Assets\n510,355.35\n528,307.45\n290,596.25\n237,850.70\n255,482.93\n247,680.14\n295,965.66\n282,271.43\n853,285.31\n996,604.88\n932,666.79\n2,417,729.41\n2,917,765.26\nForeign Liabilities\n1,727,806.48\n1,803,751.95\n1,804,460.53\n1,793,136.69\n1,710,536.17\n1,788,555.60\n2,053,648.75\n2,069,786.89\n5,530,259.29\n7,106,925.22\n7,689,239.28\n13,770,265.20\n17,520,734.04\nOther Depository Corporations(net)\n-290,766.49\n-224,241.66\n-290,736.16\n-260,008.17\n-273,324.14\n-184,141.52\n-119,075.49\n-107,886.85\n252,506.07\n126,699.85\n530,512.93\n1,160,120.10\n1,898,531.40\nForeign Assets\n263,405.79\n320,981.77\n244,837.54\n299,508.91\n308,206.84\n359,199.07\n405,848.41\n422,803.54\n1,034,721.60\n1,060,697.66\n1,491,439.91\n2,534,779.04\n3,814,622.33\nForeign Liabilities\n554,172.27\n545,223.42\n535,573.70\n559,517.07\n581,530.99\n543,340.59\n524,923.90\n530,690.39\n782,215.53\n933,997.80\n960,926.97\n1,374,658.95\n1,916,090.93\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n10,351,577.44\n10,883,377.40\n11,301,536.89\n11,637,230.97\n11,491,870.79\n11,515,467.61\n11,886,663.85\n11,752,429.58\n14,813,771.42\n16,610,996.67\n17,579,425.62\n23,201,453.94\n27,472,328.14\nDomestic Claims\n12,410,120.00\n13,195,525.47\n13,840,196.20\n14,162,804.05\n14,361,247.61\n14,642,956.80\n14,982,344.65\n14,902,955.01\n14,831,314.29\n14,652,405.60\n14,594,432.73\n14,958,514.70\n16,416,486.46\nClaims on Central Government(net)\n7,703,126.14\n8,707,427.93\n9,245,237.20\n9,367,999.90\n9,453,371.60\n9,709,749.15\n9,992,336.76\n10,031,721.31\n9,848,404.77\n9,631,357.74\n9,398,952.61\n9,082,566.10\n9,422,173.55\nClaims on Central Government\n7,834,035.83\n8,782,266.41\n9,319,418.72\n9,454,322.45\n9,547,216.70\n9,799,794.74\n10,074,924.82\n10,115,274.02\n9,996,649.93\n9,810,201.11\n9,615,349.44\n9,377,820.25\n10,630,234.88\nCentral Bank\n4,961,290.78\n5,486,379.33\n5,949,540.54\n6,303,205.89\n6,436,684.56\n6,619,938.86\n7,024,652.77\n7,072,578.19\n6,914,447.06\n6,777,148.85\n6,690,110.86\n6,461,220.18\n7,707,833.00\nODCs\n2,872,745.05\n3,295,887.08\n3,369,878.18\n3,151,116.56\n3,110,532.15\n3,179,855.88\n3,050,272.06\n3,042,695.82\n3,082,202.87\n3,033,052.26\n2,925,238.58\n2,916,600.07\n2,922,401.88\nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n130,909.69\n74,838.48\n74,181.52\n86,322.55\n93,845.11\n90,045.59\n82,588.06\n83,552.71\n148,245.17\n178,843.37\n216,396.83\n295,254.14\n1,208,061.33\nCentral Bank\n41,699.08\n41,707.71\n41,789.64\n41,694.93\n41,685.64\n41,331.00\n41,321.07\n41,366.44\n103,759.15\n130,917.86\n160,540.01\n246,390.26\n1,163,537.70\nODCs\n89,210.62\n33,130.77\n32,391.88\n44,627.63\n52,159.47\n48,714.59\n41,267.00\n42,186.27\n44,486.02\n47,925.52\n55,856.82\n48,863.88\n44,523.63\nClaims on Other Sectors\n4,706,993.86\n4,488,097.54\n4,594,959.00\n4,794,804.16\n4,907,876.01\n4,933,207.65\n4,990,007.89\n4,871,233.70\n4,982,909.52\n5,021,047.86\n5,195,480.12\n5,875,948.60\n6,994,312.91\nOther Financial Corporations\n67,789.70\n133,851.47\n141,976.37\n145,256.31\n149,474.39\n146,924.77\n156,610.64\n163,570.22\n171,891.86\n159,230.21\n161,501.25\n169,299.57\n180,349.24\nState and Local Government\n49,509.94\n54,356.85\n52,796.97\n51,597.49\n39,591.11\n37,039.73\n37,159.65\n35,335.26\n34,253.92\n35,077.27\n34,576.44\n33,304.49\n31,319.18\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n678,604.79\n653,645.57\n675,218.20\n707,808.19\n714,396.35\n759,288.09\n737,586.90\n760,026.12\n717,834.55\n874,075.49\n987,347.41\n1,256,829.39\n1,653,927.27\nPrivate Sector\n3,911,089.43\n3,646,243.64\n3,724,967.47\n3,890,142.17\n4,004,414.16\n3,989,955.06\n4,058,650.69\n3,912,302.09\n4,058,929.20\n3,952,664.90\n4,012,055.03\n4,416,515.15\n5,128,717.22\nCentral Bank\n19,822.36\n20,351.40\n22,784.69\n21,112.94\n21,332.89\n21,390.08\n21,335.35\n17,030.76\n17,036.09\n21,956.10\n24,683.88\n25,361.29\n23,154.78\nODCs\n3,891,267.06\n3,625,892.25\n3,702,182.78\n3,869,029.24\n3,983,081.27\n3,968,564.98\n4,037,315.34\n3,895,271.33\n4,041,893.11\n3,930,708.81\n3,987,371.15\n4,391,153.86\n5,105,562.43\nOther Items(Net)\n2,058,542.55\n2,312,148.07\n2,538,659.31\n2,525,573.08\n2,869,376.82\n3,127,489.19\n3,095,680.80\n3,150,525.43\n17,542.87\n-1,958,591.07\n-2,984,992.88\n-8,242,939.24\n-11,055,841.67\nShares and Other Equity\n1,993,144.37\n2,192,599.84\n2,239,731.19\n2,135,709.67\n2,187,396.87\n2,221,755.34\n2,281,378.82\n2,281,748.45\n-544,566.17\n-1,687,090.85\n-2,151,220.63\n-6,856,982.76\n-9,810,341.46\nLiabilities to Other Financial Corporations\n21,559.36\n32,602.91\n33,341.07\n46,596.88\n42,026.50\n42,504.84\n39,584.50\n39,216.29\n42,570.71\n42,675.76\n30,412.39\n49,216.06\n43,639.00\nRestricted Deposits\n65,963.28\n41,991.83\n46,269.35\n46,191.19\n68,052.98\n17,139.46\n21,014.72\n17,086.44\n8,667.49\n16,636.01\n46,764.60\n12,192.36\n363,411.77\nDeposits and Securities Excluded from Base Money\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nOther Items(net)\n-22,124.46\n44,953.48\n219,317.70\n297,075.34\n571,900.47\n846,089.55\n753,702.76\n812,474.25\n510,870.83\n-330,811.98\n-910,949.25\n-1,447,364.90\n-1,652,550.98\nBroad Money-M3\n8,843,359.83\n9,383,691.25\n9,496,936.45\n9,821,936.82\n9,763,493.41\n9,790,450.62\n10,009,905.27\n9,857,027.27\n10,389,303.50\n10,627,376.18\n11,353,366.06\n13,009,038.25\n14,767,890.75\nSecurities Other than Shares Included in Broad Money\n66,844.08\n89,499.33\n66,484.46\n52,419.97\n61,703.77\n50,864.73\n58,584.04\n59,302.10\n71,792.12\n74,503.10\n90,813.24\n139,439.93\n171,667.83\nBroad Money-M2\n8,776,515.75\n9,294,191.92\n9,430,452.00\n9,769,516.85\n9,701,789.65\n9,739,585.90\n9,951,321.23\n9,797,725.16\n10,317,511.39\n10,552,873.07\n11,262,552.82\n12,869,598.32\n14,596,222.92\nOther Deposits\n1,459,140.37\n1,501,520.77\n1,524,244.03\n1,488,981.24\n1,427,834.38\n1,430,427.17\n1,508,902.47\n1,466,797.51\n1,473,224.43\n1,437,053.15\n1,487,637.39\n1,611,815.34\n1,428,886.89\nNarrow Money-M1\n7,317,375.38\n7,792,671.15\n7,906,207.97\n8,280,535.61\n8,273,955.26\n8,309,158.73\n8,442,418.76\n8,330,927.65\n8,844,286.96\n9,115,819.92\n9,774,915.43\n11,257,782.98\n13,167,336.03\nTransferable Deposits\n6,938,172.87\n7,365,729.27\n7,444,516.45\n7,789,665.52\n7,792,430.08\n7,817,001.46\n7,940,376.20\n7,857,164.47\n8,380,317.93\n8,648,981.05\n9,283,238.74\n10,792,389.36\n12,695,789.56\n Of which Foreign Currency Accounts\n149,041.84\n139,613.34\n343,305.00\n418,087.02\n1,190,521.05\n1,417,836.22\n1,753,489.14\n3,031,536.97\n3,887,787.41\nCurrency Outside Depository Corporations\n379,202.52\n426,941.88\n461,691.52\n490,870.09\n481,525.19\n492,157.27\n502,042.57\n473,763.18\n463,969.03\n466,838.87\n491,676.69\n465,393.62\n471,546.47\nMemorandum Items\nReserve Money\n2,513,332.55\n2,789,945.53\n2,967,852.44\n2,891,742.55\n2,860,575.65\n3,135,918.22\n3,258,220.86\n3,029,004.88\n3,201,051.95\n3,172,354.75\n3,019,535.69\n2,522,708.23\n3,575,573.83\nFCAs as a Percentage of Deposits in M3\n0.0%\n0.0%\n0.0%\n0.0%\n1.6%\n1.5%\n3.6%\n4.5%\n12.0%\n14.0%\n16.1%\n24.2%\n27.2%\nEnd Period Exchange Rate\n1.00\n1.00\n1.00\n1.00\n1.00\n1.00\n1.00\n1.00\n2.50\n3.01\n3.26\n5.26\n6.62\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 2018\nNotes:\n(i) Depository corporations survey - formerly Monetary Survey.\n(ii) Broad money redefined using IMF's Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual of 2000. Major changes include exclusion of Government deposits held by banks from broad money.\n(iii) Transferable deposits made up of demand and savings deposits.\n(iv) NCDs are also referred to as securities included in broad money.\n(v) All classes of time deposits, short and long term are classified as time deposits, which are also termed other deposits.\n(vi) Credit to the private sector now excludes claims on other financial corporations, as well as claims on state and local government (local authorities)\n(vii) Depository corporations made up of the Central Bank and other depository corporations\n(viii) Other depository corporations (ODCs) - Commercial banks, merchant banks, building societies and POSB.\n(ix) In December 2017, the statistics were adjusted in restrospect by reclassifying Securities issued under Aftrades from claims on government to claims on central bank\n(x) In December 2017, the statistics were adjusted in restrospect by reclassifying amounts accessed by banks under the Aftrades from liabilities to Other Depository corporations and Other Financial Corporations to liabilities to Central Bank \nAnnual Growth (%)\nNet Foreign Assets\nCentral Bank(net)\nForeign Assets\nForeign Liabilities\nOther Depository Corporations(net)\nForeign Assets\nForeign Liabilities\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\nTABLE 1: DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS SURVEY (ZWL$ '000)\n \n \nS2 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJun-18\nJul-18\nAug-18\nSep-18\nOct-18\nNov-18\nDec-18\nJan-19\nFeb-19\nMar-19\nApr-19\nMay-19\nJun-19\nNet Foreign Assets\n-1,217,451.12\n-1,275,444.50\n-1,513,864.28\n-1,555,285.99\n-1,455,053.24\n-1,546,339.45\n-1,757,683.09\n-1,787,515.46\n-4,676,973.98\n-6,110,320.34\n-6,756,572.48\n-11,352,535.79\n-14,602,968.79\nClaims on Non Residents\n510,355.35\n528,307.45\n290,596.25\n237,850.70\n255,482.93\n253,505.88\n295,965.66\n282,271.43\n853,285.31\n996,604.88\n932,666.79\n2,417,729.41\n2,917,765.26\nOfficial Reserves Assets\n163,434.94\n180,936.77\n189,263.65\n136,268.14\n153,107.92\n143,428.48\n86,950.64\n59,870.98\n311,203.67\n344,973.29\n230,535.90\n1,223,599.47\n1,399,462.47\nOther Foreign Assets\n346,920.41\n347,370.68\n101,332.60\n101,582.56\n102,375.02\n110,077.40\n209,015.01\n222,400.44\n542,081.63\n651,631.59\n702,130.89\n1,194,129.94\n1,518,302.79\nLess Liabilities to Non Residents\n1,727,806.48\n1,803,751.95\n1,804,460.53\n1,793,136.69\n1,710,536.17\n1,799,845.33\n2,053,648.75\n2,069,786.89\n5,530,259.29\n7,106,925.22\n7,689,239.28\n13,770,265.20\n17,520,734.04\nShort Term Liabilities\n1,229,630.31\n1,303,458.23\n1,303,461.16\n1,291,247.23\n1,207,367.88\n1,300,180.35\n1,563,063.67\n1,574,674.14\n4,300,887.88\n5,631,784.52\n6,092,241.62\n11,229,210.34\n14,024,443.68\nOther Foreign Liabilities\n498,176.16\n500,293.72\n500,999.37\n501,889.46\n503,168.29\n499,664.97\n490,585.08\n495,112.75\n1,229,371.41\n1,475,140.70\n1,596,997.65\n2,541,054.86\n3,496,290.36\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n3,730,783.67\n4,065,390.03\n4,481,716.72\n4,447,028.54\n4,315,628.88\n4,682,257.67\n5,015,903.95\n4,816,520.35\n7,878,025.93\n9,282,675.10\n9,776,108.17\n13,875,244.02\n18,178,542.62\nDomestic Claims\n5,420,856.73\n6,026,539.60\n6,509,710.94\n6,826,230.06\n6,991,768.06\n7,189,089.87\n7,598,696.62\n7,633,682.43\n7,398,364.83\n7,254,587.97\n7,189,577.74\n6,912,529.53\n7,344,238.48\nNet Claims on Central Government\n4,919,591.70\n5,444,671.63\n5,907,750.89\n6,261,510.96\n6,394,998.92\n6,578,607.86\n6,983,331.70\n7,031,211.76\n6,810,687.92\n6,646,231.00\n6,529,570.85\n6,214,829.92\n6,544,295.30\nClaims on Central Government\n4,961,290.78\n5,486,379.33\n5,949,540.54\n6,303,205.89\n6,436,684.56\n6,619,938.86\n7,024,652.77\n7,072,578.19\n6,914,447.06\n6,777,148.85\n6,690,110.86\n6,461,220.18\n7,707,833.00\nOf which: Securities Other than Shares\n1,655,951.61\n1,767,970.98\n2,124,232.15\n2,107,570.78\n2,109,129.00\n2,073,611.90\n2,062,178.19\n2,011,373.84\n1,962,432.38\n1,910,408.71\n1,835,171.86\n1,793,430.00\n5,922,355.91\nLoans\n3,305,339.17\n3,718,408.35\n3,825,308.38\n4,195,635.11\n4,327,555.56\n4,546,326.96\n4,962,474.58\n5,061,204.35\n4,952,014.68\n4,866,740.14\n4,854,939.01\n4,667,790.18\n1,785,477.10\n Loans and Advances\n3,032,637.59\n3,445,708.69\n3,552,608.66\n3,925,152.95\n3,092,815.50\n3,259,847.32\n3,618,214.10\n3,632,085.91\n3,480,989.65\n3,358,008.67\n3,319,653.21\n3,053,293.48\n114,667.21\n Legacy Debt\n272,701.58\n272,699.66\n272,699.72\n270,482.16\n270,483.94\n270,476.30\n271,144.05\n291,998.61\n308,519.87\n309,020.71\n309,052.17\n309,088.45\n309,057.44\nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n657,961.30\n685,670.05\n760,667.33\n878,452.43\n964,256.12\n1,016,003.35\n1,073,116.43\n1,137,119.83\n1,162,505.16\n1,199,710.77\n1,226,233.63\n1,305,408.24\n1,361,752.45\nOf which: Deposits\n41,699.08\n41,707.71\n41,789.64\n41,694.93\n41,685.64\n41,331.00\n41,321.07\n41,366.44\n103,759.15\n130,917.86\n160,540.01\n246,390.26\n1,163,537.70\nOther \n41,699.08\n41,707.71\n41,789.64\n41,694.93\n41,685.64\n41,331.00\n41,321.07\n41,366.44\n103,759.15\n130,917.86\n160,540.01\n246,390.26\n1,163,537.70\nClaims on Other Sectors\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\nOther Financial Corporations\n501,265.03\n581,867.98\n601,960.04\n564,719.10\n596,769.14\n610,482.01\n615,364.93\n602,470.67\n587,676.91\n608,356.98\n660,006.89\n697,699.62\n799,943.18\nState and Local Government\n25,383.43\n89,858.36\n90,693.36\n93,173.28\n95,076.36\n92,865.03\n104,283.41\n109,152.02\n121,634.35\n114,497.79\n117,613.99\n114,408.61\n125,389.20\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nPrivate Sector\n456,059.23\n471,658.22\n488,482.00\n450,432.88\n480,359.88\n496,226.90\n489,746.16\n476,287.89\n449,006.47\n471,903.09\n517,709.02\n557,929.72\n651,399.20\n19,822.36\n20,351.40\n22,784.69\n21,112.94\n21,332.89\n21,390.08\n21,335.35\n17,030.76\n17,036.09\n21,956.10\n24,683.88\n25,361.29\n23,154.78\nClaims on Other Depository Corporations\nOf which: Loans\n289,295.02\n301,846.44\n306,132.79\n306,155.60\n316,177.15\n379,173.85\n393,735.95\n417,911.59\n330,900.10\n339,662.09\n332,906.49\n339,094.15\n363,908.20\nOther Liabilities to ODCs\n289,295.02\n301,846.44\n306,132.79\n306,155.60\n316,177.15\n379,173.85\n393,735.95\n417,911.59\n330,900.10\n339,662.09\n332,906.49\n339,094.15\n363,908.20\n1,181,913.83\n1,425,661.22\n1,486,721.94\n1,823,973.56\n2,083,075.39\n1,964,016.64\n2,135,541.16\n2,360,599.60\n2,314,291.29\n2,248,370.43\n2,348,400.79\n2,738,904.07\n2,200,323.26\nOther Items(Net)\nShares and Other Equity\n217,077.15\n266,557.51\n279,985.61\n290,045.02\n310,072.68\n259,341.74\n236,757.99\n233,606.33\n-2,658,437.58\n-4,088,430.87\n-4,792,135.28\n-9,670,637.45\n-13,022,965.26\nOther Items(Net)\n360,766.36\n433,728.61\n444,671.00\n454,134.87\n466,363.60\n467,391.73\n475,653.19\n464,456.24\n-2,402,232.48\n-3,873,725.31\n-4,589,274.75\n-9,310,271.34\n-12,940,837.81\nLiabilities to Other Resident Sectors\n-209,652.49\n-209,162.93\n-210,954.74\n-210,281.05\n-224,343.90\n-225,380.05\n-260,446.06\n-247,936.34\n-264,872.60\n-231,341.56\n-251,223.69\n-375,255.92\n-445,539.22\nDeposits and Securities Excluded from Bas\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n190.60\n536.14\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n1,598.56\n2,697.45\n0.00\nMonetary Base Incl. foreign currency \nclearing balances\nMonetary Base \nLiabilities to ODCs\n2,513,332.55\n2,789,945.53\n2,967,852.44\n2,891,742.55\n2,860,575.65\n3,135,918.22\n3,258,220.86\n3,029,004.88\n3,201,051.95\n3,172,354.75\n3,019,535.687\n2,522,708.231\n3,575,573.835\nBond Notes\n80,593.64\n80,812.71\n84,872.46\n86,177.94\n86,521.28\n86,507.82\n86,558.34\n86,671.08\n86,794.17\n86,775.25\n87,096.231\n87,423.296\n87,606.547\nBond Coins\n307,595.14\n366,738.89\n399,951.59\n422,933.66\n434,935.71\n436,225.70\n435,985.12\n436,131.63\n436,825.58\n442,551.17\n449,762.879\n476,656.017\n510,197.387\nReserve Deposits\n2,112,051.33\n2,294,108.09\n2,406,600.92\n2,296,266.80\n2,282,181.13\n2,545,140.17\n2,718,472.21\n2,431,429.69\n2,620,801.43\n2,556,061.06\n2,410,617.847\n1,861,836.070\n2,877,247.306\nOther\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n399,643.22\n393,439.26\n395,649.57\n387,117.92\n379,777.18\n382,618.000\n406,733.207\n434,435.931\nPrivate Deposits\n2,112,051.33\n2,294,108.09\n2,406,600.92\n2,296,266.80\n2,282,181.13\n2,145,496.95\n2,325,032.95\n2,035,780.12\n2,233,683.51\n2,176,283.88\n2,027,999.848\n1,455,102.863\n2,442,811.375\n13,092.44\n48,285.84\n76,427.47\n86,364.15\n56,937.52\n68,044.53\n17,205.18\n74,772.49\n56,630.77\n86,967.28\n72,058.730\n96,792.848\n100,522.595\nTABLE 2: CENTRAL BANK SURVEY (ZWL$'000)\n \n \nS3 \n \n \n \n \n \nS4 \n \n \n \nJun-18\nJul-18\nAug-18\nSep-18\nOct-18\nNov-18\nDec-18\nJan-19\nFeb-19\nMar-19\nApr-19\nMay-19\nJun-19\nNet Foreign Assets\n-290,766.49\n-224,241.66\n-290,736.16\n-260,008.17\n-273,324.14\n-184,141.52\n-119,075.49\n-107,886.85\n252,506.07\n126,699.85\n126,699.85\n1,160,120.10\n1,898,531.40\nClaims on Non Residents\n263,405.79\n320,981.77\n244,837.54\n299,508.91\n308,206.84\n359,199.07\n405,848.41\n422,803.54\n1,034,721.60\n1,060,697.66\n1,060,697.66\n2,534,779.04\n3,814,622.33\nOf Which: Foreign Currency\n58,497.99\n61,888.30\n72,330.74\n61,523.80\n70,410.81\n84,619.66\n94,485.74\n113,427.55\n256,754.30\n263,233.15\n263,233.15\n484,193.31\n882,204.61\nDeposits\n204,103.25\n206,979.87\n171,610.30\n237,075.06\n236,895.75\n273,677.73\n310,319.40\n307,770.08\n776,043.16\n794,324.48\n794,324.48\n2,044,144.29\n2,921,840.60\nOther\n804.54\n52,113.60\n896.50\n910.05\n900.29\n901.68\n1,043.27\n1,605.91\n1,924.14\n3,140.03\n3,140.03\n6,441.45\n10,577.12\nLess Liabilities to Non Residents\n554,172.27\n545,223.42\n535,573.70\n559,517.07\n581,530.99\n543,340.59\n524,923.90\n530,690.39\n782,215.53\n933,997.80\n933,997.80\n1,374,658.95\n1,916,090.93\nOf Which: Deposits\n76,977.43\n71,906.41\n61,764.73\n91,213.72\n115,149.81\n86,609.01\n81,573.41\n81,808.20\n172,568.31\n242,800.88\n242,800.88\n719,211.04\n769,197.36\nLoans\n477,194.84\n473,317.01\n473,808.97\n468,303.36\n466,381.17\n456,731.58\n443,350.50\n448,882.19\n609,647.22\n691,196.93\n691,196.93\n655,447.91\n1,146,893.57\nOther\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n8,741,831.36\n \n9,132,705.19\n \n9,249,553.63\n9,504,710.75\n9,498,354.86\n9,414,390.34\n9,609,733.01\n9,416,378.45\n9,616,197.64\n9,946,870.18\n9,946,870.18\n11,286,731.69\n12,297,290.28\nDomestic Claims\n6,989,263.27\n \n7,168,985.87\n \n7,330,485.27\n7,336,573.99\n7,369,479.55\n7,453,866.93\n7,383,648.03\n7,269,272.57\n7,432,949.46\n7,397,817.63\n7,397,817.63\n8,045,985.17\n9,072,247.98\nNet Claims on Central Government\n2,783,534.43\n \n3,262,756.31\n \n3,337,486.31\n3,106,488.93\n3,058,372.68\n3,131,141.29\n3,009,005.06\n3,000,509.55\n3,037,716.85\n2,985,126.74\n2,985,126.74\n2,867,736.19\n2,877,878.25\nClaims on Central Government\n2,872,745.05\n \n3,295,887.08\n \n3,369,878.18\n3,151,116.56\n3,110,532.15\n3,179,855.88\n3,050,272.06\n3,042,695.82\n3,082,202.87\n3,033,052.26\n3,033,052.26\n2,916,600.07\n2,922,401.88\nSecurities\n2,865,309.79\n \n3,291,375.03\n \n3,362,827.03\n3,145,693.06\n3,105,944.58\n3,172,866.99\n3,044,069.03\n3,038,282.27\n3,076,367.83\n3,028,779.35\n3,028,779.35\n2,912,674.94\n2,918,508.31\nLoans\n7,435.26\n \n4,512.05\n \n7,051.15\n5,423.50\n4,587.57\n6,988.90\n6,203.03\n4,413.55\n5,835.04\n4,272.91\n4,272.91\n3,925.13\n3,893.57\nOther \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n89,210.62\n \n33,130.77\n \n32,391.88\n44,627.63\n52,159.47\n48,714.59\n41,267.00\n42,186.27\n44,486.02\n47,925.52\n47,925.52\n48,863.88\n44,523.63\nOf which: Deposits\n89,210.62\n \n33,130.77\n \n32,391.88\n44,627.63\n52,159.47\n48,714.59\n41,267.00\n42,186.27\n44,486.02\n47,925.52\n47,925.52\n48,863.88\n44,523.63\nOther \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nClaims on Other Sectors\n4,205,728.83\n \n3,906,229.56\n \n3,992,998.96\n4,230,085.05\n4,311,106.88\n4,322,725.64\n4,374,642.97\n4,268,763.02\n4,395,232.61\n4,412,690.88\n4,412,690.88\n5,178,248.99\n6,194,369.73\nOther Financial Corporations\n42,406.27\n \n43,993.11\n \n51,283.01\n52,083.02\n54,398.03\n54,059.74\n52,327.23\n54,418.20\n50,257.50\n44,732.42\n44,732.42\n54,890.96\n54,960.04\nState and Local Government\n49,509.94\n \n54,356.85\n \n52,796.97\n51,597.49\n39,591.11\n37,039.73\n37,159.65\n35,335.26\n34,253.92\n35,077.27\n35,077.27\n33,304.49\n31,319.18\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n222,545.56\n \n181,987.35\n \n186,736.20\n257,375.31\n234,036.46\n263,061.19\n247,840.74\n283,738.23\n268,828.08\n402,172.40\n402,172.40\n698,899.67\n1,002,528.07\nPrivate Sector\n3,891,267.06\n \n3,625,892.25\n \n3,702,182.78\n3,869,029.24\n3,983,081.27\n3,968,564.98\n4,037,315.34\n3,895,271.33\n4,041,893.11\n3,930,708.81\n3,930,708.81\n4,391,153.86\n5,105,562.43\nClaims on the Central Bank\n3,089,939.84\n \n3,471,170.30\n \n3,498,784.50\n3,799,833.82\n3,811,216.96\n3,726,890.73\n3,969,951.54\n3,950,061.19\n3,824,458.20\n3,953,460.88\n3,953,460.88\n \n4,187,900.42\n \n4,644,902.11\n \nCurrency\n8,986.260\n \n20,609.732\n \n23,132.54\n18,241.51\n39,931.81\n30,576.25\n20,500.90\n49,039.52\n59,650.72\n62,487.55\n62,487.547\n \n98,685.696\n \n126,257.461\n \nReserves\n3,080,953.577\n \n3,450,560.570\n \n3,475,651.96\n3,781,592.32\n3,771,285.15\n3,696,314.48\n3,949,450.64\n3,901,021.67\n3,764,807.48\n3,890,973.33\n3,890,973.333\n \n4,089,214.726\n \n4,518,644.646\n \nSecurities\n-\n \n-\n \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \nOther Claims\n-\n \n-\n \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \nLiabilities to the Central Bank\n119,810.71\n \n118,944.97\n \n136,950.59\n142,244.29\n147,588.60\n213,749.43\n229,588.29\n239,529.91\n158,887.13\n165,849.57\n165,849.57\n \n148,760.15\n \n150,275.70\n \nOther Items(Net)\n1,217,561.04\n \n1,388,506.01\n \n1,442,765.55\n1,489,452.77\n1,534,753.06\n1,552,617.90\n1,514,278.27\n1,563,425.41\n1,482,322.89\n1,238,558.76\n1,238,558.76\n \n798,393.76\n \n1,269,584.10\n \nShares and Other Equity\n1,632,378.01\n \n1,758,871.23\n \n1,795,060.19\n1,681,574.79\n1,721,033.27\n1,754,363.61\n1,805,725.63\n1,817,292.21\n1,857,666.31\n2,186,634.46\n2,186,634.46\n \n2,453,288.57\n \n3,130,496.35\n \nLiabilities to other ressident sectors\n21,559.36\n \n32,602.91\n \n33,341.07\n46,596.88\n42,026.50\n42,314.24\n39,048.36\n39,216.29\n42,570.71\n42,675.76\n42,675.76\n \n46,518.61\n \n43,639.00\n \nOther Items(Net)\n(436,376.33)\n \n(402,968.13)\n \n-385,635.72\n-238,718.90\n-228,306.72\n-244,059.95\n-330,495.73\n-293,083.09\n-417,914.13\n-990,751.46\n(990,751.46)\n \n(1,701,413.42)\n \n(1,904,551.24)\n \nDeposits and Securities Included in Broad \nMoney\n8,451,064.87\n \n8,908,463.53\n \n8,958,817.46\n9,244,702.58\n9,225,030.71\n9,230,248.82\n9,490,657.52\n9,308,491.60\n9,868,703.71\n10,073,570.03\n10,073,570.03\n \n12,446,851.79\n \n14,195,821.68\n \nDeposits Included in Broad Money\n8,384,220.79\n \n8,818,964.20\n \n8,892,333.01\n \n9,192,282.61\n \n9,163,326.94\n \n9,179,384.09\n \n9,432,073.48\n \n9,249,189.49\n \n9,796,911.59\n \n9,999,066.93\n \n9,999,066.93\n \n12,307,411.86\n \n14,024,153.85\n \nTransferable Deposits\n6,925,080.42\n7,317,443.43\n7,368,088.98\n7,703,301.37\n7,735,492.56\n7,748,956.93\n7,923,171.01\n \n7,782,391.98\n \n8,323,687.16\n \n8,562,013.77\n \n8,562,013.77\n10,695,596.51\n12,595,266.96\n of which FCAs\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n149,041.84\n139,613.34\n343,305.00\n \n418,087.02\n \n1,190,521.05\n \n1,417,836.22\n \n1,417,836.22\n3,031,536.97\n3,887,787.41\nOther Deposits\n1,459,140.37\n \n1,501,520.77\n \n1,524,244.03\n \n1,488,981.24\n \n1,427,834.38\n \n1,430,427.17\n \n1,508,902.47\n1,466,797.51\n1,473,224.43\n1,437,053.15\n1,437,053.15\n \n1,611,815.34\n \n1,428,886.89\n \nMoney Market Instruments\n66,844.08\n \n89,499.33\n \n66,484.46\n \n52,419.97\n \n61,703.77\n \n50,864.73\n \n58,584.04\n \n59,302.10\n \n71,792.12\n \n74,503.10\n \n74,503.10\n \n139,439.93\n \n171,667.83\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2019\nTABLE 3 : OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS SURVEY ( ZWL$ '000)\n \n \nS5 \n \n \n \n \n \nS6 \n \n \n \nZWL$ Thousands\nEnd of\nGold\nOther\nTotal\nTreasury Bills\nCentral\nBanks\nOther\nGovt.\nOther\nOther Assets\nTOTAL\nGovernment\nStock\n2017\nJan\n480.3\n448,731.4\n449,211.7\n577,431.7\n1,693,217.2\n110,720.5\n159,458.5\n0.0\n47,416.3\n373,809.2\n3,411,265.1\nFeb\n506.3\n445,058.7\n445,565.1\n562,535.7\n1,792,897.8\n93,514.2\n191,320.8\n0.0\n51,921.8\n369,305.2\n3,507,060.7\nMar\n502.9\n419,445.4\n419,948.3\n551,741.2\n1,785,995.7\n104,865.3\n183,453.6\n0.0\n51,921.8\n375,158.7\n3,473,084.6\nApr\n508.6\n405,826.0\n406,334.5\n533,407.3\n1,911,495.3\n85,479.3\n210,432.8\n0.0\n52,185.7\n372,530.5\n3,571,865.4\nMay\n508.5\n379,864.4\n380,372.9\n537,150.6\n2,041,391.0\n50,810.9\n245,236.3\n0.0\n52,587.8\n382,752.8\n3,690,302.3\nJun\n500.8\n414,121.9\n414,622.7\n620,541.2\n2,160,968.6\n52,540.4\n237,454.5\n0.0\n52,612.9\n371,853.2\n3,910,593.5\nJul\n507.3\n379,049.6\n379,556.9\n640,269.7\n2,336,047.0\n43,316.5\n256,766.2\n0.0\n52,884.8\n375,797.0\n4,084,638.1\nAug\n526.9\n432,363.8\n432,890.7\n677,443.8\n2,576,424.1\n30,413.0\n236,643.9\n0.0\n52,884.8\n374,411.7\n4,381,112.0\nSep\n517.9\n441,545.9\n442,063.7\n641,160.0\n2,745,409.9\n40,885.3\n314,480.1\n0.0\n52,884.8\n376,561.6\n4,613,445.4\nOct\n513.3\n329,674.9\n330,188.2\n1,105,837.4\n2,452,349.1\n73,619.0\n0.0\n52,969.2\n377,689.3\n4,392,652.2\nNov\n518.1\n316,365.4\n316,883.5\n1,153,434.2\n2,672,981.8\n166,428.6\n392,842.8\n0.0\n53,131.5\n376,880.5\n5,132,582.8\nDec\n523.2\n398,775.5\n399,298.6\n1,478,745.9\n2,486,956.0\n180,890.4\n438,980.1\n0.0\n53,245.7\n381,391.7\n5,419,508.4\n2018\nJan\n542.7\n295,704.1\n296,246.8\n1,481,110.3\n2,521,699.7\n204,516.4\n392,457.4\n0.0\n53,297.6\n399,281.0\n5,348,609.1\nFeb\n535.0\n293,095.9\n293,630.9\n1,479,552.8\n2,594,224.0\n207,966.8\n405,996.7\n0.0\n53,426.7\n400,019.5\n5,434,817.4\nMar\n537.7\n253,084.5\n253,622.2\n1,546,995.9\n2,769,969.5\n215,726.1\n404,906.7\n0.0\n53,455.4\n403,745.5\n5,648,421.3\nApr\n533.3\n257,036.5\n257,569.8\n1,560,622.2\n2,950,232.6\n160,379.8\n426,520.6\n0.0\n53,595.8\n397,829.6\n5,806,750.3\nMay\n524.9\n313,482.0\n314,006.9\n1,597,939.7\n3,089,176.3\n270,870.8\n401,679.8\n0.0\n53,595.8\n398,836.7\n6,126,105.9\nJun\n505.0\n509,850.3\n510,355.4\n1,655,951.6\n3,305,339.2\n289,295.0\n447,654.5\n0.0\n53,610.6\n396,067.8\n6,658,274.0\nJul\n493.8\n527,813.6\n528,307.4\n1,767,971.0\n3,718,408.4\n301,846.4\n450,384.5\n0.0\n131,483.5\n395,874.7\n7,294,275.9\nAug\n483.2\n290,113.1\n290,596.3\n2,124,232.2\n3,825,308.4\n306,132.8\n469,976.6\n0.0\n131,983.5\n396,593.0\n7,544,822.7\nSep\n478.3\n237,372.4\n237,850.7\n2,107,570.8\n4,195,635.1\n306,155.6\n430,437.7\n0.0\n134,281.4\n380,807.0\n7,792,738.3\nOct\n494.5\n254,988.4\n255,482.9\n2,109,129.0\n4,327,555.6\n316,177.1\n462,486.6\n0.0\n134,282.6\n404,339.5\n8,009,453.3\nNov\n494.8\n247,185.3\n247,680.1\n2,073,611.9\n4,546,327.0\n379,173.9\n476,986.3\n0.0\n133,495.7\n410,630.5\n8,267,905.4\nDec\n516.1\n295,449.5\n295,965.7\n2,062,178.2\n4,962,474.6\n393,736.0\n481,858.2\n0.0\n133,506.7\n455,810.2\n8,785,529.5\n2019\nJan\n527.5\n281,743.9\n282,271.4\n2,011,373.8\n5,274,987.0\n417,911.6\n455,916.0\n0.0\n146,554.7\n479,670.8\n9,068,685.3\nFeb\n1,331.3\n851,954.0\n853,285.3\n1,962,432.4\n5,285,993.7\n330,900.1\n441,122.2\n0.0\n146,554.7\n501,209.3\n9,521,497.8\nMar\n1,570.1\n995,034.8\n996,604.9\n1,910,408.7\n5,309,582.8\n339,662.1\n460,940.2\n0.0\n147,416.8\n500,377.5\n9,664,992.9\nApr\n527.5\n281,743.9\n282,271.4\n1,835,171.9\n5,325,339.6\n332,906.5\n512,590.1\n0.0\n147,416.8\n1,138,901.7\n9,574,598.0\nMay\n1,331.3\n851,954.0\n853,285.3\n1,793,430.0\n5,406,793.3\n339,094.2\n549,282.9\n0.0\n148,416.7\n2,189,714.3\n11,280,016.7\nJun\n1,570.1\n995,034.8\n996,604.9\n5,922,355.9\n1,785,477.1\n363,908.2\n651,524.0\n0.0\n148,419.2\n2,618,702.5\n12,486,991.8\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2019\nTABLE 4.1: RESERVE BANK - ASSETS\n Foreign Assets\nLoans and advances\nInvestments\n \n \nS7 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCapital\nand\nForeign\ngeneral\nEnd of\nBond Notes in \nCirculation\nBond Coins in Circulation\nBond Notes and\nBankers Deposits \nOther Deposits\nGovt. Deposits\nTotal Deposits\nLiabilities\nreserve\nOther Liabilities\nTOTAL\ncoins* issued\n2017\nJan\n88,839.1\n13,852.7\n102,691.8\n1,395,502.1\n337,983.2\n25,722.8\n1,759,208.1\n1,032,426.2\n198,391.1\n318,547.9\n3,411,265.1\nFeb\n118,836.7\n13,845.1\n132,681.8\n1,467,941.6\n326,148.4\n25,139.9\n1,819,229.9\n1,034,365.8\n202,521.4\n318,261.8\n3,507,060.7\nMar\n134,347.6\n20,385.1\n154,732.8\n1,446,635.6\n313,240.6\n25,709.3\n1,785,585.5\n1,005,311.0\n203,258.5\n324,197.0\n3,473,084.6\nApr\n140,801.3\n23,268.9\n164,070.2\n1,492,786.2\n365,223.8\n22,277.3\n1,880,287.3\n1,004,318.5\n206,519.4\n316,670.1\n3,571,865.4\nMay\n163,388.9\n25,819.6\n189,208.5\n1,520,837.7\n406,140.0\n22,242.6\n1,949,220.4\n1,004,490.9\n220,032.0\n327,350.5\n3,690,302.3\nJun\n175,855.8\n27,667.5\n203,523.2\n1,728,301.2\n409,262.6\n40,520.1\n2,178,083.9\n987,073.9\n222,222.8\n319,689.6\n3,910,593.5\nJul\n179,722.2\n28,763.1\n208,485.3\n1,838,460.1\n411,103.5\n40,545.2\n2,290,108.7\n1,052,565.3\n215,716.9\n317,761.8\n4,084,638.1\nAug\n181,874.3\n30,289.8\n212,164.1\n2,135,122.5\n401,103.8\n40,631.8\n2,576,858.2\n1,069,019.5\n219,271.6\n303,798.7\n4,381,112.0\nSep\n220,358.2\n35,089.7\n255,447.9\n2,166,837.1\n513,475.1\n40,545.9\n2,720,858.0\n1,086,264.1\n228,502.3\n322,373.1\n4,613,445.4\nOct\n259,385.6\n37,235.5\n296,621.1\n2,181,116.2\n558,328.5\n40,530.3\n2,779,975.0\n1,066,245.9\n237,010.5\n359,848.4\n4,739,700.8\nNov\n286,809.6\n42,063.4\n328,873.0\n2,331,782.2\n555,013.8\n40,553.0\n2,927,349.0\n1,186,123.1\n234,173.1\n456,064.7\n5,132,582.8\nDec\n289,827.7\n54,687.3\n344,515.0\n2,285,501.2\n521,612.6\n40,567.8\n2,847,681.6\n1,496,983.8\n239,919.8\n490,408.3\n5,419,508.4\n2018\nJan\n291,017.0\n63,474.1\n354,491.1\n2,071,823.2\n561,090.2\n71,168.0\n2,704,081.5\n1,480,423.5\n331,769.0\n477,844.0\n5,348,609.1\nFeb\n289,315.0\n62,494.4\n351,809.4\n1,908,121.6\n531,290.0\n93,049.2\n2,532,460.8\n1,531,644.2\n339,808.3\n679,094.7\n5,434,817.4\nMar\n289,183.1\n68,055.2\n357,238.3\n1,920,236.4\n526,523.4\n42,096.2\n2,488,856.0\n1,722,990.1\n340,070.8\n739,266.1\n5,648,421.3\nApr\n289,120.9\n73,367.3\n362,488.2\n1,813,681.7\n528,811.0\n41,970.4\n2,384,463.1\n1,712,066.4\n350,685.4\n997,047.2\n5,806,750.3\nMay\n288,935.3\n79,420.3\n368,355.6\n1,924,872.4\n546,965.7\n41,858.0\n2,513,696.0\n1,782,605.2\n351,770.3\n1,109,678.9\n6,126,105.9\nJun\n307,595.1\n80,593.6\n388,188.8\n2,112,051.3\n570,387.8\n41,699.1\n2,724,138.2\n1,727,806.5\n360,766.4\n1,457,374.1\n6,658,274.0\nJul\n366,738.9\n80,812.7\n447,551.6\n2,294,108.1\n605,257.7\n41,707.7\n2,941,073.5\n1,803,751.9\n433,728.6\n1,668,170.2\n7,294,275.9\nAug\n399,951.6\n84,872.5\n484,824.1\n2,406,600.9\n670,605.2\n41,789.6\n3,118,995.7\n1,804,460.5\n444,671.0\n1,691,871.3\n7,544,822.7\nSep\n422,933.7\n86,177.9\n509,111.6\n2,296,266.8\n682,494.6\n41,694.9\n3,020,456.3\n1,793,136.7\n454,134.9\n2,015,898.8\n7,792,738.3\nOct\n434,935.7\n86,521.3\n521,457.0\n2,282,181.1\n704,720.4\n41,685.6\n3,028,587.2\n1,710,536.2\n466,363.6\n2,282,509.3\n8,009,453.3\nNov\n436,225.7\n86,507.8\n522,733.5\n2,545,140.2\n710,595.5\n41,331.0\n3,297,066.6\n1,788,555.6\n467,391.7\n2,192,157.9\n8,267,905.4\nDec\n435,985.1\n86,558.3\n522,543.5\n2,718,472.2\n587,797.4\n41,321.1\n3,347,590.7\n2,053,648.8\n475,653.2\n2,386,093.4\n8,785,529.5\n2019\nJan\n436,131.6\n86,671.1\n522,802.7\n2,431,429.7\n687,033.1\n41,366.4\n3,159,829.3\n2,069,786.9\n464,456.2\n2,851,810.2\n9,068,685.3\nFeb\n436,825.6\n86,794.2\n523,619.7\n2,620,801.4\n243,862.1\n103,759.1\n2,968,422.7\n5,530,259.3\n-2,402,232.5\n2,901,428.5\n9,521,497.8\nMar\n442,551.2\n86,775.2\n529,326.4\n2,556,061.1\n253,590.5\n130,917.9\n2,940,569.5\n7,106,925.2\n-3,873,725.3\n2,961,897.2\n9,664,992.9\nApr\n449,762.9\n87,096.2\n536,859.1\n2,410,617.8\n305,453.8\n160,540.0\n2,876,611.6\n2,069,786.9\n-4,589,274.7\n8,680,615.1\n9,574,598.0\nMay\n476,656.0\n87,423.3\n564,079.3\n1,861,836.1\n414,514.4\n246,390.3\n2,522,740.8\n5,530,259.3\n-9,310,271.3\n11,973,208.6\n11,280,016.7\nJun\n510,197.4\n87,606.5\n597,803.9\n2,877,247.3\n803,273.0\n276,635.3\n3,957,155.6\n7,106,925.2\n-12,940,837.8\n13,765,944.8\n12,486,991.8\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2019\n*Bond coins first issued in December 2014\n* Bond Notes issued on 28 November 2016\nRESRVE BANK LIABILITIES :ZWL$ Thousands\nDeposits\n \n \nS8 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nForeign\nTOTAL\nEnd of\nNotes\nBond\n&\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \n Notes &\nCoin\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment1\nLocal Governemt\nPublic Enterprises\nOther2\nGovernment\nLocal \nPublic \nOther Institutional Units3\nOther cliams\nContigent Assets\nOther Assets\nNon Financial \nCoins\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\nGovernment\nEnterprises\nAssets\n2017\nMar\n12.6\n66.4\n1,485.9\n260.5\n154.9\n53.5\n1,794.1\n18.7\n15.7\n3.8\n15.7\n15.7\n70.7\n3,460.5\n67.2\n422.4\n442.5\n635.1\n8,995.8\nApr\n10.7\n67.8\n1,495.2\n249.4\n219.3\n51.4\n1,954.0\n17.8\n15.8\n3.6\n15.8\n16.9\n74.5\n3,449.5\n24.6\n489.1\n398.8\n644.6\n9,199.0\nMay\n13.4\n56.9\n1,492.4\n272.5\n170.2\n75.3\n1,968.9\n20.3\n15.7\n33.6\n16.7\n16.3\n72.9\n3,447.8\n82.4\n486.1\n421.7\n644.4\n9,307.6\nJun\n7.4\n57.1\n1,674.9\n350.3\n92.1\n110.6\n2,014.2\n19.0\n16.0\n35.0\n47.9\n16.5\n82.9\n3,494.3\n92.8\n533.5\n408.9\n649.6\n9,702.8\nJul\n7.1\n45.2\n1,807.4\n302.3\n63.1\n103.6\n1,982.8\n17.2\n26.1\n34.4\n45.2\n16.9\n116.8\n3,417.1\n86.8\n513.6\n432.9\n635.8\n9,654.3\nAug\n12.3\n40.6\n2,061.9\n276.6\n165.3\n7.9\n2,100.9\n16.3\n26.3\n64.6\n41.3\n18.0\n145.5\n3,494.5\n78.6\n531.8\n403.7\n639.5\n10,125.5\nSep\n12.0\n38.1\n2,110.4\n226.8\n179.7\n31.3\n2,248.9\n16.1\n23.5\n65.0\n41.5\n15.6\n118.8\n3,554.4\n78.0\n472.8\n415.6\n655.1\n10,303.5\nOct\n8.7\n41.8\n2,139.3\n254.1\n190.8\n61.0\n2,372.1\n15.4\n24.4\n65.1\n34.8\n17.8\n99.6\n3,599.1\n82.0\n432.4\n459.3\n667.3\n10,564.9\nNov\n9.8\n46.1\n2,315.5\n289.8\n184.2\n74.3\n2,487.7\n18.8\n23.5\n65.4\n32.3\n19.6\n107.3\n3,608.7\n76.8\n417.7\n505.6\n672.5\n10,955.5\nDec\n12.6\n58.1\n2,592.0\n276.0\n213.4\n66.6\n2,397.2\n26.8\n23.5\n66.3\n29.4\n19.4\n145.5\n3,581.3\n92.2\n508.3\n509.3\n699.9\n11,317.7\n2018\nJan\n23.4\n66.9\n2,528.5\n291.2\n111.9\n81.9\n2,336.0\n34.5\n23.5\n65.9\n26.3\n20.6\n155.3\n3,461.2\n74.6\n501.0\n457.8\n700.8\n10,961.1\nFeb\n20.0\n46.8\n2,516.8\n347.6\n114.2\n96.2\n2,313.4\n33.5\n23.5\n66.1\n24.3\n21.1\n145.4\n3,527.1\n22.2\n507.8\n434.5\n697.8\n10,958.3\nMar\n16.7\n57.9\n2,457.7\n312.8\n139.2\n99.5\n2,434.8\n32.8\n23.5\n66.7\n19.2\n15.9\n127.5\n3,637.8\n24.2\n504.1\n487.4\n710.3\n11,168.1\nApr\n14.9\n61.9\n2,423.5\n337.0\n120.8\n78.5\n2,558.9\n32.0\n24.7\n67.0\n13.4\n20.9\n121.2\n3,674.0\n22.1\n532.0\n459.2\n715.7\n11,277.5\nMay\n14.2\n71.7\n2,543.0\n477.8\n138.6\n85.7\n2,814.9\n30.9\n25.0\n66.9\n8.4\n20.9\n134.4\n3,740.3\n12.0\n458.9\n457.2\n718.2\n11,819.1\nJun\n9.0\n58.5\n3,081.0\n509.8\n120.0\n84.1\n2,865.3\n30.1\n26.2\n66.5\n7.4\n19.4\n196.4\n3,829.3\n38.6\n551.4\n448.1\n730.7\n12,671.8\nJul\n20.6\n61.9\n3,450.6\n466.4\n111.6\n95.4\n3,291.4\n33.3\n0.0\n67.5\n4.5\n21.0\n182.0\n3,500.6\n153.9\n611.4\n472.5\n732.0\n13,276.5\nAug\n23.1\n72.3\n3,475.7\n377.8\n105.3\n66.3\n3,362.8\n32.2\n0.0\n67.3\n7.1\n20.6\n186.7\n3,585.1\n102.0\n647.7\n489.9\n736.1\n13,358.0\nSep\n18.2\n61.5\n3,781.6\n398.1\n159.1\n78.0\n3,145.7\n31.2\n45.2\n68.1\n5.4\n20.4\n212.2\n3,734.2\n119.7\n637.4\n527.8\n742.6\n13,786.4\nOct\n39.9\n70.4\n3,771.3\n368.3\n185.5\n51.4\n3,105.9\n30.2\n45.2\n68.4\n4.6\n9.4\n188.8\n3,838.0\n132.0\n647.5\n537.8\n743.0\n13,837.7\nNov\n30.6\n84.6\n3,696.3\n300.6\n209.8\n63.9\n3,172.9\n28.9\n45.2\n68.7\n7.0\n8.1\n217.7\n3,813.2\n141.9\n633.2\n581.9\n742.4\n13,846.8\nDec\n20.5\n94.5\n3,949.5\n439.6\n235.5\n74.8\n3,044.1\n28.0\n43.4\n69.2\n6.2\n9.2\n204.3\n3,870.5\n151.2\n573.8\n612.5\n812.4\n14,239.0\n2019\nJan\n49.0\n113.4\n3,901.0\n401.9\n261.6\n46.1\n3,038.3\n27.3\n94.6\n68.7\n4.4\n8.1\n189.2\n3,773.5\n109.1\n517.2\n592.3\n827.7\n14,023.5\nFeb\n59.7\n256.8\n3,764.8\n357.1\n570.4\n205.7\n3,076.4\n26.5\n60.5\n2.0\n5.8\n7.7\n208.3\n3,991.5\n100.5\n490.7\n669.1\n880.0\n14,733.6\nMar\n62.5\n263.2\n3,891.0\n432.9\n739.3\n55.1\n3,028.8\n25.5\n61.5\n4.5\n4.3\n9.5\n340.7\n3,845.0\n129.0\n523.7\n954.5\n1,205.2\n15,576.2\nApr\n45.2\n363.5\n4,153.9\n578.9\n1,031.9\n91.7\n2,921.3\n25.0\n61.8\n4.0\n4.0\n9.6\n407.8\n3,899.7\n131.9\n620.5\n1,135.4\n1,304.8\n16,790.9\nMay\n98.7\n484.2\n4,089.2\n694.1\n1,890.1\n154.1\n2,912.7\n23.9\n62.1\n4.2\n3.9\n9.4\n636.8\n4,303.9\n144.3\n910.1\n2,031.0\n1,532.3\n19,985.1\nJun\n126.3\n882.2\n4,518.6\n560.2\n2,383.0\n538.9\n2,918.5\n22.6\n63.1\n6.6\n3.9\n8.7\n929.4\n5,011.5\n163.0\n1,606.5\n1,621.9\n2,120.4\n23,485.3\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2019\nNotes\n1.Government securities includes treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households, other financial corporations.\nTABLE 5.1: OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS -ASSETS\nZWL$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \nS9 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nCapital\nContigent\nOther\nTOTAL\nand\nLiablities\nLiablities\nEnd of\nDemand\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nRBZ\nOther Depository \nOther Finacial \nReserves\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\n2017\n Mar\n3,429.2\n715.7\n1,529.9\n5,674.7\n461.0\n86.9\n6,222.6\n60.2\n249.6\n1.8\n134.9\n41.9\n1,426.8\n422.4\n435.7\n8,995.81\n \n Apr\n3,555.8\n813.7\n1,530.7\n5,900.2\n450.9\n76.2\n6,427.3\n63.3\n251.1\n0.0\n117.4\n41.9\n1,382.2\n489.1\n426.7\n9,199.00\n \n May\n3,593.7\n798.7\n1,558.4\n5,950.8\n454.6\n75.1\n6,480.5\n61.4\n243.5\n0.0\n95.2\n42.2\n1,448.6\n486.1\n450.1\n9,307.64\n \n Jun\n3,851.4\n825.6\n1,538.9\n6,215.9\n497.6\n73.7\n6,787.2\n65.7\n259.5\n0.0\n108.9\n46.6\n1,455.9\n533.5\n445.6\n9,702.82\n \n Jul\n3,845.0\n837.2\n1,600.1\n6,282.3\n503.0\n78.1\n6,863.3\n66.3\n162.2\n0.0\n99.5\n35.6\n1,463.2\n513.6\n450.7\n9,654.29\n \n Aug\n4,257.2\n927.5\n1,604.9\n6,789.6\n451.2\n88.3\n7,329.1\n71.1\n158.2\n0.0\n79.1\n22.8\n1,478.4\n531.8\n454.9\n10,125.48\n \n Sep\n4,622.2\n932.4\n1,571.4\n7,126.0\n383.4\n55.2\n7,564.6\n55.8\n151.1\n0.0\n67.4\n32.1\n1,494.5\n472.8\n465.2\n10,303.53\n \n Oct\n4,825.8\n1,010.8\n1,460.8\n7,297.4\n410.7\n43.1\n7,751.2\n63.0\n153.9\n0.0\n73.1\n42.0\n1,537.5\n432.4\n511.7\n10,564.89\n \n Nov\n5,090.7\n1,047.9\n1,450.2\n7,588.7\n454.9\n34.7\n8,078.3\n66.5\n151.3\n0.0\n84.5\n60.2\n1,562.7\n417.7\n534.3\n10,955.47\n \n Dec\n5,144.5\n1,127.4\n1,401.7\n7,673.6\n407.8\n94.6\n8,176.0\n68.6\n173.1\n113.7\n100.7\n6.2\n1,663.1\n508.3\n508.1\n11,317.70\n \n2018\nJan\n4,640.2\n1,008.1\n1,454.0\n7,102.2\n406.5\n107.3\n7,616.1\n65.1\n444.8\n115.1\n49.1\n2.6\n1,645.3\n501.0\n522.1\n10,961.10\n \nFeb\n4,633.7\n989.2\n1,458.8\n7,081.7\n418.7\n101.2\n7,601.7\n75.4\n435.4\n111.2\n92.8\n2.9\n1,620.1\n507.8\n511.0\n10,958.31\n \nMar\n4,732.9\n1,007.5\n1,491.0\n7,231.4\n365.0\n114.7\n7,711.0\n77.3\n460.8\n140.5\n89.2\n6.9\n1,654.7\n504.1\n523.4\n11,168.13\n \nApr\n4,907.7\n1,066.6\n1,374.6\n7,349.0\n387.8\n95.6\n7,832.3\n84.0\n453.1\n82.4\n68.8\n16.1\n1,641.9\n532.0\n567.0\n11,277.47\n \nMay\n5,172.9\n1,138.2\n1,442.5\n7,753.6\n442.8\n107.4\n8,303.8\n88.0\n554.0\n101.5\n94.9\n19.9\n1,671.5\n458.9\n526.5\n11,819.07\n \nJune\n5,650.6\n1,274.7\n1,459.1\n8,384.4\n438.0\n89.2\n8,911.6\n66.8\n554.0\n119.8\n173.4\n21.6\n1,707.5\n551.4\n565.7\n12,671.83\n \nJuly\n5,902.3\n1,415.3\n1,501.5\n8,819.1\n424.4\n33.1\n9,276.7\n89.5\n545.1\n118.9\n132.9\n32.6\n1,846.0\n611.4\n623.4\n13,276.49\n \nAug\n6,005.7\n1,362.6\n1,524.2\n8,892.5\n399.6\n32.4\n9,324.5\n66.5\n535.4\n137.0\n119.5\n33.3\n1,882.9\n647.7\n611.2\n13,357.99\n \nSep\n6,281.7\n1,421.8\n1,489.0\n9,192.4\n439.0\n44.6\n9,676.1\n52.4\n559.4\n142.2\n129.1\n46.6\n1,913.4\n637.4\n629.7\n13,786.39\n \nOct\n6,345.7\n1,390.0\n1,427.8\n9,163.5\n435.2\n52.2\n9,650.8\n61.7\n581.4\n147.6\n93.4\n42.0\n1,957.6\n647.5\n655.7\n13,837.68\n \nNov\n6,419.8\n1,329.4\n1,430.4\n9,179.6\n366.8\n48.7\n9,595.1\n50.9\n543.1\n213.7\n74.8\n42.3\n1,991.6\n633.2\n702.1\n13,846.78\n \nDec\n6,601.1\n1,322.2\n1,508.9\n9,432.2\n394.5\n41.3\n9,868.0\n58.6\n524.7\n229.6\n187.8\n39.0\n2,057.7\n573.8\n699.7\n14,238.96\n \n2019\nJan\n6,626.6\n1,155.9\n1,466.8\n9,249.4\n381.0\n42.2\n9,672.5\n59.3\n530.5\n239.5\n188.3\n39.2\n2,047.0\n517.2\n729.8\n14,023.50\n \nFeb\n7,168.7\n1,155.1\n1,473.2\n9,797.1\n387.8\n44.5\n10,229.3\n71.8\n782.0\n158.9\n151.7\n42.6\n2,145.1\n490.7\n661.5\n14,733.58\n \nMar\n7,435.2\n1,127.0\n1,437.1\n9,999.2\n372.7\n47.9\n10,419.9\n74.5\n933.8\n165.8\n140.9\n42.7\n2,349.0\n523.7\n925.8\n15,576.18\n \nApr\n7,968.0\n1,243.3\n1,795.8\n11,007.1\n390.9\n55.9\n11,453.8\n90.8\n652.7\n148.3\n173.5\n28.8\n2,551.4\n620.5\n1,071.0\n16,790.86\n \nMay\n9,316.8\n1,379.0\n1,932.4\n12,628.2\n462.9\n48.9\n13,139.9\n139.4\n1,053.9\n148.8\n206.7\n46.5\n2,556.6\n910.1\n1,783.2\n19,985.08\n \nJun\n11,021.9\n1,573.5\n1,737.2\n14,332.6\n422.0\n44.5\n14,799.2\n171.7\n1,607.6\n150.3\n216.7\n43.6\n3,240.7\n1,606.5\n1,649.0\n23,485.26\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2019\nTABLE 5.2 : OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS - LIABILITIES \nZWL$ millions\nDeposits\nAmounts Owing to\n \n \nS10 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nForeign\nBond\nNotes\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \nLocal\nPublic\nOther \nContigent \nNon Financial \n Notes &\n&\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment1\nLocal Governemt\nPublic Enterprises\nOther2\nGovernment\nGovernment\nEnterprises\n Institutional Units3\nOther claims\nAssets\nOther Assets\nAssets\nCoins\nCoin\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\n2017\nMar\n10.74\n \n63.27\n1,421.43\n83.18\n150.7\n53.5\n1,578.7\n0.0\n15.7\n3.8\n15.7\n15.7\n69.9\n2,554.3\n23.7\n422.4\n314.5\n484.0\n7,281.0\nApr\n9.82\n \n64.14\n1,383.44\n75.92\n209.0\n51.4\n1,744.4\n0.0\n15.8\n3.6\n15.8\n16.9\n74.0\n2,493.3\n26.4\n489.1\n263.7\n492.6\n7,429.3\nMay\n12.36\n \n52.63\n1,376.30\n119.89\n159.1\n75.3\n1,739.8\n0.0\n15.7\n33.6\n16.7\n16.3\n72.4\n2,528.3\n28.4\n486.1\n290.7\n492.0\n7,515.6\nJun\n7.01\n \n53.33\n1,578.51\n141.42\n82.2\n110.6\n1,786.8\n0.0\n16.0\n35.0\n47.9\n16.5\n82.2\n2,583.5\n23.9\n533.5\n273.6\n497.3\n7,869.2\nJul\n6.71\n \n40.92\n1,684.48\n137.62\n53.7\n103.6\n1,752.4\n0.0\n26.1\n34.4\n45.2\n16.9\n116.3\n2,495.4\n24.2\n513.6\n295.5\n482.1\n7,829.0\nAug\n11.80\n \n37.09\n1,882.39\n124.33\n161.2\n7.9\n1,856.2\n0.0\n26.3\n64.6\n41.3\n18.0\n145.0\n2,538.1\n23.8\n531.8\n272.6\n485.7\n8,228.1\nSep\n11.43\n \n35.83\n1,961.76\n109.59\n172.7\n31.3\n1,998.0\n0.0\n23.5\n65.0\n41.5\n15.6\n118.2\n2,585.7\n28.3\n472.8\n281.3\n487.7\n8,440.0\nOct\n8.10\n \n40.49\n1,961.82\n143.68\n175.7\n61.0\n2,106.6\n0.0\n24.4\n65.1\n34.8\n17.8\n99.1\n2,607.0\n29.4\n432.4\n287.8\n508.9\n8,604.1\nNov\n9.04\n \n45.09\n2,126.74\n161.14\n174.7\n74.3\n2,230.4\n0.0\n23.5\n65.4\n32.3\n19.6\n106.9\n2,618.1\n26.4\n417.7\n324.2\n511.4\n8,966.9\nDec\n11.43\n \n55.32\n2,373.95\n141.47\n203.5\n66.6\n2,128.7\n0.0\n23.5\n66.3\n29.4\n19.4\n145.0\n2,579.8\n40.0\n508.3\n324.5\n536.4\n9,253.6\n2018\nJan\n22.40\n \n64.10\n2,294.49\n192.08\n103.4\n81.9\n2,143.2\n0.0\n23.5\n65.9\n26.3\n20.6\n154.8\n2,451.1\n28.7\n501.0\n294.2\n538.9\n9,006.6\nFeb\n18.34\n \n43.97\n2,296.76\n223.72\n108.3\n96.2\n2,109.3\n0.0\n23.5\n66.1\n24.3\n21.1\n145.0\n2,461.5\n28.7\n507.8\n290.6\n536.3\n9,001.5\nMar\n14.81\n \n53.62\n2,238.77\n240.67\n124.5\n99.5\n2,164.0\n0.0\n23.5\n66.7\n19.2\n15.9\n127.1\n2,535.8\n30.4\n504.1\n325.8\n552.3\n9,136.6\nApr\n13.47\n \n56.67\n2,207.91\n274.97\n116.7\n78.5\n2,314.9\n0.0\n24.7\n67.0\n13.4\n20.9\n120.8\n2,519.8\n28.3\n532.0\n299.0\n554.9\n9,244.0\nMay\n12.85\n \n62.77\n2,308.95\n339.50\n130.1\n85.7\n2,562.4\n0.0\n25.0\n66.9\n8.4\n20.9\n134.0\n2,556.2\n23.9\n458.9\n307.9\n555.3\n9,659.8\nJune\n7.48\n \n52.61\n2,848.51\n331.76\n117.3\n84.1\n2,538.3\n0.0\n26.2\n66.5\n7.4\n19.4\n196.0\n2,662.2\n25.5\n551.4\n302.9\n563.4\n10,401.0\nJuly\n17.9\n54.3\n3,189.6\n281.1\n109.3\n95.4\n2,949.2\n0.0\n0.0\n67.5\n4.5\n21.0\n182.0\n2,414.6\n26.0\n611.4\n322.5\n565.1\n10,911.4\nAug\n21.0\n67.8\n3,196.7\n232.3\n102.5\n66.3\n3,014.9\n0.0\n0.0\n67.3\n7.1\n20.6\n186.7\n2,491.0\n29.8\n647.7\n329.4\n566.3\n11,047.4\nSep\n16.3\n58.2\n3,487.9\n305.3\n137.8\n78.0\n2,789.8\n0.0\n45.2\n68.1\n5.4\n20.4\n212.2\n2,577.1\n36.7\n637.4\n357.4\n571.8\n11,405.0\nOct\n33.1\n68.0\n3,505.8\n272.1\n173.1\n51.4\n2,728.8\n0.0\n45.2\n68.4\n4.6\n9.4\n188.8\n2,697.4\n38.7\n647.5\n353.2\n569.2\n11,454.9\nNov\n25.8\n81.4\n3,384.4\n264.6\n198.2\n63.9\n2,793.9\n0.0\n45.2\n68.7\n7.0\n8.1\n217.7\n2,672.3\n46.1\n633.2\n353.2\n569.8\n11,433.6\nDec\n18.2\n89.9\n3,737.0\n317.3\n224.4\n74.8\n2,633.7\n0.0\n43.4\n69.2\n6.2\n9.2\n204.3\n2,707.6\n53.7\n573.8\n353.2\n633.9\n11,749.8\n2019\nJan\n42.05\n \n106.91\n3,766.70\n338.09\n249.8\n46.1\n2,621.2\n0.0\n61.0\n68.7\n4.4\n8.1\n189.2\n2,594.5\n33.8\n517.2\n428.8\n649.9\n11,726.5\nFeb\n52.63\n \n238.67\n3,601.94\n293.36\n549.6\n205.7\n2,675.3\n0.0\n60.5\n2.0\n5.8\n7.7\n208.3\n2,784.2\n31.0\n490.7\n472.8\n696.8\n12,377.1\nMar\n59.17\n \n244.62\n3,729.81\n393.22\n712.1\n55.1\n2,635.7\n0.0\n61.5\n4.5\n4.3\n9.5\n340.7\n2,660.9\n25.3\n523.7\n755.6\n971.5\n13,187.2\nApr\n40.82\n \n331.97\n3,876.83\n492.10\n981.8\n91.7\n2,591.0\n0.0\n61.8\n4.0\n4.0\n9.6\n407.8\n2,721.6\n24.6\n620.5\n935.3\n1,002.5\n14,197.8\nMay\n94.59\n \n444.70\n3,886.07\n571.50\n1,747.7\n154.1\n2,508.4\n0.0\n62.1\n4.2\n3.9\n9.4\n636.8\n3,056.9\n34.5\n910.1\n1,832.9\n1,142.8\n17,100.7\nJun\n119.69\n \n810.71\n4,104.17\n413.18\n2,245.0\n538.9\n2,597.0\n0.0\n63.1\n6.6\n3.9\n8.7\n929.4\n3,667.4\n37.0\n1,606.5\n1,374.2\n1,621.3\n20,146.8\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2019\nNotes\n1.Government securities include treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households, other financial corporations, \nTABLE 6.1: COMMERCIAL BANKS -ASSETS\nZWL$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \nS11 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nEnd of\nDemand\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nCapital\nContigent\nOther\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\nand\nLiablities\nLiablities\nTOTAL\nReserves\n2018\nMar\n4,732.9\n368.8\n930.7\n6032.43\n244.7\n92.4\n6,369.5\n61.1\n419.5\n140.5\n54.8\n6.4\n1,196.4\n504.1\n384.3\n9,136.62\n \nApr\n4,907.7\n394.4\n874.8\n6176.86\n243.4\n72.8\n6,493.1\n67.4\n413.5\n82.4\n35.2\n15.7\n1,201.5\n532.0\n403.4\n9,244.00\n \nMay\n5,172.9\n416.2\n917.2\n6506.32\n246.2\n85.2\n6,837.7\n66.8\n514.1\n101.5\n63.7\n19.4\n1,224.6\n458.9\n373.2\n9,659.82\n \nJun\n5,650.6\n504.3\n897.4\n7052.21\n254.8\n66.9\n7,373.9\n45.0\n514.7\n119.8\n116.5\n21.1\n1,259.1\n551.4\n399.5\n10,401.01\n \nJul\n5,902.3\n527.0\n901.0\n7330.31\n296.0\n12.2\n7,638.4\n72.0\n507.6\n118.9\n102.5\n16.8\n1,380.1\n611.4\n463.6\n10,911.41\n \nAug\n6,005.7\n540.8\n930.8\n7477.29\n266.6\n11.5\n7,755.3\n46.4\n501.5\n137.0\n101.3\n15.4\n1,408.6\n647.7\n434.3\n11,047.44\n \nSep\n6,281.7\n556.4\n927.2\n7765.31\n273.0\n23.5\n8,061.8\n40.9\n503.5\n142.2\n108.4\n21.1\n1,434.8\n637.4\n454.9\n11,404.95\n \nOct\n6,340.3\n509.5\n898.1\n7747.92\n284.2\n31.1\n8,063.2\n49.3\n525.1\n147.6\n72.2\n16.5\n1,461.0\n647.5\n472.6\n11,454.87\n \nNov\n6,411.0\n503.9\n861.0\n7775.91\n232.8\n27.6\n8,036.4\n41.2\n487.5\n213.7\n58.6\n17.8\n1,490.0\n633.2\n508.4\n11,486.89\n \nDec\n6,582.3\n495.0\n910.9\n7988.25\n255.0\n19.7\n8,262.9\n43.3\n469.5\n229.6\n147.5\n15.6\n1,551.3\n573.8\n509.2\n11,802.70\n \n2019\nJan\n6.3\n4.6\n108.2\n63.55\n10.9\n0.0\n343.8\n27.3\n33.6\n0.0\n438.0\n0.0\n649.3\n136.7\n151.2\n1,973.35\n \nFeb\n5.4\n17.6\n120.6\n62.84\n18.1\n0.0\n339.6\n26.5\n0.0\n0.0\n416.1\n0.0\n696.1\n171.1\n156.7\n2,030.78\n \nMar\n2.6\n18.0\n126.3\n38.62\n23.9\n0.0\n331.7\n25.5\n0.0\n0.0\n415.1\n0.0\n710.1\n172.1\n207.4\n2,071.24\n \nApr\n7,861.8\n447.1\n1,280.5\n9589.32\n260.3\n34.4\n9,884.1\n76.0\n487.7\n148.3\n145.3\n14.8\n1,935.7\n620.5\n885.4\n14,197.82\n \nMay\n9,143.2\n544.3\n1,412.7\n11100.20\n309.4\n27.5\n11,437.1\n126.8\n789.2\n148.8\n164.7\n16.0\n1,916.9\n910.1\n1,591.0\n17,100.69\n \nJun\n10,758.5\n567.5\n1,279.7\n12605.76\n290.5\n23.1\n12,919.4\n159.0\n1,271.1\n150.3\n161.8\n16.5\n2,409.1\n1,606.5\n1,453.0\n20,146.83\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2019\nTABLE 6.2 : COMMERCIAL BANKS - LIABILITIES\nDeposits\nAmounts Owing to\nZWL$ Millions\n \n \nS12 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nForeign\nOther Assets\nNon Financial \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nNotes\nAssets\nBond\n&\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \n Notes &\nCoin\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment1\nLocal Governemt\nPublic Enterprises\nOther2\nMortgages\nGovernment\nOther\nCoins\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\n2018\nMar\n1.42\n \n3.40\n175.85\n72.10\n14.1\n0.0\n212.6\n32.8\n0.0\n0.0\n411.4\n0.0\n539.4\n142.8\n132.3\n1,738.2\nApr\n1.13\n \n4.31\n185.54\n61.87\n3.6\n0.0\n184.4\n32.0\n0.0\n0.0\n413.3\n0.0\n582.7\n141.6\n135.2\n1,745.7\nMay\n1.01\n \n7.63\n196.34\n138.20\n8.1\n0.0\n191.0\n30.9\n0.0\n0.0\n415.0\n0.0\n608.4\n128.1\n137.4\n1,862.0\nJune\n1.21\n \n4.88\n188.64\n177.83\n1.9\n0.0\n266.2\n30.1\n0.0\n0.0\n413.9\n0.0\n614.3\n124.0\n141.5\n1,964.5\nJuly\n1.8\n6.6\n207.1\n185.1\n1.7\n0.0\n283.2\n33.3\n0.0\n0.0\n423.5\n0.0\n636.1\n128.2\n141.1\n2,047.7\nAug\n1.6\n3.7\n224.7\n145.3\n2.4\n0.0\n288.9\n32.2\n0.0\n0.0\n428.2\n0.0\n579.4\n139.1\n143.7\n1,989.2\nSep\n1.9\n2.9\n245.6\n92.6\n20.8\n0.0\n291.1\n31.2\n0.0\n0.0\n430.3\n0.0\n650.2\n148.1\n144.4\n2,059.1\nOct\n4.9\n2.1\n220.0\n95.8\n11.9\n0.0\n318.9\n30.2\n0.0\n0.0\n427.7\n0.0\n639.8\n154.2\n147.0\n2,052.5\nNov\n3.6\n2.9\n243.3\n35.7\n10.4\n0.0\n320.7\n28.9\n0.0\n0.0\n433.5\n0.0\n635.7\n148.0\n145.8\n2,008.5\nDec\n2.3\n4.3\n157.4\n121.3\n10.4\n0.0\n339.4\n28.0\n0.0\n0.0\n444.8\n0.0\n645.9\n179.7\n151.9\n2,085.6\n2019\nJan\n6.3\n4.6\n108.2\n63.5\n10.9\n0.0\n343.8\n27.3\n33.6\n0.0\n438.0\n0.0\n649.3\n136.7\n151.2\n1,973.3\nFeb\n5.4\n17.6\n120.6\n62.8\n18.1\n0.0\n339.6\n26.5\n0.0\n0.0\n416.1\n0.0\n696.1\n171.1\n156.7\n2,030.8\nMar\n2.6\n18.0\n126.3\n38.6\n23.9\n0.0\n331.7\n25.5\n0.0\n0.0\n415.1\n0.0\n710.1\n172.1\n207.4\n2,071.2\nApr\n3.7\n30.6\n220.3\n85.0\n47.6\n0.0\n271.6\n25.0\n0.0\n0.0\n414.1\n0.0\n705.0\n169.0\n276.2\n2,247.8\nMay\n3.9\n38.4\n162.2\n115.4\n139.0\n0.0\n345.5\n23.9\n0.0\n0.0\n406.2\n0.0\n776.6\n165.7\n363.4\n2,540.1\nJun\n6.3\n69.8\n361.6\n144.5\n132.4\n0.0\n265.8\n22.6\n0.0\n0.0\n421.7\n0.0\n873.6\n210.5\n473.0\n2,981.8\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2019\nNotes\n1.Government securities include treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households, other financial corporations, \nTABLE 7.1: BUILDING SOCIETIES -ASSETS\nZWL$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \nS13 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS14 \n \n \n \n \nA GR IC U LTU R E\nC ON S TR U C TION\nC OM M U N IC A TION\nD IS TR IB U TION\nFIN A N C IA L \nFIN A N C IA L\nM A N U FA C TU R IN G\nM IN IN G\nS ER V IC ES\nTR A N S POR T\nIN D IV ID U A LS\nC ON GLOM ER A TES\nTOTA L\nEnd of \n \nIN V ES TM EN T\nOR GA N IS A TION S\n \n \n \n \n \n2017\nJan\n448,344.7\n41,732.8\n22,069.3\n264,734.2\n12,019.3\n270,117.2\n350,757.1\n144,447.3\n394,945.0\n40,975.0\n591,245.7\n11,489.3\n2,592,877.1\nFeb\n436,206.2\n40,112.3\n24,467.5\n269,358.3\n12,146.8\n272,314.8\n361,416.8\n143,990.4\n373,445.1\n40,250.7\n568,686.3\n11,227.9\n2,553,623.0\nMar\n425,496.8\n54,688.4\n25,533.4\n275,500.1\n12,241.8\n290,985.3\n349,722.5\n159,101.0\n359,672.5\n37,864.1\n572,233.3\n13,047.7\n2,576,086.9\nApr\n426,696.6\n43,836.6\n18,145.2\n340,025.3\n12,219.1\n271,824.0\n360,945.8\n134,101.0\n350,475.1\n42,208.4\n571,000.5\n12,492.9\n2,583,970.5\nMay\n428,874.0\n43,427.0\n16,689.0\n322,695.4\n12,252.6\n269,976.3\n360,929.9\n117,479.9\n354,102.7\n41,337.5\n569,798.9\n11,923.7\n2,549,487.0\nJun\n431,677.5\n45,018.0\n16,989.2\n311,641.4\n14,435.6\n266,917.5\n343,590.2\n126,542.8\n417,469.8\n37,849.5\n595,749.5\n12,001.6\n2,619,882.5\nJul\n459,128.0\n52,500.1\n11,717.0\n255,319.0\n14,541.0\n255,591.2\n311,364.4\n131,420.5\n422,799.8\n39,630.7\n609,112.5\n14,464.3\n2,577,588.5\nAug\n457,861.9\n52,622.6\n11,736.0\n262,602.7\n17,438.9\n256,802.3\n313,868.5\n138,714.9\n420,653.6\n41,089.3\n617,686.4\n15,194.2\n2,606,271.3\nSep\n457,157.2\n48,477.1\n12,117.9\n340,506.4\n21,660.1\n265,082.3\n331,929.6\n124,822.8\n393,491.3\n41,117.0\n619,867.0\n16,061.2\n2,672,289.8\nOct\n460,475.1\n46,588.0\n12,273.6\n329,020.8\n21,810.6\n262,118.2\n317,587.0\n126,041.6\n383,374.3\n41,351.4\n634,561.2\n16,061.2\n2,651,263.1\nNov\n477,486.1\n46,318.3\n12,005.2\n323,990.0\n21,811.0\n261,421.1\n316,225.5\n123,307.2\n379,542.7\n32,215.3\n649,034.3\n16,061.2\n2,659,418.0\nDec\n489,695.6\n54,162.9\n10,119.0\n334,030.3\n21,844.6\n269,399.3\n307,802.0\n126,719.0\n375,161.7\n31,701.6\n621,421.9\n13,938.1\n2,655,996.0\n2018\nJan\n479,109.6\n59,336.8\n9,442.4\n289,531.3\n20,569.7\n258,035.0\n271,453.8\n106,425.1\n390,052.9\n32,328.6\n617,303.0\n14,394.7\n2,547,982.8\nFeb\n488,203.1\n59.,977.6\n9,271.6\n315,569.6\n20,133.1\n258,263.6\n285,045.1\n108,649.0\n393,604.9\n31,636.6\n618,377.4\n15,010.6\n2,543,764.6\nMar\n484,764.7\n64,826.5\n11,050.5\n344,731.3\n15,203.3\n274,150.2\n303,649.2\n114,431.9\n363,449.4\n32,793.4\n640,496.9\n19,893.1\n2,669,440.4\nApr\n485,790.0\n63,948.2\n10,904.2\n344,532.1\n15,015.2\n271,071.8\n294,270.8\n112,692.1\n333,633.8\n31,103.5\n631,920.5\n22,066.0\n2,616,948.2\nMay\n501,783.7\n63,555.3\n10,933.5\n362,939.6\n15,079.8\n358,553.4\n317,666.7\n117,123.0\n338,846.3\n31,523.1\n651,444.0\n24,226.4\n2,793,674.8\nJun\n475,105.7\n66,796.8\n13,907.7\n385,583.3\n15,079.8\n344,917.3\n323,212.1\n117,146.6\n335,216.9\n34,457.6\n655,427.0\n34,163.4\n2,801,014.3\nJul\n463,286.3\n70,905.2\n18,924.1\n383,314.7\n14,976.4\n140,624.6\n274,507.8\n113,776.3\n309,209.5\n37,474.0\n652,652.7\n34,402.1\n2,514,053.7\nAug\n470,756.1\n79,237.1\n15,167.3\n331,672.8\n15,021.9\n144,100.7\n271,000.5\n111,960.2\n306,022.7\n37,341.2\n666,649.4\n34,402.1\n2,483,332.1\nSep\n451,745.3\n79,055.7\n15,021.6\n341,851.7\n15,021.9\n144,799.6\n263,994.2\n112,656.6\n320,788.5\n36,914.6\n666,971.5\n64,407.1\n2,513,228.2\nOct\n453,068.3\n74,931.8\n16,036.5\n389,851.7\n15,156.8\n165,252.7\n268,933.2\n111,956.6\n313,376.8\n36,118.6\n680,445.7\n12,855.7\n2,537,984.3\nNov\n444,130.8\n133,137.6\n14,884.1\n313,733.0\n15,156.8\n165,419.8\n269,459.9\n149,908.1\n316,738.8\n45,693.2\n679,403.7\n12,265.4\n2,559,931.1\nDec\n492,669.9\n78,176.7\n15,958.0\n340,422.7\n14,425.5\n165,648.7\n253,354.3\n113,596.5\n347,242.2\n40,695.4\n669,879.6\n12,254.3\n2,544,323.9\n2019\nJan\n525,176.7\n80,480.9\n20,199.4\n349,755.6\n15,294.0\n158,458.9\n255,380.4\n123,772.8\n358,554.2\n42,355.5\n666,797.1\n16,335.7\n2,612,561.3\nFeb\n521,988.1\n79,066.7\n10,931.1\n352,797.8\n14,699.0\n80,894.7\n253,027.0\n124,474.7\n389,523.0\n40,923.5\n644,320.9\n11,446.6\n2,524,093.1\nMar\n538,072.7\n87,791.3\n18,211.5\n379,233.1\n14,556.7\n205,466.5\n270,360.1\n133,324.8\n407,638.0\n43,541.4\n731,600.3\n11,476.6\n2,841,272.8\nApr\n584,205.3\n96,516.9\n22,430.9\n421,676.7\n15,968.0\n236,000.3\n310,449.7\n193,315.8\n387,730.2\n44,465.7\n788,749.6\n14,486.6\n3,115,995.7\nMay\n712,661.5\n98,826.6\n27,802.4\n466,620.0\n17,425.9\n317,055.8\n368,550.6\n250,912.5\n441,731.0\n43,682.6\n901,283.4\n14,096.6\n3,660,649.0\nJun\n940,505.8\n82,926.8\n30,534.7\n566,391.1\n169,400.8\n876,820.4\n354,648.6\n331,070.0\n404,941.1\n49,207.3\n898,523.5\n14,258.9\n4,566,768.2\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2019\nTABLE 8.1: Sectoral Analysis of Commerical Banks' Loans and Advances\nZWL$ Thousands\n \n \nS15 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAGRICULTURE CONSTRUCTION COMMUNICATION\nDISTRIBUTION\nFINANCIAL \nFINANCIAL\nMANUFACTURING\nMINING\nSERVICES\nTRANSPORT INDIVIDUALS CONGLOMERATES\nTOTAL\nEnd of\n \nINVESTMENT\nORGANISATIONS\n \n \n \n \n \n2017\nJan\n236,437.3\n108,552.5\n230,965.4\n618,213.5\n339,580.3\n1,002,775.4\n382,746.3\n86,115.0\n1,393,941.2\n82,670.8\n589,549.9\n85,602.3\n5,157,150.0\nFeb\n254,463.9\n112,294.4\n226,877.9\n613,080.1\n312,948.5\n997,181.2\n393,542.8\n121,798.7\n1,402,647.6\n91,521.7\n604,325.0\n84,653.3\n5,215,335.3\nMar\n299,519.0\n118,530.1\n232,990.6\n626,986.6\n308,297.9\n1,049,255.7\n402,864.2\n170,835.1\n1,400,323.5\n102,287.7\n610,024.4\n91,046.0\n5,412,960.9\nApr\n281,219.8\n117,174.3\n235,093.5\n687,962.2\n307,711.4\n1,013,362.6\n400,018.9\n190,005.8\n1,432,953.1\n110,258.7\n650,595.9\n102,681.0\n5,529,037.2\nMay\n301,531.2\n113,685.5\n220,541.8\n679,781.4\n320,878.2\n1,019,941.1\n417,418.5\n175,383.4\n1,454,718.3\n108,366.5\n667,019.7\n71,770.2\n5,551,035.8\nJun\n295,920.4\n109,938.0\n248,436.3\n712,648.0\n334,368.7\n1,121,023.5\n408,604.0\n185,262.3\n1,521,876.3\n107,327.1\n697,997.7\n74,195.4\n5,817,597.8\nJul\n309,864.7\n126,628.5\n262,827.7\n587,617.1\n341,371.5\n1,143,423.8\n423,846.6\n191,273.6\n1,599,344.4\n99,509.8\n680,622.6\n76,164.4\n5,842,494.6\nAug\n302,611.3\n149,014.9\n296,550.6\n914,686.8\n346,236.8\n1,131,207.5\n453,584.0\n169,521.2\n1,562,637.2\n111,394.6\n746,644.5\n90,999.4\n6,275,088.8\nSep\n348,786.3\n146,383.0\n286,092.4\n796,517.1\n340,224.7\n1,072,979.9\n571,373.7\n211,077.0\n1,705,640.6\n122,645.6\n747,874.4\n72,255.0\n6,421,849.6\nOct\n345,521.0\n138,274.9\n238,975.9\n778,597.1\n355,135.9\n1,138,203.7\n565,046.4\n259,285.2\n1,694,691.4\n123,908.8\n741,652.0\n72,255.0\n6,451,547.3\nNov\n336,339.3\n144,708.5\n239,524.3\n927,820.8\n362,515.4\n986,824.6\n629,010.4\n250,132.7\n1,694,043.5\n131,768.3\n761,400.5\n72,255.0\n6,536,343.3\nDec\n317,794.8\n160,261.7\n284,829.7\n890,549.4\n375,616.4\n1,073,707.0\n686,933.4\n257,197.2\n1,712,823.9\n143,466.1\n711,031.6\n62,444.8\n6,676,655.9\n2018\nJan\n380,283.8\n151,436.0\n257,298.2\n918,787.6\n365,354.6\n1,050,097.7\n652,999.0\n248,933.0\n1,757,391.8\n141,913.2\n669,049.8\n67,904.7\n6,661,449.4\nFeb\n455,217.0\n224,070.1\n263,961.9\n897,453.2\n399,016.2\n949,795.6\n674,828.4\n354,052.8\n1,701,611.4\n107,779.5\n680,060.2\n67,686.4\n6,775,532.7\nMar\n451,992.5\n142,332.9\n296,310.0\n825,805.5\n376,593.0\n1,001,674.3\n597,436.8\n253,127.4\n1,827,464.3\n163,971.7\n597,436.8\n63,604.3\n6,597,749.5\nApr\n476,448.1\n144,564.6\n310,795.6\n806,144.7\n364,824.6\n988,527.2\n649,893.0\n255,761.8\n1,892,415.2\n179,252.3\n712,565.9\n65,398.2\n6,846,591.4\nMay\n494,612.8\n152,567.4\n350,409.2\n874,140.5\n374,089.9\n1,097,970.7\n700,891.9\n271,892.0\n1,913,394.9\n186,192.5\n745,592.7\n64,970.7\n7,226,725.2\nJun\n465,984.0\n164,242.3\n391,142.3\n948,703.0\n368,260.1\n1,140,652.9\n754,981.1\n324,355.8\n2,160,400.4\n200,774.3\n779,012.8\n64,786.3\n7,763,295.2\nJul\n445,780.0\n226,433.0\n413,409.1\n955,925.6\n420,416.6\n1,120,834.7\n760,588.2\n321,078.4\n2,192,743.2\n200,523.6\n822,857.6\n64,786.3\n7,945,376.2\nAug\n429,439.9\n189,498.0\n386,595.6\n980,354.1\n429,659.7\n1,091,202.9\n782,008.7\n297,412.3\n1,968,724.0\n196,068.8\n836,719.1\n64,786.3\n7,652,469.3\nSep\n447,556.4\n206,194.1\n382,491.5\n1,186,453.7\n444,599.1\n1,070,365.1\n811,296.2\n302,579.3\n2,059,093.1\n247,105.7\n906,767.6\n84,514.5\n8,149,016.3\nOct\n445,484.4\n199,531.1\n391,968.4\n984,701.5\n469,891.9\n1,153,855.9\n846,453.3\n315,808.5\n2,110,864.2\n260,816.9\n817,328.3\n67,915.2\n8,064,619.7\nNov\n489,192.9\n194,869.4\n391,442.4\n925,081.3\n441,534.3\n1,248,555.8\n827,349.4\n316,945.5\n2,059,370.1\n261,756.5\n825,642.2\n66,458.7\n8,048,198.5\nDec\n494,011.3\n201,871.0\n531,888.3\n1,034,592.5\n428,738.7\n1,196,503.2\n823,081.9\n331,251.3\n2,063,550.8\n278,659.0\n802,507.6\n63,361.3\n8,250,016.9\n2019\nJan\n505,422.9\n391,022.0\n497,976.2\n1,034,948.2\n411,945.9\n1,187,606.7\n882,289.7\n322,030.3\n2,154,902.3\n135,871.6\n763,189.5\n63,064.3\n8,350,269.7\nFeb\n512,602.3\n374,750.6\n394,709.1\n936,123.6\n449,800.9\n904,919.4\n855,348.4\n347,405.5\n2,355,866.1\n138,685.8\n776,949.7\n63,097.1\n8,110,258.7\nMar\n526,564.2\n343,684.3\n376,205.6\n937,743.4\n393,489.3\n1,317,757.7\n861,574.9\n380,295.4\n2,099,331.1\n141,677.2\n773,726.4\n63,094.9\n8,215,144.4\nApr\n632,972.5\n255,945.6\n1,010,978.7\n90,282.6\n462,133.1\n1,535,772.6\n890,606.5\n325,814.6\n2,413,535.6\n320,213.5\n876,646.5\n90,282.6\n9,963,832.2\nMay\n832,073.6\n305,410.9\n1,321,039.7\n1,177,925.1\n522,764.9\n1,646,358.6\n1,142,369.6\n372,594.9\n2,765,341.2\n371,372.0\n965,202.7\n93,188.9\n11,515,642.2\nJun\n1,001,633.6\n309,108.9\n1,124,005.3\n1,337,171.0\n546,572.5\n2,210,293.9\n1,319,789.8\n562,858.0\n3,493,214.3\n434,828.2\n1,070,319.7\n52,118.6\n13,461,913.9\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2019\nTABLE 8.2: Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks' Deposits\nZWL$ Thousands\n \n \nS16 \n \n \nEnd of\nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\n INTERNET\nEnd of\nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\n INTERNET\n2017\n2017\n Jul \n 4,805.10 5.70 \n588.40\n 29.40 1,601.40 586.40 \n Jul \n 521.80 30.00 \n20,013.70\n 636.10 61,162.40 382.60 \n Aug \n 5,325.10 5.18 \n590.10\n 24.70 1,776.40 583.30 \n Aug \n 541.50 26.60 \n20,303.00\n 595.60 70,771.60 419.10 \n Sep \n 6,031.37 5.19 \n651.11\n 16.11 2,159.26 731.93 \n Sep \n 620.00 27.17 \n20,731.00\n 478.00 83,303.00 432.00 \n Oct \n 5,991.30 5.40 \n681.90\n 19.40 2,401.60 779.20 \n Oct \n 609.60 27.20 \n23,764.60\n 475.10 92,540.60 478.90 \n Nov \n 6,259.70 4.90 \n666.50\n 15.90 2,561.80 798.30 \n Nov \n 575.30 25.60 \n22,748.60\n 347.30 97,945.20 473.00 \n Dec \n 5,877.20 3.60 \n778.40\n 16.30 3,052.70 1,043.30 \n Dec \n 524.20 19.20 \n26,779.10\n 347.20 118,198.90 524.80 \n Annual \nTotal \n 61,718.13 69.43 \n6,628.17\n 428.06 18,020.56 7,021.72 \n Annual \nTotal \n 5,903.41 319.95 214,857.35 8,121.03 754,742.20 4,248.89 \n2018\n2018\n Jan \n 5,548.05 4.89 \n663.45\n 21.29 2,318.80 1,006.05 \n Jan \n 548.13 22.73 20,981.21 449.60 100,593.90 501.80 \n Feb \n 4,706.60 4.50 \n594.00\n 13.90 2,015.11 831.05 \n Feb \n 457.19 22.48 \n18,869.05\n 292.22 89,584.32 463.78 \n Mar \n 6,300.40 4.50 \n654.20\n 12.50 2,657.10 864.83 \n Mar \n 545.18 23.68 \n21,996.85\n 268.41 116,119.95 510.51 \n Apr \n 5,786.75 3.28 \n640.94\n 11.46 3,002.63 822.58 \n Apr \n 505.50 17.38 \n21,170.05\n 253.60 117,616.79 456.96 \n May \n 7,298.41 4.25 \n819.74\n 10.51 3,550.07 968.58 \n May \n 611.14 21.22 \n23,278.20\n 213.17 137,422.97 496.62 \n Jun \n 7,997.28 4.70 \n779.37\n 8.29 3,724.31 1,135.49 \n Jun \n 553.60 22.46 \n23,790.00\n 175.19 156,609.78 502.22 \n Jul \n 8,290.00 3.96 \n790.00\n 9.39 4,446.68 1,262.53 \n Jul \n 560.15 20.07 \n25,075.47\n 223.13 169,416.76 559.58 \n Aug \n 7,762.86 2.88 \n811.19\n 13.98 4,558.54 1,254.96 \n Aug \n 553.01 15.15 \n25,249.87\n 317.35 164,917.97 518.70 \n Sep \n 7,155.04 3.97 \n842.48\n 17.01 4,462.40 1,393.08 \n Sep \n 542.96 19.37 \n24,918.01\n 300.81 161,289.50 511.27 \n Oct \n 8,230.50 4.20 \n821.30\n 17.90 4,607.38 1,428.20 \n Oct \n 571.60 20.40 \n21,025.40\n 345.50 161,427.40 495.99 \n Nov \n 7,922.50 3.70 \n657.50\n 19.90 3,964.78 1,026.70 \n Nov \n 477.40 16.70 \n17,845.40\n 334.90 133,862.10 430.60 \n Dec \n 8,355.20 2.80 \n917.20\n 14.60 4,833.80 1,102.90 \n Dec \n 478.60 13.00 \n27,419.10\n 236.20 161,540.70 409.10 \n2019\n2019\n Jan \n 6,903.02 2.89 \n1,294.05\n 16.92 3,608.83 1,056.16 \n Jan \n 401.51 12.20 \n40,613.79\n 232.61 135,481.07 413.39 \n Feb \n 8,336.98 4.04 \n1,330.58\n 17.21 3,594.51 1,093.64 \n Feb \n 456.54 16.35 \n27,811.17\n 226.77 119,081.12 463.62 \n Mar \n 9,881.49 3.90 \n1,399.50\n 18.27 4,080.65 1,250.55 \n Mar \n 525.91 15.42 \n30,417.55\n 248.88 142,597.83 441.02 \n Apr \n 10,321.38 3.14 \n1,590.10\n 13.97 4,949.34 1,408.53 \n Apr \n 535.02 13.65 \n32,092.53\n 168.79 157,348.28 390.08 \n May \n 14,670.32 4.19 \n1,397.48\n 11.83 6,692.55 1,897.82 \n May \n 642.59 14.66 \n15,542.62\n 121.44 166,491.56 494.29 \n Jun \n 17,881.21 3.73 \n1,464.66\n 30.14 7,130.02 2,539.84 \n Jun \n 705.96 13.34 \n18,012.05\n 79.60 160,873.03 486.81 \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2019\nTABLE 9.1 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS TRANSACTIONAL ACTIVITY\nValues of Transactions (ZWL$ in millions)\nTABLE 9.2 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS TRANSACTIONAL ACTIVITY\nVolumes of Transactions (in thousands)\n \n \nS17 \n \n \n \n \n \nS18 \n \n \n \nEnd of\nNominal Lending \nRates2\nIndividuals \nCorporate\nSavings\n3 Months2\n2018\n2018\nJan\n4.45-18.00\n9.33\n6.99\nJan\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nFeb\n4.45-18.00\n9.57\n6.93\nFeb\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nMar\n4.45-18.00\n9.64\n6.98\nMar\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nApr\n4.00-18.00\n9.32\n7.08\nApr\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nMay\n4.00-18.00\n9.28\n7.09\nMay\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nJun\n4.00-18.00\n9.32\n7.14\nJun\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nJul\n4.00-18.00\n9.75\n6.97\nJul\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nAug\n4.00-18.00\n9.87\n7.10\nAug\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nSep\n4.00-18.00\n9.56\n7.11\nSep\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nOct\n4.00-18.00\n9.47\n7.38\nOct\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nNov\n4.00-18.00\n9.49\n7.38\nNov\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nDec\n4.00-18.00\n9.48\n7.39\nDec\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-6.75\n2019\n2019\nJan\n4.00-18.00\n9.47\n7.40\nJan\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nFeb\n4.00-18.00\n9.23\n7.30\nFeb\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-6.75\nMar \n4.00-18.00\n9.23\n7.31\nMar \n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nApr\n4.00-18.00\n9.3\n7.38\nApr\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nMay\n4.00-22.00\n9.31\n7.33\nMay\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nJun\n4.00-22.00\n9.15\n7.67\nJun\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2019\nNotes\n3. Lending rates exclude rates on staff loans. \n TABLE 10.2 : BANKS DEPOSIT RATES (percent per annum)1\n1. The range of rates qouted by banks during the period.\n2. Three (3) months deposit rates revised to exclude rates on inactive \nor dormant accounts.\nTABLE 10.1: LENDING RATES (percent per annum)1\n1. Table revised, to separate weighted lending rates for individuals and \ncorporate bodies. \n2. Nominal Lending Rates depict the range of rates quoted by banks.\nWeighted Average Lending Rates 3 \nCommercial Banks\nCommercial Banks\nEnd of \n \n \nS19 \n \n \n \n \nEnd of\nAll Share\nIndustrial\nMining\nVolume of Shares\nMarket Turnover\nMarket Capitalisation\n2018\nJan\n91.32\n305.35\n130.42\n31.4\n55,032,220.0\n8,652.85\nFeb\n88.03\n294.55\n124.91\n63.7\n138,142,187.0\n8,385.97\nMar\n86.98\n291.00\n125.10\n40.3\n108,997,097.0\n8,290.41\nApr\n98.71\n330.70\n124.40\n44.4\n206,342,675.0\n9,405.34\nMay\n108.3\n361.53\n151.53\n59.3\n129,155,586.0\n10,393.24\nJun\n102.87\n342.79\n161.30\n73.0\n234,834,368.0\n9,792.18\nJul\n114.32\n384.25\n163.99\n114.9\n624,256,160.0\n10,969.72\nAug\n117.33\n394.64\n161.34\n50.5\n142,150,599.0\n12,475.45\nSep\n115.12\n386.97\n163.76\n61.1\n197,401,341.0\n12,265.51\nOct\n163.82\n549.81\n217.34\n449.6\n316,060,000.0\n17,960.00\nNov\n160.4\n538.66\n208.56\n118.0\n153,874,660.0\n17,316.60\nDec\n146.24\n487.13\n227.71\n93.0\n144,479,601.0\n19,189.50\n2019\nJan\n157.54\n525.90\n213.13\n122.8\n110,277,827.3\n20,888.43\nFeb\n148.11\n494.31\n207.03\n229.9\n295,843,499.1\n19,773.37\nMar\n121.66\n405.57\n193.98\n123.4\n70,805,862.9\n16,084.90\nApr\n133.69\n446.52\n186.47\n116.5\n134,394,898.0\n17,502.73\nMay\n188.06\n628.41\n225.81\n193.5\n237,334,372.0\n24,919.96\nJun\n204.75\n683.51\n255.26\n235.5\n293,138,775.0\n27,017.17\nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE),2019\nZWL$ Millions\nTABLE 11: ZIMBABWE STOCK MARKET STATISTICS\nIndices\n \n \nS20 \n \n \n \nFOOD \nINFLATION\nALL\nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES \nCLOTHING\nHOUSING, \nWATER,\nFURNITURE\nHEALTH\nTRANSPORT\nCOMMUNICATION\nRECREATION &\nEDUCATION\nRESTAURANTS \n&\nMISC.\nTOTAL \nNON\nFOOD & \nITEMS\n& TOBACCO\nFOOTWEAR\nELECTRICTY, \nGAS\nAND\nCULTURE\nHOTELS\nGOODS &\nFOOD\nNON \nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES\n& OTHER\nEQUIPMENT\nSERVICES\nFUELS\nWEIGHTS\n4.9\n4.3\n27.6\n5.3\n1.4\n8.4\n2.7\n2.3\n4.3\n1.1\n6.5\n68.7\n31.3\n100\n2017\nJan\n-0.14\n-0.15\n0.10\n0.34\n-0.15\n-0.75\n0.44\n0.27\n0.00\n0.29\n0.08\n0.01\n0.80\n0.23\nFeb\n0.05\n-0.14\n0.13\n0.70\n-0.03\n0.11\n0.00\n-0.04\n0.00\n0.18\n0.52\n0.23\n1.56\n0.61\nMar\n0.15\n0.03\n-0.07\n0.64\n0.11\n0.21\n-0.02\n0.18\n0.00\n0.01\n0.36\n0.13\n-0.21\n0.03\nApr\n-0.11\n0.02\n0.04\n0.06\n-0.04\n0.00\n0.05\n0.02\n2.02\n0.34\n-0.07\n0.22\n-0.36\n0.05\nMay\n0.13\n0.09\n-0.01\n0.02\n0.13\n0.04\n0.00\n-0.21\n0.00\n-0.39\n-0.09\n0.01\n0.07\n0.03\nJun\n0.21\n0.03\n-0.82\n0.38\n-0.03\n-0.18\n0.00\n0.18\n0.00\n0.29\n0.33\n-0.15\n-0.45\n-0.24\nJul\n0.19\n0.01\n0.01\n-0.06\n0.01\n-0.23\n-0.08\n0.05\n-2.81\n1.10\n0.11\n-0.33\n-0.42\n-0.36\nAug\n-0.18\n0.10\n0.06\n0.05\n0.03\n0.00\n0.03\n0.13\n0.00\n0.00\n0.06\n0.01\n-0.47\n-0.13\nSep\n0.02\n0.45\n0.24\n1.10\n0.07\n-0.31\n0.14\n0.64\n0.00\n0.05\n0.12\n0.27\n0.66\n0.38\nOct\n0.63\n1.44\n0.24\n3.49\n1.07\n1.08\n0.37\n3.08\n0.00\n0.45\n2.66\n1.25\n2.27\n1.54\nNov\n0.28\n0.62\n0.06\n1.32\n0.38\n0.29\n-0.04\n1.14\n-1.43\n-0.72\n1.10\n0.33\n1.74\n0.74\nDec\n0.28\n0.72\n-0.43\n0.45\n0.01\n0.29\n-0.01\n0.78\n0.00\n0.49\n0.74\n0.21\n1.29\n0.53\n2018\nJan\n0.17\n0.67\n0.02\n0.55\n0.10\n0.00\n-0.04\n1.78\n0.00\n-0.16\n0.64\n0.26\n0.39\n0.30\nFeb\n0.26\n0.91\n0.01\n0.43\n0.00\n-0.02\n0.15\n0.90\n0.00\n0.01\n0.21\n0.19\n-0.18\n0.08\nMar\n0.13\n-0.34\n-0.74\n0.46\n0.18\n-1.29\n-1.60\n1.58\n0.01\n-0.14\n-0.55\n0.09\n-0.03\n-0.25\nApr\n0.20\n0.34\n-0.01\n0.00\n0.10\n-0.32\n-0.21\n-0.10\n0.63\n1.85\n0.26\n0.11\n0.02\n0.08\nMay\n-0.03\n0.10\n0.00\n-0.12\n0.03\n0.14\n-0.01\n0.08\n0.00\n0.05\n0.33\n0.03\n0.02\n0.03\nJun\n0.60\n0.14\n-0.16\n-0.48\n0.38\n0.19\n0.10\n-0.25\n0.00\n0.26\n1.00\n0.04\n-0.23\n-0.05\nJul\n0.43\n0.38\n0.00\n0.40\n0.31\n0.17\n0.08\n0.65\n7.16\n3.20\n0.75\n1.09\n0.74\n0.98\nAug\n0.13\n0.45\n0.00\n0.91\n0.24\n0.47\n0.00\n-0.23\n0.00\n0.11\n0.34\n0.28\n0.62\n0.39\nSep\n0.22\n1.35\n0.53\n2.79\n1.90\n0.51\n0.32\n0.22\n0.00\n0.28\n0.07\n0.85\n1.05\n0.92\nOct\n7.89\n45.88\n2.94\n26.86\n12.94\n19.13\n1.39\n27.66\n0.00\n9.86\n13.64\n14.66\n20.12\n16.44\nNov\n7.21\n10.63\n4.80\n9.12\n3.36\n2.31\n0.18\n16.33\n0.35\n9.29\n15.42\n6.50\n14.53\n9.20\nDec\n10.22\n8.07\n2.77\n8.07\n8.49\n28.61\n1.26\n3.19\n0.00\n13.84\n10.07\n9.01\n9.07\n9.03\n2019\nJan\n13.35\n1.04\n4.35\n9.46\n11.64\n47.25\n1.12\n11.01\n0.10\n11.73\n6.72\n12.83\n6.94\n10.75\nFeb\n2.94\n5.94\n2.77\n2.73\n2.93\n-7.70\n0.14\n3.42\n0.02\n2.20\n4.34\n0.70\n3.56\n1.67\nMar\n14.29\n5.56\n2.34\n5.20\n2.30\n3.06\n0.14\n3.92\n3.66\n4.54\n5.16\n4.05\n5.10\n4.38\nApr\n12.05\n6.57\n0.65\n5.84\n19.90\n3.40\n3.50\n5.36\n6.93\n19.74\n5.35\n4.45\n7.85\n5.52\nMay\n21.57\n11.89\n2.54\n11.51\n16.85\n16.18\n31.21\n29.81\n3.05\n6.67\n8.96\n10.12\n17.63\n12.54\nJun\n40.94\n59.89\n18.11\n63.80\n46.53\n41.90\n2.32\n35.38\n0.06\n28.71\n36.63\n31.23\n55.07\n39.26\n Source :ZIMSTATS, 2019\nNON-FOOD INFLATION\nTABLE 12.1 : MONTHLY INFLATION -- PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX\n( FEBRUARY 2019 = 100)\n \n \nS21 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFOOD INFLATION\nALL\nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES \nCLOTHING\nHSING, WATER,\nFURNITURE\nHEALTH\nTRANSPORT\nCOMMUNIC\nATION\nRECREATION &\nEDUCATION\nRESTAURAN\nTS &\nMISC.\nTOTAL \nNON\nFOOD & \nITEMS\n& TOBACCO\nFOOTWEAR\nELECTRICTY, \nGAS\nAND\nCULTURE\nHOTELS\nGOODS &\nFOOD\nNON ALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES\n& OTHER\nEQUIPMENT\nSERVICES\nFUELS\nWEIGHTS\n4.9\n4.3\n27.6\n5.3\n1.4\n8.4\n2.7\n2.3\n4.3\n1.1\n6.5\n68.7\n31.3\n100\n2018\nMar\n2.00\n4.81\n-1.32\n8.52\n1.91\n-0.35\n-1.03\n10.48\n-2.24\n1.30\n5.35\n1.81\n4.54\n2.68\nApr\n2.34\n5.14\n-1.36\n8.54\n2.06\n-0.67\n-1.28\n10.36\n-3.58\n2.84\n5.70\n1.67\n4.94\n2.71\nMay\n2.18\n5.15\n-1.36\n8.30\n1.96\n-0.58\n-1.30\n10.67\n-3.58\n3.29\n6.14\n1.69\n4.89\n2.71\nJun\n2.58\n5.27\n-0.70\n7.36\n2.38\n-0.20\n-1.20\n10.20\n-3.58\n3.26\n6.85\n1.88\n5.12\n2.91\nJul\n2.83\n5.66\n-0.71\n7.86\n2.68\n0.20\n-1.04\n10.86\n6.31\n5.42\n7.53\n3.33\n6.35\n4.29\nAug\n3.15\n6.03\n-0.77\n8.78\n2.89\n0.67\n-1.07\n10.47\n6.31\n5.53\n7.84\n3.58\n7.52\n4.83\nSep\n3.35\n6.98\n-0.47\n10.60\n4.77\n1.49\n-0.89\n10.00\n6.31\n5.77\n7.79\n4.20\n7.94\n5.39\nOct\n10.81\n53.83\n2.20\n35.57\n17.08\n19.61\n0.11\n36.24\n6.31\n15.68\n19.31\n18.06\n26.78\n20.85\nNov\n18.47\n69.14\n7.04\n46.01\n20.56\n22.02\n0.34\n56.70\n8.23\n27.34\n36.21\n25.40\n42.71\n31.01\nDec\n30.21\n81.48\n10.48\n57.08\n30.80\n56.47\n1.61\n60.45\n8.22\n44.26\n48.82\n36.48\n53.68\n42.09\n2019\nJan\n47.34\n82.13\n15.27\n71.00\n45.88\n130.41\n2.79\n75.00\n8.32\n61.45\n57.81\n54.26\n63.71\n56.90\nFeb\n51.28\n91.22\n18.46\n74.92\n50.16\n112.71\n2.78\n79.38\n8.34\n64.99\n64.31\n55.04\n69.84\n59.39\nMar\n72.67\n102.55\n22.14\n83.18\n53.34\n122.10\n4.59\n83.51\n12.30\n72.72\n73.75\n61.19\n78.55\n66.80\nApr\n93.08\n115.13\n22.94\n93.88\n83.66\n130.40\n8.49\n93.54\n19.33\n103.06\n82.56\n68.17\n92.52\n75.86\nMay\n134.80\n140.46\n26.07\n116.47\n114.54\n167.32\n42.36\n151.04\n22.97\n116.49\n98.28\n85.94\n126.43\n97.85\nJun\n228.95\n283.96\n49.13\n256.29\n213.17\n278.58\n45.52\n240.71\n23.05\n177.91\n168.24\n142.84\n251.94\n175.66\nTABLE 12.3 : ANNUAL INFLATION -- PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \n( FEB 2019=100)\nNON-FOOD INFLATION\n Source :ZIMSTATS, 2019\n \n \nS22 \n \n \n \nFOOD INFLATION\nALL\nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES \nCLOTHING\nHSING, WATER,\nFURNITURE\nHEALTH\nTRANSPORT\nCOMMUNIC\nATION\nRECREATION &\nEDUCATION\nRESTAURAN\nTS &\nMISC.\nTOTAL \nNON\nFOOD & \nITEMS\n& TOBACCO\nFOOTWEAR\nELECTRICTY, \nGAS\nAND\nCULTURE\nHOTELS\nGOODS &\nFOOD\nNON ALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES\n& OTHER\nEQUIPMENT\nSERVICES\nFUELS\nWEIGHTS\n4.9\n4.3\n27.6\n5.3\n1.4\n8.4\n2.7\n2.3\n4.3\n1.1\n6.5\n68.7\n31.3\n100\n2018\nMar\n2.00\n4.81\n-1.32\n8.52\n1.91\n-0.35\n-1.03\n10.48\n-2.24\n1.30\n5.35\n1.81\n4.54\n2.68\nApr\n2.34\n5.14\n-1.36\n8.54\n2.06\n-0.67\n-1.28\n10.36\n-3.58\n2.84\n5.70\n1.67\n4.94\n2.71\nMay\n2.18\n5.15\n-1.36\n8.30\n1.96\n-0.58\n-1.30\n10.67\n-3.58\n3.29\n6.14\n1.69\n4.89\n2.71\nJun\n2.58\n5.27\n-0.70\n7.36\n2.38\n-0.20\n-1.20\n10.20\n-3.58\n3.26\n6.85\n1.88\n5.12\n2.91\nJul\n2.83\n5.66\n-0.71\n7.86\n2.68\n0.20\n-1.04\n10.86\n6.31\n5.42\n7.53\n3.33\n6.35\n4.29\nAug\n3.15\n6.03\n-0.77\n8.78\n2.89\n0.67\n-1.07\n10.47\n6.31\n5.53\n7.84\n3.58\n7.52\n4.83\nSep\n3.35\n6.98\n-0.47\n10.60\n4.77\n1.49\n-0.89\n10.00\n6.31\n5.77\n7.79\n4.20\n7.94\n5.39\nOct\n10.81\n53.83\n2.20\n35.57\n17.08\n19.61\n0.11\n36.24\n6.31\n15.68\n19.31\n18.06\n26.78\n20.85\nNov\n18.47\n69.14\n7.04\n46.01\n20.56\n22.02\n0.34\n56.70\n8.23\n27.34\n36.21\n25.40\n42.71\n31.01\nDec\n30.21\n81.48\n10.48\n57.08\n30.80\n56.47\n1.61\n60.45\n8.22\n44.26\n48.82\n36.48\n53.68\n42.09\n2019\nJan\n47.34\n82.13\n15.27\n71.00\n45.88\n130.41\n2.79\n75.00\n8.32\n61.45\n57.81\n54.26\n63.71\n56.90\nFeb\n51.28\n91.22\n18.46\n74.92\n50.16\n112.71\n2.78\n79.38\n8.34\n64.99\n64.31\n55.04\n69.84\n59.39\nMar\n72.67\n102.55\n22.14\n83.18\n53.34\n122.10\n4.59\n83.51\n12.30\n72.72\n73.75\n61.19\n78.55\n66.80\nApr\n93.08\n115.13\n22.94\n93.88\n83.66\n130.40\n8.49\n93.54\n19.33\n103.06\n82.56\n68.17\n92.52\n75.86\nMay\n134.80\n140.46\n26.07\n116.47\n114.54\n167.32\n42.36\n151.04\n22.97\n116.49\n98.28\n85.94\n126.43\n97.85\nJun\n228.95\n283.96\n49.13\n256.29\n213.17\n278.58\n45.52\n240.71\n23.05\n177.91\n168.24\n142.84\n251.94\n175.66\nTABLE 12.3 : ANNUAL INFLATION -- PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \n( FEB 2019=100)\nNON-FOOD INFLATION\n Source :ZIMSTATS, 2019", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/Quarterly_Economic_Reviews/QUARTERLY-ECONOMIC-REVIEW-30-JUNE-2019.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "af2458c60bb92bba4cc6202c49ec606c", "text": "Vol. 28 No. 15 \n \nWeek Ending \n10TH April 2026 \n \nWeekly Economic \nHighlights \nTABLE OF CONTENTS \n \n1. \nOVERVIEW ............................................................................ 1 \n2. \nINTEREST RATES ................................................................ 2 \n3. \nEQUITY MARKETS .............................................................. 3 \n4. \nCLEARING AND SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY .................. 5 \n5. \nENERGY PRICES .................................................................. 5 \n6. \nGOLD PM FIX, MOSI-OA-TUNYA GOLD COINS AND \nGOLD BACKED DIGITAL TOKENS (GBDT) .................. 5 \n7. \nEXTERNAL SECTOR ........................................................... 6 \n \n \n \n \n1 \n1. OVERVIEW \nThis bulletin contains an overview of key developments in the monetary and financial sectors of the economy \nfor the week ending 10 April 2026. It includes updates on domestic money and capital markets, national \npayment systems, exchange rates and global commodity prices. \nThe local currency deposit rates remained stable across most tenors, save for one‑month,3-month and \nsix‑month maximum deposit rates, which increased. The Foreign currency deposit rates remained unchanged \nacross all maturities. On the lending side, local currency rates rose for individuals but declined for corporates. \nIn foreign currency lending, individual minimum rates increased while maximum rates declined, and for \ncorporates both minimum and maximum rates decreased. \nCapital markets exhibited mixed sentiments during the week ending 10th April 2026, the Zimbabwe Stock \nExchange (ZSE) experienced mixed trading sentiments, adding 0.33% to close at 360.46 points, while bearish \nsentiments characterized the Victoria Falls Stock Exchange (VFEX), thereby losing 8.07% to close at 240.95 \npoints. \nThe total value of transactions processed through the National Payment Systems platforms decreased by \n13.16% from ZiG46.87 billion reported in the previous week to ZiG40.70 billion. The volume of transactions \nprocessed decreased by 8.25% from 21.70 million to 19.91 million during the same period under review. The \nlargest share of transactional values was processed through the Real-Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) system, \naccounting for 72.11%, while mobile money accounted for 84.64% of the transaction volumes. \n The Zimbabwe Gold (ZiG) currency appreciated by 0.39%, during the week ending 10 April 2026, from an \naverage of per ZiG25.34 per US$1 to ZiG25.24. \nInternational prices for gold, platinum, palladium, and copper rose during the week, while nickel, Brent crude \noil, and lithium declined. Gold prices were supported by safe‑haven demand amid heightened geopolitical \ntensions, particularly surrounding the US–Iran conflict and concerns over disruptions to global trade routes. \nPlatinum prices rose on stronger demand and supply constraints linked to high costs, labour issues, and ageing \nmines in South Africa. Palladium also gained on firmer automotive demand amid ongoing supply challenges, \nwhile lithium prices eased slightly due to measures to curb speculation and signs of improving supply. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2 \n2. INTEREST RATES \n \nAverage commercial bank deposit rates (Local Currency (ZiG) (%) \n Deposit rates \n20-Mar-2026 \n27-Mar-2026 \n02-Apr-2026 \n10-Apr-2026 \nSavings \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n3.81 \n3.83 \n3.83 \n3.83 \nMaximum \n4.17 \n4.17 \n4.17 \n4.17 \n1-month deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n6.66 \n6.69 \n6.69 \n6.69 \nMaximum \n10.41 \n11.22 \n11.22 \n11.33 \n3-months deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n6.73 \n6.87 \n6.87 \n6.87 \nMaximum \n9.95 \n10.76 \n10.76 \n11.45 \n6-months deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n6.79 \n6.93 \n6.93 \n6.93 \nMaximum \n10.02 \n10.82 \n10.82 \n10.82 \n12-months deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n6.86 \n6.99 \n6.99 \n6.99 \nMaximum \n10.77 \n11.58 \n11.58 \n11.58 \nOver 1 year \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n6.86 \n7.00 \n7.00 \n7.00 \nMaximum \n10.78 \n11.58 \n11.58 \n12.17 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2026 \n \n \nAverage commercial bank deposit rates (Foreign Currency (US$) (%) \nUS$ Deposit rates \n 20-Mar-2026 \n27-Mar-2026 \n02-Apr-2026 \n10-Apr-2026 \nSavings \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n1.89 \n1.89 \n1.89 \n1.89 \nMaximum \n2.22 \n2.22 \n2.22 \n2.22 \n1-month deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n3.69 \n3.92 \n3.92 \n3.92 \nMaximum \n6.32 \n6.76 \n6.76 \n6.76 \n3-month deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n4.09 \n4.40 \n4.40 \n4.40 \nMaximum \n7.15 \n7.66 \n7.66 \n7.66 \n6-month deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n4.24 \n4.54 \n4.54 \n4.54 \nMaximum \n7.47 \n7.96 \n7.96 \n7.96 \n12-Month deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n4.56 \n4.83 \n4.83 \n4.83 \nMaximum \n7.89 \n8.36 \n8.36 \n8.36 \nOver 1 year \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n4.64 \n4.92 \n4.92 \n4.92 \nMaximum \n8.03 \n8.50 \n8.50 \n8.50 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2026 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n3 \nCommercial bank weighted lending rates (Local Currency (ZiG) (%) \nZiG Lending rates \n20-Mar-2026 \n27-Mar-2026 \n02-Apr-26 \n10-Apr-26 \nIndividuals \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n44.65 \n43.75 \n43.85 \n43.89 \nMaximum \n50.69 \n49.54 \n49.63 \n49.64 \nCorporates \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n40.45 \n40.33 \n40.37 \n40.31 \nMaximum \n44.27 \n46.20 \n46.21 \n45.98 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2026 \n \nCommercial bank weighted lending rates (Foreign Currency (US$) (%) \nUS$ Lending rates \n20-Mar-2026 \n27-Mar-2026 \n03-Apr-2026 \n10-Apr-2026 \nIndividuals \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n14.37 \n13.59 \n13.63 \n13.66 \nMaximum \n18.83 \n18.62 \n18.60 \n18.59 \nCorporates \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n10.56 \n10.27 \n10.36 \n10.24 \nMaximum \n15.10 \n15.82 \n15.85 \n15.80 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2026 \n \nCommercial banks and building societies mortgage lending rates (%) \nMortgage Lending \nrates \n20-Mar-2026 \n27-Mar-2026 \n03-Apr-2026 \n10-Apr-2026 \nZiG Lending rates \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n25.00 \n25.00 \n25.00 \n25.00 \nMaximum \n50.00 \n50.00 \n50.00 \n50.00 \nUS$ Lending rates \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n10.00 \n10.00 \n10.00 \n10.00 \nMaximum \n18.00 \n18.00 \n18.00 \n18.00 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2026 \n \nEQUITY MARKETS \n \nZSE Indicators \n \n \nAll \nShare \nIndex \n(points) \nTop 10 \nIndex \n(points) \nTop 15 \nIndex \n(points) \nMedium \nCap \n(points) \nSmall Cap \n(points) \nMining \nIndex \n(points) \nGrand \nMarket \nCap (ZiG \nbillion) \nMarket \nTurnover \n(ZiG \nmillion) \nVolume \nof Shares \n(million) \n20-Mar 26 \n353.90 \n361.19 \n373.60 \n349.23 \n100.11 \n129.42 \n110.71 \n625.13 \n95.00 \n27-Mar-26 \n362.34 \n370.62 \n383.58 \n353.27 \n100.11 \n129.42 \n113.59 \n868.01 \n95.84 \n02-Apr-26 \n359.27 \n365.42 \n378.15 \n360.41 \n100.11 \n129.42 \n390.17 \n833.21 \n79.74 \n10-Apr-26 \n360.46 \n363.62 \n378.09 \n372.44 \n100.11 \n129.42 \n329.72 \n281.95 \n35.49 \nWeekly \nChange \n(%) \n \n0.33 \n(0.49) \n(0.02) \n3.34 \n0 \n0 \n(15.49) \n(66.16) \n(55.49) \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2026 \n \nVFEX Indicators \nDate \n \n \nAll Share Index \nPoints \nGrand Market \nCapitalisation \n(US$ billion) \nMarket Turnover \n(US$ million) \nVolume of Shares \n(million) \n20-Mar 26 \n239.32 \n2.85 \n4.07 \n4.42 \n27-Mar-26\n251.68 \n3.00 \n1.29 \n3.98 \n02-Apr-26 \n262.09 \n1.51 \n4.75 \n7.90 \n10-Apr-26 \n240,95 \n1.56 \n5.70 \n7.47 \nWeekly Change (%) \n(8.07) \n3.31 \n20 \n5.76 \nSource: Victoria Falls Stock Exchange, 2026 \n \n \n \n \n4 \nFigure 1: ZSE and VFEX Indicators \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange and Victoria Falls Stock Exchange, 2026 \n \n \n90\n140\n190\n240\n290\n340\n390\n24-Oct-25\n31-Oct-25\n07-Nov-25\n14-Nov-25\n21-Nov-25\n28-Nov-25\n05-Dec-25\n12-Dec-25\n19-Dec-25\n26-Dec-25\n02-Jan-26\n09-Jan-26\n16-Jan-26\n23-Jan-26\n30-Jan-26\n06-Feb-26\n13-Feb-26\n20-Feb-26\n27-Feb-26\n06-Mar-26\n13-Mar-26\n20-Mar-26\n27-Mar-26\n03-Apr-26\n10-Apr-26\nIndices\nZSE Indices \nAll Share Index (ZSE)\nTop 10 Index\nMining Index\n0\n100,000\n200,000\n300,000\n400,000\n500,000\n600,000\n700,000\n800,000\n900,000\n24-Oct-25\n31-Oct-25\n07-Nov-25\n14-Nov-25\n21-Nov-25\n28-Nov-25\n05-Dec-25\n12-Dec-25\n19-Dec-25\n26-Dec-25\n02-Jan-26\n09-Jan-26\n16-Jan-26\n23-Jan-26\n30-Jan-26\n06-Feb-26\n13-Feb-26\n20-Feb-26\n27-Feb-26\n06-Mar-26\n13-Mar-26\n20-Mar-26\n27-Mar-26\n03-Apr-26\n10-Apr-26\nZiG Thousands\nZSE Market Turnover \n55\n60\n65\n70\n75\n80\n85\n90\n95\n100\n105\n110\n115\n120\n125\n28-Nov-25\n05-Dec-25\n12-Dec-25\n19-Dec-25\n26-Dec-25\n02-Jan-26\n09-Jan-26\n16-Jan-26\n23-Jan-26\n30-Jan-26\n06-Feb-26\n13-Feb-26\n20-Feb-26\n27-Feb-26\n06-Mar-26\n13-Mar-26\n20-Mar-26\n27-Mar-26\n03-Apr-26\n10-Apr-26\nZiG Billion\nZSE Market Capitalisation \n150\n160\n170\n180\n190\n200\n210\n220\n230\n240\n250\n260\n270\n280\n290\n300\n310\n320\n330\n340\n350\n360\n24-Oct-25\n31-Oct-25\n07-Nov-25\n14-Nov-25\n21-Nov-25\n28-Nov-25\n05-Dec-25\n12-Dec-25\n19-Dec-25\n26-Dec-25\n02-Jan-26\n09-Jan-26\n16-Jan-26\n23-Jan-26\n30-Jan-26\n06-Feb-26\n13-Feb-26\n20-Feb-26\n27-Feb-26\n06-Mar-26\n13-Mar-26\n20-Mar-26\n27-Mar-26\n03-Apr-26\n10-Apr-26\nIndex\nVFEX All Share Index \n0\n500\n1000\n1500\n2000\n2500\n3000\n3500\n4000\n4500\n5000\n24-Oct-25\n31-Oct-25\n07-Nov-25\n14-Nov-25\n21-Nov-25\n28-Nov-25\n05-Dec-25\n12-Dec-25\n19-Dec-25\n26-Dec-25\n02-Jan-26\n09-Jan-26\n16-Jan-26\n23-Jan-26\n30-Jan-26\n06-Feb-26\n13-Feb-26\n20-Feb-26\n27-Feb-26\n06-Mar-26\n13-Mar-26\n20-Mar-26\n27-Mar-26\n03-Apr-26\n10-Apr-26\nUS$ Thousand\nVFEX Market Turnover \n1.8\n2\n2.2\n2.4\n2.6\n2.8\n3\n3.2\n3.4\n3.6\n3.8\n4\n4.2\n24-Oct-25\n31-Oct-25\n07-Nov-25\n14-Nov-25\n21-Nov-25\n28-Nov-25\n05-Dec-25\n12-Dec-25\n19-Dec-25\n26-Dec-25\n02-Jan-26\n09-Jan-26\n16-Jan-26\n23-Jan-26\n30-Jan-26\n06-Feb-26\n13-Feb-26\n20-Feb-26\n27-Feb-26\n06-Mar-26\n13-Mar-26\n20-Mar-26\n27-Mar-26\n03-Apr-26\n10-Apr-26\nUS$ Billion\nVFEX Market Capitalisation \n \n \n5 \n3. CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY \n Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2026 \n \n4. ENERGY PRICES \n \nEnergy Prices \n \n20-Mar-2026 \n27-Mar-2026 \n03-Apr-2026 \n10-Apr-2026 \nDomestic Energy Prices \nUS$ \nUS$ \nUS$ \nUS$ \nDiesel 50/ litre \n2.05 \n2.05 \n2.11 \n2.11 \nPetrol Blend E5/ litre \n2.17 \n2.17 \n2.23 \n2.23 \nLP Gas / kg \n1.56 \n1.56 \n1.85 \n1.85 \n \n \n \n \n \nInternational Energy Prices \n(Weekly average) \nUS$/barrel \nUS$/barrel \nUS$/barrel \nUS$/barrel \nCrude Oil Prices \n(US$/barrel) \n101.74 \n94.34 \n106.32 \n98.76 \n Source: Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory Authority and BBC 2026 \n \n5. GOLD PM FIX, MOSI-OA-TUNYA GOLD COINS AND GOLD BACKED DIGITAL \nTOKENS (GBDT) \n \nGold PM Fix and Gold Backed Digital Token Prices \nDate \nGold PM Fix \nGBDT ZiG Price per Mg \nGBDT US$ Price per Mg \nUS$/oz \nBuy \nSell \nBuy \nSell \n07-Apr-26 \n4,639.35 \n3.59 \n3.97 \n0.1417 \n0.1566 \n08-Apr-26 \n4,611.70 \n3.55 \n3.93 \n0.1409 \n0.1557 \n09-Apr-26 \n4,792.55 \n3.69 \n4.08 \n0.1464 \n0.1618 \n10-Apr-26 \n4,762.60 \n3.66 \n4.05 \n0.1455 \n0.1608 \nSource: London Bullion Market Association and Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2026 \n \n \n \n \nPAYMENT STREAM \nWEEK ENDING \n02 April 2026 \nWEEK ENDING \n10 April 2026 \nWEEKLY \nCHANGE (%) \n \nVALUES \n \nRTGS \n34,420,841,294.63 \n29,350,155,060.23 \n(14.73) \nOf which ZiG \n12,341,682,608.65 \n10,254,487,801.04 \n(16.91) \nOf which US$ transactions \n(ZiG Equivalent) \n33,186,158,685.98 \n28,593,833,584.70 \n(13.84) \nPOS \n2,987,401,652.62 \n2,523,878,049.51 \n(15.52) \nATM \n2,822,245,261.04 \n1,968,487,585.45 \n(30.25) \nMOBILE BANKING \n422,691,036.12 \n337,169,573.69 \n(20.23) \nMOBILE MONEY \n5,806,592,646.45 \n6,137,657,231.02 \n5.70 \nZIPIT MOBILE \n410,765,506.72 \n384,441,165.03 \n(6.41) \nTOTAL \n46,870,537,397.58 \n40,701,788,664.92 \n(13.16) \n \nVOLUMES \n \nRTGS \n228,487 \n152,558 \n(33.23) \nOf which ZiG \n83,773 \n55,417 \n(33.85) \nOf which US$ \n144,714 \n97,141 \n(32.87) \nPOS \n2,441,310 \n1,995,004 \n(18.28) \nATM \n317,531 \n222,677 \n(29.87 \nMOBILE BANKING \n429,997 \n329,050 \n(23.48) \nMOBILE MONEY \n17,878,893 \n16,852,636 \n(5.74) \nZIPIT MOBILE \n404,374 \n358,898 \n(11.25) \nTOTAL \n21,700,592 \n19,910,823 \n(8.25) \n \n \n6 \nMosi-oa-Tunya Gold Coin Prices \nGold Coin \nPrice \n07-Apr-2026 \n08-Apr-2026 \n09-Apr-2026 \n10-Apr-2026 \n1.00Oz \n \n \n \n \nUS$ \n 4,871.32 \n4,842.29 \n5,032.18 \n5,000.73 \nZiG \n 123,383.65 \n122,206.68 \n127,012.66 \n125,834.24 \n0.50Oz \n \n \n \n \nUS$ \n2,435.66 \n2,421.14 \n2,516.09 \n2,500.37 \nZiG \n61,691.83 \n61,103.34 \n63,506.33 \n62,917.12 \n0.25Oz \n \n \n \n \nUS$ \n1,217.83 \n1,210.57 \n1,258.04 \n1,250.18 \nZiG \n30,845.91 \n30,551.67 \n31,753.17 \n31,458.56 \n0.10Oz \n \n \n \n \nUS$ \n487.13 \n484.23 \n503.22 \n500.07 \nZiG \n12,338.37 \n12,220.67 \n12,701.27 \n12,583.42 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2026 \n \n \n6. EXTERNAL SECTOR \n \n \nExchange Rate Developments (ZiG per Unit of Foreign Currency) \n \n \nUSD \nZAR \nGBP \nBWP \nEURO \nWeekly Average \n(30 Mar – 02 Apr) \n25.3408 \n1.4866 \n33.5479 \n1.7768 \n29.1968 \n07-Apr-26 \n25.3286 \n1.4981 \n33.5050 \n1.7848 \n29.2191 \n08-Apr-26 \n25.2374 \n1.5354 \n33.8902 \n1.7758 \n29.4938 \n09-Apr-26 \n25.2401 \n1.5368 \n33.8094 \n1.7835 \n29.4376 \n10-Apr-26 \n25.1632 \n1.5323 \n33.7691 \n1.7780 \n29.4183 \nWeekly Average \n(06 Apr – 10 Apr) \n25.2423 \n1.5257 \n33.7434 \n1.7805 \n29.3922 \nAppr (-)/Depr (+) (%) of the \nZiG \n-0,39 \n+2,63 \n+0,58 \n+0.21 \n+0,67 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2026 \n \n \nInternational Commodity Prices \n \nGold \nPlatinum \nPalladium \nNickel \nLithium \n \nUS$/oz \nUS$/ounce \nUS$/ounce \nUS$/tonne \nUS$/tonne \nWeekly Average \n(30 Mar – 02 Apr) \n4,612.55 \n1,917.63 \n1,449.25 \n17,199.25 \n19,937.50 \n07-Apr-26 \n4,655.34 \n1,971.00 \n1,486.00 \n17,086.00 \n20,000.00 \n08-Apr-26 \n4,721.50 \n2,020.00 \n1,561.00 \n17,302.00 \n19,850.00 \n09-Apr-26 \n4,759.45 \n2,088.50 \n1,556.00 \n17,088.00 \n19,850.00 \n10-Apr-26 \n4,719,40 \n2,046.00 \n1,536.00 \n17,241.00 \n19,950.00 \nWeekly Average \n(07 Apr – 10 Apr) \n4,713.92 \n2,031.38 \n1,534.75 \n17,179.25 \n19,912.50 \nWeekly change (%) \n2,20 \n5,93 \n5,90 \n(0.12) \n(13) \nSource: BBC, KITCO and Bloomberg, 2026 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n7 \nFigure 3: Average Weekly International Commodity Price Developments (31st October 2025– 10th April 2026) \n \n \n \n \n \nSource: BBC, KITCO and Bloomberg, 2026 \n \nRESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE \nAPRIL 2026 \n3,700\n3,900\n4,100\n4,300\n4,500\n4,700\n4,900\n5,100\n5,300\n28-Nov\n5-Dec\n12-Dec\n19-Dec\n26-Dec\n2-Jan\n9-Jan\n16-Jan\n23-Jan\n30-Jan\n6-Feb\n13-Feb\n20-Feb\n27-Feb\n6-Mar\n13-Mar\n20-Mar\n27-Mar\n3-Apr\n10-Apr\nUS$/oz\nGold\n60\n65\n70\n75\n80\n85\n90\n95\n100\n105\n28-Nov\n5-Dec\n12-Dec\n19-Dec\n26-Dec\n2-Jan\n9-Jan\n16-Jan\n23-Jan\n30-Jan\n6-Feb\n13-Feb\n20-Feb\n27-Feb\n6-Mar\n13-Mar\n20-Mar\n27-Mar\n3-Apr\n10-Apr\nUS$/oz\nCrude Oil \n1300\n1500\n1700\n1900\n2100\n2300\n2500\n2700\n2900\n28-Nov\n5-Dec\n12-Dec\n19-Dec\n26-Dec\n2-Jan\n9-Jan\n16-Jan\n23-Jan\n30-Jan\n6-Feb\n13-Feb\n20-Feb\n27-Feb\n6-Mar\n13-Mar\n20-Mar\n27-Mar\n3-Apr\n10-Apr\nUS$/oz\nPlatinum\n1100\n1300\n1500\n1700\n1900\n28-Nov\n5-Dec\n12-Dec\n19-Dec\n26-Dec\n2-Jan\n9-Jan\n16-Jan\n23-Jan\n30-Jan\n6-Feb\n13-Feb\n20-Feb\n27-Feb\n6-Mar\n13-Mar\n20-Mar\n27-Mar\n3-Apr\n10-Apr\nUS$/oz\nPalladium\n14,300\n14,800\n15,300\n15,800\n16,300\n16,800\n17,300\n17,800\n18,300\n28-Nov\n5-Dec\n12-Dec\n19-Dec\n26-Dec\n2-Jan\n9-Jan\n16-Jan\n23-Jan\n30-Jan\n6-Feb\n13-Feb\n20-Feb\n27-Feb\n6-Mar\n13-Mar\n20-Mar\n27-Mar\n3-Apr\n10-Apr\nUS$/oz\nNickel \n9,000\n11,000\n13,000\n15,000\n17,000\n19,000\n21,000\n28-Nov\n5-Dec\n12-Dec\n19-Dec\n26-Dec\n2-Jan\n9-Jan\n16-Jan\n23-Jan\n30-Jan\n6-Feb\n13-Feb\n20-Feb\n27-Feb\n6-Mar\n13-Mar\n20-Mar\n27-Mar\n3-Apr\n10-Apr\nUS$/oz\nLithium", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/Weekly_Economic_Highlights/WEEKLY_ECONOMIC_HIGHLIGHTS_10_April_2026_VOLUME_28_NUMBER_15.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "961a30059e9c41947c7e5f6c9ff903da", "text": "QUARTERLY \nECONOMIC \nREVIEW \n \n \n \nMARCH 2017 \n \nRESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE \n \n \n2 \nCONTENTS \n1. OVERVIEW ....................................................................................................... 5 \n2. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS ................................ 6 \nINTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICE DEVELOPMENTS ............................ 7 \nBRENT CRUDE OIL ................................................................................................ 7 \nBASE METALS ........................................................................................................ 8 \nMERCHANDISE TRADE DEVELOPMENTS ....................................................... 9 \nMERCHANDISE EXPORT DEVELOPMENTS ..................................................... 9 \nMAJOR MERCHANDISE EXPORT DESTINATIONS .......................................10 \nMERCHANDISE IMPORT DEVELOPMENTS ....................................................10 \nMAJOR IMPORT SOURCES .................................................................................11 \n \n3. DOMESTIC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS ...........................................12 \nREAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS ......................................................................12 \nAGRICULTURE .....................................................................................................12 \nMINING ...................................................................................................................15 \nMANUFACTURING...............................................................................................17 \nELECTRICITY ........................................................................................................18 \nINFLATION DEVELOPMENTS ...........................................................................18 \nFISCAL DEVELOPMENTS ...................................................................................19 \n \n4. MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS, INTEREST RATES AND FINANCIAL \nMARKETS .......................................................................................................21 \n5. STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS ........................................................23 \n6. PAYMENT, CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES ................24 \n \n \n \n \n3 \nList of Figures \nFigure 1: Brent Crude Oil Prices US$/Barrel) ................................................................................ 8 \nFigure 2: Base Metal Prices (US$/tonne) January 2016 to March 2017 ........................................ 8 \nFigure 3: Precious Minerals Prices ................................................................................................. 9 \nFigure 4: Merchandise Exports –Q1 2016 and Q1 2017 (US$ million) ......................................... 9 \nFigure 5: Merchandise Imports (US$ million).............................................................................. 11 \nFigure 6: Trend of major Merchandise Import Sources (% Share) .............................................. 11 \nFigure 7: Trade Balance (US$ million) ........................................................................................ 12 \nFigure 8: Quarterly Pig Slaughters in 2016 .................................................................................. 15 \nFigure 9: Gold deliveries to FPR: Q1 2016 vs Q1 2017 ............................................................... 16 \nFigure 10: Energy sent out by small hydro-power stations (January - March 2017) ................... 18 \nFigure 11: Annual Inflation Profile (%)........................................................................................ 19 \nFigure 12: First Quarter Fiscal Developments .............................................................................. 19 \nFigure 13: Quarterly Revenue Collections ................................................................................... 20 \nFigure 14: Quarterly Revenue inflows .......................................................................................... 20 \nFigure 15: Expenditure Head Performance................................................................................... 21 \nFigure 16: Annual Broad Money Supply Growth......................................................................... 22 \nFigure 17: Sectoral Distribution of credit ..................................................................................... 22 \nFigure 18: Market Capitalization .................................................................................................. 23 \nFigure 19: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Indices ............................................................................ 23 \nFigure 20 : RTGS Values and Volumes ....................................................................................... 25 \nFigure 21: SWIFT Cross Border Transactions ............................................................................. 25 \nFigure 22: Over the Counter Cash Withdrawals ........................................................................... 26 \nFigure 23: Values of Retail Transactions...................................................................................... 26 \nFigure 24 : Volumes of Retail Transactions ................................................................................. 26 \nFigure 25: Total Collateral ............................................................................................................ 27 \n \n \n \n \n4 \nList of Tables \n \nTable 1: Global Economic Growth & Outlook (%) ........................................................................ 6 \nTable 2: International Commodity Prices ....................................................................................... 7 \nTable 3: Exports Classified by HS Code (US$ millions) & Share of Total exports for January-\nMarch 2017(%) ............................................................................................................................. 10 \nTable 4: Major Merchandise Export Destinations (% Share) ....................................................... 10 \nTable 5: Area planted to selected key crops (Ha) ......................................................................... 13 \nTable 6: Cumulative First Quarter Tobacco Sales: 2016 and 2017 Tobacco Selling Season....... 13 \nTable 7: Cattle slaughtered in the formal sector ........................................................................... 14 \nTable 8: Quarterly Milk Output (million litres) in 2016 and 2017 ............................................... 15 \nTable 9: Quarterly Mining Production Statistics .......................................................................... 15 \nTable 10: Electricity output (GWh) .............................................................................................. 18 \nTable 11: Consolidated Transactional Activities .......................................................................... 24 \nTable 12: Payment Systems Access Points and Devices .............................................................. 28 \n1. OVERVIEW \n \nThe International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects \nthat global economic growth will be 3.5% for \n2017, up from 3.1% for 2016. IMF also projects \ngrowth for 2018 to reach 3.6%. Downside risks \nto global growth are expected to emanate from \nelevated geopolitical tensions in the Middle \nEast, coupled with financial vulnerabilities in \nseveral emerging market and developing \neconomies. \n \nIn Zimbabwe, the economy is projected to \nregister a positive growth of 3.7% in 2017, \nunderpinned by strong performance in the \nagriculture sector. The agriculture sector \nbenefited from the favourable rainfall season and \nfinancial \nsupport \nfrom \nGovernment \nand \ncooperating partners. \n \n \nBroad money supply1 recorded an increase of \n4.29%, during the first quarter of 2017, a lower \ngrowth compared to 6.76% recorded in the \nfourth quarter of 2016. On a year-on-year basis, \nmoney supply grew by 20%, from US$4 899.8 \nmillion in March 2016 to US$5 879.9 million in \nMarch 2017. \n \nThe first quarter of 2017 was characterised by \nsubdued trading on the Zimbabwe Stock \nExchange (ZSE), as most investors adopted a \nwait and see trading strategy at the beginning of \nthe year. Resultantly, the industrial index \ndecreased by 3.85%, from 144.53 points as at \n31st December 2016 to 138.96 points at the end \nof the first quarter of 2017. The mining index \n \n1 Under the multiple currency system, broad money is \ndefined as total bank deposits less interbank deposits and \nalso includes Bond notes and coins issued. \nrecorded a marginal growth of 0.09% to 58.56 \npoints as at the end of the first quarter of 2017, \nfrom 58.51 points as at end December 2016. \nMarket capitalisation declined by US$136.7 \nmillion, from US$4.01 billion as at end \nDecember 2016, to US$3.9 billion as at end \nMarch 2017. \n \nZimbabwe’s exports stood at US$723.8 million \nin the first quarter of 2017, compared to \nUS$652.2 million realised during the first \nquarter of 2016. Similarly, the country’s import \nbill increased by 2.9%, from US$ 1 301.1 \nmillion in the first quarter of 2016 to S$1 338.2 \nmillion during the quarter under review. The \ntrade balance worsened from a deficit of \nUS$361.7 million in the fourth quarter of 2016, \nto a deficit of US$614.4 million during the first \nquarter of 2017. \n \nZimbabwe’s exports stood at US$723.8 million \nin the first quarter of 2017, compared to \nUS$652.2 million realised during the first \nquarter of 2016. Similarly, the country’s import \nbill increased by 2.9%, from US$ 1 301. 1 \nmillion in the first quarter of 2016 to S$1 338.2 \nmillion during the quarter under review. The \ntrade balance worsened from a deficit of \nUS$361.7 million in the fourth quarter of 2016, \nto a deficit of US$614.4 million during the first \nquarter of 2017. \n \nThe value of transactions processed through the \nNational Payment Systems (NPS) decreased by \n3% to US$16.9 billion in the first quarter of \n2017, from US$17.5 billion in the fourth quarter \n \n \n6 \nof 2016. NPS transaction volumes, however, \nincreased by 2% to 127.7 million in the first \nquarter of 2017, from 124.6 million in the fourth \nquarter of 2016. \n \n2. INTERNATIONAL \nECONOMIC \nDEVELOPMENTS \n \nThe world economy continued to face multiple \nchallenges of both short and medium term nature \nin 2016, resulting in constrained global growth \nfor the year. The challenges included uncertainty \nregarding the medium to long term economic \nimplications of the Brexit; rebalancing in China \nand declining terms of trade in commodity \nexporting \neconomies, \nfollowing \nsubdued \ncommodity prices. \n \nIn addition, non-economic factors in the form of \ngeopolitical and political uncertainty in some \nregions impacted negatively on global economic \nactivity. Reflecting the challenges that beset \nmany countries, the global economy is estimated \nto have slowed to a growth of 3.1% in 2016, \nfrom 3.2% registered in 2015. \n \nThe growth outlook for 2017 is, however, \nbrighter as global economic activity is projected \nto increase during the years, largely driven by \nthe continued improvements in investment, \nmanufacturing and trade and strong global \ndemand. The IMF projects that global economic \ngrowth will be 3.5% in 2017, up from 3.1% \nestimated for 2016 and further to 3.6% in 2018, \nled by better growth performance across almost \nall the major regions. \n \nTable 1 shows global economic growth \ndevelopments for selected regions and countries. \n \nTable 1: Global Economic Growth & Outlook (%) \n \n \nActuals \nProjections \n \n2015 \n2016 \n2017 \n2018 \nWorld \nOutput \n3.2 \n3.1 \n3.5 \n3.6 \nAdvanced \nEconomies \n2.1 \n1.7 \n2.0 \n2.0 \n US \n2.6 \n1.6 \n2.3 \n2.5 \n \nEurozone \n \n2.0 \n \n1.7 \n \n1.7 \n \n1.6 \n Japan \n0.5 \n1.0 \n1.2 \n0.6 \nEmerging \nMarket & \nDeveloping \nEconomies \n4.0 \n4.1 \n4.5 \n4.8 \n China \n6.9 \n6.7 \n6.6 \n6.2 \n India \n7.6 \n6.8 \n7.2 \n7.7 \nSub-\nSaharan \nAfrica \n3.4 \n1.4 \n2.6 \n3.5 \nLatin \nAmerica & \nthe \nCaribbean \n0.0 \n-1.0 \n1.1 \n2.0 \n Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Update (April \n2017). \n \n \n7 \nThe continued recovery in base metal prices in \nthe last two quarters is buoying growth prospects \nin commodity exporting countries, most of \nwhich are emerging market and developing \neconomies. In addition, global financial markets \nare regaining confidence in the aftermath of the \nEurozone crisis, while sentiments remain strong \nthat \nChina \nwill \ncontinue \nimplementing \nfavourable rebalancing policies. \n \nThis notwithstanding, threats of elevated \ngeopolitical tensions especially in the Middle \nEast and North Africa, coupled with lingering \nfinancial vulnerabilities in several emerging \nmarket \nand \ndeveloping \neconomies, \npose \ndownside risks to global growth prospects. \n \nInternational \nCommodity \nPrice \nDevelopments \n \nInternational commodity prices have rallied \nfrom their 2016 fourth quarter levels, with \nnotable quarterly gains recorded in copper and \ncrude oil prices. Oil prices, in particular, have \nincreased following the announcement of the \nproduction agreement by the Organization of the \nPetroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). \n \nThe developments in international commodity \nprices during the quarter under review are shown \nin Table 2. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nTable 2: International Commodity Prices \n \n \nGold \nPlatinum \nCopper \nNickel \nBrent \ncrude oil \n \nus$/oz \nus$/oz \nus$/tonne \nus$/tonne \nus$/barrel \n2016 Q4 \nAverage \n1,219.39 \n941.24 \n5,268.22 \n10,793.93 \n51.74 \nJan-17 \n1,195.28 \n972.45 \n5,720.55 \n9,976.43 \n55.58 \nFeb-17 \n1,233.16 \n1,006.20 \n5,945.10 \n10,517.75 \n55.87 \nMar-17 \n1,234.04 \n963.83 \n5,808.92 \n10,380.98 \n53.30 \n2017 Q1 \nAverage \n1,220.83 \n980.83 \n5,824.86 \n10,291.72 \n54.92 \n% \nQuarterly \nChange \n(2016Q4-\n2017Q1) \n0.12 \n4.21 \n10.57 \n-4.65 \n6.15 \nSource: Bloomberg, BBC, Kitco 2017 \nBrent Crude Oil \n \nBrent crude oil prices continued to register \nstrong gains during the first quarter of 2017. This \nwas in response to concerted efforts to revive the \nglobal oil industry by OPEC producers and non-\nOPEC producers, by curbing output in the first \nquarter of 2017. The effectiveness of the \nproduction cuts was, however, partially offset by \nan increase in U.S. shale oil production during \nthe period under review. Against this backdrop, \nbrent crude oil prices firmed by 6.1% to \nUS$54.92/barrel in the first quarter of 2017. \n \n \nFigure 1 shows the monthly evolution of crude \noil prices, for the period from January 2016 to \nMarch 2017. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n8 \nFigure 1: Brent Crude Oil Prices US$/Barrel) \n \n \nSource: Bloomberg, 2017 \n \nIn its World Economic Outlook (WEO April \n2017), the IMF projects the oil market to move \nfrom surplus to deficit, in turn reducing \ninventory levels. Rapid investment recovery in \nthe U.S. shale sector could, however, tip the \nmarket back into surplus as early as the second \nhalf of 2017. \nBase Metals \nCopper prices surged, amid a rebound in \nconsumption in China, the largest consumer of \nthe base metal. Furthermore, copper supply has \nbeen negatively impacted by disruptions at the \nworld’s two biggest copper mines in Indonesia \nand Chile. The base metal price, however, eased \nin March 2017 reflecting weak global demand \nprospects, following the Fed’s monetary policy \ntightening. Copper prices rose by 10.6% to \nUS$5,824.86/tonne in the first quarter of 2017, \nfrom US$5,268.22/tonne recorded in December \n2016. \n \nNickel prices declined on oversupply concerns, \nfollowing an increase in Indonesian ore exports, \nwhich offset the effect of mine closures in the \nPhilippines. The price softened by 4.7%, to a \nquarterly average of US$10,291.72/tonne. \n \nFigure 2: Base Metal Prices (US$/tonne) January \n2016 to March 2017 \n \n \nSource: Bloomberg, 2017 \n \nPrecious metal prices recorded quarterly gains, \nas investor uncertainty about the possible impact \nof the new US president’s economic policies \nspurred safe haven demand for precious metals \nsuch as gold and platinum. In addition, investor \nconcerns over the Trump administration’s ability \nto push through its pro-growth economic agenda \nbolstered the investment demand outlook for \nprecious metals, during the period under review. \n \n -\n 10\n 20\n 30\n 40\n 50\n 60\nJan-16\nFeb-16\nMar-16\nApr-16\nMay-16\nJun-16\nJul-16\nAug-16\nSep-16\nOct-16\nNov-16\nDec-16\nJan-17\nFeb-17\nMar-17\n 8,000\n 8,500\n 9,000\n 9,500\n 10,000\n 10,500\n 11,000\n 11,500\n 4,000\n 4,500\n 5,000\n 5,500\n 6,000\n 6,500\nJan-16\nMar-16\nMay-16\nJul-16\nSep-16\nNov-16\nJan-17\nMar-17\nCopper\nNickel (RHS)\n \n \n9 \nThe positive trajectory in precious metals, \nhowever, tapered as the Federal Reserve raised \ninterest rates in March 2017. This development \ndampened investment demand prospects for \nprecious metals, which are sensitive to moves in \nU.S. rates, which increase the opportunity \ncost of holding non-yielding assets such \nas gold. Gold and platinum prices firmed by \n0.1% and 4.2% to US$1,220.83/ounce and \nUS$980.83/ounce, respectively. Figure 3 shows \ntrends in precious metal prices. \n \nFigure 3: Precious Minerals Prices \n \n \nSource: Bloomberg, 2017 \nMerchandise Trade Developments \nTotal merchandise trade during the first quarter \nof 2017 amounted to US$2,062.2 million, \nrepresenting \na \n7.0% \nincrease \nfrom \nthe \nUS$1,926.4 \nmillion \nrecorded \nin \nthe \ncorresponding quarter in 2016. \n \nMerchandise Export Developments \nOver the period January to March 2017, \nmerchandise exports increased by 15.8%, from \nUS$652.2 million realized in the same period of \n2016 to US$723.8 million in 2017, as illustrated \nin Figure 4. \n \nFigure 4: Merchandise Exports –Q1 2016 and Q1 \n2017 (US$ million) \n \n \nSource: Zimstat, 2017 \n \nGold, ferrochrome, flue-cured tobacco, nickel, \nplatinum, diamonds and granite continued to \ndominate the country’s exports, contributing \nabout 89.3% of export earnings for the period \nJanuary to March 2017 (see Table 3). \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n800\n900\n1000\n1100\n1200\n1300\n1400\nJan-16\nMar-16\nMay-16\nJul-16\nSep-16\nNov-16\nJan-17\nMar-17\nGold\nPlatinum\n652.2 \n723.8 \n 500.0\n 550.0\n 600.0\n 650.0\n 700.0\n 750.0\nQ1 2016\nQ1 2017\n \n \n10 \nTable 3: Exports Classified by HS Code (US$ \nmillions) & Share of Total exports for \nJanuary-March 2017(%) \nProduct \nJan-Mar 2017 \nUS$ (million) \nShare \nof \nTotal (%) \n Gold \n181.93 \n25.13 \n Ferro-chrome \n84.74 \n11.71 \nFlue-Cured \nTobacco \n203.34 \n28.09 \n Nickel Ores & \nconcentrates \n85.23 \n11.78 \n Chromium ores \n& concentrates \n28.79 \n3.98 \n Nickel mattes \n14.25 \n1.97 \n Unwrought \nPlatinum \n13.86 \n1.91 \n Industrial \ndiamonds \n25.09 \n3.47 \nGranite \n9.01 \n1.25 \nOther \n77.57 \n10.72 \nTotal \n723.81 \n100.00 \nSource: Zimstat, 2016 & RBZ Calculations, 2017 \n \nMajor Merchandise Export Destinations \nThe country’s exports for the first quarter of \n2017 were mainly destined for South Africa, \nMozambique, United Arab Emirates, Zambia, \nBelgium and Kenya, as shown in Table 4. \n \n \nTable 4: Major Merchandise Export Destinations \n(% Share) \n \nMerchandise Export Shares \n \n1st \nQuarter \n2016 \n4th \nQuarter \n2016 \n1st \nQuarter \n2017 \n South \nAfrica \n77.8 \n82.5 \n77.6 \n \nMozambique \n7.9 \n7.6 \n12.1 \nUnited Arab \nEmirates \n4.8 \n3.9 \n5.4 \n Zambia \n4.5 \n1.6 \n2.1 \n Belgium \n2.3 \n1.6 \n0.8 \nOther \n2.7 \n2.9 \n2.0 \n Total \n100.0 \n100.0 \n100.0 \n Source: Zimstat, 2017 & RBZ calculations, 2017 \n \nNotably, South Africa absorbed 77.6% of the \ncountry’s total merchandise exports during the \nfirst quarter of 2017, followed by Mozambique, \nat 12.1%; United Arab Emirates, 5.4%; and \nZambia, 2.1%. A proportion of the exports are \ntransshipments. The country’s major exports to \nSouth Africa included the platinum group of \nmetals (PGMs), gold and nickel, among others. \n \nMerchandise Import Developments \nTotal merchandise imports for the first quarter of \n2017 amounted to US$1,338.2 million, a 2.9% \nincrease from the US$1,301.1 million realized \nover the comparative period in 2016, as shown \nin Figure 5. \n \n \n \n11 \nFigure 5: Merchandise Imports (US$ million) \n \n \nSource: Zimstat, 2017 \n \nThe country’s import bill significantly increased \nin the first quarter of 2017, compared to the \ncomparable period in 2016, mainly reflecting \nmaize imports. \nMerchandise imports for the first quarter of 2017 \nwere, however, 6.6% lower compared to the \nfourth quarter of 2016. The decline was largely \ndue to decreases in imports of crude soya bean \noil (32.6%); rice (26.0%); electricity (7.5%); and \ndiesel (4.8%).The country’s major imports \nduring the period January to March 2017 mainly \ncomposed of cereals (maize, rice, and wheat), \nenergy (diesel, petrol and electricity), medicines \nand fertilizers. \nMajor Import Sources \nDuring the period January to March 2017, the \ncountry sourced its imports mainly from South \nAfrica (38.8%), Singapore (20.9%), China \n(9.1%), Mexico (5.4%), Zambia (2.4%) and \nMozambique (2.2%) as shown in Figure 6. \nFigure 6: Trend of major Merchandise Import \nSources (% Share) \n \nSource: Zimstat & RBZ Calculations, 2016 \n \nThe country continued to source imports from a \nfew markets, with about 90% coming from ten \ncountries, during the first quarter of 2017. \nMerchandise imports from South Africa mainly \nconstituted capital, intermediate and consumer \ngoods, while imports from Mexico were \ndominated by maize grain. \n \nTrade Balance \nThe country’s trade balance worsened from a \ndeficit of US$361.7 million in the fourth quarter \nof 2016, to a deficit of US$614.4 million in the \n1,301.1 \n1,338.2 \n 1,200.0\n 1,220.0\n 1,240.0\n 1,260.0\n 1,280.0\n 1,300.0\n 1,320.0\n 1,340.0\n 1,360.0\nJan-Mar 2016\nJan-Mar 2017\n38.8\n20.9\n9.1\n5.4\n2.4\n2.2\n1.9\n1.9\n1.6\n1.5\n1.3\n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\n50.0\nSouth Africa\nSingapore\nChina\nMexico\nZambia\nMozambique\nMauritius\nJapan\nIndia\nUnited Arab Emirates\nUnited Kingdom\n \n \n12 \nfirst quarter of 2017. The trade balance for the \nfirst quarter of 2017 was, however, a significant \nimprovement \nfrom \nthe \ndeficit \nof \nUS$702 million recorded during the first quarter \nof 2016. \n \nFigure 7: Trade Balance (US$ million) \n \nSource: Zimstat, 2016 & RBZ Computations, 2016 \n \nOverally, the country’s trade account continues \nto register recurrent deficits, on the back of high \nimports. \n \n3. DOMESTIC \nECONOMIC \nDEVELOPMENTS \n \nREAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS \n \nThe economy continues to face headwinds, \nreflecting inherent structural bottlenecks that \ninclude foreign currency shortages, low foreign \ndirect investment, high cost of doing business \nand weak aggregate demand. \n \nNotwithstanding the above challenges, the \neconomy is estimated to register a positive \ngrowth of 3.7% in 2017, underpinned by strong \nperformance in the agriculture sector, among \nothers. The agriculture sector benefited from the \nfavourable rainfall season and support from \nGovernment and cooperating partners. \n \nDevelopments in the first quarter of 2017, also \npoint to a lower than anticipated performance in \nmining and finance & insurance sectors, owing \nto the persistent challenges that have seen a \ndeceleration in economic activities in the \nsectors. \n \nAgriculture \nThe agriculture sector is projected to grow by \n21.6% in 2017, following a good 2016/17 \nagricultural season. Information from the First \nRound Crop and Livestock Assessment Report \nindicates a general increase in the area put under \nvarious crops in the 2016/17 season, compared \nto the previous season. This points to a strong \nlikelihood \nof \na \nsubstantial \nincrease \nin \nagricultural output in 2017 compared to 2016. \nTable 5 shows the area under different crops in \nthe two comparable seasons. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1071.1\n724\n1,432.8 \n1,338.2 \n-361.7\n-614.4\n-1000.0\n-500.0\n0.0\n500.0\n1000.0\n1500.0\n2000.0\n2016 Q4\n2017 Q1\nExports\nImports\nTrade Balance\n \n \n13 \nTable 5: Area planted to selected key crops (Ha) \nCrop \n2015/16 \n2016/17 \n% \nchange \nMaize \n1 161 997 \n1 770 389 \n52 \nSorghum \n198 586 \n305 779 \n54 \nPearl Millet \n155 684 \n206 632 \n33 \nFinger \nMillet \n26 649 \n50 860 \n91 \nRice \n456 \n1 627 \n257 \nTobacco \n102 537 \n110 216 \n7 \nSoyabean \n39 935 \n21 651 \n-46 \nCotton \n101 660 \n207 786 \n104 \nGroundnut \n190 235 \n240 837 \n27 \nSesame \n4 709 \n22 031 \n368 \nSunflower \n13 105 \n12 404 \n-5 \nRound nut \n64 432 \n106 486 \n65 \nCowpeas \n56 772 \n81 316 \n43 \nSugar bean \n27 472 \n24 636 \n10 \nSugarcane \n53 094 \n53 720 \n1 \nTea \n7 830 \n7 830 \n0 \nCoffee \n636 \n666 \n5 \nSource: Ministry of Agriculture, 2017 \n \nTobacco \nThe 2017 tobacco selling season started on the \n15th March 2017, at all the three licensed auction \nfloors, namely; Boka Tobacco Auction Floors, \nTobacco Sales Floor and Premier Tobacco \nAuction Floor. Tobacco marketing operations in \n2017 are expected to be smoothened by the new \nelectronic marketing system, which is widely \nexpected to stem collusion by tobacco merchants \nto keep auction prices down. \nTobacco output is projected at 215 million \nkilograms in 2017, 6% higher than the output in \n2016. \nCumulative \ntobacco \nsales \nas \nat \n31st March 2017 amounted to 20 million \nkilograms, 38.3% higher than the 14.5 million \nkilograms sold during the same period in the \nprior season. Total sales amounted to US$52.48 \nmillion, compared to the US$36.5 million \nrealised during the same period last season. The \ngolden leaf fetched higher average prices, at \nUS$2.6 per kg during the tobacco selling season \nunder review, compared to the US$2.5 per kg for \nthe 2016 season. \n \nTable 6: Cumulative First Quarter Tobacco \nSales: 2016 and 2017 Tobacco Selling Season \n \n2016 \n2017 \nVariance \n(%) \nTotal \nQuantity \nSold (million Kgs) \n14.46 \n20.00 \n38.34 \nTotal Value (US$ \nmillion) \n36.52 \n52.48 \n43.70 \nAverage \nPrice \n(US$)/Kg \n2.53 \n2.62 \n3.87 \nSource: TIMB, 2017 \n \nMaize \nMaize output is expected to exceed 2.1 million \ntonnes in 2017, compared to 0.511 million \ntonnes produced in 2016. Maize production \nbenefited from the good rainfall season as well \nas improved financing. Government launched a \nSpecial Maize Production Programme under \nCommand Agriculture, which enhanced access \nto inputs and tillage by farmers resulting in \nhigher productivity by beneficiary farmers. \nSmall Grains \nThe combined output of small grains in 2017 is \nexpected at around 300 000 tonnes, up from the \n76 500 tonnes produced in 2016. Sorghum \noutput is expected to constitute a third of the total \n \n \n14 \nsmall grain output, with pearl millet and finger \nmillet accounting for the remainder. \nFood security \nWith the combined cereal production of around \n2.5 million exceeding the annual national \nrequirement of 1.8 million tonnes, the country is \nexpected to be self-sufficient in terms of grain in \n2017. \nThere may, however, be need to distribute grain \nto districts in some provinces, such as Masvingo, \nMatebeleland North and Matebeleland South, \nwhose grain output is insufficient to cover the \nrequirement for the whole year. \n Livestock \nAccording to the First Round Crop and \nLivestock Assessment Report, the livestock \ncondition has improved considerably, compared \nto the previous season, on account of improved \ngrazing and water availability. There was, \nhowever, a general decline in meat output across \nall livestock classes in the first quarter of 2017. \nThis was attribuable to restocking by farmers, \nfollowing the depletion of stock due to the \nimpact of the 2015/16 drought season. \nCattle \nCattle slaughtered in the formal sector stood at \n60 768 head, a decline of 11% from the \nslaughters realized in the previous quarter. The \nslaughters were also 10% lower than those in the \nfirst quarter of 2016. The decline in slaughters \ncould be attributed to farmers withholding cattle \nas they rebuild their herd, following forced \nofftake due to drought in the previous season. \n \nTable 7 shows the total number of cattle \nslaughtered in the first and fourth quarters of \n2016 and the first quarter of 2017. \nTable 7: Cattle slaughtered in the formal \nsector \n \n2016 \nQ1 \n2016 \nQ4 \n2017 \nQ1 \nCattle \n67 331 \n69 006 \n60 768 \nSource: Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation \nDevelopment \n \nThe bulk of the slaughters were done at private \nabattoirs, with about 6.6% of the slaughters done \nby the Cold Storage Company, a trend that has \npersisted since the opening up of the meat \nindustry. \n \n \nPigs \nThe number of pigs slaughtered declined during \nthe first quarter of 2017, compared to the \nprevious quarter, as farmers withheld parent \nstock. This reflected farmers’ optimism on the \navailability of stock feeds during the year. \nAgainst this background, slaughters for the first \nquarter of 2017 at 38 002 pigs, were lower than \nthe 41 137 pigs in the comparable period in 2016 \nand the 40 964 pigs in the fourth quarter of 2016. \n \nFigure 8 shows the monthly performance of \nColcom relative to other abattoirs in the four \nquarters of 2016 and first quarter of 2017. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n15 \nFigure 8: Quarterly Pig Slaughters in 2016 \n \n Source: Ministry of Agriculture, 2017 \n \nDairy \nMilk output decreased by 2.13% to 15.6 million \nlitres in the first quarter of 2017, compared to \n15.93 million litres produced in the same period \nin 2016. This was also 6.8% lower than the \n16.7 million litres produced in the last quarter of \n2016. Table 8 show the milk production outturn \nfor 2016 and 2017. \n \nTable 8: Quarterly Milk Output (million litres) in \n2016 and 2017 \nMonth \nQ1 \n2016 \nQ1 \n2017 \nVariance % \nJan \n5.52 \n5.54 \n0.39 \nFeb \n5.04 \n4.39 \n-12.77 \nMarch \n5.38 \n5.66 \n5.24 \nTotal \n15.93 \n15.59 \n-2.13 \n Source: Dairy Services, 2017 \n \nThe decline in milk output in the first quarter of \n2017 largely resulted from increased incidences \nof mastitis, \ndue to excessive rains \nin \nFebruary 2017. The heavy rains also worsened \nthe condition of cattle pens, thereby, stressing \nthe cows and reducing feeding time. \n \nMINING \nDevelopments during the first two months of \n2017 indicate that most key minerals such as \nPGMs, \ncoal \nand \nnickel \nunderperformed, \ncompared to the first two months of 2016. The \nquarterly mining production figures are shown in \nTable 9. \n \n \nTable 9: Quarterly Mining Production Statistics \n \n2017 \nBudget \nProjection \nJan-Feb \n2017 \nActual \nOutturn \nJan-Feb \n2016 \nActual \nOutturn \nVariance \n(%) \n \n \n \n \n \nChrome \\t \n(000) \n375 \n317* \n- \n \nCoal \\t \n(000) \n3,000 \n385* \n754* \n-49% \nCobalt \\t \n450 \n68 \n79 \n-14% \nCopper \\t \n9,336 \n1,535 \n1,723 \n-11% \nGold \\kg \n24,500 \n3,372 \n3,337 \n1% \nGraphite \\t \n7,200 \n326 \n1,099 \n-70% \nIridium \\t \n650 \n94 \n133 \n-29% \nNickel \\t \n18,098 \n2,759 \n3,029 \n-9% \nPaladium \n\\kg \n12,400 \n2,004 \n2,365 \n-15% \nPlatinum \n\\kg \n15,500 \n2,418 \n2,951 \n-18% \nRhodium \n\\kg \n1,500 \n221 \n247 \n-11% \nRuthenium \n\\kg \n1300 \n192 \n206 \n-7% \nDiamonds \n1,900 \n567,024 \n603,950 \n-6% \nSource: MOFED, RBZ, Ministry of Mines, Chamber \nof Mines, 2017 \n \n \n \n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n35\n40\n45\n50\nQ1:2016 Q2:2016 Q3:2016 Q4:2016 Q1:2017\nThousands\nColcom\nOther\n \n \n16 \nGold \nGold output registered a growth of 1% during the \nfirst two months of 2017, compared to the same \nperiod in 2016. The less than anticipated \nperformance \nwas, \npartly, \nattributable \nto \nexcessive rains in February 2017, which \nadversely impacted the potential of miners to \nincrease production. \n \nTotal deliveries to Fidelity Printers and Refiners \n(FPR) during the first quarter of 2017 at \n4 636.8 kg, were lower than in the same period \nin 2016 by 1.6%, as shown in Figure 9. \n \nFigure 9: Gold deliveries to FPR: Q1 2016 vs Q1 \n2017 \n \nSource: FPR, 2017 \n \nTargeted gold output of 24 500 kg for the year \n2017 is expected to be achieved, following the \ninterventions by Government and the Central \nBank. The Central Bank put in place a \nUS$40 million Gold Support Facility which has \nresulted in a notable improvement in gold \ndeliveries to FPR, especially from small scale \ngold miners. The compliance monitoring by the \nGold Monitoring Committee, a collaborative \neffort between the Ministry of Mines and Mining \nDevelopment and the Reserve Bank of \nZimbabwe, has also assisted in plugging \nleakages of the precious metal. \nCoal \nCoal output stood at 385 000 tonnes in first \nquarter of 2017, about 50% lower than the \n754 319 tonnes realized during the same period \nin 2016. Production was weighed down by \nequipment challenges at Hwange, due to delays \nin the procurement of critical spares. \n \nCoal offtake also remained constrained by the \nsustained decline in capacity utilization and \ncompany closures, mainly in the manufacturing \nsector. In addition, coal miners were constrained \nby cash flow challenges due to late payment for \ndeliveries by the Zimbabwe Power Company \n(ZPC); delays in procurement of spare parts and \nequipment; lack of capitalisation; and high cost \nstructures, among other challenges. \n \nDiamond \nDiamond output stood at 567 024 carats in the \nfirst quarter of 2017, about 6% lower than \n603 590 carats produced in the comparable \nperiod in 2016. The planned mining of the \ndiamond-rich Mbada concessions by the \nZimbabwe Consolidated Diamond Company \n(ZCDC) beginning the last half of April this \nyear, as well as incorporation of the DTZ-\nOTZGEO concession expected from July 2017, \nis expected to increase diamond output beyond \nthe projected 1.9 million carats by year end. \n \n0\n500\n1000\n1500\n2000\n2500\n3000\n3500\n4000\n4500\n5000\nLarge scale\nSmall Scale\nTotal\nKg\nQ1 2016\nQ1 2017\n \n \n17 \nPlatinum \nCumulative platinum output stood at 2 418 kg \nduring the first 2 months of 2017, about 18% \nlower than the 2 951 kg produced during the \nsame period in 2016. This notwithstanding, the \nprojected output of 15 500kg for 2017 is \nachievable. \n \nNickel \nNickel production was 2 759 tonnes, during the \nfirst two months of 2017, with 1 266 tonnes \ncoming from the primary producer and \n1 494 tonnes from PGMs. This was, however, \nlower than the 3 029 tonnes realized in the \ncomparable period in 2016. Nickel production \ndeclined on account of frequent equipment \nbreakdowns, and shareholder challenges at \nBNC. \n \nChrome \nChrome ore output stood at 317 000 tonnes, \nduring the first quarter of 2017, 15.5% below the \nprojected output of 375 000 tonnes for 2017. The \noutput for the year 2017 is now expected to reach \n550 000 tonnes, well in excess of the initial \nprojection, following the firming of international \nchrome ore prices and strong demand from \nChina. \n \nMANUFACTURING \nThe manufacturing sector is projected to grow \nby 0.1% in 2017, on account of improved \nactivity in foodstuffs, wood and furniture, \ndrinks, tobacco and beverages, and non- metallic \nmineral product sub-sectors. \n \nManufacturing sector activities continued to \nbenefit from Government’s intervention, in the \nform of import management strategies, through \nStatutory Instrument (SI 64) that saw the \ndemand for locally produced goods increase. \nThe implementation of SI 64 gave local firms \nlatitude to retool and increase production. In \naddition, measures to enhance, and reduce the \ncost of doing business also had a positive impact \non the sector. Seven bills promoting the ease of \ndoing business went through Parliament during \nthe first quarter of 2017. \n \nDrinks, Tobacco and Beverages \nSubdued sales volumes were reported across the \nbeer categories, during the first quarter of 2017. \nThis was largely on account of depressed \naggregate demand and intermittent product \nshortages, \noccasioned \nby \nwater \nsupply \ndisruptions. Sparkling beverages were adversely \nimpacted \nby \nincreased \nimports \nfrom \nneighbouring countries which are covered by \npreferential trade protocols. The inaccessibility \nof the rural markets due to heavy rains affected \nthe sorghum beer sub-category. \n \nPlastic Products \nThe demand for plastic products was spurred by \nhousing \ndevelopment \nprojects, \nand \nthe \nrehabilitation of the old piping infrastructure. \nThe projects were carried out through private \npublic partnerships and by non-governmental \norganizations. In addition, growth was also \nunderpinned by orders for mining projects. The \nrestriction on imports of certain products under \nStatutory 64 of 2016, including some plastic \npipes, resulted in increased local demand for \nplastic products. \n \n \n \n18 \nELECTRICITY \n \nA total of 1 975.7 GWh of electricity were \ngenerated and sent out during the first quarter of \n2017, up by 11% from the 1 777.2 GWh \nproduced during the comparative period in 2016. \nThis was also 18.9% higher than the 1 662.7 \nGWh, produced during the last quarter of 2016. \n \nElectricity generation increased largely due to \nthe 50% increase in water allocation at Kariba \nPower Station, in line with rising dam levels. \nResultantly, first quarter output from Kariba \nPower Station increased by 40%, to 981.1 Gwh \nin 2017 from 702.8 GWh in 2016. \n \nThermal Power Stations sent out a combined \n899.5 GWh, 14% lower than output in the same \nperiod in 2016. This was due to the extensive \nrefurbishments of Hwange Unit 6 and Munyati \nPower Stations. \n \nTable 10 shows output from major power \nstations and Independent Power Producers, \n(IPP), during in the first quarter of 2017. \n \nTable 10: Electricity output (GWh) \nStation \nJan \nFeb \nMar \nKariba \n299.5 \n326.4 \n355.1 \nHwange \n175.5 \n180.1 \n241.2 \nBulawayo \n1.4 \n270.8 \n0.9 \nMunyati \n- \n- \n- \nHarare \n14.5 \n8.1 \n7.0 \nIIP \n43.0 \n28.5 \n23.5 \nTotal \n533.9 \n814.0 \n627.8 \nSource: ZPC, ZERA 2017 \n \n \n \n \nSmall hydro-power stations contributed 95 GWh \nto total energy sent out during the period January \nto March 2017. \n \nFigure 10 shows the performance of other small \npower stations in the country. \n \n \nFigure 10: Energy sent out by small hydro-power \nstations (January - March 2017) \n \nSource: ZERA, 2017 \n \nINFLATION DEVELOPMENTS \n \nAnnual headline inflation rate which had been in \nthe negative the whole of 2016, accelerated into \nthe positive, from -0.7% in January 2017 to \n0.01% in February 2017 and 0.21% in March \n2017. The increase in headline inflation was \nlargely driven by food inflation. Figure 11 shows \nthe annual inflation profile for the period from \nJanuary 2015 to March 2017. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nJan 16\nFeb 16\nMar 16\nENERGY (GWH)\nPungwe B\nDema\nOther IPPs\n \n \n19 \nFigure 11: Annual Inflation Profile (%) \n \nSource: Zimstat, 2017 \n \nAnnual Food Inflation \nThe year-on-year food inflation accelerated from \nan average of -1.5% in the last quarter of 2016, \nto an average of 0.7% in the first quarter of 2017. \nThe increase in food prices in the first quarter of \n2017 could be attributed to food shortages just \nbefore the harvesting period. Meat prices \nincreased, reflecting low supply, as farmers held \non to their cattle in light of improved pastures \nand water, following a period of forced \ndestocking that occurred in 2016. \n \nAnnual Non-Food Inflation \nAlthough remaining in the negative, annual non-\nfood inflation also accelerated from an average \nof -0.8% in the last quarter of 2016, to -0.5% in \nthe first quarter of 2017. The rise in non-food \ninflation during the first quarter of 2017 was due \nto increases in furniture, household equipment \nand maintenance; recreation and culture; \nmiscellaneous \ngood \nand \nservices \nand \ncommunication. \n \n \nInflation Outlook \nGlobal developments, such as the continued \nfirming of South Africa rand against the United \nStates dollar, as well as the expected increase in \noil and food prices, are likely to push up \ndomestic prices in the medium term. In this \nregard, average annual inflation is expected to \nrange between 2.0% and 3.0% in 2017. \n \nFISCAL DEVELOPMENTS \nCumulative Government revenue for the first \nquarter of 2017 stood at US$881.6 million, \nagainst total expenditure of US$1.1 billion, \nresulting in a budget deficit of US$181 million, \nas shown in Figure 12. \nFigure 12: First Quarter Fiscal Developments \n (2015-2017) \n \nSource: Ministry of Finance and Economic \nDevelopment, 2017. \n \n-5\n-4\n-3\n-2\n-1\n0\n1\n2\nJan 2015\nMar 2015\nMay 2015\nJul 2015\nSep 2015\nNov 2015\nJan 2016\nMar 2016\nMay 2016\nJul 2016\nSep 2016\nNov 2016\nJan 2017\nMar 2017\nFood\nNon-Food\nHeadline\n-400\n-200\n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1000\n1200\nQ1 2015\nQ1 2016\nQ1 2017\nTotal Revenue\nTotal expenditure and net lending\nDeficit\n \n \n20 \nThe deficit was largely financed through \ndomestic sources, in particular the RBZ \noverdraft and Treasury bill issuances. \nGovernment Revenue \n \nCumulative \nrevenue \ninflows \nstood \nat \nUS$881.6 million in the first quarter of 2017, \nwhich \nwas \n0.4% \nbelow \nthe \ntarget \nof \nUS$885 million. The revenue inflows were, \nhowever, higher than the comparable period in \n2016, as shown in Figure 13. \n \nFigure 13: Quarterly Revenue Collections \n(Targets and Actuals) \n \n Source: \nMinistry \nof \nFinance \n& \nEconomic \nDevelopment, 2017 \n \nThe period under review saw all tax revenue \nheads, with the exception of VAT, perform \nbelow target as shown in Figure 14. \n \n \n \n \nFigure 14: Quarterly Revenue inflows \n (Targets and Actuals) \nSource: Ministry of Finance and Economic \nDevelopment, 2017 \nGovernment Expenditure \nGovernment expenditure amounted to US$1.062 \nbillion during the first quarter of 2017, \nsurpassing the target of US$983.4 million by \nUS$79.2 million. Employment costs accounted \nfor the largest proportion of total expenditure, \nconstituting \n66.8%, \nfollowed \nby \ncapital \nexpenditure and net lending at 16.3%; operations \nand maintenance, 13%; and interest payments, \n3.9%. Figure 15 shows the expenditure \nperformance per head for the first quarters of \n2016 and 2017. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n808.4\n881.6\n920.7\n885.0\n740.0\n760.0\n780.0\n800.0\n820.0\n840.0\n860.0\n880.0\n900.0\n920.0\n940.0\nQ1 2016\nQ1 2017\nQuarterly Revenue Inflows\nQuarterly Revenue Targets\n0.0\n50.0\n100.0\n150.0\n200.0\n250.0\n300.0\n350.0\nTax on\nIncome\nand\nprofits\nCustoms\nduties\nExcise\nduties\nValue\nAdded\nTax\n(VAT)\nOther\nindirect\ntaxes\nNon-tax\nRevenue\nQ1 2017 Actual\nQ1 2017 Target\n \n \n21 \nFigure 15: Expenditure Head Performance \n(Q1 2016 and Q1 2017) \n \n \nSource: \nMinistry \nof \nFinance \n& \nEconomic \nDevelopment \n \nEmployment costs at US$709.7 million during \nthe first quarter of 2017, were about 6% below \nthe target of US$754.4 million. This was due to \nthe implementation of measures to reduce \nemployment costs. The measures included the \nrationalization of payment of staff benefits to \ncivil servants, as well as staff at foreign missions \nand the removal of duplicated functions in \nGovernment \ndepartments, \namong \nother \nmeasures instituted in the last half of 2016. \nThese \nmeasures \nresulted \nin \nGovernment \nrealizing savings of about US$9.9 million on the \nmonthly wage bill. \n \n \n \n \n4. MONETARY \nDEVELOPMENTS, \nINTEREST RATES AND FINANCIAL \nMARKETS \n \nMonetary Developments \nBroad money supply recorded an increase of \n4.29%, from US$5 638.3 million in December \n2016 to US$5 771.6 million in March 2017. The \ngrowth \nwas, \nhowever, \na \nslowdown \nof \n2.6 percentage points from the 6.8% recorded in \nthe last quarter of 2016. \nThe growth in money supply was reflective of \nthe quarterly expansion in time deposits, 4.0%; \nand transferable deposits, 2.8%. Partially \noffsetting these increases, was a decline of 4.4% \nin negotiable certificates of deposits. The growth \nin money supply in the first quarter of the year \nwas mainly attributed to tobacco selling season \nrelated inflows and the domestic financing of the \nbudget deficit through Treasury Bills and the \noverdraft. \nOn an annual basis, money supply grew by \n20%, from US$4 899.8 million in March 2016. \nFigure 16 shows annual broad money supply in \nnominal terms as well as growth rates. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n0.0\n200.0\n400.0\n600.0\n800.0\n1000.0\n1200.0\nQ1 2016\nQ1 2017\n \n \n22 \nFigure 16: Annual Broad Money Supply Growth \n Rates and Levels \n \n Source: RBZ, 2017 \n \nDomestic Credit \nNet domestic credit increased by 3.3%, to \nUS$7 920.2 million, from US$7 669.5 million \nrecorded in the fourth quarter of 2016. The \ngrowth was on the back of an increase of 766% \nin net credit to Government. The increase in net \ncredit to Government, reflected increased \nrecourse to bank sources of financing by the \nfiscus. \n \nCredit extended to the private sector, however, \ndeclined by 0.96% to US$3 494.3 million, from \nUS$3 528.4 million in the previous quarter. The \ndecline partly reflected cautionary lending by \nbanks. \n \n \nThe sectoral distribution of credit during the \nperiod under review shows that households \nclaimed the largest share of bank credit at 22.2%, \nfollowed by agriculture, 16.5%; services, \n13.96%; and manufacturing, 13.6% (see figure \n17). Credit to households, however, includes \nagriculture and small to medium enterprises \n(SMEs). Some SMEs borrow on account of \nindividuals. \nFigure 17: Sectoral Distribution of credit \nSource: RBZ, 2016 \nInterest Rates \nDuring the quarter under review, nominal \nlending rates quoted by banks ranged between \n6% and 18%. Banks are, however, expected to \nreduce their maximum lending rates to 12%, in \nline with the Central Bank’s call to stimulate the \neconomy through low borrowing costs, whilst at \nthe same time cognizant of moral hazard of low \n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\nDec-15\nJan-16\nFeb-16\nMar-16\nApr-16\nMay-16\nJun-16\nJul-16\nAug-16\nSep-16\nOct-16\nNov-16\nDec-16\nJan-17\nFeb-17\nMar-17\nANNUAL GROWTH %\nUS$ BILLION\nTransferable Deposits\nTime Deposits\nNCDs\nCurrency in Circulation\nGrowth\nHouseholds\n22.21%\nAgriculture\n16.52%\nServices\n13.96%\nManufacturing\n13.58%\nFinancial \nOrganisation\ns and \ninvestiments\n11.78%\nDistribution\n10.69%\nMining\n6.18%\nTransport \nand \nCommunicati\non\n2.46%\nConstruction\n2.12%\nOther\n0.50%\n \n \n23 \ninterest rates in an environment of scarcity of \nforeign exchange. Average maximum interest \nrates for 60-day and 90-day deposits declined \nfrom 5.6% and 6.03% to 5.5% and 5.8%, \nrespectively. \n \n5. STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS \n \nDuring the first quarter of 2017, there was \nsubdued trading on the Zimbabwe Stock \nExchange (ZSE), as most investors usually adopt \na wait and see trading strategy at the beginning \nof the year. Consequently, the ZSE lost \nUS$136.7 \nmillion \nworth \nof \nmarket \ncapitalization. This reflected a 3.4% decline, \nfrom US$4.01 billion at the end of December \n2016 to US$3.9 billion as at 31st March 2017. On \na year-on-year basis, however, the ZSE \nregistered a 46.4% growth in capitalization, from \nUS$2.6 billion as at 31st March 2016. \n \nFigure 18: Market Capitalization \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2017 \n \n \nIndustrial Index \nDuring the quarter under review, the industrial \nindex decreased by 3.9%, from 144.5 points as \nat 31st December 2016 to 139.0 points at the end \nof the first quarter of 2017. The steady decline in \nthe industrial index since the beginning of the \nquarter under review can largely be attributed to \nthe traditional slow start at the beginning of the \nyear and the cautious approach by investors, in \nlight of the prevailing challenging economic \nconditions. \n \nFigure 19: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Indices \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2017 \n \nMining Index \nThe resources index registered a marginal gain \nof 0.1% to close the quarter under review at 58.6 \npoints. The increase in the mining index was \nlargely boosted by investor demand in RioZim \nand Bindura Nickel Corporation (BNC). \n \nIn a bid to increase its gold output and \nprofitability, RioZim acquired a 100% stake in \nPalatial Gold Investments, a wholly owned \nsubsidiary of Falcon Gold Zimbabwe Limited. \n2,000\n2,500\n3,000\n3,500\n4,000\n4,500\n31-Mar-16\n30-Apr-16\n31-May-16\n30-Jun-16\n31-Jul-16\n31-Aug-16\n30-Sep-16\n31-Oct-16\n30-Nov-16\n31-Dec-16\n31-Jan-17\n28-Feb-17\n31-Mar-17\nUS$ Millions\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\n100\n70\n90\n110\n130\n150\n170\n190\nMar-16\nApr-16\nMay-16\nJun-16\nJul-16\nAug-16\nSep-16\nOct-16\nNov-16\nDec-16\nJan-17\nFeb-17\nMar-17\nMining\nIndustrial\nIndustrial Index\nMining Index\n \n \n24 \nMarket Turnover \nThe quarter under review was generally \ncharacterized by depressed demand. This \nresulted in both turnover volume and value \ndecreasing by 62.7% and 34.8% to 262.2 million \nshares and US$47 million, respectively. Foreign \ninvestor participation declined, resulting in net \noutflows of US$15.4 million during the quarter \nending 31st March 2017. \n \n6. PAYMENT, \nCLEARING \nAND \nSETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES \n \nThe value of transactions processed through the \nNational Payment Systems in the quarter ending \n31st March 2017, decreased by 3.0% to \nUS$16.9 billion, from US$17.5 billion recorded \nin the last quarter of 2016. Volumes, however, \nincreased by 2% to 127.7 million for the quarter \nending 31st March 2017, from 124.6 million \nduring the quarter ending 31st December 2016. \nTable 11 shows the consolidated transactional \nactivities for the first quarter of 2017. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nTable 11: Consolidated Transactional Activities \nTRANSACTIONAL ACTIVITIES \nPayment \nStream \nFourth \nquarter \nending \n31 \nDec 2016 \nFirst quarter \nending \n31 \nMar 2017 \nChange \nfrom \nlast \nquarter \nProporti\non \n \nVALUES IN US$ Million \n \nRTGS \n13,634.91 \n12,930.53 \n-5% \n72.20% \nCHEQUE \n20.53 \n21.87 \n7% \n0.12% \nPOS \n1,166.04 \n1,088.24 \n-7% \n6.08% \nATMS \n268.90 \n187.60 \n-30% \n1.05% \nMOBILE \n1,687.72 \n1,639.45 \n-3% \n9.15% \nINTERNET \n711.06 \n1,042.67 \n47% \n5.82% \nCASH \n1,259.23 \n998.29 \n-21% \n5.57% \nTOTAL \n18,748.38 \n17,908.66 \n-4% \n100% \n \nVOLUMES \n \n \nRTGS \n1,054,516 \n1,090,519 \n3% \n0.81% \nCHEQUE \n84,263 \n85,428 \n1% \n0.06% \nPOS \n27,980,637 \n32,832,343 \n17% \n24.54% \nATMs \n3,541,194 \n3,049,291 \n-14% \n2.28% \nMOBILE \n91,555,712 \n89,974,295 \n-2% \n67.24% \nINTERNET \n402,154 \n641,972 \n59% \n0.48% \nCASH \n4,958,635 \n6,136,384 \n24% \n4.59% \nTOTAL \n129,577,111 \n133,810,232 \n 3% \n100% \nSource: RBZ, 2017 \n \n \n \n \n \n25 \nLarge Value Payments \nZimbabwe \nElectronic \nTransfer \nand \nSettlement System \n \nThe value of transactions processed through the \nRTGS \nsystem \ndecreased \nby \n5% \nto \nUS$12.9 billion during the quarter ending \n31st March 2017, from the US$13.6 billion \nrecorded in the quarter ending 31st December \n2016. The volume of transactions registered an \nincrease of 3%, to 1, 090, 519 in the first quarter \nof 2017 from 1, 054,516 in the fourth quarter of \n2016 as shown in Figure 20. \nFigure 20 : RTGS Values and Volumes \n \n \n Source: RBZ, 2017 \n \nSWIFT Foreign Currency Transactions \nSWIFT foreign currency payments decreased by \n8% to US$0.93 billion for the quarter ending \n31st March 2017, from US$1.00 billion in the \nquarter ending 31st December 2016. During the \nsame period, SWIFT foreign currency receipts \nalso decreased by 13%, to US$0.82 billion in the \nfirst quarter of 2017 from US$0.94 billion in the \nfourth quarter of 2016, as shown in Figure 21. \n \nNet foreign currency outflows amounted to \nUS$106.84 million, during the quarter under \nreview. Figure 21 shows trends in SWIFT \nforeign currency transactions. \nFigure 21: SWIFT Cross Border Transactions \n \n \nSource: RBZ, 2017 \n \nOver the Counter Cash Withdrawals \nThe value of cash withdrawals decreased by \n20.72%, from US$1.26 billion during the quarter \nending 31st December 2016 to US$0.998 billion \nrecorded in the quarter ending 31st March 2017. \nThe corresponding volumes, however, increased \nby 23.75%, from 4.96 million during the fourth \nquarter of 2016 to 6.14 million in the first quarter \nof 2017, as shown in Figure 22. \n \n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1,000\n1,200\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n16\n 2015\nQ4\n 2016\nQ1\n2016\nQ2\n2016\nQ3\n2016\nQ4\n2017\nQ1\nRTGS Values in Billions\nRTGS Volumes in Thousamds\nValues\nVolumes\n20\n25\n30\n35\n40\n45\n0.5\n0.6\n0.7\n0.8\n0.9\n1.0\n1.1\n1.2\n1.3\n1.4\nQuarter\nending\nMar 2016\nQuarter\nending\nJune\n2016\nQuarter\nending\nSept\n2016\nQuarter\nending\nDec 2016\nQuarter\nending\nMar 2017\nVolumes in Thousands\nValue in US$B\nValue of Receipts\nValue of Payments\n Volumes of Payments\n Volumes of Receipts\n \n \n26 \nFigure 22: Over the Counter Cash Withdrawals \n \n \nSource: RBZ, 2017 \n \nRetail Payments \nThe trends in the values and volumes of retail \ntransactions, from the fourth quarter of 2016 to \nthe first quarter of 2017, indicated that electronic \npayment transactions (mobile, point of sale and \ninternet) increased in line with the Bank’s \nobjective for economy to move to a cash-lite \nsociety. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFigure 23: Values of Retail Transactions \n \n \nSource: RBZ, 2016 \n \nFigure 24 : Volumes of Retail Transactions \n \n \nSource: RBZ, 2017 \n0.00\n0.50\n1.00\n1.50\n2.00\n2.50\n3.00\n3.50\n2015\nQ4\n2016\nQ1\n2016\nQ2\n2016\nQ3\n2016\nQ4\n2017\nQ1\n0.0\n1.0\n2.0\n3.0\n4.0\n5.0\n6.0\n7.0\nUS$ BILLIONS\nMILLIONS\nVolumes\nValues\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n35\n40\n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1,000\n1,200\n1,400\n1,600\n1,800\n2015\nQ4\n2016\nQ1\n2016\nQ2\n2016\nQ3\n2016\nQ4\n2017\nQ1\nCheques (US$ millions)\nOther Retail Transactions (US$millions)\nPOS\nATMS\nMOBILE\nINTERNET\nCHEQUE\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\n100\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n35\n2015\nQ4\n2016\nQ1\n2016\nQ2\n2016\nQ3\n2016\nQ4\n2017\nQ1\nMobile Volumes in Millions\nOther Retai Volumes in Millions\nCHEQUE\nPOS\nATMs\nINTERNET\nMOBILE\n \n \n27 \nCollateral2 \n \nThe value of collateral increased to US$31.92 \nmillion in the first quarter of 2017, from \nUS$29.40 million recorded in the fourth quarter \nof 2016 as shown in Figure 25. \n \nFigure 25: Total Collateral \n \n \nSource: RBZ, 2016 \n \nAccess Points and Devices \n \nThere was an increase in access points and \naccess devices between the fourth quarter of \n2016 and the first quarter of 2017. \n \n2The collateral figure comprises of cheque and Zimswitch \ncard payment stream amounts. \nMobile banking agents decreased to 40,540 in \nquarter ending 31st March 2017, from 40,590 in \nthe quarter ending 31st December 2016. The \ndecrease was mainly attributable to Ecocash, \nwhich deregistered or de-risked agents who were \ninvolved in illegal activities in December 2016. \n \nThe POS population increased to 40,011 in first \nquarter of 2017, from 32,629 in the fourth \nquarter. The increase showed that the promotion \nof electronic means of payment was bearing \nfruits. The ATM population, however, decreased \nfrom 569 in the fourth quarter of 2016 to 557 in \nthe first quarter of 2017. \n \nActive mobile financial services subscribers \nregistered in first quarter of 2017, decreased to \n3.21 million, from 3.28 million registered during \nthe fourth quarter of 2016. \n \nTable 12 shows statistics for access points and \ndevices for the third and fourth quarters of 2016, \nand for the first quarter of 2017. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n0.00\n0.50\n1.00\n1.50\n2.00\n2.50\n3.00\n3.50\n2015\nQ4\n2016\nQ1\n2016\nQ2\n2016\nQ3\n2016\nQ4\n2017\nQ1\n0.0\n1.0\n2.0\n3.0\n4.0\n5.0\n6.0\n7.0\nUS$ BILLIONS\nMILLIONS\nVolumes\nValues\n \n \n28 \nTable 12: Payment Systems Access Points and \nDevices \nPAYMENT SYSTEMS ACCESS POINTS \n \n \n \nQ3 2016 \nQ4 2016 \nQ1 2017 \nMobile \nBanking \nAgents \n37,131 \n40,590 \n40,540 \nATMs \n566 \n569 \n557 \nPOS \n24,110 \n32,629 \n40,011 \nPAYMENT SYSTEMS ACCESS DEVICES \n \n \nDebit Cards \n2,890,731 \n3,127,153 \n3,359,455 \nCredit Cards \n14,813 \n16,030 \n16,945 \nPrepaid \nCards \n38,660 \n43,288 \n46,593 \nActive \nMobile \nBanking \nSubscribers \n3,289,271 \n3,279,049 \n3,214,001 \nInternet \nBanking \nSubscribers \n128,297 \n168,339 \n177,920 \nSource: RBZ, 2017 \nRESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE \nJUNE 2017 \n \nSTATISTICAL TABLES \n \n1. Depository Corporation Survey S1 \n2. Central Bank Survey S2 \n3. Other Depository Corporation Survey S3 \n \n4. Liabilities and Assets of the Central Bank \n4.1.Reserve Bank: Liabilities \n \n \n S4 \n \n4.2.Reserve Bank: Assets S5 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n5. Other Depository Corporation \n5.1.Other Depository Asset S6 \n5.2.Other Depository Liabilities S7 \n \n6. Commercial Banks \n6.1.Commercial Banks: Assets \n \n S8 \n6.2.Commercial Banks: Liabilities \n S9 \n7. Building Societies \n \n \n \n \n \n \n7.1.Building Societies: Assets \n \n S10 \n \n7.2.Building Societies: Liabilities S11 \n \n \n \n8. Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks \n8.1.Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks’ Loans and Advances S12 \n8.2.Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Bank’s Deposits \n \n S13 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n9. National Payment Systems \n \n \n9.1.Values of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS14 \n9.2.Volumes of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS14 \n \n10. Interest Rates, Security Yields and Prices \n10.1. Lending Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS15 \n10.2. Deposit Rates S15 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n11. Stock Exchange Indices \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS16 \n \n12. Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n12.1. Monthly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS17 \n12.2. Quarterly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS18 \n12.3. Annual Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS19 \n \n \n \n30 \n13. Balance of Payments \n13.1. Cross Border Payments \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS20 \n13.2. Cross Border Receipts \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS21 \n \n14. External Sector \n14.1. External Debt Outstanding By Debtor \n \n \n \n \nS22 \n14.2. External Debt Outstanding by Source \n \n \n \n \nS23 \n \n15. National Accounts \n15.1. Real Gross Domestic and National Product per Capita at Market Prices \nS24 \n15.2. Gross Domestic Product at Factor Cost by Industry \n \n \nS25 \n15.3. Expenditure on Gross Domestic Product \n \n \n \n \nS26 \n15.4. Mineral Production \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS27 \n15.5. Electricity Produced and Distributed S28 \n15.6. Volume of Manufacturing Index \n \n \n \n \n \nS29 \n \n \n \n \nMar-16\nJun-16\nJul-16\nAug-16\nSep-16\nOct-16\nNov-16\nDec-16\nJan-17\nFeb-17\nMar-17\nNet Foreign Assets\n-565,520.55\n-502,899.96\n-393,113.03\n-371,494.66\n-365,714.85\n-564,842.79\n-636,688.80\n-555,620.67\n-584,011.92\n-574,374.12\n-559,959.05\nCentral Bank(net)\n-578,047.53\n-473,442.49\n-379,979.17\n-390,409.11\n-383,854.74\n-545,842.19\n-591,305.32\n-573,721.83\n-583,214.44\n-588,800.77\n-585,362.68\nForeign Assets\n338,958.10\n393,393.91\n383,799.11\n354,937.59\n343,840.92\n416,996.33\n364,866.78\n410,827.76\n449,211.75\n445,565.06\n419,948.30\nForeign Liabilities\n-917,005.63\n-866,836.39\n-763,778.28\n-745,346.70\n-727,695.66\n-962,838.52\n-956,172.09\n-984,549.60\n-1,032,426.19\n-1,034,365.82\n-1,005,310.99\nOther Depository Corporations(net)\n12,526.97\n-29,457.47\n-13,133.86\n18,914.44\n18,139.89\n-19,000.60\n-45,383.48\n18,101.16\n-797.49\n14,426.64\n25,403.64\nForeign Assets\n352,856.02\n278,419.49\n283,718.30\n309,754.41\n295,146.25\n278,185.36\n244,421.21\n297,836.79\n270,935.31\n290,763.66\n275,104.70\nForeign Liabilities\n-340,329.05\n-307,876.96\n-296,852.16\n-290,839.97\n-277,006.36\n-297,185.96\n-289,804.69\n-279,735.63\n-271,732.80\n-276,337.02\n-249,701.07\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n5,465,303.32\n5,617,915.82\n5,457,438.42\n5,552,228.17\n5,642,801.47\n5,877,742.21\n6,056,699.56\n6,193,901.69\n6,247,448.43\n6,346,016.00\n6,439,892.69\nDomestic Claims\n6,740,480.37\n6,989,689.04\n6,895,453.88\n6,978,485.30\n7,059,099.99\n7,180,307.48\n7,554,069.08\n7,669,496.22\n7,643,349.84\n7,761,845.88\n7,920,221.15\nClaims on Central Government(net)\n2,877,471.73\n3,192,583.42\n3,134,575.48\n3,227,067.12\n3,299,875.31\n3,381,436.05\n3,679,166.52\n3,747,719.59\n3,862,196.57\n4,003,963.78\n4,034,942.83\nClaims on Central Government\n2,986,445.17\n3,305,953.61\n3,267,213.20\n3,373,077.05\n3,445,300.69\n3,516,314.57\n3,824,753.66\n3,908,493.46\n3,940,983.14\n4,084,363.34\n4,147,553.19\nCentral Bank\n1,738,859.81\n1,865,005.08\n1,790,569.21\n1,929,962.12\n1,954,616.32\n1,970,042.75\n2,306,454.54\n2,337,460.53\n2,270,562.63\n2,355,433.48\n2,337,736.94\nODCs\n1,247,585.36\n1,440,948.54\n1,476,643.99\n1,443,114.93\n1,490,684.38\n1,546,271.82\n1,518,299.12\n1,571,032.92\n1,670,420.50\n1,728,929.86\n1,809,816.25\nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n-108,973.44\n-113,370.19\n-132,637.72\n-146,009.93\n-145,425.39\n-134,878.53\n-145,587.14\n-160,773.86\n-78,786.57\n-80,399.57\n-112,610.37\nClaims on Other Sectors\n3,863,008.64\n3,797,105.62\n3,760,878.40\n3,751,418.18\n3,759,224.68\n3,798,871.43\n3,874,902.55\n3,921,776.63\n3,781,153.27\n3,757,882.10\n3,885,278.32\nOther Financial Corporations\n118,711.31\n122,525.52\n134,294.30\n130,939.44\n132,282.45\n124,852.98\n128,782.67\n119,157.29\n117,123.94\n79,035.53\n80,256.74\nState and Local Government\n42,766.93\n40,448.43\n48,803.79\n47,676.40\n43,554.41\n41,728.47\n37,784.82\n34,237.41\n35,909.11\n35,006.53\n34,312.18\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n196,741.14\n222,439.82\n257,749.06\n257,736.50\n234,348.95\n248,965.26\n244,277.53\n240,007.21\n242,356.99\n272,898.12\n276,370.51\nPrivate Sector\n3,504,789.27\n3,411,691.85\n3,320,031.24\n3,315,065.84\n3,349,038.87\n3,383,324.72\n3,464,057.53\n3,528,374.72\n3,385,763.22\n3,370,941.92\n3,494,338.88\nCentral Bank\n24,802.03\n24,517.65\n29,223.55\n25,871.86\n28,360.51\n28,496.47\n28,190.50\n31,268.19\n30,379.07\n13,888.69\n24,815.17\nODCs\n3,479,987.23\n3,387,174.20\n3,290,807.69\n3,289,193.98\n3,320,678.35\n3,354,828.25\n3,435,867.03\n3,497,106.53\n3,355,384.15\n3,357,053.23\n3,469,523.72\nOther Items(Net)\n1,275,177.04\n1,371,773.23\n1,438,015.46\n1,426,257.14\n1,416,298.52\n1,302,565.27\n1,497,369.51\n1,475,594.53\n1,395,901.41\n1,415,829.87\n1,480,328.45\nShares and Other Equity\n745,817.59\n808,263.47\n832,720.12\n846,025.31\n887,795.24\n915,505.55\n935,291.08\n1,470,571.26\n1,471,378.30\n1,481,807.04\n1,505,125.81\nLiabilities to Other Financial Corporations\n40,593.10\n50,664.77\n49,419.92\n44,517.02\n39,463.26\n31,567.03\n32,045.66\n52,038.47\n44,373.98\n46,621.66\n45,153.65\nRestricted Deposits\n151,399.31\n151,173.32\n149,999.92\n149,845.80\n153,471.12\n166,495.73\n180,899.67\n60,499.79\n66,478.53\n66,737.97\n67,789.29\nOther Items(net)\n337,367.05\n361,671.67\n405,875.51\n385,869.01\n335,568.90\n188,996.96\n349,133.11\n-107,514.99\n-186,329.41\n-179,336.79\n-137,740.30\nBroad Money-M3\n4,899,782.77\n5,115,015.85\n5,064,325.38\n5,180,733.50\n5,277,086.62\n5,312,899.41\n5,420,010.76\n5,638,281.02\n5,663,436.51\n5,771,641.88\n5,879,933.65\nSecurities Other than Shares Included in Broad Mo\n55,583.77\n80,952.14\n71,791.03\n80,840.29\n74,118.29\n73,356.67\n43,862.17\n62,894.35\n50,562.02\n59,329.24\n60,161.15\nBroad Money-M2\n4,844,199.00\n5,034,063.72\n4,992,534.36\n5,099,893.22\n5,202,968.33\n5,239,542.75\n5,376,148.60\n5,575,386.66\n5,612,874.49\n5,712,312.64\n5,819,772.50\nOther Deposits\n1,592,367.82\n1,569,208.72\n1,517,709.33\n1,553,347.70\n1,534,910.45\n1,508,943.19\n1,467,582.00\n1,471,657.19\n1,544,945.66\n1,552,644.56\n1,529,856.98\nNarrow Money-M1\n3,251,831.18\n3,464,854.99\n3,474,825.02\n3,546,545.52\n3,668,057.88\n3,730,599.56\n3,908,566.59\n4,103,729.48\n4,067,928.83\n4,159,668.08\n4,289,915.52\nTransferable Deposits\n3,244,219.06\n3,456,750.65\n3,466,614.21\n3,537,772.31\n3,658,634.63\n3,720,917.62\n3,889,717.47\n4,033,558.66\n3,985,443.09\n4,046,287.46\n4,147,742.43\nCurrency Outside Depository Corporations\n7,612.11\n8,104.35\n8,210.82\n8,773.21\n9,423.25\n9,681.93\n18,849.12\n70,170.81\n82,485.74\n113,380.62\n142,173.09\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbawe\nNote:\n(i) Depository corporations survey - formerly Monetary Survey.\n(ii) Broad money redefined using IMF's Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual of 2000. Major changes include exclusion of Government deposits held by banks from broad money.\n(iii) Transferable deposits made up of demand and savings deposits.\n(iv) NCDs are also referred to as securities included in broad money.\n(v) All classes of time deposits, short and long term are classified as time deposits, which are also termed other deposits.\n(vi) Credit to the private sector now excludes claims on other financial corporations, as well as claims on state and local government (local authorities)\n(vii) Depository corporations made up of the Central Bank and other depository corporations\n(viii) Other depository corporations (ODCs) - Commercial banks, merchant banks, building societies and POSB.\nTABLE 1: DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS SURVEY (US$ '000)\n \n \nS2 \n \n \n \n \n \nMar-16\nJun-16\nJul-16\nAug-16\nSep-16\nOct-16\nNov-16\nDec-16 \nJan-17\nFeb-17\nMar-17\nY\nO\nNet Foreign Assets\n-578,047.53\n-473,442.49\n-379,979.17\n-390,409.11\n-383,854.74\n-545,842.19\n-591,305.32\n-573,721.83\n-583,214.44\n-588,800.77\n-585,362.68\nClaims on Non Residents\n338,958.10\n393,393.91\n383,799.11\n354,937.59\n343,840.92\n416,996.33\n364,866.78\n410,827.76\n449,211.75\n445,565.06\n419,948.30\nOfficial Reserves Assets\n239,511.43\n293,946.47\n285,543.05\n255,805.98\n244,677.43\n316,461.39\n266,511.75\n309,331.78\n350,427.48\n346,696.05\n320,526.53\nOther Foreign Assets\n99,446.67\n99,447.43\n98,256.06\n99,131.61\n99,163.49\n100,534.95\n98,355.02\n101,495.99\n98,784.27\n98,869.01\n99,421.78\nLess Liabilities to Non Residents\n917,005.63\n866,836.39\n763,778.28\n745,346.70\n727,695.66\n962,838.52\n956,172.09\n984,549.60\n1,032,426.19\n1,034,365.82\n1,005,310.99\nShort Term Liabilities\n502,331.05\n450,321.22\n349,757.38\n351,510.63\n331,152.07\n482,116.69\n481,842.04\n515,365.90\n558,302.10\n560,678.78\n528,171.18\nOther Foreign Liabilities\n414,674.58\n416,515.17\n414,020.90\n393,836.06\n396,543.59\n480,721.84\n474,330.06\n469,183.69\n474,124.08\n473,687.04\n477,139.81\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n1,373,237.64\n1,483,098.69\n1,431,538.49\n1,528,966.57\n1,582,075.13\n1,651,349.30\n1,910,944.27\n2,046,457.01\n2,082,987.44\n2,193,388.18\n2,189,787.86\nDomestic Claims\n1,772,064.33\n1,937,013.69\n1,909,144.81\n2,028,462.52\n2,036,657.48\n2,070,285.42\n2,396,766.46\n2,420,011.99\n2,449,800.81\n2,551,097.25\n2,545,403.08\nNet Claims on Central Government\n1,646,828.49\n1,777,241.09\n1,708,832.27\n1,830,889.20\n1,852,931.02\n1,878,215.64\n2,207,020.45\n2,218,852.08\n2,244,839.79\n2,330,293.56\n2,312,027.68\nClaims on Central Government\n1,738,859.81\n1,865,005.08\n1,790,569.21\n1,929,962.12\n1,954,616.32\n1,970,042.75\n2,306,454.54\n2,337,460.53\n2,270,562.63\n2,355,433.48\n2,337,736.94\nOf which: Securities Other than Shares\n289,991.30\n283,077.80\n279,010.40\n283,933.50\n260,822.30\n259,945.20\n250,270.16\n566,328.08\n577,431.69\n562,535.65\n551,741.20\nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n92,031.32\n87,763.98\n81,736.94\n99,072.93\n101,685.30\n91,827.11\n99,434.09\n118,608.45\n25,722.84\n25,139.92\n25,709.26\nOf which: Deposits\n92,031.32\n87,763.98\n81,736.94\n99,072.93\n101,685.30\n91,827.11\n99,434.09\n118,608.45\n25,722.84\n25,139.92\n25,709.26\nClaims on Other Sectors\n125,235.84\n159,772.59\n200,312.54\n197,573.32\n183,726.46\n192,069.78\n189,746.01\n201,159.91\n204,961.02\n220,803.69\n233,375.40\nOther Financial Corporations\n12,706.89\n11,717.92\n14,072.39\n14,485.45\n14,842.27\n18,107.69\n18,890.01\n16,515.86\n16,900.44\n18,434.72\n18,570.34\nState and Local Government\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n87,726.92\n123,537.02\n157,016.59\n157,216.02\n140,523.67\n145,465.62\n142,665.50\n153,375.86\n157,681.51\n188,480.28\n189,989.89\nPrivate Sector\n24,802.03\n24,517.65\n29,223.55\n25,871.86\n28,360.51\n28,496.47\n28,190.50\n31,268.19\n30,379.07\n13,888.69\n24,815.17\nClaims on Other Depository Corporations\n259,206.18\n223,418.95\n224,948.10\n203,523.49\n199,637.85\n145,431.17\n164,922.74\n140,331.70\n112,720.51\n115,953.17\n106,865.33\nOther Liabilities to ODCs\n263,048.23\n273,601.27\n276,345.66\n277,697.37\n277,611.11\n278,881.87\n280,278.62\n268,568.70\n269,925.53\n255,446.41\n242,394.50\nOther Items(Net)\n394,984.64\n403,732.68\n426,208.76\n425,322.07\n376,609.09\n285,485.42\n370,466.32\n245,317.99\n209,608.36\n218,215.84\n220,086.04\nMonetary Base Incl. foreign currency clearing balances\nMonetary Base \n795,190.112\n1,009,656.202\n1,051,559.320\n1,138,557.468\n1,198,220.393\n1,105,507.110\n1,319,638.956\n1,472,735.173\n1,499,773.004\n1,604,587.411\n1,604,425.179\nBond Notes and Coins in Circulation\n9,138.275\n9,719.251\n9,831.185\n10,353.400\n11,050.358\n11,102.753\n23,414.148\n86,733.884\n102,691.796\n132,681.828\n154,732.753\nLiabilities to ODCs\n784,713.349\n996,320.429\n1,032,687.846\n1,123,924.446\n1,183,078.547\n1,093,687.178\n1,292,654.095\n1,385,011.220\n1,395,502.072\n1,467,941.594\n1,446,635.592\nReserve Deposits\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\nOther\n784,713.349\n996,320.429\n1,032,687.846\n1,123,924.446\n1,183,078.547\n1,093,687.178\n1,292,654.095\n1,385,011.220\n1,395,502.072\n1,467,941.594\n1,446,635.592\nPrivate Deposits\n1,338.488\n3,616.522\n9,040.289\n4,279.622\n4,091.489\n717.178\n3,570.712\n990.069\n1,579.135\n3,963.989\n3,056.833\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbawe\nTABLE 2: CENTRAL BANK SURVEY (US$'000)\n \n \nS3 \n \n \n \n \nMar-16\nJun-16\nJul-16\nAug-16\nSep-16\nOct-16\nNov-16\nDec-16\nJan-17\nFeb-17\nMar-17\nNet Foreign Assets\n12,526.97\n-29,457.47\n-13,133.86\n18,914.44\n18,139.89\n-19,000.60\n-45,383.48\n18,101.16\n-797.49\n14,426.64\n25,403.64\nClaims on Non Residents\n352,856.02\n278,419.49\n283,718.30\n309,754.41\n295,146.25\n278,185.36\n244,421.21\n297,836.79\n270,935.31\n290,763.66\n275,104.70\nOf Which: Foreign Currency\n178,995.76\n124,614.66\n111,032.19\n148,463.11\n96,321.10\n88,598.31\n76,252.73\n107,687.14\n110,979.79\n96,836.03\n66,426.17\nDeposits\n173,601.40\n153,552.10\n172,433.28\n161,037.37\n198,569.69\n189,337.46\n167,926.29\n189,886.91\n159,688.03\n193,663.57\n208,412.27\nOther\n258.86\n252.73\n252.83\n253.93\n255.46\n249.59\n242.19\n262.74\n267.49\n264.07\n266.26\nLess Liabilities to Non Residents\n340,329.05\n307,876.96\n296,852.16\n290,839.97\n277,006.36\n297,185.96\n289,804.69\n279,735.63\n271,732.80\n276,337.02\n249,701.07\nOf Which: Deposits\n150,887.08\n152,069.73\n150,944.72\n146,501.12\n142,949.55\n146,422.62\n136,426.63\n142,073.73\n137,945.79\n135,779.65\n117,026.45\nLoans\n189,441.97\n155,807.23\n145,907.44\n144,338.85\n134,056.82\n150,763.34\n153,378.06\n137,661.90\n133,787.01\n140,557.37\n132,674.61\nOther\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n4,878,305.20\n \n5,132,752.46\n \n5,060,208.14\n \n5,148,766.23\n \n5,245,432.00\n \n5,321,500.90\n \n5,442,974.41\n \n5,549,018.98\n \n5,580,169.12\n \n5,639,870.63\n \n5,709,300.08\n \nDomestic Claims\n4,968,416.04\n \n5,052,675.36\n \n4,986,309.07\n \n4,950,022.79\n \n5,022,442.51\n \n5,110,022.06\n \n5,157,302.61\n \n5,249,484.24\n \n5,193,549.03\n \n5,210,748.62\n \n5,374,818.07\n \nNet Claims on Central Government\n1,230,643.24\n \n1,415,342.33\n \n1,425,743.21\n \n1,396,177.93\n \n1,446,944.29\n \n1,503,220.41\n \n1,472,146.07\n \n1,528,867.51\n \n1,617,356.78\n \n1,673,670.22\n \n1,722,915.15\n \nClaims on Central Government\n1,247,585.3619\n \n1,440,948.5355\n \n1,476,643.9874\n \n1,443,114.9290\n \n1,490,684.3763\n \n1,546,271.8214\n \n1,518,299.1187\n \n1,571,032.9250\n \n1,670,420.5050\n \n1,728,929.8577\n \n1,809,816.2513\n \nSecurities\n1,225,003.3297\n \n1,412,869.1273\n \n1,450,083.5207\n \n1,420,220.1988\n \n1,463,404.5297\n \n1,517,535.6764\n \n1,500,671.4257\n \n1,553,239.1020\n \n1,654,534.6290\n \n1,713,961.3077\n \n1,794,113.0553\n \nLoans\n22,582.0322\n \n28,079.4082\n \n26,560.4666\n \n22,894.7303\n \n27,279.8466\n \n28,736.1450\n \n17,627.6930\n \n17,793.8230\n \n15,885.8760\n \n14,968.5500\n \n15,703.1960\n \nOther \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n(0.0000)\n \n-\n \n(0.0000)\n \n0.0000\n \n(0.0000)\n \n0.0000\n \n-\n \nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n(16,942.1215)\n \n(25,606.2057)\n \n(50,900.7775)\n \n(46,937.0009)\n \n(43,740.0913)\n \n(43,051.4118)\n \n(46,153.0502)\n \n(42,165.4109)\n \n(53,063.7244)\n \n(55,259.6416)\n \n(86,901.1009)\n \nClaims on Other Sectors\n3,737,772.8017\n \n3,637,333.0280\n \n3,560,565.8611\n \n3,553,844.8587\n \n3,575,498.2216\n \n3,606,801.6478\n \n3,685,156.5434\n \n3,720,616.7211\n \n3,576,192.2507\n \n3,537,078.4083\n \n3,651,902.92\n \nOther Financial Corporations\n106,004.42\n \n110,807.60\n \n120,221.91\n \n116,453.99\n \n117,440.18\n \n106,745.29\n \n109,892.67\n \n102,641.44\n \n100,223.50\n \n60,600.81\n \n61,686.40\n \nState and Local Government\n42,766.93\n \n40,448.43\n \n48,803.79\n \n47,676.40\n \n43,554.41\n \n41,728.47\n \n37,784.82\n \n34,237.41\n \n35,909.11\n \n35,006.53\n \n34,312.18\n \nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n109,014.22\n \n98,902.80\n \n100,732.47\n \n100,520.49\n \n93,825.28\n \n103,499.64\n \n101,612.03\n \n86,631.35\n \n84,675.48\n \n84,417.84\n \n86,380.62\n \nPrivate Sector\n3,479,987.23\n \n3,387,174.20\n \n3,290,807.69\n \n3,289,193.98\n \n3,320,678.35\n \n3,354,828.25\n \n3,435,867.03\n \n3,497,106.53\n \n3,355,384.15\n \n3,357,053.23\n \n3,469,523.72\n \nClaims on the Central Bank\n810,741.643\n \n1,017,467.818\n \n1,055,340.530\n \n1,178,684.455\n \n1,209,909.110\n \n1,156,606.119\n \n1,323,120.314\n \n1,435,556.219\n \n1,475,197.651\n \n1,507,778.322\n \n1,498,477.568\n \nBond Notes and Coins\n1,526.163\n \n1,614.904\n \n1,620.368\n \n1,580.191\n \n1,627.106\n \n1,420.818\n \n4,565.027\n \n16,563.071\n \n20,206.055\n \n19,301.209\n \n12,559.660\n \nReserves\n809,215.480\n \n1,015,852.915\n \n1,053,720.162\n \n1,177,104.264\n \n1,208,282.003\n \n1,155,185.301\n \n1,318,555.287\n \n1,418,993.147\n \n1,454,991.597\n \n1,488,477.113\n \n1,485,917.908\n \nLiabilities to the Central Bank\n1.832\n0.691\n2.585\n0.242\n0.723\n0.106\n0.219\n1750.127\n0.244\n1.8\n1752.651\nOther Items(Net)\n900,850.66\n \n937,390.03\n \n981,438.87\n \n979,940.77\n \n986,918.90\n \n945,127.17\n \n1,037,448.30\n \n1,134,271.35\n \n1,088,577.32\n \n1,078,654.52\n \n1,162,242.90\n \nShares and Other Equity\n1,103,911.46\n \n1,160,998.70\n \n1,174,877.57\n \n1,188,635.39\n \n1,194,352.25\n \n1,211,644.10\n \n1,228,902.77\n \n1,271,826.05\n \n1,272,987.21\n \n1,279,285.69\n \n1,301,867.36\n \nLiabilities to other financial corporations\n37,325.07\n \n47,396.74\n \n46,151.88\n \n41,248.99\n \n36,195.23\n \n28,299.00\n \n28,777.63\n \n48,770.44\n \n41,105.95\n \n43,353.63\n \n41,885.62\n \nOther Items(Net)\n(240,385.87)\n \n(271,005.41)\n \n(239,590.58)\n \n(249,943.61)\n \n(243,628.59)\n \n(294,815.93)\n \n(220,232.10)\n \n(186,325.14)\n \n(225,515.85)\n \n(243,984.80)\n \n(181,510.08)\n \nDeposits and Securities Included in Broad Money\n4,890,832.17\n \n5,103,294.98\n \n5,047,074.28\n \n5,167,680.67\n \n5,263,571.88\n \n5,302,500.30\n \n5,397,590.93\n \n5,567,120.14\n \n5,579,371.63\n \n5,654,297.27\n \n5,734,703.72\n \nDeposits Included in Broad Money\n4,835,248.40\n \n5,022,342.85\n \n4,975,283.25\n \n5,086,840.39\n \n5,189,453.59\n \n5,229,143.63\n \n5,353,728.76\n \n5,504,225.78\n \n5,528,809.61\n \n5,594,968.03\n \n5,674,542.57\n \nTransferable Deposits\n3,242,880.58\n \n3,453,134.13\n \n3,457,573.92\n \n3,533,492.69\n \n3,654,543.14\n \n3,720,200.45\n \n3,886,146.76\n \n4,032,568.59\n \n3,983,863.96\n \n4,042,323.47\n \n4,144,685.59\n \nOther Deposits\n1,592,367.82\n \n1,569,208.72\n \n1,517,709.33\n \n1,553,347.70\n \n1,534,910.45\n \n1,508,943.19\n \n1,467,582.00\n \n1,471,657.19\n \n1,544,945.66\n \n1,552,644.56\n \n1,529,856.98\n \nMoney Market Instruments\n55,583.77\n \n80,952.14\n \n71,791.03\n \n80,840.29\n \n74,118.29\n \n73,356.67\n \n43,862.17\n \n62,894.35\n \n50,562.02\n \n59,329.24\n \n60,161.15\n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbawe\nTABLE 3: OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS SURVEY ( US '000)\n \n \nS4 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ Thousands\nEnd of\nGold\nOther\nTotal\nTreasury Bills\nCentral\nBanks\nOther\nGovt.\nOther\nOther Assets\nTOTAL\nGovernment\nStock\n2014\n485.7\n356,094.1\n356,579.8\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n3,538.7\n0.0\n31,250.4\n478,749.2\n870,118.0\n2015\n15,643.5\n417,809.4\n433,452.9\n213,918.6\n158,684.9\n19,985.9\n128,307.0\n0.0\n29,863.5\n93,530.5\n1,077,743.3\n2016\nJan\n15,448.5\n408,820.6\n424,269.1\n212,269.6\n191,516.5\n19,985.9\n125,595.0\n0.0\n32,363.5\n97,194.4\n1,103,194.1\nFeb\n15,493.9\n375,316.3\n390,810.3\n253,708.5\n215,576.7\n19,985.9\n84,651.5\n0.0\n32,363.5\n101,077.2\n1,098,173.6\nMar\n15,497.9\n319,054.8\n334,552.7\n289,991.3\n208,465.9\n15,000.0\n86,029.9\n0.0\n33,758.9\n88,509.7\n1,056,308.3\nApr\n15,505.8\n339,102.6\n354,608.4\n295,759.5\n220,311.2\n15,000.0\n94,145.2\n0.0\n35,798.9\n102,743.4\n1,118,366.5\nMay\n15,489.8\n391,892.0\n407,381.8\n275,759.5\n251,942.7\n15,000.0\n107,168.1\n0.0\n35,798.9\n108,474.9\n1,201,525.9\nJun\n15,532.3\n373,471.8\n389,004.0\n283,077.8\n273,946.1\n1,016.0\n120,524.9\n0.0\n35,798.9\n117,263.6\n1,220,631.3\nJul\n540.4\n380,349.6\n380,890.0\n279,010.4\n316,117.8\n1,016.0\n154,877.0\n0.0\n41,007.8\n98,353.0\n1,271,272.0\nAug\n530.9\n351,879.1\n352,410.1\n283,933.5\n359,398.8\n4,016.0\n153,568.3\n0.0\n41,320.3\n93,713.7\n1,288,360.7\nSep\n530.9\n340,997.3\n341,528.2\n260,822.3\n403,450.3\n4,016.0\n138,238.7\n0.0\n41,383.1\n96,129.6\n1,285,568.3\nOct\n512.7\n412,852.6\n413,365.2\n259,945.2\n446,963.6\n6,016.0\n142,763.4\n0.0\n44,951.6\n99,887.2\n1,413,892.3\nNov\n477.8\n362,866.7\n363,344.5\n250,270.2\n729,196.5\n2,000.0\n139,797.9\n0.0\n45,144.1\n99,868.3\n1,629,621.5\nDec\n461.4\n405,940.2\n406,401.6\n566,328.1\n473,574.6\n2,000.0\n133,393.3\n0.0\n45,144.1\n98,487.0\n1,725,328.6\n2017\nJan\n480.3\n448,731.4\n449,211.7\n577,431.7\n1,693,130.9\n112,720.5\n157,544.7\n0.0\n47,416.3\n373,809.2\n3,411,265.1\nFeb\n506.3\n445,058.7\n445,565.1\n562,535.7\n1,792,897.8\n115,953.2\n168,881.8\n0.0\n51,921.8\n369,305.2\n3,507,060.7\nMar\n502.9\n419,445.4\n419,948.3\n551,741.2\n1,785,995.7\n106,865.3\n181,453.6\n0.0\n51,921.8\n375,158.7\n3,473,084.6\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2017 \nLoans and advances\nInvestments\n Foreign Assets\nTABLE 4.1: RESERVE BANK - ASSETS\n \n \nS5 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nTABLE 4.2: RESERVE BANK - LIABILITIES\nCapital\nand\nForeign\ngeneral\nEnd of\nNotes and\nBankers Deposits \nOther Deposits\nGovt. Deposits\nTotal Deposits\nLiabilities\nreserve\nOther Liabilities\nTOTAL\ncoins* in\ncirculation\n2014\n780.6\n463,303.1\n144.5\n25,063.7\n488,511.2\n1,020,936.5\n-1,154,483.9\n514,373.6\n870,118.0\n2015\n7,960.8\n555,252.4\n726.0\n41,051.4\n597,029.7\n1,096,800.8\n-1,086,695.2\n462,647.2\n1,077,743.3\n2016\nJan\n8,573.9\n678,906.5\n1,832.8\n48,555.7\n729,295.0\n1,090,485.7\n-1,183,887.9\n458,727.3\n1,103,194.1\nFeb\n8,895.6\n713,682.3\n2,086.4\n51,278.7\n767,047.4\n1,117,823.6\n-1,248,400.6\n452,807.6\n1,098,173.6\nMar\n9,138.3\n784,713.3\n1,423.3\n52,453.3\n838,589.9\n1,075,644.5\n-1,320,215.0\n453,150.7\n1,056,308.3\nApr\n9,308.7\n830,998.4\n5,061.6\n59,783.6\n895,843.6\n1,117,787.5\n-1,378,072.5\n473,499.1\n1,118,366.5\nMay\n9,502.1\n945,135.9\n3,602.5\n59,269.1\n1,008,007.4\n1,184,783.0\n-1,466,087.9\n465,321.4\n1,201,525.9\nJun\n9,719.3\n996,320.4\n3,701.2\n48,186.9\n1,048,208.5\n1,042,014.2\n-1,375,368.2\n496,057.6\n1,220,631.3\nJul\n9,831.2\n1,032,687.8\n9,125.9\n42,155.7\n1,083,969.4\n935,954.6\n-1,261,544.1\n503,060.9\n1,271,272.0\nAug\n10,353.4\n1,123,924.4\n4,363.6\n59,494.6\n1,187,782.7\n944,035.4\n-1,355,937.9\n502,127.2\n1,288,360.7\nSep\n11,050.4\n1,183,078.5\n4,176.7\n62,001.1\n1,249,256.4\n931,544.6\n-1,358,922.0\n452,638.9\n1,285,568.3\nOct\n11,102.8\n1,093,687.2\n802.3\n52,214.0\n1,146,703.4\n1,106,477.2\n-1,327,696.7\n477,305.6\n1,413,892.3\nNov\n23,414.1\n1,292,654.1\n3,655.5\n59,823.0\n1,356,132.6\n1,076,069.2\n-1,389,294.2\n563,299.8\n1,629,621.5\nDec\n86,733.9\n1,385,011.2\n1,075.3\n78,996.1\n1,465,082.6\n1,129,360.3\n-1,373,542.7\n417,694.5\n1,725,328.6\n2017\nJan\n102,691.8\n1,395,502.1\n337,983.2\n25,722.8\n1,759,208.1\n1,032,426.2\n198,391.1\n318,547.9\n3,411,265.1\nFeb\n132,681.8\n1,467,941.6\n326,148.4\n25,139.9\n1,819,229.9\n1,034,365.8\n202,521.4\n318,261.8\n3,507,060.7\nMar\n154,732.8\n1,446,635.6\n313,240.6\n25,709.3\n1,785,585.5\n1,005,311.0\n203,258.5\n324,197.0\n3,473,084.6\n*Bond coins first issued in December 2014\n*Bond Notes first issued in November 2016\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2017\nDeposits\nUS$ Thousands\n \n \nS6 \n \n \n \n \nForeign\nTOTAL\nEnd of\nNotes\nBond\n&\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \n Notes &\nCoin\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment\n1\nLocal Governemt\nPublic Enterprises\nOther\n2\nGovernment\nLocal \nPublic \nOther Institutional Units\n3\nOther cliams\nContigent Assets Other Assets\nNon Financial \nCoins\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\nGovernment\nEnterprises\nAssets\n2016\nJan\n1.22\n \n193.28\n734.58\n294.53\n116.1\n25.0\n1,147.0\n28.8\n5.2\n19.1\n28.5\n15.6\n63.6\n3,547.4\n110.2\n582.8\n412.8\n545.1\n7,870.8\nFeb\n1.44\n \n160.35\n763.47\n287.06\n102.8\n25.0\n1,228.9\n29.2\n5.2\n19.0\n25.0\n15.8\n61.1\n3,472.0\n100.5\n477.1\n427.3\n547.6\n7,748.9\nMar\n1.53\n \n179.00\n809.22\n286.42\n148.6\n25.0\n1,225.0\n28.5\n5.1\n16.4\n22.6\n14.2\n103.9\n3,510.6\n59.3\n471.0\n428.0\n552.9\n7,887.2\nApr\n1.55\n \n146.02\n818.74\n323.00\n111.8\n25.0\n1,322.7\n27.6\n5.1\n15.8\n25.1\n15.0\n102.4\n3,453.7\n66.7\n413.7\n445.5\n552.2\n7,871.5\nMay\n1.53\n \n100.12\n973.06\n281.55\n91.0\n25.0\n1,354.1\n26.8\n5.0\n16.6\n12.3\n14.7\n101.1\n3,433.4\n61.0\n397.0\n440.2\n564.1\n7,898.5\nJun\n1.61\n \n124.61\n1,015.85\n287.98\n128.5\n25.0\n1,412.9\n25.9\n0.0\n16.4\n28.1\n14.6\n98.9\n3,414.9\n66.9\n407.7\n431.5\n578.8\n8,080.1\nJul\n1.62\n \n111.03\n1,053.72\n242.57\n147.4\n25.0\n1,450.1\n33.4\n0.0\n16.2\n26.6\n15.4\n100.7\n3,320.9\n74.2\n393.1\n416.7\n592.4\n8,021.1\nAug\n1.58\n \n148.46\n1,177.10\n235.02\n136.0\n25.0\n1,420.2\n32.3\n0.0\n11.3\n22.9\n15.4\n100.5\n3,326.8\n67.8\n390.2\n445.0\n598.3\n8,153.9\nSep\n1.63\n \n96.32\n1,208.28\n310.75\n173.6\n25.0\n1,463.4\n29.0\n5.4\n3.2\n27.3\n14.5\n88.4\n3,349.0\n86.1\n382.3\n448.6\n606.6\n8,319.5\nOct\n1.42\n \n88.60\n1,155.19\n322.05\n162.3\n27.0\n1,517.5\n26.3\n15.4\n3.9\n28.7\n15.5\n88.1\n3,389.7\n68.2\n397.2\n427.7\n609.0\n8,343.8\nNov\n4.57\n \n76.25\n1,318.56\n318.52\n140.9\n27.0\n1,500.7\n22.3\n15.5\n4.6\n17.6\n15.4\n86.1\n3,469.5\n71.9\n350.5\n419.0\n618.2\n8,477.2\nDec\n16.56\n \n107.69\n1,418.99\n378.23\n162.9\n27.0\n1,553.2\n21.0\n15.3\n4.9\n17.8\n13.2\n71.3\n3,265.0\n330.1\n376.7\n408.8\n626.0\n8,814.8\n2017\nJan\n20.21\n \n110.98\n1,454.99\n239.82\n132.7\n27.0\n1,654.5\n20.8\n15.4\n3.6\n15.9\n15.1\n69.2\n3,394.7\n57.5\n395.7\n383.4\n630.4\n8,642.1\nFeb\n19.30\n \n96.84\n1,488.48\n251.83\n145.1\n48.6\n1,714.0\n20.1\n15.5\n3.2\n15.0\n14.9\n68.9\n3,177.9\n236.8\n398.5\n400.0\n631.1\n8,746.0\nMar\n12.56\n \n66.43\n1,485.92\n260.51\n154.9\n53.5\n1,794.1\n18.7\n15.7\n3.8\n15.7\n15.7\n70.7\n3,460.5\n67.2\n422.4\n442.5\n635.1\n8,995.8\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2017\nNotes\n1.Government securities includes treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households, other financial corporations, \nTABLE 5.1: - OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS -ASSETS\nUS$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \nS7 \n \n \n \n \nDebt Securities Foreign Liabilities\nCapital\nContigent\nOther\nTotal\nand\nLiablities\nLiablities\nEnd of\nDemand\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nReserves\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\n2016\n Jan\n2,487.3\n650.3\n1,536.5\n4,674.2\n388.1\n26.4\n5,088.7\n44.9\n356.5\n0.0\n125.0\n86.0\n1,189.0\n582.8\n397.8\n7,870.76\n \n Feb\n2,466.2\n669.7\n1,552.9\n4,688.8\n375.0\n20.4\n5,084.1\n50.3\n341.1\n0.0\n171.7\n36.4\n1,196.7\n477.1\n391.3\n7,748.89\n \n Mar\n2,566.3\n676.8\n1,592.4\n4,835.5\n371.0\n16.9\n5,223.5\n55.6\n340.1\n0.0\n181.1\n37.3\n1,185.3\n471.0\n393.5\n7,887.24\n \n Apr\n2,629.9\n695.1\n1,568.6\n4,893.7\n332.4\n18.5\n5,244.6\n80.1\n322.6\n0.0\n194.0\n36.9\n1,188.4\n413.7\n391.2\n7,871.55\n \n May\n2,698.3\n690.6\n1,559.5\n4,948.4\n309.8\n19.5\n5,277.7\n71.6\n336.1\n0.0\n143.5\n36.8\n1,238.7\n397.0\n397.2\n7,898.54\n \n June\n2,792.4\n660.9\n1,569.2\n5,022.5\n401.4\n25.6\n5,449.5\n81.0\n307.7\n0.0\n159.4\n47.4\n1,243.5\n407.7\n384.0\n8,080.12\n \n July\n2,734.8\n722.9\n1,517.7\n4,975.5\n435.1\n50.9\n5,461.5\n71.8\n296.6\n0.0\n129.6\n46.2\n1,256.6\n393.1\n365.6\n8,021.06\n \n Aug\n2,894.5\n639.2\n1,553.3\n5,087.1\n412.3\n46.9\n5,546.3\n80.8\n290.6\n0.0\n127.6\n41.2\n1,271.0\n390.2\n406.1\n8,153.92\n \n Sep\n2,974.8\n679.9\n1,534.9\n5,189.6\n479.7\n43.7\n5,713.0\n74.1\n276.8\n0.0\n151.7\n36.2\n1,276.8\n382.3\n408.4\n8,319.46\n \n Oct\n3,115.2\n605.1\n1,508.9\n5,229.3\n433.8\n43.1\n5,706.1\n73.4\n297.0\n0.0\n162.4\n28.3\n1,293.5\n397.2\n385.9\n8,343.79\n \n Nov\n3,245.5\n640.8\n1,467.6\n5,353.9\n471.9\n46.2\n5,872.0\n43.9\n289.7\n0.0\n142.2\n28.8\n1,313.4\n350.5\n436.9\n8,477.19\n \n Dec\n3,329.8\n702.9\n1,471.7\n5,504.4\n510.9\n42.2\n6,057.4\n62.9\n279.6\n1.8\n191.5\n48.8\n1,384.1\n376.7\n412.1\n8,814.81\n \n2017\n Jan\n3,263.8\n720.5\n1,544.9\n5,529.3\n429.8\n53.1\n6,012.2\n50.6\n271.2\n0.0\n104.5\n41.1\n1,360.2\n395.7\n406.6\n8,642.14\n \n Feb\n3,325.9\n722.0\n1,552.6\n5,600.5\n426.0\n55.3\n6,081.7\n59.3\n270.8\n0.0\n126.1\n43.4\n1,365.8\n398.5\n400.4\n8,746.02\n \n Mar\n3,429.2\n715.7\n1,529.9\n5,674.7\n461.0\n86.9\n6,222.6\n60.2\n249.6\n1.8\n134.9\n41.9\n1,426.8\n422.4\n435.7\n8,995.81\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2017\nTABLE 5.2 : OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS - LIABILITIES \nUS$millions\nDeposits\nAmounts Owing to\n \n \nS8 \n \n \n \n \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nForeign\nBond\nNotes\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \nLocal\nPublic\nOther \nContigent \nNon Financial \n Notes &\n&\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment\n1\nLocal Governemt\nPublic Enterprises\nOther\n2\nGovernment\nGovernment\nEnterprises\n Institutional Units\n3\nOther claims\nAssets\nOther Assets\nAssets\nCoins\nCoin\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\n2016\nJan\n1.05\n \n171.98\n667.53\n119.20\n105.6\n25.0\n1,039.4\n0.0\n5.2\n19.1\n28.5\n15.6\n62.6\n2,703.9\n61.5\n582.8\n278.8\n396.6\n6,284.4\nFeb\n1.21\n \n140.75\n702.19\n96.28\n93.1\n25.0\n1,128.1\n0.0\n5.2\n19.0\n25.0\n15.8\n60.1\n2,615.0\n62.1\n477.1\n292.8\n399.3\n6,158.2\nMar\n1.31\n \n161.90\n734.53\n96.34\n131.7\n25.0\n1,143.3\n0.0\n5.1\n16.4\n22.6\n14.2\n102.9\n2,618.9\n62.6\n471.0\n298.0\n405.1\n6,311.1\nApr\n1.35\n \n135.51\n778.19\n135.47\n108.3\n25.0\n1,200.9\n0.0\n5.1\n15.8\n25.1\n15.0\n101.5\n2,573.6\n69.6\n413.7\n309.7\n404.7\n6,318.6\nMay\n1.38\n \n89.57\n891.44\n130.52\n85.3\n25.0\n1,229.5\n0.0\n5.0\n16.6\n12.3\n14.7\n100.1\n2,534.2\n64.0\n397.0\n302.2\n413.8\n6,312.8\nJun\n1.42\n \n108.53\n934.42\n84.65\n123.2\n25.0\n1,279.0\n0.0\n0.0\n16.4\n28.1\n14.6\n97.9\n2,523.7\n64.1\n407.7\n299.0\n431.6\n6,439.3\nJul\n1.45\n \n101.74\n977.63\n79.50\n141.3\n25.0\n1,316.9\n0.0\n0.0\n16.2\n26.6\n15.4\n99.7\n2,414.7\n65.7\n393.1\n284.0\n440.7\n6,399.6\nAug\n1.36\n \n140.23\n1,074.47\n97.53\n131.9\n25.0\n1,297.4\n0.0\n0.0\n11.3\n22.9\n15.4\n99.5\n2,414.8\n67.3\n390.2\n313.6\n447.3\n6,550.2\nSep\n1.40\n \n91.63\n1,122.67\n143.91\n169.6\n25.0\n1,331.9\n0.0\n5.4\n3.2\n27.3\n14.5\n87.3\n2,451.9\n71.4\n382.3\n317.3\n455.9\n6,702.6\nOct\n1.27\n \n81.03\n1,090.44\n130.20\n155.1\n27.0\n1,376.2\n0.0\n15.4\n3.9\n28.7\n15.5\n87.1\n2,472.1\n66.0\n397.2\n293.2\n458.2\n6,698.6\nNov\n4.24\n \n69.45\n1,242.12\n103.17\n136.3\n27.0\n1,349.8\n0.0\n15.5\n4.6\n17.6\n15.4\n85.2\n2,511.0\n68.5\n350.5\n285.6\n466.2\n6,752.2\nDec\n14.07\n \n98.95\n1,306.91\n134.35\n156.7\n27.0\n1,416.0\n0.0\n15.3\n4.9\n17.8\n13.2\n70.4\n2,380.1\n273.8\n376.7\n274.2\n473.4\n7,053.8\n2017\nJan\n17.72\n \n103.75\n1,322.38\n81.89\n128.2\n27.0\n1,485.0\n0.0\n15.4\n3.6\n15.9\n15.1\n68.6\n2,467.7\n53.9\n395.7\n251.9\n479.3\n6,933.1\nFeb\n16.29\n \n89.44\n1,396.07\n96.11\n137.3\n48.6\n1,502.5\n0.0\n15.5\n3.2\n15.0\n14.9\n68.2\n2,238.9\n239.7\n398.5\n266.0\n480.1\n7,026.4\nMar\n10.74\n \n63.27\n1,421.43\n83.18\n150.7\n53.5\n1,578.7\n0.0\n15.7\n3.8\n15.7\n15.7\n69.9\n2,554.3\n23.7\n422.4\n314.5\n484.0\n7,281.0\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2017\nNotes\n1.Government securities includes treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households, other financial corporations, \nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\nTABLE 6.1: - COMMERCIAL BANKS -ASSETS\nUS$ millions\n \n \nS9 \n \n \n \n \nUS$ millions\nEnd of\nDemand\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nCapital\nContigent\nOther\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\nand\nLiablities\nLiablities\nTotal\nReserves\n2016\n Jan\n2,428.8\n278.8\n967.1\n3674.77\n340.4\n24.7\n4,039.9\n33.6\n313.2\n0.0\n50.3\n85.3\n871.3\n582.8\n308.0\n6284.43\n Feb\n2,407.9\n290.0\n984.9\n3682.68\n337.3\n18.8\n4,038.7\n38.4\n298.9\n0.0\n91.0\n35.0\n878.1\n477.1\n301.0\n6158.19\n Mar\n2,508.0\n288.3\n1,026.9\n3823.12\n345.4\n15.4\n4,183.9\n43.2\n303.1\n0.0\n100.2\n36.1\n886.6\n471.0\n287.1\n6311.15\n Apr\n2,571.6\n297.5\n1,014.8\n3883.80\n306.8\n16.9\n4,207.6\n67.7\n285.7\n0.0\n119.4\n36.1\n893.9\n413.7\n294.4\n6318.60\n May\n2,639.9\n280.6\n1,042.8\n3963.37\n275.1\n17.9\n4,256.4\n57.9\n300.0\n0.0\n66.3\n36.1\n908.9\n397.0\n290.1\n6312.76\n June\n2,734.1\n268.2\n1,019.8\n4022.09\n331.6\n24.0\n4,377.6\n67.9\n272.3\n0.0\n77.8\n44.3\n915.7\n407.7\n276.0\n6439.33\n July\n2,676.5\n334.1\n987.4\n3997.93\n361.0\n33.8\n4,392.8\n58.2\n261.0\n0.0\n56.9\n45.8\n922.1\n393.1\n269.8\n6399.63\n Aug\n2,836.2\n285.6\n1,009.5\n4131.35\n341.3\n29.3\n4,501.9\n67.0\n257.0\n0.0\n51.1\n40.9\n932.3\n390.2\n309.8\n6550.23\n Sep\n2,915.9\n334.9\n987.8\n4238.62\n393.9\n25.8\n4,658.3\n62.9\n246.3\n0.0\n69.3\n35.9\n944.5\n382.3\n303.2\n6702.64\n Oct\n3,056.4\n267.0\n940.9\n4264.34\n344.5\n25.0\n4,633.9\n60.0\n267.7\n0.0\n74.5\n27.9\n954.5\n397.2\n283.0\n6698.61\n Nov\n3,186.7\n254.5\n896.9\n4338.05\n382.5\n28.0\n4,748.6\n29.3\n260.0\n0.0\n51.4\n28.2\n966.9\n350.5\n317.3\n6752.22\n Dec\n3,271.3\n285.7\n896.0\n4452.99\n418.3\n19.6\n4,890.9\n47.1\n250.7\n1.8\n111.6\n48.2\n1,032.7\n376.7\n294.0\n7053.81\n2017\n Jan\n3,205.0\n317.1\n981.8\n4503.86\n348.3\n30.4\n4,882.6\n36.9\n242.1\n0.0\n38.0\n40.4\n1,005.1\n395.7\n292.2\n6933.07\n Feb\n3,267.0\n318.3\n977.1\n4562.41\n349.8\n32.6\n4,944.9\n47.5\n243.9\n0.0\n63.7\n42.9\n1,007.7\n398.5\n277.4\n7026.43\n Mar\n3,370.3\n313.3\n965.3\n4648.90\n390.8\n64.2\n5,103.9\n50.6\n225.6\n1.8\n66.3\n41.5\n1,061.6\n422.4\n307.3\n7281.03\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2017\nTABLE 6.2 : COMMERCIAL BANKS - LIABILITIES\nDeposits\nAmounts Owing to\n \n \nS10 \n \n \n \n \n \nForeign\nOther Assets\nNon Financial \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nNotes\nAssets\nBond\n&\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \n Notes &\nCoin\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment1\nLocal Governemt\nPublic Enterprises\nOther2\nMortgages\nGovernment\nOther\nCoins\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\n2016\nJan\n0.13\n \n17.39\n52.89\n174.89\n10.0\n0.0\n76.6\n28.8\n0.0\n0.0\n332.8\n0.0\n424.2\n107.9\n119.7\n1,345.3\nFeb\n0.20\n \n18.23\n51.29\n188.70\n9.2\n0.0\n65.6\n29.2\n0.0\n0.0\n330.2\n0.0\n428.9\n110.4\n119.6\n1,351.6\nMar\n0.19\n \n15.08\n63.72\n189.76\n16.6\n0.0\n50.8\n28.5\n0.0\n0.0\n345.4\n0.0\n407.7\n105.9\n119.4\n1,343.1\nApr\n0.19\n \n9.46\n24.44\n186.02\n3.4\n0.0\n90.9\n27.6\n0.0\n0.0\n332.5\n0.0\n406.6\n111.4\n119.2\n1,311.8\nMay\n0.14\n \n7.35\n65.79\n148.67\n5.5\n0.0\n93.3\n26.8\n0.0\n0.0\n339.8\n0.0\n421.5\n114.2\n122.3\n1,345.3\nJun\n0.18\n \n12.92\n66.94\n200.92\n5.2\n0.0\n103.7\n25.9\n0.0\n0.0\n353.3\n0.0\n402.0\n107.4\n119.3\n1,397.7\nJul\n0.16\n \n8.30\n63.25\n162.33\n5.7\n0.0\n101.6\n33.4\n0.0\n0.0\n346.8\n0.0\n426.1\n107.3\n123.8\n1,378.9\nAug\n0.20\n \n7.54\n84.78\n136.50\n4.1\n0.0\n95.1\n32.3\n0.0\n0.0\n353.4\n0.0\n416.6\n105.8\n123.4\n1,359.7\nSep\n0.21\n \n4.16\n67.01\n165.80\n3.8\n0.0\n95.5\n29.0\n0.0\n0.0\n354.4\n0.0\n417.1\n105.4\n123.3\n1,365.6\nOct\n0.12\n \n7.23\n52.19\n191.21\n6.8\n0.0\n100.9\n26.3\n0.0\n0.0\n356.9\n0.0\n427.0\n108.8\n123.4\n1,400.9\nNov\n0.14\n \n6.44\n54.76\n214.60\n3.9\n0.0\n114.9\n22.3\n0.0\n0.0\n381.2\n0.0\n444.9\n108.8\n124.7\n1,476.7\nDec\n1.72\n \n8.05\n89.65\n243.77\n5.1\n0.0\n91.3\n21.0\n0.0\n0.0\n379.8\n0.0\n430.2\n110.0\n124.4\n1,505.1\n0.0\n2017\nJan\n2.35\n \n7.02\n109.63\n157.70\n4.3\n0.0\n123.7\n20.8\n0.0\n0.0\n389.1\n0.0\n406.1\n106.3\n124.4\n1,451.4\nFeb\n1.19\n \n7.29\n69.26\n155.60\n7.4\n0.0\n162.0\n20.1\n0.0\n0.0\n394.4\n0.0\n410.1\n109.0\n124.2\n1,460.4\nMar\n1.65\n \n3.07\n35.53\n177.16\n4.0\n0.0\n164.2\n18.7\n0.0\n0.0\n404.4\n0.0\n413.0\n102.8\n124.2\n1,448.6\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2017\nNotes\n1.Government securities includes treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households, other financial corporations, \nTABLE 7.1: BUILDING SOCIETIES -ASSETS\nUS$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \nS11 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nCapital\nOther\nTotal\nand\nLiablities\nEnd of\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nReserves\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\n2016\n Jan\n297.8\n534.3\n832.14\n47.2\n0.1\n879.4\n22.6\n43.3\n0.0\n74.7\n0.0\n292.9\n32.3\n1345.27\n Feb\n305.9\n533.4\n839.34\n37.2\n0.1\n876.6\n23.2\n42.3\n0.0\n80.7\n0.9\n296.3\n31.5\n1351.56\n Mar\n314.1\n531.2\n845.28\n25.1\n0.0\n870.4\n23.6\n37.0\n0.0\n80.9\n0.8\n284.3\n46.0\n1343.06\n Apr\n317.6\n520.8\n838.41\n25.1\n0.0\n863.5\n23.7\n36.9\n0.0\n74.6\n0.5\n278.8\n33.9\n1311.79\n May\n330.8\n480.5\n811.31\n34.1\n0.0\n845.5\n25.0\n36.2\n0.0\n77.2\n0.5\n315.5\n45.5\n1345.27\n June\n313.1\n511.6\n824.71\n69.2\n0.0\n893.9\n24.4\n35.4\n0.0\n81.5\n3.1\n313.1\n46.3\n1397.68\n July\n313.4\n490.8\n804.18\n74.0\n15.5\n893.7\n24.8\n35.7\n0.0\n72.7\n0.4\n318.2\n33.4\n1378.87\n Aug\n278.7\n503.6\n782.31\n71.0\n16.1\n869.4\n25.1\n33.6\n0.0\n76.5\n0.4\n321.5\n33.3\n1359.67\n Sep\n270.8\n507.3\n778.11\n85.7\n16.4\n880.2\n22.5\n30.5\n0.0\n82.4\n0.3\n314.1\n35.5\n1365.62\n Oct\n267.3\n525.9\n793.19\n89.2\n16.4\n898.9\n24.6\n29.4\n0.0\n87.8\n0.4\n319.7\n40.1\n1400.87\n Nov\n311.8\n529.0\n840.82\n89.4\n16.5\n946.7\n25.8\n29.6\n0.0\n90.8\n0.6\n326.4\n56.8\n1476.66\n Dec\n339.5\n532.9\n872.41\n92.6\n16.6\n981.6\n27.0\n28.8\n0.0\n79.9\n0.5\n330.3\n56.9\n1505.10\n2017\n Jan\n326.2\n522.1\n848.23\n81.5\n16.6\n946.4\n25.0\n29.1\n0.0\n66.5\n0.7\n332.1\n51.7\n1451.40\n Feb\n326.1\n534.4\n860.48\n76.2\n16.6\n953.3\n23.1\n27.0\n0.0\n62.4\n0.5\n334.5\n59.7\n1460.43\n Mar\n319.7\n523.2\n842.91\n70.2\n16.7\n929.9\n20.9\n24.0\n0.0\n68.5\n0.3\n340.7\n64.3\n1448.62\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2017\nTABLE 7.2: BUILDING SOCIETIES -LIABILITIES\nUS$ millions\nAmounts Owing to\n \n \nS12 \n \n \n \n \nA GR IC U LTU R E\nC ON S TR U C TION\nC OM M U N IC A TION\nD IS TR IB U TION\nFIN A N C IA L \nFIN A N C IA L\nM A N U FA C TU R IN G\nM IN IN G\nS ER V IC ES\nTR A N S POR T\nIN D IV ID U A LS\nC ON GLOM ER A TES\nTOTA L\nEnd of \n \nIN V ES TM EN T\nOR GA N IS A TION S\n \n \n \n \n \n2009\n110,230.4\n12,406.6\n10,948.3\n151,169.9\n345.0\n32,093.2\n116,375.5\n36,259.7\n35,593.3\n12,726.1\n23,212.5\n1,016.1\n542,376.7\n2010\n238,969.8\n24,075.5\n15,855.7\n225,277.0\n384.6\n72,693.1\n218,621.4\n71,729.9\n112,325.2\n22,015.6\n86,980.6\n1,122.1\n1,090,050.4\n2011\n366,827.1\n36,043.9\n24,836.9\n323,322,2\n3,720.8\n87,963.3\n310,488.5\n75,310.4\n191,534.5\n55,295.7\n180,205.0\n4,726.2\n1,660,274.6\n2012\n444,341.0\n32,622.8\n37,353.2\n428,782.2\n8,513.2\n31,513.9\n414,044.9\n148,927.9\n233,864.4\n33,116.1\n288,628.5\n9,370.9\n2,111,078.9\n2013\n533,165.2\n42,285.1\n17,617.9\n435,613.1\n5,047.0\n62,165.8\n389,181.2\n115,404.6\n379,809.3\n37,409.1\n369,838.8\n18,252.9\n2,405,790.0\n2014\n565,840.1\n46,298.5\n42,604.8\n437,975.3\n47,805.8\n88,485.5\n478,895.5\n220,501.3\n481,497.5\n43,449.8\n543,038.5\n5,957.7\n3,002,529.6\n2015\n590,610.6\n30,958.8\n44,706.5\n366,799.2\n13,354.6\n87,897.5\n450,208.5\n163,452.9\n475,424.5\n40,154.3\n518,998.3\n527.5\n2,783,093.0\n2016\nJan\n577,684.4\n35,033.6\n35,535.9\n379,618.2\n13,329.2\n68,325.8\n476,677.0\n158,150.5\n410,992.6\n40,295.6\n535,379.3\n380.2\n2,731,402.2\nFeb\n539,562.8\n35,885.1\n37,857.4\n374,835.1\n13,285.9\n63,301.8\n473,970.3\n155,889.4\n415,520.6\n40,862.5\n531,789.5\n365.3\n2,683,125.7\nMar\n586,349.7\n39,180.5\n41,037.5\n371,809.6\n13,397.9\n63,061.4\n444,769.1\n156,209.2\n402,900.5\n44,606.7\n588,882.7\n410.7\n2,752,615.5\nApr\n527,545.8\n46,612.5\n40,624.2\n379,572.0\n13,428.1\n69,469.7\n437,795.4\n142,682.1\n421,335.6\n43,921.4\n645,037.3\n9,410.0\n2,777,434.0\nMay\n522,239.8\n40,194.4\n38,496.8\n358,042.5\n13,280.8\n65,381.2\n439,295.5\n145,180.0\n401,304.1\n41,908.5\n651,719.3\n9,579.0\n2,726,621.9\nJun\n510,016.8\n39,316.9\n36,866.1\n361,138.1\n12,764.5\n68,850.3\n433,145.3\n143,595.6\n476,484.5\n42,179.6\n650,071.4\n9,739.2\n2,784,168.3\nJul\n501,744.6\n43,266.6\n12,746.6\n287,960.5\n11,403.0\n64,344.7\n423,354.4\n141,639.6\n489,050.6\n40,059.9\n652,366.8\n9,804.6\n2,677,741.9\nAug\n498,489.6\n43,265.5\n26,005.4\n295,108.0\n11,957.4\n69,959.8\n423,824.7\n139,556.7\n458,763.3\n44,237.3\n636,726.8\n10,497.1\n2,658,391.5\nSep\n487,504.2\n42,900.7\n20,644.2\n338,165.8\n11,960.4\n154,582.0\n409,891.0\n142,259.6\n400,059.8\n40,609.7\n636,000.8\n11,273.3\n2,695,851.6\nOct\n513,303.7\n44,348.8\n23,814.1\n333,709.5\n11,968.6\n70,984.3\n418,465.3\n152,571.6\n456,867.4\n45,511.4\n637,546.1\n11,122.2\n2,720,213.0\nNov\n526,709.8\n42,580.2\n22,481.4\n338,556.1\n11,358.7\n72,491.9\n413,849.2\n152,092.3\n464,279.4\n42,762.1\n641,080.5\n10,545.5\n2,738,787.0\nDec\n436,452.3\n41,297.5\n19,541.4\n311,503.1\n11,668.9\n327,576.0\n377,945.5\n134,516.0\n415,801.6\n36,867.2\n613,022.6\n10,287.7\n2,736,479.6\n2017\nJan\n448,344.7\n41,732.8\n22,069.3\n264,734.2\n12,019.3\n270,117.2\n350,757.1\n144,447.3\n394,945.0\n40,975.0\n591,245.7\n11,489.3\n2,592,877.1\nFeb\n436,206.2\n40,112.3\n24,467.5\n269,358.3\n12,146.8\n272,314.8\n361,416.8\n143,990.4\n373,445.1\n40,250.7\n568,686.3\n11,227.9\n2,553,623.0\nMar\n425,496.8\n54,688.4\n25,533.4\n275,500.1\n12,241.8\n290,985.3\n349,722.5\n159,101.0\n359,672.5\n37,864.1\n572,233.3\n13,047.7\n2,576,086.9\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2017 \nTABLE 8.1: Sectoral Analysis of Commerical Banks' Loans and Advances\nUS$ Thousands\n \n \nS13 \n \n \n \nEND OF\nAGRICULTURE CONSTRUCTION COMMUNICATIONS\nDISTRIBUTION FINANCIAL &\nFINANCIAL\nMANUFACTURING\nMINING\nSERVICES\nTRANSPORT\nINDIVIDUALS\nCONGLOMERATES\nTOTAL\nINVESTMENTS ORGANISATIONS\n2016\nJan\n231,827.3\n101,724.1\n93,544.2\n517,089.2\n325,203.1\n977,272.1\n345,812.2\n62,026.3\n1,083,702.7\n61,755.6\n618,080.1\n58,808.7\n4,476,845.6\nFeb\n226,568.3\n105,747.9\n97,684.4\n525,070.9\n339,839.0\n896,869.2\n326,026.0\n59,381.3\n1,047,904.6\n63,248.3\n634,478.3\n63,017.8\n4,385,835.9\nMar\n243,546.9\n102,238.4\n116,471.1\n582,943.5\n362,058.8\n879,340.8\n368,689.6\n60,514.0\n1,073,567.6\n62,839.4\n642,779.4\n61,037.6\n4,556,027.1\nApr\n243,151.6\n102,234.0\n112,219.5\n569,660.7\n360,299.5\n907,855.6\n335,068.6\n71,721.0\n1,156,122.6\n63,858.0\n628,901.1\n61,087.0\n4,612,179.4\nMay\n236,180.5\n97,008.6\n120,726.3\n593,284.9\n371,034.5\n923,580.9\n356,500.9\n99,176.4\n1,107,956.8\n61,396.5\n607,501.4\n64,066.3\n4,638,413.9\nJun\n218,386.8\n103,914.2\n134,181.8\n596,904.8\n362,400.2\n973,333.3\n316,490.8\n58,856.9\n1,128,688.7\n72,063.3\n601,813.8\n61,833.2\n4,628,867.8\nJul\n207,280.2\n99,727.9\n138,781.2\n616,359.8\n348,779.7\n1,035,697.0\n370,456.9\n63,986.1\n1,114,413.7\n65,391.9\n622,329.2\n69,058.9\n4,752,262.6\nAug\n233,004.5\n97,248.8\n153,590.8\n578,487.3\n365,366.8\n997,123.0\n356,522.0\n64,413.7\n1,227,979.0\n67,005.8\n621,307.8\n73,076.2\n4,835,125.8\nSep\n236,724.3\n101,117.1\n155,483.5\n597,290.0\n346,375.9\n1,046,195.2\n366,312.8\n57,885.0\n1,365,673.5\n73,805.9\n595,219.8\n70,669.7\n5,012,752.7\nOct\n239,373.9\n107,235.7\n160,641.2\n593,362.2\n344,681.9\n988,274.7\n363,815.8\n63,998.0\n1,384,083.2\n76,834.0\n593,827.7\n73,608.8\n4,989,737.2\nNov\n318,652.7\n107,089.5\n189,581.3\n501,506.5\n329,147.3\n992,135.7\n411,467.8\n150,691.6\n1,337,295.6\n79,405.2\n591,639.0\n71,016.3\n5,079,628.5\nDec\n258,814.9\n110,009.2\n202,260.4\n590,595.6\n348,457.0\n1,020,795.0\n382,615.8\n81,542.7\n1,466,867.2\n82,186.5\n592,932.5\n76,874.9\n5,213,951.8\n2017\nJan\n236,437.3\n108,552.5\n230,965.4\n618,213.5\n339,580.3\n1,002,775.4\n382,746.3\n86,115.0\n1,393,941.2\n82,670.8\n589,549.9\n85,602.3\n5,157,150.0\nFeb\n254,463.9\n112,294.4\n226,877.9\n613,080.1\n312,948.5\n997,181.2\n393,542.8\n121,798.7\n1,402,647.6\n91,521.7\n604,325.0\n84,653.3\n5,215,335.3\nMar\n299,519.0\n118,530.1\n232,990.6\n626,986.6\n308,297.9\n1,049,255.7\n402,864.2\n170,835.1\n1,400,323.5\n102,287.7\n610,024.4\n91,046.0\n5,412,960.9\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2017\n TABLE 8.2: SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS DEPOSITS \nUS$ thousands\n \n \nS14 \n \n \nEnd of\nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\n INTERNET\nEnd of\nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\n INTERNET\n2016\n2016\nJan\n 3,385.87 11.10 137.39 331.52 388.89 167.68 \nJan\n 132.26 24.62 1,328.93 1,104.45 19,956.07 49.89 \nFeb\n 3,448.15 11.86 138.75 312.12 389.26 167.93 \nFeb\n 148.42 30.26 1,289.46 1,067.13 19,793.73 54.57 \nMar\n 3,460.22 11.26 142.08 288.82 417.13 255.93 \nMar\n 152.47 29.65 1,455.70 962.91 21,731.49 61.86 \nApr\n 3,564.32 9.65 180.12 247.60 427.29 168.31 \nApr\n 161.73 24.97 1,962.64 841.34 21,086.57 59.85 \nMay\n 3,869.19 10.83 214.79 203.25 479.93 217.91 \nMay\n 199.26 29.11 2,779.90 675.85 23,292.99 83.15 \nJun\n 3,870.19 10.27 203.90 131.40 465.10 174.10 \nJun\n 268.19 33.50 3,203.80 741.94 23,321.17 87.96 \nJul\n 3,911.78 9.19 240.04 166.30 491.22 218.04 \nJul\n 242.37 31.08 3,946.34 1,052.84 24,538.83 102.75 \nAug\n 3,928.66 7.92 238.03 165.92 535.39 230.62 \nAug\n 253.94 27.77 4,038.12 1,156.38 26,009.65 109.49 \nSep\n 4,382.93 10.48 237.25 167.66 533.91 215.92 \nSep\n 288.52 32.49 4,421.91 1,188.53 27,299.97 99.96 \nOct\n 4,127.64 7.99 322.79 112.49 524.46 216.05 \nOct\n 296.00 29.19 6,247.39 1,106.36 29,801.73 117.90 \nNov\n 4,624.70 6.90 363.40 84.50 537.20 229.90 \nNov\n 353.00 30.60 8,691.20 \n 1086,9 \n 28,542.10 128.80 \nDec\n 4,882.61 5.62 479.86 71.92 626.08 265.12 \nDec\n 405.38 24.23 13,042.06 1,347.98 33,211.84 155.86 \nAnnual \nTotal\n47,456.27\n113.06\n2,898.40\n2,283.51\n5,815.85\n2,527.50\nAnnual \nTotal\n 2,901.53 347.45 52,407.46 11,245.68 298,586.15 1,112.04 \n2017\n2017\n Jan \n 4,052.71 7.48 \n368.71\n 70.42 495.55 318.91 \n Jan \n 350.02 26.67 \n12,756.29\n 1,173.56 27,550.09 190.96 \n Feb \n 4,246.60 7.00 327.30 58.40 472.30 324.10 \n Feb \n 326.30 27.80 8,952.00 953.50 26,820.10 207.00 \n Mar \n 4,629.80 7.40 \n392.20\n 58.80 671.60 399.70 \n Mar \n 414.20 31.00 \n11,124.00\n 944.30 35,604.10 244.10 \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2017 \nTABLE 9.1 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS TRANSACTIONAL ACTIVITY\nValues of Transactions (US$ in millions)\nTABLE 9.2 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS TRANSACTIONAL ACTIVITY\nVolumes of Transactions (in thousands)\n \n \nS15 \n \n \n \n \nEnd of\nNominal Lending \nRates2\nIndividuals \nCorporate\nSavings\n3 Months2\n2016\n2016\nJan\n6.00-22.00\n12.08\n7.38\nJan\n0.50-8.00\n0.75-17.00\nFeb\n4.00-22.00\n11.48\n7.29\nFeb\n0.50-8.00\n0.75-17.00\nMar\n4.00-22.00\n11.44\n7.16\nMar\n0.50-8.00\n0.75-17.00\nApr\n4.00-22.00\n11.5\n7.2\nApr\n0.50-8.00\n0.75-17.00\nMay\n4.00-18.00\n11.43\n7.35\nMay\n0.50-8.00\n0.75-17.00\nJun\n4.00-18.00\n11.4\n7.48\nJun\n0.50-6.00\n0.75-17.00\nJul\n4.00-18.00\n10.69\n6.79\nJul\n0.50-6.00\n0.75-17.00\nAug\n4.00-18.00\n10.67\n6.84\nAug\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-17.00\nSep\n4.00-18.00\n10.66\n6.95\nSep\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-17.00\nOct\n4.00-18.00\n10.7\n6.93\nOct\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-17.00\nNov\n4.00-18.00\n10.69\n6.99\nNov\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-17.00\nDec\n4.00-18.00\n10.59\n6.87\nDec\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-17.00\n2017\n2017\nJan\n4.00-18.00\n10.61\n6.68\nJan\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-17.00\nFeb\n4.00-18.00\n10.06\n6.52\nFeb\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-17.00\nMar\n4.00-18.00\n9.12\n7.02\nMar\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-17.00\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2017\nNotes\nTABLE 10.2 : BANKS DEPOSIT RATES (percent per annum)\n1. The range of rates qouted by banks during the period.\n2. Three (3) months deposit rates revised to exclude rates on \ninactive or dormant accounts.\nTABLE 10.1: LENDING RATES (percent per annum)1\n3. Lending rates exclude rates on staff loans. \n1. Table revised, to separate weighted lending rates for individuals and \ncorporate bodies. \n2. Nominal Lending Rates depict the range of rates quoted by banks.\nWeighted Average Lending Rates 3 \nCommercial Banks\nCommercial Banks\nEnd of \n \n \nS16 \n \n \n \n \nEnd of\nIndustrial\nMining\nVolume of Shares\nMarket Turnover\nMarket Capitalisation\n2016\nJan\n103.04\n19.53\n61,882,767\n10,399,904.0\n2,790.40\nFeb\n99.4\n19.14\n95,020,938\n15,556,983.0\n2,692.30\nMar\n97.17\n19.53\n97,601,725\n16,428,571.0\n2,645.06\nApr\n105.79\n20.16\n187,848,946\n14,026,917.0\n2,862.61\nMay\n104.7\n25.54\n99,055,230\n13,868,486.0\n2,881.34\nJun\n101.04\n24.70\n88,525,472.0\n18,064,624.0\n2,780.90\nJul\n98.84\n25.72\n57,222,624.0\n11,838,626.0\n2,772.04\nAug\n99.47\n26.32\n41,264,438.0\n7,075,762.0\n2,734.33\nSep\n98.96\n26.61\n68,329,516.0\n13,049,388.8\n2,725.13\nOct\n120.80\n33.80\n177,384,684.0\n22,649,152.2\n3,328.30\nNov\n137.08\n57.38\n233,749,377.0\n23,460,016.0\n3,804.60\nDec\n144.53\n58.51\n292,538,969.0\n25,996,903.3\n4,007.96\n2017\nJan\n140.24\n56.31\n8.6\n31,616,982.0\n3,903.70\nFeb\n135.31\n56.47\n11.5\n85,314,995.0\n3,770.00\nMar\n138.96\n58.56\n26.9\n145,238,255.0\n3,871.20\nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE),2017\nIndices\nUS$ Millions\nTABLE 11: ZIMBABWE STOCK MARKET STATISTICS\n \n \nS17 \n \n \n \n \nFOOD \nINFLATION\nALL\nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES \nCLOTHING\nHOUSING, \nWATER,\nFURNITURE\nHEALTH\nTRANSPORT COMMUNICATION\nRECREATION \n&\nEDUCATION\nRESTAURANTS \n&\nMISC.\nTOTAL NON\nFOOD & \nITEMS\n& TOBACCO\nFOOTWEAR\nELECTRICTY, \nGAS\nAND\nCULTURE\nHOTELS\nGOODS &\nFOOD\nNON \nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES\n& OTHER\nEQUIPMENT\nSERVICES\nFUELS\nWEIGHTS\n4.38\n6.05\n17.74\n9.91\n2.16\n9.76\n3.41\n2.1\n5.67\n1.38\n3.91\n66.47\n33.53\n100\n2016 \nJan\n0.05\n-0.02\n-0.04\n-0.30\n-0.15\n-0.37\n0.00\n-0.18\n0.00\n-0.16\n-0.29\n-0.13\n0.13\n-0.05\nFeb\n-0.14\n0.00\n-0.12\n-0.19\n-0.17\n-0.37\n-0.13\n-0.01\n0.00\n-0.17\n0.06\n-0.14\n-0.03\n-0.10\nMar\n-0.15\n-0.17\n-1.03\n-0.73\n-0.13\n-0.30\n0.42\n-0.04\n3.36\n-0.62\n-0.60\n-0.11\n-0.13\n-0.12\nApr\n0.03\n-0.14\n-0.02\n-0.32\n0.00\n0.07\n-0.08\n-0.02\n-0.01\n-0.09\n-0.35\n-0.08\n-0.51\n-0.21\nMay\n-0.29\n-0.22\n0.12\n-0.11\n-0.18\n-0.11\n-1.61\n0.06\n0.00\n0.02\n-0.33\n-0.12\n-0.49\n-0.24\nJun\n0.07\n-0.21\n0.58\n0.03\n0.15\n-0.08\n-0.01\n-0.23\n2.65\n0.31\n0.09\n0.44\n-0.35\n0.19\nJul\n0.01\n-0.15\n0.04\n0.05\n-0.15\n-0.03\n-0.36\n0.09\n0.00\n0.04\n-0.30\n-0.03\n-0.52\n-0.19\nAug\n-0.06\n-0.22\n0.00\n-0.03\n-0.02\n-0.13\n-0.02\n-0.10\n0.00\n0.01\n0.13\n-0.04\n-0.31\n-0.13\nSep\n0.10\n-0.03\n-1.11\n-0.27\n-0.03\n-0.08\n-0.09\n-0.26\n0.00\n0.01\n0.10\n-0.34\n-0.06\n-0.26\nOct\n-0.05\n-0.24\n-0.13\n0.06\n-0.03\n-0.06\n0.00\n-0.01\n0.00\n-0.06\n0.17\n-0.05\n0.40\n0.09\nNov\n0.06\n-0.09\n0.00\n0.10\n-0.07\n0.33\n0.00\n0.18\n-2.46\n-0.01\n0.14\n-0.22\n0.54\n0.02\nDec\n-0.06\n0.09\n-0.59\n0.46\n0.09\n-0.27\n0.00\n0.29\n0.00\n0.16\n0.34\n-0.09\n0.38\n0.06\n2017 \nJan\n0.00\n-0.15\n0.10\n0.34\n-0.15\n-0.75\n0.44\n0.27\n0.00\n0.29\n0.08\n-0.03\n0.80\n0.23\nFeb\n-0.09\n-0.14\n0.13\n0.70\n-0.03\n0.11\n0.00\n-0.04\n0.00\n0.18\n0.52\n0.17\n1.56\n0.61\nMar\n0.15\n0.03\n-0.07\n0.64\n0.11\n0.21\n-0.02\n0.18\n0.00\n0.01\n0.36\n0.15\n-0.21\n0.03\nSource:Zimstat, 2017\nNON-FOOD INFLATION\nTABLE 12.1 : MONTHLY INFLATION -- PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX\n( DECEMBER 2012 = 100)\n \n \nS18 \n \n \n \n \n \nFOOD \nINFLATION\nALL\nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES \nCLOTHING\nHSING, WATER,\nFURNITURE\nHEALTH\nTRANSPORT\nCOMMUNICATION\nRECREATION &\nEDUCATION\nRESTAURANT\nS &\nMISC.\nTOTAL NON\nFOOD & \nITEMS\n& TOBACCO\nFOOTWEAR\nELECTRICTY, GAS\nAND\nCULTURE\nHOTELS\nGOODS &\nFOOD\nNON \nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES\n& OTHER\nEQUIPMENT\nSERVICES\nFUELS\nWEIGHTS\n4.38\n6.05\n17.74\n9.91\n2.16\n9.76\n3.41\n2.10\n5.67\n1.38\n3.91\n66.47\n33.53\n100.00\n2014\n0.2\n0.0\n-0.1\n-0.5\n0.2\n0.3\n-0.1\n-0.1\n2.2\n-0.3\n-0.6\n0.1\n-0.6\n-0.1\n2015\n-1.0\n-0.6\n0.1\n-0.6\n0.5\n-0.8\n-0.2\n-0.1\n2.8\n-0.3\n-0.2\n0.0\n-0.7\n-0.2\n2016\nJan\n-0.5\n-0.4\n0.1\n-0.6\n-0.2\n-0.7\n-0.3\n-0.1\n2.8\n-0.3\n-0.6\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nFeb\n-0.5\n-0.2\n0.0\n-0.6\n-0.4\n-1.0\n-0.2\n-0.1\n0.0\n-0.3\n-0.6\n-0.3\n-0.1\n-0.3\nMar\n-0.2\n-0.2\n-1.2\n-1.2\n-0.4\n-1.0\n0.3\n-0.2\n3.4\n-0.9\n-0.9\n-0.4\n0.0\n-0.3\nApr\n-0.3\n-0.3\n-1.2\n-1.2\n-0.3\n-0.6\n0.2\n-0.1\n3.3\n-0.8\n-1.0\n-0.3\n-0.7\n-0.4\nMay\n-0.4\n-0.5\n-0.9\n-1.2\n-0.3\n-0.3\n-1.3\n0.0\n3.4\n-0.7\n-1.3\n-0.3\n-1.1\n-0.6\nJun\n-0.2\n-0.6\n0.7\n-0.4\n0.0\n-0.1\n-1.7\n-0.2\n2.6\n0.2\n-0.6\n0.2\n-1.3\n-0.3\nJul\n-0.2\n-0.6\n0.7\n0.0\n-0.2\n-0.2\n-2.0\n-0.1\n2.7\n0.4\n-0.5\n0.3\n-1.4\n-0.2\nAug\n0.0\n-0.6\n0.6\n0.1\n0.0\n-0.2\n-0.4\n-0.3\n2.7\n0.4\n-0.1\n0.4\n-1.2\n-0.1\nSep\n0.1\n-0.4\n-1.1\n-0.3\n-0.2\n-0.2\n-0.5\n-0.3\n0.0\n0.1\n-0.1\n-0.4\n-0.9\n-0.6\nOct\n0.0\n-0.5\n-1.2\n-0.2\n-0.1\n-0.3\n-0.1\n-0.4\n0.0\n0.0\n0.4\n-0.4\n0.0\n-0.3\nNov\n0.1\n-0.4\n-1.2\n-0.1\n-0.1\n0.2\n-0.1\n-0.1\n-2.5\n-0.1\n0.4\n-0.6\n0.9\n-0.1\nDec\n0.0\n-0.2\n-0.7\n0.6\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.5\n-2.5\n0.1\n0.6\n-0.4\n1.3\n0.2\n2017\nJan\n0.0\n-0.1\n-0.5\n0.9\n-0.1\n-0.7\n0.4\n0.7\n-2.5\n0.4\n0.6\n-0.3\n1.7\n0.3\nFeb\n-0.1\n-0.2\n-0.4\n1.5\n-0.1\n-0.9\n0.4\n0.5\n0.0\n0.6\n0.9\n0.1\n2.8\n0.9\nMar\n0.1\n-0.3\n0.2\n1.7\n-0.1\n-0.4\n0.4\n0.4\n0.0\n0.5\n1.0\n0.3\n2.2\n0.9\n Source :ZIMSTATS, 2017\nTABLE 12.2 : QUARTERLY INFLATION -- PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \n( DECEMBER 2012 = 100)\nNON-FOOD INFLATION\n \n \nS19 \n \n \n \n \nFOOD INFLATION\nALL\nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES \nCLOTHING\nHSING, WATER,\nFURNITURE\nHEALTH\nTRANSPORT\nCOMMUNIC\nATION\nRECREATION &\nEDUCATION\nRESTAURAN\nTS &\nMISC.\nTOTAL \nNON\nFOOD & \nITEMS\n& TOBACCO\nFOOTWEAR\nELECTRICTY, \nGAS\nAND\nCULTURE\nHOTELS\nGOODS &\nFOOD\nNON ALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES\n& OTHER\nEQUIPMENT\nSERVICES\nFUELS\nWEIGHTS\n4.38\n6.05\n17.74\n9.91\n2.16\n9.76\n3.41\n2.1\n5.67\n1.38\n3.91\n66.47\n33.53\n100\n2014\n2.1\n-0.5\n1.1\n-2.2\n0.7\n0.6\n-4.4\n-0.9\n18.4\n1.2\n-1.9\n1.4\n-3.2\n-0.1\n2015\n-0.9\n-2.4\n-4.3\n-2.9\n0.6\n-3.2\n-14.2\n-0.9\n11.1\n0.4\n-0.4\n-1.9\n-3.7\n-2.5\n2016\nJan\n-0.8\n-2.4\n-4.4\n-3.3\n0.4\n-2.7\n-0.9\n-1.1\n11.2\n0.8\n-1.0\n-1.3\n-4.0\n-2.2\nFeb\n-1.2\n-2.1\n-4.4\n-3.4\n0.2\n-2.6\n-1.0\n0.2\n11.2\n1.0\n-1.2\n-1.4\n-4.0\n-2.2\nMar\n-1.4\n-2.0\n-5.4\n-4.0\n0.1\n-2.9\n-0.6\n-1.0\n14.9\n0.2\n-1.9\n-1.4\n-4.1\n-2.3\nApr\n-1.4\n-1.4\n-2.1\n-3.9\n0.2\n-2.7\n-0.5\n-0.9\n14.2\n-0.3\n-2.2\n-0.5\n-4.0\n-1.6\nMay\n-1.5\n-1.2\n-2.2\n-3.8\n-0.1\n-2.6\n-2.1\n-0.8\n14.2\n-0.2\n-2.1\n-0.5\n-4.1\n-1.7\nJun\n-1.8\n-1.4\n-1.6\n-3.7\n0.2\n-2.7\n-2.1\n-0.9\n17.2\n0.2\n-2.1\n-0.1\n-4.0\n-1.4\nJul\n-1.7\n-1.6\n-1.0\n-2.8\n-0.1\n-2.7\n-2.4\n-0.7\n9.1\n0.3\n-2.4\n-0.6\n-3.8\n-1.6\nAug\n-1.5\n-1.8\n-1.0\n-2.7\n-0.1\n-2.5\n-2.4\n-0.5\n9.1\n0.4\n-2.2\n-0.5\n-3.3\n-1.4\nSep\n-1.4\n-1.8\n-1.5\n-2.5\n-0.1\n-2.2\n-2.1\n-0.8\n9.1\n-0.8\n-1.8\n-0.6\n-2.9\n-1.3\nOct\n-1.0\n-1.7\n-1.5\n-2.1\n-0.8\n-1.8\n-2.1\n-0.7\n9.1\n-0.7\n-1.8\n-0.5\n-2.0\n-1.0\nNov\n-0.8\n-1.6\n-1.5\n-1.8\n-0.8\n-1.4\n-1.9\n-0.4\n3.5\n-0.7\n-1.6\n-0.9\n-1.5\n-1.1\nDec\n-0.4\n-1.4\n-2.3\n-1.3\n-0.7\n-1.4\n-1.9\n-0.2\n3.5\n-0.5\n-1.0\n-0.9\n-1.0\n-0.9\n2017\nJan\n-0.47\n-1.52\n-2.16\n-0.62\n-0.68\n-1.76\n-1.44\n0.20\n3.49\n-0.02\n-0.62\n-0.82\n-0.30\n-0.65\nFeb\n-0.42\n-1.66\n-1.91\n0.26\n-0.53\n-1.29\n-1.31\n0.18\n3.49\n0.24\n-0.05\n-0.51\n1.29\n0.06\nMar\n-0.13\n-1.45\n-0.95\n1.64\n-0.30\n-0.79\n-1.74\n0.40\n0.12\n0.87\n0.92\n-0.25\n1.21\n0.21\n Source :ZIMSTATS, 2017\nTABLE 12.3 : ANNUAL INFLATION -- PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \n( DECEMBER 2012 = 100)\nNON-FOOD INFLATION\n \n \nS20 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nEnd of\nApr-16\nMay-16\nJun-16\nJul-16\nAug-16\nSep-16\nOct-16\nNov-16\nDec-16\nJan-17\nFeb-17\nMar-17\nMerchandise Imports (excl. energy)\n230.3\n \n169.2\n \n242.4\n \n189.1\n \n225.5\n \n226.9\n \n218.8\n \n236.7\n \n180.5\n \n207.1\n \n194.4\n \n213.8\n \n- Consumption Goods\n108.1\n \n85.3\n \n112.8\n \n86.9\n \n112.9\n \n121.5\n \n110.9\n \n125.4\n \n92.7\n \n94.1\n \n78.4\n \n99.1\n \n- Capital Goods\n62.3\n \n44.6\n \n65.9\n \n50.5\n \n53.4\n \n48.6\n \n46.6\n \n57.6\n \n33.9\n \n55.2\n \n57.9\n \n55.9\n \n- Intermediate Goods\n60.0\n \n39.4\n \n63.8\n \n51.7\n \n59.2\n \n56.8\n \n61.3\n \n53.8\n \n53.8\n \n57.8\n \n58.1\n \n58.8\n \nEnergy (Fuel & Electricity)\n59.1\n \n42.6\n \n73.9\n \n63.8\n \n58.6\n \n56.7\n \n64.3\n \n90.9\n \n65.1\n \n63.7\n \n58.3\n \n51.1\n \nService Payments\n99.1\n \n98.2\n \n84.5\n \n101.1\n \n87.7\n \n76.5\n \n74.9\n \n81.2\n \n99.8\n \n74.6\n \n66.4\n \n81.9\n \n- Technical, Professional & consult\n56.7\n \n59.4\n \n39.2\n \n54.2\n \n39.8\n \n37.8\n \n33.1\n \n36.7\n \n40.8\n \n29.0\n \n17.1\n \n36.5\n \n- Software\n4.8\n \n4.5\n \n10.0\n \n15.4\n \n6.3\n \n3.0\n \n3.4\n \n3.4\n \n2.6\n \n4.6\n \n3.9\n \n4.9\n \n- Other (tourism, edu, freight etc)\n37.7\n \n34.2\n \n35.4\n \n31.5\n \n41.6\n \n35.6\n \n38.4\n \n41.1\n \n56.4\n \n41.0\n \n45.4\n \n40.5\n \nIncome Payments (Profits, Dividends\n18.3\n \n6.3\n \n7.9\n \n11.0\n \n8.3\n \n7.9\n \n15.5\n \n10.6\n \n8.2\n \n14.0\n \n6.3\n \n12.0\n \nCapital Remittances (outward)\n52.9\n \n45.0\n \n37.2\n \n28.6\n \n23.9\n \n50.1\n \n58.8\n \n26.4\n \n23.9\n \n24.0\n \n33.2\n \n41.6\n \n- External Loan Repayments \n42.6\n \n35.4\n \n21.0\n \n23.0\n \n15.4\n \n43.1\n \n52.2\n \n20.8\n \n23.3\n \n22.8\n \n32.4\n \n29.9\n \n- Disinvestments\n10.2\n \n9.6\n \n15.9\n \n5.6\n \n7.6\n \n6.2\n \n6.6\n \n5.2\n \n0.6\n \n1.0\n \n0.2\n \n11.7\n \n- Cross Border Investment\n0.1\n \n0.0\n \n0.3\n \n0.0\n \n0.9\n \n0.7\n \n0.1\n \n0.5\n \n0.1\n \n0.1\n \n0.6\n \n0.1\n \nOther Payments\n1.0\n \n0.2\n \n0.5\n \n0.7\n \n0.2\n \n2.2\n \n0.3\n \n0.2\n \n0.1\n \n0.3\n \n0.1\n \n0.3\n \nTOTAL\n460.9\n \n361.6\n \n446.4\n \n394.3\n \n404.3\n \n420.3\n \n432.7\n \n446.1\n \n377.6\n \n383.7\n \n358.7\n \n400.7\n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2017\nTable 13.1: Monthly Cross Border Payments (US$ Millions)\n \n \nS21 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAgriculture\nHorticulture Manufacturing\nMining\nTobacco\nTourism\n Transport & \nOther Services Total\nEnd of \nTelecom\nJan-16\n10.4\n1.9\n12.0\n149.9\n121.6\n0.0\n15.3\n3.4\n314.5\nFeb-16\n15.4\n2.2\n11.3\n64.6\n42.5\n4.9\n20.6\n1.9\n163.4\nMar-16\n15.5\n2.2\n10.5\n202.9\n29.9\n4.7\n23.0\n7.9\n296.6\nApr-16\n7.9\n2.9\n7.2\n69.2\n84.3\n9.9\n12.3\n0.2\n193.9\nMay-16\n9.2\n2.3\n13.0\n206.9\n21.9\n14.5\n20.2\n0.2\n288.2\nJun-16\n6.9\n1.7\n9.2\n101.4\n18.4\n13.2\n18.4\n4.0\n173.2\nJul-16\n8.6\n2.1\n9.1\n258.2\n6.8\n13.1\n12.4\n2.3\n312.6\nAug-16\n15.3\n4.8\n8.2\n187.6\n10.2\n16.1\n21.4\n1.0\n264.6\nSep-16\n13.8\n5.8\n8.6\n151.5\n9.7\n19.1\n19.8\n3.1\n231.4\nOct-16\n6.5\n3.9\n9.5\n179.1\n50.2\n18.2\n17.0\n2.4\n286.8\nNov-16\n10.6\n3.1\n7.3\n113.0\n66.1\n7.9\n14.6\n4.2\n226.8\nDec-16\n7.9\n1.3\n6.3\n112.2\n46.1\n16.5\n11.3\n2.4\n204.1\nJan-17\n4.8\n0.6\n6.5\n170.6\n94.0\n6.9\n14.3\n2.8\n300.5\nFeb-17\n7.5\n1.1\n8.8\n189.4\n77.9\n7.0\n11.5\n1.6\n304.8\nMar-17\n9.8\n1.9\n11.3\n223.4\n36.7\n8.6\n9.9\n5.1\n306.7\n Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2017\nTable 13.2: Monthly Cross Border Receipts (US$Millions)\n \n \nS22 \n \n \n \n \n(US$ millions)\nEnd Period\n2000\n2001\n2002\n2003\n2004\n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\n2014\n2015\n2016\nLong-Term External Debt\n3,227\n3,255\n3,327\n3,644\n3,927\n3,805\n3,965\n4,032\n4,464\n4,951\n5,175\n6,096\n6,607\n7,370\n8,444\n8,426\n8,656\nGovernment\n2,249\n2,328\n2,376\n2,617\n2,844\n2,895\n3,024\n3,054\n3,464\n4,037\n4,095\n4,638\n4,929\n5,012\n4,522\n5,293\n5,365\nBilateral Creditors\n1,050\n1,115\n1,107\n1,255\n1,455\n1,438\n1,520\n1,520\n1,863\n2,308\n2,325\n2,597\n2,694\n2,928\n2,445\n3,310\n3,479\nMultilateral Creditors\n1,199\n1,213\n1,269\n1,362\n1,389\n1,457\n1,504\n1,524\n1,592\n1,729\n1,770\n2,041\n2,235\n2,084\n2,078\n1,982\n1,886\nPrivate Creditors\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n10\n10\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPublic Enterprises\n534\n568\n616\n698\n714\n709\n766\n790\n825\n857\n938\n1,092\n1,198\n1,356\n1,661\n1,220\n1,370\nBilateral Creditors\n301\n315\n351\n403\n442\n439\n464\n474\n497\n453\n238\n711\n703\n858\n1,155\n760\n779\nMultilateral Creditors\n233\n253\n265\n295\n272\n270\n302\n316\n327\n403\n700\n382\n495\n498\n506\n460\n591\nPrivate Creditors\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nMonetary Authorities\n292\n292\n279\n288\n291\n144\n130\n137\n140\n140\n138\n127\n125\n125\n120\n110\n0\nMultilateral Creditors - IMF\n292\n292\n279\n288\n291\n144\n130\n137\n140\n140\n138\n127\n125\n125\n120\n110\n0\nPrivate\n152\n67\n56\n41\n78\n57\n45\n51\n35\n57\n142\n366\n480\n1,002\n2,261\n1,913\n1,920\nShort-Term External Debt\n298\n167\n183\n169\n144\n173\n281\n387\n226\n1,198\n1,382\n1,289\n890\n1,564\n2,394\n2,258\n2,304\nSupplier's Credits\n42\n13\n26\n51\n69\n107\n122\n178\n41\n193\n286\n134\n30\n0\n0\n0\n0\nReserve Bank\n642\n642\n618\n614\n614\n587\n587\n573\nPrivate\n256\n154\n157\n118\n75\n66\n159\n209\n185\n363\n454\n537\n246\n950\n1,807\n1,671\n1,731\nTotal External Debt\n3,525\n3,422\n3,510\n3,812\n4,071\n3,978\n4,246\n4,419\n4,690\n6,149\n6,557\n7,385\n7,497\n8,934\n10,838\n10,684\n10,960\nSource: Ministry of Finance & Economic Development, 2017; & Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2017\nTABLE 14.1: ZIMBABWE: EXTERNAL DEBT OUTSTANDING BY DEBTOR (INCLUDING ALL ARREARS)\n \n \nS23 \n \n \n \n \n \nEnd of\n2001\n2002\n2003\n2004\n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\n2014\n2015\n2016\n(US$ millions)\nTotal Medium to Long-Term External Debt\n3,255\n3,327\n3,644\n3,927\n3,805\n3,965\n4,032\n4,464\n5,091\n5,313\n6,096\n6,607\n7,370\n8,444\n8,426\n8,656\nPublic and Publicly Guaranteed Debt \n3,188\n3,271\n3,603\n3,849\n3,748\n3,920\n3,981\n4,429\n5,676\n5,813\n6,345\n6,742\n6,982\n6,768\n7,100\n7,308\nBilateral Creditors\n1,430\n1,458\n1,658\n1,897\n1,877\n1,984\n1,994\n2,360\n2,761\n2,563\n3,307\n3,397\n3,786\n3,479\n3,960\n3,479\nMultilateral Creditors\n1,758\n1,813\n1,945\n1,952\n1,871\n1,936\n1,976\n2,059\n2,272\n2,608\n2,423\n2,730\n2,582\n2,704\n2,553\n1,886\nPrivate Creditors\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n10\n10\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPrivate Non-Guaranteed Long term\n67\n56\n41\n78\n57\n45\n51\n35\n57\n142\n366\n480\n1,002\n2,261\n1,913\n1,920\nShort-Term External Debt\n167\n183\n169\n144\n173\n281\n387\n226\n1198\n1382\n1,286\n891\n1,564\n2,394\n2,258\n2,304\n Public and Publicly Guaranteed Debt\n13\n26\n51\n69\n107\n122\n178\n41\n193\n286\n134\n30\n0\n0\n0\n0\n Reserve Bank\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n642\n642\n615\n615\n614\n587\n587\n573\n Private\n154\n157\n118\n75\n66\n159\n209\n185\n363\n454\n537\n246\n950\n1,807\n1,671\n1,731\nTotal External Debt\n3,422\n3,510\n3,812\n4,071\n3,978\n4,246\n4,419\n4,690\n6,289\n6,695\n7,382\n7,498\n8,934\n10,838\n10,684\n10,960\nGross Domestic Product\n10,887\n6,715\n5,037\n4,299\n2,918\n6,645\n4,000\n3,175\n8157\n9457\n10,956\n12,472\n12,973\n14,068\n13,891\n14,160\nExternal Debt / GDP\n31.4%\n52.3%\n75.7%\n94.7%\n136.3%\n63.9%\n110.5%\n147.7%\n77.1%\n70.8%\n67.4%\n60.1%\n68.9%\n77.0%\n76.9%\n77.4%\nSource: Ministry of Finance & Economic Development, 2017 ; Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2017\nTABLE 14.2: External Debt Outstanding by Source\n(US$ millions)\n \n \nS24 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n US$ Millions\n Gross\nNet Investment Gross\n Gross\n Gross\n Domestic\nIncome Paid\n National\n Domestic National\nGross Domestic\nGross National\nEnd of\n Product\nto Other\n Product\n Product Product\nProduct\nProduct\nPeriod\nCountries\n \n2009\n8,366.8\n-394.7\n7,972.1\n8,366.8\n8,111.9\n684.1\n663.2\n2010\n10,052.0\n-607.8\n9,444.2\n9,659.2\n9,128.8\n783.0\n740.0\n2011\n12,071.7\n-876.5\n11,195.2\n11,236.8\n10,391.8\n901.9\n834.0\n2012\n14,058.4\n-855.8\n13,202.6\n12,766.0\n11,895.1\n977.4\n910.7\n2013\n15,223.5\n-917.1\n14,306.5\n13,438.8\n12,492.3\n1,005.3\n934.5\n2014\n15,834.1\n-963.4\n14,870.6\n13,810.5\n12,786.4\n1,011.6\n936.6\n2015\n16,072.4\n-541.3\n15,531.1\n14,007.1\n13,495.3\n1,004.6\n967.9\n \n \nSource :ZIMSTATS, 2017\nCurrent Prices\nConstant Prices\n Constant Prices\nPer Capita\n TABLE 15.1: REAL GROSS DOMESTIC AND NATIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA AT MARKET PRICE\n \n \nS25 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAgriculture\n Mining \nElectricity\nFinance\nDistribution\n Transport\n Public\nHunting and\n and\nManufacturing and\nConstruction\n and\n Real\nHotels and\nand\nAdministration\n Other\nEnd of\n Fishing\n Quarrying\n Water\nInsurance Estate Restaurants Communication\nEducation\nHealth\n Services\nTotal\n \n2009\n1,038.4\n560.8\n1,066.2\n278.5\n136.7\n571.6\n110.5\n1,207.1\n1,080.1\n323.6\n301.2\n68.6\n35.2\n342.8\n2010\n1,157.2\n802.4\n1,108.8\n358.8\n182.2\n618.8\n126.3\n1,375.8\n1,137.0\n540.4\n656.8\n130.3\n38.4\n390.2\n2011\n1,222.1\n1,006.3\n1,293.5\n436.4\n288.5\n703.6\n193.2\n1,397.2\n1,320.1\n910.5\n948.3\n205.6\n40.6\n453.4\n2012\n1,376.8\n1,063.6\n1,419.8\n448.3\n376.2\n942.6\n302.9\n1,601.3\n1,333.5\n1,272.2\n1,326.5\n279.4\n40.2\n416.4\n2013\n1,364.0\n1,186.5\n1,457.0\n492.1\n398.6\n1,072.5\n340.5\n1,909.1\n1,374.0\n1,300.7\n1,523.6\n313.5\n43.0\n399.9\n2014\n1,704.9\n1,157.0\n1,450.0\n546.5\n426.0\n893.4\n385.0\n1,926.7\n1,477.7\n1,447.5\n1,684.2\n348.2\n44.7\n403.6\n2015\n1,653.8\n1,089.4\n1,402.0\n533.2\n426.3\n881.6\n417.1\n1,979.0\n1,498.0\n1,495.5\n1,834.5\n395.0\n47.0\n413.0\nSource :ZIMSTATS, 2017\n2 . Includes domestic services and allowance for imputed banking service charges .\nTABLE 15.2 : GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT FACTOR COST BY INDUSTRY\n US$ Millions\n (at current prices )\n \n \nS26 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Net\n Private\n Gross\n Net\nExpenditure\n Private\n Gvt\n non-profit\n fixed\n Increase\n Total\n export of\n on gross\n consumption current\n making\n captital\n in\n Statistical\n domestic\n goods and\n domestic\nEnd of\nexpenditure bodies\n formation\n stocks\ndiscrepancy\n expenditure\n services\n product\n2009\n7,429.7\n912.7\n360.4\n959.7\n272.3\n0.0\n9,934.9\n-1,568.1\n7,972.1\n2010\n7,458.7\n1,844.3\n361.6\n2,048.5\n210.9\n0.0\n11,924.0\n-1,872.0\n9,444.2\n2011\n9,594.0\n2,647.5\n362.9\n2,063.8\n389.6\n0.0\n15,057.7\n-2,986.0\n11,195.2\n2012\n11,289.5\n3,424.0\n364.1\n2,079.2\n-392.2\n0.0\n16,764.6\n-2,706.3\n13,202.6\n2013\n12,541.4\n3,520.1\n350.9\n1,752.8\n5.4\n0.0\n18,170.6\n-2,947.1\n14,306.5\n2014\n12,187.9\n3,813.4\n542.6\n1,873.4\n5.8\n0.0\n18,423.1\n-2,589.1\n14,870.6\n2015\n12,175.4\n3,768.5\n573.2\n1,995.4\n8.0\n0.0\n18,520.5\n-2,448.1\n15,531.1\nSource :ZIMSTATS, 2017\n(at current prices)\nUS$ Millions\nTABLE 15.3: EXPENDITURE ON GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT/1\n \nS27 \n \nEnd of\n Gold\nPlatinum\nPalladium\nNickel\nCopper\nCoal\nChrome\nRhodium Other/1\nTotal\nMay\n56.0\n28.1\n15.2\n12.2\n2.8\n5.1\n1.3\n2.3\n8.1\n131.1\nJun\n66.0\n20.5\n10.7\n8.8\n2.4\n5.6\n1.5\n1.6\n8.8\n125.9\nJul\n60.3\n34.2\n18.0\n8.9\n2.9\n6.5\n1.6\n2.4\n9.0\n143.8\nAug\n63.8\n33.9\n17.2\n10.9\n2.8\n9.3\n2.6\n2.4\n8.8\n151.7\nSep\n68.3\n32.9\n16.0\n13.4\n2.9\n7.5\n1.9\n2.2\n9.3\n154.1\nOct\n67.2\n31.6\n16.4\n10.3\n2.5\n1.6\n1.7\n2.1\n8.2\n141.8\nNov\n64.4\n30.4\n15.9\n9.3\n2.6\n7.1\n2.0\n2.1\n9.4\n143.2\nDec\n72.7\n32.7\n17.0\n10.4\n3.1\n7.4\n1.4\n2.2\n3.5\n150.4\n2016\nJan\n52.5\n30.0\n14.3\n10.2\n2.6\n7.7\n0.0\n1.9\n1.2\n120.5\nFeb\n69.0\n43.2\n20.1\n9.4\n3.1\n5.4\n0.0\n2.4\n2.2\n154.9\nMar\n70.0\n35.7\n16.3\n11.3\n2.8\n10.4\n0.0\n2.1\n2.0\n150.6\nApr\n61.3\n32.3\n14.7\n8.3\n2.4\n7.9\n0.0\n1.9\n1.0\n129.9\nMay\n76.8\n32.8\n15.2\n8.7\n2.4\n6.1\n0.0\n2.0\n1.2\n145.0\nJun\n73.0\n37.3\n17.3\n10.3\n2.7\n6.7\n0.0\n2.1\n1.2\n150.5\nJul\n76.8\n11.0\n4.9\n7.5\n1.4\n7.8\n0.0\n0.6\n0.8\n110.7\nAug\n92.9\n39.2\n19.2\n11.6\n2.5\n7.0\n0.0\n2.0\n1.3\n175.6\nSource: ZimStats, 2017\n1. Other minerals include Ferrosilicon, Iron ore, Iron pyrite and magnesite\nTable 15.4: MINERAL PRODUCTION\nUS$ Millions\n \nS28 \n \nEnd of\nBy Hwange \nPower station\nBy Kariba \nPower \nStation\nBy Other \nPower Station\nIPPs\nTotal from \nZimbabwe\n2015\nJan\n322.2\n418.5\n49.7\n2.6\n792.9\nFeb\n202.0\n376.2\n44.2\n2.6\n625.0\nMar\n228.6\n463.8\n50.5\n2.6\n745.5\nApr\n254.7\n446.6\n42.3\n10.8\n754.4\nMay\n262.3\n492.8\n51.3\n6.3\n812.7\nJun\n395.1\n465.0\n47.5\n3.9\n911.5\nJul\n470.1\n470.0\n58.4\n3.3\n1001.8\nAug\n369.4\n491.7\n50.0\n2.4\n913.5\nSep\n357.2\n341.0\n51.5\n2.4\n752.1\nOct\n339.9\n360.1\n45.2\n1.9\n747.1\nNov\n382.5\n303.6\n45.4\n2.4\n733.9\nDec\n361.9\n309.9\n47.2\n1.8\n720.8\n2016\nJan\n367.3\n281.5\n38.5\n3.8\n691.1\nFeb\n284.7\n209.6\n44.4\n5.0\n543.7\nMar\n313.1\n211.7\n35.2\n11.5\n571.5\nApr\n312.1\n205.1\n43.5\n12.7\n573.6\nMay\n292.5\n248.3\n40.8\n7.5\n608.7\nJun\n279.3\n238.5\n31.7\n6.1\n568.8\nJul\n342.2\n273.9\n3737.0\n18.2\n609.1\nAug\n279.3\n242.8\n30.3\n46.3\n661.6\nSep\n290.9\n234.4\n24.7\n46.8\n596.8\nSource: ZIMSTATS, 2017\nTable 15.5: Electricity Energy Produced and Distributed\nInterconnected System\nGeneration Sent Out\n \n \nS29 \n \n \n(2009=100)\nFood-stuffs \n(including \nstockfeeds)\nDrink and \nTobacco\nTextiles \nincluding \nginning\nClothing \nand \nFootwear\nWood and \nFurniture\nPaper, \nPrinting and \nPublishing\nChemical and \nPetroleum \nProducts\nNon-metalic \nMineral Products\nMetals and \nMetal Products\nTransport and \nTransport \nEquipment\nOther \nManufacturing \nGroups\nAll \nManufacturing \nGroups\nWeight\n252\n118\n28\n79\n24\n68\n172\n46\n103\n20\n89\n1000\n2014:Jan\n86.0\n65.7\n47.6\n82.7\n89.2\n99.9\n90.4\n110.7\n63.9\n60.9\n43.6\n78.6\nFeb\n92.8\n88.8\n64.7\n87.1\n94.4\n115.0\n98.7\n122.3\n76.6\n67.5\n56.8\n89.6\nMar\n87.6\n83.2\n61.3\n93.6\n86.0\n104.2\n92.0\n108.8\n69.7\n60.9\n48.5\n83.8\nApr\n93.6\n92.7\n53.5\n92.7\n98.6\n100.0\n92.9\n108.5\n73.7\n65.0\n47.3\n86.6\nMay\n94.5\n87.6\n66.8\n82.4\n83.8\n95.0\n82.6\n114.4\n65.3\n56.5\n56.8\n83.5\nJun\n98.9\n97.9\n93.6\n88.0\n89.7\n108.3\n94.0\n138.5\n68.0\n58.1\n63.3\n92.0\nJul\n103.9\n115.8\n124.7\n61.0\n103.2\n92.9\n90.4\n147.6\n69.5\n59.2\n66.7\n93.7\nAug\n95.6\n113.6\n116.1\n64.4\n101.6\n92.0\n88.8\n142.3\n70.1\n58.0\n65.6\n90.7\nSep\n117.4\n124.7\n114.8\n85.2\n102.6\n97.2\n88.0\n154.0\n69.4\n60.5\n72.4\n100.5\nOct\n119.5\n95.5\n99.2\n89.9\n143.0\n79.3\n89.3\n142.3\n74.8\n65.0\n59.5\n96.4\nNov\n98.1\n109.4\n84.4\n96.5\n163.7\n101.1\n87.2\n153.6\n78.3\n67.7\n97.2\n98.6\nDec\n105.7\n107.9\n72.4\n81.7\n92.5\n97.6\n89.3\n132.0\n65.9\n58.2\n63.1\n91.8\n2015:Jan\n97.3\n109.0\n67.1\n79.1\n84.3\n97.4\n89.7\n135.0\n66.1\n58.6\n64.8\n89.6\nFeb\n121.3\n121.7\n75.3\n97.9\n179.0\n107.3\n97.5\n153.2\n73.5\n65.6\n74.0\n105.7\nMar \n105.4\n110.3\n67.8\n91.0\n145.7\n96.3\n85.6\n141.0\n67.0\n59.6\n68.0\n94.1\nApr\n101.4\n114.7\n69.2\n88.4\n152.4\n99.5\n84.9\n146.5\n70.1\n61.5\n69.2\n94.5\nMay\n104.4\n110.9\n67.2\n85.6\n160.2\n95.7\n82.9\n141.1\n68.2\n59.9\n67.0\n93.4\nJun\n102.4\n113.7\n67.7\n91.2\n171.3\n97.3\n84.1\n145.7\n70.7\n62.5\n69.8\n95.1\nJul\n109.8\n105.2\n87.6\n82.8\n146.5\n87.4\n80.6\n149.6\n64.5\n56.9\n82.8\n94.5\nAug\n113.4\n101.1\n81.3\n85.2\n133.1\n102.1\n94.0\n151.7\n57.2\n57.8\n86.2\n97.6\nSep\n113.7\n106.4\n89.2\n86.8\n134.7\n101.1\n89.0\n145.5\n64.4\n59.3\n80.2\n97.7\nOct\n116.3\n104.9\n88.9\n82.8\n142.4\n101.9\n103.3\n154.7\n63.8\n57.2\n81.1\n101.0\nNov\n109.5\n98.3\n88.8\n86.3\n150.3\n101.4\n120.0\n146.8\n59.3\n59.1\n78.2\n100.7\nDec\n116.2\n101.5\n84.1\n81.6\n127.8\n99.1\n81.5\n141.9\n45.2\n57.3\n87.6\n94.1\nSource:ZIMSTATS ,2017\nTABLE 15.6: VOLUME OF MANUFACTURING INDEX (VMI)\n \n \nS30", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/Quarterly_Economic_Reviews/qermar2017.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "711a3c8927a0ab510e679f6adbc70bb8", "text": "MPC Statement 27 January 2022 \nPage 1 \n \n \n \n \nPRESS STATEMENT \nEMBARGO DELIVERY \n27 January 2022 \n \n \nSTATEMENT OF THE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE \n \nIssued by Lesetja Kganyago, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank \nOver the past year, rising vaccination rates have sustained confidence and the global \neconomic recovery, despite the rapid spread of the Omicron virus. Looking ahead to \nthis year, global growth will be slower as the rebound from the pandemic fades. Growth \nin emerging market and developing economies will continue to lag that in advanced \neconomies, due to a slower pace of vaccinations and other headwinds. South Africa’s \neconomy rebounded strongly from the pandemic in 2021, but going forward the growth \nrate will, like global growth, slow and remain subject to various risks. \nThe International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) forecast for global gross domestic product \n(GDP) is unchanged at 5.9% in 2021. Global growth is expected to slow to 4.4% in \n2022 (down from 4.9%). The SARB’s forecast for global growth in 2021 sits at 6.2% \n(down from 6.3%), and is unchanged for 2022 and 2023, at 4.4% and 3.3%, \n \nMPC Statement 27 January 2022 \nPage 2 \n \nrespectively.1 GDP growth in our trading partners in 2024 is forecast to be 2.7%. \nGlobal economic conditions are less supportive of emerging and developing \neconomies now than they were for most of this past year. \nAlthough policy settings in advanced economies remain accommodative, higher global \ninflation is likely to accelerate normalisation of interest rates and balance sheet \nreductions by major central banks. It is less certain how far the normalisation process \nwill go and the exact timing, and this uncertainty continues to cause financial market \nturmoil and capital flow volatility. Risk aversion in financial markets has increased. \nEconomies that failed to take advantage of better global conditions or to reduce large \nmacroeconomic imbalances remain vulnerable. \nLast year saw the ongoing recovery of the South African economy from the pandemic, \nbut also the damage caused by the July unrest, cyber attacks and strikes. Those \nfactors led to a downward revision to the growth forecast for the year as a whole, from \nthe 5.2% forecast in November to 4.8%.2 \nThis year and next, economic growth will remain well above a low rate of potential \ngrowth.3 GDP is expected to grow by 1.7% in 2022. The deceleration in growth from \n2021 to 2022 is primarily a result of the fading rebound from the pandemic, alongside \na climbdown from high export prices. GDP growth is forecast to be 1.8% in 2023 and \n2.0% in 2024.4 \n \n1 Global growth in the QPM model is a trade-weighted average of South Africa’s trading partners. \n2 In the third quarter of 2021, economic growth was -5.8%, compared to our previous estimate of -2.5%. For the \nfourth quarter, we expect a GDP outcome of 5.5%, compared to the previous 2.6%. On a not-annualised basis, \nthe quarter-on-quarter growth rate for the third quarter was -1.5%, compared to our estimate of -0.6%. The \nfourth quarter is expected to be 1.4%, compared to 0.6%. \n3 Potential growth for 2022 and 2023 is estimated at 0.8%, rising to 1.1% in 2024. \n4 The growth forecast includes expected changes in the policy rate. \n \nMPC Statement 27 January 2022 \nPage 3 \n \nWith lower export prices the economy’s future demand will depend more on \ninvestment and household spending. Sustained low borrowing costs and faster \neconomic growth have strengthened private sector investment somewhat, despite \nongoing constraints from loadshedding and policy uncertainty. Household spending \nremains supportive, as a result of good growth in disposable income, rising asset \nprices, and more credit demand. \nOverall, and after revisions, the risks to the medium-term domestic growth outlook are \nassessed to be balanced. \nWith the downward revision to GDP growth for 2021, the output gap is more negative \nover the forecast period compared to the November meeting. However, as the \neconomy is forecast to grow faster than potential, the output gap closes steadily \nthrough to 2024. \nWhile important commodity export prices such as for coal, iron ore, platinum, and \nrhodium generally decreased in the latter half of 2021, in recent weeks some prices \nand export values have been more buoyant. As a result, the current account surplus \nof the past year is expected to decline at a slower pace than at the time of the \nNovember meeting.5 The current account deficit in 2023 and 2024 is, at this stage, \nforecast to be smaller than previously expected. \nAlthough fiscal risk has eased, financing conditions remain volatile and the yield curve \nfor rand-denominated bonds remains steep. Ten-year bond yields remain at about \n9.4%. \n \n5 The current account surplus is expected to decline in 2022 to about 0.4% of GDP (from 3.8% of GDP in 2021). \nThe current account is expected to be in deficit of -0.2% in 2023 (from -1.8%) and -0.6% in 2024 (from -2.5%). \n \nMPC Statement 27 January 2022 \nPage 4 \n \nFor much of 2021, strong commodity export prices and generally favourable global \nfinancial and economic conditions strengthened the currency above its long-run \nequilibrium level. In recent months, global and domestic factors contributed to a \nweaker rand exchange rate and the rand now sits somewhat below its equilibrium \nlevel. The implied starting point for the rand forecast is R15.60 to the US dollar, \ncompared with R15.10 at the time of the previous meeting.6 \nOver the past year and into this year, global supply shortages and strong demand \nhave caused a wide range of prices to accelerate, including raw materials, \nintermediate inputs and food.7 Some of these price increases have passed-through \nto consumer prices in major economies. Our estimate for inflation in the G3 was \nrevised higher to 3.1% in 2021 and 2022 (up from 2.9% and 2.4%), and is revised \nslightly lower to 1.7% in 2023.8 For 2024, G3 inflation of 1.6% is forecast, unchanged \nfrom the previous meeting. \nOil prices are revised up for this year, and fuel price inflation is higher at 13.7% (up \nfrom 4.6%).9 Local electricity price inflation for 2021 was 10.2%, while the forecast for \n2022 is revised up to 14.5% (from 14.4%) and remains at 12.4% in 2023. For 2024, \nelectricity price inflation of 10% is expected, unchanged from the previous meeting. \n \n6 The rand has appreciated by about 1.5% to the US dollar since the November meeting. \n7 World food prices continue to rise. The assumption used for the forecast for USD-denominated world food \nprices increased from 13.4% in September to 25.4% for November and to 28% for the January meeting. \n8 The G3 comprises the United States, the Eurozone, and Japan. The latest CPI inflation in the respective \ncomponents sits at 7%, 5% and 0.6%. \n9 For 2023 and 2024, petrol price inflation is expected to be -0.1% and 1.7%, respectively. Our assumptions are \nnow for oil prices to average $78 per barrel in 2022 and $72 per barrel in 2023. An average price of $70 per \nbarrel is expected in 2024. \n \nMPC Statement 27 January 2022 \nPage 5 \n \nHeadline inflation in 2021 came out at 4.5%. The Bank’s forecast of headline inflation \nfor this year is revised higher to 4.9% (from 4.3%). Headline inflation is expected to \nbe 4.5% in 2023 and in 2024. \nCore inflation was 3.1% in 2021, and is forecast to rise to 3.8% in 2022 (up from 3.7%). \nWith the economy expanding faster than potential over the forecast period, core \ninflation is projected to rise to 4.5%, despite a still low rate of services price inflation \nand unit labour costs. Core inflation forecasts for 2023 and 2024 are unchanged at \n4.4% and 4.5%. \nThe risks to the inflation outlook are assessed to the upside. Global producer price \nand food price inflation continued to surprise higher in recent months and could do so \nagain. Oil prices increased strongly through 2021 and are up sharply year to date. \nCurrent oil prices sit well above forecasted levels for this year. Electricity and other \nadministered prices continue to present short- and medium-term risks. Given the \nmoderate medium and long-term inflation projections set out above, higher domestic \nimport tariffs, stronger services inflation, and higher wage demands present additional \nupside risks to the inflation forecast. \nA particular risk arises from the possibility of a faster normalisation of global policy \nrates than is currently built into the forecast, which assumes some rate hikes to begin \naround June of 2022. Added to this is the risk that quantitative tightening will occur \nmore quickly than previously expected, leading to stronger capital flow reversals from \nriskier assets such as emerging market debt. \n \nMPC Statement 27 January 2022 \nPage 6 \n \nAverage surveyed expectations of future inflation have increased to 4.8% for 2022 \n(from 4.4%). Market-based surveyed expectations for inflation have also increased to \n4.8%.10 \nIn the near term, headline inflation has increased well above the mid-point of the \ninflation target band, and returns close to the mid-point in the fourth quarter of 2022. \nSome risks to the inflation outlook, like food and fuel, have been realised, and other \nrisks, such as currency volatility and capital flow reversals, have become more \npronounced. \nAgainst this backdrop, the MPC decided to increase the repurchase rate by 25 basis \npoints to 4% per year, with effect from the 28th of January 2022. Four members of the \nCommittee preferred an increase and one member preferred an unchanged stance. \nThe implied policy rate path of the Quarterly Projection Model (QPM) indicates gradual \nnormalisation in the first quarter of 2022, and into 2023 and 2024, given the inflation \nforecast. As usual, the repo rate projection from the QPM remains a broad policy \nguide, changing from meeting to meeting in response to new data and risks. \nGiven the expected trajectory for headline inflation and upside risks, the Committee \nbelieves a gradual rise in the repo rate will be sufficient to keep inflation expectations \nwell anchored and moderate the future path of interest rates. However, economic and \nfinancial conditions are expected to remain more volatile for the foreseeable future. In \n \n10 The (Q4) Bureau for Economic Research (BER) survey expectations rose above the target midpoint to 4.8% \n(4.4%) for 2022 and 4.7% (4.5%) for 2023. Market analysts (Reuters Econometer) in January expect inflation to \nbe higher at 4.8% (4.5%) in 2022, 4.5% (4.3%) in 2023 and 4.4% in 2024. Market-based rates are calculated \nfrom the break-even inflation rate, which is the yield differential between conventional and inflation-linked \nbonds. These now sit at 4.8% for the 5-year and 5.93% on the 10-year breakeven. 15-year breakeven inflation \nsits at 6.4%. \n \n \nMPC Statement 27 January 2022 \nPage 7 \n \nthis uncertain environment, policy decisions will continue to be data dependent and \nsensitive to the balance of risks to the outlook. The MPC will seek to look through \ntemporary price shocks and focus on potential second round effects. \nCurrent repurchase rate levels reflect an accommodative policy stance through the \nforecast period, keeping financial conditions supportive of credit demand as the \neconomy continues to recover.11 The Bank has ensured adequate liquidity in domestic \nmarkets and will continue to closely monitor funding markets for stress. In addition, \nregulatory relief provided to banks continues to support lending to households and \nfirms. \nBetter anchored expectations of future inflation should keep interest rates lower for \nlonger, and can be realised by achieving a prudent public debt level, increasing the \nsupply of energy, moderating administered price inflation and keeping wage growth in \nline with productivity gains. Such steps will enhance the effectiveness of monetary \npolicy and its transmission to the broader economy. \n \nLesetja Kganyago \nGOVERNOR \nThe next statement of the MPC will be released on 24 March 2022. \nContact person: \nThoraya Pandy \n0824168416 \nmedia@resbank.co.za \n \n11 This implies a rise in the inflation-adjusted repo rate from -1.4% for 2021 to 0.0% for 2022, 1.0% for 2023, \nand 1.8% in 2024. The real repurchase rate calculation here is based on the 1-quarter ahead inflation forecast.", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/MPC_Statements/Monetary Policy Committee Statement January 2022.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "8ed27f32f410c4f404549574a8ec5ac0", "text": "Vol. 27 No. 3 \n \n \nWeek Ending \n17th JANUARY 2025 \nWeekly Economic \nHighlights \nTABLE OF CONTENTS \n \n1. \nOVERVIEW ............................................................................ 1 \n2. \nINTEREST RATES ................................................................ 2 \n3. \nEQUITY MARKETS .............................................................. 3 \n4. \nCLEARING AND SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY .................. 5 \n5. \nENERGY PRICES .................................................................. 5 \n6. \nGOLD PM FIX, MOSI-OA-TUNYA GOLD COINS AND \nGOLD BACKED DIGITAL TOKENS (GBDT) .................. 5 \n7. \nEXTERNAL SECTOR ........................................................... 6 \n \n \n \n 1 \n1. OVERVIEW \n \n \n \nThis report provides an overview of monetary and financial developments for the week ending January 17, \n2025. It encompasses updates on domestic and international money and capital markets, national payment \nsystems, as well as international commodity prices and exchange rates. \nDuring the week under review, the majority of foreign and local currency deposit rates remained unchanged, \nwhile local currency maximum deposits rates for 1 month and 3 months tenor declined by 4.7 percentage \npoints and 8.1 percentage points, respectively. \nLocal currency lending rates for individual clients increased, while those for corporate clients declined during \nthe week under review. The minimum foreign currency lending rates for individual clients have remained \nstable, while the maximum lending rates declined marginally. The minimum foreign currency lending rates \nfor corporate clients also decreased, whereas the maximum lending rates increased. \n \nIn the capital markets, the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) showed bearish trends during the week under \nanalysis, resulting in a 0.21% decline of the ZSE All Share Index, which closed at 207.92 points. The Victoria \nFalls Stock Exchange (VFEX), however, traded positively during the same period, with the VFEX All Share \nIndex increasing by 0.60% to close at 103.90 points. \n \nThe aggregate transactions processed through the National Payment System (NPS) platforms increased by \n3.49% to ZiG29.46 billion in value terms, from ZiG28.47 billion recorded in the previous week. The increase \nin NPS transactions was mainly attributable to increases in values processed through Real Time Gross \nSettlement and mobile money payment platforms. \n \nThe Zimbabwe Gold (ZiG) currency depreciated by 0.9% on the interbank market, from an average exchange \nrate of ZiG25.93 per US$1 in the previous week to ZiG26.17 per US$1, during the week under review \n \nThe weekly average international commodity prices for gold, palladium, copper, nickel and crude oil increased \nduring the week under review. Gold prices increased, bolstered by safe haven demand. Similarly, nickel prices \nrose reflecting ongoing market adjustments to production cuts and oversupply concerns. Brent crude oil prices \nincreased, driven by supply concerns following new sanctions on Russia's energy sector imposed by the United \nStates America over the Ukraine war. Platinum prices, on the other hand, retreated amid slowing demand for \ninternal combustion engines, which use platinum in their catalytic converter. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n 2 \n2. INTEREST RATES \n \nAverage commercial bank deposit rates (Local Currency (ZiG)) (%) \nZiG Deposit rates \n27 December 2024 \n3 January 2025 \n10 January 2025 \n17 January 2025 \nSavings \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n3.75 \n3.54 \n3.54 \n3.54 \nMaximum \n3.88 \n3.38 \n3.38 \n3.38 \n1-month deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n5.38 \n5.38 \n5.38 \n5.38 \nMaximum \n8.33 \n7.94 \n8.33 \n7.94 \n3-months deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n5.67 \n5.67 \n5.67 \n5.67 \nMaximum \n8.15 \n8.15 \n8.87 \n8.15 \n6-months deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n5.00 \n5.00 \n5.00 \n5.00 \nMaximum \n7.48 \n7.48 \n7.48 \n7.48 \n12-months deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n5.01 \n5.01 \n5.01 \n5.01 \nMaximum \n7.49 \n7.49 \n7.49 \n7.49 \nOver 1 year \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n5.02 \n5.02 \n5.02 \n5.02 \nMaximum \n7.78 \n7.78 \n7.78 \n7.78 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n \nAverage commercial bank deposit rates (Foreign Currency (US$)) (%) \nUS$ Deposit rates \n27 December 2024 \n 3 January 2025 \n10 January 2025 \n17 January 2025 \nSavings \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n1.35 \n1.35 \n1.35 \n1.35 \nMaximum \n1.57 \n1.57 \n1.57 \n1.57 \n1-month deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n3.31 \n3.31 \n3.31 \n3.31 \nMaximum \n5.17 \n5.17 \n5.17 \n5.17 \n3-month deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n3.99 \n3.99 \n3.99 \n3.99 \nMaximum \n6.01 \n6.01 \n6.01 \n6.01 \n6-month deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n3.66 \n3.66 \n3.66 \n3.66 \nMaximum \n6.06 \n6.06 \n6.06 \n6.06 \n12-Month deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n3.75 \n3.75 \n3.75 \n3.75 \nMaximum \n6.19 \n6.19 \n6.19 \n6.19 \nOver 1 year \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n3.86 \n3.86 \n3.86 \n3.86 \nMaximum \n6.28 \n6.28 \n6.28 \n6.28 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n 3 \nCommercial bank weighted lending rates (Local Currency (ZiG)) (%) \nZiG Lending rates \n27 December 2024 \n3 January 2025 \n10 January 2025 \n17 January 2025 \nIndividuals \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n41.03 \n41.51 \n41.55 \n41.60 \nMaximum \n46.47 \n47.04 \n47.08 \n47.12 \nCorporates \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n39.91 \n40.21 \n40.19 \n40.16 \nMaximum \n45.64 \n46.14 \n45.97 \n45.90 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n \nCommercial bank weighted lending rates (Foreign Currency (US$)) (%) \nUS$ Lending rates \n27 December 2024 \n3 January 2025 \n10 January 2025 \n17 January 2025 \nIndividuals \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n13.02 \n12.77 \n12.79 \n12.79 \nMaximum \n17.40 \n17.31 \n17.34 \n17.33 \nCorporates \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n10.58 \n10.66 \n10.65 \n10.62 \nMaximum \n16.24 \n16.30 \n16.25 \n16.34 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n \nCommercial banks and building societies mortgage lending rates (%) \nMortgage Lending rates \n27 December 2024 \n3 January 2025 \n10 January 2025 \n17 January 2025 \nZiG Lending rates \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n20.00 \n20.00 \n20.00 \n20.00 \nMaximum \n30.00 \n30.00 \n30.00 \n30.00 \nUS$ Lending rates \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n10.00 \n10.00 \n10.00 \n10.00 \nMaximum \n18.00 \n18.00 \n18.00 \n18.00 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n \n \n3. EQUITY MARKETS \n \n \nZSE Indicators \n \n \nAll Share \nIndex \n(points) \nTop 10 \nIndex \n(points) \nTop 15 \nIndex \n(points) \nMedium Cap \n(points) \nSmall Cap \n(points) \nMining \nIndex \n(points) \nGrand \nMarket Cap \n(ZiG billion) \nMarket \nTurnover \n(ZiG million) \nVolume of \nShares \n(million) \n27-Dec-24 \n216.88 \n214.21 \n211.70 \n227.67 \n100.11 \n235.38 \n66.21 \n30.98 \n0.89 \n3-Jan-25 \n213.90 \n212.33 \n213.56 \n246.61 \n100.11 \n235.38 \n65.09 \n30.98 \n5.73 \n10-Jan-25 \n208.36 \n206.60 \n208.73 \n240.23 \n100.11 \n235.38 \n62.93 \n51.39 \n48.73 \n17-Jan-25 \n207.92 \n207.33 \n209.36 \n235.04 \n100.11 \n229.61 \n63.03 \n55.84 \n29.27 \nWeekly \nChange (%) \n(0.21) \n0.35 \n0.30 \n(2.16) \n0.00 \n(2.45) \n0.16 \n8.66 \n(39.93) \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2025 \n \nVFEX Indicators \nDate \nAll Share Index \nPoints \nGrand Market Capitalisation \n(US$ billion) \nMarket Turnover \n(US$ million) \nVolume of Shares \n(million) \n27-Dec-24 \n100.22 \n1.23 \n0.01 \n0.05 \n3-Jan-25 \n105.77 \n1.28 \n0.41 \n1.85 \n10-Jan-25 \n103.28 \n1.25 \n0.25 \n1.64 \n17-Jan-25 \n103.90 \n1.25 \n0.63 \n3.18 \nWeekly Change (%) \n0.60 \n(0.56) \n152.00 \n93.90 \nSource: Victoria Falls Stock Exchange, 2025 \n \n \n \n 4 \nFigure 1: ZSE and VFEX Indicators \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange and Victoria Falls Stock Exchange, 2025 \n \n \n \n140\n160\n180\n200\n220\n240\n260\n280\n300\n320\n18-Oct-24\n25-Oct-24\n01-Nov-24\n08-Nov-24\n15-Nov-24\n22-Nov-24\n29-Nov-24\n06-Dec-24\n13-Dec-24\n20-Dec-24\n27-Dec-24\n03-Jan-25\n10-Jan-25\n17-Jan-25\nIndices\nZSE Indices \nAll Share Index (ZSE)\nTop 10 Index\nMining Index\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\n100\n18-Oct-24\n25-Oct-24\n01-Nov-24\n08-Nov-24\n15-Nov-24\n22-Nov-24\n29-Nov-24\n06-Dec-24\n13-Dec-24\n20-Dec-24\n27-Dec-24\n03-Jan-25\n10-Jan-25\n17-Jan-25\nZiG Billion\nZSE Market Capitalisation \n0\n2000\n4000\n6000\n8000\n10000\n12000\n14000\n16000\n18000\n20000\n18-Oct-24\n25-Oct-24\n01-Nov-24\n08-Nov-24\n15-Nov-24\n22-Nov-24\n29-Nov-24\n06-Dec-24\n13-Dec-24\n20-Dec-24\n27-Dec-24\n03-Jan-25\n10-Jan-25\n17-Jan-25\nUS$ Thousand\nVFEX Market Turnover \n1.15\n1.2\n1.25\n1.3\n1.35\n1.4\n18-Oct-24\n25-Oct-24\n01-Nov-24\n08-Nov-24\n15-Nov-24\n22-Nov-24\n29-Nov-24\n06-Dec-24\n13-Dec-24\n20-Dec-24\n27-Dec-24\n03-Jan-25\n10-Jan-25\n17-Jan-25\nUS$ Billion\nVFEX Market Capitalisation \n95\n100\n105\n110\n115\n18-Oct-24\n25-Oct-24\n01-Nov-24\n08-Nov-24\n15-Nov-24\n22-Nov-24\n29-Nov-24\n06-Dec-24\n13-Dec-24\n20-Dec-24\n27-Dec-24\n03-Jan-25\n10-Jan-25\n17-Jan-25\nIndices\nVFEX All Share Index \n0\n20 0 000\n40 0 000\n60 0 000\n80 0 000\n100 0 000\n120 0 000\n18-Oct-24\n25-Oct-24\n01-Nov-24\n08-Nov-24\n15-Nov-24\n22-Nov-24\n29-Nov-24\n06-Dec-24\n13-Dec-24\n20-Dec-24\n27-Dec-24\n03-Jan-25\n10-Jan-25\n17-Jan-25\nZiG Thousands\nZSE Market Turnover \nNegotiated trade deals Simbisa \nBrands Limited shares, Innscor \nAfrica Limited shares. \n \n 5 \n4. CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY \n Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n \n5. ENERGY PRICES \n \nEnergy Prices \n \n27 December 2024 \n03 January 2025 \n10 January 2025 \n17 January 2025 \nDomestic Energy Prices \nUS$ \nUS$ \nUS$ \nUS$ \nDiesel 50/ litre \n1.54 \n1.54 \n1.53 \n1.53 \nPetrol Blend E20/ litre \n1.48 \n1.48 \n1.48 \n1.48 \nLP Gas / kg \n1.86 \n1.86 \n1.58 \n1.58 \n \n \n \n \n \nInternational Energy Prices \n(Weekly average) \nUS$/barrel \nUS$/barrel \nUS$/barrel \nUS$/barrel \nCrude Oil Prices \n73.11 \n75.28 \n77.49 \n80.18 \n Source: Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory Authority and BBC 2025 \n \n \n6. GOLD PM FIX, MOSI-OA-TUNYA GOLD COINS AND GOLD BACKED DIGITAL TOKENS \n(GBDT) \n \n \n \nGold PM Fix and Gold Backed Digital Token Prices \nDate \nGold PM Fix \nGBDT ZiG Price per Mg \nGBDT US$ Price per Mg \nUS$/oz \nBuy \nSell \nBuy \nSell \n13-January-25 \n2,687.45 \n2.14 \n2.37 \n0.0821 \n0.0907 \n14-January-25 \n2,669.50 \n2.14 \n2.36 \n0.0815 \n0.0901 \n15-January-25 \n2,667.00 \n2.13 \n2.35 \n0.0815 \n0.0900 \n16-January-25 \n2,677.70 \n2.15 \n2.37 \n0.0818 \n0.0904 \n17-January-25 \n2,716.50 \n2.18 \n2.41 \n0.0830 \n0.0917 \nSource: London Bullion Market Association and Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n \n \nPAYMENT STREAM \nWEEK ENDING \n10 January 2025 \nWEEK ENDING \n17 January 2025 \nWEEKLY \nCHANGE (%) \n \nVALUES \n \nRTGS \n22,487,646,895.77 \n24,073,286,229.77 \n7.05 \nOf which ZiG \n5,904,560,329.29 \n7,860,558,576.89 \n \nOf which US$ transactions \n(ZiG Equivalent) \n16,583,086,566.48 \n \n16,212,727,652.88 \n \nPOS \n1,838,609,995.33 \n1,550,943,195.01 \n(15.65) \nATM \n1,330,705,393.04 \n1,157,328,887.38 \n(13.03) \nMOBILE BANKING \n284,176,661.09 \n157,966,869.65 \n(44.41) \nMOBILE MONEY \n2,370,732,013.39 \n2,415,164,496.23 \n1.87 \nZIPIT MOBILE \n154,681,398.88 \n105,818,515.82 \n(31.59) \nTOTAL \n28,466,552,357.50 \n29,460,508,193.88 \n3.49 \n \nVOLUMES \n \nRTGS \n148,864 \n154,147 \n3.55 \nOf which ZiG \n60,668 \n62,536 \n \nOf which US$ \n88,196 \n91,611 \n \nPOS \n1,639,104 \n1,464,186 \n(10.67) \nATM \n168,525 \n139,795 \n(17.05) \nMOBILE BANKING \n474,221 \n233,676 \n(50.72) \nMOBILE MONEY \n9,120,407 \n8,694,089 \n(4.67) \nZIPIT MOBILE \n169,941 \n144,205 \n(15.14) \nTOTAL \n11,721,062 \n10,830,098 \n(7.60) \n \n 6 \n \nMosi-oa-Tunya Gold Coin Prices \nGold Coin \nPrice \n13-January-25 \n14-January-25 \n15-January-25 \n16-January-25 \n17-January-25 \n1.00Oz \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ \n2,821.82 \n2,802.98 \n2,800.35 \n2,811.59 \n2,852.33 \nZiG \n73,674.98 \n73,423.37 \n73,229.99 \n73,853.31 \n74.906.05 \n0.50Oz \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ \n1,410.91 \n1,401.49 \n1,400.18 \n1,405.79 \n1,426.16 \nZiG \n36.837.49 \n36,711.68 \n36,615.00 \n36,926.65 \n37,453.02 \n0.25Oz \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ \n705.46 \n700.74 \n700.09 \n702.90 \n713.08 \nZiG \n18,418.74 \n18,355.84 \n18,307.50 \n18,463.33 \n18,726.51 \n0.10Oz \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ \n282.18 \n280.30 \n280.04 \n281.16 \n285.23 \nZiG \n7,367.50 \n7,342.34 \n7,323.00 \n7,385.33 \n7,490.60 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n \n7. EXTERNAL SECTOR \n \n \nExchange Rate Developments (ZiG per Unit of foreign currency) \n \n \nUSD \nZAR \nGBP \nBWP \nEURO \nWeekly Average \n(06 – 10Jan) \n25.9269 \n1.37949 \n32.20068 \n1.86056 \n26.79862 \n13-Jan \n26.109 \n1.36222 \n31.6952 \n1.8577 \n26.6678 \n14-Jan \n26.1948 \n1.3782 \n31.959 \n1.8534 \n26.88353 \n15-Jan \n26.1503 \n1.3806 \n31.9205 \n1.8595 \n26.9401 \n16-Jan \n261503 \n1.3945 \n32.0846 \n1.8744 \n26.0175 \n17-Jan \n26.2614 \n1.3959 \n32.0929 \n1.874 \n26.0309 \nWeekly Average \n(13– 17Jan) \n26.1732 \n1.3823 \n31.9504 \n1.8638 \n26.8983 \nAppr (-)/Depr (+) (%) of the \nZWG \n0.9 \n0.2 \n(0.8) \n0.2 \n0.4 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n \nInternational Commodity Prices \n \nGold \nPlatinum \nPalladium \nNickel \nLithium \n \nUS$/oz \nUS$/ounce \nUS$/ounce \nUS$/tonne \nUS$/tonne \nWeekly Average \n(6-10 Jan) \n2,659.22 \n955.10 \n934.70 \n15,434.20 \n10,025.00 \n13-Jan \n2,679.56 \n958.43 \n920.30 \n15,850.00 \n10,025.00 \n14-Jan \n2,636.70 \n953.00 \n945.50 \n15,956.00 \n10,025.00 \n15-Jan \n2,682.15 \n944.00 \n955.50 \n15,850.00 \n10,025.00 \n16-Jan \n2,711.98 \n945.00 \n956.50 \n15,963.00 \n10,025.00 \n17-Jan \n2,710.15 \n941.00 \n946.00 \n16,097.00 \n10,025.00 \nWeekly Average \n(13- 17 Jan) \n2,684.11 \n948.29 \n944.76 \n15,943.20 \n10,025.00 \nWeekly Change (%) \n0.94 \n(0.71) \n1.08 \n3.30 \n0.00 \nSource: BBC, KITCO and Bloomberg, 2025 \n \n \n \n \n \n 7 \nFigure 3: Weekly International Commodity Price Developments (3rd January 2025– 17th January 2025) \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSource: BBC, KITCO and Bloomberg, 2025 \n \nRESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE \nJANUARY 2025 \n2 5 500\n2 5 550\n2 6 600\n2 6 650\n2 7 700\n2 7 750\n2 8 800\n03-Jan\n10-Jan\n17-Jan\nUS$/oz\nGold\n70\n72\n74\n76\n78\n80\n82\n3-Jan\n10-Jan\n17-Jan\nUS$/barrel\nCrude oil \n900\n920\n940\n960\n980\n1 0 000\n3-Jan\n10-Jan\n17-Jan\nUS$/tonne\nPlatinum\n900\n910\n920\n930\n940\n950\n960\n970\n980\n990\n1 0 000\n3-Jan\n10-Jan\n17-Jan\nUS$/tonne\nPalladium\n15 0 000\n15 2 200\n15 4 400\n15 6 600\n15 8 800\n16 0 000\n16 2 200\n16 4 400\n3-Jan\n10-Jan\n17-Jan\nUS$/tonne\nNickel\n9 6 600\n9 7 700\n9 8 800\n9 9 900\n10 0 000\n10 1 100\n3-Jan\n5-Jan\n7-Jan\n9-Jan\n11-Jan\n13-Jan\n15-Jan\n17-Jan\nUS$/tonne\nLithium", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/Weekly_Economic_Highlights/WEEKLY_ECONOMIC_HIGHLIGHTS_17_JANUARY_2025_Volume_27_Number_3.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "d6c6f911bf7cb2242d3619e478c78992", "text": "South African Reserve Bank\nMonetary Policy Review \nDecember 2014\nMonetary Policy Review\nDecember 2014\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\n© South African Reserve Bank\nAll rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any \nmeans, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without fully acknowledging the Monetary Policy Review of the South \nAfrican Reserve Bank as the source. The contents of this publication are intended for general information only and are not intended to serve \nas financial or other advice. While every precaution is taken to ensure the accuracy of information, the South African Reserve Bank shall \nnot be liable to any person for inaccurate information or opinions contained in this publication.\nEnquiries relating to this Review should be addressed to:\n\t\nHead: Research Department\n\t\nResearch Department\n\t\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n\t\nP O Box 427\n\t\nPretoria 0001\n\t\nTel. +27 12 313-3668\nhttp://www.reservebank.co.za\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n ISSN: 1609-3194\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\nPreface\nThe primary mandate of the South African Reserve Bank (the Bank) is to achieve and \nmaintain price stability in the interest of balanced and sustainable economic growth. \nLow inflation helps to maintain and improve competitiveness, protects the purchasing \npower and living standards of all South Africans, and provides a favourable environment \nfor balanced growth, investment and employment creation. In addition, the Bank has a \ncomplementary mandate to oversee and maintain financial stability. The Bank’s Monetary \nPolicy Committee (MPC) is responsible for monetary policy decisions, and comprises the \nGovernor as Chairperson, the deputy governors and senior officials of the Bank. \nPrice stability is quantified by the setting of an inflation target range by government after \nconsultation with the Bank. The Bank has instrument independence, with the commitment \nto pursue a continuous target of 3 to 6 per cent for headline consumer price index inflation. \nThe MPC conducts monetary policy within a flexible inflation-targeting framework that \nallows inflation to be temporarily outside the target range under certain circumstances. \nThe MPC takes into account a viable medium-term time horizon for inflation and considers \nthe time lags between policy adjustments and economic effects. This provides for interest-\nrate smoothing over the cycle, and contributes towards more stable economic growth. \nThe repurchase rate decision reflects the MPC’s assessment of the appropriate monetary \npolicy stance. \nThe decision of the MPC, together with a comprehensive statement, is announced at a \nmedia conference at the end of each bimonthly meeting. This announcement outlines the \nMPC’s assessment of prevailing domestic and global economic conditions, as well as recent \noutcomes and forecasts for inflation and real economic activity. \nThe Monetary Policy Review (MPR) is published twice a year and is aimed at broadening \nthe understanding of the objectives and conduct of monetary policy. The MPR reviews \ndomestic and international developments that have affected inflation and that impact on the \nmonetary policy stance. It also provides an assessment of the factors determining inflation \nand the Bank’s forecast of the future path of inflation and economic growth. The MPR \nis presented by the Governor and senior officials of the Bank at Monetary Policy Forums \nin various centres across South Africa in an effort to develop a better understanding of \nmonetary policy through direct interaction with stakeholders.\nContents\nExecutive summary ......................................................................................................\t\n1\nPolicy stance..................................................................................................................\t\n3\nInflation\t........................................................................................................................\t\n8\nGlobal economic assessment..........................................................................................\t\n18\nDomestic growth outcomes...........................................................................................\t\n22\nConclusion....................................................................................................................\t\n28\nBoxes\nBox 1\tPotential output: Towards a better real-time measure ........................................\t\n5\nBox 2\tWage rigidities, employment conditions and inflation in South Africa...............\t\n10\nBox 3\tInflation forecast accuracy..................................................................................\t\n16\nBox 4\tTrends in international income flows..................................................................\t\n25\nAppendix\nAppendix 1 The Bank’s fan charts.................................................................................\t\n29\nStatements issued by Gill Marcus, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n17 July 2014...................................................................................................................\t\n30\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n18 September 2014........................................................................................................\t\n35\nStatement issued by Lesetja Kganyago, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n20 November 2014........................................................................................................\t\n40\nAbbreviations...............................................................................................................\t\n45\nGlossary........................................................................................................................\t\n46\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\nFigures\nFigure 1\t\nMonetary policy and the prime lending rate.....................................................\t 3\nFigure 2\t\nInflation and the exchange rate........................................................................\t 4\nFigure 3\t\nTargeted inflation forecast................................................................................\t 5\nFigure 4\t\nTargeted and core inflation forecasts................................................................\t 5\nFigure B1.1\t Targeted inflation outcomes and projection from the November 2011 MPR....\t 6\nFigure B1.2\t Real GDP growth outcomes and projection from the November 2011 MPR....\t 6\nFigure 5\t\nReal GDP growth forecast................................................................................\t 6\nFigure 6\t\nComposite leading business cycle indicator......................................................\t 7\nFigure 7\t\nEquity-market performance in US dollar terms................................................\t 8\nFigure 8\t\nBanks’ loans and advances to the private sector................................................\t 9\nFigure 9\t\nFiscal stance......................................................................................................\t 9\nFigure 10\t\nConsumer price inflation: Targeted inflation...................................................\t10\nFigure 11\t\nExchange rates of the rand................................................................................\t10\nFigure 12\t\nExchange rate performance against the US dollar.............................................\t11\nFigure B2.1\t Exchange rate volatility against the US dollar before and after adoption\n\t\n\t\nof inflation targeting........................................................................................\t11\nFigure 13\t\nPrice pressures..................................................................................................\t12\nFigure 14\t\nSpot and futures prices of Brent crude oil, and the petrol price.........................\t12\nFigure 15\t\nContribution of petrol and food prices to headline inflation............................\t12\nFigure 16\t\nMaize and cereals prices...................................................................................\t13\nFigure 17\t\nTargeted inflation and food inflation...............................................................\t13\nFigure 18\t\nCore measures of inflation................................................................................\t13\nFigure 19\t\nBER surveys of headline CPI inflation expectations.........................................\t14\nFigure B3.1\t One-year-ahead inflation expectations and realised inflation...........................\t14\nFigure 20\t\nAverage annual inflation and wage settlements.................................................\t14\nFigure 21\t\nRemuneration per worker and unit labour cost in the formal \nnon-agricultural sector......................................................................................\t15\nFigure 22\t\nPurchasing Managers’ Indices..........................................................................\t15\nFigure 23\t\nGrowth rates in advanced economies................................................................\t16\nFigure 24\t\nTen-year real bond yields in the euro area periphery.........................................\t16\nFigure 25\t\nGrowth rates in emerging-market and developing economies...........................\t17\nFigure 26\t\nMonetary policy interest rates of selected countries..........................................\t17\nFigure 27\t\nReal commodity prices.....................................................................................\t17\nFigure 28\t\nFlow of capital to and from South Africa..........................................................\t18\nFigure 29\t\nMonthly non-resident net purchases of domestic securities...............................\t18\nFigure 30\t\nTrade and current accounts..............................................................................\t19\nFigure 31\t\nGrowth in electricity supply and real GDP in the upward phase \n\t\n\t\nof the business cycle..........................................................................................\t19\nFigure 32\t\nFormal non-agricultural-sector employment and GDP.....................................\t19\nTables\nTable 1\t\nEvolution of the Bank’s targeted inflation forecasts............................................\t 5\nTable 2\t\nEvolution of the Bank’s core inflation forecasts..................................................\t 6\nTable 3\t\nReal domestic sectoral growth rates....................................................................\t 7\nTable 4\t\nEvolution of the Bank’s real GDP growth forecasts............................................\t 7\nTable 5\t\nDomestic economic sentiment indicators...........................................................\t 8\nTable 6\t\nGrowth in expenditure on GDP.........................................................................\t 8\nTable 7\t\nPublic finance medium-term estimates..............................................................\t 9\nTable 8\t\nContributions to targeted inflation....................................................................\t10\nTable 9\t\nMeasures of producer price inflation..................................................................\t12\nTable 10\t\nReuters survey of CPI forecasts: May 2014.........................................................\t14\nTable 11\t\nGlobal growth rates............................................................................................\t15\n1\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\nExecutive summary\nThe repurchase (repo) rate was raised by 75 basis points in 2014 as part of a gradual rate- \nhiking cycle. This is a response to a combination of a higher trajectory for headline inflation \nand elevated risks to the longer-term inflation outlook. Headline inflation has been outside \nthe target for much of the year, peaking at 6,6 per cent in May and June, before falling to \njust within the target range in September and October. Significantly lower oil prices and \nmoderating food price inflation have helped the near-term headline inflation outlook. Core \ninflation, however, is stubbornly high, propelled by rand weakness, inertia in price and wage \nsetting and consistently high services inflation. Inflation expectations appear stable but are \nabove the upper end of the target range. \nSouth Africa’s macroeconomic imbalances have grown more uncomfortable. The current-\naccount deficit is large relative to historic norms and peer countries, and has been closing \nonly slowly. Policy adjustment through a lower inflation rate and gradual fiscal consolidation \nwill help over time to ease the current-account deficit to more sustainable levels, while \ncontributing to lower long-term costs of borrowing. \nGlobal financial conditions have become less hospitable for countries with large external \nfinancing requirements – a change emanating from a gradual normalisation of monetary \npolicy in the United States (US). This process has already delivered a bumpy ride for \nSouth Africa, as it has for some other countries, with bouts of volatility (such as January \n2014) interspersed with periods of uneasy calm (as in mid-2014). We cannot be sure how \nnormalisation will proceed, or how much additional easing by the European Central \nBank and the Bank of Japan will offset tightening by the US Federal Reserve (the Fed). \nThe overall process should be protracted, with world interest rates moving higher at \na slow and steady pace. Based on experience, however, it is unlikely that markets will \nadjust smoothly despite the best efforts of policymakers to communicate their intentions \nclearly. From this perspective, the rand exchange rate is likely to be intermittently volatile \nand could weaken further. \nDomestic economic performance has been disappointing, with growth forecasts for the year \nreduced from 3 per cent (as of November 2013) to 1,4 per cent. This reflects a series of long- \nand short-term supply shocks, including rising intermediate input and labour costs, costlier \nand less reliable electricity, and severe strikes in the mining and manufacturing sectors. \nEstimates of potential growth show it has fallen, and it may have deteriorated further this \nyear given the severity of these disruptions. Commodity prices have also declined, affecting \nSouth Africa’s terms of trade. World economic growth has been subdued, owing in particular \nto protracted weakness in the euro area and a broad-based emerging-market slowdown. It \nis therefore unlikely that better export earnings will soon moderate South Africa’s external \nfinancing requirements.\nGrowth is expected to pick up gradually over a two-year time horizon, approaching 3 per \ncent as the global environment improves and the economy recovers from domestic shocks. \nThe monetary policy adjustment will ensure that inflation remains under control and \nexpectations of future inflation are lowered. On its own this should reduce uncertainty about \nfuture economic prospects and support long-run investment. The current tightening cycle \nhas been slower and more moderate than previous cycles, and rates remain close to historical \nlows, with the real repo rate still near zero – which supports growth in the economy over \nthe near term. Fiscal policy strikes a similar balance, with spending growth slowing but still \npositive in real terms. \nSouth Africa has the leeway to adjust quite gradually, protecting growth, thanks to two \nfactors. First, global conditions are still generally supportive, with interest rates very low \nfrom a historical perspective and likely to stay that way for an extended period of time. \nSecond, South Africa entered the crisis period with crucial policy buffers, including low \nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\n2\ndebt levels and considerable policy credibility. These advantages have been exploited over the \npast half-decade, tiding the country over an unusually difficult period in modern economic \nhistory, and are not yet altogether exhausted. Provided that imbalances can be constrained \nnow, before they develop into more serious vulnerabilities, South Africa will remain an \nattractive investment destination. We choose to adjust slowly so that we are not forced to \nadjust fast.\nThis Monetary Policy Review is divided into four sections. First is a short, chronological \noverview of the policy stance, followed by sections on inflation and the inflation outlook, \nthe world economic environment and domestic growth. These combine to provide a full \npicture of monetary policy in South Africa, but may be read as stand-alone discussions on \neach subject.\n3\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\nPolicy stance\nInflation has been above target for much of the year and expectations of \nfuture inflation stubbornly high. Economic growth, meanwhile, has been \nweak and volatile, confidence low, and demand slowing. Although some \nimprovement in global growth is expected, the environment threatens \nongoing currency depreciation for emerging markets with large \nmacroeconomic imbalances, such as South Africa. \nThe monetary policy response to these challenges has been a gradual tightening \ncycle. This is echoed in the themes of fiscal policy, with spending growth \nstill positive but slowing as budget deficits fall. Both these policy settings are \ncalibrated to reduce South Africa’s vulnerabilities, with a gradual adjustment \nsupportive of demand in the short term while ensuring the environment \nremains conducive to longer-term growth.\nAs of mid-2014, when the previous Monetary Policy Review (MPR) was \npublished, the repo rate had been increased for the first time since 2008. \nInflation was above target and the breach was expected to last until the second \nquarter of 2015. This forecast entailed a significant deterioration from the \noutlook at the end of 2013, which had shown inflation staying within the \ntarget range through 2014 and 2015, and growth rebounding to 3 per cent \nby 2014. \nThe first reductions in the Fed’s asset purchase programme affected a number \nof emerging-market currencies, including the rand. The nominal effective \nexchange rate hit an all-time low in January 2014, with rand depreciation a \nmajor inflation threat. Oil and food prices were also exerting pressure; food \ncosts in particular were rebounding from a brief decline towards the end of \n2013. These factors risked second-round effects to wages and prices more \ngenerally, as well as to inflation expectations, which were already grouped at \nthe high end of the target range. \nThe current MPR updates this narrative in a few important ways. Inflation \nappears to have peaked sooner than anticipated, at 6,5 per cent in the second \nquarter rather than 6,5 per cent in the last quarter of 2014, and has dipped \nby more than expected to just below the target in September and October. \nElectricity prices are set to increase sharply from the middle of next year, \nbut other supply factors have been favourable. Food prices have ebbed again \nthanks to excellent harvests in many producer countries (including South \nAfrica). Oil prices have shifted abruptly lower as global supply expands \nalongside weak demand forecasts. These positive supply shocks have brought \ndown the most recent inflation forecasts, lowering the 2014 number from \n6,2 to 6,1 per cent and the 2015 number from 5,7 to 5,3 per cent. \nAs with negative supply shocks, however, it is important to look through the \nfirst-round effects and focus on spillovers to underlying inflation and inflation \nexpectations. Here there is less scope for relief. Core inflation is close to the \ntop end of the target, having trended steadily upwards from 2011. It is forecast \nat 5,6 per cent in 2014, 5,7 per cent in 2015 and 5,3 per cent in 2016. Inflation \nexpectations on average have remained relatively steady at just over 6 per cent, \noutside the target range. Analysts’ expectations are within the target range, \nbut expectations for business and union leaders are slightly higher. Wage \nincreases have been correspondingly elevated.\nIndices: 31 December 2012 = 100\nIndices: 31 December 2012 = 100\n90\n100\n110\n120\n130\n140\n90\n100\n110\n120\n130\n140\nFigure 2 \nExchange-rate performance\n \nagainst the US dollar\n \nSouth African rand\n \nAustralian dollar\n \nCanadian dollar\n \nIndonesian rupiah\n \nMexican peso\nSources: Reuters and own calculations\n \nTaper talk\nTapering\nTaper talk\nTapering\n2013\n2014\n2013\n2014\n \nBrazilian real\n \nIndian rupee\n \n Turkish lira\n \n Chilean peso\nPer cent\n-2\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n16\n18\nFigure 1 \nMonetary policy and the prime \n \nlending rate \n \nPrime lending rate\n \nRepurchase rate\n \nReal repurchase rate* \n* Nominal rate adjusted by Reuters one-year-ahead \nCPI forecast\n Sources: South African Reserve Bank and Reuters\n2006\n2008\n2010\n2012\n2014\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\n4\nSince January 2014, the exchange rate has fluctuated sharply on foreign and \ndomestic news but the overall trend has been quite flat, in contrast to the \nsecular depreciation of the preceding three years. The path of the currency \nremains uncertain: it may be that markets have priced in appropriate \nassumptions for the world and local economy, but there is ample scope \nfor miscalculation and surprises. The current-account deficit remains an \nimportant vulnerability, with an unexpectedly favourable figure in the first \nquarter supporting the rand while a worse-than-anticipated second-quarter \nfigure helped weaken it again. For most of the period since the financial \ncrisis, the global environment has actually been exceptionally supportive \nof South Africa’s excess of expenditure over saving (reflecting the current-\naccount deficit). But this climate is changing as a recovering US economy \ndiverts capital flows. A stronger US economy is also bolstering the dollar, \ncreating a divergence between the bilateral exchange rate and the broader \nnominal effective rate.\nGlobal growth has disappointed expectations, even from earlier in 2014, with \nthe International Monetary Fund (IMF) lowering its forecasts in October \nand warning of mounting downside risks, particularly from geopolitical \ninstability. The euro area has fared worse than expected, with Italy in a \nprolonged recession, France stagnant and even Germany faltering in the \nsecond and third quarters. Emerging markets have in general slowed, partly \nfor structural and partly for cyclical reasons, and appear unlikely to recover \nthe growth levels seen before the crisis. The brightest spots in the global \neconomy are the US and United Kingdom (UK), where unemployment \nlevels have fallen sharply. Sub-Saharan Africa has also maintained high \ngrowth rates, although some countries are exposed to financial stress and \na few West African countries are suffering a horrific outbreak of the Ebola \nvirus, which has already caused over 5 000 deaths. \nDomestic output was seriously damaged by strikes lasting into the third \nquarter of the year, forcing downward revisions of growth forecasts at each \nMonetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting. However, growth in non-\nstrike-affected sectors remained positive and leading indicators have picked \nup as strikes ended, pointing to better economic performance from the third \nquarter onwards. The forecast shows gross domestic product (GDP) growth \nreverting towards potential in 2015, with the output gap closing over the \nnext few years as the economy recovers lost ground. With unit labour \ncosts rising by close to the inflation rate, however, there seems to be little \nopportunity for stronger job creation. Strikes and electricity constraints may \nalso have detracted further from South Africa’s potential growth rate.\nUS dollars per barrel\nFigure 3 \nEvolution of Brent crude oil\n \nprice forecasts\n \n2013\n \n2015\nNote: This graph denotes selected forecasts of average \nBrent crude oil prices since January 2012\n \n2014\n \n2016\nApr\n2012\nSep\nJan\nApr\n2013\nSep\nJan\nApr\n2014\nSep Oct\nJan\n92\n96\n100\n104\n108\n112\n116\nSource: Reuters monthly oil poll of industry analysts\n5\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\nIn responding to the mix of disappointingly low growth and high inflation, \nboth worse than anticipated earlier in the year, the MPC raised the repo rate \nby 25 basis points in July 2014 but left policy unchanged in September and \nNovember. This marks gradual progress along the path to normalisation, \nbut progress has been delayed by strikes and feeble domestic and global \ngrowth. The contrast with previous tightening cycles is striking: the repo \nrate has so far been raised by 75 basis points over 11 months, compared with \n500 basis points in 25 months between 2006 and 2008, 400 basis points \nin nine months in 2002 and – in the pre-inflation targeting era – 695 basis \npoints in just five months. \nFinancial markets appear to have understood that this cycle is different: \nforward rate agreements spiked upwards after the January rate increase but \nhave since moderated in line with Bank communications. The short end \nof the yield curve has also been taking the brunt of the adjustment, at least \nin 2014. After increases in May 2013 and again in January 2014, 10-year \ngovernment bond yields have declined over the year. \nBox 1\t\nPotential output: Towards a better real-time measure1\nThe output gap, defined as the difference between real GDP outcomes and the \neconomy’s non-inflationary production potential, serves as an indicator of inflationary \npressures in the real economy. An economy’s non-inflationary production potential \ncannot be observed directly and needs to be estimated. Real GDP is decomposed into \ntwo components: a trend and a cycle. The trend represents the economy’s level of \npotential output and the de-trended cycle reflects a suitable measure of the output gap.\nThe Hodrick–Prescott (HP) filter provides a simple statistical methodology for this \ndecomposition, but because the filtered trend series gravitates towards the observed \ndata at the end of the sample, it often results in a biased estimate for the most recent \nquarter. The need to revise the HP estimates limits the usefulness of the HP filter for \nreal-time policymaking. \nTo overcome this weakness, the HP filter is enriched with additional real-economy \ninformation including growth in private-sector credit extension and the utilisation of \nproduction capacity in the manufacturing sector. The inclusion of additional \ninformation about the real economy improves the real-time output gap estimates, and \nreduces the extent of future revisions. \nThe global financial crisis and the ensuing mediocre recovery contributed to a global \nslowing in potential GDP growth. South Africa’s potential growth also slowed, with an \nestimated decline from a pre-crisis peak of 3,9 per cent in 2006 to around 2,5 per \ncent in 2014 (see Figure B1.1). This is similar to the IMF’s estimate for South Africa’s \npotential growth, which is about 2,5 per cent for 2013–2014.2 The slowdown in post-\ncrisis potential growth implies an output gap of about -1 to -2 per cent in 2012 \nand 2013.\n1\t\nFor further technical details, see V Anvari, N Ehlers and R Steinbach. ‘A semi-structural approach \nto estimate South Africa’s potential output’, South African Reserve Bank Working Paper WP/14/08, \nNovember 2014.\n2\t\nSee Y Wu, ‘IMF Selected Issues: Estimating South Africa’s potential growth’, internal IMF discussion \npaper, forthcoming.\nPer cent\nPer cent\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\n10\n11\n12\n13\nFigure 4 \nMoney-market and forward rates,\n \nand 10-year bond yield\n \nRepurchase rate\n \n3x6 Jibar (FRA)*\n \n9x12 Jibar (FRA)*\n \nExchange rate (left-hand scale)\n* FRA: Forward rate agreements\nSources: Bloomberg and Datastream\n \n2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014\nRand per US dollar\n4,5\n5,0\n5,5\n6,0\n6,5\n7,0\n7,5\n8,0\n8,5\n9,5\n10,5\n11,5\nMay\nJul\nSep\nNov\n2013\nNov\n2014\nJan\nMar\n \n3-month Jibar\n \n6x9 Jibar (FRA)*\n \n10-year bond yield\n \n-3\n-2\n-1\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\nPer cent\n2000\n02\n04\n06\n08\n10\n12 13\n \nPotential growth \nSource: South African Reserve Bank Working Paper WP/14/08, \nNovember 2014.\n \nReal GDP growth\nFigure B1.1 South Africa’s estimated \n \npotential output growth, \n \n2000–2014\n-3\n-2\n-1\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\nPer cent of potential GDP\nSource: South African Reserve Bank Working Paper WP/14/08, \nNovember 2014.\nFigure B1.2 South Africa’s estimated \n \noutput gap, 2000–2014\n2000\n02\n04\n06\n08\n10\n12 13\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\n6\nFiscal policy complementarity\nThe October 2014 Medium Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS) heralds \na ‘turning point’ for fiscal policy. Government spending will continue to \ngrow in real terms, by 1,8 per cent a year, but this rate of increase is much \nlower than in previous years, and will be strictly limited to ensure it supports \nthe economy instead of raising its vulnerability.\nNational Treasury’s growth projections are similar to the Bank’s, with the \noutlook for 2014 cut from 2,7 per cent (in the February 2014 Budget) to \n1,4 per cent. Lower growth reduces tax revenues, threatening greater debt \naccumulation through larger deficits. South Africa’s government debt-\nto-GDP ratio has increased by significantly more than its peer emerging \nmarkets’. Fiscal deficits of about 5 per cent (for the main budget) have \nbecome entrenched as growth repeatedly disappoints.1 US monetary policy \nnormalisation and credit ratings downgrades make additional debt more \nexpensive. Financing requirements will also rise in 2017, when debt issued \nin the aftermath of the financial crisis matures. \nTable 1\t Public finance data\n \n2013/14\n2014/15\n2015/16\n2016/17\n2017/18\nConsolidated\ngovernment* (R billions) \nOutcome\nBudget\nMTBPS\nestimates\nMedium-term estimates\nRevenue.............................\n1 012,7\n1 099,2\n1 093,9\n1 199,5\n1 323,0\n1 434,6\nExpenditure........................\n1 147,4\n1 252,3\n1 247,1\n1 344,0\n1 437,1\n1 553,4\nBudget balance..................\n-134,7\n-153,1\n-153,2\n-144,5\n-114,1\n-118,7\nTotal net loan debt**...........\n1 379,5\n1 589,0\n1 588,7\n1 799,0\n1 989,7\n2 191,9\nAs a percentage of GDP\nBudget balance..................\n-3,9\n-4,0\n-4,1\n-3,6\n-2,6\n-2,5\nTotal net loan debt**...........\n40,0\n41,9\n42,8\n44,6\n45,4\n45,9\n*\t Includes national government, provinces, social security funds and selected public entities\n**\t National government\nNote: Owing to a change in presentation of budget statistics, the budget balance now includes extraordinary receipts \nand payments\nSources: National Treasury, Budget Review 2014 and Medium Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS), October 2014 \nThe MTBPS sets out a strategy to narrow the fiscal deficit and stabilise \ndebt, aiming for it to peak at 45,9 per cent of GDP in 2017/18. One element \nof this is higher revenue collection, but the major decisions on this subject \nhave been deferred to the 2015 Budget. The major, specific contribution \nfrom the MTBPS, by contrast, is to set out a variety of spending limits.\nState-owned enterprises have sporadically required large bailouts over the \npast few years, putting unexpected pressure on the fiscus. To control these \ncosts, National Treasury will henceforth only enact bailouts if and when \nneeded through the use of deficit-neutral funding. The extra revenue will be \nraised through the sale of non-core state assets. \n1\t\nNational Treasury, Medium Term Budget Policy Statement, http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/mtbps/2014/\nmtbps/MTBPS%202014%20Full%20Document.pdf, p 20.\n7\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\nExpenditure will also be limited through the use of nominal spending \nceilings, which are binding on all non-interest main budget expenditure. \nThey were first adopted in 2012 and have been repeatedly lowered since, \nincluding in the 2014 MTBPS. To ensure spending comes in under the \nceiling, the MTBPS withdrew funding for positions that have been vacant \nfor an extended period. It also aims to lower transfers to public entities and \nlimits expenditure growth on non-essential expenses such as consultants, \nadvertising and travel. Crucially, should these measures prove insufficient \nto contain costs, the ceilings automatically require reductions elsewhere. \nOne important risk is the government’s wage bill, which is budgeted to rise \nin line with inflation but is exposed to demands for much higher increases. \nAnother more general risk is higher inflation. National Treasury currently \nexpects headline inflation to average 6,2 per cent for the 2014/15 fiscal \nyear, falling to 5,3 per cent by 2017/18. Because the ceilings are nominal, \nadditional inflation that pushes expenditure to the limit will require \nreductions in budget allocations. Monetary policy will make an important \ncontribution by controlling inflation and thereby help the state achieve its \nspending priorities.\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\n8\nInflation \nHeadline consumer price index (CPI) inflation cleared the top of the target \nin April 2014, rising to a high of 6,6 per cent in May and June before \nreceding to 5,9 per cent in September and October. Food and petrol – \nmediated by the exchange rate – have been instrumental in determining \nwhich side of 6 per cent prices land: food prices have added over a full \npercentage point to headline inflation in each of the past six months, while \npetrol prices contributed nearly 1 percentage point to headline inflation in \nMay and June. More recently the effect has reversed, pulling CPI inflation \nnarrowly under 6 per cent earlier than anticipated. \nTable 2\t Contributions to targeted inflation\nPercentage change over 12 months* and percentage points\n2013\n2014\nWeights\n4th qr\n1st qr\nMay\nJun\nJul\nAug\nSep\nOct\nGoods inflation*..............................\n49,86\n4,8\n6,0\n7,5\n7,4\n6,8\n6,8\n5,8\n5,6\nServices inflation*...........................\n50,14\n5,9\n5,9\n5,9\n6,0\n6,0\n6,0\n6,1\n6,0\nTargeted inflation*.........................\n100,00\n5,4\n5,9\n6,6\n6,6\n6,3\n6,4\n5,9\n5,9\nFood and non-alcoholic beverages\n15,41\n0,6\n0,9\n1,3\n1,3\n1,3\n1,4\n1,3\n1,2\nFood.........................................\n14,20\n0,5\n0,8\n1,3\n1,3\n1,3\n1,4\n1,2\n1,1\nHousing and utilities.......................\n24,52\n1,3\n1,3\n1,4\n1,4\n1,4\n1,4\n1,4\n1,4\nTransport........................................\n16,43\n1,0\n1,3\n1,5\n1,4\n1,1\n1,0\n0,7\n0,8\n Petrol.........................................\n5,68\n0,5\n0,7\n0,8\n0,8\n0,5\n0,3\n0,1\n0,1\nMiscellaneous................................\n14,72\n1,1\n1,0\n1,0\n1,0\n1,1\n1,1\n1,0\n1,0\nOther.............................................\n28,92\n1,5\n1,4\n1,4\n1,5\n1,4\n1,5\n1,5\n1,5\nOf which:\nCPI for administered prices*...........\n18,48\n7,6\n8,6\n8,9\n8,6\n7,0\n6,2\n4,7\n5,1\nCore inflation*, **............................\n74,78\n5,3\n5,4\n5,5\n5,6\n5,7\n5,8\n5,6\n5,7\n** CPI excluding food, non-alcoholic beverages, petrol and energy\nSources: Statistics South Africa and own calculations\nUnderlying the fluctuations from volatile components of the CPI are more \nbroad-based and persistent elements of inflation, described by various core \nmeasures. All these indices have shown a slow upward trend since 2011, \nfrom near the bottom of the target to the top. This rise in core inflation \nhas coincided with deteriorating growth and a negative output gap, with \nlittle evidence of excessive demand. There are instead more plausible causes: \nexchange-rate depreciation as well as food and energy price increases, which \ngenerated indirect first- and second-round effects, and above-inflation wage \nand salary adjustments. \nFood prices\nEarlier in the year the outlook for food prices was gloomy. Geopolitical \ntension between Ukraine and Russia threatened production in one of the \nworld’s major grain belts, while meteorologists warned of a severe El Niño \nevent during the year, a phenomenon which typically reduces rainfall in \nSouth Africa. These fears, however, proved unfounded: 2014 is instead \nyielding bumper crops, both at home and abroad, suppressing food prices \nas a result. The Food and Agriculture Organization Food Price Index has \nPercentage change over 12 months\nFigure 7 \nCore measures of inflation\n \nHeadline CPI\n \nCPI excluding food and NAB* prices\n \nCPI excluding food, NAB*, petrol and energy prices\n \nCPI excluding administered prices \n \n3–6 per cent inflation target range\n* NAB: Non-alcoholic beverages\nSource: Statistics South Africa\n2009\n2010\n2012\n2013\n2014\n2011\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\nPercentage change over 12 months\nFigure 5 \nConsumer price inflation:\n \nTargeted inflation*\n \n3–6 per cent inflation target range\n* CPI for all urban areas\nSource: Statistics South Africa\n2009\n2010\n2012\n2013\n2014\n2011\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\nProportion of headline\ninflation\nPercentage points\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\nFigure 6 \nContribution of petrol and food\n \nprices to headline inflation*\n \nPetrol: Estimated contribution\n \nFood: Estimated contribution\n \nCombined contribution (right-hand scale)\n* Petrol and food prices have a combined weight of\nalmost 20 per cent in the basket and therefore have\na significant effect on headline inflation \n \n \n \n \nSources: Statistics South Africa, Department of\nEnergy and own calculations\n2014\n2013\n2012\n2011\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n9\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\ndeclined to its lowest level since 2010, and the national Crop Estimates \nCommittee has revised its final production estimates for white and yellow \nmaize to 14,3 million tonnes for 2014 – which would be the second-largest \nmaize harvest in South African history. The outlook is also helped by falling \noil prices, given that oil is an important input to food production and also \na substitute for biofuels, making it perhaps the single most important long-\nterm driver of food prices over the past ten years.2\nPetrol prices\nPetrol price inflation has fallen since May 2014, helped by both declining \nworld oil prices and a fairly stable exchange-rate trend. International crude \noil prices fell below US$100 in September, despite geopolitical instability \naffecting important energy producers including Iraq and Russia. Prices \nfell even further to November, with Brent crude at four-year lows of below \nUS$80 a barrel. Rand prices are correspondingly down but not as far down, \ngiven exchange-rate depreciation since 2011, with the rand price of Brent \ncrude at a 17-month low in October 2014. \nThe decline in oil prices stems from three crucial factors: first, production \nfrom the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries has risen, with \nLibyan output in particular rebounding sharply from instability-induced \nlows. Second, the US shale revolution is reshaping world energy markets, \ntransforming the US into the world’s largest oil producer, ahead of Saudi \nArabia. (As a result, Nigeria has sold almost no oil to the US since July, \ndespite having previously been one of the US’s top five suppliers.) Third, \nglobal demand forecasts have also fallen steadily alongside deteriorating \ngrowth prospects for the world economy. \nCore inflation and its drivers\nThe acceleration of food and petrol prices opened up a wedge between \nheadline and core inflation. This wedge has recently narrowed as headline \ninflation comes down but core inflation continues its slow rise, and the \nforecast shows core inflation overtaking headline in 2015. There are several \ncomplementary explanations for core inflation’s protracted rise. One is that \nprice setters are catching up with the higher inflation they have experienced; \na demonstration of indirect effects from earlier supply pressures. This \napplies particularly to services, a category which is strongly represented in \nmost core measures, filling more than half of these baskets. Because services \nare generally non-tradeables, service price inflation is not simply a response \nto higher costs from a depreciated exchange rate. These prices also tend \nto be adjusted more infrequently than goods so they often lag headline \ndevelopments – which implies core inflation will ‘overshoot’ headline \ninflation as food and oil prices fall. \nA similar process affects wage deals, which reflect previous inflation outcomes \nbut also factor into firms’ costs, prompting corresponding increases in the \nprices they charge. This effect is accelerated by a separate mechanism, in \nwhich employees win above-inflation increases, resulting in further pressure \non production costs. Wages in South Africa tend to be downwardly rigid \nin real terms and well-insulated from employment and growth conditions, \nboosting inflation even in a lacklustre economy (see Box 2).\n2\t\nJ Baffes and A Dennis, ‘Long-term drivers of food prices’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 6455, \nMay 2013.\nPercentage change over 12 months\nFigure 8 \nConsumer and producer \n \nfood prices\n \nPPI: Final manufactured producer food prices\n \nPPI: Agricultural producer prices\n \nCPI: All food\n \nCPI: Bread and cereals\nSource: Statistics South Africa\n2009\n2011\n2012\n2013\n2014\n2010\n-10\n-5\n0\n5\n10\n15\nPercentage change over 12 months\nFigure 9 \nTargeted* inflation and \n \nfood inflation\n \nAll food items\n \nBread and cereals\n \nMeat\n \nMilk, cheese and eggs\n \nTargeted inflation measure\n* CPI for all urban areas\nSource: Statistics South Africa\n2010\n2012\n2013\n2014\n2011\n-4\n0\n4\n8\n12\n16\n20\nCents per litre\nCents per litre\n400\n600\n800\n1 000\n1 200\n1 400\n1 600\nFigure 10 South African petrol price and\n \ncontributions to changes in the\n \nbasic fuel price \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nExchange rate\n \nMovement in international product prices \n \nPrice change\n \nGauteng price of 95 octane unleaded petrol\n \n(right-hand scale)\nSource: Department of Energy\n \n2010\n2009\n2011\n2013\n2012\n2014\n-160\n-120\n-80\n-40\n-0\n40\n80\n120\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\n10\nEvidence for the ‘inflation plus’ approach is visible in quarterly releases of \nthe Andrew Levy Wage Settlement Survey, which show consistent real growth \nin wage settlements since the crisis. This measure is limited by its coverage, \nrepresenting a relatively small fraction of the workforce, but it points to \nconsistent above-inflation wage increases, with average nominal wage \nsettlements of about 8 per cent. \nRemuneration per worker, a more general measure, shows a slightly lower \ngrowth rate, averaging 7,4 per cent between 2011 and the end of 2013. \nThe first half of the year saw a sudden decline in remuneration growth, \ninfluenced by two factors. Strike action in the platinum-mining sector meant \nworkers were employed but not paid, forfeiting wages of approximately \nR10,7 billion. Furthermore, a large number of temporary jobs were created \naround the election, which lifted public employment but had a much \nsmaller effect on public-sector wages. The recent decline in remuneration \nper worker therefore probably does not presage moderating wage pressures; \nthe longer-term average is more revealing.\nInflation expectations have been sticky around the upper end of the target \nrange for most of the post-crisis period. The survey conducted by the Bureau \nfor Economic Research (BER) provides expectations for three groups – \nfinancial analysts, business people and trade union leaders – with financial \nanalysts typically anticipating less inflation than the other two categories \nof respondents. Whereas analysts see inflation within the target for both \n2015 and 2016, businesses and unions have consistently predicted inflation \nnarrowly above 6 per cent; the most recent predictions for 2015 are 6,4 per \ncent and 6,2 per cent respectively. This is significant because businesses and \nunions are price setters, and their actions will feed into core inflation even \nas headline inflation declines.\nBox 2\t\nWage rigidities, employment conditions and inflation \nin South Africa\nLike most economies, South Africa’s economic output was negatively affected by the \nglobal financial crisis, but the recession was short-lived and relatively mild compared \nto most of the other economies. By contrast, our employment response was among \nthe worst, with a loss of around one million private-sector jobs, or 7 per cent of the \nemployed labour force, in less than one year. South Africa’s inflation rate increased \ncomparatively sharply just before the crisis, leading unit labour costs (ULCs) to ratchet \nhigher as wage settlements matched the inflation rate. To test the reaction of ULCs to \nchanges in GDP and changes in inflation, Viegi (2014) estimates a Philips Curve \nequation using South African data over various time frames.1\nπw\nt = a + γπ¯ pt-1 + ϕ0ût + ϕ̂1 ût-1 + ϑt \nWhere πw\nt is the measure of wage inflation (proxied by private-sector, non-agricultural \nwage inflation or manufacturing unit labour costs inflation), π¯ pt-1 is the measure of \ninflation expectations (proxied by the previous period’s inflation outcome or by using \nBER inflation expectations survey data) and ût is the deviation of employment or \nunemployment from a long-term trend. A variety of estimations are done over the \nperiods 1970–2014, 1994–2014 and 2000–2014, according to data availability.\nPer cent\nFigure 11 Average annual inflation and\n \nwage settlements\n \nAverage wage settlements\n \nAverage real wage settlements\n* Data for 2014 are for the first nine months of the year\nSources: Andrew Levy Employment Publications, Statistics \nSouth Africa and own calculations\n \nCPI\n1994 96\n98 2000 02\n04\n06\n08 2010 12\n14 -2\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n*\nPercentage change over four quarters\nFigure 12 Remuneration per worker and\n \nunit labour cost in the formal\n \nnon-agricultural sector \n \n \nNominal unit labour cost\n \nRenumeration per worker\nSources: Statistics South Africa and South African \nReserve Bank\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\n2014\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n16\n18\nAnnual average, per cent\n \n4th qr 2013\n \n2nd qr 2014\n \n6 per cent upper limit of the inflation target range\nSource: Bureau for Economic Research, Stellenbosch University\n5,0\n5,5\n6,0\n6,5\n7,0\nTrade\nunions\nBusiness\nAnalysts\nTrade\nunions\n2015\n2016\nBusiness\nAnalysts\nFigure 13 \nMedium-term inflation \n \nexpectations \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1st qr 2014\n3rd qr 2014\n11\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\nExchange rate\nRand depreciation has contributed to the sustained rise in headline and core \ninflation and remains a major risk to the inflation outlook. The threat to \ninflation takes two forms: the rand could depreciate further, or the pass-\nthrough from depreciation could rise. \nOver the course of the year, the exchange rate has been affected by distinct \nexternal and internal factors. Internationally, a crucial development has been \nUS dollar strength. Robust growth in the US and the corresponding shift \nTable B2.1\t Estimated wage inflation: Private-sector wages\n(1)\n(2)\n(3)\n(4)\n(5)\n(6)\n1970–2014 1994–2014 1970–2014 1994–2014 1970–2014 1994–2014 \nnt\n0,19***\n0,07\n0,13**\n0,06\n0,18**\n0,11*\n(0,05)\n(0,04)\n(0,04)\n(0,04)\n(0,05)\n(0,05)\nnt-1\n-0,07\n-0,06\n(0,05)\n(0,05)\nπt-1\n0,55***\n0,25*\n0,56***\n0,27**\n(0,05)\n(0,12)\n(0,05)\n(0,12)\n***\t denotes significance at the 1 per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and * at the 10 per cent level, standard \nerrors in parenthesis\nNote:\tnt identifies the deviation of manufacturing-sector employment from its trend\nSource: Viegi (2014)\nThe estimations show that the relationship between wage inflation and employment \nhas become weaker over time, and especially in the period since 1994. This suggests \nthat as the economy is buffeted by adverse economic shocks, wage and salary \nincreases are largely insensitive to employment conditions. By contrast, inflation \nexpectations feed into wage and salary inflation. This is corroborated when using \ntrade unions’ inflation expectations for the current year, the next year and two years \nahead, as published by the BER. \nTable B2.2\t Estimated wage inflation: Trade union inflation expectations\n(1)\n(2)\n(3)\nEπt\nEπt+1\nEπt+2\nut\n-0,37**\n-0,35**\n-0,37**\n(0,18)\n(0,19)\n(0,18)\nEπt\n0,73***\n0,72***\n0,82***\n(0,23)\n(0,26)\n(0,29)\n2000 Q3–2013 Q4\n***\t denotes significance at the 1 per cent level and ** at the 5 per cent level, standard errors in parenthesis\nSource: Viegi (2014)\nFurther analysis using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model confirms that \nthe domestic labour market exhibits pervasive wage rigidities, inducing rates of job \ndestruction greater than job creation. \n1\t\nThis box is based on a paper titled ‘Labour Market and Monetary Policy in South Africa’ presented by \nNicola Viegi at the South African Reserve Bank Conference held in Pretoria on 30 and 31 October 2014. \nIndices: 2008 Q1 = 100\n90\n92\n94\n96\n98\n100\n102\nFigure B2.1 Unit labour costs and\n \nemployment in South Africa\n \nManufacturing: Unit labour costs\n \nTotal employment in the non-agricultural\n \nprivate sector (right-hand scale)\nSource: South African Reserve Bank\n2010\n2009\n2008\n2011\n2013\n2012\n2014\n80\n90\n100\n110\n120\n130\n140\n150\n160\n170\nRand per euro\nRand per dollar\n6\n8\n10\n12\nFigure 14 Bilateral exchange rates of\n \nthe rand\n \nRand per US dollar\n \nRand per euro (right-hand scale)\nSources: Bloomberg\n2012\n2014\n2008\n2010\n2013\n2009\n2011\n7\n9\n11\n13\n15\n17\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\n12\nto the normalisation of monetary policy by the Fed has boosted the dollar. \nAt the same time, weak growth and ever-looser monetary policy by the \nnext two largest central banks, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the \nBank of Japan (BOJ), has cheapened the euro and yen. Furthermore, rising \ngeopolitical risks and deteriorating world growth prospects have attracted \ninvestors to dollar-denominated safe haven assets. As a consequence, the \ndollar reached four-year highs at the end of November. The rand has \naccordingly weakened against the dollar but not to other major currencies.\nDomestic factors have also intruded on the exchange rate, especially the \nlarge current-account deficit. The rand appeared to strengthen on a relatively \ngood number for the first-quarter deficit but weakened alongside a more \ndisappointing second-quarter number. Much of the difference between the \nfirst and second quarter figures came from large dividend inflows, which \nwas a temporary effect. Strikes also depressed exports from the second \nquarter, with a recovery setting in towards the end of the third quarter. \nMore fundamentally, South Africa’s terms of trade have been weakening \nsince 2011 as commodity prices decline, although they remain elevated from \na historical perspective. Domestic import penetration has also been rising. \nThe dynamics of exchange-rate pass-through are more obscure. Some pass-\nthrough is complete and nearly immediate, which is the case with the petrol \nprice, but for many other goods and services the link is less predictable. \nFirms might choose to absorb additional costs imposed by the exchange-\nrate change if they expect them to be temporary or believe raising prices \nwould reduce demand excessively. By contrast, they might shift costs to \nconsumers more readily if they judge depreciation will be permanent or \nfind their profit margins are being unacceptably squeezed. Since the crisis \npass-through appears to have been relatively low, perhaps because firms \nhave moderated mark-ups in response to subdued domestic demand. This \npattern may persist. However, there is a risk of pass-through reverting to its \nprevious rate.\nTable 3\t Measures of producer price inflation in 2014\nPercentage change over 12 months\nMar\nApr\nMay \nJun\nJul\nAug\nSep\nOct\nFinal manufactured goods..............\n8,2\n8,8\n8,7\n8,1\n8,0\n7,2\n6,9\n6,7\nExcluding:\nPetroleum products......................\n8,2\n8,5\n8,5\n8,0\n7,9\n7,3\n7,1\n7,2\nFood............................................\n7,9\n8,4\n8,6\n7,9\n7,8\n6,6\n6,4\n6,1\nIntermediate manufactured goods....\n10,1\n10,2\n9,8\n9,0\n8,5\n6,7\n7,0\n6,2\nElectricity and water.........................\n14,6\n10,4\n9,7\n8,2\n7,8\n8,6\n7,4\n8,0\nMining..............................................\n3,7\n6,6\n4,9\n5,8\n7,8\n3,6\n5,1\n2,5\nAgriculture, forestry and fishing........\n11,7\n7,6\n6,7\n4,5\n3,9\n4,2\n4,4\n3,0\nImport unit value index*....................\n20,7\n20,8\n21,8\n21,5\n19,2\n15,3\n12,5\n*\t Unit value indices use customs-level data to measure inflation in imported and exported commodities. \nThey are not comparable to the old PPI series for imported commodities.\nSource: Statistics South Africa\nIndices\nFigure 15 Measures of developed- and\n \nemerging-market risk aversion\n \nCBOE Volatility Index® \n \nSouth African volatility index\n \nEmerging Markets Volatility Index (right-hand scale)\nSources: Bloomberg, JPMorgan, Chicago Board Options\nExchange (CBOE) and JSE Limited\n2009\n2008\n2007\n2011 2012 2013 2014\n2010\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n35\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\nPercentage change over 12 months\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n16\nFigure 16 Inflation and the exchange rate\n \nHeadline CPI\n \nGoods inflation\n \nNominal effective exchange rate of the rand \n \n(right-hand inverted scale)\nSources: Statistics South Africa and South African \nReserve Bank\nDepreciation\nAppreciation\n2012\n2014\n2006\n2008\n2010\n-40\n-30\n-20\n-10\n0\n10\n20\n30\nPercentage change over 12 months\nFigure 17 Consumer and producer \n \nprice inflation \n \nHeadline CPI\n \nCPI: Services inflation\nSource: Statistics South Africa\n2013\n2014\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\n \nCPI: Goods inflation\n \nPPI: Final manufactured \n \ngoods\n13\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\nThere is evidence of pressure on firms’ costs in producer price indices (PPIs), \nwhich measure input price changes (at various stages of production) as \nexperienced by South African goods producers. Although the PPIs cannot \nbe interpreted as direct inputs into the CPI, there is close co-movement \nbetween headline PPI – the PPI for final manufactured goods – and the \nCPI for goods inflation. During the first four months of 2014, the PPIs \nfor both intermediate and final manufactured goods increased robustly, \nowing to exchange-rate pressures (proxied by the import unit value index) \nas well as high PPI food prices. However, by May this trend had reversed, \nforeshadowing the moderation in headline CPI. PPI inflation nonetheless \nremains high and well above CPI.\nDomestic expenditure\nThe main expenditure drivers of the private-sector economy are household \nfinal consumption expenditure and private-sector gross fixed capital \nformation. Both these forces have been trending gradually weaker since \nmid-2013, resulting in a negative output gap and therefore little inflationary \npressure from the demand side. New estimates of the output gap, described \nin Box 1, suggest it may be smaller than previously estimated. The \nimplications of this adjustment for inflation are mostly in the future: with \na smaller output gap, the economy will reach full capacity sooner, at which \npoint demand pressures will start to generate inflation.\nTable 4\t Growth in expenditure on GDP\t\n\t\nPer cent*\n2012\n2013\n2014\nYear\n1st qr\n2nd qr\n3rd qr\n4th qr\nYear\n1st qr\n2nd qr\nFinal consumption expenditure\nHouseholds............................\n3,5\n2,4\n2,5\n2,1\n2,0\n2,6\n1,8\n1,5\n Disposable income.............\n3,9\n2,3\n2,4\n2,1\n2,0\n2,5\n1,7\n1,3\nGeneral government...............\n4,0\n2,8\n1,7\n1,5\n2,0\n2,4\n1,4\n1,6\nGross fixed capital formation......\n4,4\n3,8\n5,6\n7,0\n3,1\n4,7\n2,6\n0,5\nGross domestic expenditure.....\n4,0\n5,3\n3,2\n-0,8\n-3,6\n2,2\n2,7\n1,8\nExports of goods and services...\n0,4\n5,9\n9,0\n16,7\n3,9\n4,2\n5,4\n-11,4\nImports of goods and services...\n6,0\n21,5\n7,3\n7,0\n-18,9\n4,7\n16,3\n-5,2\n*\t Quarterly data refer to quarter-on-quarter growth at seasonally adjusted annualised rates at 2005 prices\nSource: South African Reserve Bank\nFinal consumption expenditure by households is the single biggest component \nof demand, accounting for more than 60 per cent of gross domestic \nexpenditure. Growth in this category has been weak for several reasons. Real \ndisposable income has increased only moderately and job creation has been \nlimited. Credit extension has been weak. Households are highly indebted and \nare therefore deleveraging, which is necessary but constrains final demand. \nHouse price growth has been muted. In this context, consumer confidence \nis predictably low. \nPercentage change over 12 months\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\nFigure 18 Producer prices and the \n \nexchange rate\n \nIntermediate manufactured goods\n \nExchange rate (right-hand scale)\nSources: Statistics South Africa and South African\nReserve Bank\n2014\n2013\n \n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\nPercentage change over 12 months\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\nFigure 19 Producer price pressures \n \nIntermediate manufactured goods\n \nFinal manufactured goods\n \nImport unit value index* (right-hand scale)\n* Import unit value indices measure inflation in imported\ncommodities using customs-level data from the\nSouth African Revenue Service \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSource: Statistics South Africa\n2014\n2013\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n-6\n-4\n-2\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\n \nGrowth in real disposable income*\n \nRepurchase rate\n \nDebt to disposable income (right-hand scale)\n* Percentage change over previous quarter at a\n seasonally adjusted and annualised rate\nSource: South African Reserve Bank\n14\n2000\n04\n02\n06\n10\n12\n08\nFigure 20 Household income and\n \ndebt levels\nPer cent\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\n14\nCredit extension to households has followed a 22-month downward trend. \nThis pattern combines two factors: mortgage credit, which constitutes \nmost of the stock of household credit and which was a key growth driver \nin the pre-crisis boom years, has contracted in real terms since the crisis. \nMeanwhile, smaller volume, higher interest-rate categories of credit have \nslumped after a period of strong growth. Instalment credit, which is mostly \nused for vehicle purchases, has been expanding more slowly since May \n2013. Unsecured lending, which is included in general loans, contributed \nto improved household expenditure after 2009 but has fallen steeply since \nthe beginning of 2013. The aftermath of the African Bank Investments \nLimited intervention may also be contributing to hesitance in unsecured \ncredit extension. \nRising asset-price developments have been somewhat more favourable \nfor households, supporting confidence and spending, but the gains have \nbeen mostly in the equity market. Over the past two years, house prices \nhave staged a recovery after an extended period of weak, and, at times, \nnegative real growth. Real house prices have yet to regain their pre-crisis \npeak, however, and the recovery is likely to remain subdued as interest-rate \nincreases raise the cost of debt. \nThe performance of the FTSE/JSE All-Share Price Index (Alsi) has been \nmore impressive, recovering from the crisis to record highs. In June 2014 \nthe Alsi breached the 50 000 level for the first time, aided by non-resident \nnet purchases amounting to a cumulative R111 billion since the beginning \nof 2009. It retreated sharply from the end of September to below 47 000 \npoints, in line with global equity movements, but has since staged a partial \nrecovery. These broad developments have provided quite limited support to \nhousehold spending, however, as evidenced by indicators such as consumer \nconfidence. One explanation for this is that overall wealth gains from \ninvesting in the equity market since 2007 remain muted when adjusted for \ncurrency depreciation and inflation. A second explanation is that equity \nownership is quite concentrated in South Africa, such that wealth gains in \nthis sector have a limited impact on overall household demand. \nHouseholds are therefore not contributing significantly to inflationary \npressure, at least not through the demand channel. It is, however, quite likely \nthat households are feeding inflation indirectly through two channels. First, \nstronger credit growth over the past few years has been seen in categories \nwith significant import intensities, especially for consumer durables such \nas cars and household appliances. These have contributed to the current-\naccount deficit and thereby weakened the exchange rate. The implication \nis that the recent slowdown in these credit categories will benefit inflation \nby moderating the current-account deficit. Second, debt accumulation has \nevidently become a major burden on households, driven by strong post-\ncrisis debt growth in credit categories with higher interest rates, notably \nunsecured lending. Squeezed households are more likely to push for larger \nwage increases to help rectify their balance sheets, which may help explain \nhigh wage demands, protracted strikes and above-inflation wage settlements. \nPercentage change over 12 months\n-5\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n35\n40\nFigure 21 Bank credit to households\n \nand retail sales\n \nCredit excluding mortgage loans\n \nGeneral loans\n \nReal total credit\n \nReal retail sales (right-hand scale)*\n* Smoothed average\nSources: Statistics South Africa, South African Reserve\nBank and own calculations \n2007\n2013 2014\n2009\n2011\n2008\n2010\n2012\n-5\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\nPercentage change over 12 months\n-50\n-40\n-30\n-20\n-10\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\nFigure 22 Real house and share prices\n \nFTSE/JSE All-Share Price Index\n \nAbsa house prices (right-hand scale)\nSources: JSE Limited, Absa, Statistics South Africa\nand own calculations\n2007\n2013 2014\n2009\n2011\n-15\n-10\n-5\n0\n5\n10\n15\n2008\n2010\n2012\nIndices: 2 January 2007 = 100\nIndex\n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\nFigure 23 Share prices\n \nJSE All-Share Price Index\n \nJSE All-Share Price Index (US$)\n \nS&P 500 price index\n \nRMB/BER Business Confidence Index \n \n(right-hand scale)\nSources: JSE Limited; Bloomberg; Bureau for\nEconomic Research; Stellenbosch University; \nand own calculations\n2007\n2013 2014\n2009\n2011\n2008\n2010\n2012\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\n100\n15\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\nThe other crucial driver of domestic spending, private-sector investment, \nhas been even more muted than household demand. Private gross fixed \ncapital formation contracted in the second quarter of 2014, for the first time \nsince 2009, echoing weak business confidence. The Rand Merchant Bank/\nBureau for Economic Research (RMB/BER) Business Confidence Index \nhad been below the 50-point neutral level for six consecutive quarters up to \nthe third quarter of 2014. Manufacturing capacity utilisation has also been \nlow, suggesting little scope for additional investment. \nBy contrast, credit extension to corporates has picked up recently, both \nin terms of mortgage lending and general loans. This has supported \noverall growth in total credit extension to the private sector from a low in \nDecember 2013 to 8,8 per cent in September 2014. Nonetheless, this is \nfairly unremarkable when compared to the 10-year average growth rate of \n12,9 per cent. \nThe Bank’s inflation forecasts\nAfter January 2014, inflation forecasts for this year have remained close \nto but above the 6 per cent upper end of the target range. By contrast, \nheadline inflation forecasts for 2015 and 2016 have remained within \nthe target band, fluctuating between 5,3 per cent and 5,9 per cent over \nsuccessive MPC meetings. Positive developments in global food and oil \nprices caused an improvement in the November outlook, especially for \n2015 and 2016. However, core inflation looks set to continue its upward \ntrend until early 2015. \nThe 2015 headline inflation forecast has declined over time, assisted by \nhigher interest rates and more recently by the expectation of lower global \ninflation. It increased briefly in July 2014, owing to a less favourable \nfood price forecast, but recovered in September as petrol prices weakened \nand it became clear that excellent grain harvests were to be expected \nboth domestically and internationally. At the same time, the outlook for \nelectricity prices deteriorated when the National Energy Regulator of South \nAfrica announced that it would allow Eskom to recover revenue losses of \nR7,8 billion by increasing its 2015 and 2016 prices by more than previously \nannounced. This news was incorporated into forecasts as an 11,6 per cent \nincrease in electricity costs in July of both these years, resulting in an upward \nadjustment to the inflation forecast of approximately 0,1 per cent for 2015 \nand 0,2 per cent for 2016.\nThe Bank’s most recent inflation outlook as at November 2014 has improved \nagain following further petrol price cuts prompted by lower international \ncrude oil prices – which are also likely to further reduce food prices as the \ntwo are highly correlated. As a result, headline inflation is now expected \nto return to within the target at 5,9 per cent by the fourth quarter of 2014. \nInflation in 2015 is projected to average 5,3 per cent, which if realised would \nbe a four-year low.\nIndex\nPercentage change\n-30\n-20\n-10\n0\n10\n20\n30\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\nFigure 24 Private-sector investment and\n \nbusiness confidence\n \nGross fixed capital formation of private \n \nbusiness enterprises*\n \nRMB/BER Business Confidence Index \n \n(right-hand scale)\n* Percentage change over previous quarter at a seasonally\nadjusted and annualised rate\nSources: Bureau for Economic Research; Stellenbosch\nUniversity; Rand Merchant Bank; and South African \nReserve Bank\n2012\n2014\n2006\n2008\n2010\nPer cent\nFigure 25 Evolution of the Bank’s targeted\n \ninflation forecasts\n \n2014\nNote: This graph denotes forecasts of average annual targeted\ninflation as at each of the MPC meetings held since \nNovember 2013\n \n2015\n2013\nJan\nNov\nMar\n2014\n \n2016\nJul\nSep\nNov\nMay\n5,2\n5,4\n5,6\n5,8\n6,0\n6,2\n6,4\nSource: South African Reserve Bank\nFigure 26 Targeted inflation* forecast\nPer cent\n3–6 per cent inflation target range\n* CPIX for metropolitan and other urban areas until the end \nof 2008; CPI for all urban areas thereafter\nSource: South African Reserve Bank\n2006\n2008\n2010\n2012\n2014\n2016\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\n16\nThe outlook for core inflation3 has developed less favourably. Core inflation \nis forecast to overtake headline inflation in 2015, averaging 5,7 per cent for \nthe year, with a peak in the first quarter of 2015 at 5,9 per cent. This should \nmark the high point of a long upward trend in core inflation dating back \nto 2011 – evidence of sustained, broad-based inflationary pressure which \nhas been a significant concern for the MPC. The outlook for 2016 is more \nfavourable, however, with this year’s interest-rate hikes and lower oil prices \ncontributing to more moderate underlying inflation of about 5,3 per cent.\nThe risks to headline inflation have evolved such that there is now an \nequal probability of outcomes above or below the central projection, \nthat is, the risks are balanced. The key upside risk factors remain the \nexchange rate and the interaction between high wage settlements and \nprices. However, headline inflation could surprise on the low side \nif food and petrol prices decline further. In particular, the oil price \nassumption is above the lows reached in November. It is very difficult \nto forecast both oil and food prices and the exchange rate, as the review \nof previous forecasts in Box 3 attests, creating significant uncertainty in \nthe inflation outlook. \n3\t\nThe measure of core discussed here is CPI excluding food, non-alcoholic beverages, energy and petrol prices.\nPercentage change over 12 months\n-40\n-30\n-20\n-10\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\nFigure 27 International food and crude\n \noil prices*\n \nFAO Food Price Index\n \nBrent crude oil price (right-hand scale)\n* Prices are in US dollars\nSources: International Monetary Fund, Food and \nAgriculture Organization (FAO), Reuters and own \ncalculations \n2006\n2014\n2016\n2008\n2010\n2012\n-80\n-60\n-40\n-20\n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\nPer cent\nFigure 28 Evolution of the Bank’s core\n \ninflation forecasts\n \n2014\n \n2015\n2013\nJan\nNov\nMar\n2014\n \n2016\nJul\nSep\nNov\nMay\n5,2\n5,3\n5,4\n5,5\n5,6\n5,7\n5,8\n5,9\n6,0\nNote: This graph denotes forecasts of average annual core\ninflation as at each of the MPC meetings held since \nNovember 2013\nSource: South African Reserve Bank\nPer cent\nFigure 29 Targeted and core inflation \n \nforecasts\n \nTargeted inflation\n \n3–6 per cent inflation target range\nSource: South African Reserve Bank\n2006\n2008\n2010\n2014\n2016\n2012\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\nCore inflation\nBox 3\t\nInflation forecast accuracy\nIn a forward-looking inflation-targeting framework, monetary policy decisions require \nforecasts of key economic variables, including inflation. To evaluate the accuracy of these \ninflation forecasts, they are contrasted to actual outcomes using specific error statistics. \nThe accuracy of the forecasts obtained from the chosen error measures are then \ncompared to outside forecasters’ accuracy. For the purposes of this analysis, accuracy \nis evaluated over two periods. The first period (P1) is up to and including the worst of the \nfinancial crisis – the sample begins in the first quarter of 2003 and ends in the third \nquarter of 2009. The second period (P2) is after the crisis nadir and stretches from the \nfourth quarter of 2009 until the second quarter of 2014. \nTwo common error statistics are used, namely the average forecast error and the root \nmean square error (RMSE).1 The error statistics are calculated for both the Bank and \nReuters consensus forecasts, after subtracting the inflation outcomes from their \nprojections. The average forecast error measures projection bias in terms of systematic \nover- or underestimation. Meanwhile, the RMSE gives an indication of both the size and \nthe variability of the errors. \nBoth the Bank and Reuters’ average errors are negative for most of the forecast quarters \nduring period P1 and thus biased downwards. This suggests that these projections have \nunderestimated the actual outcome of headline CPI inflation, on average, before and \nduring the crisis. However, the opposite is true for period P2 where the pattern of the \naverage forecast error is largely reversed. Here, the bias is to the upside, which indicates \nthat both the Bank and the average of Reuters’ forecasts overestimated the outcomes of \ninflation, on average, for most of the quarters over the post-crisis period.\n17\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\nThe RMSE (Figure B3.2) gives an approximation of the magnitude of the errors. This \nmeasure shows that the Bank’s forecast is marginally more accurate than the Reuters \nconsensus forecast for all seven forecast quarters over the period up to and including the \ncrisis, and for the first four quarters in the post-crisis period. In period P1, the RMSE for \nthe four-quarters-ahead inflation forecast of the Bank is 2,0 percentage points, while that \nof the Reuters average is 2,4 percentage points. For the period P2, the RMSEs of the \nBank and Reuters decline by 1,2 and 1,4 percentage points to 0,8 and 1,0 percentage \npoints, respectively. This post-crisis improvement in forecasting accuracy largely relates \nto the relative stability of inflation over this period, as opposed to the high variation of \ninflation rates that were seen in the pre-crisis period. \nSizeable inflation forecast errors result from South Africa being a small and open \neconomy, subjected to a number of large external shocks. This was particularly evident \nduring the period up to and including the financial crisis. These shocks mostly emanate \nfrom significant movements in international oil and food prices which transmit quickly to \ninflation. The free-floating rand exchange rate also moves rapidly at times and has a \nmarked effect on the price of imports. These large price movements pose significant \nchallenges to forecasting inflation. As the forecast horizon extends into the future, the \nuncertainty surrounding future shocks increases and, as a result, the forecast accuracy \ntends to worsen.\n1\t\nThe root mean square error is the square root of the average of squared forecast errors.\n-1,0\n-0,8\n-0,6\n-0,4\n-0,2\n0,0\n0,2\n7\n6\n5\n4\n3\n2\n1\n0,4\nPercentage points\n \nCore P1\n \nCore P2\nSources: Reuters consensus and own calculations\n \nReuters P1\n \nReuters P2\nFigure B3.1 Average forecast error\nQuarters ahead\n0,0\n0,5\n1,0\n1,5\n2,0\n2,5\n3,0\n3,5\n7\n6\n5\n4\n3\n2\n1\nPercentage points\n \nCore P1\n \nCore P2\nSources: Reuters consensus and own calculations\n \nReuters P1\n \nReuters P2\nFigure B3.2 Root mean square error\nQuarters ahead\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\n18\nGlobal economic assessment\nForecasts for world economic growth have fallen in 2014, as indeed they \nhave every year since 2011. The outlook for 2015 is for improved growth, \nalbeit just over 3 per cent, which is a lower level than in previous forecasts \nfor the coming year and also much closer to the average growth rates of the \npast three years. Put more simply, forecasts have now caught up with the \ndisappointing realities of the recent past. \nAdvanced economies\nIn the advanced-economy universe, there is a marked divergence between \nthe US and UK, which are now growing strongly, and the euro area and \nJapan, which have once again stalled. \nAt the end of 2013, most commentators were optimistic that the US \neconomy was about to experience a robust recovery after several false starts. \nThe first quarter instead delivered a large growth contraction, owing mostly \nto unusually bad weather, and this predictably yielded a strong rebound \nin the second quarter, for an overall inconclusive growth performance for \nthe first half of the year. The third quarter provided more encouraging \nnews with a better-than-expected 3,9 per cent growth rate (according to \nthe advance estimate), and leading indicators promise a strong finish to \nthe year, with the manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) at a \n44-month high. \nUnemployment outcomes have been encouraging all year, with \nunemployment slipping below 6 per cent in September and job creation \naveraging nearly 230 000 monthly in 2014. Wage growth has been more \nlimited, however, and this, along with muted inflation and the low labour \nforce participation rate, suggests persistent labour market slack. The Fed \nhas judged this progress adequate to conclude its programme of quantitative \neasing in October, as expected, but is only anticipated to move the policy \nrate off the zero lower bound sometime in mid-2015, with rates increasing \ngradually thereafter. \nThe UK has claimed the mantle of fastest-growing economy in the G-7 \nfor 2014, a title only partly earned by the earlier weakness of its recovery. \nRevisions to GDP data have altered the narrative of the crisis, with output \nnow seen to have fallen less and recovered sooner than originally thought. \nIn particular, the latest data indicates that the UK regained its pre-crisis \npeak in the third quarter of 2013 instead of the second quarter of 2014. \nUnemployment peaked at 8,5 per cent during the second half of 2011, but \nhas since declined much faster than expected, reaching 6 per cent at the \nend of the third quarter of 2014 alongside an employment rate close to its \nrecord high. Inflation, meanwhile, has fallen below the 2 per cent target \nand might well drop below 1 per cent – which will likely postpone the first \nrate increases since the crisis. An additional delaying factor is the British \nrecovery’s exposure to risks from the broader world economy, particularly \nstagnation in the euro area and fraught relations with Russia. \nIn contrast to the US and the UK, the euro area’s prospects have deteriorated \nover the year, with two developments of particular concern. The first is \nthe relocation of slow or negative growth from the periphery to the centre. \nOf the two largest euro area economies, France and Germany, France \nhas been stagnant since mid-2012, with government spending sustaining \nPer cent\n4,3\n3,1\n2,7\n2,6\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\nFigure 30 Evolution of global real GDP \n \nforecasts*\n \nActual GDP\n \nMarch 2014\n \nJuly 2014\n \nNovember 2014\n* Data weighted by market exchange rates\nSource: Consensus Economics\n2014\n2015\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\n \nJanuary 2014\n \nMay 2014\n \nSeptember 2014\n \n \n \n2,7\n3,1\nIndex points\nFigure 31 Selected advanced-economy\n \nPurchasing Managers’ Indices\n \nUnited States\n \nGermany\n \nUnited Kingdom\nSource: JPMorgan\n2007 2008\n2011 2012 2013 2014\n2009 2010\n25\n35\n45\n55\n65\n \nEuro area\n \nFrance\n \nJapan\nPer cent of total labour force\nFigure 32 Unemployment \n \nAdvanced economies\n \nEuro area\n \nMajor advanced economies G-7\n \nOther advanced economies*\n \nUnited States\n \nUnited Kingdom\n* Advanced economies excluding the G-7 and euro area\nSource: International Monetary Fund, World Economic\nOutlook, October 2014\n3\n5\n7\n9\n11\n13\n2019\n2017\n2015\n2013\n2011\n2009\n2007\n19\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\ndemand through large fiscal deficits alongside feeble private consumption \nand investment. Germany, meanwhile, contracted in the second quarter of \nthe year. This dip could, in part, be blamed on weather effects, but deeper \nrisks to growth seem to underpin recent disappointing manufacturing data \n– especially the slowdown in China and the effects of Russian sanctions and \ncounter-sanctions. Reflecting these weaknesses, the European Commission \nslashed its November forecasts for 2015 growth in both these countries, \ntaking France from 1,5 per cent to 0,7 per cent and Germany from 2 per \ncent to 1,1 per cent. These contrast unfavourably with the forecast for the \neuro area as a whole, revised down from 1,7 per cent to 1,1 per cent – a \ndemonstration of the weakness of the centre. \nThe second problem is extremely low inflation. The Harmonised Index of \nConsumer Prices grew a mere 0,4 per cent in October 2014, far below the \nECB’s 2 per cent target. Inflation expectations have also fallen, including \neven expectations for five years ahead, threatening a deflationary experience \nsimilar to Japan’s. The ECB has responded with a slew of initiatives including \nnegative rates, the creation of special loan facilities to banks to encourage \nlending, and asset purchases. These policies are aimed at adding about \n€1 trillion to the ECB’s balance sheet, restoring it to 2012 levels of about \na third of euro area GDP. The consequences for inflation have so far been \nlimited, although the new programmes remain in their infancy. The most \ntangible gain so far has been a weaker euro, down 11 per cent against the \nUS dollar since May 2014, which may help raise inflation and support \nexpectations. This effect, however, is likely to be neutralised by falling oil \nand food prices.\nIn Japan, growth in the first half of the year was volatile as consumers \nbrought spending forward to avoid a value-added tax (VAT) increase, \nproducing a large boost in the first quarter and an offsetting bust in the \nsecond. Overall output dropped slightly from the beginning of the year to its \nmid-point, and then fell further in the third quarter, indicating significant \neconomic fallout from the tax hike. Fiscal policy, originally one of the three \narrows of Abenomics, has thereby instead become a threat to short-term \ngrowth. Monetary policy, however, has become even more aggressive, which \nis an extraordinary shift given that the BOJ was already enacting the most \nradical balance-sheet expansion of the big advanced-economy central banks, \nhaving accumulated assets worth more than half of GDP – compared to \napproximately a quarter for the Fed and the Bank of England. Under the new \npolicy, the BOJ will acquire even more government debt, shifting annual \npurchases from ¥50 trillion to ¥80 trillion a year and also buying longer \nmaturities, extending its lead as the largest holder of Japanese government \nbonds (with about 20 per cent of the total). It will also purchase stocks and \nproperty funds. The goal of these policies is to achieve a 2 per cent inflation \ntarget, and although inflation has turned positive and is in fact just over \n3 per cent, much of this effect comes from the VAT increase and will therefore \ndrop out of the data in early 2015. What remains is inflation consolidated \naround 1 per cent, which is a victory over deflation but not yet the target. \nThe broader problem for Japan is that higher inflation without corresponding \ngrowth and wage increases will simply lower living standards. In this way, \na ‘one arrow’ strategy, lacking fiscal and structural reform components, \ncould be self-defeating. The result – protracted stagnation – would also be a \nserious concern for the global recovery. In the pre-crisis period, world output \ncould flourish despite Japan’s weakness thanks to fast growth (sometimes \nPer cent\n-1\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\nFigure 33 European Central Bank and\n \nUnited States Federal Reserve\n \ninterest rates\n \nECB refinancing rate*\n \nUS Fed funds target rate*\n \nECB deposit rate\n* Both forecasts are proxied by Consensus Economics\nprojections of three-month rates – the Treasury bill rate for the\nFed and Euribor rate for the ECB \nSources: Datastream, Consensus Economics and \nown calculations\n2000\n02\n04\n06\n08\n10\n12\n14\n16\nPer cent\nFigure 34 Growth rates in advanced\n \neconomies\n \nWorld\n \nJapan\n \nEuro area\nSource: International Monetary Fund, World Economic \nOutlook, October 2014\n \nUnited States\n \nAdvanced economies\n \nUnited Kingdom\n-6\n-4\n-2\n0\n2\n4\n6\n2015\n2013\n2011\n2009\n2007\nIndices: 2 January 2008 = 100\nFigure 35 Central bank balance sheets*\n \nUS Federal Reserve\n \nEuropean Central Bank\n* The calculations above are based on local currency values\n \nof the selected countries’ balance sheets\n** There is a break in the balance sheet disclosure by the Bank\n \nof England from October 2014 in which bilateral operations are \n \nexcluded. As a result, from October 2014 the weekly reported \n \nassets have been used\nSources: US Federal Reserve, Bank of England, European\nCentral Bank, Bank of Japan and own calculations\n2008\n2011 2012 2013 2014 2015\n2009 2010\n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n \nBank of England**\n \nBank of Japan\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\n20\nexcessively fast) in the US and euro area, as well as in China and many \nother emerging markets. But now much of this growth has abated and the \nJapanese contribution is more visible for its absence.\nEmerging markets\nIn the immediate aftermath of the crisis the world seemed to be experiencing \na two-speed recovery, with advanced economies stumbling and emerging \nmarkets speeding ahead; as late as April 2013 the IMF could insist that, \n“Emerging market and developing economies are still going strong…”.4 \nThis position has now yielded to something close to its opposite, with hopes \nfor the world recovery centring on the US and other smaller advanced \neconomies, and emerging markets generally slowing. \nThat change in fortune has varying origins, with the Chinese experience \nquite distinct from that of other large emerging markets. In China, the \nsurprise is not so much the slowdown as the fact that it took so long to \nhappen; as Larry Summers and Lant Pritchett have recently observed, no \nother economy in history has grown so fast for so long.5 Slower growth is \nappropriate as the Chinese economy matures, switching its growth drivers \nfrom investment and exports to consumption. This will also be helpful for \nthe world economy as it will reduce current-account and savings imbalances \nand bolster demand. In the short term, however, China’s transformation \nposes a number of risks. It has become such a large economy that it cannot \nreduce speed without also bringing down the world growth rate. Its appetite \nfor commodities has delivered windfall gains for commodity exporters, but \nthese countries are now also feeling their vulnerability to lower commodity \nprices as Chinese demand wanes. It is also uncertain whether China can \nmanage to slow just the right amount; many observers have warned of the \npossibility of a hard landing, a cliché that nonetheless describes a serious \nrisk. The property sector in particular has seen bubble-like conditions, with \nexcessive construction leading to large unsold inventories. \nThrough much of the fast-growth period, China has solved its economic \nproblems with more investment. This pattern has persisted through \n2014, with stimulus packages following promptly on fears of below-target \ngrowth. Over time, this model has delivered stellar GDP results but also \nunprecedented levels of debt (217 per cent of GDP in 2013, excluding \nfinancial sector borrowing, of which 168 per cent is private, according to \nthe Geneva Report) as well as investment (at around 50 per cent of GDP).6 \nPerhaps the overriding challenge for Chinese rebalancing is maintaining \ngrowth without resorting to even more saving and investment – a recourse \nthat has almost certainly become unsustainable.\nOther big emerging markets look quite different to China. Where China \nruns a current-account surplus, and would like to reduce investment, the \naverage large emerging market reports a deficit and aims to raise savings \nand investment. Chinese inflation has been very low and stable, but for \nthe average emerging market peer inflation has been rising, and many \ncentral banks have responded with rate hikes (including Brazil, Indonesia, \nTurkey, Russia and South Africa). China joins other emerging markets in \n4\t\nInternational Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, April 2013, page xiii.\n5\t\nL Pritchett and L H Summers, ‘Asiaphoria meets regression to the mean’, NBER Working Paper 20573, \nOctober 2014.\n6\t\nL Buttiglione, P R Lane, L Reichlin and V Reinhart, ‘Deleveraging? What deleveraging?’ Geneva Reports on the \nWorld Economy, No. 16, September 2014, p 12.\nIndex points\nFigure 36 Selected emerging-market\n \neconomy Purchasing Managers’\n \nIndices\n \nRussia\n \nSouth Africa\n \nBrazil\nSource: JPMorgan, Bureau of Economic Research;\nStellenbosch University; and Kagiso\n \nChina\n \nIndia\n2012\n2014\n2013\n40\n45\n50\n55\n60\nPer cent\nFigure 37 Growth rates in emerging-market\n \neconomies\n \nWorld\n \nBrazil\n \nEmerging-market and \n \ndeveloping economies\nSource: International Monetary Fund, World Economic \nOutlook, October 2014\n \nChina\n \nNigeria\n \nSub-Saharan Africa\n-3\n0\n3\n6\n9\n12\n15\n2015\n2013\n2011\n2009\n2007\n0\n4\n8\n12\n16\n20\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\n10\n11\n12\n \nIndustrial production\n \nReal GDP growth (right-hand scale)\nSource: Bloomberg\n2013 2014\n2007\n2011\n2009\n2008\n2012\n2010\nFigure 38 Growth in China’s industrial\n \nproduction and economic\n \nactivity\nPercentage change\nover 4 quarters\nPercentage change\nover 12 months\n21\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\nhaving experienced falling growth, but Chinese growth remains well above \nlevels seen elsewhere and Chinese policymakers are deliberately targeting a \nreduced pace of expansion. \nThe current emerging-market slowdown has been surprisingly widespread \nand protracted. Previous episodes aligned with crisis episodes (as in 1994, \n1997–1998 and 2008–2009) and ended comparatively quickly.7 In this \ninstance, the culprit is elusive: different factors apply to different cases. \nFor commodity exporters, particularly in Latin America, declining terms \nof trade damaged growth and pushed current accounts into deficit. Loose \nmonetary policies, aided by capital inflows from advanced economies, \npowered credit booms that left balance sheets overstretched – typically \nin the private sector – necessitating a period of consolidation. Easy credit \nmay have lulled policymakers into deferring structural reforms, lowering \npotential growth. A weak world economy has also undermined export-led \ngrowth, long a staple strategy of the most successful emerging markets. In \nsome instances, especially in the Middle East, North Africa, Russia and \nUkraine, geopolitical instability has profoundly affected economies. \n7\t\nG Fayad and R Perrelli, ‘Growth surprises and synchronized slowdowns in emerging markets – an empirical \ninvestigation’, IMF Working Paper WP/14/173, Washington: IMF, September 2014. See https://www.imf.org/\nexternal/pubs/ft/wp/2014/wp14173.pdf.\nPer cent\nFigure 39 Policy rates\n \nIndia\n \nMalaysia\n \nChile\nSource: Bloomberg\n2007 2008\n2011 2012 2013 2014\n2009 2010\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n \nIndonesia\n \nBrazil\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\n22\nDomestic growth outcomes\nSouth Africa’s economic performance has been seriously damaged by strikes \nin 2014. The economy contracted by 1,6 per cent during the first quarter \nof 2014 – the first contraction since 2009. This was followed by a weak \nrecovery of 0,5 per cent in the second quarter, rising to 1,4 per cent in the \nthird quarter.\nTable 5\t Real domestic growth rates\nPer cent*\nSector\n2012\n2013\n2014\nYear\n1st qr 2nd qr 3rd qr 4th qr\nYear\n1st qr 2nd qr 3rd qr\nPrimary sector...........................\n-2,1\n10,1\n-3,7\n10,2\n14,8\n3,4\n-17,7\n-1,2\n3,1\n\t\nAgriculture............................\n0,6\n-2,9\n-1,1\n3,6\n6,8\n1,5\n3,3\n5,3\n8,2\n\t\nMining...................................\n-2,9\n14,3\n-4,5\n12,3\n17,2\n4,0\n-23,0\n-3,1\n1,6\nSecondary sector......................\n1,6\n-6,1\n9,3\n-4,3\n8,2\n0,9\n-3,8\n-2,5\n-2,0\n\t\nManufacturing.......................\n1,9\n-7,8\n11,7\n-6,6\n12,3\n0,7\n-6,4\n-4,0\n-3,4\nTertiary sector...........................\n3,1\n2,4\n3,2\n2,1\n2,7\n2,5\n1,7\n1,9\n2,4\n\t\nWholesale and retail trade.....\n3,6\n0,9\n2,2\n0,3\n1,8\n1,9\n1,5\n-0,2\n3,4\n\t\nFinance, real-estate and \nbusiness services.................\n3,0\n4,8\n5,0\n2,8\n2,6\n3,0\n1,4\n1,2\n2,4\nNon-mining sector....................\n2,7\n0,3\n4,4\n0,7\n4,0\n2,1\n0,5\n1,0\n1,6\nTotal..........................................\n2,2\n1,4\n3,7\n1,2\n5,1\n2,2\n-1,6\n0,5\n1,4\n*\t Quarterly data refer to quarter-on-quarter growth at seasonally adjusted annualised rates at 2010 prices\nSources: Statistics South Africa and own calculations\nGiven the timing of and the sectors affected by strikes, it is no surprise \nthat losses have been concentrated in mining and manufacturing, and \nparticularly in the first half of the year. The economy began to recover \nin the third quarter, and some platinum producers returned to full \ncapacity by October, earlier than expected, suggesting that the primary \nsector will support fourth-quarter growth.\nOther sectors of the economy have fared better. Agriculture and services \nhave been positive throughout the year. An ample maize harvest (noted in \nthe inflation section) has bolstered growth in the primary sector, and the \ntertiary sector has continued to expand, with financial and business services \nthe outstanding contributor. The wholesale and retail trade sector, however, \nexperienced a contraction in the second quarter of 2014.\nLeading indicators suggest an economy picking up from strike disruptions. \nThe PMI has been rising since July and cleared the 50-point level (denoting \nexpansion) in October, promising better growth in the fourth quarter. \nConsumer confidence has risen from extremely low levels in late 2013 \nand early 2014 (worse even than during the 2008–2009 crisis), although \nit remains significantly below its long-term average. The composite leading \nbusiness cycle indicator has been edging up from lows in the first half of the \nyear, but is still under 2013 levels. These data are consistent with forecasts \nof higher, but not high growth. \nMillion days\nPer cent\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n16\nFigure 40 Real economic activity and\n \nstrike action\n \nFinal consumption expenditure by households*\n \nGDP***\n \nWork days lost to strike action \n \n(right-hand scale)**\n * Data for 2014 are for the first two quarters of the year\n** Data for 2014 are for the first three quarters of the year\n*** Growth in unadjusted GDP for the first three quarter of\n 2014 compared with the same period in 2013\nSources: Statistics South Africa, South African Reserve\nBank and Andrew Levy Employment Publications \n \n \n \n14\n1996 98 2000 02\n04\n06\n08\n10\n12\n-4\n-2\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n70\n75\n80\n85\n90\n95\n100\n105\n30\n35\n40\n45\n50\n55\n60\n65\n \nComposite leading business cycle indicator\n \nPMI neutral level (right-hand scale)\n \nPurchasing Managers’ Index (right-hand scale)\nNote: The direction of movements of the composite\nleading business cycle indicator show the expected\nmovements in aggregate economic activity over the\nnext 6 to 12 months\n* Data are seasonally adjusted\nSources: Bureau for Economic Research; Stellenbosch\nUniversity; Kagiso; and South African Reserve Bank \n14\n2000\n04\n02\n06\n10\n12\n08\nFigure 41 Forward-looking growth\n \nindicators *\nIndex: 2010 = 100\nIndex\n23\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\nGiven the distorting impact of strikes, 2014 is quite an unhelpful year for \nunderstanding the economy’s trajectory since the crisis. Taking a longer \nview, the economy has expanded, in real rand terms, by about 2,5 per cent \nper year since 2009 and the second quarter of 2014. Growth in 2010 and \n2011, which includes the inevitable post-crisis bounce, averaged 3,4 per cent. \nSince then, average growth has slowed to just 2 per cent. Throughout, the \nstrongest contributor has been household consumption, which constitutes \nthe largest share of GDP. But the sustainability of this growth is threatened \nby its reliance on debt and imports, exposing it to constraints from household \nbalance sheets and the current-account deficit. \nPrivate-sector investment has been one of the great disappointments of the \npost-crisis period. Although its growth has been positive since 2010, it has \nbeen low at roughly half the rates achieved before the crisis – despite very \nfavourable monetary policy settings. The result has been not only lower \nshort-term growth, but also weaker foundations for long-term growth, \ncontributing to falling estimates for potential output. Lower potential \ngrowth in turn means inflation picks up even at low growth rates, placing \na serious constraint on policy. A number of factors influence private-sector \ninvestment decisions. Business confidence, one strongly correlated indicator, \nhas been volatile but usually below neutral over the period, with longer-term \ncomponents such as building and manufacturing indices particularly low. \nThis pattern has persisted through 2014 even as other indicators such as the \nPMI and consumer confidence have picked up.\nTable 6\t Domestic economic sentiment indicators\nHistoric range\nMost recent\nAs at MPR*\nLow\nHigh\nLow\nHigh\nJun \n2014\nDec \n2014\nRMB/BER Business Confidence Index.............\n10\n91\n23\n55\n41\n51\nKagiso Purchasing Managers’ Index................\n34,1\n63,7\n44,3\n55,6\n47,4\n50,1\nFNB/BER Consumer Confidence Index............\n-33\n23\n-8\n15\n-8\n-1\n*\t Improved/worsened since previous MPR\nSources: Kagiso Securities, Rand Merchant Bank, First National Bank, Ernst & Young and the Bureau for Economic \nResearch, Stellenbosch University\nGovernment’s role as a source of counter-cyclical demand is visible in its \nrelatively large contributions to overall growth – almost a quarter of the \ntotal expansion since 2009. As with household consumption, this has \nprovided welcome support to the economy but also created vulnerabilities, \nparticularly through an expanding debt burden. The public sector has also \naccounted for all net job creation in South Africa since the crisis, whereas \nprivate-sector employment has yet to regain 2008 levels.\nFinally, the contribution from net exports has been negative since the \ncrisis (although positive in some quarters, such as at the start of 2014). Net \nexports represent South Africa’s borrowing from abroad to fund imports of \nconsumer and investment goods above what exports can pay for. Because \nthis imbalance has become a significant vulnerability for the economy, it \nmerits a more extensive discussion. \nPercentage points\n-1,0\n-0,5\n0,0\n0,5\n1,0\n1,5\n2,0\n2,5\n3,0\n3,5\n4,0\nFigure 42 Contributions to real gross \n \ndomestic product\n \nHousehold consumption\n \nGovernment expenditure**\n* 2014 data are up to the second quarter at 2005 prices\n** Government expenditure includes consumption and investment\n expenditure of government\nSource: South African Reserve Bank \n \n \n \n \nPrivate-sector investment\n \nNet exports\n2012–2014*\n2010–2014*\nFigure 43 Formal non-agricultural\n \nemployment and GDP*\n90\n95\n100\n105\n110\n115\n120\n125\n130\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\n2014\n \nTotal\n \nPrivate sector\n \nPublic sector\n \nReal GDP excluding agriculture \n* Data are seasonally adjusted\n** Public-sector employment increased temporarily in the \n second quarter of 2014 due to elections\nSources: Statistics South Africa; Quarterly Employment Statistics;\nand South African Reserve Bank\nIndices: 2008 Q1 = 100\n **\nR billions\nR billions\n350\n400\n450\n500\n550\n600\n650\n700\nFigure 44 Real exports and imports of \n \ngoods and services*\n \nExports\n \nNet exports (right-hand scale)\n* Data are seasonally adjusted at an annualised rate\nSource: South African Reserve Bank\n2007\n2005\n2013\n2009\n2011\n \nImports\n-180\n-160\n-140\n-120\n-100\n-80\n-60\n-40\n-20\n0\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\n24\nThe current account and slow growth\nSouth Africa runs large current-account deficits during periods of growth, \nas an expanding economy sucks in imports. Symmetrically, the current- \naccount deficit typically closes during periods of weak growth and crisis, \nas investment flows abate and confidence fails, as in 2009. The change is \ndriven by the trade account, which swings between surplus and deficit. The \nservices, income and current transfer account, by contrast, is more stable \nand always in deficit, reflecting our borrowing from foreign savers.\nSouth Africa’s tendency to run a trade deficit whenever growth is healthy \nis unsurprising. We are a small, open economy with a low savings rate, and \nwe benefit from importing advanced technology and scarce resources from \ncountries with better endowments of those goods. Historically, an increase \nin the growth rate has been associated with more net imports, with 1 per \ncent extra growth detracting about 1,4 per cent from the trade balance. \nSince the crisis, however, significantly slower growth has not also produced \na much smaller trade deficit. \nOne explanation for the shift is that growth is also weak abroad, reducing \ndemand for our exports. In part, this has to do with a slowing, rebalancing \nChina consuming fewer commodities, as reflected in a falling terms of \ntrade. Another aspect is the protracted euro area crisis, which has flattened \nconsumption in a region that remains the single largest destination for \nSouth African exports. Other advanced economies have also been weak, \nalthough the US and UK are now rebounding. \nOur export performance has also been hampered by competitiveness \nproblems. A sustained depreciation in our exchange rate should have made \nour exports much more attractive in global markets (and supported import-\ncompeting industries locally), helping to shift the trade account back towards \nsurplus through a J-curve. The actual adjustment, however, is proceeding \nvery slowly. Part of the problem is that the exchange-rate advantage has been \ntempered by rising domestic prices, with inflation rates markedly above \nour peers’. Electricity shortages and labour disruptions have also dragged \non the tradeables sector, which may explain why it has declined relative to \nthe non-tradeables sector (which is dominated by wholesale, retail, finance \nand government). It is the tradeables sector that benefits from exchange-rate \ndepreciation; the smaller and weaker it is, the slighter the depreciation benefit \nto growth and net exports. \nSouth Africa’s import appetite, by contrast, remains robust. There are \nseveral explanations for this pattern. One is that low pass-through softens \nincentives to avoid imports, moderating inflation but also flattening the \nJ-curve. Another is that capital goods imports are necessary for longstanding \ninvestment plans which cannot be easily deferred. Similarly, South Africa \nimports inputs into other goods and services for which there may not be \nreadily available domestic substitutes. The structure of South African \nimports is approximately 20 per cent consumer goods, 20 per cent capital \ngoods and the remainder intermediate inputs, of which roughly a third is oil. \nSome relief from falling oil prices may be anticipated, but this could be \nqualified by lower export prices for goods such as coal, platinum and \niron, which also respond to lower world growth prospects. Some import \ncompression may also be expected as credit extension slows.\nPer cent\nR billions\nFigure 45 Trade and current accounts*\n \nBalance on current account\n \nTrade balance\n \nCurrent account as a ratio of GDP\n \n(right-hand scale) \n \n \n \n \n \n* Data are seasonally adjusted\nSource: South African Reserve Bank\n2010\n2012\n2014\n2008\n2011\n2013\n2009\n \n \n-9\n-8\n-7\n-6\n-5\n-4\n-3\n-2\n-1\n0\n-250\n-200\n-150\n-100\n-50\n0\n50\n100\n150\nIndices: 2005 = 100\nFigure 46 South Africa’s exports and\n \nconsumption expenditure \n \nof selected export partners\n \nSouth Africa’s volume of merchandise exports\n \nUnited States nominal consumption expenditure\n \nUnited Kingdom nominal consumption expenditure\n \nEuro area nominal consumption expenditure\nSources: South African Reserve Bank; Bureau of Economic\nAnalysis; ‘Personal income and outlays’, Eurostat; and the\nOffice for National Statistics \n \n \n \n \n \n70\n80\n90\n100\n110\n120\n130\n140\n2000\n02\n04\n06\n08\n10\n12\n14\nIndices: 2010 = 100\n60\n70\n80\n90\n100\n110\n120\nFigure 47 Nominal and real effective exchange\n \nrates of the rand\n \nReal effective exchange rate of the rand\n \nNominal effective exchange rate of the rand \n \n(right-hand scale)\nSource: South African Reserve Bank\n2014\n1990\n1995\n2000\n2005\n2010\n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\n300\n350\n25\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\nIn contrast to the fluctuating trade account, the services, income and current \ntransfer account is always in deficit. This is the natural consequence of \nsustained current-account deficits: foreigners will own increasing stocks of \nassets on which they will enjoy returns. As South Africa becomes increasingly \nintegrated with the rest of the world, following its period of forced isolation, \nthese holdings will rise towards the levels seen in other countries which are \nfinancially open and invest more than they save. However, investment and \ntherefore ultimately income payments are not strictly one-way as evidence \nby unexpectedly high inflows in the first quarter of 2014. In recent years, \nSouth African companies have been expanding abroad, including into the \nrest of Africa (see Box 4). Over time, these asset holdings will offset some of \nthe income outflows to foreign investors and so help reduce pressure on the \ncurrent-account deficit. \nFigure 48 Non-resident purchases of \n \nequities and bonds*\n-100\n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n1994 96\n98 2000 02\n04\n06\n08\n10\n12\n14\n* Data up to 25 November 2014\nSource: JSE Limited\nCumulative net\nequity purchases\nCumulative net\nbond purchases\nR billions\nFigure 49 The disaggregated current- \n \naccount balance*\n-250\n-200\n-150\n-100\n-50\n0\n50\n100\n150\n2000\n02\n04\n06\n08\n10\n12\n14\nR billions\n \nCurrent-account balance\n \nServices, income and current transfer account\n* Data are seasonally adjusted at an annualised rate\nSources: South African Reserve Bank and own calculations\n \nTrade account\nBox 4\t\nTrends in international income flows\nSouth Africa’s openness has increased following a period of extreme isolation ending in \nthe 1990s. This change is best represented by the current account; the magnitude of \nthe trade account and the services, income and current transfer (SIT) account totals \nhave increased dramatically, particularly in the past ten years, representing increased \ntrade and investment between South Africa and the rest of the world. Although this \nopenness is a source of volatility in our exchange rate and foreign capital flows, such \nvolatility is rarely transmitted to the real economy. More importantly, our openness \nfacilitates South Africa’s access to international markets, which is an essential factor for \nlong-run economic growth.\nSouth Africa has repeatedly seen large net inflows of foreign capital, causing a \nstructural deficit in the SIT account. Within this deficit, the income component \ndominates, comprising net dividend, interest and other1 receipts. Interest payments \nrelated to foreign debt of the public and private sector increased substantially over the \nquantitative easing periods from 2009 to 2014, yet equity purchases by non-residents \nhad been growing even before the crisis. Over the past ten years, net dividend \npayments accounted for 77 per cent of net income payments, spiking to 95 per cent \nin late 2007. \nIntegration has also enabled a steady rise in foreign assets and associated receipts, \nparticularly through dividends paid to South African holders of foreign equities. Despite \nthe post-crisis growth slowdown, the FTSE/JSE All-Share Price Index has reached new \nhighs over the past three years. Hassan and Paul (2014)2 analysed equity issued3 on \nthe JSE from 2012 to 2014.4 The amount of capital raised through equity issuances has \nincreased over each of the years, yet this was not related to increased domestic \ninvestment activity or in anticipation of higher aggregate demand. Instead, the authors \nfound that by 2014 at least 46 per cent of these issuances had been raised for \ninvestment abroad.5\nHassan and Paul’s findings indicate that South African firms are expanding abroad more \naggressively, although it will take time for this expansion to result in significant dividend \ninflows to South Africa from new operations.6 At least some of this expansion continues \na trend of South African firms expanding into Africa, reinforcing the notion that Africa is \na particularly (and increasingly) important trade and investment partner for the country. \n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\nPercentage of GDP\n2000\n02\n04\n06\n08\n10\n12\n14\nSource: South African Reserve Bank\nReceipts\nPayments\nFigure B4.1 Dividend payments \n \nand receipts\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\n26\nThe corollary of weak growth in South Africa’s trading partners has been \nvery loose monetary policy in those economies, lowering borrowing costs \nand encouraging a search for yield. This has led to increased non-resident \ndemand for bonds and equities, purchases of which have financed most \nof the current account deficit since 2010. Over the past five years, non-\nresidents have purchased net equities to the value of R38,3 billion and net \nbonds worth R140,1 billion. However, South Africa’s substantial external \nfinancing requirements create vulnerability to changing risk attitudes in \nfinancial markets. South Africa saw dramatic capital outflows during the \nMay 2013 ‘taper tantrum’, and since then, non-residents have sold over \nR62 billion of South African bonds (net). \nThe Bank’s growth forecasts\nSince November 2013 the forecast for real GDP growth for 2014 has shrunk \nto 1,4 per cent, lower even than 2013’s disappointing 2,2 per cent. Growth is \nexpected to pick up gradually in 2015 and 2016, but the pace of the recovery \nis slower than previously anticipated, with growth still fractionally below \n3 per cent in the second year of the forecast. \nThe main drivers of improved growth are really just returns to normalcy. \nThe world economy is expected to pick up from its current lows, led by \nthe US, thus raising exports. Similarly, the 2014 strikes were exceptionally \nsevere and are unlikely to be repeated. A more natural number of working \ndays will raise earnings and support consumer spending. Once this rebound \nis effected, growth is expected to persist at levels above 2013 and 2014, but \nbelow the pre-crisis period. Households are already heavily indebted which \nwill continue to suppress spending and confidence; household consumption \nis therefore forecast to grow more slowly than overall GDP over the next \ntwo years. Similarly, government’s need to consolidate its finances will also \ndepress demand growth. Investment from the public and private sector, is \nexpected to do better, especially in the outer years of the forecast as spending \nplans by parastatals come to fruition and private-sector investment rebounds. \nLarger flows and a structural deficit on the SIT account are not necessarily problematic. \nThis structural deficit cannot be considered in isolation; the macroeconomic context is \ncrucial. Thus the SIT-account deficit will be problematic if it is continuously accompanied \nby a trade deficit (as large and persistent current-account deficits are undesirable) or if it \nrepresents an unsustainable debt burden. However, alongside higher economic growth, \nan offsetting trade surplus or real effective exchange-rate depreciation (encouraging a \ntrade surplus), a SIT-account deficit may be a sign of healthy investor attention and \ndomestic business activity.\n1\t\nNet other receipts were approximately 1 per cent of the total income component from 2004 to 2014, hence \nthey are excluded from discussion.\n2 \t\nS Hassan and M Paul, ‘Recent capital raising by firms listed on the JSE: where is the money going?’, South \nAfrican Reserve Bank Economic Note EN/14/17.\n3 \t\nOf the ten largest issuers, forming approximately 65 per cent of total equity issuances over the period.\n4 \t\nUp to 4 August 2014.\n5 \t\nFor dual-listed firms, capital could be raised either through the JSE or the other exchange on which they \nwere listed, and not all firms specified the location of issuances.\n6 \t\nMany large companies on the JSE are dual-listed, and the profit destination depends on the primary listing of \nthe company. Dividends will nonetheless flow to shareholders wherever they are resident.\n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\n2014**\n2013\n2012\nR billions\nFigure B4.3 Equity capital raised \n \nby purpose*\n \nDomestic purposes\n* Excludes capital raised relating to share incentive schemes\n** Data for 2014 are up to 4 August\nSources: Hassan and Paul (2014) and own calculations\n \nInvestment abroad\n0,0\n0,5\n1,0\n1,5\n2,0\n2,5\nPercentage of GDP\n2000\n02\n04\n06\n08\n10\n12\n14\nSource: South African Reserve Bank\nReceipts\nPayments\nFigure B4.2 Interest payments\n \nand receipts\nPer cent\n3,1\n3,6\n2,5\n1,9\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\nFigure 50 Evolution of the Bank’s real\n \nGDP forecasts\n \nActual GDP\n \nJanuary 2014\n \nMay 2014\n \nSeptember 2014\nSources: Statistics South Africa and South African Reserve Bank\n2014\n2015 2016\n2010 2011\n2012\n2013\n \nNovember 2013\n \nMarch 2014\n \nJuly 2014\n \nNovember 2014\n1,4\n2,5\n2,9\n27\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\nAlthough the US remains the world’s largest economy, it will have little help \nfrom other economies and will struggle to pull the world out of stagnation \nby itself. Net exports for South Africa will therefore be constrained, both by \nstronger investment (and therefore capital goods imports) and a paucity of \nforeign demand. \nRisks to growth\nSouth Africa’s growth has long been constrained by deep structural factors, \nwith skills shortages and spatial legacies perhaps especially damaging. \nThese factors have lately been exacerbated by additional problems in the \nform of dysfunctional labour relations and electricity shortages and these, \nalong with a struggling world economy, now pose the most acute risks to \nresumed growth. \nStrike action in 2014 has been unusually severe, carrying the threat of \nlonger and more violent strikes. Should these become the norm, the case \nfor investing in South Africa would be weakened and there would be \nstronger incentives for substituting capital for labour. Large salary and wage \nincreases, in excess of productivity gains and inflation, are also a threat to \nSouth Africa’s competitiveness. Such increases would potentially reverse real \nexchange-rate gains and prolong the current-account deficit, high inflation \nand weak growth. \nElectricity-supply constraints have proven even tighter than originally \nanticipated, presenting another barrier to investment, especially in the \nmanufacturing and mining sectors. Large new investments in capacity are \nunder way, particularly the Kusile and Medupi power stations, but even \nonce these come online existing capacity will be desperately in need of \nmaintenance and therefore electricity constraints will not be satisfactorily \nlifted. November furnished an effective demonstration of the problem when \nan accident at the Majuba power station in Mpumalanga forced rolling \nblackouts, reminiscent of the electricity crisis of 2008. \nGrowth prospects are also at risk from external demand. A stronger US \neconomy should grow at around 3 per cent over the next two years, before \nreverting to potential of about 2,1 per cent, but it has repeatedly failed to \nachieve 3 per cent annual growth since the crisis. It is also unlikely that the \nUS can power a robust world recovery unaided. The euro area is expected \nto see a moderate uptick in growth, but this is endangered by geopolitical \nrisks and weakness in the three largest economies, Germany, France and \nItaly. China has so far managed a relatively smooth growth deceleration \nbut could still suffer a hard landing. Japan’s unexpected contraction in the \nthird quarter of 2014 suggests it will struggle to achieve a new era of growth, \nespecially if it also proceeds with VAT increases to improve its fiscal position. \nMany emerging markets require difficult reforms to restore growth, and \nsome, including fast-growing sub-Saharan African countries, are exposed to \nfalling commodity prices and rising borrowing costs. In sum, global growth \nconfronts a host of risks and could quite easily fall below forecasts. \nFigure 51 Real GDP growth forecast\nPercentage change*\n2006\n2008\n2010\n2012\n2014\n2016\n-8\n-6\n-4\n-2\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n* At seasonally adjusted annualised rates\nSource: South African Reserve Bank\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\n28\nConclusion\nInflation has been high all year, either near the top end of the target or \nabove it. Expectations are clustered just above 6 per cent and core inflation \nhas persisted in its steady upward drift, from 3 per cent in early 2011 to \n5,7 per cent in October 2014. However, positive oil and food price shocks \nhave recently lowered the headline inflation forecasts. Expected inflation \nfor 2015 has declined from 5,7 per cent to 5,3 per cent, and the risks to this \nforecast appear quite evenly balanced.\nDomestic growth has been weak. The economy has suffered a series of \nshort-term shocks, especially strikes. In addition, potential growth appears \nto have declined. The output gap remains negative, although smaller than \npreviously estimated, and credit growth is slow, contributing to minimal \ninflationary pressures from the demand side. \nDomestic imbalances, meanwhile, are a source of vulnerability. Substantial \nfiscal deficits since the crisis have expanded the state’s debt burden, and \ngrowth is unlikely to rebound strongly enough that these deficits will fall \nsignificantly without separate policy adjustments. The current account deficit \nrequires financing, exposing South Africa to changing risk assessments and \nappetites in financial markets. This danger is mitigated by the floating \nexchange rate, but further currency depreciation remains an inflation risk. \nSouth Africa’s major macroeconomic settings are being adjusted. The pace \nof fiscal consolidation has accelerated. Monetary policy has embarked on \na moderate rate-hiking cycle. This has so far taken the form of two rate \nincreases in six meetings, for a total of 75 basis points. The scale and timing \nof future increases will depend on various factors, including inflation \nexpectations, wage developments and changes in the global financial \nenvironment.\n29\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\nAppendix 1: The Bank’s fan charts\nThis appendix is intended to assist in interpreting the growth and inflation fan charts. The \nMPC uses fan charts to focus the discussion of risks lying ahead and their impact on the \ninflation and growth forecasts. \nFan chart projections are based on assumptions and are subject to uncertainty. These graphical \nrepresentations reflect the MPC’s collective judgement (a single view of the probability) of \nthe most likely path of inflation and growth outcomes in the future. However, there is no \nmechanical link between either the central projection or the distribution at the forecast \nhorizon and the setting of monetary policy. \nFan charts reflect the MPC’s view of uncertainty associated with the projections at different \nhorizons through a range of confidence intervals. The mode – the darkest band at the centre \nof the fan chart – represents the most likely 10 per cent of the probable outcomes, including \nthe central projection. Moving away from the central projection, the area covered by each \nsuccessive band, shaded slightly lighter and added on either side of the central band, adds \na further 10 per cent to the probability, until the whole shaded area depicts a 90 per cent \nconfidence interval.8 The width of the coloured confidence bands is an indication of the \nestimated uncertainty. \nThe fan becomes progressively wider and flatter as the projection extends into the future, \nreflecting increased uncertainty. The MPC also takes a view on the balance of risks. The \nprobability distribution will be symmetrical if risks are viewed as evenly spread. If risks \nare viewed as not evenly spread then the probability distribution will be asymmetrical and \nskewed. A skewed probability distribution reflects a higher likelihood of outcomes in one \ndirection (above or below the central projection). An upward bias is reflected by a slightly \nlarger shaded area covered by the upper bands and a downward bias by a slightly larger \nshaded area covered by the lower bands.\n8\t\nActual inflation and growth outcomes are therefore expected to be somewhere within the fan on 90 out of 100 occasions. For the remaining \n10 out of 100 occasions inflation and growth can be anywhere in the area outside the shaded range.\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\n30\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n17 July 2014\nIssued by Gill Marcus, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, at a meeting of the \nMonetary Policy Committee in Pretoria\nSince the previous meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), the economic growth \noutlook has deteriorated against the backdrop of protracted strike action in the mining \nand manufacturing sectors. The economy contracted in the first quarter of 2014, and the \ngrowth outlook for the rest of the year remains subdued amid low business confidence. \nCompounding the MPC’s policy dilemma, inflation has breached the upper end of the \ntarget range, driven primarily by the exchange-rate depreciation and rising food prices, \nwhile a possible wage-price spiral resulting from recent wage settlements and wage demands \nconsiderably in excess of inflation and productivity growth have added to the upside risk to \nthe inflation outlook. \nThe year-on-year inflation rate as measured by the consumer price index (CPI) for all urban \nareas measured 6,6 per cent in May, up from 6,0 per cent and 6,1 2 per cent in March and April \n2014 respectively. The main driver of this marked acceleration was food and non-alcoholic \nbeverage price inflation which measured 8,8 per cent in May compared with 7,0 per cent and \n7,8 per cent in the previous two months respectively. This category contributed 1,3 percentage \npoints to the headline CPI outcome, compared with a recent low of 0,5 percentage points in \nDecember 2013. The categories of food, housing utilities and transport together accounted for \n4,2 percentage points of the inflation outcome in May, compared with 3,7 percentage points \nin the previous month. The transport index increased at an annual rate of 8,9 per cent, from \n6,8 per cent in April, despite a 15 cents per litre decline in the petrol price in May. Core \ninflation, which excludes food, petrol and electricity, remained unchanged at 5,5 per cent for \nthe third consecutive month. Administered price inflation excluding petrol was unchanged \nfrom the previous month at 6,5 per cent. The headline producer price inflation for final \nmanufactured goods moderated slightly from 8,8 per cent in April to 8,7 per cent in May, \ndriven in part by lower agricultural product inflation. \nThe marginal improvement in the Bank’s forecast of headline inflation at the previous \nmeeting has been more or less reversed, as recent food price developments surprised on \nthe upside. Inflation is now expected to average 6,3 per cent in 2014, compared with \n6,2 per cent previously, with the quarterly peak of 6,6 per cent (previously 6,5 per cent) \nstill expected in the fourth quarter, following a slight moderation in the third quarter. The \nforecast average inflation for 2015 increased to 5,9 per cent from 5,8 per cent, while the \nforecast for 2016 increased marginally to 5,6 per cent, and to 5,5 per cent in the final quarter \nof that year. Inflation is still expected to return to within the target band during the second \nquarter of 2015 provided that there are no further shocks to the system, particularly from \npossible higher tariff increases being granted to Eskom by the National Energy Regulator of \nSouth Africa (Nersa) from 2015. \nThe forecast for core inflation is unchanged. This measure is expected to average 5,6 per \ncent and 5,7 per cent in 2014 and 2015 respectively, moderating to 5,5 per cent in 2016, \nwith the moderate upward pressure coming from the lagged effects of the exchange-rate \ndepreciation rather than evidence of strong domestic demand pressures. As before, the MPC \nsees the risks to the headline inflation forecast to be skewed to the upside. \nInflation expectations as reflected in the survey conducted by the Bureau for Economic \nResearch (BER) at Stellenbosch University have remained anchored at the upper end of the \ntarget band. The average inflation expectation of analysts, business people and trade union \nofficials for this year and next year has remained unchanged for six consecutive quarters at \n6,1 per cent for both years, declining to 5,9 per cent in 2016. Within these categories, the \nlargest change was by business people for 2016, where expectations increased from 6,2 per \n31\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\ncent in the previous survey to 6,4 per cent. However, their expectation for 2015 moderated \nslightly. Inflation expectations of households for 2014 declined from 6,7 per cent in the first \nquarter to 6,3 per cent in the second quarter. \nThe Reuters survey of inflation expectations of economic analysts conducted in May \nremained more or less unchanged since the previous survey, with a slight upward shift. The \noutcome of the survey shows a divergence of views among analysts as to whether inflation \nwill peak in the second or fourth quarter of 2014. On average, the expectation is for inflation \nto peak in the second quarter, at an average of 6,4 per cent, and to return to within the target \nrange in the first quarter of 2015. According to the survey, annual inflation is expected to \naverage 6,2 per cent in 2014, and 5,7 per cent and 5,5 per cent in the subsequent two years \nrespectively. \nThe global economy continues to exhibit mixed signals regarding the economic growth \noutlook. Since the previous meeting of the MPC, consensus forecasts for growth in 2014 \nhave been revised downwards for the United States (US) and the eurozone, but those for \nJapan and the United Kingdom (UK) have been revised upwards. The earlier optimism that \nthe US would grow at around 3 per cent in 2014 has been moderated following the 2,9 per \ncent annualised contraction in the first quarter, partly as a result of severe weather conditions \nand a decline in expenditure on health care. Most analysts now expect US growth to be \ncloser to 2 per cent. This weaker growth is despite larger-than-expected improvements in \nthe unemployment rate. The outlook for the eurozone has also deteriorated, following weak \nindustrial output in Germany in May, and slowing growth in France and Italy. Real output \nin Japan is expected to contract in the second quarter following the surge in expenditure in \nthe first quarter in advance of the increase of consumption taxes. The UK recovery, however, \nappears to be sustained with growth of around 3 per cent expected in 2014. \nThe outlook for emerging markets remains relatively subdued, but some emerging Asian \neconomies have benefited from stronger US growth. The Chinese economy is expected to \ngrow by just under 7,5 per cent in 2014, although concerns about the shadow banking \nsystem remain. Subdued growth is expected in a number of emerging markets, including \nBrazil, Russia, Thailand and Argentina. \nGlobal financial-market developments remain dominated by expectations of changes in \nmonetary policy in the advanced economies, amid concerns that the current low interest \nrate and low volatility environment may encourage excessive risk taking and asset price \nbubbles. By contrast to a number of emerging-market economies, inflation remains benign \nin the advanced economies, although the risk of deflation in the eurozone persists. The UK \nis expected to be the first advanced economy to raise interest rates, but at a moderate pace, \nwhile the US is generally not expected to begin the process of normalisation before the third \nquarter of 2015. However, the tapering of bond purchases by the US Federal Reserve (Fed) \nis expected to continue at a steady pace. This process is fully discounted in the markets, and \nis expected to be completed later this year.\nBy contrast, the European Central Bank (ECB) has recently announced a range of new \nmonetary policy measures aimed at stimulating the economy through encouraging bank \nlending and preventing deflation, while Japanese monetary policy is expected to remain \nhighly stimulatory for some time. Since the previous meeting of the MPC, a number of \ncountries have reduced their policy rates, including the eurozone, Sweden, Mexico, Hungary \nand Turkey, while the tightening cycle continued in New Zealand. \nThe exchange rate of the rand continues to pose an upside risk to the inflation outlook. \nHaving appreciated to a level of R10,29 against the US dollar soon after the previous MPC \nmeeting, the rand exchange rate followed a depreciating trend, reaching a new trading range \nof between R10,60 and R10,80 since the beginning of June. Since the previous meeting, the \nrand has depreciated by 2,6 per cent on a trade-weighted basis. The appreciation of the rand \nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\n32\nin May was in response to more benign global factors as market participants absorbed the \nforward guidance provided by the central banks in the advanced economies. This contributed \nto lower risk aversion and renewed flows to emerging markets in general. Since the previous \nmeeting, non-resident net purchases of bonds and equities have amounted to R7,2 billion, and \nR44,2 billion since the beginning of February. \nDespite these inflows, since early June the rand has largely decoupled from its emerging-\nmarket peers, and depreciated relative to most currencies, as it reacted to deteriorating domestic \nfundamentals. These included the negative gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate, the \nadverse reports from the ratings agencies, and the protracted nature of the platinum and metal \nworkers’ strikes. The impact of the platinum-sector strikes on exports began to be felt in April \nand May, and it is estimated that during these two months the value of platinum group metals \n(PGM) exports was around R20 billion lower than during the first quarter. This is likely \nto put pressure on the current account of the balance of payments in the second quarter, \nfollowing a narrowing of the deficit in the first quarter to 4,5 per cent of GDP. \nSouth Africa’s growth outlook has deteriorated since the previous meeting of the MPC, \ncompounded by continued labour disruptions. Following a contraction of 0,6 per cent in \nthe first quarter, the outlook for the second quarter is expected to be positive but subdued, \nparticularly in the light of weak mining and manufacturing data in May. The Bank’s latest \nforecast, which assumes a speedy resolution of the metal workers’ strike, sees growth in 2014 \nat 1,7 per cent, compared with 2,1 per cent previously and 2,8 per cent at the beginning of the \nyear. Growth forecasts for the coming two calendar years have been reduced to 2,9 per cent \nand 3,2 per cent, from 3,1 per cent and 3,4 per cent respectively. The Rand Merchant Bank \n(RMB)/BER Business Confidence Index remained low and unchanged at 41 index points in \nthe second quarter of 2014, with a sharp decline particularly evident among manufacturers. \nThe Bank’s leading indicator of economic activity declined moderately, reflecting subdued \ngrowth expectations. \nThe weak business confidence is mirrored in the 2,6 per cent growth in gross fixed capital \nformation in the first quarter of 2014. Growth in fixed investment by the private sector, \nwhich accounts for about two thirds of gross fixed capital formation, weakened further, \nfrom 2,4 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2013 to 1,0 per cent in the first quarter of 2014. \nThe mining sector contracted by an annualised 24,7 per cent in the first quarter of 2014, \nand although mainly driven by the strike-induced decline in PGM output, the contraction \nwas fairly broad-based across the sector. Despite a higher-than-expected performance in \nApril, the data for May show that the outlook for the second quarter is also bleak. In May \nthe physical volume of mining output declined by (a non-annualised) 3,1 per cent on a \nmonth-to-month basis, and by 5,6 per cent on a three-month-to-three-month basis, with \nPGM output declining by 34,1 per cent. While the strike is over and miners are returning \nto work, PGM production is not expected to normalise for some time, and possible shaft \nclosures could reduce the longer-term potential of the sector. \nThe manufacturing-sector performance in the first two months of the second quarter has \nalso been disappointing, following the 4,4 per cent contraction in the first quarter. In May \nmanufacturing output declined by 3,7 per cent on a year-on-year basis, and by 2,0 per cent \non a three-month-on-three-month basis. The sector was negatively impacted by electricity \nsupply constraints and the platinum-sector strike, while the current strike by metal workers \nis likely to undermine the outlook for the third quarter. The Kagiso Purchasing Managers’ \nIndex (PMI) registered a slight improvement in June, measuring 46,6 index points, but has \nremained below the neutral 50 index point level for three consecutive months. \nTrends in employment growth are indicative of the weak private-sector investment. Although \nformal non-agricultural employment increased for the third consecutive quarter in the first \nquarter of 2014, all the gains were in the public sector. While overall employment increased \nby 42 000 jobs in the year to the end of March, 49 000 jobs were created in the public sector \n33\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\nwhile the private sector shed jobs, particularly in the mining sector where almost 29 000 \njobs were lost. \nFinal consumption expenditure by households remains the main driver of GDP growth, \nbut with a declining contribution of 1,2 percentage points in the first quarter of 2014. \nGrowth in household consumption expenditure, which measured 2,6 per cent in 2013, \ndeclined to 1,8 per cent in the first quarter of 2014, with a marked moderation in the \ngrowth of expenditure on durable goods and a contraction in spending on non-durable \ngoods. Real retail sales growth contracted by 0,8 per cent on a three-month-to-three-\nmonth basis in May, and increased at a month-to-month rate of 0,8 per cent. Domestic \nmotor vehicle sales declined by 2,3 per cent on a year-on-year basis, but increased by \n4,7 per cent on a month-to-month basis in June. Despite these weak trends, consumer \nconfidence surprised on the upside in the second quarter, with the FNB/BER Consumer \nConfidence Index increasing from -6 to 4 index points, although respondents do not \ndeem the present time as appropriate to buy durable goods. \nGrowth over twelve months in total loans and advances to the private sector measured \n8,2 per cent in May 2014, but the divergent trends in bank credit extended to households and \nthe corporate sector have continued. Growth in credit extended to the corporate sector has \nbeen steadily increasing since the beginning of the year, measuring 13,3 per cent in May, due in \npart to renewable energy contracts. By contrast, growth in credit extended to the private sector \nhas continued to trend downwards, to measure 4,3 per cent in May. Twelve-month growth in \ngeneral loans to households, mainly unsecured lending, declined to 2,8 per cent in May; its \nlowest growth since February 2005. Mortgage credit extension remained within the 2 to 3 per \ncent range observed since January 2013, and instalment sale credit and leasing finance also \ncontinued to moderate from growth rates of around 13 per cent in the second half of 2013 to \n8,6 per cent in May. These credit extension trends to households reflect a combination \nof weakening household consumption expenditure and stricter bank lending criteria for \nunsecured loans in particular. Household debt to disposable income remains elevated, but \ndeclined marginally to 74,5 per cent in the first quarter of 2014. \nThe trend in wage settlements poses an upside risk to the inflation outlook, and these \npressures are likely to intensify in the current difficult labour relations environment. \nAccording to Andrew Levy Employment Publications, the average wage settlement rate in \ncollective bargaining agreements increased from 7,9 per cent in the first quarter of 2014 to \n8,1 per cent in the second quarter. However, increases over four quarters in nominal unit \nlabour costs in the formal non-agricultural sector declined from 5,9 per cent in the fourth \nquarter of 2013 to 4,8 per cent in the first quarter of 2014. The MPC is concerned that \nrecent wage settlements in the mining sector and current demands in the metals sector \ncould set a precedent for wage demands more generally. Unless accompanied by higher \nproductivity, such settlements could generate a wage-price spiral, and are also likely to \nhave a negative impact on employment trends. While the focus has generally been on wage \ndemands, there is an imperative for attention to also be paid to excessive salaries and bonuses \nof management and executives. \nFood prices have been one of the main drivers of inflation since the beginning of the year \nand have generally surprised on the upside in recent months. There are, however, some \ntentative indications that we may be near the peak: in May manufactured food producer \nprice inflation moderated for the first time since October 2013 and measured 8,9 per cent, \ndown from 9,5 per cent in April. Agricultural producer price inflation declined from a \nrecent peak of 13,3 per cent in March to 6,7 per cent in May reflecting in part the sharp \ndecline in maize prices to export parity price levels. Prices of cereals and other crops declined \nby 0,8 per cent in May, having reached a recent peak of 27,6 per cent in February. Global \nfood price pressures are also benign, with the year-on-year inflation rates as reflected in \nthe Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) food price index being negative for twelve \nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\n34\nconsecutive months. Apart from weather-related risks, the overall trend in food prices will \nremain highly sensitive to exchange-rate developments. \nDespite recent geopolitical risks, particularly in Ukraine and Iraq, international oil prices \nhave remained relatively stable. Apart from a brief spike to a level of around US$115 per \nbarrel in June, the price of Brent crude oil has generally traded in a range of US$105 and \nUS$110 per barrel, and is currently at around US$105 per barrel. Domestic petrol prices \nhave therefore been driven primarily by exchange-rate changes. Following the appreciation \nof the rand in April, the petrol price was reduced by a total of 37 cents per litre in May and \nJune, but this was largely reversed in July when the price increased by 31 cents per litre. If the \ncurrent trends persist, a further small increase in the petrol price can be expected in August. \nThe MPC remains concerned about weak growth, the widening output gap and the negative \nemployment outlook. The strike in the platinum sector contributed to the downward \nrevision of the growth forecast, and the latest forecast has not factored in the possibility of a \nprotracted work stoppage by the metal workers, which would potentially have much wider \nramifications because of the direct linkages to other sectors of the economy. This weak \ngrowth outlook, however, is not something that monetary policy can ameliorate. \nThe MPC is also increasingly concerned about the inflation outlook and the further upside \nrisks to the forecast. Although the exchange rate remains a key factor in this regard, the \npossibility of a wage-price spiral, should wage settlements well in excess of inflation and \nproductivity growth become an economy-wide norm, has increased. Although the inflation \ntrajectory has not deteriorated markedly since the previous meeting, upside risks have \nincreased, and it is expected to remain uncomfortably close to the upper end of the target \nrange when it does eventually return to within the target. The upside risk factors make this \ntrajectory highly vulnerable to any significant changes in inflation pressures. \nAlthough inflation expectations have remained relatively anchored, should inflation persist \noutside the target band, these expectations risk becoming dislodged. \nThe MPC is, however, cognisant of the fact that the inflation pressures do not reflect excess \ndemand conditions in the economy. Household consumption expenditure remains weak \nand credit extension to households is contracting in real terms. However, we do have to be \nmindful of second-round effects of supply-side shocks. \nThe MPC faces an increasingly difficult dilemma of rising inflation and slowing growth. \nThe core mandate of the Bank remains price stability but, at the same time in achieving \nthis mandate, we have to be mindful of the impact of our actions on economic growth \nand tread a fine line between acting effectively to address the inflation objective while not \nundermining growth unduly. \nThe MPC has decided to continue on its gradual normalisation path and raise the repurchase \nrate by 25 basis points to 5,75 per cent per annum, effective from Friday, 18 July. Given the \nexpected inflation trajectory, the real repurchase rate remains slightly negative and well \nbelow its longer-term neutral level. The monetary policy stance remains supportive of the \ndomestic economy and, as before, any future moves will be gradual and highly data-\ndependent. \nWe would like to reiterate that monetary policy should not be seen as the growth engine \nof the economy. The sources of the below-par growth performance are largely outside \nthe realms of monetary policy. In the short term, an improvement in the interaction and \nrelationships between management and labour is essential to foster a climate of trust and \nconfidence, and get South Africa back to work. Given that the key headwinds preventing \na return to trend growth are structural, there is an urgent need to implement necessary \nstructural reforms, as envisaged in the National Development Plan, in order to achieve \nhigher and more inclusive growth. \n35\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n18 September 2014 \nIssued by Gill Marcus, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, at a meeting of the \nMonetary Policy Committee in Pretoria\nSince the previous meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), the domestic \ninflation forecast has improved slightly, but the inflation trajectory remains uncomfortably \nclose to the upper end of the target range. At the same time, the domestic economic \ngrowth outlook has deteriorated further, with declining growth in both consumption \nexpenditure and gross fixed capital formation, as confidence remains low. The combination \nof stubborn inflation and a sluggish growth outlook continues to pose a difficult dilemma \nfor monetary policy.\nThe global environment has been characterised by increased financial market volatility \nfollowing heightened speculation relating to the timing and extent of United States (US) \nmonetary policy normalisation. This impacted on emerging-market currencies in general, \nand on the rand in particular. This was further illustrated after yesterday’s Federal Open \nMarket Committee (FOMC) meeting which reaffirmed the gradual pace of US monetary \npolicy normalisation and its data-dependent nature. However, despite increased political \ninstability and significant risks in a number of regions, the international oil price has declined \nalong with continued weakness in global food prices, contributing to a more benign global \nbackdrop for the domestic inflation outlook. \nThe year-on-year inflation rate as measured by the consumer price index (CPI) for all urban \nareas surprised on the upside at 6,4 per cent in August, having measured 6,6 per cent and \n6,3 per cent in June and July 2014 respectively. The higher turnout was mainly due to higher-\nthan-expected food prices, which had been anticipated to continue their recent downward \ntrend. Downward pressure was exerted by petrol prices which increased by 5,8 per cent, down \nfrom 8,3 per cent in July. The categories of food, housing utilities and transport together \naccounted for 3,8 percentage points of the inflation outcome in August, unchanged from \nthe previous month. Core inflation, which excludes food, petrol and electricity, increased to \n5,8 per cent from 5,7 per cent in July, driven mainly by the impact of the weaker exchange \nrate on some goods categories. \nAdministered price inflation excluding petrol measured 6,5 per cent, up from the 6,4 per \ncent measured in July. The headline producer price inflation for final manufactured goods, \nwhich reached a recent high of 8,8 per cent in April, measured 8,1 per cent and 8,0 per cent \nin June and July respectively, driven in part by lower agricultural product inflation.\nThe Bank’s forecast of headline inflation is slightly more favourable than that presented \nat the previous meeting, mainly a result of lower expected food and petrol price pressures. \nWhereas for some time inflation had been forecast to peak at an average of 6,6 per cent in \nthe fourth quarter of this year, the peak now appears to have occurred in the second quarter, \nat an average of 6,5 per cent. Inflation is now expected to average 6,2 per cent in 2014, \ncompared with 6,3 per cent previously, and 5,7 per cent in 2015 (5,9 per cent previously), \nand to return to within the target range in the first quarter of 2015 instead of the second \nquarter as previously forecast. The inflation forecast for 2016 increased to 5,8 per cent \nfrom 5,6 per cent, mainly as a result of the revised electricity price assumption following \nthe review of Eskom tariffs by the National Energy Regulator of South Africa (Nersa). The \nrevised assumption makes provision for electricity price increases of 11,6 per cent from July \n2015 and again from July 2016.\nThe forecast for core inflation is unchanged at an average 5,6 per cent and 5,7 per cent \nin 2014 and 2015 respectively, reaching a peak of 5,8 per cent in the first quarter of 2015, \nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\n36\nand moderating to 5,5 per cent in 2016. As before, the MPC sees the risks to the headline \ninflation forecast to be skewed to the upside, with possible renewed pressure coming from \nthe exchange rate. \nInflation expectations, as reflected in the survey conducted by the Bureau for Economic \nResearch (BER) at Stellenbosch University in the third quarter of 2014, have again remained \nmore or less unchanged, and anchored at around the upper end of the target range. Inflation \nis expected to average 6,2 per cent in 2014 and 6,1 per cent and 6,0 per cent in 2015 and 2016 \nrespectively. As usual, there is a fairly wide dispersion of expectations between the different \ncategories of respondents. While business people expect inflation to average 6,4 per cent in \n2015 and 2016, analysts’ expectations average 5,7 per cent and 5,4 per cent. Expectations of \ntrade unionists are for 6,2 per cent in both years, and all categories of respondents expect \ninflation in the current year to average 6,2 per cent. Household inflation expectations for \n2014 remained unchanged at 6,3 per cent.\nThe global growth recovery remains asynchronous amid sustained improvements in the \nUS and United Kingdom (UK), and deteriorating prospects in the eurozone and Japan. \nAlthough growth in the US is not expected to exceed the 2,2 per cent achieved in 2013, \nthis is mainly a result of the contraction during the first quarter of this year. Real output \ngrowth of 4,2 per cent was recorded in the second quarter of 2014, and consensus forecasts \nare for growth rates of around 3 per cent in the next two quarters. Similar growth rates are \nexpected in 2015. At the same time, the unemployment rate has been declining at a faster \npace than previously anticipated. While the growth outlook for the UK remains positive, \npossible downside risks could emerge should Scotland vote for independence from the UK. \nGrowth in the eurozone has remained weak, with the German economy also under pressure \nfollowing a contraction in the second quarter. Sanctions on Russia are expected to be an \nadditional constraint affecting the eurozone’s growth outlook. Although the Japanese \neconomy appears to be recovering from the value-added tax (VAT)-induced slump in the \nsecond quarter, the recovery looks fragile.\nWhile emerging Asia appears to be benefiting most from the US recovery, emerging markets \ngenerally are facing increasing headwinds. Signals coming out of China continue to be mixed \namid a sharp slowdown in industrial production in August. Latin American economies \nalso face a challenging outlook, particularly in Argentina, Venezuela and Brazil, which are \ncurrently experiencing a technical recession. Growth in sub-Saharan Africa is expected to \nremain relatively strong, although commodity producers may be adversely affected by lower \ncommodity prices and possible spillover effects from the Ebola outbreak. \nThere is a continued absence of significant upside global inflation risks despite pressures \nexperienced in some emerging markets. The various indicators of US inflation remain well \ncontained below the 2 per cent level, while the fear of deflation in the eurozone persists. \nDeclining international oil and food prices, along with a number of other commodity prices, \nare expected to reinforce the current benign global inflation environment.\nThe divergent growth outlooks in the advanced economies are likely to be the main drivers \nof monetary policy developments. The UK is expected to tighten monetary policy early next \nyear. The stronger performance of the US labour market has led to heightened speculation \nthat normalisation may begin earlier than previously anticipated. These expectations resulted \nin an appreciation of the US dollar against most currencies, as well as rising long-term US \nTreasury yields ahead of yesterday’s FOMC meeting. At yesterday’s press conference, the \nFOMC Chair reaffirmed the view that policy normalisation will occur gradually, but is \ncontingent on no surprises to employment growth or inflation in either direction.\nThe data-dependent nature of the forward guidance means that changes in the outlook for \ninflation, unemployment and growth are likely to lead to bouts of global financial market \nuncertainty in advance of FOMC meetings in the coming months. \n37\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\nAt the same time, however, the European Central Bank (ECB) has loosened monetary \npolicy and has indicated its willingness to embark on some form of quantitative easing \nshould this be necessary. Monetary policy is also expected to remain accommodative for \nsome time in Japan. Since the previous meeting of the MPC, policy rates have been reduced \nin the eurozone, Israel, South Korea, Chile and Hungary, and increased in Russia and \nNew Zealand.\nFollowing a few weeks of relative stability, the rand exchange rate weakened in the past \nfew days in response to US dollar strength, as well as the widening deficit on the current \naccount of the balance of payments to 6,2 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP). \nSince the previous meeting of the MPC, the rand initially traded in a range of R10,50 and \nR10,75 against the US dollar, but has weakened since early September, reaching a low of \nR11,07. On a trade-weighted basis, however, the rand depreciated by 0,4 per cent, having \nappreciated against the euro and the British pound. The rand is expected to remain sensitive \nto changes in sentiment regarding possible changes in US policy which will affect the \nappetite for emerging-market assets generally, as well as to possible impacts from geopolitical \nrisks and domestic factors.\nSince the previous MPC, non-residents have been net sellers of bonds to the value of \nR29,3 billion, but this has been offset in part by net purchases of equities to the value of \nR16,2 billion over the same period. In the year to date, there have been net outflows of \nbonds and equities to the value of R6,3 billion. These trends indicate that the financing of \nthe current account through portfolio inflows is likely to become increasingly challenging. \nThe current-account deficit in the second quarter of 2014 was wider than generally expected \nby the markets, following the 4,5 per cent of GDP recorded in the first quarter. This widening \nwas a result of increased dividend outflows, lower dividend inflows following a large one-off \ninflow during the first quarter, and weak export growth, impacted to some extent by the \nplatinum strike. Export growth in the third quarter is expected to remain constrained by \nthe slow return to full capacity production by the platinum mines and the strike in the steel \nand engineering sector in July, which had significant spillover effects on the manufacturing \nsector in general. The current account is anticipated to narrow gradually over time.\nThe domestic economic growth outlook remains weak following growth rates of -0,6 per \ncent and 0,6 per cent in the first and second quarters of the year respectively. These growth \nrates are well below potential output growth and indicative of a widening output gap. Partly \nas result of this outcome, as well as the expected impact of the metal workers strike in July, \nthe Bank’s forecast for GDP growth for 2014 has been revised down further to 1,5 per cent, \nfrom 1,7 per cent previously, with the risks still assessed to be on the downside. The forecasts \nfor both 2015 and 2016 have been revised down by 0,1 percentage points to 2,8 per cent and \n3,1 per cent respectively. The Bank’s leading indicator of economic activity continues to trend \nsideways, consistent with a subdued growth outlook. Business confidence, as reflected in the \nRand Merchant Bank/Bureau for Economic Research (RMB/BER) Business Confidence \nIndex, remains negative despite a 5 index point increase to 46 in the third quarter. Adding \nto prevailing concerns are indications from Eskom that electricity supply constraints may be \nmore severe and endure for longer than previously expected. \nThe near-term outlook for mining remains subdued, with platinum production not expected \nto return to full capacity before the end of the year. In July, mining production recorded \na broad-based year-on-year decline of 7,7 per cent, but a 0,9 per cent increase on a month-\nto-month basis. Manufacturing output declined significantly in July, recording year-on-\nyear and month-to-month contractions of 7,9 per cent and 5,4 per cent respectively, largely \ndue to the impact of the four-week strike in the steel and engineering subsector. Capacity \nutilisation in the sector declined from 82,1 per cent in the first quarter of 2014 to 80,6 per \ncent in the second quarter. More positively, the Kagiso Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) \nreflected some improvement in sentiment in August, with the index rising 3,1 index points \nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\n38\nto 49, marginally below the neutral level, while the construction sector has recorded growth \nrates of 5 per cent in the first two quarters of the year. \nGrowth prospects have been constrained by the weakening trend in gross fixed capital \nformation which grew at an annualised rate of 0,5 per cent in the second quarter. Real fixed \ncapital expenditure by both the public corporations and the private sector contracted during \nthe quarter. Of particular concern is the continued downward trend over the past three \nquarters in private-sector investment, despite higher capital outlays in the manufacturing \nsector. This has been reflected in the continued slow pace of employment creation in the \nprivate sector and the rise in the unemployment rate to 25,5 per cent in the second quarter \nof 2014. \nConsumption expenditure by households also continued its moderating trend which began \nin the first quarter of 2012 amid declining real disposable income growth. Annualised \ngrowth of 1,5 per cent was recorded in the second quarter of 2014. The slowdown was \nparticularly marked in the durable and semi-durable goods categories, probably impacted \nby the prolonged strikes in the mining and manufacturing sectors. Retail trade sales \ncontracted by 0,9 per cent in June on a month-to-month basis, but increased by 1,2 per \ncent in July, higher than generally expected. Wholesale trade sales contracted by 5,2 per \ncent month-to-month in July, and by 4,6 per cent year-on-year. Domestic vehicle sales \nhave also slowed. Given the above, somewhat surprisingly the First National Bank/Bureau \nfor Economic Research (FNB/BER) Consumer Confidence Index increased from -6 to \n+4 in the second quarter. \nTrends in credit extension to households are consistent with the weak growth in household \nconsumption expenditure, showing a further divergence between credit extension to \nhouseholds and to the corporate sector. Growth in total loans and advances over the year \nmeasured 9,7 per cent in July, with lending to the corporate sector increasing by 17 per cent \nand to households by 4,1 per cent. The latter reflects continued sluggish growth in mortgage \ncredit extension and tighter credit criteria for unsecured lending in particular. Twelve-month \ngrowth in general loans to households, which is mainly unsecured lending, reached a low \nof 0,2 per cent in July, while growth over three months exhibited an annualised contraction \nof 2,5 per cent. This decline is across all income groups, but more pronounced at the lower \nlevels. A positive development is that household debt to disposable income moderated from \n74,4 per cent in the first quarter to 73,5 per cent in the second quarter.\nGrowth in corporate-sector borrowing during the first half of the year was dominated by the \nagricultural sector, electricity supply (renewable energy projects) as well as the wholesale and \nretail trade sectors. The cost of bank funding appears to have increased recently as a result \nof changed regulatory requirements relating to the implementation of Basel III, the impact \nof the bail-in of certain African Bank Limited creditors and the consequent rating action by \nMoody’s Investors Service, all of which could result in tighter funding conditions. \nNo new wage and unit labour cost data have been released since the previous meeting of \nthe MPC, although settlements in the steel and engineering sector and the clothing sector \nhave been well above current and expected inflation rates. The MPC remains concerned \nabout the apparent delinking of wage demands and some wage settlements from underlying \ninflation and productivity growth trends, as well as the possible impact of forthcoming \nwage negotiations, including in the public sector. These concerns relate to settlements at all \nlevels, including executive pay. Excessive wage settlements could have adverse impacts on \nemployment, inflation, the general competitiveness of the economy, and the profitability \nand viability of small businesses in particular. \nNotwithstanding the 9,5 per cent increase in July, food price inflation is expected to slow \nover the coming months. Pipeline pressures from agricultural prices continue to moderate \nfollowing sharply lower maize prices since March, while manufactured food price inflation \n39\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\ndeclined to 8,5 per cent in July, compared with 9,5 per cent in April. International food \nprices, as reflected in the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) international food \nprice index, declined for the fifth consecutive month in August 2014 in response to positive \nmaize and wheat supply conditions. These developments are expected to impact favourably \non domestic consumer prices, although base effects are likely to interrupt the declining year-\non-year trend in the final months of the year.\nInternational oil prices declined in recent weeks, having traded in a range of between \nUS$105–US$114 per barrel for the year to the end of July. Since August, the price has fallen \nbelow this range and is currently trading at around US$98 per barrel. This is despite rising \ntensions and instability in the Middle East and conflict in Ukraine, events that in the past \nwould likely have resulted in an oil price spike. As a result of this lower price, the domestic \npetrol price was reduced by 67 cents per litre in September, having been unchanged in \nAugust. At this stage there is an average over-recovery on the petrol price due to the lower \ninternational price, but the favourable impact is being partially offset by continued rand \nweakness.\nDespite the slight near-term improvement in the inflation outlook and the relatively stable \ninflation expectations, the MPC is concerned that the forecast remains uncomfortably close \nto the upper end of the target band. Given the upside risks to the forecast, the proximity \nto the upper end of the band makes the inflation outcomes highly vulnerable to changes in \ninflationary pressures. \nA key upside risk is the exchange rate, which is vulnerable to the slow pace of adjustment \nto the current-account deficit, as well as to the uncertainty surrounding the future path of \nmonetary policy in the advanced economies. At this stage it is difficult to assess the extent \nto which normalisation of US monetary policy is already priced in to the rate. \nThe MPC remains concerned about the risks of a wage-price spiral, should settlements \nwell in excess of inflation and productivity growth become the economy-wide norm. Such \ndevelopments could also undermine South Africa’s international competitiveness and delay \nthe current-account adjustment. \nThe deterioration in the longer-term inflation trajectory relative to the previous forecast is \na result of the revised tariff increases granted to Eskom by Nersa. The view of the MPC is \nthat such relative price adjustments should not be reacted to automatically. However, while \nthe focus of monetary policy should be on the second-round effects of these increases, this \nis complicated given the multi-year nature of the adjustment. \nWhile inflation is the primary focus of the Committee, the MPC is also mindful of the \nanaemic state of the domestic economy, rising unemployment and the downside risk to its \ngrowth forecast. Domestic expenditure has deteriorated further, particularly private-sector \nfixed capital formation and, together with continued moderation in household consumption \nexpenditure, is indicative of the lack of demand pressures in the economy. \nThe MPC is still of the view that interest rates will have to normalise over time. However, \ngiven the slightly improved inflation outlook notwithstanding the upside risks, the stable \ninflation expectations and the downside risks to the weak growth outlook, the MPC has \ndecided that the repurchase rate will remain unchanged at 5,75 per cent per annum. \nDespite the 75 basis point increase so far this year, monetary policy remains accommodative, \nand will continue to be supportive of the domestic economy subject to achieving its primary \ninflation-targeting objective. Future decisions will, as always, be highly data-dependent. \nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\n40\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n20 November 2014 \nIssued by Lesetja Kganyago, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, at a meeting of \nthe Monetary Policy Committee in Pretoria\nSince the previous meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), the sharp decline \nin international oil prices has contributed to a more benign global inflation environment. \nThis development may also ameliorate the deteriorating growth outlook in some regions by \nproviding a boost to consumption expenditure. Lower oil prices have also had a favourable \nimpact on domestic headline inflation, with the medium-term forecast improving relative \nto the previous forecast. However, the underlying inflation pressures, as reflected in core \ninflation, persist. \nThe domestic growth outlook remains challenging, but after two quarters dominated by \nthe fall-out from extended strikes, some recovery is expected, but demand remains subdued. \nThe coming quarters are expected to see an improved performance in the mining and \nmanufacturing sectors, but the outlook is inhibited by domestic structural constraints, as \nwell as by a weak global economy and the continued declining trend in non-oil commodity \nprices. Growth next year is expected to remain weak.\nThe year-on-year inflation rate as measured by the consumer price index (CPI) for all urban \nareas measured 5,9 per cent in both September and October, having measured 6,4 per cent \nin August. Downward pressure on inflation in October came from continued moderation \nin food and petrol prices. Food price inflation continued its downward trend, measuring \n8,0 per cent in October, down from 8,7 per cent previously, while petrol prices increased \nby 2,4 per cent. Core inflation, which excludes food, petrol and electricity, moderated to \n5,6 per cent in September from 5,8 per cent in August, but measured 5,7 in October, \nreflecting primarily continued exchange-rate pass-through to some goods categories. \nAdministered price inflation excluding petrol measured 6,4 per cent in October, down from \n6,5 per cent in September. Headline producer price inflation for final manufactured goods, \nwhich reached a recent high of 8,8 per cent in April, measured 7,2 per cent and 6,9 per cent \nin August and September respectively, driven in part by lower food and fuel price inflation. \nThe Bank’s forecast of headline inflation has improved since the previous meeting of the \nMPC, mainly due to the impact of declining international oil prices. Having reached a \npeak of 6,5 per cent in the second quarter of this year, inflation is now expected to average \n5,9 per cent in the final quarter of 2014, and average 6,1 per cent for the year, compared \nwith 6,2 per cent previously. The downward trend is expected to continue into next year, \nwith inflation forecast to reach a low of 5,1 per cent in the second quarter, and to average \n5,3 per cent for the year, compared with 5,7 per cent previously. The forecast for 2016 has \nbeen revised down from 5,8 per cent to 5,5 per cent, and is expected to measure 5,4 per cent \nin the final quarter of the year. \nThe forecast for core inflation, by contrast, is more or less unchanged at an average 5,6 per \ncent and 5,7 per cent in 2014 and 2015 respectively, reaching a peak of 5,9 per cent in the \nfirst quarter of 2015 (previously 5,8 per cent), and moderating to 5,3 per cent in 2016, down \nfrom 5,5 per cent previously. The MPC assesses the risk to the headline inflation forecast to \nbe broadly balanced. \nThe results of the fourth quarter inflation expectations survey of the Bureau for Economic \nResearch (BER) will only be released in December. Market-based surveys, as reflected in \nthe Reuters Econometer survey, however, show that the median CPI inflation expectation \nof analysts has remained unchanged over the past two months at 5,7 per cent and \n5,5 per cent for 2015 and 2016 respectively. Break-even inflation rates (the yield differential \n41\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\nbetween conventional government bonds and inflation-linked bonds) declined since the \nprevious meeting and reflect expectations within the target range for 5-year maturities, and \nmarginally above the upper limit of the inflation target range at 10-year maturities. \nThe United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) remain the main drivers of global \ngrowth although more broadly, global growth may get some impetus from lower oil and \nfood prices, which should provide some boost to consumers. US economic growth was \nbetter than expected in the third quarter with the first advanced estimate of 3,5 per cent, \nand the unemployment rate declining to 5,8 per cent – the lowest level since June 2008. \nThe UK recorded growth of 2,8 per cent in the third quarter, while the unemployment rate \nwas unchanged at 6,0 per cent. The Japanese economy contracted for a second consecutive \nquarter during the third quarter, and has prompted a reconsideration of a further value-\nadded tax (VAT) increase next year. The response to the further additional monetary \nstimulus announced recently remains uncertain amid a tighter fiscal policy stance. The \neurozone outlook also remains bleak, including in the core countries such as France and \nGermany, although lower food and oil prices, coupled with further monetary easing, may \nhave a positive impact. \nThe outlook for emerging markets is mixed, with emerging Asian economies expected to \nbenefit most from the positive spillovers from the US recovery. This is expected to offset \nin part the adverse impact of the slowdown in China, where growth is expected to be \nlower than in the past few years, as the economy rebalances away from investment towards \nconsumption. This moderation is expected to continue to impact negatively on commodity \nprices. The Indian economy is showing signs of sustained recovery, while the other BRICS \npartners, Russia and Brazil, face significant growth headwinds. Oil exporters generally are \nexpected to face challenges from international oil price weakness. \nGlobal inflation is expected to moderate in the face of benign food price inflation and \nfalling international oil and other commodity prices. While this is welcome in the higher \ninflation regions, particularly emerging markets, it does aggravate deflationary risks in some \nof the advanced economies, particularly in the eurozone and Japan. Monetary policy stances \nare expected to remain ultra-loose in these two regions, with a significant stimulus package \nannounced recently in Japan, and the European Central Bank (ECB) is anticipated to \nconduct further asset purchases. The US Federal Reserve (the Fed) has ended its programme \nof quantitative easing, but at this stage it is not contracting its balance sheet and proceeds \nfrom maturing assets are being reinvested. Although the general expectation is that the \nFed will begin raising interest rates in mid-2015, there are also some expectations that the \nmore benign inflation outlook could delay this. Forward guidance from both the Bank of \nEngland and the Fed is that any adjustment is likely to be gradual, and policy rates may be \nlower than their estimated long-run normal rates for some time despite the improved growth \noutlooks. Since the previous meeting of the MPC, policy rates have increased in Brazil, \nRussia and Indonesia, but reduced in Sweden, South Korea, Chile and Poland. \nThe exchange rate of the rand has been relatively volatile since the previous meeting in \nresponse to external and domestic factors, including changing expectations of the timing \nof the first US interest-rate increase as well as the downgrade of South Africa’s credit rating \nby Moody’s Investors Service. Although the rand initially weakened sharply against the US \ndollar, at one stage reaching a level of R11,36 against the US dollar, this move has since \nlargely been reversed. Since the previous meeting of the MPC, the rand has depreciated \nmarginally against the US dollar, but appreciated by 2,1 per cent and 3,5 per cent against \nthe euro and sterling respectively, and by 1,8 per cent on a trade- weighted basis. \nThe rand is expected to remain susceptible to sudden shifts in sentiment regarding changes \nin monetary policy stances in the advanced economies, and the continued uncertainty \nregarding the extent to which US normalisation is already priced in to the exchange rate. \nThe asynchronous nature of advanced economy monetary policies is expected to complicate \nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\n42\nthe outlook and outcomes. However, the rand is likely to remain more sensitive to changes \nin financial conditions in the US than in Japan and the eurozone. The persistently slow \nadjustment of the current-account deficit also makes the rand vulnerable to swings in \nsentiment that raise concerns about the financing of this deficit. Although the lower oil \nprices should reduce the oil import bill, its positive impact on the deficit may be limited by \nfurther declines in other commodity prices. \nThe volatility in portfolio capital flows is indicative of fickle global investor sentiment. Net \nbond sales by non-residents amounted to R12,6 billion in September and R2,1 billion in \nOctober and a further R1,5 billion to date in November. In the equities market, having been \nmarginal net sellers in September, non-residents were net buyers to the value of R5,7 billion \nin October but net sellers of R6,3 billion to date. \nThe domestic growth outlook remains subdued. Although an improved growth outcome is \nexpected in the third quarter, following the 0,6 per cent growth in the second quarter, this \nis off a low base following prolonged strikes in the mining and manufacturing sectors. The \nBank’s forecast for gross domestic product (GDP) growth in 2014 has declined marginally \nfrom 1,5 per cent to 1,4 per cent, and forecasts for 2015 and 2016 have been revised down \nfrom 2,8 per cent and 3,1 per cent to 2,5 per cent and 2,9 per cent respectively. This \nrestrained outlook is consistent with the Bank’s composite leading indicator of economic \nactivity which continues to trend sideways, with a slight upward move recently. The Rand \nMerchant Bank/Bureau for Economic Research (RMB/BER) Business Confidence Index \nimproved in the third quarter but, at 46 index points, remains below the neutral level of 50. \nThe mining sector appears to be recovering to some extent from the strike-affected first half \nof the year, and is expected to contribute positively to third-quarter growth, following two \nconsecutive quarters of contraction. The physical volume of mining production increased \nby 0,7 per cent in the third quarter compared with the second quarter, and further increases \ncan be expected in the final quarter, as platinum output is still below pre-strike levels. By \ncontrast, although the physical volume of manufacturing production increased in September, \nthe month-long strike in the steel and engineering industry in July contributed to a quarter-\nto-quarter contraction of 1,3 per cent in the third quarter. Sentiment indicators suggest that \nthe outlook for the sector remains bleak, with the manufacturing confidence index still at \nvery low levels and capacity utilisation rates back at 2011 levels. More positively, the Kagiso \nPurchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) edged above 50 index points in October for the first \ntime since March, driven mainly by the inventory and new sales orders subindices. \nThe outlook for the construction sector is more positive, with the real value of building plans \npassed increasing for the fourth successive month in August. On a three-month-to-three-\nmonth basis, an increase of 9,8 per cent was recorded. However, while the various building \nconfidence indices have generally improved, they remain below the neutral level. \nThe weak pace of economic growth is mirrored in the unemployment rate which, according \nto the Quarterly Labour Force Survey published by Statistics South Africa measured \n25,4 per cent in the third quarter, compared with 24,5 per cent a year earlier. Total \nemployment increased at a year-on-year rate of 0,5 per cent in the quarter. At the same time, \nthe number of discouraged workers increased sharply, by almost 100 000, and now total \n2,5 million. \nConsumption expenditure by households has remained relatively subdued, but there are \nsigns of a moderate increase in the quarterly growth rate, as the negative effects of the \nprotracted strikes on consumption dissipate. Consumption expenditure could be positively \nimpacted by lower petrol prices. Although retail sales growth declined by 0,8 per cent (non-\nannualised) in September, quarter-to-quarter growth of 0,9 per cent was recorded in the \nthird quarter, and 2,3 per cent year on year. Similarly, wholesale trade sales contracted in \nthe third quarter, but increased by 5,9 per cent on a year-on-year basis. Motor vehicle sales \n43\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\nhave also shown some signs of recovery, although domestic sales are expected to be lower \nthis year than in 2013. Retail-sector confidence improved, with the BER reporting retailer \nconfidence above the neutral level for the first time in two and a half years. Consumer \nconfidence, however, declined significantly in the third quarter following an unexpected \nincrease in the second quarter. \nTrends in bank credit extension to the private sector have remained characterised by declining \ngrowth in advances to households, while advances to corporates have been buoyant. Total \nloans and advances grew at a twelve-month rate of 8,8 per cent in September, but excluding \nmortgages the growth rate was 13,5 per cent, compared with a recent high of 18,6 per cent in \nDecember 2012. Credit extension to the household sector grew by 3,7 per cent in September, \nas unsecured lending remained weak despite a reversal of the negative growth trend in the \nmonth, but credit to the corporate sector grew by 15,3 per cent. Twelve-month growth in \nmortgage advances to households remained at levels below 3 per cent, while instalment sale \ncredit and leasing finance continued its downward trend with growth of 6,9 per cent. These \ntrends are likely to constrain consumer demand in the coming months. \nAccording to the October Medium Term Budget Policy Statement, government remains \ncommitted to its policy of fiscal consolidation in order to prevent an increase in the debt \nratio to unsustainable levels. The fiscal deficit is expected to decline from a projected 4,7 per \ncent of GDP in the current fiscal year to 3,0 per cent in 2017/18.\nThis is expected to be achieved through adherence to a nominal expenditure growth ceiling \nand increased tax revenues. The ability to achieve the nominal expenditure targets will be \ndetermined to an important degree by the public-sector wage settlement. \nWage trends have remained broadly unchanged since the previous meeting of the MPC. \nAccording to Andrew Levy Employment Publications, wage settlement rates averaged \n8,0 per cent in the first nine months of the year. Nominal remuneration per worker as \nwell as productivity trends in the formal non-agricultural sector were distorted by the \nsignificant increase in temporary employees by the Independent Electoral Commission, \nwhich contributed to the decline in the year-on-year increase in remuneration from \n6,3 per cent to 3,5 per cent, while productivity declined by 1,6 per cent. The net result was \na marginal increase in unit labour costs of 5,2 per cent in the second quarter from 5,1 per \ncent previously. \nFood price inflation remains a major driver of inflation, but is expected to continue to \nmoderate in the coming months. Food price inflation appears to have peaked at 9,5 per \ncent in August, and has since moderated to 8,0 per cent in October as lower producer prices \nof crops and cereals, which declined by 6,3 per cent in September, are beginning to have \nan impact at the consumer price level. Restocking of herds following the drought in 2013, \nhowever, has kept meat price inflation elevated. Food price pressures also remain benign at \nthe global level, with the Food and Agriculture Organization international food price index \ndeclining for seven consecutive months to its lowest level since August 2010. \nInternational oil prices have declined markedly since their recent peak in June 2014 \nof around US$115 per barrel to current levels of below US$80 per barrel. This decline \nreflects a combination of factors, including increased supply coming from the US and \nLibya, moderating demand from China in particular, and changes in the internal dynamics \nwithin the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel. The general \nexpectation in the market is that these lower prices could persist for some time. Although \nsome of the advantage of lower international oil prices has been offset to some extent by a \nweaker rand exchange rate, domestic petrol prices have declined by a cumulative R1,17 per \nlitre since August and, should current trends continue, a further decline of around 70 cents \nper litre can be expected in December. \nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\n44\nThe marked decline in international oil prices has had a significant impact on the medium-\nterm outlook for headline inflation in the global economy and in South Africa. At this stage \nit is unclear whether this is a temporary shock, or if it will be sustained or decline further. As \nwith an oil price increase, we would look through the impact effect and focus on the possible \nsecond-round effects of this decline. The possibility that oil prices are sustained at current \nlevels introduces a degree of downside risk to the inflation forecast. \nThe domestic growth outlook remains challenging, and the risks to the forecast are assessed \nto be moderately on the downside. The MPC does not see significant signs of excess \ndemand pressures that are impacting on the inflation outlook and household consumption \nexpenditure is expected to remain constrained. \nAt the same time, despite its recent relative stability, the exchange rate remains an upside risk \nto the inflation outlook, vulnerable to changing perceptions of the timing of global monetary \npolicy adjustments, and the slow pace of contraction in the current-account deficit. The \nextent to which policy normalisation is already priced into the exchange rate is also unclear.\nA further upside risk to the inflation forecast comes from a possible increase in wage \nsettlement rates in excess of inflation and productivity growth in the coming year. \nIn light of this assessment, the MPC sees the overall risk to the headline inflation forecast \nto be more or less balanced. However, given the elevated level of core inflation and the fact \nthat headline inflation is expected to increase later in the forecast period as the first-round \neffect of the oil price decline dissipates, the Committee remains vigilant and will continue \nto monitor developments closely. \nThe Committee remains of the view that interest rates will have to normalise over time. \nHowever, given the lower trajectory of headline inflation and the continued weak state of \nthe economy, the MPC has unanimously decided to keep the repurchase rate unchanged at \n5,75 per cent per annum at this stage. \nThe timing of future interest-rate increases will be dependent on a range of factors, including \nthe evolution of inflation expectations, the speed of normalisation of monetary policy in the \nUS and the state of the domestic economy. \n45\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\nAbbreviations\nAlsi\t\n\t\nFTSE/JSE All-Share Price Index\nBER\t\n\t\nBureau for Economic Research \nBOJ\t\n\t\nBank of Japan\nCPI\t\n\t\nconsumer price index\nCBOE\t \t\nChicago Board Options Exchange\nECB\t\n\t\nEuropean Central Bank\nFRA\t\n\t\nForward rate agreements\nGDP\t\n\t\ngross domestic product\nHP\t\n\t\nHodrick–Prescott [filter]\nIMF\t\n\t\nInternational Monetary Fund\nJSE\t\n\t\nJSE Limited\nMPC\t\n\t\nMonetary Policy Committee\nMPR\t\n\t\nMonetary Policy Review\nMTBPS\t\nMedium Term Budget Policy Statement\nNEER\t \t\nNominal effective exchange rate\nPMI\t\n\t\nPurchasing Managers’ Index\nPPI\t\n\t\nproducer price index\nREER\t \t\nReal effective exchange rate\nrepo\t\n\t\nrepurchase [rate]\nRMB\t \t\nRand Merchant Bank\nRMSE\t \t\nroot mean square error\nSIT\t\n\t\nservices, income and current transfer [account]\nthe Bank\t\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nthe Fed\t\t\nUnited States Federal Reserve\nVAT\t\n\t\nvalue-added tax\nUK\t\n\t\nUnited Kingdom\nULC\t\n\t\nunit labour cost\nUS\t\n\t\nUnited States\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\n46\nGlossary\nAdministered prices: These prices are set according to government’s policy rather than \ndetermined by market supply and demand forces (usually because the product is related to \nsocial welfare). These prices may or may not have an economic regulator. \nAdvanced economies: Advanced economies are highly industrialised countries with high \nlevels of GDP per capita. \nBalance of payments: This is a record of transactions between the home country and the \nrest of the world over a specific period of time. It includes the current and financial accounts. \nSee also ‘current account’ below. \nBudget deficit: A budget deficit indicates the extent to which government expenditure \nexceeds government revenue (a budget surplus occurs when revenue exceeds expenditure). \nBusiness and consumer confidence: These are economic indicators that measure the state \nof optimism about the economy and its prospects among business managers and consumers. \nCapacity utilisation: The percentage utilisation of production capacity in the manufacturing \nindustry is a measure of the use of manpower, plant and machinery in manufacturing. The \ndegree of capacity constraint experienced in the manufacturing industry is determined by \nobtaining indications from large manufacturing enterprises regarding skills shortages and \nother reasons, such as downtime due to maintenance, changes in productivity and seasonal \nfactors. The measure is used to assess the degree of capacity constraint experienced in the \nmanufacturing industry. \nCentral projection: This is the most likely outcome for the variable of interest over the \nperiod, according to South African Reserve Bank forecasts. \nCommodity prices: Commodities can refer to food, oil or precious metals. Major South \nAfrican-produced commodities include platinum and gold. \nConsumer price index (CPI): The CPI provides an indication of aggregate price changes \nin the domestic economy. The index is calculated using a number of categories forming a \nrepresentative set of goods and services bought by consumers. \nCore inflation: This is inflation excluding food and energy (including petrol) prices, which \nis considered a better reflection of the trend underlying inflation. \nCrude oil price: This is the price, in US dollars, per barrel of unrefined (North Sea) oil. \nCurrent account: The current account of the balance of payments consists of net exports \n(exports less imports) in the trade account, as well as the services, income and current \ntransfer account. \nDemand pressures: Demand pressures refer to price pressures from increased consumption \nin the domestic or foreign economy. \nEmerging-market economies: Emerging-market economies are those with low to middle \nincome per capita. They are advancing rapidly and are integrating with global (product and \ncapital) markets. \nExchange-rate depreciation (appreciation): Exchange-rate depreciation (appreciation) refers \nto a decrease (increase) in the value of a currency relative to another currency. \n47\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\nExchange-rate pass-through: This is the effect of exchange-rate changes on \ndomestic inflation (i.e. the percentage change in domestic CPI due to a 1 \nper cent change in the exchange rate). Changes in the exchange rate affect \nimport prices, which in turn affect domestic consumer prices and inflation. \nFirst- and second-round effects: A price shock has direct as well as indirect \nfirst-round effects; for example, higher oil prices leading to increased petrol \nprices (direct) and then higher prices for goods and services for which petrol \nis an input (indirect). This shock may also have a second-round effect if it \ncauses an additional change in inflation expectations, wage settlements or \nunderlying inflation. \nFlexible inflation targeting: This refers to inflation-targeting regimes that \nconsider changes in inflation and other variables affecting the real economy \nin the short term. Under strict inflation targeting only inflation matters, \nbut flexible inflation targeting takes into account other variables, such as \noutput. \nForward rate agreement (FRA): A contract that determines the rate of \ninterest to be paid or received on an obligation beginning at a future start \ndate.\nForecast horizon: This is the future period over which the Bank generates \nits forecasts, typically between two and three years. \nGross domestic expenditure: This refers to the total value of expenditure \non goods and services within the country plus expenditure on imports less \nexports. \nGross domestic product (GDP): GDP is the total market value of all \ngoods and services produced in a country. It includes total consumption \nexpenditure, capital formation, government consumption expenditure and \nthe value of exports less the value of imports. \nGross fixed capital formation: Value of acquisitions of capital goods (e.g. \nmachinery, equipment and buildings) by firms, adjusted for disposals, \nconstitutes gross fixed capital formation. \nHeadline consumer price index (CPI): Headline CPI refers to CPI for all \nurban areas that is released monthly by Stats SA. Headline CPI is a measure \nof price levels in all urban areas. The 12-month percentage change in \nheadline CPI is referred to as ‘headline CPI inflation’ and reflects changes \nin the cost of living. This is the official inflation measure for South Africa. \nHousehold final consumption expenditure: This is the amount of money \nspent by households on consumer goods and services. \nHousehold disposable income: Household disposable income is defined \nas primary income, net current transfers and social benefits, less taxes on \nincome and wealth. \nHouse price index: This is a measure of the prices at which residential \ndwellings are bought and sold over time. \nImport penetration: This ratio shows the degree to which domestic demand \nis satisfied by imports. It is calculated as imports divided by domestic \ndemand (where domestic demand is gross domestic product minus exports \nplus imports).\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\n48\nImport unit value indices (UVI): This measures inflation in imported \ncommodities. The average value changes are calculated by dividing the \nvalue of imported goods per category with the respective amount of the \ngoods. The Statistics South Africa import UVI is calculated as a five-month \nmoving average using customs data as a proxy for inflation in imported \ncommodities.\nInflation (growth) outlook: This outlook refers to the evolution of future \ninflation (growth) over the forecast horizon. \nInflation targeting: This is a monetary policy framework used by central \nbanks to steer actual inflation towards an inflation target level or range.\nInterest-rate smoothing: This is the gradual decrease (increase) of the policy \nrate over the business cycle. Policymakers target the medium term, thus \nthey allow time for previous changes to have an effect before making further \nchanges (if necessary). Gradual interest-rate changes also permit economic \nstakeholders to adapt their expectations about future interest-rate changes. \nJ–curve: The path followed by a country’s trade balance in response to \ncurrency depreciation. A delayed reaction of more expensive imports and less \nvaluable exports will initially worsen the trade balance before it improves, \ntracing a path that looks like a letter “J”.\nMedian: This is a statistical term used to describe the observed number that \nseparates ordered observations in half. \nMortgage: A mortgage is a form of secured loan extended for the purchase \nof real estate. \nNominal effective exchange rate (NEER): The NEER is an index that \nexpresses the value of a country’s currency relative to a basket of other \ncurrencies. An increase (decrease) in the effective exchange rate indicates \na strengthening (weakening) of the domestic currency with respect to the \nselected basket of currencies. The weighted average exchange rate of the \nrand is calculated against 20 currencies. The weights of the five major \ncurrencies are in brackets: euro (29,26), Chinese yuan (20,54), US dollar \n(13,72), Japanese yen (6,03) and British pound (5,82). Index: 2010 = 100. \nNon-tradeables: Goods and services produced and consumed domestically \nthat are not close substitutes to goods and services that are imported or \nexported.\nOutput gap/potential growth: Potential growth is the rate of GDP growth \nthat could theoretically be achieved if all productive assets in the economy \nare employed in a stable inflation environment. The output gap is the \ndifference between actual growth and potential growth. If this is negative, \nthen the economy is viewed to be underperforming and demand pressures \non inflation low. If the output gap is positive, the economy is viewed to be \noverheating and demand pressures inflationary in nature.\nProducer price index (PPI): This index measures changes in the prices of \ngoods at the factory gate. Stats SA currently produces five different indices \nthat measure price changes at different stages of production. Headline PPI \nis the index for final manufactured goods. PPI measures indicate potential \npressure on consumer prices. \n49\nMonetary Policy Review December 2014\nProductivity: Productivity indicates the amount of goods and services \nproduced in relation to the resources utilised in the form of labour and \ncapital. The most common measure is labour productivity. \nPurchasing Managers’ Index (PMI): This index shows the sentiment of \npurchasing managers in the manufacturing sector, indicating the broader \neconomic health of the sector. \nQuantitative easing (QE): is an unconventional monetary policy tool \nimplemented largely in the US, the UK, the euro area and Japan. QE \ninvolves the central bank purchasing bonds on the open market so as to \ninject liquidity into the economy. This also leads to a markedly higher level \nof money supply in the economy. \nReal effective exchange rate (REER): The REER is the NEER adjusted by \nrelative consumer prices in South Africa and its main trading partners. \nReal variables: These variables are adjusted for inflation and hence are \nexpressed in constant prices (of some base year) and represent the volume of \nan aggregate. \nReal repo rate: This is the nominal repurchase (repo) rate, as set by the \nMonetary Policy Committee, adjusted for expected inflation. \nRepurchase rate (repo rate): This is the rate that commercial banks pay to \nborrow money from the South African Reserve Bank. \nTerms of trade: This refers to the ratio of export prices to import prices. \nTradeables: Goods or services that are imported or exported. \nUnit labour costs: A unit labour cost is the labour cost to produce one \n‘unit’ of output. This is calculated as the total wages and salaries in the \nnon-agricultural sector divided by the real value added at basic prices in the \nnon-agricultural sector of the economy. \nUnsecured loans: Loans extended without any collateral (guarantees or \nunderlying assets) as security to protect the value of the loan are called \n‘unsecured loans’.\nVIX®: The Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index \n(VIX®) measures the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options and serves \nas a popular indicator of investors’ perception of risk.", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/Monetary_Policy_Reports/MPRDec2014.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "88608ea6996e8a61f4034ab6a28aff76", "text": "i \n \n \n \nFEBRUARY 2024 \n \n2 \nTABLE OF CONTENTS \n \nOVERVIEW .................................................................................................................................. 3 \nINTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICE DEVELOPMENTS ........................................... 3 \nMONETARY DEVELOPMENTS .............................................................................................. 8 \nSTOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS ..................................................................................... 9 \nZimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) ........................................................................................... 9 \nVictoria Falls Stock Exchange (VFEX) ................................................................................. 10 \nNATIONAL PAYMENTS SYSTEM ........................................................................................ 10 \nZimbabwe Electronic Transfer Settlement System (ZETSS) ............................................. 11 \nMobile and Internet Based Transactions .............................................................................. 11 \nINFLATION OUTTURN ........................................................................................................... 11 \nAnnual Inflation ...................................................................................................................... 11 \nMonthly Inflation .................................................................................................................... 11 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n3 \n \n OVERVIEW \nAnnual headline inflation rose to 47.6% in \nFebruary 2024 from 34.8% in January 2024. \nThis was, partly, attributable to the depreciation \nof the local currency against major currencies \nand the second-round effects on new tax \nmeasures. \n \n \nOn a monthly basis, broad money increased by \n38.86% in February 2024, compared to 54.63% \nin the previous month. The increase in broad \nmoney was largely attributable to valuation \nchanges arising from exchange rate movements \ncoupled with expansion in the quantum of \nforeign currency deposits. \n \n \nThe Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) was \nbearish during the month of February 2024. \nThe All Share, Top 10 and Top 15 indices lost \n3.16%, 4.29% and 7.7%, respectively. \n \nThe Victoria Falls Stock Exchange (VFEX) \ncontinued to trade in a negative trajectory in \nFebruary 2024. The All-Share index decreased \nby 3.83% to close at 98.59 points, from 102.52 \npoints registered in February 2024. \n \n \nIn value terms, transactions processed through \nthe National Payment Systems (NPS) increased \nby 36% from ZW$58.35 trillion in January \n2024 to ZW$79.13 trillion in February 2024. \n \nNPS transaction volumes decreased by 5% to \n61.95 million in the reporting month from \n64.97 million in February 2024. \n \nOn the external front, export earnings for \nFebruary 2024 stood at US$644.0 million, up \n47.8% from US$435.9 million in February \n2023, driven by increases in gold, PGM and \ntobacco exports. The country’s import bill for \nFebruary 2024 amounted to US$725.4 million, \nup from US$623.5 million recorded in \nFebruary 2023. \n \nRegarding global prices, the average prices of \nplatinum, palladium, copper, gold, and lithium \ndeclined, while nickel and crude oil prices \nregistered increases in February 2024. \n \nINTERNATIONAL COMMODITY \nPRICE DEVELOPMENTS \nInternational \nprices \nfor \ngold, \nplatinum, \npalladium, copper, and lithium retreated, while \nthose for nickel and Brent crude oil firmed \nduring the month of February 2024. Prices for \nmost of the commodities were subdued as the \nU.S. dollar strengthened. Table 1 shows the \ndevelopments in international prices for \nselected commodities, during the month under \nanalysis. \n \nTable 1: International Commodity Prices \nfor January and February 2024 \nCommodity \nJan-24 \nFeb-24 \nMonthly \nchanges (%) \nGold \nUS$/oz \n2,034.61 \n2,024.21 \n-0.51 \nPlatinum \nUS$/oz \n925.93 \n894.81 \n-3.36 \nPalladium \nUS$/ounce \n979.52 \n938.31 \n-4.21 \nCopper \nUS$/tonne \n8,458.66 \n8,410.88 \n-0.56 \nNickel \nUS$/tonne \n16,352.41 \n16,582.14 \n1.40 \nBrent Crude \noil \nUS$/barrel \n79.05 \n81.5 \n3.11 \nLithium \nUS$/tonne \n14,650.45 \n13,249.05 \n-9.57 \nSource: Bloomberg, 2024 \nGold \nGold prices \ndeclined by 0.51%, from \nUS$2,034.61 per ounce in January 2024 to \nUS$2,024.21 per ounce in February 2024. The \ndecline was due to the higher-than-expected \n \n \n \n4 \n \nU.S. inflation data, which prompted investors \nto lower bets for early Federal Reserve interest \nrate cuts. \nPlatinum \nPlatinum prices remained on a negative \ntrajectory during the reporting month, amid a \nslowdown in industrial activities and growing \nconcerns about weak demand for the metal, \nespecially in China. As such, prices declined by \n3.36%, from an average of US$925.93 per \nounce in the previous month to US$894.81 per \nounce in February 2024. \nPalladium \nPalladium prices fell by 4.21% to US$938.31 \nper ounce during the reporting month, from \nUS$972.52 per ounce recorded in January \n2024. This was on account of the depressed \nlong-term demand outlook, coupled with the \nimpact of expectations for a steady supply. The \nprice trends of precious metals for the period \nfrom February 2021 to February 2024 are \nshown in Figure 1. \nFigure 1: Monthly Precious Metal Prices (in \nUS$ per Ounce): Feb 2021 – Feb 2024 \n \nSource: Bloomberg, 2024 \n \nBrent Crude Oil \nBrent crude oil prices firmed by 3.11%, from \nan average of US$79.05 per barrel in January \n2024 to US$81.50 per barrel in February 2024. \nPrices increased as simmering tensions in the \nMiddle East overshadowed persistent inflation \nin the U.S. The price developments of brent \ncrude oil for the period from February 2021 to \nFebruary 2024 are shown in Figure 2. \n \nFigure 2: Brent Crude Oil Prices \n(US$/Barrel) Feb 2021 – Feb 2024 \nSource: Bloomberg, 2024 \n \nCopper \nCopper prices remained subdued, primarily due \nto \napprehensions \nsurrounding \ndemand \nprospects in China, the primary consumer of \nthe metal. Against this backdrop, the monthly \naverage price of the red metal, declined by \n0.56%, from US$8,458.66 per tonne in the \npreceding month to US$8,410.88 per tonne \nduring the month under analysis. \n \nNickel \nNickel prices increased by 1.40%, from a \nmonthly average of US$16,352.41 per tonne \nrecorded \nin \nthe \nprevious \nmonth \nto \nUS$16,582.14 per tonne in February 2024. \n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1000\n1200\n1400\n800\n1,000\n1,200\n1,400\n1,600\n1,800\n2,000\n2,200\n2,400\n2,600\n2,800\n3,000\nFeb-21\nApr-21\nJun-21\nAug-21\nOct-21\nDec-21\nFeb-22\nApr-22\nJun-22\nAug-22\nOct-22\nDec-22\nFeb-23\nApr-23\nJun-23\nAug-23\nOct-23\nDec-23\nFeb-24\nUS$/ounce\nUS$/ounce\nGold\nPalladium\nPlatinum (RHS)\n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\n140\nFeb-21\nApr-21\nJun-21\nAug-21\nOct-21\nDec-21\nFeb-22\nApr-22\nJun-22\nAug-22\nOct-22\nDec-22\nFeb-23\nApr-23\nJun-23\nAug-23\nOct-23\nDec-23\nFeb-24\nUS$/barrel\n \n \n \n5 \n \nFigure 3 shows base metal price developments \nfor the period from February 2021 to February \n2024. \nFigure 3: Base Metal Prices (US$/tonne): \nFeb 2021 – Feb 2024 \nSource: Bloomberg 2024 \n \n \nLithium \nDuring the month of February 2024, lithium \nprices declined by 9.57%, from US$14,650.45 \nper tonne in the prior month to US$13,249.05 \nper tonne. This was primarily driven by the \ndeceleration in China's demand for electric \nvehicles. The price developments for lithium \nfor the period from February 2023 to February \n2024 are shown in Figure 4. \n \nFigure 4: Lithium Prices (US$/tonne) \nFebruary 2023 – February 2024 \nSource: London Metal Exchange, 2024 \n \nMerchandise Trade Developments \nThe country’s total merchandise trade for \nFebruary 2024 stood at US$1,369.4 million, \n11.6% higher compared to US$1,226.7 million \nrecorded in the previous month. The increase in \ntotal trade was attributable to increases in both \nimports and exports during the reporting \nmonth. On a year-on-year basis, total \nmerchandise trade rose by about 29.3%, from \nUS$1,059.3 \nmillion \nrecorded \nin \nthe \ncorresponding month in 2023. \n \nMerchandise Exports \nDuring the month of February 2024, the \ncountry exported merchandise worth US$644.0 \nmillion, representing an increase of 19.3% from \nUS$539.9 million recorded in January 2024. \nThe increase was supported by a rise in tobacco \nand PGMs exports. Similarly, the monthly \nexports for February 2024 were 47.8% higher \nthan the US$435.9 million recorded in the \ncorresponding month in 2023. Figure 5 shows \ndevelopments in the country’s merchandise \nexports for the period from January 2023 to \nFebruary 2024. \n \nFigure 5: Merchandise Exports (US$ \nmillions): 2023 and 2024 \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2024 \n \n8,000\n13,000\n18,000\n23,000\n28,000\n33,000\n38,000\n4,500\n5,500\n6,500\n7,500\n8,500\n9,500\n10,500\n11,500\nFeb-21\nApr-21\nJun-21\nAug-21\nOct-21\nDec-21\nFeb-22\nApr-22\nJun-22\nAug-22\nOct-22\nDec-22\nFeb-23\nApr-23\nJun-23\nAug-23\nOct-23\nDec-23\nFeb-24\nUS$/tonne\nUS$/tonne\nCopper\nNickel (RHS)\n0\n10,000\n20,000\n30,000\n40,000\n50,000\n60,000\n70,000\n80,000\nFeb-23\nMay-23\nAug-23\nNov-23\nFeb-24\nUS$/tonne\n0.0\n200.0\n400.0\n600.0\n800.0\n1000.0\nMerchandise Exports (US$m)\n2023\n2024\n \n \n \n6 \n \nExports by Commodity \nThe country’s exports continued to be \ndominated by primary commodities, including \ntobacco, gold, PGMs, and ferrochromium. In \nterms of proportions to total exports, the \ntobacco constituted 34.4%; gold, 19.9%; \nPGMs, 24.9%; and Ferrochromium, 4.2% of \nthe export basket. Table 2 shows developments \nin the country’s exports for the months of \nJanuary and February 2024. \n \nTable 2: Major Exports (US$ millions) \n \nJan-24 \n(US$m) \nFeb-24 \n(US$m) \n Jan-Feb \nChanges \n(%) \nShare of \nExports \n(%) Feb-24 \nTotal \n539.9 \n644.0 \n19.3 \n100.0 \nOf Which: \n \n \n \n \nTobacco (incl \ncigarettes) \n139.1 \n221.4 \n59.2 \n34.4 \nPGMs* \n126.6 \n168.2 \n32.8 \n26.1 \nGold \n130.9 \n127.9 \n-2.3 \n19.9 \nFerrochromium \n24.3 \n27.3 \n12.5 \n4.2 \nIndustrial \ndiamonds \n17.2 \n20.5 \n18.8 \n3.2 \nCoal \n9.2 \n10.3 \n11.4 \n1.6 \nCotton \n3.2 \n5.5 \n74.3 \n0.9 \nGranite \n1.1 \n3.9 \n264.3 \n0.6 \nElectricity \n1.3 \n1.8 \n39.2 \n0.3 \nBlack tea \n1.62 \n1.61 \n-0.4 \n0.2 \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Calculations, 2024 \n*PGMs Include Nickel mattes, nickel ores & \nconcentrates and platinum \n \nExport Markets \nDuring the month under analysis, the country’s \nexports were destined for South Africa \n(28.8%), China (27.5%), United Arab Emirates \n(22.5%) and other jurisdictions. Figure 6 shows \nthe country’s major export markets, during the \nreporting month. \n \n \n \n \n \nFigure 6: Top Ten Merchandise Export \nDestinations (% Share) \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Calculations, 2024 \n \nMerchandise Imports \nThe country’s import bill for February 2024 \namounted to US$725.4 million, reflective of a \n5.6% increase from US$686.9 million reported \nin the previous month. Similarly, the reporting \nmonth’s imports were higher than the \nUS$623.5 million recorded in the comparable \nmonth in 2023, as shown in Figure 7. \n \n \nFigure 7: Merchandise Imports (US$ \nmillions): 2023 and 2024 \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Computations, 2023 \n \n \n28.8\n27.5\n22.5\n7.0\n2.7\n1.7\n1.6\n1.2\n0.8\n0.7\n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\nSouth Africa\nChina\nUnited Arab Emirates\nMozambique\nHong Kong\nZambia\nVietnam\nIndonesia\nIndia\nUnited States\n633.8\n623.5\n746.4\n708.0\n850.3\n727.0\n781.6\n820.1\n771.1\n901.6\n825.9\n817.0\n686.9\n725.4\n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1000\n2023\n2024\n \n \n \n7 \n \nImports by Commodity \nDuring the month of February 2024, the \ncountry's major imports consisted of diesel, \nmaize, leaded petrol, and machinery, which \naccounted for 9.2%, 6.0%, 5.7%, and 5.5% of \ntotal imports, respectively. Table 3 shows \nimports of major commodities for January and \nFebruary 2024. \n \nTable 3: Major Imports (US$ millions) \n \nJan-24 \n(US$ \nm) \nFeb-24 \n (US$ \nm) \n Jan - Feb \nChanges \n(%) \nShare of \nTotal \nImports (%) \nFeb 24 \nTotal \n686.9 \n725.4 \n5.6 \n100.0 \nOf Which: \n \n \n \n \nDiesel \n69.0 \n66.9 \n-3.0 \n9.2 \nMaize \n42.7 \n43.7 \n2.3 \n6.0 \nLeaded petrol \n36.2 \n41.4 \n14.3 \n5.7 \nMachinery \n32.0 \n40.2 \n25.7 \n5.5 \nFertilizers \n33.8 \n25.5 \n-24.4 \n3.5 \nWheat \n5.0 \n11.9 \n139.9 \n1.6 \nCrude soya \nbean oil \n12.4 \n11.9 \n-4.1 \n1.6 \nRice \n9.7 \n11.4 \n17.6 \n1.6 \nElectricity \n11.0 \n9.3 \n-15.2 \n1.3 \nButanes, \nliquefied \n7.9 \n6.5 \n-18.3 \n0.9 \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Calculations, 2024 \n \nSource Markets \nDuring the month of February 2024, the \ncountry sourced most of its imports from South \nAfrica which accounted for about 39.2% of \ntotal imports, followed by China, the Bahamas, \nUnited Arab Emirates, Mozambique, and \nZambia at 15.1%, 8.2%, 3.9%, 3.3% and 3.1%, \nrespectively. Figure 8 shows the country’s top \nimport sources in February 2024. \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFigure 8: Top Ten Merchandise Import \nSources (% Share) \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Calculations, 2024 \n \nMerchandise Trade Balance \nThe country's trade deficit amounted to \nUS$81.4 million in February 2024, compared \nto US$147.0 million recorded in January 2024. \nSimilarly, the trade deficit for the reporting \nmonth was lower, compared to the US$187.6 \nmillion recorded for the corresponding month \nin 2023, as shown in Figure 9. \n \nFigure 9: Merchandise Trade Balance (US$ \nmillions) \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Computations, 2024 \n \n39.2\n15.1\n8.2\n3.9\n3.3\n3.1\n3.0\n2.4\n2.2\n2.2\nSouth Africa\nChina\nBahamas\nUnited Arab Emirates\nMozambique\nZambia\nMauritius\nBahrain\nSingapore\nRussian Federation\n539.9\n644.0\n686.9\n725.4\n-147.0\n-81.4\n-200.0\n-100.0\n0.0\n100.0\n200.0\n300.0\n400.0\n500.0\n600.0\n700.0\n800.0\nJan-24\nFeb-24\nExports\nImports\nTrade Balance\n \n \n \n8 \n \nMONETARY DEVELOPMENTS1 \nTotal broad money (M3) amounted to \nZW$40.61 trillion in February 2024, compared \nto ZW$29.25 trillion recorded in the previous \nmonth. \n \nBroad money supply was composed of foreign \ncurrency deposits, 86.32%; local currency \ndeposits, 13.64%; and local currency in \ncirculation, 0.04%. \n \nFigure 10: Composition of Money Supply \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024 \nOn a monthly basis, broad money increased by \n38.86% in February 2024, compared to 54.63% \nin January 2024. \n \nThe monthly increase in money supply \nreflected an expansion of 44.39% in the local \ncurrency component and 11.80% in the foreign \ncurrency component. \n \nCredit to the private sector, increased by \nZW$8,257.58 billion to ZW$25,522.77 billion, \nlargely reflecting valuation changes owing to \nexchange rate depreciation. Over the same \n \n1 All monetary numbers are valued in ZW$ since the \nadoption of an interbank market determined exchange \nrate in February 2019. \nperiod, net claims on Government increased by \nZW$4,359.50 billion, from ZW$8,146.92 \nbillion, also reflecting the impact of exchange \nrate depreciation on the legacy amounts paid on \nbehalf of Government. \n \nOn a yearly basis, broad money increased by \n1,286.94% compared to 478.56% in February \n2023. The annual growth in money supply \nlargely reflected exchange rate depreciation, \nwhich moved from ZW$889.13/US$ in \nFebruary 2023 to ZW$14,912.83/US$ by end-\nFebruary 2024. Expansion in foreign currency \ndeposits accounted for 1,130.73 percentage \npoints of the 1,286.94% annual growth in broad \nmoney. The local currency component of the \nmoney supply contributed 156.21 percentage \npoints of the total annual growth. \n \nOn the asset side, the annual increase in broad \nmoney largely reflected nominal changes in \ncredit to the private sector and net claims on the \nGovernment of 1,579.66% and 2,617.27%, \nrespectively. \n \nOutstanding credit to the private sector was \nmainly \nchannelled \nto \nhouseholds, \nmanufacturing, and agriculture which received \n24.63%, 16.29%, and 15.41% of the total \ncredit, \nrespectively. \nThe \nmining \nand \ndistribution sectors received 12.76% and \n10.69% of the total outstanding credit, \nrespectively. \n \nPrivate sector credit shares by economic sectors \nare shown in Figure 11. \n \nNCDs, 0.02%\nLocal Currency Time \n, 1.76%\nFX Time Deposits, \n5.15%\nLocal Currency \nTransferable , \n11.85%\nFX \nTransferable \nDeposits, \n81.18%\nCurrency in \nCirculation, \n0.04%\n \n \n \n9 \n \nFigure 11: Distribution of Private Sector \nCredit \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024 \n \nCredit to the private sector was largely utilized \nfor recurrent expenditures, 31.44%; inventory \nbuild-up, \n22.84%; \nand \nfixed \ncapital \ninvestments, 19.44%. \n \nSTOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS \nZimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) \nDuring the month of February 2024, the \nZimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) registered \nlosses. As such, the All Share, Top 10, and Top \n15 indices lost 3.16%, 4.29%, and 7.7%, to \nclose at 525 570.56 points, 235 643.91 points \nand 306 056.17 points, respectively. \n \nThe mining index, however, gained 32.25% to \nclose at 216 534.42 points compared to 163 \n733.73 points, registered in January 2024. \n \nOn an annual basis, the All Share, Top 10, Top \n15, Small and Medium Cap indices gained \n1 741.01%, 1 455.85%, 1 900.37% and 3 \n222.27%. This compares to 28 548.02 points, \n16 983.33 points, 19 671.29 points, 631 204.30 \npoints, and 62 970.45 points recorded in the \ncomparable period in 2024, respectively. \n \nThe mining index also added 641.36% from \n29 207.92 points recorded in February 2023. \n \nFigure 12: ZSE All Share, Top 10 and \nMining Indices \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2024 \n \nThe cumulative volumes and values of shares \ntraded amounted to 73.94 million shares and \nZW$103.47 billion, a decline of 7.30% and \n8.05%, respectively. This is in comparison to \n79.77 million shares and ZW$112.53 billion \nrecorded in the previous month. \n \nThe proportion of foreign purchases to the \nvalue of shares traded improved to 5.19% from \n2.02% registered in January 2024. \n \nNet foreign position further worsened to \nnegative ZW$15.89 billion, from negative \nZW$5.37 billion recorded in January 2024. \n \n \n \n \nHouseholds\n24.63%\nAgriculture\n15.41%\nMining\n12.76%\nManufacturing\n16.29%\nDistribution\n10.69%\nTransport and \nCommunication\n2.70%\nServices\n9.17%\nFinancial Organisations \nand Investiments\n5.67%\nConstruction\n1.91%\nOther\n0.77%\n4,000\n34,000\n64,000\n94,000\n124,000\n154,000\n184,000\n214,000\n244,000\n274,000\n10,000\n80,000\n150,000\n220,000\n290,000\n360,000\n430,000\n500,000\n570,000\n31-Jan-23\n28-Feb-23\n31-Mar-23\n30-Apr-23\n31-May-23\n30-Jun-23\n31-Jul-23\n31-Aug-23\n30-Sep-23\n31-Oct-23\n30-Nov-23\n31-Dec-23\n31-Jan-24\n29-Feb-24\nAll Share Index\nTop 10 Index\nMining Index\n \n \n \n10 \n \nFigure 13: ZSE Monthly Volume and Value \nTraded \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2024 \nOwing to the negative trading developments on \nthe ZSE, market capitalization declined by \nZW$1 960.13 billion, or 4.51% to close at \nZW$41 499.02. \n \nOn a year-on-year basis, ZSE capitalization \nadded 1 510.78%, from ZW$2 576.32 billion \nrecorded in February 2023. \n \nVictoria Falls Stock Exchange (VFEX) \nDuring the month of February 2024, the \nVictoria Falls Stock Exchange (VFEX) \nexhibited bearish sentiments. As such, the All-\nShare index lost 3.83% to close at 98.59 points, \ncompared to 102.52 points recorded in January \n2024. \n \nOn an annual basis, the VFEX All Share index \ndeclined by 8.07%, from 107.27 points \nrecorded in February 2023. \n \n \n \n \nFigure 14: Victoria Falls Stock Exchange \n(VFEX) All Share Index (ASI) \n \nSource: Victoria Falls Stock Exchange, 2024 \n \nVFEX Market Capitalization \nOwing to the negative trading on the VFEX \nmarket capitalization declined by 3.83% to \nUS$1.19 billion, compared to US$1.24 billion \nrecorded in the previous month. \n \nFigure 15: Victoria Falls Stock Exchange \n(VFEX) Market Capitalization (US$ Billion) \n \nSource: Victoria Falls Stock Exchange (VFEX), 2024 \n \nNATIONAL PAYMENTS SYSTEM \nThe value of transactions processed through the \nNational Payment Systems (NPS) increased by \n0\n10,000\n20,000\n30,000\n40,000\n50,000\n60,000\n70,000\n80,000\n90,000\n100,000\n110,000\n120,000\n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n700\n800\n900\nFeb-23\nMar-23\nApr-23\nMay-23\nJun-23\nJul-23\nAug-23\nSep-23\nOct-23\nNov-23\nDec-23\nJan-24\nFeb-24\nVALUE TRADED ($ MILLIONS)\nVOLUME TRADED (MILIONS)\nVolume\nValue\n60\n65\n70\n75\n80\n85\n90\n95\n100\n105\n110\n115\n31-Jan-23\n28-Feb-23\n31-Mar-23\n30-Apr-23\n31-May-23\n30-Jun-23\n31-Jul-23\n31-Aug-23\n30-Sep-23\n31-Oct-23\n30-Nov-23\n31-Dec-23\n31-Jan-24\n29-Feb-24\n0\n0.2\n0.4\n0.6\n0.8\n1\n1.2\n1.4\n1.6\nFeb-23\nMar-23\nApr-23\nMay-23\nJun-23\nJul-23\nAug-23\nSep-23\nOct-23\nNov-23\nDec-23\nJan-24\nFeb-24\nUS$ BILLIONS\n \n \n \n11 \n \n36% from ZW$58.35 trillion in January 2024 \nto close at ZW$79.13 in February 2024. \n \nNPS transactions volumes decreased by 5% to \nclose at 61.95 million in the reporting month \nfrom 64.97 million in the previous month. \n \nZimbabwe Electronic Transfer Settlement \nSystem (ZETSS) \nThe value of transactions processed through the \nReal Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) system \nincreased by 35%, from ZW$28.29 trillion in \nthe previous month to close at ZW$38.30 \ntrillion in February 2024. \n \n \nThe volume of RTGS transactions decreased by \n3% to close at 890 thousand during the month \nunder review, from 915 thousand in January \n2024. \n \nFigure 16: ZETSS Volumes and Values \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024 \n \nMobile and Internet Based Transactions \nMobile \nand \ninternet-based \ntransactions \namounted to ZW$35.29 trillion, during the \nmonth under analysis, representing an increase \nof 34.08% from ZW$26.32 trillion recorded in \nJanuary 2024. \nCash Transactions \nCash based transactions amounted to ZW$4 \ntrillion during the month of February 2024. \n \nCard Transactions \nCard based transactions remained unchanged at \nZW$375 trillion during the month under \nanalysis. \n \nINFLATION OUTTURN \nAnnual Inflation \nAnnual headline inflation rose to 47.6% in \nFebruary 2024, from 34.8% in January 2024. \nThis was, partly, on account of the depreciation \nof the local currency against major currencies \nand the effects of tax measures announced in \nthe 2024 National Budget. \n \nMonthly Inflation \nMonth-on-month inflation rate, however, \ndecelerated to 5.39% in February 2024, from \n6.58% in January 2024, largely driven by the \ndecline in food and non-alcoholic beverages \ninflation. \n \nAlbeit declining to 9.83% in February 2024, \ndown from 15.01% in January 2024, food \ninflation remained high, largely due to the \nimposition of VAT and import duties on some \nbasic food products. \n \nMonthly non-food inflation slightly rose from \n2.50% in January 2024 to 2.98% in February \n2024. \n \n \n \n0\n4\n8\n12\n16\n20\n24\n28\n32\n36\n40\n44\n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1,000\n1,200\nFeb-23\nMar-23\nApr-23\nMay-23\nJun-23\nJul-23\nAug-23\nSep-23\nOct-23\nNov-23\nDec-23\nJan-24\nValue in ZW$ Trillions\nVolume in Thousands\nVolume\nValue\n \n \n \n12 \n \nFigure 17: Month-on-Month Inflation (%) \nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2024 \n \n \nAPRIL 2024 \n \nRESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE \n-5.00\n-2.00\n1.00\n4.00\n7.00\n10.00\n13.00\n16.00\n19.00\nFeb-22\nApr-22\nJun-22\nAug-22\nOct-22\nDec-22\nFeb-23\nApr-23\nJun-23\nAug-23\nOct-23\nDec-23\nFeb-24\nFood and non alcoholic beverages\nNon food\nAll Items\n \n \n13 \nStatistical Tables \n \nMonetary Statistics \n 1. Depository Corporations Survey \n \n \n \n \n15 \n 2. Central Bank Survey \n \n \n \n \n \n \n16 \n \n3. Other Depository Corporations Survey \n \n \n \n \n17 \n Other Depository Corporations \n \n4.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n18 \n 4.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n19 \n Commercial Banks \n 5.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n20 \n 5.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n21 \n Building Societies \n 6.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n22 \n 6.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n \n23 \n Sectoral Analysis of Bank Loans and Advances and Deposits \n \n7.1 Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks Loans and Advances \n \n24 \n \n7.2 Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks Deposits \n \n \n \n25 \n Interest Rates \n \n8.1 Lending Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n26 \n \n8.2 Banks Deposit Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n27 \n \nInflation \n \n9.1 Monthly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n28 \n \n9.2 Yearly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n29 \nExternal Statistics \n 10. Exchange Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n30 \nZimbabwe Stock Exchange \n 11. Zimbabwe Stock Market Statistics \n \n \n \n \n \n31 \n \n \n \n \n14 \n \nNational Payments System Statistics \n \n \n \n12.1 Values of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n32 \n \n12.2 Volumes of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n \n33 \nTrade Statistics \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n 13. Merchandise Trade Statistics \n \n \n \n \n \n34 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n15 \n \nTABLE 1: DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS SURVEY ($ '000)\nFeb-23\nMar-23\nApr-23\nMay-23\nJun-23\nJul-23\nAug-23\nSep-23\nOct-23\nNov-23\nDec-23\nJan-24\nFeb-24\nNet Foreign Assets\n-2,951,073,126.64\n-3,006,324,492.94\n-3,566,322,365.73\n-8,582,225,834.40\n-16,963,911,301.47\n-14,214,106,707.82\n-14,227,506,302.78\n-16,447,478,675.26\n-17,460,266,333.79\n-18,045,044,675.98 -18,830,050,198.23 -30,708,633,279.93\n-45,596,903,934.05\nCentral Bank(net)\n-3,703,423,556.62\n-3,750,737,078.21\n-4,364,843,604.61\n-10,488,101,584.18\n-20,831,187,742.72\n-17,851,691,225.27\n-17,684,416,714.28\n-20,303,911,826.15\n-21,115,539,152.06\n-21,850,985,894.27\n-22,724,299,913.18\n-37,204,315,094.00\n-54,031,060,405.32\nForeign Assets\n615,433,643.39\n564,973,118.29\n487,113,521.79\n1,242,178,197.33\n4,938,308,098.53\n2,249,211,942.26\n2,357,413,332.73\n2,869,139,839.85\n2,930,487,891.77\n2,722,752,920.94\n2,750,142,276.55\n4,789,971,270.20\n7,165,906,234.24\nForeign Liabilities\n4,318,857,200.01\n4,315,710,196.51\n4,851,957,126.40\n11,730,279,781.51\n25,769,495,841.25\n20,100,903,167.53\n20,041,830,047.01\n23,173,051,666.00\n24,046,027,043.83\n24,573,738,815.21 25,474,442,189.73 41,994,286,364.20\n61,196,966,639.56\nOther Depository Corporations(net)\n752,350,429.98\n744,412,585.27\n798,521,238.87\n1,905,875,749.78\n3,867,276,441.25\n3,637,584,517.45\n3,456,910,411.50\n3,856,433,150.89\n3,655,272,818.27\n3,805,941,218.28\n3,894,249,714.95\n6,495,681,814.07\n8,434,156,471.26\nForeign Assets\n978,124,840.54\n1,001,481,472.45\n1,117,664,547.79\n2,691,035,602.70\n5,707,374,025.18\n5,099,940,234.73\n4,942,678,600.40\n5,547,113,224.93\n5,232,466,845.31\n5,592,082,221.64\n5,729,082,981.88\n9,507,866,394.28\n12,860,635,148.65\nForeign Liabilities\n225,774,410.56\n257,068,887.17\n319,143,308.91\n785,159,852.92\n1,840,097,583.93\n1,462,355,717.28\n1,485,768,188.90\n1,690,680,074.03\n1,577,194,027.04\n1,786,141,003.36\n1,834,833,266.93\n3,012,184,580.21\n4,426,478,677.39\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n5,879,316,414.74\n6,201,650,160.38\n7,164,925,241.35\n15,821,191,266.69\n31,239,386,362.79\n27,217,558,926.15\n27,639,288,378.08\n32,161,547,467.69\n34,250,554,903.24\n35,673,225,646.05 37,744,636,990.28 59,956,750,588.31\n86,209,941,031.87\nDomestic Claims\n2,390,147,141.27\n2,794,025,252.47\n3,101,957,753.62\n6,541,657,510.89\n10,642,561,243.15\n11,094,734,236.77\n11,015,584,365.69\n13,148,134,761.58\n14,099,323,168.68\n14,764,938,049.74\n16,661,349,824.12 26,555,487,015.34\n39,630,053,424.85\nClaims on Central Government(net)\n460,256,173.30\n603,775,191.70\n783,297,842.19\n1,389,082,186.11\n-464,905,858.96\n1,919,403,373.96\n2,035,378,139.93\n2,469,546,156.09\n2,685,249,888.61\n3,426,568,722.64\n4,633,764,250.89\n8,146,919,528.13\n12,506,419,694.13\nClaims on Central Government\n961,476,154.82\n1,030,581,569.13\n1,109,723,491.62\n1,853,707,138.97\n3,237,920,191.20\n3,137,951,747.03\n3,471,122,173.32\n3,948,824,640.88\n4,022,430,300.76\n4,506,540,165.69\n5,826,109,037.18\n9,899,880,742.54\n14,706,600,268.21\nCentral Bank\n628,530,323.58\n669,523,170.19\n717,575,879.35\n1,196,082,138.57\n2,246,012,881.84\n1,888,538,492.52\n2,273,053,198.66\n2,620,306,139.59\n2,738,773,804.86\n2,978,270,299.68\n3,186,271,122.40\n5,598,206,535.08\n8,298,885,386.12\nODCs\n332,945,831.24\n361,058,398.93\n392,147,612.28\n657,625,000.40\n991,907,309.36\n1,249,413,254.51\n1,198,068,974.66\n1,328,518,501.28\n1,283,656,495.90\n1,528,269,866.01\n2,639,837,914.78\n4,301,674,207.46\n6,407,714,882.09\nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n501,219,981.52\n426,806,377.42\n326,425,649.43\n464,624,952.86\n3,702,826,050.16\n1,218,548,373.07\n1,435,744,033.39\n1,479,278,484.78\n1,337,180,412.15\n1,079,971,443.04\n1,192,344,786.29\n1,752,961,214.41\n2,200,180,574.08\nCentral Bank\n490,179,791.18\n420,617,652.14\n316,723,447.84\n414,113,225.54\n3,270,215,884.09\n838,112,561.24\n1,054,218,531.34\n1,364,775,878.32\n1,190,127,107.91\n946,496,075.59\n990,859,913.99\n1,583,331,636.98\n1,859,602,799.84\nODCs\n11,040,190.34\n6,188,725.28\n9,702,201.59\n50,511,727.32\n432,610,166.07\n380,435,811.82\n381,525,502.04\n114,502,606.47\n147,053,304.24\n133,475,367.46\n201,484,872.29\n169,629,577.43\n340,577,774.24\nClaims on Other Sectors\n1,929,890,967.97\n2,190,250,060.77\n2,318,659,911.43\n5,152,575,324.78\n11,107,467,102.11\n9,175,330,862.81\n8,980,206,225.76\n10,678,588,605.49\n11,414,073,280.07\n11,338,369,327.09\n12,027,585,573.22\n18,408,567,487.20\n27,123,633,730.72\nOther Financial Corporations\n189,742,321.73\n202,939,856.36\n127,476,071.53\n204,879,115.02\n372,829,596.47\n286,485,380.68\n286,556,911.67\n345,395,684.06\n402,497,102.41\n366,785,937.06\n210,979,095.28\n367,132,374.31\n461,955,002.81\nState and Local Government\n197,442.25\n149,777.75\n99,276.39\n80,342.62\n83,001.69\n68,073.17\n75,802.84\n92,048.54\n98,056.56\n59,769.23\n73,453.85\n198,797.86\n232,003.28\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n221,082,772.48\n244,918,005.85\n282,369,808.93\n680,427,260.99\n1,426,648,513.58\n1,144,767,740.03\n942,115,955.79\n1,064,377,138.00\n1,124,773,262.90\n758,994,509.56\n779,253,503.92\n787,050,316.56\n1,149,678,230.61\nPrivate Sector\n1,518,868,431.51\n1,742,242,420.81\n1,908,714,754.59\n4,267,188,606.15\n9,307,905,990.36\n7,744,009,668.94\n7,751,457,555.47\n9,268,723,734.89\n9,886,704,858.20\n10,212,529,111.24\n11,037,279,520.17\n17,254,185,998.48\n25,511,768,494.02\nCentral Bank\n15,366,452.38\n18,410,955.96\n21,144,958.50\n23,007,099.44\n23,430,389.25\n42,772,151.02\n61,406,600.26\n79,455,077.51\n92,261,985.53\n97,474,935.67\n102,273,703.78\n144,071,607.24\n211,425,087.76\nODCs\n1,503,501,979.13\n1,723,831,464.85\n1,887,569,796.09\n4,244,181,506.71\n9,284,475,601.11\n7,701,237,517.92\n7,690,050,955.21\n9,189,268,657.38\n9,794,442,872.67\n10,115,054,175.57 10,935,005,816.39 17,110,114,391.24\n25,300,343,406.26\nOther Items(Net)\n-3,489,169,273.48\n-3,407,624,907.90\n-4,062,967,487.72\n-9,279,533,755.80\n-20,596,825,119.64\n-16,122,824,689.39\n-16,623,704,012.39\n-19,013,412,706.11\n-20,151,231,734.56\n-20,908,287,596.32 -21,083,287,166.17 -33,401,263,572.98\n-46,579,887,607.02\n Shares and Other Equity\n-3,217,266,965.75\n-3,126,405,163.72\n-3,579,533,655.47\n-9,203,936,084.43\n-19,402,711,215.33\n-14,321,122,638.86\n-14,203,729,090.13\n-16,555,368,520.87\n-17,032,283,456.63\n-17,122,059,892.58\n-17,570,066,671.33\n-29,549,325,579.05\n-43,302,266,345.67\n Liabilities to Other Financial Corporations\n3,108,981.29\n3,714,628.40\n6,418,803.44\n30,583,343.97\n64,321,874.21\n58,256,168.71\n56,751,608.46\n90,032,397.59\n83,441,760.88\n89,997,662.25\n138,722,557.11\n182,726,965.66\n279,727,919.49\n Restricted Deposits\n95,262,450.25\n116,383,765.15\n168,057,733.95\n452,445,666.52\n929,649,277.24\n832,146,281.94\n481,313,635.70\n652,311,438.83\n616,319,027.72\n598,451,618.98\n634,635,960.65\n1,122,721,876.21\n2,182,139,254.83\n Deposits and Securities Excluded from Base Money\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n Other Items(net)\n-370,273,739.26\n-401,318,137.73\n-657,910,369.64\n-558,626,681.86\n-2,188,085,055.76\n-2,692,104,501.18\n-2,958,040,166.42\n-3,200,388,021.66\n-3,818,709,066.54\n-4,474,676,984.97\n-4,286,579,012.59\n-5,157,386,835.80\n-5,739,488,435.67\n0.86\nBroad Money-M3\n2,928,243,288.10\n3,195,325,667.44\n3,598,602,875.61\n7,238,965,432.29\n14,275,475,061.32\n13,003,452,218.33\n13,411,782,075.30\n15,714,068,792.44\n16,790,288,569.45\n17,628,180,970.07 18,914,586,792.05 29,248,117,308.38\n40,613,037,097.82\nSecurities Other than Shares Included in Broad Money\n15,711,655.30\n16,082,619.50\n1,843,391.22\n4,659,433.86\n4,243,581.90\n2,137,443.55\n3,182,683.74\n2,685,488.92\n3,497,226.23\n4,173,191.32\n42,811,406.21\n7,317,942.35\n9,458,363.45\nBroad Money-M2\n2,912,531,632.80\n3,179,243,047.93\n3,596,759,484.40\n7,234,305,998.43\n14,271,231,479.42\n13,001,314,774.78\n13,408,599,391.56\n15,711,383,303.52\n16,786,791,343.22\n17,624,007,778.75 18,871,775,385.85 29,240,799,366.03\n40,603,578,734.36\nOther Deposits (Time Deposits)\n293,774,251.17\n332,735,496.03\n268,888,357.23\n555,305,758.75\n1,066,573,312.15\n824,657,970.63\n860,202,048.80\n945,509,710.97\n1,187,384,045.43\n1,239,087,789.32\n1,287,203,962.67\n1,749,790,464.18\n2,805,565,709.39\nof which Foreign Currency Accounts\n193,826,996.54\n204,002,079.62\n140,843,185.69\n366,430,904.52\n852,167,654.54\n616,409,108.42\n586,082,872.02\n715,202,149.51\n865,876,028.52\n823,225,160.91\n878,430,928.79\n1,378,784,627.54\n2,089,992,436.79\nNarrow Money-M1\n2,618,757,381.64\n2,846,507,551.90\n3,327,871,127.16\n6,679,000,239.69\n13,204,658,167.27\n12,176,656,804.16\n12,548,397,342.75\n14,765,873,592.55\n15,599,407,297.79\n16,384,919,989.43 17,584,571,423.18 27,491,008,901.84\n37,798,013,024.97\nTransferable Deposits\n2,612,610,043.68\n2,840,026,628.31\n3,320,722,893.78\n6,671,063,283.95\n13,196,303,401.12\n12,166,873,421.72\n12,538,725,239.63\n14,755,523,314.82\n15,588,193,442.31\n16,373,116,452.32\n17,572,220,001.14\n27,476,970,003.22\n37,782,959,103.37\n Of which Foreign Currency Accounts\n1,754,513,308.92\n1,869,072,784.19\n2,148,792,572.06\n5,274,426,984.71\n11,635,488,089.25\n10,099,330,132.00\n10,173,498,286.11\n12,310,342,777.52\n12,429,076,347.34\n12,757,305,066.07 13,397,781,145.35 22,901,496,643.22\n32,969,005,356.37\nCurrency Outside Depository Corporations\n6,147,337.96\n6,480,923.60\n7,148,233.38\n7,936,955.74\n8,354,766.15\n9,783,382.43\n9,672,103.13\n10,350,277.73\n11,213,855.47\n11,803,537.12\n12,351,422.04\n14,038,898.63\n15,053,921.60\nMemorandum Items\nReserve Money\n204,036,133.91\n232,896,654.62\n276,496,079.11\n520,611,909.67\n1,064,898,441.01\n1,003,043,754.90\n1,062,092,590.09\n1,312,407,291.74\n1,787,437,296.87\n1,817,508,312.01\n2,021,215,296.65\n3,069,128,065.16\n4,054,140,062.89\nFCAs as a Percentage of Deposits in M3\n60.0%\n58.6%\n59.8%\n72.9%\n87.5%\n77.7%\n75.9%\n78.4%\n74.1%\n72.4%\n70.9%\n78.3%\n81.2%\nEnd Period Exchange Rate\n889.13\n929.86\n1,047.44\n2,577.06\n5,739.80\n4,516.80\n4,608.11\n5,466.75\n5,698.96\n5,791.08\n6,104.72\n10,152.39\n14,912.83\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2024\nNotes:\n(i) Depository corporations survey - formerly Monetary Survey.\n(ii) Broad money redefined using IMF's Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual of 2000. Major changes include exclusion of Government deposits held by banks from broad money.\n(iii) Transferable deposits made up of demand and savings deposits.\n(iv) NCDs are also referred to as securities included in broad money.\n(v) All classes of time deposits, short and long term are classified as time deposits, which are also termed other deposits.\n(vi) Credit to the private sector now excludes claims on other financial corporations, as well as claims on state and local government (local authorities)\n(vii) Depository corporations made up of the Central Bank and other depository corporations\n(viii) Other depository corporations (ODCs) - Commercial banks, merchant banks, building societies and POSB.\n(ix) In December 2017, the statistics were adjusted in restrospect by reclassifying Securities issued under Aftrades from claims on government to claims on central bank\n(x) In December 2017, the statistics were adjusted in restrospect by reclassifying amounts accessed by banks under the Aftrades from liabilities to Other Depository corporations and Other Financial Corporations to liabilities to Central Bank \n(xi) In December 2018, statistics were revised from November 2017 due to reclassification of lines of credit (foreign liabilities) that were initially classified as deposits included in broad money\n(xii) All monetary and financial statistics are valued in $ since the introduction of the interbank foreign exchange market in February 2019\n \n \n16 \n \n \n \n \n \nFeb-23\nMar-23\nApr-23\nMay-23\nJun-23\nJul-23\nAug-23\nSep-23\nOct-23\nNov-23\nDec-23\nJan-24\nFeb-24\nNet Foreign Assets\n-3,703,423,556.62\n-3,750,737,078.21\n-4,364,843,604.61 -10,488,101,584.18\n-20,831,187,742.72 -17,851,691,225.27 -17,684,416,714.28\n-20,303,911,826.15 -21,115,539,152.06\n-21,850,985,894.27 -22,724,299,913.18 -37,204,315,094.00\n-54,031,060,405.32\nClaims on Non Residents\n615,433,643.39\n564,973,118.29\n487,113,521.79\n1,242,178,197.33\n4,938,308,098.53\n2,249,211,942.26\n2,357,413,332.73\n2,869,139,839.85\n2,930,487,891.77\n2,722,752,920.94\n2,750,142,276.55\n4,789,971,270.20\n7,165,906,234.24\nOfficial Reserves Assets\n249,068,733.08\n171,692,411.97\n146,106,760.95\n305,095,927.20\n2,685,528,792.05\n501,097,650.65\n609,700,872.98\n873,028,937.84\n901,998,462.96\n664,790,048.98\n670,897,605.40\n1,283,063,711.48\n1,440,292,080.05\nOther Foreign Assets\n366,364,910.31\n393,280,706.32\n341,006,760.85\n937,082,270.13\n2,252,779,306.49\n1,748,114,291.61\n1,747,712,459.75\n1,996,110,902.01\n2,028,489,428.81\n2,057,962,871.96\n2,079,244,671.16\n3,506,907,558.71\n5,725,614,154.20\nLess Liabilities to Non Residents\n4,318,857,200.01\n4,315,710,196.51\n4,851,957,126.40\n11,730,279,781.51\n25,769,495,841.25\n20,100,903,167.53\n20,041,830,047.01\n23,173,051,666.00\n24,046,027,043.83\n24,573,738,815.21\n25,474,442,189.73\n41,994,286,364.20\n61,196,966,639.56\nShort Term Liabilities\n2,092,686,621.90\n2,190,571,858.03\n2,461,132,179.69\n454,737,994.24\n740,090,616.66\n489,297,027.10\n431,377,013.98\n412,442,545.53\n498,435,076.07\n417,352,772.09\n253,445,372.66\n330,761,013.21\n347,930,957.96\nOther Foreign Liabilities*\n2,226,170,578.11\n2,125,138,338.48\n2,390,824,946.71 11,275,541,787.27\n25,029,405,224.59 19,611,606,140.43\n19,610,453,033.03\n22,760,609,120.47\n23,547,591,967.77\n24,156,386,043.12 25,220,996,817.07 41,663,525,350.99\n60,849,035,681.60\n of which blocked funds\n1,016,910,134.72\n844,460,244.12\n946,785,361.64\n2,218,121,428.14\n4,846,720,895.68\n3,809,201,616.00\n3,638,215,070.80\n4,306,782,215.73\n4,458,649,260.58\n4,527,891,788.72\n4,848,587,011.60\n8,054,627,951.76\n11,781,589,928.45\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n3,907,459,690.53\n3,983,633,732.83\n4,641,339,683.72 11,008,713,493.85\n21,896,086,183.73 18,854,734,980.17\n18,746,509,304.37\n21,616,319,117.89\n22,902,976,448.93\n23,668,494,206.27 24,745,515,209.82 40,273,443,159.16\n58,085,200,468.20\nDomestic Claims\n313,504,419.70\n449,443,570.90\n633,073,494.67\n1,307,855,143.64\n-23,847,709.69\n1,885,131,142.46\n1,873,807,183.49\n2,028,957,342.73\n2,411,597,729.92\n2,496,519,062.46\n2,685,240,421.33\n4,316,485,335.80\n6,966,928,713.06\nNet Claims on Central Government\n138,350,532.40\n248,905,518.05\n400,852,431.51\n781,968,913.03\n-1,024,203,002.25\n1,050,425,931.27\n1,218,834,667.32\n1,255,530,261.28\n1,548,646,696.96\n2,031,774,224.09\n2,195,411,208.41\n4,014,874,898.09\n6,439,282,586.28\nClaims on Central Government\n628,530,323.58\n669,523,170.19\n717,575,879.35\n1,196,082,138.57\n2,246,012,881.84\n1,888,538,492.52\n2,273,053,198.66\n2,620,306,139.59\n2,738,773,804.86\n2,978,270,299.68\n3,186,271,122.40\n5,598,206,535.08\n8,298,885,386.12\nOf which: Securities Other than Shares\n141,163,866.74\n163,408,985.73\n197,483,744.44\n491,408,539.76\n1,282,058,425.55\n1,041,256,825.36\n1,354,647,836.07\n1,738,161,413.25\n1,883,996,199.01\n1,984,147,610.08\n2,219,186,779.04\n4,440,121,511.31\n6,608,105,197.48\nf\n(\ng\nLoans\n487,366,456.84\n506,114,184.46\n520,092,134.91\n704,673,598.81\n963,954,456.29\n847,281,667.16\n918,405,362.59\n882,144,726.34\n854,777,605.86\n994,122,689.61\n967,084,343.36\n1,158,085,023.77\n1,690,780,188.64\n Loans and Advances\n100,736,810.22\n112,483,069.83\n126,461,020.28\n298,686,901.35\n557,967,758.83\n441,294,969.70\n453,167,575.54\n416,906,939.29\n389,539,818.81\n450,658,841.88\n423,620,495.64\n709,564,039.01\n1,049,930,696.57\nAmounts Due from Gvt including SDR Drawdowns\n386,629,646.61\n393,631,114.63\n393,631,114.63\n405,986,697.46\n405,986,697.46\n405,986,697.46\n465,237,787.05\n465,237,787.05\n465,237,787.05\n543,463,847.72\n543,463,847.72\n448,520,984.75\n640,849,492.08\n Export Incentives\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n490,179,791.18\n420,617,652.14\n316,723,447.84\n414,113,225.54\n3,270,215,884.09\n838,112,561.24\n1,054,218,531.34\n1,364,775,878.32\n1,190,127,107.91\n946,496,075.59\n990,859,913.99\n1,583,331,636.98\n1,859,602,799.84\nOf which: Deposits\n490,179,791.18\n420,617,652.14\n316,723,447.84\n414,113,225.54\n3,270,215,884.09\n838,112,561.24\n1,054,218,531.34\n1,364,775,878.32\n1,190,127,107.91\n946,496,075.59\n990,859,913.99\n1,583,331,636.98\n1,859,602,799.84\nOther \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nClaims on Other Sectors\n175,153,887.31\n200,538,052.85\n232,221,063.16\n525,886,230.61\n1,000,355,292.57\n834,705,211.19\n654,972,516.17\n773,427,081.45\n862,951,032.96\n464,744,838.37\n489,829,212.93\n301,610,437.71\n527,646,126.78\nOther Financial Corporations\n10,113,325.42\n10,623,469.30\n10,883,730.62\n10,991,470.34\n12,986,635.27\n12,976,151.03\n13,602,645.94\n14,588,403.94\n63,414,783.51\n25,307,666.81\n28,216,636.43\n32,493,405.07\n71,573,929.14\nState and Local Government\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n149,674,109.51\n171,503,627.58\n200,192,374.04\n491,887,660.82\n963,938,268.05\n778,956,909.14\n579,963,269.97\n679,383,600.01\n707,274,263.92\n341,962,235.89\n359,338,872.72\n125,045,425.40\n244,647,109.88\nPrivate Sector\n15,366,452.38\n18,410,955.96\n21,144,958.50\n23,007,099.44\n23,430,389.25\n42,772,151.02\n61,406,600.26\n79,455,077.51\n92,261,985.53\n97,474,935.67\n102,273,703.78\n144,071,607.24\n211,425,087.76\nClaims on Other Depository Corporations\n43,495,940.76\n45,842,895.27\n47,004,500.30\n116,825,246.16\n267,624,056.04\n261,303,321.91\n238,753,031.59\n207,009,026.95\n229,347,409.30\n246,227,512.18\n266,265,290.73\n392,377,252.77\n503,151,449.55\nOf which: Loans\n43,495,940.76\n45,842,895.27\n47,004,500.30\n116,825,246.16\n267,624,056.04\n261,303,321.91\n238,753,031.59\n207,009,026.95\n229,347,409.30\n246,227,512.18\n266,265,290.73\n392,377,252.77\n503,151,449.55\nOther Liabilities to ODCs\n655,353,298.81\n642,344,547.18\n750,760,102.33\n1,428,720,516.68\n2,666,026,665.35\n2,901,005,739.21\n3,100,647,536.01\n3,107,865,677.76\n3,216,633,940.85\n3,876,066,859.55\n3,854,578,282.87\n5,812,079,968.88\n8,128,905,484.34\nOf which: Aftrades Balances\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n Securities\n307,661,257.90\n318,264,602.32\n358,416,719.69\n479,833,629.00\n683,711,355.79\n1,196,912,067.35\n1,309,913,863.13\n1,094,629,530.65\n1,078,752,001.46\n1,460,737,223.38\n1,519,969,710.79\n1,701,520,057.58\n2,432,925,529.23\nOther Items(Net)\n-4,205,812,628.87\n-4,130,691,813.85\n-4,712,021,791.09 -11,012,753,620.73\n-24,318,336,502.72 -19,609,306,255.01 -19,734,596,625.30\n-22,488,218,425.97 -23,478,665,250.56\n-24,801,814,491.19 -25,648,587,780.63 -41,376,660,539.47\n-58,744,025,789.94\nShares and Other Equity\n-4,085,919,716.08\n-4,078,823,961.23\n-4,620,636,211.04\n-11,291,316,467.09\n-25,202,259,045.14\n-19,805,080,179.46\n-19,579,648,458.36\n-22,753,122,010.85\n-23,550,146,670.91\n-23,892,801,192.96\n-25,053,448,266.86\n-40,143,169,460.35\n-58,155,147,571.29\nOther Items(Net)\n-233,402,893.37\n-175,955,067.06\n-276,252,783.87\n-193,714,335.06\n-63,920,685.55\n-652,745,707.09\n-652,393,199.08\n-396,662,893.13\n-589,895,589.07\n-1,529,336,116.22\n-1,251,036,312.37\n-2,400,043,318.75\n-2,790,865,158.91\nLiabilities to Other Resident Sectors\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nDeposits and Securities Excluded from Base Money\n113,509,980.58\n124,087,214.44\n184,867,203.81\n472,277,181.43\n947,843,227.98\n848,519,631.54\n497,445,032.14\n661,566,478.01\n661,377,009.41\n620,322,818.00\n655,896,798.59\n1,166,552,239.63\n2,201,986,940.26\nMonetary Base \n204,036,133.91\n232,896,654.62\n276,496,079.11\n520,611,909.67\n1,064,898,441.01\n1,003,043,754.90\n1,062,092,590.09\n1,312,407,291.74\n1,787,437,296.87\n1,817,508,312.01\n2,021,215,296.65\n3,069,128,065.16\n4,054,140,062.89\nBond Coins\n99,645.43\n97,745.29\n90,572.71\n83,649.70\n80,542.92\n79,344.94\n79,163.84\n79,154.38\n79,154.84\n78,794.30\n76,968.83\n66,290.72\n59,094.22\nBond Notes\n7,927,761.49\n8,414,729.87\n8,902,316.39\n8,960,488.74\n10,258,707.59\n11,193,057.46\n11,885,047.43\n12,736,767.90\n13,560,105.45\n14,430,019.79\n15,672,830.10\n16,920,535.77\n18,138,392.93\nLiabilities to ODCs\n195,908,361.99\n224,283,814.46\n267,402,825.02\n511,467,406.24\n1,054,458,825.51\n961,770,952.77\n1,020,125,611.77\n1,269,591,004.47\n1,743,797,671.58\n1,772,929,799.17\n1,975,463,236.74\n3,052,141,238.66\n4,035,942,575.74\n Local Currency Reserve Deposits\n63,026,207.68\n72,736,726.53\n86,910,489.22\n105,795,700.01\n182,612,061.98\n243,159,063.25\n295,859,644.01\n344,623,158.66\n400,041,844.52\n449,770,161.09\n533,568,035.27\n557,373,870.90\n589,096,334.10\n Foreign Currency Reserve Deposits\n132,882,154.31\n151,547,087.93\n180,492,335.81\n405,671,706.23\n871,846,763.53\n718,611,889.52\n724,265,967.76\n924,967,845.81\n1,343,755,827.07\n1,323,159,638.08\n1,441,895,201.47\n2,464,767,002.76\n3,416,845,876.64\n Exess reserves \n100,364.99\n100,364.99\n100,364.99\n100,364.99\n100,364.99\n30,000,399.73\n30,002,767.04\n30,000,364.99\n30,000,364.99\n30,069,698.74\n30,002,260.98\n30,000,364.99\n30,000,364.99\nPrivate Deposits\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2024\nTABLE 2: CENTRAL BANK SURVEY ($'000)\n \n \n17 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nTABLE 3: OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS SURVEY ($ '000)\nFeb-23\nMar-23\nApr-23\nMay-23\nJun-23\nJul-23\nAug-23\nSep-23\nOct-23\nNov-23\nDec-23\nJan-24\nFeb-24\nNet Foreign Assets\n752,350,429.98\n744,412,585.27\n798,521,238.87\n1,905,875,749.78\n3,867,276,441.25\n3,637,584,517.45\n3,456,910,411.50\n3,856,433,150.89\n3,655,272,818.27\n3,805,941,218.28\n3,894,249,714.95\n6,495,681,814.07\n8,434,156,471.26\nClaims on Non Residents\n978,124,840.54\n1,001,481,472.45\n1,117,664,547.79\n2,691,035,602.70\n5,707,374,025.18\n5,099,940,234.73\n4,942,678,600.40\n5,547,113,224.93\n5,232,466,845.31\n5,592,082,221.64\n5,729,082,981.88\n9,507,866,394.28\n12,860,635,148.65\nOf Which: Foreign Currency\n436,062,788.15\n425,326,479.00\n462,081,408.59\n1,048,116,376.82\n2,249,201,574.76\n1,584,403,308.04\n1,505,916,176.81\n2,015,621,585.66\n2,312,575,134.73\n2,558,589,332.45\n2,868,505,570.48\n5,196,670,641.24\n7,309,076,955.04\nDeposits\n540,045,460.79\n573,864,075.80\n652,301,901.26\n1,639,116,293.75\n3,441,353,382.68\n3,502,402,457.26\n3,423,237,567.41\n3,515,981,784.12\n2,903,444,523.75\n3,019,701,118.75\n2,843,740,238.47\n4,283,885,090.87\n5,518,707,074.63\nOther\n2,016,591.60\n2,290,917.65\n3,281,237.94\n3,802,932.12\n16,819,067.74\n13,134,469.43\n13,524,856.19\n15,509,855.15\n16,447,186.84\n13,791,770.44\n16,837,172.93\n27,310,662.17\n32,851,118.98\nLess Liabilities to Non Residents\n225,774,410.56\n257,068,887.17\n319,143,308.91\n785,159,852.92\n1,840,097,583.93\n1,462,355,717.28\n1,485,768,188.90\n1,690,680,074.03\n1,577,194,027.04\n1,786,141,003.36\n1,834,833,266.93\n3,012,184,580.21\n4,426,478,677.39\nOf Which: Deposits\n109,244,589.40\n121,808,803.93\n153,776,940.69\n378,197,467.04\n820,337,332.33\n764,960,085.21\n772,511,911.80\n827,268,243.95\n655,899,412.79\n782,004,591.95\n776,859,238.67\n1,316,061,176.34\n1,936,356,521.78\nLoans\n116,529,821.16\n135,260,083.25\n165,366,368.23\n406,962,385.88\n1,019,760,251.61\n697,395,632.08\n713,256,277.09\n863,411,830.08\n921,294,614.24\n1,004,136,411.41\n1,057,974,028.26\n1,696,123,403.87\n2,490,122,155.61\nOther\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n2,151,497,989.83\n2,436,728,709.28\n2,776,123,933.49\n5,305,321,211.88\n10,381,649,903.19\n9,339,710,968.86\n9,929,068,164.23\n11,838,030,324.64\n13,078,743,914.01\n13,788,565,015.66\n14,986,724,817.13\n22,694,566,232.26\n32,143,979,019.53\nDomestic Claims\n2,076,642,721.56\n2,344,581,681.58\n2,468,884,258.96\n5,233,802,367.26\n10,666,408,952.84\n9,209,603,094.31\n9,141,777,182.20\n11,119,177,418.85\n11,687,725,438.76\n12,268,418,987.27\n13,976,109,402.78\n22,239,001,679.53\n32,663,124,711.79\nNet Claims on Central Government\n321,905,640.90\n354,869,673.65\n382,445,410.68\n607,113,273.08\n559,297,143.29\n868,977,442.69\n816,543,472.61\n1,214,015,894.82\n1,136,603,191.66\n1,394,794,498.55\n2,438,353,042.48\n4,132,044,630.04\n6,067,137,107.85\nClaims on Central Government\n332,945,831.24\n361,058,398.93\n392,147,612.28\n657,625,000.40\n991,907,309.36\n1,249,413,254.51\n1,198,068,974.66\n1,328,518,501.28\n1,283,656,495.90\n1,528,269,866.01\n2,639,837,914.78\n4,301,674,207.46\n6,407,714,882.09\nSecurities\n332,626,867.19\n360,626,182.29\n391,587,790.26\n653,025,854.60\n981,773,844.67\n1,242,045,163.04\n1,190,599,025.63\n1,318,582,684.20\n1,272,839,666.04\n1,517,348,442.88\n2,627,512,618.11\n4,283,761,798.56\n6,381,641,818.99\nLoans\n318,964.05\n432,216.64\n559,822.02\n4,599,145.80\n10,133,464.70\n7,368,091.47\n7,469,949.03\n9,935,817.09\n10,816,829.86\n10,921,423.13\n12,325,296.66\n17,912,408.90\n26,073,063.10\nOther \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n11,040,190.34\n6,188,725.28\n9,702,201.59\n50,511,727.32\n432,610,166.07\n380,435,811.82\n381,525,502.04\n114,502,606.47\n147,053,304.24\n133,475,367.46\n201,484,872.29\n169,629,577.43\n340,577,774.24\nOf which: Deposits\n11,040,190.34\n6,188,725.28\n9,702,201.59\n50,511,727.32\n432,610,166.07\n380,435,811.82\n381,525,502.04\n114,502,606.47\n147,053,304.24\n133,475,367.46\n201,484,872.29\n169,629,577.43\n340,577,774.24\nOther \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nClaims on Other Sectors\n1,754,737,080.66\n1,989,712,007.92\n2,086,438,848.27\n4,626,689,094.18\n10,107,111,809.54\n8,340,625,651.62\n8,325,233,709.58\n9,905,161,524.04\n10,551,122,247.10\n10,873,624,488.72\n11,537,756,360.30\n18,106,957,049.49\n26,595,987,603.94\nOther Financial Corporations\n179,628,996.31\n192,316,387.05\n116,592,340.90\n193,887,644.68\n359,842,961.20\n273,509,229.65\n272,954,265.73\n330,807,280.13\n339,082,318.90\n341,478,270.25\n182,762,458.86\n334,638,969.24\n390,381,073.67\nState and Local Government\n197,442.25\n149,777.75\n99,276.39\n80,342.62\n83,001.69\n68,073.17\n75,802.84\n92,048.54\n98,056.56\n59,769.23\n73,453.85\n198,797.86\n232,003.28\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n71,408,662.97\n73,414,378.27\n82,177,434.89\n188,539,600.17\n462,710,245.53\n365,810,830.89\n362,152,685.81\n384,993,537.99\n417,498,998.98\n417,032,273.67\n419,914,631.20\n662,004,891.16\n905,031,120.73\nPrivate Sector\n1,503,501,979.13\n1,723,831,464.85\n1,887,569,796.09\n4,244,181,506.71\n9,284,475,601.11\n7,701,237,517.92\n7,690,050,955.21\n9,189,268,657.38\n9,794,442,872.67\n10,115,054,175.57\n10,935,005,816.39\n17,110,114,391.24\n25,300,343,406.26\nClaims on the Central Bank\n745,768,616.10\n819,662,608.72\n973,967,364.65\n2,050,173,260.89\n4,434,783,343.65\n4,138,866,267.43\n4,653,650,898.99\n5,265,804,171.22\n5,912,703,283.03\n6,326,849,329.56\n5,977,105,227.74\n9,099,022,563.30\n12,598,181,489.84\nCurrency\n1,880,068.97\n2,031,551.56\n1,844,655.72\n1,107,182.70\n1,984,484.37\n1,489,019.97\n2,292,108.14\n2,465,644.54\n2,425,404.82\n2,705,276.98\n3,398,376.89\n2,947,927.87\n3,143,565.55\nReserves\n743,888,547.13\n817,631,057.16\n972,122,708.94\n2,049,066,078.19\n4,424,349,970.82\n4,137,377,247.46\n4,651,358,790.85\n5,263,338,526.67\n5,910,277,878.21\n6,324,144,052.58\n5,973,706,850.85\n9,096,074,635.43\n12,595,037,924.29\nSecurities\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n8,448,888.46\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nOther Claims\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nLiabilities to the Central Bank\n8,092,936.71\n9,639,861.61\n13,321,881.07\n78,332,582.02\n39,166,568.11\n87,827,165.17\n84,841,425.78\n82,493,417.82\n84,628,889.30\n92,939,919.06\n55,157,360.84\n114,298,041.18\n105,237,097.37\nOther Items(Net)\n662,820,411.12\n717,875,719.41\n653,405,809.04\n1,900,321,834.26\n4,680,375,825.19\n3,920,931,227.71\n3,781,518,491.17\n4,464,457,847.61\n4,437,055,918.48\n4,713,763,382.12\n4,911,332,452.56\n8,529,159,969.39\n13,012,090,084.74\nShares and Other Equity\n868,652,750.33\n952,418,797.50\n1,041,102,555.56\n2,087,380,382.66\n5,799,547,829.81\n5,483,957,540.60\n5,375,919,368.23\n6,197,753,489.98\n6,517,863,214.28\n6,770,741,300.38\n7,483,381,595.52\n10,593,843,881.30\n14,852,881,225.62\nLiabilities to other ressident sectors\n3,108,981.29\n3,714,628.40\n6,418,803.44\n30,583,343.97\n64,321,874.21\n58,256,168.71\n56,751,608.46\n90,032,397.59\n83,441,760.88\n89,997,662.25\n138,722,557.11\n182,726,965.66\n279,727,919.49\nOther Items(Net)\n-208,941,320.50\n-238,257,706.49\n-394,115,549.96\n-217,641,892.37\n-1,183,493,878.83\n-1,621,282,481.61\n-1,651,152,485.52\n-1,823,328,039.96\n-2,164,249,056.68\n-2,146,975,580.51\n-2,710,771,700.07\n-2,247,410,877.57\n-2,120,519,060.37\nDeposits and Securities Included in Broad Mo\n2,903,848,419.81\n3,181,141,294.55\n3,574,645,172.37\n7,211,196,961.65\n14,248,926,344.43\n12,977,295,486.31\n13,385,978,575.73\n15,694,463,475.53\n16,734,016,732.29\n17,594,506,233.94\n18,880,974,532.07\n29,190,248,046.34\n40,578,135,490.79\nDeposits Included in Broad Money\n2,888,136,764.51\n \n3,165,058,675.05\n \n3,572,801,781.15\n \n7,206,537,527.79\n \n14,244,682,762.54\n \n12,975,158,042.76\n \n13,382,795,891.99\n \n15,691,777,986.61\n \n16,730,519,506.06\n \n17,590,333,042.62\n \n18,838,163,125.87\n \n29,182,930,103.98\n \n40,568,677,127.34\n \nTransferable Deposits\n2,594,362,513.35\n \n2,832,323,179.02\n \n3,303,913,423.92\n \n6,651,231,769.05\n \n13,178,109,450.38\n \n12,150,500,072.13\n \n12,522,593,843.18\n \n14,746,268,275.64\n \n15,543,135,460.62\n \n16,351,245,253.30\n \n17,550,959,163.20\n \n27,433,139,639.80\n \n37,763,111,417.94\n \n of which FCAs\n1,750,982,009.54\n \n1,865,387,117.78\n \n2,144,912,895.57\n \n5,273,965,984.48\n \n11,634,530,484.57\n \n10,099,327,960.39\n \n10,172,409,984.27\n \n12,309,119,479.36\n \n12,388,978,422.26\n \n12,751,597,340.40\n \n13,391,882,427.59\n \n22,891,974,397.20\n \n32,954,377,682.43\n \nOther Deposits (Time Deposits)\n293,774,251.17\n332,735,496.03\n268,888,357.23\n555,305,758.75\n1,066,573,312.15\n824,657,970.63\n860,202,048.80\n945,509,710.97\n1,187,384,045.43\n1,239,087,789.32\n1,287,203,962.67\n1,749,790,464.18\n2,805,565,709.39\n of which FCAs\n193,826,996.54\n204,002,079.62\n140,843,185.69\n366,430,904.52\n852,167,654.54\n616,409,108.42\n586,082,872.02\n715,202,149.51\n865,876,028.52\n823,225,160.91\n878,430,928.79\n1,378,784,627.54\n2,089,992,436.79\nMoney Market Instruments\n15,711,655.30\n \n16,082,619.50\n \n1,843,391.22\n \n4,659,433.86\n \n4,243,581.90\n \n2,137,443.55\n \n3,182,683.74\n \n2,685,488.92\n \n3,497,226.23\n \n4,173,191.32\n \n42,811,406.21\n \n7,317,942.35\n \n9,458,363.45\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024\n \n \n18 \n \n \n \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nForeign\nBond\nNotes\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \nLocal\nOther \n Notes &\n&\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nLocal Governemt\nOther2\nGovernment\nLocal \nPublic \n Institutional \nOther cliams\nContigent Assets\nOther Assets\nNon Financial \nCoins\nCoin\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nsecurities\nGovernment\nEnterprises\nUnits\nAssets\n2021\nJan\n1,483.3\n \n42,733.9\n \n77,994.4\n \n13,109.2\n \n40,071.8\n \n10,922.0\n10,322.7\n10.2\n0.0\n212.4\n16.7\n18.0\n1,264.3\n77,984.0\n5,315.2\n25,036.2\n15,951.2\n41,028.5\n363,474.0\nFeb\n1,735.4\n \n41,180.7\n \n76,140.3\n \n17,748.1\n \n39,141.4\n \n6,341.4\n15,612.1\n9.2\n0.0\n238.0\n24.1\n22.7\n1,493.7\n84,845.3\n5,413.6\n28,339.2\n19,441.2\n42,761.3\n380,487.7\nMar\n1,457.1\n \n40,953.3\n \n83,032.1\n \n6,945.5\n \n42,516.8\n \n8,733.6\n17,602.7\n8.4\n19.2\n449.7\n15.2\n21.7\n1,400.3\n90,291.7\n4,912.2\n32,908.1\n22,849.5\n40,104.9\n394,221.9\nApr\n1,699.7\n \n40,964.4\n \n85,330.2\n \n6,844.8\n \n49,733.4\n \n7,679.0\n19,384.3\n7.7\n19.2\n571.8\n19.9\n12.7\n1,336.7\n104,118.1\n5,432.6\n34,537.9\n25,207.8\n41,034.6\n423,934.8\nMay\n1,906.1\n \n30,579.1\n \n94,330.9\n \n7,907.2\n \n63,644.8\n \n11,582.4\n19,197.1\n7.0\n152.7\n611.0\n21.8\n16.6\n1,263.7\n111,185.7\n5,063.0\n35,592.3\n24,975.4\n40,256.6\n448,293.6\nJun\n1,702.8\n \n30,255.6\n \n75,795.2\n \n25,605.9\n \n72,780.6\n \n17,601.3\n17,610.8\n6.5\n19.5\n1,385.2\n17.9\n77.8\n1,511.9\n125,592.3\n5,203.8\n26,856.5\n29,616.4\n42,418.7\n474,058.5\nJul\n2,139.9\n \n30,509.1\n \n104,983.5\n \n17,817.9\n \n82,032.9\n \n25,314.3\n23,160.6\n6.0\n290.8\n1,264.1\n17.3\n67.8\n1,351.1\n135,107.8\n5,762.2\n26,869.2\n33,897.2\n42,726.7\n533,318.3\nAug\n2,551.1\n \n33,323.4\n \n93,806.9\n \n11,919.2\n \n72,753.9\n \n25,194.9\n35,371.1\n5.4\n339.7\n1,111.2\n22.5\n63.9\n1,583.3\n150,558.7\n7,014.2\n32,281.1\n34,820.2\n46,819.4\n549,540.1\nSep\n2,853.7\n \n38,500.1\n \n100,996.0\n \n8,626.8\n \n68,707.9\n \n25,023.4\n36,196.3\n5.1\n366.9\n948.5\n21.1\n62.5\n1,531.1\n154,818.9\n6,587.8\n31,981.0\n35,461.8\n45,544.7\n558,233.5\nOct\n2,611.1\n \n50,074.7\n \n108,009.2\n \n9,575.8\n \n89,822.4\n \n26,924.2\n43,786.5\n4.3\n188.1\n1,054.2\n21.2\n75.4\n1,683.9\n172,358.5\n6,987.7\n49,581.0\n47,370.6\n47,611.9\n657,740.6\nNov\n2,721.5\n \n53,424.3\n \n107,781.7\n \n15,560.6\n \n74,072.3\n \n29,748.5\n47,418.1\n3.7\n187.0\n2,678.7\n21.2\n74.8\n1,882.5\n195,765.6\n7,682.2\n52,327.7\n45,567.2\n54,967.5\n691,885.0\nDec\n2,838.3\n \n50,031.0\n \n118,451.3\n \n13,654.0\n \n91,352.6\n \n33,690.9\n41,452.1\n3.0\n186.0\n6,192.4\n21.1\n167.5\n2,998.6\n212,438.0\n14,917.3\n60,917.0\n48,759.9\n71,817.7\n769,888.8\n2022\nJan\n2,891.2\n \n53,378.3\n \n116,654.8\n \n13,232.3\n \n69,668.2\n \n30,774.3\n40,241.6\n2.4\n186.8\n2,906.7\n20.3\n163.0\n4,023.2\n228,616.6\n16,284.0\n53,627.8\n55,303.6\n85,737.0\n773,712.0\nFeb\n2,577.7\n \n62,064.5\n \n122,479.8\n \n17,480.5\n \n76,802.2\n \n28,703.5\n49,241.8\n1.6\n0.0\n3,242.5\n20.3\n158.1\n5,761.9\n249,205.9\n16,681.8\n55,099.6\n59,171.4\n86,732.0\n835,425.0\nMar\n2,111.5\n \n76,544.2\n \n142,962.5\n \n19,239.6\n \n87,884.5\n \n43,284.1\n50,566.9\n0.9\n0.0\n2,970.2\n19.4\n253.4\n6,635.8\n296,282.4\n16,435.1\n65,660.6\n69,287.0\n94,293.1\n974,431.2\nApr\n2,624.9\n \n74,716.9\n \n160,466.5\n \n28,352.1\n \n123,190.3\n \n26,628.8\n63,944.8\n0.2\n0.0\n2,583.9\n37.5\n252.4\n7,258.1\n338,207.2\n30,154.8\n53,372.3\n73,993.0\n90,352.8\n1,076,136.5\nMay\n3,155.9\n \n142,118.9\n \n236,166.0\n \n35,928.9\n \n207,812.8\n \n61,757.6\n70,936.8\n0.0\n155.0\n3,762.8\n41.3\n289.0\n16,588.0\n455,287.9\n36,125.5\n134,993.5\n111,577.7\n130,617.1\n1,647,314.7\nJun\n2,801.2\n \n138,347.1\n \n266,691.8\n \n45,952.0\n \n241,920.1\n \n63,631.8\n86,890.0\n0.0\n654.0\n5,297.4\n61.2\n226.3\n14,282.6\n549,799.2\n38,578.3\n169,511.8\n130,604.3\n205,601.3\n1,960,850.3\nJul\n2,427.6\n \n159,024.6\n \n315,832.5\n \n39,388.2\n \n230,432.5\n \n41,246.8\n91,509.2\n0.0\n394.3\n4,940.5\n100.7\n349.7\n22,911.0\n638,556.7\n45,361.4\n144,090.2\n143,606.3\n242,024.6\n2,122,196.7\nAug\n2,640.6\n \n263,637.4\n \n411,439.9\n \n69,203.5\n \n311,107.0\n \n29,186.6\n100,187.1\n0.0\n330.1\n6,912.2\n113.5\n287.1\n46,504.1\n764,466.3\n46,788.2\n167,029.4\n251,442.9\n244,934.2\n2,716,210.1\nSep\n3,030.7\n \n289,230.8\n \n504,071.1\n \n75,446.7\n \n417,007.1\n \n18,185.0\n143,464.9\n0.0\n267.4\n8,265.9\n115.1\n306.3\n41,560.9\n902,078.3\n51,664.5\n146,133.1\n231,760.0\n285,781.8\n3,118,369.8\nOct\n3,022.6\n \n300,240.3\n \n525,870.3\n \n104,483.2\n \n389,979.7\n \n22,895.3\n151,757.7\n0.0\n204.7\n4,590.6\n116.5\n342.0\n43,335.5\n936,397.1\n58,632.8\n165,306.9\n267,183.8\n298,996.3\n3,273,355.4\nNov\n3,251.4\n \n286,365.2\n \n575,885.7\n \n111,716.1\n \n342,790.1\n \n17,089.0\n198,814.4\n0.0\n142.0\n6,078.2\n119.5\n303.6\n43,195.4\n1,042,144.5\n73,069.8\n170,944.8\n232,107.1\n302,373.7\n3,406,390.5\nDec\n3,361.7\n \n295,435.1\n \n652,284.4\n \n119,932.8\n \n351,906.8\n \n7,965.4\n288,844.0\n0.0\n20,072.7\n8,831.7\n114.4\n282.6\n30,272.3\n1,143,910.8\n84,048.5\n159,126.2\n234,748.7\n418,944.7\n3,820,082.5\n2023\nJan\n4,923.3\n \n379,841.7\n \n704,168.6\n \n151,980.1\n \n389,342.8\n \n-1,443.6\n319,807.4\n0.0\n23,774.5\n8,624.7\n228.5\n251.2\n44,113.2\n1,348,919.7\n137,477.6\n227,545.4\n251,246.0\n451,149.8\n4,441,950.8\nFeb\n1,880.1\n \n436,062.8\n \n743,888.5\n \n81,067.5\n \n518,081.0\n \n21,964.4\n332,626.9\n0.0\n26,717.2\n6,974.7\n319.0\n197.4\n44,691.5\n1,538,078.6\n142,383.8\n226,933.0\n281,339.4\n490,831.3\n4,894,037.1\nMar\n2,031.6\n \n425,326.5\n \n817,631.1\n \n112,374.3\n \n531,935.4\n \n41,928.7\n360,626.2\n0.0\n24,689.0\n10,382.7\n432.2\n149.8\n48,725.4\n1,745,783.1\n166,893.5\n554,840.9\n315,882.3\n532,130.1\n5,691,762.4\nApr\n1,844.7\n \n462,081.4\n \n972,122.7\n \n161,740.7\n \n620,095.0\n \n32,207.0\n391,587.8\n0.0\n28,119.0\n19,573.0\n559.8\n99.3\n54,058.4\n1,822,350.9\n178,895.0\n214,270.9\n411,870.0\n572,012.3\n5,943,487.7\nMay\n1,107.2\n \n1,048,116.4\n \n2,049,066.1\n \n309,234.1\n \n1,554,969.0\n \n84,147.3\n653,025.9\n0.0\n76,351.5\n16,564.4\n4,599.1\n80.3\n112,188.1\n4,068,894.1\n366,505.1\n607,438.1\n788,546.8\n884,349.9\n12,625,183.4\nJun\n1,984.5\n \n2,249,201.6\n \n4,424,350.0\n \n471,360.3\n \n3,050,984.1\n \n390,369.2\n981,773.8\n0.0\n212,126.8\n8,070.8\n18,582.4\n83.0\n260,946.3\n8,977,244.2\n669,100.1\n1,390,786.2\n1,582,985.5\n2,782,639.3\n27,472,588.1\nJul\n1,489.0\n \n1,584,403.3\n \n4,137,377.2\n \n380,493.0\n \n3,132,849.9\n \n369,552.6\n1,242,045.2\n0.0\n165,764.7\n17,713.9\n7,368.1\n68.1\n208,253.7\n7,144,225.5\n821,517.0\n829,382.3\n1,411,037.1\n3,124,457.4\n24,577,997.9\nAug\n2,292.1\n \n1,505,916.2\n \n4,651,358.8\n \n448,025.8\n \n3,179,274.3\n \n245,546.0\n1,190,599.0\n0.0\n165,103.2\n7,939.8\n7,469.9\n75.8\n205,341.5\n7,142,066.9\n817,682.7\n701,626.2\n1,348,230.8\n3,086,091.3\n24,704,640.2\nSep\n2,465.6\n \n2,015,621.6\n \n5,263,338.5\n \n560,033.8\n \n3,210,332.7\n \n305,649.1\n1,318,582.7\n0.0\n175,013.5\n10,773.5\n9,935.8\n92.0\n219,878.9\n8,628,418.0\n892,737.1\n776,997.6\n1,646,406.8\n3,310,710.4\n28,346,987.7\nOct\n2,425.4\n \n2,312,575.1\n \n5,910,277.9\n \n751,077.6\n \n2,663,186.5\n \n240,258.0\n1,272,839.7\n0.0\n190,359.3\n21,408.8\n10,816.8\n98.1\n237,525.7\n9,281,352.1\n844,462.4\n958,746.4\n1,741,207.9\n3,433,150.2\n29,871,767.9\nNov\n2,705.3\n \n2,558,589.3\n \n6,324,144.1\n \n730,377.0\n \n2,788,783.6\n \n230,917.5\n1,517,348.4\n0.0\n188,949.4\n34,470.7\n10,921.4\n59.8\n238,702.3\n9,523,818.5\n907,759.0\n1,046,257.0\n2,150,227.0\n3,544,388.6\n31,798,418.9\nDec\n3,398.4\n \n2,868,505.6\n \n5,973,706.9\n \n918,524.5\n \n2,631,445.7\n \n212,294.5\n2,627,512.6\n0.0\n182,480.9\n38,249.3\n12,325.3\n73.5\n248,699.8\n10,110,961.4\n984,502.1\n1,184,706.9\n2,319,603.9\n4,087,896.6\n34,404,887.7\n2024\nJan\n2,947.9\n \n5,196,670.6\n \n9,096,074.6\n \n1,414,527.9\n \n3,957,664.6\n \n326,220.5\n4,283,761.8\n0.0\n306,771.2\n57,595.6\n17,912.4\n198.8\n374,088.3\n16,298,021.8\n1,109,251.7\n1,949,662.4\n3,467,246.2\n5,133,753.8\n52,992,370.2\nFeb\n3,143.6\n \n7,309,077.0\n \n12,595,037.9\n \n2,395,225.7\n \n5,340,576.7\n \n178,130.4\n6,381,641.8\n0.0\n437,989.9\n78,292.7\n26,073.1\n232.0\n488,602.8\n24,095,690.3\n1,538,423.6\n2,608,075.1\n4,122,833.9\n6,863,317.4\n74,462,363.7\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024\nNotes\n1.Government securities includes treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households, other financial corporations.\nPublic Enterprises\nTABLE 4.1: OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS -ASSETS\nZWL$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\nGovernment1 \nSecurities\n \n \n19 \n \n \n \n \nEnd of\n2021\nJan\n188,337.3\n17,667.3\n11,376.7\n217,381.3\n2,730.8\n5,453.7\n225,565.8\n1,422.4\n15,750.7\n391.1\n600.9\n376.7\n58,123.9\n25,036.2\n36,206.3\n363,474.0\nFeb\n189,154.3\n18,991.1\n14,072.8\n222,218.2\n2,959.1\n4,788.2\n229,965.5\n1,457.4\n15,908.6\n409.2\n581.4\n609.9\n63,583.8\n28,339.2\n39,632.7\n380,487.7\nMar\n193,674.2\n21,569.9\n14,209.4\n229,453.4\n4,691.2\n4,875.8\n239,020.5\n1,641.2\n14,997.2\n75.4\n1,378.2\n408.9\n67,061.8\n32,908.1\n36,730.7\n394,221.9\nApr\n219,936.5\n23,818.3\n13,746.7\n257,501.5\n2,725.1\n5,382.5\n265,609.2\n1,503.8\n15,748.4\n176.5\n939.0\n409.9\n68,812.8\n34,537.9\n36,197.4\n423,934.8\nMay\n232,585.8\n26,296.1\n18,415.5\n277,297.4\n2,205.9\n6,832.6\n286,335.9\n1,525.8\n16,063.1\n654.2\n540.1\n429.0\n69,567.0\n35,592.3\n37,586.2\n448,293.6\nJun\n249,167.5\n27,977.7\n21,449.6\n298,594.8\n2,906.1\n6,295.3\n307,796.2\n1,559.7\n15,430.6\n662.3\n939.0\n462.6\n72,403.8\n26,856.5\n47,947.9\n474,058.5\nJul\n271,359.4\n31,671.3\n23,074.4\n326,105.1\n3,016.7\n5,050.7\n334,172.4\n1,523.2\n16,041.4\n706.9\n750.8\n552.8\n76,406.3\n26,869.2\n76,295.4\n533,318.3\nAug\n275,007.8\n29,893.2\n29,352.2\n334,253.2\n3,661.5\n5,912.2\n343,826.8\n1,873.1\n18,699.5\n1,444.4\n2,300.1\n478.6\n82,627.2\n32,281.1\n66,009.2\n549,540.1\nSep\n301,829.4\n30,564.7\n26,426.5\n358,820.7\n3,719.1\n3,512.9\n366,052.6\n3,191.9\n16,236.1\n1,453.1\n71.3\n375.4\n84,564.6\n31,981.0\n54,307.5\n558,233.5\nOct\n350,366.7\n33,145.0\n27,967.9\n411,479.6\n2,824.1\n3,162.8\n417,466.5\n3,729.7\n21,509.9\n1,095.3\n1,109.9\n503.1\n92,871.8\n49,581.0\n69,873.5\n657,740.6\nNov\n363,455.0\n33,905.6\n33,256.8\n430,617.4\n3,325.7\n2,899.2\n436,842.3\n4,007.8\n19,465.9\n2,726.5\n1,556.1\n347.1\n104,310.9\n52,327.7\n70,300.6\n691,885.0\nDec\n396,412.5\n33,935.5\n37,464.8\n467,812.7\n3,922.1\n4,020.7\n475,755.5\n3,696.3\n23,643.2\n2,808.1\n2,405.3\n139.8\n128,421.4\n60,917.0\n72,102.3\n769,888.8\n2022\nJan\n392,702.2\n32,298.0\n39,346.3\n464,346.5\n2,962.5\n4,027.0\n471,336.0\n3,685.3\n25,398.5\n2,688.6\n1,416.9\n230.5\n144,852.4\n53,627.8\n70,476.0\n773,712.0\nFeb\n413,978.3\n37,494.3\n47,592.5\n499,065.1\n3,229.3\n4,407.7\n506,702.1\n4,456.2\n30,483.6\n2,120.4\n1,769.7\n226.8\n153,788.5\n55,099.6\n80,778.2\n835,425.0\nMar\n488,137.1\n37,893.9\n54,213.9\n580,244.9\n3,062.2\n5,330.5\n588,637.7\n4,510.9\n33,995.7\n2,137.9\n3,281.0\n810.6\n175,156.3\n65,660.6\n100,240.6\n974,431.2\nApr\n562,613.7\n46,129.7\n52,760.1\n661,503.5\n6,377.5\n7,656.8\n675,537.9\n4,246.9\n38,472.7\n2,173.0\n3,877.2\n486.8\n178,614.3\n53,372.3\n119,355.4\n1,076,136.5\nMay\n830,166.0\n61,112.6\n70,113.9\n961,392.5\n7,310.9\n7,417.6\n976,120.9\n6,165.3\n73,411.8\n2,383.3\n3,241.0\n321.8\n243,544.4\n134,993.5\n207,132.5\n1,647,314.7\nJun\n961,316.9\n66,716.9\n81,118.5\n1,109,152.4\n5,627.3\n10,226.2\n1,125,005.9\n7,157.9\n83,048.1\n2,898.5\n4,589.8\n345.2\n355,060.9\n169,511.8\n213,232.2\n1,960,850.3\nJul\n1,016,820.2\n79,550.5\n94,495.2\n1,190,865.8\n1,789.6\n9,363.5\n1,202,018.9\n8,137.9\n100,313.8\n2,814.9\n5,020.5\n1,339.1\n419,883.3\n144,090.2\n238,578.1\n2,122,196.7\nAug\n1,367,431.3\n85,931.5\n134,512.9\n1,587,875.7\n2,415.4\n7,892.4\n1,598,183.5\n12,785.6\n119,851.6\n3,230.7\n5,771.2\n555.2\n491,336.5\n167,029.4\n317,466.4\n2,716,210.1\nSep\n1,648,027.7\n92,678.5\n157,504.6\n1,898,210.8\n1,482.9\n8,707.2\n1,908,401.0\n14,047.5\n143,842.3\n3,720.2\n9,246.7\n587.2\n553,942.2\n146,133.1\n338,449.6\n3,118,369.8\nOct\n1,615,381.5\n76,774.2\n166,880.7\n1,859,036.4\n2,028.0\n6,673.7\n1,867,738.0\n15,558.9\n153,649.9\n28,072.2\n8,610.3\n762.5\n581,740.3\n165,306.9\n451,916.4\n3,273,355.4\nNov\n1,771,644.8\n81,518.1\n189,465.9\n2,042,628.9\n1,547.6\n6,731.4\n2,050,907.9\n13,438.5\n139,370.8\n19,973.5\n10,489.1\n339.6\n612,977.2\n170,944.8\n387,949.1\n3,406,390.5\nDec\n1,990,867.6\n90,317.0\n234,004.4\n2,315,189.0\n2,754.1\n7,866.7\n2,325,809.8\n14,149.0\n177,214.1\n10,597.8\n15,234.4\n752.5\n750,161.5\n159,126.2\n367,037.4\n3,820,082.5\n2023\nJan\n2,270,946.6\n100,094.1\n275,805.1\n2,646,845.8\n1,676.5\n41,821.3\n2,690,343.7\n15,056.5\n196,129.5\n4,974.3\n12,291.7\n675.5\n881,874.7\n227,545.4\n413,059.5\n4,441,950.8\nFeb\n2,496,192.1\n98,177.2\n294,332.5\n2,888,701.8\n1,956.9\n11,040.2\n2,901,698.9\n15,711.7\n225,209.4\n8,092.9\n20,822.5\n3,109.0\n951,831.6\n226,933.0\n540,628.1\n4,894,037.1\nMar\n2,710,394.6\n121,937.7\n333,589.3\n3,165,921.6\n1,430.8\n6,188.7\n3,173,541.1\n16,082.6\n256,206.0\n9,639.9\n22,996.8\n3,714.6\n1,036,325.4\n554,840.9\n618,415.2\n5,691,762.4\nApr\n3,144,048.4\n159,872.5\n269,932.0\n3,573,852.9\n573.4\n9,702.2\n3,584,128.5\n1,843.4\n318,092.2\n13,321.9\n29,787.9\n6,418.8\n1,137,637.3\n214,270.9\n637,986.8\n5,943,487.7\nMay\n6,481,742.5\n169,496.7\n556,927.2\n7,208,166.4\n1,068.6\n50,511.7\n7,259,746.7\n4,659.4\n783,531.0\n78,332.6\n74,083.0\n30,583.3\n2,224,856.6\n607,438.1\n1,561,952.6\n12,625,183.4\nJun\n12,937,869.2\n240,252.2\n1,073,317.8\n14,251,439.2\n4,578.8\n432,610.2\n14,688,628.1\n4,243.6\n1,833,341.2\n39,166.6\n112,338.9\n64,321.9\n6,245,056.0\n1,390,786.2\n3,094,705.7\n27,472,588.1\nJul\n11,864,787.9\n285,723.5\n828,095.7\n12,978,607.1\n30,380.7\n380,435.8\n13,389,423.7\n2,137.4\n1,458,906.6\n87,827.2\n160,696.4\n58,256.2\n5,865,068.7\n829,382.3\n2,726,299.5\n24,577,997.9\nAug\n12,168,928.8\n353,674.2\n862,852.8\n13,385,455.8\n23,457.8\n381,525.5\n13,790,439.1\n3,182.7\n1,483,108.2\n84,841.4\n154,160.3\n56,751.6\n5,646,934.2\n701,626.2\n2,783,596.5\n24,704,640.2\nSep\n14,342,241.3\n404,040.4\n947,184.1\n15,693,465.8\n11,309.1\n114,502.6\n15,819,277.6\n2,685.5\n1,688,992.2\n82,493.4\n168,880.8\n90,032.4\n6,410,594.6\n776,997.6\n3,307,033.6\n28,346,987.7\nOct\n15,103,817.1\n439,336.7\n1,190,702.7\n16,733,856.4\n8,575.8\n147,053.3\n16,889,485.5\n3,497.2\n1,573,857.1\n84,628.9\n176,455.5\n83,441.8\n6,756,087.7\n958,746.4\n3,345,567.7\n29,871,767.9\nNov\n15,816,643.6\n534,621.6\n1,241,055.7\n17,592,320.9\n92,509.4\n133,475.4\n17,818,305.6\n4,173.2\n1,784,153.1\n92,939.9\n244,115.1\n89,997.7\n7,059,070.8\n1,046,257.0\n3,659,406.4\n31,798,418.9\nDec\n16,937,697.1\n613,283.2\n1,290,630.5\n18,841,610.7\n94,004.9\n201,484.9\n19,137,100.5\n42,811.4\n1,831,385.7\n55,157.4\n162,437.9\n138,722.6\n7,736,287.7\n1,184,706.9\n4,116,277.7\n34,404,887.7\n2024\nJan\n26,686,959.6\n746,212.0\n1,754,255.7\n29,187,427.3\n113,265.9\n169,629.6\n29,470,322.8\n7,317.9\n3,007,687.4\n114,298.0\n290,202.8\n182,727.0\n11,623,761.9\n1,949,662.4\n6,346,389.9\n52,992,370.2\nFeb\n36,944,811.1\n818,341.2\n2,810,669.8\n40,573,822.1\n177,789.1\n340,577.8\n41,092,189.0\n9,458.4\n4,421,333.7\n105,237.1\n454,842.1\n279,727.9\n16,146,119.3\n2,608,075.1\n9,345,381.2\n74,462,363.7\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024\nTABLE 4.2 : OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS - LIABILITIES \nDeposits\nAmounts Owing to\nZWL$ millions\nTOTAL\nTime Deposits\nSavings\nDemand\nGovernment \nTotal\nOther Finacial \nCorporations\nCapital and \nReserves\nContigent \nLiabilities\nOther \nLiabilities\nOther \nDepository \nTotal Deposits from \nthe Public \nOther Depository \nCorporations\nDebt Securities\nForeign \nLiabilities\nRBZ\n \n \n20 \n \n \n \n \n \nEnd of\nForeign\nBond\nNotes\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \nLocal\nPublic\nOther \nContigent \nNon Financial \n Notes &\n&\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment1\nLocal Governemt\nPublic Enterprises\nOther2\nGovernment\nGovernment\nEnterprises\n Institutional Units3\nOther claims\nAssets\nOther Assets\nAssets\nTOTAL\nCoins\nCoin\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\n2021\nJan\n1,237.43\n \n39,565.64\n \n71,463.64\n \n12,288.89\n \n39,092.85\n \n10,921.99\n \n8,281.80\n \n-\n \n-\n \n1.18\n \n16.67\n \n18.01\n \n1,264.28\n \n71,090.96\n \n718.83\n \n25,036.22\n \n12,333.21\n \n32,123.11\n \n325,454.7\n \nFeb\n1,320.27\n \n38,100.03\n \n69,341.48\n \n16,867.76\n \n38,108.83\n \n6,341.39\n \n12,518.15\n \n-\n \n-\n \n1.26\n \n24.15\n \n22.69\n \n1,493.66\n \n77,324.34\n \n774.89\n \n28,339.17\n \n15,953.14\n \n33,612.14\n \n340,143.4\n \nMar\n1,244.16\n \n38,369.53\n \n76,479.44\n \n5,317.61\n \n41,401.24\n \n8,733.65\n \n15,889.61\n \n-\n \n19.21\n \n34.56\n \n15.17\n \n21.67\n \n1,309.75\n \n80,607.03\n \n878.97\n \n32,908.13\n \n19,302.34\n \n30,861.86\n \n353,393.9\n \nApr\n1,430.83\n \n38,008.89\n \n79,592.64\n \n5,639.40\n \n48,564.03\n \n7,679.05\n \n18,267.01\n \n-\n \n19.23\n \n62.89\n \n19.86\n \n12.71\n \n1,336.70\n \n91,062.16\n \n956.75\n \n34,537.88\n \n21,214.88\n \n32,383.77\n \n380,788.7\n \nMay\n1,648.09\n \n28,677.21\n \n87,611.51\n \n6,479.66\n \n59,745.10\n \n11,582.44\n \n18,846.75\n \n-\n \n152.75\n \n93.37\n \n21.77\n \n16.58\n \n1,263.75\n \n94,790.46\n \n990.41\n \n35,592.28\n \n21,398.95\n \n31,307.45\n \n400,218.5\n \nJun\n1,419.27\n \n28,452.53\n \n69,413.26\n \n24,215.35\n \n70,835.98\n \n17,601.31\n \n17,152.75\n \n-\n \n19.46\n \n92.91\n \n17.91\n \n77.79\n \n1,511.86\n \n106,954.15\n \n1,247.08\n \n26,856.45\n \n26,444.57\n \n33,288.94\n \n425,601.6\n \nJul\n1,794.72\n \n29,100.73\n \n97,429.50\n \n15,901.02\n \n79,937.02\n \n25,314.30\n \n21,665.10\n \n-\n \n290.76\n \n47.39\n \n17.32\n \n67.80\n \n1,351.13\n \n117,348.16\n \n1,301.18\n \n26,869.18\n \n29,079.64\n \n33,587.68\n \n481,102.6\n \nAug\n2,137.72\n \n31,734.84\n \n85,441.98\n \n9,099.10\n \n70,391.64\n \n25,194.95\n \n31,434.20\n \n-\n \n339.72\n \n51.28\n \n22.49\n \n63.94\n \n1,583.28\n \n132,522.63\n \n1,337.19\n \n32,281.12\n \n30,022.43\n \n37,697.05\n \n491,355.6\n \nSep\n2,417.81\n \n36,259.54\n \n93,032.71\n \n6,164.78\n \n66,640.78\n \n25,023.38\n \n31,460.81\n \n-\n \n366.88\n \n57.60\n \n21.07\n \n62.45\n \n1,531.08\n \n134,780.92\n \n1,342.62\n \n31,980.97\n \n30,439.34\n \n34,630.85\n \n496,213.6\n \nOct\n1,993.06\n \n47,379.62\n \n99,470.02\n \n7,339.71\n \n86,302.62\n \n26,924.18\n \n37,639.16\n \n-\n \n188.07\n \n121.59\n \n21.20\n \n75.41\n \n1,683.89\n \n149,477.36\n \n1,523.34\n \n49,580.96\n \n40,853.06\n \n36,664.31\n \n587,237.6\n \nNov\n2,168.80\n \n49,327.15\n \n100,125.90\n \n12,723.73\n \n71,667.33\n \n29,748.47\n \n41,015.56\n \n-\n \n187.03\n \n999.12\n \n21.24\n \n74.76\n \n1,882.53\n \n168,661.25\n \n1,484.24\n \n52,327.68\n \n40,073.22\n \n43,878.52\n \n616,366.5\n \nDec\n2,315.32\n \n46,412.99\n \n109,803.84\n \n10,942.92\n \n87,347.07\n \n33,690.93\n \n38,610.29\n \n-\n \n185.99\n \n4,146.13\n \n21.09\n \n167.53\n \n2,798.61\n \n184,836.87\n \n3,368.75\n \n60,916.98\n \n41,811.67\n \n59,011.63\n \n686,388.6\n \n2022\nJan\n2,359.27\n \n49,206.02\n \n108,119.97\n \n10,419.90\n \n66,808.45\n \n30,774.31\n \n38,636.84\n \n-\n \n186.80\n \n801.50\n \n20.33\n \n163.02\n \n3,628.73\n \n199,495.34\n \n2,997.94\n \n53,627.76\n \n47,405.91\n \n69,989.80\n \n684,641.9\n \nFeb\n1,971.78\n \n57,553.54\n \n112,522.99\n \n14,300.66\n \n70,750.63\n \n28,703.53\n \n44,705.21\n \n-\n \n-\n \n976.55\n \n20.34\n \n158.06\n \n5,367.16\n \n215,520.37\n \n3,055.50\n \n55,099.61\n \n53,459.12\n \n70,832.47\n \n734,997.5\n \nMar\n1,541.49\n \n70,856.33\n \n130,423.48\n \n15,503.46\n \n82,662.70\n \n43,284.13\n \n44,874.23\n \n-\n \n-\n \n1,380.20\n \n19.40\n \n253.42\n \n6,240.94\n \n258,715.05\n \n3,092.69\n \n65,660.61\n \n58,874.69\n \n76,938.87\n \n860,321.7\n \nApr\n1,939.64\n \n70,204.43\n \n144,168.02\n \n23,452.88\n \n117,033.42\n \n26,628.79\n \n57,772.47\n \n-\n \n-\n \n722.54\n \n37.54\n \n252.44\n \n6,858.06\n \n305,476.79\n \n4,348.46\n \n53,372.28\n \n62,788.55\n \n71,414.75\n \n946,471.1\n \nMay\n2,397.94\n \n131,996.38\n \n211,837.59\n \n31,586.61\n \n190,366.81\n \n61,757.62\n \n64,373.91\n \n-\n \n154.99\n \n1,559.14\n \n41.28\n \n289.00\n \n16,193.81\n \n398,048.90\n \n4,712.74\n \n134,993.54\n \n94,851.60\n \n111,543.84\n \n1,456,705.7\n \nJun\n2,263.18\n \n127,839.16\n \n234,109.43\n \n40,937.28\n \n219,607.39\n \n63,631.76\n \n83,690.44\n \n-\n \n653.97\n \n2,159.12\n \n61.20\n \n226.29\n \n13,888.60\n \n478,163.38\n \n8,954.46\n \n169,511.81\n \n110,528.09\n \n168,440.54\n \n1,724,666.1\n \nJul\n1,578.47\n \n147,217.74\n \n284,912.89\n \n34,334.13\n \n202,815.28\n \n41,246.78\n \n86,971.63\n \n-\n \n394.34\n \n1,852.14\n \n100.65\n \n349.68\n \n22,516.21\n \n556,692.12\n \n9,737.92\n \n144,090.18\n \n129,869.55\n \n192,524.32\n \n1,857,204.0\n \nAug\n1,630.70\n \n247,190.46\n \n377,078.80\n \n64,650.96\n \n273,181.97\n \n29,186.59\n \n95,346.12\n \n-\n \n330.12\n \n3,556.96\n \n113.50\n \n287.14\n \n26,564.57\n \n681,253.30\n \n11,493.92\n \n167,029.36\n \n238,442.98\n \n194,745.11\n \n2,412,082.6\n \nSep\n1,791.71\n \n270,594.59\n \n465,301.31\n \n68,020.95\n \n370,323.69\n \n18,184.96\n \n134,414.53\n \n-\n \n267.40\n \n4,916.56\n \n115.11\n \n306.33\n \n21,773.50\n \n806,774.24\n \n12,680.89\n \n146,133.14\n \n215,417.68\n \n219,933.24\n \n2,756,949.8\n \nOct\n1,704.79\n \n281,204.64\n \n480,106.49\n \n94,573.08\n \n343,440.15\n \n22,895.35\n \n136,939.74\n \n-\n \n204.69\n \n2,201.55\n \n116.48\n \n341.96\n \n22,935.50\n \n852,069.39\n \n15,525.65\n \n165,306.91\n \n232,188.99\n \n245,924.22\n \n2,897,679.6\n \nNov\n1,644.95\n \n259,109.18\n \n533,438.97\n \n101,870.32\n \n299,715.01\n \n17,089.04\n \n180,534.44\n \n-\n \n141.97\n \n2,292.28\n \n119.53\n \n303.55\n \n22,178.73\n \n960,814.77\n \n15,450.39\n \n170,944.78\n \n196,338.19\n \n250,551.19\n \n3,012,537.3\n \nDec\n1,778.71\n \n263,863.65\n \n603,136.26\n \n110,935.77\n \n299,087.30\n \n7,965.37\n \n266,725.41\n \n-\n \n79.26\n \n3,887.78\n \n114.42\n \n282.61\n \n30,272.25\n \n1,066,654.12\n \n16,130.63\n \n159,126.16\n \n189,560.01\n \n344,235.10\n \n3,363,834.8\n \n2023\nJan\n2,391.61\n \n340,953.56\n \n654,740.29\n \n143,455.70\n \n335,380.17\n \n(1,443.59)\n \n301,026.07\n \n-\n \n105.97\n \n4,873.87\n \n228.45\n \n251.24\n \n44,113.17\n \n1,307,512.98\n \n17,767.70\n \n227,545.42\n \n204,830.78\n \n374,080.77\n \n3,957,814.2\n \nFeb\n1,470.56\n \n366,544.71\n \n691,937.49\n \n71,097.36\n \n452,795.43\n \n21,074.53\n \n306,913.92\n \n-\n \n50.02\n \n1,524.98\n \n318.96\n \n197.44\n \n44,691.50\n \n1,481,851.05\n \n18,037.18\n \n226,932.96\n \n224,983.29\n \n411,002.80\n \n4,321,424.2\n \nMar\n1,771.98\n \n344,570.46\n \n755,463.34\n \n103,284.07\n \n478,333.21\n \n41,928.66\n \n330,669.68\n \n-\n \n-\n \n3,884.11\n \n432.22\n \n149.78\n \n48,725.38\n \n1,679,284.89\n \n28,439.56\n \n554,840.85\n \n254,605.57\n \n438,790.17\n \n5,065,173.9\n \nApr\n1,631.24\n \n388,822.83\n \n903,029.49\n \n144,252.31\n \n555,886.92\n \n32,206.95\n \n361,846.09\n \n-\n \n-\n \n8,716.45\n \n559.82\n \n99.28\n \n54,058.39\n \n1,722,384.40\n \n28,899.91\n \n214,270.92\n \n321,765.39\n \n476,263.19\n \n5,214,693.6\n \nMay\n1,010.26\n \n907,818.70\n \n1,932,225.57\n \n281,052.93\n \n1,351,116.97\n \n84,147.32\n \n570,367.60\n \n-\n \n-\n \n8,974.78\n \n4,599.15\n \n80.34\n \n112,188.06\n \n3,844,133.80\n \n65,696.39\n \n607,438.10\n \n669,908.72\n \n758,154.17\n \n11,198,912.9\n \nJun\n1,762.11\n \n1,979,000.71\n \n4,218,755.04\n \n444,538.09\n \n2,584,596.63\n \n350,042.51\n \n865,465.55\n \n-\n \n-\n \n221.09\n \n10,133.46\n \n8,052.34\n \n260,946.26\n \n8,487,837.63\n \n92,224.26\n \n1,390,786.24\n \n1,304,228.92\n \n2,222,499.38\n \n24,221,090.2\n \nJul\n1,305.13\n \n1,428,604.02\n \n3,898,282.53\n \n359,151.15\n \n2,646,743.26\n \n337,541.82\n \n1,133,463.14\n \n-\n \n-\n \n153.30\n \n7,368.09\n \n68.07\n \n208,253.70\n \n6,917,007.30\n \n129,308.58\n \n829,382.28\n \n1,155,945.57\n \n2,438,538.20\n \n21,491,116.1\n \nAug\n1,664.09\n \n1,370,651.81\n \n4,309,693.74\n \n391,792.23\n \n2,693,989.06\n \n208,098.88\n \n1,084,784.90\n \n-\n \n-\n \n138.30\n \n7,469.95\n \n75.80\n \n205,341.47\n \n6,863,348.14\n \n127,816.16\n \n701,626.16\n \n1,081,800.09\n \n2,446,465.02\n \n21,494,755.8\n \nSep\n1,503.56\n \n1,763,364.33\n \n4,914,305.55\n \n517,813.92\n \n2,760,807.78\n \n247,094.60\n \n1,204,684.14\n \n-\n \n-\n \n9.75\n \n9,935.82\n \n92.05\n \n219,878.94\n \n8,245,053.80\n \n151,685.43\n \n776,997.57\n \n1,312,147.78\n \n2,668,520.81\n \n24,793,895.8\n \nOct\n1,977.18\n \n2,059,471.85\n \n5,625,069.70\n \n562,790.91\n \n2,202,475.21\n \n175,235.94\n \n1,172,130.22\n \n-\n \n-\n \n0.03\n \n10,816.83\n \n98.06\n \n237,525.73\n \n8,864,363.09\n \n153,534.70\n \n958,746.42\n \n1,351,846.54\n \n2,767,099.33\n \n26,143,181.7\n \nNov\n2,295.18\n \n2,278,921.91\n \n5,913,094.15\n \n568,556.41\n \n2,451,981.00\n \n180,229.25\n \n1,337,040.40\n \n-\n \n-\n \n0.03\n \n10,921.42\n \n59.77\n \n238,702.30\n \n9,040,518.08\n \n158,702.11\n \n1,046,256.98\n \n1,702,370.26\n \n2,868,031.98\n \n27,797,681.2\n \nDec\n2,947.49\n \n2,536,437.97\n \n5,489,443.24\n \n657,432.63\n \n2,268,702.96\n \n155,742.88\n \n2,420,663.39\n \n-\n \n-\n \n0.03\n \n12,324.59\n \n73.45\n \n248,699.79\n \n9,507,281.46\n \n255,007.08\n \n1,184,706.91\n \n1,748,495.98\n \n3,349,062.31\n \n29,837,022.2\n \n2024\nJan\n2,536.36\n \n4,749,173.95\n \n8,535,153.83\n \n940,210.80\n \n3,564,879.01\n \n285,807.60\n \n3,972,600.87\n \n-\n \n-\n \n0.03\n \n17,912.41\n \n198.80\n \n374,088.29\n \n14,957,169.30\n \n312,516.30\n \n1,949,662.45\n \n2,737,500.88\n \n4,289,981.53\n \n46,689,392.4\n \nFeb\n2,519.25\n \n6,564,463.71\n \n11,709,703.62\n \n1,772,649.65\n \n4,708,270.62\n \n153,450.01\n \n5,911,393.45\n \n-\n \n-\n \n0.03\n \n26,073.06\n \n232.00\n \n488,602.76\n \n22,234,523.09\n \n378,975.16\n \n2,608,075.14\n \n3,125,793.33\n \n5,812,047.28\n \n65,496,772.2\n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024\nNotes\n1.Government securities include treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households, other financial corporations. \nTABLE 5.1: COMMERCIAL BANKS -ASSETS\nZWL$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \n21 \n \n \n \nZWL$ millions\nEnd of\nDemand\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nCapital\nContigent\nOther\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\nand\nLiablities\nLiablities\nTOTAL\nReserves\n2021\nJan\n158,888.8\n28,456.6\n10,150.2\n197,495.5\n2,580.8\n5,423.4\n205,499.8\n1,142.5\n12,732.6\n391.1\n519.6\n376.7\n50,147.7\n25,036.2\n29,608.5\n325,454.7\nFeb\n162,092.2\n26,146.3\n12,239.7\n200,478.2\n2,809.1\n4,762.5\n208,049.7\n1,150.4\n12,833.2\n409.2\n540.7\n609.9\n54,930.3\n28,339.2\n33,280.7\n340,143.4\nMar\n165,101.1\n30,313.5\n12,276.4\n207,691.0\n4,541.2\n4,845.3\n217,077.6\n1,331.7\n11,620.2\n75.4\n1,136.7\n408.9\n58,208.9\n32,908.1\n30,626.5\n353,393.9\nApr\n191,923.5\n31,441.3\n11,549.5\n234,914.3\n2,195.0\n5,346.7\n242,455.9\n1,190.1\n11,503.5\n176.5\n757.1\n409.9\n60,361.3\n34,537.9\n29,396.5\n380,788.7\nMay\n194,108.9\n40,921.9\n15,896.4\n250,927.2\n1,705.9\n6,802.1\n259,435.2\n1,186.9\n11,783.3\n654.2\n145.2\n429.0\n61,202.0\n35,592.3\n29,790.4\n400,218.5\nJun\n211,950.0\n40,878.5\n18,536.0\n271,364.4\n2,696.6\n6,202.3\n280,263.2\n1,211.8\n11,575.5\n662.3\n368.5\n462.6\n63,417.5\n26,856.5\n40,783.7\n425,601.6\nJul\n226,860.1\n48,928.9\n19,775.4\n295,564.4\n2,991.7\n5,012.2\n303,568.3\n1,169.2\n12,552.8\n706.9\n476.2\n552.8\n66,514.1\n26,869.2\n68,693.1\n481,102.6\nAug\n237,167.0\n38,425.4\n25,114.2\n300,706.5\n3,601.5\n5,873.7\n310,181.7\n1,216.2\n13,354.7\n1,444.4\n1,678.3\n478.6\n72,123.3\n32,281.1\n58,597.3\n491,355.6\nSep\n263,598.2\n37,954.3\n21,954.4\n323,506.9\n3,643.0\n3,469.0\n330,618.9\n2,141.0\n11,770.4\n1,453.1\n-110.6\n375.4\n71,255.0\n31,981.0\n46,729.4\n496,213.6\nOct\n299,038.0\n50,766.0\n22,882.7\n372,686.7\n2,824.1\n3,023.7\n378,534.5\n2,411.8\n14,077.4\n1,095.3\n1,109.9\n503.1\n78,644.6\n49,581.0\n61,280.0\n587,237.6\nNov\n307,063.4\n52,309.9\n27,875.3\n387,248.6\n3,325.7\n2,764.9\n393,339.3\n2,869.4\n12,437.2\n2,726.5\n1,352.5\n347.1\n89,288.6\n52,327.7\n61,678.3\n616,366.5\nDec\n334,599.0\n58,318.5\n30,455.6\n423,373.1\n3,842.1\n3,855.7\n431,070.9\n3,027.0\n13,896.4\n2,808.1\n1,693.3\n139.8\n109,665.4\n60,917.0\n63,170.8\n686,388.6\n2022\nJan\n346,619.5\n43,438.8\n31,158.1\n421,216.4\n2,962.5\n3,864.8\n428,043.7\n2,995.6\n14,406.9\n2,688.6\n1,043.2\n230.5\n122,752.1\n53,627.8\n58,853.6\n684,641.9\nFeb\n358,979.4\n51,510.7\n38,313.7\n448,803.8\n3,229.3\n4,248.7\n456,281.8\n3,834.1\n16,267.7\n2,120.4\n1,338.1\n226.8\n130,981.3\n55,099.6\n68,847.8\n734,997.5\nMar\n422,934.6\n58,283.5\n42,258.5\n523,476.6\n3,062.2\n5,171.3\n531,710.2\n3,850.2\n18,374.8\n2,137.9\n2,779.1\n810.6\n149,781.8\n65,660.6\n85,216.5\n860,321.7\nApr\n479,558.7\n74,880.3\n40,491.0\n594,930.0\n6,377.5\n7,486.7\n608,794.2\n3,792.3\n21,445.6\n2,173.0\n3,173.0\n486.8\n149,610.1\n53,372.3\n103,623.7\n946,471.1\nMay\n666,937.8\n137,419.9\n55,389.8\n859,747.5\n7,310.9\n7,249.8\n874,308.3\n5,769.3\n39,105.1\n2,383.3\n2,207.5\n321.8\n214,978.6\n134,993.5\n182,638.3\n1,456,705.7\nJun\n773,692.7\n154,956.9\n63,511.7\n992,161.3\n4,597.1\n10,018.0\n1,006,776.4\n6,743.2\n42,701.8\n2,898.5\n3,389.3\n345.2\n307,341.8\n169,511.8\n184,958.1\n1,724,666.1\nJul\n810,906.6\n173,134.0\n74,324.5\n1,058,365.1\n717.0\n9,153.8\n1,068,235.9\n7,994.5\n54,168.7\n2,814.9\n2,948.9\n1,339.1\n355,597.9\n144,090.2\n220,013.9\n1,857,204.0\nAug\n1,100,922.1\n219,798.6\n110,595.1\n1,431,315.7\n790.2\n7,675.2\n1,439,781.1\n12,484.6\n64,160.3\n3,230.7\n2,791.8\n555.2\n421,880.4\n167,029.4\n300,169.0\n2,412,082.6\nSep\n1,328,584.6\n256,980.2\n127,051.1\n1,712,616.0\n1,482.9\n8,473.0\n1,722,571.9\n13,789.2\n81,182.4\n3,720.2\n5,632.9\n587.2\n465,063.9\n146,133.1\n318,269.0\n2,756,949.8\nOct\n1,365,908.5\n205,688.8\n128,186.9\n1,699,784.2\n813.8\n6,314.3\n1,706,912.3\n14,933.2\n83,998.0\n28,072.2\n4,282.4\n762.5\n486,396.6\n165,306.9\n407,015.5\n2,897,679.6\nNov\n1,481,503.5\n243,239.9\n146,530.0\n1,871,273.4\n291.3\n6,366.6\n1,877,931.3\n12,665.1\n67,318.9\n19,973.5\n5,349.1\n339.6\n514,200.0\n170,944.8\n343,815.1\n3,012,537.3\nDec\n1,697,008.7\n235,271.2\n181,090.6\n2,113,370.5\n1,514.4\n7,399.5\n2,122,284.4\n13,296.8\n106,071.5\n10,597.8\n9,610.4\n752.5\n621,113.3\n159,126.2\n320,981.8\n3,363,834.8\n2023\nJan\n2,139,458.0\n78,197.7\n215,537.0\n2,433,192.7\n214.3\n41,333.8\n2,474,740.8\n12,923.7\n123,605.0\n4,974.3\n5,669.1\n675.5\n723,452.2\n227,545.4\n384,228.1\n3,957,814.2\nFeb\n1,997,073.4\n398,595.8\n230,549.9\n2,626,219.1\n303.5\n10,655.7\n2,637,178.4\n14,443.3\n140,484.9\n8,092.9\n13,273.6\n3,109.0\n780,290.7\n226,933.0\n497,618.5\n4,321,424.2\nMar\n2,218,678.7\n384,245.5\n262,119.8\n2,865,044.1\n1,272.8\n5,953.0\n2,872,269.9\n15,181.9\n166,322.5\n9,639.9\n15,494.1\n3,714.6\n846,479.9\n554,840.9\n581,230.2\n5,065,173.9\nApr\n2,646,522.9\n382,678.9\n197,662.2\n3,226,864.0\n173.4\n9,463.7\n3,236,501.1\n1,115.5\n201,674.1\n13,321.9\n21,331.0\n6,418.8\n935,402.2\n214,270.9\n584,658.1\n5,214,693.6\nMay\n5,196,712.7\n969,812.4\n435,965.9\n6,602,490.9\n514.9\n50,270.4\n6,653,276.3\n1,287.6\n493,894.8\n78,332.6\n65,967.5\n30,583.3\n1,815,309.9\n607,438.1\n1,452,822.8\n11,198,912.9\nJun\n10,038,744.6\n2,287,818.9\n789,112.9\n13,115,676.4\n1,468.6\n432,367.0\n13,549,512.0\n1,177.5\n1,201,797.0\n39,166.6\n101,465.7\n64,321.9\n5,042,026.4\n1,390,786.2\n2,830,837.1\n24,221,090.2\nJul\n9,592,825.0\n1,787,488.9\n592,115.4\n11,972,429.2\n9,138.5\n380,190.7\n12,361,758.4\n512.4\n847,658.7\n87,827.2\n146,299.0\n58,256.2\n4,649,856.9\n829,382.3\n2,509,565.1\n21,491,116.1\nAug\n9,698,801.3\n1,920,804.2\n622,360.9\n12,241,966.5\n1,479.8\n381,277.2\n12,624,723.5\n863.9\n865,945.4\n84,841.4\n141,305.4\n56,751.6\n4,465,099.7\n701,626.2\n2,553,598.8\n21,494,755.8\nSep\n13,388,822.1\n319,686.0\n695,555.0\n14,404,063.1\n4,754.8\n114,251.5\n14,523,069.4\n504.3\n1,036,635.6\n82,493.4\n152,779.3\n90,032.4\n5,159,376.7\n776,997.6\n2,972,007.2\n24,793,895.8\nOct\n14,087,303.5\n312,655.9\n827,902.5\n15,227,861.9\n1,692.7\n146,801.2\n15,376,355.8\n522.9\n1,106,440.5\n84,628.9\n159,670.3\n83,441.8\n5,427,255.6\n958,746.4\n2,946,119.7\n26,143,181.7\nNov\n14,816,672.7\n306,014.4\n882,972.1\n16,005,659.2\n5,789.4\n133,219.7\n16,144,668.4\n432.3\n1,259,039.0\n92,939.9\n227,935.0\n89,997.7\n5,701,702.0\n1,046,257.0\n3,234,709.9\n27,797,681.2\nDec\n15,726,758.6\n369,405.4\n808,422.2\n16,904,586.1\n6,923.3\n201,225.8\n17,112,735.3\n36,808.0\n1,314,667.6\n55,157.4\n153,701.6\n138,722.6\n6,264,918.7\n1,184,706.9\n3,575,604.1\n29,837,022.2\n2024\nJan\n24,824,665.8\n662,989.2\n1,191,915.8\n26,679,570.7\n25,881.9\n169,368.5\n26,874,821.1\n168.2\n2,102,990.2\n114,298.0\n279,174.1\n182,727.0\n9,532,603.9\n1,949,662.4\n5,652,947.5\n46,689,392.4\nFeb\n34,081,030.9\n911,544.4\n1,983,870.0\n36,976,445.3\n7,146.9\n340,314.0\n37,323,906.2\n151.1\n3,106,432.1\n105,237.1\n449,118.3\n279,727.9\n13,237,287.6\n2,608,075.1\n8,386,836.6\n65,496,772.2\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024\nTABLE 5.2 : COMMERCIAL BANKS - LIABILITIES\nDeposits\nAmounts Owing to\n \n \n22 \n \n \n \nForeign\nOther Assets\nNon Financial \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nNotes\nAssets\nBond\n&\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \n Notes &\nCoin\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment1\nLocal Governemt\nPublic Enterprises\nOther2\nMortgages\nGovernment\nOther\nCoins\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\n2021\nJan\n188.7\n \n2943.3\n5,986.5\n \n793.8\n843.5\n \n-\n \n1,783.8\n \n10.2\n-\n \n211.3\n \n1,091.3\n \n0.0\n \n9,329.1\n \n2980.3\n7,685.1\n \n33,846.9\n \nFeb\n345.7\n \n2762.9\n6,004.8\n \n811.1\n984.2\n \n-\n \n2,731.0\n \n9.2\n-\n \n236.8\n \n2,089.3\n \n-\n \n8,950.2\n \n2949.2\n7,790.6\n \n35,665.0\n \nMar\n168.3\n \n2278.9\n6,313.1\n \n1594.4\n1,028.2\n \n-\n \n1,341.7\n \n8.4\n-\n \n415.1\n \n1,242.4\n \n-\n \n10,867.7\n \n3027.5\n7,841.0\n \n36,126.8\n \nApr\n206.9\n \n2702.1\n5,302.6\n \n1156.7\n1,085.4\n \n-\n \n871.7\n \n7.7\n-\n \n508.9\n \n1,581.5\n \n-\n \n14,233.6\n \n3431.1\n7,237.9\n \n38,326.2\n \nMay\n210.3\n \n1687.6\n5,962.2\n \n1250.9\n3,847.1\n \n-\n \n116.9\n \n7.0\n-\n \n517.7\n \n1,568.8\n \n-\n \n17,154.9\n \n2927.9\n7,532.9\n \n42,784.2\n \nJun\n249.6\n \n1649.7\n6,202.6\n \n1163.8\n1,866.7\n \n-\n \n204.6\n \n6.5\n-\n \n588.0\n \n1,851.9\n \n-\n \n18,795.4\n \n2580.9\n7,701.1\n \n42,860.7\n \nJul\n283.7\n \n1212.2\n7,193.4\n \n1892.7\n1,875.4\n \n-\n \n1,143.4\n \n6.0\n-\n \n447.3\n \n1,963.2\n \n-\n \n18,280.3\n \n3923.5\n7,695.6\n \n45,916.5\n \nAug\n352.8\n \n1408.8\n7,869.3\n \n2537.6\n2,316.2\n \n-\n \n3,535.6\n \n5.4\n-\n \n399.5\n \n2,101.3\n \n-\n \n19,422.2\n \n3837.6\n7,666.6\n \n51,453.0\n \nSep\n349.8\n \n1926.6\n7,608.5\n \n2430.2\n1,941.4\n \n-\n \n4,314.6\n \n5.1\n-\n \n205.2\n \n2,231.7\n \n-\n \n20,461.1\n \n4013.2\n9,460.7\n \n54,948.1\n \nOct\n411.5\n \n2396.2\n8,221.0\n \n2162.4\n3,421.5\n \n-\n \n5,627.7\n \n4.3\n-\n \n271.1\n \n2,539.5\n \n-\n \n22,881.3\n \n5432.3\n9,501.3\n \n62,870.1\n \nNov\n339.8\n \n3578.4\n7,561.6\n \n2568.8\n2,299.5\n \n-\n \n5,882.7\n \n3.7\n-\n \n566.4\n \n2,788.5\n \n-\n \n27,326.1\n \n4400.3\n9,614.3\n \n66,930.0\n \nDec\n351.1\n \n3217.3\n8,557.8\n \n2619.2\n3,620.2\n \n-\n \n2,353.6\n \n3.0\n-\n \n1,189.0\n \n2,786.9\n \n-\n \n33,115.3\n \n5610.8\n11,334.1\n \n74,758.3\n \n2022\nJan\n324.6\n \n3,504.3\n \n8,506.5\n \n2680.3\n2,631.0\n \n-\n \n1,110.8\n \n2.4\n-\n \n1,487.3\n \n2,967.6\n \n-\n \n35,913.5\n \n6693.8\n14,008.7\n \n79,830.9\n \nFeb\n411.5\n \n4,021.5\n \n9,763.6\n \n3069.7\n5,678.0\n \n-\n \n4,048.9\n \n1.6\n-\n \n1,465.4\n \n3,241.1\n \n-\n \n39,977.5\n \n4511.5\n13,964.4\n \n90,154.6\n \nMar\n354.3\n \n4,413.6\n \n11,882.6\n \n3691.3\n4,932.3\n \n-\n \n5,235.0\n \n0.9\n-\n \n1,590.0\n \n3,888.3\n \n-\n \n42,741.3\n \n9086.6\n15,421.2\n \n103,237.4\n \nApr\n546.4\n \n3,054.1\n \n15,585.8\n \n4857.7\n5,768.6\n \n-\n \n5,714.4\n \n0.2\n-\n \n1,861.4\n \n4,143.7\n \n-\n \n48,582.4\n \n9654.2\n16,999.2\n \n116,768.1\n \nMay\n639.5\n \n8,326.7\n \n23,817.6\n \n4251.9\n16,001.6\n \n-\n \n6,150.9\n \n0.0\n-\n \n1,486.3\n \n8,474.8\n \n-\n \n74,864.0\n \n14793.9\n17,091.2\n \n175,898.5\n \nJun\n418.5\n \n8,464.3\n \n32,497.6\n \n3807.5\n21,184.8\n \n-\n \n2,639.3\n \n0.0\n-\n \n1,340.0\n \n10,851.1\n \n-\n \n85,145.9\n \n18155.8\n35,128.1\n \n219,633.0\n \nJul\n700.4\n \n9,914.6\n \n30,660.3\n \n4983.4\n24,902.9\n \n-\n \n4,077.6\n \n0.0\n-\n \n1,411.5\n \n13,722.1\n \n-\n \n98,066.0\n \n9998.6\n45,127.9\n \n243,565.1\n \nAug\n863.8\n \n14,422.1\n \n33,703.2\n \n4483.0\n34,971.8\n \n-\n \n4,379.8\n \n0.0\n-\n \n2,106.6\n \n16,515.4\n \n-\n \n115,491.9\n \n8745.3\n45,694.0\n \n281,377.1\n \nSep\n1,086.8\n \n14,998.2\n \n37,911.3\n \n7470.1\n45,094.8\n \n-\n \n8,440.8\n \n0.0\n-\n \n1,302.8\n \n17,996.8\n \n-\n \n129,242.7\n \n11630.7\n60,830.4\n \n336,005.2\n \nOct\n1,158.3\n \n14,768.7\n \n44,296.5\n \n10013.7\n44,664.1\n \n-\n \n14,109.9\n \n0.0\n-\n \n1,142.4\n \n16,817.7\n \n-\n \n123,793.8\n \n30036.4\n47,678.2\n \n348,479.7\n \nNov\n1,449.3\n \n22,456.9\n \n41,398.0\n \n9771.8\n41,317.6\n \n-\n \n17,572.6\n \n0.0\n-\n \n2,085.3\n \n16,785.8\n \n-\n \n136,029.9\n \n30694.0\n46,275.8\n \n365,836.9\n \nDec\n1,470.7\n \n23,012.7\n \n48,533.8\n \n8913.7\n50,229.0\n \n-\n \n21,411.1\n \n0.0\n19,993.4\n \n2,176.2\n \n17,693.7\n \n-\n \n119,322.3\n \n39279.1\n69,102.5\n \n421,138.1\n \n2023\nJan\n2,402.7\n \n32405.1\n47,062.6\n \n8410.8\n50,364.6\n \n-\n \n17,976.2\n \n0.0\n23,668.5\n \n2,406.3\n \n18,311.0\n \n-\n \n132,757.4\n \n41367.4\n69,570.1\n \n446,702.8\n \nFeb\n234.9\n \n59685.4\n50,103.0\n \n9568.6\n62,701.4\n \n889.9\n \n24,809.7\n \n0.0\n26,667.1\n \n4,451.9\n \n21,629.1\n \n-\n \n146,798.4\n \n50093.6\n70,987.9\n \n528,620.9\n \nMar\n214.6\n \n72311.9\n57,399.6\n \n9196.8\n51,300.9\n \n-\n \n28,841.5\n \n0.0\n24,689.0\n \n5,503.9\n \n19,118.6\n \n-\n \n170,376.6\n \n54524.7\n84,489.1\n \n577,967.3\n \nApr\n184.1\n \n61341.6\n63,129.5\n \n16343.2\n61,444.0\n \n-\n \n28,727.0\n \n0.0\n28,119.0\n \n5,989.2\n \n27,619.9\n \n-\n \n205,412.2\n \n81442.9\n86,571.2\n \n666,323.9\n \nMay\n78.1\n \n125685.1\n100,808.7\n \n22707.0\n195,646.6\n \n-\n \n81,344.3\n \n0.0\n69,908.9\n \n6,246.8\n \n53,180.7\n \n-\n \n440,462.4\n \n103176.1\n116,103.7\n \n1,315,348.2\n \nJun\n176.6\n \n227001.8\n172,666.5\n \n25998.2\n452,772.6\n \n40,326.7\n \n115,193.3\n \n0.0\n196,310.3\n \n4,209.5\n \n121,677.5\n \n-\n \n870,075.1\n \n230604.4\n544,587.8\n \n3,001,600.3\n \nJul\n162.7\n \n132017.2\n220,995.0\n \n20797.2\n459,668.2\n \n32,010.8\n \n105,308.6\n \n0.0\n154,472.7\n \n13,777.8\n \n153,638.5\n \n-\n \n697,177.8\n \n209734.6\n612,937.8\n \n2,812,698.9\n \nAug\n611.0\n \n105296.6\n309,821.7\n \n55744.7\n475,838.3\n \n37,447.1\n \n102,495.2\n \n0.0\n153,578.2\n \n6,767.5\n \n135,193.3\n \n-\n \n758,439.2\n \n223114.4\n564,622.1\n \n2,928,969.2\n \nSep\n949.3\n \n193065.6\n339,269.2\n \n41680.1\n437,996.0\n \n58,554.5\n \n110,351.3\n \n0.0\n161,346.6\n \n4,522.1\n \n153,113.7\n \n-\n \n880,148.8\n \n290026.7\n565,616.4\n \n3,236,640.3\n \nOct\n403.8\n \n204713.4\n254,684.1\n \n187632.1\n440,150.3\n \n65,022.1\n \n97,046.1\n \n0.0\n176,111.9\n \n13,771.8\n \n173,523.5\n \n-\n \n829,479.5\n \n345029.3\n586,015.6\n \n3,373,583.5\n \nNov\n370.5\n \n222344.7\n387,213.2\n \n160896.0\n326,510.1\n \n50,688.3\n \n159,225.4\n \n0.0\n173,990.9\n \n28,127.2\n \n187,363.3\n \n-\n \n926,663.7\n \n395549.5\n595,811.6\n \n3,614,754.5\n \nDec\n403.7\n \n251968.8\n457,034.9\n \n261067.9\n345,348.0\n \n56,551.7\n \n185,131.1\n \n0.0\n166,902.0\n \n27,875.9\n \n222,503.1\n \n0.7\n \n973,788.6\n \n507890.9\n658,045.7\n \n4,114,512.9\n \n2024\nJan\n367.9\n \n368046.7\n524,020.9\n \n471915.0\n363,325.6\n \n40,412.9\n \n280,803.2\n \n0.0\n280,441.0\n \n45,935.9\n \n339,610.7\n \n-\n \n1,563,405.5\n \n649087.4\n742,734.0\n \n5,670,106.8\n \nFeb\n578.8\n \n637645.2\n797,581.2\n \n618074.6\n613,309.7\n \n24,680.4\n \n425,783.2\n \n0.0\n399,313.5\n \n67,900.2\n \n519,513.4\n \n-\n \n2,188,186.8\n \n904519.6\n937,957.6\n \n8,135,044.1\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2024\nNotes\n1.Government securities include treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households and other financial corporations, \nTABLE 6.1: BUILDING SOCIETIES -ASSETS\n$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \n23 \n \n \n \n \nCapital\nOther\nTOTAL\nand\nLiablities\nEnd of\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nRBZ\nOther Depository \nOther Finacial \nReserves\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\n2021\nJan\n17,060.5\n985.1\n18,045.7\n150.0\n15.0\n18,210.7\n291.2\n3,018.1\n0.0\n81.3\n0.0\n6,054.0\n6,191.6\n33,846.9\nFeb\n18,610.7\n1,047.5\n19,658.2\n150.0\n15.0\n19,823.2\n318.2\n3,075.5\n0.0\n40.7\n0.0\n6,533.5\n5,874.0\n35,665.0\nMar\n18,562.7\n1,070.5\n19,633.2\n150.0\n15.0\n19,798.2\n320.8\n3,377.0\n0.0\n241.5\n0.0\n6,727.5\n5,661.8\n36,126.8\nApr\n19,021.2\n1,353.2\n20,374.5\n500.0\n15.0\n20,889.5\n325.0\n4,244.8\n0.0\n181.9\n0.0\n6,267.0\n6,418.0\n38,326.2\nMay\n22,332.1\n1,453.5\n23,785.6\n500.0\n15.0\n24,300.6\n350.2\n4,279.9\n0.0\n394.8\n0.0\n6,067.1\n7,391.6\n42,784.2\nJun\n22,784.4\n1,675.4\n24,459.8\n209.5\n70.5\n24,739.8\n359.1\n3,855.1\n0.0\n570.4\n0.0\n6,623.0\n6,713.2\n42,860.7\nJul\n25,425.9\n1,997.8\n27,423.7\n25.0\n15.0\n27,463.7\n365.2\n3,488.6\n0.0\n274.6\n0.0\n7,194.2\n7,130.1\n45,916.5\nAug\n27,475.7\n2,728.9\n30,204.6\n60.0\n15.0\n30,279.6\n668.2\n5,344.8\n0.0\n621.9\n0.0\n7,683.7\n6,854.8\n51,453.0\nSep\n29,023.8\n2,834.6\n31,858.5\n76.0\n15.2\n31,949.7\n1,062.2\n4,465.7\n0.0\n181.9\n0.0\n10,227.1\n7,061.5\n54,948.1\nOct\n30,925.8\n4,239.0\n35,164.7\n0.0\n30.0\n35,194.8\n1,329.1\n7,432.5\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n10,906.3\n8,007.4\n62,870.1\nNov\n34,486.8\n4,344.1\n38,830.8\n0.0\n15.0\n38,845.9\n1,149.7\n7,028.7\n0.0\n203.6\n0.0\n11,575.7\n8,126.5\n66,930.0\nDec\n33,974.4\n4,856.8\n38,831.3\n80.0\n15.0\n38,926.3\n1,750.9\n9,746.8\n0.0\n712.0\n0.0\n15,101.8\n8,520.4\n74,758.3\n2022\nJan\n31,695.1\n5,983.6\n37,678.7\n0.0\n15.0\n37,693.7\n1,771.4\n10,991.6\n0.0\n373.7\n0.0\n18,063.5\n10,937.0\n79,830.9\nFeb\n37,132.1\n7,089.1\n44,221.1\n0.0\n15.0\n44,236.1\n1,703.8\n14,215.9\n0.0\n431.6\n0.0\n18,241.5\n11,325.7\n90,154.6\nMar\n44,187.4\n6,190.7\n50,378.1\n0.0\n15.0\n50,393.1\n1,742.3\n15,620.9\n0.0\n501.9\n0.0\n20,548.8\n14,430.4\n103,237.4\nApr\n52,979.2\n6,553.0\n59,532.2\n0.0\n15.0\n59,547.2\n1,536.3\n17,027.1\n0.0\n704.1\n0.0\n23,099.0\n14,854.4\n116,768.1\nMay\n86,411.7\n6,683.0\n93,094.7\n0.0\n15.0\n93,109.8\n1,477.7\n34,306.7\n0.0\n1,033.4\n0.0\n22,645.2\n23,325.7\n175,898.5\nJun\n98,008.7\n8,427.1\n106,435.9\n1,030.1\n15.0\n107,481.1\n1,496.4\n40,346.3\n0.0\n1,200.6\n0.0\n42,213.2\n26,895.5\n219,633.0\nJul\n111,583.1\n9,489.2\n121,072.3\n1,072.6\n15.0\n122,159.9\n1,225.0\n46,145.1\n0.0\n2,071.5\n0.0\n55,131.6\n16,832.0\n243,565.1\nAug\n133,071.2\n11,398.3\n144,469.5\n1,625.2\n15.0\n146,109.7\n1,382.6\n55,691.4\n0.0\n2,979.3\n0.0\n60,157.4\n15,056.7\n281,377.1\nSep\n143,338.6\n28,284.7\n171,623.3\n0.0\n15.0\n171,638.3\n1,339.9\n62,659.9\n0.0\n3,613.8\n0.0\n79,343.1\n17,410.1\n336,005.2\nOct\n122,775.3\n20,897.6\n143,672.9\n1,214.2\n15.0\n144,902.1\n1,707.3\n69,651.9\n0.0\n4,327.9\n0.0\n86,799.2\n41,091.4\n348,479.7\nNov\n130,892.9\n23,401.5\n154,294.3\n1,256.4\n13.0\n155,563.7\n1,855.1\n72,052.0\n0.0\n5,140.0\n0.0\n89,895.0\n41,331.2\n365,836.9\nDec\n149,207.3\n30,517.1\n179,724.4\n1,239.7\n103.8\n181,068.0\n1,933.7\n71,142.6\n0.0\n5,623.9\n0.0\n118,486.1\n42,883.8\n421,138.1\n2023\nJan\n161,506.8\n31,099.4\n192,606.2\n1,462.2\n121.0\n194,189.4\n3,214.4\n72,524.5\n0.0\n6,622.6\n0.0\n144,335.3\n25,816.5\n446,702.8\nFeb\n210,739.4\n27,500.2\n238,239.5\n1,153.4\n15.0\n239,407.9\n2,349.9\n84,724.5\n0.0\n7,548.9\n0.0\n155,007.6\n39,582.0\n528,620.9\nMar\n234,480.2\n38,088.7\n272,568.9\n158.0\n14.4\n272,741.2\n1,982.4\n89,883.4\n0.0\n7,502.7\n0.0\n172,499.0\n33,358.6\n577,967.3\nApr\n272,738.9\n35,889.2\n308,628.0\n400.0\n15.0\n309,043.1\n1,809.5\n116,418.1\n0.0\n8,456.9\n0.0\n183,262.3\n47,334.0\n666,323.9\nMay\n502,897.5\n36,680.3\n539,577.9\n553.7\n15.0\n540,146.6\n4,453.5\n289,636.2\n0.0\n8,115.4\n0.0\n372,206.8\n100,789.6\n1,315,348.2\nJun\n927,980.2\n66,404.1\n994,384.3\n0.0\n15.0\n994,399.3\n4,147.7\n631,544.2\n0.0\n10,873.2\n0.0\n1,117,122.1\n243,513.7\n3,001,600.3\nJul\n804,547.2\n73,047.1\n877,594.3\n15,753.2\n15.0\n893,362.6\n2,706.7\n611,248.0\n0.0\n14,397.5\n0.0\n1,093,858.2\n197,126.1\n2,812,698.9\nAug\n920,687.4\n90,856.7\n1,011,544.1\n15,752.3\n15.0\n1,027,311.4\n3,400.5\n617,162.9\n0.0\n12,854.9\n0.0\n1,064,286.3\n203,953.2\n2,928,969.2\nSep\n1,062,730.1\n75,413.9\n1,138,143.9\n0.0\n15.1\n1,138,159.0\n3,262.9\n652,356.6\n0.0\n16,101.5\n0.0\n1,117,548.2\n309,212.1\n3,236,640.3\nOct\n1,261,965.8\n64,282.0\n1,326,247.8\n0.0\n15.1\n1,326,262.9\n4,056.0\n467,416.6\n0.0\n16,785.2\n0.0\n1,188,499.5\n370,563.3\n3,373,583.5\nNov\n1,301,463.8\n82,076.9\n1,383,540.7\n79,497.1\n15.1\n1,463,052.8\n4,822.5\n525,114.1\n0.0\n16,180.1\n0.0\n1,209,652.3\n395,932.7\n3,614,754.5\nDec\n1,541,238.9\n142,705.5\n1,683,944.4\n79,497.1\n15.8\n1,763,457.2\n7,085.0\n516,718.0\n0.0\n8,736.3\n0.0\n1,308,419.6\n510,096.7\n4,114,512.9\n2024\nJan\n2,094,039.4\n96,896.2\n2,190,935.6\n79,481.7\n15.1\n2,270,432.3\n8,231.4\n904,697.2\n0.0\n11,028.7\n0.0\n1,826,995.6\n648,721.6\n5,670,106.8\nFeb\n2,991,430.0\n192,203.3\n3,183,633.2\n162,422.1\n15.1\n3,346,070.4\n10,388.9\n1,314,901.6\n0.0\n5,723.7\n0.0\n2,630,626.9\n827,332.6\n8,135,044.1\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2024\nTABLE 6.2: BUILDING SOCIETIES -LIABILITIES\n$ millions\nAmounts Owing to\n \n \n24 \n \n \n \n \nAGRICULTURE\nCONSTRUCTION\nCOMMUNICATION\nDISTRIBUTION\nFINANCIAL &\nFINANCIAL\nMANUFACTURING\nMINING\nSERVICES\nTRANSPORT\nINDIVIDUALS\nCONGLOMERATES\nTOTAL\nEND OF\n \n \n \nINVESTMENTS\nORGANISATIONS\n \n \n \n \n2021\nJan\n23,978,167.4\n610,696.1\n267,400.2\n9,997,383.0\n66,046.9\n9,811,097.6\n7,641,910.4\n7,176,323.0\n4,807,054.2\n1,685,871.1\n10,092,630.5\n47,525.6\n76,182,105.9\nFeb\n24,581,772.2\n653,205.5\n285,830.7\n10,330,772.0\n65,231.4\n10,024,935.1\n7,949,013.1\n6,754,180.2\n5,018,015.8\n1,766,077.9\n10,905,948.4\n47,678.1\n78,382,660.3\nMar\n28,741,816.7\n737,140.5\n320,102.5\n10,604,119.6\n76,828.9\n10,517,753.1\n9,428,559.8\n8,179,722.0\n5,701,289.5\n1,822,020.0\n12,528,176.5\n33,915.5\n88,691,444.6\nApr\n31,859,146.3\n675,080.9\n347,881.0\n12,101,683.3\n205,760.2\n12,046,268.5\n10,788,214.4\n8,802,924.2\n6,559,969.1\n1,831,534.4\n14,724,055.2\n36,984.3\n99,979,502.0\nMay\n34,645,328.6\n713,518.5\n292,339.8\n13,012,546.0\n70,347.7\n10,160,360.7\n11,287,317.4\n8,318,871.5\n7,438,997.6\n1,831,015.1\n17,169,532.7\n10,879.2\n104,951,054.8\nJune\n36,527,537.2\n993,308.6\n357,200.7\n14,622,859.3\n69,173.2\n12,832,747.3\n12,635,012.9\n7,938,660.3\n9,226,503.3\n1,903,845.8\n19,986,300.5\n40,765.7\n117,133,914.9\nJul\n39,160,305.6\n1,280,558.7\n411,253.9\n16,562,010.5\n62,624.8\n13,792,648.8\n12,583,048.9\n8,567,557.8\n10,717,151.0\n1,820,088.9\n22,581,130.3\n13,756.8\n127,552,136.1\nAug\n41,218,056.3\n1,372,177.0\n431,669.1\n15,667,033.1\n66,504.4\n14,701,546.3\n13,446,660.9\n8,828,791.2\n11,500,069.8\n1,942,139.4\n27,299,685.3\n15,470.3\n136,489,803.2\nSep\n41,133,553.7\n1,649,182.2\n433,781.1\n16,702,896.3\n321,991.2\n15,183,417.2\n15,271,161.9\n9,065,558.1\n11,973,442.3\n2,145,369.5\n30,851,901.8\n19,863.2\n144,752,118.4\nOct\n48,491,758.7\n1,644,045.1\n477,340.8\n20,072,721.7\n337,273.5\n16,644,705.0\n17,906,042.4\n10,150,149.7\n8,544,940.3\n2,418,354.8\n35,641,091.1\n17,894.6\n162,346,317.7\nNov\n48,945,526.6\n1,598,923.1\n394,575.8\n20,998,777.0\n434,931.6\n16,621,266.4\n19,372,274.1\n10,802,887.6\n8,904,904.9\n2,882,220.1\n40,009,482.2\n18,275.2\n170,984,044.5\nDec\n54,028,791.8\n1,778,880.5\n556,046.6\n24,450,917.2\n570,685.1\n10,955,470.2\n22,025,406.6\n10,538,491.2\n14,437,886.1\n2,996,425.0\n43,047,088.4\n29,601.2\n185,415,689.9\n2022\nJan\n58,163,723.8\n2,180,551.5\n576,438.1\n26,576,317.7\n366,231.4\n8,887,534.5\n23,074,734.8\n11,840,524.9\n15,743,736.5\n3,516,259.7\n47,325,078.3\n29,564.7\n198,280,695.9\nFeb\n59,500,669.7\n2,289,260.8\n618,640.1\n27,925,301.7\n641,435.0\n9,370,886.7\n27,976,121.6\n13,027,815.1\n20,505,827.5\n3,747,288.3\n51,007,737.3\n19,692.3\n216,630,676.1\nMar\n66,551,117.8\n2,538,377.1\n656,335.5\n29,688,979.7\n660,584.5\n10,903,917.1\n32,629,411.6\n15,688,496.1\n38,075,386.7\n4,471,441.5\n58,500,950.7\n802,168.3\n261,167,166.6\nApr\n74,441,781.1\n4,219,500.3\n1,441,218.1\n33,136,441.4\n673,885.9\n13,157,284.3\n34,426,878.3\n18,261,710.3\n39,043,359.8\n5,001,307.2\n63,176,517.9\n40,089.6\n287,019,974.2\nMay\n101,753,100.1\n5,120,524.8\n3,358,419.2\n50,514,059.3\n760,401.2\n12,433,390.5\n42,057,624.5\n28,724,818.4\n48,088,662.7\n6,286,840.2\n76,655,600.2\n34,456.8\n375,787,897.7\nJune\n118,753,589.0\n6,209,658.5\n2,293,665.5\n64,942,950.0\n869,273.2\n23,897,585.0\n58,442,367.2\n37,195,284.1\n62,467,707.8\n9,414,912.5\n96,536,183.0\n43,204.2\n481,066,380.0\nJuly\n133,779,414.0\n7,610,614.1\n3,684,426.1\n77,836,080.2\n938,368.0\n30,537,998.0\n69,408,788.7\n46,181,587.4\n72,642,938.5\n10,449,582.5\n111,094,524.5\n46,145.7\n564,210,467.8\nAug\n165,210,571.4\n10,163,176.7\n2,624,492.9\n93,899,073.6\n1,266,729.8\n39,544,245.3\n87,691,102.8\n58,330,938.2\n97,552,420.8\n10,450,507.1\n131,625,765.3\n154,457.6\n698,513,481.5\nSept\n201,167,878.5\n11,330,918.8\n5,038,300.4\n110,956,484.0\n1,297,748.5\n44,492,682.7\n101,816,518.3\n92,708,096.4\n88,483,494.4\n11,685,667.9\n152,934,863.3\n276,752.3\n822,189,405.6\nOct\n223,506,677.7\n12,026,669.5\n4,229,873.3\n113,451,159.2\n1,302,041.3\n46,399,745.2\n110,333,025.8\n79,715,558.1\n89,501,330.5\n9,611,322.3\n175,816,703.6\n178,607.8\n866,072,714.2\nNov\n232,953,535.1\n16,431,625.9\n11,131,139.8\n118,284,970.8\n1,687,527.0\n42,192,397.3\n124,017,335.4\n75,874,234.7\n94,636,395.6\n12,440,947.3\n207,085,835.5\n197,473.3\n936,933,417.8\nDec\n253,185,165.2\n19,199,455.9\n10,466,455.0\n135,037,685.1\n1,551,994.2\n70,805,600.3\n136,576,579.6\n94,115,141.7\n123,404,532.1\n12,079,018.7\n235,371,108.1\n173,717.1\n1,091,966,452.8\n2023\nJan\n299,237,745.1\n22,096,826.9\n11,001,194.9\n154,399,125.0\n2,073,794.8\n72,677,263.1\n165,905,496.5\n124,259,994.3\n140,303,195.4\n16,560,714.3\n290,446,774.7\n286,968.1\n1,299,249,093.1\nFeb\n333,081,520.8\n26,349,752.5\n12,607,980.8\n168,969,321.4\n3,232,834.7\n79,874,665.8\n198,087,465.1\n146,996,948.4\n150,078,778.0\n18,960,512.9\n335,439,856.5\n415,659.5\n1,474,095,296.5\nMar\n411,138,419.1\n28,795,432.6\n14,081,946.7\n184,250,094.2\n3,256,927.2\n101,507,881.5\n232,125,042.8\n168,374,643.7\n159,301,093.2\n20,786,447.1\n364,183,808.4\n229,595.5\n1,688,031,331.8\nApr\n411,638,425.6\n28,865,765.5\n14,081,964.7\n184,833,219.7\n3,256,927.2\n101,507,881.5\n235,076,590.9\n168,374,757.6\n159,310,920.5\n20,785,827.2\n365,366,760.5\n229,595.5\n1,693,328,636.3\nMay\n726,348,772.4\n78,828,771.5\n44,800,380.0\n409,618,602.9\n6,584,930.1\n226,467,642.5\n583,387,051.3\n480,909,418.5\n381,628,891.5\n62,593,512.5\n757,858,742.6\n267,815.4\n3,759,294,531.0\nJun\n1,385,380,571.7\n173,918,051.5\n114,682,839.7\n1,119,448,698.2\n23,922,347.4\n571,712,604.7\n1,309,324,347.9\n1,111,326,640.1\n808,734,970.2\n129,722,475.7\n1,754,989,459.0\n444,788.0\n8,503,607,794.2\nJul\n1,088,372,491.6\n132,529,236.3\n101,023,084.2\n843,805,813.7\n21,291,030.4\n370,922,779.8\n1,037,949,287.4\n824,419,062.0\n646,244,001.7\n87,491,103.6\n1,451,125,105.6\n356,098.9\n6,605,529,095.1\nAug\n1,104,126,310.1\n133,512,317.7\n105,426,999.2\n683,402,044.9\n21,345,225.8\n393,145,008.1\n1,077,529,295.3\n824,970,068.6\n716,638,286.7\n85,309,683.4\n1,543,461,599.3\n382,505.3\n6,689,249,344.4\nSep\n1,336,413,273.4\n158,136,405.6\n121,080,865.9\n752,199,791.2\n28,592,532.7\n465,470,715.5\n1,334,020,478.9\n1,012,670,250.7\n799,826,458.0\n102,238,002.6\n1,857,297,850.0\n586,991.0\n7,968,533,615.5\nOct\n1,461,090,986.5\n163,948,853.9\n120,153,516.7\n935,064,277.1\n24,681,683.2\n520,361,009.0\n1,381,206,351.2\n1,092,469,043.7\n859,550,943.1\n118,799,556.9\n2,126,512,435.0\n627,911.8\n8,804,466,568.2\nNov\n1,397,804,072.5\n171,337,302.5\n117,526,650.4\n1,017,731,862.9\n26,161,720.1\n535,490,381.0\n1,401,587,612.9\n992,371,783.2\n885,248,702.8\n129,500,343.7\n2,255,158,373.7\n621,795.6\n8,930,540,600.9\nDec\n1,360,816,417.4\n179,675,138.5\n121,167,248.1\n1,077,783,652.1\n46,946,926.9\n551,786,675.3\n1,483,619,833.9\n1,207,471,368.5\n863,309,236.7\n136,388,007.8\n2,458,239,172.8\n644,093.7\n9,487,847,771.7\n2024\nJan\n2,212,746,050.3\n265,031,131.4\n214,923,355.9\n1,663,240,228.2\n110,086,710.6\n875,780,504.1\n2,505,473,968.4\n1,910,394,449.6\n1,256,413,922.9\n237,647,459.8\n3,945,256,597.2\n1,037,343.5\n15,198,031,722.0\nFeb\n3,435,102,730.5\n426,536,836.7\n249,129,096.2\n2,383,796,904.4\n171,219,221.6\n1,264,658,167.3\n3,631,856,467.6\n2,844,642,895.8\n2,043,483,472.0\n352,320,643.5\n5,491,307,643.3\n1,518,795.1\n22,295,572,874.1\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2024\n/1 Including the only merchant bank still in operation.\nTABLE 7.1 : SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS LOANS AND ADVANCES\n$ ('000)\n \n \n25 \n \n \n \nEND OF\nAGRICULTURE\nCONSTRUCTION\nCOMMUNICATIONS\nDISTRIBUTION\nFINANCIAL &\nFINANCIAL\nMANUFACTURING\nMINING\nSERVICES\nTRANSPORT\nINDIVIDUALS\nCONGLOMERATES\nTOTAL\nINVESTMENTS\nORGANISATIONS\n2021\nJan\n12,195,945.1\n4,725,946.7\n13,067,828.6\n32,314,625.6\n6,804,952.5\n19,638,789.0\n27,577,248.2\n13,566,042.8\n60,234,250.6\n3,993,814.3\n22,146,327.5\n314,523.4\n216,580,294.3\nFeb\n12,215,925.4\n4,335,293.2\n13,268,343.2\n31,820,079.5\n6,327,338.7\n19,480,197.8\n27,088,789.9\n11,873,767.2\n62,647,881.9\n3,583,509.9\n23,594,651.5\n323,276.8\n216,559,054.9\nMar\n12,086,596.9\n5,009,117.9\n15,457,881.6\n33,668,114.2\n7,879,623.6\n17,019,379.3\n29,927,193.1\n12,664,366.4\n68,761,992.2\n4,513,060.2\n25,352,486.1\n371,874.6\n232,711,686.2\nApr\n14,293,712.8\n6,264,137.3\n17,624,611.6\n35,860,252.5\n7,955,587.7\n18,411,151.8\n32,890,743.1\n11,445,151.9\n81,410,668.9\n4,248,558.7\n27,176,673.5\n411,001.0\n257,992,250.8\nMay\n14,731,869.5\n5,542,211.6\n19,231,383.7\n37,283,237.7\n7,903,622.6\n19,756,317.3\n33,027,214.9\n22,796,168.0\n84,596,653.5\n4,504,355.7\n28,445,264.8\n378,185.1\n278,196,484.5\nJun\n15,628,935.5\n6,154,316.5\n20,722,752.3\n39,604,431.5\n7,861,552.7\n21,455,061.8\n36,502,664.4\n23,449,074.9\n92,196,178.9\n4,756,434.9\n29,731,644.5\n415,508.6\n298,478,556.4\nJul\n14,899,561.1\n6,742,913.7\n25,082,739.8\n39,720,936.0\n9,580,503.8\n24,570,676.0\n38,875,306.1\n31,312,003.2\n94,151,108.5\n5,021,547.7\n32,324,374.5\n568,402.6\n322,850,073.2\nAug\n14,056,945.2\n6,611,127.0\n26,897,316.6\n39,624,666.3\n9,778,338.9\n27,046,621.0\n40,693,944.2\n26,504,554.0\n84,766,848.1\n4,915,399.2\n33,960,935.1\n645,902.4\n315,502,598.2\nSep\n14,777,285.5\n6,264,492.1\n27,413,062.1\n45,375,795.4\n10,337,697.2\n25,786,388.3\n43,113,093.0\n30,700,846.4\n95,985,614.8\n5,605,871.7\n37,606,703.5\n687,817.2\n343,654,667.4\nOct\n14,923,669.7\n8,437,829.5\n26,583,413.6\n47,841,912.8\n11,477,927.2\n29,796,762.9\n51,676,553.8\n49,115,499.0\n111,611,484.2\n5,940,819.2\n35,043,857.0\n618,831.0\n393,068,560.0\nNov\n14,147,912.2\n7,546,852.9\n27,174,334.3\n44,238,573.4\n11,949,923.7\n27,199,271.6\n52,401,389.3\n49,817,772.3\n115,576,831.0\n5,911,967.6\n37,770,843.3\n751,068.7\n394,486,740.3\nDec\n16,522,401.6\n9,204,283.5\n26,835,545.0\n47,381,404.7\n15,303,976.8\n43,092,763.3\n57,822,911.0\n61,555,101.2\n122,091,550.6\n6,093,367.4\n40,046,246.7\n1,319,573.7\n447,269,125.4\n2022\nJan\n17,399,268.4\n9,928,816.1\n28,146,847.2\n46,285,881.1\n15,060,177.5\n34,087,881.4\n60,888,346.7\n38,232,883.7\n135,579,116.5\n6,454,492.6\n32,504,960.5\n745,336.0\n425,314,007.6\nFeb\n20,260,983.5\n9,641,974.7\n32,159,803.2\n50,825,844.5\n15,235,028.5\n35,068,548.5\n49,157,612.2\n43,769,515.0\n146,423,512.2\n7,768,846.5\n36,257,364.0\n724,522.4\n447,293,555.2\nMar\n22,638,817.9\n11,683,937.4\n34,271,841.3\n61,002,811.6\n20,352,647.3\n34,501,628.6\n57,839,997.3\n60,678,395.3\n173,444,002.6\n9,467,563.9\n43,160,654.7\n970,393.8\n530,012,691.6\nApr\n26,926,844.7\n12,304,918.4\n34,924,202.5\n67,201,357.8\n21,444,798.1\n38,606,872.2\n61,303,321.1\n64,980,792.3\n216,612,532.7\n10,455,473.9\n45,951,692.0\n939,217.9\n601,652,023.6\nMay\n39,564,579.0\n21,954,770.2\n42,666,739.4\n108,620,498.7\n28,757,840.8\n54,108,110.4\n88,717,845.2\n107,568,244.7\n291,739,801.6\n14,310,137.6\n65,853,453.1\n1,190,747.9\n865,052,768.6\nJun\n45,956,287.6\n26,686,177.1\n47,155,850.8\n128,881,143.6\n23,783,755.2\n60,238,450.0\n105,247,922.5\n120,389,796.0\n326,034,986.6\n17,068,663.5\n108,828,797.1\n1,325,268.7\n1,011,597,098.7\nJul\n40,699,352.1\n28,329,526.0\n45,417,841.1\n128,847,329.1\n21,958,796.0\n62,326,844.4\n103,536,398.9\n112,642,685.5\n401,574,353.3\n17,902,000.2\n112,555,899.5\n1,117,408.2\n1,076,908,434.3\nAug\n68,438,409.6\n39,107,020.5\n53,616,955.7\n171,501,037.8\n25,370,674.6\n68,913,237.2\n162,326,617.3\n137,243,494.6\n538,409,018.4\n23,523,309.1\n146,121,882.2\n1,197,164.4\n1,435,768,821.4\nSep\n81,174,128.7\n51,501,554.8\n58,104,791.5\n204,056,688.7\n63,246,197.1\n174,562,749.5\n172,521,502.9\n138,936,277.9\n626,755,883.0\n25,607,188.8\n182,077,675.0\n11,177,650.8\n1,789,722,288.7\nOct\n83,201,043.6\n63,984,990.3\n67,031,137.9\n207,367,773.6\n40,617,325.3\n155,873,800.6\n179,051,392.6\n157,121,308.5\n575,293,016.5\n27,092,268.9\n201,852,712.9\n3,193,614.1\n1,761,680,384.8\nNov\n88,153,064.5\n61,978,896.6\n78,744,676.9\n236,152,455.1\n39,915,042.9\n100,872,718.3\n214,281,243.0\n200,240,592.5\n606,580,960.9\n32,903,876.7\n233,604,874.7\n119,223.2\n1,893,547,625.3\nDec\n106,799,918.4\n60,886,327.3\n73,518,960.3\n260,923,049.6\n48,959,835.1\n122,528,998.7\n242,741,914.1\n171,982,170.0\n747,151,447.2\n37,453,518.8\n270,164,633.7\n10,753,958.6\n2,153,864,731.9\n2023\nJan\n114,820,700.8\n79,460,381.9\n82,589,902.3\n305,204,829.9\n45,118,619.6\n135,072,311.1\n263,222,364.1\n223,632,204.7\n896,980,184.3\n37,534,722.0\n288,326,194.2\n7,916,696.9\n2,479,879,111.8\nFeb\n118,375,609.7\n85,995,682.6\n93,761,236.2\n312,626,341.5\n56,688,432.6\n147,245,179.4\n266,610,300.9\n273,709,371.2\n938,437,753.7\n39,909,193.6\n292,841,727.2\n6,842,518.8\n2,633,043,347.3\nMar\n119,963,933.2\n85,731,698.4\n100,697,025.6\n322,453,843.0\n45,619,349.1\n148,455,496.2\n286,712,763.6\n273,572,570.9\n1,064,798,433.6\n44,685,590.6\n330,031,150.7\n14,190,575.5\n2,836,912,430.3\nApr\n131,146,380.3\n89,322,733.6\n99,723,066.8\n324,249,300.1\n45,619,349.1\n149,245,957.9\n289,670,780.4\n273,578,020.7\n1,072,456,655.2\n44,926,335.6\n331,068,417.4\n14,190,575.5\n2,865,197,572.7\nMay\n269,460,363.1\n210,867,012.3\n216,906,304.0\n631,589,937.9\n113,357,505.7\n362,294,051.4\n581,761,350.4\n545,536,680.6\n2,504,454,969.8\n102,648,366.2\n702,960,786.4\n28,985,518.4\n6,270,822,846.4\nJun\n581,642,309.8\n428,772,683.4\n410,699,487.7\n1,366,510,052.6\n227,784,986.6\n700,617,673.8\n1,094,382,949.6\n1,185,026,806.7\n5,283,380,622.2\n199,474,750.2\n1,564,762,675.1\n40,673,167.4\n13,083,728,165.1\nJul\n535,377,934.4\n436,808,429.5\n413,150,824.0\n1,394,747,348.2\n206,866,966.8\n711,462,740.8\n1,157,802,106.8\n982,808,623.8\n4,533,520,705.6\n184,470,180.5\n1,464,856,207.2\n37,277,944.9\n12,059,150,012.5\nAug\n537,439,303.1\n422,479,784.1\n413,226,172.3\n1,343,458,227.8\n285,743,813.6\n662,607,567.9\n1,197,898,912.2\n1,004,826,660.3\n4,639,684,933.9\n209,521,849.6\n1,553,047,811.0\n38,718,344.9\n12,308,653,380.6\nSep\n632,283,427.7\n491,562,911.4\n426,060,663.5\n1,510,241,869.9\n296,604,785.0\n789,587,698.1\n1,300,914,518.5\n1,250,791,974.4\n5,214,851,978.1\n217,382,274.5\n1,781,106,637.9\n43,583,660.4\n13,954,972,399.2\nOct\n721,203,425.9\n541,011,315.6\n554,440,420.1\n1,657,817,920.3\n309,251,239.3\n841,367,968.7\n1,438,592,170.7\n1,187,082,973.9\n5,659,995,585.3\n260,248,908.5\n1,906,411,104.9\n49,647,602.0\n15,127,070,635.2\nNov\n703,080,882.8\n566,993,243.1\n532,803,998.3\n1,698,467,822.7\n346,291,934.3\n269,835,136.3\n1,554,832,195.3\n1,195,274,632.9\n6,063,945,343.0\n293,942,495.1\n2,031,657,547.5\n46,866,707.1\n15,885,967,935.9\nDec\n605,605,541.7\n423,493,370.4\n730,799,100.8\n1,549,938,533.1\n553,801,063.2\n767,650,016.2\n1,254,233,648.4\n1,348,969,145.1\n6,689,372,974.4\n247,647,472.3\n2,091,666,965.1\n53,713,528.9\n16,882,080,093.7\n2024\nJan\n833,932,128.8\n694,796,940.8\n1,029,474,123.2\n2,082,328,111.9\n884,819,488.9\n2,004,818,592.2\n1,699,026,894.5\n1,837,959,924.5\n12,124,252,579.3\n323,794,777.4\n3,044,604,553.8\n71,184,543.7\n26,630,992,659.0\nFeb\n1,156,065,718.2\n1,037,783,187.5\n1,369,731,749.1\n3,170,746,459.4\n114,038,016.4\n3,174,169,477.5\n2,227,190,946.8\n2,855,301,054.3\n15,834,462,125.0\n552,622,448.4\n4,294,792,965.3\n89,063,348.6\n36,904,967,496.7\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2024\n TABLE 7.2: SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS DEPOSITS \n$ ('000)\n \n \n26 \n \n \n \nMinimum\nMaximum\nMinimum\nMaximum\n2021\nJan\n32.65\n55.57\n24.77\n61.12\nFeb\n36.67\n52.01\n21.36\n58.43\nMar\n35.83\n55.77\n22.61\n59.03\nApr\n35.22\n57.08\n22.59\n59.75\nMay\n34.84\n56.21\n21.76\n59.67\nJun\n36.25\n57.04\n22.46\n59.66\nJul\n36.56\n57.00\n21.66\n59.81\nAug\n41.06\n57.39\n39.65\n65.06\nSep\n40.61\n58.44\n39.50\n63.66\nOct\n41.86\n58.68\n45.81\n58.54\nNov\n39.13\n58.74\n38.10\n64.38\nDec\n39.34\n58.65\n37.94\n64.00\n2022\nJan\n39.32\n57.26\n39.62\n64.14\nFeb\n40.55\n57.28\n64.02\n64.02\nMar\n40.74\n57.83\n43.88\n63.78\nApr\n38.15\n59.59\n45.56\n63.89\nMay\n38.01\n59.70\n47.25\n63.82\nJun\n38.45\n60.09\n48.25\n64.31\nJul\n82.75\n123.71\n165.45\n218.51\nAug\n88.46\n123.46\n155.96\n218.02\nSep\n98.07\n123.64\n158.46\n221.58\nOct\n99.37\n127.72\n115.26\n222.80\nNov\n99.03\n127.58\n110.97\n223.48\nDec\n99.02\n125.64\n110.83\n242.53\n2023\nJan\n90.05\n125.64\n116.03\n242.53\nFeb\n60.12\n125.64\n80.88\n242.53\nMar\n74.35\n110.30\n81.46\n166.96\nApr\n74.48\n105.75\n86.96\n167.31\nMay\n77.86\n107.41\n83.61\n168.27\nJun\n76.33\n103.85\n92.64\n167.80\nJul\n77.82\n103.56\n94.80\n166.24\nAug\n77.63\n102.79\n93.18\n166.18\nSep\n76.49\n100.20\n92.69\n166.00\nOct\n71.72\n102.10\n92.43\n167.77\nNov\n70.15\n101.53\n93.15\n166.18\nDec\n69.02\n101.71\n93.77\n164.47\n2024\nJan\n70.18\n100.81\n95.24\n164.86\nFeb\n76.06\n99..2\n93.76\n166.71\n Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024\nTABLE 8.1: COMMECIAL BANKS LENDING RATES (percent per annum)\nIndividuals \nCorporates\nEnd of\nWeighted Lending Rates\n \n \n27 \n \n \n \n2021\nJan\n1.57\n4.47\n6.26\n11.15\nFeb\n1.57\n4.24\n6.08\n11.43\nMar\n1.57\n4.04\n6.79\n11.80\nApr\n1.57\n4.04\n6.82\n11.78\nMay\n1.57\n4.04\n6.89\n11.72\nJun\n1.57\n4.24\n6.89\n11.72\nJul\n2.22\n4.61\n7.32\n12.67\nAug\n5.28\n7.29\n9.05\n14.29\nSep\n5.38\n8.25\n9.18\n13.71\nOct\n2.79\n5.29\n9.26\n14.03\nNov\n2.96\n5.33\n10.71\n15.05\nDec\n3.04\n4.97\n11.26\n15.05\n2022\nJan\n3.66\n5.76\n13.16\n16.95\nFeb\n3.72\n6.29\n16.68\n16.84\nMar\n3.83\n5.94\n14.83\n16.95\nApr\n4.22\n6.35\n16.78\n18.53\nMay\n4.21\n6.35\n16.44\n18.42\nJun\n4.21\n6.35\n16.61\n19.05\nJul\n21.06\n23.44\n50.14\n54.58\nAug\n20.09\n20.25\n52.97\n57.29\nSep\n20.09\n20.25\n57.25\n61.08\nOct\n20.09\n20.25\n54.06\n60.55\nNov\n20.38\n20.53\n56.69\n60.87\nDec\n18.03\n18.03\n55.32\n60.08\n2023\nJan\n18.03\n18.03\n55.32\n60.08\nFeb\n18.03\n18.03\n55.32\n60.08\nMar\n34.01\n35.26\n68.06\n73.39\nApr\n36.00\n36.50\n63.06\n71.72\nMay\n35.33\n35.88\n61.31\n69.61\nJun\n35.33\n33.60\n59.18\n65.00\nJul\n34.29\n35.29\n61.67\n69.44\nAug\n34.29\n35.60\n57.67\n70.35\nSep\n34.29\n35.60\n61.67\n69.33\nOct\n34.29\n35.60\n61.67\n70.35\nNov\n35.00\n38.27\n60.81\n69.76\nDec\n34.38\n37.13\n57.94\n65.65\n2024\nJan\n33.75\n37.13\n56.06\n65.65\nFeb\n33.75\n37.13\n56.06\n65.65\n Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024\n* Deposit rates depict the range of rates qouted by banks. \nSAVINGS\n3 MONTHS\nTABLE 8.2 : COMMECIAL BANKS DEPOSIT RATES (percent per annum)\n \n \n28 \n \n \n \nWEIGHTS\n4.90\n4.35\n27.62\n5.29\n1.42\n8.39\n2.65\n2.27\n4.25\n1.08\n6.46\n68.70\n31.30\n100\n2020\nJan\n-3.00\n-2.06\n-0.28\n-2.74\n-1.04\n-0.84\n-1.06\n-4.48\n11.15\n4.75\n-4.37\n-0.58\n0.53\n-0.31\nFeb\n-12.36\n-10.83\n-2.89\n-12.30\n-10.59\n-10.28\n22.91\n-8.51\n14.28\n-12.28\n-6.48\n-5.06\n-7.72\n-5.72\nMar\n9.23\n9.65\n16.27\n2.69\n16.74\n0.11\n17.92\n22.40\n-27.82\n-11.98\n-11.43\n4.92\n-3.80\n2.78\nApr\n11.89\n-6.38\n-7.22\n10.27\n-0.98\n-8.34\n-15.68\n-12.00\n-12.48\n-7.83\n0.34\n-3.49\n10.74\n-0.21\nMay\n-0.71\n-5.16\n9.16\n-0.59\n-8.60\n-3.90\n-4.34\n-3.82\n-7.21\n4.44\n-0.85\n1.57\n0.57\n1.32\nJun\n4.42\n3.69\n8.01\n-2.64\n7.91\n12.94\n19.95\n11.11\n9.88\n-4.54\n0.25\n6.01\n-2.51\n3.85\nJul\n7.34\n4.46\n-0.64\n4.36\n4.41\n5.10\n11.54\n-6.38\n-6.24\n-7.89\n-14.18\n0.79\n11.88\n3.43\nAug\n-4.40\n0.30\n0.59\n0.10\n-0.31\n1.24\n36.61\n-3.95\n2.75\n-0.69\n5.74\n1.56\n-1.86\n0.68\nSep\n0.21\n-0.46\n0.55\n-3.17\n-0.67\n-4.96\n4.69\n0.09\n-1.55\n-2.85\n-3.21\n-0.89\n-0.32\n-0.75\nOct\n-0.88\n-2.63\n4.38\n-3.89\n-0.08\n0.32\n0.85\n0.23\n0.20\n2.44\n0.36\n1.29\n0.48\n1.08\nNov\n1.65\n2.18\n0.83\n-0.14\n1.65\n1.13\n0.02\n0.57\n12.03\n3.79\n0.14\n1.72\n3.63\n2.20\nDec\n1.90\n3.21\n2.81\n1.47\n0.60\n2.51\n-0.25\n0.15\n-1.18\n3.98\n1.26\n2.14\n3.92\n2.60\n2021\nJan\n2.84\n1.59\n1.52\n4.26\n2.44\n2.57\n1.33\n-0.72\n1.69\n-0.48\n3.81\n2.14\n2.87\n2.33\nFeb\n1.27\n-0.30\n-1.71\n-0.49\n1.59\n1.07\n-1.60\n10.67\n-2.10\n-0.94\n0.55\n-0.16\n2.03\n0.41\nMar\n0.15\n-0.08\n1.24\n4.37\n-2.37\n0.65\n4.58\n-0.29\n0.02\n0.74\n-0.18\n0.99\n0.52\n0.87\nApr\n0.12\n-0.57\n0.45\n-0.05\n0.24\n0.70\n0.58\n-0.99\n17.14\n1.41\n-3.37\n0.87\n0.25\n0.71\nMay\n0.62\n2.41\n1.41\n0.84\n-0.02\n0.80\n0.07\n42.32\n1.32\n2.36\n0.65\n2.15\n0.28\n1.66\nJun\n1.64\n3.87\n9.35\n6.99\n1.48\n0.57\n0.97\n1.28\n4.88\n2.93\n1.92\n5.07\n2.37\n4.38\nJul\n1.29\n1.73\n0.51\n-0.08\n-0.69\n0.33\n0.10\n0.58\n-0.05\n-0.01\n1.15\n0.51\n0.06\n0.40\nAug\n1.73\n0.72\n1.03\n0.99\n1.14\n1.06\n3.56\n0.29\n-0.05\n2.11\n1.60\n1.10\n0.74\n1.01\nSep\n1.76\n0.08\n1.58\n1.43\n0.64\n0.01\n3.95\n0.87\n-0.78\n1.33\n1.53\n1.27\n2.30\n1.53\nOct\n1.51\n0.77\n0.84\n1.78\n0.72\n1.47\n7.45\n0.36\n2.11\n1.62\n0.91\n1.53\n3.51\n2.03\nNov\n0.85\n0.34\n1.47\n1.12\n0.68\n1.22\n4.43\n0.37\n-6.92\n1.67\n1.11\n0.96\n3.19\n1.53\nDec\n2.41\n0.98\n1.50\n1.30\n0.64\n-0.77\n0.26\n1.01\n0.03\n1.14\n2.05\n1.17\n1.99\n1.38\n2022\nJan\n1.08\n0.64\n2.14\n0.42\n0.71\n0.43\n1.51\n12.08\n0.94\n1.90\n0.11\n1.68\n2.53\n1.90\nFeb\n1.82\n3.39\n1.89\n1.79\n0.68\n1.08\n0.60\n0.92\n0.35\n1.39\n1.69\n1.76\n3.43\n2.20\nMar\n2.59\n2.24\n0.77\n1.22\n0.96\n5.86\n2.27\n0.82\n0.15\n1.02\n-0.06\n1.67\n3.05\n2.04\nApr\n3.38\n1.68\n14.21\n5.59\n1.77\n1.93\n1.73\n1.76\n2.91\n6.05\n1.87\n7.17\n6.94\n7.11\nMay\n3.70\n8.73\n2.02\n1.21\n2.46\n3.36\n2.47\n2.06\n0.48\n3.33\n3.78\n3.12\n9.56\n4.85\nJun\n8.20\n7.94\n12.49\n10.84\n13.72\n5.65\n4.95\n6.63\n4.63\n5.35\n9.86\n9.85\n17.32\n11.95\nJul\n4.57\n1.91\n8.66\n5.87\n3.74\n2.16\n1.21\n2.64\n11.86\n2.00\n2.15\n5.88\n12.09\n7.71\nAug\n3.71\n2.47\n2.01\n1.44\n1.98\n1.59\n1.91\n1.12\n0.41\n1.21\n2.93\n2.02\n4.94\n2.91\nSep\n-2.39\n-1.80\n5.21\n-3.33\n-0.66\n-1.20\n10.12\n0.36\n8.21\n-1.80\n-1.68\n1.99\n-3.23\n0.36\nOct\n0.81\n1.31\n6.74\n1.83\n0.72\n0.88\n2.83\n1.21\n0.10\n0.72\n0.68\n3.29\n2.10\n2.93\nNov\n-0.23\n0.35\n0.34\n0.60\n0.85\n0.25\n4.30\n0.48\n16.78\n19.32\n0.85\n1.71\n0.23\n1.27\nDec\n0.39\n0.76\n0.20\n-0.24\n0.03\n-0.15\n3.91\n-0.10\n0.00\n0.73\n-0.23\n0.28\n1.55\n0.66\n2023\nJan\n0.17\n-0.62\n0.81\n0.34\n0.26\n0.45\n-2.36\n0.45\n0.06\n-0.58\n0.54\n0.33\n-0.77\n0.00\nFeb\n-3.59\n-1.56\n-3.56\n-1.27\n-1.02\n-4.40\n-1.81\n-2.19\n0.06\n-3.63\n-7.55\n-3.40\n-4.54\n-3.73\nMar\n-0.57\n-0.46\n-0.01\n-0.71\n-0.10\n-0.13\n0.44\n-0.24\n0.16\n-0.16\n-0.42\n-0.18\n-0.66\n-0.32\nApr\n1.05\n0.05\n2.79\n-0.18\n0.92\n0.18\n0.59\n0.43\n0.53\n0.35\n0.55\n1.36\n1.96\n1.54\nMay\n3.05\n0.34\n3.03\n-0.08\n2.87\n1.74\n6.10\n1.65\n1.19\n0.99\n2.35\n2.34\n3.37\n2.64\nJun\n11.74\n0.93\n14.88\n-0.85\n9.19\n5.27\n23.88\n5.15\n3.07\n3.15\n6.58\n9.53\n18.23\n12.10\nJul\n1.68\n0.51\n0.36\n0.56\n-0.34\n0.69\n0.68\n-0.11\n1.04\n2.82\n1.11\n0.65\n1.85\n1.03\nAug\n-1.11\n-0.11\n-2.00\n-0.19\n-0.02\n-0.02\n-0.61\n-0.53\n-0.45\n-0.40\n-1.37\n-1.12\n-1.83\n-1.34\nSep\n0.32\n0.04\n0.34\n0.30\n-0.38\n0.63\n5.77\n-0.21\n5.97\n-0.10\n0.91\n0.91\n1.05\n0.95\nOct\n1.91\n1.10\n4.96\n0.54\n1.89\n2.81\n-2.69\n0.43\n-4.21\n0.53\n2.43\n2.48\n2.42\n2.46\nNov\n1.94\n0.60\n8.93\n-0.36\n2.45\n1.30\n3.24\n0.79\n4.28\n-0.67\n1.07\n4.39\n4.89\n4.54\nDec\n3.49\n1.41\n5.40\n0.63\n0.55\n0.86\n0.71\n1.92\n0.22\n1.07\n1.95\n2.90\n8.64\n4.70\n2024\nJan\n2.65\n-2.53\n5.48\n-1.30\n-3.17\n11.61\n-8.22\n-3.90\n5.52\n0.78\n-3.36\n2.50\n15.01\n6.58\nFeb\n3.31\n0.26\n4.84\n0.64\n2.77\n2.47\n8.40\n2.25\n1.67\n1.15\n3.35\n2.98\n9.83\n5.39\nSource: Zimstat, 2024\nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES & \nTOBACCO\nFURNITURE AND \nEQUIPMENT\nHEALTH\nTRANSPORT\nCOMMUNICATION\nFOOD & NON \nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES\nALL \nITEMS\nHOUSING, \nWATER, \nELECTRICTY, \nGAS & OTHER \nFUELS\nCLOTHING & \nFOOTWEAR\nRECREATION & \nCULTURE\nRESTAURANTS & \nHOTELS\nEDUCATION\nMISC. GOODS & \nSERVICES\nTOTAL NON \nFOOD\nTABLE 9.1 : MONTHLY INFLATION - % CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \n \n \n29 \n \n \n \nFOOD \nINFLATION\nWEIGHTS\n4.90\n4.35\n27.62\n5.29\n1.42\n8.39\n2.65\n2.27\n4.25\n1.08\n6.46\n68.70\n31.30\n100\n2020\nJun\n49.10\n-10.07\n29.30\n-16.31\n1.57\n-10.74\n24.86\n25.51\n-53.67\n-27.59\n-13.54\n9.22\n44.68\n15.98\nJul\n51.72\n-10.57\n31.42\n-14.75\n0.95\n-2.95\n46.48\n8.81\n-54.66\n-35.14\n-34.68\n8.73\n54.96\n17.77\nAug\n41.24\n-5.57\n34.15\n-8.90\n11.10\n-6.93\n98.46\n4.21\n-53.15\n-34.91\n-29.70\n10.35\n42.88\n17.03\nSep\n54.50\n5.38\n41.86\n4.35\n14.13\n-7.18\n106.87\n-1.44\n-33.62\n-14.65\n-13.91\n21.81\n65.73\n30.52\nOct\n19.20\n-16.47\n38.22\n-16.86\n1.99\n-16.89\n109.61\n-14.02\n-26.79\n-24.38\n-27.05\n7.83\n18.98\n10.42\nNov\n16.40\n-8.49\n38.98\n-10.94\n5.74\n-10.42\n118.10\n-9.99\n-17.04\n-26.54\n-26.56\n10.98\n18.95\n12.90\nDec\n13.75\n-5.58\n33.93\n-7.91\n6.56\n-6.80\n122.72\n-8.61\n-13.92\n-26.98\n-29.39\n9.88\n14.77\n11.10\n2021\nJan\n20.60\n-2.07\n36.36\n-1.28\n10.32\n-3.60\n128.10\n-5.01\n-21.25\n-30.63\n-23.35\n12.89\n17.44\n14.03\nFeb\n39.34\n9.50\n38.02\n12.01\n25.35\n8.60\n82.62\n14.90\n-32.54\n-21.66\n-17.59\n18.72\n29.84\n21.45\nMar\n14.17\n6.58\n29.52\n3.24\n5.87\n19.12\n92.07\n6.36\n6.81\n-2.73\n-7.44\n18.40\n22.51\n19.45\nApr\n14.30\n5.98\n30.11\n3.19\n6.13\n19.96\n93.18\n5.32\n25.12\n-1.35\n-10.56\n19.42\n22.82\n20.29\nMay\n15.83\n14.44\n20.88\n4.68\n16.10\n25.82\n102.08\n55.83\n36.63\n-3.32\n-9.20\n20.10\n22.47\n20.70\nJun\n12.75\n14.64\n22.39\n15.03\n9.18\n12.04\n70.11\n42.04\n30.41\n4.24\n-7.69\n19.04\n28.60\n21.31\nJul\n6.39\n11.64\n23.80\n10.15\n3.85\n6.95\n52.67\n52.59\n39.02\n13.15\n8.80\n18.71\n15.01\n17.76\nAug\n13.21\n12.09\n24.34\n11.12\n5.35\n6.76\n15.74\n59.33\n35.23\n16.34\n4.54\n18.18\n18.05\n18.15\nSep\n14.96\n12.70\n25.60\n16.41\n6.74\n12.34\n14.92\n60.58\n36.28\n21.35\n9.67\n20.76\n21.15\n20.86\nOct\n17.72\n16.64\n21.34\n23.27\n7.60\n13.62\n22.43\n60.80\n38.87\n20.39\n10.27\n21.05\n24.80\n21.99\nNov\n16.80\n14.54\n22.11\n24.82\n6.57\n13.72\n27.83\n60.49\n15.38\n17.92\n11.34\n20.15\n24.28\n21.19\nDec\n17.38\n12.07\n20.56\n24.61\n6.62\n10.09\n28.48\n61.86\n16.79\n14.71\n12.21\n19.00\n21.96\n19.76\n2022\nJan\n15.38\n11.03\n21.29\n20.02\n4.81\n7.80\n28.71\n82.72\n15.93\n17.46\n8.22\n18.46\n21.56\n19.26\nFeb\n16.00\n15.14\n25.74\n22.76\n3.87\n7.80\n31.58\n66.63\n18.83\n20.23\n9.44\n20.73\n23.23\n21.38\nMar\n18.84\n17.81\n25.15\n19.07\n7.41\n13.39\n28.67\n68.48\n18.98\n20.57\n9.57\n21.54\n26.32\n22.80\nApr\n22.71\n20.48\n42.29\n25.78\n9.04\n14.77\n30.15\n73.15\n4.52\n26.09\n15.50\n29.14\n34.75\n30.60\nMay\n26.46\n27.91\n43.15\n26.23\n11.74\n17.68\n33.27\n24.17\n3.66\n27.29\n19.09\n30.37\n47.22\n34.70\nJun\n34.62\n32.92\n47.25\n30.78\n25.21\n23.62\n38.51\n30.74\n3.41\n30.29\n28.37\n36.30\n68.72\n44.47\nJul\n38.99\n33.16\n59.19\n38.55\n30.80\n25.88\n40.04\n33.42\n15.74\n32.91\n29.63\n43.58\n89.00\n54.99\nAug\n41.70\n35.49\n60.73\n39.17\n31.89\n26.54\n37.81\n34.54\n16.27\n31.74\n31.34\n44.88\n96.89\n57.92\nSep\n35.93\n32.94\n66.48\n32.64\n30.19\n25.02\n45.99\n33.85\n26.81\n27.66\n27.17\n45.91\n86.25\n56.09\nOct\n35.00\n33.64\n76.23\n32.71\n30.19\n24.29\n39.72\n34.98\n24.31\n26.52\n26.89\n48.43\n83.72\n57.47\nNov\n33.55\n33.65\n74.26\n32.03\n30.42\n23.10\n39.54\n35.12\n55.96\n48.48\n26.56\n49.54\n78.43\n57.06\nDec\n30.92\n33.36\n72.02\n30.01\n29.63\n23.87\n44.62\n33.64\n55.91\n47.88\n23.73\n48.22\n77.66\n55.93\n2023\nJan\n29.74\n31.69\n69.78\n29.91\n29.05\n23.89\n39.11\n19.78\n54.56\n44.29\n24.25\n46.26\n71.94\n53.03\nFeb\n22.86\n25.38\n60.69\n26.01\n26.87\n23.89\n35.79\n16.09\n54.11\n37.14\n12.96\n38.85\n58.69\n44.14\nMar\n19.07\n22.07\n59.46\n23.60\n25.55\n23.89\n33.36\n14.86\n54.13\n35.54\n12.56\n36.31\n52.99\n40.80\nApr\n16.38\n20.11\n43.52\n16.85\n24.51\n23.89\n31.87\n13.36\n50.56\n28.25\n11.10\n28.93\n45.87\n33.48\nMay\n15.66\n10.84\n44.93\n15.37\n25.01\n23.89\n36.54\n12.90\n51.63\n25.34\n9.57\n27.96\n37.63\n30.68\nJun\n19.45\n3.65\n48.01\n3.20\n20.03\n23.89\n61.17\n11.33\n49.36\n22.73\n6.31\n27.58\n38.70\n30.85\nJul\n16.14\n2.22\n36.71\n-1.98\n15.30\n23.89\n60.33\n8.34\n34.91\n23.72\n5.22\n21.28\n26.03\n22.74\nAug\n10.74\n-0.36\n31.33\n-3.54\n13.04\n23.89\n56.36\n6.57\n33.75\n21.75\n0.82\n17.55\n17.90\n17.66\nSep\n13.82\n1.52\n25.26\n0.08\n13.36\n23.89\n50.18\n5.97\n30.99\n23.86\n3.48\n16.31\n23.12\n18.36\nOct\n15.06\n1.31\n23.16\n-1.20\n14.66\n7.28\n42.11\n5.15\n25.35\n23.64\n5.28\n15.40\n23.50\n17.82\nNov\n17.55\n1.56\n33.71\n-2.14\n16.48\n8.40\n40.66\n5.48\n11.94\n2.93\n5.52\n18.43\n29.24\n21.63\nDec\n21.19\n2.22\n40.65\n-1.28\n17.09\n9.49\n36.33\n7.61\n12.19\n3.27\n7.82\n21.52\n38.26\n26.52\n2024\nJan\n24.18\n0.25\n47.17\n-2.90\n13.08\n21.65\n28.14\n2.95\n18.31\n4.68\n3.64\n24.16\n60.25\n34.84\nFeb\n33.06\n2.10\n59.99\n-1.02\n17.41\n30.39\n41.46\n7.62\n20.22\n9.87\n15.86\n32.35\n84.37\n47.62\nSource: Zimstat, 2024\nTABLE 9.2 : YEARLY INFLATION - % CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \nNON-FOOD INFLATION\nHEALTH\nTRANSPORT\nCOMMUNICATION\nEDUCATION\nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES \n& \nTOBACCO \nCLOTHING \n& \nFOOTWEAR\nHOUSING, \nWATER, \nELECTRICTY, \nGAS & \nOTHER FUELS\nFURNITURE \nAND \nEQUIPMENT\nRECREATION \n& CULTURE\nRESTAURANTS \n& HOTELS\nMISC. \nGOODS & \nSERVICES\nTOTAL \nNON \nFOOD\nFOOD & NON \nALCOHOLIC \nCEVERAGES \nALL ITEMS\n \n \n30 \n \n \n \n2022\nJan\n115.422\n7.4069\n9.8109\n0.9995\n128.8401\n154.8332\nFeb\n124.019\n8.0738\n10.7214\n1.0732\n138.2625\n165.6148\nMar\n142.424\n9.8091\n12.4763\n1.1665\n159.0161\n186.8670\nApr\n159.348\n10.0334\n13.1064\n1.2217\n167.9530\n199.4880\nMay\n290.888\n18.7787\n24.3182\n2.2757\n312.8351\n367.1438\nJun\n366.269\n22.5194\n29.7593\n2.6861\n382.8607\n444.3572\nJul\n416.289\n25.2673\n33.2407\n3.1299\n425.1560\n507.7061\nAug\n546.825\n32.3336\n42.8164\n3.9498\n548.9033\n638.9381\nSep\n621.532\n34.5376\n46.4284\n4.2999\n609.9716\n691.9517\nOct\n632.137\n34.7014\n47.2839\n4.2742\n628.8500\n732.8998\nNov\n654.865\n38.5947\n51.0140\n4.7279\n677.5889\n784.3319\nDec\n671.447\n39.5836\n52.6414\n5.0669\n715.4935\n809.2610\n2023\nJan\n796.522\n45.7487\n61.8897\n6.1132\n863.6683\n983.1863\nFeb\n889.133\n48.1898\n66.7294\n6.5202\n941.1468\n1070.6489\nMar\n929.862\n52.0727\n71.3204\n6.9912\n1013.3634\n1151.6803\nApr\n1047.445\n57.1437\n79.4723\n7.7646\n1151.0384\n1309.3061\nMay\n2577.056\n130.3252\n186.5789\n18.4901\n2755.1310\n3192.3286\nJun\n5739.000\n306.2597\n425.5469\n39.6710\n6240.5886\n7250.9396\nJul\n4516.803\n255.8972\n346.4388\n31.8342\n4971.8704\n5801.8328\nAug\n4608.107\n246.2293\n343.3039\n31.5721\n5031.5916\n5860.1292\nSep\n5466.747\n288.5390\n396.3391\n36.6073\n5782.7246\n6680.6377\nOct\n5698.961\n301.1746\n417.7338\n37.9539\n6039.7584\n6920.5328\nNov\n5791.080\n309.3526\n429.6053\n39.3710\n6363.8242\n7330.4810\nDec\n6104.723\n329.1177\n455.4123\n43.1811\n6753.9598\n7783.5213\n2024\nJan\n10152.393\n555.5556\n745.3522\n65.3595\n10985.0050\n12870.8909\nFeb\n14912.829\n769.2308\n1082.9160\n99.0099\n16156.7220\n18886.3930\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024\n TABLE 10 : SELECTED INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE RATES\n1. ZWL$ dollar per unit of foreign currency\nEND OF\nUSA DOLLAR\nSOUTH ARFICAN \nRAND\nBOTSWANA PULA\nJAPANESE YEN\nEURO\nPOUND \nSTERLING\n \n \n31 \n \n \n \nMarket Capitalisation\nAll Share Index*\nZWL$ millions\n2020\nJan\n332.9\n344.9\n304.86\n179,559,446\n43,426.5\nFeb\n473.13\n826.73\n360.13\n172,678,984\n60,987.5\nMar\n456.21\n720.47\n425.24\n237,667,043\n58,612.1\nApr\n488.60\n826.64\n269.66\n107,308,931\n63,387.9\nMay\n1180.14\n1582.86\n568.96\n218,832,930\n152,719.7\nJune**\n1788.75\n3995.48\n379.93\n519,901,300\n228,577.1\nAug\n1389.23\n3709.15\n1,026.76\n164,501,200\n175,678.4\nSep\n1638.17\n4128.52\n4,640.88\n1,093,040,821\n206,502.5\nOct\n1476.87\n3792.35\n986.70\n397,006,127\n179,690.0\nNov\n1595.59\n3322.22\n4,103.78\n470,899,659\n193,270.8\nDec\n2636.34\n4134.09\n2,734.50\n316,737,200\n317,879.3\n2021\nJan\n3600.82\n4356.74\n3,513.59\n2,477,166,688\n434,856.23\nFeb\n4154.37\n6683.44\n1,529.25\n149,031,800\n501,184.95\nMar\n4489.47\n5315.39\n4,517.14\n203,633,747\n531,742.64\nApr\n4641.11\n5061.28\n3,075.98\n223,494,202\n540,745.24\nMay\n5428.28\n6820.54\n3,917.41\n188,748,200\n634,011.15\nJun\n6194.88\n6211.49\n4458.87\n248,500,624\n745,175.95\nJul\n6818.29\n6621.17\n2921.32\n181,010,800\n803,900.15\nAug\n6652.31\n6115.85\n3456.94\n147,232,800\n792,291.48\nSep\n8580.16\n6014.53\n4730.25\n2,909,442,557\n1,032,472.92\nOct\n11329.48\n6652.04\n5661.76\n108,843,000\n1,378,227.92\nNov\n 10695.57\n7193.11\n9883.24\n791,653,520\n1,290,069.75\nDec\n12079.74\n7815.37\n17577.25\n228,225,060\n1,317,205.11\n2022\nJan\n12079.74\n8196.79\n3704.23\n82,402,101\n1,475,217.45\nFeb\n14990.42\n9300.03\n7979.35\n156,327,700\n1,863,028.60\nMar\n15858.92\n11289.34\n8186.00\n117,815,800\n1,964,738.42\nApr\n28391.75\n30527.28\n11366.89\n193,411,483\n3,547,347.52\nMay\n23072.46\n20021.24\n8211.45\n195,475,400\n2,893,011.70\nJune\n19791.94\n20021.24\n14570.16\n271,227,100\n2,439,165.45\nJuly\n16594.91\n20021.24\n23673.34\n239,937,180\n2,068,222.01\nAug\n13705.12\n15473.37\n8674.85\n139,225,500\n1,685,592.28\nSept\n14771.65\n18929.75\n5128.54\n137,092,750\n1,819,157.07\nOct\n15072.14\n23659.53\n8657.90\n201,566,548\n1,826,101.68\nNov\n14577.46\n25478.67\n7680.78\n90,311,600\n1,610,203.36\nDec\n19493.85\n25487.77\n27753.79\n472,926,200\n2,044,869.14\n2023\nJan\n22813.24\n25496.86\n11638.16\n102,792,200\n2,460,037.66\nFeb\n28548.02\n29207.92\n24410.54\n164,006,458\n2,576,324.76\nMar\n38568.48\n37359.78\n14262.67\n97,920,600\n3,381,456.06\nApr\n41391.62\n36393.55\n16756.85\n74,505,000\n3,482,408.54\nMay\n108195.29\n52765.85\n34867.41\n206,593,600\n8,939,058.47\nJun\n171408.90\n76960.49\n85279.40\n192,473,571\n13,987,476.83\nJul\n114746.13\n89512.59\n40846.72\n176,547,600\n9,171,346.28\nAug\n125134.79\n109159.36\n39214.53\n103,854,600\n9,723,577.74\nSep\n126642.42\n125531.67\n91310.72\n343,359,119\n9,873,493.87\nOct\n157083.06\n125531.67\n31773.08\n64,000,500\n12,576,665.45\nNov\n191271.68\n148883.44\n54864.31\n162,675,500\n15,311,628.01\nDec\n210833.92\n145542.27\n109727.94\n254,991,213\n16,812,914.36\n2024\nJan\n542743.66\n163733.73\n112532.73\n79,766,490\n43,459,150.79\nFeb\n525570.76\n216534.42\n103474.44\n73,940,200\n41,499,016.93\nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2024\n**As at 26 June 2020\n*All Share index was introduced in January, 2018\nTABLE 11: ZIMBABWE STOCK MARKET STATISTICS\nMining Index\n Market Turnover \nZWL$ million \nVolume of Shares\nEND OF\n \n \n32 \n \n \n \nEND OF\nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\n INTERNET\n2021\nJan\n255551.3\n-\n21042.2\n2300.3\n35349.1\n66624.4\nFeb\n226335.8\n-\n22882.6\n2288.9\n36434.4\n63598.2\nMar\n320422.1\n-\n28569.9\n3316.6\n44524.0\n86463.9\nApr\n288958.8\n-\n30071.5\n2807.0\n44131.6\n90580.4\nMay\n361427.1\n-\n36765.1\n3193.7\n49745.8\n89471.3\nJun\n388757.5\n-\n38540.1\n3200.0\n51437.4\n115145.7\nJul\n379659.9\n-\n45808.1\n2489.1\n57565.8\n145027.0\nAug\n397539.0\n-\n52853.9\n4086.0\n60908.4\n159206.6\nSep\n477933.6\n-\n52262.7\n4179.5\n64139.2\n181194.8\nOct\n481180.9\n-\n53165.9\n3839.9\n65329.0\n197972.5\nNov\n621896.7\n-\n56025.3\n4877.0\n63017.5\n252407.9\nDec\n747035.6\n-\n67903.9\n4705.5\n76511.6\n264749.2\n2022\nJan\n802677.7\n-\n55961.6\n5074.7\n53456.3\n218545.3\nFeb\n672723.0\n-\n59581.6\n5607.0\n66812.0\n238910.8\nMar\n961452.0\n-\n75050.7\n7882.2\n82886.9\n342168.7\nApr\n976617.2\n-\n89192.6\n8391.5\n89672.0\n293204.6\nMay\n1205990.0\n-\n110807.3\n13712.8\n106881.8\n469185.2\nJune\n1601225.3\n-\n134551.0\n18810.6\n123721.3\n618347.5\nJuly\n1754112.0\n-\n170480.6\n20413.1\n172562.5\n713401.1\nAug\n2334295.0\n-\n152343.4\n31418.6\n178188.9\n826377.1\nSep\n2793056.6\n-\n177701.7\n35144.4\n202368.1\n872807.4\nOct\n2728731.3\n-\n186478.9\n50202.3\n209758.0\n622412.8\nNov\n3370779.9\n-\n202876.2\n61086.7\n213295.3\n734610.6\nDec\n3310814.9\n-\n246783.6\n76872.0\n249516.4\n1106346.5\n2023\nJan\n3289379.3\n-\n240010.3\n68386.7\n238455.3\n1107756.4\nFeb\n3050933.3\n-\n219437.8\n73672.3\n245282.5\n1202998.5\nMar\n5068223.7\n-\n308609.1\n85343.4\n328822.3\n1517972.6\nApr\n5294044.5\n-\n341571.3\n79754.6\n355007.3\n1517972.6\nMay\n6275310.7\n-\n518333.9\n173170.7\n532078.6\n3274968.5\nJun\n17059664.0\n-\n882362.6\n615190.9\n1210486.2\n6640627.1\nJul\n17859586.4\n-\n1033836.9\n541445.6\n1620242.8\n6077538.3\nAug\n17955865.5\n-\n1017990.5\n649827.9\n1440537.4\n6244772.4\nSep\n18690087.0\n-\n1221725.3\n773363.9\n1672654.2\n7746084.3\nOct\n19808639.1\n-\n1264577.2\n826681.2\n5116902.9\n8661662.9\nNov\n23685304.8\n-\n1429269.5\n901515.6\n1999069.4\n9557300.7\nDec\n26396219.4\n-\n1805050.5\n1092682.6\n2604059.2\n10150615.3\n2024\nJan\n28285124.9\n-\n1907120.0\n1843871.0\n4295911.6\n22017137.9\nFeb\n38298901.1\n-\n2856867.0\n2676718.2\n5734025.5\n29563851.5\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024\nTABLE 12.1 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS \n Values of Transactions (ZWL$ millions)\n \n \n33 \n \n \n \nEND OF\nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\n INTERNET\n2021\nJan\n720.0\n-\n9849.3\n229.0\n94691.4\n872.2\nFeb\n806.0\n-\n12309.3\n527.8\n90078.0\n754.9\nMar\n1112.8\n-\n15178.8\n751.0\n105272.0\n1003.7\nApr\n951.7\n-\n15185.0\n605.5\n97253.3\n1040.1\nMay\n1029.8\n-\n16511.3\n664.4\n103708.7\n994.8\nJun\n1076.9\n-\n14797.9\n581.9\n99349.6\n982.1\nJul\n1028.2\n-\n15217.6\n551.0\n102587.6\n980.8\nAug\n1045.0\n-\n14624.5\n475.4\n105269.7\n955.8\nSep\n1193.1\n-\n15397.6\n492.2\n104141.9\n2092.6\nOct\n1114.2\n-\n18207.4\n434.5\n107294.6\n2342.6\nNov\n1144.9\n-\n17435.9\n477.0\n98386.5\n2322.9\nDec\n1220.3\n-\n20029.6\n519.5\n106428.6\n2580.6\n2022\nJan\n957.9\n-\n15480.2\n439.9\n83661.8\n1902.9\nFeb\n981.0\n-\n15190.4\n433.7\n78916.1\n1895.3\nMar\n1242.3\n-\n16967.6\n519.1\n87501.1\n2128.6\nApr\n1073.0\n-\n15906.2\n458.0\n82673.4\n1937.6\nMay\n1213.5\n-\n16069.9\n477.8\n78385.2\n2001.2\nJune\n1190.3\n-\n15304.7\n474.2\n75631.7\n1705.1\nJuly\n1115.8\n-\n16063.8\n517.0\n88030.6\n1866.7\nAug\n1028.0\n-\n13686.8\n489.1\n76957.8\n1623.7\nSep\n1084.6\n-\n13084.7\n455.5\n71362.1\n2225.2\nOct\n969.3\n-\n12986.8\n510.9\n67641.7\n1825.4\nNov\n1001.4\n-\n12324.1\n499.9\n59151.5\n2430.2\nDec\n1013.6\n-\n14316.9\n616.7\n60584.5\n2469.8\n2023\nJan\n918.9\n-\n11734.0\n444.0\n48617.1\n1693.0\nFeb\n886.7\n-\n10301.5\n479.9\n43326.5\n1895.8\nMar\n1092.6\n-\n13217.0\n594.0\n50037.4\n1927.1\nApr\n907.6\n-\n14375.1\n526.7\n47171.7\n1982.9\nMay\n1119.2\n-\n12808.7\n576.7\n49143.2\n2233.6\nJun\n1050.2\n-\n10190.6\n606.0\n45488.8\n1213.0\nJul\n942.7\n-\n8226.8\n1777.1\n42648.8\n993.7\nAug\n888.0\n-\n8434.6\n653.6\n42648.8\n977.5\nSep\n964.1\n-\n9659.0\n703.6\n45148.7\n1061.4\nOct\n949.1\n-\n9449.3\n619.0\n50640.6\n904.4\nNov\n924.5\n-\n9525.7\n623.3\n52332.4\n1048.5\nDec\n924.5\n-\n11846.0\n776.5\n56451.0\n1026.2\n2024\nJan\n914.9\n10017.9\n708.1\n52445.0\n882.8\nFeb\n889.7\n-\n7868.7\n737.5\n51545.9\n904.2\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024\nTABLE 12.2 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS \n Volumes of Transactions (000's)\n \n \n34 \n \n \n \nEND OF\nEXPORTS\nIMPORTS\nTOTAL TRADE TRADE BALANCE\n2021\nJan\n282.9\n460.3\n743.20\n-177.4\nFeb\n340.8\n451.9\n792.70\n-111.1\nMar\n461.8\n527.2\n989.00\n-65.4\nApr\n444.7\n489.9\n934.60\n-45.2\nMay\n486.8\n503.1\n989.91\n-16.2\nJun\n502.5\n622.2\n-119.7\n-55.6\nJul\n629.9\n667.6\n-37.7\n-37.7\nAug\n597.3\n630.2\n-32.9\n-32.9\nSep\n514.4\n666.7\n-152.2\n-152.3\nOct\n535.5\n713.6\n-178.1\n-178.1\nNov\n647.6\n684.3\n-36.7\n-36.7\nDec\n591.2\n771.2\n-179.9\n-180.0\n2022\nJan\n543.9\n633.2\n-88.1\n-89.3\nFeb\n438.0\n630.1\n1068.1\n-192.2\nMar\n557.6\n713.8\n1271.4\n-156.2\nApr\n587.3\n637.2\n1224.5\n-49.9\nMay\n513.1\n714.4\n1227.6\n-201.3\nJun\n541.0\n751.4\n1292.3\n-210.4\nJul\n548.4\n728.2\n1276.6\n-179.9\nAug\n493.6\n759.9\n1253.4\n-266.3\nSep\n552.3\n765.3\n1317.6\n-213.1\nOct\n502.3\n770.5\n1272.8\n-268.2\nNov\n674.6\n802.2\n1476.8\n-127.5\nDec\n633.5\n772.6\n1406.1\n-139.1\n2023\nJan\n427.8\n633.8\n1061.6\n-206.0\nFeb\n435.9\n623.5\n1059.3\n-187.6\nMar\n515.3\n746.4\n1261.7\n-231.1\nApr\n555.5\n708.6\n1264.1\n-153.0\nMay\n654.2\n850.3\n1504.6\n-196.1\nJun\n641.5\n727.4\n1368.9\n-85.9\nJul\n603.2\n782.9\n1386.2\n-179.7\nAug\n649.8\n820.2\n1470.1\n-170.4\nSep\n678.1\n772.7\n1450.8\n-94.6\nOct\n831.9\n901.5\n1733.4\n-69.6\nNov\n681.4\n827.3\n1508.7\n-145.9\nDec\n550.6\n819.4\n1370.0\n-268.7\n0.0\n2024\nJan\n539.9\n686.9\n1226.7\n-147.0\nFeb\n644.0\n725.4\n1369.4\n-81.4\nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2024\nTABLE 13 : MERCHANDISE TRADE STATISTICS\n (US$ millions)", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/Monthly_Economic_Reviews/Monthly_Economic_Review_February_2024.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "064134a75f87d968f4a9a9a80eae73ad", "text": "1\n \nPRESS STATEMENT \nEMBARGO DELIVERY \n20 November 2025 \n \nSTATEMENT OF THE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE \n \nIssued by Lesetja Kganyago, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank \nGood day \nIt has been a turbulent year for the global economy. Trade patterns are shifting, but \nglobal growth is holding up better than expected.1 In the euro area, inflation appears \ncontained. However, in other major economies price dynamics are more challenging, \nwith deflation risk in China, and inflation materially above 2% targets in the United \nKingdom, Japan, and the United States (US). In emerging markets (EM), by contrast, \ninflation has eased. Indeed, 2025 has been better than expected for EMs. This is \ndue to stronger capital flows and a weaker dollar, as well as favourable terms of \ntrade. \nMeanwhile, there is an investment boom underway in Artificial Intelligence (AI) \ninfrastructure, accompanied by aggressive valuations for major technology stocks. \nDespite the promise of AI, there are signs of a bubble inflating. With lower rates, and \ncheap credit even for riskier borrowers, financial markets appear vulnerable to a \ncorrection. If that happens, emerging markets could suffer from spillovers. \nTurning to South Africa, growth is looking steadier than last year. The second-quarter \noutcome surprised on the upside and the third-quarter indicators are looking broadly \npositive. Our 2025 growth forecast has therefore been revised slightly higher, to \n \n1 The SARB’s growth projection for South Africa’s major trading partners has been marked up to \n2.7%, from 2.5% as of the September MPC. \n \n2\n1.3%. We continue to see growth nearing 2% over the forecast horizon.2 \nEmployment has also been rising.3 \nHousehold spending has been relatively strong to date, supported by wealth effects,4 \nfurther withdrawals from Two-Pot pension savings, and lower inflation and interest \nrates.5 At the same time, investment has disappointed, contracting further in the first \nhalf of the year. We expect an investment recovery in the second half, and if this \nmaterialises it will be an encouraging signal that the economy is getting back to its \nhistoric growth trend.6 As it stands, growth is better, but not yet healthy. \nThe risks to the growth outlook are assessed as balanced. \nMoving to prices, inflation has accelerated somewhat over the past few months, \nreaching 3.6% for October. This is higher than the 3% average for the first half of the \nyear.7 The uptick is mainly due to non-core items: meat, vegetables, and fuel. We \ncontinue to see this pressure as temporary, with inflation heading lower again from \nthe beginning of next year. Indeed, recent outcomes have undershot our forecasts \nslightly. \nBecause of these downside surprises, together with a stronger rand,8 and a lower oil \nprice assumption,9 we have small downward revisions to our inflation outlook, for \nboth 2025 and 2026.10 We remain on track to deliver 3% inflation over the medium \nterm. \n \n2 The 2025Q3 growth forecast has been revised up to 0.5% (q/q sa), from 0.4%. 2025Q4 has also \nbeen revised up, to 0.4%, from 0.3%. \n3 According to the Quarterly Labour Force Survey, total employment rose to 17.055 million in \nSeptember 2025, which contrasts with 16.946 million in September 2024 (one year ago) and 16.807 \nmillion in June 2025 (one quarter ago). The official unemployment rate also eased, to 31.9% (versus \n32.1% a year ago and 33.2% one quarter ago). \n4 This reflects strong asset price performance; for instance, the year-to-date change for the JSE All-\nShare Index is ±30%. \n5 Household consumption growth is projected at 2.7% for 2025, approximately double the growth rate \nof overall GDP (1.3%). \n6 In the MPC’s modelling framework, steady-state growth is 2.5%. \n7 Average headline CPI inflation was 2.95% between January 2025 and June 2025. It was 3.5% in \nJuly, 3.3% in August and 3.4% in September. \n8 The implied starting point for the forecast is 17.21, for 2025Q4; the assumption for that quarter as of \nthe September MPC was 17.61. The 2026Q1 projection is 17.25. \n9 The oil price assumption has been lowered to US$63.10 per barrel for 2025Q4 and US$67 per \nbarrel subsequently. The September MPC had US$67 for 2025Q4 and US$70 subsequently. Fuel \ninflation for 2025 drops from -5.5% to -5.9%; for 2026 it slows from 3.8% to 2.2%. \n10 Annual inflation for 2025 has been revised from 3.4% to 3.3%, and 2026 from 3.6% to 3.5%. \nInflation for 2027 is unchanged at 3.1%. \n \n3\nFor inflation expectations, we do not have an update from our usual survey this \nmeeting, but market rates and surveys of analysts both show further progress \ntowards the 3% objective.11 Core goods prices are benefitting from exchange rate \nstrength. Food price inflation seems to have peaked, although we have a small \nupward revision to this forecast, mainly from beef prices. Services inflation is \nunchanged from the last meeting: the announced medical aid increases are lower \nthan last year’s;12 at the same time, housing inflation has accelerated, which \nwarrants ongoing scrutiny. \nWe assess the risks to the inflation outlook as balanced. \nAgainst this backdrop, the MPC decided to reduce the policy rate by 25 basis points, \nto 6.75%, with effect from 21 November. The decision was unanimous. Members \nagreed there was scope now to make the policy stance less restrictive, in the context \nof an improved inflation outlook. \nThe Quarterly Projection Model continues to forecast gradual rate cuts as inflation \nsubsides. As before, this rate path remains a broad policy guide. Our decisions will \ncontinue to be taken on a meeting-by-meeting basis, with careful attention to the \noutlook, data outcomes, and the balance of risks to the forecast. \nFor this meeting, we considered two risk scenarios. \nThe first scenario featured a US dollar rebound, recognising that while the rand has \nappreciated this year, this partly reflects broad dollar weakness, not just rand \nstrength.13 In this scenario, the rand depreciates back to its 2023 levels against the \ndollar, rather than holding on to its recent gains, as in our baseline.14 \n \n11 Since the September MPC, breakeven rates have declined across the curve. As of the start of this \nMPC week, the 5-year measure was down by the smallest margin (2bps). The 10-year was down by \n22bps; the 15-year by 51bps, and the 20-year by 59bps. In the latest Reuters poll, analysts have \ninflation at 3.6% for 2026 (versus 3.8% previously) and 3.4% for 2027 (versus 3.5% previously). \n12 The average of the published increases announced by the various medical aid schemes, for 2026, \nis 8.1%. \n13 For instance, while the rand has appreciated by about 9% against the US dollar so far this year, it \nhas depreciated by around 2% against the euro. \n14 In this scenario, the local currency weakens to about R19 per US dollar over the forecast period. In \nthe baseline, the rand is stable close to R17 per US dollar. \n \n4\nThe second scenario was based on higher administered prices, linked to a rapid \ncorrection of the R54 billion electricity pricing error disclosed a few months back.15 \nThe scenario also had inflation expectations staying higher for longer, in response. \nBoth scenarios featured tighter monetary policy, with rates coming down more slowly \ncompared to the baseline.16 The administered price scenario in particular shows that \nif price setters take on board the 3% target, we will have space to get to lower rates \nfaster. \nThis brings us to the subject of the new target. As announced last week, we have \nmoved away from the 3-6% target range, which was established 25 years ago. The \nrevised target, agreed between the Minister of Finance and myself as the Governor \nof the South African Reserve Bank, is 3% plus or minus 1 percentage point. \nAs we move from a range target to a point target with a tolerance band, it is \nimportant to understand what the new target means. \nThe tolerance band, of 1 percentage point either side of 3%, does not mean we will \nbe indifferent to inflation anywhere between 2% and 4%. We want to be at 3%. \nHowever, no central bank has the tools to deliver inflation at an exact point all the \ntime. As flexible inflation targeters, we also recognise that trying to offset all price \nshocks would create undesirable volatility in output. \nTo support communication and accountability, we therefore want it understood that \ninflation will not always be precisely 3%. \nWhen there are deviations, we will explain what has driven inflation away from \ntarget, and we will do what is required to get back to target. \n \n15 The scenario had admin. price inflation of 5.0% in 2026, 5.1% in 2027 and 4.0% in 2028 (baseline: \n4.5% for 2026, 4.3% for 2027 and 3.9% for 2028), with electricity inflation at 10.6% in 2026, 9.5% in \n2027 and 6.7% in 2028 (baseline: 9.1%, 7.9% and 6.9%, respectively). The scenario assumed the \nNERSA correction was frontloaded, which is why 2028 inflation is not higher. \n16 In the dollar scenario, inflation is 3.6% in 2026, 3.4% in 2027 and 3.4% in 2028. In the admin. price \nscenario, inflation is 3.6%, 3.5% and 3.2% in those three years, respectively. The corresponding \ninflation projections in the baseline are 3.5%, 3.1% and 3.0%, respectively. In the admin. price \nscenario, the divergence is largest in mid-2027, when the policy rate is 6.44% (2027Q2) and 6.41% \n(2027Q3), versus a baseline policy rate of 6.05% and 6.03% for those two quarters, respectively. For \nthe dollar scenario, the divergence is largest in 2028Q1, when the policy rate is at 6.58%, versus a \nbaseline rate of 5.97%. \n \n5\nMost of the time, we should be expected to keep inflation within the tolerance band, \nwith breaches occurring only when there are severe shocks. We will always be \nsetting policy so that inflation is going back to 3%. \nMonetary policy actions have their main effects on prices after 12 to 24 months, so \nyou should expect us to achieve our target over that horizon. Accordingly, we want \nlonger-run expectations to anchor at 3%, staying there even when there are shocks. \nThis lag, between monetary policy decisions and outcomes, also explains why the \n3% target is taking effect now, but will be achieved over the forecast period. \nThe MPC has long emphasised the need for macroeconomic and structural reforms \nto boost potential growth, achieve a sustainable debt path, and shift to a low-inflation \nregime. There has been significant progress on reform this year, as underscored by \nthe recent credit rating upgrade from Standard & Poor’s, as well as South Africa’s \nexit from the Financial Action Task Force grey list. The global environment \nnonetheless remains challenging, so it is urgent to sustain domestic reform efforts. \nThank you. \nLesetja Kganyago \nGOVERNOR \n \nThe dates for the 2026 MPC decisions are as follows: \n29 January \n26 March \n28 May \n23 July \n23 September \n19 November \n \nContact person: \nThoraya Pandy \n082.416.8416 \nmedia@resbank.co.za", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/MPC_Statements/nov25-statement.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "3f0f84478ac06e6dc5461dfd79631833", "text": "i \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nDECEMBER 2020 \n \n2 \n \nTABLE OF CONTENTS \n \nSELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS ..............................................................................3 \nINTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICE DEVELOPMENTS ..........................................4 \nMONETARY DEVELOPMENTS ...........................................................................................8 \nSTOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS...................................................................................9 \nINFLATION OUTTURN ....................................................................................................... 11 \nAnnual Inflation .................................................................................................................. 11 \nMonthly Inflation................................................................................................................. 11 \n \nNATIONAL PAYMENTS SYSTEM ..................................................................................... 12 \nZimbabwe Electronic Transfer Settlement System (ZETSS) ............................................ 12 \nCash Transactions ............................................................................................................... 12 \nMobile and Internet Based Transactions ............................................................................ 12 \nCard Based Transactions .................................................................................................... 12 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n3 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2020 \n \nNovember \n \n2020 \n \nDecember \n \nMonth-on- \nMonth Change \n(%) \nReserve Money (M0) (ZW$ millions) \n18,424.35 \n \n18,762.403 \n \n1.83 \n \nMoney Supply2 (M3) (ZW$ millions) \n184,348.77 \n \n204,924.863 \n \n11.16 \n \nAnnual Inflation1 (%) \n401.66 \n348.59 \n-53.07a \n \nBlended Annual Inflation1 (%) \n215.00 \n188.91 \n-26.09a \nMonthly Inflation1 (%) \n3.15 \n4.22 \n1.07a \n \nBlended Monthly Inflation1 (%) \n2.25 \n2.75 \n0.50a \nNational Payment System Transactions2 \n(ZW$ billions) \n360.22 \n454.10 \n26.06 \nNominal Lending Rate2 \n(% per annum) \n6.00-65.00 \n6.00-65.00 \n \nSources: \n1. Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency. \n2. Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. \n3. Provisional until audit is completed. \na- Percentage point. \nSELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS \n \n \n \n4 \n \nINTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICE \nDEVELOPMENTS \n \nThe international monthly average prices for \nplatinum, nickel, copper and Brent crude oil \nincreased in December 2020. Gold prices, \nhowever, declined in the same month. The \nglobal economy was once again hit by resurgent \ncoronavirus cases, which also sent jitters among \ninvestors in global markets, as a new variant of \nthe deadly virus emerged. This notwithstanding, \nrobust growth in China, news of the US stimulus \npackage and vaccine roll-outs, buoyed global \nmarkets, with expectations of firming economic \nrecovery in 2021. \n \nPrecious Metals \n Gold \nGold prices declined by 0.5% in December 2020 \nto US$1,856.89 per ounce, from US$1866.50 \nper ounce recorded in the previous month. \nPrices eased for the fourth consecutive month, \nas investors turned to riskier assets, on the back \nof the roll-out of coronavirus vaccines. The \nlosses were, however, limited by the yellow \nmetal’s safe haven appeal and an unchanged \nmonetary policy stance by the Federal Reserve. \n \nPlatinum \nPlatinum prices breached the US$1,000.00 per \nounce mark in December 2020. The price of the \nprecious metal continued on a positive \ntrajectory, gaining 12.5% month-on-month, \nfrom US$914.05 per ounce recorded in \nNovember 2020 to US$1,027.95 per ounce, \nduring the month under review. Prices were \nsupported by the renewed US stimulus package \nand greater risk sentiment amongst investors, \nwhich supported industrial demand for the \nmetal. In addition, a projected deficit in the \nplatinum market for 2021, is expected to support \nprices from the supply side. \n \nFigure 1 shows developments in precious metal \nprices for the period from December 2019 to \nDecember 2020. \n \n Figure 1: Precious metal prices (US$/oz.) \nSource: Bloomberg, 2020 \n \nBase Metals \n \nCopper \nCopper prices continued on a positive trajectory \non account of robust economic activity in China, \nthe renewed US stimulus package and investor \noptimism, as Covid-19 vaccines were rolled out. \nResultantly, copper prices firmed by 9.8% to a \nmonthly average of US$7,756.95 per tonne, \nfrom US$7,063.43 per tonne recorded in the \nprevious month. \n \nNickel \nNickel prices registered a monthly increase of \n6.4%, from US$15,796.05 per tonne to \n600\n800\n1000\n1200\n1400\n1600\n1800\n2000\n2200\nDec-19\nJan-20\nFeb-20\nMar-20\nApr-20\nMay-20\nJun-20\nJul-20\nAug-20\nSep-20\nOct-20\nNov-20\nDec-20\nUS$/oz.\nGold\nPlatinum\n \n \n \n5 \n \nUS$16,814.00 per tonne, during the month \nunder review. Prices were supported from the \nsupply-side, as industrial action in New \nCaledonia and violent protests at a major \nsmelting plant in Indonesia prompted fears of \nsupply disruptions. On the demand side, prices \ngained support from robust Chinese growth and \nthe renewed stimulus package in the US. \nFigure 2: Base metal prices (US$/ton) \nSource: Bloomberg, 2020 \n \nBrent Crude Oil \nBrent crude oil prices surged by 14.6% on a \nmonthly basis, from US$43.98 per barrel in \nNovember 2020 to US$50.41 per barrel in \nDecember 2020. This followed the approval of \na renewed stimulus package in the US and \ninvestor optimism over Covid-19 vaccine \napprovals and roll-out programmes. These \nfactors renewed optimism over global economic \nrecovery. \nFigure 3 shows developments in Brent crude oil \nprices for the period from December 2019 to \nDecember 2020. \n \n \nFigure 3: International crude oil prices \n(US$/barrel) \n \nSource: Bloomberg, 2020 \n \nMERCHANDISE TRADE \nDEVELOPMENTS \n \nTotal merchandise trade declined by 2.2%, from \nUS$1,038.2 million in November 2020 to \nUS$1,015.5 million, during the month under \nreview. \nMerchandise Exports \nThe country’s merchandise exports eased by \n7.6%, from US$528.4 million in November to \nUS$488.3 \nmillion \nin \nDecember \n2020. \nCompared to the corresponding month in 2019, \nthe December 2020 outturn was 0.2% lower. \nThe month-on-month decline was largely due to \nthe significant decrease in tobacco exports. \nFigure 4 shows developments in the country’s \nmerchandise exports for the period from January \n2019 to December 2020. \n \n \n5,000\n7,000\n9,000\n11,000\n13,000\n15,000\n17,000\n19,000\n4,000\n4,500\n5,000\n5,500\n6,000\n6,500\n7,000\n7,500\n8,000\nDec-19\nFeb-20\nApr-20\nJun-20\nAug-20\nOct-20\nDec-20\nNickel US$/ton\nCopper US$/ton\nCopper\nNickel (RHS)\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\nDec-19\nJan-20\nFeb-20\nMar-20\nApr-20\nMay-20\nJun-20\nJul-20\nAug-20\nSep-20\nOct-20\nNov-20\nDec-20\nUS$/barrel\n \n \n \n6 \n \nFigure 4: Merchandise Exports (US$ m) \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2020 \n \nNotwithstanding the overall decline in exports, \nexports for commodities such as nickel, gold, \ndiamonds and platinum recorded monthly \nincreases, as shown in Table 1. \nTable 1: Exports Classified by Harmonised \nCommodity Description and Code System \nCommodity \n \nNov-20 \nDec-20 \nShare of \nTotal (%) \nTotal Exports \n528.4 \n488.3 \n100.0 \nOf Which: \n \n \n \nNickel mattes \n44.4 \n149.2 \n30.5 \nGold \n76.5 \n105.3 \n21.6 \nTobacco \n258 \n79 \n16.2 \nNickel \nores \nand \nconcentrates1 \n54.9 \n64.6 \n13.2 \nIndustrial diamonds \n12.9 \n26.8 \n5.5 \nUnwrought Platinum \n12.4 \n13.3 \n2.7 \nFerro-chromium \n15.7 \n4.4 \n0.9 \nChromium \nores \nand concentrates \n3.3 \n3.2 \n0.7 \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Calculations, 2020 \nDuring the month of December 2020, the \ncountry’s exports were mainly destined for \n \n1 Nickel ores and concentrates, nickel matters and \nunwrought platinum are components of the platinum \ngroup of metals (PGMs). \nSouth \nAfrica \n(32.8%), \nU.A.E \n(24.1%), \nMozambique (6.2%) and Belgium (2.5%), as \nshown in Figure 5. \nFigure 5: Top Ten Merchandise Export \nDestinations (% Share) \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Calculations, 2020 \n \nMerchandise Imports \nMerchandise imports rose by 3.4%, from \nUS$509.8 million in November to US$527.2 \nmillion in December 2020, maintaining a \nsustained upward trend since July 2020. Imports \nfor the month under review were also higher \nthan in the corresponding month in 2019, as \nshown in Figure 6. \n \n0.0\n200.0\n400.0\n600.0\nJan\nFeb\nMar\nApr\nMay\nJune\nJuly\nAug\nSep\nOct\nNov\nDec\n2019\n2020\n32.83%\n24.10%\n6.25%\n2.51%\n0.73%\n0.73%\n0.31%\n0.21%\n0.20%\n0.03%\nSouth Africa\nUnited Arab Emirates\nMozambique\nBelgium\nZambia\nBotswana\nNamibia\nSwitzerland\nUnited Republic of\nTanzania\nMalawi\n \n \n \n7 \n \nFigure 6: Merchandise Imports classified by \nHS Codes 2019 & 2020 (US$ m) \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Computations, 2020 \nThe increase in imports in December 2020, was \nmainly attributable to increases in monthly \nimports of fertilisers, diesel and electricity. The \nincrease in fuel imports was partly on account of \nthe recovery of oil prices on the global markets. \nTable 3 shows imports of major commodities \nfor the months of November and December \n2020. \n \n \n \n \n \n Table 2: Imports Classified by Harmonised \nCommodity Description and Code \nSystem \nCommodity \n Nov 20 \nUS$ m \nDec 20 \nUS$ m \nShare of \nTotal \nImports \n(%) \nTotal Imports \n509.8 \n527.2 \n100.0 \nOf Which: \n \n \n \nFertiliser \nChemicals \n13.0 \n35.1 \n6.7 \nDiesel \n14.3 \n22.7 \n4.3 \nElectrical energy \n12.2 \n13.7 \n2.6 \nMaize (Excluding \nSeed) \n16.4 \n13.5 \n2.6 \nCrude soya bean \noil \n13.1 \n13.1 \n2.5 \nOther durum wheat \n20.1 \n13.0 \n2.5 \nMedicines \n3.0 \n11.7 \n2.2 \nRoad tractors (for \nsemi-trailers) \n6.9 \n9.4 \n1.8 \nRice \n10.6 \n7.6 \n1.4 \nUnleaded petrol \n6.3 \n7.1 \n1.3 \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Calculations, 2020 \nThe country’s main import sources were South \nAfrica (50.2%), China (9.4%), Singapore \n(6.5%), and Mauritius (4.5%), as shown in \nFigure 7. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n2019\n2020\n \n \n \n8 \n \nFigure 7: Top Ten Merchandise Import \nSources (% Share) \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Calculations, 2020 \n \nMerchandise Trade Balance \nThe country’s net external trade position moved \nfrom a surplus position of US$18.6 million in \nNovember 2020, to a deficit of US$39.0 million \nin \nDecember \n2020. \nFigure \n8 \nshows \ndevelopments in the country’s trade balance for \nthe period December 2019 to December 2020. \n \n \n \n \n2All monetary numbers valued in ZW$ since the adoption \nof an interbank market determined exchange rate in \nFebruary 2019. \nFigure 8: Merchandise Trade Balance \n(US$ m) \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Computations, 2020 \n \nMONETARY DEVELOPMENTS2 \n \nBroad money stood at ZW$204.92 billion3 in \nDecember 2020, an increase of 11.16%, from \nZW$184.35 billion recorded in November 2020. \nThe money stock (M3) consisted of foreign \ncurrency deposits amounting to ZW$103.73 \nbillion or 51% of total deposits. Local currency \ndeposits and currency in circulation constituted \nthe balance. Of the local currency deposits, \ntransferrable (or demand) deposits amounted to \nZW$88.66 billion; time deposits, ZW$9.91 \nbillion; and negotiable certificates of deposits, \nZW$1.44 billion. Notes and coin (currency) in \ncirculation stood at ZW$1.07 billion, as at end-\nDecember 2020. \n3 Based on December 2020 provisional balance sheet, \npending completion of the audit process. \n50.2%\n9.4%\n6.5%\n4.5%\n3.4%\n2.6%\n2.5%\n2.5%\n1.6%\n1.1%\nSouth Africa\nChina\nSingapore\nMauritius\nIndia\nUnited Kingdom\nMozambique\nZambia\nLatvia\nSaudi Arabia\n-400.0\n-200.0\n0.0\n200.0\n400.0\n600.0\nDec-19\nJan-20\nFeb-20\nMar-20\nApr-20\nMay-20\nJun-20\nJul-20\nAug-20\nSep-20\nOct-20\nNov-20\nDec-20\nExports\nImports\nTrade Balance\n \n \n \n9 \n \nOn an annual basis, the growth in foreign \ncurrency deposits partly reflected valuation \nchanges owing to exchange rate changes, from \nZW$16.77 per US$1 in December 2019 to \nZW$81.79 per US$1 in December 2020. Local \ncurrency deposits registered a growth of \n351.02%, due to money multiplier effects in the \neconomy, \nwhile \ncurrency \nin \ncirculation \nincreased by 32.01% over the year. \nTransitory deposits, consisting of demand and \nsavings deposits continued to dominate the \ncountry’s money stock, accounting for close to \n90% of the deposits in money supply. \nFigure 9: Composition of Money Supply \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020 \n \nThe annual growth in broad money largely \nreflected a 571.83% increases in credit to the \nprivate sector. Net credit to Government \nremained low due fiscal consolidation measures \nbeing pursued by Government. \nOn a month-on-month basis, net claims on \nGovernment increased by 24.09%, largely \nreflecting holdings of treasury bills, while credit \nto the private sector rose by 24.09%, to \nZW$74.66 billion as at end-December 2020. \nCredit to the private sector was mainly extended \ntowards \nagriculture, \n26.94%; \ndistribution, \n14.19%; financial organizations, 13.39%; and \nhouseholds, 13.01%; as shown in Figure 10. \n \nFigure 10: Distribution of Private Sector Credit \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020 \n \nCredit to the private sector was channeled \ntowards inventory build-up, 38.09%; other \nrecurrent expenditures, 28.27%; fixed capital \ninvestment, 17.21%; and pre and post shipment \nfinancing, 2.63%. \n \nSTOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS \n \nDuring the month of December 2020, the \nZimbabwe \nStock \nExchange \n(ZSE) \nwas \ncharacterized by bullish sentiments, despite the \nfestive season interruption. As a result, all the \nmajor indices recorded gains, despite the \ndecrease in the volume and value of shares \ntraded, during the period under analysis. \n \nLocal \nCurrency \nTransferable \ndeposits\n43.26%\nForeign \nCurrency \nDeposits\n50.62%\nTime \nDeposits\n4.83%\nCurrency in \nCirculation\n0.59%\nNCDs\n0.70%\nHouseholds\n13.01%\nAgriculture\n26.94%\nMining\n10.73%\nManufacturing\n11.60%\nDistribution\n14.19%\nConstruction\n0.79%\nTransport & \nCommunicat\nions\n2.57%\nServices\n6.71%\nFinancial Org. \n& Investments\n13.39%\nOther\n0.07%\n \n \n \n10 \n \nThe Top 10, industrial, Top 15, All Share, \nMedium Cap, Small Cap and mining indices \nincreased by 66.94%, 66.38%, 65.99%, 65.23%, \n63.54%, 48.05% and 24.44%, to close at 1 \n671.47 points, 8 782.18 points, 1 976.98 points, \n2 636.34 points, 5 491.09 points, 11 914.14 \npoints and 4 134.09 points, respectively. \n \nFigure 10: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange All \nShare and Top 10 Indices \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2020 \nOn an annual basis, the mining, All Share, \nindustrial and Top 10 indices gained by \n1 205.53%, 1 035.52%, 1 035.51% and \n709.94%, from 316.66 points, 232.17 points, \n773.41 points and 206.37 points recorded in \nDecember 2019, respectively. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFigure 11: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange \nIndices \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2020 \nDespite the bullish sentiments that were \nexhibited on the local bourse during the month \nunder review, the cumulative value and volume \nof shares traded declined by 33.37% and \n32.74% to ZW$2.73 billion and 316.74 million \nshares, respectively. \n \n Figure 12: ZSE Monthly Volumes and \nValues Traded \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2020 \nIn line with developments on the local bourse, \nthe market gained ZW$124.61 billion, or \n0.00\n200.00\n400.00\n600.00\n800.00\n1000.00\n1200.00\n1400.00\n1600.00\n1800.00\n0.00\n500.00\n1000.00\n1500.00\n2000.00\n2500.00\n3000.00\n31-Dec-19\n31-Jan-20\n29-Feb-20\n31-Mar-20\n30-Apr-20\n31-May-20\n30-Jun-20\n31-Jul-20\n31-Aug-20\n30-Sep-20\n31-Oct-20\n30-Nov-20\n31-Dec-20\nTop 10 Index\nAll Share Index\nAll Share Index\nTop 10 Index\n0\n500\n1000\n1500\n2000\n2500\n3000\n3500\n4000\n4500\n0\n1000\n2000\n3000\n4000\n5000\n6000\n7000\n8000\n9000\n10000\n31-Dec-19\n29-Feb-20\n30-Apr-20\n30-Jun-20\n31-Aug-20\n31-Oct-20\n31-Dec-20\nMining Index Points\nIndustrial Inedx Points\nIndustrial\nMining\n0\n500\n1,000\n1,500\n2,000\n2,500\n3,000\n3,500\n4,000\n4,500\n5,000\n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1,000\n1,200\nDec-19\nJan-20\nFeb-20\nMar-20\nApr-20\nMay-20\nJun-20\nJul-20\nAug-20\nSep-20\nOct-20\nNov-20\nDec-20\nValues Traded (ZW$ millions)\nVolumes Traded (milions)\nVolume\nTurnover\n \n \n \n11 \n \n64.47% worth of capitalization, to ZW$317.88 \nbillion as at end of December 2020. On a year-\non-year basis, local bourse capitalization \nincreased by 957.74%, from ZW$30.05 billion \nrecorded in December 2019. \n \nINFLATION OUTTURN \n \nAnnual Inflation \n \nHeadline inflation which peaked at 837.53% in \nJuly 2020, decelerated further from 401.66% in \nNovember 2020 to close the year at 348.59%. \nThe rapid disinflation during the second half of \nthe year 2020, was largely attributable to the \nstability in the foreign exchange market. \n \nAnnual \nfood \ninflation \ndecelerated \nfrom \n385.02% in November 2020 to 346.40% in \nDecember 2020. In the same vein, annual non-\nfood inflation eased from 413.85% to 350.17% \nover the same period. The declines in both food \nand non-food inflation culminated in the lowest \ninflation rate recorded since September 2019. \n \nFood and non-alcoholic beverages contributed \n145.43 percentage points to the December \ninflation rate of 348.59%, a marked increase \nfrom the previous month. Bread and cereals and \nvegetables and meat continued to drive annual \nfood inflation in December 2020. \n \n \nNon-food inflation contributed about 203.16 \npercentage points to the December 2020 \n \n4The Zimbabwe National Statistical Agency (ZIMSTAT) \ncommenced publication of the blended CPI inflation in June \n2020. The blended CPI inflation combines the average changes \ninflation. Miscellaneous goods and services; \nhousing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels; \ntransport; and alcoholic beverages and tobacco \nwere major contributors to non-food inflation in \nDecember 2020. The increase in housing and \nenergy prices was largely attributable to \nmaintenance of dwellings and increases in \nmunicipality charges over the year. \n \nAnnual Blended CPI inflation4 decelerated \nfurther, from 214.99% in November 2020 to \n188.91%. The non-food component contributed \n129.96 percentage points to annual blended \ninflation, \nwhile \nfood \nand \nnon-alcoholic \nbeverages accounted for the remaining 58.95 \npercentage points. \n \nMonthly Inflation \n \nMonth-on-month ZW$ inflation accelerated \nfrom 3.15% in November 2020 to 4.22% in \nDecember 2020. This was largely attributed to \nincreases in prices of food items. Non-food \ninflation, \nhowever, \nremained \nunchanged, \ncompared to the previous month. \n \nMonth-on-month food inflation rose from \n3.91% in November 2020 to 6.54% in \nDecember 2020. Fruits, meat and vegetables \nrecorded the largest monthly price increases in \nDecember 2020. \n \nThe blended monthly inflation accelerated from \n2.25% in November 2020 to close the year at \n4.25%. This was attributed to price increases in \nin price of goods and services sold in the two main currencies in \ncirculation, namely the ZW$ and the US$. \n \n \n \n12 \n \nall categories, apart from education and \ncommunication. \n \nFigure 13 shows month-on-month inflation \ndevelopments for the period from November \n2019 to November 2020. \n \nFigure 13: Month-on-Month Inflation (%) \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2020 \n \nNATIONAL PAYMENTS SYSTEM \n \nThe \nNational \nPayments \nSystem \n(NPS) \nprocessed \ntransactions \namounting \nto \nZW$454.10 \nbillion \nin \nDecember \n2020, \nreflecting a 26.06% increase from ZW$360.22 \nbillion recorded in November 2020. NPS \ntransaction volumes rose by 12.08% to close at \n137.63 million, during the month under \nanalysis. \nZimbabwe Electronic Transfer Settlement \nSystem (ZETSS) \n \nReal \nGross \nSettlement \nSystem \n(RTGS) \ntransactions were 28.12% higher, to close at \nZW$302.66 billion in December 2020, from \nZW$236.26 million in November 2020. In \nvolume terms, RTGS transactions increased by \n13.26% to close at 1 100 043 transactions in \nDecember 2020. \nFigure 14: ZETSS Volumes and Values \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020 \n \nCash Transactions \n \nCash based transactions rose by 1.57% to close \nat ZW$7.13 billion, during the month under \nreview, from ZW$6.62 billion in the previous \nmonth. \nMobile and Internet Based Transactions \n \nMobile \nand \ninternet-based \ntransactions \namounted to ZW$112.31 billion in December \n2020, from ZW$91.27 billion in the preceding \nmonth. \nCard Based Transactions \n \nDuring the month under review, card-based \ntransactions increased by 22.65%, to close at \nZW$32.00 billion. \n \nRESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE \n0.00%\n10.00%\n20.00%\n30.00%\n40.00%\n50.00%\n60.00%\nNov-19\nDec-19\nJan-20\nFeb-20\nMar-20\nApr-20\nMay-20\nJun-20\nJul-20\nAug-20\nSep-20\nOct-20\nNov-20\nDec-20\nFood\nNon-Food\nOverall\n -\n 50.0\n 100.0\n 150.0\n 200.0\n 250.0\n 300.0\n 350.0\n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1000\n1200\nDec-19\nJan-20\nFeb-20\nMar-20\nApr-20\nMay-20\nJun-20\nJul-20\nAug-20\nSep-20\nOct-20\nNov-20\nDec-20\nValue in ZW$ Billions\nVolume in Thousands\nVolume\nValue\n \n13 \n \nStatistical Tables \n \nMonetary Statistics \n 1. Depository Corporations Survey \n \n \n \n15 \n 2. Central Bank Survey \n \n \n \n \n \n \n16 \n \n3. Other Depository Corporations Survey \n \n \n \n \n17 \n Other Depository Corporations \n \n4.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n18 \n 4.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n19 \n Commercial Banks \n 5.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n20 \n 5.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n21 \n Building Societies \n 6.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n22 \n 6.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n23 \n Sectoral Analysis of Bank Loans and Advances and Deposits \n \n7.1 Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks Loans and Advances \n24 \n \n7.2 Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks Deposits \n \n \n25 \n Interest Rates \n \n8.1 Lending Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n26 \n \n8.2 Banks Deposit Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n27 \n \n Inflation \n \n9.1 Monthly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n28 \n \n9.2 Yearly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n29 \n External Statistics \n \n10. Total External Debt Outstanding by Debtor \n \n \n \n30 \n 11. Exchange Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n31 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n14 \n \n12. Zimbabwe Stock Market Statistics \n \n \n \n \n 32 \n \n 13. National Payments System Statistics \n \n \n \n \n13.1 Values of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n 33 \n \n13.2 Volumes of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n 34 \n \n14. Merchandise Trade Statistics \n \n \n \n \n \n 35 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n15 \n \n \nDec-19\nJan-20\nFeb-20\nMar-20\nApr-20\nMay-20\nJun-20\nJul-20\nAug-20\nSep-20\nOct-20\nNov-20\nDec-20\nNet Foreign Assets\n-40,662,175.37\n-41,890,476.47\n-41,693,753.23\n-64,413,672.15\n-89,046,879.04\n-97,000,590.99\n-234,278,568.81\n-309,340,585.00\n-323,918,937.77\n-317,370,813.35\n-327,434,598.03\n-322,916,992.61\n-316,766,634.64\nCentral Bank(net)\n-50,285,843.15\n-51,596,769.75\n-51,659,786.89\n-78,356,892.58\n-104,544,431.97\n-114,377,001.26\n-275,623,563.54\n-366,357,650.73\n-391,303,802.50\n-386,104,783.47\n-398,503,742.75\n-398,165,536.09\n-392,036,907.50\nForeign Assets\n5,504,939.77\n5,234,031.88\n5,504,836.03\n4,948,927.35\n4,516,675.83\n5,054,120.38\n17,845,745.97\n23,630,101.57\n27,645,575.83\n24,043,853.69\n24,017,722.16\n23,436,187.04\n14,624,495.02\nForeign Liabilities\n55,790,782.92\n56,830,801.63\n57,164,622.92\n83,305,819.93\n109,061,107.80\n119,431,121.65\n293,469,309.50\n389,987,752.30\n418,949,378.32\n410,148,637.16\n422,521,464.91\n421,601,723.13\n406,661,402.52\nOther Depository Corporations(net)\n9,623,667.78\n9,706,293.27\n9,966,033.66\n13,943,220.42\n15,497,552.93\n17,376,410.27\n41,344,994.73\n57,017,065.73\n67,384,864.72\n68,733,970.12\n71,069,144.72\n75,248,543.48\n75,270,272.86\nForeign Assets\n12,948,416.33\n13,153,007.07\n13,344,846.71\n18,827,846.39\n20,437,584.87\n22,510,950.77\n53,130,231.08\n72,022,862.19\n84,210,291.97\n83,986,978.02\n85,970,018.68\n90,081,991.05\n89,458,700.13\nForeign Liabilities\n3,324,748.55\n3,446,713.79\n3,378,813.04\n4,884,625.96\n4,940,031.94\n5,134,540.50\n11,785,236.35\n15,005,796.46\n16,825,427.25\n15,253,007.90\n14,900,873.96\n14,833,447.57\n14,188,427.27\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n75,680,355.31\n78,162,546.08\n80,030,632.68\n112,816,570.52\n141,032,021.98\n156,475,813.43\n334,099,369.96\n441,599,870.68\n470,066,520.53\n471,206,354.87\n497,207,430.71\n507,265,762.28\n521,691,490.51\nDomestic Claims\n27,819,807.93\n28,569,680.55\n30,260,777.76\n34,054,407.09\n32,574,364.29\n39,063,809.71\n50,113,139.15\n59,894,402.15\n62,852,286.66\n63,493,587.42\n80,786,149.78\n88,712,115.98\n101,159,726.29\nClaims on Central Government(net)\n14,062,737.58\n12,724,160.31\n12,697,777.62\n12,949,759.72\n10,305,498.64\n14,278,461.16\n11,286,874.74\n14,475,978.36\n11,939,163.62\n9,165,660.28\n16,233,346.76\n18,766,373.80\n23,276,846.68\nClaims on Central Government\n15,580,358.19\n16,676,243.01\n16,838,781.22\n17,542,397.05\n17,458,577.62\n18,059,689.23\n22,643,966.48\n25,495,963.30\n25,856,421.22\n24,510,261.70\n26,940,376.62\n28,442,906.62\n37,789,748.86\nCentral Bank\n11,338,532.85\n12,298,711.08\n12,540,517.65\n12,762,386.66\n12,737,251.42\n13,476,066.34\n16,374,954.71\n18,731,582.60\n18,958,846.78\n17,824,429.35\n18,854,638.49\n19,461,417.62\n25,693,679.77\nODCs\n4,241,825.34\n4,377,531.93\n4,298,263.57\n4,780,010.39\n4,721,326.20\n4,583,622.89\n6,269,011.77\n6,764,380.71\n6,897,574.44\n6,685,832.35\n8,085,738.13\n8,981,489.00\n12,096,069.09\nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n1,517,620.61\n3,952,082.70\n4,141,003.60\n4,592,637.32\n7,153,078.98\n3,781,228.06\n11,357,091.74\n11,019,984.94\n13,917,257.60\n15,344,601.42\n10,707,029.86\n9,676,532.82\n14,512,902.18\nCentral Bank\n1,399,114.53\n3,859,448.40\n4,062,791.73\n4,183,646.73\n6,636,736.42\n3,150,547.32\n9,877,720.74\n9,288,102.23\n13,066,429.55\n13,813,071.38\n8,907,284.36\n8,106,585.00\n10,172,875.57\nODCs\n118,506.08\n92,634.30\n78,211.87\n408,990.60\n516,342.56\n630,680.74\n1,479,371.00\n1,731,882.71\n850,828.05\n1,531,530.04\n1,799,745.50\n1,569,947.81\n4,340,026.60\nClaims on Other Sectors\n13,757,070.35\n15,845,520.24\n17,563,000.14\n21,104,647.37\n22,268,865.65\n24,785,348.54\n38,826,264.41\n45,418,423.79\n50,913,123.04\n54,327,927.14\n64,552,803.02\n69,945,742.18\n77,882,879.61\nOther Financial Corporations\n186,506.15\n202,429.27\n281,264.28\n307,104.48\n290,091.57\n356,669.90\n753,439.03\n1,010,123.42\n298,579.49\n338,002.03\n1,398,438.67\n1,450,895.49\n606,276.57\nState and Local Government\n26,320.30\n32,308.50\n31,704.96\n30,621.46\n27,844.50\n26,575.69\n23,225.26\n25,961.37\n27,859.83\n35,174.26\n34,462.77\n28,449.36\n37,924.29\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n2,431,172.28\n2,564,682.98\n2,591,284.85\n3,301,602.89\n3,508,675.95\n2,824,122.73\n5,863,041.63\n5,154,947.39\n3,941,697.68\n4,796,976.15\n6,006,655.50\n5,000,659.17\n2,578,274.18\nPrivate Sector\n11,113,071.62\n13,046,099.50\n14,658,746.06\n17,465,318.54\n18,442,253.62\n21,577,980.23\n32,186,558.49\n39,227,391.60\n46,644,986.05\n49,157,774.70\n57,113,246.08\n63,465,738.17\n74,660,404.58\nCentral Bank\n75,911.82\n78,069.12\n174,180.02\n182,998.11\n182,226.89\n182,856.59\n185,977.83\n184,094.09\n184,679.11\n185,814.45\n1,223,752.47\n697,643.23\n703,343.34\nODCs\n11,037,159.81\n12,968,030.37\n14,484,566.04\n17,282,320.43\n18,260,026.74\n21,395,123.64\n32,000,580.66\n39,043,297.50\n46,460,306.94\n48,971,960.25\n55,889,493.61\n62,768,094.94\n73,957,061.25\nOther Items(Net)\n-47,860,547.38\n-49,592,865.53 -49,769,854.91 -78,762,163.43 -108,457,657.69 -117,412,003.72 -283,986,230.81 -381,705,468.53 -407,214,233.87 -407,712,767.45 -416,421,280.93 -418,553,646.30 -420,531,764.21\nShares and Other Equity\n-44,544,759.40\n-43,829,432.91\n-44,342,348.31\n-71,119,022.50\n-98,326,925.77\n-108,187,301.34\n-265,536,483.62\n-359,843,502.38\n-393,275,806.44\n-386,761,250.11\n-392,085,071.73\n-397,700,402.79\n-390,151,578.46\nLiabilities to Other Financial Corporations\n119,397.64\n140,072.14\n154,917.78\n339,909.43\n233,181.06\n365,355.02\n348,181.06\n348,728.32\n422,486.38\n372,163.87\n441,747.71\n423,616.80\n292,018.63\nRestricted Deposits\n1,147,967.31\n1,346,272.48\n1,119,306.34\n1,947,438.89\n1,501,573.14\n845,775.37\n3,417,797.70\n1,726,243.32\n4,057,817.74\n1,036,012.77\n1,208,834.37\n2,648,204.14\n835,126.11\nDeposits and Securities Excluded from Base Money\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nOther Items(net)\n-4,583,152.93\n-7,249,777.25\n-6,701,730.71\n-9,930,489.25\n-11,865,486.12\n-10,435,832.78\n-22,215,725.96\n-23,936,937.79\n-18,418,731.56\n-22,359,693.99\n-25,986,791.29\n-23,925,064.43\n-31,507,330.50\nBroad Money-M3\n35,018,179.94\n36,272,069.61\n38,336,879.45\n48,402,898.37\n51,985,142.94\n59,475,222.44\n99,820,801.15\n132,259,285.68\n146,147,582.76\n153,835,541.52\n169,772,832.69\n184,348,769.67\n204,924,855.86\nSecurities Other than Shares Included in Broad Money\n243,976.57\n255,563.69\n260,055.92\n476,793.67\n337,556.97\n359,194.93\n863,206.40\n1,024,311.11\n1,111,664.44\n1,083,907.10\n1,231,944.90\n1,237,340.99\n1,436,202.84\nBroad Money-M2\n34,774,203.37\n36,016,505.92\n38,076,823.53\n47,926,104.70\n51,647,585.97\n59,116,027.50\n98,957,594.75\n131,234,974.57\n145,035,918.32\n152,751,634.42\n168,540,887.79\n183,111,428.68\n203,488,653.02\nOther Deposits\n1,887,924.83\n2,026,599.28\n2,194,313.07\n2,351,990.85\n2,522,855.18\n2,842,782.22\n4,017,695.39\n6,047,153.88\n5,431,611.26\n6,935,433.58\n8,397,139.11\n8,997,813.50\n9,906,844.70\nNarrow Money-M1\n32,886,278.54\n33,989,906.64\n35,882,510.46\n45,574,113.84\n49,124,730.79\n56,273,245.28\n94,939,899.37\n125,187,820.69\n139,604,307.06\n145,816,200.84\n160,143,748.68\n174,113,615.18\n193,581,808.32\nTransferable Deposits\n31,978,710.26\n33,036,665.86\n34,932,660.39\n44,529,936.02\n48,082,573.35\n55,147,175.33\n93,730,970.73\n123,981,130.10\n138,523,712.90\n144,756,556.77\n159,085,591.39\n173,047,801.52\n192,383,729.76\n Of which Foreign Currency Accounts\n11,938,732.84\n12,458,349.93\n12,476,934.91\n20,909,726.92\n19,463,088.16\n24,984,322.48\n57,701,775.14\n79,076,606.18\n86,014,194.25\n92,191,134.58\n97,621,848.10\n102,185,943.24\n103,728,205.33\nCurrency Outside Depository Corporations\n907,568.29\n953,240.77\n949,850.07\n1,044,177.82\n1,042,157.43\n1,126,069.95\n1,208,928.64\n1,206,690.59\n1,080,594.16\n1,059,644.06\n1,058,157.28\n1,065,813.65\n1,198,078.56\nMemorandum Items\nReserve Money\n10,327,816.88\n9,251,024.10\n9,380,944.48\n11,704,943.82\n12,459,746.60\n13,815,364.85\n12,651,566.81\n16,145,434.53\n12,383,054.95\n12,732,319.53\n15,522,125.70\n18,424,345.96\n18,762,395.12\nFCAs as a Percentage of Deposits in M3\n35.0%\n35.3%\n33.4%\n44.2%\n38.2%\n42.8%\n58.5%\n60.3%\n59.3%\n60.3%\n57.9%\n55.8%\n50.9%\nEnd Period Exchange Rate\n16.77\n17.35\n17.95\n25.00\n25.00\n25.00\n57.36\n76.76\n83.40\n81.44\n81.35\n81.82\n81.79\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2020\nNotes:\n(i) Depository corporations survey - formerly Monetary Survey.\n(ii) Broad money redefined using IMF's Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual of 2000. Major changes include exclusion of Government deposits held by banks from broad money.\n(iii) Transferable deposits made up of demand and savings deposits.\n(iv) NCDs are also referred to as securities included in broad money.\n(v) All classes of time deposits, short and long term are classified as time deposits, which are also termed other deposits.\n(vi) Credit to the private sector now excludes claims on other financial corporations, as well as claims on state and local government (local authorities)\n(vii) Depository corporations made up of the Central Bank and other depository corporations\n(viii) Other depository corporations (ODCs) - Commercial banks, merchant banks, building societies and POSB.\n(ix) In December 2017, the statistics were adjusted in restrospect by reclassifying Securities issued under Aftrades from claims on government to claims on central bank\n(x) In December 2017, the statistics were adjusted in restrospect by reclassifying amounts accessed by banks under the Aftrades from liabilities to Other Depository corporations and Other Financial Corporations to liabilities to Central Bank \n(xi) In December 2018, statistics were revised from November 2017 due to reclassification of lines of credit (foreign liabilities) that were initially classified as deposits included in broad money\n(xii) All monetary and financial statistics are valued in ZWL$ since the introduction of the interbank foreign exchange market in February 2019\nTABLE 1: DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS SURVEY ($'000)\n \n \n \n16 \n \n \nDec-19\nJan-20\nFeb-20\nMar-20\nApr-20\nMay-20\nJun-20\nJul-20\nAug-20\nSep-20\nOct-20\nNov-20\nDec-20\nNet Foreign Assets\n-50,285,843.15 -51,596,769.75 -51,659,786.89 -78,356,892.58 -104,544,431.97 -114,377,001.26 -275,623,563.54 -366,357,650.73 -391,303,802.50 -386,104,783.47 -398,503,742.75 -398,165,536.09 -392,036,907.50\nClaims on Non Residents\n5,504,939.77\n5,234,031.88\n5,504,836.03\n4,948,927.35\n4,516,675.83\n5,054,120.38\n17,845,745.97\n23,630,101.57\n27,645,575.83\n24,043,853.69\n24,017,722.16\n23,436,187.04\n14,624,495.02\nOfficial Reserves Assets\n2,537,103.33\n2,888,945.28\n3,104,642.81\n1,759,943.91\n1,340,523.61\n1,452,620.38\n9,522,205.82\n12,511,281.83\n15,651,918.68\n12,374,572.35\n12,357,598.03\n11,668,298.64\n2,786,278.07\nOther Foreign Assets\n2,967,836.45\n2,345,086.60\n2,400,193.22\n3,188,983.44\n3,176,152.22\n3,601,500.00\n8,323,540.15\n11,118,819.74\n11,993,657.14\n11,669,281.34\n11,660,124.13\n11,767,888.40\n11,838,216.95\nLess Liabilities to Non Residents\n55,790,782.92\n56,830,801.63\n57,164,622.92\n83,305,819.93\n109,061,107.80\n119,431,121.65\n293,469,309.50\n389,987,752.30\n418,949,378.32\n410,148,637.16\n422,521,464.91\n421,601,723.13\n406,661,402.52\nShort Term Liabilities\n35,686,123.01\n39,597,730.68\n41,112,190.47\n55,611,921.72\n54,593,528.76\n54,707,783.64\n134,067,700.58\n179,874,148.53\n193,114,218.14\n190,611,160.64\n190,817,851.33\n189,287,948.45\n187,885,613.69\nOther Foreign Liabilities*\n20,104,659.91\n17,233,070.95\n16,052,432.45\n27,693,898.21\n54,467,579.05\n64,723,338.01\n159,401,608.92\n210,113,603.77\n225,835,160.18\n219,537,476.52\n231,703,613.58\n232,313,774.68\n218,775,788.84\n of which blocked funds\n11,993,435.57\n8,883,831.36\n7,456,288.96\n15,724,574.19\n42,561,402.55\n52,790,869.15\n131,743,040.88\n171,686,088.39\n184,824,435.01\n179,488,881.37\n191,557,287.91\n191,564,844.22\n177,917,599.86\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n60,613,660.02\n60,847,793.85\n61,040,731.37\n90,061,836.40\n117,004,178.58\n128,192,366.11\n288,275,130.35\n382,503,085.26\n403,686,857.45\n398,837,103.00\n414,025,868.46\n416,589,882.06\n410,799,302.62\nDomestic Claims\n12,259,697.53\n10,746,256.31\n10,973,320.90\n11,480,169.17\n9,144,133.05\n12,736,347.09\n10,707,313.49\n13,930,835.24\n9,173,375.62\n8,137,864.08\n16,330,004.87\n15,975,321.34\n17,731,762.12\nNet Claims on Central Government\n9,939,418.32\n8,439,262.68\n8,477,725.92\n8,578,739.93\n6,100,515.00\n10,322,164.33\n6,497,233.96\n9,443,480.36\n5,892,417.23\n4,011,357.97\n9,947,354.13\n11,354,832.62\n15,520,804.20\nClaims on Central Government\n11,338,532.85\n12,298,711.08\n12,540,517.65\n12,762,386.66\n12,737,251.42\n13,472,711.66\n16,374,954.71\n18,731,582.60\n18,958,846.78\n17,824,429.35\n18,854,638.49\n19,461,417.62\n25,693,679.77\nOf which: Securities Other than Shares\n6,828,363.47\n6,784,907.24\n6,729,080.00\n6,635,562.28\n6,568,167.46\n6,515,431.76\n6,441,291.52\n6,348,432.53\n6,274,326.46\n6,194,697.32\n6,101,509.11\n6,051,655.92\n6,035,224.38\n of which USD Securities revaluations (Ex\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nLoans\n4,510,169.38\n5,513,803.84\n5,811,437.65\n6,126,824.37\n6,169,083.96\n6,957,279.90\n9,933,663.19\n12,383,150.07\n12,684,520.32\n11,629,732.03\n12,753,129.37\n13,409,761.69\n19,658,455.39\n Loans and Advances\n1,199,032.23\n1,611,254.61\n1,808,444.47\n2,123,588.25\n2,165,988.51\n2,954,184.45\n5,927,212.09\n8,377,024.21\n8,672,446.67\n7,617,711.22\n8,740,654.93\n9,388,431.71\n15,645,165.82\n Legacy Debt\n376,260.18\n371,310.28\n391,427.33\n391,670.28\n391,529.61\n391,529.61\n394,885.26\n394,560.01\n400,507.80\n400,454.97\n400,908.59\n409,764.14\n401,723.73\n Export Incentives\n2,934,876.98\n3,531,238.96\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n1,399,114.53\n3,859,448.40\n4,062,791.73\n4,183,646.73\n6,636,736.42\n3,150,547.32\n9,877,720.74\n9,288,102.23\n13,066,429.55\n13,813,071.38\n8,907,284.36\n8,106,585.00\n10,172,875.57\nOf which: Deposits\n1,399,114.53\n3,859,448.40\n4,062,791.73\n4,183,646.73\n6,636,736.42\n3,150,547.32\n9,877,720.74\n9,288,102.23\n13,066,429.55\n13,813,071.38\n8,907,284.36\n8,106,585.00\n10,172,875.57\nOther \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nClaims on Other Sectors\n2,320,279.21\n2,306,993.64\n2,495,594.98\n2,901,429.23\n3,043,618.05\n2,414,182.75\n4,210,079.53\n4,487,354.87\n3,280,958.40\n4,126,506.11\n6,382,650.74\n4,620,488.72\n2,210,957.92\nOther Financial Corporations\n114,216.39\n123,637.97\n185,777.12\n190,538.80\n197,799.53\n198,980.02\n198,722.36\n199,979.99\n200,871.01\n194,092.65\n191,304.06\n192,148.23\n198,349.05\nState and Local Government\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n2,130,151.01\n2,105,286.54\n2,135,637.84\n2,527,892.32\n2,663,591.64\n2,032,346.15\n3,825,379.33\n4,103,280.79\n2,895,408.28\n3,746,599.01\n4,967,594.21\n3,730,697.26\n1,309,265.53\nPrivate Sector\n75,911.82\n78,069.12\n174,180.02\n182,998.11\n182,226.89\n182,856.59\n185,977.83\n184,094.09\n184,679.11\n185,814.45\n1,223,752.47\n697,643.23\n703,343.34\nClaims on Other Depository Corporations\n1,247,758.47\n1,418,055.93\n1,537,977.10\n1,747,842.08\n2,004,400.25\n2,363,408.58\n2,836,488.36\n2,971,403.60\n3,064,656.78\n2,842,129.71\n2,887,258.50\n2,988,284.32\n3,674,021.80\nOf which: Loans\n1,247,758.47\n1,418,055.93\n1,537,977.10\n1,747,842.08\n2,004,400.25\n2,363,408.58\n2,836,488.36\n2,971,403.60\n3,064,656.78\n2,842,129.71\n2,887,258.50\n2,988,284.32\n3,674,021.80\nOther Liabilities to ODCs\n7,563,514.16\n8,461,698.70\n9,792,726.83\n9,684,173.41\n9,131,313.79\n12,393,411.08\n20,777,523.67\n31,484,074.13\n36,504,621.50\n37,868,889.89\n35,078,524.21\n43,158,130.62\n53,880,036.70\nOf which: Aftrades Balances\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n Securities\n4,579,216.20\n5,320,924.19\n5,467,251.69\n5,944,214.63\n6,089,528.73\n6,941,755.11\n11,137,597.35\n13,291,243.49\n14,580,745.12\n13,851,775.48\n9,084,137.29\n11,687,723.67\n22,262,484.07\nOther Items(Net)\n-54,669,718.18 -57,145,180.31 -58,322,160.20 -86,517,998.56 -114,986,959.06 -125,482,666.85 -295,508,852.17 -397,084,920.55 -427,953,446.54 -425,725,999.11 -429,887,129.29 -440,784,407.01 -443,273,555.40\nShares and Other Equity\n-54,656,738.27\n-55,918,839.02\n-56,770,197.78\n-85,756,440.85\n-113,862,068.88\n-124,140,506.17\n-296,849,225.12\n-396,135,173.94\n-433,060,072.45\n-427,106,363.79\n-433,463,716.88\n-441,933,638.10\n-442,191,359.79\nOther Items(Net)\n-1,160,947.22\n-2,572,613.77\n-2,671,268.75\n-2,708,996.60\n-2,626,463.31\n-2,187,936.05\n-2,077,424.75\n-2,675,989.93\n-2,358,189.93\n-3,416,387.63\n-3,309,230.72\n-3,537,819.62\n-3,242,652.80\nLiabilities to Other Resident Sectors\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nDeposits and Securities Excluded from Base Mon\n1,147,967.31\n1,346,272.48\n1,119,306.34\n1,947,438.89\n1,501,573.14\n845,775.37\n3,417,797.70\n1,726,243.32\n7,464,815.83\n4,796,752.30\n6,885,818.31\n4,687,050.70\n2,160,457.19\n0.17\n0.12\n0.13\nMonetary Base Incl. foreign currency clearing balances\nMonetary Base \n10,327,816.88\n9,251,024.10\n9,380,944.48\n11,704,943.82\n12,459,746.60\n13,815,364.85\n12,651,566.81\n16,145,434.53\n12,383,054.95\n12,732,319.53\n15,522,125.70\n18,424,345.96\n18,762,395.12\nBond Coins\n99,010.30\n99,714.26\n99,712.42\n99,712.71\n99,710.76\n99,712.72\n99,710.08\n99,709.22\n99,709.27\n99,709.34\n99,709.54\n99,709.66\n99,709.69\nBond Notes\n978,393.54\n1,036,938.66\n1,117,198.96\n1,208,072.64\n1,240,929.09\n1,356,393.24\n1,570,979.64\n1,797,797.97\n1,955,979.19\n2,044,143.53\n2,022,625.16\n2,029,709.06\n2,276,216.30\nLiabilities to ODCs\n8,352,572.72\n7,253,578.67\n7,089,397.08\n8,789,318.37\n10,198,688.17\n12,082,367.03\n10,419,558.83\n11,457,457.43\n10,063,539.06\n10,250,353.16\n13,378,590.41\n15,910,190.58\n16,386,469.12\n Reserve Deposits\n918,034.34\n1,040,852.24\n1,082,852.88\n1,205,004.05\n1,213,756.71\n1,386,675.05\n890,125.59\n1,049,647.55\n1,237,283.94\n1,401,898.97\n1,678,661.09\n2,008,569.51\n2,199,092.20\n Exess reserves \n7,434,538.38\n6,212,726.43\n6,006,544.20\n7,584,314.32\n8,984,931.47\n10,695,691.98\n9,529,433.25\n10,407,809.87\n8,826,255.12\n8,848,454.19\n11,699,929.32\n13,901,621.07\n14,187,376.93\nPrivate Deposits\n897,840.31\n860,792.52\n1,074,636.02\n1,607,840.10\n920,418.59\n276,891.86\n561,318.26\n2,790,469.91\n263,827.44\n338,113.50\n21,200.60\n384,736.66\n0.00\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2020\n Provisional until audit is completed\n NB: * Other Foreign Liabilities include blocked funds amounting to USD2.2 billion assumed by the Central Bank on behalf of Government.\nTABLE 2: CENTRAL BANK SURVEY ($'000)\n \n \n \n17 \n \n \n \n \n TABLE 3 : OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS SURVEY ( $ '000)\nDec-19\nJan-20\nFeb-20\nMar-20\nApr-20\nMay-20\nJun-20\nJul-20\nAug-20\nSep-20\nOct-20\nNov-20\nDec-20\nNet Foreign Assets\n9,623,667.78\n9,706,293.27\n9,966,033.66\n13,943,220.42\n15,497,552.93\n17,376,410.27\n41,344,994.73\n57,017,065.73\n67,384,864.72\n68,733,970.12\n71,069,144.72\n75,248,543.48\n75,270,272.86\nClaims on Non Residents\n12,948,416.33\n13,153,007.07\n13,344,846.71\n18,827,846.39\n20,437,584.87\n22,510,950.77\n53,130,231.08\n72,022,862.19\n84,210,291.97\n83,986,978.02\n85,970,018.68\n90,081,991.05\n89,458,700.13\nOf Which: Foreign Currency\n2,526,205.54\n3,176,598.38\n3,136,431.39\n3,607,624.65\n3,642,933.80\n3,581,769.90\n9,729,549.76\n18,357,028.29\n28,776,016.24\n30,217,561.04\n32,235,029.76\n34,673,918.84\n39,886,775.04\nDeposits\n10,399,832.16\n9,953,357.06\n10,175,380.89\n15,179,403.50\n16,753,404.99\n18,887,749.91\n43,314,001.39\n53,559,656.10\n55,319,393.27\n53,657,586.61\n53,623,468.12\n55,308,353.64\n49,426,810.30\nOther\n22,378.63\n23,051.63\n33,034.42\n40,818.25\n41,246.08\n41,430.97\n86,679.92\n106,177.81\n114,882.47\n111,830.36\n111,520.80\n99,718.57\n145,114.78\nLess Liabilities to Non Residents\n3,324,748.55\n3,446,713.79\n3,378,813.04\n4,884,625.96\n4,940,031.94\n5,134,540.50\n11,785,236.35\n15,005,796.46\n16,825,427.25\n15,253,007.90\n14,900,873.96\n14,833,447.57\n14,188,427.27\nOf Which: Deposits\n1,457,271.39\n1,591,189.46\n1,285,842.52\n1,574,950.88\n1,667,098.42\n1,860,609.63\n3,767,028.56\n5,065,144.06\n5,996,405.81\n4,800,281.08\n4,449,027.74\n4,387,729.22\n3,826,796.90\nLoans\n1,867,477.16\n1,855,524.33\n2,092,970.52\n3,309,675.09\n3,272,933.52\n3,273,930.87\n8,018,207.80\n9,940,652.40\n10,829,021.44\n10,452,726.81\n10,451,846.22\n10,445,718.35\n10,361,630.37\nOther\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n23,589,103.57\n24,751,743.05\n26,346,359.69\n31,807,660.02\n34,525,013.99\n40,695,850.36\n56,705,559.53\n71,245,059.44\n74,011,298.35\n79,943,074.31\n91,947,346.14\n105,610,829.31\n127,131,173.37\nDomestic Claims\n15,560,110.40\n17,823,424.24\n19,287,456.86\n22,574,237.92\n23,430,231.24\n26,324,107.94\n39,405,825.66\n45,963,566.91\n53,678,911.04\n55,355,723.35\n64,456,144.91\n72,736,794.64\n83,427,964.18\nNet Claims on Central Government\n4,123,319.26\n4,284,897.63\n4,220,051.70\n4,371,019.79\n4,204,983.64\n3,952,942.15\n4,789,640.77\n5,032,498.00\n6,046,746.39\n5,154,302.32\n6,285,992.63\n7,411,541.18\n7,756,042.48\nClaims on Central Government\n4,241,825.34\n4,377,531.93\n4,298,263.57\n4,780,010.39\n4,721,326.20\n4,583,622.89\n6,269,011.77\n6,764,380.71\n6,897,574.44\n6,685,832.35\n8,085,738.13\n8,981,489.00\n12,096,069.09\nSecurities\n4,240,495.63\n4,372,420.71\n4,293,116.08\n4,775,618.52\n4,716,858.96\n4,579,097.46\n6,264,725.96\n6,760,053.73\n6,883,528.44\n6,676,225.73\n8,068,172.39\n8,961,484.35\n12,072,773.09\nLoans\n1,329.70\n5,111.21\n5,147.49\n4,391.86\n4,467.24\n4,525.43\n4,285.81\n4,326.98\n14,046.00\n9,606.62\n17,565.74\n20,004.65\n23,296.00\nOther \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n118,506.08\n92,634.30\n78,211.87\n408,990.60\n516,342.56\n630,680.74\n1,479,371.00\n1,731,882.71\n850,828.05\n1,531,530.04\n1,799,745.50\n1,569,947.81\n4,340,026.60\nOf which: Deposits\n118,506.08\n92,634.30\n78,211.87\n408,990.60\n516,342.56\n630,680.74\n1,479,371.00\n1,731,882.71\n850,828.05\n1,531,530.04\n1,799,745.50\n1,569,947.81\n4,340,026.60\nOther \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nClaims on Other Sectors\n11,436,791.14\n13,538,526.61\n15,067,405.16\n18,203,218.14\n19,225,247.60\n22,371,165.79\n34,616,184.88\n40,931,068.91\n47,632,164.65\n50,201,421.03\n58,170,152.28\n65,325,253.46\n75,671,921.69\nOther Financial Corporations\n72,289.76\n78,791.30\n95,487.15\n116,565.68\n92,292.05\n157,689.88\n554,716.67\n810,143.43\n97,708.48\n143,909.38\n1,207,134.60\n1,258,747.26\n407,927.51\nState and Local Government\n26,320.30\n32,308.50\n31,704.96\n30,621.46\n27,844.50\n26,575.69\n23,225.26\n25,961.37\n27,859.83\n35,174.26\n34,462.77\n28,449.36\n37,924.29\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n301,021.27\n459,396.43\n455,647.01\n773,710.57\n845,084.31\n791,776.58\n2,037,662.29\n1,051,666.60\n1,046,289.40\n1,050,377.14\n1,039,061.29\n1,269,961.90\n1,269,008.65\nPrivate Sector\n11,037,159.81\n12,968,030.37\n14,484,566.04\n17,282,320.43\n18,260,026.74\n21,395,123.64\n32,000,580.66\n39,043,297.50\n46,460,306.94\n48,971,960.25\n55,889,493.61\n62,768,094.94\n73,957,061.25\nClaims on the Central Bank\n14,013,346.66\n13,400,742.47\n14,084,026.73\n16,430,721.57\n18,224,911.62\n21,706,416.06\n29,919,616.89\n54,830,533.49\n55,843,634.83\n57,763,783.89\n68,012,702.35\n74,300,828.81\n77,254,382.86\nCurrency\n169,835.56\n183,412.14\n267,061.31\n263,607.53\n298,482.41\n330,036.01\n461,761.08\n690,816.60\n975,094.30\n1,084,208.81\n1,064,177.41\n1,063,605.07\n1,177,847.43\nReserves\n13,843,511.10\n13,217,330.33\n13,816,965.42\n16,167,114.04\n17,926,429.21\n21,376,380.05\n29,457,855.81\n54,139,716.89\n54,868,540.52\n56,679,575.08\n66,948,524.94\n73,237,223.74\n76,076,535.42\nSecurities\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nOther Claims\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nLiabilities to the Central Bank\n179,468.01\n185,829.15\n189,591.37\n258,425.60\n346,363.87\n536,691.85\n887,577.50\n1,387,934.10\n1,837,109.59\n1,863,123.11\n1,812,655.13\n1,489,512.69\n1,318,615.34\nOther Items(Net)\n5,804,885.48\n6,286,594.51\n6,835,532.53\n6,938,873.87\n6,783,765.00\n6,797,981.79\n11,732,305.51\n28,161,106.86\n33,674,137.93\n31,313,309.81\n38,708,845.99\n39,937,281.45\n32,232,558.32\nShares and Other Equity\n10,111,978.87\n12,089,406.11\n12,427,849.47\n14,637,418.35\n15,535,143.11\n15,953,204.84\n31,312,741.50\n36,291,671.56\n39,784,266.01\n40,345,113.68\n41,378,645.15\n44,233,235.31\n52,039,781.33\nLiabilities to other ressident sectors\n119,397.64\n140,072.14\n154,917.78\n339,909.43\n233,181.06\n365,355.02\n348,181.06\n348,728.32\n422,486.38\n372,163.87\n441,747.71\n423,616.80\n292,018.63\nOther Items(Net)\n-4,426,491.02\n-5,942,883.74\n-5,747,234.71\n-8,038,453.91\n-8,984,559.18\n-9,520,578.07\n-19,928,617.05\n-8,479,293.02\n-6,532,614.47\n-9,403,967.74\n-3,111,546.88\n-4,719,570.65\n-20,099,241.64\nDeposits and Securities Included in Broad Money\n33,212,771.35\n34,458,036.32\n36,312,393.36\n45,750,880.45\n50,022,566.92\n58,072,260.63\n98,050,554.25\n128,262,125.18\n141,396,163.08\n148,677,044.43\n163,016,490.87\n180,859,372.79\n202,401,446.22\nDeposits Included in Broad Money\n32,968,794.78\n \n34,202,472.63\n \n36,052,337.44\n \n45,274,086.77\n \n49,685,009.94\n \n57,713,065.69\n \n97,187,347.86\n \n127,237,814.07\n \n140,284,498.63\n \n147,593,137.33\n \n161,784,545.97\n \n179,622,031.80\n \n200,965,243.38\n \nTransferable Deposits\n31,080,869.95\n \n32,175,873.35\n \n33,858,024.37\n \n42,922,095.92\n \n47,162,154.77\n \n54,870,283.47\n \n93,169,652.47\n \n121,190,660.19\n \n134,852,887.37\n \n140,657,703.75\n \n153,387,406.86\n \n170,624,218.30\n \n191,058,398.68\n \n of which FCAs\n11,938,732.84\n \n12,458,349.93\n \n12,476,934.91\n \n20,909,726.92\n \n19,463,088.16\n \n24,984,322.48\n \n57,701,775.14\n \n79,076,606.18\n \n82,607,196.16\n \n88,430,395.05\n \n91,944,864.16\n \n100,147,096.67\n \n102,824,762.68\n \nOther Deposits\n1,887,924.83\n2,026,599.28\n2,194,313.07\n2,351,990.85\n2,522,855.18\n2,842,782.22\n4,017,695.39\n6,047,153.88\n5,431,611.26\n6,935,433.58\n8,397,139.11\n8,997,813.50\n9,906,844.70\nMoney Market Instruments\n243,976.57\n \n255,563.69\n \n260,055.92\n \n476,793.67\n \n337,556.97\n \n359,194.93\n \n863,206.40\n \n1,024,311.11\n \n1,111,664.44\n \n1,083,907.10\n \n1,231,944.90\n \n1,237,340.99\n \n1,436,202.84\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2020\n \n \n \n \n18 \n \n \nForeign\nTOTAL\nEnd of\nNotes\nBond\n&\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \nLocal\nOther \n Notes &\nCoin\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\n1\nLocal \nGovernemt\nOther2\nGovernment\nLocal \nPublic \n Institutional \nOther cliams\nContigent Assets\nOther Assets\nNon Financial \nCoins\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\nGovernment\nEnterprises\nUnits\nAssets\n2018\nJan\n23.4\n \n66.9\n \n2,528.5\n \n291.2\n \n111.9\n \n81.9\n2,336.0\n34.5\n23.5\n65.9\n26.3\n20.6\n155.3\n3,461.2\n74.6\n501.0\n457.8\n700.8\n10,961.1\nFeb\n20.0\n \n46.8\n \n2,516.8\n \n347.6\n \n114.2\n \n96.2\n2,313.4\n33.5\n23.5\n66.1\n24.3\n21.1\n145.4\n3,527.1\n22.2\n507.8\n434.5\n697.8\n10,958.3\nMar\n16.7\n \n57.9\n \n2,457.7\n \n312.8\n \n139.2\n \n99.5\n2,434.8\n32.8\n23.5\n66.7\n19.2\n15.9\n127.5\n3,637.8\n24.2\n504.1\n487.4\n710.3\n11,168.1\nApr\n14.9\n \n61.9\n \n2,423.5\n \n337.0\n \n120.8\n \n78.5\n2,558.9\n32.0\n24.7\n67.0\n13.4\n20.9\n121.2\n3,674.0\n22.1\n532.0\n459.2\n715.7\n11,277.5\nMay\n14.2\n \n71.7\n \n2,543.0\n \n477.8\n \n138.6\n \n85.7\n2,814.9\n30.9\n25.0\n66.9\n8.4\n20.9\n134.4\n3,740.3\n12.0\n458.9\n457.2\n718.2\n11,819.1\nJun\n9.0\n \n58.5\n \n3,081.0\n \n509.8\n \n120.0\n \n84.1\n2,865.3\n30.1\n26.2\n66.5\n7.4\n19.4\n196.4\n3,829.3\n38.6\n551.4\n448.1\n730.7\n12,671.8\nJul\n20.6\n \n61.9\n \n3,450.6\n \n466.4\n \n111.6\n \n95.4\n3,291.4\n33.3\n0.0\n67.5\n4.5\n21.0\n182.0\n3,500.6\n153.9\n611.4\n472.5\n732.0\n13,276.5\nAug\n23.1\n \n72.3\n \n3,475.7\n \n377.8\n \n105.3\n \n66.3\n3,362.8\n32.2\n0.0\n67.3\n7.1\n20.6\n186.7\n3,585.1\n102.0\n647.7\n489.9\n736.1\n13,358.0\nSep\n18.2\n \n61.5\n \n3,781.6\n \n398.1\n \n159.1\n \n78.0\n3,145.7\n31.2\n45.2\n68.1\n5.4\n20.4\n212.2\n3,734.2\n119.7\n637.4\n527.8\n742.6\n13,786.4\nOct\n39.9\n \n70.4\n \n3,771.3\n \n368.3\n \n185.5\n \n51.4\n3,105.9\n30.2\n45.2\n68.4\n4.6\n9.4\n188.8\n3,838.0\n132.0\n647.5\n537.8\n743.0\n13,837.7\nNov\n30.6\n \n84.6\n \n3,696.3\n \n300.6\n \n209.8\n \n63.9\n3,172.9\n28.9\n45.2\n68.7\n7.0\n8.1\n217.7\n3,813.2\n141.9\n633.2\n581.9\n742.4\n13,846.8\nDec\n20.5\n \n94.5\n \n3,949.5\n \n439.6\n \n235.5\n \n74.8\n3,044.1\n28.0\n43.4\n69.2\n6.2\n9.2\n204.3\n3,870.5\n151.2\n573.8\n612.5\n812.4\n14,239.0\n2019\nJan\n49.0\n \n113.4\n \n3,901.0\n \n401.9\n \n261.6\n \n46.1\n3,038.3\n27.3\n94.6\n68.7\n4.4\n8.1\n189.2\n3,773.5\n109.1\n517.2\n592.3\n827.7\n14,023.5\nFeb\n59.7\n \n256.8\n \n3,764.8\n \n357.1\n \n570.4\n \n205.7\n3,076.4\n26.5\n60.5\n2.0\n5.8\n7.7\n208.3\n3,991.5\n100.5\n490.7\n669.1\n880.0\n14,733.6\nMar\n62.5\n \n263.2\n \n3,891.0\n \n432.9\n \n739.3\n \n55.1\n3,028.8\n25.5\n61.5\n4.5\n4.3\n9.5\n340.7\n3,845.0\n129.0\n523.7\n954.5\n1,205.2\n15,576.2\nApr\n45.2\n \n363.5\n \n4,153.9\n \n578.9\n \n1,031.9\n \n91.7\n2,921.3\n25.0\n61.8\n4.0\n4.0\n9.6\n407.8\n3,899.7\n131.9\n620.5\n1,135.4\n1,304.8\n16,790.9\nMay\n98.7\n \n484.2\n \n4,089.2\n \n694.1\n \n1,890.1\n \n154.1\n2,912.7\n23.9\n62.1\n4.2\n3.9\n9.4\n636.8\n4,303.9\n144.3\n910.1\n2,031.0\n1,532.3\n19,985.1\nJun\n126.3\n \n882.2\n \n4,518.6\n \n560.2\n \n2,383.0\n \n538.9\n2,918.5\n22.6\n63.1\n6.6\n3.9\n8.7\n929.4\n5,011.5\n163.0\n1,606.5\n1,621.9\n2,120.4\n23,485.3\nJul\n232.4\n \n968.8\n \n5,605.6\n \n370.4\n \n3,738.0\n \n801.9\n2,962.9\n22.2\n103.4\n5.5\n2.2\n9.0\n164.6\n5,364.7\n228.7\n1,587.7\n2,124.1\n2,345.3\n26,637.3\nAug\n184.4\n \n1,150.4\n \n7,956.5\n \n527.8\n \n3,904.2\n \n1,050.7\n3,409.1\n21.5\n103.9\n6.8\n1.0\n9.2\n212.5\n5,764.9\n263.2\n2,614.6\n2,149.5\n2,623.2\n31,953.4\nSep\n124.5\n \n2,108.5\n \n9,128.1\n \n874.0\n \n5,678.3\n \n1,575.7\n3,577.4\n20.9\n27.0\n6.5\n1.4\n9.4\n187.5\n6,456.9\n389.5\n3,707.8\n3,665.5\n3,549.9\n41,088.9\nOct\n144.3\n \n1,906.0\n \n11,613.0\n \n2,511.0\n \n7,644.9\n \n907.0\n3,749.0\n20.2\n27.1\n5.3\n1.1\n7.9\n254.8\n7,393.9\n400.9\n4,081.1\n2,230.5\n3,580.5\n46,478.4\nNov\n128.8\n \n2,243.1\n \n11,417.7\n \n2,236.3\n \n8,417.4\n \n940.7\n4,150.2\n19.6\n27.1\n11.8\n1.4\n8.7\n248.8\n9,260.2\n442.8\n3,148.3\n2,272.9\n4,208.0\n49,183.9\nDec\n169.8\n \n2,526.2\n \n13,994.1\n \n1,254.7\n \n8,415.7\n \n1,984.1\n4,090.0\n18.2\n24.7\n20.7\n1.3\n8.1\n268.6\n10,562.1\n556.7\n4,867.7\n3,517.6\n8,485.9\n60,766.3\n2020\nJan\n183.4\n \n3,176.6\n \n13,217.3\n \n1,073.2\n \n8,142.0\n \n1,811.4\n4,372.4\n20.1\n125.5\n15.0\n5.1\n12.2\n326.1\n12,115.8\n946.9\n2,965.9\n4,191.6\n9,691.7\n62,392.3\nFeb\n267.1\n \n3,136.4\n \n13,817.0\n \n1,504.5\n \n8,642.5\n \n1,532.9\n4,293.1\n20.1\n117.4\n15.5\n5.1\n11.6\n329.5\n13,632.6\n973.7\n5,441.7\n12,758.8\n10,338.7\n76,838.2\nMar\n263.6\n \n3,607.6\n \n16,167.1\n \n2,214.4\n \n12,681.9\n \n2,497.5\n4,775.6\n19.2\n0.1\n20.8\n4.4\n11.4\n765.8\n16,323.6\n1,103.1\n7,917.3\n7,042.4\n11,309.5\n86,725.4\nApr\n298.5\n \n3,642.9\n \n17,926.4\n \n1,523.3\n \n13,697.1\n \n3,056.3\n4,716.9\n18.1\n0.1\n18.4\n4.5\n9.7\n834.7\n17,280.6\n1,104.9\n7,642.8\n8,200.2\n11,988.1\n91,963.5\nMay\n330.0\n \n3,581.8\n \n21,376.4\n \n1,749.6\n \n15,757.4\n \n3,130.4\n4,579.1\n17.0\n0.1\n45.8\n4.5\n9.6\n768.0\n20,291.6\n1,280.4\n7,042.0\n8,823.5\n12,139.9\n100,927.2\nJun\n606.6\n \n9,584.7\n \n29,457.9\n \n3,974.7\n \n35,786.5\n \n7,527.5\n6,264.7\n13.8\n0.1\n90.1\n4.3\n9.4\n2,010.8\n30,567.5\n2,011.1\n24,299.3\n17,433.0\n23,843.0\n193,485.0\nJul\n690.8\n \n18,357.0\n \n54,139.7\n \n5,578.7\n \n42,159.7\n \n11,399.9\n6,760.1\n13.4\n0.0\n74.6\n4.3\n12.6\n1,025.8\n36,840.5\n3,070.4\n28,551.1\n14,418.6\n24,902.0\n247,999.1\nAug\n975.1\n \n28,776.0\n \n54,868.5\n \n4,623.1\n \n41,100.2\n \n14,219.2\n6,883.5\n13.1\n0.0\n39.1\n14.0\n14.7\n1,046.3\n43,502.9\n3,130.9\n25,354.6\n14,240.7\n26,391.3\n265,193.4\nSep\n1,084.2\n \n30,217.6\n \n56,679.6\n \n4,426.6\n \n39,530.8\n \n14,126.8\n6,676.2\n12.9\n0.0\n107.8\n9.6\n22.3\n1,050.4\n45,297.5\n3,822.4\n28,289.4\n20,662.0\n27,055.5\n279,071.4\nOct\n1,064.2\n \n32,235.0\n \n66,948.5\n \n4,457.3\n \n40,092.7\n \n13,530.7\n8,068.2\n12.3\n20.1\n222.0\n17.6\n22.2\n1,019.0\n53,116.5\n3,869.6\n29,764.7\n19,044.4\n27,327.7\n300,832.8\nNov\n1,063.6\n \n34,673.9\n \n73,237.2\n \n4,211.3\n \n41,173.6\n \n14,134.7\n8,961.5\n11.6\n0.0\n268.2\n20.0\n16.8\n1,269.9\n60,179.7\n3,678.7\n29,821.2\n19,694.9\n27,426.0\n319,842.9\nDec\n1,177.8\n \n39,886.8\n \n76,076.5\n \n5,771.7\n \n38,623.2\n \n10,803.6\n12,072.8\n11.2\n0.0\n252.2\n23.3\n26.8\n1,269.0\n69,691.0\n4,566.9\n29,608.0\n15,822.0\n36,808.1\n342,490.8\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2020\nNotes\n1.Government securities includes treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households and other financial corporations.\nPublic \nEnterprises\nTABLE 4.1: OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS -ASSETS\n$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \n \n19 \n \n \nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nCapital\nContigent\nOther\nTOTAL\nand\nLiablities\nLiablities\nEnd of\nDemand\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nReserves\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\n2018\nJan\n4,640.2\n1,008.1\n1,454.0\n7,102.2\n406.5\n107.3\n7,616.1\n65.1\n444.8\n115.1\n49.1\n2.6\n1,645.3\n501.0\n522.1\n10,961.1\nFeb\n4,633.7\n989.2\n1,458.8\n7,081.7\n418.7\n101.2\n7,601.7\n75.4\n435.4\n111.2\n92.8\n2.9\n1,620.1\n507.8\n511.0\n10,958.3\nMar\n4,732.9\n1,007.5\n1,491.0\n7,231.4\n365.0\n114.7\n7,711.0\n77.3\n460.8\n140.5\n89.2\n6.9\n1,654.7\n504.1\n523.4\n11,168.1\nApr\n4,907.7\n1,066.6\n1,374.6\n7,349.0\n387.8\n95.6\n7,832.3\n84.0\n453.1\n82.4\n68.8\n16.1\n1,641.9\n532.0\n567.0\n11,277.5\nMay\n5,172.9\n1,138.2\n1,442.5\n7,753.6\n442.8\n107.4\n8,303.8\n88.0\n554.0\n101.5\n94.9\n19.9\n1,671.5\n458.9\n526.5\n11,819.1\nJune\n5,650.6\n1,274.7\n1,459.1\n8,384.4\n438.0\n89.2\n8,911.6\n66.8\n554.0\n119.8\n173.4\n21.6\n1,707.5\n551.4\n565.7\n12,671.8\nJuly\n5,902.3\n1,415.3\n1,501.5\n8,819.1\n424.4\n33.1\n9,276.7\n89.5\n545.1\n118.9\n132.9\n32.6\n1,846.0\n611.4\n623.4\n13,276.5\nAug\n6,005.7\n1,362.6\n1,524.2\n8,892.5\n399.6\n32.4\n9,324.5\n66.5\n535.4\n137.0\n119.5\n33.3\n1,882.9\n647.7\n611.2\n13,358.0\nSep\n6,281.7\n1,421.8\n1,489.0\n9,192.4\n439.0\n44.6\n9,676.1\n52.4\n559.4\n142.2\n129.1\n46.6\n1,913.4\n637.4\n629.7\n13,786.4\nOct\n6,345.7\n1,390.0\n1,427.8\n9,163.5\n435.2\n52.2\n9,650.8\n61.7\n581.4\n147.6\n93.4\n42.0\n1,957.6\n647.5\n655.7\n13,837.7\nNov\n6,419.8\n1,329.4\n1,430.4\n9,179.6\n366.8\n48.7\n9,595.1\n50.9\n543.1\n213.7\n74.8\n42.3\n1,991.6\n633.2\n702.1\n13,846.8\nDec\n6,601.1\n1,322.2\n1,508.9\n9,432.2\n394.5\n41.3\n9,868.0\n58.6\n524.7\n229.6\n187.8\n39.0\n2,057.7\n573.8\n699.7\n14,239.0\n2019\nJan\n6,626.6\n1,155.9\n1,466.8\n9,249.4\n381.0\n42.2\n9,672.5\n59.3\n530.5\n239.5\n188.3\n39.2\n2,047.0\n517.2\n729.8\n14,023.5\nFeb\n7,168.7\n1,155.1\n1,473.2\n9,797.1\n387.8\n44.5\n10,229.3\n71.8\n782.0\n158.9\n151.7\n42.6\n2,145.1\n490.7\n661.5\n14,733.6\nMar\n7,435.2\n1,127.0\n1,437.1\n9,999.2\n372.7\n47.9\n10,419.9\n74.5\n933.8\n165.8\n140.9\n42.7\n2,349.0\n523.7\n925.8\n15,576.2\nApr\n7,968.0\n1,243.3\n1,795.8\n11,007.1\n390.9\n55.9\n11,453.8\n90.8\n652.7\n148.3\n173.5\n28.8\n2,551.4\n620.5\n1,071.0\n16,790.9\nMay\n9,316.8\n1,379.0\n1,932.4\n12,628.2\n462.9\n48.9\n13,139.9\n139.4\n1,053.9\n148.8\n206.7\n46.5\n2,556.6\n910.1\n1,783.2\n19,985.1\nJun\n11,021.9\n1,573.5\n1,737.2\n14,332.6\n422.0\n44.5\n14,799.2\n171.7\n1,607.6\n150.3\n216.7\n43.6\n3,240.7\n1,606.5\n1,649.0\n23,485.3\nJul\n13,014.4\n1,661.3\n1,949.2\n16,624.9\n432.6\n50.6\n17,108.1\n168.2\n1,710.5\n152.0\n225.8\n27.4\n3,522.6\n1,587.7\n2,135.1\n26,637.3\nAug\n15,189.7\n1,798.7\n1,922.5\n18,910.9\n639.1\n59.2\n19,609.3\n202.9\n2,064.4\n155.0\n116.2\n28.0\n4,061.0\n2,614.6\n3,102.0\n31,953.4\nSep\n18,834.0\n2,049.2\n1,925.3\n22,808.5\n549.2\n54.5\n23,412.2\n219.9\n2,989.7\n155.9\n182.3\n23.3\n5,510.0\n3,707.8\n4,887.7\n41,088.9\nOct\n23,441.5\n2,298.0\n1,891.9\n27,631.4\n526.0\n68.6\n28,226.0\n205.7\n3,020.7\n159.1\n211.3\n24.6\n5,937.5\n4,081.1\n4,612.3\n46,478.4\nNov\n25,114.5\n2,868.9\n2,123.8\n30,107.2\n878.6\n99.1\n31,084.9\n235.1\n2,966.0\n175.3\n275.5\n50.5\n6,404.3\n3,148.3\n4,844.2\n49,183.9\nDec\n27,842.2\n3,238.9\n2,192.0\n33,273.1\n1,067.2\n118.5\n34,458.8\n244.0\n3,020.4\n179.5\n326.4\n119.4\n10,212.4\n4,867.7\n7,337.7\n60,766.3\n2020\nJan\n28,570.4\n3,605.9\n2,358.3\n34,534.5\n1,299.1\n92.6\n35,926.3\n255.6\n3,114.7\n185.8\n336.1\n140.1\n12,285.7\n2,965.9\n7,182.1\n62,392.3\nFeb\n37,082.9\n3,939.6\n2,215.0\n43,237.5\n1,674.9\n78.2\n44,990.7\n260.1\n3,357.7\n189.6\n767.7\n154.9\n12,930.2\n5,441.7\n8,745.6\n76,838.2\nMar\n37,923.6\n4,998.7\n2,361.6\n45,283.9\n1,721.0\n409.0\n47,413.9\n476.8\n4,874.8\n258.4\n314.6\n339.9\n15,172.3\n7,917.3\n9,957.3\n86,725.4\nApr\n42,102.4\n5,060.0\n2,530.7\n49,693.1\n1,805.2\n516.3\n52,014.6\n337.6\n4,931.9\n346.4\n312.9\n233.2\n16,105.4\n7,642.8\n10,038.7\n91,963.5\nMay\n48,595.9\n6,274.7\n2,847.3\n57,717.9\n1,840.2\n630.7\n60,188.8\n359.2\n5,129.7\n536.7\n469.1\n365.4\n16,562.4\n7,042.0\n10,273.9\n100,927.2\nJun\n86,454.7\n6,715.3\n4,040.8\n97,210.8\n2,277.4\n1,479.4\n100,967.5\n863.2\n11,761.8\n887.6\n959.9\n348.2\n32,058.2\n24,299.3\n21,339.3\n193,485.0\nJul\n113,233.5\n7,957.5\n6,089.8\n127,280.8\n2,997.8\n1,731.9\n132,010.5\n1,024.3\n14,962.8\n1,387.9\n2,114.7\n348.7\n37,319.8\n28,551.1\n30,279.2\n247,999.1\nAug\n126,039.2\n8,814.1\n5,476.0\n140,329.3\n2,942.4\n850.8\n144,122.5\n1,111.7\n16,780.7\n1,837.1\n3,844.1\n422.5\n40,894.6\n25,354.6\n30,825.6\n265,193.4\nSep\n130,929.6\n9,728.6\n6,981.5\n147,639.7\n2,655.6\n1,531.5\n151,826.9\n1,083.9\n15,206.4\n1,863.1\n2,956.8\n372.2\n42,400.0\n28,289.4\n35,072.8\n279,071.4\nOct\n141,293.3\n12,094.6\n8,429.2\n161,817.1\n2,769.1\n1,799.7\n166,385.9\n1,231.9\n14,868.4\n1,812.7\n4,513.6\n441.7\n43,466.4\n29,764.7\n38,347.5\n300,832.8\nNov\n156,892.5\n13,732.4\n9,029.7\n179,654.6\n2,622.0\n1,569.9\n183,846.6\n1,237.3\n14,800.8\n1,489.5\n5,726.8\n423.6\n46,209.7\n29,821.2\n36,287.5\n319,842.9\nDec\n174,270.2\n16,788.9\n9,949.2\n201,008.3\n2,806.1\n4,340.0\n208,154.4\n1,436.2\n14,145.4\n1,318.6\n757.0\n292.0\n54,752.7\n29,608.0\n32,026.4\n342,490.8\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2020\nTABLE 4.2 : OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS - LIABILITIES \nDeposits\nAmounts Owing to\n$ millions\n \n \n \n20 \n \n \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nForeign\nBond\nNotes\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \nLocal\nPublic\nOther \nContigent \nNon Financial \n Notes &\n&\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment1\nLocal Governemt\nPublic Enterprises\nOther2\nGovernment\nGovernment\nEnterprises\n Institutional Units3\nOther claims\nAssets\nOther Assets\nAssets\nCoins\nCoin\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\n2018\nJan\n22.40\n \n64.10\n \n2,294.49\n \n192.08\n \n103.42\n \n81.91\n \n2,143.23\n \n-\n \n23.45\n \n65.90\n \n26.32\n \n20.59\n \n154.85\n \n2,451.11\n \n28.68\n \n500.96\n \n294.22\n \n538.92\n \n9,006.6\n \nFeb\n18.34\n \n43.97\n \n2,296.76\n \n223.72\n \n108.28\n \n96.17\n \n2,109.34\n \n-\n \n23.45\n \n66.10\n \n24.29\n \n21.11\n \n145.03\n \n2,461.49\n \n28.67\n \n507.82\n \n290.62\n \n536.35\n \n9,001.5\n \nMar\n14.81\n \n53.62\n \n2,238.77\n \n240.67\n \n124.48\n \n99.51\n \n2,164.00\n \n-\n \n23.45\n \n66.69\n \n19.16\n \n15.90\n \n127.10\n \n2,535.82\n \n30.40\n \n504.13\n \n325.78\n \n552.34\n \n9,136.6\n \nApr\n13.47\n \n56.67\n \n2,207.91\n \n274.97\n \n116.75\n \n78.50\n \n2,314.90\n \n-\n \n24.75\n \n66.97\n \n13.44\n \n20.89\n \n120.77\n \n2,519.81\n \n28.31\n \n531.98\n \n298.96\n \n554.95\n \n9,244.0\n \nMay\n12.85\n \n62.77\n \n2,308.95\n \n339.50\n \n130.13\n \n85.74\n \n2,562.36\n \n-\n \n24.97\n \n66.94\n \n8.44\n \n20.88\n \n134.01\n \n2,556.25\n \n23.90\n \n458.93\n \n307.90\n \n555.31\n \n9,659.8\n \nJune\n7.48\n \n52.61\n \n2,848.51\n \n331.76\n \n117.26\n \n84.05\n \n2,538.32\n \n-\n \n26.19\n \n66.55\n \n7.44\n \n19.43\n \n196.00\n \n2,662.21\n \n25.46\n \n551.39\n \n302.93\n \n563.41\n \n10,401.0\n \nJuly\n17.85\n \n54.25\n \n3,189.62\n \n281.13\n \n109.31\n \n95.43\n \n2,949.15\n \n-\n \n-\n \n67.49\n \n4.51\n \n21.01\n \n181.99\n \n2,414.59\n \n26.03\n \n611.36\n \n322.53\n \n565.15\n \n10,911.4\n \nAug\n21.01\n \n67.83\n \n3,196.71\n \n232.34\n \n102.46\n \n66.26\n \n3,014.90\n \n-\n \n-\n \n67.29\n \n7.05\n \n20.62\n \n186.74\n \n2,490.99\n \n29.82\n \n647.67\n \n329.42\n \n566.33\n \n11,047.4\n \nSep\n16.25\n \n58.19\n \n3,487.91\n \n305.30\n \n137.84\n \n78.01\n \n2,789.78\n \n-\n \n45.21\n \n68.09\n \n5.42\n \n20.39\n \n212.17\n \n2,577.06\n \n36.68\n \n637.41\n \n357.43\n \n571.83\n \n11,405.0\n \nOct\n33.06\n \n67.98\n \n3,505.83\n \n272.14\n \n173.15\n \n51.45\n \n2,728.83\n \n-\n \n45.21\n \n68.41\n \n4.59\n \n9.35\n \n188.83\n \n2,697.37\n \n38.71\n \n647.52\n \n353.24\n \n569.20\n \n11,454.9\n \nNov\n25.84\n \n81.42\n \n3,384.38\n \n264.64\n \n198.18\n \n63.91\n \n2,793.90\n \n-\n \n45.21\n \n68.65\n \n6.99\n \n8.13\n \n217.69\n \n2,672.32\n \n46.06\n \n633.21\n \n406.55\n \n569.81\n \n11,486.9\n \nDec\n18.17\n \n89.91\n \n3,736.98\n \n317.34\n \n224.44\n \n74.84\n \n2,633.69\n \n-\n \n43.37\n \n69.16\n \n6.20\n \n9.18\n \n204.31\n \n2,707.60\n \n53.75\n \n573.76\n \n406.16\n \n633.85\n \n11,802.7\n \n2019\nJan\n42.05\n \n106.91\n \n3,766.70\n \n338.09\n \n249.77\n \n46.14\n \n2,621.20\n \n-\n \n61.02\n \n68.66\n \n4.41\n \n8.06\n \n189.15\n \n2,594.53\n \n33.84\n \n517.24\n \n428.82\n \n649.94\n \n11,726.5\n \nFeb\n52.63\n \n238.67\n \n3,601.94\n \n293.36\n \n549.59\n \n205.65\n \n2,675.29\n \n-\n \n60.52\n \n2.00\n \n5.84\n \n7.71\n \n208.31\n \n2,784.17\n \n31.04\n \n490.74\n \n472.78\n \n696.82\n \n12,377.1\n \nMar\n59.17\n \n244.62\n \n3,729.81\n \n393.22\n \n712.08\n \n55.05\n \n2,635.68\n \n-\n \n61.52\n \n4.53\n \n4.27\n \n9.53\n \n340.66\n \n2,660.90\n \n25.33\n \n523.72\n \n755.57\n \n971.53\n \n13,187.2\n \nApr\n40.82\n \n331.97\n \n3,876.83\n \n492.10\n \n981.80\n \n91.75\n \n2,590.97\n \n-\n \n61.79\n \n3.95\n \n3.98\n \n9.62\n \n407.85\n \n2,721.57\n \n24.55\n \n620.52\n \n935.27\n \n1,002.47\n \n14,197.8\n \nMay\n94.59\n \n444.70\n \n3,886.07\n \n571.50\n \n1,747.69\n \n154.08\n \n2,508.43\n \n-\n \n62.12\n \n4.20\n \n3.93\n \n9.43\n \n636.78\n \n3,056.86\n \n34.46\n \n910.14\n \n1,832.95\n \n1,142.77\n \n17,100.7\n \nJun\n119.69\n \n810.71\n \n4,104.17\n \n413.18\n \n2,244.98\n \n538.88\n \n2,596.97\n \n-\n \n63.09\n \n6.62\n \n3.89\n \n8.73\n \n929.36\n \n3,667.45\n \n37.02\n \n1,606.53\n \n1,374.23\n \n1,621.33\n \n20,146.8\n \nJul\n224.75\n \n791.31\n \n5,081.19\n \n275.44\n \n3,602.89\n \n801.93\n \n2,640.55\n \n-\n \n103.36\n \n5.49\n \n2.18\n \n9.00\n \n164.58\n \n4,043.75\n \n32.65\n \n1,587.68\n \n1,873.44\n \n1,722.66\n \n22,962.9\n \nAug\n178.74\n \n1,054.06\n \n7,123.10\n \n461.83\n \n3,778.75\n \n1,050.74\n \n3,106.90\n \n-\n \n103.86\n \n6.78\n \n1.04\n \n9.21\n \n212.50\n \n4,430.78\n \n37.42\n \n2,614.64\n \n1,744.16\n \n1,989.27\n \n27,903.8\n \nSep\n108.51\n \n1,915.41\n \n8,246.09\n \n676.17\n \n5,563.16\n \n1,575.75\n \n3,240.85\n \n-\n \n26.96\n \n6.47\n \n1.37\n \n9.40\n \n187.53\n \n4,993.71\n \n42.30\n \n3,707.80\n \n3,074.10\n \n2,440.63\n \n35,816.2\n \nOct\n138.01\n \n1,702.35\n \n10,537.81\n \n2,437.08\n \n7,376.80\n \n906.98\n \n3,416.23\n \n-\n \n27.05\n \n5.29\n \n1.15\n \n7.94\n \n254.84\n \n5,859.32\n \n41.94\n \n4,081.09\n \n1,658.19\n \n2,434.21\n \n40,886.3\n \nNov\n113.92\n \n2,078.54\n \n10,430.55\n \n2,073.35\n \n7,977.27\n \n940.70\n \n3,737.72\n \n-\n \n27.15\n \n11.83\n \n1.37\n \n8.74\n \n248.79\n \n7,670.96\n \n42.07\n \n3,148.28\n \n1,627.27\n \n3,059.40\n \n43,197.9\n \nDec\n158.44\n \n2,300.01\n \n12,821.54\n \n934.73\n \n7,898.48\n \n1,984.08\n \n3,716.31\n \n-\n \n24.75\n \n20.65\n \n1.33\n \n8.11\n \n268.61\n \n8,976.00\n \n61.84\n \n4,867.67\n \n2,740.16\n \n6,935.56\n \n53,718.3\n \n2020\nJan\n165.80\n \n2,845.62\n \n12,018.43\n \n708.00\n \n7,706.57\n \n1,811.38\n \n4,029.43\n \n-\n \n125.52\n \n14.97\n \n5.11\n \n12.17\n \n326.11\n \n10,766.91\n \n77.59\n \n2,965.93\n \n3,395.90\n \n8,058.15\n \n55,033.6\n \nFeb\n251.70\n \n2,756.57\n \n12,731.97\n \n889.16\n \n8,264.76\n \n1,532.87\n \n3,877.19\n \n-\n \n117.45\n \n13.99\n \n5.15\n \n11.56\n \n329.47\n \n11,656.91\n \n88.37\n \n5,441.70\n \n11,907.90\n \n8,653.69\n \n68,530.4\n \nMar\n242.41\n \n3,063.92\n \n14,545.58\n \n1,948.14\n \n12,381.17\n \n2,497.47\n \n4,373.76\n \n-\n \n0.08\n \n20.23\n \n4.39\n \n11.39\n \n765.82\n \n14,041.67\n \n127.46\n \n7,917.31\n \n5,718.53\n \n9,244.62\n \n76,904.0\n \nApr\n263.29\n \n3,147.75\n \n16,673.44\n \n1,287.51\n \n13,285.14\n \n3,056.32\n \n4,235.96\n \n-\n \n0.08\n \n18.39\n \n4.47\n \n9.75\n \n834.72\n \n14,864.30\n \n129.90\n \n7,642.80\n \n6,534.14\n \n9,703.93\n \n81,691.9\n \nMay\n284.33\n \n3,144.57\n \n19,827.46\n \n1,553.68\n \n15,003.29\n \n3,130.38\n \n4,160.50\n \n-\n \n0.12\n \n45.79\n \n4.53\n \n9.61\n \n768.01\n \n17,762.27\n \n143.44\n \n7,042.04\n \n6,012.40\n \n9,845.09\n \n88,737.5\n \nJun\n515.11\n \n8,372.39\n \n26,368.55\n \n3,570.85\n \n34,550.44\n \n7,527.46\n \n5,841.98\n \n-\n \n0.12\n \n90.14\n \n4.29\n \n9.41\n \n2,010.79\n \n26,638.87\n \n215.56\n \n24,299.33\n \n14,590.26\n \n18,983.05\n \n173,588.6\n \nJul\n577.99\n \n16,536.53\n \n49,470.13\n \n4,219.81\n \n40,259.84\n \n11,399.93\n \n6,357.84\n \n-\n \n-\n \n74.57\n \n4.33\n \n12.61\n \n1,025.78\n \n33,054.99\n \n229.06\n \n28,551.07\n \n10,247.64\n \n19,646.49\n \n221,668.6\n \nAug\n821.16\n \n26,519.73\n \n49,165.59\n \n4,265.44\n \n38,763.72\n \n14,219.24\n \n6,484.68\n \n-\n \n-\n \n39.07\n \n14.05\n \n14.74\n \n1,046.29\n \n38,741.31\n \n231.00\n \n25,354.64\n \n9,460.49\n \n19,961.16\n \n235,102.3\n \nSep\n891.26\n \n27,646.41\n \n51,169.67\n \n3,898.65\n \n38,420.20\n \n14,126.83\n \n6,354.19\n \n-\n \n-\n \n107.40\n \n9.61\n \n22.30\n \n1,050.38\n \n41,088.91\n \n228.95\n \n28,289.36\n \n17,608.70\n \n19,375.08\n \n250,287.9\n \nOct\n896.48\n \n29,309.79\n \n60,589.19\n \n3,602.58\n \n38,877.31\n \n13,530.74\n \n7,763.97\n \n-\n \n20.06\n \n109.83\n \n17.57\n \n22.18\n \n1,019.00\n \n48,440.92\n \n268.07\n \n29,764.70\n \n15,978.22\n \n19,616.63\n \n269,827.2\n \nNov\n919.42\n \n31,596.89\n \n67,899.10\n \n3,494.87\n \n39,693.38\n \n14,134.74\n \n7,098.29\n \n-\n \n0.02\n \n110.37\n \n20.00\n \n16.81\n \n1,269.94\n \n54,496.74\n \n259.90\n \n29,821.16\n \n16,683.48\n \n19,526.70\n \n287,041.8\n \nDec\n1,019.76\n \n36,507.59\n \n70,392.07\n \n4,949.48\n \n37,346.17\n \n10,803.58\n \n9,985.57\n \n-\n \n-\n \n1.18\n \n23.30\n \n26.76\n \n1,269.01\n \n62,953.03\n \n718.16\n \n29,608.01\n \n12,793.91\n \n28,230.82\n \n306,628.4\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2020\nNotes\n1.Government securities include treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households and other financial corporations, \nTABLE 5.1: COMMERCIAL BANKS -ASSETS\n$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \n \n21 \n \n \nZWL$ millions\nEnd of\nDemand\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nCapital\nContigent\nOther\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\nand\nLiablities\nLiablities\nTOTAL\nReserves\n2018\nJan\n4,640.2\n369.3\n903.3\n5,912.7\n301.3\n85.0\n6,299.0\n53.6\n418.7\n115.1\n26.2\n2.4\n1,205.0\n501.0\n385.6\n9,006.6\nFeb\n4,633.7\n375.8\n920.2\n5,929.7\n298.5\n78.6\n6,306.8\n58.1\n409.1\n111.2\n59.1\n2.4\n1,174.8\n507.8\n372.1\n9,001.5\nMar\n4,732.9\n368.8\n930.7\n6,032.4\n244.7\n92.4\n6,369.5\n61.1\n419.5\n140.5\n54.8\n6.4\n1,196.4\n504.1\n384.3\n9,136.6\nApr\n4,907.7\n394.4\n874.8\n6,176.9\n243.4\n72.8\n6,493.1\n67.4\n413.5\n82.4\n35.2\n15.7\n1,201.5\n532.0\n403.4\n9,244.0\nMay\n5,172.9\n416.2\n917.2\n6,506.3\n246.2\n85.2\n6,837.7\n66.8\n514.1\n101.5\n63.7\n19.4\n1,224.6\n458.9\n373.2\n9,659.8\nJun\n5,650.6\n504.3\n897.4\n7,052.2\n254.8\n66.9\n7,373.9\n45.0\n514.7\n119.8\n116.5\n21.1\n1,259.1\n551.4\n399.5\n10,401.0\nJul\n5,902.3\n527.0\n901.0\n7,330.3\n296.0\n12.2\n7,638.4\n72.0\n507.6\n118.9\n102.5\n16.8\n1,380.1\n611.4\n463.6\n10,911.4\nAug\n6,005.7\n540.8\n930.8\n7,477.3\n266.6\n11.5\n7,755.3\n46.4\n501.5\n137.0\n101.3\n15.4\n1,408.6\n647.7\n434.3\n11,047.4\nSep\n6,281.7\n556.4\n927.2\n7,765.3\n273.0\n23.5\n8,061.8\n40.9\n503.5\n142.2\n108.4\n21.1\n1,434.8\n637.4\n454.9\n11,405.0\nOct\n6,340.3\n509.5\n898.1\n7,747.9\n284.2\n31.1\n8,063.2\n49.3\n525.1\n147.6\n72.2\n16.5\n1,461.0\n647.5\n472.6\n11,454.9\nNov\n6,411.0\n503.9\n861.0\n7,775.9\n232.8\n27.6\n8,036.4\n41.2\n487.5\n213.7\n58.6\n17.8\n1,490.0\n633.2\n508.4\n11,486.9\nDec\n6,582.3\n495.0\n910.9\n7,988.3\n255.0\n19.7\n8,262.9\n43.3\n469.5\n229.6\n147.5\n15.6\n1,551.3\n573.8\n509.2\n11,802.7\n2019\nJan\n6,603.6\n440.8\n919.5\n7,964.0\n240.5\n20.5\n8,225.0\n42.6\n475.0\n239.5\n130.2\n14.4\n1,545.2\n517.2\n537.2\n11,726.5\nFeb\n7,129.0\n426.7\n923.8\n8,479.6\n248.9\n22.8\n8,751.4\n57.3\n647.5\n158.9\n119.1\n14.4\n1,626.6\n490.7\n511.1\n12,377.0\nMar\n7,350.5\n451.8\n915.0\n8,717.3\n225.9\n26.4\n8,969.6\n56.8\n778.3\n165.8\n108.4\n17.0\n1,804.3\n523.7\n763.2\n13,187.2\nApr\n7,861.8\n447.1\n1,280.5\n9,589.3\n260.3\n34.4\n9,884.1\n76.0\n487.7\n148.3\n145.3\n14.8\n1,935.7\n620.5\n885.4\n14,197.8\nMay\n9,143.2\n544.3\n1,412.7\n11,100.2\n309.4\n27.5\n11,437.1\n126.8\n789.2\n148.8\n164.7\n16.0\n1,916.9\n910.1\n1,591.0\n17,100.7\nJun\n10,758.5\n567.5\n1,279.7\n12,605.8\n290.5\n23.1\n12,919.4\n159.0\n1,271.1\n150.3\n161.8\n16.5\n2,409.1\n1,606.5\n1,453.0\n20,146.8\nJul\n12,675.9\n672.2\n1,367.7\n14,715.9\n357.4\n29.4\n15,102.7\n146.4\n1,254.8\n152.0\n205.6\n10.4\n2,583.9\n1,587.7\n1,919.4\n22,962.9\nAug\n14,591.5\n825.3\n1,330.1\n16,747.0\n592.1\n38.0\n17,377.1\n182.4\n1,525.0\n155.0\n88.0\n24.5\n3,065.7\n2,614.6\n2,871.4\n27,903.8\nSep\n18,105.1\n947.3\n1,354.6\n20,407.1\n504.3\n33.3\n20,944.7\n205.7\n2,120.6\n155.9\n115.4\n23.3\n3,933.6\n3,707.8\n4,609.2\n35,816.2\nOct\n22,636.1\n1,003.6\n1,292.7\n24,932.3\n489.1\n47.4\n25,468.8\n200.2\n2,159.7\n159.1\n135.3\n24.6\n4,347.1\n4,081.1\n4,310.3\n40,886.3\nNov\n24,297.0\n1,057.2\n1,633.8\n26,988.0\n843.6\n78.9\n27,910.5\n227.7\n2,089.7\n175.3\n154.3\n48.0\n4,931.5\n3,148.3\n4,512.6\n43,197.9\nDec\n26,909.1\n1,184.4\n1,638.8\n29,732.2\n823.2\n102.9\n30,658.3\n231.6\n2,097.0\n179.5\n209.4\n119.4\n8,414.9\n4,867.7\n6,940.7\n53,718.3\n2020\nJan\n27,276.4\n1,787.3\n1,876.0\n30,939.8\n1,026.0\n76.3\n32,042.1\n232.1\n2,170.0\n185.8\n236.2\n140.1\n10,357.6\n2,965.9\n6,703.8\n55,033.6\nFeb\n35,796.5\n1,869.8\n1,712.8\n39,379.1\n1,404.1\n62.2\n40,845.3\n238.9\n2,391.2\n189.6\n209.2\n154.9\n10,877.8\n5,441.7\n8,181.8\n68,530.4\nMar\n36,078.2\n2,458.2\n1,884.9\n40,421.2\n1,430.6\n393.1\n42,245.0\n468.8\n3,731.4\n258.4\n181.2\n339.9\n12,487.9\n7,917.3\n9,274.0\n76,904.0\nApr\n40,156.4\n2,457.6\n2,078.8\n44,692.9\n1,514.8\n496.9\n46,704.6\n333.2\n3,779.7\n346.4\n172.1\n233.2\n13,105.1\n7,642.8\n9,374.8\n81,691.9\nMay\n46,306.1\n2,502.0\n2,405.7\n51,213.8\n1,399.0\n611.4\n53,224.1\n324.9\n3,968.6\n536.7\n319.4\n365.4\n13,454.1\n7,042.0\n9,502.3\n88,737.5\nJun\n67,548.1\n17,859.0\n3,562.0\n88,969.1\n1,931.1\n1,453.1\n92,353.3\n856.9\n9,116.9\n887.6\n681.7\n348.2\n24,773.8\n24,299.3\n20,270.9\n173,588.6\nJul\n89,092.1\n20,865.7\n5,595.6\n115,553.4\n2,671.5\n1,702.4\n119,927.3\n1,014.3\n11,100.4\n1,387.9\n1,907.7\n348.7\n28,563.5\n28,551.1\n28,867.6\n221,668.6\nAug\n102,750.2\n20,005.2\n4,891.9\n127,647.3\n2,577.9\n824.8\n131,049.9\n1,101.5\n12,302.3\n1,837.1\n3,658.1\n412.5\n30,713.4\n25,354.6\n28,672.9\n235,102.3\nSep\n104,770.7\n24,130.0\n6,488.3\n135,389.0\n2,548.1\n1,496.4\n139,433.5\n1,063.5\n11,363.7\n1,863.1\n2,831.0\n372.2\n32,694.4\n28,289.4\n32,377.1\n250,287.9\nOct\n114,057.9\n26,079.1\n7,702.2\n147,839.2\n2,666.6\n1,767.2\n152,273.0\n1,089.2\n11,137.3\n1,812.7\n4,232.9\n441.7\n33,811.1\n29,764.7\n35,264.5\n269,827.2\nNov\n129,129.6\n26,871.0\n8,262.1\n164,262.8\n2,369.5\n1,538.3\n168,170.5\n1,100.4\n11,019.9\n1,489.5\n5,403.8\n423.6\n36,278.2\n29,821.2\n33,334.7\n287,041.8\nDec\n146,151.8\n27,804.4\n8,926.9\n182,883.1\n2,547.6\n4,309.9\n189,740.6\n1,239.9\n10,924.0\n1,318.6\n316.6\n292.0\n43,984.3\n29,608.0\n29,204.3\n306,628.4\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2020\nTABLE 5.2 : COMMERCIAL BANKS - LIABILITIES\nDeposits\nAmounts Owing to\n \n \n \n22 \n \n \nForeign\nOther Assets\nNon Financial \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nNotes\nAssets\nBond\n&\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \n Notes &\nCoin\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment1\nLocal Governemt\nPublic Enterprises\nOther2\nMortgages\nGovernment\nOther\nCoins\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\n2018\nJan\n0.9\n \n2.3\n \n197.4\n \n98.7\n \n7.8\n \n-\n \n129.8\n \n34.5\n \n-\n \n-\n \n413.2\n \n-\n \n508.7\n \n144.9\n \n136.1\n \n1,674.3\n \nFeb\n1.5\n \n1.8\n \n172.4\n \n123.5\n \n5.5\n \n-\n \n141.3\n \n33.5\n \n-\n \n-\n \n414.8\n \n-\n \n507.9\n \n125.7\n \n135.7\n \n1,663.6\n \nMar\n1.4\n \n3.4\n \n175.9\n \n72.1\n \n14.1\n \n-\n \n212.6\n \n32.8\n \n-\n \n-\n \n411.4\n \n-\n \n539.4\n \n142.8\n \n132.3\n \n1,738.2\n \nApr\n1.1\n \n4.3\n \n185.5\n \n61.9\n \n3.6\n \n-\n \n184.4\n \n32.0\n \n-\n \n-\n \n413.3\n \n-\n \n582.7\n \n141.6\n \n135.2\n \n1,745.7\n \nMay\n1.0\n \n7.6\n \n196.3\n \n138.2\n \n8.1\n \n-\n \n191.0\n \n30.9\n \n-\n \n-\n \n415.0\n \n-\n \n608.4\n \n128.1\n \n137.4\n \n1,862.0\n \nJune\n1.2\n \n4.9\n \n188.6\n \n177.8\n \n1.9\n \n-\n \n266.2\n \n30.1\n \n-\n \n-\n \n413.9\n \n-\n \n614.3\n \n124.0\n \n141.5\n \n1,964.5\n \nJuly\n1.8\n \n6.6\n \n207.1\n \n185.1\n \n1.7\n \n-\n \n283.2\n \n33.3\n \n-\n \n-\n \n423.5\n \n-\n \n636.1\n \n128.2\n \n141.1\n \n2,047.7\n \nAug\n1.6\n \n3.7\n \n224.7\n \n145.3\n \n2.4\n \n-\n \n288.9\n \n32.2\n \n-\n \n-\n \n428.2\n \n-\n \n579.4\n \n139.1\n \n143.7\n \n1,989.2\n \nSep\n1.9\n \n2.9\n \n245.6\n \n92.6\n \n20.8\n \n-\n \n291.1\n \n31.2\n \n-\n \n-\n \n430.3\n \n-\n \n650.2\n \n148.1\n \n144.4\n \n2,059.1\n \nOct\n4.9\n \n2.1\n \n220.0\n \n95.8\n \n11.9\n \n-\n \n318.9\n \n30.2\n \n-\n \n-\n \n427.7\n \n-\n \n639.8\n \n154.2\n \n147.0\n \n2,052.5\n \nNov\n3.6\n \n2.9\n \n243.3\n \n35.7\n \n10.4\n \n-\n \n320.7\n \n28.9\n \n-\n \n-\n \n433.5\n \n-\n \n635.7\n \n148.0\n \n145.8\n \n2,008.5\n \nDec\n2.3\n \n4.3\n \n157.4\n \n121.3\n \n10.4\n \n-\n \n339.4\n \n28.0\n \n-\n \n-\n \n444.8\n \n-\n \n645.9\n \n179.7\n \n151.9\n \n2,085.6\n \n2019\nJan\n6.3\n \n4.6\n108.2\n \n63.5\n10.9\n \n0.0\n343.8\n \n27.3\n33.6\n \n0.0\n438.0\n \n0.0\n649.3\n \n136.7\n151.2\n \n1973.3\nFeb\n5.4\n \n17.6\n120.6\n \n62.8\n18.1\n \n-\n \n339.6\n \n26.5\n-\n \n-\n \n416.1\n \n-\n \n696.1\n \n171.1\n156.7\n \n2,030.8\n \nMar\n2.6\n \n18.0\n126.3\n \n38.6\n23.9\n \n-\n \n331.7\n \n25.5\n-\n \n-\n \n415.1\n \n-\n \n710.1\n \n172.1\n207.4\n \n2,071.2\n \nApr\n3.7\n \n30.6\n220.3\n \n85.0\n47.6\n \n-\n \n271.6\n \n25.0\n-\n \n-\n \n414.1\n \n-\n \n705.0\n \n169.0\n276.2\n \n2,247.8\n \nMay\n3.9\n \n38.4\n162.2\n \n115.4\n139.0\n \n-\n \n345.5\n \n23.9\n-\n \n-\n \n406.2\n \n-\n \n776.6\n \n165.7\n363.4\n \n2,540.1\n \nJun\n6.3\n \n69.8\n361.6\n \n144.5\n132.4\n \n-\n \n265.8\n \n22.6\n-\n \n-\n \n421.7\n \n-\n \n873.6\n \n210.5\n473.0\n \n2,981.8\n \nJul\n6.5\n \n174.7\n473.9\n \n89.7\n131.1\n \n-\n \n258.3\n \n22.2\n-\n \n-\n \n416.0\n \n-\n \n934.6\n \n203.1\n565.6\n \n3,275.8\n \nAug\n5.5\n \n94.5\n758.0\n \n60.6\n115.5\n \n-\n \n247.4\n \n21.5\n-\n \n-\n \n418.1\n \n-\n \n970.6\n \n345.1\n567.6\n \n3,604.2\n \nSep\n15.8\n \n180.3\n831.8\n \n195.4\n104.2\n \n-\n \n267.6\n \n20.9\n-\n \n-\n \n499.1\n \n-\n \n1,137.6\n \n528.8\n1,042.2\n \n4,823.6\n \nOct\n6.2\n \n198.7\n997.2\n \n72.2\n243.7\n \n-\n \n268.8\n \n20.2\n-\n \n-\n \n429.8\n \n-\n \n1,286.7\n \n503.4\n1,069.3\n \n5,096.2\n \nNov\n11.9\n \n156.1\n872.3\n \n159.7\n426.0\n \n-\n \n338.6\n \n19.6\n-\n \n-\n \n443.5\n \n-\n \n1,357.4\n \n575.8\n1,068.7\n \n5,429.6\n \nDec\n9.2\n \n223.9\n1,016.9\n \n317.4\n492.3\n \n-\n \n308.3\n \n18.2\n-\n \n-\n \n454.5\n \n-\n \n1,413.5\n \n700.6\n1,470.0\n \n6,424.9\n \n2020\nJan\n16.3\n \n322.3\n1,106.8\n \n361.8\n421.8\n \n-\n \n283.0\n \n20.1\n-\n \n-\n \n478.2\n \n-\n \n1,498.8\n \n717.5\n1,552.8\n \n6,779.5\n \nFeb\n14.5\n \n368.2\n977.2\n \n612.5\n370.5\n \n-\n \n357.1\n \n20.1\n-\n \n1.5\n \n503.6\n \n-\n \n2,097.7\n \n735.9\n1,538.8\n \n7,597.4\n \nMar\n20.1\n \n529.4\n1,423.7\n \n261.8\n282.6\n \n-\n \n341.6\n \n19.2\n-\n \n0.6\n \n526.4\n \n-\n \n2,406.4\n \n1165.6\n1,914.1\n \n8,891.5\n \nApr\n33.1\n \n493.1\n914.2\n \n232.1\n384.9\n \n-\n \n424.3\n \n18.1\n-\n \n-\n \n525.9\n \n-\n \n2,568.2\n \n1528.5\n2,134.4\n \n9,256.8\n \nMay\n39.7\n \n434.7\n1,248.4\n \n192.3\n725.0\n \n-\n \n382.4\n \n17.0\n-\n \n-\n \n517.6\n \n-\n \n2,793.4\n \n2669.6\n2,146.1\n \n11,166.3\n \nJun\n88.7\n \n1167.9\n2,857.8\n \n395.9\n1,222.0\n \n-\n \n385.4\n \n13.8\n-\n \n-\n \n653.4\n \n-\n \n4,663.9\n \n2688.0\n4,712.1\n \n18,848.8\n \nJul\n109.1\n \n1780.7\n3,878.9\n \n1342.9\n1,879.4\n \n-\n \n346.6\n \n13.4\n-\n \n-\n \n585.7\n \n-\n \n5,648.0\n \n3879.5\n4,927.7\n \n24,391.8\n \nAug\n142.9\n \n2175.5\n4,799.3\n \n341.7\n2,310.6\n \n-\n \n294.6\n \n13.1\n-\n \n-\n \n688.7\n \n-\n \n6,552.1\n \n4480.3\n6,104.6\n \n27,903.4\n \nSep\n179.8\n \n2469.9\n4,547.1\n \n504.6\n1,027.7\n \n-\n \n218.3\n \n12.9\n-\n \n0.4\n \n741.5\n \n-\n \n6,518.3\n \n2774.9\n6,503.8\n \n25,499.1\n \nOct\n149.1\n \n2787.0\n5,056.1\n \n778.9\n1,182.4\n \n-\n \n206.5\n \n12.3\n-\n \n112.2\n \n772.3\n \n-\n \n6,874.4\n \n2795.4\n6,537.1\n \n27,263.4\n \nNov\n104.3\n \n2935.7\n4,448.9\n \n691.0\n1,412.8\n \n-\n \n1,666.7\n \n11.6\n-\n \n157.8\n \n930.4\n \n-\n \n7,498.6\n \n2571.1\n6,712.9\n \n29,141.9\n \nDec\n116.2\n \n3210.3\n5,085.9\n \n802.0\n1,183.4\n \n-\n \n1,830.2\n \n11.2\n-\n \n251.1\n \n1,008.4\n \n-\n \n8,562.3\n \n2559.4\n7,352.9\n \n31,973.2\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2020\nNotes\n1.Government securities include treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households and other financial corporations, \nTABLE 6.1: BUILDING SOCIETIES -ASSETS\n$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \n \n23 \n \n \nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nCapital\nOther\nTOTAL\nand\nLiablities\nEnd of\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nReserves\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\n2018\nJan\n544.7\n497.1\n1,041.7\n105.2\n16.4\n1,163.3\n22.8\n26.1\n0.0\n22.9\n0.2\n362.1\n77.0\n1,674.3\nFeb\n512.0\n480.5\n992.5\n120.3\n16.8\n1,129.5\n28.5\n26.3\n0.0\n33.6\n0.5\n366.0\n79.2\n1,663.6\nMar\n535.1\n507.8\n1,042.9\n120.3\n16.5\n1,179.7\n27.5\n41.3\n0.0\n34.5\n0.5\n378.2\n76.5\n1,738.2\nApr\n568.0\n452.6\n1,020.5\n144.4\n17.0\n1,181.9\n27.9\n39.7\n0.0\n33.6\n0.4\n358.5\n103.7\n1,745.7\nMay\n613.8\n475.1\n1,089.0\n196.6\n16.4\n1,302.0\n32.4\n40.0\n0.0\n31.2\n0.5\n363.1\n92.8\n1,862.0\nJune\n658.5\n507.9\n1,166.5\n183.2\n16.4\n1,366.0\n33.1\n39.3\n0.0\n56.9\n0.4\n363.5\n105.2\n1,964.5\nJuly\n770.2\n542.9\n1,313.1\n128.5\n15.0\n1,456.6\n28.7\n37.5\n0.0\n30.4\n15.8\n378.9\n99.8\n2,047.7\nAug\n703.4\n534.7\n1,238.0\n133.0\n15.0\n1,386.0\n31.3\n33.9\n0.0\n18.3\n17.9\n385.8\n116.0\n1,989.2\nSep\n749.8\n502.3\n1,252.2\n166.0\n15.1\n1,433.2\n22.8\n55.9\n0.0\n20.7\n25.5\n388.6\n112.3\n2,059.1\nOct\n772.5\n471.9\n1,244.4\n151.0\n15.1\n1,410.5\n23.7\n56.3\n0.0\n21.2\n25.5\n389.9\n125.4\n2,052.5\nNov\n699.9\n511.9\n1,211.9\n134.0\n15.1\n1,360.9\n21.0\n55.6\n0.0\n16.2\n24.5\n396.1\n134.2\n2,008.5\nDec\n713.2\n540.0\n1,253.1\n139.6\n15.1\n1,407.8\n26.5\n55.3\n0.0\n40.2\n23.4\n400.1\n132.3\n2,085.6\n2019\nJan\n633.8\n490.2\n1,124.0\n140.5\n15.0\n1,279.6\n27.9\n55.5\n0.0\n58.1\n24.8\n392.8\n134.7\n1,973.3\nFeb\n661.3\n492.3\n1,153.6\n138.8\n15.0\n1,307.4\n25.8\n134.5\n0.0\n32.6\n28.2\n366.7\n135.6\n2,030.8\nMar\n655.2\n473.9\n1,129.1\n146.8\n15.0\n1,290.9\n29.0\n155.6\n0.0\n32.5\n25.7\n391.4\n146.2\n2,071.2\nApr\n782.3\n460.0\n1,242.3\n130.5\n14.9\n1,387.7\n26.0\n165.0\n0.0\n28.2\n14.1\n457.7\n169.2\n2,247.8\nMay\n895.0\n464.3\n1,359.4\n153.5\n15.0\n1,527.9\n23.9\n264.7\n0.0\n41.9\n30.6\n477.5\n173.6\n2,540.1\nJun\n1,154.3\n406.8\n1,561.1\n131.5\n15.0\n1,707.7\n23.9\n336.5\n0.0\n54.8\n27.1\n664.7\n167.0\n2,981.8\nJul\n1,192.2\n538.1\n1,730.3\n75.2\n14.9\n1,820.4\n33.0\n455.7\n0.0\n20.2\n17.0\n739.6\n189.9\n3,275.8\nAug\n1,424.7\n542.9\n1,967.6\n47.0\n15.0\n2,029.6\n31.8\n539.4\n0.0\n28.2\n3.5\n777.8\n193.9\n3,604.2\nSep\n1,686.2\n524.9\n2,211.1\n44.9\n15.0\n2,271.0\n25.5\n869.0\n0.0\n66.9\n0.0\n1,352.0\n239.1\n4,823.6\nOct\n1,920.1\n548.8\n2,468.8\n36.9\n15.0\n2,520.7\n16.7\n861.0\n0.0\n76.0\n0.0\n1,362.8\n259.0\n5,096.2\nNov\n2,394.7\n441.2\n2,835.9\n35.0\n15.0\n2,886.0\n18.6\n876.3\n0.0\n121.1\n2.5\n1,246.7\n278.3\n5,429.6\nDec\n2,713.3\n481.5\n3,194.7\n244.0\n15.0\n3,453.8\n23.7\n923.5\n0.0\n117.1\n0.0\n1,563.0\n343.9\n6,424.9\n2020\nJan\n2,894.8\n398.4\n3,293.3\n273.1\n15.0\n3,581.4\n34.7\n944.7\n0.0\n100.0\n0.0\n1,699.9\n418.8\n6,779.5\nFeb\n3,118.5\n419.8\n3,538.4\n270.9\n15.0\n3,824.3\n32.5\n966.5\n0.0\n558.5\n0.0\n1,714.1\n501.5\n7,597.4\nMar\n3,978.7\n384.4\n4,363.1\n290.4\n15.0\n4,668.5\n19.3\n1,143.4\n0.0\n133.4\n0.0\n2,335.6\n591.3\n8,891.5\nApr\n4,097.6\n354.9\n4,452.5\n290.4\n15.0\n4,757.9\n15.6\n1,152.3\n0.0\n140.8\n0.0\n2,628.1\n562.1\n9,256.8\nMay\n5,615.0\n370.0\n5,985.0\n441.2\n15.0\n6,441.2\n45.6\n1,161.2\n0.0\n149.8\n0.0\n2,708.1\n660.4\n11,166.3\nJun\n7,327.5\n405.9\n7,733.4\n346.2\n15.0\n8,094.6\n17.6\n2,644.8\n0.0\n278.2\n0.0\n6,867.2\n946.4\n18,848.8\nJul\n10,284.7\n427.7\n10,712.4\n326.2\n15.0\n11,053.7\n21.3\n3,862.4\n0.0\n207.1\n0.0\n8,010.7\n1,236.7\n24,391.8\nAug\n10,984.4\n502.7\n11,487.1\n364.5\n15.0\n11,866.6\n21.4\n4,478.3\n0.0\n186.1\n10.0\n9,438.3\n1,902.7\n27,903.4\nSep\n10,408.2\n403.5\n10,811.8\n107.5\n15.0\n10,934.3\n31.7\n3,842.7\n0.0\n125.8\n0.0\n8,069.6\n2,495.1\n25,499.1\nOct\n11,881.7\n628.7\n12,510.4\n102.5\n15.0\n12,627.9\n154.0\n3,731.0\n0.0\n280.6\n0.0\n7,991.8\n2,478.1\n27,263.4\nNov\n13,173.5\n668.5\n13,842.1\n252.5\n15.0\n14,109.6\n148.2\n3,781.0\n0.0\n323.0\n0.0\n8,200.8\n2,579.4\n29,141.9\nDec\n15,585.8\n797.7\n16,383.5\n258.5\n15.0\n16,657.0\n207.5\n3,221.3\n0.0\n440.4\n0.0\n9,002.7\n2,444.3\n31,973.2\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2020\nAmounts Owing to\nTABLE 6.2: BUILDING SOCIETIES -LIABILITIES\n$ millions\n \n \n \n24 \n \n \n \nAGRICULTURE\nCONSTRUCTION\nCOMMUNICATION\nDISTRIBUTION\nFINANCIAL &\nFINANCIAL\nMANUFACTURING\nMINING\nSERVICES\nTRANSPORT\nINDIVIDUALS\nCONGLOMERATES\nTOTAL\nEND OF\n \n \n \nINVESTMENTS\nORGANISATIONS\n \n \n \n \n1,000.0\n2018\nJan\n479,109.6\n59,336.8\n9,442.4\n289,531.3\n20,569.7\n258,035.0\n271,453.8\n106,425.1\n390,052.9\n32,328.6\n617,303.0\n14,394.7\n2,547,982.8\nFeb\n488,203.1\n59.,977.6\n9,271.6\n315,569.6\n20,133.1\n258,263.6\n285,045.1\n108,649.0\n393,604.9\n31,636.6\n618,377.4\n15,010.6\n2,543,764.6\nMar\n484,764.7\n64,826.5\n11,050.5\n344,731.3\n15,203.3\n274,150.2\n303,649.2\n114,431.9\n363,449.4\n32,793.4\n640,496.9\n19,893.1\n2,669,440.4\nApr\n485,790.0\n63,948.2\n10,904.2\n344,532.1\n15,015.2\n271,071.8\n294,270.8\n112,692.1\n333,633.8\n31,103.5\n631,920.5\n22,066.0\n2,616,948.2\nMay\n501,783.7\n63,555.3\n10,933.5\n362,939.6\n15,079.8\n358,553.4\n317,666.7\n117,123.0\n338,846.3\n31,523.1\n651,444.0\n24,226.4\n2,793,674.8\nJun\n475,105.7\n66,796.8\n13,907.7\n385,583.3\n15,079.8\n344,917.3\n323,212.1\n117,146.6\n335,216.9\n34,457.6\n655,427.0\n34,163.4\n2,801,014.3\nJul\n463,286.3\n70,905.2\n18,924.1\n383,314.7\n14,976.4\n140,624.6\n274,507.8\n113,776.3\n309,209.5\n37,474.0\n652,652.7\n34,402.1\n2,514,053.7\nAug\n470,756.1\n79,237.1\n15,167.3\n331,672.8\n15,021.9\n144,100.7\n271,000.5\n111,960.2\n306,022.7\n37,341.2\n666,649.4\n34,402.1\n2,483,332.1\nSep\n451,745.3\n79,055.7\n15,021.6\n341,851.7\n15,021.9\n144,799.6\n263,994.2\n112,656.6\n320,788.5\n36,914.6\n666,971.5\n64,407.1\n2,513,228.2\nOct\n453,068.3\n74,931.8\n16,036.5\n389,851.7\n15,156.8\n165,252.7\n268,933.2\n111,956.6\n313,376.8\n36,118.6\n680,445.7\n12,855.7\n2,537,984.3\nNov\n444,130.8\n133,137.6\n14,884.1\n313,733.0\n15,156.8\n165,419.8\n269,459.9\n149,908.1\n316,738.8\n45,693.2\n679,403.7\n12,265.4\n2,559,931.1\nDec\n492,669.9\n78,176.7\n15,958.0\n340,422.7\n14,425.5\n165,648.7\n253,354.3\n113,596.5\n347,242.2\n40,695.4\n669,879.6\n12,254.3\n2,544,323.9\n2019\nJan\n525,176.7\n80,480.9\n20,199.4\n349,755.6\n15,294.0\n158,458.9\n255,380.4\n123,772.8\n358,554.2\n42,355.5\n666,797.1\n16,335.7\n2,612,561.3\nFeb\n521,988.1\n79,066.7\n10,931.1\n352,797.8\n14,699.0\n80,894.7\n253,027.0\n124,474.7\n389,523.0\n40,923.5\n644,320.9\n11,446.6\n2,524,093.1\nMar\n538,072.7\n87,791.3\n18,211.5\n379,233.1\n14,556.7\n205,466.5\n270,360.1\n133,324.8\n407,638.0\n43,541.4\n731,600.3\n11,476.6\n2,841,272.8\nApr\n584,205.3\n96,516.9\n22,430.9\n421,676.7\n15,968.0\n236,000.3\n310,449.7\n193,315.8\n387,730.2\n44,465.7\n788,749.6\n14,486.6\n3,115,995.7\nMay\n712,661.5\n98,826.6\n27,802.4\n466,620.0\n17,425.9\n317,055.8\n368,550.6\n250,912.5\n441,731.0\n43,682.6\n901,283.4\n14,096.6\n3,660,649.0\nJun\n940,505.8\n82,926.8\n30,534.7\n566,391.1\n169,400.8\n876,820.4\n354,648.6\n331,070.0\n404,941.1\n49,207.3\n898,523.5\n14,258.9\n4,719,228.9\nJul\n1,060,152.4\n108,889.3\n38,005.8\n685,729.8\n22,484.8\n470,421.8\n497,581.3\n333,137.4\n643,722.0\n51,560.7\n1,111,698.0\n7,683.2\n5,031,066.5\nAug\n1,163,054.3\n117,882.9\n40,904.6\n720,937.6\n15,289.6\n524,650.1\n575,937.1\n378,008.7\n742,674.6\n51,710.4\n1,202,415.1\n5,830.8\n5,539,295.7\nSep\n1,379,203.2\n101,683.9\n20,216.2\n755,828.9\n15,563.7\n1,430,322.3\n520,659.8\n487,089.9\n594,143.3\n59,974.6\n1,004,073.3\n6,055.4\n5,087,524.4\nOct\n1,917,349.8\n103,709.0\n20,826.5\n798,377.2\n24,574.7\n1,447,865.7\n603,692.2\n541,020.3\n618,349.6\n61,677.9\n1,112,873.3\n4,322.0\n7,530,493.2\nNov\n1,916,599.1\n103,450.1\n22,381.7\n878,695.3\n24,749.4\n1,566,329.2\n623,341.5\n554,037.1\n623,064.8\n61,153.1\n1,152,340.0\n4,351.8\n7,530,493.2\nDec\n3,260,641.3\n140,783.7\n27,127.1\n1,114,871.8\n48,155.6\n1,504,624.8\n1,027,373.9\n821,797.2\n823,237.5\n84,684.8\n1,428,029.4\n7,328.2\n10,288,655.3\n2020\nJan\n4,084,551.9\n155,581.9\n40,879.9\n1,241,096.7\n54,212.8\n1,614,135.9\n1,136,124.9\n905,568.2\n799,835.7\n83,887.6\n1,594,904.4\n3,435.4\n11,714,215.3\nFeb\n4,492,412.3\n157,892.1\n54,850.8\n1,305,056.3\n51,575.2\n1,667,016.0\n1,328,895.1\n875,096.3\n827,340.4\n103,240.6\n1,837,059.2\n1,195.4\n12,701,629.5\nMar\n5,400,573.8\n137,553.1\n109,432.3\n1,355,737.8\n60,656.4\n2,181,804.5\n1,514,365.3\n1,743,391.4\n911,568.0\n129,647.8\n2,083,395.0\n30,867.0\n15,658,992.1\nApr\n5,497,243.2\n144,302.2\n94,782.2\n1,298,701.4\n50,563.1\n2,200,545.8\n1,762,996.4\n1,756,962.2\n1,057,031.7\n149,805.9\n2,211,133.9\n33,524.9\n16,257,593.1\nMay\n6,753,987.6\n152,161.1\n176,776.3\n1,688,453.5\n61,403.0\n2,272,323.3\n2,155,232.1\n2,018,291.5\n1,335,664.7\n161,892.6\n2,646,269.6\n56,873.3\n19,479,328.7\nJun\n8,233,748.4\n178,010.1\n127,961.9\n3,248,219.4\n64,989.9\n5,469,986.1\n3,799,659.7\n4,379,017.7\n1,983,339.3\n277,602.3\n3,665,408.8\n46,385.0\n31,474,328.4\nJul\n8,927,920.7\n256,440.3\n209,123.9\n4,249,101.8\n34,055.9\n7,106,442.2\n5,125,740.6\n5,385,837.1\n2,413,677.9\n418,160.1\n4,321,918.7\n46,630.6\n38,495,050.0\nAug\n9,773,178.5\n269,675.4\n194,537.6\n5,470,092.5\n33,043.1\n7,946,261.7\n6,723,930.2\n5,651,838.1\n3,103,883.1\n446,084.4\n5,291,100.2\n48,922.4\n44,952,547.2\nSep\n10,508,860.2\n202,929.0\n203,610.8\n4,810,727.3\n29,975.8\n1,041,079.2\n7,136,261.7\n4,099,760.8\n3,255,496.9\n517,871.7\n6,526,576.1\n48,754.1\n38,381,903.5\nOct\n12,296,430.5\n302,589.5\n251,238.7\n9,053,118.1\n28,434.2\n8,136,185.8\n6,305,609.4\n6,351,785.6\n3,855,757.6\n649,444.5\n7,243,035.0\n49,339.0\n54,522,967.8\nNov\n14,705,718.3\n553,426.7\n299,226.19\n10,178,453.66\n26,676.82\n9,457,279.18\n7,442,871.42\n6,834,160.25\n4,193,059.76\n959,134.44\n7,919,442.36\n50,802.6\n62,620,251.7\nDec\n19,070,900.2\n557,071.8\n265,529.08\n10,043,351.16\n24,925.66\n9,451,197.42\n8,214,424.44\n7,599,398.94\n4,750,996.82\n1,556,410.92\n9,213,845.68\n46,489.9\n70,794,542.0\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2020\n/1 Including the only merchant bank still in operation.\n TABLE 7.1 : SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS LOANS AND ADVANCES\n$ ('000)\n \n \n \n25 \n \n \nEND OF\nAGRICULTURE\nCONSTRUCTION\nCOMMUNICATIONS\nDISTRIBUTION\nFINANCIAL &\nFINANCIAL\nMANUFACTURING\nMINING\nSERVICES\nTRANSPORT\nINDIVIDUALS\nCONGLOMERATES\nTOTAL\nINVESTMENTS ORGANISATIONS\n1,000.0\n \n2018\nJan\n380,283.8\n151,436.0\n257,298.2\n918,787.6\n365,354.6\n1,050,097.7\n652,999.0\n248,933.0\n1,757,391.8\n141,913.2\n669,049.8\n67,904.7\n6,661,449.4\nFeb\n455,217.0\n224,070.1\n263,961.9\n897,453.2\n399,016.2\n949,795.6\n674,828.4\n354,052.8\n1,701,611.4\n107,779.5\n680,060.2\n67,686.4\n6,775,532.7\nMar\n451,992.5\n142,332.9\n296,310.0\n825,805.5\n376,593.0\n1,001,674.3\n597,436.8\n253,127.4\n1,827,464.3\n163,971.7\n597,436.8\n63,604.3\n6,597,749.5\nApr\n476,448.1\n144,564.6\n310,795.6\n806,144.7\n364,824.6\n988,527.2\n649,893.0\n255,761.8\n1,892,415.2\n179,252.3\n712,565.9\n65,398.2\n6,846,591.4\nMay\n494,612.8\n152,567.4\n350,409.2\n874,140.5\n374,089.9\n1,097,970.7\n700,891.9\n271,892.0\n1,913,394.9\n186,192.5\n745,592.7\n64,970.7\n7,226,725.2\nJun\n465,984.0\n164,242.3\n391,142.3\n948,703.0\n368,260.1\n1,140,652.9\n754,981.1\n324,355.8\n2,160,400.4\n200,774.3\n779,012.8\n64,786.3\n7,763,295.2\nJul\n445,780.0\n226,433.0\n413,409.1\n955,925.6\n420,416.6\n1,120,834.7\n760,588.2\n321,078.4\n2,192,743.2\n200,523.6\n822,857.6\n64,786.3\n7,945,376.2\nAug\n429,439.9\n189,498.0\n386,595.6\n980,354.1\n429,659.7\n1,091,202.9\n782,008.7\n297,412.3\n1,968,724.0\n196,068.8\n836,719.1\n64,786.3\n7,652,469.3\nSep\n447,556.4\n206,194.1\n382,491.5\n1,186,453.7\n444,599.1\n1,070,365.1\n811,296.2\n302,579.3\n2,059,093.1\n247,105.7\n906,767.6\n84,514.5\n8,149,016.3\nOct\n445,484.4\n199,531.1\n391,968.4\n984,701.5\n469,891.9\n1,153,855.9\n846,453.3\n315,808.5\n2,110,864.2\n260,816.9\n817,328.3\n67,915.2\n8,064,619.7\nNov\n489,192.9\n194,869.4\n391,442.4\n925,081.3\n441,534.3\n1,248,555.8\n827,349.4\n316,945.5\n2,059,370.1\n261,756.5\n825,642.2\n66,458.7\n8,048,198.5\nDec\n494,011.3\n201,871.0\n531,888.3\n1,034,592.5\n428,738.7\n1,196,503.2\n823,081.9\n331,251.3\n2,063,550.8\n278,659.0\n802,507.6\n63,361.3\n8,250,016.9\n2019\nJan\n505,422.9\n391,022.0\n497,976.2\n1,034,948.2\n411,945.9\n1,187,606.7\n882,289.7\n322,030.3\n2,154,902.3\n135,871.6\n763,189.5\n63,064.3\n8,350,269.7\nFeb\n512,602.3\n374,750.6\n394,709.1\n936,123.6\n449,800.9\n904,919.4\n855,348.4\n347,405.5\n2,355,866.1\n138,685.8\n776,949.7\n63,097.1\n8,110,258.7\nMar\n526,564.2\n343,684.3\n376,205.6\n937,743.4\n393,489.3\n1,317,757.7\n861,574.9\n380,295.4\n2,099,331.1\n141,677.2\n773,726.4\n63,094.9\n8,215,144.4\nApr\n632,972.5\n255,945.6\n1,010,978.7\n90,282.6\n462,133.1\n1,535,772.6\n890,606.5\n325,814.6\n2,413,535.6\n320,213.5\n876,646.5\n90,282.6\n9,963,832.2\nMay\n832,073.6\n305,410.9\n1,321,039.7\n1,177,925.1\n522,764.9\n1,646,358.6\n1,142,369.6\n372,594.9\n2,765,341.2\n371,372.0\n965,202.7\n93,188.9\n11,515,642.2\nJun\n1,001,633.6\n309,108.9\n1,124,005.3\n1,337,171.0\n546,572.5\n2,210,293.9\n1,319,789.8\n562,858.0\n3,493,214.3\n434,828.2\n1,070,319.7\n52,118.6\n13,461,913.9\nJul\n1,171,245.4\n353,388.5\n1,504,911.5\n1,241,910.1\n654,904.7\n2,553,878.7\n1,383,215.2\n585,108.2\n4,131,588.8\n463,161.9\n1,304,402.7\n71,943.6\n15,419,659.2\nAug\n1,313,462.5\n477,215.8\n1,795,905.4\n1,687,246.4\n804,316.2\n2,591,386.5\n1,647,680.2\n1,114,306.0\n3,872,187.0\n503,541.6\n1,532,441.9\n75,829.3\n17,413,139.2\nSep\n1,581,141.7\n321,121.4\n1,934,554.4\n1,728,390.1\n952,548.3\n3,086,893.1\n1,638,855.1\n1,375,546.6\n5,961,405.3\n589,939.6\n1,848,708.4\n76,775.9\n21,272,162.4\nOct\n1,744,905.8\n796,996.5\n2,217,888.5\n2,626,316.7\n768,125.2\n3,204,019.2\n2,287,076.1\n1,889,144.7\n7,536,588.6\n510,151.5\n1,942,195.1\n48,142.7\n25,571,550.5\nNov\n1,783,345.3\n813,506.5\n2,257,181.8\n2,618,010.3\n1,287,013.8\n3,544,459.5\n2,082,447.8\n1,787,923.6\n7,794,026.0\n491,371.8\n1,920,297.4\n57,897.5\n26,437,481.4\nDec\n1,877,764.1\n950,348.8\n2,917,087.2\n3,126,494.5\n1,421,969.0\n4,411,638.4\n2,605,023.1\n1,664,547.7\n8,410,964.0\n554,937.3\n2,477,474.0\n116,789.4\n30,535,037.6\n1,000.0\n2020\nJan\n2,173,633.0\n972,609.2\n3,182,087.1\n4,279,565.8\n1,757,297.1\n4,791,990.6\n2,791,625.2\n2,223,774.1\n9,875,803.5\n609,781.7\n2,838,775.9\n81,735.2\n35,578,678.4\nFeb\n2,492,591.8\n1,191,731.7\n3,340,863.8\n8,721,475.9\n1,919,428.5\n5,869,104.2\n3,481,495.5\n2,729,162.0\n10,202,203.6\n760,155.3\n3,574,134.5\n82,845.8\n44,365,192.6\nMar\n2,678,262.7\n1,449,645.9\n3,231,059.0\n11,715,273.9\n2,114,093.0\n6,507,000.0\n4,576,971.8\n3,048,053.5\n11,490,205.2\n947,918.2\n4,257,117.7\n72,082.9\n52,087,683.7\nApr\n2,854,374.8\n1,118,295.5\n3,492,330.5\n5,271,473.4\n1,999,901.1\n6,191,170.7\n4,276,817.2\n3,727,579.4\n14,060,717.8\n713,407.0\n4,444,924.9\n83,109.3\n48,234,101.6\nMay\n3,866,781.1\n1,163,944.9\n4,713,727.6\n7,932,403.4\n1,991,042.6\n7,151,451.5\n5,858,495.1\n5,031,912.5\n13,907,794.8\n944,318.1\n5,060,401.3\n88,613.6\n57,710,886.5\nJun\n7,228,784.4\n1,963,030.9\n5,393,404.5\n14,526,855.6\n3,997,135.7\n12,452,202.5\n11,386,156.5\n9,507,719.1\n22,807,615.5\n1,630,544.9\n9,798,261.2\n121,561.2\n100,813,272.0\nJul\n9,091,726.8\n2,629,847.1\n6,043,419.0\n19,096,889.5\n4,988,887.7\n15,446,649.7\n15,274,687.4\n7,918,819.5\n31,916,392.6\n2,035,354.7\n15,762,315.2\n147,866.0\n130,352,855.1\nAug\n9,462,082.7\n2,865,950.9\n6,582,519.6\n19,234,704.0\n5,333,846.9\n16,821,248.6\n17,017,042.1\n7,304,595.8\n35,312,317.7\n2,217,425.5\n16,548,990.5\n134,271.1\n138,834,995.4\nSep\n9,832,514.4\n3,139,646.1\n7,166,350.4\n20,531,087.6\n5,145,328.3\n9,505,277.1\n17,311,149.2\n10,234,597.7\n39,731,086.5\n2,011,372.4\n16,155,747.9\n148,612.6\n140,912,770.1\nOct\n9,923,335.1\n3,346,982.4\n9,919,999.1\n22,567,492.9\n6,180,403.3\n21,021,376.9\n20,667,754.2\n10,950,177.8\n41,131,626.2\n2,597,408.1\n18,072,164.5\n176,961.0\n166,555,681.4\nNov\n10,683,513,834.0\n3,732,868,947.3\n9,809,491.39\n28,228,980.99\n6,029,490.43\n17,343,347.49\n23,027,365.97\n14,471,556.33\n47,870,360.42\n2,986,050.60\n19,045,412.04\n209,168.81\n183,437,607.25\nDec\n10,252,495,912.3\n4,965,472,753.3\n12,171,250.70\n30,987,168.50\n5,959,867.34\n19,653,397.02\n25,666,591.10\n13,188,851.04\n55,454,341.21\n3,901,504.33\n22,313,591.00\n519,773.38\n205,034,304.27\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2020\n TABLE 7.2: SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS DEPOSITS \n$ ('000)\n \n \n \n26 \n \n \nEnd of\nNominal \nLending \nRates 1\nIndividuals \nCorporate\n2018\nJan\n4.45-18.00\n9.33\n6.99\nFeb\n4.45-18.00\n9.57\n6.93\nMar\n4.45-18.00\n9.64\n6.98\nApr\n4.00-18.00\n9.32\n7.08\nMay\n4.00-18.00\n9.28\n7.09\nJun\n4.00-18.00\n9.32\n7.14\nJul\n4.00-18.00\n9.75\n6.97\nAug\n4.00-18.00\n9.87\n7.10\nSep\n4.00-18.00\n9.56\n7.11\nOct\n4.00-18.00\n9.47\n7.38\nNov\n4.00-18.00\n9.49\n7.38\nDec\n4.00-18.00\n9.48\n7.39\n2019\nJan\n4.00-18.00\n9.47\n7.40\nFeb\n4.00-18.00\n9.23\n7.30\nMar\n4.00-18.00\n9.23\n7.31\nApr\n4.00-18.00\n9.30\n7.38\nMay\n4.00-22.00\n9.31\n7.33\nJun\n4.00-22.00\n9.15\n7.67\nJul\n4.00-35.00\n9.54\n8.40\nAug\n5.00-55.00\n14.37\n18.43\nSep\n5.00-65.00\n14.64\n19.81\nOct\n5.00-65.00\n15.59\n19.66\nNov\n5.00-65.00\n15.06\n18.00\nDec\n5.00-65.00\n16.08\n18.31\n2020\nJan\n5.00-65.00\n16.56\n17.20\nFeb\n5.00-65.00\n16.92\n16.68\nMar\n5.00-65.00\n19.65\n17.21\nApr\n5.00-65.00\n18.57\n18.69\nMay\n5.00-65.00\n18.06\n18.07\nJune\n5.00-65.00\n20.04\n17.38\nJuly\n5.00-65.00\n18.87\n20.11\nAug\n6.00-65.00\n19.14\n18.99\nSep\n6.00-65.00\n20.65\n25.09\nOct\n6.00-65.00\n26.04\n26.68\nNov\n6.00-65.00\n30.32\n27.67\nDec\n6.00-65.00\n32.11\n26.91\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\nNotes\nTABLE 8.1: LENDING RATES (percent per annum)\n1. Nominal lending rates depict the range of rates quoted by banks.\nCommercial Banks\nWeighted Lending Rates\n \n \n \n27 \n \n \nTABLE 8.2 : BANK DEPOSIT RATES (percent per annum)\nEND OF\nSAVINGS\n3 MONTHS\n2018\nJan\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nFeb\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nMar\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nApr\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nMay\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nJun\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nJul\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nAug\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nSep\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nOct\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nNov\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nDec\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-6.75\n2019\nJan\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nFeb\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-6.75\nMar\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nApr\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nMay\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nJun\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nJul\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nAug\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nSep\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nOct\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nNov\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nDec\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\n2020\nJan\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nFeb\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nMar\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nApr\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nMay\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nJun\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nJul\n0.22-12.00\n1.33-14.00\nAug\n0.50-15.00\n1.00-20.28\nSep\n0.50-15.00\n1.00-20.28\nOct\n0.50-15.00\n1.00-20.28\nNov\n0.50-15.00\n1.00-20.28\nDec\n0.50-15.00\n1.00-20.28\n Source:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\n* Deposit rates depict the range of rates qouted by banks. \n **Banks have adjusted their costs of holding deposits following the \n call by the RBZ to reduce lending rates.\nCOMMERCIAL BANKS\n \n \n \n28 \n \n \nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES \nCLOTHING \n&\nHOUSING, \nWATER,\nFURNITURE\nHEALTH\nTRANSPORT\nCOMMUNIC\nATION\nRECREATION \n&\nEDUCATION\nRESTAUR\nANTS &\nMISC.\nTOTAL NON\n& TOBACCO\nFOOTWEAR\nELECTRICTY, \nGAS\nAND\nCULTURE\nHOTELS\nGOODS &\nFOOD\n& OTHER\nEQUIPMEN\nT\nSERVICES\nFUELS\nWEIGHTS\n4.90\n4.35\n27.62\n5.29\n1.42\n8.39\n2.65\n2.27\n4.25\n1.08\n6.46\n68.70\n31.30\n100\n2018\nJan\n0.17\n0.67\n0.02\n0.55\n0.10\n0.00\n-0.04\n1.78\n0.00\n-0.16\n0.64\n0.26\n0.39\n0.30\nFeb\n0.26\n0.91\n0.01\n0.43\n0.00\n-0.02\n0.15\n0.90\n0.00\n0.01\n0.21\n0.19\n-0.18\n0.08\nMar\n0.13\n-0.34\n-0.74\n0.46\n0.18\n-1.29\n-1.60\n1.58\n0.01\n-0.14\n-0.55\n0.09\n-0.03\n-0.25\nApr\n0.20\n0.34\n-0.01\n0.00\n0.10\n-0.32\n-0.21\n-0.10\n0.63\n1.85\n0.26\n0.11\n0.02\n0.08\nMay\n-0.03\n0.10\n0.00\n-0.12\n0.03\n0.14\n-0.01\n0.08\n0.00\n0.05\n0.33\n0.03\n0.02\n0.03\nJun\n0.60\n0.14\n-0.16\n-0.48\n0.38\n0.19\n0.10\n-0.25\n0.00\n0.26\n1.00\n0.04\n-0.23\n-0.05\nJul\n0.43\n0.38\n0.00\n0.40\n0.31\n0.17\n0.08\n0.65\n7.16\n3.20\n0.75\n1.09\n0.74\n0.98\nAug\n0.13\n0.45\n0.00\n0.91\n0.24\n0.47\n0.00\n-0.23\n0.00\n0.11\n0.34\n0.28\n0.62\n0.39\nSep\n0.22\n1.35\n0.53\n2.79\n1.90\n0.51\n0.32\n0.22\n0.00\n0.28\n0.07\n0.85\n1.05\n0.92\nOct\n7.89\n45.88\n2.94\n26.86\n12.94\n19.13\n1.39\n27.66\n0.00\n9.86\n13.64\n14.66\n20.12\n16.44\nNov\n7.21\n10.63\n4.80\n9.12\n3.36\n2.31\n0.18\n16.33\n0.35\n9.29\n15.42\n6.50\n14.53\n9.20\nDec\n10.22\n8.07\n2.77\n8.07\n8.49\n28.61\n1.26\n3.19\n0.00\n13.84\n10.07\n9.01\n9.07\n9.03\n2019\nJan\n13.35\n1.04\n4.35\n9.46\n11.64\n47.25\n1.12\n11.01\n0.10\n11.73\n6.72\n12.83\n6.94\n10.75\nFeb\n2.94\n5.94\n2.77\n2.73\n2.93\n-7.70\n0.14\n3.42\n0.02\n2.20\n4.34\n0.70\n3.56\n1.67\nMar\n14.29\n5.56\n2.34\n5.20\n2.30\n3.06\n0.14\n3.92\n3.66\n4.54\n5.16\n4.05\n5.10\n4.38\nApr\n12.05\n6.57\n0.65\n5.84\n19.90\n3.40\n3.50\n5.36\n6.93\n19.74\n5.35\n4.45\n7.85\n5.52\nMay\n21.57\n11.89\n2.54\n11.51\n16.85\n16.18\n31.21\n29.81\n3.05\n6.67\n8.96\n10.12\n17.63\n12.54\nJun\n40.94\n59.89\n18.11\n63.80\n46.53\n41.90\n2.32\n35.38\n0.06\n28.71\n36.63\n31.23\n55.07\n39.26\nJul\n23.72\n27.68\n9.19\n27.01\n43.32\n26.39\n7.48\n36.17\n11.05\n30.51\n39.79\n21.72\n19.90\n21.04\nAug\n18.09\n10.81\n13.65\n11.18\n7.47\n32.66\n67.86\n12.65\n4.09\n8.67\n18.77\n17.79\n18.55\n18.07\nSep\n11.01\n17.47\n15.52\n14.73\n18.68\n16.83\n1.29\n18.03\n4.10\n8.42\n35.01\n16.63\n19.55\n17.72\nOct\n42.80\n37.15\n38.63\n35.12\n34.80\n26.55\n9.15\n31.78\n5.47\n37.99\n30.03\n32.90\n48.35\n38.75\nNov\n16.54\n18.35\n5.83\n25.67\n18.49\n9.68\n13.01\n20.59\n17.10\n36.46\n23.89\n13.94\n22.63\n17.46\nDec\n11.51\n13.48\n31.25\n17.51\n12.74\n11.82\n1.43\n5.70\n0.17\n15.52\n18.28\n17.14\n15.75\n16.55\n2020\nJan\n1.83\n3.84\n0.60\n1.50\n5.32\n2.24\n2.77\n2.01\n9.39\n2.72\n1.86\n1.99\n2.55\n2.23\nFeb\n8.48\n10.01\n2.27\n7.00\n21.56\n9.62\n220.04\n17.96\n94.95\n2.92\n30.86\n18.41\n6.81\n13.52\nMar\n28.76\n37.12\n57.14\n29.35\n27.28\n18.10\n4.26\n58.79\n0.66\n17.49\n22.67\n32.44\n17.69\n26.59\nApr\n26.21\n13.46\n3.05\n24.06\n25.07\n8.87\n3.05\n9.42\n1.13\n21.08\n15.12\n11.38\n28.37\n17.64\nMay\n28.90\n18.99\n3.42\n21.36\n18.30\n22.97\n4.22\n10.04\n0.02\n29.69\n23.31\n15.41\n14.72\n15.13\nJun\n35.25\n48.84\n7.52\n38.21\n43.77\n32.48\n23.24\n39.46\n0.87\n32.46\n29.51\n27.61\n37.73\n31.66\nJul\n33.30\n35.93\n12.07\n32.45\n27.35\n50.65\n118.89\n17.13\n1.14\n37.84\n34.77\n33.76\n37.99\n35.53\nAug\n9.71\n7.52\n2.82\n7.83\n7.02\n11.02\n19.57\n7.75\n79.86\n8.40\n11.19\n10.03\n6.30\n8.44\nSep\n2.53\n1.71\n3.01\n1.52\n2.59\n1.69\n19.84\n5.79\n23.42\n0.33\n7.26\n5.08\n2.08\n3.83\nOct\n5.68\n2.51\n15.42\n0.95\n1.12\n3.02\n3.78\n1.59\n4.91\n4.22\n4.46\n5.33\n3.00\n4.37\nNov\n3.70\n3.73\n3.35\n2.02\n0.66\n3.60\n0.39\n1.74\n0.71\n4.36\n2.09\n2.63\n3.39\n3.15\nDec\n4.58\n3.08\n0.52\n3.26\n1.73\n3.61\n1.17\n1.26\n0.18\n2.12\n3.82\n2.63\n6.54\n4.22\nSource:Zimstat, 2020\nFOOD & NON \nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES\nALL \nITEMS\nTABLE 9.1 : MONTHLY INFLATION - % CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \n(February 2019 = 100)\n \n \n \n29 \n \n \nFOOD \nINFLATION\nALCOHOLIC \nCLOT HING\nHOUS ING, \nW AT E R,\nFURNIT URE\nMIS C.\nFOOD & \nB E VE RAGE S \n& \nE LE CT RICT Y, \nGAS\nAND\nRE CRE AT ION &\nRE S T AURANT S \n&\nGOODS &\nT OT AL NON\nNON \nALCOHOLIC \nALL\n& T OB ACCO\nFOOT W E AR\n& OT HE R\nE QUIP ME NT\nCULT URE\nHOT E LS\nS E RVICE S\nFOOD\nB E VE RAGE S\nIT E MS\nFUE LS\nWEIGHTS\n4.90\n4.35\n27.62\n5.29\n1.42\n8.39\n2.65\n2.27\n4.25\n1.08\n6.46\n68.70\n31.30\n100\n2018\nJan\n1.83\n4.12\n-0.52\n9.00\n1.82\n1.30\n0.41\n7.95\n-2.25\n1.63\n6.64\n2.45\n6.17\n3.52\nFeb\n2.04\n5.21\n-0.65\n8.71\n1.84\n1.17\n0.56\n8.96\n-2.25\n1.45\n6.31\n2.41\n4.35\n2.98\nMar\n2.02\n4.81\n-1.32\n8.52\n1.91\n-0.35\n-1.03\n10.48\n-2.24\n1.30\n5.35\n2.37\n4.54\n2.68\nApr\n2.34\n5.14\n-1.36\n8.45\n2.06\n-0.67\n-1.28\n10.36\n-3.58\n2.84\n5.70\n2.26\n4.94\n2.71\nMay\n2.18\n5.15\n-1.36\n8.30\n1.96\n-0.58\n-1.30\n10.67\n-3.58\n3.29\n6.14\n2.28\n4.89\n2.71\nJun\n2.58\n5.27\n-0.70\n7.36\n2.38\n-0.20\n-1.20\n10.20\n-3.58\n3.26\n6.85\n2.48\n5.12\n2.91\nJul\n2.83\n5.66\n-0.71\n7.86\n2.68\n0.20\n-1.04\n10.86\n6.31\n5.42\n7.53\n3.94\n6.35\n4.29\nAug\n3.15\n6.03\n-0.77\n8.78\n2.89\n0.67\n-1.07\n10.47\n6.31\n5.53\n7.84\n4.22\n7.52\n4.83\nSep\n3.35\n6.98\n-0.47\n10.60\n4.77\n1.49\n-0.89\n10.00\n6.31\n5.77\n7.79\n4.83\n7.94\n5.39\nOct\n10.81\n53.83\n2.20\n35.57\n17.08\n19.61\n0.11\n36.24\n6.31\n15.68\n19.31\n18.71\n26.78\n20.85\nNov\n18.47\n69.14\n7.04\n46.01\n20.56\n22.02\n0.34\n56.70\n8.23\n27.34\n36.21\n26.02\n42.71\n31.01\nDec\n30.21\n81.48\n10.48\n57.08\n30.80\n56.47\n1.61\n60.45\n8.22\n44.26\n48.82\n37.08\n53.68\n42.09\n2019\nJan\n47.34\n82.13\n15.27\n71.00\n45.88\n130.41\n2.79\n75.00\n8.32\n61.45\n57.81\n54.26\n63.71\n56.90\nFeb\n51.28\n91.22\n18.46\n74.92\n50.16\n112.71\n2.78\n79.38\n8.34\n64.99\n64.31\n55.04\n69.84\n59.39\nMar\n72.67\n102.55\n22.14\n83.18\n53.34\n122.10\n4.59\n83.51\n12.30\n72.72\n73.75\n61.19\n78.55\n66.80\nApr\n93.08\n115.13\n22.94\n93.88\n83.66\n130.40\n8.49\n93.54\n19.33\n103.06\n82.56\n68.17\n92.52\n75.86\nMay\n134.80\n140.46\n26.07\n116.47\n114.54\n167.32\n42.36\n151.04\n22.97\n116.49\n98.28\n85.94\n126.43\n97.85\nJun\n228.95\n283.96\n49.13\n256.29\n213.17\n278.58\n45.52\n240.71\n23.05\n177.91\n168.24\n142.84\n251.94\n175.66\n2020\nFeb\n710.29\n629.57\n603.89\n254.34\n523.95\n785.04\n498.64\n946.38\n604.12\n262.80\n507.72\n839.15\n462.64\n540.16\nMar\n807.36\n721.94\n814.31\n444.09\n667.21\n1001.14\n585.97\n989.48\n975.94\n252.31\n582.94\n995.50\n616.11\n676.39\nApr\n980.03\n825.86\n873.49\n456.99\n799.24\n1048.61\n622.22\n984.76\n1017.34\n233.23\n590.62\n1097.13\n663.66\n765.57\nMay\n953.34\n881.65\n935.22\n461.76\n878.64\n1062.84\n664.43\n761.68\n847.15\n223.43\n739.67\n1254.79\n700.38\n785.55\nJun\n842.04\n863.68\n411.42\n725.77\n1040.97\n613.71\n937.83\n875.68\n226.03\n764.10\n1184.15\n678.29\n835.56\n737.26\nJul\n914.97\n925.92\n424.89\n761.12\n913.86\n750.68\n2013.62\n739.27\n196.93\n812.65\n1138.04\n755.27\n976.73\n837.53\nAug\n842.90\n895.39\n374.89\n735.12\n909.62\n611.88\n1405.52\n702.75\n413.11\n810.44\n1058.99\n698.90\n865.48\n761.02\nSep\n770.81\n761.81\n323.45\n638.97\n772.72\n519.65\n1681.32\n619.53\n508.37\n742.51\n820.76\n619.77\n724.40\n659.40\nOct\n544.43\n544.11\n252.56\n452.09\n554.64\n404.46\n1593.73\n454.72\n505.13\n536.36\n639.65\n470.47\n472.40\n471.25\nNov\n473.41\n464.54\n244.29\n385.99\n456.13\n376.50\n1404.55\n368.00\n420.46\n386.63\n509.46\n413.85\n385.02\n401.66\nDec\n437.80\n412.80\n163.67\n350.75\n401.81\n341.52\n1400.70\n348.33\n420.53\n330.15\n434.93\n350.17\n346.40\n348.59\nSource:Zimstat, 2020\nTABLE 9.2 : YEARLY INFLATION - % CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \n(February 2019 = 100)\nNON-FOOD INFLATION\nHE ALT H\nT RANS P ORT\nCOMMUNICAT ION\nE DUCAT ION\n \n \n \n30 \n \n \n \n \n(US$ MILLIONS)\nEnd Period\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\n2014\n2015\n2016\n2017\n2018\n2019\nEst\nLong-Term External Debt\n6,326\n6,556\n7,713\n8,125\n8,655\n10,234\n9,341\n9,305\n9,555\n9,827\n10,557\nGovernment\n5,304\n5,039\n6,128\n6,321\n6,172\n6,192\n6,097\n6,015\n6,200\n6,306\n6,930\nBilateral Creditors\n3,703\n3,402\n4,087\n4,087\n4,088\n4,115\n4,115\n4,129\n4,194\n4,261\n4,892\nMultilateral Creditors\n1,591\n1,627\n2,041\n2,235\n2,084\n2,078\n1,982\n1,886\n2,006\n2,045\n2,069\nPrivate Creditors\n10\n10\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPublic Enterprises\n825\n825\n1,092\n1,198\n1,356\n1,661\n1,220\n1,370\n1,406\n1,426\n1,165\nBilateral Creditors\n497\n497\n711\n703\n858\n1,155\n760\n779\n843\n898\n783\nMultilateral Creditors\n327\n327\n382\n495\n498\n506\n460\n591\n562\n528\n381\nPrivate Creditors\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nMonetary Authorities\n140\n550\n127\n125\n125\n120\n110\n0\n0\n0\n0\nMultilateral Creditors - IMF\n140\n550\n127\n125\n125\n120\n110\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPrivate\n57\n142\n366\n480\n1,002\n2,261\n1,913\n1,920\n1,949\n2,095\n2,431\nShort-Term External Debt\n1,348\n2,040\n1,286\n891\n1,564\n2,394\n2,258\n2,304\n2,299\n2,374\n3,799\nSupplier's Credits\n193\n286\n134\n30\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nReserve Bank\n998\n1,300\n615\n615\n614\n587\n587\n573\n507\n441\n2,463\nPrivate\n156\n454\n537\n246\n950\n1,807\n1,671\n1,731\n1,792\n1,933\n1,336\nTotal External Debt\n7,674\n8,596\n8,999\n9,016\n10,219\n12,628\n11,599\n11,610\n11,854\n13,134\n14,324\nSource: Ministry of Finance & Economic Development, 2019; & Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\nTABLE 10: ZIMBABWE: EXTERNAL DEBT OUTSTANDING BY DEBTOR (INCLUDING ALL ARREARS)\n \n \n \n31 \n \n \nUSA\nSOUTH ARFICAN\nBOTSWANA\nJAPANESE\nEURO\nPOUND\nEND OF\nDollar\nRAND\nPULA\nYEN\nSTERLING\n2019\nMar\n3.0120\n0.2064\n0.2789\n0.0272\n3.3832\n3.9363\nApr\n3.2614\n0.2275\n0.3031\n0.0292\n3.6490\n4.2209\nMay\n5.2635\n0.3550\n0.4831\n0.0483\n5.8585\n6.6391\nJun\n6.6220\n0.4673\n0.6231\n0.0615\n7.5245\n8.3906\nJul\n9.1900\n0.6494\n0.8621\n0.0846\n10.0000\n11.1111\nAug\n10.512\n0.6833\n0.9458\n0.0940\n11.6288\n12.8226\nSep\n15.200\n1.0234\n1.3883\n0.1415\n16.5699\n18.7643\nOct\n16.120\n1.0804\n1.4721\n0.1491\n17.5217\n20.4051\nNov\n15.970\n1.0800\n1.4600\n0.1500\n17.6600\n20.5800\nDec\n16.530\n1.1400\n1.5400\n0.1500\n18.3700\n21.6900\n2020\nJan\n17.100\n1.1883\n1.5922\n0.1564\n19.0000\n22.5000\nFeb\n17.680\n1.1779\n1.6073\n0.1608\n19.2174\n22.9610\nMar\n21.160\n1.2709\n1.8384\n0.1970\n23.5111\n26.1235\nApr\n25.000\n1.3448\n2.0542\n0.2321\n27.1739\n30.8642\nMay\n25.000\n1.3736\n2.0695\n0.2333\n27.1739\n30.8642\nJun\n32.350\n1.8876\n2.7638\n0.3007\n36.4229\n40.5346\nJul\n68.943\n4.1073\n5.9515\n0.6457\n79.5784\n87.2651\nAug\n81.604\n4.7435\n7.0151\n0.7697\n96.5746\n107.2191\nSep\n82.250\n4.9133\n7.1482\n0.7790\n97.0112\n106.6580\nOct\n81.370\n4.9403\n7.1042\n0.7734\n95.7690\n105.5999\nNov\n81.679\n5.2531\n7.3127\n0.7827\n96.6100\n107.8000\nDec\n81.815\n5.4767\n7.5022\n0.7878\n99.5164\n109.9537\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\n TABLE 11 : SELECTED INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE RATES\n1. ZWL$ dollar per unit of foreign currency\n \n \n \n32 \n \n \nMarket Capitalisation\nEND OF\nAll Share*\nZWL$ millions\n2018\nJan\n91.3\n305.4\n130.4\n31.4\n55,032,220\n8,652.9\nFeb\n88.0\n294.6\n124.9\n63.7\n138,142,187\n8,386.0\nMar\n87.0\n291.0\n125.1\n40.3\n108,997,097\n8,290.4\nApr\n98.7\n330.7\n124.4\n44.4\n206,342,675\n9,405.3\nMay\n108.3\n361.5\n151.5\n59.3\n129,155,586\n10,393.2\nJun\n102.9\n342.8\n161.3\n73.0\n234,834,368\n9,792.2\nJul\n114.3\n384.3\n164.0\n114.9\n624,256,160\n10,969.7\nAug\n117.3\n394.6\n161.3\n50.5\n142,150,599\n12,475.4\nSep\n115.1\n387.0\n163.8\n61.1\n197,401,341\n12,265.5\nOct\n163.8\n549.8\n217.3\n449.6\n316,060,000\n17,960.0\nNov\n160.4\n538.7\n208.6\n118.0\n153,874,660\n17,316.6\nDec\n146.2\n487.1\n227.7\n93.0\n144,479,601\n19,424.4\n2019\nJan\n157.5\n525.9\n213.1\n110.3\n122,778,938\n20,888.4\nFeb\n148.1\n494.3\n206.9\n295.8\n229,935,122\n19,773.4\nMar\n121.7\n405.6\n194.0\n70.8\n123,398,632\n16,084.9\nApr\n133.7\n446.5\n186.5\n116.5\n134,394,898\n17,502.7\nMay\n188.1\n628.4\n225.8\n193.5\n237,334,372\n24,920.0\nJun\n204.8\n683.5\n255.3\n235.5\n293,138,775\n27,017.2\nJul\n187.1\n624.4\n244.6\n191.0\n163,556,663\n24,636.1\nAug\n166.36\n553.59\n269.6\n109.0\n117,688,558\n21,742.2\nSep\n232.52\n774.55\n317.8\n166.6\n335,373,041\n30,527.2\nOct\n232.86\n777.48\n276.3\n208.4\n203,004,611\n30,390.0\nNov\n240.81\n801.38\n344.4\n130.0\n129,886,035\n31,226.3\nDec\n230.08\n766.34\n316.7\n194.2\n190,880,245\n29,767.1\n2020\nJan\n332.9\n1,112.27\n344.9\n304.9\n179,559,446\n43,426.5\nFeb\n473.13\n1,564.98\n826.73\n360.1\n172,678,984\n60,987.5\nMar\n456.21\n1,512.46\n720.47\n425.2\n237,667,043\n58,612.1\nApr\n488.60\n1,617.24\n826.64\n269.7\n107,308,931\n63,387.9\nMay\n1180.14\n3,919.50\n1582.86\n569.0\n218,832,930\n152,719.7\nJune*\n1788.75\n5,870.36\n3995.48\n379.9\n519,901,300\n228,577.1\nAug\n1389.23\n4533.79\n3709.15\n1,026.8\n164,501,200\n175,678.4\nSep\n1638.17\n5385.73\n4128.52\n4,640.9\n1,093,040,821\n206,502.5\nOct\n1476.87\n4852.49\n3792.35\n986.7\n397,006,127\n179,690.0\nNov\n1595.59\n5278.38\n3322.22\n4,103.8\n470,899,659\n193,270.8\nDec\n2636.34\n8782.18\n4134.09\n2734.50\n316,737,200\n317,879.3\nSource:Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2020\n*All Share index was introduced in January, 2018\n**As at 26 June 2020\nIndices\nTABLE 12: ZIMBABWE STOCK MARKET STATISTICS\nIndustrial\n Market Turnover \nZWL$ million \nVolume of Shares\nMining\n \n \n \n33 \n \n \nEND OF\nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\n INTERNET\n2018\nJan\n 5,548.1 \n4.9\n663.5\n21.3 2,318.80 1,006.05 \nFeb\n 4,706.6 \n4.5\n594.0\n13.9 2,015.11 831.05 \nMar\n 6,300.4 \n4.5\n654.2\n12.5 2,657.10 864.83 \nApr\n 5,786.8 \n3.3\n640.9\n11.5 3,002.63 822.58 \nMay\n 7,298.4 \n4.2\n819.7\n10.5 3,550.07 968.58 \nJun\n 7,997.3 \n4.7\n779.4\n8.3 3,724.31 1,135.49 \nJul\n 8,290.0 \n4.0\n790.0\n9.4 4,446.68 1,262.53 \nAug\n 7,762.9 \n2.9\n811.2\n14.0 4,558.54 1,254.96 \nSep\n 7,155.0 \n4.0\n842.5\n17.0 4,462.40 1,393.08 \nOct\n 8,230.5 \n4.2\n821.3\n17.9 4,607.38 1,428.20 \nNov\n 7,922.5 \n3.7\n657.5\n19.9 3,964.78 1,026.70 \nDec\n 8,355.2 \n2.8\n917.2\n14.6 4,833.80 1,102.90 \n2019\nJan\n 6,903.0 \n2.9 1,294.05 \n16.9 3,608.83 1,056.16 \nFeb\n 8,337.0 \n4.0 1,330.58 \n17.2 3,594.51 1,093.64 \nMar\n 9,881.5 \n3.9 1,399.50 \n18.3 4,080.65 1,250.55 \nApr\n 10,321.4 \n3.1 1,590.10 \n14.0 4,949.34 1,408.53 \nMay\n 14,670.3 \n4.2 1,397.48 \n11.8 6,692.55 1,897.82 \nJun\n 17,881.2 \n3.7 1,464.66 \n30.1 7,130.02 2,539.84 \nJul\n 23,309.9 \n3.7 1,806.45 \n36.6 9,137.36 3,295.81 \nAug\n 23,596.6 \n2.4 2,181.56 \n38.5 11,077.65 3,493.56 \nSep\n 30,328.1 \n3.8 3,029.87 \n51.9 15,112.00 5,337.71 \nOct\n 39,413.7 \n3.9 3,621.64 \n67.1 16,588.28 6,237.03 \nNov\n 40,871.8 \n3.5 4,199.30 \n67.4 13,537.77 7,200.30 \nDec\n 49,579.8 \n2.8 5,695.39 \n97.2 19,356.74 8,724.02 \n2020\nJan\n 47,841.3 \n1.8 5,236.3 115.2 21,247.9 9,646.8 \nFeb\n 41,637.6 \n4.7 5,431.8 136.9 22,589.7 9,633.8 \nMar\n 60,804.1 \n4.1 7,252.9 268.0 27,993.6 14,411.4 \nApr\n 47,525.5 \n0.0 4,150.6 82.6 18,299.2 11,481.8 \nMay\n 59,271.1 \n0.0 7,426.0 349.8 24,851.5 19,593.2 \nJun\n 91,311.3 \n0.0 9,752.7 516.6 26,042.5 25,842.3 \nJul\n 127,743.2 \n0.0 14,741.1 1,028.7 26,033.3 35,199.7 \nAug\n 143,042.1 \n0.0 14,953.6 1,547.5 27,217.6 34,505.0 \nSep\n 203,172.0 \n0.8 18,252.3 1,963.0 26,441.0 41,958.4 \nOct\n 198,863.56 \n0.0\n 22,482.28 2,163.27 42,767.66 46,270.42 \nNov\n 236,231.56 \n0.0\n 23,936.70 2,151.61 36,475.66 54,797.79 \nDec\n 302,661.15 \n - 30,061.03 1,935.29 45,278.12 67,038.24 \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\nTABLE 13.1 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS \n Values of Transactions (ZWL$ millions)\n \n \n \n34 \n \n \nEND OF\nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\nINTERNET\n2018\nJan\n 548.1 \n22.7 20,981.2 449.6 100,593.9 \n 501.8 \nFeb\n 457.2 \n22.5 18,869.0 292.2 89,584.3 \n 463.8 \nMar\n 545.2 \n23.7 21,996.8 268.4 116,120.0 \n 510.5 \nApr\n 505.5 \n17.4 21,170.0 253.6 117,616.8 \n 457.0 \nMay\n 611.1 \n21.2 23,278.2 213.2 137,423.0 \n 496.6 \nJun\n 553.6 \n22.5 23,790.0 175.2 156,609.8 \n 502.2 \nJul\n 560.2 \n20.1 25,075.5 223.1 169,416.8 \n 559.6 \nAug\n 553.0 \n15.1 25,249.9 317.4 164,918.0 \n 518.7 \nSep\n 543.0 \n19.4 24,918.0 300.8 161,289.5 \n 511.3 \nOct\n 571.6 \n20.4 21,025.4 345.5 161,427.4 \n 496.0 \nNov\n 477.4 \n16.7 17,845.4 334.9 133,862.1 \n 430.6 \nDec\n 478.6 \n13.0 27,419.1 236.2 161,540.7 \n 409.1 \nAnnual Total\n 6,404.4 \n234.6 271,618.6 3,410.1 1,670,402.1 \n 5,857.13 \n2019\nJan\n 401.5 \n12.2 40,613.8 232.6 135,481.1 \n 413.4 \nFeb\n 456.5 \n16.4 27,811.2 226.8 119,081.1 \n 463.6 \nMar\n 525.9 \n15.4 30,417.6 248.9 142,597.8 \n 441.0 \nApr\n 535.0 \n13.7 32,092.5 168.8 157,348.3 \n 390.1 \nMay\n 642.6 \n14.7 15,542.6 121.4 166,491.6 \n 494.3 \nJun\n 706.0 \n13.3 18,012.1 79.6 160,873.0 \n 486.8 \nJul\n 983.5 \n13.6 20,465.4 99.6 170,823.3 \n 638.2 \nAug\n 872.9 \n9.0 21,919.8 85.2 179,281.2 \n 542.3 \nSep\n 1,010.7 \n11.9 22,749.6 62.4 200,441.9 \n 679.4 \nOct\n 1,079.4 \n12.7 23,191.6 65.0 206,621.5 \n 1,099.3 \nNov\n 982.1 \n10.3 25,737.5 225.2 152,919.9 \n 2,044.1 \nDec\n 1,003.8 \n7.6 27,800.5 385.5 146,316.6 \n 1,273.6 \n2020\nJan\n 943.3 4.6 23,649.0 199.9 139,278.2 671.7 \nFeb\n 916.1 8.9 21,652.2 196.6 149,671.5 647.8 \nMar\n 1,068.5 7.4 22,588.1 234.3 173,042.2 661.2 \nApr\n 515.1 \n - 11,036.4 36.4 131,190.0 998.0 \nMay\n 674.1 \n - 14,711.6 231.2 150,936.1 705.3 \nJun\n 907.8 \n - 14,420.9 286.1 135,524.3 1,390.4 \nJul\n 918.4 \n - 15,786.5 251.4 121,072.4 791.9 \nAug\n 789.4 \n - 13,536.2 248.2 127,308.6 702.1 \nSep\n 911.9 0.002 15,524.1 309.8 125,059.2 783.2 \nOct\n 990.2 \n - 19,138.6 398.8 191,148.8 735.8 \nNov\n 971.3 \n - 17,584.9 430.0 101,305.8 755.6 \nDec\n 1,100.0 \n - 19,404.0 453.0 115,290.2 820.1 \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\nTABLE 13.2 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS \n Volumes of Transactions (000's)\n \n \n \n35 \n \n \nEND OF\nEXPORTS\nIMPORTS\nTOTAL TRADE TRADE BALANCE\n2018\nJan\n251.2\n489.7\n740.9\n-238.5\nFeb\n346.3\n574.9\n921.2\n-228.6\nMar\n288.6\n605.8\n894.3\n-317.2\nApr\n329.6\n544.1\n873.7\n-214.5\nMay\n267.2\n532.4\n799.6\n-265.2\nJun\n384.6\n614.6\n999.3\n-230.0\nJul\n340.3\n560.0\n900.3\n-219.7\nAug\n449.3\n576.5\n1025.9\n-127.2\nSep\n353.4\n577.1\n930.5\n-223.7\nOct\n448.6\n592.3\n1040.9\n-143.7\nNov\n471.7\n628.7\n1100.4\n-157.0\nDec\n364.8\n494.7\n859.5\n-129.9\nTotal\n4,295.63\n6,790.84\n11,086.47\n-2,495.21\n2019\nJan\n292.6\n336.8\n629.4\n-44.2\nFeb\n348.4\n370.5\n718.9\n-22.1\nMar\n295.9\n329.0\n624.9\n-33.1\nApr\n277.0\n416.7\n693.7\n-139.7\nMay\n343.2\n436.8\n780.0\n-93.6\nJun\n239.8\n458.5\n698.3\n-218.7\nJul\n299.5\n357.0\n656.5\n-57.5\nAug\n345.4\n384.2\n729.60\n-38.80\nSep\n378.4\n403.9\n782.30\n-25.50\nOct\n483.3\n400.6\n883.90\n82.70\nNov\n475.2\n431.2\n906.40\n44.00\nDec\n489.1\n418.8\n907.90\n70.30\nTotal\n4,267.80\n4,744.00\n9,011.80\n-476.20\n2020\nJan\n397.7\n383.5\n781.27\n14.18\nFeb\n365.5\n455.3\n820.89\n-89.81\nMar\n272.1\n450.5\n722.56\n-178.45\nApr\n200.5\n224.7\n425.20\n-24.23\nMay\n298.7\n361.1\n659.80\n-62.40\nJun\n330.0\n407.3\n737.32\n-77.28\nJul\n286.4\n345.8\n632.20\n59.31\nAug\n389.3\n404.9\n794.25\n-15.62\nSep\n398.8\n441.4\n840.21\n-42.57\nOct\n439.4\n490.2\n929.60\n-50.80\nNov\n528.9\n509.7\n1038.60\n19.20\nDec\n488.3\n527.2\n1015.50\n-38.90\nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2020\nTABLE 14 : MERCHANDISE TRADE STATISTICS\n (US$ millions)", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/Monthly_Economic_Reviews/Monthly-Economic-Review-December-2020.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "ba0b2125dcb9e23c50b0ddcbdc087193", "text": "Monetary Policy Review\nChris Loewald \nHead: Policy Development and Research\nPretoria ∙ 17 April 2019\nApril 2019 review: towards permanently lower inflation\n2019‐04‐17\n2\n• Global growth slowdown, monetary tightening deferred\n• SA growth modestly higher over medium term, but trend rate low\n• Near‐term inflation slower, largely due to helpful shocks\n• Interest rate path keeping longer‐term inflation close to midpoint \nGlobal economy slowing again\n2019‐04‐17\n3\nAbrupt China deceleration, stimulus response\n2019‐04‐17\n4\nDefaults blunting stimulus – lenders avoiding risk \n2019‐04‐17\n5\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n35\n40\n2014\n2015\n2016\n2017\n2018\nNumber of defaults\nChinese corporate defaults (onshore)\nSource: Wind Info\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\n10\n2010\n2012\n2014\n2016\n2018\n%\nChina corporate 5yr bond yields\nSpread\n5‐year AA‐\n5‐year AAA\nSource: Bloomberg\nSpillovers to Europe\n2019‐04‐17\n6\n… exacerbated by temporary shocks\n2019‐04‐17\n7\nBrexit uncertainty also a problem\n2019‐04‐17\n8\nECB postponing tightening plans \n2019‐04‐17\n9\nUS stimulus has faded, growth already slowing\n2019‐04‐17\n10\nUS inflation undershooting target (again)\n2019‐04‐17\n11\nFed pause helping loosen financial conditions\n2019‐04‐17\n12\nEasier environment for EMs\n2019‐04‐17\n13\nEM inflation lower, central banks generally cautious\n2019‐04‐17\n14\nSample countries comprise: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, \nMexico, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey\nSources: Haver, Bloomberg and SARB \n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n16\n18\n20\n2H 2018\n1H 2019\n2H 2019\nNumber of countries\nHiking\nOn Hold\nCutting\nEmerging market policy rate forecasts\nBig growth and current account adjustments for some\n2019‐04‐17\n15\nIndia & Brazil have achieved significant disinflations\n2019‐04‐17\n16\nNo obvious growth sacrifice for disinflation \n2019‐04‐17\n17\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n2010Q1–2017Q2\n2017Q3–2018Q4\n2010Q1–2013Q4\n2014Q1–2018Q4\nBrazil\nIndia\n%\nGDP growth, before & after disinflations\nSource: Haver\nSome scope for EM acceleration, against global trend\n2019‐04‐17\n18\nSA still waiting for the recovery\n2019‐04‐17\n19\n0.0\n0.5\n1.0\n1.5\n2.0\n2.5\n2014\n2015\n2016\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\nY/Y, (%)\nSouth African growth\nActual\nMar 2018\nMar 2019\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\nGrowth disappointments widening output gap\n2019‐04‐17\n20\nNov 2017: \n1.2%\nMar 2018: \n1.7%\nActual:\n0.8%\n0.50\n0.75\n1.00\n1.25\n1.50\n1.75\n2.00\nMar‐16\nNov‐16\nJul‐17\nMar‐18\nNov‐18\n%\nEvolution of 2018 GDP forecast\nDate of meeting\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\n‐2\n‐1.5\n‐1\n‐0.5\n0\n0.5\n1\n2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021\n% of potential GDP\nEvolution of output gap estimates\nMarch 2018\nMarch 2019\nSource: SARB QPM\nForecast\nPrimary sector, public investment negative in 2018\n2019‐04‐17\n21\n‐4.4\n‐12.5\n‐0.8\n2.1\n‐0.5\n1.4\n‐14\n‐12\n‐10\n‐8\n‐6\n‐4\n‐2\n0\n2\n4\nBefore revisions\n(Jan 2019 forecast)\nAfter revisions\n(actual)\n%\nGeneral government\nPublic corporations\nPrivate businesses\nTotal\nGross fixed capital formation\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\n0.8\n1.1\n0.0\n0.5\n1.0\n1.5\n2.0\n2.5\n2014\n2015\n2016\n2017\n2018\n%\nReal GDP growth\nTotal GDP\nGDP excluding primary sector\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\nMild growth pick‐up in forecast\n2019‐04‐17\n22\n1.3\n1.8\n2.0\n2013\n2015\n2017\n2019\n2021\n‐2\n‐1\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\nPercentage points\nContributions to GDP growth\nHouseholds\nGovernment consumption\nGFCF\nInventories and residual\nNet exports\nGDP growth (percentage change)\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\n…but risks to the downside again \n(see MPR Box 1)\n2019‐04‐17\n23\n77.7\n78.0\n71.8\n63.2\n50\n55\n60\n65\n70\n75\n80\n85\n%\nEnergy availability factor\nIncludes RMB Morgan Stanley estimate for 2019 ytd\nSources: Eskom and RMB Morgan Stanley\n‐1.0\n‐0.7\n‐0.5\n‐0.4\n‐1.3\n‐1.1\n‐0.9\n‐0.5\n‐0.4\n‐1.5\n‐1.2\n‐0.9\n‐0.6\n‐0.3\n0.0\nHSRC (2008)\nCameron & Rossouw (2012)\nRMB Morgan Stanley (2019)\nNWU (2014)\nNational Treasury\nSARB\nGoldman Sachs\nOld Mutual\nFree Market Foundation*\n10% power cut\nloss\nGDP lost in 2019\nPercentage points\nEstimated GDP growth response to power supply cuts \nSources: Various institutions and SARB\n* Estimate for the first half of 2019\nGrowth problems mainly structural…\n2019‐04‐17\n24\n50‐year average: \n2.5%\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n1970s\n1980s\n1990s\n2000s\n2010s\n%\nLong‐term real GDP growth\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\n1.5\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n2010\n2012\n2014\n2016\n2018\n2020\n%\nPotential growth\nTrend growth\nSource: Stats SA and SARB\nPotential GDP, adjusted for supply shocks\n… falling potential growth key to GDP forecast errors\n2019‐04‐17\n25\n‐2\n‐1\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n2001\n2002\n2003\n2004\n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\n2014\n2015\n2016\n2017\n2018\n%\nUnderestimated\nOverestimated\nGDP average errors\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\nLow growth despite extra investment, large CAD?\n2019‐04‐17\n26\n10\n12\n14\n16\n18\n20\n22\n24\n26\n2000\n2003\n2006\n2009\n2012\n2015\n2018\n% of GDP\nGross fixed capital formation\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\nPost‐democracy average\n‐7\n‐6\n‐5\n‐4\n‐3\n‐2\n‐1\n0\n1\n2\n2000\n2003\n2006\n2009\n2012\n2015\n2018\n% of GDP\nCurrent account balance\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\nPost‐democracy average\nHigher government debt and lower national savings\n2019‐04‐17\n27\n25\n30\n35\n40\n45\n50\n55\n60\n1960\n1970\n1980\n1990\n2000\n2010\n% of GDP\nGeneral government debt\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\n‐10\n‐5\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n1946\n1956\n1966\n1976\n1986\n1996\n2006\n2016\n% of GDP\nNational net savings\nGeneral government\nHouseholds\nCorporations\nTotal\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\nInvestment expenditure unproductive\n2019‐04‐17\n28\n‐0.4\n‐2\n‐1\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017\ny/y (%)\nFactors of production\nLabour force (working age population)\nCapital stock\nImplied total factor productivity\nSource: SARB \n1.1\n3.3\n1.8\n0.0\n0.5\n1.0\n1.5\n2.0\n2.5\n3.0\n3.5\n4.0\n4.5\n2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017\ny/y (%)\nPotential growth scenarios \nActual\nTFP at pre‐crisis average\nTFP at 2009‐2013 average\nSource: SARB\nHigher risk and rising long‐term rates\n2019‐04‐17\n29\n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n700\nArgentina\nTurkey\nSouth Africa\nBrazil\nRussia\nMexico\nColombia\nIndonesia\nMalaysia\nChina\nChile\nThailand\nBasis points\n5y CDS spreads\n(2019ytd average)\nSource: Bloomberg\n6.0\n6.5\n7.0\n7.5\n8.0\n8.5\n9.0\n9.5\n10.0\n2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019\n%\nSouth Africa's long‐term borrowing costs*\n*10‐year government bond yields; 9‐year yields used where 10‐year yields were unavailable.\nSource: Bloomberg\nCAD adjustment helped stabilise rand\n2019‐04‐17\n30\nCore goods inflation mostly following exchange rate\n2019‐04‐17\n31\n‐2\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019\n%\nContributions to core goods inflation\nVehicles\nClothing\nOther core goods\nHousehold contents\nAlcohol and tobacco\nCore goods\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\nOil outlook revised down in 2019\n2019‐04‐17\n32\n73.0\n65.0\n48\n52\n56\n60\n64\n68\n72\n76\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\nUS$/bbl\nActual\nNov 2018\nJan 2019\nMar 2019\nEvolution of crude oil price forecasts\nSources: Reuters and SARB\n‐10\n‐5\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n2010\n2012\n2014\n2016\n2018\n2020\nY/Y (%)\nFuel price inflation\nFuel price inflation\nForecast\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\nFood inflation staying lower for longer\n2019‐04‐17\n33\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\n10\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\ny/y (%)\nActual\nSep 2018\nNov 2018\nJan 2019\nMar 2019\nEvolution of food and non‐alcoholic beverages \ninflation forecasts\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\n6.8\n6.9\n3.6\n4.2\n‐1\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n2009‐17\naverage\n2017\n2018\n2019f\n%\nFood & NAB inflation\nBread and cereals\nMeat\nVegetables\nOther\nFood & NAB inflation\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\nSubstantial near‐term forecast revisions\n2019‐04‐17\n34\n5.5\n4.7\n‐0.3\n‐0.2\n‐0.2\n‐0.1\n‐0.9\n‐0.8\n‐0.7\n‐0.6\n‐0.5\n‐0.4\n‐0.3\n‐0.2\n‐0.1\n0.0\n3\n4\n5\n6\nNovember\nMPC\nMarch MPC\nContributions\nto forecast\nchange\nPercentage points\n%\nEvolution of 2019 inflation forecasts\nServices\nFood\nEnergy\nCore\ngoods\nSource: SARB QPM\n3.0\n3.5\n4.0\n4.5\n5.0\n5.5\n6.0\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\nY/Y (%)\nActual\nNov 2018 MPC forecast\nMar 2019 MPC forecast\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\nChanges to the SARB's inflation forecasts\nWeak demand part of disinflation – but not central\n2019‐04‐17\n35\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018\n%\nCyclical and acyclical inflation\nProcyclical components\nAcyclical components\nCore CPI\nSources: Stats SA & SARB\n1.9\n1.6\n4.0\n2.8\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018\n%\nContributions to core CPI inflation\nProcyclical components (Dec. 2016 weight 37%)\nAcyclical components  (Dec. 2016 weight 63%)\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\n2020 inflation ↑on petrol, food, then back to 4.5%\n2019‐04‐17\n36\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n2015\n2016\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\nY/Y, (%)\nHeadline and core CPI\nInflation target range\nHeadline CPI\nCore CPI\nMidpoint of inflation target\nSource: SARB QPM\nWages moderating, ULC gap closing\n2019‐04‐17\n37\n‐2\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n2012\n2014\n2016\n2018\n2020\nY/Y (%)\nWage growth rates\nNominal wages\nReal wages\nSource: SARB QPM\n‐4\n‐3\n‐2\n‐1\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n2000\n2003\n2006\n2009\n2012\n2015\n2018\n2021\nY/Y (%)\nReal unit labour cost gap\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\n(+) Inflationary\n(‐) Disinflationary\nSA getting used to lower inflation\n2019‐04‐17\n38\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n2010\n2012\n2014\n2016\n2018\n%\nInflation expectations\nCurrent year\nOne year ahead\nTwo years ahead\nFive years ahead\nSource: BER\n‐‐‐‐ 3–6% inflation target range\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n%\nSource: SARB\nQPM inflation expectations*\n*A blend of short‐term model expectations and medium‐term BER expectations\nRepo path lower in nominal terms\n2019‐04‐17\n39\n6.0\n6.5\n7.0\n7.5\n8.0\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n%\nNov 2018 MPC\nMar 2019 MPC\nSource: SARB\nRepurchase rate\nPolicy stance expansionary\n2019‐04‐17\n40\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n‐1.5\n‐1.0\n‐0.5\n0.0\n0.5\n1.0\n1.5\n2.0\n2.5\n3.0\n2010\n2012\n2014\n2016\n2018\n2020\nReal repo rate\nAccommodative\nNeutral\nContractionary\nNote: The real repo rate is the nominal repo deflated by a 4q moving average of year‐on‐year headline inflation\nSource: SARB\nChance to lock‐in lower inflation without tight policy\n2019‐04‐17\n41\nSame as median\n‐1\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\n10 11 12\nTurkey\nGhana\nMexico\nRussia\nKenya\nBrazil\nIndonesia\nChina\nBotswana\nMedian\nSouth Africa\nIndia\nNigeria\nMalaysia\nColombia\nZambia\nThailand\nPeru\nChile\nPoland\nEM real ex ante policy rates*\n* Nominal policy rates less 2020 \nCPI inflation forecast\n%\nSources: Bloomberg, Consensus Economics, Haver and SARB\n4.9\n6.2\n5.4\n4.5\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n2000\n2003\n2006\n2009\n2012\n2015\n2018\n2021\nY/Y, (%)\nMedian EM headline CPI\nSA headline CPI\nSA period averages\nEM median\nEM countries comprise of: BRA, CHL, CHN, COL, IND*, IDN, MYS, MEX, PER, PHL, \nPOL, RUS, ZAF, THA & TUR. *CPI data for IND starts in Jan 2002. \nSources: SARB, Haver and Bloomberg\nConclusions\n• Weaker global economy, pick‐ups for some emerging markets\n• SA potential growth low – no quick fixes \n• Inflation at 4.5%; repo path about keeping it there\n• Path undemanding so long as shocks are favourable\n2019‐04‐17\n42\nGet in touch with us\n2019‐04‐17\n43\nThe publication and accompanying presentation can be accessed online at \nwww.resbank.co.za/Publications/Reviews/Pages/Monetary‐Policy‐Review.aspx\nMedia Office:\nZamandlovu Ndlovu\n012 399 7118\nmedia@resbank.co.za\nStakeholder Relations:\nLi‐Ann Meyer\n012 313 4795 \nStakeholderRelations@resbank.co.za\n@SAReserveBank", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/Forecast/MPF-presentation.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "01963ad8545a80ca8cee6ff9a2b17d71", "text": "Vol. 27 No. 16 \n \n \nWeek Ending \n17th April 2025 \nWeekly Economic \nHighlights \nTABLE OF CONTENTS \n \n1. \nOVERVIEW ............................................................................ 1 \n2. \nINTEREST RATES ................................................................ 1 \n3. \nEQUITY MARKETS .............................................................. 3 \n4. \nCLEARING AND SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY .................. 5 \n5. \nENERGY PRICES .................................................................. 5 \n6. \nGOLD PM FIX, MOSI-OA-TUNYA GOLD COINS AND \nGOLD BACKED DIGITAL TOKENS (GBDT) .................. 5 \n7. \nEXTERNAL SECTOR ........................................................... 6 \n \n \n \n 1 \n1. OVERVIEW \n \n \n \nThis report provides a concise overview of key developments in the domestic monetary and financial sectors \nduring the week ending 17th April 2025. It incorporates updates on money and capital markets, national \npayment systems, exchange rates, and international commodity prices. \nDuring the week under review, local currency minimum deposit rates for all tenors remained unchanged at \nprevious week levels. The maximum deposit rates for all tenors, however, increased during the same week, \nexcept for savings which were unchanged. Similarly, foreign currency deposit rates for most tenors remained \nunchanged, with the exception of maximum rates for 12-month tenor, which increased. \nLocal currency lending rates for both individual and corporate clients increased during the week ending 17th \nApril 2025. Similarly, foreign currency lending rates for both individual and corporate clients increased, \nexcept for minimum rates for corporates clients which decreased. \nDuring the week under review, both the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) and the Victoria Falls Stock \nExchange (VFEX) exhibited bearish trends. Resultantly, the ZSE and VFEX All Share indices lost 1.06% and \n0.93% to close at 198.29 points and 110.28 points, respectively. \nThe value of aggregate transactions processed through the National Payment Systems platforms rose by \n4.80%, to ZiG34.66 billion, from ZiG33.07 billion in the previous week. The increase in NPS transactions \nwas underpinned by processing through the RTGS and mobile banking payment platforms. \nThe Zimbabwe Gold (ZiG) marginally depreciated by 0.02%, from an average of ZiG26.80 per US$1 in the \nprevious week to ZiG26.81 per US$1, during the week under review. \nWeekly average international prices for precious metals, nickel and crude oil firmed, while lithium prices \nretreated during the review period. Rising tensions in the global trade war have prompted investors to flock to \nsafe-haven assets, resulting in a surge in gold prices due to heightened demand. Platinum and palladium prices \nincreased, driven by supply constraints stemming from power shortages in South Africa, one of the world’s \ntop producers of the metal. \nSimilarly, nickel prices increased on expectations of supply constraints, after Indonesia indicated potential \nproduction cuts. Brent crude oil prices increased, following the imposition of trade sanctions on Chinese firms \nengaged in Iranian oil transactions by the US, a move that reinforced supply-side constraints in global markets. \nLithium prices, however, continued on a downward trend, driven by expanded production incentives from \nChina, where government subsidise battery manufacturers, leading to a rise in supply. \nA cumulative total of 85.12 million kilograms of tobacco had been sold as at day 32 of the tobacco selling \nseason, a 10.69% decrease from the 95.31 million kilograms sold during the same period in 2024. In value \nterms, tobacco sales dropped by 14.32%, from US$340.84 million recorded in the same period in 2024 to \nUS$292.01 million, during the period under review. \n \n \n \n 2 \n2. INTEREST RATES \n \nAverage commercial bank deposit rates (Local Currency (ZiG) (%) \nZiG Deposit rates \n28 March 2025 \n04 April 2025 \n11 April 2025 \n17 April 2025 \nSavings \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n3.81 \n3.81 \n3.81 \n3.81 \nMaximum \n4.14 \n4.14 \n4.14 \n4.14 \n1-month deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n5.66 \n5.66 \n5.66 \n5.66 \nMaximum \n8.66 \n8.66 \n8.33 \n8.66 \n3-months deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n5.95 \n5.95 \n5.95 \n5.95 \nMaximum \n8.87 \n8.15 \n8.87 \n8.93 \n6-months deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n5.56 \n5.56 \n5.56 \n5.56 \nMaximum \n7.76 \n7.76 \n7.76 \n8.23 \n12-months deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n5.57 \n5.57 \n5.57 \n5.57 \nMaximum \n7.77 \n8.04 \n7.77 \n8.24 \nOver 1 year \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n5.58 \n5.58 \n5.58 \n5.58 \nMaximum \n7.78 \n7.78 \n7.78 \n8.25 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n \nAverage commercial bank deposit rates (Foreign Currency (US$) (%) \nUS$ Deposit rates \n28 March 2025 \n04 April 2025 \n11 April 2025 \n17 April 2025 \nSavings \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n1.67 \n1.67 \n1.67 \n1.67 \nMaximum \n1.86 \n1.86 \n1.86 \n1.86 \n1-month deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n3.72 \n3.72 \n3.72 \n3.72 \nMaximum \n5.72 \n5.72 \n5.67 \n5.67 \n3-month deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n4.38 \n4.38 \n4.38 \n4.38 \nMaximum \n6.53 \n6.53 \n6.53 \n6.53 \n6-month deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n4.18 \n4.18 \n4.18 \n4.18 \nMaximum \n6.71 \n6.71 \n6.71 \n6.71 \n12-Month deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n4.25 \n4.25 \n4.25 \n4.25 \nMaximum \n6.53 \n6.53 \n6.22 \n6.44 \nOver 1 year \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n4.36 \n4.36 \n4.36 \n4.36 \nMaximum \n6.31 \n6.31 \n6.61 \n6.61 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n 3 \nCommercial bank weighted lending rates (Local Currency (ZiG) (%) \nZiG Lending rates \n28 March 2025 \n04 April 2025 \n11 April 2025 \n17 April 2025 \nIndividuals \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n42.33 \n42.28 \n42.20 \n42.79 \nMaximum \n47.97 \n47.91 \n47.83 \n48.42 \nCorporates \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n40.42 \n40.45 \n40.47 \n40.64 \nMaximum \n46.11 \n45.99 \n46.02 \n46.89 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n \nCommercial bank weighted lending rates (Foreign Currency (US$) (%) \nUS$ Lending rates \n28 March 2025 \n04 April 2025 \n11 April 2025 \n17 April 2025 \nIndividuals \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n12.91 \n12.96 \n13.01 \n13.03 \nMaximum \n17.38 \n17.40 \n17.38 \n17.39 \nCorporates \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n10.99 \n11.09 \n11.11 \n11.01 \nMaximum \n16.12 \n16.18 \n16.20 \n16.48 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n \nCommercial banks and building societies mortgage lending rates (%) \nMortgage Lending rates \n28 March 2025 \n04 April 2025 \n11 April 2025 \n17 April 2025 \nZiG Lending rates \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n25.00 \n25.00 \n25.00 \n25.00 \nMaximum \n45.00 \n50.00 \n50.00 \n50.00 \nUS$ Lending rates \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n10.00 \n10.00 \n10.00 \n10.00 \nMaximum \n22.00 \n22.00 \n22.00 \n22.00 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n \n3. EQUITY MARKETS \n \n \nZSE Indicators \n \n \nAll \nShare \nIndex \n(points) \nTop 10 \nIndex \n(points) \nTop 15 \nIndex \n(points) \nMedium Cap \n(points) \nSmall Cap \n(points) \nMining \nIndex \n(points) \nGrand \nMarket Cap \n(ZiG \nbillion) \nMarket \nTurnover \n(ZiG \nmillion) \nVolume of \nShares \n(million) \n28-Mar-25 \n204.11 \n199.43 \n203.75 \n245.34 \n100.11 \n180.43 \n62.64 \n84.23 \n10.99 \n04-Apr-25 \n201.75 \n194.65 \n200.53 \n251.83 \n100.12 \n156.98 \n61.34 \n72.80 \n16.11 \n11-Apr-25 \n200.42 \n193.16 \n198.75 \n250.94 \n100.11 \n168.39 \n60.89 \n97.40 \n105.55 \n17-Apr-25 \n198.29 \n192.61 \n197.09 \n242.62 \n100.11 \n143.13 \n60.48 \n23.12 \n4.25 \nWeekly \nChange (%) \n(1.06) \n(0.28) \n(0.84) \n(3.32) \n0.00 \n(15.00) \n(0.67) \n(76.26) \n(95.97) \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2025 \n \n \nVFEX Indicators \nDate \n \nAll Share Index \nPoints \nGrand Market Capitalisation \n(US$ billion) \nMarket Turnover (US$ \nmillion) \nVolume of Shares (million) \n28-Mar-25 \n108.40 \n1.26 \n0.62 \n6.81 \n04-Apr-25 \n106.95 \n1.25 \n1.06 \n5.26 \n11-Apr-25 \n111.31 \n1.30 \n0.78 \n8.31 \n17-Apr-25 \n110.28 \n1.29 \n0.70 \n3.90 \nWeekly Change (%) \n(0.93) \n(0.77) \n(10.26) \n(53.07) \nSource: Victoria Falls Stock Exchange, 2025 \n \n \n \n 4 \nFigure 1: ZSE and VFEX Indicators \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange and Victoria Falls Stock Exchange, 2025 \n \n \n \n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\n100\n12-Dec-24\n19-Dec-24\n26-Dec-24\n02-Jan-25\n09-Jan-25\n16-Jan-25\n23-Jan-25\n30-Jan-25\n06-Feb-25\n13-Feb-25\n20-Feb-25\n27-Feb-25\n06-Mar-25\n13-Mar-25\n20-Mar-25\n27-Mar-25\n03-Apr-25\n10-Apr-25\n17-Apr-25\nZiG Billion\nZSE Market Capitalisation \n10\n5010\n10010\n15010\n20010\n25010\n30010\n35010\n40010\n45010\n12-Dec-24\n19-Dec-24\n26-Dec-24\n02-Jan-25\n09-Jan-25\n16-Jan-25\n23-Jan-25\n30-Jan-25\n06-Feb-25\n13-Feb-25\n20-Feb-25\n27-Feb-25\n06-Mar-25\n13-Mar-25\n20-Mar-25\n27-Mar-25\n03-Apr-25\n10-Apr-25\n17-Apr-25\nUS$ Thousand\nVFEX Market Turnover \nTrade\ndeal:\nFirst\nCapital\nBank\nLimited\n(1,134.27\nmillion\nshares\nsold\nat\n(US$0.04 cents per share)\n1.1\n1.15\n1.2\n1.25\n1.3\n1.35\n1.4\n12-Dec-24\n19-Dec-24\n26-Dec-24\n02-Jan-25\n09-Jan-25\n16-Jan-25\n23-Jan-25\n30-Jan-25\n06-Feb-25\n13-Feb-25\n20-Feb-25\n27-Feb-25\n06-Mar-25\n13-Mar-25\n20-Mar-25\n27-Mar-25\n03-Apr-25\n10-Apr-25\n17-Apr-25\nUS$ Billion\nVFEX Market Capitalisation \n95\n100\n105\n110\n115\n12-Dec-24\n19-Dec-24\n26-Dec-24\n02-Jan-25\n09-Jan-25\n16-Jan-25\n23-Jan-25\n30-Jan-25\n06-Feb-25\n13-Feb-25\n20-Feb-25\n27-Feb-25\n06-Mar-25\n13-Mar-25\n20-Mar-25\n27-Mar-25\n03-Apr-25\n10-Apr-25\n17-Apr-25\nIndex\nVFEX All Share Index \n0\n20,000\n40,000\n60,000\n80,000\n100,000\n120,000\n140,000\n160,000\n12-Dec-24\n19-Dec-24\n26-Dec-24\n02-Jan-25\n09-Jan-25\n16-Jan-25\n23-Jan-25\n30-Jan-25\n06-Feb-25\n13-Feb-25\n20-Feb-25\n27-Feb-25\n06-Mar-25\n13-Mar-25\n20-Mar-25\n27-Mar-25\n03-Apr-25\n10-Apr-25\n17-Apr-25\nZiG Thousands\nZSE Market Turnover \nLump-sum deals:\nEconet Wireless \nZimbabwe \nLimited, OK \nZimbabwe \nLimited, Delta \nCorporation \nLimited\n90\n110\n130\n150\n170\n190\n210\n230\n250\n270\n12-Dec-24\n19-Dec-24\n26-Dec-24\n02-Jan-25\n09-Jan-25\n16-Jan-25\n23-Jan-25\n30-Jan-25\n06-Feb-25\n13-Feb-25\n20-Feb-25\n27-Feb-25\n06-Mar-25\n13-Mar-25\n20-Mar-25\n27-Mar-25\n03-Apr-25\n10-Apr-25\n17-Apr-25\nIndices\nZSE Indices \nAll Share Index (ZSE)\nTop 10 Index\nMining Index\n \n 5 \n4. CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY \n Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n5. ENERGY PRICES \n \nEnergy Prices \n \n28 March 2025 \n04 April 2025 \n11 April 2025 \n17 April 2025 \nDomestic Energy Prices \nUS$ \nUS$ \nUS$ \nUS$ \nDiesel 50/ litre \n1.55 \n1.52 \n1.52 \n1.52 \nPetrol Blend E20/ litre \n1.54 \n1.53 \n1.53 \n1.53 \nLP Gas / kg \n1.61 \n1.57 \n1.57 \n1.57 \n \n \n \n \n \nInternational Energy \nPrices (Weekly average) \nUS$/barrel \nUS$/barrel \nUS$/barrel \nUS$/barrel \nCrude Oil Prices \n72.83 \n71.13 \n63.79 \n65.40 \n Source: Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory Authority and BBC 2025 \n \n6. GOLD PM FIX, MOSI-OA-TUNYA GOLD COINS AND GOLD BACKED DIGITAL TOKENS \n(GBDT) \n \nGold PM Fix and Gold Backed Digital Token Prices \nDate \nGold PM Fix \nGBDT ZiG Price per Mg \nGBDT US$ Price per Mg \nUS$/oz \nBuy \nSell \nBuy \nSell \n14-April-25 \n3,230.50 \n2.65 \n2.92 \n0.0987 \n0.1091 \n15-April-25 \n3,204.20 \n2.62 \n2.90 \n0.0979 \n0.1082 \n16-April-25 \n3,219.60 \n2.63 \n2.91 \n0.0983 \n0.1087 \n17-April-25 \n3,322.90 \n2.72 \n3.01 \n0.1015 \n0.1122 \nSource: London Bullion Market Association and Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n \n \n \n \nPAYMENT STREAM \nWEEK ENDING \n11 April 2025 \nWEEK ENDING \n17 April 2025 \nWEEKLY \nCHANGE (%) \n \nVALUES \n \nRTGS \n26,132,101,548.77 \n28,200,688,885.89 \n7.92 \nOf which ZiG \n9,009,075,111.12 \n10,739,934,210.18 \n \nOf which US$ transactions \n(ZiG Equivalent) \n17,123,026,437.65 \n \n17,460,754,675.71 \n \nPOS \n1,865,816,855.95 \n1,760,519,029.65 \n(5.64) \nATM \n1,556,693,710.43 \n1,177,673,317.37 \n(24.35) \nMOBILE BANKING \n100,932,282.83 \n321,390,382.76 \n218.42 \nMOBILE MONEY \n3,255,998,291.99 \n3,049,766,821.71 \n(6.33) \nZIPIT MOBILE \n157,733,768.70 \n147,688,569.66 \n(6.37) \nTOTAL \n33,069,276,458.67 \n34,657,727,007.03 \n4.80 \n \nVOLUMES \n \nRTGS \n164,864 \n157,487 \n(4.47) \nOf which ZiG \n66,074 \n67,683 \n \nOf which US$ \n98,790 \n89,804 \n \nPOS \n1,603,193 \n1,523,007 \n(5.00) \nATM \n202,490 \n136,237 \n(32.72) \nMOBILE BANKING \n198,702 \n442,407 \n122.65 \nMOBILE MONEY \n11,288,582 \n10,753,050 \n(4.74) \nZIPIT MOBILE \n202,025 \n180,596 \n(10.61) \nTOTAL \n13,659,856 \n13,192,784 \n(3.42) \n \n 6 \nMosi-oa-Tunya Gold Coin Prices \nGold Coin \nPrice \n14-April -25 \n15-April -25 \n16-April -25 \n17-April -25 \n1.00Oz \n \n \n \n \nUS$ \n3,392.02 \n3,364.41 \n3,380.58 \n3,489.05 \nZiG \n90,966.99 \n90.231.99 \n90,579.66 \n93,504.31 \n0.50Oz \n \n \n \n \nUS$ \n1,696.01 \n1,682.21 \n1,690.29 \n1,744.52 \nZiG \n45,483.49 \n45,116.00 \n45,289.83 \n46,752.16 \n0.25Oz \n \n \n \n \nUS$ \n848.01 \n841.10 \n845.15 \n872.26 \nZiG \n22,741.75 \n22,558.00 \n22,644.92 \n23,376.08 \n0.10Oz \n \n \n \n \nUS$ \n339.20 \n336.44 \n338.06 \n348.90 \nZiG \n9,096.70 \n9,023.20 \n9,057.97 \n9,350.43 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n \n7. EXTERNAL SECTOR \n \n \nExchange Rate Developments (ZiG per Unit of foreign currency) \n \n \nUSD \nZAR \nGBP \nBWP \nEURO \nWeekly Average \n(07 – 11 Apr) \n26.8011 \n1.3786 \n34.5195 \n1.9059 \n29.6427 \n14-Apr \n26.8179 \n1.4077 \n35.1519 \n1.9257 \n30.4867 \n15-Apr \n26.8196 \n1.4235 \n35.4531 \n1.9379 \n30.4845 \n16-Apr \n26.7941 \n1.4083 \n35.5358 \n1.9374 \n30.4114 \n17-Apr \n26.7994 \n1.4194 \n35.4183 \n1.9404 \n30.4495 \nWeekly Average \n(14 – 17 Apr) \n26.8078 \n1.4147 \n35.3898 \n1.9354 \n30.4580 \nAppr (-)/Depr (+) (%) of the \nZWG \n0.02 \n2.62 \n2.52 \n1.55 \n2.75 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n \nInternational Commodity Prices \n \nGold \nPlatinum \nPalladium \nNickel \nLithium \n \nUS$/oz \nUS$/ounce \nUS$/ounce \nUS$/tonne \nUS$/tonne \nWeekly Average \n(07 - 11 Apr)) \n3,089.91 \n923.63 \n915.38 \n14,499.00 \n9,449.55 \n14-Apr \n3,212.43 \n952.50 \n943.50 \n15,307.00 \n9,413.64 \n15-Apr \n3,223.48 \n960.00 \n958.50 \n15,558.00 \n9,413.64 \n16-Apr \n3,313.45 \n961.50 \n969.50 \n15,683.00 \n9,413.64 \n17-Apr \n3,314.83 \n961.00 \n952.50 \n15,622.00 \n9,459.09 \nWeekly Average \n(14 - 17 Apr) \n3,266.04 \n958.75 \n 956.00 \n15,542.50 \n9,425.00 \nWeekly change (%) \n5.70 \n3.80 \n4.44 \n7.20 \n(0.26) \nSource: BBC, KITCO and Bloomberg, 2025 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n 7 \nFigure 3: Weekly International Commodity Price Developments (30th January 2025– 17th April 2025) \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSource: BBC, KITCO and Bloomberg, 2025 \n \n \n \n \n2,500\n2,550\n2,600\n2,650\n2,700\n2,750\n2,800\n2,850\n2,900\n2,950\n3,000\n3,050\n3,100\n3,150\n3,200\n3,250\n3,300\n3,350\n3,400\n30-Jan\n6-Feb\n13-Feb\n20-Feb\n27-Feb\n6-Mar\n13-Mar\n20-Mar\n27-Mar\n3-Apr\n10-Apr\n17-Apr\nUS$/oz\nGold\n50\n55\n60\n65\n70\n75\n80\n85\n90\n30-Jan\n6-Feb\n13-Feb\n20-Feb\n27-Feb\n6-Mar\n13-Mar\n20-Mar\n27-Mar\n3-Apr\n10-Apr\n17-Apr\nUS$/barrel\nCrude oil \n820\n840\n860\n880\n900\n920\n940\n960\n980\n1,000\n1,020\n30-Jan\n6-Feb\n13-Feb\n20-Feb\n27-Feb\n6-Mar\n13-Mar\n20-Mar\n27-Mar\n3-Apr\n10-Apr\n17-Apr\nUS$/tonne\nPlatinum\n14,000\n14,200\n14,400\n14,600\n14,800\n15,000\n15,200\n15,400\n15,600\n15,800\n16,000\n16,200\n16,400\n16,600\n16,800\n30-Jan\n6-Feb\n13-Feb\n20-Feb\n27-Feb\n6-Mar\n13-Mar\n20-Mar\n27-Mar\n3-Apr\n10-Apr\n17-Apr\nUS$/tonne\nNickel\n8,600\n8,800\n9,000\n9,200\n9,400\n9,600\n9,800\n10,000\n10,200\n10,400\n10,600\n10,800\n30-Jan\n6-Feb\n13-Feb\n20-Feb\n27-Feb\n6-Mar\n13-Mar\n20-Mar\n27-Mar\n3-Apr\n10-Apr\n17-Apr\nUS$/tonne\nLithium \n900\n910\n920\n930\n940\n950\n960\n970\n980\n990\n1,000\n1,010\n1,020\n30-Jan\n6-Feb\n13-Feb\n20-Feb\n27-Feb\n6-Mar\n13-Mar\n20-Mar\n27-Mar\n3-Apr\n10-Apr\n17-Apr\nUS$/tonne\nPalladium\n \n 8 \n8. TOBACCO SALES \n \nWeekly Cumulative Tobacco Sales: Day 32 (17th April 2025) \n \n2024 \n2025 \nVariance (%) \nCumulative Quantity Sold (million kgs) \n95,305,929 \n85,121,668 \n(10.69) \nAverage Price (US$/kg) \n3.58 \n3.43 \n(4.19) \nCumulative value (US$ million) \n340,837,618 \n292,039,926 \n(14.32) \nSource: Tobacco Industry and Marketing Board (TIMB), 2025 \n \n \n \nRESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE \nAPRIL 2025", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/Weekly_Economic_Highlights/WEEKLY_ECONOMIC_HIGHLIGHTS_17_April_2025_Volume_27_Number_16.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "8155e966ce82466709aca97bee07a7a9", "text": "About us\nWhat we do\nPublications\nNewsroom\nContact us\nSARB POLICY RATE 6.75% \n\n24 Apr 2026\n\nCPI 3.1% \n\nMar 2026\n\nPPI 1.8% \n\nFeb 2026\n\nPRIME 10.25% \n\n24 Apr 2026\n\nR2030\n\t\n\nR209\n\t\n\nSABOR\n\t\n\nZARONIA\n\t\nZAR/USD\n\t\n16.6276\n\nZAR/GBP\n\t\n22.4116\n\nZAR/EUR\n\t\n19.4385\n\nZAR/JPY\n\t\n0.1041\nHome Publications\n \n\nPUBLICATION DETAILS\n\nTitle :\nAddress by Lesetja Kganyago, Governor of the SARB, at the 105th annual Ordinary General Meeting\nPublished Date:\n2025-08-08\nLast Modified Date:\n2025-08-08, 10:14\nCategory:\nSpeeches > Speeches by Governors | What's New | Media > Media Releases\n\nAfter another momentous year, today we convene the South African Reserve Bank’s (SARB) annual Ordinary General Meeting (AGM).\n\nAttachments:\nLesetja Kganyago | Address at the SARB's 105th annual Ordinary General Meeting\nBack\nQuick links\nFrequently asked questions\nGold Coins Purchased from the Public\nCareers\nInternet banking\nForms\nExtranets\nWhistleblowing\nPromotion of Access to Information Manual\nSARB Group Privacy Notice\nProcurement\nFraud and scams\nRSS feed subscription\nDisclaimer\nSitemap\nCookie policy\nContact\n\nTo contact us, click here\n\nTelephone: 0861 127 272 \n\n370 Helen Joseph Street,\n\nPretoria, 0002\n\nP O Box 427,\n\nPretoria, 0001\n\nDownload app\nQuarterly Bulletin\nSocial Media\n \nSupported Browsers\n \nThe South African Reserve Bank © Copyright 2020.", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-04-27", "url": "https://www.resbank.co.za/en/home/publications/publication-detail-pages/speeches/speeches-by-governors/2025/kganyago-address-agm-105"}
{"doc_id": "9f15510441beccb661bfc649d21380e6", "text": "MONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW \nFEBRUARY 2013 \nSelected Economic Indicators \n2 \nStock Market Developments \n3 \nInflation \n6 \nNational Payments System \n7 \nStatistical Tables \n9 \n \n \nMonetary Developments \n4 \nINSIDE THIS ISSUE: \n \nPAGE \nSELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS \n2 \n \n2013 \nJanuary \n2013 \nFebruary \nZ.S.E. Mining Index1 \n84.07 \n72.01 \nZ.S.E. Industrial Index1 \n179.34 \n182.64 \nMoney Supply (Total Bank Deposits) (US$)2 \n3.81 billion \n3.81 billion \nMoney Supply (M3) Annual Growth2 \n21.09% \n12.91% \nYearly Inflation3 \n2.51% \n2.98% \nSources: \n1 Zimbabwe Stock Exchange \n2 Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe \n3 ZIMSTAT \n \n \n \nSTOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS \n \nThe rally witnessed on the Zimbabwe Stock \nExchange (ZSE), in January 2013 faltered \nduring the month of February. This was \npartly due to some investors cashing in the \ngains already made in the first month of the \nyear. \n \nTrading volumes in February 2013 increased \nmarginally by 0.4%, from 166.4 million \nshares in the previous month to 165.8 million \nshares. Over the same period last year, trad-\ning volumes were recorded at 255.2 million \nshares, representing a 26.4% decline on a \nyear-on-year basis. \n \nDespite the marginal decline in trading vol-\numes, market turnover for February 2013 \nrose to US$46 million, from US$36.8 mil-\nlion in January. On an annual basis, market \nturnover registered a growth of 48.5%, from \nUS$31 million in February 2012. \n \nPartly reflecting profit taking, net foreign \npurchases registered a monthly decline of \n27.1% from US$16.6 million in January to \nUS$12.1 million February 2013. However, \nboth foreign purchases and sales were higher \nin February, at US$29.7 million and \nUS$17.6 million, as compared to January’s \nUS$24.9 million and US$8.9 million. \n \nThe above developments resulted in the in-\ndustrial index gaining 1.8% to end the month \nat 182.3 points, largely sustained by high \ndemand on blue chip counters. On a year-to-\ndate basis, the industrial index gained an im-\npressive 20.7%. \n \nFollowing challenges at some of the mining \nhouses, the mining index lost 14.3%, from \n84.07 points in January to 72.01 points in \nFebruary 2013. On a year-to-date basis, \nhowever, the mining index gained 8.6%. \n \nThe above developments maintained the to-\ntal market capitalization for the ZSE at \nUS$4.7 billion. The outlook for the ZSE will \n \n2 3 \n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\nValues Traded (US$ Millions)\nVolumes Traded (Millions)\nZSE: Daily Volumes and Values Traded\nVolumes \nTurnover\n \n2 4 \ncontinue to be affected by liquidity con-\nstraints in the economy, as reflected by the \nlow trading volumes. \n \nMONETARY DEVELOPMENTS \n \nThe slowdown in the annual growth in \nmoney supply continued in February 2013. \nThe development, partially reflects economic \nactivity which has plateaued. On an annual \nbasis, broad money grew by 12.84% in Feb-\nruary 2013, a decline of 8.25 percentage \npoints from 21.09% recorded in January \n2013. \n \nThe growth was on the back of surges in over \n30-days deposits, 91.40%; savings deposits, \n22.24%; \nand \nunder \n30-days \ndeposits, \n17.08%. Demand deposits, the dominant \ncomponent of money supply, however, re-\ncorded an annual decline of 1.71%. \n \nOn a month on month basis, broad money \ngrew by 0.14%, from US$3 808.4 million in \nJanuary to US$3 813.6 million in February \n2013. The growth came after a decline of \n2%, from US$3 886.7 million in December \n2012 to US$3 808.4 million in January \n2013. \n \nThe month on month growth, was driven by \nexpansions of 8.51% in under 30-day depos-\nits and 2.36% in savings deposits. Partially \noffsetting these growths were declines in \nover 30-day deposits, 3.08%; and demand \ndeposits, 2.62%. \n \n \n \n \n0.0\n0.5\n1.0\n1.5\n2.0\n2.5\n3.0\n3.5\n4.0\n4.5\n10 \n20 \n30 \n40 \n50 \n60 \n70 \nFeb\nApr\nJun\nAug\nOct\nDec\nFeb\nApr\nJun\nAug\nOct\nDec\nFeb\nUS$ Billions\n%\nMoney Supply\nM3 \nM3 Growth\n50\n70\n90\n110\n130\n150\n170\n190\nZSE Indices\nIndustrial\nMining\n \n3 5 \nCredit to the private sector, however, con-\ntinued to be short term in nature and largely \nchanneled towards recurrent expenditures, \npartly owing to high credit and liquidity \nrisks in the economy. The absence of a well \nfunctioning money market also continues to \nconstrain the banks’ lending activities. \n \n \nDemand\n51.9%\nUnder 30-\nday\n22.3%\nSavings\n10.9%\nLong \nterm\n14.8%\nBanking Sector Deposits\nFebruary 2013\nLoans and \nAdvances\n84.2%\nBills \nDiscounted\n3.4%\nBankers \nAcceptance\ns\n1.1%\nMortgages\n8.2%\nOther \nInvestments\n3.1%\nCredit to Private Sector\nTotal credit to the private sector as at the end of \nFebruary 2013 was US$3 574.9million.\nDomestic credit recorded an annual growth \nof 34.09% in February 2013, a decline of \n1.27 percentage points, from 35.36% re-\ncorded in January. The growth was under-\npinned by a 28.8% increase in credit to the \nprivate sector, from US$2 776.2 million in \nFebruary 2012 to US$3 574.9 million in \nFebruary 2013. \n \n \nAs at February 2013, loans and advances ac-\ncessed at banks by economic agents were util-\nised in paying for recurrent expenditures, \n78.2%; capital expenditures, 11.2%; and pur-\nchase of durable household goods, 10.6%. \n \nFinancing by banks mainly benefited the agri-\ncultural sector, 19.1%; distribution, 17.1%; \nmanufacturing, \n16.8%; \nand \nhouseholds, \n14.8%. Mining and construction industries, \nwhich require long term financing, accessed \nonly 7.5% and 1.9% of the cumulative credit \nto the private sector. \n \n4 \n \n6 \n \nINFLATION DEVELOPMENTS \n \nAnnual Inflation \nThe downward trend in headline inflation \nwas reversed in February 2013, where annual \nheadline inflation surged from 2.51% in \nJanuary 2013 to 2.98% in February 2013. \nAnnual food inflation increased from 3.72% \nin January 2013 to 4.67% in February 2013, \nmainly driven by the rise in the price of cere-\nals. Non-food inflation also rose from 1.91% \n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\nDec-10\nFeb-11\nApr-11\nJun-11\nAug-11\nOct-11\nDec-11\nFeb-12\nApr-12\nJun-12\nAug-12\nOct-12\nDec-12\nFeb-13\nAnnual Inflation \n(%)\nHeadline Inflation\nFood\nNon Food\nin January 2013 to 2.19% in February 2013, \n.reflecting the impact of administered prices \nsuch as rates for water, refuse and sewerage \ncollection. \n \n Month-on-Month Inflation \n \nMonth on month inflation increased signifi-\ncantly, on the back of increases in food, \nfuel, rates and clothing prices. Month on \nmonth inflation increased from 0.07% in \nJanuary 2013 to 0.95% in February 2013. \nMonthly food inflation surged from 0.32% \nin January 2013, to 1.4% in February 2013. \nThe elevated monthly food inflation for \nFebruary 2013, reflected increases in the \nprices of bread and cereals, as well as fish. \nMonthly non-food inflation also increased \nfrom -0.06% in January 2013 to 0.72% in \nFebruary 2013, mainly driven by transport \ninflation due to increases in fuel prices. \nThe increase in fuel prices, which were ef-\nfected on the 11th February 2013, were \ndriven by increases in international prices as \nwell as challenges in logistics in transport-\ning fuel into the country. Pump prices, how-\never, had declined by the end of February \n2013. \nThe review of excise duty by 5 percentage \npoints, from 20% to 25% and 25% to 30% \n7 \n \nfor diesel and petrol, respectively, however, \nincreased pump prices by an average of 3 \ncents to 5 cents, effective 8th March 2013. \nTaking the CPI weight for fuel of 1.6%, the \nimpact of the upward review in excise duty is \nlikely to be minimal, with the first round and \ndirect impact on inflation estimated at \n0.05%. The second round effect which is \ntransmitted through the distribution and pro-\nduction costs, will be felt in the next 2 to 3 \nmonths. \nInflation Outlook \nBarring \nsignificant \nexternal \nexogenous \nshocks to the economy, particularly emanat-\ning from international oil prices, world food \nprices and the US$/rand exchange rate, the \ndomestic inflation is expected to remain sta-\nble in the medium to long term. \nNATIONAL \nPAYMENTS \nSYSTEM \nDEVELOPMENTS \n \nDuring the month of February 2013, there \nwas a significant decrease in the RTGS trans-\nactions in value terms. Other payment plat-\nforms registered mixed developments. \nZimbabwe Electronic Transfer Settlement \nSystem (ZETSS) \nThe value of transactions processed through \nthe RTGS system decreased from US$3 \n563.8 million in January 2013 to US$2 968.0 \nmillion in February 2013, representing a de-\ncline of 16.7%. Over the same period, the vol-\nume of transactions processed through the \nRTGS system also declined by 1%. \nCard Systems \n \n \nThe total value of card based transactions \nrose by 2.4%, from US$254.4 million in Janu-\nary to US$260.5 million in February 2013. \nMobile and Internet Based Transactions \n \n \nThe total value of mobile and internet based \ntransactions decreased by 2.9% to US$199.3 \n-\n0.5 \n1.0 \n1.5 \n2.0 \n2.5 \n3.0 \n3.5 \n4.0 \n-\n50 \n100 \n150 \n200 \n250 \nJul-11\nSep-11\nNov-11\nJan-12\nMar-12\nMay-12\nJul-12\nSep-12\nNov-12\nJan-13\nValue in US$ Billions\nVolume in Thounsands\nZETSS Volumes and Values\nVolume\nValue\n8 \nmillion in February 2013, from US$205.2 mil-\nlion recorded in January 2013. \nCheques \n \nThe total value of cheque transactions increased \nby 5.8%, from US$5.2 million in January 2013 \nto US$5.5 million in February 2013. \n \n \n \nReserve Bank of Zimbabwe \nApril 2013 \n9 \nSTATISTICAL TABLES \nCONTENTS \n \nTable \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nPage \n \n \n1. Monetary Statistics \n \n \n1.1 Monetary Aggregates \n \n \n \n \n \n11 \n \n1.2 Broad Money Survey \n \n \n \n \n \n12 \n \n1.3 Analysis of Monthly Changes in Money Supply \n \n13 \n \n1.4 Analysis of Yearly Changes in Money Supply \n \n \n14 \n \n \n2. Sectoral Analysis of Bank Loans and Advances and Deposits \n \n \n2.1 Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks Loans and Advances 15 \n \n2.2 Sectoral Analysis of Merchant Banks Loans and Advances \n16 \n \n2.3 Sectoral Analysis of Merchant Acceptances \n \n \n17 \n \n2.4 Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks Deposits \n \n18 \n \n2.5 Sectoral Analysis of Merchant Banks Deposits \n \n19 \n \n3. External Statistics \n \n \n3.1 Total External Debt Outstanding by Debtor \n \n \n20 \n \n4. Interest Rates \n \n \n4.1 Lending Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n21 \n \n4.2 Banks Deposit Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n22 \n \n5. Inflation \n \n \n5.1 Monthly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n23 \n \n5.2 Yearly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n24 \n \n6. Exchange Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n25 \n \n \n \n \n \nSTATISTICAL TABLES \nCONTENTS \n \nTable \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nPage \n \n \n7. Commercial Banks \n \n \n7.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n26 \n \n7.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n \n27 \n \n8. Accepting Houses \n \n \n8.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n28 \n \n8.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n \n29 \n \n 9. Building Societies \n \n \n9.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n30 \n \n9.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n \n31 \n \n10. Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Statistics \n \n \n \n \n32 \n \n11. Savings with Financial Institutions \n \n \n \n \n33 \n \n12. Analysis of Liquid Assets of Monetary Banks \n \n \n \n34 \n \n13. ZETSS, Cheques and Cards Activity \n \n \n \n \n35 \n \n10 \n11 \nTABLE 1.1 : MONETARY AGGREGATES \n US$ Thousands \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n2013 \n \nFebruary \nMarch \nApril \nMay \nJune \nJuly \nAugust \nSeptember \nOctober \nNovember \nDecember \nJanuary \nFebruary \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nRBZ Demand Deposits \n84.4 \n83.1 \n82.9 \n78.6 \n79.7 \n80.1 \n80.9 \n82.1 \n80.7 \n79.6 \n80.8 \n78.6 \n78.3 \nComm. Banks Dem. \nDeposits \n1,892,187.10 \n1,855,658.60 \n1,833,486.40 \n1,804,232.70 \n1,815,912.30 \n1,875,149.30 \n1,826,752.40 \n1,869,138.70 \n1,894,495.70 \n1,804,260.40 \n1,981,218.70 \n1,924,517.40 \n1,875,465.40 \nMerchant Banks Dem. \nDeposits \n120,552.40 \n70,044.40 \n89,097.40 \n84,715.00 \n136,052.50 \n110,779.00 \n106,955.10 \n102,471.00 \n112,805.60 \n105,260.20 \n108,094.70 \n106,935.20 \n102,797.70 \nTotal Demand \n2,012,823.80 \n1,925,786.00 \n1,922,666.70 \n1,889,026.30 \n1,952,044.50 \n1,986,008.40 \n1,933,788.40 \n1,971,691.80 \n2,017,382.00 \n1,909,600.20 \n2,089,394.20 \n2,031,531.20 \n1,978,341.39 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nComm. Banks Savings \nDeposits \n163,972.90 \n154,142.30 \n167,459.30 \n161,039.20 \n160,170.30 \n162,953.00 \n171,279.30 \n189,287.90 \n182,029.00 \n288,914.00 \n253,471.90 \n193,007.60 \n192,683.50 \nBuilding Soc. Savings \nDeposits \n128,590.70 \n131,003.70 \n133,025.20 \n156,772.00 \n171,972.60 \n168,562.60 \n171,825.00 \n176,983.10 \n164,699.00 \n163,276.10 \n180,152.60 \n159,093.70 \n168,605.40 \nP O S B Savings \nDeposits \n49,031.30 \n48,916.50 \n46,057.10 \n49,423.70 \n50,001.80 \n51,631.20 \n51,322.20 \n51,747.00 \n50,457.00 \n55,822.70 \n54,893.70 \n55,832.50 \n56,274.20 \nComm. Banks U-30 Day \nDeposits \n568,582.50 \n471,171.90 \n522,894.70 \n622,619.00 \n706,497.80 \n668,743.80 \n716,241.30 \n648,981.90 \n781,995.10 \n593,873.60 \n613,008.00 \n632,215.70 \n708,500.60 \nMerchant Banks U-30 \nDay Deposits \n77,452.00 \n126,730.80 \n116,172.00 \n100,355.40 \n91,241.50 \n36,431.80 \n39,907.30 \n60,358.50 \n35,887.60 \n69,265.10 \n67,930.50 \n91,671.20 \n65,975.90 \nBuilding Soc. U- 30 Day \nDeposits \n81,322.60 \n51,100.00 \n72,310.00 \n77,364.40 \n70,088.70 \n53,684.50 \n59,216 \n70,300.40 \n98,536.70 \n73,514.30 \n65,572.40 \n60,885.90 \n77,091.90 \nTotal Savings and Short \nterm \n1,068,952.10 \n983,065.10 \n1,057,917.30 \n1,167,573.80 \n1,249,972.70 \n1,142,006.90 \n1,209,791 \n1,197,658.80 \n1,313,605.10 \n1,244,665,.8 \n1,235,029.10 \n1,192,706.60 \n1,269,131.48 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nComm. Banks O-30 Day \nDeposits \n126,660.50 \n314,416.20 \n289,006.70 \n347,816.00 \n228,931.50 \n327,819.80 \n192,982.40 \n311,167.70 \n235,566.90 \n424,351.90 \n314,380.70 \n351,356.60 \n297,613.90 \nMerchant Banks O-30 \nDay Deposits \n35,722.40 \n47,602.10 \n41,942.50 \n66,248.40 \n31,257.60 \n65,758.00 \n64,463.70 \n56,445.30 \n60,561...8 \n46,439.30 \n44,191.40 \n21,339.00 \n55,714.00 \nBuilding Soc. O- 30 Day \nDeposits \n115,296.20 \n152,203.50 \n125,863.20 \n93,384.40 \n109,663.70 \n156,055.20 \n170,113.20 \n172,761.30 \n165,382.50 \n179,493.10 \n184,561.20 \n192,823.30 \n194,226.70 \nBuilding Soc. Class C \nDeposits \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nBuilding Soc. Other \nShare Deposits \n10,141.60 \n10,141.60 \n10,141.60 \n10,141.60 \n10,141.60 \n10,141.60 \n10,141.60 \n10,141.60 \n10,141.60 \n10,141.60 \n10,141.60 \n10,141.60 \n10,141.60 \nP O S B Time Deposits \n7,971.20 \n5,404.10 \n6,217.40 \n5,995.00 \n8,259.10 \n9,770.50 \n8,018 \n8,316.80 \n11,324.00 \n9,964.90 \n8,973.90 \n8,497.20 \n8,447.90 \nTotal Long term \n295,791.80 \n529,767.50 \n473,171.30 \n523.585.4 \n388,253.50 \n569,545.10 \n445,718.90 \n558,832.70 \n482,976.80 \n670,390.80 \n562,248.80 \n584,157.70 \n566,144.07 \nGrand Total \n3,377,567.7 \n3,438,618.50 \n3,453,755.30 \n3,580,185.40 \n3,590,270.70 \n3,697,560.40 \n3,589,298.30 \n3,728,183.40 \n3,813,963.80 \n3,824,656.80 \n3,886,672.10 \n3,808,395.50 \n3,813,616.90 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n12 \nTABLE 1.2 : BROAD MONEY SURVEY \n US$ Thousands \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFEBRUARY \nMARCH \nAPRIL \nMAY \nJUNE \nJULY \nAUGUST \nSEPTEMBER \nOCTOBER \nNOVEMBER \nDECEMBER \nJANUARY \nFEBRUARY \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nNET FOREIGN ASSETS \n-69,906.60 \n-358613.1 \n-330,975.30 \n-372,096.90 \n-375,252.50 \n-366,349.80 \n-459,138.70 \n-447,672.70 \n-417,840.40 \n-340,899.70 \n-435,528.80 \n-485,643.40 \n-478,669.10 \n \n Assets \n1,310,340.30 \n1,016,963.80 \n1,049,371.80 \n1,014,946.00 \n1,008,028.90 \n1,010,995.60 \n918,272.00 \n952,305.80 \n964,367.00 \n1,063,411.00 \n1,089,808.50 \n994,812.70 \n988,575.61 \n \n Reserve Bank (RBZ) \n550,967.20 \n487,204.70 \n510,111.80 \n456,394.50 \n439,248.40 \n443,530.60 \n392,913.30 \n431,019.90 \n402,814.90 \n385,911.70 \n447,988.80 \n454,346.10 \n421,879.25 \n \n Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) \n736,966.60 \n508,239.40 \n514,286.00 \n531,555.60 \n547,519.30 \n543,103.30 \n497,720.10 \n490,916.00 \n527,291.20 \n635,377.30 \n599,274.60 \n507,151.40 \n529,296.47 \n \n Other Banking Institutions \n(OBIs) \\1 \n22,406.50 \n21,519.70 \n24,974.00 \n26,996.00 \n21,261.20 \n24,361.70 \n27,638.60 \n30,369.90 \n34,260.90 \n42,122.10 \n42,545.10 \n33,315.20 \n37,399.89 \n \n Liabilities \\2 \n-1,380,246.90 \n-1,375,576.80 \n-1,380,347.10 \n-1,387,042.90 \n-1,383,281.50 \n-1,377,345.40 \n-1,377,410.80 \n-1,399,978.50 \n-1,382,207.30 \n-1,404,310.70 \n-1,525,337.30 \n-1,480,456.00 \n-1,467,244.71 \n \n RBZ \n1,161,635.70 \n1,158,462.90 \n1,157,868.10 \n1,144,411.30 \n1,145,150.60 \n1,142,322.10 \n1,144,176.70 \n1,149,650.90 \n1,147,233.00 \n1,147,319.70 \n1,149,161.20 \n1,149,023.60 \n1,141,623.47 \n \n DMBs \n197,813.20 \n196,138.80 \n200,681.00 \n220,947.20 \n216,314.50 \n217,204.30 \n216,220.20 \n233,273.50 \n211,042.10 \n233,317.40 \n352,118.40 \n311,214.10 \n303,476.08 \n \n OBIs \n20,798.10 \n20,975.10 \n21,798.00 \n21,684.40 \n21,816.30 \n17,818.90 \n17,013.80 \n17,054.10 \n23,932.20 \n23,673.70 \n24,057.80 \n20,218.40 \n22,145.17 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nNET DOMESTIC ASSETS \n3,447,474.30 \n3,797,231.60 \n3,784,730.50 \n3,952,282.30 \n3,965,523.20 \n4,063,910.10 \n4,048,437.10 \n4,175,856.10 \n4,231,804.20 \n4,165,556.50 \n4,322,201.00 \n4,294,038.70 \n4,292,286.03 \n \nDOMESTIC CREDIT \n2,818,438.60 \n3,002,168.00 \n3,022,182.40 \n3,139,957.20 \n3,227,332.40 \n3,362,641.70 \n3,396,416.20 \n3,469,968.40 \n3,502,649.80 \n3,620,952.20 \n3,788,468.50 \n3,777,967.90 \n3,781,756.54 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Claims on Government (net) \n-1,756.00 \n89,582.80 \n88,583.80 \n78,536.20 \n82,193.20 \n79,337.50 \n73,155.70 \n73,214.80 \n80,219.70 \n80,710.40 \n176,058.40 \n166,842.30 \n153,163.97 \n \n RBZ \n-1,755.00 \n-1,761.70 \n-1,718.70 \n-1,733.00 \n-2,106.20 \n-1,522.60 \n-1,502.40 \n-1,514.60 \n-11,344.70 \n-11,034.80 \n-11,097.80 \n-1,225.80 \n-1,192.38 \n \n DMBs \n0 \n91,344.50 \n90,099.00 \n80,045.40 \n84,095.80 \n80,860.20 \n74,658.00 \n74,729.30 \n90,330.70 \n90,511.60 \n185,922.50 \n167,834.50 \n154,122.73 \n \n OBIs \n0 \n0 \n203.6 \n223.8 \n203.6 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n1,233.60 \n1,233.60 \n1,233.60 \n233.6 \n233.63 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Claims on Public Enterprises \n44,043.50 \n29,969.40 \n31,445.00 \n31,792.50 \n49,311.30 \n49,615.70 \n49,289.80 \n46,060.70 \n49,641.40 \n51,464.50 \n51,716.90 \n52,261.10 \n53,708.48 \n \n RBZ \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n \n DMBs \n44,043.50 \n29,969.40 \n31,445.00 \n31,792.50 \n49,311.30 \n49,615.70 \n49,289.80 \n46,060.70 \n49,641.40 \n51,464.50 \n51,716.90 \n52,261.10 \n53,708.48 \n \n Agri-PEs \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n \n \n Other \n-659.7 \n29,969.40 \n31,445.00 \n31,792.50 \n49,311.30 \n49,615.70 \n49,289.80 \n46,060.70 \n49,641.40 \n51,464.50 \n51,716.90 \n52,261.10 \n53,708.48 \n \n OBIs \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Claims on Private Sector \n2,776,151.10 \n2,882,615.80 \n2,902,153.60 \n3,029,628.50 \n3,095,827.90 \n3,233,688.50 \n3,273,970.70 \n3,350,693.00 \n3,372,788.70 \n3,488,777.20 \n3,560,693.20 \n3,558,864.50 \n3,574,884.08 \n \n RBZ \n48,403.20 \n47,708.00 \n44,103.00 \n47,176.70 \n43,759.20 \n38,792.30 \n41,323.60 \n42,548.20 \n42,122.00 \n41,521.50 \n40,636.30 \n41,014.10 \n41,015.10 \n \n DMBs \n2,377,837.40 \n2,484,151.40 \n2,513,158.60 \n2,622,165.20 \n2,663,738.30 \n2,797,404.90 \n2,823,945.60 \n2,897,885.30 \n2,890,646.50 \n2,996,259.40 \n3,065,153.80 \n3,057,321.20 \n3,065,133.69 \n \n OBIs \n349,910.50 \n350,756.40 \n344,891.90 \n360,286.50 \n388,330.30 \n397,491.40 \n408,701.50 \n410,259.50 \n440,020.20 \n450,996.30 \n454,903.20 \n460,529.20 \n468,735.29 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nOTHER ITEMS (NET) \n629,035.70 \n795,063.60 \n762,548.20 \n812,325.10 \n738,190.80 \n701,268.40 \n652,020.90 \n705,887.60 \n729,154.40 \n544,604.30 \n533,732.40 \n516,070.80 \n510,529.50 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nBROAD MONEY (M3) \n3,377,567.70 \n3,438,618.50 \n3,453,755.20 \n3,580,185.40 \n3,590,270.70 \n3,697,560.40 \n3,589,298.30 \n3,728,183.40 \n3,813,963.80 \n3,824,656.80 \n3,886,672.10 \n3,808,395.40 \n3,813,616.93 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n13 \nTABLE 1.3 : ANALYSIS OF MONTHLY CHANGES IN MONEY SUPPLY (M3) \n US$ Thousands \n1. Finance houses, building societies and P. O. S. B. \n2. Sign reversal. \n3. Net Domestic Assets consist of domestic credit and other items net. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFEBRUARY \nMARCH \nAPRIL \nMAY \nJUNE \nJULY \nAUGUST \nSEPTEMBER \nOCTOBER \nNOVEMBER \nDECEMBER \nJANUARY \nFEBRUARY \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nNET FOREIGN \n204,719.00 \n-288,706.50 \n27,637.80 \n-41,121.60 \n-3,155.70 \n8,902.80 \n-92,789.00 \n11,466.10 \n29,832.30 \n76,940.70 \n-94,629.10 \n-50,114.50 \n6,974.25 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Assets \n215,883.30 \n-293,376.60 \n32,408.00 \n-34,425.80 \n-6,917.10 \n2,966.70 \n-92,723.60 \n34,033.80 \n12,061.10 \n99,044.00 \n26,397.50 \n-94,995.80 \n-6,237.07 \n Reserve Bank \n120,183.20 \n-63,762.50 \n22,907.10 \n-53,717.30 \n-17,146.10 \n4,282.20 \n-50,617.30 \n38,106.70 \n-28,205.00 \n-16,903.20 \n62,077.10 \n6,357.30 \n-32,466.80 \n Deposit \nMoney Banks \n(DMBs) \n95,318.30 \n-228,727.20 \n6,046.70 \n17,269.50 \n15,963.80 \n-4,416.00 \n-45,383.20 \n-6,804.10 \n36,375.10 \n108,086.10 \n-36,102.60 \n-92,123.20 \n22,145.09 \n Other \nBanking Institutions \n(OBIs) \\1 \n381.8 \n-886.8 \n3,454.30 \n2,022.00 \n-5,734.70 \n3,100.50 \n3,276.90 \n2,731.30 \n3,891.00 \n7,861.20 \n423 \n-9,229.80 \n4,084.65 \n Liabilities \\2 \n-11,164.30 \n4,670.10 \n-4,770.30 \n-6,695.80 \n3,761.40 \n5,936.10 \n-65.4 \n-22,567.70 \n17,771.10 \n-22,103.40 \n-121,026.60 \n44,881.30 \n13,211.32 \n RBZ \n3,456.60 \n-3,172.80 \n-594.8 \n-13,456.80 \n739.3 \n-2,828.50 \n1,854.60 \n5,474.20 \n-2,417.90 \n86.7 \n1,841.50 \n-137.6 \n-7,400.09 \n DMBs \n8,577.10 \n-1,674.40 \n4,542.10 \n20,266.20 \n-4,632.70 \n889.8 \n-984.1 \n17,053.30 \n-22,231.40 \n22,275.20 \n118,801.00 \n-40,904.20 \n-7,738.03 \n OBIs \n-869.4 \n177 \n823 \n-113.7 \n131.9 \n-3,997.50 \n-805.1 \n40.3 \n6,878.20 \n-258.6 \n384.1 \n-3,839.40 \n1,926.80 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nNET DOMESTIC \n27,824.30 \n349,757.30 \n-12,501.00 \n167,551.70 \n13,240.90 \n98,386.90 \n-15,473.10 \n127,419.00 \n55,948.10 \n-66,247.70 \n156,644.50 \n-28,162.20 \n-1,752.72 \nDOMESTIC \n27,460.10 \n183,729.40 \n20,014.40 \n117,774.80 \n87,375.20 \n135,309.30 \n33,774.50 \n73,552.20 \n32,681.40 \n118,302.40 \n167,516.40 \n-10,500.60 \n3,788.59 \n Claims on \n122.6 \n91,338.80 \n-999 \n-10,047.60 \n3,657.00 \n-2,855.70 \n-6,181.90 \n59.1 \n7,004.90 \n490.8 \n95,348.00 \n-9,216.10 \n-13,678.34 \n RBZ \n123.6 \n-6.7 \n43 \n-14.3 \n-373.2 \n583.5 \n20.3 \n-12.2 \n-9,830.10 \n309.9 \n-63 \n9,872.00 \n33.43 \n DMBs \n0 \n91,345.50 \n-1,245.50 \n-10,053.60 \n4,050.40 \n-3,235.60 \n-6,202.10 \n71.3 \n15,601.40 \n180.9 \n95,410.90 \n-18,088.00 \n-13,711.77 \n OBIs \n0 \n0 \n203.6 \n20.2 \n-20.2 \n-203.6 \n0 \n0 \n1,233.60 \n0 \n0 \n-1,000.00 \n0 \n Claims on Public \n-659.7 \n-14,074.10 \n1,475.60 \n347.5 \n17,518.80 \n304.3 \n-325.8 \n-3,229.10 \n3,580.70 \n1,823.10 \n252.4 \n544.3 \n1,447.33 \n RBZ \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n DMBs \n-659.7 \n-14,074.10 \n1,475.60 \n347.5 \n17,518.80 \n304.3 \n-325.8 \n-3,229.10 \n3,580.70 \n18231 \n252.4 \n544.3 \n1,447.33 \n Agri-PEs \n0 \n-1 \n-1 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n-4,771.80 \n-4,772.80 \n-4,773.80 \n-4,774.80 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n Other \n-659.7 \n-14,073.10 \n1,476.60 \n347.5 \n17,518.80 \n304.3 \n4,446.00 \n1,543.70 \n8,354.50 \n6,597.90 \n252.4 \n544.3 \n1,447.33 \n OBIs \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n Claims on \n27,997.20 \n106,464.70 \n19,537.70 \n127,474.90 \n66,199.40 \n137,860.60 \n40,282.20 \n76,722.30 \n22,095.70 \n115,988.50 \n71,916.00 \n-1,828.70 \n16,019.59 \n RBZ \n1,600.30 \n-695.2 \n-3,605.00 \n3,073.70 \n-3,417.50 \n-4,967.00 \n2,531.30 \n1,224.60 \n-426.2 \n-600.5 \n-885.3 \n377.8 \n1 \n DMBs \n12,334.30 \n106,314.00 \n29,007.30 \n109,006.50 \n41,573.10 \n133,666.60 \n26,540.70 \n73,939.70 \n-7,238.70 \n105,612.90 \n68,894.30 \n-7,832.60 \n7,812.52 \n OBIs \n14,062.60 \n845.9 \n-5,864.50 \n15,394.60 \n28,043.80 \n9,161.00 \n11,210.10 \n1,558.00 \n29,760.70 \n10,976.10 \n3,906.90 \n5,626.00 \n8,206.07 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nOTHER ITEMS \n364.2 \n166,027.90 \n-32,515.40 \n49,777.00 \n-74,134.30 \n-36,922.40 \n-49,247.60 \n53,866.80 \n23,266.70 \n-184,550.10 \n-10,871.90 \n-17,661.60 \n-5,541.30 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nBROAD MONEY \n232,543.30 \n61,050.80 \n15,136.70 \n126,430.10 \n10,085.30 \n107,289.70 \n-108,262.00 \n138,885.10 \n85,780.40 \n10,692.90 \n62,015.40 \n-78,276.70 \n5,221.54 \nGROWTH RATES \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Broad Money \n7.40% \n1.80% \n0.40% \n3.70% \n0.30% \n3.00% \n-2.90% \n3.90% \n2.30% \n0.30% \n1.60% \n-2.00% \n0.14% \n Domestic Credit \n1.00% \n6.50% \n0.70% \n3.90% \n2.80% \n4.20% \n1.00% \n2.20% \n0.90% \n3.40% \n4.60% \n-0.30% \n0.10% \n Claims on \n1.00% \n3.80% \n0.70% \n4.40% \n2.20% \n4.50% \n1.20% \n2.30% \n0.70% \n3.40% \n2.10% \n-0.10% \n0.45% \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nTABLE 1.4 : ANALYSIS OF YEARLY CHANGES IN MONEY SUPPLY (M3) \n \n \n \n \n$ Thousands \n \n \n \n \n14 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFEBRUARY \nMARCH \nAPRIL \nMAY \nJUNE \nJULY \nAUGUST \nSEPTEMBER \nOCTOBER \nNOVEMBER \nDECEMBER \nJANUARY \nFEBRUARY \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nNET FOREIGN ASSETS \n150,031.80 \n-107,880.30 \n-27,421.40 \n-103,677.30 \n-202,674.90 \n-89,936.30 \n-190,761.00 \n-131,411.50 \n-100,210.80 \n-19,830.80 \n-139,041.90 \n-211,017.80 \n-408,762.52 \n Assets \n231,987.30 \n-32,780.10 \n63,059.10 \n4,008.90 \n-129,754.20 \n-42,038.00 \n-142,367.40 \n-71,725.60 \n-81,928.20 \n36,818.40 \n33,821.10 \n-99,644.30 \n-321,764.74 \n Reserve Bank (RBZ) \n74,172.50 \n42,857.60 \n83,610.00 \n20,800.00 \n-95,804.20 \n-5,809.40 \n-77,953.30 \n-5,234.10 \n-34,371.40 \n-34,330.10 \n33,849.90 \n23,562.10 \n-129,087.95 \n Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) \n145,135.60 \n-86,779.10 \n-38,349.10 \n-41,001.10 \n-41,235.80 \n10,917.80 \n-76,767.00 \n-84,133.70 \n-68,113.20 \n53,083.10 \n-22,552.60 \n-134,496.90 \n-207,670.13 \n Other Banking Institutions (OBIs) \n\\1 \n12,679.20 \n11,141.50 \n17,798.20 \n24,210.00 \n7,285.80 \n10,917.80 \n12,352.80 \n17,642.10 \n20,556.40 \n18,065.40 \n22,523.80 \n11,290.50 \n14,993.34 \n Liabilities \\2 \n-81,955.40 \n-75,100.20 \n-90,480.50 \n-107,686.20 \n-72,920.70 \n-47,898.30 \n-48,393.50 \n-59,685.90 \n-18,282.60 \n-56,649.10 \n-172,863.00 \n-111,373.40 \n-86,997.79 \n RBZ \n-2,136.70 \n-10,095.40 \n-14,778.20 \n-22,208.00 \n-23,594.10 \n-28,246.40 \n-27,498.90 \n-21,730.40 \n-33,783.90 \n-20,811.30 \n-2,908.60 \n-9,155.50 \n-20,012.20 \n DMBs \n63,294.00 \n64,220.60 \n83,460.60 \n108,209.80 \n74,698.50 \n78,373.30 \n79,089.80 \n89,568.80 \n53,504.60 \n79,315.30 \n177,406.00 \n121,978.00 \n105,662.89 \n OBIs \n20,798.10 \n20,975.10 \n21,798.00 \n21,684.40 \n21,816.30 \n-2,228.60 \n-3,197.30 \n-8,152.60 \n-1,438.00 \n-1,854.90 \n-1,634.40 \n-1,449.10 \n1,347.09 \nNET DOMESTIC ASSETS \\3 \n769,411.20 \n968,318.40 \n879,760.10 \n950,213.50 \n893,222.20 \n880,494.10 \n827,621.50 \n830,303.80 \n860,964.80 \n755,911.50 \n925,312.70 \n874,388.80 \n844,811.73 \nDOMESTIC CREDIT \n908,726.40 \n985,554.80 \n901,624.20 \n892,017.10 \n842,025.30 \n864,860.40 \n822,357.30 \n802,510.00 \n795,755.70 \n873,159.50 \n990,341.70 \n986,989.40 \n963,317.91 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Claims on Government (net) \n482.6 \n91,868.60 \n91,058.50 \n80,446.20 \n84,027.80 \n81,808.40 \n75,191.50 \n74,845.90 \n82,122.60 \n82,338.10 \n177,893.20 \n168,720.90 \n154,919.99 \n DMBs \n-295.3 \n91,139.30 \n90,099.00 \n80,045.40 \n84,095.80 \n80,860.20 \n74,658.00 \n74,729.30 \n90,330.70 \n90,511.60 \n185,922.50 \n167,834.50 \n154,123.73 \n OBIs \n0 \n0 \n203.6 \n223.8 \n203.6 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n1,233.60 \n1,233.60 \n1,233.60 \n233.6 \n233.625 \n Claims on Public Enterprises \n20,429.30 \n4,194.40 \n5,024.70 \n2,323.80 \n9,520.40 \n5,300.20 \n7,279.80 \n-3,179.60 \n49.8 \n9,427.10 \n6,792.40 \n7,557.90 \n9,664.95 \n RBZ \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n DMBs \n20,429.30 \n4,194.40 \n5,024.70 \n2,323.80 \n9,520.40 \n5,300.20 \n7,279.80 \n-3,179.60 \n49.8 \n9,427.10 \n6,792.40 \n7,557.90 \n9,664.95 \n Agri-PEs \n-2,338.30 \n-2,339.30 \n-252.3 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n Other \n22,767.60 \n6,533.70 \n5,277.00 \n2,323.80 \n9,520.40 \n5,300.20 \n7,279.80 \n-3,179.60 \n49.8 \n9,427.10 \n6,793.40 \n7,557.90 \n9,665.95 \n OBIs \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n Claims on Private Sector \n887,814.40 \n889,491.80 \n805,541.00 \n809,247.00 \n748,477.10 \n777,751.70 \n739,886.00 \n730,843.70 \n713,583.30 \n781,394.30 \n805,656.00 \n810,710.60 \n798,732.97 \n RBZ \n12,750.00 \n10,669.40 \n7,991.30 \n10,864.80 \n3,313.70 \n665 \n1,765.10 \n-9,455.10 \n-9,387.20 \n-3,975.50 \n-3,903.10 \n-5,788.80 \n-7,388.11 \n DMBs \n678,407.60 \n704,828.20 \n648,551.40 \n654,211.80 \n584,559.50 \n616,003.90 \n597,497.20 \n617,287.40 \n574,157.10 \n654,515.10 \n687,696.60 \n691,818.10 \n687,296.33 \n OBIs \n196,656.80 \n173,994.20 \n148,998.40 \n144,170.40 \n160,603.90 \n161,082.90 \n140,623.70 \n123,011.40 \n148,813.50 \n130,854.70 \n121,862.50 \n124,681.30 \n118,824.75 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nOTHER ITEMS (NET) \n-139,315.20 \n-17,236.40 \n-21,864.10 \n58,196.40 \n51,196.90 \n15,633.70 \n5,264.20 \n27,793.80 \n65,209.10 \n-117,248.00 \n-65,029.00 \n-112,600.70 \n-118,506.18 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nBROAD MONEY (M3) \n919,443.00 \n860,438.10 \n852,338.70 \n846,536.20 \n690,547.40 \n790,557.90 \n636,860.50 \n698,892.30 \n760,753.90 \n736,080.70 \n786,270.80 \n663,371.00 \n436,049.20 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nGROWTH RATES \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Broad Money (M3) \n37.40% \n33.40% \n32.80% \n31.00% \n23.80% \n27.20% \n21.60% \n23.10% \n24.90% \n23.80% \n25.40% \n21.10% \n12.91% \n Domestic Credit \n47.60% \n48.90% \n42.50% \n39.70% \n35.30% \n34.60% \n31.90% \n30.10% \n29.40% \n31.80% \n35.40% \n35.40% \n34.18% \n Claims on Private Sector \n47.00% \n44.60% \n38.40% \n36.40% \n31.90% \n31.70% \n29.20% \n27.90% \n26.80% \n28.90% \n29.20% \n29.50% \n28.77% \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n15 \nTABLE 2.1 : SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS LOANS AND ADVANCES \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ Thousands \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAGRICULTURE \nCONSTRUCTION \nCOMMUNICA-\nTION \nDISTRIBU-\nTION \nFINANCIAL \n& \nFINANCIAL \nMANUFAC-\nTURING \nMINING \nSERVICES TRANSPORT \nINDIVIDUALS \nCONGLOMER-\nATES/1 \nTOTAL \nEND OF \n \n \n \n \nINVEST-\nMENTS \nORGANISA-\nTIONS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n363,990.9 \n39,589.6 \n27,332.8 \n322,510.1 \n8,749.9 \n74,636.2 \n336,196.7 \n77,655.7 \n198,437.3 \n52,515.7 \n171,956.3 \n1,013.2 \n1,674,584.5 \nFEBRUARY \n352,190.20 \n36,718.69 \n26,551.03 \n284,567.87 \n9,291.08 \n85,886.99 \n336,261.49 \n88,738.25 \n202,845.20 \n53,191.93 \n172,424.01 \n1,567.65 \n1,650,234.17 \nMARCH \n354,440.8 \n37,811.0 \n31,484.9 \n328,381.1 \n8,193.5 \n92,178.6 \n324,375.5 \n108,000.1 \n205,453.7 \n32,088.9 \n174,479.6 \n1,583.8 \n1,698,471.4 \nAPRIL \n341,893.5 \n30,462.0 \n33,633.8 \n358,038.0 \n5,558.5 \n78,498.4 \n334,699.5 \n110,765.7 \n220,956.5 \n26,181.8 \n179,845.8 \n1,355.3 \n1,721,888.8 \nMAY \n375,541.0 \n30,286.7 \n31,158.4 \n350,097.9 \n7,623.4 \n97,695.7 \n327,187.7 \n113,796.7 \n207,041.1 \n28,432.9 \n202,146.6 \n1,738.3 \n1,772,746.5 \nJUNE \n402,314.1 \n30,399.7 \n37,466.6 \n356,842.2 \n7,580.8 \n28,025.9 \n337,059.2 \n130,973.8 \n201,898.0 \n40,295.4 \n219,606.7 \n1,649.8 \n1,794,112.2 \nJULY \n416,536.2 \n26,795.9 \n36,424.2 \n369,410.8 \n8,174.0 \n26,119.1 \n348,484.2 \n136,934.2 \n203,314.6 \n36,869.5 \n249,542.8 \n3,382.6 \n1,861,988.0 \nAUGUST \n422,545.8 \n30,950.3 \n43,395.1 \n390,558.4 \n8,333.0 \n29,323.9 \n348,252.0 \n146,338.5 \n173,945.4 \n55,950.3 \n254,919.8 \n3,523.5 \n1,907,991.4 \nSEPTEMBER \n431,501.7 \n36,637.9 \n38,487.8 \n384,840.8 \n6,828.2 \n37,420.1 \n396,813.5 \n145,657.9 \n219,452.1 \n29,378.2 \n254,248.3 \n5,036.1 \n1,986,302.5 \nOCTOBER \n444,653.7 \n33,583.2 \n34,764.4 \n411,489.2 \n9,551.4 \n29,439.4 \n401,206.1 \n144,223.4 \n230,809.2 \n35,103.6 \n271,795.8 \n6,715.9 \n2,053,335.2 \nNOVEMBER \n444,527.3 \n33,548.0 \n37,207.3 \n428,008.3 \n10,704.6 \n32,236.2 \n417,838.2 \n142,715.0 \n228,088.4 \n36,568.0 \n267,282.0 \n8,055.2 \n2,087,778.7 \nDECEMBER \n444,341.0 \n32,622.8 \n37,353.2 \n428,782.2 \n8,513.2 \n31,513.9 \n414,044.9 \n148,927.9 \n233,864.4 \n33,116.1 \n288,628.5 \n9,370.9 \n2,111,078.9 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n450,170.0 \n31,073.4 \n38,762.3 \n426,050.9 \n11,967.9 \n31,547.4 \n417,961.3 \n144,645.1 \n237,323.7 \n33,906.5 \n300,841.1 \n9,373.1 \n2,133,622.7 \nFREBRUARY \n494,536.6 \n33,786.9 \n28,372.0 \n439,556.7 \n14,811.4 \n33,948.5 \n409,692.7 \n128,242.7 \n303,269.9 \n38,235.9 \n298,171.5 \n3,685.5 \n2,226,310.2 \n1. These are large corporation with business operations covering across a number of sectors. \nTABLE 2.2 :SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF MERCHANT BANKS LOANS AND ADVANCES \n \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ Thousands \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAGRICULTURE \nCONSTRUCTION DISTRIBUTION \nFINANCIAL \nFINANCIAL \nMANUFACTUR-\nING \nMINING \nSERVICES TRANSPORT INDIVIDUALS CONGLOM-\nERATES \nTOTAL \nEND OF \n \n \n \nINVESTMENT ORGANISATIONS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n35,376.1 \n10,738.7 \n47,937.8 \n17,312.5 \n50,388.0 \n66,466.5 \n39,965.4 \n84,903.2 \n26,657.0 \n71,065.7 \n2,342.2 \n453,153.1 \nFEBRUARY \n34,059.98 \n13,041.24 \n52,903.21 \n13,996.58 \n16,604.58 \n63,567.90 \n54,375.98 \n102,197.29 \n38,026,78 \n79,721.89 \n4,643.07 \n473,138.50 \nMARCH \n39,424.8 \n9 774.0 \n61,447.5 \n17,975.5 \n16,996.3 \n58,655.1 \n41,242.3 \n105,237.4 \n24,714.2 \n78,820.4 \n12,938.4 \n467,225.9 \nAPRIL \n43,485.3 \n10,392.5 \n61,081.2 \n19,067.3 \n19,238.3 \n57,209.2 \n43,704.5 \n106,196.8 \n36,968.1 \n84,346.1 \n4,839.5 \n486,528.7 \nMAY \n78,656.9 \n13,181.3 \n27,476.1 \n12,928.2 \n22,947.0 \n62,231.5 \n79,196.3 \n74,699.3 \n47,191.6 \n115,625.4 \n8,319.3 \n542,453.4 \nJUNE \n99,949.6 \n12,989.0 \n55,552.6 \n15,544.8 \n22,884.4 \n64,832.4 \n58,599.9 \n91,171.3 \n33,744.2 \n125,204.9 \n7,515.8 \n587,988.8 \nJULY \n57,212.2 \n15,008.9 \n28,053.9 \n25,999.1 \n48,343.1 \n66,151.0 \n76,442.2 \n92,251.0 \n46,904.3 \n111,009.8 \n4,461.3 \n571,836.8 \nAUGUST \n49,200.5 \n14,198.6 \n38,216.6 \n26,733.6 \n27,.22.2 \n54,208.9 \n65,862.8 \n65,893.7 \n44,173.3 \n114,603.8 \n7,371.6 \n507,485.6 \nSEPTEMBER \n57,953.8 \n14,365.5 \n37,230.9 \n27,211.1 \n27,365.5 \n54,699.3 \n67,007.8 \n69,196.8 \n43,515.1 \n119,899.9 \n7,225.4 \n525,670.8 \nOCTOBER \n62,501.8 \n15,369.1 \n50,322.8 \n13,991.3 \n43,176.3 \n76,085.7 \n 84,137.4 \n74,481.1 \n36,442.3 \n 159,860.1 \n7,139.6 \n 623,507.5 \nNOVEMBER \n79,498.6 \n17,399.0 \n51,214.2 \n37,028.4 \n41,525.2 \n68,737.1 \n65,831.1 \n81,757.5 \n41,273.6 \n165,811.3 \n8,614.2 \n658,690.2 \nDECEMBER \n69,626.60 \n17,100.57 \n61,871.18 \n35,218.31 \n38,605.14 \n76,364.84 \n79,801.05 \n85,485.21 \n45,026.61 \n166,500.19 \n8,482.65 \n684,082.35 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n67,517.6 \n16,163.5 \n56,807.8 \n18,616.7 \n58,326.4 \n78,419.6 \n89,890.9 \n106,553.9 \n18,590.6 \n144,497.3 \n15,986.5 \n671,370.72 \nFEBRUARY \n58,292.9 \n21,826.4 \n56,104.4 \n18,101.2 \n62,883.5 \n78,714.5 \n89,292.0 \n117,785.5 \n17,680.2 \n128,827.9 \n9,967.9 \n668,578.1 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n16 \n17 \nTABLE 2.3 :SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF MERCHANT BANKS ACCEPTANCES \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ Thousands \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAGRICULTURE \nDISTRIBUTION \nFINANCIAL \nFINANCIAL \nMANUFACTURING \nMINING \nSERVICES \nTRANSPORT \nINDIVIDUALS \nCONGLOMERATES \nTOTAL \nEND OF \n \n \nINVESTMENT ORGANISATIONS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n15,494.8 \n1,897.5 \n0.0 \n479,6 \n31,053.3 \n31,756.6 \n20,082.4 \n0.0 \n1,516.1 \n3,623.5 \n105,903.9 \n FEBRUARY \n 16,359.6 \n483.9 \n0.0 \n734.6 \n32,663.4 \n15,907.7 \n5,112.6 \n0.0 \n301.8 \n0.0 \n71,563.6 \nMARCH \n15,328.4 \n4,816.6 \n0.0 \n734.6 \n33,053.5 \n22,330.2 \n3,206.4 \n0.0 \n301.8 \n0.0 \n75,436.7 \nAPRIL \n7,793.4 \n831.6 \n0.0 \n180.6 \n19,825.5 \n23,032.0 \n12,462.5 \n102.0 \n189.3 \n0.0 \n69,482.2 \nMAY \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n2,055.8 \n14,431.9 \n15,786.1 \n17,666.6 \n589.7 \n2,850.8 \n836.1 \n54,217..1 \nJUNE \n1,031.1 \n1,011.3 \n0.0 \n1,875.2 \n13,904.0 \n21,823.7 \n16,562.2 \n0.0 \n189.3 \n836.1 \n57,233.0 \nJULY \n125.6 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n7,054.0 \n19,331.9 \n14,121.2 \n1,533.9 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n42,166.6 \nAUGUST \n0.0 \n913.3 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n13,898.0 \n13,694.7 \n18,347.2 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n46,853.3 \nSEPTEMBER \n0.0 \n11,242.5 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n12,193.0 \n15,228.3 \n3,969.9 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n42,633.7 \nOCTOBER \n0.0 \n1,135.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n2,134.9 \n28,261.6 \n204.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n31,735.5 \nNOVEMBER \n8,373.2 \n3,045.0 \n11,889.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n11,190.4 \n0.0 \n34,497.7 \nDECEMBER \n6,559.3 \n1,430.0 \n14,889.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n11,190.4 \n70.0 \n34,138.7 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n70.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n3,641.0 \n18,088.3 \n1,189.0 \n11,190.4 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n34,178.7 \nFEBRUARY \n100.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n8,000.0 \n14,889.0 \n1,569.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n24,558.3 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n18 \n TABLE 2.4 : SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS DEPOSITS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ Thousands \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nEND OF \nAGRICUL-\nTURE \nCONSTRUC-\nTION \nCOMMUNI-\nCATIONS \nDISTRIBU-\nTION \nFINANCIAL \n& \nFINANCIAL MANUFACTUR-\nING \nMINING \nSERVICES TRANSPORT \nINDIVIDUALS \nCONGLOMERATES \nTOTAL \n \n \n \n \n \nINVEST-\nMENTS \nORGANISA-\nTIONS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n137,919.4 \n35,324.8 \n106,812.5 \n296,807.8 \n116,945.8 \n277,304.7 \n268,525.2 \n119,278.5 \n515,754.9 \n21,989.9 \n431,208.6 \n14,582.8 \n2,342,454.9 \n FEBRUARY \n132,404.53 \n36,283.33 \n110,794.26 \n341,462.75 \n99,165.46 \n288,834.34 \n264,450.53 \n104,923.38 \n577,378.61 \n22,873.9 \n467,084.94 \n14,234.06 \n2,459,890.1 \nMARCH \n121,233.1 \n38,555.4 \n124,038.5 \n348,687.2 \n93,320.0 \n263’552.7 \n276,941.5 \n76,084.4 \n629,624.3 \n24,984.1 \n468,608.5 \n14,756.2 \n2,480,386.1 \nAPRIL \n127,168.8 \n39,606.6 \n115,033.7 \n331,306.5 \n83,707.8 \n289,829.1 \n276,208.7 \n75,855.9 \n644,979.8 \n24,822.5 \n465,129 \n14,829.3 \n2,488,477.6 \nMAY \n124,277.7 \n43,333.7 \n142,130.1 \n370,561.1 \n93,500.0 \n249,454.2 \n299,116.6 \n86,314.7 \n648,511.1 \n28,279.3 \n516,523.0 \n16,891.5 \n2,618,892.9 \nJUNE \n84,589.8 \n51,354.0 \n132,428.7 \n351,179.8 \n98,785.6 \n375,613.6 \n214,696.7 \n76,370.1 \n727,955.7 \n36,208.4 \n456,454.4 \n18,727.6 \n2,624,364.4 \nJULY \n106,470.8 \n47,401.0 \n131,489.0 \n345,036.3 \n70,487,9 \n397,969.7 \n213,370.5 \n89,915.4 \n726,447.6 \n46,000.4 \n505,054.1 \n29,735.3 \n2,709,378.0 \nAUGUST \n99,151.6 \n49,226.4 \n116,820.6 \n363,080.1 \n382,619.4 \n71,775.9 \n216,433.0 \n73,978.5 \n737,065.6 \n48,183.8 \n488,183.8 \n28,785.3 \n2,663,379.8 \nSEPTEMBER \n113,907.6 \n43,671.0 \n125,801.3 \n276,363.0 \n177,790.6 \n429,596.7 \n228,342.2 \n82,777.7 \n651,389.2 \n48,764.9 \n517,788.8 \n29,019.9 \n2,725,213.0 \nOCTOBER \n101,122.4 \n48,716.9 \n155,798.3 \n313,982.4 \n257,300.6 \n409,730.0 \n245,131.8 \n83,995.5 \n661,217.2 \n48,396.8 \n534,643.6 \n26,158.0 \n2,886,193.5 \nNOVEMBER \n104,695.1 \n53,233.8 \n151,359.5 \n348,390.4 \n185,802.5 \n464,782.4 \n269,513.8 \n85,906.9 \n962,840.9 \n47,647.2 \n548,847.7 \n23,130.6 \n3,246,150.7 \nDECEMBER \n96,098.4 \n50,492.7 \n126,343.5 \n379,068.0 \n198,323.3 \n509,241.6 \n280,975.4 \n95,457.1 \n582,286.2 \n41,852.2 \n538,135.2 \n26,491.3 \n2,924,764.8 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n91,648.8 \n48,329.1 \n128,426.0 \n351,566.7 \n212,401.7 \n494,823.6 \n252,389.7 \n93,470.0 \n658,260.1 \n44,091.4 \n512,289.8 \n32,145.9 \n2,919,842.6 \nFEBRUARY \n96,796.5 \n48,491.5 \n147,571.5 \n360,757.9 \n 147,995.9 \n 578,306.4 \n284,603.8 \n64,530.5 \n679,554.8 \n41,983.6 \n516,431.2 \n25,275.3 \n2,991.999.1 \n19 \n TABLE 2.5 : SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF MERCHANT BANKS DEPOSITS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ Thousands \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAGRICUL-\nTURE \nCOMMUNICA-\nTIONS \nCONSTRUC-\nTION \nDISTRIBU-\nTION \nFINANCIAL \n& \nFINANCIAL MANUFACTUR-\nING \nMINING \nSERVICES \nTRANSPORT \nINDIVIDUALS \nCONGLOMER-\nATES \nTOTAL \nEND OF \n \n \n \n \nINVEST-\nMENTS \nORGANISA-\nTIONS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n11,744.1 \n8,250.4 \n7.1 \n3,238.1 \n129,742.5 \n80,306.4 \n17,664.5 \n9,146.5 \n158,059.3 \n1,650.5 \n113,108.8 \n3,038.0 \n535,956.3 \nFEBRUARY \n14,684.8 \n5,815.5 \n6.8 \n23,523.2 \n131,181.2 \n95,143.4 \n21,911.4 \n22,184.5 \n131,968.5 \n1,350.6 \n149,680.8 \n3,038.0 \n600,488.7 \n MARCH \n 46,519.8 \n 5,039.7 \n1,662.6 \n4,119.3 \n127,903.5 \n 91,695.5 \n 17,886.8 \n 39,142.1 \n143,818.6 \n 4,669.7 \n 83,525.1 \n28,564.2 \n594,546.8 \nAPRIL \n24,233.2 \n8,046.5 \n1,868.8 \n27,036.4 \n121,160.1 \n109,064.2 \n36,456.3 \n30,240.9 \n151,505.2 \n4,892.5 \n75,547.7 \n29,200.4 \n619,252.1 \nMAY \n10,329.7 \n6,452.6 \n1,765.0 \n12,678.2 \n115,998.5 \n103,213.2 \n35,266.7 \n25,989.8 \n183,915.3 \n6,141.2 \n63,313.3 \n39,110.5 \n604,173.9 \nJUNE \n10,271.8 \n7,330.0 \n1,698.4 \n9,186.1 \n134,312.0 \n129,103.5 \n26,823.0 \n22,693.9 \n173,514.3 \n4,286.6 \n62,007.9 \n30,818.9 \n612,046.3 \nJULY \n4,473.9 \n5,298.2 \n270.1 \n27,217.9 \n132,809.8 \n98,744.9 \n30,365.9 \n21,415.7 \n217,331.4 \n2,077.4 \n57,143.0 \n33,601.7 \n630,749.9 \nAUGUST \n6,744.1 \n6,765.6 \n288.6 \n26,394.2 \n123,569.3 \n83,662.1 \n33,578.1 \n18,015.7 \n222,325.8 \n2,979.2 \n92,733.9 \n33,058.9 \n650,115.6 \nSEPTEMBER \n16,997.7 \n8,628.2 \n300.8 \n27,315.7 \n124,411.1 \n85,232.7 \n50,279.5 \n27,896.5 \n208,113.3 \n2,000.9 \n85,429.2 \n34,840.8 \n671,446.4 \nOCTOBER \n4,473.9 \n5,298.2 \n270.1 \n3,119.1 \n124,342.3 \n115,774.8 \n30,524.5 \n21,415.7 \n191,204.2 \n2,077.4 \n153,329.1 \n32,049.8 \n683,879.0 \nNOVEMBER \n12,872.8 \n10,868.0 \n13,414.5 \n1,649.6 \n174,107.7 \n60,405.7 \n18,484.7 \n35,828.3 \n188,441.9 \n4,251.7 \n203,879.7 \n27,745.0 \n751,949.6 \nDECEMBER \n12,164.3 \n5,900.3 \n14,197.9 \n3,080.8 \n173,009.4 \n60,501.2 \n17,631.4 \n137,537.4 \n198,977.5 \n2,664.8 \n79,504.3 \n32,534.7 \n737,703.9 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n11,723.2 \n6,581.0 \n10,921.0 \n751.4 \n180,889.6 \n64,042.8 \n16,845.3 \n28,513.2 \n215,563.4 \n2,547.7 \n113,832.1 \n34,578.4 \n686,789.2 \nFEBRUARY \n10,020.1 \n7,034.4 \n11,383.1 \n1,419.4 \n196,108.5 \n51,751.6 \n16,973.1 \n28,365.1 \n187,610.2 \n6,432.7 \n70,211.6 \n34,798.8 \n622,108.3 \n20 \nTABLE 3.1: ZIMBABWE: EXTERNAL DEBT OUTSTANDING BY DEBTOR (INCLUDING ALL ARREARS BUT EXCLUDING PENALTIES) \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nEnd Period \n1999 \n2000 \n2001 \n2002 \n2003 \n2004 \n2005 \n2006 \n2007 \n2008 \n2009 \n2010 \n(US$ millions) \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nLong-Term External Debt \n3,530 \n3,227 \n3,255 \n3,327 \n3,644 \n3,927 \n3,805 \n3,965 \n4,032 \n4,464 \n4,339 \n5,010 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nGovernment \n2,461 \n2,249 \n2,328 \n2,376 \n2,617 \n2,844 \n2,895 \n3,024 \n3,054 \n3,464 \n3,317 \n3,493 \nBilateral Creditors \n935 \n1,050 \n1,115 \n1,107 \n1,255 \n1,455 \n1,438 \n1,520 \n1,520 \n1,863 \n1,716 \n1,855 \nMultilateral Creditors \n1,235 \n1,199 \n1,213 \n1,269 \n1,362 \n1,389 \n1,457 \n1,504 \n1,524 \n1,592 \n1,591 \n1,627 \nPrivate Creditors \n291 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n10 \n10 \n10 \n10 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nPublic Enterprises \n543 \n534 \n568 \n616 \n698 \n714 \n709 \n766 \n790 \n825 \n825 \n825 \nBilateral Creditors \n316 \n301 \n315 \n351 \n403 \n442 \n439 \n464 \n474 \n497 \n497 \n497 \nMultilateral Creditors \n224 \n233 \n253 \n265 \n295 \n272 \n270 \n302 \n316 \n327 \n327 \n327 \nPrivate Creditors \n3 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nMonetary Authorities \n364 \n292 \n292 \n279 \n288 \n291 \n144 \n130 \n137 \n140 \n140 \n550 \nMultilateral Creditors - IMF \n364 \n292 \n292 \n279 \n288 \n291 \n144 \n130 \n137 \n140 \n140 \n550 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nPrivate \n162 \n152 \n67 \n56 \n41 \n78 \n57 \n45 \n51 \n35 \n57 \n142 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nShort-Term External Debt \n532 \n298 \n167 \n183 \n169 \n144 \n173 \n281 \n387 \n226 \n1,348 \n2,040 \nSupplier's Credits \n150 \n42 \n13 \n26 \n51 \n69 \n107 \n122 \n178 \n41 \n193 \n286 \nReserve Bank \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n998 \n1,300 \nPrivate \n382 \n256 \n154 \n157 \n118 \n75 \n66 \n159 \n209 \n185 \n156 \n454 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nTotal External Debt/1 \n4,062 \n3,525 \n3,422 \n3,510 \n3,812 \n4,071 \n3,978 \n4,246 \n4,607 \n4,690 \n5,687 \n7,050 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nGross Domestic Product \n5,990 \n6,107 \n10,887 \n6,715 \n5,037 \n4,299 \n2,918 \n6,645 \n4,000 \n3,175 \n5,836 \n7,495 \nExternal Debt / GDP \n68% \n57.7% \n31.4% \n52.3% \n75.7% \n94.7% \n136.3% \n63.9% \n110.5% \n147.7% \n97.4% \n94.1% \n/1 Total external debt excludes penalties \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSOURCE: Ministry of Finance and Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n21 \nTABLE 4.1 LENDING RATES (percent per annum)1 \n \nCommercial Banks \nMerchant Banks \n \n \n \n \nWeighted Average Lending \nRates3 \n \nWeighted Average Lending \nRates3 \n \n \nEnd Period \nNominal \nLending \nRates2 \nIndividuals \nCorporate \nNominal \nLending \nRates2 \nIndividuals \nCorporate \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nMar \n8.00-30.00 \n16.04 \n12.53 \n14.00-35.00 \n18.17 \n13.26 \n \n \nApr \n8.00-30.00 \n15.00 \n13.06 \n13.00-25.00 \n18.37 \n16.36 \n \n \nMay \n6.00-30.00 \n14.98 \n11.86 \n15.00-30.00 \n15.78 \n14.47 \n \n \nJun \n6.00-35.00 \n13.81 \n11.58 \n15.00-30.00 \n17.86 \n14.05 \n \n \nJul \n6.00-35.00 \n14.32 \n10.88 \n15.00-30.00 \n17.92 \n13.93 \n \n \nAug \n6.00-35.00 \n15.65 \n10.74 \n15.00-30.00 \n17.94 \n13.95 \n \n \nSep \n6.00-35.00 \n13.25 \n11.14 \n15.00-30.00 \n17.98 \n13.92 \n \n \nOct \n6.00-35.00 \n13.35 \n11.03 \n13.00-30.00 \n17.98 \n13.95 \n \n \nNov \n6.00-35.00 \n15.25 \n10.88 \n13.00-25.00 \n17.91 \n14.42 \n \n \nFeb \n10.00-35.00 \n14.83 \n10.53 \n13.00-25.00 \n17.93 \n14.36 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nNotes \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1. Table revised, to separate weighted lending rates for individuals and corporate bodies. \n \n2. Nominal Lending Rates depict the range of rates quoted by banks. \n \n \n \n \n3. Lending rates exclude rates on staff loans. \nDec \n10.00-35.00 \n15.08 \n10.40 \n15.00-25.00 \n17.93 \n14.43 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n10.00-35.00 \n15.58 \n10.81 \n13.00-25.00 \n17.96 \n14.42 \n \n \n22 \nTABLE 4.2 : BANKS DEPOSIT RATES (percent per annum)1 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCOMMERCIAL BANKS \nACCEPTING HOUSES \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nEND OF \nSAVINGS \n3 MONTHS \n3 MONTHS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2011 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n0.05-2.00 \n0.50-18.00 \n10.00-17.00 \nFEBRUARY \n0.05-2.00 \n0.50-18.00 \n10.00-17.00 \nMARCH \n0.05-2.00 \n0.50-16.00 \n10.00-17.00 \nAPRIL \n0.35-6.00 \n0.15-17.00 \n10.00-17.00 \nMAY \n0.30-5.00 \n0.15-17.00 \n10.00-17.00 \nJUNE \n0.15-5.00 \n0.15-17.00 \n10.00-17.00 \nJULY \n0.15-5.00 \n0.10-17.00 \n10.00-17.00 \nAUGUST \n0.15-5.00 \n0.10-17.00 \n11.00-17.00 \nSEPTEMBER \n0.15-5.00 \n0.10-17.00 \n10.00-17.00 \nOCTOBER \n0.15-5.00 \n0.10-17.00 \n10.00-17.00 \nNOVEMBER \n0.15-5.00 \n0.10-17.00 \n10.00-17.00 \nDECEMBER \n0.15-5.00 \n0.10-18.00 \n10.00-17.00 \n \n \n \n \n20122 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n0.15-5.00 \n5.00-18.00 \n10.00-17.00 \nFEBRUARY \n0.15-5.00 \n5.00-18.00 \n10.00-17.00 \nMARCH \n0.01-12.00 \n5.00-20.00 \n7.00-17.00 \nAPRIL \n0.00-12.00 \n5.00-20.00 \n8.00-17.00 \nMAY \n0.00-12.00 \n5.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nFEBRUARY \n0.15-8.00 \n4.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \n \n \n \n \n1. \nThe range of rates qouted by banks during the period. \n2. \nThree (3) months deposit rates revised to exclude rates on inactive or dormant \naccounts. \n \n \nJUNE \n0.00-12.00 \n5.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nJULY \n0.00-12.00 \n5.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nAUGUST \n0.00-12.00 \n5.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nSEPTEMBER \n0.00-12.00 \n5.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nOCTOBER \n0.00-12.00 \n5.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nNOVEMBER \n0.15-8.00 \n4.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nDECEMBER \n0.15-8.00 \n4.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n0.15-8.00 \n4.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \n23 \nTABLE 5.1 : MONTHLY INFLATION -- PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \\1 \n( 2012 = 100) \n1. Source: ZIMSTATS \n \nNON-FOOD INFLATION \nFOOD \nINFLA-\nTION \nALL \n \nALCO-\nHOLIC \nBEVER-\nAGES \nCLOTH-\nING \nHSING, \nWATER, \nFURNITURE FURNISH, HSE HEALTH TRANSPORT \nCOMMUNI-\nCATION \nRECREATION & EDUCATION \nRESTAU-\nRANTS & \nMISC. \nTOTAL \nNON \nFOOD & \nITEMS \n \n& TO-\nBACCO \nFOOT-\nWEAR \nELEC-\nTRICTY, \nGAS \nAND \nEQUIP AND \nROUTINE \n \n \n \nCULTURE \n \nHOTELS \nGOODS & \nFOOD \nNON \nALCO-\nHOLIC \nBEVER-\nAGES \n \n \n \n \n& OTHER \nEQUIPMENT \nMAINTE-\nNANCE \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSERVICES \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFUELS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nWEIGHTS \n4.38 \n6.05 \n17.74 \n9.91 \n1.89 \n2.16 \n9.76 \n3.41 \n2.1 \n5.67 \n1.38 \n3.91 \n66.47 \n33.53 \n100 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n-0.54 \n0.00 \n0.00 \n0.00 \n0.00 \n0.01 \n0.00 \n0.00 \n0.01 \n0.00 \n0.01 \n-0.52 \n-0.06 \n0.32 \n0.07 \nFEBRUARY \n 2.75 \n.37 \n0.41 \n0.20 \n0.00 \n1.51 \n1.65 \n-0.17 \n-0.08 \n0.08 \n0.77 \n1.11 \n0.72 \n1.40 \n0.95 \n24 \nTABLE 5.2 : YEARLY INFLATION -- PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \\1 \n(2012 = 100) \n1. Source: ZIMSTATS \n \nNON-FOOD INFLATION \nFOOD \nINFLATION \nALL \n \nALCO-\nHOLIC \nBEVER-\nAGES \nCLOTHING \nHSING, \nWATER, \nFURNI-\nTURE \nFURNISH, \nHSE \nHEALTH \nTRANSPORT \nCOMMU-\nNICATION \nRECREA-\nTION & \nEDUCA-\nTION \nRESTAU-\nRANTS & \nMISC. \nTOTAL \nNON \nFOOD & \nITEMS \n \n& TO-\nBACCO \nFOOTWEAR \nELEC-\nTRICTY, GAS \nAND \nEQUIP AND \nROUTINE \n \n \nCULTURE \nHOTELS \nGOODS & \nFOOD \nNON ALCO-\nHOLIC \nBEVER-\nAGES \n \n \n \n \n& OTHER \nEQUIP-\nMENT \nMAINTE-\nNANCE \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSERVICES \n \n \n \n \n \nFUELS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nWEIGHTS \n4.38 \n6.05 \n17.74 \n9.91 \n1.89 \n2.16 \n9.76 \n3.41 \n2.1 \n5.67 \n1.38 \n3.91 \n66.47 \n33.53 \n100 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n3.83 \n-0.74 \n10.70 \n0.65 \n0.10 \n1.94 \n6.42 \n-0.36 \n1.92 \n12.96 \n1.92 \n1.32 \n1.91 \n3.72 \n2.51 \nFEBRUARY \n5.77 \n-0.74 \n7.11 \n0.64 \n 0.0- \n3.23 \n8.31 \n-0.01 \n-0.19 \n13.05 \n 3.01 \n 1.95 \n2.91 \n4.67 \n2.98 \n25 \n TABLE 6 : SELECTED INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE RATES \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSA \nBW \nJAPANESE \nEUROPEAN \nPOUND \nEND OF \nRAND/1 \nPULA/1 \nYEN/1 \nCURRENCY/2 \nSTERLING/2 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n7.82 \n7.32 \n76.20 \n1.32 \n1.60 \nFEBRUARY \n7.47 \n7.13 \n80.28 \n1.35 \n1.60 \nMARCH \n7.59 \n7.29 \n81.92 \n1.33 \n1.59 \nAPRIL \n7.82 \n7.41 \n80.78 \n1.32 \n1.61 \nMAY \n8.14 \n7.63 \n79.80 \n1.28 \n1.59 \nJUNE \n8.38 \n7.77 \n79.42 \n1.25 \n1.56 \nJULY \n8.18 \n7.74 \n78.23 \n1.23 \n1.57 \nAUGUST \n8.45 \n7.80 \n78.47 \n1.25 \n1.58 \nSEPTEMBER \n8.23 \n7.65 \n77.50 \n1.29 \n1.63 \nOCTOBER \n8.64 \n7.88 \n79.78 \n1.30 \n1.61 \nNOVEMBER \n8.78 \n7.95 \n80.94 \n1.30 \n1.60 \nDECEMBER \n8.48 \n7.88 \n86.06 \n1.32 \n1.62 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n9.03 \n8.05 \n90.90 \n1.36 \n1.58 \nFEBRUARY \n8.84 \n8.04 \n92.36 \n1.31 \n1.52 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1. Foreign currency per US Dollar. \n \n \n \n \n2. US Dollar per unit of foreign currency. \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n26 \nTABLE 7.1: COMMERCIAL BANKS - ASSETS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ Millions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nLiquid Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSecurities \n \n \nLoans & Contingent \nOther \nNon Financial \nTotal \nEnd of \nNotes \n \n \n \n \n \n \nTotal \nOther Balances Advances \nAssets \nAssets \nAssets \nAssets \n \n& \nBalances \nBalances \nBalances \n \n \n \n Liquid \nwith RBZ \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCoin \nwith \nwith Other \nat \nTrade \nTreasury Agric PEs \n Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nat Banks \nRBZ \nBanks \nForeign \nBanks \nBills \nBills \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Jan \n255.1 \n258.7 \n91.1 \n382.3 \n109.8 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n1,097.0 \n120.3 \n1,988.3 \n262.6 \n135.2 \n316.4 \n3,919.8 \nFeb \n242.8 \n335.2 \n90.0 \n489.4 \n121.3 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n1,278.7 \n102.7 \n1,978.3 \n265.7 \n138.9 \n329.6 \n4,093.8 \n Mar \n285.0 \n444.6 \n103.2 \n217.6 \n140.4 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n1,191.3 \n34.7 \n2,040.5 \n337.0 \n152.8 \n339.6 \n4,095.9 \n Apr \n306.5 \n459.1 \n128.5 \n197.4 \n217.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n1,308.5 \n32.8 \n2,068.4 \n348.9 \n180.2 \n342.0 \n4,280.7 \n May \n316.3 \n441.8 \n113.2 \n210.5 \n225.8 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n1,307.6 \n32.2 \n2,156.2 \n388.5 \n182.5 \n384.1 \n4,451.3 \nJun \n297.2 \n413.2 \n98.2 \n245.8 \n232.6 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n1,287.1 \n32.4 \n2,140.6 \n369.7 \n228.5 \n386.3 \n4,444.7 \n Jul \n329.9 \n403.3 \n108.9 \n211.0 \n205.1 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n1,258.2 \n25.0 \n2,359.7 \n370.0 \n242.7 \n393.3 \n4,648.8 \n Aug 331.2 \n363.1 \n97.7 \n165.3 \n211.6 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n1,168.8 \n24.9 \n2,404.0 \n385.9 \n221.3 \n390.1 \n4,594.9 \n Sep \n299.3 \n381.7 \n109.8 \n185.2 \n175.2 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n1,151.3 \n25.1 \n2,498.0 \n390.6 \n240.1 \n390.4 \n4,695.4 \nOct \n331.5 \n368.4 \n127.1 \n191.5 \n174.2 \n7.4 \n0.0 \n1,200.1 \n25.0 \n2,530.01 \n372.3 \n246.6 \n389.6 \n4,763.6 \nNov \n306.6 \n358.3 \n119.3 \n325.9 \n188.1 \n7.5 \n0.0 \n1306.0 \n25.5 \n2,591.9 \n348.3 \n234.4 \n394.1 \n4,900.0 \nDec \n375.9 \n374.7 \n131.1 \n219.7 \n190.8 \n8.2 \n0.0 \n1,300.4 \n27.7 \n2,631.6 \n375.3 \n255.7 \n389.0 \n4,980.0 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Jan \n323.4 \n378.5 \n103.4 \n182.3 \n247.8 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n1,235.5 \n52.2 \n2,694.9 \n386.1 \n205.7 \n386.7 \n4,961.1 \nFeb \n292.2 \n357.7 \n120.5 \n234.6 \n239.9 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n1,244.9 \n27.7 \n2,289.3 \n328.8 \n208.0 \n388.3 \n4,887.0 \n27 \nTABLE 7.2: COMMERCIAL BANKS - LIABILITIES \nUS$ Millions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nDeposits \n \n \n \nAmounts Owing to \nCapital \nContingent \nOther \nTotal \nOf which \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nand \nLiabilities Liabilities Liabilities Liabilities \nto the \nEnd of \nDemand \nSavings and \nShort-term \nLong-term \nTotal \nForeign \nLiabilities \nRBZ \nOther Banks Reserves \n \n \n \nPublic \n \n \n \n \n Deposits \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n1,830.5 \n740.1 \n170.2 \n2,740.8 \n143.6 \n0.0 \n47.3 \n426.6 \n262.6 \n298.9 \n3,919.8 \n2,740.8 \nFeb \n1,980.9 \n745.4 \n197.8 \n2,924.1 \n163.3 \n0.0 \n23.5 \n437.8 \n265.7 \n281.4 \n4,095.8 \n2,924.1 \n Mar \n1,944.7 \n699.6 \n322.7 \n2,967.0 \n149.2 \n0.0 \n25.4 \n437.5 \n337.0 \n262.4 \n4,178.6 \n2,967.0 \n Apr \n1,932,8 \n722.1 \n350.4 \n3,005.3 \n155.1 \n0.0 \n23.8 \n440.3 \n348.9 \n307.3 \n4,280.7 \n3,005.3 \n May \n1,886.1 \n802.5 \n462.2 \n3,150.9 \n175.3 \n0.0 \n23.2 \n483.6 \n388.5 \n229.7 \n4,451.3 \n3,150.9 \nJun \n1,889.3 \n899.4 \n391.7 \n3,180.4 \n170.9 \n0.0 \n21.5 \n503.9 \n369.7 \n198.2 \n4,444.7 \n3,180.4 \nJul \n1,957.8 \n873.6 \n500.6 \n3,331.9 \n172.8 \n0.0 \n22.7 \n539.0 \n370.0 \n212.4 \n4,648.8 \n3,331.9 \nAug \n1,919.2 \n930.2 \n374.3 \n3,223.6 \n172.2 \n0.0 \n22.1 \n562.5 \n385.9 \n228.5 \n4,594.9 \n3,223.6 \n Sep \n1,962.6 \n883.0 \n490.0 \n3,335.6 \n183.9 \n0.0 \n20.5 \n552.6 \n390.6 \n205.8 \n4,689.0 \n3,335.6 \n Oct \n1,997.7 \n1,011.7 \n413.6 \n3,422.9 \n168.1 \n0.0 \n20.5 \n562.9 \n372.3 \n216.7 \n4,763.6 \n3,422.9 \n Nov \n1,895.8 \n966.6 \n679.6 \n3,542.0 \n192.9 \n0.0 \n38.2 \n562.2 \n348.3 \n216.4 \n4,900.0 \n3,542.0 \n Dec \n2,090.5 \n922.3 \n507.5 \n3,520.4 \n212.5 \n0.0 \n30.8 \n618.5 \n375.3 \n222.5 \n4,980.0 \n3,520.4 \nFeb \n1,987.8 \n933.3 \n491.5 \n3,412.5 \n258.1 \n0 \n32.4 \n631.9 \n328.8 \n223.3 \n4,887.0 \n3,417.9 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n2,032.2 \n866.1 \n552.4 \n3,450.7 \n266.1 \n0.0 \n27.8 \n623.9 \n386.1 \n206.5 \n4,961.1 \n3,450.7 \n28 \nTABLE 8.1 : ACCEPTING HOUSES - ASSETS \nUS$ Millions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nLiquid Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nLoans & Contingent \nOther \nNon Financial \nTotal \nEnd of \nNotes \n \n \n \n \n \nTotal \nOther \nBalances Advances \nAssets \nAssets \nAssets \nAssets \n \n& \nBalances Balances Balances \n \n \nLiquid \nwith RBZ \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCoin \nwith \nwith Other \nat \nTrade \nTreasury \n Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nat Banks \nRBZ \nBanks \nForeign \nBanks \nBills \nBills \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n2.3 \n4.4 \n10.7 \n2.0 \n55.7 \n0.0 \n75.1 \n5.0 \n210.7 \n66.3 \n58.5 \n28.2 \n443.8 \nFeb \n2.6 \n15.6 \n0.9 \n2.1 \n23.5 \n0.0 \n44.8 \n5.0 \n247.6 \n73.4 \n75.6 \n28.5 \n474.9 \n Mar \n2.6 \n12.3 \n13.1 \n2.9 \n64.1 \n0.0 \n95.1 \n0.0 \n218.6 \n64.9 \n70.8 \n30.1 \n479.4 \nApr \n6.5 \n9.0 \n15.2 \n3.9 \n37.7 \n0.0 \n72.3 \n0.0 \n241.6 \n56.3 \n74.3 \n31.8 \n476.2 \n May \n3.0 \n7.6 \n18.5 \n1.8 \n20.0 \n0.0 \n51.0 \n0.0 \n259.5 \n54.9 \n77.4 \n31.4 \n474.3 \nJune \n3.6 \n6.6 \n23.9 \n1.0 \n9.9 \n0.0 \n44.9 \n0.0 \n277.8 \n49.6 \n84.2 \n22.7 \n479.3 \nJul \n1.4 \n2.2 \n25.2 \n0.9 \n8.2 \n0.0 \n37.9 \n0.0 \n237.5 \n37.5 \n75.7 \n14.8 \n403.5 \nAug \n0.8 \n0.6 \n31.8 \n0.4 \n5.5 \n0.0 \n39.2 \n0.0 \n223.3 \n36.7 \n59.5 \n22.7 \n381.4 \nSep \n0.9 \n3.7 \n27.8 \n5.5 \n3.1 \n0.0 \n40.9 \n0.0 \n228.0 \n36.8 \n56.1 \n22.1 \n383.9 \nOct \n2.8 \n0.4 \n28.4 \n1.6 \n3.3 \n0.4 \n36.9 \n0.0 \n208.9 \n37.1 \n53.5 \n22.4 \n358.7 \nNov \n1.7 \n0.5 \n30.2 \n1.2 \n3.3 \n0.4 \n37.3 \n0.0 \n235.9 \n37.1 \n53.6 \n22.4 \n386.3 \nDec \n2.2 \n1.0 \n26.1 \n1.4 \n3.3 \n0.4 \n34.4 \n0.0 \n239.2 \n37.2 \n69.1 \n22.3 \n402.3 \nFeb \n4.7 \n1.5 \n18.4 \n0 \n4.5 \n0.0 \n26.9 \n0.0 \n245.7 \n34.8 \n63.9 \n28.9 \n398.2 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n1.5 \n2.7 \n28.6 \n0.0 \n3.4 \n0.0 \n36.2 \n0.0 \n236.7 \n34.8 \n60.2 \n29.1 \n397.0 \n29 \nTABLE 8.2 : ACCEPTING HOUSES - LIABILITIES \nUS$ Millions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nOf which \n \n \nDeposits \n \n \n \nAmounts Owing to \nCapital \nContingent \nOther \nTotal \nLiabilities to the \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nand \nLiabilities \nLiabilities \nLiabilities \nPublic \nEnd of Demand Savings and \nShort-term \nLong-term \nTotal \nForeign \nLiabilities \nRBZ \nOther \nBanks \nReserves \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Deposits \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Jan \n137.8 \n73.5 \n37.4 \n248.7 \n44.5 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n18.1 \n66.3 \n66.2 \n443.8 \n248.7 \n Feb \n134.2 \n78.8 \n44.4 \n257.4 \n34.4 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n50.8 \n73.4 \n58.9 \n474.9 \n257.4 \n Mar \n70.9 \n129.8 \n48.5 \n249.1 \n46.1 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n55.7 \n64.9 \n63.6 \n479.4 \n249.1 \n Apr \n89.9 \n117.5 \n42.8 \n250.3 \n44.8 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n55.6 \n56.3 \n69.4 \n476.2 \n250.3 \n May \n85.5 \n100.9 \n68.1 \n254.6 \n44.8 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n-48.7 \n54.9 \n168.7 \n474.3 \n254.6 \n Jun \n136.9 \n91.2 \n33.7 \n261.8 \n44.6 \n0.0 \n1.7 \n-22.4 \n49.6 \n144.0 \n479.3 \n261.8 \n Jul \n110.8 \n36.4 \n69.2 \n216.4 \n43.6 \n0.0 \n1.0 \n-33.1 \n37.5 \n138.1 \n403.5 \n216.4 \n Aug \n107.0 \n42.6 \n64.5 \n214.1 \n43.1 \n0.0 \n1.0 \n-96.8 \n36.7 \n183.3 \n381.4 \n214.1 \n Sep \n102.5 \n60.4 \n56.4 \n219.3 \n42.8 \n0.0 \n2.7 \n-47.9 \n36.8 \n130.2 \n383.9 \n219.3 \n Oct \n122.8 \n35.9 \n60.6 \n219.3 \n39.8 \n0.0 \n2.7 \n-51..1 \n37.1 \n110.9 \n358.7 \n219.3 \n Nov \n105.3 \n69.3 \n46.4 \n221.0 \n39.9 \n0.0 \n2.7 \n-69.7 \n37.1 \n155.2 \n386.3 \n221.0 \n Dec \n108.1 \n67.9 \n44.2 \n220.2 \n44.5 \n0.0 \n2.7 \n-60.9 \n37.2 \n158.5 \n402.3 \n220.2 \n Feb \n102.8 \n66.0 \n55.7 \n224.5 \n45.3 \n0.0 \n2.7 \n-77.8 \n34.8 \n168.7 \n398.2 \n224.5 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Jan \n106.9 \n91.7 \n21.3 \n220.0 \n44.8 \n0.0 \n2.7 \n-72.4 \n34.8 \n167.2 \n397.0 \n220.0 \n30 \nTABLE 9.1 : BUILDING SOCIETIES - ASSETS \nUS$ Millions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nLiquid Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nNotes \nBalances \nTrade \nTreasury \nTotal \nMortgage \nOther \nOther \nNon Finan-\ncial \nTotal \nEnd of \n& \nwith Other \nBills \nBills \nLiquid \nAdvances \nAdvances \nAssets \nAssets \n Assets \n \nCoin \nBanks \n \n \n Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \nat Banks \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Jan \n20.1 \n80.8 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n100.9 \n207.2 \n80.6 \n17.6 \n112.2 \n518.5 \n Feb \n13.3 \n99.2 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n112.6 \n226.5 \n81.0 \n19.3 \n112.5 \n551.8 \n Mar \n15.8 \n109.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n124.7 \n221.5 \n83.1 \n19.7 \n112.7 \n561.6 \n Apr \n18.2 \n99.7 \n0.2 \n0.0 \n118.0 \n215.5 \n85.5 \n23.7 \n111.3 \n554.0 \n May \n19.6 \n93.7 \n0.2 \n0.0 \n113.4 \n219.7 \n93.3 \n24.5 \n113.0 \n564.0 \n Jun \n15.7 \n102.2 \n0.2 \n0.0 \n118.1 \n239.5 \n96.5 \n25.6 \n114.6 \n594.3 \n Jul \n19.6 \n108.6 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n128.2 \n242.3 \n101.3 \n26.2 \n116.2 \n614.3 \n Aug \n18.7 \n113.1 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n131.8 \n248.8 \n104.7 \n27.5 \n118.2 \n630.9 \n Sep \n18.6 \n131.9 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n150.5 \n248.8 \n105.6 \n29.2 \n118.9 \n653.0 \n Oct \n20.1 \n123.0 \n0.0 \n1.0 \n144.0 \n266.6 \n116.7 \n28.9 \n118.9 \n675.1 \n Nov \n22.5 \n125.0 \n0.0 \n1.0 \n148.6 \n277.2 \n117.8 \n33.4 \n117.4 \n694.3 \n Dec \n29.2 \n133.2 \n0.0 \n1.0 \n163.4 \n278.1 \n118.3 \n30.2 \n126.9 \n716.9 \n Feb \n20.2 \n164.3 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n84.5 \n291.8 \n117.9 \n35.3 \n121.4 \n734.2 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Jan \n20.4 \n125.5 \n0.2 \n0.0 \n146.1 \n283.2 \n118.5 \n36.1 \n121.4 \n705.3 \n31 \nTABLE 9.2 : BUILDING SOCIETIES - LIABILITIES \nUS$ Millions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nOf which \n \nDeposits \nCapital \nOther \nTotal \nLiabilities to the \n \n \n \n \nand \nLiabilities \n Liabilities \nPublic \nEnd of \nSavings and \nShort-term \nLong-term \nTotal \nReserves \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Deposits \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2011 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Jan \n72.6 \n70.1 \n142.8 \n105.8 \n34.6 \n283.1 \n142.8 \n Feb \n78.8 \n76.2 \n155.0 \n107.6 \n36.1 \n298.7 \n155.0 \n Mar \n87.0 \n83.0 \n170.1 \n108.6 \n11.8 \n318.7 \n170.1 \n Apr \n90.1 \n85.0 \n175.1 \n110.6 \n16.4 \n332.1 \n175.1 \n May \n95.5 \n102.5 \n197.9 \n112.7 \n21.6 \n364.9 \n197.9 \n Jun \n124.6 \n77.4 \n202.0 \n116.7 \n50.6 \n369.4 \n202.0 \n Jul \n146.7 \n68.1 \n214.8 \n119.0 \n70.0 \n403.9 \n214.8 \n Aug \n149.9 \n80.6 \n230.6 \n122.0 \n67.7 \n420.3 \n230.6 \n Sep \n149.4 \n93.2 \n242.6 \n123.1 \n77.5 \n443.3 \n242.6 \n Oct \n154.3 \n93.0 \n247.3 \n125.8 \n13.7 \n453.8 \n247.3 \n Nov \n158.3 \n123.9 \n282.4 \n129.0 \n89.2 \n500.6 \n282.4 \n Dec \n186.4 \n100.7 \n287.0 \n121.3 \n96.7 \n505.1 \n287.0 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Jan \n201.3 \n94.2 \n295.5 \n127.3 \n95.7 \n518.5 \n295.5 \n Feb \n209.9 \n115.3 \n325.2 \n129.9 \n96.7 \n551.8 \n325.2 \n Mar \n182.1 \n152.2 \n334.3 \n129.6 \n76.7 \n540.7 \n334.3 \n Apr \n205.3 \n126.2 \n331.5 \n131.9 \n90.5 \n554.0 \n331.5 \n May \n242.1 \n93.4 \n335.5 \n136.3 \n70.4 \n564.0 \n335.5 \n Jun \n260.1 \n109.7 \n369.7 \n141.8 \n82.7 \n594.3 \n369.7 \n Jul \n233.2 \n156.1 \n389.3 \n145.7 \n79.3 \n614.3 \n389.3 \n Aug \n231.0 \n170.1 \n401.2 \n150.0 \n79..8 \n630.9 \n401.2 \n Sep \n247.3 \n172.8 \n420.0 \n153.1 \n80.0 \n653.0 \n420.0 \n Oct \n263.2 \n165.4 \n428.6 \n159.8 \n27.5 \n675.1 \n428.6 \n Nov \n246.8 \n179.5 \n426.3 \n165.5 \n28.2 \n694.3 \n426.3 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Dec \n255.8 \n184.6 \n440.3 \n177.8 \n28.1 \n716.9 \n440.3 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Jan \n230.0 \n192.8 \n422.8 \n180.3 \n102.3 \n705.3 \n422.8 \n Feb \n255.7 \n194.2 \n449.9 \n183.7 \n100.6 \n734.2 \n449.9 \n32 \nTable 10: ZIMBABWE STOCK MARKET STATISTICS \n \n \n \n \n \nIndices \nUS$ Millions \n \nIndustrial \nMining \nMarket Capitalisation \n \n \n \n \n2011 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nMay \n163.37 \n197.37 \n4,191.00 \nJun \n167.18 \n171.32 \n4,267.14 \nJul \n163.69 \n160.17 \n4,172.70 \nAug \n160.53 \n164.52 \n4,145.36 \nSep \n155.82 \n152.42 \n3,984.47 \nOct \n143.58 \n131.75 \n3,656.60 \nNov \n144.98 \n115.47 \n3,677.60 \nDec \n145.86 \n100.70 \n3,689.70 \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n138.52 \n79.09 \n3,422.20 \nFeb \n146.03 \n95.39 \n3,696.60 \nMar \n136.76 \n85.01 \n3,458.10 \nApr \n129.55 \n97.15 \n3,303.40 \nMay \n132.03 \n83.73 \n3,351.20 \nJun \n131.96 \n75.70 \n3,341.46 \nJul \n132.92 \n112.12 \n3,445.93 \nAug \n132.27 \n89.04 \n3,434.00 \nSep \n146.00 \n96.00 \n3,822.80 \nOct \n154.47 \n93.66 \n4,033,76 \nNov \n150.16 \n68.74 \n3,890.9 \nDec \n152.40 \n65.12 \n3,963.50 \nFeb \n182.3 \n72.01 \n4,748.24 \n \n \n \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n179.34 \n84.07 \n4,700.33 \n33 \nTABLE 11 : SAVINGS /1 WITH FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ Millions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCommercial \nMerchant \n \nBuilding \n \nEnd of \nBanks \nBanks \nOther/2 \nSocieties \nTOTAL \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2011 \n \n \n \n \n \nMay \n854.5 \n165.3 \n45.1 \n197.9 \n1,262.8 \nJune \n922.7 \n120.0 \n45.4 \n202.0 \n1,290.1 \nJuly \n933.5 \n97.5 \n42.5 \n214.8 \n1,288.3 \nAugust \n830.2 \n109.9 \n54.0 \n230.6 \n1,224.6 \nSeptember \n903.4 \n116.8 \n53.7 \n242.6 \n1,316.4 \nOctober \n946.2 \n239.5 \n54.2 \n247.3 \n1,487.3 \nNovember \n1,048.1 \n233.5 \n53.2 \n282.4 \n1,617.2 \nDecember \n887.3 \n294.8 \n52.1 \n287.0 \n1,521.2 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJanuary \n910.3 \n110.9 \n52.3 \n295.5 \n1,369.0 \nFebruary \n943.2 \n123.2 \n57.0 \n325.2 \n1,448.6 \nMarch \n1,022.3 \n178.3 \n56.0 \n334.3 \n1,590.9 \nApril \n1,072.5 \n160.3 \n54.2 \n331.5 \n1,618.5 \nMay \n1,264.8 \n169.0 \n55.4 \n335.5 \n1,824.7 \nJune \n1,291.1 \n124.9 \n58.3 \n369.7 \n1,844.0 \nJuly \n1,374.2 \n105.6 \n61.4 \n389.3 \n1,930.5 \nAugust \n1,304.5 \n107.1 \n59.3 \n401.2 \n1,872.1 \nSeptember \n1,373.0 \n116.8 \n60.1 \n420.0 \n1,969.9 \nOctober \n1,425.3 \n96.4 \n61.8 \n428.6 \n2,012.1 \nNovember \n1,646.2 \n115.7 \n67.2 \n426.3 \n2,255.4 \nDecember \n1,429.8 \n112.1 \n63.9 \n440.3 \n2,046.1 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFebruary \n1,424.8 \n121.7 \n64.7 \n449.9 \n2,061.1 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1/ Comprises all deposits other than demand deposits. \n2/ Includes People’s Own Savings Bank (POSB). \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJanuary \n1,418.5 \n113.0 \n64.3 \n422.8 \n2,018.6 \n34 \nTABLE 12 : ANALYSIS OF LIQUID ASSETS OF MONETARY BANKS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ Millions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCommercial Banks \nAccepting Houses \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nLiquid \nPrescribed \nExcess \nLiquid \nPrescribed \nExcess \n \nassets \nliquid \nliquid \nassets \nliquid \nLiquid \nEnd of \nheld \nassets/1 \nassets \nheld \nassets/1 \nassets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2011 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJanuary \n961.5 \n417.2 \n544.3 \n111.4 \n50.4 \n61.0 \nFebruary \n994.1 \n436.3 \n557.8 \n68.9 \n49.8 \n19.1 \nMarch \n1,053.0 \n455.5 \n597.5 \n70.1 \n53.1 \n16.9 \nApril \n954.9 \n453.4 \n501.5 \n61.9 \n52.7 \n9.2 \nMay \n999.8 \n477.6 \n522.2 \n44.4 \n51.0 \n-6.7 \nJune \n1,145.9 \n505.5 \n640.4 \n41.6 \n53.6 \n-11.9 \nJuly \n1,018.3 \n506.7 \n511.6 \n64.5 \n50.3 \n14.2 \nAugust \n1,046.9 \n647.0 \n399.9 \n55.1 \n62.8 \n-7.7 \nSeptember \n1,031.8 \n656.8 \n375.0 \n65.8 \n65.9 \n-0.1 \nOctober \n1,014.8 \n665.6 \n349.2 \n134.7 \n105.7 \n28.9 \nNovember \n1,041.1 \n663.8 \n377.3 \n135.3 \n107.2 \n28.1 \nDecember \n1,075.7 \n671.9 \n403.8 \n196.1 \n115.7 \n80.4 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJanuary \n1,097.0 \n685.2 \n411.8 \n75.1 \n62.2 \n12.9 \nFebruary \n1,278.7 \n731.5 \n548.2 \n44.8 \n64.4 \n-19.6 \nMarch \n1,273.6 \n741.8 \n531.8 \n95.1 \n62.3 \n32.8 \nApril \n1,308.5 \n751.3 \n557.2 \n72.3 \n62.6 \n9.8 \nMay \n1,307.6 \n787.7 \n519.9 \n51.0 \n63.6 \n-12.6 \nJune \n1,287.5 \n795.1 \n492.4 \n44.9 \n65.4 \n-20.5 \nJuly \n1,258.2 \n833.0 \n425.2 \n37.9 \n54.1 \n-16.2 \nAug \n1,168.8 \n805.9 \n362.9 \n39.2 \n53.5 \n-14.4 \nSeptember \n1,151.3 \n833.9 \n317.4 \n40.9 \n54.8 \n-13.9 \nFebruary \n1,244.9 \n8,544.7 \n854.5 \n26.9 \n56.1 \n-29.2 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1/ With effect from 1 August 2010, the prescribed liquid asset ratio was reviewed from 10% to 20% of liabilities to the public. \nOctober \n1,200.1 \n855.7 \n344.4 \n36.9 \n54.8 \n-17.9 \nNovember \n1,306.0 \n885.5 \n420.5 \n37.3 \n55.2 \n-18.0 \nDecember \n1,300.4 \n880.1 \n420.3 \n34.4 \n55.1 \n-20.6 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJanuary \n1,235.5 \n862.7 \n372.8 \n36.2 \n55.0 \n-18.8 \n35 \nTABLE 13 : ZETSS, CHEQUES AND CARDS ACTIVITY. \nUS$ Millions \nMONTH \nZETSS VALUES \nCHEQUE VALUES \nCARD VALUES \nMOBILE & INTERNET \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \nJan \n2,439.7 \n5.3 \n137.2 \n60.8 \nFeb \n2,920.1 \n6.1 \n137.1 \n77.2 \nMar \n3,242.8 \n6.8 \n156.4 \n104.1 \nApr \n2,948.5 \n5.5 \n160.5 \n68.6 \nMay \n3,237.4 \n5.0 \n189.6 \n82.0 \nJun \n3,407.3 \n6.5 \n177.7 \n93.5 \nJul \n3,321.0 \n6.7 \n169.1 \n135.6 \nAug \n3,417.3 \n6.1 \n218.4 \n98.3 \nSep \n3,043.2 \n5.6 \n235.5 \n149.2 \nOct \n3,630.7 \n6.6 \n232.9 \n196.9 \nNov \n3,526.0 \n5.9 \n240.8 \n197.3 \nDec \n3,584.7 \n5.0 \n308.9 \n220.3 \nAnnual Total \n38,718.7 \n71.1 \n2,364.1 \n1,483.8 \nFeb \n2,968.0 \n5.5 \n260.5 \n199.3 \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \nJan \n3,563.8 \n5.2 \n254.4 \n205.2", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/MPC_Statements/February2013.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "2c2bd6ba4af8bd85e031ecf66db88853", "text": "MONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW \nAUGUST 2014 \nSelected Economic Indicators \n 2 \nStock Market Developments \n 3 \nMonetary Developments \n 5 \nInflation \n 6 \nNational Payments System \n 7 \nStatistical Tables \n 9 \n \n \nINSIDE THIS ISSUE \n \nPAGE \nSELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS \n2 \n \n2014 \nJuly \n2014 \nAugust \nMonth-on- \nMonth \nChange \nZ.S.E. Mining Index1 \n95.00 \n104.80 \n10.32% \nZ.S.E. Industrial Index1 \n188.07 \n196.43 \n4.45% \nMoney Supply (Total Bank Deposits) (US$)2 \n4.22 billion \n4.32 billion \n2.32% \nMoney Supply (M3) Annual Growth2 \n9.58% \n13.85% \n2.32% \nYearly Inflation3 \n0.31% \n0.15% \n-0.31% \nNominal Lending Rate (%) \n6.00-35.00 \n6.00-35.00 \n \nSources: \n1 Zimbabwe Stock Exchange \n2 Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe \n3 Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZIMSTAT) \n \n \n \n \nSTOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS \n \nThe Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) \nregistered gains in August 2014, despite the \nlackluster \nperformance \nof \nsome \nlisted \ncounters. \nThe \nZSE’s \nindustrial \nindex \nrecorded an increase of 4.5%, to close at \n196.4 points. The increase was largely due to \ntrading \nbeing \nconcentrated \nin \nheavily \ncapitalized counters. On a year-to-date basis, \nhowever, the industrial index lost 2.8%. \n \nThe mining index maintained its upward \ntrend, gaining 10.3% to close at 104.8 points \nin August 2014, from 95 points in July. The \ngains were fueled by a rise of 66.7% in the \nshare price of Hwange. The mining index \ngained 128.9%, on a year to date basis. \n \nShares traded totaled 328.3 million in volume \nterms in August 2014, compared to 322.4 \nmillion shares in July 2014. Total turnover, \nalso rose by 163.2%, to close the month under \nreview at US$66.4 million. The trading \ndevelopments were largely supported by two \nspecial bargain deals of 47.5 million BancABC \nshares. \n \nButtressed by increases in the prices of heavily \ncapitalized \ncounters, \nmarket \ncapitalization \nincreased by 4.6% to US$5.2 billion at the end \nof August 2014, from US$4.9 billion at the \n2 3 \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2014. \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2014. \n2 4 \nclose of July 2014. On a year to date basis, \nhowever, the ZSE’s market capitalization \nfell by 2.8%. \n \nMONETARY DEVELOPMENTS \n \nAnnual growth in broad money increased \nfurther to 13.9% in August 2014. Broad \nmoney stood at US$4 322.1 million in \nAugust 2014, up from US$3 796.2 million in \nAugust 2013. On a monthly basis, broad \nmillion, respectively. These increases were, \nhowever, partially offset by a US$27.6 \nmillion decline in short term deposits. \n \nAgainst the background of an increase in \ndeposits, annual growth in domestic credit \nrose to 6.2%, largely reflecting an 86.9% \nincrease in net credit to Government. \nUnderpinning the increase in net credit to \nGovernment were Treasury bills holdings by \ncommercial and merchant banks, which \nincreased by 113.1% to US$237.5 million, \nbetween August 2013 and August 2014. \n \nCredit to the private sector continued to be \ndriven by loans and advances, which were \npartly sustained by offshore lines of credit, as \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2014. \nmoney registered a 2.3% growth. \n \nThe annual growth in broad money was \nunderpinned by an increase in long term, \nsavings and demand deposits of US$315.1 \nmillion; US$129.2 million; and US$109.2 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2014. \n3 5 \nlocal \nsources \nof \nliquidity \nremained \nconstrained. Lending to the private sector by \nbanks declined to US$3 117.9 million in \nAugust 2014, from US$3 165.4 million in \nAugust 2013. \n \nCredit to the private sector was mainly \ncomposed of loans and advances, 83.7%; \nmortgages, 11.9%; banker’s acceptances, \n0.6%; bills discounted, 1.9%; and other \ninvestments, 1.9%. The loans and advances \nwere mainly extended to agriculture (18.7%), \ndistribution (16.9%), and manufacturing \n(14.4%). Individuals accounted for 16.1% of \ntotal loans and advances. \n \nThe private sector borrowed mainly for \nunclassified asset purchases (43.7%) as well \nas inventory build-up (34.0%). Loans and \nadvances utilized for fixed investment activity \nhave remained low, with the procurement of \nplant and equipment accounting for 3.4% and \npre and post shipment financing at 1.9%, of \ntotal loans and advances. \n \n \nINFLATION DEVELOPMENTS \n \n \nAnnual Inflation \n \nAnnual headline inflation retreated from \n0.31% in July 2014, to 0.15% in August 2014. \nThis was largely on account of declines in \nboth food and non-food inflation. \n \nAnnual food inflation eased from -2.9% in \nJuly 2014, to -2.8% in August 2014. All food \ncategories, except unclassified food items, \nregistered price decreases in August 2014. \n \nThe combined effect of improved domestic \nand global food supply, as well as depressed \neffective demand resulted in a fall in food \nprices. \n \nAnnual non-food inflation retreated from to \n1.9% in July 2014, to 1.6% in August 2014, \nmainly driven by declines in health, recreation \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2014. \n4 6 \nand culture, as well as housing, water, \nelectricity, gas and other fuels categories. \nMonth-on-Month Inflation \nMonth-on-month inflation stood at -0.3% in \nAugust 2014, shedding 0.3 percentage points \nfrom the 0.01% recorded in July 2014. This \ndecline was mainly driven by decreases in \nmonthly food and non alcoholic beverages. \nMonthly food inflation decelerated to -0.8% \nin August 2014, from -0.5% in July 2014. \nThis was on account of a continued decline in \nvegetables, bread and cereals, milk, cheese, \neggs, oil and fats, coffee, tea and cocoa, and \nmeat prices from previous month levels. \nMonthly non-food inflation retreated from \n0.2% in July 2014, to -0.1% in August 2014, \nfollowing decreases in the prices of clothing \nand footwear as well as furniture and \nhousehold equipment. \n \nNATIONAL \nPAYMENTS \nSYSTEM \nDEVELOPMENTS \nZimbabwe Electronic Transfer Settlement \nSystem (ZETSS) \nThe value of transactions processed through \nthe Real Time Gross Settlement system in \nAugust 2014 decreased by 11% to US$3.5 \nbillion, from US$3.9 billion recorded in \nJuly 2014. Concomitantly, the volume of \ntransactions registered a decrease of 14% \nfrom 199 587 to 170 858 in the same period. \nCard Based Transactions \nThe total value of card based transactions \nincreased by 4.2% to US$409.3 million in \nAugust 2014, from US$392.8 million in July \n2014. \n \n \nSource: ZIMSTATS, 2014. \n7 \nMobile and Internet Based Transactions \nThe value of mobile and internet based \ntransactions increased by 2.3%, from \nUS$414.1 \nmillion \nin \nJuly \n2014, \nto \nUS$423.6 million in August 2014. \n \nCheque Transactions \nThe value of cheque transactions stood at \nUS$9.4 million in August 2014, down from \nUS$11.7 million in July 2014. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nReserve Bank of Zimbabwe \nSeptember 2014 \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2014. \n8 \nNOTES \n9 \nSTATISTICAL TABLES \nCONTENTS \n \nTable \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nPage \n \n \n1. Monetary Statistics \n \n \n1.1 Monetary Aggregates \n \n \n \n \n \n11 \n \n1.2 Broad Money Survey \n \n \n \n \n \n12 \n \n1.3 Analysis of Monthly Changes in Money Supply \n \n13 \n \n1.4 Analysis of Yearly Changes in Money Supply \n \n \n14 \n \n \n2. Sectoral Analysis of Bank Loans and Advances and Deposits \n \n \n2.1 Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks Loans and Advances 15 \n \n2.2 Sectoral Analysis of Merchant Banks Loans and Advances \n16 \n \n2.3 Sectoral Analysis of Merchant Acceptances \n \n \n17 \n \n2.4 Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks Deposits \n \n18 \n \n2.5 Sectoral Analysis of Merchant Banks Deposits \n \n19 \n \n3. External Statistics \n \n \n3.1 Total External Debt Outstanding by Debtor \n \n \n20 \n \n4. Interest Rates \n \n \n4.1 Lending Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n21 \n \n4.2 Banks Deposit Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n22 \n \n5. Inflation \n \n \n5.1 Monthly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n23 \n \n5.2 Yearly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n24 \n \n6. Exchange Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n25 \n \n \n \n \n \nSTATISTICAL TABLES \nCONTENTS \n \nTable \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nPage \n \n \n7. Commercial Banks \n \n \n7.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n26 \n \n7.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n \n27 \n \n8. Accepting Houses \n \n \n8.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n28 \n \n8.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n \n29 \n \n 9. Building Societies \n \n \n9.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n30 \n \n9.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n \n31 \n \n10. Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Statistics \n \n \n \n \n32 \n \n11. Savings with Financial Institutions \n \n \n \n \n33 \n \n12. Analysis of Liquid Assets of Monetary Banks \n \n \n \n34 \n \n13. ZETSS, Cheques and Cards Activity \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n13.1 Values of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n35 \n \n13.2 Volumes of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n36 \n10 \n11 \n12 \n13 \n14 \n15 \n1. These are large corporation with business operations covering across a number of sectors. \nTABLE 2.1 : SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS LOANS AND ADVANCES \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ Thousands \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAGRICULTURE \nCONSTRUCTION \nCOMMUNICA-\nTION \nDISTRIBU-\nTION \nFINANCIAL \n& \nFINANCIAL \nMANUFAC-\nTURING \nMINING \nSERVICES TRANSPORT \nINDIVIDUALS \nCONGLOMER-\nATES/1 \nTOTAL \nEND OF \n \n \n \n \nINVEST-\nMENTS \nORGANISA-\nTIONS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n450,170.0 \n31,073.4 \n38,762.3 \n426,050.9 \n11,967.9 \n31,547.4 \n417,961.3 \n144,645.1 \n237,323.7 \n33,906.5 \n300,841.1 \n9,373.1 \n2,133,622.7 \nFREBRUARY \n494,536.6 \n33,786.9 \n28,372.0 \n439,556.7 \n14,811.4 \n33,948.5 \n409,692.7 \n128,242.7 \n303,269.9 \n38,235.9 \n298,171.5 \n3,685.5 \n2,226,310.2 \nMARCH \n467,873.97 \n41,532.7 \n68,987.2 \n433,337.1 \n16,118.8 \n34,704.7 \n471,204.9 \n159,925.7 \n307,134.7 \n44,413.57 \n370,123.5 \n4,491.7 \n2,419,848.6 \nAPRIL \n455,178.9 \n43,628.2 \n23,433.4 \n428,381.7 \n14,997.8 \n35,589.1 \n444,798.7 \n135,046.2 \n288,857.6 \n45,643.6 \n377,037.0 \n7,693.7 \n2,300,585.8 \nMAY \n484,635.0 \n38,637.2 \n27,795.2 \n455,737.9 \n14,699.1 \n35,106.1 \n465,890.2 \n115,457.8 \n301,547.9 \n52,075.2 \n382,172.8 \n5,034.0 \n2,378,788.7 \nJUNE \n489,730.1 \n37,474.3 \n38,198.7 \n425,521.3 \n7,310.7 \n53,815.0 \n454,368.5 \n110,349.9 \n295,432.3 \n51,453.6 \n385,769.7 \n11,033.4 \n2,360,457.5 \nJULY \n483,103.7 \n40,342.5 \n33,494.3 \n464,921.7 \n6,869.2 \n38,522.6 \n541,025.9 \n116,557.1 \n307,117.5 \n48,218.0 \n426,582.7 \n4,455.3 \n2,511,210.5 \nAUGUST \n521,743.0 \n38,889.1 \n43,894.5 \n425,531.4 \n7,260.6 \n39.087.2 \n451,871.2 \n110,041.8 \n346,006.0 \n40,216.0 \n374,587.1 \n9,914.6 \n2,409,042.5 \nSEPTEMBER \n496,289.3 \n39,446.9 \n38,856.6 \n447,247.2 \n13,953.5 \n43,006.7 \n437,211.9 \n118,873.7 \n330,709.6 \n40,046.6 \n373,596.8 \n9,790.6 \n2,389,029.4 \nOCTOBER \n491,610.6 \n38,871.5 \n39,766.0 \n471,966.2 \n8,023.3 \n40,835.3 \n420,445.3 \n110,778.3 \n417,411.6 \n36,334.1 \n376,463.1 \n9,861.9 \n2,462,367.3 \nNOVEMBER \n487,289.4 \n40,321.7 \n42,332.0 \n488,637.3 \n3,116.5 \n36,852.0 \n417,162.5 \n117,050.8 \n389,727.1 \n39,126.4 \n369,190.3 \n17,960.5 \n2,448,766.4 \nDECEMBER \n533,165.2 \n42,285.1 \n17,617.9 \n435,613.1 \n5,047.0 \n62,165.8 \n389,181.2 \n115,404.6 \n379,809.3 \n37,409.1 \n369,838.8 \n18,252.9 \n2,405,790.0 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n489,585.3 \n43,743.8 \n18,574.7 \n464,097.6 \n5,467.4 \n48,086.1 \n362,554.0 \n116,635.5 \n412,901.1 \n37,722.2 \n367,126.2 \n16,773.1 \n2,383,267.1 \nFEBRUARY \n519,154.6 \n38,918.1 \n24,765.4 \n460,528.2 \n10,397.3 \n47,488.6 \n385,038.1 \n116,670.5 \n401,619.6 \n32,978.1 \n396,800.8 \n8,542.7 \n2,442,902.1 \nMARCH \n503,868.1 \n42,707.9 \n35,785.1 \n494,663.8 \n5,257.4 \n52,722.0 \n374,809.1 \n116,653.0 \n396,000.6 \n38,089.3 \n406,503.1 \n15,833.1 \n2,482,892.7 \nAPRIL \n540,156.2 \n40,707.1 \n18,138.9 \n502,514.1 \n9,898.6 \n18,817.9 \n407,595.0 \n175,048.3 \n447,549.2 \n49,619.1 \n511,048.2 \n15,136.7 \n2,736,229.2 \nMAY \n546,733.9 \n41,594.2 \n21,547.9 \n488,389.7 \n10,073.8 \n23,049.1 \n396,846.0 \n184,730.9 \n452.373.8 \n51,891.8 \n512,864.5 \n17,718.8 \n2,747,814.6 \nJUNE \n536,188.9 \n46,085.8 \n28,201.0 \n500,266.1 \n10,656.3 \n25,616.2 \n417,002.7 \n197,441.1 \n432,692.4 \n46,751.6 \n499,191.5 \n17,173.9 \n2,757,267.4 \nJULY \n575,645.3 \n43,055.0 \n28,090.8 \n480,483.6 \n6,359.2 \n27284.9 \n428611.4 \n206052.3 \n479384.6 \n49260.4 \n507930.0 \n46148.1 \n2878305.8 \nAUGUST \n548,866.7 \n56,886.1 \n38,891.3 \n498,696.8 \n54,387.2 \n110,618.5 \n422,942.5 \n221099.2 \n430,156.3 \n48,167.0 \n474,060.2 \n37,230.9 \n2,942,002.7 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n TABLE 2.2: SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS DEPOSITS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ Thousands \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nEND OF \nAGRICUL-\nTURE \nCONSTRUC-\nTION \nCOMMUNI-\nCATIONS \nDISTRIBU-\nTION \nFINANCIAL \n& \nFINANCIAL MANUFACTUR-\nING \nMINING \nSERVICES TRANSPORT \nINDIVIDUALS \nCONGLOMER-\nATES \nTOTAL \n \n \n \n \n \nINVEST-\nMENTS \nORGANISA-\nTIONS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJUNE \n84,589.8 \n51,354.0 \n132,428.7 \n351,179.8 \n98,785.6 \n375,613.6 \n214,696.7 \n76,370.1 \n727,955.7 \n36,208.4 \n456,454.4 \n18,727.6 \n2,624,364.4 \nJULY \n106,470.8 \n47,401.0 \n131,489.0 \n345,036.3 \n70,487,9 \n397,969.7 \n213,370.5 \n89,915.4 \n726,447.6 \n46,000.4 \n505,054.1 \n29,735.3 \n2,709,378.0 \nAUGUST \n99,151.6 \n49,226.4 \n116,820.6 \n363,080.1 \n382,619.4 \n71,775.9 \n216,433.0 \n73,978.5 \n737,065.6 \n48,183.8 \n488,183.8 \n28,785.3 \n2,663,379.8 \nSEPTEMBER \n113,907.6 \n43,671.0 \n125,801.3 \n276,363.0 \n177,790.6 \n429,596.7 \n228,342.2 \n82,777.7 \n651,389.2 \n48,764.9 \n517,788.8 \n29,019.9 \n2,725,213.0 \nOCTOBER \n101,122.4 \n48,716.9 \n155,798.3 \n313,982.4 \n257,300.6 \n409,730.0 \n245,131.8 \n83,995.5 \n661,217.2 \n48,396.8 \n534,643.6 \n26,158.0 \n2,886,193.5 \nNOVEMBER \n104,695.1 \n53,233.8 \n151,359.5 \n348,390.4 \n185,802.5 \n464,782.4 \n269,513.8 \n85,906.9 \n962,840.9 \n47,647.2 \n548,847.7 \n23,130.6 \n3,246,150.7 \nDECEMBER \n96,098.4 \n50,492.7 \n126,343.5 \n379,068.0 \n198,323.3 \n509,241.6 \n280,975.4 \n95,457.1 \n582,286.2 \n41,852.2 \n538,135.2 \n26,491.3 \n2,924,764.8 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n91,648.8 \n48,329.1 \n128,426.0 \n351,566.7 \n212,401.7 \n494,823.6 \n252,389.7 \n93,470.0 \n658,260.1 \n44,091.4 \n512,289.8 \n32,145.9 \n2,919,842.6 \nFEBRUARY \n96,796.5 \n48,491.5 \n147,571.5 \n360,757.9 \n 147,995.9 \n 578,306.4 \n284,603.8 \n64,530.5 \n679,554.8 \n41,983.6 \n516,431.2 \n25,275.3 \n2,991.999.1 \nMARCH \n96,752.8 \n44,883.3 \n139,327.8 \n354,627.8 \n155,915.2 \n610,758.4 \n290,072.8 \n87,143.0 \n594,397.7 \n38,345.5 \n523,913.8 \n141,404.6 \n3,077,542.7 \nAPRIL \n98,671.0 \n49,093.8 \n152,390.8 \n350,269.2 \n166,578.5 \n545,118.2 \n311,310.8 \n105,766.9 \n638,341.8 \n39,837.1 \n533,691.3 \n99,053.9 \n3,090,123.4 \nMAY \n114,053.3 \n55,427.4 \n142,023.3 \n389,384.7 \n255,352.1 \n484,429.7 \n318,129.4 \n92,777.2 \n700,668.7 \n46,593.8 \n578,509.2 \n32,297.7 \n3,209,646.5 \nJUNE \n116,635.2 \n58,578.8 \n147,313.8 \n447,394.5 \n183,146.3 \n352,600.3 \n366,824.2 \n96,685.8 \n701,195.7 \n46,578.5 \n597,373.1 \n104,843.6 \n3,219,169.8 \nJULY \n108,086.6 \n46,449.5 \n120,982.3 \n380,448.8 \n178,341.4 \n677,700.7 \n301,575.9 \n97,583.8 \n710,856.1 \n39,395.9 \n487,954.4 \n102,531.4 \n3,251,906.9 \nAUGUST \n137,107.1 \n48,726.1 \n135,788.5 \n319,106.0 \n174,593.9 \n637,190.7 \n333,255.3 \n99,194.1 \n639,401.6 \n41,996.5 \n417,762.6 \n93,772.1 \n3,077,894.4 \nSEPTEMBER \n100,028.3 \n57,039.8 \n145,652.5 \n380,781.4 \n207,379.2 \n612,131.5 \n408,359.1 \n103,872.8 \n795,047.6 \n46,982.9 \n435,912.4 \n90,265.8 \n3,383,453.4 \nOCTOBER \n94,346.3 \n52,722.4 \n141,401.4 \n338,625.9 \n223,223.8 \n754,145.4 \n339,305.6 \n99,583.3 \n754,116.1 \n41,527.2 \n440,197.9 \n97,771.1 \n3,376,966.4 \nNOVEMBER \n114,178.7 \n47,740.9 \n128,399.3 \n312,639.2 \n241,628.8 \n741,885.4 \n283,426.0 \n80,507.6 \n727,492.5 \n42,901.0 \n458,479.9 \n89,292.5 \n3,268,571.8 \nDECEMBER \n113,914.2 \n51,981.7 \n142,938.1 \n342,785.1 \n213,125.2 \n755,299.4 \n327,658.1 \n83,103.1 \n762,884.4 \n41,827.9 \n432,436.3 \n61,038.7 \n3,328,992.1 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n130,154.6 \n53,292.9 \n146,876.1 \n353,793.8 \n259,569.6 \n731,703.3 \n304,033.2 \n93,776.7 \n770,435.4 \n40,085.9 \n485,573.1 \n60,897.7 \n3,430,192.5 \nFEBRUARY \n138,812.3 \n55,092.2 \n134,813.9 \n420,181.0 \n262,183.8 \n786,295.6 \n270,062.5 \n131,134.8 \n779,640.3 \n39,169.2 \n508,813.7 \n61,822.3 \n3,588,021.6 \nMARCH \n118,239.1 \n55,167.5 \n135,807.9 \n382,675.5 \n216,025.3 \n791,776.0 \n275,549.1 \n103,298.7 \n806,185.9 \n42,432.8 \n521,381.5 \n72,990.9 \n3,521,530.3 \nAPRIL \n164,347.5 \n59,289.3 \n102,323.7 \n408,823.5 \n325,559.7 \n780,207.0 \n325,659.8 \n135,187.4 \n888,876.2 \n43,746.5 \n582,848.8 \n82,009.8 \n3,898,879.1 \nMAY \n149,474.1 \n60,669.4 \n108,977.6 \n355,802.3 \n332,850.8 \n800,256.8 \n303,599.4 \n132,132.8 \n1,027,552.7 \n38,921.0 \n581,930.2 \n93,334.9 \n3,985,501.8 \nJUNE \n194,685.1 \n64,188.9 \n95,595.6 \n470,267.7 \n291,594.6 \n812,999.7 \n348,303.5 \n130,453.4 \n895,698.0 \n44,735.5 \n575,149.1 \n91,392.4 \n4,015,063.5 \nJULY \n163335.6 \n56812.0 \n87587.5 \n370121.7 \n303367.3 \n830988.6 \n334436.8 \n112985.0 \n880761.1 \n44675.4 \n587756.7 \n94841.5 \n3867669.2 \nAUGUST \n128794.1 \n38934.1 \n90012.5 \n271204.3 \n270009.9 \n755141.6 \n236267.5 \n130548.6 \n865566.6 \n31180.4 \n467724.2 \n89582.4 \n3374966.2 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n16 \n17 \nTABLE 3.1: ZIMBABWE: EXTERNAL DEBT OUTSTANDING BY DEBTOR (INCLUDING ALL \nARREARS) (WITH RBZ) \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nEnd Period \n1999 \n2000 \n2001 \n2002 \n2003 \n2004 \n2005 \n2006 \n2007 \n2008 \n2009 \n2010 \n2011 \n2012 \n2013 \n(US$ millions) \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nLong-Term External Debt \n3,530 \n3,227 \n3,255 \n3,327 \n3,644 \n3,927 \n3,805 \n3,965 \n4,032 \n4,464 \n4,951 \n5,175 \n6,096 \n6,607 \n7,370 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nGovernment \n2,461 \n2,249 \n2,328 \n2,376 \n2,617 \n2,844 \n2,895 \n3,024 \n3,054 \n3,464 \n4,037 \n4,095 \n4,638 \n4,929 \n5,012 \nBilateral Creditors \n935 \n1,050 \n1,115 \n1,107 \n1,255 \n1,455 \n1,438 \n1,520 \n1,520 \n1,863 \n2,308 \n2,325 \n2,597 \n2,694 \n2,928 \nMultilateral Creditors \n1,235 \n1,199 \n1,213 \n1,269 \n1,362 \n1,389 \n1,457 \n1,504 \n1,524 \n1,592 \n1,729 \n1,770 \n2,041 \n2,235 \n2,084 \nPrivate Creditors \n291 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n10 \n10 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \nPublic Enterprises \n543 \n534 \n568 \n616 \n698 \n714 \n709 \n766 \n790 \n825 \n857 \n938 \n1,092 \n1,198 \n1,356 \nBilateral Creditors \n316 \n301 \n315 \n351 \n403 \n442 \n439 \n464 \n474 \n497 \n453 \n238 \n711 \n703 \n858 \nMultilateral Creditors \n224 \n233 \n253 \n265 \n295 \n272 \n270 \n302 \n316 \n327 \n403 \n700 \n382 \n495 \n498 \nPrivate Creditors \n3 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \nMonetary Authorities \n364 \n292 \n292 \n279 \n288 \n291 \n144 \n130 \n137 \n140 \n140 \n138 \n127 \n125 \n125 \nMultilateral Creditors - IMF \n364 \n292 \n292 \n279 \n288 \n291 \n144 \n130 \n137 \n140 \n140 \n138 \n127 \n125 \n125 \nPrivate \n162 \n152 \n67 \n56 \n41 \n78 \n57 \n45 \n51 \n35 \n57 \n142 \n366 \n480 \n1,002 \nShort-Term External Debt \n532 \n298 \n167 \n183 \n169 \n144 \n173 \n281 \n387 \n226 \n1,198 \n1,382 \n1,289 \n890 \n1,564 \nSupplier's Credits \n150 \n42 \n13 \n26 \n51 \n69 \n107 \n122 \n178 \n41 \n193 \n286 \n134 \n30 \n0 \nReserve Bank \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n642 \n642 \n618 \n614 \n614 \nPrivate \n382 \n256 \n154 \n157 \n118 \n75 \n66 \n159 \n209 \n185 \n363 \n454 \n537 \n246 \n950 \nTotal External Debt \n4,062 \n3,525 \n3,422 \n3,510 \n3,812 \n4,071 \n3,978 \n4,246 \n4,607 \n4,690 \n6,289 \n6,695 \n7,385 \n7,497 \n8,934 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nGross Domestic Product \n5,990 \n6,107 \n10,887 \n6,715 \n5,037 \n4,299 \n2,918 \n6,645 \n4,000 \n3,175 \n6,133 \n7,433 \n8,865 \n8,865 \n12,973 \nExternal Debt / GDP \n68% \n57.7% 31.4% 52.3% 75.7% 94.7% 136.3% \n63.9% \n110.5% 147.7% 102.5% \n90.1% \n83.3% 84.6% 68.9% \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSOURCE: Ministry of \nFinance and Reserve Bank \nof Zimbabwe \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n18 \nTABLE 4.1 LENDING RATES (percent per annum)1 \n \nCommercial Banks \nMerchant Banks \n \n \nWeighted Average Lending \nRates3 \n \nWeighted Average Lending \nRates3 \nEnd Period \nNominal \nLending \nRates2 \nIndividuals \nCorporate \nNominal \nLending \nRates2 \nIndividuals \nCorporate \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nApr \n3.00-35.00 \n14.58 \n9.66 \n14.00-25.00 \n17.77 \n14.35 \nMay \n9.00-35.00 \n14.25 \n9.89 \n13.00-23.00 \n17.66 \n17.02 \nJun \n9.00-35.00 \n14.29 \n9.46 \n15.00-22.50 \n17.78 \n16.89 \nJul \n6.00-35.00 \n14.39 \n9.65 \n15.00-28.00 \n17.70 \n16.97 \nAug \n6.00-35.00 \n13.82 \n9.32 \n15.00-23.00 \n18.32 \n16.92 \nSep \n6.00-35.00 \n14.03 \n9.37 \n15.00-22.50 \n18.31 \n16.94 \nOct \n6.00-35.00 \n13.95 \n9.25 \n15.00-23.00 \n18.67 \n17.66 \nNov \n6.00-35.00 \n14.18 \n9.40 \n15.00-23.00 \n18.84 \n17.72 \nDec \n6.00-35.00 \n14.13 \n9.35 \n15.00-23.00 \n18.84 \n17.76 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n6.00-35.00 \n14.09 \n9.30 \n15.00-23.00 \n18.88 \n17.74 \nFeb \n6.00-35.00 \n14.08 \n9.32 \n15.00-23.00 \n18.88 \n17.73 \nMar \n6.00-35.00 \n14.24 \n9.27 \n15.00-23.00 \n18.88 \n17.73 \nApr \n6.00-35.00 \n14.22 \n9.12 \n15.00-23.00 \n18.88 \n17.73 \nMay \n6.00-35.00 \n14.39 \n9.25 \n15.00-23.00 \n18.87 \n17.74 \nJune \n6.00-35.00 \n14.44 \n9.33 \n15.00-23.00 \n19.00 \n18.00 \nJuly \n6.00-35.00 \n14.33 \n9.45 \n15.00-23.00 \n19.00 \n18.00 \nAugust \n6.00-35.00 \n14.28 \n9.45 \n15.00-23.00 \n19.00 \n18.00 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nNotes \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1. Table revised, to separate weighted lending rates for individuals and corporate bodies. \n2. Nominal Lending Rates depict the range of rates quoted by banks. \n3. Lending rates exclude rates on staff loans. \n \n \n19 \nTABLE 4.2 : BANKS DEPOSIT RATES (percent per annum)1 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCOMMERCIAL BANKS \nACCEPTING HOUSES \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nEND OF \nSAVINGS \n3 MONTHS \n3 MONTHS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n0.15-8.00 \n4.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nFEBRUARY \n0.15-8.00 \n4.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nMARCH \n0.15-8.00 \n4.00-20.00 \n8.00-12.00 \nAPRIL \n0.15-8.00 \n4.00-20.00 \n8.00-12.00 \nMAY \n0.15-8.00 \n4.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nJUNE \n0.15-8.00 \n4.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nJULY \n0.15-8.00 \n3.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nAUGUST \n0.15-8.00 \n3.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nSEPTEMBER \n0.15-8.00 \n3.00-20.00 \n11.00-12.00 \nOCTOBER \n0.15--8.00 \n3.00-20.00 \n11.00-12.00 \nNOVEMBER \n0.15--8.00 \n3.00-20.00 \n11.00-12.00 \nDECEMBER \n0.15--8.00 \n3.00-20.00 \n11.00-12.00 \n \n \n \n \n2014 \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n0.15--8.00 \n3.00-20.00 \n11.00-12.00 \nFEBRUARY \n0.15--8.00 \n3.00-20.00 \n11.00-12.00 \nMARCH \n0.15--8.00 \n3.00-20.00 \n11.00-12.00 \nAPRIL \n0.15--8.00 \n3.00-20.00 \n11.00-12.00 \nMAY \n0.15-8.00 \n3.00-20.00 \n11.00-12.00 \nJUNE \n0.15-8.00 \n3.00-20.00 \n11.00-12.00 \nJULY \n0.15-8.00 \n3.00-20.00 \n11.00-12.00 \nAUGUST \n0.15-8.00 \n4.00-20.00 \n11.00-12.00 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1. \nThe range of rates quoted by banks during the period. \n2. \nThree (3) months deposit rates revised to exclude rates on inactive or dormant \naccounts. \n \n \n \nNON-FOOD INFLATION \nFOOD \nINFLA-\nTION \nALL \n \nALCO-\nHOLIC \nBEVER-\nAGES \nCLOTH-\nING \nHSING, \nWATER, \nFURNITURE HEALTH \nTRANSPOR\nT \nCOMMUNI-\nCATION \nRECREATION \n& \nEDUCA-\nTION \nRESTAU-\nRANTS & \nMISC. \nTOTAL \nNON \nFOOD & \nITEMS \n \n& TO-\nBACCO \nFOOT-\nWEAR \nELEC-\nTRICTY, \nGAS \nAND \n \n \n \nCULTURE \n \nHOTELS \nGOODS & \nFOOD \nNON \nALCO-\nHOLIC \nBEVER-\nAGES \n \n \n \n \n& OTHER \nEQUIPMENT \n \n \n \n \n \nSERVICES \n \n \n \n \n \nFUELS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nWEIGHTS \n4.38 \n6.05 \n17.74 \n9.91 \n2.16 \n9.76 \n3.41 \n2.1 \n5.67 \n1.38 \n3.91 \n66.47 \n33.53 \n100 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nOCTOBER \n1.21 \n0.00 \n-0.01 \n-0.36 \n0.06 \n-0.32 \n-0.07 \n-0.15 \n0.02 \n-0.08 \n-0.20 \n-0.04 \n0.04 \n-0.01 \nNOVEMBER \n0.38 \n-0.19 \n-0.01 \n-0.37 \n0.10 \n-0.13 \n-0.01 \n-0.13 \n5.57 \n1.08 \n-0.27 \n0.43 \n-0.60 \n0.09 \nDECEMBER \n0.14 \n-0.01 \n0.37 \n-0.29 \n0.12 \n0.27 \n0.05 \n-0.22 \n0.00 \n0.00 \n-0.46 \n0.08 \n-0.41 \n-0.08 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n0.20 \n-0.07 \n0.00 \n0.01 \n-0.23 \n0.01 \n0.00 \n-0.07 \n0.02 \n0.16 \n-0.09 \n0.00 \n0.44 \n0.14 \nFEBRUARY \n-0.01 \n-0.09 \n-0.11 \n-0.08 \n0.09 \n0.08 \n0.00 \n-0.04 \n0.23 \n-0.08 \n0.07 \n-0.01 \n0.18 \n0.05 \nMARCH \n-0.05 \n-0.06 \n-0.82 \n-0.12 \n0.02 \n0.00 \n0.01 \n0.00 \n0.00 \n0.01 \n-0.30 \n-0.26 \n-0.14 \n-0.22 \nAPRIL \n0.30 \n-0.10 \n-0.13 \n-0.75 \n0.16 \n0.33 \n-0.02 \n0.34 \n12.64 \n-1.02 \n-0.03 \n1.09 \n-0.46 \n0.58 \nMAY \n0.11 \n-0.11 \n-0.06 \n-0.29 \n0.00 \n0.23 \n-0.03 \n-0.20 \n0.07 \n-0.13 \n-0.43 \n-0.05 \n-0.30 \n-0.13 \nJUNE \n-0.05 \n0.12 \n0.00 \n0.06 \n0.30 \n-0.03 \n0.00 \n-0.09 \n0.00 \n-0.11 \n0.15 \n0.02 \n-0.12 \n-0.03 \nJULY \n-0.47 \n-0.21 \n0.12 \n0.30 \n-0.01 \n0.11 \n-0.12 \n-0.13 \n-0.08 \n1.79 \n0.85 \n-0.37 \n0.25 \n0.01 \nAUGUST \n-0.81 \n-0.05 \n-0.09 \n0.00 \n-0.14 \n0.04 \n0.28 \n-0.06 \n-0.08 \n-0.02 \n0.02 \n-1.21 \n-0.07 \n-0.31 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nTABLE 5.1 : MONTHLY INFLATION -- PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \\1 \n( DECEMBER 2012 = 100) \n20 \n21 \n \nNON-FOOD INFLATION \nFOOD \nINFLATION \nALL \n \nALCOHOL-\nIC BEVER-\nAGES \nCLOTHING \nHSING, \nWATER, \nFURNI-\nTURE \nHEALTH \nTRANSPORT \nCOMMU-\nNICATION \nRECREA-\nTION & \nEDUCA-\nTION \nRESTAU-\nRANTS & \nMISC. \nTOTAL \nNON \nFOOD & \nITEMS \n \n& TOBAC-\nCO \nFOOTWEAR \nELEC-\nTRICTY, GAS \nAND \n \n \n \nCULTURE \nHOTELS \nGOODS & \nFOOD \nNON ALCO-\nHOLIC \nBEVERAG-\n \n \n \n \n& OTHER \nEQUIP-\nMENT \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSERVICES \n \n \n \n \n \nFUELS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nWEIGHTS \n4.38 \n6.05 \n17.74 \n9.91 \n2.16 \n9.76 \n3.41 \n2.1 \n5.67 \n1.38 \n3.91 \n66.47 \n33.53 \n100 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSEPTEMBER \n4.36 \n0.61 \n3.70 \n-0.37 \n2.10 \n5.06 \n-13.66 \n-1.01 \n5.74 \n1.23 \n0.93 \n1.45 \n-0.32 \n0.86 \nOCTOBER \n5.23 \n0.25 \n2.96 \n-0.70 \n2.21 \n1.40 \n-13.76 \n-0.73 \n9.05 \n0.83 \n-0.20 \n1.25 \n-0.74 \n0.59 \nNOVEMBER \n5.94 \n-0.07 \n3.51 \n-1.03 \n2.42 \n-7.04 \n-13.83 \n-0.92 \n11.19 \n2.06 \n-0.35 \n1.58 \n-1.51 \n0.54 \nDECEMBER \n4.26 \n0.09 \n3.63 \n-1.08 \n2.11 \n1.61 \n-13.99 \n-1.03 \n11.29 \n2.03 \n-0.87 \n1.61 \n-2.20 \n0.33 \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n5.03 \n0.03 \n3.63 \n-1.07 \n1.87 \n1.62 \n-14.00 \n-1.12 \n11.30 \n2.18 \n-0.43 \n1.67 \n-2.08 \n0.41 \nFEBRUARY \n2.21 \n-0.43 \n3.09 \n-1.35 \n0.44 \n0.05 \n-13.86 \n-1.08 \n11.47 \n1.32 \n-1.45 \n0.93 \n-3.26 \n-0.49 \nMARCH \n1.67 \n-0.53 \n2.21 \n-1.82 \n0.40 \n-0.44 \n-13.68 \n-1.21 \n11.47 \n2.47 \n-1.82 \n0.51 \n-3.71 \n-0.91 \nAPRIL \n1.78 \n-0.55 \n0.46 \n-2.60 \n0.22 \n-0.11 \n-0.62 \n-0.93 \n20.71 \n1.13 \n-1.56 \n1.50 \n-3.73 \n-0.26 \nMAY \n1.91 \n-0.83 \n0.39 \n-2.62 \n0.29 \n0.86 \n-0.60 \n-0.64 \n20.79 \n0.95 \n-1.69 \n1.62 \n-3.75 \n-0.19 \nJUNE \n1.68 \n-0.81 \n0.40 \n-2.54 \n0.64 \n0.97 \n-0.27 \n-0.84 \n20.79 \n0.99 \n-1.67 \n1.67 \n-3.54 \n-0.08 \nJULY \n-2.88 \n1.64 \n-0.68 \n0.7 \n-2.4 \n0.8 \n0.5 \n-0.4 \n-0.8 \n23.0 \n1.8 \n-2.0 \n1.9 \n0.3 \nAUGUST \n-2.79 \n2.02 \n-0.44 \n-0.1 \n-2.5 \n0.6 \n0.7 \n-0.3 \n-0.8 \n21.4 \n0.9 \n-2.8 \n1.6 \n0.2 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nTABLE 5.2 : YEARLY INFLATION -- PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \\1 \n(DECEMBER 2012 = 100) \n22 \n TABLE 6 : SELECTED INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE RATES \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSA \nBW \nJAPANESE \nEUROPEAN \nPOUND \nEND OF \nRAND/1 \nPULA/1 \nYEN/1 \nCURRENCY/2 \nSTERLING/2 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n9.03 \n8.05 \n90.90 \n1.36 \n1.58 \nFEBRUARY \n8.84 \n8.04 \n92.36 \n1.31 \n1.52 \nMARCH \n9.26 \n8.30 \n94.13 \n1.28 \n1.51 \nAPRIL \n8.98 \n8.10 \n97.76 \n1.31 \n1.55 \nMAY \n10.08 \n8.65 \n100.85 \n1.30 \n1.52 \nJUNE \n9.94 \n8.60 \n98.74 \n1.31 \n1.53 \nJULY \n9.83 \n8.49 \n98.31 \n1.33 \n1.53 \nAUGUST \n10.33 \n8.75 \n98.18 \n1.32 \n1.55 \nSEPTEMBER \n10.10 \n8.58 \n97.92 \n1.35 \n1.62 \nOCTOBER \n9.95 \n8.50 \n98.28 \n1.37 \n1.60 \nNOVEMBER \n10.19 \n8.64 \n102.33 \n1.36 \n1.64 \nDECEMBER \n10.43 \n8.72 \n105.02 \n1.38 \n1.65 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n11.21 \n9.09 \n102.47 \n1.35 \n1.65 \nFEBRUARY \n10.71 \n8.85 \n101.74 \n1.37 \n1.67 \nMARCH \n10.56 \n8.85 \n102.38 \n1.38 \n1.68 \nAPRIL \n10.57 \n8.85 \n102.38 \n1.38 \n1.68 \nMAY \n10.44 \n8.73 \n101.61 \n1.36 \n1.67 \nJUNE \n10.58 \n8.67 \n101.30 \n1.36 \n1.70 \nJULY \n10.68 \n8.85 \n102.76 \n1.36 \n1.69 \nAUGUST \n10.98 \n9.07 \n107.35 \n1.29 \n1.63 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1. Foreign currency per US Dollar. \n \n \n \n \n2. US Dollar per unit of foreign currency. \n \n \n \n \n23 \nTABLE 7.1: COMMERCIAL BANKS - ASSETS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ Millions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nLiquid Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSecurities \n \n \nLoans & Contingent \nOther \nNon \nFinan-\ncial \nTotal \nEnd of \nNotes \n \n \n \n \n \n \nTotal \nOther Balances Advances \nAssets \nAssets \nAssets \nAssets \n \n& \nBalances \nBalances \nBalances \n \n \n \n Liquid \nwith RBZ \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCoin \nwith \nwith Other \nat \nTrade \nTreasury Agric PEs \n Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nat Banks \nRBZ \nBanks \nForeign \nBanks \nBills \nBills \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n May \n250.9 \n400.9 \n198.2 \n296.7 \n253.5 \n75.4 \n5.3 \n1,480.8 \n25.8 \n2,673.2 \n389.8 \n208.0 \n382.9 \n5,160.5 \nJun \n227.2 \n416.4 \n171.9 \n257.5 \n271.8 \n75.5 \n5.3 \n1,425.8 \n26.0 \n2,698.3 \n364.1 \n217.8 \n384.6 \n5,116.5 \nJul \n266.5 \n352.8 \n164.2 \n266.1 \n263.8 \n110.2 \n6.4 \n1,429.9 \n26.5 \n2,701.3 \n337.1 \n229.8 \n387.0 \n5,111.7 \n Aug. \n322.8 \n277.9 \n136.4 \n242.5 \n237.8 \n61.1 \n6.4 \n1,285.0 \n26.2 \n2,813.0 \n367.0 \n218.3 \n385.2 \n5,094.7 \n Sep \n334.1 \n336.0 \n178.0 \n327.8 \n226.3 \n111.5 \n6.0 \n1,519.7 \n26.9 \n2773.3 \n298.8 \n234.7 \n386.4 \n5,239.8 \nOct \n379.4 \n387.5 \n137.1 \n219.7 \n260.9 \n99.4 \n5.0 \n1,489.0 \n17.3 \n2,809.1 \n316.7 \n257.3 \n371.5 \n5,260.9 \nNov \n333.3 \n312.7 \n160.2 \n197.1 \n261.1 \n108.6 \n6.5 \n1,379.5 \n26.6 \n2,789.7 \n291.3 \n235.4 \n369.8 \n5,092.3 \nDec \n 354.8 \n367.8 \n135.5 \n 287.3 \n199.9 \n118.0 \n6.6 \n1,469.9 \n28.4 \n2,799.5 \n490.8 \n259.5 \n347.6 \n5,395.7 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Jan \n356.9 \n395.3 \n134.1 \n253.1 \n153.0 \n119.2 \n5.4 \n1,417.0 \n27.9 \n2,866.4 \n516.1 \n362.2 \n353.9 \n5,543.5 \nFeb \n334.3 \n387.0 \n130.5 \n285.0 \n195.0 \n193.2 \n5.4 \n1,530.0 \n32.8 \n2,718.1 \n534.5 \n502.9 \n351.1 \n5,669.5 \nMar \n304.6 \n354.1 \n147.4 \n280.3 \n165.9 \n255.2 \n5.4 \n1,512.9 \n28.7 \n2,737.9 \n522.7 \n538.8 \n349.7 \n5,690.7 \n Apr \n353.3 \n367.8 \n154.4 \n274.9 \n205.7 \n247.0 \n5.4 \n1,608.4 \n32.5 \n2,844.6 \n534.1 \n345.3 \n348.6 \n5,713.6 \n May \n327.8 \n421.1 \n120.5 \n372.8 \n211.5 \n241.7 \n5.4 \n1,700.6 \n27.5 \n2,836.8 \n591.4 \n366.2 \n347.1 \n5,869.6 \nJun \n347.1 \n404.7 \n166.4 \n338.1 \n198.0 \n261.9 \n0.0 \n1,716.1 \n16.2 \n2,863.2 \n607.8 \n362.9 \n346.1 \n5,912.6 \nJul \n347.1 \n321.3 \n176.7 \n276.3 \n186.0 \n246.2 \n0.0 \n1,553.7 \n15.4 \n2,940.4 \n597.5 \n347.4 \n345.6 \n5,800.0 \nAug \n360.7 \n424.5 \n178.5 \n243.5 \n173.9 \n237.5 \n0.0 \n1,618.6 \n15.5 \n2,949.1 \n609.5 \n353.9 \n346.4 \n5,892.9 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n24 \nTABLE 7.2: COMMERCIAL BANKS - LIABILITIES \nUS$ Millions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nDeposits \n \n \n \nAmounts Owing to \nCapital \nContingent \nOther \nTotal \nOf which \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nand \nLiabilities Liabilities Liabilities Liabilities \nto the \nEnd of \nDemand \nSavings and \nShort-term \nLong-term \nTotal \nForeign \nLiabilities \nRBZ \nOther Banks Reserves \n \n \n \nPublic \n \n \n \n \n Deposits \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nMay \n2,066.0 \n913.0 \n479.9 \n3,459.0 \n346.5 \n0.0 \n81.8 \n674.4 \n389.8 \n209.0 \n5,160.4 \n3,459.0 \nJun \n2,013.9 \n919.6 \n298.9 \n3,232.4 \n553.0 \n0.0 \n74.1 \n702.3 \n364.1 \n190.6 \n5,116.5 \n3,232.4 \nJul \n2,054.1 \n916.2 \n245.9 \n3,216.2 \n578.3 \n0.0 \n77.5 \n699.7 \n337.1 \n202.9 \n 5,111.7 \n3,216.2 \nAug \n2,017.4 \n879.5 \n253.2 \n3,150.1 \n608.2 \n0.0 \n63.8 \n694.9 \n367.0 \n210.8 \n5,094.7 \n3,150.1 \nSep \n2,082.1 \n899.3 \n294.5 \n3,275.8 \n674.6 \n0.0 \n 74.0 \n708.8 \n298.8 \n207.7 \n5,239.8 \n3,275.8 \nOct \n2,125.9 \n880.0 \n349.3 \n3,355.2 \n611.4 \n0.0 \n68.5 \n703.0 \n316.7 \n206.0 \n5,260.9 \n3,355.2 \nNov \n1,953.4 \n861.2 \n 371.6 \n3,186.2 \n627.8 \n0.0 \n75.8 \n689.7 \n291.3 \n221.6 \n5,092.3 \n3,186.2 \nDec \n 1,980.4 \n813.6 \n 517.1 \n3,311.1 \n614.0 \n0.0 \n65.0 \n730.9 \n490.8 \n 184.0 \n 5,395.7 \n3,311.1 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n2,153.6 \n802.7 \n403.5 \n3,359.8 \n661.3 \n0.0 \n55.9 \n592.9 \n516.1 \n357.5 \n5,543.5 \n3,359.8 \nFeb \n2,111.8 \n878.8 \n494.6 \n3,485.2 \n630.0 \n0.0 \n51.1 \n609.5 \n534.5 \n359.0 \n5,669.5 \n3,485.2 \nMar \n2,156.8 \n919.6 \n454.2 \n3,530.6 \n635.5 \n0.0 \n44.8 \n596.4 \n522.7 \n360.7 \n5,690.7 \n3,530.6 \n Apr \n2,267.5 \n958.3 \n435.7 \n3,661.5 \n553.5 \n0.0 \n17.0 \n595.0 \n534.1 \n352.4 \n5,713.6 \n3,661.5 \n May \n2,294.9 \n975.8 \n451.7 \n3,722.4 \n585.0 \n0.0 \n13.7 \n591.1 \n591.4 \n366.1 \n5,869.6 \n3,722.4 \nJun \n2,248.9 \n989.8 \n506.1 \n3,744.8 \n543.8 \n0.0 \n48.3 \n591.2 \n607.8 \n376.7 \n5,912.6 \n3,744.8 \nJul \n2,130.4 \n892.9 \n606.6 \n3,629.9 \n560.8 \n0.0 \n39.5 \n571.5 \n597.5 \n400.6 \n5,800.0 \n3,629.9 \nAug \n2202.3 \n963.1 \n539.9 \n3705.3 \n552.7 \n0.0 \n43.5 \n580.7 \n609.5 \n401.2 \n5892.9 \n3,705.3 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n25 \nTABLE 8.1 : ACCEPTING HOUSES - ASSETS \nUS$ Millions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nLiquid Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nLoans & Contingent \nOther \nNon Financial \nTotal \n \nEnd of \nNotes \n \n \n \n \n \nTotal \nOther \nBalances Advances \nAssets \nAssets \nAssets \nAssets \n \n \n& \nBalances Balances Balances \n \n \nLiquid \nwith RBZ \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCoin \nwith \nwith Other \nat \nTrade \nTreasury \n Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nat Banks \nRBZ \nBanks \nForeign \nBanks \nBills \nBills \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAug \n1.4 \n1.7 \n0.4 \n0.6 \n3.4 \n0.0 \n7.4 \n0.0 \n265.6 \n34.5 \n45.5 \n37.3 \n390.3 \n \nSep \n1.2 \n0.8 \n0.0 \n0.3 \n3.4 \n0.0 \n5.7 \n0.0 \n233.7 \n35.8 \n46.6 \n38.6 \n360.4 \n \nOct \n0.9 \n0.5 \n0.4 \n0.6 \n2.5 \n0.0 \n4.8 \n0.0 \n234.8 \n35.6 \n41.3 \n38.7 \n355.2 \n \nNov \n0.4 \n0.6 \n0.1 \n0.2 \n2.5 \n0.0 \n3.9 \n0.0 \n231.9 \n35.5 \n39.6 \n38.3 \n349.2 \n \nDec \n1.1 \n0.5 \n0.1 \n0.4 \n2.5 \n0.0 \n4.6 \n0.0 \n232.7 \n35.5 \n29.2 \n40.5 \n342.5 \n \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n0.1 \n0.5 \n0.0 \n0.2 \n1.8 \n0.0 \n2.6 \n0.0 \n81.3 \n10.0 \n23.5 \n34.7 \n152.1 \n \nFeb \n0.2 \n0.4 \n0.1 \n0.1 \n1.8 \n0.0 \n2.5 \n0.0 \n77.6 \n9.0 \n24.1 \n34.6 \n147.9 \n \nMar \n0.1 \n0.1 \n0.1 \n0.1 \n1.6 \n0.0 \n2.0 \n0.0 \n53.2 \n8.7 \n21.8 \n32.5 \n118.1 \n \nApr \n0.1 \n0.4 \n0.2 \n0.3 \n1.6 \n0.0 \n2.6 \n0.0 \n75.2 \n8.5 \n22.2 \n32.4 \n140.9 \n \nMay \n0.2 \n0.4 \n0.0 \n0.1 \n0.3 \n0.0 \n0.9 \n0.0 \n68.7 \n0.1 \n14.6 \n30.3 \n114.6 \n \nJun \n0.2 \n0.2 \n0.1 \n0.1 \n0.6 \n0.0 \n1.2 \n0.0 \n66.8 \n0.1 \n14.7 \n29.6 \n112.4 \n \nJul \n0.2 \n0.3 \n0.0 \n0.1 \n0.3 \n0 \n0.9 \n0.0 \n66.9 \n0.1 \n12.9 \n28.7 \n109.6 \n \nAug \n0.2 \n0.7 \n0.0 \n0.1 \n0.3 \n0.0 \n1.3 \n0.0 \n64.4 \n0.0 \n19.4 \n23.9 \n109.0 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n26 \nTABLE 8.2 : ACCEPTING HOUSES - LIABILITIES \nUS$ Millions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nOf which \n \n \nDeposits \n \n \n \nAmounts Owing to \nCapital \nContingent \nOther \nTotal \nLiabilities to the \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nand \nLiabilities \nLiabilities \nLiabilities \nPublic \nEnd of Demand Savings and \nShort-term \nLong-term \nTotal \nForeign \nLiabilities \nRBZ \nOther \nBanks \nReserves \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Deposits \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAug \n109.5 \n80.6 \n 25.2 \n215.2 \n47.5 \n0.0 \n1.2 \n-101.7 \n34.5 \n 193.6 \n390.3 \n 215.2 \nSep \n111.2 \n82.6 \n19.0 \n212.8 \n47.9 \n0.0 \n1.2 \n-114.9 \n35.8 \n177.8 \n360.4 \n212.8 \nOct \n112.5 \n80.4 \n14.9 \n207.8 \n48.3 \n0.0 \n1.2 \n-114.3 \n35.6 \n176.7 \n355.2 \n207.8 \nNov \n122.6 \n59.7 \n20.0 \n202.3 \n48.2 \n0.0 \n1.2 \n-118.2 \n35.5 \n180.2 \n349.2 \n202.3 \nDec \n134.5 \n56.4 \n6.9 \n 197.8 \n48.9 \n0.0 \n1.2 \n-127.6 \n35.5 \n186.7 \n342.5 \n 197.8 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n36.8 \n57.7 \n5.7 \n100.1 \n11.7 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.7 \n10.0 \n29.6 \n152.1 \n100.1 \nFeb \n47.6 \n48.3 \n0.0 \n95.8 \n11.7 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n-10.9 \n9.0 \n42.3 \n147.9 \n95.8 \nMar \n41.0 \n55.8 \n0.0 \n96.9 \n12.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n-17.7 \n8.7 \n18.4 \n118.1 \n96.9 \nApr \n57.4 \n40.3 \n0.0 \n97.7 \n12.2 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n-19.8 \n8.5 \n42.4 \n140.9 \n97.7 \nMay \n42.8 \n34.6 \n0.0 \n77.4 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n4.7 \n0.1 \n32.5 \n114.6 \n77.4 \nJun \n42.8 \n33.2 \n0.0 \n76.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n2.3 \n0.1 \n33.7 \n112.3 \n76.0 \nJul \n42.6 \n33.8 \n0.0 \n76.3 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n-8.7 \n0.1 \n41.8 \n109.6 \n76.3 \nAug \n36.4 \n40.4 \n0.0 \n76.8 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n-7.8 \n0.0 \n40.0 \n109.0 \n76.8 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n27 \nTABLE 9.1 : BUILDING SOCIETIES - ASSETS \nUS$ Millions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nLiquid Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nNotes \nBalances \nTrade \nTreasury \nTotal \nMortgage \nOther \nOther \nNon Finan-\ncial \nTotal \nEnd of \n& \nwith Other \nBills \nBills \nLiquid \nAdvances \nAdvances \nAssets \nAssets \n Assets \n \nCoin \nBanks \n \n \n Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \nat Banks \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n20.4 \n125.5 \n0.2 \n0.0 \n146.1 \n283.2 \n118.5 \n36.1 \n121.4 \n705.3 \nFeb \n20.2 \n164.3 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n84.5 \n291.8 \n117.9 \n35.3 \n121.4 \n734.2 \nMar \n18.8 \n129.1 \n0.2 \n20.0 \n168.1 \n291.4 \n116.9 \n39.5 \n121.4 \n737.3 \nApr \n16.9 \n159.8 \n0.2 \n20.2 \n197.2 \n294.8 \n115.5 \n39.5 \n122.1 \n769.1 \nMay \n30.2 \n179.6 \n0.2 \n20.3 \n230.0 \n307.3 \n120.3 \n40.4 \n121.9 \n820.0 \nJun \n28.6 \n178.8 \n0.0 \n20.0 \n227.3 \n314.2 \n122.4 \n44.6 \n121.8 \n830.3 \nJul \n26.1 \n207.4 \n0.0 \n20.0 \n253.5 \n312.4 \n123.1 \n48.6 \n121.6 \n859.2 \nAug \n34.7 \n204.1 \n0.0 \n20.0 \n258.8 \n320.6 \n123.0 \n46.4 \n124.1 \n872.9 \nSep \n36.4 \n204.9 \n0.0 \n20.0 \n261.3 \n353.4 \n122.7 \n52.2 \n124.6 \n914.2 \nOct \n39.3 \n186.8 \n0.0 \n20.0 \n246.1 \n358.4 \n128.2 \n51.8 \n122.4 \n906.9 \nNov \n39.7 \n163.1 \n0.0 \n40.0 \n242.8 \n361.6 \n135.8 \n43.6 \n122.9 \n906.7 \nDec \n34.8 \n158.8 \n0.0 \n40.0 \n233.6 \n381.5 \n127.7 \n55.2 \n123.0 \n920.9 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n30.9 \n147.5 \n0.2 \n40.0 \n218.6 \n384.5 \n136.4 \n64.4 \n125.3 \n929.1 \nFeb \n30.2 \n165.0 \n0.2 \n40.0 \n235.3 \n385.8 \n132.0 \n65.4 \n125.4 \n943.9 \nMar \n47.5 \n166.2 \n0.2 \n40.0 \n253.8 \n390.4 \n132.1 \n68.8 \n125.0 \n970.1 \nApr \n45.2 \n161.0 \n0.2 \n40.0 \n246.5 \n401.8 \n132.4 \n76.6 \n124.7 \n981.9 \nMay \n47.7 \n190.7 \n0.2 \n40.0 \n278.6 \n394.0 \n147.0 \n82.7 \n124.3 \n1,026.7 \nJun \n39.5 \n187.9 \n0.0 \n40.0 \n267.4 \n400.0 \n150.4 \n84.0 \n124.4 \n1,026.1 \nJul \n40.6 \n180.9 \n0.0 \n40.0 \n261.5 \n431.8 \n159.4 \n84.1 \n124.4 \n1,061.2 \nAug \n17.8 \n219.8 \n0.0 \n51.4 \n289.1 \n442.4 \n166.5 \n86.4 \n124.2 \n1,108.6 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n28 \nTABLE 9.2 : BUILDING SOCIETIES - LIABILITIES \nUS$ Millions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nOf which \n \nDeposits \nCapital \nOther \nTotal \nLiabilities to the \n \n \n \n \nand \nLiabilities \n Liabilities \nPublic \nEnd of \nSavings and \nShort-term \nLong-term \nTotal \nReserves \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Deposits \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Jun \n260.1 \n109.7 \n369.7 \n141.8 \n82.7 \n594.3 \n369.7 \n Jul \n233.2 \n156.1 \n389.3 \n145.7 \n79.3 \n614.3 \n389.3 \n Aug \n231.0 \n170.1 \n401.2 \n150.0 \n79..8 \n630.9 \n401.2 \n Sep \n247.3 \n172.8 \n420.0 \n153.1 \n80.0 \n653.0 \n420.0 \n Oct \n263.2 \n165.4 \n428.6 \n159.8 \n27.5 \n675.1 \n428.6 \n Nov \n246.8 \n179.5 \n426.3 \n165.5 \n28.2 \n694.3 \n426.3 \n Dec \n255.8 \n184.6 \n440.3 \n177.8 \n28.1 \n716.9 \n440.3 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Jan \n230.0 \n192.8 \n422.8 \n180.3 \n102.3 \n705.3 \n422.8 \n Feb \n255.7 \n194.2 \n449.9 \n183.7 \n100.6 \n734.2 \n449.9 \n Mar \n250.6 \n203.9 \n454.5 \n187.2 \n95.7 \n737.3 \n454.5 \n Apr \n252.9 \n226.6 \n479.5 \n190.6 \n22.3 \n769.3 \n479.5 \n May \n315.3 \n212.0 \n527.4 \n193.3 \n23.4 \n820.0 \n527.4 \n Jun \n309.0 \n222.6 \n531.6 \n198.3 \n100.4 \n830.3 \n531.6 \n Jul \n339.1 \n222.8 \n561.9 \n202.0 \n95.3 \n859.2 \n561.9 \n Aug \n298.4 \n270.1 \n568.4 \n206.3 \n98.2 \n872.9 \n568.4 \n Sep \n336.1 \n246.9 \n583.0 \n209.2 \n122.0 \n914.2 \n583.0 \n Oct \n310.9 \n264.9 \n575.8 \n212.0 \n119.4 \n907.2 \n575.8 \n Nov \n328.9 \n244.3 \n573.1 \n214.8 \n118.8 \n906.7 \n573.1 \n Dec \n370.3 \n197.3 \n567.6 \n219.6 \n133.9 \n921.0 \n567.6 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n313.9 \n253.1 \n567.0 \n225.9 \n136.2 \n929.1 \n567.0 \nFeb \n318.7 \n264.4 \n583.1 \n228.6 \n132.2 \n943.9 \n583.1 \nMar \n374.6 \n234.6 \n609.2 \n231.4 \n129.5 \n970.1 \n609.2 \nApr \n358.4 \n262.7 \n621.1 \n234.0 \n126.8 \n981.9 \n621.1 \nMay \n436.2 \n233.2 \n669.4 \n238.0 \n119.1 \n1,026.7 \n669.4 \nJun \n440.1 \n212.2 \n652.3 \n243.1 \n130.9 \n1,026.3 \n652.3 \nJuly \n362.4 \n302.9 \n665.3 \n244.2 \n151.9 \n1,061.3 \n665.3 \nAug \n358.8 \n336.8 \n695.5 \n250.6 \n162..6 \n1,108.7 \n695.5 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n29 \nTable 10: ZIMBABWE STOCK MARKET STATISTICS \n \n \n \n \n \nIndices \nUS$ Millions \n \nIndustrial \nMining \nMarket Capitalisation \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n179.34 \n84.07 \n4,700.33 \nFeb \n182.3 \n72.01 \n4,748.24 \nMar \n183.88 \n66.21 \n4,726.34 \nApr \n189.66 \n71.98 \n4,894.68 \nMay \n212.72 \n73.99 \n5,471.22 \nJun \n211.19 \n73.29 \n5,436.57 \nJul \n232.87 \n66.77 \n5,9136.78 \nAug \n181.67 \n48.73 \n4,682.27 \nSep \n200.05 \n49.90 \n5,157.20 \nOct \n209.74 \n52.68 \n5,407.42 \nNov \n213.04 \n47.02 \n5,482.03 \nDec \n202.12 \n45.79 \n5,203.13 \n \n \n \n \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n189.25 \n35.40 \n4,882.11 \nFeb \n189.45 \n39.24 \n4,906.94 \nMar \n176.32 \n29.51 \n4,560.29 \nApr \n172.91 \n29.64 \n4,473.51 \nMay \n174.89 \n35.45 \n4,485.11 \nJun \n186.57 \n61.32 \n4,873.40 \nJuly \n188.07 \n95.00 \n4,959.21 \nAug \n196.43 \n104.8 \n5,186.63 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) \n \n30 \nTABLE 11 : SAVINGS /1 WITH FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ Millions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCommercial \nMerchant \n \nBuilding \n \nEnd of \nBanks \nBanks \nOther/2 \nSocieties \nTOTAL \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJanuary \n1,418.5 \n113.0 \n64.3 \n422.8 \n2,018.6 \nFebruary \n1,424.8 \n121.7 \n64.7 \n449.9 \n2,061.1 \nMarch \n1,427.3 \n115.2 \n66.7 \n454.5 \n2,063.6 \nApril \n1,425.8 \n121.0 \n63.9 \n479.5 \n2,090.1 \nMay \n1,393.0 \n121.5 \n66.2 \n527.4 \n2,108.0 \nJune \n1,218.4 \n108.6 \n70.6 \n531.6 \n1,929.2 \nJuly \n1,162.1 \n109.7 \n70.8 \n561.9 \n1,904.5 \nAugust \n1,132.7 \n105.8 \n70.4 \n568.4 \n1,877.2 \nSeptember \n1,193.8 \n101.6 \n69.8 \n583.0 \n1,948.2 \nOctober \n1,229.3 \n95.2 \n69.3 \n575.8 \n1,969.7 \nNovember \n1,232.8 \n79.7 \n73.4 \n573.1 \n1,959.0 \nDecember \n1,330.7 \n63.3 \n72.7 \n567.6 \n2,034.3 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJanuary \n1,206.2 \n63.3 \n70.1 \n567.0 \n1,906.7 \nFebruary \n1,373.4 \n48.3 \n71.5 \n583.1 \n2,076.3 \nMarch \n1,373.8 \n55.8 \n75.1 \n609.2 \n2,113.9 \nApril \n1,394.0 \n40.3 \n81.0 \n621.1 \n2,136.4 \nMay \n1,427.5 \n34.6 \n77.5 \n669.4 \n2,209.0 \nJune \n1,495.8 \n33.2 \n81.3 \n652.3 \n2,262.6 \nJuly \n1,499.5 \n33.8 \n84.2 \n665.3 \n2,282.80 \nAug \n1,502.9 \n40.4 \n84.0 \n695.5 \n2,322.9 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1/ Comprises all deposits other than demand deposits. \n2/ Includes People’s Own Savings Bank (POSB). \n \n \n31 \nTABLE 12 : ANALYSIS OF LIQUID ASSETS OF MONETARY BANKS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ Millions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCommercial Banks \nAccepting Houses \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nLiquid \nPrescribed \nExcess \nLiquid \nPrescribed \nExcess \n \nassets \nliquid \nliquid \nassets \nliquid \nLiquid \nEnd of \nheld \nassets/1 \nassets \nheld \nassets/1 \nassets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJanuary \n1,235.5 \n1,035.2 \n200.3 \n36.2 \n66.0 \n-29.8 \nFebruary \n1,244.9 \n1,025.4 \n219.5 \n26.9 \n67.3 \n-40.4 \nMarch \n1,277.6 \n1,016.2 \n261.4 \n8.9 \n65.8 \n-57.0 \nApril \n1,491.7 \n1,050.1 \n441.6 \n23.4 \n68.5 \n-45.1 \nMay \n1,480.8 \n1,037.7 \n443.1 \n27.3 \n70.1 \n-42.8 \nJune \n1,425.8 \n969.7 \n456.0 \n24.1 \n66.9 \n-42.8 \nJuly \n1,429.9 \n964.9 \n465.1 \n11.6 \n66.3 \n-54.7 \nAugust \n1,285.0 \n945.0 \n340.0 \n7.4 \n64.6 \n-57.2 \nSeptember \n1,519.7 \n982.7 \n536.9 \n5.7 \n63.8 \n-58.1 \nOctober \n1,489.0 \n1,006.6 \n482.5 \n4.8 \n62.3 \n-57.5 \nNovember \n1,379.5 \n955.9 \n423.7 \n3.9 \n60.7 \n-56.8 \nDecember \n1,469.9 \n993.3 \n476.6 \n4.6 \n59.3 \n-54.7 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJanuary \n1,417.0 \n1,007.9 \n409.0 \n2.6 \n30.0 \n-27.4 \nFebruary \n1,466.6 \n1,045.6 \n421.0 \n2.5 \n28.7 \n-26.2 \nMarch \n1,512.9 \n1,059.2 \n453.7 \n2.0 \n29.1 \n-27.1 \nApril \n1,608.4 \n1,098.5 \n509.9 \n2.6 \n29.3 \n-26.7 \nMay \n1,700.6 \n1,116.7 \n583.9 \n0.9 \n23.2 \n-22.3 \nJune \n1,716.1 \n1,123.4 \n592.7 \n1.2 \n22.8 \n-21.6 \nJuly \n1,553.7 \n1,089.0 \n464.7 \n0.9 \n22.9 \n-22.0 \nAugust \n1,618.6 \n1,111.6 \n507.0 \n1.3 \n23.0 \n-21.7 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1/ With effect from May 2012, the prescribed liquid asset ratio was reviewed to 30% of liabilities to the public. \n32 \nTABLE 13.1 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS TRANSACTIONAL ACTIVITY \nValues of Transactions (US$ in millions) \nMONTH \nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS \nATM \nMOBILE \n INTERNET \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n3,563.84 \n5.24 \n80.72 \n173.71 \n115.53 \n89.67 \nFeb \n2,968.02 \n5.52 \n103.88 \n156.66 \n118.70 \n80.56 \nMar \n3,339.98 \n15.21 \n134.33 \n178.08 \n118.47 \n102.05 \nApr \n3,535.58 \n16.58 \n140.28 \n187.85 \n160.61 \n123.03 \nMay \n3,915.31 \n15.42 \n129.20 \n203.37 \n211.75 \n152.24 \nJun \n3,544.35 \n13.65 \n117.11 \n181.35 \n146.64 \n121.98 \nJul \n3,955.45 \n12.31 \n132.61 \n205.37 \n164.08 \n139.13 \nAug \n3,351.13 \n10.45 \n138.05 \n203.41 \n189.48 \n128.68 \nSep \n3,409.17 \n13.34 \n120.41 \n190.44 \n173.13 \n142.32 \nOct \n3,641.98 \n13.75 \n121.55 \n206.51 \n201.51 \n156.26 \nNov \n3,134.35 \n11.40 \n102.19 \n229.52 \n222.18 \n57.34 \nDec \n3,438.08 \n4.04 \n130.15 \n265.80 \n268.94 \n68.58 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAnnual Total \n41,797.24 \n136.91 \n1,450.48 \n2,382.07 \n2,091.02 \n1,361.84 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n3,093.01 \n5.24 \n102.26 \n233.10 \n228.25 \n68.31 \nFeb \n2,954.93 \n10.73 \n96.27 \n193.90 \n217.14 \n64.42 \nMar \n3,332.79 \n10.40 \n103.58 \n232.94 \n255.32 \n87.94 \nApr \n3,439.33 \n9.66 \n126.26 \n253.16 \n264.38 \n96.29 \nMay \n3,915.31 \n13.65 \n117.11 \n181.35 \n146.64 \n121.98 \nJune \n3,657.44 \n12.42 \n110.38 \n250.87 \n284.18 \n104.28 \nJuly \n3,955.45 \n11.72 \n125.81 \n267.00 \n312.35 \n101.75 \nAugust \n 3,467.34 \n9.36 \n 135.90 \n 273.39 \n 320.36 \n103.26 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n36 \nTABLE 13.2 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS TRANSACTIONAL ACTIVITY \nVolumes of Transactions (in thousands) \nMONTH \nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS \nATM \nMOBILE \n INTERNET \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n181.68 \n21.18 \n761.09 \n691.18 \n6,950.84 \n47.53 \nFeb \n172.41 \n21.95 \n811.83 \n620.06 \n6,835.89 \n30.75 \nMar \n179.44 \n37.01 \n1,377.65 \n743.82 \n7,042.27 \n33.69 \nApr \n182.87 \n37.31 \n954.80 \n760.46 \n9,908.41 \n34.73 \nMay \n215.20 \n37.09 \n954.18 \n793.43 \n12,146.90 \n38.68 \nJun \n185.80 \n34.36 \n968.54 \n731.17 \n9,110.97 \n36.87 \nJul \n205.85 \n35.41 \n1,052.26 \n822.57 \n10,099.72 \n42.74 \nAug \n187.25 \n30.29 \n1,114.86 \n825.75 \n11,551.94 \n41.78 \nSep \n201.22 \n33.17 \n1,003.98 \n799.62 \n8,701.56 \n44.48 \nOct \n212.66 \n35.69 \n1,073.88 \n873.19 \n9,769.81 \n48.59 \nNov \n186.64 \n31.74 \n904.27 \n927.93 \n14,753.35 \n24.04 \nDec \n180.80 \n11.82 \n1,033.73 \n1,042.32 \n12,273.02 \n23.56 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAnnual Total \n2,291.82 \n367.02 \n12,011.07 \n9,631.50 \n119,144.68 \n447.44 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n182.48 \n29.41 \n973.79 \n815.89 \n11,141.19 \n24.19 \nFeb \n175.09 \n32.95 \n991.91 \n799.12 \n10,631.60 \n25.10 \nMar \n192.02 \n32.35 \n1,163.76 \n947.64 \n12,859.50 \n30.82 \nApr \n183.63 \n28.12 \n1,184.85 \n974.37 \n13,298.04 \n29.23 \nMay \n215.20 \n37.09 \n954.18 \n793.43 \n12,146.90 \n38.68 \nJun \n193.58 \n32.98 \n1,164.73 \n966.45 \n14,163.56 \n34.25 \nJuly \n199.59 \n34.34 \n1,272.91 \n1038.44 \n15,370.63 \n37.68 \nAugust \n 170.86 \n 27.25 \n 1,300.35 \n 1,122.41 \n 16,268.07 \n 33.84", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/MPC_Statements/August2014.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "d51ec9bc14eee2dc1a41023f10c5979f", "text": "1\n \nPRESS STATEMENT \nEMBARGO DELIVERY \n26 March 2026 \n \nSTATEMENT OF THE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE \n \nIssued by Lesetja Kganyago, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank \nGood day \nSince our last meeting, the key event has been the outbreak of conflict in the Middle \nEast. Prices for commodities like oil, gas and fertiliser have moved sharply higher. \nMeanwhile, there have been broad losses across equity, bond and currency markets, \nwith only a few safe havens and energy producers showing gains. This repricing has \nbeen largely orderly, with few signs of financial-market dysfunction so far. \nWe are just a few weeks into this shock, and conditions remain extremely uncertain. \nAt this stage, it is obvious that global inflation will be higher in the near term, while \ngrowth will probably suffer from supply-chain disruptions and rising costs. But the \nlonger-term outlook is less clear. \nIn these circumstances, leading central banks have generally kept rates unchanged, \nas they wait for more information.1 Markets have largely dropped expectations for \nrate cuts, in major economies, and probabilities of rate hikes have risen. \nTurning to South Africa, the latest data show the economy grew further in the fourth \nquarter of 2025, with output rising by 1.1% for the year as a whole. This is better \n \n1 This covers the recent meetings of the United States Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, \nthe Bank of Japan and the Bank of England. The Reserve Bank of Australia raised rates last week, \nwhile the Central Bank of Brazil cut. \n \n2\nthan recent years but still well below longer-run averages.2 We have been \nencouraged by green shoots such as rising confidence and stronger investment,3 but \nthe ongoing war could interrupt the growth recovery. \nFor the time being, our growth projections are largely unchanged. There have been \ndata revisions which lowered 2025 growth, making 2026 look a bit stronger in \ncomparison. This offsets some of the impact from the current shock.4 We still have \ngrowth rising to around 2% over the next few years, but we now see downside risks \nto the outlook.5 \nMoving to prices, inflation was 3.0% for February, with core inflation also at 3.0%. \nThis is precisely in line with our target. Higher energy prices will raise inflation in the \nnear term.6 We expect headline will soon accelerate to around 4%, with fuel inflation \nover 18% for the second quarter.7 Our baseline forecast then has a gradual \nunwinding of the shock, taking inflation back to 3% late next year.8 \nThe ongoing Middle East conflict is a clear instance of a supply shock, which raises \nprices while weakening demand. The standard response to a supply shock is to look \nthrough first-round effects, which are unavoidable and cannot be stopped by interest \nrate changes. At the same time, central banks should be alert to second-round \neffects, where an initial shock triggers broad price increases.9 Getting policy right \n \n2 Growth for 2023 was 0.8% and for 2024 it was 0.5%. Longer-run average growth has been around \n2%–2.5%; steady-state growth in the QPM is 2.5%. \n3 Real gross fixed capital formation grew 1.4% in 2025Q3 and 1.3% in 2025Q4. \n4 The latest GDP release from Stats SA revised growth lower for 2025Q2 and 2025Q3, so despite the \nupside surprise in 2025Q4 (0.4% vs 0.3% expected), the full-year growth estimate was revised down \nfrom 1.3% to 1.1%. \n5 Growth for 2026Q1 is projected at 0.2% (q/q, s.a.), with 0.3% for 2026Q2. \n6 While the rand has weakened during March, earlier forecasts did not fully incorporate the rand \nstrength of early 2026, so the change to the exchange rate is significantly smaller than the change to \nthe oil price assumption. The 2026Q1 implied dollar/rand exchange rate is revised from 16.54 to 16.33 \n(more appreciated) while 2026Q2 is now R16.69 and 2026Q3 is R16.83 (previously R16.73 and \nR16.85, respectively). \n7 The peak in the forecast is 4.3% in April. The average for 2026Q2 is 4.0%. \n8 The baseline has the oil shock unwind by 2028, with prices back to US$65 per barrel by 2028Q2, in \nline with the January projections (also equivalent to the pre-war starting point; the January projections \nhad US$64.3 for 2026Q1). But oil now averages US$78 in 2026 and US$68 in 2027, instead of \nstaying flat at US$65 over the medium term, as in the January forecast round. \n9 For an extended discussion of monetary policy responses to supply shocks, see this 2022 speech: \nhttps://www.resbank.co.za/content/dam/sarb/publications/speeches/speeches-by-\ngovernors/2022/Keynote%20address%20by%20Dr%20Rashad%20Cassim,%20Deputy%20Governor\n%20of%20the%20South%20African%20Reserve%20Bank,%20at%20the%20ACI%20Financial%20M\narkets%20Association%20South%20Africa.pdf \n \n3\nmeans ensuring that the price response to supply shocks is transitory, and not \npersistent. \nIt is always difficult to assess second-round effects in time. Waiting for clear \nevidence risks leaving the policy response too late. We therefore rely on forecasts, \nas well as indicators like wages and inflation expectations, to judge if there is a \nbroader build-up of inflation pressure. \nFor expectations, the latest survey once again showed all respondents lowering their \nprojections, closer to our target – but this survey was in the field before the war \nstarted.10 Market-based indicators of inflation expectations have picked up recently, \nbut they tend to be volatile.11 \nThe fact is, we are still only a few weeks into this crisis. The coming months will be \ncrucial for assessing the longer-term inflation consequences. \nGiven current forecasts, we see inflation risks to the upside. \nAgainst this backdrop, the committee decided to keep the policy rate unchanged, at \n6.75%. The decision was unanimous. \nIn previous meetings we warned of elevated risks, and we have been proceeding \ncautiously in our rate setting. Now a crisis has hit, this prudent approach is proving \nappropriate. \nThe latest forecasts from our Quarterly Projection Model show rates unchanged for a \nlonger period, postponing the cuts from the January projections.12 The policy stance \nis treated as moderately restrictive, which helps bring inflation back to target. As \nbefore, this rate path remains a broad policy guide. Our decisions will continue to be \ntaken on a meeting-by-meeting basis, with careful attention to the outlook, data \noutcomes, and the balance of risks to the forecast. \n \n10 Average expectations shifted lower, converging at 3.6% for all the measures (2026, 2027, 2028, \nand ‘over 5 years’). \n11 For breakeven rates, the 5-year measure is up from 3.36% as of the previous MPC meeting to \n4.46%, a change of 110bps. The 10-year measure has moved from 3.98% to 4.65% over that period, \na change of 67bps. Although these indicators have a long horizon, they typically respond aggressively \nto short-term shocks. \n12 The policy rate projection now averages 6.75% for 2026Q1, 6.83% for 2026Q2, 6.63% for 2026Q3 \nand 6.47% for 2026Q4. The previous forecast had two cuts implied for 2026, one early in the year and \none in the second half; the new forecast has one implied cut in 2026, in the second half. \n \n4\nGiven global uncertainty, it is useful to consider scenarios. For this meeting we \nlooked at two alternatives, both with more adverse assumptions than our baseline. \nThe first scenario assumes that the conflict lasts another two months or so, with oil \nprices averaging nearly US$100 per barrel for this period and the rand about 5% \nweaker against the dollar. The second, more extreme scenario has the war lasting \nover a year, with oil prices staying above US$100 per barrel and the rand 10% \nweaker.13 \nIn both scenarios inflation is higher, exceeding 4% in the first version and 5% in the \nsecond. Both call for higher interest rates this year, with one hike in the first scenario \nand several more in the other.14 Inflation then slows as oil prices start easing and the \npolicy response takes effect. In the first scenario we are back to target during 2027. \nIn the second scenario this only happens in 2028. In both cases, growth is weaker \ninitially but there is some catch-up later. \nWhen we adopted the new 3% inflation target, we were clear that achieving it could \ntake a couple of years.15 Until recently, conditions were favourable, and it looked like \nwe would get there fast. Now there has been a negative shock, and it could take a bit \nlonger. Nonetheless, all our forecasts show inflation reverting to 3% during the next \ntwo years. We are committed to delivering that outcome, and stand ready to act as \nneeded to fulfil our mandate. \nTo conclude, South Africa has made important macroeconomic progress recently, \nwith a lower inflation target, improved fiscal prospects and steadier growth. Prudent \nmonetary policy will help sustain these gains, despite difficult global conditions. \nFurther support would come from reaching a prudent public debt level, lowering \nadministered price inflation, and continuing structural reforms that raise potential \ngrowth. \n \n13 In the baseline, Brent crude averages US$78, US$68 and US$65 per barrel, for 2026, 2027 and \n2028 respectively. In the intermediate scenario it is US$85, US$72 and US$67 for those three years; \nin the worse-case scenario it is US$97, US$118 and US$103. The scenarios also used higher country \nrisk premiums, up 10% in the intermediate scenario and 20% in the severe scenario. \n14 The rate peak in this scenario is approximately aligned with the peak of the 2021-2023 hiking cycle, \nwhich was 8.25%. \n15 Accordingly, the November 2025 announcement of the new inflation target stipulated that it would \n“be implemented over the next two years.” See \nhttps://www.resbank.co.za/en/home/publications/publication-detail-pages/media-releases/2025/new-\ninflation-target \n \n5\nLesetja Kganyago \nGOVERNOR \n \nThe next statement of the Monetary Policy Committee will be released on 28 May. \n \nContact person: \nThoraya Pandy \n082.416.8416 \nmedia@resbank.co.za", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/MPC_Statements/mar26-statement.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "9ca18c30d849922036afd44c227aa16d", "text": "Vol. 26 No. 18 \n \n \nWeek Ending \n3rd May 2024 \nWeekly Economic \nHighlights \nTABLE OF CONTENTS \n \n1. \nOVERVIEW ............................................................................ 1 \n2. \nINTEREST RATES ................................................................ 2 \n3. \nEQUITY MARKETS .............................................................. 3 \n4. \nCLEARING AND SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY .................. 4 \n5. \nPRICES .................................................................................... 5 \n6. \nMOSI-OA-TUNYA GOLD COINS AND GOLD BACKED \nDIGITAL TOKENS (GBDT) ................................................. 5 \n7. \nEXTERNAL SECTOR ........................................................... 6 \n8. \nTOBACCO SALES ................................................................. 7 \n \n \n \n 1 \n1. OVERVIEW \n \n \nMaximum local currency deposit rates for all tenors increased during the week ending 3rd May 2024. \nSimilarly, local currency lending rates for both individual and corporate clients increased during the \nweek, though marginally. Foreign currency deposits rates for savings, 3-month, 6-month and over \n1-year tenors remained unchanged. Similarly, maximum foreign currency lending rates for corporate \nclients remained unchanged while those for individual clients registered increases. \nThe Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) All Share Index declined by 0.75% to close the week at 98.29 \npoints. The cumulative value of shares traded declined by 41.8% during the week to close at ZiG6.98 \nmillion from ZiG11.99 million in the previous week. The Victoria Falls Stock Exchange (VFEX) \ntraded on a positive trajectory during the week under review. The VFEX All Share Index and market \ncapitalisation increased from 97.49 points and US$1.18 billion to close at 99.15 points and US$1.20 \nbillion, respectively. \nThe value of the aggregate transactions processed through the National Payment Systems platforms \namounted to ZiG13.06 billion during the week under analysis, representing a decrease of 14.33% \nfrom ZiG15.24 billion registered in the previous week. The Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) \nsystem constituted 74.22% and mobile platforms 76.57% as the highest proportion in terms of value \nand volume respectively. \nThe interbank exchange rate depreciated by 0.92% from ZiG13.4301 per US$ at the beginning of the \nweek to ZiG13.5540 per US$ at the end of the week, mainly driven by decreases in the gold price. \nThe average international commodity prices for gold, palladium, nickel, and crude oil declined during \nthe week ending 3rd of May 2024. Platinum and lithium prices were, however, higher. Gold prices \ndeclined during the week as investors continued to evaluate the Federal Reserve's policy decision. In \naddition, the moderation of geopolitical tensions in the Middle East, fuelled by increasing optimism \nregarding an Egypt-mediated cease-fire between Israel and Hamas, have diminished the \nattractiveness of gold as a safe haven asset. \nSimilarly, palladium prices fell on account of a shift to cheaper platinum translating to decreasing \ndemand for the metal. Nickel prices also declined due to the weakened demand in China, the largest \nconsumer of base metals. Crude oil prices fell amid rising inventories in the United Sates coupled \nwith subdued demand. Conversely, platinum and lithium prices increased largely driven by \nstrengthening demand for the metals. \nA cumulative total of 101.01 million kilograms of tobacco had been sold as of 3rd May 2024. This \nreflected an 17.58% decrease from 122.5 million kilograms sold during the same period in 2023. The \ngolden leaf was sold at an average price of US$3.58 per kilogram, up from US$3.00 per kilogram \nrealised in the same period last year. \n \n 2 \n2. INTEREST RATES \n \nAverage commercial bank deposit rates (Local Currency (ZiG)) \nZiG Deposit rates \n 12 April 2024 \n 19 April 2024 \n 26 April 2024 \n 3 May 2024 \nSavings \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n5.69 \n5.22 \n5.22 \n5.22 \nMaximum \n6.19 \n5.34 \n5.34 \n7.83 \n1-month deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n5.34 \n5.34 \n5.42 \n5.42 \nMaximum \n5.73 \n5.73 \n5.82 \n7.76 \n3-month deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n5.43 \n5.43 \n5.51 \n5.51 \nMaximum \n5.96 \n5.94 \n6.04 \n8.51 \n6-month deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n5.61 \n5.61 \n5.61 \n5.61 \nMaximum \n6.23 \n6.22 \n6.15 \n9.05 \n12-Month deposits \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n5.65 \n5.65 \n5.65 \n5.65 \nMaximum \n6.27 \n6.25 \n6.17 \n9.09 \nOver 1 year \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n5.65 \n5.65 \n5.65 \n5.65 \nMaximum \n6.30 \n6.28 \n6.22 \n9.26 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024 \n \nAverage commercial bank deposit rates (Foreign Currency (US$) \nUS$ Deposit rates \n 12 April 2024 \n 19 April 2024 \n 26 April 2024 \n 3 May 2024 \nSavings \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n1.32 \n1.40 \n1.23 \n1.23 \nMaximum \n1.73 \n1.86 \n1.68 \n1.68 \n1-month deposits \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n3.14 \n3.28 \n3.28 \n3.25 \nMaximum \n4.38 \n4.38 \n4.68 \n4.68 \n3-month deposits \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n3.37 \n3.64 \n3.69 \n3.69 \nMaximum \n4.67 \n4.85 \n5.21 \n5.21 \n6-month deposits \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n3.51 \n3.69 \n3.81 \n3.81 \nMaximum \n5.09 \n5.23 \n5.68 \n5.68 \n12-Month deposits \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n3.75 \n3.93 \n4.00 \n3.97 \nMaximum \n5.30 \n5.48 \n5.92 \n5.95 \nOver 1 year \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n3.91 \n4.05 \n4.18 \n4.18 \nMaximum \n5.30 \n5.48 \n5.92 \n5.92 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n 3 \nCommercial bank weighted lending rates (Local Currency (ZiG)) \nZiG Lending rates \n 12 April 2024 \n 19 April 2024 \n 26 April 2024 \n 3 May 2024 \nIndividuals \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n21.81 \n23.53 \n25.91 \n26.00 \nMaximum \n29.37 \n31.62 \n32.10 \n32.00 \nCorporates \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n24.14 \n23.99 \n24.29 \n24.32 \nMaximum \n31.42 \n31.73 \n32.52 \n32.72 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024 \n \nCommercial bank weighted lending rates (Foreign Currency (US$) \nUS$ Lending rates \n 12 April 2024 \n 19 April 2024 \n 26 April 2024 \n 3 May 2024 \nIndividuals \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n10.41 \n10.42 \n10.35 \n10.38 \nMaximum \n14.52 \n14.56 \n14.58 \n14.59 \nCorporates \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n8.43 \n8.65 \n8.37 \n8.39 \nMaximum \n14.71 \n14.90 \n14.77 \n14.77 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024 \n \nCommercial banks and Building societies mortgage lending rates. \nMortgage Lending rates \n 12 April 2024 \n 19 April 2024 \n 26 April 2024 \n3 May 2024 \nZiG Lending rates \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n20.00 \n20.00 \n20.00 \n20.00 \nMaximum \n30.00 \n30.00 \n30.00 \n30.00 \nUS$ Lending rates \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n10.00 \n10.00 \n10.00 \n10.00 \nMaximum \n18.00 \n18.00 \n18.00 \n18.00 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024 \n \n3. EQUITY MARKETS \n \nZSE Indicators \n \n \nAll \nShare \nIndex \n(points) \n \nTop 10 \nindex \n(points) \nTop 15 \nIndex \n(points) \nMedium Cap \n(points) \nSmall Cap \n(points) \nMining \nIndex \n(points) \nGrand \nMarket \nCap (ZiG \nbillion) \nMarket \nTurnover \n(ZiG \nmillion) \nVolume of \nShares \n(million) \n12-April24 \n100.39 \n99.71 \n99.64 \n101.69 \n100.00 \n100.00 \n29.77 \n0.17 \n0.19 \n19-April-24 \n95.99 \n92.99 \n94.01 \n102.32 \n100.00 \n100.04 \n27.77 \n2.70 \n1.69 \n26-April-24 \n99.03 \n96.98 \n98.17 \n104.23 \n100.00 \n100.04 \n28.63 \n11.99 \n9.62 \n3-May-24 \n98.29 \n96.63 \n97.63 \n102.85 \n100.00 \n114.07 \n28.34 \n6.98 \n4.49 \nWeekly \nChange (%) \n-0.75 \n-0.36 \n-0.55 \n-1.32 \n0.00 \n14.02 \n-1.01 \n-41.78 \n-53.33 \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2024 \n \n \nVFEX Indicators \nDate \nAll Share Index \nPoints \nGrand Market \nCapitalisation \n(US$ billion) \nMarket Turnover \n(US$ million) \nVolume of Shares (million) \n12-April-24 \n98.77 \n1.19 \n0.77 \n3.23 \n19-April-24 \n95.94 \n1.16 \n0.68 \n2.16 \n26-April-24 \n97.49 \n1.18 \n0.58 \n4.59 \n3-May-24 \n99.15 \n1.20 \n0.52 \n0.16 \nWeekly Change (%) \n1.70 \n1.69 \n-10.34 \n-96.51 \nSource: Victoria Falls Stock Exchange, 2024 \n \n \n \n \n \n 4 \nFigure 1: ZSE and VFEX Indicators \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange and Victoria Falls Stock Exchange 2024 \n4. CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY \n Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024 \nPAYMENT STREAM \nWEEK ENDING \n26 April 2024 \nWEEK ENDING \n3 May 2024 \nWEEKLY \nCHANGE (%) \n \nVALUES IN ZiG \n \nRTGS \n12,751,746,808.55 \n9,695,635,847.31 \n-23.97% \nOf which ZiG \n3,745,988,748.93 \n3,183,600,033.05 \n \nOf which US$ \n676,102,829.08 \n483,872,535.22 \n \nPOS \n699,139,455.71 \n824,973,297.27 \n18.00% \nATM \n667,814,460.62 \n1,153,587,163.47 \n72.74% \nMOBILE \n1,123,723,796.36 \n1,388,467,796.59 \n22.91% \nTOTAL \n15,242,424,521.25 \n13,062,664,104.63 \n-14.33% \n \nVOLUMES \n \nRTGS \n257,331 \n264,902 \n2.94% \nOf which ZiG \n115,738 \n119,896 \n \nOf which US$ \n141,593 \n145,006 \n \nPOS \n1,986,378 \n2,105,394 \n5.99% \nATM \n272,880 \n319,734 \n17.17% \nMOBILE \n8,854,930 \n8,793,310 \n-3.27% \nTOTAL \n11,371,519 \n11,483,340 \n-1.07% \n90\n95\n100\n105\n110\n115\n120\n16-Apr-24\n17-Apr-24\n18-Apr-24\n19-Apr-24\n20-Apr-24\n21-Apr-24\n22-Apr-24\n23-Apr-24\n24-Apr-24\n25-Apr-24\n26-Apr-24\n27-Apr-24\n28-Apr-24\n29-Apr-24\n30-Apr-24\n01-May-24\n02-May-24\n03-May-24\nIndices\nZSE Indices \nAll Share Index (ZSE)\nTop 10 Index\nMining Index\n0\n500\n1,000\n1,500\n2,000\n2,500\n3,000\n3,500\n4,000\n16-Apr-24\n17-Apr-24\n18-Apr-24\n19-Apr-24\n20-Apr-24\n21-Apr-24\n22-Apr-24\n23-Apr-24\n24-Apr-24\n25-Apr-24\n26-Apr-24\n27-Apr-24\n28-Apr-24\n29-Apr-24\n30-Apr-24\n01-May-24\n02-May-24\n03-May-24\nZiG Thousands\nZSE Market Turnover \n25\n30\n35\n16-Apr-24\n17-Apr-24\n18-Apr-24\n19-Apr-24\n20-Apr-24\n21-Apr-24\n22-Apr-24\n23-Apr-24\n24-Apr-24\n25-Apr-24\n26-Apr-24\n27-Apr-24\n28-Apr-24\n29-Apr-24\n30-Apr-24\n01-May-24\n02-May-24\n03-May-24\nZiG Billion\nZSE Market Capitalisation \n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\n09-Feb-24\n16-Feb-24\n23-Feb-24\n01-Mar-24\n08-Mar-24\n15-Mar-24\n22-Mar-24\n29-Mar-24\n05-Apr-24\n12-Apr-24\n19-Apr-24\n26-Apr-24\n03-May-24\nUS$ Bililon\nVFEX All Share Index \n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1000\n1200\n1400\n1600\n23-Feb-24\n01-Mar-24\n08-Mar-24\n15-Mar-24\n22-Mar-24\n29-Mar-24\n05-Apr-24\n12-Apr-24\n19-Apr-24\n26-Apr-24\n03-May-24\nUS$ Thousand\nVFEX Market Turnover \n0.8\n1\n1.2\n1.4\n1.6\n09-Feb-24\n16-Feb-24\n23-Feb-24\n01-Mar-24\n08-Mar-24\n15-Mar-24\n22-Mar-24\n29-Mar-24\n05-Apr-24\n12-Apr-24\n19-Apr-24\n26-Apr-24\n03-May-24\nUS$ Billion\nVFEX Market Capitalisation \n \n 5 \n5. PRICES \nDomestic Energy Prices \nEnergy prices \n 12 April 2024 \n19 April 2024 \n26 April 2024 \n3 May 2024 \n \nUS$ \nUS$ \nUS$ \nUS$ \nDiesel 50/ litre \n1.68 \n1.68 \n1.68 \n1.68 \nPetrol Blend E20/ litre \n1.69 \n1.69 \n1.69 \n1.69 \nLP Gas / kg \n1.87 \n1.87 \n1.87 \n1.87 \nSource: Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory Authority, 2024 \n \nInternational Energy Prices (Weekly average) \n Energy prices \n 12 April 2024 \n 19 April 2024 \n 26 April 2024 \n 3 May 2024 \n \nUS$/barrel \nUS$/barrel \nUS$/barrel \nUS$/barrel \nCrude Oil Prices \n90.16 \n88.88 \n88.20 \n84.75 \nSource: BBC, 2024 \n \n6. MOSI-OA-TUNYA GOLD COINS AND GOLD BACKED DIGITAL TOKENS \n(GBDT) \n \nPrevious day Gold PM Fix \nGold prices \n12 April 2024 \n19 April 2024 \n26 April 2024 \n3 May 2024 \n \nUS$/oz \nUS$/oz \nUS$/oz \nUS$/oz \nGold PM Fix \n2,345.65 \n2,380.75 \n2,318.70 \n2,288.85 \nSource: London Bullion Market Association, 2024 \n \n \nGold Backed Digital Token Price Per Milligram \nDaily prices \nZiG Price per Mg \nUS$ Price per Mg \nBuy \nSell \nBuy \nSell \n29-April-24 \n0.96 \n1.06 \n0.0716 \n0.0791 \n30-April-24 \n0.96 \n1.06 \n0.0713 \n0.0788 \n2-May-24 \n0.94 \n1.04 \n0.0703 \n0.0777 \n3-May -24 \n0.95 \n1.05 \n0.0699 \n0.0773 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024 \n \n \nFigure 2: Cumulative KGs Purchased of GBDT \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024 \n \n \n \n \n \n -\n 100\n 200\n 300\n 400\n 500\n 600\n 700\n 800\n 900\n 1,000\n18-May-23\n01-Jun-23\n15-Jun-23\n29-Jun-23\n13-Jul-23\n03-Aug-23\n31-Aug-23\n28-Sep-23\n18-Oct-23\n23-Nov-23\n21-Dec-23\n25-Jan-24\n31-Jan-24\n02-Feb-24\n06-Feb-24\n08-Feb-24\n12-Feb-24\n14-Feb-24\n16-Feb-24\n20-Feb-24\n23-Feb-24\n27-Feb-24\n29-Feb-24\n04-Mar-24\n06-Mar-24\n08-Mar-24\n12-Mar-24\n14-Mar-24\n18-Mar-24\n20-Mar-24\n22-Mar-24\n26-Mar-24\n28-Mar-24\n03-Apr-24\n05-Apr-24\n \n 6 \nMosi-oa-Tunya Gold Coin Prices \nGold Coin Price \n 29 April 2024 \n 30 April 2024 \n 2 May 2024 \n 3 May 2024 \n1.00Oz \n \n \n \n \nUS$ \n2,460.26 \n2,450.23 \n2,417.47 \n2,403.29 \nZiG \n33,067.55 \n32,906.80 \n32,440.00 \n32,574.23 \n0.50Oz \n \n \n \n \nUS$ \n1,230.13 \n1,255.11 \n1,208.73 \n1,201.65 \nZiG \n16,533.77 \n16,453.40 \n16,220.00 \n16,287.11 \n0.25Oz \n \n \n \n \nUS$ \n615.06 \n612.56 \n604.37 \n600.82 \nZiG \n8,266.89 \n8,226.70 \n8,110.00 \n8,143.56 \n0.10Oz \n \n \n \n \nUS$ \n246.03 \n245.02 \n241.75 \n240.33 \nZiG \n3,306.75 \n3,290.68 \n3,244.00 \n3,257.42 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024 \n \n \n7. EXTERNAL SECTOR \nExchange Rate Developments (ZiG per Unit of foreign currency) \n \nUSD \nZAR \nGBP \nBWP \nEURO \n29-April \n13.4301 \n0.7180 \n16.8366 \n0.9544 \n14.3722 \n30-April \n13.4301 \n0.7180 \n16.8366 \n0.9544 \n14.3722 \n1-May \n13.4190 \n0.7220 \n16.82.01 \n0.9402 \n14.3785 \n3-May \n13.5540 \n0.7307 \n17.0123 \n0.9563 \n14.5535 \nWeekly Average \n(29 April– 3May) \n13.46 \n0.72 \n16.90 \n0.95 \n14.55 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024 \n \nInternational Commodity Price Developments \n \nPlatinum \nPalladium \nNickel \nLithium \n2024 \nUS$/ounce \nUS$/ounce \nUS$/tonne \nUS$/tonne \nWeekly Average \n (22April -26 April) \n913.38 \n1000.70 \n19,174.40 \n14,060.00 \n29-April \n929.00 \n955.50 \n19,148.00 \n14,270.00 \n30-April \n939.00 \n947.50 \n19,238.00 \n14,340.00 \n1-May \n942.00 \n938.00 \n18,879.00 \n14,410.00 \n2-May \n954.00 \n940.00 \n18,648.00 \n14,380.00 \n3-May \n965.00 \n947.00 \n19,237.00 \n14,350.00 \nWeekly Average \n (29 April -3 May) \n945.80 \n945.60 \n19,030.00 \n14,350.00 \nSource: BBC, KITCO and Bloomberg, 2024 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n 7 \nFigure 3: Weekly Precious Metals Price Developments (29th – 3rd May 2024) \n \n \n \n \nSource: BBC, KITCO and Bloomberg, 2024 \n \n \n8. TOBACCO SALES \nWeekly Cumulative Tobacco Sales (3rd May 2024) \n \n2023 \n2024 \nVariance (%) \nCumulative Quantity Sold (million kgs) \n122,543,540 \n101,005,709 \n-17.58 \nAverage Price (US$/kg) \n3.00 \n3.58 \n19.21 \nCumulative value (US$ million) \n367,991,565 \n361,586,918 \n-1.74 \nSource: Tobacco Industry and Marketing Board (TIMB), 2024 \n890\n910\n930\n950\n970\n990\n29-Apr\n30-Apr\n1-May\n2-May\n3-May\nUS$/tonne\nPlatinum\n900\n910\n920\n930\n940\n950\n960\n29-Apr\n30-Apr\n1-May\n2-May\n3-May\nUS$/tonne\nPalladium\n18,200\n18,400\n18,600\n18,800\n19,000\n19,200\n19,400\n29-Apr\n30-Apr\n1-May\n2-May\n3-May\nUS$/tonne\nNickel\n13,900\n14,000\n14,100\n14,200\n14,300\n14,400\n14,500\n29-Apr\n30-Apr\n1-May\n2-May\n3-May\nUS$/tonne\nLithium", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/Weekly_Economic_Highlights/WEEKLY_ECONOMIC_HIGHLIGHTS_3_MAY_2024_Volume_26_Number_18.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "f86741337224f8f62eb9090641d4ce32", "text": "MONETARY POLICY REVIEW\nAPRIL 2020\nAPRIL 2020\n© South African Reserve Bank\nAll rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photo-\ncopying, recording or otherwise, without fully acknowledging the Monetary Policy Review of the South African Reserve Bank as the source. The contents of this publication \nare intended for general information only and are not intended to serve as financial or other advice. While every precaution is taken to ensure the accuracy of information, \nthe South African Reserve Bank shall not be liable to any person for inaccurate information or opinions contained in this publication.\nEnquiries relating to this Monetary Policy Review should be addressed to:\n\t\nHead: Economic Research Department\n\t\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n\t\nP O Box 427\n\t\nPretoria 0001\n\t\nTel. +27 12 313 3668\nwww.resbank.co.za\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n ISSN: 1609-3194\nProduced by the Publishing Section of the South African Reserve Bank\nAPRIL 2020\ni\nPreface\nThe primary mandate of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) is to achieve and maintain price stability in the interest of \nbalanced and sustainable economic growth. In addition, the SARB has a complementary mandate to oversee and maintain \nfinancial stability.\nPrice stability helps to protect the purchasing power and living standards of all South Africans. It provides a favourable \nenvironment for investment and job creation, and supports international competitiveness. The goal of price stability is \nquantified through an inflation target, which is set in consultation with government. The target is a range of 3–6%, which has \nbeen in place since 2000. \nThe SARB has full operational independence. Monetary policy decisions are made by the SARB’s Monetary Policy Committee \n(MPC), which is chaired by the Governor, and includes the Deputy Governors and other senior officials of the SARB.\nThe inflation-targeting framework is flexible, meaning that policymakers will seek to look through temporary shocks, thereby \navoiding excessive volatility in interest rates and economic output. The MPC takes a forward-looking approach to account for \nthe time lags between policy adjustments and economic effects. MPC decisions are communicated at a press conference at \nthe end of each meeting, accompanied by a comprehensive statement.\nThe Monetary Policy Review (MPR) is published twice a year and is aimed at broadening public understanding of the objectives \nand conduct of monetary policy. The MPR covers domestic and international developments that affect the monetary policy \nstance. In normal circumstances, the MPR is presented by senior officials of the SARB at monetary policy forums held in \nmajor centres across South Africa. However, this particular MPR appears during the national COVID-19 lockdown, which has \nforced the cancellation of these forums. As an alternative, questions about this document may be directed to Marlene Hugo, \nat marlene.hugo@resbank.co.za.\nAPRIL 2020\nii\nContents\nExecutive summary and overview of the policy stance............................................................................. \t\n1\nGlobal economy: new decade, new crisis................................................................................................ \t\n8\nFinancial market developments: a riskier country in a riskier world.......................................................... \t 12\nReal economy: low growth and a new shock........................................................................................... \t 17 \nPrice developments: starting at the midpoint, ending at the midpoint...................................................... \t 26 \nSummary................................................................................................................................................. \t 38\nBoxes\nBox 1\tCOVID-19 and monetary policy..................................................................................................... \t\n3\nBox 2\tSouth Africa’s term-premium shock.............................................................................................. \t 16\nBox 3\tWhat is different about this downswing?....................................................................................... \t 20\nBox 4\tThe fiscal impact on growth.......................................................................................................... \t 24\nBox 5\tPowerless? Monetary policy and potential growth......................................................................... \t 25\nBox 6\tMeasuring public sector inflation................................................................................................... \t 35 \nBox 7\tUnpacking the 2019 inflation forecast errors................................................................................. \t 36\nStatements issued by Lesetja Kganyago, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee \n21 November 2019.................................................................................................................................. \t 40\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee \n16 January 2020...................................................................................................................................... \t 44\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee \n19 March 2020......................................................................................................................................... \t 48\nGlossary.................................................................................................................................................. \t 54\nAbbreviations.......................................................................................................................................... \t 56\n1\nAPRIL 2020\nHaving monetary space, \nand using it\nExecutive summary and \noverview of the policy stance\nThe COVID-19 pandemic is the biggest disruption to the \nglobal economy since the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in \n2008. The South African Reserve Bank has space to respond, \ngiven that inflation is projected under 4.5% this year, and is \nlikely to stay well within the target range over the medium \nterm. Accordingly, the Monetary Policy Committee lowered \nthe repurchase rate by a full percentage point in March. \nAlongside January’s quarter-point cut, which predated the \noutbreak but which was also premised on lower inflation and \nlower growth, this brings the repurchase rate to a six-year low. \nMonetary stimulus can help mitigate the economic costs of \nthe COVID-19 shock, by supporting the spending power of \nfirms and households. South Africa, however, suffers from \nsignificant, pre-existing growth constraints. Better long-term \ngrowth prospects will therefore require a range of interventions, \nmany of them outside the domain of the central bank.\nGlobal growth slowed to a post-crisis low of 3% in 2019, \nand will decelerate further in 2020. The COVID-19 outbreak \nhas severely reduced output in the first quarter of the year, \nand the disruption will intensify in the second quarter. After \nthat, the outlook is uncertain, but most analysts expect a \nrebound which will push up growth by 2021, although more \nadverse scenarios are conceivable. In China, where the \noutbreak began, the economy likely contracted in quarter-on-\nquarter terms at the start of the year, but is now recovering. \nBy contrast, in the euro area and the United States (US) – the \nother largest blocs in the global economy – the disease effects \nonly became widespread towards the end of the first quarter, \nwith the turning point not yet in sight. A number of other large \neconomies have also locked down, often pre-emptively, which \nis prudent but will massively reduce economic activity in \nthe short term.\nIn the major economies, monetary policies have become \neven more stimulative. In particular, the US Federal Reserve \n(Fed) has lowered its policy rate to just above 0%, completely \nunwinding the interest rate normalisation of 2015–2018, and \nrestarted quantitative easing. Similarly, the Bank of England \n(BoE) has cut interest rates to almost zero, while the European \nCentral Bank (ECB) has expanded its quantitative easing \nprogramme and established a new asset-purchase facility. \nInflation in these economies is likely to slow further this year, \nhaving already been below targets in 2019 (at 1.5% in the US, \n1.8% in the United Kingdom (UK), and 1.3% in the euro area). \nAdvanced economy central banks are now once again all \nencumbered by the zero lower bound, which prevents interest \nPercentage change over four quarters\n2012\n2014\n2016\n2018\n2020\n2022\nHeadline inflation*\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\n* Dotted line indicates forecast\n \nMidpoint\n3–6% inflation target range\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\nPer cent\n2017\n2016\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\nG3 interest rates*\n0.0\n0.5\n1.0\n1.5\nSource: SARB\n* Dotted line indicates forecasts\nPercentage change over four quarters\n2017\n2016\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\nGrowth in South Africa’s major trading partners*\n0.5\n1.0\n1.5\n2.0\n2.5\n3.0\n3.5\n4.0\n \nSep 2019\n \nMar 2020\nSource: SARB\n* Dotted lines indicate forecasts\n2\nAPRIL 2020\nrates from being lowered too far into negative territory. In the \nemerging markets, by contrast, interest rates have not dipped \nto zero and inflation has not persistently undershot targets, \nleaving these central banks with more policy space.\nIn South Africa, 2019 inflation came out well below \nexpectations, ultimately averaging 4.1% for the year. This \nwas a rare instance of inflation in the bottom half of the target \nrange: since 2010, monthly inflation has been at or above the \n4.5% midpoint of the target range for 77% of the time. Notable \ncontributors to this relatively low inflation rate were food prices, \nwhich remained below longer-run averages, as well as housing \ninflation, which decelerated to an all-time low of 2.2% in \nDecember. (See Box 7 on page 36 for a discussion of the 2019 \ninflation forecast errors.) Inflation picked up temporarily at the \nend of the year, as anticipated, on base effects from oil price \nweakness the year before. The most recent inflation prints have \nbeen 4.5% for January and 4.6% for February. \nInflation is expected to remain well contained within the \ninflation target range across the forecast horizon. The most \nrecent Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) forecasts show \ninflation in the bottom half of the target range again this year, \naveraging 3.8%, before recovering to 4.6% in 2021 and 4.4% \nin 2022. The main driver of low inflation this year is fuel prices, \nfollowing a collapse in world oil prices. Weaker demand is also \nexerting downward pressure on inflation, partly offset by the \nmore depreciated exchange rate. The distribution of risks to \nthis forecast, as captured in the inflation fan charts, indicates \na high probability that inflation will be within the target range \nthroughout this period, with 92% of the probability distribution \nbetween 3% and 6%. The chance of target misses is quite \nsmall, with 4% of the distribution above the upper bound and \n4% under it, over the forecast period (2020–2022). The chance \nof a target undershoot is marginally higher in 2020, however, \nwith 5% of the distribution under the lower bound of the target \nrange. (Note that these probabilities refer to quarterly inflation \noutcomes; the chances of target misses in individual months \nare higher.)\nInflation expectations are well within the target range, having \ndeclined steadily in recent years. The average two-year-ahead \nexpectation measure of the Bureau for Economic Research \n(BER) is down to 4.8% as of the latest survey, from around 6% \nin 2016, while current-year expectations have fallen to 4.4%, \na 14-year low. The COVID-19 outbreak will provide a test of \nwhether expectations are resistant to shocks, helping reveal \nhow firmly they are anchored. For the time being, however, it \nis clear that expectations are better positioned than they were \nhistorically, because they are no longer close to, or above, the \ntop of the target range. This means the South African Reserve \nBank (SARB) has monetary policy space at a moment of crisis, \nwhich was a major objective of the strategic initiative, begun in \n2017, to anchor expectations closer to 4.5%.\nPercentage change over four quarters\n2016\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\nHeadline inflation*\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n* The bands around the central projection show confidence intervals \n of 10%, 30%, 50% and 70%\nThis chart shows seasonally adjusted data, as used in the QPM\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\nProbability (per cent)\n>6%\n4.5% < 6%\n3% < 4.5%\n<3%\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\nInflation forecast probabilities\nSource: SARB\n92% probability of 3–6% inflation\n4\n59\n33\n4\nHeadline inflation (percentage change)\nPer cent\n2017\n2016\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\nTwo-year-ahead inflation expectations*\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\nSources: BER and SARB\n* Dotted line indicates blended forecasts\nMidpoint of the inflation target range\n3\nAPRIL 2020\nGross domestic product (GDP) growth has been feeble. \nOutput expanded by just 0.2% last year, the lowest rate of \ngrowth since the global financial crisis. The primary and \nsecondary sectors were particularly weak, principally due to \ninadequate rainfall and electricity shortages. The tertiary sector, \nby contrast, posted modest gains over the year, expanding \nby 1.3%. This sustained a pattern that has prevailed since \nat least 2016, in which the tertiary sector delivers narrowly \npositive growth, while the other sectors are volatile and drive \nfluctuations in the headline growth rate. \nThe COVID-19 outbreak will cause the economy to contract \nthis year. The current-year growth forecast was -0.2% as \nof March, with output declining in the first and the second \nquarters. This forecast predated government’s decision to lock \ndown the economy, meaning it is probably too optimistic. More \nrecent work suggests 2020 growth will be in a range of -2% to \n-4%, with downside risks should the lockdown be extended, or \nif the global economy weakens more than currently projected. \nFurther out, there is limited scope for a rebound, but growth is \nnow unlikely to exceed 1% in 2021. South Africa was already \nin recession prior to the COVID-19 shock, and the situation \nhas become more challenging since. The upside risk to this \nforecast, however, is that a deeper contraction this year would \npermit a stronger rebound in 2021. \n \nPercentage change over four quarters\n2016\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\nReal GDP growth*\n-2\n-1\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n* The bands around the central projection show confidence intervals \n of 10%, 30%, 50% and 70%\nThis chart shows seasonally adjusted data, as used in the QPM\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\nBox 1\t COVID-19 and monetary policy\nFor the March Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting, the South \nAfrican growth forecast was lowered to -0.2% for 2020, from 1.2% \nas of the January MPC meeting. Of this revision, approximately half \ncame from COVID-19. In other words, the 2020 growth forecasts \nwould have been lower than they were in January even without \nthe pandemic, mainly due to weak data outcomes over the past \ntwo months. The MPC judged that risks to this forecast lay on the \ndownside, an assessment subsequently vindicated by the country-\nwide lockdown announced the week after the MPC. Updated \nestimates show the economy contracting by around 2% to 4% in \n2020, although these projections are tentative. \nThe March MPC forecasts marked growth among South Africa’s \ntrading partners down to 1.1% for 2020, from 2.7% as of the January \nMPC meeting. These forecasts predated lockdown measures in the \nUnited Kingdom, most euro area countries (except Italy), much of the \nUnited States, and also South Africa’s regional neighbours. It is now \nlikely trading-partner growth will be around -1% this year. Growth is \nstill expected to rebound to 2.8% next year.\nThe March MPC had a lower inflation outlook, largely because of \nthe pandemic, although a downside inflation surprise in January also \ncontributed. The headline inflation projections were 3.8%, 4.6% and \n4.4% for 2020, 2021 and 2022 respectively, while core was at 3.9%, \n4.3% and 4.4% for those three years. These numbers will probably \nchange less than the March MPC growth projections, with some \nPercentage change\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2020\nSouth African versus trading-partner real \nGDP growth*\n-1\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\nSource: SARB\n* Dotted lines indicate forecasts\n2021\n2022\n \nSouth Africa’s trading partners\n \nSouth Africa\n4\nAPRIL 2020\nsubsequent developments pushing prices down (oil, the output gap) \nbut others pushing them up again (primarily the exchange rate).\n\t-\n\tFuel prices were the main reason for the lower inflation forecast \nin March. The oil price assumptions for the forecast were \nUS$40.4 per barrel for 2020, slowly recovering to US$45 per \nbarrel by 2021Q2. Cheaper oil implied fuel price deflation of \n5.8% in 2020, relative to an increase of 4.2% projected for the \nJanuary MPC. However, the recovery in oil prices next year \ncreates a temporary uptick in headline inflation in 2020.1 \n\t-\nThe inflation forecast was also lowered by a more negative \noutput gap. The March forecast had this gap reaching -2.3% of \npotential gross domestic product this year, which is larger than \nit was following the global financial crisis. New estimates \nsuggest a more negative gap, even if some of the lockdown \nlosses are deemed permanent, implying lower potential growth. \n\t-\n\tThe exchange rate is the main source of upward inflation \npressure on the forecast. The March projections assumed the \nexchange rate would average R15.55 per US dollar this year, up \nfrom R14.45 per dollar last year, for a rand undervaluation close \nto 6% for 2020. The undervaluation is now likely to be larger. \nHowever, as per the modelling framework and historical \nexperience, the exchange rate is likely to overshoot and then \nrecover over the medium term. Pass-through is lower than it was \nhistorically, which mitigates the inflation threat posed by a \nweaker rand.\n\t-\n\tCrucially, with both headline and core inflation projected in the \nbottom half of the target range this year, there is space to absorb \nshort-term inflationary pressure.\nThe major central banks have all loosened policy, with the United \nStates Federal Reserve in particular cutting rates back to zero. For a \ncountry like South Africa, which is a net borrower from the world, this \ncreates more policy space. Specifically, in the modelling framework, \nit lowers the neutral rate. There are some offsetting pressures on \nneutral because of rising South Africa-specific risk, but the overall \nneutral is still lower by 0.2 percentage points.\nThe MPC responded to the COVID-19 outbreak by lowering the \nrepurchase rate (repo rate) by 100 basis points. The forecasts \ndescribed above were premised on a somewhat higher repo rate, \nwith three 25 basis point cuts spread over 2020 and early 2021. \nThis suggests the policy decision internalised some of the downside \nrisks to the growth outlook, many of which have subsequently \nmaterialised.\n1\t\nThis posed a problem for the Quarterly Projection Model forecast, \nbecause the forward-looking repo rule overlooks most of the lower \ninflation from cheaper fuel, but sees the upward pressure from the \nbase effect. This reduces the repo rate reaction in the model, a \nconsequence that was discussed in the MPC forecast meeting.\nPercentage change over four quarters\n2016\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2020\nHeadline inflation\n3.0\n3.5\n4.0\n4.5\n5.0\n5.5\n6.0\n6.5\n7.0\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\n2021\n2022\n \nJan 2020\n \nMar 2020\nForecast\nChanges in the headline inflation forecast \nbetween January and March 2020\nPercentage points\n-1.0\n-0.9\n-0.8\n-0.7\n-0.6\n-0.5\n-0.4\n-0.3\n-0.2\n-0.1\n0.0\n0.1\n0.2\n0.3\nCore inflation\nFood\nPetrol\nElectricity\nHeadline inflation\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\n2021\n2020\n2022\n5\nAPRIL 2020\nOverview of the policy stance\nThis Monetary Policy Review (MPR) covers three MPC \nmeetings: in November 2019, January 2020 and March 2020. \nOver these meetings, the repurchase rate (repo rate) was \nreduced by 25 basis points at the January meeting and by \n100 basis points in March. The repo rate is now at 5.25%, its \nlowest level since January 2014, when the SARB commenced \na hiking cycle. (The all-time repo low is 5%, in force from \nJuly 2012 to January 2014.)\nThe November MPC meeting followed the October release of \nthe Medium Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS), which \nhad spelt out a significant deterioration in the fiscal position. \nNational Treasury’s projections for the fiscal deficit shifted to \naround 6% of GDP across the medium term, in contrast to \nforecasts in the region of 4% in the February 2019 Budget. \nAlthough additional burdens on the fiscus had become clear \nprior to the publication of the MTBPS, that document did not \nannounce offsetting measures to stabilise sovereign debt. \nIn response, South Africa’s sovereign risk premium spiked \nhigher, and two of the credit rating agencies adopted negative \noutlooks on the sovereign’s rating. In the forecasting framework, \nthese developments fed into the forecast of a higher neutral \ninterest rate, because South Africa had become riskier, as \nwell as a more depreciated exchange rate outlook. However, \nthis upward pressure on rates was mitigated by lower inflation \nprojections as well as a weaker growth forecast, and with it a \nwider output gap. As a result, the Quarterly Projection Model \n(QPM) signalled a repo rate cut towards the end of 2020, in \ncontrast to the preceding forecast which had pointed to an \nunchanged repo rate stance.\nThe forecast shifted markedly for the January 2020 MPC \nmeeting, with both growth and inflation data coming in lower \nthan expected. This required downward revisions to the \nforecast starting point, reducing the 2020 inflation projection \nfrom 5.1% to 4.7%, and 2020 GDP growth from 1.4% to 1.2%. \nMeanwhile, the risk environment shifted in an unexpected \ndirection, with favourable global conditions offsetting South \nAfrica-specific risk factors, allowing the rand to appreciate \nfrom around R14.90 to the dollar in November to R14.40 in \nJanuary. The QPM rate path shifted lower again, with rate cuts \nin both the first and the fourth quarters of 2020. The MPC \nchose to reduce rates at this meeting, a move which surprised \nthe majority of analysts and was not fully anticipated by \nmarkets (pricing for forward rate agreements (FRAs) indicated \napproximately a 40% probability of a cut). The rate cut was \nnonetheless consistent with a standard Taylor-type rule, like \nthat in the QPM, and followed shifts in the data, underscoring \nthe MPC’s frequently reiterated data dependence.\nPer cent\n2000\n2004\n2012\n2016\n2020\nRepurchase rate\nSource: SARB\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n16\n2008\nPer cent\n2017\n2016\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\nEvolution of the QPM repo rate path*\n5.5\n6.0\n6.5\n7.0\n7.5\nSource: SARB\n* Dotted lines indicate forecasts\n \nNov 2019\n \nJan 2020\n \nMar 2020\nPer cent\n2017\n2016\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\nReal neutral rate*\n1.5\n2.0\n2.5\n3.0\n \nNov 2019\n \nJan 2020\n \nMar 2020\nSource: SARB\n* Dotted lines indicate forecasts\n6\nAPRIL 2020\nFor March, three fundamental changes occurred. The inflation \nforecast shifted much lower for 2020, well into the bottom half \nof the 3–6% target range. The growth outlook deteriorated \nsubstantially, with the output gap becoming more negative. \nFinally, global short-term interest rates dropped to zero, pulling \ndown South Africa’s neutral rate (despite a partial offset from \nhigher domestic risk). Most of these changes stemmed from \nthe COVID-19 outbreak, although the effects of this shock were \nreinforced by new data prints (both GDP and inflation surprised \nto the downside) as well as a breakdown in cooperation \nbetween OPEC1 and non-OPEC oil producers (which further \ndepressed oil prices). \nThese circumstances prompted an interest rate cut of \n100 basis points, the largest repo adjustment since May 2009. \nThis was significantly larger than analyst expectations,2 and \nmore than the QPM projections envisioned over the entire \nforecast period. The scale of the move reflected expectations \nthat the COVID-19 pandemic would have large negative effects, \nconcentrated in the near term. As such, delaying stimulus would \nrisk missing the worst of the crisis. (By analogy, firefighters \nshould aim to arrive before the fire gets going, not when it \npeaks.) In ordinary circumstances, policy can adjust gradually, \npausing to incorporate new data, to steer inflation and output \nback towards equilibrium levels. This is the basic operating \nprocedure of the QPM, which hardwires an incremental policy \nresponse through a large smoothing parameter in the Taylor \nRule. The COVID-19 shock, however, threatened a sudden \ndownward shift in South Africa’s economic performance, \nwhich merited a more forceful response.\nAs the COVID-19 pandemic intensified, financial conditions \nbecame increasingly stressed, with liquidity strains appearing \nin various markets by mid-March. In response, the SARB \nfollowed up the March MPC decision with measures to meet \nmarkets’ increased demands for cash (that is, liquidity). These \nincluded holding repo auctions on a daily rather than weekly \nbasis, as well as offering repos for longer timeframes than the \nusual overnight period. The Standing Facility borrowing and \nlending rates were adjusted lower, to improve the supply of \nliquidity in interbank markets and discourage cash hoarding \nby individual banks. Furthermore, the SARB began expanding \nits monetary policy portfolio by purchasing government bonds \non the secondary market, both to stabilise that market and to \ninject new cash into the financial system. \n1\t\nOrganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries\n2\t\nMedian expectations varied between -25 basis points and -50 basis \npoints, depending on the survey.\nPer cent\n2017\n2016\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\nRisk premium*\n2.0\n2.5\n3.0\n3.5\n4.0\n \nNov 2019\n \nJan 2020\n \nMar 2020\nSources: JPMorgan and SARB\n* Dotted lines indicate forecasts\n7\nAPRIL 2020\nThis last measure has attracted particular attention because \nof its resemblance to quantitative easing (QE). It should not \nbe interpreted as QE, however, because: (1) it is not a policy \nnecessitated by the zero lower bound on interest rates, as \nSouth Africa’s short-term rates are still well above zero; (2) it \nis not required to prevent deflation, as inflation is unlikely to \ndeviate from the target range over the medium term, let alone \nfall below zero; and (3) it is not aimed at crowding investors \nout of the government bond market and into riskier assets, \nan important QE channel. It should also be remembered \nthat balance sheet expansion in moments of financial stress \nis a phenomenon dating back hundreds of years, not a \n21st century invention.3\nThe interventions described above have improved market \nfunctioning, furthering the SARB’s financial stability mandate \nand supporting effective monetary policy transmission. It \nshould be noted, however, that these decisions did not require \na meeting of the MPC, and were not intended to replace or \namend the policy stance agreed by that Committee.\n3\t\nJ Barker, D Bholat and R Thomas, ‘Central bank balance sheets: \npast, present and future’, Bank Underground, 3 July 2017, available at \nhttps://bankunderground.co.uk/2017/07/03/central-bank-balance-\nsheets-past-present-and-future/.\nPer cent\nR2030\nR2048\nSelected government bond yields\nSource: Bloomberg\nMarch 2020\n8\n9\n10\n11\n12\n13\n14\nChanges in liquidity\nstrategy announced\n2\n9\n16\n23\n30\n8\nAPRIL 2020\nGlobal economy: \nnew decade, new crisis\nGlobal growth reached a decade-low in 2019. A recovery \nhad been anticipated for 2020, but this has been derailed by \nthe COVID-19 outbreak. Although detailed data are not yet \navailable, the global economy is almost certainly in recession \nalready, with China contracting in the first quarter and both \nthe United States and the euro area likely to follow suit in the \nsecond. Forecasts at this stage are highly uncertain, but the \nmost likely outcome is that global growth will rebound next \nyear, as the pandemic effects fade. Inflation rates are generally \nbelow targets in the advanced economies and well contained \nin most of the major emerging markets, permitting additional \nmonetary stimulus.\nGlobal growth and the \nCOVID-19 pandemic\nGlobal growth slowed to just 2.9% in 2019 from 3.6% in 2018, \nthe weakest pace of expansion since the 2008–2009 global \nfinancial crisis. The most visible driver of this underperformance \nwas trade policy conflict, particularly between the United States \nand China: global trade activity contracted by 0.5% in 2019, \nthe worst rate since the 2012 euro area crisis. Manufacturing \nsectors were harder-hit while the services sectors proved more \nresilient, which helped to maintain employment growth rates \nin the advanced economies. Emerging markets, by contrast, \ncontinued to underperform, in the context of a persistently \nstrong dollar, heavy debt burdens and a variety of country-\nspecific factors, from financial sector disruptions in India to the \nafter-effects of a sudden stop in Turkey.\nBy the end of 2019, with the US and China agreeing on a \npreliminary trade deal – and with some Brexit uncertainty \nresolved through a decisive UK election – it appeared the \nglobal economy was primed for a rebound. The International \nMonetary Fund’s (IMF) January forecasts looked forward \nto growth of 3.3% in 2020, followed by 3.4% in 2021. These \nprospects, however, were destroyed by the COVID-19 \noutbreak, which began in late 2019 and was a global news \nstory by February 2020. The infograph on the next page \nsets out the timeline to date, illustrating how rapidly the crisis \nhas escalated.\nThe outbreak originated in China. The number of new cases \nrecorded accelerated from January to mid-February and \nthen began to slow again, fading out almost entirely by early \nMarch. Lockdown measures severely interrupted economic \nactivity during the quarter, with the manufacturing Purchasing \nManagers’ Index (PMI) falling to 40.3 in February (its lowest \nlevel on record), industrial production contracting by 13.5% \nfrom December, and the official unemployment rate (for urban \nPercentage change\n2000\nGlobal growth\nSource: IMF\n-1\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n2003\n2006\n2009\n2012\n2015\n2018\nThousand people\nFeb 2020\nMar 2020\nNew COVID-19 cases\nNew\ndefinition\nused\nSources: Johns Hopkins University and SARB\nJan 2020\nIn China\nOutside of China\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\nPercentage change\n2019\nChinese economic growth forecasts\nSource: OECD \n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n2020\n \nNov 2019\n \nMar 2020\n2021\n9\nAPRIL 2020\nareas) spiking to 6.2% from 5.3% in January. GDP data are not \nyet available, but output almost certainly contracted in the first \nquarter. In sum, China’s experience has been one of a large \nbut quite short-lived shock, which is likely to be reversed with \nthe help of policy stimulus – provided the second, global stage \nof the pandemic does not derail the recovery.\nFrom China, the pandemic spread widely, with Italy and South \nKorea the next two worst-affected countries as of mid-March. \nThe Italian outbreak necessitated a country-wide lockdown, \nfollowed by similar measures in France, more or less \nguaranteeing that the euro area will suffer a recession. The US, \nwhile initially less affected than Asia or Europe, saw infections \nincrease rapidly from mid-February, leading to a restrictions on \nmovement in a number of states. A range of other countries \nhas subsequently adopted partial or complete lockdowns, \n31 Dec 2019\nChina treats dozens of \npneumonia patients\n11 Jan 2020\nChina reports \nits first death\n15 Jan 2020\nJapan reports \nits first case\n23 Jan 2020\nWuhan isolated \nby authorities\n2 Feb 2020\nFirst death outside of \nChina (Philippines)\n13 Feb 2020\nPeak of new cases \nin Hubei\n19 Feb 2020\nFirst case reported \nin Iran\n23 Feb 2020\nItaly implements lockdowns \n in response to surge in cases\n7 Jan 2020\nNew strain of \ncoronavirus identified\n13 Jan 2020\nThailand reports \nits first case\n20 Jan 2020\nSouth Korea reports \nits first case\n30 Jan 2020\nWHO declares global \nhealth emergency\n10 Feb 2020\nDeath toll in China \nsurpasses global \nSARS deaths\n14 Feb 2020\nFirst death in Europe\n21 Feb 2020\nSouth Korea implements \nshutdown and gathering \nrestrictions\n29 Feb 2020\nUS reports its first death, \nimplement travel \nrestrictions\n5 Mar 2020\nSouth Africa reports \nits first case\n13 Mar 2020\nUS declares national \nemergency\n16 Mar 2020\nSpain enters lockdown, \ninstitutes public control \nover health care\n18 Mar 2020\nGlobal confirmed cases \nexceed 200 000\n21 Mar 2020\nItaly records 793 deaths, \na new global single-day high\n23 Mar 2020\nSouth Africa announces national \nlockdown, to begin 26 March; \nNew York City confirms 21 000 cases, \non par with Iran\n25 Mar 2020\nUS Senate approves US$2 trillion \nstimulus package; \nIndia enters lockdown\n3 Mar 2020\nFed cuts interest rates \nby 50 basis points\n6 Mar 2020\nGlobal confirmed cases \nexceed 100 000\n15 Mar 2020\nSouth Africa implements travel \nand gathering restrictions, declares \nnational state of disaster, \nat 61 confirmed cases; \nFed cuts interest rates \nby 100 basis points\n17 Mar 2020\nFrance enters lockdown\n19 Mar 2020\nSARB cuts repo rate \nby 100 basis points; \nnearly all US states declare \nstate of emergency\n22 Mar 2020\nGlobal confirmed cases \nexceed 300 000\n24 Mar 2020\nUK enters partial lockdown; \nglobal confirmed cases \nexceed 400 000\n26 Mar 2020\nSouth Africa enters lockdown\nCOVID-19 timeline\n10\nAPRIL 2020\nwith one quarter of the world’s population under some form of \nlockdown by late March. Globally, the worst-affected industries \nhave been those which move or assemble people, particularly \nairlines, as well as the entertainment, restaurant and tourism \nsectors. Financial markets have also been highly volatile (as \ndiscussed in the following chapter).\nContext\nAlthough the COVID-19 outbreak has imposed a single theme \non the global economic narrative, it appeared against a \nbackdrop of diversity, with the US having performed relatively \nwell, the euro area being weaker, and many major emerging \nmarkets having already struggled with protracted low growth. \nIn the US, growth was steady around a trend rate of \napproximately 2% throughout 2019. US unemployment \nregistered 3.6% in January 2020, a 51-year low, and job growth \nwas unexpectedly robust, with net job gains averaging over \n200 000 monthly in the second half of the year and reaching \n273 000 jobs added as late as February 2020. By contrast, \neuro area growth was just 1.2% in 2019, a seven-year low. \nJapan and the UK also lagged US growth levels, with those \neconomies growing 1% and 1.3% respectively during 2019.\nInflation in the major advanced economies once again fell \nbelow central banks’ targets in 2019. In the US, targeted \ninflation averaged 1.4% for the year. It was 1.2% in the euro area \nand 0.6% in Japan. The UK has had inflation closer to target \nrecently, mainly due to exchange rate depreciation, but the \nconsumer price index (CPI) has nonetheless slowed in 2019, to \naverage 1.8% for the year. Persistently low advanced economy \ninflation remains an acute challenge to both monetary policy \npractice and theory, prompting, so far, many hypotheses but \nas yet no consensus answers.4 \nEmerging market growth disappointed yet again in 2019. India’s \nslowdown intensified, with growth falling to just 4.8% in the \nyear, from 6.8% in 2018. Other major emerging markets, having \nstagnated through much of the past decade, once again failed \nto accelerate meaningfully. (For instance, Brazil grew 1.2%, \nMexico 0%, and Russia 1.1%.) Meanwhile, China’s slowdown \npersisted, with growth of 6.1% for the year against 6.6% the \nyear before. In this context, and with inflation generally well-\nbehaved, emerging market central banks had been lowering \nrates, with a total of 53 easing policy during 2019. This trend \nhas since been reinforced by the COVID-19 pandemic, with a \nnew round of easing broadly underway since February.\nIn sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), some countries grew rapidly, while \nothers continued to struggle with stagnations induced by lower \ncommodity prices and excess debt, among other challenges. \n4\t\nFor a review of these hypotheses, see S Belz, D Wessel and J Yellen, \n‘What’s (not) up with inflation?’, Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary \nPolicy, The Brookings Institution, January 2020, available at https://www.\nbrookings.edu/product/ explaining-the-inflation-puzzle/.\nPercentage change over 12 months\nG3 unemployment and inflation\nSource: Haver\n-4\n-2\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n \nUnemployment (per cent)\n \nTargeted inflation\nUS\n2000–2020\nJapan\n2000–2020\nEuro area\n2000–2020\nMajor emerging market growth\nPercentage change\n0.6*\n4.5\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\nRussia\nBrazil \nIndia \nChina \nSource: Haver\n2019\n2010–2018 average\nPercentage change\n-3\n0\n3\n6\n9\nTrade volumes in emerging markets\n2010–2016\n2017\n2018\n2019\nSource: CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis \n \nImports\n \nExports\n11\nAPRIL 2020\nThe region’s three largest economies – South Africa, Nigeria \nand Angola – all underperformed, with 2019 growth rates of \n0.2%, 2.3% and -0.3% respectively. By contrast, the next three \nbiggest economies – Kenya, Ethiopia and Ghana – delivered \n2019 growth rates of 5.6%, 7.4% and 7.5% respectively. \nStrikingly, while growth averages for the SSA region were \naround 3%, few countries recorded growth around 3%; instead, \nthe distribution was bimodal. South Africa’s major regional \ntrade partners have mostly fallen into the worse-performing \ngroup, partly because of exposure to South Africa, but also \ndue to domestic factors. Zimbabwe’s economy, for instance, \ncontracted by around 7% in 2019, in the context of renewed \nhyperinflation (official statistics show prices rose 540% for \nthe 12 months following the reintroduction of a domestic fiat \ncurrency in February 2019). Meanwhile, Mozambique’s growth \nslowed to a 19-year low of 1.8%, given the shock of two major \ncyclones in March and April, in addition to ongoing debt \ntroubles. (Mozambique is one of seven countries in the region \nin debt distress, as classified by the IMF.)\nConclusion\nThe global economy slowed in 2019, with export-oriented \neconomies generally the hardest-hit. Growth deteriorated \nfurther at the start of 2020, mainly due to the COVID-19 \noutbreak interrupting a global recovery. The baseline forecast \nassumes this is a temporary shock with a recovery underway \nfrom late-2020, helped by fiscal and monetary stimulus. More \nadverse scenarios are conceivable, however, and the outlook \nis unusually uncertain. For a range of major emerging markets, \nincluding South Africa, this marks yet another delay in a multi-\nyear failure to restart growth – an inauspicious start to a new \ndecade after the serial disappointments of the 2010s.\nChanges since 31 Jan 2020 in basis points\nSources: Haver and SARB\nEmerging market policy rates\n-175\n-150\n-125\n-100\n-75\n-50\n-25\n0\nColombia\nIndia\nTaiwan\nCzech Rep.\nMalaysia\nRussia\nThailand\nPoland\nIndonesia\nChile\nBrazil\nMexico\nPeru\nSouth Africa\nTurkey\nChina\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\nNumber of countries\nDistribution of SSA growth for 2019\nSSA average 3.2%\nSources: IMF and SARB\n<0\n0–1\n1–2\n2–3\n3–4\n5–6\n4–5\n6–7\n>7\n12\nAPRIL 2020\nFinancial market developments: \na riskier country in a riskier world\nThe COVID-19 pandemic has caused financial market turmoil \non a scale not seen since the 2009 crisis. Risk assets have \nsold off, while signs of market dislocations have appeared in \nmajor financial centres. Central banks in these jurisdictions \nhave implemented massive easing policies, drawing on the \ntools developed a decade ago. South African assets have \nfollowed the global risk-off trend, with the exchange rate falling \nto record lows, equities declining abruptly, and long-term \ngovernment interest rates rising. Expectations for short-term \nrates have fallen, however, consistent with a looser monetary \npolicy stance.\nGlobal asset markets recorded significant gains in 2019, \nespecially in the closing half of the year. The MSCI benchmark \nfor emerging market equities rose 15% during 2019, while \ndeveloped market equities did even better, returning 25%. (US \nstocks rose 29%.) Within the fixed-income space, emerging \nmarket sovereign bonds outperformed developed market \ncounterparts as risk appetite improved towards the end of the \nyear. The reach for yield also benefitted corporate and high-\nyield bonds. Most emerging market currencies appreciated \nversus the US dollar in the final quarter of last year, and the \nBritish pound also gained as some Brexit uncertainty lifted.\nThese trends reversed abruptly in early 2020, as the COVID-19 \noutbreak spread around the world, followed by an oil price \nwar between OPEC and non-OPEC oil producers. The VIX, \na measure of risk aversion, began climbing in February and \nreached 2008 levels in March, paralleled by the MOVE, which \ntracks volatility in US Treasury bonds. Safe-haven assets \nmostly benefitted; the 10- and 30-year US Treasury bond \nyields, for instance, declined to record lows, with the US \nTreasury curve entirely below 1% at one point (on 9 March). \nCore European government bond yields also fell, while \nspreads between German bond yields and those of riskier \neuro countries widened. Equities sold off, in both advanced \neconomies and emerging markets, with the MSCI world equity \nindex down almost 30% for the year to date. Similarly, the \nS&P 500 lost nearly 30% from its February peak, with circuit \nbreakers halting trading on several occasions following falls \nof 7%, while the MSCI equity index for emerging markets fell \nover 30% from its January high. February also saw the gold \nprice breach US$1 600 per fine ounce for the first time since \n2013 – a rally which drove the copper-gold ratio to historic \nlows, reflecting gold’s role as a hedge in uncertain times and \ncopper’s status as a proxy for real economy activity.\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\n100\n110\n120\n130\nIndex (both scales)\n2017\n2016\n2015\n2018\n2019\n2020\nVolatility indices\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\nSource: Bloomberg\n \nVIX\n \nMOVE (right-hand scale)\n \nEuro area\n \nUS\n \nChina\nIndex\nFinancial conditions\nSources: Bloomberg and SARB\nLess than 0 = tighter financial conditions\n-5\n-4\n-3\n-2\n-1\n0\n1\n2\n3\n2018\n2019\n2020\nRatio\n2017\n2016\n2015\n2018\n2019\n2020\nCopper/gold price ratio\n0.12\n0.14\n0.16\n0.18\n0.20\n0.22\n0.24\n0.26\nSources: Bloomberg and SARB\n13\nAPRIL 2020\nIn exchange rate markets, the US dollar weakened momentarily \nas the Fed lowered rates, which reduced its interest rate \ndifferential with other major currencies. It has since benefitted \nfrom its status as the world’s reserve currency, however, \nhelping the Bloomberg Dollar Index to an all-time high in mid-\nMarch. Few other currencies have been so resilient. The UK \npound sank to a 35-year low in March, while emerging market \ncurrencies retreated to the lowest levels on record (as per the \nJPMorgan Emerging Market Currency Index).\nPolicymakers in the major economies have responded to \nthe crisis with a range of measures, both to stimulate their \neconomies and to keep financial markets functioning. In the \nUS, the Fed reduced its policy rate by 1.5 percentage points \nin a pair of unscheduled meetings, taking it to around zero, \nand restarted quantitative easing with US$700 billion of asset \npurchases. It also opened a variety of borrowing facilities \nto improve liquidity in exchange for an expanded range of \ncollateral. In China, policymakers implemented stimulus worth \napproximately 1.2% of GDP, through liquidity measures, tax \ncuts and a range of other interventions, supplemented by an \ninterest rate cut in late March.5 Similarly, the ECB expanded its \nQE programme as well as two bank lending programmes, and \nintroduced a new €750 billion Pandemic Emergency Purchase \nProgramme for government bonds, while leaving interest \nrates unchanged (the deposit rate was already negative, at \n-0.5%). The BoE cut Bank Rate to just above zero, released \nits countercyclical capital buffer (a macroprudential tool used \nto manage credit growth), and launched a new bank lending \nscheme. Together, a network of six major central banks6 also \nactivated foreign currency swap lines, ensuring they could act \nas lenders of last resort for their respective financial systems, \nin foreign as well as domestic currency. These measures were \nsubsequently extended to a wider range of central banks, \nincluding some large emerging markets (Mexico, Brazil).\nDomestic financial market \ndevelopments\nThe fourth quarter of 2019 delivered a series of domestic \ndisappointments, including renewed electricity load-shedding, \na worse fiscal outlook (as announced in the October MTBPS), \nand negative ratings outlooks from Moody’s and Standard & \nPoor’s. Despite these factors, the rand outpaced its emerging \n5\t\nThe 1.2% estimate is drawn from T Wang, N Zhang, J Zhong, A Luo and \nK Jiang. 3 March 2020, ‘Macro keys: how large is China’s policy response?’, \nUBS Global Research.\n6\t\nThe six are as follows: the US Federal Reserve, the ECB, the Bank of \nJapan, the BoE, the Swiss National Bank and the Bank of Canada.\n94\n95\n96\n97\n98\n99\n100\n101\n102\n103\n104\nOct\nNov\nDec\n2020\n2019\nJan\nFeb\nMar\nUS dollar and emerging market exchange rates\nSource: Bloomberg\n \nBloomberg US Dollar Index\n \nJPMorgan EM Currency Index\n \n(inverted right-hand scale)\n52\nIndex (both scales)\n54\n56\n58\n60\n62\n-15\n-12\n-9\n-6\n-3\n0\n3\n6\n9\n12\nOct\nNov\nDec\n2020\n2019\nJan\nFeb\nMar\nEmerging market currencies\nSource: Bloomberg\n \nRand/US$\n \nJPMorgan EM FX Index\nCumulative percentage return since 1 Oct 2019 \n-1\n0\n1\n2\n3\nPer cent\nDeveloped market bond yield curves*\n \nUS\n \nUK\n \nGermany\nSource: Bloomberg\n2\n3\n5\n7\n10\n30\n* Dotted lines reflect October 2019; solid lines reflect 28 March 2020\nYears to maturity\n14\nAPRIL 2020\nmarket peers in the fourth quarter, appreciating more than \n8% against the dollar, with the bilateral exchange rate nearing \nR14.00 at some points. On a nominal effective exchange rate \n(NEER) basis, the rand strengthened over 6% in the fourth \nquarter of 2019.\nThese gains were based on an accommodating global \nenvironment rather than domestic strengths, and they \nevaporated as the global climate changed. With risk aversion \nspreading in financial markets, the rand depreciated rapidly, \npassing R17.00 to the dollar in mid-March, and then R18.00 \nper dollar towards the end of the month, following Moody’s \ndowngrade of the sovereign to below investment grade. The \nlocal currency’s year-to-date performance ranks among the \npoorest by emerging market standards, with the rand having \nweakened nearly 22% against the US dollar. (Since the \nprevious MPR, the rand has depreciated 14.1%, compared \nwith an emerging market average of 11.1%.)\nAs risk sentiment deteriorated, capital flows out of emerging \nmarkets picked up to levels exceeding those seen in 2008, \nhitting both bond and equity markets. The JSE All-Share \nIndex (Alsi) gave up its late-2019 gains by early February, with \nlosses reaching 30% year-to-date by March. These losses \nwere broad-based across the Alsi sub-indices. Meanwhile, \nlong-term government bond yields rose to over 10%, and the \nyield curve steepened further. The gap between long-term \nnominal bond yields and short-term ones is now the widest on \nrecord; the 2023 and 2048 bond yields, for instance, are over \n500 basis points apart. (On average, the gap between 2- and \n30-year bonds has been around 360 basis points over the past \nfive years.)\nExpectations for short-term interest rates had been shifting \nlower before the COVID-19 outbreak, and then declined \nrapidly as the crisis took hold. The November MPC forecast \nhad indicated a repo rate cut in the third quarter of 2020, \nwhich FRAs then priced in completely. The January repo rate \nreduction was only partially priced in, with the FRA market \ngiving the probability as 40%. Following that meeting, markets \nalso began pricing in a second cut in the fourth quarter, in \nline with the forecast repo rate projection. In February and \nMarch, as the pandemic intensified, markets began pricing \nin a larger pre-emptive cut, nearing 100 basis points by the \nsecond quarter of 2020, with short-term rates then expected \nto rise again by around 25 basis points towards the end of \nthe year. Following the March MPC decision, markets began \nto anticipate another 50 to 75 basis points of cuts in the \nsecond and third quarters, again with some normalisation of \nrates subsequently.\nCumulative percentage return since 1 Oct 2019\nOct\nNov\nDec\n2020\n2019\nJan\nFeb\nMar\nEquity performance\nSources: Bloomberg and SARB\n \nChina CSI 300\n \nEuro Stoxx\n \nMSCI EM\n \nUS S&P 500\n \nJapan Nikkei\n-40\n-30\n-20\n-10\n0\n10\n20\nBasis points\n2015\nSpread: 2-year versus 30-year government bonds\nSources: Bloomberg and SARB\n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n2016\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2020\n \nSouth African EMBI+ spread\n \nDomestic portion\n-100\n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n700\n800\nBasis points\n2014\n2015\n2016\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2020\nSouth African EMBI+ decomposition\nSources: Bloomberg and SARB\n \n15\nAPRIL 2020\nIn assessing local asset market developments, it is important \nto disentangle global factors from local ones. South African \nassets, especially the rand, are used as proxies for emerging \nmarkets more broadly. For this reason, their prices tend to \nfollow and magnify what is happening in wider markets (in \nfinancial jargon, they have ‘high beta’). But South Africa has \nidiosyncratic challenges, which also affect market pricing. \nA decomposition of risk measures (both the EMBI+ and CDS \nspreads) into these general and idiosyncratic components \nshows, strikingly, that the South Africa-specific portion had \nbeen rising sharply into February, reaching levels last seen \nduring the ‘Nenegate’ episode of late 2015. The global \nportion, which attaches to emerging markets in general, \nthen also begins accelerating as the COVID-19 crisis hits. \nBoth the idiosyncratic and the general elements of risk are now \nunusually elevated.\nAs the global crisis intensified in mid-March, liquidity strains \nbegan to emerge in some domestic funding markets. \nTo facilitate smooth market functioning, the SARB therefore \nintroduced a range of liquidity-enhancing measures, starting \nthe day after the March MPC. These measures have made \nit easier for banks to get cash, by increasing the number \nof opportunities to source liquidity from the SARB, and by \noffering it for longer periods (rather than just overnight). \nThey have also created incentives for banks to lend money \non, rather than holding it at the central bank, with a lower and \ntherefore unattractive rate on money deposited back at the \nSARB. In addition, the SARB has also purchased government \nbonds in the secondary market, which has expanded liquidity \nand also moderated abrupt shifts in government bond yields, \nwhich appear to have been driven by market malfunctions \nrather than economic factors. To date, these measures appear \nto have improved market functioning.\nConclusion\nThe COVID-19 outbreak has caused turmoil in financial \nmarkets, reducing the value of risk assets and driving returns \non risk-free assets to new lows. The crisis comes at a moment \nof vulnerability for South Africa, given a deteriorated fiscal \nsituation and therefore a rising domestic risk profile. Markets \nhave nonetheless understood that the SARB has space to lower \ninterest rates, which has put downward pressure on shorter-\nterm rates even as longer-term borrowing costs have risen.\nPer cent (changes since 1 Oct 2019)\nRange\nMin.\nMax.\nCurrent\nGovernment bond yields \nSource: Bloomberg\n28\n20\n16\n15\n10\n6\n3\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\n10\n11\n12\n13\n14\nYears to maturity\nBasis point change\nTurkey\nRussia\nIndonesia\nMexico\nBrazil\nSouth Africa\n-5\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n10-year local currency bond yields\nSource: Bloomberg\nYear to date\nSince 1 Oct 2019\n-50\n-40\n-30\n-20\n-10\n0\n10\n20\nOct\nNov\nDec\n2020\n2019\nJan\nFeb\nMar\nJSE share prices\nSource: Bloomberg\n \nMining\n \nIndustrial\n \nRetail\n \nBanking\n \nAll-Share\nCumulative percentage return since 1 Oct 2019 \n16\nAPRIL 2020\nBox 2\t South Africa’s term-premium shock\n1\t\nEstimates of the term premium follow the approach by T Adrian, \nR K Crump and E Moench, ‘Pricing the term structure with \nlinear regressions’, Journal of Financial Economics 110(1), 2013, \npp 110–138.\n2\t\nG Rudebusch, B P Sack and E Swanson, ‘Macroeconomic \nimplications of changes in the term premium’, Federal Reserve \nBank of St. Louis Review 89(4), 2007, available at https://research.\nstlouisfed.org/publications/review/07/07/Rudebusch.pdf.\nSouth Africa’s long-term borrowing costs have been elevated despite \nlower inflation expectations and lower short-term interest rates. The \nbenchmark 10-year government bond returned around 9.6% in 2019, \ncompared to an average of 8.7% for the period from the start of 2010 \nto the end of 2015. As this box demonstrates, upward pressure on \nlong-term rates has been coming from a higher term premium.1 This \nlikely contributed to disappointing growth outcomes, pre-COVID-19, \nand will likely remain a challenge when that shock has faded.\nA term premium provides compensation for lending long-term \ninstead of short-term. Bond market investors can choose between \nbuying long-dated instruments (like 10-year bonds) and rolling over \na series of short-dated instruments (like 3-month Treasury bills) \nfor an equivalent time period. The first approach is riskier because \nthe money is locked in, making the investment less liquid and also \nleaving it more exposed to inflation surprises and credit risk (meaning \na whole or partial default). For this reason, investors typically charge \nmore for long-term funds. By contrast, short-term rates usually follow \nthe central bank’s policy rate. The long-term rate can therefore be \ndecomposed into expectations for the short-term rate, over the \nwhole life of a given bond, plus a term premium.\nThe South African term premium has been rising quite steadily \nsince 2015, with spikes around episodes of heightened risk. (These \nincluding ‘Nenegate’ in late 2015 and the 2017 medium-term \nbudget, which announced a severe fiscal deterioration.) Between \n2015 and 2019, it climbed by around 2 percentage points, with \nan additional increase of roughly half a percentage point in the first \nquarter of 2020. Taking a longer average, it was 103 basis points \nhigher in 2019 than it was for the 2010–2015 period. Were it not \nfor this term premium, long-term borrowing costs would have been \naround 8% in 2019, comparable to their lowest ever level, reflecting \nreduced inflation expectations as well as a repurchase rate well \nbelow historical averages. \nA higher term premium is bad for growth.2 Econometric estimates \nby South African Reserve Bank staff indicate that a 100 basis point \nterm-premium shock weakens growth by around 0.6 percentage \npoints at the point of maximum impact, which is about four quarters \nafter the shock. The estimated effect on inflation is more ambiguous, \nwith the disinflationary impact of weaker demand offset by currency \ndepreciation, as risk deters investors. \nThese estimates cannot be transferred directly to South Africa’s \nexperience, which has been about a sustained upward trend in \nthe term premium rather than a one-off shock. Nonetheless, this \nmechanism helps to explain how sovereign debt accumulation has \nweakened growth. In addition, it is one of the key channels through \nwhich fiscal repairs – as discussed in both the recent State of the \nNation Address and the 2020 Budget – could benefit the economy \nover time. \nPercentage points\n2017\n2016\n2015\n2018\n2019\n2020\nTerm premium on the South African 10-year bond\n-1.0\n-0.5\n0.0\n0.5\n1.0\n1.5\n2.0\n2.5\nSources: Bloomberg and SARB\nPercentage points\nGDP response* to a 100 basis point \nterm-premium shock\nSources: Bloomberg and SARB\nQuarters\n-0.8\n-0.7\n-0.6\n-0.5\n-0.4\n-0.3\n-0.2\n-0.1\n0.0\n0.1\n0.2\n1\n3\n5\n7\n9\n11\n13\n15\n17\n19\n* Dotted lines show plus or minus \n one standard error\nPercentage points\nInflation response* to a 100 basis point \nterm-premium shock\nSources: Bloomberg and SARB\nQuarters\n-0.2\n-0.1\n0.0\n0.1\n0.2\n0.3\n1\n3\n5\n7\n9\n11\n13\n15\n17\n19\n0.4\n* Dotted lines show plus or minus \n one standard error\n17\nAPRIL 2020\nReal economy: low growth \nand a new shock\nSouth Africa’s growth rate slowed to 0.2% in 2019, the worst \nperformance since the 2009 recession. The forecast indicates \noutput will contract in 2020, based primarily on the COVID-19 \noutbreak. Other domestic constraints would nonetheless have \nkept growth near-zero this year, even in the absence of this \nshock. Accordingly, potential growth is also very low, under 1%. \nIn the outer forecast years, the economy recovers somewhat, \nto a growth rate a little over 1%, given an assumption that \nthe global economy rebounds and domestic circumstances \nimprove. It is difficult to say whether this projection is optimistic \nor pessimistic: it is around half of South Africa’s longer-run \naverage growth rate, but it is roughly double the average rate \nof the past four years.\nA bad ending to a lost decade\nThe final quarter of 2019 yielded another GDP contraction \n(-1.4% in annualised terms, quarter on quarter). With the \n-0.8% recorded for the third quarter, this put South Africa \nin a technical recession, for the second time in two years. \nIt also confirmed that the 2010s were the worst decade for \nSouth African growth on record.7 Total output expanded by \nonly 15.9% between the first quarter of 2010 and the final \nquarter of 2019, which compares unfavourably with the crisis-\nridden 1980s and 1990s, during which GDP grew by a total of \n18.9% and 16.7% respectively.8\nGrowth has been unusually volatile in recent years. As noted in \nprevious issues of the MPR, the primary and secondary sectors \nhave moved abruptly in response to shocks. This pattern \npersisted in 2019, where mining, manufacturing and agriculture \nall contracted (by 1.9%, 0.8% and 6.9%, deducting 0.1, \n0.1 and 0.2 percentage points from 2019 growth respectively). \nMeanwhile, the rest of the economy posted positive but low \ngrowth rates. This ‘core’ growth was 0.9% over the year, close \nto its five-year average rate of 1.1%.\nThe underperformance of agriculture was primarily due to \ninsufficient rainfall, with a rebound likely this year given better \ngrowing conditions and therefore larger crop estimates. \nBy contrast, electricity shortages constituted the major \nconstraint for mining and manufacturing – the two most \n electricity intensive sectors of the economy. Over the past year, \nEskom shed 1352GWh from the system, with the Electricity \nAvailability Factor (EAF) falling to 66.9% – implying that only \ntwo-thirds of installed capacity was producing electricity, \n7\t\nQuarterly GDP data are available from 1960.\n8\t\nThese calculations reflect the difference between output in \nthe first quarter of the decade and the final quarter (2010Q1 \nand 2019Q4). No other quarters are considered.\nIndices: first quarter of decade = 100\nReal GDP levels\nSources: Stats SA and SARB \nYear\n1\n0\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\n \n1960s\n \n1970s\n \n1980s\n \n1990s\n \n2000s\n \n2010s\n90\n100\n110\n120\n130\n140\n150\n160\n170\n180\nAgricultural crop estimates*\nAnnual percentage change\n0.6*\n4.5\n3.1\n2.3\n0.6*\nMidpoint\nSA real yield\nUS nominal\nyield\n2.2\nSA CDS\nspread\n2.5\nUS-SA target\ndifferential\n-25\n-20\n-15\n-10\n-5\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\nSummer 2019/20\nWinter 2019\nSummer 2018/19\nWhite maize\nYellow maize\nWheat\nMalting barley\nOther\nTotal\n* Based on tons\nSources: DAFF and SARB\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n35\n40\nPercentage of total industrial use\nElectricity use by industry\nFinance\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\nConstruction\nTransport\nAgriculture\nTrade\nElectricity etc.\nCommunity etc.\nMining\nManufacturing\n18\nAPRIL 2020\nan all-time low. As in 2015, the previous most severe episode \nof load-shedding, electricity shortages have coincided with \ncontractions in both mining and manufacturing. Transport also \ndeclined in both instances, plausibly related to offline power \nstations not needing coal. These sectors are likely to remain \nunder pressure in an environment of ongoing load-shedding; \nelectricity availability has been only around 62% so far this year.\nIn these difficult economic circumstances, unemployment \nhas risen. Job growth stalled in 2019, with the total number \nof employed people declining from 16.44 million at the end \nof 2018 to 16.34 million at the end of 2019 (using seasonally \nadjusted data). Meanwhile, the labour force continued to \nexpand, with a net increase of 481 000 people during 2019. \nOver the past decade as a whole, the total increase in the \nworkforce has been 4.87 million people, compared with an \nemployment increase of 2.52 million.\nWage growth has also slowed markedly, in stark contrast to \nthe situation a decade ago, when pay boomed even as the \neconomy shed jobs. Formal sector wages, as measured by \nthe Quarterly Employment Statistics (QES) survey, declined by \n0.7% in the first three quarters of 2019, extending a downward \ntrend in wage growth which began around 2015. Bonus and \novertime pay appears to have slowed more than base pay, \nalthough the available data only start in 2018, so it is difficult to \nestablish a trend. According to the Andrew Levy survey, wage \ngrowth in sectors with collective bargaining arrangements \nhas also decelerated, although in this case increases have \nmaintained a fairly constant margin over inflation, generating \nconstant real gains. There is also some evidence of slowing \ngrowth in public sector wages in 2019, after an extended \nperiod of growth above private sector rates. (For instance, \npublic wages have outpaced private wages over both the \n2000-date and the 2010-date periods.)\nShifts in the composition of GDP\nDespite this pressure on households, household consumption \nhas trended steadily higher over the past decade as a share \nof total demand, reaching an all-time high in 2019, at just over \n62% of GDP (based on inflation-adjusted data). By definition, \nthis means other components of GDP have been growing \nmore slowly. Investment has held up better than is usually \nunderstood, at levels narrowly below 20% of GDP, compared \nwith a longer-term average of 16.9%. Public sector investment \nhas weakened sharply in recent years, but private sector \ninvestment has been more resilient, which has supported \naggregate investment at levels that are better than historical \nnorms (although still lower than desirable). Government \nconsumption has also been elevated, above 20% of GDP. \nBy contrast, net exports have been unusually depressed for \nmost of the decade. Imports, which detract from net exports, \nhave held up surprisingly well for an economy suffering from \nweak demand. Meanwhile, exports have stagnated, despite \nMillions of people\n2015\n2013\n2011\n2009\n2017\n2019\nLabour trends\n12\n14\n16\n18\n20\n22\n24\n \nLabour force\n \nEmployed\nSource: Stats SA\nTotal salaries and wages\nPercentage change\n0.6*\n4.5\n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n700\nTotal\nPrivate\nPublic\nTotal\nPrivate\nPublic\n578\nSources: QES and SARB\n2000–2019\n2010–2019\n416\n455\n123\n85\n95\nPercentage of GDP\n1990\n2000\n2010\nHousehold consumption*\n40\n45\n50\n55\n60\n65\n \n* Real seasonally adjusted and annualised\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\n1980\n1960\n1970\n19\nAPRIL 2020\nunusually favourable commodity prices, especially in rand \nterms. (Mining export prices were on average 40% higher in \nthe 2010s than they were in the 2000s; export volumes grew \nonly 5.5%.) In sum, the composition of GDP has shifted such \nthat the economy has become excessively reliant on internal \ndemand, a growth model that has generated substantial \nfiscal and current account deficits, as well as poor overall \neconomic performance.\nCredit growth\nThis analysis also helps to cast some light on an emerging \nhousehold credit puzzle. Over much of the past decade, \nhouseholds sought to repair the excesses of the 2000s \nhousing boom by deleveraging. As a result, the household \ndebt-to-income ratio declined from 85.7% in 2008 to 72.0% in \n2018. While there were some bursts of credit activity during this \nperiod, particularly the unsecured lending boom of 2012–2013, \nhousehold credit growth was generally low. This prompted \ndebate over the relative contributions of different factors, \nincluding new regulations (Basel III), weak growth prospects, \ncautious lending practices and policy settings. More recently, \nhousehold credit has been growing again, led by unsecured \nlending but with a supporting contribution from mortgages – a \ndevelopment that has been attributed to a range of factors, \nincluding banks competing for market share, technological \nimprovements making credit more convenient, and consumers \nborrowing to compensate for declining incomes.\nThe puzzle is whether this is desirable. For a central bank \naiming to close a negative output gap with a lower interest rate, \ncredit growth is an important part of the policy transmission \nmechanism. However, where that central bank also has a \nfinancial stability mandate, credit growth in excess of income \ngrowth or overall GDP growth is a risk warning.\nReflecting on the changing composition of GDP, it becomes \nclearer that pushing consumption still higher, using either \nhousehold or government debt, will likely not permit higher \noverall growth. In the short term, it may provide useful support \nto an economy under demand stress. The longer-term \npolicy challenge, however, is finding tools to achieve higher-\nquality demand rather than just more demand. South Africa’s \nconsumption-focused growth model appears to have passed \nits limits.\nPercentage of GDP\n1990\n2000\n2010\nGross fixed capital formation*\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n16\n18\n* Real seasonally adjusted and annualised\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\n1980\n1960\n1970\nPrivate business enterprises\nGeneral government and public corporations\nPercentage of GDP\n1990\n2000\n2010\nNet exports*\n-5\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\nLong-term\naverage\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\n1980\n1960\n1970\n* Real seasonally adjusted and annualised\nPercentage change over 12 months\n2016\n2018\n2020\nHousehold credit extension\n-8\n-6\n-4\n-2\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n \nNominal\n \nCPI inflation-adjusted\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\n2014\n2010\n2012\n20\nAPRIL 2020\nBox 3\t What is different about this downswing?\n1\t\nThis calculation assumes an upswing had not begun as of \nFebruary 2020.\nSouth Africa is in the midst of the longest business cycle downswing \nin its history. Historically, downswings have lasted on average 20 \nmonths. The current downswing has so far extended for 74 months,1 \nbeating out the slump of March 1989 to May 1993, which lasted \n51  months. This box explores the behaviour of the different \ncomponents of gross domestic product (GDP) during this and past \ndownswings, to better understand its unusual character. Two major \ndifferences stand out. First, imports have been unusually buoyant. \nSecond, public sector investment has fallen much more than normal.\nMost downswings are concluded after about three years. \nOn average, the level of GDP moves marginally higher over this \nperiod, reflecting the fact that downswings are periods of poorer \neconomic performance, not necessarily output contractions. \nExports, household consumption and government consumption all \ngrow faster than GDP, while private sector investment and imports \ncontract. These last two components are then also the items that \nexpand the most in the upswing phase. Public sector investment \nnormally holds up better during the initial phase of a downswing but \nweakens later, perhaps reflecting the pressure a weak economy puts \non government finances over time.\nIn the current downswing, the trio of exports, household consumption \nand government consumption has followed the average downswing \npattern fairly closely. Exports are moderately weaker than usual, \nespecially towards the end of the sample, while household \nconsumption has been stronger. Government consumption was \ninitially somewhat weaker than average, but it has picked up \nrecently. The standout differences, however, relate to imports and \npublic sector investment. Imports normally end a downswing around \n5% below their level when the downswing commenced. In this case, \nimports are currently around 10% above their starting point. (After \nthree years, when most downswings are concluded, imports were \nabout 5% above their starting point – still a significant difference.) \nInversely, public sector investment is now around 20% below its \nstarting point, where, for the average downswing, the trough is \napproximately -5%.\nThis weakness in public sector investment helps to explain the \ndisappointing total investment numbers. While overall investment \nis lower than it was at the start of the downswing, private sector \ninvestment has risen. Over the first three years of the downswing, \nprivate sector investment followed its usual pattern, declining \nby around 5%. It has since recovered, however, to a level around \n5% higher than the 2013 starting point (as of the third quarter of \n2019). This suggests that firms are maintaining their capital stock and \nsome are implementing new projects, contrary to the ‘investment \nstrike’ hypothesis which has been mooted in the press.\nOngoing import strength may reflect a combination of supply-side \nweakness (including electricity shortages and policy uncertainty) \nalongside significant demand support (large fiscal deficits and \nrelatively low short-term interest rates). Although fair-value estimates \nshow the exchange rate has been undervalued through most of \nthe downswing period, strong imports suggest it may have been \novervalued. Another hypothesis is that South Africa has become \nmore integrated into the global economy, although if this were the \ncase, then exports should also have benefitted.\nIndex: upswing peak = 100\nGDP growth\nImports\nPrivate capex\nGDP, private capex and imports: average past \ndownswings since 1960 (excluding current downswing)\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\nNumber of quarters\n80\n85\n90\n95\n100\n105\n110\n115\n120\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\n10 11\n12 13\nIndex: upswing peak = 100\nGDP growth\nImports\nPrivate capex\nGDP, private capex and imports: current \ndownswing up to 2019Q2\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\nNumber of quarters\n80\n85\n90\n95\n100\n105\n110\n115\n120\n0 1\n3\n5\n7\n9\n11\n13\n15\n17\n19\n21\n23\nIndex: upswing peak = 100\nCurrent downswing\nAverage past downswings\n(excluding current)\nPublic capex: current downswing versus average \npast downswings since 1960\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\nNumber of quarters\n75\n80\n85\n90\n95\n100\n105\n110\n115\n120\n0 1\n3\n5\n7\n9\n11\n13\n15\n17\n19\n21\n23\n21\nAPRIL 2020\nGrowth outlook\nThe 2020 growth forecast has been revised down substantially \nsince the start of the year, from 1.2% as of the January meeting \nof the MPC to -0.2% in March. More recent estimates are lower \nstill, suggesting a range of -2% to -4% is now likely. Potential \ngrowth for 2020 was estimated at 0.8% for the March MPC, \nbut this will likely fall further in new forecasts: the lockdown \nmeans some growth now becomes irrecoverable. The output \ngap is nonetheless likely to be even more negative than the \nMarch projections (-2.2% of potential GDP), because the \nCOVID-19 effect also has demand-shock characteristics, with \nmuch of the supply side of the economy likely to emerge from \nthe lockdown with capacity intact but demand missing. \nAs of the March MPC, the COVID-19 shock was not yet visible \nin most sources of real economy data. International passenger \narrivals through airports fell in February, and there was \nabundant anecdotal evidence of cancelled tourist bookings \nand corporate events. The overall growth outlook was highly \nuncertain, however, with clear downside risks. The post-MPC \nannouncement of a country-wide lockdown made it clear far \nlarger swathes of the economy would be affected. Based on the \nnumber of working days lost to the lockdown, and differences \nin the extent to which sectors are likely to be affected, recent \nSARB calculations suggest the 21-day shutdown will reduce \n2020 growth by 2.6 percentage points. But the indirect effects \nare less easily estimated. Most data, including those for trade \nand retail sales, are only available with a two-month lag, so it \nwill be some time before we achieve precision about even the \nnear-term impact of this unusual shock. \nIn 2009, the previous instance of a major crisis, the economy \ncontracted by 1.5% for the year, with the primary and secondary \nsectors deeply negative (-4.4% and -6.4% respectively) and \nthe tertiary sector slightly positive (+0.7%). Within the tertiary \nsector, however, hotels and restaurants fell 3.9%. Vehicles \nand finance were both down 3.6%. In that year, business \ntravel also declined by over a third. The comparison with 2009 \nhas limitations, however, with the starting point having been \nsignificantly more favourable, given a fast-growing economy \nand a more robust fiscal position when that crisis hit. The nature \nof South Africa’s current lockdown also suggests the tertiary \nsector will be the main drag on growth this year, in contrast to \nits normal role as a relatively stable demand component.\nOver the medium term, the SARB forecasts continue to project \na mild recovery, to around 1.0% in 2021 and 1.6% in 2022. This \nexpectation of moderately stronger growth in the outer years \nhas been the norm for recent forecasts, to their detriment: they \nlater had to be revised down. Nonetheless, this forecast feature \nhas been maintained for the latest projections. This choice is \nbased on two reasons.\nPercentage of potential GDP\n2016\n2018\n2020\n2022\nOutput gap\n-2.5\n-2.0\n-1.5\n-1.0\n-0.5\n0.0\n0.5\n \nSep 2019\n \nMar 2020\nSource: SARB\n2014\n2010\n2012\nPercentage change\n2016\n2015\n2017\n2018\n2020\n2021\n2022\nReal GDP growth*\n-0.5\n0.0\n0.5\n1.0\n1.5\n2.0\n \nSep 2019\n \nMar 2020\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\n* Dotted lines indicate forecasts\n2019\n22\nAPRIL 2020\nFirst, in the structure of the QPM, the growth outlook is shaped \nby the output gap, which the model aims to close over the \nmedium term (around three years). The growth forecast is \ntherefore largely determined by whatever is required to close \nthe output gap. Because this gap measures the difference \nbetween actual and potential output, it can be eliminated by \nlowering potential output. But the potential output estimates \nhave already been revised down substantially. Various measures \nof slack suggest this economy is not operating at full capacity, \nand the COVID-19 pandemic is doing more damage to the \ndemand side of the economy than the supply side. (Although \nboth demand and supply have been deliberately turned off for \nthe duration of the March–April lockdown, the supply side will \nstill have capacity to meet demand afterwards.) This suggests \nthe output gap should be negative and potential growth \nshould not be marked down to the point that the output gap \ndisappears. (See Box 5.) But this then implies stronger catch-\nup growth over the forecast period. To mitigate this problem, \nthe QPM results have been adjusted by the forecasting team \nso that the gap closes more slowly than the model would \nnormally allow. It therefore remains slightly negative in 2022, \nthe last year of the forecast period, at -1.5% of potential GDP.\nSecond, there are plausible reasons why growth might \nimprove somewhat over the medium term. The starting point is \nnow extremely low, given a year-on-year contraction in 2020. \nElectricity load-shedding will persist throughout 2020 and into \n2021, but power stations are being taken offline to create time \nfor maintenance, which will ultimately improve the quality of \nsupply. New initiatives to allow large users to generate their \nown power should also help to ease constraints on some \nbusinesses. In addition, government has tabled a range \nof structural reforms designed to raise growth. Finally, the \nCOVID-19 pandemic will likely dissipate this year, permitting \na global recovery. Together, these considerations suggest \ngrowth could restart next year, even if it does not return to \nlonger-run averages (around 2.5%) over the medium term.\nCurrent account\nSouth Africa’s current account deficit averaged 3.0% of GDP \nin 2019. This outcome marked a deterioration from 2017, when \nit had moderated to 2.5%, mainly due to import compression. \n(The smallest quarterly deficit recorded was 1.7% of GDP \nin the fourth quarter of 2016.) However, the current account \nnarrowed sharply in the fourth quarter of 2019, to just 1.2% \nof GDP. About half of this adjustment came from the trade \nbalance, which moved by 1.1 percentage points of GDP, mostly \n(0.9 percentage points) on account of lower imports. The other \nhalf was due to a recovery in net dividend payments, following \nan unusually large corporate transaction in the third quarter.\nThe current account deficit typically fluctuates with swings \nin the trade balance, which tend to follow movements in the \nbusiness cycle. Meanwhile, the Services, Income and current \nTransfers (SIT) account contributes steady deficits, in the region \nof 3–4% of GDP, which ensures the overall current account \nremains consistently in deficit. This item also explains why \nGDP growth, potential GDP and output gap \n(March 2020 forecasts)\nAnnual percentage change, September 2019 forecasts in brackets\nActual\nForecast\n2016 2017 2018 2019\n2020\n2021 2022\nPotential growth......\n0.9\n1.2\n0.9\n0.6\n0.6\n0.9\n1.0\n(1.0)\n(1.1)\n(1.2)\nOuput gap \n(percentage \nof potential GDP).....\n-1.1\n-1.0\n-1.0\n-1.5\n-2.3\n-2.1\n-1.6\n(-1.7)\n(-1.3)\n(-0.6)\nGDP growth............\n0.4\n1.4\n0.8\n0.2\n-0.2\n1.0\n1.6\n(0.6)\n(1.5)\n(1.8)\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\nPercentage of GDP\n2000\n2004\n2012\n2016\nCurrent account balance\nSource: SARB\n-8\n-7\n-6\n-5\n-4\n-3\n-2\n-1\n0\n1\n2\n2008\n23\nAPRIL 2020\nSouth Africa typically has one of the largest current account \ndeficits among the large- and medium-sized economies, even \nwhen the economy is weak, imports are subdued, and the \ntrade balance is in surplus.\nGiven the more subdued growth outlook, the current account \nforecast has been revised down, so that deficits now average \naround 3% of GDP for the medium term. This implies persistent \ntrade surpluses. It is difficult to narrow the current account \ndeficit much further, however, as foreigners have been major \npurchasers of government debt, producing a large stream of \noutgoing interest payments (1.4% of GDP in 2018, for example). \nUnlike dividends, interest costs are not responsive to local \nbusiness conditions, so they do not help the current account \nrebalance when growth is slow.\nFiscal accounts\nThe 2020 Budget envisioned similar fiscal deficits to those \noutlined in the 2019 MTBPS, which was discussed in the \nprevious MPR. (The MTBPS had -6.5% of GDP for 2020/21 \nand -6.2% for 2021/22; the 2020 Budget has -6.8% and \n-6.2% for those fiscal years respectively.) The debt trajectories \nin the two documents were also comparable, passing 60% of \nGDP in 2019/20 and exceeding 70% by 2022/23. However, the \nBudget was better received than the MTBPS, mainly because \nit included significant reductions to the wage bill, over three \nyears, for total savings of around R160 billion. These cuts \nwere offset by a weaker growth outlook as well as additional \nspending on bailouts, which explains why the deficit figures \nwere similar.\nThe COVID-19 shock will dramatically expand the 2020 budget \ndeficit, simply by depriving the government of revenue. It will \nalso require additional spending, especially if infections are not \ncontained by the lockdown, and many more South Africans \n– especially those served by the public sector – require \nmedical attention. The outlook is highly uncertain, but it is \nplausible the deficit will exceed 10% of GDP this year, rivalling \nhistorical records. (The largest deficit in South African history is \n11.6% of GDP in 1914; the next largest is 10.4% in 1940, which \nunderlines the relevance of the war-time parallel invoked in \nsome COVID-19 analysis.)9\nConclusion\nSouth Africa has entered a period of a global crisis encumbered \nby a very low growth rate, a problematic composition of growth, \nand little or no fiscal space. The SARB forecasts indicate an \neconomic contraction this year, followed by a limited recovery \nin 2021 and 2022 as the global economy revives and some \nof South Africa’s domestic constraints, such as electricity \nshortages, ease. Monetary policy provides a boost to demand, \nbut the reach of these measures is limited by weak economic \nfundamentals and the scale of the COVID-19 shock.\n9\t\nSee P Mauro, R Romeu, A Binder and A Zaman, ‘A modern history of fiscal \nprudence and profligacy’, International Monetary Fund Working Paper \nNo. 13/5, 2013. Data available at https://www.imf.org/~/media/Websites/\nIMF/imported-datasets/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/Data/_wp1305.ashx.\n-6\n-5\n-4\n-3\n-2\n-1\n0\n1\n2\n3\nPercentage of GDP\nCurrent account decomposition\n2010\n2012\n2014\n2016\n2018\nSource: SARB\n \nTrade balance\n \nNet SIT\n2.2\n1.6\n0.7\n1.4\n0.5\n0.8\n-3.7\n-3.8\n-4.0\n-3.8\n-3.6\n-3.5\n-3.5\n-3.9\n-4.1\n-3.8\n-1.1\n-2.0\n-1.5\n-1.2\nPercentage of GDP\n2016/17\n2018/19\n2020/21\n2022/23\nMain budget deficit\nSource: National Treasury\n \n2019 MTBPS\n \n2020 Budget \n-8\n-7\n-6\n-5\n-4\n-3\n-2\n-1\n0\nPercentage of GDP\nFiscal deficit\nSources: Mauro et al. (2013) and National Treasury\n-14\n-12\n-10\n-8\n-6\n-4\n-2\n0\n2\n4\n-11.6%\n-10.9%\n1933\n1913\n1953\n1973\n1993\n2020\n24\nAPRIL 2020\nBox 4\t The fiscal impact on growth\n1\t\nSee L Sheiner and S Belz, The Hutchins Center’s Fiscal Impact \nMeasure, 26 July 2019, available at https://www.brookings.edu/\nresearch/the-hutchins-centers-fiscal-impact-measure/. The estimate \nfor South Africa reported here excludes interest payments and bailouts \nfor state-owned enterprises, in contrast to the Brookings Institution’s \nestimates for the United States. Detailed calculations will be available in \nT Radebe (forthcoming, 2020).\t\n2\t\nFor the calculations reported here, potential growth is the estimate \nused for the Monetary Policy Committee forecasts.\n3\t\nMeasured as the change in the consumer price index.\n4\t\nTax changes are discounted for the marginal propensity to consume, \ngiven that tax adjustments do not typically move demand precisely \nR1 for R1. Consistent with the South African Reserve Bank’s Core \nMacroeconometric Model, households’ marginal propensity to \nconsume is 0.4% and corporates’ is 0.8%. For other direct taxes, it is \n0.6% (the average of the two). The revenue estimates also adjust for \ntransfers to households.\nFiscal policy has loosened recently, with more spending and smaller tax \nincreases. As this box shows, the estimated fiscal impact on growth \nwas around +0.6 percentage points in 2019. This estimate excludes \ninterest spending as well as bailouts for state-owned enterprises. The \nfact that growth slowed to a post-crisis low, despite the larger fiscal \nimpact, suggests either that other factors offset the stimulus, or that the \nnegative, indirect effects of a deteriorated fiscal position cancelled out \nthe positive, direct effects.\nThe fiscal impact measure (FIM) described here is based on the \nmethodology developed by the Brookings Institution’s Hutchins Center.1 \nIts core intuition is counterfactual, where taxes and spending just follow \nthe economy’s potential growth rate2 plus inflation.3 Government is \nproviding stimulus if it is growing spending faster than this counterfactual, \nneutral rate. Similarly, it is also providing stimulus if it takes in less tax \nthan it would in this counterfactual scenario, leaving more money in the \nhands of firms and households.4 \nLooking at the results, the fiscal response to the global financial \ncrisis stands out as a major stimulus. In subsequent years, as the \nfiscal authorities attempted fiscal consolidation, the stance becomes \nmarginally contractionary. The revenue contributions are more negative \nthan those for spending, showing that National Treasury leaned more \nheavily on tax increases than spending cuts. The fiscal impact becomes \npositive again in 2017/18 and peaks in 2019/20, with more spending \nand less downward pressure from taxation. The counterfactual slows \nmore than actual spending and taxation in this period, consistent with \nTreasury forecasts overestimating potential growth and inflation. \nThe FIM is not a comprehensive measure of the fiscal policy stance. \nFirst, it excludes all indirect effects. This means it ignores offsetting \nfactors such as higher interest rates that might follow from extra \ngovernment borrowing. It also ignores productivity; a rand of expenditure \nis deemed the same whether it pays for new infrastructure or is lost to \ncorruption. Second, it focuses purely on the change in the fiscal stance. \nIf policymakers implement a massive stimulus and then do not expand \nthat stimulus further in the following year, by at least potential growth \nplus inflation, the fiscal impulse will become contractionary – even if the \nfiscal stance is looser than it was before the initial stimulus.\nGiven these considerations, FIMs should be consulted alongside \nother indicators, such as cyclically adjusted budget balances \nand fiscal multipliers. Taken together, the range of indicators \navailable makes it clear that the aggregate fiscal stance has been \nloose recently. It is less obvious, however, that this benefitted \ngrowth, with both the efficiency and the sustainability of spending \nin question.\nPercentage points\nFiscal impact measure\n2009/10\n2011/12 2013/14 2015/16\nSource: SARB\n \nRevenue measures\n \nExpenditure*\n \nTotal\n-1.0\n-0.5\n0.0\n0.5\n1.0\n1.5\n2.0\n2.5\n3.0\n* Non-interest, non-bailout spending\n2017/18 2019/20\n25\nAPRIL 2020\nHow fast can South Africa grow, over the medium term? The question \nmatters both because growth has slumped – even before the COVID-19 \nshock – and because constraints on growth have tightened (such as \npersistent electricity shortages). For monetary policy, it is not enough to \nknow that growth is low. The crucial question is whether growth is below \npotential. If growth is undershooting the economy’s capacity, then lower \ninterest rates can help by boosting demand. If not, then stimulus just \nprompts more inflation and more imports.\nPotential growth cannot be observed, and therefore has to be estimated. \nGiven South Africa’s growth challenges, staff at the South African \nReserve Bank (SARB) have recently re-estimated potential growth using \na range of different methods, to better assess spare capacity. The major \ntakeaways are as follows.\n\t-\nPotential growth estimates, and therefore output gaps, should be \nused with caution. This is because they are often revised \nsubstantially when new data become available.1 For instance, in \n2013, South Africa’s output gap appeared to be large and negative, \nat -3.2% of potential gross domestic product (GDP); current \nestimates suggest it was much smaller (-0.4% of potential GDP). \n\t-\n\tAll available estimates agree that potential growth is lower than its \nlonger-run average, of around 2.5%, but they also all agree that the \noutput gap is negative (even before the COVID-19 shock). The \nHodrick-Prescott filter identifies a positive output gap for the final \nquarter of 2017; the Composite Activity Index2 has a positive gap \nfor three quarters in 2018. Otherwise, all measures have negative \noutput gaps for every quarter since at least 2016. The estimates for \nthe 2019 output gap range in size from -2% of potential GDP to \n-0.1% of potential GDP, with an average of -0.6%.\n\t-\nSome output gap estimates are negative over long time periods. \nThis conflicts with the textbook deviation of an output gap as \nreflecting temporary deviations from a trend. Purely statistical \nmethods do not have this feature. However, there is an argument in \nthe literature that output gaps may have negative means owing to \nrigidities in wages. This causes employers to shed labour in \ndownturns more than they raise employment in upturns, meaning \nthat labour resources are usually underemployed.3 \n\t-\nSouth Africa’s electricity shortages are clearly a constraint on \ngrowth, but they affect some sectors more directly than others. \nIn broad terms, mining and manufacturing are the heaviest users. \nOne implication of this is that other, less electricity-intensive sectors \ncan still grow, even with scarce electricity. Another is that the \nbalance of payments is likely to become a constraint on growth, as \nthe tradeables sector is most exposed to electricity shortages.\n1\t\nA Kangur, K Kirabaeva, J Natal and S Voigts, ‘How informative are real-\ntime output gap estimates in Europe?’, International Monetary Fund \nWorking Paper No. 19/200, 2019, available at https://www.imf.org/en/\nPublications/WP/Issues/2019/09/20/How-Informative-Are-Real-Time-\nOutput-Gap-Estimates-in-Europe-48645.\n2\t\nBased on the measure calculated for the US by J H Stock and \nM W Watson, ‘Slack and cyclically sensitive inflation’, National Bureau \nof Economic Research Working Paper No. 25987, June 2019, available \nat https://www.nber.org/papers/w25987.\n3\t\nS Aiyar and S Voigts. ‘The negative mean output gap’. International \nMonetary Fund Working Paper No. 19/183, 2019, available at https://\nwww.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2019/08/23/The-Negative-\nMean-Output-Gap-48605.\nPercentage of potential GDP\n2001\n2004\n2007\n2010\n2013\n2016\n2019\nOutput gap estimates\nSource: SARB\n-6\n-4\n-2\n0\n2\n4\n \nOfficial*\n \nFinance-neutral*\n \nComposite Activity Index\n \nOfficial latest data\n \nHP filter\n \nProduction function\n* Real time\nPercentage of potential GDP\n2005\n2007\n2009\n2011\n2013\n2015\n2017\nEvolution of the SARB’s output gap estimates\nSource: SARB\n-6\n-4\n-2\n0\n2\n4\n6\n2019\nLines show MPC \noutput gap estimates \nat 6-months intervals\n\t-\n\tLower inflation helps. Having inflation close to or below 4.5% \nreduce the risks of a policy mistake, because there is less \nchance of missing the target even if the potential growth \nestimate is significantly wrong. Inflation also has the \nadvantage of being observable, so it is easier to recognise \nmistakes timeously.\nIn sum, South Africa’s slowdown up to 2019 has been mostly \nstructural, linked to problems larger than monetary policy. \nHowever, growth has undershot even this low trend rate, resulting \nin a negative output gap. This verdict is premised on imperfect \nestimation methods, but it is robust to a range of different tests. \nThe COVID-19 pandemic will widen this gap substantially, as it \nrepresents a significant demand shock to South Africa, although \nit also poses some supply-side challenges.\nBox 5\t Powerless? Monetary policy and potential growth\n26\nAPRIL 2020\nPrice developments: \nstarting at the midpoint, \nending at the midpoint\nInflation dipped below the target midpoint in 2019, averaging \n4.1% for the year. It returned to 4.5% at the start of 2020, but \nis expected to fall sharply in the near term on lower fuel prices, \nbefore recovering next year. Headline inflation is therefore \nexpected to average 3.8%, 4.6% and 4.4% through 2020, 2021 \nand 2022 respectively.\nStarting point\nSouth African inflation reached a nine-year low in November, \nat 3.6%, before rebounding to 4.5% in January and \n4.6% in February. This uptick in inflation reflected a base effect \nin fuel prices, which was anticipated. Underlying inflation has \nsoftened, however, with core inflation at its lowest levels since \nOctober 2011 (at 3.8% as of the February CPI release). These \ndevelopments alone would have justified reducing the 2020 \ninflation outlook to around 4.2% for 2019. However, they have \nbeen compounded by a collapse in world oil prices and a \nsubstantially more negative output gap due to the COVID-19 \nshock. Accordingly, the 2019 inflation forecast has been \nrevised down to just 3.8%, which, if realised, would be a \n14-year low. \nIt is possible COVID-19 will interrupt publication of the CPI. \nStatistics South Africa (Stats SA), however, had already \ncompleted surveys for March before the lockdown was \nannounced. (Early indications are that an April figure will \nalso be published, although it may be based on more limited \nsurveys.) This means the first-quarter CPI numbers will not \nfeature significant COVID-19 effects. \nOne reason this matters is that there is a seasonal pattern in \nthe CPI, with price changes concentrated in January, February \nand March. The fact that the first quarter is already fixed puts \na floor under the 2020 inflation outcome: even if there are no \nprice changes for anything from April onwards – except in July, \nwhen electricity and other administered price adjustments \noccur – the annual inflation outcome would still be 3.4%. Fuel \nprice deflation will of course lower this number, but it is probably \nunrealistic to expect no other price increases, economy-wide, \nfor the remainder of the year. It is therefore unlikely inflation \nwill undershoot the 3–6% target range for 2020 as a whole, \nalthough there may be target misses in specific months.\nFood and non-alcoholic beverages\nFood inflation has averaged 3.5% over the past 24 months, \nwell below its longer-run average of 5.9% (for 2010–2019). \nDuring the past 12 months, food inflation has bottomed out, \nat 2.9% early in 2019, and has since trended higher, nearing \nPercentage change over four quarters\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\nHeadline inflation*\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\n* Dotted lines indicate forecasts\n \nActual\n \nSep 2019\n \nMar 2020\n \nMidpoint of the \ninflation target\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\nPercentage change over 12 months\nHeadline and core inflation\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\nJan\n \nHeadline inflation \n Core inflation\n \n4.6\nMidpoint of the inflation target range\nMar\nMay\nJul\n2019\n2020\nSep\nNov\nJan\nPercentage change over four quarters\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\nFood and non-alcoholic beverages inflation forecasts*\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\n* Dotted lines indicate forecasts\n \nActual\n \nMar 2019\n \nSep 2019\n \nMar 2020\n27\nAPRIL 2020\n4.0% during 2019 (the peak was 3.9%). It is expected to climb \nfurther during 2020, to a high of 4.9% in the fourth quarter of \nthis year, before easing again to average 4.4% in both 2021 \nand 2022.\nHistorically, food price inflation has on average been higher \nthan 4.4%. However, long-term averages are no longer reliable \nguides to future inflation rates, because the overall level of \ninflation in the economy has fallen. Since 2010, the gap between \nCPI and food inflation has been around 0.7 percentage points. \nWere the forecasts to continue using long-term food inflation \naverages, the implied gap would rise to around 1.5% annually, \nimplying a substantial increase in food prices relative to other \nitems in the CPI. It is therefore important to avoid relying on \nhistorical averages for food price forecasts, although this \nsimplifying assumption is often employed in forecasts.\nThe main surprise in food inflation last year came from meat. An \noutbreak of foot-and-mouth disease closed export markets from \nJanuary 2019, increasing the supply available domestically and \nthereby suppressing prices. In these circumstances, meat prices \ndeflated for four months in the first half of the year and remained \nsubdued thereafter, for a 2019 inflation average of 0.3%.\nGiven meat’s large weight in the food basket – nearly a third \n– this shock was sufficient to offset higher bread and cereals \ninflation, which had been better anticipated. The inflation \ntrough for this category occurred in 2018, as a base effect \nfrom the 2016/17 drought, and prices accelerated afterwards, \nto a peak of 8.6% in August 2019, more or less in line with \nexpectations. Bread and cereals inflation is projected to slow \nto around 3% by the end of 2020, in the context of a favourable \nproduction outlook. Crop estimates for maize, for instance, \npoint to a harvest of 14.6 million tons for the 2019/20 season, \nup from 11.3 million tons for 2018/19.\nPercentage change over four quarters\n2017\n2019\nMeat inflation forecasts*\nSources: Stats SA and SARB \n-2\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n16\n \nActual\n \nMar 2019\n \nSep 2019\n \nMar 2020\n2018\n2020\n* Dotted lines indicate forecasts \nPercentage change over four quarters\n2017\n2019\nBread and cereals inflation forecasts*\nSources: Stats SA and SARB \n-6\n-4\n-2\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n \nActual\n \nMar 2019\n \nSep 2019\n \nMar 2020\n2018\n2020\n* Dotted lines indicate forecasts \nConsumer food price inflation (March 2020 forecasts)\nPercentage change over four quarters, September 2019 forecasts in brackets \nActual \nForecast\nActual\nForecast\nWeight 2009–2019*\n2019*\n2020*\n2019Q3\n2019Q4\n2020Q1\n2020Q2\n2020Q3\n2020Q4\nFood and non-alcoholic beverages\n17.24\n5.9\n3.4\n4.4\n3.7\n3.7\n3.9\n4.5\n4.5\n4.9\n(3.6)\n(5.7)\n(3.5)\n(4.4)\n(5.2)\n(5.9)\n Bread and cereals...................\n3.21\n5.4\n7.0\n4.5\n8.3\n8.2\n5.2\n5.0\n4.2\n3.7\n(7.1)\n(5.3)\n(8.3)\n(8.5)\n(7.9)\n(6.9)\n Meat........................................\n5.46\n6.1\n0.3\n4.4\n0.7\n1.6\n3.5\n4.4\n4.8\n4.9\n(0.6)\n(5.1)\n(0.7)\n(2.8)\n(5.0)\n(5.6)\n Beef....................................\n1.44\n6.4\n-1.3\n4.4\n-0.8\n-0.2\n3.8\n4.6\n4.4\n4.7\n \n(-1.1)\n(7.5)\n(-1.0)\n(1.1)\n(5.7)\n(6.3)\n Poultry.................................\n2.12\n5.8\n1.0\n4.6\n1.4\n4.6\n4.9\n5.0\n4.6\n4.1\n(0.8)\n(7.5)\n(1.2)\n(4.1)\n(6.0)\n(5.8)\n Vegetables...............................\n1.30\n5.9\n6.3\n3.8\n4.7\n2.9\n1.9\n3.5\n4.4\n5.7\n(6.2)\n(6.0)\n(4.4)\n(2.9)\n(3.4)\n(5.9)\n* Annual average percentage change\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\n28\nAPRIL 2020\nFuel\nThe main fuel price development of the past six months has \nbeen a substantial slide in oil prices, which started with the \nCOVID-19 outbreak in China and intensified when the major \noil-producing countries failed to agree on production cuts and \nstarted a price war instead. From a high of US$67 in December, \nthe Brent crude benchmark fell to US$56 in February and then \nto under US$30 per barrel in late March, its lowest level since \n2016. This development has prompted downward revisions \nto the oil price assumptions, to US$40 per barrel for 2020, \nUS$44 per barrel for 2021, and US$45 per barrel for 2022. \nThe lowest quarterly assumptions are US$35 per barrel for \nthe second and third quarters of 2020, with the price edging \nhigher in each subsequent quarter.\nOver the course of 2019, domestic fuel price inflation benefitted \nfrom the relatively elevated 2018 starting point. The end of \n2018, in particular, was marked by higher oil prices as well \nas a more depreciated exchange rate, lifting the petrol price \n(for example) to R17.4 per litre. As oil prices moderated again \nin 2019, and the rand recovered some ground, the petrol price \nrecovered, averaging R16.0 per litre for 2019. As a result, \nfuel price inflation was muted during the year, averaging \n2.2%, and even deflating in some months. The effect was \nmost marked in October and November, driving the dip in \nheadline CPI to 3.7% and 3.6% respectively. Fuel price \ninflation then leapt to 13.7% in January 2020, as the flattering \nbase effect disappeared.\nOver the forecast period, fuel price inflation is expected to \naverage -5.8%, 8.7% and 3.9% for 2020, 2021 and 2022 \nrespectively. Fuel taxes will rise 25c this year, as announced \nin the 2020 Budget Speech, and subsequent increases are \nprojected to be of comparable magnitudes.\nElectricity\nElectricity inflation averaged 9.6% in 2019, up from \n5.2% in 2018 but close to its 10.8% average for the past \ndecade. It is expected to accelerate somewhat in 2020, to \n10.4%, before moderating again to 7.5% and 6.0% in 2021 \nand 2022 respectively. The lower outlook for electricity price \ninflation in the outer years of the forecast is consistent with the \nNational Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA)-approved \nincreases: 9.4% for 2019/20, 8.1% for 2020/21, and 5.2% for \n2021/22. (Note that these are not calendar-year increments; \nthey cover the period July through to June of the following year.) \nThere are, however, upside risks to these numbers, based on \nEskom court action to recoup costs that Eskom claims should \nhave been reimbursed during the previous Regulatory Clearing \nAccount process.\nForecast\nUS$ per barrel\nRand per US$\n2017\n2019\nExchange rate and oil\nSources: Bloomberg and SARB \n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n2021\n \nExchange rate \n \n(right-hand scale)\n \nBrent price\n2018\n2020\n2022\n11.5\n12.0\n12.5\n13.0\n13.5\n14.0\n14.5\n15.0\n15.5\n16.0\n16.5\nUS$ per barrel\n2017\n2019\nEvolution of crude oil price forecasts*\nSource: SARB \n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n2021\n \nActual\n \nMar 2019\n \nSep 2019\n \nMar 2020\n2018\n2020\n2022\n* Dotted lines indicate forecasts \n29\nAPRIL 2020\nCore inflation\nCore inflation, which as recently as 2016 was at 5.6%, has \nmoderated substantially. It has been in the bottom half of the \ntarget range since April 2018, averaged 4.1% in 2019, and \ndeclined further to 3.8% as of February 2020. Over the forecast \nperiod, it is expected to average 3.9%, 4.3% and 4.4% in 2020, \n2021 and 2022 respectively.\nPerhaps the biggest surprise in the recent inflation data has \nbeen the sustained slowdown in service price inflation. Having \nlong been stuck close to 6%, inflation for this category began \ndecelerating in 2017 and slowed markedly in 2019. Specifically, \nservices inflation started the year at 5.2% and finished at \n4.1%, the largest decline in this series since 2011.\nThe moderation in services inflation has been broad-based. \nThe single most important contributor to lower services \ninflation, however, has been housing, which is also the largest \nsingle item in the CPI basket, at 17% (and around a third of \nservices). Housing alone explains the bulk of the 2019 forecast \nerrors for the services category.\nFor this category, unusually low inflation reflects a mix of \nhigher supply and falling demand. The demand-side problems \nare well known: households’ economic prospects have \ndeteriorated, reducing their willingness and capacity to make \nmajor purchases. This is evident in the Lightstone Property \ntransfers series, which has been trending lower in recent years, \nas well as in First National Bank’s (FNB) property barometer \nsurvey, which has shown a marked uptick in the proportion of \nrespondents downscaling for financial reasons. (It also shows \na corresponding decline in the share of respondents upscaling \nfor the same reason.) Meanwhile, on the supply side of the \nmarket, there has been an ill-timed expansion of the housing \nstock. In inflation-adjusted terms, the value of new residential \nhousing coming on-stream reached a post-crisis high in 2019, \nprimarily due to rapid growth in the supply of urban apartments. \nCombined, these two factors have pushed housing inflation to \nan all-time low, of 2.5% in December 2019.\nWhile services inflation has been slowing, core goods inflation \nhas mostly been rising over the past two years: it averaged \n2.3% in 2018 and 3.1% in 2019. Despite this upward trend, \ncore goods inflation has come in lower than expected through \nmuch of the past year. The previous MPR, for instance, \nanticipated core goods inflation of 3.3% in 2019, a miss of \n0.2 percentage points.\n \nHousing\n \nCommunication\n \nRestaurants and hotels\n \nPublic transport\nPercentage points\n-1\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\nContributions to services inflation\n* Percentage change over 12 months\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\n2015\n2016\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2014\n \nEducation\n \nInsurance\n \nOther\n \nTotal services*\n2020\nPercentage change over 12 months \nR billions (real)* \n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\nSupply of residential housing and housing inflation\n \nResidential buildings completed excluding\n \nadditions and alterations (right-hand scale)\n \nHousing inflation\n* 12-months moving average\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n2010\n2012\n2014\n2016\n2018\n2020\nPercentange of sellers\n2008\n2010\n2012\n2014\n2016\n2018\nSources: FNB and SARB\nReasons for selling houses\n \nUpgrading\n \nDownscaling due to financial pressure\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n30\nAPRIL 2020\nThe three most important components of core goods are \nvehicles, clothing, and alcohol and tobacco, which together \naccount for more than two-thirds of the core goods basket. Of \nthese, alcohol and tobacco products have the highest inflation, \nby a significant margin: the 2019 outcome, for instance, was \n5.6%. The relatively high inflation for this category is due to sin \ntaxes, which have been rising by around 7% annually. (See \nalso Box 6.) \nVehicles inflation hit a high of 7.6% in 2016 and then moderated \nsharply afterwards, reflecting both an exchange rate recovery \nand a base effect. From a trough of 3.1% in 2018, inflation \nfor this category has now picked up somewhat, averaging \n3.6% for 2019, which makes it the second-largest contributor \nto core goods inflation. This peak, trough and recovery pattern \nin vehicles inflation is also the main reason why inflation for the \nbroader core goods category has been accelerating over the \npast two years.\nIn clothing, by contrast, inflation has averaged just above \n2% for the past three years. Retail sales growth has been \nslowing, averaging 1.3% in inflation-adjusted terms in 2019, \ndown from 2.4% in 2018. Meanwhile, retail competition has \nintensified, with new market entrants challenging established \nplayers, reducing their pricing power. Both factors have \nfavoured lower inflation. Import prices have also been falling, \nas discussed below.\nHeadline inflation (March 2020 forecasts)\nPercentage change over four quarters, September 2019 forecasts in brackets\nActual \nForecast\nActual\nForecast\nWeight 2010–2019*\n2019*\n2020*\n2019Q3\n2019Q4\n2020Q1\n2020Q2\n2020Q3\n2020Q4\nHeadline inflation......................\n100.00\n5.2\n4.1\n3.8\n4.1\n3.7\n4.4\n3.4\n3.5\n4.1\n(4.2)\n(5.1)\n(4.1)\n(4.3)\n(5.3)\n(4.9)\nCore inflation**.........................\n74.43\n4.7\n4.1\n3.9\n4.1\n3.9\n3.8\n3.9\n4.0\n4.2\n(4.3)\n(4.7)\n(4.2)\n(4.3)\n(4.6)\n(4.8)\n Rentals***...............................\n16.84\n4.4\n3.1\n3.0\n3.2\n2.7\n2.7\n3.0\n2.9\n3.2\n(3.3)\n(4.0)\n(3.3)\n(3.2)\n(3.5)\n(3.7)\n Insurance...............................\n10.06\n7.4\n6.7\n7.1\n6.9\n6.9\n7.1\n7.1\n6.9\n7.0\n(6.7)\n(6.9)\n(6.9)\n(6.9)\n(6.9)\n(6.8)\n Education..............................\n2.53\n7.9\n6.7\n6.8\n6.7\n6.7\n6.7\n6.9\n6.9\n6.9\n(6.7)\n(6.8)\n(6.7)\n(6.7)\n(6.7)\n(6.9)\n Vehicles.................................\n6.12\n3.1\n3.6\n4.2\n3.8\n3.7\n4.0\n4.4\n4.2\n4.1\n(3.5)\n(3.7)\n(3.9)\n(3.4)\n(3.4)\n(3.6)\nFuel..........................................\n4.58\n8.3\n2.2\n-5.8\n-0.3\n-3.2\n10.5\n-13.5\n-12.1\n-6.1\n(2.4)\n(4.2)\n(-0.1)\n(-2.6)\n(11.8)\n(-0.7)\nElectricity.................................\n3.75\n10.8\n9.6\n10.4\n11.5\n12.0\n12.0\n12.0\n9.0\n9.0\n(9.0)\n(9.8)\n(10.6)\n(10.6)\n(10.6)\n(10.6)\n*\t\nAnnual average percentage change\n**\t\nCPI excluding food, non-alcoholic beverages, fuel and electricity\n***\t\nCombines actual rentals and owners’ equivalent rent\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\nPercentage change over four quarters\n2017\n2016\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\nCore goods inflation forecasts*\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\nSource: SARB\n* Dotted lines indicate forecasts\n \nActual\n \nMar 2019\n \nSep 2019\n \nMar 2020\n \nMidpoint of the \ninflation target range\n31\nAPRIL 2020\nMedium-term outlook\nIn the QPM, the longer-term forecast is based on four major \nvariables: the exchange rate, wages and productivity, the \noutput gap, and inflation expectations. By design, the QPM \ndelivers inflation in line with its programmed inflation target (set \nat 4.5%) over the medium term, which it does by moving a \nfifth variable: the repo rate. As in the previous MPR, inflation \nstabilises at 4.5% in the final quarter of 2021.\nWages and unit labour costs\nSouth African wage growth has trended steadily lower in recent \nyears. Labour productivity has, however, also declined, in the \ncontext of a weak economy. These two developments have \noffsetting inflationary consequences: lower wages reduce \ninflationary pressure, but reduced productivity means that \nwages are higher per unit of output. \nTo capture this dynamic in full, the QPM relies on unit labour \ncosts (ULC), a measure of wages adjusted for output. Given \nthe reduced wage growth, the QPM measure of ULC growth \nhas moderated recently, to 3.6%. This is significantly lower \nthan the ULC growth levels of around 6.2% recorded for \nthe period 2010 to 2017, a period of higher wage growth. A \npositive ULC gap, with wage growth in excess of productivity \ngrowth, nonetheless generates some inflation pressure. Over \nthe forecast period, this pressure is expected to fade, based \non wage growth staying low but productivity recovering. This \npermits the ULC gap to reach zero by the end of the forecast \nperiod, at which point it becomes neutral for prices.\nExchange rate\nIn the QPM, the exchange rate affects some prices directly \n(such as those for fuel) and other components indirectly (such \nas those for services or core goods). The direct effects are \nrelatively straightforward to model, using only the projected \nrand/dollar exchange rate. For the rest, however, the QPM uses \na real exchange rate gap, which is the difference between an \nestimated equilibrium real exchange rate, based on economic \nfundamentals, and the projected real exchange rate.\nThis measure shows that the real exchange rate gap is \ncurrently negative, meaning the exchange rate is undervalued \nand therefore generating upward pressure on inflation. \nThe implied fair-value rand/dollar exchange rate is around \nR14.20 presently, compared with an average outcome of \nR15.30 for the first quarter of 2020 and a projected R16.00 for \nthe second quarter (a number that will likely have to be revised \nup in future forecasts, to over R17.00). The model treats the \ncurrent rand sell-off as an exchange rate overshoot, so the real \n-2\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\nPercentage change over 12 months\nContributions to core goods inflation\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\n2017\n2018\n2022\n2021\n2020\n2019\n2016\n \nAlcoholic beverages and tobacco\n \nOther core goods\n \nClothing\n \nVehicles\n \nCore goods\nForecast\n-1.0\n-0.5\n0\n0.5\n1.0\n1.5\n2.0\n2.5\n3.0\nPer cent\nContributions to unit labour cost gap\nSource: SARB\n2017\n2018\n2022\n2021\n2020\n2019\n2016\n \nReal wage gap\n \nProductivity\n \nUnit labour cost gap\nForecast\nImplied rand/US$ exchange rate\n2017\n2016\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\nExchange rate*\n11.5\n12.0\n12.5\n13.0\n13.5\n14.0\n14.5\n15.0\n15.5\n16.0\n16.5\nSource: SARB\n* Dotted lines indicate forecasts\n \nActual\n \nSep 2019\n \nMar 2020\n \n32\nAPRIL 2020\nexchange rate gap narrows over the forecast period, to restore \nequilibrium. The Moody’s downgrade nonetheless suggests \nthe equilibrium will be more depreciated than it used to be; \nthe implied rand/dollar exchange rate for the March MPC was \nR15.30 by the end of 2022, but an updated estimate puts that \nfigure at R16.40.\nIn unpacking the recent inflation surprises, many analysts have \nfocused on the possibility of lower exchange rate pass-through. \nThis concept captures the degree to which inflation changes \nin response to a movement in the exchange rate. In the QPM, \nthe pass-through estimate is 0.13 for the peak change in \ninflation following an exchange rate shock, which is lower than \nthe 0.2 rule of thumb used prior to the introduction of the QPM. \nIt may be that pass-through has declined further, possibly \nto less than 0.1. However, there are at least two alternative \nexplanations available. \nThe first is that pass-through has seemed low because of a \nperiod of relative stability in the exchange rate trend. Although \nthe rand/dollar exchange rate was volatile over the 2016 to \n2019 period, it appreciated on a net basis, and was almost \nunchanged over the course of 2019. Accordingly, pass-through \nmay have seemed low because importers were not actually \nfacing a trend depreciation. The test for this hypothesis will be \nwhether prices (particularly of core goods) start to move higher \nfollowing a persistent exchange rate shock.\nThe second explanation is that exchange rate effects have \nbeen offset by low import prices. Evidence from Stats SA’s \nUnit Value Index (UVI) for imports suggests that import prices \nhave been in deflation over the past half-decade (in rand terms). \nThe drawback with this measure is that it does not match the \nCPI closely, because it includes items that are not purchased by \nhouseholds (such as mining equipment). However, it is possible \nto match specific UVI subcategories to CPI subcategories, \nsuch as clothing and vehicles. This exercise shows substantial \ngaps between import prices and related CPI categories. For \ninstance, while clothing and footwear CPI inflation has averaged \n2.4% since 2017, the UVI for this category has deflated by 3.8% \nannually. Vehicles CPI has risen by 3.8% on average over the \npast three years; the vehicle UVI has gained only 1% annually. \nThese dynamics should have helped to moderate inflation, \nseparate from any lower pass-through effect.\nOutput gap\nSouth Africa’s output gap had already widened to 2% of \npotential GDP, a 26-year low, before the COVID-19 pandemic \nbegan affecting demand. The March MPC forecast anticipated \na decline in output in 2020, widening the output gap to \n-2.3% of potential GDP by 2020Q3. (This number is now likely \nto be nearer -4% of potential GDP.) Weak demand is therefore \nexpected to exert downward pressure on prices. \nPer cent\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\nReal effective exchange rate gap forecasts\n-15\n-10\n-5\n0\n5\n10\n15\n \nSep 2019\n \nJan 2020\n \nMar 2020\nSource: SARB\nValues <0 imply undervaluations\nPercentage change over 12 months\n2015\n2016\n2017\n2018\n2019\nImport and consumer prices, matched items\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\n \n \nCPI components\n \nMatching UVI components\n \nAverage: 3.7%\n \nAverage: -1.3%\n \n-20\n-15\n-10\n-5\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n33\nAPRIL 2020\nThe relationship between inflation and demand, however, is \nnot straightforward. Historically, there has been little or no \nconnection between inflation and growth in South Africa.10 \nMore recently, however, slowing growth has coincided with \ndisinflation. These two contrasting facts may prompt either an \noverstatement or an understatement of the price effects of a \nnegative output gap. Empirical estimates, however, show that \napproximately 30–40% of the South African inflation basket \nresponds to demand pressures, which is comparable to \nrates estimated for other economies.11 The demand-sensitive \nitems tend to be non-tradable, such as housing, which helps \nexplain why they are most strongly affected by local business \nconditions. The output gap is therefore neither the overriding \ndeterminant of inflation outcomes, nor is it irrelevant. It has \nbeen the one factor among several that has reduced inflation \nin recent years, and it is likely to support further disinflation this \nyear, while moderating the inflation rebound of 2021 and 2022.\nInflation expectations\nThrough much of the past decade, South African inflation \nexpectations have moved in a narrow band around the \n6% upper bound of the SARB’s inflation target range. From \n2017, the SARB began offering explicit guidance on where in \nthe target range it wanted inflation to stabilise, and therefore \nwhere inflation expectations should ultimately settle. Rather \nthan a de facto target of around 6%, policymakers instead \nemphasised the 4.5% midpoint of the target range. Over the \nsubsequent three years or so, inflation expectations moderated \nin line with this guidance. Progress on lowering expectations \nhas been significant, sustained, and visible across all available \nmeasures of inflation expectations. As of the latest available \ndata, the BER survey average shows inflation expectations \nat 4.8% for two years ahead and at 4.7% over the next five \nyears (which is the lowest reading on record for this question). \nThis survey also shows current-year inflation at 4.4%, which is \nthe first time in 13 years that the survey has reported a sub-\n4.5% average response for any of its questions. Market-based \nmeasures, using the break-even method, have also trended \nlower, although the latest data points have been compromised \nby volatility in bond markets and should therefore be interpreted \nwith caution.\n10\t J Fedderke and Y Liu, ‘Inflation in South Africa: an assessment of alternative \ninflation models’, South African Reserve Bank Working Paper No. 16/03, \nMay 2016, available at http://www.resbank.co.za/Lists/News%20and%20\nPublications/Attachments/7275/WP603.pdf.\n11\t Based on the methods discussed in J H Stock and M W Watson, ‘Slack \nand cyclically sensitive inflation’, National Bureau of Economic Research \nWorking Paper No. 25987, June 2019, available at https://www.nber.\norg/papers/w25987 and T Mahedy and A Shapiro, ‘What’s down with \ninflation?’, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter \n2017–35, November 2017, available at https://www.frbsf.org/economic-\nresearch/publications/economic-letter/2017/november/contribution-to-\nlow-pce inflation-from-healthcare/. See also Box 6 on p. 34 of the April 2019 \nMonetary Policy Review.\nPer cent\n2012\n2014\n2016\n2018\n2020\n2022\nInflation expectations\nSources: BER and SARB\n \nMidpoint\n \nCurrent year\n \nOne year ahead\n \nTwo years ahead\n \nFive years ahead\n 3–6% inflation target range\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n34\nAPRIL 2020\nGiven the inflation outlook and the SARB’s continued \ncommunication around the midpoint of the target range, the \nforecast assumes that longer-term inflation expectations will \nsettle at 4.5% during 2021, thereby helping inflation itself to \nstabilise at that level. Inflation expectations are comfortably on \ntrack to reach this level, although volatile economic conditions \nwill test whether they anchor at that point.\nConclusion\nThroughout 2019, the SARB’s inflation forecasts looked forward \nto inflation converging on 4.5% by the end of 2021. However, \nthey also had inflation temporarily above 4.5% for 2020 and \npart of 2021. This near-term increase in inflation has now been \nturned inside out, based on a massive oil price shock as well \nas downside surprises to core. As a result, inflation is likely \nto average just 3.8% this year, before returning to around the \nmiddle of the target range in 2021 and 2022.\nThe risks to this forecast, in the MPC’s assessment, are \nbalanced. This does not mean the risks are small, but rather \nthat there are risks of roughly equivalent magnitude on both \nsides. These include the possibility of more substantial and \npersistent currency depreciation (on the upside) and further \nintensifications of the COVID-19 outbreak (on the downside, a \nrisk which transpired with the lockdown announced the week \nafter the MPC meeting). As usual, as new information appears \nthe forecast will shift lower or higher in the near term, while \npermitting the repo rate to adjust in order to return inflation to \n4.5% over the medium term.\nPer cent\n2016\n2018\n2020\nBreak-even inflation rates\n3.0\n3.5\n4.0\n4.5\n5.0\n5.5\n6.0\n6.5\n7.0\n7.5\n8.0\n \n5-year break-even rate\n \n10-year break-even rate\nSource: Bloomberg\n2019\n2017\n35\nAPRIL 2020\nBox 6\t Measuring public sector inflation\n1\t\nTaxes now represent 60% of pump prices, up from 40% as of 2013.\n2\t\nSin tax inflation has been 7.9% over the past nine years, compared \nwith inflation of 4.1% for the ex-tax portion of these goods. Without \nsin taxes, alcohol and tobacco inflation would be below 4.5% rather \nthan above.\nMost components of the consumer price index (CPI) have shown lower \ninflation over the past three years, and the headline inflation rate has duly \nslowed to about the middle of the target range. (The average inflation \nrate for this period is 4.6%.) However, a number of price categories have \nshown stubbornly high inflation. On closer inspection, it transpires that \nmost of these prices are either set or strongly influenced by government. \n(The only substantial exception to this rule is medical insurance.) \nFormalising this insight with a public sector CPI measure shows that \npublic sector inflation is running over 6% while private sector inflation is \naround 3.5%. This shows that the public sector is an important source \nof inflation pressure in this economy.\nThe standard measure of government prices is the administered price \nindex published by Statistics South Africa. However, this index omits \nsome prices that are shaped by public sector decisions. It is also \nexcessively responsive to international oil prices, given the inclusion of \nfuel as an administered price.\nThe alternative measure shown here differs from the administered \nprice series in three respects. First, it uses only the tax portion of the \nfuel price, and excludes the underlying cost of fuel, which is shaped \nby the exchange rate and the international oil market, neither of which \nare controlled by government.1 Second, it includes prices which are \nunregulated but strongly influenced by the public sector. Of these, the \nmost significant category is alcohol and tobacco, which attracts sin \ntaxes.2 Third, this measure includes two tax increases, the April 2018 \nvalue-added tax adjustment and the new sugar tax, both of which \nexerted upward pressure on consumer prices.\nContrasting the public and private sector CPI measures shows that \nprivate sector inflation has decelerated steadily since 2017, and is \nnow close to the bottom of the target range. Public sector CPI is more \nvolatile. Strikingly, it moderated to around 4.5% during 2017, when the \neconomy began disinflating, mainly because of unusually low electricity \nand education inflation. It has picked up again over the past two years, \nhowever, averaging around 6%. \nFor monetary policy, high inflation in one part of the CPI requires lower \ninflation in other parts, to ensure the headline figure is consistent with \nthe inflation target. It is not appropriate to simply ‘look through’ public \nsector inflation and target only private sector inflation, as public sector \nprices are then likely to accelerate further to maintain the same real \nincreases (unless public sector price-setters suffer from money illusion). \nHowever, given that the public sector also incurs costs from higher \nCPI inflation, mainly through wage increases for employees as well as \nCPI-indexed interest payments on government debt, it may be that high \npublic sector inflation is suboptimal even for the public sector itself. \nA clearer understanding of the public sector’s contribution to inflation \nmay ultimately promote more efficient price-setting choices, with \nbenefits including lower inflation.\n \nPublic sector inflation\n \nExcluding VAT estimate\n \nHeadline inflation\n \nHeadline excluding public sector inflation\nPercentage change over 12 months\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2020\nPublic and private sector inflation\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\n10\n3–6% inflation target range\nMidpoint\n2015\n2016\n2014\n \nAdministered price inflation\n \nAdministered price inflation excluding fuel\n \nPublic sector inflation\nPercentage change over 12 months\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2020\nAdministered versus public sector inflation\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\n-6\n-3\n0\n3\n6\n9\n12\n15\n3–6% inflation target range\nMidpoint\n2015\n2016\n2014\n-1\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\n10\nPercentage points\nContributions to public sector inflation\n \nFuel taxes (11%)\n \nElectricity (17%)\n \nAlcoholic beverages \n and tobacco (26%)\n \nWater (5%)\n \n \n \nEducation (11%)\n \nAll communication (11%)\n \nOther (19%)\n \nPublic sector inflation* (100%)\n \n \nFigures in brackets indicate weight in public sector inflation basket\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\n* Percentage change over 12 months\n2015\n2016\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2014\n36\nAPRIL 2020\nBox 7\t Unpacking the 2019 inflation forecast errors\n1\t\nThe core forecasts are actually broken down into separate \nprojections for core goods and services, but these subcomponents \nare combined here to simplify the error analysis charts.\nSouth African inflation averaged 4.1% in 2019. This outcome was \nwell below most forecasts, including the South African Reserve \nBank’s (SARB). The April 2019 Monetary Policy Review (MPR), for \ninstance, showed 2019 inflation at 4.8%. The October 2018 MPR \nprojected 5.7%. This box unpacks the SARB’s forecast errors, \ncompares the accuracy of the SARB forecasts with those from \nother analysts, and offers some lessons to improve the forecasts \nin future.\nThe Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meets six times a year, \nand new forecasts are prepared for each meeting. These forecasts \ncombine near-term numbers from a disaggregated model, which \nrelies on statistical trends, with those from the Quarterly Projection \nModel (QPM), which takes a more theoretically grounded \napproach. Typically, the first quarter of the forecast is drawn from \nthe disaggregated model, with the QPM taking over for the rest of \nthe forecast period.\nThe disaggregated model produces forecasts for all the main \ncomponents of the inflation basket. An error decomposition using \nthese different items shows substantial errors on food, especially \nin late 2018 and early 2019, mainly due to unexpected meat price \ndeflation. Housing inflation also shows up as a major contributor to \nforecast mistakes. (Both these factors are discussed in the prices \nchapter of this MPR.) Together, food and housing explain roughly \nhalf of the forecast error. However, there were also errors across \nother components, and almost all these mistakes were skewed to \nthe upside. (The main exception was fuel, which had higher inflation \nthan projected in the January and March 2019 forecasts.) A general \nexplanation for this pattern is that this model was drawing on too \nlong a period of inflation history. Arguably, South Africa’s inflation \nhistory is no longer a good guide to future inflation, as the economy \nappears to have disinflated from a ‘normal’ level close to 6% to one \nnearer 4.5%. By following longer-term average inflation patterns, \nthe disaggregated model overstated 2019 inflation.\nThe QPM generates separate forecasts for fuel, electricity, food \nand core inflation.1 Drawing on this decomposition, a variety of \nerrors is visible in late 2018 and early 2019. The exchange rate \nprojections were too depreciated, in the context of an emerging \nmarket sell-off towards the end of 2018. (Argentina and Turkey \nexperienced currency crises, but the exchange rates for other \nemerging markets recovered.) Inflation expectations were too high, \nas the MPC had at the time framed the 4.5% objective only as \na longer-term aspiration rather than a live policy objective: model \nexpectations were therefore set to prevailing levels, at 5.5% rather \nthan 4.5%. The output gap estimate was insufficiently negative, \nwith the growth forecasts well above the 0.2% outcome. The food \nprojections were also too high, as discussed above.\nThe November 2018 interest rate increase revealed a clearer \npreference by policymakers to achieve the 4.5% objective sooner \nrather than later. This prompted adjustments to the model to allow \ninflation expectations to converge on that target within a reasonable \ntime frame (around three years), and to allow inflation to reach 4.5% \nby the end of the forecast period, with the endogenous repurchase \n \nFuel \n \nElectricity\n \nFood\n \nCore goods\n \nServices\n \nof which are housing\n \nHeadline inflation\n-0.25\n0.00\n0.25\n0.50\n0.75\n1.00\n1.25\n1.50\nPercentage points\nContributions to 2019 forecast errors\nNov 2018\nMar 2019\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\nJul 2019\nNov 2019\nMPC meetings\n \nFood\n \nFuel\n \nCore import prices\n \nCore real ULC gap\n \nCore residual\n \nHeadline inflation\n-0.5\n0.0\n0.5\n1.0\n1.5\n2.0\nPercentage points\nContributions to 2019 inflation errors\nJul 2018\nNov 2018\nSources: Stats SA and SARB\nJul 2019\nNov 2019\n \nElectricity\n \nCore inflation expectations\n \nCore output gap\n \nCore real exchange rate gap\n \nCore intervention\nMar 2019\nMPC meeting\n37\nAPRIL 2020\nrate adjusting to get it there.2 These steps reduced the size of the \ninflation expectations error. However, through the first six months of \n2019 staff applied judgement to raise the forecast, offsetting some of \nthis decline in expectations. This was done partly because the QPM’s \ndisinflation trajectory appeared implausibly rapid, and partly because \nof a desire to avoid abrupt changes in the forecast. Unfortunately, \nin this instance, a naïve model forecast would have been more \naccurate.\nTowards the end of the year, the size of the errors naturally declined. \nThe statistical residual remaining at this stage reflects the portion of \ninflation unexplained by the model, which largely defies economic \nexplanation, although some of it may be capturing housing \ndisinflation.\nOne lesson of this experience is that disinflationary periods present \ndifficult forecast challenges, because the old statistical patterns in \nthe data are beginning to break down but new relationships are \nstill unclear. In these circumstances, staff judgement is especially \nimportant, to bridge the gap between where the data have been and \nwhere they are going. However, in this case, that judgement missed \na variety of disinflationary shocks, which moved inflation down faster \nthan anticipated. \nThis experience also demonstrates the difficulty of making abrupt \nforecast changes, especially for a central bank, and particularly when \nnew projections would mark a large departure from consensus. To \nannounce in 2018 that inflation would average 4.1% in 2019, even \nhad that been anticipated, would have made the SARB a major \noutlier. It may even have jeopardised disinflation, had the SARB \nbeen perceived as complacent. But forecasters should be wary of \nprioritising consistency over accuracy in developing new projections. \nThe issue of forecast outliers raises the additional question of whether \nany analysts correctly anticipated 2019 inflation. The SARB forecasts \nfor 2019 were generally close to the Reuters median, showing that \nthe forecast miss was a general rather than a SARB-specific surprise. \nThat said, there were two individual firms with forecasts consistently, \nand substantially, below this median.3 Of these, one was also below \nthe actual outcome for most of 2019 (falling as low as 2.7% at one \nstage). It was also too low for previous years, suggesting either a \npersistent downside bias or mistakes in data capturing. The other \nforecast (from Capital Economics) was more impressive. It first \nmoved away from the Reuters median in late 2017 and stayed well \nbelow it, but relatively close to the actual outcome, through 2018 \nand 2019 (averaging 4.6% and 4.3% in those years respectively). \nThe relative accuracy of this forecast cannot be attributed to a lower, \nmore realistic view of growth: the corresponding growth projections \nwere close to the Reuters median throughout. This firm had also \nnot been an outlier previously, having been close to the Reuters \nmedian forecasts for 2016, 2017 and 2018 – which suggests it was \nnot a ‘stopped clock’ forecast that eventually coincided with the \nfacts. A conclusion is that, while a number of analysts have reported \nanticipating lower inflation in 2019, better than the SARB, at least \none has a valid claim.\n2\t\nThese adjustments actually permitted lower repo rate forecasts, \nas inflation did not remain stubbornly above the Taylor Rule’s 4.5% \ntarget over the medium term. This is the main reason why the \nearly QPM forecasts envisioned substantial rate increases, which \ndisappeared in later forecasts.\n3\t\nThere were also some analysts who at times had lower forecasts, \nbut they all revised their forecasts up to around the median \nsubsequently, implying they had lost faith in their original projections. \nA number of them did not enter the survey consistently.\n \n2019 outcome\n \nReuters median\n \nSARB\n \nReuters minimum forecast\n \nBest forecast\n \nPercentage change over 12 months\n2019 CPI inflation forecasts\nSources: Reuters and SARB\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\nJ\nM\nM\n2018\nJ\nS\nN\nJ\nM\nM\n2019\nJ\nS\nN\n38\nAPRIL 2020\nSummary\nWhat will inflation be over the medium term – the next two to \nthree years? One test of a central bank’s success is whether \nthe most likely outcome is the inflation target. Inevitably, \nshocks will arise that push inflation above or below that target. \nIf these are just temporary surprises, however, then they will \nfade with time, leaving the inflation target as the best guide to \nfuture inflation. This is one important sense in which inflation \nexpectations become well-anchored.\nOne year ago, the SARB began publishing an inflation forecast \nin which inflation converged on 4.5%, the midpoint of the \n3–6% range, over the medium term (defined as the end of \nthe forecast, which was then the fourth quarter of 2021). To \nachieve this outcome, the forecast required a specific path \nfor the repo rate, which was also published. At the time, no \nanalysts expected inflation to reach 4.5% by the end of 2021, \nand neither analysts nor market-based measures matched the \nSARB’s repo rate projections either.\nOne year later, much has changed. Analysts’ medium-term \nforecasts have moderated towards the SARB’s projections. \nThe SARB forecasts continue to show inflation at 4.5% by \nthe end of 2021, and the latest forecasts, which include 2022, \nhave inflation at 4.5% by the end of that year. The average of \nthe Reuters analyst survey indicates inflation of 4.6% in 2021 \nand 4.5% in 2022. This suggests an emerging consensus that \ninflation is likely to be close to the middle of the SARB’s target \nrange over the medium term.\nWith inflation well-behaved, the SARB has had space to lower \ninterest rates. Up to January 2019, this meant incremental \nmovements to adjust for changes in data. When the COVID-19 \npandemic appeared, the SARB changed tactics, providing \nsubstantial, pre-emptive support to mitigate a major demand \nshock. In both cases, the SARB has had monetary policy \nspace to cut rates.\nThis situation contrasts with much of the historical record, \nin which South Africa regularly suffered from stagflation – a \ncombination of low growth and higher inflation – and typically \nhad to respond to exchange rate collapses with higher interest \nrates, even where that exacerbated growth weakness. \nBy enhancing clarity around the target and anchoring \nexpectations near 4.5%, stagflation risks have been significantly \nreduced. This leaves policymakers with a better choice than \ntolerating higher inflation for the sake of short-term growth. \nIndeed, recent MPC forecasts have shown that a lower repo \nrate path was required to prevent inflation from undershooting \nthe 4.5% model objective over the medium term. As the SARB \nhas repeatedly communicated, lower inflation leads to lower \ninterest rates.\nPercentage change\nJan\n2019\n2020\nApr\nJul\nOct\nJan\nEvolution of the 2021 headline inflation forecast\nSources: Reuters and SARB\nMidpoint of the inflation target range\n4.0\n4.2\n4.4\n4.6\n4.8\n5.0\n5.2\n5.4\n \nReuters consensus median\n \nSARB QPM\n39\nAPRIL 2020\nUnfortunately, South Africa’s sovereign risk premium remains a \nsource of upward pressure on interest rates, in large because of \na deteriorated fiscal position. South Africa is a major borrower \nfrom the world, with one of the largest current account deficits \nof any sizeable economy. Openness to the world makes capital \ncheaper, as South Africa benefits from access to abundant \nforeign savings. But openness also means that domestic \nborrowing costs will be affected by changes in world interest \nrates and perceptions of South African risk, rather than purely \ndomestic factors such as potential growth. \nThe COVID-19 outbreak has prompted a sudden rise in global \nrisk aversion, pushing up rates for riskier borrowers in general. \nThese global effects are likely to be temporary, as they were \nin 2009–2010. But the South Africa-specific component \nof risk will be more persistent, given problematic domestic \nfundamentals. For this reason, efforts to de-risk the local \neconomy are important, over time, for South Africa to enjoy \nmore of the benefits of ultra-low global rates.\nIn the near term, the COVID-19 shock has put large portions \nof the economy into a policy-induced coma. This is a supply \nshock, in the sense that no amount of demand can be satisfied \nif industries are closed. As the supply side of the economy \nreawakens after the lockdown, however, the demand-side \naspects of COVID-19 will become more pressing. Preliminary \nestimates suggest South Africa could lose about 370 000 jobs \nthis year, on a net basis, with business insolvencies increasing \nby roughly 1 600 firms as the economy contracts. The core \nmacroeconomic problem, therefore, is how best to support the \neconomy, to mitigate these losses, while remaining cognisant \nof South Africa’s pre-existing macroeconomic vulnerabilities, \nwhich make it unrealistic to implement stimulus on the scale \nseen in the strongest advanced economies.\nCurrent account balance of 40 largest* countries\n* In 2019, as measured in US dollars using current exchange rates\nSources: IMF and SARB\n-5\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\nPercentage of GDP\nColombia\nUK\nSouth Africa\nIndonesia\nIran\nUS\nPhilippines\nIndia\nCanada\nBrazil\nArgentina\nMexico\nBelgium\nPoland\nTurkey\nFrance\nAustralia\nNigeria\nSpain\nChina\nAustria\nIsrael\nSweden\nItaly\nMalaysia\nKorea\nJapan\nSaudi Arabia\nDenmark\nHong Kong SAR\nRussia\nThailand\nNorway\nGermany\nUAE\nSwitzerland\nNetherlands\nIreland\nTaiwan POC\nSingapore\n40\nAPRIL 2020\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n21 November 2019 \nIssued by Lesetja Kganyago, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, \nat a meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee in Pretoria\nSince the September meeting of the Monetary Policy \nCommittee (MPC), global economic indicators have \nremained weak and global inflation low. Central banks \nin \nadvanced \neconomies \nprovided \nmore \nmonetary \naccommodation, \nhelping \nto \nease \nglobal \nfinancing \nconditions, but further easing appears less likely. Downside \nrisks from heightened trade tensions and geopolitical \ndevelopments remain.\nDespite a rebound in local gross domestic product (GDP) \nin the second quarter of this year, indicators suggest that \neconomic activity will remain weak for the rest of the year. \nRecent monthly inflation has been lower than the midpoint \nof the inflation target range, as owners’ equivalent rent, food \nand services inflation remain subdued. \nThe year-on-year inflation rate, as measured by the consumer \nprice index (CPI) for all urban areas, was 3.7% in October \n(down from 4.1% in September). Goods price inflation in \nOctober was 3.1% (down from 4.0% in September), while \nservices price inflation remained at 4.2%. Food and non-\nalcoholic beverage (NAB) price inflation slowed to 3.6% \n(down from 3.9%). The South African Reserve Bank’s \n(SARB) measure of core inflation, which excludes food, fuel \nand electricity, remains unchanged at 4.0%. Producer price \ninflation for final manufactured goods decreased to 4.1% in \nSeptember (compared to 4.5% in August).\nThe medium-term inflation outlook has remained largely \nunchanged \nsince \nSeptember. \nThe \ninflation \nforecast \ngenerated by the SARB’s Quarterly Projection Model (QPM) \nis unchanged compared to September, averaging 4.2% \nin 2019, 5.1% for 2020 and 4.7% for 2021. Headline CPI \ninflation is expected to peak at 5.3% in the first quarter of \n2020 and settle at 4.5% in the last quarter of 2021. \nThe forecast for core inflation is lower at 4.2% in 2019 (down \nfrom 4.3%) and at 4.5% in 2020 (down from 4.7%), and remains \nsteady at 4.6% in 2021. Food price inflation continues to \nsurprise to the downside on a monthly basis, and is expected \nto peak at about 6.1% in the third quarter of 2020.\nInflation expectations have continued to moderate gradually. \nAccording to the Bureau for Economic Research (BER) \nthird-quarter survey, expectations for headline inflation are \ndown slightly for 2019 to 4.6% (from 4.8%). Expectations \nfor 2020 remain unchanged at 5.0% and have eased from \n5.2% to 5.1% for 2021, reaching the lowest levels since \n2007. Five-year-ahead inflation expectations also declined \nto 5.0% (from 5.1%).\nThe inflation expectations of market analysts in the \nNovember 2019 Reuters Econometer survey remain \nunchanged at 4.3% for 2019, revised lower to 4.7% (from \n4.9%) for 2020, and are unchanged at 4.8% for 2021.\nMarket-based expectations implicit in the break-even \ninflation rates (the yield differential between conventional \nand inflation-linked bonds) have moderated somewhat \nsince the previous MPC. Five-year break-even inflation \nrates are currently about 4.5% and ten-year break-even \nrates are at 5.4%.\nGlobal GDP is expected to average 3.0% in 2019, rising \nto about 3.4% in 2020. While trade and manufacturing \nindicators continue to be weak, services have remained \nmore resilient, keeping overall global growth rates up. \nHowever, services have shown weakness in some regions \nand a range of downside risks to growth remains. These \ninclude geopolitical developments, trade tensions, further \noil price shocks, and high levels of corporate and sovereign \ndebt. Across most countries, there is limited policy space to \nrespond to shocks.\nInflation outcomes and inflation expectations in most \nadvanced economies remain below targeted levels. Barring \nsignificant shocks, monetary policy in major advanced \neconomies will remain accommodative over the medium \nterm. While global financial market sentiment has turned \nmore positive in recent weeks, the risk of renewed market \nvolatility remains high.\nSince the September MPC, the rand has depreciated slightly \nby 0.6% against the United States (US) dollar and by 0.8% \nagainst the euro. The implied starting point for the rand is \nR14.94 against the US dollar, compared with R14.88 at the \ntime of the previous meeting. While the rand has benefitted \nfrom improvements in global sentiment, investors remain \nconcerned about domestic growth prospects and fiscal risks.\nAlthough GDP growth rebounded to 3.1% in the second \nquarter, longer-term weakness in most sectors remains a \nserious concern. Based on recent short-term economic \nindicators for the mining and manufacturing sectors, the \nthird-quarter GDP outcome is expected to be weak. Public \nsector investment has declined and export growth remains \nlow, whereas government and household consumption \ncontinue to grow, albeit modestly.\nBusiness confidence remains weak. The Rand Merchant \nBank (RMB)/BER Business Confidence Index fell to \n41\nAPRIL 2020\n21 points (from 28), while the Absa Purchasing Managers’ \nIndex (PMI) rose to 48.1 points in October (from 45.1). \nThe SARB’s composite leading business cycle indicator \nalso continued to trend lower, and the coincident indicator \ndecreased month on month while remaining positive on a \nyear-on-year basis.\nThe forecast of GDP growth for 2019 is revised lower at \n0.5% (from 0.6%). The forecasts for 2020 and 2021 have \ndecreased to 1.4% (from 1.5%) and 1.7% (from 1.8%) \nrespectively, due to lower growth than previously expected \nin the third and fourth quarters and downward revisions to \nglobal growth.\nThe MPC assesses the risks to the growth forecast to \nbe to the downside. Escalation in global trade tensions, \ngeopolitical risks, further domestic supply constraints and/\nor sustained higher oil prices could generate headwinds to \ngrowth. Public sector financing needs have risen, raising the \nprospect of further pressure on the currency and pushing \nthe borrowing costs for the broader economy higher. \nImplementation of prudent macroeconomic policies and \nstructural reforms that lower costs and increase investment, \npotential growth and job creation, remains urgent.\nThe overall risks to the inflation outlook are assessed to be \nbalanced, but uncertainty about inflation risks is unusually \nhigh. Demand-side pressures remain subdued and house \nrental prices are expected to increase at only moderate \nrates. Global inflation should also remain low. Food price \ninflation has continued to surprise to the downside, but \nrising imported food prices and uncertain domestic weather \npatterns raise uncertainty about the future price trajectory. \nFurther upside risks to the inflation outlook include wage \ngrowth and fuel, electricity and water prices. The risk of \nfurther capital flow volatility has also increased, which could \nput pressure on the exchange rate.\nThe MPC welcomes the sustained moderation in inflation \noutcomes and inflation expectations, and would like to see \ninflation expectations anchored closer to the midpoint of the \ninflation target range on a sustained basis.\nAgainst this backdrop, the MPC decided to keep the \nrepurchase rate (repo rate) unchanged at 6.5% per annum. \nThree members preferred to keep interest rates on hold and \ntwo members preferred a cut of 25 basis points.\nMonetary policy actions will continue to focus on anchoring \ninflation expectations near the midpoint of the inflation \ntarget range in the interest of balanced and sustainable \ngrowth. In this persistently uncertain environment, future \npolicy decisions will continue to be highly data-dependent, \nsensitive to the balance of risks to the outlook, and will seek \nto look through temporary price shocks.\nThe implied path of policy rates over the forecast period \ngenerated by the QPM indicated one repo cut of 25 basis \npoints in the third quarter of 2020. This remains a broad \npolicy guide which could change in either direction from \nmeeting to meeting in response to new developments and \nchanging data and risks.\nPer cent\n2014\n2013\n2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021\nRepurchase rate forecast (November 2019)\n \n90%\n \n60%\n \n30%\n \nRepo rate\n \n \n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\nThe uncertainty bands for the repo rate are based on historical \nforecasting experience and stochastic simulations in the QPM. The \nbands are symmetric and do not reflect any assessment of upside or \ndownside risk.\nSource: SARB\n42\nAPRIL 2020\nSummary of assumptions: Monetary Policy Committee \nmeeting on 21 November 2019*\n1.\t Foreign sector assumptions\nActual\nForecast\n2016\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n1.\t Real GDP growth in South Africa’s \nmajor trading-partner countries...................................................\n3.0% \n3.3% \n3.2% \n2.4% \n2.7% \n3.1% \n(3.0%)\n(3.2%)\n(3.3%)\n(2.5%) \n(2.8%)\n(3.1%)\n2.\t Output gap in South Africa’s major trading-partner countries \n\t\n(ratio to potential GDP).................................................................\n-0.6% \n-0.1% \n0.2% \n-0.1% \n-0.1% \n-0.0% \n(-0.4%)\n(0.0%)\n(0.1%)\n(-0.1%) \n(-0.2%)\n(-0.1%) \n3.\t Change in international commodity prices in US$ \n(excluding oil)................................................................................\n4.4% \n18.2%\n11.0% \n-2.5% \n1.0% \n2.0% \n(4.4%)\n(18.2%)\n(11.0%)\n(-3.0%) \n(0.0%) \n(1.0%)\n4.\t Brent crude (US$/barrel)..............................................................\n43.6 \n54.2\n71.0\n64.4 \n66.0 \n66.0 \n(43.6) \n(54.2)\n(71.0)\n(65.0)\n(66.0)\n(66.0)\n5.\t Change in world food prices (US$)..............................................\n-1.5% \n8.1% \n-3.5% \n0.8% \n1.5% \n1.0% \n(-1.5%)\n(8.1%) \n(-3.5%) \n(0.8%) \n(1.5%)\n(1.0%)\n6.\t Change in international consumer prices....................................\n0.6% \n1.8%\n1.9% \n1.4% \n1.8% \n1.6% \n(0.6%) \n(1.8%)\n(1.9%) \n(1.5%) \n(1.8%) \n(1.8%)\n7.\t International policy interest rate...................................................\n0.2% \n0.5% \n0.9% \n1.1%\n0.8% \n(0.8%) \n(0.2%) \n(0.5%) \n(0.9%) \n(1.1%) \n(0.9%) \n(1.0%)\n2.\t Domestic sector assumptions\nActual\nForecast\n2016\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n1.\t Change in electricity price.........................................................\n9.3% \n4.7% \n5.2% \n9.6% \n10.4% \n7.4% \n(9.3%)\n(4.7%)\n(5.2%) \n(9.0%)\n(9.7%)\n(7.4%)\n2. \t Change in fuel taxes and levies................................................\n9.0% \n8.3%\n8.9% \n5.8%\n5.5%\n5.6%\n(9.0%)\n(8.3%)\n(8.9%) \n(5.3%)\n(5.9%)\n(5.6%) \n3.\t Potential growth.........................................................................\n1.0%\n1.4% \n1.1% \n1.0% \n1.1% \n1.2% \n(1.0%) \n(1.4%)\n(1.1%)\n(1.0%) \n(1.1%)\n(1.2%) \n4.\t Inflation target midpoint.............................................................\n4.5% \n4.5% \n4.5% \n4.5% \n4.5% \n4.5% \n(4.5%) \n(4.5%) \n(4.5%) \n(4.5%) \n(4.5%)\n(4.5%) \n5.\t Neutral real interest rate............................................................\n1.6% \n1.7% \n1.9% \n2.2%\n2.4% \n2.4%\n(1.6%)\n(1.7%)\n(1.9%) \n(2.2%)\n(2.4%)\n(2.4%)\nNotes \n1.\t\nShaded areas indicate forecast assumptions.\n2.\t\nThe figures in brackets represent the previous assumptions of the Monetary Policy Committee.\n*\t For an explanation of foreign sector assumptions and domestic sector assumptions, see pages 52 and 53.\n43\nAPRIL 2020\nSummary of selected forecast results: Monetary Policy Committee meeting \non 21 November 2019*\nSelected forecast results (annual)\nForecast\n2016\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n1. GDP growth............................................................................\n0.4%\n1.4%\n0.8%\n0.5%\n1.4%\n1.7%\n(0.4%)\n(1.4%)\n(0.8%)\n(0.6%)\n(1.5%)\n(1.8%)\n2.\t Output gap (ratio to potential GDP).......................................\n-1.1%\n-1.1%\n-1.4%\n-1.8%\n-1.6%\n-1.1%\n(-1.1%)\n(-1.1%)\n(-1.4%)\n(-1.7%)\n(-1.3%)\n(-0.6%)\n3.\t Change in nominal effective exchange rate..........................\n-14.8%\n9.9%\n-1.1%\n-7.2%\n-2.3%\n-1.7%\n(-14.8%)\n(9.9%)\n(-1.1%)\n(-7.5%)\n(-0.8%)\n(-2.1%)\n4.\t Change in real effective exchange rate.................................\n-9.7%\n13.6%\n1.5%\n-4.7%\n0.9%\n1.3%\n(-9.7%)\n(13.6%)\n(1.5%)\n(-4.9%)\n(2.4%)\n(0.7%)\n5.\t Real exchange rate gap........................................................\n-11.7%\n1.5%\n2.3%\n-3.1%\n-2.5%\n-1.3%\n(-11.7%)\n(1.5%)\n(2.3%)\n(-3.4%)\n(-1.3%)\n(-0.6%)\n6.\t Repurchase rate (end of period)...........................................\n7.0%\n6.8%\n6.6%\n6.6%\n6.3%\n6.3%\n(7.0%)\n(6.8%)\n(6.6%)\n(6.6%)\n(6.4%)\n(6.5%)\n7.\t Current account balance (ratio to GDP)...............................\n-2.9%\n-2.5%\n-3.6%\n-3.4%\n-3.6%\n-3.8%\n\t\n(-2.9%)\n(-2.5%)\n(-3.6%)\n(-3.5%)\n(-3.7%)\n(-3.8%)\nNotes\n1.\t\nThe nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) is based on the bilateral exchange rates of South Africa’s three largest trading partners (the euro area, the US \nand Japan). The bilateral exchange rates are weighted by export trade weights.\n2.\t\nThe real effective exchange rate (REER) is the NEER deflated by the consumer price differential (between South Africa and the trade-weighted CPI of the euro \narea, the US and Japan).\n3.\t\nThe real exchange rate gap signifies the extent to which the real exchange rate deviates from its estimated equilibrium level. A positive gap shows an \novervaluation of the currency, and vice versa.\n4.\t\nThe forecast of the current account balance is obtained from the SARB’s Core Macroeconometric Model.\n5.\t\nShaded areas indicate the forecasts of the Monetary Policy Committee.\n6.\t\nThe figures in brackets represent the previous forecasts of the Monetary Policy Committee.\nSelected forecast results (quarterly)\nYear-on-year percentage change\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n5.3 (5.3)\n4.6 (4.6)\n4.2 (4.2)\n5.1 (5.1)\n4.7 (4.7)\n1. Headline inflation\nQ1\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\nQ1\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\nQ1\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\nQ1\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\n4.1\n4.5\n5.0\n4.8\n4.2\n4.4\n4.1\n4.1\n5.3\n5.0\n5.2\n5.1\n4.8\n4.8\n4.6\n4.5\n(4.1)\n(4.5)\n(5.0)\n(4.8)\n(4.2)\n(4.4)\n(4.1)\n(4.3)\n(5.3)\n(4.9)\n(5.2)\n(5.0)\n(4.8)\n(4.8)\n(4.6)\n(4.5)\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n4.7 (4.7)\n4.3 (4.3)\n4.2 (4.3)\n4.5 (4.7)\n4.6 (4.6)\n2. Core inflation\nQ1\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\nQ1\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\nQ1\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\nQ1\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\n4.1\n4.4\n4.2\n4.4\n4.4\n4.2\n4.1\n4.1\n4.3\n4.5\n4.6\n4.6\n4.7\n4.6\n4.5\n4.5\n(4.1)\n(4.4)\n(4.2)\n(4.4)\n(4.4)\n(4.2)\n(4.2)\n(4.3)\n(4.6)\n(4.8)\n(4.8)\n(4.8)\n(4.6)\n(4.6)\n(4.5)\n(4.5)\nNotes \n1.\tShaded areas indicate the forecasts of the Monetary Policy Committee.\n2.\tThe figures in brackets represent the previous forecasts of the Monetary Policy Committee.\n44\nAPRIL 2020\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n16 January 2020 \nIssued by Lesetja Kganyago, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, \nat a meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee in Pretoria\nSince the November meeting of the Monetary Policy \nCommittee (MPC), global economic indicators have \nimproved somewhat and global inflation has remained \nlow. Central banks in advanced economies provided \nmore monetary accommodation, helping to ease global \nfinancing conditions, but further easing appears less likely. \nWhile downside risks from trade tensions and geopolitical \ndevelopments remain, the global slowdown appears to be \nbottoming out.\nThe domestic economic outlook remains fragile. Despite a \nrebound in local gross domestic product (GDP) in the second \nquarter of 2019, GDP contracted in the third quarter. The \nfourth quarter is expected to show some positive growth.\nRecent monthly inflation has been lower than the midpoint \nof the inflation target range. The year-on-year inflation rate, \nas measured by the headline consumer price index (CPI), \nwas 3.6% in November (down from 3.7% in October). \nGoods price inflation in November was 2.8% (down from \n3.1% in October), while services price inflation remained \nat 4.2%. Food and non-alcoholic beverage (NAB) price \ninflation was stable at 3.5% (down from 3.6%). The South \nAfrican Reserve Bank’s (SARB) measure of core inflation, \nwhich excludes food, fuel and electricity, decreased slightly \nto 3.9% (from 4.0% in October). Producer price inflation for \nfinal manufactured goods decreased to 2.3% in November \n(from 3.0% in October).\nThe medium-term inflation outlook has been revised \nsignificantly lower compared to the November forecast. \nThe inflation forecast generated by the SARB’s Quarterly \nProjection Model (QPM) averages 4.1% in 2019 (down \nfrom 4.2%), 4.7% for 2020 (down from 5.1%) and 4.6% for \n2021 (down from 4.7%). The SARB’s forecast for headline \nCPI inflation for 2022 is 4.5%. Headline CPI inflation is now \nexpected to peak at 4.9% in the final quarter of 2020 and \nsettle at 4.5% in the third quarter of 2021 (one quarter \nearlier). The forecast for core inflation for 2019 is unchanged \nat 4.2%, 4.3% in 2020 (down from 4.5%) and 4.4% in 2021 \n(down from 4.6%). The SARB’s forecast for core inflation \nfor 2022 is 4.5%. Food price inflation continues to surprise \nto the downside on a monthly basis, and has been revised \nfrom 5.8% to 4.7% for 2020.\nInflation expectations have continued to moderate gradually. \nAccording to the Bureau for Economic Research (BER) \nfourth-quarter survey, expectations for headline inflation are \ndown slightly for 2019 to 4.5% (from 4.6%). Expectations for \n2020 have declined to 4.8% (from 5.0%), and to 5.0% (from \n5.1%) for 2021. Five-year-ahead inflation expectations have \nalso eased, to 4.9% (from 5.0%).\nThe inflation expectations of market analysts in the \nDecember 2019 Reuters Econometer survey are generally \nlower, at 4.2% (from 4.3%) for 2019, 4.6% (from 4.7%) for \n2020 and 4.7% (from 4.8%) for 2021.\nMarket-based expectations implicit in break-even inflation \nrates (the yield differential between conventional and \ninflation-linked bonds) have moderated somewhat since \nthe previous MPC meeting. The five-year break-even rates \nare currently about 4.1% and the ten-year break-even rates \nare 5.3%.\nGlobal GDP is expected to average 3.0% in 2019, rising \nto about 3.4% in 2020. In recent months, global trade and \nmanufacturing indicators have exhibited signs of stabilisation \nand, alongside resilient services, suggest that global growth \nrates will hold up. However, a range of downside risks to \ngrowth remains. These include geopolitical developments, \ntrade tensions, further oil price shocks, and high levels of \ncorporate and sovereign debt.\nInflation outcomes and inflation expectations in most \nadvanced \neconomies \nremain \nbelow \ntarget \nlevels. \nBarring significant shocks, monetary policy in major \nadvanced economies will remain accommodative over the \nmedium term.\nSince the November MPC, the rand has appreciated by \n2.6% against the United States (US) dollar and by 1.8% \nagainst the euro. The implied starting point for the rand is \nR14.60 against the US dollar, compared with R14.94 at the \ntime of the previous meeting. While the rand has benefitted \nfrom improvements in global sentiment, high long-term bond \nyields reflect concerns about domestic growth prospects \nand fiscal risks.\nThe GDP growth outcome for the third quarter confirmed that \nthe economy remains weak and vulnerable to idiosyncratic \nshocks and poor sectoral performances. While growth in \nthe fourth quarter is expected to have picked up, electricity \nsupply constraints will likely keep economic activity muted \nin the near term. Public sector investment continues to be \nweak and export growth remains lacklustre despite strong \nterms of trade. Government and household consumption, \nand private investment, continue to grow, albeit modestly.\nBusiness confidence remains weak. The Rand Merchant \nBank (RMB)/BER Business Confidence Index improved to \n26 points (from 21), while the Absa Purchasing Managers’ \nIndex (PMI) fell to 47.1 points in December (from 47.7). The \nSARB’s composite leading business cycle indicator also \ncontinued to trend lower, while the coincident indicator \nincreased marginally month on month.\n45\nAPRIL 2020\nThe forecast of GDP growth for 2019 is revised lower to \n0.4% (from 0.5%). The forecasts for 2020 and 2021 have \nalso decreased to 1.2% (from 1.4%) and 1.6% (from 1.7%) \nrespectively, due to lower growth than previously expected \nin the third and fourth quarters. The GDP forecast for 2022 \nis 1.9%.\nThe MPC assesses the risks to the growth forecast to \nbe to the downside. Escalation in global trade tensions, \ngeopolitical risks, further domestic supply constraints and/\nor sustained higher oil prices could generate headwinds \nto growth. Public sector financing needs have risen, \nincreasing risk premiums and pushing borrowing costs for \nthe broader economy higher. Implementation of prudent \nmacroeconomic policies and structural reforms that lower \ncosts and increase investment, potential growth and job \ncreation, remains urgent.\nThe overall risks to the inflation outlook are assessed to \nbe balanced. Demand-side pressures remain subdued \nand house rental prices are expected to increase at only \nmoderate rates. Global inflation should also remain low. Food \nprice inflation has continued to surprise to the downside, \nalthough rising imported food prices create some caution \nabout the future price trajectory. While the currency has \nstrengthened relative to the November meeting, the risk \nremains that domestic shocks might generate more capital \nflow volatility and put pressure on the exchange rate and \ninflation. Other upside risks to the inflation outlook remain, \nincluding from fuel, electricity and water prices, and from \nnominal wage growth.\nThe MPC welcomes the lower inflation outcomes and the \ncontinued moderation in inflation expectations. While the \nMPC would like to see inflation expectations anchored \ncloser to the midpoint of the inflation target range on a \nsustained basis, the lower inflation forecast and improved \nrisk profile opens some space to provide further policy \naccommodation to the economy.\nAgainst this backdrop, the MPC decided to reduce the \nrepurchase rate (repo rate) by 25 basis points. The decision \nwas unanimous.\nMonetary policy actions will continue to focus on anchoring \ninflation expectations near the midpoint of the inflation \ntarget range in the interest of balanced and sustainable \ngrowth. In this persistently uncertain environment, future \npolicy decisions will continue to be highly data-dependent, \nsensitive to the balance of risks to the outlook, and will seek \nto look through temporary price shocks.\nThe implied path of policy rates over the forecast period \ngenerated by the QPM indicated two repo rate cuts of \n25 basis points each in the first and fourth quarters of 2020. \nThis remains a broad policy guide which could change in \neither direction from meeting to meeting in response to new \ndevelopments and changing data and risks.\nPer cent\n2014\n2013\n2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022\nRepurchase rate forecast (January 2020)\n \n90%\n \n60%\n \n30%\n \nRepo rate\n \n \n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\n10\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\n10\nThe uncertainty bands for the repo rate are based on historical \nforecasting experience and stochastic simulations in the QPM. The \nbands are symmetric and do not reflect any assessment of upside or \ndownside risk.\nSource: SARB\n46\nAPRIL 2020\nSummary of assumptions: Monetary Policy Committee \nmeeting on 16 January 2020*\n1.\t Foreign sector assumptions\nActual\nForecast\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\n1.\t Real GDP growth in South Africa’s \nmajor trading-partner countries...................................................\n3.2% \n3.3% \n2.4% \n2.7% \n3.1% \n3.1% \n(3.3%)\n(3.2%)\n(2.4%)\n(2.7%) \n(3.1%)\n2.\t Output gap in South Africa’s major trading-partner countries \n\t\n(ratio to potential GDP).................................................................\n-0.1% \n0.1% \n-0.1% \n-0.1% \n0.0% \n0.2% \n(-0.1%)\n(0.2%)\n(-0.1%)\n(-0.1%) \n(0.0%)\n3.\t Change in international commodity prices in US$ \n(excluding oil)................................................................................\n18.2% \n11.0%\n-2.3% \n2.0% \n2.1% \n2.5% \n(18.2%)\n11.0%\n(-2.5%)\n(1.0%) \n(2.0%) \n4.\t Brent crude (US$/barrel)..............................................................\n54.2 \n71.0\n64.4\n66.5 \n66.0 \n66.0 \n(54.2) \n(71.0)\n(64.4)\n(66.0)\n(66.0)\n5.\t Change in world food prices (US$)..............................................\n8.1% \n3.5% \n1.6% \n2.0% \n1.0% \n1.5% \n(8.1%)\n(-3.5%) \n(0.8%) \n(1.5%) \n(1.0%)\n6.\t Change in international consumer prices....................................\n(1.8%) \n1.9%\n1.4% \n1.8% \n1.6% \n1.9% \n(1.8%) \n(1.9%)\n(1.4%) \n(1.8%) \n(1.6%) \n7.\t International policy interest rate...................................................\n0.5% \n0.9% \n1.1% \n0.9%\n0.9% \n1.1% \n(0.5%) \n(0.9%) \n(1.1%) \n(0.8%) \n(0.8%) \n2.\t Domestic sector assumptions\nActual\nForecast\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\n1.\t Change in electricity price.........................................................\n4.7% \n5.2% \n9.6% \n10.4% \n7.4% \n6.0% \n(4.7%)\n(5.2%)\n(9.6%) \n(10.4%)\n(7.4%)\n2. \t Change in fuel taxes and levies................................................\n8.3%\n8.9%\n5.8% \n6.1%\n5.6%\n5.3%\n(8.3%)\n(8.9%)\n(5.8%) \n(5.5%)\n(5.6%)\n \n3.\t Potential growth.........................................................................\n1.4% \n1.1% \n1.0% \n1.1% \n1.2% \n1.2% \n(1.4%)\n(1.1%)\n(1.0%)\n(1.1%) \n(1.2%)\n \n4.\t Inflation target midpoint.............................................................\n4.5% \n4.5% \n4.5% \n4.5% \n4.5% \n4.5% \n(4.5%) \n(4.5%) \n(4.5%) \n(4.5%) \n(4.5%)\n \n5.\t Neutral real interest rate............................................................\n1.7% \n1.9% \n2.2% \n2.4%\n2.4% \n2.5%\n(1.7%)\n(1.9%)\n(2.2%) \n(2.4%)\n(2.4%)\nNotes \n1.\t\nShaded areas indicate forecast assumptions.\n2.\t\nThe figures in brackets represent the previous assumptions of the Monetary Policy Committee.\n*\t For an explanation of foreign sector assumptions and domestic sector assumptions, see pages 52 and 53.\n47\nAPRIL 2020\nSummary of selected forecast results: Monetary Policy Committee meeting \non 16 January 2020*\nSelected forecast results (annual)\nActual\nForecast\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\n1. GDP growth...................................................................................\n1.4%\n0.8%\n0.4%\n1.2%\n1.6%\n1.9%\n(1.4%)\n(0.8%)\n(0.5%)\n(1.4%)\n(1.7%)\n2.\t Output gap (ratio to potential GDP)..............................................\n-1.1%\n-1.4%\n-1.9%\n-1.9%\n-1.4%\n-0.7%\n(-1.1%)\n(-1.4%)\n(-1.8%)\n(-1.6%)\n(-1.1%)\n3.\t Change in nominal effective exchange rate.................................\n9.9%\n-1.1%\n-7.1%\n-1.6%\n-2.1%\n-1.5%\n(9.9%)\n(-1.1%)\n(-7.2%)\n(-2.3%)\n(-1.7%)\n4.\t Change in real effective exchange rate........................................\n13.6%\n1.5%\n-4.5%\n1.2%\n0.8%\n1.0%\n(13.6%)\n(1.5%)\n(-4.7%)\n(0.9%)\n(1.3%)\n5.\t Real exchange rate gap...............................................................\n1.5%\n2.3%\n-3.1%\n-2.3%\n-1.6%\n-0.6%\n(1.5%)\n(2.3%)\n(-3.1%)\n(-2.5%)\n(-1.3%)\n6.\t Repurchase rate (end of period)..................................................\n6.8%\n6.6%\n6.5%\n6.1%\n6.0%\n6.4%\n(6.8%)\n(6.6%)\n(6.6%)\n(6.3%)\n(6.3%)\n7.\t Current account balance (ratio to GDP)......................................\n-2.5%\n-3.6%\n-3.5%\n-3.5%\n-3.7%\n-3.7%\n\t\n(-2.5%)\n(-3.6%)\n(-3.4%)\n(-3.6%)\n(-3.8%)\nNotes\n1.\t\nThe nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) is based on the bilateral exchange rates of South Africa’s three largest trading partners (the euro area, the US \nand Japan). The bilateral exchange rates are weighted by export trade weights.\n2.\t\nThe real effective exchange rate (REER) is the NEER deflated by the consumer price differential (between South Africa and the trade-weighted CPI of the euro \narea, the US and Japan).\n3.\t\nThe real exchange rate gap signifies the extent to which the real exchange rate deviates from its estimated equilibrium level. A positive gap shows an \novervaluation of the currency, and vice versa.\n4.\t\nThe forecast of the current account balance is obtained from the SARB’s Core Macroeconometric Model.\n5.\t\nShaded areas indicate the forecasts of the Monetary Policy Committee.\n6.\t\nThe figures in brackets represent the previous forecasts of the Monetary Policy Committee.\nSelected forecast results (quarterly)\nYear-on-year percentage change\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\n4.6 (4.6)\n4.1 (4.2)\n4.7 (5.1)\n4.6 (4.7)\n4.5\n1. Headline inflation\nQ1\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\nQ1\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\nQ1\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\nQ1\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\n4.2\n4.4\n4.1\n3.8\n4.8\n4.4\n4.6\n4.9\n4.7\n4.7\n4.5\n4.4\n4.5\n4.5\n4.5\n4.5\n(4.2)\n(4.4)\n(4.1)\n(4.1)\n(5.3)\n(5.0)\n(5.2)\n(5.1)\n(4.8)\n(4.8)\n(4.6)\n(4.5)\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\n4.3 (4.3)\n4.2 (4.2)\n4.3 (4.5)\n4.4 (4.6)\n4.5\n2. Core inflation\nQ1\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\nQ1\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\nQ1\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\nQ1\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\n4.4\n4.2\n4.1\n3.9\n4.2\n4.2\n4.4\n4.5\n4.4\n4.5\n4.4\n4.4\n4.5\n4.5\n4.5\n4.5\n(4.4)\n(4.2)\n(4.1)\n(4.1)\n(4.3)\n(4.5)\n(4.6)\n(4.6)\n(4.7)\n(4.6)\n(4.5)\n(4.5)\nNotes \n1.\tShaded areas indicate the forecasts of the Monetary Policy Committee.\n2.\tThe figures in brackets represent the previous forecasts of the Monetary Policy Committee.\n48\nAPRIL 2020\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n19 March 2020 \nIssued by Lesetja Kganyago, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, \nat a meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee in Pretoria\n1\t\nThe forecast deducts 0.5 percentage points from 2020 GDP for load-shedding at stage 2.\nSince the January meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee \n(MPC), the South African Reserve Bank’s (SARB) forecast \nfor inflation has continued to moderate, in line with monthly \ninflation data and recent lower oil prices. Globally, a once-\nhealthy economic growth outlook has been revised down \nsharply due to the outbreak and spread of COVID-19. This \ncoronavirus will negatively affect global and domestic \neconomic growth through the first half of 2020 and potentially \nlonger, depending on steps taken to limit its spread.\nThe COVID-19 outbreak will have a major health and \nsocial impact, and forecasting global and domestic activity \npresents significant uncertainty. The Chinese economy, \nwhere the virus originated, is expected to contract by 1% in \nthe first half of 2020. Economic activity is likely to contract \nin the United States (US) and Europe, as governments there \ntake actions to contain the spread of the virus.\nIn financial markets, the sustained global bull market in \nequities and corporate bonds also ended dramatically last \nweek, with extensive and deep repricing. Prices for emerging \nmarket sovereign debt and other risky assets also fell sharply. \nThis will have repercussions for household wealth and \nincome, impacting further on global economic growth.\nIn response to all these developments, the US Federal \nReserve (Fed), alongside other central banks, took various \nsteps to provide further monetary accommodation. \nAdditional steps have also been taken to provide liquidity \nand ensure the smooth functioning of markets. Some \ngovernments have taken fiscal measures to mitigate the \neconomic effects of the virus.\nIn light of these considerations, we have marked down \nglobal growth to 1.1% for 2020, rising to around 2.8% in \n2021. While a deeper or longer global and domestic \ncontraction is not in our baseline, the MPC did consider a \nscenario featuring that possibility.\nPrices for some commodities have fallen as a result of weaker \ndemand globally, with copper and oil being particularly hard-\nhit. The spot price for Brent crude oil is currently around \nUS$30 per barrel but is expected to bounce back to higher \nlevels. For our forecast, the Brent crude oil price is expected \nto average US$40.4 per barrel in 2020 and US$44.5 per \nbarrel in 2021, well below previous assumptions.\nThe domestic economic outlook remains fragile. At this \npoint, COVID-19 is likely to result in weaker demand for \nexports as well as domestic goods and services, but its \nimpact on the economy could be partly offset by lower oil \nprices. We also expect disruptions to supply chains and to \nnormal business operations. The SARB now expects the \neconomy to contract by 0.2% in 2020. Gross domestic \nproduct (GDP) growth is expected to rise to 1.0% in 2021 \nand to 1.6% in 2022.\nApart from the COVID-19 global pandemic, electricity supply \nconstraints and other sources of uncertainty are expected \nto keep economic activity muted. Public sector investment \nhas declined, and job creation has slowed. Business and \nhousehold confidence has weakened further. Government \nand household consumption, and private investment, however, \ncontinue to grow, albeit modestly. While export growth is \nexpected to decelerate further in the near term, prices remain \nhigh for some export commodities and could be supported \nby an early resumption in China’s economic activity.\nThe technical recession of the latter half of 2019 has \ncontributed to a lower economic growth forecast. In \naddition, COVID-19 and existing constraints such as load-\nshedding, imply significant downside risk to the forecast.1 \nWith persistently low inflation, and the coronavirus now \nhitting economic activity, monetary policy in major advanced \neconomies and China will likely remain accommodative \nover the medium term. Easy global financing conditions \nhave previously supported the value of the local currency, \nbut financial volatility and a sharp rise in perceived risk \nhave caused the rand to depreciate by 17.2% against the \nUS dollar since January. The implied starting point for the \nrand forecast is R15.30 to the US dollar, compared with \nR14.90 at the time of the previous meeting. The forecast \nshows the currency strengthening over time, recovering \ntowards its longer-run equilibrium level.\nThe SARB’s headline consumer price inflation forecast \naverages 3.8% for 2020, 4.6% for 2021, and 4.4% in 2022. \nThe forecast for core inflation is lower at 3.9% in 2020, 4.3% \nin 2021, and 4.4% in 2022.\nWith the downward revision to the forecast, the overall risks \nto the inflation outlook at this time appear to be balanced. \nElectricity pricing remains an immediate concern, and there \nis likely to be higher volatility in prices of other goods and \nservices as a result of sharp changes in demand and supply. \nRisks to inflation from recent currency depreciation are \nexpected to be muted as pass-through is slow and could be \n49\nAPRIL 2020\noffset by a wider output gap. Food price inflation is expected \nto remain low, in part due to better weather conditions.\nExpectations of future inflation have moderated further, \non the back of lower services prices, modest food price \ninflation, and slower-growing nominal wages. Across the \ndifferent surveys we look at, inflation expectations currently \naverage 4.4% for 2020, 4.6% for 2021, and 4.7% for 2025.2 \nMarket-based expectations have also moderated, with five-\nyear break-even rates currently at about 3.90%.3 \nHeightened risk sentiment in global markets has amplified \ndomestic and fiscal risks. This has pushed South Africa’s \nsovereign bond yields sharply higher and weakened the \ndomestic currency, increasing risks to monetary policy. \nThe steep drop in global real interest rates implemented \nby advanced economies in recent days has partly offset \nthose risks.4 \nDespite the general rise in risk, the significantly lower forecast \nfor headline inflation has created space for monetary policy \nto respond to the rapid deterioration in economic conditions. \nBarring severe and persistent currency and oil shocks, \ninflation is expected to be well-contained, remaining below \nthe midpoint of the target range in 2020 and close to the \nmidpoint in 2021.\nAgainst this backdrop, the MPC decided to cut the \nrepurchase rate (repo rate) by 100 basis points. \nThis takes the repo rate to 5.25% per annum, with effect \nfrom 20 March 2020. The decision was unanimous.\nThe implied path of policy rates over the forecast period \ngenerated by the Quarterly Projection Model (QPM) \nindicated three repo rate cuts of 25 basis points each in the \nsecond and fourth quarters of 2020, as well as in the third \nquarter of 2021.\nMonetary policy can ease financial conditions and improve \nthe resilience of households and firms to the short-term \neconomic implications of COVID-19. Our decision and its \nmagnitude seeks to do this in the near term.\nMonetary policy, however, cannot on its own improve the \npotential growth rate of the economy or reduce fiscal risks. \nCurrent economic conditions underscore the importance \nof implementing prudent macroeconomic policies and \nstructural reforms that lower costs generally, and increase \ninvestment opportunities, potential growth and job creation.\n2\t\nThe latest Bureau for Economic Research (BER) survey has expectations for 2020 down by 0.4 percentage points to 4.4% and to 4.6% (from 5.0%) for \n2021. Five-year-ahead inflation expectations also eased to 4.7% (from 4.9%). Market analysts (Reuters Econometer) expect inflation to be 4.2% (from \n4.4%) for 2020, 4.6% (from 4.7%) in 2021 and 4.5% (from 4.6%) for 2022.\t\n3\t\nCalculated from the break-even inflation rate, which is the yield differential between conventional and inflation-linked bonds.\t\n4\t\nThe risk premium starting point increased from 3.2% to 3.8% since January, driving up the neutral real rate by 20 basis points and currency contribution \nto the neutral by 10 basis points. The weighted global neutral real rate estimated in the QPM fell by 50 basis points, resulting in an overall decline in the \nneutral by 20 basis points.\t\nGlobal economic and financial conditions are expected to \nremain highly volatile for the foreseeable future. The MPC \nwill continue to assess risks to inflation, including from \nweaker economic growth and those arising from wage and \nprice pressures, as well as currency depreciation. \nAs usual, the repo rate projection from the QPM remains \na broad policy guide which can change from meeting to \nmeeting in response to changing data and risks.\nPer cent\n2014\n2013\n2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022\nRepurchase rate forecast (March 2020)\n \n90%\n \n60%\n \n30%\n \nRepo rate\n \n \n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\nThe uncertainty bands for the repo rate are based on historical \nforecasting experience and stochastic simulations in the QPM. The \nbands are symmetric and do not reflect any assessment of upside or \ndownside risk.\nSource: SARB\n50\nAPRIL 2020\nSummary of assumptions: Monetary Policy Committee \nmeeting on 19 March 2020*\n1.\t Foreign sector assumptions\nActual\nForecast\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\n1.\t Real GDP growth in South Africa’s \nmajor trading-partner countries...................................................\n3.4% \n3.3% \n2.3% \n1.1% \n2.8% \n3.1% \n(3.2%)\n(3.3%)\n(2.4%)\n(2.7%) \n(3.1%)\n(3.1%)\n2.\t Output gap in South Africa’s major trading-partner countries \n\t\n(ratio to potential GDP).................................................................\n0.0% \n0.1% \n-0.1% \n-1.4% \n-0.8% \n-0.4% \n(-0.1%)\n(0.1%)\n(-0.1%)\n(-0.1%) \n(0.0%)\n(0.2%) \n3.\t Change in international commodity prices in US$ \n(excluding oil)................................................................................\n18.2% \n11.2%\n-0.9% \n-0.6% \n-7.0% \n3.4% \n(18.2%)\n(11.0%)\n(-2.3%)\n(2.0%) \n(2.1%) \n(2.5%)\n4.\t Brent crude (US$/barrel)..............................................................\n54.2 \n71.0\n64.4\n40.4 \n44.5 \n45.0 \n(54.2) \n(71.0)\n(64.4)\n(66.5)\n(66.0)\n(66.0)\n5.\t Change in world food prices (US$)..............................................\n8.1% \n-3.5% \n1.8% \n2.5% \n1.5% \n1.5% \n(8.1%)\n(-3.5%) \n(1.6%) \n(2.0%) \n(1.0%)\n(1.5%)\n6.\t Change in international consumer prices....................................\n1.8% \n1.9%\n1.4% \n0.5% \n1.3% \n1.4% \n(1.8%) \n(1.9%)\n(1.4%) \n(1.8%) \n(1.6%) \n(1.9%)\n7.\t International policy interest rate...................................................\n0.5% \n0.9% \n1.1% \n0.2%\n0.1% \n0.1% \n(0.5%) \n(0.9%) \n(1.1%) \n(0.9%) \n(0.9%) \n(1.1%)\n2.\t Domestic sector assumptions\nActual\nForecast\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\n1.\t Change in electricity price.........................................................\n4.7% \n5.2% \n9.6% \n10.4% \n7.4% \n6.0% \n(4.7%)\n(5.2%) \n(9.6%) \n(10.4%)\n(7.4%)\n(6.0%)\n2. \t Change in fuel taxes and levies................................................\n8.3% \n8.9%\n5.8% \n5.3%\n4.6%\n4.4%\n(8.3%)\n(8.9%)\n(5.8%) \n(6.1%)\n(5.6%)\n(5.3%) \n3.\t Potential growth.........................................................................\n1.2%\n0.9% \n0.6% \n0.6% \n0.9% \n1.0% \n(1.4%) \n(1.1%)\n(1.0%)\n(1.1%) \n(1.2%)\n(1.2%) \n4.\t Inflation target midpoint.............................................................\n4.5% \n4.5% \n4.5% \n4.5% \n4.5% \n4.5% \n(4.5%) \n(4.5%) \n(4.5%) \n(4.5%) \n(4.5%)\n(4.5%) \n5.\t Neutral real interest rate............................................................\n1.7% \n1.9% \n2.1% \n2.2%\n2.2% \n2.3%\n(1.7%)\n(1.9%)\n(2.2%) \n(2.4%)\n(2.4%)\n(2.5%)\nNotes \n1.\t\nShaded areas indicate forecast assumptions.\n2.\t\nThe figures in brackets represent the previous assumptions of the Monetary Policy Committee.\n*\t\nFor an explanation of foreign sector assumptions and domestic sector assumptions, see pages 52 and 53.\n51\nAPRIL 2020\nSummary of selected forecast results: Monetary Policy Committee meeting \non 19 March 2020*\nSelected forecast results (annual)\nForecast\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\n1. GDP growth............................................................................\n1.4%\n0.8%\n0.2%\n-0.2%\n1.0%\n1.6%\n(1.4%)\n(0.8%)\n(0.4%)\n(1.2%)\n(1.6%)\n(1.9%)\n2.\t Output gap (ratio to potential GDP).......................................\n-1.0%\n-1.0%\n-1.5%\n-2.3%\n-2.1%\n-1.6%\n(-1.1%)\n(-1.4%)\n(-1.9%)\n(-1.9%)\n(-1.4%)\n(-0.7%)\n3.\t Change in nominal effective exchange rate..........................\n9.9%\n-1.1%\n-7.1%\n-6.6%\n-0.4%\n-2.1%\n(9.9%)\n(-1.1%)\n(-7.1%)\n(-1.6%)\n(-2.1%)\n(-1.5%)\n4.\t Change in real effective exchange rate.................................\n13.6%\n1.5%\n-4.5%\n-3.5%\n2.9%\n0.7%\n(13.6%)\n(1.5%)\n(-4.5%)\n(1.2%)\n(0.8%)\n(1.0%)\n5.\t Real exchange rate gap........................................................\n1.5%\n2.2%\n-2.4%\n-5.9%\n-3.1%\n-2.3%\n(1.5%)\n(2.3%)\n(-3.1%)\n(-2.3%)\n(-1.6%)\n(-0.6%)\n6.\t Repurchase rate (end of period)...........................................\n6.8%\n6.6%\n6.5%\n5.9%\n5.6%\n5.8%\n(6.8%)\n(6.6%)\n(6.5%)\n(6.1%)\n(6.0%)\n(6.4%)\n7.\t Current account balance (ratio to GDP)...............................\n-2.5%\n-3.6%\n-3.0%\n-2.4%\n-3.4%\n-3.7%\n\t\n(-2.5%)\n(-3.6%)\n(-3.5%)\n(-3.5%)\n(-3.7%)\n(-3.7%)\nNotes\n1.\t\nThe nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) is based on the bilateral exchange rates of South Africa’s three largest trading partners (the euro area, the US \nand Japan). The bilateral exchange rates are weighted by export trade weights.\n2.\t\nThe real effective exchange rate (REER) is the NEER deflated by the consumer price differential (between South Africa and the trade-weighted CPI of the euro \narea, the US and Japan).\n3.\t\nThe real exchange rate gap signifies the extent to which the real exchange rate deviates from its estimated equilibrium level. A positive gap shows an \novervaluation of the currency, and vice versa.\n4.\t\nThe forecast of the current account balance is obtained from the SARB’s Core Macroeconometric Model.\n5.\t\nShaded areas indicate the forecasts of the Monetary Policy Committee.\n6.\t\nThe figures in brackets represent the previous forecasts of the Monetary Policy Committee.\nSelected forecast results (quarterly)\nYear-on-year percentage change\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\n4.6 (4.6)\n4.1 (4.1)\n3.8 (4.7)\n4.6 (4.6)\n4.4 (4.5)\n1. Headline inflation\nQ1\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\nQ1\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\nQ1\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\nQ1\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\n4.2\n4.4\n4.1\n3.7\n4.4\n3.4\n3.5\n4.1\n4.3\n4.9\n4.8\n4.5\n4.5\n4.4\n4.4\n4.4\n(4.2)\n(4.4)\n(4.1)\n(3.8)\n(4.8)\n(4.4)\n(4.6)\n(4.9)\n(4.7)\n(4.7)\n(4.5)\n(4.4)\n(4.5)\n(4.5)\n(4.5)\n(4.5)\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\n4.3 (4.3)\n4.1 (4.2)\n3.9 (4.3)\n4.3 (4.4)\n4.4 (4.5)\n2. Core inflation\nQ1\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\nQ1\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\nQ1\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\nQ1\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\n4.4\n4.2\n4.1\n3.9\n3.8\n3.9\n4.0\n4.2\n4.3\n4.3\n4.3\n4.3\n4.3\n4.4\n4.4\n4.4\n(4.4)\n(4.2)\n(4.1)\n(3.9)\n(4.2)\n(4.2)\n(4.4)\n(4.5)\n(4.4)\n(4.5)\n(4.4)\n(4.4)\n(4.5)\n(4.5)\n(4.5)\n(4.5)\nNotes \n1.\tShaded areas indicate the forecasts of the Monetary Policy Committee.\n2.\tThe figures in brackets represent the previous forecasts of the Monetary Policy Committee.\n52\nAPRIL 2020\nForeign sector assumptions\n1.\t Trading-partner gross domestic product (GDP) growth \nis broadly determined using the Global Projection Model \n(GPM), which is adjusted to aggregate the GDP growth \nrates of South Africa’s major trading partners on a trade-\nweighted basis. Individual projections are done for the \nsix largest trading partners, namely the euro area, the \nUnited States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), Japan, \nChina and India. Other countries considered, although \nwith small weights, are Brazil, Mexico and Russia. The \nremaining trading partners are grouped into the ‘Rest \nof Countries’ bloc. Since sub-Saharan Africa is also a \nmajor trading region for South Africa (but does not have \na bloc in the GPM), it is modelled separately and then \ncombined with the aggregate of all the countries in the \nGPM to make up total trading-partner growth.\n2.\t As with GDP growth, the output gap is determined using \nthe GPM and is adjusted in a similar way. The output gap \nis driven by a combination of country-specific domestic \nfactors, external factors, and financial-real linkages \n(beyond interest rate and exchange rate effects). \nDomestic factors include expectations of future demand \nand medium-term interest rates. External factors include \nexchange rate impacts on demand, direct spillovers \nthrough trade with trading-partner countries, and \nforeign demand.\n3.\t The commodity price index is a weighted aggregate \nprice index of the major South African export \ncommodities.\n4.\t The Brent crude oil price is expressed in US dollars \nper barrel. The assumption incorporates supply and \ndemand dynamics as well as oil inventories (of all grades). \nThe assumption is also informed by projections from the \nUS Energy Information Administration, the Organization \nof the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and \nReuters.\n5.\t World food prices is the composite food price index \nof the United Nations (UN) Food and Agriculture \nOrganization (FAO) in US dollars. It is weighted using \naverage export shares, and represents the monthly \nchange in the international prices of a basket of five \nfood commodity price indices (cereals, vegetable oil, \ndairy, meat and sugar). World food price prospects \nincorporate selected global institution forecasts for \nfood prices and imbalances from the anticipated trend \nin international food supplies relative to expected food \ndemand pressures.\n6.\t International consumer prices are also broadly \ndetermined using the GPM. The index is an aggregate \nof the consumer price indices of the euro area, the \nUS and Japan, weighted by their relative trade shares. \nConsumer prices are determined for each of these \neconomies by accounting for inflation expectations, \ndemand pressures, and pass-through from changes in \nthe relevant exchange rate. Other institutional forecasts \nfor international consumer prices are also considered.\n7.\t International policy interest rates are again broadly \ndetermined using the GPM. Interest rates are a weighted \naverage of the policy rates of the euro area, the US and \nJapan. They are individually determined by a ‘Taylor-\ntype’ monetary policy rule. The communications of the \nrelevant central banks and other institutional forecasts \nare also considered.\n53\nAPRIL 2020\nDomestic sector assumptions\n1.\t The electricity price is an administered price measured \nat the municipal level with a weight of 3.75% in the \nheadline consumer price index (CPI) basket. Electricity \nprice adjustments generally take place in the months of \nJuly and August of each year, and the assumed pace of \nincrease over the forecast period reflects the multi-year \nprice determination agreement between Eskom and the \nNational Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA), with \na slight adjustment for measurement at the municipal \nlevel.\n2.\t Fuel taxes and levies are the total domestic taxes and \ncosts included in the price of fuel paid at the pump. They \ninclude the Road Accident Fund (RAF) levy, the fuel levy, \nretail and wholesale margins, the slate levy, and other \nminor levies. The two major taxes, which are set by the \nMinister of Finance in the annual national Budget, are the \nRAF levy and the fuel levy. The income generated by the \nRAF levy is utilised to compensate third-party victims of \nmotor vehicle accidents, while the fuel levy is used to \nprovide funding for road infrastructure.\n3.\t Potential growth is derived from the South African \nReserve Bank’s (SARB) semi-structural potential output \nmodel. The measurement accounts for the impact of the \nfinancial cycle on real economic activity, and introduces \neconomic structure via the relationship between potential \noutput and capacity utilisation in the manufacturing \nsector (SARB Working Paper Series No. WP/14/08).\n4.\t The midpoint of the inflation target range is 4.5%. \nThe official inflation target range is 3–6%.\n5.\t The neutral real interest rate (NRIR) is the interest rate \nconsistent with stable inflation and output in line with \nthe economy’s potential. This variable is the basis for \njudging whether a given policy stance is expansionary, \ncontractionary or neutral. \n54\nAPRIL 2020\nGlossary\nAdvanced economies: Advanced economies are countries \nwith high gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, \ndiversified exports, and close integration into the global \nfinancial system. \nBalance of payments: This is a record of transactions \nbetween the home country and the rest of the world over a \nspecific period of time. It includes the current and financial \naccounts. See also ‘Current account’ below.\nBrent crude: Brent crude is a light and sweet blend of oil \nfrom five different fields in the North Sea. The price of Brent \ncrude is one of the benchmark oil prices in international \nmarkets.\nBudget deficit: A budget deficit indicates the extent to which \ngovernment expenditure exceeds government revenue.\nBusiness and consumer confidence: These are economic \nindicators that measure the level of optimism about the \neconomy and its prospects among business managers and \nconsumers.\nCommodities: Commodities can refer to energy, agriculture, \nmetals and minerals. Major South African-produced \ncommodities include platinum and gold.\nConsumer price index (CPI): The CPI provides an indication \nof aggregate price changes in the domestic economy. The \nindex is calculated using a number of categories forming \na representative set of goods and services bought by \nconsumers.\nCore inflation: Core generally refers to underlying inflation \nexcluding the volatile elements (e.g. food and energy prices). \nThe South African Reserve Bank’s (SARB) forecasts and \ndiscussions refer to headline CPI excluding food, non-\nalcoholic beverages (NAB), fuel and electricity prices.\nCrude oil price: This is the United States (US) dollar price \nper barrel of unrefined oil. See also ‘Brent crude’ above.\nCurrent account: The current account of the balance of \npayments consists of net exports (exports less imports) \nin the trade account as well as the services, income and \ncurrent transfers.\nEmerging markets: Emerging markets are countries with \nlow to middle income per capita. They are advancing rapidly \nand are integrating with global (product and capital) markets.\nExchange rate depreciation (appreciation): Exchange rate \ndepreciation (appreciation) refers to a decrease (increase) in \nthe value of a currency relative to another currency.\nExchange rate pass-through: This is the effect of exchange \nrate changes on domestic inflation (i.e. the percentage \nchange in domestic CPI due to a change in the exchange \nrate). Changes in the exchange rate affect import prices, \nwhich in turn affect domestic consumer prices and inflation.\nForecast horizon: This is the future period over which the \nSARB generates its forecasts, typically between two and \nthree years.\nGross domestic product (GDP): GDP is the total market \nvalue of all the goods and services produced in a country. \nIt includes total consumption expenditure, capital formation, \ngovernment consumption expenditure, and the value of \nexports less the value of imports.\nGross fixed capital formation (investment): The value of \nacquisitions of capital goods (e.g. machinery, equipment \nand buildings) by firms, adjusted for disposals, constitutes \ngross fixed capital formation.\nHeadline consumer price index (CPI): Headline CPI refers \nto CPI for all urban areas, as measured on a monthly basis \nby Statistics South Africa (Stats SA). Headline CPI is a \nmeasure of price levels in all urban areas. The 12-month \npercentage change in headline CPI is referred to as ‘headline \nCPI inflation’ and reflects changes in the cost of living. This \nis the official inflation measure for South Africa.\nHousehold consumption: This is the amount of money \nspent by households on consumer goods and services.\nInflation (growth) outlook: This outlook refers to the evolution \nof future inflation (growth) over the forecast horizon.\nInflation targeting: This is a monetary policy framework \nused by central banks to steer actual inflation towards an \ninflation-target level or range.\nMonetary policy normalisation: This refers to the unwinding \nof an unusually accommodative monetary policy. It could \nalso mean adjusting the economy’s policy rate towards its \nreal neutral policy rate.\nNeutral real interest rate (NRIR): The NRIR is the level at \nwhich the real interest rate will settle once the output gap is \nclosed and inflation is stable. \nNominal effective exchange rate (NEER): The NEER \nis an index that expresses the value of a country’s \ncurrency relative to a basket of other (trading-partner) \ncurrencies. An increase (decrease) in the NEER indicates \na strengthening (weakening) of the domestic currency with \nrespect to the selected basket of currencies. The weighted \naverage exchange rate of the rand is calculated against \n20 currencies. The weights of the five major currencies are \nas follows: the euro (29.26%), the Chinese yuan (20.54%), \nthe US dollar (13.72%), the Japanese yen (6.03%), and the \nBritish pound (5.82%). Index: 2010 = 100. See also ‘Real \neffective exchange rate’ below.\nOutput gap/potential growth: Potential growth is the rate \nof GDP growth that could theoretically be achieved if all \nthe productive assets in the economy were employed \n55\nAPRIL 2020\nin a stable inflation environment. The output gap is the \ndifference between actual growth and potential growth, \nwhich accumulates over time. If this is negative, then the \neconomy is viewed to be underperforming and demand \npressures on inflation are low. If the output gap is positive, \nthe economy is viewed to be overheating and demand \npressures are inflationary.\nPolicy rate: A policy rate is the interest rate used by a central \nbank to implement monetary policy.\nProductivity: Productivity indicates the amount of goods \nand services produced in relation to the resources utilised \nin the form of labour and capital.\nReal effective exchange rate (REER): The REER is the \nNEER adjusted for inflation differentials between South Africa \nand its main trading partners. See also ‘Nominal effective \nexchange rate’ above.\nRepurchase rate (repo rate): This is the policy rate that is set \nby the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). It is the rate that \ncommercial banks pay to borrow money from the SARB.\nReal repo rate: This is the nominal repo rate, as set by the \nMPC, adjusted for expected inflation.\nTerms of trade: This refers to the ratio of export prices to \nimport prices.\nUnit labour cost (ULC): A ULC is the labour cost to produce \none ‘unit’ of output. This is calculated as the total wages \nand salaries in the non-agricultural sector divided by the real \nvalue added at basic prices in the non-agricultural sector of \nthe economy.\n56\nAPRIL 2020\nAbbreviations\nAlsi\t\nAll-Share Index\nBER\t\nBureau for Economic Research\nBoE\t\nBank of England\nCapex\t\ncapital expenditure\nCDS\t\ncredit default swap\nCPB\t\nCentraal Planbureau (Netherlands Bureau \nfor Economic Policy Analysis)\nCPI\t\nconsumer price index\nCSI \t\ncomposite slack index\nDAFF\t\nDepartment of Agriculture, Forestry and \nFisheries\t\nEAF\t\nEnergy Availability Factor\nECB\t\nEuropean Central Bank\nEM \t\nEmerging Market\nEMBI+\t\nEmerging Market Bond Index plus\nFAO\t\nFood and Agriculture Organization\nFed\t\nFederal Reserve\nFIM\t\nfiscal impulse measure\nFNB\t\nFirst National Bank\nFRA\t\nforward rate agreement\nFTSE\t\nFinancial Times Stock Exchange\nFX \t\nforeign exchange \nG3\t\nGroup of Three (United States, euro area, Japan)\nGDP\t\ngross domestic product\nGPM\t\nGlobal Projection Model\nGVA\t\ngross value added\nHaver\t\nHaver Analytics\nHP\t\nHodrick-Prescott filter\nIMF\t\nInternational Monetary Fund\nJSE\t\nJSE Limited\nMoody’s\t Moody’s Corporation\nMPC\t\nMonetary Policy Committee\nMPR\t\nMonetary Policy Review\t\t\nMTBPS\t\nMedium Term Budget Policy Statement\nNAB\t\nnon-alcoholic beverages\nNEER\t\nnominal effective exchange rate\nNERSA\t\nNational Energy Regulator of South Africa\nNRIR\t\nneutral real interest rate\nOECD\t\nOrganisation for Economic \nCo-operation and Development\nOPEC\t\nOrganization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries\nPMI\t\nPurchasing Managers’ Index\nPOC\t\nProvince of China\nQE\t\nquantitative easing\nQES\t\nQuarterly Employment Statistics\nQPM\t\nQuarterly Projection Model\nRAF\t\nRoad Accident Fund\nREER\t\nreal effective exchange rate\nrepo rate\t repurchase rate\nRMB\t\nRand Merchant Bank\nSAR \t\nSpecial Administrative Region\nSARB\t\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nSARS\t\nSouth African Revenue Service\nSIT\t\nservices, income and current transfers\nS&P\t\nStandard & Poor’s Global Ratings\nSSA\t\nsub-Saharan Africa\nStats SA\t Statistics South Africa\nUAE\t\nUnited Arab Emirates\nUK\t\nUnited Kingdom\nULC\t\nunit labour cost\nUN\t\nUnited Nations\nUS\t\nUnited States\nUVI\t\nUnit Value Index\nVAT\t\nvalue-added tax\nVIX\t\nChicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index\nWHO\t\nWorld Health Organization", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/Monetary_Policy_Reviews/Monetary-Policy-Review---April-2020 (1).pdf"}
{"doc_id": "eb66730eefcbb81a28eb7f2303572f10", "text": "i \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFEBRUARY 2018 \n \n1 \n \nTABLE OF CONTENTS \n \nSelected Economic Indicators ...................................................................................................... 2 \nInternational Commodity Prices ................................................................................................. 3 \nMerchandise Trade Developments .............................................................................................. 4 \nMonetary Developments ............................................................................................................... 6 \nStock Market Developments ........................................................................................................ 7 \nInflation Outturn .......................................................................................................................... 8 \nNational Payments System Developments .................................................................................. 9 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2 \n \n \n \n \n2018 \n \nJanuary \n2018 \n \nFebruary \nMonth-on- \nMonth \nChange (%) \nZ.S.E. Mining Index1 \n130.42 \n124.91 \n-4.22 \nZ.S.E. Industrial Index1 \n305.33 \n294.55 \n-3.53 \nNational Payment System Transactions \n(US$ millions) \n10 596 .92 \n8 962.11 \n-15.4 \nMoney Supply (US$ millions)2 \n7 837.57 \n7 825.33 \n0.16 \nMoney Supply (M3) Annual Growth2 (%) \n38.39 \n35.58 \n \nYearly Inflation3 (%) \n3.52 \n2.98 \n \nMonthly Inflation3 (%) \n0.30 \n0.08 \n \nNominal Lending Rate2 (% per annum) \n4.45-18.00 \n4.45-18.00 \n \nSources: \n1. Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) \n2. Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) \n3. Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZIMSTAT) \nSELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS \n \n \n \n3 \n \nINTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICE \nDEVELOPMENTS \n \nDuring \nthe \nmonth \nof \nFebruary \n2018, \ninternational commodity prices of precious and \nbase metals increased. Crude oil prices, \nhowever, retreated during the same period. \n \n Precious Metals \n \nPrecious metals continued on an upward trend, \nwith gold prices firming by 0.1%, from \nUS$1,332.17/oz in the previous month to \nUS$1,333.04/oz in February 2018. Similarly, \nplatinum prices increased from US$994.22/oz \nin January 2018, to US$996.48/oz in February \n2018. This followed the dampening of \nexpectations of an interest rate hike by the \nFederal Reserve. \n Figure 1: Precious metal prices \nSource: Bloomberg, 2018 \n \nBase Metals \nCopper prices registered a 1.9% increase to \nclose the month of February 2018 at \nUS$7,266.78/ton. Nickel prices, also increased \nby 5.8%, from US$12,863.41/ton in January \n2018 to US$13,608.75/ton, in February 2018. \nThe base metal prices firmed on the back of \neasing economic growth concerns in China, \nfollowing the release of positive data on China’s \ngrowth outlook. The positive outlook boosted \nthe demand prospects for base metals in China, \nthe world’s largest base metal consumer. \nFigure 2:Base metal prices \nSource: Bloomberg, 2018 \n Brent Crude Oil \nCrude oil prices declined by 5.0%, from \nUS$69.04/barrel \nin \nJanuary \n2018 \nto \n$ 65.60/barrel, during the month under review. \nThe prices were weighed down by an \nunexpected rise in US stockpiles, coupled with \nthe increase in crude oil production. \n Figure 3: International crude oil prices \nSource: Bloomberg, 2018 \n0\n450\n900\n1350\n1800\nFeb-17\nMar-17\nApr-17\nMay-17\nJun-17\nJul-17\nAug-17\nSep-17\nOct-17\nNov-17\nDec-17\nJan-18\nFeb-18\nGold\nPlatinum\n0\n2000\n4000\n6000\n8000\n10000\n12000\n14000\n0\n1500\n3000\n4500\n6000\n7500\nFeb-17\nApr-17\nJun-17\nAug-17\nOct-17\nDec-17\nFeb-18\nNICKEL US/TON\nCOPPER US$/TON\nCopper\nNickel\n0.00\n10.00\n20.00\n30.00\n40.00\n50.00\n60.00\n70.00\n80.00\nFeb-16\nApr-16\nJun-16\nAug-16\nOct-16\nDec-16\nFeb-17\nApr-17\nJun-17\nAug-17\nOct-17\nDec-17\nFeb-18\n \n \n \n4 \n \nMERCHANDISE TRADE \nDEVELOPMENTS \n \nTotal merchandise trade stood at US$922.0 \nmillion in February 2018, a 24.3% increase from \nUS$740.9 million recorded in January 2018. \nMerchandise \nexports \nfor \nFebruary \n2018 \namounted to US$347.2 million, representing a \n37.9% increase from US$347.2 million realized \nin January 2018. Merchandise imports during \nthe month under review were 17.4% higher than \nthe previous month, at US$574.7 million. \nMerchandise Exports \nDuring the month under review, gold, flue-cured \ntobacco, nickel (mattes, ores & concentrates) \nferrochrome and ferrochrome dominated the \ncountry’s exports, contributing about 80% of \ntotal export earnings. \n \nTable 1: Exports Classified by HS Code \nProduct \nFeb-18 \nUS$m \nFeb-18 \nShare of \nTotal \nExports \n(%) \n Semi-manufactured \ngold \n100.6 \n29.0 \n Flue-cured tobacco \n75.8 \n21.8 \n Nickel mattes \n46.1 \n13.3 \n Nickel ores and \nconcentrates \n36.9 \n10.6 \n Ferro-chrome \n18.9 \n5.5 \nChromium ores and \nconcentrates \n7.2 \n2.1 \nCoal (Coke) \n5.3 \n1.5 \n Unwrought Platinum \n3.9 \n1.1 \n Blake tea \n3.5 \n1.0 \n Granite \n2.2 \n0.6 \n Other \n46.9 \n13.5 \n Total \n347.2 \n100.0 \nSource: Zimstat, 2018 & RBZ Calculations, 2018 \nThe country’s exports for the month under \nreview were mainly destined for the SADC \nregion, with South Africa and Mozambique \nabsorbing about 63.7% and 7.8% of total \nexports, respectively. Figure 4 shows the \ncountry’s major export destinations during the \nmonth under analysis. \n \nFigure \n4: Major \nMerchandise Export \nDestinations (% Share of Total) \n \nSource: Zimstat, 2018 & RBZ Calculations, 2018 \nMerchandise Imports \nEnergy imports, namely; diesel, petrol and \nelectricity, dominated the country’s import bill \nduring the month under analysis, accounting for \nabout 21.0% of total imports. \nThe source of imports by country was as \nfollows: South Africa (45.5%), Singapore \n(15.4%), China (5.4%), United Kingdom \n(3.2%); and Mauritius (3.1%). \n \n \nSouth \nAfrica\n63.7%\nMozambique\n7.8%\nUAE\n11.3%\nZambia\n1.8%\nGermany\n0.3%\nNamibia\n0.2%\nNetherlands\n0.1%\nBotswana\n0.6%\nMalawi\n0.5%\nItaly\n0.1%\n \n \n \n5 \n \nFigure 5: Major Merchandise Import \nSources (% Share of Total) \n \nSource: Zimstat, 2017 & RBZ Calculations, 2018 \n \nTrade balance \nThe merchandise trade developments during the \nmonth under review resulted in a trade deficit of \n-US$228.6 million. This was 4.2% lower than \nthe -US$238.5 million trade deficit recorded in \nJanuary 2018. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1 Provisional figures \n2 Beginning January 2017, broad money is redefined using \nIMF’s Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual of 2000. \nFigure 6: Merchandise Exports, Imports & \nTrade Balance (US$m): Jan-Feb 2018 \n \nSource: Zimstat, 2017 & RBZ Calculations, 2018 \n \nMONETARY DEVELOPMENTS1 \n \nBroad money supply2 stood at US$7 825.33 \nmillion in February 2018, registering an annual \ngrowth of 35.58%, from US$5 771.61 million \nin February 2017. The growth was due to \nincreases in transferable deposits, 47.28%; and \nnegotiable certificates of deposits3, 27.01%. \nTime deposits, however, declined by 6.04%. \nBond notes and coins in circulation increased \nfrom US$113.38 million in February 2017, to \nUS$331.84 million in February 2018. \n \nOn a month-on-month basis, broad money \ndeclined by 0.16%, from US$7 837.57 million \nin January 2018 to US$7 825.33 in February \n2018. This was on the back of a 6.88% decline \nThe major change is the exclusion of Government deposits \nheld by banks from broad money. \n3 NCDs are also referred to as securities included in broad \nmoney. \n -\n 10.0\n 20.0\n 30.0\n 40.0\n 50.0\nSouth Africa\nSingapore\nChina\nUnited Kingdom\nMauritius\nIndia\nJapan\nUnited Arab Emirates\nFrance\nZambia\nMozambique\nOther\nPercent\n251.2 \n346.3 \n489.7 \n574.9 \n(238.5)\n(228.6)\n-300\n-200\n-100\n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n700\nJan'2018\nFeb'2018\nExports\nImports\nTrade Balance\n \n \n \n6 \n \nin reserve money, from US$2 475.79 million in \nJanuary 2018 to US$2 305.52 million February \n2018. \n \nFigure 7: Money Supply \n \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2018 \n \nDuring the month under review, broad money \ncomprised of transferable or transitory deposits, \n76.15%; time deposits, 18.64%; currency in \ncirculation, 4.24%; and negotiable certificates \nof deposits, 0.96%. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFigure 8: Composition of Money Supply \nFebruary 2018 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2018 \nDomestic credit increased by 38.35%, from \nUS$7 606.21 million in February 2017 to \nUS$10 523.40 million in February 2018. The \ngrowth was largely driven by a 61.09% increase \nin net credit to Government. On a month-on-\nmonth basis, domestic credit registered a 0.50% \nincrease, from US$10 471.11 million in \nJanuary 2018 to US$10 523.40 in February \n2018. \nCredit to the private sector stood at \nUS$3 587.17 million in February 2018, a 6.17% \nincrease from $3 378.77 million in February \n2017. \nOn a month-on-month basis, credit to the private \nsector \nincreased \nby \n0.28%, \nfrom \nUS$ 3 577.05 million in January 2018 to \nUS$3 587.17 million in February 2018. \n \n \n \n-10\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n -\n 1.0\n 2.0\n 3.0\n 4.0\n 5.0\n 6.0\n 7.0\n 8.0\n%\nUS$ BILLIONS\nM3\nM3 Annual Growth rate\nTransferable Deposits\n76.15%\nOther Deposits \n(Time)\n18.64%\nNCDs\n0.96%\nBond \nNotes and \nCoins\n4.24%\n \n \n \n7 \n \nFigure 9: Sectoral Distribution of Credit \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2018 \nDuring the month of February 2018, outstanding \ncredit to the private sector was distributed as \nfollows: \nhouseholds, 23.75%; \nagriculture, \n18.75%; \nservices, \n15.12%; \ndistribution, \n12.12%; manufacturing, 10.95%; financial \norganisations and investments, 10.69%; mining, \n4.17%; construction, 2.30%; transport; and \ncommunications, 1.57% and other,0.58%. \nPrivate sector credit was channelled towards \ninventory build-up, 28.18%; consumer durables, \n19.60%; fixed capital investment, 11.66%; and \npre and post shipment financing, 1.06%. \nAmounts \nutilised \nfor \nother \nrecurrent \nexpenditures constituted 39.51% of the total \noutstanding loans and advances, during the \nmonth under review. \nSTOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS \n \nBearish investor sentiments persisted on the \nZimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) during the \nmonth under analysis. Resultantly, the All Share \nIndex (ASI) registered a 3.60% decline, from \n91.32 \npoints \nin \nJanuary \n2018, \nto \n88.03 points in February 2018. This largely \nreflected price correction, following the stock \nprice bubble of the second half of 2017. \n \nFigure 10: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange All \nShare and top 10 Indices \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange,2018 \n \n \nSimilarly, industrial and mining indices \ndeclined by 3.54% and 4.22%, to close the \nmonth under review at 294.55 points and \n124.91 points, respectively. \n \nFigure 11: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange \nIndices \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2018 \nHouseholds\n23.75%\nAgriculture, \n18.75%\nManufacturing, 10.95%\nServices, \n15.12%\nDistribution, 12.12%\nFinancial \nOrganisations\n, 10.69%\nMining, \n4.17%\nTransport and \nCommunication, \n1.57%\nConstruction, 2.30%\nOther, 0.58%\n75.00\n80.00\n85.00\n90.00\n95.00\n100.00\n2-Jan-18\n6-Jan-18\n10-Jan-18\n14-Jan-18\n18-Jan-18\n22-Jan-18\n26-Jan-18\n30-Jan-18\n3-Feb-18\n7-Feb-18\n11-Feb-18\n15-Feb-18\n19-Feb-18\n23-Feb-18\n27-Feb-18\nFigure 1: ZSE All Share and Top \n10 Indices\nAll Share Index\nTop 10 Index\n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\n300\n350\n400\n450\n500\n550\n31-Jan-17\n28-Feb-17\n31-Mar-17\n30-Apr-17\n31-May-17\n30-Jun-17\n31-Jul-17\n31-Aug-17\n30-Sep-17\n31-Oct-17\n30-Nov-17\n31-Dec-17\n31-Jan-18\n28-Feb-18\nIndustrial\nMining\n \n \n \n8 \n \nThe volume of shares traded closed the month \nof February 2018 at 138.14 million, up from \n55.03 million shares in January 2018. This was \nunderpinned by block trades of 23.3 million \nFirst Mutual Properties shares, 13.3 million \nMashonaland Holdings shares, 3.47 million \nDairibord Holdings shares, 2.97 million Meikles \nshares, 2.02 million Econet Wireless shares and \n0.99 million Delta Corporation shares that \nexchanged hands at 5 cents, 2.99 cents, 11.15 \ncents, 30 cents, 68 cents and 158.5 cents, \nrespectively. \nThe ZSE market turnover also increased by \n102.95%, from US$31.40 million in January \n2018 to US$63.74 million, during the month \nunder review. \nForeign \ninvestor \nparticipation, \nhowever, \nretreated, reflected by a net outflow of $2.05 \nmillion in February 2018, compared to the net \ninflow of $12.37 million in the previous month. \n \nFigure 12: ZSE Monthly Volumes and Values \nTraded \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2018 \nZSE market capitalisation stood at $8.39 billion \nin February 2018 a 3.08% decline from US$8.65 \nbillion registered in January 2018. \n \nINFLATION OUTTURN \n \nAnnual Inflation \n \nThe annual headline inflation slowed down to \n2.98% in February 2018, from 3.52% registered \nin January 2018. This was on account of the \ndecelaration in food inflation. \nAnnual food inflation declined from 6.17% in \nJanuary 2018 to 4.35% in February 2018. Non \nfood inflation, however, accelerated from 2.29% \nin January 2018, to close the month under \nreview at 2.33%. \nFigure 9 shows annual inflation developments \nfrom January 2016 to February 2018. \nFigure 13:Annual Inflation (%) \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2018 \nMonthly Inflation \n \nMonthly inflation stood at 0.08% in February \n2018, down from 0.3% in January 2018, on \naccount of both food and non-food inflation. \n \n0.00\n30.00\n60.00\n90.00\n120.00\n150.00\n180.00\n210.00\n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n700\n800\n900\n1,000\nJan-17\nFeb-17\nMar-17\nApr-17\nMay-17\nJun-17\nJul-17\nAug-17\nSep-17\nOct-17\nNov-17\nDec-17\nJan-18\nFeb-18\nValues Traded (US$ Millions)\nVolumes Traded (Millions)\nVolume\nTurnover\n-4.5\n-3\n-1.5\n0\n1.5\n3\n4.5\n6\nFeb-16\nMay-16\nAug-16\nNov-16\nFeb-17\nMay-17\nAug-17\nNov-17\nFeb-18\nHeadline Inflation\nFood\nNon Food\n \n \n \n9 \n \n \nFigure 14: Month On Month Inflation \n \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2018 \nMonth-on-month food inflation fell by 0.57 \npercentage points from 0.39% in January 2018, \nto -0.18% in February 2018. Food inflation was \nlargely driven by declines in prices of bread and \ncereals, meat, oils and fats, and coffee, tea and \ncocoa. \nMonthly non-food inflation decelerated to \n0.21% in February 2018, from 0.25% in \nJanuary 2018. This was, in large part, accounted \nfor by the decline in transport services. \n \nNATIONAL PAYMENTS SYSTEM \n \nThe total value of transactions processed \nthrough the National Payment System (NPS) \nplatform registered a 15.7% decline, to close the \nmonth of February 2018 at US$8.96 billion. \nSimilarly, the volume of NPS transactions \ndeclined by 10.9%, from 124.93 million in \nJanuary \n2018 \nto \n111.37 \nmillion \nin \nFebruary 2018. \n \n \nZimbabwe Electronic Transfer Settlement \nSystem (ZETSS) \n \nDuring the month of February 2018, the value \nof transactions processed through the RTGS \nsystem stood at US$4.71 billion, down from \nUS$5.55 billion in January 2018. RTGS \nvolumes \nalso \ndeclined \nfrom \n548 \n125 \ntransactions in the previous month, to 457 188 \ntransactions during the month under review. \nFigure 15: ZETTS Volumes and Values \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2018 \n \nCash transactions \nThe total value of cash transactions stood at \nUS$204.78 million in February 2018, down \nfrom US$220.5 million in January 2018. \nMobile and Internet Based Transactions \nMobile and internet based transactions closed \nthe month under review at US$2.85 billion, \nregistering a 16.82% decline from the previous \nmonth value of US$3.3 billion. \n-0.5\n-0.3\n-0.1\n0.2\n0.4\n0.6\n0.8\n1.0\n1.2\n1.4\n1.6\nFeb-16\nMay-16\nAug-16\nNov-16\nFeb-17\nMay-17\nAug-17\nNov-17\nFeb-18\n -\n 1.0\n 2.0\n 3.0\n 4.0\n 5.0\n 6.0\n 7.0\n -\n 100\n 200\n 300\n 400\n 500\n 600\n 700\nVALUE IN US$ BILLIONS\nVOLUME IN THOUSANDS\nVolume\nValue\n \n \n \n10 \n \n \n \nCard Based Transactions \nCard based transactions declined from \nUS$684.74 million in January 2018, to \nUS$607.93 million in February 2018. \nCheque Transactions \nThe value of cheque transactions also decreased \nby 8.7%, from US$4.89 million in the previous \nmonth to US$4.47 million in February 2018. \n \nAPRIL 2018 \nRESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE \n \n11 \n \nStatistical Tables \n \nMonetary Statistics \n 1. Depository Corporations Survey \n \n \n \n11 \n 2. Central Bank Survey \n \n \n \n \n \n \n12 \n \n3. Other Depository Corporations Survey \n \n \n \n \n13 \n Other Depository Corporations \n \n4.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n14 \n 4.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n15 \n Commercial Banks \n 5.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n16 \n 5.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n17 \n Building Societies \n 6.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n18 \n 6.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n19 \n Sectoral Analysis of Bank Loans and Advances and Deposits \n \n7.1 Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks Loans and Advances \n20 \n \n7.2 Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks Deposits \n \n \n21 \n Interest Rates \n \n8.1 Lending Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n22 \n \n8.2 Banks Deposit Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n23 \n \n Inflation \n \n9.1 Monthly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n24 \n \n9.2 Yearly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n25 \n External Statistics \n \n10. Total External Debt Outstanding by Debtor \n \n \n \n26 \n 11. Exchange Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n27 \n \n \n \n \n \n12 \n \n12. Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Statistics \n \n \n \n \n 28 \n \n 13. National Payments System Statistics \n \n \n \n \n13.1 Values of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n 29 \n \n13.2 Volumes of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n 30 \n \n14. Merchandise Trade Statistics \n \n \n \n \n \n 31 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n 13 \n \n \nFeb-17\nMar-17\nApr-17\nMay-17\nJun-17\nJul-17\nAug-17\nSep-17\nOct-17\nNov-17\nDec-17\nJan-18\nFeb-18\nNet Foreign Assets\n-574,226.80\n-558,721.32\n-513,306.49\n-568,383.24\n-574,712.07\n-626,166.71\n-581,024.98\n-549,943.15\n-600,146.55\n-718,745.96\n-963,774.49 -1,004,950.72\n-1,058,322.46\nCentral Bank(net)\n-588,653.44\n-584,124.96\n-598,046.16\n-624,627.79\n-572,190.43\n-673,117.34\n-634,409.89\n-644,166.06\n-736,057.71\n-869,239.58 -1,126,260.86 -1,184,176.73\n-1,238,013.30\nForeign Assets\n446,101.75\n420,146.58\n406,925.81\n381,126.20\n415,139.98\n380,195.83\n432,967.36\n442,659.91\n330,188.17\n316,883.48\n426,145.71\n296,246.77\n293,630.88\nForeign Liabilities\n1,034,755.19\n1,004,271.54\n1,004,971.97\n1,005,753.98\n987,330.41\n1,053,313.17\n1,067,377.25\n1,086,825.97\n1,066,245.88\n1,186,123.05\n1,552,406.57\n1,480,423.50\n1,531,644.18\nOther Depository Corporations(net)\n14,426.64\n25,403.64\n84,739.67\n56,244.55\n-2,521.64\n46,950.63\n53,384.91\n94,222.92\n135,911.17\n150,493.62\n162,486.37\n179,226.01\n179,690.85\nForeign Assets\n290,763.66\n275,104.70\n338,839.86\n302,736.47\n260,090.51\n212,254.02\n214,135.93\n249,362.59\n293,931.99\n304,880.23\n338,932.13\n334,406.75\n324,307.90\nForeign Liabilities\n276,337.02\n249,701.07\n254,100.19\n246,491.92\n262,612.14\n165,303.39\n160,751.02\n155,139.67\n158,020.82\n154,386.61\n176,445.76\n155,180.74\n144,617.06\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n6,345,868.68 6,438,654.97 6,630,089.13 6,768,665.58 7,066,383.69\n7,190,192.60 7,656,567.78\n8,010,141.46 8,287,169.55\n8,738,773.53\n9,071,999.06\n8,842,518.51\n8,883,651.73\nDomestic Claims\n7,606,214.41\n7,693,211.88 7,850,810.40\n8,109,966.41\n8,430,156.54 8,563,257.71\n9,041,471.69 9,445,954.95 9,806,932.03 10,290,523.51 10,699,362.07 10,501,106.36\n10,523,404.79\nClaims on Central Government(net)\n3,859,591.32 3,839,525.33 4,019,529.99\n4,168,269.21\n4,429,130.33\n4,583,719.81\n4,963,451.34 5,262,365.52 5,558,940.68\n5,980,149.89\n6,277,467.58\n6,217,222.75\n6,217,344.80\nClaims on Central Government\n3,939,990.88\n3,952,135.70\n4,118,041.33\n4,265,615.80\n4,543,365.26\n4,702,324.42\n5,092,414.12\n5,358,107.60\n5,642,566.58\n6,055,451.35\n6,412,445.92\n6,365,720.36\n6,411,631.80\nCentral Bank\n2,355,433.40\n2,337,736.86\n2,444,902.51\n2,578,541.50\n2,781,509.63\n2,976,316.75\n3,253,867.88\n3,386,569.83\n3,558,186.58\n3,826,415.91\n3,985,873.65\n4,002,809.96\n4,073,776.80\nODCs\n1,584,557.48\n1,614,398.84\n1,673,138.81\n1,687,074.29\n1,761,855.63\n1,726,007.68\n1,838,546.24\n1,971,537.77\n2,084,380.00\n2,229,035.44\n2,426,572.26\n2,362,910.40\n2,337,855.00\nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n80,399.57\n112,610.37\n98,511.34\n97,346.59\n114,234.93\n118,604.61\n128,962.78\n95,742.09\n83,625.90\n75,301.46\n134,978.34\n148,497.61\n194,286.99\nCentral Bank\n25,139.92\n25,709.26\n22,277.32\n22,242.61\n40,520.14\n40,545.19\n40,631.81\n40,545.86\n40,530.28\n40,553.01\n40,373.09\n41,168.00\n93,049.24\nODCs\n55,259.64\n86,901.10\n76,234.01\n75,103.98\n73,714.80\n78,059.42\n88,330.97\n55,196.23\n43,095.62\n34,748.45\n94,605.25\n107,329.61\n101,237.76\nClaims on Other Sectors\n3,746,623.09\n3,853,686.55\n3,831,280.41\n3,941,697.20\n4,001,026.21\n3,979,537.89\n4,078,020.35\n4,183,589.43\n4,247,991.35\n4,310,373.62\n4,421,894.49\n4,283,883.60\n4,306,059.99\nOther Financial Corporations\n46,341.75\n47,369.15\n49,453.09\n52,463.93\n105,548.86\n54,242.21\n48,020.09\n49,739.69\n49,554.83\n52,045.37\n64,990.53\n61,245.16\n71,411.06\nState and Local Government\n35,006.53\n34,312.18\n34,732.93\n36,595.52\n35,573.02\n34,059.17\n34,223.63\n31,707.35\n33,198.40\n38,416.75\n46,177.22\n55,046.17\n54,613.41\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n286,508.91\n280,721.01\n314,505.79\n346,370.34\n349,686.88\n412,068.05\n412,045.72\n465,886.74\n474,544.48\n526,356.79\n591,300.63\n590,546.93\n592,869.46\nPrivate Sector\n3,378,765.90\n3,491,284.21\n3,432,588.60\n3,506,267.42\n3,510,217.45\n3,479,168.47\n3,583,730.91\n3,636,255.65\n3,690,693.65\n3,693,554.71\n3,719,426.11\n3,577,045.34\n3,587,166.06\nCentral Bank\n21,712.67\n21,760.49\n18,704.05\n19,992.79\n20,634.27\n21,723.98\n30,090.82\n24,112.13\n29,027.93\n30,167.18\n25,776.78\n14,203.44\n14,223.70\nODCs\n3,357,053.23\n3,469,523.72\n3,413,884.55\n3,486,274.63\n3,489,583.19\n3,457,444.48\n3,553,640.10\n3,612,143.52\n3,661,665.72\n3,663,387.53\n3,693,649.33\n3,562,841.90\n3,572,942.36\nOther Items(Net)\n1,260,345.73\n1,254,556.91\n1,220,721.27\n1,341,300.82 1,363,772.85\n1,373,065.10 1,384,903.90\n1,435,813.49\n1,519,762.48\n1,551,749.98\n1,627,363.01\n1,658,587.85\n1,639,753.06\nShares and Other Equity\n1,481,806.96\n1,505,125.73\n1,501,542.78\n1,530,318.81\n1,547,498.75\n1,546,591.54\n1,561,407.08\n1,584,816.35\n1,635,896.82\n1,657,131.70\n1,862,915.59\n1,838,103.60\n1,868,350.08\nLiabilities to Other Financial Corporations\n19,754.13\n15,735.14\n15,467.80\n15,506.06\n17,953.19\n18,647.30\n17,870.07\n27,738.15\n24,759.56\n24,615.34\n6,152.75\n2,600.12\n2,920.26\nRestricted Deposits\n66,737.97\n67,789.29\n68,133.12\n84,939.87\n84,617.96\n84,477.31\n32,685.62\n115,800.59\n161,010.60\n88,854.55\n65,604.73\n83,202.55\n63,087.75\nDeposits and Securities Excluded from Base Mone\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nOther Items(net)\n-307,953.33\n-334,093.24\n-364,422.43\n-289,463.92\n-286,297.05\n-276,651.05\n-227,058.87\n-292,541.60\n-301,904.50\n-218,851.62\n-307,310.05\n-265,318.43\n-294,605.04\nBroad Money-M3\n5,771,641.88 5,879,933.65\n6,116,782.64 6,200,282.35\n6,491,671.62 6,564,025.89 7,075,542.80\n7,460,198.31\n7,687,023.01\n8,020,027.58\n8,108,224.57\n7,837,567.78\n7,825,329.27\nSecurities Other than Shares Included in Broad M\n59,329.24\n60,161.15\n63,292.20\n61,392.93\n65,667.46\n66,282.58\n71,054.38\n55,830.26\n62,975.36\n66,482.78\n68,638.47\n65,056.19\n75,354.27\nBroad Money-M2\n5,712,312.64 5,819,772.50 6,053,490.44 6,138,889.42 6,426,004.16 6,497,743.31 7,004,488.42 7,404,368.06 7,624,047.65\n7,953,544.80\n8,039,586.10\n7,772,511.59\n7,749,975.00\nOther Deposits\n1,552,644.56\n1,529,856.98\n1,530,705.58\n1,558,418.08\n1,538,865.52\n1,600,104.76\n1,604,901.44\n1,571,434.68\n1,460,819.34\n1,450,191.32\n1,401,725.04\n1,453,958.89\n1,458,797.16\nNarrow Money-M1\n4,159,668.08 4,289,915.52 4,522,784.87 4,580,471.34 4,887,138.64 4,897,638.55 5,399,586.98 5,832,933.38\n6,163,228.31\n6,503,353.48\n6,637,861.06\n6,318,552.70\n6,291,177.84\nTransferable Deposits\n4,046,287.46\n4,147,742.43\n4,369,406.07\n4,404,701.40\n4,690,977.34\n4,696,301.61\n5,199,733.27\n5,589,485.14\n5,875,303.92\n6,184,269.27\n6,305,923.18\n5,987,477.45\n5,959,338.10\nCurrency Outside Depository Corporations\n113,380.62\n142,173.09\n153,378.80\n175,769.94\n196,161.30\n201,336.94\n199,853.71\n243,448.24\n287,924.39\n319,084.21\n331,937.88\n331,075.25\n331,839.74\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2018\nNotes:\n(i) Depository corporations survey - formerly Monetary Survey.\n(ii) Broad money redefined using IMF's Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual of 2000. Major changes include exclusion of Government deposits held by banks from broad money.\n(iii) Transferable deposits made up of demand and savings deposits.\n(iv) NCDs are also referred to as securities included in broad money.\n(v) All classes of time deposits, short and long term are classified as time deposits, which are also termed other deposits.\n(vi) Credit to the private sector now excludes claims on other financial corporations, as well as claims on state and local government (local authorities)\n(vii) Depository corporations made up of the Central Bank and other depository corporations\n(viii) Other depository corporations (ODCs) - Commercial banks, merchant banks, building societies and POSB.\n(ix) In December 2017, the statistics were adjusted in restrospect by reclassifying Securities issued under Aftrades from claims on government to claims on central bank\n(x) In December 2017, the statistics were adjusted in restrospect by reclassifying amounts accessed by banks under the Aftrades from liabilities to Other Depository corporations and Other Financial Corporations to liabilities to Central Bank\nTABLE 1: DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS SURVEY (US$ '000)\n \n \n \n14 \n \n \nFeb-17\nMar-17\nApr-17\nMay-17\nJun-17\nJul-17\nAug-17\nSep-17\nOct-17\nNov-17\nDec-17\nJan-18\nFeb-18\nNet Foreign Assets\n-588,653.44\n-584,124.96\n-598,046.16\n-624,627.79\n-572,190.43\n-673,117.34\n-634,409.89\n-644,166.06\n-736,057.71\n-869,239.58 -1,126,260.86 -1,184,176.73\n-1,238,013.30\nClaims on Non Residents\n446,101.75\n420,146.58\n406,925.81\n381,126.20\n415,139.98\n380,195.83\n432,967.36\n442,659.91\n330,188.17\n316,883.48\n426,145.71\n296,246.77\n293,630.88\nOfficial Reserves Assets\n347,232.74\n320,724.81\n306,786.71\n281,496.90\n311,951.49\n217,201.99\n270,004.32\n281,012.34\n227,656.94\n205,053.80\n292,621.94\n158,151.02\n155,811.96\nOther Foreign Assets\n98,869.01\n99,421.78\n100,139.10\n99,629.30\n103,188.49\n162,993.84\n162,963.05\n161,647.57\n102,531.22\n111,829.68\n133,523.77\n138,095.75\n137,818.91\nLess Liabilities to Non Residents\n1,034,755.19\n1,004,271.54\n1,004,971.97\n1,005,753.98\n987,330.41\n1,053,313.17\n1,067,377.25\n1,086,825.97\n1,066,245.88\n1,186,123.05\n1,552,406.57\n1,480,423.50\n1,531,644.18\nShort Term Liabilities\n560,678.78\n528,171.18\n523,978.67\n523,548.11\n502,610.47\n563,024.67\n574,360.75\n593,884.47\n573,462.17\n693,209.75\n1,054,937.74\n983,052.84\n1,033,413.81\nOther Foreign Liabilities\n474,076.41\n476,100.37\n480,993.30\n482,205.88\n484,719.93\n490,288.49\n493,016.51\n492,941.50\n492,783.71\n492,913.31\n497,468.83\n497,370.66\n498,230.37\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n2,193,240.85\n2,188,550.14\n2,257,792.42\n2,349,975.84\n2,521,069.54\n2,737,322.28\n2,999,347.85\n3,105,441.82\n3,256,650.47\n3,578,707.96\n3,794,421.55\n3,659,970.31\n3,543,535.61\nDomestic Claims\n2,572,531.94\n2,546,698.82\n2,684,539.56\n2,853,418.83\n3,030,356.62\n3,245,039.24\n3,502,380.95\n3,713,000.64\n3,917,674.05\n4,231,837.20\n4,413,271.32\n4,407,396.99\n4,440,150.98\nNet Claims on Central Government\n2,330,293.48\n2,312,027.60\n2,422,625.19\n2,556,298.89\n2,740,989.49\n2,935,771.55\n3,213,236.07\n3,346,023.97\n3,517,656.29\n3,785,862.91\n3,945,500.57\n3,961,641.96\n3,980,727.56\nClaims on Central Government\n2,355,433.40\n2,337,736.86\n2,444,902.51\n2,578,541.50\n2,781,509.63\n2,976,316.75\n3,253,867.88\n3,386,569.83\n3,558,186.58\n3,826,415.91\n3,985,873.65\n4,002,809.96\n4,073,776.80\nOf which: Securities Other than Shares\n562,535.65\n551,741.20\n533,407.34\n537,150.63\n620,541.15\n640,269.72\n677,443.83\n641,160.04\n1,105,837.44\n1,153,434.17\n1,478,745.94\n1,481,110.28\n1,479,552.84\nLoans\n1,792,897.75\n1,785,995.66\n1,911,495.17\n2,041,390.87\n2,160,968.48\n2,336,047.02\n2,576,424.05\n2,745,409.80\n2,452,349.14\n2,672,981.75\n2,507,127.72\n2,521,699.68\n2,594,223.95\n Loans and Advances\n1,435,423.48\n1,464,915.87\n1,590,415.34\n1,720,310.96\n1,839,861.18\n2,014,968.77\n2,255,345.80\n2,426,555.62\n2,133,497.10\n2,354,104.05\n2,232,210.60\n2,246,782.40\n2,319,307.01\n Legacy Debt\n357,474.27\n321,079.79\n321,079.84\n321,079.91\n321,107.30\n321,078.25\n321,078.25\n318,854.18\n318,852.04\n318,877.70\n274,917.12\n274,917.28\n274,916.94\nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n25,139.92\n25,709.26\n22,277.32\n22,242.61\n40,520.14\n40,545.19\n40,631.81\n40,545.86\n40,530.28\n40,553.01\n40,373.09\n41,168.00\n93,049.24\nOf which: Deposits\n25,139.92\n25,709.26\n22,277.32\n22,242.61\n40,520.14\n40,545.19\n40,631.81\n40,545.86\n40,530.28\n40,553.01\n40,373.09\n41,168.00\n93,049.24\nOther \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nClaims on Other Sectors\n242,238.465\n234,671.229\n261,914.370\n297,119.940\n289,367.124\n309,267.684\n289,144.884\n366,976.666\n400,017.757\n445,974.296\n467,770.756\n445,755.028\n459,423.417\nOther Financial Corporations\n18,434.72\n18,570.34\n18,972.27\n19,413.25\n17,924.43\n18,367.00\n18,768.05\n19,232.50\n20,476.27\n20,253.71\n19,611.12\n19,721.47\n21,217.48\nState and Local Government\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n202,091.08\n194,340.40\n224,238.05\n257,713.90\n250,808.43\n269,176.70\n240,286.01\n323,632.04\n350,513.55\n395,553.41\n422,382.85\n411,830.12\n423,982.23\nPrivate Sector\n21,712.67\n21,760.49\n18,704.05\n19,992.79\n20,634.27\n21,723.98\n30,090.82\n24,112.13\n29,027.93\n30,167.18\n25,776.78\n14,203.44\n14,223.70\nClaims on Other Depository Corporations\n93,514.18\n104,865.33\n85,479.27\n50,810.90\n52,540.42\n43,316.48\n30,413.03\n40,885.26\n73,618.97\n166,428.64\n205,755.37\n204,516.36\n207,966.83\nOf which: Loans\n93,514.18\n104,865.33\n85,479.27\n50,810.90\n52,540.42\n43,316.48\n30,413.03\n40,885.26\n73,618.97\n166,428.64\n205,755.37\n204,516.36\n207,966.83\nOther Liabilities to ODCs\n264,018.11\n261,130.29\n305,203.40\n328,027.29\n322,885.34\n319,687.89\n362,778.93\n386,988.59\n423,416.48\n567,034.15\n619,142.24\n725,157.20\n894,833.23\nOf which: Aftrades Balances\n214,543.03\n240,485.80\n290,485.80\n300,443.03\n300,442.83\n300,443.03\n339,943.03\n339,943.03\n339,943.03\n399,943.03\n399,964.34\n434,271.39\n392,081.59\n Securities\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n6,000.00\n65,130.00\n142,380.00\n165,174.80\n239,009.68\n433,102.50\nOther Items(Net)\n208,787.15\n201,883.73\n207,023.01\n226,226.60\n238,942.17\n231,345.55\n170,667.19\n261,455.48\n311,226.08\n252,523.73\n205,462.90\n226,785.84\n209,748.97\nShares and Other Equity\n202,521.27\n203,258.37\n206,519.28\n220,031.93\n222,222.74\n215,716.92\n219,271.55\n228,502.18\n237,010.51\n234,173.10\n332,517.62\n331,769.05\n339,808.29\nOther Items(Net)\n-78,308.70\n-84,747.72\n-83,213.17\n-94,328.99\n-83,482.31\n-84,432.46\n-96,873.76\n-99,019.71\n-102,378.81\n-86,087.70\n-192,659.44\n-188,185.76\n-193,147.08\nLiabilities to Other Resident Sectors\n17,836.62\n15,583.78\n15,583.78\n15,583.78\n15,583.78\n15,583.78\n15,583.78\n16,172.43\n15,583.78\n15,583.78\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nDeposits and Securities Excluded from Base \n66,737.97\n67,789.29\n68,133.12\n84,939.87\n84,617.96\n84,477.31\n32,685.62\n115,800.59\n161,010.60\n88,854.55\n65,604.73\n83,202.55\n63,087.75\nMonetary Base Incl. foreign currency clearing balances\nMonetary Base \n1,604,587.411 1,604,425.179 1,659,746.254 1,725,348.049 1,948,879.104 2,064,204.942 2,364,937.964 2,461,275.759 2,520,592.752 2,709,468.388 2,668,160.697 2,475,793.573\n2,305,522.304\nBond Coins\n13,845.125\n20,385.149\n23,268.864\n25,819.605\n27,667.474\n28,763.070\n30,289.792\n35,089.724\n37,235.523\n42,063.416\n54,687.288\n63,474.085\n62,494.374\nBond Notes\n118,836.703\n134,347.604\n140,801.342\n163,388.941\n175,855.752\n179,722.240\n181,874.281\n220,358.199\n259,385.565\n286,809.559\n289,827.726\n291,016.987\n289,314.982\nLiabilities to ODCs\n1,467,941.594\n1,446,635.592\n1,492,786.162\n1,520,837.740\n1,728,301.189\n1,838,460.100\n2,135,122.534\n2,166,837.091\n2,181,116.178\n2,331,782.192\n2,286,227.877\n2,071,823.239\n1,908,121.603\nReserve Deposits\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\nOther\n1,467,941.594 1,446,635.592 1,492,786.162 1,520,837.740 1,728,301.189 1,838,460.100 2,135,122.534 2,166,837.091 2,181,116.178 2,331,782.192 2,286,227.877 2,071,823.239\n1,908,121.603\nPrivate Deposits\n3,963.989\n3,056.833\n2,889.886\n15,301.762\n17,054.689\n17,259.532\n17,651.358\n38,990.746\n42,855.486\n48,813.221\n37,417.806\n49,479.262\n45,591.345\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2018\nTABLE 2: CENTRAL BANK SURVEY (US$'000)\n \n \n \n15 \n \n \n \n \n \n16 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nForeign\nTOTAL\nEnd of\nNotes\nBond\n&\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \n Notes &\nCoin\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment\n1\nLocal Governemt\nPublic Enterprises\nOther\n2\nGovernment\nLocal \nPublic \nOther Institutional Units\n3\nOther cliams\nContigent Assets\nOther Assets\nNon Financial \nCoins\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\nGovernment\nEnterprises\nAssets\n2017\nJan\n20.21\n \n110.98\n1,454.99\n239.82\n132.7\n27.0\n1,654.5\n20.8\n15.4\n3.6\n15.9\n15.1\n69.2\n3,394.7\n57.5\n395.7\n383.4\n630.4\n8,642.1\nFeb\n19.30\n \n96.84\n1,488.48\n251.83\n145.1\n48.6\n1,714.0\n20.1\n15.5\n3.2\n15.0\n14.9\n68.9\n3,177.9\n236.8\n398.5\n400.0\n631.1\n8,746.0\nMar\n12.56\n \n66.43\n1,485.92\n260.51\n154.9\n53.5\n1,794.1\n18.7\n15.7\n3.8\n15.7\n15.7\n70.7\n3,460.5\n67.2\n422.4\n442.5\n635.1\n8,995.8\nApr\n10.69\n \n67.82\n1,495.25\n249.41\n219.3\n51.4\n1,954.0\n17.8\n15.8\n3.6\n15.8\n16.9\n74.5\n3,449.5\n24.6\n489.1\n398.8\n644.6\n9,199.0\nMay\n13.44\n \n56.94\n1,492.38\n272.47\n170.2\n75.3\n1,968.9\n20.3\n15.7\n33.6\n16.7\n16.3\n72.9\n3,447.8\n82.4\n486.1\n421.7\n644.4\n9,307.6\nJun\n7.36\n \n57.08\n1,674.91\n350.26\n92.1\n110.6\n2,014.2\n19.0\n16.0\n35.0\n47.9\n16.5\n82.9\n3,494.3\n92.8\n533.5\n408.9\n649.6\n9,702.8\nJul\n7.15\n \n45.19\n1,807.42\n302.34\n63.1\n103.6\n1,982.8\n17.2\n26.1\n34.4\n45.2\n16.9\n116.8\n3,417.1\n86.8\n513.6\n432.9\n635.8\n9,654.3\nAug\n12.31\n \n40.58\n2,061.85\n276.55\n165.3\n7.9\n2,100.9\n16.3\n26.3\n64.6\n41.3\n18.0\n145.5\n3,494.5\n78.6\n531.8\n403.7\n639.5\n10,125.5\nSep\n12.00\n \n38.06\n2,110.44\n226.79\n179.7\n31.3\n2,248.9\n16.1\n23.5\n65.0\n41.5\n15.6\n118.8\n3,554.4\n78.0\n472.8\n415.6\n655.1\n10,303.5\nOct\n8.70\n \n41.81\n2,139.31\n254.07\n190.8\n61.0\n2,372.1\n15.4\n24.4\n65.1\n34.8\n17.8\n99.6\n3,599.1\n82.0\n432.4\n459.3\n667.3\n10,564.9\nNov\n9.79\n \n46.09\n2,315.51\n289.76\n184.2\n74.3\n2,487.7\n18.8\n23.5\n65.4\n32.3\n19.6\n107.3\n3,608.7\n76.8\n417.7\n505.6\n672.5\n10,955.5\nDec\n12.58\n \n58.13\n2,592.00\n276.01\n213.4\n66.6\n2,397.2\n26.8\n23.5\n66.3\n29.4\n19.4\n145.5\n3,581.3\n92.2\n508.3\n509.3\n699.9\n11,317.7\n2018\nJan\n23.42\n \n66.89\n2,528.85\n216.11\n186.9\n79.7\n2,336.6\n34.5\n23.5\n65.9\n26.3\n20.6\n155.3\n3,462.6\n76.8\n501.0\n457.8\n699.5\n10,962.1\nFeb\n19.97\n \n46.80\n2,516.78\n272.61\n189.2\n87.4\n2,313.6\n33.5\n23.5\n66.1\n24.3\n21.1\n145.4\n3,526.9\n31.0\n507.8\n434.3\n697.8\n10,958.1\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2018\nNotes\n1.Government securities includes treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households, other financial corporations.\nTABLE 4.1: OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS -ASSETS\nUS$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \n \n17 \n \nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nCapital\nContigent\nOther\nTOTAL\nand\nLiablities\nLiablities\nEnd of\nDemand\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nRBZ\nOther Depository \nOther Finacial \nReserves\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\n2017\n Jan\n3,263.8\n720.5\n1,544.9\n5,529.3\n429.8\n53.1\n6,012.2\n50.6\n271.2\n0.0\n104.5\n41.1\n1,360.2\n395.7\n406.6\n8,642.14\n \n Feb\n3,325.9\n722.0\n1,552.6\n5,600.5\n426.0\n55.3\n6,081.7\n59.3\n270.8\n0.0\n126.1\n43.4\n1,365.8\n398.5\n400.4\n8,746.02\n \n Mar\n3,429.2\n715.7\n1,529.9\n5,674.7\n461.0\n86.9\n6,222.6\n60.2\n249.6\n1.8\n134.9\n41.9\n1,426.8\n422.4\n435.7\n8,995.81\n \n Apr\n3,555.8\n813.7\n1,530.7\n5,900.2\n450.9\n76.2\n6,427.3\n63.3\n251.1\n0.0\n117.4\n41.9\n1,382.2\n489.1\n426.7\n9,199.00\n \n May\n3,593.7\n798.7\n1,558.4\n5,950.8\n454.6\n75.1\n6,480.5\n61.4\n243.5\n0.0\n95.2\n42.2\n1,448.6\n486.1\n450.1\n9,307.64\n \n Jun\n3,851.4\n825.6\n1,538.9\n6,215.9\n497.6\n73.7\n6,787.2\n65.7\n259.5\n0.0\n108.9\n46.6\n1,455.9\n533.5\n445.6\n9,702.82\n \n Jul\n3,845.0\n837.2\n1,600.1\n6,282.3\n503.0\n78.1\n6,863.3\n66.3\n162.2\n0.0\n99.5\n35.6\n1,463.2\n513.6\n450.7\n9,654.29\n \n Aug\n4,257.2\n927.5\n1,604.9\n6,789.6\n451.2\n88.3\n7,329.1\n71.1\n158.2\n0.0\n79.1\n22.8\n1,478.4\n531.8\n454.9\n10,125.48\n \n Sep\n4,622.2\n932.4\n1,571.4\n7,126.0\n383.4\n55.2\n7,564.6\n55.8\n151.1\n0.0\n67.4\n32.1\n1,494.5\n472.8\n465.2\n10,303.53\n \n Oct\n4,825.8\n1,010.8\n1,460.8\n7,297.4\n410.7\n43.1\n7,751.2\n63.0\n153.9\n0.0\n73.1\n42.0\n1,537.5\n432.4\n511.7\n10,564.89\n \n Nov\n5,090.7\n1,047.9\n1,450.2\n7,588.7\n454.9\n34.7\n8,078.3\n66.5\n151.3\n0.0\n84.5\n60.2\n1,562.7\n417.7\n534.3\n10,955.47\n \n Dec\n5,144.5\n1,127.4\n1,401.7\n7,673.6\n407.8\n94.6\n8,176.0\n68.6\n173.1\n113.7\n100.7\n6.2\n1,663.1\n508.3\n508.1\n11,317.70\n \n2018\nJan\n4,932.8\n1,008.1\n1,454.0\n7,394.8\n406.5\n107.3\n7,908.7\n65.1\n152.3\n115.1\n49.1\n2.6\n1,645.2\n501.0\n523.2\n10,962.14\n \nFeb\n4,927.4\n989.2\n1,458.8\n7,375.4\n418.7\n101.2\n7,895.4\n75.4\n141.7\n111.2\n92.8\n2.9\n1,619.9\n507.8\n511.0\n10,958.12\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2018\nTABLE 4.2 : OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS - LIABILITIES \nDeposits\nAmounts Owing to\nUS$ millions\n \n \n \n18 \n \n \n \n \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nForeign\nBond\nNotes\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \nLocal\nPublic\nOther \nContigent \nNon Financial \n Notes &\n&\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment1\nLocal Governemt\nPublic Enterprises\nOther2\nGovernment\nGovernment\nEnterprises\n Institutional Units3\nOther claims\nAssets\nOther Assets\nAssets\nCoins\nCoin\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\n2017\nJan\n17.72\n \n103.75\n1,322.38\n81.89\n128.2\n27.0\n1,485.0\n0.0\n15.4\n3.6\n15.9\n15.1\n68.6\n2,467.7\n53.9\n395.7\n251.9\n479.3\n6,933.1\nFeb\n16.29\n \n89.44\n1,396.07\n96.11\n137.3\n48.6\n1,502.5\n0.0\n15.5\n3.2\n15.0\n14.9\n68.2\n2,238.9\n239.7\n398.5\n266.0\n480.1\n7,026.4\nMar\n10.74\n \n63.27\n1,421.43\n83.18\n150.7\n53.5\n1,578.7\n0.0\n15.7\n3.8\n15.7\n15.7\n69.9\n2,554.3\n23.7\n422.4\n314.5\n484.0\n7,281.0\nApr\n9.82\n \n64.14\n1,383.44\n75.92\n209.0\n51.4\n1,744.4\n0.0\n15.8\n3.6\n15.8\n16.9\n74.0\n2,493.3\n26.4\n489.1\n263.7\n492.6\n7,429.3\nMay\n12.36\n \n52.63\n1,376.30\n119.89\n159.1\n75.3\n1,739.8\n0.0\n15.7\n33.6\n16.7\n16.3\n72.4\n2,528.3\n28.4\n486.1\n290.7\n492.0\n7,515.6\nJun\n7.01\n \n53.33\n1,578.51\n141.42\n82.2\n110.6\n1,786.8\n0.0\n16.0\n35.0\n47.9\n16.5\n82.2\n2,583.5\n23.9\n533.5\n273.6\n497.3\n7,869.2\nJul\n6.71\n \n40.92\n1,684.48\n137.62\n53.7\n103.6\n1,752.4\n0.0\n26.1\n34.4\n45.2\n16.9\n116.3\n2,495.4\n24.2\n513.6\n295.5\n482.1\n7,829.0\nAug\n11.80\n \n37.09\n1,882.39\n124.33\n161.2\n7.9\n1,856.2\n0.0\n26.3\n64.6\n41.3\n18.0\n145.0\n2,538.1\n23.8\n531.8\n272.6\n485.7\n8,228.1\nSep\n11.43\n \n35.83\n1,961.76\n109.59\n172.7\n31.3\n1,998.0\n0.0\n23.5\n65.0\n41.5\n15.6\n118.2\n2,585.7\n28.3\n472.8\n281.3\n487.7\n8,440.0\nOct\n8.10\n \n40.49\n1,961.82\n143.68\n175.7\n61.0\n2,106.6\n0.0\n24.4\n65.1\n34.8\n17.8\n99.1\n2,607.0\n29.4\n432.4\n287.8\n508.9\n8,604.1\nNov\n9.04\n \n45.09\n2,126.74\n161.14\n174.7\n74.3\n2,230.4\n0.0\n23.5\n65.4\n32.3\n19.6\n106.9\n2,618.1\n26.4\n417.7\n324.2\n511.4\n8,966.9\nDec\n11.43\n \n55.32\n2,373.95\n141.47\n203.5\n66.6\n2,128.7\n0.0\n23.5\n66.3\n29.4\n19.4\n145.0\n2,579.8\n40.0\n508.3\n324.5\n536.4\n9,253.6\n2018\nJan\n22.40\n \n64.10\n2,294.49\n117.08\n178.4\n79.7\n2,143.2\n0.0\n23.5\n65.9\n26.3\n20.6\n154.8\n2,451.1\n30.9\n501.0\n294.2\n538.9\n9,006.6\nFeb\n18.34\n \n43.97\n2,296.76\n148.72\n183.3\n87.4\n2,109.3\n0.0\n23.5\n66.1\n24.3\n21.1\n145.0\n2,461.5\n37.4\n507.8\n290.6\n536.3\n9,001.5\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2018\nNotes\n1.Government securities include treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households, other financial corporations, \nTABLE 5.1: COMMERCIAL BANKS -ASSETS\nUS$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \n \n19 \n \n \n \n \nUS$ millions\nEnd of\nDemand\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nCapital\nContigent\nOther\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\nand\nLiablities\nLiablities\nTOTAL\nReserves\n2017\n Jan\n3,205.0\n317.1\n981.8\n4503.86\n348.3\n30.4\n4,882.6\n36.9\n242.1\n0.0\n38.0\n40.4\n1,005.1\n395.7\n292.2\n6,933.07\n \n Feb\n3,267.0\n318.3\n977.1\n4562.41\n349.8\n32.6\n4,944.9\n47.5\n243.9\n0.0\n63.7\n42.9\n1,007.7\n398.5\n277.4\n7,026.43\n \n Mar\n3,370.3\n313.3\n965.3\n4648.90\n390.8\n64.2\n5,103.9\n50.6\n225.6\n1.8\n66.3\n41.5\n1,061.6\n422.4\n307.3\n7,281.03\n \n Apr\n3,496.9\n328.5\n960.8\n4786.12\n380.3\n54.3\n5,220.7\n52.8\n228.3\n0.0\n63.3\n41.7\n1,034.4\n489.1\n299.0\n7,429.28\n \n May\n3,534.8\n331.2\n979.7\n4845.74\n384.0\n53.4\n5,283.1\n50.8\n220.4\n0.0\n29.0\n41.9\n1,092.7\n486.1\n311.6\n7,515.61\n \n Jun\n3,792.5\n332.7\n949.8\n5075.08\n423.9\n51.7\n5,550.7\n54.9\n237.5\n0.0\n43.7\n45.8\n1,095.2\n533.5\n308.0\n7,869.22\n \n Jul\n3,786.1\n326.0\n1,021.7\n5133.85\n432.5\n56.2\n5,622.6\n55.3\n140.0\n0.0\n42.2\n35.3\n1,096.8\n513.6\n323.2\n7,829.03\n \n Aug\n4,198.3\n342.7\n1,010.3\n5551.37\n380.7\n66.3\n5,998.3\n58.3\n136.9\n0.0\n41.8\n22.5\n1,116.1\n531.8\n322.4\n8,228.06\n \n Sep\n4,561.7\n355.5\n1,003.7\n5920.98\n303.1\n32.7\n6,256.8\n42.3\n133.7\n0.0\n50.4\n31.9\n1,129.8\n472.8\n322.3\n8,440.05\n \n Oct\n4,771.6\n340.7\n927.8\n6040.15\n329.8\n21.1\n6,391.1\n50.8\n127.5\n0.0\n52.5\n41.7\n1,167.6\n432.4\n340.5\n8,604.14\n \n Nov\n5,036.5\n380.1\n918.9\n6335.46\n349.5\n12.7\n6,697.6\n54.0\n124.7\n0.0\n61.8\n59.9\n1,189.6\n417.7\n361.6\n8,966.85\n \n Dec\n5,143.9\n409.2\n850.3\n6403.38\n302.6\n72.1\n6,778.1\n56.5\n147.2\n113.7\n78.0\n5.7\n1,205.7\n508.3\n360.4\n9,253.57\n \n2018\nJan\n4,932.7\n369.3\n903.3\n6205.22\n301.3\n85.0\n6,591.5\n53.6\n126.2\n115.1\n26.2\n2.4\n1,205.0\n501.0\n385.6\n9,006.62\n \nFeb\n4,927.4\n375.8\n920.2\n6223.43\n298.5\n78.6\n6,600.5\n58.1\n115.4\n111.2\n59.1\n2.4\n1,174.8\n507.8\n372.1\n9,001.50\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2018\nTABLE 5.2 : COMMERCIAL BANKS - LIABILITIES\nDeposits\nAmounts Owing to\n \n \n \n20 \n \n \n \n \nForeign\nOther Assets\nNon Financial \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nNotes\nAssets\nBond\n&\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \n Notes &\nCoin\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment1\nLocal Governemt\nPublic Enterprises\nOther2\nMortgages\nGovernment\nOther\nCoins\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\n2017\nJan\n2.35\n \n7.02\n109.63\n157.70\n4.3\n0.0\n123.7\n20.8\n0.0\n0.0\n389.1\n0.0\n406.1\n106.3\n124.4\n1,451.4\nFeb\n1.19\n \n7.29\n69.26\n155.60\n7.4\n0.0\n162.0\n20.1\n0.0\n0.0\n394.4\n0.0\n410.1\n109.0\n124.2\n1,460.4\nMar\n1.65\n \n3.07\n35.53\n177.16\n4.0\n0.0\n164.2\n18.7\n0.0\n0.0\n404.4\n0.0\n413.0\n102.8\n124.2\n1,448.6\nApr\n0.74\n \n3.56\n73.43\n173.28\n9.8\n0.0\n158.6\n17.8\n0.0\n0.0\n392.5\n0.0\n432.3\n109.7\n125.1\n1,496.8\nMay\n0.92\n \n3.94\n81.47\n152.32\n10.8\n0.0\n168.2\n20.3\n0.0\n0.0\n394.4\n0.0\n451.1\n105.9\n126.1\n1,515.4\nJun\n0.34\n \n3.66\n65.90\n208.75\n9.8\n0.0\n165.3\n19.0\n0.0\n0.0\n387.6\n0.0\n452.9\n109.6\n126.0\n1,548.8\nJul\n0.39\n \n3.93\n105.83\n164.58\n9.2\n0.0\n168.4\n17.2\n0.0\n0.0\n391.9\n0.0\n451.9\n110.9\n127.3\n1,551.5\nAug\n0.44\n \n3.09\n142.75\n152.03\n3.9\n0.0\n186.7\n16.3\n0.0\n0.0\n409.3\n0.0\n465.5\n104.7\n127.2\n1,611.9\nSep\n0.56\n \n1.82\n108.41\n116.96\n6.7\n0.0\n193.0\n16.1\n0.0\n0.0\n412.7\n0.0\n475.2\n113.4\n130.1\n1,574.8\nOct\n0.57\n \n1.15\n145.68\n110.02\n14.8\n0.0\n193.9\n15.4\n0.0\n0.0\n420.7\n0.0\n493.6\n149.9\n130.4\n1,676.0\nNov\n0.75\n \n0.90\n138.84\n128.42\n8.7\n0.0\n193.6\n18.8\n0.0\n0.0\n420.9\n0.0\n489.0\n160.4\n133.0\n1,693.3\nDec\n1.05\n \n2.59\n170.60\n134.30\n9.1\n0.0\n195.1\n26.8\n0.0\n0.0\n402.3\n0.0\n516.8\n163.2\n135.5\n1,757.3\n2018\nJan\n0.90\n \n2.25\n197.37\n98.73\n7.8\n0.0\n129.8\n34.5\n0.0\n0.0\n413.2\n0.0\n508.7\n144.9\n136.1\n1,674.3\nFeb\n1.52\n \n1.78\n172.37\n123.48\n5.5\n0.0\n141.3\n33.5\n0.0\n0.0\n414.8\n0.0\n507.9\n125.7\n135.7\n1,663.6\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2018\nNotes\n1.Government securities include treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households, other financial corporations, \nTABLE 6.1: BUILDING SOCIETIES -ASSETS\nUS$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \n \n21 \n \nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nCapital\nOther\nTOTAL\nand\nLiablities\nEnd of\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nReserves\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\n2017\n Jan\n326.2\n522.1\n848.23\n81.5\n16.6\n946.4\n25.0\n29.1\n0.0\n66.5\n0.7\n332.1\n51.7\n1,451.40\n \n Feb\n326.1\n534.4\n860.48\n76.2\n16.6\n953.3\n23.1\n27.0\n0.0\n62.4\n0.5\n334.5\n59.7\n1,460.43\n \n Mar\n319.7\n523.2\n842.91\n70.2\n16.7\n929.9\n20.9\n24.0\n0.0\n68.5\n0.3\n340.7\n64.3\n1,448.62\n \n Apr\n399.6\n527.1\n926.64\n70.6\n16.0\n1,013.2\n21.8\n22.8\n0.0\n54.0\n0.2\n322.5\n62.3\n1,496.83\n \n May\n378.0\n536.0\n914.03\n70.7\n16.1\n1,000.8\n21.8\n23.0\n0.0\n66.2\n0.4\n325.8\n77.4\n1,515.45\n \n Jun\n401.8\n544.4\n946.24\n70.7\n16.5\n1,033.4\n22.0\n22.0\n0.0\n65.2\n0.8\n330.0\n75.4\n1,548.79\n \n Jul\n430.3\n531.5\n961.78\n70.4\n16.1\n1,048.3\n22.2\n22.2\n0.0\n57.3\n0.3\n334.5\n66.8\n1,551.54\n \n Aug\n495.3\n546.5\n1041.77\n70.6\n16.3\n1,128.6\n24.0\n21.3\n0.0\n37.4\n0.4\n328.9\n71.4\n1,611.94\n \n Sep\n488.5\n517.9\n1006.46\n80.3\n16.7\n1,103.4\n24.8\n17.4\n0.0\n17.0\n0.2\n334.0\n78.0\n1,574.82\n \n Oct\n583.1\n475.2\n1058.27\n80.9\n16.2\n1,155.4\n23.4\n26.4\n0.0\n20.6\n0.3\n338.0\n111.8\n1,675.97\n \n Nov\n570.3\n473.5\n1043.76\n105.4\n16.3\n1,165.4\n23.7\n26.6\n0.0\n22.7\n0.3\n341.5\n113.0\n1,693.33\n \n Dec\n608.2\n496.6\n1104.85\n105.2\n16.5\n1,226.6\n23.4\n25.9\n0.0\n22.7\n0.5\n371.7\n86.7\n1,757.28\n \n2018\nJan\n544.7\n497.1\n1041.72\n105.2\n16.4\n1,163.3\n22.8\n26.1\n0.0\n22.9\n0.2\n362.1\n77.0\n1,674.26\n \nFeb\n512.0\n480.5\n992.48\n120.3\n16.8\n1,129.5\n28.5\n26.3\n0.0\n33.6\n0.5\n366.0\n79.2\n1,663.63\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2018\nAmounts Owing to\nTABLE 6.2: BUILDING SOCIETIES -LIABILITIES\nUS$ millions\n \n \n \n22 \n \n \n \nAGRICULTURE\nCONSTRUCTION\nCOMMUNICATION\nDISTRIBUTION\nFINANCIAL &\nFINANCIAL\nMANUFACTURING\nMINING\nSERVICES\nTRANSPORT\nINDIVIDUALS\nCONGLOMERATES\nTOTAL\nEND OF\n \n \n \nINVESTMENTS\nORGANISATIONS\n \n \n \n \n2017\nJan\n448,344.7\n41,732.8\n22,069.3\n264,734.2\n12,019.3\n270,117.2\n350,757.1\n144,447.3\n394,945.0\n40,975.0\n591,245.7\n11,489.3\n2,592,877.1\nFeb\n436,206.2\n40,112.3\n24,467.5\n269,358.3\n12,146.8\n272,314.8\n361,416.8\n143,990.4\n373,445.1\n40,250.7\n568,686.3\n11,227.9\n2,553,623.0\nMar\n425,496.8\n54,688.4\n25,533.4\n275,500.1\n12,241.8\n290,985.3\n349,722.5\n159,101.0\n359,672.5\n37,864.1\n572,233.3\n13,047.7\n2,576,086.9\nApr\n426,696.6\n43,836.6\n18,145.2\n340,025.3\n12,219.1\n271,824.0\n360,945.8\n134,101.0\n350,475.1\n42,208.4\n571,000.5\n12,492.9\n2,583,970.5\nMay\n428,874.0\n43,427.0\n16,689.0\n322,695.4\n12,252.6\n269,976.3\n360,929.9\n117,479.9\n354,102.7\n41,337.5\n569,798.9\n11,923.7\n2,549,487.0\nJun\n431,677.5\n45,018.0\n16,989.2\n311,641.4\n14,435.6\n266,917.5\n343,590.2\n126,542.8\n417,469.8\n37,849.5\n595,749.5\n12,001.6\n2,619,882.5\nJul\n459,128.0\n52,500.1\n11,717.0\n255,319.0\n14,541.0\n255,591.2\n311,364.4\n131,420.5\n422,799.8\n39,630.7\n609,112.5\n14,464.3\n2,577,588.5\nAug\n457,861.9\n52,622.6\n11,736.0\n262,602.7\n17,438.9\n256,802.3\n313,868.5\n138,714.9\n420,653.6\n41,089.3\n617,686.4\n15,194.2\n2,606,271.3\nSep\n457,157.2\n48,477.1\n12,117.9\n340,506.4\n21,660.1\n265,082.3\n331,929.6\n124,822.8\n393,491.3\n41,117.0\n619,867.0\n16,061.2\n2,672,289.8\nOct\n460,475.1\n46,588.0\n12,273.6\n329,020.8\n21,810.6\n262,118.2\n317,587.0\n126,041.6\n383,374.3\n41,351.4\n634,561.2\n16,061.2\n2,651,263.1\nNov\n477,486.1\n46,318.3\n12,005.2\n323,990.0\n21,811.0\n261,421.1\n316,225.5\n123,307.2\n379,542.7\n32,215.3\n649,034.3\n16,061.2\n2,659,418.0\nDec\n489,695.6\n54,162.9\n10,119.0\n334,030.3\n21,844.6\n269,399.3\n307,802.0\n126,719.0\n375,161.7\n31,701.6\n621,421.9\n13,938.1\n2,655,996.0\n2018\nJan\n479,109.6\n59,336.8\n9,442.4\n289,531.3\n20,569.7\n258,035.0\n271,453.8\n106,425.1\n390,052.9\n32,328.6\n617,303.0\n14,394.7\n2,547,982.8\nFeb\n488,203.1\n59.,977.6\n9,271.6\n315,569.6\n20,133.1\n258,263.6\n285,045.1\n108,649.0\n393,604.9\n31,636.6\n618,377.4\n15,010.6\n2,603,742.4\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2018\n/1 Including the only merchant bank still in operation.\nTABLE 7.1 : SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS LOANS AND ADVANCES/1\nUS$ ('000)\n \n \n \n23 \n \n \nEND OF\nAGRICULTURE CONSTRUCTION COMMUNICATIONS\nDISTRIBUTION\nFINANCIAL &\nFINANCIAL\nMANUFACTURING\nMINING\nSERVICES\nTRANSPORT\nINDIVIDUALS\nCONGLOMERATES\nTOTAL\nINVESTMENTS ORGANISATIONS\n \n2017\nJan\n236,437.3\n108,552.5\n230,965.4\n618,213.5\n339,580.3\n1,002,775.4\n382,746.3\n86,115.0\n1,393,941.2\n82,670.8\n589,549.9\n85,602.3\n5,157,150.0\nFeb\n254,463.9\n112,294.4\n226,877.9\n613,080.1\n312,948.5\n997,181.2\n393,542.8\n121,798.7\n1,402,647.6\n91,521.7\n604,325.0\n84,653.3\n5,215,335.3\nMar\n299,519.0\n118,530.1\n232,990.6\n626,986.6\n308,297.9\n1,049,255.7\n402,864.2\n170,835.1\n1,400,323.5\n102,287.7\n610,024.4\n91,046.0\n5,412,960.9\nApr\n281,219.8\n117,174.3\n235,093.5\n687,962.2\n307,711.4\n1,013,362.6\n400,018.9\n190,005.8\n1,432,953.1\n110,258.7\n650,595.9\n102,681.0\n5,529,037.2\nMay\n301,531.2\n113,685.5\n220,541.8\n679,781.4\n320,878.2\n1,019,941.1\n417,418.5\n175,383.4\n1,454,718.3\n108,366.5\n667,019.7\n71,770.2\n5,551,035.8\nJun\n295,920.4\n109,938.0\n248,436.3\n712,648.0\n334,368.7\n1,121,023.5\n408,604.0\n185,262.3\n1,521,876.3\n107,327.1\n697,997.7\n74,195.4\n5,817,597.8\nJul\n309,864.7\n126,628.5\n262,827.7\n587,617.1\n341,371.5\n1,143,423.8\n423,846.6\n191,273.6\n1,599,344.4\n99,509.8\n680,622.6\n76,164.4\n5,842,494.6\nAug\n302,611.3\n149,014.9\n296,550.6\n914,686.8\n346,236.8\n1,131,207.5\n453,584.0\n169,521.2\n1,562,637.2\n111,394.6\n746,644.5\n90,999.4\n6,275,088.8\nSep\n348,786.3\n146,383.0\n286,092.4\n796,517.1\n340,224.7\n1,072,979.9\n571,373.7\n211,077.0\n1,705,640.6\n122,645.6\n747,874.4\n72,255.0\n6,421,849.6\nOct\n345,521.0\n138,274.9\n238,975.9\n778,597.1\n355,135.9\n1,138,203.7\n565,046.4\n259,285.2\n1,694,691.4\n123,908.8\n741,652.0\n72,255.0\n6,451,547.3\nNov\n336,339.3\n144,708.5\n239,524.3\n927,820.8\n362,515.4\n986,824.6\n629,010.4\n250,132.7\n1,694,043.5\n131,768.3\n761,400.5\n72,255.0\n6,536,343.3\nDec\n317,794.8\n160,261.7\n284,829.7\n890,549.4\n375,616.4\n1,073,707.0\n686,933.4\n257,197.2\n1,712,823.9\n143,466.1\n711,031.6\n62,444.8\n6,676,655.9\n2018\nJan\n380,283.8\n151,436.0\n257,298.2\n918,787.6\n365,354.6\n1,050,097.7\n652,999.0\n248,933.0\n1,757,391.8\n141,913.2\n669,049.8\n67,904.7\n6,661,449.4\nFeb\n455,217.0\n224,070.1\n263,961.9\n897,453.2\n399,016.2\n949,795.6\n674,828.4\n354,052.8\n1,701,611.4\n107,779.5\n680.,060.2\n67,686.4\n6,775,532.7\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2018\n TABLE 7.2: SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS DEPOSITS \nUS$ ('000)\n \n24 \n \n \nEnd Period\nNominal Lending \nRates 1\nIndividuals \nCorporate\n2017 \nJan\n4.00-18.00\n10.61\n6.68\nFeb\n4.00-18.00\n10.06\n6.52\nMar\n4.00-18.00\n9.12\n7.02\nApr\n4.00-18.00\n9.25\n7.02\nMay\n4.00-18.00\n9.17\n7.03\nJun\n4.00-18.00\n9.01\n7.05\nJul\n4.00-18.00\n8.94\n7.05\nAug\n4.00-18.00\n8.88\n6.95\nSep\n4.45-18.00\n8.86\n7.01\nOct\n4.45-18.00\n9.66\n7.06\nNov\n4.45-18.00\n9.66\n7.03\nDec\n4.45-18.00\n9.39\n7.00\n2018\nJan\n4.45-18.00\n9.33\n6.99\nFeb\n4.45-18.00\n9.57\n6.93\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2018\nNotes\nTABLE 8.1: LENDING RATES (percent per annum)\n1. Nominal lending rates depict the range of rates quoted by banks.\nCommercial Banks\nRates\n \n \n \n25 \n \n \nEND OF\nSAVINGS\n3 MONTHS\n2017 \nJan\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-17.00\nFeb\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-17.00\nMar\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-17.00\nApr\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-17.00\nMay\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-9.50**\nJun\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-12.00\nJul\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-12.00\nAug\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-12.00\nSep\n0.50-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nOct\n0.50-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nNov\n0.50-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nDec\n0.50-12.00\n0.75-8.00\n2018\nJan\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nFeb\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\n Source:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2018\n* Deposit rates depict the range of rates qouted by banks. \n **Banks have adjusted their costs of holding deposits following the call by the RBZ to reduce lending rates. \nTABLE 8.2 : BANK DEPOSIT RATES (percent per annum)\nCOMMERCIAL BANKS\n \n 26 \n \n \nFOOD \nINFLATION\nALL\nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES \nCLOTHING\nHOUSING, \nWATER,\nFURNITURE\nHEALTH\nTRANSPORT\nCOMMUNICATION\nRECREATION \n&\nEDUCATION\nRESTAURANTS \n&\nMISC.\nTOTAL NON\nFOOD & \nITEMS\n& TOBACCO\nFOOTWEAR\nELECTRICTY, \nGAS\nAND\nCULTURE\nHOTELS\nGOODS &\nFOOD\nNON \nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES\n& OTHER\nEQUIPMENT\nSERVICES\nFUELS\nWEIGHTS\n4.38\n6.05\n17.74\n9.91\n2.16\n9.76\n3.41\n2.1\n5.67\n1.38\n3.91\n66.47\n33.53\n100\n2017 \nJan\n0.00\n-0.15\n0.10\n0.34\n-0.15\n-0.75\n0.44\n0.27\n0.00\n0.29\n0.08\n-0.03\n0.80\n0.23\nFeb\n-0.09\n-0.14\n0.13\n0.70\n-0.03\n0.11\n0.00\n-0.04\n0.00\n0.18\n0.52\n0.17\n1.56\n0.61\nMar\n0.15\n0.03\n-0.07\n0.64\n0.11\n0.21\n-0.02\n0.18\n0.00\n0.01\n0.36\n0.15\n-0.21\n0.03\nApr\n-0.11\n0.02\n0.04\n0.06\n-0.04\n0.00\n0.05\n0.02\n2.02\n0.34\n-0.07\n0.25\n-0.36\n0.05\nMay\n0.13\n0.09\n-0.01\n0.02\n0.13\n0.04\n0.00\n-0.21\n0.00\n-0.39\n-0.09\n0.01\n0.07\n0.03\nJun\n0.21\n0.03\n-0.82\n0.38\n-0.03\n-0.18\n0.00\n0.18\n0.00\n0.29\n0.33\n-0.14\n-0.45\n-0.24\nJul\n0.19\n0.01\n0.01\n-0.06\n0.01\n-0.23\n-0.08\n0.05\n-2.81\n1.10\n0.11\n-0.33\n-0.42\n-0.36\nAug\n-0.18\n0.10\n0.06\n0.05\n0.03\n0.00\n0.03\n0.13\n0.00\n0.00\n0.06\n0.03\n-0.47\n-0.13\nSep\n0.02\n0.45\n0.24\n1.10\n0.07\n-0.31\n0.14\n0.64\n0.00\n0.05\n0.12\n0.25\n0.66\n0.38\nOct\n0.63\n1.44\n0.24\n3.49\n1.07\n1.08\n0.37\n3.08\n0.00\n0.45\n2.66\n1.20\n2.27\n1.54\nNov\n0.28\n0.62\n0.06\n1.32\n0.38\n0.29\n-0.04\n1.14\n-1.43\n-0.72\n1.10\n0.26\n1.74\n0.74\nDec\n0.28\n0.72\n-0.43\n0.45\n0.01\n0.29\n-0.01\n0.78\n0.00\n0.49\n0.74\n0.16\n1.29\n0.53\n2018\nJan\n0.17\n0.67\n0.02\n0.55\n0.10\n0.00\n-0.04\n1.78\n0.00\n-0.16\n0.64\n0.25\n0.39\n0.30\nFeb\n0.26\n0.91\n0.01\n0.43\n0.00\n-0.02\n0.15\n0.90\n0.00\n0.01\n0.21\n0.21\n-0.18\n0.08\nSource:Zimstat, 2018\nNON-FOOD INFLATION\nTABLE 9.1 : MONTHLY INFLATION - % CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \n( December 2012 = 100)\n \n \n \n27 \n \n \nF OOD \nIN F LA TION\nA LC OHOLIC \nC LOTHIN G\nHOUS IN G, \nWA TER ,\nF UR N ITUR E\nM IS C .\nF OOD & \nB EVER A GES \n& \nELEC TR IC T\nY, GA S\nA N D\nR EC R EA TION \n&\nR ES TA UR A N TS \n&\nGOOD S &\nTOTA L N ON\nN ON \nA LC OHOLIC \nA LL\n& TOB A C C O\nF OOTWEA R\n& OTHER\nEQUIP M EN T\nC ULTUR E\nHOTELS\nS ER VIC ES\nF OOD\nB EVER A GES\nITEM S\nF UELS\n2017\nJan\n-0.47\n-1.52\n-2.16\n-0.62\n-0.68\n-1.76\n-1.44\n0.20\n3.49\n-0.02\n-0.62\n-0.82\n-0.30\n-0.65\nFeb\n-0.42\n-1.66\n-1.91\n0.26\n-0.53\n-1.29\n-1.31\n0.18\n3.49\n0.24\n-0.05\n-0.51\n1.29\n0.06\nMar\n-0.13\n-1.45\n-0.95\n1.64\n-0.30\n-0.79\n-1.74\n0.40\n0.12\n0.87\n0.92\n-0.25\n1.21\n0.21\nApr\n-0.26\n-1.29\n-0.89\n2.03\n-0.33\n-0.86\n-1.61\n0.44\n2.16\n1.30\n1.21\n0.08\n1.35\n0.48\nMay\n0.15\n-0.98\n-1.01\n2.16\n-0.01\n-0.71\n0.00\n0.17\n2.16\n0.88\n1.46\n0.21\n1.92\n0.75\nJun\n0.29\n-0.74\n-2.39\n2.52\n-0.19\n-0.81\n0.00\n0.59\n-0.48\n0.86\n1.70\n-0.37\n1.82\n0.31\nJul\n0.47\n-0.58\n-2.43\n2.41\n-0.03\n-1.01\n0.29\n0.55\n-3.28\n1.93\n2.12\n-0.67\n1.92\n0.14\nAug\n0.35\n-0.26\n-2.37\n2.50\n0.02\n-0.88\n0.33\n0.78\n-3.28\n1.92\n2.05\n-0.60\n1.76\n0.14\nSep\n0.27\n0.22\n-1.05\n3.91\n0.12\n-1.11\n0.57\n1.69\n-3.28\n1.97\n2.07\n-0.01\n2.49\n0.78\nOct\n0.95\n1.91\n-0.68\n7.47\n1.22\n0.02\n0.94\n4.84\n-3.28\n2.49\n4.61\n1.25\n4.40\n2.24\nNov\n1.17\n2.62\n-0.62\n8.78\n1.67\n-0.02\n0.89\n5.83\n-2.25\n1.76\n5.62\n1.74\n5.65\n2.97\nDec\n1.51\n3.27\n-0.45\n8.77\n1.57\n0.55\n0.89\n6.35\n-2.26\n2.09\n6.04\n2.00\n6.60\n3.46\n2018\nJan\n1.68\n4.12\n-0.52\n9.00\n1.82\n1.30\n0.41\n7.95\n-2.25\n1.63\n6.64\n2.29\n6.17\n3.52\nFeb\n2.00\n5.21\n-0.65\n8.71\n1.84\n1.17\n0.56\n8.96\n-2.25\n1.45\n6.31\n2.33\n4.35\n2.98\nSource:Zimstat, 2018\nC OM M UN IC A TION\nTR A N S P OR T\nHEA LTH\nED UC A TION\nN ON -F OOD IN F LA TION\nTABLE 9.2 : YEARLY INFLATION - % CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \n(December 2012 = 100)\n \n \n \n28 \n \n \n \n \n(US$ millions)\nEnd Period\n2000\n2001\n2002\n2003\n2004\n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\n2014\n2015\n2016\n2017\nLong-Term External Debt\n3,227\n3,255\n3,327\n3,644\n3,927\n3,805\n3,965\n4,032\n4,464\n4,951\n5,175\n6,096\n6,607\n7,370\n8,444\n8,426\n8,656\n8,977\nGovernment\n2,249\n2,328\n2,376\n2,617\n2,844\n2,895\n3,024\n3,054\n3,464\n4,037\n4,095\n4,638\n4,929\n5,012\n4,522\n5,293\n5,365\n5,638\nBilateral Creditors\n1,050\n1,115\n1,107\n1,255\n1,455\n1,438\n1,520\n1,520\n1,863\n2,308\n2,325\n2,597\n2,694\n2,928\n2,445\n3,310\n3,479\n3,654\nMultilateral Creditors\n1,199\n1,213\n1,269\n1,362\n1,389\n1,457\n1,504\n1,524\n1,592\n1,729\n1,770\n2,041\n2,235\n2,084\n2,078\n1,982\n1,886\n1,984\nPrivate Creditors\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n10\n10\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPublic Enterprises\n534\n568\n616\n698\n714\n709\n766\n790\n825\n857\n938\n1,092\n1,198\n1,356\n1,661\n1,220\n1,370\n1,419\nBilateral Creditors\n301\n315\n351\n403\n442\n439\n464\n474\n497\n453\n238\n711\n703\n858\n1,155\n760\n779\n837\nMultilateral Creditors\n233\n253\n265\n295\n272\n270\n302\n316\n327\n403\n700\n382\n495\n498\n506\n460\n591\n582\nPrivate Creditors\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nMonetary Authorities\n292\n292\n279\n288\n291\n144\n130\n137\n140\n140\n138\n127\n125\n125\n120\n110\n0\n0\nMultilateral Creditors - IMF\n292\n292\n279\n288\n291\n144\n130\n137\n140\n140\n138\n127\n125\n125\n120\n110\n0\n0\nPrivate\n152\n67\n56\n41\n78\n57\n45\n51\n35\n57\n142\n366\n480\n1,002\n2,261\n1,913\n1,920\n1,960\nShort-Term External Debt\n298\n167\n183\n169\n144\n173\n281\n387\n226\n1,198\n1,382\n1,289\n890\n1,564\n2,394\n2,258\n2,304\n2,271\nSupplier's Credits\n42\n13\n26\n51\n69\n107\n122\n178\n41\n193\n286\n134\n30\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nReserve Bank\n642\n642\n618\n614\n614\n587\n587\n573\n490\nPrivate\n256\n154\n157\n118\n75\n66\n159\n209\n185\n363\n454\n537\n246\n950\n1,807\n1,671\n1,731\n1,781\nTotal External Debt\n3,525\n3,422\n3,510\n3,812\n4,071\n3,978\n4,246\n4,419\n4,690\n6,149\n6,557\n7,385\n7,497\n8,934\n10,838\n10,684\n10,960\n11,299\nSource: Ministry of Finance & Economic Development, 2017; & Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2017\nTABLE 10: ZIMBABWE: EXTERNAL DEBT OUTSTANDING BY DEBTOR (INCLUDING ALL ARREARS)\n \n29 \n \n \n \nSOUTH ARFICAN\nBOTSWANA\nJAPANESE\nEURO/2\nPOUND\nEND OF\nRAND/1\nPULA/1\nYEN/1\nSTERLING/2\n2017\nJan\n13.5146\n10.5652\n113.4750\n1.0701\n1.2516\nFeb\n12.9957\n10.3573\n112.5100\n1.0591\n1.2439\nMar\n13.5450\n10.5541\n111.8750\n1.0678\n1.2487\nApr\n13.3461\n10.4384\n111.1600\n1.0862\n1.2908\nMay\n13.1162\n10.2987\n110.9650\n1.1168\n1.2801\nJun\n13.0150\n10.2249\n111.9450\n1.1439\n1.3013\nJul\n12.9986\n10.2093\n110.5150\n1.1734\n1.3127\nAug\n13.0153\n10.1368\n110.5500\n1.1873\n1.2920\nSep\n13.5463\n10.3252\n112.6750\n1.1777\n1.3416\nOct\n14.0603\n10.5319\n113.1150\n1.1630\n1.3209\nNov\n13.6625\n10.3199\n112.1250\n1.1867\n1.3470\nDec\n12.4000\n9.9602\n112.7500\n1.1945\n1.3500\n2018\nJan\n12.2727\n9.7871\n111.2348\n1.2105\n1.3734\nFeb\n11.8296\n9.5527\n107.8824\n1.2364\n1.3985\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2018\n TABLE 11 : SELECTED INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE RATES\n1. Foreign currency per US dollar.\n \n \n \n30 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nMarket Capitalisation\nEND OF\nUS$ millions\n2017\nJan\n140.2\n56.3\n8.6\n31,616,982\n3,903.7\nFeb\n135.3\n56.5\n11.5\n85,314,995\n3,770.0\nMar\n139.0\n58.6\n26.9\n145,238,255\n3,871.3\nApr\n143.0\n66.3\n11.2\n75,857,712\n4,182.8\nMay\n162.3\n69.6\n16.8\n170,830,515\n4,740.1\nJun\n196.0\n69.8\n39.7\n311,145,262\n5,695.2\nJul\n203.3\n69.4\n24.7\n149,425,245\n5,759.0\nAug\n235.0\n73.5\n13.6\n107,920,143\n6,659.4\nSep\n418.4\n122.6\n89.5\n245,278,194\n11,860.2\nOct\n521.9\n132.5\n168.8\n1,006,687,304\n14,830.3\nNov\n376.7\n126.9\n207.5\n196,489,710\n10,777.7\nDec\n333.0\n142.4\n75.3\n844,189,447\n9,580.6\n2018\nJan\n305.4\n130.4\n31.4\n55,032,220\n8,652.9\nFeb\n294.6\n124.9\n63.7\n138,142,187\n8,386.0\nSource:Zimbabwe Stock Exchange ,2018\nTABLE 12: ZIMBABWE STOCK MARKET STATISTICS\nIndustrial\n Market Turnover \nUS$ million \nVolume of Shares\nMining\nIndices\n \n \n \n31 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nEND OF\nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\n \nINTERNET\n2017\nJan\n 4,052.7 \n7.5\n368.7\n70.4\n495.6\n318.9\nFeb\n 4,246.6 \n7.0\n327.3\n58.4\n472.3\n324.1\nMar\n 4,629.8 \n7.4\n392.2\n58.8\n671.6\n399.7\nApr\n 4,178.8 \n4.8\n466.9\n39.3\n792.5\n337.6\nMay\n 4,974.0 \n6.5\n557.8\n44.7\n939.9\n618.7\nJun\n 5,346.4 \n6.3\n558.8\n34.6\n1095.5\n500.3\nJul\n 4,805.1 \n5.7\n588.4\n29.4\n1601.4\n586.4\nAug\n 5,325.1 \n5.2\n590.1\n24.7\n1776.4\n583.3\nSep\n 6,031.4 \n5.2\n651.1\n16.1\n2159.3\n731.9\nOct\n 5,991.3 \n5.4\n681.9\n19.4\n2401.6\n779.2\nNov\n 6,259.7 \n4.9\n666.5\n15.9\n2561.8\n798.3\nDec\n 5,877.2 \n3.6\n778.4\n16.3\n3052.7\n1043.3\n2018\nJan\n 5,548.1 \n4.9\n663.5\n21.3\n2318.8\n1006.1\nFeb\n 4,706.6 \n4.5\n594.0\n13.9\n2015.1\n831.0\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2018\nTABLE 13.1 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS \n Values of Transactions (US$ millions)\n \n \n \n32 \n \n \nEND OF\nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\n INTERNET\n2017\nJan\n 350.0 \n26.7\n 12,756.3 1,173.6 27,550.1 \n191.0\nFeb\n 326.3 \n27.8\n 8,952.0 953.5 26,820.1 \n207.0\nMar\n 414.2 \n31.0\n 11,124.0 922.2 35,604.1 \n244.1\nApr\n 363.7 \n21.6\n 13,595.5 652.9 40,089.0 \n231.0\nMay\n 531.8 \n27.8\n 16,623.4 820.6 47,019.1 \n323.3\nJun\n 525.0 \n29.3\n 17,466.2 696.9 53,738.1 \n342.1\nJul\n 521.8 \n30.0\n 20,013.7 636.1 61,162.4 \n382.6\nAug\n 541.5 \n26.6\n 20,303.0 595.6 70,771.6 \n419.1\nSep\n 620.0 \n27.2\n 20,731.0 478.0 83,303.0 \n432.0\nOct\n 609.6 \n27.2\n 23,764.6 475.1 92,540.6 \n478.9\nNov\n 575.3 \n25.6\n 22,748.6 347.3 97,945.2 \n473.0\nDec\n 524.2 \n19.2\n 26,779.1 347.2 118,198.9 \n524.8\nAnnual Total\n 5,903.4 \n320.1\n 214,857.4 8,099.0 754,742.1 \n4248.8\n2018\nJan\n 548.1 \n22.7\n 20,981.2 449.6 100,593.9 \n501.8\nFeb\n 457.2 \n22.5\n 18,869.0 292.2 895,843.2 \n463.8\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2018\nTABLE 13.2 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS \n Volumes of Transactions (000's)\n \n \n \n33 \n \n \n \nEND OF\nEXPORTS\nIMPORTS\nTOTAL TRADE TRADE BALANCE\n2016\nJan\n249.18\n395.35\n644.52\n(146.17)\nFeb\n209.55\n427.73\n637.28\n(218.18)\nMar\n166.50\n478.06\n644.55\n(311.56)\nApr\n157.83\n356.48\n514.31\n(198.65)\nMay\n165.20\n408.49\n573.69\n(243.29)\nJun\n176.21\n429.41\n605.61\n(253.20)\nJul\n184.21\n394.23\n578.43\n(210.02)\nAug\n202.14\n445.03\n647.16\n(242.89)\nSep\n250.42\n443.89\n694.30\n(193.47)\nOct\n318.45\n468.06\n786.52\n(149.61)\nNov\n460.73\n475.33\n936.06\n(14.61)\nDec\n291.87\n489.37\n781.24\n(197.50)\nTotal\n2832.27\n5211.41\n8043.69\n(2379.14)\n2017\nJan\n291.97\n384.96\n676.93\n(92.99)\nFeb\n290.34\n424.36\n714.71\n(134.02)\nMar\n265.67\n461.71\n727.37\n(196.04)\nApr\n225.58\n405.52\n631.09\n(179.94)\nMay\n268.65\n466.11\n734.77\n(197.46)\nJun\n264.67\n495.14\n759.82\n(230.47)\nJul\n262.65\n482.09\n744.74\n(219.43)\nAug\n356.46\n448.08\n804.54\n(91.62)\nSep\n326.48\n439.58\n766.05\n(113.10)\nOct\n352.96\n459.89\n812.85\n(106.94)\nNov\n577.59\n492.67\n1070.30\n84.91\nSource: Zimstat, 2017\nTABLE 14 : MERCHANDISE TRADE STATISTICS\n (US$ millions)", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/MPC_Statements/February2018.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "b04d88ff11b98385cbeeb2bbe874545c", "text": "[Date] \n \n \n \n \nDECEMBER 2014 \n \n \ni \n \nMONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW \nTABLE OF CONTENTS \n \nSELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS _________________________________________ 1 \nSTOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS ___________________________________________ 2 \nMONETARY DEVELOPMENTS ________________________________________________ 2 \nINFLATION OUTTURN ______________________________________________________ 4 \nNATIONAL PAYMENTS SYSTEM ______________________________________________ 5 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1 \n \nMONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW \n \n \n \n2014 \nNovember \n2014 \nDecember \nMonth-on- \nMonth \nChange \nZ.S.E. Mining Index1 \n64.39 \n71.71 \n11.34% \nZ.S.E. Industrial Index1 \n171.45 \n162.79 \n-5.05% \n*Money Supply (US$)2 \n4.42 billion \n4.40 billion \n-0.28% \n*Money Supply (M3) Annual Growth2 \n15.98% \n11.97% \n \nYearly Inflation3 \n-0.78% \n-0.80% \n-0.09% \nNominal Lending Rate \n6.00-35.00% \n6.00-35.00% \n \nSources: \n1 Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) \n2 Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) \n3 Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZIMSTAT) \n* Provisional figures \n \n \n \n \nSELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS \n \n \n2 \n \nMONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW \nSTOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS \n \nThe continued decline in oil prices, coupled with \nescalating political tensions in Greece increased risk \nsensitivity of investors in the global stock markets. \nThis resulted in most major international stock \nmarkets trending downwards during the month of \nDecember 2014. \nIn line with most European and US markets, major \nAfrican stock markets registered losses in December \n2014. Declines were recorded in Kenya, Egypt, and \nSouth Africa, whilst Nigeria recorded a marginal gain \nof 0.3%, during the month under review. \nOn the domestic front, bearish sentiments continued \nto characterize trading on the Zimbabwe Stock \nExchange (ZSE). The mining index registered an \n11.37% gain, to close the month under review at \n71.71 points. The industrial index, however, declined \nby 5.05%, between November and December 2014. \nOn a year to date basis, the mining index registered \nan increase of 56.61%, whilst the industrial index \ndeclined by 19.41%. \n \n \n \nTrading volumes rose by 210.3%, from 149.1 million \nshares in November 2014, to 462.6 million shares in \nDecember 2014. This was largely due to a special \nbargain deal of 248.3 million in Dawn property \nshares. Over the same period, however, the value of \nshares traded declined by 15.41% to US$29.11 \nmillion. \nMarket turnover decreased by 5.3%, from US$34.41 \nmillion in November 2014 to US$29.11 million in \nDecember 2014. On a year-on-year basis, market \nturnover also declined by 40.9%. \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange \nReflecting the bearish conditions prevailing during \nthe month under review, market capitalization closed \nthe month of December 2014 at US$4 327.1 million, \ndown from US$4 517.9 million in November 2014. \nMONETARY DEVELOPMENTS \n \nAnnual broad money growth slowed down to 11.97% \nin December 2014, from 15.98% in November 2014. \nIn absolute terms, broad money rose from \n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\n03-Mar-12\n03-Jun-12\n03-Sep-12\n03-Dec-12\n03-Mar-13\n03-Jun-13\n03-Sep-13\n03-Dec-13\n03-Mar-14\n03-Jun-14\n03-Sep-14\n03-Dec-14\nZSE Indices\nIndustrial\nMining\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\n300\n350\nVALUES TRADED (US$ MILLIONS)\nVOLUMES TRADED (MILLIONS)\nZSE: Daily Volumes and Values \nZSE: Daily Volumes and Values Traded\nTraded\nVolume\nTurnover\nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange \n \n \nMONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW \n3 \n \nUS$3 932.33 million in December 2013 to US$4 \n403.12 million in December 2014. \n \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe \nThe growth in broad money was underpinned by \nincreases across all deposit classes. Short term \ndeposits registered the largest annual growth of \n18.26% in December 2014. Long term, demand, and \nsavings deposits recorded increases of 16.47%, \n10.13%, and 4.59%, respectively. \nDuring the month under review, demand deposits \ncontinued to dominate total deposits, accounting for \n49%; followed by short and long term deposits at 19% \neach, while savings deposits were at 13%. \n \n \nOver the same period, on the assets side, growth in \nM3 was driven by increases of both net foreign assets \n(NFA) and net domestic assets of 10.23% and 8.18%, \nrespectively. \nThe annual increase in domestic credit was mainly \nunderpinned by a 44.03% increase in net credit to \nGovernment. Credit to the private sector registered a \ngrowth of 4.01%. \nNet credit to Government continued to be driven by \nTreasury bill issuances, which registered a 141.81% \nannual growth during the period under review. The \nincrease in Treasury bill issuances, partly reflected \nthe slowdown in Government revenue collections as \na result of the economic downturn. \nGrowth in credit to the productive sectors of the \neconomy continued on an upward trend, reaching \n4,01% in December, the highest annual growth in \n2014. On a monthly basis, however, credit to the \nprivate sector declined by 0.72%, from US$3 823.8 \nmillion in November to US$3 796.3 million in \nDecember 2014. \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe \nLoans and advances constituted 81.81% of total credit \nto the private sector, followed by mortgages, 13.51%; \n-5\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n -\n 0.5\n 1.0\n 1.5\n 2.0\n 2.5\n 3.0\n 3.5\n 4.0\n 4.5\n 5.0\nJun\nAug\nOct\nDec\nFeb\nApr\nJun\nAug\nOct\nDec\nFeb\nApr\nJun\nAug\nOct\nDec\n%\nUS$ BILLIONS\nMoney Supply\nMoney Supply\nM3\nM3 Annual Growth\nShort \nTerm\n19%\nLong Term \n19%\nDemand\n49%\nSavings\n13%Banking Sector Deposits\nBanking Sector DepositsDecember 2014\nDecember 2014\nLoans&Advances\n81.81%\nBills \nDiscounted\n1.69%\nBankers \nacceptances\n1.29%\nOther \ninvestments\n1.70%\nMortgages\n13.51%Credit to Private Sector\nCredit to Private SectorDecember 2014\nDecember 2014\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe \n \n \nMONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW \n4 \n \nother investments, 1.70%; bills discounted, 1.69%; \nand bankers’ acceptances, 1.29%. \nSectorally, credit was mainly channeled to agriculture \n(18.85%); \nservices \n(16.04%); \nmanufacturing \n(15.95%); distribution (14.59%); mining (7.34%); \nfinancial (4.54%); transport and communications \n(2.87%); and construction (1.54%). Households \naccounted for 18.09% of total credit to the private \nsector. \nThe credit advanced to the private sector was mainly \nutilized for working capital requirements (74.85%), \nprocurement of consumer durables (11.17%) and \nother purchases (9.98%). Loans and advances utilized \nfor fixed investment activity remained low, with the \nprocurement of plant and equipment accounting for \nonly 4% of total loans and advances. \nINFLATION OUTTURN \n \nAnnual Inflation \nAnnual headline inflation remained in the negative \nterritory, decelerating further from -0.78% in \nNovember 2014 to -0.8% in December 2014, largely \ndriven by declines in both food and non-food \ninflation. Reflecting the dampening of inflationary \npressures in the economy, annual average inflation \nfell from 1.6% in 2013 to -0.2% in 2014. The \ndeflation environment reflected the impact of \ndepressed international oil and food prices, weaker \nSouth African rand and subdued aggregate domestic \ndemand. \nAnnual food inflation increased marginally from \n-2.75% in November 2014 to -2.71% in December \n2014. The negative annual food inflation is attributed \nto the declines in prices across all the food categories \nincluding bread and cereal; meat; sugar, jam, honey \nand chocolate; oils and fats; fruit; vegetables and milk \ncheese and eggs. \nReflecting entrenched deflationary pressures, annual \nnon-food inflation which fell from 1.59% in October \n2014 to 0.17% in November 2014, declined further to \n0.13% in December 2014. Major contributors to the \ndownward spiral in non-food inflation included \ndecreases in communication; housing, electricity, \nwater, gas and other fuels; recreation and culture; \nfurniture and equipment; restaurants and hotels; and \nclothing and footwear. \nDespite the downward trend in prices, alcoholic \nbeverages and tobacco; education; transport; and \nhealth services recorded positive annual inflation in \nDecember 2014. \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Statistics Agency \nMonthly Inflation \nMonth-on-month inflation stood at -0.09% in \nDecember 2014, up from -0.69% in November 2014, \non the back of a slowdown in monthly non-food \ninflation. \nMonthly food inflation declined from -0.11% in \nNovember 2014 to -0.36% in December 2014. This \nfollowed declines in bread and cereals; milk, cheese \nand eggs; fruits; vegetables; fish and sea food and oils \nand fats. \nMonthly non-food inflation rose from -0.96% in \nNovember 2014 to 0.04% in December 2014, driven \nby increases in alcoholic, beverages and tobacco; \n-4\n-3\n-2\n-1\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\nAnnual Inflation \n(%)\nHeadline Inflation\nFood\nNon Food\n \n \nMONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW \n5 \n \nhousing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels; health; \nand transport. \nNATIONAL PAYMENTS SYSTEM \n \nZimbabwe Electronic Transfer Settlement System \n(ZETSS) \nIn December 2014, the value of transactions \nprocessed through the RTGS system stood at \nUS$4.6 billion, compared to US$4.1 billion in \nNovember 2014. In volume terms, total transactions \nregistered an increase of 10.7% from 171 446 to \n189 831, during the same period. \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe \n \nCard Based Transactions \nThe total value of card based transactions were higher \nat US$485.15 million in December 2014, compared \nto US$460.34 million in November 2014. \n \nMobile and Internet Based Transactions \nThe total value of mobile and internet based \ntransactions also increased to US$520.26 million in \nDecember 2014, from US$462.52 million in \nNovember 2014. \n Cheque Transactions \nDuring the period under analysis, the value of cheque \ntransactions rose to US$11.53 million in December \n2014, from US$9.33 million in November 2014. \n \nRESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE \nJANUARY 2015\n -\n 0.5\n 1.0\n 1.5\n 2.0\n 2.5\n 3.0\n 3.5\n 4.0\n 4.5\n 5.0\nDec-11\nApr-12\nAug-12\nDec-12\nApr-13\nAug-13\nDec-13\nApr-14\nAug-14\nDec-14\n -\n 50\n 100\n 150\n 200\n 250\nVALUE IN US$ BILLIONS\nVOLUME IN THOUSANDS\nZETSS Volumes and Values\nZETSS Volumes and Values\nVolume\nValue\n \n \n6 \n \nMONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW \nStatistical Tables\n \n1. Monetary Statistics \n \n1.1 Monetary Aggregates \n \n \n \n \n \n10 \n \n1.2 Broad Money Survey \n \n \n \n \n \n11 \n \n1.3 Analysis of Monthly Changes in Money Supply \n \n12 \n \n1.4 Analysis of Yearly Changes in Money Supply \n \n \n13 \n \n 2. Sectoral Analysis of Bank Loans and Advances and Deposits \n \n2.1 Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks Loans and Advances 14 \n \n2.2 Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks Deposits \n \n15 \n \n \n \n3. External Statistics \n \n3.1 Total External Debt Outstanding by Debtor \n \n \n16 \n \n4. Interest Rates \n \n4.1 Lending Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n17 \n \n4.2 Banks Deposit Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n18 \n \n5. Inflation \n \n5.1 Monthly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n19 \n \n5.2 Yearly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n20 \n \n6. Exchange Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n21 \n \n7. Commercial Banks \n \n7.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n22 \n \n7.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n \n23 \n \n \n \nMONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW \n7 \n \n8. Accepting Houses \n \n8.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n24 \n \n8.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n \n25 \n \n 9. Building Societies \n \n9.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n26 \n \n9.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n \n27 \n \n10. Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Statistics \n \n \n \n \n28 \n \n11. Savings with Financial Institutions \n \n \n \n \n29 \n \n12. Analysis of Liquid Assets of Monetary Banks \n \n \n \n30 \n \n13. ZETSS, Cheques and Cards Activity \n \n \n \n \n \n \n13.1 Values of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n31 \n \n13.2 Volumes of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n32 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n8 \n \nMONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW \n \nN.B: December Monetary statistics are provisional. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nDecember\nJanuary\nFebruary\nMarch\nApril\nMay\nJune\nJuly\nAugust\nSeptember\nOctober\nNovember\nDecember\nRBZ Demand Deposits\n71.9\n69.7\n71.1\n71.5\n71.5\n71.9\n96.6\n95.9\n95.8\n93.7\n94.4\n94.0\n144.5\nComm. Banks Dem. Deposits\n1,825,413.5\n2,039,955.9\n1,974,493.8\n2,033,715.1\n2,130,063.2\n2,173,283.2\n2,120,102.4\n2,011,296.3\n2,084,005.9\n2,089,784.7\n2,162,566.6\n2,124,944.0\n2,121,401.6\nMerchant Banks Dem. Deposits\n134,494.8\n36,792.2\n47,555.9\n41,037.1\n57,346.1\n42,779.8\n42,779.8\n42,560.1\n36,379.5\n40,922.6\n39,909.5\n39,446.4\n36,942.7\nM1\n1,959,980.2\n2,076,817.8\n2,022,120.8\n2,074,823.7\n2,187,480.8\n2,216,134.9\n2,162,978.8\n2,053,952.3\n2,120,481.2\n2,130,801.0\n2,202,570.5\n2,164,484.4\n2,158,488.8\nComm. Banks Savings Deposits\n281,785.8\n215,665.0\n230,541.1\n237,243.6\n233,539.2\n223,445.3\n253,857.5\n236,942.8\n256,908.6\n272,392.1\n252,758.2\n250,745.7\n267,179.5\nBuilding Soc. Savings Deposits\n204,200.7\n196,806.6\n195,707.7\n202,936.6\n228,310.8\n241,398.4\n234,278.6\n228,203.4\n232,305.6\n230,155.7\n236,100.8\n253,699.7\n236,423.8\nP O S B Savings Deposits\n62,044.0\n58,314.5\n58,920.4\n60,801.9\n66,479.0\n64,831.6\n68,218.1\n68,388.5\n68,651.3\n68,147.5\n65,414.5\n70,142.9\n69,601.1\nComm. Banks U-30 Day Deposits\n489,493.1\n552,134.9\n596,106.0\n626,443.7\n661,815.1\n685,132.2\n669,439.9\n596,373.1\n629,496.8\n651,068.5\n686,998.0\n630,856.1\n654,559.9\nMerchant Banks U-30 Day Deposits\n56,379.8\n47,277.8\n48,250.7\n48,387.9\n40,336.6\n34,572.1\n33,202.1\n33,787.2\n40,442.4\n33,929.0\n33,679.6\n33,288.9\n31,176.0\nBuilding Soc. U- 30 Day Deposits\n155,932.2\n107,130.3\n112,927.5\n156,466.8\n115,037.7\n164,622.3\n175,432.1\n113,937.3\n126,458.5\n149,478.7\n116,270.3\n113,090.1\n144,211.5\nM2\n3,209,815.8\n3,254,146.9\n3,264,574.2\n3,407,104.1\n3,532,999.2\n3,630,137.0\n3,597,407.0\n3,331,584.7\n3,474,744.4\n3,535,972.5\n3,593,792.1\n3,516,307.8\n3,561,640.5\nComm. Banks O-30 Day Deposits\n496,391.7\n352,689.2\n468,960.6\n426,625.1\n408,961.7\n438,431.5\n489,568.8\n577,592.3\n516,231.3\n540,278.5\n492,200.3\n508,747.2\n449,703.8\nMerchant Banks O-30 Day Deposits\n6,900.3\n5,665.1\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nBuilding Soc. O- 30 Day Deposits\n197,343.9\n253,060.8\n264,395.8\n234,625.6\n262,711.8\n233,243.8\n212,224.9\n287,853.4\n304,479.1\n280,499.3\n337,930.1\n359,491.3\n365,334.8\nBuilding Soc. Other Share Deposits\n11,266.6\n11,266.6\n11,266.6\n11,266.6\n11,266.6\n11,266.6\n11,266.6\n11,266.6\n11,266.6\n11,266.6\n11,266.6\n11,266.6\n11,266.6\nP O S B Time Deposits\n10,606.9\n11,816.7\n12,582.4\n14,317.8\n14,519.3\n12,651.5\n13,098.6\n15,773.0\n15,354.3\n20,485.8\n22,070.6\n19,652.7\n15,174.4\nM3\n3,932,325.1\n3,888,645.3\n4,021,779.6\n4,093,939.2\n4,230,458.6\n4,325,730.4\n4,323,565.9\n4,224,069.9\n4,322,075.8\n4,388,502.7\n4,457,259.7\n4,415,465.6\n4,403,120.1\nTABLE 1.1 : MONETARY AGGREGATES\n US$ Thousands\n2013\n2014\n \n \nMONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW \n9 \n \n \nN.B: December Monetary statistics are provisional. \nDECEMBER\nJANUARY\nFEBRUARY\nMARCH\nAPRIL\nMAY\nJUNE\nJULY\nAUGUST\nSEPTEMBER\nOCTOBER\nNOVEMBER\nDECEMBER\nNET FOREIGN ASSETS \n-810,172.3\n-846,622.1\n-799,433.7\n-816,838.4\n-695,843.6\n-585,616.7\n-595,417.7\n-701,074.2\n-627,733.6\n-536,234.0\n-598,846.1\n-767,824.4\n-1,750,112.7\n Assets\n1,042,166.0\n1,009,920.7\n1,032,518.9\n1,021,388.4\n1,063,604.4\n1,190,209.8\n1,126,637.1\n1,027,150.0\n1,079,627.1\n1,105,902.8\n999,042.7\n827,514.2\n-132,686.9\n Reserve Bank (RBZ)\n338,487.8\n354,820.2\n365,075.8\n357,157.3\n359,859.4\n410,904.2\n374,556.5\n327,295.3\n411,681.6\n620,484.9\n508,155.9\n334,534.3\n-666,167.5\n Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) \n643,560.1\n610,318.8\n619,567.7\n585,124.3\n628,565.0\n700,802.8\n685,339.5\n623,693.1\n604,460.0\n414,981.4\n432,341.0\n416,989.8\n463,492.7\n Other Banking Institutions (OBI\n60,118.1\n44,781.8\n47,875.4\n79,106.9\n75,180.0\n78,502.7\n66,741.0\n76,161.6\n63,485.5\n70,436.5\n58,545.8\n75,990.2\n69,987.9\n Liabilities \\2\n-1,852,338.3\n-1,856,542.9\n-1,831,952.5\n-1,838,226.8\n-1,759,448.0\n-1,775,826.5\n-1,722,054.8\n-1,728,224.2\n-1,707,360.7\n-1,642,136.8\n-1,597,888.8\n-1,595,338.6\n-1,617,425.8\n RBZ\n1,150,150.8\n1,148,693.8\n1,151,300.5\n1,152,604.9\n1,155,463.3\n1,152,736.3\n1,141,906.4\n1,136,091.5\n1,117,663.4\n1,037,740.5\n1,035,611.2\n1,030,053.8\n1,022,781.2\n DMBs\n671,435.2\n681,744.6\n655,537.7\n660,898.1\n579,093.6\n598,403.2\n545,347.3\n562,067.8\n553,968.9\n550,158.8\n508,060.2\n510,711.1\n540,423.0\n OBIs\n30,752.3\n26,104.5\n25,114.4\n24,723.8\n24,891.2\n24,687.0\n34,801.1\n30,065.0\n35,728.4\n54,237.5\n54,217.5\n54,573.7\n54,221.6\nNET DOMESTIC ASSETS \n4,742,497.4\n4,735,267.5\n4,821,213.2\n4,910,777.6\n4,926,302.1\n4,911,347.2\n4,918,983.6\n4,925,144.1\n4,949,809.4\n4,924,736.6\n5,056,105.8\n5,183,290.0\n5,130,451.6\nDOMESTIC CREDIT\n4,068,697.5\n3,954,914.2\n4,102,727.4\n4,180,109.0\n4,150,137.4\n4,138,311.2\n4,174,067.9\n4,205,226.6\n4,234,468.5\n4,267,183.2\n4,331,337.1\n4,352,932.2\n4,378,654.6\n Claims on Government (net) \n357,997.4\n327,805.9\n415,048.8\n490,233.2\n476,917.3\n468,461.4\n498,617.0\n423,988.3\n437,473.4\n442,435.9\n470,504.6\n462,425.7\n515,636.4\n RBZ\n-1,182.3\n-1,181.7\n-1,181.8\n-1,179.6\n-1,178.8\n-1,178.9\n-1,179.1\n-46,158.3\n-25,974.8\n-35,915.4\n-14,433.2\n-14,031.5\n-25,063.7\n DMBs\n319,016.2\n288,824.0\n376,067.1\n451,249.2\n437,932.6\n429,476.7\n459,632.5\n429,983.1\n411,866.1\n426,769.3\n433,084.8\n443,478.0\n487,962.9\n OBIs\n40,163.5\n40,163.5\n40,163.5\n40,163.5\n40,163.5\n40,163.5\n40,163.5\n40,163.5\n51,582.0\n51,582.0\n51,852.9\n32,979.1\n52,737.2\n Claims on Public Enterprises \n60,645.0\n60,553.0\n60,689.3\n79,528.0\n78,292.8\n78,383.6\n73,173.2\n77,393.8\n70,324.8\n72,390.6\n72,375.0\n66,661.0\n66,750.2\n RBZ\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n DMBs\n60,645.0\n60,553.0\n60,689.3\n79,528.0\n78,292.8\n78,383.6\n73,173.2\n77,393.8\n70,324.8\n72,390.6\n72,375.0\n66,661.0\n66,750.2\n Agri-PEs\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n Other\n60,645.0\n60,553.0\n60,689.3\n79,528.0\n78,292.8\n78,383.6\n73,173.2\n77,393.8\n70,324.8\n72,390.6\n72,375.0\n66,661.0\n66,750.2\n OBIs\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n Claims on Private Sector\n3,650,055.2\n3,566,555.3\n3,626,989.2\n3,610,347.9\n3,594,927.4\n3,591,466.2\n3,602,277.7\n3,703,844.6\n3,726,670.4\n3,752,356.7\n3,788,457.5\n3,823,845.6\n3,796,268.1\n RBZ\n35,116.1\n35,116.1\n35,116.1\n34,745.1\n34,745.1\n34,745.1\n34,725.3\n34,725.3\n34,725.3\n34,726.3\n34,727.3\n34,725.3\n34,726.3\n DMBs\n3,053,645.3\n2,955,033.9\n3,016,585.0\n2,993,988.2\n2,968,560.6\n2,956,036.4\n2,955,853.5\n3,013,188.5\n3,016,709.8\n3,021,389.7\n3,016,750.9\n3,036,795.2\n3,010,101.6\n OBIs\n561,293.9\n576,405.3\n575,288.2\n581,614.6\n591,621.7\n600,684.7\n611,698.9\n655,930.8\n675,235.3\n696,240.7\n736,979.3\n752,325.1\n751,440.3\nOTHER ITEMS (NET) \n673,799.9\n780,353.3\n718,485.9\n730,668.6\n776,164.7\n773,035.9\n744,915.7\n719,917.4\n715,340.8\n657,553.4\n724,768.7\n830,357.8\n751,796.9\nBROAD MONEY (M3) \n3,932,325.1\n3,888,645.3\n4,021,779.6\n4,093,939.2\n4,230,458.5\n4,325,730.5\n4,323,565.9\n4,224,069.9\n4,322,075.8\n4,388,502.6\n4,457,259.7\n4,415,465.6\n4,403,120.1\nUS$ Thousands\nTABLE 1.2 : BROAD MONEY SURVEY\n2013\n2014\n \n \nMONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW \n10 \n \n \n \nN.B: December Monetary statistics are provisional. \nNOVEMBER\nDECEMBER\nJANUARY\nFEBRUARY\nMARCH\nAPRIL\nMAY\nJUNE\nJULY\nAUGUST\nSEPTEMBER\nOCTOBER\nNOVEMBER\nDECEMBER\nNET FOREIGN ASSETS \n-151,462.4\n191,626.5\n-36,449.8\n47,188.5\n-17,404.7\n120,994.8\n110,226.8\n-9,801.0\n-105,656.4\n73,340.6\n91,499.6\n-62,612.2\n-168,978.3\n40,492.9\n Assets\n-137,671.2\n185,511.0\n-32,245.2\n22,598.1\n-11,130.5\n42,216.0\n126,605.3\n-63,572.7\n-99,487.0\n52,477.1\n26,275.7\n-106,860.1\n-171,528.5\n62,580.1\n Reserve Bank (RBZ)\n-57,623.5\n73,661.0\n16,332.4\n10,255.6\n-7,918.6\n2,702.2\n51,044.8\n-36,347.7\n-47,261.2\n84,386.3\n208,803.3\n-112,329.0\n-173,621.7\n22,079.4\n Deposit Money Banks (DMBs)\n-69,563.6\n112,501.1\n-33,241.3\n9,248.9\n-34,443.4\n43,440.8\n72,237.8\n-15,463.3\n-61,646.4\n-19,233.1\n-189,478.6\n17,359.6\n-15,351.2\n46,502.9\n Other Banking Institutions (OBIs) \\1\n-10,484.1\n-651.0\n-15,336.3\n3,093.6\n31,231.5\n-3,926.9\n3,322.7\n-11,761.7\n9,420.6\n-12,676.1\n6,951.0\n-11,890.7\n17,444.4\n-6,002.2\n Liabilities \\2\n-13,791.2\n6,115.5\n-4,204.6\n24,590.3\n-6,274.3\n78,778.8\n-16,378.5\n53,771.7\n-6,169.4\n20,863.4\n65,223.9\n44,248.0\n2,550.2\n-22,087.1\n RBZ\n-2,548.3\n2,171.8\n-1,457.0\n2,606.7\n1,304.4\n2,858.4\n-2,727.0\n-10,829.9\n-5,814.9\n-18,428.0\n-79,922.9\n-2,129.4\n-5,557.4\n-7,272.6\n DMBs\n16,324.7\n-18,045.7\n10,309.4\n-26,206.9\n5,360.4\n-81,804.5\n19,309.6\n-53,055.9\n16,720.4\n-8,098.8\n-3,810.2\n-42,098.6\n2,651.0\n29,711.9\n OBIs\n14.9\n9,758.4\n-4,647.8\n-990.1\n-390.5\n167.4\n-204.2\n10,114.1\n-4,736.2\n5,663.4\n18,509.2\n-20.0\n356.2\n-352.1\nNET DOMESTIC ASSETS \\3\n6,889.9\n-66,411.8\n-7,230.0\n85,945.8\n89,564.4\n15,524.5\n-14,954.9\n7,636.5\n6,160.4\n24,665.3\n-25,072.8\n131,369.2\n127,184.2\n-52,838.5\nDOMESTIC CREDIT\n12,095.0\n-22,612.8\n-113,783.4\n147,813.2\n77,381.6\n-29,971.6\n-11,826.2\n35,756.7\n31,158.7\n29,241.9\n32,714.7\n64,153.8\n21,595.2\n25,722.4\n Claims on Government (net) \n32,111.8\n26,199.6\n-30,191.5\n87,242.9\n75,184.3\n-13,315.9\n-8,455.9\n30,155.7\n-74,628.7\n13,485.1\n4,962.5\n28,068.6\n-8,078.9\n53,210.7\n RBZ\n280.7\n5.8\n0.7\n-0.1\n2.2\n0.8\n0.0\n-0.2\n-44,979.3\n20,183.6\n-9,940.6\n21,482.2\n401.6\n-11,032.2\n DMBs\n11,831.0\n26,263.8\n-30,192.1\n87,243.1\n75,182.1\n-13,316.6\n-8,455.9\n30,155.8\n-29,649.5\n-18,117.0\n14,903.2\n6,315.6\n10,393.2\n44,484.8\n OBIs\n20,000.0\n-70.1\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n11,418.5\n0.0\n270.8\n-18,873.7\n19,758.1\n Claims on Public Enterprises \n1,420.6\n-199.9\n-91.9\n136.3\n18,838.6\n-1,235.2\n90.9\n-5,210.4\n4,220.6\n-7,069.0\n2,065.8\n-15.6\n-5,714.0\n89.2\n RBZ\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n DMBs\n1,420.6\n-199.9\n-91.9\n136.3\n18,838.6\n-1,235.2\n90.9\n-5,210.4\n4,220.6\n-7,069.0\n2,065.8\n-15.6\n-5,714.0\n89.2\n Agri-PEs\n-5,003.2\n-5,004.2\n-5,005.2\n-5,006.2\n-5,007.2\n-5,008.2\n-6,898.8\n-6,908.9\n-6,909.9\n-6,910.9\n-1,514.5\n-1,515.5\n-1,515.5\n-1,516.5\n Other\n6,423.8\n4,804.3\n4,913.3\n5,142.5\n23,845.8\n3,773.0\n6,989.7\n1,698.5\n11,130.5\n-158.1\n3,580.4\n1,499.9\n-4,198.5\n1,605.7\n OBIs\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n Claims on Private Sector\n-21,437.3\n-48,612.5\n-83,500.0\n60,434.0\n-16,641.3\n-15,420.5\n-3,461.1\n10,811.4\n101,566.9\n22,825.8\n25,686.3\n36,100.8\n35,388.1\n-27,577.5\n RBZ\n-4.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-371.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-19.8\n0.0\n0.0\n1.0\n1.0\n-2.0\n1.0\n DMBs\n-35,445.7\n-52,550.5\n-98,611.4\n61,551.1\n-22,596.8\n-25,427.6\n-12,524.1\n-182.9\n57,335.0\n3,521.2\n4,680.0\n-4,638.8\n20,044.3\n-26,693.6\n OBIs\n14,012.4\n3,938.0\n15,111.4\n-1,117.1\n6,326.4\n10,007.1\n9,063.0\n11,014.2\n44,231.9\n19,304.6\n21,005.3\n40,738.6\n15,345.8\n-884.9\nOTHER ITEMS (NET) \n-5,205.1\n-43,799.0\n106,553.4\n-61,867.4\n12,182.7\n45,496.1\n-3,128.7\n-28,120.2\n-24,998.3\n-4,576.6\n-57,787.4\n67,215.3\n105,589.1\n-78,560.9\nBROAD MONEY (M3) \n-144,572.5\n125,214.7\n-43,679.7\n133,134.2\n72,159.7\n136,519.3\n95,271.9\n-2,164.5\n-99,496.0\n98,005.9\n66,426.9\n68,757.0\n-41,794.1\n-12,345.5\n Broad Money (M3) \n-3.7%\n3.3%\n-1.1%\n3.4%\n1.8%\n3.3%\n2.3%\n-0.1%\n-2.3%\n2.3%\n1.5%\n1.6%\n-0.9%\n-0.3%\n Domestic Credit \n0.3%\n-0.6%\n-2.8%\n3.7%\n1.9%\n-0.7%\n-0.3%\n0.9%\n0.7%\n0.7%\n0.8%\n1.5%\n0.5%\n0.6%\n Claims on Private Sector\n-0.6%\n-1.3%\n-2.3%\n1.7%\n-0.5%\n-0.4%\n-0.1%\n0.3%\n2.8%\n0.6%\n0.7%\n1.0%\n0.9%\n-0.7%\n US$ Thousands\nTABLE 1.3 : ANALYSIS OF MONTHLY CHANGES IN MONEY SUPPLY (M3)\n2013\n2014\n \n \nMONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW \n11 \n \n \nN.B: December Monetary statistics are provisional. \nDECEMBER\nJANUARY\nFEBRUARY\nMARCH\nAPRIL\nMAY\nJUNE\nJULY\nAUGUST\nSEPTEMBER\nOCTOBER\nNOVEMBER\nDECEMBER\nNET FOREIGN ASSETS \n-374,643.5\n-360,978.8\n-320,764.6\n-189,743.9\n-218,632.9\n-97,000.4\n174,984.2\n121,341.3\n256,709.5\n278,254.4\n251,490.3\n233,974.4\n82,840.8\n Assets\n-47,642.5\n15,108.1\n43,943.2\n153,988.8\n80,414.9\n124,519.6\n132,134.9\n59,355.9\n147,638.2\n30,394.8\n4,716.6\n-29,140.7\n-152,071.7\n Reserve Bank (RBZ)\n-109,501.0\n-99,525.9\n-56,803.4\n-9,935.5\n-52,295.6\n-60,760.6\n-87,240.5\n-35,011.5\n124,065.4\n275,699.8\n185,705.6\n69,707.4\n18,125.8\n Deposit Money Banks (DMBs)\n44,285.5\n103,167.4\n90,271.2\n115,289.4\n91,118.6\n153,245.8\n197,101.5\n87,011.4\n37,263.5\n-248,474.2\n-168,281.7\n-114,069.3\n-180,067.4\n Other Banking Institutions (OBIs) \\1\n17,573.0\n11,466.5\n10,475.5\n48,635.0\n41,591.9\n32,034.3\n22,274.0\n7,356.1\n-13,690.7\n3,169.2\n-12,707.3\n15,221.1\n9,869.9\n Liabilities \\2\n-327,001.0\n-376,086.8\n-364,707.8\n-343,732.7\n-299,047.9\n-221,520.0\n42,849.2\n61,985.4\n109,071.4\n247,859.6\n246,773.7\n263,115.2\n234,912.5\n RBZ\n989.6\n-329.7\n9,677.0\n17,531.5\n14,941.5\n18,630.8\n3,844.4\n-7,035.3\n-22,202.4\n-108,893.9\n-114,916.2\n-117,925.2\n-127,369.6\n DMBs\n319,316.8\n370,530.4\n352,061.6\n323,807.0\n285,699.2\n204,827.4\n-54,779.1\n-63,362.3\n-101,759.1\n-172,362.2\n-165,096.0\n-178,769.8\n-131,012.2\n OBIs\n6,694.5\n5,886.1\n2,969.2\n2,394.3\n-1,592.9\n-1,938.2\n8,085.5\n8,412.1\n14,890.2\n33,396.5\n33,238.5\n33,579.8\n23,469.3\nNET DOMESTIC ASSETS \\3\n420,296.5\n441,228.7\n528,927.2\n485,159.0\n482,349.0\n404,589.2\n310,374.5\n247,806.9\n269,129.6\n199,588.8\n254,086.5\n374,380.8\n387,954.1\nDOMESTIC CREDIT\n280,229.0\n176,946.2\n320,970.8\n334,998.9\n341,752.2\n267,298.2\n238,021.8\n238,960.1\n245,653.9\n260,892.3\n252,121.7\n261,621.9\n309,957.1\n Claims on Government (net) \n181,938.9\n160,963.6\n261,884.9\n319,595.1\n296,909.4\n256,239.5\n292,427.5\n191,715.5\n203,355.4\n213,821.1\n170,818.5\n130,627.9\n157,639.0\n RBZ\n9,915.4\n44.1\n10.6\n0.0\n2.0\n0.8\n649.4\n-42,670.8\n-24,732.7\n-34,718.8\n-12,964.3\n-12,843.3\n-23,881.4\n DMBs\n133,093.6\n120,989.5\n221,944.4\n299,706.3\n277,394.1\n236,596.5\n271,848.2\n214,456.4\n196,739.8\n217,191.5\n152,163.6\n150,725.7\n168,946.7\n OBIs\n38,929.9\n39,929.9\n39,929.9\n19,888.8\n19,513.3\n19,642.1\n19,929.9\n19,929.9\n31,348.4\n31,348.4\n31,619.3\n-7,254.5\n12,573.7\n Claims on Public Enterprises \n8,928.1\n8,291.9\n6,980.8\n25,436.5\n19,319.1\n14,778.7\n9,544.5\n15,219.5\n9,961.8\n12,580.8\n12,950.8\n5,816.2\n6,105.2\n RBZ\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n DMBs\n8,928.1\n8,291.9\n6,980.8\n25,436.5\n19,319.1\n14,778.7\n9,544.5\n15,219.5\n9,961.8\n12,580.8\n12,950.8\n5,816.2\n6,105.2\n Agri-PEs\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-5,259.3\n-5,260.3\n-5,261.3\n-5,262.3\n-5,263.3\n-5,003.2\n-5,004.2\n-5,005.2\n Other\n8,928.1\n8,291.9\n6,980.8\n25,436.5\n19,319.1\n20,038.0\n14,804.8\n20,480.8\n15,224.1\n17,844.1\n17,954.0\n10,820.4\n11,110.4\n OBIs\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n Claims on Private Sector\n89,362.0\n7,690.8\n52,105.1\n-10,032.7\n25,523.6\n-3,720.0\n-63,950.1\n32,025.1\n32,336.7\n34,490.5\n68,352.4\n125,177.8\n146,212.9\n RBZ\n-5,520.2\n-5,898.0\n-5,899.0\n-6,269.0\n-6,269.0\n-5,383.7\n-5,403.6\n-1,420.9\n-1,421.9\n-1,386.4\n-392.8\n-390.8\n-389.8\n DMBs\n-11,508.5\n-102,287.3\n-48,548.7\n-117,960.6\n-90,130.3\n-107,645.2\n-169,498.5\n-120,335.1\n-142,682.7\n-121,001.5\n-124,890.6\n-69,400.6\n-43,543.7\n OBIs\n106,390.7\n115,876.1\n106,552.9\n114,196.9\n121,923.0\n109,308.9\n110,951.9\n153,781.1\n176,441.3\n156,878.5\n193,635.8\n194,969.2\n190,146.4\nOTHER ITEMS (NET) \n140,067.4\n264,282.5\n207,956.4\n150,160.1\n140,596.8\n137,290.9\n72,352.6\n8,846.8\n23,475.6\n-61,303.5\n1,964.8\n112,758.9\n77,997.0\nBROAD MONEY (M3) \n45,653.0\n80,250.0\n208,162.6\n295,415.1\n263,716.0\n307,589.0\n485,358.6\n369,148.2\n525,839.1\n477,843.2\n505,576.8\n608,355.2\n470,795.0\nGROWTH RATES\n Broad Money (M3) \n1.2%\n2.1%\n5.5%\n7.8%\n6.6%\n7.7%\n12.6%\n9.6%\n13.9%\n12.2%\n12.8%\n16.0%\n12.0%\n Domestic Credit \n7.4%\n4.7%\n8.5%\n8.7%\n9.0%\n6.9%\n6.0%\n6.0%\n6.2%\n6.5%\n6.2%\n6.4%\n7.6%\n Claims on Private Sector\n2.5%\n0.2%\n1.5%\n-0.3%\n0.7%\n-0.1%\n-1.7%\n0.9%\n0.9%\n0.9%\n1.8%\n3.4%\n4.0%\nTABLE 1.4 : ANALYSIS OF YEARLY CHANGES IN MONEY SUPPLY (M3)\n$ Thousands\n2013\n2014\n \n \nMONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW \n12 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAGRICULTURE\nCONSTRUCTION\nCOMMUNICATION\nDISTRIBUTION\nFINANCIAL &\nFINANCIAL\nMANUFACTURING\nMINING\nSERVICES\nTRANSPORT\nINDIVIDUALS\nCONGLOMERATE\nTOTAL\nEND OF\n \n \n \nINVESTMENTS\nORGANISATIONS\n \n \n \n \n2013 \nJan\n450,170.0\n31,073.4\n38,762.3\n426,050.9\n11,967.9\n31,547.4\n417,961.3\n144,645.1\n237,323.7\n33,906.5\n300,841.1\n9,373.1\n2,133,622.7\nFeb \n494,536.6\n33,786.9\n28,372.0\n439,556.7\n14,811.4\n33,948.5\n409,692.7\n128,242.7\n303,269.9\n38,235.9\n298,171.5\n3,685.5\n2,226,310.2\nMar\n467,874.0\n41,532.7\n68,987.2\n433,337.1\n16,118.8\n34,704.7\n471,204.9\n159,925.7\n307,134.7\n44,413.6\n370,123.5\n4,491.7\n2,419,848.6\nApr\n455,178.9\n43,628.2\n23,433.4\n428,381.7\n14,997.8\n35,589.1\n444,798.7\n135,046.2\n288,857.6\n45,643.6\n377,037.0\n7,693.7\n2,300,585.8\nMay\n484,635.0\n38,637.2\n27,795.2\n455,737.9\n14,699.1\n35,106.1\n465,890.2\n115,457.8\n301,547.9\n52,075.2\n382,172.8\n5,034.0\n2,378,788.7\nJun\n489,730.1\n37,474.3\n38,198.7\n425,521.3\n7,310.7\n53,815.0\n454,368.5\n110,349.9\n295,432.3\n51,453.6\n385,769.7\n11,033.4\n2,360,457.5\nJul\n483,103.7\n40,342.5\n33,494.3\n464,921.7\n6,869.2\n38,522.6\n541,025.9\n116,557.1\n307,117.5\n48,218.0\n426,582.7\n4,455.3\n2,511,210.5\nAug\n521,743.0\n38,889.1\n43,894.5\n425,531.4\n7,260.6\n39.087.2\n451,871.2\n110,041.8\n346,006.0\n40,216.0\n374,587.1\n9,914.6\n2,409,042.5\nSep\n496,289.3\n39,446.9\n38,856.6\n447,247.2\n13,953.5\n43,006.7\n437,211.9\n118,873.7\n330,709.6\n40,046.6\n373,596.8\n9,790.6\n2,389,029.4\nOct\n491,610.6\n38,871.5\n39,766.0\n471,966.2\n8,023.3\n40,835.3\n420,445.3\n110,778.3\n417,411.6\n36,334.1\n376,463.1\n9,861.9\n2,462,367.3\nNov\n487,289.4\n40,321.7\n42,332.0\n488,637.3\n3,116.5\n36,852.0\n417,162.5\n117,050.8\n389,727.1\n39,126.4\n369,190.3\n17,960.5\n2,448,766.4\nDec\n533,165.2\n42,285.1\n17,617.9\n435,613.1\n5,047.0\n62,165.8\n389,181.2\n115,404.6\n379,809.3\n37,409.1\n369,838.8\n18,252.9\n2,405,790.0\n2014 \nJan\n489,585.3\n43,743.8\n18,574.7\n464,097.6\n5,467.4\n48,086.1\n362,554.0\n116,635.5\n412,901.1\n37,722.2\n367,126.2\n16,773.1\n2,383,267.1\nFeb \n519,154.6\n38,918.1\n24,765.4\n460,528.2\n10,397.3\n47,488.6\n385,038.1\n116,670.5\n401,619.6\n32,978.1\n396,800.8\n8,542.7\n2,442,902.1\nMar\n503,868.1\n42,707.9\n35,785.1\n494,663.8\n5,257.4\n52,722.0\n374,809.1\n116,653.0\n396,000.6\n38,089.3\n406,503.1\n15,833.1\n2,482,892.7\nApr\n540,156.2\n40,707.1\n18,138.9\n502,514.1\n9,898.6\n18,817.9\n407,595.0\n175,048.3\n447,549.2\n49,619.1\n511,048.2\n15,136.7\n2,736,229.2\nMay\n546,733.9\n41,594.2\n21,547.9\n488,389.7\n10,073.8\n23,049.1\n396,846.0\n184,730.9\n452.373.8\n51,891.8\n512,864.5\n17,718.8\n2,747,814.6\nJun\n536,188.9\n46,085.8\n28,201.0\n500,266.1\n10,656.3\n25,616.2\n417,002.7\n197,441.1\n432,692.4\n46,751.6\n499,191.5\n17,173.9\n2,757,267.4\nJul\n575,645.3\n43,055.0\n28,090.8\n480,483.6\n6,359.2\n27,284.9\n428,611.4\n206,052.3\n479,384.6\n49,260.4\n507,930.0\n46,148.1\n2,878,305.8\nAug\n548,866.7\n56,886.1\n38,891.3\n498,696.8\n54,387.2\n110,618.5\n422,942.5\n221,099.2\n430,156.3\n48,167.0\n474,060.2\n37,230.9\n2,942,002.7\nSep\n539,818.8\n51,349.1\n29,191.8\n493,610.7\n51,999.0\n109,975.0\n428,697.3\n201,791.6\n451,117.2\n45,100.0\n539,108.1\n36,708.6\n2,978,467.1\nOct\n530,544.7\n62,891.8\n55,922.5\n507,936.4\n50,701.1\n101,818.5\n436,519.1\n196,491.0\n413,443.5\n39,088.3\n520,437.0\n5,799.4\n2,921,593.2\nNov\n574,859.5\n58,780.5\n46,419.5\n460,989.3\n50,008.6\n120,510.4\n453,924.5\n208,418.3\n413,410.7\n45,289.6\n540,638.4\n5,976.9\n2,979,226.2\nDec\n565,840.1\n46,298.5\n42,604.8\n437,975.3\n47,805.8\n88,485.5\n478,895.5\n220,501.3\n481,497.5\n43,449.8\n543,038.5\n5,957.7\n3,002,529.6\n/1 Including the only merchant bank still in operation.\nTABLE 2.1 : SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS LOANS AND ADVANCES/1\n$ Thousands\n \n \nMONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW \n13 \n \n \n \n \n \nEND OF\nAGRICULTURE\nCONSTRUCTION\nCOMMUNICATIONS\nDISTRIBUTION\nFINANCIAL &\nFINANCIAL\nMANUFACTURING\nMINING\nSERVICES\nTRANSPORT\nINDIVIDUALS\nCONGLOMERATES\nTOTAL\nINVESTMENTS\nORGANISATIONS\n2013\nJANUARY\n91,648.8\n48,329.1\n128,426.0\n351,566.7\n212,401.7\n494,823.6\n252,389.7\n93,470.0\n658,260.1\n44,091.4\n512,289.8\n32,145.9\n2,919,842.6\nFEBRUARY\n96,796.5\n48,491.5\n147,571.5\n360,757.9\n147,995.9\n578,306.4\n284,603.8\n64,530.5\n679,554.8\n41,983.6\n516,431.2\n25,275.3\n2,991.999.1\nMARCH\n96,752.8\n44,883.3\n139,327.8\n354,627.8\n155,915.2\n610,758.4\n290,072.8\n87,143.0\n594,397.7\n38,345.5\n523,913.8\n141,404.6\n3,077,542.7\nAPRIL\n98,671.0\n49,093.8\n152,390.8\n350,269.2\n166,578.5\n545,118.2\n311,310.8\n105,766.9\n638,341.8\n39,837.1\n533,691.3\n99,053.9\n3,090,123.4\nMAY\n114,053.3\n55,427.4\n142,023.3\n389,384.7\n255,352.1\n484,429.7\n318,129.4\n92,777.2\n700,668.7\n46,593.8\n578,509.2\n32,297.7\n3,209,646.5\nJUNE\n116,635.2\n58,578.8\n147,313.8\n447,394.5\n183,146.3\n352,600.3\n366,824.2\n96,685.8\n701,195.7\n46,578.5\n597,373.1\n104,843.6\n3,219,169.8\nJULY\n108,086.6\n46,449.5\n120,982.3\n380,448.8\n178,341.4\n677,700.7\n301,575.9\n97,583.8\n710,856.1\n39,395.9\n487,954.4\n102,531.4\n3,251,906.9\nAUGUST\n137,107.1\n48,726.1\n135,788.5\n319,106.0\n174,593.9\n637,190.7\n333,255.3\n99,194.1\n639,401.6\n41,996.5\n417,762.6\n93,772.1\n3,077,894.4\nSEPTEMBER\n100,028.3\n57,039.8\n145,652.5\n380,781.4\n207,379.2\n612,131.5\n408,359.1\n103,872.8\n795,047.6\n46,982.9\n435,912.4\n90,265.8\n3,383,453.4\nOCTOBER\n94,346.3\n52,722.4\n141,401.4\n338,625.9\n223,223.8\n754,145.4\n339,305.6\n99,583.3\n754,116.1\n41,527.2\n440,197.9\n97,771.1\n3,376,966.4\nNOVEMBER\n114,178.7\n47,740.9\n128,399.3\n312,639.2\n241,628.8\n741,885.4\n283,426.0\n80,507.6\n727,492.5\n42,901.0\n458,479.9\n89,292.5\n3,268,571.8\nDECEMBER\n113,914.2\n51,981.7\n142,938.1\n342,785.1\n213,125.2\n755,299.4\n327,658.1\n83,103.1\n762,884.4\n41,827.9\n432,436.3\n61,038.7\n3,328,992.1\n2014\nJANUARY\n130,154.6\n53,292.9\n146,876.1\n353,793.8\n259,569.6\n731,703.3\n304,033.2\n93,776.7\n770,435.4\n40,085.9\n485,573.1\n60,897.7\n3,430,192.5\nFEBRUARY\n138,812.3\n55,092.2\n134,813.9\n420,181.0\n262,183.8\n786,295.6\n270,062.5\n131,134.8\n779,640.3\n39,169.2\n508,813.7\n61,822.3\n3,588,021.6\nMARCH\n118,239.1\n55,167.5\n135,807.9\n382,675.5\n216,025.3\n791,776.0\n275,549.1\n103,298.7\n806,185.9\n42,432.8\n521,381.5\n72,990.9\n3,521,530.3\nAPRIL\n164,347.5\n59,289.3\n102,323.7\n408,823.5\n325,559.7\n780,207.0\n325,659.8\n135,187.4\n888,876.2\n43,746.5\n582,848.8\n82,009.8\n3,898,879.1\nMAY\n149,474.1\n60,669.4\n108,977.6\n355,802.3\n332,850.8\n800,256.8\n303,599.4\n132,132.8\n1,027,552.7\n38,921.0\n581,930.2\n93,334.9\n3,985,501.8\nJUNE\n194,685.1\n64,188.9\n95,595.6\n470,267.7\n291,594.6\n812,999.7\n348,303.5\n130,453.4\n895,698.0\n44,735.5\n575,149.1\n91,392.4\n4,015,063.5\nJULY\n163,335.6\n56,812.0\n87,587.5\n370,121.7\n303,367.3\n830,988.6\n334,436.8\n112,985.0\n880,761.1\n44,675.4\n587,756.7\n94,841.5\n3,867,669.2\nAUGUST\n128,794.1\n38,934.1\n90,012.5\n271,204.3\n270,009.9\n755,141.6\n236,267.5\n130,548.6\n865,566.6\n31,180.4\n467,724.2\n89,582.4\n3,374,966.2\nSEPTEMBER\n177,932.5\n56,444.5\n82,756.7\n315,956.8\n309,508.3\n951,593.4\n278,461.5\n174,497.9\n978,044.0\n47,792.7\n571,629.9\n103,464.8\n4,048,083.1\nOCTOBER\n158,421.7\n57,091.4\n83,973.9\n407,934.0\n308,028.8\n917,450.3\n266,690.9\n178,771.0\n936,336.2\n44,950.2\n613,425.1\n91,764.1\n4,064,837.5\nNOVEMBER\n140,908.6\n61,494.3\n93,114.0\n350,153.8\n313,668.7\n881,007.4\n271,049.9\n137,867.8\n955,760.6\n48,177.7\n641,405.3\n90,462.2\n3,985,070.2\nDECEMBER\n118,725.7\n328,729.5\n325,746.6\n950,304.9\n290,329.3\n118,977.8\n964,815.0\n47,574.3\n638,061.1\n92,040.8\n4,082,906.3\n/1 Including the only merchant bank still in operation.\n TABLE 2.2: SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS DEPOSITS \nUS$ Thousands\n \n \nMONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW \n14 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nEnd Pe rio d\nJun- 0 5\nJun- 0 5\n2 0 0 1\n2 0 0 2\n2 0 0 3\n2 0 0 4\n2 0 0 5\n2 0 0 6\n2 0 0 7\n2 0 0 8\n2 0 0 9\n2 0 10\n2 0 11\n2 0 12\n2 0 13\n( U S $ millio ns )\nLo ng - Te rm Ext e rnal D e b t\n3 ,53 0\n3 ,2 2 7\n3 ,2 55\n3 ,3 2 7\n3 ,6 4 4\n3 ,9 2 7\n3 ,8 0 5\n3 ,9 6 5\n4 ,0 3 2\n4 ,4 6 4\n4 ,9 51\n5,175\n6 ,0 9 6\n6 ,6 0 7\n7,3 70\nGo ve rnme nt\n2 ,4 6 1\n2 ,2 4 9\n2 ,3 2 8\n2 ,3 76\n2 ,6 17\n2 ,8 4 4\n2 ,8 9 5\n3 ,0 2 4\n3 ,0 54\n3 ,4 6 4\n4 ,0 3 7\n4 ,0 9 5\n4 ,6 3 8\n4 ,9 2 9\n5,0 12\nBilateral Creditors\n935\n1,050\n1,115\n1,107\n1,255\n1,455\n1,438\n1,520\n1,520\n1,863\n2,308\n2,325\n2,597\n2,694\n2,928\nMultilateral Creditors\n1,235\n1,199\n1,213\n1,269\n1,362\n1,389\n1,457\n1,504\n1,524\n1,592\n1,729\n1,770\n2,041\n2,235\n2,084\nPrivate Creditors\n291\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n10\n10\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPub lic Ent e rp ris e s\n54 3\n53 4\n56 8\n6 16\n6 9 8\n714\n70 9\n76 6\n79 0\n8 2 5\n8 57\n9 3 8\n1,0 9 2\n1,19 8\n1,3 56\nBilateral Creditors\n316\n301\n315\n351\n403\n442\n439\n464\n474\n497\n453\n238\n711\n703\n858\nMultilateral Creditors\n224\n233\n253\n265\n295\n272\n270\n302\n316\n327\n403\n700\n382\n495\n498\nPrivate Creditors\n3\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nM o ne t ary A ut ho rit ie s\n3 6 4\n2 9 2\n2 9 2\n2 79\n2 8 8\n2 9 1\n14 4\n13 0\n13 7\n14 0\n14 0\n13 8\n12 7\n12 5\n12 5\nMultilateral Creditors - IMF\n364\n292\n292\n279\n288\n291\n144\n130\n137\n140\n140\n138\n127\n125\n125\nPrivat e\n16 2\n152\n6 7\n56\n4 1\n78\n57\n4 5\n51\n3 5\n57\n14 2\n3 6 6\n4 8 0\n1,0 0 2\nS ho rt - Te rm Ext e rnal D e b t\n53 2\n2 9 8\n16 7\n18 3\n16 9\n14 4\n173\n2 8 1\n3 8 7\n2 2 6\n1,19 8\n1,3 8 2\n1,2 8 9\n8 9 0\n1,56 4\nSupplier's Credits\n150\n42\n13\n26\n51\n69\n107\n122\n178\n41\n193\n286\n134\n30\n0\nReserve Bank\n642\n642\n618\n614\n614\nPrivate\n382\n256\n154\n157\n118\n75\n66\n159\n209\n185\n363\n454\n537\n246\n950\nTo t al Ext e rnal D e b t\n4 ,0 6 2\n3 ,52 5\n3 ,4 2 2\n3 ,510\n3 ,8 12\n4 ,0 71\n3 ,9 78\n4 ,2 4 6\n4 ,4 19\n4 ,6 9 0\n6 ,14 9\n6 ,557\n7,3 8 5\n7,4 9 7\n8 ,9 3 4\nGro s s D o me s t ic Pro d uc t\n5,990\n6,107\n10,887\n6,715\n5,037\n4,299\n2,918\n6,645\n4,000\n3,175\n6,133\n7,433\n8,865\n8,865\n12,973\nExt e rnal D e b t / GD P\n6 8 %\n57.7%\n3 1.4 %\n52 .3 %\n75.7%\n9 4 .7%\n13 6 .3 %\n6 3 .9 %\n110 .5%\n14 7.7%\n10 0 .3 %\n8 8 .2 %\n8 3 .3 %\n8 4 .6 %\n6 8 .9 %\nSOURCE: M inistry of Finance and Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe\nTABLE 3.1: ZIMBABWE: EXTERNAL DEBT OUTSTANDING BY DEBTOR (INCLUDING ALL ARREARS) (WITH RBZ)\n \n \nMONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW \n15 \n \n \n \nEnd Period\nNominal Lending Rates2\nIndividuals \nCorporate\nNominal Lending \nRates2\nIndividuals \nCorporate\n2013 \nJan\n10.00-35.00\n15.58 \n10.81 \n13.00-25.00\n17.96 \n14.42 \nFeb \n10.00-35.00\n14.83 \n10.53 \n13.00-25.00 \n17.93 \n14.36 \nMar\n6.00-35.00\n14.32 \n10.19 \n14.00-25.00\n17.80 \n14.35 \nApr\n3.00-35.00\n14.58 \n9.66 \n14.00-25.00\n17.77 \n14.35 \nMay\n9.00-35.00\n14.25 \n9.89 \n13.00-23.00\n17.66 \n17.02 \nJun\n9.00-35.00\n14.29 \n9.46 \n15.00-22.50\n17.78 \n16.89 \nJul\n6.00-35.00\n14.39 \n9.65 \n15.00-28.00\n17.70 \n16.97 \nAug\n6.00-35.00\n13.82 \n9.32 \n15.00-23.00\n18.32 \n16.92 \nSep\n6.00-35.00\n14.03 \n9.37 \n15.00-22.50\n18.31 \n16.94 \nOct\n6.00-35.00\n13.95 \n9.25 \n15.00-23.00\n18.67 \n17.66 \nNov\n6.00-35.00\n14.18 \n9.40 \n15.00-23.00\n18.84 \n17.72 \nDec\n6.00-35.00\n14.13 \n9.35 \n15.00-23.00\n18.84 \n17.76 \n2014 \nJan\n6.00-35.00\n14.09 \n9.30 \n15.00-23.00\n18.88 \n17.74 \nFeb \n6.00-35.00\n14.08 \n9.32 \n15.00-23.00\n18.88 \n17.73 \nMar\n6.00-35.00\n14.24 \n9.27 \n15.00-23.00\n18.88 \n17.73 \nApr\n6.00-35.00\n14.22 \n9.12 \n15.00-23.00\n18.88 \n17.73 \nMay\n6.00-35.00\n14.39 \n9.25 \n15.00-23.00\n18.87 \n17.74 \nJun\n6.00-35.00\n14.44 \n9.33 \n15.00-23.00\n19.00 \n18.00 \nJul\n6.00-35.00\n14.33 \n9.45 \n15.00-23.00\n19.00 \n18.00 \nAug\n6.00-35.00\n14.28 \n9.45 \n15.00-23.00\n19.00 \n18.00 \nSep\n6.00-35.00\n14.45 \n9.57 \n15.00-23.00\n19.00 \n18.00 \nOct\n6.00-35.00\n14.36 \n9.90 \n15.00-23.00\n19.00 \n18.00 \nNov\n6.00-35.00\n14.26 \n9.97 \n15.00-23.00\n19.00 \n18.00 \nDec\n6.00-35.00\n14.19 \n9.68 \n15.00-23.00\n19.00 \n18.00 \nNotes\n3. Lending rates exclude rates on staff loans. \nTABLE 4.1 LENDING RATES (percent per annum)1\n2. Nominal Lending Rates depict the range of rates quoted by banks.\nCommercial Banks\nMerchant Banks\nWeighted Average Lending Rates3 \nNominal Lending Rates3 \n1. Table revised, to separate weighted lending rates for individuals and corporate bodies. \n \n \nMONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW \n16 \n \n \n \n ACCEPTING HOUSES\nEND OF\nSAVINGS\n3 MONTHS\n3 MONTHS\n2013 \nJan\n0.15-8.00\n4.00-20.00\n6.00-17.00\nFeb \n0.15-8.00\n4.00-20.00\n6.00-17.00\nMar\n0.15-8.00\n4.00-20.00\n8.00-12.00\nApr\n0.15-8.00\n4.00-20.00\n8.00-12.00\nMay\n0.15-8.00\n4.00-20.00\n6.00-17.00\nJun\n0.15-8.00\n4.00-20.00\n6.00-17.00\nJul\n0.15-8.00\n3.00-20.00\n6.00-17.00\nAug\n0.15-8.00\n3.00-20.00\n6.00-17.00\nSep\n0.15-8.00\n3.00-20.00\n11.00-12.00\nOct\n0.15-8.00\n3.00-20.00\n11.00-12.00\nNov\n0.15-8.00\n3.00-20.00\n11.00-12.00\nDec\n0.15-8.00\n3.00-20.00\n11.00-12.00\n2014 \nJan\n0.15-8.00\n3.00-20.00\n11.00-12.00\nFeb \n0.15-8.00\n3.00-20.00\n11.00-12.00\nMar\n0.15-8.00\n3.00-20.00\n11.00-12.00\nApr\n0.15-8.00\n3.00-20.00\n11.00-12.00\nMay\n0.15-8.00\n3.00-20.00\n11.00-12.00\nJun\n0.15-8.00\n3.00-20.00\n11.00-12.00\nJul\n0.15-8.00\n3.00-20.00\n11.00-12.00\nAug\n0.15-8.00\n4.00-20.00\n11.00-12.00\nSep\n0.15-8.00\n4.00-20.00\n11.00-12.00\nOct\n0.15-8.00\n4.00-20.00\n11.00-12.00\nNov\n0.15-8.00\n4.00-20.00\n11.00-12.00\nDec\n0.15-8.00\n3.00-20.00\n12.00 \n* The range of rates qouted by banks during the period.\nTABLE 4.2 : BANKS DEPOSIT RATES (percent per annum)*\nCOMMERCIAL BANKS\n \n \nMONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW \n17 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFOOD IN FLA TION\nA LL\nA LC OHOLIC \nB EV ER A GES \nC LOTHIN G\nHS IN G, WA TER ,\nFU R N ITU R E\nHEA LTH\nTR A N S POR T\nC OM M U N IC A TION\nR EC R EA TION &\nED U C A TION\nR ES TA U R A N TS &\nM IS C .\nTOTA L N ON\nFOOD & \nITEM S\n& TOB A C C O\nFOOTWEA R\nELEC TR IC TY , \nGA S\nA N D\nC U LTU R E\nHOTELS\nGOOD S &\nFOOD\nN ON A LC OHOLIC \nB EV ER A GES\n& OTHER\nEQU IPM EN T\nS ER V IC ES\nFU ELS\nWEIGHTS\n4 .3 8\n6 .0 5\n17.74\n9 .9 1\n2 .16\n9 .76\n3 .4 1\n2 .1\n5.6 7\n1.3 8\n3 .9 1\n6 6 .4 7\n3 3 .53\n10 0\n2013\nOC TOB ER\n1.2 1\n0 .0 0\n- 0 .0 1\n- 0 .3 6\n0 .0 6\n- 0 .3 2\n- 0 .0 7\n- 0 .15\n0 .0 2\n- 0 .0 8\n- 0 .2 0\n- 0 .0 4\n0 .0 4\n- 0 .0 1\nN OV EM B ER\n0 .3 8\n- 0 .19\n- 0 .0 1\n- 0 .3 7\n0 .10\n- 0 .13\n- 0 .0 1\n- 0 .13\n5.57\n1.0 8\n- 0 .2 7\n0 .4 3\n- 0 .6 0\n0 .0 9\nD EC EM B ER\n0 .14\n- 0 .0 1\n0 .3 7\n- 0 .2 9\n0 .12\n0 .2 7\n0 .0 5\n- 0 .2 2\n0 .0 0\n0 .0 0\n- 0 .4 6\n0 .0 8\n- 0 .4 1\n- 0 .0 8\n2014\nJA N U A R Y\n0 .2 0\n- 0 .0 7\n0 .0 0\n0 .0 1\n- 0 .2 3\n0 .0 1\n0 .0 0\n- 0 .0 7\n0 .0 2\n0 .16\n- 0 .0 9\n0 .0 0\n0 .4 4\n0 .14\nFEB R U A R Y\n- 0 .0 1\n- 0 .0 9\n- 0 .11\n- 0 .0 8\n0 .0 9\n0 .0 8\n0 .0 0\n- 0 .0 4\n0 .2 3\n- 0 .0 8\n0 .0 7\n- 0 .0 1\n0 .18\n0 .0 5\nM A R C H\n- 0 .0 5\n- 0 .0 6\n- 0 .8 2\n- 0 .12\n0 .0 2\n0 .0 0\n0 .0 1\n0 .0 0\n0 .0 0\n0 .0 1\n- 0 .3 0\n- 0 .2 6\n- 0 .14\n- 0 .2 2\nA PR IL\n0 .3 0\n- 0 .10\n- 0 .13\n- 0 .75\n0 .16\n0 .3 3\n- 0 .0 2\n0 .3 4\n12 .6 4\n- 1.0 2\n- 0 .0 3\n1.0 9\n- 0 .4 6\n0 .58\nM A Y\n0 .11\n- 0 .11\n- 0 .0 6\n- 0 .2 9\n0 .0 0\n0 .2 3\n- 0 .0 3\n- 0 .2 0\n0 .0 7\n- 0 .13\n- 0 .4 3\n- 0 .0 5\n- 0 .3 0\n- 0 .13\nJU N E\n- 0 .0 5\n0 .12\n0 .0 0\n0 .0 6\n0 .3 0\n- 0 .0 3\n0 .0 0\n- 0 .0 9\n0 .0 0\n- 0 .11\n0 .15\n0 .0 2\n- 0 .12\n- 0 .0 3\nJU LY\n- 0 .4 7\n- 0 .2 1\n0 .12\n0 .3 0\n- 0 .0 1\n0 .11\n- 0 .12\n- 0 .13\n- 0 .0 8\n1.79\n0 .8 5\n- 0 .3 7\n0 .2 5\n0 .0 1\nA U GU S T\n- 0 .8 1\n- 0 .0 5\n- 0 .0 9\n0 .0 0\n- 0 .14\n0 .0 4\n0 .2 8\n- 0 .0 6\n- 0 .0 8\n- 0 .0 2\n0 .0 2\n- 1.2 1\n- 0 .0 7\n- 0 .3 1\nS EPTEM B ER\n0 .10\n0 .14\n0 .4 5\n- 0 .2 7\n0 .2 1\n0 .3 8\n- 0 .0 6\n- 0 .14\n0 .0 0\n- 0 .4 0\n0 .11\n0 .15\n- 0 .3 4\n- 0 .0 1\nOC TOB ER\n0 .16\n0 .0 7\n0 .0 0\n- 0 .14\n- 0 .0 1\n- 0 .2 7\n- 0 .0 6\n- 0 .0 4\n0 .0 1\n0 .0 2\n0 .0 3\n- 0 .0 4\n- 0 .2 4\n- 0 .11\nN OV EM B ER\n0 .19\n0 .12\n- 0 .0 3\n- 0 .0 9\n0 .0 9\n0 .10\n0 .0 2\n0 .0 2\n- 9 .18\n- 0 .6 2\n0 .0 6\n- 0 .9 6\n- 0 .11\n- 0 .6 9\nD EC EM B ER\n0 .0 1\n- 0 .1\n0 .16\n- 0 .1\n0 .13\n0 .19\n0 .0 0\n- 0 .16\n0 .0 0\n- 0 .2 3\n- 0 .15\n0 .0 4\n- 0 .3 6\n- 0 .0 9\nN ON - FOOD IN FLA TION\nTABLE 5.1 : MONTHLY INFLATION -- PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX\n( DECEMBER 2012 = 100)\n \n \nMONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW \n18 \n \n \n \n \nFOOD \nIN FLA TION\nA LL\nA LC OHOLIC \nB EV ER A GES \nC LOTHIN G\nHS IN G, \nWA TER ,\nFU R N ITU R E\nHEA LTH\nTR A N S POR T\nC OM M U N IC A\nTION\nR EC R EA TION \n&\nED U C A TION\nR ES TA U R A N\nTS &\nM IS C .\nTOTA L N ON\nFOOD & \nITEM S\n& TOB A C C O\nFOOTWEA R\nELEC TR IC TY , \nGA S\nA N D\nC U LTU R E\nHOTELS\nGOOD S &\nFOOD\nN ON \nA LC OHOLIC \nB EV ER A GES\n& OTHER\nEQU IPM EN T\nS ER V IC ES\nFU ELS\nWEIGHTS\n4 .3 8\n6 .0 5\n17.74\n9 .9 1\n2 .16\n9 .76\n3 .4 1\n2 .1\n5.6 7\n1.3 8\n3 .9 1\n6 6 .4 7\n3 3 .53\n10 0\n2 0 13\nS EPTEM B ER\n4 .3 6\n0 .6 1\n3 .7\n- 0 .3 7\n2 .1\n5.0 6\n- 13 .6 6\n- 1.0 1\n5.74\n1.2 3\n0 .9 3\n1.4 5\n- 0 .3 2\n0 .8 6\nOC TOB ER\n5.2 3\n0 .2 5\n2 .9 6\n- 0 .7\n2 .2 1\n1.4\n- 13 .76\n- 0 .73\n9 .0 5\n0 .8 3\n- 0 .2\n1.2 5\n- 0 .74\n0 .59\nN OV EM B ER\n5.9 4\n- 0 .0 7\n3 .51\n- 1.0 3\n2 .4 2\n- 7.0 4\n- 13 .8 3\n- 0 .9 2\n11.19\n2 .0 6\n- 0 .3 5\n1.58\n- 1.51\n0 .54\nD EC EM B ER\n4 .2 6\n0 .0 9\n3 .6 3\n- 1.0 8\n2 .11\n1.6 1\n- 13 .9 9\n- 1.0 3\n11.2 9\n2 .0 3\n- 0 .8 7\n1.6 1\n- 2 .2\n0 .3 3\n2 0 14\nJA N U A R Y\n5.0 3\n0 .0 3\n3 .6 3\n- 1.0 7\n1.8 7\n1.6 2\n- 14\n- 1.12\n11.3\n2 .18\n- 0 .4 3\n1.6 7\n- 2 .0 8\n0 .4 1\nFEB R U A R Y\n2 .2 1\n- 0 .4 3\n3 .0 9\n- 1.3 5\n0 .4 4\n0 .0 5\n- 13 .8 6\n- 1.0 8\n11.4 7\n1.3 2\n- 1.4 5\n0 .9 3\n- 3 .2 6\n- 0 .4 9\nM A R C H\n1.6 7\n- 0 .53\n2 .2 1\n- 1.8 2\n0 .4\n- 0 .4 4\n- 13 .6 8\n- 1.2 1\n11.4 7\n2 .4 7\n- 1.8 2\n0 .51\n- 3 .71\n- 0 .9 1\nA PR IL\n1.78\n- 0 .55\n0 .4 6\n- 2 .6\n0 .2 2\n- 0 .11\n- 0 .6 2\n- 0 .9 3\n2 0 .71\n1.13\n- 1.56\n1.5\n- 3 .73\n- 0 .2 6\nM A Y\n1.9 1\n- 0 .8 3\n0 .3 9\n- 2 .6 2\n0 .2 9\n0 .8 6\n- 0 .6\n- 0 .6 4\n2 0 .79\n0 .9 5\n- 1.6 9\n1.6 2\n- 3 .75\n- 0 .19\nJU N E\n1.6 8\n- 0 .8 1\n0 .4\n- 2 .54\n0 .6 4\n0 .9 7\n- 0 .2 7\n- 0 .8 4\n2 0 .79\n0 .9 9\n- 1.6 7\n1.6 7\n- 3 .54\n- 0 .0 8\nJU LY\n- 2 .8 8\n1.6 4\n- 0 .6 8\n0 .7\n- 2 .4\n0 .8\n0 .5\n- 0 .4\n- 0 .8\n2 3\n1.8\n- 2\n1.9\n0 .3\nA U GU S T\n- 2 .79\n2 .0 2\n- 0 .4 4\n- 0 .1\n- 2 .5\n0 .6\n0 .7\n- 0 .3\n- 0 .8\n2 1.4\n0 .9\n- 2 .8\n1.6\n0 .2\nS EPTEM B ER\n2 .10\n- 0 .3 4\n- 0 .0 3\n- 2 .6 0\n0 .9 8\n0 .9 9\n- 0 .3 2\n- 0 .8 5\n2 1.4 2\n0 .2 8\n- 3 .0 6\n1.59\n- 2 .9 5\n0 .0 9\nOC TOB ER\n1.0 4\n- 0 .2 7\n- 0 .0 1\n- 2 .3 8\n0 .9 1\n1.0 4\n- 0 .3 1\n- 0 .75\n2 1.4 1\n0 .3 8\n- 2 .8 3\n1.59\n- 3 .2 3\n0 .0 0\nN OV EM B ER\n0 .8 4\n0 .0 4\n- 0 .0 3\n- 2 .11\n0 .9 1\n1.2 6\n- 0 .2 8\n- 0 .59\n4 .4 4\n- 1.3 1\n- 2 .50\n0 .17\n- 2 .75\n- 0 .78\nD EC EM B ER\n0 .71\n- 0 .0 5\n- 0 .2 4\n- 1.9 2\n0 .9 2\n1.18\n- 0 .3 3\n- 0 .53\n4 .4 5\n- 1.54\n- 2 .2 1\n0 .13\n- 2 .7\n- 0 .8\nN ON - FOOD IN FLA TION\nTABLE 5.2 : YEARLY INFLATION -- PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \\1\n(DECEMBER 2012 = 100)\n \n \nMONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW \n19 \n \n \nSA\nBW\nJAPANESE\nEUROPEAN\nPOUND\nEND OF\nRAND/1\nPULA/1\nYEN/1\nCURRENCY/2\nSTERLING/2\n2013\nJANUARY\n9.03\n8.05\n90.9\n1.36\n1.58\nFEBRUARY\n8.84\n8.04\n92.36\n1.31\n1.52\nMARCH\n9.26\n8.3\n94.13\n1.28\n1.51\nAPRIL\n8.98\n8.1\n97.76\n1.31\n1.55\nMAY\n10.08\n8.65\n100.85\n1.3\n1.52\nJUNE\n9.94\n8.6\n98.74\n1.31\n1.53\nJULY\n9.83\n8.49\n98.31\n1.33\n1.53\nAUGUST\n10.33\n8.75\n98.18\n1.32\n1.55\nSEPTEMBER\n10.1\n8.58\n97.92\n1.35\n1.62\nOCTOBER\n9.95\n8.5\n98.28\n1.37\n1.6\nNOVEMBER\n10.19\n8.64\n102.33\n1.36\n1.64\nDECEMBER\n10.43\n8.72\n105.02\n1.38\n1.65\n2014\nJANUARY\n11.21\n9.09\n102.47\n1.35\n1.65\nFEBRUARY\n10.71\n8.85\n101.74\n1.37\n1.67\nMARCH\n10.56\n8.85\n102.38\n1.38\n1.68\nAPRIL\n10.57\n8.85\n102.38\n1.38\n1.68\nMAY\n10.44\n8.73\n101.61\n1.36\n1.67\nJUNE\n10.58\n8.67\n101.3\n1.36\n1.7\nJULY\n10.68\n8.85\n102.76\n1.36\n1.69\nAUGUST\n10.98\n9.07\n107.35\n1.29\n1.63\nSEPTEMBER\n11.26\n9.26\n109.39\n1.27\n1.63\nOCTOBER\n10.90\n9.11\n110.87\n1.26\n1.59\nNOVEMBER\n11.02\n9.22\n118.21\n1.38\n1.57\nDECEMBER\n11.56\n9.51\n119.65\n0.82\n1.56\n TABLE 6 : SELECTED INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE RATES\n1. Fo reign currency per US Do llar.\n2. US Do llar per unit o f fo reign currency.\n \n \nMONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW \n20 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nLoans & \nContigent\nOther\nNon Financial \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nNotes\nTotal\nOther Balances\nAdvnces\nAssets\nAssets\nAssets\n&\nBalances\nBalances \nBalances\nwith RBZ\nCoin\nwith\nwith Other \nat\nTrade\nTreasury\nAgric PEs\n2013\nat Banks\nRBZ\nBanks\nForeign Banks\nBills\nBills\n Jan\n323.4\n378.5\n103.4\n182.3\n247.8\n0.0\n0.0\n1235.5\n52.2\n2694.9\n386.1\n205.7\n386.7\n4961.1\n Feb\n292.2\n357.7\n120.5\n234.6\n239.9\n0.0\n0.0\n1244.9\n27.7\n2689.3\n328.8\n208.0\n388.3\n4887.0\n Mar\n271.6\n345.7\n196.1\n198.9\n265.3\n0.0\n0.0\n1277.6\n26.1\n2715.8\n367.2\n228.8\n388.0\n5003.5\n Apr\n263.8\n383.6\n201.1\n272.9\n289.9\n75.3\n5.2\n1491.7\n26.3\n2595.8\n341.3\n207.0\n382.1\n5044.2\n May\n250.9\n400.9\n198.2\n296.7\n253.5\n75.4\n5.3\n1480.8\n25.8\n2673.2\n389.8\n208.0\n382.9\n5160.4\n Jun\n227.2\n416.4\n171.9\n257.5\n271.8\n75.5\n5.3\n1425.8\n26.0\n2698.3\n364.1\n217.8\n384.6\n5116.5\n Jul\n266.5\n352.8\n164.2\n266.1\n263.8\n110.2\n6.4\n1429.9\n26.5\n2701.3\n337.1\n229.8\n387.0\n5111.7\n Aug.\n322.8\n277.9\n136.4\n242.5\n237.8\n61.1\n6.4\n1285.0\n26.2\n2813.0\n367.0\n218.3\n385.2\n5094.7\n Sep\n334.1\n336.0\n178.0\n327.8\n226.3\n111.5\n6.0\n1519.7\n26.9\n2773.3\n298.8\n234.7\n386.4\n5239.8\n Oct\n379.4\n387.5\n137.1\n219.7\n260.9\n99.4\n5.0\n1489.0\n17.3\n2809.1\n316.7\n257.3\n371.5\n5260.9\n Nov\n333.3\n312.7\n160.2\n197.1\n261.1\n108.6\n6.5\n1379.5\n26.6\n2789.7\n291.3\n235.4\n369.8\n5092.3\n Dec\n354.8\n367.8\n135.5\n287.3\n199.9\n118.0\n6.6\n1469.9\n28.4\n2799.5\n490.8\n259.5\n347.6\n5395.7\n2014\n Jan\n356.9\n395.3\n134.1\n253.1\n153.0\n119.2\n5.4\n1417.0\n27.9\n2866.4\n516.1\n362.2\n353.9\n5543.5\n Feb\n334.3\n387.0\n130.5\n285.0\n131.2\n193.2\n5.4\n1466.6\n32.8\n2718.1\n534.5\n502.9\n351.1\n5606.0\n Mar\n304.6\n354.1\n147.4\n280.3\n165.9\n255.2\n5.4\n1512.9\n28.7\n2737.9\n522.7\n538.8\n349.7\n5690.7\n Apr\n353.3\n367.8\n154.4\n274.9\n205.7\n247.0\n5.4\n1608.4\n32.5\n2844.6\n534.1\n345.3\n348.6\n5713.6\n May\n327.8\n421.1\n120.5\n372.8\n211.5\n241.7\n5.4\n1700.6\n27.5\n2836.8\n591.4\n366.2\n347.1\n5869.6\n Jun\n347.1\n404.7\n166.4\n338.1\n198.0\n261.9\n0.0\n1716.1\n16.2\n2863.2\n607.8\n362.9\n346.4\n5912.6\n Jul\n347.1\n321.3\n176.7\n276.3\n186.0\n246.2\n0.0\n1553.7\n15.4\n2940.4\n597.5\n347.4\n345.6\n5800.0\n Aug\n360.7\n424.5\n178.5\n243.5\n173.9\n237.5\n0.0\n1618.6\n15.5\n2949.1\n609.5\n353.9\n346.4\n5892.9\n Sep\n255.6\n636.8\n183.0\n158.8\n176.0\n253.9\n0.0\n1664.2\n4.1\n2949.4\n624.6\n371.5\n341.5\n5955.3\n Oct\n226.1\n597.7\n175.0\n205.5\n180.3\n260.1\n0.0\n1644.7\n15.6\n2938.4\n594.4\n369.0\n341.8\n5903.8\n Nov\n258.9\n556.7\n169.1\n157.5\n178.5\n281.6\n0.0\n1602.2\n4.2\n2951.6\n597.5\n369.4\n341.1\n5865.9\n Dec\n310.2\n466.1\n168.0\n152.4\n188.8\n285.4\n0.0\n1571.0\n7.3\n2961.2\n633.2\n377.7\n389.2\n5939.5\nLiquid Assets\nTABLE 7.1: COMMERCIAL BANKS - ASSETS\nSecurities\nUS$ Millions\n \n \nMONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW \n21 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nDeposits\nCapital\nContigent\nOther\nTotal\nOf which\nand\nLiablities\nLiablities\nLiabilities to the \nEnd of\nDemand\nSavings and Short-term\nLong-term\nTotal\nForeign Liabilities\nRBZ\nOther Banks\nReserves\nPublic\n2013\n Jan\n2032.2\n866.1\n552.4\n3450.7\n266.1\n0.0\n27.8\n623.9\n386.1\n206.5\n4961.1\n3450.7\n Feb\n1987.8\n933.3\n491.5\n3412.5\n258.1\n0.0\n32.4\n631.9\n328.8\n223.3\n4887.0\n3417.9\n Mar\n1960.0\n976.3\n451.0\n3387.3\n290.9\n0.0\n32.8\n687.7\n367.2\n237.6\n5003.5\n3387.3\n Apr\n2074.5\n1046.3\n379.5\n3500.3\n247.6\n0.0\n37.9\n667.2\n341.3\n249.8\n5044.2\n3500.3\n May\n2066.0\n913.0\n479.9\n3459.0\n346.5\n0.0\n81.8\n674.4\n389.8\n209.0\n5160.4\n3459.0\n Jun\n2014.0\n919.6\n298.9\n3232.4\n553.0\n0.0\n74.1\n702.3\n364.1\n190.6\n5116.5\n3232.4\n Jul\n2054.1\n916.2\n245.9\n3216.2\n578.3\n0.0\n77.5\n699.7\n337.1\n202.9\n5111.7\n3216.2\n Aug.\n2017.4\n879.5\n253.2\n3150.1\n608.2\n0.0\n63.8\n694.9\n367.0\n210.8\n5094.7\n3150.1\n Sep\n2082.1\n899.3\n294.5\n3275.8\n674.6\n0.0\n74.0\n708.8\n298.8\n207.7\n5239.8\n3275.8\n Oct\n2125.9\n880.0\n349.3\n3355.2\n611.4\n0.0\n68.5\n703.0\n316.7\n206.0\n5260.9\n3355.2\n Nov\n1953.4\n861.2\n371.6\n3186.2\n627.8\n0.0\n75.8\n689.7\n291.3\n221.6\n5092.3\n3186.2\n Dec\n1980.4\n813.6\n517.1\n3311.1\n614.0\n0.0\n65.0\n730.9\n490.8\n184.0\n5395.7\n3311.1\n2014\n Jan\n2153.6\n802.7\n403.5\n3359.8\n661.3\n0.0\n55.9\n592.9\n516.1\n357.5\n5543.5\n3359.8\n Feb\n2111.8\n878.8\n494.6\n3485.2\n630.0\n0.0\n51.1\n609.5\n534.5\n359.0\n5669.5\n3485.2\n Mar\n2156.8\n919.6\n454.2\n3530.6\n635.5\n0.0\n44.8\n596.4\n522.7\n360.7\n5690.7\n3530.6\n Apr\n2267.5\n958.3\n435.7\n3661.5\n553.5\n0.0\n17.0\n595.0\n534.1\n352.4\n5713.6\n3661.5\n May\n2294.9\n975.8\n451.7\n3722.4\n585.0\n0.0\n13.7\n591.1\n591.4\n366.1\n5869.6\n3722.4\n Jun\n2248.9\n989.8\n506.1\n3744.8\n543.8\n0.0\n48.3\n591.2\n607.8\n376.7\n5912.6\n3744.8\n Jul\n2130.4\n892.9\n606.6\n3629.9\n560.8\n0.0\n39.5\n571.5\n597.5\n400.6\n5800.0\n3629.9\n Aug\n2202.3\n963.1\n539.9\n3705.3\n552.7\n0.0\n43.5\n580.7\n609.5\n401.2\n5892.9\n3705.3\n Sep\n2191.0\n1011.1\n562.6\n3764.8\n548.9\n0.0\n59.5\n544.8\n624.6\n412.7\n5955.3\n3764.8\n Oct\n2260.8\n1015.1\n509.9\n3785.8\n506.8\n0.0\n47.4\n543.3\n594.4\n426.0\n5903.8\n3785.8\n Nov\n2231.8\n943.4\n526.5\n3701.6\n509.4\n0.0\n90.6\n541.8\n597.5\n425.0\n5865.9\n3701.6\n Dec\n2219.8\n1015.2\n457.9\n3692.9\n537.6\n0.0\n85.1\n560.7\n633.2\n430.0\n5939.5\n3692.9\nTABLE 7.2: COMMERCIAL BANKS - LIABILITIES\nUS$ Millions\nAmounts Owing to\n \n \nMONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW \n22 \n \n \n \n \n \nLoans & \nContigent\nOther\nNon Financial \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nNotes\nTotal\nOther Balances\nAdvnces\nAssets\nAssets\nAssets\n&\nBalances\nBalances \nBalances\nLiquid\nwith RBZ\nCoin\nwith\nwith Other \nat\nTrade\nTreasury\nAgris Pes\nAssets\nat Banks\nRBZ\nBanks\nForeign Banks\nBills\nBills\n2013\n Jan\n1.5\n2.7\n28.6\n0.0\n3.4\n0.0\n0.0\n36.2\n0.0\n236.7\n34.8\n60.2\n29.1\n397.0\n Feb\n4.7\n1.5\n18.4\n0.0\n4.5\n0.0\n0.0\n26.9\n0.0\n245.7\n34.8\n63.9\n28.9\n398.2\n Mar\n2.5\n1.1\n7.3\n-3.1\n1.2\n0.0\n0.0\n8.9\n0.0\n260.3\n34.2\n50.4\n28.8\n382.6\n Apr\n2.7\n1.3\n20.1\n-1.9\n1.2\n0.0\n0.0\n23.4\n0.0\n254.9\n34.2\n51.7\n27.7\n392.0\n May\n2.4\n4.1\n18.6\n-2.4\n4.5\n0.0\n0.0\n27.3\n0.0\n253.4\n34.6\n63.0\n12.7\n391.0\n Jun\n2.4\n3.6\n7.9\n1.1\n9.1\n0.0\n0.0\n24.1\n0.0\n260.3\n34.6\n51.4\n35.2\n405.6\n Jul\n1.9\n1.3\n2.8\n2.2\n3.4\n0.0\n0.0\n11.6\n0.0\n264.0\n34.8\n51.7\n35.5\n397.6\n Aug\n1.4\n1.7\n0.4\n0.6\n3.4\n0.0\n0.0\n7.4\n0.0\n265.6\n34.5\n45.5\n37.3\n390.3\n Sep\n1.2\n0.8\n0.0\n0.3\n3.4\n0.0\n0.0\n5.7\n0.0\n233.7\n35.8\n46.6\n38.6\n360.4\n Oct\n0.9\n0.5\n0.4\n0.6\n2.5\n0.0\n0.0\n4.8\n0.0\n234.8\n35.6\n41.3\n38.7\n355.2\n Nov\n0.4\n0.6\n0.1\n0.2\n2.5\n0.0\n0.0\n3.9\n0.0\n231.9\n35.5\n39.6\n38.3\n349.2\n Dec\n1.1\n0.5\n0.1\n0.4\n2.5\n0.0\n0.0\n4.6\n0.0\n232.7\n35.5\n29.2\n40.5\n342.5\n2014\n Jan\n0.1\n0.5\n0.0\n0.2\n1.8\n0.0\n0.0\n2.6\n0.0\n81.3\n10.0\n23.5\n34.7\n152.1\n Feb\n0.2\n0.4\n0.1\n0.1\n1.8\n0.0\n0.0\n2.5\n0.0\n77.6\n9.0\n24.1\n34.6\n147.9\n Mar\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n1.6\n0.0\n0.0\n2.0\n0.0\n53.2\n8.7\n21.8\n32.5\n118.1\n Apr\n0.1\n0.4\n0.2\n0.3\n1.6\n0.0\n2.6\n5.2\n75.2\n8.5\n22.2\n32.4\n140.9\n284.4\n May\n0.2\n0.4\n0.0\n0.1\n0.3\n0.0\n0.9\n1.9\n68.7\n0.1\n14.6\n30.3\n114.6\n230.2\n Jun\n0.2\n0.2\n0.1\n0.0\n0.6\n0.0\n0.0\n1.2\n0.0\n66.8\n0.1\n14.7\n29.6\n112.4\n Jul\n0.2\n0.3\n0.0\n0.1\n0.3\n0.0\n0.0\n0.9\n0.0\n66.9\n0.1\n12.9\n28.7\n109.6\n Aug\n0.2\n0.7\n0.0\n0.1\n0.3\n0.0\n0.0\n1.3\n0.0\n64.4\n0.0\n19.4\n23.9\n109.0\n Sep\n0.4\n0.2\n0.0\n0.1\n0.3\n0.0\n0.0\n1.1\n0.0\n65.9\n0.1\n18.9\n19.7\n105.8\n Oct\n0.7\n0.7\n0.0\n0.1\n0.3\n0.0\n0.0\n1.7\n0.0\n68.3\n0.1\n10.8\n25.9\n106.9\n Nov\n0.6\n0.1\n0.0\n0.1\n0.3\n0.0\n0.0\n1.0\n0.0\n67.1\n0.1\n12.4\n25.8\n106.3\n Dec\n0.9\n0.4\n0.0\n0.1\n0.3\n0.0\n0.0\n1.7\n0.0\n63.6\n0.1\n10.0\n24.6\n100.0\nUS$ Millions\nTABLE 8.1 : ACCEPTING HOUSES - ASSETS\nLiquid Assets\nSecurities\n \n \nMONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW \n23 \n \n \n \n \n \nOf which\nDeposits\nCapital\nContigent\nOther\nTotal\nLiabilities to the \nand\nLiablities\nLiablities\nPublic\nEnd of\nDemand\nSavings and Short-term\nLong-term\nTotal\nForeign Liabilities\nRBZ\nOther Banks\nReserves\n2013\n Jan\n106.9\n91.7\n21.3\n220.0\n44.8\n0.0\n2.7\n-72.4\n34.8\n167.2\n397.0\n220.0\n Feb\n102.8\n66.0\n55.7\n224.5\n45.3\n0.0\n2.7\n-77.8\n34.8\n168.7\n398.2\n224.5\n Mar\n104.3\n62.3\n52.8\n219.5\n45.8\n0.0\n1.2\n-97.3\n34.2\n179.3\n382.6\n219.5\n Apr\n107.3\n64.6\n56.3\n228.3\n45.4\n0.0\n1.2\n-98.1\n34.2\n181.1\n392.0\n228.3\n May\n112.2\n67.1\n54.4\n233.6\n46.7\n0.0\n1.2\n-99.4\n34.6\n174.3\n391.0\n233.6\n Jun\n114.6\n56.2\n52.3\n223.1\n46.7\n0.0\n1.2\n-91.2\n34.6\n191.2\n405.6\n223.1\n Jul\n111.3\n82.7\n27.0\n220.9\n47.1\n0.0\n1.2\n-94.1\n34.8\n187.8\n397.6\n220.9\n Aug\n109.5\n80.6\n25.2\n215.2\n47.5\n0.0\n1.2\n-101.7\n34.5\n193.6\n390.3\n215.2\n Sep\n111.2\n82.6\n19.0\n212.8\n47.9\n0.0\n1.2\n-114.9\n35.8\n177.8\n360.4\n212.8\n Oct\n112.5\n80.4\n14.9\n207.8\n48.2\n0.0\n1.2\n-114.3\n35.6\n176.7\n355.2\n207.8\n Nov\n122.6\n59.7\n20.0\n202.3\n48.2\n0.0\n1.2\n-118.2\n35.5\n180.2\n349.2\n202.3\n Dec\n134.5\n56.4\n6.9\n197.8\n48.9\n0.0\n1.2\n-127.6\n35.5\n186.7\n342.5\n197.8\n2014\n Jan\n36.8\n57.7\n5.7\n100.1\n11.7\n0.0\n0.0\n0.7\n10.0\n29.5\n152.1\n100.1\n Feb\n47.6\n48.3\n0.0\n95.8\n11.7\n0.0\n0.0\n-10.9\n9.0\n42.3\n147.9\n95.8\n Mar\n41.0\n55.8\n0.0\n96.9\n12.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-17.7\n8.7\n18.4\n118.1\n96.9\n Apr\n57.4\n40.3\n0.0\n97.7\n12.2\n0.0\n0.0\n-19.8\n8.5\n42.4\n140.9\n97.7\n May\n42.8\n34.6\n0.0\n77.4\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n4.7\n0.1\n32.5\n114.6\n77.4\n Jun\n42.8\n33.2\n0.0\n76.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n2.3\n0.1\n33.7\n112.1\n76.0\n Jul\n42.6\n33.8\n0.0\n76.3\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-8.7\n0.1\n41.8\n109.6\n76.3\n Aug\n36.4\n40.4\n0.0\n76.8\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-7.8\n0.0\n40.0\n109.0\n76.8\n Sep\n40.9\n33.9\n0.0\n74.9\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-7.6\n0.1\n38.4\n105.8\n74.9\n Oct\n39.9\n33.7\n0.0\n73.6\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-9.6\n0.1\n42.8\n106.9\n73.6\n Nov\n39.4\n33.3\n0.0\n72.7\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-10.9\n0.1\n44.4\n106.3\n72.7\n Dec\n36.9\n31.2\n0.0\n68.1\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-17.9\n0.1\n49.7\n100.0\n68.1\nAmounts Owing to\nTABLE 8.2 : ACCEPTING HOUSES - LIABILITIES\nUS$ Millions\n \n \nMONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW \n24 \n \n \n \n \nMortgage\nOther\nOther\nNon Financial \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nNotes\nTotal\nOther Balances\nAdvances\nAdvances\nAssets\nAssets\n&\nBalances \nNostro \nwith RBZ/1\nCoin\nwith Other \nBalances\nTrade\nTreasury\nAgris Pes\nat Banks\nBanks\nBills\n2013\nJan\n20.4\n125.5\n0.0\n0.2\n0.0\n0.0\n146.1\n0.0\n283.2\n118.5\n36.1\n121.4\n705.3\nFeb\n20.2\n64.3\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n84.5\n0.0\n291.8\n117.9\n35.3\n121.4\n734.2\nMar\n18.8\n129.1\n0.0\n0.2\n20.0\n0.0\n168.1\n0.0\n291.4\n116.9\n39.5\n121.4\n737.3\nApr\n16.9\n159.8\n0.0\n0.2\n20.2\n0.0\n197.2\n0.0\n294.8\n115.5\n39.5\n122.1\n769.1\nMay\n30.2\n179.6\n0.0\n0.0\n20.3\n0.0\n230.0\n0.0\n307.3\n120.3\n40.4\n121.9\n819.9\nJun\n28.6\n178.8\n0.0\n0.0\n20.0\n0.0\n227.3\n0.0\n314.2\n122.4\n44.6\n121.8\n830.3\nJul\n26.1\n207.4\n0.0\n0.0\n20.0\n0.0\n253.5\n0.0\n312.4\n123.1\n48.3\n121.6\n858.9\nAug\n34.7\n204.1\n0.0\n0.0\n20.0\n0.0\n258.8\n0.0\n320.6\n123.0\n46.4\n124.1\n872.9\nSep\n36.4\n204.9\n0.0\n0.0\n20.0\n0.0\n261.3\n0.0\n353.4\n122.7\n51.9\n124.6\n913.9\nOct\n39.3\n186.8\n0.0\n0.0\n20.0\n0.0\n246.1\n0.0\n358.4\n128.2\n51.8\n122.4\n906.9\nNov\n39.7\n163.1\n0.0\n0.0\n40.0\n0.0\n242.8\n0.0\n361.6\n135.8\n43.6\n122.6\n906.4\nDec\n34.8\n158.8\n0.0\n0.0\n40.0\n0.0\n233.6\n0.0\n381.5\n127.7\n55.2\n123.0\n920.9\n2014\nJan\n30.9\n147.5\n0.2\n40.0\n0.0\n218.6\n0.0\n384.5\n136.4\n64.4\n125.3\n929.1\nFeb\n30.2\n165.0\n0.0\n0.2\n40.0\n0.0\n235.3\n0.0\n385.8\n132.0\n65.4\n125.4\n943.9\nMar\n47.5\n166.2\n0.0\n0.2\n40.0\n0.0\n253.8\n0.0\n390.4\n132.1\n68.8\n125.0\n970.1\nApr\n45.2\n161.0\n0.0\n0.2\n40.0\n0.0\n246.5\n0.0\n401.8\n132.4\n76.6\n124.7\n981.9\nMay\n47.7\n190.7\n0.0\n0.2\n40.0\n0.0\n278.6\n0.0\n394.0\n147.0\n82.7\n124.3\n1026.7\nJun\n39.5\n187.9\n0.0\n0.0\n40.0\n0.0\n267.4\n0.0\n400.0\n150.4\n84.0\n124.4\n1026.1\nJul\n40.6\n180.9\n0.0\n0.0\n40.0\n0.0\n261.5\n0.0\n431.8\n159.4\n84.1\n124.4\n1061.2\nAug\n17.8\n219.8\n0.0\n0.0\n51.4\n0.0\n289.1\n0.0\n442.4\n166.5\n86.4\n124.2\n1108.6\nSep\n51.2\n183.1\n0.0\n0.0\n51.4\n0.0\n285.7\n0.0\n452.1\n173.8\n95.6\n123.8\n1131.0\nOct\n37.1\n199.8\n0.0\n0.0\n51.7\n0.0\n288.6\n0.0\n483.1\n179.7\n102.2\n124.0\n1177.6\nNov\n53.2\n217.5\n0.0\n0.0\n32.8\n0.0\n303.5\n0.0\n512.4\n169.3\n109.0\n123.5\n1217.6\n Dec\n47.1\n211.2\n0.0\n0.0\n52.6\n0.0\n310.9\n0.0\n512.9\n169.0\n102.9\n125.3\n1,220.9\nLiquid Assets\nSecurities\nTABLE 9.1 : BUILDING SOCIETIES - ASSETS\nUS$ Millions\n \n \nMONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW \n25 \n \n \n \n \nOf which\nCapital\nOther\nTotal\nLiabilities to the \nand\nLiabilities\nPublic\nEnd of\nSavings and Short-term\nLong-term\nTotal\nForeign Liabilities\nOther Banks\nReserves\n2013\nJan\n230.0\n192.8\n422.8\n0.0\n0.0\n180.3\n102.3\n705.4\n422.8\nFeb\n255.7\n194.2\n449.9\n0.0\n0.0\n183.7\n100.6\n734.2\n449.9\nMar\n250.6\n203.9\n454.5\n0.0\n0.0\n187.2\n95.7\n737.3\n454.5\nApr\n252.9\n226.6\n479.5\n26.5\n50.4\n190.6\n22.3\n769.3\n479.5\nMay\n315.3\n212.0\n527.4\n26.6\n49.4\n193.3\n23.6\n820.2\n527.4\nJun\n309.0\n222.6\n531.6\n0.0\n0.0\n198.3\n100.4\n830.3\n531.6\nJul\n339.1\n222.8\n561.9\n21.7\n50.2\n202.0\n23.5\n859.2\n561.9\nAug\n298.4\n270.1\n568.4\n0.0\n0.0\n206.3\n95.8\n873.1\n568.4\nSep\n336.1\n246.9\n583.0\n20.8\n77.8\n209.2\n23.4\n914.1\n583.0\nOct\n310.9\n264.9\n575.8\n21.0\n74.4\n212.0\n24.0\n907.2\n575.8\nNov\n328.9\n244.3\n573.1\n21.0\n72.3\n214.8\n25.4\n906.7\n573.1\nDec\n370.3\n197.3\n567.6\n30.8\n75.8\n219.5\n27.3\n921.0\n567.6\n2014\nJan\n313.9\n253.1\n567.0\n26.1\n80.6\n225.9\n29.5\n929.1\n567.0\nFeb\n318.7\n264.4\n583.1\n25.1\n81.3\n228.6\n25.8\n943.9\n583.1\nMar\n374.6\n234.6\n609.2\n24.7\n79.6\n231.4\n25.2\n970.1\n609.2\nApr\n358.4\n262.7\n621.1\n24.9\n76.5\n234.0\n25.4\n981.9\n621.1\nMay\n436.2\n233.2\n669.4\n24.7\n77.3\n238.0\n17.1\n1026.7\n669.4\nJun\n440.1\n212.2\n652.3\n34.8\n78.9\n243.1\n17.3\n1026.3\n652.3\nJul\n362.4\n302.9\n665.3\n30.1\n104.3\n244.2\n17.5\n1061.3\n665.3\nAug\n358.8\n336.8\n695.5\n35.7\n105.7\n250.6\n21.2\n1108.7\n695.5\nSep\n394.8\n297.6\n692.4\n54.2\n106.9\n253.5\n23.9\n1131.0\n692.4\nOct\n364.5\n368.0\n732.5\n54.2\n105.3\n258.5\n27.3\n1177.7\n732.5\nNov\n376.9\n392.0\n768.9\n54.6\n104.4\n262.9\n27.2\n1217.8\n768.9\nDec\n400.9\n387.5\n788.4\n54.2\n102.0\n262.7\n27.6\n1234.9\n788.4\nDeposits\nTABLE 9.2 : BUILDING SOCIETIES - LIABILITIES\nUS$ Millions \nAmounts Owing to\n \n \nMONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW \n26 \n \n \nMarket Capitalisation\nIndustrial\nMining\nUS$ Millions\n2013\nJan\n179.34\n84.07\n4700.33\nFeb\n182.3\n72.01\n4748.24\nMar\n183.9\n66.2\n4726.34\nApr\n189.66\n71.98\n4894.68\nMay\n212.72\n73.99\n5471.22\nJun\n211.19\n73.29\n5436.57\nJul\n232.87\n66.77\n5936.78\nAug\n181.67\n48.73\n4682.27\nSep\n200.05\n49.9\n5157.2\nOct\n209.74\n52.68\n5407.42\nNov\n213.04\n47.02\n5482.03\nDec\n202.12\n45.79\n5203.13\n2014\nJan\n189.25\n35.4\n4882.11\nFeb\n189.45\n39.24\n4906.94\nMar\n176.32\n29.51\n4560.29\nApr\n172.91\n29.64\n4473.51\nMay\n174.89\n35.45\n4485.11\nJun\n186.57\n61.32\n4873.4\nJuly\n188.07\n95.00\n4959.21\nAug\n196.43\n104.8\n5186.63\nSep\n195.25\n92.75\n5140.20\nOct\n177.88\n70.38\n4664.80\nNov\n171.45\n64.39\n4517.93\nDec\n162.57\n72.61\n4323.17\nIndices\nTable 10: ZIMBABWE STOCK MARKET STATISTICS\n \n \nMONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW \n27 \n \n \nCommercial\nAccepting\nBuilding \nEnd of\nBanks\nHouses\nP.O.S.B.\nSocieties\nTOTAL\n2013\nJan\n1,418.5\n113.0\n64.3\n422.8\n2,018.6\nFeb\n1,424.8\n121.7\n64.7\n449.9\n2,061.1\nMar\n1,427.3\n115.2\n66.7\n454.5\n2,063.6\nApr\n1,425.8\n121.0\n63.9\n479.5\n2,090.1\nMay\n1,393.0\n121.5\n66.2\n527.4\n2,108.0\nJun\n1,218.4\n108.6\n70.6\n531.6\n1,929.2\nJul\n1,162.1\n109.7\n70.8\n561.9\n1,904.5\nAug\n1,132.7\n105.8\n70.4\n568.4\n1,877.2\nSep\n1,193.8\n101.6\n69.8\n583.0\n1,948.1\nOct\n1,229.3\n95.2\n69.3\n575.8\n1,969.7\nNov\n1,232.8\n79.7\n73.4\n573.1\n1,959.0\nDec\n1,330.7\n63.3\n72.7\n567.6\n2,034.3\n2014\nJan\n1,206.2\n63.3\n70.1\n567.0\n1,906.7\nFeb\n1,373.4\n48.3\n71.5\n583.1\n2,076.3\nMar\n1,373.8\n55.8\n75.1\n609.2\n2,113.9\nApr\n1,394.0\n40.3\n81.0\n621.1\n2,136.4\nMay\n1,427.5\n34.6\n77.5\n669.4\n2,209.0\nJun\n1,495.8\n33.2\n81.3\n652.3\n2,262.6\nJul\n1,499.5\n33.8\n84.2\n665.3\n2,282.7\nAug\n1,502.9\n40.4\n84.0\n695.5\n2,322.9\nSep\n1,573.8\n33.9\n88.6\n692.4\n2,388.8\nOct\n1,525.0\n33.7\n87.5\n732.5\n2,378.7\nNov\n1,469.9\n33.3\n89.8\n768.9\n2,361.8\nDec\n1,473.1\n31.2\n84.8\n788.4\n2,377.5\n1/ Comprises all deposits other than demand deposits.\nTABLE 11 : SAVINGS /1 WITH FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS\nUS$ Millions\n \n \nMONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW \n28 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nLiquid\nPrescribed\nExcess\nLiquid\nPrescribed\nExcess\nassets\nliquid\nliquid\nassets\nliquid\nLiquid\nEnd of\nheld\nassets/1\nassets\nheld\nassets/1\nassets\n2013\nJan\n1,235.5\n1,035.2\n200.3\n36.2\n66.0\n-29.8\nFeb\n1,244.9\n1,025.4\n219.5\n26.9\n67.3\n-40.4\nMar\n1,277.6\n1,016.2\n261.4\n8.9\n65.8\n-57.0\nApr\n1,491.7\n1,050.1\n441.6\n23.4\n68.5\n-45.1\nMay\n1,480.8\n1,037.7\n443.1\n27.3\n70.1\n-42.8\nJun\n1,425.8\n969.7\n456.0\n24.1\n66.9\n-42.8\nJul\n1,429.9\n964.9\n465.1\n11.6\n66.3\n-54.7\nAug\n1,285.0\n945.0\n340.0\n7.4\n64.6\n-57.2\nSep\n1,519.7\n982.7\n536.9\n5.7\n63.8\n-58.1\nOct\n1,489.0\n1,006.6\n482.5\n4.8\n62.3\n-57.5\nNov\n1,379.5\n955.9\n423.7\n3.9\n60.7\n-56.8\nDec\n1,469.9\n993.3\n476.6\n4.6\n59.3\n-54.7\n2014\nJan\n1,417.0\n1,007.9\n409.0\n2.6\n30.0\n-27.4\nFeb\n1,466.6\n1,045.6\n421.0\n2.5\n28.7\n-26.2\nMar\n1,512.9\n1,059.2\n453.7\n2.0\n29.1\n-27.1\nApr\n1,608.4\n1,098.5\n510.0\n5.2\n29.3\n-24.1\nMay\n1,700.6\n1,116.7\n583.9\n1.9\n23.2\n-21.3\nJun\n1,716.1\n1,123.4\n592.7\n1.2\n22.8\n-21.6\nJul\n1,553.7\n1,089.0\n464.7\n0.9\n22.9\n-22.0\nAug\n1,618.6\n1,111.6\n507.0\n1.3\n23.0\n-21.7\nSep\n1,664.2\n1,129.4\n534.7\n1.1\n22.5\n-21.3\nOct\n1,644.7\n1,135.7\n508.9\n1.7\n22.1\n-20.3\nNov\n1,602.2\n1,110.5\n491.7\n1.0\n21.8\n-20.8\nDec\n1,571.0\n1,107.9\n463.1\n1.7\n20.4\n-18.7\n1/ With effect from 1 August 2011, the prescribed liquid asset ratio was reviewed to 25% of liabilities to the public, from 20%. \nUS$ Millions\nTABLE 12 : ANALYSIS OF LIQUID ASSETS OF MONETARY BANKS \nCommercial Banks\n Accepting Houses\n \n \nMONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW \n29 \n \n \n \nMONTH \nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\n INTERNET\n2013\nJan\n3563.84\n5.24\n80.72\n173.71\n115.53\n89.67\nFeb\n2968.02\n5.52\n103.88\n156.66\n118.7\n80.56\nMar\n3339.98\n15.21\n134.33\n178.08\n118.47\n102.05\nApr\n3535.58\n16.58\n140.28\n187.85\n160.61\n123.03\nMay\n3915.31\n15.42\n129.2\n203.37\n211.75\n152.24\nJun\n3544.35\n13.65\n117.11\n181.35\n146.64\n121.98\nJul\n3955.45\n12.31\n132.61\n205.37\n164.08\n139.13\nAug\n3351.13\n10.45\n138.05\n203.41\n189.48\n128.68\nSep\n3409.17\n13.34\n120.41\n190.44\n173.13\n142.32\nOct\n3641.98\n13.75\n121.55\n206.51\n201.51\n156.26\nNov\n3134.35\n11.4\n102.19\n229.52\n222.18\n57.34\nDec\n3438.08\n4.04\n130.15\n265.8\n268.94\n68.58\nAnnual Total\n41797.24\n136.91\n1450.48\n2382.07\n2091.02\n1361.84\n2014\nJan\n3093.01\n5.24\n102.26\n233.1\n228.25\n68.31\nFeb\n2954.93\n10.73\n96.27\n193.9\n217.14\n64.42\nMar\n3332.79\n10.4\n103.58\n232.94\n255.32\n87.94\nApr\n3439.33\n9.66\n126.26\n253.16\n264.38\n96.29\nMay\n3915.31\n13.65\n117.11\n181.35\n146.64\n121.98\nJun\n3657.44\n12.42\n110.38\n250.87\n284.18\n104.28\nJul\n3955.45\n11.72\n125.81\n267\n312.35\n101.75\nAug\n3467.34\n9.36\n135.9\n273.39\n320.36\n103.26\nSep\n4037.98\n11.16\n138.09\n280.8\n341.23\n115.94\nOct\n3843.84\n13.58\n150.09\n291.68\n362.30\n117.40\nNov\n4104.33\n9.33\n160.40\n299.94\n358.76\n103.76\nDec\n4615.04\n11.53\n148.5\n336.65\n395.93\n124.33\nTABLE 13.1 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS TRANSACTIONAL ACTIVITY\nValues of Transactions (US$ in millions)\n \n \nMONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW \n30 \n \n \nMONTH \nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\n INTERNET\n2013\nJan\n181.68\n21.18\n761.09\n691.18\n6950.84\n47.53\nFeb\n172.41\n21.95\n811.83\n620.06\n6835.89\n30.75\nMar\n179.44\n37.01\n1377.65\n743.82\n7042.27\n33.69\nApr\n182.87\n37.31\n954.8\n760.46\n9908.41\n34.73\nMay\n215.2\n37.09\n954.18\n793.43\n12146.9\n38.68\nJun\n185.8\n34.36\n968.54\n731.17\n9110.97\n36.87\nJul\n205.85\n35.41\n1052.26\n822.57\n10099.72\n42.74\nAug\n187.25\n30.29\n1114.86\n825.75\n11551.94\n41.78\nSep\n201.22\n33.17\n1003.98\n799.62\n8701.56\n44.48\nOct\n212.66\n35.69\n1073.88\n873.19\n9769.81\n48.59\nNov\n186.64\n31.74\n904.27\n927.93\n14753.35\n24.04\nDec\n180.8\n11.82\n1033.73\n1042.32\n12273.02\n23.56\nAnnual Total\n2291.82\n367.02\n12011.07\n9631.5\n119144.68\n447.44\n2014\nJan\n182.48\n29.41\n973.79\n815.89\n11141.19\n24.19\nFeb\n175.09\n32.95\n991.91\n799.12\n10631.6\n25.1\nMar\n192.02\n32.35\n1163.76\n947.64\n12859.5\n30.82\nApr\n183.63\n28.12\n1184.85\n974.37\n13298.04\n29.23\nMay\n215.2\n37.09\n954.18\n793.43\n12146.9\n38.68\nJun\n193.58\n32.98\n1164.73\n966.45\n14163.56\n34.25\nJul\n199.59\n34.34\n1272.91\n1038.44\n15370.63\n37.68\nAug\n170.86\n27.25\n1300.35\n1122.41\n16268.07\n33.84\nSep\n197.88\n30.39\n1158.84\n1057.48\n15991.79\n39.35\nOct\n200.32\n34.58\n1193.38\n1086.16\n17527.40\n40.96\nNov\n171.45\n27.66\n1143.69\n1077.30\n17876.31\n42.01\nDec\n189.83\n27.49\n1161.59\n1162.71\n19347.91\n40.49\nTABLE 13.2 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS TRANSACTIONAL ACTIVITY\nVolumes of Transactions (in thousands)\n \n \n31 \n \nMONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/MPC_Statements/December2014.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "90472e85e1f7aa754a19894eeea1cb97", "text": "Monetary Policy\nReview\nNovember 2011\nMonetary Policy\nReview\nNovember 2011\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\n© South African Reserve Bank\nAll rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by \nany means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without fully acknowledging the Monetary Policy \nReview of the South African Reserve Bank as the source. The contents of this publication are intended for general information \nonly and are not intended to serve as financial or other advice. While every precaution is taken to ensure the accuracy of \ninformation, the South African Reserve Bank shall not be liable to any person for inaccurate information or opinions contained \nin this publication.\nEnquiries relating to this Review should be addressed to:\n\t\nHead: Research Department\n\t\n\t\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n\t\nP O\n \nBox 427\n\t\nPretoria 0001\n\t\nTel. 27 12 313-3668\nhttp://www.reservebank.co.za\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n ISSN: 1609-3194\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\nContents\nMonetary Policy Review\nIntroduction....................................................................................................................... \t\n1\nRecent developments in inflation...................................................................................... \t\n1\n\t\nThe evolution of inflation indicators............................................................................. \t\n1\n\t\nFactors affecting inflation............................................................................................ \t\n9\nMonetary policy................................................................................................................ \t\n24\nThe outlook for inflation..................................................................................................... \t\n28\n\t\nInternational outlook................................................................................................... \t\n28\n\t\nOutlook for domestic demand and supply.................................................................. \t\n30\n\t\nIndicators of inflation expectations.............................................................................. \t\n33\n\t\nThe South African Reserve Bank inflation forecast...................................................... \t\n35\nAssessment and conclusion............................................................................................. \t\n37\nStatements issued by Gill Marcus, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n21 July 2011...................................................................................................................... \t\n39\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n22 September 2011.......................................................................................................... \t\n43\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n10 November 2011............................................................................................................ \t\n47\nAbbreviations................................................................................................................... \t\n51\nBoxes \n1\t\nThe high-frequency response of the rand–US dollar rate to inflation surprises........ \t\n7\n2 \t\nAn accuracy analysis of inflation forecasts.............................................................\t\n36\nFigures \n1\t\nConsumer price inflation: Targeted inflation ........................................................... \t\n2\n2\t\nSelected commodity prices.................................................................................... \t\n3\n3\t\nSouth African petrol price....................................................................................... \t\n4\n4\t\nThe effect of food, petrol and energy prices on headline inflation .......................... \t\n5\n5\t\nPPI for domestic output and imported commodities............................................... \t\n6\n6\t\nFood prices in the PPI and CPI............................................................................... \t\n7\nB1.1\t Exchange rate behaviour on 30 May 2003............................................................. \t\n8\nB1.2\t High-frequency rand–US dollar returns around inflation announcements............... \t\n8\nB1.3\t Inflation surprises.................................................................................................... \t\n9\n7\t\nEvolution of real GDP forecasts for 2011 for the G7 and eurozone \n(surveys conducted during 2010 and 2011)............................................................. \t\n11\n8\t\nPrice of Brent crude oil........................................................................................... \t\n11\n9\t\nBrent crude futures prices...................................................................................... \t\n12\n10\t\nThe VIX® and the rand–US dollar exchange rate..................................................... \t\n14\n11\t\nExchange rates of the rand..................................................................................... \t\n15\n12\t\nExchange rate performance against the US dollar.................................................. \t\n16\n13\t\nNon-resident net purchases of domestic bonds and equities................................. \t\n16\n14\t\nRemuneration per worker, labour productivity and unit labour cost in the \n\t\nformal non-agricultural sector................................................................................. \t\n17\n15\t\nAverage annual inflation and wage settlements...................................................... \t\n17\n16\t\nTotal employment................................................................................................... \t\n18\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\n17\t\nDomestic share price indices.................................................................................. \t\n20\n18\t\nHouse prices.......................................................................................................... \t\n20\n19\t\nHistorical trends in total loans and advances at times of recession......................... \t\n23\n20\t\nBanks’ loans and advances by type....................................................................... \t\n23\n21\t\nGrowth in monetary aggregates............................................................................. \t\n24\n22\t\nThe repurchase rate and other short-term interest rates......................................... \t\n24\n23\t\nEvolution of real GDP forecasts for 2012 for the G7 and eurozone \n\t\n(surveys conducted during 2011)............................................................................ \t\n29\n24\t\nSelected indicators of global economic activity....................................................... \t\n30\n25\t\nReal GDP growth forecast...................................................................................... \t\n31\n26\t\nKagiso PMI............................................................................................................. \t\n31\n27\t\nComposite leading business cycle indicator........................................................... \t\n32\n28\t\nRMB/BER business confidence.............................................................................. \t\n32\n29\t\nBER surveys of headline CPI inflation expectations................................................. \t\n33\n30\t\nBreak-even inflation rates........................................................................................ \t\n34\n31\t\nTargeted inflation forecast....................................................................................... \t\n35\nB2.1\t Average forecast error............................................................................................ \t\n36\nB2.2\t Root mean square error.......................................................................................... \t\n37\nTables \n1\t\nContributions to CPI inflation.................................................................................. \t\n2\n2\t\nContributions of food subcategories to headline CPI.............................................. \t\n3\n3\t\nCPI: Goods and services inflation........................................................................... \t\n5\n4\t\nContributions to administered prices...................................................................... \t\n6\n5\t\nAnnual percentage change in real GDP and consumer prices................................ \t\n10\n6\t\nSelected central bank interest rates........................................................................ \t\n13\n7\t\nGrowth in real GDP and expenditure components.................................................. \t\n19\n8\t\nReal value of building plans passed and buildings completed in \nlarger municipalities................................................................................................ \t\n21\n9\t\nPublic finance data................................................................................................. \t\n22\n10\t\nIMF projections of world growth and inflation for 2011 and 2012............................. \t\n29\n11\t\nReuters survey of CPI inflation forecasts: October 2011.......................................... \t\n34\n1\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\nMonetary Policy Review\nIntroduction\nSince the previous Monetary Policy Review (MPR) was published in May 2011, the prospects for \nglobal and domestic growth have deteriorated. Growth in a number of advanced economies has \nslowed, and confidence levels have been undermined by renewed financial market turbulence, \ngenerated in large part by the unresolved European sovereign debt crisis. Some advanced \neconomies face prolonged periods of economic adjustment, and although emerging markets \nare expected to continue to outperform advanced economies, their growth will be affected by \nthe challenging environment. Heightened perceptions of risk by global investors have resulted in \nincreased volatility of capital flows worldwide. Recent shifts in capital flows have also impacted \non the domestic capital and foreign-exchange markets. \nSouth Africa’s fragile and uneven domestic economic recovery is evident in recent economic \ndata. After providing the main support to the domestic recovery for the past two years, \ngrowth in household consumption expenditure slowed markedly in the second quarter of \n2011. Growth forecasts have been lowered following the deterioration in the global growth \noutlook, the weaker-than-expected domestic growth outcome in the second quarter, and \nthe impact of industrial action on key sectors of the economy. Domestic inflation also picked \nup during the period under review, with oil, food and administered prices rising strongly. \nHowever, wage pressures have eased somewhat, and targeted inflation has remained within \nthe inflation target range of 3 to 6 per cent. \nThis MPR analyses the latest developments in inflation and the factors that impact on it. It \nreviews recent monetary policy developments, discusses the outlook for inflation and presents \nthe South African Reserve Bank’s (the Bank) growth and inflation forecasts. In addition, topical \nissues are addressed in boxes. The first box reports on the high-frequency reaction of the rand \nper US dollar exchange rate to inflation surprises, and considers whether there is a negative \ncorrelation between inflation surprises and changes in the nominal exchange rate in the very \nshort term. The second box provides an assessment of the accuracy of the forecasts of inflation \nprovided by the Bank’s suite of models. \nRecent developments in inflation\nThis section reviews recent trends in the main inflation indices and analyses developments in \nthe main factors impacting on inflation in South Africa.\nThe evolution of inflation indicators\nThe year-on-year percentage change in the headline consumer price index for all urban areas \n(CPI), the measure of inflation targeted by the Bank, increased from 4,2 per cent in April 2011 to \n5,7 per cent in September (Figure 1). Headline inflation has remained within the inflation target \nrange of 3 to 6 per cent since February 2010. \nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\n2\nPercentage change over 12 months\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\nFigure 1 \nConsumer price inflation: Targeted inflation*\n* CPIX for metropolitan and other urban areas until the end of 2008; CPI for all urban \n areas thereafter\nSource: Statistics South Africa\n2003\n2006\n2004\n2005\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\nThe 1,5 percentage point increase in the inflation rate since April 2011 has been driven mainly \nby increases in the food and non-alcoholic beverages (NAB) and transport categories (Table 1). \nThe contribution to the inflation rate from the food and NAB category has increased from \n0,7 percentage points in April to 1,3 percentage points in September 2011. The transport \ncategory has also seen significant price increases, primarily due to petrol price increases, \ncausing its contribution to increase from 0,6 percentage points in April to 1,1 percentage points \nin September 2011. The inflation rate has also been supported by a steady but high contribution \nfrom the housing and utilities category which has increased from 1,5 percentage points in April \nand May to 1,6 percentage points for the period from June to September 2011. \nTable 1\t\nContributions to CPI inflation\nPercentage change over 12 months* and percentage points\n2011\nApr\nMay\nJun\nJul\nAug\nSep\nTotal*.............................................................................\n4,2\n4,6\n5,0\n5,3\n5,3\n5,7\nOf which:\nFood and non-alcoholic beverages................................\n0,7\n1,0\n1,1\n1,1\n1,1\n1,3\nAlcoholic beverages and tobacco..................................\n0,3\n0,3\n0,4\n0,4\n0,4\n0,4\nHousing and utilities....................................................... \n1,5\n1,5\n1,6\n1,6\n1,6\n1,6\nHealth............................................................................\n0,1\n0,1\n0,1\n0,1\n0,1\n0,1\nTransport........................................................................\n0,6\n0,7\n0,9\n0,9\n1,0\n1,1\nEducation.......................................................................\n0,2\n0,2\n0,2\n0,2\n0,2\n0,2\nRestaurants and hotels..................................................\n0,2\n0,2\n0,0\n0,2\n0,2\n0,2\nMiscellaneous goods and services.................................\n0,5\n0,5\n0,6\n0,6\n0,6\n0,7\nOther.............................................................................\n0,1\n0,1\n0,1\n0,2\n0,1\n0,1\nSource:\t Statistics South Africa\nThe year-on-year inflation rate for all food items increased from 4,8 per cent in April to 8,7 per \ncent in September 2011. This increase is largely the result of rising inflation in the breads and \ncereals, and the meat subcategories. The inflation rate for meat had risen by 3,8 percentage \npoints since April to 12,1 per cent in September, resulting in the contribution of meat to headline \n3\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\ninflation increasing from 0,4 percentage points in April to 0,6 percentage points in September \n(Table 2). Similarly, the inflation rate for breads and cereals had increased by 4,7 percentage \npoints since April to 8,6 per cent in September, resulting in the contribution to headline inflation \nincreasing from 0,1 percentage points in April to 0,3 percentage points in September.\nTable 2\t\n Contributions of food subcategories to headline CPI\nPercentage change over 12 months* and percentage points\n2011\nWeight\nApr\nMay\nJun\nJul\nAug\nSep\nHeadline CPI*..................................................\n100,00\n4,2\n4,6\n5,0\n5,3\n5,3\n5,7\nOf which:\nFood and non-alcoholic beverages..................\n15,68\n0,7\n1,0\n1,1\n1,1\n1,1\n1,3\n Food..............................................................\n14,27\n0,7\n0,9\n1,0\n1,1\n1,0\n1,2\n Processed food...........................................\n6,79\n0,3\n0,5\n0,5\n0,6\n0,6\n0,7\n Unprocessed food.......................................\n7,48\n0,4\n0,4\n0,5\n0,5\n0,5\n0,6\n Bread and cereals.......................................\n3,08\n0,1\n0,2\n0,3\n0,3\n0,3\n0,3\n Meat............................................................\n4,59\n0,4\n0,4\n0,4\n0,5\n0,5\n0,6\n All other food...............................................\n6,60\n0,2\n0,3\n0,3\n0,3\n0,3\n0,3\nPlease note that the contributions may not add up to the total due to rounding\nSource:\t Statistics South Africa\nMaize prices in South Africa continued to increase between April and November 2011, although \nthe prices of wheat and sunflower seeds remained relatively unchanged (Figure 2). Maize \nand sunflower seeds traded at around export parity prices in 2011 due to good yields and \nincreased international prices, resulting in increased export opportunities. Wheat prices have \nbeen at import parity as South Africa is a net importer of wheat. The export parity prices, \nwhich reflect the notional prices at which South African producers could export commodities, \nare calculated using international free-on-board (fob) prices, the exchange rate (rand per\nYellow maize SAFEX spot price\nFigure 2 Selected commodity prices\nRand per ton\n0\n1 000\n2 000\n3 000\n4 000\n0\n1 000\n2 000\n3 000\n4 000\n5 000\n0\n1 000\n2 000\n3 000\n4 000\n5 000\n6 000\n0\n2 000\n4 000\n6 000\n8 000\n10 000\nWhite maize SAFEX spot price\nRand per ton\nRand per ton\nRand per ton\nWheat SAFEX spot price\nSunflower seed SAFEX spot price\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n* Please note that the top blue line is the import parity price and the bottom blue line is the export parity price. These prices are the \n theoretical upper and lower bound prices for commodities\nSource: Grain South Africa\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\n4\nUS dollar), financing, loading and transport costs. Import parity prices, which provide the \nnotional prices at which commodities could be imported, are calculated using international \nfob prices, the exchange rate (rand per US dollar), import tariffs and insurance, financing and \ntransport costs. \nPetrol prices have continued to increase, with the Gauteng price of 95 octane petrol rising \nto R10,77 per litre in November 2011, exceeding the previous peak price of R10,70 per litre \nrecorded in July 2008. As Figure 3 shows, the increase in the past three months is mainly due \nto a depreciation in the value of the currency. The exchange rate used in the calculations of the \npetrol price depreciated from an average of R6,84 per US dollar in August to R8,00 per US dollar \nin the November petrol price calculation. Furthermore, during October 2011 the retail margin \nwas increased by 4 cents per litre to cover the increased wages of service station industry staff. \nCents per litre\nCents per litre\nFigure 3 \n South African petrol price\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\nExchange rate\nOver (-)/Under (+) recovery\nMovement in international product prices\nPrice change\n400\n600\n800\n1 000\n1 200\n-200\n-160\n-120\n-80\n-40\n0\n40\n80\n120\nSource: Department of Energy\nContributions to the change in \nthe petrol price\nLevel\nGoods and services price inflation have both trended upward since April 2011 (Table 3). Year-\non-year goods price inflation increased from 3,7 per cent in April to 5,8 per cent in September \n2011. The greatest pressure came from non-durable goods inflation which increased from \n6,8 per cent in April to 9,7 per cent in September. Inflation in the durable goods and semi-\ndurable goods categories remained below the lower level of the inflation target range over \nthis period. The durable goods category has continued to experience deflation, with prices \ndeclining by 2 per cent in September. Services inflation increased from 4,7 per cent in April to \n5,4 per cent in September 2011.\n5\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\nTable 3\t\nCPI: Goods and services inflation\nPercentage change over 12 months\n2011\nApr\nMay\nJun\nJul\nAug\nSep\nHeadline CPI....................................................................\n4,2\n4,6\n5,0\n5,3\n5,3\n5,7\nGoods inflation..................................................................\n3,7\n4,5\n4,9\n5,1\n5,4\n5,8\nDurable goods...........................................................\n-2,3\n-2,3\n-2,7\n-2,1\n-2,1\n-2,0\nSemi-durable goods...................................................\n1,0\n1,6\n1,8\n1,7\n2,1\n2,2\nNon-durable goods....................................................\n6,8\n7,6\n8,5\n8,6\n8,9\n9,7\nServices inflation...............................................................\n4,7\n4,7\n5,2\n5,5\n5,4\n5,4\nSource:\t Statistics South Africa\nThe measures of core inflation in Figure 4 (defined as year-on-year headline inflation excluding \nselected administered and volatile prices) show that food, petrol and energy prices continue \nto place upward pressure on headline inflation. Compared with overall headline CPI inflation \nof 5,7 per cent in September, core inflation was 4,9 per cent for CPI excluding petrol prices, \n5,2 per cent for CPI excluding food and non-alcoholic beverage prices, and 3,8 per cent for \nCPI excluding food, non-alcoholic beverages, petrol and energy prices. However, these core \ninflation measures have all been trending upwards during 2011, reflecting general upward \npressure on inflation. \nPercentage change over 12 months\n2009\n2010\n2011\n* NAB: Non-alcoholic beverages\nSource: Statistics South Africa\nFigure 4 \nThe effect of food, petrol and energy prices on \n \nheadline inflation\nCPI excluding food and NAB* prices\nCPI excluding food, NAB and petrol prices\nHeadline CPI\nCPI excluding petrol prices\nCPI excluding food, NAB, petrol and energy prices\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\nAdministered price inflation has remained significantly above the upper level of the inflation \ntarget range (Table 4). Movements in electricity and petrol prices have made the most significant \ncontribution to the high and increasing administered price inflation rate, contributing over half of \nthe increase each month since April 2011. Electricity prices contributed 3,0 percentage points \nto administered price inflation in September (electricity and other fuels prices, a category \ndominated by electricity prices, increased at a year-on-year rate of 17,3 per cent in September). \nRising petrol prices over the period increased the contribution of this component to administered \nprice inflation from 3,7 percentage points in April to 5,4 percentage points in September 2011. \nAssessment rates and water have also contributed significantly to overall administered price \ninflation over the period.\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\n6\nTable 4\t\n Contributions to administered prices\nPercentage change over 12 months* and percentage points\nWeights\n2011\nCPI\nAPI\nApr\nMay\nJun\nJul\nAug\nSep\nRegulated component\nWater.....................................\n1,10\n7,50\n0,9\n0,9\n0,9\n1,0\n1,0\n1,0\nElectricity...............................\n1,68\n11,46\n2,9\n2,9\n2,9\n3,2\n3,0\n3,0\nParaffin...................................\n0,16\n1,09\n0,1\n0,1\n0,1\n0,1\n0,1\n0,2\nPetrol.....................................\n3,93\n26,81\n3,7\n4,1\n4,8\n4,2\n4,9\n5,4\nTelephone fees.......................\n1,26\n8,59\n0,1\n0,1\n0,1\n0,1\n-0,1\n-0,1\nPostage.................................\n0,02\n0,14\n0,0\n0,0\n0,0\n0,0\n0,0\n0,0\nCellular telephone calls...........\n1,47\n10,03\n-0,1\n-0,1\n0,0\n0,0\n0,0\n0,0\nUnregulated component\nAssessment rates..................\n2,07\n14,12\n1,1\n1,1\n1,1\n1,1\n1,1\n1,1\nSewage collection..................\n0,06\n0,41\n0,1\n0,1\n0,1\n0,1\n0,1\n0,1\nRefuse collection....................\n0,09\n0,61\n0,1\n0,1\n0,1\n0,0\n0,0\n0,0\nTrain fees...............................\n0,04\n0,27\n0,0\n0,0\n0,0\n0,0\n0,0\n0,0\nMotor vehicle licences............\n0,09\n0,61\n0,0\n0,1\n0,1\n0,1\n0,1\n0,1\nMotor vehicle registration fees.\n0,10\n0,68\n0,1\n0,2\n0,2\n0,1\n0,1\n0,1\nTelevision licences..................\n0,13\n0,89\n0,0\n0,0\n0,0\n0,0\n0,0\n0,0\nPrimary and secondary \nschool fees.............................\n1,28\n8,73\n0,8\n0,8\n0,9\n0,8\n0,8\n0,8\nUniversity fees........................\n0,90\n6,14\n0,6\n0,6\n0,6\n0,5\n0,5\n0,5\nUniversity boarding fees.........\n0,28\n1,91\n0,2\n0,2\n0,2\n0,2\n0,2\n0,2\nCPI for administered prices*........\n14,66\n100,00\n10,7\n11,3\n12,0\n11,7\n11,9\n12,5\nSource:\t Statistics South Africa\nThe year-on-year inflation rate measured in terms of the producer price index (PPI) for domestic \noutput was 10,5 per cent in September; a 3,9 percentage point increase from the rate of \n6,6 per cent recorded for April 2011 (Figure 5). This is mainly due to high year-on-year increases \nPercentage change over 12 months\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\nDetails regarding changes to the PPI in this period are documented in statistical release \nP0142.1, February 2008, issued by Statistics South Africa\nSource: Statistics South Africa\nFigure 5 \nPPI for domestic output and imported commodities\nDomestic output\nDomestic output: Electricity\nDomestic output: Manufacturing\nImported commodities \n-30\n-20\n-10\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n7\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\nin the prices of electricity (26,7 per cent), mining and quarrying (17,7 per cent) and products \nof petroleum and coal (27,1 per cent) in September 2011. The year-on-year increase in the PPI \nfor imported commodities rose to 10,7 per cent in September, mainly due to an increase of \n36,3 per cent in the price of crude petroleum and natural gas.\nAfter declining for an extended period, the price of food at the agricultural level in the PPI for domestic \nprices rose by 8,9 per cent on a year-on-year basis in May 2011 (Figure 6). This rate then moderated \nto 3,6 per cent in August 2011 before increasing sharply in September to 9,9 per cent as a result of \nincreases in the inflation rates for the vegetables and the fruits and nuts subcategories. The year-\non-year percentage change in the price of food at manufacturing level in the PPI for domestic prices \nhas continued to increase since April 2011, rising to 8,8 per cent in September.\nPercentage change over 12 months\nSource: Statistics South Africa\nFigure 6 \nFood prices in the PPI and CPI\n-20\n-15\n-10\n-5\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\nPPI: Food at agricultural level\nPPI: Food at manufacturing level\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\nCPI: Food\nBox 1\t\nThe high-frequency response of the rand–US dollar rate to inflation surprises1\nThe median expectation in the financial markets for inflation in South Africa for the May 2002 to April 2003 \nperiod was 10,4 per cent in mid-May 2003.2 When the data were released on 30 May 2003 at 11:30 \nJohannesburg time (GMT+2), they revealed an inflation rate of 8,5 per cent – an exceptionally large inflation \nsurprise (and good news about inflation). The currency market’s response to the official announcement of an \ninflation rate that was two percentage points lower than the earlier market expectation was a sharp and \nimmediate depreciation of the currency (see Figure B1.1).3 \nAlthough inconsistent with the conventional wisdom that inflation is “bad” for the exchange rate, the direction \nof the currency’s movement in response to this inflation surprise is not uncommon. Anecdotal evidence \nfrequently indicates that at least some currencies consistently appreciate in response to unexpectedly high \ninflation and depreciate in response to unexpectedly low inflation. Recent research has shown the theoretical \nbasis for this outcome.4 \nFarrell, Hassan and Viegi  assess the high-frequency reaction of the rand–US dollar rate to inflation surprises \nto see if there is a negative correlation between inflation surprises and changes in the nominal exchange \nrate in the very short term (five minutes before, and five minutes after the inflation announcement) and \nwhether it has changed with the adoption of inflation targeting.\n1\t Greg Farrell, Shakill Hassan and Nicola Viegi, “The High-Frequency Response of the Rand–US Dollar Rate to Inflation \nSurprises”, South African Reserve Bank Discussion Paper (2011a, forthcoming).\n2\t Bloomberg conducted a market survey of expected inflation in mid-May (the last survey before the official release). The \nrates refer to annual South African consumer price index excluding mortgage interest cost for metropolitan and other \nurban areas (CPIX) inflation.\n3\t Note that press reports in the weeks before the announcement (and an admission of an error in the computation of \nCPIX by the Minister of Finance shortly before the announcement) suggest that at least some market participants \nexpected some degree of revision (and hence a “surprise”), but not its magnitude, nor with certainty.\n4\t See Richard Clarida and Daniel Waldman, “Is Bad News About Inflation Good News for the Exchange Rate? And, If So, \nCan That Tell Us Anything About the Conduct of Monetary Policy?” in Asset Prices and Monetary Policy, ed. John \nCampbell, ch. 9, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2008) 371–392; and Greg Farrell, Shakill Hassan \nand Nicola Viegi, “Minimal Conditions for Bad News About Inflation to Cause Currency Appreciation on Impact”, South \nAfrican Reserve Bank Discussion Paper (2011b, forthcoming. Paper originally presented at the Biennial Conference of \nthe Economic Society of South Africa, Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch, South Africa, 5–7 September 2011).\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\n8\nRand per US dollar\nRand per US dollar\nFigure B1.1 Exchange rate behaviour on 30 May 2003\n8,050\n8,075\n8,100\n8,125\n8,150\n8,175\n8,200\n8,225\n02:00\n00:00\n04:00\n06:00\n08:00\n10:00\n12:00\n14:00\n16:00\n18:00\n20:00\n22:00 24:00\n10:00\n10:30\n11:00\n11:30\n12:00\nFive-minute rand–US dollar rates over 24 hours\nFive-minute rand–US dollar rates around 11:30\n7,8\n7,9\n8,0\n8,1\n8,2\n8,3\nThe high-frequency response of the South African rand to inflation surprises is to appreciate (respectively \ndepreciate) on impact when inflation is higher (respectively lower) than expected, but only under inflation \ntargeting. For the period before the adoption of inflation targeting, bad news about inflation is bad news \nfor the currency. The exchange rate response is also larger when inflation is outside the central bank’s \ntarget range. (Figure B1.2 and B1.3).\nPer cent\n2000\n2002\n2004\n2006\n2008\n2010\nFigure B1.2 High-frequency rand–US dollar returns around inflation \n \nannouncements\n \n10-minute return (100*log differences)\nSources: Olsen and Associates, and own calculations\n-0,8\n-0,6\n-0,4\n-0,2\n0,0\n0,2\n0,4\n0,6\n0,8\n9\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\nFactors affecting inflation\nMonetary policy decisions are made on the basis of current and expected developments in the \nwider macroeconomy. Recent developments in some of the main variables influencing inflation \nin South Africa are reviewed in this section, while the outlooks for these variables and their likely \nimpact on inflation are discussed in a later section.\nInternational economic developments\nRecent data suggest that growth in some of the advanced economies has weakened against \nthe backdrop of financial market turbulence, generated in large part by the unresolved European \nsovereign debt crisis. Financial market concerns about government debt have spread beyond \nthe smaller economies in the euro area, despite the progress made in cutting budget deficits, \nand heightened risk aversion has resulted in increased volatility of capital flows globally and a \nflight from what are perceived to be more risky emerging-market assets. These developments \nhave impacted on international capital and foreign-exchange markets. \nIn its September 2011 World Economic Outlook (WEO) the International Monetary Fund (IMF) \nestimates growth in the United States (US) at 1,5 per cent in 2011, compared with 3,0 per cent \nin 2010 (Table 5). Economic growth in the euro area is estimated at 1,6 per cent for the year 2011 \ncompared with 1,8 per cent in 2010. In the United Kingdom (UK), growth of just 1,1 per cent is \nPercentage change over 12 months\nPercentage change over 12 months\nFigure B1.3 Inflation surprises\n3\n6\n9\n12\n15\n-2,0\n-1,5\n-1,0\n-0,5\n0,0\n0,5\n1,0\n2000\n2002\n2004\n2006\n2008\n2010\n \nActual release value\n \nBloomberg survey median\nSources: Bloomberg, Statistics South Africa and own calculations\nInflation surprise\nThis implies that the market expects the bank to raise interest rates in response, with short-term \nmovements in the currency still perceived as largely unpredictable. This is consistent with a credible \ninflation-targeting policy in South Africa.\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\n10\nprojected for 2011, compared with 1,4 per cent in 2010. For Japan, the IMF estimates negative \ngrowth of 0,5 per cent for 2011 compared with a positive 4 per cent in 2010. Economic growth \nin emerging and developing economies has continued to outperform that of the advanced \neconomies. For developing Asia, IMF data show real output growth of 9,5 per cent in 2010 and \n8,2 per cent in 2011. Headline inflation in emerging and developing economies increased from \n6,1 per cent in 2010 to 7,5 per cent in 2011.\nTable 5\t\nAnnual percentage change in real GDP and consumer prices\nReal \nGDP\nConsumer \nprices\n2010\n2011\n(estimate)\n2010\n2011\n(estimate)\nWorld.....................................................................................\n5,1\n4,0\n3,7\n5,0\nAdvanced economies...........................................................\n3,1\n1,6\n1,6\n2,6\nUnited States.....................................................................\n3,0\n1,5\n1,6\n3,0\nJapan.................................................................................\n4,0\n-0,5\n-0,7\n-0,4\nEuro area...........................................................................\n1,8\n1,6\n1,6\n2,5\nUnited Kingdom.................................................................\n1,4\n1,1\n3,3\n4,5\nCanada..............................................................................\n3,2\n2,1\n1,8\n2,9\nOther advanced economies...............................................\n5,8\n3,6\n2,3\n3,3\nEmerging-market and developing economies......................\n7,3\n6,4\n6,1\n7,5\nSub-Saharan Africa............................................................\n5,4\n5,2\n7,5\n8,4\nCentral and eastern Europe...............................................\n4,5\n4,3\n5,3\n5,2\nCommonwealth of Independent States..............................\n4,6\n4,6\n7,2\n10,3\nDeveloping Asia.................................................................\n9,5\n8,2\n5,7\n7,0\nChina ............................................................................\n10,3\n9,5\n3,3\n5,5\nIndia...............................................................................\n10,1\n7,8\n12,0\n10,6\nMiddle East and North Africa.............................................\n4,4\n4,0\n6,8\n9,9\nLatin America and the Caribbean.......................................\n6,1\n4,5\n6,0\n6,7\nSource:\t IMF World Economic Outlook, September 2011\nThe IMF cautions that projections for some smaller advanced economies, as well as for \nemerging and developing economies, do not yet fully reflect the downward revisions to growth \nin the major advanced economies. These downward revisions are evident in the evolution of \nreal gross domestic product (GDP) forecasts for 2011 for the Group of Seven (G7) and euro \narea countries published by Consensus Forecasts (Figure 7). The consensus forecast for the US \nwas revised down by 1 percentage point between May and October 2011. Significant downward \nrevisions to other G7 countries over this period include Canada (0,6 percentage points), the \nUK (0,6 percentage points), Japan (0,5 percentage points), and Italy (0,3 percentage points). \nThe consensus forecast for Germany was raised by 0,1 percentage points between May and \nOctober 2011 while that of France remained unchanged. The forecast for the eurozone was \nrevised down by 0,1 percentage points. \nEconomic growth projections have been negatively affected by a significant deterioration in overall \nglobal creditworthiness. According to Institutional Investor’s most recent semi­annual Country \nCredit Survey, the debt and budget crises in Western Europe and the US, and political upheavals \nacross the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) led to countries in these regions posting sizable \ndeclines in creditworthiness. Most of the rest of the world showed only modest adjustments. The \npicture is mixed in Africa, with most of the creditworthiness gains reflecting commodities-based \neconomic strength. The gainers include South Africa (up 3,5 points) and Angola (up 2,6 points). \nConversely, Swaziland declined by 5,2 points, and Namibia dropped 3,1 points. 1\n1\t\nHarvey D Shapiro, \n“Brazil Grows, But the Global \nCredit Picture is Otherwise \nMurky”, Institutional Investor, \n13 September 2011, http://\nwww.institutionalinvestor.\ncom/Popups/PrintArticle.\naspx?ArticleID=2898625.\n11\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\nAnnual percentage change\n \n \n2010\n2011\nSource: Consensus Forecasts\nFigure 7 \nEvolution of real GDP forecasts for 2011 for the G7 and \n \neurozone (surveys conducted during 2010 and 2011)\nUnited States\nEurozone\nItaly\n-1\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\nJapan\nGermany\nCanada\nUnited Kingdom\nFrance\nJ\nJ\nJ\nF\nM\nM\nA\nA\nS\nO\nN\nD\nJ\nJ\nJ\nF\nM\nM\nA\nA\nS\nO\nN\nD\nOil prices\nThe price per barrel of Brent crude oil rose to a high of US$126 per barrel at the end of April 2011 \nas supplies from the Middle East tightened and investors anticipated a more robust economic \nrecovery (Figure 8). The subsequent decline in the oil price was initially aided by increased \nsupply from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the release \nof crude oil and petroleum stocks from strategic emergency reserves by International Energy \nAgency (IEA) members. An increase in US crude oil inventories and escalating risks to the global \ngrowth outlook in recent months resulted in a continued decline in the oil price from US$114 per \nbarrel early in September to around US$101 per barrel early in October. Although the oil price \nsubsequently rose temporarily to US$115 per barrel in mid-October (mainly due to renewed US \ndollar weakness), the downward trend resumed thereafter and declined to US$108 per barrel in \nearly November. The oil price has returned to levels that prevailed before the unrest in the MENA \nregion as signs of slowing growth in the US, China and Germany heightened concerns that fuel \ndemand will suffer.\nFigure 8 \nPrice of Brent crude oil \n2005\n2004\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\nUS dollar per barrel\nSource: Bloomberg\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\n140\n160\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\n12\nHowever, in contrast to the market that prevailed in 2008, the futures market signals tighter near-\nterm market conditions than are expected for contracts maturing further out (Figure 9). Futures \ncontracts for delivery in the first and second quarters of 2012 are currently trading at around \nUS$102 per barrel. \nFigure 9 \nBrent crude futures prices\n2006\n2008\n2010\n2012\n2014\n2016\nUS dollar per barrel\n \nBrent crude spot price\n \nFutures prices (29 Apr 2011)\nSource: Bloomberg\n \nFutures prices (30 Jun 2008)\n \nFutures prices (11 Nov 2011)\n \nFutures prices (30 Sep 2008)\n30\n60\n90\n120\n150\nInternational monetary policy developments\nA cooling global economy and the threat from Europe’s debt crisis have refocused attention away \nfrom inflation risks to avoiding a slide back into recession. Policy rate increases have been limited \nprimarily to developing nations with robust growth and upward inflationary pressures (Table 6), \nwhile policy rates have been kept stable or decreased in a number of developed countries and \nsome developing countries who are concerned about the effect of increased global economic \nuncertainty on the pace of economic recovery. The European Central Bank (ECB) decreased \ninterest rates in November; the US – still at the zero-lower-bound – has instead chosen to “twist” \nthe maturities of its Treasury holdings in an effort to keep market interest rates low; and the UK has \nembarked on an additional round of quantitative easing. China and India have continued to tighten \nmonetary policy due to concerns about inflationary pressures, but smaller open economies have \nchosen to keep interest rates stable or decrease them.\nIn August the United States Federal Reserve System (the Fed) announced its commitment to \nmaintaining the current, exceptionally low level of the federal funds rate at least up to 2013. \nFollowing its meeting in September, the Fed also announced that it would rebalance its Treasury \nholdings to cut longer-term borrowing costs and that it was taking these new steps to try to \nboost the economy by making credit cheaper. The Fed said it would “twist” US$400 billion of its \nUS$1,66 trillion in Treasury holdings into longer-dated debt. About 30 per cent of the purchases \nwould be in the 20- to 30-year range. The Fed intends buying US$400 billion of Treasury \nsecurities with maturities between 6 and 30 years by June 2012, and selling an identical amount \nof shorter-term Treasuries (maturities from three months to three years). \nThe ECB reduced interest rates by a quarter of a percentage point to 1,25 per cent in November \nat the first policy meeting chaired by its new President Mario Draghi, after having raised interest \nrates further in July 2011 due to continuing concerns about inflationary pressures. In August \nand October measures were introduced to help relieve increasing strains in some European \nfinancial markets, including the introduction of additional long-term refinancing operations and \nthe launch of a second covered bond purchase programme (called CBPP2) to the value of \n€40 billion. \n13\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\nTable 6\t\nSelected central bank interest rates\nPer cent\nCountries\n17 May 2011 14 Nov 2011\nLatest decision \n(Change in percentage points)\nUnited States.....................................................\n0,00–0,25\n0,00–0,25\n2 Nov 2011\n(0,00)\nJapan\t................................................................\n0,00–0,10\n0,00–0,10\n27 Oct 2011\n(0,00)\nEuro area...........................................................\n1,25\n1,25\n3 Nov 2011\n(-0,25)\nUnited Kingdom.................................................\n0,50\n0,50\n10 Nov 2011\n(0,00)\nCanada..............................................................\n1,00\n1,00\n25 Oct 2011\n(0,00)\nDenmark............................................................\n1,30\n1,20\n3 Nov 2011\n(-0,35)\nSweden.............................................................\n1,75\n2,00\n27 Oct 2011\n(0,00)\nNorway..............................................................\n2,25\n2,25\n19 Oct 2011\n(0,00)\nSwitzerland........................................................\n0,00–0,75\n0,00–0,25\n15 Sep 2011\n(0,00)\nAustralia.............................................................\n4,75\n4,50\n1 Nov 2011\n(-0,25)\nNew Zealand......................................................\n2,50\n2,50\n27 Oct 2011\n(0,00)\nIsrael.................................................................. \t\n3,00\n3,00\n24 Oct 2011\n(0,00)\nChina................................................................. \t\n6,31\n6,56\n30 Sep 2011\n(0,00)\nIndia...................................................................\n7,25\n8,50\n25 Oct 2011\n(0,25)\nIndonesia...........................................................\n6,75\n6,00\n10 Nov 2011\n(-0,50)\nMalaysia.............................................................\n3,00\n3,00\n11 Nov 2011\n(0,00)\nPhilippines..........................................................\n4,50\n4,50\n20 Oct 2011\n(0,00)\nSouth Korea.......................................................\n3,00\n3,25\n11 Nov 2011\n(0,00)\nTaiwan................................................................\n1,75\n1,875\n29 Sep 2011\n(0,00)\nThailand.............................................................\n2,75\n3,50\n19 Oct 2011\n(0,00)\nBrazil..................................................................\n12,00\n11,50\n19 Oct 2011\n(-0,50)\nChile..................................................................\n5,00\n5,25\n13 Oct 2011\n(0,00)\nMexico...............................................................\n4,50\n4,50\n14 Oct 2011\n(0,00)\nCzech Republic..................................................\n0,75\n0,75\n3 Nov 2011\n(0,00)\nHungary.............................................................\n6,00\n6,00\n25 Oct 2011\n(0,00)\nPoland...............................................................\n4,25\n4,50\n9 Nov 2011\n(0,00)\nRussia................................................................\n8,25\n8,25\n28 Oct 2011\n(0,00)\nTurkey................................................................\n6,25\n5,75\n20 Oct 2011\n(0,00)\nIceland...............................................................\n4,25\n4,75\n2 Nov 2011\n(0,25)\nNigeria...............................................................\n7,50\n12,00\n10 Oct 2011\n(2,75)\nSource:\t National central banks\nThe ECB also boosted liquidity to the European banking sector through, among other things, a \ndollar lending facility launched in September 2011. \nThe Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) continued to maintain the bank rate \nat 0,5 per cent at its most recent meeting in November. Concerns about the effect of the euro \nzone sovereign debt crisis on the economy, along with already weak domestic demand and \nlow levels of credit extension, led the committee to increase the size of the asset purchase \nprogramme by £75 billion in October.\nIn early August 2011 the Swiss National Bank narrowed the target for the three-month London \nInterbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) to closer to zero. In September it set a minimum exchange rate \nat CHF 1,20 per euro. Sweden’s Riksbank indicated in September that slowing growth and low \nunderlying inflationary pressures had resulted in the decision to hold the interest rate at 2,0 per \ncent and temporarily to halt further interest rate increases, effectively lowering the Riksbank’s \nexpected interest rate path. Interest rates in emerging markets in Europe have mostly been kept \nstable given the economic climate, although Poland raised interest rates in June and Turkey cut \ninterest rates in August.\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\n14\nThe Bank of Japan (BoJ) has kept interest rates at as close to zero as possible over the period \nunder review. In August and October 2011 the bank announced that it would increase the total \nsize of the Asset Purchase Programme by a combined total of ¥15 000 billion, and in October \nthe BoJ announced that it would extend the deadline for applications for loans supplied to \nfinancial institutions and central organisations of financial co-operatives in the disaster areas by \nsix months to 30 April 2012. \nInterest rates have been raised by India, China, Taiwan and Thailand in the period since the \nprevious MPR was published in May 2011. Monetary policy in China has remained tight, with \nkey interest rates increasing in July and banks’ reserve requirements increasing in June. In \nIndia interest rates increased on four occasions from 7,25 per cent in May to 8,50 per cent in \nOctober due to concerns over high inflation and high inflation expectations. In August the Bank \nof Thailand raised its key rate for the seventh time in as many meetings to 3,5 per cent, as part \nof a process of returning the policy interest rate to more normal levels. \nIn August and October Brazil’s Copcom voted to decrease the selic rate by 50 basis points, \neffectively reversing the increases announced in 2011. This move was to help mitigate the effect \nof the continued uncertainty about the pace of the global economic recovery on the Brazilian \neconomy, at a time when the Copcom felt that price pressures were easing. In June 2011 the \ncentral bank of Chile raised interest rates for the fifth time this year to 5,25 per cent, due to \ninflationary pressures in the economy. However, the monetary tightening has been halted during \nthe meetings held since, due to concern about weaknesses in the global economy. The Bank \nof Mexico has continued to keep interest rates stable.\nExchange rate developments\nThe foreign-exchange rate of the rand has been highly volatile in recent months as risk aversion \ntook hold of global foreign-exchange markets once more. Figure 10 shows that the Volatility \nIndex (VIX® ) published by the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) – which measures \nthe options-implied volatility of the US Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 index and serves as a \npopular indicator of global investors’ perception of risk – rose sharply in July and August 2011, \nand has since remained at elevated levels. This volatility has been reflected in the exchange \nrates of a number of emerging-market and/or commodity currencies.\nRand per US dollar\nIndex\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n5,0\n5,5\n6,0\n6,5\n7,0\n7,5\n8,0\n8,5\n9,0\nFigure 10 \nThe VIX® and the rand–US dollar exchange rate\nSource: Bloomberg\nMay\nAug\nJun\nJul\nSep\nOct\nNov\n2011\nRand per US dollar\nVIX® (right-hand scale)\n15\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\nThe nominal effective exchange rate of the South African rand (NEER), measured against a \nbasket of 15 currencies,2 averaged just below 76 index points between May and July 2011, and \nthen depreciated to a low of 64,4 index points on 23 September before recovering slightly to its \ncurrent value of 66,5 index points on 11 November 2011 (Figure 11). The real effective exchange \nrate measured against the same basket of currencies depreciated by 2,4 per cent from \n113,4 index points in May 2011 to 110,7 index points in August. \nIndex: 2000 = 100 (foreign currency per rand)\nRand per US dollar\nRand per euro\nFigure 11 \nExchange rates of the rand\n40\n60\n80\n100\n7\n9\n11\n13\n15\n6\n8\n10\n12\nNominal effective exchange rate of the rand\n(NEER)\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\nRand per US dollar\nRand per euro (right-hand scale)\nMeasured on a bilateral basis against the US dollar, the rand fluctuated between R6,63 at the \nbeginning of May 2011 and R8,28 on 23 September, subsequently recovering to R7,96 on \n11 November. Measured against the euro, the rand depreciated from R9,54 on 11 July 2011 to \nR11,22 on 23 September, before recovering to R10,88 on 11 November. \nThe recent volatility in the rand exchange rate has mirrored that in a number of other emerging-\nmarket and/or commodity currencies. Compared to a base of 100 index points on 3 May \n2011, all currencies in Figure 12 depreciated against the US dollar, particularly in August and \nSeptember. On 11 November 2011 the rand stood at 120 index points, the Mexican peso at \n117 index points, the Turkish lira at 117 index points, the Brazilian real at 111 index points and \nthe Australian dollar at 107 index points. \n2\t\nThe weighted \naverage exchange \nrate of the rand is \nbased on trade in, \nand consumption of, \nmanufactured goods \nbetween South Africa \nand its most important \ntrading partners. The \nmethodology applied is \ndescribed in an article \nin the December 2008 \nQuarterly Bulletin. \nThe weighted average \nexchange rate of the \nrand is calculated \nagainst 15 currencies. \nThe weights of the \nfive major currencies \nare in brackets: Euro \n(34,82), US dollar (14,88), \nChinese yuan (12,49), \nBritish pound (10,71), \nJapanese yen (10,12). \nIndex: 2000 = 100.\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\n16\n90\n100\n110\n120\n130\nIndices: 3 May 2011 = 100\nMay\nJun\nJul\nAug\n2011\nSep\nOct\nNov\nFigure 12 \nExchange rate performance against the US dollar\n \nTurkish lira \n \nAustralian dollar \n \n \nSources: Reuters and own calculations\n \nSouth African rand\n \nCanadian dollar\n \nBrazilian real\n \nMexican peso\nPortfolio flows to the domestic equity and bond markets have also been volatile, in line with \nthe experiences of emerging-market economies around the world. Non-resident purchases of \nSouth African bonds slowed in 2011, when compared with 2010, and investment in domestic \nequities has declined (Figure 13). Cumulative non-resident net purchases in the bond market \nwere R51,2 billion by the week ending 11 November 2011 compared with net purchases of \nR70,9 billion in the comparable period in 2010. In the share market non-residents were net \nsellers in 2011, with cumulative net sales of R17,5 billion by 11 November 2011 (compared to \ncumulative non-resident share purchases of R26,4 billion at the same stage in 2010).\n-20\n-16\n-12\n-8\n-4\n0\n4\n8\n12\n16\n20\nFigure 13 \nNon-resident net purchases of domestic bonds and equities\nR billions\n \nNet equity purchases\n* Net purchases of bonds and equities for the month of November cumulative to 11 November 2011\nSource: JSE Limited\nNet bond purchases\n2011\nJan\nFeb\nMar\nApr\nMay\nJun\nJul\nAug\nSep\nOct\nNov*\nDec\n \n17\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\nLabour markets\nUnit labour costs, calculated as the ratio of remuneration per worker to labour productivity, \naccelerated in the second quarter of 2011. Figure 14 shows that the year-on-year percentage \nchange in nominal unit labour cost increased from 5,4 per cent in the first quarter of 2011 to \n6,4 per cent in the second quarter. This was due to growth in labour productivity remaining \nunchanged in the first two quarters of the year, as employment levels remained stable, while the \nrate of increase in remuneration per worker rose from 6,4 per cent to 7,4 per cent. \nPercentage change over four quarters\n2004\n2003\n2005\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2006\nFigure 14 \nRemuneration per worker, labour productivity and \n \nunit labour cost in the formal non-agricultural sector\n \nNominal unit labour cost\n \nRemuneration per worker\n \nLabour productivity\n \n \nSources: Statistics South Africa and South African Reserve Bank calculations\n-2\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n16\n18\nThe Andrew Levy Wage Settlements Survey for the third quarter of 2011 reported that the \naverage level of wage settlements fell from 8,2 per cent in March 2011 to 7,7 per cent in \nSeptember 2011 (Figure 15), influenced by uncertainties about economic growth and relatively \nstable inflation. \nPer cent\n1994\n1996\n1998\n2000\n2002\n2004\n2006\n2008\n2011*\nFigure 15 \nAverage annual inflation and wage settlements\n \nCPI\n \n* Data for 2011 are for the first nine months of the year \nSources: Andrew Levy Employment Publications and Statistics South Africa\n-2\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n16\nAverage wage settlements\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\n18\nThe levels of settlements reached in the third quarter of 2011 ranged from 3 per cent in the food/\nmanufacturing sector to 10 per cent in the retail, transport and food/agricultural sectors. The \nsurvey reported that 78 per cent of wage settlements were for one year, 16,9 per cent for two \nyears and 5,1 per cent for three years. \nFigure 16 shows total employment in the formal and informal non-agricultural, agriculture and \nprivate household sectors between the first quarter of 2008 and the third quarter of 2011 as \nreported by Statistics South Africa’s Quarterly Labour Force Survey. Total employment declined \nfrom 13,844 million in the fourth quarter of 2008 to 12,975 million in the third quarter of 2010, \na loss of 869 000 jobs, before increasing to 13,319 million in the third quarter of 2011. The \nunemployment rate fell from 25,3 per cent in third quarter of 2010 to 25,0 per cent in the third \nquarter of 2011.\nThousands\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\nFigure 16 \nTotal employment\nSource: Statistics South Africa Quarterly Labour Force Survey\n12 500\n13 000\n13 500\n14 000\n14 500\nThe total employment increased by 343  000 between the third quarter of 2011 and the \ncorresponding quarter of 2010. The sectoral contributions indicate that employment in the \ncommunity and social services industry increased the most, rising by 158 000 jobs. By \ncontrast, employment in the utilities sector declined by 26 000 jobs; the highest loss recorded \nover the period.\nDemand and output\nReal GDP increased by 1,3 per cent on an annualised basis in the second quarter of 2011, \nfollowing growth of 4,5 per cent in both the fourth quarter of 2010 and the first quarter of \n2011 (Table 7). Widespread industrial action, which continued into the third quarter of 2011, \ncontributed to this subdued outcome. Real value added by both the primary and secondary \nsectors contracted in the second quarter. The largest negative contribution came from the \nmanufacturing sector, where real value added declined by 10,2 per cent. \nReal gross domestic expenditure also slowed down significantly from an annualised growth rate \nof 7,9 per cent in the first quarter of 2011 to 1,3 per cent in the second quarter. \nConsumption expenditure by households has, to date, been the main driver of growth. However, \nin the second quarter of 2011, growth in consumption expenditure moderated to an annualised \nrate of 3,8 per cent, compared with an increase of 5,2 per cent in the first quarter. Consumption \nexpenditure is expected to remain constrained, to some extent, by low rates of credit extension \nand continued debt deleveraging by households. The ratio of household debt to disposable \nincome declined further to 75,9 per cent in the second quarter of 2011 from a peak of 82,0 per \ncent in the first two quarters of 2008.\n19\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\nTable 7\t\nGrowth in real GDP and expenditure components\nPer cent*\n2010\n2011\n1st qr\n2nd qr\n3rd qr\n4th qr\nYear\n1st qr\n2nd qr\nFinal consumption expenditure \nHouseholds...................................................\n 5,5\n 4,4\n 5,7\n 4,8\n 4,4\n5,2\n3,8\nGeneral government......................................\n 7,1\n 7,1\n -0,8\n 3,9\n 4,6\n 9,5\n-0,1\nGross fixed capital formation.............................\n -2,8\n 1,2\n 1,0\n 1,5\n -3,7\n3,1\n4,1\nChanges in inventories (R billions)**...................\n -7,9\n -7,6\n -0,9\n 1,1\n -3,8\n9,3\n5,6\nGross domestic expenditure............................\n 10,9\n 3,2\n 6,6\n 2,4\n 4,2\n 7,9\n1,3\nExports of goods and services.......................... \n-16,4\n 18,2\n 12,5\n 5,7\n 4,5\n -11,9\n13,9\nImports of goods and services.......................... 7,8\n 17,0\n 26,5\n -2,0\n 9,6\n 2,7\n11,4\nGross domestic product.................................. 4,8\n 2,8\n 2,7\n 4,5\n 2,8\n 4,5\n1,3\n*\t Quarterly data refer to quarter-on-quarter growth at annual rates of seasonally adjusted data \n**\t Constant 2005 prices\nReal final consumption expenditure by general government contracted at an annual rate of \n0,1 per cent in the second quarter of 2011, after having increased by 9,5 per cent in the first \nquarter. This deceleration is mainly attributable to the fact that in the second quarter no \narmaments were acquired by government in terms of the defence procurement programme, in \ncontrast to significant purchases in the first quarter. \nA positive development was the further acceleration in the growth of real gross fixed-capital \nformation, albeit off a low base, from an annualised rate of 3,1 per cent in the first quarter to \n4,1 per cent in the second quarter. Nevertheless, the ratio of gross fixed capital formation to GDP, \nat 18,9 per cent, is still well below the peak of 24,6 per cent measured in the fourth quarter of 2008. \nThe level of real inventory accumulation slowed from the first to the second quarter of 2011 – real \ninventory investment (annualised, at 2005 prices) amounted to R5,6 billion in the second quarter \nof 2011 compared with R9,3 billion in the first quarter. The slower accumulation of inventories was \nevident in most of the sectors, with the exception of the mining and manufacturing sectors.\nIn the first half of 2011 imports rose more strongly than exports, resulting in smaller trade surpluses \nin both the first and second quarters. Successive supply shocks weakened demand from trading-\npartner countries early in 2011 and these developments, together with a moderate increase in the \nshortfall on the services, income and current transfer account of the balance of payments, gave \nrise to a widening of the current-account deficit. The ratio of the deficit on the current account of \nthe balance of payments to GDP increased from 1 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2010 to 3,1 per \ncent in the first quarter of 2011 and to 3,3 per cent in the second quarter.\nSouth Africa’s gross international reserve position declined from US$50,0 billion at the end of \nJune 2011 to US$49,7 billion at the end of September, before increasing to US$50,3 billion at \nthe end of October. The international liquidity position rose from US$47,2 billion at the end of \nJune to US$47,9 billion at the end of September and US$49,2 billion at the end of October.\nReal-estate and equity prices \nGlobal developments have impacted significantly on the FTSE/JSE All-Share Index (Alsi) in the \nperiod since May 2011. From a level of 32 384 index points on 27 May 2011, the index declined \nto a low 28 391 index points on 8 August. This was in line with international experiences, as \ncontagion effects from the European sovereign debt crisis, concerns over France’s AAA rating, \nand S&P downgrading of the US credit rating from AAA to AA+ impacted on markets. Stock \nmarket volatility continued into September and October due to uncertainty over downgrades for \nFrench banks and concerns that a number of European banks were highly exposed to indebted \nnations such as Greece. Greece’s call at the beginning of November 2011 for a referendum on \nthe Euro deal agreed to on 27 October 2011 to reduce its debt burden added to volatility in the \nglobal equity markets.\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\n20\nTrends in four major South African stock price indices that comprise the Alsi are shown in \nFigure 17. Since August 2011, the volatilities of these four indices have tended to move in line \nwith developments in global stock markets. \nIndex\n2010\n2011\nFTSE/JSE All-Share Index\nFTSE/JSE Industrial Index\nFigure 17 \nDomestic share price indices\n15 000\n20 000\n25 000\n30 000\n35 000\nFTSE/JSE Resource Index\nFTSE/JSE Financial Index\nSources: JSE Limited and I-Net Bridge\nThe year-on-year percentage changes in nominal house prices published by Absa, Standard \nBank, First National Bank (FNB) and Lightstone all currently show modest increases despite \nhaving diverged since mid-2011 (Figure 18). The year-on-year percentage change in the \nStandard Bank median house price index slowed from 3,4 per cent in April 2011 to 0,6 per cent \nin September, while the extended repeat sales house price index of Lightstone continued to \ndecelerate from a peak of 5,9 per cent in July 2010 to 2,4 per cent in September. \nPercentage change over 12 months\n2004\n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n-10\n-5\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n35\n40\n \nAbsa House Price Index\n \nFirst National Bank House Price Index\nSources: Absa, Standard Bank, First National Bank and Lightstone\nFigure 18 \nHouse prices \n \nStandard Bank House Price Index\n \nLightstone House Price Index\n21\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\nBy contrast, the rate of change in the Absa House Price Index shows a recovery, increasing from \nnegative 1,1 per cent in March 2011 to 5,6 per cent in October. Similarly, the rate of increase in \nthe FNB national average house price index continued to improve from 1,3 per cent in February \n2011 to 4,5 per cent in October 2011. \nThe FNB estate agent survey indicates that the estimated average time taken to sell a house in the \nthird quarter of 2011 was approximately 17 weeks, considerably higher than the nearly 6 weeks \ntaken in 2005/6. The proportion of properties sold at less than the asking price was 91 per cent \nin the third quarter of 2011 compared with 30 per cent in 2004. Sellers’ initial asking prices for \nhouses sold decreased by 13 per cent on average in the third quarter of 2011. \nTable 8 shows that the annual percentage changes in the total values of both buildings \ncompleted and plans passed have been negative for four years. All subcomponents of the real \nvalue of buildings completed contracted at a slower rate in 2011 than in 2010, and both the \nresidential and non-residential components of the total value of building plans passed increased \nin 2011 compared to 2010.\nTable 8\t\nReal value of building plans passed and buildings completed in \nlarger municipalities\nAnnual percentage change\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011*\nBuilding plans passed\nTotal........................................................................................\n-17,2\n-23,2\n-7,9\n-0,7\nResidential.............................................................................. \n-26,1\n-37,8\n0,7\n3,9\nNon-residential........................................................................ \n0,6\n-11,0\n-34,3\n3,2\nAdditions and alterations......................................................... \n-12,0\n-8,2\n5,2\n-8,8\nBuildings completed\nTotal........................................................................................\n-0,4\n-13,0\n-23,7\n-9,2\nResidential.............................................................................. \n-9,5\n-26,2\n-22,1\n-8,0\nNon-residential........................................................................ \n13,6\n3,4\n-34,0\n -15,3\nAdditions and alterations.........................................................\n14,9\n 3,5\n-13,2\n-5,4\n*\t Data for 2011 are for the first eight months of 2011 compared with the same period of the previous year\nSource:\t Statistics South Africa\nFiscal policy \nThe Minister of Finance presented the Medium Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS) on \n25 October 2011. In contrast to the more restrictive fiscal policies that have had to be adopted \nin several countries because of high initial debt levels, South Africa’s fiscal stance remains \ncountercyclical. Government debt is set to rise to about 40 per cent of GDP by 2015, after which \nit is expected to stabilise and decline. Government aims to achieve fiscal consolidation by shifting \nthe composition of public expenditure towards investment and economic development in order \nto ensure sustainable long-term economic growth. The Minister announced that measures \nto promote industrial development and expand trade opportunities would be strengthened. \nFinancial support for housing and urban infrastructure investment would also be extended while \nfunding for employment programmes and training would be increased. \nThe MTBPS calls for greater accountability, transparency and moderation in remuneration \nacross public and corporate sectors. Substantial improvements in public-service remuneration \nand increases in employment have raised the wage bill to about 42 per cent of government \nrevenue over the past four years. The MTBPS provides for a 5 per cent cost-of-living adjustment \nfor public-sector employees, implemented with effect from April each year, while similar \nadjustments to social grants are assumed in the expenditure estimates. \nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\n22\nThe revised budget balance for 2011/12 is a deficit of R164,6 billion, which represents 5,5 per \ncent of GDP (Table 9). This revised budget balance is larger than the deficit of 5,3 per cent \nof GDP projected in the Budget Review 2011. Consolidated government revenue reflects the \nimpact of lower earnings and reduced consumption and imports on tax revenues, and is now \nexpected to be R814,2 billion in 2011/12, significantly lower than the estimate of R824,5 billion \nmade in February. Consolidated government expenditure in 2011/12 is expected to be slightly \nlower than projected in February, declining from R979,3 billion to R978,8 billion. In the medium \nterm, projected deficits as a percentage of GDP are 5,2 per cent for 2012/13, declining to \n4,5 per cent for 2013/14, and to 3,3 per cent for 2014/15.\nTable 9\t\nPublic finance data\n2010/11\n2011/12\n2012/13 2013/14 2014/15\nOutcome Budget\nRevised\nestimates\nMedium-term estimates\nConsolidated government* (R billions)\nRevenue..........................................................\n758,4\n824,5\n814,2\n890,0\n994,5\n1 113,0\nExpenditure.....................................................\n885,8\n979,3\n978,8\n1 062,3\n1 157,4\n1 247,0\nBudget balance...............................................\n-127,4\n-154,8\n-164,6\n-172,3\n-162,9\n-134,1\nAs a percentage of GDP\n \n \n \n \n \n \nBudget balance...............................................\n-4,6\n-5,3\n-5,5\n-5,2\n-4,5 \t\n-3,3\nTotal net loan debt..........................................\n29,7\n34,3\n33,8\n36,7\n38,9\n39,7\nPSBR**...........................................................\n6,5\n9,5\n8,1\n7,8\n6,8\n5,1\n*\t Includes national government, provinces, social security funds and selected public entities \n**\t PSBR: Public-sector borrowing requirement\nSource:\t National Treasury Medium Term Budget Policy Statement 2011\nThe estimated public-sector borrowing requirement (PSBR), reflecting the higher financing \nrequirements of government and the non-financial public enterprises, increased from \nR177,5 billion in 2010/11 (6,5 per cent of GDP) to a revised R241,5 billion for 2011/12 (8,1 per cent of \nGDP). With the higher main budget deficit set out in the MTBPS, the PSBR is projected to remain \nrelatively high over the medium term before declining to 7,8 per cent of GDP in 2012/13 and to \n5,1 per cent of GDP in 2014/15. Net loan debt is projected to increase to 39,7 per cent of GDP \nby 2014/15. \nMonetary conditions\nGrowth in private-sector credit extension has remained subdued at around 6 per cent per \nannum over the period under review, despite interest rates being at 30-year lows. The recovery \nin the growth in total loans and advances following the 2008/09 recession has been slow when \nconsidered in historical context (Figure 19). Following the recessions of 1974/75, 1982/83, 1985, \nand 1990/92, the growth in total loans and advances had returned at least once to the long-\nterm average rate of above 15 per cent within the current 27-month period.\n23\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\n12-month growth, per cent\nFigure 19 \nHistorical trends in total loans and advances at times \n \nof recession\n-5\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n35\n40\n24\n22\n20\n18\n16\n14\n12\n10\n8\n6\n4\n2\n0\n-2\n-4\n-6\n-8\n-10\n-12\nMonths after start of recession\nMonths before start of recession\nRecessions:\n \n1982Q1–1983Q1\n \n1974Q4–1975Q1\n \n2008Q4–2009Q2\n \n \n1990Q2–1992Q4\n \n1985Q1–1985Q3\n \nLong-term average (1973/10–2011/07)\nThe year-on-year growth in banks’ total loans and advances was 5,5 per cent in May 2011 and \nrose to 6,1 per cent in July before declining to 5,3 per cent in September (Figure 20). Credit \nextension has been underpinned by the performance of the general advances component, \nwhich recorded year-on-year growth of 17,9 per cent in August and 12,9 per cent in September. \nMortgage advances, which constitute just over half of the outstanding balance for total loans, \ngrew by just 2,2 per cent in September, consistent with the weak levels of activity in the \nresidential and commercial property sectors. \nPercentage change over 12 months\n-20\n-10\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\nFigure 20 \nBanks’ loans and advances by type\n \nMortgages\n \nInstalment sale and leasing finance\n \nCredit card advances\n \nGeneral advances\n \nOverdrafts\n \nTotal loans and advances\n2003\n2006\n2004\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2005\n2007\n2008\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\n24\nMonetary growth was below the growth in nominal GDP during the period under review. The \nyear-on-year growth in the M3 monetary aggregate, which had slowed early in 2011, remained \nrelatively stable for most of the period and then rose somewhat in September (Figure 21). Growth \nin M3 increased marginally from 6,1 per cent in May to 6,2 per cent in August 2011, before rising \nto 6,8 per cent in September. By comparison, M2 growth rose from 5,5 per cent in May to \n6,1 per cent in August, and to 8,3 per cent in September.\nPercentage change over 12 months\n2006\n2004\n2003\n2005\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\nFigure 21 \nGrowth in monetary aggregates\n-10\n-5\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n35\nM3\nM1\nM2\nMonetary policy \nA global economic recovery and slowly rising inflation pressures marked the first half of the year \nbefore giving way to significantly weaker economic prospects, diverging inflation trajectories and \nsharply higher uncertainty. With South Africa’s headline CPI remaining within the inflation-targeting \nband of 3 to 6 per cent despite gradually rising food and petrol prices and the economic recovery \nweakening significantly, the monetary policy stance remained unchanged for the year (Figure 22). \nThe potential for cost–push pressures to raise headline consumer prices, rising unit labour costs \nand administered prices presented the most serious upside risks to the inflation forecasts for 2011 \nand 2012. A deepening of the financial crisis in Europe, and potential for a downturn in the global \nand domestic economy were the primary downside risks considered by the MPC.\nPer cent\n2004\n2003\n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\nPrime overdraft rate\nRepurchase rate\nThree-month negotiable certificates of deposit rate\nFigure 22 \nThe repurchase rate and other short-term interest rates\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n16\n18\n25\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\nIn the months up to May, most economic indicators and growth projections for key economies \nremained favourable, suggesting a moderate and sustained economic recovery. The MPC \nnoted the strong growth in manufacturing and the uneven character of the global recovery, with \nrobust growth in emerging-market economies combined with modest but stronger growth in \nmost advanced economies. The MPC felt there were convincing signs that the global economic \nrecovery would be sustained. \nThese initially favourable economic growth trends deteriorated in mid-2011, resulting in markedly \nlower expectations for much of the world for the latter half of the year and extending into 2012. \nMany global growth projections had tended to downplay the role of rising commodity prices as \na potential drag on global growth and looked past contemporaneous events that had negative \nreal economy effects, such as the tsunami and its aftermath in Japan or the unfolding of the \nArab Spring and the impact of higher oil prices. With hindsight, each of these factors may have \nplayed a stronger role in undermining growth momentum than had been previously estimated. \nBy July and August of this year concerns about the recovery were sharply exacerbated by rising \ntension associated with key fiscal and sovereign debt issues in the US and Europe. Weaker \neconomic growth, policy indecision and financial tensions interacted with one another and \ncontributed to a serious deterioration in the global economic outlook. \nThe MPC noted the risks reflected in increasing credit default swap (CDS) spreads for Europe’s \nperipheral economies, the developing political turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa, \nand the potential for medium-term disruption to global supply chains from the crisis in Japan. \nAlthough the latter risk turned out to be less damaging to regional and global growth, the \ndeveloping sovereign debt crisis in Europe and fiscal policy concerns in the US contributed \nmuch more strongly to global financial uncertainty. In Europe the crisis worsened in the run-up \nto the November meeting of the committee. \nThe sovereign debt concerns facing peripheral European countries evolved into a dual crisis of \nfinancial institutions weak balance sheets and ineffectual regional policy-making in the eurozone. \nThese risks intensified between May and November, resulting in the focus of concern shifting to \nthe larger economies of Italy and Spain, and to some extent France. The MPC expressed high \nlevels of concern about the need to resolve the sovereign debt crisis fully to restore confidence \nand reduce volatility in financial markets. A disorderly write-down of debt was identified as a \npotential trigger for systemic financial difficulties. By November the committee observed little \nmeaningful progress in resolving those issues, and recognised the need to be prepared and \ncapable of responding to adverse effects on the South African economy.\nThe worsening financial and policy environment contributed to deteriorating economic outcomes \nacross the world economy. Global economic growth prospects were clearly less benign by \nAugust 2011 and confirmed by the revisions to projections set out by the IMF in September. \nThe larger downward revisions related to the advanced economies. The MPC felt, however, \nthat there was insufficient clarity on whether the stalled state of advanced economies would \ntranslate into a recession.\nFor much of the year emerging-market economies exhibited robust economic growth. Some \nemerging markets show signs of overheating, with high and rising inflation and growth well \nabove estimates of potential. A combination of country-specific dynamics and the spillover \neffects of deterioration in advanced economies, however, suggested that emerging markets \nwould also begin to slow and be subjected to greater volatility in risk perceptions, capital flows \nand exchange rate movements. \nThe MPC took a stronger view over time on the importance of downside risks to the global \neconomy, and in particular the role of the European crisis. Monetary accommodation in key \nadvanced economies was expected to persist for the foreseeable future, particularly where \nfiscal policy was constrained. \nFor much of the first half of 2011 the global recovery was seen to be supporting South Africa’s \neconomic recovery, and stronger confidence in businesses and households. A sustained \nand moderate recovery and reasonably well-contained price pressures were expected. The \nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\n26\nRand Merchant Bank (RMB)/ Bureau for Economic Research at Stellenbosch University (BER) \nBusiness Confidence Index (BCI), Kagiso/BER Purchasing Managers Index, and the Bank’s \ncomposite leading business cycle indicator showed stronger real economic conditions. \nThe healthy performance of the economy in the first quarter of 2011, however, was not \nsustained in the second. Following the 4,5 per cent annualised growth for the first quarter, the \neconomy slowed to 1,3 per cent in the second quarter. The MPC noted with growing concern \nthe increasing fragility of the economy and the hesitant nature of the recovery. The second \nquarter growth rate reflected a combination of weaker growth elsewhere and faltering output \ndomestically, in part due to widespread industrial action. The RMB/BER BCI fell to below the \nneutral 50 level in the second quarter of 2011. The Kagiso/BER Purchasing Managers Index \n(PMI) weakened sharply in July in line with the decline in manufacturing output. The building \nsector in particular continued to lag growth in the rest of the economy, with continued weakness \nshowing in house prices, mortgage advances, and indicators of future building plans. Having \nincreased through much of the year, capacity utilisation declined from July. \nGross fixed capital formation in the first and second quarters of 2011 exhibited a modest \nrecovery from the decline in 2010, growing by 3,1 per cent and 4,1 per cent respectively. Private- \nand public-sector corporation investment increased, while the sustained decline in general \ngovernment investment appears to have ended. The Bank’s forecast shows a significantly \nrising contribution to GDP growth in 2012 and 2013 compared with the modest contribution of \n0,5 percentage points expected for 2011.\nHousehold consumption had played a major role in sustaining growth in the economy in 2010 \nand into 2011. Moderate growth in household spending is expected to continue, although a \nrange of factors should constrain household spending from returning to its pre-crisis pace. \nThe MPC observed that although household net wealth had recovered partially since the \nrecession, it remained below the peak achieved in 2007, due in part to weak nominal house \nprice growth. Household debt as a percentage of disposable income has fallen from a high \nof 82 per cent in 2008 to about 75,9 per cent of disposable income in the second quarter of \n2011. This is still a high level compared to the average level of 64,3 per cent in 2005. Growth \nin retail sales and new vehicle sales has been volatile, and consumer confidence moderate \nand declining in recent months. \nCredit demand from households has been very weak and lending conditions constrained. The \nratio of impaired advances to gross loans and advances, largely attributable to retail debt, had \nremained at around 5,5 to 5,8 per cent in the first half of the year. The MPC expressed concern \nover the lack of movement in this ratio despite growth in the economy. By the November meeting \nthe ratio of impaired advances had started to fall, reaching 5,1 per cent. \nThe third quarter also revealed further strengthening in the money supply and credit extension. \nCredit advanced to corporates and for motor vehicle sales had shown greater signs of life \nthan other credit categories. By the end of September, general advances had grown by about \n13 per cent. Mortgage advances have weakened over the course of the year, reflecting a distinct \nfaltering in the housing market recovery that was thought to be evident early in the year. \nThe considerably weaker trajectory of the domestic economy from the second quarter of the \nyear and downward adjustments of global growth have resulted in a lower forecast for average \ngrowth in GDP. By September the forecast for 2011 GDP growth had declined to 3,2 per cent \nfrom 3,7 per cent at the July meeting. The forecast for 2012 was similarly marked down from \n3,9 per cent to 3,6 per cent, while the 2013 projection remained unchanged at 4,4 per cent. \nThe November forecast continued the downward trend in outlook for both the global economy \nand South Africa. GDP growth for South Africa’s largest 15 trading partners (the measure used \nin the Bank’s forecasting process) is expected to be 3 per cent for 2011, decelerating to 2,7 per \ncent in 2012. The South African economy is projected to grow by 3,0 per cent in 2011 and by \n3,2 per cent in 2012.\nThe modest global economic recovery of the first half of 2011 was associated with rising inflation \npressures driven primarily by global food and oil prices. Food and oil price pressures drove up \nthe imported component of consumer prices in many economies, with the risk of pass-through \n27\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\ninto broader consumer prices or measures of core inflation higher in countries experiencing \nstrong economic growth. In some economies, property market buoyancy and GDP growth \nrunning above potential output were indicative of a broadening in inflationary pressures. Some \nrapidly growing emerging-market economies began to shift to a tighter monetary policy stance \nearly in the year. In advanced economies, core measures of inflation remained somewhat \nmuted, reflecting weak underlying demand conditions.\nEarly in 2011, the MPC raised concerns about the extent of international food price pressures \ncaused by changing weather patterns, rising demand for food in emerging markets and tight \nfood supplies. Sharply rising wheat prices late in 2010 posed a potential challenge for South \nAfrica, although the impact on consumer prices was moderated by increases in the exchange \nrate of the rand. The Bank’s inflation forecast set out the potential for food prices to put sustained \nupward pressure on headline consumer price inflation through the year, despite the view that \nglobal food prices were seen to be peaking around the middle of 2011. \nAt the March MPC meeting the Bank’s inflation forecast remained within the target range, \ndespite the headline CPI projection increasing by about half-a-percentage point in 2012. By \nthe May meeting the headline CPI forecast had increased to above the top end of the target \nband for the final quarter of 2011 and peaked at 6,3 per cent in the first quarter of 2012 before \nmoderating somewhat. The July forecast saw headline inflation peaking at about the same time \nand level, and then remaining stuck at around 6 per cent for several quarters in 2012 and then \ndeclining. The primary driver of the increase in the headline CPI forecast was higher international \noil prices. With the softening in global economic conditions in August and September, the \nBank’s inflation forecast showed the peak expected in the first quarter of 2012 at 6,2 per cent \nbefore declining to average 5,5 per cent in the final quarter of 2013. \nThe Bank’s November forecast reflected a somewhat sharper rise in monthly food and petrol prices in \n2011, offset somewhat by weaker demand-side pressures in 2012 and 2013. Headline CPI is forecast \nto average 5 per cent for 2011, 6 per cent for 2012 and 5,5 per cent for 2013. The peak is expected \nin the first quarter of 2012 at 6,3 per cent before returning to within the target in the fourth quarter. A \ncore measure of inflation excluding food, petrol and energy remained well contained.\nOil prices had moderated significantly before sharply increasing as the crisis in Libya unfolded in \nFebruary and oil exports slowed dramatically from that country. Tighter supply was accompanied \nby large swings in oil prices as futures prices reacted to the release of oil stocks by the International \nEnergy Agency in June. The MPC expressed its concern that the future trajectory of oil prices \nhad become less clear. In September the committee noted that oil prices would be affected \nby the extent to which the Chinese economy slowed in coming months. The combination of \nstrong global demand and falling supply were expected to keep international oil prices at elevated \nlevels. Since December 2010 the petrol price increased by a cumulative 232 cents per litre or \n27,5 per cent, with a large increase in October caused by the depreciation of the rand.\nThe prospect of sustained high wage settlements presented a further risk to the inflation \noutlook. Wage settlements started to moderate in 2011 with strong growth in 2010 of \n8,2 per cent easing to 7,5 per cent in the first and second quarters of 2011. The MPC noted \nthat continued moderation of unit labour cost growth could contribute meaningfully to low \ninflation and employment creation, although negative outcomes posed a significant upside \nrisk to the outlook.\nThe firm exchange rate of the rand for much of 2010 and 2011 has had a moderating effect on \ndomestic inflation, primarily by dampening the impact of rising prices for imported food and \noil. The exchange rate has also enabled a sustained low repurchase rate. Yet the MPC also \nnoted over the course of its meetings that bouts of global risk aversion – associated in 2011 \nmostly with the low interest rate environment and events in the US and Europe – have resulted \nin large swings in capital flows to South Africa and in volatility in the value of the currency. \nVolatility increased dramatically in August and September as events came to a head in these \nmajor economies, and the rand depreciated sharply. Between the September and November \nmeetings of the MPC, the rand has traded in a range against the US dollar of between \nR7,70 and R8,50. Since January, the rand has depreciated by 19 per cent against the dollar, by \n24 per cent against the euro and by 18 per cent on a trade-weighted basis. \nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\n28\nThe MPC noted that the extent and persistence of the depreciation trend will have a determining \nimpact on the degree to which the currency’s movements present an upside risk to the inflation \nforecast. In September the MPC deemed the risk to be relatively moderate but rising. \nExpectations of future inflation play a key role in the monetary policy toolkit and are watched with care \nby the MPC. The January committee meeting noted that expectations held by business executives \nand trade unionists continued to decline in line with the moderating inflation trend at that time. \nFinancial analysts, however, had already begun shifting to a less sanguine view of future inflation. \nThe second quarter of 2011 revealed a bottoming out of inflation expectations and over the next \nfew months inflation expectations followed the general upward trend in the Bank’s inflation \nforecast, driven largely by global food and oil price pressures. The September and November \nMPC discussions revealed inflation expectations hovering at the upper end of the target range. \nAt the time of the September meeting, market analysts expected an upward policy rate change. \nBy the November meeting, the expectation of policy rate normalisation had been pushed out \nsignificantly by the majority of analysts. Market-based expectations of long-run future inflation, \nas measured by breakeven inflation rates on longer-term debt, tended to rise above the short- \nand medium-term forecasts of inflation.\nIn the context of extraordinary global tensions and changes to growth and inflation trajectories, \nthe MPC held the view that the inflation risks facing South Africa primarily lay in cost–push \npressures emanating from international food and oil prices. The committee emphasised its \nconcern that these prices could feed into headline CPI and generate expectations of rising \ninflation that would have serious negative economic effects. The committee also expressed \nits concern at the possibility that moderating unit labour cost outcomes, which will tend \nto support growth and employment creation, could be reversed. The MPC repeatedly cautioned \nthat it would closely monitor indications of second-round effects arising from cost–push pressures. \nDomestic economic developments, and since May the global growth trajectory, have weakened \ndemand pressures in the economy and may have lessened the build-up of significant second-\nround inflation effects. Despite the expected peak in headline CPI in early 2012 at 6,3 per cent, \nthe trajectory shows re-entry into the target band later in the year without a policy adjustment. \nThe September MPC meeting felt that the downside risks to inflation from a disorderly debt \nworkout in Europe and weak domestic growth prospects were delicately balanced against \nongoing cost–push pressures. The November meeting suggested that while core inflation was \nexpected to be contained, there was greater potential for marginally worse inflation expectations \nfor 2012 and on balance upside risks to the headline inflation outlook. \nThe outlook for inflation\nThe prospects, risk and uncertainties relating to some of the factors that determine the outlook \nfor inflation are presented in this section. \nInternational outlook\nThe global economic outlook has deteriorated markedly since the previous MPR was published in \nMay 2011, and growth forecasts for 2012 have generally been revised downwards in recent months \n(Figure 23). The tide had begun to turn in May as economic data, especially for manufacturing, \nsoftened worldwide and some investors became concerned about the end of the Fed’s second \nround of quantitative easing that ended in June. Successive negative shocks – including the \ntsunami in Japan and the deepening euro area debt crisis – have contributed to an increasingly \nfragile economic recovery in recent months. Mixed signals on the US economic outlook, S&P’s \ndowngrading of the US’ credit rating on 5 August, and a sovereign debt crisis that pushed \ngovernment bond yields in Spain, Italy and Greece to euro-era records also impacted negatively \non global investor, business and consumer sentiment. \nIn its September WEO, the IMF sharply downgraded its growth forecasts for the US, the euro \narea, and the UK, warning that strong action was needed to prevent a return to recession. Given \nescalating risks to the global recovery, it cautioned policy-makers in leading economies not to \ntighten fiscal policy too sharply but, nevertheless, expects the recent financial turmoil to delay \nrather than derail the economic recovery in advanced countries.\n29\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\nAnnual percentage change\nSource: Consensus Forecasts\nFigure 23 \nEvolution of real GDP forecasts for 2012 for the G7 and \n \neurozone (surveys conducted during 2011)\nUnited States\nEurozone\nItaly\n-1\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\nJapan\nGermany\nCanada\nUnited Kingdom\nFrance\nJ\nJ\nJ\nF\nM\nM\nA\nA\nS\nO\nN\nD\n2011\nAs Table 10 shows, global output is projected to expand by 4,0 per cent in 2012 and the growth \nforecast for advanced economies has been reduced to 1,9 per cent. On balance, the IMF expects \ncontinued, uneven expansion and deems risks to its growth projections to be mainly to the \ndownside given continued concerns about sovereign debt in the euro area.\nTable 10\t\nIMF projections of world growth and inflation for 2011 and 2012\t\nPer cent\nReal GDP\nConsumer prices\n2011\n2012\n2011\n2012\nWorld............................................................................................\n4,0\n4,0\n5,0\n3,7\nAdvanced economies..................................................................\n1,6\n1,9\n2,6\n1,4\nUnited States............................................................................\n1,5\n1,8\n3,0\n1,2\nJapan........................................................................................\n-0,5\n2,3\n-0,4\n-0,5\nEuro area..................................................................................\n1,6\n1,1\n2,5\n1,5\nUnited Kingdom........................................................................\n1,1\n1,6\n4,5\n2,4\nCanada.....................................................................................\n2,1\n1,9\n2,9\n2,1\nOther advanced economies......................................................\n3,6\n3,7\n3,3\n2,8\nEmerging-market and developing economies...............................\n6,4\n6,1\n7,5\n5,9\nSub-Saharan Africa...................................................................\n5,2\n5,8\n8,4\n8,3\nCentral and eastern Europe......................................................\n4,3\n2,7\n5,2\n4,5\nCommonwealth of Independent States.....................................\n4,6\n4,4\n10,3\n8,7\nDeveloping Asia........................................................................\n8,2\n8,0\n7,0\n5,1\nChina ....................................................................................\n9,5\n9,0\n5,5\n3,3\nIndia.......................................................................................\n7,8\n7,5\n10,6\n8,6\nMiddle East and North Africa....................................................\n4,0\n3,6\n9,9\n7,6\nLatin America and the Caribbean..............................................\n4,5\n4,0\n6,7\n6,0\nSource:\t IMF World Economic Outlook, September 2011\nIn the US growth is expected to be higher in 2012 than in 2011, although the IMF has reduced its \nprojection for 2012 by 0,9 percentage points to 1,8 per cent, with risks to the outlook remaining \nelevated. Euro area growth is expected to decline in 2012, with the IMF expecting real GDP to \nexpand by about 1,1 per cent.\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\n30\nIn November the European Commission more than halved its euro area GDP growth forecast for \n2012 to 0,5 per cent, citing the risk of an ongoing fiscal crisis leading to recession in the region. \nIn Japan the earthquake and tsunami on 11 March had a greater-than-anticipated effect on \ninternational supply chains and global growth, but industrial production rebounded in the second \nhalf of 2011. The IMF projects GDP growth in Japan to improve significantly from a negative \n0,5 per cent in 2011 to 2,3 per cent in 2012. The growth forecast for the UK is projected to increase \nmoderately to 1,6 per cent in 2012 from 1,1 per cent in 2011.\nThere has also been a pronounced slowdown of growth in emerging-market and developing \neconomies. The IMF expects the major countries in this group to continue to grow faster \nthan the advanced economies, but also expects them to remain vulnerable to contagion \neffects from a possible significant slowdown or recession in these economies. Growth in \nthese countries is projected to be 6,1 per cent in 2012, with developing Asia projected to grow \nby 8,0 per cent. China is projected to continue to grow at rates of around 9,0 per cent in 2012, \nwhile India is projected to achieve growth well above 7,0 per cent per annum for the year. \nThe IMF projects that consumer-price growth in the global economy will decline to 3,7 per cent \nin 2012 from 5,0 per cent in 2011. Consumer price inflation is expected to slow in 2012 in both \nadvanced economies (from 2,6 to 1,4 per cent) and emerging and developing countries (from \n7,5 to 5,9 per cent). \nSelected indicators of global economic activity are shown in Figure 24. The Organisation for \nEconomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) index of composite leading indicators, \ndesigned to give a broad indication of economic activity six months ahead, suggests a slowdown \nin economic activity into early 2012. It declined by 1,3 per cent in September 2011, compared \nwith the corresponding month of the previous year. The year-on-year rate of change in the \nOECD industrial production index likewise slowed significantly from 5,8 per cent in February to \n3,0 per cent in August 2011. The JPMorgan global manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index \n(PMI) has also declined from a level of 57,4 in February 2011 to 50,0 in October. \nPercentage change over 12 months \nIndex points\n30\n35\n40\n45\n50\n55\n60\n65\n \nOECD composite leading indicator\n \nOECD industrial production index\n \nJPMorgan global manufacturing PMI (right-hand scale) \nSources: OECD and JPMorgan\nFigure 24 \nSelected indicators of global economic activity\n-20\n-15\n-10\n-5\n0\n5\n10\n15\n1999\n2001\n2003\n2005\n2007\n2009\n2011\nOutlook for domestic demand and supply\nAccording to the Bank’s latest quarterly projection, annual average growth in real output is \nexpected to be 3,0 per cent in 2011, followed by 3,2 per cent in 2012 and 4,2 per cent in 2013 \n(Figure 25). The lower forecast is mainly a result of the lower-than-expected economic growth \noutcome in the second quarter and downward revisions to global growth. \n31\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\n-10\n-8\n-6\n-4\n-2\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\nPercentage change at seasonally adjusted annualised rates\n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\nFigure 25 \nReal GDP growth forecast\nThe 2011 MTBPS forecasts slightly higher annual average economic growth of 3,1 per cent in \n2011 and 3,4 per cent in 2012. For the years 2013 and 2014 GDP growth is forecast to reach \n4,1 per cent and 4,3 per cent, respectively, as global uncertainties decrease and confidence \nstrengthens. The Reuters October 2011 survey showed that financial analysts, on average, \nexpect annual GDP to increase by 3,2 per cent in 2011, followed by 3,3 per cent in 2012 and \n4,0 per cent in 2013. \nThe seasonally adjusted Kagiso/BER PMI had risen for the third time since July, when it registered \n46,4 index points, to reach 50,5 in October 2011, moving back above the neutral level of \n50 (Figure 26). The business activity index posted 50,9 index points, and new sales orders improved \nto 51,6 index points. Purchasing commitments registered 55,4 index points and expected business \nconditions rose to 62,4 index points in October, up from 60,8 points in September. \nIndex points\nSources: Kagiso Securities and Bureau for Economic Research, Stellenbosch University\nFigure 26 \nKagiso PMI\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\n100\nEmployment\nKagiso PMI\nExpected business conditions\n1999\n2001\n2003\n2005\n2007\n2009\n2011\nAccording to the Ernst & Young/BER retail survey, the percentage of wholesalers rating business \nconditions as satisfactory declined from 47 in the second quarter of 2011 to 31 in the third \nquarter. The Ernst & Young/BER retail confidence index gained 1 index point to reach a level of \n48 during the third quarter. \nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\n32\nThe Bank’s composite leading business cycle indicator decreased in August 2011, having also \ndecreased in July (Figure 27). Ten of the eleven component time series that were available for \nAugust decreased, while one increased. The major negative contributors to the movement in \nthe leading indicator in August were the year-on-year percentage change in the composite \nleading business cycle indicator of South Africa’s major trading-partner countries, followed by \nthe prices of all classes of shares traded on the JSE. The only positive contribution came \nfrom the export commodity price index. Since February 2011, the leading indicator has been \nfollowing a moderate downward trend, pointing to a possible slowdown in aggregate economic \nactivity in the months ahead.\nIndex: 2000 = 100\n1994\n1996\n1998\n2000\n2002\n2004\n2006\n2008\n2011\nFigure 27 \nComposite leading business cycle indicator\n80\n90\n100\n110\n120\n130\n140\nThe RMB/BER BCI fell sharply from 48 index points in the second quarter of 2011 to 39 index \npoints in the third quarter. Business confidence declined in the new vehicle trade, manufacturing \nand wholesale trade sectors, but increased in the retail trade sector. Confidence in the building \nsector remained low and declined marginally from 21 index points in the second quarter to \n20 index points in the third quarter.\nIndex\nNet positive\nNet negative\n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\nFigure 28 \nRMB/BER business confidence\n \nDownward phases of the business cycle\nSources: Rand Merchant Bank and Bureau for Economic Research, Stellenbosch University\n1980\n82\n84\n86\n88 1990\n92\n94\n96\n98\n2000 02\n04\n06\n08\n2010\nAccording to the BER Manufacturing Survey, manufacturing business confidence declined from \n51 index points in the second quarter of 2011 to 36 points in the third quarter, with the net majority \n33\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\nreporting general business conditions as worse than a year ago rising from 8 per cent to 33 per \ncent. The net majority who reported a rise in domestic sales volumes fell from 26 per cent during \nthe second quarter to 3 per cent in the third quarter, while the net majority reporting an increase \nin domestic orders fell from 14 per cent to 1 per cent. The percentage of total respondents rating \nthe present level of output as below capacity rose from 67 per cent to 74 per cent. \nThe FNB/BER Building Confidence Index declined marginally from 24 index points in the \nsecond quarter of 2011 to 23 index points in the third quarter. Three quarters of respondents \nin the surveyed sectors of the building industry rated the prevailing business conditions as \nunsatisfactory. The confidence of quantity surveyors, sub-contractors and building material \nmerchants increased, while that of architects, main contractors and building material \nmanufacturers declined relative to second quarter.\nThe FNB/BER Consumer Confidence Index (CCI) declined from +11 index points in the second \nquarter of 2011 to +4 index points in the third quarter. The fall in the third quarter can mostly be \nattributed to a large decline in the percentage of consumers expecting an improvement in the \neconomy. The percentage of consumers expecting an improvement in their own finances also \ndeclined, while the percentage rating the present as an unsuitable time to buy durable goods \nremained almost unchanged relative to the second quarter. \nIndicators of inflation expectations\nInflation expectations play an important role in price setting and wage negotiations, and \nare therefore an important factor in determining future inflation outcomes. The BER survey \nof inflation expectations undertaken in the third quarter of 2011 shows that average inflation \nexpectations remain within the target range, rising from 5,5 per cent in 2011 to 5,9 per cent in \n2013 (Figure 29). However, expectations have increased from the time the previous survey was \nundertaken in the second quarter of 2011. The average inflation expectation for 2011 has risen \nfrom 5,3 per cent in the second quarter of 2011 to 5,5 per cent in the third quarter. The average \ninflation expectation for 2012 and 2013 also increased in the third quarter by 0,1 percentage \npoints to 5,9 per cent. \nAnnual averages, per cent\n4,0\n4,5\n5,0\n5,5\n6,0\n6,5\n2011\n2012\n2013\nFigure 29 \nBER surveys of headline CPI inflation expectations\n5,3\n5,3\n5,5\n5,7\n5,8\n5,9\n5,9\n6,0\n5,8\nSurvey conducted during 2011:\n \n1st qr\nSource: Bureau for Economic Research, Stellenbosch University \n \n2nd qr \n \n3rd qr \nAccording to the BER survey results, all respondent groups revised their 2011 inflation forecast \nupwards in September 2011. Financial analysts forecast that consumer headline inflation would \nremain below 6 per cent over the entire 2011–13 period, while business now expects inflation \nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\n34\nto breach the upper inflation target limit and reach 6,1 per cent in 2012, before accelerating to \n6,3 per cent in 2013. Trade unions expect inflation to reach 6 per cent in 2012 before moderating to \n5,9 per cent in 2013. \nThe Reuters survey of long-term forecasts for the South African economy shows the forecasts \nfor CPI inflation rising in 2012. The mean CPI forecast is for inflation of 5,1 per cent in 2011, \n5,8 per cent in 2012 and 5,6 per cent in 2013 (Table 11). The inflation forecasts were relatively \nunchanged between September and October 2011. \nTable 11\t\nReuters survey of CPI inflation forecasts: October 2011*\n2011\n2012\n2013\n1. Mean.........................................................\n(5,0)\n5,1\n (5,8)\n5,8\n(5,7)\n5,6\n2. Median.......................................................\n(5,0)\n5,0\n (5,8)\n5,8\n (5,7)\n5,6\n3. Highest......................................................\n(5,1)\n6,2\n(7,0)\n7,0\n (6,0)\n6,5\n4. Lowest.......................................................\n(4,7)\n4,9\n(5,4)\n5,1\n (4,9)\n4,9\nNumber of forecasters...................................\n(17)\n19\n(17)\n19\n (12)\n15\n* \t September 2011 survey results in parentheses\nSource: \tReuters\nFigure 30 shows the inflation expectations associated with break-even inflation rates, measured as \nthe yield differential between South African government CPI inflation-linked bonds and conventional \nnominal bonds of similar maturity, assuming constant inflation and liquidity risk premia over the \nperiod until the bond matures. In September break-even rates rose as a result of sharp increases \nin government bond yields and a weakening in the foreign-exchange rate of the rand. Increased \nrisk aversion resulted in non-resident investors selling emerging-market economies’ bonds (including \nSouth Africa’s) due to eurozone sovereign debt issues, and there was an expectation of increased \nbond issuance to be announced in the MTBPS. Break-even rates then reversed as non-residents \nreturned to the domestic bond market in October and National Treasury announced a less-than-\nexpected long-term bond issuance on 25 October 2011.\nPercentage points\n2006\n2007\nFigure 30 \nBreak-even inflation rates\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\n10\n \nSpread between R189 and R206 bonds (2- to 3-year maturity)\n \nSpread between R197 and R186 bonds (12- to 15-year maturity)\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n35\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\nThe South African Reserve Bank inflation forecast\nThe most recent projections of the Bank’s core quarterly inflation forecasting model, presented to \nthe MPC meeting on 8–10 November 2011, are reproduced in the form of a fan chart in Figure 31. \nAccording to these projections, the inflation forecast of the Bank has shown a modest increase \nsince the previous meeting of the MPC. The targeted inflation rate is expected to continue to \ntrend upwards, moving above the upper level of the inflation target range from the fourth quarter \nof 2011 to the third quarter of 2012, before returning to within the target range for the remainder \nof the forecast period. \nThe central projection, conditional on an unchanged repurchase rate, is for the average quarterly \nCPI inflation rate to peak at an average rate of 6,3 per cent in the first quarter of 2012, then \ndecline gradually to average around 5,2 per cent in the final quarter of 2013. Movements in oil \nprices, electricity prices or the exchange rate of the rand that differ from those assumed for the \nforecast will impact on the central projection, with alternative scenarios for movements in these \nvariables generating more optimistic or pessimistic outcomes for targeted inflation. The forecast \nmakes provision for electricity price increases of 17,3 per cent per annum in the third quarters \nof 2012 and 2013.\nPer cent\nFigure 31 \nTargeted inflation* forecast\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n* CPIX for metropolitan and other urban areas until the end of 2008; CPI for all urban areas thereafter\n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\nGiven the central projection for targeted inflation as the most likely outcome, the risks to the \nforecast in Figure 31 are viewed as being skewed slightly to the upside. Uncertainty regarding \nfuture developments in cost–push pressures and the exchange rate pose an upside risk to the \noutlook, which more than offsets the downside risks from possible contagion effects from the \nEuropean crisis and associated slow growth. \nNote:\t\nThe fan chart uses confidence bands to depict varying degrees of certainty. The darkest \nband of the fan chart covers the most likely 10 per cent of probable outcomes foreseen \nfor inflation, including the central projection. Each successive band, shaded slightly \nlighter and added on either side of the central band, adds a further 10 per cent to the \nprobability, until the whole shaded area depicts a 90 per cent confidence interval (see \nBox 4 “Understanding the fan chart” on p. 27 of the March 2001 Monetary Policy Review).\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\n36\nBox 2\t An accuracy analysis of inflation forecasts \nDespite the high degree of uncertainty involved in economic forecasting, forward-looking projections \nof inflation and other variables play a critical role in any monetary policy decision-making process.\nForecast errors arise from a variety of sources, including misspecification of economic relationships, \ndata revisions, unforeseen shocks to the economy and incorrect or partial assumptions for exogenous \ninput into the models. Models are always imperfect as they are simplified facsimiles of the real world. \nMonetary Policy Committee (MPC) decisions are based, in part, on the forecast and on the analysis \nand assessment of other information, coupled with the balance of risks affecting the baseline forecast.\nThe South African Reserve Bank (the Bank) compares the accuracy of its forecasts of headline \nconsumer price inflation produced by its core model, 1 the Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average \n(ARIMA) model and the disaggregated inflation model against the Reuters Consensus Forecast.2 \nA number of descriptive statistics are used in the assessment of the accuracy of the inflation \nforecast. The most frequently used error measures are the mean errors (measuring bias in terms of \nsystematic over- or underestimation) and the root mean squared errors (relating errors to the \nvariability of the series).\nThe average forecast errors of the Bank’s models and that of the Reuters Survey (the average of the \nparticipants) for the period May 2003 to September 2011, presented in Figure B2.1, are negative and \nbiased downwards. This bias indicates that both the Bank and the Reuters participants, on average, \nunderestimated the actual outcome of headline consumer price inflation over the medium-term \nforecast horizons, that is, two-quarters-ahead to four-quarters-ahead forecasts. \n4\n3\n2\n1\n-0,5\n-0,4\n-0,3\n-0,2\n-0,1\n0,0\n0,1\nFigure B2.1 Average forecast error\n \nReuters consensus forecast\n \nARIMA model\nSource: Reuters and own calculations\nCore model\nDisaggregated inflation model\nQuarters ahead\nSupply-side shocks in 2007 and 2008 – largely unexpected changes in international commodity, oil \nand food prices – contributed to a sharp acceleration of quarterly rates of year-on-year headline \ninflation. This exceeded 13 per cent in the third quarter of 2008. These exceptional shocks resulted in \nlarge consecutive negative forecast errors dominating the outcome of the average forecast error. \n1 The core model is a simultaneous-equation macroeconometric model consisting of 27 stochastic equations and \nseveral identities. It provides a well-defined conceptual framework for macroeconomic analysis. The ARIMA model is \nbased on the historical properties of the series, which is intended for the very short term. In the disaggregated inflation \nmodel the main components of the headline consumer price index are forecast individually and then aggregated with \nthe appropriate weights to calculate the forecast of headline consumer price index.\n2 The Reuters Survey is published monthly and contains forecasts of several macroeconomic variables over a relatively \nlong time span. The forecasters consist of economists from major investment banks, corporations, consulting firms \nand academic institutions, using different methods and models to produce their forecasts. On average, the survey \ncontains 22 forecasts each month, and many of the forecasters have participated in the survey for several years.\n37\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\nIn Figure B2.2 it is evident that the Bank’s models are considerably more accurate than that of the Reuters \nConsensus Forecast over the one-quarter-ahead horizon when comparing the respective root mean square \nerrors. However, as the forecast horizon extends and uncertainty rises, the gap in the forecast accuracy declines. \n4\n3\n2\n1\n0,0\n0,5\n1,0\n1,5\n2,0\n2,5\nFigure B2.2 Root mean square error\n \nReuters consensus forecast\n \nARIMA model\nSource: Reuters and own calculations\nCore model\nDisaggregated inflation model\nQuarters ahead\nThe Bank’s forecasting performance is also compared with the 16 individual forecasters or institutions that \nparticipate consistently in the Reuters Survey.3 The results show that the forecast produced by the Bank’s \ncore model is consistently the best over the one-, two and three-quarters-ahead forecast period, with only \nthe ARIMA model slipping to the fourth position over the four-quarter-ahead forecasting period. \n3 The Reuters Consensus Forecast is treated in this instance as a forecasting entity in its own right. It is therefore not \nthe average of the forecast errors of all the participants in the Reuters Survey. All other participants are identified by a \nnumber only and the same number is attached to a particular participant throughout the analysis and forecast \nhorizon.\nAssessment and conclusion\nThe global economy remains extraordinarily turbulent. Efforts at global, regional and national \nlevels to make policy decisions underscore the complexity of the world’s current economic and \nfinancial difficulties. Since the previous meeting of the MPC, there has been little meaningful \nprogress towards resolving the sovereign debt crisis that is engulfing the euro area. Coalition \ngovernments in some countries may help to unlock tough decisions. Advanced economies \ngenerally need to achieve more rapid economic growth rates but this goal remains hampered \nby policy uncertainty, slow deleveraging by households and financial institutions, and blocked \ncredit channels. \nGrowth in emerging-market economies has up to now supported the overall growth rate of \nthe world economy. Forecasts for emerging markets are being marked down because of their \nsensitivity to growth in advanced economies. Downward revisions are likely to remain limited, \nhowever, as China and India avoid hard landings and the US avoids a recession more comfortably \nthan expected a few months ago. Emerging markets that are more dependent on growth in \nadvanced economies, such as in Latin America and Central Europe, should experience more \nsignificant economic slowdowns. \nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\n38\nFor advanced economies, headline inflation should be expected to moderate in line with \ndeclining economic activity and the softer trend in commodity prices. Inflation remains quite \nhigh in many emerging-market economies, although in recent weeks some moderation has \nbeen seen. Economic growth concerns and financial fragility suggest that monetary policy in \nadvanced economies is expected to remain accommodative for a considerable period. This \npolicy stance may support a continuation of the somewhat higher rate of global price inflation \nexperienced in 2011 despite weaker growth. The rise in prices has been caused primarily by \nsupply pressures on resources and food that will only gradually ease over the longer term. \nThe heightened uncertainty of advanced economy developments and weaker growth has had \nimplications for the pattern of global capital flows and exchange rates in emerging markets. \nCapital flows to emerging-market economies and commodity producers may remain strong \nover the medium and long term, even as short-term flows are volatile. This implies that inflation \nexpectations need to remain well anchored around a sound inflation target to ensure that \ntemporary shocks have minimal effects on inflation or the economy more generally. A clear \nprice stability objective implemented within a flexible inflation-targeting framework is central to \nthe Bank’s approach. \nThe South African economy has been significantly affected by global developments and \ndomestic constraints to the recovery. The domestic recovery remains hesitant and confidence \nlow. Domestic demand pressures on inflation are restrained at this point in time but various \nsupply-side factors have resulted in a deterioration of the inflation outlook. The subdued \ncharacter of domestic demand is expected to keep core inflation contained. Food and petrol \nprices, and administered prices more broadly, are the drivers of the poorer outlook. Compared \nto the May assessment a more protracted, but relatively small, breach of the inflation target is \nexpected in 2012. \nCost–push pressures and sustained exchange rate depreciation are the primary upside risks to \nthe inflation outlook. Downside risks emanate from the potential contagion effects of the crisis in \nEurope and negative spillover effects on global economic growth. While the MPC viewed these \nrisks overall to be skewed to the upside, the committee is aware of the dangers of a disorderly \nresolution of the crisis, and the systemic implications for the global and domestic economy, and \nremains ready to act appropriately should the need arise. \n39\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n21 July 2011\nIssued by Gill Marcus, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, at a meeting of the \nMonetary Policy Committee (MPC) in Pretoria\nSince the previous meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), the global economic \noutlook has deteriorated. Events in the eurozone appear to have entered a new phase, with the \nfocus moving from the peripheral countries to some of the larger economies in the region. The \nglobal systemic risks posed by any failure to overcome the sovereign debt crisis are enormous, \nand are exacerbated by the potential failure to resolve the debt ceiling crisis in the United States \n(US). These events are taking place against the backdrop of a slowdown in growth in many of \nthe advanced economies.\nThe domestic economic recovery has continued, but in a hesitant manner. The strong \nperformance of the economy in the first quarter of the year is unlikely to have been repeated \nin the second quarter, and growth prospects will also be dependent on global developments. \nDomestic inflation has been increasing in line with expectations, driven mainly by cost-push \npressures, but more broad-based pricing pressures are beginning to emerge.\nThe year-on-year inflation rate as measured by the consumer price index (CPI) for all urban \nareas increased to 5,0 per cent in June 2011, from 4,6 per cent in May. As was the case in the \nprevious few months, the main contributions to the inflation outcome came from food, housing \nand utilities, and transport categories which, together, accounted for 3,6 percentage points \nof the 5,0 per cent outcome in June. Food price inflation continued its marked upward trend, \nmeasuring 7,3 per cent in June, from 6,3 per cent in May. Petrol and electricity prices increased \nat rates of 21,4 per cent and 19,0 per cent respectively in June. Administered price inflation \nexcluding petrol was unchanged in June at 9,3 per cent. \nThe underlying inflation trends have remained relatively moderate. In May and June CPI excluding \nfood and petrol measured 3,7 per cent and 3,9 per cent respectively, while CPI excluding food, \npetrol and electricity measured 3,2 per cent and 3,5 per cent in these months. \nYear-on-year producer price inflation has displayed some volatility in recent months, partly \nas a result of commodity price fluctuations. Producer prices increased by 6,6 per cent and \n6,9 per cent in April and May respectively, compared with 7,3 per cent in March. Price increases \nin electricity and products of petroleum and coal were major contributors to the PPI outcome, \nbut there were also significant increases in food prices, which had until recently remained \nsubdued. Agricultural prices increased by 6,8 per cent in May, from 2,1 per cent in April, while \nmanufactured food prices increased at rates of 3,4 per cent and 4,8 per cent in April and May \nrespectively. \nThe inflation forecast of the Bank has shown a slight near-term deterioration since the previous \nmeeting of the MPC. Inflation is now expected to breach marginally the upper end of the \ntarget range in the final quarter of 2011, and to average 6,3 per cent in the first quarter of \n2012. Thereafter it is expected to remain at the upper end of the target range for the next two \nquarters, before declining somewhat in the final quarter of the year. The forecast period has \nbeen extended to the end of 2013 and inflation is expected to decline gradually during the year, \nto measure 5,6 per cent in the final quarter of 2013. The Bank’s forecast of core inflation shows \na moderately rising trend, peaking at around 5 per cent in the second quarter of 2012.\nInflation expectations for 2011 as reflected in the survey conducted by the Bureau for Economic \nResearch (BER) at Stellenbosch University had been declining for six consecutive quarters, but \nremained unchanged in the second quarter of 2011. Expectations for 2012 increased marginally, \nbut remained within the target range, and declined for 2013. The average inflation expectation \nfor the three main categories of respondents was 5,3 per cent for 2011 and 5,8 per cent for the \nnext two years. \nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\n40\nInflation expectations as measured by the Reuters survey of financial analysts showed very little \nchange when compared to the forecasts at the time of the previous MPC meeting, with inflation \nexpected to remain, on average, within the upper end of the target range until the end of 2013. \nInflation expectations as reflected in the break-even inflation rates of the inflation-linked bonds \nhave moderated slightly since the previous meeting.\nThe MPC assesses the risks to the global economic environment to be on the downside, and \ncontinued weakness in the economies of the US and United Kingdom has extended the likely \nduration of monetary accommodation, particularly in the face of declining fiscal stimuli. \nRisks relating to debt sustainability in peripheral Europe have intensified, with further ratings \ndowngrades to some countries. The focus has also moved beyond the periphery to larger \ncountries such as Spain and Italy. As long as the sovereign debt crisis is unresolved, confidence \nwill not be restored and periodic bouts of risk aversion can be expected to contribute to a high \ndegree of volatility in financial markets. There are concerns that a disorderly write-down of this \ndebt could have systemic implications because of the high exposure of European banks to the \ndebt of these countries.\nBy contrast, there are encouraging trends in other parts of the world. The reconstruction of the \nJapanese economy in the wake of the natural disasters has begun to have some positive impact \non that country’s growth rate. Growth in emerging markets has generally remained strong, and \nfears of a marked slowdown in Chinese growth have been allayed somewhat by robust second \nquarter growth performance.\nGlobal inflation has been driven primarily by food and oil price developments. There are, however, \nsome indications that these price pressures may have peaked. Both the International Monetary \nFund and Food and Agricultural Organization food price indices have shown a flattening out \nsince the beginning of the year. International oil prices have contributed to, and in turn have also \nbeen constrained by, the slowdown in global growth.\nThe bouts of risk aversion relating to developments in the euro area have impacted on the \nvolatility of the rand exchange rate. Since the previous MPC meeting, the rand has fluctuated \nwithin a range of R6,67 and R7,02 against the US dollar. The current level of the rand exchange \nrate against both the dollar and the euro has remained more or less unchanged since the \nprevious MPC meeting. In recent months the rand has also been affected by a number of actual \nand expected direct investment transactions, and by net purchases of bonds and equities by \nnon-residents totalling around R32,6 billion since the beginning of May. Net bond purchases by \nnon-residents amounted to R34,1 billion, while net sales of equities amounted to R1,5 billion.\nFrom a macroeconomic perspective, the rand has remained relatively strong despite heightened \nglobal risk aversion, and despite continued purchases of foreign exchange by the Bank with \nthe support of National Treasury. Between September 2009 and August 2010, the rand dollar \nexchange rate fluctuated in the range of around R7,40 to R7,80. Since September of 2010, the \nrand has generally traded in the range of around R6,60 to R7,00, apart from a short period in \nearly 2011 when it breached the R7,20 level. \nThe domestic economic recovery remains fragile. Annualised GDP growth in the first quarter \nof 2011 measured 4,8 per cent, driven primarily by a 14,5 per cent growth in the manufacturing \nsector. This performance is not expected to be sustained in the second quarter: the monthly \ndata for manufacturing-sector output in April and May suggest that unless there is a major \nupside surprise in June, the positive contribution of the sector to second quarter growth is likely \nto be minimal. The Kagiso Purchasing Managers Index, while still indicating positive growth in the \nsector, has declined for three consecutive months. Some of the slowdown in manufacturing can \nbe ascribed to temporary factors such as the impact of the earthquake in Japan on the global \nmotor industry supply chain. The outlook for the sector will also be influenced by developments \nin Europe, which is a significant market for South African-manufactured exports. Growth in the \nphysical volume of mining production was weak in April and May.\n41\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\nGrowth in gross fixed capital formation improved in the first quarter of 2011 to register an \nannualised growth rate of 3,1 per cent. This was mainly due to the higher levels of investment \nby public corporations. Growth in private-sector fixed capital formation, while rising, was still \nsubdued at 2,7 per cent.\nDespite the expected growth slowdown in the second quarter, the forecast of the Bank for \ngross domestic product growth in 2011 and 2012 remains unchanged at 3,7 per cent and \n3,9 per cent respectively, while growth in 2013 is expected to average 4,4 per cent. With a \npotential output growth rate of around 3,5 per cent, the estimates of the Bank show that the \noutput gap, although closing, is still negative at around 2,5 per cent. This is consistent with \nthe fact that the levels of output in both the manufacturing and mining sectors are still below \npre-crisis levels, as is the level of capacity utilisation in the manufacturing sector. Business \nconfidence, as reflected in the Rand Merchant Bank/Bureau for Economic Research Business \nConfidence Index, reversed its positive trend when it declined to below the neutral 50 level in \nthe second quarter of 2011. Confidence in the construction sector remains at an extremely low \nlevel, and the real value of new building plans passed declined further in April.\nHousehold consumption expenditure, which grew at an annualised rate of 5,2 per cent in the \nfirst quarter of 2011, has been the main driver of the domestic growth recovery. There are \nindications that this growth may have moderated in the second quarter. The robust growth in \nreal retail sales in April was more than offset in May when a month-on-month decline of 4,7 per \ncent was measured, while the year-on-year growth rate was zero. New vehicle sales increased \nby 12,6 per cent year on year, but declined by 4 per cent in the second quarter compared \nwith the previous quarter. The First National Bank/Bureau for Economic Research Consumer \nConfidence Index increased marginally in the second quarter of 2011, but remains below levels \nreached in 2010. \nThe MPC expects household consumption expenditure to be constrained by a number of \nfactors, including subdued credit market conditions, high levels of household debt, negative \nwealth effects and persistently high rates of unemployment.\nGrowth in total loans and advances extended by banks to the private sector remain relatively \nsubdued and grew at a year-on-year rate of 5,5 per cent in May, compared with 6,0 per cent in \nApril. Growth in “other loans and advances” , particularly general loans, was the major driver, as \ngrowth in mortgage loans – the largest category of loans – was restrained at around 3 per cent, \nin line with the weak housing market. The subdued state of the credit markets reflects in part \nthe high levels of consumer indebtedness, which measured 77 per cent of personal disposable \nincome in the first quarter of 2011. The ratio of impaired advances to gross loans and advances \nhas remained at elevated levels for some time but declined marginally to 5,73 per cent in May.\nWealth effects have been negatively affected by the subdued housing market. The various \nhouse price indices indicate that house prices are falling in real terms, although there appears \nto be some positive nominal growth. While the JSE is at relatively high levels, it is vulnerable \nto correction in the event of a significant global slowdown. Although household net wealth \nto disposable income has recovered somewhat since the recession, it is still below the peak \nreached in 2007. \nEmployment trends have been improving slowly. According to the Quarterly Employment Survey \nof Statistics South Africa, formal non-agricultural employment increased by 2,6 per cent in the \nfirst quarter of 2011, compared with the first quarter of 2010. This represented an increase of \n212 000 jobs, just over half the number of formal-sector jobs lost during the crisis. The majority \nof jobs created have been in the public sector and the recovery in employment in the private \nsector remains slow.\nWage settlement rates have been declining, with Andrew Levy Employment Publications \nreporting an average overall wage settlement rate in collective bargaining agreements of 7,5 per \ncent in the first half of 2011, compared with 8,2 per cent in 2010 as a whole. Similarly, nominal \nunit labour costs, which account for productivity changes, moderated to 5,2 per cent in the \nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\n42\nfirst quarter of 2011, from 7,7 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2010. However, given that most \nof the wage negotiations take place in the second half of the year, and that some of the recent \nhigh-profile settlements appear to have reversed the moderating trend, this positive outcome \ncould change. Should these higher trends set a precedent for other wage settlements, this \ncould represent a significant upside risk to the inflation outlook. The high trends in executive \nremuneration increases are also cause for concern.\nFood and oil price developments remain the major risks to the inflation outlook. As noted above, \ninternational food prices appear to have levelled out. Domestic food price inflation has lagged \nglobal trends, and further increases can be expected in the near term. However, these increases \ncould be constrained should the favourable global developments persist. \nThe price of Brent crude oil, currently at around US$117 per barrel, is at levels similar to those \nprevailing at the time of the previous meeting of the MPC. The price has experienced some \nvolatility in recent weeks, particularly following the release of oil stocks by the International \nEnergy Agency in June, when the price declined to US$106 per barrel. Although supply \nconditions are expected to remain tight, further upside potential is likely to be constrained by the \nuncertain global growth outlook. These developments allowed for a 31 cent per litre reduction in \ndomestic petrol prices in July, following a 2 cent per litre decline in June. However, an increase \nis expected in August.\nThe view of the MPC continues to be that the underlying inflation pressures are mainly of a \ncost-push nature, notwithstanding signs of a possible moderate increase in underlying inflation. \nDespite the upside risks posed by cost-push factors, the MPC sees a number of downside risks \nto the inflation outlook, with the risks being seen to be delicately balanced. These risks include \nthe continued fragile nature of the domestic recovery and risks posed by the ramifications of a \npossible disorderly debt default in the eurozone. \nIt is, however, recognised that should there be unexpectedly high inflation outcomes, particularly \nwith respect to underlying inflation trends, this could impact negatively on inflation expectations, \nwhich to date appear to be relatively well anchored. For this reason, the MPC is not complacent \nand will remain vigilant and continue to monitor closely any indications of second-round effects \non inflation emanating from these cost pressures and from the changing risk profile of the \ninflation outlook. \nIn the light of the above, the MPC has decided to keep the repurchase rate unchanged at \n5,5 per cent per annum, for the time being. The MPC will not hesitate to respond timeously to \nsigns that threaten to move inflation out of the target range on a sustained basis. \n43\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n22 September 2011\nIssued by Gill Marcus, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, at a meeting of the \nMonetary Policy Committee (MPC) in Pretoria\nSince the previous meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) the downside risks to \nthe global and domestic growth prospects have increased. Growth in some of the advanced \neconomies has weakened against the backdrop of financial market turbulence, generated in \nlarge part by the unresolved European sovereign debt crisis. Although economic growth in \nemerging markets is expected to continue to outperform that of the advanced economies, these \neconomies are unlikely to emerge unscathed from the challenging environment. Heightened risk \naversion has resulted in increased volatility of capital flows globally and a flight from what are \nperceived to be more risky emerging-market assets. These developments have impacted on \nthe domestic capital and foreign-exchange markets.\nRecent data have confirmed the fragile and uneven nature of the domestic economic recovery, \nand unfavourable forward-looking indicators are consistent with a downward revision of the \nBank’s economic growth forecast. At the same time, a number of exogenous factors have \ncontinued to put upward pressure on domestic inflation. This combination of declining growth \nand rising inflation poses a challenge to monetary policy going forward, and is a feature being \nexperienced in a number of emerging markets. \nThe year-on-year inflation rate as measured by the consumer price index (CPI) for all urban areas \nwas unchanged at 5,3 per cent in August 2011. The categories of food, housing and utilities, \nand transport together accounted for 3,7 percentage points of the August outcome. Although \nfood price inflation moderated from 7,5 per cent in July to 7,3 per cent, further acceleration is \nexpected in the coming months. Administered price inflation excluding petrol declined from \n9,3 per cent in July to 8,8 per cent in August. Underlying inflation trends remained relatively well \ncontained with CPI excluding food, petrol and electricity declining from 3,9 per cent in July to \n3,8 per cent in August.\nYear-on-year producer price inflation followed a strong upward trend, increasing by 7,4 per \ncent and 8,9 per cent in June and July respectively. Price increases in the categories of mining, \nelectricity, and products of petroleum and coal remained the major contributors to the PPI \noutcome, but there were also significant contributions from chemical and other manufactures. \nFood prices continued to trend higher: agricultural prices increased by 5,1 per cent and 6,2 per \ncent in June and July respectively, while manufactured food prices increased at rates of 5,9 per \ncent and 6,3 per cent in these months.\nThe inflation forecast of the Bank has remained more or less unchanged since the previous \nmeeting of the MPC. Inflation is still expected to breach marginally the upper end of the target \nrange in the final quarter of 2011 and to peak in the first quarter of 2012 at around 6,2 per cent \nbefore returning to within the target range in the second quarter. Inflation is then expected to \ndecline gradually and to measure 5,5 per cent in the final quarter of 2013. The Bank’s forecast \nof core inflation, which excludes food, petrol and electricity, shows a moderately rising trend, \npeaking at around 5,1 per cent in the second and third quarters of 2013.\nInflation expectations, as reflected in the survey conducted in the third quarter of 2011 by the \nBureau for Economic Research at Stellenbosch University, on average remain within the target \nrange for the forecast period ending 2013. Inflation is expected to average 5,5 per cent in 2011 \nand 5,9 per cent in both 2012 and 2013. This represents slight upward adjustments for all three \nyears. While financial analysts and trade union officials expect inflation to remain within the \ntarget range over the forecast period, business executives expect average inflation to exceed \nmoderately the upper end of the target range in the coming two years. \nInflation expectations as measured by the Reuters survey of financial analysts also remain fairly \nstable at the upper end of the target range. According to the survey, inflation is expected to \naverage 5,8 per cent and 5,6 per cent in 2012 and 2013 respectively. \nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\n44\nThe growth performance in the advanced economies has remained weak. There is a general \nexpectation of even weaker outcomes in the near-term, although it is still unclear if the stalled \nstate that many economies find themselves in will translate into a recession. The International \nMonetary Fund, in its latest World Economic Outlook, has reduced its forecast for growth in \nthe United States (US) by 1,0 per cent in 2011 and by 0,9 per cent in 2012 to 1,5 per cent and \n1,8 per cent respectively. euro area growth has been revised down to 1,6 per cent and 1,1 per \ncent in these two years. The risks are seen to be on the downside. \nThis slowdown comes against the backdrop of a deterioration in the sovereign debt crisis in \nthe euro area and the inability of the member countries to reach agreement on a credible and \nworkable solution. Concerns have also spread to the European banking sector, particularly to \nthose banks with exposures to peripheral Europe, resulting in ratings downgrades of a number \nof French and Italian banks. Growth in the US is also being affected by continued weakness in \nthe housing market and political disagreements on the pace and nature of fiscal consolidation.\nEmerging markets are still expected to experience faster growth than the advanced economies, \nbut remain vulnerable to contagion effects from a possible significant slowdown or recession \nin the advanced economies. In line with the current two-speed global economy, inflation trends \nare higher in the emerging economies, driven mainly by food and energy prices. \nOver the past two years, the extraordinarily low interest rate environment in the advanced \neconomies has resulted in significant capital flows to emerging markets, with consequences \nfor their exchange rates and asset prices. However, the pattern of flows has not been smooth. \nDuring bouts of global risk aversion, there has been a tendency for these flows to reverse to \nso-called safe havens. Risk aversion associated with recent events in the US and Europe has \nresulted in a high degree of volatility of flows to emerging markets, including South Africa. \nSince the beginning of the year, non-residents have been net sellers of equities to the value of \nR16,9 billion and net buyers of bonds to the value of R44,3 billion. However, since the beginning \nof September, non-residents were net sellers of both bonds and equities valued at R4,6 billion \nand R7,6 billion respectively. \nThese recent outflows, together with increased risk aversion, have contributed to the high \ndegree of volatility observed in the JSE All-share Index, in domestic bond yields and in the \nexchange rate of the rand. Since the previous meeting of the MPC, the rand has traded in a \nrange against the US dollar of between R6,68 and R8,33 per US dollar, and has depreciated \nby around 15,6 per cent against the dollar, by 11,0 per cent against the euro and by 12,7 per \ncent on a trade-weighted basis. Since the beginning of the year the rand has depreciated by \n18,6 per cent against the US dollar. \nThe depreciation of the rand poses a potential upside risk to the inflation outlook. However, the \ndegree of this risk will depend on the extent and persistence of the depreciation trend which, in \nturn, will be influenced by the duration and intensity of global risk aversion. The rand tends to be \nmore sensitive to changes in global risk perceptions than most of its emerging-market peers. At \nthis stage, the MPC still considers the upside risk to the inflation outlook from this source to be \nrelatively moderate, but rising.\nDomestic economic growth remains disappointing, with the negative output gap widening to \naround 3 per cent in the second quarter of 2011 and gross domestic product (GDP) growing by \n1,3 per cent, following the 4,5 per cent increase recorded in the first quarter. Both the primary \nand secondary sectors contracted in the second quarter, while real value added by the tertiary \nsector increased only marginally. Widespread industrial action, which continued into the third \nquarter, contributed to this subdued outcome, and is expected to weigh negatively on third-\nquarter prospects as well.\nRecent high-frequency indicators are also not very favourable. Mining production contracted \nat a year-on-year rate of 5,1 per cent in July, and by 4,3 per cent on a month-on-month basis. \nManufacturing output declined at a month-on-month and year-on-year rate of 6,0 per cent in \nJuly, confirming the sharp decline to 44,2 index points observed in the Kagiso/BER Purchasing \nManagers’ Index (PMI) in July. Despite a modest recovery in August to 46,7 index points, the \n45\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\nPMI remained below the neutral 50 level, pointing to a further possible contraction in the sector. \nThe construction sector also remains subdued with both the first First National Bank (FNB) \nBuilding Confidence Index and the FNB Civil Construction Index remaining at very low levels, \nwhile there was a further decline in the number of building plans passed in the third quarter. \nOverall business confidence, as reflected in the Rand Merchant Bank (RMB)/BER Business \nConfidence Index, has declined for two consecutive quarters, and at 39 index points is well \nbelow the neutral level of 50. The Bank has lowered its forecast for average growth in 2011 \nto 3,2 per cent, down from 3,7 per cent, while the forecast for 2012 has been reduced from \n3,9 per cent to 3,6 per cent. The forecast for 2013 remains unchanged at 4,4 per cent. The \nlower forecast is a result of the lower-than-expected outcome in the second quarter, as well as \na downward adjustment to the global growth assumption. The risks to this outlook are seen to \nbe on the downside.\nThe lower growth trajectory does not bode well for employment creation, which has been \nrelatively muted. According to Statistics South Africa, employment in the formal non-agricultural \nbusiness sector increased by 0,1 per cent or 5,701 people in this second quarter of 2011. \nThe outcome was, however, negatively affected by the decline in public-sector employment \nassociated with the termination of contracts of temporary employees hired for the municipal \nelections. \nConsistent with the moderation in domestic production, growth in real gross domestic \nexpenditure also declined, from an annualised growth rate of 7,9 per cent in the first quarter of \n2011, to 1,3 per cent in the second quarter. A positive development was the further acceleration \nin the growth of real gross fixed-capital formation, albeit off a low base, from an annualised rate \nof 2,7 per cent in the first quarter to 4,0 per cent in the second quarter. Nevertheless the ratio \nof gross fixed capital formation to GDP, at 18,9 per cent, is still well below the peak of 24,6 per \ncent measured in the fourth quarter of 2008.\nConsumption expenditure by households has been the main driver of growth to date. However, \nin the second quarter of 2011, growth in consumption expenditure moderated to an annualised \nrate of 3,8 per cent, compared with an increase of 5,2 per cent in the first quarter. Real retail \ntrade sales increased at a year-on-year rate of 2,8 per cent in July, but declined by 0,7 per cent \nin the three months to July compared with the previous three months. Growth in motor vehicle \nsales, while still positive, has also declined. Consumption patterns may have been distorted \nsomewhat by the high base effects arising from the 2010 FIFA World CupTM tournament and \na clearer picture should emerge in August. The RMB/BER Consumer Confidence Index has \ndeclined for two consecutive quarters, underlying the fragility of the outlook. \nConsumption expenditure is expected to remain constrained to some extent by low rates of \ncredit extension and continued debt deleveraging by households. The ratio of household debt \nto disposable income declined further to 75,9 per cent in the second quarter of 2011 from a \npeak of 82,0 per cent in the first two quarters of 2008. Twelve-month growth in total loans and \nadvances extended by banks to the private sector has fluctuated around 6 per cent in the three \nmonths to July. Mortgage advances, which is the largest category of credit, grew at a year-on-\nyear rate of 2,9 per cent, consistent with the slow pace of recovery in the domestic property \nmarket. The main driver of growth in credit extension was the category of other loans and \nadvances, in particular general loans which reflect primarily corporate-sector borrowing. This \ncategory grew by almost 15 per cent in the year to end of July. \nNominal wage settlements have continued to moderate somewhat and have been lower than \nmany of the highly publicised initial demands. Nevertheless, wage increases have been well \nabove the upper end of the inflation target range. \nThe main upside risks to the inflation forecast continue to emanate from administered prices \nand exogenous factors. Since the previous meeting of the MPC the price of Brent crude oil has \nfluctuated in a range of around US$104 and US$118 per barrel. The outlook for the oil price will \nbe determined in part by global growth developments, and in particular by the extent to which \nChina is affected by the slowdown. The recent depreciation of the South African rand against \nthe US dollar is likely to contribute to a further increase in the domestic petrol price in October. \nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\n46\nFood prices are also expected to maintain their upward momentum for some time. The major \nglobal food price indices have remained relatively stable but at elevated levels during the past few \nmonths. However, global wheat and maize prices have increased markedly, and have impacted \non the domestic prices of these commodities. These increases have been compounded by the \nweaker exchange rate of the rand. The price of white maize, for example, has increased by over \n70 per cent during the past year, but futures prices reflect some expected moderation in the \nmedium term.\nThe MPC remains of the view that the underlying inflation pressures are mainly of a cost–push \nnature, and at this stage there is no evidence of significant second-round effects from these \nincreases. Although the inflation trend remains on an upward trajectory, both headline and core \ninflation forecasts appear to be consistent with the continued attainment of the inflation target \nover time. Demand-side pressures remain subdued and are expected to be constrained in the \nshort to medium term. Inflation expectations also appear to be relatively well anchored.\nHowever, there have been some changes in the MPC’s assessment of the risks to the inflation \noutlook. The recent volatility in the rand exchange rate has imparted a degree of upside risk \nto the inflation forecast. Although the rand may not return to the elevated levels reached in the \nearlier part of 2011, the MPC considers some of the recent volatility to be of a short-term nature, \ninfluenced by the vagaries of global risk aversion. Downside risks are seen to come from the \nheightened risks to global growth and its consequences for the domestic economy. The overall \nrisks to the inflation outlook are assessed to be delicately balanced. The MPC will continue to \nassess the changing risk profile of the inflation outlook and monitor closely those factors that \ncould push inflation outside the target on a sustained basis.\nIn the light of the above the MPC has decided to keep the repurchase rate unchanged at \n5,5 per cent per annum, for the time being. The MPC is, however, concerned at the potential \nimpact of the current global turmoil on domestic economic prospects and stands ready to act \nappropriately should the need arise. \n47\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n10 November 2011\nIssued by Gill Marcus, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, at a meeting of the \nMonetary Policy Committee (MPC) in Pretoria\nSince the previous meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), there has been no \nmeaningful progress to resolving the sovereign debt crisis that is engulfing the euro area, with \nthe primary focus now on Italy and Greece. The interlinked nature of the debt crisis and concerns \nabout the banking sector in Europe, coupled with the inability of the advanced economies to \ngenerate sustained growth, continues to weigh negatively on the global economic outlook. \nThe heightened uncertainty has had implications for the pattern of global capital flows and \nexchange rates in emerging markets.\nThe domestic economic recovery remains hesitant. The relatively weak economy has ensured \nthat demand pressures on inflation are restrained at this stage. Nevertheless exogenous supply-\nside factors have resulted in a deterioration of the inflation outlook, with a more protracted \nbreach of the inflation target expected in 2012. \nThe year-on-year inflation rate as measured by the consumer price index (CPI) for all urban areas \nincreased to 5,7 per cent in September 2011, up from 5,3 per cent in August. The categories of \nfood, housing and utilities, and transport together accounted for 4,0 percentage points of the \nSeptember outcome. Food price inflation accelerated from 7,3 per cent in August to 8,7 per \ncent. Petrol and electricity prices increased by 26,2 per cent and 17,3 per cent respectively. \nAdministered price inflation, excluding petrol was unchanged at 8,8 per cent. CPI inflation \nexcluding food, petrol and electricity remained unchanged at 3,8 per cent in September.\nYear-on-year producer price inflation continued its strong upward trend, increasing by 10,5 per cent \nin September, from 9,6 per cent in August. These price developments were strongly influenced \nby global commodity price movements as well as by the depreciation of the rand exchange \nrate. Price increases in the categories of mining, electricity and products of petroleum and coal, \nas well as other manufacturers remained the major contributors to the producer price inflation \noutcome. Food prices also continued their higher trend, with agricultural prices increasing by \n10,7 per cent and manufactured food prices by 8,8 per cent in September.\nThe inflation forecast of the Bank has shown a modest increase since the previous meeting of \nthe MPC. Inflation is expected to breach the upper end of the target range in the final quarter of \n2011 and to peak in the first quarter of 2012 at around 6,3 per cent, before declining gradually \nand returning to within the target range in the final quarter of 2012. Inflation is expected to \nmeasure 5,2 per cent in the final quarter of 2013. The Bank’s forecast of core inflation, which \nexcludes food, petrol and electricity, continues to show a moderately rising trend, with the peak \nof around 5,2 per cent expected in the first quarter of 2013.\nMarket expectations of inflation, as reflected in the Reuters survey of financial analysts, show \nexpectations to be anchored around the upper level of the inflation target range over the medium \nterm. In the October survey inflation was expected to peak at an average of 6,1 per cent in the \nfirst quarter of 2012, and to measure 5,4 per cent by the second quarter of 2013. Break-even \ninflation rates have moderated against most maturities since the previous meeting.\nThe global growth outlook continues to be characterised by heightened uncertainty, with weak \ngrowth and declining consumer confidence in a number of the major advanced economies. \nThe protracted crisis in the euro area has now spread beyond the peripheral countries, despite \nrecent attempts to devise a credible and workable approach to contain the problem. The risks \ncreated by these developments are likely to exacerbate the low or negative growth expected in \nthe region, amid increased fiscal austerity, tightened bank lending standards and deleveraging, \nand tightening conditions in the European interbank markets. Weak growth is also forecast for \nthe United Kingdom and Japan.\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\n48\nOn the positive side, fears of a return to recession in the United States (US) have dissipated \nsomewhat with a higher-than-expected growth outcome in the third quarter, driven mainly by a \nrecovery in household consumption expenditure. Although employment increased in the past \nquarter, the unemployment rate is expected to remain at elevated levels for some time, along \nwith persistent weakness in the housing market. \nGrowth in many of the emerging markets has moderated during the year. Growth forecasts have \ngenerally been revised down, and are sensitive to developments in the advanced economies. \nChina has experienced a policy-induced slowdown, but fears of a possible hard landing have \nreceded somewhat. Significant growth reductions have been experienced in a number of Latin \nAmerican and emerging European countries.\nHeadline inflation appears to have peaked in many of the advanced economies, and is \nexpected to moderate in line with declining economic activity and the softer trend in commodity \nprices. Inflationary pressures remain at elevated levels in many of the major emerging-market \neconomies.\nThe exchange rate of the South African rand continues to be subject to changes in risk aversion \nin global financial markets. Since the previous meeting of the MPC, the rand has fluctuated \nbetween R7,70 and R8,50 to the US dollar, but has generally traded in a more narrow range \nof between R7,80 and R8,00. On a trade-weighted basis, the rand has depreciated by around \n18,6 per cent since the beginning of the year. Since the last meeting of the MPC the rand has \nappreciated by 1,0 per cent on a trade-weighted basis and by 1,4 per cent against the US \ndollar. Although the rand tends to be more volatile than most of its emerging-market peers, \nthe movements of the currency have been in line with other emerging-market and commodity-\nlinked currencies.\nThe exchange rate has also been influenced to some extent by volatile capital flows. Non-\nresidents have been persistent net sellers of South African equities for most of 2011, with \ncumulative net sales since the beginning of the year amounting to R16,6 billion. Between April \nand August, non-residents were net buyers of bonds to the value of R58,4 billion but as the \nEuropean crisis intensified, net sales of R17,0 billion were recorded in September. In October \nthis trend was reversed somewhat with non-resident net purchases of R9,8 billion. Year to date \nnet purchases of bonds and equities amount to R29,4 billion.\nThe uncertainty related to the exchange rate imparts an upside risk to the inflation outlook. \nHowever, unless the rand continues on a depreciating trend, the impact is likely to be relatively \nlimited and should dissipate in the short to medium term. While the rand is not expected to \nreturn to its previous elevated levels, consensus forecasts indicate an expectation of a moderate \nappreciation from the current levels in the course of 2012. This is largely dependent on global \ndevelopments.\nThe slower domestic economic growth in the second quarter of 2011 appears to have continued \nin the third quarter and the forecast of the Bank has been subject to downward revision. Real \nGDP growth in 2011 is now expected to average 3,0 per cent, compared with 3,2 per cent in the \nprevious forecast. The growth forecasts for 2012 and 2013 have been revised down to 3,2 per \ncent and 4,2 per cent from 3,6 per cent and 4,4 per cent respectively. The downward revision \nis a result of revised assumptions primarily of international commodity prices and global growth.\nThe composite leading business cycle indicators of the Bank continued the moderate downward \ntrend that began in February. It decreased for the second consecutive month in August, \ncorroborating the expected restrained economic conditions. \nThere has been some normalisation of manufacturing activity following widespread industrial \naction in July. The physical volume of manufacturing output increased at a year-on-year rate of \n7,7 per cent in September, following the revised 5,9 per cent increase in August. On a quarter-\non-quarter basis, a slight contraction of -0,1 per cent was measured in the third quarter. Despite \nthe recent recovery, the Kagiso/BER PMI remained marginally above the neutral 50 level in \nSeptember and October, in line with subdued global PMIs. \n49\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\nMining output has continued its overall downward trend, with the physical volume of mining \noutput declining by 5,1 per cent in September on a quarter-on-quarter basis and by 5,4 per cent \non a year-on-year basis. The construction sector remains under stress with the FNB/BER civil \nconstruction index declining further in the third quarter. \nDespite the disappointing growth outcomes, the Quarterly Labour Force Survey published by \nStatistics South Africa indicates that the number of people employed increased by 195 000 in \nthe third quarter of 2011. The prospects for further employment creation are uncertain, given the \nslowing growth of the domestic economy and the fragile global economic environment.\nGrowth in consumption expenditure by households is expected to have remained relatively \nsubdued following its moderation in the second quarter of 2011 to 3,8 per cent from 5,2 per \ncent in the previous quarter. When comparing the three months to August with the previous \nthree months, real retail trade sales increased by 0,7 per cent. The BER Retail Survey for the \nthird quarter of 2011 shows that business confidence among retailers, at a level of 48, remained \nbelow the neutral level of 50. These trends reflect, in part, concern about employment, slower \nwage and income growth, and declining levels of consumer confidence. Other factors expected \nto constrain consumption expenditure include high levels of household debt, constrained \naccess to credit and consistently above-average increases in a range of administered prices \nwhich reduce the amount available for household discretionary expenditure.\nGrowth in credit extension to the private sector remains lacklustre, reflecting both supply-and-\ndemand considerations. After reaching a recent high of 6,1 per cent in July, 12-month growth \nin banks’ total loans and advances extended to the private sector moderated to 5,3 per cent in \nSeptember. Twelve-month growth in mortgage advances declined to 1,9 per cent, consistent \nwith the subdued state of the domestic housing market. The main driver of credit extension \nwas the category of other loans and advances, in particular general loans, which grew at a rate \nover 12 months of 12,9 per cent, down from 17,9 per cent in August. General loans account \nfor 11 per cent of total loans and advances to households. The ratio of impaired advances as a \npercentage of gross loans and advances of banks has declined to 5,1 per cent in September \n2011, down from 5,9 per cent in September 2010, indicating some improvement in the balance \nsheets of the banks.\nAccording to the Medium Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS), fiscal policy is set to be more \nexpansionary than indicated in the main budget in February. Nevertheless the commitment to \nmedium-term deficit consolidation remains. For the current fiscal year, the deficit is expected \nto increase from 5,3 per cent of GDP to 5,5 per cent, compared with the 4,6 per cent deficit \nrecorded in 2010/11, and is expected to decline to 3,3 per cent of GDP by 2014/15. The wider \ndeficit for the current year is a result of a 0,7 per cent of GDP increase in expenditure, and lower \ntax revenues of 0,3 per cent of GDP which result from the slower economic growth. The primary \ndeficit is expected to decline from 2,9 per cent of GDP in the current year, to 0,5 per cent in \n2014/15. If maintained within the parameters as set out in the MTBPS, the fiscal consolidation \nand debt dynamics should be sustainable.\nFood prices continue to pose an upside risk to the inflation outlook, and a further acceleration \nof food inflation is expected in the near term. This follows the marked food and agricultural price \nincreases at the PPI level, and the depreciation of the exchange rate which has contributed to \nthe increase in maize prices in recent weeks. Global food prices have remained relatively stable \nover the past months, albeit at high levels, and could signal some relief going forward.\nInternational oil prices have remained relatively stable since the last meeting of the MPC and \nare expected to remain constrained by the weak growth outlook in the advanced economies. \nAt current prices, Brent crude oil is about US$10 per barrel lower than the peak prevailing \nearlier in 2011. At present there is a small over-recovery on the domestic petrol price and, if \nmaintained, could provide some relief to consumers following four consecutive months of price \nincreases which has resulted in domestic petrol prices being at their highest levels ever. Other \nadministered prices, particularly electricity, are expected to maintain upside pressure on the \ninflation rate. \nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\n50\nThe MPC remains of the view that the underlying inflation pressures are of a cost–push nature \nand that the subdued state of domestic demand and output will contribute to core inflation \nremaining contained, notwithstanding the continued pressures from some administered prices. \nHowever, the committee is concerned that the change in the profile of the inflation forecasts \nand the extended breach of the upper end of the inflation target range may impact adversely on \ninflation expectations. At this stage the breach of the upper limit is still expected to be relatively \nsmall and inflation is expected to return to within the target range by the end of 2012.\nThe committee assesses the risks to the inflation outlook to be on the upside mainly due to \ncost–push pressures. The exchange rate is also seen to pose some upside risk to the outlook, \nwhile downside risks are seen to come from possible contagion effects from the European crisis \nand associated slow growth. The committee is aware of the dangers of a disorderly resolution \nof the crisis and the systemic implications for the global and domestic economy, and remains \nready to act appropriately should the need arise. \nUnder the prevailing circumstances the MPC has decided to keep the repurchase rate \nunchanged at 5,5 per cent per annum.\n51\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\nAbbreviations\nAlsi\t\nAll-Share Index\nAPI\t\nadministered price index\nARIMA\t Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average\nBCI\t\nBusiness Confidence Index\nBER\t\nBureau for Economic Research [of Stellenbosch University]\nBoJ\t\nBank of Japan\nCBOE\t\nChicago Board Options Exchange\nCCI\t\nConsumer Confidence Index\nCDS\t\ncredit-default swap\nCPI\t\nconsumer price index for all urban areas\nECB\t\nEuropean Central Bank\nFNB\t\nFirst National Bank\nfob\t\t\nfree on board\nG7\t\t\nGroup of Seven\nGDP\t\ngross domestic product\nIEA\t\nInternational Energy Agency\nIMF\t\nInternational Monetary Fund\nJSE\t\nJSE Limited\nLIBOR\t\nLondon Interbank Offered Rate\nMENA\t\nMiddle East and North Africa\nMPC\t\nMonetary Policy Committee\nMPR\t\nMonetary Policy Review [of the South African Reserve Bank]\nMTBPS\t Medium Term Budget Policy Statement\nNAB\t\nnon-alcoholic beverage\nNEER\t\nnominal effective exchange rate\nOECD\t\nOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development\nOPEC\t\nOrganization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries\nPMI\t\nPurchasing Managers’ Index\nPPI\t\t\nproducer price index\nPSBR\t\npublic-sector borrowing requirement\t\nRMB\t\nRand Merchant Bank\nS&P\t\nStandard and Poor’s\nUK\t\t\nUnited Kingdom\nUS\t\t\nUnited States\nVIX®\t\nChicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index \nWEO\t\nWorld Economic Outlook\nGlossary\nthe Bank\t South African Reserve Bank\nthe Fed\t\nUnited States Federal Reserve\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011\n52\n53\nMonetary Policy Review November 2011", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/Monetary_Policy_Reports/MPR-November-2011.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "5de10dc6cd03fb22c6a1b93261d30e14", "text": "i \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFEBRUARY 2017 \n \n \n1 \n \nTable of Contents \n \nSELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS ............................................................................................... 2 \n INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICE DEVELOPMENTS ........................................................ 3 \nMERCHANDISE TRADE DEVELOPMENTS ....................................................................................... 3 \nSTOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS ................................................................................................... 7 \nMONETARY DEVELOPMENTS ............................................................................................................ 6 \nINFLATION OUTTURN ........................................................................................................................... 8 \nNATIONAL PAYMENTS SYSTEM ........................................................................................................ 9 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2 \n \n \n \n \n2017 \n \nJanuary \n2017 \n \nFebruary \nMonth-on- \nMonth \nChange \nMerchandise Exports (US$ millions) \n258.7 \n240.5 \n-7.0% \nMerchandise Imports (US$ millions) \n384.6 \n424.2 \n10.3% \nZ.S.E. Mining Index1 \n56.3 \n56.5 \n0.28 \nZ.S.E. Industrial Index1 \n140.2 \n135.3 \n-4.02 \nNational Payment System Transactions \n(US$ millions) \n6 211.6 \n6 429.5 \n3.5% \nMoney Supply (US$ millions)2 \n5 663.4 \n5 771.6 \n1.9% \n \nMoney Supply (M3) Annual Growth2 (%) \n19.8 \n21.5 \n \nYearly Inflation3 (%) \n-0.65 \n0.06 \n \nMonthly Inflation3 (%) \n0.23 \n0.61 \n \nNominal Lending Rate2 (% per annum) \n4.0-18.0 \n4.0-18.0 \n \nSources: \n1. Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) \n2. Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) \n3. Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZIMSTAT) \nSELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS \n \n \n \n3 \n \nINTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICE \nDEVELOPMENTS \n \nInternational \ncommodity \nprices \nof \ngold, \nplatinum, copper, nickel and crude oil registered \ngains in February 2017. This is a welcome \ndevelopment for mineral export dependent \ncountries, including Zimbabwe. \n \nPrecious Metals \nGold and platinum prices rose by 3.2% and \n3.5% in February 2017, to US$1,233.2/oz and \nUS$1,006.2/oz, \nrespectively. \nThe \nprice \nincreases were largely attributable to the \nweakening of the US dollar. \nFigure 1: Precious metals prices \nSource: Bloomberg, 2017 \n \nBase Metals \nPrices of base metals firmed during the month \nof February 2017, mainly driven by falling \ninventories and prospects of higher demand \nemanating from China. Furthermore, supply \nrisks from the world’s largest copper mine in \nChile, as well as nickel mines in Indonesia, \nsupported base metal prices during the month \nunder review. \nAs a result, monthly prices of copper and nickel \nsurged by 3.9% and 5.4% to close at \nUS$5,945.1/tonne \nand \nUS$10,517.8/tonne, \nrespectively. \nBrent Crude Oil \nDuring the month under review, crude oil prices \nincreased by 0.5%, to a monthly average of \nUS$55.9/barrel \nin \nFebruary \n2017 \nfrom \nUS$55.6/barrel recorded in the previous month. \nCrude oil prices firmed on the back of OPEC \nsupply curbs to reduce the global surplus. \n \nSource: Bloomberg, 2017\n \nMERCHANDISE TRADE \nDEVELOPMENTS \n \nTotal \nmerchandise \ntrade \nstood \nat \nUS$664.7 million, representing a 2.0% increase \n600.0\n700.0\n800.0\n900.0\n1000.0\n1100.0\n1200.0\n1300.0\n1400.0\nFeb-16\nMar-16\nApr-16\nMay-16\nJun-16\nJul-16\nAug-16\nSep-16\nOct-16\nNov-16\nDec-16\nJan-17\nFeb-17\nGold\nPlatinum\n 30\n 35\n 40\n 45\n 50\n 55\n 60\nJan-16\nFeb-16\nMar-16\nApr-16\nMay-16\nJun-16\nJul-16\nAug-16\nSep-16\nOct-16\nNov-16\nDec-16\nJan-17\nFeb-17\nUS$\\Barrel\nFigure 2: Brent crude oil prices \n \n \n \n4 \n \nfrom the US$643.3 million recorded in the \nprevious month. \n \nMerchandise export developments \nMerchandise \nexports \namounted \nto \nUS$240.5 million in February 2017, registering \na 7.0% decline from the US$258.7 million \nrealized in January 2017. The slowdown in \nmerchandise exports reflected the seasonality of \ntobacco, which is the country’s anchor export \ncommodity. \nFigure 4: Merchandise Exports (US$m) \nSource: Zimstat, 2017 \nIn terms of exports by commodity, flue-cured \ntobacco, gold, nickel and ferrochrome were the \ncountry’s major export earners, accounting for \nabout 89.73% of the total export revenues, \nduring the month under review. \n \n \n \n \nTable 1: Exports Classified by HS Code: \nProduct \nJanuary \n2017 (US$m) \nFebruary \n2017 (US$m) \nFebruary \n2017 Share \nof Total \n Flue-cured \n99.7 \n74.2 \n30.85 \n Gold \n56.7 \n57.0 \n23.70 \n Nickel ores & \nconcentrates \n29.3 \n27.0 \n11.23 \n Ferro-chrome \n26.1 \n27.6 \n11.48 \n Chromium \nores & \n8.6 \n6.2 \n2.58 \nUnwrought & \nplatinum \n7.5 \n4.1 \n1.70 \n Cane sugar \n3.9 \n4.9 \n2.04 \n Industrial \ndiamonds \n2.0 \n12.4 \n5.16 \n Other \n24.7 \n23.8 \n9.90 \n Total \n258.6 \n240.5 \n100.0 \nSource: Zimstat, 2017 & RBZ Calculations, 2017 \n \nMajor Merchandise Export Destinations \nThe country’s major merchandise export \ndestinations were South Africa, Mozambique, \nthe United Arab Emirates, Kenya and Zambia, \nduring the month under review. \nMerchandise exports to South Africa were \n77.1% of the country’s total merchandise \nexports; followed by Mozambique, 8.8%; \nUnited Arabs Emirates; 8.7% and Zambia, \n2.1%. \n230\n235\n240\n245\n250\n255\n260\nJan-17\nFeb-17\n \n \n \n5 \n \nSource: Zimstat, 2017 & RBZ Calculations, 2017 \nMerchandise Import Developments \nThe country’s monthly merchandise imports \nstood at US$424.2 million in February 2017, \n10.3% higher compared to the previous month. \nThe increase in imports during the month under \nreview was mainly driven by increases in fuel \nimports (diesel and petrol). Electricity and food \nimports, however, recorded declines during the \nmonth of February 2017. \nMajor Import Sources \nThe country’s imports were mainly sourced \nfrom South Africa, 40.4%; Singapore, 26.5%; \nChina, 7.6%; Zambia, 2.4% and Mozambique, \n2.3%, during the month under analysis. \n \nSource: Zimstat, 2017 & RBZ Calculations, 2017 \nMerchandise Trade Balance \nThe country’s external position worsened from \na deficit of US$126.0 million in January 2017 to \nUS$183.7 million in February 2017, on the back \nof a rebound in imports. Exports were also lower \nin February 2017, compared to the previous \nmonth. \n \nFigure 7: Merchandise Trade Balance \n(US$m) \n \n \nSource: Zimstat, 2017 & RBZ Computations, 2017 \nSouth \nAfrica \n77.1%\nMozambique \n8.8%\nUnited \nArab \nEmirates \n8.7%\nZambia\n2.1%\nKenya\n2.0%\nBotswana \n0.5%\nNamibia\n0.3%\nArgentina\n0.1%\nMalawi\n0.1%\nSwaziland\n0.1%\nOther \n0.2%Figure 5:Major Merchandise Export \nFigure 5:Major Merchandise Export Destinations\nDestinations\nSouth Africa\nSingapore\nChina\nZambia\nMozambique\nIndia\nUnited Kingdom\nItaly\nJapan\nUnited Arab Emirates\n0%\n10%\n20%\n30%\n40%\nFigure 6: Major Mechandise Import \nsources (% Share)\n-400.0\n-300.0\n-200.0\n-100.0\n0.0\n100.0\n200.0\n300.0\n400.0\n500.0\nFeb-16\nMar-16\nApr-16\nMay-16\nJun-16\nJul-16\nAug-16\nSep-16\nOct-16\nNov-16\nDec-16\nJan-17\nFeb-17\nExports\nImports\nTrade balance\n \n \n \n6 \n \nMONETARY DEVELOPMENTS \n \nMoney supply1 registered an annual growth of \n21.56% in February 2017 to $5 771.6 million, \nfrom $4 748.0 million in February 2016. The \ngrowth, was an increase of 1.8 percentage points \nfrom the annual growth of 19.80% recorded in \nJanuary 2017. On a month-on-month basis, \nbroad money increased by 1.91% from $5 663.4 \nmillion in January 2017. \nThe annual growth in money supply during the \nmonth under review, reflected increases in \ntransferable2 deposits, 28.97%; and negotiable \ncertificates of deposits (NCDs)3, 17.86%. Time \ndeposits4, however, declined by 0.02%. \n \n1 Broad money redefined using IMF’s Monetary and \nFinancial Statistics Manual of 2000. Major changes \ninclude the exclusion of Government deposits held by \nbanks from broad money. \n2 Transferable deposits made up of demand and savings \ndeposits. \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2017 \n \nDuring February 2017, transferable or transitory \ndeposits accounted for 70.1% of money supply; \ntime deposits, 26.9%; currency in circulation, \n2.0%; and negotiable certificates of deposits, \n1%. The dominance of transitory deposits, \ncoupled with limited access to external \nfinancing, continued to inhibit the lending \ncapacity of banks. \n \n3 NCDs are also referred to as securities included in \nbroad money. \n4All classes of time deposits, short and long term are \nclassified as time deposits, which are also termed other \ndeposits. \n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n 0.5\n 1.5\n 2.5\n 3.5\n 4.5\n 5.5\n 6.5\n%\nUS$ BILLIONS\nFigure 10: Money Supply\nFigure 10: Money Supply\nM3\nM3 Annual Growth rate\n \n \n \n7 \n \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2017 \n \nDomestic credit grew by 17.61%, on an annual \nbasis, from US$6 599.7 million in February \n2016 to US$7 761.8 million in February 2017. \nOn a month-on-month basis, domestic credit \nincreased by 1.55%, from US$7 643.3 million \nrecorded in January 2017. \n \nCredit to the private sector5, the dominant \ncomponent of domestic credit, recorded an \nannual decline of 4.36%, from US$3 524.6 \nmillion in February 2016 to US$3 370.9 million. \nThe decline was partly driven by cautionary \nlending by banks, during the period under \nanalysis. On a month- on- month basis, credit to \nthe private sector recorded a marginal decline of \n0.44%, from US$3 385.8 million in January \n2017. \n \n5 Credit to the private sector now excludes claims on \nother financial corporations, as well as claims on state \nand local government (local authorities) \nSTOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS \nDuring the month of February 2017, bearish \ninvestor sentiments persisted on the Zimbabwe \nStock Exchange (ZSE). Consequently, the \nmainstream index declined by 4.02% to close at \n135.31 points. The mining index, however, \nincreased by 0.28% to 56.47 points in the \nsame month. \n \n \nThe volume of trades, increased by 169.89%, \nfrom 31 616 982 shares in January 2017 to \n85 314 995 shares in February 2017. Over the \nsame period, the value of shares traded also \nincreased by 34.94% to US$11.54 million. \n \nTransferable \ndeposits\n70.11%\nTime Deposits\n26.90%\nNCDs\n1.03%\nCurrency outside Depository \nCorporations\n1.96%Figure 11: Composition of Money \nFigure 11: Composition of Money Supply February 2017\nSupply February 2017\n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\n140\n160\n28-Feb-16\n28-Mar-16\n28-Apr-16\n28-May-16\n28-Jun-16\n28-Jul-16\n28-Aug-16\n28-Sep-16\n28-Oct-16\n28-Nov-16\n28-Dec-16\n28-Jan-17\n28-Feb-17\nFigure 8: \nFigure 8: ZSE Indices\nIndustrial\nMining\nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2017 \n \n \n \n8 \n \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2017 \nDuring the month under review, the ZSE market \ncapitalisation declined by 3.42% to US$3.77 \nbillion. This was, in large part, on account of \ndecline in the industrial index. \n \nINFLATION OUTTURN \n \nAnnual Inflation \n \nAnnual headline inflation at 0.06% in February \n2017, was in positive territory for the first time \nsince October 2014. The inflation rate for \nFebruary 2017 gained by 0.71 percentage points \non the January 2017 rate of -0.65%, driven by \nincreases in both food and non-food inflation. \n \n \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2017 \nAnnual food inflation surged from -0.30% in \nJanuary 2017 to 1.28% in February 2017. The \nincrease in food inflation was largely on account \nof price increases in the bread and cereals sub-\ncategory. Other sub-categories that contributed \nto the positive food inflation rate in February \n2017 included fish and sea food; oils and fats \nand vegetables sub-categories, among others. \nThe increases were, however, partially offset by \ndeclines in fruits, and milk, cheese, and eggs. \nYear-on-year non-food inflation increased by \n0.31 percentage points to -0.50%, during the \nperiod under analysis. The increase was largely \non account of education inflation. Other sub-\ncategories \nthat \nrecorded \nincreases \nwere \nrecreation and culture, and restaurants and \nhotels. \n \nMonthly Inflation \n \n \nThe month-on-month inflation rate increased \nfrom 0.23% in January 2017, to 0.6% in \nFebruary 2017. The increase was driven by both \nfood and non-food inflation. \n0.00\n5.00\n10.00\n15.00\n20.00\n25.00\n30.00\n0.00\n50.00\n100.00\n150.00\n200.00\n250.00\n300.00\nFeb-16\nMar-16\nApr-16\nMay-16\nJun-16\nJul-16\nAug-16\nSep-16\nOct-16\nNov-16\nDec-16\nJan-17\nFeb-17\nVALUES TRADED (US$ MILLIONS)\nVOLUMES TRADED (MILLIONS)\nFigure 9: ZSE: Monthly Volumes \nFigure 9: ZSE: Monthly Volumes and Values Traded\nand Values Traded\nVolume\nTurnover\n-5\n-4\n-3\n-2\n-1\n0\n1\n2\nFigure 12: Annual Inflation \n(%)\nHeadline Inflation\nFood\nNon Food\n \n \n \n9 \n \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2017 \nMonthly food inflation rose by 0.8% in January \n2017 to 1.6% in February 2017, on account of \nincreases in all sub-categories, except oils and \nfats and confectionaries. \nMonthly non-food inflation increased from \n-0.03% in January 2017 to 0.17% in February \n2017. This was due to increases in furniture and \nmaintenance and transport. Partially offsetting \nthe increases were declines in recreation and \nculture, and restaurants and hotels. \nNATIONAL PAYMENTS SYSTEM \n \nThe value of transactions processed through the \nnational payments system increased by 3.5% to \nUS$6 429.5 million in February 2017, from \nUS$6 211.6 in January 2017. Transaction \nvolumes processed through the NPS, however, \ndeclined by 11%, from 43 905 251 in the \nprevious month to 39 227 571, during the month \nunder analysis. \n \n \nZimbabwe Electronic Transfer Settlement \nSystem (ZETSS) \n \nThe value of transactions processed through the \nRTGS system increased by 4.8% in February \n2017 \nto \nUS$4 \n247.91 \nmillion, \nfrom \nUS$4 052.79 million recorded in January 2017. \nTotal RTGS volumes, however, registered a \ndecrease of 7% to 326 329 during the same \nperiod. \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2017 \n \n \n \nCash transactions \nCash transactions stood at US$360.42 million in \nFebruary 2017, a 12.3% increase from the \nUS$321.02 million recorded in January 2017. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n-1.0\n-0.8\n-0.6\n-0.4\n-0.2\n0.0\n0.2Figure 13: M\nFigure 13: M-\n-O\nO-\n-M Inflation\nM Inflation\n -\n 1.0\n 2.0\n 3.0\n 4.0\n 5.0\n 6.0\n -\n 50\n 100\n 150\n 200\n 250\n 300\n 350\n 400\n 450\nVALUE IN US$ BILLIONS\nVOLUME IN THOUSANDS\nFigure 14: \nFigure 14: ZETSS Volumes and Values\nValues\nVolume\nValue\n \n \n \n10 \n \nMobile and Internet Based Transactions \n \nThe total value of mobile and internet based \ntransactions closed the month of February 2017 \nlower at US$796.4 million, compared to \nUS$814.5 million registered in January 2017. \n \nCard Based Transactions \n \nCard based transactions also declined to \nUS$385.7 million in February 2017, from \nUS$439.1 million in January 2017. \n \nCheque Transactions \nThe value of cheque transactions was 6.2% \nlower at US$7.02 million in the month under \nreview, from US$7.48 million in January 2017. \n \nRESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE \nMAY 2017\n \n \n11 \n \nStatistical Tables \n \nMonetary Statistics \n \n 1. Depository Corporations Survey \n \n \n \n13 \n \n 2. Central Bank Survey \n \n \n \n \n \n \n14 \n \n3. Other Depository Corporations Survey \n \n \n \n \n15 \n \nOther Depository Corporations \n \n4.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n17 \n 4.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n18 \n Commercial Banks \n 5.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n19 \n 5.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n20 \n Building Societies \n 6.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n21 \n 6.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n22 \nSectoral Analysis of Bank Loans and Advances and Deposits \n \n7.1 Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks Loans and Advances \n23 \n \n7.2 Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks Deposits \n \n \n24 \n Interest Rates \n \n8.1 Lending Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n21 \n \n8.2 Banks Deposit Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n22 \n \n Inflation \n \n9.1 Monthly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n23 \n \n9.2 Yearly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n24 \n External Statistics \n \n10. Total External Debt Outstanding by Debtor \n \n \n \n25 \n 11. Exchange Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n26 \n \n \n \n \n12 \n \n12. Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Statistics \n \n \n \n \n 27 \n \n National Payments System Statistics \n \n \n \n \n13.1 Values of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n 28 \n \n13.2 Volumes of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n 29 \n \n 14. Merchandise Trade Statistics \n \n \n \n \n \n 30 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n 13 \n \n \nFeb-16\nMar-16\nJun-16\nJul-16\nAug-16\nSep-16\nOct-16\nNov-16\nDec-16\nJan-17\nFeb-17\nNet Foreign Assets\n-620,871.50\n-565,520.55\n-502,899.96\n-393,113.03\n-371,494.66\n-365,714.85\n-564,842.79\n-636,688.80\n-555,620.67\n-584,011.92\n-574,374.12\nCentral Bank(net)\n-567,955.70\n-578,047.53\n-473,442.49\n-379,979.17\n-390,409.11\n-383,854.74\n-545,842.19\n-591,305.32\n-573,721.83\n-583,214.44\n-588,800.77\nForeign Assets\n392,622.61\n338,958.10\n393,393.91\n383,799.11\n354,937.59\n343,840.92\n416,996.33\n364,866.78\n410,827.76\n449,211.75\n445,565.06\nForeign Liabilities\n-960,578.31\n-917,005.63\n-866,836.39\n-763,778.28\n-745,346.70\n-727,695.66\n-962,838.52\n-956,172.09\n-984,549.60\n-1,032,426.19\n-1,034,365.82\nOther Depository Corporations(net)\n-52,915.80\n12,526.97\n-29,457.47\n-13,133.86\n18,914.44\n18,139.89\n-19,000.60\n-45,383.48\n18,101.16\n-797.49\n14,426.64\nForeign Assets\n288,402.18\n352,856.02\n278,419.49\n283,718.30\n309,754.41\n295,146.25\n278,185.36\n244,421.21\n297,836.79\n270,935.31\n290,763.66\nForeign Liabilities\n-341,317.98\n-340,329.05\n-307,876.96\n-296,852.16\n-290,839.97\n-277,006.36\n-297,185.96\n-289,804.69\n-279,735.63\n-271,732.80\n-276,337.02\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n5,368,900.71\n5,465,303.32\n5,617,915.82\n5,457,438.42\n5,552,228.17\n5,642,801.47\n5,877,742.21\n6,056,699.56\n6,193,901.69\n6,247,448.43\n6,346,016.00\nDomestic Claims\n6,599,655.83\n6,740,480.37\n6,989,689.04\n6,895,453.88\n6,978,485.30\n7,059,099.99\n7,180,307.48\n7,554,069.08\n7,669,496.22\n7,643,349.84\n7,761,845.88\nClaims on Central Government(net)\n2,774,826.89\n2,877,471.73\n3,192,583.42\n3,134,575.48\n3,227,067.12\n3,299,875.31\n3,381,436.05\n3,679,166.52\n3,747,719.59\n3,862,196.57\n4,003,963.78\nClaims on Central Government\n2,886,441.11\n2,986,445.17\n3,305,953.61\n3,267,213.20\n3,373,077.05\n3,445,300.69\n3,516,314.57\n3,824,753.66\n3,908,493.46\n3,940,983.14\n4,084,363.34\nCentral Bank\n1,632,513.24\n1,738,859.81\n1,865,005.08\n1,790,569.21\n1,929,962.12\n1,954,616.32\n1,970,042.75\n2,306,454.54\n2,337,460.53\n2,270,562.63\n2,355,433.48\nODCs\n1,253,927.87\n1,247,585.36\n1,440,948.54\n1,476,643.99\n1,443,114.93\n1,490,684.38\n1,546,271.82\n1,518,299.12\n1,571,032.92\n1,670,420.50\n1,728,929.86\nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n-111,614.22\n-108,973.44\n-113,370.19\n-132,637.72\n-146,009.93\n-145,425.39\n-134,878.53\n-145,587.14\n-160,773.86\n-78,786.57\n-80,399.57\nClaims on Other Sectors\n3,824,828.94\n3,863,008.64\n3,797,105.62\n3,760,878.40\n3,751,418.18\n3,759,224.68\n3,798,871.43\n3,874,902.55\n3,921,776.63\n3,781,153.27\n3,757,882.10\nOther Financial Corporations\n118,447.05\n118,711.31\n122,525.52\n134,294.30\n130,939.44\n132,282.45\n124,852.98\n128,782.67\n119,157.29\n117,123.94\n79,035.53\nState and Local Government\n45,013.90\n42,766.93\n40,448.43\n48,803.79\n47,676.40\n43,554.41\n41,728.47\n37,784.82\n34,237.41\n35,909.11\n35,006.53\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n136,718.63\n196,741.14\n222,439.82\n257,749.06\n257,736.50\n234,348.95\n248,965.26\n244,277.53\n240,007.21\n242,356.99\n272,898.12\nPrivate Sector\n3,524,649.36\n3,504,789.27\n3,411,691.85\n3,320,031.24\n3,315,065.84\n3,349,038.87\n3,383,324.72\n3,464,057.53\n3,528,374.72\n3,385,763.22\n3,370,941.92\nCentral Bank\n39,497.39\n24,802.03\n24,517.65\n29,223.55\n25,871.86\n28,360.51\n28,496.47\n28,190.50\n31,268.19\n30,379.07\n13,888.69\nODCs\n3,485,151.97\n3,479,987.23\n3,387,174.20\n3,290,807.69\n3,289,193.98\n3,320,678.35\n3,354,828.25\n3,435,867.03\n3,497,106.53\n3,355,384.15\n3,357,053.23\nOther Items(Net)\n1,230,755.13\n1,275,177.04\n1,371,773.23\n1,438,015.46\n1,426,257.14\n1,416,298.52\n1,302,565.27\n1,497,369.51\n1,475,594.53\n1,395,901.41\n1,415,829.87\nShares and Other Equity\n755,276.72\n745,817.59\n808,263.47\n832,720.12\n846,025.31\n887,795.24\n915,505.55\n935,291.08\n1,470,571.26\n1,471,378.30\n1,481,807.04\nLiabilities to Other Financial Corporations\n39,712.26\n40,593.10\n50,664.77\n49,419.92\n44,517.02\n39,463.26\n31,567.03\n32,045.66\n52,038.47\n44,373.98\n46,621.66\nRestricted Deposits\n138,312.36\n151,399.31\n151,173.32\n149,999.92\n149,845.80\n153,471.12\n166,495.73\n180,899.67\n60,499.79\n66,478.53\n66,737.97\nOther Items(net)\n297,453.79\n337,367.05\n361,671.67\n405,875.51\n385,869.01\n335,568.90\n188,996.96\n349,133.11\n-107,514.99\n-186,329.41\n-179,336.79\nBroad Money-M3\n4,748,029.21\n4,899,782.77\n5,115,015.85\n5,064,325.38\n5,180,733.50\n5,277,086.62\n5,312,899.41\n5,420,010.76\n5,638,281.02\n5,663,436.51\n5,771,641.88\nSecurities Other than Shares Included in Broad Mo\n50,340.06\n55,583.77\n80,952.14\n71,791.03\n80,840.29\n74,118.29\n73,356.67\n43,862.17\n62,894.35\n50,562.02\n59,329.24\nBroad Money-M2\n4,697,689.14\n4,844,199.00\n5,034,063.72\n4,992,534.36\n5,099,893.22\n5,202,968.33\n5,239,542.75\n5,376,148.60\n5,575,386.66\n5,612,874.49\n5,712,312.64\nOther Deposits\n1,552,889.34\n1,592,367.82\n1,569,208.72\n1,517,709.33\n1,553,347.70\n1,534,910.45\n1,508,943.19\n1,467,582.00\n1,471,657.19\n1,544,945.66\n1,552,644.56\nNarrow Money-M1\n3,144,799.80\n3,251,831.18\n3,464,854.99\n3,474,825.02\n3,546,545.52\n3,668,057.88\n3,730,599.56\n3,908,566.59\n4,103,729.48\n4,067,928.83\n4,159,668.08\nTransferable Deposits\n3,137,342.53\n3,244,219.06\n3,456,750.65\n3,466,614.21\n3,537,772.31\n3,658,634.63\n3,720,917.62\n3,889,717.47\n4,033,558.66\n3,985,443.09\n4,046,287.46\nCurrency Outside Depository Corporations\n7,457.27\n7,612.11\n8,104.35\n8,210.82\n8,773.21\n9,423.25\n9,681.93\n18,849.12\n70,170.81\n82,485.74\n113,380.62\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbawe\nNote:\n(i) Depository corporations survey - formerly Monetary Survey.\n(ii) Broad money redefined using IMF's Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual of 2000. Major changes include exclusion of Government deposits held by banks from broad money.\n(iii) Transferable deposits made up of demand and savings deposits.\n(iv) NCDs are also referred to as securities included in broad money.\n(v) All classes of time deposits, short and long term are classified as time deposits, which are also termed other deposits.\n(vi) Credit to the private sector now excludes claims on other financial corporations, as well as claims on state and local government (local authorities)\n(vii) Depository corporations made up of the Central Bank and other depository corporations\n(viii) Other depository corporations (ODCs) - Commercial banks, merchant banks, building societies and POSB.\nTABLE 1: DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS SURVEY (US$ '000)\n \n \n \n14 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFeb-16\nMar-16\nJun-16\nJul-16\nAug-16\nSep-16\nOct-16\nNov-16\nDec-16 \nJan-17\nFeb-17\nY\nO\nNet Foreign Assets\n-567,955.70\n-578,047.53\n-473,442.49\n-379,979.17\n-390,409.11\n-383,854.74\n-545,842.19\n-591,305.32\n-573,721.83\n-583,214.44\n-588,800.77\nClaims on Non Residents\n392,622.61\n338,958.10\n393,393.91\n383,799.11\n354,937.59\n343,840.92\n416,996.33\n364,866.78\n410,827.76\n449,211.75\n445,565.06\nOfficial Reserves Assets\n296,171.93\n239,511.43\n293,946.47\n285,543.05\n255,805.98\n244,677.43\n316,461.39\n266,511.75\n309,331.78\n350,427.48\n346,696.05\nOther Foreign Assets\n96,450.69\n99,446.67\n99,447.43\n98,256.06\n99,131.61\n99,163.49\n100,534.95\n98,355.02\n101,495.99\n98,784.27\n98,869.01\nLess Liabilities to Non Residents\n960,578.31\n917,005.63\n866,836.39\n763,778.28\n745,346.70\n727,695.66\n962,838.52\n956,172.09\n984,549.60\n1,032,426.19\n1,034,365.82\nShort Term Liabilities\n546,352.47\n502,331.05\n450,321.22\n349,757.38\n351,510.63\n331,152.07\n482,116.69\n481,842.04\n515,365.90\n558,302.10\n560,678.78\nOther Foreign Liabilities\n414,225.84\n414,674.58\n416,515.17\n414,020.90\n393,836.06\n396,543.59\n480,721.84\n474,330.06\n469,183.69\n474,124.08\n473,687.04\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n1,292,163.17\n1,373,237.64\n1,483,098.69\n1,431,538.49\n1,528,966.57\n1,582,075.13\n1,651,349.30\n1,910,944.27\n2,046,457.01\n2,082,987.44\n2,193,388.18\nDomestic Claims\n1,663,508.92\n1,772,064.33\n1,937,013.69\n1,909,144.81\n2,028,462.52\n2,036,657.48\n2,070,285.42\n2,396,766.46\n2,420,011.99\n2,449,800.81\n2,551,097.25\nNet Claims on Central Government\n1,541,291.07\n1,646,828.49\n1,777,241.09\n1,708,832.27\n1,830,889.20\n1,852,931.02\n1,878,215.64\n2,207,020.45\n2,218,852.08\n2,244,839.79\n2,330,293.56\nClaims on Central Government\n1,632,513.24\n1,738,859.81\n1,865,005.08\n1,790,569.21\n1,929,962.12\n1,954,616.32\n1,970,042.75\n2,306,454.54\n2,337,460.53\n2,270,562.63\n2,355,433.48\nOf which: Securities Other than Shares\n253,708.51\n289,991.30\n283,077.80\n279,010.40\n283,933.50\n260,822.30\n259,945.20\n250,270.16\n566,328.08\n577,431.69\n562,535.65\nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n91,222.17\n92,031.32\n87,763.98\n81,736.94\n99,072.93\n101,685.30\n91,827.11\n99,434.09\n118,608.45\n25,722.84\n25,139.92\nOf which: Deposits\n91,222.17\n92,031.32\n87,763.98\n81,736.94\n99,072.93\n101,685.30\n91,827.11\n99,434.09\n118,608.45\n25,722.84\n25,139.92\nClaims on Other Sectors\n122,217.86\n125,235.84\n159,772.59\n200,312.54\n197,573.32\n183,726.46\n192,069.78\n189,746.01\n201,159.91\n204,961.02\n220,803.69\nOther Financial Corporations\n12,278.71\n12,706.89\n11,717.92\n14,072.39\n14,485.45\n14,842.27\n18,107.69\n18,890.01\n16,515.86\n16,900.44\n18,434.72\nState and Local Government\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n70,441.76\n87,726.92\n123,537.02\n157,016.59\n157,216.02\n140,523.67\n145,465.62\n142,665.50\n153,375.86\n157,681.51\n188,480.28\nPrivate Sector\n39,497.39\n24,802.03\n24,517.65\n29,223.55\n25,871.86\n28,360.51\n28,496.47\n28,190.50\n31,268.19\n30,379.07\n13,888.69\nClaims on Other Depository Corporations\n270,047.83\n259,206.18\n223,418.95\n224,948.10\n203,523.49\n199,637.85\n145,431.17\n164,922.74\n140,331.70\n112,720.51\n115,953.17\nOther Liabilities to ODCs\n260,915.19\n263,048.23\n273,601.27\n276,345.66\n277,697.37\n277,611.11\n278,881.87\n280,278.62\n268,568.70\n269,925.53\n255,446.41\nOther Items(Net)\n380,478.39\n394,984.64\n403,732.68\n426,208.76\n425,322.07\n376,609.09\n285,485.42\n370,466.32\n245,317.99\n209,608.36\n218,215.84\nMonetary Base Incl. foreign currency clearing balances\nMonetary Base \n724,207.474\n795,190.112\n1,009,656.202\n1,051,559.320\n1,138,557.468\n1,198,220.393\n1,105,507.110\n1,319,638.956\n1,472,735.173\n1,499,773.004\n1,604,587.411\nBond Notes and Coins in Circulation\n8,895.597\n9,138.275\n9,719.251\n9,831.185\n10,353.400\n11,050.358\n11,102.753\n23,414.148\n86,733.884\n102,691.796\n132,681.828\nLiabilities to ODCs\n713,682.298\n784,713.349\n996,320.429\n1,032,687.846\n1,123,924.446\n1,183,078.547\n1,093,687.178\n1,292,654.095\n1,385,011.220\n1,395,502.072\n1,467,941.594\nReserve Deposits\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\nOther\n713,682.298\n784,713.349\n996,320.429\n1,032,687.846\n1,123,924.446\n1,183,078.547\n1,093,687.178\n1,292,654.095\n1,385,011.220\n1,395,502.072\n1,467,941.594\nPrivate Deposits\n1,629.579\n1,338.488\n3,616.522\n9,040.289\n4,279.622\n4,091.489\n717.178\n3,570.712\n990.069\n1,579.135\n3,963.989\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbawe\nTABLE 2: CENTRAL BANK SURVEY (US$'000)\n \n \n \n15 \n \n \n \nFeb-16\nMar-16\nJun-16\nJul-16\nAug-16\nSep-16\nOct-16\nNov-16\nDec-16\nJan-17\nFeb-17\nNet Foreign Assets\n-52,915.80\n12,526.97\n-29,457.47\n-13,133.86\n18,914.44\n18,139.89\n-19,000.60\n-45,383.48\n18,101.16\n-797.49\n14,426.64\nClaims on Non Residents\n288,402.18\n352,856.02\n278,419.49\n283,718.30\n309,754.41\n295,146.25\n278,185.36\n244,421.21\n297,836.79\n270,935.31\n290,763.66\nOf Which: Foreign Currency\n160,351.42\n178,995.76\n124,614.66\n111,032.19\n148,463.11\n96,321.10\n88,598.31\n76,252.73\n107,687.14\n110,979.79\n96,836.03\nDeposits\n127,840.17\n173,601.40\n153,552.10\n172,433.28\n161,037.37\n198,569.69\n189,337.46\n167,926.29\n189,886.91\n159,688.03\n193,663.57\nOther\n210.59\n258.86\n252.73\n252.83\n253.93\n255.46\n249.59\n242.19\n262.74\n267.49\n264.07\nLess Liabilities to Non Residents\n341,317.98\n340,329.05\n307,876.96\n296,852.16\n290,839.97\n277,006.36\n297,185.96\n289,804.69\n279,735.63\n271,732.80\n276,337.02\nOf Which: Deposits\n147,453.51\n150,887.08\n152,069.73\n150,944.72\n146,501.12\n142,949.55\n146,422.62\n136,426.63\n142,073.73\n137,945.79\n135,779.65\nLoans\n193,864.47\n189,441.97\n155,807.23\n145,907.44\n144,338.85\n134,056.82\n150,763.34\n153,378.06\n137,661.90\n133,787.01\n140,557.37\nOther\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n4,791,858.16\n \n4,878,305.20\n \n5,132,752.46\n \n5,060,208.14\n \n5,148,766.23\n \n5,245,432.00\n \n5,321,500.90\n \n5,442,974.41\n \n5,549,018.98\n \n5,580,169.12\n \n5,639,870.63\n \nDomestic Claims\n4,936,146.91\n \n4,968,416.04\n \n5,052,675.36\n \n4,986,309.07\n \n4,950,022.79\n \n5,022,442.51\n \n5,110,022.06\n \n5,157,302.61\n \n5,249,484.24\n \n5,193,549.03\n \n5,210,748.62\n \nNet Claims on Central Government\n1,233,535.82\n \n1,230,643.24\n \n1,415,342.33\n \n1,425,743.21\n \n1,396,177.93\n \n1,446,944.29\n \n1,503,220.41\n \n1,472,146.07\n \n1,528,867.51\n \n1,617,356.78\n \n1,673,670.22\n \nClaims on Central Government\n1,253,927.8725\n \n1,247,585.3619\n \n1,440,948.5355\n \n1,476,643.9874\n \n1,443,114.9290\n \n1,490,684.3763\n \n1,546,271.8214\n \n1,518,299.1187\n \n1,571,032.9250\n \n1,670,420.5050\n \n1,728,929.8577\n \nSecurities\n1,228,947.3345\n \n1,225,003.3297\n \n1,412,869.1273\n \n1,450,083.5207\n \n1,420,220.1988\n \n1,463,404.5297\n \n1,517,535.6764\n \n1,500,671.4257\n \n1,553,239.1020\n \n1,654,534.6290\n \n1,713,961.3077\n \nLoans\n24,980.5379\n \n22,582.0322\n \n28,079.4082\n \n26,560.4666\n \n22,894.7303\n \n27,279.8466\n \n28,736.1450\n \n17,627.6930\n \n17,793.8230\n \n15,885.8760\n \n14,968.5500\n \nOther \n(0.00)\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n(0.00)\n \n-\n \n(0.00)\n \n0.00\n \n(0.00)\n \n0.00\n \nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n(20,392.0485)\n \n(16,942.1215)\n \n(25,606.2057)\n \n(50,900.7775)\n \n(46,937.0009)\n \n(43,740.0913)\n \n(43,051.4118)\n \n(46,153.0502)\n \n(42,165.4109)\n \n(53,063.7244)\n \n-55259.64163\nClaims on Other Sectors\n3,702,611.09\n \n3,737,772.80\n \n3,637,333.03\n \n3,560,565.86\n \n3,553,844.86\n \n3,575,498.22\n \n3,606,801.65\n \n3,685,156.54\n \n3,720,616.72\n \n3,576,192.25\n \n3,537,078.41\n \nOther Financial Corporations\n106,168.34\n \n106,004.42\n \n110,807.60\n \n120,221.91\n \n116,453.99\n \n117,440.18\n \n106,745.29\n \n109,892.67\n \n102,641.44\n \n100,223.50\n \n60,600.81\n \nState and Local Government\n45,013.90\n \n42,766.93\n \n40,448.43\n \n48,803.79\n \n47,676.40\n \n43,554.41\n \n41,728.47\n \n37,784.82\n \n34,237.41\n \n35,909.11\n \n35,006.53\n \nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n66,276.87\n \n109,014.22\n \n98,902.80\n \n100,732.47\n \n100,520.49\n \n93,825.28\n \n103,499.64\n \n101,612.03\n \n86,631.35\n \n84,675.48\n \n84,417.84\n \nPrivate Sector\n3,485,151.97\n \n3,479,987.23\n \n3,387,174.20\n \n3,290,807.69\n \n3,289,193.98\n \n3,320,678.35\n \n3,354,828.25\n \n3,435,867.03\n \n3,497,106.53\n \n3,355,384.1548\n \n3,357,053.2344\n \nClaims on the Central Bank\n764,905.319\n \n810,741.643\n \n1,017,467.818\n \n1,055,340.530\n \n1,178,684.455\n \n1,209,909.110\n \n1,156,606.119\n \n1,323,120.314\n \n1,435,556.219\n \n1,475,197.651\n \n1,507,778.322\n \nBond Notes and Coins\n1,438.325\n \n1,526.163\n \n1,614.904\n \n1,620.368\n \n1,580.191\n \n1,627.106\n \n1,420.818\n \n4,565.027\n \n16,563.071\n \n20,206.055\n \n19,301.209\n \nReserves\n763,466.993\n \n809,215.480\n \n1,015,852.915\n \n1,053,720.162\n \n1,177,104.264\n \n1,208,282.003\n \n1,155,185.301\n \n1,318,555.287\n \n1,418,993.147\n \n1,454,991.597\n \n1,488,477.113\n \nLiabilities to the Central Bank\n0\n1.832\n0.691\n2.585\n0.242\n0.723\n0.106\n0.219\n1750.127\n0.244\n1.8\nOther Items(Net)\n909,194.07\n \n900,850.66\n \n937,390.03\n \n981,438.87\n \n979,940.77\n \n986,918.90\n \n945,127.17\n \n1,037,448.30\n \n1,134,271.35\n \n1,088,577.32\n \n1,078,654.52\n \nShares and Other Equity\n1,114,980.01\n \n1,103,911.46\n \n1,160,998.70\n \n1,174,877.57\n \n1,188,635.39\n \n1,194,352.25\n \n1,211,644.10\n \n1,228,902.77\n \n1,271,826.05\n \n1,272,987.21\n \n1,279,285.69\n \nLiabilities to other financial corporations\n36,444.23\n \n37,325.07\n \n47,396.74\n \n46,151.88\n \n41,248.99\n \n36,195.23\n \n28,299.00\n \n28,777.63\n \n48,770.44\n \n41,105.95\n \n43,353.63\n \nOther Items(Net)\n(242,230.16)\n \n(240,385.87)\n \n(271,005.41)\n \n(239,590.58)\n \n(249,943.61)\n \n(243,628.59)\n \n(294,815.93)\n \n(220,232.10)\n \n(186,325.14)\n \n(225,515.85)\n \n(243,984.80)\n \nDeposits and Securities Included in Broad Money\n4,738,942.36\n \n4,890,832.17\n \n5,103,294.98\n \n5,047,074.28\n \n5,167,680.67\n \n5,263,571.88\n \n5,302,500.30\n \n5,397,590.93\n \n5,567,120.14\n \n5,579,371.63\n \n5,654,297.27\n \nDeposits Included in Broad Money\n4,688,602.29\n \n4,835,248.40\n \n5,022,342.85\n \n4,975,283.25\n \n5,086,840.39\n \n5,189,453.59\n \n5,229,143.63\n \n5,353,728.76\n \n5,504,225.78\n \n5,528,809.61\n \n5,594,968.03\n \nTransferable Deposits\n3,135,712.95\n \n3,242,880.58\n \n3,453,134.13\n \n3,457,573.92\n \n3,533,492.69\n \n3,654,543.14\n \n3,720,200.45\n \n3,886,146.76\n \n4,032,568.59\n \n3,983,863.96\n \n4,042,323.47\n \nOther Deposits\n1,552,889.34\n \n1,592,367.82\n \n1,569,208.72\n \n1,517,709.33\n \n1,553,347.70\n \n1,534,910.45\n \n1,508,943.19\n \n1,467,582.00\n \n1,471,657.19\n \n1,544,945.66\n \n1,552,644.56\n \nMoney Market Instruments\n50,340.06\n \n55,583.77\n \n80,952.14\n \n71,791.03\n \n80,840.29\n \n74,118.29\n \n73,356.67\n \n43,862.17\n \n62,894.35\n \n50,562.02\n \n59,329.24\n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbawe\nTABLE 3: OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS SURVEY ( US '000)\n \n \n \n16 \n \n \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nForeign\nBond\nNotes\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \n Notes &\n&\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment1\nLocal Governemt\nPublic Enterprises\nOther2\nGovernment\nLocal \nPublic \nOther \nOther cliams\nContigent \nOther Assets\nNon Financial \nCoins\nCoin\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\nGovernment\nEnterprises\n Institutional Units3\nAssets\nAssets\n2016\nJan\n1.22\n \n193.28\n734.58\n294.53\n116.1\n25.0\n1,147.0\n28.8\n5.2\n19.1\n28.5\n15.6\n63.6\n3,547.4\n110.2\n582.8\n412.8\n545.1\n7,870.8\nFeb\n1.44\n \n160.35\n763.47\n287.06\n102.8\n25.0\n1,228.9\n29.2\n5.2\n19.0\n25.0\n15.8\n61.1\n3,472.0\n100.5\n477.1\n427.3\n547.6\n7,748.9\nMar\n1.53\n \n179.00\n809.22\n286.42\n148.6\n25.0\n1,225.0\n28.5\n5.1\n16.4\n22.6\n14.2\n103.9\n3,510.6\n59.3\n471.0\n428.0\n552.9\n7,887.2\nApr\n1.55\n \n146.02\n818.74\n323.00\n111.8\n25.0\n1,322.7\n27.6\n5.1\n15.8\n25.1\n15.0\n102.4\n3,453.7\n66.7\n413.7\n445.5\n552.2\n7,871.5\nMay\n1.53\n \n100.12\n973.06\n281.55\n91.0\n25.0\n1,354.1\n26.8\n5.0\n16.6\n12.3\n14.7\n101.1\n3,433.4\n61.0\n397.0\n440.2\n564.1\n7,898.5\nJun\n1.61\n \n124.61\n1,015.85\n287.98\n128.5\n25.0\n1,412.9\n25.9\n0.0\n16.4\n28.1\n14.6\n98.9\n3,414.9\n66.9\n407.7\n431.5\n578.8\n8,080.1\nJul\n1.62\n \n111.03\n1,053.72\n242.57\n147.4\n25.0\n1,450.1\n33.4\n0.0\n16.2\n26.6\n15.4\n100.7\n3,320.9\n74.2\n393.1\n416.7\n592.4\n8,021.1\nAug\n1.58\n \n148.46\n1,177.10\n235.02\n136.0\n25.0\n1,420.2\n32.3\n0.0\n11.3\n22.9\n15.4\n100.5\n3,326.8\n67.8\n390.2\n445.0\n598.3\n8,153.9\nSep\n1.63\n \n96.32\n1,208.28\n310.75\n173.6\n25.0\n1,463.4\n29.0\n5.4\n3.2\n27.3\n14.5\n88.4\n3,349.0\n86.1\n382.3\n448.6\n606.6\n8,319.5\nOct\n1.42\n \n88.60\n1,155.19\n322.05\n162.3\n27.0\n1,517.5\n26.3\n15.4\n3.9\n28.7\n15.5\n88.1\n3,389.7\n68.2\n397.2\n427.7\n609.0\n8,343.8\nNov\n4.57\n \n76.25\n1,318.56\n318.52\n140.9\n27.0\n1,500.7\n22.3\n15.5\n4.6\n17.6\n15.4\n86.1\n3,469.5\n71.9\n350.5\n419.0\n618.2\n8,477.2\nDec\n16.56\n \n107.69\n1,418.99\n378.23\n162.9\n27.0\n1,553.2\n21.0\n15.3\n4.9\n17.8\n13.2\n71.3\n3,265.0\n330.1\n376.7\n408.8\n626.0\n8,814.8\n2017\nJan\n20.21\n \n110.98\n1,454.99\n239.82\n132.7\n27.0\n1,654.5\n20.8\n15.4\n3.6\n15.9\n15.1\n69.2\n3,394.7\n57.5\n395.7\n383.4\n630.4\n8,642.1\nFeb\n19.30\n \n96.84\n1,488.48\n251.83\n145.1\n48.6\n1,714.0\n20.1\n15.5\n3.2\n15.0\n14.9\n68.9\n3,177.9\n236.83\n398.51\n399.99\n631.1\n8,746.0\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2017\nNotes\n1.Government securities includes treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households, other financial corporations, \nTABLE 4.1: - OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS -ASSETS\nUS$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \n \n17 \n \nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nCapital\nContigent\nOther\nTotal\nand\nLiablities\nLiablities\nEnd of\nDemand\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nReserves\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\n2016\n Jan\n2,487.3\n650.3\n1,536.5\n4,674.2\n388.1\n26.4\n5,088.7\n44.9\n356.5\n0.0\n125.0\n86.0\n1,189.0\n582.8\n397.8\n7,870.76\n \n Feb\n2,466.2\n669.7\n1,552.9\n4,688.8\n375.0\n20.4\n5,084.1\n50.3\n341.1\n0.0\n171.7\n36.4\n1,196.7\n477.1\n391.3\n7,748.89\n \n Mar\n2,566.3\n676.8\n1,592.4\n4,835.5\n371.0\n16.9\n5,223.5\n55.6\n340.1\n0.0\n181.1\n37.3\n1,185.3\n471.0\n393.5\n7,887.24\n \n Apr\n2,629.9\n695.1\n1,568.6\n4,893.7\n332.4\n18.5\n5,244.6\n80.1\n322.6\n0.0\n194.0\n36.9\n1,188.4\n413.7\n391.2\n7,871.55\n \n May\n2,698.3\n690.6\n1,559.5\n4,948.4\n309.8\n19.5\n5,277.7\n71.6\n336.1\n0.0\n143.5\n36.8\n1,238.7\n397.0\n397.2\n7,898.54\n \n June\n2,792.4\n660.9\n1,569.2\n5,022.5\n401.4\n25.6\n5,449.5\n81.0\n307.7\n0.0\n159.4\n47.4\n1,243.5\n407.7\n384.0\n8,080.12\n \n July\n2,734.8\n722.9\n1,517.7\n4,975.5\n435.1\n50.9\n5,461.5\n71.8\n296.6\n0.0\n129.6\n46.2\n1,256.6\n393.1\n365.6\n8,021.06\n \n Aug\n2,894.5\n639.2\n1,553.3\n5,087.1\n412.3\n46.9\n5,546.3\n80.8\n290.6\n0.0\n127.6\n41.2\n1,271.0\n390.2\n406.1\n8,153.92\n \n Sep\n2,974.8\n679.9\n1,534.9\n5,189.6\n479.7\n43.7\n5,713.0\n74.1\n276.8\n0.0\n151.7\n36.2\n1,276.8\n382.3\n408.4\n8,319.46\n \n Oct\n3,115.2\n605.1\n1,508.9\n5,229.3\n433.8\n43.1\n5,706.1\n73.4\n297.0\n0.0\n162.4\n28.3\n1,293.5\n397.2\n385.9\n8,343.79\n \n Nov\n3,245.5\n640.8\n1,467.6\n5,353.9\n471.9\n46.2\n5,872.0\n43.9\n289.7\n0.0\n142.2\n28.8\n1,313.4\n350.5\n436.9\n8,477.19\n \n Dec\n3,329.8\n702.9\n1,471.7\n5,504.4\n510.9\n42.2\n6,057.4\n62.9\n279.6\n1.8\n191.5\n48.8\n1,384.1\n376.7\n412.1\n8,814.81\n \n2017\n Jan\n3,263.8\n720.5\n1,544.9\n5,529.3\n429.8\n53.1\n6,012.2\n50.6\n271.2\n0.0\n104.5\n41.1\n1,360.2\n395.7\n406.6\n8,642.14\n \n Feb\n3,325.9\n722.0\n1,552.6\n5,600.5\n426.0\n55.3\n6,081.7\n59.3\n270.8\n0.0\n126.1\n43.4\n1,365.8\n398.5\n400.4\n8,746.02\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2017\nTABLE 4.2 : OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS - LIABILITIES \nDeposits\nAmounts Owing to\nUS$millions\n \n \n \n18 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nForeign\nBond\nNotes\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \nLocal\nPublic\nOther \nContigent \nNon Financial \n Notes &\n&\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment1\nLocal Governemt\nPublic Enterprises\nOther2\nGovernment\nGovernment\nEnterprises\n Institutional Units3\nOther claims\nAssets\nOther Assets\nAssets\nCoins\nCoin\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\n2016\nJan\n1.0\n \n172.0\n \n667.5\n \n119.2\n \n105.6\n25.0\n1,039.4\n0.0\n5.2\n19.1\n28.5\n15.6\n62.6\n2,703.9\n61.5\n582.8\n278.8\n396.6\n6,284.4\nFeb\n1.2\n \n140.7\n \n702.2\n \n96.3\n \n93.1\n25.0\n1,128.1\n0.0\n5.2\n19.0\n25.0\n15.8\n60.1\n2,615.0\n62.1\n477.1\n292.8\n399.3\n6,158.2\nMar\n1.3\n \n161.9\n \n734.5\n \n96.3\n \n131.7\n25.0\n1,143.3\n0.0\n5.1\n16.4\n22.6\n14.2\n102.9\n2,618.9\n62.6\n471.0\n298.0\n405.1\n6,311.1\nApr\n1.3\n \n135.5\n \n778.2\n \n135.5\n \n108.3\n25.0\n1,200.9\n0.0\n5.1\n15.8\n25.1\n15.0\n101.5\n2,573.6\n69.6\n413.7\n309.7\n404.7\n6,318.6\nMay\n1.4\n \n89.6\n \n891.4\n \n130.5\n \n85.3\n25.0\n1,229.5\n0.0\n5.0\n16.6\n12.3\n14.7\n100.1\n2,534.2\n64.0\n397.0\n302.2\n413.8\n6,312.8\nJun\n1.4\n \n108.5\n \n934.4\n \n84.6\n \n123.2\n25.0\n1,279.0\n0.0\n0.0\n16.4\n28.1\n14.6\n97.9\n2,523.7\n64.1\n407.7\n299.0\n431.6\n6,439.3\nJul\n1.5\n \n101.7\n \n977.6\n \n79.5\n \n141.3\n25.0\n1,316.9\n0.0\n0.0\n16.2\n26.6\n15.4\n99.7\n2,414.7\n65.7\n393.1\n284.0\n440.7\n6,399.6\nAug\n1.4\n \n140.2\n \n1,074.5\n \n97.5\n \n131.9\n25.0\n1,297.4\n0.0\n0.0\n11.3\n22.9\n15.4\n99.5\n2,414.8\n67.3\n390.2\n313.6\n447.3\n6,550.2\nSep\n1.4\n \n91.6\n \n1,122.7\n \n143.9\n \n169.6\n25.0\n1,331.9\n0.0\n5.4\n3.2\n27.3\n14.5\n87.3\n2,451.9\n71.4\n382.3\n317.3\n455.9\n6,702.6\nOct\n1.3\n \n81.0\n \n1,090.4\n \n130.2\n \n155.1\n27.0\n1,376.2\n0.0\n15.4\n3.9\n28.7\n15.5\n87.1\n2,472.1\n66.0\n397.2\n293.2\n458.2\n6,698.6\nNov\n4.2\n \n69.4\n \n1,242.1\n \n103.2\n \n136.3\n27.0\n1,349.8\n0.0\n15.5\n4.6\n17.6\n15.4\n85.2\n2,511.0\n68.5\n350.5\n285.6\n466.2\n6,752.2\nDec\n14.1\n \n99.0\n \n1,306.9\n \n134.4\n \n156.7\n27.0\n1,416.0\n0.0\n15.3\n4.9\n17.8\n13.2\n70.4\n2,380.1\n273.8\n376.7\n274.2\n473.4\n7,053.8\n2017\nJan\n17.7\n \n103.8\n \n1,322.4\n \n81.9\n \n128.2\n27.0\n1,485.0\n0.0\n15.4\n3.6\n15.9\n15.1\n68.6\n2,467.7\n53.9\n395.7\n251.9\n479.3\n6,933.1\nFeb\n16.3\n \n89.4\n \n1,396.1\n \n96.1\n \n137.3\n48.6\n1,502.5\n0.0\n15.5\n3.2\n15.0\n14.9\n68.2\n2,238.9\n239.7\n398.5\n266.0\n480.1\n7,026.4\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2017\nNotes\n1.Government securities includes treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households, other financial corporations, \nTABLE 5.1: - COMMERCIAL BANKS -ASSETS\nUS$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \n \n19 \n \nUS$ millions\nEnd of\nDemand\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nCapital\nContigent\nOther\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\nand\nLiablities\nLiablities\nTotal\nReserves\n2016\n Jan\n2,428.8\n278.8\n967.1\n3,674.8\n340.4\n24.7\n4,039.9\n33.6\n313.2\n0.0\n50.3\n85.3\n871.3\n582.8\n308.0\n6,284.4\n Feb\n2,407.9\n290.0\n984.9\n3,682.7\n337.3\n18.8\n4,038.7\n38.4\n298.9\n0.0\n91.0\n35.0\n878.1\n477.1\n301.0\n6,158.2\n Mar\n2,508.0\n288.3\n1,026.9\n3,823.1\n345.4\n15.4\n4,183.9\n43.2\n303.1\n0.0\n100.2\n36.1\n886.6\n471.0\n287.1\n6,311.1\n Apr\n2,571.6\n297.5\n1,014.8\n3,883.8\n306.8\n16.9\n4,207.6\n67.7\n285.7\n0.0\n119.4\n36.1\n893.9\n413.7\n294.4\n6,318.6\n May\n2,639.9\n280.6\n1,042.8\n3,963.4\n275.1\n17.9\n4,256.4\n57.9\n300.0\n0.0\n66.3\n36.1\n908.9\n397.0\n290.1\n6,312.8\n June\n2,734.1\n268.2\n1,019.8\n4,022.1\n331.6\n24.0\n4,377.6\n67.9\n272.3\n0.0\n77.8\n44.3\n915.7\n407.7\n276.0\n6,439.3\n July\n2,676.5\n334.1\n987.4\n3,997.9\n361.0\n33.8\n4,392.8\n58.2\n261.0\n0.0\n56.9\n45.8\n922.1\n393.1\n269.8\n6,399.6\n Aug\n2,836.2\n285.6\n1,009.5\n4,131.3\n341.3\n29.3\n4,501.9\n67.0\n257.0\n0.0\n51.1\n40.9\n932.3\n390.2\n309.8\n6,550.2\n Sep\n2,915.9\n334.9\n987.8\n4,238.6\n393.9\n25.8\n4,658.3\n62.9\n246.3\n0.0\n69.3\n35.9\n944.5\n382.3\n303.2\n6,702.6\n Oct\n3,056.4\n267.0\n940.9\n4,264.3\n344.5\n25.0\n4,633.9\n60.0\n267.7\n0.0\n74.5\n27.9\n954.5\n397.2\n283.0\n6,698.6\n Nov\n3,186.7\n254.5\n896.9\n4,338.1\n382.5\n28.0\n4,748.6\n29.3\n260.0\n0.0\n51.4\n28.2\n966.9\n350.5\n317.3\n6,752.2\n Dec\n3,271.3\n285.7\n896.0\n4,453.0\n418.3\n19.6\n4,890.9\n47.1\n250.7\n1.8\n111.6\n48.2\n1,032.7\n376.7\n294.0\n7,053.8\n2017\n Jan\n3,205.0\n317.1\n981.8\n4,503.9\n348.3\n30.4\n4,882.6\n36.9\n242.1\n0.0\n38.0\n40.4\n1,005.1\n395.7\n292.2\n6,933.1\n Feb\n3,267.0\n318.3\n977.1\n4,562.4\n349.8\n32.6\n4,944.9\n47.5\n243.9\n0.0\n63.7\n42.9\n1,007.7\n398.5\n277.4\n7,026.4\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2017\nTABLE 5.2 : COMMERCIAL BANKS - LIABILITIES\nDeposits\nAmounts Owing to\n \n \n \n20 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nForeign\nOther Assets\nNon Financial \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nNotes\nAssets\nBond\n&\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \n Notes &\nCoin\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment1\nLocal Governemt\nPublic Enterprises\nOther2\nMortgages\nGovernment\nOther\nCoins\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\n2016\nJan\n0.13\n \n17.39\n52.89\n174.89\n10.0\n0.0\n76.6\n28.8\n0.0\n0.0\n332.8\n0.0\n424.2\n107.9\n119.7\n1,345.3\nFeb\n0.20\n \n18.23\n51.29\n188.70\n9.2\n0.0\n65.6\n29.2\n0.0\n0.0\n330.2\n0.0\n428.9\n110.4\n119.6\n1,351.6\nMar\n0.19\n \n15.08\n63.72\n189.76\n16.6\n0.0\n50.8\n28.5\n0.0\n0.0\n345.4\n0.0\n407.7\n105.9\n119.4\n1,343.1\nApr\n0.19\n \n9.46\n24.44\n186.02\n3.4\n0.0\n90.9\n27.6\n0.0\n0.0\n332.5\n0.0\n406.6\n111.4\n119.2\n1,311.8\nMay\n0.14\n \n7.35\n65.79\n148.67\n5.5\n0.0\n93.3\n26.8\n0.0\n0.0\n339.8\n0.0\n421.5\n114.2\n122.3\n1,345.3\nJun\n0.18\n \n12.92\n66.94\n200.92\n5.2\n0.0\n103.7\n25.9\n0.0\n0.0\n353.3\n0.0\n402.0\n107.4\n119.3\n1,397.7\nJul\n0.16\n \n8.30\n63.25\n162.33\n5.7\n0.0\n101.6\n33.4\n0.0\n0.0\n346.8\n0.0\n426.1\n107.3\n123.8\n1,378.9\nAug\n0.20\n \n7.54\n84.78\n136.50\n4.1\n0.0\n95.1\n32.3\n0.0\n0.0\n353.4\n0.0\n416.6\n105.8\n123.4\n1,359.7\nSep\n0.21\n \n4.16\n67.01\n165.80\n3.8\n0.0\n95.5\n29.0\n0.0\n0.0\n354.4\n0.0\n417.1\n105.4\n123.3\n1,365.6\nOct\n0.12\n \n7.23\n52.19\n191.21\n6.8\n0.0\n100.9\n26.3\n0.0\n0.0\n356.9\n0.0\n427.0\n108.8\n123.4\n1,400.9\nNov\n0.14\n \n6.44\n54.76\n214.60\n3.9\n0.0\n114.9\n22.3\n0.0\n0.0\n381.2\n0.0\n444.9\n108.8\n124.7\n1,476.7\nDec\n1.72\n \n8.05\n89.65\n243.77\n5.1\n0.0\n91.3\n21.0\n0.0\n0.0\n379.8\n0.0\n430.2\n110.0\n124.4\n1,505.1\n2017\nJan\n2.35\n \n7.02\n109.63\n157.70\n4.3\n0.0\n123.7\n20.8\n0.0\n0.0\n389.1\n0.0\n406.1\n106.3\n124.4\n1,451.4\nFeb\n1.19\n \n7.29\n69.26\n155.60\n7.4\n0.0\n162.0\n20.1\n0.0\n0.0\n394.4\n0.0\n410.1\n109.0\n124.2\n1,460.4\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2017\nNotes\n1.Government securities includes treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households, other financial corporations, \nTABLE 6.1: BUILDING SOCIETIES -ASSETS\nUS$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \n \n21 \n \n \n \n \n \n22 \n \nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nCapital\nOther\nTotal\nand\nLiablities\nEnd of\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nReserves\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\n2016\n Jan\n297.8\n534.3\n832.14\n47.2\n0.1\n879.4\n22.6\n43.3\n0.0\n74.7\n0.0\n292.9\n32.3\n1345.27\n Feb\n305.9\n533.4\n839.34\n37.2\n0.1\n876.6\n23.2\n42.3\n0.0\n80.7\n0.9\n296.3\n31.5\n1351.56\n Mar\n314.1\n531.2\n845.28\n25.1\n0.0\n870.4\n23.6\n37.0\n0.0\n80.9\n0.8\n284.3\n46.0\n1343.06\n Apr\n317.6\n520.8\n838.41\n25.1\n0.0\n863.5\n23.7\n36.9\n0.0\n74.6\n0.5\n278.8\n33.9\n1311.79\n May\n330.8\n480.5\n811.31\n34.1\n0.0\n845.5\n25.0\n36.2\n0.0\n77.2\n0.5\n315.5\n45.5\n1345.27\n June\n313.1\n511.6\n824.71\n69.2\n0.0\n893.9\n24.4\n35.4\n0.0\n81.5\n3.1\n313.1\n46.3\n1397.68\n July\n313.4\n490.8\n804.18\n74.0\n15.5\n893.7\n24.8\n35.7\n0.0\n72.7\n0.4\n318.2\n33.4\n1378.87\n Aug\n278.7\n503.6\n782.31\n71.0\n16.1\n869.4\n25.1\n33.6\n0.0\n76.5\n0.4\n321.5\n33.3\n1359.67\n Sep\n270.8\n507.3\n778.11\n85.7\n16.4\n880.2\n22.5\n30.5\n0.0\n82.4\n0.3\n314.1\n35.5\n1365.62\n Oct\n267.3\n525.9\n793.19\n89.2\n16.4\n898.9\n24.6\n29.4\n0.0\n87.8\n0.4\n319.7\n40.1\n1400.87\n Nov\n311.8\n529.0\n840.82\n89.4\n16.5\n946.7\n25.8\n29.6\n0.0\n90.8\n0.6\n326.4\n56.8\n1476.66\n Dec\n339.5\n532.9\n872.41\n92.6\n16.6\n981.6\n27.0\n28.8\n0.0\n79.9\n0.5\n330.3\n56.9\n1505.10\n2017\n Jan\n326.2\n522.1\n848.23\n81.5\n16.6\n946.4\n25.0\n29.1\n0.0\n66.5\n0.7\n332.1\n51.7\n1451.40\n Feb\n326.1\n534.4\n860.48\n76.2\n16.6\n953.3\n23.1\n27.0\n0.0\n62.4\n0.5\n334.5\n59.7\n1460.43\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2017\nAmounts Owing to\nTABLE 6.2: BUILDING SOCIETIES -LIABILITIES\nUS$ millions\n \n \n \n23 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAGRICULTURE\nCONSTRUCTION COMMUNICATION\nDISTRIBUTION\nFINANCIAL &\nFINANCIAL\nMANUFACTURING\nMINING\nSERVICES\nTRANSPORT\nINDIVIDUALS CONGLOMERATES\nTOTAL\nEND OF\n \n \n \nINVESTMENTS\nORGANISATIONS\n \n \n \n \n2016\nJan\n577,684.4\n35,033.6\n35,535.9\n379,618.2\n13,329.2\n68,325.8\n476,677.0\n158,150.5\n410,992.6\n40,295.6\n535,379.3\n380.2\n2,731,402.2\nFeb\n539,562.8\n35,885.1\n37,857.4\n374,835.1\n13,285.9\n63,301.8\n473,970.3\n155,889.4\n415,520.6\n40,862.5\n531,789.5\n365.3\n2,683,125.7\nMar\n586,349.7\n39,180.5\n41,037.5\n371,809.6\n13,397.9\n63,061.4\n444,769.1\n156,209.2\n402,900.5\n44,606.7\n588,882.7\n410.7\n2,752,615.5\nApr\n527,545.8\n46,612.5\n40,624.2\n379,572.0\n13,428.1\n69,469.7\n437,795.4\n142,682.1\n421,335.6\n43,921.4\n645,037.3\n9,410.0\n2,777,434.0\nMay\n522,239.8\n40,194.4\n38,496.8\n358,042.5\n13,280.8\n65,381.2\n439,295.5\n145,180.0\n401,304.1\n41,908.5\n651,719.3\n9,579.0\n2,726,621.9\nJun\n510,016.8\n39,316.9\n36,866.1\n361,138.1\n12,764.5\n68,850.3\n433,145.3\n143,595.6\n476,484.5\n42,179.6\n650,071.4\n9,739.2\n2,784,168.3\nJul\n501,744.6\n43,266.6\n12,746.6\n287,960.5\n11,403.0\n64,344.7\n423,354.4\n141,639.6\n489,050.6\n40,059.9\n652,366.8\n9,804.6\n2,677,741.9\nAug\n498,489.6\n43,265.5\n26,005.4\n295,108.0\n11,957.4\n69,959.8\n423,824.7\n139,556.7\n458,763.3\n44,237.3\n636,726.8\n10,497.1\n2,658,391.5\nSep\n487,504.2\n42,900.7\n20,644.2\n338,165.8\n11,960.4\n154,582.0\n409,891.0\n142,259.6\n400,059.8\n40,609.7\n636,000.8\n11,273.3\n2,695,851.5\nOct\n513,303.7\n44,348.8\n23,814.1\n333,709.5\n11,968.6\n70,984.3\n418,465.3\n152,571.6\n456,867.4\n45,511.4\n637,546.1\n11,122.2\n2,720,213.0\nNov\n526,709.8\n42,580.2\n22,481.4\n338,556.1\n11,358.7\n72,491.9\n413,849.2\n152,092.3\n464,279.4\n42,762.1\n641,080.5\n10,545.5\n2,738,787.0\nDec\n436,452.3\n41,297.5\n19,541.4\n311,503.1\n11,668.9\n327,576.0\n377,945.5\n134,516.0\n415,801.6\n36,867.2\n613,022.6\n10,287.7\n2,736,479.6\n2017\nJan\n448,344.7\n41,732.8\n22,069.3\n264,734.2\n12,019.3\n270,117.2\n350,757.1\n144,447.3\n394,945.0\n40,975.0\n591,245.7\n11,489.3\n2,592,877.1\nFeb\n436,206.2\n40,112.3\n24,467.5\n269,358.3\n12,146.8\n272,314.8\n361,416.8\n143,990.4\n373,445.1\n40,250.7\n568,686.3\n11,227.9\n2,553,623.0\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2017\n/1 Including the only merchant bank still in operation.\nTABLE 7.1 : SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS LOANS AND ADVANCES/1\nUS$ thousands\n \n \n \n24 \n \nEND OF\nAGRICULTURE CONSTRUCTION COMMUNICATIONS\nDISTRIBUTION\nFINANCIAL &\nFINANCIAL\nMANUFACTURING\nMINING\nSERVICES\nTRANSPORT\nINDIVIDUALS\nCONGLOMERATES\nTOTAL\nINVESTMENTS ORGANISATIONS\n2016\nJan\n231,827.3\n101,724.1\n93,544.2\n517,089.2\n325,203.1\n977,272.1\n345,812.2\n62,026.3\n1,083,702.7\n61,755.6\n618,080.1\n58,808.7\n4,476,845.6\nFeb\n226,568.3\n105,747.9\n97,684.4\n525,070.9\n339,839.0\n896,869.2\n326,026.0\n59,381.3\n1,047,904.6\n63,248.3\n634,478.3\n63,017.8\n4,385,835.9\nMar\n243,546.9\n102,238.4\n116,471.1\n582,943.5\n362,058.8\n879,340.8\n368,689.6\n60,514.0\n402,900.5\n62,839.4\n642,779.4\n61,037.6\n4,556,027.1\nApr\n243,151.6\n102,234.0\n112,219.5\n569,660.7\n360,299.5\n907,855.6\n335,068.6\n71,721.0\n1,156,122.6\n63,858.0\n628,901.1\n61,087.0\n4,612,179.4\nMay\n236,180.5\n97,008.6\n120,726.3\n593,284.9\n371,034.5\n923,580.9\n356,500.9\n99,176.4\n1,107,956.8\n61,396.5\n607,501.4\n64,066.3\n4,638,413.9\nJun\n218,386.8\n103,914.2\n134,181.8\n596,904.8\n362,400.2\n973,333.3\n316,490.8\n58,856.9\n1,128,688.7\n72,063.3\n601,813.8\n61,833.2\n4,628,867.8\nJul\n207,280.2\n99,727.9\n138,781.2\n616,359.8\n348,779.7\n1,035,697.0\n370,456.9\n63,986.1\n1,114,413.7\n65,391.9\n622,329.2\n69,058.9\n4,752,262.6\nAug\n233,004.5\n97,248.8\n153,590.8\n578,487.3\n365,366.8\n997,123.0\n356,522.0\n64,413.7\n1,227,979.0\n67,005.8\n621,307.8\n73,076.2\n4,835,125.8\nSep\n236,724.3\n101,117.1\n155,483.5\n597,290.0\n346,375.9\n1,046,195.2\n366,312.8\n57,885.0\n1,365,673.5\n73,805.9\n595,219.8\n70,669.7\n5,012,752.7\nOct\n239,373.9\n107,235.7\n160,641.2\n593,362.2\n344,681.9\n988,274.7\n363,815.8\n63,998.0\n1,384,083.2\n76,834.0\n593,827.7\n73,608.8\n4,989,737.2\nNov\n318,652.7\n107,089.5\n189,581.3\n501,506.5\n329,147.3\n992,135.7\n411,467.8\n150,691.6\n1,337,295.6\n79,405.2\n591,639.0\n71,016.3\n5,079,628.6\nDec\n258,814.9\n110,009.2\n202,260.4\n590,595.6\n348,457.0\n1,020,795.0\n382,615.8\n81,542.7\n1,466,867.2\n82,186.5\n592,932.5\n76,874.9\n5,213,951.8\n2017\nJan\n236,437.3\n108,552.5\n230,965.4\n618,213.5\n339,580.3\n1,002,775.4\n382,746.3\n86,115.0\n1,393,941.2\n82,670.8\n589,549.9\n85,602.3\n5,157,150.0\nFeb\n254,463.9\n112,294.4\n226,877.9\n613,080.1\n312,948.5\n997,181.2\n393,542.8\n121,798.7\n1,402,647.6\n91,521.7\n604,325.0\n84,653.3\n5,215,335.3\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2017\n TABLE 7.2: SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS DEPOSITS \nUS$ thousands\n \n \n25 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nEnd Period\nNominal Lending Rates 1\nIndividuals \nCorporate\n2016 \nJan\n6.00-22.00\n12.08 \n7.38 \nFeb\n4.00-22.00\n11.48 \n7.29 \nMar\n4.00-22.00\n11.44 \n7.16 \nApr\n4.00-22.00\n11.50 \n7.20 \nMay\n4.00-18.00\n11.43 \n7.35 \nJun\n4.00-18.00\n11.40 \n7.48 \nJul\n4.00-18.00\n10.69 \n6.79 \nAug\n4.00-18.00\n10.67 \n6.84 \nSep\n4.00-18.00\n10.66 \n6.95 \nOct\n4.00-18.00\n10.70 \n6.93 \nNov\n4.00-18.00\n10.69 \n6.99 \nDec\n4.00-18.00\n10.59 \n6.87 \n2017 \nJan\n4.00-18.00\n10.61 \n6.68 \nFeb\n4.00-18.00\n10.06 \n6.52 \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2017\nNotes\nTABLE 8.1: LENDING RATES (percent per annum)\n1. Nominal Lending Rates depict the range of rates quoted by banks.\nCommercial Banks\nWeighted Average Lending Rates\n \n \n \n26 \n \n \nEND OF\nSAVINGS\n3 MONTHS\n2016 \nJan\n0.50-8.00\n0.75-17.00\nFeb\n0.50-8.00\n0.75-17.00\nMar\n0.50-8.00\n0.75-17.00\nApr\n0.50-8.00\n0.75-17.00\nMay\n0.50-8.00\n0.75-17.00\nJun\n0.50-6.00\n0.75-17.00\nJul\n0.50-6.00\n0.75-17.00\nAug\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-17.00\nSep\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-17.00\nOct\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-17.00\nNov\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-17.00\nDec\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-17.00\n2017 \nJan\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-17.00\nFeb\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-17.00\n Source:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2017\n* The range of rates qouted by banks during the period.\nTABLE 8.2 : BANKS DEPOSIT RATES (percent per annum)*\nCOMMERCIAL BANKS\n \n \n 27 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFOOD \nINFLATION\nALL\nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES \nCLOTHING\nHOUSING, \nWATER,\nFURNITURE\nHEALTH\nTRANSPORT COMMUNICATION\nRECREATION \n&\nEDUCATION\nRESTAURANTS \n&\nMISC.\nTOTAL NON\nFOOD & \nITEMS\n& TOBACCO\nFOOTWEAR\nELECTRICTY, \nGAS\nAND\nCULTURE\nHOTELS\nGOODS &\nFOOD\nNON \nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES\n& OTHER\nEQUIPMENT\nSERVICES\nFUELS\nWEIGHTS\n4.38\n6.05\n17.74\n9.91\n2.16\n9.76\n3.41\n2.1\n5.67\n1.38\n3.91\n66.47\n33.53\n100\n2016 \nJan\n0.05\n-0.02\n-0.04\n-0.30\n-0.15\n-0.37\n0.00\n-0.18\n0.00\n-0.16\n-0.29\n-0.13\n0.13\n-0.05\nFeb\n-0.14\n0.00\n-0.12\n-0.19\n-0.17\n-0.37\n-0.13\n-0.01\n0.00\n-0.17\n0.06\n-0.14\n-0.03\n-0.10\nMar\n-0.15\n-0.17\n-1.03\n-0.73\n-0.13\n-0.30\n0.42\n-0.04\n3.36\n-0.62\n-0.60\n-0.11\n-0.13\n-0.12\nApr\n0.03\n-0.14\n-0.02\n-0.32\n0.00\n0.07\n-0.08\n-0.02\n-0.01\n-0.09\n-0.35\n-0.08\n-0.51\n-0.21\nMay\n-0.29\n-0.22\n0.12\n-0.11\n-0.18\n-0.11\n-1.61\n0.06\n0.00\n0.02\n-0.33\n-0.12\n-0.49\n-0.24\nJun\n0.07\n-0.21\n0.58\n0.03\n0.15\n-0.08\n-0.01\n-0.23\n2.65\n0.31\n0.09\n0.44\n-0.35\n0.19\nJul\n0.01\n-0.15\n0.04\n0.05\n-0.15\n-0.03\n-0.36\n0.09\n0.00\n0.04\n-0.30\n-0.03\n-0.52\n-0.19\nAug\n-0.06\n-0.22\n0.00\n-0.03\n-0.02\n-0.13\n-0.02\n-0.10\n0.00\n0.01\n0.13\n-0.04\n-0.31\n-0.13\nSep\n0.10\n-0.03\n-1.11\n-0.27\n-0.03\n-0.08\n-0.09\n-0.26\n0.00\n0.01\n0.10\n-0.34\n-0.06\n-0.26\nOct\n-0.05\n-0.24\n-0.13\n0.06\n-0.03\n-0.06\n0.00\n-0.01\n0.00\n-0.06\n0.17\n-0.05\n0.40\n0.09\nNov\n0.06\n-0.09\n0.00\n0.10\n-0.07\n0.33\n0.00\n0.18\n-2.46\n-0.01\n0.14\n-0.22\n0.54\n0.02\nDec\n-0.06\n0.09\n-0.59\n0.46\n0.09\n-0.27\n0.00\n0.29\n0.00\n0.16\n0.34\n-0.09\n0.38\n0.06\n2017 \nJan\n0.00\n-0.15\n0.10\n0.34\n-0.15\n-0.75\n0.44\n0.27\n0.00\n0.29\n0.08\n-0.03\n0.80\n0.23\nFeb\n-0.09\n-0.14\n0.13\n0.70\n-0.03\n0.11\n0.00\n-0.04\n0.00\n0.18\n0.52\n0.17\n1.56\n0.61\nSource:Zimstat, 2017\nNON-FOOD INFLATION\nTABLE 9.1 : MONTHLY INFLATION -- PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX\n( DECEMBER 2012 = 100)\n \n \n \n28 \n \n \n \nF OOD \nIN F LA TION\nA LC OHOLIC \nC LOTHIN G\nHOUS IN G, \nWA TER ,\nF UR N ITUR E\nM IS C .\nF OOD & \nB EVER A GES \n& \nELEC TR IC T\nY, GA S\nA N D\nR EC R EA TION \n&\nR ES TA UR A N TS \n&\nGOOD S &\nTOTA L N ON\nN ON \nA LC OHOLIC \nA LL\n& TOB A C C O\nF OOTWEA R\n& OTHER\nEQUIP M EN T\nC ULTUR E\nHOTELS\nS ER VIC ES\nF OOD\nB EVER A GES\nITEM S\nF UELS\n2016\nJan\n-0.79\n-2.41\n-4.40\n-3.27\n0.37\n-2.66\n-0.93\n-1.09\n11.17\n0.75\n-1.01\n-1.34\n-3.96\n-2.19\nFeb\n-1.16\n-2.06\n-4.43\n-3.35\n0.22\n-2.62\n-0.97\n0.21\n11.17\n0.96\n-1.17\n-1.35\n-4.04\n-2.22\nMar\n-1.43\n-1.97\n-5.36\n-4.04\n0.14\n-2.92\n-0.55\n-1.00\n14.91\n0.21\n-1.86\n-1.43\n-4.13\n-2.31\nApr\n-1.40\n-1.40\n-2.11\n-3.91\n0.19\n-2.71\n-0.50\n-0.95\n14.21\n-0.28\n-2.17\n-0.51\n-4.02\n-1.64\nMay\n-1.52\n-1.21\n-2.17\n-3.77\n-0.10\n-2.57\n-2.09\n-0.78\n14.21\n-0.18\n-2.07\n-0.53\n-4.13\n-1.69\nJun\n-1.80\n-1.36\n-1.58\n-3.67\n0.21\n-2.71\n-2.10\n-0.92\n17.24\n0.20\n-2.09\n-0.09\n-4.04\n-1.37\nJul\n-1.71\n-1.56\n-0.98\n-2.83\n-0.09\n-2.66\n-2.43\n-0.69\n9.09\n0.27\n-2.42\n-0.59\n-3.76\n-1.60\nAug\n-1.50\n-1.77\n-1.01\n-2.73\n-0.07\n-2.50\n-2.39\n-0.54\n9.09\n0.42\n-2.21\n-0.54\n-3.34\n-1.43\nSep\n-1.36\n-1.79\n-1.50\n-2.48\n-0.14\n-2.17\n-2.10\n-0.78\n9.09\n-0.84\n-1.82\n-0.58\n-2.94\n-1.33\nOct\n-0.97\n-1.73\n-1.54\n-2.10\n-0.76\n-1.77\n-2.13\n-0.65\n9.09\n-0.72\n-1.77\n-0.45\n-2.03\n-0.95\nNov\n-0.77\n-1.63\n-1.53\n-1.77\n-0.83\n-1.37\n-1.91\n-0.45\n3.48\n-0.70\n-1.62\n-0.89\n-1.54\n-1.09\nDec\n-0.42\n-1.39\n-2.29\n-1.25\n-0.67\n-1.39\n-1.87\n-0.24\n3.49\n-0.47\n-0.99\n-0.92\n-0.95\n-0.93\n2017\nJan\n-0.47\n-1.52\n-2.16\n-0.62\n-0.68\n-1.76\n-1.44\n0.20\n3.49\n-0.02\n-0.62\n-0.82\n-0.30\n-0.65\nFeb\n-0.42\n-1.66\n-1.91\n0.26\n-0.53\n-1.29\n-1.31\n0.18\n3.49\n0.24\n-0.05\n-0.51\n1.29\n0.06\nSource: Zimstat, 2017\nC OM M UN IC A TION\nTR A N S P OR T\nHEA LTH\nED UC A TION\nN ON -F OOD IN F LA TION\nTABLE 9.2 : YEARLY INFLATION -- PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \n(DECEMBER 2012 = 100)\n \n \n \n29 \n \n(US$ millions)\nEnd Period\n2000\n2001\n2002\n2003\n2004\n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\n2014\n2015\n2016\nLong-Term External Debt\n3,227\n3,255\n3,327\n3,644\n3,927\n3,805\n3,965\n4,032\n4,464\n4,951\n5,175\n6,096\n6,607\n7,370\n8,444\n8,426\n8,656\nGovernment\n2,249\n2,328\n2,376\n2,617\n2,844\n2,895\n3,024\n3,054\n3,464\n4,037\n4,095\n4,638\n4,929\n5,012\n4,522\n5,293\n5,365\nBilateral Creditors\n1,050\n1,115\n1,107\n1,255\n1,455\n1,438\n1,520\n1,520\n1,863\n2,308\n2,325\n2,597\n2,694\n2,928\n2,445\n3,310\n3,479\nMultilateral Creditors\n1,199\n1,213\n1,269\n1,362\n1,389\n1,457\n1,504\n1,524\n1,592\n1,729\n1,770\n2,041\n2,235\n2,084\n2,078\n1,982\n1,886\nPrivate Creditors\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n10\n10\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPublic Enterprises\n534\n568\n616\n698\n714\n709\n766\n790\n825\n857\n938\n1,092\n1,198\n1,356\n1,661\n1,220\n1,370\nBilateral Creditors\n301\n315\n351\n403\n442\n439\n464\n474\n497\n453\n238\n711\n703\n858\n1,155\n760\n779\nMultilateral Creditors\n233\n253\n265\n295\n272\n270\n302\n316\n327\n403\n700\n382\n495\n498\n506\n460\n591\nPrivate Creditors\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nMonetary Authorities\n292\n292\n279\n288\n291\n144\n130\n137\n140\n140\n138\n127\n125\n125\n120\n110\n0\nMultilateral Creditors - IMF\n292\n292\n279\n288\n291\n144\n130\n137\n140\n140\n138\n127\n125\n125\n120\n110\n0\nPrivate\n152\n67\n56\n41\n78\n57\n45\n51\n35\n57\n142\n366\n480\n1,002\n2,261\n1,913\n1,920\nShort-Term External Debt\n298\n167\n183\n169\n144\n173\n281\n387\n226\n1,198\n1,382\n1,289\n890\n1,564\n2,394\n2,258\n2,304\nSupplier's Credits\n42\n13\n26\n51\n69\n107\n122\n178\n41\n193\n286\n134\n30\n0\n0\n0\n0\nReserve Bank\n642\n642\n618\n614\n614\n587\n587\n573\nPrivate\n256\n154\n157\n118\n75\n66\n159\n209\n185\n363\n454\n537\n246\n950\n1,807\n1,671\n1,731\nTotal External Debt\n3,525\n3,422\n3,510\n3,812\n4,071\n3,978\n4,246\n4,419\n4,690\n6,149\n6,557\n7,385\n7,497\n8,934\n10,838\n10,684\n10,960\nSource: Ministry of Finance & Economic Development, 2017; & Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2017\nTABLE 10: ZIMBABWE: EXTERNAL DEBT OUTSTANDING BY DEBTOR (INCLUDING ALL ARREARS)\n \n \n30 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSA\nBW\nJAPANESE\nEUROPEAN\nPOUND\nEND OF\nRAND/1\nPULA/1\nYEN/1\nCURRENCY/2\nSTERLING/2\n2016\nJAN\n16.0900\n11.4300\n120.5500\n1.0905\n1.4493\nFEB\n16.1100\n11.2700\n113.0300\n1.0990\n1.3880\nMAR\n15.4500\n11.1000\n112.9500\n1.1100\n1.4200\nAPR\n14.6200\n10.7575\n109.6825\n1.1340\n1.4306\nMAY\n15.3200\n10.9800\n108.9323\n1.1340\n1.4522\nJUN\n14.8834\n10.9349\n102.6700\n1.1095\n1.3397\nJUL\n14.4277\n10.7892\n103.9398\n1.1069\n1.3180\nAUG\n13.7656\n9.4521\n101.2190\n1.0960\n1.2280\nSEP\n13.9200\n10.5800\n101.6000\n1.1200\n1.3200\nOCT\n13.9400\n10.6500\n103.7600\n1.0989\n1.2346\nNOV\n13.9402\n10.6875\n107.9934\n1.0811\n1.2430\nDEC\n13.8416\n10.7247\n115.7895\n1.0556\n1.2509\n2017\nJan\n13.5146\n10.5652\n113.4750\n1.0701\n1.2516\nFeb\n12.9957\n10.3573\n112.5100\n1.0591\n1.2439\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2017\n TABLE 11 : SELECTED INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE RATES\n1. Foreign currency per US dollar.\n2. US dollars per unit of foreign currency.\n \n \n \n31 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nMarket Capitalisation \nUS$ millions \n2016\nJan\n103.0\n19.5\n10.4\n61,882,757\n2,790.4\nFeb\n99.4\n19.1\n15.6\n95,020,938\n2,692.3\nMar\n97.6\n19.4\n16.4\n97,601,725\n2,645.1\nApr\n105.8\n20.2\n14.0\n187,848,946\n2,862.6\nMay \n104.7\n25.5\n13.9\n99,055,230\n2,881.3\nJun\n101.0\n24.7\n18.1\n88,525,472\n2,780.9\nJul\n98.8\n25.7\n11.8\n57,222,624\n2,772.0\nAug \n99.5\n26.3\n7.1\n41,264,438\n2,734.3\nSep\n98.9\n26.6\n13.0\n68,329,516\n2,725.1\nOct \n120.8\n33.8\n22.6\n177,384,684\n3,328.3\nNov\n137.1\n57.4\n23.5\n233,749,377\n3,804.6\nDec\n144.5\n58.5\n26.0\n292,538,969\n4,008.0\n2017\nJan\n140.2\n56.3\n8.6\n31,616,982\n3,903.7\nFeb\n135.3\n56.5\n11.5\n85,314,995\n3,770.0\nSource:Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE),2017 \nIndices \nTABLE 12: ZIMBABWE STOCK MARKET STATISTICS\n \nIndustrial \n Market Turnover \nUS$ millions \nVolume of Shares \nMining\n \n \n \n32 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nMONTH \nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE INTERNET\n2016\nJan\n 3,385.9 \n11.1\n137.4\n331.5\n388.9\n167.7\nFeb\n 3,448.2 \n11.9\n138.8\n312.1\n389.3\n167.9\nMar\n 3,460.2 \n11.3\n142.1\n288.8\n417.1\n255.9\nApr\n 3,564.3 \n9.7\n180.1\n247.6\n427.3\n168.3\nMay\n 3,869.2 \n10.8\n214.8\n203.3\n479.9\n217.9\nJun\n 4,522.2 \n10.3\n203.9\n131.4\n465.1\n174.1\nJul\n 3,911.8 \n9.2\n240.0\n166.3\n491.2\n218.0\nAug\n 3,928.7 \n7.9\n238.0\n165.9\n535.4\n230.6\nSep\n 4,382.9 \n10.5\n237.3\n167.7\n533.9\n215.9\nOct\n 4,127.6 \n8.0\n322.8\n112.5\n524.5\n216.0\nNov\n 4,624.7 \n6.9\n363.4\n84.5\n537.2\n229.9\nDec\n 4,882.6 \n5.6\n479.9\n71.9\n626.1\n265.1\n2017\nJan\n 4,052.8 \n7.5\n368.7\n70.4\n495.6\n318.9\nFeb\n 4,247.9 \n7.0\n327.3\n58.4\n472.3\n324.1\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2017\nTABLE 14.1 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS \n Values of Transactions (US$ millions)\n \n \n33 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n‘ \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n34 \n \n \n \n \nMonth\nExports\nImports\nTotal Trade\nTrade Balance\n2016\nJan\n249.18\n395.35\n644.52\n(146.17)\nFeb\n209.55\n427.73\n637.28\n(218.18)\nMar\n166.50\n478.06\n644.55\n(311.56)\nApr\n157.83\n356.48\n514.31\n(198.65)\nMay\n165.20\n408.49\n573.69\n(243.29)\nJun\n176.21\n429.41\n605.61\n(253.20)\nJul\n184.21\n394.23\n578.43\n(210.02)\nAug\n202.14\n445.03\n647.16\n(242.89)\nSep\n250.42\n443.89\n694.30\n(193.47)\nOct\n318.45\n468.06\n786.52\n(149.61)\nNov\n460.73\n475.33\n936.06\n(14.61)\nDec\n291.87\n489.37\n781.24\n(197.50)\nTotal\n2540.40\n4722.05\n7262.45\n(2181.65)\n2017\nJan\n258.67\n384.62\n643.29\n(125.96)\nFeb\n240.48\n424.22\n664.70\n(183.75)\nSource: Zimstat, 2017\nTABLE 14 : MERCHANDISE TRADE STATISTICS\n (US$ millions)", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/MPC_Statements/February2017.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "6dd82513fa3107f1277317f96f5e6e12", "text": "i \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nNOVEMBER 2017 \n \n1 \n \nTABLE OF CONTENTS \n \nSelected Economic Indicators ...................................................................................................... 2 \nInternational Commodity Prices ................................................................................................. 3 \nMerchandise Trade Developments .............................................................................................. 4 \nMonetary Developments ............................................................................................................... 6 \nStock Market Developments ........................................................................................................ 7 \nInflation Outturn .......................................................................................................................... 8 \nNational Payments System Developments .................................................................................. 9 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2 \n \n \n \n \n2017 \n \nOctober \n2017 \n \nNovember \nMonth-on- \nMonth \nChange (%) \nZ.S.E. Mining Index1 \n132.49 \n126.86 \n-4.25 \nZ.S.E. Industrial Index1 \n521.85 \n376.69 \n-27.82 \nNational Payment System Transactions \n(US$ millions) \n10 727.63 \n11 154.6 \n3.98 \nMoney Supply (US$ millions)2 \n7 687.02 \n8 020.03 \n4.33 \nMoney Supply (M3) Annual Growth2 (%) \n44.69 \n47.97 \n \nYearly Inflation3 (%) \n2.24 \n2.94 \n \nMonthly Inflation3 (%) \n1.54 \n0.74 \n \nNominal Lending Rate2 (% per annum) \n4.45-18.00 \n4.45-18.00 \n \nSources: \n1. Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) \n2. Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) \n3. Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZIMSTAT) \nSELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS \n \n \n \n3 \n \nINTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICE \nDEVELOPMENTS \n \nInternational commodity prices for precious \nmetals, base metals and crude oil firmed during \nthe month of November 2017. \n \n Precious Metals \n \nPrecious metal prices rose on account of a \nweaker US dollar, on the back of diminishing \nprospects of a US Fed interest rate hike in 2018. \nGold and platinum prices increased by 0.21% \nand \n1.38% \nto \nmonthly \naverages \nof \nUS$1,282.89/oz \nand \nUS$934.02/oz, \nrespectively, in November 2017. \n Figure 1: Precious metal prices \n \nSource: Bloomberg, 2017 \n \nBase Metals \n Base metal prices firmed mainly on account of \ndwindling inventories and prospects of higher \ndemand, particularly in China. In addition, base \nmetal prices were supported by a weaker US \ndollar, a development which made commodities \npriced in US dollars cheaper for holders of other \ncurrencies. Against this background, copper and \nnickel monthly average prices firmed by 0.84% \nand \n6.61% \nto \nUS$6,863.86/tonne \nand \nUS$12,088.18/tonne, respectively. \nFigure 2: Base metal prices \n \nSource: Bloomberg, 2017 \n Brent Crude Oil \nCrude oil prices surged by 8.9% to a monthly \naverage of US$62.80/barrel in November 2017, \nfrom US$57.64/barrel recorded in the previous \nmonth. The increase was supported by rising \nexpectations that members of the Organization \nPetroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and \nother major producers such as Russia would \nsupport production cuts beyond March 2018. \n Figure 3: International crude oil prices \nSource: Bloomberg, 2017 \n0\n450\n900\n1350\n1800\nNov-16\nDec-16\nJan-17\nFeb-17\nMar-17\nApr-17\nMay-17\nJun-17\nJul-17\nAug-17\nSep-17\nOct-17\nNov-17\nGold\nPlatinum\n0\n4000\n8000\n12000\n0\n2000\n4000\n6000\nNov-16\nJan-17\nMar-17\nMay-17\nJul-17\nSep-17\nNov-17\nNICKEL US/TON\nCOPPER US$/TON\nCopper\nNickel\n0.00\n25.00\n50.00\n75.00\nNov-16\nDec-16\nJan-17\nFeb-17\nMar-17\nApr-17\nMay-17\nJun-17\nJul-17\nAug-17\nSep-17\nOct-17\nNov-17\n \n \n \n4 \n \nMERCHANDISE TRADE \nDEVELOPMENTS \n \nTotal merchandise trade for November 2017 \nstood at US$1,070.3 million, representing a \n32.6% \nincrease \nfrom \nUS$807.0 \nmillion \nrecorded in the previous month. The increase \nwas buttressed by growths in both merchandise \nimports and exports during the month under \nanalysis. \nMerchandise Export Developments \nMerchandise exports surged by 63.9%, from \nUS$352.3 million recorded in October 2017 to \nUS$577.6 million in November 2017. The \ngrowth was largely underpinned by increases in \nexports of flue cure tobacco, gold and nickel \nmattes. \nFigure 4: Merchandise Exports (US$ m) \n \n \nSource: Zimstat, 2017 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nTable 1: Exports Classified by HS Code \n Product \nOctober-17 \nUS$m \nNovember-17 \nUS$m \nShare of \ntotal \nExports \n(%) \n Flue-cured \ntobacco \n(Virginia \ntype) \n86.2 \n284.8 \n49.3 \n Gold \n95.6 \n110.4 \n19.1 \n Nickel \nmattes \n33.9 \n57.8 \n10 \n Nickel ores \nand \nconcentrates \n46 \n41.2 \n7.1 \n Ferro-\nchrome \n25.3 \n17.1 \n3 \n Industrial \ndiamonds \n9.4 \n8.3 \n1.4 \n Chromium \nores and \nconcentrates \n8.5 \n8.2 \n1.4 \n Platinum \n3.9 \n3.1 \n0.5 \n Black \nGranite \n2.6 \n2.4 \n0.4 \n Black tea \n(fermented) \n1.2 \n2.3 \n0.4 \n Cane sugar \n1.7 \n2.2 \n0.4 \n Other \n38 \n39.7 \n6.9 \n Total: \n352.3 \n577.6 \n100 \nSource: Zimstat, 2017 & RBZ Calculations, 2017 \nThe \ncountry’s \ntop \nmerchandise \nexports \ndestinations included South Africa which \nabsorbed 73.4% of the country’s exports, \nfollowed by Mozambique, 5.2%; UAE, 4.9%, \nBelgium, 1.4%; Zambia,0.9%; Botswana, 0.4%; \nMalawi, 0.5%; and Italy, 0.1%. \n0\n30.5\n61\n91.5\n122\n152.5\n183\n213.5\n244\n274.5\n305\n335.5\n366\nSep-17\nOct-17\n \n \n \n5 \n \n \nSource: Zimstat, 2017 & RBZ Calculations, 2017 \nMerchandise Import Developments \nIn November 2017, merchandise imports surged \nby 8.4%, to US$492.79 million, on account of \nincreases in imports of aviation spirit, medicines \nand fertilisers. Imports of crude soya bean oil \nand electricity, however, declined during the \nmonth under review. Energy imports (diesel, \npetrol and electricity) accounted for the highest \nproportion of total merchandise imports, at \n26.0%. \nThe country sourced imports mainly from South \nAfrica (37.7%); Singapore (24.0%); China \n(8.0%); India (4.7%), Mauritius (3.6%); Japan \n(2.8%); Zambia (2.3%); U.A.E (2.1%) and \nUnited Kingdom (2.0%), during the month of \nNovember 2017. \n \n \n \n \nFigure 6: Major Merchandise Import \nSources (% Share) \n \nSource: Zimstat, 2017 & RBZ Calculations, 2017 \nMerchandise Trade Balance \nThe country’s monthly trade balance improved \nsignificantly, from a deficit of US$102.4 million \nin October to a surplus of US$84.9 million in \nNovember 2017. This was largely on account of \na significant increase in merchandise exports, \nduring the month under analysis. \nFigure 7: Merchandise Exports, Imports and \nTrade Balance (US$m) \n \nSource: Zimstat, 2017 & RBZ Computations, 2017 \nSouth \nAfrica\n73.4%\nMozambique\n5.2%\nUAE\n4.9%\nZambia\n0.9%\nBelgium\n1.4%\nBotswana\n0.4%\nMalawi\n0.5%\nItaly\n0.1%\nOther\n13.2%Figure 5:Major Merchandise \nFigure 5:Major Merchandise Export Destinations\nExport Destinations\nSouth Africa\nSingapore\nChina\nIndia\nMauritius\nJapan\nZambia\nUAE\nUK\n0%\n10%\n20%\n30%\n40%\n (300.0)\n (200.0)\n (100.0)\n -\n 100.0\n 200.0\n 300.0\n 400.0\n 500.0\nJan-17\nFeb-17\nMar-17\nApr-17\nMay-17\nJun-17\nJul-17\nAug-17\nSep-17\nOct-17\nNov-17\nExports\nImports\nTrade balance\n \n \n \n6 \n \nMONETARY DEVELOPMENTS \n \nBroad money1 recorded an annual growth of \n47.97%, from $5 420.01 million in November \n2016 to $8 020.03 million in November 2017. \nThe growth was on the back of increases in \ntransferable deposits, 58.99%; and negotiable \ncertificates of deposits (NCDs)2, 51.57%. Time \ndeposits, however, declined by 1.18%. Over the \nsame period, currency outside the banking \nsystem (bond notes and coins in circulation), \nincreased by $300.24 million. \n \nOn a month-on-month basis, broad money grew \nby 4.33% from $7 687.02 million in October \n2017 to $8 020.03 million in November 2017. \n \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2017 \nDuring the month under review, broad money \nwas made up of transferable or transitory \ndeposits, 77.11%; time deposits, 18.08%; \ncurrency in circulation, 3.98%; and negotiable \ncertificates of deposits, 0.83%. \n \n1 Beginning January 2017, broad money is redefined using \nIMF’s Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual of 2000. The \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2017 \nTotal bank lending to local economic agents \ngrew by 44.31%, from $7 554.07 million in \nNovember 2016 to $10 637.23 million in \nNovember 2017. The growth was largely due to \nan expansion of 70.45% in net credit to \nGovernment. The increase in net credit to \nGovernment reflected the fiscus’ reliance on the \nbanking sector to finance the budget deficit. On \na month-on-month basis, domestic credit grew \nby 4.44%, from $10 185.05 million in October \n2017 to $10 637.23 million in November 2017. \n \nYear on year, credit to the private sector \nincreased by 6.97%, from $3 464.06 million in \nOctober 207 to $3 705.51 million in November \n2017. Monthly credit to the private sector \nrecorded a modest growth of 0.06% from \nmajor change is the exclusion of Government deposits held by \nbanks from broad money. \n2 NCDs are also referred to as securities included in broad \nmoney. \n-10\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n -\n 2.0\n 4.0\n 6.0\n 8.0\n 10.0\n%\nUS$ BILLIONS\nFigure 8: Money Supply\nFigure 8: Money Supply\nM3\nM3 Annual Growth rate\nTransferable \nDeposits\n77.11%\nOther \nDeposits \n(Time)\n18.08%\nNCDs\n0.83%\nBond \nNotes and \nCoins\n3.98%Figure 9: \nFigure 9: Composition of Money Supply \nSupply November\nNovember2017\n2017\n \n \n \n7 \n \n$3 703.46 million registered in the previous \nmonth. \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2017 \nDuring \nthe \nmonth \nunder \nanalysis, \nthe \ndistribution of outstanding credit to the private \nsector was as follows: households, 24.4%; \nagriculture, \n18.0%; \nservices, \n14.3%; \ndistribution, 12.2%; manufacturing, 11.9%; \nfinancial organisations and investments, 10.6%; \nmining, \n4.6%; \nand \ntransport \nand \ncommunications and construction, 1.7% each. \nPrivate sector credit was utilised for inventory \nbuild-up, 28.1%; consumer durables, 19.1%; \nfixed capital investment, 9.7%; and pre and post \nshipment financing, 1.1%. Amounts channelled \ntowards other recurrent expenditures constituted \n39.1% of the total outstanding loans and \nadvances. \n \n \n \nSTOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS \nDuring the month of November 2017, trading \nactivity on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange \n(ZSE) registered significant price correction, \nfollowing \npolitical \ndevelopments. \nConsequently, the industrial and mining indices \ndeclined by 27.8% and 4.2%, to close at 376.69 \npoints and 126.86 points, respectively. \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2017 \nTurnover volume declined by 80.48% to 196.49 \nmillion shares, from 1.01 billion shares \nregistered in the previous month. In value terms, \nhowever, market turnover value increased by \n22.95% to US$207.52 million during the same \nmonth. \nForeign investor participation improved, as \nreflected by the decline in net outflows from \nUS$31.5 \nmillion \nin \nOctober \n2017, \nto \nUS$19.8 million in November 2017. \n \n \n \nHouseholds\n24.4%\nAgriculture, \n18.0%\nManufacturing, \n11.9%\nServices, \n14.3%\nDistribution, \n12.2%\nFinancial \nOrganisati\nons, \n10.6%\nMining, \n4.6%\nTransport and \nCommunication, \n1.7%\nConstruction, \n1.7%\nOther, 0.6%\nFigure 10 : Sectoral Distribution of \nCredit\n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\n300\n350\n400\n450\n500\n550\n30-Nov-16\n31-Dec-16\n31-Jan-17\n28-Feb-17\n31-Mar-17\n30-Apr-17\n31-May-17\n30-Jun-17\n31-Jul-17\n31-Aug-17\n30-Sep-17\n31-Oct-17\n30-Nov-17\nFigure 11: ZSE Indices\nIndustrial\nMining\n \n \n \n8 \n \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2017 \nDuring the period under review, the ZSE lost \nUS$4.05 billion worth of capitalization or \n27.33% of the previous month’s value, to close \nat US$10.77 billion, due to price correction. \nOn a year-on year basis, however, ZSE market \ncapitalization increased by 183.28%. \n \nINFLATION OUTTURN \n \nAnnual Inflation \n \nThe annual headline inflation rose from 2.24% \nin October 2017, to 2.97% in November 2017. \nThis was largely attributable to increases in both \nfood and non food prices, on the back of \nspeculative activities on the domestic foreign \ncurrency market. \nAnnual food inflation surged from 4.40% in \nOctober 2017, to 5.65% in November 2017. \nLikewise, non-food inflation accelerated from \n1.25% in October 2017, to 1.74% in November \n2017. \nFigure 12 shows annual inflation developments. \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2017 \nMonthly Inflation \n \nMonthly inflation decelerated to 0.7% in \nNovember 2017, from 1.5% in October 2017. \nThe decline reflected the fall in both food and \nnon-food prices. \n \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2017 \n0.00\n30.00\n60.00\n90.00\n120.00\n150.00\n180.00\n210.00\n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n700\n800\n900\n1,000\nNov-16\nDec-16\nJan-17\nFeb-17\nMar-17\nApr-17\nMay-17\nJun-17\nJul-17\nAug-17\nSep-17\nOct-17\nNov-17\nValues Traded (US$ Millions)\nVolumes Traded (Millions)\nFigure 2: ZSE Monthly Volumes \nFigure 2: ZSE Monthly Volumes and Values Traded\nand Values Traded\nVolume\nTurnover\n-4.5\n-2.5\n-0.5\n1.5\n3.5\n5.5\nFigure 12: Annual Inflation \n(%)\nHeadline Inflation\nFood\nNon Food\n-0.5\n-0.3\n-0.1\n0.2\n0.4\n0.6\n0.8\n1.0\n1.2\n1.4\n1.6Figure 13: M\nFigure 13: M-\n-O\nO-\n-M Inflation\nM Inflation\n \n \n \n9 \n \nMonth-on-month, food inflation fell from \n2.27% in October 2017 to 1.74% in November \n2017. This was largely on account of a decline \nin vegetable prices. \nMonthly non-food inflation also decelerated, \nfrom 1.20% in October to 0.26% in November \n2017. This followed declines in communication, \neducation and restaurants and hotels. \n \nNATIONAL PAYMENTS SYSTEM \n \nTransactions processed through the National \nPayment System (NPS) increased by 4% to \nUS$11.2 billion in November 2017, from \nUS$10.7 billion in October 2017. NPS \ntransaction volumes increased by 3% to 123.8 \nmillion transactions, during the same month \nunder review. \n \nZimbabwe Electronic Transfer Settlement \nSystem (ZETSS) \n \nThe value of transactions processed through the \nRTGS system increased to US$6.3 billion in \nNovember 2017, a 4.5% increase from \nUS$6.0 billion registerd in the previous month. \nRTGS transaction volumes, however, declined \nfrom 609 636 in October 2017 to 575 269 in \nNovember 2017. \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2017 \nCash transactions \nCash based transactions declined by 3.3% to \nUS$209.07 million in November 2017, from \nUS$216.27 million recorded in the previous \nmonth. \nMobile and Internet Based Transactions \nMobile and internet based transactions rose to \nUS$3.36 billion as at end of November 2017, \nfrom US$3.18 billion in October 2017. \n \nCard Based Transactions \nCard based transactions closed the month under \nreview at US$682.33 million, down from \nUS$701.27 million registered in October 2017. \nCheque Transactions \nCheque transactions decreased by 9.9% to \nUS$4.88 million in November 2017, from \nUS$5.42 million in October 2017. \n \nJANUARY 2017 \nRESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE \n -\n 2.0\n 4.0\n 6.0\n 8.0\n -\n 200\n 400\n 600\n 800\nVALUE IN US$ BILLIONS\nVOLUME IN THOUSANDS\nFigure 14: ZETSS Volumes and \nFigure 14: ZETSS Volumes and Values\nValues\nVolume\nValue\n \n10 \n \nStatistical Tables \n \nMonetary Statistics \n 1. Depository Corporations Survey \n \n \n \n12 \n 2. Central Bank Survey \n \n \n \n \n \n \n13 \n \n3. Other Depository Corporations Survey \n \n \n \n \n14 \n Other Depository Corporations \n \n4.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n15 \n 4.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n16 \n Commercial Banks \n 5.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n17 \n 5.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n18 \n Building Societies \n 6.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n19 \n 6.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n20 \n Sectoral Analysis of Bank Loans and Advances and Deposits \n \n7.1 Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks Loans and Advances \n21 \n \n7.2 Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks Deposits \n \n \n22 \n Interest Rates \n \n8.1 Lending Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n23 \n \n8.2 Banks Deposit Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n24 \n \n Inflation \n \n9.1 Monthly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n25 \n \n9.2 Yearly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n26 \n External Statistics \n \n10. Total External Debt Outstanding by Debtor \n \n \n \n27 \n 11. Exchange Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n28 \n \n \n \n \n \n11 \n \n12. Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Statistics \n \n \n \n \n 29 \n \n 13. National Payments System Statistics \n \n \n \n \n13.1 Values of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n 30 \n \n13.2 Volumes of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n 31 \n \n14. Merchandise Trade Statistics \n \n \n \n \n \n 32 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n 12 \n \n \n \n \n \nNov-16\nDec-16\nJan-17\nFeb-17\nMar-17\nApr-17\nMay-17\nJun-17\nJul-17\nAug-17\nSep-17\nOct-17\nNov-17\nNet Foreign Assets\n-636,688.80\n-555,620.67\n-584,011.92\n-574,374.12\n-559,959.05\n-513,244.32\n-567,873.40\n-574,972.81\n-626,057.81\n-582,743.90\n-549,977.40\n-598,056.20\n-720,531.61\nCentral Bank(net)\n-591,305.32\n-573,721.83\n-583,214.44\n-588,800.77\n-585,362.68\n-597,983.99\n-624,117.95\n-572,451.17\n-673,008.44\n-636,128.81\n-644,200.31\n-733,967.37\n-871,025.23\nForeign Assets\n364,866.78\n410,827.76\n449,211.75\n445,565.06\n419,948.30\n406,334.53\n380,372.91\n414,622.73\n379,556.86\n432,890.70\n442,063.74\n328,936.85\n316,144.17\nForeign Liabilities\n-956,172.09\n-984,549.60\n-1,032,426.19\n-1,034,365.82\n-1,005,310.99\n-1,004,318.51\n-1,004,490.86\n-987,073.90\n-1,052,565.30\n-1,069,019.51\n-1,086,264.06\n-1,062,904.22\n-1,187,169.40\nOther Depository Corporations(net)\n-45,383.48\n18,101.16\n-797.49\n14,426.64\n25,403.64\n84,739.67\n56,244.55\n-2,521.64\n46,950.63\n53,384.91\n94,222.92\n135,911.17\n150,493.62\nForeign Assets\n244,421.21\n297,836.79\n270,935.31\n290,763.66\n275,104.70\n338,839.86\n302,736.47\n260,090.51\n212,254.02\n214,135.93\n249,362.59\n293,931.99\n304,880.23\nForeign Liabilities\n-289,804.69\n-279,735.63\n-271,732.80\n-276,337.02\n-249,701.07\n-254,100.19\n-246,491.92\n-262,612.14\n-165,303.39\n-160,751.02\n-155,139.67\n-158,020.82\n-154,386.61\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n6,056,699.56\n6,193,901.69\n6,247,448.43\n6,346,016.00\n6,439,892.69\n6,630,026.96\n6,768,155.75\n7,066,644.43\n7,190,083.71\n7,658,286.70\n8,010,175.71\n8,285,079.21\n8,740,559.19\nDomestic Claims\n7,554,069.08\n7,669,496.22\n7,645,349.84\n7,784,284.88\n7,922,221.15\n8,181,305.42\n8,453,437.89\n8,775,537.48\n8,910,298.85\n9,400,014.14\n9,819,593.03\n10,185,048.27\n10,637,228.44\nClaims on Central Government(net)\n3,679,166.52\n3,747,719.59\n3,862,282.83\n4,003,963.78\n4,034,942.83\n4,316,258.18\n4,466,829.20\n4,729,355.59\n4,885,665.81\n5,267,118.15\n5,581,193.25\n5,881,505.10\n6,271,018.90\nClaims on Central Government\n3,824,753.66\n3,908,493.46\n3,941,069.39\n4,084,363.34\n4,147,553.19\n4,414,769.52\n4,564,175.79\n4,843,590.52\n5,004,270.42\n5,396,080.93\n5,676,935.33\n5,965,131.00\n6,346,320.36\nCentral Bank\n2,306,454.54\n2,337,460.53\n2,270,648.89\n2,355,433.48\n2,337,736.94\n2,444,902.59\n2,578,541.58\n2,781,509.70\n2,976,316.77\n3,253,867.93\n3,386,569.92\n3,558,186.66\n3,826,415.91\nODCs\n1,518,299.12\n1,571,032.92\n1,670,420.50\n1,728,929.86\n1,809,816.25\n1,969,866.92\n1,985,634.21\n2,062,080.82\n2,027,953.65\n2,142,212.99\n2,290,365.42\n2,406,944.35\n2,519,904.45\nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n-145,587.14\n-160,773.86\n-78,786.57\n-80,399.57\n-112,610.37\n-98,511.34\n-97,346.59\n-114,234.93\n-118,604.61\n-128,962.78\n-95,742.09\n-83,625.90\n-75,301.46\nClaims on Other Sectors\n3,874,902.55\n3,921,776.63\n3,783,067.01\n3,780,321.10\n3,887,278.32\n3,865,047.24\n3,986,608.69\n4,046,181.88\n4,024,633.04\n4,132,895.99\n4,238,399.78\n4,303,543.17\n4,366,209.54\nOther Financial Corporations\n128,782.67\n119,157.29\n117,123.94\n79,035.53\n80,256.74\n82,515.74\n96,671.25\n150,004.30\n98,954.02\n102,511.95\n104,161.83\n104,614.44\n107,453.59\nState and Local Government\n37,784.82\n34,237.41\n35,909.11\n35,006.53\n34,312.18\n34,732.93\n36,595.52\n35,573.02\n34,059.17\n34,223.63\n31,707.35\n33,198.40\n38,416.75\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n244,277.53\n240,007.21\n246,102.41\n274,898.12\n268,976.36\n302,761.14\n334,495.68\n337,668.92\n400,050.10\n399,893.78\n453,678.02\n462,270.64\n514,831.37\nPrivate Sector\n3,464,057.53\n3,528,374.72\n3,383,931.55\n3,391,380.92\n3,503,733.03\n3,445,037.42\n3,518,846.25\n3,522,935.65\n3,491,569.75\n3,596,266.62\n3,648,852.59\n3,703,459.69\n3,705,507.82\nCentral Bank\n28,190.50\n31,268.19\n28,547.39\n34,327.69\n34,209.32\n31,152.87\n32,571.62\n33,352.46\n34,125.26\n42,626.53\n36,709.07\n41,793.97\n42,120.29\nODCs\n3,435,867.03\n3,497,106.53\n3,355,384.15\n3,357,053.23\n3,469,523.72\n3,413,884.55\n3,486,274.63\n3,489,583.19\n3,457,444.48\n3,553,640.10\n3,612,143.52\n3,661,665.72\n3,663,387.53\nOther Items(Net)\n1,497,369.51\n1,475,594.53\n1,397,901.41\n1,438,268.87\n1,482,328.45\n1,551,278.46\n1,685,282.14\n1,708,893.05\n1,720,215.14\n1,741,727.44\n1,809,417.31\n1,899,969.06\n1,896,669.25\nShares and Other Equity\n935,291.08\n1,470,571.26\n1,471,378.30\n1,481,807.04\n1,505,125.81\n1,501,542.86\n1,530,318.89\n1,547,498.82\n1,546,591.56\n1,561,407.13\n1,584,816.43\n1,635,896.90\n1,657,131.70\nLiabilities to Other Financial Corporations\n32,045.66\n52,038.47\n44,373.98\n46,621.66\n45,153.65\n45,155.62\n45,511.27\n49,869.95\n38,847.96\n26,097.05\n35,381.24\n45,306.15\n63,455.52\nRestricted Deposits\n180,899.67\n60,499.79\n66,478.53\n66,737.97\n67,789.29\n68,133.12\n84,939.87\n84,617.96\n84,477.31\n32,685.62\n115,800.59\n161,010.60\n88,854.55\nOther Items(net)\n349,133.11\n-107,514.99\n-184,329.41\n-156,897.79\n-135,740.30\n-63,553.13\n24,512.12\n26,906.32\n50,298.31\n121,537.64\n73,419.06\n57,755.41\n87,227.48\nBroad Money-M3\n5,420,010.76\n5,638,281.02\n5,663,436.51\n5,771,641.88\n5,879,933.65\n6,116,782.64\n6,200,282.35\n6,491,671.62\n6,564,025.89\n7,075,542.80\n7,460,198.31\n7,687,023.01\n8,020,027.58\nSecurities Other than Shares Included in Broad Mon\n43,862.17\n62,894.35\n50,562.02\n59,329.24\n60,161.15\n63,292.20\n61,392.93\n65,667.46\n66,282.58\n71,054.38\n55,830.26\n62,975.36\n66,482.78\nBroad Money-M2\n5,376,148.60\n5,575,386.66\n5,612,874.49\n5,712,312.64\n5,819,772.50\n6,053,490.44\n6,138,889.42\n6,426,004.16\n6,497,743.31\n7,004,488.42\n7,404,368.06\n7,624,047.65\n7,953,544.80\nOther Deposits\n1,467,582.00\n1,471,657.19\n1,544,945.66\n1,552,644.56\n1,529,856.98\n1,530,705.58\n1,558,418.08\n1,538,865.52\n1,600,104.76\n1,604,901.44\n1,571,434.68\n1,460,819.34\n1,450,191.32\nNarrow Money-M1\n3,908,566.59\n4,103,729.48\n4,067,928.83\n4,159,668.08\n4,289,915.52\n4,522,784.87\n4,580,471.34\n4,887,138.64\n4,897,638.55\n5,399,586.98\n5,832,933.38\n6,163,228.31\n6,503,353.48\nTransferable Deposits\n3,889,717.47\n4,033,558.66\n3,985,443.09\n4,046,287.46\n4,147,742.43\n4,369,406.07\n4,404,701.40\n4,690,977.34\n4,696,301.61\n5,199,733.27\n5,589,485.14\n5,875,303.92\n6,184,269.27\nCurrency Outside Depository Corporations\n18,849.12\n70,170.81\n82,485.74\n113,380.62\n142,173.09\n153,378.80\n175,769.94\n196,161.30\n201,336.94\n199,853.71\n243,448.24\n287,924.39\n319,084.21\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2017\nNote:\n(i) Depository corporations survey - formerly Monetary Survey.\n(ii) Broad money redefined using IMF's Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual of 2000. Major changes include exclusion of Government deposits held by banks from broad money.\n(iii) Transferable deposits made up of demand and savings deposits.\n(iv) NCDs are also referred to as securities included in broad money.\n(v) All classes of time deposits, short and long term are classified as time deposits, which are also termed other deposits.\n(vi) Credit to the private sector now excludes claims on other financial corporations, as well as claims on state and local government (local authorities)\n(vii) Depository corporations made up of the Central Bank and other depository corporations\n(viii) Other depository corporations (ODCs) - Commercial banks, merchant banks, building societies and POSB.\nTABLE 1: DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS SURVEY (US$ '000)\n \n \n \n13 \n \n \n \n \n \nNov-16\nDec-16 \nJan-17\nFeb-17\nMar-17\nApr-17\nMay-17\nJun-17\nJul-17\nAug-17\nSep-17\nOct-17\nNov-17\nNet Foreign Assets\n-591,305.32\n-573,721.83\n-583,214.44\n-588,800.77\n-585,362.68\n-597,983.99\n-624,117.95\n-572,451.17\n-673,008.44\n-636,128.81\n-644,200.31\n-733,967.37\n-871,025.23\nClaims on Non Residents\n364,866.78\n410,827.76\n449,211.75\n445,565.06\n419,948.30\n406,334.53\n380,372.91\n414,622.73\n379,556.86\n432,890.70\n442,063.74\n328,936.85\n316,144.17\nOfficial Reserves Assets\n266,511.75\n309,331.78\n350,427.48\n346,696.05\n320,526.53\n306,195.43\n280,743.61\n311,434.24\n216,563.03\n269,927.65\n280,416.18\n226,405.62\n204,314.49\nOther Foreign Assets\n98,355.02\n101,495.99\n98,784.27\n98,869.01\n99,421.78\n100,139.10\n99,629.30\n103,188.49\n162,993.84\n162,963.05\n161,647.57\n102,531.22\n111,829.68\nLess Liabilities to Non Residents\n956,172.09\n984,549.60\n1,032,426.19\n1,034,365.82\n1,005,310.99\n1,004,318.51\n1,004,490.86\n987,073.90\n1,052,565.30\n1,069,019.51\n1,086,264.06\n1,062,904.22\n1,187,169.40\nShort Term Liabilities\n481,842.04\n515,365.90\n558,302.10\n560,678.78\n528,171.18\n523,978.67\n523,548.11\n502,610.47\n563,024.67\n574,360.75\n593,884.47\n573,462.17\n693,209.75\nOther Foreign Liabilities\n474,330.06\n469,183.69\n474,124.08\n473,687.04\n477,139.81\n480,339.84\n480,942.76\n484,463.43\n489,540.63\n494,658.76\n492,379.59\n489,442.05\n493,959.66\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n1,910,944.27\n2,046,457.01\n2,082,987.44\n2,193,388.18\n2,189,787.86\n2,257,730.24\n2,349,466.00\n2,521,330.28\n2,737,213.38\n3,001,066.77\n3,105,476.07\n3,254,560.12\n3,580,493.62\nDomestic Claims\n2,396,766.46\n2,420,011.99\n2,449,800.81\n2,551,097.25\n2,545,403.08\n2,683,243.81\n2,852,123.09\n3,029,056.93\n3,245,422.59\n3,502,764.78\n3,713,388.93\n3,918,166.34\n4,232,264.89\nNet Claims on Central Government\n2,207,020.45\n2,218,852.08\n2,244,839.79\n2,330,293.56\n2,312,027.68\n2,422,539.02\n2,556,298.97\n2,740,989.57\n2,935,771.58\n3,213,236.12\n3,346,024.06\n3,517,656.37\n3,785,862.91\nClaims on Central Government\n2,306,454.54\n2,337,460.53\n2,270,562.63\n2,355,433.48\n2,337,736.94\n2,444,816.34\n2,578,541.58\n2,781,509.70\n2,976,316.77\n3,253,867.93\n3,386,569.92\n3,558,186.66\n3,826,415.91\nOf which: Securities Other than Shares\n250,270.16\n566,328.08\n577,431.69\n562,535.65\n551,741.20\n533,407.34\n537,150.63\n620,541.15\n640,269.72\n677,443.83\n641,160.04\n1,105,837.44\n1,153,434.17\nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n99,434.09\n118,608.45\n25,722.84\n25,139.92\n25,709.26\n22,277.32\n22,242.61\n338,860.92\n40,545.19\n40,631.81\n40,545.86\n40,530.28\n40,553.01\nOf which: Deposits\n99,434.09\n118,608.45\n25,722.84\n25,139.92\n25,709.26\n22,277.32\n22,242.61\n40,520.14\n40,545.19\n40,631.81\n40,545.86\n40,530.28\n40,553.01\nClaims on Other Sectors\n189,746.01\n201,159.91\n206,874.76\n243,242.69\n235,375.40\n262,618.54\n297,824.11\n290,067.36\n309,651.01\n289,528.66\n367,364.88\n400,509.96\n446,401.99\nOther Financial Corporations\n18,890.01\n16,515.86\n16,900.44\n18,434.72\n18,570.34\n18,972.27\n19,413.25\n17,924.43\n18,367.00\n18,768.05\n19,232.50\n20,476.27\n20,253.71\nState and Local Government\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n142,665.50\n153,375.86\n161,426.93\n190,480.28\n182,595.75\n212,493.40\n245,839.24\n238,790.47\n257,158.75\n228,134.08\n311,423.31\n338,239.72\n384,027.99\nPrivate Sector\n28,190.50\n31,268.19\n28,547.39\n34,327.69\n34,209.32\n31,152.87\n32,571.62\n33,352.46\n34,125.26\n42,626.53\n36,709.07\n41,793.97\n42,120.29\nClaims on Other Depository Corporations\n164,922.74\n140,331.70\n110,720.51\n93,514.18\n104,865.33\n85,479.27\n50,810.90\n52,540.42\n43,316.48\n30,413.03\n40,885.26\n73,618.97\n166,428.64\nOther Liabilities to ODCs\n280,278.62\n268,568.70\n269,925.53\n255,446.41\n242,394.50\n294,200.81\n305,898.38\n307,589.96\n309,366.61\n350,766.86\n358,683.75\n419,794.54\n559,928.12\nOther Items(Net)\n370,466.32\n245,317.99\n209,608.36\n218,215.84\n220,086.04\n218,792.03\n249,569.60\n254,677.12\n242,159.08\n181,344.18\n290,114.37\n317,430.64\n258,271.80\nMonetary Base \n1,319,638.956\n1,472,735.173\n1,499,773.004\n1,604,587.411\n1,604,425.179\n1,659,746.254\n1,725,348.049\n1,948,879.104\n2,064,204.942\n2,364,937.960\n2,461,275.759\n2,520,592.750\n2,709,468.388\nBond Coins\n13,404.374\n13,783.332\n13,852.694\n13,845.125\n20,385.149\n23,268.864\n25,819.605\n27,667.474\n28,763.070\n30,289.790\n35,089.724\n37,235.520\n42,063.416\nBond Notes\n10,009.774\n72,950.552\n88,839.102\n118,836.703\n134,347.604\n140,801.342\n163,388.941\n175,855.752\n179,722.240\n181,874.280\n220,358.199\n259,385.570\n286,809.559\nLiabilities to ODCs\n1,292,654.095\n1,385,011.220\n1,395,502.072\n1,467,941.594\n1,446,635.592\n1,492,786.162\n1,520,837.740\n1,728,301.189\n1,838,460.100\n2,135,122.530\n2,166,837.091\n2,181,116.180\n2,331,782.192\nReserve Deposits\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000\n0.000 - \n0.000\nOther\n1,292,654.095\n1,385,011.220\n1,395,502.072\n1,467,941.594\n1,446,635.592\n1,492,786.162\n1,520,837.740\n1,728,301.189\n1,838,460.100\n2,135,122.530\n2,166,837.091\n2,181,116.180\n2,331,782.192\nPrivate Deposits\n3,570.712\n990.069\n1,579.135\n3,963.989\n3,056.833\n2,889.886\n15,301.762\n17,054.689\n17,259.532\n17,651.360\n38,990.746\n42,855.490\n48,813.221\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2017\nTABLE 2: CENTRAL BANK SURVEY (US$'000)\n \n \n \n14 \n \n \n \n \n \nNov-16\nDec-16\nJan-17\nFeb-17\nMar-17\nApr-17\nMay-17\nJun-17\nJul-17\nAug-17\nSep-17\nOct-17\nNov-17\nNet Foreign Assets\n-45,383.48\n18,101.16\n-797.49\n14,426.64\n25,403.64\n84,739.67\n56,244.55\n-2,521.64\n46,950.63\n53,384.91\n94,222.92\n135,911.17\n150,493.62\nClaims on Non Residents\n244,421.21\n297,836.79\n270,935.31\n290,763.66\n275,104.70\n338,839.86\n302,736.47\n260,090.51\n212,254.02\n214,135.93\n249,362.59\n293,931.99\n304,880.23\nOf Which: Foreign Currency\n76,252.73\n107,687.14\n110,979.79\n96,836.03\n66,426.17\n67,822.05\n56,944.26\n57,084.55\n45,185.40\n40,576.65\n38,057.17\n41,812.82\n46,089.81\nDeposits\n167,926.29\n189,886.91\n159,688.03\n193,663.57\n208,412.27\n270,746.20\n245,512.83\n202,703.19\n166,729.03\n173,240.95\n210,988.32\n251,805.84\n258,471.13\nOther\n242.19\n262.74\n267.49\n264.07\n266.26\n271.61\n279.38\n302.77\n339.60\n318.33\n317.10\n313.33\n319.29\nLess Liabilities to Non Residents\n289,804.69\n279,735.63\n271,732.80\n276,337.02\n249,701.07\n254,100.19\n246,491.92\n262,612.14\n165,303.39\n160,751.02\n155,139.67\n158,020.82\n154,386.61\nOf Which: Deposits\n136,426.63\n142,073.73\n137,945.79\n135,779.65\n117,026.45\n126,179.95\n120,578.30\n119,073.63\n54,731.95\n51,835.14\n54,067.71\n58,472.24\n56,101.99\nLoans\n153,378.06\n137,661.90\n133,787.01\n140,557.37\n132,674.61\n127,920.24\n125,913.62\n143,538.51\n110,571.44\n108,915.89\n101,071.96\n99,548.59\n98,284.62\nOther\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n5,442,974.41\n \n5,549,018.98\n \n5,580,169.12\n \n5,639,870.63\n \n5,709,300.08\n \n5,875,774.29\n \n5,952,966.10\n \n6,280,977.27\n \n6,298,478.80\n \n6,804,652.82\n \n7,083,536.41\n \n7,220,331.96\n \n7,501,636.53\n \nDomestic Claims\n5,157,302.61\n \n5,249,484.24\n \n5,193,549.03\n \n5,210,748.62\n \n5,374,818.07\n \n5,496,061.61\n \n5,599,314.81\n \n5,744,480.55\n \n5,664,876.26\n \n5,897,249.35\n \n6,106,204.09\n \n6,266,881.93\n \n6,404,963.55\n \nNet Claims on Central Government\n1,472,146.07\n \n1,528,867.51\n \n1,617,356.78\n \n1,673,670.22\n \n1,722,915.15\n \n1,893,632.91\n \n1,910,530.23\n \n1,988,366.03\n \n1,949,894.23\n \n2,053,882.03\n \n2,235,169.19\n \n2,363,848.73\n \n2,485,156.00\n \nClaims on Central Government\n1,518,299.1187\n \n1,571,032.9250\n \n1,670,420.5050\n \n1,728,929.8577\n \n1,809,816.2513\n \n1,969,866.9249\n \n1,985,634.2076\n \n2,062,080.8211\n \n2,027,953.6484\n \n2,142,212.9900\n \n2,290,365.4156\n \n2,406,944.3500\n \n2,519,904.4492\n \nSecurities\n1,500,671.4257\n \n1,553,239.1020\n \n1,654,534.6290\n \n1,713,961.3077\n \n1,794,113.0553\n \n1,954,045.2049\n \n1,968,887.3446\n \n2,014,158.1741\n \n1,982,771.1424\n \n2,100,894.1800\n \n2,248,874.2676\n \n2,372,099.4000\n \n2,487,651.0712\n \nLoans\n17,627.6930\n \n17,793.8230\n \n15,885.8760\n \n14,968.5500\n \n15,703.1960\n \n15,821.7200\n \n16,746.8630\n \n47,922.6470\n \n45,182.5060\n \n41,318.8200\n \n41,491.1480\n \n34,844.9500\n \n32,253.3780\n \nOther \n(0.0000)\n \n0.0000\n \n(0.0000)\n \n0.0000\n \n-\n \n(0.00)\n \n(0.00)\n \n(0.00)\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n(46,153.0502)\n \n(42,165.4109)\n \n(53,063.7244)\n \n(55,259.6416)\n \n(86,901.1009)\n \n(76,234.0149)\n \n(75,103.9806)\n \n(73,714.7955)\n \n(78,059.4171)\n \n(88,330.9700)\n \n(55,196.2259)\n \n(43,095.6200)\n \n(34,748.4530)\n \nClaims on Other Sectors\n3,685,156.5434\n \n3,720,616.7211\n \n3,576,192.2507\n \n3,537,078.4083\n \n3,651,902.92\n \n3,602,428.70\n \n3,688,784.58\n \n3,756,114.52\n \n3,714,982.03\n \n3,843,367.33\n \n3,871,034.90\n \n3,903,033.21\n \n3,919,807.55\n \nOther Financial Corporations\n109,892.67\n \n102,641.44\n \n100,223.50\n \n60,600.81\n \n61,686.40\n \n63,543.47\n \n77,258.00\n \n132,079.86\n \n80,587.02\n \n83,743.90\n \n84,929.32\n \n84,138.16\n \n87,199.89\n \nState and Local Government\n37,784.82\n \n34,237.41\n \n35,909.11\n \n35,006.53\n \n34,312.18\n \n34,732.93\n \n36,595.52\n \n35,573.02\n \n34,059.17\n \n34,223.63\n \n31,707.35\n \n33,198.40\n \n38,416.75\n \nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n101,612.03\n \n86,631.35\n \n84,675.48\n \n84,417.84\n \n86,380.62\n \n90,267.74\n \n88,656.44\n \n98,878.45\n \n142,891.35\n \n171,759.70\n \n142,254.70\n \n124,030.93\n \n130,803.39\n \nPrivate Sector\n3,435,867.03\n \n3,497,106.53\n \n3,355,384.15\n \n3,357,053.23\n \n3,469,523.72\n \n3,413,884.55\n \n3,486,274.63\n \n3,489,583.19\n \n3,457,444.48\n \n3,553,640.10\n \n3,612,143.52\n \n3,661,665.72\n \n3,663,387.53\n \nClaims on the Central Bank\n1,323,120.314\n \n1,435,556.219\n \n1,475,197.651\n \n1,507,778.322\n \n1,498,477.568\n \n1,505,940.672\n \n1,505,814.461\n \n1,682,269.779\n \n1,814,568.562\n \n2,074,164.010\n \n2,122,438.965\n \n2,148,009.900\n \n2,325,299.451\n \nBond Notes and Coins\n4,565.027\n \n16,563.071\n \n20,206.055\n \n19,301.209\n \n12,559.660\n \n10,691.409\n \n13,438.609\n \n7,361.926\n \n7,148.374\n \n12,310.360\n \n11,999.682\n \n8,696.700\n \n9,788.767\n \nReserves\n1,318,555.287\n \n1,418,993.147\n \n1,454,991.597\n \n1,488,477.113\n \n1,485,917.908\n \n1,495,249.263\n \n1,492,375.852\n \n1,674,907.853\n \n1,807,420.188\n \n2,061,853.650\n \n2,110,439.283\n \n2,139,313.210\n \n2,315,510.684\n \nLiabilities to the Central Bank\n0.219\n1750.127\n0.244\n1.8\n1752.651\n3.143\n0.771\n0.694\n0\n1.79\n3.386\n1.46\n0.462\nOther Items(Net)\n1,037,448.30\n \n1,134,271.35\n \n1,088,577.32\n \n1,078,654.52\n \n1,162,242.90\n \n1,126,224.85\n \n1,152,162.40\n \n1,145,772.36\n \n1,180,966.02\n \n1,166,758.76\n \n1,145,103.26\n \n1,194,558.41\n \n1,228,626.01\n \nShares and Other Equity\n1,228,902.77\n \n1,271,826.05\n \n1,272,987.21\n \n1,279,285.69\n \n1,301,867.36\n \n1,295,023.50\n \n1,310,286.87\n \n1,325,276.01\n \n1,330,874.62\n \n1,342,135.53\n \n1,356,314.17\n \n1,398,886.31\n \n1,422,958.60\n \nLiabilities to other financial corporations\n28,777.63\n \n48,770.44\n \n41,105.95\n \n43,353.63\n \n41,885.62\n \n41,887.59\n \n42,243.24\n \n46,601.91\n \n35,579.93\n \n22,829.02\n \n32,113.21\n \n42,038.12\n \n60,187.49\n \nOther Items(Net)\n(220,232.10)\n \n(186,325.14)\n \n(225,515.85)\n \n(243,984.80)\n \n(181,510.08)\n \n(210,686.24)\n \n(200,367.71)\n \n(226,105.56)\n \n(185,488.52)\n \n(198,205.79)\n \n(243,324.12)\n \n(246,366.01)\n \n(254,520.08)\n \nDeposits and Securities Included in Broad Mo\n5,397,590.93\n \n5,567,120.14\n \n5,579,371.63\n \n5,654,297.27\n \n5,734,703.72\n \n5,960,513.96\n \n6,009,210.65\n \n6,278,455.63\n \n6,345,429.42\n \n6,858,037.73\n \n7,177,759.33\n \n7,356,243.13\n \n7,652,130.15\n \nDeposits Included in Broad Money\n5,353,728.76\n \n5,504,225.78\n \n5,528,809.61\n \n5,594,968.03\n \n5,674,542.57\n \n5,897,221.76\n \n5,947,817.72\n \n6,212,788.17\n \n6,279,146.84\n \n6,786,983.35\n \n7,121,929.07\n \n7,293,267.77\n \n7,585,647.37\n \nTransferable Deposits\n3,886,146.76\n \n4,032,568.59\n \n3,983,863.96\n \n4,042,323.47\n \n4,144,685.59\n \n4,366,516.18\n \n4,389,399.64\n \n4,673,922.65\n \n4,679,042.08\n \n5,182,081.91\n \n5,550,494.39\n \n5,832,448.43\n \n6,135,456.05\n \nOther Deposits\n1,467,582.00\n \n1,471,657.19\n \n1,544,945.66\n \n1,552,644.56\n \n1,529,856.98\n \n1,530,705.58\n \n1,558,418.08\n \n1,538,865.52\n \n1,600,104.76\n \n1,604,901.44\n \n1,571,434.68\n \n1,460,819.34\n \n1,450,191.32\n \n43,862.17\n \n62,894.35\n \n50,562.02\n \n59,329.24\n \n60,161.15\n \n63,292.20\n \n61,392.93\n \n65,667.46\n \n66,282.58\n \n71,054.38\n \n55,830.26\n \n62,975.36\n \n66,482.78\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2017\nTABLE 3: OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS SURVEY (US '000)\n \n \n \n15 \n \n \nForeign\nTOTAL\nEnd of\nNotes\nBond\n&\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \n Notes &\nCoin\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment\n1\nLocal Governemt\nPublic Enterprises\nOther\n2\nGovernment\nLocal \nPublic \nOther Institutional Units\n3\nOther cliams\nContigent Assets\nOther Assets\nNon Financial \nCoins\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\nGovernment\nEnterprises\nAssets\n2016\nJan\n1.22\n \n193.28\n734.58\n294.53\n116.1\n25.0\n1,147.0\n28.8\n5.2\n19.1\n28.5\n15.6\n63.6\n3,547.4\n110.2\n582.8\n412.8\n545.1\n7,870.8\nFeb\n1.44\n \n160.35\n763.47\n287.06\n102.8\n25.0\n1,228.9\n29.2\n5.2\n19.0\n25.0\n15.8\n61.1\n3,472.0\n100.5\n477.1\n427.3\n547.6\n7,748.9\nMar\n1.53\n \n179.00\n809.22\n286.42\n148.6\n25.0\n1,225.0\n28.5\n5.1\n16.4\n22.6\n14.2\n103.9\n3,510.6\n59.3\n471.0\n428.0\n552.9\n7,887.2\nApr\n1.55\n \n146.02\n818.74\n323.00\n111.8\n25.0\n1,322.7\n27.6\n5.1\n15.8\n25.1\n15.0\n102.4\n3,453.7\n66.7\n413.7\n445.5\n552.2\n7,871.5\nMay\n1.53\n \n100.12\n973.06\n281.55\n91.0\n25.0\n1,354.1\n26.8\n5.0\n16.6\n12.3\n14.7\n101.1\n3,433.4\n61.0\n397.0\n440.2\n564.1\n7,898.5\nJun\n1.61\n \n124.61\n1,015.85\n287.98\n128.5\n25.0\n1,412.9\n25.9\n0.0\n16.4\n28.1\n14.6\n98.9\n3,414.9\n66.9\n407.7\n431.5\n578.8\n8,080.1\nJul\n1.62\n \n111.03\n1,053.72\n242.57\n147.4\n25.0\n1,450.1\n33.4\n0.0\n16.2\n26.6\n15.4\n100.7\n3,320.9\n74.2\n393.1\n416.7\n592.4\n8,021.1\nAug\n1.58\n \n148.46\n1,177.10\n235.02\n136.0\n25.0\n1,420.2\n32.3\n0.0\n11.3\n22.9\n15.4\n100.5\n3,326.8\n67.8\n390.2\n445.0\n598.3\n8,153.9\nSep\n1.63\n \n96.32\n1,208.28\n310.75\n173.6\n25.0\n1,463.4\n29.0\n5.4\n3.2\n27.3\n14.5\n88.4\n3,349.0\n86.1\n382.3\n448.6\n606.6\n8,319.5\nOct\n1.42\n \n88.60\n1,155.19\n322.05\n162.3\n27.0\n1,517.5\n26.3\n15.4\n3.9\n28.7\n15.5\n88.1\n3,389.7\n68.2\n397.2\n427.7\n609.0\n8,343.8\nNov\n4.57\n \n76.25\n1,318.56\n318.52\n140.9\n27.0\n1,500.7\n22.3\n15.5\n4.6\n17.6\n15.4\n86.1\n3,469.5\n71.9\n350.5\n419.0\n618.2\n8,477.2\nDec\n16.56\n \n107.69\n1,418.99\n378.23\n162.9\n27.0\n1,553.2\n21.0\n15.3\n4.9\n17.8\n13.2\n71.3\n3,265.0\n330.1\n376.7\n408.8\n626.0\n8,814.8\n2017\nJan\n20.21\n \n110.98\n1,454.99\n239.82\n132.7\n27.0\n1,654.5\n20.8\n15.4\n3.6\n15.9\n15.1\n69.2\n3,394.7\n57.5\n395.7\n383.4\n630.4\n8,642.1\nFeb\n19.30\n \n96.84\n1,488.48\n251.83\n145.1\n48.6\n1,714.0\n20.1\n15.5\n3.2\n15.0\n14.9\n68.9\n3,177.9\n236.8\n398.5\n400.0\n631.1\n8,746.0\nMar\n12.56\n \n66.43\n1,485.92\n260.51\n154.9\n53.5\n1,794.1\n18.7\n15.7\n3.8\n15.7\n15.7\n70.7\n3,460.5\n67.2\n422.4\n442.5\n635.1\n8,995.8\nApr\n10.69\n \n67.82\n1,495.25\n249.41\n219.3\n51.4\n1,954.0\n17.8\n15.8\n3.6\n15.8\n16.9\n74.5\n3,449.5\n24.6\n489.1\n398.8\n644.6\n9,199.0\nMay\n13.44\n \n56.94\n1,492.38\n272.47\n170.2\n75.3\n1,968.9\n20.3\n15.7\n33.6\n16.7\n16.3\n72.9\n3,447.8\n82.4\n486.1\n421.7\n644.4\n9,307.6\nJun\n7.36\n \n57.08\n1,674.91\n350.26\n92.1\n110.6\n2,014.2\n19.0\n16.0\n35.0\n47.9\n16.5\n82.9\n3,494.3\n92.8\n533.5\n408.9\n649.6\n9,702.8\nJul\n7.15\n \n45.19\n1,807.42\n302.34\n63.1\n103.6\n1,982.8\n17.2\n26.1\n34.4\n45.2\n16.9\n116.8\n3,417.1\n86.8\n513.6\n432.9\n635.8\n9,654.3\nAug\n12.31\n \n40.58\n2,061.85\n276.55\n165.3\n7.9\n2,100.9\n16.3\n26.3\n64.6\n41.3\n18.0\n145.5\n3,494.5\n78.6\n531.8\n403.7\n639.5\n10,125.5\nSep\n12.00\n \n38.06\n2,110.44\n226.79\n179.7\n31.3\n2,248.9\n16.1\n23.5\n65.0\n41.5\n15.6\n118.8\n3,554.4\n78.0\n472.8\n415.6\n655.1\n10,303.5\nOct\n8.70\n \n41.81\n2,139.31\n254.07\n190.8\n61.0\n2,372.1\n15.4\n24.4\n65.1\n34.8\n17.8\n99.6\n3,599.1\n82.0\n432.4\n459.3\n667.3\n10,564.9\nNov\n9.79\n \n46.09\n2,315.51\n289.76\n184.2\n74.3\n2,487.7\n18.8\n23.5\n65.4\n32.3\n19.6\n107.3\n3,608.7\n76.8\n417.7\n505.6\n672.5\n10,955.5\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2017\nNotes\n1.Government securities includes treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households, other financial corporations.\nTABLE 4.1: OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS -ASSETS\nUS$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \n \n16 \n \n \n \n \nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nCapital\nContigent\nOther\nTOTAL\nand\nLiablities\nLiablities\nEnd of\nDemand\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nRBZ\nOther Depository \nOther Finacial \nReserves\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\n2016\n Jan\n2,487.3\n650.3\n1,536.5\n4,674.2\n388.1\n26.4\n5,088.7\n44.9\n356.5\n0.0\n125.0\n86.0\n1,189.0\n582.8\n397.8\n7,870.76\n \n Feb\n2,466.2\n669.7\n1,552.9\n4,688.8\n375.0\n20.4\n5,084.1\n50.3\n341.1\n0.0\n171.7\n36.4\n1,196.7\n477.1\n391.3\n7,748.89\n \n Mar\n2,566.3\n676.8\n1,592.4\n4,835.5\n371.0\n16.9\n5,223.5\n55.6\n340.1\n0.0\n181.1\n37.3\n1,185.3\n471.0\n393.5\n7,887.24\n \n Apr\n2,629.9\n695.1\n1,568.6\n4,893.7\n332.4\n18.5\n5,244.6\n80.1\n322.6\n0.0\n194.0\n36.9\n1,188.4\n413.7\n391.2\n7,871.55\n \n May\n2,698.3\n690.6\n1,559.5\n4,948.4\n309.8\n19.5\n5,277.7\n71.6\n336.1\n0.0\n143.5\n36.8\n1,238.7\n397.0\n397.2\n7,898.54\n \n Jun\n2,792.4\n660.9\n1,569.2\n5,022.5\n401.4\n25.6\n5,449.5\n81.0\n307.7\n0.0\n159.4\n47.4\n1,243.5\n407.7\n384.0\n8,080.12\n \n Jul\n2,734.8\n722.9\n1,517.7\n4,975.5\n435.1\n50.9\n5,461.5\n71.8\n296.6\n0.0\n129.6\n46.2\n1,256.6\n393.1\n365.6\n8,021.06\n \n Aug\n2,894.5\n639.2\n1,553.3\n5,087.1\n412.3\n46.9\n5,546.3\n80.8\n290.6\n0.0\n127.6\n41.2\n1,271.0\n390.2\n406.1\n8,153.92\n \n Sep\n2,974.8\n679.9\n1,534.9\n5,189.6\n479.7\n43.7\n5,713.0\n74.1\n276.8\n0.0\n151.7\n36.2\n1,276.8\n382.3\n408.4\n8,319.46\n \n Oct\n3,115.2\n605.1\n1,508.9\n5,229.3\n433.8\n43.1\n5,706.1\n73.4\n297.0\n0.0\n162.4\n28.3\n1,293.5\n397.2\n385.9\n8,343.79\n \n Nov\n3,245.5\n640.8\n1,467.6\n5,353.9\n471.9\n46.2\n5,872.0\n43.9\n289.7\n0.0\n142.2\n28.8\n1,313.4\n350.5\n436.9\n8,477.19\n \n Dec\n3,329.8\n702.9\n1,471.7\n5,504.4\n510.9\n42.2\n6,057.4\n62.9\n279.6\n1.8\n191.5\n48.8\n1,384.1\n376.7\n412.1\n8,814.81\n \n2017\n Jan\n3,263.8\n720.5\n1,544.9\n5,529.3\n429.8\n53.1\n6,012.2\n50.6\n271.2\n0.0\n104.5\n41.1\n1,360.2\n395.7\n406.6\n8,642.14\n \n Feb\n3,325.9\n722.0\n1,552.6\n5,600.5\n426.0\n55.3\n6,081.7\n59.3\n270.8\n0.0\n126.1\n43.4\n1,365.8\n398.5\n400.4\n8,746.02\n \n Mar\n3,429.2\n715.7\n1,529.9\n5,674.7\n461.0\n86.9\n6,222.6\n60.2\n249.6\n1.8\n134.9\n41.9\n1,426.8\n422.4\n435.7\n8,995.81\n \n Apr\n3,555.8\n813.7\n1,530.7\n5,900.2\n450.9\n76.2\n6,427.3\n63.3\n251.1\n0.0\n117.4\n41.9\n1,382.2\n489.1\n426.7\n9,199.00\n \n May\n3,593.7\n798.7\n1,558.4\n5,950.8\n454.6\n75.1\n6,480.5\n61.4\n243.5\n0.0\n95.2\n42.2\n1,448.6\n486.1\n450.1\n9,307.64\n \n Jun\n3,851.4\n825.6\n1,538.9\n6,215.9\n497.6\n73.7\n6,787.2\n65.7\n259.5\n0.0\n108.9\n46.6\n1,455.9\n533.5\n445.6\n9,702.82\n \n Jul\n3,845.0\n837.2\n1,600.1\n6,282.3\n503.0\n78.1\n6,863.3\n66.3\n162.2\n0.0\n99.5\n35.6\n1,463.2\n513.6\n450.7\n9,654.29\n \n Aug\n4,257.2\n927.5\n1,604.9\n6,789.6\n451.2\n88.3\n7,329.1\n71.1\n158.2\n0.0\n79.1\n22.8\n1,478.4\n531.8\n454.9\n10,125.48\n \n Sep\n4,622.2\n932.4\n1,571.4\n7,126.0\n383.4\n55.2\n7,564.6\n55.8\n151.1\n0.0\n67.4\n32.1\n1,494.5\n472.8\n465.2\n10,303.53\n \n Oct\n4,825.8\n1,010.8\n1,460.8\n7,297.4\n410.7\n43.1\n7,751.2\n63.0\n153.9\n0.0\n73.1\n42.0\n1,537.5\n432.4\n511.7\n10,564.89\n \n Nov\n5,090.7\n1,047.9\n1,450.2\n7,588.7\n454.9\n34.7\n8,078.3\n66.5\n151.3\n0.0\n84.5\n60.2\n1,562.7\n417.7\n534.3\n10,955.47\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2017\nTABLE 4.2 : OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS - LIABILITIES \nDeposits\nAmounts Owing to\nUS$ millions\n \n \n \n17 \n \n \n \n \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nForeign\nBond\nNotes\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \nLocal\nPublic\nOther \nContigent \nNon Financial \n Notes &\n&\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment1\nLocal Governemt\nPublic Enterprises\nOther2\nGovernment\nGovernment\nEnterprises\n Institutional Units3\nOther claims\nAssets\nOther Assets\nAssets\nCoins\nCoin\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\n2016\nJan\n1.05\n \n171.98\n667.53\n119.20\n105.6\n25.0\n1,039.4\n0.0\n5.2\n19.1\n28.5\n15.6\n62.6\n2,703.9\n61.5\n582.8\n278.8\n396.6\n6,284.4\nFeb\n1.21\n \n140.75\n702.19\n96.28\n93.1\n25.0\n1,128.1\n0.0\n5.2\n19.0\n25.0\n15.8\n60.1\n2,615.0\n62.1\n477.1\n292.8\n399.3\n6,158.2\nMar\n1.31\n \n161.90\n734.53\n96.34\n131.7\n25.0\n1,143.3\n0.0\n5.1\n16.4\n22.6\n14.2\n102.9\n2,618.9\n62.6\n471.0\n298.0\n405.1\n6,311.1\nApr\n1.35\n \n135.51\n778.19\n135.47\n108.3\n25.0\n1,200.9\n0.0\n5.1\n15.8\n25.1\n15.0\n101.5\n2,573.6\n69.6\n413.7\n309.7\n404.7\n6,318.6\nMay\n1.38\n \n89.57\n891.44\n130.52\n85.3\n25.0\n1,229.5\n0.0\n5.0\n16.6\n12.3\n14.7\n100.1\n2,534.2\n64.0\n397.0\n302.2\n413.8\n6,312.8\nJun\n1.42\n \n108.53\n934.42\n84.65\n123.2\n25.0\n1,279.0\n0.0\n0.0\n16.4\n28.1\n14.6\n97.9\n2,523.7\n64.1\n407.7\n299.0\n431.6\n6,439.3\nJul\n1.45\n \n101.74\n977.63\n79.50\n141.3\n25.0\n1,316.9\n0.0\n0.0\n16.2\n26.6\n15.4\n99.7\n2,414.7\n65.7\n393.1\n284.0\n440.7\n6,399.6\nAug\n1.36\n \n140.23\n1,074.47\n97.53\n131.9\n25.0\n1,297.4\n0.0\n0.0\n11.3\n22.9\n15.4\n99.5\n2,414.8\n67.3\n390.2\n313.6\n447.3\n6,550.2\nSep\n1.40\n \n91.63\n1,122.67\n143.91\n169.6\n25.0\n1,331.9\n0.0\n5.4\n3.2\n27.3\n14.5\n87.3\n2,451.9\n71.4\n382.3\n317.3\n455.9\n6,702.6\nOct\n1.27\n \n81.03\n1,090.44\n130.20\n155.1\n27.0\n1,376.2\n0.0\n15.4\n3.9\n28.7\n15.5\n87.1\n2,472.1\n66.0\n397.2\n293.2\n458.2\n6,698.6\nNov\n4.24\n \n69.45\n1,242.12\n103.17\n136.3\n27.0\n1,349.8\n0.0\n15.5\n4.6\n17.6\n15.4\n85.2\n2,511.0\n68.5\n350.5\n285.6\n466.2\n6,752.2\nDec\n14.07\n \n98.95\n1,306.91\n134.35\n156.7\n27.0\n1,416.0\n0.0\n15.3\n4.9\n17.8\n13.2\n70.4\n2,380.1\n273.8\n376.7\n274.2\n473.4\n7,053.8\n2017\nJan\n17.72\n \n103.75\n1,322.38\n81.89\n128.2\n27.0\n1,485.0\n0.0\n15.4\n3.6\n15.9\n15.1\n68.6\n2,467.7\n53.9\n395.7\n251.9\n479.3\n6,933.1\nFeb\n16.29\n \n89.44\n1,396.07\n96.11\n137.3\n48.6\n1,502.5\n0.0\n15.5\n3.2\n15.0\n14.9\n68.2\n2,238.9\n239.7\n398.5\n266.0\n480.1\n7,026.4\nMar\n10.74\n \n63.27\n1,421.43\n83.18\n150.7\n53.5\n1,578.7\n0.0\n15.7\n3.8\n15.7\n15.7\n69.9\n2,554.3\n23.7\n422.4\n314.5\n484.0\n7,281.0\nApr\n9.82\n \n64.14\n1,383.44\n75.92\n209.0\n51.4\n1,744.4\n0.0\n15.8\n3.6\n15.8\n16.9\n74.0\n2,493.3\n26.4\n489.1\n263.7\n492.6\n7,429.3\nMay\n12.36\n \n52.63\n1,376.30\n119.89\n159.1\n75.3\n1,739.8\n0.0\n15.7\n33.6\n16.7\n16.3\n72.4\n2,528.3\n28.4\n486.1\n290.7\n492.0\n7,515.6\nJun\n7.01\n \n53.33\n1,578.51\n141.42\n82.2\n110.6\n1,786.8\n0.0\n16.0\n35.0\n47.9\n16.5\n82.2\n2,583.5\n23.9\n533.5\n273.6\n497.3\n7,869.2\nJul\n6.71\n \n40.92\n1,684.48\n137.62\n53.7\n103.6\n1,752.4\n0.0\n26.1\n34.4\n45.2\n16.9\n116.3\n2,495.4\n24.2\n513.6\n295.5\n482.1\n7,829.0\nAug\n11.80\n \n37.09\n1,882.39\n124.33\n161.2\n7.9\n1,856.2\n0.0\n26.3\n64.6\n41.3\n18.0\n145.0\n2,538.1\n23.8\n531.8\n272.6\n485.7\n8,228.1\nSep\n11.43\n \n35.83\n1,961.76\n109.59\n172.7\n31.3\n1,998.0\n0.0\n23.5\n65.0\n41.5\n15.6\n118.2\n2,585.7\n28.3\n472.8\n281.3\n487.7\n8,440.0\nOct\n8.10\n \n40.49\n1,961.82\n143.68\n175.7\n61.0\n2,106.6\n0.0\n24.4\n65.1\n34.8\n17.8\n99.1\n2,607.0\n29.4\n432.4\n287.8\n508.9\n8,604.1\nNov\n9.04\n \n45.09\n2,126.74\n161.14\n174.7\n74.3\n2,230.4\n0.0\n23.5\n65.4\n32.3\n19.6\n106.9\n2,618.1\n26.4\n417.7\n324.2\n511.4\n8,966.9\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2017\nNotes\n1.Government securities include treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households, other financial corporations, \nTABLE 5.1: COMMERCIAL BANKS -ASSETS\nUS$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \n \n18 \n \n \n \nUS$ millions\nEnd of\nDemand\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nCapital\nContigent\nOther\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\nand\nLiablities\nLiablities\nTOTAL\nReserves\n2016\n Jan\n2,428.8\n278.8\n967.1\n3674.77\n340.4\n24.7\n4,039.9\n33.6\n313.2\n0.0\n50.3\n85.3\n871.3\n582.8\n308.0\n6,284.43\n \n Feb\n2,407.9\n290.0\n984.9\n3682.68\n337.3\n18.8\n4,038.7\n38.4\n298.9\n0.0\n91.0\n35.0\n878.1\n477.1\n301.0\n6,158.19\n \n Mar\n2,508.0\n288.3\n1,026.9\n3823.12\n345.4\n15.4\n4,183.9\n43.2\n303.1\n0.0\n100.2\n36.1\n886.6\n471.0\n287.1\n6,311.15\n \n Apr\n2,571.6\n297.5\n1,014.8\n3883.80\n306.8\n16.9\n4,207.6\n67.7\n285.7\n0.0\n119.4\n36.1\n893.9\n413.7\n294.4\n6,318.60\n \n May\n2,639.9\n280.6\n1,042.8\n3963.37\n275.1\n17.9\n4,256.4\n57.9\n300.0\n0.0\n66.3\n36.1\n908.9\n397.0\n290.1\n6,312.76\n \n Jun\n2,734.1\n268.2\n1,019.8\n4022.09\n331.6\n24.0\n4,377.6\n67.9\n272.3\n0.0\n77.8\n44.3\n915.7\n407.7\n276.0\n6,439.33\n \n Jul\n2,676.5\n334.1\n987.4\n3997.93\n361.0\n33.8\n4,392.8\n58.2\n261.0\n0.0\n56.9\n45.8\n922.1\n393.1\n269.8\n6,399.63\n \n Aug\n2,836.2\n285.6\n1,009.5\n4131.35\n341.3\n29.3\n4,501.9\n67.0\n257.0\n0.0\n51.1\n40.9\n932.3\n390.2\n309.8\n6,550.23\n \n Sep\n2,915.9\n334.9\n987.8\n4238.62\n393.9\n25.8\n4,658.3\n62.9\n246.3\n0.0\n69.3\n35.9\n944.5\n382.3\n303.2\n6,702.64\n \n Oct\n3,056.4\n267.0\n940.9\n4264.34\n344.5\n25.0\n4,633.9\n60.0\n267.7\n0.0\n74.5\n27.9\n954.5\n397.2\n283.0\n6,698.61\n \n Nov\n3,186.7\n254.5\n896.9\n4338.05\n382.5\n28.0\n4,748.6\n29.3\n260.0\n0.0\n51.4\n28.2\n966.9\n350.5\n317.3\n6,752.22\n \n Dec\n3,271.3\n285.7\n896.0\n4452.99\n418.3\n19.6\n4,890.9\n47.1\n250.7\n1.8\n111.6\n48.2\n1,032.7\n376.7\n294.0\n7,053.81\n \n2017\n Jan\n3,205.0\n317.1\n981.8\n4503.86\n348.3\n30.4\n4,882.6\n36.9\n242.1\n0.0\n38.0\n40.4\n1,005.1\n395.7\n292.2\n6,933.07\n \n Feb\n3,267.0\n318.3\n977.1\n4562.41\n349.8\n32.6\n4,944.9\n47.5\n243.9\n0.0\n63.7\n42.9\n1,007.7\n398.5\n277.4\n7,026.43\n \n Mar\n3,370.3\n313.3\n965.3\n4648.90\n390.8\n64.2\n5,103.9\n50.6\n225.6\n1.8\n66.3\n41.5\n1,061.6\n422.4\n307.3\n7,281.03\n \n Apr\n3,496.9\n328.5\n960.8\n4786.12\n380.3\n54.3\n5,220.7\n52.8\n228.3\n0.0\n63.3\n41.7\n1,034.4\n489.1\n299.0\n7,429.28\n \n May\n3,534.8\n331.2\n979.7\n4845.74\n384.0\n53.4\n5,283.1\n50.8\n220.4\n0.0\n29.0\n41.9\n1,092.7\n486.1\n311.6\n7,515.61\n \n Jun\n3,792.5\n332.7\n949.8\n5075.08\n423.9\n51.7\n5,550.7\n54.9\n237.5\n0.0\n43.7\n45.8\n1,095.2\n533.5\n308.0\n7,869.22\n \n Jul\n3,786.1\n326.0\n1,021.7\n5133.85\n432.5\n56.2\n5,622.6\n55.3\n140.0\n0.0\n42.2\n35.3\n1,096.8\n513.6\n323.2\n7,829.03\n \n Aug\n4,198.3\n342.7\n1,010.3\n5551.37\n380.7\n66.3\n5,998.3\n58.3\n136.9\n0.0\n41.8\n22.5\n1,116.1\n531.8\n322.4\n8,228.06\n \n Sep\n4,561.7\n355.5\n1,003.7\n5920.98\n303.1\n32.7\n6,256.8\n42.3\n133.7\n0.0\n50.4\n31.9\n1,129.8\n472.8\n322.3\n8,440.05\n \n Oct\n4,771.6\n340.7\n927.8\n6040.15\n329.8\n21.1\n6,391.1\n50.8\n127.5\n0.0\n52.5\n41.7\n1,167.6\n432.4\n340.5\n8,604.14\n \n Nov\n5,036.5\n380.1\n918.9\n6335.46\n349.5\n12.7\n6,697.6\n54.0\n124.7\n0.0\n61.8\n59.9\n1,189.6\n417.7\n361.6\n8,966.85\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2017\nTABLE 5.2 : COMMERCIAL BANKS - LIABILITIES\nDeposits\nAmounts Owing to\n \n \n \n19 \n \n \nForeign\nOther Assets\nNon Financial \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nNotes\nAssets\nBond\n&\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \n Notes &\nCoin\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment1\nLocal Governemt\nPublic Enterprises\nOther2\nMortgages\nGovernment\nOther\nCoins\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\n2016\nJan\n0.13\n \n17.39\n52.89\n174.89\n10.0\n0.0\n76.6\n28.8\n0.0\n0.0\n332.8\n0.0\n424.2\n107.9\n119.7\n1,345.3\nFeb\n0.20\n \n18.23\n51.29\n188.70\n9.2\n0.0\n65.6\n29.2\n0.0\n0.0\n330.2\n0.0\n428.9\n110.4\n119.6\n1,351.6\nMar\n0.19\n \n15.08\n63.72\n189.76\n16.6\n0.0\n50.8\n28.5\n0.0\n0.0\n345.4\n0.0\n407.7\n105.9\n119.4\n1,343.1\nApr\n0.19\n \n9.46\n24.44\n186.02\n3.4\n0.0\n90.9\n27.6\n0.0\n0.0\n332.5\n0.0\n406.6\n111.4\n119.2\n1,311.8\nMay\n0.14\n \n7.35\n65.79\n148.67\n5.5\n0.0\n93.3\n26.8\n0.0\n0.0\n339.8\n0.0\n421.5\n114.2\n122.3\n1,345.3\nJun\n0.18\n \n12.92\n66.94\n200.92\n5.2\n0.0\n103.7\n25.9\n0.0\n0.0\n353.3\n0.0\n402.0\n107.4\n119.3\n1,397.7\nJul\n0.16\n \n8.30\n63.25\n162.33\n5.7\n0.0\n101.6\n33.4\n0.0\n0.0\n346.8\n0.0\n426.1\n107.3\n123.8\n1,378.9\nAug\n0.20\n \n7.54\n84.78\n136.50\n4.1\n0.0\n95.1\n32.3\n0.0\n0.0\n353.4\n0.0\n416.6\n105.8\n123.4\n1,359.7\nSep\n0.21\n \n4.16\n67.01\n165.80\n3.8\n0.0\n95.5\n29.0\n0.0\n0.0\n354.4\n0.0\n417.1\n105.4\n123.3\n1,365.6\nOct\n0.12\n \n7.23\n52.19\n191.21\n6.8\n0.0\n100.9\n26.3\n0.0\n0.0\n356.9\n0.0\n427.0\n108.8\n123.4\n1,400.9\nNov\n0.14\n \n6.44\n54.76\n214.60\n3.9\n0.0\n114.9\n22.3\n0.0\n0.0\n381.2\n0.0\n444.9\n108.8\n124.7\n1,476.7\nDec\n1.72\n \n8.05\n89.65\n243.77\n5.1\n0.0\n91.3\n21.0\n0.0\n0.0\n379.8\n0.0\n430.2\n110.0\n124.4\n1,505.1\n2017\nJan\n2.35\n \n7.02\n109.63\n157.70\n4.3\n0.0\n123.7\n20.8\n0.0\n0.0\n389.1\n0.0\n406.1\n106.3\n124.4\n1,451.4\nFeb\n1.19\n \n7.29\n69.26\n155.60\n7.4\n0.0\n162.0\n20.1\n0.0\n0.0\n394.4\n0.0\n410.1\n109.0\n124.2\n1,460.4\nMar\n1.65\n \n3.07\n35.53\n177.16\n4.0\n0.0\n164.2\n18.7\n0.0\n0.0\n404.4\n0.0\n413.0\n102.8\n124.2\n1,448.6\nApr\n0.74\n \n3.56\n73.43\n173.28\n9.8\n0.0\n158.6\n17.8\n0.0\n0.0\n392.5\n0.0\n432.3\n109.7\n125.1\n1,496.8\nMay\n0.92\n \n3.94\n81.47\n152.32\n10.8\n0.0\n168.2\n20.3\n0.0\n0.0\n394.4\n0.0\n451.1\n105.9\n126.1\n1,515.4\nJun\n0.34\n \n3.66\n65.90\n208.75\n9.8\n0.0\n165.3\n19.0\n0.0\n0.0\n387.6\n0.0\n452.9\n109.6\n126.0\n1,548.8\nJul\n0.39\n \n3.93\n105.83\n164.58\n9.2\n0.0\n168.4\n17.2\n0.0\n0.0\n391.9\n0.0\n451.9\n110.9\n127.3\n1,551.5\nAug\n0.44\n \n3.09\n142.75\n152.03\n3.9\n0.0\n186.7\n16.3\n0.0\n0.0\n409.3\n0.0\n465.5\n104.7\n127.2\n1,611.9\nSep\n0.56\n \n1.82\n108.41\n116.96\n6.7\n0.0\n193.0\n16.1\n0.0\n0.0\n412.7\n0.0\n475.2\n113.4\n130.1\n1,574.8\nOct\n0.57\n \n1.15\n145.68\n110.02\n14.8\n0.0\n193.9\n15.4\n0.0\n0.0\n420.7\n0.0\n493.6\n149.9\n130.4\n1,676.0\nNov\n0.75\n \n0.90\n138.84\n128.42\n8.7\n0.0\n193.6\n18.8\n0.0\n0.0\n420.9\n0.0\n489.0\n160.4\n133.0\n1,693.3\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2017\nNotes\n1.Government securities include treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households, other financial corporations, \nTABLE 6.1: BUILDING SOCIETIES -ASSETS\nUS$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \n \n20 \n \n \n \nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nCapital\nOther\nTOTAL\nand\nLiablities\nEnd of\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nReserves\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\n2016\n Jan\n297.8\n534.3\n832.14\n47.2\n0.1\n879.4\n22.6\n43.3\n0.0\n74.7\n0.0\n292.9\n32.3\n1,345.27\n \n Feb\n305.9\n533.4\n839.34\n37.2\n0.1\n876.6\n23.2\n42.3\n0.0\n80.7\n0.9\n296.3\n31.5\n1,351.56\n \n Mar\n314.1\n531.2\n845.28\n25.1\n0.0\n870.4\n23.6\n37.0\n0.0\n80.9\n0.8\n284.3\n46.0\n1,343.06\n \n Apr\n317.6\n520.8\n838.41\n25.1\n0.0\n863.5\n23.7\n36.9\n0.0\n74.6\n0.5\n278.8\n33.9\n1,311.79\n \n May\n330.8\n480.5\n811.31\n34.1\n0.0\n845.5\n25.0\n36.2\n0.0\n77.2\n0.5\n315.5\n45.5\n1,345.27\n \n Jun\n313.1\n511.6\n824.71\n69.2\n0.0\n893.9\n24.4\n35.4\n0.0\n81.5\n3.1\n313.1\n46.3\n1,397.68\n \n Jul\n313.4\n490.8\n804.18\n74.0\n15.5\n893.7\n24.8\n35.7\n0.0\n72.7\n0.4\n318.2\n33.4\n1,378.87\n \n Aug\n278.7\n503.6\n782.31\n71.0\n16.1\n869.4\n25.1\n33.6\n0.0\n76.5\n0.4\n321.5\n33.3\n1,359.67\n \n Sep\n270.8\n507.3\n778.11\n85.7\n16.4\n880.2\n22.5\n30.5\n0.0\n82.4\n0.3\n314.1\n35.5\n1,365.62\n \n Oct\n267.3\n525.9\n793.19\n89.2\n16.4\n898.9\n24.6\n29.4\n0.0\n87.8\n0.4\n319.7\n40.1\n1,400.87\n \n Nov\n311.8\n529.0\n840.82\n89.4\n16.5\n946.7\n25.8\n29.6\n0.0\n90.8\n0.6\n326.4\n56.8\n1,476.66\n \n Dec\n339.5\n532.9\n872.41\n92.6\n16.6\n981.6\n27.0\n28.8\n0.0\n79.9\n0.5\n330.3\n56.9\n1,505.10\n \n2017\n Jan\n326.2\n522.1\n848.23\n81.5\n16.6\n946.4\n25.0\n29.1\n0.0\n66.5\n0.7\n332.1\n51.7\n1,451.40\n \n Feb\n326.1\n534.4\n860.48\n76.2\n16.6\n953.3\n23.1\n27.0\n0.0\n62.4\n0.5\n334.5\n59.7\n1,460.43\n \n Mar\n319.7\n523.2\n842.91\n70.2\n16.7\n929.9\n20.9\n24.0\n0.0\n68.5\n0.3\n340.7\n64.3\n1,448.62\n \n Apr\n399.6\n527.1\n926.64\n70.6\n16.0\n1,013.2\n21.8\n22.8\n0.0\n54.0\n0.2\n322.5\n62.3\n1,496.83\n \n May\n378.0\n536.0\n914.03\n70.7\n16.1\n1,000.8\n21.8\n23.0\n0.0\n66.2\n0.4\n325.8\n77.4\n1,515.45\n \n Jun\n401.8\n544.4\n946.24\n70.7\n16.5\n1,033.4\n22.0\n22.0\n0.0\n65.2\n0.8\n330.0\n75.4\n1,548.79\n \n Jul\n430.3\n531.5\n961.78\n70.4\n16.1\n1,048.3\n22.2\n22.2\n0.0\n57.3\n0.3\n334.5\n66.8\n1,551.54\n \n Aug\n495.3\n546.5\n1041.77\n70.6\n16.3\n1,128.6\n24.0\n21.3\n0.0\n37.4\n0.4\n328.9\n71.4\n1,611.94\n \n Sep\n488.5\n517.9\n1006.46\n80.3\n16.7\n1,103.4\n24.8\n17.4\n0.0\n17.0\n0.2\n334.0\n78.0\n1,574.82\n \n Oct\n583.1\n475.2\n1058.27\n80.9\n16.2\n1,155.4\n23.4\n26.4\n0.0\n20.6\n0.3\n338.0\n111.8\n1,675.97\n \n Nov\n570.3\n473.5\n1043.76\n105.4\n16.3\n1,165.4\n23.7\n26.6\n0.0\n22.7\n0.3\n341.5\n113.0\n1,693.33\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2017\nAmounts Owing to\nTABLE 6.2: BUILDING SOCIETIES -LIABILITIES\nUS$ millions\n \n \n \n21 \n \n \n \n \nAGRICULTURE\nCONSTRUCTION\nCOMMUNICATION\nDISTRIBUTION\nFINANCIAL &\nFINANCIAL\nMANUFACTURING\nMINING\nSERVICES\nTRANSPORT\nINDIVIDUALS\nCONGLOMERATES\nTOTAL\nEND OF\n \n \n \nINVESTMENTS\nORGANISATIONS\n \n \n \n \n2016\nJan\n577,684.4\n35,033.6\n35,535.9\n379,618.2\n13,329.2\n68,325.8\n476,677.0\n158,150.5\n410,992.6\n40,295.6\n535,379.3\n380.2\n2,731,402.2\nFeb\n539,562.8\n35,885.1\n37,857.4\n374,835.1\n13,285.9\n63,301.8\n473,970.3\n155,889.4\n415,520.6\n40,862.5\n531,789.5\n365.3\n2,683,125.7\nMar\n586,349.7\n39,180.5\n41,037.5\n371,809.6\n13,397.9\n63,061.4\n444,769.1\n156,209.2\n402,900.5\n44,606.7\n588,882.7\n410.7\n2,752,615.5\nApr\n527,545.8\n46,612.5\n40,624.2\n379,572.0\n13,428.1\n69,469.7\n437,795.4\n142,682.1\n421,335.6\n43,921.4\n645,037.3\n9,410.0\n2,777,434.0\nMay\n522,239.8\n40,194.4\n38,496.8\n358,042.5\n13,280.8\n65,381.2\n439,295.5\n145,180.0\n401,304.1\n41,908.5\n651,719.3\n9,579.0\n2,726,621.9\nJun\n510,016.8\n39,316.9\n36,866.1\n361,138.1\n12,764.5\n68,850.3\n433,145.3\n143,595.6\n476,484.5\n42,179.6\n650,071.4\n9,739.2\n2,784,168.3\nJul\n501,744.6\n43,266.6\n12,746.6\n287,960.5\n11,403.0\n64,344.7\n423,354.4\n141,639.6\n489,050.6\n40,059.9\n652,366.8\n9,804.6\n2,677,741.9\nAug\n498,489.6\n43,265.5\n26,005.4\n295,108.0\n11,957.4\n69,959.8\n423,824.7\n139,556.7\n458,763.3\n44,237.3\n636,726.8\n10,497.1\n2,658,391.5\nSep\n487,504.2\n42,900.7\n20,644.2\n338,165.8\n11,960.4\n154,582.0\n409,891.0\n142,259.6\n400,059.8\n40,609.7\n636,000.8\n11,273.3\n2,695,851.5\nOct\n513,303.7\n44,348.8\n23,814.1\n333,709.5\n11,968.6\n70,984.3\n418,465.3\n152,571.6\n456,867.4\n45,511.4\n637,546.1\n11,122.2\n2,720,213.0\nNov\n526,709.8\n42,580.2\n22,481.4\n338,556.1\n11,358.7\n72,491.9\n413,849.2\n152,092.3\n464,279.4\n42,762.1\n641,080.5\n10,545.5\n2,738,787.0\nDec\n436,452.3\n41,297.5\n19,541.4\n311,503.1\n11,668.9\n327,576.0\n377,945.5\n134,516.0\n415,801.6\n36,867.2\n613,022.6\n10,287.7\n2,736,479.6\n2017\nJan\n448,344.7\n41,732.8\n22,069.3\n264,734.2\n12,019.3\n270,117.2\n350,757.1\n144,447.3\n394,945.0\n40,975.0\n591,245.7\n11,489.3\n2,592,877.1\nFeb\n436,206.2\n40,112.3\n24,467.5\n269,358.3\n12,146.8\n272,314.8\n361,416.8\n143,990.4\n373,445.1\n40,250.7\n568,686.3\n11,227.9\n2,553,623.0\nMar\n425,496.8\n54,688.4\n25,533.4\n275,500.1\n12,241.8\n290,985.3\n349,722.5\n159,101.0\n359,672.5\n37,864.1\n572,233.3\n13,047.7\n2,576,086.9\nApr\n426,696.6\n43,836.6\n18,145.2\n340,025.3\n12,219.1\n271,824.0\n360,945.8\n134,101.0\n350,475.1\n42,208.4\n571,000.5\n12,492.9\n2,583,970.5\nMay\n428,874.0\n43,427.0\n16,689.0\n322,695.4\n12,252.6\n269,976.3\n360,929.9\n117,479.9\n354,102.7\n41,337.5\n569,798.9\n11,923.7\n2,549,487.0\nJun\n431,677.5\n45,018.0\n16,989.2\n311,641.4\n14,435.6\n266,917.5\n343,590.2\n126,542.8\n417,469.8\n37,849.5\n595,749.5\n12,001.6\n2,619,882.5\nJul\n459,128.0\n52,500.1\n11,717.0\n255,319.0\n14,541.0\n255,591.2\n311,364.4\n131,420.5\n422,799.8\n39,630.7\n609,112.5\n14,464.3\n2,577,588.5\nAug\n457,861.9\n52,622.6\n11,736.0\n262,602.7\n17,438.9\n256,802.3\n313,868.5\n138,714.9\n420,653.6\n41,089.3\n617,686.4\n15,194.2\n2,606,271.3\nSep\n457,157.2\n48,477.1\n12,117.9\n340,506.4\n21,660.1\n265,082.3\n331,929.6\n124,822.8\n393,491.3\n41,117.0\n619,867.0\n16,061.2\n2,672,289.8\nOct\n460,475.1\n46,588.0\n12,273.6\n329,020.8\n21,810.6\n262,118.2\n317,587.0\n126,041.6\n383,374.3\n41,351.4\n634,561.2\n16,061.2\n2,651,263.1\nNov\n477,486.1\n46,318.3\n12,005.2\n323,990.0\n21,811.0\n261,421.1\n316,225.5\n123,307.2\n379,542.7\n32,215.3\n649,034.3\n16,061.2\n2,659,418.0\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2017\n/1 Including the only merchant bank still in operation.\nTABLE 7.1 : SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS LOANS AND ADVANCES/1\nUS$ ('000)\n \n \n \n22 \n \n \n \nEND OF\nAGRICULTURE CONSTRUCTION COMMUNICATIONS\nDISTRIBUTION\nFINANCIAL &\nFINANCIAL\nMANUFACTURING\nMINING\nSERVICES\nTRANSPORT\nINDIVIDUALS\nCONGLOMERATES\nTOTAL\nINVESTMENTS ORGANISATIONS\n2016\nJan\n231,827.3\n101,724.1\n93,544.2\n465,089.7\n325,203.1\n977,272.1\n345,812.2\n62,026.3\n1,083,702.7\n61,755.6\n618,080.1\n58,808.7\n4,424,846.1\nFeb\n226,568.3\n105,747.9\n97,684.4\n518,411.4\n339,839.0\n896,869.2\n326,026.0\n59,381.3\n1,047,904.6\n63,248.3\n634,478.3\n63,017.8\n4,379,176.4\nMar\n243,546.9\n102,238.4\n116,471.1\n517,089.2\n362,058.8\n879,340.8\n368,689.6\n60,514.0\n1,073,567.6\n62,839.4\n642,779.4\n61,037.6\n4,490,172.8\nApr\n243,151.6\n102,234.0\n112,219.5\n525,070.9\n360,299.5\n907,855.6\n335,068.6\n71,721.0\n1,156,122.6\n63,858.0\n628,901.1\n61,087.0\n4,567,589.5\nMay\n236,180.5\n97,008.6\n120,726.3\n582,943.5\n371,034.5\n923,580.9\n356,500.9\n99,176.4\n1,107,956.8\n61,396.5\n607,501.4\n64,066.3\n4,628,072.5\nJun\n218,386.8\n103,914.2\n134,181.8\n569,660.7\n362,400.2\n973,333.3\n316,490.8\n58,856.9\n1,128,688.7\n72,063.3\n601,813.8\n61,833.2\n4,601,623.8\nJul\n207,280.2\n99,727.9\n138,781.2\n593,284.9\n348,779.7\n1,035,697.0\n370,456.9\n63,986.1\n1,114,413.7\n65,391.9\n622,329.2\n69,058.9\n4,729,187.8\nAug\n233,004.5\n97,248.8\n153,590.8\n596,904.8\n365,366.8\n997,123.0\n356,522.0\n64,413.7\n1,227,979.0\n67,005.8\n621,307.8\n73,076.2\n4,853,543.2\nSep\n236,724.3\n101,117.1\n155,483.5\n616,359.8\n346,375.9\n1,046,195.2\n366,312.8\n57,885.0\n1,365,673.5\n73,805.9\n595,219.8\n70,669.7\n5,031,822.4\nOct\n239,373.9\n107,235.7\n160,641.2\n578,487.3\n344,681.9\n988,274.7\n363,815.8\n63,998.0\n1,384,083.2\n76,834.0\n593,827.7\n73,608.8\n4,974,862.2\nNov\n318,652.7\n107,089.5\n189,581.3\n597,290.0\n329,147.3\n992,135.7\n411,467.8\n150,691.6\n1,337,295.6\n79,405.2\n591,639.0\n71,016.3\n5,175,412.0\nDec\n258,814.9\n110,009.2\n202,260.4\n593,362.2\n348,457.0\n1,020,795.0\n382,615.8\n81,542.7\n1,466,867.2\n82,186.5\n592,932.5\n76,874.9\n5,216,718.4\n \n2017\nJan\n236,437.3\n108,552.5\n230,965.4\n618,213.5\n339,580.3\n1,002,775.4\n382,746.3\n86,115.0\n1,393,941.2\n82,670.8\n589,549.9\n85,602.3\n5,157,150.0\nFeb\n254,463.9\n112,294.4\n226,877.9\n613,080.1\n312,948.5\n997,181.2\n393,542.8\n121,798.7\n1,402,647.6\n91,521.7\n604,325.0\n84,653.3\n5,215,335.3\nMar\n299,519.0\n118,530.1\n232,990.6\n626,986.6\n308,297.9\n1,049,255.7\n402,864.2\n170,835.1\n1,400,323.5\n102,287.7\n610,024.4\n91,046.0\n5,412,960.9\nApr\n281,219.8\n117,174.3\n235,093.5\n687,962.2\n307,711.4\n1,013,362.6\n400,018.9\n190,005.8\n1,432,953.1\n110,258.7\n650,595.9\n102,681.0\n5,529,037.2\nMay\n301,531.2\n113,685.5\n220,541.8\n679,781.4\n320,878.2\n1,019,941.1\n417,418.5\n175,383.4\n1,454,718.3\n108,366.5\n667,019.7\n71,770.2\n5,551,035.8\nJun\n295,920.4\n109,938.0\n248,436.3\n712,648.0\n334,368.7\n1,121,023.5\n408,604.0\n185,262.3\n1,521,876.3\n107,327.1\n697,997.7\n74,195.4\n5,817,597.8\nJul\n309,864.7\n126,628.5\n262,827.7\n587,617.1\n341,371.5\n1,143,423.8\n423,846.6\n191,273.6\n1,599,344.4\n99,509.8\n680,622.6\n76,164.4\n5,842,494.6\nAug\n302,611.3\n149,014.9\n296,550.6\n914,686.8\n346,236.8\n1,131,207.5\n453,584.0\n169,521.2\n1,562,637.2\n111,394.6\n746,644.5\n90,999.4\n6,275,088.8\nSep\n348,786.3\n146,383.0\n286,092.4\n796,517.1\n340,224.7\n1,072,979.9\n571,373.7\n211,077.0\n1,705,640.6\n122,645.6\n747,874.4\n72,255.0\n6,421,849.6\nOct\n345,521.0\n138,274.9\n238,975.9\n778,597.1\n355,135.9\n1,138,203.7\n565,046.4\n259,285.2\n1,694,691.4\n123,908.8\n741,652.0\n72,255.0\n6,451,547.3\nNov\n336,339.3\n144,708.5\n239,524.3\n927,820.8\n362,515.4\n986,824.6\n629,010.4\n250,132.7\n1,694,043.5\n131,768.3\n761,400.5\n72,255.0\n6,536,343.3\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2017\n TABLE 7.2: SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS DEPOSITS \nUS$ ('000)\n \n23 \n \n \nEnd Period\nNominal Lending \nRates 1\nIndividuals \nCorporate\n2016 \nJan\n6.00-22.00\n12.08 \n7.38 \nFeb\n4.00-22.00\n11.48 \n7.29 \nMar\n4.00-22.00\n11.44 \n7.16 \nApr\n4.00-22.00\n11.50 \n7.20 \nMay\n4.00-18.00\n11.43 \n7.35 \nJun\n4.00-18.00\n11.40 \n7.48 \nJul\n4.00-18.00\n10.69 \n6.79 \nAug\n4.00-18.00\n10.67 \n6.84 \nSep\n4.00-18.00\n10.66 \n6.95 \nOct\n4.00-18.00\n10.70 \n6.93 \nNov\n4.00-18.00\n10.69 \n6.99 \nDec\n4.00-18.00\n10.59 \n6.87 \n2017 \nJan\n4.00-18.00\n10.61 \n6.68 \nFeb\n4.00-18.00\n10.06 \n6.52 \nMar\n4.00-18.00\n9.12 \n7.02 \nApr\n4.00-18.00\n9.25 \n7.02 \nMay\n4.00-18.00\n9.17 \n7.03 \nJun\n4.00-18.00\n9.01 \n7.05 \nJul\n4.00-18.00\n8.94 \n7.05 \nAug\n4.00-18.00\n8.88 \n6.95 \nSep\n4.45-18.00\n8.86 \n7.01 \nOct\n4.45-18.00\n9.66 \n7.06 \nNov\n4.45-18.00\n9.66 \n7.03 \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2017\nNotes\nTABLE 8.1: LENDING RATES (percent per annum)\n1. Nominal lending rates depict the range of rates quoted by banks.\nCommercial Banks\nRates\n \n \n \n24 \n \n \nEND OF\nSAVINGS\n3 MONTHS\n2016 \nJan\n0.50-8.00\n0.75-17.00\nFeb\n0.50-8.00\n0.75-17.00\nMar\n0.50-8.00\n0.75-17.00\nApr\n0.50-8.00\n0.75-17.00\nMay\n0.50-8.00\n0.75-17.00\nJun\n0.50-6.00\n0.75-17.00\nJul\n0.50-6.00\n0.75-17.00\nAug\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-17.00\nSep\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-17.00\nOct\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-17.00\nNov\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-17.00\nDec\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-17.00\n2017 \nJan\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-17.00\nFeb\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-17.00\nMar\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-17.00\nApr\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-17.00\nMay\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-9.50**\nJun\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-12.00\nJul\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-12.00\nAug\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-12.00\nSep\n0.50-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nOct\n0.50-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nNov\n0.5-12.00\n0.75-8.00\n Source:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2017\n* Deposit rates depict the range of rates qouted by banks. \n **Banks have adjusted their costs of holding deposits following the call by the RB\nTABLE 8.2 : BANK DEPOSIT RATES (percent per annum)\nCOMMERCIAL BANKS\n \n 25 \n \n \nFOOD \nINFLATION\nALL\nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES \nCLOTHING\nHOUSING, \nWATER,\nFURNITURE\nHEALTH\nTRANSPORT\nCOMMUNICATION\nRECREATION \n&\nEDUCATION\nRESTAURANTS \n&\nMISC.\nTOTAL NON\nFOOD & \nITEMS\n& TOBACCO\nFOOTWEAR\nELECTRICTY, \nGAS\nAND\nCULTURE\nHOTELS\nGOODS &\nFOOD\nNON \nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES\n& OTHER\nEQUIPMENT\nSERVICES\nFUELS\nWEIGHTS\n4.38\n6.05\n17.74\n9.91\n2.16\n9.76\n3.41\n2.1\n5.67\n1.38\n3.91\n66.47\n33.53\n100\n2016 \nJan\n0.05\n-0.02\n-0.04\n-0.30\n-0.15\n-0.37\n0.00\n-0.18\n0.00\n-0.16\n-0.29\n-0.13\n0.13\n-0.05\nFeb\n-0.14\n0.00\n-0.12\n-0.19\n-0.17\n-0.37\n-0.13\n-0.01\n0.00\n-0.17\n0.06\n-0.14\n-0.03\n-0.10\nMar\n-0.15\n-0.17\n-1.03\n-0.73\n-0.13\n-0.30\n0.42\n-0.04\n3.36\n-0.62\n-0.60\n-0.11\n-0.13\n-0.12\nApr\n0.03\n-0.14\n-0.02\n-0.32\n0.00\n0.07\n-0.08\n-0.02\n-0.01\n-0.09\n-0.35\n-0.08\n-0.51\n-0.21\nMay\n-0.29\n-0.22\n0.12\n-0.11\n-0.18\n-0.11\n-1.61\n0.06\n0.00\n0.02\n-0.33\n-0.12\n-0.49\n-0.24\nJun\n0.07\n-0.21\n0.58\n0.03\n0.15\n-0.08\n-0.01\n-0.23\n2.65\n0.31\n0.09\n0.44\n-0.35\n0.19\nJul\n0.01\n-0.15\n0.04\n0.05\n-0.15\n-0.03\n-0.36\n0.09\n0.00\n0.04\n-0.30\n-0.03\n-0.52\n-0.19\nAug\n-0.06\n-0.22\n0.00\n-0.03\n-0.02\n-0.13\n-0.02\n-0.10\n0.00\n0.01\n0.13\n-0.04\n-0.31\n-0.13\nSep\n0.10\n-0.03\n-1.11\n-0.27\n-0.03\n-0.08\n-0.09\n-0.26\n0.00\n0.01\n0.10\n-0.34\n-0.06\n-0.26\nOct\n-0.05\n-0.24\n-0.13\n0.06\n-0.03\n-0.06\n0.00\n-0.01\n0.00\n-0.06\n0.17\n-0.05\n0.40\n0.09\nNov\n0.06\n-0.09\n0.00\n0.10\n-0.07\n0.33\n0.00\n0.18\n-2.46\n-0.01\n0.14\n-0.22\n0.54\n0.02\nDec\n-0.06\n0.09\n-0.59\n0.46\n0.09\n-0.27\n0.00\n0.29\n0.00\n0.16\n0.34\n-0.09\n0.38\n0.06\n2017 \nJan\n0.00\n-0.15\n0.10\n0.34\n-0.15\n-0.75\n0.44\n0.27\n0.00\n0.29\n0.08\n-0.03\n0.80\n0.23\nFeb\n-0.09\n-0.14\n0.13\n0.70\n-0.03\n0.11\n0.00\n-0.04\n0.00\n0.18\n0.52\n0.17\n1.56\n0.61\nMar\n0.15\n0.03\n-0.07\n0.64\n0.11\n0.21\n-0.02\n0.18\n0.00\n0.01\n0.36\n0.15\n-0.21\n0.03\nApr\n-0.11\n0.02\n0.04\n0.06\n-0.04\n0.00\n0.05\n0.02\n2.02\n0.34\n-0.07\n0.25\n-0.36\n0.05\nMay\n0.13\n0.09\n-0.01\n0.02\n0.13\n0.04\n0.00\n-0.21\n0.00\n-0.39\n-0.09\n0.01\n0.07\n0.03\nJun\n0.21\n0.03\n-0.82\n0.38\n-0.03\n-0.18\n0.00\n0.18\n0.00\n0.29\n0.33\n-0.14\n-0.45\n-0.24\nJul\n0.19\n0.01\n0.01\n-0.06\n0.01\n-0.23\n-0.08\n0.05\n-2.81\n1.10\n0.11\n-0.33\n-0.42\n-0.36\nAug\n-0.18\n0.10\n0.06\n0.05\n0.03\n0.00\n0.03\n0.13\n0.00\n0.00\n0.06\n0.03\n-0.47\n-0.13\nSep\n0.02\n0.45\n0.24\n1.10\n0.07\n-0.31\n0.14\n0.64\n0.00\n0.05\n0.12\n0.25\n0.66\n0.38\nOct\n0.63\n1.44\n0.24\n3.49\n1.07\n1.08\n0.37\n3.08\n0.00\n0.45\n2.66\n1.20\n2.27\n1.54\nNov\n0.28\n0.62\n0.06\n1.32\n0.38\n0.29\n-0.04\n1.14\n-1.43\n-0.72\n1.10\n0.26\n1.74\n0.74\nSource:Zimstat, 2017\nNON-FOOD INFLATION\nTABLE 9.1 : MONTHLY INFLATION - % CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \n( December 2012 = 100)\n \n \n \n26 \n \n \nF OOD \nIN F LA TION\nA LC OHOLIC \nC LOTHIN G\nHOUS IN G, \nWA TER ,\nF UR N ITUR E\nM IS C .\nF OOD & \nB EVER A GES \n& \nELEC TR IC T\nY, GA S\nA N D\nR EC R EA TION \n&\nR ES TA UR A N TS \n&\nGOOD S &\nTOTA L N ON\nN ON \nA LC OHOLIC \nA LL\n& TOB A C C O\nF OOTWEA R\n& OTHER\nEQUIP M EN T\nC ULTUR E\nHOTELS\nS ER VIC ES\nF OOD\nB EVER A GES\nITEM S\nF UELS\n2016\nJan\n-0.79\n-2.41\n-4.40\n-3.27\n0.37\n-2.66\n-0.93\n-1.09\n11.17\n0.75\n-1.01\n-1.34\n-3.96\n-2.19\nFeb\n-1.16\n-2.06\n-4.43\n-3.35\n0.22\n-2.62\n-0.97\n0.21\n11.17\n0.96\n-1.17\n-1.35\n-4.04\n-2.22\nMar\n-1.43\n-1.97\n-5.36\n-4.04\n0.14\n-2.92\n-0.55\n-1.00\n14.91\n0.21\n-1.86\n-1.43\n-4.13\n-2.31\nApr\n-1.40\n-1.40\n-2.11\n-3.91\n0.19\n-2.71\n-0.50\n-0.95\n14.21\n-0.28\n-2.17\n-0.51\n-4.02\n-1.64\nMay\n-1.52\n-1.21\n-2.17\n-3.77\n-0.10\n-2.57\n-2.09\n-0.78\n14.21\n-0.18\n-2.07\n-0.53\n-4.13\n-1.69\nJun\n-1.80\n-1.36\n-1.58\n-3.67\n0.21\n-2.71\n-2.10\n-0.92\n17.24\n0.20\n-2.09\n-0.09\n-4.04\n-1.37\nJul\n-1.71\n-1.56\n-0.98\n-2.83\n-0.09\n-2.66\n-2.43\n-0.69\n9.09\n0.27\n-2.42\n-0.59\n-3.76\n-1.60\nAug\n-1.50\n-1.77\n-1.01\n-2.73\n-0.07\n-2.50\n-2.39\n-0.54\n9.09\n0.42\n-2.21\n-0.54\n-3.34\n-1.43\nSep\n-1.36\n-1.79\n-1.50\n-2.48\n-0.14\n-2.17\n-2.10\n-0.78\n9.09\n-0.84\n-1.82\n-0.58\n-2.94\n-1.33\nOct\n-0.97\n-1.73\n-1.54\n-2.10\n-0.76\n-1.77\n-2.13\n-0.65\n9.09\n-0.72\n-1.77\n-0.45\n-2.03\n-0.95\nNov\n-0.77\n-1.63\n-1.53\n-1.77\n-0.83\n-1.37\n-1.91\n-0.45\n3.48\n-0.70\n-1.62\n-0.89\n-1.54\n-1.09\nDec\n-0.42\n-1.39\n-2.29\n-1.25\n-0.67\n-1.39\n-1.87\n-0.24\n3.49\n-0.47\n-0.99\n-0.92\n-0.95\n-0.93\n2017\nJan\n-0.47\n-1.52\n-2.16\n-0.62\n-0.68\n-1.76\n-1.44\n0.20\n3.49\n-0.02\n-0.62\n-0.82\n-0.30\n-0.65\nFeb\n-0.42\n-1.66\n-1.91\n0.26\n-0.53\n-1.29\n-1.31\n0.18\n3.49\n0.24\n-0.05\n-0.51\n1.29\n0.06\nMar\n-0.13\n-1.45\n-0.95\n1.64\n-0.30\n-0.79\n-1.74\n0.40\n0.12\n0.87\n0.92\n-0.25\n1.21\n0.21\nApr\n-0.26\n-1.29\n-0.89\n2.03\n-0.33\n-0.86\n-1.61\n0.44\n2.16\n1.30\n1.21\n0.08\n1.35\n0.48\nMay\n0.15\n-0.98\n-1.01\n2.16\n-0.01\n-0.71\n0.00\n0.17\n2.16\n0.88\n1.46\n0.21\n1.92\n0.75\nJun\n0.29\n-0.74\n-2.39\n2.52\n-0.19\n-0.81\n0.00\n0.59\n-0.48\n0.86\n1.70\n-0.37\n1.82\n0.31\nJul\n0.47\n-0.58\n-2.43\n2.41\n-0.03\n-1.01\n0.29\n0.55\n-3.28\n1.93\n2.12\n-0.67\n1.92\n0.14\nAug\n0.35\n-0.26\n-2.37\n2.50\n0.02\n-0.88\n0.33\n0.78\n-3.28\n1.92\n2.05\n-0.60\n1.76\n0.14\nSep\n0.27\n0.22\n-1.05\n3.91\n0.12\n-1.11\n0.57\n1.69\n-3.28\n1.97\n2.07\n-0.01\n2.49\n0.78\nOct\n0.95\n1.91\n-0.68\n7.47\n1.22\n0.02\n0.94\n4.84\n-3.28\n2.49\n4.61\n1.25\n4.40\n2.24\nNov\n1.17\n2.62\n-0.62\n8.78\n1.67\n-0.02\n0.89\n5.83\n-2.25\n1.76\n5.62\n1.74\n5.65\n2.97\nSource: Zimstat, 2017\nC OM M UN IC A TION\nTR A N S P OR T\nHEA LTH\nED UC A TION\nN ON -F OOD IN F LA TION\nTABLE 9.2 : YEARLY INFLATION - % CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \n(December 2012 = 100)\n \n \n \n27 \n \n \n \n \n(US$ millions)\nEnd Period\n2000\n2001\n2002\n2003\n2004\n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\n2014\n2015\n2016\n2017\nLong-Term External Debt\n3,227\n3,255\n3,327\n3,644\n3,927\n3,805\n3,965\n4,032\n4,464\n4,951\n5,175\n6,096\n6,607\n7,370\n8,444\n8,426\n8,656\n8,977\nGovernment\n2,249\n2,328\n2,376\n2,617\n2,844\n2,895\n3,024\n3,054\n3,464\n4,037\n4,095\n4,638\n4,929\n5,012\n4,522\n5,293\n5,365\n5,638\nBilateral Creditors\n1,050\n1,115\n1,107\n1,255\n1,455\n1,438\n1,520\n1,520\n1,863\n2,308\n2,325\n2,597\n2,694\n2,928\n2,445\n3,310\n3,479\n3,654\nMultilateral Creditors\n1,199\n1,213\n1,269\n1,362\n1,389\n1,457\n1,504\n1,524\n1,592\n1,729\n1,770\n2,041\n2,235\n2,084\n2,078\n1,982\n1,886\n1,984\nPrivate Creditors\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n10\n10\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPublic Enterprises\n534\n568\n616\n698\n714\n709\n766\n790\n825\n857\n938\n1,092\n1,198\n1,356\n1,661\n1,220\n1,370\n1,419\nBilateral Creditors\n301\n315\n351\n403\n442\n439\n464\n474\n497\n453\n238\n711\n703\n858\n1,155\n760\n779\n837\nMultilateral Creditors\n233\n253\n265\n295\n272\n270\n302\n316\n327\n403\n700\n382\n495\n498\n506\n460\n591\n582\nPrivate Creditors\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nMonetary Authorities\n292\n292\n279\n288\n291\n144\n130\n137\n140\n140\n138\n127\n125\n125\n120\n110\n0\n0\nMultilateral Creditors - IMF\n292\n292\n279\n288\n291\n144\n130\n137\n140\n140\n138\n127\n125\n125\n120\n110\n0\n0\nPrivate\n152\n67\n56\n41\n78\n57\n45\n51\n35\n57\n142\n366\n480\n1,002\n2,261\n1,913\n1,920\n1,960\nShort-Term External Debt\n298\n167\n183\n169\n144\n173\n281\n387\n226\n1,198\n1,382\n1,289\n890\n1,564\n2,394\n2,258\n2,304\n2,271\nSupplier's Credits\n42\n13\n26\n51\n69\n107\n122\n178\n41\n193\n286\n134\n30\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nReserve Bank\n642\n642\n618\n614\n614\n587\n587\n573\n490\nPrivate\n256\n154\n157\n118\n75\n66\n159\n209\n185\n363\n454\n537\n246\n950\n1,807\n1,671\n1,731\n1,781\nTotal External Debt\n3,525\n3,422\n3,510\n3,812\n4,071\n3,978\n4,246\n4,419\n4,690\n6,149\n6,557\n7,385\n7,497\n8,934\n10,838\n10,684\n10,960\n11,299\nSource: Ministry of Finance & Economic Development, 2017; & Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2017\nTABLE 10: ZIMBABWE: EXTERNAL DEBT OUTSTANDING BY DEBTOR (INCLUDING ALL ARREARS)\n \n28 \n \n \n \nSOUTH ARFICAN\nBOTSWANA\nJAPANESE\nEURO/2\nPOUND\nEND OF\nRAND/1\nPULA/1\nYEN/1\nSTERLING/2\n2016\nJan\n16.0900\n11.4300\n120.5500\n1.0905\n1.4493\nfeb\n16.1100\n11.2700\n113.0300\n1.0990\n1.3880\nMar\n15.4500\n11.1000\n112.9500\n1.1100\n1.4200\nApr\n14.6200\n10.7575\n109.6825\n1.1340\n1.4306\nMay\n15.3200\n10.9800\n108.9323\n1.1340\n1.4522\nJun\n14.8834\n10.9349\n102.6700\n1.1095\n1.3397\nJul\n14.4277\n10.7892\n103.9398\n1.1069\n1.3180\nAug\n13.7656\n9.4521\n101.2190\n1.0960\n1.2280\nSep\n13.9200\n10.5800\n101.6000\n1.1200\n1.3200\nOct\n13.9400\n10.6500\n103.7600\n1.0989\n1.2346\nNov\n13.9402\n10.6875\n107.9934\n1.0811\n1.2430\nDec\n13.8416\n10.7247\n115.7895\n1.0556\n1.2509\n2017\nJan\n13.5146\n10.5652\n113.4750\n1.0701\n1.2516\nFeb\n12.9957\n10.3573\n112.5100\n1.0591\n1.2439\nMar\n13.5450\n10.5541\n111.8750\n1.0678\n1.2487\nApr\n13.3461\n10.4384\n111.1600\n1.0862\n1.2908\nMay\n13.1162\n10.2987\n110.9650\n1.1168\n1.2801\nJun\n13.0150\n10.2249\n111.9450\n1.1439\n1.3013\nJul\n12.9986\n10.2093\n110.5150\n1.1734\n1.3127\nAug\n13.0153\n10.1368\n110.5500\n1.1873\n1.2920\nSep\n13.5463\n10.3252\n112.6750\n1.1777\n1.3416\nOct\n14.0603\n10.5319\n113.1150\n1.1630\n1.3209\nNov\n13.6625\n10.3199\n112.1250\n1.1867\n1.3470\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2017\n TABLE 11 : SELECTED INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE RATES\n1. Foreign currency per US dollar.\n2. US dollars per unit of foreign currency.\n \n \n \n29 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nMarket Capitalisation\nEND OF\nUS$ millions\n2016\nJan\n103.0\n19.5\n10.4\n61,882,757\n2,790.4\nFeb\n99.4\n19.1\n15.6\n95,020,938\n2,692.3\nMar\n97.6\n19.4\n16.4\n97,601,725\n2,645.1\nApr\n105.8\n20.2\n14.0\n187,848,946\n2,862.6\nMay\n104.7\n25.5\n13.9\n99,055,230\n2,881.3\nJun\n101.0\n24.7\n18.1\n88,525,472\n2,780.9\nJul\n98.8\n25.7\n11.8\n57,222,624\n2,772.0\nAug\n99.5\n26.3\n7.1\n41,264,438\n2,734.3\nSep\n98.9\n26.6\n13.0\n68,329,516\n2,725.1\nOct\n120.8\n33.8\n22.6\n177,384,684\n3,328.3\nNov\n137.1\n57.4\n23.5\n233,749,377\n3,804.6\nDec\n144.5\n58.5\n26.0\n292,538,969\n4,008.0\n2017\nJan\n140.2\n56.3\n8.6\n31,616,982\n3,903.7\nFeb\n135.3\n56.5\n11.5\n85,314,995\n3,770.0\nMar\n139.0\n58.6\n26.9\n145,238,255\n3,871.3\nApr\n143.0\n66.3\n11.2\n75,857,712\n4,182.8\nMay\n162.3\n69.6\n16.8\n170,830,515\n4,740.1\nJun\n196.0\n69.8\n39.7\n311,145,262\n5,695.2\nJul\n203.3\n69.4\n24.7\n149,425,245\n5,759.0\nAug\n235.0\n73.5\n13.6\n107,920,143\n6,659.4\nSep\n418.4\n122.6\n89.5\n245,278,194\n11,860.2\nOct\n521.9\n132.5\n168.8\n1,006,687,304\n14,830.3\nNov\n376.7\n126.9\n207.5\n196,489,710\n10,777.7\nSource:Zimbabwe Stock Exchange ,2017\nTABLE 12: ZIMBABWE STOCK MARKET STATISTICS\nIndustrial\n Market Turnover \nUS$ million \nVolume of Shares\nMining\nIndices\n \n \n \n30 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nEND OF\nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\n \nINTERNET\n2016\nJan\n 3,385.9 \n11.1\n137.4\n331.5\n388.9\n167.7\nFeb\n 3,448.2 \n11.9\n138.8\n312.1\n389.3\n167.9\nMar\n 3,460.2 \n11.3\n142.1\n288.8\n417.1\n255.9\nApr\n 3,564.3 \n9.7\n180.1\n247.6\n427.3\n168.3\nMay\n 3,869.2 \n10.8\n214.8\n203.3\n479.9\n217.9\nJun\n 4,522.2 \n10.3\n203.9\n131.4\n465.1\n174.1\nJul\n 3,911.8 \n9.2\n240.0\n166.3\n491.2\n218.0\nAug\n 3,928.7 \n7.9\n238.0\n165.9\n535.4\n230.6\nSep\n 4,382.9 \n10.5\n237.3\n167.7\n533.9\n215.9\nOct\n 4,127.6 \n8.0\n322.8\n112.5\n524.5\n216.0\nNov\n 4,624.7 \n6.9\n363.4\n84.5\n537.2\n229.9\nDec\n 4,882.6 \n5.6\n479.9\n71.9\n626.1\n265.1\n2017\nJan\n 4,052.7 \n7.5\n368.7\n70.4\n495.6\n318.9\nFeb\n 4,246.6 \n7.0\n327.3\n58.4\n472.3\n324.1\nMar\n 4,629.8 \n7.4\n392.2\n58.8\n671.6\n399.7\nApr\n 4,178.8 \n4.8\n466.9\n39.3\n792.5\n337.6\nMay\n 4,974.0 \n6.5\n557.8\n44.7\n939.9\n618.7\nJun\n 5,346.4 \n6.3\n558.8\n34.6\n1095.5\n500.3\nJul\n 4,805.1 \n5.7\n588.4\n29.4\n1601.4\n586.4\nAug\n 5,325.1 \n5.2\n590.1\n24.7\n1776.4\n583.3\nSep\n 6,031.4 \n5.2\n651.1\n16.1\n2159.3\n731.9\nOct\n 5,991.3 \n5.4\n681.9\n19.4\n2401.6\n779.2\nNov\n 6,259.7 \n4.9\n666.5\n15.9\n2561.8\n798.3\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2017\nTABLE 13.1 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS \n Values of Transactions (US$ millions)\n \n \n \n31 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nEND OF\nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\n INTERNET\n2016\nJan\n132.3\n24.6\n1328.9\n1104.4\n 19,956.1 \n49.9\nFeb\n148.4\n30.3\n1289.5\n1067.1\n 19,793.7 \n54.6\nMar\n152.5\n29.6\n1455.7\n962.9\n 21,731.5 \n61.9\nApr\n161.7\n25.0\n1962.6\n841.3\n 21,086.6 \n59.9\nMay\n199.3\n29.1\n2779.9\n675.8\n 23,293.0 \n83.2\nJun\n268.2\n33.5\n3203.8\n741.9\n 23,321.2 \n88.0\nJul\n242.4\n31.1\n3946.3\n1052.8\n 24,538.8 \n102.7\nAug\n253.9\n27.8\n4038.1\n1156.4\n 26,009.6 \n109.5\nSep\n288.5\n32.5\n4421.9\n1188.5\n 27,300.0 \n100.0\nOct\n296.0\n29.2\n6247.4\n1106.4\n 29,801.7 \n117.9\nNov\n353.0\n30.6\n8691.2\n1086,9\n 28,542.1 \n128.8\nDec\n405.4\n24.4\n13042.1\n1348.0\n 33,211.8 \n155.9\nAnnual Total\n 2,901.5 \n347.7\n 52,407.5 11,245.7 298,586.2 \n1112.1\n2017\nJan\n 350.0 \n26.7\n 12,756.3 1,173.6 27,550.1 \n191.0\nFeb\n 326.3 \n27.8\n 8,952.0 953.5 26,820.1 \n207.0\nMar\n 414.2 \n31.0\n 11,124.0 922.2 35,604.1 \n244.1\nApr\n 363.7 \n21.6\n 13,595.5 652.9 40,089.0 \n231.0\nMay\n 531.8 \n27.8\n 16,623.4 820.6 47,019.1 \n323.3\nJun\n 525.0 \n29.3\n 17,466.2 696.9 53,738.1 \n342.1\nJul\n 521.8 \n30.0\n 20,013.7 636.1 61,162.4 \n382.6\nAug\n 541.5 \n26.6\n 20,303.0 595.6 70,771.6 \n419.1\nSep\n 620.0 \n27.2\n 20,731.0 478.0 83,303.0 \n432.0\nOct\n 609.6 \n27.2\n 23,764.6 475.1 92,540.6 \n478.9\nNov\n 575.3 \n25.6\n 22,748.6 347.3 97,945.2 \n473.0\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2017\nTABLE 13.2 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS \n Volumes of Transactions (000's)\n \n \n \n32 \n \n \n \nEND OF\nEXPORTS\nIMPORTS\nTOTAL TRADE TRADE BALANCE\n2016\nJan\n249.18\n395.35\n644.52\n(146.17)\nFeb\n209.55\n427.73\n637.28\n(218.18)\nMar\n166.50\n478.06\n644.55\n(311.56)\nApr\n157.83\n356.48\n514.31\n(198.65)\nMay\n165.20\n408.49\n573.69\n(243.29)\nJun\n176.21\n429.41\n605.61\n(253.20)\nJul\n184.21\n394.23\n578.43\n(210.02)\nAug\n202.14\n445.03\n647.16\n(242.89)\nSep\n250.42\n443.89\n694.30\n(193.47)\nOct\n318.45\n468.06\n786.52\n(149.61)\nNov\n460.73\n475.33\n936.06\n(14.61)\nDec\n291.87\n489.37\n781.24\n(197.50)\nTotal\n2832.27\n5211.41\n8043.69\n(2379.14)\n2017\nJan\n291.97\n384.96\n676.93\n(92.99)\nFeb\n290.34\n424.36\n714.71\n(134.02)\nMar\n265.67\n461.71\n727.37\n(196.04)\nApr\n225.58\n405.52\n631.09\n(179.94)\nMay\n268.65\n466.11\n734.77\n(197.46)\nJun\n264.67\n495.14\n759.82\n(230.47)\nJul\n262.65\n482.09\n744.74\n(219.43)\nAug\n356.46\n448.08\n804.54\n(91.62)\nSep\n326.48\n439.58\n766.05\n(113.10)\nOct\n352.96\n459.89\n812.85\n(106.94)\nNov\n577.59\n492.67\n1070.30\n84.91\nSource: Zimstat, 2017\nTABLE 14 : MERCHANDISE TRADE STATISTICS\n (US$ millions)", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/MPC_Statements/November2017.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "cbca0e22e172fcc14e27e95cf587a62c", "text": "i \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFEBRUARY 2020 \n \n1 \n \nTABLE OF CONTENTS \n \nSELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS ................................................................................. 2 \nINTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICE DEVELOPMENTS ........................................... 3 \nMERCHANDISE TRADE DEVELOPMENTS..................................................................... 4 \nMONETARY DEVELOPMENTS .............................................................................................. 8 \nSTOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS ..................................................................................... 9 \nINFLATION OUTTURN ........................................................................................................... 10 \nAnnual Inflation ...................................................................................................................... 10 \nMonthly Inflation .................................................................................................................... 10 \n \nNATIONAL PAYMENTS SYSTEM ........................................................................................ 11 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSources: \n1. Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency. \n2. Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. \n3. Zimbabwe Stock Exchange. \na- Percentage point \n \n2020 \n \nJanuary \n \n2020 \n \nFebruary \n \nMonth-on- \nMonth Change \n(%) \nReserve Money (M0) (ZW$ millions) \n9,251.02 \n \n9,380.94 \n \n1.4 \nMoney Supply (M3)2 (ZW$ millions) \n36,272.07 \n \n38,336.88 \n5.69 \nMonthly Inflation1 (%) \n2.23 \n13.50 \n11.27a \n \nNational Payment System Transactions2 \n($ billions) \n85.14 \n80.80 \n-5.10 \nNominal Lending Rate2 \n(% per annum) \n5.00-65.00 \n5.00-65.00 \n- \nZ.S.E All share Index3 \n332.90 \n473.13 \n42.12 \nZ.S.E. Mining Index3 \n213.13 \n826.73 \n287.90 \nZ.S.E. Industrial Index3 \n773.41 \n1 564.98 \n102.35 \nSELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS \n \n \n \n \n3 \n \nINTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICE \nDEVELOPMENTS \n \n \nInternational prices of platinum, nickel, copper, \nand Brent crude oil retreated in February 2020. \nGold prices, however, firmed during the same \nmonth. \n \n \nPrecious Metals \nThe average monthly price of gold recorded a \n2.3% increase, from US$1,561.77 per ounce in \nJanuary 2020 to US$1,597.96 per ounce1 in \nFebruary 2020. This was on the back of an \nincrease in the appeal of the yellow metal as a \nsafe-haven asset, amid concerns about global \neconomic growth prospects. \n \nPlatinum prices recorded a month-on-month \ndecline, from US$989.77 per ounce in January \n2020 to US$ 962.00 per ounce, during the month \nunder review. This was partly on account of \nlower \ndemand \nfrom \nmajor \nautomobile \nmanufacturers such as South Korea’s Hyundai. \nThe \nsuspension \nof \nproduction \ndue \nto \ncoronavirus concerns induced disruptions in \nglobal supply chains. In addition, physical \ndemand for platinum eased in China and India, \nthe world’s top consumers of jewelry. Prices \nwere also weighed down by lower output from \nSouth Africa, the world’s top platinum \nproducer, on account worries about power \navailability and possible industrial actions in \nmines. \n \n \n \n \n \n1 1 troy ounce (oz) of gold is equivalent to 31.103 grams \nFigure 1 shows developments in precious metal \nprices for the period from January 2019 to \nJanuary 2020. \n \n \nFigure 1: Precious metal prices (US$/oz.) \nSource: Bloomberg, 2020 \n \nBase metals \n \nDuring the month under analysis, average prices \nof copper and nickel registered declines, on the \nback of lower output and the decline in global \ndemand. \n \nNickel prices were weighed down by reduced \noutput from smelters, amid slackening demand \nfrom automobile companies. The increase in \nglobal stockpiles also contributed to lower \nprices. Consequently, monthly average prices of \nnickel declined from US$13,519 per tonne in \nJanuary 2020 to US$12,737.10 per tonne in \nFebruary 2020. \n \nLikewise, monthly average prices of copper fell \nfrom US$6,027.65 per tonne to US$5,687.46 \nper tonne, during the month under review. \n \n600\n800\n1000\n1200\n1400\n1600\n1800\nFeb-19\nMar-19\nApr-19\nMay-19\nJun-19\nJul-19\nAug-19\nSep-19\nOct-19\nNov-19\nDec-19\nJan-20\nFeb-20\nUS$/oz.\nGold\nPlatinum\n \n \n \n4 \n \nFigure 2: Base metal prices (US$/ton) \nSource: Bloomberg, 2020 \n \n \n Brent Crude Oil \nMonthly average prices of Brent crude oil fell \nby 12.9%, from US$63.77 per barrel2 in the \nprevious month to US$55.56 per barrel in \nFebruary 2020. The decline was partly \nattributable to a slump in demand in China, the \nworld’s top oil importer. In addition, growing \nfears about the coronavirus having a more \nsignificant impact outside of China, particularly \nin South Korea, Japan, Italy, and Iran also \nexerted additional downward pressure on \ndemand. \n \n \n \n \n \n2 1 barrel of oil is equivalent to 157.987 litres \nFigure 3 shows developments in Brent crude oil \nprice for the period January 2018 to January \n2020. \nFigure 3: International crude oil prices \n(US$/barrel) \n \nSource: Bloomberg, 2020 \n \n \nMERCHANDISE TRADE \nDEVELOPMENTS \n \nTotal Merchandise trade3 for February 2020 \nincreased by 5.0% to US$ 820.0 million, from \nUS$781.4 million recorded in January 2020. \nThis followed a 18.7% increase in imports, \nwhich more than offset the 8.3% decline in \nexports, during the month under review \nMerchandise Exports \nMerchandise exports registered a month-on-\nmonth decline of 8.3%, from US$ 397.7 million \nin January 2020 to US$364.7 million in \nFebruary 2020. The decline was due to reduced \nperformance of mineral exports, mainly, gold; \nnickel ores; and ferro-chromium concentrates. \n3 Sum of exports and imports \n5,000\n7,000\n9,000\n11,000\n13,000\n15,000\n17,000\n19,000\n4,000\n4,500\n5,000\n5,500\n6,000\n6,500\n7,000\n7,500\nFeb-19\nApr-19\nJun-19\nAug-19\nOct-19\nDec-19\nFeb-20\nNickel US$/ton\nCopper US$/ton\nCopper\nNickel (RHS)\n40\n45\n50\n55\n60\n65\n70\n75\n80\n85\nNov-18\nDec-18\nJan-19\nFeb-19\nMar-19\nApr-19\nMay-19\nJun-19\nJul-19\nAug-19\nSep-19\nOct-19\nNov-19\nDec-19\nJan-20\nFeb-20\nUS$/barrel\n \n \n \n5 \n \nGold exports fell by 45.8% to US$56.4 million \nin February 2020, from US$104.1 million \nrealised in January 2020. Similarly, export \nrevenue from nickel ore and concentrates \ndecreased by 32.6% to US$31.3 million in \nFebruary 2020. \nFigure 4: Merchandise Exports (US$ m) \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2020 \n \nOn the up-side, the country recorded positive \nexport performance from nickel mattes and flue-\ncure tobacco, with monthly gains of 71.7% and \n41.6%, respectively. The two commodities \naccounted for 52.1% of the total value of exports \nin February 2020. While export performance in \nFebruary 2020 was not materially different from \nthe comparable period last year, going forward, \ndownside risks are expected to emanate from \nincreased volatility caused by the coronavirus \npandemic. \nTable 1: Exports Classified by Harmonised \nCommodity Description and Code System \nCommodity \nJan-20 \nFeb-20 \n Share \nof total \n(%) \nFlue-cured tobacco \n74.8 \n106.0 \n29.0 \nNickel mattes \n48.9 \n84.0 \n23.0 \nGold (semi-\nmanufactured gold) \n104.1 \n56.4 \n15.5 \nNickel ores and \nconcentrates \n46.4 \n31.3 \n8.6 \nFerro-chromium \n24.0 \n14.2 \n3.9 \nIndustrial \ndiamonds \n8.9 \n8.9 \n2.4 \nUnwrought \nPlatinum \n3.0 \n8.8 \n2.4 \nCane Sugar \n8.5 \n6.4 \n1.8 \nCoke and semi-coke \nof coal \n3.2 \n3.5 \n1.0 \nChromium ores and \nconcentrates \n3.2 \n1.9 \n0.5 \nTotal \n397.7 \n365.5 \n100.0 \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Calculations, 2020 \n \nThe country’s top five export destinations \nduring the month of February 2020 were South \nAfrica, 62.6%; United Arab Emirates,13.4%; \nMozambique \n8.2%; \nZambia, \n1.3%; \nand \nBotswana, 1.0%, as shown in Figure 5. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\n300\n350\n400\n450\n500\n550\nOct-18\nDec-18\nFeb-19\nApr-19\nJun-19\nAug-19\nOct-19\nDec-19\nFeb-20\n \n \n \n6 \n \nFigure 5: Top Ten Merchandise Export \nDestinations (% Share) \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Calculations, 2020 \nMerchandise Imports \nMerchandise imports increased to US$455.33 \nmillion in February 2020, from US$383.6 \nmillion recorded in January 2020. The surge in \nimports was mainly attributed to the 147% \nincrease in maize imports, which rose from \nUS$23.6 \nmillion \nin \nJanuary \n2020 \nto \nUS$58.6 million in the month under analysis. \nMaize imports were necessitated by the poor \nharvest, following the drought experienced by \nthe country in the 2019/2020 agriculture season. \nFigure 6 shows developments in the country’s \nmerchandise imports for 2019 and 2020. \n \n4 Fuels and electricity \nFigure 6: Merchandise Imports classified by \nHS Codes 2019 & 2020 (US$ m) \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Computations, 2020 \nThe growth in imports was also a result of \nincreased imports of energy4 and crude soya \nbean oil. Energy imports accounted for 23% of \nthe value of total imports, during the month \nunder analysis. Imports of diesel stood at US$60 \nmillion; unleaded petrol, US$29.2 million; \nelectricity, US$17.0 million, accounting for \n13.2%, 6.4% and 3.7% of total imports, \nrespectively. Crude soya bean oil imports, \nincreased by 17.0%, and accounted for 1.3% of \ntotal imports, during the month under review. \n \nTable 2 shows imports by commodity for the \nmonths of January and February 2020. \n \n62.6%\n13.4%\n8.2%\n1.9%\n1.5%\n1.3%\n1.0%\n0.3%\n0.3%\n9.4%\nSouth Africa\nUnited Arab Emirates\nMozambique\nBelgium\nKenya\nZambia\nBotswana\nSwaziland\nItaly\nOther\n366.8 \n408.2 \n330.1 \n418.4 \n438.2 \n458.8 \n357.2 \n384.5 \n404.0 \n401.1 \n431.2 \n418.8 \n383.6\n455.3\n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\n300\n350\n400\n450\n500\n2019\n2020\n \n \n \n7 \n \nTable 2: Imports Classified by Harmonised \nCommodity Description and Code System \nCommodity \nJan 20 \nUS$ m \nFeb 20 \nUS$ m \nShare of \nTotal \nImports \n(%) \nDiesel \n57.4 \n60.0 \n13.2 \nMaize \n(Excluding \nSeed) \n23.6 \n58.6 \n12.9 \nUnleaded petrol \n24.4 \n29.2 \n6.4 \nElectrical energy \n13.1 \n17.0 \n3.7 \nCrude soya bean oil \n5.1 \n5.9 \n1.3 \nMedicines \n10.4 \n10.1 \n2.2 \nRice \n10.3 \n5.4 \n1.2 \nInsecticides \n6.7 \n4.6 \n1.0 \nMotor vehicles \n(for transporting goods) \n2.6 \n3.3 \n0.7 \nTotal \n383.6 \n455.3 \n100 \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Calculations, 2020 \nThe country’s imports for the month of February \n2020 were mainly from South Africa (46.1%); \nSingapore (18.5%); China (6%); India (3.8%); \nand Mozambique (3.4%), as shown in Figure 7. \nFigure 7: Top Ten Merchandise Import \nSources (% Share) \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Calculations, 2020 \n \nMerchandise Trade Balance \nThe country’s trade balance reverted to negative \nterritory \nin \nFebruary \n2020, \nafter \nfour \nconsecutive months in surplus, from October \n2019 to January 2020. The net external trade \nposition was a deficit of -US$90.6 million, \ndown from a surplus of US$14.1 recorded in \nJanuary 2020. Compared to the same period in \n2019, the country’s trade position deteriorated \nby US$32.0 million. This was mainly attributed \nto the marked increase in imports of critical \ncommodities, which constituted the bulk of the \nimport basket. \nFigure 8 shows the country’s trade balance for \nthe period February 2019 to February 2020. \nFigure 8: Merchandise Trade Balance \n(US$ m) \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Computations, 2020 \n46.1%\n18.5%\n6.0%\n3.8%\n3.4%\n3.2%\n2.0%\n1.8%\n1.8%\n1.5%\nSouth Africa\nSingapore\nChina\nIndia\nMozambique\nMauritius\nMexico\nUnited Republic of…\nZambia\nUnited Kingdom\n-400.0\n-200.0\n0.0\n200.0\n400.0\n600.0\nFeb-19\nMar-19\nApr-19\nMay-19\nJun-19\nJul-19\nAug-19\nSep-19\nOct-19\nNov-19\nDec-19\nJan-20\nFeb-20\nExports\nImports\nTrade Balance\n \n \n \n8 \n \nMONETARY DEVELOPMENTS5 \n \nBroad money consists of two components, \nnamely, domestic and foreign currency accounts \n(FCA) deposits. Of the total stock of broad \nmoney of ZW$38.34 billion as at end-February \n2020, FCA deposits totalled an equivalent of \nZW$12.48 billion (32.55%) of total, while local \ncurrency deposits amounted to ZW$24.91 \nbillion (or 64.98%). Currency in circulation \nconstituted the balance of Z$0.95 billion \n(2.48%). \nOver the year to February 2020, FCA deposits \ngrew by 296.00%, largely reflecting the impact \nof \nexchange \nrate \ndepreciation, \nfrom \nZW$2.5/US$ \nin \nFebruary \n2019 \nto \nZW$17.96/US$ in February 2020. As a result, \nabout 40% of the annual growth in broad money \nin February 2020 emanated from the valuation \nadjustments due to exchange rate movements \nand does not constitute new money creation. \nThe ZW$ denominated component of money \nsupply rose from ZW$8.7 billion in February \n2019 to ZW$24.9 billion in February 2020, \npartly reflecting the multiplier effects of deposit \ncreation in the economy and inflation. \nNotes and coin in circulation rose by ZW$550.5 \nmillion, from ZW$473.8 million in February \n2019 to ZW$1.04 billion in February 2020, in \nline with the Bank’s drip-feed policy on the \nrelease of new currency. The rise in notes and \ncoin in circulation is also in response to the \ndemand for money in the economy, for \ntransactions purposes. The figure below shows \n \n5All monetary numbers valued in Zimbabwe dollars ($) \nsince the adoption of an interbank market determined \nexchange rate in February 2019. \nthe components of money supply in the \neconomy. \nFigure 9: Composition of Money Supply \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2019 \nOn an annual basis, broad money was largely \ndriven by increase in credit to the private sector, \nwhich grew by 261.15%, coupled with increase \nin credit to Government of 29.37%. Month-on-\nmonth, credit to the private sector rose by \n12.36%, from ZW$13.05 billion in January \n2020 to ZW$14.66 billion in February 2020, \nwhile net credit to Government declined from \nZW$12.72 billion in January to ZW$12.70 \nbillion in February 2020. Government deposits \nin the banking system rose 4.78%, from \nZW$3.95 billion in January 2020 to ZW$4.14 \nbillion in February. \n \nCredit to the private sector was extended largely \nto \nagriculture, \nhouseholds, \nfinancial \norganisations, manufacturing, and distribution, \nas shown in Figure 10. \nLocal \nCurrency \nTransferable \ndeposits\n58.57%\nForeign \nCurrency \nDeposits\n32.55%\nTime \nDeposits\nCurrency in \nCirculation\n2.48%\nNCDs\n0.68%\n \n \n \n9 \n \nFigure 10: Distribution of Private Sector \nCredit \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2019 \nCredit to the private sector was utilised as \nfollows: inventory build-up, 35.08%; other \nrecurrent expenditures, 32.25%; fixed capital \ninvestment, \n18.67%; \nconsumer \ndurables, \n11.84%; and pre and post shipment financing, \n2.16%. \n \nSTOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS \n \nDuring the month of February 2020, The \nZimbabwe \nStock \nExchange \n(ZSE) \nwas \ncharacterized by bullish sentiments as investors \nflocked to the bourse, on the back of limited \ninvestment options and high inflation. \nThe All Share and Top 10 indices increased by \n42.12% and 27.57%, to close at 473.13 points \nand 399.69 points, respectively. \n \n \n \nFigure 11: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange All \nShare and Top 10 Indices \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2019 \n \nOn a month-on-month basis, the ZSE Small \nCap, Medium Cap and the Top 15 indices \nregistered monthly increases of 662.20 points; \n282.35 points; and 101.32 points, to close at \n1493.28 points; 638.23 points; and 409.42 \npoints, respectively. \nMining and industrial indices rose by 481.81 \npoints and 452.71 points to close at 826.73 \npoints and 1 564.98 points, respectively, during \nthe month under analysis. \nOn an annual basis, mining and industrial \nindices grew by 299.33% and 216.60%, from \n207.03 points and 494.31 points registered in \nFebruary 2019, to close at 1 564.98 points and \n826.73 points in February 2020, respectively. \n \n \n \n \nHouseholds\n14.46%\nAgriculture\n35.37%\nMining\n6.89%\nManufacturing\n10.46%\nDistribution\n10.27%\nConstruction\n1.24%\nTransport & \nCommunica\ntions\n1.24%\nServices\n6.51%\nFinancial Org. \n& Investments\n13.53%\nOther\n0.03%\n0.00\n100.00\n200.00\n300.00\n400.00\n500.00\n600.00\n40.00\n90.00\n140.00\n190.00\n240.00\n290.00\n340.00\n390.00\n440.00\n490.00\n540.00\n590.00\n28-Mar-19\n28-Apr-19\n28-May-19\n28-Jun-19\n28-Jul-19\n28-Aug-19\n28-Sep-19\n28-Oct-19\n28-Nov-19\n28-Dec-19\n28-Jan-20\n28-Feb-20\nTop 10 Index\nAll Share Index\nAll Share Index\nTop 10 Index\n \n \n \n10 \n \nFigure 12: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange \nIndices \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2019 \nThe volume of shares traded during the month \nunder review fell by 24.90% to 172.68 million \nshares, from 179.56 million shares traded in the \nprevious month. The cumulative value of shares \ntraded, however, increased by 21.73% to close \nat ZW$360.13 million, during the same month. \nFigure 13: ZSE Monthly Volumes and Values \nTraded \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2019 \n \nThe ZSE gained ZW$17.56 billion, or 40.44% \nof the previous month’s value to close at \nZW$60.99 billion, during the month under \nreview. On a year-on-year basis, the local \nbourse capitalization increased by $41.21 \nbillion, from Z$19.77 billion recorded in \nFebruary 2019. \n \nINFLATION OUTTURN \n \n \nAnnual Inflation \n \nThe annual headline inflation stood at 540.2% in \nFebruary 2020, up from 473.3% recorded in \nJanuary 2020. This was on account of increases \nin both food and non-food inflation. \nAnnual food inflation increased from 685.6% in \nJanuary 2020 to 710.3% in February 2020. \nAnnual non-food inflation also accelerated from \n378.5% in January 2020 to 462.6%, during the \nperiod under review. \nThe price increases were partly attributable to \nthe indexation of prices to alternative market \nexchange rates for both imported and locally \nproduced goods. \n \nMonthly Inflation \n \nMonth-on-month inflation rose to 13.5% in \nFebruary 2020, from 2.2% in January 2020. This \nwas underpinned by the acceleration in non-\nfood inflation, which rose from 2.1% in January \n2020 to 18.4% in February 2020. Monthly food \ninflation also increased from 2.6% in the \nprevious month to 6.8%, during the month under \nreview. \n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1000\n1200\n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1000\n1200\n1400\n1600\n1800\n2000\nMining Index Points\nIndustrial Inedx Points\nIndustrial\nMining\n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\n300\n350\n400\n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\nFeb-19\nMar-19\nApr-19\nMay-19\nJun-19\nJul-19\nAug-19\nSep-19\nOct-19\nNov-19\nDec-19\nJan-20\nFeb-20\nValues Traded (ZW$ millions)\nVolumes Traded (milions)\nVolume\nTurnover\n \n \n \n11 \n \nFigure 14 shows the month-on-month inflation \ndevelopments, for the period from January 2019 \nto February 2020. \nFigure 14: Month-on-Month Inflation (%) \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2019 \n \nNATIONAL PAYMENTS SYSTEM \n \n \n \n \nTransactions processed through the National \nPayment System (NPS) registered a decline of \n5.2% in February 2020, to close at ZW$80.80 \nbillion. NPS transaction volumes, however, \nincreased by 4%, from 85.14 million in January \n2020 to 174.58 million in February 2020. \n \nZimbabwe Electronic Transfer Settlement \nSystem (ZETSS) \n \nThe total value of Real Time Gross Settlement \n(RTGS) transactions registered a 13.0% decline, \nto \nclose the month \nunder analysis \nat \nZW$41.64 billion. Similarly, the volume of \ntransactions processed through the RTGS \nsystem declined to 916,116 in February 2020, \nfrom 943,296 transactions in January 2020. \n \n \n \nFigure 15: ZETSS Volumes and Values \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2019 \n \nCash transactions \n \nCash transactions stood at ZW$1,361.94 million \nin February 2020, up from ZW$1,109.68 \nmillion in January 2020. \nMobile and Internet Based Transactions \nThe value of Mobile and Internet based \ntransactions increased by 4.06% to ZW$32.23 \nbillion in February 2020, from ZW$30.97 \nbillion in January 2020. \nCard Based Transactions \nCard based transactions closed the month under \nreview at ZW$5.57 million, up from ZW$5.25 \nmillion in the preceding month. \nCheque Transactions \nCheque transactions increased from ZW$4.36 \nmillion in January 2020 to ZW$4.66 million in \nFebruary 2020. \nMARCH 2020 \nRESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE \n-0.50\n4.50\n9.50\n14.50\n19.50\n24.50\n29.50\n34.50\n39.50\n44.50\nJan-19\nFeb-19\nMar-19\nApr-19\nMay-19\nJun-19\nJul-19\nAug-19\nSep-19\nOct-19\nNov-19\nDec-19\nJan-20\nFeb-20\n -\n 10.0\n 20.0\n 30.0\n 40.0\n 50.0\n 60.0\n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1000\n1200\nFeb-19\nMar-19\nApr-19\nMay-19\nJun-19\nJul-19\nAug-19\nSep-19\nOct-19\nNov-19\nDec-19\nJan-20\nFeb-20\nValue in ZW$ Billions\nVolume in Thousands\nVolume\nValue\n \n12 \n \nStatistical Tables \n \nMonetary Statistics \n 1. Depository Corporations Survey \n \n \n \n14 \n 2. Central Bank Survey \n \n \n \n \n \n \n15 \n \n3. Other Depository Corporations Survey \n \n \n \n \n16 \n Other Depository Corporations \n \n4.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n17 \n 4.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n18 \n Commercial Banks \n 5.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n19 \n 5.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n20 \n Building Societies \n 6.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n21 \n 6.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n22 \n Sectoral Analysis of Bank Loans and Advances and Deposits \n \n7.1 Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks Loans and Advances \n23 \n \n7.2 Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks Deposits \n \n \n24 \n Interest Rates \n \n8.1 Lending Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n25 \n \n8.2 Banks Deposit Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n26 \n \n Inflation \n \n9.1 Monthly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n27 \n \n9.2 Yearly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n28 \n External Statistics \n \n10. Total External Debt Outstanding by Debtor \n \n \n \n29 \n 11. Exchange Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n30 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n13 \n \nZimbabwe Stock Market Statistics \n \n \n \n 31 \n \nNational Payments System Statistics \n \n \n \n \n \n13.1 Values of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n 32 \n \n13.2 Volumes of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n 33 \n \nMerchandise Trade Statistics \n \n \n \n \n 34 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n 14 \n \n \nFeb-19\nMar-19\nApr-19\nMay-19\nJun-19\nJul-19\nAug-19\nSep-19\nOct-19\nNov-19\nDec-19\nJan-20\nFeb-20\nNet Foreign Assets\n-4,424,467.92\n-5,983,620.49\n-6,229,030.67\n-10,196,485.70\n-12,704,437.39\n-19,915,608.51\n-23,599,341.26\n-33,219,232.58\n-38,974,813.91 -39,899,004.55\n-40,662,175.37\n-41,890,476.47 -41,693,753.23\nCentral Bank(net)\n-4,676,973.98\n-6,110,320.34\n-6,759,543.60\n-11,356,605.80\n-14,602,968.79\n-23,287,056.52\n-27,352,064.33\n-39,349,960.03 -46,395,160.21 -48,267,748.85\n-50,285,843.15\n-51,596,769.75 -51,659,786.89\nForeign Assets\n853,285.31\n996,604.88\n931,294.24\n2,416,356.86\n2,917,765.26\n3,402,652.93\n4,334,171.18\n6,464,247.45\n5,444,857.74\n5,552,951.79\n5,504,939.77\n5,234,031.88\n5,504,836.03\nForeign Liabilities\n5,530,259.29\n7,106,925.22\n7,690,837.84\n13,772,962.65\n17,520,734.04\n26,689,709.45\n31,686,235.51\n45,814,207.48\n51,840,017.94\n53,820,700.64\n55,790,782.92\n56,830,801.63\n57,164,622.92\nOther Depository Corporations(net)\n252,506.07\n126,699.85\n530,512.93\n1,160,120.10\n1,898,531.40\n3,371,448.01\n3,752,723.07\n6,130,727.45\n7,420,346.30\n8,368,744.30\n9,623,667.78\n9,706,293.27\n9,966,033.66\nForeign Assets\n1,034,721.60\n1,060,697.66\n1,491,439.91\n2,534,779.04\n3,814,622.33\n5,390,485.00\n6,120,479.23\n9,382,906.26\n10,478,858.26\n11,622,874.19\n12,948,416.33\n13,153,007.07\n13,344,846.71\nForeign Liabilities\n782,215.53\n933,997.80\n960,926.97\n1,374,658.95\n1,916,090.93\n2,019,036.99\n2,367,756.16\n3,252,178.80\n3,058,511.96\n3,254,129.88\n3,324,748.55\n3,446,713.79\n3,378,813.04\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n14,813,771.42\n16,610,996.67\n17,582,396.73\n23,205,523.95\n27,472,328.14\n36,991,644.76\n43,293,406.54\n56,770,962.37\n67,904,876.25\n71,719,556.15\n75,680,355.31\n78,162,546.08\n80,030,632.68\nDomestic Claims\n14,662,980.96\n14,348,514.27\n14,306,293.28\n14,375,803.17\n15,645,411.46\n18,228,356.09\n20,234,819.47\n21,168,772.43\n24,743,158.13\n28,575,556.98\n27,819,807.93\n28,569,680.55\n30,260,777.76\nClaims on Central Government(net)\n9,815,071.43\n9,598,024.41\n9,412,261.62\n8,963,975.12\n9,422,173.55\n11,519,440.01\n12,964,643.80\n13,061,889.35\n14,409,797.90\n15,813,415.72\n14,062,737.58\n12,724,160.31\n12,697,777.62\nClaims on Central Government\n10,297,295.66\n10,219,710.43\n10,099,059.06\n9,998,232.41\n10,630,234.88\n13,077,256.67\n14,949,077.76\n16,410,748.86\n16,955,759.46\n17,933,911.03\n15,580,358.19\n16,676,243.01\n16,838,781.22\nCentral Bank\n7,248,426.12\n7,219,991.51\n7,173,820.48\n7,213,532.34\n7,707,833.00\n9,591,038.53\n11,538,930.29\n12,831,965.83\n13,205,609.13\n13,782,384.33\n11,338,532.85\n12,298,711.08\n12,540,517.65\nODCs\n3,048,869.54\n2,999,718.93\n2,925,238.58\n2,784,700.07\n2,922,401.88\n3,486,218.14\n3,410,147.47\n3,578,783.04\n3,750,150.34\n4,151,526.70\n4,241,825.34\n4,377,531.93\n4,298,263.57\nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n482,224.23\n621,686.02\n686,797.43\n1,034,257.30\n1,208,061.33\n1,557,816.66\n1,984,433.95\n3,348,859.52\n2,545,961.56\n2,120,495.31\n1,517,620.61\n3,952,082.70\n4,141,003.60\nCentral Bank\n437,738.21\n573,760.51\n630,940.61\n985,393.41\n1,163,537.70\n1,507,260.60\n1,925,235.84\n3,294,387.73\n2,477,362.61\n2,021,412.86\n1,399,114.53\n3,859,448.40\n4,062,791.73\nODCs\n44,486.02\n47,925.52\n55,856.82\n48,863.88\n44,523.63\n50,556.06\n59,198.12\n54,471.79\n68,598.95\n99,082.45\n118,506.08\n92,634.30\n78,211.87\nClaims on Other Sectors\n4,982,909.52\n5,021,047.86\n5,195,480.12\n5,875,948.60\n6,994,312.91\n6,708,916.08\n7,270,175.67\n8,106,883.08\n10,333,360.23\n12,762,141.26\n13,757,070.35\n15,845,520.24\n17,563,000.14\nOther Financial Corporations\n171,891.86\n159,230.21\n161,501.25\n169,299.57\n180,349.24\n174,910.96\n151,317.02\n152,985.99\n162,263.79\n160,062.11\n186,506.15\n202,429.27\n281,264.28\nState and Local Government\n34,253.92\n35,077.27\n34,576.44\n33,304.49\n31,319.18\n31,193.91\n30,689.81\n30,341.36\n28,130.16\n28,347.69\n26,320.30\n32,308.50\n31,704.96\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n717,834.55\n874,075.49\n987,347.41\n1,256,829.39\n1,653,927.27\n957,335.21\n988,381.20\n1,048,058.46\n2,322,563.84\n2,861,071.05\n2,431,172.28\n2,564,682.98\n2,591,284.85\nPrivate Sector\n4,058,929.20\n3,952,664.90\n4,012,055.03\n4,416,515.15\n5,128,717.22\n5,545,476.00\n6,099,787.63\n6,875,497.28\n7,820,402.44\n9,712,660.41\n11,113,071.62\n13,046,099.50\n14,658,746.06\nCentral Bank\n17,036.09\n21,956.10\n24,683.88\n25,361.29\n23,154.78\n33,310.97\n125,702.15\n86,780.68\n89,898.41\n65,420.53\n75,911.82\n78,069.12\n174,180.02\nODCs\n4,041,893.11\n3,930,708.81\n3,987,371.15\n4,391,153.86\n5,105,562.43\n5,512,165.03\n5,974,085.48\n6,788,716.60\n7,730,504.03\n9,647,239.89\n11,037,159.81\n12,968,030.37\n14,484,566.04\nOther Items(Net)\n-150,790.47\n-2,262,482.40\n-3,276,103.44\n-8,829,720.78\n-11,826,916.67\n-18,934,333.82\n-23,517,846.42\n-35,602,189.94\n-43,161,718.12\n-43,143,999.17\n-47,860,547.38\n-49,592,865.53 -49,769,854.91\nShares and Other Equity\n-544,566.17\n-1,687,090.85\n-2,151,220.63\n-6,856,982.76\n-9,810,341.46\n-18,099,228.93\n-22,440,397.72\n-32,505,897.24 -39,007,159.14 -41,160,941.61\n-44,544,759.40\n-43,829,432.91 -44,342,348.31\nLiabilities to Other Financial Corporations\n42,570.71\n42,675.76\n28,813.83\n46,518.61\n43,639.00\n27,408.22\n27,999.41\n23,286.81\n24,632.93\n50,514.35\n119,397.64\n140,072.14\n154,917.78\nRestricted Deposits\n8,667.49\n16,636.01\n46,764.60\n12,192.36\n363,411.77\n1,123,177.17\n1,290,893.19\n1,546,424.26\n1,881,910.27\n1,980,372.79\n1,147,967.31\n1,346,272.48\n1,119,306.34\nDeposits and Securities Excluded from Base Money\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nOther Items(net)\n342,537.50\n-634,703.31\n-1,200,461.25\n-2,031,448.99\n-2,423,625.98\n-1,985,690.29\n-2,396,341.30\n-4,666,003.77\n-6,061,102.18\n-4,013,944.69\n-4,583,152.93\n-7,249,777.25\n-6,701,730.71\nBroad Money-M3\n10,389,303.50\n10,627,376.18\n11,353,366.06\n13,009,038.25\n14,767,890.75\n17,076,036.26\n19,694,065.28\n23,551,729.79\n28,930,062.34\n31,820,551.60\n35,018,179.94\n36,272,069.61 38,336,879.45\nSecurities Other than Shares Included in Broad Money\n71,792.12\n74,503.10\n90,813.24\n139,439.93\n171,667.83\n168,169.20\n202,928.98\n219,889.50\n205,671.08\n235,117.26\n243,976.57\n255,563.69\n260,055.92\nBroad Money-M2\n10,317,511.39\n10,552,873.07\n11,262,552.82\n12,869,598.32\n14,596,222.92\n16,907,867.06\n19,491,136.30\n23,331,840.28\n28,724,391.26\n31,585,434.34\n34,774,203.37\n36,016,505.92\n38,076,823.53\nOther Deposits\n1,473,224.43\n1,437,053.15\n1,487,637.39\n1,611,815.34\n1,428,886.89\n1,640,846.54\n1,619,775.77\n1,662,956.26\n1,854,294.19\n1,835,730.85\n1,887,924.83\n2,026,599.28\n2,194,313.07\nNarrow Money-M1\n8,844,286.96\n9,115,819.92\n9,774,915.43\n11,257,782.98\n13,167,336.03\n15,267,020.52\n17,871,360.53\n21,668,884.03\n26,870,097.07\n29,749,703.49\n32,886,278.54\n33,989,906.64\n35,882,510.46\nTransferable Deposits\n8,380,317.93\n8,648,981.05\n9,283,238.74\n10,792,389.36\n12,695,789.56\n14,802,212.01\n17,310,786.11\n20,977,141.17\n26,157,975.38\n28,913,109.34\n31,978,710.26\n33,036,665.86\n34,932,660.39\n Of which Foreign Currency Accounts\n1,190,521.05\n1,417,836.22\n1,753,489.14\n3,031,536.97\n3,887,787.41\n4,049,120.88\n5,737,719.98\n9,859,484.27\n11,155,597.09\n11,472,035.58\n11,938,732.84\n12,458,349.93\n12,476,934.91\nCurrency Outside Depository Corporations\n463,969.03\n466,838.87\n491,676.69\n465,393.62\n471,546.47\n464,808.51\n560,574.42\n691,742.86\n712,121.69\n836,594.15\n907,568.29\n953,240.77\n949,850.07\nMemorandum Items\nReserve Money\n3,201,051.95\n3,172,354.75\n3,019,535.69\n2,522,708.23\n3,282,131.58\n3,769,321.37\n5,747,625.57\n4,682,715.46\n6,810,750.63\n8,114,953.04\n10,327,816.88\n9,251,024.10\n9,380,944.48\nFCAs as a Percentage of Deposits in M3\n12.0%\n14.0%\n16.1%\n24.2%\n27.2%\n24.4%\n30.0%\n43.1%\n39.5%\n37.0%\n35.0%\n35.3%\n33.4%\nEnd Period Exchange Rate\n2.50\n3.01\n3.26\n5.26\n6.62\n9.19\n10.71\n15.20\n16.12\n16.26\n16.77\n17.35\n17.95\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2020\nNotes:\n(i) Depository corporations survey - formerly Monetary Survey.\n(ii) Broad money redefined using IMF's Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual of 2000. Major changes include exclusion of Government deposits held by banks from broad money.\n(iii) Transferable deposits made up of demand and savings deposits.\n(iv) NCDs are also referred to as securities included in broad money.\n(v) All classes of time deposits, short and long term are classified as time deposits, which are also termed other deposits.\n(vi) Credit to the private sector now excludes claims on other financial corporations, as well as claims on state and local government (local authorities)\n(vii) Depository corporations made up of the Central Bank and other depository corporations\n(viii) Other depository corporations (ODCs) - Commercial banks, merchant banks, building societies and POSB.\n(ix) In December 2017, the statistics were adjusted in restrospect by reclassifying Securities issued under Aftrades from claims on government to claims on central bank\n(x) In December 2017, the statistics were adjusted in restrospect by reclassifying amounts accessed by banks under the Aftrades from liabilities to Other Depository corporations and Other Financial Corporations to liabilities to Central Bank \n(xi) In December 2018, statistics were revised from November 2017 due to reclassification of lines of credit (foreign liabilities) that were initially classified as deposits included in broad money\n(xii) All monetary and financial statistics are valued in ZWL$ since the introduction of the interbank foreign exchange market in February 2019\nTABLE 1: DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS SURVEY ($ '000)\n \n \n \n15 \n \n \nFeb-19\nMar-19\nApr-19\nMay-19\nJun-19\nJul-19\nAug-19\nSep-19\nOct-19\nNov-19\nDec-19\nJan-20\nFeb-20\nNet Foreign Assets\n-4,676,973.98 -6,110,320.34 -6,759,543.60 -11,356,605.80 -14,602,968.79 -23,287,056.52 -27,352,064.33\n-39,349,960.03 -46,395,160.21 -48,267,748.85 -50,285,843.15 -51,596,769.75 -51,659,786.89\nClaims on Non Residents\n853,285.31\n996,604.88\n931,294.24\n2,416,356.86\n2,917,765.26\n3,402,652.93\n4,334,171.18\n6,464,247.45\n5,444,857.74\n5,552,951.79\n5,504,939.77\n5,234,031.88\n5,504,836.03\nOfficial Reserves Assets\n311,203.67\n344,973.29\n230,535.90\n1,223,599.47\n1,399,462.47\n1,401,366.80\n1,964,853.83\n1,511,299.58\n1,937,457.59\n1,915,477.05\n2,537,103.33\n2,888,945.28\n3,104,642.81\nOther Foreign Assets\n542,081.63\n651,631.59\n700,758.34\n1,192,757.39\n1,518,302.79\n2,001,286.13\n2,369,317.36\n4,952,947.87\n3,507,400.15\n3,637,474.74\n2,967,836.45\n2,345,086.60\n2,400,193.22\nLess Liabilities to Non Residents\n5,530,259.29\n7,106,925.22\n7,690,837.84\n13,772,962.65\n17,520,734.04\n26,689,709.45\n31,686,235.51\n45,814,207.48\n51,840,017.94\n53,820,700.64\n55,790,782.92\n56,830,801.63\n57,164,622.92\nShort Term Liabilities\n4,300,887.88 5,631,784.52 6,093,840.18\n11,231,907.80\n14,024,443.68\n18,833,457.18\n22,284,382.58\n32,602,281.08\n33,501,054.49\n34,223,789.11\n35,686,123.01\n39,597,730.68\n41,112,190.47\nOther Foreign Liabilities\n1,229,371.41 1,475,140.70 1,596,997.65\n2,541,054.86\n3,496,290.36\n7,856,252.27\n9,401,852.93\n13,211,926.40\n18,338,963.45\n19,596,911.53\n20,104,659.91\n17,233,070.95\n16,052,432.45\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n7,878,025.93 9,282,675.10 9,779,079.28\n13,879,314.03\n17,885,100.37\n27,056,377.90\n33,099,689.90\n44,032,675.49\n53,205,910.84\n56,382,701.89\n60,613,660.02\n60,847,793.85\n61,040,731.37\nDomestic Claims\n7,398,364.83 7,254,587.97 7,190,950.30\n6,924,182.99\n7,344,238.48\n8,736,761.70\n10,057,820.09\n10,567,049.53\n12,972,537.88\n14,525,637.67\n12,259,697.53\n10,746,256.31\n10,973,320.90\nNet Claims on Central Government\n6,810,687.92 6,646,231.00 6,542,879.87\n6,228,138.93\n6,544,295.30\n7,912,732.78\n9,154,435.10\n9,537,578.10\n10,728,246.52\n11,760,971.47\n9,939,418.32\n8,439,262.68\n8,477,725.92\nClaims on Central Government\n7,248,426.12\n7,219,991.51\n7,173,820.48\n7,213,532.34\n7,707,833.00\n9,419,993.38\n11,079,670.93\n12,831,965.83\n13,205,609.13\n13,782,384.33\n11,338,532.85\n12,298,711.08\n12,540,517.65\nOf which: Securities Other than Shares\n1,962,432.38 1,910,408.71 1,835,171.86\n1,793,430.00\n5,922,355.91\n7,222,007.40\n8,308,198.93\n9,491,988.13\n9,617,665.33\n9,771,722.53\n6,828,363.47\n6,784,907.24\n6,729,080.00\n of which USD Securities revaluations (Excha\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n171,045.15\n620,748.19\n1,795,917.79\n1,930,201.39\n2,084,258.59\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nLoans\n5,285,993.74\n5,309,582.80\n5,338,648.62\n5,420,102.34\n1,785,477.10\n2,197,985.98\n2,771,472.00\n3,339,977.70\n3,587,943.80\n4,010,661.79\n4,510,169.38\n5,513,803.84\n5,811,437.65\n Loans and Advances\n3,814,968.71 3,800,851.32 3,803,362.82\n3,805,605.65\n114,667.21\n368,837.75\n568,020.15\n835,231.09\n1,110,375.86\n1,262,301.22\n1,199,032.23\n1,611,254.61\n1,808,444.47\n Legacy Debt\n308,519.87\n309,020.71\n309,052.17\n309,088.45\n309,057.44\n405,543.61\n404,773.69\n414,023.05\n381,741.08\n382,025.83\n376,260.18\n371,310.28\n391,427.33\n Export Incentives\n1,199,710.77\n1,226,233.63\n1,305,408.24\n1,361,752.45\n1,423,604.62\n1,798,678.16\n2,090,723.55\n2,095,826.85\n2,366,334.74\n2,934,876.98\n3,531,238.96\n3,611,565.85\nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n437,738.21\n573,760.51\n630,940.61\n985,393.41\n1,163,537.70\n1,507,260.60\n1,925,235.84\n3,294,387.73\n2,477,362.61\n2,021,412.86\n1,399,114.53\n3,859,448.40\n4,062,791.73\nOf which: Deposits\n437,738.21\n573,760.51\n630,940.61\n985,393.41\n1,163,537.70\n1,507,260.60\n1,925,235.84\n3,294,387.73\n2,477,362.61\n2,021,412.86\n1,399,114.53\n3,859,448.40\n4,062,791.73\nOther \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nClaims on Other Sectors\n587,676.92\n608,356.98\n648,070.43\n696,044.06\n799,943.18\n824,028.92\n903,384.99\n1,029,471.42\n2,244,291.36\n2,764,666.21\n2,320,279.21\n2,306,993.64\n2,495,594.98\nOther Financial Corporations\n121,634.35\n114,497.79\n117,613.99\n114,408.61\n125,389.20\n109,687.61\n112,349.24\n118,657.17\n122,348.15\n122,367.95\n114,216.39\n123,637.97\n185,777.12\nState and Local Government\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n449,006.47\n471,903.09\n505,772.56\n556,274.16\n651,399.20\n681,030.34\n665,333.60\n824,033.57\n2,032,044.80\n2,576,877.72\n2,130,151.01\n2,105,286.54\n2,135,637.84\nPrivate Sector\n17,036.09\n21,956.10\n24,683.88\n25,361.29\n23,154.78\n33,310.97\n125,702.15\n86,780.68\n89,898.41\n65,420.53\n75,911.82\n78,069.12\n174,180.02\nClaims on Other Depository Corporations\n330,900.10\n339,662.09\n332,906.49\n328,813.24\n363,908.20\n339,280.92\n348,501.79\n385,543.38\n429,889.74\n875,893.44\n1,247,758.47\n1,418,055.93\n1,537,977.10\nOf which: Loans\n330,900.10\n339,662.09\n332,906.49\n328,813.24\n363,908.20\n339,280.92\n348,501.79\n385,543.38\n429,889.74\n875,893.44\n1,247,758.47\n1,418,055.93\n1,537,977.10\nOther Liabilities to ODCs\n2,509,676.59 2,400,005.83 2,538,511.34\n3,047,017.11\n2,846,011.57\n2,756,773.68\n3,094,984.02\n4,129,952.46\n4,009,051.66\n5,433,469.12\n7,563,514.16\n8,461,698.70\n9,792,726.83\nOf which: Aftrades Balances\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n Securities\n2,314,291.29\n2,248,370.43\n2,348,400.79\n2,738,904.07\n2,200,323.26\n2,004,097.96\n2,145,531.30\n2,824,669.92\n2,966,155.20\n2,939,654.78\n4,579,216.20\n5,320,924.19\n5,467,251.69\nOther Items(Net)\n-2,658,437.58 -4,088,430.87 -4,793,733.84\n-9,673,334.90 -13,022,965.26 -20,737,108.96 -25,788,352.03\n-37,210,035.04 -43,812,534.88 -46,414,639.90 -54,669,718.18 -57,145,180.31 -58,322,160.20\nShares and Other Equity\n-2,402,232.48\n-3,873,725.31\n-4,589,274.75\n-9,310,271.34\n-12,940,837.81\n-21,517,328.05\n-26,390,209.56\n-37,895,629.34\n-44,802,824.15\n-47,413,029.48\n-54,656,738.27\n-55,918,839.02\n-56,770,197.78\nOther Items(Net)\n-264,872.60\n-231,341.56\n-251,223.69\n-375,255.92\n-445,539.22\n-342,958.09\n-689,035.65\n-860,829.96\n-891,621.00\n-981,983.21\n-1,160,947.22\n-2,572,613.77\n-2,671,268.75\nLiabilities to Other Resident Sectors\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nDeposits and Securities Excluded from Base Money\n8,667.49\n16,636.01\n46,764.60\n12,192.36\n363,411.77\n1,123,177.17\n1,290,893.19\n1,546,424.26\n1,881,910.27\n1,980,372.79\n1,147,967.31\n1,346,272.48\n1,119,306.34\nMonetary Base Incl. foreign currency clearing balances\nMonetary Base \n3,201,051.95 3,172,354.76 3,019,535.69\n2,522,708.23\n3,282,131.58\n3,769,321.38\n5,747,625.57\n4,682,715.46\n6,810,750.63\n8,114,953.04\n10,327,816.88\n9,251,024.10\n9,380,944.48\nBond Coins\n86,794.17\n86,775.25\n87,096.23\n87,423.30\n87,606.55\n87,843.40\n87,844.15\n87,847.30\n87,845.55\n93,158.32\n99,010.30\n99,714.26\n99,712.42\nBond Notes\n436,825.58\n442,551.17\n449,762.88\n476,656.02\n510,197.39\n609,392.70\n657,100.48\n728,411.73\n768,566.52\n872,222.06\n978,393.54\n1,036,938.66\n1,117,198.96\nLiabilities to ODCs\n2,620,801.43 2,556,061.06 2,410,617.85\n1,861,836.07\n2,583,805.05\n2,945,382.52\n4,679,680.86\n3,772,389.39\n5,535,717.81\n6,219,757.79\n8,352,572.72\n7,253,578.67\n7,089,397.08\n Reserve Deposits\n387,117.92\n379,777.18\n382,618.00\n406,733.21\n434,435.93\n497,763.67\n586,218.84\n625,173.97\n758,953.25\n861,489.70\n918,034.34\n1,040,852.24\n1,082,852.88\n Exess reserves \n2,233,683.51 2,176,283.88 2,027,999.85\n1,455,102.86\n2,149,369.12\n2,447,618.85\n4,093,462.02\n3,147,215.41\n4,776,764.57\n5,358,268.10\n7,434,538.38\n6,212,726.43\n6,006,544.20\nPrivate Deposits\n56,630.77\n86,967.28\n72,058.73\n96,792.85\n100,522.60\n126,702.75\n323,000.08\n94,067.04\n418,620.75\n929,814.87\n897,840.31\n860,792.52\n1,074,636.02\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2020\nTABLE 2: CENTRAL BANK SURVEY ($'000)\n \n \n \n16 \n \n \n \n \nFeb-19\nMar-19\nApr-19\nMay-19\nJun-19\nJul-19\nAug-19\nSep-19\nOct-19\nNov-19\nDec-19\nJan-20\nFeb-20\nNet Foreign Assets\n252,506.07\n126,699.85\n530,512.93\n1,160,120.10\n1,898,531.40\n3,371,448.01\n3,752,723.07\n6,130,727.45\n7,420,346.30\n8,368,744.30\n9,623,667.78\n9,706,293.27\n9,966,033.66\nClaims on Non Residents\n1,034,721.60\n1,060,697.66\n1,491,439.91\n2,534,779.04\n3,814,622.33\n5,390,485.00\n6,120,479.23\n9,382,906.26\n10,478,858.26\n11,622,874.19\n12,948,416.33\n13,153,007.07\n13,344,846.71\nOf Which: Foreign Currency\n256,754.30\n263,233.15\n363,481.95\n484,193.31\n882,204.61\n968,769.48\n1,150,434.08\n2,108,450.56\n1,905,985.69\n2,243,113.59\n2,526,205.54\n3,176,598.38\n3,136,431.39\nDeposits\n776,043.16\n794,324.48\n1,123,646.46\n2,044,144.29\n2,921,840.60\n4,408,575.22\n4,954,935.41\n7,254,079.84\n8,551,844.58\n9,358,131.61\n10,399,832.16\n9,953,357.06\n10,175,380.89\nOther\n1,924.14\n3,140.03\n4,311.50\n6,441.45\n10,577.12\n13,140.31\n15,109.74\n20,375.85\n21,027.99\n21,628.98\n22,378.63\n23,051.63\n33,034.42\nLess Liabilities to Non Residents\n782,215.53\n933,997.80\n960,926.97\n1,374,658.95\n1,916,090.93\n2,019,036.99\n2,367,756.16\n3,252,178.80\n3,058,511.96\n3,254,129.88\n3,324,748.55\n3,446,713.79\n3,378,813.04\nOf Which: Deposits\n172,568.31\n553,655.47\n584,272.60\n719,211.04\n769,197.36\n857,462.40\n938,762.40\n1,334,410.99\n1,141,821.51\n1,377,452.16\n1,457,271.39\n1,591,189.46\n1,285,842.52\nLoans\n609,647.22\n380,342.34\n376,654.37\n655,447.91\n1,146,893.57\n1,161,574.59\n1,428,993.76\n1,917,767.81\n1,916,690.45\n1,876,677.72\n1,867,477.16\n1,855,524.33\n2,092,970.52\nOther\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n9,616,197.64\n9,946,870.18\n10,259,117.71\n11,286,731.69\n12,297,290.28\n13,113,076.98\n15,057,767.71\n16,635,192.44\n20,378,973.60\n21,685,398.27\n23,589,103.57\n24,751,743.05\n26,346,359.69\nDomestic Claims\n7,264,616.12\n7,093,926.30\n7,115,342.99\n7,451,620.17\n8,301,172.98\n9,320,549.24\n9,717,740.03\n10,601,722.91\n11,770,620.25\n14,049,919.30\n15,560,110.40\n17,823,424.24\n19,287,456.86\nNet Claims on Central Government\n3,004,383.52\n2,951,793.41\n2,869,381.76\n2,735,836.19\n2,877,878.25\n3,435,662.08\n3,350,949.35\n3,524,311.24\n3,681,551.38\n4,052,444.25\n4,123,319.26\n4,284,897.63\n4,220,051.70\nClaims on Central Government\n3,048,869.54\n2,999,718.93\n2,925,238.58\n2,784,700.07\n2,922,401.88\n3,486,218.14\n3,410,147.47\n3,578,783.04\n3,750,150.34\n4,151,526.70\n4,241,825.34\n4,377,531.93\n4,298,263.57\nSecurities\n3,043,034.49\n2,995,446.01\n2,921,262.97\n2,780,774.94\n2,918,508.31\n3,484,041.96\n3,409,103.10\n3,577,410.30\n3,749,000.52\n4,150,152.74\n4,240,495.63\n4,372,420.71\n4,293,116.08\nLoans\n5,835.04\n4,272.91\n3,975.61\n3,925.13\n3,893.57\n2,176.18\n1,044.37\n1,372.73\n1,149.81\n1,373.97\n1,329.70\n5,111.21\n5,147.49\nOther \n - - - - - \n - \n - \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n44,486.02\n47,925.52\n55,856.82\n48,863.88\n44,523.63\n50,556.06\n59,198.12\n54,471.79\n68,598.95\n99,082.45\n118,506.08\n92,634.30\n78,211.87\nOf which: Deposits\n44,486.02\n47,925.52\n55,856.82\n48,863.88\n44,523.63\n50,556.06\n59,198.12\n54,471.79\n68,598.95\n99,082.45\n118,506.08\n92,634.30\n78,211.87\nOther \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nClaims on Other Sectors\n4,260,232.61\n4,142,132.88\n4,245,961.23\n4,715,783.99\n5,423,294.73\n5,884,887.16\n6,366,790.67\n7,077,411.66\n8,089,068.87\n9,997,475.05\n11,436,791.14\n13,538,526.61\n15,067,405.16\nOther Financial Corporations\n50,257.50\n44,732.42\n43,887.25\n54,890.96\n54,960.04\n65,223.35\n38,967.78\n34,328.82\n39,915.64\n37,694.15\n72,289.76\n78,791.30\n95,487.15\nState and Local Government\n34,253.92\n35,077.27\n34,576.44\n33,304.49\n31,319.18\n31,193.91\n30,689.81\n30,341.36\n28,130.16\n28,347.69\n26,320.30\n32,308.50\n31,704.96\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n133,828.08\n131,614.40\n180,126.39\n236,434.67\n231,453.07\n276,304.88\n323,047.60\n224,024.88\n290,519.04\n284,193.32\n301,021.27\n459,396.43\n455,647.01\nPrivate Sector\n4,041,893.11\n3,930,708.81\n3,987,371.15\n4,391,153.86\n5,105,562.43\n5,512,165.03\n5,974,085.48\n6,788,716.60\n7,730,504.03\n9,647,239.89\n11,037,159.81\n12,968,030.37\n14,484,566.04\nClaims on the Central Bank\n3,992,791.54\n4,257,352.21\n4,488,587.04\n4,782,265.42\n5,415,977.11\n5,448,316.23\n8,140,877.50\n9,252,623.62\n11,757,301.08\n11,546,508.94\n14,013,346.66\n13,400,742.47\n14,084,026.73\nCurrency\n59,650.72\n62,487.55\n45,182.42\n98,685.70\n126,257.46\n232,427.59\n184,370.21\n124,516.17\n144,290.37\n128,786.22\n169,835.56\n183,412.14\n267,061.31\nReserves\n3,933,140.82\n4,194,864.67\n4,443,404.62\n4,683,579.73\n5,289,719.65\n5,215,888.64\n7,956,507.29\n9,128,107.45\n11,613,010.71\n11,417,722.72\n13,843,511.10\n13,217,330.33\n13,816,965.42\nSecurities\n - \n - \n - \n - \n - \n - \n - \n - \n - \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nOther Claims\n - \n - \n - \n - \n - \n - \n - \n - \n - \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nLiabilities to the Central Bank\n158,887.13\n165,849.57\n148,327.69\n148,760.15\n150,275.70\n151,973.32\n155,014.53\n155,934.06\n159,104.77\n175,255.53\n179,468.01\n185,829.15\n189,591.37\nOther Items(Net)\n1,482,322.89\n1,238,558.76\n1,196,484.63\n798,393.76\n1,269,584.10\n1,503,815.17\n2,645,835.28\n3,063,220.03\n2,989,842.96\n3,735,774.45\n5,804,885.48\n6,286,594.51\n6,835,532.53\nShares and Other Equity\n1,857,666.31\n2,186,634.46\n2,438,054.11\n2,453,288.57\n3,130,496.35\n3,418,099.11\n3,949,811.84\n5,389,732.10\n5,795,665.01\n6,252,087.86\n10,111,978.87\n12,089,406.11\n12,427,849.47\nLiabilities to other ressident sectors\n42,570.71\n42,675.76\n28,813.83\n46,518.61\n43,639.00\n27,408.22\n27,999.41\n23,286.81\n24,632.93\n50,514.35\n119,397.64\n140,072.14\n154,917.78\nOther Items(Net)\n-417,914.13\n-990,751.46\n-1,270,383.32\n-1,701,413.42\n-1,904,551.24\n-1,941,692.17\n-1,331,975.97\n-2,349,798.88\n-2,830,454.98\n-2,566,827.76\n-4,426,491.02\n-5,942,883.74\n-5,747,234.71\nDeposits and Securities Included in Broad Mo\n9,868,703.71\n10,073,570.03\n10,789,630.64\n12,446,851.79\n14,195,821.68\n16,484,524.99\n18,810,490.79\n22,765,919.89\n27,799,319.90\n30,054,142.57\n33,212,771.35\n34,458,036.32\n36,312,393.36\nDeposits Included in Broad Money\n9,796,911.59\n \n9,999,066.93\n \n10,698,817.40\n \n12,307,411.86\n \n14,024,153.85\n \n16,316,355.79\n \n18,607,561.81\n \n22,546,030.38\n \n27,593,648.82\n \n29,819,025.32\n \n32,968,794.78\n \n34,202,472.63\n \n36,052,337.44\n \nTransferable Deposits\n8,323,687.16\n \n8,562,013.77\n \n9,211,180.01\n \n10,695,596.51\n \n12,595,266.96\n \n14,675,509.25\n \n16,987,786.03\n \n20,883,074.13\n \n25,739,354.63\n \n27,983,294.46\n \n31,080,869.95\n \n32,175,873.35\n \n33,858,024.37\n \n of which FCAs\n1,190,521.05\n \n1,417,836.22\n \n1,753,489.14\n \n3,031,536.97\n \n3,887,787.41\n \n4,049,120.88\n \n5,737,719.98\n \n9,859,484.27\n \n11,155,597.09\n \n11,472,035.58\n \n11,938,732.84\n \n12,458,349.93\n \n12,476,934.91\n \nOther Deposits\n1,473,224.43\n1,437,053.15\n1,487,637.39\n1,611,815.34\n1,428,886.89\n1,640,846.54\n1,619,775.77\n1,662,956.26\n1,854,294.19\n1,835,730.85\n1,887,924.83\n2,026,599.28\n2,194,313.07\nMoney Market Instruments\n71,792.12\n \n74,503.10\n \n90,813.24\n \n139,439.93\n \n171,667.83\n \n168,169.20\n \n202,928.98\n \n219,889.50\n \n205,671.08\n \n235,117.26\n \n243,976.57\n \n255,563.69\n \n260,055.92\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2020\nTABLE 3 : OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS SURVEY ( $ '000)\n \n \n \n17 \n \n \n \n \n \nForeign\nTOTAL\nEnd of\nNotes\nBond\n&\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \nLocal\nOther \n Notes &\nCoin\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment1\nGovernemt\nOther2\nGovernment\nLocal \nPublic \n Institutional \nOther cliams\nContigent Assets\nOther Assets\nNon Financial \nCoins\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\nGovernment\nEnterprises\nUnits\nAssets\n2018\nJan\n23.4\n \n66.9\n \n2,528.5\n \n291.2\n \n111.9\n \n81.9\n2,336.0\n34.5\n23.5\n65.9\n26.3\n20.6\n155.3\n3,461.2\n74.6\n501.0\n457.8\n700.8\n10,961.1\nFeb\n20.0\n \n46.8\n \n2,516.8\n \n347.6\n \n114.2\n \n96.2\n2,313.4\n33.5\n23.5\n66.1\n24.3\n21.1\n145.4\n3,527.1\n22.2\n507.8\n434.5\n697.8\n10,958.3\nMar\n16.7\n \n57.9\n \n2,457.7\n \n312.8\n \n139.2\n \n99.5\n2,434.8\n32.8\n23.5\n66.7\n19.2\n15.9\n127.5\n3,637.8\n24.2\n504.1\n487.4\n710.3\n11,168.1\nApr\n14.9\n \n61.9\n \n2,423.5\n \n337.0\n \n120.8\n \n78.5\n2,558.9\n32.0\n24.7\n67.0\n13.4\n20.9\n121.2\n3,674.0\n22.1\n532.0\n459.2\n715.7\n11,277.5\nMay\n14.2\n \n71.7\n \n2,543.0\n \n477.8\n \n138.6\n \n85.7\n2,814.9\n30.9\n25.0\n66.9\n8.4\n20.9\n134.4\n3,740.3\n12.0\n458.9\n457.2\n718.2\n11,819.1\nJun\n9.0\n \n58.5\n \n3,081.0\n \n509.8\n \n120.0\n \n84.1\n2,865.3\n30.1\n26.2\n66.5\n7.4\n19.4\n196.4\n3,829.3\n38.6\n551.4\n448.1\n730.7\n12,671.8\nJul\n20.6\n \n61.9\n \n3,450.6\n \n466.4\n \n111.6\n \n95.4\n3,291.4\n33.3\n0.0\n67.5\n4.5\n21.0\n182.0\n3,500.6\n153.9\n611.4\n472.5\n732.0\n13,276.5\nAug\n23.1\n \n72.3\n \n3,475.7\n \n377.8\n \n105.3\n \n66.3\n3,362.8\n32.2\n0.0\n67.3\n7.1\n20.6\n186.7\n3,585.1\n102.0\n647.7\n489.9\n736.1\n13,358.0\nSep\n18.2\n \n61.5\n \n3,781.6\n \n398.1\n \n159.1\n \n78.0\n3,145.7\n31.2\n45.2\n68.1\n5.4\n20.4\n212.2\n3,734.2\n119.7\n637.4\n527.8\n742.6\n13,786.4\nOct\n39.9\n \n70.4\n \n3,771.3\n \n368.3\n \n185.5\n \n51.4\n3,105.9\n30.2\n45.2\n68.4\n4.6\n9.4\n188.8\n3,838.0\n132.0\n647.5\n537.8\n743.0\n13,837.7\nNov\n30.6\n \n84.6\n \n3,696.3\n \n300.6\n \n209.8\n \n63.9\n3,172.9\n28.9\n45.2\n68.7\n7.0\n8.1\n217.7\n3,813.2\n141.9\n633.2\n581.9\n742.4\n13,846.8\nDec\n20.5\n \n94.5\n \n3,949.5\n \n439.6\n \n235.5\n \n74.8\n3,044.1\n28.0\n43.4\n69.2\n6.2\n9.2\n204.3\n3,870.5\n151.2\n573.8\n612.5\n812.4\n14,239.0\n2019\nJan\n49.0\n \n113.4\n \n3,901.0\n \n401.9\n \n261.6\n \n46.1\n3,038.3\n27.3\n94.6\n68.7\n4.4\n8.1\n189.2\n3,773.5\n109.1\n517.2\n592.3\n827.7\n14,023.5\nFeb\n59.7\n \n256.8\n \n3,764.8\n \n357.1\n \n570.4\n \n205.7\n3,076.4\n26.5\n60.5\n2.0\n5.8\n7.7\n208.3\n3,991.5\n100.5\n490.7\n669.1\n880.0\n14,733.6\nMar\n62.5\n \n263.2\n \n3,891.0\n \n432.9\n \n739.3\n \n55.1\n3,028.8\n25.5\n61.5\n4.5\n4.3\n9.5\n340.7\n3,845.0\n129.0\n523.7\n954.5\n1,205.2\n15,576.2\nApr\n45.2\n \n363.5\n \n4,153.9\n \n578.9\n \n1,031.9\n \n91.7\n2,921.3\n25.0\n61.8\n4.0\n4.0\n9.6\n407.8\n3,899.7\n131.9\n620.5\n1,135.4\n1,304.8\n16,790.9\nMay\n98.7\n \n484.2\n \n4,089.2\n \n694.1\n \n1,890.1\n \n154.1\n2,912.7\n23.9\n62.1\n4.2\n3.9\n9.4\n636.8\n4,303.9\n144.3\n910.1\n2,031.0\n1,532.3\n19,985.1\nJun\n126.3\n \n882.2\n \n4,518.6\n \n560.2\n \n2,383.0\n \n538.9\n2,918.5\n22.6\n63.1\n6.6\n3.9\n8.7\n929.4\n5,011.5\n163.0\n1,606.5\n1,621.9\n2,120.4\n23,485.3\nJul\n232.4\n \n968.8\n \n5,605.6\n \n370.4\n \n3,738.0\n \n801.9\n2,962.9\n22.2\n103.4\n5.5\n2.2\n9.0\n164.6\n5,364.7\n228.7\n1,587.7\n2,124.1\n2,345.3\n26,637.3\nAug\n184.4\n \n1,150.4\n \n7,956.5\n \n527.8\n \n3,904.2\n \n1,050.7\n3,409.1\n21.5\n103.9\n6.8\n1.0\n9.2\n212.5\n5,764.9\n263.2\n2,614.6\n2,149.5\n2,623.2\n31,953.4\nSep\n124.5\n \n2,108.5\n \n9,128.1\n \n874.0\n \n5,678.3\n \n1,575.7\n3,577.4\n20.9\n27.0\n6.5\n1.4\n9.4\n187.5\n6,456.9\n389.5\n3,707.8\n3,665.5\n3,549.9\n41,088.9\nOct\n144.3\n \n1,906.0\n \n11,613.0\n \n2,511.0\n \n7,644.9\n \n907.0\n3,749.0\n20.2\n27.1\n5.3\n1.1\n7.9\n254.8\n7,393.9\n400.9\n4,081.1\n2,230.5\n3,580.5\n46,478.4\nNov\n128.8\n \n2,243.1\n \n11,417.7\n \n2,236.3\n \n8,417.4\n \n940.7\n4,150.2\n19.6\n27.1\n11.8\n1.4\n8.7\n248.8\n9,260.2\n442.8\n3,148.3\n2,272.9\n4,208.0\n49,183.9\nDec\n169.8\n \n2,526.2\n \n13,994.1\n \n1,254.7\n \n8,415.7\n \n1,984.1\n4,090.0\n18.2\n24.7\n20.7\n1.3\n8.1\n268.6\n10,562.1\n556.7\n4,867.7\n3,517.6\n8,485.9\n60,766.3\n2020\nJan\n183.4\n \n3,176.6\n \n13,217.3\n \n1,073.2\n \n8,142.0\n \n1,811.4\n4,372.4\n20.1\n125.5\n15.0\n5.1\n12.2\n326.1\n12,115.8\n946.9\n2,965.9\n4,191.6\n9,691.7\n62,392.3\nFeb\n267.1\n \n3,136.4\n \n13,817.0\n \n1,504.5\n \n8,642.5\n \n1,532.9\n4,293.1\n20.1\n117.4\n15.5\n5.1\n11.6\n329.5\n13,632.6\n973.7\n5,441.7\n12,758.8\n10,338.7\n76,838.2\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2020\nNotes\n1.Government securities includes treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households and other financial corporations.\nPublic \nEnterprises\nTABLE 4.1: OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS -ASSETS\n$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \n \n18 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nDebt Securities Foreign Liabilities\nCapital\nContigent\nOther\nTOTAL\nand\nLiablities\nLiablities\nEnd of\nDemand\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nReserves\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\n2018\nJan\n4,640.2\n1,008.1\n1,454.0\n7,102.2\n406.5\n107.3\n7,616.1\n65.1\n444.8\n115.1\n49.1\n2.6\n1,645.3\n501.0\n522.1\n10,961.1\nFeb\n4,633.7\n989.2\n1,458.8\n7,081.7\n418.7\n101.2\n7,601.7\n75.4\n435.4\n111.2\n92.8\n2.9\n1,620.1\n507.8\n511.0\n10,958.3\nMar\n4,732.9\n1,007.5\n1,491.0\n7,231.4\n365.0\n114.7\n7,711.0\n77.3\n460.8\n140.5\n89.2\n6.9\n1,654.7\n504.1\n523.4\n11,168.1\nApr\n4,907.7\n1,066.6\n1,374.6\n7,349.0\n387.8\n95.6\n7,832.3\n84.0\n453.1\n82.4\n68.8\n16.1\n1,641.9\n532.0\n567.0\n11,277.5\nMay\n5,172.9\n1,138.2\n1,442.5\n7,753.6\n442.8\n107.4\n8,303.8\n88.0\n554.0\n101.5\n94.9\n19.9\n1,671.5\n458.9\n526.5\n11,819.1\nJune\n5,650.6\n1,274.7\n1,459.1\n8,384.4\n438.0\n89.2\n8,911.6\n66.8\n554.0\n119.8\n173.4\n21.6\n1,707.5\n551.4\n565.7\n12,671.8\nJuly\n5,902.3\n1,415.3\n1,501.5\n8,819.1\n424.4\n33.1\n9,276.7\n89.5\n545.1\n118.9\n132.9\n32.6\n1,846.0\n611.4\n623.4\n13,276.5\nAug\n6,005.7\n1,362.6\n1,524.2\n8,892.5\n399.6\n32.4\n9,324.5\n66.5\n535.4\n137.0\n119.5\n33.3\n1,882.9\n647.7\n611.2\n13,358.0\nSep\n6,281.7\n1,421.8\n1,489.0\n9,192.4\n439.0\n44.6\n9,676.1\n52.4\n559.4\n142.2\n129.1\n46.6\n1,913.4\n637.4\n629.7\n13,786.4\nOct\n6,345.7\n1,390.0\n1,427.8\n9,163.5\n435.2\n52.2\n9,650.8\n61.7\n581.4\n147.6\n93.4\n42.0\n1,957.6\n647.5\n655.7\n13,837.7\nNov\n6,419.8\n1,329.4\n1,430.4\n9,179.6\n366.8\n48.7\n9,595.1\n50.9\n543.1\n213.7\n74.8\n42.3\n1,991.6\n633.2\n702.1\n13,846.8\nDec\n6,601.1\n1,322.2\n1,508.9\n9,432.2\n394.5\n41.3\n9,868.0\n58.6\n524.7\n229.6\n187.8\n39.0\n2,057.7\n573.8\n699.7\n14,239.0\n2019\nJan\n6,626.6\n1,155.9\n1,466.8\n9,249.4\n381.0\n42.2\n9,672.5\n59.3\n530.5\n239.5\n188.3\n39.2\n2,047.0\n517.2\n729.8\n14,023.5\nFeb\n7,168.7\n1,155.1\n1,473.2\n9,797.1\n387.8\n44.5\n10,229.3\n71.8\n782.0\n158.9\n151.7\n42.6\n2,145.1\n490.7\n661.5\n14,733.6\nMar\n7,435.2\n1,127.0\n1,437.1\n9,999.2\n372.7\n47.9\n10,419.9\n74.5\n933.8\n165.8\n140.9\n42.7\n2,349.0\n523.7\n925.8\n15,576.2\nApr\n7,968.0\n1,243.3\n1,795.8\n11,007.1\n390.9\n55.9\n11,453.8\n90.8\n652.7\n148.3\n173.5\n28.8\n2,551.4\n620.5\n1,071.0\n16,790.9\nMay\n9,316.8\n1,379.0\n1,932.4\n12,628.2\n462.9\n48.9\n13,139.9\n139.4\n1,053.9\n148.8\n206.7\n46.5\n2,556.6\n910.1\n1,783.2\n19,985.1\nJun\n11,021.9\n1,573.5\n1,737.2\n14,332.6\n422.0\n44.5\n14,799.2\n171.7\n1,607.6\n150.3\n216.7\n43.6\n3,240.7\n1,606.5\n1,649.0\n23,485.3\nJul\n13,014.4\n1,661.3\n1,949.2\n16,624.9\n432.6\n50.6\n17,108.1\n168.2\n1,710.5\n152.0\n225.8\n27.4\n3,522.6\n1,587.7\n2,135.1\n26,637.3\nAug\n15,189.7\n1,798.7\n1,922.5\n18,910.9\n639.1\n59.2\n19,609.3\n202.9\n2,064.4\n155.0\n116.2\n28.0\n4,061.0\n2,614.6\n3,102.0\n31,953.4\nSep\n18,834.0\n2,049.2\n1,925.3\n22,808.5\n549.2\n54.5\n23,412.2\n219.9\n2,989.7\n155.9\n182.3\n23.3\n5,510.0\n3,707.8\n4,887.7\n41,088.9\nOct\n23,441.5\n2,298.0\n1,891.9\n27,631.4\n526.0\n68.6\n28,226.0\n205.7\n3,020.7\n159.1\n211.3\n24.6\n5,937.5\n4,081.1\n4,612.3\n46,478.4\nNov\n25,114.5\n2,868.9\n2,123.8\n30,107.2\n878.6\n99.1\n31,084.9\n235.1\n2,966.0\n175.3\n275.5\n50.5\n6,404.3\n3,148.3\n4,844.2\n49,183.9\nDec\n27,842.2\n3,238.9\n2,192.0\n33,273.1\n1,067.2\n118.5\n34,458.8\n244.0\n3,020.4\n179.5\n326.4\n119.4\n10,212.4\n4,867.7\n7,337.7\n60,766.3\n2020\nJan\n28,570.4\n3,605.9\n2,358.3\n34,534.5\n1,299.1\n92.6\n35,926.3\n255.6\n3,114.7\n185.8\n336.1\n140.1\n12,285.7\n2,965.9\n7,182.1\n62,392.3\nFeb\n37,082.9\n3,939.6\n2,215.0\n43,237.5\n1,674.9\n78.2\n44,990.7\n260.1\n3,357.7\n189.6\n767.7\n154.9\n12,930.2\n5,441.7\n8,745.6\n76,838.2\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2020\nTABLE 4.2 : OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS - LIABILITIES \nDeposits\nAmounts Owing to\n$ millions\n \n \n \n19 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nForeign\nBond\nNotes\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \nLocal\nPublic\nOther \nContigent \nNon Financial \n Notes &\n&\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment1\nLocal Governemt\nPublic Enterprises\nOther2\nGovernment\nGovernment\nEnterprises\n Institutional Units3\nOther claims\nAssets\nOther Assets\nAssets\nCoins\nCoin\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\n2018\nJan\n22.40\n \n64.10\n \n2,294.49\n \n192.08\n \n103.42\n \n81.91\n \n2,143.23\n \n-\n \n23.45\n \n65.90\n \n26.32\n \n20.59\n \n154.85\n \n2,451.11\n \n28.68\n \n500.96\n \n294.22\n \n538.92\n \n9,006.6\n \nFeb\n18.34\n \n43.97\n \n2,296.76\n \n223.72\n \n108.28\n \n96.17\n \n2,109.34\n \n-\n \n23.45\n \n66.10\n \n24.29\n \n21.11\n \n145.03\n \n2,461.49\n \n28.67\n \n507.82\n \n290.62\n \n536.35\n \n9,001.5\n \nMar\n14.81\n \n53.62\n \n2,238.77\n \n240.67\n \n124.48\n \n99.51\n \n2,164.00\n \n-\n \n23.45\n \n66.69\n \n19.16\n \n15.90\n \n127.10\n \n2,535.82\n \n30.40\n \n504.13\n \n325.78\n \n552.34\n \n9,136.6\n \nApr\n13.47\n \n56.67\n \n2,207.91\n \n274.97\n \n116.75\n \n78.50\n \n2,314.90\n \n-\n \n24.75\n \n66.97\n \n13.44\n \n20.89\n \n120.77\n \n2,519.81\n \n28.31\n \n531.98\n \n298.96\n \n554.95\n \n9,244.0\n \nMay\n12.85\n \n62.77\n \n2,308.95\n \n339.50\n \n130.13\n \n85.74\n \n2,562.36\n \n-\n \n24.97\n \n66.94\n \n8.44\n \n20.88\n \n134.01\n \n2,556.25\n \n23.90\n \n458.93\n \n307.90\n \n555.31\n \n9,659.8\n \nJune\n7.48\n \n52.61\n \n2,848.51\n \n331.76\n \n117.26\n \n84.05\n \n2,538.32\n \n-\n \n26.19\n \n66.55\n \n7.44\n \n19.43\n \n196.00\n \n2,662.21\n \n25.46\n \n551.39\n \n302.93\n \n563.41\n \n10,401.0\n \nJuly\n17.85\n \n54.25\n \n3,189.62\n \n281.13\n \n109.31\n \n95.43\n \n2,949.15\n \n-\n \n-\n \n67.49\n \n4.51\n \n21.01\n \n181.99\n \n2,414.59\n \n26.03\n \n611.36\n \n322.53\n \n565.15\n \n10,911.4\n \nAug\n21.01\n \n67.83\n \n3,196.71\n \n232.34\n \n102.46\n \n66.26\n \n3,014.90\n \n-\n \n-\n \n67.29\n \n7.05\n \n20.62\n \n186.74\n \n2,490.99\n \n29.82\n \n647.67\n \n329.42\n \n566.33\n \n11,047.4\n \nSep\n16.25\n \n58.19\n \n3,487.91\n \n305.30\n \n137.84\n \n78.01\n \n2,789.78\n \n-\n \n45.21\n \n68.09\n \n5.42\n \n20.39\n \n212.17\n \n2,577.06\n \n36.68\n \n637.41\n \n357.43\n \n571.83\n \n11,405.0\n \nOct\n33.06\n \n67.98\n \n3,505.83\n \n272.14\n \n173.15\n \n51.45\n \n2,728.83\n \n-\n \n45.21\n \n68.41\n \n4.59\n \n9.35\n \n188.83\n \n2,697.37\n \n38.71\n \n647.52\n \n353.24\n \n569.20\n \n11,454.9\n \nNov\n25.84\n \n81.42\n \n3,384.38\n \n264.64\n \n198.18\n \n63.91\n \n2,793.90\n \n-\n \n45.21\n \n68.65\n \n6.99\n \n8.13\n \n217.69\n \n2,672.32\n \n46.06\n \n633.21\n \n406.55\n \n569.81\n \n11,486.9\n \nDec\n18.17\n \n89.91\n \n3,736.98\n \n317.34\n \n224.44\n \n74.84\n \n2,633.69\n \n-\n \n43.37\n \n69.16\n \n6.20\n \n9.18\n \n204.31\n \n2,707.60\n \n53.75\n \n573.76\n \n406.16\n \n633.85\n \n11,802.7\n \n2019\nJan\n42.05\n \n106.91\n \n3,766.70\n \n338.09\n \n249.77\n \n46.14\n \n2,621.20\n \n-\n \n61.02\n \n68.66\n \n4.41\n \n8.06\n \n189.15\n \n2,594.53\n \n33.84\n \n517.24\n \n428.82\n \n649.94\n \n11,726.5\n \nFeb\n52.63\n \n238.67\n \n3,601.94\n \n293.36\n \n549.59\n \n205.65\n \n2,675.29\n \n-\n \n60.52\n \n2.00\n \n5.84\n \n7.71\n \n208.31\n \n2,784.17\n \n31.04\n \n490.74\n \n472.78\n \n696.82\n \n12,377.1\n \nMar\n59.17\n \n244.62\n \n3,729.81\n \n393.22\n \n712.08\n \n55.05\n \n2,635.68\n \n-\n \n61.52\n \n4.53\n \n4.27\n \n9.53\n \n340.66\n \n2,660.90\n \n25.33\n \n523.72\n \n755.57\n \n971.53\n \n13,187.2\n \nApr\n40.82\n \n331.97\n \n3,876.83\n \n492.10\n \n981.80\n \n91.75\n \n2,590.97\n \n-\n \n61.79\n \n3.95\n \n3.98\n \n9.62\n \n407.85\n \n2,721.57\n \n24.55\n \n620.52\n \n935.27\n \n1,002.47\n \n14,197.8\n \nMay\n94.59\n \n444.70\n \n3,886.07\n \n571.50\n \n1,747.69\n \n154.08\n \n2,508.43\n \n-\n \n62.12\n \n4.20\n \n3.93\n \n9.43\n \n636.78\n \n3,056.86\n \n34.46\n \n910.14\n \n1,832.95\n \n1,142.77\n \n17,100.7\n \nJun\n119.69\n \n810.71\n \n4,104.17\n \n413.18\n \n2,244.98\n \n538.88\n \n2,596.97\n \n-\n \n63.09\n \n6.62\n \n3.89\n \n8.73\n \n929.36\n \n3,667.45\n \n37.02\n \n1,606.53\n \n1,374.23\n \n1,621.33\n \n20,146.8\n \nJul\n224.75\n \n791.31\n \n5,081.19\n \n275.44\n \n3,602.89\n \n801.93\n \n2,640.55\n \n-\n \n103.36\n \n5.49\n \n2.18\n \n9.00\n \n164.58\n \n4,043.75\n \n32.65\n \n1,587.68\n \n1,873.44\n \n1,722.66\n \n22,962.9\n \nAug\n178.74\n \n1,054.06\n \n7,123.10\n \n461.83\n \n3,778.75\n \n1,050.74\n \n3,106.90\n \n-\n \n103.86\n \n6.78\n \n1.04\n \n9.21\n \n212.50\n \n4,430.78\n \n37.42\n \n2,614.64\n \n1,744.16\n \n1,989.27\n \n27,903.8\n \nSep\n108.51\n \n1,915.41\n \n8,246.09\n \n676.17\n \n5,563.16\n \n1,575.75\n \n3,240.85\n \n-\n \n26.96\n \n6.47\n \n1.37\n \n9.40\n \n187.53\n \n4,993.71\n \n42.30\n \n3,707.80\n \n3,074.10\n \n2,440.63\n \n35,816.2\n \nOct\n138.01\n \n1,702.35\n \n10,537.81\n \n2,437.08\n \n7,376.80\n \n906.98\n \n3,416.23\n \n-\n \n27.05\n \n5.29\n \n1.15\n \n7.94\n \n254.84\n \n5,859.32\n \n41.94\n \n4,081.09\n \n1,658.19\n \n2,434.21\n \n40,886.3\n \nNov\n113.92\n \n2,078.54\n \n10,430.55\n \n2,073.35\n \n7,977.27\n \n940.70\n \n3,737.72\n \n-\n \n27.15\n \n11.83\n \n1.37\n \n8.74\n \n248.79\n \n7,670.96\n \n42.07\n \n3,148.28\n \n1,627.27\n \n3,059.40\n \n43,197.9\n \nDec\n158.44\n \n2,300.01\n \n12,821.54\n \n934.73\n \n7,898.48\n \n1,984.08\n \n3,716.31\n \n-\n \n24.75\n \n20.65\n \n1.33\n \n8.11\n \n268.61\n \n8,976.00\n \n61.84\n \n4,867.67\n \n2,740.16\n \n6,935.56\n \n53,718.3\n \n2020\nJan\n165.80\n \n2,845.62\n \n12,018.43\n \n708.00\n \n7,706.57\n \n1,811.38\n \n4,029.43\n \n-\n \n125.52\n \n14.97\n \n5.11\n \n12.17\n \n326.11\n \n10,766.91\n \n77.59\n \n2,965.93\n \n3,395.90\n \n8,058.15\n \n55,033.6\n \nFeb\n251.70\n \n2,756.57\n \n12,731.97\n \n889.16\n \n8,264.76\n \n1,532.87\n \n3,877.19\n \n-\n \n117.45\n \n13.99\n \n5.15\n \n11.56\n \n329.47\n \n11,656.91\n \n88.37\n \n5,441.70\n \n11,907.90\n \n8,653.69\n \n68,530.4\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2020\nNotes\n1.Government securities include treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households and other financial corporations, \nTABLE 5.1: COMMERCIAL BANKS -ASSETS\n$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \n \n20 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nZWL$ millions\nEnd of\nDemand\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nCapital\nContigent\nOther\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\nand\nLiablities\nLiablities\nTOTAL\nReserves\n2018\nJan\n4,640.2\n369.3\n903.3\n5,912.7\n301.3\n85.0\n6,299.0\n53.6\n418.7\n115.1\n26.2\n2.4\n1,205.0\n501.0\n385.6\n9,006.6\nFeb\n4,633.7\n375.8\n920.2\n5,929.7\n298.5\n78.6\n6,306.8\n58.1\n409.1\n111.2\n59.1\n2.4\n1,174.8\n507.8\n372.1\n9,001.5\nMar\n4,732.9\n368.8\n930.7\n6,032.4\n244.7\n92.4\n6,369.5\n61.1\n419.5\n140.5\n54.8\n6.4\n1,196.4\n504.1\n384.3\n9,136.6\nApr\n4,907.7\n394.4\n874.8\n6,176.9\n243.4\n72.8\n6,493.1\n67.4\n413.5\n82.4\n35.2\n15.7\n1,201.5\n532.0\n403.4\n9,244.0\nMay\n5,172.9\n416.2\n917.2\n6,506.3\n246.2\n85.2\n6,837.7\n66.8\n514.1\n101.5\n63.7\n19.4\n1,224.6\n458.9\n373.2\n9,659.8\nJun\n5,650.6\n504.3\n897.4\n7,052.2\n254.8\n66.9\n7,373.9\n45.0\n514.7\n119.8\n116.5\n21.1\n1,259.1\n551.4\n399.5\n10,401.0\nJul\n5,902.3\n527.0\n901.0\n7,330.3\n296.0\n12.2\n7,638.4\n72.0\n507.6\n118.9\n102.5\n16.8\n1,380.1\n611.4\n463.6\n10,911.4\nAug\n6,005.7\n540.8\n930.8\n7,477.3\n266.6\n11.5\n7,755.3\n46.4\n501.5\n137.0\n101.3\n15.4\n1,408.6\n647.7\n434.3\n11,047.4\nSep\n6,281.7\n556.4\n927.2\n7,765.3\n273.0\n23.5\n8,061.8\n40.9\n503.5\n142.2\n108.4\n21.1\n1,434.8\n637.4\n454.9\n11,405.0\nOct\n6,340.3\n509.5\n898.1\n7,747.9\n284.2\n31.1\n8,063.2\n49.3\n525.1\n147.6\n72.2\n16.5\n1,461.0\n647.5\n472.6\n11,454.9\nNov\n6,411.0\n503.9\n861.0\n7,775.9\n232.8\n27.6\n8,036.4\n41.2\n487.5\n213.7\n58.6\n17.8\n1,490.0\n633.2\n508.4\n11,486.9\nDec\n6,582.3\n495.0\n910.9\n7,988.3\n255.0\n19.7\n8,262.9\n43.3\n469.5\n229.6\n147.5\n15.6\n1,551.3\n573.8\n509.2\n11,802.7\n2019\nJan\n6,603.6\n440.8\n919.5\n7,964.0\n240.5\n20.5\n8,225.0\n42.6\n475.0\n239.5\n130.2\n14.4\n1,545.2\n517.2\n537.2\n11,726.5\nFeb\n7,129.0\n426.7\n923.8\n8,479.6\n248.9\n22.8\n8,751.4\n57.3\n647.5\n158.9\n119.1\n14.4\n1,626.6\n490.7\n511.1\n12,377.0\nMar\n7,350.5\n451.8\n915.0\n8,717.3\n225.9\n26.4\n8,969.6\n56.8\n778.3\n165.8\n108.4\n17.0\n1,804.3\n523.7\n763.2\n13,187.2\nApr\n7,861.8\n447.1\n1,280.5\n9,589.3\n260.3\n34.4\n9,884.1\n76.0\n487.7\n148.3\n145.3\n14.8\n1,935.7\n620.5\n885.4\n14,197.8\nMay\n9,143.2\n544.3\n1,412.7\n11,100.2\n309.4\n27.5\n11,437.1\n126.8\n789.2\n148.8\n164.7\n16.0\n1,916.9\n910.1\n1,591.0\n17,100.7\nJun\n10,758.5\n567.5\n1,279.7\n12,605.8\n290.5\n23.1\n12,919.4\n159.0\n1,271.1\n150.3\n161.8\n16.5\n2,409.1\n1,606.5\n1,453.0\n20,146.8\nJul\n12,675.9\n672.2\n1,367.7\n14,715.9\n357.4\n29.4\n15,102.7\n146.4\n1,254.8\n152.0\n205.6\n10.4\n2,583.9\n1,587.7\n1,919.4\n22,962.9\nAug\n14,591.5\n825.3\n1,330.1\n16,747.0\n592.1\n38.0\n17,377.1\n182.4\n1,525.0\n155.0\n88.0\n24.5\n3,065.7\n2,614.6\n2,871.4\n27,903.8\nSep\n18,105.1\n947.3\n1,354.6\n20,407.1\n504.3\n33.3\n20,944.7\n205.7\n2,120.6\n155.9\n115.4\n23.3\n3,933.6\n3,707.8\n4,609.2\n35,816.2\nOct\n22,636.1\n1,003.6\n1,292.7\n24,932.3\n489.1\n47.4\n25,468.8\n200.2\n2,159.7\n159.1\n135.3\n24.6\n4,347.1\n4,081.1\n4,310.3\n40,886.3\nNov\n24,297.0\n1,057.2\n1,633.8\n26,988.0\n843.6\n78.9\n27,910.5\n227.7\n2,089.7\n175.3\n154.3\n48.0\n4,931.5\n3,148.3\n4,512.6\n43,197.9\nDec\n26,909.1\n1,184.4\n1,638.8\n29,732.2\n823.2\n102.9\n30,658.3\n231.6\n2,097.0\n179.5\n209.4\n119.4\n8,414.9\n4,867.7\n6,940.7\n53,718.3\n2020\nJan\n27,276.4\n1,787.3\n1,876.0\n30,939.8\n1,026.0\n76.3\n32,042.1\n232.1\n2,170.0\n185.8\n236.2\n140.1\n10,357.6\n2,965.9\n6,703.8\n55,033.6\nFeb\n35,796.5\n1,869.8\n1,712.8\n39,379.1\n1,404.1\n62.2\n40,845.3\n238.9\n2,391.2\n189.6\n209.2\n154.9\n10,877.8\n5,441.7\n8,181.8\n68,530.4\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2020\nTABLE 5.2 : COMMERCIAL BANKS - LIABILITIES\nDeposits\nAmounts Owing to\n \n \n \n21 \n \n \nForeign\nOther Assets\nNon Financial \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nNotes\nAssets\nBond\n&\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \n Notes &\nCoin\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment1\nLocal Governemt\nPublic Enterprises\nOther2\nMortgages\nGovernment\nOther\nCoins\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\n2017\nJun\n0.3\n \n3.7\n \n65.9\n \n208.8\n \n9.8\n \n-\n \n165.3\n \n19.0\n \n-\n \n-\n \n387.6\n \n-\n \n452.9\n \n109.6\n \n126.0\n \n1,548.8\n \nJul\n0.4\n \n3.9\n \n105.8\n \n164.6\n \n9.2\n \n-\n \n168.4\n \n17.2\n \n-\n \n-\n \n391.9\n \n-\n \n451.9\n \n110.9\n \n127.3\n \n1,551.5\n \nAug\n0.4\n \n3.1\n \n142.8\n \n152.0\n \n3.9\n \n-\n \n186.7\n \n16.3\n \n-\n \n-\n \n409.3\n \n-\n \n465.5\n \n104.7\n \n127.2\n \n1,611.9\n \nSep\n0.6\n \n1.8\n \n108.4\n \n117.0\n \n6.7\n \n-\n \n193.0\n \n16.1\n \n-\n \n-\n \n412.7\n \n-\n \n475.2\n \n113.4\n \n130.1\n \n1,574.8\n \nOct\n0.6\n \n1.1\n \n145.7\n \n110.0\n \n14.8\n \n-\n \n193.9\n \n15.4\n \n-\n \n-\n \n420.7\n \n-\n \n493.6\n \n149.9\n \n130.4\n \n1,676.0\n \nNov\n0.7\n \n0.9\n \n138.8\n \n128.4\n \n8.7\n \n-\n \n193.6\n \n18.8\n \n-\n \n-\n \n420.9\n \n-\n \n489.0\n \n160.4\n \n133.0\n \n1,693.3\n \nDec\n1.0\n \n2.6\n \n170.6\n \n134.3\n \n9.1\n \n-\n \n195.1\n \n26.8\n \n-\n \n-\n \n402.3\n \n-\n \n516.8\n \n163.2\n \n135.5\n \n1,757.3\n \n2018\nJan\n0.9\n \n2.3\n \n197.4\n \n98.7\n \n7.8\n \n-\n \n129.8\n \n34.5\n \n-\n \n-\n \n413.2\n \n-\n \n508.7\n \n144.9\n \n136.1\n \n1,674.3\n \nFeb\n1.5\n \n1.8\n \n172.4\n \n123.5\n \n5.5\n \n-\n \n141.3\n \n33.5\n \n-\n \n-\n \n414.8\n \n-\n \n507.9\n \n125.7\n \n135.7\n \n1,663.6\n \nMar\n1.4\n \n3.4\n \n175.9\n \n72.1\n \n14.1\n \n-\n \n212.6\n \n32.8\n \n-\n \n-\n \n411.4\n \n-\n \n539.4\n \n142.8\n \n132.3\n \n1,738.2\n \nApr\n1.1\n \n4.3\n \n185.5\n \n61.9\n \n3.6\n \n-\n \n184.4\n \n32.0\n \n-\n \n-\n \n413.3\n \n-\n \n582.7\n \n141.6\n \n135.2\n \n1,745.7\n \nMay\n1.0\n \n7.6\n \n196.3\n \n138.2\n \n8.1\n \n-\n \n191.0\n \n30.9\n \n-\n \n-\n \n415.0\n \n-\n \n608.4\n \n128.1\n \n137.4\n \n1,862.0\n \nJune\n1.2\n \n4.9\n \n188.6\n \n177.8\n \n1.9\n \n-\n \n266.2\n \n30.1\n \n-\n \n-\n \n413.9\n \n-\n \n614.3\n \n124.0\n \n141.5\n \n1,964.5\n \nJuly\n1.8\n \n6.6\n \n207.1\n \n185.1\n \n1.7\n \n-\n \n283.2\n \n33.3\n \n-\n \n-\n \n423.5\n \n-\n \n636.1\n \n128.2\n \n141.1\n \n2,047.7\n \nAug\n1.6\n \n3.7\n \n224.7\n \n145.3\n \n2.4\n \n-\n \n288.9\n \n32.2\n \n-\n \n-\n \n428.2\n \n-\n \n579.4\n \n139.1\n \n143.7\n \n1,989.2\n \nSep\n1.9\n \n2.9\n \n245.6\n \n92.6\n \n20.8\n \n-\n \n291.1\n \n31.2\n \n-\n \n-\n \n430.3\n \n-\n \n650.2\n \n148.1\n \n144.4\n \n2,059.1\n \nOct\n4.9\n \n2.1\n \n220.0\n \n95.8\n \n11.9\n \n-\n \n318.9\n \n30.2\n \n-\n \n-\n \n427.7\n \n-\n \n639.8\n \n154.2\n \n147.0\n \n2,052.5\n \nNov\n3.6\n \n2.9\n \n243.3\n \n35.7\n \n10.4\n \n-\n \n320.7\n \n28.9\n \n-\n \n-\n \n433.5\n \n-\n \n635.7\n \n148.0\n \n145.8\n \n2,008.5\n \nDec\n2.3\n \n4.3\n \n157.4\n \n121.3\n \n10.4\n \n-\n \n339.4\n \n28.0\n \n-\n \n-\n \n444.8\n \n-\n \n645.9\n \n179.7\n \n151.9\n \n2,085.6\n \n2019\nJan\n6.3\n \n4.6\n108.2\n \n63.5\n10.9\n \n0.0\n343.8\n \n27.3\n33.6\n \n0.0\n438.0\n \n0.0\n649.3\n \n136.7\n151.2\n \n1973.3\nFeb\n5.4\n \n17.6\n120.6\n \n62.8\n18.1\n \n-\n \n339.6\n \n26.5\n-\n \n-\n \n416.1\n \n-\n \n696.1\n \n171.1\n156.7\n \n2,030.8\n \nMar\n2.6\n \n18.0\n126.3\n \n38.6\n23.9\n \n-\n \n331.7\n \n25.5\n-\n \n-\n \n415.1\n \n-\n \n710.1\n \n172.1\n207.4\n \n2,071.2\n \nApr\n3.7\n \n30.6\n220.3\n \n85.0\n47.6\n \n-\n \n271.6\n \n25.0\n-\n \n-\n \n414.1\n \n-\n \n705.0\n \n169.0\n276.2\n \n2,247.8\n \nMay\n3.9\n \n38.4\n162.2\n \n115.4\n139.0\n \n-\n \n345.5\n \n23.9\n-\n \n-\n \n406.2\n \n-\n \n776.6\n \n165.7\n363.4\n \n2,540.1\n \nJun\n6.3\n \n69.8\n361.6\n \n144.5\n132.4\n \n-\n \n265.8\n \n22.6\n-\n \n-\n \n421.7\n \n-\n \n873.6\n \n210.5\n473.0\n \n2,981.8\n \nJul\n6.5\n \n174.7\n473.9\n \n89.7\n131.1\n \n-\n \n258.3\n \n22.2\n-\n \n-\n \n416.0\n \n-\n \n934.6\n \n203.1\n565.6\n \n3,275.8\n \nAug\n5.5\n \n94.5\n758.0\n \n60.6\n115.5\n \n-\n \n247.4\n \n21.5\n-\n \n-\n \n418.1\n \n-\n \n970.6\n \n345.1\n567.6\n \n3,604.2\n \nSep\n15.8\n \n180.3\n831.8\n \n195.4\n104.2\n \n-\n \n267.6\n \n20.9\n-\n \n-\n \n499.1\n \n-\n \n1,137.6\n \n528.8\n1,042.2\n \n4,823.6\n \nOct\n6.2\n \n198.7\n997.2\n \n72.2\n243.7\n \n-\n \n268.8\n \n20.2\n-\n \n-\n \n429.8\n \n-\n \n1,286.7\n \n503.4\n1,069.3\n \n5,096.2\n \nNov\n11.9\n \n156.1\n872.3\n \n159.7\n426.0\n \n-\n \n338.6\n \n19.6\n-\n \n-\n \n443.5\n \n-\n \n1,357.4\n \n575.8\n1,068.7\n \n5,429.6\n \nDec\n9.2\n \n223.9\n1,016.9\n \n317.4\n492.3\n \n-\n \n308.3\n \n18.2\n-\n \n-\n \n454.5\n \n-\n \n1,413.5\n \n700.6\n1,470.0\n \n6,424.9\n \n2020\nJan\n16.3\n \n322.3\n1,106.8\n \n361.8\n421.8\n \n-\n \n283.0\n \n20.1\n-\n \n-\n \n478.2\n \n-\n \n1,498.8\n \n717.5\n1,552.8\n \n6,779.5\n \nFeb\n14.5\n \n368.2\n977.2\n \n612.5\n370.5\n \n-\n \n357.1\n \n20.1\n-\n \n1.5\n \n503.6\n \n-\n \n2,097.7\n \n735.9\n1,538.8\n \n7,597.4\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2020\nNotes\n1.Government securities include treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households and other financial corporations, \nTABLE 6.1: BUILDING SOCIETIES -ASSETS\n$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \n \n22 \n \n \n \nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nCapital\nOther\nTOTAL\nand\nLiablities\nEnd of\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nReserves\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\n2017\n Jun\n401.8\n544.4\n946.2\n70.7\n16.5\n1,033.4\n22.0\n22.0\n0.0\n65.2\n0.8\n330.0\n75.4\n1,548.8\n Jul\n430.3\n531.5\n961.8\n70.4\n16.1\n1,048.3\n22.2\n22.2\n0.0\n57.3\n0.3\n334.5\n66.8\n1,551.5\n Aug\n495.3\n546.5\n1,041.8\n70.6\n16.3\n1,128.6\n24.0\n21.3\n0.0\n37.4\n0.4\n328.9\n71.4\n1,611.9\n Sep\n488.5\n517.9\n1,006.5\n80.3\n16.7\n1,103.4\n24.8\n17.4\n0.0\n17.0\n0.2\n334.0\n78.0\n1,574.8\n Oct\n583.1\n475.2\n1,058.3\n80.9\n16.2\n1,155.4\n23.4\n26.4\n0.0\n20.6\n0.3\n338.0\n111.8\n1,676.0\n Nov\n570.3\n473.5\n1,043.8\n105.4\n16.3\n1,165.4\n23.7\n26.6\n0.0\n22.7\n0.3\n341.5\n113.0\n1,693.3\n Dec\n608.2\n496.6\n1,104.9\n105.2\n16.5\n1,226.6\n23.4\n25.9\n0.0\n22.7\n0.5\n371.7\n86.7\n1,757.3\n2018\nJan\n544.7\n497.1\n1,041.7\n105.2\n16.4\n1,163.3\n22.8\n26.1\n0.0\n22.9\n0.2\n362.1\n77.0\n1,674.3\nFeb\n512.0\n480.5\n992.5\n120.3\n16.8\n1,129.5\n28.5\n26.3\n0.0\n33.6\n0.5\n366.0\n79.2\n1,663.6\nMar\n535.1\n507.8\n1,042.9\n120.3\n16.5\n1,179.7\n27.5\n41.3\n0.0\n34.5\n0.5\n378.2\n76.5\n1,738.2\nApr\n568.0\n452.6\n1,020.5\n144.4\n17.0\n1,181.9\n27.9\n39.7\n0.0\n33.6\n0.4\n358.5\n103.7\n1,745.7\nMay\n613.8\n475.1\n1,089.0\n196.6\n16.4\n1,302.0\n32.4\n40.0\n0.0\n31.2\n0.5\n363.1\n92.8\n1,862.0\nJune\n658.5\n507.9\n1,166.5\n183.2\n16.4\n1,366.0\n33.1\n39.3\n0.0\n56.9\n0.4\n363.5\n105.2\n1,964.5\nJuly\n770.2\n542.9\n1,313.1\n128.5\n15.0\n1,456.6\n28.7\n37.5\n0.0\n30.4\n15.8\n378.9\n99.8\n2,047.7\nAug\n703.4\n534.7\n1,238.0\n133.0\n15.0\n1,386.0\n31.3\n33.9\n0.0\n18.3\n17.9\n385.8\n116.0\n1,989.2\nSep\n749.8\n502.3\n1,252.2\n166.0\n15.1\n1,433.2\n22.8\n55.9\n0.0\n20.7\n25.5\n388.6\n112.3\n2,059.1\nOct\n772.5\n471.9\n1,244.4\n151.0\n15.1\n1,410.5\n23.7\n56.3\n0.0\n21.2\n25.5\n389.9\n125.4\n2,052.5\nNov\n699.9\n511.9\n1,211.9\n134.0\n15.1\n1,360.9\n21.0\n55.6\n0.0\n16.2\n24.5\n396.1\n134.2\n2,008.5\nDec\n713.2\n540.0\n1,253.1\n139.6\n15.1\n1,407.8\n26.5\n55.3\n0.0\n40.2\n23.4\n400.1\n132.3\n2,085.6\n2019\nJan\n633.8\n490.2\n1,124.0\n140.5\n15.0\n1,279.6\n27.9\n55.5\n0.0\n58.1\n24.8\n392.8\n134.7\n1,973.3\nFeb\n661.3\n492.3\n1,153.6\n138.8\n15.0\n1,307.4\n25.8\n134.5\n0.0\n32.6\n28.2\n366.7\n135.6\n2,030.8\nMar\n655.2\n473.9\n1,129.1\n146.8\n15.0\n1,290.9\n29.0\n155.6\n0.0\n32.5\n25.7\n391.4\n146.2\n2,071.2\nApr\n782.3\n460.0\n1,242.3\n130.5\n14.9\n1,387.7\n26.0\n165.0\n0.0\n28.2\n14.1\n457.7\n169.2\n2,247.8\nMay\n895.0\n464.3\n1,359.4\n153.5\n15.0\n1,527.9\n23.9\n264.7\n0.0\n41.9\n30.6\n477.5\n173.6\n2,540.1\nJun\n1,154.3\n406.8\n1,561.1\n131.5\n15.0\n1,707.7\n23.9\n336.5\n0.0\n54.8\n27.1\n664.7\n167.0\n2,981.8\nJul\n1,192.2\n538.1\n1,730.3\n75.2\n14.9\n1,820.4\n33.0\n455.7\n0.0\n20.2\n17.0\n739.6\n189.9\n3,275.8\nAug\n1,424.7\n542.9\n1,967.6\n47.0\n15.0\n2,029.6\n31.8\n539.4\n0.0\n28.2\n3.5\n777.8\n193.9\n3,604.2\nSep\n1,686.2\n524.9\n2,211.1\n44.9\n15.0\n2,271.0\n25.5\n869.0\n0.0\n66.9\n0.0\n1,352.0\n239.1\n4,823.6\nOct\n1,920.1\n548.8\n2,468.8\n36.9\n15.0\n2,520.7\n16.7\n861.0\n0.0\n76.0\n0.0\n1,362.8\n259.0\n5,096.2\nNov\n2,394.7\n441.2\n2,835.9\n35.0\n15.0\n2,886.0\n18.6\n876.3\n0.0\n121.1\n2.5\n1,246.7\n278.3\n5,429.6\nDec\n2,713.3\n481.5\n3,194.7\n244.0\n15.0\n3,453.8\n23.7\n923.5\n0.0\n117.1\n0.0\n1,563.0\n343.9\n6,424.9\n2020\nJan\n2,894.8\n398.4\n3,293.3\n273.1\n15.0\n3,581.4\n34.7\n944.7\n0.0\n100.0\n0.0\n1,699.9\n418.8\n6,779.5\nFeb\n3,118.5\n419.8\n3,538.4\n270.9\n15.0\n3,824.3\n32.5\n966.5\n0.0\n558.5\n0.0\n1,714.1\n501.5\n7,597.4\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2020\nAmounts Owing to\nTABLE 6.2: BUILDING SOCIETIES -LIABILITIES\n$ millions\n \n \n \n23 \n \n \n \nAGRICULTURE\nCONSTRUCTION\nCOMMUNICATION\nDISTRIBUTION\nFINANCIAL &\nFINANCIAL\nMANUFACTURING\nMINING\nSERVICES\nTRANSPORT\nINDIVIDUALS\nCONGLOMERATES\nTOTAL\nEND OF\n \n \n \nINVESTMENTS\nORGANISATIONS\n \n \n \n \n2017\nJun\n431,677.5\n45,018.0\n16,989.2\n311,641.4\n14,435.6\n266,917.5\n343,590.2\n126,542.8\n417,469.8\n37,849.5\n595,749.5\n12,001.6\n2,619,882.5\nJul\n459,128.0\n52,500.1\n11,717.0\n255,319.0\n14,541.0\n255,591.2\n311,364.4\n131,420.5\n422,799.8\n39,630.7\n609,112.5\n14,464.3\n2,577,588.5\nAug\n457,861.9\n52,622.6\n11,736.0\n262,602.7\n17,438.9\n256,802.3\n313,868.5\n138,714.9\n420,653.6\n41,089.3\n617,686.4\n15,194.2\n2,606,271.3\nSep\n457,157.2\n48,477.1\n12,117.9\n340,506.4\n21,660.1\n265,082.3\n331,929.6\n124,822.8\n393,491.3\n41,117.0\n619,867.0\n16,061.2\n2,672,289.8\nOct\n460,475.1\n46,588.0\n12,273.6\n329,020.8\n21,810.6\n262,118.2\n317,587.0\n126,041.6\n383,374.3\n41,351.4\n634,561.2\n16,061.2\n2,651,263.1\nNov\n477,486.1\n46,318.3\n12,005.2\n323,990.0\n21,811.0\n261,421.1\n316,225.5\n123,307.2\n379,542.7\n32,215.3\n649,034.3\n16,061.2\n2,659,418.0\nDec\n489,695.6\n54,162.9\n10,119.0\n334,030.3\n21,844.6\n269,399.3\n307,802.0\n126,719.0\n375,161.7\n31,701.6\n621,421.9\n13,938.1\n2,655,996.0\n2018\nJan\n479,109.6\n59,336.8\n9,442.4\n289,531.3\n20,569.7\n258,035.0\n271,453.8\n106,425.1\n390,052.9\n32,328.6\n617,303.0\n14,394.7\n2,547,982.8\nFeb\n488,203.1\n59.,977.6\n9,271.6\n315,569.6\n20,133.1\n258,263.6\n285,045.1\n108,649.0\n393,604.9\n31,636.6\n618,377.4\n15,010.6\n2,543,764.6\nMar\n484,764.7\n64,826.5\n11,050.5\n344,731.3\n15,203.3\n274,150.2\n303,649.2\n114,431.9\n363,449.4\n32,793.4\n640,496.9\n19,893.1\n2,669,440.4\nApr\n485,790.0\n63,948.2\n10,904.2\n344,532.1\n15,015.2\n271,071.8\n294,270.8\n112,692.1\n333,633.8\n31,103.5\n631,920.5\n22,066.0\n2,616,948.2\nMay\n501,783.7\n63,555.3\n10,933.5\n362,939.6\n15,079.8\n358,553.4\n317,666.7\n117,123.0\n338,846.3\n31,523.1\n651,444.0\n24,226.4\n2,793,674.8\nJun\n475,105.7\n66,796.8\n13,907.7\n385,583.3\n15,079.8\n344,917.3\n323,212.1\n117,146.6\n335,216.9\n34,457.6\n655,427.0\n34,163.4\n2,801,014.3\nJul\n463,286.3\n70,905.2\n18,924.1\n383,314.7\n14,976.4\n140,624.6\n274,507.8\n113,776.3\n309,209.5\n37,474.0\n652,652.7\n34,402.1\n2,514,053.7\nAug\n470,756.1\n79,237.1\n15,167.3\n331,672.8\n15,021.9\n144,100.7\n271,000.5\n111,960.2\n306,022.7\n37,341.2\n666,649.4\n34,402.1\n2,483,332.1\nSep\n451,745.3\n79,055.7\n15,021.6\n341,851.7\n15,021.9\n144,799.6\n263,994.2\n112,656.6\n320,788.5\n36,914.6\n666,971.5\n64,407.1\n2,513,228.2\nOct\n453,068.3\n74,931.8\n16,036.5\n389,851.7\n15,156.8\n165,252.7\n268,933.2\n111,956.6\n313,376.8\n36,118.6\n680,445.7\n12,855.7\n2,537,984.3\nNov\n444,130.8\n133,137.6\n14,884.1\n313,733.0\n15,156.8\n165,419.8\n269,459.9\n149,908.1\n316,738.8\n45,693.2\n679,403.7\n12,265.4\n2,559,931.1\nDec\n492,669.9\n78,176.7\n15,958.0\n340,422.7\n14,425.5\n165,648.7\n253,354.3\n113,596.5\n347,242.2\n40,695.4\n669,879.6\n12,254.3\n2,544,323.9\n2019\nJan\n525,176.7\n80,480.9\n20,199.4\n349,755.6\n15,294.0\n158,458.9\n255,380.4\n123,772.8\n358,554.2\n42,355.5\n666,797.1\n16,335.7\n2,612,561.3\nFeb\n521,988.1\n79,066.7\n10,931.1\n352,797.8\n14,699.0\n80,894.7\n253,027.0\n124,474.7\n389,523.0\n40,923.5\n644,320.9\n11,446.6\n2,524,093.1\nMar\n538,072.7\n87,791.3\n18,211.5\n379,233.1\n14,556.7\n205,466.5\n270,360.1\n133,324.8\n407,638.0\n43,541.4\n731,600.3\n11,476.6\n2,841,272.8\nApr\n584,205.3\n96,516.9\n22,430.9\n421,676.7\n15,968.0\n236,000.3\n310,449.7\n193,315.8\n387,730.2\n44,465.7\n788,749.6\n14,486.6\n3,115,995.7\nMay\n712,661.5\n98,826.6\n27,802.4\n466,620.0\n17,425.9\n317,055.8\n368,550.6\n250,912.5\n441,731.0\n43,682.6\n901,283.4\n14,096.6\n3,660,649.0\nJun\n940,505.8\n82,926.8\n30,534.7\n566,391.1\n169,400.8\n876,820.4\n354,648.6\n331,070.0\n404,941.1\n49,207.3\n898,523.5\n14,258.9\n4,719,228.9\nJul\n1,060,152.4\n108,889.3\n38,005.8\n685,729.8\n22,484.8\n470,421.8\n497,581.3\n333,137.4\n643,722.0\n51,560.7\n1,111,698.0\n7,683.2\n5,031,066.5\nAug\n1,163,054.3\n117,882.9\n40,904.6\n720,937.6\n15,289.6\n524,650.1\n575,937.1\n378,008.7\n742,674.6\n51,710.4\n1,202,415.1\n5,830.8\n5,539,295.7\nSep\n1,379,203.2\n101,683.9\n20,216.2\n755,828.9\n15,563.7\n1,430,322.3\n520,659.8\n487,089.9\n594,143.3\n59,974.6\n1,004,073.3\n6,055.4\n5,087,524.4\nOct\n1,917,349.8\n103,709.0\n20,826.5\n798,377.2\n24,574.7\n1,447,865.7\n603,692.2\n541,020.3\n618,349.6\n61,677.9\n1,112,873.3\n4,322.0\n7,530,493.2\nNov\n1,916,599.1\n103,450.1\n22,381.7\n878,695.3\n24,749.4\n1,566,329.2\n623,341.5\n554,037.1\n623,064.8\n61,153.1\n1,152,340.0\n4,351.8\n7,530,493.2\nDec\n3,260,641.3\n140,783.7\n27,127.1\n1,114,871.8\n48,155.6\n1,504,624.8\n1,027,373.9\n821,797.2\n823,237.5\n84,684.8\n1,428,029.4\n7,328.2\n10,288,655.3\n2020\nJan\n4,084,551.9\n155,581.9\n40,879.9\n1,241,096.7\n54,212.8\n1,614,135.9\n1,136,124.9\n905,568.2\n799,835.7\n83,887.6\n1,594,904.4\n3,435.4\n11,714,215.3\nFeb\n4,492,412.3\n157,892.1\n54,850.8\n1,305,056.3\n51,575.2\n1,667,016.0\n1,328,895.1\n875,096.3\n827,340.4\n103,240.6\n1,837,059.2\n1,195.4\n12,701,629.5\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2020\n/1 Including the only merchant bank still in operation.\nTABLE 7.1 : SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS LOANS AND ADVANCES\n$ ('000)\n \n \n \n24 \n \n \n \nEND OF\nAGRICULTURE\nCONSTRUCTION\nCOMMUNICATIONS\nDISTRIBUTION\nFINANCIAL &\nFINANCIAL\nMANUFACTURING\nMINING\nSERVICES\nTRANSPORT\nINDIVIDUALS\nCONGLOMERATES\nTOTAL\nINVESTMENTS\nORGANISATIONS\n \n2017\nJul\n309,864.7\n126,628.5\n262,827.7\n587,617.1\n341,371.5\n1,143,423.8\n423,846.6\n191,273.6\n1,599,344.4\n99,509.8\n680,622.6\n76,164.4\n5,842,494.6\nAug\n302,611.3\n149,014.9\n296,550.6\n914,686.8\n346,236.8\n1,131,207.5\n453,584.0\n169,521.2\n1,562,637.2\n111,394.6\n746,644.5\n90,999.4\n6,275,088.8\nSep\n348,786.3\n146,383.0\n286,092.4\n796,517.1\n340,224.7\n1,072,979.9\n571,373.7\n211,077.0\n1,705,640.6\n122,645.6\n747,874.4\n72,255.0\n6,421,849.6\nOct\n345,521.0\n138,274.9\n238,975.9\n778,597.1\n355,135.9\n1,138,203.7\n565,046.4\n259,285.2\n1,694,691.4\n123,908.8\n741,652.0\n72,255.0\n6,451,547.3\nNov\n336,339.3\n144,708.5\n239,524.3\n927,820.8\n362,515.4\n986,824.6\n629,010.4\n250,132.7\n1,694,043.5\n131,768.3\n761,400.5\n72,255.0\n6,536,343.3\nDec\n317,794.8\n160,261.7\n284,829.7\n890,549.4\n375,616.4\n1,073,707.0\n686,933.4\n257,197.2\n1,712,823.9\n143,466.1\n711,031.6\n62,444.8\n6,676,655.9\n2018\nJan\n380,283.8\n151,436.0\n257,298.2\n918,787.6\n365,354.6\n1,050,097.7\n652,999.0\n248,933.0\n1,757,391.8\n141,913.2\n669,049.8\n67,904.7\n6,661,449.4\nFeb\n455,217.0\n224,070.1\n263,961.9\n897,453.2\n399,016.2\n949,795.6\n674,828.4\n354,052.8\n1,701,611.4\n107,779.5\n680,060.2\n67,686.4\n6,775,532.7\nMar\n451,992.5\n142,332.9\n296,310.0\n825,805.5\n376,593.0\n1,001,674.3\n597,436.8\n253,127.4\n1,827,464.3\n163,971.7\n597,436.8\n63,604.3\n6,597,749.5\nApr\n476,448.1\n144,564.6\n310,795.6\n806,144.7\n364,824.6\n988,527.2\n649,893.0\n255,761.8\n1,892,415.2\n179,252.3\n712,565.9\n65,398.2\n6,846,591.4\nMay\n494,612.8\n152,567.4\n350,409.2\n874,140.5\n374,089.9\n1,097,970.7\n700,891.9\n271,892.0\n1,913,394.9\n186,192.5\n745,592.7\n64,970.7\n7,226,725.2\nJun\n465,984.0\n164,242.3\n391,142.3\n948,703.0\n368,260.1\n1,140,652.9\n754,981.1\n324,355.8\n2,160,400.4\n200,774.3\n779,012.8\n64,786.3\n7,763,295.2\nJul\n445,780.0\n226,433.0\n413,409.1\n955,925.6\n420,416.6\n1,120,834.7\n760,588.2\n321,078.4\n2,192,743.2\n200,523.6\n822,857.6\n64,786.3\n7,945,376.2\nAug\n429,439.9\n189,498.0\n386,595.6\n980,354.1\n429,659.7\n1,091,202.9\n782,008.7\n297,412.3\n1,968,724.0\n196,068.8\n836,719.1\n64,786.3\n7,652,469.3\nSep\n447,556.4\n206,194.1\n382,491.5\n1,186,453.7\n444,599.1\n1,070,365.1\n811,296.2\n302,579.3\n2,059,093.1\n247,105.7\n906,767.6\n84,514.5\n8,149,016.3\nOct\n445,484.4\n199,531.1\n391,968.4\n984,701.5\n469,891.9\n1,153,855.9\n846,453.3\n315,808.5\n2,110,864.2\n260,816.9\n817,328.3\n67,915.2\n8,064,619.7\nNov\n489,192.9\n194,869.4\n391,442.4\n925,081.3\n441,534.3\n1,248,555.8\n827,349.4\n316,945.5\n2,059,370.1\n261,756.5\n825,642.2\n66,458.7\n8,048,198.5\nDec\n494,011.3\n201,871.0\n531,888.3\n1,034,592.5\n428,738.7\n1,196,503.2\n823,081.9\n331,251.3\n2,063,550.8\n278,659.0\n802,507.6\n63,361.3\n8,250,016.9\n2019\nJan\n505,422.9\n391,022.0\n497,976.2\n1,034,948.2\n411,945.9\n1,187,606.7\n882,289.7\n322,030.3\n2,154,902.3\n135,871.6\n763,189.5\n63,064.3\n8,350,269.7\nFeb\n512,602.3\n374,750.6\n394,709.1\n936,123.6\n449,800.9\n904,919.4\n855,348.4\n347,405.5\n2,355,866.1\n138,685.8\n776,949.7\n63,097.1\n8,110,258.7\nMar\n526,564.2\n343,684.3\n376,205.6\n937,743.4\n393,489.3\n1,317,757.7\n861,574.9\n380,295.4\n2,099,331.1\n141,677.2\n773,726.4\n63,094.9\n8,215,144.4\nApr\n632,972.5\n255,945.6\n1,010,978.7\n90,282.6\n462,133.1\n1,535,772.6\n890,606.5\n325,814.6\n2,413,535.6\n320,213.5\n876,646.5\n90,282.6\n9,963,832.2\nMay\n832,073.6\n305,410.9\n1,321,039.7\n1,177,925.1\n522,764.9\n1,646,358.6\n1,142,369.6\n372,594.9\n2,765,341.2\n371,372.0\n965,202.7\n93,188.9\n11,515,642.2\nJun\n1,001,633.6\n309,108.9\n1,124,005.3\n1,337,171.0\n546,572.5\n2,210,293.9\n1,319,789.8\n562,858.0\n3,493,214.3\n434,828.2\n1,070,319.7\n52,118.6\n13,461,913.9\nJul\n1,171,245.4\n353,388.5\n1,504,911.5\n1,241,910.1\n654,904.7\n2,553,878.7\n1,383,215.2\n585,108.2\n4,131,588.8\n463,161.9\n1,304,402.7\n71,943.6\n15,419,659.2\nAug\n1,313,462.5\n477,215.8\n1,795,905.4\n1,687,246.4\n804,316.2\n2,591,386.5\n1,647,680.2\n1,114,306.0\n3,872,187.0\n503,541.6\n1,532,441.9\n75,829.3\n17,413,139.2\nSep\n1,581,141.7\n321,121.4\n1,934,554.4\n1,728,390.1\n952,548.3\n3,086,893.1\n1,638,855.1\n1,375,546.6\n5,961,405.3\n589,939.6\n1,848,708.4\n76,775.9\n21,272,162.4\nOct\n1,744,905.8\n796,996.5\n2,217,888.5\n2,626,316.7\n768,125.2\n3,204,019.2\n2,287,076.1\n1,889,144.7\n7,536,588.6\n510,151.5\n1,942,195.1\n48,142.7\n25,571,550.5\nNov\n1,783,345.3\n813,506.5\n2,257,181.8\n2,618,010.3\n1,287,013.8\n3,544,459.5\n2,082,447.8\n1,787,923.6\n7,794,026.0\n491,371.8\n1,920,297.4\n57,897.5\n26,437,481.4\nDec\n1,877,764.1\n950,348.8\n2,917,087.2\n3,126,494.5\n1,421,969.0\n4,411,638.4\n2,605,023.1\n1,664,547.7\n8,410,964.0\n554,937.3\n2,477,474.0\n116,789.4\n30,535,037.6\n1,000.0\n2020\nJan\n2,173,633.0\n972,609.2\n3,182,087.1\n4,279,565.8\n1,757,297.1\n4,791,990.6\n2,791,625.2\n2,223,774.1\n9,875,803.5\n609,781.7\n2,838,775.9\n81,735.2\n35,578,678.4\nFeb\n2,492,591.8\n1,191,731.7\n3,340,863.8\n8,721,475.9\n1,919,428.5\n5,869,104.2\n3,481,495.5\n2,729,162.0\n10,202,203.6\n760,155.3\n3,574,134.5\n82,845.8\n44,365,192.6\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2020\n TABLE 7.2: SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS DEPOSITS \n$ ('000)\n \n \n \n25 \n \n \nEnd of\nNominal \nLending \nRates 1\nIndividuals \nCorporate\n2018\nJan\n4.45-18.00\n9.33 \n6.99 \nFeb\n4.45-18.00\n9.57 \n6.93 \nMar\n4.45-18.00\n9.64 \n6.98 \nApr\n4.00-18.00\n9.32 \n7.08 \nMay\n4.00-18.00\n9.28 \n7.09 \nJun\n4.00-18.00\n9.32 \n7.14 \nJul\n4.00-18.00\n9.75 \n6.97 \nAug\n4.00-18.00\n9.87 \n7.10 \nSep\n4.00-18.00\n9.56 \n7.11 \nOct\n4.00-18.00\n9.47 \n7.38 \nNov\n4.00-18.00\n9.49 \n7.38 \nDec\n4.00-18.00\n9.48 \n7.39 \n2019\nJan\n4.00-18.00\n9.47 \n7.40 \nFeb\n4.00-18.00\n9.23 \n7.30 \nMar\n4.00-18.00\n9.23 \n7.31 \nApr\n4.00-18.00\n9.30 \n7.38 \nMay\n4.00-22.00\n9.31 \n7.33 \nJun\n4.00-22.00\n9.15 \n7.67 \nJul\n4.00-35.00\n9.54 \n8.40 \nAug\n5.00-55.00\n14.37 \n18.43 \nSep\n5.00-65.00\n14.64 \n19.81 \nOct\n5.00-65.00\n15.59 \n19.66 \nNov\n5.00-65.00\n15.06 \n18.00 \nDec\n5.00-65.00\n16.08 \n18.31 \n2020\nJan\n5.00-65.00\n16.56 \n17.20 \nFeb\n5.00-65.00\n16.92 \n16.68 \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\nNotes\nTABLE 8.1: LENDING RATES (percent per annum)\n1. Nominal lending rates depict the range of rates quoted by banks.\nCommercial Banks\nWeighted Lending Rates\n \n \n \n26 \n \n \nTABLE 8.2 : BANK DEPOSIT RATES (percent per annum)\nEND OF\nSAVINGS\n3 MONTHS\n2018\nJan\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nFeb\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nMar\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nApr\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nMay\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nJun\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nJul\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nAug\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nSep\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nOct\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nNov\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nDec\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-6.75\n2019\nJan\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nFeb\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-6.75\nMar\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nApr\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nMay\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nJun\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nJul\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nAug\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nSep\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nOct\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nNov\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nDec\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\n2020\nJan\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nFeb\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\n Source:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\n* Deposit rates depict the range of rates qouted by banks. \n **Banks have adjusted their costs of holding deposits following the \n call by the RBZ to reduce lending rates.\nCOMMERCIAL BANKS\n \n \n \n27 \n \n \nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES \nCLOTHING &\nHOUSING, \nWATER,\nFURNITURE\nHEALTH\nTRANSPORT\nCOMMUNICA\nTION\nRECREATION &\nEDUCATION\nRESTAURA\nNTS &\nMISC.\nTOTAL NON\n& TOBACCO\nFOOTWEAR\nELECTRICTY, \nGAS\nAND\nCULTURE\nHOTELS\nGOODS &\nFOOD\n& OTHER\nEQUIPMENT\nSERVICES\nFUELS\nWEIGHTS\n4.90\n4.35\n27.62\n5.29\n1.42\n8.39\n2.65\n2.27\n4.25\n1.08\n6.46\n68.70\n31.30\n100\n2017 \nJun\n0.21\n0.03\n-0.82\n0.38\n-0.03\n-0.18\n0.00\n0.18\n0.00\n0.29\n0.33\n-0.15\n-0.45\n-0.24\nJul\n0.19\n0.01\n0.01\n-0.06\n0.01\n-0.23\n-0.08\n0.05\n-2.81\n1.10\n0.11\n-0.33\n-0.42\n-0.36\nAug\n-0.18\n0.10\n0.06\n0.05\n0.03\n0.00\n0.03\n0.13\n0.00\n0.00\n0.06\n0.01\n-0.47\n-0.13\nSep\n0.02\n0.45\n0.24\n1.10\n0.07\n-0.31\n0.14\n0.64\n0.00\n0.05\n0.12\n0.27\n0.66\n0.38\nOct\n0.63\n1.44\n0.24\n3.49\n1.07\n1.08\n0.37\n3.08\n0.00\n0.45\n2.66\n1.25\n2.27\n1.54\nNov\n0.28\n0.62\n0.06\n1.32\n0.38\n0.29\n-0.04\n1.14\n-1.43\n-0.72\n1.10\n0.33\n1.74\n0.74\nDec\n0.28\n0.72\n-0.43\n0.45\n0.01\n0.29\n-0.01\n0.78\n0.00\n0.49\n0.74\n0.21\n1.29\n0.53\n2018\nJan\n0.17\n0.67\n0.02\n0.55\n0.10\n0.00\n-0.04\n1.78\n0.00\n-0.16\n0.64\n0.26\n0.39\n0.30\nFeb\n0.26\n0.91\n0.01\n0.43\n0.00\n-0.02\n0.15\n0.90\n0.00\n0.01\n0.21\n0.19\n-0.18\n0.08\nMar\n0.13\n-0.34\n-0.74\n0.46\n0.18\n-1.29\n-1.60\n1.58\n0.01\n-0.14\n-0.55\n0.09\n-0.03\n-0.25\nApr\n0.20\n0.34\n-0.01\n0.00\n0.10\n-0.32\n-0.21\n-0.10\n0.63\n1.85\n0.26\n0.11\n0.02\n0.08\nMay\n-0.03\n0.10\n0.00\n-0.12\n0.03\n0.14\n-0.01\n0.08\n0.00\n0.05\n0.33\n0.03\n0.02\n0.03\nJun\n0.60\n0.14\n-0.16\n-0.48\n0.38\n0.19\n0.10\n-0.25\n0.00\n0.26\n1.00\n0.04\n-0.23\n-0.05\nJul\n0.43\n0.38\n0.00\n0.40\n0.31\n0.17\n0.08\n0.65\n7.16\n3.20\n0.75\n1.09\n0.74\n0.98\nAug\n0.13\n0.45\n0.00\n0.91\n0.24\n0.47\n0.00\n-0.23\n0.00\n0.11\n0.34\n0.28\n0.62\n0.39\nSep\n0.22\n1.35\n0.53\n2.79\n1.90\n0.51\n0.32\n0.22\n0.00\n0.28\n0.07\n0.85\n1.05\n0.92\nOct\n7.89\n45.88\n2.94\n26.86\n12.94\n19.13\n1.39\n27.66\n0.00\n9.86\n13.64\n14.66\n20.12\n16.44\nNov\n7.21\n10.63\n4.80\n9.12\n3.36\n2.31\n0.18\n16.33\n0.35\n9.29\n15.42\n6.50\n14.53\n9.20\nDec\n10.22\n8.07\n2.77\n8.07\n8.49\n28.61\n1.26\n3.19\n0.00\n13.84\n10.07\n9.01\n9.07\n9.03\n2019\nJan\n13.35\n1.04\n4.35\n9.46\n11.64\n47.25\n1.12\n11.01\n0.10\n11.73\n6.72\n12.83\n6.94\n10.75\nFeb\n2.94\n5.94\n2.77\n2.73\n2.93\n-7.70\n0.14\n3.42\n0.02\n2.20\n4.34\n0.70\n3.56\n1.67\nMar\n14.29\n5.56\n2.34\n5.20\n2.30\n3.06\n0.14\n3.92\n3.66\n4.54\n5.16\n4.05\n5.10\n4.38\nApr\n12.05\n6.57\n0.65\n5.84\n19.90\n3.40\n3.50\n5.36\n6.93\n19.74\n5.35\n4.45\n7.85\n5.52\nMay\n21.57\n11.89\n2.54\n11.51\n16.85\n16.18\n31.21\n29.81\n3.05\n6.67\n8.96\n10.12\n17.63\n12.54\nJun\n40.94\n59.89\n18.11\n63.80\n46.53\n41.90\n2.32\n35.38\n0.06\n28.71\n36.63\n31.23\n55.07\n39.26\nJul\n23.72\n27.68\n9.19\n27.01\n43.32\n26.39\n7.48\n36.17\n11.05\n30.51\n39.79\n21.72\n19.90\n21.04\nAug\n18.09\n10.81\n13.65\n11.18\n7.47\n32.66\n67.86\n12.65\n4.09\n8.67\n18.77\n17.79\n18.55\n18.07\nSep\n11.01\n17.47\n15.52\n14.73\n18.68\n16.83\n1.29\n18.03\n4.10\n8.42\n35.01\n16.63\n19.55\n17.72\nOct\n42.80\n37.15\n38.63\n35.12\n34.80\n26.55\n9.15\n31.78\n5.47\n37.99\n30.03\n32.90\n48.35\n38.75\nNov\n16.54\n18.35\n5.83\n25.67\n18.49\n9.68\n13.01\n20.59\n17.10\n36.46\n23.89\n13.94\n22.63\n17.46\nDec\n11.51\n13.48\n31.25\n17.51\n12.74\n11.82\n1.43\n5.70\n0.17\n15.52\n18.28\n17.14\n15.75\n16.55\n2020\nJan\n1.83\n3.84\n0.60\n1.50\n5.32\n2.24\n2.77\n2.01\n9.39\n2.72\n1.86\n1.99\n2.55\n2.23\nFeb\n8.48\n10.01\n2.27\n7.00\n21.56\n9.62\n220.04\n17.96\n94.95\n2.92\n30.86\n18.41\n6.81\n13.52\nSource:Zimstat, 2020\nFOOD & NON \nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES\nALL \nITEMS\nTABLE 9.1 : MONTHLY INFLATION - % CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \n(February 2019 = 100)\n \n \n \n28 \n \n \nF OOD \nIN F LA TION\nA LC OHOLIC \nC LOTHIN G\nHOUS IN G, \nWA TER ,\nF UR N ITUR E\nM IS C .\nF OOD & \nB EVER A GES \n& \nELEC TR IC TY, \nGA S\nA N D\nR EC R EA TION \n&\nR ES TA UR A N TS \n&\nGOOD S &\nTOTA L N ON\nN ON \nA LC OHOLIC \nA LL\n& TOB A C C O\nF OOTWEA R\n& OTHER\nEQUIP M EN T\nC ULTUR E\nHOTELS\nS ER VIC ES\nF OOD\nB EVER A GES\nITEM S\nF UELS\nWEIGHTS\n4.90\n4.35\n27.62\n5.29\n1.42\n8.39\n2.65\n2.27\n4.25\n1.08\n6.46\n68.70\n31.30\n100\n2017\nJan\n-0.61\n-1.52\n-2.16\n-0.62\n-0.68\n-1.76\n-1.44\n0.20\n3.49\n-0.02\n-0.62\n-0.79\n-0.30\n-0.65\nFeb\n-0.42\n-1.66\n-1.91\n0.26\n-0.53\n-1.29\n-1.31\n0.18\n3.49\n0.24\n-0.05\n-0.43\n1.29\n0.06\nMar\n-0.13\n-1.45\n-0.95\n1.64\n-0.30\n-0.79\n-1.74\n0.40\n0.12\n0.87\n0.92\n-0.19\n1.21\n0.21\nApr\n-0.26\n-1.29\n-0.89\n2.03\n-0.33\n-0.86\n-1.61\n0.44\n2.16\n1.30\n1.21\n0.13\n1.35\n0.48\nMay\n0.15\n-0.98\n-1.01\n2.16\n-0.01\n-0.71\n0.00\n0.17\n2.16\n0.88\n1.46\n0.28\n1.92\n0.75\nJun\n0.29\n-0.74\n-2.39\n2.52\n-0.19\n-0.81\n0.00\n0.59\n-0.48\n0.86\n1.70\n-0.28\n1.82\n0.31\nJul\n0.47\n-0.58\n-2.43\n2.41\n-0.03\n-1.01\n0.29\n0.55\n-3.28\n1.93\n2.12\n-0.56\n1.92\n0.14\nAug\n0.35\n-0.26\n-2.37\n2.50\n0.02\n-0.88\n0.33\n0.78\n-3.28\n1.92\n2.05\n-0.50\n1.76\n0.14\nSep\n0.27\n0.22\n-1.05\n3.91\n0.12\n-1.11\n0.57\n1.69\n-3.28\n1.97\n2.07\n0.10\n2.49\n0.78\nOct\n0.95\n1.91\n-0.68\n7.47\n1.22\n0.02\n0.94\n4.84\n-3.28\n2.49\n4.61\n1.38\n4.40\n2.24\nNov\n1.17\n2.62\n-0.62\n8.78\n1.67\n-0.02\n0.89\n5.83\n-2.25\n1.76\n5.62\n1.91\n5.65\n2.97\nDec\n1.51\n3.27\n-0.45\n8.77\n1.57\n0.55\n0.89\n6.35\n-2.26\n2.09\n6.04\n2.20\n6.60\n3.46\n2018\nJan\n1.83\n4.12\n-0.52\n9.00\n1.82\n1.30\n0.41\n7.95\n-2.25\n1.63\n6.64\n2.45\n6.17\n3.52\nFeb\n2.04\n5.21\n-0.65\n8.71\n1.84\n1.17\n0.56\n8.96\n-2.25\n1.45\n6.31\n2.41\n4.35\n2.98\nMar\n2.02\n4.81\n-1.32\n8.52\n1.91\n-0.35\n-1.03\n10.48\n-2.24\n1.30\n5.35\n2.37\n4.54\n2.68\nApr\n2.34\n5.14\n-1.36\n8.45\n2.06\n-0.67\n-1.28\n10.36\n-3.58\n2.84\n5.70\n2.26\n4.94\n2.71\nMay\n2.18\n5.15\n-1.36\n8.30\n1.96\n-0.58\n-1.30\n10.67\n-3.58\n3.29\n6.14\n2.28\n4.89\n2.71\nJun\n2.58\n5.27\n-0.70\n7.36\n2.38\n-0.20\n-1.20\n10.20\n-3.58\n3.26\n6.85\n2.48\n5.12\n2.91\nJul\n2.83\n5.66\n-0.71\n7.86\n2.68\n0.20\n-1.04\n10.86\n6.31\n5.42\n7.53\n3.94\n6.35\n4.29\nAug\n3.15\n6.03\n-0.77\n8.78\n2.89\n0.67\n-1.07\n10.47\n6.31\n5.53\n7.84\n4.22\n7.52\n4.83\nSep\n3.35\n6.98\n-0.47\n10.60\n4.77\n1.49\n-0.89\n10.00\n6.31\n5.77\n7.79\n4.83\n7.94\n5.39\nOct\n10.81\n53.83\n2.20\n35.57\n17.08\n19.61\n0.11\n36.24\n6.31\n15.68\n19.31\n18.71\n26.78\n20.85\nNov\n18.47\n69.14\n7.04\n46.01\n20.56\n22.02\n0.34\n56.70\n8.23\n27.34\n36.21\n26.02\n42.71\n31.01\nDec\n30.21\n81.48\n10.48\n57.08\n30.80\n56.47\n1.61\n60.45\n8.22\n44.26\n48.82\n37.08\n53.68\n42.09\n2019\nJan\n47.34\n82.13\n15.27\n71.00\n45.88\n130.41\n2.79\n75.00\n8.32\n61.45\n57.81\n54.26\n63.71\n56.90\nFeb\n51.28\n91.22\n18.46\n74.92\n50.16\n112.71\n2.78\n79.38\n8.34\n64.99\n64.31\n55.04\n69.84\n59.39\nMar\n72.67\n102.55\n22.14\n83.18\n53.34\n122.10\n4.59\n83.51\n12.30\n72.72\n73.75\n61.19\n78.55\n66.80\nApr\n93.08\n115.13\n22.94\n93.88\n83.66\n130.40\n8.49\n93.54\n19.33\n103.06\n82.56\n68.17\n92.52\n75.86\nMay\n134.80\n140.46\n26.07\n116.47\n114.54\n167.32\n42.36\n151.04\n22.97\n116.49\n98.28\n85.94\n126.43\n97.85\nJun\n228.95\n283.96\n49.13\n256.29\n213.17\n278.58\n45.52\n240.71\n23.05\n177.91\n168.24\n142.84\n251.94\n175.66\n2020\nFeb\n729.57\n703.89\n354.34\n623.95\n885.04\n598.64\n1046.38\n704.12\n362.80\n607.72\n939.15\n562.64\n810.29\n640.16\nSource:Zimstat, 2020\nTABLE 9.2 : YEARLY INFLATION - % CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \n(February 2019 = 100)\nC OM M UN IC A TION\nTR A N S P OR T\nHEA LTH\nED UC A TION\nN ON -F OOD IN F LA TION\n \n \n \n29 \n \n \n \n \n \n(US$ MILLIONS)\nEnd Period\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\n2014\n2015\n2016\n2017\n2018\n2019\nEst\nLong-Term External Debt\n6,326\n6,556\n7,713\n8,125\n8,655\n10,234\n9,341\n9,305\n9,555\n9,827\n10,557\nGovernment\n5,304\n5,039\n6,128\n6,321\n6,172\n6,192\n6,097\n6,015\n6,200\n6,306\n6,930\nBilateral Creditors\n3,703\n3,402\n4,087\n4,087\n4,088\n4,115\n4,115\n4,129\n4,194\n4,261\n4,892\nMultilateral Creditors\n1,591\n1,627\n2,041\n2,235\n2,084\n2,078\n1,982\n1,886\n2,006\n2,045\n2,069\nPrivate Creditors\n10\n10\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPublic Enterprises\n825\n825\n1,092\n1,198\n1,356\n1,661\n1,220\n1,370\n1,406\n1,426\n1,165\nBilateral Creditors\n497\n497\n711\n703\n858\n1,155\n760\n779\n843\n898\n783\nMultilateral Creditors\n327\n327\n382\n495\n498\n506\n460\n591\n562\n528\n381\nPrivate Creditors\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nMonetary Authorities\n140\n550\n127\n125\n125\n120\n110\n0\n0\n0\n0\nMultilateral Creditors - IMF\n140\n550\n127\n125\n125\n120\n110\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPrivate\n57\n142\n366\n480\n1,002\n2,261\n1,913\n1,920\n1,949\n2,095\n2,431\nShort-Term External Debt\n1,348\n2,040\n1,286\n891\n1,564\n2,394\n2,258\n2,304\n2,299\n2,374\n3,799\nSupplier's Credits\n193\n286\n134\n30\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nReserve Bank\n998\n1,300\n615\n615\n614\n587\n587\n573\n507\n441\n2,463\nPrivate\n156\n454\n537\n246\n950\n1,807\n1,671\n1,731\n1,792\n1,933\n1,336\nTotal External Debt\n7,674\n8,596\n8,999\n9,016\n10,219\n12,628\n11,599\n11,610\n11,854\n13,134\n14,324\nSource: Ministry of Finance & Economic Development, 2019; & Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\nTABLE 10: ZIMBABWE: EXTERNAL DEBT OUTSTANDING BY DEBTOR (INCLUDING ALL ARREARS)\n \n \n \n30 \n \n \n \n \nUSA\nSOUTH ARFICAN\nBOTSWANA\nJAPANESE\nEURO\nPOUND\nEND OF\nDollar\nRAND\nPULA\nYEN\nSTERLING\n2019\nMar\n3.0120\n0.2064\n0.2789\n0.0272\n3.3832\n3.9363\nApr\n3.2614\n0.2275\n0.3031\n0.0292\n3.6490\n4.2209\nMay\n5.2635\n0.3550\n0.4831\n0.0483\n5.8585\n6.6391\nJun\n6.6220\n0.4673\n0.6231\n0.0615\n7.5245\n8.3906\nJul\n9.1900\n0.6494\n0.8621\n0.0846\n10.0000\n11.1111\nAug\n10.512\n0.6833\n0.9458\n0.0940\n11.6288\n12.8226\nSep\n15.200\n1.0234\n1.3883\n0.1415\n16.5699\n18.7643\nOct\n16.120\n1.0804\n1.4721\n0.1491\n17.5217\n20.4051\nNov\n15.970\n1.0800\n1.4600\n0.1500\n17.6600\n20.5800\nDec\n16.530\n1.1400\n1.5400\n0.1500\n18.3700\n21.6900\n2020\nJan\n17.100\n1.1883\n1.5922\n0.1564\n19.0000\n22.5000\nFeb\n17.680\n1.1779\n1.6073\n0.1608\n19.2174\n22.9610\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\n TABLE 11 : SELECTED INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE RATES\n \n \n \n31 \n \n \nMarket Capitalisation\nEND OF\nAll Share*\nZWL$ millions\n2017\nJun\n-\n196.0\n69.8\n39.7\n311,145,262\n5,695.2\nJul\n-\n203.3\n69.4\n24.7\n149,425,245\n5,759.0\nAug\n-\n235.0\n73.5\n13.6\n107,920,143\n6,659.4\nSep\n-\n418.4\n122.6\n89.5\n245,278,194\n11,860.2\nOct\n-\n521.9\n132.5\n168.8\n1,006,687,304\n14,830.3\nNov\n-\n376.7\n126.9\n207.5\n196,489,710\n10,777.7\nDec\n-\n333.0\n142.4\n75.3\n844,189,447\n9,580.6\n2018\nJan\n91.3\n305.4\n130.4\n31.4\n55,032,220\n8,652.9\nFeb\n88.0\n294.6\n124.9\n63.7\n138,142,187\n8,386.0\nMar\n87.0\n291.0\n125.1\n40.3\n108,997,097\n8,290.4\nApr\n98.7\n330.7\n124.4\n44.4\n206,342,675\n9,405.3\nMay\n108.3\n361.5\n151.5\n59.3\n129,155,586\n10,393.2\nJun\n102.9\n342.8\n161.3\n73.0\n234,834,368\n9,792.2\nJul\n114.3\n384.3\n164.0\n114.9\n624,256,160\n10,969.7\nAug\n117.3\n394.6\n161.3\n50.5\n142,150,599\n12,475.4\nSep\n115.1\n387.0\n163.8\n61.1\n197,401,341\n12,265.5\nOct\n163.8\n549.8\n217.3\n449.6\n316,060,000\n17,960.0\nNov\n160.4\n538.7\n208.6\n118.0\n153,874,660\n17,316.6\nDec\n146.2\n487.1\n227.7\n93.0\n144,479,601\n19,424.4\n2019\nJan\n157.5\n525.9\n213.1\n110.3\n122,778,938\n20,888.4\nFeb\n148.1\n494.3\n206.9\n295.8\n229,935,122\n19,773.4\nMar\n121.7\n405.6\n194.0\n70.8\n123,398,632\n16,084.9\nApr\n133.7\n446.5\n186.5\n116.5\n134,394,898\n17,502.7\nMay\n188.1\n628.4\n225.8\n193.5\n237,334,372\n24,920.0\nJun\n204.8\n683.5\n255.3\n235.5\n293,138,775\n27,017.2\nJul\n187.1\n624.4\n244.6\n191.0\n163,556,663\n24,636.1\nAug\n166.36\n553.59\n269.6\n109.0\n117,688,558\n21,742.2\nSep\n232.52\n774.55\n317.8\n166.6\n335,373,041\n30,527.2\nOct\n232.86\n777.48\n276.3\n208.4\n203,004,611\n30,390.0\nNov\n240.81\n801.38\n344.4\n130.0\n129,886,035\n31,226.3\nDec\n230.08\n766.34\n316.7\n194.2\n190,880,245\n29,767.1\n2020\nJan\n332.9\n1 112.27 \n344.9\n304.9\n179,559,446\n43,426.5\nFeb\n473.13\n1 564.98\n826.73\n360.1\n172,678,984\n60,987.5\nSource:Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2020\n*All Share index was introduced in January, 2018\nTABLE 12: ZIMBABWE STOCK MARKET STATISTICS\nIndustrial\n Market Turnover \nZWL$ million \nVolume of Shares\nMining\nIndices\n \n \n \n32 \n \n \nEND OF\nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\n \nINTERNET\n2018\nJan\n 5,548.1 \n4.9\n663.5\n21.3 2,318.80 1,006.05 \nFeb\n 4,706.6 \n4.5\n594.0\n13.9 2,015.11 831.05 \nMar\n 6,300.4 \n4.5\n654.2\n12.5 2,657.10 864.83 \nApr\n 5,786.8 \n3.3\n640.9\n11.5 3,002.63 822.58 \nMay\n 7,298.4 \n4.2\n819.7\n10.5 3,550.07 968.58 \nJun\n 7,997.3 \n4.7\n779.4\n8.3 3,724.31 1,135.49 \nJul\n 8,290.0 \n4.0\n790.0\n9.4 4,446.68 1,262.53 \nAug\n 7,762.9 \n2.9\n811.2\n14.0 4,558.54 1,254.96 \nSep\n 7,155.0 \n4.0\n842.5\n17.0 4,462.40 1,393.08 \nOct\n 8,230.5 \n4.2\n821.3\n17.9 4,607.38 1,428.20 \nNov\n 7,922.5 \n3.7\n657.5\n19.9 3,964.78 1,026.70 \nDec\n 8,355.2 \n2.8\n917.2\n14.6 4,833.80 1,102.90 \n2019\nJan\n 6,903.0 \n2.9 1,294.05 \n16.9 3,608.83 1,056.16 \nFeb\n 8,337.0 \n4.0 1,330.58 \n17.2 3,594.51 1,093.64 \nMar\n 9,881.5 \n3.9 1,399.50 \n18.3 4,080.65 1,250.55 \nApr\n 10,321.4 \n3.1 1,590.10 \n14.0 4,949.34 1,408.53 \nMay\n 14,670.3 \n4.2 1,397.48 \n11.8 6,692.55 1,897.82 \nJun\n 17,881.2 \n3.7 1,464.66 \n30.1 7,130.02 2,539.84 \nJul\n 23,309.9 \n3.7 1,806.45 \n36.6 9,137.36 3,295.81 \nAug\n 23,596.6 \n2.4 2,181.56 \n38.5 11,077.65 3,493.56 \nSep\n 30,328.1 \n3.8 3,029.87 \n51.9 15,112.00 5,337.71 \nOct\n 39,413.7 \n3.9 3,621.64 \n67.1 16,588.28 6,237.03 \nNov\n 40,871.8 \n3.5 4,199.30 \n67.4 13,537.77 7,200.30 \nDec\n 49,579.8 \n2.8 5,695.39 \n97.2 19,356.74 8,724.02 \n2020\nJan\n 47,841.3 \n1.8 5,236.31 \n115.2 21,247.93 9,646.84 \nFeb\n 41,637.6 \n4.7\n5,431.81\n \n136.9 22,589.66 9,633.79 \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\nTABLE 13.1 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS \n Values of Transactions (ZWL$ millions)\n \n \n \n33 \n \n \nEND OF\nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\n INTERNET\n2018\nJan\n 548.1 \n22.7\n 20,981.2 449.6 100,593.9 \n 501.8 \nFeb\n 457.2 \n22.5\n 18,869.0 292.2 89,584.3 \n 463.8 \nMar\n 545.2 \n23.7\n 21,996.8 268.4 116,120.0 \n 510.5 \nApr\n 505.5 \n17.4\n 21,170.0 253.6 117,616.8 \n 457.0 \nMay\n 611.1 \n21.2\n 23,278.2 213.2 137,423.0 \n 496.6 \nJun\n 553.6 \n22.5\n 23,790.0 175.2 156,609.8 \n 502.2 \nJul\n 560.2 \n20.1\n 25,075.5 223.1 169,416.8 \n 559.6 \nAug\n 553.0 \n15.1\n 25,249.9 317.4 164,918.0 \n 518.7 \nSep\n 543.0 \n19.4\n 24,918.0 300.8 161,289.5 \n 511.3 \nOct\n 571.6 \n20.4\n 21,025.4 345.5 161,427.4 \n 496.0 \nNov\n 477.4 \n16.7\n 17,845.4 334.9 133,862.1 \n 430.6 \nDec\n 478.6 \n13.0\n 27,419.1 236.2 161,540.7 \n 409.1 \nAnnual Total\n 6,404.4 \n234.6\n 271,618.6 3,410.1 1,670,402.1 5,857.13 \n2019\nJan\n 401.5 \n12.2\n 40,613.8 232.6 135,481.1 \n 413.4 \nFeb\n 456.5 \n16.4\n 27,811.2 226.8 119,081.1 \n 463.6 \nMar\n 525.9 \n15.4\n 30,417.6 248.9 142,597.8 \n 441.0 \nApr\n 535.0 \n13.7\n 32,092.5 168.8 157,348.3 \n 390.1 \nMay\n 642.6 \n14.7\n 15,542.6 121.4 166,491.6 \n 494.3 \nJun\n 706.0 \n13.3\n 18,012.1 79.6 160,873.0 \n 486.8 \nJul\n 983.5 \n13.6\n 20,465.4 99.6 170,823.3 \n 638.2 \nAug\n 872.9 \n9.0\n 21,919.8 85.2 179,281.2 \n 542.3 \nSep\n 1,010.7 \n11.9\n 22,749.6 62.4 200,441.9 \n 679.4 \nOct\n 1,079.4 \n12.7\n 23,191.6 65.0 206,621.5 \n 1,099.3 \nNov\n 982.1 \n10.3\n 25,737.5 225.2 152,919.9 \n 2,044.1 \nDec\n 1,003.8 \n7.6\n 27,800.5 385.5 146,316.6 \n 1,273.6 \n2020\nJan\n 943.3 \n4.6\n 23,649.0 199.9 139,278.2 \n 671.7 \nFeb\n 916.1 \n8.9\n 21,652.2 196.6 149,671.5 \n 647.8 \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\nTABLE 13.2 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS \n Volumes of Transactions (ZWL$ 000's)\n \n \n \n34 \n \n \nEND OF\nEXPORTS\nIMPORTS\nTOTAL TRADE\nTRADE BALANCE\n2018\nJan\n251.2\n489.7\n740.9\n-238.5\nFeb\n346.3\n574.9\n921.2\n-228.6\nMar\n288.6\n605.8\n894.3\n-317.2\nApr\n329.6\n544.1\n873.7\n-214.5\nMay\n267.2\n532.4\n799.6\n-265.2\nJun\n384.6\n614.6\n999.3\n-230.0\nJul\n340.3\n560.0\n900.3\n-219.7\nAug\n449.3\n576.5\n1025.9\n-127.2\nSep\n353.4\n577.1\n930.5\n-223.7\nOct\n448.6\n592.3\n1040.9\n-143.7\nNov\n471.7\n628.7\n1100.4\n-157.0\nDec\n364.8\n494.7\n859.5\n-129.9\nTotal\n4,295.63\n6,790.84\n11,086.47\n-2,495.21\n2019\nJan\n292.6\n336.8\n629.4\n-44.2\nFeb\n348.4\n370.5\n718.9\n-22.1\nMar\n295.9\n329.0\n624.9\n-33.1\nApr\n277.0\n416.7\n693.7\n-139.7\nMay\n343.2\n436.8\n780.0\n-93.6\nJun\n239.8\n458.5\n698.3\n-218.7\nJul\n299.5\n357.0\n656.5\n-57.5\nAug\n345.4\n384.2\n729.60\n-38.80\nSep\n378.4\n403.9\n782.30\n-25.50\nOct\n483.3\n400.6\n883.90\n82.70\nNov\n475.2\n431.2\n906.40\n44.00\nDec\n489.1\n418.8\n907.90\n70.30\nTotal\n4,267.80\n4,744.00\n9,011.80\n-476.20\n2020\nJan\n397.7\n383.5\n781.27\n14.18\nFeb\n365.5\n455.3\n820.89\n-89.81\nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2020\nTABLE 14 : MERCHANDISE TRADE STATISTICS\n (US$ millions)", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/Monthly_Economic_Reviews/Monthly-Economic-Review-February-2020.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "c89a59f889d3d6a006068911d665833f", "text": "i \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nMARCH 2019 \n \n1 \n \nTABLE OF CONTENTS \n \nSELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS ........................................................................................ 2 \nINTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICE DEVELOPMENTS ......................................................... 3 \nMERCHANDISE TRADE DEVELOPMENTS ..................................................................................... 4 \nMONETARY DEVELOPMENTS ............................................................................................................ 6 \nSTOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS ................................................................................................... 7 \nINFLATION OUTTURN ........................................................................................................................... 8 \nAnnual Inflation ...................................................................................................................................... 8 \nMonthly Inflation .................................................................................................................................... 9 \nNATIONAL PAYMENTS SYSTEM ........................................................................................................ 9 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2 \n \n \n \n \n2019 \n \nFebruary \n2019 \n \nMarch \nMonth-on- \nMonth \nChange (%) \nYearly Inflation3 (%) \n59.40 \n66.8 \n- \nMonthly Inflation3 (%) \n1.67 \n4.4 \n- \nNational Payment System Transactions2 \n(US$ millions) \n15, 286.08 \n17, 554.08 \n14.8 \nMoney Supply2 (US$ millions) \n10, 389.30 \n10, 627.38 \n2.29 \nMoney Supply (M3) Annual Growth2 (%) \n37.94 \n38.14 \n- \nNominal Lending Rate2 (% per annum) \n4.00-18.00 \n4.00-18.00 \n- \nMerchandise Exports3 (US$ millions) \n349.5 \n295.9 \n-15.3 \nMerchandise Imports3 (US$ millions) \n408 \n329.0 \n-19.4 \nTrade Balance3 (US$ millions) \n-58.5 \n-33.1 \n43.42 \nZ.S.E All share Index \n148.11 \n121.66 \n-17.86 \nZ.S.E. Mining Index1 \n207.03 \n193.98 \n-6.30 \nZ.S.E. Industrial Index1 \n494.31 \n405.57 \n-17.95 \nSources: \n1. Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) \n2. Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) \n3. Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZIMSTAT) \nSELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS \n \n \n \n3 \n \nINTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICE \nDEVELOPMENTS \n \nDuring the month of March 2019, the \ninternational commodity prices of platinum, \ncopper, nickel and brent crude oil firmed. Gold \nprices, however, declined. \n \n Precious Metals \nMonthly average gold prices retreated by 1.1%, \nto an average of US$1,301.59/oz. in March \n2019. This was against a backdrop of a stronger \nUS dollar, which weakened the demand for the \nyellow metal as a safe haven asset. A higher \neffective US Fed Res funds rate, also weighed \ndown the price of gold, during the month under \nreview. Platinum prices, however, rose by 3.7% \nto US$843.07/oz. in March 2019. \n \nFigure. 1: Precious metal prices (US$/oz.) \nSource: Bloomberg, 2019 \n \nBase Metals \nPrices of base metals continued to register \npositive trends, as the market reacted positively \nto reports that the US had postponed a planned \ntariff increase on Chinese goods. An expected \nfiscal stimulus in China, coupled with improved \nglobal market sentiment also spurred base metal \nprices. \n \nResultantly, copper and nickel increased by \n2.3% and 2.8%, to close the month under review \nat US$6,434.02/tonne and US$13,019.04/tonne, \nrespectively. \n \nFigure 2: Base metal prices (US$/ton) \nSource: Bloomberg, 2019 \n \n \nBrent Crude Oil \nAverage monthly prices of crude oil increased \nby 3.5%, to close the month of March 2019 at \nUS$66.59/barrel. This followed tight global \nsupply conditions mainly driven by production \ncuts by the Oil and Petroleum Exporting \nCountries. Prices also increased on account of a \nfurther reduction in US shale oil production. \n \n \n \n \n600\n700\n800\n900\n1000\n1100\n1200\n1300\n1400\nMar-18\nApr-18\nMay-18\nJun-18\nJul-18\nAug-18\nSep-18\nOct-18\nNov-18\nDec-18\nJan-19\nFeb-19\nMar-19\nUS$/oz.\nGold\nPlatinum\n5,000\n7,000\n9,000\n11,000\n13,000\n15,000\n17,000\n4,000\n4,500\n5,000\n5,500\n6,000\n6,500\n7,000\n7,500\nMar-18\nMay-18\nJul-18\nSep-18\nNov-18\nJan-19\nMar-19\nNickel US$/ton\nCopper US$/ton\nCopper\nNickel (RHS)\n \n \n \n4 \n \nFigure 3: International crude oil prices \n(US$/barrel) \nSource: Bloomberg, 2019 \nMERCHANDISE TRADE \nDEVELOPMENTS \n \nTotal merchandise trade for March 2019 \namounted to US$894.6 million, a 17.5% decline \nfrom US$921.3 million recorded in the \npreceeding \nmonth. \nThe \ndrop \nin \ntotal \nmerchandise trade was on account of a \nslowdown in both merchandise exports and \nimports. \nMerchandise Exports \nMerchandise exports registered a 15.3% \ndecline, to close the month under review at \nUS$295.9 million. This was on the back of \ndecreases in exports of nickel mattes; tobacco; \ndiamonds and cane sugar. Gold; nickel ores and \nconcentrates; ferro-chromium; chromium ores \nand concentrates; \nand platinum exports, \nhowever, increased, during the period under \nreview. \n \n1 Unwrought platinum excludes other platinum group of \nmetals (PGMs). \nFigure 4: Merchandise Exports (US$ m) \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2019 \n \nTable 1 shows the major export commodities for \nthe months of February 2019 and March 2019. \n \n \nTable 1: Exports Classified by Harmonised \nCommodity Description and Code \nSystem \nCommodity \nFeb-19 \nMar-19 \nShare \nof \nTotal \nExports \nUS$m \nUS$m \n(%) \nGold \n82.8 \n84.3 \n28.5 \nNickel mattes \n52.2 \n45.4 \n15.4 \nFlue-cured tobacco \n83.8 \n21.7 \n7.3 \nNickel ores and concentrates \n34 \n43.4 \n14.7 \nFerro-chromium \n14.9 \n23.2 \n7.8 \nIndustrial diamonds \n11.5 \n10.5 \n3.5 \nCane Sugar \n11.3 \n6.5 \n2.2 \nChromium ores and concentrates \n3.6 \n4.2 \n1.4 \nUnwrought Platinum1 \n3.5 \n4.5 \n1.5 \nOther \n51.8 \n52.3 \n17.7 \n Total \n349.5 \n295.9 \n100 \nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2019 & RBZ Calculations, 2019 \n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\nUS$/barrel\n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\n300\n350\n400\n450\n500\nJan-18\nFeb-18\nMar-18\nApr-18\nMay-18\nJun-18\nJul-18\nAug-18\nSep-18\nOct-18\nNov-18\nDec-18\nJan-19\nFeb-19\nMar-19\n \n \n \n5 \n \nThe country’s merchandise exports were mainly \ndestined for South Africa (44.4%); the United \nArab Emirates (23.1%); Mozambique (7.8%); \nBelgium (2.5%); and Zambia (2%), as shown in \nFigure 5. \nFigure 5: Top Five Merchandise Export \nDestinations (%Share) \nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2019 & RBZ Calculations, 2019 \nMerchandise Imports \nMerchandise imports declined by 19.4%, from \nUS$408 million in February 2019 to US$329 \nmillion in March 2019. In terms of proportions, \ndiesel accounted for 21.2%; unleaded petrol \n10%; vaccines, 1.6%; and tractors, 1.3% of total \nimports. The reduction in imports reflected the \nimpact \nof \nimport \ndemand \nmanagement \nmeasures being implemented by government, \ncoupled with foreign currency constraints. \nTable 2 shows the country’s major import \ncommodities for February 2019 and March \n2019. \n \n \n \n Table 2: Imports Classified by Harmonised \nCommodity Description and Code \nSystem \nCommodity \nFebruary \nUS$m \nMarch \nUS$m \nShare of \nTotal \nExports \n(%) \n Diesel \n75.3 \n69.6 \n21.2 \n Unleaded petrol \n35.8 \n33 \n10 \n Vaccines \n1.1 \n5.3 \n1.6 \n Tractors \n8.9 \n4.2 \n1.3 \n Insecticides \n1.8 \n3.6 \n1.1 \n Motor vehicles \n5.3 \n3.5 \n1.1 \n Electrical energy \n3.2 \n3.5 \n1.1 \n Crude soya bean oil \n5.8 \n3.5 \n1.1 \n Machinery \n1.4 \n2.6 \n0.8 \n Other \n269 \n200 \n60.8 \n Total \n408 \n329 \n100 \nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2019 & RBZ Calculations, 2019 \nThe country’s imports were mainly sourced \nfrom South Africa, 39.3%; Singapore, 30.2%; \nChina, 7%; United Kingdom, 2.9%; and India, \n1.9%, as shown in Figure 6. \nFigure 6: Top Five Merchandise Import \nSources (% Share). \nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2019 & RBZ Calculations, 2019 \n \n44.4%\n23.1%\n7.8%\n2.5%\n2.0%\n South Africa\n United Arab Emirates\nMozambique\nBelgium\nZambia\n39.3%\n30.2%\n7.0%\n2.9%\n1.9%\n South Africa\n Singapore\nChina\nUnited\nKingdom\nIndia\n \n \n \n6 \n \nMerchandise Trade Balance \nThe country’s merchandise trade deficit \nnarrowed from US$55.5 million in February \n2019, to US$33.1 million in March 2019. \nFigure 7: Merchandise Trade Balance \n(US$m) \nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2019 & RBZ Computations, 2019 \nMONETARY DEVELOPMENTS2 \n \nBroad money supply3 recorded an annual \ngrowth of 38.14% in March 2019, from 37.94% \nrecorded in February 2019. The growth was \nreflected in demand deposits, which grew by \n49.52%; currency in circulation, 37.09%; \nnegotiable certificates of deposits, 3.63%; and \ntime deposits, 3.62%. \n \n \n2 All monetary numbers valued in RTGS$ since the \nadoption of an interbank market determined exchange rate \nin February 2019. \n \nIn levels, annual broad money supply increased \nfrom $7 693.30 million in March 2018, to $10 \n627.38 million in March 2019. \n \nMonth-on-month, \nbroad \nmoney \nsupply \nincreased by 2.29%, from $10 389.30 million in \nin February 2019 to $10 627.38 million in \nMarch 2019, largely due to the growth in \ntransferable deposits. \n \nFigure 8: Broad Money in Levels and \nGrowth Rates \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2019 \nDuring the month under review, demand \ndeposits accounted for 81.38% of broad money; \ntime deposits, 13.52%; currency in circulation, \n4.39%; and negotiable certificates of deposits, \n0.71%. \n \n \n3 From November 2017, broad money adjusted by a \nreclassification of lines of credit that were incorrectly \nclassified as deposits included in broad money. This \nreduced the stock of money and at the same time reducing \nthe net foreign assets of other depository corporations. \n-400.0\n-200.0\n0.0\n200.0\n400.0\n600.0\nFeb-18\nMar-18\nApr-18\nMay-18\nJun-18\nJul-18\nAug-18\nSep-18\nOct-18\nNov-18\nDec-18\nJan-19\nFeb-19\nMar-19\nExports\nImports\nTrade Balance\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n35\n40\n45\n50\n -\n 2\n 4\n 6\n 8\n 10\n 12\nMar-18\nApr-18\nMay-18\nJun-18\nJul-18\nAug-18\nSep-18\nOct-18\nNov-18\nDec-18\nJan-19\nFeb-19\nMar-19\n%\n$ Billions\nM3\nM3 Annual Growth rate\n \n \n \n7 \n \nFigure 9: Composition of Money Supply \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2019 \nCredit to the private sector recorded an annual \ngrowth of 6.92% to $3 952.66 million in March \n2019. Month-on-month, credit to the private \nsector declined by 2.62%, from $4 058.93 \nmillion in February 2019 to $3 953 million in \nMarch 2019. \nPrivate sector credit was distributed as follows: \nhouseholds, 25.75%; agriculture, 18.94%; \nservices, \n14.35%; \ndistribution, \n13.35%; \nmanufacturing, 9.52%; financial organisations \nand investments, 7.74%; mining, 4.74%; \nconstruction, \n3.09%; \nand \ntransport \nand \ncommunications, 2.17%. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFigure 10: Distribution of Private Sector \nCredit \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2019 \n \nSTOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS \n \nNegative trading activity was registered on the \nZimbabwe Stock Exchange, during the month of \nMarch 2019. Consequently, the All Share and \nTop 10 indices recorded declines of 17.86% and \n21.12%, respectively. The counters closed at \n121.66 points for the All Share index and 114.61 \npoints for the Top 10 index. \n \n \n \n \n \n \nDemand \ndeposits\n81.38%\nTime \nDeposits\n13.52%\nCurrency in \nCirculation\n4.39%\nNegotiable \nCertificates of \nDeposits\n0.71%\nConstruction\n3%\nTransport and \nCommunication\n2%\nMining\n5%\nFin \nOrgan & \nInvest\n8%\nDistrubution\n13%\nServices\n14%\nManufacturing\n10%\nAgriculture\n19%\nHouseholds\n26%\nOther\n0%\n \n \n \n8 \n \nFigure 11: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange All \nShare and Top 10 Indices \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2019 \nThe industrial index stood at 405.57 points in \nMarch 2019, representing a 22.88% decline \nfrom 525.90 points recorded in the previous \nmonth. Similarly, the mining index declined \nfrom 213.13 points in February 2019, to close \nthe month under review at 193.98 points. \n \nFigure 12: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange \nIndices \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2019 \nThe volume of shares traded on the ZSE \ndeclined by 46.33%, to close the month of \nMarch \n2019 \nat \n123.40 \nmillion \nshares. \nConcommitantly, the value of shares traded \ndecreased by 76.07%, from $295.84 million in \nFebruary 2019 to $70.81 million in March 2019. \n \nFigure 13: ZSE Monthly Volumes and \nValues Traded \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2019 \nZSE market capitalisation stood at $16.08 \nbillion in March 2019, down from $19.77 billion \nrecorded in February 2019. This was largely \ndriven by negative trading on the local bourse. \nINFLATION OUTTURN \n \nAnnual Inflation \n \nAnnual headline inflation rose from 59.40% in \nFebruary 2019, to 66.8% in March 2019. This \nwas largely attributable to increases in both food \nand non-food prices. \nAnnual food inflation surged from 69.84% in \nFebruary 2019, to 78.55% in March 2019. \nSimilarly, annual non-food inflation accelerated \nfrom 54.35% in February 2019, to 61.2% in \nMarch 2019. \n0.00\n50.00\n100.00\n150.00\n200.00\n250.00\n40.00\n90.00\n140.00\n190.00\n240.00\n31-Mar-18\n30-Apr-18\n31-May-18\n30-Jun-18\n31-Jul-18\n31-Aug-18\n30-Sep-18\n31-Oct-18\n30-Nov-18\n31-Dec-18\n31-Jan-19\n28-Feb-19\n31-Mar-19\nTop 10 Index\nAll Share Index\nAll Share Index\nTop 10 Index\n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\n300\n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n700\n800\nMining Index Points\nIndustrial Inedx Points\nIndustrial\nMining\n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\n300\n350\n400\n450\n500\n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n700\n800\n900\n1,000\n1,100\nMar-18\nApr-18\nMay-18\nJun-18\nJul-18\nAug-18\nSep-18\nOct-18\nNov-18\nDec-18\nJan-19\nFeb-19\nMar-19\nValues Traded ($ millions)\nVolumes Traded (milions)\nVolume\nTurnover\n \n \n \n9 \n \nFigure 14: Annual Inflation (%) \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2019 \n \nMonthly Inflation \n \nMonth-to-month inflation increased from 1.67% \nin February 2019 to 4.38% in March 2019, \ndriven by both food and non-food inflation. \nMonthly food inflation rose by 1.5 percentage \npoints to 5.1% in March 2019, largely due to \nincreases in vegetable prices. Non-food inflation \nregistered a month-on month growth of 4.05%, \nfrom 0.70% in February 2019. The surged in \nmonthly non-food inflation was largely on \naccount of increases in alcoholic beverages and \ntobacco and transport. Other sub-categories that \ncontributed to the increase in monthly non-food \ninflation were education; restaurants and hotels; \nand furniture, household equipment and \nmaintenance. The increases were, however, \npartially offset by marginal declines in housing, \nwater, electricity, gas and other fuels, health and \nclothing and footwear. \n \nFigure 15: Month-on-Month Inflation (%)\nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2019 \n \nNATIONAL PAYMENTS SYSTEM \n \n \n \n \nThe total value of transactions processed \nthrough the National Payment System (NPS) \nincreased by 14.8%, from $15.3 billion in \nFebruary 2019 to $17.6 billion in March 2019. \nNPS transaction volumes also increased by \n17.6% to 175.91 million in March 2019, from \n149.62 million in February 2019. \n \nZimbabwe Electronic Transfer Settlement \nSystem (ZETSS) \nThe value of transactions processed through the \nRTGS system increased by 18.5% to $9.88 \nbillion, during the month under review. \nTransaction volumes registered a 15.2% \nincrease, from 456 537 in February 2019 to \n525 909 in March 2019. \n \n \n \n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\n50.0\n60.0\n70.0\n80.0\n90.0\nJan-18\nFeb-18\nMar-18\nApr-18\nMay-18\nJun-18\nJul-18\nAug-18\nSep-18\nOct-18\nNov-18\nDec-18\nJan-19\nFeb-19\nMar-19\nFood Inflation\nNon-Food Inflation\nAll Items\n-2.0\n0.0\n2.0\n4.0\n6.0\n8.0\n10.0\n12.0\n14.0\n16.0\n18.0\nMar-18\nMay-18\nJul-18\nSep-18\nNov-18\nJan-19\nMar-19\n \n \n \n10 \n \nFigure 16: ZETSS Volumes and Values \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2019 \n \nCash transactions \n \nThe value of cash based transactions stood at \n$481.69 million in March 2019, a 46.7% surge \nfrom $328.46 million recorded in February \n2019. \n \n \nMobile and Internet Based Transactions \nThe total value of mobile and internet based \ntransactions closed the month of March 2019 at \n$5.33 billion, up from $4.69 billion in February \n2019. \n \nCard Based Transactions \nCard based transactions stood at $1.39 billion in \nMarch 2019, up from $1.33 billion recorded in \nFebruary 2019. \n \n \nCheque Transactions \nCheque transactions decreased to $3.9 million in \nMarch 2019, from $4.04 million in February \n2019. \n \nJUNE 2019 \nRESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE \n -\n 2.0\n 4.0\n 6.0\n 8.0\n 10.0\n 12.0\n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n700\nMar-18\nApr-18\nMay-18\nJun-18\nJul-18\nAug-18\nSep-18\nOct-18\nNov-18\nDec-18\nJan-19\nFeb-19\nMar-19\nValue in $ Billions\nVolume in Thousands\nVolume\nValue\n \n11 \n \nStatistical Tables \n \nMonetary Statistics \n 1. Depository Corporations Survey \n \n \n \n12 \n 2. Central Bank Survey \n \n \n \n \n \n \n13 \n \n3. Other Depository Corporations Survey \n \n \n \n \n14 \n Other Depository Corporations \n \n4.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n15 \n 4.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n16 \n Commercial Banks \n 5.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n17 \n 5.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n18 \n Building Societies \n 6.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n19 \n 6.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n20 \n Sectoral Analysis of Bank Loans and Advances and Deposits \n \n7.1 Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks Loans and Advances \n21 \n \n7.2 Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks Deposits \n \n \n22 \n Interest Rates \n \n8.1 Lending Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n23 \n \n8.2 Banks Deposit Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n24 \n \n Inflation \n \n9.1 Monthly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n25 \n \n9.2 Yearly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n26 \n External Statistics \n \n10. Total External Debt Outstanding by Debtor \n \n \n \n27 \n 11. Exchange Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n28 \n \n \n \n \n \n12 \n \n12. Zimbabwe Stock Market Statistics \n \n \n \n \n 29 \n \n 13. National Payments System Statistics \n \n \n \n \n13.1 Values of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n 30 \n \n13.2 Volumes of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n 31 \n \n14. Merchandise Trade Statistics \n \n \n \n \n \n 32 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n 13 \n \n \nMar-18\nApr-18\nMay-18\nJun-18\nJul-18\nAug-18\nSep-18\nOct-18\nNov-18\nDec-18\nJan-19\nFeb-19\nMar-19\nNet Foreign Assets\n-1,632,912.01\n-1,645,842.76\n-1,725,931.55\n-1,508,217.61\n-1,499,686.15\n-1,804,600.44\n-1,815,294.15\n-1,728,377.38\n-1,725,207.58\n-1,877,294.72\n-1,874,425.56\n-4,424,467.92\n-5,983,620.49\nCentral Bank(net)\n-1,469,367.91\n-1,454,496.55\n-1,468,598.27\n-1,217,451.12\n-1,275,444.50\n-1,513,864.28\n-1,555,285.99\n-1,455,053.24\n-1,541,066.06\n-1,758,219.23\n-1,766,538.71\n-4,676,973.98\n-6,110,320.34\nForeign Assets\n253,622.18\n257,569.81\n314,006.88\n510,355.35\n528,307.45\n290,596.25\n237,850.70\n255,482.93\n247,680.14\n295,965.66\n303,248.18\n853,285.31\n996,604.88\nForeign Liabilities\n1,722,990.09\n1,712,066.36\n1,782,605.15\n1,727,806.48\n1,803,751.95\n1,804,460.53\n1,793,136.69\n1,710,536.17\n1,788,746.20\n2,054,184.89\n2,069,786.89\n5,530,259.29\n7,106,925.22\nOther Depository Corporations(net)\n-163,544.10\n-191,346.21\n-257,333.28\n-290,766.49\n-224,241.66\n-290,736.16\n-260,008.17\n-273,324.14\n-184,141.52\n-119,075.49\n-107,886.85\n252,506.07\n126,699.85\nForeign Assets\n297,434.24\n261,946.07\n296,836.55\n263,405.79\n320,981.77\n244,837.54\n299,508.91\n308,206.84\n359,199.07\n405,848.41\n422,803.54\n1,034,721.60\n1,060,697.66\nForeign Liabilities\n460,978.35\n453,292.29\n554,169.83\n554,172.27\n545,223.42\n535,573.70\n559,517.07\n581,530.99\n543,340.59\n524,923.90\n530,690.39\n782,215.53\n933,997.80\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n9,326,215.99\n9,468,421.41\n9,984,853.80\n10,351,577.44\n10,883,377.40\n11,301,536.89\n11,637,230.97\n11,491,870.79\n11,515,658.20\n11,887,199.99\n11,731,452.83\n14,813,771.42\n16,610,996.67\nDomestic Claims\n11,000,141.88\n11,386,721.27\n11,846,066.17\n12,410,120.00\n13,195,525.47\n13,840,196.20\n14,162,804.05\n14,361,247.61\n14,642,956.80\n14,982,344.65\n15,268,955.01\n14,831,314.29\n14,652,405.60\nClaims on Central Government(net)\n6,614,169.62\n6,945,662.37\n7,361,243.19\n7,703,126.14\n8,707,427.93\n9,245,237.20\n9,367,999.90\n9,453,371.60\n9,709,749.15\n9,992,336.76\n10,397,721.31\n9,848,404.77\n9,631,357.74\nClaims on Central Government\n6,770,958.92\n7,083,205.15\n7,510,470.60\n7,834,035.83\n8,782,266.41\n9,319,418.72\n9,454,322.45\n9,547,216.70\n9,799,794.74\n10,074,924.82\n10,481,274.02\n9,996,649.93\n9,810,201.11\nCentral Bank\n4,316,965.46\n4,510,854.75\n4,687,116.02\n4,961,290.78\n5,486,379.33\n5,949,540.54\n6,303,205.89\n6,436,684.56\n6,619,938.86\n7,024,652.77\n7,438,578.19\n6,914,447.06\n6,777,148.85\nODCs\n2,453,993.46\n2,572,350.40\n2,823,354.57\n2,872,745.05\n3,295,887.08\n3,369,878.18\n3,151,116.56\n3,110,532.15\n3,179,855.88\n3,050,272.06\n3,042,695.82\n3,082,202.87\n3,033,052.26\nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n156,789.30\n137,542.78\n149,227.40\n130,909.69\n74,838.48\n74,181.52\n86,322.55\n93,845.11\n90,045.59\n82,588.06\n83,552.71\n148,245.17\n178,843.37\nCentral Bank\n42,096.19\n41,970.42\n41,857.98\n41,699.08\n41,707.71\n41,789.64\n41,694.93\n41,685.64\n41,331.00\n41,321.07\n41,366.44\n103,759.15\n130,917.86\nODCs\n114,693.11\n95,572.36\n107,369.43\n89,210.62\n33,130.77\n32,391.88\n44,627.63\n52,159.47\n48,714.59\n41,267.00\n42,186.27\n44,486.02\n47,925.52\nClaims on Other Sectors\n4,385,972.26\n4,441,058.90\n4,484,822.98\n4,706,993.86\n4,488,097.54\n4,594,959.00\n4,794,804.16\n4,907,876.01\n4,933,207.65\n4,990,007.89\n4,871,233.70\n4,982,909.52\n5,021,047.86\nOther Financial Corporations\n69,429.67\n74,313.48\n60,319.74\n67,789.70\n133,851.47\n141,976.37\n145,256.31\n149,474.39\n146,924.77\n156,610.64\n163,570.22\n171,891.86\n159,230.21\nState and Local Government\n48,750.40\n52,851.54\n51,746.27\n49,509.94\n54,356.85\n52,796.97\n51,597.49\n39,591.11\n37,039.73\n37,159.65\n35,335.26\n34,253.92\n35,077.27\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n571,018.58\n584,553.05\n571,881.14\n678,604.79\n653,645.57\n675,218.20\n707,808.19\n714,396.35\n759,288.09\n737,586.90\n760,026.12\n717,834.55\n874,075.49\nPrivate Sector\n3,696,773.61\n3,729,340.82\n3,800,875.83\n3,911,089.43\n3,646,243.64\n3,724,967.47\n3,890,142.17\n4,004,414.16\n3,989,955.06\n4,058,650.69\n3,912,302.09\n4,058,929.20\n3,952,664.90\nCentral Bank\n15,959.49\n14,425.53\n19,406.23\n19,822.36\n20,351.40\n22,784.69\n21,112.94\n21,332.89\n21,390.08\n21,335.35\n17,030.76\n17,036.09\n21,956.10\nODCs\n3,680,814.12\n3,714,915.30\n3,781,469.60\n3,891,267.06\n3,625,892.25\n3,702,182.78\n3,869,029.24\n3,983,081.27\n3,968,564.98\n4,037,315.34\n3,895,271.33\n4,041,893.11\n3,930,708.81\nOther Items(Net)\n1,673,925.89\n1,918,299.85\n1,861,212.37\n2,058,542.55\n2,312,148.07\n2,538,659.31\n2,525,573.08\n2,869,376.82\n3,127,298.60\n3,095,144.66\n3,537,502.18\n17,542.87\n-1,958,591.07\nShares and Other Equity\n1,895,980.71\n1,893,321.46\n1,925,814.17\n1,993,144.37\n2,192,599.84\n2,239,731.19\n2,135,709.67\n2,187,396.87\n2,221,755.34\n2,281,378.82\n2,281,748.45\n-544,566.17\n-1,687,090.85\nLiabilities to Other Financial Corporations\n6,906.82\n16,085.12\n19,885.58\n21,559.36\n32,602.91\n33,341.07\n46,596.88\n42,026.50\n42,314.24\n39,048.36\n39,216.29\n42,570.71\n42,675.76\nRestricted Deposits\n58,609.87\n58,351.76\n51,411.94\n65,963.28\n41,991.83\n46,269.35\n46,191.19\n68,052.98\n17,139.46\n21,014.72\n17,086.44\n8,667.49\n16,636.01\nDeposits and Securities Excluded from Base Money\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nOther Items(net)\n-287,571.51\n-49,458.49\n-135,899.32\n-22,124.46\n44,953.48\n219,317.70\n297,075.34\n571,900.47\n846,089.55\n753,702.76\n1,199,451.00\n510,870.83\n-330,811.98\nBroad Money-M3\n7,693,303.98\n7,822,578.65\n8,258,922.25\n8,843,359.83\n9,383,691.25\n9,496,936.45\n9,821,936.82\n9,763,493.41\n9,790,450.62\n10,009,905.27\n9,857,027.27\n10,389,303.50\n10,627,376.18\nSecurities Other than Shares Included in Broad Money\n77,311.81\n83,964.91\n88,015.27\n66,844.08\n89,499.33\n66,484.46\n52,419.97\n61,703.77\n50,864.73\n58,584.04\n59,302.10\n71,792.12\n74,503.10\nBroad Money-M2\n7,615,992.16\n7,738,613.74\n8,170,906.98\n8,776,515.75\n9,294,191.92\n9,430,452.00\n9,769,516.85\n9,701,789.65\n9,739,585.90\n9,951,321.23\n9,797,725.16\n10,317,511.39\n10,552,873.07\nOther Deposits\n1,490,952.43\n1,374,640.48\n1,442,460.95\n1,459,140.37\n1,501,520.77\n1,524,244.03\n1,488,981.24\n1,427,834.38\n1,430,427.17\n1,508,902.47\n1,466,797.51\n1,473,224.43\n1,437,053.15\nNarrow Money-M1\n6,125,039.73\n6,363,973.26\n6,728,446.03\n7,317,375.38\n7,792,671.15\n7,906,207.97\n8,280,535.61\n8,273,955.26\n8,309,158.73\n8,442,418.76\n8,330,927.65\n8,844,286.96\n9,115,819.92\nTransferable Deposits\n5,784,508.89\n6,016,373.81\n6,374,245.17\n6,938,172.87\n7,365,729.27\n7,444,516.45\n7,789,665.52\n7,792,430.08\n7,817,001.46\n7,940,376.20\n7,857,164.47\n8,380,317.93\n8,648,981.05\nCurrency Outside Depository Corporations\n340,530.85\n347,599.45\n354,200.86\n379,202.52\n426,941.88\n461,691.52\n490,870.09\n481,525.19\n492,157.27\n502,042.57\n473,763.18\n463,969.03\n466,838.87\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2019\nNotes:\n(i) Depository corporations survey - formerly Monetary Survey.\n(ii) Broad money redefined using IMF's Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual of 2000. Major changes include exclusion of Government deposits held by banks from broad money.\n(iii) Transferable deposits made up of demand and savings deposits.\n(iv) NCDs are also referred to as securities included in broad money.\n(v) All classes of time deposits, short and long term are classified as time deposits, which are also termed other deposits.\n(vi) Credit to the private sector now excludes claims on other financial corporations, as well as claims on state and local government (local authorities)\n(vii) Depository corporations made up of the Central Bank and other depository corporations\n(viii) Other depository corporations (ODCs) - Commercial banks, merchant banks, building societies and POSB.\n(ix) In December 2017, the statistics were adjusted in restrospect by reclassifying Securities issued under Aftrades from claims on government to claims on central bank\n(x) In December 2017, the statistics were adjusted in restrospect by reclassifying amounts accessed by banks under the Aftrades from liabilities to Other Depository corporations and Other Financial Corporations to liabilities to Central Bank \n(xi) In December 2018, statistics were revised from November 2017 due to reclassification of lines of credit (foreign liabilities) that were initially classified as deposits included in broad money\n(xii) All monetary and financial statistics are valued in ZWL$ since the introduction of the interbank foreign exchange market in February 2019\nTABLE 1: DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS SURVEY (ZWL$ '000)\n \n \n \n14 \n \n \nMar-18\nApr-18\nMay-18\nJun-18\nJul-18\nAug-18\nSep-18\nOct-18\nNov-18\nDec-18\nJan-19\nFeb-19\nMar-19\nNet Foreign Assets\n-1,469,367.91\n-1,454,496.55\n-1,468,598.27\n-1,217,451.12\n-1,275,444.50 -1,513,864.28 -1,555,285.99 -1,455,053.24 -1,541,066.06 -1,758,219.23 -1,766,538.71 -4,676,973.98 -6,110,320.34\nClaims on Non Residents\n253,622.18\n257,569.81\n314,006.88\n510,355.35\n528,307.45\n290,596.25\n237,850.70\n255,482.93\n247,680.14\n295,965.66\n303,248.18\n853,285.31\n996,604.88\nOfficial Reserves Assets\n151,870.93\n148,866.28\n203,306.89\n163,434.94\n180,936.77\n189,263.65\n136,268.14\n153,107.92\n137,602.74\n86,950.64\n80,847.73\n311,203.67\n344,973.29\nOther Foreign Assets\n101,751.25\n108,703.53\n110,699.99\n346,920.41\n347,370.68\n101,332.60\n101,582.56\n102,375.02\n110,077.40\n209,015.01\n222,400.44\n542,081.63\n651,631.59\nLess Liabilities to Non Residents\n1,722,990.09\n1,712,066.36\n1,782,605.15\n1,727,806.48\n1,803,751.95\n1,804,460.53\n1,793,136.69\n1,710,536.17\n1,788,746.20\n2,054,184.89\n2,069,786.89\n5,530,259.29\n7,106,925.22\nShort Term Liabilities\n1,224,423.97\n1,213,571.58\n1,284,003.16\n1,229,630.31\n1,303,458.23 1,303,461.16 1,291,247.23 1,207,367.88 1,300,370.95 1,563,599.81 1,574,674.14 4,300,887.88 5,631,784.52\nOther Foreign Liabilities\n498,566.12\n498,494.78\n498,601.99\n498,176.16\n500,293.72\n500,999.37\n501,889.46\n503,168.29\n488,375.25\n490,585.08\n495,112.75 1,229,371.41 1,475,140.70\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n3,791,063.48\n3,672,870.69\n3,825,066.36\n3,730,783.67\n4,065,390.03 4,481,716.72 4,447,028.54 4,315,628.88 4,676,984.28 5,016,440.09 4,795,543.60 7,878,025.93 9,282,675.10\nDomestic Claims\n4,733,231.32\n4,949,000.69\n5,100,533.66\n5,420,856.73\n6,026,539.60 6,509,710.94 6,826,230.06 6,991,768.06 7,189,089.87 7,598,696.62 7,999,682.43 7,398,364.83 7,254,587.97\nNet Claims on Central Government\n4,274,869.27\n4,468,884.32\n4,645,258.05\n4,919,591.70\n5,444,671.63 5,907,750.89 6,261,510.96 6,394,998.92 6,578,607.86 6,983,331.70 7,397,211.76 6,810,687.92 6,646,231.00\nClaims on Central Government\n4,316,965.46\n4,510,854.75\n4,687,116.02\n4,961,290.78\n5,486,379.33\n5,949,540.54\n6,303,205.89\n6,436,684.56\n6,619,938.86\n7,024,652.77\n7,438,578.19\n6,914,447.06\n6,777,148.85\nOf which: Securities Other than Shares\n1,546,995.94\n1,560,622.17\n1,597,939.74\n1,655,951.61\n1,767,970.98 2,124,232.15 2,107,570.78 2,109,129.00 2,073,611.90 2,062,178.19 2,377,373.84 1,962,432.38 1,910,408.71\nLoans\n2,769,969.52\n2,950,232.58\n3,089,176.28\n3,305,339.17\n3,718,408.35\n3,825,308.38\n4,195,635.11\n4,327,555.56\n4,546,326.96\n4,962,474.58\n5,061,204.35\n4,952,014.68\n4,866,740.14\n Loans and Advances\n2,495,052.07\n2,677,530.89\n2,816,474.69\n3,032,637.59\n3,445,708.69 3,552,608.66 3,925,152.95 3,092,815.50 3,259,847.32 3,618,214.10 3,632,085.91 3,480,989.65 3,358,008.67\n Legacy Debt\n274,917.46\n272,701.69\n272,701.59\n272,701.58\n272,699.66\n272,699.72\n270,482.16\n270,483.94\n270,476.30\n271,144.05\n291,998.61\n308,519.87\n309,020.71\n Export Incentives\n416,035.49\n477,611.93\n530,141.11\n657,961.30\n685,670.05\n760,667.33\n878,452.43\n964,256.12\n1,016,003.35\n1,073,116.43\n1,137,119.83\n1,162,505.16\n1,199,710.77\nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n42,096.19\n41,970.42\n41,857.98\n41,699.08\n41,707.71\n41,789.64\n41,694.93\n41,685.64\n41,331.00\n41,321.07\n41,366.44\n103,759.15\n130,917.86\nOf which: Deposits\n42,096.19\n41,970.42\n41,857.98\n41,699.08\n41,707.71\n41,789.64\n41,694.93\n41,685.64\n41,331.00\n41,321.07\n41,366.44\n103,759.15\n130,917.86\nOther \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nClaims on Other Sectors\n458,362.05\n480,116.36\n455,275.61\n501,265.03\n581,867.98\n601,960.04\n564,719.10\n596,769.14\n610,482.01\n615,364.93\n602,470.67\n587,676.91\n608,356.98\nOther Financial Corporations\n22,351.28\n27,040.76\n23,338.60\n25,383.43\n89,858.36\n90,693.36\n93,173.28\n95,076.36\n92,865.03\n104,283.41\n109,152.02\n121,634.35\n114,497.79\nState and Local Government\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n420,051.27\n438,650.07\n412,530.77\n456,059.23\n471,658.22\n488,482.00\n450,432.88\n480,359.88\n496,226.90\n489,746.16\n476,287.89\n449,006.47\n471,903.09\nPrivate Sector\n15,959.49\n14,425.53\n19,406.23\n19,822.36\n20,351.40\n22,784.69\n21,112.94\n21,332.89\n21,390.08\n21,335.35\n17,030.76\n17,036.09\n21,956.10\nClaims on Other Depository Corporations\n215,726.13\n160,379.82\n270,870.78\n289,295.02\n301,846.44\n306,132.79\n306,155.60\n316,177.15\n379,173.85\n393,735.95\n418,332.74\n330,900.10\n339,662.09\nOf which: Loans\n215,726.13\n160,379.82\n270,870.78\n289,295.02\n301,846.44\n306,132.79\n306,155.60\n316,177.15\n379,173.85\n393,735.95\n418,332.74\n330,900.10\n339,662.09\nOther Liabilities to ODCs\n957,558.02\n1,227,106.07\n1,351,211.59\n1,762,290.93\n1,996,438.50 2,054,141.40 2,395,312.12 2,682,243.65 2,626,664.31 2,739,770.63 3,367,888.49 2,509,676.59 2,400,005.83\nOf which: Aftrades Balances\n392,086.59\n393,049.36\n393,054.36\n445,143.93\n463,755.70\n489,416.24\n483,497.99\n388,000.00\n388,000.00\n388,000.00\n388,000.00\n0.00\n0.00\n Securities\n492,624.92\n726,718.83\n844,572.29\n1,181,913.83\n1,425,661.22\n1,486,721.94\n1,823,973.56\n2,083,075.39\n1,964,016.64\n2,135,541.16\n2,726,599.60\n2,314,291.29\n2,248,370.43\nOther Items(Net)\n200,335.95\n209,403.74\n195,126.49\n217,077.15\n266,557.51\n279,985.61\n290,045.02\n310,072.68\n264,615.13\n236,221.85\n254,583.08\n-2,658,437.58\n-4,088,430.87\nShares and Other Equity\n340,070.83\n350,685.43\n351,770.33\n360,766.36\n433,728.61\n444,671.00\n454,134.87\n466,363.60\n467,391.73\n475,653.19\n464,456.24\n-2,402,232.48\n-3,873,725.31\nOther Items(Net)\n-198,344.74\n-199,633.45\n-208,055.78\n-209,652.49\n-209,162.93\n-210,954.74\n-210,281.05\n-224,343.90\n-219,916.07\n-260,446.06\n-226,959.59\n-264,872.60\n-231,341.56\nLiabilities to Other Resident Sectors\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nDeposits and Securities Excluded from Base Money\n58,609.87\n58,351.76\n51,411.94\n65,963.28\n41,991.83\n46,269.35\n46,191.19\n68,052.98\n17,139.46\n21,014.72\n17,086.44\n8,667.49\n16,636.01\nMonetary Base Incl. foreign currency clearing balances\nMonetary Base \n2,321,695.57\n2,218,374.14\n2,356,468.08\n2,513,332.55\n2,789,945.53 2,967,852.44 2,891,742.55 2,860,575.65 3,135,918.22 3,258,220.86 3,029,004.88 3,201,051.95 3,172,354.75\nBond Coins\n68,055.24\n73,367.25\n79,420.27\n80,593.64\n80,812.71\n84,872.46\n86,177.94\n86,521.28\n86,507.82\n86,558.34\n86,671.08\n86,794.17\n86,775.25\nBond Notes\n289,183.09\n289,120.92\n288,935.32\n307,595.14\n366,738.89\n399,951.59\n422,933.66\n434,935.71\n436,225.70\n435,985.12\n436,131.63\n436,825.58\n442,551.17\nLiabilities to ODCs\n1,920,236.39\n1,813,681.70\n1,924,872.37\n2,112,051.33\n2,294,108.09 2,406,600.92 2,296,266.80 2,282,181.13 2,545,140.17 2,718,472.21 2,431,429.69 2,620,801.43 2,556,061.06\nReserve Deposits\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n399,643.22\n393,439.26\n395,649.57\n387,117.92\n379,777.18\nOther\n1,920,236.39\n1,813,681.70\n1,924,872.37\n2,112,051.33\n2,294,108.09 2,406,600.92 2,296,266.80 2,282,181.13 2,145,496.95 2,325,032.95 2,035,780.12 2,233,683.51 2,176,283.88\nPrivate Deposits\n44,220.86\n42,204.27\n63,240.13\n13,092.44\n48,285.84\n76,427.47\n86,364.15\n56,937.52\n68,044.53\n17,205.18\n74,772.49\n56,630.77\n86,967.28\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2019\nTABLE 2: CENTRAL BANK SURVEY (ZWL$'000)\n \n \n \n15 \n \n \nMar-18\nApr-18\nMay-18\nJun-18\nJul-18\nAug-18\nSep-18\nOct-18\nNov-18\nDec-18\nJan-19\nFeb-19\nMar-19\nNet Foreign Assets\n-163,544.10\n-191,346.21\n-257,333.28\n-290,766.49\n-224,241.66\n-290,736.16\n-260,008.17\n-273,324.14\n-184,141.52\n-119,075.49\n-107,886.85\n252,506.07\n126,699.85\nClaims on Non Residents\n297,434.24\n261,946.07\n296,836.55\n263,405.79\n320,981.77\n244,837.54\n299,508.91\n308,206.84\n359,199.07\n405,848.41\n422,803.54\n1,034,721.60\n1,060,697.66\nOf Which: Foreign Currency\n57,869.75\n61,873.54\n71,684.03\n58,497.99\n61,888.30\n72,330.74\n61,523.80\n70,410.81\n84,619.66\n94,485.74\n113,427.55\n256,754.30\n263,233.15\nDeposits\n238,758.58\n199,270.91\n224,360.39\n204,103.25\n206,979.87\n171,610.30\n237,075.06\n236,895.75\n273,677.73\n310,319.40\n307,770.08\n776,043.16\n794,324.48\nOther\n805.91\n801.63\n792.13\n804.54\n52,113.60\n896.50\n910.05\n900.29\n901.68\n1,043.27\n1,605.91\n1,924.14\n3,140.03\nLess Liabilities to Non Residents\n460,978.35\n453,292.29\n554,169.83\n554,172.27\n545,223.42\n535,573.70\n559,517.07\n581,530.99\n543,340.59\n524,923.90\n530,690.39\n782,215.53\n933,997.80\nOf Which: Deposits\n85,081.69\n75,827.46\n77,458.35\n76,977.43\n71,906.41\n61,764.73\n91,213.72\n115,149.81\n86,609.01\n81,573.41\n81,808.20\n172,568.31\n242,800.88\nLoans\n375,896.65\n377,464.82\n476,711.48\n477,194.84\n473,317.01\n473,808.97\n468,303.36\n466,381.17\n456,731.58\n443,350.50\n448,882.19\n609,647.22\n691,196.93\nOther\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n7,472,096.38\n \n7,624,121.15\n \n8,098,814.54\n \n8,741,831.36\n \n9,132,705.19\n \n9,249,553.63\n9,504,710.75\n9,498,354.86\n9,414,390.34\n9,609,733.01\n9,416,378.45\n9,616,197.64\n9,946,870.18\nDomestic Claims\n6,266,910.56\n \n6,437,720.58\n \n6,745,532.52\n \n6,989,263.27\n \n7,168,985.87\n \n7,330,485.27\n7,336,573.99\n7,369,479.55\n7,453,866.93\n7,383,648.03\n7,269,272.57\n7,432,949.46\n7,397,817.63\nNet Claims on Central Government\n2,339,300.34\n \n2,476,778.04\n \n2,715,985.15\n \n2,783,534.43\n \n3,262,756.31\n \n3,337,486.31\n3,106,488.93\n3,058,372.68\n3,131,141.29\n3,009,005.06\n3,000,509.55\n3,037,716.85\n2,985,126.74\nClaims on Central Government\n2,453,993.46\n \n2,572,350.40\n \n2,823,354.57\n \n2,872,745.05\n \n3,295,887.08\n \n3,369,878.18\n3,151,116.56\n3,110,532.15\n3,179,855.88\n3,050,272.06\n3,042,695.82\n3,082,202.87\n3,033,052.26\nSecurities\n2,434,830.12\n \n2,558,912.76\n \n2,814,916.90\n \n2,865,309.79\n \n3,291,375.03\n \n3,362,827.03\n3,145,693.06\n3,105,944.58\n3,172,866.99\n3,044,069.03\n3,038,282.27\n3,076,367.83\n3,028,779.35\nLoans\n19,163.34\n \n13,437.64\n \n8,437.68\n \n7,435.26\n \n4,512.05\n \n7,051.15\n5,423.50\n4,587.57\n6,988.90\n6,203.03\n4,413.55\n5,835.04\n4,272.91\nOther \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n114,693.11\n \n95,572.36\n \n107,369.43\n \n89,210.62\n \n33,130.77\n \n32,391.88\n44,627.63\n52,159.47\n48,714.59\n41,267.00\n42,186.27\n44,486.02\n47,925.52\nOf which: Deposits\n114,693.11\n \n95,572.36\n \n107,369.43\n \n89,210.62\n \n33,130.77\n \n32,391.88\n44,627.63\n52,159.47\n48,714.59\n41,267.00\n42,186.27\n44,486.02\n47,925.52\nOther \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nClaims on Other Sectors\n3,927,610.21\n \n3,960,942.53\n \n4,029,547.37\n \n4,205,728.83\n \n3,906,229.56\n \n3,992,998.96\n4,230,085.05\n4,311,106.88\n4,322,725.64\n4,374,642.97\n4,268,763.02\n4,395,232.61\n4,412,690.88\nOther Financial Corporations\n47,078.39\n \n47,272.71\n \n36,981.14\n \n42,406.27\n \n43,993.11\n \n51,283.01\n52,083.02\n54,398.03\n54,059.74\n52,327.23\n54,418.20\n50,257.50\n44,732.42\nState and Local Government\n48,750.40\n \n52,851.54\n \n51,746.27\n \n49,509.94\n \n54,356.85\n \n52,796.97\n51,597.49\n39,591.11\n37,039.73\n37,159.65\n35,335.26\n34,253.92\n35,077.27\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n150,967.31\n \n145,902.98\n \n159,350.37\n \n222,545.56\n \n181,987.35\n \n186,736.20\n257,375.31\n234,036.46\n263,061.19\n247,840.74\n283,738.23\n268,828.08\n402,172.40\nPrivate Sector\n3,680,814.12\n \n3,714,915.30\n \n3,781,469.60\n \n3,891,267.06\n \n3,625,892.25\n \n3,702,182.78\n3,869,029.24\n3,983,081.27\n3,968,564.98\n4,037,315.34\n3,895,271.33\n4,041,893.11\n3,930,708.81\nClaims on the Central Bank\n2,474,448.22\n \n2,438,430.82\n \n2,557,149.58\n \n3,089,939.84\n \n3,471,170.30\n \n3,498,784.50\n3,799,833.82\n3,811,216.96\n3,726,890.73\n3,969,951.54\n3,950,061.19\n3,824,458.20\n3,953,460.88\nCurrency\n16,707.478\n \n14,888.726\n \n14,154.729\n \n8,986.260\n \n20,609.732\n \n23,132.54\n18,241.51\n39,931.81\n30,576.25\n20,500.90\n49,039.52\n59,650.72\n62,487.55\nOther Claims including Reserves\n2,457,740.74\n \n2,423,542.10\n \n2,542,994.86\n \n3,080,953.58\n \n3,450,560.57\n \n3,475,651.96\n3,781,592.32\n3,771,285.15\n3,696,314.48\n3,949,450.64\n3,901,021.67\n3,764,807.48\n3,890,973.33\nLiabilities to the Central Bank\n140,468.21\n \n82,369.89\n \n101,470.93\n \n119,810.71\n \n118,944.97\n \n136,950.59\n142,244.29\n147,588.60\n213,749.43\n229,588.29\n239,529.91\n158,887.13\n165,849.57\nOther Items(Net)\n1,128,794.20\n \n1,169,660.36\n \n1,102,396.63\n \n1,217,561.04\n \n1,388,506.01\n \n1,442,765.55\n1,489,452.77\n1,534,753.06\n1,552,617.90\n1,514,278.27\n1,563,425.41\n1,482,322.89\n1,238,558.76\nShares and Other Equity\n1,555,909.88\n \n1,542,636.03\n \n1,574,043.84\n \n1,632,378.01\n \n1,758,871.23\n \n1,795,060.19\n1,681,574.79\n1,721,033.27\n1,754,363.61\n1,805,725.63\n1,817,292.21\n1,857,666.31\n2,186,634.46\nLiabilities to other ressident sectors\n6,906.82\n \n16,085.12\n \n19,885.58\n \n21,559.36\n \n32,602.91\n \n33,341.07\n46,596.88\n42,026.50\n42,314.24\n39,048.36\n39,216.29\n42,570.71\n42,675.76\nOther Items(Net)\n(434,022.51)\n \n(389,060.79)\n \n(491,532.80)\n \n(436,376.33)\n \n(402,968.13)\n \n-385,635.72\n-238,718.90\n-228,306.72\n-244,059.95\n-330,495.73\n-293,083.09\n-417,914.13\n-990,751.46\nDeposits and Securities Included in Broad Mone\n7,308,552.27\n \n7,432,774.94\n \n7,841,481.27\n \n8,451,064.87\n \n8,908,463.53\n \n8,958,817.46\n9,244,702.58\n9,225,030.71\n9,230,248.82\n9,490,657.52\n9,308,491.60\n9,868,703.71\n10,073,570.03\nDeposits Included in Broad Money\n7,231,240.46\n \n7,348,810.03\n \n7,753,466.00\n \n8,384,220.79\n \n8,818,964.20\n \n8,892,333.01\n \n9,192,282.61\n \n9,163,326.94\n \n9,179,384.09\n \n9,432,073.48\n \n9,249,189.49\n \n9,796,911.59\n \n9,999,066.93\n \nTransferable Deposits\n5,740,288.03\n5,974,169.54\n6,311,005.04\n6,925,080.42\n7,317,443.43\n7,368,088.98\n7,703,301.37\n7,735,492.56\n7,748,956.93\n7,923,171.01\n \n7,782,391.98\n \n8,323,687.16\n \n8,562,013.77\n \n of which FCAs\n149,041.84\n139,613.34\n343,305.00\n \n418,087.02\n \n1,190,521.05\n \n1,417,836.22\n \nOther Deposits\n1,490,952.43\n \n1,374,640.48\n \n1,442,460.95\n \n1,459,140.37\n \n1,501,520.77\n \n1,524,244.03\n \n1,488,981.24\n \n1,427,834.38\n \n1,430,427.17\n1,508,902.47\n \n1,466,797.51\n1,473,224.43\n1,437,053.15\nMoney Market Instruments\n77,311.81\n \n83,964.91\n \n88,015.27\n \n66,844.08\n \n89,499.33\n \n66,484.46\n \n52,419.97\n \n61,703.77\n \n50,864.73\n \n58,584.04\n \n59,302.10\n \n71,792.12\n \n74,503.10\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2019\nTABLE 3 : OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS SURVEY ( ZWL$ '000)\n \n \n \n16 \n \n \nForeign\nTOTAL\nEnd of\nNotes\nBond\n&\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \nLocal\nOther \n Notes &\nCoin\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment\n1 Governemt\nOther\n2\nGovernment\nLocal \nPublic \n Institutional \nOther cliams\nContigent Assets\nOther Assets\nNon Financial \nCoins\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\nGovernment\nEnterprises\nUnits\nAssets\n2017\nMar\n12.6\n \n66.4\n \n1,485.9\n \n260.5\n \n154.9\n \n53.5\n1,794.1\n18.7\n15.7\n3.8\n15.7\n15.7\n70.7\n3,460.5\n67.2\n422.4\n442.5\n635.1\n8,995.8\nApr\n10.7\n \n67.8\n \n1,495.2\n \n249.4\n \n219.3\n \n51.4\n1,954.0\n17.8\n15.8\n3.6\n15.8\n16.9\n74.5\n3,449.5\n24.6\n489.1\n398.8\n644.6\n9,199.0\nMay\n13.4\n \n56.9\n \n1,492.4\n \n272.5\n \n170.2\n \n75.3\n1,968.9\n20.3\n15.7\n33.6\n16.7\n16.3\n72.9\n3,447.8\n82.4\n486.1\n421.7\n644.4\n9,307.6\nJun\n7.4\n \n57.1\n \n1,674.9\n \n350.3\n \n92.1\n \n110.6\n2,014.2\n19.0\n16.0\n35.0\n47.9\n16.5\n82.9\n3,494.3\n92.8\n533.5\n408.9\n649.6\n9,702.8\nJul\n7.1\n \n45.2\n \n1,807.4\n \n302.3\n \n63.1\n \n103.6\n1,982.8\n17.2\n26.1\n34.4\n45.2\n16.9\n116.8\n3,417.1\n86.8\n513.6\n432.9\n635.8\n9,654.3\nAug\n12.3\n \n40.6\n \n2,061.9\n \n276.6\n \n165.3\n \n7.9\n2,100.9\n16.3\n26.3\n64.6\n41.3\n18.0\n145.5\n3,494.5\n78.6\n531.8\n403.7\n639.5\n10,125.5\nSep\n12.0\n \n38.1\n \n2,110.4\n \n226.8\n \n179.7\n \n31.3\n2,248.9\n16.1\n23.5\n65.0\n41.5\n15.6\n118.8\n3,554.4\n78.0\n472.8\n415.6\n655.1\n10,303.5\nOct\n8.7\n \n41.8\n \n2,139.3\n \n254.1\n \n190.8\n \n61.0\n2,372.1\n15.4\n24.4\n65.1\n34.8\n17.8\n99.6\n3,599.1\n82.0\n432.4\n459.3\n667.3\n10,564.9\nNov\n9.8\n \n46.1\n \n2,315.5\n \n289.8\n \n184.2\n \n74.3\n2,487.7\n18.8\n23.5\n65.4\n32.3\n19.6\n107.3\n3,608.7\n76.8\n417.7\n505.6\n672.5\n10,955.5\nDec\n12.6\n \n58.1\n \n2,592.0\n \n276.0\n \n213.4\n \n66.6\n2,397.2\n26.8\n23.5\n66.3\n29.4\n19.4\n145.5\n3,581.3\n92.2\n508.3\n509.3\n699.9\n11,317.7\n2018\nJan\n23.4\n \n66.9\n \n2,528.5\n \n291.2\n \n111.9\n \n81.9\n2,336.0\n34.5\n23.5\n65.9\n26.3\n20.6\n155.3\n3,461.2\n74.6\n501.0\n457.8\n700.8\n10,961.1\nFeb\n20.0\n \n46.8\n \n2,516.8\n \n347.6\n \n114.2\n \n96.2\n2,313.4\n33.5\n23.5\n66.1\n24.3\n21.1\n145.4\n3,527.1\n22.2\n507.8\n434.5\n697.8\n10,958.3\nMar\n16.7\n \n57.9\n \n2,457.7\n \n312.8\n \n139.2\n \n99.5\n2,434.8\n32.8\n23.5\n66.7\n19.2\n15.9\n127.5\n3,637.8\n24.2\n504.1\n487.4\n710.3\n11,168.1\nApr\n14.9\n \n61.9\n \n2,423.5\n \n337.0\n \n120.8\n \n78.5\n2,558.9\n32.0\n24.7\n67.0\n13.4\n20.9\n121.2\n3,674.0\n22.1\n532.0\n459.2\n715.7\n11,277.5\nMay\n14.2\n \n71.7\n \n2,543.0\n \n477.8\n \n138.6\n \n85.7\n2,814.9\n30.9\n25.0\n66.9\n8.4\n20.9\n134.4\n3,740.3\n12.0\n458.9\n457.2\n718.2\n11,819.1\nJun\n9.0\n \n58.5\n \n3,081.0\n \n509.8\n \n120.0\n \n84.1\n2,865.3\n30.1\n26.2\n66.5\n7.4\n19.4\n196.4\n3,829.3\n38.6\n551.4\n448.1\n730.7\n12,671.8\nJul\n20.6\n \n61.9\n \n3,450.6\n \n466.4\n \n111.6\n \n95.4\n3,291.4\n33.3\n0.0\n67.5\n4.5\n21.0\n182.0\n3,500.6\n153.9\n611.4\n472.5\n732.0\n13,276.5\nAug\n23.1\n \n72.3\n \n3,475.7\n \n377.8\n \n105.3\n \n66.3\n3,362.8\n32.2\n0.0\n67.3\n7.1\n20.6\n186.7\n3,585.1\n102.0\n647.7\n489.9\n736.1\n13,358.0\nSep\n18.2\n \n61.5\n \n3,781.6\n \n398.1\n \n159.1\n \n78.0\n3,145.7\n31.2\n45.2\n68.1\n5.4\n20.4\n212.2\n3,734.2\n119.7\n637.4\n527.8\n742.6\n13,786.4\nOct\n39.9\n \n70.4\n \n3,771.3\n \n368.3\n \n185.5\n \n51.4\n3,105.9\n30.2\n45.2\n68.4\n4.6\n9.4\n188.8\n3,838.0\n132.0\n647.5\n537.8\n743.0\n13,837.7\nNov\n30.6\n \n84.6\n \n3,696.3\n \n300.6\n \n209.8\n \n63.9\n3,172.9\n28.9\n45.2\n68.7\n7.0\n8.1\n217.7\n3,813.2\n141.9\n633.2\n581.9\n742.4\n13,846.8\nDec\n20.5\n \n94.5\n \n3,949.5\n \n439.6\n \n235.5\n \n74.8\n3,044.1\n28.0\n43.4\n69.2\n6.2\n9.2\n204.3\n3,870.5\n151.2\n573.8\n612.5\n812.4\n14,239.0\n2019\nJan\n49.0\n \n113.4\n \n3,901.0\n \n401.9\n \n261.6\n \n46.1\n3,038.3\n27.3\n94.6\n68.7\n4.4\n8.1\n189.2\n3,773.5\n109.1\n517.2\n592.3\n827.7\n14,023.5\nFeb\n59.7\n \n256.8\n \n3,764.8\n \n357.1\n \n570.4\n \n205.7\n3,076.4\n26.5\n60.5\n2.0\n5.8\n7.7\n208.3\n3,991.5\n100.5\n490.7\n669.1\n880.0\n14,733.6\nMar\n62.5\n \n263.2\n \n3,891.0\n \n432.9\n \n739.3\n \n55.1\n3,028.8\n25.5\n61.5\n4.5\n4.3\n9.5\n340.7\n3,845.0\n129.0\n523.7\n954.5\n1,205.2\n15,576.2\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2019\nNotes\n1.Government securities includes treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households, other financial corporations.\nPublic \nEnterprises\nTABLE 4.1: OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS -ASSETS\nZWL$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \n \n17 \n \n \nDebt Securities Foreign Liabilities\nCapital\nContigent\nOther\nTOTAL\nand\nLiablities\nLiablities\nEnd of\nDemand\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nReserves\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\n2017\n Mar\n3,429.2\n715.7\n1,529.9\n5,674.7\n461.0\n86.9\n6,222.6\n60.2\n249.6\n1.8\n134.9\n41.9\n1,426.8\n422.4\n435.7\n8,995.8\n Apr\n3,555.8\n813.7\n1,530.7\n5,900.2\n450.9\n76.2\n6,427.3\n63.3\n251.1\n0.0\n117.4\n41.9\n1,382.2\n489.1\n426.7\n9,199.0\n May\n3,593.7\n798.7\n1,558.4\n5,950.8\n454.6\n75.1\n6,480.5\n61.4\n243.5\n0.0\n95.2\n42.2\n1,448.6\n486.1\n450.1\n9,307.6\n Jun\n3,851.4\n825.6\n1,538.9\n6,215.9\n497.6\n73.7\n6,787.2\n65.7\n259.5\n0.0\n108.9\n46.6\n1,455.9\n533.5\n445.6\n9,702.8\n Jul\n3,845.0\n837.2\n1,600.1\n6,282.3\n503.0\n78.1\n6,863.3\n66.3\n162.2\n0.0\n99.5\n35.6\n1,463.2\n513.6\n450.7\n9,654.3\n Aug\n4,257.2\n927.5\n1,604.9\n6,789.6\n451.2\n88.3\n7,329.1\n71.1\n158.2\n0.0\n79.1\n22.8\n1,478.4\n531.8\n454.9\n10,125.5\n Sep\n4,622.2\n932.4\n1,571.4\n7,126.0\n383.4\n55.2\n7,564.6\n55.8\n151.1\n0.0\n67.4\n32.1\n1,494.5\n472.8\n465.2\n10,303.5\n Oct\n4,825.8\n1,010.8\n1,460.8\n7,297.4\n410.7\n43.1\n7,751.2\n63.0\n153.9\n0.0\n73.1\n42.0\n1,537.5\n432.4\n511.7\n10,564.9\n Nov\n5,090.7\n1,047.9\n1,450.2\n7,588.7\n454.9\n34.7\n8,078.3\n66.5\n151.3\n0.0\n84.5\n60.2\n1,562.7\n417.7\n534.3\n10,955.5\n Dec\n5,144.5\n1,127.4\n1,401.7\n7,673.6\n407.8\n94.6\n8,176.0\n68.6\n173.1\n113.7\n100.7\n6.2\n1,663.1\n508.3\n508.1\n11,317.7\n2018\nJan\n4,640.2\n1,008.1\n1,454.0\n7,102.2\n406.5\n107.3\n7,616.1\n65.1\n444.8\n115.1\n49.1\n2.6\n1,645.3\n501.0\n522.1\n10,961.1\nFeb\n4,633.7\n989.2\n1,458.8\n7,081.7\n418.7\n101.2\n7,601.7\n75.4\n435.4\n111.2\n92.8\n2.9\n1,620.1\n507.8\n511.0\n10,958.3\nMar\n4,732.9\n1,007.5\n1,491.0\n7,231.4\n365.0\n114.7\n7,711.0\n77.3\n460.8\n140.5\n89.2\n6.9\n1,654.7\n504.1\n523.4\n11,168.1\nApr\n4,907.7\n1,066.6\n1,374.6\n7,349.0\n387.8\n95.6\n7,832.3\n84.0\n453.1\n82.4\n68.8\n16.1\n1,641.9\n532.0\n567.0\n11,277.5\nMay\n5,172.9\n1,138.2\n1,442.5\n7,753.6\n442.8\n107.4\n8,303.8\n88.0\n554.0\n101.5\n94.9\n19.9\n1,671.5\n458.9\n526.5\n11,819.1\nJune\n5,650.6\n1,274.7\n1,459.1\n8,384.4\n438.0\n89.2\n8,911.6\n66.8\n554.0\n119.8\n173.4\n21.6\n1,707.5\n551.4\n565.7\n12,671.8\nJuly\n5,902.3\n1,415.3\n1,501.5\n8,819.1\n424.4\n33.1\n9,276.7\n89.5\n545.1\n118.9\n132.9\n32.6\n1,846.0\n611.4\n623.4\n13,276.5\nAug\n6,005.7\n1,362.6\n1,524.2\n8,892.5\n399.6\n32.4\n9,324.5\n66.5\n535.4\n137.0\n119.5\n33.3\n1,882.9\n647.7\n611.2\n13,358.0\nSep\n6,281.7\n1,421.8\n1,489.0\n9,192.4\n439.0\n44.6\n9,676.1\n52.4\n559.4\n142.2\n129.1\n46.6\n1,913.4\n637.4\n629.7\n13,786.4\nOct\n6,345.7\n1,390.0\n1,427.8\n9,163.5\n435.2\n52.2\n9,650.8\n61.7\n581.4\n147.6\n93.4\n42.0\n1,957.6\n647.5\n655.7\n13,837.7\nNov\n6,419.8\n1,329.4\n1,430.4\n9,179.6\n366.8\n48.7\n9,595.1\n50.9\n543.1\n213.7\n74.8\n42.3\n1,991.6\n633.2\n702.1\n13,846.8\nDec\n6,601.1\n1,322.2\n1,508.9\n9,432.2\n394.5\n41.3\n9,868.0\n58.6\n524.7\n229.6\n187.8\n39.0\n2,057.7\n573.8\n699.7\n14,239.0\n2019\nJan\n6,626.6\n1,155.9\n1,466.8\n9,249.4\n381.0\n42.2\n9,672.5\n59.3\n530.5\n239.5\n188.3\n39.2\n2,047.0\n517.2\n729.8\n14,023.5\nFeb\n7,168.7\n1,155.1\n1,473.2\n9,797.1\n387.8\n44.5\n10,229.3\n71.8\n782.0\n158.9\n151.7\n42.6\n2,145.1\n490.7\n661.5\n14,733.6\nMar\n7,435.2\n1,127.0\n1,437.1\n9,999.2\n372.7\n47.9\n10,419.9\n74.5\n933.8\n165.8\n140.9\n42.7\n2,349.0\n523.7\n925.8\n15,576.2\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2019\nTABLE 4.2 : OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS - LIABILITIES \nDeposits\nAmounts Owing to\nZWL$ millions\n \n \n \n18 \n \n \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nForeign\nBond\nNotes\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \nLocal\nPublic\nOther \nContigent \nNon Financial \n Notes &\n&\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment\n1\nLocal Governemt\nPublic Enterprises\nOther\n2\nGovernment\nGovernment\nEnterprises\n Institutional Units\n3\nOther claims\nAssets\nOther Assets\nAssets\nCoins\nCoin\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\n2017\nJan\n17.7\n \n103.8\n \n1,322.4\n \n81.9\n \n128.2\n \n27.0\n \n1,485.0\n \n-\n \n15.4\n \n3.6\n \n15.9\n \n15.1\n \n68.6\n \n2,467.7\n \n53.9\n \n395.7\n \n251.9\n \n479.3\n \n6,933.1\n \nFeb\n16.3\n \n89.4\n \n1,396.1\n \n96.1\n \n137.3\n \n48.6\n \n1,502.5\n \n-\n \n15.5\n \n3.2\n \n15.0\n \n14.9\n \n68.2\n \n2,238.9\n \n239.7\n \n398.5\n \n266.0\n \n480.1\n \n7,026.4\n \nMar\n10.7\n \n63.3\n \n1,421.4\n \n83.2\n \n150.7\n \n53.5\n \n1,578.7\n \n-\n \n15.7\n \n3.8\n \n15.7\n \n15.7\n \n69.9\n \n2,554.3\n \n23.7\n \n422.4\n \n314.5\n \n484.0\n \n7,281.0\n \nApr\n9.8\n \n64.1\n \n1,383.4\n \n75.9\n \n209.0\n \n51.4\n \n1,744.4\n \n-\n \n15.8\n \n3.6\n \n15.8\n \n16.9\n \n74.0\n \n2,493.3\n \n26.4\n \n489.1\n \n263.7\n \n492.6\n \n7,429.3\n \nMay\n12.4\n \n52.6\n \n1,376.3\n \n119.9\n \n159.1\n \n75.3\n \n1,739.8\n \n-\n \n15.7\n \n33.6\n \n16.7\n \n16.3\n \n72.4\n \n2,528.3\n \n28.4\n \n486.1\n \n290.7\n \n492.0\n \n7,515.6\n \nJun\n7.0\n \n53.3\n \n1,578.5\n \n141.4\n \n82.2\n \n110.6\n \n1,786.8\n \n-\n \n16.0\n \n35.0\n \n47.9\n \n16.5\n \n82.2\n \n2,583.5\n \n23.9\n \n533.5\n \n273.6\n \n497.3\n \n7,869.2\n \nJul\n6.7\n \n40.9\n \n1,684.5\n \n137.6\n \n53.7\n \n103.6\n \n1,752.4\n \n-\n \n26.1\n \n34.4\n \n45.2\n \n16.9\n \n116.3\n \n2,495.4\n \n24.2\n \n513.6\n \n295.5\n \n482.1\n \n7,829.0\n \nAug\n11.8\n \n37.1\n \n1,882.4\n \n124.3\n \n161.2\n \n7.9\n \n1,856.2\n \n-\n \n26.3\n \n64.6\n \n41.3\n \n18.0\n \n145.0\n \n2,538.1\n \n23.8\n \n531.8\n \n272.6\n \n485.7\n \n8,228.1\n \nSep\n11.4\n \n35.8\n \n1,961.8\n \n109.6\n \n172.7\n \n31.3\n \n1,998.0\n \n-\n \n23.5\n \n65.0\n \n41.5\n \n15.6\n \n118.2\n \n2,585.7\n \n28.3\n \n472.8\n \n281.3\n \n487.7\n \n8,440.0\n \nOct\n8.1\n \n40.5\n \n1,961.8\n \n143.7\n \n175.7\n \n61.0\n \n2,106.6\n \n-\n \n24.4\n \n65.1\n \n34.8\n \n17.8\n \n99.1\n \n2,607.0\n \n29.4\n \n432.4\n \n287.8\n \n508.9\n \n8,604.1\n \nNov\n9.0\n \n45.1\n \n2,126.7\n \n161.1\n \n174.7\n \n74.3\n \n2,230.4\n \n-\n \n23.5\n \n65.4\n \n32.3\n \n19.6\n \n106.9\n \n2,618.1\n \n26.4\n \n417.7\n \n324.2\n \n511.4\n \n8,966.9\n \nDec\n11.4\n \n55.3\n \n2,373.9\n \n141.5\n \n203.5\n \n66.6\n \n2,128.7\n \n-\n \n23.5\n \n66.3\n \n29.4\n \n19.4\n \n145.0\n \n2,579.8\n \n40.0\n \n508.3\n \n324.5\n \n536.4\n \n9,253.6\n \n2018\nJan\n22.4\n \n64.1\n \n2,294.5\n \n192.1\n \n103.4\n \n81.9\n \n2,143.2\n \n-\n \n23.5\n \n65.9\n \n26.3\n \n20.6\n \n154.8\n \n2,451.1\n \n28.7\n \n501.0\n \n294.2\n \n538.9\n \n9,006.6\n \nFeb\n18.3\n \n44.0\n \n2,296.8\n \n223.7\n \n108.3\n \n96.2\n \n2,109.3\n \n-\n \n23.5\n \n66.1\n \n24.3\n \n21.1\n \n145.0\n \n2,461.5\n \n28.7\n \n507.8\n \n290.6\n \n536.3\n \n9,001.5\n \nMar\n14.8\n \n53.6\n \n2,238.8\n \n240.7\n \n124.5\n \n99.5\n \n2,164.0\n \n-\n \n23.5\n \n66.7\n \n19.2\n \n15.9\n \n127.1\n \n2,535.8\n \n30.4\n \n504.1\n \n325.8\n \n552.3\n \n9,136.6\n \nApr\n13.5\n \n56.7\n \n2,207.9\n \n275.0\n \n116.7\n \n78.5\n \n2,314.9\n \n-\n \n24.7\n \n67.0\n \n13.4\n \n20.9\n \n120.8\n \n2,519.8\n \n28.3\n \n532.0\n \n299.0\n \n554.9\n \n9,244.0\n \nMay\n12.9\n \n62.8\n \n2,309.0\n \n339.5\n \n130.1\n \n85.7\n \n2,562.4\n \n-\n \n25.0\n \n66.9\n \n8.4\n \n20.9\n \n134.0\n \n2,556.2\n \n23.9\n \n458.9\n \n307.9\n \n555.3\n \n9,659.8\n \nJune\n7.5\n \n52.6\n \n2,848.5\n \n331.8\n \n117.3\n \n84.1\n \n2,538.3\n \n-\n \n26.2\n \n66.5\n \n7.4\n \n19.4\n \n196.0\n \n2,662.2\n \n25.5\n \n551.4\n \n302.9\n \n563.4\n \n10,401.0\n \nJuly\n17.9\n \n54.3\n \n3,189.6\n \n281.1\n \n109.3\n \n95.4\n \n2,949.2\n \n-\n \n-\n \n67.5\n \n4.5\n \n21.0\n \n182.0\n \n2,414.6\n \n26.0\n \n611.4\n \n322.5\n \n565.1\n \n10,911.4\n \nAug\n21.0\n \n67.8\n \n3,196.7\n \n232.3\n \n102.5\n \n66.3\n \n3,014.9\n \n-\n \n-\n \n67.3\n \n7.1\n \n20.6\n \n186.7\n \n2,491.0\n \n29.8\n \n647.7\n \n329.4\n \n566.3\n \n11,047.4\n \nSep\n16.3\n \n58.2\n \n3,487.9\n \n305.3\n \n137.8\n \n78.0\n \n2,789.8\n \n-\n \n45.2\n \n68.1\n \n5.4\n \n20.4\n \n212.2\n \n2,577.1\n \n36.7\n \n637.4\n \n357.4\n \n571.8\n \n11,405.0\n \nOct\n33.1\n \n68.0\n \n3,505.8\n \n272.1\n \n173.1\n \n51.4\n \n2,728.8\n \n-\n \n45.2\n \n68.4\n \n4.6\n \n9.4\n \n188.8\n \n2,697.4\n \n38.7\n \n647.5\n \n353.2\n \n569.2\n \n11,454.9\n \nNov\n25.8\n \n81.4\n \n3,384.4\n \n264.6\n \n198.2\n \n63.9\n \n2,793.9\n \n-\n \n45.2\n \n68.7\n \n7.0\n \n8.1\n \n217.7\n \n2,672.3\n \n46.1\n \n633.2\n \n406.6\n \n569.8\n \n11,486.9\n \nDec\n18.2\n \n89.9\n \n3,737.0\n \n317.3\n \n224.4\n \n74.8\n \n2,633.7\n \n-\n \n43.4\n \n69.2\n \n6.2\n \n9.2\n \n204.3\n \n2,707.6\n \n53.7\n \n573.8\n \n406.2\n \n633.9\n \n11,802.7\n \n2019\nJan\n42.05\n \n106.91\n \n3,766.70\n \n338.09\n \n249.77\n \n46.14\n \n2,621.20\n \n-\n \n61.02\n \n68.66\n \n4.41\n \n8.06\n \n189.15\n \n2,594.53\n \n33.84\n \n517.24\n \n428.82\n \n649.94\n \n11,726.5\n \nFeb\n52.63\n \n238.67\n \n3,601.94\n \n293.36\n \n549.59\n \n205.65\n \n2,675.29\n \n-\n \n60.52\n \n2.00\n \n5.84\n \n7.71\n \n208.31\n \n2,784.17\n \n31.04\n \n490.74\n \n472.78\n \n696.82\n \n12,377.1\n \nMar\n59.17\n \n244.62\n \n3,729.81\n \n393.22\n \n712.08\n \n55.05\n \n2,635.68\n \n-\n \n61.52\n \n4.53\n \n4.27\n \n9.53\n \n340.66\n \n2,660.90\n \n25.33\n \n523.72\n \n755.57\n \n971.53\n \n13,187.2\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2019\nNotes\n1.Government securities include treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households, other financial corporations, \nTABLE 5.1: COMMERCIAL BANKS -ASSETS\nZWL$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \n \n19 \n \n \nZWL$ millions\nEnd of\nDemand\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nDebt Securities Foreign Liabilities\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nCapital\nContigent\nOther\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\nand\nLiablities\nLiablities\nTOTAL\nReserves\n2017\n Jan\n3,205.0\n317.1\n981.8\n4,503.9\n348.3\n30.4\n4,882.6\n36.9\n242.1\n0.0\n38.0\n40.4\n1,005.1\n395.7\n292.2\n6,933.1\n Feb\n3,267.0\n318.3\n977.1\n4,562.4\n349.8\n32.6\n4,944.9\n47.5\n243.9\n0.0\n63.7\n42.9\n1,007.7\n398.5\n277.4\n7,026.4\n Mar\n3,370.3\n313.3\n965.3\n4,648.9\n390.8\n64.2\n5,103.9\n50.6\n225.6\n1.8\n66.3\n41.5\n1,061.6\n422.4\n307.3\n7,281.0\n Apr\n3,496.9\n328.5\n960.8\n4,786.1\n380.3\n54.3\n5,220.7\n52.8\n228.3\n0.0\n63.3\n41.7\n1,034.4\n489.1\n299.0\n7,429.3\n May\n3,534.8\n331.2\n979.7\n4,845.7\n384.0\n53.4\n5,283.1\n50.8\n220.4\n0.0\n29.0\n41.9\n1,092.7\n486.1\n311.6\n7,515.6\n Jun\n3,792.5\n332.7\n949.8\n5,075.1\n423.9\n51.7\n5,550.7\n54.9\n237.5\n0.0\n43.7\n45.8\n1,095.2\n533.5\n308.0\n7,869.2\n Jul\n3,786.1\n326.0\n1,021.7\n5,133.8\n432.5\n56.2\n5,622.6\n55.3\n140.0\n0.0\n42.2\n35.3\n1,096.8\n513.6\n323.2\n7,829.0\n Aug\n4,198.3\n342.7\n1,010.3\n5,551.4\n380.7\n66.3\n5,998.3\n58.3\n136.9\n0.0\n41.8\n22.5\n1,116.1\n531.8\n322.4\n8,228.1\n Sep\n4,561.7\n355.5\n1,003.7\n5,921.0\n303.1\n32.7\n6,256.8\n42.3\n133.7\n0.0\n50.4\n31.9\n1,129.8\n472.8\n322.3\n8,440.0\n Oct\n4,771.6\n340.7\n927.8\n6,040.2\n329.8\n21.1\n6,391.1\n50.8\n127.5\n0.0\n52.5\n41.7\n1,167.6\n432.4\n340.5\n8,604.1\n Nov\n5,036.5\n380.1\n918.9\n6,335.5\n349.5\n12.7\n6,697.6\n54.0\n124.7\n0.0\n61.8\n59.9\n1,189.6\n417.7\n361.6\n8,966.9\n Dec\n5,143.9\n409.2\n850.3\n6,403.4\n302.6\n72.1\n6,778.1\n56.5\n147.2\n113.7\n78.0\n5.7\n1,205.7\n508.3\n360.4\n9,253.6\n2018\nJan\n4,640.2\n369.3\n903.3\n5,912.7\n301.3\n85.0\n6,299.0\n53.6\n418.7\n115.1\n26.2\n2.4\n1,205.0\n501.0\n385.6\n9,006.6\nFeb\n4,633.7\n375.8\n920.2\n5,929.7\n298.5\n78.6\n6,306.8\n58.1\n409.1\n111.2\n59.1\n2.4\n1,174.8\n507.8\n372.1\n9,001.5\nMar\n4,732.9\n368.8\n930.7\n6,032.4\n244.7\n92.4\n6,369.5\n61.1\n419.5\n140.5\n54.8\n6.4\n1,196.4\n504.1\n384.3\n9,136.6\nApr\n4,907.7\n394.4\n874.8\n6,176.9\n243.4\n72.8\n6,493.1\n67.4\n413.5\n82.4\n35.2\n15.7\n1,201.5\n532.0\n403.4\n9,244.0\nMay\n5,172.9\n416.2\n917.2\n6,506.3\n246.2\n85.2\n6,837.7\n66.8\n514.1\n101.5\n63.7\n19.4\n1,224.6\n458.9\n373.2\n9,659.8\nJun\n5,650.6\n504.3\n897.4\n7,052.2\n254.8\n66.9\n7,373.9\n45.0\n514.7\n119.8\n116.5\n21.1\n1,259.1\n551.4\n399.5\n10,401.0\nJul\n5,902.3\n527.0\n901.0\n7,330.3\n296.0\n12.2\n7,638.4\n72.0\n507.6\n118.9\n102.5\n16.8\n1,380.1\n611.4\n463.6\n10,911.4\nAug\n6,005.7\n540.8\n930.8\n7,477.3\n266.6\n11.5\n7,755.3\n46.4\n501.5\n137.0\n101.3\n15.4\n1,408.6\n647.7\n434.3\n11,047.4\nSep\n6,281.7\n556.4\n927.2\n7,765.3\n273.0\n23.5\n8,061.8\n40.9\n503.5\n142.2\n108.4\n21.1\n1,434.8\n637.4\n454.9\n11,405.0\nOct\n6,340.3\n509.5\n898.1\n7,747.9\n284.2\n31.1\n8,063.2\n49.3\n525.1\n147.6\n72.2\n16.5\n1,461.0\n647.5\n472.6\n11,454.9\nNov\n6,411.0\n503.9\n861.0\n7,775.9\n232.8\n27.6\n8,036.4\n41.2\n487.5\n213.7\n58.6\n17.8\n1,490.0\n633.2\n508.4\n11,486.9\nDec\n6,582.3\n495.0\n910.9\n7,988.3\n255.0\n19.7\n8,262.9\n43.3\n469.5\n229.6\n147.5\n15.6\n1,551.3\n573.8\n509.2\n11,802.7\n2019\nJan\n6,603.6\n440.8\n919.5\n7,964.0\n240.5\n20.5\n8,225.0\n42.6\n475.0\n239.5\n130.2\n14.4\n1,545.2\n517.2\n537.2\n11,726.5\nFeb\n7,129.0\n426.7\n923.8\n8,479.6\n248.9\n22.8\n8,751.4\n57.3\n647.5\n158.9\n119.1\n14.4\n1,626.6\n490.7\n511.1\n12,377.0\nMar\n7,350.5\n451.8\n915.0\n8,717.3\n225.9\n26.4\n8,969.6\n56.8\n778.3\n165.8\n108.4\n17.0\n1,804.3\n523.7\n763.2\n13,187.2\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2019\nTABLE 5.2 : COMMERCIAL BANKS - LIABILITIES\nDeposits\nAmounts Owing to\n \n \n \n20 \n \nForeign\nOther Assets\nNon Financial \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nNotes\nAssets\nBond\n&\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \n Notes &\nCoin\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment1\nLocal Governemt\nPublic Enterprises\nOther2\nMortgages\nGovernment\nOther\nCoins\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\n2017\nJan\n2.4\n \n7.0\n \n109.6\n \n157.7\n \n4.3\n \n-\n \n123.7\n \n20.8\n \n-\n \n-\n \n389.1\n \n-\n \n406.1\n \n106.3\n \n124.4\n \n1,451.4\n \nFeb\n1.2\n \n7.3\n \n69.3\n \n155.6\n \n7.4\n \n-\n \n162.0\n \n20.1\n \n-\n \n-\n \n394.4\n \n-\n \n410.1\n \n109.0\n \n124.2\n \n1,460.4\n \nMar\n1.6\n \n3.1\n \n35.5\n \n177.2\n \n4.0\n \n-\n \n164.2\n \n18.7\n \n-\n \n-\n \n404.4\n \n-\n \n413.0\n \n102.8\n \n124.2\n \n1,448.6\n \nApr\n0.7\n \n3.6\n \n73.4\n \n173.3\n \n9.8\n \n-\n \n158.6\n \n17.8\n \n-\n \n-\n \n392.5\n \n-\n \n432.3\n \n109.7\n \n125.1\n \n1,496.8\n \nMay\n0.9\n \n3.9\n \n81.5\n \n152.3\n \n10.8\n \n-\n \n168.2\n \n20.3\n \n-\n \n-\n \n394.4\n \n-\n \n451.1\n \n105.9\n \n126.1\n \n1,515.4\n \nJun\n0.3\n \n3.7\n \n65.9\n \n208.8\n \n9.8\n \n-\n \n165.3\n \n19.0\n \n-\n \n-\n \n387.6\n \n-\n \n452.9\n \n109.6\n \n126.0\n \n1,548.8\n \nJul\n0.4\n \n3.9\n \n105.8\n \n164.6\n \n9.2\n \n-\n \n168.4\n \n17.2\n \n-\n \n-\n \n391.9\n \n-\n \n451.9\n \n110.9\n \n127.3\n \n1,551.5\n \nAug\n0.4\n \n3.1\n \n142.8\n \n152.0\n \n3.9\n \n-\n \n186.7\n \n16.3\n \n-\n \n-\n \n409.3\n \n-\n \n465.5\n \n104.7\n \n127.2\n \n1,611.9\n \nSep\n0.6\n \n1.8\n \n108.4\n \n117.0\n \n6.7\n \n-\n \n193.0\n \n16.1\n \n-\n \n-\n \n412.7\n \n-\n \n475.2\n \n113.4\n \n130.1\n \n1,574.8\n \nOct\n0.6\n \n1.1\n \n145.7\n \n110.0\n \n14.8\n \n-\n \n193.9\n \n15.4\n \n-\n \n-\n \n420.7\n \n-\n \n493.6\n \n149.9\n \n130.4\n \n1,676.0\n \nNov\n0.7\n \n0.9\n \n138.8\n \n128.4\n \n8.7\n \n-\n \n193.6\n \n18.8\n \n-\n \n-\n \n420.9\n \n-\n \n489.0\n \n160.4\n \n133.0\n \n1,693.3\n \nDec\n1.0\n \n2.6\n \n170.6\n \n134.3\n \n9.1\n \n-\n \n195.1\n \n26.8\n \n-\n \n-\n \n402.3\n \n-\n \n516.8\n \n163.2\n \n135.5\n \n1,757.3\n \n2018\nJan\n0.9\n \n2.3\n \n197.4\n \n98.7\n \n7.8\n \n-\n \n129.8\n \n34.5\n \n-\n \n-\n \n413.2\n \n-\n \n508.7\n \n144.9\n \n136.1\n \n1,674.3\n \nFeb\n1.5\n \n1.8\n \n172.4\n \n123.5\n \n5.5\n \n-\n \n141.3\n \n33.5\n \n-\n \n-\n \n414.8\n \n-\n \n507.9\n \n125.7\n \n135.7\n \n1,663.6\n \nMar\n1.4\n \n3.4\n \n175.9\n \n72.1\n \n14.1\n \n-\n \n212.6\n \n32.8\n \n-\n \n-\n \n411.4\n \n-\n \n539.4\n \n142.8\n \n132.3\n \n1,738.2\n \nApr\n1.1\n \n4.3\n \n185.5\n \n61.9\n \n3.6\n \n-\n \n184.4\n \n32.0\n \n-\n \n-\n \n413.3\n \n-\n \n582.7\n \n141.6\n \n135.2\n \n1,745.7\n \nMay\n1.0\n \n7.6\n \n196.3\n \n138.2\n \n8.1\n \n-\n \n191.0\n \n30.9\n \n-\n \n-\n \n415.0\n \n-\n \n608.4\n \n128.1\n \n137.4\n \n1,862.0\n \nJune\n1.2\n \n4.9\n \n188.6\n \n177.8\n \n1.9\n \n-\n \n266.2\n \n30.1\n \n-\n \n-\n \n413.9\n \n-\n \n614.3\n \n124.0\n \n141.5\n \n1,964.5\n \nJuly\n1.8\n \n6.6\n \n207.1\n \n185.1\n \n1.7\n \n-\n \n283.2\n \n33.3\n \n-\n \n-\n \n423.5\n \n-\n \n636.1\n \n128.2\n \n141.1\n \n2,047.7\n \nAug\n1.6\n \n3.7\n \n224.7\n \n145.3\n \n2.4\n \n-\n \n288.9\n \n32.2\n \n-\n \n-\n \n428.2\n \n-\n \n579.4\n \n139.1\n \n143.7\n \n1,989.2\n \nSep\n1.9\n \n2.9\n \n245.6\n \n92.6\n \n20.8\n \n-\n \n291.1\n \n31.2\n \n-\n \n-\n \n430.3\n \n-\n \n650.2\n \n148.1\n \n144.4\n \n2,059.1\n \nOct\n4.9\n \n2.1\n \n220.0\n \n95.8\n \n11.9\n \n-\n \n318.9\n \n30.2\n \n-\n \n-\n \n427.7\n \n-\n \n639.8\n \n154.2\n \n147.0\n \n2,052.5\n \nNov\n3.6\n \n2.9\n \n243.3\n \n35.7\n \n10.4\n \n-\n \n320.7\n \n28.9\n \n-\n \n-\n \n433.5\n \n-\n \n635.7\n \n148.0\n \n145.8\n \n2,008.5\n \nDec\n2.3\n \n4.3\n \n157.4\n \n121.3\n \n10.4\n \n-\n \n339.4\n \n28.0\n \n-\n \n-\n \n444.8\n \n-\n \n645.9\n \n179.7\n \n151.9\n \n2,085.6\n \n2019\nJan\n6.3\n \n4.6\n108.2\n \n63.5\n10.9\n \n-\n \n343.8\n \n27.3\n33.6\n \n-\n \n438.0\n \n-\n \n649.3\n \n136.7\n151.2\n \n1,973.3\n \nFeb\n5.4\n \n17.6\n120.6\n \n62.8\n18.1\n \n-\n \n339.6\n \n26.5\n-\n \n-\n \n416.1\n \n-\n \n696.1\n \n171.1\n156.7\n \n2,030.8\n \nMar\n2.6\n \n18.0\n126.3\n \n38.6\n23.9\n \n-\n \n331.7\n \n25.5\n-\n \n-\n \n415.1\n \n-\n \n710.1\n \n172.1\n207.4\n \n2,071.2\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2019\nNotes\n1.Government securities include treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households, other financial corporations, \nTABLE 6.1: BUILDING SOCIETIES -ASSETS\nZWL$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \n \n21 \n \n \n \nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nCapital\nOther\nTOTAL\nand\nLiablities\nEnd of\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nReserves\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\n2017\n Jan\n326.2\n522.1\n848.2\n81.5\n16.6\n946.4\n25.0\n29.1\n0.0\n66.5\n0.7\n332.1\n51.7\n1,451.4\n Feb\n326.1\n534.4\n860.5\n76.2\n16.6\n953.3\n23.1\n27.0\n0.0\n62.4\n0.5\n334.5\n59.7\n1,460.4\n Mar\n319.7\n523.2\n842.9\n70.2\n16.7\n929.9\n20.9\n24.0\n0.0\n68.5\n0.3\n340.7\n64.3\n1,448.6\n Apr\n399.6\n527.1\n926.6\n70.6\n16.0\n1,013.2\n21.8\n22.8\n0.0\n54.0\n0.2\n322.5\n62.3\n1,496.8\n May\n378.0\n536.0\n914.0\n70.7\n16.1\n1,000.8\n21.8\n23.0\n0.0\n66.2\n0.4\n325.8\n77.4\n1,515.4\n Jun\n401.8\n544.4\n946.2\n70.7\n16.5\n1,033.4\n22.0\n22.0\n0.0\n65.2\n0.8\n330.0\n75.4\n1,548.8\n Jul\n430.3\n531.5\n961.8\n70.4\n16.1\n1,048.3\n22.2\n22.2\n0.0\n57.3\n0.3\n334.5\n66.8\n1,551.5\n Aug\n495.3\n546.5\n1,041.8\n70.6\n16.3\n1,128.6\n24.0\n21.3\n0.0\n37.4\n0.4\n328.9\n71.4\n1,611.9\n Sep\n488.5\n517.9\n1,006.5\n80.3\n16.7\n1,103.4\n24.8\n17.4\n0.0\n17.0\n0.2\n334.0\n78.0\n1,574.8\n Oct\n583.1\n475.2\n1,058.3\n80.9\n16.2\n1,155.4\n23.4\n26.4\n0.0\n20.6\n0.3\n338.0\n111.8\n1,676.0\n Nov\n570.3\n473.5\n1,043.8\n105.4\n16.3\n1,165.4\n23.7\n26.6\n0.0\n22.7\n0.3\n341.5\n113.0\n1,693.3\n Dec\n608.2\n496.6\n1,104.9\n105.2\n16.5\n1,226.6\n23.4\n25.9\n0.0\n22.7\n0.5\n371.7\n86.7\n1,757.3\n2018\nJan\n544.7\n497.1\n1,041.7\n105.2\n16.4\n1,163.3\n22.8\n26.1\n0.0\n22.9\n0.2\n362.1\n77.0\n1,674.3\nFeb\n512.0\n480.5\n992.5\n120.3\n16.8\n1,129.5\n28.5\n26.3\n0.0\n33.6\n0.5\n366.0\n79.2\n1,663.6\nMar\n535.1\n507.8\n1,042.9\n120.3\n16.5\n1,179.7\n27.5\n41.3\n0.0\n34.5\n0.5\n378.2\n76.5\n1,738.2\nApr\n568.0\n452.6\n1,020.5\n144.4\n17.0\n1,181.9\n27.9\n39.7\n0.0\n33.6\n0.4\n358.5\n103.7\n1,745.7\nMay\n613.8\n475.1\n1,089.0\n196.6\n16.4\n1,302.0\n32.4\n40.0\n0.0\n31.2\n0.5\n363.1\n92.8\n1,862.0\nJune\n658.5\n507.9\n1,166.5\n183.2\n16.4\n1,366.0\n33.1\n39.3\n0.0\n56.9\n0.4\n363.5\n105.2\n1,964.5\nJuly\n770.2\n542.9\n1,313.1\n128.5\n15.0\n1,456.6\n28.7\n37.5\n0.0\n30.4\n15.8\n378.9\n99.8\n2,047.7\nAug\n703.4\n534.7\n1,238.0\n133.0\n15.0\n1,386.0\n31.3\n33.9\n0.0\n18.3\n17.9\n385.8\n116.0\n1,989.2\nSep\n749.8\n502.3\n1,252.2\n166.0\n15.1\n1,433.2\n22.8\n55.9\n0.0\n20.7\n25.5\n388.6\n112.3\n2,059.1\nOct\n772.5\n471.9\n1,244.4\n151.0\n15.1\n1,410.5\n23.7\n56.3\n0.0\n21.2\n25.5\n389.9\n125.4\n2,052.5\nNov\n699.9\n511.9\n1,211.9\n134.0\n15.1\n1,360.9\n21.0\n55.6\n0.0\n16.2\n24.5\n396.1\n134.2\n2,008.5\nDec\n713.2\n540.0\n1,253.1\n139.6\n15.1\n1,407.8\n26.5\n55.3\n0.0\n40.2\n23.4\n400.1\n132.3\n2,085.6\n2019\nJan\n633.8\n490.2\n1,124.0\n140.5\n15.0\n1,279.6\n27.9\n55.5\n0.0\n58.1\n24.8\n392.8\n134.7\n1,973.3\nFeb\n661.3\n492.3\n1,153.6\n138.8\n15.0\n1,307.4\n25.8\n134.5\n0.0\n32.6\n28.2\n366.7\n135.6\n2,030.8\nMar\n655.2\n473.9\n1,129.1\n146.8\n15.0\n1,290.9\n29.0\n155.6\n0.0\n32.5\n25.7\n391.4\n146.2\n2,071.2\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2019\nAmounts Owing to\nTABLE 6.2: BUILDING SOCIETIES -LIABILITIES\nZWL$ millions\n \n \n \n22 \n \n \n \nAGRICULTURE\nCONSTRUCTION COMMUNICATION\nDISTRIBUTION\nFINANCIAL &\nFINANCIAL\nMANUFACTURING\nMINING\nSERVICES\nTRANSPORT\nINDIVIDUALS\nCONGLOMERATES\nTOTAL\nEND OF\n \n \n \nINVESTMENTS\nORGANISATIONS\n \n \n \n \n2017\nJan\n448,344.7\n41,732.8\n22,069.3\n264,734.2\n12,019.3\n270,117.2\n350,757.1\n144,447.3\n394,945.0\n40,975.0\n591,245.7\n11,489.3\n2,592,877.1\nFeb\n436,206.2\n40,112.3\n24,467.5\n269,358.3\n12,146.8\n272,314.8\n361,416.8\n143,990.4\n373,445.1\n40,250.7\n568,686.3\n11,227.9\n2,553,623.0\nMar\n425,496.8\n54,688.4\n25,533.4\n275,500.1\n12,241.8\n290,985.3\n349,722.5\n159,101.0\n359,672.5\n37,864.1\n572,233.3\n13,047.7\n2,576,086.9\nApr\n426,696.6\n43,836.6\n18,145.2\n340,025.3\n12,219.1\n271,824.0\n360,945.8\n134,101.0\n350,475.1\n42,208.4\n571,000.5\n12,492.9\n2,583,970.5\nMay\n428,874.0\n43,427.0\n16,689.0\n322,695.4\n12,252.6\n269,976.3\n360,929.9\n117,479.9\n354,102.7\n41,337.5\n569,798.9\n11,923.7\n2,549,487.0\nJun\n431,677.5\n45,018.0\n16,989.2\n311,641.4\n14,435.6\n266,917.5\n343,590.2\n126,542.8\n417,469.8\n37,849.5\n595,749.5\n12,001.6\n2,619,882.5\nJul\n459,128.0\n52,500.1\n11,717.0\n255,319.0\n14,541.0\n255,591.2\n311,364.4\n131,420.5\n422,799.8\n39,630.7\n609,112.5\n14,464.3\n2,577,588.5\nAug\n457,861.9\n52,622.6\n11,736.0\n262,602.7\n17,438.9\n256,802.3\n313,868.5\n138,714.9\n420,653.6\n41,089.3\n617,686.4\n15,194.2\n2,606,271.3\nSep\n457,157.2\n48,477.1\n12,117.9\n340,506.4\n21,660.1\n265,082.3\n331,929.6\n124,822.8\n393,491.3\n41,117.0\n619,867.0\n16,061.2\n2,672,289.8\nOct\n460,475.1\n46,588.0\n12,273.6\n329,020.8\n21,810.6\n262,118.2\n317,587.0\n126,041.6\n383,374.3\n41,351.4\n634,561.2\n16,061.2\n2,651,263.1\nNov\n477,486.1\n46,318.3\n12,005.2\n323,990.0\n21,811.0\n261,421.1\n316,225.5\n123,307.2\n379,542.7\n32,215.3\n649,034.3\n16,061.2\n2,659,418.0\nDec\n489,695.6\n54,162.9\n10,119.0\n334,030.3\n21,844.6\n269,399.3\n307,802.0\n126,719.0\n375,161.7\n31,701.6\n621,421.9\n13,938.1\n2,655,996.0\n2018\nJan\n479,109.6\n59,336.8\n9,442.4\n289,531.3\n20,569.7\n258,035.0\n271,453.8\n106,425.1\n390,052.9\n32,328.6\n617,303.0\n14,394.7\n2,547,982.8\nFeb\n488,203.1\n59.,977.6\n9,271.6\n315,569.6\n20,133.1\n258,263.6\n285,045.1\n108,649.0\n393,604.9\n31,636.6\n618,377.4\n15,010.6\n2,543,764.6\nMar\n484,764.7\n64,826.5\n11,050.5\n344,731.3\n15,203.3\n274,150.2\n303,649.2\n114,431.9\n363,449.4\n32,793.4\n640,496.9\n19,893.1\n2,669,440.4\nApr\n485,790.0\n63,948.2\n10,904.2\n344,532.1\n15,015.2\n271,071.8\n294,270.8\n112,692.1\n333,633.8\n31,103.5\n631,920.5\n22,066.0\n2,616,948.2\nMay\n501,783.7\n63,555.3\n10,933.5\n362,939.6\n15,079.8\n358,553.4\n317,666.7\n117,123.0\n338,846.3\n31,523.1\n651,444.0\n24,226.4\n2,793,674.8\nJun\n475,105.7\n66,796.8\n13,907.7\n385,583.3\n15,079.8\n344,917.3\n323,212.1\n117,146.6\n335,216.9\n34,457.6\n655,427.0\n34,163.4\n2,801,014.3\nJul\n463,286.3\n70,905.2\n18,924.1\n383,314.7\n14,976.4\n140,624.6\n274,507.8\n113,776.3\n309,209.5\n37,474.0\n652,652.7\n34,402.1\n2,514,053.7\nAug\n470,756.1\n79,237.1\n15,167.3\n331,672.8\n15,021.9\n144,100.7\n271,000.5\n111,960.2\n306,022.7\n37,341.2\n666,649.4\n34,402.1\n2,483,332.1\nSep\n451,745.3\n79,055.7\n15,021.6\n341,851.7\n15,021.9\n144,799.6\n263,994.2\n112,656.6\n320,788.5\n36,914.6\n666,971.5\n64,407.1\n2,513,228.2\nOct\n453,068.3\n74,931.8\n16,036.5\n389,851.7\n15,156.8\n165,252.7\n268,933.2\n111,956.6\n313,376.8\n36,118.6\n680,445.7\n12,855.7\n2,537,984.3\nNov\n444,130.8\n133,137.6\n14,884.1\n313,733.0\n15,156.8\n165,419.8\n269,459.9\n149,908.1\n316,738.8\n45,693.2\n679,403.7\n12,265.4\n2,559,931.1\nDec\n492,669.9\n78,176.7\n15,958.0\n340,422.7\n14,425.5\n165,648.7\n253,354.3\n113,596.5\n347,242.2\n40,695.4\n669,879.6\n12,254.3\n2,544,323.9\n2019\nJan\n525,176.7\n80,480.9\n20,199.4\n349,755.6\n15,294.0\n158,458.9\n255,380.4\n123,772.8\n358,554.2\n42,355.5\n666,797.1\n16,335.7\n2,612,561.3\nFeb\n521,988.1\n79,066.7\n10,931.1\n352,797.8\n14,699.0\n80,894.7\n253,027.0\n124,474.7\n389,523.0\n40,923.5\n644,320.9\n11,446.6\n2,524,093.1\nMar\n538,072.7\n87,791.3\n18,211.5\n379,233.1\n14,556.7\n205,466.5\n270,360.1\n133,324.8\n407,638.0\n43,541.4\n731,600.3\n11,476.6\n2,841,272.8\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2019\n/1 Including the only merchant bank still in operation.\nTABLE 7.1 : SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS LOANS AND ADVANCES/1\nZWL$ ('000)\n \n \n \n23 \n \n \nEND OF\nAGRICULTURE\nCONSTRUCTION COMMUNICATIONS\nDISTRIBUTION\nFINANCIAL &\nFINANCIAL\nMANUFACTURING\nMINING\nSERVICES\nTRANSPORT\nINDIVIDUALS\nCONGLOMERATES\nTOTAL\nINVESTMENTS ORGANISATIONS\n2017\nJan\n236,437.3\n108,552.5\n230,965.4\n618,213.5\n339,580.3\n1,002,775.4\n382,746.3\n86,115.0\n1,393,941.2\n82,670.8\n589,549.9\n85,602.3\n5,157,150.0\nFeb\n254,463.9\n112,294.4\n226,877.9\n613,080.1\n312,948.5\n997,181.2\n393,542.8\n121,798.7\n1,402,647.6\n91,521.7\n604,325.0\n84,653.3\n5,215,335.3\nMar\n299,519.0\n118,530.1\n232,990.6\n626,986.6\n308,297.9\n1,049,255.7\n402,864.2\n170,835.1\n1,400,323.5\n102,287.7\n610,024.4\n91,046.0\n5,412,960.9\nApr\n281,219.8\n117,174.3\n235,093.5\n687,962.2\n307,711.4\n1,013,362.6\n400,018.9\n190,005.8\n1,432,953.1\n110,258.7\n650,595.9\n102,681.0\n5,529,037.2\nMay\n301,531.2\n113,685.5\n220,541.8\n679,781.4\n320,878.2\n1,019,941.1\n417,418.5\n175,383.4\n1,454,718.3\n108,366.5\n667,019.7\n71,770.2\n5,551,035.8\nJun\n295,920.4\n109,938.0\n248,436.3\n712,648.0\n334,368.7\n1,121,023.5\n408,604.0\n185,262.3\n1,521,876.3\n107,327.1\n697,997.7\n74,195.4\n5,817,597.8\nJul\n309,864.7\n126,628.5\n262,827.7\n587,617.1\n341,371.5\n1,143,423.8\n423,846.6\n191,273.6\n1,599,344.4\n99,509.8\n680,622.6\n76,164.4\n5,842,494.6\nAug\n302,611.3\n149,014.9\n296,550.6\n914,686.8\n346,236.8\n1,131,207.5\n453,584.0\n169,521.2\n1,562,637.2\n111,394.6\n746,644.5\n90,999.4\n6,275,088.8\nSep\n348,786.3\n146,383.0\n286,092.4\n796,517.1\n340,224.7\n1,072,979.9\n571,373.7\n211,077.0\n1,705,640.6\n122,645.6\n747,874.4\n72,255.0\n6,421,849.6\nOct\n345,521.0\n138,274.9\n238,975.9\n778,597.1\n355,135.9\n1,138,203.7\n565,046.4\n259,285.2\n1,694,691.4\n123,908.8\n741,652.0\n72,255.0\n6,451,547.3\nNov\n336,339.3\n144,708.5\n239,524.3\n927,820.8\n362,515.4\n986,824.6\n629,010.4\n250,132.7\n1,694,043.5\n131,768.3\n761,400.5\n72,255.0\n6,536,343.3\nDec\n317,794.8\n160,261.7\n284,829.7\n890,549.4\n375,616.4\n1,073,707.0\n686,933.4\n257,197.2\n1,712,823.9\n143,466.1\n711,031.6\n62,444.8\n6,676,655.9\n2018\nJan\n380,283.8\n151,436.0\n257,298.2\n918,787.6\n365,354.6\n1,050,097.7\n652,999.0\n248,933.0\n1,757,391.8\n141,913.2\n669,049.8\n67,904.7\n6,661,449.4\nFeb\n455,217.0\n224,070.1\n263,961.9\n897,453.2\n399,016.2\n949,795.6\n674,828.4\n354,052.8\n1,701,611.4\n107,779.5\n680,060.2\n67,686.4\n6,775,532.7\nMar\n451,992.5\n142,332.9\n296,310.0\n825,805.5\n376,593.0\n1,001,674.3\n597,436.8\n253,127.4\n1,827,464.3\n163,971.7\n597,436.8\n63,604.3\n6,597,749.5\nApr\n476,448.1\n144,564.6\n310,795.6\n806,144.7\n364,824.6\n988,527.2\n649,893.0\n255,761.8\n1,892,415.2\n179,252.3\n712,565.9\n65,398.2\n6,846,591.4\nMay\n494,612.8\n152,567.4\n350,409.2\n874,140.5\n374,089.9\n1,097,970.7\n700,891.9\n271,892.0\n1,913,394.9\n186,192.5\n745,592.7\n64,970.7\n7,226,725.2\nJun\n465,984.0\n164,242.3\n391,142.3\n948,703.0\n368,260.1\n1,140,652.9\n754,981.1\n324,355.8\n2,160,400.4\n200,774.3\n779,012.8\n64,786.3\n7,763,295.2\nJul\n445,780.0\n226,433.0\n413,409.1\n955,925.6\n420,416.6\n1,120,834.7\n760,588.2\n321,078.4\n2,192,743.2\n200,523.6\n822,857.6\n64,786.3\n7,945,376.2\nAug\n429,439.9\n189,498.0\n386,595.6\n980,354.1\n429,659.7\n1,091,202.9\n782,008.7\n297,412.3\n1,968,724.0\n196,068.8\n836,719.1\n64,786.3\n7,652,469.3\nSep\n447,556.4\n206,194.1\n382,491.5\n1,186,453.7\n444,599.1\n1,070,365.1\n811,296.2\n302,579.3\n2,059,093.1\n247,105.7\n906,767.6\n84,514.5\n8,149,016.3\nOct\n445,484.4\n199,531.1\n391,968.4\n984,701.5\n469,891.9\n1,153,855.9\n846,453.3\n315,808.5\n2,110,864.2\n260,816.9\n817,328.3\n67,915.2\n8,064,619.7\nNov\n489,192.9\n194,869.4\n391,442.4\n925,081.3\n441,534.3\n1,248,555.8\n827,349.4\n316,945.5\n2,059,370.1\n261,756.5\n825,642.2\n66,458.7\n8,048,198.5\nDec\n494,011.3\n201,871.0\n531,888.3\n1,034,592.5\n428,738.7\n1,196,503.2\n823,081.9\n331,251.3\n2,063,550.8\n278,659.0\n802,507.6\n63,361.3\n8,250,016.9\n2019\nJan\n505,422.9\n391,022.0\n497,976.2\n1,034,948.2\n411,945.9\n1,187,606.7\n882,289.7\n322,030.3\n2,154,902.3\n135,871.6\n763,189.5\n63,064.3\n8,350,269.7\nFeb\n512,602.3\n374,750.6\n394,709.1\n936,123.6\n449,800.9\n904,919.4\n855,348.4\n347,405.5\n2,355,866.1\n138,685.8\n776,949.7\n63,097.1\n8,110,258.7\nMar\n526,564.2\n343,684.3\n376,205.6\n937,743.4\n393,489.3\n1,317,757.7\n861,574.9\n380,295.4\n2,099,331.1\n141,677.2\n773,726.4\n63,094.9\n8,215,144.4\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2019\n TABLE 7.2: SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS DEPOSITS \nZWL$ ('000)\n \n24 \n \n \nEnd of\nNominal Lending \nRates 1\nIndividuals \nCorporate\n2017 \nJan\n4.00-18.00\n10.61\n6.68\nFeb\n4.00-18.00\n10.06\n6.52\nMar\n4.00-18.00\n9.12\n7.02\nApr\n4.00-18.00\n9.25\n7.02\nMay\n4.00-18.00\n9.17\n7.03\nJun\n4.00-18.00\n9.01\n7.05\nJul\n4.00-18.00\n8.94\n7.05\nAug\n4.00-18.00\n8.88\n6.95\nSep\n4.45-18.00\n8.86\n7.01\nOct\n4.45-18.00\n9.66\n7.06\nNov\n4.45-18.00\n9.66\n7.03\nDec\n4.45-18.00\n9.39\n7.00\n2018\nJan\n4.45-18.00\n9.33\n6.99\nFeb\n4.45-18.00\n9.57\n6.93\nMar\n4.45-18.00\n9.64\n6.98\nApr\n4.00-18.00\n9.32\n7.08\nMay\n4.00-18.00\n9.28\n7.09\nJun\n4.00-18.00\n9.32\n7.14\nJul\n4.00-18.00\n9.75\n6.97\nAug\n4.00-18.00\n9.87\n7.10\nSep\n4.00-18.00\n9.56\n7.11\nOct\n4.00-18.00\n9.47\n7.38\nNov\n4.00-18.00\n9.49\n7.38\nDec\n4.00-18.00\n9.48\n7.39\n2019\nJan\n4.00-18.00\n9.47\n7.40\nFeb\n4.00-18.00\n9.23\n7.30\nMar\n4.00-18.00\n9.23\n7.31\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2019\nNotes\nTABLE 8.1: LENDING RATES (percent per annum)\n1. Nominal lending rates depict the range of rates quoted by banks.\nCommercial Banks\nWeighted Lending Rates\n \n25 \n \n \nEND OF\nSAVINGS\n3 MONTHS\n2017 \nJan\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-17.00\nFeb\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-17.00\nMar\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-17.00\nApr\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-17.00\nMay\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-9.50**\nJun\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-12.00\nJul\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-12.00\nAug\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-12.00\nSep\n0.50-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nOct\n0.50-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nNov\n0.50-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nDec\n0.50-12.00\n0.75-8.00\n2018\nJan\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nFeb\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nMar\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nApr\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nMay\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nJun\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nJul\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nAug\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nSep\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nOct\n0.22-12.00\n0.75-8.00\nNov\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nDec\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-6.75\n2019\nJan\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nFeb\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-6.75\nMar\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\n Source:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2019\n* Deposit rates depict the range of rates qouted by banks. \n **Banks have adjusted their costs of holding deposits following the call by the RBZ to reduce lending rates. \nTABLE 8.2 : BANK DEPOSIT RATES (percent per annum)\nCOMMERCIAL BANKS\n \n 26 \n \n \nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES \nCLOTHING\nHOUSING, \nWATER,\nFURNITURE\nHEALTH\nTRANSPORT COMMUNICATION RECREATION \n&\nEDUCATION RESTAURANTS \n&\nMISC.\nTOTAL NON\n& TOBACCO\nFOOTWEAR\nELECTRICTY, \nGAS\nAND\nCULTURE\nHOTELS\nGOODS &\nFOOD\n& OTHER\nEQUIPMENT\nSERVICES\nFUELS\nWEIGHTS\n4.90\n4.35\n27.62\n5.29\n1.42\n8.39\n2.65\n2.27\n4.25\n1.08\n6.46\n68.70\n31.30\n100\n2017 \nJan\n-0.14\n-0.15\n0.10\n0.34\n-0.15\n-0.75\n0.44\n0.27\n0.00\n0.29\n0.08\n0.01\n0.80\n0.23\nFeb\n0.05\n-0.14\n0.13\n0.70\n-0.03\n0.11\n0.00\n-0.04\n0.00\n0.18\n0.52\n0.23\n1.56\n0.61\nMar\n0.15\n0.03\n-0.07\n0.64\n0.11\n0.21\n-0.02\n0.18\n0.00\n0.01\n0.36\n0.13\n-0.21\n0.03\nApr\n-0.11\n0.02\n0.04\n0.06\n-0.04\n0.00\n0.05\n0.02\n2.02\n0.34\n-0.07\n0.22\n-0.36\n0.05\nMay\n0.13\n0.09\n-0.01\n0.02\n0.13\n0.04\n0.00\n-0.21\n0.00\n-0.39\n-0.09\n0.01\n0.07\n0.03\nJun\n0.21\n0.03\n-0.82\n0.38\n-0.03\n-0.18\n0.00\n0.18\n0.00\n0.29\n0.33\n-0.15\n-0.45\n-0.24\nJul\n0.19\n0.01\n0.01\n-0.06\n0.01\n-0.23\n-0.08\n0.05\n-2.81\n1.10\n0.11\n-0.33\n-0.42\n-0.36\nAug\n-0.18\n0.10\n0.06\n0.05\n0.03\n0.00\n0.03\n0.13\n0.00\n0.00\n0.06\n0.01\n-0.47\n-0.13\nSep\n0.02\n0.45\n0.24\n1.10\n0.07\n-0.31\n0.14\n0.64\n0.00\n0.05\n0.12\n0.27\n0.66\n0.38\nOct\n0.63\n1.44\n0.24\n3.49\n1.07\n1.08\n0.37\n3.08\n0.00\n0.45\n2.66\n1.25\n2.27\n1.54\nNov\n0.28\n0.62\n0.06\n1.32\n0.38\n0.29\n-0.04\n1.14\n-1.43\n-0.72\n1.10\n0.33\n1.74\n0.74\nDec\n0.28\n0.72\n-0.43\n0.45\n0.01\n0.29\n-0.01\n0.78\n0.00\n0.49\n0.74\n0.21\n1.29\n0.53\n2018\nJan\n0.17\n0.67\n0.02\n0.55\n0.10\n0.00\n-0.04\n1.78\n0.00\n-0.16\n0.64\n0.26\n0.39\n0.30\nFeb\n0.26\n0.91\n0.01\n0.43\n0.00\n-0.02\n0.15\n0.90\n0.00\n0.01\n0.21\n0.19\n-0.18\n0.08\nMar\n0.13\n-0.34\n-0.74\n0.46\n0.18\n-1.29\n-1.60\n1.58\n0.01\n-0.14\n-0.55\n0.09\n-0.03\n-0.25\nApr\n0.20\n0.34\n-0.01\n0.00\n0.10\n-0.32\n-0.21\n-0.10\n0.63\n1.85\n0.26\n0.11\n0.02\n0.08\nMay\n-0.03\n0.10\n0.00\n-0.12\n0.03\n0.14\n-0.01\n0.08\n0.00\n0.05\n0.33\n0.03\n0.02\n0.03\nJun\n0.60\n0.14\n-0.16\n-0.48\n0.38\n0.19\n0.10\n-0.25\n0.00\n0.26\n1.00\n0.04\n-0.23\n-0.05\nJul\n0.43\n0.38\n0.00\n0.40\n0.31\n0.17\n0.08\n0.65\n7.16\n3.20\n0.75\n1.09\n0.74\n0.98\nAug\n0.13\n0.45\n0.00\n0.91\n0.24\n0.47\n0.00\n-0.23\n0.00\n0.11\n0.34\n0.28\n0.62\n0.39\nSep\n0.22\n1.35\n0.53\n2.79\n1.90\n0.51\n0.32\n0.22\n0.00\n0.28\n0.07\n0.85\n1.05\n0.92\nOct\n7.89\n45.88\n2.94\n26.86\n12.94\n19.13\n1.39\n27.66\n0.00\n9.86\n13.64\n14.66\n20.12\n16.44\nNov\n7.21\n10.63\n4.80\n9.12\n3.36\n2.31\n0.18\n16.33\n0.35\n9.29\n15.42\n6.50\n14.53\n9.20\nDec\n10.22\n8.07\n2.77\n8.07\n8.49\n28.61\n1.26\n3.19\n0.00\n13.84\n10.07\n9.01\n9.07\n9.03\n2019\nJan\n13.35\n1.04\n4.35\n9.46\n11.64\n47.25\n1.12\n11.01\n0.10\n11.73\n6.72\n12.83\n6.94\n10.75\nFeb\n2.94\n5.94\n2.77\n2.73\n2.93\n-7.70\n0.14\n3.42\n0.02\n2.20\n4.34\n0.70\n3.56\n1.67\nMar\n14.29\n5.56\n2.34\n5.20\n2.30\n3.06\n0.14\n3.92\n3.66\n4.54\n5.16\n4.05\n5.10\n4.38\nSource:Zimstat, 2019\nFOOD & NON \nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES\nALL \nITEMS\nTABLE 9.1 : MONTHLY INFLATION - % CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \n(February 2019 = 100)\n \n \n \n27 \n \n \nF OOD \nIN F LA TION\nA LC OHOLIC \nC LOTHIN G\nHOUS IN G, \nWA TER ,\nF UR N ITUR E\nM IS C .\nF OOD & \nB EVER A GES \n& \nELEC TR IC TY, \nGA S\nA N D\nR EC R EA TION \n&\nR ES TA UR A N TS \n&\nGOOD S &\nTOTA L N ON\nN ON \nA LC OHOLIC \nA LL\n& TOB A C C O\nF OOTWEA R\n& OTHER\nEQUIP M EN T\nC ULTUR E\nHOTELS\nS ER VIC ES\nF OOD\nB EVER A GES\nITEM S\nF UELS\nWEIGHTS\n4.90\n4.35\n27.62\n5.29\n1.42\n8.39\n2.65\n2.27\n4.25\n1.08\n6.46\n68.70\n31.30\n100\n2017\nJan\n-0.61\n-1.52\n-2.16\n-0.62\n-0.68\n-1.76\n-1.44\n0.20\n3.49\n-0.02\n-0.62\n-0.79\n-0.30\n-0.65\nFeb\n-0.42\n-1.66\n-1.91\n0.26\n-0.53\n-1.29\n-1.31\n0.18\n3.49\n0.24\n-0.05\n-0.43\n1.29\n0.06\nMar\n-0.13\n-1.45\n-0.95\n1.64\n-0.30\n-0.79\n-1.74\n0.40\n0.12\n0.87\n0.92\n-0.19\n1.21\n0.21\nApr\n-0.26\n-1.29\n-0.89\n2.03\n-0.33\n-0.86\n-1.61\n0.44\n2.16\n1.30\n1.21\n0.13\n1.35\n0.48\nMay\n0.15\n-0.98\n-1.01\n2.16\n-0.01\n-0.71\n0.00\n0.17\n2.16\n0.88\n1.46\n0.28\n1.92\n0.75\nJun\n0.29\n-0.74\n-2.39\n2.52\n-0.19\n-0.81\n0.00\n0.59\n-0.48\n0.86\n1.70\n-0.28\n1.82\n0.31\nJul\n0.47\n-0.58\n-2.43\n2.41\n-0.03\n-1.01\n0.29\n0.55\n-3.28\n1.93\n2.12\n-0.56\n1.92\n0.14\nAug\n0.35\n-0.26\n-2.37\n2.50\n0.02\n-0.88\n0.33\n0.78\n-3.28\n1.92\n2.05\n-0.50\n1.76\n0.14\nSep\n0.27\n0.22\n-1.05\n3.91\n0.12\n-1.11\n0.57\n1.69\n-3.28\n1.97\n2.07\n0.10\n2.49\n0.78\nOct\n0.95\n1.91\n-0.68\n7.47\n1.22\n0.02\n0.94\n4.84\n-3.28\n2.49\n4.61\n1.38\n4.40\n2.24\nNov\n1.17\n2.62\n-0.62\n8.78\n1.67\n-0.02\n0.89\n5.83\n-2.25\n1.76\n5.62\n1.91\n5.65\n2.97\nDec\n1.51\n3.27\n-0.45\n8.77\n1.57\n0.55\n0.89\n6.35\n-2.26\n2.09\n6.04\n2.20\n6.60\n3.46\n2018\nJan\n1.83\n4.12\n-0.52\n9.00\n1.82\n1.30\n0.41\n7.95\n-2.25\n1.63\n6.64\n2.45\n6.17\n3.52\nFeb\n2.04\n5.21\n-0.65\n8.71\n1.84\n1.17\n0.56\n8.96\n-2.25\n1.45\n6.31\n2.41\n4.35\n2.98\nMar\n2.02\n4.81\n-1.32\n8.52\n1.91\n-0.35\n-1.03\n10.48\n-2.24\n1.30\n5.35\n2.37\n4.54\n2.68\nApr\n2.34\n5.14\n-1.36\n8.45\n2.06\n-0.67\n-1.28\n10.36\n-3.58\n2.84\n5.70\n2.26\n4.94\n2.71\nMay\n2.18\n5.15\n-1.36\n8.30\n1.96\n-0.58\n-1.30\n10.67\n-3.58\n3.29\n6.14\n2.28\n4.89\n2.71\nJun\n2.58\n5.27\n-0.70\n7.36\n2.38\n-0.20\n-1.20\n10.20\n-3.58\n3.26\n6.85\n2.48\n5.12\n2.91\nJul\n2.83\n5.66\n-0.71\n7.86\n2.68\n0.20\n-1.04\n10.86\n6.31\n5.42\n7.53\n3.94\n6.35\n4.29\nAug\n3.15\n6.03\n-0.77\n8.78\n2.89\n0.67\n-1.07\n10.47\n6.31\n5.53\n7.84\n4.22\n7.52\n4.83\nSep\n3.35\n6.98\n-0.47\n10.60\n4.77\n1.49\n-0.89\n10.00\n6.31\n5.77\n7.79\n4.83\n7.94\n5.39\nOct\n10.81\n53.83\n2.20\n35.57\n17.08\n19.61\n0.11\n36.24\n6.31\n15.68\n19.31\n18.71\n26.78\n20.85\nNov\n18.47\n69.14\n7.04\n46.01\n20.56\n22.02\n0.34\n56.70\n8.23\n27.34\n36.21\n26.02\n42.71\n31.01\nDec\n30.21\n81.48\n10.48\n57.08\n30.80\n56.47\n1.61\n60.45\n8.22\n44.26\n48.82\n37.08\n53.68\n42.09\n2019\nJan\n47.34\n82.13\n15.27\n71.00\n45.88\n130.41\n2.79\n75.00\n8.32\n61.45\n57.81\n54.26\n63.71\n56.90\nFeb\n51.28\n91.22\n18.46\n74.92\n50.16\n112.71\n2.78\n79.38\n8.34\n64.99\n64.31\n55.04\n69.84\n59.39\nMar\n72.67\n102.55\n22.14\n83.18\n53.34\n122.10\n4.59\n83.51\n12.30\n72.72\n73.75\n61.19\n78.55\n66.80\nSource:Zimstat, 2019\nTABLE 9.2 : YEARLY INFLATION - % CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \n(February 2019 = 100)\nC OM M UN IC A TION\nTR A N S P OR T\nHEA LTH\nED UC A TION\nN ON -F OOD IN F LA TION\n \n \n \n28 \n \n \nEnd Period\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\n2014\n2015\n2016\n2017\n2018\nLong-Term External Debt\n5,164\n5,834\n7,316\n7,930\n8,851\n10,225\n9,757\n8,656\n8,949\n9,827\nGovernment\n4,282\n4,868\n5,857\n6,252\n6,493\n6,303\n6,623\n5,365\n5,595\n6,306\nBilateral Creditors\n2,213\n2,353\n3,307\n3,397\n3,786\n3,599\n4,071\n3,479\n3,589\n4,261\nMultilateral Creditors\n2,059\n2,505\n2,550\n2,855\n2,707\n2,704\n2,553\n1,886\n2,006\n2,045\nPrivate Creditors\n10\n10\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPublic Enterprises\n825\n825\n1,092\n1,198\n1,356\n1,661\n1,220\n1,370\n1,405\n1,426\nBilateral Creditors\n497\n497\n711\n703\n858\n1,155\n760\n779\n843\n898\nMultilateral Creditors\n327\n327\n382\n495\n498\n506\n460\n591\n562\n528\nPrivate Creditors\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nMonetary Authorities\n140\n550\n127\n125\n125\n120\n110\n0\n0\n0\nMultilateral Creditors - IMF\n140\n550\n127\n125\n125\n120\n110\n0\n0\n0\nPrivate\n57\n142\n366\n480\n1,002\n2,261\n1,913\n1,920\n1,949\n2,095\nShort-Term External Debt\n1,348\n2,040\n1,286\n891\n1,564\n2,394\n2,258\n2,304\n2,292\n2,374\nSupplier's Credits\n193\n286\n134\n30\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nReserve Bank\n998\n1,300\n615\n615\n614\n587\n587\n573\n490\n1,374\nPrivate\n156\n454\n537\n246\n950\n1,807\n1,671\n1,731\n1,802\n1,933\nTotal External Debt\n5,687\n7,050\n7,509\n7,623\n9,059\n10,958\n10,794\n10,960\n11,299\n13,134\nSource: Ministry of Finance & Economic Development, 2019; & Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2019\nTABLE 10: ZIMBABWE: EXTERNAL DEBT OUTSTANDING BY DEBTOR (INCLUDING ALL ARREARS)\n \n29 \n \n \n \nSOUTH ARFICAN\nBOTSWANA\nJAPANESE\nEURO/2\nPOUND\nEND OF\nRAND/1\nPULA/1\nYEN/1\nSTERLING/2\n2017\nJan\n13.5146\n10.5652\n113.4750\n1.0701\n1.2516\nFeb\n12.9957\n10.3573\n112.5100\n1.0591\n1.2439\nMar\n13.5450\n10.5541\n111.8750\n1.0678\n1.2487\nApr\n13.3461\n10.4384\n111.1600\n1.0862\n1.2908\nMay\n13.1162\n10.2987\n110.9650\n1.1168\n1.2801\nJun\n13.0150\n10.2249\n111.9450\n1.1439\n1.3013\nJul\n12.9986\n10.2093\n110.5150\n1.1734\n1.3127\nAug\n13.0153\n10.1368\n110.5500\n1.1873\n1.2920\nSep\n13.5463\n10.3252\n112.6750\n1.1777\n1.3416\nOct\n14.0603\n10.5319\n113.1150\n1.1630\n1.3209\nNov\n13.6625\n10.3199\n112.1250\n1.1867\n1.3470\nDec\n12.4000\n9.9602\n112.7500\n1.1945\n1.3500\n2018\nJan\n12.2727\n9.7871\n111.2348\n1.2105\n1.3734\nFeb\n11.8296\n9.5527\n107.8824\n1.2364\n1.3985\nMar\n11.8379\n9.5578\n106.0110\n1.2340\n1.3966\nApr\n12.0772\n9.6657\n107.6105\n1.2280\n1.4074\nMay\n12.5399\n9.9234\n109.7331\n1.1825\n1.3476\nJun\n13.2814\n10.2146\n109.9890\n1.1677\n1.3287\nJul\n13.4216\n10.3179\n111.4419\n1.1687\n1.3174\nAug\n14.0374\n10.5615\n111.1295\n1.1561\n1.2892\nSep\n14.7996\n10.7997\n111.9253\n1.1659\n1.3049\nOct\n14.5388\n10.7466\n112.6963\n1.1217\n1.2698\nNov\n14.1100\n10.6500\n113.3400\n1.1368\n1.2987\nDec\n14.1900\n10.6800\n112.5400\n1.1364\n1.2658\n2019\nJan\n13.8618\n10.5360\n109.1589\n1.1381\n1.2853\nFeb\n13.7789\n10.4964\n110.3111\n1.1449\n1.3004\nMar\n14.3557\n10.6896\n111.1195\n1.1306\n1.3174\n TABLE 11 : SELECTED INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE RATES\n \n \n \n30 \n \n \nMarket Capitalisation\nEND OF\nAll Share*\nZWL$ millions\n2017\nJan\n-\n140.2\n56.3\n8.6\n31,616,982\n3,903.7\nFeb\n-\n135.3\n56.5\n11.5\n85,314,995\n3,770.0\nMar\n-\n139.0\n58.6\n26.9\n145,238,255\n3,871.3\nApr\n-\n143.0\n66.3\n11.2\n75,857,712\n4,182.8\nMay\n-\n162.3\n69.6\n16.8\n170,830,515\n4,740.1\nJun\n-\n196.0\n69.8\n39.7\n311,145,262\n5,695.2\nJul\n-\n203.3\n69.4\n24.7\n149,425,245\n5,759.0\nAug\n-\n235.0\n73.5\n13.6\n107,920,143\n6,659.4\nSep\n-\n418.4\n122.6\n89.5\n245,278,194\n11,860.2\nOct\n-\n521.9\n132.5\n168.8\n1,006,687,304\n14,830.3\nNov\n-\n376.7\n126.9\n207.5\n196,489,710\n10,777.7\nDec\n-\n333.0\n142.4\n75.3\n844,189,447\n9,580.6\n2018\nJan\n91.3\n305.4\n130.4\n31.4\n55,032,220\n8,652.9\nFeb\n88.0\n294.6\n124.9\n63.7\n138,142,187\n8,386.0\nMar\n87.0\n291.0\n125.1\n40.3\n108,997,097\n8,290.4\nApr\n98.7\n330.7\n124.4\n44.4\n206,342,675\n9,405.3\nMay\n108.3\n361.5\n151.5\n59.3\n129,155,586\n10,393.2\nJun\n102.9\n342.8\n161.3\n73.0\n234,834,368\n9,792.2\nJul\n114.3\n384.3\n164.0\n114.9\n624,256,160\n10,969.7\nAug\n117.3\n394.6\n161.3\n50.5\n142,150,599\n12,475.4\nSep\n115.1\n387.0\n163.8\n61.1\n197,401,341\n12,265.5\nOct\n163.8\n549.8\n217.3\n449.6\n316,060,000\n17,960.0\nNov\n160.4\n538.7\n208.6\n118.0\n153,874,660\n17,316.6\nDec\n146.2\n487.1\n227.7\n93.0\n144,479,601\n19,424.4\n2019\nJan\n157.5\n525.9\n213.1\n110.3\n122,778,938\n20,888.4\nFeb\n148.1\n494.3\n206.9\n295.8\n229,935,122\n19,773.4\nMar\n121.7\n405.6\n194.0\n70.8\n123,398,632\n16,084.9\nSource:Zimbabwe Stock Exchange ,2019\n*All Share index was introduced in January 2018\nTABLE 12: ZIMBABWE STOCK MARKET STATISTICS\nIndustrial\n Market Turnover \nZWL$ million \nVolume of Shares\nMining\nIndices\n \n \n \n31 \n \n \n \nEND OF\nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\n \nINTERNET\n2017\nJan\n 4,052.7 \n7.5\n368.7\n70.4\n 495.55 \n318.9\nFeb\n 4,246.6 \n7.0\n327.3\n58.4\n 472.30 \n324.1\nMar\n 4,629.8 \n7.4\n392.2\n58.8\n 671.60 \n399.7\nApr\n 4,178.8 \n4.8\n466.9\n39.3\n 792.50 \n337.6\nMay\n 4,974.0 \n6.5\n557.8\n44.7\n 939.90 \n618.7\nJun\n 5,346.4 \n6.3\n558.8\n34.6\n 1,095.55 \n500.3\nJul\n 4,805.1 \n5.7\n588.4\n29.4\n 1,601.38 \n586.4\nAug\n 5,325.1 \n5.2\n590.1\n24.7\n 1,776.44 \n583.3\nSep\n 6,031.4 \n5.2\n651.1\n16.1\n 2,159.26 731.93 \nOct\n 5,991.3 \n5.4\n681.9\n19.4\n 2,401.62 779.16 \nNov\n 6,259.7 \n4.9\n666.5\n15.9\n 2,561.84 798.33 \nDec\n 5,877.2 \n3.6\n778.4\n16.3\n 3,052.72 1,043.25 \n2018\nJan\n 5,548.1 \n4.9\n663.5\n21.3\n 2,318.80 1,006.05 \nFeb\n 4,706.6 \n4.5\n594.0\n13.9\n 2,015.11 831.05 \nMar\n 6,300.4 \n4.5\n654.2\n12.5\n 2,657.10 864.83 \nApr\n 5,786.8 \n3.3\n640.9\n11.5\n 3,002.63 822.58 \nMay\n 7,298.4 \n4.2\n819.7\n10.5\n 3,550.07 968.58 \nJun\n 7,997.3 \n4.7\n779.4\n8.3\n 3,724.31 1,135.49 \nJul\n 8,290.0 \n4.0\n790.0\n9.4\n 4,446.68 1,262.53 \nAug\n 7,762.9 \n2.9\n811.2\n14.0\n 4,558.54 1,254.96 \nSep\n 7,155.0 \n4.0\n842.5\n17.0\n 4,462.40 1,393.08 \nOct\n 8,230.5 \n4.2\n821.3\n17.9\n 4,607.38 1,428.20 \nNov\n 7,922.5 \n3.7\n657.5\n19.9\n 3,964.78 1,026.70 \nDec\n 8,355.2 \n2.8\n917.2\n14.6\n 4,833.80 1,102.90 \n2019\nJan\n 6,903.0 \n2.9\n 1,294.05 \n16.9\n 3,608.83 1,056.16 \nFeb\n 8,337.0 \n4.0\n 1,330.58 \n17.2\n 3,594.51 1,093.64 \nMar\n 9,881.5 \n3.9\n 1,399.50 \n18.3\n 4,080.65 1,250.55 \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2019\nTABLE 13.1 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS \n Values of Transactions (ZWL$ millions)\n \n \n \n32 \n \n \nEND OF\nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\n INTERNET\n2017\nJan\n 350.0 \n26.7\n 12,756.3 1,173.6 27,550.1 191.0 \nFeb\n 326.3 \n27.8\n 8,952.0 953.5 26,820.1 207.0 \nMar\n 414.2 \n31.0\n 11,124.0 922.2 35,604.1 244.1 \nApr\n 363.7 \n21.6\n 13,595.5 652.9 40,089.0 231.0 \nMay\n 531.8 \n27.8\n 16,623.4 820.6 47,019.1 323.3 \nJun\n 525.0 \n29.3\n 17,466.2 696.9 53,738.1 342.1 \nJul\n 521.8 \n30.0\n 20,013.7 636.1 61,162.4 382.6 \nAug\n 541.5 \n26.6\n 20,303.0 595.6 70,771.6 419.1 \nSep\n 620.0 \n27.2\n 20,731.0 478.0 83,303.0 432.0 \nOct\n 609.6 \n27.2\n 23,764.6 475.1 92,540.6 478.9 \nNov\n 575.3 \n25.6\n 22,748.6 347.3 97,945.2 473.0 \nDec\n 524.2 \n19.2\n 26,779.1 347.2 118,198.9 524.8 \nAnnual Total\n 5,903.4 \n320.1\n 214,857.4 8,099.0 754,742.1 4,248.84 \n2018\nJan\n 548.1 \n22.7\n 20,981.2 449.6 100,593.9 501.8 \nFeb\n 457.2 \n22.5\n 18,869.0 292.2 89,584.3 463.8 \nMar\n 545.2 \n23.7\n 21,996.8 268.4 116,120.0 510.5 \nApr\n 505.5 \n17.4\n 21,170.0 253.6 117,616.8 457.0 \nMay\n 611.1 \n21.2\n 23,278.2 213.2 137,423.0 496.6 \nJun\n 553.6 \n22.5\n 23,790.0 175.2 156,609.8 502.2 \nJul\n 560.2 \n20.1\n 25,075.5 223.1 169,416.8 559.6 \nAug\n 553.0 \n15.1\n 25,249.9 317.4 164,918.0 518.7 \nSep\n 543.0 \n19.4\n 24,918.0 300.8 161,289.5 511.3 \nOct\n 571.6 \n20.4\n 21,025.4 345.5 161,427.4 496.0 \nNov\n 477.4 \n16.7\n 17,845.4 334.9 133,862.1 430.6 \nDec\n 478.6 \n13.0\n 27,419.1 236.2 161,540.7 409.1 \nAnnual Total\n 6,404.4 \n234.6\n 271,618.6 3,410.1 1,670,402.1 5,857.13 \n2019\nJan\n 401.5 \n12.2\n 40,613.8 232.6 135,481.1 413.4 \nFeb\n 456.5 \n16.4\n 27,811.2 226.8 119,081.1 463.6 \nMar\n 525.9 \n15.4\n 30,417.6 248.9 142,597.8 441.0 \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2019\nTABLE 13.2 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS \n Volumes of Transactions (000's)\n \n \n \n33 \n \n \nEND OF\nEXPORTS\nIMPORTS\nTOTAL TRADE TRADE BALANCE\n2017\nJan\n292.0\n385.0\n677.0\n-93.0\nFeb\n290.3\n424.4\n714.7\n-134.1\nMar\n265.7\n461.8\n727.5\n-196.1\nApr\n225.6\n405.5\n631.1\n-179.9\nMay\n268.6\n465.6\n734.2\n-197.0\nJun\n264.5\n495.1\n759.6\n-230.6\nJul\n261.9\n481.9\n743.8\n-220.0\nAug\n356.4\n448.2\n804.6\n-91.8\nSep\n324.8\n440.0\n764.8\n-115.2\nOct\n352.8\n460.8\n813.6\n-108.0\nNov\n577.7\n493.7\n1071.4\n84.0\nDec\n299.8\n556.3\n856.1\n-256.5\nTotal\n3780.2\n5518.3\n9298.5\n-1738.1\n2018\nJan\n251.2\n489.7\n740.9\n-238.5\nFeb\n346.3\n574.9\n921.2\n-228.6\nMar\n288.6\n605.8\n894.3\n-317.2\nApr\n329.6\n544.1\n873.7\n-214.5\nMay\n267.2\n532.4\n799.6\n-265.2\nJun\n384.6\n614.6\n999.3\n-230.0\nJul\n340.3\n560.0\n900.3\n-219.7\nAug\n449.3\n576.5\n1025.9\n-127.2\nSep\n353.4\n577.1\n930.5\n-223.7\nOct\n448.6\n592.3\n1040.9\n-143.7\nNov\n471.7\n628.7\n1100.4\n-157.0\nDec\n364.8\n494.7\n859.5\n-129.9\nTotal\n4295.6\n6790.8\n11086.5\n-2495.2\n2019\nJan\n292.6\n336.8\n629.4\n-44.2\nFeb\n348.4\n370.5\n718.9\n-22.1\nMar\n295.9\n329.0\n624.9\n-33.1\nSource: Zimstat, 2019\nTABLE 14 : MERCHANDISE TRADE STATISTICS\n (US$ millions)", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/Monthly_Economic_Reviews/Monthly-Ecn-Rev-March-19.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "09bac2f9101a68b56123c3404b00bb1f", "text": "MPC Statement January 17th, 2019 \nPage 1 \n \n \nSouth African Reserve Bank \n \nPRESS STATEMENT \nEMBARGO DELIVERY \n17 January 2019 \n \n \nSTATEMENT OF THE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE \n \nIssued by Lesetja Kganyago, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank \nSince November 2018, international developments have been the major contributor to \nan improved inflation outlook. Significant declines in international oil prices and a less \ndepreciated exchange rate have been key drivers of this improved outlook. Domestic \npetrol prices decreased by a cumulative R3.07 per litre (for 95 unleaded in Gauteng) \nin December and January. Lower food price inflation also contributed to lower \nconsumer price inflation. The economy’s recovery from the technical recession in the \nfirst half of 2018 is welcomed, but it remains modest, with growth constrained by \nsubdued demand as a result of weaker levels of consumer and business confidence. \nThe year-on-year inflation rate as measured by the consumer price index (CPI) for all \nurban areas was 5.2% in November (up from 5.1% in October). Goods price inflation \nwas 5.3% (up from 5.1% in October), while services price inflation was unchanged at \n5.1%. The Bank’s measure of core inflation, which excludes food, fuel and electricity \nMPC Statement January 17th, 2019 \nPage 2 \n \nwas 4.4% in November compared to 4.2% in October. Producer price inflation for final \nmanufactured goods slowed marginally to 6.8% in November from 6.9% in October. \nThe near-term inflation forecast generated by the SARB’s Quarterly Projection Model \n(QPM) has improved significantly since the previous MPC. Headline inflation is now \nexpected to average 4.6% in 2018 (down from 4.7%) and 4.8% in 2019 (down from \n5.5%), before increasing to 5.3% in 2020 (down from 5.4%) and moderating to 4.8% \nin 2021. Headline CPI inflation is now expected to peak at around 5.6%, in the first \nquarter of 2020. Core inflation is expected remain unchanged at 4.3% in 2018 and \nforecast to average 5.0% in 2019 (down from 5.3%), 5.1% in 2020 (down from 5.5%) \nand 4.8% in 2021. These inflation projections are based on an interest rate path \ngenerated by the QPM. \nFollowing a significant decline in oil prices since November, the assumptions for Brent \ncrude oil in the QPM were revised down by around US$10 per barrel from US$73 to \nUS$62 for 2019 and US$65 for 2020 and 2021. Food price inflation is expected to \nhave bottomed out in the fourth quarter of 2018 and to rise to 4.6% in 2021. \nAverage inflation expectations for both 2019 and 2020, as reflected in the survey \nconducted by the Bureau for Economic Research (BER) in the fourth quarter of 2018, \ndeclined from 5.6% to 5.4%. Average five-year expectations also came down from \n5.5% in the previous survey to 5.3%. \nThe inflation expectations of market analysts in the January 2019 Reuters Econometer \nsurvey are also lower at 5.2% in 2019 (down from 5.5%) and remained unchanged at \n5.3% for 2020. Expectations implicit in the break-even inflation rates (i.e. the yield \ndifferential between conventional and inflation-linked government bonds) remain \nMPC Statement January 17th, 2019 \nPage 3 \n \nsensitive to exchange rate movements. While five-year break-even rates remain within \nthe inflation target range, the longer-term break-even rates remain above 6%. \nGlobal growth is expected to remain broadly favourable over the near term, but to \nmoderate over the medium term while risks are tilted to the downside. The negative \neffects of tariff increases are becoming more visible in economic data and uncertainty \narising from trade tensions remains. Other risks include geo-political developments \nand excessive financial market volatility. \nRecent communication from major central banks suggests a slower pace of monetary \npolicy normalisation in advanced economies. In December, the US Fed signalled a \nmore gradual pace of rate hikes. Although the European Central Bank (ECB) ended \nits asset purchase programme in December, it has indicated that monetary policy \nwould remain largely accommodative. \nSince the November MPC, the rand has appreciated by 1.4% against the US dollar, \nby 1.5% against the euro, and by 0.5% on a trade-weighted basis. The implied starting \npoint for the rand is R14.30 against the US dollar, compared with R14.50 at the time \nof the previous meeting. At these levels, the QPM assesses the rand to be less \nundervalued. \nEmerging market currencies, including the rand, have recently benefited from a \nweaker US dollar and indications of continued accommodative monetary policy in \nadvanced economies, but they remain vulnerable to changes in investor sentiment. \nThe rand also remains sensitive to domestic growth prospects, political developments \nand policy settings. \nMPC Statement January 17th, 2019 \nPage 4 \n \nThe domestic growth outlook remains sluggish. Although, GDP increased by 2.2% in \nthe third quarter of 2018, private sector fixed investment remains weak and production \nin key sectors is volatile. The SARB now expects growth in 2018 to have averaged \n0.7% (up from 0.6% in November). The growth forecast for 2019 is 1.7% (down from \n1.9%), it is unchanged at 2.0% for 2020 and increases to 2.2% in 2021. At these \ngrowth rates, the negative output gap is expected to close in the first quarter of 2021. \nThe Absa Purchasing Managers’ Index reached 50.7 index points in December driven \nby improved expectations about new sales orders and business activity, however the \nemployment sub-index receded to its lowest levels since 2014. Although the SARB’s \ncomposite leading business cycle indicator increased somewhat in October, it has \nbeen trending lower since early 2018. The RMB/BER Business Confidence Index also \nremains significantly below the neutral level of 50 index points, broadly aligned with \nweakness in gross fixed capital formation. Sustained growth in fixed capital formation \nis needed to raise potential growth and to make in-roads into unemployment. \nHousehold consumption expenditure remains constrained by weak employment \ngrowth. Over the forecast period, consumption expenditure growth is expected to \nremain around 2%, on the back of moderate increases in real wages and household \ndisposable income. \nThe MPC assesses the risks to the growth forecast to be on the downside. Weak \nbusiness and consumer confidence continue to weigh on fixed capital formation. This \ncould be exacerbated by the possibility of protracted electricity supply constraints. \nPrudent macroeconomic policies are essential to ensuring that growth is sustainable \nand the economy is more resilient to shocks. Furthermore, the Committee remains of \nthe view that current challenges facing the economy are primarily structural in nature. \nMPC Statement January 17th, 2019 \nPage 5 \n \nThe implementation of credible structural policy initiatives that make a marked impact \non potential output and employment and lower the cost structure of the economy \nshould be prioritised. \nThe MPC has taken note of the improved inflation outlook, especially in the near-term. \nOver the forecast period, inflation is expected to remain within the inflation target \nrange, averaging 5.3% in 2020 and 4.8% in 2021. \nThe overall risks to the inflation outlook are assessed to be moderately on the upside. \nThe risks include administered prices such as electricity and water tariffs, rising \ndomestic food prices in the outer years, changing investor sentiment towards \nemerging markets, moderation in global growth and volatile international oil prices. \nAgainst this backdrop, the MPC unanimously decided to keep the repurchase rate \nunchanged at 6,75% per year. \nThe Committee continues to assess the stance of monetary policy to be broadly \naccommodative. Monetary policy actions will continue to focus on anchoring inflation \nexpectations closer to the mid-point of the inflation target, in the interest of balanced \nand sustainable growth. The approach of the MPC is to look through the first-round \neffects and focus on the possible second-round effects of supply side shocks. As \npreviously indicated, any future policy adjustments will be data dependent. \nThe implied path of policy rates generated by the Quarterly Projection Model is for one \nhike of 25 basis points, reaching 7.0% by the end of 2021. The forecasted endogenous \ninterest rate path is built into our growth and inflation outlook. As emphasised \npreviously, the implied path remains a broad policy guide which can and does change \nMPC Statement January 17th, 2019 \nPage 6 \n \nin either direction between meetings in response to new developments and changing \nrisks. \nLesetja Kganyago \nGOVERNOR \nThe next statement of the Monetary Policy Committee will be released on \n28 March 2019. \n \nContact person: \nZiyanda Mtshali \n012 399 7966 \nmedia@resbank.co.za", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/MPC_Statements/January-MPC-Statement_17-January-2019-FINAL.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "c94d140f525852b201bd217027286e8b", "text": "QUARTERLY \nECONOMIC \nREVIEW \n \n \n \nSEPTEMBER 2020 \n \n \n \n \n \n2 \nCONTENTS \n1. OVERVIEW ....................................................................................................... 5 \n2. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS ................................ 6 \n3. DOMESTIC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS ...........................................14 \n4. MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS .................................................................21 \n5. STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS ........................................................23 \n6. PAYMENT, CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES ................25 \n7. FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS ..........................................................................29 \n \n \n \n \n \n3 \nList of Figures \nFigure 1: Precious Mineral Prices (US$/ounce): Mar 2019 – September 2020 ............................ 8 \nFigure 2: Base Metal Prices (US$/ton): Mar 2018 – Sept 2020 ................................................... 8 \nFigure 3: Brent Crude Oil Prices (US$/Barrel) ............................................................................... 9 \nFigure 4: Convergence of Foreign Currency Rates ....................................................................... 9 \nFigure 5: Auction Total Allocations (US$ million) ...................................................................... 10 \nFigure 6: SMEs Auction Total Allocations (US$ million) ........................................................... 10 \nFigure 7: Distribution of Foreign Currency in the Auction .......................................................... 11 \nFigure 8: Quarterly Merchandise Trade (US$ m) ........................................................................ 11 \nFigure 9: Quarterly Merchandise Exports (US$ m) ..................................................................... 12 \nFigure 10: Major Export Destinations third quarter 2020. ......................................................... 12 \nFigure 11: Quarterly Merchandise Imports................................................................................... 13 \nFigure 12: Major Merchandise Import Sources (% of Share)....................................................... 14 \nFigure 13: Merchandise Trade Balance ........................................................................................ 14 \nFigure 14: Quarterly Fresh Milk Output (litres) ........................................................................... 16 \nFigure 15: Quarterly Trends in Gold Output and International Prices: 2019-2020 ...................... 17 \nFigure 16: Quarterly Trends in Platinum Output and International Prices ................................... 18 \nFigure 17: Quarterly Trends in Palladium Output and International Prices ................................. 18 \nFigure 18: Quarterly Trends in Nickel Output and International prices ....................................... 18 \nFigure 19: Quarterly trends in chrome production and average prices ......................................... 19 \nFigure 20: Quarterly Inflation Profile (%) .................................................................................... 20 \nFigure 21: Monthly Inflation Profile (%)...................................................................................... 21 \nFigure 22: Broad Money Developments ....................................................................................... 22 \nFigure 23: Distribution of Private Sector Credit ........................................................................ 22 \nFigure 24: ZSE All Share and Top 10 Indices .............................................................................. 23 \nFigure 25: Industrial and Mining Indices...................................................................................... 24 \nFigure 26: Market Capitalization .................................................................................................. 24 \nFigure 27: ZSE Market Turnover ................................................................................................. 24 \nFigure 28: Values and Volumes of RTGS Transactions ............................................................... 26 \nFigure 29: SWIFT Quarterly Foreign Currency Transactions ...................................................... 26 \nFigure 30: Over the Counter Cash Withdrawals ......................................................................... 27 \nFigure 31: Retail Transaction Values ........................................................................................... 27 \nFigure 32: Retail Transaction Volumes ........................................................................................ 27 \nFigure 33: Collateral Amounts from June 2019 to September 2020 ............................................ 28 \nFigure 34: Government Revenue Structure .................................................................................. 29 \nFigure 35: Budget balance Z$ Billion in January to September 2020 .......................................... 30 \n \n \n \n \n4 \nList of Tables \n \nTable 1: Global Economic Growth & Outlook(%) ......................................................................... 6 \nTable 2: International Commodity Prices: ...................................................................................... 7 \nTable 3: Quarterly Merchandise Exports ...................................................................................... 12 \nTable 4: Quarterly Merchandise Imports (US $m) .............................................................. 13 \nTable 5: Cumulative Tobacco Sales as at September 2019 and 2020 ......................................... 15 \nTable 6: Cattle Slaughters ............................................................................................................. 15 \nTable 7: Quarterly Pig Slaughters ................................................................................................. 16 \nTable 8: Quarterly Mineral Production Statistics ......................................................................... 17 \nTable 9: Total Electricity Output (GWh) ...................................................................................... 19 \nTable 10: Electricity output .......................................................................................................... 20 \nTable 11: Key Stock Market Developments ................................................................................. 23 \nTable 12: Consolidated Transactional Activities .......................................................................... 25 \nTable 13: Payment Systems Access Points and Devices .............................................................. 28 \nTable 14: Summary of Second and Third Quarter 2020 Fiscal Position (Z$ million) ................. 29 \nTable 15: Summarised Government Spending in Q2 and Q3 of 2020 (Z$ billion) ...................... 30 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n5 \n1. \nOVERVIEW \n \nEconomic activity continued to pick up in the \nthird quarter of 2020, reflecting macroeconomic \nstability achieved following the introduction of \nthe auction system in June 2020. As a result, the \ndomestic economy is now projected to contract by \n4.1% in 2020, compared to the initial projected \ndecline of 4.5%. This trend is also consistent with \nglobal economic outlook where the global \neconomy is now expected to decline by 4.4% up \nfrom the initial forecast of a 4.9% decline. \nReflecting general macroeconomic stability in the \neconomy, the quarter under review saw annual \nheadline inflation decelerating from 737.26% in \nJune 2020 to 659.40% by end of September 2020. \nThe significant decline in annual inflation was on \naccount of reduced impact of exchange rate pass \nthrough on inflation given the stability of the \nexchange rate witnessed since June 2020. The \nparallel market exchange rate premium also \nsignificantly reduced from 73.4% in June to about \n19% in September 2020. \n \nDomestic economic performance was also \nspurred by external sector performance which \nrecorded significant improvements in exports and \nremittances. Total merchandise trade for the first \nnine months of 2020 grew by 9.9% from \nUS$3155.5 million in 2019 to US$3468.6 million \nin 2020. Similarly, remittances improved from \nUS$225.2 million in 2019 to US$287.3 million in \n2020, notwithstanding the impact of the COVID-\n19 on world economies. The strong export \nperformance against subdued imports, saw trade \nbalance narrowing from a deficit of US$164.8 \nmillion registered during the second quarter of \n2020 to a deficit of US$131.0 million in the third \nquarter \nof \n2020. \nStrong \nexternal \nsector \nperformance is critical for sustaining exchange \nrate stability. \n \nOn the monetary front, the monetary policy \nremained accommodative with reserve money \ngrowth firmly contained within the Bank’s \ndesired inflation neutral and growth enhancing \nquarterly growth target of less than 25%. Broad \nmoney, however increased by 54.1% from \nZW$99.82 billion in June 2020 to Z$153.84 \nbillion in September 2020. The growth in broad \nmoney was largely due to increase in the foreign \ncurrency component, from Z$57.70 billion as at \nend June 2020 to Z$92.19 billion as at end of \nSeptember 2020. \n \nActivity on the National Payment system (NPS) \nwas buoyant, with the value of transactions \nprocessed through the NPS increasing by 109% to \nZ$738.02 billion during the third quarter from \nZWL$353.20 billion recorded in the second \nquarter of 2020. Volumes of transactions, \nhowever, decreased by 8% to 426.40 million in \nthe third quarter from 465.50 million recorded \nduring the second quarter of 2020. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n6 \n2. GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS \n \nGlobal economic activity continues to pick up \nduring the third quarter of 2020, following easing \nof Covid-19 lockdown restrictions in the second \nquarter of the year. As a result, global economic \ngrowth has been revised upwards by the IMF, in \nits July 2020 World Economic Outlook update, to \n-4.4% up from the June forecast of -4.9%. \nThe revision in global growth suggest that the \nglobal economy is somewhat responding to the \nvarious \nstimulus \nmeasures \ninstituted \nby \npolicymakers to counteract the demand-slumping \neffects of the worldwide health crisis. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1 Growth rates projections for Zimbabwe are from \nTreasury, Reserve Bank & actuals from Zimstat \nTable \n1: \nGlobal \nEconomic \nGrowth \n& \nOutlook(%) \n \n \n2019 \n2020 \n(Projectio\nn) \n2021 \n(Projection) \nWorld Output \n2.9 \n-4.4 \n5.2 \nAdvanced \nEconomies \n1.7 \n-5.8 \n3.9 \n US \n2.3 \n-4.3 \n3.1 \n Euro Area \n1.3 \n-8.3 \n5.2 \n Japan \n0.7 \n-5.3 \n2.3 \nEmerging \nMarket \n& \nDeveloping \nEconomies \n3.7 \n-3.3 \n6.0 \n China \n5.5 \n-1.7 \n8.0 \n India \n6.1 \n1.9 \n8.2 \nSub-Saharan \n4.2 \n-10.3 \n8.8 \nZimbabwe1 \n-6.0 \n-4.5 \n7.4 \nNigeria \n2.2 \n-4.3 \n1.7 \nSouth Africa \n0.2 \n-8.0 \n3.0 \nSource: IMF World Economic Outlook: June 2020 \nGrowth in the advanced economies group is \nprojected at –5.8% in 2020. In 2021 the advanced \neconomies growth rate is projected to strengthen \nto 3.9%. The US economy is, however, projected \nto contract by 4.3% in 2020 before rebounding by \n3.1% percent in 2021. \n \nAmongst emerging market and developing \neconomies, growth is forecast at –3.3% in 2020, \nbefore strengthening to 6% in 2021. India is \nexpected to be hardest hit at -10.3%, while \nprospects for China are much stronger than for \nmost emerging and developing countries, with the \n \n \n \n \n7 \neconomy projected to grow by about 1.9% in \n2020. \n \nThe Sub-Saharan African region also continues to \nbe adversely affected by the economically \ndisruptive effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. \nGrowth in Sub-Saharan Africa is projected to be -\n3% in 2020, before recovering to 3.1% in 2021 on \nthe back of continued re-opening of the global \neconomy. \n \nINTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICE \nDEVELOPMENTS \n \nThe international prices of Brent crude oil, \nselected precious and base metals were all on a \npositive trajectory during the third quarter of \n2020. This was on the back of economic stimulus \nand easing lockdown restrictions in most \neconomies, which supported the demand side for \ncommodities. Commodity prices were also \naffected to a larger extent by the COVID-19-\ninduced disruptions across markets. \n \nTable 2 shows the evolution of international \nprices for selected commodities, during the third \nquarter of 2020. \n \n \n \n \n \nTable 2: International Commodity Prices: \nQ3 2020 \n \nGold \nPlatinum \nCopper \nNickel \nBrent \nCrude Oil \n \nUS$/oz \nUS$/oz \nUS$/tonne \nUS$/tonne \nUS$/Barrel \n2020 Q2 \nAverage \n1,710.50 \n790.83 \n5,341.75 \n12,198.16 \n33.12 \nJul-20 \n1,841.08 \n863.52 \n6,340.72 \n13,297.87 \n43.10 \nAug-20 \n1,969.14 \n937.69 \n6,507.71 \n14,533.86 \n44.98 \nSep-20 \n1,922.85 \n908.66 \n6,712.41 \n14,866.27 \n41.92 \n2020 Q3 \nAverage \n1,911.02 \n903.29 \n6,520.28 \n14,232.67 \n43.34 \n2020 Q2-\nQ3 \nChanges \n(%) \n11.7 \n14.2 \n22.1 \n16.7 \n30.8 \n Source: Bloomberg, BBC, 2020 \nPrecious Metals \nPrecious metal prices rallied during the third \nquarter of 2020, supported by robust safe-haven \ndemand, as investors shifted from riskier assets. \nThis followed mounting fears of the impact of the \nglobal pandemic, and concerns about slowing \nglobal economic growth. In addition, precious \nmetal prices were also supported by decisions of \nthe U.S. Federal Reserve and other central banks, \nto ease their monetary policy stance, as a way of \nmoderating the impact of the coronavirus on the \nglobal economy. \n \nQuarterly average prices of gold prices surged by \n11.7% to US$1,911.02 per ounce in the third \nquarter from US$1,710.50 per ounce in the second \nquarter. Similarly, quarterly average platinum \nprices gained 14.2% to US$903.29 per ounce in \nthe third quarter from US$790.83 per ounce \nregistered in the second quarter. Figure 1 shows \nthe evolution of gold and platinum prices for the \nperiod from March 2019 to September 2020. \n \n \n \n \n8 \nFigure \n1: \nPrecious \nMineral \nPrices \n(US$/ounce): Mar 2019 – September 2020 \n \nSource: Bloomberg, 2020 \n \nBase Metals \nBase metal prices continued to rally during the \nthird quarter of 2020, mainly as a result of \nimproved demand from China as industrial \nactivity reached pre-pandemic levels and tight \nsupply conditions in source markets, supported \nprices during the period under review. On the \nsupply-side, COVID-19 and industrial action-\ninduced disruptions in Chile, the World’s top \ncopper producer also supported the firming \nprices. In addition, disruptions in Peru on back of \nunfavourable weather and labour shortages, \nlowered supply of copper. Further, supply \ndisruptions in the Philippines the top supplier of \nnickel to China, suffered from mine closures \nduring the period under analysis. \n \nQuarterly \naverage \ncopper \nprices \nrose \nto \nUS$6,520.28 per tonne in the third quarter, an \nincrease of 22%, from US$5,341.75 per tonne \nrecorded in the second quarter in 2020. Quarterly \naverage prices of nickel also exhibited similar \ntrends to copper and increased by 16.7% to \nUS$14,232.67 per tonne in the third quarter from \nUS$12,198.16 per tonne recorded in the second \nquarter of 2020. \n \nFigure 2 shows the monthly trends for base metal \nprices for the period from March 2018 to June \n2020. \n \nFigure 2: Base Metal Prices (US$/ton): \nMar 2018 – Sept 2020 \n \nSource: Bloomberg, 2020 \nBrent Crude Oil \nThe international price of Brent crude oil \naveraged US$43.34 per barrel during the third \nquarter of 2020. Prices continued to recover from \nall-time lows reached in April 2020, when \ncoronavirus-induced lockdowns took effect. The \nrebounding of economic activity in China and \nstockpiling of oil proved a boon for oil exporters \nas a significant demand-side driver during the \n700\n750\n800\n850\n900\n950\n1000\n1050\n1100\n1200\n1300\n1400\n1500\n1600\n1700\n1800\n1900\n2000\n2100\nMar-19\nMay-19\nJul-19\nSep-19\nNov-19\nJan-20\nMar-20\nMay-20\nJul-20\nSep-20\nGold\nPlatinum (RHS)\n 8,000\n 10,000\n 12,000\n 14,000\n 16,000\n 18,000\n 20,000\n 5,000\n 5,500\n 6,000\n 6,500\n 7,000\n 7,500\nJan-18\nMar-18\nMay-18\nJul-18\nSep-18\nNov-18\nJan-19\nMar-19\nMay-19\nJul-19\nSep-19\nNov-19\nJan-20\nMar-20\nMay-20\nJul-20\nSep-20\nCopper\nNickel (RHS)\n \n \n \n \n9 \nperiod under review. The Organization of \nPetroleum \nExporting \nCountries \n(OPEC)’s \ninterventions on the supply-side conspired with \nhigh demand to further support oil prices. \n \nFigure 3 shows the monthly evolution of crude oil \nprices for the period from March 2018 to June \n2020. \n \nFigure 3: Brent Crude Oil Prices (US$/Barrel) \n \n \nSource: Bloomberg, 2020 \n \nEXCHANGE RATE DEVELOPMENTS \n \nThe Zimbabwe Dollar (Z$) depreciated to \nZ$81.44 per US$1 at the end of the third quarter \nof 2020 from Z$57.36 per US$1 recorded at the \nend of second quarter. The introduction of the \nForeign Exchange Auction System on the 23rd of \nJune 2020, saw the foreign currency exchange \nrates almost converging as the exchange rate \npremium collapsed from 73.4% to 19%, during \nthe period under review. \nFigure 4 shows exchange rate developments since \nthe introduction of the interbank market in \nFebruary 2019. \nFigure 4: Convergence of Foreign Currency \nRates \n \nSource: RBZ & Bank Market Intelligent Surveys, 2020 \nAs a result of the relative stability of the exchange \nrates, foreign currency flows into the formal \nsystem has been on an increase in 2020. The \nincreased foreign currency in the official market \nhas resulted in the amounts allocated through \nsuccessive Auctions increasing significantly for \nboth the main and small medium enterprises \nAuctions bringing the total allocations to \nUS$256.60 million as at 29th September 2020. \nPrecisely, the average total allotments for the \nmain auction per week almost doubled from \nUS$15.62 million between June and August 2020. \nDuring the third quarter of 2020, a total of 14 \nforeign currency auctions were held. Foreign \ncurrency auctions specifically targeted at small \nand medium enterprises were also held starting \n0.00\n10.00\n20.00\n30.00\n40.00\n50.00\n60.00\n70.00\n80.00\n90.00\nMar-18\nJun-18\nSep-18\nDec-18\nMar-19\nJun-19\nSep-19\nDec-19\nMar-20\nJun-20\nSep-20\n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\nFX02/2020\nFX06/2020\nFX10/2020\nFX15/2020\n30 Jun 20\n28 Jul 20\n25 Aug 20\n29-Sep\nLow Bid Rate\nHigh Bid Rate\nWeighted Rate\nParallel Rate\n \n \n \n \n10 \nfrom the 4th of August 2020. Figure 5 shows the \ntotal weekly foreign currency auction allocations \nthat were held during the period under review. \nFigure 5: Auction Total Allocations (US$ \nmillion) \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020 \nSimilarly, the foreign currency allocations to the \nSME sector doubled from an average of \nUS$764, 000 per auction to US$1.47 million, \nduring the same period. \nFigure 6: SMEs Auction Total Allocations \n(US$ million) \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020 \nDuring the third quarter 2020, on average about \n45% of the total foreign currency traded on the \nAuction were allocated to raw materials for \nproduction purposes. Capital goods such as \nmachinery and equipment were allocated about \n17% of the total allocations. Figure 7 shows the \ndistribution of foreign currency through the \nforeign currency auction system. \n -\n 5.0\n 10.0\n 15.0\n 20.0\n 25.0\n 30.0\n 35.0\n30-Jun-20\n7-Jul-20\n14-Jul-20\n21-Jul-20\n28-Jul-20\n4-Aug-20\n11-Aug-20\n18-Aug-20\n25-Aug-20\n1-Sep-20\n8-Sep-20\n15-Sep-20\n22-Sep-20\n29-Sep-20\n -\n 0.20\n 0.40\n 0.60\n 0.80\n 1.00\n 1.20\n 1.40\n 1.60\n4-Aug-20\n11-Aug-20\n18-Aug-20\n25-Aug-20\n1-Sep-20\n8-Sep-20\n15-Sep-20\n22-Sep-20\n29-Sep-20\n \n \n \n \n11 \nFigure 7: Distribution of Foreign Currency in \nthe Auction \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020 \n \nMERCHANDISE \nTRADE \nDEVELOPMENTS \nTotal merchandise trade for the third quarter of \n2020 amounted to US$2,280.2 million which was \n5.1% higher than US$2,169.0 million recorded in \nthe corresponding quarter in 2019, as shown in \nFigure 8. \n \n \n \nFigure 8: Quarterly Merchandise Trade \n(US$ m) \n \n \nSource: Zimstat, 2020 \nRelative to the preceding second quarter, \nmerchandise trade improved markedly by 25.1% \nfrom US$1,822.4 million to US$2,280.2 million \nin the third quarter of 2020. \n \nMerchandise Export Developments \nMerchandise exports for the third quarter of 2020 \namounted to US$1,074.6 million, representing a \n29.7% increase from US$828.8 million recorded \nin preceding quarter. The recovery in commodity \nprices from the coronavirus pandemic continued \nto spur the country’s exports. Similarly, the \ncurrent quarter outturn also compared favourably \nwith the US$1,023.4 million realized in the \ncorresponding quarter in 2019, as shown in Figure \n9. \n -\n 5.0\n 10.0\n 15.0\n 20.0\n 25.0\nFX02/2020\nFX06/2020\nFX10/2020\nFX15/2020\n30 Jun 20\n28 Jul 20\n25 Aug 20\n29-Sep\nPaper and Packaging\nServices\nPharmaceuticals and Chemicals\nConsumables\nRetail and Distribution\nMachinery and Equipment\nRaw Materials\n2,169.0 \n2,280.2 \n -\n 500.0\n 1,000.0\n 1,500.0\n 2,000.0\n 2,500.0\n2019Q3\n2020Q3\n \n \n \n \n12 \nFigure 9: Quarterly Merchandise Exports \n(US$ m) \n \n Source: Zimstat, 2020 \n \nTable 3 shows developments on quarterly \nmerchandise exports by commodity. \n \nTable 3: Quarterly Merchandise Exports \n(US$ m) \n Commodity \n2020Q2 \n(US$ m) \n2020Q3 \n(US$ m) \n2020Q2-\nQ3 \nChanges \n(%) \n2020Q2 \nShare \nof \nTotal \n(%) \nTotal Exports \n828.8 \n1,074.6 \n29.7 \n100.0 \nOf which: \n \n \n \n \nNickel mattes \n238.8 \n260.9 \n9.2 \n24.3 \nGold \n250.5 \n236.1 \n-5.7 \n22.0 \nNickel ores and \nconcentrates \n99.6 \n208.1 \n108.9 \n19.4 \nTobacco \n34.3 \n97.8 \n185.2 \n9.1 \nUnwrought \nPlatinum \n21.2 \n49.6 \n133.9 \n4.6 \nFerro-\nchromium \n27.5 \n25.3 \n-8.0 \n2.4 \nIndustrial \ndiamonds \n30.6 \n23.9 \n-21.9 \n2.2 \nJewellery \n5.9 \n19.8 \n236.6 \n1.8 \nCane sugar \n17.7 \n23.5 \n32.8 \n2.2 \nChromium ores \nand \nconcentrates \n12.9 \n12.7 \n-1.4 \n1.2 \n Source: Zimstat, 2019 & RBZ Calculations, 2020 \nTable 3 shows that the country’s export basket \ncontinued to be skewed towards primary \ncommodities from mining and agriculture. The \nthird quarter exports were dominated by nickel \nmattes (24.3%), gold (22.0%), nickel ores & \nconcentrates (19.4), tobacco (9.1%) and platinum \n(4.6%). \nMajor Merchandise Export Destinations \nThe country’s exports during the third quarter \nwere mainly destined for South Africa (34.5%), \nthe United Arab Emirates (12.9%), Uganda \n(10.1%), \nMozambique \n(9.5%) \nwith \nother \njurisdictions taking up negligibly small amounts \nas shown in respectively, as shown in Figure 10. \nFigure \n10: \nMajor \nExport \nDestinations \nthird quarter 2020. \n \nSource: Zimstat, 2020 \n \nMerchandise Import Developments \n \nTotal merchandise imports for the third quarter of \n2020 amounted to US$1,205.6 million, a 5.2% \nincrease on US$1,145.6 million recorded in the \ncorresponding period in 2019. Figure 11 shows \nquarterly merchandise imports for the third \nquarters of 2019 and 2020. \n34.5\n12.9\n10.1\n9.5\n1.7\n1.2\n1.2\n0.9\n0.8\n0.3\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\nSouth Africa\nUnited Arab Emirates\nUganda\nMozambique\nKenya\nBotswana\nZambia\nUkraine\nBelgium\nHong Kong\n1,023.4 \n1,074.6 \n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1,000\n1,200\n2019Q3\n2020Q3\n \n \n \n \n13 \nFigure 11: Quarterly Merchandise Imports \n (US$ m) \n \nSource: Zimstat, 2020 \n \nOn a quarter-on-quarter basis, merchandise \nimports for the third quarter in 2020 were \nUS$993.6 million, 21.39% higher than the level \nof exports registered for the second quarter of \n2020. The increase in imports was also attributed \nto the easing of COVID-19 induced total \nlockdowns which had previously disrupted supply \nchains and slowed global trade particularly during \nthe first half of 2020. Table 4 shows the \nmerchandise imports for the second and third \nquarters of 2020. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nTable 4: Quarterly Merchandise Imports \n(US $m) \n \n \n2020 \nQ2 \n(US$m) \n2020 \nQ3 \n(US$m) \n2020 \nQ3-2 \nChanges \n(%) \n2020Q2 \nShare \nof Total \n(%) \nTotal \nImports \n993.6 \n1205.6 \n21.3 \n100.0 \nOf which: \n \n \n \n \nDiesel \n103.5 \n43.2 \n-58.3 \n3.6 \nCrude \nsoya bean \noil \n35.3 \n38.4 \n8.8 \n3.2 \nElectricity \n41.4 \n35.5 \n-14.4 \n2.9 \nWheat \n17.2 \n31.3 \n81.8 \n2.6 \nRice \n23.6 \n28.0 \n18.7 \n2.3 \nMaize \n(Excludin\ng Seed) \n94.4 \n27.7 \n-70.7 \n2.3 \nStructures \nof \niron/ \nsteel \n4.9 \n24.2 \n393.3 \n2.0 \nMedicines \n27.3 \n31.8 \n16.5 \n2.6 \nRoad \ntractors \n5.9 \n18.1 \n209.5 \n1.5 \nChemicals \n15.5 \n18.2 \n16.7 \n1.5 \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Computations \n \nMajor Import Sources \n \nThe country’s imports for the third quarter of \n2020 were mainly from South Africa (53.0%), \nChina (10.2%), Singapore (4.7%), India (3.3%), \nMauritius (3.2%), and Mozambique (3.1%), as \nshown in Figure 12. \n \n \n1,145.6\n1,205.6\n2019Q3\n2020Q3\n \n \n \n \n14 \nFigure 12: Major Merchandise Import Sources \n(% of Share) \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Computations, 2020 \n \nTRADE BALANCE \nThe country’s trade balance narrowed from a \ndeficit of US$164.8 million registered during the \nsecond quarter of 2020 to a deficit of US$131.0 \nmillion in the third quarter of 2020, as shown in \nFigure 13. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFigure 13: Merchandise Trade Balance \n(US$ m) \n \nSource: Zimstat, 2020 & RBZ Computations, 2020 \n \n \n \n3. \nDOMESTIC \nECONOMIC \nDEVELOPMENTS \n \nREAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS \n \nGross Domestic Product \n \nDuring the third quarter of 2020, there was a \nrebound of business activity compared to the \nsecond quarter of 2020, on the back of a stable \nmacroeconomic environment and the easing of \nCOVID-19 restriction measures. \n \nDespite the relative improvement in business \nenvironment, the effects of the 2019/20 drought \nseason and COVID-19 pandemic are still evident. \nThe economy is, therefore, projected to contract \nby -4.1% in 2020, with output declines expected \nin the productive sectors of agriculture, -0.2%; \nmining, -4.7%; manufacturing, -9.6%; and \nelectricity and water, -7.9%. \n \n53.0\n10.2\n4.7\n3.3\n3.2\n3.1\n2.8\n2.1\n2.0\n1.1\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\nSouth Africa\nChina\nSingapore\nIndia\nMauritius\nMozambique\nZambia\nUnited Arab Emirates\nUnited Kingdom\nUnited States\n828.8 \n1,074.6 \n993.6\n1,205.6\n(164.8)\n(131.0)\n2020Q2\n2 0 2 0 Q 3\nExports\nImports\nTrade Balance\n \n \n \n \n15 \nAGRICULTURE \nThe agriculture sector is expected to further \ncontract by 2.4% in 2020 on account of a poor \nrainfall outturn as well as the increasing cost and \nshortage of inputs. The output of tobacco, beef, \npoultry, milk and soyabeans, among others are \nexpected to decline significantly in 2020. \n \nCrops \n \nTobacco \nA total of 183.34 million kilogrammes of tobacco \nhad been sold under both the contract and auction \nsales by 30th September 2020, representing a \n27.97% decline from 2019 sales. The tobacco \nsold was valued at US$458.51 million, at an \naverage price of US250 cents. The tobacco \nproduction volumes dipped due to drought \nconditions prevailing during the growing season. \nTable 5 shows the tobacco sales outturn as at end \nSeptember 2020. \n \nTable 5: Cumulative Tobacco Sales as at \nSeptember 2019 and 2020 \n \n2020 \n2019 \nVariance \n(%) \nTotal Quantity Sold \n(million Kgs) \n183.34 \n255 \n-27.97 \nTotal Value (US$ \nmillion) \n458.51 \n516 \n-11.05 \nAverage Price \n(US$)/Kg \n2.50 \n2.03 \n23.15 \nSource: Tobacco Industry and Marketing Board, 2020. \nWheat \nThe total area under winter wheat in 2020 was \nrecorded at 44 466 hectares, which is significantly \nhigher than the 24 186 hectares in 2019. About \n36 165 hectares (81.3%) was contracted under the \ncommand agriculture programme with the \nremainder being self-financed. \n \nCotton \nBy the end of September 2020 about 83.06 \nmillion kilogrammes of seed cotton sales had \nbeen recorded, 11.7% up from the 74.36 million \nkilogrammes sold during the same period in 2019. \nThe crop continues to benefit from government \ninput support aimed at strengthening the cotton to \nclothing value chain. \n \nLivestock \nThe negative impact of impact of COVID-19 \nlockdown measures, drought induced shortage of \nstock feeds and low demand saw formal livestock \nslaughters in the third quarter of 2020 lagging \nbehind the performance in the same period in \n2019. \n \nCattle \nCumulatively, 161 495 cattle were slaughtered in \nthe 9 months to September 2020, 12% lower than \nslaughters during the same period in 2019. Cattle \nofftake in 2020 were largely weighed down by the \nCOVID-19 restrictions as well reduction on the \nbeef herd in 2020 due to higher mortality induced \nby drought and high incidence of tick borne \ndiseases. Table 6 summarises cattle slaughters in \n2019 and 2020. \n \n \n \n \n16 \nTable 6: Cattle Slaughters \n \n2019 \n2020 \n% Change \nQ1 \n57 674 \n54 073 \n-6.24 \nQ2 \n64 946 \n42 446 \n-34.64 \nQ3 \n63 233 \n64 940 \n2.70 \nTotal \n187 872 \n161 459 \n-12.98 \nSource: Ministry of Lands, Agriculture, Water, and Rural \nResettlement, 2020 \nPigs \nPig slaughters continued to decline through to the \nthird quarter of 2020, as shown in the Table 7. \nThird quarter pig slaughters were 3.43% lower \nthan the second quarter slaughters. The decline in \nslaughters in the subsector is attributed protracted \ndestocking since June 2019 which reduced parent \nstock. Due to declines in second and third quarters \nof 2020, cumulative slaughters fell by 9.82% to \n133 128 by September 2020. \n \nTable 7: Quarterly Pig Slaughters \nPigs \n2019 \n2020 \n% Change \nQ1 \n46 128 \n47 198 \n2.32 \nQ2 \n52 598 \n43 918 \n-16.50 \nQ3 \n48 898 \n42 012 \n-14.08 \nTotal \n147 624 \n133 128 \n-9.82 \nSource: Ministry of Lands, Agriculture, Water and Rural \nResettlement, 2020. \n \nDairy \nReversing the declines in the first half of the year, \nquarterly milk output increased to 19.51 million \nlitres, up from 19.23 million litres and 18.34 \nmillion litres recorded in the second quarter of \n2020, as shown in Figure 14. \n \nFigure 14: Quarterly Fresh Milk Output \n(litres) \n \nSource: Ministry of Lands, Agriculture, Water and Rural \nResettlement, 2020 \n \nMINING \n \nActivities in the mining industry generally \nimproved during the third quarter of 2020, \ncompared to same period in 2019. Gold, chrome, \ncoal and black granite, however, underperformed, \nas shown in Table 8. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n17.00\n17.50\n18.00\n18.50\n19.00\n19.50\n20.00\n20.50\n21.00\nMillions\n \n \n \n \n17 \nTable 8: Quarterly Mineral Production \nStatistics \n \nq3 2019 q2 2020 q3 2020 \nGold (kg) \n8,744 \n5,408 \n4,519 \nPlatinum (kg) \n3,159 \n4,461 \n3,675 \nPalladium (kg) \n2,735 \n3,780 \n3,138 \nRhodium (kg) \n279 \n399 \n345 \nIridium (kg) \n188 \n299 \n189 \nRuthenium (kg) \n189 \n224 \n311 \nDiamonds (cts) \n479,922 933,507 541,390 \nChrome (MT) \n394,253 336,477 245,515 \nNickel (MT) \n3,791 \n3,818 \n4,369 \nCopper (MT) \n1,993 \n2,518 \n1,732 \nCobalt (MT) \n108 \n72 \n386 \nCoal (MT) \n879,154 970,967 830,105 \nLithium (MT) \n13,929 \n570 \n- \nPhosphate (T) \n3,839 \n15,131 \n6,341 \nGranite (MT) \n40,440 \n551,400 \n38,518 \nVermiculite (MT) \n7,515 \n7,401 \n3,781 \nSource: Ministry of Mines, Chamber of Mines, \nFPR, 2020 \n \nThe performance of the mining sector was largely \nimpacted by COVID-19 induced lockdown in \nsource and transit markets. \nGold \nGold output fell by 48.3% to 4 519 kg in the third \nquarter of 2020 from 8 744 kg that was produced \nin the comparable period in 2019. This was \nmainly due to declines in deliveries by artisanal \nand small-scale miners. The declines in gold \noutput occurred despite a 30% increase in average \ninternational prices recorded in the third quarter \nof 2020. Figure 15 depicts quartely trnds in gold \noutput and average international prices. \nFigure 15: Quarterly Trends in Gold Output \nand International Prices: 2019-2020 \n \nSource: FPR, Chamber of Mines, Ministry of \nMines. 2020 \n \nPGMs \nThe output of the key PGMS, platinum and \npalladium, in the third quarter of 2020, surpassed \nthe output that was produced in the same period \nin 2019 by 16.3% and 14.7%, respectively. \nOutput was, however, 17.6% and 17%, down \nwhen compared the to the previous quarter of \n2020, as shown in Figures 16 and 17. \n \n \n0\n500\n1000\n1500\n2000\n2500\n0\n1000\n2000\n3000\n4000\n5000\n6000\n7000\nQ3 2019 Q4 2019 Q1 2020 Q2 2020 Q3 2020\nUS$\nOutput Kg\nPrimary producers (kg)\nASM producers (kg)\nSecondary Producers (Kg)\nAverage International Prices (US$/ounce)\n \n \n \n \n18 \nFigure 16: Quarterly Trends in Platinum \nOutput and International Prices \n \nSource: Ministry of Mines, Chamber of Mines 2020 \n \nFigure 17: Quarterly Trends in Palladium \nOutput and International Prices \n \nSource: Ministry of Mines, Chamber of Mines 2020 \n \nPGMs largely benefitted from the firming prices, \non account of supply bottlenecks as a result of \nCovid-19 induced work stoppages in South \nAfrica, the major supplier, as well as strong \ndemand in precious metals by investors that offset \nthe decrease in demand from automotive, \njewellery and industrial use. \nNickel \nNickel output stood at 4 369 tonnes in the third \nquarter of 2020, surpassed both output for the \nsame period in 2019 and the second quarter of \n2020 by 15.2% and 14.4%, respectively, as shown \nin the Figure 18. \nFigure 18: Quarterly Trends in Nickel Output \nand International prices \n \nSource: Ministry of Mines, Chamber of Mines, 2020 \n \nNickel production continues to be dominated by \nsecondary producers, who contributed about \n58.7% in the third quarter of 2020 while primary \nproducers contributed about 42.3% in the same \nperiod. \n Diamond \nDiamond output stood at 54,1390 carats in the \nthird quarter of 2020, about 12.8% more than in \nthe comparable period in 2019. Production was, \n720\n740\n760\n780\n800\n820\n840\n860\n880\n900\n920\n0\n500\n1000\n1500\n2000\n2500\n3000\n3500\n4000\n4500\n5000\nQ3 2019 Q4 2019 q2 2020\nq3 2020\nUS$\nOutput Kg\nPlatinum (Kg)\nAverage Price (US$/Ounce)\n0\n500\n1000\n1500\n2000\n2500\n0\n500\n1000\n1500\n2000\n2500\n3000\n3500\n4000\nQ3\n2019\nQ4\n2019\nq1\n2020\nq2\n2020\nq3\n2020\nUS$\nOutput Kg\nPalladium\nAverage prices\n0\n2000\n4000\n6000\n8000\n10000\n12000\n14000\n16000\n18000\n3500\n3600\n3700\n3800\n3900\n4000\n4100\n4200\n4300\n4400\n4500\nQ3 2019 Q4 2019 q1 2020 q2 2020 q3 2020\nNickel (tonnes)\nAverage Price (US$/tonne)\n \n \n \n \n19 \nhowever, 42% lower than in the second quarter of \n2020, partly due to processing of low ore grades \nat one of the mines, as well as working capital \nchallenges as mining houses faced cash flow \nchallenges due to closure of markets. \n \nChrome \nChrome production remained subdued during the \nthird quarter of 2020 largely due to the Covid-19 \npandemic which culminated in reduced demand \nfor chrome and related products in the major \nmarkets, China and Europe. Consequently, \nchrome output in the third quarter of 2020 was \n27%, lower than in the second quarter of 2020. \nFigure shows quarterly trends in chrome \nproduction and developments in chrome ore and \nHCF average international prices. \nFigure 19: Quarterly trends in chrome \nproduction and average prices \n \nSource: Ministry of Mines, Chamber of Mines, 2020 \nELECTRICITY \nTotal power generated during the third quarter of \n2020 amounted to 1,825.62 GWh, 29% up from \nthe 1,411.77 GWh produced in the preceding \nquarter, and 20% above the performance of the \ncomparable period in 2019. The increase in \nelectricity output for the third quarter of 2020 is \nlargely due to a 65% increase in output from \nKariba Hydro. Table 9 shows the quarterly power \noutput from the various plants during the period \nunder review. \n \nTable 9: Total Electricity Output (GWh) \n \nQ3 2019 \nQ2 2020 \nQ3 2020 \n Kariba \n609.79 \n 747.69 \n1,235.90 \n Hwange \n839.12 \n 618.44 \n522.89 \n Bulawayo \n13.88 \n 5.90 \n7.77 \n Munyati \n17.57 \n 2.53 \n13.70 \n Harare \n24.98 \n 10.02 \n27.17 \n IPPS \n16.61 \n 27.18 \n18.20 \nTotal \n1,521.95 \n 1,411.77 1,825.62 \nSource: ZERA, ZPC, 2020 \nCumulatively, energy sent out amounted to \n4 569.15 GWh in the nine months to September \n2020, compared to 6 342.61 produced in 2019. \n \nAll power producers recorded declines in power \ngeneration throughout the period under review. \nThe poor performance of the thermal power \nstations is attributable to the frequent machinery \n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\n0\n50000\n100000\n150000\n200000\n250000\n300000\n350000\n400000\n450000\nQ3\n2019\nQ4\n2019\nq1\n2020\nq2\n2020\nq3\n2020\nUS$/tonne\nTonnes\nTotal Chrome ore\nAverage Price of Chrome ore (US$/tonne)\n \n \n \n \n20 \nbreakdowns and shortage of spares, while lower \nwater allocation affected production at Kariba. \nTable 10 compares the performance of the power \nproducers in 2019 and 2020. \n \nTable 10: Electricity output \nPower \nStation \n2019 \nQ1-Q3 \n2020 \nQ1-Q3 \nVariance \n% \nKariba \n3,597.98 \n2,638.15 \n-26.66 \nHwange \n2,443.97 \n1,768.96 \n-27.59 \nBulawayo \n 42.03 \n 19.87 \n-52.73 \nMunyati \n 72.45 \n 20.20 \n-72.12 \nHarare \n 65.12 \n 39.24 \n-39.74 \nIPPs \n 123.05 \n 82.72 \n-32.78 \nTotal (GWhs) \n 6,342.61 \n \n4,569.15 \n-27.96 \nSource: ZERA, ZPC, 2020 \nINFLATION DEVELOPMENTS \nHeadline inflation decelerated from 737.26% in \nJune 2020 to end the third quarter at 659.40%. \nThe easing of inflationary pressures is attributed \nto the stability of the Z$ exchange rate against \nmajor currency following the introduction of the \nForex Auction System to manage the allocation \nof forex in the formal market. \n \nAnnual food inflation eased from 835.56% in \nJune 2020 to 724.40% in September 2020, price \nincreases \nin \nthe \nmajor \nsubcategories \nof \nvegetables, bread, cereals and meat, resulted in \nhigh food inflation over the third quarter. \n \nYear-on-year non-food inflation also declined \nfrom 678.29% at the end of the second quarter, to \n619.77 in September 2020. Housing, water, \nelectricity, gas and other fuels, miscellaneous \ngoods and services, communication and transport \ndrove non-food inflation during the quarter. \nFigure \n20 \ndepicts \nthe \nannual \ninflation \ndevelopments \nfrom \nSeptember \n2019 \nto \nSeptember 2020. \n \n \nFigure 20: Quarterly Inflation Profile (%) \n \nSource: Zimstat 2020 \nThe disinflationary trend experienced in the third \nquarter of 2020 saw month-on-month inflation \ndecelerating to 3.83% in September 2020, from \n8.44% in August 2020 and 35.53% in July 2020. \n \nThe fall in monthly inflation was reflected in \ndeclines for both food and non-food inflation as \nshown in Figure 21. Monthly non-food inflation \nwas driven by education, housing, water, \nelectricity, gas and other fuels, in light of \nincreases in municipality charges during the \nperiod under review. Vegetables, bread and \n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n700\n800\n900\nSep-19\nDec-19\nMar-20\nJun-20\nSep-20\nFood\nNon-Food\nAll Items\n \n \n \n \n21 \ncereals and meat continued to have the largest \ncontribution to food inflation over the quarter. \n \nFigure 21: Monthly Inflation Profile (%) \n \nSource: Zimstat 2020 \nBlended Consumer Price Inflation \nThe blended CPI inflation, which combines the \naverage changes in price of goods and services sold \nin the ZWL and the USD, largely mimicked the \ndisinflationary trend of headline inflation. Annual \nblended CPI inflation decelerated from the June \n2020 rate of 457.19%, to 376.29% in September, \nlargely due to declines in food inflation. \n \nBlended non-food inflation also fell, due to declines \nin alcoholic beverages and tobacco, clothing and \nfootwear, recreation and culture and miscellaneous \ngoods \nand \nservices. \nRising \ncharges \nin \ncommunication, particularly for internet services, \nhowever, partially offset the declines. \n \n \n2 All monetary numbers are in ZW$ since the adoption of \nthe inter-bank foreign exchange market in February 2019. \nMonthly blended CPI inflation declined from \n29.44% in June 2020 to -0.47% in September 2020, \nwith actual price declines recorded for most \ncategories \nin \nSeptember \n2020, \nexcept \nfor \ncommunication; alcoholic beverages and tobacco; \nand food and non-alcoholic beverages. \n \n4. MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS2 \n \nBroad money stood at Z$153.84 billion in third \nquarter of 2020, compared to Z$99.82 billion \nrecorded in the second quarter. The growth was \nlargely due to increase in the foreign currency \ncomponent, from Z$57.70 billion as at end June \n2020 to Z$92.19 billion as at end of September \n2020. The expansion in foreign currency \ncomponent largely reflected valuation changes \nowing to exchange rate depreciation. \nTime deposits also recorded a quarterly increase \nof 27.69%, from Z$4.02 billion in June 2020 to \nZ$6.94 billion in September 2020. \nForeign currency deposits accounted for 59.93% \nof money stock. Local currency transferable, time \ndeposits, NCD and currency in circulation \naccounted for 34.17%, 4.51%, 0.70% and 0.69%, \nrespectively. \nFigure 22 shows annual broad money supply \ncomponents in nominal terms as well as growth \nrates. \n-10\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\nNov-19\nDec-19\nJan-20\nFeb-20\nMar-20\nApr-20\nMay-20\nJun-20\nJul-20\nAug-20\nSep-20\nFood\nNon-Food\nOverall\n \n \n \n \n22 \nFigure 22: Broad Money Developments \n \nSource: RBZ, 2020 \nDomestic Credit \nDomestic credit stood at Z$63.49 billion as at end \nSeptember 2020, an increase of 26.70% from \nZ$50.11 billion recorded in June 2020. The \ngrowth was largely driven by an increase in credit \nto private sector of 52.73%, against a decline of \ncredit to other financial corporations of 55.19%. \nDuring the third quarter of 2020, net claims on \nGovernment declined by 18.79% to close the \nquarter at Z$9.17 billion. \n \nCredit to the private sector was utilised as follows: \nagriculture, 27.38%; manufacturing, 18.59%; \nhouseholds, 17.00%; distribution, 10.68%; and \nmining, 10.68%, as shown in Figure 23. \nFigure 23: Distribution of Private Sector \nCredit \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020 \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2020 \n \nCredit to the private sector was channelled \ntowards inventory build-up, 44.36%; other \nrecurrent expenditures, 22.07%; and fixed capital \ninvestment, 17.04%; among other purposes. \nInterest Rates \nNominal lending rates quoted by banks ranged \nbetween 5% and 70% during the quarter under \nreview. \n \nDuring the quarter under review, time deposit \ninterest rates for 60-day and 90-day tenures \nregistered maximum averages of 7.73% and \n8.37%, compared to respective rates of 7.12% and \n7.70, recorded in the previous quarter. Average \nmaximum savings rate remained unchanged at \nprevious quarter’s level of 5.19%. \n \n \n \n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\nMar-18\nJun-18\nSep-18\nDec-18\nMar-19\nJun-19\nSep-19\nDec-19\nMar-20\nJun-20\nSep-20\n%\nZ$ Billion\nCurrency in Circulation\nFCAs\nLCY Transferable Deposits\nTime Deposits\nNCDs\nAnnual Growth\nHouseholds\n11.77%\nAgriculture\n21.74%\nMining\n12.57%\nManufacturing\n14.96%\nDistribution\n12.17%\nConstruction\n0.60%\nTransport & \nCommunicati\nons\n1.42%\nServices\n6.90%\nFinancial Org. \n& Investments\n17.75%\nOther\n0.12%\n \n \n \n \n23 \n5. STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS \n \nThe quarter ended 30th September 2020 was \ndominated by bearish sentiments. This resulted in \ndeclines in all the major indices. The All Share, \nTop 10 and Medium Cap indices shed 8.42%, \n11.33% and 4.43% to close at 1 638.17 points, \n1 093.10 points and 3 156.59 points, respectively. \nOn an annual basis, however, the All Share and \nTop 10 indices went up by 1 323.01% and \n829.51%, from 115.12 points and 117.60 points \nrecorded in September 2019, respectively. \n \nTable 11: Key Stock Market Developments \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange 2020 \n \nDuring the period under analysis, the industrial \nindex declined by 8.26% to close at 5 385.73 \npoints while the mining index gained 3.33% to \nclose at 4 128.52 points. On a year on year basis, \nthe industrial and mining indices grew by \n1 291.77% and 2 421.08%, from 386.97 points \nand 163.76 points registered in September 2019, \nrespectively. \nFigure 24 shows the developments of the ZSE All \nShare and Top 10 Indices for the period \nSeptember 2019 to September 2020. \n \n Figure 24: ZSE All Share and Top 10 Indices \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange 2020 \n \nFigure 25 shows industrial and mining indices \ndevelopments for the period September 2019 to \nSeptember 2020. \n \n0\n250\n500\n750\n1000\n1250\n1500\n1750\n2000\n30-Sep-19\n31-Oct-19\n30-Nov-19\n31-Dec-19\n31-Jan-20\n29-Feb-20\n31-Mar-20\n30-Apr-20\n31-May-20\n30-Jun-20\n31-Jul-20\n31-Aug-20\n30-Sep-20\nAll Share Index\nTop 10 Index\nZSE Indicator \n \nJun-20 \n \nSep-20 \n \nChange \n(%) \nAll \nShare \nIndex \n(points) \n1,788.75 \n1,638.17 \n-8.42 \nTop 10 Index (points) \n1,232.79 \n1,093.10 \n-11.33 \nMedium Cap Index \n(points) \n3,302.89 \n3,156.59 \n-4.43 \nSmall \nCap \nIndex \n(points) \n5,558.15 \n5,664.14 \n1.91 \nIndustrial \nIndex \n(points) \n5 870.36 \n5,385.73 \n-8.26 \nMining Index (points) \n3 995.48 \n4,128.52 \n3.33 \nVolume \nof \nshares \ntraded (m) \n706.07 \n1 257.54 \n78.10 \nMarket Turnover ($m) \n2 745.81 \n5 667.64 \n106.41 \nZSE \nCapitalization \n($m) \n228 577.11 \n206 502.49 \n-9.66 \nNet Foreign Position \n($m) \n-404,75 \n-221,53 \n-221533.63 \n \n \n \n \n24 \nFigure 25: Industrial and Mining Indices \n \n Source: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2020 \n \nMarket Capitalisation and Turnover \nAs a consequence of dampened activity on the \nlocal bourse, market capitalization declined by \n9.66%, from Z$228.58 billion recorded in the \nsecond quarter of 2020 to close at Z$206.50 \nbillion during the quarter ended September 2020. \nThe cumulative turnover volume and value rose \nby 78.10% and 106.41% to 1.26 billion shares and \nZ$5.67 billion, respectively. The increase in \nvolume and value of shares during the quarter \nunder review was largely a result of a block trade \nwhich saw 928.35 million Bindura Nickel \nCorporation (BNC) shares exchanging hands at \nZW$3.70 each. The shares were sold by a \nforeigner and bought locally. \n \n \nFigure \n26 \nshows \nmarket \ncapitalization \ndevelopments for the period September 2019 to \nSeptember 2020. \nFigure 26: Market Capitalization \n \n Source: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2020 \nFigure 27 shows developments in market turnover \nvolumes and values for the period from January \n2020 to September 2020. \n \nFigure 27: ZSE Market Turnover \n \n Source: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2020 \n0\n450\n900\n1,350\n1,800\n2,250\n2,700\n3,150\n3,600\n4,050\n4,500\n0\n650\n1,300\n1,950\n2,600\n3,250\n3,900\n4,550\n5,200\n5,850\n30-Sep-19\n31-Oct-19\n30-Nov-19\n31-Dec-19\n31-Jan-20\n29-Feb-20\n31-Mar-20\n30-Apr-20\n31-May-20\n30-Jun-20\n31-Jul-20\n31-Aug-20\n30-Sep-20\nMining Index\nIndustrial Index\nIndustrial Index\nMining Index\n4.0\n21.0\n38.0\n55.0\n72.0\n89.0\n106.0\n123.0\n140.0\n157.0\n174.0\n191.0\n208.0\n225.0\n30-Sep-19\n31-Oct-19\n30-Nov-19\n31-Dec-19\n31-Jan-20\n29-Feb-20\n31-Mar-20\n30-Apr-20\n31-May-20\n30-Jun-20\n31-Jul-20\n31-Aug-20\n30-Sep-20\n$ Billions\n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1,000\n22-Jan-20\n05-Feb-20\n19-Feb-20\n04-Mar-20\n18-Mar-20\n01-Apr-20\n15-Apr-20\n29-Apr-20\n13-May-20\n27-May-20\n10-Jun-20\n24-Jun-20\n08-Jul-20\n22-Jul-20\n05-Aug-20\n19-Aug-20\n02-Sep-20\n16-Sep-20\n30-Sep-20\nZW$ millions\nBindura Nickel \nCorporation block \ntrade which \n \n \n \n \n25 \nForeign investor participation, as measured by its \ncontribution to value of shares traded, declined to \n2.30%, compared to 10.35% recorded in the \nsecond quarter of 2020. Concomitantly, net \nforeign position worsened by Z$221.13 billion \nduring the quarter under review. This could be a \nresult of dampened foreign investor appetite. \n \n6. PAYMENT, \nCLEARING \nAND \nSETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES \n \nThe value of transactions processed through the \nNational Payment Systems in the third quarter \nending increased by 109% to Z$738.02 billion \nfrom Z$353.20 billion recorded in the previous \nquarter. Volumes of transactions, however, \ndecreased by 8% to 426.40 million from 465.50 \nmillion during the same period. \n \nTable 12 provides the statistical information on \nvarious payment streams for the quarters ending \nJune 2020 and September 2020. \n \n \nTable \n12: \nConsolidated \nTransactional \nActivities \nValues in Z$ Million \n \nQ2 \nQ3 \nChan\nge \nProporti\non \n2020 \n2020 \nRTGS \n198,107.88 \n473,957.33 \n139% \n64.22% \nCASH \n6,079.09 \n20,222.81 \n233% \n2.74% \nCHEQUE \n0.001 \n2,715.00 \n108% \n0.00% \nPOS \n21,944.11 \n47,946.98 \n118% \n6.50% \nATMS \n958.11 \n4,539.22 \n374% \n0.62% \nMOBILE \n69,193.73 \n79,691.83 \n15% \n10.80% \nINTERNET \n56,917.35 \n111,663.09 \n96% \n15.13% \nTOTAL \n353,200.29 \n738,021.23 \n109% \n100.00% \nVolumes \nRTGS \n2,096,942 \n2,619,680 \n25% \n0.61% \nCASH \n1,934,972 \n2,406,903 \n24% \n0.56% \nCHEQUE \n0 \n6 \nN/A \n0.00% \nPOS \n40,168,920 \n44,846,879 \n12% \n10.52% \nATMs \n556,836 \n809,389 \n45% \n0.19% \nMOBILE \n417,650,402 \n373,440,240 \n-11% \n87.58% \nINTERNET \n3,093,717 \n2,277,122 \n-26% \n0.53% \nTOTAL \n465,501,789 \n426,400,219 \n-8% \n100.00% \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n26 \nLARGE VALUE PAYMENTS \n \nZimbabwe \nElectronic \nTransfer \nand \nSettlement System \nThe value of transactions processed through the \nRTGS system increased by 64.22% to Z$473.96 \nbillion for the third quarter compared to previous \nquarter. Volume of transactions, also increased \nby 0.61% to 2.62 million transactions during the \nsame period, as shown in Figure 28. \n \nFigure 28: Values and Volumes of RTGS \nTransactions \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020 \n \nSWIFT Foreign Currency Transactions \n \nSWIFT foreign currency payments increased by \n25% to $1.17 billion in the third quarter from \n$935.48 million in the second quarter of 2020. \nDuring the same period, SWIFT foreign currency \nreceipts increased by 9% to $989.34 million, from \n$909.93 million, as shown in Figure 29. The net \nforeign currency outflow amounted to $177.41 \nmillion in the quarter ending 30th September 2020 \nfrom a net outflow of $26.55 million recorded in \nthe quarter ending 30th June 2020, as shown in \nFigure 29. \n \nFigure \n29: \nSWIFT \nQuarterly \nForeign \nCurrency Transactions \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020 \nCASH \nOver the Counter Cash Withdrawals \nThe value of cash withdrawals increased by 233% \nfrom $6.08 billion in the quarter ending 30th June \n2020 to Z$20.22 billion recorded in quarter \nending 30th September 2020. The corresponding \n0\n500\n1,000\n1,500\n2,000\n2,500\n3,000\n3,500\n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\n300\n350\n400\n450\n500\n2019 Q22019 Q32019 Q42020 Q12020 Q22020 Q3\nRTGS Values in Billions\nRTGS Volumes in Thousamds\nValues\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n0.50\n0.60\n0.70\n0.80\n0.90\n1.00\n1.10\n1.20\n1.30\nQ4\n2018\nQ1\n2019\nQ2\n2019\nQ3\n2019\nQ4\n2019\nQ1\n2020\nQ2\n2020\nQ3\n2020\nVolumes in Thousands\nValue in US$B\nValue of Receipts\nValue of Payments\n Volumes of Payments\n Volumes of Receipts\n \n \n \n \n27 \nvolumes increased by 24% to 2.41 million, as \nshown in Figure 30. \n \nFigure \n30: \nOver \nthe \nCounter \nCash \nWithdrawals \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020 \n \nRetail Payments \nFigures 31 and 32 show the trend in the aggregate \nvalues and volumes of retail transactions from \nquarter ending 30th June 2020 to quarter ending \n30th September 2020. The aggregate values of \nretail transactions increased by 70.26% to \nZ$264.06 billion in the period under review from \nZ$155.09 billion recorded in the second quarter \nended June 2020. The retail volumes decreased by \n8.55% to 423.78 million during the third quarter \nof 2020, as compared to the previous quarter. \n \nFigure 31: Retail Transaction Values \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020 \nFigure 32: Retail Transaction Volumes \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020 \n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n2019\nQ2\n2019\nQ3\n2019\nQ4\n2020\nQ1\n2020\nQ2\n2020\nQ3\n0.0\n1.0\n2.0\n3.0\n4.0\n5.0\n6.0\nUS$ BILLIONS\nMILLIONS\nVolumes\nValues\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\n2019 Q2\n2019 Q3\n2019 Q4\n2020 Q1\n2020 Q2\n2020 Q3\nMobile in Billions\nOther Retail Values in Billions\nCHEQUE\nPOS\nATMS\nINTERNET\nCASH\nMOBILE\n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\n2019 Q2 2019 Q3 2019 Q4 2020 Q1 2020 Q2 2020 Q3\nMobile Volumes in Millions\nOther Retai Volumes in Millions\nCHEQUE\nPOS\nATMs\nINTERNET\nCASH\nMOBILE\n \n \n \n \n28 \nCollateral3 \nThe value of collateral increased to Z$1.86 billion \nin the third quarter ending 30th September 2020 \nfrom Z$1.05 billion recorded in the previous \nquarter, as shown in Figure 33. \n \nFigure 33: Collateral Amounts from June 2019 \nto September 2020 \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020 \nAccess Points and Devices \nThe mobile banking agents decreased to 52,065 in \nthe third quarter ending 30th September 2020 from \n73,281 reported in the second quarter ended 30th \nJune 2020. POS population increased to 128,896 \nfrom 126,696 in line with the promotion of \nelectronic means of payment and the ATM \npopulation decreased to 527 from 537. There were \n \n3 The local collateral figure comprises of Cheque, Zimswitch, \nChengetedzai Deposit Corporation settlement systems. \n4.26 million active mobile financial services \nsubscribers registered in the period under review \nfrom 5.31 million registered subscribers recorded \nin the previous quarter ending 30th June 2020. \nTable 13 shows payment access points and \ndevices for the first quarter of 2020 and the second \nand third quarters of 2020. \n \nTable 13: Payment Systems Access Points and \nDevices \n \nQuarter \nending \nMar 2020 \nQuarter \nending \nJun 2020 \nQuarter \nending \nSept \n2020 \nMobile Banking \nagents \n71,054 \n73,281 \n52,065 \nATMs \n539 \n539 \n527 \nPOS \n122,138 \n126,696 \n128,896 \nPAYMENT SYSTEM ACCESS DEVICES \nDebit Cards \n5,358,746 \n5,837,878 \n5,989,282 \nCredit Cards \n18,060 \n17,431 \n16,595 \nPrepaid Cards \n116,143 \n120,433 \n112,154 \nMobile Banking \nsubscribers \n5,394,816 \n \n5,307,515 \n \n4,261,048 \nInternet \nBanking \nsubscribers \n360,850 \n \n410,724 \n \n427,993 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020 \n \n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1,000\n1,200\n1,400\n1,600\n1,800\n2,000\nQ2 2019\nQ3 2019\nQ4 2019\nQ1 2020\nQ2 2020\nQ3 2020\nZ$ MILLIONS\n \n \n \n \n29 \n7. \nFISCAL DEVELOPMENTS \nDuring the third quarter of 2020, Government \nrevenue amounted to Z$54.85 billion, against \nexpenditures of Z$55.89 billion, culminating in a \nbudget deficit of Z$1.04 billion. Table 14 shows \nthe summarised fiscal positions during the second \nand third quarter of the 2020. \n \nTable 14: Summary of Second and Third \nQuarter 2020 Fiscal Position (Z$ million) \n \nQ2 \nQ3 \nRevenue \n19 631.45 \n 54 852.14 \nTax revenue \n19 094.72 \n53 686.03 \nNon-Tax Revenue \n536.74 \n1 166.11 \nExpenditure \n15 214.60 \n55 888.73 \nCurrent expenditure \n10 917.55 \n33 979.74 \no/w employment costs \n5 059.75 \n17 714.08 \nCapital Expenditure \n4 297.05 \n21 908.99 \nOverall Balance \n4 416.85 \n(1 036.59) \nSource: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, \n2020 \nGovernment Revenue \nGovernment revenue collections during the third \nquarter of 2020 increased to Z$54.85 billion, \nsurpassing the target by 21.6%. Tax revenue \namounted to Z$53.69 billion which accounted for \n97.9% of total revenue, with the remaining \nZ$1.17 billion (2.1%) being non-tax revenues. \n \n \nGovernment Revenue Structure \nTaxes on income and profits at Z$18.48 billion \naccounted for 33.7% of total revenue. Value \nadded tax (VAT) accounted for 26.8%; followed \nby excise duty 13.6%; Tax on financial and \ncapital transfers, 13%; customs duties, 17%. \nFigure 34: Government Revenue Structure \n \nSource: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, \n2020 \nGovernment Expenditure \nCumulative Government spending in the third \nquarter of 2020 amounted to Z$55.89 billion, \ncomprising \nof \nZ$33.98 \nbillion \nrecurrent \nexpenditure, interest on debt of Z$0.07 billion and \ncapital expenditure of Z$21.91 billion. \nTable 15 shows a comparison of Government \nexpenditure in the second and third quarters of \n2020. \nTax on \nIncome and \nProfits, 60%\nCustoms \nduties, 17%\nExcise duties, \n24%\nTaxes on \nSpecific \nServices, 1%\nValue Added \nTax (VAT), \n47%\ntax on gross \nRevenue, 11%\nTaxes on \nfinancial and \ncapital \ntransactions , \n13%\nOther Indirect \ntaxes , 0%\nNon-tax \nRevenue, 4%\n \n \n \n \n30 \nTable 15: Summarised Government Spending \nin Q2 and Q3 of 2020 (Z$ billion) \n \nQ2 \n2020 \n% of \nTotal \nQ3 \n2020 \n% of \nTotal \nEmployment cost \n6.24 \n41.0 \n20.97 \n37.5 \nOperations \n4.57 \n30.1 \n12.93 \n23.1 \nInterest On debt \n0.10 \n0.7 \n0.07 \n0.1 \nCapital \nExpenditure \n4.30 \n28.2 \n21.91 \n39.2 \nSource: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, \n2020 \nOverall Budget Balance \nThe fiscal developments in the third quarter of \n2020 culminated in a budget deficit of Z$1.04 \nbillion, down from the Z$4.42 billion surplus in \nthe second quarter. Figure 35 shows the monthly \ndevelopments in Government budget balance in \n2020. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFigure 35: Budget balance Z$ Billion in \nJanuary to September 2020 \n \nSource: Ministry of Finance and Economic \nDevelopment, 2020 \n \n \nRESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE \nDECEMBER 2020 \n-10\n-5\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\nJanuary\nFebruary\nMarch\nApril\nMay\nJune\nJuly\nAugust\nSeptember\nRevenue\nExpenditure\nOverall Balance\n \n \nSTATISTICAL TABLES \n1. Depository Corporation Survey S1 \n2. Central Bank Survey S2 \n3. Other Depository Corporation Survey S3 \n \n4. Liabilities and Assets of the Central Bank \n4.1.Reserve Bank: Assets \n \n \n \n S4 \n \n4.2.Reserve Bank: liabilities S5 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n5. Other Depository Corporation \n5.1.Other Depository Asset S6 \n5.2.Other Depository Liabilities S7 \n \n6. Commercial Banks \n6.1.Commercial Banks: Assets \n \n S8 \n6.2.Commercial Banks: Liabilities \n S9 \n7. Building Societies \n \n \n \n \n \n \n7.1.Building Societies: Assets \n \n S10 \n \n7.2.Building Societies: Liabilities S11 \n \n \n \n8. Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks \n8.1.Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks’ Loans and Advances S12 \n8.2.Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Bank’s Deposits \n \n S13 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n9. National Payment Systems \n \n \n9.1.Values of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS14 \n9.2.Volumes of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS14 \n \n10. Interest Rates, Security Yields and Prices \n10.1. Lending Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS15 \n10.2. Deposit Rates S15 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n11. Stock Exchange Indices \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS16 \n \n12. Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n12.1. Monthly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS17 \n12.2. Quarterly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS18 \n12.3. Annual Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS19 \n \n13. Balance of Payments \n13.1. Cross Border Payments \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS20 \n \n \n \n \n32 \n13.2. Cross Border Receipts \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS21 \n \n14. External Sector \n14.1. External Debt Outstanding By Debtor \n \n \n \n \nS22 \n14.2. External Debt Outstanding by Source \n \n \n \n \nS23 \n14.3. External Debt Service and Service Ratios \n \n \n \n \nS24 \n \n \n \nSep-19\nOct-19\nNov-19\nDec-19\nJan-20\nFeb-20\nMar-20\nApr-20\nMay-20\nJun-20\nJul-20\nAug-20\nSep-20\nNet Foreign Assets\n-33,219,232.58\n-38,974,813.91\n-39,899,004.55\n-40,662,175.37\n-41,890,476.47\n-41,693,753.23\n-64,413,672.15\n-89,046,879.04\n-97,000,590.99\n-234,278,568.81\n-309,340,585.00\n-323,918,937.77\n-317,370,813.35\nCentral Bank(net)\n-39,349,960.03\n-46,395,160.21\n-48,267,748.85\n-50,285,843.15\n-51,596,769.75\n-51,659,786.89\n-78,356,892.58\n-104,544,431.97\n-114,377,001.26\n-275,623,563.54\n-366,357,650.73\n-391,303,802.50\n-386,104,783.47\nForeign Assets\n6,464,247.45\n5,444,857.74\n5,552,951.79\n5,504,939.77\n5,234,031.88\n5,504,836.03\n4,948,927.35\n4,516,675.83\n5,054,120.38\n17,845,745.97\n23,630,101.57\n27,645,575.83\n24,043,853.69\nForeign Liabilities\n45,814,207.48\n51,840,017.94\n53,820,700.64\n55,790,782.92\n56,830,801.63\n57,164,622.92\n83,305,819.93\n109,061,107.80\n119,431,121.65\n293,469,309.50\n389,987,752.30\n418,949,378.32\n410,148,637.16\nOther Depository Corporations(net)\n6,130,727.45\n7,420,346.30\n8,368,744.30\n9,623,667.78\n9,706,293.27\n9,966,033.66\n13,943,220.42\n15,497,552.93\n17,376,410.27\n41,344,994.73\n57,017,065.73\n67,384,864.72\n68,733,970.12\nForeign Assets\n9,382,906.26\n10,478,858.26\n11,622,874.19\n12,948,416.33\n13,153,007.07\n13,344,846.71\n18,827,846.39\n20,437,584.87\n22,510,950.77\n53,130,231.08\n72,022,862.19\n84,210,291.97\n83,986,978.02\nForeign Liabilities\n3,252,178.80\n3,058,511.96\n3,254,129.88\n3,324,748.55\n3,446,713.79\n3,378,813.04\n4,884,625.96\n4,940,031.94\n5,134,540.50\n11,785,236.35\n15,005,796.46\n16,825,427.25\n15,253,007.90\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n56,770,962.37\n67,904,876.25\n71,719,556.15\n75,680,355.31\n78,162,546.08\n80,030,632.68\n112,816,570.52\n141,032,021.98\n156,475,813.43\n334,099,369.96\n441,599,870.68\n470,066,520.53\n471,206,354.87\nDomestic Claims\n21,168,772.43\n24,743,158.13\n28,575,556.98\n27,819,807.93\n28,569,680.55\n30,260,777.76\n34,054,407.09\n32,574,364.29\n39,063,809.71\n50,113,139.15\n59,894,402.15\n62,852,286.66\n63,493,587.42\nClaims on Central Government(net)\n13,061,889.35\n14,409,797.90\n15,813,415.72\n14,062,737.58\n12,724,160.31\n12,697,777.62\n12,949,759.72\n10,305,498.64\n14,278,461.16\n11,286,874.74\n14,475,978.36\n11,939,163.62\n9,165,660.28\nClaims on Central Government\n16,410,748.86\n16,955,759.46\n17,933,911.03\n15,580,358.19\n16,676,243.01\n16,838,781.22\n17,542,397.05\n17,458,577.62\n18,059,689.23\n22,643,966.48\n25,495,963.30\n25,856,421.22\n24,510,261.70\nCentral Bank\n12,831,965.83\n13,205,609.13\n13,782,384.33\n11,338,532.85\n12,298,711.08\n12,540,517.65\n12,762,386.66\n12,737,251.42\n13,476,066.34\n16,374,954.71\n18,731,582.60\n18,958,846.78\n17,824,429.35\nODCs\n3,578,783.04\n3,750,150.34\n4,151,526.70\n4,241,825.34\n4,377,531.93\n4,298,263.57\n4,780,010.39\n4,721,326.20\n4,583,622.89\n6,269,011.77\n6,764,380.71\n6,897,574.44\n6,685,832.35\nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n3,348,859.52\n2,545,961.56\n2,120,495.31\n1,517,620.61\n3,952,082.70\n4,141,003.60\n4,592,637.32\n7,153,078.98\n3,781,228.06\n11,357,091.74\n11,019,984.94\n13,917,257.60\n15,344,601.42\nCentral Bank\n3,294,387.73\n2,477,362.61\n2,021,412.86\n1,399,114.53\n3,859,448.40\n4,062,791.73\n4,183,646.73\n6,636,736.42\n3,150,547.32\n9,877,720.74\n9,288,102.23\n13,066,429.55\n13,813,071.38\nODCs\n54,471.79\n68,598.95\n99,082.45\n118,506.08\n92,634.30\n78,211.87\n408,990.60\n516,342.56\n630,680.74\n1,479,371.00\n1,731,882.71\n850,828.05\n1,531,530.04\nClaims on Other Sectors\n8,106,883.08\n10,333,360.23\n12,762,141.26\n13,757,070.35\n15,845,520.24\n17,563,000.14\n21,104,647.37\n22,268,865.65\n24,785,348.54\n38,826,264.41\n45,418,423.79\n50,913,123.04\n54,327,927.14\nOther Financial Corporations\n152,985.99\n162,263.79\n160,062.11\n186,506.15\n202,429.27\n281,264.28\n307,104.48\n290,091.57\n356,669.90\n753,439.03\n1,010,123.42\n298,579.49\n338,002.03\nState and Local Government\n30,341.36\n28,130.16\n28,347.69\n26,320.30\n32,308.50\n31,704.96\n30,621.46\n27,844.50\n26,575.69\n23,225.26\n25,961.37\n27,859.83\n35,174.26\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n1,048,058.46\n2,322,563.84\n2,861,071.05\n2,431,172.28\n2,564,682.98\n2,591,284.85\n3,301,602.89\n3,508,675.95\n2,824,122.73\n5,863,041.63\n5,154,947.39\n3,941,697.68\n4,796,976.15\nPrivate Sector\n6,875,497.28\n7,820,402.44\n9,712,660.41\n11,113,071.62\n13,046,099.50\n14,658,746.06\n17,465,318.54\n18,442,253.62\n21,577,980.23\n32,186,558.49\n39,227,391.60\n46,644,986.05\n49,157,774.70\nCentral Bank\n86,780.68\n89,898.41\n65,420.53\n75,911.82\n78,069.12\n174,180.02\n182,998.11\n182,226.89\n182,856.59\n185,977.83\n184,094.09\n184,679.11\n185,814.45\nODCs\n6,788,716.60\n7,730,504.03\n9,647,239.89\n11,037,159.81\n12,968,030.37\n14,484,566.04\n17,282,320.43\n18,260,026.74\n21,395,123.64\n32,000,580.66\n39,043,297.50\n46,460,306.94\n48,971,960.25\nOther Items(Net)\n-35,602,189.94\n-43,161,718.12\n-43,143,999.17\n-47,860,547.38\n-49,592,865.53\n-49,769,854.91\n-78,762,163.43\n-108,457,657.69\n-117,412,003.72\n-283,986,230.81\n-381,705,468.53\n-407,214,233.87\n-407,712,767.45\nShares and Other Equity\n-32,505,897.24\n-39,007,159.14\n-41,160,941.61\n-44,544,759.40\n-43,829,432.91\n-44,342,348.31\n-71,119,022.50\n-98,326,925.77\n-108,187,301.34\n-265,536,483.62\n-359,843,502.38\n-393,275,806.44\n-386,761,250.11\nLiabilities to Other Financial Corporations\n23,286.81\n24,632.93\n50,514.35\n119,397.64\n140,072.14\n154,917.78\n339,909.43\n233,181.06\n365,355.02\n348,181.06\n348,728.32\n422,486.38\n372,163.87\nRestricted Deposits\n1,546,424.26\n1,881,910.27\n1,980,372.79\n1,147,967.31\n1,346,272.48\n1,119,306.34\n1,947,438.89\n1,501,573.14\n845,775.37\n3,417,797.70\n1,726,243.32\n4,057,817.74\n1,036,012.77\nDeposits and Securities Excluded from Base Money\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nOther Items(net)\n-4,666,003.77\n-6,061,102.18\n-4,013,944.69\n-4,583,152.93\n-7,249,777.25\n-6,701,730.71\n-9,930,489.25\n-11,865,486.12\n-10,435,832.78\n-22,215,725.96\n-23,936,937.79\n-18,418,731.56\n-22,359,693.99\nBroad Money-M3\n23,551,729.79\n28,930,062.34\n31,820,551.60\n35,018,179.94\n36,272,069.61\n38,336,879.45\n48,402,898.37\n51,985,142.94\n59,475,222.44\n99,820,801.15\n132,259,285.68\n146,147,582.76\n153,835,541.52\nSecurities Other than Shares Included in Broad Money\n219,889.50\n205,671.08\n235,117.26\n243,976.57\n255,563.69\n260,055.92\n476,793.67\n337,556.97\n359,194.93\n863,206.40\n1,024,311.11\n1,111,664.44\n1,083,907.10\nBroad Money-M2\n23,331,840.28\n28,724,391.26\n31,585,434.34\n34,774,203.37\n36,016,505.92\n38,076,823.53\n47,926,104.70\n51,647,585.97\n59,116,027.50\n98,957,594.75\n131,234,974.57\n145,035,918.32\n152,751,634.42\nOther Deposits\n1,662,956.26\n1,854,294.19\n1,835,730.85\n1,887,924.83\n2,026,599.28\n2,194,313.07\n2,351,990.85\n2,522,855.18\n2,842,782.22\n4,017,695.39\n6,047,153.88\n5,431,611.26\n6,935,433.58\nNarrow Money-M1\n21,668,884.03\n26,870,097.07\n29,749,703.49\n32,886,278.54\n33,989,906.64\n35,882,510.46\n45,574,113.84\n49,124,730.79\n56,273,245.28\n94,939,899.37\n125,187,820.69\n139,604,307.06\n145,816,200.84\nTransferable Deposits\n20,977,141.17\n26,157,975.38\n28,913,109.34\n31,978,710.26\n33,036,665.86\n34,932,660.39\n44,529,936.02\n48,082,573.35\n55,147,175.33\n93,730,970.73\n123,981,130.10\n138,523,712.90\n144,756,556.77\n Of which Foreign Currency Accounts\n9,859,484.27\n11,155,597.09\n11,472,035.58\n11,938,732.84\n12,458,349.93\n12,476,934.91\n20,909,726.92\n19,463,088.16\n24,984,322.48\n57,701,775.14\n79,076,606.18\n86,014,194.25\n92,191,134.58\nCurrency Outside Depository Corporations\n691,742.86\n712,121.69\n836,594.15\n907,568.29\n953,240.77\n949,850.07\n1,044,177.82\n1,042,157.43\n1,126,069.95\n1,208,928.64\n1,206,690.59\n1,080,594.16\n1,059,644.06\nMemorandum Items\nReserve Money\n4,682,715.46\n6,810,750.63\n8,114,953.04\n10,327,816.88\n9,251,024.10\n9,380,944.48\n11,704,943.82\n12,459,746.60\n13,815,364.85\n12,651,566.81\n16,145,434.53\n12,383,054.95\n12,732,319.53\nFCAs as a Percentage of Deposits in M3\n43.1%\n39.5%\n37.0%\n35.0%\n35.3%\n33.4%\n44.2%\n38.2%\n42.8%\n58.5%\n60.3%\n59.3%\n60.3%\nEnd Period Exchange Rate\n15.20\n16.12\n16.26\n16.77\n17.35\n17.95\n25.00\n25.00\n25.00\n57.36\n76.76\n83.40\n81.44\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 2020\nNotes:\nNotes:\n(i) Depository corporations survey - formerly Monetary Survey.\n(ii) Broad money redefined using IMF's Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual of 2000. Major changes include exclusion of Government deposits held by banks from broad money.\n(iii) Transferable deposits made up of demand and savings deposits.\n(iv) NCDs are also referred to as securities included in broad money.\n(v) All classes of time deposits, short and long term are classified as time deposits, which are also termed other deposits.\n(vi) Credit to the private sector now excludes claims on other financial corporations, as well as claims on state and local government (local authorities)\n(vii) Depository corporations made up of the Central Bank and other depository corporations\n(viii) Other depository corporations (ODCs) - Commercial banks, merchant banks, building societies and POSB.\n(ix) In December 2017, the statistics were adjusted in restrospect by reclassifying Securities issued under Aftrades from claims on government to claims on central bank\n(x) In December 2017, the statistics were adjusted in restrospect by reclassifying amounts accessed by banks under the Aftrades from liabilities to Other Depository corporations and Other Financial Corporations to liabilities to Central Bank \n(xi) In December 2018, statistics were revised from November 2017 due to reclassification of lines of credit (foreign liabilities) that were initially classified as deposits included in broad money\n(xii) All monetary and financial statistics are valued in ZWL$ since the introduction of the interbank foreign exchange market in February 2019\n TABLE 1: DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS SURVEY (ZWL$ '000)\n \n \nS2 \n \n \n \nSep-19\nOct-19\nNov-19\nDec-19\nJan-20\nFeb-20\nMar-20\nApr-20\nMay-20\nJun-20\nJul-20\nAug-20\nSep-20\nNet Foreign Assets\n-39,349,960.03\n-46,395,160.21\n-48,267,748.85\n-50,285,843.15\n-51,596,769.75\n-51,659,786.89\n-78,356,892.58\n-104,544,431.97\n-114,377,001.26\n-275,623,563.54\n-366,357,650.73\n-391,303,802.50\n-386,104,783.47\nClaims on Non Residents\n6,464,247.45\n5,444,857.74\n5,552,951.79\n5,504,939.77\n5,234,031.88\n5,504,836.03\n4,948,927.35\n4,516,675.83\n5,054,120.38\n17,845,745.97\n23,630,101.57\n27,645,575.83\n24,043,853.69\nOfficial Reserves Assets\n1,511,299.58\n1,937,457.59\n1,915,477.05\n2,537,103.33\n2,888,945.28\n3,104,642.81\n1,759,943.91\n1,340,523.61\n1,452,620.38\n9,522,205.82\n12,511,281.83\n15,651,918.68\n12,374,572.35\nOther Foreign Assets\n4,952,947.87\n3,507,400.15\n3,637,474.74\n2,967,836.45\n2,345,086.60\n2,400,193.22\n3,188,983.44\n3,176,152.22\n3,601,500.00\n8,323,540.15\n11,118,819.74\n11,993,657.14\n11,669,281.34\nLess Liabilities to Non Residents\n45,814,207.48\n51,840,017.94\n53,820,700.64\n55,790,782.92\n56,830,801.63\n57,164,622.92\n83,305,819.93\n109,061,107.80\n119,431,121.65\n293,469,309.50\n389,987,752.30\n418,949,378.32\n410,148,637.16\nShort Term Liabilities\n32,602,281.08\n33,501,054.49\n34,223,789.11\n35,686,123.01\n39,597,730.68\n41,112,190.47\n55,611,921.72\n54,593,528.76\n54,707,783.64\n134,067,700.58\n179,874,148.53\n193,114,218.14\n190,611,160.64\nOther Foreign Liabilities*\n13,211,926.40\n18,338,963.45\n19,596,911.53\n20,104,659.91\n17,233,070.95\n16,052,432.45\n27,693,898.21\n54,467,579.05\n64,723,338.01\n159,401,608.92\n210,113,603.77\n225,835,160.18\n219,537,476.52\n of which blocked funds\n5,961,408.31\n10,796,643.82\n11,793,293.36\n11,993,435.57\n8,883,831.36\n7,456,288.96\n15,724,574.19\n42,561,402.55\n52,790,869.15\n131,743,040.88\n171,686,088.39\n184,824,435.01\n179,488,881.37\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n44,032,675.49\n53,205,910.84\n56,382,701.89\n60,613,660.02\n60,847,793.85\n61,040,731.37\n90,061,836.40\n117,004,178.58\n128,192,366.11\n288,275,130.35\n382,503,085.26\n403,686,857.45\n398,837,103.00\nDomestic Claims\n10,567,049.53\n12,972,537.88\n14,525,637.67\n12,259,697.53\n10,746,256.31\n10,973,320.90\n11,480,169.17\n9,144,133.05\n12,736,347.09\n10,707,313.49\n13,930,835.24\n9,173,375.62\n8,137,864.08\nNet Claims on Central Government\n9,537,578.10\n10,728,246.52\n11,760,971.47\n9,939,418.32\n8,439,262.68\n8,477,725.92\n8,578,739.93\n6,100,515.00\n10,322,164.33\n6,497,233.96\n9,443,480.36\n5,892,417.23\n4,011,357.97\nClaims on Central Government\n12,831,965.83\n13,205,609.13\n13,782,384.33\n11,338,532.85\n12,298,711.08\n12,540,517.65\n12,762,386.66\n12,737,251.42\n13,472,711.66\n16,374,954.71\n18,731,582.60\n18,958,846.78\n17,824,429.35\nOf which: Securities Other than Shares\n9,491,988.13\n9,617,665.33\n9,771,722.53\n6,828,363.47\n6,784,907.24\n6,729,080.00\n6,635,562.28\n6,568,167.46\n6,515,431.76\n6,441,291.52\n6,348,432.53\n6,274,326.46\n6,194,697.32\n of which USD Securities revaluations (Exchange rate moveme\n1,795,917.79\n1,930,201.39\n2,084,258.59\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nLoans\n3,339,977.70\n3,587,943.80\n4,010,661.79\n4,510,169.38\n5,513,803.84\n5,811,437.65\n6,126,824.37\n6,169,083.96\n6,957,279.90\n9,933,663.19\n12,383,150.07\n12,684,520.32\n11,629,732.03\n Loans and Advances\n835,231.09\n1,110,375.86\n1,262,301.22\n1,199,032.23\n1,611,254.61\n1,808,444.47\n2,123,588.25\n2,165,988.51\n2,954,184.45\n5,927,212.09\n8,377,024.21\n8,672,446.67\n7,617,711.22\n Legacy Debt\n414,023.05\n381,741.08\n382,025.83\n376,260.18\n371,310.28\n391,427.33\n391,670.28\n391,529.61\n391,529.61\n394,885.26\n394,560.01\n400,507.80\n400,454.97\n Export Incentives\n2,090,723.55\n2,095,826.85\n2,366,334.74\n2,934,876.98\n3,531,238.96\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n3,294,387.73\n2,477,362.61\n2,021,412.86\n1,399,114.53\n3,859,448.40\n4,062,791.73\n4,183,646.73\n6,636,736.42\n3,150,547.32\n9,877,720.74\n9,288,102.23\n13,066,429.55\n13,813,071.38\nOf which: Deposits\n3,294,387.73\n2,477,362.61\n2,021,412.86\n1,399,114.53\n3,859,448.40\n4,062,791.73\n4,183,646.73\n6,636,736.42\n3,150,547.32\n9,877,720.74\n9,288,102.23\n13,066,429.55\n13,813,071.38\nOther \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nClaims on Other Sectors\n1,029,471.42\n2,244,291.36\n2,764,666.21\n2,320,279.21\n2,306,993.64\n2,495,594.98\n2,901,429.23\n3,043,618.05\n2,414,182.75\n4,210,079.53\n4,487,354.87\n3,280,958.40\n4,126,506.11\nOther Financial Corporations\n118,657.17\n122,348.15\n122,367.95\n114,216.39\n123,637.97\n185,777.12\n190,538.80\n197,799.53\n198,980.02\n198,722.36\n199,979.99\n200,871.01\n194,092.65\nState and Local Government\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n824033.57\n2032044.80\n2576877.72\n2130151.01\n2105286.54\n2135637.84\n2527892.32\n2663591.64\n2032346.15\n3825379.33\n4103280.79\n2895408.28\n3746599.01\nPrivate Sector\n86,780.68\n89,898.41\n65,420.53\n75,911.82\n78,069.12\n174,180.02\n182,998.11\n182,226.89\n182,856.59\n185,977.83\n184,094.09\n184,679.11\n185,814.45\nClaims on Other Depository Corporations\n385,543.38\n429,889.74\n875,893.44\n1,247,758.47\n1,418,055.93\n1,537,977.10\n1,747,842.08\n2,004,400.25\n2,363,408.58\n2,836,488.36\n2,971,403.60\n3,064,656.78\n2,842,129.71\nOf which: Loans\n385,543.38\n429,889.74\n875,893.44\n1,247,758.47\n1,418,055.93\n1,537,977.10\n1,747,842.08\n2,004,400.25\n2,363,408.58\n2,836,488.36\n2,971,403.60\n3,064,656.78\n2,842,129.71\nOther Liabilities to ODCs\n4,129,952.46\n4,009,051.66\n5,433,469.12\n7,563,514.16\n8,461,698.70\n9,792,726.83\n9,684,173.41\n9,131,313.79\n12,393,411.08\n20,777,523.67\n31,484,074.13\n36,504,621.50\n37,868,889.89\nOf which: Aftrades Balances\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n Securities\n2,824,669.92\n2,966,155.20\n2,939,654.78\n4,579,216.20\n5,320,924.19\n5,467,251.69\n5,944,214.63\n6,089,528.73\n6,941,755.11\n11,137,597.35\n13,291,243.49\n14,580,745.12\n13,851,775.48\nOther Items(Net)\n-37,210,035.04\n-43,812,534.88\n-46,414,639.90\n-54,669,718.18\n-57,145,180.31\n-58,322,160.20\n-86,517,998.56\n-114,986,959.06\n-125,482,666.85\n-295,508,852.17\n-397,084,920.55\n-427,953,446.54\n-425,725,999.11\nShares and Other Equity\n-37,895,629.34\n-44,802,824.15\n-47,413,029.48\n-54,656,738.27\n-55,918,839.02\n-56,770,197.78\n-85,756,440.85\n-113,862,068.88\n-124,140,506.17\n-296,849,225.12\n-396,135,173.94\n-433,060,072.45\n-427,106,363.79\nOther Items(Net)\n-860,829.96\n-891,621.00\n-981,983.21\n-1,160,947.22\n-2,572,613.77\n-2,671,268.75\n-2,708,996.60\n-2,626,463.31\n-2,187,936.05\n-2,077,424.75\n-2,675,989.93\n-2,358,189.93\n-3,416,387.63\nLiabilities to Other Resident Sectors\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nMonetary Base Incl. foreign currency clearing balances\nMonetary Base \n4,682,715.46\n6,810,750.63\n8,114,953.04\n10,327,816.88\n9,251,024.10\n9,380,944.48\n11,704,943.82\n12,459,746.60\n13,815,364.85\n12,651,566.81\n16,145,434.53\n12,383,054.95\n12,732,319.53\nBond Coins\n87,847.30\n87,845.55\n93,158.32\n99,010.30\n99,714.26\n99,712.42\n99,712.71\n99,710.76\n99,712.72\n99,710.08\n99,709.22\n99,709.27\n99,709.34\nBond Notes\n728,411.73\n768,566.52\n872,222.06\n978,393.54\n1,036,938.66\n1,117,198.96\n1,208,072.64\n1,240,929.09\n1,356,393.24\n1,570,979.64\n1,797,797.97\n1,955,979.19\n2,044,143.53\nLiabilities to ODCs\n3,772,389.39\n5,535,717.81\n6,219,757.79\n8,352,572.72\n7,253,578.67\n7,089,397.08\n8,789,318.37\n10,198,688.17\n12,082,367.03\n10,419,558.83\n11,457,457.43\n10,063,539.06\n10,250,353.16\n Reserve Deposits\n625,173.97\n758,953.25\n861,489.70\n918,034.34\n1,040,852.24\n1,082,852.88\n1,205,004.05\n1,213,756.71\n1,386,675.05\n890,125.59\n1,049,647.55\n1,237,283.94\n1,401,898.97\n Exess reserves \n3,147,215.41\n4,776,764.57\n5,358,268.10\n7,434,538.38\n6,212,726.43\n6,006,544.20\n7,584,314.32\n8,984,931.47\n10,695,691.98\n9,529,433.25\n10,407,809.87\n8,826,255.12\n8,848,454.19\nPrivate Deposits\n94,067.04\n418,620.75\n929,814.87\n897,840.31\n860,792.52\n1,074,636.02\n1,607,840.10\n920,418.59\n276,891.86\n561,318.26\n2,790,469.91\n263,827.44\n338,113.50\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2020\nNB: * Other Foreign Liabilities include blocked funds amounting to USD2.2 billion assumed by the Central Bank on behalf of Government.\nTABLE 2: CENTRAL BANK SURVEY (ZWL$'000)\n \n \nS3 \n \n \n \n \nSep-19\nOct-19\nNov-19\nDec-19\nJan-20\nFeb-20\nMar-20\nApr-20\nMay-20\nJun-20\nJul-20\nAug-20\nSep-20\nNet Foreign Assets\n6,130,727.45\n7,420,346.30\n8,368,744.30\n9,623,667.78\n9,706,293.27\n9,966,033.66\n13,943,220.42\n15,497,552.93\n17,376,410.27\n41,344,994.73\n57,017,065.73\n67,384,864.72\n68,733,970.12\nClaims on Non Residents\n9,382,906.26\n10,478,858.26\n11,622,874.19\n12,948,416.33\n13,153,007.07\n13,344,846.71\n18,827,846.39\n20,437,584.87\n22,510,950.77\n53,130,231.08\n72,022,862.19\n84,210,291.97\n83,986,978.02\nOf Which: Foreign Currency\n2,108,450.56\n1,905,985.69\n2,243,113.59\n2,526,205.54\n3,176,598.38\n3,136,431.39\n3,607,624.65\n3,642,933.80\n3,581,769.90\n9,729,549.76\n18,357,028.29\n28,776,016.24\n30,217,561.04\nDeposits\n7,254,079.84\n8,551,844.58\n9,358,131.61\n10,399,832.16\n9,953,357.06\n10,175,380.89\n15,179,403.50\n16,753,404.99\n18,887,749.91\n43,314,001.39\n53,559,656.10\n55,319,393.27\n53,657,586.61\nOther\n20,375.85\n21,027.99\n21,628.98\n22,378.63\n23,051.63\n33,034.42\n40,818.25\n41,246.08\n41,430.97\n86,679.92\n106,177.81\n114,882.47\n111,830.36\nLess Liabilities to Non Residents\n3,252,178.80\n3,058,511.96\n3,254,129.88\n3,324,748.55\n3,446,713.79\n3,378,813.04\n4,884,625.96\n4,940,031.94\n5,134,540.50\n11,785,236.35\n15,005,796.46\n16,825,427.25\n15,253,007.90\nOf Which: Deposits\n1,334,410.99\n1,141,821.51\n1,377,452.16\n1,457,271.39\n1,591,189.46\n1,285,842.52\n1,574,950.88\n1,667,098.42\n1,860,609.63\n3,767,028.56\n5,065,144.06\n5,996,405.81\n4,800,281.08\nLoans\n1,917,767.81\n1,916,690.45\n1,876,677.72\n1,867,477.16\n1,855,524.33\n2,092,970.52\n3,309,675.09\n3,272,933.52\n3,273,930.87\n8,018,207.80\n9,940,652.40\n10,829,021.44\n10,452,726.81\nOther\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n16,635,192.44\n20,378,973.60\n21,685,398.27\n23,589,103.57\n24,751,743.05\n26,346,359.69\n31,807,660.02\n34,525,013.99\n40,695,850.36\n56,705,559.53\n71,245,059.44\n74,011,298.35\n79,943,074.31\nDomestic Claims\n10,601,722.91\n11,770,620.25\n14,049,919.30\n15,560,110.40\n17,823,424.24\n19,287,456.86\n22,574,237.92\n23,430,231.24\n26,324,107.94\n39,405,825.66\n45,963,566.91\n53,678,911.04\n55,355,723.35\nNet Claims on Central Government\n3,524,311.24\n3,681,551.38\n4,052,444.25\n4,123,319.26\n4,284,897.63\n4,220,051.70\n4,371,019.79\n4,204,983.64\n3,952,942.15\n4,789,640.77\n5,032,498.00\n6,046,746.39\n5,154,302.32\nClaims on Central Government\n3,578,783.04\n3,750,150.34\n4,151,526.70\n4,241,825.34\n4,377,531.93\n4,298,263.57\n4,780,010.39\n4,721,326.20\n4,583,622.89\n6,269,011.77\n6,764,380.71\n6,897,574.44\n6,685,832.35\nSecurities\n3,577,410.30\n3,749,000.52\n4,150,152.74\n4,240,495.63\n4,372,420.71\n4,293,116.08\n4,775,618.52\n4,716,858.96\n4,579,097.46\n6,264,725.96\n6,760,053.73\n6,883,528.44\n6,676,225.73\nLoans\n1,372.73\n1,149.81\n1,373.97\n1,329.70\n5,111.21\n5,147.49\n4,391.86\n4,467.24\n4,525.43\n4,285.81\n4,326.98\n14,046.00\n9,606.62\nOther \n - -\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n54,471.79\n68,598.95\n99,082.45\n118,506.08\n92,634.30\n78,211.87\n408,990.60\n516,342.56\n630,680.74\n1,479,371.00\n1,731,882.71\n850,828.05\n1,531,530.04\nOf which: Deposits\n54,471.79\n68,598.95\n99,082.45\n118,506.08\n92,634.30\n78,211.87\n408,990.60\n516,342.56\n630,680.74\n1,479,371.00\n1,731,882.71\n850,828.05\n1,531,530.04\nOther \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nClaims on Other Sectors\n7,077,411.66\n8,089,068.87\n9,997,475.05\n11,436,791.14\n13,538,526.61\n15,067,405.16\n18,203,218.14\n19,225,247.60\n22,371,165.79\n34,616,184.88\n40,931,068.91\n47,632,164.65\n50,201,421.03\nOther Financial Corporations\n34,328.82\n39,915.64\n37,694.15\n72,289.76\n78,791.30\n95,487.15\n116,565.68\n92,292.05\n157,689.88\n554,716.67\n810,143.43\n97,708.48\n143,909.38\nState and Local Government\n30,341.36\n28,130.16\n28,347.69\n26,320.30\n32,308.50\n31,704.96\n30,621.46\n27,844.50\n26,575.69\n23,225.26\n25,961.37\n27,859.83\n35,174.26\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n224,024.88\n290,519.04\n284,193.32\n301,021.27\n459,396.43\n455,647.01\n773,710.57\n845,084.31\n791,776.58\n2,037,662.29\n1,051,666.60\n1,046,289.40\n1,050,377.14\nPrivate Sector\n6,788,716.60\n7,730,504.03\n9,647,239.89\n11,037,159.81\n12,968,030.37\n14,484,566.04\n17,282,320.43\n18,260,026.74\n21,395,123.64\n32,000,580.66\n39,043,297.50\n46,460,306.94\n48,971,960.25\nClaims on the Central Bank\n9,252,623.62\n11,757,301.08\n11,546,508.94\n14,013,346.66\n13,400,742.47\n14,084,026.73\n16,430,721.57\n18,224,911.62\n21,706,416.06\n29,919,616.89\n54,830,533.49\n55,843,634.83\n57,763,783.89\nCurrency\n124,516.17\n144,290.37\n128,786.22\n169,835.56\n183,412.14\n267,061.31\n263,607.53\n298,482.41\n330,036.01\n461,761.08\n690,816.60\n975,094.30\n1,084,208.81\nReserves\n9,128,107.45\n11,613,010.71\n11,417,722.72\n13,843,511.10\n13,217,330.33\n13,816,965.42\n16,167,114.04\n17,926,429.21\n21,376,380.05\n29,457,855.81\n54,139,716.89\n54,868,540.52\n56,679,575.08\nSecurities\n - \n - \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nOther Claims\n - \n - \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nLiabilities to the Central Bank\n155,934.06\n159,104.77\n175,255.53\n179,468.01\n185,829.15\n189,591.37\n258,425.60\n346,363.87\n536,691.85\n887,577.50\n1,387,934.10\n1,837,109.59\n1,863,123.11\nOther Items(Net)\n3,063,220.03\n2,989,842.96\n3,735,774.45\n5,804,885.48\n6,286,594.51\n6,835,532.53\n6,938,873.87\n6,783,765.00\n6,797,981.79\n11,732,305.51\n28,161,106.86\n33,674,137.93\n31,313,309.81\nShares and Other Equity\n5,389,732.10\n5,795,665.01\n6,252,087.86\n10,111,978.87\n12,089,406.11\n12,427,849.47\n14,637,418.35\n15,535,143.11\n15,953,204.84\n31,312,741.50\n36,291,671.56\n39,784,266.01\n40,345,113.68\nLiabilities to other ressident sectors\n23,286.81\n24,632.93\n50,514.35\n119,397.64\n140,072.14\n154,917.78\n339,909.43\n233,181.06\n365,355.02\n348,181.06\n348,728.32\n422,486.38\n372,163.87\nOther Items(Net)\n-2,349,798.88\n-2,830,454.98\n-2,566,827.76\n-4,426,491.02\n-5,942,883.74\n-5,747,234.71\n-8,038,453.91\n-8,984,559.18\n-9,520,578.07\n-19,928,617.05\n-8,479,293.02\n-6,532,614.47\n-9,403,967.74\nDeposits and Securities Included in Broad Money\n22,765,919.89\n27,799,319.90\n30,054,142.57\n33,212,771.35\n34,458,036.32\n36,312,393.36\n45,750,880.45\n50,022,566.92\n58,072,260.63\n98,050,554.25\n128,262,125.18\n141,396,163.08\n148,677,044.43\nDeposits Included in Broad Money\n22,546,030.38\n \n27,593,648.82\n \n29,819,025.32\n \n32,968,794.78\n \n34,202,472.63\n \n36,052,337.44\n \n45,274,086.77\n \n49,685,009.94\n \n57,713,065.69\n \n97,187,347.86\n \n############\n############\n############\nTransferable Deposits\n20,883,074.13\n \n25,739,354.63\n \n27,983,294.46\n \n31,080,869.95\n \n32,175,873.35\n \n33,858,024.37\n \n42,922,095.92\n \n47,162,154.77\n \n54,870,283.47\n \n93,169,652.47\n \n121,190,660.19\n \n134,852,887.37\n \n140,657,703.75\n \n of which FCAs\n9,859,484.27\n \n11,155,597.09\n \n11,472,035.58\n \n11,938,732.84\n \n12,458,349.93\n \n12,476,934.91\n \n20,909,726.92\n \n19,463,088.16\n \n24,984,322.48\n \n57,701,775.14\n \n79,076,606.18\n \n82,607,196.16\n \n88,430,395.05\n \nOther Deposits\n1,662,956.26\n1,854,294.19\n1,835,730.85\n1,887,924.83\n2,026,599.28\n2,194,313.07\n2,351,990.85\n2,522,855.18\n2,842,782.22\n4,017,695.39\n6,047,153.88\n5,431,611.26\n6,935,433.58\nMoney Market Instruments\n219,889.50\n \n205,671.08\n \n235,117.26\n \n243,976.57\n \n255,563.69\n \n260,055.92\n \n476,793.67\n \n337,556.97\n \n359,194.93\n \n863,206.40\n \n1,024,311.11\n \n1,111,664.44\n \n1,083,907.10\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2020\n TABLE 3 : OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS SURVEY ( ZWL$ '000)\n \n \nS4 \n \n \n \nZWL$ Thousands\nEnd of\nGold\nOther\nTotal\nTreasury Bills\nCentral\nBanks\nOther\nGovt.\nOther\nOther Assets\nTOTAL\nGovernment\nStock\n2018\nJan\n542.7\n295,704.1\n296,246.8\n1,481,110.3\n2,521,699.7\n204,516.4\n392,457.4\n0.0\n53,297.6\n399,281.0\n5,348,609.1\nFeb\n535.0\n293,095.9\n293,630.9\n1,479,552.8\n2,594,224.0\n207,966.8\n405,996.7\n0.0\n53,426.7\n400,019.5\n5,434,817.4\nMar\n537.7\n253,084.5\n253,622.2\n1,546,995.9\n2,769,969.5\n215,726.1\n404,906.7\n0.0\n53,455.4\n403,745.5\n5,648,421.3\nApr\n533.3\n257,036.5\n257,569.8\n1,560,622.2\n2,950,232.6\n160,379.8\n426,520.6\n0.0\n53,595.8\n397,829.6\n5,806,750.3\nMay\n524.9\n313,482.0\n314,006.9\n1,597,939.7\n3,089,176.3\n270,870.8\n401,679.8\n0.0\n53,595.8\n398,836.7\n6,126,105.9\nJun\n505.0\n509,850.3\n510,355.4\n1,655,951.6\n3,305,339.2\n289,295.0\n447,654.5\n0.0\n53,610.6\n396,067.8\n6,658,274.0\nJul\n493.8\n527,813.6\n528,307.4\n1,767,971.0\n3,718,408.4\n301,846.4\n450,384.5\n0.0\n131,483.5\n395,874.7\n7,294,275.9\nAug\n483.2\n290,113.1\n290,596.3\n2,124,232.2\n3,825,308.4\n306,132.8\n469,976.6\n0.0\n131,983.5\n396,593.0\n7,544,822.7\nSep\n478.3\n237,372.4\n237,850.7\n2,107,570.8\n4,195,635.1\n306,155.6\n430,437.7\n0.0\n134,281.4\n380,807.0\n7,792,738.3\nOct\n494.5\n254,988.4\n255,482.9\n2,109,129.0\n4,327,555.6\n316,177.1\n462,486.6\n0.0\n134,282.6\n404,339.5\n8,009,453.3\nNov\n494.8\n247,185.3\n247,680.1\n2,073,611.9\n4,546,327.0\n379,173.9\n476,986.3\n0.0\n133,495.7\n410,630.5\n8,267,905.4\nDec\n516.1\n295,449.5\n295,965.7\n2,062,178.2\n4,962,474.6\n393,736.0\n481,858.2\n0.0\n133,506.7\n455,810.2\n8,785,529.5\n2019\nJan\n527.5\n281,743.9\n282,271.4\n2,011,373.8\n5,274,987.0\n417,911.6\n455,916.0\n0.0\n146,554.7\n479,670.8\n9,068,685.3\nFeb\n1,331.3\n851,954.0\n853,285.3\n1,962,432.4\n5,285,993.7\n330,900.1\n441,122.2\n0.0\n146,554.7\n501,209.3\n9,521,497.8\nMar\n1,570.1\n995,034.8\n996,604.9\n1,910,408.7\n5,309,582.8\n339,662.1\n460,940.2\n0.0\n147,416.8\n500,377.5\n9,664,992.9\nApr\n527.5\n281,743.9\n282,271.4\n1,835,171.9\n5,325,339.6\n332,906.5\n512,590.1\n0.0\n147,416.8\n1,138,901.7\n9,574,598.0\nMay\n1,331.3\n851,954.0\n853,285.3\n1,793,430.0\n5,406,793.3\n339,094.2\n549,282.9\n0.0\n148,416.7\n2,189,714.3\n11,280,016.7\nJun\n1,570.1\n995,034.8\n996,604.9\n5,480,531.5\n1,785,477.1\n363,908.2\n651,524.0\n0.0\n148,419.2\n3,060,526.9\n12,486,991.8\nJul\n1,668.6\n930,998.2\n932,666.8\n5,489,742.5\n2,197,986.0\n339,280.9\n674,702.3\n0.0\n149,326.6\n4,822,117.0\n14,605,822.1\nAug\n2,713.7\n2,415,015.7\n2,417,729.4\n5,479,729.3\n2,771,472.0\n348,501.8\n754,058.4\n0.0\n149,326.6\n5,627,355.2\n17,548,172.7\nSep\n3,755.3\n2,914,009.9\n2,917,765.3\n5,488,348.9\n3,339,977.7\n385,543.4\n878,502.6\n0.0\n150,968.8\n8,641,331.5\n21,802,438.2\nOct\n5,271.7\n3,397,381.3\n3,402,652.9\n5,479,742.5\n3,587,943.8\n429,889.7\n2,093,322.6\n0.0\n150,968.8\n7,496,844.7\n22,641,365.0\nNov\n6,641.6\n4,327,529.6\n4,334,171.2\n5,479,742.5\n4,010,661.8\n875,893.4\n2,606,915.9\n0.0\n157,750.3\n6,924,599.9\n24,389,735.1\nDec\n9,113.6\n6,455,133.8\n6,464,247.4\n6,828,363.5\n4,510,169.4\n1,247,758.5\n2,162,528.9\n0.0\n157,750.3\n706,808.9\n22,077,626.8\n2020\nJan\n9,413.0\n5,435,444.8\n5,444,857.7\n6,784,907.2\n5,513,803.8\n1,418,055.9\n2,161,612.4\n0.0\n145,381.3\n3,077,991.1\n24,546,609.5\nFeb\n9,518.4\n5,543,433.4\n5,552,951.8\n6,729,080.0\n5,811,437.6\n1,537,977.1\n2,289,690.3\n0.0\n205,904.7\n3,345,628.1\n25,472,669.6\nMar\n10,226.2\n5,494,713.6\n5,504,939.8\n6,635,562.3\n6,126,824.4\n1,747,842.1\n2,695,524.5\n0.0\n205,904.7\n2,787,290.2\n25,703,888.0\nApr\n32,549.9\n4,484,125.9\n4,516,675.8\n6,568,167.5\n6,169,084.0\n2,004,400.3\n2,837,713.3\n0.0\n205,904.7\n3,414,571.8\n25,716,517.4\nMay\n32,829.0\n5,021,291.4\n5,054,120.4\n6,515,431.8\n6,960,634.6\n2,363,408.6\n2,208,278.0\n0.0\n205,904.7\n2,989,468.8\n26,297,246.8\nJun\n77,699.9\n17,768,046.1\n17,845,746.0\n6,441,291.5\n9,933,663.2\n2,836,488.4\n4,004,174.8\n0.0\n205,904.7\n4,229,035.8\n45,496,304.3\nJul\n114,901.8\n23,515,199.8\n23,630,101.6\n6,348,432.5\n12,383,150.1\n2,971,403.6\n4,657,339.6\n0.0\n205,904.7\n5,727,986.9\n55,924,319.0\nAug\n124,821.8\n27,515,333.5\n27,640,155.3\n6,274,326.5\n12,684,520.3\n3,064,656.8\n3,075,053.7\n0.0\n205,904.7\n5,880,908.9\n58,825,526.1\nSep\n117,324.0\n23,926,529.7\n24,043,853.7\n6,194,697.3\n11,629,732.0\n2,842,129.7\n3,920,772.5\n0.0\n205,904.7\n6,511,740.8\n55,348,830.7\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\nTABLE 4.1: RESERVE BANK - ASSETS\n Foreign Assets\nLoans and advances\nInvestments\n \n \nS5 \n \n \n \n \n TABLE 4.2 RESERVE BANK: LIABILITIES\nCapital\nand\nForeign\ngeneral\nEnd of\nBond Notes in \nCirculation\nBond Coins in Circulation\nBond Notes and\nBankers Deposits \nOther Deposits\nGovt. Deposits\nTotal Deposits\nLiabilities\nreserve\nOther Liabilities\nTOTAL\ncoins* issued\n2018\nJan\n291,017.0\n63,474.1\n354,491.1\n2,071,823.2\n561,090.2\n71,168.0\n2,704,081.5\n1,480,423.5\n331,769.0\n477,844.0\n5,348,609.1\nFeb\n289,315.0\n62,494.4\n351,809.4\n1,908,121.6\n531,290.0\n93,049.2\n2,532,460.8\n1,531,644.2\n339,808.3\n679,094.7\n5,434,817.4\nMar\n289,183.1\n68,055.2\n357,238.3\n1,920,236.4\n526,523.4\n42,096.2\n2,488,856.0\n1,722,990.1\n340,070.8\n739,266.1\n5,648,421.3\nApr\n289,120.9\n73,367.3\n362,488.2\n1,813,681.7\n528,811.0\n41,970.4\n2,384,463.1\n1,712,066.4\n350,685.4\n997,047.2\n5,806,750.3\nMay\n288,935.3\n79,420.3\n368,355.6\n1,924,872.4\n546,965.7\n41,858.0\n2,513,696.0\n1,782,605.2\n351,770.3\n1,109,678.9\n6,126,105.9\nJun\n307,595.1\n80,593.6\n388,188.8\n2,112,051.3\n570,387.8\n41,699.1\n2,724,138.2\n1,727,806.5\n360,766.4\n1,457,374.1\n6,658,274.0\nJul\n366,738.9\n80,812.7\n447,551.6\n2,294,108.1\n605,257.7\n41,707.7\n2,941,073.5\n1,803,751.9\n433,728.6\n1,668,170.2\n7,294,275.9\nAug\n399,951.6\n84,872.5\n484,824.1\n2,406,600.9\n670,605.2\n41,789.6\n3,118,995.7\n1,804,460.5\n444,671.0\n1,691,871.3\n7,544,822.7\nSep\n422,933.7\n86,177.9\n509,111.6\n2,296,266.8\n682,494.6\n41,694.9\n3,020,456.3\n1,793,136.7\n454,134.9\n2,015,898.8\n7,792,738.3\nOct\n434,935.7\n86,521.3\n521,457.0\n2,282,181.1\n704,720.4\n41,685.6\n3,028,587.2\n1,710,536.2\n466,363.6\n2,282,509.3\n8,009,453.3\nNov\n436,225.7\n86,507.8\n522,733.5\n2,545,140.2\n710,595.5\n41,331.0\n3,297,066.6\n1,788,555.6\n467,391.7\n2,192,157.9\n8,267,905.4\nDec\n435,985.1\n86,558.3\n522,543.5\n2,718,472.2\n587,797.4\n41,321.1\n3,347,590.7\n2,053,648.8\n475,653.2\n2,386,093.4\n8,785,529.5\n2019\nJan\n436,131.6\n86,671.1\n522,802.7\n2,431,429.7\n687,033.1\n41,366.4\n3,159,829.3\n2,069,786.9\n464,456.2\n2,851,810.2\n9,068,685.3\nFeb\n436,825.6\n86,794.2\n523,619.7\n2,620,801.4\n243,862.1\n103,759.1\n2,968,422.7\n5,530,259.3\n-2,402,232.5\n2,901,428.5\n9,521,497.8\nMar\n442,551.2\n86,775.2\n529,326.4\n2,556,061.1\n253,590.5\n130,917.9\n2,940,569.5\n7,106,925.2\n-3,873,725.3\n2,961,897.2\n9,664,992.9\nApr\n449,762.9\n87,096.2\n536,859.1\n2,410,617.8\n305,453.8\n160,540.0\n2,876,611.6\n2,069,786.9\n-4,589,274.7\n8,680,615.1\n9,574,598.0\nMay\n476,656.0\n87,423.3\n564,079.3\n1,861,836.1\n414,514.4\n246,390.3\n2,522,740.8\n5,530,259.3\n-9,310,271.3\n11,973,208.6\n11,280,016.7\nJun\n510,197.4\n87,606.5\n597,803.9\n2,877,247.3\n803,273.0\n276,635.3\n3,957,155.6\n7,106,925.2\n-12,647,395.6\n13,472,502.6\n12,486,991.8\nJul\n609,392.7\n87,843.4\n697,236.1\n3,233,425.2\n1,711,703.4\n379,351.4\n5,324,480.0\n7,690,837.8\n-21,058,240.2\n21,951,508.4\n14,605,822.1\nAug\n657,100.5\n87,844.1\n744,944.6\n5,381,620.4\n1,858,313.6\n441,622.1\n7,681,556.2\n13,772,962.7\n-25,229,010.7\n20,577,719.9\n17,548,172.7\nSep\n728,411.7\n87,847.3\n816,259.0\n4,764,143.1\n1,949,291.2\n626,345.4\n7,339,779.7\n17,520,734.0\n-36,903,875.7\n33,029,541.0\n21,802,438.2\nOct\n768,566.5\n87,845.5\n856,412.1\n6,528,467.6\n2,345,066.3\n646,639.5\n9,520,173.4\n26,689,709.4\n-44,802,824.2\n30,377,894.2\n22,641,365.0\nNov\n872,222.1\n93,158.3\n965,380.4\n7,287,217.4\n4,330,028.3\n662,159.7\n12,279,405.5\n31,686,235.5\n-47,413,029.5\n26,871,743.2\n24,389,735.1\nDec\n978,393.5\n99,010.3\n1,077,403.8\n9,987,301.1\n3,387,893.1\n692,865.5\n14,068,059.7\n45,814,207.5\n-54,656,738.3\n15,774,694.1\n22,077,626.8\n2020\nJan\n1,036,938.7\n99,714.3\n1,136,652.9\n8,559,782.6\n4,031,311.7\n3,859,448.4\n16,450,542.7\n51,840,017.9\n-55,918,839.0\n11,038,235.0\n24,546,609.5\nFeb\n1,117,199.0\n99,712.4\n1,216,911.4\n8,434,752.2\n5,161,938.2\n4,062,791.7\n17,659,482.1\n53,820,700.6\n-56,770,197.8\n9,545,773.2\n25,472,669.6\nMar\n1,208,072.6\n99,712.7\n1,307,785.4\n10,592,446.0\n5,479,019.6\n4,183,646.7\n20,255,112.3\n55,790,782.9\n-85,756,440.8\n34,106,648.3\n25,703,888.0\nApr\n1,240,929.1\n99,710.8\n1,340,639.8\n12,242,950.5\n3,406,630.5\n6,636,736.4\n22,286,317.5\n109,061,107.8\n-113,862,068.9\n6,890,521.1\n25,716,517.4\nMay\n1,356,393.2\n99,712.7\n1,456,106.0\n14,238,158.4\n4,405,076.0\n3,150,547.3\n21,793,781.7\n119,431,121.6\n-124,140,506.2\n7,756,743.7\n26,297,246.8\nJun\n1,570,979.6\n99,710.1\n1,670,689.7\n15,136,849.3\n8,883,539.7\n9,877,720.7\n33,898,109.8\n293,469,309.5\n-296,849,225.1\n13,307,420.5\n45,496,304.3\nJul\n1,797,798.0\n99,709.2\n1,897,507.2\n21,953,223.9\n12,569,497.2\n9,288,102.2\n43,810,823.3\n389,987,752.3\n-396,135,173.9\n16,363,410.2\n55,924,319.0\nAug\n1,955,979.2\n99,709.3\n2,055,688.5\n21,684,566.1\n14,603,669.3\n13,066,429.6\n49,354,665.0\n419,269,308.7\n-433,060,072.5\n21,205,936.4\n58,825,526.1\nSep\n2,044,143.5\n99,709.3\n2,143,852.9\n24,463,643.9\n11,157,031.3\n13,813,071.4\n49,433,746.6\n410,148,637.2\n-427,106,363.8\n20,728,957.9\n55,348,830.7\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\n*Bond coins first issued in December 2014\n* Bond Notes issued on 28 November 2016\nZWL$ Thousands\nDeposits\n \n \nS6 \n \n \n \n \nForeign\nTOTAL\nEnd of\nNotes\nBond\n&\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \nLocal\nOther \n Notes &\nCoin\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment1\noca\nGovernemt\nOther2\nGovernment\nLocal \nPublic \n Institutional \nOther cliams\nContigent Assets\nOther Assets\nNon Financial \nCoins\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\nGovernment\nEnterprises\nUnits\nAssets\n2018\nJan\n23.4\n \n66.9\n \n2,528.5\n \n291.2\n \n111.9\n \n81.9\n2,336.0\n34.5\n23.5\n65.9\n26.3\n20.6\n155.3\n3,461.2\n74.6\n501.0\n457.8\n700.8\n10,961.1\nFeb\n20.0\n \n46.8\n \n2,516.8\n \n347.6\n \n114.2\n \n96.2\n2,313.4\n33.5\n23.5\n66.1\n24.3\n21.1\n145.4\n3,527.1\n22.2\n507.8\n434.5\n697.8\n10,958.3\nMar\n16.7\n \n57.9\n \n2,457.7\n \n312.8\n \n139.2\n \n99.5\n2,434.8\n32.8\n23.5\n66.7\n19.2\n15.9\n127.5\n3,637.8\n24.2\n504.1\n487.4\n710.3\n11,168.1\nApr\n14.9\n \n61.9\n \n2,423.5\n \n337.0\n \n120.8\n \n78.5\n2,558.9\n32.0\n24.7\n67.0\n13.4\n20.9\n121.2\n3,674.0\n22.1\n532.0\n459.2\n715.7\n11,277.5\nMay\n14.2\n \n71.7\n \n2,543.0\n \n477.8\n \n138.6\n \n85.7\n2,814.9\n30.9\n25.0\n66.9\n8.4\n20.9\n134.4\n3,740.3\n12.0\n458.9\n457.2\n718.2\n11,819.1\nJun\n9.0\n \n58.5\n \n3,081.0\n \n509.8\n \n120.0\n \n84.1\n2,865.3\n30.1\n26.2\n66.5\n7.4\n19.4\n196.4\n3,829.3\n38.6\n551.4\n448.1\n730.7\n12,671.8\nJul\n20.6\n \n61.9\n \n3,450.6\n \n466.4\n \n111.6\n \n95.4\n3,291.4\n33.3\n0.0\n67.5\n4.5\n21.0\n182.0\n3,500.6\n153.9\n611.4\n472.5\n732.0\n13,276.5\nAug\n23.1\n \n72.3\n \n3,475.7\n \n377.8\n \n105.3\n \n66.3\n3,362.8\n32.2\n0.0\n67.3\n7.1\n20.6\n186.7\n3,585.1\n102.0\n647.7\n489.9\n736.1\n13,358.0\nSep\n18.2\n \n61.5\n \n3,781.6\n \n398.1\n \n159.1\n \n78.0\n3,145.7\n31.2\n45.2\n68.1\n5.4\n20.4\n212.2\n3,734.2\n119.7\n637.4\n527.8\n742.6\n13,786.4\nOct\n39.9\n \n70.4\n \n3,771.3\n \n368.3\n \n185.5\n \n51.4\n3,105.9\n30.2\n45.2\n68.4\n4.6\n9.4\n188.8\n3,838.0\n132.0\n647.5\n537.8\n743.0\n13,837.7\nNov\n30.6\n \n84.6\n \n3,696.3\n \n300.6\n \n209.8\n \n63.9\n3,172.9\n28.9\n45.2\n68.7\n7.0\n8.1\n217.7\n3,813.2\n141.9\n633.2\n581.9\n742.4\n13,846.8\nDec\n20.5\n \n94.5\n \n3,949.5\n \n439.6\n \n235.5\n \n74.8\n3,044.1\n28.0\n43.4\n69.2\n6.2\n9.2\n204.3\n3,870.5\n151.2\n573.8\n612.5\n812.4\n14,239.0\n2019\nJan\n49.0\n \n113.4\n \n3,901.0\n \n401.9\n \n261.6\n \n46.1\n3,038.3\n27.3\n94.6\n68.7\n4.4\n8.1\n189.2\n3,773.5\n109.1\n517.2\n592.3\n827.7\n14,023.5\nFeb\n59.7\n \n256.8\n \n3,764.8\n \n357.1\n \n570.4\n \n205.7\n3,076.4\n26.5\n60.5\n2.0\n5.8\n7.7\n208.3\n3,991.5\n100.5\n490.7\n669.1\n880.0\n14,733.6\nMar\n62.5\n \n263.2\n \n3,891.0\n \n432.9\n \n739.3\n \n55.1\n3,028.8\n25.5\n61.5\n4.5\n4.3\n9.5\n340.7\n3,845.0\n129.0\n523.7\n954.5\n1,205.2\n15,576.2\nApr\n45.2\n \n363.5\n \n4,153.9\n \n578.9\n \n1,031.9\n \n91.7\n2,921.3\n25.0\n61.8\n4.0\n4.0\n9.6\n407.8\n3,899.7\n131.9\n620.5\n1,135.4\n1,304.8\n16,790.9\nMay\n98.7\n \n484.2\n \n4,089.2\n \n694.1\n \n1,890.1\n \n154.1\n2,912.7\n23.9\n62.1\n4.2\n3.9\n9.4\n636.8\n4,303.9\n144.3\n910.1\n2,031.0\n1,532.3\n19,985.1\nJun\n126.3\n \n882.2\n \n4,518.6\n \n560.2\n \n2,383.0\n \n538.9\n2,918.5\n22.6\n63.1\n6.6\n3.9\n8.7\n929.4\n5,011.5\n163.0\n1,606.5\n1,621.9\n2,120.4\n23,485.3\nJul\n232.4\n \n968.8\n \n5,605.6\n \n370.4\n \n3,738.0\n \n801.9\n2,962.9\n22.2\n103.4\n5.5\n2.2\n9.0\n164.6\n5,364.7\n228.7\n1,587.7\n2,124.1\n2,345.3\n26,637.3\nAug\n184.4\n \n1,150.4\n \n7,956.5\n \n527.8\n \n3,904.2\n \n1,050.7\n3,409.1\n21.5\n103.9\n6.8\n1.0\n9.2\n212.5\n5,764.9\n263.2\n2,614.6\n2,149.5\n2,623.2\n31,953.4\nSep\n124.5\n \n2,108.5\n \n9,128.1\n \n874.0\n \n5,678.3\n \n1,575.7\n3,577.4\n20.9\n27.0\n6.5\n1.4\n9.4\n187.5\n6,456.9\n389.5\n3,707.8\n3,665.5\n3,549.9\n41,088.9\nOct\n144.3\n \n1,906.0\n \n11,613.0\n \n2,511.0\n \n7,644.9\n \n907.0\n3,749.0\n20.2\n27.1\n5.3\n1.1\n7.9\n254.8\n7,393.9\n400.9\n4,081.1\n2,230.5\n3,580.5\n46,478.4\nNov\n128.8\n \n2,243.1\n \n11,417.7\n \n2,236.3\n \n8,417.4\n \n940.7\n4,150.2\n19.6\n27.1\n11.8\n1.4\n8.7\n248.8\n9,260.2\n442.8\n3,148.3\n2,272.9\n4,208.0\n49,183.9\nDec\n169.8\n \n2,526.2\n \n13,994.1\n \n1,254.7\n \n8,415.7\n \n1,984.1\n4,090.0\n18.2\n24.7\n20.7\n1.3\n8.1\n268.6\n10,562.1\n556.7\n4,867.7\n3,517.6\n8,485.9\n60,766.3\n2020\nJan\n183.4\n \n3,176.6\n \n13,217.3\n \n1,073.2\n \n8,142.0\n \n1,811.4\n4,372.4\n20.1\n125.5\n15.0\n5.1\n12.2\n326.1\n12,115.8\n946.9\n2,965.9\n4,191.6\n9,691.7\n62,392.3\nFeb\n267.1\n \n3,136.4\n \n13,817.0\n \n1,504.5\n \n8,642.5\n \n1,532.9\n4,293.1\n20.1\n117.4\n15.5\n5.1\n11.6\n329.5\n13,632.6\n973.7\n5,441.7\n12,758.8\n10,338.7\n76,838.2\nMar\n263.6\n \n3,607.6\n \n16,167.1\n \n2,214.4\n \n12,681.9\n \n2,497.5\n4,775.6\n19.2\n0.1\n20.8\n4.4\n11.4\n765.8\n16,323.6\n1,103.1\n7,917.3\n7,042.4\n11,309.5\n86,725.4\nApr\n298.5\n \n3,642.9\n \n17,926.4\n \n1,523.3\n \n13,697.1\n \n3,056.3\n4,716.9\n18.1\n0.1\n18.4\n4.5\n9.7\n834.7\n17,280.6\n1,104.9\n7,642.8\n8,200.2\n11,988.1\n91,963.5\nMay\n330.0\n \n3,581.8\n \n21,376.4\n \n1,749.6\n \n15,757.4\n \n3,130.4\n4,579.1\n17.0\n0.1\n45.8\n4.5\n9.6\n768.0\n20,291.6\n1,280.4\n7,042.0\n8,823.5\n12,139.9\n100,927.2\nJun\n606.6\n \n9,584.7\n \n29,457.9\n \n3,974.7\n \n35,786.5\n \n7,527.5\n6,264.7\n13.8\n0.1\n90.1\n4.3\n9.4\n2,010.8\n30,567.5\n2,011.1\n24,299.3\n17,433.0\n23,843.0\n193,485.0\nJul\n690.8\n \n18,357.0\n \n54,139.7\n \n5,578.7\n \n42,159.7\n \n11,399.9\n6,760.1\n13.4\n0.0\n74.6\n4.3\n12.6\n1,025.8\n36,840.5\n3,070.4\n28,551.1\n14,418.6\n24,902.0\n247,999.1\nAug\n975.1\n \n28,776.0\n \n54,868.5\n \n4,623.1\n \n41,100.2\n \n14,219.2\n6,883.5\n13.1\n0.0\n39.1\n14.0\n14.7\n1,046.3\n43,502.9\n3,130.9\n25,354.6\n14,240.7\n26,391.3\n265,193.4\nSep\n1,084.2\n \n30,217.6\n \n56,679.6\n \n4,426.6\n \n39,530.8\n \n14,126.8\n6,676.2\n12.9\n0.0\n107.8\n9.6\n22.3\n1,050.4\n45,297.5\n3,822.4\n28,289.4\n20,662.0\n27,055.5\n279,071.4\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2020\nNotes\n1.Government securities includes treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households and other financial corporations.\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\nPublic \nEnterprises\nTABLE 5.1: OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS -ASSETS\nZWL$ millions\n \n \nS7 \n \n \n \n \n \nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nCapital\nContigent\nOther\nTOTAL\nand\nLiablities\nLiablities\nEnd of\nDemand\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nRBZ\nOther Depository \nOther Finacial \nReserves\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\n2018\nJan\n4,640.2\n1,008.1\n1,454.0\n7,102.2\n406.5\n107.3\n7,616.1\n65.1\n444.8\n115.1\n49.1\n2.6\n1,645.3\n501.0\n522.1\n10,961.1\nFeb\n4,633.7\n989.2\n1,458.8\n7,081.7\n418.7\n101.2\n7,601.7\n75.4\n435.4\n111.2\n92.8\n2.9\n1,620.1\n507.8\n511.0\n10,958.3\nMar\n4,732.9\n1,007.5\n1,491.0\n7,231.4\n365.0\n114.7\n7,711.0\n77.3\n460.8\n140.5\n89.2\n6.9\n1,654.7\n504.1\n523.4\n11,168.1\nApr\n4,907.7\n1,066.6\n1,374.6\n7,349.0\n387.8\n95.6\n7,832.3\n84.0\n453.1\n82.4\n68.8\n16.1\n1,641.9\n532.0\n567.0\n11,277.5\nMay\n5,172.9\n1,138.2\n1,442.5\n7,753.6\n442.8\n107.4\n8,303.8\n88.0\n554.0\n101.5\n94.9\n19.9\n1,671.5\n458.9\n526.5\n11,819.1\nJune\n5,650.6\n1,274.7\n1,459.1\n8,384.4\n438.0\n89.2\n8,911.6\n66.8\n554.0\n119.8\n173.4\n21.6\n1,707.5\n551.4\n565.7\n12,671.8\nJuly\n5,902.3\n1,415.3\n1,501.5\n8,819.1\n424.4\n33.1\n9,276.7\n89.5\n545.1\n118.9\n132.9\n32.6\n1,846.0\n611.4\n623.4\n13,276.5\nAug\n6,005.7\n1,362.6\n1,524.2\n8,892.5\n399.6\n32.4\n9,324.5\n66.5\n535.4\n137.0\n119.5\n33.3\n1,882.9\n647.7\n611.2\n13,358.0\nSep\n6,281.7\n1,421.8\n1,489.0\n9,192.4\n439.0\n44.6\n9,676.1\n52.4\n559.4\n142.2\n129.1\n46.6\n1,913.4\n637.4\n629.7\n13,786.4\nOct\n6,345.7\n1,390.0\n1,427.8\n9,163.5\n435.2\n52.2\n9,650.8\n61.7\n581.4\n147.6\n93.4\n42.0\n1,957.6\n647.5\n655.7\n13,837.7\nNov\n6,419.8\n1,329.4\n1,430.4\n9,179.6\n366.8\n48.7\n9,595.1\n50.9\n543.1\n213.7\n74.8\n42.3\n1,991.6\n633.2\n702.1\n13,846.8\nDec\n6,601.1\n1,322.2\n1,508.9\n9,432.2\n394.5\n41.3\n9,868.0\n58.6\n524.7\n229.6\n187.8\n39.0\n2,057.7\n573.8\n699.7\n14,239.0\n2019\nJan\n6,626.6\n1,155.9\n1,466.8\n9,249.4\n381.0\n42.2\n9,672.5\n59.3\n530.5\n239.5\n188.3\n39.2\n2,047.0\n517.2\n729.8\n14,023.5\nFeb\n7,168.7\n1,155.1\n1,473.2\n9,797.1\n387.8\n44.5\n10,229.3\n71.8\n782.0\n158.9\n151.7\n42.6\n2,145.1\n490.7\n661.5\n14,733.6\nMar\n7,435.2\n1,127.0\n1,437.1\n9,999.2\n372.7\n47.9\n10,419.9\n74.5\n933.8\n165.8\n140.9\n42.7\n2,349.0\n523.7\n925.8\n15,576.2\nApr\n7,968.0\n1,243.3\n1,795.8\n11,007.1\n390.9\n55.9\n11,453.8\n90.8\n652.7\n148.3\n173.5\n28.8\n2,551.4\n620.5\n1,071.0\n16,790.9\nMay\n9,316.8\n1,379.0\n1,932.4\n12,628.2\n462.9\n48.9\n13,139.9\n139.4\n1,053.9\n148.8\n206.7\n46.5\n2,556.6\n910.1\n1,783.2\n19,985.1\nJun\n11,021.9\n1,573.5\n1,737.2\n14,332.6\n422.0\n44.5\n14,799.2\n171.7\n1,607.6\n150.3\n216.7\n43.6\n3,240.7\n1,606.5\n1,649.0\n23,485.3\nJul\n13,014.4\n1,661.3\n1,949.2\n16,624.9\n432.6\n50.6\n17,108.1\n168.2\n1,710.5\n152.0\n225.8\n27.4\n3,522.6\n1,587.7\n2,135.1\n26,637.3\nAug\n15,189.7\n1,798.7\n1,922.5\n18,910.9\n639.1\n59.2\n19,609.3\n202.9\n2,064.4\n155.0\n116.2\n28.0\n4,061.0\n2,614.6\n3,102.0\n31,953.4\nSep\n18,834.0\n2,049.2\n1,925.3\n22,808.5\n549.2\n54.5\n23,412.2\n219.9\n2,989.7\n155.9\n182.3\n23.3\n5,510.0\n3,707.8\n4,887.7\n41,088.9\nOct\n23,441.5\n2,298.0\n1,891.9\n27,631.4\n526.0\n68.6\n28,226.0\n205.7\n3,020.7\n159.1\n211.3\n24.6\n5,937.5\n4,081.1\n4,612.3\n46,478.4\nNov\n25,114.5\n2,868.9\n2,123.8\n30,107.2\n878.6\n99.1\n31,084.9\n235.1\n2,966.0\n175.3\n275.5\n50.5\n6,404.3\n3,148.3\n4,844.2\n49,183.9\nDec\n27,842.2\n3,238.9\n2,192.0\n33,273.1\n1,067.2\n118.5\n34,458.8\n244.0\n3,020.4\n179.5\n326.4\n119.4\n10,212.4\n4,867.7\n7,337.7\n60,766.3\n2020\nJan\n28,570.4\n3,605.9\n2,358.3\n34,534.5\n1,299.1\n92.6\n35,926.3\n255.6\n3,114.7\n185.8\n336.1\n140.1\n12,285.7\n2,965.9\n7,182.1\n62,392.3\nFeb\n37,082.9\n3,939.6\n2,215.0\n43,237.5\n1,674.9\n78.2\n44,990.7\n260.1\n3,357.7\n189.6\n767.7\n154.9\n12,930.2\n5,441.7\n8,745.6\n76,838.2\nMar\n37,923.6\n4,998.7\n2,361.6\n45,283.9\n1,721.0\n409.0\n47,413.9\n476.8\n4,874.8\n258.4\n314.6\n339.9\n15,172.3\n7,917.3\n9,957.3\n86,725.4\nApr\n42,102.4\n5,060.0\n2,530.7\n49,693.1\n1,805.2\n516.3\n52,014.6\n337.6\n4,931.9\n346.4\n312.9\n233.2\n16,105.4\n7,642.8\n10,038.7\n91,963.5\nMay\n48,595.9\n6,274.7\n2,847.3\n57,717.9\n1,840.2\n630.7\n60,188.8\n359.2\n5,129.7\n536.7\n469.1\n365.4\n16,562.4\n7,042.0\n10,273.9\n100,927.2\nJun\n86,454.7\n6,715.3\n4,040.8\n97,210.8\n2,277.4\n1,479.4\n100,967.5\n863.2\n11,761.8\n887.6\n959.9\n348.2\n32,058.2\n24,299.3\n21,339.3\n193,485.0\nJul\n113,233.5\n7,957.5\n6,089.8\n127,280.8\n2,997.8\n1,731.9\n132,010.5\n1,024.3\n14,962.8\n1,387.9\n2,114.7\n348.7\n37,319.8\n28,551.1\n30,279.2\n247,999.1\nAug\n126,039.2\n8,814.1\n5,476.0\n140,329.3\n2,942.4\n850.8\n144,122.5\n1,111.7\n16,780.7\n1,837.1\n3,844.1\n422.5\n40,894.6\n25,354.6\n30,825.6\n265,193.4\nSep\n130,929.6\n9,728.6\n6,981.5\n147,639.7\n2,655.6\n1,531.5\n151,826.9\n1,083.9\n15,206.4\n1,863.1\n2,956.8\n372.2\n42,400.0\n28,289.4\n35,072.8\n279,071.4\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\nTABLE 5.2 : OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS - LIABILITIES \nZWL$ millions\nDeposits\nAmounts Owing to\n \n \nS8 \n \n \n \n \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nForeign\nBond\nNotes\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \nLocal\nPublic\nOther \nContigent \nNon Financial \n Notes &\n&\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment1\nLocal Governemt\nPublic Enterprises\nOther2\nGovernment\nGovernment\nEnterprises\n Institutional Units3\nOther claims\nAssets\nOther Assets\nAssets\nCoins\nCoin\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\n2018\nJan\n22.4\n \n64.1\n \n2,294.5\n \n192.1\n \n103.4\n \n81.9\n \n2,143.2\n \n-\n \n23.5\n \n65.9\n \n26.3\n \n20.6\n \n154.8\n \n2,451.1\n \n28.7\n \n501.0\n \n294.2\n \n538.9\n \n9,006.6\n \nFeb\n18.3\n \n44.0\n \n2,296.8\n \n223.7\n \n108.3\n \n96.2\n \n2,109.3\n \n-\n \n23.5\n \n66.1\n \n24.3\n \n21.1\n \n145.0\n \n2,461.5\n \n28.7\n \n507.8\n \n290.6\n \n536.3\n \n9,001.5\n \nMar\n14.8\n \n53.6\n \n2,238.8\n \n240.7\n \n124.5\n \n99.5\n \n2,164.0\n \n-\n \n23.5\n \n66.7\n \n19.2\n \n15.9\n \n127.1\n \n2,535.8\n \n30.4\n \n504.1\n \n325.8\n \n552.3\n \n9,136.6\n \nApr\n13.5\n \n56.7\n \n2,207.9\n \n275.0\n \n116.7\n \n78.5\n \n2,314.9\n \n-\n \n24.7\n \n67.0\n \n13.4\n \n20.9\n \n120.8\n \n2,519.8\n \n28.3\n \n532.0\n \n299.0\n \n554.9\n \n9,244.0\n \nMay\n12.9\n \n62.8\n \n2,309.0\n \n339.5\n \n130.1\n \n85.7\n \n2,562.4\n \n-\n \n25.0\n \n66.9\n \n8.4\n \n20.9\n \n134.0\n \n2,556.2\n \n23.9\n \n458.9\n \n307.9\n \n555.3\n \n9,659.8\n \nJune\n7.5\n \n52.6\n \n2,848.5\n \n331.8\n \n117.3\n \n84.1\n \n2,538.3\n \n-\n \n26.2\n \n66.5\n \n7.4\n \n19.4\n \n196.0\n \n2,662.2\n \n25.5\n \n551.4\n \n302.9\n \n563.4\n \n10,401.0\n \nJuly\n17.9\n \n54.3\n \n3,189.6\n \n281.1\n \n109.3\n \n95.4\n \n2,949.2\n \n-\n \n-\n \n67.5\n \n4.5\n \n21.0\n \n182.0\n \n2,414.6\n \n26.0\n \n611.4\n \n322.5\n \n565.1\n \n10,911.4\n \nAug\n21.0\n \n67.8\n \n3,196.7\n \n232.3\n \n102.5\n \n66.3\n \n3,014.9\n \n-\n \n-\n \n67.3\n \n7.1\n \n20.6\n \n186.7\n \n2,491.0\n \n29.8\n \n647.7\n \n329.4\n \n566.3\n \n11,047.4\n \nSep\n16.3\n \n58.2\n \n3,487.9\n \n305.3\n \n137.8\n \n78.0\n \n2,789.8\n \n-\n \n45.2\n \n68.1\n \n5.4\n \n20.4\n \n212.2\n \n2,577.1\n \n36.7\n \n637.4\n \n357.4\n \n571.8\n \n11,405.0\n \nOct\n33.1\n \n68.0\n \n3,505.8\n \n272.1\n \n173.1\n \n51.4\n \n2,728.8\n \n-\n \n45.2\n \n68.4\n \n4.6\n \n9.4\n \n188.8\n \n2,697.4\n \n38.7\n \n647.5\n \n353.2\n \n569.2\n \n11,454.9\n \nNov\n25.8\n \n81.4\n \n3,384.4\n \n264.6\n \n198.2\n \n63.9\n \n2,793.9\n \n-\n \n45.2\n \n68.7\n \n7.0\n \n8.1\n \n217.7\n \n2,672.3\n \n46.1\n \n633.2\n \n406.6\n \n569.8\n \n11,486.9\n \nDec\n18.2\n \n89.9\n \n3,737.0\n \n317.3\n \n224.4\n \n74.8\n \n2,633.7\n \n-\n \n43.4\n \n69.2\n \n6.2\n \n9.2\n \n204.3\n \n2,707.6\n \n53.7\n \n573.8\n \n406.2\n \n633.9\n \n11,802.7\n \n2019\nJan\n42.05\n \n106.91\n \n3,766.70\n \n338.09\n \n249.77\n \n46.14\n \n2,621.20\n \n-\n \n61.02\n \n68.66\n \n4.41\n \n8.06\n \n189.15\n \n2,594.53\n \n33.84\n \n517.24\n \n428.82\n \n649.94\n \n11,726.5\n \nFeb\n52.63\n \n238.67\n \n3,601.94\n \n293.36\n \n549.59\n \n205.65\n \n2,675.29\n \n-\n \n60.52\n \n2.00\n \n5.84\n \n7.71\n \n208.31\n \n2,784.17\n \n31.04\n \n490.74\n \n472.78\n \n696.82\n \n12,377.1\n \nMar\n59.17\n \n244.62\n \n3,729.81\n \n393.22\n \n712.08\n \n55.05\n \n2,635.68\n \n-\n \n61.52\n \n4.53\n \n4.27\n \n9.53\n \n340.66\n \n2,660.90\n \n25.33\n \n523.72\n \n755.57\n \n971.53\n \n13,187.2\n \nApr\n40.82\n \n331.97\n \n3,876.83\n \n492.10\n \n981.80\n \n91.75\n \n2,590.97\n \n-\n \n61.79\n \n3.95\n \n3.98\n \n9.62\n \n407.85\n \n2,721.57\n \n24.55\n \n620.52\n \n935.27\n \n1,002.47\n \n14,197.8\n \nMay\n94.59\n \n444.70\n \n3,886.07\n \n571.50\n \n1,747.69\n \n154.08\n \n2,508.43\n \n-\n \n62.12\n \n4.20\n \n3.93\n \n9.43\n \n636.78\n \n3,056.86\n \n34.46\n \n910.14\n \n1,832.95\n \n1,142.77\n \n17,100.7\n \nJun\n119.69\n \n810.71\n \n4,104.17\n \n413.18\n \n2,244.98\n \n538.88\n \n2,596.97\n \n-\n \n63.09\n \n6.62\n \n3.89\n \n8.73\n \n929.36\n \n3,667.45\n \n37.02\n \n1,606.53\n \n1,374.23\n \n1,621.33\n \n20,146.8\n \nJul\n224.75\n \n791.31\n \n5,081.19\n \n275.44\n \n3,602.89\n \n801.93\n \n2,640.55\n \n-\n \n103.36\n \n5.49\n \n2.18\n \n9.00\n \n164.58\n \n4,043.75\n \n32.65\n \n1,587.68\n \n1,873.44\n \n1,722.66\n \n22,962.9\n \nAug\n178.74\n \n1,054.06\n \n7,123.10\n \n461.83\n \n3,778.75\n \n1,050.74\n \n3,106.90\n \n-\n \n103.86\n \n6.78\n \n1.04\n \n9.21\n \n212.50\n \n4,430.78\n \n37.42\n \n2,614.64\n \n1,744.16\n \n1,989.27\n \n27,903.8\n \nSep\n108.51\n \n1,915.41\n \n8,246.09\n \n676.17\n \n5,563.16\n \n1,575.75\n \n3,240.85\n \n-\n \n26.96\n \n6.47\n \n1.37\n \n9.40\n \n187.53\n \n4,993.71\n \n42.30\n \n3,707.80\n \n3,074.10\n \n2,440.63\n \n35,816.2\n \nOct\n138.01\n \n1,702.35\n \n10,537.81\n \n2,437.08\n \n7,376.80\n \n906.98\n \n3,416.23\n \n-\n \n27.05\n \n5.29\n \n1.15\n \n7.94\n \n254.84\n \n5,859.32\n \n41.94\n \n4,081.09\n \n1,658.19\n \n2,434.21\n \n40,886.3\n \nNov\n113.92\n \n2,078.54\n \n10,430.55\n \n2,073.35\n \n7,977.27\n \n940.70\n \n3,737.72\n \n-\n \n27.15\n \n11.83\n \n1.37\n \n8.74\n \n248.79\n \n7,670.96\n \n42.07\n \n3,148.28\n \n1,627.27\n \n3,059.40\n \n43,197.9\n \nDec\n158.44\n \n2,300.01\n \n12,821.54\n \n934.73\n \n7,898.48\n \n1,984.08\n \n3,716.31\n \n-\n \n24.75\n \n20.65\n \n1.33\n \n8.11\n \n268.61\n \n8,976.00\n \n61.84\n \n4,867.67\n \n2,740.16\n \n6,935.56\n \n53,718.3\n \n2020\nJan\n165.80\n \n2,845.62\n \n12,018.43\n \n708.00\n \n7,706.57\n \n1,811.38\n \n4,029.43\n \n-\n \n125.52\n \n14.97\n \n5.11\n \n12.17\n \n326.11\n \n10,766.91\n \n77.59\n \n2,965.93\n \n3,395.90\n \n8,058.15\n \n55,033.6\n \nFeb\n251.70\n \n2,756.57\n \n12,731.97\n \n889.16\n \n8,264.76\n \n1,532.87\n \n3,877.19\n \n-\n \n117.45\n \n13.99\n \n5.15\n \n11.56\n \n329.47\n \n11,656.91\n \n88.37\n \n5,441.70\n \n11,907.90\n \n8,653.69\n \n68,530.4\n \nMar\n242.41\n \n3,063.92\n \n14,545.58\n \n1,948.14\n \n12,381.17\n \n2,497.47\n \n4,373.76\n \n-\n \n0.08\n \n20.23\n \n4.39\n \n11.39\n \n765.82\n \n14,041.67\n \n127.46\n \n7,917.31\n \n5,718.53\n \n9,244.62\n \n76,904.0\n \nApr\n263.29\n \n3,147.75\n \n16,673.44\n \n1,287.51\n \n13,285.14\n \n3,056.32\n \n4,235.96\n \n-\n \n0.08\n \n18.39\n \n4.47\n \n9.75\n \n834.72\n \n14,864.30\n \n129.90\n \n7,642.80\n \n6,534.14\n \n9,703.93\n \n81,691.9\n \nMay\n284.33\n \n3,144.57\n \n19,827.46\n \n1,553.68\n \n15,003.29\n \n3,130.38\n \n4,160.50\n \n-\n \n0.12\n \n45.79\n \n4.53\n \n9.61\n \n768.01\n \n17,762.27\n \n143.44\n \n7,042.04\n \n6,012.40\n \n9,845.09\n \n88,737.5\n \nJun\n515.11\n \n8,372.39\n \n26,368.55\n \n3,570.85\n \n34,550.44\n \n7,527.46\n \n5,841.98\n \n-\n \n0.12\n \n90.14\n \n4.29\n \n9.41\n \n2,010.79\n \n26,638.87\n \n215.56\n \n24,299.33\n \n14,590.26\n \n18,983.05\n \n173,588.6\n \nJul\n577.99\n \n16,536.53\n \n49,470.13\n \n4,219.81\n \n40,259.84\n \n11,399.93\n \n6,357.84\n \n-\n \n-\n \n74.57\n \n4.33\n \n12.61\n \n1,025.78\n \n33,054.99\n \n229.06\n \n28,551.07\n \n10,247.64\n \n19,646.49\n \n221,668.6\n \nAug\n821.16\n \n26,519.73\n \n49,165.59\n \n4,265.44\n \n38,763.72\n \n14,219.24\n \n6,484.68\n \n-\n \n-\n \n39.07\n \n14.05\n \n14.74\n \n1,046.29\n \n38,741.31\n \n231.00\n \n25,354.64\n \n9,460.49\n \n19,961.16\n \n235,102.3\n \nSep\n891.26\n \n27,646.41\n \n51,169.67\n \n3,898.65\n \n38,420.20\n \n14,126.83\n \n6,354.19\n \n-\n \n-\n \n107.40\n \n9.61\n \n22.30\n \n1,050.38\n \n41,088.91\n \n228.95\n \n28,289.36\n \n17,608.70\n \n19,375.08\n \n250,287.9\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\nTABLE 6.1: COMMERCIAL BANKS -ASSETS\nZWL$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \nS9 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nZWL$ millions\nEnd of\nDemand\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nRBZ\nOther Depository \nOther Finacial \nCapital\nContigent\nOther\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\nand\nLiablities\nLiablities\nTOTAL\nReserves\n2018\nMar\n4,732.9\n368.8\n930.7\n6,032.4\n244.7\n92.4\n6,369.5\n61.1\n419.5\n140.5\n54.8\n6.4\n1,196.4\n504.1\n384.3\n9,136.6\nApr\n4,907.7\n394.4\n874.8\n6,176.9\n243.4\n72.8\n6,493.1\n67.4\n413.5\n82.4\n35.2\n15.7\n1,201.5\n532.0\n403.4\n9,244.0\nMay\n5,172.9\n416.2\n917.2\n6,506.3\n246.2\n85.2\n6,837.7\n66.8\n514.1\n101.5\n63.7\n19.4\n1,224.6\n458.9\n373.2\n9,659.8\nJun\n5,650.6\n504.3\n897.4\n7,052.2\n254.8\n66.9\n7,373.9\n45.0\n514.7\n119.8\n116.5\n21.1\n1,259.1\n551.4\n399.5\n10,401.0\nJul\n5,902.3\n527.0\n901.0\n7,330.3\n296.0\n12.2\n7,638.4\n72.0\n507.6\n118.9\n102.5\n16.8\n1,380.1\n611.4\n463.6\n10,911.4\nAug\n6,005.7\n540.8\n930.8\n7,477.3\n266.6\n11.5\n7,755.3\n46.4\n501.5\n137.0\n101.3\n15.4\n1,408.6\n647.7\n434.3\n11,047.4\nSep\n6,281.7\n556.4\n927.2\n7,765.3\n273.0\n23.5\n8,061.8\n40.9\n503.5\n142.2\n108.4\n21.1\n1,434.8\n637.4\n454.9\n11,405.0\nOct\n6,340.3\n509.5\n898.1\n7,747.9\n284.2\n31.1\n8,063.2\n49.3\n525.1\n147.6\n72.2\n16.5\n1,461.0\n647.5\n472.6\n11,454.9\nNov\n6,411.0\n503.9\n861.0\n7,775.9\n232.8\n27.6\n8,036.4\n41.2\n487.5\n213.7\n58.6\n17.8\n1,490.0\n633.2\n508.4\n11,486.9\nDec\n6,582.3\n495.0\n910.9\n7,988.3\n255.0\n19.7\n8,262.9\n43.3\n469.5\n229.6\n147.5\n15.6\n1,551.3\n573.8\n509.2\n11,802.7\n2019\nJan\n6,603.6\n440.8\n919.5\n7,964.0\n240.5\n20.5\n8,225.0\n42.6\n475.0\n239.5\n130.2\n14.4\n1,545.2\n517.2\n537.2\n11,726.5\nFeb\n7,129.0\n426.7\n923.8\n8,479.6\n248.9\n22.8\n8,751.4\n57.3\n647.5\n158.9\n119.1\n14.4\n1,626.6\n490.7\n511.1\n12,377.0\nMar\n7,350.5\n451.8\n915.0\n8,717.3\n225.9\n26.4\n8,969.6\n56.8\n778.3\n165.8\n108.4\n17.0\n1,804.3\n523.7\n763.2\n13,187.2\nApr\n7,861.8\n447.1\n1,280.5\n9,589.3\n260.3\n34.4\n9,884.1\n76.0\n487.7\n148.3\n145.3\n14.8\n1,935.7\n620.5\n885.4\n14,197.8\nMay\n9,143.2\n544.3\n1,412.7\n11,100.2\n309.4\n27.5\n11,437.1\n126.8\n789.2\n148.8\n164.7\n16.0\n1,916.9\n910.1\n1,591.0\n17,100.7\nJun\n10,758.5\n567.5\n1,279.7\n12,605.8\n290.5\n23.1\n12,919.4\n159.0\n1,271.1\n150.3\n161.8\n16.5\n2,409.1\n1,606.5\n1,453.0\n20,146.8\nJul\n12,675.9\n672.2\n1,367.7\n14,715.9\n357.4\n29.4\n15,102.7\n146.4\n1,254.8\n152.0\n205.6\n10.4\n2,583.9\n1,587.7\n1,919.4\n22,962.9\nAug\n14,591.5\n825.3\n1,330.1\n16,747.0\n592.1\n38.0\n17,377.1\n182.4\n1,525.0\n155.0\n88.0\n24.5\n3,065.7\n2,614.6\n2,871.4\n27,903.8\nSep\n18,105.1\n947.3\n1,354.6\n20,407.1\n504.3\n33.3\n20,944.7\n205.7\n2,120.6\n155.9\n115.4\n23.3\n3,933.6\n3,707.8\n4,609.2\n35,816.2\nOct\n22,636.1\n1,003.6\n1,292.7\n24,932.3\n489.1\n47.4\n25,468.8\n200.2\n2,159.7\n159.1\n135.3\n24.6\n4,347.1\n4,081.1\n4,310.3\n40,886.3\nNov\n24,297.0\n1,057.2\n1,633.8\n26,988.0\n843.6\n78.9\n27,910.5\n227.7\n2,089.7\n175.3\n154.3\n48.0\n4,931.5\n3,148.3\n4,512.6\n43,197.9\nDec\n26,909.1\n1,184.4\n1,638.8\n29,732.2\n823.2\n102.9\n30,658.3\n231.6\n2,097.0\n179.5\n209.4\n119.4\n8,414.9\n4,867.7\n6,940.7\n53,718.3\n2020\nJan\n27,276.4\n1,787.3\n1,876.0\n30,939.8\n1,026.0\n76.3\n32,042.1\n232.1\n2,170.0\n185.8\n236.2\n140.1\n10,357.6\n2,965.9\n6,703.8\n55,033.6\nFeb\n35,796.5\n1,869.8\n1,712.8\n39,379.1\n1,404.1\n62.2\n40,845.3\n238.9\n2,391.2\n189.6\n209.2\n154.9\n10,877.8\n5,441.7\n8,181.8\n68,530.4\nMar\n36,078.2\n2,458.2\n1,884.9\n40,421.2\n1,430.6\n393.1\n42,245.0\n468.8\n3,731.4\n258.4\n181.2\n339.9\n12,487.9\n7,917.3\n9,274.0\n76,904.0\nApr\n40,156.4\n2,457.6\n2,078.8\n44,692.9\n1,514.8\n496.9\n46,704.6\n333.2\n3,779.7\n346.4\n172.1\n233.2\n13,105.1\n7,642.8\n9,374.8\n81,691.9\nMay\n46,306.1\n2,502.0\n2,405.7\n51,213.8\n1,399.0\n611.4\n53,224.1\n324.9\n3,968.6\n536.7\n319.4\n365.4\n13,454.1\n7,042.0\n9,502.3\n88,737.5\nJun\n67,548.1\n17,859.0\n3,562.0\n88,969.1\n1,931.1\n1,453.1\n92,353.3\n856.9\n9,116.9\n887.6\n681.7\n348.2\n24,773.8\n24,299.3\n20,270.9\n173,588.6\nJul\n89,092.1\n20,865.7\n5,595.6\n115,553.4\n2,671.5\n1,702.4\n119,927.3\n1,014.3\n11,100.4\n1,387.9\n1,907.7\n348.7\n28,563.5\n28,551.1\n28,867.6\n221,668.6\nAug\n102,750.2\n20,005.2\n4,891.9\n127,647.3\n2,577.9\n824.8\n131,049.9\n1,101.5\n12,302.3\n1,837.1\n3,658.1\n412.5\n30,713.4\n25,354.6\n28,672.9\n235,102.3\nSep\n104,770.7\n24,130.0\n6,488.3\n135,389.0\n2,548.1\n1,496.4\n139,433.5\n1,063.5\n11,363.7\n1,863.1\n2,831.0\n372.2\n32,694.4\n28,289.4\n32,377.1\n250,287.9\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\nTABLE 6.2 : COMMERCIAL BANKS - LIABILITIES\nDeposits\nAmounts Owing to\n \n \nS10 \n \n \n \nForeign\nOther Assets\nNon Financial \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nNotes\nAssets\nBond\n&\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \n Notes &\nCoin\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment1\nLocal Governemt\nPublic Enterprises\nOther2\nMortgages\nGovernment\nOther\nCoins\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\n2018\nJan\n0.9\n \n2.3\n \n197.4\n \n98.7\n \n7.8\n \n-\n \n129.8\n \n34.5\n \n-\n \n-\n \n413.2\n \n-\n \n508.7\n \n144.9\n \n136.1\n \n1,674.3\n \nFeb\n1.5\n \n1.8\n \n172.4\n \n123.5\n \n5.5\n \n-\n \n141.3\n \n33.5\n \n-\n \n-\n \n414.8\n \n-\n \n507.9\n \n125.7\n \n135.7\n \n1,663.6\n \nMar\n1.4\n \n3.4\n \n175.9\n \n72.1\n \n14.1\n \n-\n \n212.6\n \n32.8\n \n-\n \n-\n \n411.4\n \n-\n \n539.4\n \n142.8\n \n132.3\n \n1,738.2\n \nApr\n1.1\n \n4.3\n \n185.5\n \n61.9\n \n3.6\n \n-\n \n184.4\n \n32.0\n \n-\n \n-\n \n413.3\n \n-\n \n582.7\n \n141.6\n \n135.2\n \n1,745.7\n \nMay\n1.0\n \n7.6\n \n196.3\n \n138.2\n \n8.1\n \n-\n \n191.0\n \n30.9\n \n-\n \n-\n \n415.0\n \n-\n \n608.4\n \n128.1\n \n137.4\n \n1,862.0\n \nJune\n1.2\n \n4.9\n \n188.6\n \n177.8\n \n1.9\n \n-\n \n266.2\n \n30.1\n \n-\n \n-\n \n413.9\n \n-\n \n614.3\n \n124.0\n \n141.5\n \n1,964.5\n \nJuly\n1.8\n \n6.6\n \n207.1\n \n185.1\n \n1.7\n \n-\n \n283.2\n \n33.3\n \n-\n \n-\n \n423.5\n \n-\n \n636.1\n \n128.2\n \n141.1\n \n2,047.7\n \nAug\n1.6\n \n3.7\n \n224.7\n \n145.3\n \n2.4\n \n-\n \n288.9\n \n32.2\n \n-\n \n-\n \n428.2\n \n-\n \n579.4\n \n139.1\n \n143.7\n \n1,989.2\n \nSep\n1.9\n \n2.9\n \n245.6\n \n92.6\n \n20.8\n \n-\n \n291.1\n \n31.2\n \n-\n \n-\n \n430.3\n \n-\n \n650.2\n \n148.1\n \n144.4\n \n2,059.1\n \nOct\n4.9\n \n2.1\n \n220.0\n \n95.8\n \n11.9\n \n-\n \n318.9\n \n30.2\n \n-\n \n-\n \n427.7\n \n-\n \n639.8\n \n154.2\n \n147.0\n \n2,052.5\n \nNov\n3.6\n \n2.9\n \n243.3\n \n35.7\n \n10.4\n \n-\n \n320.7\n \n28.9\n \n-\n \n-\n \n433.5\n \n-\n \n635.7\n \n148.0\n \n145.8\n \n2,008.5\n \nDec\n2.3\n \n4.3\n \n157.4\n \n121.3\n \n10.4\n \n-\n \n339.4\n \n28.0\n \n-\n \n-\n \n444.8\n \n-\n \n645.9\n \n179.7\n \n151.9\n \n2,085.6\n \n2019\nJan\n6.3\n \n4.6\n108.2\n \n63.5\n10.9\n \n-\n \n343.8\n \n27.3\n33.6\n \n-\n \n438.0\n \n-\n \n649.3\n \n136.7\n151.2\n \n1,973.3\n \nFeb\n5.4\n \n17.6\n120.6\n \n62.8\n18.1\n \n-\n \n339.6\n \n26.5\n-\n \n-\n \n416.1\n \n-\n \n696.1\n \n171.1\n156.7\n \n2,030.8\n \nMar\n2.6\n \n18.0\n126.3\n \n38.6\n23.9\n \n-\n \n331.7\n \n25.5\n-\n \n-\n \n415.1\n \n-\n \n710.1\n \n172.1\n207.4\n \n2,071.2\n \nApr\n3.7\n \n30.6\n220.3\n \n85.0\n47.6\n \n-\n \n271.6\n \n25.0\n-\n \n-\n \n414.1\n \n-\n \n705.0\n \n169.0\n276.2\n \n2,247.8\n \nMay\n3.9\n \n38.4\n162.2\n \n115.4\n139.0\n \n-\n \n345.5\n \n23.9\n-\n \n-\n \n406.2\n \n-\n \n776.6\n \n165.7\n363.4\n \n2,540.1\n \nJun\n6.3\n \n69.8\n361.6\n \n144.5\n132.4\n \n-\n \n265.8\n \n22.6\n-\n \n-\n \n421.7\n \n-\n \n873.6\n \n210.5\n473.0\n \n2,981.8\n \nJul\n6.5\n \n174.7\n473.9\n \n89.7\n131.1\n \n-\n \n258.3\n \n22.2\n-\n \n-\n \n416.0\n \n-\n \n934.6\n \n203.1\n565.6\n \n3,275.8\n \nAug\n5.5\n \n94.5\n758.0\n \n60.6\n115.5\n \n-\n \n247.4\n \n21.5\n-\n \n-\n \n418.1\n \n-\n \n970.6\n \n345.1\n567.6\n \n3,604.2\n \nSep\n15.8\n \n180.3\n831.8\n \n195.4\n104.2\n \n-\n \n267.6\n \n20.9\n-\n \n-\n \n499.1\n \n-\n \n1,137.6\n \n528.8\n1,042.2\n \n4,823.6\n \nOct\n6.2\n \n198.7\n997.2\n \n72.2\n243.7\n \n-\n \n268.8\n \n20.2\n-\n \n-\n \n429.8\n \n-\n \n1,286.7\n \n503.4\n1,069.3\n \n5,096.2\n \nNov\n11.9\n \n156.1\n872.3\n \n159.7\n426.0\n \n-\n \n338.6\n \n19.6\n-\n \n-\n \n443.5\n \n-\n \n1,357.4\n \n575.8\n1,068.7\n \n5,429.6\n \nDec\n9.2\n \n223.9\n1,016.9\n \n317.4\n492.3\n \n-\n \n308.3\n \n18.2\n-\n \n-\n \n454.5\n \n-\n \n1,413.5\n \n700.6\n1,470.0\n \n6,424.9\n \n2020\nJan\n16.3\n \n322.3\n1,106.8\n \n361.8\n421.8\n \n-\n \n283.0\n \n20.1\n-\n \n-\n \n478.2\n \n-\n \n1,498.8\n \n717.5\n1,552.8\n \n6,779.5\n \nFeb\n14.5\n \n368.2\n977.2\n \n612.5\n370.5\n \n-\n \n357.1\n \n20.1\n-\n \n1.5\n \n503.6\n \n-\n \n2,097.7\n \n735.9\n1,538.8\n \n7,597.4\n \nMar\n20.1\n \n529.4\n1,423.7\n \n261.8\n282.6\n \n-\n \n341.6\n \n19.2\n-\n \n0.6\n \n526.4\n \n-\n \n2,406.4\n \n1165.6\n1,914.1\n \n8,891.5\n \nApr\n33.1\n \n493.1\n914.2\n \n232.1\n384.9\n \n-\n \n424.3\n \n18.1\n-\n \n-\n \n525.9\n \n-\n \n2,568.2\n \n1528.5\n2,134.4\n \n9,256.8\n \nMay\n39.7\n \n434.7\n1,248.4\n \n192.3\n725.0\n \n-\n \n382.4\n \n17.0\n-\n \n-\n \n517.6\n \n-\n \n2,793.4\n \n2669.6\n2,146.1\n \n11,166.3\n \nJun\n88.7\n \n1167.9\n2,857.8\n \n395.9\n1,222.0\n \n-\n \n385.4\n \n13.8\n-\n \n-\n \n653.4\n \n-\n \n4,663.9\n \n2688.0\n4,712.1\n \n18,848.8\n \nJul\n109.1\n \n1780.7\n3,878.9\n \n1342.9\n1,879.4\n \n-\n \n346.6\n \n13.4\n-\n \n-\n \n585.7\n \n-\n \n5,648.0\n \n3879.5\n4,927.7\n \n24,391.8\n \nAug\n142.9\n \n2175.5\n4,799.3\n \n341.7\n2,310.6\n \n-\n \n294.6\n \n13.1\n-\n \n-\n \n688.7\n \n-\n \n6,552.1\n \n4480.3\n6,104.6\n \n27,903.4\n \nSep\n179.8\n \n2469.9\n4,547.1\n \n504.6\n1,027.7\n \n-\n \n218.3\n \n12.9\n-\n \n0.4\n \n741.5\n \n-\n \n6,518.3\n \n2774.9\n6,503.8\n \n25,499.1\n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\nNotes\n1.Government securities include treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households and other financial corporations, \nTABLE 7.1: BUILDING SOCIETIES -ASSETS\nZWL$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \nS11 \n \n \n \n \nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nCapital\nOther\nTOTAL\nand\nLiablities\nEnd of\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nRBZ\nOther Depository \nOther Finacial \nReserves\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\n2018\nMar\n535.1\n507.8\n1,042.9\n120.3\n16.5\n1,179.7\n27.5\n41.3\n0.0\n34.5\n0.5\n378.2\n76.5\n1,738.2\nApr\n568.0\n452.6\n1,020.5\n144.4\n17.0\n1,181.9\n27.9\n39.7\n0.0\n33.6\n0.4\n358.5\n103.7\n1,745.7\nMay\n613.8\n475.1\n1,089.0\n196.6\n16.4\n1,302.0\n32.4\n40.0\n0.0\n31.2\n0.5\n363.1\n92.8\n1,862.0\nJune\n658.5\n507.9\n1,166.5\n183.2\n16.4\n1,366.0\n33.1\n39.3\n0.0\n56.9\n0.4\n363.5\n105.2\n1,964.5\nJuly\n770.2\n542.9\n1,313.1\n128.5\n15.0\n1,456.6\n28.7\n37.5\n0.0\n30.4\n15.8\n378.9\n99.8\n2,047.7\nAug\n703.4\n534.7\n1,238.0\n133.0\n15.0\n1,386.0\n31.3\n33.9\n0.0\n18.3\n17.9\n385.8\n116.0\n1,989.2\nSep\n749.8\n502.3\n1,252.2\n166.0\n15.1\n1,433.2\n22.8\n55.9\n0.0\n20.7\n25.5\n388.6\n112.3\n2,059.1\nOct\n772.5\n471.9\n1,244.4\n151.0\n15.1\n1,410.5\n23.7\n56.3\n0.0\n21.2\n25.5\n389.9\n125.4\n2,052.5\nNov\n699.9\n511.9\n1,211.9\n134.0\n15.1\n1,360.9\n21.0\n55.6\n0.0\n16.2\n24.5\n396.1\n134.2\n2,008.5\nDec\n713.2\n540.0\n1,253.1\n139.6\n15.1\n1,407.8\n26.5\n55.3\n0.0\n40.2\n23.4\n400.1\n132.3\n2,085.6\n2019\nJan\n633.8\n490.2\n1,124.0\n140.5\n15.0\n1,279.6\n27.9\n55.5\n0.0\n58.1\n24.8\n392.8\n134.7\n1,973.3\nFeb\n661.3\n492.3\n1,153.6\n138.8\n15.0\n1,307.4\n25.8\n134.5\n0.0\n32.6\n28.2\n366.7\n135.6\n2,030.8\nMar\n655.2\n473.9\n1,129.1\n146.8\n15.0\n1,290.9\n29.0\n155.6\n0.0\n32.5\n25.7\n391.4\n146.2\n2,071.2\nApr\n782.3\n460.0\n1,242.3\n130.5\n14.9\n1,387.7\n26.0\n165.0\n0.0\n28.2\n14.1\n457.7\n169.2\n2,247.8\nMay\n895.0\n464.3\n1,359.4\n153.5\n15.0\n1,527.9\n23.9\n264.7\n0.0\n41.9\n30.6\n477.5\n173.6\n2,540.1\nJun\n1,154.3\n406.8\n1,561.1\n131.5\n15.0\n1,707.7\n23.9\n336.5\n0.0\n54.8\n27.1\n664.7\n167.0\n2,981.8\nJul\n1,192.2\n538.1\n1,730.3\n75.2\n14.9\n1,820.4\n33.0\n455.7\n0.0\n20.2\n17.0\n739.6\n189.9\n3,275.8\nAug\n1,424.7\n542.9\n1,967.6\n47.0\n15.0\n2,029.6\n31.8\n539.4\n0.0\n28.2\n3.5\n777.8\n193.9\n3,604.2\nSep\n1,686.2\n524.9\n2,211.1\n44.9\n15.0\n2,271.0\n25.5\n869.0\n0.0\n66.9\n0.0\n1,352.0\n239.1\n4,823.6\nOct\n1,920.1\n548.8\n2,468.8\n36.9\n15.0\n2,520.7\n16.7\n861.0\n0.0\n76.0\n0.0\n1,362.8\n259.0\n5,096.2\nNov\n2,394.7\n441.2\n2,835.9\n35.0\n15.0\n2,886.0\n18.6\n876.3\n0.0\n121.1\n2.5\n1,246.7\n278.3\n5,429.6\nDec\n2,713.3\n481.5\n3,194.7\n244.0\n15.0\n3,453.8\n23.7\n923.5\n0.0\n117.1\n0.0\n1,563.0\n343.9\n6,424.9\n2020\nJan\n2,894.8\n398.4\n3,293.3\n273.1\n15.0\n3,581.4\n34.7\n944.7\n0.0\n100.0\n0.0\n1,699.9\n418.8\n6,779.5\nFeb\n3,118.5\n419.8\n3,538.4\n270.9\n15.0\n3,824.3\n32.5\n966.5\n0.0\n558.5\n0.0\n1,714.1\n501.5\n7,597.4\nMar\n3,978.7\n384.4\n4,363.1\n290.4\n15.0\n4,668.5\n19.3\n1,143.4\n0.0\n133.4\n0.0\n2,335.6\n591.3\n8,891.5\nApr\n4,097.6\n354.9\n4,452.5\n290.4\n15.0\n4,757.9\n15.6\n1,152.3\n0.0\n140.8\n0.0\n2,628.1\n562.1\n9,256.8\nMay\n5,615.0\n370.0\n5,985.0\n441.2\n15.0\n6,441.2\n45.6\n1,161.2\n0.0\n149.8\n0.0\n2,708.1\n660.4\n11,166.3\nJun\n7,327.5\n405.9\n7,733.4\n346.2\n15.0\n8,094.6\n17.6\n2,644.8\n0.0\n278.2\n0.0\n6,867.2\n946.4\n18,848.8\nJul\n10,284.7\n427.7\n10,712.4\n326.2\n15.0\n11,053.7\n21.3\n3,862.4\n0.0\n207.1\n0.0\n8,010.7\n1,236.7\n24,391.8\nAug\n10,984.4\n502.7\n11,487.1\n364.5\n15.0\n11,866.6\n21.4\n4,478.3\n0.0\n186.1\n10.0\n9,438.3\n1,902.7\n27,903.4\nSep\n10,408.2\n403.5\n10,811.8\n107.5\n15.0\n10,934.3\n31.7\n3,842.7\n0.0\n125.8\n0.0\n8,069.6\n2,495.1\n25,499.1\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\nAmounts Owing to\nTABLE 7.2: BUILDING SOCIETIES -LIABILITIES\nZWL$ millions\n \n \nS12 \n \n \n Table 8.1: SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS LOANS AND ADVANCES\n$ ('000)\n \nAGRICULTURE\nCONSTRUCTION\nCOMMUNICATION\nDISTRIBUTION\nFINANCIAL &\nFINANCIAL\nMANUFACTURING\nMINING\nSERVICES\nTRANSPORT\nINDIVIDUALS\nCONGLOMERATES\nTOTAL\nEND OF\n \n \n \nINVESTMENTS\nORGANISATIONS\n \n \n \n \n2018\nJan\n479,109.6\n59,336.8\n9,442.4\n289,531.3\n20,569.7\n258,035.0\n271,453.8\n106,425.1\n390,052.9\n32,328.6\n617,303.0\n14,394.7\n2,547,982.8\nFeb\n488,203.1\n59.,977.6\n9,271.6\n315,569.6\n20,133.1\n258,263.6\n285,045.1\n108,649.0\n393,604.9\n31,636.6\n618,377.4\n15,010.6\n2,543,764.6\nMar\n484,764.7\n64,826.5\n11,050.5\n344,731.3\n15,203.3\n274,150.2\n303,649.2\n114,431.9\n363,449.4\n32,793.4\n640,496.9\n19,893.1\n2,669,440.4\nApr\n485,790.0\n63,948.2\n10,904.2\n344,532.1\n15,015.2\n271,071.8\n294,270.8\n112,692.1\n333,633.8\n31,103.5\n631,920.5\n22,066.0\n2,616,948.2\nMay\n501,783.7\n63,555.3\n10,933.5\n362,939.6\n15,079.8\n358,553.4\n317,666.7\n117,123.0\n338,846.3\n31,523.1\n651,444.0\n24,226.4\n2,793,674.8\nJun\n475,105.7\n66,796.8\n13,907.7\n385,583.3\n15,079.8\n344,917.3\n323,212.1\n117,146.6\n335,216.9\n34,457.6\n655,427.0\n34,163.4\n2,801,014.3\nJul\n463,286.3\n70,905.2\n18,924.1\n383,314.7\n14,976.4\n140,624.6\n274,507.8\n113,776.3\n309,209.5\n37,474.0\n652,652.7\n34,402.1\n2,514,053.7\nAug\n470,756.1\n79,237.1\n15,167.3\n331,672.8\n15,021.9\n144,100.7\n271,000.5\n111,960.2\n306,022.7\n37,341.2\n666,649.4\n34,402.1\n2,483,332.1\nSep\n451,745.3\n79,055.7\n15,021.6\n341,851.7\n15,021.9\n144,799.6\n263,994.2\n112,656.6\n320,788.5\n36,914.6\n666,971.5\n64,407.1\n2,513,228.2\nOct\n453,068.3\n74,931.8\n16,036.5\n389,851.7\n15,156.8\n165,252.7\n268,933.2\n111,956.6\n313,376.8\n36,118.6\n680,445.7\n12,855.7\n2,537,984.3\nNov\n444,130.8\n133,137.6\n14,884.1\n313,733.0\n15,156.8\n165,419.8\n269,459.9\n149,908.1\n316,738.8\n45,693.2\n679,403.7\n12,265.4\n2,559,931.1\nDec\n492,669.9\n78,176.7\n15,958.0\n340,422.7\n14,425.5\n165,648.7\n253,354.3\n113,596.5\n347,242.2\n40,695.4\n669,879.6\n12,254.3\n2,544,323.9\n2019\nJan\n525,176.7\n80,480.9\n20,199.4\n349,755.6\n15,294.0\n158,458.9\n255,380.4\n123,772.8\n358,554.2\n42,355.5\n666,797.1\n16,335.7\n2,612,561.3\nFeb\n521,988.1\n79,066.7\n10,931.1\n352,797.8\n14,699.0\n80,894.7\n253,027.0\n124,474.7\n389,523.0\n40,923.5\n644,320.9\n11,446.6\n2,524,093.1\nMar\n538,072.7\n87,791.3\n18,211.5\n379,233.1\n14,556.7\n205,466.5\n270,360.1\n133,324.8\n407,638.0\n43,541.4\n731,600.3\n11,476.6\n2,841,272.8\nApr\n584,205.3\n96,516.9\n22,430.9\n421,676.7\n15,968.0\n236,000.3\n310,449.7\n193,315.8\n387,730.2\n44,465.7\n788,749.6\n14,486.6\n3,115,995.7\nMay\n712,661.5\n98,826.6\n27,802.4\n466,620.0\n17,425.9\n317,055.8\n368,550.6\n250,912.5\n441,731.0\n43,682.6\n901,283.4\n14,096.6\n3,660,649.0\nJun\n940,505.8\n82,926.8\n30,534.7\n566,391.1\n169,400.8\n876,820.4\n354,648.6\n331,070.0\n404,941.1\n49,207.3\n898,523.5\n14,258.9\n4,719,228.9\nJul\n1,060,152.4\n108,889.3\n38,005.8\n685,729.8\n22,484.8\n470,421.8\n497,581.3\n333,137.4\n643,722.0\n51,560.7\n1,111,698.0\n7,683.2\n5,031,066.5\nAug\n1,163,054.3\n117,882.9\n40,904.6\n720,937.6\n15,289.6\n524,650.1\n575,937.1\n378,008.7\n742,674.6\n51,710.4\n1,202,415.1\n5,830.8\n5,539,295.7\nSep\n1,379,203.2\n101,683.9\n20,216.2\n755,828.9\n15,563.7\n1,430,322.3\n520,659.8\n487,089.9\n594,143.3\n59,974.6\n1,004,073.3\n6,055.4\n5,087,524.4\nOct\n1,917,349.8\n103,709.0\n20,826.5\n798,377.2\n24,574.7\n1,447,865.7\n603,692.2\n541,020.3\n618,349.6\n61,677.9\n1,112,873.3\n4,322.0\n7,530,493.2\nNov\n1,916,599.1\n103,450.1\n22,381.7\n878,695.3\n24,749.4\n1,566,329.2\n623,341.5\n554,037.1\n623,064.8\n61,153.1\n1,152,340.0\n4,351.8\n7,530,493.2\nDec\n3,260,641.3\n140,783.7\n27,127.1\n1,114,871.8\n48,155.6\n1,504,624.8\n1,027,373.9\n821,797.2\n823,237.5\n84,684.8\n1,428,029.4\n7,328.2\n10,288,655.3\n2020\nJan\n4,084,551.9\n155,581.9\n40,879.9\n1,241,096.7\n54,212.8\n1,614,135.9\n1,136,124.9\n905,568.2\n799,835.7\n83,887.6\n1,594,904.4\n3,435.4\n11,714,215.3\nFeb\n4,492,412.3\n157,892.1\n54,850.8\n1,305,056.3\n51,575.2\n1,667,016.0\n1,328,895.1\n875,096.3\n827,340.4\n103,240.6\n1,837,059.2\n1,195.4\n12,701,629.5\nMar\n5,400,573.8\n137,553.1\n109,432.3\n1,355,737.8\n60,656.4\n2,181,804.5\n1,514,365.3\n1,743,391.4\n911,568.0\n129,647.8\n2,083,395.0\n30,867.0\n15,658,992.1\nApr\n5,497,243.2\n144,302.2\n94,782.2\n1,298,701.4\n50,563.1\n2,200,545.8\n1,762,996.4\n1,756,962.2\n1,057,031.7\n149,805.9\n2,211,133.9\n33,524.9\n16,257,593.1\nMay\n6,753,987.6\n152,161.1\n176,776.3\n1,688,453.5\n61,403.0\n2,272,323.3\n2,155,232.1\n2,018,291.5\n1,335,664.7\n161,892.6\n2,646,269.6\n56,873.3\n19,479,328.7\nJun\n8,233,748.4\n178,010.1\n127,961.9\n3,248,219.4\n64,989.9\n5,469,986.1\n3,799,659.7\n4,379,017.7\n1,983,339.3\n277,602.3\n3,665,408.8\n46,385.0\n31,474,328.4\nJul\n8,927,920.7\n256,440.3\n209,123.9\n4,249,101.8\n34,055.9\n7,106,442.2\n5,125,740.6\n5,385,837.1\n2,413,677.9\n418,160.1\n4,321,918.7\n46,630.6\n38,495,050.0\nAug\n9,773,178.5\n269,675.4\n194,537.6\n5,470,092.5\n33,043.1\n7,946,261.7\n6,723,930.2\n5,651,838.1\n3,103,883.1\n446,084.4\n5,291,100.2\n48,922.4\n44,952,547.2\nSep\n10,508,860.2\n202,929.0\n203,610.8\n4,810,727.3\n29,975.8\n1,041,079.2\n7,136,261.7\n4,099,760.8\n3,255,496.9\n517,871.7\n6,526,576.1\n48,754.1\n38,381,903.5\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\n/1 Including the only merchant bank still in operation.\n \n \nS13 \n \n \n \n Table 8.1: SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS LOANS AND ADVANCES\n$ ('000)\n \nAGRICULTURE\nCONSTRUCTION\nCOMMUNICATION\nDISTRIBUTION\nFINANCIAL &\nFINANCIAL\nMANUFACTURING\nMINING\nSERVICES\nTRANSPORT\nINDIVIDUALS\nCONGLOMERATES\nTOTAL\nEND OF\n \n \n \nINVESTMENTS\nORGANISATIONS\n \n \n \n \n2018\nJan\n479,109.6\n59,336.8\n9,442.4\n289,531.3\n20,569.7\n258,035.0\n271,453.8\n106,425.1\n390,052.9\n32,328.6\n617,303.0\n14,394.7\n2,547,982.8\nFeb\n488,203.1\n59.,977.6\n9,271.6\n315,569.6\n20,133.1\n258,263.6\n285,045.1\n108,649.0\n393,604.9\n31,636.6\n618,377.4\n15,010.6\n2,543,764.6\nMar\n484,764.7\n64,826.5\n11,050.5\n344,731.3\n15,203.3\n274,150.2\n303,649.2\n114,431.9\n363,449.4\n32,793.4\n640,496.9\n19,893.1\n2,669,440.4\nApr\n485,790.0\n63,948.2\n10,904.2\n344,532.1\n15,015.2\n271,071.8\n294,270.8\n112,692.1\n333,633.8\n31,103.5\n631,920.5\n22,066.0\n2,616,948.2\nMay\n501,783.7\n63,555.3\n10,933.5\n362,939.6\n15,079.8\n358,553.4\n317,666.7\n117,123.0\n338,846.3\n31,523.1\n651,444.0\n24,226.4\n2,793,674.8\nJun\n475,105.7\n66,796.8\n13,907.7\n385,583.3\n15,079.8\n344,917.3\n323,212.1\n117,146.6\n335,216.9\n34,457.6\n655,427.0\n34,163.4\n2,801,014.3\nJul\n463,286.3\n70,905.2\n18,924.1\n383,314.7\n14,976.4\n140,624.6\n274,507.8\n113,776.3\n309,209.5\n37,474.0\n652,652.7\n34,402.1\n2,514,053.7\nAug\n470,756.1\n79,237.1\n15,167.3\n331,672.8\n15,021.9\n144,100.7\n271,000.5\n111,960.2\n306,022.7\n37,341.2\n666,649.4\n34,402.1\n2,483,332.1\nSep\n451,745.3\n79,055.7\n15,021.6\n341,851.7\n15,021.9\n144,799.6\n263,994.2\n112,656.6\n320,788.5\n36,914.6\n666,971.5\n64,407.1\n2,513,228.2\nOct\n453,068.3\n74,931.8\n16,036.5\n389,851.7\n15,156.8\n165,252.7\n268,933.2\n111,956.6\n313,376.8\n36,118.6\n680,445.7\n12,855.7\n2,537,984.3\nNov\n444,130.8\n133,137.6\n14,884.1\n313,733.0\n15,156.8\n165,419.8\n269,459.9\n149,908.1\n316,738.8\n45,693.2\n679,403.7\n12,265.4\n2,559,931.1\nDec\n492,669.9\n78,176.7\n15,958.0\n340,422.7\n14,425.5\n165,648.7\n253,354.3\n113,596.5\n347,242.2\n40,695.4\n669,879.6\n12,254.3\n2,544,323.9\n2019\nJan\n525,176.7\n80,480.9\n20,199.4\n349,755.6\n15,294.0\n158,458.9\n255,380.4\n123,772.8\n358,554.2\n42,355.5\n666,797.1\n16,335.7\n2,612,561.3\nFeb\n521,988.1\n79,066.7\n10,931.1\n352,797.8\n14,699.0\n80,894.7\n253,027.0\n124,474.7\n389,523.0\n40,923.5\n644,320.9\n11,446.6\n2,524,093.1\nMar\n538,072.7\n87,791.3\n18,211.5\n379,233.1\n14,556.7\n205,466.5\n270,360.1\n133,324.8\n407,638.0\n43,541.4\n731,600.3\n11,476.6\n2,841,272.8\nApr\n584,205.3\n96,516.9\n22,430.9\n421,676.7\n15,968.0\n236,000.3\n310,449.7\n193,315.8\n387,730.2\n44,465.7\n788,749.6\n14,486.6\n3,115,995.7\nMay\n712,661.5\n98,826.6\n27,802.4\n466,620.0\n17,425.9\n317,055.8\n368,550.6\n250,912.5\n441,731.0\n43,682.6\n901,283.4\n14,096.6\n3,660,649.0\nJun\n940,505.8\n82,926.8\n30,534.7\n566,391.1\n169,400.8\n876,820.4\n354,648.6\n331,070.0\n404,941.1\n49,207.3\n898,523.5\n14,258.9\n4,719,228.9\nJul\n1,060,152.4\n108,889.3\n38,005.8\n685,729.8\n22,484.8\n470,421.8\n497,581.3\n333,137.4\n643,722.0\n51,560.7\n1,111,698.0\n7,683.2\n5,031,066.5\nAug\n1,163,054.3\n117,882.9\n40,904.6\n720,937.6\n15,289.6\n524,650.1\n575,937.1\n378,008.7\n742,674.6\n51,710.4\n1,202,415.1\n5,830.8\n5,539,295.7\nSep\n1,379,203.2\n101,683.9\n20,216.2\n755,828.9\n15,563.7\n1,430,322.3\n520,659.8\n487,089.9\n594,143.3\n59,974.6\n1,004,073.3\n6,055.4\n5,087,524.4\nOct\n1,917,349.8\n103,709.0\n20,826.5\n798,377.2\n24,574.7\n1,447,865.7\n603,692.2\n541,020.3\n618,349.6\n61,677.9\n1,112,873.3\n4,322.0\n7,530,493.2\nNov\n1,916,599.1\n103,450.1\n22,381.7\n878,695.3\n24,749.4\n1,566,329.2\n623,341.5\n554,037.1\n623,064.8\n61,153.1\n1,152,340.0\n4,351.8\n7,530,493.2\nDec\n3,260,641.3\n140,783.7\n27,127.1\n1,114,871.8\n48,155.6\n1,504,624.8\n1,027,373.9\n821,797.2\n823,237.5\n84,684.8\n1,428,029.4\n7,328.2\n10,288,655.3\n2020\nJan\n4,084,551.9\n155,581.9\n40,879.9\n1,241,096.7\n54,212.8\n1,614,135.9\n1,136,124.9\n905,568.2\n799,835.7\n83,887.6\n1,594,904.4\n3,435.4\n11,714,215.3\nFeb\n4,492,412.3\n157,892.1\n54,850.8\n1,305,056.3\n51,575.2\n1,667,016.0\n1,328,895.1\n875,096.3\n827,340.4\n103,240.6\n1,837,059.2\n1,195.4\n12,701,629.5\nMar\n5,400,573.8\n137,553.1\n109,432.3\n1,355,737.8\n60,656.4\n2,181,804.5\n1,514,365.3\n1,743,391.4\n911,568.0\n129,647.8\n2,083,395.0\n30,867.0\n15,658,992.1\nApr\n5,497,243.2\n144,302.2\n94,782.2\n1,298,701.4\n50,563.1\n2,200,545.8\n1,762,996.4\n1,756,962.2\n1,057,031.7\n149,805.9\n2,211,133.9\n33,524.9\n16,257,593.1\nMay\n6,753,987.6\n152,161.1\n176,776.3\n1,688,453.5\n61,403.0\n2,272,323.3\n2,155,232.1\n2,018,291.5\n1,335,664.7\n161,892.6\n2,646,269.6\n56,873.3\n19,479,328.7\nJun\n8,233,748.4\n178,010.1\n127,961.9\n3,248,219.4\n64,989.9\n5,469,986.1\n3,799,659.7\n4,379,017.7\n1,983,339.3\n277,602.3\n3,665,408.8\n46,385.0\n31,474,328.4\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\n/1 Including the only merchant bank still in operation.\n \n \nS14 \n \n \n \nEND OF\nAGRICULTURE\nCONSTRUCTION\nCOMMUNICATIONS\nDISTRIBUTION\nFINANCIAL&INV\nESTMENT\nFINANCIAL ORG\nMANUFACTURING\nMINING\nSERVICES\nTRANSPORT\nINDIVIDUALS\nCONGLOMERATES\nTOTAL\n2019\nJan\n505,422.9\n391,022.0\n497,976.2\n1,034,948.2\n411,945.9\n1,187,606.7\n882,289.7\n322,030.3\n2,154,902.3\n135,871.6\n763,189.5\n63,064.3\n8,350,269.7\nFeb\n512,602.3\n374,750.6\n394,709.1\n936,123.6\n449,800.9\n904,919.4\n855,348.4\n347,405.5\n2,355,866.1\n138,685.8\n776,949.7\n63,097.1\n8,110,258.7\nMar\n526,564.2\n343,684.3\n376,205.6\n937,743.4\n393,489.3\n1,317,757.7\n861,574.9\n380,295.4\n2,099,331.1\n141,677.2\n773,726.4\n63,094.9\n8,215,144.4\nApr\n632,972.5\n255,945.6\n1,010,978.7\n90,282.6\n462,133.1\n1,535,772.6\n890,606.5\n325,814.6\n2,413,535.6\n320,213.5\n876,646.5\n90,282.6\n9,963,832.2\nMay\n832,073.6\n305,410.9\n1,321,039.7\n1,177,925.1\n522,764.9\n1,646,358.6\n1,142,369.6\n372,594.9\n2,765,341.2\n371,372.0\n965,202.7\n93,188.9\n11,515,642.2\nJun\n1,001,633.6\n309,108.9\n1,124,005.3\n1,337,171.0\n546,572.5\n2,210,293.9\n1,319,789.8\n562,858.0\n3,493,214.3\n434,828.2\n1,070,319.7\n52,118.6\n13,461,913.9\nJul\n1,171,245.4\n353,388.5\n1,504,911.5\n1,241,910.1\n654,904.7\n2,553,878.7\n1,383,215.2\n585,108.2\n4,131,588.8\n463,161.9\n1,304,402.7\n71,943.6\n15,419,659.2\nAug\n1,313,462.5\n477,215.8\n1,795,905.4\n1,687,246.4\n804,316.2\n2,591,386.5\n1,647,680.2\n1,114,306.0\n3,872,187.0\n503,541.6\n1,532,441.9\n75,829.3\n17,413,139.2\nSep\n1,581,141.7\n321,121.4\n1,934,554.4\n1,728,390.1\n952,548.3\n3,086,893.1\n1,638,855.1\n1,375,546.6\n5,961,405.3\n589,939.6\n1,848,708.4\n76,775.9\n21,272,162.4\nOct\n1,744,905.8\n796,996.5\n2,217,888.5\n2,626,316.7\n768,125.2\n3,204,019.2\n2,287,076.1\n1,889,144.7\n7,536,588.6\n510,151.5\n1,942,195.1\n48,142.7\n25,571,550.5\nNov\n1,783,345.3\n813,506.5\n2,257,181.8\n2,618,010.3\n1,287,013.8\n3,544,459.5\n2,082,447.8\n1,787,923.6\n7,794,026.0\n491,371.8\n1,920,297.4\n57,897.5\n26,437,481.4\nDec\n1,877,764.1\n950,348.8\n2,917,087.2\n3,126,494.5\n1,421,969.0\n4,411,638.4\n2,605,023.1\n1,664,547.7\n8,410,964.0\n554,937.3\n2,477,474.0\n116,789.4\n30,535,037.6\n2020\nJan\n2,173,633.0\n972,609.2\n3,182,087.1\n4,279,565.8\n1,757,297.1\n4,791,990.6\n2,791,625.2\n2,223,774.1\n9,875,803.5\n609,781.7\n2,838,775.9\n81,735.2\n35,578,678.4\nFeb\n2,492,591.8\n1,191,731.7\n3,340,863.8\n8,721,475.9\n1,919,428.5\n5,869,104.2\n3,481,495.5\n2,729,162.0\n10,202,203.6\n760,155.3\n3,574,134.5\n82,845.8\n44,365,192.6\nMar\n2,678,262.7\n1,449,645.9\n3,231,059.0\n11,715,273.9\n2,114,093.0\n6,507,000.0\n4,576,971.8\n3,048,053.5\n11,490,205.2\n947,918.2\n4,257,117.7\n72,082.9\n52,087,683.7\nApr\n2,854,374.8\n1,118,295.5\n3,492,330.5\n5,271,473.4\n1,999,901.1\n6,191,170.7\n4,276,817.2\n3,727,579.4\n14,060,717.8\n713,407.0\n4,444,924.9\n83,109.3\n48,234,101.6\nMay\n3,866,781.1\n1,163,944.9\n4,713,727.6\n7,932,403.4\n1,991,042.6\n7,151,451.5\n5,858,495.1\n5,031,912.5\n13,907,794.8\n944,318.1\n5,060,401.3\n88,613.6\n57,710,886.5\nJun\n7,228,784.4\n1,963,030.9\n5,393,404.5\n14,526,855.6\n3,997,135.7\n12,452,202.5\n11,386,156.5\n9,507,719.1\n22,807,615.5\n1,630,544.9\n9,798,261.2\n121,561.2\n100,813,272.0\nJul\n9,091,726.8\n2,629,847.1\n6,043,419.0\n19,096,889.5\n4,988,887.7\n15,446,649.7\n15,274,687.4\n7,918,819.5\n31,916,392.6\n2,035,354.7\n15,762,315.2\n147,866.0\n130,352,855.1\nAug\n9,462,082.7\n2,865,950.9\n6,582,519.6\n19,234,704.0\n5,333,846.9\n16,821,248.6\n17,017,042.1\n7,304,595.8\n35,312,317.7\n2,217,425.5\n16,548,990.5\n134,271.1\n138,834,995.4\nSep\n9,832,514.4\n3,139,646.1\n7,166,350.4\n20,531,087.6\n5,145,328.3\n9,505,277.1\n17,311,149.2\n10,234,597.7\n39,731,086.5\n2,011,372.4\n16,155,747.9\n148,612.6\n140,912,770.1\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2020\n TABLE 8.2: SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS DEPOSITS \n$ ('000)\n \n \nS15 \n \n \n \nEnd of\nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\n INTERNET\nEnd of\nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\n INTERNET\n2018\n2018\n Jan \n 5,548.05 4.89 \n663.45\n 21.29 2,318.80 1,006.05 \n Jan \n 548.13 22.73 20,981.21 449.60 100,593.90 501.80 \n Feb \n 4,706.60 4.50 \n594.00\n 13.90 2,015.11 831.05 \n Feb \n 457.19 22.48 \n18,869.05\n 292.22 89,584.32 463.78 \n Mar \n 6,300.40 4.50 \n654.20\n 12.50 2,657.10 864.83 \n Mar \n 545.18 23.68 \n21,996.85\n 268.41 116,119.95 510.51 \n Apr \n 5,786.75 3.28 \n640.94\n 11.46 3,002.63 822.58 \n Apr \n 505.50 17.38 \n21,170.05\n 253.60 117,616.79 456.96 \n May \n 7,298.41 4.25 \n819.74\n 10.51 3,550.07 968.58 \n May \n 611.14 21.22 \n23,278.20\n 213.17 137,422.97 496.62 \n Jun \n 7,997.28 4.70 \n779.37\n 8.29 3,724.31 1,135.49 \n Jun \n 553.60 22.46 \n23,790.00\n 175.19 156,609.78 502.22 \n Jul \n 8,290.00 3.96 \n790.00\n 9.39 4,446.68 1,262.53 \n Jul \n 560.15 20.07 \n25,075.47\n 223.13 169,416.76 559.58 \n Aug \n 7,762.86 2.88 \n811.19\n 13.98 4,558.54 1,254.96 \n Aug \n 553.01 15.15 \n25,249.87\n 317.35 164,917.97 518.70 \n Sep \n 7,155.04 3.97 \n842.48\n 17.01 4,462.40 1,393.08 \n Sep \n 542.96 19.37 \n24,918.01\n 300.81 161,289.50 511.27 \n Oct \n 8,230.50 4.20 \n821.30\n 17.90 4,607.38 1,428.20 \n Oct \n 571.60 20.40 \n21,025.40\n 345.50 161,427.40 495.99 \n Nov \n 7,922.50 3.70 \n657.50\n 19.90 3,964.78 1,026.70 \n Nov \n 477.40 16.70 \n17,845.40\n 334.90 133,862.10 430.60 \n Dec \n 8,355.20 2.80 \n917.20\n 14.60 4,833.80 1,102.90 \n Dec \n 478.60 13.00 \n27,419.10\n 236.20 161,540.70 409.10 \n2019\n2019\n Jan \n 6,903.02 2.89 \n1,294.05\n 16.92 3,608.83 1,056.16 \n Jan \n 401.51 12.20 \n40,613.79\n 232.61 135,481.07 413.39 \n Feb \n 8,336.98 4.04 \n1,330.58\n 17.21 3,594.51 1,093.64 \n Feb \n 456.54 16.35 \n27,811.17\n 226.77 119,081.12 463.62 \n Mar \n 9,881.49 3.90 \n1,399.50\n 18.27 4,080.65 1,250.55 \n Mar \n 525.91 15.42 \n30,417.55\n 248.88 142,597.83 441.02 \n Apr \n 10,321.38 3.14 \n1,590.10\n 13.97 4,949.34 1,408.53 \n Apr \n 535.02 13.65 \n32,092.53\n 168.79 157,348.28 390.08 \n May \n 14,670.32 4.19 \n1,397.48\n 11.83 6,692.55 1,897.82 \n May \n 642.59 14.66 \n15,542.62\n 121.44 166,491.56 494.29 \n Jun \n 17,881.21 3.73 \n1,464.66\n 30.14 7,130.02 2,539.84 \n Jun \n 705.96 13.34 \n18,012.05\n 79.60 160,873.03 486.81 \n Jul \n 23,309.86 3.70 \n1,806.45\n 36.55 9,137.36 3,295.81 \n Jul \n 983.53 13.59 \n20,465.37\n 99.56 170,823.27 638.17 \n Aug \n 23,596.62 2.37 \n2,181.56\n 38.47 11,077.65 3,493.56 \n Aug \n 872.91 8.99 \n21,919.77\n 85.24 179,281.20 542.28 \n Sep \n 30,328.13 3.80 \n3,029.87\n 51.94 15,112.00 5,337.71 \n Sep \n 1,010.70 11.88 \n22,749.60\n 62.44 200,441.85 679.42 \n Oct \n 39,413.72 3.87 \n3,621.64\n 67.08 16,588.28 6,237.03 \n Oct \n 1,079.40 12.66 \n23,191.58\n 65.00 206,621.48 1,099.30 \n Nov \n 40,871.80 3.53 \n4,199.30\n 67.41 13,537.77 7,200.30 \n Nov \n 982.10 10.32 \n25,737.50\n 225.22 152,919.89 2,044.08 \n Dec \n 49,579.82 2.76 \n5,695.39\n 97.22 19,356.74 8,724.02 \n Dec \n 1,003.81 7.64 \n27,800.46\n 385.47 146,316.57 1,273.62 \n2020\n2020 \n Jan \n 47,841.35 1.85 \n5,236.31\n 115.20 21,247.93 9,646.84 \n Jan \n 943.30 4.56 \n23,649.03\n 199.88 139,278.20 671.73 \n Feb \n 41,637.65 4.66 \n5,431.81\n 136.93 22,589.66 9,633.79 \n Feb \n 916.12 8.87 \n21,652.22\n 196.62 149,671.48 647.84 \n Mar \n 60,804.08 4.06 \n7,252.88\n 267.95 27,993.61 14,411.35 \n Mar \n 1,068.45 7.35 \n22,588.12\n 234.27 173,042.15 661.19 \n Apr \n 47,525.48 - \n4,150.63\n 82.57 18,299.23 11,481.82 \n Apr \n 515.07 - \n11,036.39\n 36.36 131,189.97 998.03 \n May \n 59,271.13 - \n7,426.04\n 349.82 24,851.46 19,593.20 \n May \n 674.11 - \n14,711.60\n 231.19 150,936.13 705.32 \n Jun \n 91,311.28 - \n9,752.73\n 516.61 26,042.54 25,842.33 \n Jun \n 907.77 - \n14,420.93\n 286.06 135,524.31 1,390.39 \n Jul \n 127,743.20 - \n14,741.10\n 1,028.71 26,033.25 35,199.67 \n Jul \n 918.35 - \n15,786.53\n 251.44 121,072.40 791.91 \n Aug \n 143,042.09 - \n14,953.63\n 1,547.55 27,217.60 34,505.02 \n Aug \n 789.41 - \n13,536.22\n 248.17 127,308.59 702.05 \n Sep \n 203,172.05 0.77 \n18,252.25\n 1,962.96 26,440.98 41,958.39 \n Sep \n 911.91 0.00 \n15,524.14\n 309.78 125,059.25 783.16 \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2020\nTABLE 9.1 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS TRANSACTIONAL ACTIVITY\nValues of Transactions (ZWL$ in millions)\nTABLE 9.2 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS TRANSACTIONAL ACTIVITY\nVolumes of Transactions (in thousands)\n \n \nS16 \n \n \n \nEnd of\nNominal Lending \nRates2\nIndividuals \nCorporate\nSavings\n3 Months2\n2019\n2019\nJan\n4.00-18.00\n9.47\n7.40\nJan\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nFeb\n4.00-18.00\n9.23\n7.30\nFeb\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-6.75\nMar \n4.00-18.00\n9.23\n7.31\nMar \n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nApr\n4.00-18.00\n9.3\n7.38\nApr\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nMay\n4.00-22.00\n9.31\n7.33\nMay\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nJun\n4.00-22.00\n9.15\n7.67\nJun\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nJul\n4.00-35.00\n9.54\n8.4\nJul\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nAug\n5.00-55.00\n14.37\n18.43\nAug\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nSep\n5.00-65.00\n14.64\n19.81\nSep\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nOct\n5.00-65.00\n15.59\n19.66\nOct\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nNov\n5.00-65.00\n15.06\n18.00\nNov\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nDec\n5.00-65.00\n16.08\n18.31\nDec\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\n2020\n2020\nJan\n5.00-65.00\n16.56\n17.2\nJan\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nFeb\n5.00-65.00\n16.92\n16.68\nFeb\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nMar \n5.00-65.00\n19.65\n17.21\nMar \n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nApr\n5.00-65.00\n18.57\n18.69\nApr\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nMay\n5.00-65.00\n18.06\n18.07\nMay\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nJun\n5.00-65.00\n20.04\n17.38\nJun\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nJuly\n5.00-65.00\n18.87\n20.11\nJul\n0.22-12.00\n1.33-14.00\nAug\n6.00-65.00\n19.14\n18.99\nAug\n0.50-15.00\n1.00-20.28\nSep\n6.00-65.00\n20.65\n25.09\nSep\n0.50-15.00\n1.00-20.28\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2020\nNotes\n3. Lending rates exclude rates on staff loans. \n TABLE 10.2 : BANKS DEPOSIT RATES (percent per annum)1\n1. The range of rates qouted by banks during the period.\n2. Three (3) months deposit rates revised to exclude rates on \ninactive or dormant accounts.\nTABLE 10.1: LENDING RATES (percent per annum)1\n1. Table revised, to separate weighted lending rates for individuals and \ncorporate bodies. \n2. Nominal Lending Rates depict the range of rates quoted by banks.\nWeighted Average Lending Rates3 \nCommercial Banks\nCommercial Banks\nEnd of \n \n \nS17 \n \n \n \nEnd of\nAll Share\nIndustrial\nMining\nVolume of Shares\nMarket Turnover\nMarket Capitalisation\n2018\nJan\n91.32\n305.35\n130.42\n55.03\n31.40\n8,652.85\nFeb\n88.03\n294.55\n124.91\n138.14\n63.74\n8,385.97\nMar\n86.98\n291.00\n125.10\n109.00\n40.33\n8,290.41\nApr\n98.71\n330.70\n124.40\n206.34\n44.43\n9,405.34\nMay\n108.3\n361.53\n151.53\n129.16\n59.28\n10,393.24\nJun\n102.87\n342.79\n161.30\n234.83\n72.99\n9,792.18\nJul\n114.32\n384.25\n163.99\n624.26\n114.94\n10,969.72\nAug\n117.33\n394.64\n161.34\n142.15\n50.49\n12,475.45\nSep\n115.12\n386.97\n163.76\n197.40\n61.11\n12,265.51\nOct\n163.82\n549.81\n217.34\n316.06\n449.60\n17,960.00\nNov\n160.4\n538.66\n208.56\n153.87\n118.00\n17,316.60\nDec\n146.24\n487.13\n227.71\n144.48\n92.97\n19,189.50\n2019\nJan\n157.54\n525.90\n213.13\n110.28\n122.78\n20,888.43\nFeb\n148.11\n494.31\n206.91\n295.84\n229.94\n19,773.37\nMar\n121.66\n405.57\n193.98\n70.81\n123.40\n16,084.87\nApr\n133.69\n446.52\n186.47\n116.52\n134.39\n17,502.73\nMay\n188.06\n628.41\n225.81\n193.52\n237.33\n24,919.96\nJun\n204.75\n683.51\n255.26\n235.49\n293.14\n27,017.17\nJul\n187.12\n624.41\n244.58\n191.05\n163.56\n24,636.14\nAug\n166.36\n553.59\n269.55\n109.03\n117.69\n21,742.20\nSep\n232.52\n774.55\n317.75\n166.56\n335.37\n30,527.18\nOct\n232.86\n777.48\n276.31\n208.40\n203.00\n30,390.04\nNov\n240.81\n801.38\n344.42\n130.00\n129.89\n31,226.28\nDec\n230.08\n766.34\n316.66\n194.20\n190.88\n29,767.09\n2020\nJan\n332.90\n1,112.27\n344.92\n304.86\n179.56\n43,426.48\nFeb\n473.13\n1,564.98\n826.73\n360.13\n172.68\n60,987.46\nMar\n456.21\n1,512.46\n720.47\n425.24\n237.67\n58,612.10\nApr\n488.60\n1,617.24\n826.64\n269.66\n107.31\n63,387.90\nMay\n1,180.14\n3,919.50\n1,582.86\n568.96\n218.83\n152,719.68\nJune*\n1,788.75\n5,870.36\n3,995.48\n379.93\n519.90\n228,577.09\nAug\n1,389.23\n4,533.79\n3,709.15\n1,026.76\n164.50\n175,678.36\nSep\n1,638.17\n5,385.73\n4,128.52\n`\n1,093.04\n206,502.49\nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE), 2020\n$ Millions\nTABLE 11: ZIMBABWE STOCK MARKET STATISTICS\nIndices\n*All Share index was introduced in \n \n \nS18 \n \n \n \nFOOD \nINFLATION\nALL\nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES \nCLOTHING\nHOUSING, \nWATER,\nFURNITURE\nHEALTH\nTRANSPORT\nCOMMUNICATION\nRECREATION &\nEDUCATION\nRESTAURANTS \n&\nMISC.\nTOTAL \nNON\nFOOD & \nITEMS\n& TOBACCO\nFOOTWEAR\nELECTRICTY, \nGAS\nAND\nCULTURE\nHOTELS\nGOODS &\nFOOD\nNON \nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES\n& OTHER\nEQUIPMENT\nSERVICES\nFUELS\nWEIGHTS\n4.9\n4.3\n27.6\n5.3\n1.4\n8.4\n2.7\n2.3\n4.3\n1.1\n6.5\n68.7\n31.3\n100\n2018\nJan\n0.17\n0.67\n0.02\n0.55\n0.10\n0.00\n-0.04\n1.78\n0.00\n-0.16\n0.64\n0.26\n0.39\n0.30\nFeb\n0.26\n0.91\n0.01\n0.43\n0.00\n-0.02\n0.15\n0.90\n0.00\n0.01\n0.21\n0.19\n-0.18\n0.08\nMar\n0.13\n-0.34\n-0.74\n0.46\n0.18\n-1.29\n-1.60\n1.58\n0.01\n-0.14\n-0.55\n0.09\n-0.03\n-0.25\nApr\n0.20\n0.34\n-0.01\n0.00\n0.10\n-0.32\n-0.21\n-0.10\n0.63\n1.85\n0.26\n0.11\n0.02\n0.08\nMay\n-0.03\n0.10\n0.00\n-0.12\n0.03\n0.14\n-0.01\n0.08\n0.00\n0.05\n0.33\n0.03\n0.02\n0.03\nJun\n0.60\n0.14\n-0.16\n-0.48\n0.38\n0.19\n0.10\n-0.25\n0.00\n0.26\n1.00\n0.04\n-0.23\n-0.05\nJul\n0.43\n0.38\n0.00\n0.40\n0.31\n0.17\n0.08\n0.65\n7.16\n3.20\n0.75\n1.09\n0.74\n0.98\nAug\n0.13\n0.45\n0.00\n0.91\n0.24\n0.47\n0.00\n-0.23\n0.00\n0.11\n0.34\n0.28\n0.62\n0.39\nSep\n0.22\n1.35\n0.53\n2.79\n1.90\n0.51\n0.32\n0.22\n0.00\n0.28\n0.07\n0.85\n1.05\n0.92\nOct\n7.89\n45.88\n2.94\n26.86\n12.94\n19.13\n1.39\n27.66\n0.00\n9.86\n13.64\n14.66\n20.12\n16.44\nNov\n7.21\n10.63\n4.80\n9.12\n3.36\n2.31\n0.18\n16.33\n0.35\n9.29\n15.42\n6.50\n14.53\n9.20\nDec\n10.22\n8.07\n2.77\n8.07\n8.49\n28.61\n1.26\n3.19\n0.00\n13.84\n10.07\n9.01\n9.07\n9.03\n2019\nJan\n13.35\n1.04\n4.35\n9.46\n11.64\n47.25\n1.12\n11.01\n0.10\n11.73\n6.72\n12.83\n6.94\n10.75\nFeb\n2.94\n5.94\n2.77\n2.73\n2.93\n-7.70\n0.14\n3.42\n0.02\n2.20\n4.34\n0.70\n3.56\n1.67\nMar\n14.29\n5.56\n2.34\n5.20\n2.30\n3.06\n0.14\n3.92\n3.66\n4.54\n5.16\n4.05\n5.10\n4.38\nApr\n12.05\n6.57\n0.65\n5.84\n19.90\n3.40\n3.50\n5.36\n6.93\n19.74\n5.35\n4.45\n7.85\n5.52\nMay\n21.57\n11.89\n2.54\n11.51\n16.85\n16.18\n31.21\n29.81\n3.05\n6.67\n8.96\n10.12\n17.63\n12.54\nJun\n40.94\n59.89\n18.11\n63.80\n46.53\n41.90\n2.32\n35.38\n0.06\n28.71\n36.63\n31.23\n55.07\n39.26\nJul\n23.72\n27.68\n9.19\n27.01\n43.32\n26.39\n7.48\n36.17\n11.05\n30.51\n39.79\n21.72\n19.90\n21.04\nAug\n18.09\n10.81\n13.65\n11.18\n7.47\n32.66\n67.86\n12.65\n4.09\n8.67\n18.77\n17.79\n18.55\n18.07\nSep\n11.01\n17.47\n15.52\n14.73\n18.68\n16.83\n1.29\n18.03\n4.10\n8.42\n35.01\n16.63\n19.55\n17.72\nOct\n42.80\n37.15\n38.63\n35.12\n34.80\n26.55\n9.15\n31.78\n5.47\n37.99\n30.03\n32.90\n48.35\n38.75\nNov\n16.54\n18.35\n5.83\n25.67\n18.49\n9.68\n13.01\n20.59\n17.10\n36.46\n23.89\n13.94\n22.63\n17.46\nDec\n11.51\n13.48\n31.25\n17.51\n12.74\n11.82\n1.43\n5.70\n0.17\n15.52\n18.28\n17.14\n15.75\n16.55\n2020\nJan\n1.83\n3.84\n0.60\n1.50\n5.32\n2.24\n2.77\n2.01\n9.39\n2.72\n1.86\n1.99\n2.55\n2.23\nFeb\n8.48\n10.01\n2.27\n7.00\n21.56\n9.62\n220.04\n17.96\n94.95\n2.92\n30.86\n18.41\n6.81\n13.52\nMar\n28.76\n37.12\n57.14\n29.35\n27.28\n18.10\n4.26\n58.79\n0.66\n17.49\n22.67\n32.44\n17.69\n26.59\nApr\n26.21\n13.46\n3.05\n24.06\n25.07\n8.87\n3.05\n9.42\n1.13\n21.08\n15.12\n11.38\n28.37\n17.64\nMay\n28.90\n18.99\n3.42\n21.36\n18.30\n22.97\n4.22\n10.04\n0.02\n29.69\n23.31\n15.41\n14.72\n15.13\nJun\n35.25\n48.84\n7.52\n38.21\n43.77\n32.48\n23.24\n39.46\n0.87\n32.46\n29.51\n27.61\n37.73\n31.66\nJul\n33.30\n35.93\n12.07\n32.45\n27.35\n50.65\n118.89\n17.13\n1.14\n37.84\n34.77\n33.76\n37.99\n35.53\nAug\n9.71\n7.52\n2.82\n7.83\n7.02\n11.02\n19.57\n7.75\n79.86\n8.40\n11.19\n10.03\n6.30\n8.44\nSep\n2.53\n1.71\n3.01\n1.52\n2.59\n1.69\n19.84\n5.79\n23.42\n0.33\n7.26\n5.08\n2.08\n3.83\n Source :ZIMSTATS, 2020\nNON-FOOD INFLATION\nTABLE 12.1 : MONTHLY INFLATION -- PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX\n( FEBRUARY 2019 = 100)\n \n \nS19 \n \n \n \nFOOD \nINFLATION\nALL\nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES \nCLOTHING\nHOUSING, WATER,\nFURNITURE\nHEALTH\nTRANSPORT\nCOMMUNICATION\nRECREATION &\nEDUCATION\nRESTAURANT\nS &\nMISC.\nTOTAL NON\nFOOD & \nITEMS\n& TOBACCO\nFOOTWEAR\nELECTRICTY, GAS\nAND\nCULTURE\nHOTELS\nGOODS &\nFOOD\nNON \nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES\n& OTHER\nEQUIPMENT\nSERVICES\nFUELS\nWEIGHTS\n4.90\n4.35\n27.62\n5.29\n1.42\n8.39\n2.65\n2.27\n4.25\n1.08\n6.46\n68.70\n31.30\n100.00\n2018\nJan\n0.7\n2.0\n-0.3\n2.3\n0.5\n0.6\n-0.1\n3.7\n-1.4\n-0.4\n2.5\n0.8\n3.5\n1.6\nFeb\n0.7\n2.3\n-0.4\n1.4\n0.1\n0.3\n0.1\n3.5\n0.0\n0.3\n1.6\n0.7\n1.5\n0.9\nMar\n0.6\n1.2\n-0.7\n1.4\n0.3\n-1.3\n-1.5\n4.3\n0.0\n-0.3\n0.3\n0.5\n0.2\n0.1\nApr\n0.6\n0.9\n-0.7\n0.9\n0.3\n-1.6\n-1.7\n2.4\n0.6\n1.7\n-0.1\n0.4\n-0.2\n-0.1\nMay\n0.3\n0.1\n-0.7\n0.3\n0.3\n-1.5\n-1.8\n1.6\n0.6\n1.8\n0.0\n0.2\n0.0\n-0.1\nJun\n0.8\n0.6\n-0.2\n-0.6\n0.5\n0.0\n-0.1\n-0.3\n0.6\n2.2\n1.6\n0.2\n-0.2\n0.1\nJul\n1.0\n0.6\n-0.2\n-0.2\n0.7\n0.5\n0.2\n0.5\n7.2\n3.5\n2.1\n1.2\n0.5\n1.0\nAug\n1.2\n1.0\n-0.2\n0.8\n0.9\n0.8\n0.2\n0.2\n7.2\n3.6\n2.1\n1.4\n1.1\n1.3\nSep\n0.8\n2.2\n0.5\n4.1\n2.5\n1.1\n0.4\n0.6\n7.2\n3.6\n1.2\n2.2\n2.4\n2.3\nOct\n8.3\n48.5\n3.5\n31.6\n15.4\n20.3\n1.7\n27.7\n0.0\n10.3\n14.1\n16.0\n22.1\n18.0\nNov\n15.9\n63.6\n8.5\n42.3\n19.0\n22.5\n1.9\n48.8\n0.3\n20.4\n31.3\n23.2\n39.0\n28.3\nDec\n27.5\n74.4\n10.9\n49.6\n26.7\n56.7\n2.9\n53.2\n0.3\n36.7\n44.4\n33.1\n50.1\n38.6\n2019\nJan\n33.9\n20.8\n12.4\n29.1\n25.2\n93.8\n2.6\n33.2\n0.4\n39.0\n35.6\n31.0\n33.6\n31.9\nFeb\n28.6\n15.7\n10.2\n21.5\n24.7\n74.8\n2.5\n18.5\n0.1\n30.0\n22.6\n23.9\n20.8\n22.8\nMar\n33.4\n13.0\n9.8\n18.3\n17.6\n40.1\n1.4\n19.3\n3.8\n19.4\n17.1\n18.2\n16.4\n17.5\nApr\n31.8\n19.2\n5.9\n14.4\n26.3\n-1.6\n3.8\n13.2\n10.9\n27.9\n15.6\n9.4\n17.4\n12.0\nMay\n55.7\n25.9\n5.6\n24.2\n43.3\n23.8\n36.0\n42.1\n14.2\n33.5\n20.7\n19.7\n33.3\n24.0\nJun\n92.0\n90.7\n21.9\n93.3\n105.3\n70.5\n39.0\n85.2\n10.3\n64.4\n56.8\n50.9\n96.7\n65.4\nJul\n112.0\n128.4\n32.2\n132.0\n145.4\n108.4\n44.3\n139.3\n14.5\n79.2\n108.1\n75.9\n118.7\n89.7\nAug\n105.9\n126.2\n46.6\n131.3\n125.7\n137.9\n84.6\n107.7\n15.7\n82.5\n126.9\n88.1\n120.4\n99.0\nSep\n62.2\n66.2\n43.4\n62.0\n82.8\n95.9\n82.7\n81.0\n20.3\n53.8\n124.2\n67.2\n69.9\n68.2\nOct\n87.2\n78.5\n82.0\n72.4\n71.9\n96.1\n85.6\n75.2\n14.3\n62.6\n108.5\n82.6\n110.2\n92.9\nNov\n84.8\n90.7\n69.5\n79.7\n89.6\n62.2\n24.9\n87.6\n28.6\n104.2\n117.5\n76.6\n117.5\n91.9\nDec\n85.6\n84.2\n92.6\n74.3\n80.1\n55.2\n25.1\n68.0\n23.7\n117.5\n90.6\n77.4\n110.6\n90.0\n2020\nJan\n32.3\n39.5\n39.7\n31.0\n40.7\n25.4\n17.8\n30.0\n28.3\n61.9\n49.3\n36.1\n45.6\n40.0\nFeb\n23.2\n29.6\n35.0\n20.9\n44.3\n25.3\n233.6\n27.2\n113.6\n22.1\n57.7\n41.5\n26.8\n35.3\nMar\n42.2\n56.6\n61.7\n40.5\n63.0\n32.4\n242.9\n91.1\n114.7\n24.2\n63.5\n59.9\n28.9\n46.9\nApr\n76.3\n71.2\n65.6\n71.7\n93.5\n40.9\n243.9\n105.0\n98.5\n46.4\n84.8\n74.7\n61.4\n69.1\nMay\n109.5\n85.1\n67.5\n94.8\n88.3\n58.1\n12.0\n91.2\n1.8\n84.5\n74.1\n70.3\n73.3\n71.5\nJun\n120.0\n100.9\n14.6\n108.1\n112.7\n77.4\n32.4\n67.9\n2.0\n108.0\n83.8\n64.0\n102.8\n78.3\nJul\n132.4\n140.7\n24.6\n122.2\n116.6\n145.4\n181.2\n79.7\n2.0\n136.8\n115.2\n97.0\n118.0\n105.5\nAug\n97.8\n117.5\n23.9\n97.4\n95.9\n121.6\n222.6\n76.0\n83.5\n97.9\n94.1\n87.8\n102.0\n93.5\nSep\n49.9\n48.6\n18.7\n45.0\n39.8\n70.1\n213.6\n33.5\n124.5\n49.9\n60.7\n54.6\n49.7\n52.6\n Source :ZIMSTATS, 2020\nTABLE 12.2 : QUARTERLY INFLATION -- PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \n(FEBRUARY 2019 = 100)\nNON-FOOD INFLATION\n \n \nS20 \n \n \nFOOD \nINFLATION\nALCOHOLIC \nCLOT HING\nHOUS ING, \nW AT E R,\nFURNIT URE\nMIS C.\nFOOD & \nB E VE RAGE S \n& \nE LE CT RICT Y, \nGAS\nAND\nRE CRE AT ION &\nRE S T AURANT S \n&\nGOODS &\nT OT AL NON\nNON \nALCOHOLIC \nALL\n& T OB ACCO\nFOOT W E AR\n& OT HE R\nE QUIP ME NT\nCULT URE\nHOT E LS\nS E RVICE S\nFOOD\nB E VE RAGE S\nIT E MS\nFUE LS\nWEIGHTS\n4.90\n4.35\n27.62\n5.29\n1.42\n8.39\n2.65\n2.27\n4.25\n1.08\n6.46\n68.70\n31.30\n100\n2018\nSep\n3.35\n6.98\n-0.47\n10.60\n4.77\n1.49\n-0.89\n10.00\n6.31\n5.77\n7.79\n4.83\n7.94\n5.39\nOct\n10.81\n53.83\n2.20\n35.57\n17.08\n19.61\n0.11\n36.24\n6.31\n15.68\n19.31\n18.71\n26.78\n20.85\nNov\n18.47\n69.14\n7.04\n46.01\n20.56\n22.02\n0.34\n56.70\n8.23\n27.34\n36.21\n26.02\n42.71\n31.01\nDec\n30.21\n81.48\n10.48\n57.08\n30.80\n56.47\n1.61\n60.45\n8.22\n44.26\n48.82\n37.08\n53.68\n42.09\n2019\nJan\n47.34\n82.13\n15.27\n71.00\n45.88\n130.41\n2.79\n75.00\n8.32\n61.45\n57.81\n54.26\n63.71\n56.90\nFeb\n51.28\n91.22\n18.46\n74.92\n50.16\n112.71\n2.78\n79.38\n8.34\n64.99\n64.31\n55.04\n69.84\n59.39\nMar\n72.67\n102.55\n22.14\n83.18\n53.34\n122.10\n4.59\n83.51\n12.30\n72.72\n73.75\n61.19\n78.55\n66.80\nApr\n93.08\n115.13\n22.94\n93.88\n83.66\n130.40\n8.49\n93.54\n19.33\n103.06\n82.56\n68.17\n92.52\n75.86\nMay\n134.80\n140.46\n26.07\n116.47\n114.54\n167.32\n42.36\n151.04\n22.97\n116.49\n98.28\n85.94\n126.43\n97.85\nJun\n228.95\n283.96\n49.13\n256.29\n213.17\n278.58\n45.52\n240.71\n23.05\n177.91\n168.24\n142.84\n251.94\n175.66\n2020\nFeb\n710.29\n629.57\n603.89\n254.34\n523.95\n785.04\n498.64\n946.38\n604.12\n262.80\n507.72\n839.15\n462.64\n540.16\nMar\n807.36\n721.94\n814.31\n444.09\n667.21\n1001.14\n585.97\n989.48\n975.94\n252.31\n582.94\n995.50\n616.11\n676.39\nApr\n980.03\n825.86\n873.49\n456.99\n799.24\n1048.61\n622.22\n984.76\n1017.34\n233.23\n590.62\n1097.13\n663.66\n765.57\nMay\n953.34\n881.65\n935.22\n461.76\n878.64\n1062.84\n664.43\n761.68\n847.15\n223.43\n739.67\n1254.79\n700.38\n785.55\nJun\n842.04\n863.68\n411.42\n725.77\n1040.97\n613.71\n937.83\n875.68\n226.03\n764.10\n1184.15\n678.29\n835.56\n737.26\nJul\n914.97\n925.92\n424.89\n761.12\n913.86\n750.68\n2013.62\n739.27\n196.93\n812.65\n1138.04\n755.27\n976.73\n837.53\nAug\n842.90\n895.39\n374.89\n735.12\n909.62\n611.88\n1405.52\n702.75\n413.11\n810.44\n1058.99\n698.90\n865.48\n761.02\nSep\n770.81\n761.81\n323.45\n638.97\n772.72\n519.65\n1681.32\n619.53\n508.37\n742.51\n820.76\n619.77\n724.40\n659.40\nSource:Zimstat, 2020\nTABLE 12.3 : YEARLY INFLATION - % CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \n(February 2019 = 100)\nCOMMUNICAT ION\nT RANS P ORT\nHE ALT H\nE DUCAT ION\nNON-FOOD INFLATION\n \n \nS21 \n \n \n \n \nEnd of\nJun-19\nJul-19 Aug-19 Sep-19 Oct-19 Nov-19 Dec-19\nJan-20\nFeb-20\nMar-20\nApr-20\nMay-20\nJun-20\nJul-20\nAug-20\nSep-20\nTotal \n(Q3 2020)\nMerchandise Imports (excl. energy)\n168.6\n \n222.3\n \n182.1\n \n232.9\n \n209.0\n \n226.1\n \n216.0\n \n164.4\n \n170.7\n \n178.2\n \n153.1\n \n162.0\n \n221.1\n \n302.6\n \n235.8\n \n242.3\n \n780.7\n \n- Consumption Goods\n62.6\n \n97.3\n \n73.3\n \n85.4\n \n87.8\n \n97.3\n \n94.4\n \n75.1\n \n90.2\n \n82.2\n \n76.6\n \n86.3\n \n116.4\n \n116.4\n \n97.6\n \n101.1\n \n315.1\n \n- Capital Goods\n70.6\n \n87.4\n \n73.4\n \n118.4\n \n91.1\n \n89.0\n \n90.8\n \n64.9\n \n60.3\n \n61.5\n \n52.8\n \n47.5\n \n72.4\n \n97.9\n \n93.3\n \n96.3\n \n287.4\n \n- Intermediate Goods\n35.5\n \n37.6\n \n35.4\n \n29.0\n \n30.2\n \n39.9\n \n30.8\n \n24.4\n \n20.1\n \n34.5\n \n23.7\n \n28.3\n \n32.3\n \n88.3\n \n44.9\n \n44.9\n \n178.2\n \nEnergy (Fuel & Electricity)\n54.2\n \n55.7\n \n50.9\n \n46.1\n \n67.8\n \n39.1\n \n39.4\n \n43.9\n \n53.2\n \n50.7\n \n27.0\n \n40.3\n \n34.9\n \n36.5\n \n49.1\n \n57.4\n \n143.0\n \nService Payments\n58.6\n \n46.7\n \n50.4\n \n44.6\n \n51.5\n \n52.6\n \n37.4\n \n43.3\n \n40.0\n \n67.3\n \n36.6\n \n33.8\n \n52.7\n \n30.4\n \n31.6\n \n33.1\n \n95.2\n \n- Technical, Professional & consult\n30.9\n \n21.6\n \n22.0\n \n17.7\n \n17.4\n \n19.1\n \n16.9\n \n17.7\n \n17.9\n \n39.1\n \n16.7\n \n11.8\n \n32.9\n \n13.1\n \n16.7\n \n15.1\n \n44.8\n \n- Software\n9.3\n \n6.4\n \n3.5\n \n4.1\n \n5.8\n \n5.2\n \n2.8\n \n5.7\n \n3.4\n \n4.5\n \n5.1\n \n6.8\n \n9.0\n \n4.2\n \n4.0\n \n4.1\n \n12.3\n \n- Other (tourism, edu, freight etc)\n18.4\n \n18.7\n \n24.9\n \n22.8\n \n28.4\n \n28.3\n \n17.7\n \n20.0\n \n18.7\n \n23.7\n \n14.8\n \n15.2\n \n10.9\n \n13.2\n \n11.0\n \n13.9\n \n38.1\n \nIncome Payments (Profits, Dividends)\n14.7\n \n38.3\n \n14.3\n \n24.4\n \n6.8\n \n14.7\n \n15.4\n \n18.7\n \n28.1\n \n17.4\n \n26.4\n \n11.1\n \n14.8\n \n19.9\n \n18.7\n \n46.1\n \n84.7\n \nCapital Remittances (outward)\n36.2\n \n44.9\n \n49.7\n \n55.6\n \n74.5\n \n39.9\n \n73.3\n \n38.7\n \n30.1\n \n62.1\n \n34.8\n \n16.1\n \n20.3\n \n22.2\n \n20.9\n \n36.8\n \n79.9\n \n- External Loan Repayments \n31.9\n \n39.3\n \n46.8\n \n53.2\n \n70.7\n \n38.5\n \n71.5\n \n35.3\n \n27.2\n \n60.9\n \n34.2\n \n16.0\n \n17.5\n \n15.9\n \n17.8\n \n28.5\n \n62.1\n \n- Disinvestments\n2.2\n \n4.0\n \n0.8\n \n2.4\n \n3.8\n \n1.5\n \n1.6\n \n1.0\n \n1.7\n \n1.2\n \n0.6\n \n0.1\n \n1.7\n \n3.9\n \n1.0\n \n3.7\n \n8.6\n \n- Cross Border Investment\n2.0\n \n1.7\n \n2.1\n \n-\n \n0.0\n \n0.0\n \n0.2\n \n2.5\n \n1.2\n \n0.0\n \n-\n \n0.0\n \n1.2\n \n2.5\n \n2.1\n \n4.6\n \n9.2\n \nOther Payments\n4.6\n \n11.9\n \n6.3\n \n15.4\n \n11.0\n \n24.3\n \n15.7\n \n13.7\n \n13.3\n \n10.3\n \n4.6\n \n3.4\n \n6.0\n \n7.4\n \n5.9\n \n7.5\n \n20.8\n \nTOTAL\n336.9\n \n419.9\n \n353.8\n \n418.9\n \n420.6\n \n396.8\n \n397.3\n \n322.8\n \n335.3\n \n386.0\n \n282.5\n \n266.7\n \n349.9\n \n419.0\n \n361.9\n \n423.3\n \n1,204.2\n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\nTable 13.1: Monthly Cross Border Payments (US$ Millions)\n \n \nS22 \n \n \nAgriculture\nHorticulture\nManufacturing\nMining\nTobacco\nTourism\n Transport & \nOther Services\nTotal\nEnd of \nTelecom\n2018\nJan\n7.4\n2.2\n7.2\n259.2\n52.8\n9.0\n30.0\n4.2\n372.0\nFeb\n12.4\n2.8\n10.5\n131.0\n75.7\n9.5\n29.7\n0.3\n272.0\nMar\n20.6\n3.0\n16.8\n201.5\n72.2\n12.8\n16.0\n1.7\n344.6\nApr\n7.8\n2.5\n10.8\n305.4\n17.2\n12.7\n13.8\n0.7\n370.9\nMay\n14.5\n2.2\n19.7\n359.4\n28.0\n13.9\n16.7\n2.8\n457.1\nJun\n7.9\n2.6\n16.6\n285.7\n10.3\n14.0\n12.8\n25.9\n375.8\nJul\n8.4\n2.5\n10.3\n200.0\n23.1\n18.7\n14.6\n1.9\n279.5\nAug\n9.6\n5.1\n16.8\n264.1\n29.3\n21.6\n12.6\n1.8\n361.0\nSep\n16.4\n3.0\n15.2\n343.1\n22.5\n19.8\n21.7\n2.1\n443.9\nOct\n22.0\n3.6\n23.6\n210.5\n34.4\n17.2\n15.2\n1.6\n327.9\nNov\n15.7\n4.9\n18.0\n263.2\n28.8\n8.6\n24.6\n0.9\n364.6\n2019\nJan\n12.3\n1.7\n10.5\n109.3\n55.6\n8.4\n16.9\n0.3\n215.1\nFeb\n11.3\n1.6\n11.6\n111.5\n44.0\n8.5\n18.5\n0.1\n206.9\nMar\n12.1\n1.5\n14.1\n67.4\n37.5\n9.7\n24.7\n0.8\n167.8\nApr\n15.3\n2.6\n10.2\n470.8\n27.8\n19.7\n20.3\n0.2\n20.3\nMay\n19.6\n2.3\n13.8\n256.8\n43.7\n21.2\n18.0\n1.3\n18.0\nJun\n9.9\n1.9\n13.4\n224.1\n24.5\n24.6\n14.9\n3.9\n14.9\nJul\n6.3\n3.5\n25.9\n104.1\n16.0\n44.0\n15.1\n2.6\n15.1\nAug\n13.8\n9.5\n72.6\n371.5\n15.7\n31.8\n13.2\n5.0\n13.2\nSep\n7.7\n3.7\n46.1\n130.2\n19.0\n27.4\n16.0\n6.4\n16.0\nOct\n14.7\n2.6\n22.5\n267.1\n23.4\n28.6\n15.4\n4.7\n15.4\nNov\n12.4\n2.3\n14.4\n128.2\n25.7\n17.1\n21.6\n26.2\n21.6\nDec\n12.7\n3.4\n16.0\n311.0\n32.8\n1.4\n23.7\n1.3\n23.7\n2020\nJan\n28.2\n2.2\n42.2\n214.1\n41.4\n13.9\n16.9\n1.0\n359.9\nFeb\n10.9\n2.8\n51.4\n113.5\n34.9\n14.8\n24.9\n4.4\n257.7\nMar\n8.6\n1.9\n37.1\n199.5\n16.5\n6.0\n12.2\n2.4\n284.1\nApr\n1.4\n0.5\n3.2\n229.6\n9.1\n0.3\n6.3\n0.2\n250.5\nMay\n8.0\n1.4\n37.3\n89.8\n16.1\n0.0\n15.1\n0.1\n167.8\nJun\n10.4\n3.3\n17.3\n534.1\n27.6\n3.7\n36.2\n3.1\n635.7\nJul\n4.7\n3.1\n15.7\n381.5\n38.8\n4.8\n11.4\n2.0\n462.1\nAug\n4.1\n4.8\n25.4\n117.0\n19.4\n1.2\n15.1\n0.5\n187.5\nSep\n8.5\n6.2\n22.2\n195.6\n16.8\n5.2\n23.4\n1.5\n279.4\nTable 13.2: Monthly Cross Border Receipts (US$Millions)\n \n \nS23 \n \n \n \nEnd of\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\n2014\n2015\n2016\n2017\n2018\n2019\nEst\nLong-Term External Debt\n6,326\n6,556\n7,713\n8,125\n8,655\n10,234\n9,341\n9,305\n9,555\n9,827\n10,526\nGovernment\n5,304\n5,039\n6,128\n6,321\n6,172\n6,192\n6,097\n6,015\n6,200\n6,306\n6,930\nBilateral Creditors\n3,703\n3,402\n4,087\n4,087\n4,088\n4,115\n4,115\n4,129\n4,194\n4,261\n4,861\nMultilateral Creditors\n1,591\n1,627\n2,041\n2,235\n2,084\n2,078\n1,982\n1,886\n2,006\n2,045\n2,069\nPrivate Creditors\n10\n10\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPublic Enterprises\n825\n825\n1,092\n1,198\n1,356\n1,661\n1,220\n1,370\n1,406\n1,426\n1,165\nBilateral Creditors\n497\n497\n711\n703\n858\n1,155\n760\n779\n843\n898\n783\nMultilateral Creditors\n327\n327\n382\n495\n498\n506\n460\n591\n562\n528\n381\nPrivate Creditors\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nMonetary Authorities\n140\n550\n127\n125\n125\n120\n110\n0\n0\n0\n0\nMultilateral Creditors - IMF\n140\n550\n127\n125\n125\n120\n110\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPrivate\n57\n142\n366\n480\n1,002\n2,261\n1,913\n1,920\n1,949\n2,095\n2,431\nShort-Term External Debt\n1,348\n2,040\n1,286\n891\n1,564\n2,394\n2,258\n2,304\n2,299\n2,374\n3,799\nSupplier's Credits\n193\n286\n134\n30\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nReserve Bank\n998\n1,300\n615\n615\n614\n587\n587\n573\n507\n441\n2,463\nPrivate\n156\n454\n537\n246\n950\n1,807\n1,671\n1,731\n1,792\n1,933\n1,336\nTotal External Debt\n7,674\n8,596\n8,999\n9,016\n10,219\n12,628\n11,599\n11,610\n11,854\n13,134\n14,324\nGross Domestic Product\n10,735\n12,847\n14,670\n16,988\n17,455\n17,870\n18,188\n18,326\n19,188\n19,846\n18,555\nExternal Debt / GDP\n71%\n67%\n61%\n53%\n59%\n71%\n64%\n63%\n62%\n66%\n77%\nSource: Ministry of Finance & Economic Development, 2020; & Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\nTABLE 14.1: ZIMBABWE: EXTERNAL DEBT OUTSTANDING BY DEBTOR (INCLUDING ALL ARREARS)\n \n \nS24 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nEnd of\n2000\n2001\n2002\n2003\n2004\n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\n2014\n2015\n2016\n2017\n2018\n2019 Est\n(US$ millions)\nTotal Medium to Long-Term External Debt\n6,921\n6,855\n6,948\n7,141\n7,243\n7,175\n7,269\n7,391\n7,343\n7,518\n8,142\n8,462\n8,770\n9,269\n10,821\n9,928\n9,878\n10,062\n11,201\n10,526\nPublic and Publicly Guaranteed Debt \n6,769\n6,787\n6,892\n7,100\n7,165\n7,118\n7,224\n7,340\n7,308\n7,461\n8,000\n8,096\n8,290\n8,267\n8,560\n8,015\n7,958\n8,113\n9,106\n8,095\nBilateral Creditors\n5,003\n5,017\n5,053\n5,105\n5,144\n5,140\n5,165\n5,176\n5,199\n4,201\n3,899\n4,797\n4,790\n4,946\n5,269\n4,875\n4,908\n5,038\n5,159\n5,644\nMultilateral Creditors\n1,724\n1,758\n1,813\n1,945\n1,952\n1,871\n1,936\n1,976\n2,059\n2,059\n2,505\n2,550\n2,855\n2,707\n2,704\n2,553\n2,477\n2,568\n2,573\n2,450\nPrivate Creditors\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n10\n10\n10\n10\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPrivate Non-Guaranteed Long term\n152\n67\n56\n41\n78\n57\n45\n51\n35\n57\n142\n366\n480\n1,002\n2,261\n1,913\n1,920\n1,949\n2,095\n2,431\nShort-Term External Debt\n42\n13\n26\n51\n69\n107\n122\n178\n41\n1192\n1586\n749\n645\n614\n587\n587\n573\n507\n441\n3,799\nPublic and Publicly Guaranteed Debt\n42\n13\n26\n51\n69\n107\n122\n178\n41\n193\n286\n134\n30\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nReserve Bank\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n998\n1300\n615\n615\n614\n587\n587\n573\n507\n441\n2,463\nPrivate\n256\n154\n157\n118\n75\n66\n159\n209\n185\n-37\n168\n404\n216\n950\n1,807\n1,671\n1,731\n1,792\n1,933\n1,336\nTotal External Debt\n7,177\n7,009\n7,105\n7,259\n7,318\n7,241\n7,428\n7,600\n7,528\n7,481\n8,309\n8,866\n8,986\n10,219\n12,628\n11,599\n11,610\n11,854\n13,134\n14,324\nGross Domestic Product\n6,107 10,887\n6,715\n5,037\n4,299\n2,918\n6,645\n4,000\n3,175\n10,735\n12,847\n14,670\n16,988\n17,455\n17,870\n18,188\n18,326\n19,188\n19,846\n18,555\nExternal Debt / GDP\n117.5%\n64.4% 105.8% 144.1% 170.2% 248.1% 111.8% 190.0% 237.1%\n69.7%\n64.7%\n60.4%\n52.9%\n58.5%\n70.7%\n63.8%\n63.4%\n61.8%\n66.2%\n77.2%\nSource: Ministry of Finance & Economic Development, 2020 ; Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\nTABLE 14.2: External Debt Outstanding by Source\n(US$ millions)\n \n \nS25 \n \n \n \nEnd of\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\n2014\n2015\n2016\n2017\n2018\n2019\nGovernment\n170\n188\n170\n172\n240\n240\n173\n193\n133\n139\n158\nCapital\n131\n154\n142\n136\n156\n156\n130\n144\n93\n103\n135\nInterest\n39\n34\n28\n36\n84\n84\n43\n50\n40\n36\n23\nParastatals\n43\n36\n30\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nCapital\n34\n29\n25\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nInterest\n8\n7\n5\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPrivate\n51\n50\n239\n359\n360\n315\n418\n364\n366\n395\n375\nCapital\n45\n43\n178\n281\n315\n270\n255\n280\n268\n280\n276\nInterest\n6\n8\n60\n78\n45\n45\n163\n84\n97\n115\n99\nTotal\n264\n274\n438\n530\n600\n555\n591\n558\n498\n534\n976\nCapital\n211\n226\n345\n417\n471\n426\n385\n424\n361\n383\n854\nInterest\n53\n48\n94\n114\n129\n129\n206\n134\n137\n151\n122\nExports of Goods\nand Services\n1839\n3522\n4859\n4288\n4146\n4018\n3954\n4031\n4640\n5178\n5267\nDebt Service ratio\n14%\n8%\n9%\n12%\n14%\n14%\n15%\n14%\n11%\n10%\n19%\nCapital Service Ratio\n11%\n6%\n7%\n10%\n11%\n11%\n10%\n11%\n8%\n7%\n16%\nInterest Service ratio\n3%\n1%\n2%\n3%\n3%\n3%\n5%\n3%\n3%\n3%\n2%\nNote: Figures reflect scheduled debt service.\n \nSource: Ministry of Finance & Economic Development, 2020 ; Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\nTABLE 14.3: EXTERNAL DEBT SERVICE AND DEBT SERVICE RATIOS\n (US$ MILLIONS)", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/Quarterly_Economic_Reviews/QUARTERLY-ECONOMIC-REVIEW-SEPT-2020.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "beabc209c974665b50e5c991768667d0", "text": "MPC Statement January 16th, 2020 \nPage 1 \n \n \n \nSouth African Reserve Bank \nPRESS STATEMENT \nEMBARGO DELIVERY \n16 January 2020 \n \n \nSTATEMENT OF THE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE \n \nIssued by Lesetja Kganyago, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank \n \nSince the November meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), global \neconomic indicators improved somewhat and global inflation remained low. Central \nbanks in advanced economies provided more monetary accommodation, helping to \nease global financing conditions, but further easing appears less likely. While \ndownside risks from trade tensions and geo-political developments remain, the global \nslowdown appears to be bottoming out. \nThe domestic economic outlook remains fragile. Despite a rebound in local GDP in \nthe second quarter of 2019, GDP contracted in the third quarter. The fourth quarter is \nexpected to show some positive growth. \nRecent monthly inflation has been lower than the mid-point of the inflation target range. \nThe year-on-year inflation rate, as measured by the headline consumer price index \nMPC Statement January 16th, 2020 \nPage 2 \n \n(CPI) was 3.6% in November (down from 3.7% in October). Goods price inflation in \nNovember was 2.8% (down from 3.1% in October), while services price inflation \nremained at 4.2%. Food and non-alcoholic beverage price inflation was stable at 3.5% \n(down from 3.6%). The Bank’s measure of core inflation, which excludes food, fuel \nand electricity decreased slightly to 3.9% (from 4.0% in October). Producer price \ninflation for final manufactured goods decreased to 2.3% in November (from 3.0% in \nOctober). \nThe medium-term inflation outlook has been revised significantly lower compared to \nthe November forecast. The inflation forecast generated by the SARB’s Quarterly \nProjection Model (QPM) averages 4.1% in 2019 (down from 4.2%), 4.7% for 2020 \n(down from 5.1%) and 4.6% for 2021 (down from 4.7%). The Bank’s forecast for \nheadline CPI inflation for 2022 is 4.5%. Headline CPI inflation is now expected to peak \nat 4.9% in the final quarter of 2020 and settle at 4.5% in the third quarter of 2021 (one \nquarter earlier). The forecast for core inflation for 2019 is unchanged at 4.2%, is 4.3% \nin 2020 (down from 4.5%) and 4.4% in 2021 (down from 4.6%). The Bank’s forecast \nfor core inflation for 2022 is 4.5%. Food price inflation continues to surprise to the \ndownside on a monthly basis, and is revised from 5.8% to 4.7% for 2020. \nInflation expectations have continued to moderate gradually. According to the Bureau \nfor Economic Research (BER) fourth quarter survey, expectations for headline inflation \nare down slightly for 2019 to 4.5% (from 4.6%). Expectations for 2020 declined to 4.8% \n(from 5.0%) and to 5.0% (from 5.1%) for 2021. Five-year-ahead inflation expectations \nalso eased to 4.9% (from 5.0%). \nMPC Statement January 16th, 2020 \nPage 3 \n \nThe inflation expectations of market analysts in the December 2019 Reuters \nEconometer survey are generally lower, at 4.2% (from 4.3%) for 2019, 4.6% (from \n4.7%) for 2020 and 4.7% (from 4.8%) in 2021. \nMarket based expectations implicit in the break-even inflation rate (the yield differential \nbetween conventional and inflation-linked bonds) have moderated somewhat since \nthe previous MPC. Five-year break-even rates are currently about 4.1% and ten-year \nbreak-even rates are 5.3%. \nGlobal GDP is expected to average 3.0% in 2019, rising to about 3.4% in 2020. In \nrecent months, global trade and manufacturing indicators have exhibited signs of \nstabilisation, and, alongside resilient services, suggest that global growth rates will \nhold up. However, a range of downside risks to growth remain. These include geo-\npolitical developments, trade tensions, further oil price shocks, and high levels of \ncorporate and sovereign debt. \nInflation outcomes and inflation expectations in most advanced economies remain \nbelow target levels. Barring significant shocks, monetary policy in major advanced \neconomies will remain accommodative over the medium term. \nSince the November MPC, the rand has appreciated by 2.6% against the US dollar, \nand by 1.8% against the euro. The implied starting point for the rand is R14.60 against \nthe US dollar, compared with R14.94 at the time of the previous meeting. While the \nrand has benefited from improvements in global sentiment, high long-term bond yields \nreflect concerns about domestic growth prospects and fiscal risks. \nThe GDP growth outcome for the third quarter confirmed that the economy remains \nweak and vulnerable to idiosyncratic shocks and poor sectoral performances. While \nMPC Statement January 16th, 2020 \nPage 4 \n \ngrowth in the fourth quarter is expected to have picked up, electricity supply constraints \nwill likely keep economic activity muted in the near term. Public sector investment \ncontinues to be weak and export growth remains lacklustre, despite strong terms of \ntrade. Government and household consumption, and private investment, continue to \ngrow, albeit modestly. \nBusiness confidence remains weak. The RMB/BER Business Confidence Index \nimproved to 26 points (from 21), while the Absa Purchasing Managers’ Index fell to \n47.1 points in December (from 47.7). The SARB’s composite leading business cycle \nindicator also continued to trend lower, while the coincident indicator increased \nmarginally month-on-month. \nThe forecast of GDP growth for 2019 is revised lower to 0.4% (from 0.5%). The \nforecasts for 2020 and 2021 have also decreased to 1.2% (from 1.4%) and 1.6% (from \n1.7%), respectively, due to lower growth than previously expected in the third and \nfourth quarters. The GDP forecast for 2022 is 1.9%. \nThe MPC assesses the risks to the growth forecast to be to the downside. Escalation \nin global trade tensions, geo-political risks, further domestic supply constraints and/or \nsustained higher oil prices could generate headwinds to growth. Public sector \nfinancing needs have risen, increasing risk premiums and pushing borrowing costs for \nthe broader economy higher. Implementation of prudent macroeconomic policies and \nstructural reforms that lower costs and increase investment, potential growth and job \ncreation, remains urgent. \nThe overall risks to the inflation outlook are assessed to be balanced. Demand side \npressures remain subdued and house rental prices are expected to increase at only \nmoderate rates. Global inflation should also remain low. Food price inflation has \nMPC Statement January 16th, 2020 \nPage 5 \n \ncontinued to surprise to the downside, although rising imported food prices create \nsome caution about the future price trajectory. While the currency has strengthened \nrelative to the November meeting, the risk remains that domestic shocks generate \nmore capital flow volatility and put pressure on the exchange rate and inflation. Other \nupside risks to the inflation outlook remain, including from fuel, electricity and water \nprices, and from nominal wage growth. \nThe MPC welcomes the lower inflation outcomes and continued moderation in inflation \nexpectations. While the Committee would like to see inflation expectations anchored \ncloser to the mid-point of the inflation target range on a sustained basis, the lower \ninflation forecast and improved risk profile opens some space to provide further policy \naccommodation to the economy. \nAgainst this backdrop, the MPC decided to reduce the repurchase rate by 25 basis \npoints. The decision was unanimous. \nMonetary policy actions will continue to focus on anchoring inflation expectations near \nthe mid-point of the inflation target range in the interest of balanced and sustainable \ngrowth. In this persistently uncertain environment, future policy decisions will continue \nto be highly data-dependent, sensitive to the balance of risks to the outlook, and will \nseek to look-through temporary price shocks. \nThe implied path of policy rates over the forecast period generated by the Quarterly \nProjection Model indicated two repo rate cuts of 25 basis points each in the first and \nfourth quarters of 2020. This remains a broad policy guide which could change in either \ndirection from meeting to meeting in response to new developments and changing \ndata and risks. \nMPC Statement January 16th, 2020 \nPage 6 \n \nLesetja Kganyago \nGOVERNOR \nThe next statement of the Monetary Policy Committee will be released on 19th March \n2020. \n \nContact person: \nZiyanda Mtshali \n012 399 7966 \nmedia@resbank.co.za", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/MPC_Statements/Statement-of-the-Monetary-Policy-Committee-January-2020.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "32e6e375070d95fee4564eed68452933", "text": "Monetary Policy\nReview\n \n \n November 2009\nMonetary Policy\nReview\nNovember 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\n© South African Reserve Bank\nAll rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in\nany form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without fully\nacknowledging the Monetary Policy Review of the South African Reserve Bank as the source. The contents of\nthis publication are intended for general information only and are not intended to serve as financial or other\nadvice. While every precaution is taken to ensure the accuracy of information, the South African Reserve Bank\nshall not be liable to any person for inaccurate information or opinions contained in this publication.\nEnquiries relating to this Review should be addressed to:\nExecutive General Manager and Chief Economist\nResearch Department\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nP O Box 427\nPretoria 0001\nTel. 27-12-3133668\nhttp://www.reservebank.co.za/mpr\nISSN: 1609-3194\nProduced by the Publishing Section\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nContents\nMonetary Policy Review\nIntroduction...........................................................................................................................\n1\nRecent developments in inflation...........................................................................................\n1\nThe evolution of indicators of inflation..............................................................................\n1\nFactors affecting inflation.................................................................................................\n6\nMonetary policy.....................................................................................................................\n24\nThe outlook for inflation.........................................................................................................\n28\nInternational outlook........................................................................................................\n28\nOutlook for domestic demand and supply ......................................................................\n32\nIndicators of inflation expectations ..................................................................................\n36\nThe South African Reserve Bank inflation forecast ..........................................................\n38\nAssessment and conclusion..................................................................................................\n39\nStatements issued by Mr T T Mboweni, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n28 May 2009 ........................................................................................................................\n40\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n25 June 2009 .......................................................................................................................\n43\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n13 August 2009 ....................................................................................................................\n46\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n22 September 2009..............................................................................................................\n49\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n22 October 2009 ..................................................................................................................\n52\nStatement issued by Ms G Marcus, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n17 November 2009...............................................................................................................\n55\nAbbreviations......................................................................................................................\n58\nBoxes\n1\nAnalysis of banks’ deposit and lending rates over the inflation-targeting period ..........\n18\n2\nAsset-backed securitisation by South African banks...................................................\n22\n3\nThe composite leading business cycle indicator..........................................................\n32\nFigures\n1\nConsumer price inflation: Targeted inflation ................................................................\n2\n2\nComparison of monthly petrol prices for 2008 and 2009 ............................................\n3\n3\nTargeted inflation and food inflation.............................................................................\n3\n4\nPPI for domestic output and imported commodities...................................................\n5\n5\nFood prices in the PPI and CPI...................................................................................\n6\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\n6\nPrice of Brent crude oil ...............................................................................................\n9\n7\nExchange rates of the rand.........................................................................................\n11\n8\nRemuneration per worker, labour productivity and unit labour cost in the formal \nnon-agricultural sector ................................................................................................\n12\n9\nAverage annual inflation and wage settlements...........................................................\n12\n10\nHouse prices...............................................................................................................\n14\n11\nShare price indices .....................................................................................................\n16\n12\nBanks’ loans and advances by type ...........................................................................\n17\nB1.1 Calculated average funding cost and the repurchase rate...........................................\n18\nB1.2 Deposit categories: Calculated average yields ............................................................\n19\nB1.3 Client categories: Average 0–1-year fixed-deposit rates (top five banks).....................\n19\nB1.4 Calculated average interest rate on total loans and advances, and the repurchase rate...\n20\nB1.5 Calculated average interest rates on categories of loans and advances compared to \nthe repurchase and prime rates ..................................................................................\n20\nB1.6 Average lending rates (top five banks).........................................................................\n21\n13\nGrowth in monetary aggregates..................................................................................\n22\nB2.1 Asset-backed securitisations by private-sector banks – new issues ...........................\n23\n14\nThe repurchase rate and other short-term interest rates .............................................\n24\n15\nIMF forecasts for real GDP: G-20 countries.................................................................\n28\n16\nSelected indicators of global economic activity ...........................................................\n31\nB3.1 Composite leading business cycle indicator................................................................\n34\n17\nRMB/BER Business Confidence Index........................................................................\n35\n18\nBER surveys of headline CPI inflation expectations.....................................................\n36\n19\nBreak-even inflation rates............................................................................................\n37\n20\nTargeted inflation forecast ...........................................................................................\n38 \nTables\n1\nContributions to CPI inflation.......................................................................................\n2\n2\nThe effect of food, petrol and electricity prices on headline inflation............................\n4\n3 \nCPI: Goods and services inflation ...............................................................................\n5\n4 \nAdministered prices ....................................................................................................\n5\n5\nAnnual percentage change in real GDP and consumer prices.....................................\n7\n6\nSelected central bank interest rates ............................................................................\n10\n7\nGrowth in real GDP and expenditure components ......................................................\n13\n8\nReal value of building plans passed and buildings completed in larger municipalities...\n15\n9\nPublic finance data .....................................................................................................\n17\n10\nIMF projections of world growth and inflation for 2009 and 2010................................\n29\nB3.1 Component series of the composite leading business cycle indicator and their \ncontribution to the August 2009 data point.................................................................\n33\nB3.2 Timing relationship between the composite leading indicator and the reference \nturning points of the business cycle............................................................................\n33\n11\nReuters survey of CPI forecasts: September 2009......................................................\n37\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n1\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nMonetary Policy Review\nIntroduction\nThere are signs that the global economic recovery is under way, although indications\nare that the initial pace of recovery is likely to be slow and distributed unevenly across\ncountries. The severe global recession saw a synchronised contraction of advanced\neconomies and a significant slowdown in the growth of developing economies.\nHowever, recent forecasts suggest a turnaround in the second quarter of 2009, and\nstronger growth prospects for the second half of the year and for 2010. Nevertheless,\nactivity levels are likely to remain well below pre-crisis levels and important policy\nchallenges will need to be faced. Macroeconomic policies are expected to continue to\nfocus on restoring financial sector health and supporting the recovery until it is well\nestablished, while preparing to exit the period of eased monetary conditions adopted\nin response to the crisis. \nThe domestic economy was not spared the effects of the global recession. In the second\nquarter of 2009 the economy recorded a third successive quarterly contraction, although\nthe rate of contraction slowed relative to that of the previous quarter. Consistent with\nglobal growth developments, domestic economic growth is expected to improve in the\ncoming quarters. Domestic inflation has continued to trend downwards, reaching a level\njust above the inflation target range in September 2009.\nIn this Monetary Policy Review the latest developments in inflation and the factors that\nimpact on inflation are analysed. Recent monetary policy developments are reviewed,\nand the outlook for inflation and the inflation forecast are presented. In addition, three\nissues are examined in boxes. The first box examines the degree of pass-through and\nthe speed of adjustment in banks’ deposit and lending rates in response to changes\nin the benchmark repurchase rate in South Africa during the period since the\nintroduction of the inflation-targeting monetary policy framework. The second box\ndiscusses asset-backed securitisation by South African banks, and the final box\ndiscusses the compilation and characteristics of the composite leading business cycle\nindicator for South Africa.\nRecent developments in inflation\nThis section analyses recent trends in the main inflation indices and reviews\ndevelopments in the main determinants of inflation in the South African economy.\nThe evolution of indicators of inflation\nThe measure of inflation targeted by the South African Reserve Bank (Bank), the year-\non-year percentage change in the headline consumer price index (CPI) for all urban\nareas, has declined continuously since April 2009 to marginally above the inflation\ntarget range of 3 to 6 per cent. After recording 8,4 per cent in April, the inflation rate\ndecreased to 6,1 per cent in September (Figure 1), largely as a result of falling food\nprice inflation and lower petrol prices.\n2\nFood and non-alcoholic beverages, housing and utilities, and miscellaneous goods and\nservices have remained the highest contributing categories to the inflation rate over the\nperiod since April 2009 (Table 1). The contribution of food and non-alcoholic beverage\nprices decreased from 2,1 percentage points to the overall inflation rate of 8,4 per cent\nin April 2009, to 0,9 percentage points in September 2009 when overall inflation was \n6,1 per cent. This was due to a decrease in the prices of most food categories. Except\nfor a temporary decrease of 0,2 percentage points in June 2009 that was reversed by\nJuly, the contribution of the housing and utilities category to inflation remained at \n1,8 percentage points until September, when it recorded 1,7 percentage points.\nElectricity prices remain a significant contributor to this category. The transport\ncategory has contributed to the fall in the inflation rate since April 2009, largely as a\nresult of a lower petrol price. The contribution of transport to inflation declined from \n0,2 percentage points in April to -0,7 percentage points in July before moderating to \n-0,2 percentage points in September. \nTable 1\nContributions to CPI inflation\nPercentage change over 12 months* and percentage points\n2009\nMar\nApr\nMay\nJun\nJul\nAug\nSep\nTotal*.................................................\n8,5\n8,4\n8,0\n6,9\n6,7\n6,4\n6,1\nOf which:\nFood and non-alcoholic beverages....\n2,3\n2,1\n1,9\n1,6\n1,3\n1,1\n0,9\nAlcoholic beverages and tobacco......\n0,6\n0,6\n0,6\n0,6\n0,6\n0,7\n0,7\nHousing and utilities ..........................\n1,8\n1,8\n1,8\n1,6\n1,8\n1,8\n1,7\nHealth................................................\n0,2\n0,2\n0,2\n0,2\n0,2\n0,2\n0,2\nTransport...........................................\n0,2\n0,2\n0,1\n-0,4\n-0,7\n-0,5\n-0,2\nEducation..........................................\n0,2\n0,2\n0,2\n0,2\n0,2\n0,2\n0,2\nMiscellaneous goods and services ....\n1,6\n1,6\n1,6\n1,6\n1,7\n1,7\n1,6\nOther.................................................\n1,6\n1,7\n1,6\n1,5\n1,6\n1,2\n1,0\nSource: Statistics South Africa\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nPercentage change over 12 months\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n2003\n2004\n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\nFigure 1 \nConsumer price inflation: Targeted inflation*\n* CPIX for metropolitan and other urban areas until the end of 2008; CPI for all urban \n areas thereafter\nSource: Statistics South Africa\nThe reason for the negative contribution of the petrol price to the inflation rate is evident\nfrom Figure 2. The year-on-year inflation rate calculates the change in the price of a good\ncompared to the price of the good in the same month of the previous year. Despite the\nfact that the petrol price has only decreased on four occasions in the past 11 months,\nthe petrol price in 2009 has been consistently lower than in the corresponding months\nof 2008 and has, therefore, contributed negatively to the year-on-year inflation rate. \nTotal food price inflation has fallen significantly from its peak in August 2008, when it\nrecorded 19,2 per cent, to 4,9 per cent in September 2009. Figure 3 shows that the food\nitems contributing to this continued decline include bread and cereals (for which the\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n3\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nCents per litre\nApr\nJan\nFeb\nMar\nMay\nJun\nJul\nAug\nSep\nOct\nNov\nDec\nFigure 2 \nComparison of monthly petrol prices for 2008 and 2009\n500\n600\n700\n800\n900\n1 000\n1 100\n \n2008\n \n2009\nPercentage change over 12 months\n2003\n2006\n2004\n2005\n2007\n2008\n2009\nFigure 3 \nTargeted inflation* and food inflation\nAll food items\nMeat\nVegetables\nBread and cereals\nMilk, cheese and eggs\nTargeted inflation measure\n-10\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n* CPIX for metropolitan and other urban areas until the end of 2008, CPI for all urban \n areas thereafter\nSource: Statistics South Africa\n4\ninflation rate has fallen from 17,7 per cent in April 2009 to -2,0 per cent in September\n2009) and meat (for which inflation declined from 10,5 per cent to 4,1 per cent over the\nsame period). Inflation rates for vegetable prices and for milk, cheese and egg prices have\nremained above that of overall food prices. Vegetable price inflation increased in\nSeptember for the first time since February 2009, although milk, cheese and eggs price\ninflation has continued to decline. \nTable 2 considers the effect of excluding a number of categories from the CPI inflation\nrate in the period since April 2009. If petrol prices were excluded, the inflation rate for the\nremaining items in the CPI would have been higher than the headline rate throughout the\nperiod under review. In September 2009 the inflation rate for CPI excluding petrol prices\nwas 7,1 per cent, compared with 6,1 per cent for the headline rate. By contrast, food and\nnon-alcoholic beverage prices exerted upward pressure on the headline CPI inflation rate\nuntil August. However, for September, excluding this category results in a CPI inflation\nrate of 6,4 per cent, above the headline rate. If petrol prices, and food and non-alcoholic\nbeverage prices are excluded from the CPI, the inflation rate for the remaining items was\n7,5 per cent in September. Finally, if energy were also excluded, the inflation rate would\nhave been lower at 7,1 per cent in September; this can be explained by the recent large\nyear-on-year increases in the price of electricity which have placed upward pressure on\nthe CPI inflation rate.\nTable 2\nThe effect of food, petrol and electricity prices on headline inflation\nPercentage change over 12 months\n2009\nMar\nApr\nMay\nJun\nJul\nAug\nSep\nHeadline CPI ....................................\n8,5\n8,4\n8,0\n6,9\n6,7\n6,4\n6,1\nCPI excluding petrol prices................\n9,5\n9,4\n9,2\n8,3\n8,2\n8,0\n7,1\nCPI excluding food and NAB* prices...\n7,5\n7,3\n7,2\n6,2\n6,3\n6,3\n6,4\nCPI excluding food, NAB and \npetrol prices ......................................\n8,6\n8,6\n8,7\n8,0\n8,2\n8,2\n7,5\nCPI excluding food, NAB, petrol \nand energy prices..............................\n8,0\n8,1\n8,3\n7,5\n7,7\n7,6\n7,1\n*\nNAB: Non-alcoholic beverage\nSource: Statistics South Africa\nGoods inflation fell to within the inflation target range in July 2009 and continued to\ndecline, recording a 12-month rate of 4,9 per cent in September (Table 3). This was\nlargely due to the significant decreases in non-durable goods price inflation over the\nperiod. The inflation rates for durable and semi-durable goods have oscillated at\nrelatively low levels since April 2009. Services inflation has remained high and has shown\nsigns of price stickiness. It declined to 7,6 per cent in June 2009, rose to 8,1 per cent\nin August and then decreased once more to 7,8 per cent in September. \nOverall administered price increases have remained subdued in 2009 (Table 4). The year-\non-year changes in total administered prices appear to have bottomed in June 2009 \n(-1,2 per cent) and subsequently rose to 3,2 per cent in September 2009. Although the\nregulated component of administered prices has recorded significant negative inflation\nrates since April, mainly due to lower petrol prices, inflation for the unregulated\ncomponent rose from 6,9 per cent in June to 9,3 per cent in July and 9,8 per cent in\nSeptember. This was largely the result of an increase in the inflation rate of assessment\nrates, which doubled over the period. \nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nTable 3\nCPI: Goods and services inflation\nPercentage change over 12 months\n2009\nMar\nApr\nMay\nJun\nJul\nAug\nSep\nHeadline CPI ....................................\n8,5\n8,4\n8,0\n6,9\n6,7\n6,4\n6,1\nGoods inflation ..................................\n8,7\n8,3\n7,6\n6,2\n5,5\n5,0\n4,9\nDurable goods ...............................\n2,9\n3,7\n4,9\n4,1\n3,3\n3,5\n2,5\nSemi-durable goods ......................\n6,6\n5,9\n5,2\n4,7\n5,1\n4,5\n4,6\nNon-durable goods........................\n11,8\n10,9\n9,2\n7,6\n6,5\n5,7\n6,1\nServices inflation................................\n8,4\n8,4\n8,4\n7,6\n8,0\n8,1\n7,8\nSource: Statistics South Africa\nTable 4\nAdministered prices\nPercentage change over 12 months\n2009\nMar\nApr\nMay\nJun\nJul\nAug\nSep\nTotal ..................................................\n2,8\n1,7\n0,0\n-1,2\n-0,4\n0,2\n3,2\nRegulated..........................................\n0,6\n-1,0\n-3,6\n-5,3\n-5,0\n-4,5\n-0,3\nUnregulated.......................................\n6,8\n6,9\n6,9\n6,9\n9,3\n9,8\n9,8\nSource: Statistics South Africa\nThe year-on-year rate of inflation of domestic output measured by the producer price\nindex (PPI) continued to decline in 2009, decreasing from 2,9 per cent in April to \n-3,7 per cent in September (Figure 4). The rate of decline in the PPI has been moderated\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n5\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nPercentage change over 12 months\n2007\n2008\n2009\nDetails regarding changes to the PPI in this period are documented in Statistical Release \nP0142.1, February 2008, by Statistics South Africa\nSource: Statistics South Africa\nFigure 4 \nPPI for domestic output and imported commodities\n-30\n-20\n-10\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\nDomestic output: Manufacturing\nDomestic output: Electrical energy\nDomestic output\nImported commodities\n6\nsomewhat by large year-on-year increases in the price of electricity, which rose by \n27,4 per cent in July and 28,1 per cent in September. The PPI for imported commodities\ninflation rate has been negative since the beginning of 2009, mainly as a result of\ndevelopments in the foreign-exchange rate of the rand during this period. \nThe rate of change in food prices in the PPI, measured at both the agricultural and\nmanufacturing levels, has remained below the rate of food price changes recorded in the\nCPI (Figure 5). The year-on-year inflation rate for food prices in the CPI was 4,9 per cent\nin September, compared to PPI food price inflation of -1,8 per cent at the manufacturing\nlevel and -5,8 per cent at the agricultural level.\nFactors affecting inflation\nMonetary policy decisions are made on the basis of current and expected developments\nin the wider macroeconomy. Recent developments in some of the main variables\ninfluencing inflation in South Africa are reviewed in this section, while the outlook for\nthese variables and their likely impact on inflation are discussed in a later section.\nInternational economic developments\nThe most recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) data show that global growth fell from\n3,0 per cent in 2008 to a projected -1,1 per cent in 2009, the first outright contraction in\nthe world economy since the IMF began collecting real gross domestic product (GDP)\ndata in 1970 (Table 5). The data reflect a synchronised contraction of advanced\neconomies and a significant slowing of the growth rates of developing economies. \nThe financial shocks of September and October 2008 and their aftermath clearly illustrated\nthe effects of financial stress on real economic activity in the global economy. The United\nStates (US) alone has lost more than 7 million jobs since the recession began in December\n2007, and the unemployment rate reached a 26-year high in September 2009. Potential\noutput growth rates were impacted negatively in all the advanced economies, and activity\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nPercentage change over 12 months\n2007\n2008\n2009\nSource: Statistics South Africa\nFigure 5 \nFood prices in the PPI and CPI\n-15\n-10\n-5\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\nPPI: Food at agricultural level\nConsumer prices – food\nPPI: Food at manufacturing level\nin the housing and financial sectors slumped. Weaker demand resulted in a noticeable\nincrease in excess capacity that is projected to keep inflation in advanced economies\nclose to 0 per cent in 2009. In the emerging economies, stronger disinflationary forces\nin some regions also prompted modest reductions in October of the IMF’s April\nprojections for inflation, notwithstanding the upward revisions to output growth for these\ncountries. The IMF forecasts that the pace of world inflation will slow markedly in 2009\nto 2,5 per cent from 6,0 per cent in 2008.\nTable 5\nAnnual percentage change in real GDP and consumer prices \nReal GDP\nConsumer prices*\n2008\n2009\n2008\n2009\n(estimate)\n(estimate)\nWorld ............................................................\n3,0\n-1,1\n6,0\n2,5\nAdvanced economies....................................\n0,6\n-3,4\n3,4\n0,1\nUnited States ..........................................\n0,4\n-2,7\n3,8\n-0,4\nJapan ......................................................\n-0,7\n-5,4\n1,4\n-1,1\nEuro area ..................................................\n0,7\n-4,2\n3,3\n0,3\nUnited Kingdom........................................\n0,7\n-4,4\n3,6\n1,9\nOther advanced economies......................\n1,6\n-2,1\n4,3\n1,3\nOther emerging-market and \ndeveloping countries ....................................\n6,0\n1,7\n9,3\n5,5\nAfrica ........................................................\n5,2\n1,7\n10,3\n9,0\nCentral and eastern Europe ......................\n3,0\n-5,0\n8,1\n4,8\nCommonwealth of Independent States ....\n5,5\n-6,7\n15,6\n11,8\nDeveloping Asia ........................................\n7,6\n6,2\n7,5\n3,0\nChina......................................................\n9,0\n8,5\n5,9\n-0,1\nIndia ......................................................\n7,3\n5,4\n8,3\n8,7\nMiddle East ..............................................\n5,4\n2,0\n15,0\n8,3\nWestern hemisphere ................................\n4,2\n-2,5\n7,9\n6,1\n*\nZimbabwe excluded\nSource: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2009\nAlthough real growth in the largest economies in the Group of Twenty (G-20) has been\nseverely affected during the global recession, most of them already appear to have\nembarked on a path to recovery. The rate of contraction in economic activity moderated\nin the second quarter of 2009 in the US, the euro area, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom\n(UK) and Canada. Economic activity in some advanced economies stabilised towards\nthe middle of 2009, with positive growth resuming in either the second or third quarter.\nEconomic conditions also improved in the second quarter of 2009 in most emerging-\nmarket economies partly due to improved demand in advanced economies. However,\nthe US economy is expected to record negative growth of 2,7 per cent in 2009,\ncompared with positive growth of 0,4 per cent in 2008. The US is projected to record\ndeflation of 0,4 per cent in 2009, compared with an inflation rate of 3,8 per cent in 2008. \nIn Japan, following a dismal first quarter of 2009, there are signs that output is stabilising.\nImproved consumer confidence, progress in inventory adjustment, expansionary fiscal\npolicies, and strong performance by other Asian economies are expected to lift growth\nin the coming quarters. The IMF, nevertheless, forecasts another year of negative GDP\ngrowth in Japan of 5,4 per cent in 2009 following the decline of 0,7 per cent recorded\nin 2008. The IMF also forecasts a return to deflation of 1,1 per cent for Japan in 2009\nafter the inflation of 1,4 per cent recorded in 2008. \nSouth African Reserve Bank\n7\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\n8\nIn addition to efforts to stabilise, restore and reform the banking sector, the European\nEconomic Recovery Plan was launched in December 2008 to restore confidence and\nbolster demand through a co-ordinated injection of purchasing power. The overall\nfiscal stimulus in the euro area, including the effects of automatic stabilisers, amounts\nto 5 per cent of GDP. Real GDP in the euro area is, nevertheless, projected to decline\nby 4,2 per cent in 2009 from the 0,7 per cent real growth recorded in 2008. Inflation\nin the euro area is projected to fall to 0,3 per cent in 2009 from the 3,3 per cent\nrecorded in 2008.\nThe IMF forecasts that the UK will record negative growth of 4,4 per cent in 2009\ncompared with positive real growth of 0,7 per cent recorded in 2008. Inflation in the UK\nis projected to decelerate from 3,6 per cent in 2008 to 1,9 per cent in 2009. \nAs global trade flows contracted, China suffered a ten-month decline in exports,\ndampening growth in the region and pulling the nationwide expansion rate down to \n6,1 per cent in the first quarter of 2009 – the slowest pace in almost a decade.\nHowever, the Chinese government is using a US$586 billion stimulus package and\nrecord bank lending to build railways, roads and power plants in the country, and the\nIMF forecasts that China will grow by 8,5 per cent in 2009 compared with 9,0 per cent\nin 2008. India is expected to record growth of 5,4 per cent in 2009 compared with \n7,3 per cent in 2008.\nThe global slowdown has had a significant impact on Africa and the continent is\nexpected to record growth of only 1,7 per cent in 2009, compared with 5,2 per cent in\n2008. The decline in global trade dampened economic expansion in all countries in \nsub-Saharan Africa as their terms of trade deteriorated. Inflation in Africa is expected to\nfall slightly from 10,3 per cent in 2008 to 9,0 per cent in 2009.\nOil prices\nAfter falling significantly in the second half of 2008 to levels below US$35 per barrel at the\nend of the year, Brent crude oil prices rose in the first two quarters of 2009 to around\nUS$70 per barrel in early June (Figure 6). Prices declined briefly in early July 2009, amid\nconcerns about weakening energy demand and excess supply, before rising to around\nUS$72 at the end of August and then fluctuating within a US$64–US$79 band in\nSeptember and October. This was against the backdrop of contradictory projections for\nthe global economy. \nThe oil market remained in contango in 2009 (where near-term oil contracts cost less\nthan those maturing further out) as relatively large stockpiles of physical oil tended to\nkeep a lid on near-term prices. In recent months there have also been indications that\nthe Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has had difficulty in\nensuring that member countries adhere to output target cuts; these factors have\ncontributed to futures prices trending lower. Other factors weighing on the oil price\nwere the announcement in September 2009 that Russia’s oil output expanded\nbeyond 10 million barrels per day – more than that of Saudi Arabia – and in October\nmilitants in Nigeria (producer of some of the world’s most sought-after grades of\ncrude oil) appeared to accept an amnesty. However, the longer-term oil price outlook\nhas, in general, been underpinned by an improving global economic outlook and\nrising equity prices. On 4 November 2009 the futures prices for Brent crude oil to be\ndelivered in May and June 2010 were around US$82 per barrel and US$83 per \nbarrel respectively.\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nInternational monetary policy developments\nFinancial market turbulence and deteriorating growth prospects prompted aggressive\nmonetary loosening in the course of the past 12 months. Decisive and concerted policy\nactions are yielding signs of early recovery, and G-20 countries have stated their commitment\nto maintaining supportive monetary, fiscal and financial sector policies until a durable recovery\nis assured. All the major central banks have cut policy interest rates to unusually\naccommodative levels to revive credit, and the IMF and the Organisation for Economic Co-\noperation and Development (OECD) do not expect a reversal of these policies until the\nsecond half of 2010. The challenge for policy-makers is to prepare for an orderly unwinding\nof the extraordinary levels of public intervention, without undermining the recovery.\nMost central banks have eased official policy rates since the onset of the global financial\ncrisis (Table 6), and a number of them have implemented unconventional monetary\npolicy measures in response to the deteriorating economic conditions and dissipating\ninflationary pressures. Since the release of the May 2009 Monetary Policy Review, official\ninterest rates have been reduced by central banks in Brazil, Canada, Chile, the Czech\nRepublic, Denmark, the euro area, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Mexico, New\nZealand, Poland, Russia, Sweden, Thailand and Turkey. \nRecently, the interest rate cycle has been reversed in Israel, Australia and Norway. In these\ncountries the economic contraction was seen to be over and policy has become more\nfocused on inflation concerns.\nThe United States Federal Reserve (the Fed) unanimously decided to keep the target\nrate unchanged at a record low of 0 to 0,25 per cent at meetings of the Federal Open\nMarket Committee (FOMC) in August, September and November 2009, and reiterated\nat its most recent meeting that it would keep rates on hold for an “extended period”. The\nFOMC opted to extend its mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and agency debt\npurchase programmes until the end of the first quarter of 2010, and committed itself to\nreducing the pace of purchases. \nSouth African Reserve Bank\n9\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nFigure 6 \nPrice of Brent crude oil \n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\nJ M M J S N\nM M J S N\nJ\nJ M M J S N\nM M J S N\nJ\nM M\nJ\nM M J S N\nJ\nUS dollar per barrel\n \nBrent crude spot price\n \nFutures prices (21 September 2009)\n \nFutures prices (21 October 2009)\n \nFutures prices (4 November 2009)\nSource: Bloomberg\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\n140\n160\n10\nTable 6\nSelected central bank interest rates\nPer cent\nLatest decision\n(change in \nCountries\n1 Sep 2008\n5 Nov 2009\npercentage points)\nUnited States ....................................\n2,00\n0,00-0,25\n04 Nov 2009\n(0,00)\nJapan................................................\n0,50\n0,10\n30 Oct 2009\n(0,00)\nEuro area ..........................................\n4,25\n1,00\n05 Nov 2009\n(0,00)\nUnited Kingdom ................................\n5,00\n0,50\n05 Nov 2009\n(0,00)\nCanada ............................................\n3,00\n0,25\n20 Oct 2009\n(0,00)\nDenmark ..........................................\n4,60\n1,25\n25 Sep 2009\n(-0,10)\nSweden ............................................\n4,50\n0,25\n28 Oct 2009\n(0,00)\nNorway..............................................\n5,75\n1,50\n29 Oct 2009\n(0,25)\nSwitzerland........................................\n2,75\n0,00-0,75\n17 Sep 2009\n(0,00)\nAustralia ............................................\n7,25\n3,50\n04 Nov 2009\n(0,25)\nNew Zealand ....................................\n8,00\n2,50\n29 Oct 2009\n(0,00)\nIsrael ................................................\n4,25\n0,75\n26 Oct 2009\n(0,00)\nChina ................................................\n7,47\n5,31\n29 Sep 2009\n(0,00)\nHong Kong........................................\n3,50\n0,50\n05 Nov 2009\n(0,00)\nIndonesia ..........................................\n9,00\n6,50\n04 Nov 2009\n(0,00)\nMalaysia ............................................\n3,50\n2,00\n28 Oct 2009\n(0,00)\nSouth Korea ......................................\n5,25\n2,00\n09 Oct 2009\n(0,00)\nTaiwan ..............................................\n3,63\n1,25\n24 Sep 2009\n(0,00)\nThailand ............................................\n3,75\n1,25\n21 Oct 2009\n(0,00)\nIndia ..................................................\n9,00\n4,75\n27 Oct 2009\n(0,00)\nBrazil ................................................\n13,00\n8,75\n21 Oct 2009\n(0,00)\nChile..................................................\n7,75\n0,50\n13 Oct 2009\n(0,00)\nMexico ..............................................\n8,25\n4,50\n16 Oct 2009\n(0,00)\nCzech Republic ................................\n3,50\n1,25\n05 Nov 2009\n(0,00)\nHungary ............................................\n8,50\n7,00\n20 Oct 2009\n(-0,50)\nPoland ..............................................\n6,00\n3,50\n28 Oct 2009\n(0,00)\nRussia ..............................................\n11,00\n9,50\n30 Oct 2009\n(-0,50)\nTurkey ..............................................\n16,75\n6,75\n16 Oct 2009\n(-0,50)\nIceland ..............................................\n15,50\n11,00\n05 Nov 2009\n(-1,00)\nSource: National central banks\nThe Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) left the policy rate\nunchanged at recent meetings and affirmed that it had no precommitment on when to\nwithdraw the emergency measures introduced to fight the financial crisis, but that it\nwould take the required steps at the appropriate time. The Bank of England’s Monetary\nPolicy Committee (MPC) kept the policy rate unchanged at a record low of 0,50 per\ncent at recent meetings and increased the stock of asset purchases in terms of the Asset\nPurchase Facility. It announced in October 2009 that it would give more banks access to\nits open-market operations and deposit facilities to help smaller institutions better\nmanage their liquidity. \nCentral banks in emerging-market economies have either held policy rates steady or\nhave lowered them further since the publication of the May 2009 Monetary Policy\nReview. The Czech National Bank held the policy rate at a record low of 1,25 per cent\nat its most recent meeting on signs that the outlook for inflation remained subdued. The\ncentral bank of the Republic of Turkey lowered the policy rate by 50 basis points in\nOctober 2009 after an MPC assessment that inflation was expected to remain at low\nlevels for an extended period, and that the ongoing recovery in economic activity would\nbe gradual and protracted.\nThe People’s Bank of China announced a continued “moderately loose” monetary policy\nstance in September 2009 to cement China’s economic recovery further.\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nExchange rate developments\nHaving recovered markedly in March and April 2009 as investor sentiment improved\naround the world, the nominal effective exchange rate of the rand (NEER), measured\nagainst a basket of 15 currencies, rose from 67,2 index points on 1 May to 68,6 index\npoints on 5 November 2009 (Figure 7). Over this period, the bilateral exchange rate of\nthe rand appreciated from R8,43 to R7,67 against the US dollar, and depreciated from\nR11,26 to R11,37 against the euro. \nThe strengthening of the rand against the US dollar is largely due to the relative\nweakness of the latter currency, which depreciated by approximately 12 per cent against\nthe euro over the period. Furthermore, dollar weakness has resulted in higher\ncommodity prices, which have supported the foreign exchange rate of the rand. This\nphenomenon is not unique to the rand as other commodity-based economies have\nexperienced similar currency strength against the US dollar. \nLabour markets\nIn recent months inflationary pressure emanating from the labour markets has been\nmoderating (Figure 8). Wage inflation measured in terms of the year-on-year changes in\nnominal remuneration per worker in the formal non-agricultural sector, which recorded\njust over 12 per cent in each of the quarters of 2008, slowed to 11,5 per cent in the first\nquarter and 8,7 per cent in the second quarter of 2009. Labour productivity, measured\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n11\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nIndex: 2000 = 100 (foreign currency per rand)\nRand per euro\nRand per US dollar\nFigure 7 \nExchange rates of the rand\n2007\nM\nM\nJ\nS\nN\nJ\n2008\nM\nM\nJ\nS\nN\nJ\n2009\nM\nM\nJ\nS\nN\nJ\n \nNominal effective exchange rate of the rand (NEER)\n \nRand per US dollar \n \nRand per euro (right-hand scale)\n45\n55\n65\n75\n85\n6\n7\n8\n9\n10\n11\n12\n7\n8\n9\n10\n11\n12\n13\n14\n15\n12\nas the ratio of real value added to employment in the formal non-agricultural sector, rose\nby 0,1 per cent in the first quarter of 2009, before declining by 0,5 per cent in the second\nquarter. Economy-wide unit labour cost inflation, measured as wage inflation adjusted for\nproductivity changes in the formal non-agricultural sector, therefore declined to 11,3 per\ncent in the first quarter of 2009 and 9,3 per cent in the second quarter, after having\nrecorded a year-on-year increase of around 12,6 per cent in the final quarter of 2008. \nThe average level of wage settlements reported for the first nine months of 2009 by the\nAndrew Levy Wage Settlement Survey was 9,4 per cent (Figure 9), suggesting that wage\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nPercentage change over four quarters\n2004\n2003\n2005\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2006\nFigure 8 \nRemuneration per worker, labour productivity and \n \nunit labour cost in the formal non-agricultural sector\n \nNominal unit labour cost\n \nRemuneration per worker\n \nLabour productivity\n \n \nSources: Statistics South Africa and South African Reserve Bank calculations\n-2\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n16\nPer cent\n1995\n1997\n1999\n2001\n2003\n2005\n2007\n2009*\nFigure 9 \nAverage annual inflation and wage settlements\n \nCPI\n \nAverage wage settlements\n* Data for 2009 are for the first nine months of the year \n \nSources: Andrew Levy Employment Publications and Statistics South Africa\n-2\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n16\nsettlements are falling slowly when compared to the 9,8 per cent recorded for the year\n2008. Settlements have ranged from 5 per cent in the paper/printing sector to 12,3 per\ncent for the food/agriculture sector over the first nine months of 2009. \nDemand and output\nReal GDP contracted by 3 per cent on an annualised basis in the second quarter of\n2009, following declines of 6,4 per cent in the first quarter of the year and 1,8 per cent\nin the final quarter of 2008. Real value added by the primary, secondary and tertiary\nsectors all continued to contract in the second quarter. The largest negative contribution\ncame from the manufacturing sector, where real value added declined by 10,2 per cent,\nfollowing a contraction of 22,1 per cent in the preceding quarter.\nReal gross domestic expenditure also contracted during the second quarter of 2009\n(Table 7). Inventory depletion, a contraction in final consumption expenditure by house-\nholds, and slowing growth in final consumption expenditure by government and in gross\nfixed capital formation resulted in real gross domestic expenditure contracting at an\nannualised rate of 14,5 per cent during the quarter.\nTable 7\nGrowth in real GDP and expenditure components\nPer cent*\n2008\n2009\n1st qr\n2nd qr\n3rd qr\n4th qr\nYear\n1st qr\n2nd qr\nFinal consumption expenditure: \nHouseholds ......................................\n3,0\n1,3\n-0,9\n-2,7\n2,3\n-4,8\n-5,8\nGeneral government ........................\n12,3\n-2,1\n10,2\n3,6\n5,0\n5,8\n0,2\nGross fixed capital formation ..............\n10,4\n5,2\n7,3\n3,0\n10,2\n12,7\n0,1\nChanges in inventories (R billions)** ....\n11,1\n-4,7\n-11,2\n-21,1\n-6,5\n-16,6\n-52,9\nGross domestic expenditure..............\n12,5\n-1,7\n0,7\n-3,9\n3,1\n2,2\n-14,5\nExports of goods and services............\n-30,1\n42,5\n4,0\n-16,4\n1,7\n-55,1\n-10,1\nImports of goods and services............\n3,9\n7,9\n4,7\n-19,0\n2,2\n-27,5\n-41,9\nGross domestic product ....................\n1,7\n5,0\n0,2\n-1,8\n3,1\n-6,4\n-3,0\n*\nQuarterly data refer to quarter-on-quarter growth at annual rates of seasonally adjusted data \n**\nConstant 2000 prices\nReal final consumption expenditure by households contracted by 5,8 per cent in the\nsecond quarter of 2009, following a decline of 4,8 per cent in the first quarter of the year.\nHousehold expenditure on durable goods has been particularly affected, declining by\n18,8 per cent in the second quarter of 2009 and having contracted in each of the\npreceding 6 quarters. Growth in real final consumption expenditure by general\ngovernment decelerated to 0,2 per cent in the second quarter of 2009, after having\nincreased at an annualised rate of 5,8 per cent in the first quarter. This deceleration is\nmainly attributable to lower spending on the Defence Procurement Programme.\nFollowing a revised annualised increase of 12,7 per cent in the first quarter of 2009,\ngrowth in real gross fixed capital formation slowed to 0,1 per cent in the second quarter.\nThis deceleration mainly reflected substantially slower growth in real capital outlays by\npublic corporations, while those by private business enterprises declined at a similar rate\nto that recorded in the first quarter of 2009. Real inventories declined by R52,9 billion in\nthe second quarter of 2009 compared with a decline of R16,6 billion in the first quarter.\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n13\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\n14\nInventory depletion in the second quarter of 2009 was mainly evident in the\nmanufacturing and agricultural sectors.\nDevelopments in the external sector of the economy resulted in the ratio of the deficit on\nthe current account of the balance of payments to GDP declining from 7,0 per cent in\nthe first quarter of 2009 to 3,2 per cent in the second quarter. The decline in the volume\nof imports of goods and services outweighed a smaller decline in the volume of exports\nof goods and services, resulting in the smaller deficit on the trade account in the second\nquarter of 2009. Lower net income and other service-related payments to non-residents\nmeant that the shortfall in the country’s net services, income and current transfer\naccount with the rest of the world also narrowed significantly. \nSouth Africa’s gross international reserve position strengthened from US$35,7 billion at\nthe end of July 2009 to US$39,8 billion at the end of October, partly due to a general\nallocation of SDR 1,385 billion from the IMF in August and a special allocation of \nSDR 179,9 million in September. The international liquidity position also improved from\nUS$34,7 billion at the end of July to US$38,8 billion at the end of October.\nReal-estate and equity prices \nA general easing in risk aversion became evident during the second half of 2009 as\nfinancial markets globally displayed signs of cautious optimism regarding a recovery\nin growth. The South African share market followed the upward movement in\ninternational markets, benefiting from a recovery in commodity prices, the lowering of\ndomestic interest rates and continued non-resident interest. By contrast, the property\nmarket remained in the doldrums, although there are some indications of a return to\npositive growth.\nThe year-on-year changes in nominal house prices (Figure 10) have generally been\nnegative since the end of 2008, declining to rates last recorded more than 20 years ago.\nThe rate of change in the average price of residential property in the middle segment of\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nPercentage change over twelve months\n2004\n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\n-15\n-10\n-5\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n35\n40\n \nAbsa House Price Index\n \nStandard Bank House Price Index\n \nFirst National Bank House Price Index\nSources: Absa, Standard Bank and First National Bank\nFigure 10 House prices \nthe market, as measured by the Absa House Price Index, reached a recent low at a\nnegative rate of 3,5 per cent in April 2009, before improving to 2,6 per cent in October.\nThis was mirrored by the First National Bank House Price Index which recorded a similar\nimprovement from a negative year-on-year rate of 8,7 per cent in June 2009 to -1,0 per\ncent in October. The change over 12 months in the Standard Bank median house price\nrecorded a decline of 4,6 per cent in October 2009. \nBuilding statistics published by Statistics South Africa, summarised in Table 8,\nindicate the deteriorating level of activity in the real-estate sector during 2009, while\nsuggesting bleak prospects for future construction activity. The real value of building\nplans passed by larger municipalities during the first eight months of 2009, which\nprovides insight into future construction activity, decreased by 29,5 per cent\ncompared with the period January to August 2008. The real value of building plans\npassed for residential buildings recorded a decline of 46,5 per cent measured on this\nbasis, with less pronounced decreases of 13,6 per cent recorded in the category for\nadditions and alterations, and 10,3 per cent in plans for non-residential buildings. \nTable 8\nReal value of building plans passed and buildings completed in \nlarger municipalities\nAnnual percentage change\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009*\nBuilding plans passed\nTotal ..............................................................\n8,1\n-2,4\n-17,4\n-29,5\nResidential.................................................. \n2,7\n-3,2\n-26,5\n-46,5\nNon-residential .......................................... \n31,7\n-5,9\n2,0\n-10,3\nAdditions and alterations .......................... \n5,0\n1,9\n-12,5\n-13,6\nBuildings completed\nTotal ..............................................................\n21,5\n9,5\n1,8\n-11,7\nResidential ..............................................\n16,7\n1,2\n-8,2\n-25,2\nNon-residential ........................................\n30,6\n48,6\n19,4\n1,0\nAdditions and alterations..........................\n34,0\n6,1\n15,9\n10,0\n*\nData for 2009 are for the first eight months of 2009 compared with the same period of the previous year\nSource: Statistics South Africa\nThe real value of buildings reported as completed in larger municipalities during the first\neight months of 2009 decreased by 11,7 per cent when compared with the same period\na year earlier. Measured on this basis, the real value of residential buildings completed\ndeclined by 25,2 per cent, while increases of 1,0 per cent for non-residential buildings\nand 10,0 per cent for additions and alterations were reported.\nFollowing global trends share prices on the JSE Limited (JSE) recorded a notable\nrecovery during 2009 (Figure 11). From its recent low of 18 121 index points on \n3 March 2009 the FTSE/JSE All-Share Index (Alsi) increased by 43 per cent to 25 925\non 4 November 2009. The trend was consistent with international markets becoming\nincreasingly confident of a global economic recovery. Continued non-resident interest,\nimprovements in commodity prices and lower domestic interest rates ensured that the\nbuoyant share market conditions in the first ten months of 2009 were spread fairly\nwidely across the various sectors. The daily average price level of shares listed in the\nresources sector increased by 40 per cent from 3 March to 4 November 2009. Over\nthe same period the industrial index recorded a gain of 44 per cent while the financial\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n15\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\n16\nindex rebounded by 48 per cent as the lower interest rates and the appreciating\nexchange value of the rand weighed favourably on the profitability prospects of\ncompanies in these sectors. \nFiscal policy \nThe Medium Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS) was presented by the Minister of\nFinance on 27 October 2009. The revised budget balance for 2009/10 is a deficit of\nR183,8 billion, which represents 7,6 per cent of GDP (Table 9). This revised budget\nbalance is twice the deficit of 3,8 per cent of GDP projected in the Budget Review 2009.\nConsolidated government revenue reflects the impact of lower earnings and reduced\nconsumption and imports on tax revenues, and is now expected to be \nR657,5 billion in 2009/10, significantly lower than the estimate of R740,4 billion made in\nFebruary. Consolidated government expenditure in 2009/10 is expected to be slightly\nhigher than projected in February, rising from R834,3 billion to R841,4 billion. In the\nmedium term, projected deficits as a percentage of GDP are 6,2 per cent for 2010/11,\ndeclining to 5,0 per cent for 2011/12, and to 4,2 per cent for 2012/13. \nThe estimated public-sector borrowing requirement (PSBR), reflecting the higher financing\nrequirements of government and the non-financial public enterprises, increased from\nR88,9 billion in 2008/09 (3,8 per cent of GDP) to a revised R284,5 billion for 2009/10 \n(11,8 per cent of GDP). The PSBR is projected to remain relatively high over the medium\nterm as a result of the infrastructure programmes of the non-financial public enterprises,\ndeclining to 11,2 per cent of GDP in 2010/11, to 9,4 per cent of GDP in 2011/12 and to\n8,4 per cent of GDP in 2012/13. Net loan debt as a share of GDP has been revised\nupwards from 25,6 per cent of GDP in the February Budget Review 2009 to 29,2 per cent,\nand is projected to increase to 41,1 per cent of GDP by 2012/13.\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nIndices: 1 January 2007 = 100\n2007\n2008\n2009\nFTSE/JSE All-Share Index\nUnited States (S&P 500)\nEuro area (DJ Euro Stoxx 50)\nJapan (Nikkei 225)\nFigure 11 Share price indices\n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\nBrazil (Bovespa)\nIndia (Bombay Sensitive)\nMalaysia (Kuala Lumpur Composite)\nChina (Shanghai A Share)\nSources: JSE Limited and I-Net Bridge\nTable 9\nPublic finance data \n2008/09\n2009/10\n2010/11\n2011/12\n2012/13\nRevised\nOutcome\nBudget\nestimates\nMedium-term estimates\nConsolidated \ngovernment* (R billions)\nRevenue..........................\n692,0\n740,4\n657,5\n743,5\n833,4\n921,3\nExpenditure.....................\n715,4\n834,3\n841,4\n905,6\n975,6\n1 052,8\nBudget balance...............\n-23,4\n-94,0\n-183,8\n-162,1\n-142,1\n-131,5\nAs a percentage of GDP\nBudget balance...............\n-1,0\n-3,8\n-7,6\n-6,2\n-5,0\n-4,2\nTotal net loan debt ..........\n22,6\n25,6\n29,2\n34,2\n37,8\n41,1\nPSBR** ...........................\n3,8\n8,0\n11,8\n11,2\n9,4\n8,4\n*\nIncludes national government, provinces, social security funds and selected public entities\n**\nPSBR: Public-sector borrowing requirement\nSource: National Treasury Medium Term Budget Policy Statement 2009\nMonetary conditions\nGrowth in total loans and advances extended to the private sector remained lacklustre\nin 2009, despite the cumulative effect of decreases in lending rates as monetary policy\neased in successive steps from December 2008 (Figure 12). The sluggish response in\nthe quantity of credit demanded to decreases in lending rates partly reflected the low\nlevels of consumer and business confidence associated with concerns over prospects\nfor income and employment, and impaired balance sheets on account of asset \nmarket declines. The supply of credit has also been affected by stricter lending criteria\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n17\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nPercentage change over twelve months\n2003\n2006\n2004\n2005\n2007\n2008\n2009\nFigure 12 Banks’ loans and advances by type\nMortgages\nInstalment sale and leasing\nCredit card advances\nGeneral advances\nOverdrafts\nTotal loans and advances\n-20\n-10\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n18\napplied by banks. Box 1 provides an analysis of banks’ deposit and lending rates over\nthe inflation targeting period.\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nBox 1 Analysis of banks’ deposit and lending rates over the inflation-\ntargeting period\nCredit extension to both households and companies has been slow to react to the easier monetary\npolicy stance adopted since December 2008 as weaker macroeconomic conditions continue to\naffect the South African economy. Year-on-year growth in banks’ total loans and advances extended\nhas declined significantly from near record levels of around 25 per cent, on average, in 2007 to\nsingle-digit growth in 2009. Growth in money supply followed a similar downward trajectory due to\ndeteriorating growth in household and corporate income and declining household wealth.\nThis box briefly examines the degree of pass-through and the speed of adjustment in banks’\ndeposit and lending rates in response to changes in the benchmark repurchase rate in South Africa\nduring the period since the introduction of the inflation-targeting monetary policy framework in\n2000. The data are obtained from Banks Act BA returns (DI returns prior to 2008), submitted to\nthe Registrar of Banks.\nThe lending and deposit rates offered by banks are affected by their cost of funding which, inter\nalia, is impacted by the money-market yield curve and, ultimately, the repurchase rate. Variable\ndeposit and lending rates, therefore, fluctuate along with changes in the repurchase rate – lending\nrates at a margin above, and deposit rates at a margin below to slightly above the repurchase rate,\ndepending on maturity, risk, liquidity and prevailing economic conditions. \nDeposit rates\nAn average calculated deposit rate or funding cost is derived by analysing banks’ interest outlays\nagainst deposit liabilities1 (Figure B1.1). \nThe spread between deposit rates and the repurchase rate narrowed during the initial phases of\nthe previous and current monetary policy easing cycles, while adjustments to deposit rates also\ntended to lag during policy tightening phases. Depositors, therefore, tended to receive a relatively\nsmaller interest benefit during monetary policy tightening phases, but received a relatively larger\ninterest benefit during monetary easing cycles. A much narrower spread between banks’ deposit\nPer cent\n2001\n2000\n2002\n2003\n2004\n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\nRepurchase rate\nSpread\nFigure B1.1 \nCalculated average funding cost and the \n \nrepurchase rate\nAverage funding cost\n-6\n-3\n0\n3\n6\n9\n12\n15\n1\nCalculated as the ratio\nof total rand-denominated\ninterest expenses to total\nrand-denominated deposits.\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n19\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nrates and the repurchase rate was maintained in 20082 and early 2009 as banks probably\nattempted to attract deposits during a period of decelerating real economic growth. The beneficial\nrates that banks offered are especially evident in rates on longer term deposits, such as fixed\ndeposits (Figure B1.2). \nInformation on the actual reported interest rates on existing deposits offered by banks, illustrated\nin Figure B1.3, also tends to paint a similar picture. While deposit rates vary depending on the client\nand term of deposit, the rates on fixed deposits of less than one year for different economic sectors\ndisplayed a close alignment with the repurchase rate. Interest rates on existing deposits lagged the\ndownward movement in the repurchase rate during 2009, with households receiving a somewhat\nlarger benefit relative to other client categories.\nPer cent\nRepurchase rate\nTransmission account deposits\nFigure B1.2 \nDeposit categories: Calculated average yields\nCurrent account and call deposits\nNotice and fixed deposits\n0\n3\n6\n9\n12\n15\n2001\n2000\n2002\n2003\n2004\n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\nPer cent\nFigure B1.3 \nClient categories: Average 0–1-year fixed-deposit \n \nrates (top five banks)\n6\n7\n8\n9\n10\n11\n12\n13\n \nRepurchase rate\n \nCentral and provincial government – fixed deposits\n \nPrivate non-financial corporations – fixed deposits\n \nHousehold sector – fixed deposits\n2008\n2009\n2\nThe implementation of\nthe Basel II accounting\nframework in January 2008\nmay have influenced the\ncomparability of data over\nthe period of analysis.\n20\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nLending rates\nThe average calculated yield on banks’ total rand-denominated loans and advances was found to\nfluctuate at around 240 basis points above the repurchase rate from 2001 to 2009. Some\nnarrowing occurred during 2002 and from 2006 to 2008 during the tightening phases of monetary\npolicy, suggesting that lending rates lagged the increases in the repurchase rate. Similarly, the gap\nbetween lending rates and the repurchase rate widened when policy eased in 2003 and 2009. The\nlagged response of lending rates probably contributed to the slowdown experienced in the growth\nof credit extension in the wake of the monetary policy easing cycle. The repurchase rate and an\nimplied average lending rate3 are shown in Figure B1.4. \nFigure B1.5 shows that most of the lending rates of the different loan categories fluctuated between\nthe repurchase rate and the prime rate (benchmarked at the repurchase rate plus 350 basis\npoints). Mortgage rates, a lower risk product due to its term and collateral requirements, fluctuated\nPer cent\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n16\n18\nFigure B1.4 \nCalculated average interest rate on total loans and \n \nadvances, and the repurchase rate\n \nRepurchase rate\n \nAverage lending rate\n \nSpread\n2001\n2000\n2002\n2003\n2004\n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\nPer cent\nPrime overdraft rate\nMortgage loans\nInstalment sale and leasing finance\nFigure B1.5 \nCalculated average interest rates on categories of \n \nloans and advances compared to the repurchase \n \nand prime rates\nRepurchase rate\nCredit card debtors\nOverdrafts and loans\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n2001\n2000\n2002\n2003\n2004\n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\n3\nCalculated as the ratio\nof total rand-denominated\ninterest income to total rand-\ndenominated loans and\nadvances.\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n21\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\naround mid-way between the repurchase and prime rates, while interest rates on instalment sales\nfluctuated closer to the prime rate. Overdrafts are generally subject to greater variation in lending\nrates, while credit card debtors are charged a significantly higher premium for the privilege of\nhaving access to a more flexible credit facility. \nWhen comparing actual reported lending rates for households and companies, the interest rates\nvary according to the loan category (Figure B1.6). In the case of mortgage loans, the rates for\nhouseholds and companies appeared to be quite similar, while overdraft rates displayed a greater\nvariance between different economic sectors. Rates on overdrafts to the public sector are generally\nsubstantially lower than those available to the private and household sectors. \nConclusion\nThis analysis suggests a complete long-term pass-through for most lending rates, but incomplete\nimmediate short-term pass-through of the policy rate to bank lending rates. However, there is no\nevidence of an asymmetric response of lending rates to changes in the repurchase rate. Although\nbanks’ lending and deposit rates appear to have reacted in a broadly consistent way during the\nperiod under review, there is some evidence of heterogeneity in the adjustments across lending\ncategories. Furthermore, there is evidence of a somewhat more lagged response of banks’ interest\nrate adjustments over the most recent monetary policy cycle. While this may constrain lending\nduring an easing phase of the cycle, the relatively more favourable deposit rates that have prevailed\nin the recent period should encourage renewed growth in money supply over the longer term.\nSources\nImplied average interest rates were calculated from the aggregated information of bank returns:\nBA100 Balance sheet (DI100 prior to January 2008)\nBA120 Income statement ((DI200 prior to January 2008) \nAverage actual interest rates were extracted from: \nBA930 Interest rates on deposits, loans and advances\nPer cent\nPer cent\nFigure B1.6 \nAverage lending rates (top five banks)\n6\n9\n12\n15\n5\n10\n15\n20\n \nRepurchase rate\n \nPrivate non-financial corporate sector \nJ\nJ\nS\nN\nM\nM\n2008\nJ\nJ\nS\nN\nM\nM\n2009\nMortgage rates\nOverdraft rates\nHousehold sector\nCentral and provincial government\n22\nYear-on-year growth in banks’ total loans and advances to the private sector fell back\nfrom average growth of around 20 per cent in 2008 to a negative 0,2 per cent in\nSeptember 2009 – the slowest growth on record. Negative year-on-year rates of change\nin total loans and advances were last recorded in May 1966. Growth over 12 months in\nmortgage advances, which dominate the bank loans and advances aggregate, declined\nnotably from 24,5 per cent at the start of 2008 to 4,8 per cent in September 2009.\nGrowth in other loans and advances, which include general loans, overdrafts and credit\ncard advances, followed a similar downward trajectory, declining to negative growth\nrates from May 2009. The securitisation of loans and advances by banks, a\nphenomenon that gathered pace in South Africa before contracting sharply in the wake\nof the turmoil in international markets in 2008, is discussed in Box 2. \nSimilar to the deceleration in credit extension, the year-on-year growth in broad money\nsupply (M3) fell back from average growth of 19,0 per cent in 2008 to 4,0 per cent in\nSeptember 2009 (Figure 13). During the same period a decline of similar magnitude\nwas recorded by the narrower M2 monetary aggregate. The M1 monetary aggregate,\nwhich represents cash, cheque and other demand deposits, declined to negative\ngrowth in the first three months of 2009, before improving to year-on-year growth of\n1,2 per cent in September.\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nPercentage change over 12 months\n2006\n2004\n2003\n2005\n2007\n2008\n2009\nFigure 13 Growth in monetary aggregates\n-10\n-5\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n35\nM3\nM1\nM2\nBox 2 Asset-backed securitisation by South African banks\nThe United States (US) sub-prime-related credit crisis placed renewed emphasis on the issuance\nand use of financial derivatives and financing vehicles globally as securitisation of risky assets\nserved to amplify the extent of the crisis. Securitisation provides an avenue whereby non-\nmarketable loans and/or cash flows are replaced by negotiable securities issued in the capital\nmarkets. By issuing such debt instruments, future cash inflows are turned into present cash. \nInternationally, and especially in the US market, the securitisation of risky mortgage loans and the\nuse of financial derivatives and financing vehicles helped to transfer and spread the risk in an\nincreasingly leveraged global financial system. Securitisation transactions in these markets\naccelerated after 2004 when the Basel II4 Accord on international bank regulation was published.\nThe second Basel Accord opened an arbitrage opportunity for banks through its recognition of the\n4\nBasel Accord: A set of\nrecommended common\nbanking standards agreed to\nby the Basel Committee on\nBank Supervision in 1988, with\nthe focus on capital adequacy\nand risk. The second Basel\nAccord, known as Basel II,\nbecame effective from 2008. \nIt focuses on three main areas,\nnamely minimum capital\nrequirements, supervisory\nreview and market discipline.\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n23\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\ntransfer of assets, or the risks related to them, and allowing for the exclusion of these assets from\nrisk-based calculations. This essentially enabled banks to reduce their capital requirements through\nsecuritisation and contributed towards the acceleration in off-balance-sheet activity.\nIn South Africa the scale and extent of securitisation were limited by, inter alia, market size, lack of\ndemand and prudent supervision. The first issuance in the present decade of a mortgage-backed\nsecuritisation to the value of R1 billion occurred in 2002. This was followed by the securitisation of\nvehicle receivables, and other types of collateralised loans and advances in subsequent years.\nActivity picked up from 2005 with securitisations amounting to around R10 billion for that year.\nIssuance doubled in 2006 and increased further to over R30 billion in 2007. The issuance of\nsecuritised bank assets virtually dried up in early 2008, when turmoil in international markets led to\nrisk aversion and a general tightening in credit conditions. An independent review of all\nsecuritisation schemes affecting banks was commissioned by the Bank Supervision Department of\nthe South African Reserve Bank (the Bank) during April 2008. \nFollowing the recommendations made by a large international locally based auditing firm, the\nsupervisory authority stated its intent to consider the proposals in order to ascertain the need to\nrevise the legislative framework. The report also noted that securitisation in South Africa was not\nas complicated as in the US and in European countries, and that the assets housed in South\nAfrican schemes tended to have a high level of transparency. Risks related to securitisation\nschemes were found to have been managed appropriately by the banks reviewed. Furthermore,\ntop-tier South African banks, on average, sourced only 4 per cent of their total funding from\nsecuritisation, which was significantly less than that of international banks that struggled during the\nliquidity crisis.\nReferences\nWehinger, G. 2008. “Lessons from the financial market turmoil: Challenges ahead for the financial\nindustry and policy makers”. Financial Market Trends, Vol. 2008/2, No. 95. Paris: Organisation for\nEconomic Co-operation and Development. \nSouth African Reserve Bank. 2009. Bank Supervision Department Annual Report 2008. Pretoria:\nSouth African Reserve Bank.\nR billions\nFigure B2.1 \nAsset-backed securitisations by private-sector \n \nbanks – new issues\n \nInstalment sale and leasing finance \n \nsecuritised \n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\n \nMortgage advances securitised\n \nOther loans and advances securitised\nSource: Bond Exchange of South Africa \n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\n24\nMonetary policy\nThe global financial crisis resulted in the widespread adoption of more accommodating\nmonetary policy stances globally. South Africa’s monetary policy easing began in\nDecember 2008, and in the four MPC meetings between then and April 2009 the\nrepurchase rate was reduced by 350 basis points (Figure 14). Since then, and following\nthe publication of the previous Monetary Policy Review, there were six meetings of the\nMPC, and the repurchase rate was reduced by a further 150 basis points – by 100\nbasis points in May and a further 50 basis points in August. The repurchase rate\ndeclined to a level of 7 per cent per annum, which was the same as the low point of\nthe interest rate cycle reached in 2005, and the lowest nominal policy rate since the\nlate 1970s. However, the inflation rate in 2009 was significantly higher than that which\nprevailed in 2005.\nThe adjustment in the repurchase rate offset the 500 basis point monetary policy\ntightening implemented between June 2006 and June 2008, and was over a considerably\nshorter period. This decisive response reflected the severity of the global and domestic\ndownturn, and the consequent dissipation of inflationary pressures. However, during the\nperiod under review, it appeared that the global and domestic recessions were reaching\ntheir lower turning points, and, given the lag in the impact of monetary policy actions on\ndemand and inflation, the need for further stimulus was reduced.\nDuring this period, the inflation rate remained outside the inflation target range, but the\ninflation forecasts of the staff of the Bank consistently showed that the inflation rate was\nexpected to follow a persistent downward trend to within the target range. By the time\nof the November 2009 meeting the latest inflation outcome (September) was 6,1 per\ncent, only marginally outside the range. Although there were slight changes to the\nforecast in the various meetings, as a result of changing assumptions of the exogenous\nvariables, the pattern remained relatively stable. The forecasts consistently showed that\nCPI inflation was expected to enter the inflation target range on a sustained basis in the\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nPer cent\n2004\n2003\n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\nPrime overdraft rate\nRepurchase rate\nThree-month negotiable certificates of deposits rate\nFigure 14 The repurchase rate and other short-term interest rates\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n16\n18\nsecond quarter of 2010 and to remain within the target range until the end of the\nforecast period in the final quarter of 2011. However, the changing electricity price\nassumptions reversed this favourable trend somewhat in the later part of the forecast\nperiod. The most recent forecast presented to the MPC is discussed in greater detail\nlater in this review. Of concern to the committee was the fact that the central forecast\nremained close to the upper end of the target, so that relatively small shocks to inflation\ncould result in a breach of the upper end of the target. During the period under review,\nthe main changes to exogenous assumptions related to the exchange rate and\nadministered prices, particularly petrol and electricity prices. \nInflation expectations are an important determinant of inflation outcomes, as they impact\non price and wage setting. During the past period, inflation expectations have been a\nconcern for the committee, as they did not appear to reflect fully the actual decline in the\ninflation that had been taking place. According to the inflation expectations survey\nconducted by the Bureau for Economic Research (BER) at Stellenbosch University,\ninflation expectations for 2009 deteriorated during the second quarter of 2009. While a\ndownward trend for the subsequent two years remained, only the financial analysts\nexpected that inflation would be within the target range in 2010 and 2011. The survey\nconducted in the third quarter of 2009 showed some improvement, but, on average,\nremained above the upper end of the inflation target range, with inflation expected to\naverage 7,5 per cent in both 2010 and 2011. Again, only the financial analysts expected\nthat inflation would be within the target range in these years.\nThe outlook for the global economy featured prominently in the deliberations of the\ncommittee, because of the linkages to the domestic economy. Whereas in the first few\nmonths of the year the global economy was characterised by progressively worse\noutcomes, by the May 2009 MPC meeting there were tentative signs that the global\nrecession was bottoming out as financial market conditions had become less restrictive.\nDuring the subsequent months, there was greater optimism concerning the global\noutlook, but there were some doubts about the strength and the sustainability of the\nrecovery. By September forecasts were generally being revised upwards, and the risks to\nthe global growth prospects were generally assessed to be on the upside. There were,\nhowever, still concerns about the timing and extent of reversals of monetary and fiscal\npolicy stimuli, which could retard the rate of recovery. The pace of recovery was also\nexpected to be uneven across regions, with faster growth expected in emerging markets,\nparticularly those in Asia. As a result of weak demand and lower commodity prices, global\ninflation pressures remained subdued and were not expected to place significant\npressures on domestic inflation despite the generally loose monetary conditions.\nThe domestic recession and the associated widening of the domestic output gap resulted\nin downward pressure on domestic inflation. The output gap, which is calculated as the\ndifference between actual and potential output growth, is an important determinant of\ninflation. While potential output is difficult to calculate with precision and may also have\ndeclined over the past months, the output gap nevertheless remains wide. By the time of\nthe May meeting, the extent of the GDP growth contraction in the first quarter was\napparent. GDP had contracted at a quarter-on-quarter annualised rate of 6,4 per cent,\nand capacity utilisation in the manufacturing sector had declined to 79 per cent in the\nsame period. At that time it was expected that negative growth would persist into the\nsecond quarter, but the pace of contraction was expected to moderate. This was\nconfirmed by the quarter-on-quarter decline of 3,0 per cent, published in August. \nIn September 2009 the committee indicated that the lower turning point of the cycle may\nhave been reached, but that recovery in the short term would be relatively slow and\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n25\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\n26\ntentative. The South African Reserve Bank’s composite leading indicator indicated that\nthe economy was likely to resume positive growth by the end of the year. This was\nconsistent with other high-frequency indicators, including the Kagiso/BER Purchasing\nManagers’ Index (PMI). By the October meeting, the three-month-on-three-month\ngrowth rates in manufacturing and mining had become positive, further reinforcing the\npositive growth outlook.\nThe subdued domestic expenditure was a persistent theme during the period under\nreview, and there were no signs that the easier stance of monetary policy was likely to\nhave imminent demand-led inflationary impacts. Wholesale and retail trade sales\ncontracted during this period, as did overall household consumption expenditure.\nExpenditure on durable goods was particularly weak over the period. In October the\nMPC noted that real retail trade sales had declined at a year-on-year rate of 7,0 per cent\nin August, while in the three months to August there was a 1,0 per cent decline.\nHowever, there were some signs that the negative trend of motor vehicle sales may have\nreached its lower turning point in September 2009 with zero or slightly positive rates of\nchange being recorded on a month-on-month and quarter-on-quarter basis.\nTrends in domestic credit extension reflected the weak state of domestic consumption\nexpenditure. The committee noted that supply-side developments may also have\ncontributed to these pressures, with the generally tighter credit criteria applied by banks\nto both household and corporate sector borrowers. However, in October it was noted\nthat the Ernst & Young Financial Services Index had indicated that credit standards\napplied by retail banks to loan applications continued to tighten in the third quarter of\n2009, but at significantly lower levels. \nDomestic expenditure was also constrained by negative wealth effects over the period.\nAlthough equity prices had recovered significantly since their lows in March, they were\nstill significantly below the peaks reached in 2008. House prices also declined further\nover the period, but the various house price indices indicated that there appeared to be\na moderation in the rate of decline in house prices. These factors, along with indications\nthat consumers were attempting to reduce their overall debt and repair impaired balance\nsheets, were seen to be a constraint on consumption expenditure in the near term.\nIn the early stages of the global financial crisis, the rand exchange rate had depreciated\nsignificantly, and the exchange rate was seen as one of the main upside risk factors to\ninflation. However, during the period under review, as global risk aversion subsided and\ncommodity prices recovered somewhat, the rand appreciated along with a number of\nemerging-market and commodity-producing currencies. The exchange rate, while still\nrelatively volatile, strengthened significantly and by October had appreciated since the\nbeginning of the year by about 20 per cent on a trade-weighted basis. The committee\nrecognised the vulnerability of the rand to changes in sentiment or risk aversion, and felt\nthat the risk to inflation from this source had declined over the period.\nThe risks posed to the inflation outlook by a number of other variables were also\nperceived to have moderated somewhat. For most of 2008 and the early part of 2009,\nfood prices had posed an upside risk to the inflation outlook. Although food prices at the\nproducer price level had been moderating for some time, this was not initially reflected\nat the consumer price level. At the May meeting the committee noted that although\nmanufactured food price inflation had declined to 8,4 per cent in April and agricultural\nprice inflation to 2,2 per cent, the moderation at the consumer price level was stubbornly\nslow. At that time consumer food price inflation measured almost 18 per cent. Since\nthen the rate of deceleration of consumer food price inflation has increased and by\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nSeptember it had declined to 4,9 per cent; below the average headline inflation rate of\n6,1 per cent. Inflation at the producer price level continued to indicate that this\nfavourable trend was likely to continue.\nInternational oil prices had been one of the main upside risk factors for the first part of\n2008, but this changed later in the year when the oil price declined to a low of around\nUS$35 per barrel in the wake of the global downturn. Since then oil prices have doubled,\nas global prospects improved and the US dollar depreciated, but are still well below the\npeaks reached in 2008. However, the impact on domestic petrol prices was relatively\nmodest as the higher international oil prices were largely offset by the appreciation of the\nrand exchange rate. Since May 2009 the domestic petrol price had increased by about\n30 cents per litre.\nWhile demand pressures remained benign, the committee consistently identified cost-\npush pressures as being the main threat to the inflation outlook. Of particular concern\nwere wage settlements and administered price increases. During the period, nominal\nwage increases were generally in excess of inflation. However, by October 2009 the\ncommittee noted that there was evidence that nominal wage increases had been\nmoderating. The substantial electricity tariff increases requested by Eskom were seen as\nthe main longer-term threat to the inflation outlook. The request by Eskom for a trebling\nof current electricity tariffs over the next three years will be decided upon by the National\nEnergy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) in February 2010.\nDuring this period the MPC continued to implement monetary policy within a flexible\ninflation-targeting framework. While focusing on bringing inflation down to within the\ntarget range over a reasonable time frame, the committee remained sensitive to cyclical\ngrowth considerations. At the MPC meeting in May the risks to the inflation outlook were\nstill seen to be on the downside and the committee decided to reduce the repurchase\nrate by 100 basis points. The view of the committee was that the widening output gap\ncontributed to an improved inflation outlook despite the relatively slow pace of disinflation.\nThe committee’s assessment of the downside risks was such that the additional\nreduction in the repurchase rate would provide a stimulus to the economy without\ncreating significant additional inflationary pressures. At the subsequent meeting, in June\n2009, the repurchase rate was kept unchanged. The committee was cognisant of the fact\nthat there had been significant monetary accommodation since December 2008, and felt\nit prudent to pause and assess the impact of previous interest rate reductions.\nBy August 2009 the MPC had decided that the balance of risks to the inflation outlook\nhad tilted to the downside again as a result of the continued adverse output and\nexpenditure trends, along with favourable exchange rate and food price developments.\nAccordingly, the committee decided to reduce the repurchase rate by a further 50 basis\npoints, bringing the cumulative decrease since December 2008 to 500 basis points. \nAt the subsequent meetings in September and October 2009 the risks to the outlook\nwere seen to be more balanced than before, particularly in the light of positive indications\nthat the economy was likely to emerge from the recession later in the year. At the same\ntime, the Eskom request for further electricity tariff increases imparted additional upside\nrisk to the outlook. This rebalancing of the perceived risks prompted an unchanged\nmonetary policy stance. At the November 2009 meeting the risks were assessed as\nhaving remained more or less unchanged and so the repurchase rate was kept\nunchanged at 7 per cent per annum.\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n27\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\n28\nThe outlook for inflation\nThe outlook, risk and uncertainties relating to some of the factors that determine the\noutlook for inflation are presented in this section. \nInternational outlook\nRecent data suggest that aggressive policy action by central banks and governments in\na large number of countries has provided the impetus for the global economy to bottom\nout and regain traction. The huge policy responses by various governments have\nenabled an incipient economic recovery, restored confidence, and allayed fears of global\nfinancial collapse and deflation. The latest projections for growth in the G-20 countries,\npublished in the IMF’s October 2009 World Economic Outlook and incorporated in\nFigure 15, show a marked turnaround in the forecasts for 2010 relative to the growth\nrates achieved in 2009.\nA similar reversal is foreseen for the global economy. After contracting by about 1,1 per cent\nin 2009, world growth is projected by the IMF to reaccelerate to 3,1 per cent in 2010 (Table\n10). This is comfortably above recent growth rates, but still well below the rates achieved\nbefore the crisis. According to the latest projections, inflation in advanced economies is\nexpected to ease to 0,1 per cent in 2009 due to the contraction of global economic activity,\nbefore accelerating to 1,1 per cent in 2010. Owing to moderation in energy and food prices,\nannual consumer price inflation continued to decelerate in emerging markets as a group\nduring 2009. Inflation in emerging-market and developing economies is projected to\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nFigure 15 IMF forecasts for real GDP: G-20 countries\n \n2009\n \n2010\nSources: IMF World Economic Outlook database, October 2009\nAnnual percentage change\nRussia\nMexico\nTurkey\nJapan\nGermany\nItaly\nUnited Kingdom\nEuropean Union\nUnited States\nArgentina\nCanada\nFrance\nSouth Africa\nSouth Korea\nSaudi Arabia\nBrazil\nAustralia\nIndonesia\nIndia\nChina\n-8\n-6\n-4\n-2\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\ndecelerate further from 5,5 per cent in 2009 to 4,9 per cent in 2010. Despite upward\npressure from recovering commodity prices, global inflation is expected to remain subdued\nthrough 2010, held back by significant excess capacity. Risks for sustained deflation appear\nsmall, as core inflation and inflation expectations in most major economies are still holding\nin the 1 to 2 per cent range.\nTable 10\nIMF projections of world growth and inflation for 2009 and 2010*\nPer cent\nReal GDP\nConsumer prices**\n2009\n2010\n2009\n2010\nWorld ......................................................................\n(-1,3)\n-1,1\n3,1\n(2,5)\n2,5\n2,9\nAdvanced economies ............................................\n(-3,8)\n-3,4\n1,3\n(-0,2)\n0,1\n1,1\nUnited States ....................................................\n(-2,8)\n-2,7\n1,5\n(-0,9)\n-0,4\n1,7\nJapan ................................................................\n(-6,2)\n-5,4\n1,7\n(-1,0)\n-1,1\n-0,8\nEuro area ..........................................................\n(-4,2)\n-4,2\n0,3\n(0,4)\n0,3\n0,8\nUnited Kingdom ................................................\n(-4,1)\n-4,4\n0,9\n(1,5)\n1,9\n1,5\nOther advanced economies ..............................\n(-4,1)\n-2,1\n2,6\n(0,6)\n1,3\n1,7\nOther emerging-market and developing countries....\n(1,6)\n1,7\n5,1\n(5,7)\n5,5\n4,9\nAfrica ................................................................\n(2,0)\n1,7\n4,0\n(9,0)\n9,0\n6,5\nCentral and eastern Europe ..............................\n(-3,7)\n-5,0\n1,8\n(4,6)\n4,8\n4,2\nCommonwealth of Independent States..............\n(-5,1)\n-6,7\n2,1\n(12,6) 11,8\n9,4\nDeveloping Asia ................................................\n(4,8)\n6,2\n7,3\n(2,8)\n3,0\n3,4\nChina ..............................................................\n(6,5)\n8,5\n9,0\n(0,1)\n-0,1\n0,6\nIndia ................................................................\n(4,5)\n5,4\n6,4\n(6,3)\n8,7\n8,4\nMiddle East........................................................\n(2,5)\n2,0\n4,2\n(11,0)\n8,3\n6,6\nWestern hemisphere..........................................\n(-1,5)\n-2,5\n2,9\n(6,6)\n6,1\n5,2\n*\nIMF projections for 2009 as at April 2009 in parenthesis\n**\nZimbabwe excluded\nSource: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2009\nThe US economy appears to be stabilising after contracting for four consecutive\nquarters. It expanded at a higher-than-expected 3,5 per cent seasonally adjusted and\nannualised rate in the third quarter of 2009 thanks to a recovery in consumer spending.\nFinancial markets have shown signs of improvement, and interbank lending has largely\nreturned to normal. Companies appear to be done with their cost cutting and this could\nhave laid the groundwork for economic growth in the third quarter of 2009. The \nUS$787 billion stimulus bill was also expected to have given GDP a boost in the third\nquarter. High-frequency indicators point to a diminishing rate of deterioration, and\nindustrial production may be close to bottoming out; the inventory cycle is turning; and\nbusiness and consumer confidence has improved. These developments are consistent\nwith stabilisation of output during the second half of 2009 and with a gradual recovery\nemerging in 2010. \nJapan’s economy emerged from recession by improving significantly in the second\nquarter of 2009, after a second significant double-digit rate of decline in GDP in the first\nquarter of the year. Japan’s US$275 billion stimulus package was largely credited with\nthe rebound. The plan included massive public works projects, a “cash-for-clunkers”\nprogramme to promote the replacement of old vehicles with new ones, and sending\nconsumers cheques amounting to about US$130 each. These initiatives helped drive\nconsumer spending up, but analysts have been cautious about labelling Japan’s\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n29\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\n30\neconomic turnaround as a true recovery, as businesses cut inventories very low in prior\nquarters. The increasing rate of deflation, unemployment rising to a record high in\nSeptember and jobless rates that are projected to rise above the 6 per cent level in 2010\nare growing sources of concern. Another concern is that Japan’s fiscal stimulus has\ngrown the debt-to-GDP ratio to an all-time-high of 200 per cent.\nConsumer and business survey indicators have been recovering in the euro area, but\ndata on real activity show few signs of stabilisation and thus activity is projected to\nstrengthen more slowly than elsewhere. Macroeconomic policies are providing support,\nbut much adjustment in the labour market still needs to be done. Rising unemployment\nwill weigh on consumption and activity, as will the region’s heavy dependence on the\nbanking sector. However, the two largest economies in the euro area recorded positive\ngrowth in the second quarter of 2009. Germany rebounded from four straight quarters\nof decline to grow at an annualised pace of 1,3 per cent in the second quarter of 2009.\nA US$120 billion stimulus package, a US$25,9 billion business lending programme and\nextensions of government-subsidised labour contracts helped Germany to emerge from\nthe recession. Business confidence in Germany rose to a one-year high, and consumer\nconfidence is at a 15-month high. France’s US$37 billion economic stimulus programme\nhelped bring the French economy back to positive growth in the second quarter of 2009\nfor the first time in more than a year. However, the fiscal deficit is forecast to rise to\nbetween 7 per cent and 7,5 per cent of GDP in 2010, which is more than double the \n3 per cent limit set by the European Union.\nThe OECD expects the UK’s real GDP to fall by 4,7 per cent in 2009, having previously\nforecast it would shrink by 4,3 per cent. The UK is the only major economy for which\nthe OECD has forecast a larger contraction than previously, although the country has\nshown signs that it is beginning to recover. In August the services sector grew at the\nfastest pace in almost two years, while factory output has begun to rebound after\nsignificant declines throughout the downturn. The latest business and consumer\nconfidence surveys show a slight improvement, and the UK government announced\nplans to continue the nation’s stimulus efforts at least through next year.\nMany developing countries posted growth in their GDP during the second quarter of\n2009, benefiting from China’s strength, as well as unprecedented global stimulus and\nfollowing a sharp decline in economic activity in the first quarter of 2009. Estimates for\nmany developing economies were revised upwards by the IMF and the positive\nfeedback loop, launched by government stimulus, is expected to continue. \nChina has weathered the global downturn better than any other G-20 nation and the\nChinese economy has responded to reflationary measures. China’s GDP rebounded well\nin the second quarter of 2009 as the economy was aided by a US$586 billion stimulus\npackage, increased bank lending and government support for exports. According to a\nrecent report from the Asian Development Bank, China’s state-controlled banking\nsystem lent US$1,2 trillion more to Chinese businesses and consumers in the first seven\nmonths of 2009 than during the same period a year ago. As a result, factory output,\nconstruction and auto sales grew rapidly in the second quarter. Although the global\ndownturn resulted in a slowdown in China’s GDP growth to an annualised rate of 6,5 per\ncent in the first half of 2009, the IMF has forecasted real growth of 8,5 per cent for 2009\nand 9 per cent for 2010. \nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nThe IMF expects African economies to recover fairly quickly once the global economy\ngains momentum. Debt levels in most countries on the continent are not a source of\nconcern, and fiscal and monetary policies are expected to remain supportive of recovery\nin these countries. Both China and India have sharply increased trade with, and\ninvestments in, Africa, which could further aid the region’s recovery. The strength of the\nrecovery would, nevertheless, be determined by the extent of the rebound in global\ntrade, favourable commodity prices and a pick-up in worker remittances.\nImproving signs of recovery in a number of OECD countries resulted in the composite\nleading indicator compiled by the OECD recording year-on-year increases of 0,7 per cent\nin August and 3,4 per cent in September 2009 (Figure 16). These are the first positive\nchanges since November 2007. The JPMorgan Global Manufacturing PMI remained\nabove the neutral level of 50 for a third consecutive month in October 2009 at 54,4 after\na reading of 53 was recorded in September. The year-on-year rate of decline in the OECD\nindustrial production index decelerated to 11,3 per cent in August 2009. \nAmong leading advanced economies, only the UK, Italy, and Canada were still in\nrecession in the third quarter of 2009. The outlook for emerging economies is even\nbrighter, but some parts of the developing world are still experiencing difficult conditions\n– notably parts of central and eastern Europe and Africa. The re-emergence of relatively\nstrong growth in parts of Asia and Latin America means that these regions are leading\nthe West out of recession. At the G-20 Summit in the US held in September 2009 steps\nwere announced to help the global economy transition to sustained growth and G-20\nleaders gave the assurance that policy stimulus would continue until a durable recovery\nis secured. However, the first tentative signs are emerging that some central banks are\nscaling back their supportive policies and that the risks to growth are more balanced. \nSouth African Reserve Bank\n31\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nPercentage change over 12 months \nIndex points\n30\n35\n40\n45\n50\n55\n60\n \nOECD composite leading indicator\n \nOECD industrial production index\n \nJPMorgan global manufacturing PMI (right-hand scale) \nSources: OECD and JPMorgan\nFigure 16 Selected indicators of global economic activity\n-20\n-15\n-10\n-5\n0\n5\n10\n15\n1999\n2001\n2003\n2005\n2007\n2009\n32\nOutlook for domestic demand and supply\nAlthough real GDP growth has been negative in the past three quarters, there is a\ngeneral expectation among economists surveyed by Reuters in October that growth\nin South Africa will improve moderately in the fourth quarter of 2009 and continue on\na positive trajectory in 2010 and 2011. With the exception of July, the Bank’s\ncomposite leading indicator (discussed in Box 3) has increased each month since\nApril 2009, pointing to a probable recovery in economic conditions towards the end\nof 2009. In August 2009 components such as average hours worked per factory\nworker in manufacturing, the volume of domestic orders in manufacturing and the\nannual percentage change in the number of new passenger vehicles sold have shown\nimprovements. In addition, commodity price and share price indices, as well as\nleading trading-partner indicators, all point to economic recovery and an improved\nexport climate.\nAccording to the latest Reuters consensus forecasts surveyed in October 2009, the\nSouth African economy is expected to contract by 1,91 per cent in 2009, with the fourth\nquarter of the year expected to show an annual increase of 1,94 per cent, followed by\npositive growth of 2,83 and 2,91 per cent in the first and second quarters of 2010.\nGrowth in 2010 is expected to recover to 2,33 per cent and to 3,50 per cent in 2011.\nIn its October 2009 Forecast of Key Economic Variables, the BER projected a calendar\nyear real economic growth rate of -1,7 per cent in 2009 and 2,7 per cent in 2010,\nfollowed by 3,7 per cent in 2011. According to the MTBPS released on 27 October\n2009, real GDP is expected to contract by 1,9 per cent in 2009. However, the growth\nrate is projected to be 1,5 per cent in 2010 and 2,7 per cent in 2011.\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nBox 3 The composite leading business cycle indicator\nIn monitoring the South African economy, the Bank regularly compiles and continuously analyses\nthree composite business cycle indicators – leading, coincident and lagging. The composite\nleading business cycle indicator is a key indicator of the domestic economic outlook presented in\nthis Monetary Policy Review and this box briefly discusses the compilation and characteristics of\nthe composite leading business cycle indicator.\nThe Bank first published composite business cycle indicators in 1983. Composite business cycle\nindicators are compiled by integrating various economic indicators into a single index. Various\nfactors, such as structural changes in the economy or the identification of new economic\nindicators, necessitate the frequent reassessment of the constituent time series of the composite\nbusiness cycle indicators. For this reason the composite leading business cycle indicator was last\nrevised for in 2007. With every revision, a range of economic indicators is evaluated for possible\ninclusion and all the time series are subjected to an appraisal system that rates business cycle\nindicators according to the\n-\neconomic significance of the process represented by the indicator;\n-\nstatistical adequacy of the data;\n-\nhistorical conformity to, and timing relationship with, the business cycle;\n-\nsmoothness of the time series; and\n-\ntimeliness of the data.\nThe composite leading business cycle indicator currently comprises 12 economic indicators, which\nhave historically preceded turning points in the business cycle (Table B3.1). \nThe Bank determines the official reference turning points in South Africa’s business cycle in terms\nof the growth cycle definition of business cycles and, according to this methodology, the most\nrecently identified peak in the business cycle occurred in November 2007. Therefore, the Bank’s\nbusiness cycle chronology, published regularly in its Quarterly Bulletin, represents reference\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n33\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nturning-point dates that distinguish between upward phases when the pace of growth in aggregate\neconomic activity exceeds its long-term growth trend, and downward phases when aggregate\neconomic activity either contracts or increases at a slower rate than its long-term growth trend. \nTable B3.1 Component series of the composite leading business cycle \nindicator and their contribution to the August 2009 data point\nComponent series\nContribution\nBER: Average hours worked per factory worker in manufacturing (half weight)\nPositive\nJob advertisements: The Sunday Times (percentage change over 12 months)\nNegative\nBER: Volume of orders in manufacturing (half weight)\nPositive\nBER: Business confidence index\nNegative\nNumber of building plans approved: Flats, townhouses and houses larger than 80 m2\nPositive\nNumber of new passenger vehicles sold (percentage change over 12 months)\nPositive\nGross operating surplus as a percentage of GDP\nN/A\nInterest rate spread: 10-year government bonds minus 91-day Treasury bills\nNegative\nIndex of prices of all classes of shares traded on the JSE\nPositive\nReal M1 (six-month smoothed growth rate)\nNegative\nCommodity price index for South Africa’s main export commodities (US dollar based)\nPositive\nComposite leading business cycle indicator of South Africa’s major trading-partner \ncountries (percentage change over 12 months)*\nPositive\n*\nThe international business cycle indicator comprises the composite leading business cycle indicators of\neight of South Africa’s main trading-partner countries, weighted according to the value of South Africa’s\nexports to each country\nPeriodic revisions of the composite leading business cycle indicator have ensured that this indicator\nremains as reliable as possible in predicting movements in the business cycle. The leading business\ncycle indicator exhibits a lead time of about 10 months, on average, on business cycle turning\npoints. The timing relationship of the composite leading business cycle indicator is shown in Table\nB3.2 along with the reference turning points of the business cycle for the period since August 1981. \nTable B3.2 Timing relationship between the composite leading indicator and\nthe reference turning points of the business cycle*\nReference turning points\nTiming relationship in months\nPeak\nTrough\nPeak\nTrough\nAugust 1981\n-11\nMarch 1983\n-8\nJune 1984\n-1\nMarch 1986\n-13\nFebruary 1989\n-9\nMay 1993\n-9\nNovember 1996\n-23\nAugust 1999\n-10\nNovember 2007\n-8\nAverage:\n-101⁄2\n-10\nMedian:\n-9\n-91⁄2\n*\nThe minus sign means that this indicator leads the reference turning point\n34\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nAs is the case in other countries, there is a fairly large dispersion in the number of months by which\nthe leading indicator leads the reference turning points of various cycles. Although the composite\nleading and other business cycle indicators provide invaluable information in this regard, a\nreference turning point in the business cycle can only be determined accurately ex post. Various\nother macroeconomic indicators, together with significant economic events and developments\noccurring near a turning point, are subjected to comprehensive analysis to identify the reference\nturning point accurately. Figure B3.1 shows the composite leading business cycle indicator over\nthe officially identified cycle from 1980.\nThe recent relatively consistent upward trend in the composite leading business cycle indicator\nprovides significant evidence that a reference trough in the business cycle should arrive towards\nthe end of 2009 or early 2010. The declining trend in the leading indicator that has persisted since\nApril 2007 appears to have been reversed. The composite leading indicator increased significantly\nin August 2009, the fifth consecutive increase in the indicator since it reached a most recent low\nin March 2009. Seven of the eleven component time series that were available for August 2009\nincreased, while four decreased (Table B3.1).\nCountercyclical monetary and fiscal policy measures have paved the way for the domestic\neconomic recovery, but the ultimate outcome will depend in large measure on the sustainability of\nthe global recovery that is currently under way. South Africa’s business cycle has a relatively low\ncontemporaneous concordance with certain trading-partner growth cycles. However, given the\nsynchronised nature of the current global recession, the resumption of sustainable growth in the\ndomestic economy will be largely determined by a return to sustained global growth and the\nassociated strong rebound in global trade and commodity prices. Encouragingly, the International\nMonetary Fund (IMF) has forecast a reacceleration of global growth to 3,1 per cent in 2010 in the\nOctober 2009 World Economic Outlook.\nReferences\nDu Plessis, S J. 2004. “Reconsidering the business cycle and stabilisation policies in South Africa”.\nPaper prepared for the 9th Annual Conference on Econometric Modelling for Africa, held at the\nUniversity of Cape Town, 30 June – 2 July. Available online at www.sciencedirect.com.\nVenter, J C. 2007. “Revisions to the composite leading and coincident business cycle indicators”.\nQuarterly Bulletin, June. Pretoria: South African Reserve Bank.\nVenter, J C. 2009. “Business cycles in South Africa during the period 1999 to 2007”. Quarterly\nBulletin, September. Pretoria: South African Reserve Bank.\nIndex: 2000 = 100\n1980\n1985\n1990\n1995\n2000\n2005\n2009\nFigure B3.1 \nComposite leading business cycle indicator\n60\n80\n100\n120\n140\nDownward phases of business cycle\nAs far as the quarterly analysis of manufacturing activity is concerned, the third quarter\n2009 BER survey revealed that the net majority of respondents rating current business\nconditions worse than those of a year ago decreased from 70 per cent to 53 per cent, with\n20 per cent of respondents expecting business conditions to improve in 12 months’ time.\nOn the supply side, the pace of contraction in production volumes is slowing, while fixed\ninvestment is expected to increase in a year’s time. On the demand side, net majorities\nreporting lower sales and order volumes declined from 51 per cent to 47 per cent.\nThe seasonally adjusted Kagiso PMI, a barometer of domestic manufacturing activity,\nincreased from 45,9 index points in September to 47,6 index points in October 2009.\nThe October results showed continued signs of increased activity in the domestic\nmanufacturing sector, even though the index has not yet reached the break-even level\nof 50. Both the business activity and the forward-looking new sales orders indices\nincreased, reaching 48,4 and 48,9 index points respectively. After rising uninteruptedly\nfor seven months, the index for expected business conditions declined slightly from \n70,3 points in September to 67,9 index points in October. The backlog of sales orders\nindex increased from 34,4 to 41,6 points, while that of purchasing commitments rose\nfrom 44,3 to 50,0 points. The inventories index decreased moderately to 42,9 in October\nfrom 45,5 points in September 2009. \nThe level of business confidence, measured in terms of the Rand Merchant Bank\n(RMB)/BER Business Confidence Index, declined to its lowest level in a decade, registering\n23 index points in the third quarter of 2009, which was preceded by 26 points in the\nsecond quarter of 2009 (Figure 17). The index measures business confidence on a scale\nof 0 to 100, with 0 indicating an extreme lack of confidence, 50 neutrality and 100 extreme\nconfidence. The decline in business confidence occurred due to declines in all but one of\nthe retail subsectors, with overall confidence decreasing from 47 to 35 index points. On\nthe positive side, business confidence accretion in new vehicle trade occurred for three\nconsecutive quarters, climbing from 12 index points in the second quarter to 19 in the third\nquarter of 2009. By contrast, confidence among wholesalers dropped to 17 points in the\nthird quarter, down from 36 index points in the second quarter of 2009. Although still low,\nmanufacturers’ confidence rose from 11 to 22 index points due to improvements in both\ndomestic and foreign sales volumes. Building contractor confidence changed slightly,\nregistering 24 index points in the third quarter, up from 23 in the second quarter. \nSouth African Reserve Bank\n35\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nPercentage\n1980 82\n84\n86\n88\n90\n92\n94\n96\n98 2000 02\n04\n06\n08\n0\n25\n50\n75\n100\nSources: Rand Merchant Bank and Bureau for Economic Research\nFigure 17 RMB/BER Business Confidence Index\nNet positive\nNet negative\n36\nThe FNB Building Confidence Index, which measures the business confidence of all\nthe major role players and suppliers involved in the building industry, rose marginally\nfrom an index value of 30 in the second quarter to 32 in the third quarter of 2009.\nThree out of six sub-components of the index registered increases. Improvements in\nconfidence levels were recorded among building contractors (+1), manufacturers\n(+23) and retailers of building materials (+13). Declines occurred in the case of\narchitects (-7), quantity surveyors (-4) and building sub-contractors (-15). However,\nsurvey respondents do not expect business conditions to deteriorate significantly in\nthe fourth quarter of 2009.\nDuring the third quarter of 2009 all consumer confidence sub-indices of the the\nFNB/BER Consumer Confidence Index deteriorated. The economic performance sub-\ncomponent saw the largest decline, with the index falling by 6 index points to +11 during\nthe same quarter. The net percentage of consumers expecting their own finances to\nimprove declined by two index points, from +17 to +15 during the third quarter of 2009,\nwhile the net percentage of consumers rating the present as an appropriate time to buy\ndurable goods declined by two index points, from -21 to -23.\nIndicators of inflation expectations\nEstimates of inflation expectations for the forecast period from 2009 to 2011 obtained\nfrom the BER survey conducted during the third quarter of 2009 show that average\nannual CPI inflation is expected to decline over the forecast years, although it is\nexpected to remain above the upper limit of the CPI inflation target range. Inflation\nexpectations in the third quarter are lower at all horizons than those surveyed in the\npreceding quarter. As depicted in Figure 18, the average CPI inflation expectation for\n2009 is 8,2 per cent, and 7,5 per cent for 2010 and 2011. Among the groups surveyed,\nonly the financial analysts expect CPI inflation to fall within the target range during 2010\nand 2011. By contrast, business and labour expect CPI inflation to exceed the upper\nend of the target range by at least 2,2 percentage points. \nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nAnnual averages, per cent\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\n10\n2009\n2010\n2011\nFigure 18 BER surveys of headline CPI inflation expectations\n8,3\n8,7\n8,2\n8,0\n8,1\n7,8\n7,9\n7,5\n7,5\nSurvey conducted during 2009:\n \n1st qr\n \n2nd qr\n \n3rd qr\nSource: Bureau for Economic Research, Stellenbosch University \nThe October 2009 Reuters survey of long-term forecasts for the South African economy,\nwhich surveys a group of financial market analysts, reports that targeted CPI inflation is\nexpected to fall within the official target range of 3 to 6 per cent from the second quarter\nof 2010 and is expected to stay within the target range until the end of the forecast\nperiod in 2011 (Table 11). It is expected that CPI inflation will average 7,2 per cent in\n2009, decline to 5,8 per cent in 2010, and record 5,9 per cent in 2011. \nTable 11\nReuters survey of CPI forecasts: October 2009*\nPer cent\n2009\n2010\n2011\n1. Mean..................................................................\n(7,2)\n7,2\n(5,7)\n5,8\n(5,6)\n5,9\n2. Median ..............................................................\n(7,2)\n7,2\n(5,8)\n5,8\n(5,5)\n5,7\n3. Highest ..............................................................\n(7,4)\n7,3\n(6,4)\n7,5\n(6,6)\n7,0\n4. Lowest ..............................................................\n(7,0)\n7,0\n(4,5)\n4,8\n(4,6)\n4,6\nNumber of forecasters..............................................\n(20)\n19\n(20)\n19\n(17)\n17\n*\nSeptember 2009 survey results in parentheses\nSource: Reuters\nInflation expectations as derived from break-even inflation rates, measured as the\ndifference between the yields on South African CPI inflation-linked bonds and\nconventional nominal bonds of similar maturity, initially trended somewhat higher from the\nmiddle of April 2009 to mid-July, rising to levels just exceeding the upper limit of the\ninflation target range. The upward momentum was mainly the result of rising yields on\nconventional bonds. Subsequently, break-even inflation over the different maturities\nconsolidated at lower levels as inflation prospects improved. On 4 November 2009 break-\neven inflation in the four-year maturity range stood at 6,24 per cent, while that over \n14 years indicated expectations of 5,77 per cent. The slight widening of the gap between\nshort- and longer-term break-even inflation rates suggests that market participants have\nslightly better inflation expectations over the long term than over the short term. \nSouth African Reserve Bank\n37\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nPercentage points\n2006\n2007\nFigure 19 Break-even inflation rates\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\n10\n \nSpread between R189 and R206 bonds (4-year maturity)\n \nSpread between R197 and R186 bonds (14-year maturity)\n2008\n2009\n38\nThe South African Reserve Bank inflation forecast\nThe most recent projections of the Bank’s quarterly inflation forecasting model,\npresented to the MPC meeting on 16 and 17 November 2009, are reproduced in the\nform of a fan chart in Figure 20. According to these projections, the targeted inflation\nrate is expected to continue to trend downwards, moving below the upper level of the\ninflation target range in the second quarter of 2010 and remaining within the target range\nfor the remainder of the forecast period. \nThe central projection, conditional on an unchanged repurchase rate, is for the average\nquarterly CPI inflation rate to decelerate further to 6,1 per cent in the fourth quarter of\n2009, then increase marginally in the first quarter of 2010, before moving below the\nupper level of the inflation target range in the second quarter of 2010. It is then expected\nto remain within the inflation target range, fluctuating between 5,3 per cent and 5,9 per\ncent, until the end of the forecast period in the fourth quarter of 2011. The projections\nfor 2010 and 2011 are slightly higher than those presented to the previous MPC meeting\nin October 2009. \nMovements in oil prices, commodity prices, electricity prices and the exchange rate of\nthe rand that differ from those assumed in the model will impact on the central\nprojection, with alternative scenarios for movements in these variables generating more\noptimistic or pessimistic outcomes for targeted inflation. The forecast makes provision\nfor electricity price increases of 25 per cent per annum for the next two years, which is\nbelow the 45 per cent per annum proposed by Eskom. On balance, there is deemed to\nbe a neutral risk to the forecast of targeted inflation in Figure 20.\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nPer cent\n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\nFigure 20 Targeted inflation* forecast\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n* CPIX for metropolitan and other urban areas until the end of 2008; CPI for all urban\n areas thereafter\nNote:\nThe fan chart uses confidence bands to depict varying degrees of\ncertainty. The darkest band of the chart covers the most likely 10 per cent\nof probable outcomes foreseen for inflation, including the central\nprojection. Each successive band, shaded slightly lighter and added on\neither side of the central band, adds a further 10 per cent to the probability,\nuntil the whole shaded area depicts a 90 per cent confidence interval (see\nBox 4 “Understanding the fan chart” on p. 27 of the March 2001 Monetary\nPolicy Review).\nAssessment and conclusion\nThere are positive signs that the worst of the global recession may be over. A number of\nindustrialised economies have experienced positive growth in the third quarter of 2009,\nwhile growth in some emerging market economies has been robust. The recovery is not\nexpected to be smooth and even across countries and regions, and a number of risks\nand concerns persist. While the global downturn was deep, the duration was probably\nshorter than initially feared at the height of the financial crisis. Part of the reason was the\ndecisive intervention undertaken by governments in the form of significant monetary and\nfiscal stimuli. However, these actions will have to be reversed at some point, and the\nnature and timing of these exit strategies could impact on the speed and extent of the\nrecovery. There are also concerns that while global financial markets have become less\nrestrictive, it is not clear that the financial markets and banking systems, particularly in\nthe industrialised countries, have dealt fully with the toxic assets that were at the root of\nthe crisis. Furthermore, the global recovery will be dependent to a certain extent on the\nrecovery of consumption expenditure in the advanced economies. The housing market\nin the US is still under pressure, and this may constrain consumption expenditure as\nhouseholds attempt to rebuild their impaired balance sheets.\nThe recovery in the South African economy appears to be lagging that of the global\neconomy. Nevertheless, there are convincing signs that the low point of the current\ngrowth cycle has been reached and that positive growth will resume by the fourth\nquarter of this year. The global recovery has already been reflected in an improved export\nperformance in the past months. However, the domestic recovery is expected to be\nhesitant, driven by the inventory cycle and fixed investment projects. Consumption\nexpenditure is expected to take a while longer to recover. \nThe global inflation environment remains benign. The relatively wide output gaps and\nlower commodity prices have contributed to this outcome. Domestic inflation has also\nresponded to the weak demand conditions, and the inflation rate has reached a level\nmarginally above the inflation target range. This has allowed for a significant \n500 basis point reduction in the repurchase rate since December 2008. By adopting a\nforward-looking flexible approach, the MPC was able to provide some stimulus to the\nslowing economy, while maintaining the focus on its price stability objective. Even\nthough some risks to the inflation outlook remain, the current monetary policy stance\nis deemed adequate to moderate inflation further to within the target range, while\nsimultaneously allowing for the resumption of a positive growth trajectory. \nSouth African Reserve Bank\n39\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\n40\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n28 May 2009\nIssued by Mr T T Mboweni, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, at a meeting\nof the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) in Pretoria\nIntroduction\nThe global downturn continues to have a negative impact on the domestic economy,\nwhich experienced two consecutive quarters of contraction. The significant widening of\nthe domestic output gap has added further downside risk to the inflation outlook. The\ndownward trend in inflation is expected to continue, despite inflation being subject to\nsome inertia in the near term.\nDomestic economic developments will be influenced to a large degree by the pace and\nmagnitude of the recovery in the global economy. There are tentative signs that the\nglobal economy may have seen the worst of the downturn, but the recovery is expected\nto be slow and protracted.\nRecent developments in inflation\nThe year-on-year inflation rate as measured by the consumer price index (CPI) for all\nurban areas declined from 8,5 per cent in March 2009 to 8,4 per cent in April. The prices\nof food and non-alcoholic beverages, which increased at a year-on-year rate of 13,7 per\ncent, contributed 2,1 percentage points to the inflation outcome. Housing and utilities\ncontributed 1,8 percentage points. This category includes electricity and other fuels,\nwhich increased by 29,4 per cent. Petrol prices declined by 17,5 per cent, while public\ntransport prices increased by 15,1 per cent.\nThe producer price index continued its downward trend in April when it increased at a\nyear-on-year rate of 2,9 per cent. Food price pressures moderated further with\nmanufactured food price inflation declining to 8,4 per cent, compared with 9,4 per cent\nin March. Prices of agricultural products increased by 2,2 per cent.\nThe outlook for inflation\nThe most recent CPI inflation forecast of the Bank shows a relatively unchanged\noutcome for the near-term as compared with that presented to the previous meeting of\nthe Monetary Policy Committee. Over the longer term, there appears to be a moderate\nimprovement. This forecast is similar to the Reuters consensus forecast of private\nanalysts who expect inflation to average 6,9 per cent and 5,7 per cent in 2009 and \n2010 respectively.\nThe main upside risk to the inflation outlook comes from cost-push pressures, in particular\nfrom electricity price increases. Eskom has applied to the National Energy Regulator of\nSouth Africa (NERSA) for a 34 per cent interim increase in electricity tariffs, but there is still\nuncertainty about the final adjustment. A number of municipalities have already budgeted\nfor significant electricity price increases in anticipation of higher Eskom tariffs.\nIn line with the less-negative global outlook, there has been a moderate recovery in\ninternational oil prices. North Sea Brent crude oil has been trading at prices of around\nUS$60 per barrel during the past days, compared with an average of around US$50 per\nbarrel during April. These developments may result in a moderate increase in the\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\ndomestic petrol price in June. The impact of the higher international prices on domestic\npetrol prices has been partly offset by exchange rate movements during the month. \nFood price inflation remains well above average inflation, and has been lagging the\nfavourable developments at the producer price level and in the spot prices of agricultural\ncommodities. Food price inflation measured 17,9 per cent in August 2008 and has been\nmoderating persistently, but slowly, since then. \nIn the first quarter of 2009 gross domestic product (GDP) contracted at a quarter-on-\nquarter annualised rate of 6,4 per cent, with mining and quarrying declining by 32,8 per\ncent. The manufacturing sector, which contracted at an annualised rate of 22,1 per cent,\nwas the largest contributor to the negative GDP outcome. The weak manufacturing\nperformance was also reflected in the utilisation of production capacity in the\nmanufacturing sector, which declined from 82 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2008 to\n79 per cent in the first quarter of 2009. \nThe GDP contraction was broad based, with general government services, personal\nservices and construction being the only sectors that exhibited positive growth. Civil\nconstruction is expected to remain strong as the infrastructure programme proceeds.\nHowever, other parts of construction are expected to remain under pressure as the value\nof new building plans passed for both residential and non-residential construction declined\nby 13,4 per cent in the first quarter of this year compared with the preceding quarter.\nRecent high-frequency indicators suggest that the negative trend in GDP growth is likely\nto continue during the second quarter of 2009, although at a more moderate pace of\ncontraction. Most analysts expect positive, but relatively low, growth in the final half of this\nyear. The composite leading and coincident business cycle indicators of the South African\nReserve Bank (the Bank) indicate continued weakness in the economy in 2009. In March\n2009 the leading indicator declined by 15,1 per cent; the largest year-on-year decline on\nrecord. The composite indicator declined at a year-on-year rate of 9,4 per cent in February.\nThe Investec Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) declined further to 35,6 index points in\nApril. However, expectations of business conditions six months ahead showed some\nimprovement.\nDomestic demand conditions remain subdued. Real wholesale trade sales declined by\n5,9 per cent on a year-on-year basis in March 2009 and by 1,8 per cent on a month-on-\nmonth basis. Real retail sales recorded a 5,3 per cent year-on-year decline and a 1,9 per\ncent month-on-month decline in March. Total new vehicle sales declined at a year-on-\nyear rate of 44 per cent in April, with commercial vehicle sales declining by 51 per cent.\nVehicle exports were 31 per cent lower in April compared with the previous month.\nHousehold consumption expenditure is expected to remain constrained by negative\nwealth effects and tight credit conditions. The various house price indices show that\nhouse prices have been falling in recent months. Although the All-Share Index on the\nJSE Limited has recovered somewhat since its recent lows, it is still significantly lower\nthan the levels prevailing during 2008. Domestic credit extension continues to reflect\nthe lower demand for credit, as well as the wider spreads and more stringent credit\ncriteria being applied by banks with respect to loans to both households and\ncompanies. Year-on-year growth in total loans and advances to the private sector\ndeclined to 6,6 per cent in April. The rate of growth of instalment sale credit and leasing\nfinance declined by 0,1 per cent, reflecting the weak demand for durable goods.\nExtension of bank overdrafts contracted by 6,8 per cent, while credit card advances\nincreased marginally.\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n41\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\n42\nThere are tentative signs that the downturn in the global economy may be bottoming out\nas financial market conditions appear to have become less restrictive. However, there\nare as yet few convincing indications that the recovery will be quick. At this stage it\nappears that a protracted period of slow, below-potential growth is most likely, with\nmost analysts predicting some recovery later this year or early next year. Global inflation\npressures remain subdued and have declined in a number of economies.\nSince the beginning of the year the rand has appreciated by around 13 per cent on a\ntrade-weighted basis. While the rand, along with other currencies, remains vulnerable to\nfurther possible bouts of risk aversion, the risk to the inflation outlook has been reduced\nby the relative strength of the rand.\nMonetary policy stance\nThe evidence that was presented to the MPC suggests that the output gap has widened\nfurther. This is expected to contribute to an improved inflation outlook, notwithstanding\nsome current inflation inertia. Accordingly, the MPC has decided to reduce the repurchase\nrate by 100 basis points to 7,5 per cent per annum with effect from 29 May 2009.\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n25 June 2009\nIssued by Mr T T Mboweni, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, at a meeting\nof the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) in Pretoria\nIntroduction\nThe domestic economy continues to show signs of stress in the wake of the global\neconomic downturn. Output growth remains negative, while trends in household\nconsumption expenditure have continued to deteriorate. There are, however, signs that\nthe downturn, both globally and domestically, may be nearing the lower turning point,\nbut the recovery is expected to be slow and protracted.\nThe inflation rate has continued its downward trend, which has been constrained by\nrelatively sticky services price inflation. While the widening output gap and weak\ndomestic demand pose a downside risk to the inflation outlook, these risks are\nincreasingly being offset by various cost-push and exogenous factors that are impacting\non the economy, as well as by deteriorating inflation expectations.\nRecent developments in inflation\nThe year-on-year inflation rate as measured by the consumer price index (CPI) for all\nurban areas declined from 8,4 per cent in April 2009 to 8,0 per cent in May. Food price\ninflation declined from 13,6 per cent in April to 12,1 per cent in May, but remains the\nmain contributor to the inflation outcome, having contributed 1,9 percentage points.\nHousing and utilities inflation contributed 1,8 percentage points, mainly as a result of the\n29,6 per cent increase in electricity prices and the 15,1 per cent increase in the cost of\nmaintenance and repairs. Services price inflation has remained unchanged at 8,4 per\ncent since March 2009, while goods price inflation declined from 8,7 per cent to 7,6 per\ncent over the same period.\nProducer prices declined at a year-on-year rate of 3 per cent in May 2009. Nonetheless,\nagricultural product prices increased at a year-on-year rate of 1,5 per cent, while\nmanufactured food product prices increased by 6,2 per cent.\nThe outlook for inflation\nThe most recent CPI inflation forecast by the staff of the South African Reserve Bank (the\nBank) shows that CPI inflation is still expected to continue its moderate downward trend,\nto enter the target range during the second quarter of 2010, and to remain within the\ntarget range for the rest of the forecast period ending 2011. A more favourable exchange\nrate assumption has been offset by higher-than-expected petrol price increases and\ninflation outcomes.\nCPI inflation expectations, as measured by the Bureau for Economic Research (BER) at\nStellenbosch University deteriorated during the second quarter of 2009. Average\ninflation expectations for 2009 increased from 8,3 per cent in the first quarter to 8,7 per\ncent in the second quarter, mainly as a result of upward revisions by financial analysts.\nWhile a downward trend for the subsequent two years remains, only the financial\nanalysts predict inflation to be within the inflation target range in the coming two years.\nOverall, CPI inflation is expected to average 8,1 per cent and 7,9 per cent in 2010 and\n2011 respectively.\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n43\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\n44\nInflation expectations, as measured by the yield differential between conventional and\ninflation-linked bonds, also showed a moderate increase over the past weeks. However,\nthe break-even rate has generally remained within the inflation target range over the\nshort- to medium-term maturities.\nThe growth prospects for the economy remain a downside risk to the inflation outlook.\nThe output gap, which is the difference between actual and potential output growth, has\nwidened over the past few quarters. Following the 6,4 per cent contraction of gross\ndomestic product (GDP) in the first quarter of 2009, the most recent high frequency data\nand indicators suggest that the negative trend in GDP growth is likely to have continued\nduring the second quarter of 2009. Mining production declined at a year-on-year rate of\n10,6 per cent in April, but increased by 7,2 per cent on a month-on-month basis. Total\nmanufacturing production declined by 3,3 per cent in April 2009, compared with the\nprevious month, and by 21,6 per cent on a year-on-year basis. \nThe composite leading indicator as compiled by the staff of the Bank increased slightly\nin April. The indicator suggests that the lower turning point in the cycle could be reached\nlater in the year. The Kagiso Securities/Bureau for Economic Research Purchasing\nManagers’ Index remains at low levels, but recorded a slight increase in May, also\nindicating an expectation that the economy may be approaching its lower turning point.\nThis is consistent with the Rand Merchant Bank/Bureau for Economic Research\nBusiness Confidence Indicator, which declined further in the second quarter, but the rate\nof decline has slowed. \nThe domestic growth prospects will be determined, to an important degree, by\ninternational developments. The global downturn has resulted in a significant decline in\nSouth Africa’s exports in the first quarter of 2009, leading to a wider deficit on the current\naccount of the balance of payments compared with the previous quarter. The outlook\nfor the global economy remains uncertain, but there is a general sense of cautious\noptimism that the lower turning point of the cycle might have been reached. The general\nview appears to be that the global economy will remain under pressure for most of this\nyear before beginning a slow recovery. Global inflation remains well contained.\nGrowth in domestic expenditure has remained subdued, with real domestic final\ndemand contracting by 1,5 per cent in the first quarter of 2009. Real final consumption\nexpenditure by households declined at a quarter-on-quarter annualised rate of 4,9 per\ncent. Contractions in consumption were experienced in all broad categories of goods,\nbut there was a rebound in the growth of expenditure on services. Growth in real gross\nfixed capital formation moderated to 2,6 per cent during the same period. The main\ncontributor to the 2,2 per cent increase in gross domestic expenditure was final\nconsumption expenditure by general government, which increased by 5,9 per cent.\nHousehold consumption expenditure appears to have remained under pressure in the\nsecond quarter of 2009. In April, real retail trade sales declined by 1,1 per cent\ncompared with the previous month, and by 6,7 per cent on a year-on-year basis. Real\nwholesale trade sales increased by 0,7 per cent on a month-on-month basis, but\ndeclined by 15,1 per cent on a year-on-year basis. While new vehicle sales in May\nincreased marginally compared with the previous month, the year-on-year decline\nmeasured 32,9 per cent. \nHousehold consumption expenditure is expected to remain constrained by tighter credit\ncriteria of banks and negative wealth effects. The various house price indicators all show\nthat house prices have continued to decline. The All-Share Index on the JSE Limited has\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nrecovered somewhat from its lows in March, but is still substantially below the levels\nrecorded during the first half of 2008.\nGrowth in expenditure may also be affected negatively by the adverse trends in employment\ngrowth. According to the Quarterly Employment Survey of Statistics South Africa, 179 000\njobs were lost in the formal non-agricultural sector during the first quarter of 2009.\nThe exchange rate of the rand has fluctuated against the US dollar between a range of\nabout R7,85 and R8,25 since the previous meeting of the MPC. As global risk aversion\nhas declined, a number of emerging-market economy currencies have appreciated and\nsince the beginning of the year, the rand has appreciated by approximately 15 per cent\non a trade-weighted basis. \nAs noted above, food price inflation remains the main contributor to the inflation\noutcome, but the downward trend has continued, although at a slow pace. The spot\nprice of yellow maize has declined by about 40 per cent since June 2008, and is now\nat levels last seen in the final quarter of 2006. \nThe main upside risk to the inflation outlook comes from cost-push pressures, particularly\nfrom electricity price increases and other administered prices, as well as nominal wage\nincreases, which have generally been in excess of inflation. In the first quarter of 2009 the\nincrease in unit labour cost over four quarters amounted to 11,2 per cent. \nThe international oil price has re-emerged as a potential upside risk to the inflation outlook.\nThe price of North Sea Brent crude oil reached levels in excess of US$70 per barrel in the\npast week, before declining to current levels of around US$67 per barrel. As a result of the\nhigher international product prices, a further petrol price increase is likely in July.\nMonetary policy stance\nThe MPC has decided to keep the repurchase rate unchanged at 7,5 per cent per\nannum. This decision is based on the economic and inflation analysis provided above.\nThe committee is fully cognisant of the fact that there has been significant monetary\naccommodation since December 2008. The MPC remains fully committed to its\nmandate of achieving and maintaining price stability.\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n45\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\n46\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n13 August 2009\nIssued by Mr T T Mboweni, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, at a meeting\nof the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) in Pretoria\nIntroduction\nThere are encouraging signs that the global slowdown may have reached its lower\nturning point, although the speed and extent of the recovery are still subject to a high\ndegree of uncertainty. The South African economy appears to be lagging behind these\ninternational developments and it is likely that the domestic economy contracted in the\nsecond quarter of this year. The domestic economy remains constrained by weak global\nand domestic demand.\nTargeted inflation declined materially in June, but is still outside the inflation target range.\nExpectations are that it will take some time before inflation returns to within the target\nrange on a sustainable basis. Cost-push pressures appear to be the main source of\nupside risk to the inflation outlook.\nRecent developments in inflation\nThe year-on-year inflation rate as measured by the consumer price index (CPI) for all\nurban areas declined from 8,0 per cent in May 2009 to 6,9 per cent in June. The main\ncontributors to the inflation outcome were food and non-alcoholic beverages, housing\nand utilities, and miscellaneous goods and services. Each of these categories\ncontributed 1,6 percentage points to CPI inflation. Petrol prices declined at a year-on-\nyear rate of 25 per cent, despite the 17 cents per litre increase in the petrol price in June.\nAdministered price inflation, excluding petrol prices, measured 9,1 per cent in June, with\nelectricity prices increasing by 28,6 per cent.\nProducer prices declined at a year-on-year rate of 4,1 per cent in June, compared with\na decline of 3,0 per cent in May. Prices of mining and chemical products were the main\ncontributors to this trend, but there was also further moderation in food price inflation.\nPrices of agricultural products declined at a year-on-year rate of 1,7 per cent, while\nprices of manufactured food products increased at a rate of 3,7 per cent, compared with\na rate of 6,2 per cent in the previous month.\nThe outlook for inflation\nThe most recent CPI inflation forecast by the staff of the South African Reserve Bank\nremained more or less unchanged compared with the previous forecast. However, CPI\ninflation is still expected to continue its moderate downward trend, to enter the target\nrange during the second quarter of 2010 and to remain within the target range for the\nrest of the forecast period ending in 2011. \nThese projections are broadly in line with the Reuters consensus survey of private-sector\nanalysts. The most recent survey for July indicates that analysts expect inflation to decline\nto within the inflation target range during the second quarter of 2010, and to average \n5,8 per cent and 5,6 per cent in 2010 and 2011 respectively. Expectations derived from\nthe yield differential between conventional government bonds and inflation-linked bonds\nhave remained within the inflation target range over the short- to medium-term maturities.\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nThe outlook for the international economy appears to have improved. The cautious\noptimism that the bottom of the cycle may have been reached continues to prevail,\nalthough some analysts still doubt the strength and sustainability of this recovery. The\nrecovery is also not expected to be uniform across countries or regions. According to the\nJuly 2009 World Economic Outlook of the IMF, global output is expected to contract by\n1,4 per cent in 2009 before recovering to 2,5 per cent in 2010. The developed economies\nare expected to grow by 0,6 per cent, while growth in emerging economies is expected\nto average 4,7 per cent in 2010. At this stage, global inflation appears to be under control\ndespite the significant monetary accommodation in a number of advanced economies.\nDomestic economic conditions remain subdued amid indications that the economy\ncontracted further in the second quarter of 2009, although at a slower rate of contraction\nthan in the previous quarter. Manufacturing production declined at a year-on-year rate of\n17,1 per cent in June, and by 3 per cent in the three months to June 2009 compared\nwith the previous three months. The utilisation of production capacity in manufacturing in\nMay 2009 was 78 per cent; down from 84,4 per cent a year ago. The Kagiso/Bureau for\nEconomic Research Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) declined in July, indicating that the\ndifficult conditions in the manufacturing sector are likely to persist. However, according to\nthe PMI, expectations of business conditions six months ahead continued to improve.\nSimilarly, the Bank’s composite leading business cycle indicator increased for a second\nconsecutive month in May 2009, indicating the possibility of a recovery later in the year. \nHousehold consumption expenditure growth continued to contract during the past few\nmonths. New vehicle sales declined again in July, with total vehicle sales declining by \n4,5 per cent in July compared with the previous month. Total vehicle exports declined by\n12 per cent on a month-on-month basis, and by 60,3 per cent on a year-on-year basis.\nReal retail trade sales contracted at a seasonally adjusted rate of 3,6 per cent in the\nsecond quarter of 2009 compared with the first quarter. On a year-on-year basis, retail\nsales declined by 6,7 per cent in June. The First National Bank/Bureau for Economic\nResearch Consumer Confidence Index increased moderately in the second quarter of\n2009, although it is still at low levels.\nThe weak state of domestic demand is reflected in the rate of credit extension to the\nprivate sector. Year-on-year growth in total loans and advances of banks to the private\nsector declined from 6,3 per cent in April 2009 to 2,2 per cent in June. On a quarter-on-\nquarter basis, negative growth of 1,8 per cent was measured in the second quarter of\n2009. Year-on-year growth in mortgage advances moderated to 8,2 per cent in June,\nwhile instalment sales credit and leasing finance, as well as other loans and advances,\nexperienced negative year-on-year growth. These declines are due, in part, to stricter\nlending criteria being applied by banks. \nThe impact of negative wealth effects on domestic consumption expenditure may have\ndissipated somewhat with the partial recovery of equity prices in the local and global\nmarkets. Since the beginning of the year, the All-Share Index on the JSE Limited has\nincreased by about 14 per cent. However, the index is still significantly below the levels\nreached in 2008. The various house price indices all show that house prices continued\nto decline in July, but the pace of decline appears to be moderating.\nThe exchange rate of the rand has remained relatively volatile, but within a range that\nhas prevailed since May 2009 with the decline in global risk aversion. The exchange rate\nof the rand has fluctuated between approximately R7,68 to the US dollar and R8,32 to\nthe US dollar since the previous meeting of the MPC. Since the beginning of the year,\nthe nominal effective exchange rate of the rand has appreciated by about 13 per cent.\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n47\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\n48\nAs noted above, food price developments continue to be a major factor in the overall\ninflation outcomes. After months of relative stickiness, food price inflation at the\nconsumer price level appears to be responding to the favourable trends at the producer\nprice level. In June 2009 food price inflation declined to 9,8 per cent compared with a\nrate of 16,1 per cent in January 2009. \nThe main upside risks to the inflation outlook emanate from cost-push pressures. The\ninternational oil price has continued its stronger upward trend, as the outlook for the\nglobal economy improves. The price of North Sea Brent crude oil has remained above\nUS$70 per barrel for most of the period since the previous meeting. Although domestic\npetrol prices were reduced by 21 cents per litre in July, the current under-recovery\nindicates that a further petrol price increase is likely in August. \nOther adverse cost pressures include administered price increases, particularly\nelectricity prices, and wage increases that have generally been in excess of inflation.\nAccording to Andrew Levy Employment publications, wage settlements in the first six\nmonths of 2009 averaged 9,7 per cent. In the first quarter of 2009 the increase in unit\nlabour cost over four quarters amounted to 11,2 per cent. \nMonetary policy stance\nThe MPC is of the view that, notwithstanding upside cost pressures, the adverse\neconomic conditions appear to tilt the balance of risks to the inflation outlook towards\nthe downside over the medium term. The MPC has, therefore, decided to reduce the\nrepurchase rate by 50 basis points to 7 per cent per annum with effect from \n14 August 2009.\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n22 September 2009\nIssued by Mr T T Mboweni, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, at a meeting\nof the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) in Pretoria\nIntroduction\nThere are signs that the global economic recovery is under way, but the indications are\nthat the pace of recovery is likely to be slow and uneven, particularly in the industrialised\neconomies where banking sector concerns still persist. Domestic economic growth,\nwhich has been negative in each of the past three quarters, is expected to improve in\nthe coming quarters. However, the domestic recovery is likely to be influenced by global\ngrowth developments and is subject to a relatively high degree of uncertainty. Domestic\ninflation has continued its downward trend, but some risks to the outlook remain.\nRecent developments in inflation\nThe year-on-year inflation rate as measured by the consumer price index (CPI) for all\nurban areas declined to 6,4 per cent in August, compared with 6,7 per cent in July. The\nmain contributors to the inflation outcome were the categories of housing and utilities,\nand miscellaneous goods and services. Food price inflation moderated further, with food\nand alcoholic beverages increasing at a year-on-year rate of 6,8 per cent; down from \n8,3 per cent in July.\nProducer prices have continued their negative trend and declined at a year-on-year rate\nof 3,8 per cent in July, compared with a decline of 4,1 per cent in June. Food price\ninflation at the consumer level can be expected to abate as agricultural product prices\ndeclined at a year-on-year rate of 1,7 per cent, while manufactured food product prices\nincreased at a rate of 0,8 per cent. Upside pressure on producer prices came from\nelectricity prices which increased by 27,4 per cent.\nThe outlook for inflation\nThe CPI inflation forecast by the South African Reserve Bank staff continues to indicate\nthat inflation is likely to return on a sustained basis to within the inflation target range by\nthe second quarter of 2010. CPI inflation is then expected to remain within the inflation\ntarget range for the remainder of the forecast period until the end of 2011. Compared\nwith the previous forecast, the outlook is unchanged for 2009 and 2010, although there\nis a slight improvement for 2011. The exchange rate of the rand has provided downside\npressure, which has more or less offset higher oil price assumptions and higher unit\nlabour costs over the period.\nThe most recent study of inflation expectations undertaken on behalf of the Bank by the\nBureau for Economic Research (BER) at Stellenbosch University indicates that inflation\nexpectations have improved somewhat, but remain, on average, above the upper end\nof the inflation target range. Inflation is expected to average 7,5 per cent in both 2010\nand 2011. This represents declines of 0,6 per cent and 0,4 per cent in these years\nrespectively, compared with the previous survey. Only the financial analysts expect\ninflation to be within the target range in the coming two years. Since the previous\nmeeting of the MPC, the break-even inflation rates, as measured by the yield differential\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n49\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\n50\nbetween conventional government bonds and inflation-linked bonds, declined across all\nmaturities to within the inflation target range.\nOverall, the risks to the inflation outlook appear to be fairly evenly balanced. The main\nupside risks continue to emanate from high increases in some administered prices,\nparticularly electricity prices, and increases in nominal unit labour costs well in excess of\nthe current inflation rate. Nominal unit labour cost increased over four quarters by 9,3 per\ncent in the second quarter of 2009, compared with 11,3 per cent in the previous quarter.\nInternational oil prices, which remain an upside inflation risk factor, have moderated\nslightly since the previous meeting of the MPC and appear to have stabilised around\ncurrent levels of about US$70 per barrel. Domestic petrol prices increased by 36 cents\nper litre in September, but the current over-recovery indicates that this increase may be\noffset, to a large extent, in October, as a result of lower product prices and the recent\nappreciation of the rand. \nGrowth in domestic final demand declined at an annualised rate of 3,5 per cent in the\nsecond quarter of 2009. Household consumption expenditure contracted by 5,8 per\ncent, compared with a decline of 4,8 per cent in the previous quarter. Durable goods\nconsumption was the most affected sub-category, declining by 18,8 per cent. New\nvehicle sales declined at a year-on-year rate of 23 per cent in August, but there are signs\nthat the decline is levelling out. In July real retail and wholesale trade sales contracted at\nyear-on-year rates of 3,8 per cent and 13,8 per cent respectively, although retail sales\nincreased on a month-on-month basis. \nConsumption expenditure is expected to remain constrained by negative wealth effects,\nalthough there has been a marked recovery in the equity markets, which may relieve\nthese effects somewhat. Since the beginning of the year, the all-share index on the JSE\nLimited has increased by about 20 per cent. House prices, however, have continued\ntheir downward trend. The various house price indices, while still indicating negative\nprice trends, show that prices are declining at a slower rate.\nCredit extension to the private sector continued to reflect both the weak household\nconsumption expenditure and the prevailing tighter credit criteria. Twelve-month growth\nin banks’ total loans and advances declined to 2,1 per cent in July. Mortgage advances\ndeclined to a year-on-year rate of growth of 6,4 per cent in July, while instalment sale\ncredit and leasing finance contracted by 3,2 per cent over the same period, as a result of\nsubdued demand for motor vehicles and other durable goods. Other loans and\nadvances, comprising credit card advances, bank overdrafts and general loans, declined\nby 2,0 per cent. Lower levels of credit extension have resulted in a slight decline in\nhousehold debt as a percentage of household disposable income to 76,3 per cent in the\nsecond quarter of 2009. The ratio of debt-service cost to household disposable income\ndeclined from 10,9 per cent in the first quarter to 9,5 per cent in the second quarter.\nDomestic output contracted by 3,0 per cent in the second quarter of 2009, but there\nare early indications that the lower turning point may have been reached. However the\nrecovery is expected to be slow. The South African Reserve Bank composite leading\nindicator increased for the third consecutive month in June and continues to predict a\nrecovery by the end of the year. \nThe rate of contraction in the manufacturing sector also shows signs of slowing down.\nOn a year-on-year basis, manufacturing output declined by 13,7 per cent in July, but it\nincreased at an annualised month-on-month rate of 3,0 per cent. The Kagiso/BER\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nPurchasing Managers Index (PMI) increased in July, although still at levels that indicate\nnegative growth. Mining production increased at a year-on-year rate of 4,8 per cent in\nJuly. However, the real value of all building plans passed declined by 43,2 per cent in\nJuly, with the slowdown in residential building plans being the main contributor. \nThe exchange rate of the rand continues to provide downside pressure on inflation and\nhas appreciated further since the previous meeting of the MPC when it was at a level of\naround R8,10 to the US dollar. Since the beginning of the year, the rand has appreciated\nby 26 per cent against the US dollar, and by 20 per cent on a trade-weighted basis. \nThe global economy appears to be recovering in response to concerted fiscal and\nmonetary packages that have been put in place. A number of industrialised economies\nhave experienced positive growth rates in the second quarter, while others have shown\na moderation in the rate of contraction. Many forecasts for the second half of the year\nand for 2010 have been revised upward, but remain well below pre-crisis levels.\nHowever, there are risks that the recovery may be short-lived should consumer demand\nnot improve further in the industrialised economies. While there have been some\nimprovements in financial market conditions, more still remains to be done. Global\ninflation remains relatively subdued and poses no immediate risk to the domestic\ninflation outlook.\nMonetary policy stance\nThe MPC is of the view that the risks to the inflation outlook appear to be fairly evenly\nbalanced. Given the current policy stance, inflation is expected to continue moderating\nand return to within the inflation target range during the forecast period. Accordingly, the\nMPC has decided to leave the repurchase rate unchanged at 7 per cent per annum.\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n51\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\n52\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n22 October 2009\nIssued by Mr T T Mboweni, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, at a meeting\nof the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) in Pretoria\nIntroduction\nThe prospects for inflation returning to within the inflation target range by the second\nquarter of 2010 remain promising. Domestic demand conditions continue to be\nsubdued and currently do not pose a significant threat to the inflation outlook. Economic\ngrowth is expected to improve in the coming months, but is likely to remain below\npotential for some time. Domestic growth prospects are dependent to an extent on the\nglobal recovery, which appears to be uneven across countries and regions. However,\nthe medium-term inflation outlook has been affected adversely by possible further\nsignificant adjustments to electricity tariffs.\nRecent developments in inflation\nThere has been no publication of consumer price index (CPI) data since the previous\nmeeting of the MPC. The most recent data showed that the year-on-year inflation rate\nas measured by the CPI for all urban areas declined to 6,4 per cent in August, compared\nwith 6,7 per cent in July. The main contributors to the inflation outcome were the\ncategories of housing and utilities, and miscellaneous goods and services. \nProducer prices declined at a year-on-year rate of 4,0 per cent in August, compared\nwith a decline of 3,8 per cent in July. Food price inflation at the producer price level\ncontinues to signal dissipating pressures on food prices at the consumer price level.\nAgricultural product prices declined at a year-on-year rate of 2,0 per cent, while\nmanufactured food product prices increased at a rate of 0,1 per cent. Upside pressure\non producer prices came from electricity prices, which increased by 28,6 per cent.\nThe outlook for inflation\nThe CPI inflation forecast by the South African Reserve Bank staff continues to indicate\nthat inflation is likely to return to within the inflation target range, on a sustained basis,\nby the second quarter of 2010. CPI inflation is then expected to stay within the inflation\ntarget range for the rest of the forecast period until the end of 2011. Compared with the\nprevious forecast, the outlook showed a slight improvement for 2010 and 2011, mainly\nas a result of the changed assumption regarding the rand exchange rate. No adjustment\nhas been made at this stage to the central forecast for possible further increases in\nelectricity tariffs over and above those that are already assumed in the baseline forecast.\nA number of domestic and global factors have contributed to the persistent downward\npressure on inflation. The global economy shows continued signs of improvement, but\nthe recovery is not uniform across regions. The pace of recovery of most of the Asian\neconomies has been higher than that achieved in the main industrialised economies.\nThe timing and speed of the withdrawal of the fiscal and monetary policy stimuli may\nhave a bearing on the nature of the recovery in these economies. Global inflation is\nexpected to be constrained by the relatively weak demand from the industrialised\ncountries, although the US dollar movements may provide some upward pressure to\ncommodity prices.\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nThere are some positive indications that the rate of contraction of the domestic economy\nhas declined and that the economy may emerge from the recession by the end of 2009.\nHowever, the mixed picture from the published data shows that the recovery is likely to\nbe tentative, and the output gap is likely to remain positive for some time. The physical\nvolume of manufacturing output declined at a year-on-year rate of 15,0 per cent in\nAugust and by 2,8 per cent on a month-on-month basis. However, in the three months\nto August, compared with the previous three months, an increase of 0,8 per cent was\nrecorded. The Kagiso/Bureau for Economic Research (BER) Purchasing Managers Index\n(PMI) increased markedly from 39,3 index points in August to 48,0 index points in\nSeptember. The index shows that new sales orders have increased significantly, while\nmanufacturers’ expectations of business conditions six months ahead improved to the\nhighest level since early 2007. \nOther sectoral developments indicate that the physical volume of total mining production\nincreased in the three months to August, but contracted on a month-on-month basis,\nwhile the real value of building plans passed continued to decline. The Rand Merchant\nBank (RMB)/BER Business Confidence Indicator (BCI) declined to a ten-year low in the\nthird quarter of 2009. The tentative nature of the domestic recovery is also reflected in\nthe composite leading business cycle indicator compiled by the South African Reserve\nBank, which declined marginally in July, following three consecutive monthly increases. \nConsumption expenditure by households also remains subdued, with real retail trade\nsales declining at a year-on-year rate of 7,0 per cent in August. In the three months to\nAugust, there was a 1,0 per cent decline, compared with the previous three months.\nWholesale trade sales also declined further in August. Total new vehicle sales are also\nwell below their levels of a year ago. However, there are indications that the negative\ntrend may have reached its lower turning point with zero or slightly positive rates of\nchange being recorded on a month-on-month and quarter-on-quarter basis. The First\nNational Bank (FNB)/BER consumer confidence index declined in the third quarter of\n2009 to a relatively neutral confidence level.\nCredit extension to the private sector continued to reflect both the weak household\nconsumption expenditure and the prevailing tighter credit criteria. The Ernst & Young\nFinancial Services Index indicates that credit standards applied by retail banks to loan\napplications continued to tighten in the third quarter of 2009, but at significantly lower\nlevels. Twelve-month growth in banks’ total loans and advances declined to 0,8 per cent\nin August 2009. Mortgage advances increased by 5,6 per cent in August, while\ninstalment sale credit and leasing finance contracted by 4,2 per cent. Negative year-on-\nyear growth rates were also recorded in credit card advances, bank overdrafts and\ngeneral loans.\nThere has been some recovery in asset prices in recent months, but wealth effects do\nnot appear to be posing an immediate threat to the inflation outlook. Domestic equity\nprices have increased markedly since March, but are still significantly below the levels\nreached in May 2008. The various house price indices indicate a moderation in the rate\nof decline in house prices.\nThe exchange rate of the rand continues to provide downside pressure on inflation and\nis currently trading at levels against the US dollar, similar to those prevailing at the time\nof the previous MPC meeting. During the past month the rand traded in a range of\naround R7,20 and R7,79 against the US dollar. The exchange rate of the rand has\nappreciated by 28 per cent against the US dollar since the beginning of 2009 and by \n20 per cent on a trade-weighted basis. \nSouth African Reserve Bank\n53\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\n54\nThe international oil price has increased in the past week, but does not pose an\nimmediate threat to the inflation outlook. Having averaged around US$70 per barrel for\na number of weeks, the price of North Sea Brent crude oil increased to current levels of\naround US$76 per barrel, mainly as a result of the weaker US dollar and improved global\ngrowth prospects. In October the domestic price of 95 octane petrol was reduced by\n40 cents per litre as a result of both lower product prices and an appreciated rand\nexchange rate. \nThe main risks to the inflation outlook emanate from cost pressures in the economy. The\ntrend of wage settlements still poses an upside risk to the inflation outlook. However,\nthere appears to be some evidence that nominal wage increases are moderating,\nalthough increases have generally been above the inflation rate. According to Andrew\nLevy Employment Publications, the average level of wage settlements amounted to \n9,4 per cent in the first nine months of 2009 compared with 9,6 per cent in the\ncorresponding period of 2008. These increases are consistent with the Quarterly\nEmployment Survey (QES) of Statistics South Africa, which reported that growth in\naverage nominal remuneration per worker in the formal non-agricultural sector of the\neconomy moderated from 11,5 per cent in the first quarter of 2009 to 8,7 per cent in\nthe second quarter. Unit labour cost increases declined from 11,3 per cent in the first\nquarter to 9,3 per cent in the second quarter.\nThe substantial electricity tariff increases requested by Eskom are seen to be the main\nlonger-term threat to the inflation outlook. Eskom has requested a trebling of the current\nelectricity tariffs over the next three years, and the National Energy Regulator of South\nAfrica (NERSA) is expected to make a decision in February 2010. \nMonetary policy stance\nThe MPC is of the view that overall the risks to the inflation outlook have not changed\nmarkedly since the previous meeting. Accordingly, the MPC has decided to leave the\nrepurchase rate unchanged at 7,0 per cent per annum. The MPC will continue to\nmonitor economic and financial developments, and will not hesitate to adjust the\nmonetary policy stance should the risks to the inflation outlook change materially.\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n17 November 2009\nIssued by Ms G Marcus, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, at a meeting\nof the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) in Pretoria\nIntroduction\nThere are signs that the domestic economy will continue on its recovery path, but\neconomic growth is expected to remain below potential for some time and dependent\nto some extent on the pace of the global recovery, which still appears to be fragile and\nuneven across regions. Economic growth is also expected to be constrained by\nsubdued domestic consumption expenditure. The domestic outlook for inflation remains\nfavourable as a result of weak demand pressures and the main threat to the inflation\noutlook emanates from possible electricity price increases.\nRecent developments in inflation\nThe year-on-year inflation rate as measured by the consumer price index (CPI) for all\nurban areas declined from 6,4 per cent in August 2009 to 6,1 per cent in September.\nThe single biggest contributor to the inflation outcome was the category of housing and\nutilities which accounted for 1,7 percentage points. This was mainly due to the electricity\ncomponent which increased at a year-on-year rate of 29,1 per cent. Food price inflation\ncontinued to moderate and at 4,9 per cent is now exerting downward pressure on\noverall inflation. Goods price inflation measured 4,9 per cent, compared with services\nprice inflation of 7,8 per cent. \nProducer prices declined for the fifth successive month in September, with the headline\nproducer price inflation measuring -3,7 per cent. Most categories in the index exhibited\nlow or negative year-on-year rates of inflation, apart from electricity, gas and water, and\ntobacco products.\nThe outlook for inflation\nThe CPI inflation forecast by the South African Reserve Bank (the Bank) continues to indicate\nthat inflation is likely to return to within the inflation target range, on a sustained basis, by the\nsecond quarter of 2010. There may, however, be temporary declines to within the target\nrange before then. CPI inflation is expected to remain within the inflation target range until the\nend of the forecast period in the final quarter of 2011, when it is forecast to average 5,5 per\ncent. Given the current uncertainty related to Eskom’s tariff application to the National Energy\nRegulator of South Africa (NERSA), the forecast does not make provision for the higher\nincreases requested by Eskom, and electricity price increases of 25 per cent in 2010 and\n2011 are assumed. The Bank’s forecast is in line with those of private-sector analysts.\nAccording to the latest Reuters consensus forecast, inflation is expected to average 5,7 per\ncent in 2010 and 5,85 per cent in 2011.\nThere are no major demand-side pressures on inflation, and the assessment of the\nMonetary Policy Committee (MPC) is that there are no significant upside risks to the\ninflation outlook emanating from this source.\nHousehold consumption expenditure remains subdued. Real retail sales growth has\nbeen negative, but there is further evidence that motor vehicle sales may have reached\ntheir lower turning point. Although total vehicle sales in October were 12,5 per cent lower\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n55\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\n56\nthan a year ago, when the three months to October 2009 are compared with the\npreceding three months, an increase of 1,4 per cent was recorded. The recovery has\nbeen in passenger vehicle sales and exports. Commercial vehicle sales are still declining.\nConsumption expenditure is expected to remain subdued, despite the lower interest rate\nenvironment, as a result of tighter lending conditions by banks, high levels of consumer\nindebtedness, negative wealth effects or impaired household balance sheets, and higher\nlevels of unemployment.\nCredit extension to the private sector reflects weak demand by households and the\ncorporate sector, and tight lending conditions by banks in response to higher perceived\nrisk and rising impaired advances. Twelve-month growth in banks’ total loans and\nadvances declined to -0,2 per cent in September 2009. Growth in mortgage advances\nto the private sector declined further in September, measuring 4,8 per cent. The other\nmain categories of loans and advances, namely instalment sale and leasing finance,\ncredit card advances, bank overdrafts and general loans, all contracted.\nConsumption expenditure is also constrained by high debt levels and negative wealth\neffects, although asset values have recovered somewhat from their lows earlier in the\nyear. The all-share index on the JSE Limited is currently about 50 per cent higher than\nthe most recent lowest point in March of 2009. House prices also appear to be\nrecovering, with the various house price indices reflecting either small positive growth or\nmoderate declines in October.\nLabour market developments are also likely to constrain household consumption\nexpenditure. According to the Quarterly Labour Force Survey, approximately 800 000\njobs have been lost since the beginning of the fourth quarter of 2008. The Quarterly\nEmployment Statistics show a decline of over 200 000 formal-sector jobs between the\nbeginning of the fourth quarter of 2008 and the end of the second quarter of 2009. \nDomestic output appears to be recovering and the leading business cycle indicator of\nthe Bank has continued its positive trend. There are still some doubts about the speed\nof recovery, and the output gap remains relatively wide. Most forecasts suggest that\npositive growth will have resumed by the fourth quarter of 2009, but there is less\nunanimity about the third quarter outcome. \nThe outlook is also not even across sectors. The monthly data suggests that the mining\nsector contracted further in the third quarter, but the manufacturing sector performance\non a quarter-on-quarter basis was relatively robust. According to Statistics South Africa,\nthe physical volume of mining production declined by 7,5 per cent in the three months\nto September compared with the previous three months. However, a more positive trend\nmay be expected in the fourth quarter. \nThe physical volume of manufacturing production increased by 2,6 per cent over the\nsame period. This outcome is consistent with the Kagiso/Bureau for Economic\nResearch Purchasing Managers Index which, although still reflecting a contraction in\nmanufacturing, has rebounded significantly and the forward-looking indicators in the\nindex are generally positive. There is a risk, however, that this recovery could be affected\nby low consumption expenditure growth. The outlook for the construction sector\nappears to be less favourable. The real value of building plans passed declined by \n18,5 per cent on a year-on-year basis in August, while in the three months to August,\ncompared with the previous three months, a decrease of 27,7 per cent was recorded.\nThe First National Bank Civil Construction Index also declined significantly in the third\nquarter of 2009. \nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nFiscal policy developments are not seen to be a threat to the inflation outlook. The\nrevised budgeted deficit of 7,6 per cent of gross domestic product announced in the\nMedium Term Budget Policy Statement is to a significant extent due to lower tax\nrevenues – a result of low economic growth – and is therefore part of the workings of\nthe automatic stabilisers. The previous fiscal prudence has provided sufficient space for\nincreased borrowing to fund the shortfall. The deficit is expected to narrow as growth\ngains momentum. \nNo significant upside risks to the inflation outlook are expected from food prices. Food\nprice inflation has declined to below 5 per cent, and this favourable trend is expected to\ncontinue. Consumer food prices tend to lag food price developments at the producer\nprice level, and the latter have been either declining or rising marginally over the past\nmonths. In October, manufactured food prices declined at a year-on-year rate of 1,8 per\ncent, while agricultural product prices declined by 2,4 per cent. The current spot and\nfuture prices of agricultural commodities indicate that no significant upward pressures\nare expected in the near future.\nFor the past year petrol prices have exerted downward pressure on inflation as a result\nof the appreciation of the rand and relatively low international product prices compared\nto the previous year. However, these favourable base effects are not expected to\ncontinue. Over the past few months the international oil prices have remained relatively\nstable, but some account is taken in the forecast of possible increases in the\ninternational oil price should the global recovery accelerate. In November the domestic\npetrol price remained unchanged and, should current trends continue, a modest\nincrease in the petrol price is possible in December.\nThe rand has remained a positive factor in the inflation outlook, notwithstanding some\nvolatility during the month. Since the previous MPC meeting, the rand has traded in a\nrange of between R7,30 and R7,90 against the US dollar. The rand’s movements have\nbeen influenced, to a large extent, by exogenous factors, in particular movements in the\ndollar, a resumption in global capital flows to emerging markets and a recovery in\ncommodity prices. Since the beginning of the year the rand has appreciated by 20 per\ncent on a trade-weighted basis.\nThe global economic recovery has been led by the emerging Asian economies. However,\nthe turnaround in the advanced economies is less certain. While there are positive signs,\nthe recent higher growth rates have been driven by a turn in the inventory cycle, and the\ncontinued weakness in consumption expenditure in the United States in particular, and\nrising levels of unemployment pose risks to the recovery. The nature and speed of exit\nstrategies from the previous stimulus packages also remain a risk to the outlook.\nThe global environment remains benign from an inflation perspective. Despite moderately\nhigher commodity prices, there are no significant risks to the global inflation outlook.\nAs in the past few meetings, the main risks to the inflation outlook are seen to emanate\nfrom electricity price increases and the possible second-round effects thereof. In addition,\nthe trend of wage settlements continues to pose an upside risk to the inflation outlook.\nMonetary policy stance\nThe MPC, having reviewed the global and domestic economic and financial\ndevelopments, has decided to maintain the current stance of monetary policy and to\nleave the repurchase rate unchanged at 7 per cent per annum.\nSouth African Reserve Bank\n57\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\n58\nAbbreviations\nAlsi\nAll-Share Index\nBER\nBureau for Economic Research (Stellenbosch University)\nBESA\nBond Exchange of South Africa \nCPI\nconsumer price index\nCPIX\nconsumer price index excluding mortgage interest costs\nECB\nEuropean Central Bank\nFNB\nFirst National Bank\nFOMC\nFederal Open Market Committee\nG-20\nGroup of Twenty\nGDP\ngross domestic product\nIMF\nInternational Monetary Fund\nJSE\nJSE Limited\nMBS\nmortgage-backed security\nMPC\nMonetary Policy Committee\nMTBPS\nMedium Term Budget Policy Statement\nNAB\nnon-alcoholic beverage\nNCD\nnegotiable certificates of deposit\nNEER\nnominal effective exchange rate of the rand\nNERSA\nNational Energy Regulator of South Africa\nOECD\nOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development\nOPEC\nOrganization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries\nPMI\nPurchasing Managers Index\nPPI\nproducer price index\nPSBR\npublic-sector borrowing requirement\nRMB\nRand Merchant Bank\nStats SA\nStatistics South Africa\nthe Bank\nSouth African Reserve Bank\nthe Fed\nFederal Reserve System\nUK\nUnited Kingdom\nUS\nUnited States\nMonetary Policy Review November 2009\nSouth African Reserve Bank", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/Monetary_Policy_Reports/MPRNov2009-1-.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "8cfa97f58da3010e67cac9128dde6047", "text": "Vol. 25 No. 16 \n \n \nWeek Ending \n21st April 2023 \nWeekly Economic \nHighlights \nTABLE OF CONTENTS \n \n1. \nINTEREST RATES .................................................................................... 1 \n2. \nCLEARING AND SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY ...................................... 3 \n3. \nTOBACCO SALES ..................................................................................... 4 \n4. \nINTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICE DEVELOPMENTS ......... 4 \n5. \nEXCHANGE RATE DEVELOPMENTS ................................................. 6 \n6. \nEQUITY MARKETS.................................................................................. 7 \n \n \n \n \n \n1 \n1. \nINTEREST RATES \n \nLocal Currency (ZWL) Deposit Rates \n \nAverage minimum and maximum deposits rates for savings deposits, deposits of 1-month tenor \nand 3-months tenor declined during the week ending 21st April 2023, as shown in Table 1. \n \n \nTable 1: Average Deposit Rates (per annum) \nDate \nSavings deposits (%) \n1- Month deposit’s rates (%) \n \n3- Month deposit rates (%) \n \nMinimum (%) \nMaximum (%) \nMinimum (%) \nMaximum (%) \nMinimum (%) \nMaximum (%) \n24-Mar-23 \n34.01 \n35.26 \n64.00 \n75.94 \n66.39 \n75.06 \n31-Mar-23 \n34.01 \n35.26 \n63.72 \n75.39 \n68.06 \n73.39 \n6-Apr-23 \n33.58 \n34.94 \n62.06 \n74.28 \n63.06 \n73.61 \n14-Apr-23 \n34.01 \n35.26 \n63.72 \n74.28 \n64.72 \n73.61 \n21-Apr-23 \n33.34 \n34.01 \n62.06 \n73.17 \n63.06 \n71.94 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2023 \n \n \nLocal Currency (ZWL) Lending Rates \n \nCommercial bank minimum and maximum lending rates for individual clients and maximum \nlending rates for corporate clients decreased, during the week under review. However, average \nminimum lending rates for corporate clients increased by 5.80 percentage points during the same \nweek, as shown in Table 2. \n \nTable 2: Lending Rates (per annum) \nDate \nMinimum (%) \nMaximum (%) \nMinimum (%) \nMaximum (%) \n \nIndividual Clients \n \n Corporate Clients \n24-Mar-23 \n74.05 \n110.94 \n82.21 \n167.86 \n31-Mar-23 \n74.35 \n110.30 \n81.46 \n166.96 \n6-Apr-23 \n73.79 \n110.27 \n81.50 \n166.90 \n14-Apr-23 \n75.02 \n110.60 \n81.36 \n167.90 \n21-Apr-23 \n74.11 \n105.67 \n87.16 \n167.82 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2023 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2 \nForeign Currency (USD) Deposit Rates \n \nDuring the week ending 21st April 2023, average deposits rates for deposits of all classes, quoted \nby commercial banks, remained unchanged from previous week levels, as shown in Table 3. \n \n \nTable 3: Average Deposit Rates (per annum) \nDate \nSavings deposits (%) \n1- Month deposit’s rates (%) \n \n3- Month deposit rates (%) \n \nMinimum (%) \nMaximum (%) \nMinimum (%) \nMaximum (%) \nMinimum (%) \nMaximum (%) \n24-Mar-23 \n1.27 \n1.69 \n3.00 \n4.29 \n3.55 \n4.94 \n31-Mar-23 \n1.27 \n1.69 \n3.00 \n4.29 \n3.55 \n4.94 \n6-Apr-23 \n1.27 \n1.69 \n3.00 \n4.28 \n3.55 \n4.78 \n14-Apr-23 \n1.27 \n1.69 \n3.12 \n4.32 \n3.45 \n4.77 \n21-Apr-23 \n1.27 \n1.69 \n3.12 \n4.32 \n3.45 \n4.77 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2023 \n \n \nForeign Currency (USD) Lending Rates \n \nIn the week ending 21st April 2023, marginal changes were recorded on minimum and maximum \ncommercial bank lending rates for individual clients as well as on minimum lending rates for \ncorporate clients. However, maximum lending rates for corporate clients remained at previous \nweek levels, as shown in Table 4. \n \nTable 4: Lending Rates (per annum) \nDate \nMinimum (%) \nMaximum (%) \nMinimum (%) \nMaximum (%) \n \nIndividual Clients \n \n Corporate Clients \n24-Mar-23 \n11.16 \n13.34 \n7.74 \n14.63 \n31-Mar-23 \n11.22 \n13.31 \n7.77 \n14.69 \n6-Apr-23 \n11.23 \n13.31 \n7.77 \n14.72 \n14-Apr-23 \n11.29 \n13.28 \n7.76 \n14.76 \n21-Apr-23 \n11.33 \n13.25 \n7.75 \n14.76 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2023 \n \n \n \n \n \n3 \n2. \nCLEARING AND SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY \n \nDuring the week ending 21st April 2023, the National Payment Systems (NPS) processed \ntransactions valued at ZW$802.92 billion, down from ZW$811.52 billion recorded in the \nprevious week. Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) transactions declined from ZW$673.82 \nbillion in the previous week to ZW$655.72 billion, during the week under review. In proportions, \nthe NPS transaction values were distributed as follows: RTGS, 81.67%, POS, 9.80%; Mobile, \n6.04%; and ATM, 2.49%. \n \n \nFigure 1: Composition of NPS Transactions in Value Terms \n \n Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2023 \n \n \n \nNPS transaction volumes declined by 1.41% to 10.95 million, during the week ending 21st April \n2023, from 11.10 million recorded in the preceding week. The distribution of NPS transaction \nvolumes was as follows: Mobile, 70.78%; POS, 26.52%; RTGS, 1.60%; and ATM, 1.11%, as \nshown in Figure 2. \n \n \n Figure 2: Composition of NPS Transactions in Volume Terms \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2023 \n \nRTGS\n81.67%\nPOS\n9.80%\nATM\n2.49%\nMOBILE\n6.04%\nRTGS\nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\nRTGS, 1.60%\nPOS, 26.52%\nATM, 1.11%\nMOBILE, 70.78%\nRTGS\nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\n \n \n4 \nTable 5: National Payment Systems Activity \nPAYMENT \nSTREAM \nWEEK ENDING \n14th April 2023 \n \nWEEK ENDING \n \n21st April 2023 \n% CHANGE FROM \nLAST WEEK \nPROPORTION \n% \n \nValues in ZW$ Millions \n \n \nRTGS \n673,816.86 \n655,721.28 \n-2.69% \n81.67% \nPOS \n69,468.33 \n78,744.45 \n13.35% \n9.81% \nATM \n18,327.26 \n19,959.43 \n8.91% \n2.49% \nMOBILE \n49,901.83 \n48,494.96 \n-2.83% \n6.04% \nTOTAL \n811,514.28 \n802,920.12 \n-1.06% \n100% \nVolumes \n \n \nRTGS \n162,950 \n174,744 \n7.24% \n1.60% \nPOS \n2,548,539 \n2,903,198 \n13.92% \n26.52% \nATM \n94,109 \n121,467 \n29.07% \n1.11% \nMOBILE \n8,298,517 \n7,748,116 \n-6.63% \n70.78% \nTOTAL \n11,104,115 \n10,947,525 \n-1.41% \n100% \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2023 \n \n3. \nTOBACCO SALES \nA cumulative total of 102.89 million kilograms of tobacco had been sold as at day 30 of the \ntobacco selling season. This was a 23.61% increase from the 83.24 million kilograms sold during \nthe same period in 2022. In value terms, tobacco sales registered a 24.28% increase to US$307.95 \nmillion, from US$247.79 million realized during the corresponding period in 2022, as shown in \nTable 6. \n \nTable 6: Weekly Cumulative Tobacco Sales: Day 30 (21st April 2023) \n \n2022 \n2023 \nVariance (%) \nCumulative Quantity Sold (million kgs) \n83,239,721 \n102,889,471 \n23.61 \nAverage Price (US$/kg) \n2.98 \n \n2.99 \n0.44 \nCumulative value (US$ million) \n307,945,562 \n247,789,777 \n24.28 \n Source: Tobacco Industry and Marketing Board (TIMB), 2022 \n \nThe golden leaf was sold at an average price of US$2.99 per kilogram, a marginal increase from \nUS$2.98 per kilogram realised in the same period last year. \n4. \nINTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICE DEVELOPMENTS \n \nDuring the week ending 21st April 2023, average prices for platinum, palladium and nickel rose \nwhile gold, copper and Brent crude oil prices retreated. Table 7 shows commodity prices \ndevelopments during the week under review. \n \n \n \n5 \nTable 7: Metal and Crude Oil Prices for the week ending 21st April 2023 \n \nGold \nPlatinum \nPalladium \nCopper \nNickel \nCrude Oil \n2023 \nUS$/ounce US$/ounce US$/ounce US$/tonne \nUS$/tonne \nUS$/barrel \nWeekly Average (11-14 Apr 23) \n2,019.00 \n1,021.25 \n1,460.13 \n8,997.75 \n23,946.25 \n86.35 \n17-Apr-23 \n2,004.60 \n1,051.50 \n1,506.00 \n9,020.00 \n24,6655.00 \n85.50 \n18-Apr-23 \n1,999.35 \n1,068.50 \n1,623.00 \n8,953.50 \n25,310.00 \n84.35 \n19-Apr-23 \n1,983.33 \n1,068.50 \n1,614.50 \n8,948.00 \n25,555.00 \n82.18 \n20-Apr-23 \n2,000.60 \n1,089.50 \n1,609.50 \n8,825.50 \n24,855.00 \n81.07 \n21-Apr-23 \n1,979.88 \n1,111.00 \n1,612,00 \n8,779.00 \n24,155.00 \n80.70 \nWeekly Average (17-21 Apr 23) \n1,996.97 \n1,069.50 \n1,588.25 \n8,936.75 \n25,093.75 \n83.28 \nWeekly Change (%) \n-1.09 \n4.72 \n8.77 \n-0.68 \n4.79 \n-3.56 \nSource: BBC, KITCO and Bloomberg, 2023 \nGold \n \nDuring the week ending 21st April 2023, gold prices declined by 1.09% to US$1996.97 per \nounce, from US$2,019.00 per ounce recorded in the prior week. Prices of the yellow metal \nslipped amid investor expectations that the Federal Reserve and other central banks would \nmoderate interest rate hikes in their upcoming monetary policy meetings. \n \nPlatinum \nPlatinum prices sustained a bullish run, gaining by 4.72%, from a weekly average of \nUS$1,021.25 per ounce in the prior week to US$1,069.50 per ounce, during the week under \nreview. Prices rose amid tight global supply, particularly in South Africa and rising demand in \nChina as its economic recovery gains traction. \n \nPalladium \nPalladium prices surged by 8.77%, from US$1,460.13 per ounce in the previous week to \nUS$1,588.25 per ounce, during the week under review. The increase was underpinned by signs \nof growth in the technology industry, which relies heavily on palladium for the manufacturing \nof electronics. \n \nCopper \nCopper prices retreated by 0.68%, from a weekly average of US$8,997.75 per tonne recorded in \nthe previous week to US$8,936.75 per tonne, during the week ending 21st April 2023. Prices \ndeclined as global supplies increased mainly on account of the ramping up of production by \nnewly opened mines in Peru, one of the world’s largest copper producers. \n \n \n \n6 \nNickel \nNickel prices continued to increase due to tight supply, against the background of rising demand \nin China, the world’s top base metal consumer. Accordingly, prices increased by 4.79%, from a \nweekly average of US$22,946.25 per tonne in the previous week to US$25,093.75 per tonne, \nduring the reporting week. \n \nBrent Crude Oil \n \nBrent crude oil prices declined by 3.56%, from US$86.35 per barrel recorded in the previous \nweek to US$83.28 per barrel, during the week under review. Prices were weighed down by \nprospects of further interest rate hikes by the Federal Reserve, that could hurt global economic \ngrowth and future energy demand. \n \n5. EXCHANGE RATE DEVELOPMENTS \n \n \nInterbank Market \nOn the interbank market, the Zimbabwe dollar (ZW$) depreciated by 3.3%, from an average of \nZW$960.4250 per US$1 in the previous week to ZW$992.1109 per US$1, during the week \nending 21st April 2023, as shown in Table 8. \n \nTable 8: Interbank Market Exchange Rates1 \n \nUSD \nZAR \nGBP \nBWP \nEURO \n2023 \n \n \n \n \n \nWeekly Average (11-14 Apr 23) \n960.4250 \n52.50752 \n1197.48396 \n72.95396 \n1,053.5294 \n17-Apr-23 \n978.9487 \n54.2005 \n1,215.6131 \n74.7010 \n1,075.9673 \n \n19-Apr-23 \n989.0679 \n54.4959 \n1,227.7802 \n75.2211 \n1,084.2196 \n \n 20-Apr-23 \n1,000.0227 \n55.0964 \n1,243.1790 \n75.9544 \n1,096.0284 \n21-Apr-23 \n1,000.4041 \n55.5556 \n1,243.1565 \n76.3361 \n1,096.0445 \nWeekly Average (17-21 Apr 23 ) \n992.1109 \n54.8371 \n1,232.4322 \n75.5531 \n1,088.0649 \nAppr(-)/Depr(+) (%) of the ZWL \n3.3 \n4.4 \n2.9 \n3.6 \n3.3 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2023 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1 Direct quote – the amount of domestic currency needed to exchange for 1 unit of foreign currency \n \n \n7 \n6. EQUITY MARKETS \n \n \nZimbabwe Stock Exchange \nThe week ending 21st April 2023 saw positive trading on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE). \nAs a result, the ZSE All Share index gained 1.99% to close at 36 894.04 points. The Top 10, Top \n15 and Small Cap indices gained 3.27%, 2.61% and 14.46% to close the week at 21 387.56 \npoints, 25 315.56 points and 764 280.19 points, respectively. However, the Medium Cap index, \nlost 1.63% to close the week at 79 094.87 points. \n \nThe increase in the mainstream index was a result of share price gains for British American \nTobacco Zimbabwe Limited (34.28%), Turnall Holdings Limited (31.67%), Econet Wireless \nZimbabwe Limited (27.81%), General Beltings Holdings Limited (22.26%), and First Mutual \nHoldings (14.72%). Partially offsetting the gains were losses in share prices for SeedCo Limited \n(13.95%), Masimba Holdings Limited (13.01%), Edgars Stores Limited (7.50%), TSL Limited \n(7.44%) and Mashonaland Holdings Limited (5.85%). The resources index2, also shed 14.98% \nto close at 31 763.82 points from 37 359.78 points recorded in the previous week. \n \nTable 9: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Statistics3 \n \nAll Share \nIndex \nPoints \nTop 10 \nindex3 \n(points) \n \n \n \nMining \nIndex \n(points) \nGrand \nMarket \nCapitaliz\nation \n(ZWL \nbillion) \nMarket \nTurnover \n(ZWL \nmillion) \nVolume \nof Shares \n(million) \nTop 15 \nIndex3 \npoints \nMedium \nCap3 \n(points) \nSmall Cap3 \n(points) \n \n \n \n17-Mar-23 \n33,715.26 \n19,984.56 \n23,578.08 \n68,364.97 \n671,319.22 \n33,482.91 \n2,953.44 \n3,431.13 \n16.58 \n24-Mar-23 \n38,119.28 \n22,334.80 \n26,177.51 \n73,828.83 \n678,365.52 \n33,482.91 \n3,281.91 \n2,818.75 \n14.62 \n31-Mar-23 \n38,568.48 \n23,081.98 \n27,012.64 \n75,307.75 \n697,921.97 \n37,359.78 \n3,381.46 \n2,140.82 \n11.28 \n06-Apr-23 \n38,375.64 \n22,587.87 \n26,699.66 \n78,928.41 \n667,752.24 \n37,359.78 \n3,151.23 \n2,825.00 \n13.52 \n14-Apr-23 \n36,174.67 \n20,710.73 \n24,671.27 \n80,404.08 \n667,752.24 \n37,359.78 \n2,970.77 \n3,308.51 \n9.88 \n21-Apr-23 \n36,894.04 \n21,387.56 \n25,315.78 \n79,094.87 \n764,280.19 \n31,763.82 \n3,072.77 \n5,287.81 \n19.30 \n% Change \n \n1.99 \n3.27 \n \n2.61 \n-1.63 \n \n14.46 \n -14.98 \n \n3.43 \n59.82 \n95.37 \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE), 2023 \n \nFigure 3 shows the trend in daily market turnover for the period from 1st March 2022 to 21st April \n2023. \n \n \n2 Resource Index – Comprise RioZim Limited Share Price \n3 The Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) adopted the Global Industry Classification Standards, effective from 1 January 2020.The ZSE indices \nconstitute the following categories; Top 10 Index; Top 15; Top 25; Medium cap and Small cap Indices. \n \n \n \n \n8 \nFigure 3: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange All Share and Top 10 Indices \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2023 \n \n \nMarket Turnover and Volume \n \nReflecting improved investor appetite during the week under review, the cumulative volume of \nshares traded on the ZSE increased by 95.37% to 19.30 million, compared to 9.88 million \nrecorded in the prior week. The turnover value of shares amounted to ZW$5.29 billion, \nrepresenting an increase of 59.82%, from ZW$3.31 billion recorded in the previous week. Figure \n4 shows the trend in daily market turnover for the period from 1st March 2022 to 21st April 2023. \n \n Figure 4: Daily Market Turnover \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2023 \n \n \n \n \n \n0\n4,000\n8,000\n12,000\n16,000\n20,000\n24,000\n28,000\n32,000\n36,000\n40,000\n1-Mar-22\n14-Mar-22\n27-Mar-22\n9-Apr-22\n22-Apr-22\n5-May-22\n18-May-22\n31-May-22\n13-Jun-22\n26-Jun-22\n9-Jul-22\n22-Jul-22\n4-Aug-22\n17-Aug-22\n30-Aug-22\n12-Sep-22\n25-Sep-22\n8-Oct-22\n21-Oct-22\n3-Nov-22\n16-Nov-22\n29-Nov-22\n12-Dec-22\n25-Dec-22\n7-Jan-23\n20-Jan-23\n2-Feb-23\n15-Feb-23\n28-Feb-23\n13-Mar-23\n26-Mar-23\n8-Apr-23\n21-Apr-23\nAll Share Index\nTop 10 Index\n0\n2,000\n4,000\n6,000\n8,000\n10,000\n12,000\n14,000\n16,000\n18,000\n20,000\n01-Mar-22\n14-Mar-22\n27-Mar-22\n09-Apr-22\n22-Apr-22\n05-May-22\n18-May-22\n31-May-22\n13-Jun-22\n26-Jun-22\n09-Jul-22\n22-Jul-22\n04-Aug-22\n17-Aug-22\n30-Aug-22\n12-Sep-22\n25-Sep-22\n08-Oct-22\n21-Oct-22\n03-Nov-22\n16-Nov-22\n29-Nov-22\n12-Dec-22\n25-Dec-22\n07-Jan-23\n20-Jan-23\n02-Feb-23\n15-Feb-23\n28-Feb-23\n13-Mar-23\n26-Mar-23\n08-Apr-23\n21-Apr-23\nZW$ millions\nNegotiated deal: 61.16 million Larfage\nCement\nZimbabwe\nLimited\nshares\nexchanged hands at ZW$312.65\n \n \n9 \nMarket Capitalization \n \nThe ZSE market capitalization increased by 3.43% or ZW$101.99 million to close at ZW$3.02 \ntrillion, from ZW$2.97 trillion recorded in the preceding week. Figure 5 shows the evolution of \nZSE market capitalization for the period from 1st March 2022 to 21st April 2023. \n \nFigure 5: Daily Market Capitalization in ZW$ billions \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2023 \n \nVictoria Falls Stock Exchange \n \nThe Victoria Falls Stock Exchange (VFEX) was characterised by negative trading for the second \nconsecutive week. Resultantly, the VFEX All Share index lost 0.30% to close at 90.12 points, \ncompared to 90.40 points recorded in the previous week. The decline in the VFEX mainstream \nindex was a result of share price decreases for Bindura Nickel Corporation (20.10%), Seed Co \nInternational (3.45%) and Innscor Africa Limited (2.41%). \n \nThe cumulative volume and value of shares traded on the VFEX decreased by 2.92% and 37.34% \nto 0.95 million shares and US$0.18 million, respectively. VFEX market capitalization gained by \n12.61% or US$123.33 million worth of capitalisation to US$1.10 billion, compared to US$0.98 \nbillion recorded in the previous week. Figure 6 shows the trend in the VFEX All Share Index \n(ASI) for the period from 1st March 2022 to 21st April 2023. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n0\n400\n800\n1,200\n1,600\n2,000\n2,400\n2,800\n3,200\n3,600\n4,000\n01-Mar-22\n14-Mar-22\n27-Mar-22\n09-Apr-22\n22-Apr-22\n05-May-22\n18-May-22\n31-May-22\n13-Jun-22\n26-Jun-22\n09-Jul-22\n22-Jul-22\n04-Aug-22\n17-Aug-22\n30-Aug-22\n12-Sep-22\n25-Sep-22\n08-Oct-22\n21-Oct-22\n03-Nov-22\n16-Nov-22\n29-Nov-22\n12-Dec-22\n25-Dec-22\n07-Jan-23\n20-Jan-23\n02-Feb-23\n15-Feb-23\n28-Feb-23\n13-Mar-23\n26-Mar-23\n08-Apr-23\n21-Apr-23\nBillions\n \n \n10 \nFigure 6: Victoria Falls Stock Exchange All Share Index \n \nSource: Victoria Falls Stock Exchange, 2023 \n \nJohannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) Developments \n \nThe Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) All Share Index declined from 78,870.36 points in the \nprevious week to close at 77,910.96 points, during the week ending 21st April 2023. JSE market \ncapitalization also declined by 0.93% to ZAR22.35 trillion, during the same week. \n \nTable 10: Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) Statistics \nPeriod \nAll Share Index \nMarket Capitalization \n(points) \n(ZAR trillions) \n17-Mar-23 \n72,527.92 \n21.07 \n24-Mar-23 \n74,695.04 \n21.70 \n31-Mar-23 \n76,100.17 \n22.20 \n06-Apr-23 \n77,113.70 \n22.38 \n14-Apr-23 \n78,870.36 \n22.56 \n21-Apr-23 \n77,910.96 \n22.35 \n% Change \n \n -1.22 \n \n -0.93 \nSource:https://www.jse.co.za/services/market-data/market-statistics, 2023 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n90.00\n100.00\n110.00\n120.00\n130.00\n140.00\n150.00\n01-Mar-22\n14-Mar-22\n27-Mar-22\n09-Apr-22\n22-Apr-22\n05-May-22\n18-May-22\n31-May-22\n13-Jun-22\n26-Jun-22\n09-Jul-22\n22-Jul-22\n04-Aug-22\n17-Aug-22\n30-Aug-22\n12-Sep-22\n25-Sep-22\n08-Oct-22\n21-Oct-22\n03-Nov-22\n16-Nov-22\n29-Nov-22\n12-Dec-22\n25-Dec-22\n07-Jan-23\n20-Jan-23\n02-Feb-23\n15-Feb-23\n28-Feb-23\n13-Mar-23\n26-Mar-23\n08-Apr-23\n21-Apr-23\n \n \n11 \nFigure 7: Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) All Share Index \nSource:https://www.jse.co.za/services/market-data/market-statistics,2023 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nRESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE \n 60.00\n 65.00\n 70.00\n 75.00\n 80.00\n 85.00\n1-Mar-22\n14-Mar-22\n27-Mar-22\n9-Apr-22\n22-Apr-22\n5-May-22\n18-May-22\n31-May-22\n13-Jun-22\n26-Jun-22\n9-Jul-22\n22-Jul-22\n4-Aug-22\n17-Aug-22\n30-Aug-22\n12-Sep-22\n25-Sep-22\n8-Oct-22\n21-Oct-22\n3-Nov-22\n16-Nov-22\n29-Nov-22\n12-Dec-22\n25-Dec-22\n7-Jan-23\n20-Jan-23\n2-Feb-23\n15-Feb-23\n28-Feb-23\n13-Mar-23\n26-Mar-23\n8-Apr-23\n21-Apr-23\n \n \n12 \n APPENDIX 1: FOREIGN EXCHANGE AUCTION RESULTS FOR MAINFX4 AND SMEFX5 \n Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2023 \n \n \n4 Main Foreign Currency Auction \n5 Small and Medium Enterprises Foreign Currency Auction \n \nMAINFX \n 31-Mar-23 06-Apr-23 14-Apr-23 21-Apr-23 \n \n SMEFX \n 31-Mar-23 06-Apr-23 14-Apr-23 21-Apr-23 \nTotal \nBids (US$ dollars) \n18,346,935.41 \n19,140,766.78 \n18,807,027.41 \n19,061,728.12 \n2,536,327.61 \n2,424,075.86 \n2,259,478.16 \n1,874,240.77 \nAmount Allotted \n(US$ dollars) \n17,715,664.47 \n18,589,967.20 \n18,326,348.39 \n17,173,332.97 \n2,379,470.31 \n2,379,980.25 \n2,241,706.95 \n1,731,764.97 \nHighest Rate \n1,020 \n1,020 \n1,050 \n \n1,100 \n1,015 \n1,050 \n1,100 \n1,125 \nLowest Bid \nRate \n927 \n940 \n950 \n978 \n927 \n940 \n950 \n978 \nLowest Bid Rate \nAllotted \n927 \n940 \n950 \n978 \n927 \n940 \n950 \n978 \nWeighted Average \nRate \n928.5887 \n944.7133 \n959.3111 \n1,000.0227 \n928.5887 \n944.7133 \n959.3111 \n1,000.0227 \nNumber of Bids \nReceived \n259 \n295 \n291 \n330 \n285 \n305 \n275 \n322 \nNumber of Bids \nRejected \n4 \n1 \n4 \n3 \n2 \n1 \n3 \n6 \n \n \n13 \n APPENDIX 2: SUMMARY OF FOREIGN CURRENCY AUCTION ALLOTMENTS BY PURPOSE \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2023 \nPurpose \nMAINFX \n 31-Mar-23 06-Apr-23 14-Apr-23 21-Apr-23 \nSMEFX \n 31-Mar-23 06-Apr-23 14-Apr-23 21-Apr-23 \nRaw Materials \n \n9,225,734.27 \n9,921,801.13 \n10,145,544.10 \n9,101,791.90 \n794,513.90 \n642,960.42 \n780,117.95 \n616,821.49 \nMachinery and \nEquipment \n3,035,605.25 \n3,319,993.62 \n3,111,160.89 \n3,439,887.52 \n757,698.99 \n949,651.17 \n680,281.10 \n537,029.59 \nConsumables \n(Incl. Spares, \nTyres, \nPackaging) \n1,229,890.94 \n910,220.60 \n1,082,756.22 \n1,077,195.49 \n278,084.08 \n300,634.15 \n303,176.35 \n213,005.13 \nPharmaceuticals \nand Chemicals \n407,964.89 \n324,162.91 \n480,479.95 \n517,726.37 \n100,473.59 \n73,637.54 \n92,954.56 \n54,055.63 \nServices \n(Loans, \nDividends and \nDisinvestments) \n927,561.66 \n1,401,883.47 \n1,157,856.91 \n1,033,601.13 \n127,196.00 \n162,558.55 \n130,751.42 \n115,342.95 \nRetail and \nDistribution \n2,067,940.33 \n1,884,6656.94 \n1,603,231.85 \n1,183,168.54 \n269,075.99 \n195,569.86 \n231,773.24 \n168,605.61 \nFuel, Electricity \nand Gas \n- \n40,000.00 \n40,000.00 \n50,000.00 \n- \n- \n- \n- \nPaper and \nPackaging \n820,967.13 \n787,248.53 \n705,318.47 \n769,962.02 \n52,427.76 \n54,968.56 \n22,652.33 \n26,904.57 \nTOTAL \n17,715,664.47 18,589,967.20 18,326,348.39 17,173,332.97 \n2,379,470.31 \n2,379,980.25 \n2,241,706.95 \n1,731,764.97", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/Weekly_Economic_Highlights/WEEKLY_ECONOMIC_HIGHLIGHTS_21_April_2023_Volume_25_Number_16.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "4a8a0ceb99a49f1c153009d138d9b3bd", "text": "QUARTERLY \nECONOMIC \nREVIEW \n \n \n \nSEPTEMBER 2016 \n \nRESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE \n \n2 \nCONTENTS \n \n1. \nOVERVIEW ............................................................................................................................ 5 \n2. \nINTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS .......................................................... 6 \nAdvanced Economies .................................................................................................................. 6 \nEmerging Market and Developing Economies ........................................................................... 7 \nSub-Saharan Africa ..................................................................................................................... 8 \nCommodity Price Developments ................................................................................................ 8 \n3. \nDOMESTIC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS .................................................................... 14 \nREAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS ....................................................................................... 14 \nAgriculture ................................................................................................................................ 15 \nMining ....................................................................................................................................... 17 \nManufacturing ........................................................................................................................... 20 \nElectricity Energy ...................................................................................................................... 21 \nINFLATION DEVELOPMENTS ............................................................................................. 22 \nFISCAL DEVELOPMENTS .................................................................................................... 23 \n4. \nMONETARY DEVELOPMENTS, INTEREST RATES AND FINANCIAL MARKETS . 24 \n5. \nPAYMENT, CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES .......................................... 27 \nSTATISTICAL TABLES ............................................................................................................. 32 \n \n \n \n \n3 \nList of Figures \nFigure 1: Brent Crude Oil Prices US$/Barrel) ................................................................................ 8 \nFigure 2: Base Metal Prices (US$/tonne) ....................................................................................... 9 \nFigure 3: Precious Minerals Prices ................................................................................................. 9 \nFigure 4: Food Price Indices ......................................................................................................... 10 \nFigure 5: Total Merchandise Trade –Q1, Q2 and Q3 2016 (US$ million) ................................... 10 \nFigure 6: Merchandise Exports – Q3 2015 and Q3 2016 (US$ millions) .................................... 11 \nFigure 7: Major Merchandise Export Destinations (% Share)...................................................... 12 \nFigure 8: Merchandise Imports – Q3 2015 and Q3 2016 (US$ million) ...................................... 12 \nFigure 9: Major Merchandise Import Sources (% Share) ............................................................. 13 \nFigure 10: Trade Balance (US$ million) ...................................................................................... 13 \nFigure 11: Economic Growth (%)................................................................................................. 14 \nFigure 12: Formal Sector Quarterly Cattle Slaughters ................................................................. 16 \nFigure 13: Quarterly Pig Slaughters ............................................................................................. 17 \nFigure 14: Quarterly Gold Deliveries ........................................................................................... 18 \nFigure 15: Quarterly Platinum Output (kg) ................................................................................. 18 \nFigure 16: Quarterly Diamond Production (Carats) ..................................................................... 19 \nFigure 17: Quarterly Nickel Output (tonnes) ................................................................................ 19 \nFigure 18: Retrenchments by Quarter ........................................................................................... 21 \nFigure 19: Electricity Energy Sent Out (GWh) (2015 – 2016) ..................................................... 21 \nFigure 20: Quarterly Average Annual Inflation Profile (%) (2015-2016) .................................... 22 \nFigure 21: Quarterly Annualized Inflation Profile (%)................................................................. 23 \nFigure 22: Contribution of Revenue Heads to Government Revenue (Jan to Sept 2016) ............ 24 \nFigure 23: Structure of Government Expenditure ........................................................................ 24 \nFigure 24 : Annual Broad Money Supply Growth Rates and Levels .......................................... 25 \nFigure 25 : Market Capitalisation ................................................................................................. 26 \nFigure 26: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Indices ............................................................................ 26 \nFigure 27: Market Turnover Value ............................................................................................... 27 \nFigure 28 : RTGS Values and Volumes ....................................................................................... 28 \nFigure 29: SWIFT Cross Border Transactions ............................................................................. 29 \nFigure 30: Over the Counter Cash Withdrawals. .......................................................................... 29 \nFigure 31: Values of Retail Transactions...................................................................................... 30 \nFigure 32 : Volumes of Retail Transactions ................................................................................. 30 \nFigure 33 :Total Collateral ............................................................................................................ 30 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n4 \nList of Tables \nTable 1: Global Economic Growth & Outlook (%) ........................................................................ 6 \nTable 2: International Commodity Prices ....................................................................................... 8 \nTable 3: Exports Classified by lHS Code ..................................................................................... 11 \nTable 4: Sectoral Growth Rates (%) ............................................................................................. 14 \nTable 5: Comparison of Tobacco Sales in 2015 and 2016 ........................................................... 15 \nTable 6: Wheat Output .................................................................................................................. 16 \nTable 7: Mineral Production: Q1-Q3 2015 and 2016 ................................................................... 17 \nTable 8: Companies under Judicial Management & Liquidation ................................................. 21 \nTable 9: Electricity Energy Sent Out (GWh) ................................................................................ 21 \nTable 10: Annual Inflation rates (%) for Selected SADC Countries measured by HCPIs ........... 23 \nTable 11: Consolidated Transactional Activities ....................................................................... 28 \nTable 12: Payment Systems Access Points and Devices .............................................................. 31 \n \n1. OVERVIEW \n \nSignificant economic challenges such as the \ncontinued uncertainty regarding the medium to \nlong term economic implications of Brexit, \nrebalancing in China and declining terms of \ntrade in commodity exporting economies, \ncontinued to characterise the world economy \nduring the third quarter of 2016. Against this \nbackground, the International Monetary Fund \n(IMF) in its October 2016 World Economic \nOutlook (WEO) report, left the global \neconomic growth forecasts for 2016 and 2017 \nunchanged at 3.1% and 3.4%, respectively. \n \n \nThe \nfragile \nglobal \neconomic \ngrowth \nperformance continued to negatively impact on \ndomestic economic activity. In this regard, the \nreal GDP growth rate has been revised \ndownwards from 1.2% in the 2016 Mid-Term \nFiscal Policy Review to 0.6 % for 2016. The \neconomy is projected to grow by 1.7% in 2017. \n \n \nThis, notwithstanding, the manufacturing \nsector has shown signs of recovery supported \nby interim policy measures introduced by \nGovernment to promote the consumption of \nlocally produced goods under Statutory \nInstrument (SI) 64. The positive impact of the \nSI 64 of 2016 has been reported in sub-sectors \nsuch as baking, iron and steel fabrication, \npharmaceuticals, oil expressing and furniture \nmanufacturing. \n \nOn the external sector front, the country’s \nexport earnings increased by 28.4% in the third \nquarter of 2016, largely on account of increases \n \n1 Under the multiple currency system, broad money is \ndefined as total bank deposits less interbank deposits and \nexcludes currency in circulation. \nin exports of tobacco (211%) and semi-\nprocessed gold (31%). As a result, the trade \nbalance improved by 7.5%, from a deficit of \nUS$695.0 million registered during the second \nquarter of 2016, to a deficit of US$642.5 \nmillion in the third quarter. \n \nBroad money supply1 grew by 3.51%, from \nUS$5 140.7 million in the second quarter, to \nUS$5 320.9 million in the third quarter of 2016. \nOn a year-on-year basis, money supply grew by \n16.02%, from US$4 586.02 million in \nSeptember 2015, to US$5 320.91 million in \nSeptember 2016. \nThe Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE), \ncontinued on a negative trajectory during the \nthird quarter of 2016. During this period, the \nlocal bourse lost a cumulative US$0.72 billion \nworth of capitalisation. Similarly, the industrial \nindex declined by 2.08 points, from 101.04 \npoints as at end June 2016 to 98.96 points as at \nend September 2016. The mining index, \nhowever, increased by 1.91 points, from 24.70 \npoints as at end June 2016, to close the third \nquarter of 2016 at 26.61 points. \n \nReflecting the increased use of plastic money, \nthe value of transactions processed through the \nNational Payment Systems increased by 4%, to \nUS$15.69 billion in the quarter ending \nSeptember 2016, from US$15.08 billion in the \nquarter \nending \nJune \n2016. \nSimilarly, \ntransaction volumes also increased by 20% to \n94.84 million during the quarter under review, \nfrom 78.85 million in the second quarter. \n \n \n6 \n2. \nINTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC \nDEVELOPMENTS \nThe world economy continued to experience \nsignificant challenges during the third quarter \nof 2016. The challenges included the continued \nuncertainty regarding the medium to long term \neconomic implications of Brexit, rebalancing \nin China, declining terms of trade in \ncommodity \nexporting \neconomies \nand \ngeopolitical factors in some regions. \nEuropean economies, however, experienced \nloss of consumer and business confidence, \nlower equity prices and suppressed yields on \nsafe haven assets in the short term, despite that \nthe long term impact of Brexit is still \nindeterminate. \nAdvanced Economies \nEconomic activity in advanced economies, \nparticularly the United States, Euro area and \nJapan decelerated during the second quarter of \n2016, due to weak non-residential investment \nand subdued external demand. Emerging \nmarket and developing economies, however, \nregistered a slight pick-up in economic activity \nduring the first half of 2016. \nIn light of these contrasting fortunes between \nadvanced economies and emerging market and \ndeveloping economies, the IMF’s latest growth \nforecasts for 2016 and 2017, as reported in its \nOctober 2016 World Economic Outlook \n(WEO) report, remain unchanged from the July \n2016 WEO report. The global economy is \nprojected to slow down to a growth of 3.1% in \n2016, from 3.2% registered in 2015, before \npicking to 3.4% in 2017. Table 1 shows \neconomic growth developments and the \nrevised projections for selected regions and \ncountries for 2016 and 2017. \nTable 1: Global Economic Growth & Outlook \n(%) \n \n Actuals \nProjections \n \n2014 \n2015 \n2016 2017 \nWorld Output \n3.4 \n3.1 \n3.1 \n3.4 \nAdvanced Economies \n1.9 \n1.9 \n1.8 \n1.8 \n US \n2.4 \n2.4 \n2.2 \n2.5 \n Eurozone \n0.9 \n1.7 \n1.6 \n1.4 \n Japan \n0.0 \n0.5 \n0.3 \n0.1 \nEmerging \nMarket & Developing \nEconomies \n4.6 \n4.0 \n4.1 \n4.6 \n China \n7.3 \n6.9 \n6.6 \n6.2 \n India \n7.2 \n7.6 \n7.4 \n7.4 \nSub-Saharan Africa \n5.1 \n3.3 \n1.6 \n3.3 \nLatin America \n& the Caribbean \n1.3 \n0.0 \n-0.4 \n1.6 \nSource: IMF World Economic Outlook Update (October 2016), \nMinistry of Finance and Economic Development and RBZ \nprojections \n \nUnited States \nThe economic performance of the USA was \nweaker than expected in the first quarter of \n2016. In addition, prospects for a pick-up in the \nsecond quarter did not materialise, prompting a \ndownward revision of the 2016 growth \nforecast, initially from 2.4% to 2.2% in July \n2016, before a further revision to 1.6% in \nOctober 2016. \nGrowth in consumption remained strong \nduring the first half of 2016, averaging 3.0%. \n \n \n7 \nThis positive development was, however, \noffset by a sustained weakness in non-\nresidential investment, reflecting a slump in \ncapital spending in the energy sector, the \nimpact of a stronger US dollar on investment in \nexport-oriented \nindustries. \nIn \naddition, \nheightened fears of financial market volatility \nalso \nmilitated \nagainst \nstrong \neconomic \nperformance. \n Eurozone \nThe Eurozone’s annualised growth in the first \nquarter of 2016 stood at 2.2%, before declining \nby 1.2% in the second quarter. Growth in the \nfirst quarter was largely supported by strong \nconstruction activity. A deceleration in \ndomestic demand, particularly investment, \nexplained the contraction in economic activity \nduring the second quarter. \nCompared to the July 2016 WEO forecasts, the \nreal GDP growth in the Eurozone was revised \nupwards by 0.1 percentage points, from 1.6% \nto 1.7% for 2016, in the October 2016 WEO. \nThis was largely in anticipation of higher \ndomestic private consumption anchored on \nrising incomes, subdued oil prices and a \nrebound in investment during the second half \nof 2016. Growth is projected to moderate to \n1.5% in 2017, taking into consideration the \npotential medium to long term negative impact \nof Brexit. \nJapan \nIn Japan, economic growth is now projected at \n0.5% in 2016, up from an initial projection of \n0.3%, reflecting stronger than expected \ndomestic demand during the first half of the \nyear. In addition, improved external demand \nand corporate investment are expected to spur \ngrowth in the medium term, with growth \nprojected to be higher at 0.6% in 2017. \nEmerging \nMarket \nand \nDeveloping \nEconomies \nEmerging market and developing economies, \nregistered a slender pick-up in economic \nactivity during the first half of 2016. Several \nemerging market economies in Asia continued \nto record robust growth in the first half of the \nyear. In particular, China’s growth was close to \n7.0%, during the first half of the year, on \naccount of favourable policies, namely; the \nlower benchmark interest rate; expansionary \nfiscal \npolicy; \nincreased \ninfrastructure \nspending; and strong credit and consumption \ngrowth. \nIndia, which is projected to register a 7.6% \ngrowth in 2016, up from an initial projection of \n7.4%, is benefiting from a sizable improvement \nin the terms of trade and effective policy \nactions. These developments are helping to \nprop up domestic confidence in India. \nReflecting positive developments in Asia \nduring the first half of the year, the IMF revised \nthe 2016 growth projections upwards, for \nemerging market economies from the initial \nprojection of 4.1% to 4.2%. \nIn the Middle East, a number of countries are \ngrappling with subdued oil prices, the \nconsequences of geopolitical tensions and civil \nconflicts. \n \n \n \n \n \n8 \nSub-Saharan Africa \nSub-Saharan Africa (SSA)’s growth prospects \nremain gloomy, on the back of challenging \nmacroeconomic conditions, notably in Nigeria \nand South Africa, which are the two biggest \neconomies in Africa. In Nigeria, economic \nactivity is being hamstrung by foreign currency \nshortages, militant activity in the Niger Delta \nas well as power blackouts. The South African \neconomy continues to grapple with lower \ncommodity export revenues, weaker investor \nconfidence and constrained power generation. \nConsequently, 2016 growth projections for the \nregion were revised downwards substantially, \ninitially from 3.0% to 1.6% and subsequently \nto 1.4% and from 4.0% to 2.9% for 2017. \nCommodity Price Developments \nInternational commodity prices, which have \ngenerally been declining over the recent past, \nrebounded from their early 2016 lows, in spite \nof rising uncertainty following the Brexit vote \nin June 2016. The modest recovery in \ncommodity prices during the third quarter of \n2016, \nparticularly \nmetals, \nwas \nlargely \nunderpinned by the transient stabilisation of \nglobal markets in 2016. \nNickel prices recorded the strongest quarterly \ngain of 16.4%, between the second and third \nquarters, due to on-going supply tightness from \nthe suspensions of mines in the Philippines, for \nenvironmental violations. The evolution of \ninternational commodity prices during the \nperiod under analysis is shown in Table 2. \n \n \n \n \nTable 2: International Commodity Prices \n \nJune \nSeptember % Change\nGold (US$/oz) \n1,274.99 \n1,334.85 \n6% \nPlatinum (US$/oz) \n984.45 \n1,085.10 \n8.1% \nCopper (US$/ton) \n4,634.34 \n4,771.18 \n0.6% \nNickel (US$/ton) \n8,882.27 10,259.12 \n16.4% \nCrude Oil (US$/ \nbarrel) \n49.83 \n47.01 \n0.3% \nSource: Bloomberg, 2016 \nBrent Crude Oil \nBrent crude oil prices registered a marginal \nrecovery in the third quarter of 2016, gaining \nby 0.3% to average US$47.01/barrel. The \nincrease was driven by supply outages, notably \nin Canada, a decline in US crude oil stockpiles \nand reports of a possible production freeze \namong major oil producers in the Organization \nof the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). \nFigure 1 shows the monthly evolution of crude \noil prices for the period January 2009 to \nSeptember 2016. \nFigure 1: Brent Crude Oil Prices US$/Barrel) \n \nSource: Bloomberg, 2016 \n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\n140\n2011 M1\n2011 M5\n2011 M9\n2012 M1\n2012 M5\n2012 M9\n2013 M1\n2013 M5\n2013 M9\n2014 M1\n2014 M5\n2014 M9\n2015 M1\n2015 M5\n2015 M9\n2016 M1\n2016 M5\n2016 M9\n \n \n9 \nWorld crude oil supply in the third quarter of \n2016 was slightly lower than in the \ncomparative period last year. The decline in the \noutput of Non-OPEC oil producers was \npartially offset by an increase in output from \nOPEC member States, led by the Islamic \nRepublic of Iran and Saudi Arabia. \nBase Metals \nBase metals prices firmed during the third \nquarter of 2016, the second consecutive \nquarterly gain as prices continued to rebound \nfrom first-quarter lows on supply constraints, \nrising demand, and falling stocks. China’s \npolicy efforts to boost the commodity-intensive \ninfrastructure and construction sectors has been \na key driver of demand for base metals. In \nparticular, nickel prices were boosted by strong \nstainless steel demand and the potential loss of \nPhilippines ore output due to environmental \nmine audits. \nAgainst this backdrop, quarterly average prices \nof copper and nickel picked by 0.6% and 16.4% \nto US$4,771.18/ton and US$10,259.12/ton, \nrespectively as shown in Figure 2. \nFigure 2: Base Metal Prices (US$/tonne) \nSource: Bloomberg, 2016 \n \nDespite a rebound in prices from the January \n2016 lows, the World Bank projects average \nprices for 2016 to be lower than last year. \nGold and Platinum \nPrecious metal prices rallied during the period \nunder review, largely on account of strong \ninvestment demand and safe haven buying, \namid continued low interest rate policy. The \ninvestor-driven gains were partly the result of \ntepid U.S. economic data and the U.S. Federal \nReserve decision to delay raising policy \ninterest rates. In addition, Brexit fuelled \nspeculation that central banks in major \neconomies such as China, UK and Japan would \nopt for stimulus measures to boost economic \ngrowth and counter its negative impact on \nglobal financial markets. This would heighten \nsafe haven demand for precious metals. \nResultantly, gold and platinum prices surged \nby 6.0% and 8.1%, from their second quarter \naverages \nto \nUS$1,334.85/oz \nand \nUS$1,085.1/oz, respectively. \nFigure 3 shows trends in precious metal prices. \nFigure 3: Precious Minerals Prices \nSource: Bloomberg, 2016 \n4000\n6000\n8000\n10000\n7000\n9000\n11000\n13000\n15000\n17000\n19000\n21000\n23000\n2012M1\n2012M5\n2012M9\n2013M1\n2013M5\n2013M9\n2014M1\n2014M5\n2014M9\n2015M1\n2015M5\n2015M9\n2016M1\n2016M5\n2016M9\nNickel\nCopper (RHS)\n600\n900\n1200\n1500\n1800\n2012M1\n2012M5\n2012M9\n2013M1\n2013M5\n2013M9\n2014M1\n2014M5\n2014M9\n2015M1\n2015M5\n2015M9\n2016M1\n2016M5\n2016M9\nGold\nPlatinum\n \n \n10 \nFood Prices \nInternational prices of most food items \ngenerally declined in the third quarter of 2016, \nreflecting ample supplies of maize in the \nUnited States and wheat in Australia and \nCentral Asia. The recent crop assessment \nreports point to improved prospects for 2016 \nglobal food production. Figure 4 shows \ndevelopments in food price indices. \nFigure 4: Food Price Indices \nSource: Bloomberg, 2016 \nMerchandise Trade Developments \nTotal merchandise trade during the third \nquarter of 2016 amounted to US$1,924.9 \nmillion, a 14.3% decline from US$2,244.8 \nmillion recorded during the third quarter of \n2015. On a quarterly basis, total merchandise \ntrade rose by 13.6%, from US$1,693.8 million \nin the second quarter of 2016, to US$1,924.9 \nmillion in the third quarter. Figure 5 shows \ntotal merchandise trade from the first quarter to \nthe third quarter of 2016. \n \nFigure 5: Total Merchandise Trade –Q1, Q2 and \nQ3 2016 (US$ million) \n \nSource: Zimstat, 2016 \n \nMerchandise Export Developments \nMerchandise exports increased by 28.4% from \nUS$499.4 million in the second quarter of 2016 \nto US$641.2 million in the third quarter, as \nshown in Figure 6. The export earnings were \n5.6% higher compared to the same period in \n2015. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n100.00\n150.00\n200.00\n250.00\n300.00\n350.00\n2013M1\n2013M4\n2013M7\n2013M10\n2014M1\n2014M4\n2014M7\n2014M10\n2015M1\n2015M4\n2015M7\n2015M10\n2016M1\n2016M4\n2016M7\n2016M10\nFOOD\nMAIZE\nWHEAT\n2209.6\n1939.8\n2244.8\n1926.5\n1693.8\n1924.9\nQ1\nQ2\nQ3\n2015\n2016\n \n \n11 \n Figure 6: Merchandise Exports – Q3 2015 \nand Q3 2016 (US$ millions) \n \nSource: Zimstat, 2016 \n \n \nThe increase in exports was largely on account \nof increases in exports of tobacco (211%) and \nsemi-processed gold (31%). \nFlue-cured tobacco, gold, nickel, diamond and \nferrochrome continued to dominate the \ncountry’s exports, contributing about 75% of \ntotal export earnings for the third quarter of \n2016. \n \n \n \n \nTable 3: Exports Classified by lHS Code \nProduct \n2nd Quarter \n2016 (US$m) \n3rd Quarter \n2016 \n(US$m) \n3rd Quarter \n2016 Share of \nTotal (%) \nSemi-\nmanufactured \ngold \n182.0 \n237.6 \n37.1 \nNickel \n94.3 \n86.6 \n13.5 \nFlue-cured \ntobacco \n35.2 \n109.7 \n17.1 \nIndustrial \ndiamonds \n38.3 \n20.6 \n3.2 \nFerro-\nchromium \n24.8 \n26.1 \n4.1 \nCane sugar \n7.3 \n30.3 \n4.7 \nPlatinum \n13.3 \n14.0 \n2.2 \nGranite \n8.5 \n9.0 \n1.4 \nOther \n95.6 \n107.2 \n16.7 \nTotal \n499.4 \n641.2 \n100.0 \nSource: Zimstat, 2016 & RBZ Computations, 2016 \nMajor Merchandise Export Destinations \nThe country’s major export markets consist of \nSouth Africa, Mozambique, the United Arab \nEmirates, Zambia, Belgium and Botswana. \nThese countries together absorbed about 98% \nof the country’s total merchandise exports, \nduring the third quarter of 2016. Notably, \nSouth Africa absorbed 77% of the country’s \ntotal merchandise exports, followed by \nMozambique (13%); United Arabs Emirates \n(3%); Zambia (3%); Belgium (1%); and \nBotswana (1%), as shown in Figure 7. \n \n516.1\n607.3\n499.4\n641.2\n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n700\nQ2\nQ3\n2015\n2016\n \n \n12 \nFigure 7: Major Merchandise Export \nDestinations (% Share) \n \nSource: Zimstat, 2016 & RBZ Calculations, 2016 \nExports to other destinations in the world \nconstituted 2% of the total exports, in the third \nquarter of 2016. \n \nMerchandise Import Developments \nTotal merchandise imports for the third quarter \nof 2016 amounted to US$1,283.7 million, \n21.6% lower than in 2015, as shown in \nFigure 8. Merchandise imports for the third \nquarter of 2016 were, however, 7.5% higher, \ncompared to the second quarter. \n \n \n \n \nFigure 8: Merchandise Imports – Q3 2015 \nand Q3 2016 (US$ million) \n \nSource: Zimstat, 2016 \nThe country’s major imports during the period \nJanuary to September 2016, mainly comprised \nof fuels (diesel and petrol), cereals (maize, rice, \nand wheat), soya beans and medicines. \n \nMajor Import Sources \nDuring the third quarter of 2016, the country \nsourced its imports mainly from South Africa, \n43.5%; Singapore, 19.8%; China, 5.6%; India, \n3.4%; Mozambique, 3.1%; and Zambia, 3.1%, \nas shown in Figure 9. \n \n \n \n \n \nSouth \nAfrica\n77%\nMozambique\n13%\nUnited \nArab \nEmirates\n3%\nZambia\n3%\nBelgium\n1%\nBotswana\n1%\nOther\n2%\n1,423.7\n1,637.6\n1,194.40\n1,283.70\n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1000\n1200\n1400\n1600\n1800\nQ2\nQ3\n2015\n2016\n \n \n13 \nFigure 9: Major Merchandise Import \nSources (% Share) \n \nSource: Zimstat, 2016 & RBZ Calculations, 2016 \n \nThe country’s merchandise imports from South \nAfrica \nmainly \ncomprised \nof \ncapital, \nintermediate and consumer goods. Imports \nfrom Singapore were dominated by petroleum \nproducts, including diesel and petrol. \n \nTrade Balance \nThe 2016 third quarter merchandise trade \ndevelopments resulted in the improvement of \nthe trade balance by 7.5%, from a deficit of \nUS$695.0 million registered during the second \nquarter of 2016, to a deficit of US$642.5 \nmillion in the third quarter of 2016, as shown \nin Figure 10. \n \n \n \n \nFigure 10: Trade Balance (US$ million) \n \nSource: Zimstat, 2016 & RBZ Computations, 2016 \n \nOverall, the country’s trade account continues \nto register deficits due to over-reliance on \nimports of finished goods, against subdued \nexport receipts. The continued incurrence of \ntrade deficits is undermining current efforts to \nresuscitate domestic industrial production and \nthe rejuvenation of export sectors. This poses \nsignificant challenges, as the country relies on \nexport revenues to generate liquidity to support \ndomestic economic activity. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n43.5 \n21.3 \n19.8 \n5.6 \n3.4 \n3.1 \n3.1 \n -\n 10.0\n 20.0\n 30.0\n 40.0\n 50.0\nSouth Africa\nOther\nSingapore\nChina\nIndia\nZambia\nMozambique\n499.4\n641.2\n1,194.4 \n1,283.7 \n-695.0\n-642.5\n-1000\n-500\n0\n500\n1000\n1500\n2016 Q2\n2016 Q3\nExports\nImports\nTrade Balance\n \n \n14 \n3. \nDOMESTIC ECONOMIC \nDEVELOPMENTS \nThe performance of the domestic economy \ncontinued to be constrained by weak local \naggregate \ndemand; \nlow \ninternational \ncommodity prices; lack of fiscal space; and \ninfrastructural bottlenecks, during the period \nunder review. \n \nREAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS \nThe economy is projected to grow by 0.6% in \n2016, from an earlier projection of 1.2%, as \nreported in the 2016 Mid Term Fiscal Policy \nReview. Figure 11 shows the economic growth \ntrends. \nFigure 11: Economic Growth (%) \n \nSource: Zimstat, 2016 & RBZ Estimates, 2016 \n \nThe downward revision was necessitated by \ndepressed economic activities in most sectors, \nincluding mining, manufacturing, transport and \ncommunication. \n \n \n \nTable 4: Sectoral Growth Rates (%) \n Source: Zimstat, MOFED, RBZ, 2016 \nThe third quarter of 2016 witnessed further \ndeterioration \nin \nthe \nmacro-economic \nenvironment \ndriven \nby \nthe \nfollowing \nchallenges: \n Liquidity shortages as a result of poor \nexport \nperformance, \nagainst \nhigh \nimport demand \n Challenges in the provision of key \nenablers, \nparticularly \nwater \nand \nelectricity; \n Increase in pipeline payments, further \ndelaying payments to foreign suppliers \nand ultimately, the procurement of \ncritical inputs and raw materials; and \n Depressed consumer spending, against \nthe backdrop of weak aggregate \ndemand. \n \n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\n2014\n2015 2016p\n \n2015 \nEst. \n2016 Mid-\nTerm Proj \n2016 \nRevised \nProj \nAgriculture, hunting \nand fishing \n-5.2 \n-4.2 \n-3.7 \nMining and \nquarrying \n0.4 \n13.2 \n6.9 \nManufacturing \n0.2 \n0.2 \n0.3 \nElectricity and water \n-5.5 \n-21.8 \n-19.0 \nConstruction \n4.0 \n1.8 \n3.5 \nFinance and \ninsurance \n4.6 \n2.0 \n2.0 \nReal estate \n3.5 \n2.0 \n2.0 \nDistribution, hotels \nand restaurants \n4.0 \n2.8 \n1.7 \nTransport and \ncommunication \n1.9 \n1.5 \n1.5 \nPublic administration \n1.2 \n-5.0 \n-5.0 \nEducation \n4.2 \n2.6 \n2.6 \nHealth \n-0.7 \n0.4 \n0.4 \nDomestic services \n2.0 \n1.0 \n1.0 \nOther services \n3.0 \n3.0 \n3.0 \nGDP at market prices \n1.1 \n1.2 \n0.6 \n \n \n15 \nAgriculture \nThe better than anticipated performance of \ntobacco and maize crops prompted the revision \nof the decline in agriculture output from the \ninitial -9.9% to -3.7% for 2016. The drastic \nreduction in the performance of cotton to less \nthan 50% of the previous season’s output, \nhowever, \nweighed \ndown \nthe \noverall \nperformance of the sector in 2016. \nThis, notwithstanding, the decline in crop \noutput in 2016 is expected to be partially offset \nby increases in output in the livestock sub-\nsector, particularly cattle, largely due to \ndrought induced destocking. The high levels of \ndestocking are, however, expected to have a \nnegative impact on output in the coming \nseasons, as farmers rebuild their breeding \nstock. \nMaize \nMaize output for the 2015/16 agriculture \nseason, at about 511 000 tonnes, resulted in a \ndeficit of about 1.3 million tonnes, expected to \nbe covered through imports of grain until the \n2017 harvest. Against this background, \nGovernment \nlaunched \na \nspecial \nmaize \nproduction \nsupport \nprogramme \nunder \ncommand agriculture, aimed at meeting the \nnational requirement of maize from local \nproduction. \nA special maize production programme has \nbeen put in place to increase production levels \nsufficient to meet national requirements. \nGovernment has already mobilised US$160 \nmillion towards the programme, with US$85.5 \nmillion going towards irrigable lands and \nUS$75 million for dry land. \n \n \nTobacco \nSeasonal tobacco sales amounted to 202.3 \nmillion kilograms in 2016, compared to 198 \nmillion kilograms in 2015. Tobacco output \nincreased during the current season largely due \nto improved agronomic practices as well as \nbetter than expected yields from the crop \ngrown under irrigation. Comparisons of \ntobacco sales for the year 2015 and 2016 are \nshown in Table 5. \n \nTable 5: Comparison of Tobacco Sales in 2015 \nand 2016 \n \n \nSeasonal \nTotal \n2016 \nSeasonal \nTotal \n2015 \n% change \nMass sold \n(kg) \n202,275,688 \n197,210,175 \n 2.57 \nValue (US$) \n595,927,523 \n581,470,968 \n 2 \nPrice \nUS$/kg \n2.95 \n2.95 \n(0.1) \nProduction \nTarget \n170,000, 000 \n198, 900 000 \n \nSource: Tobacco Industry and Marketing Board \n \nWheat \nWheat output declined from 62 261 tonnes in \n2015 to 59 343 tonnes in 2016, due to a \nreduction in both the area under cropping and a \ngeneral fall in yields. Table 6 summarises the \nperformance of winter wheat during the two \nseasons. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n16 \nTable 6: Wheat Output \n2015 \n2016 \nArea under Wheat \n(ha) \n14 789 \n14 229 \nYield (t/ha) \n4.21 \n4.17 \nOutput (tonnes) \n62 261 \n59 343 \nSource: Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanization \nand Irrigation Development \n \nWheat production benefited from the relatively \nstable power supply during the growing period, \nas well as the reduction in tariffs charged for \nraw water for agricultural purposes. \n \n \nMilk Production \n \nMilk output for the period January 2016 to \nSeptember 2016 stood at 48.6 million litres, \n14.2% higher than the 42.6 million litres \nproduced during the same period in 2015. On a \nquarterly basis, milk output increased by 5.5% \nto 16.8 million litres from July 2016 to \nSeptember 2016, following a 0.13% decline in \nthe previous quarter. \n \nMilk production has largely benefited from the \ncontinued importation of heifers over the years. \nDuring the third quarter of 2016, Government \nwith assistance from some development \npartners, imported 400 dairy heifers under the \nDairy \nRevitalisation \nProgramme. \nThis \naugmentation to the dairy herd is expected to \nincrease the industry’s output and reduce \nreliance on imports of dairy products. \n \n \n \n \n \nBeef \nCattle slaughters increased for the third \nconsecutive quarter, with 76 650 slaughters in \nthe third quarter compared to 71 518 in the \nsecond quarter and 67 331 slaughters in the first \nquarter, as shown in Figure 12. \n \nFigure 12: Formal Sector Quarterly Cattle \nSlaughters \n \nSource: Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanization \nand Irrigation Development \n \nCumulatively, a total of 215 499 cattle were \nslaughtered during the first nine months of \n2016, compared to 191 251 cattle during the \nsame period in 2015. \n \nPork \n \nPig slaughters amounted to 43 191 during the \nthird quarter of 2016, compared to 41 874 \nduring the previous quarter, as shown in \nFigure 13. \n \n \n \n \n \n2015\nQ1\n2015\nQ2\n2015\nQ3\n2015\nQ4\n2016\nQ1\n2016\nQ2\n2016\nQ3\nSlaughters 60716 63365 67170 64667 67331 71518 76650\n60\n62\n64\n66\n68\n70\n72\n74\n76\n78\nCATTLE SLAUGHTERED (000)\n \n \n17 \nFigure 13: Quarterly Pig Slaughters \n \n \nSource: Livestock and Meat Advisory Council \n \nA total of 126 202 pigs were slaughtered over \nthe period January to September 2016 - 28% \nhigher than the 98 305 pigs that were \nslaughtered during the same period in 2015. \n \nThe increase in pig slaughters reflected the \ndestocking exercise due to viability concerns \nemanating from falling pork prices to below \nbreak-even point. Other protein substitutes, \nsuch as beef and poultry, whose prices have \nalso drastically fallen, have also flooded the \nmarket. The trend in destocking is expected to \ncontinue during the remainder of 2016. \n \nLike other livestock classes which are mostly \ngrown under penned conditions and rely on \nmanufactured stockfeeds, the pig production \nindustry continues to be negatively affected by \nliquidity constraints as well as the illegal \nimportation of cheap meat products. \n \n \nMining \nThe output of gold and nickel in the third \nquarter of 2016 surpassed the levels registered \nduring the comparable period in 2015. PGMs, \ndiamond, coal and chrome output was, \nhowever, lower in 2016 compared to 2015. The \nfollowing table shows quarterly production \nstatistics for selected minerals in 2015 and \n2016. \nTable 7: Mineral Production: Q1-Q3 2015 and \n2016 \n \nQ3 \n2015 \nQ2 \n2016 \nQ3 \n2016 \nCumulative \nSept 2016 \nGold\\ kg \n5 354 \n5 255 \n5 779 \n16 139 \n \nChrome \\t \n77 044 \n35 289 \n \n64 113 \n112 026 \n \nCoal \\t \n1152 499 \n529 809 \n920 701 \n2 204 829 \n \nNickel \\t \n4 056 \n4 227 \n4 099 \n13 200 \n \nPlatinum\\ kg \n3 479 \n3 647 \n2 863 \n10 831 \n \nPalladium\\kg \n2 823 \n2 940 \n2 358 \n8 760 \n \nDiamonds \n(Carats) \n797 979 \n481 009 \n526 430 \n1 664 000 \nSource: Ministry Of Mines, Chamber of Mines, 2016 \n \nGold \nGold production continued to benefit from the \nregular monitoring and auditing of producers \nby the gold mobilisation taskforce that \nmanaged to plug leakages, resulting in \nimproved deliveries to Fidelity Printers and \nRefiners. The firming of international gold \nprices from an average of US$1 259.35/oz in \nthe second quarter of 2016, to about \nUS$1 334.82/oz in the third quarter, coupled \nwith the relatively stable availability of power \nduring the third quarter, also supported gold \nproduction. \n \n2015\nQ1\n2015\nQ2\n2015\nQ3\n2015\nQ4\n2016\nQ1\n2016\nQ2\n2016\nQ3\nPigs Slaughtered 28973327003663240878411374187443191\n25\n30\n35\n40\n45\nPIGS SLAUGHTERED (000)\n \n \n18 \nSmall scale producers delivered a total of \n2 535 kg of gold during the third quarter of \n2016, compared to 2 066 kg delivered during \nthe same period in 2015. Large scale miners \ndelivered 3 155 kg during the third quarter of \n2016, compared to 2 892 kg during the same \nperiod \nin \n2015, \nas \nshown \nin \nFigure 14. \n \nFigure 14: Quarterly Gold Deliveries \n \n Source: Fidelity Printers and Refineries, Chamber \nof Mines 2016 \n \nCumulative gold output stood at 16 139kg \nduring the first nine months of 2016 - 13.5% \nmore than the 14 223kg produced during the \nsame period in 2015. \n \nImproved cash allocations to Fidelity Printers \nand Refiners helped to increase gold deliveries, \nwhile the 5% incentive on exports reduced \ndiversion of gold to the informal market. \nDelays in the procurement of key raw \nmaterials, however, adversely affected the \nlarge scale producers. \n \nThe continued slump in investment towards \nexploration activities remains a major setback \non the potential of the mining sector, as access \nto high ore grades by producers is restricted. \n \nPlatinum \nPlatinum output stood at 2 863 kg in the third \nquarter of 2016, down from 3 479 kg produced \nin the same period in 2015. Output was also \nlower than the 3 647 kg produced during the \nsecond quarter of 2016. \n \nThe \ndecrease \nin \nplatinum \noutput \nwas \nattributable to the furnace shut down for a \nperiodic matte - end wall rebuild in July 2016 \nat Zimplats, which resulted in a 15% reduction \nin operating time. \n \nCumulative platinum output as at end \nSeptember 2016 was 10 831 kg, up from the \n9 040 kg produced during the same period in \n2015. Figure 15 shows the quarterly platinum \noutput and average international prices for \n2015 and 2016. \n \nFigure 15: Quarterly Platinum Output (kg) \n \nSource: Chamber of Mines, 2016. \n \nDiamond \nDiamond output stood at 526 430 carats in the \nthird quarter of 2016, up from 481 008 carats \n0.00\n200.00\n400.00\n600.00\n800.00\n1000.00\n1200.00\n1400.00\n1600.00\n0.0\n500.0\n1000.0\n1500.0\n2000.0\n2500.0\n3000.0\n3500.0\nQ1\n2015\nQ2\n2015\nQ3\n2015\nQ4\n2015\nQ1\n2016\nQ2\n2016\nQ3\n2016\nAv Price (US$/Ounce\nPrimary Producers\nSmall Scale Produders\nPGMs Gold\nAv price(USD/ounce)\n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1000\n1200\n1400\n0\n1000\n2000\n3000\n4000\n5000\nQ1\n2015\nQ2\n2015\nQ3\n2015\nQ4\n2015\nQ1\n2016\nQ2\n2016\nQ3\n2016\nPlatinum\nAverage Price (US$/ounce)\n \n \n19 \nproduced during the second quarter. The \ndiamond output for the quarter under review \nwas, however, lower than the output for the \ncomparable \nperiod \nin \n2015. \nDiamond \nproduction statistics for 2015 and 2016 are \nshown in Figure 16. \n \nFigure 16: Quarterly Diamond Production \n(Carats) \nSource: Ministry of Mines and Mining Development \nDiamond production continued to be weighed \ndown by the transitional bottlenecks at \nChiadzwa, following the consolidation of \ndiamond mining firms into the state-owned \nZimbabwe Consolidated Diamond Company \n(ZCDC). The subsequent legal wrangles \nregarding the consolidation, coupled with \nundercapitalisation of the ZCDC, have delayed \nthe complete resumption of operations. \n \nNickel \nDuring the third quarter of 2016, nickel output \ntotaled 4 099 tonnes, with 46% coming from \nprimary production, while the remainder was \nfrom PGMs. This compares favorably with the \n4 056 tonnes produced in the comparable \nperiod of 2015. Output was, however, lower \nthan the 4 227 tonnes realised during the \nsecond quarter of 2016. \n \nCumulative nickel output amounted to 13 200 \ntonnes during the first nine months of 2016, up \nfrom the 11 973 tonnes produced in the \ncomparable period in 2015. \n \nThe increase in nickel output was attributed to \nthe ramp up in production by both the primary \nand the secondary producers. This was in \nresponse to the increase in international prices \nof the metal to an average of US$10 262/ tonne \nduring the third quarter of 2016, from an \naverage of US$8 815/tonne in the second \nquarter. The average nickel price has risen by \nabout 20%, from the beginning of the year to \nSeptember 2016. \n \nFigure 17 show trends in nickel output and \nprices in 2015 and 2016. \n \nFigure 17: Quarterly Nickel Output (tonnes) \n \nSource: Chamber of Mines, 2016 \n \n639377\n735876797979\n1041279\n656561\n481008.7526430\n0\n200000\n400000\n600000\n800000\n1000000\n1200000\nQ1\n2015\nQ2\n2015\nQ3\n2015\nQ4\n2015\nQ1\n2016\nQ2\n2016\nQ3\n2016\n0\n2000\n4000\n6000\n8000\n10000\n12000\n14000\n16000\n0\n1000\n2000\n3000\n4000\n5000\n6000\nQ1\n2015\nQ2\n2015\nQ3\n2015\nQ4\n2015\nQ1\n2016\nQ2\n2016\nQ3\n2016\nNickel \\t\nAverage Price (US$/t)\n \n \n20 \nCoal \nCoal output at 920 701 tonnes during the third \nquarter of 2016, was 20.1% lower than the \n1 152 499 tonnes produced in the comparable \nperiod in 2015. Cumulatively, coal output \namounted to 2 204 829 tonnes over the period \nJanuary to September 2016. \n \nCoal production was adversely affected by \nweak demand in the domestic economy, \nunderpinned by the sustained decline in \ncapacity utilisation and company closures, \nmainly in the manufacturing industry. In \naddition, challenges relating to the debt \noverhang and non-payment for deliveries by \nkey consumers also weighed down production. \n \nChrome \nTotal chrome ore produced during the third \nquarter of 2016 was 64 113 tonnes, up from the \n35 289 tonnes produced in the second quarter. \nIn the comparable period in 2015 chrome \noutput stood at 77 044 tonnes. The rebound in \nchrome output in the third quarter of 2016 was \nlargely attributed to the gradual improvement \nin both chrome ore and ferrochrome prices. The \nEuropean benchmark price for ferrochrome for \nthe third quarter of 2016 increased by 19%, \nfrom 82USc/lb Cr to 98USc/lb Cr delivered \nEurope. \n \nThe price increase was on account of the \nshortage of chrome ore and ferrochrome, \nfollowing the shutdown of three smelters by \nlarge ferrochrome producers in South Africa. \n \nChrome ore output continued to be adversely \naffected by the shortage of working capital, the \nabsence of proper technology to extract from \nnarrow seams in the Great Dyke; and the recent \nliquidity crunch that is threatening viability of \noperations. The anticipated redistribution of \nGovernment acquired chrome claims from \nZIMASCO to small scale miners is, however, \nexpected to boost production. \n \nManufacturing \nThe manufacturing sector is projected to grow \nby 0.3% in 2016, on account of expected \nimprovements in capacity utilisation in some \nsub-sectors. The promulgation of Statutory \nInstrument 64 (SI 64) of 2016, in addition to \nStatutory Instrument 18-20 (SI 18-20) of \n2014/15, which removed more goods that are \nlocally available from Open General Import \nLicence exemption, is expected to promote \ndomestic production of basic and essential \ncommodities and create scope for enhanced \nindustrialisation. \n \nThe positive impact of the SI 64 of 2016 has \nbeen reported in sub-sectors such as baking, \nfruits and vegetables, iron and steel fabrication, \npharmaceuticals, oil expressing, and furniture \nmanufacturing. \n \nResults from the retail surveys conducted by \nthe Ministry of Industry and Commerce during \nthe quarter under analysis showed that shelf \nspace occupancy space was around 70% and \n30% for locally produced goods and imported \ngoods, respectively. \n \n \nCompany Closures \nAccording to data obtained from the Master of \nthe High Court, a total of 14 companies were \nplaced under judicial management, while 20 \nwere liquidated during the third quarter of \n2016. Most liquidations witnessed were in the \nmanufacturing sector. \n \n \n \n21 \nTable 8: Companies under Judicial \nManagement & Liquidation \nYear \nQ2 \n2015 \n \nQ3 \n2015 \n \nQ4 \n2015 \n \nQ2 \n2016 \n \nQ3 \n2016 \n \nJudicial \nManagement \n5 \n6 \n4 \n5 \n14 \nLiquidation \n19 \n19 \n16 \n21 \n20 \nSource: Master of High Court, 2016 \nRetrenchments \nA total of 1 175 retrenchments were witnessed, \nduring the third quarter of 2016, compared to \n1 340 in the comparative period in 2015. Figure \n18 shows quarterly retrenchment figures, from \nthe first quarter of 2013 to the third quarter of \n2016. \nFigure 18: Retrenchments by Quarter \n \nSource: Master of High Court, 2016 \nElectricity Energy \nElectricity sent out from local power stations \ndecreased to 1758.24 GWh in the third quarter \nof 2016, compared to the 1887.92 GWh in the \nsecond quarter. The outturn fell short of the \ntargeted output of 1,935.10GWh by 9.14%, \nlargely due to the fall in output at Hwange and \nthe small thermal power stations, namely; \nMunyati and Bulawayo. The thermal power \nstations also experienced coal supply shortages \nand frequent machinery breakdowns. \nTable 9 shows the outturn of electricity \ngeneration in 2016. \n \nTable 9: Electricity Energy Sent Out (GWh) \nPower Station \nQ1 \nQ2 \nQ3 \nKariba \n702.75 \n695.35 \n753.11 \nHwange \n933.31 \n1,059.59 912.39 \nBulawayo \n34.75 \n41.15 \n16.13 \nMunyati \n35.85 \n44.45 \n26.25 \nHarare \n44.52 \n47.38 \n50.35 \nIPPs \n26.03 \n33.43 \n111.05 \nTotal \n1,751.18 1,887.92 1,758.24 \nSource: Zimbabwe Power Company, 2016 \n \nCumulative power generation to September \n2016 at 5426.59 GWh, was 25.9% lower than \nwhat was generated in the same period in 2015. \nThe decline was partially attributable to low \nwater levels at Lake Kariba, which culminated \nin the rationing of water allocated for power \ngeneration by the Zambezi Water Authority. \nFigure 19 compares the electricity generation \nby month in 2015 and 2016. \n \nFigure 19: Electricity Energy Sent Out (GWh) \n(2015 – 2016) \n \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Power Company, 2016 \n0\n500\n1000\n1500\n2000\n2500\n3000\n2013:Q1\n2013:Q2\n2013:Q3\n2013:Q4\n2014:Q1\n2014:Q2\n2014:Q3\n2014:Q4\n2015:Q1\n2015:Q2\n2015:Q3\n2015:Q4\n2016:Q1\n2016:Q2\n2016:Q3\n400\n500\n600\n700\n800\n900\n1000\n1100\nJan\nFeb\nMar\nApr\nMay\nJun\njul\nAug\nSep\nElectricity Generated (GWh)\n2015\n2016\n \n \n22 \nIndependent \nPower \nProducers \nincreased \noutput, due to the coming on board of the \n100MW Dema emergency diesel power plant, \nwhich was commissioned during the third \nquarter of 2016. Cumulative output from \nIndependent Power Producers for the period \nJanuary to September increased from 47.1 \nGWh in 2015, to 170.5 GWh in 2016. \n \nINFLATION DEVELOPMENTS \nAnnual headline inflation, which has been in \nnegative territory since the beginning of the \nyear, accelerated from an average of -1.57% in \nthe second quarter to an average of -1.45% in \nthe third quarter of 2016. This was on account \nof both food and non-food inflation. \nDespite the increase in inflation during the \nthird quarter, deflationary pressures still persist \nin the economy, largely underpinned by the \ncontinued downward correction in prices, \nwaning domestic demand and the depreciation \nof the South African rand. \nFigure 20 shows average annual inflation, on a \nquarterly basis, from March 2015 to September \n2016. \nFigure 20: Quarterly Average Annual Inflation \nProfile (%) (2015-2016) \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT, October 2016 \nAnnual Food Inflation \nAnnual food inflation rose to an average of \n-3.35% during the third quarter of 2016, from \nan average of -4.06% in the second quarter, \nlargely driven by increases in the prices of \nsugar, jam, honey, chocolate and confectionery \nitems. The increases were partially offset by \ndeclines in the prices of meat; bread and \ncereals; milk, cheese and eggs; and vegetables, \namong others. \nAnnual Non Food Inflation \nAnnual non-food inflation decelerated from an \naverage of -0.38% in the second quarter, to an \naverage of -0.57% in the third quarter of 2016. \nThis followed declines in furniture, household \nequipment \nand \nmaintenance; \ntransport; \nhousing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels; \nand communication, among others. The \nincrease in education during the third quarter, \nhowever, partially offset the declines. \nRegional Inflation \nZimbabwe’s inflation was the lowest and the \nonly one in negative territory in the SADC \nregion, as shown in Table 10. \nThe September 2016 annual inflation rate of \n-1.4% was significantly lower than the SADC \nend period inflation rate of 11.9%, as measured \nby the National Harmonised Consumer Price \nIndices. \n \n \n \n \n-2.70\n-2.88\n-2.74\n-2.24\n-1.57\n-1.45\n-3.00\n-2.50\n-2.00\n-1.50\n-1.00\nQ2-2015\nQ3-2015\nQ4-2015\nQ1-2016\nQ2-2016\nQ3-2016\n \n \n23 \nTable 10: Annual Inflation rates (%) for \nSelected SADC Countries measured by \nHCPIs \n \nWeight \nDec \n2015 \nMar \n2016 \nJun \n2016 \nSep \n2016 \nZimbabwe \n2.35 \n-2.6 \n-2.6 \n-1.4 \n-1.4 \nSouth Africa \n55.34 \n5.4 \n7.0 \n7.1 \n7.1 \nBotswana \n1.78 \n3.4 \n3.4 \n3.0 \n3.1 \nMozambique \n3.03 \n10.0 \n13.5 \n20.3 \n25.1 \nTanzania \n6.87 \n7.5 \n6.7 \n6.1 \n4.7 \nZambia \n3.38 \n23.7 \n30.3 \n28.5 \n24.4 \nMalawi \n2.20 \n24.9 \n22.1 \n22.6 \n22.8 \nHCPI \n100.00 \n \n \n \n \nSource: Country Central Bank Websites, 2016 \n \nInflation Outlook \nQuarterly annualised inflation, which has \nremained in negative territory since January \n2016, points to the persistence of deflationary \npressures in the short to medium term. The \nchart below shows the quarterly annualised \ninflation profile since March 2014. \n \nFigure 21: Quarterly Annualized Inflation \nProfile (%) \nSource: RBZ, July 2016 \nFISCAL DEVELOPMENTS \nFiscal developments during the nine months to \nSeptember 2016 resulted in cumulative \nrevenue inflows of US$2 591.6 million, against \nexpenditures of US$3 483.1 million. This \nresulted in a budget deficit of US$891.5 \nmillion, which was financed through domestic \nsources. The deficit reflected subdued revenue \ncollections arising from the subdued economic \nactivity. \n \nGovernment Revenue \n \nCumulative Government revenue to September \n2016 stood at US$2 592 million, against a \ntarget of US$2 851 million, resulting in a \nnegative variance of US$259.9 million. This \nalso represented a 3.2% decline from the \nUS$2 676 million collected during the same \nperiod in 2015. \nCumulative \ntax \nrevenues \namounted \nto \nUS$ 2 396 million for the nine month period to \nthe end of September 2016, falling short of the \ntarget of US$2 672 million by US$275.2 \nmillion. \nTaxes \non \nincomes \nand \nprofits \nat \nUS$948.7 million contributed about 37% to \ntotal revenues, while value added tax \naccounted for about 27%, at US$700.4 million. \nExcise and Customs duties amounted to \nUS$473.2 million and US$200.3 million, \ncontributing about 18% and 8% to total \nrevenues, \nrespectively. \nNon-tax \nrevenue \naccounted for 7% of cumulative Government \nrevenue during the same period. \n \nFigure 22 shows the contribution of the various \nrevenue heads to cumulative Government \n-6.0%\n-5.0%\n-4.0%\n-3.0%\n-2.0%\n-1.0%\n0.0%\n1.0%\n2.0%\nMar-14\nJun-14\nSep-14\nDec-14\nMar-15\nJun-15\nSep-15\nDec-15\nMar-16\nJun-16\nSep-16\n \n \n24 \nrevenue for the nine months to September \n2016. \nFigure 22: Contribution of Revenue Heads to \nGovernment Revenue (January to September \n2016 \n \nSource: Ministry of Finance & Economic \nDevelopment, October 2016 \n \nGovernment Expenditure \nCumulative \nGovernment \nexpenditure \nat \nUS$3 483 million for the nine months to end \nSeptember 2016, significantly exceeded the \ntarget of US$2 994 million. Cumulative \nrecurrent expenditure to September 2016 was \nUS$2 923 million - 5.0% higher than the target \nof US$2 718 million. Total employment costs \nat US$2 139 million, accounted for 84% and \n70.5%, of recurrent and total expenditures, \nrespectively \nRecurrent expenditure continued to dominate \nGovernment \nexpenditure, \naccounting \nfor \n83.9% of total expenditure for the period under \nreview. \nCumulative capital expenditure and net \nlending, which accounted for 16.1% of total \nexpenditure, amounted to US$560.2 million, \nagainst a target of US$212.2 million. \n \nFigure \n23: \nStructure \nof \nGovernment \nExpenditure \n \nSource: Ministry of Finance & Economic \nDevelopment, October 2016 \n4. \nMONETARY DEVELOPMENTS, \nINTEREST RATES AND \nFINANCIAL MARKETS \n \nMonetary Developments \nBroad \nmoney \ngrew \nby \n3.51%, \nfrom \nUS$5 140.7 million in the second quarter of \n2016, to US$5 320.9 million in the third \nquarter. On a year on year basis, money supply \ngrew by 16.02%, from US$4 586.02 million in \nSeptember 2015. \nTaxes on \nIncomes \nand \nProfits\n37%\nCustoms \nDuties\n8%\nExcise \nduties\n18%\nVAT\n27%\nOther \nIndirect \nTaxes\n3%\nNon Tax \nRevenues\n7%\nEmployment \nCosts\n70%\nOperations & \nMaintainance\n11%\nInterest \nRepayments\n3%\nCapital \nexpenditure\n16%\n \n \n25 \nThe growth in money supply was broadly \ndriven by quarterly increases in demand \ndeposits, 6.6%; savings deposits, 2.9%; and \nover \n30-days \ndeposits, \n1.9%. \nPartially \noffsetting these increases was a 6.4% decline in \nunder 30-days deposits. \nThe slowdown in money supply growth, from \n4.55% in the second quarter to 3.51% in the \nthird quarter, in part, reflected the end of the \ntobacco selling season a major source of \nliquidity in the economy. \nFigure 24 shows annual broad money supply in \nnominal terms as well as growth rates. \n \nFigure 24 : Annual Broad Money Supply \nGrowth Rates and Levels \n \nSource: RBZ, 2016 \nDomestic Credit \nCredit extended to the private sector has \ncontinued on a downward trend, registering a \ndecrease of 2.74% in the second quarter of \n2016; and a further decline of 1.44% in the \nthird quarter, from US$3 571.6 million in June \n2016 to US$3 520.3 million in September \n2016. Since the last quarter of 2015, private \nsector credit growth has, generally, weakened \ndue to cautionary lending by banks as well as \nwaning economic activities. \nOutstanding credit to the private sector was \ndistributed as follows: households (23.6%); \nagriculture \n(18.1%); \nservices \n(14.8%); \nmanufacturing (15.2%); distribution (12.5%); \nfinancial \norganisations \nand \ninvestments \n(6.1%); \nmining \n(5.3%); \ntransport \nand \ncommunications (2.3%); and construction \n(1.6%). \n \n \nInterest Rates \nDuring the period under review, nominal \nlending rates quoted by banks ranged between \n6% and 18%. The range was in accordance \nwith the guidelines prescribed by the Central \nBank in the second half of 2015. Banks were, \nhowever, expected to lower their lending rates \nto range between 5% and 15% as per the new \nguidelines put in place by the Central Bank in \nthe monetary policy measures announced in \nApril 2016. \nDuring the quarter under review, the average \n90-days deposit rate declined by 0.35 \npercentage points from 6.14% to 5.79%. \nNotably, in the first quarter of 2016, 90-day \ndeposit rates were at 7.00%. The decline, \npartially reflected banks’ low appetite for \ncostly \ndeposits, \nin \nan \nenvironment \ncharacterised by waning lending activities. \n \nSTOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS \n \nThe prevailing economic challenges have \nweighed down performance of the Zimbabwe \nStock Exchange (ZSE). As a consequence, the \n0%\n5%\n10%\n15%\n20%\n0.00\n1.00\n2.00\n3.00\n4.00\n5.00\n6.00\nMoney Supply Growth\nUS$ Billion\nDemand Deposits\n Savings\n Short Term Deposits\n Long Term Deposits\n Bond Coins\nAnnual Growth\n \n \n26 \nZSE lost US$55.8 million worth of market \ncapitalisation. This was a 2.01% decline, from \nUS$2.78 billion at the end of June 2016, to \nUS$2.73 billion as at end September 2016. \nCumulatively, over the year to September \n2016, the ZSE lost US$0.72 billion worth of \ncapitalisation. Figure 25 shows the trend in \nMarket Capitalisation. \n \n \nFigure 25 : Market Capitalisation \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2016 \n \nIndustrial Index \nDuring the quarter under review, the industrial \nindex declined by 2.08 points, from 101.04 \npoints as at end June 2016, to 98.96 points as at \nend September 2016. On a year-on-year basis, \nthe industrial index softened by 32.97 points, \nfrom 131.93 points in 2015, as shown in \nFigure 26. \n \n \n \n \n \nFigure 26: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Indices \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2016 \n \nMining Index \nInvestor interest in mining counters was \nadversely affected by challenges facing the \nmining sector for the better part of the third \nquarter of 2016. The challenges included weak \ninternational commodity prices and the \nprojected slowdown in global economic \ngrowth. \n \nDuring the quarter under review, however, \nthere was renewed investor interest in RioZim \nand Bindura Nickel Corporation (BNC), \nunderpinned by positive growth prospects for \nthe mining companies. \n \nAs a result, the resources index increased by \n1.91 points, from 24.70 points as at end June \n2016, to close the third quarter of 2016 at 26.61 \npoints. On a year-on-year basis, the mining \nindex increased by 2.25 points. \n \n \n2,000\n2,500\n3,000\n3,500\n4,000\n4,500\n30-Sep-15\n31-Oct-15\n30-Nov-15\n31-Dec-15\n31-Jan-16\n29-Feb-16\n31-Mar-16\n30-Apr-16\n31-May-16\n30-Jun-16\n31-Jul-16\n31-Aug-16\n30-Sep-16\nUS$ Millions\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\n100\n70\n90\n110\n130\n150\n170\n190\nSep-15\nOct-15\nNov-15\nDec-15\nJan-16\nFeb-16\nMar-16\nApr-16\nMay-16\nJun-16\nJul-16\nAug-16\nSep-16\nMining\nIndustrial\nIndustrial Index\nMining Index\n \n \n27 \nMarket Turnover \nDuring the third quarter of 2016, the ZSE trade \nwas skewed towards blue chip counters such as \nDelta, Econet, Innscor Africa, Old Mutual Plc \nand National Foods. In light of the continuous \nreduction in market value, there was significant \ninterest in blue chip counters as investors \nrebalanced their portfolios in a bid to preserve \ntheir wealth. \n \nThe 30.45% decline in market turnover to \nUS$32 million realised in the quarter ending \nSeptember 2016, was a reflection of the \nchallenges in the economy, which resulted in \ndisinvestment by foreign investors, coupled \nwith weak local investment. Consequently, \nthere was an increase in net outflows to \nUS$16.20 million in the third quarter, \ncompared to US$6.88 million in the quarter \nending June 2016. \n \nThe volume of shares traded declined by \n55.57%, from 375 429 648 in the second \nquarter of 2016 to 166 816 578 shares during \nthe third quarter. \n \nFigure 27: Market Turnover Value \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2016 \n5. \nPAYMENT, CLEARING AND \nSETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES \n \nThe value of transactions processed through the \nNational Payment Systems increased by 4% to \nUS$15.69 billion in the third quarter of 2016, \nfrom US$15.08 billion recorded in the quarter \nending June 2016. Similarly, transaction \nvolumes \nalso \nincreased \nby \n20% \nto \n94.84 million in the third quarter of 2016, from \n78.85 million in the second quarter. \n \nCheque and ATMs payment streams recorded \ndecreases in values during the quarter under \nreview, while RTGS, POS, Internet and mobile \nregistered \nincreased. \nThe \ncorresponding \nvolumes, however, registered increases during \nthe third quarter of 2016, compared to the \nsecond quarter. \n \nTable 11 provides the statistical information on \nvarious payment streams for the third quarter \nending September 2016. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\nUS$ Millions\n \n \n28 \nTable 11: Consolidated Transactional \nActivities \nPayment \nstream \nSecond \nquarter \nending 30 \nJune 2016 \nThird \nquarter \nending 30 \nSeptember \n2016 \nChange \nfrom \nlast \nquarter \nProportion \n \nUS$ Millions \n \n \nRTGS \n11,955.75 \n12,223.37 \n2% \n77.90% \nCHEQUE \n30.75 \n27.59 \n-10% \n0.18% \nPOS \n598.85 \n715.32 \n19% \n4.56% \nATMS \n582.29 \n499.88 \n-14% \n3.19% \nMOBILE \n1,372.35 \n1,560.51 \n14% \n9.95% \nINTERNET \n536.73 \n664.59 \n24% \n4.24% \nTOTAL \n15,076.72 \n15,691,28 \n4% \n100% \nVOLUMES \nRTGS \n629,173 \n784,834 \n25% \n0.83% \nCHEQUE \n87,620 \n91,330 \n4% \n0.10% \nPOS \n7,946,373 \n12,406,367 \n56% \n13.08% \nATMs \n2,259,121 \n3,397,746 \n50% \n3.58% \nMOBILE \n67,700,733 \n77,848,447 \n15% \n82.08% \nINTERNET \n229,331 \n312,201 \n36% \n0.33% \nTOTAL \n78,852,351 \n94,840,925 \n20% \n100% \nSource: RBZ, 2016 \nLarge Value Payments \nZimbabwe \nElectronic \nTransfer \nand \nSettlement System \nThe value of transactions processed through the \nRTGS system for the quarter ending September \n2016 stood at US$12.22 billion, from \nUS$11.96 billion recorded in the quarter \nending June 2016. Transaction volumes \nregistered a 25% increase, to close the quarter \nunder review at 784,834 as shown in figure in \nFigure 28. \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFigure 28 : RTGS Values and Volumes \n \nSource: RBZ, 2016 \n \nSWIFT Foreign Currency Transactions \nSWIFT foreign currency payments decreased \nby 9% to US$1.09 billion for the quarter ending \nSeptember 2016, from US$1.19 billion in the \nquarter ending June 2016. During the same \nperiod, SWIFT foreign currency receipts also \ndecreased by 12% to US$1.16 billion, from \nUS$1.33 billion. \n \nNet foreign currency inflows amounted to \nUS$75.26 million during the quarter under \nreview. Figure 29 shows trends in swift \nforeign currency transactions. \n \n \n \n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n700\n800\n900\n9.00\n9.50\n10.00\n10.50\n11.00\n11.50\n12.00\n12.50\n2015\nQ2\n2015\nQ3\n2015\nQ4\n2016\nQ1\n2016\nQ2\n2016\nQ3\nRTGS Values in Billions\nRTGS Volumes in Thousands\nValues\n \n \n29 \nFigure 29: SWIFT Cross Border Transactions \n \nSource: RBZ, 2016 \nOver the Counter Cash Withdrawals \nThe value of cash withdrawals decreased by \n22%, from USD1.98 billion during the quarter \nending June 2016, to USD1.54 billion recorded \nin quarter ending September 2016. The \ncorresponding volumes, however, increased by \n31% from 4.24 million to 4.25 million as \nshown in Figure 30. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFigure 30: Over the Counter Cash \nWithdrawals. \n \nSource: RBZ, 2016 \n \n \nRetail Payments \nThe trends in values and volumes of retail \ntransactions from the quarter ending June 2015 \nto quarter ending September 2016 indicate that \nPOS have now overtaken ATM transactions, as \nshown in Figures 31 and 32. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n20\n25\n30\n35\n40\n45\n50\n55\n1.00\n1.05\n1.10\n1.15\n1.20\n1.25\n1.30\n1.35\n1.40\n1.45\n1.50\n2015Q1\n2015Q2\n2015Q3\n2015Q4\n2016Q1\n2016Q2\n2016Q3\nVolumes in Thousands\nValue in US$B\nValue of Receipts\nValue of Payments\n Volumes of Payments\n Volumes of Receipts\n0.00\n0.50\n1.00\n1.50\n2.00\n2.50\n3.00\n3.50\n0.0\n0.5\n1.0\n1.5\n2.0\n2.5\n3.0\n3.5\n4.0\n4.5\nUS$ BILLIONS\nMILLIONS\nVolumes\nValues\n \n \n30 \nFigure 31: Values of Retail Transactions \n \n Source: RBZ, 2016 \n \nFigure 32 : Volumes of Retail Transactions \n \nSource: RBZ, 2016 \n \n2The collateral figure comprises of cheque and \nZimswitch card payment stream amounts. \nCollateral2 \nThe value of collateral increased to USD17.26 \nmillion in the third quarter ending September \n2016, from US$13.15 million recorded in the \nquarter ending June 2016, as shown in Figure \n33. \n \nFigure 33 :Total Collateral \n \nSource: RBZ, 2016 \nAccess Points and Devices \nThere was a general increase in access points \nand access devices between the second and \nthird quarters of 2016. The increase was \nattributable to the national drive to increase \nelectronic means of payment. Existing market \nplayers have taken heed of the policy direction \nto provide mechanisms that encourage usage \n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1,000\n1,200\n1,400\n1,600\n1,800\n2015\nQ2\n2015\nQ3\n2015\nQ4\n2016\nQ1\n2016\nQ2\n2016\nQ3\nUS$ Millions\nCHEQUE\nPOS\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\n0.0\n2.0\n4.0\n6.0\n8.0\n10.0\n12.0\n14.0\n2015\nQ2\n2015\nQ3\n2015\nQ4\n 2016\nQ1\n 2016\nQ2\n2016\nQ3\nMobile Volumes in Millions\nOther Retai Volumes in Millions\nCHEQUE\nPOS\nATMs\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n16\n18\n20\n2015\nQ2\n2015\nQ3\n2015\nQ4\n2016\nQ1\n2016\nQ2\n2016\nQ3\nUS$ MILLIONS\n \n \n31 \nand uptake of electronic means of payment to \nthe transacting public. \nTable 12 shows statistics for access points and \ndevices for the third quarter of 2015, as well as \nfor the second and third quarters of 2016. \nTable 12: Payment Systems Access Points and \nDevices \nPAYMENT SYSTEMS \nACCESS POINTS \n \n \n \nQ3 2015 \nQ2 2016 \nQ3 2016 \nMobile \nBanking \nAgents \n32,528 \n34,351 \n37,131 \nATMs \n545 \n548 \n566 \nPOS \n16,268 \n19,280 \n24,111 \nPAYMENT SYSTEMS \nACCESS DEVICES \n \nDebit Cards \n2,292,969 \n2,724,317 \n2,890,731 \nCredit Cards \n10,809 \n14,299 \n14,813 \nPrepaid Cards \n28,226 \n30,339 \n38,660 \nActive Mobile \nBanking \nSubscribers \n4,306,198 \n3,212,561 \n3,289,271 \nInternet \nBanking \nSubscribers \n96,983 \n115,478 \n128,297 \nSource: RBZ, 2016 \nRESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE \nDECEMBER 2016 \n \nSTATISTICAL TABLES \n \n1. \nLiabilities and Assets of the Central Bank \n1.1. Reserve Bank: Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS3 \n1.2. Reserve Bank: Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS4 \n \n2. \nLiabilities and Assets of Other Depository Corporations \n2.1. Commercial Banks: Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS5 \n2.2. Commercial Banks: Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS6 \n2.3. Accepting Houses: Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS7 \n2.4. Accepting Houses: Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS8 \n2.5. Building Societies: Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS9 \n2.6. Building Societies: Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS10 \n \n3. \nMoney Supply and Bank Liquidity \n3.1. Monetary Aggregates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS11 \n3.2. Broad Money Survey \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS12 \n3.3. Analysis of Monthly Changes in Money Supply \n \n \n \n \nS13 \n3.4. Analysis of Yearly Changes in Money Supply \n \n \n \n \nS14 \n3.5. Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks’ Loans and Advances \n \n \nS15 \n3.6. Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Bank’s Deposits \n \n \n \nS16 \n \n4. \nNational Payment Systems \n \n \n4.1. Values of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS17 \n4.2. Volumes of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS17 \n \n5. \nInterest Rates, Security Yields and Prices \n5.1. Lending Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS18 \n5.2. Deposit Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS18 \n5.3. Stock Exchange Indices \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS19 \n5.4. Monthly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS20 \n5.5. Quarterly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS21 \n5.6. Annual Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS22 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n33 \n6. \nBalance of Payments \n6.1. Cross Border Payments \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS23 \n6.2. Cross Border Receipts \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS24 \n6.3. External Debt Outstanding By Debtor \n \n \n \n \n \nS25 \n6.4. External Debt Outstanding by Source \n \n \n \n \n \nS26 \n6.5. External Debt Service and Debt Service Ratios \n \n \n \n \nS27 \n \n7. \nNational Accounts \n7.1. Real Gross Domestic and National Product per Capita at Market Prices \n \nS28 \n7.2. Gross Domestic Product at Factor Cost by Industry \n \n \n \nS29 \n7.3. Expenditure on Gross Domestic Product \n \n \n \n \n \nS20 \n7.4. Mineral Production \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS21 \n7.5. Electricity Produced and Distributed \nS32 \n7.6. Volume of Manufacturing Index \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS33 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nTABLE 1.1: RESERVE BANK - LIABILITIES\nCapital\nand\nForeign\ngeneral\nEnd of\nNotes and\nBankers Deposits \nOther Deposits\nGovt. Deposits\nTotal Deposits\nLiabilities\nreserve\nOther Liabilities\nTOTAL\ncoins* in\ncirculation\n2009\n0.0\n125,081.2\n0.0\n0.0\n125,081.2\n0.0\n-1,131,128.2\n0.0\n-1,006,047.0\n2010\n0.0\n255,984.5\n0.0\n0.0\n255,984.5\n0.0\n-1,146,095.7\n0.0\n-890,111.2\n2011\n0.0\n185,871.1\n0.0\n0.0\n185,871.1\n0.0\n-1,056,254.3\n0.0\n-870,383.1\n2012\n0.0\n272,600.8\n0.0\n0.0\n272,600.8\n0.0\n-1,089,458.2\n0.0\n-816,857.3\n2013\n0.0\n271,521.6\n0.0\n0.0\n271,521.6\n0.0\n-1,206,013.8\n0.0\n-934,492.2\n2014\n780.6\n463,303.1\n144.5\n25,063.7\n488,511.2\n1,020,936.5\n-1,154,483.9\n514,373.6\n870,118.0\n2015\nJan\n1,256.3\n546,579.0\n714.7\n12,594.0\n559,887.7\n1,007,096.0\n-1,234,015.1\n523,627.1\n857,852.0\nFeb\n1,609.4\n553,281.5\n898.5\n12,908.0\n567,088.1\n1,009,161.8\n-1,205,744.6\n521,890.3\n894,004.9\nMar\n1,977.5\n477,018.7\n545.0\n22,274.1\n499,837.7\n858,095.4\n-1,276,355.3\n588,328.8\n671,884.1\nApr\n2,597.6\n536,954.50\n491.6\n20,372.3\n557,818.4\n894,207.5\n-1,296,216.5\n527,921.7\n686,328.6\nMay\n3,194.1\n530,935.78\n340.2\n21,462.1\n552,738.1\n868,931.4\n-1,237,240.7\n517,976.8\n705,599.7\nJun\n3,687.7\n590,212.15\n4,035.0\n28,221.8\n622,468.9\n1,093,306.3\n-1,204,438.8\n522,439.0\n1,037,463.2\nJul\n3,831.8\n569,265.20\n3,889.6\n38,524.6\n611,679.4\n1,039,959.7\n-1,180,737.7\n522,899.7\n997,632.8\nAug\n4,169.8\n516,622.42\n3,480.3\n37,156.9\n557,259.6\n1,056,817.9\n-1,139,506.4\n514,099.9\n992,840.7\nSep\n4,570.9\n569,998.59\n3,478.9\n54,700.0\n628,177.6\n1,057,080.8\n-1,198,410.5\n515,732.0\n1,007,150.8\nOct\n5,474.5\n571,870.59\n3,485.7\n37,000.6\n612,356.9\n1,069,972.4\n-1,224,135.7\n526,985.7\n990,653.7\nNov\n7,099.3\n570,235.83\n2,470.9\n33,271.0\n605,977.8\n1,048,664.8\n-1,209,170.9\n533,237.9\n985,808.8\nDec\n7,960.8\n555,252.37\n726.0\n41,051.4\n597,029.7\n1,096,800.8\n-1,086,695.2\n462,647.2\n1,077,743.3\n2016\nJan\n8,573.9\n678,906.55\n1,832.8\n48,555.7\n729,295.0\n1,090,485.7\n-1,183,887.9\n458,727.3\n1,103,194.1\nFeb\n8,895.6\n713,682.30\n2,086.4\n51,278.7\n767,047.4\n1,117,823.6\n-1,248,400.6\n452,807.6\n1,098,173.6\nMar\n9,138.3\n784,713.35\n1,423.3\n52,453.3\n838,589.9\n1,075,644.5\n-1,320,215.0\n453,150.7\n1,056,308.3\nApr\n9,308.7\n830,998.39\n5,061.6\n59,783.6\n895,843.6\n1,117,787.5\n-1,378,072.5\n473,499.1\n1,118,366.5\nMay\n9,502.1\n945,135.87\n3,602.5\n59,269.1\n1,008,007.4\n1,184,783.0\n-1,466,087.9\n465,321.4\n1,201,525.9\nJun\n9,719.3\n996,320.43\n3,701.2\n48,186.9\n1,048,208.5\n1,042,014.2\n-1,375,368.2\n496,057.6\n1,220,631.3\n*Bond coins first issued in December 2014\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2016\nDeposits\nUS$ Thousands\n \n \nS2 \n \n \n \nUS$ Thousands\nEnd of\nGold\nOther\nTotal\nTreasury Bills\nCentral\nBanks\nOther\nGovt.\nOther\nOther Assets\nTOTAL\nGovernment\nStock\n2009\n0.0\n467,033.2\n467,033.2\n0.0\n-1,857.6\n0.0\n318.1\n0.0\n15,937.1\n202,242.7\n684,290.0\n2010\n0.0\n484,200.1\n484,200.1\n0.0\n-4,729.2\n0.0\n547.5\n0.0\n12,242.7\n300,344.1\n793,276.8\n2011\n1,053.6\n413,085.3\n414,138.9\n0.0\n-1,834.8\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n43,849.4\n459,279.7\n916,123.1\n2012\n1,140.6\n446,848.2\n447,988.8\n0.0\n-11,097.8\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n37,106.2\n570,985.5\n1,048,512.8\n2013\n486.1\n338,001.8\n338,487.8\n0.0\n-1,182.3\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n31,621.4\n495,455.6\n867,877.2\n2014\n485.7\n356,094.1\n356,579.8\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n3,538.7\n0.0\n31,250.4\n478,749.2\n870,118.0\n2015\nJan\n511.0\n345,932.3\n346,443.2\n15.3\n0.0\n0.0\n3,542.8\n0.0\n31,250.4\n476,600.2\n857,852.0\nFeb\n486.6\n280,403.4\n280,889.9\n100,015.2\n0.0\n0.0\n3,584.5\n0.0\n31,250.4\n478,264.8\n894,004.9\nMar\n477.4\n281,692.7\n282,170.1\n118,205.2\n0.0\n0.0\n2,960.6\n0.0\n28,623.2\n239,925.1\n671,884.1\nApr\n486.9\n282,413.8\n282,900.6\n118,749.9\n0.0\n0.0\n17,646.4\n0.0\n28,773.2\n238,258.5\n686,328.6\nMay\n479.8\n302,738.8\n303,218.6\n119,309.9\n0.0\n0.0\n20,219.4\n0.0\n28,929.7\n233,922.1\n705,599.7\nJun\n473.5\n453,512.5\n453,986.1\n120,029.3\n161,578.2\n4,821.5\n35,961.1\n0.0\n29,147.6\n231,939.5\n1,037,463.2\nJul\n437.8\n395,333.2\n395,771.0\n120,029.3\n161,578.2\n4,821.5\n54,293.1\n0.0\n29,147.6\n231,992.1\n997,632.8\nAug\n457.0\n360,248.6\n360,705.6\n120,096.3\n187,350.1\n4,821.5\n58,797.7\n0.0\n29,147.6\n231,921.9\n992,840.7\nSep\n455.8\n359,800.0\n360,255.9\n120,093.6\n188,904.2\n4,821.5\n69,165.1\n0.0\n29,330.1\n234,580.4\n1,007,150.8\nOct\n462.5\n334,859.2\n335,321.7\n120,093.6\n188,904.2\n4,863.0\n79,380.5\n0.0\n29,330.1\n232,760.7\n990,653.7\nNov\n425.7\n299,754.8\n300,180.5\n158,463.3\n188,904.2\n4,863.0\n81,260.1\n0.0\n29,330.1\n222,807.8\n985,808.8\nDec\n15,643.5\n417,809.4\n433,452.9\n213,918.6\n158,684.9\n19,985.9\n128,307.0\n0.0\n29,863.5\n93,530.5\n1,077,743.3\n2016\nJan\n15,448.5\n408,820.6\n424,269.1\n212,269.6\n191,516.5\n19,985.9\n125,595.0\n0.0\n32,363.5\n97,194.4\n1,103,194.1\nFeb\n15,493.9\n375,316.3\n390,810.3\n253,708.5\n215,576.7\n19,985.9\n84,651.5\n0.0\n32,363.5\n101,077.2\n1,098,173.6\nMar\n15,497.9\n319,054.8\n334,552.7\n289,991.3\n208,465.9\n15,000.0\n86,029.9\n0.0\n33,758.9\n88,509.7\n1,056,308.3\nApr\n15,505.8\n339,102.6\n354,608.4\n295,759.5\n220,311.2\n15,000.0\n94,145.2\n0.0\n35,798.9\n102,743.4\n1,118,366.5\nMay\n15,489.8\n391,892.0\n407,381.8\n275,759.5\n251,942.7\n15,000.0\n107,168.1\n0.0\n35,798.9\n108,474.9\n1,201,525.9\nJun\n15,532.3\n373,471.8\n389,004.0\n283,077.8\n273,946.1\n1,016.0\n120,524.9\n0.0\n35,798.9\n117,263.6\n1,220,631.3\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2016 \nLoans and advances\nInvestments\n Foreign Assets\nTABLE 1.2: RESERVE BANK - ASSETS\n \n \nS3 \n \n \n \nLoans & \nContingent\nOther\nNon \nFinancial \nTotal\nEnd of\nBond \nCoins\nForeign \nNotes\nTotal\nOther \nBalances\nAdvances\nAssets\nAssets\nAssets\nAssets \n&\nBalances\nBalances \nBalances\n Liquid\nwith RBZ\nCoin\nwith\nwith Other \nat\nTrade\nTreasury\nAgric PEs\n Assets\nat Banks\nRBZ\nBanks\nForeign \nBills\nBills\n2009\n158.3\n106.3\n7.3\n423.6\n36.2\n0.0\n0.0\n731.8\n91.1\n523.5\n192.3\n47.3\n217.8\n1,803.8\n2010\n206.3\n136.2\n12.0\n420.5\n88.8\n0.0\n0.0\n863.7\n115.2\n1,080.0\n303.5\n125.1\n222.0\n2,709.4\n2011\n256.0\n225.3\n92.0\n361.7\n140.6\n0.0\n0.0\n1,075.7\n119.8\n1,952.0\n244.2\n127.6\n310.5\n3,829.8\n2012\n375.9\n374.7\n131.1\n219.7\n190.8\n8.2\n0.0\n1,300.4\n27.7\n2,631.8\n375.3\n250.7\n389.0\n4,975.0\n2013\n354.8\n367.8\n135.5\n287.3\n199.9\n118.0\n6.6\n1,469.9\n28.4\n2,799.5\n490.8\n259.5\n347.6\n5,395.7\n2014\n310.2\n466.1\n168.0\n152.4\n188.8\n285.4\n0.0\n1,571.0\n7.3\n2,961.2\n633.2\n377.7\n389.2\n5,939.5\n2015\nJan\n0.6\n222.5\n527.9\n159.0\n182.6\n163.6\n301.9\n0.0\n1,581.9\n21.4\n2,796.8\n557.7\n606.5\n366.1\n5,684.2\n Feb\n0.4\n216.7\n501.2\n149.6\n183.2\n128.6\n344.6\n0.0\n1,524.2\n17.9\n2,792.5\n564.8\n542.1\n356.8\n5,581.5\n Mar\n0.6\n246.9\n461.4\n147.8\n222.2\n121.6\n338.0\n5.4\n1,543.8\n15.5\n2,925.5\n527.3\n599.4\n362.0\n5,726.6\n Apr\n0.7\n205.5\n492.8\n158.6\n218.5\n112.0\n335.1\n5.4\n1,528.6\n18.2\n2,967.1\n527.1\n364.2\n385.4\n5,790.7\n May\n0.7\n237.3\n495.6\n135.1\n181.0\n101.4\n622.7\n5.5\n1,779.2\n18.2\n2,922.7\n525.7\n434.2\n384.3\n6,064.3\n Jun\n0.8\n245.7\n570.9\n155.1\n144.7\n90.8\n750.1\n4.4\n1,962.4\n28.8\n2,872.6\n498.4\n351.0\n386.2\n6,099.4\n Jul\n0.9\n226.0\n544.9\n137.3\n135.3\n86.3\n770.0\n0.0\n1,900.7\n28.8\n2,815.0\n504.1\n361.1\n388.8\n5,998.5\n Aug\n1.0\n234.0\n523.7\n104.3\n194.7\n76.1\n786.5\n5.1\n1,925.3\n28.8\n2,810.1\n535.2\n339.9\n390.5\n6,029.6\n Sep\n1.0\n255.2\n551.8\n114.8\n192.9\n63.7\n764.9\n5.1\n1,949.4\n28.0\n2,844.1\n599.2\n404.6\n392.3\n6,217.7\n Oct\n0.9\n215.7\n536.1\n143.7\n171.5\n83.5\n808.3\n5.2\n1,964.9\n26.7\n2,884.2\n599.3\n350.6\n391.5\n6,217.0\n Nov\n1.2\n186.9\n526.1\n135.9\n123.5\n74.3\n871.8\n5.2\n1,924.9\n26.6\n2,931.5\n603.6\n355.3\n393.6\n6,235.5\n Dec\n0.7\n181.6\n542.9\n127.5\n118.6\n79.7\n1,031.3\n5.2\n2,087.6\n20.8\n2,820.5\n582.0\n352.8\n396.7\n6,260.4\n2016\n Jan\n1.0\n172.0\n646.9\n119.2\n130.7\n76.6\n981.9\n5.2\n2,133.5\n20.6\n2,763.7\n582.8\n387.3\n396.6\n6,284.4\n Feb\n1.2\n140.7\n682.1\n96.3\n118.1\n21.5\n1,125.6\n5.2\n2,190.7\n20.1\n2,680.9\n477.1\n390.1\n399.3\n6,158.2\n Mar\n1.3\n161.9\n714.2\n96.3\n156.8\n19.2\n1,140.5\n5.1\n2,295.4\n20.3\n2,690.6\n430.6\n428.7\n405.1\n6,270.8\n Apr\n1.3\n135.5\n757.8\n135.5\n133.3\n18.7\n1,198.1\n5.1\n2,385.4\n20.4\n2,653.4\n413.7\n441.1\n404.7\n6,318.6\n May\n1.4\n89.6\n871.6\n130.5\n110.4\n19.3\n1,215.9\n5.0\n2,443.6\n19.8\n2,681.8\n397.0\n358.0\n412.6\n6,312.8\n Jun\n1.4\n108.5\n914.7\n84.6\n148.3\n19.2\n1,274.4\n1.8\n2,553.0\n19.7\n2,669.3\n407.7\n358.0\n431.6\n6,439.3\n Jul\n1.4\n101.2\n972.6\n82.5\n166.0\n16.5\n1,313.2\n0.0\n2,653.5\n20.5\n2,567.9\n393.2\n342.6\n440.3\n6,418.1\n Aug\n1.4\n140.2\n1,054.0\n97.5\n156.9\n14.9\n1,293.8\n0.0\n2,758.7\n20.5\n2,565.9\n390.2\n367.5\n447.3\n6,550.2\n Sep\n1.4\n91.6\n1,104.1\n143.9\n194.6\n6.0\n1,329.1\n5.4\n2,876.2\n18.5\n2,547.7\n382.3\n422.0\n455.9\n6,702.6\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2016 \nTABLE 2.1: COMMERCIAL BANKS - ASSETS\nUS$ Millions\nLiquid Assets\nSecurities\n \n \nS4 \n \n \n \nDeposits\nAmounts \nOwing to\nCapital\nContingent\nOther\nTotal\nOf which\nand\nLiabilities\nLiabilities\nLiabilities \nLiabilities to \nthe \nEnd of\nDemand\nSavings and \nShort-term\nLong-term\nTotal\nForeign \nLiabilities\nRBZ\nOther Banks\nReserves\nPublic\n Deposits\n2009\n996.3\n140.3\n54.4\n1,191.0\n54.3\n0.0\n6.4\n230.3\n192.3\n129.4\n1,803.8\n1,191.0\n2010\n1,321.3\n424.5\n111.1\n1,856.9\n116.9\n0.0\n19.4\n275.3\n303.5\n137.4\n2,709.4\n1,856.9\n2011\n1,800.2\n673.4\n213.9\n2,687.5\n127.8\n0.0\n53.6\n411.6\n244.2\n304.9\n3,829.7\n2,687.5\n2012\n2,090.5\n922.3\n507.5\n3,520.4\n212.5\n0.0\n30.8\n618.5\n375.3\n222.5\n4,980.0\n3,520.4\n2013\n1,980.4\n813.6\n517.1\n3,311.1\n614.0\n0.0\n65.0\n730.9\n490.8\n184.0\n5,395.7\n3,311.1\n2014\n2,219.8\n1,015.2\n457.9\n3,692.9\n537.6\n0.0\n85.1\n560.7\n633.2\n430.0\n5,939.5\n3,692.9\n2015\nJan\n2,056.2\n996.2\n561.7\n3,614.0\n470.1\n0.0\n79.5\n728.5\n557.7\n234.3\n5,684.2\n3,614.0\nFeb\n2,079.6\n876.1\n611.6\n3,567.3\n426.6\n0.0\n75.6\n720.3\n564.8\n227.0\n5,581.5\n3,567.3\nMar\n2,139.3\n940.4\n513.3\n3,593.0\n461.1\n0.0\n101.9\n749.7\n527.3\n293.6\n5,726.6\n3,593.0\nApr\n2,098.7\n943.5\n629.8\n3,672.0\n448.9\n0.0\n103.4\n747.4\n527.1\n291.8\n5,790.7\n3,672.0\nMay\n2,131.8\n1,015.3\n615.3\n3,762.4\n574.7\n0.0\n82.4\n814.7\n525.7\n304.4\n6,064.3\n3,762.4\nJun\n2,213.2\n1,021.9\n593.5\n3,828.7\n560.2\n0.8\n103.1\n814.9\n498.4\n293.2\n6,099.4\n3,828.7\nJul\n2,166.4\n889.7\n732.5\n3,788.6\n478.9\n0.8\n88.2\n813.0\n504.1\n325.0\n5,998.5\n3,788.6\nAug\n2,266.7\n790.9\n723.1\n3,780.7\n490.7\n0.0\n83.4\n825.7\n535.2\n313.9\n6,029.6\n3,780.7\nSep\n2,276.7\n967.6\n648.7\n3,892.9\n504.0\n0.0\n72.0\n828.1\n599.2\n321.5\n6,217.7\n3,892.9\nOct\n2,259.9\n909.3\n667.8\n3,837.0\n494.3\n0.0\n122.2\n841.2\n599.3\n322.9\n6,217.0\n3,837.0\nNov\n2,475.9\n919.4\n580.1\n3,975.4\n347.6\n0.0\n126.0\n845.3\n603.6\n337.5\n6,235.5\n3,975.4\nDec\n2,512.2\n999.0\n543.0\n4,054.2\n320.4\n0.0\n140.4\n866.9\n582.0\n296.5\n6,260.4\n4,054.2\n2016\nJan\n2,562.6\n952.2\n558.7\n4,073.5\n313.2\n0.0\n135.6\n871.3\n582.8\n308.0\n6,284.4\n4,073.5\nFeb\n2,545.7\n959.3\n572.0\n4,077.1\n298.9\n0.0\n126.0\n878.1\n477.1\n301.0\n6,158.2\n4,077.1\nMar\n2,653.7\n893.4\n680.0\n4,227.1\n303.1\n0.0\n135.2\n886.6\n430.6\n288.2\n6,270.8\n4,227.1\nApr\n2,675.3\n1,008.1\n591.9\n4,275.3\n285.7\n0.0\n154.4\n893.9\n413.7\n295.5\n6,318.6\n4,275.3\nMay\n2,764.6\n1,100.0\n449.7\n4,314.3\n300.0\n0.0\n101.3\n908.9\n397.0\n291.2\n6,312.8\n4,314.3\n Jun\n2,865.3\n907.1\n673.1\n4,445.5\n272.3\n0.0\n118.6\n915.7\n407.7\n279.5\n6,439.3\n4,445.5\n Jul\n2,826.1\n993.3\n654.3\n4,473.7\n260.7\n0.0\n93.8\n922.3\n393.2\n274.4\n6,418.1\n4,473.7\n Aug\n2,979.0\n1,002.4\n587.6\n4,569.0\n257.0\n0.0\n87.1\n932.3\n390.2\n314.7\n6,550.2\n4,569.0\n Sep\n3,093.4\n965.0\n662.8\n4,721.2\n246.3\n0.0\n100.2\n944.5\n382.3\n308.1\n6,702.6\n4,721.2\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2016 \nTABLE 2.2: COMMERCIAL BANKS - LIABILITIES\nUS$ Millions\n \n \nS5 \n \n \n \nLiquid Assets\nLoans & \nContingent\nOther\nNon Financial \nTotal\nEnd of\nNotes\nTotal\nOther \nBalances\nAdvances\nAssets\nAssets\nAssets\nAssets \nBond \nCoins\n&\nBalances\nBalances \nBalances\nLiquid \nwith RBZ\nCoin\nwith\nwith Other \nat\nTrade\nTreasury\n Assets\nat Banks\nRBZ\nBanks\nForeign \nBanks\nBills\nBills\n2009\n0.0\n7.1\n5.9\n17.7\n9.9\n37.3\n0.0\n78.0\n5.6\n51.3\n17.0\n23.6\n46.0\n221.5\n2010\n0.0\n15.5\n10.4\n69.3\n31.7\n121.5\n0.0\n248.3\n17.3\n211.7\n62.3\n69.1\n42.1\n650.9\n2011\n0.0\n3.6\n8.3\n2.4\n0.7\n57.0\n0.0\n72.1\n5.0\n216.5\n83.1\n58.5\n28.9\n464.1\n2012\n0.0\n2.2\n1.0\n26.1\n1.4\n3.3\n0.4\n34.4\n0.0\n239.2\n37.2\n69.1\n22.3\n402.3\n2013\n0.0\n1.1\n0.5\n0.1\n0.4\n2.5\n0.0\n4.6\n0.0\n232.7\n35.5\n29.2\n40.5\n342.5\n2014\n0.0\n0.9\n0.4\n0.0\n0.1\n0.3\n0.0\n1.7\n0.0\n63.6\n0.1\n10.0\n24.6\n100.0\n2015\n Jan\n0.0\n0.6\n0.3\n0.0\n0.1\n1.6\n0.0\n2.0\n0.0\n70.2\n8.3\n19.0\n23.7\n123.8\n Feb\n0.0\n0.4\n0.2\n0.1\n0.1\n1.6\n0.0\n2.5\n0.0\n72.0\n8.3\n19.3\n23.6\n125.7\n Mar\n0.0\n0.4\n0.1\n0.0\n0.1\n1.5\n0.0\n2.1\n0.0\n73.3\n8.2\n18.5\n23.4\n125.5\n Apr\n0.0\n0.3\n0.1\n0.0\n0.1\n0.2\n0.0\n0.6\n0.0\n66.7\n0.0\n10.3\n21.3\n98.9\n May\n0.0\n0.4\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.2\n0.0\n0.6\n0.0\n67.9\n0.0\n9.6\n21.2\n99.3\n Jun\n0.0\n0.3\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.4\n0.0\n0.7\n0.0\n68.1\n0.0\n9.7\n21.1\n99.6\n Jul\n0.0\n0.2\n1.6\n0.0\n0.0\n0.2\n0.0\n2.0\n0.0\n67.8\n0.0\n9.2\n21.0\n100.0\n Aug\n0.0\n0.1\n1.8\n0.0\n0.0\n0.2\n0.0\n2.0\n0.0\n60.0\n0.0\n9.3\n28.1\n99.4\n Sep\n0.0\n0.1\n2.2\n0.0\n0.0\n0.2\n0.0\n2.5\n0.0\n59.2\n0.0\n9.2\n28.0\n98.9\n Oct\n0.0\n0.1\n2.1\n0.0\n0.0\n0.2\n0.0\n2.4\n0.0\n59.4\n0.0\n9.1\n27.8\n98.8\n Nov\n0.0\n0.1\n2.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.2\n0.0\n2.4\n0.0\n58.5\n0.0\n9.5\n20.6\n91.0\n Dec\n0.0\n0.1\n1.6\n0.0\n0.0\n0.2\n0.0\n1.9\n0.0\n59.8\n0.0\n9.4\n20.5\n91.6\n2016\n Jan\n0.0\n0.1\n1.9\n0.0\n0.0\n0.2\n0.0\n2.2\n0.0\n60.7\n0.0\n9.3\n20.3\n92.5\n Feb\n0.0\n0.1\n0.9\n1.1\n0.0\n0.2\n0.0\n2.3\n0.0\n61.6\n0.0\n9.2\n20.2\n93.2\n Mar\n0.0\n0.1\n1.9\n0.0\n0.0\n0.2\n0.0\n2.3\n0.0\n62.0\n0.0\n9.3\n20.1\n93.6\n Apr\n0.0\n0.2\n0.7\n1.1\n0.0\n0.2\n0.0\n2.2\n0.0\n62.3\n0.0\n9.4\n19.9\n93.8\n May\n0.0\n0.1\n0.9\n1.2\n0.0\n0.2\n0.0\n2.4\n0.0\n62.7\n0.0\n9.3\n19.8\n94.2\n Jun\n0.0\n0.1\n0.9\n1.2\n0.0\n0.4\n0.0\n2.6\n0.0\n62.7\n0.0\n9.3\n19.8\n94.4\n Jul\n0.0\n0.1\n1.8\n0.6\n0.0\n0.2\n0.0\n0.0\n2.7\n0.0\n63.4\n0.0\n9.2\n19.8\n Aug\n0.0\n0.1\n1.7\n0.6\n0.0\n0.2\n0.0\n0.0\n2.6\n0.0\n63.6\n0.0\n9.3\n19.7\n Sep\n0.0\n0.1\n1.7\n0.6\n0.0\n0.2\n0.0\n0.0\n2.6\n0.0\n63.9\n0.0\n9.4\n19.6\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2016 \nTABLE 2.3 : ACCEPTING HOUSES - ASSETS\nUS$ Millions\n \n \nS6 \n \n \n \nOf which\nDeposits\nAmounts \nOwing to\nCapital\nContingent\nOther\nTotal\nLiabilities to the \nand\nLiabilities\nLiabilities\nLiabilities \nPublic\nEnd of\nDemand\nSavings and \nShort-term\nLong-term\nTotal\nForeign \nLiabilities\nRBZ\nOther Banks\nReserves\n Deposits\n2009\n36.2\n75.4\n9.3\n120.9\n0.0\n0.0\n12.3\n58.8\n17.0\n12.4\n221.5\n120.9\n2010\n141.0\n257.4\n59.3\n457.8\n25.1\n0.0\n0.0\n79.6\n62.3\n26.1\n650.9\n457.8\n2011\n109.1\n75.4\n60.5\n245.0\n44.9\n0.0\n0.0\n22.5\n83.1\n68.6\n464.1\n245.0\n2012\n108.1\n67.9\n44.2\n220.2\n44.5\n0.0\n2.7\n-60.9\n37.2\n158.5\n402.3\n220.2\n2013\n134.5\n56.4\n6.9\n197.8\n48.9\n0.0\n1.2\n-127.6\n35.5\n186.7\n342.5\n197.8\n2014\n36.9\n31.2\n0\n68.1\n0\n0\n0\n-17.9\n0.1\n49.7\n100\n68.1\n2015\n Jan\n39.0\n40.9\n0.0\n80.0\n11.7\n0.0\n0.0\n-47.0\n8.3\n70.7\n123.8\n80.0\n Feb\n38.4\n40.4\n0.0\n78.7\n11.7\n0.0\n0.0\n-48.7\n8.3\n75.6\n125.7\n78.7\n Mar\n68.6\n12.1\n0.0\n80.7\n12.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-50.7\n8.2\n75.2\n125.5\n80.7\n Apr\n63.9\n0.0\n0.0\n63.9\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-27.5\n0.0\n62.4\n98.9\n63.9\n May\n63.9\n0.0\n0.0\n63.9\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-28.8\n0.0\n64.2\n99.3\n63.9\n Jun\n62.9\n0.0\n0.0\n62.9\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-28.9\n0.0\n65.6\n99.6\n62.9\n Jul\n62.9\n0.0\n0.0\n62.9\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-27.8\n0.0\n64.8\n100.0\n62.9\n Aug\n62.9\n0.0\n0.0\n62.9\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-14.9\n0.0\n51.3\n99.4\n62.9\n Sep\n62.2\n0.0\n0.0\n62.2\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-15.3\n0.0\n52.0\n98.9\n62.2\n Oct\n61.9\n0.0\n0.0\n61.9\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-16.4\n0.0\n53.2\n98.8\n61.9\n Nov\n58.8\n0.0\n0.0\n58.8\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-20.2\n0.0\n52.5\n91.0\n58.8\n Dec\n58.5\n0.0\n0.0\n58.5\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-20.1\n0.0\n53.2\n91.6\n58.5\n2016\n Jan\n58.5\n0.0\n0.0\n58.5\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-18.8\n0.0\n52.9\n92.5\n58.5\n Feb\n58.3\n0.0\n0.0\n58.3\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-19.4\n0.0\n54.3\n93.2\n58.3\n Mar\n58.3\n0.0\n0.0\n58.3\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-20.1\n0.0\n55.3\n93.6\n58.3\n Apr\n58.3\n0.0\n0.0\n58.3\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-19.5\n0.0\n55.0\n93.8\n58.3\n May\n58.4\n0.0\n0.0\n58.4\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-20.2\n0.0\n56.0\n94.2\n58.4\n Jun\n58.4\n0.0\n0.0\n58.4\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-20.2\n0.0\n56.0\n94.2\n58.4\n Jul\n58.4\n0.0\n0.0\n58.4\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-19.3\n0.0\n56.1\n95.1\n58.4\n Aug\n58.3\n0.0\n0.0\n58.3\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-19.3\n0.0\n56.1\n95.2\n58.3\n Sep\n58.9\n0.0\n0.0\n58.9\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-19.3\n0.0\n55.9\n95.5\n58.9\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2016 \nTABLE 2.4: ACCEPTING HOUSES - LIABILITIES\nUS$ Millions\n \n \n \nLiquid \nAssets\nNotes \nBalances \nTrade\nTreasury\nTotal\nMortgage\nOther\nOther\nNon Financial \nTotal\nEnd of\nBond Coins\n&\nwith Other \nBills\nBills\nLiquid \nAdvances\nAdvances\nAssets\nAssets\n Assets\nCoin\nBanks\n Assets\nat Banks\n2010\n0.0\n11.8\n0.0\n73.3\n0.0\n85.1\n65.0\n24.0\n8.7\n97.3\n 280.11 \n2011\n0.0\n17.1\n0.0\n76.7\n0.0\n93.8\n199.5\n83.4\n19.0\n109.4\n 505.10 \n2012\n0.0\n29.2\n0.0\n133.2\n163.4\n0.0\n278.1\n118.3\n30.2\n126.9\n 716.91 \n2013\n0.0\n34.8\n158.8\n0.0\n40.0\n233.6\n381.5\n127.7\n55.2\n123.0\n 920.90 \n2014\n0.1\n47.1\n211.2\n0.0\n52.6\n310.9\n512.9\n169.0\n102.9\n125.3\n 1,221.00 \n2015\nJan\n0.1\n37.3\n196.0\n0.1\n51.8\n269.8\n511.6\n172.1\n143.2\n126.1\n 1,222.64 \nFeb\n0.1\n32.1\n244.4\n0.1\n51.9\n296.5\n522.9\n176.2\n138.9\n125.8\n 1,260.24 \nMar\n0.1\n52.4\n214.4\n0.1\n52.0\n266.6\n508.7\n180.0\n174.8\n125.5\n 1,255.51 \nApr\n0.1\n32.5\n243.2\n0.0\n60.4\n336.3\n520.2\n182.5\n118.3\n124.8\n 1,282.04 \nMay\n0.1\n33.6\n257.7\n0.0\n60.1\n351.5\n448.7\n235.1\n137.5\n125.2\n 1,297.97 \nJun\n0.2\n59.6\n204.9\n0.0\n60.1\n324.8\n464.9\n231.9\n139.4\n122.0\n 1,283.00 \nJul\n0.2\n51.6\n205.5\n0.1\n62.9\n320.2\n461.5\n230.6\n133.9\n121.9\n 1,268.20 \nAug\n0.1\n53.0\n158.9\n0.1\n76.2\n288.4\n482.9\n228.4\n136.0\n122.2\n 1,257.94 \nSep\n0.1\n55.4\n161.7\n0.1\n76.0\n293.3\n480.4\n235.9\n124.6\n122.1\n 1,256.35 \nOct\n0.1\n45.2\n229.1\n0.1\n76.0\n350.5\n494.0\n265.1\n126.0\n122.8\n 1,358.35 \nNov\n0.1\n43.6\n256.8\n0.1\n76.1\n376.7\n292.0\n479.3\n131.8\n121.1\n 1,400.90 \nDec\n0.1\n27.3\n284.0\n0.0\n76.6\n387.9\n317.4\n470.4\n114.7\n118.4\n 1,408.85 \n2016\nJan\n0.1\n17.4\n227.8\n0.0\n76.6\n331.9\n326.9\n415.3\n145.6\n119.7\n 1,339.40 \nFeb\n0.2\n13.9\n253.5\n0.0\n65.6\n333.2\n324.4\n420.2\n148.4\n119.6\n 1,345.82 \nMar\n0.2\n20.8\n266.6\n0.0\n48.3\n335.9\n339.6\n399.4\n142.9\n119.4\n 1,337.22 \nApr\n0.2\n9.5\n213.7\n0.0\n90.9\n314.2\n332.5\n402.2\n143.6\n119.2\n 1,311.79 \nMay\n0.1\n7.1\n220.3\n0.0\n93.3\n320.8\n404.6\n341.0\n149.9\n122.9\n 1,339.24 \nJun\n0.2\n8.0\n278.0\n0.0\n104.0\n390.0\n348.0\n389.4\n146.0\n119.3\n 1,392.30 \nJul\n0.2\n8.2\n231.4\n0.0\n101.6\n341.4\n341.5\n412.1\n154.8\n123.8\n 1,373.55 \nAug\n0.1\n7.4\n225.6\n0.0\n95.1\n328.2\n348.0\n402.7\n152.0\n123.4\n 1,354.26 \nSep\n0.2\n4.1\n236.7\n0.0\n95.5\n336.5\n349.1\n406.2\n115.2\n123.3\n 1,330.26 \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2016 \nTABLE 2.5: BUILDING SOCIETIES- ASSETS\nUS$ Millions\nOf which\nDeposits\nCapital\nOther\nTotal\nLiabilities to \nthe \nand\nLiabilities\n Liabilities\nPublic\nEnd of\nSavings and \nShort-term\nLong-term\nTotal\nReserves\n Deposits\n2010\n92.3\n52.5\n144.9\n101.9\n33.4\n 280.1 \n144.9\n2011\n186.4\n100.7\n287.1\n121.3\n96.7\n 505.1 \n287.0\n2012\n255.8\n184.6\n440.3\n177.8\n28.1\n 716.9 \n440.3\n2013\n370.3\n197.3\n567.6\n219.6\n133.9\n 921.0 \n567.6\n2014\n400.9\n387.5\n788.4\n262.7\n27.6\n 1,234.9 \n788.4\n2015\nJan\n373.0\n397.1\n770.2\n267.8\n31.0\n 1,222.6 \n770.2\nFeb\n405.8\n400.3\n806.2\n272.9\n29.2\n 1,260.2 \n806.2\nMar\n408.1\n386.3\n794.4\n275.8\n25.8\n 1,255.5 \n794.4\nApr\n464.1\n364.8\n828.9\n276.8\n28.7\n 1,282.0 \n828.9\nMay\n472.0\n391.6\n863.6\n270.7\n27.8\n 1,298.0 \n863.6\nJun\n492.9\n343.9\n836.8\n272.9\n31.1\n 1,283.0 \n836.8\nJul\n458.3\n370.6\n828.9\n277.4\n27.5\n 1,268.2 \n828.9\nAug\n438.4\n386.1\n824.5\n282.7\n29.9\n 1,257.9 \n824.5\nSep\n498.9\n334.3\n833.2\n288.4\n35.0\n 1,285.0 \n833.2\nOct\n465.3\n428.4\n893.7\n293.6\n29.7\n 1,358.4 \n893.7\nNov\n446.1\n474.4\n920.4\n297.7\n36.0\n 1,400.9 \n920.4\nDec\n480.5\n463.9\n944.4\n293.3\n28.8\n 1,408.8 \n944.4\n2016\nJan\n447.7\n443.1\n890.7\n298.3\n32.3\n 1,339.4 \n890.7\nFeb\n446.8\n441.8\n888.6\n301.9\n31.5\n 1,345.8 \n888.6\nMar\n433.3\n449.5\n882.8\n289.7\n46.0\n 1,337.2 \n882.8\nApr\n455.3\n403.8\n859.2\n320.7\n45.5\n 1,339.2 \n859.2\nMay\n455.3\n403.8\n859.2\n320.7\n45.5\n 1,339.2 \n859.2\nJun\n463.4\n443.7\n907.0\n319.0\n46.3\n 1,392.3 \n907.0\nJul\n420.3\n486.9\n907.3\n324.1\n33.4\n 1,373.5 \n907.3\nAug\n359.8\n523.3\n883.2\n327.4\n33.3\n 1,354.3 \n883.2\nSep\n414.2\n477.3\n891.5\n320.2\n35.5\n 1,360.4 \n891.5\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2016 \nTABLE 2.6 : BUILDING SOCIETIES - LIABILITIES\nUS$ Millions \n \n \nS9 \n \n \n \nEnd of\nBond \nCoins\nRBZ \nDemand \nDeposits\nComm. \nBanks Dem. \nDeposits\nMerchant \nBanks \nDem. \nDeposits\nM1\nComm. \nBanks \nSavings \nDeposits\nBuilding \nSoc. \nSavings \nDeposits\nP O S B \nSavings \nDeposits\nComm. \nBanks U-30 \nDay \nDeposits\nMerchant \nBanks U-30 \nDay Deposits\nBuilding \nSoc. U- 30 \nDay \nDeposits\nM2\nComm. \nBanks O-30 \nDay \nDeposits\nMerchant \nBanks O-\n30 Day \nDeposits\nBuilding \nSoc. O- 30 \nDay \nDeposits\nBuilding \nSoc. Class \nC \nDeposits\nBuilding \nSoc. \nOther \nShare \nDeposits\nP O S B \nTime \nDeposits\nM3\n2009\n0.0\n185.2\n996,286.9\n36,033.8 1,032,505.9\n94,905.0\n32,364.7\n13,702.2\n45,361.6\n73,354.2\n2,894.1\n1,295,087.7\n54,412.4\n9,250.1\n9,776.3\n1,500.0\n6,332.8\n4,887.9\n1,381,247.2\n2010\n0.0\n186.8\n1,230,648.3\n141,200.0 1,372,035.1\n194,400.4\n65,394.5\n28,600.5\n197,255.1\n241,039.3\n26,946.3\n2,125,671.0\n77,607.4\n53,073.5\n52,544.3\n0.0\n10,141.6\n8,570.5\n2,327,608.3\n2011\n0.0\n80.5\n1,738,095.6\n106,850.7 1,845,026.8\n150,648.2\n123,501.5\n44,220.9\n505,981.7\n65,287.0\n62,893.7\n2,797,559.8\n131,736.8\n52,440.1\n100,654.2\n0.0\n10,141.6\n7,869.0\n3,100,401.5\n2012\n0.0\n80.8\n1,981,218.7\n108,094.7 2,089,394.2\n253,471.9\n180,152.6\n54,893.7\n613,008.0\n67,930.5\n65,572.4\n3,324,423.3\n314,380.7\n44,191.4\n184,561.2\n0.0\n10,141.6\n8,973.9\n3,886,672.1\n2013\n0.0\n71.9\n1,825,413.5\n134,494.8 1,959,980.2\n281,785.8\n204,200.7\n62,044.0\n489,493.1\n56,379.8\n155,932.2\n3,209,815.8\n496,391.7\n6,900.3\n197,343.9\n0.0\n11,266.6\n10,606.9 3,932,325.2\n2014\n0.0\n144.5\n2,121,401.6\n36,942.7 2,158,488.8\n267,179.5\n236,423.8\n69,601.1\n654,559.9\n31,176.0\n144,211.5\n3,561,640.5\n449,703.8\n0.0\n365,334.8\n0.0\n11,266.6\n15,174.4 4,403,120.1\n2015\n Jan\n567.1\n714.7\n1,967,789.9\n39,049.7\n2,008,121.3\n282,832.4\n233,498.2\n70,144.8\n638,395.6\n40,928.2\n127,399.4\n3,401,319.9\n544,421.5\n0.0\n366,978.6\n0.0\n11,266.6\n16,138.8 4,340,125.3\nFeb\n1096.7\n898.5\n1,978,595.1\n38,382.5\n2,018,972.8\n240,444.7\n238,848.9\n72,839.1\n574,946.1\n40,362.2\n149,834.6\n3,336,248.4\n597,685.2\n0.0\n375,166.9\n0.0\n11,266.6\n17,519.8 4,337,886.9\nMar\n1294.0\n545.0\n2,051,081.7\n68,611.1\n2,121,531.8\n230,198.0\n244,746.0\n75,993.4\n645,401.5\n12,132.4\n152,280.6\n3,482,283.7\n503,769.1\n0.0\n355,362.1\n0.0\n11,266.6\n17,638.5 4,370,320.0\nApr\n1749.3\n491.6\n1,990,235.2\n63,935.0\n2,056,411.0\n267,921.4\n256,526.3\n74,678.1\n607,334.3\n0.0\n189,428.7\n3,452,299.9\n618,804.9\n0.0\n340,739.4\n0.0\n11,266.6\n15,733.8 4,438,844.6\nMay\n2316.7\n340.2\n2,017,918.3\n63,899.2\n2,084,474.4\n275,167.8\n280,947.9\n71,195.6\n670,242.5\n0.0\n175,953.7\n3,557,981.9\n536,216.7\n0.0\n364,490.5\n0.0\n11,266.6\n18,011.8 4,487,967.5\nJun\n2684.1\n4,035.0\n2,112,470.2\n62,949.9\n2,182,139.2\n248,074.6\n279,625.3\n73,397.6\n707,686.1\n0.0\n188,805.2\n3,679,728.0\n509,642.0\n0.0\n326,111.5\n0.0\n11,266.6\n17,261.6 4,544,009.7\nJul\n2719.3\n3,889.6\n2,023,527.6\n62,949.9\n2,093,086.3\n239,113.1\n275,914.5\n68,785.7\n587,421.2\n0.0\n171,250.8\n3,435,571.5\n651,895.8\n0.0\n351,579.9\n0.0\n11,266.6\n23,646.5 4,473,960.3\nAug\n3016.3\n3,480.3\n2,168,409.0\n62,949.9\n2,237,855.5\n227,534.6\n277,271.4\n71,554.2\n505,981.9\n0.0\n156,077.5\n3,476,274.9\n622,991.6\n0.0\n340,974.7\n0.0\n11,266.6\n21,540.3 4,473,048.2\nSep\n3425.5\n3,478.9\n2,166,471.3\n62,157.8\n2,235,533.5\n230,176.6\n230,176.6\n77,161.5\n613,287.8\n0.0\n190,548.2\n3,635,952.6\n611,608.0\n0.0\n303,177.5\n0.0\n11,266.6\n24,019.0 4,586,023.7\nOct\n4,445.3\n3,485.7\n2,149,026.8\n61,925.6\n2,218,883.4\n231,465.3\n294,208.3\n73,380.5\n565,136.6\n0.0\n144,911.8\n3,527,985.9\n628,213.7\n0.0\n409,350.0\n0.0\n11,266.6\n24,010.2 4,600,826.4\nNov\n5,789.3\n2,470.9\n2,358,226.5\n58,750.3\n2,425,237.0\n259,856.4\n308,439.9\n76,307.7\n565,317.5\n0.0\n127,578.2\n3,762,736.7\n503,244.7\n0.0\n444,267.1\n0.0\n11,266.6\n23,668.6 4,745,183.7\nDec\n7,127.0\n726.0\n2,362,538.7\n58,524.4\n2,428,916.0\n266,166.6\n296,041.8\n72,505.8\n650,234.3\n0.0\n165,352.5\n3,879,217.1\n420,265.1\n0.0\n432,822.3\n0.0\n11,266.6\n21,851.3 4,765,422.3\n2016\nJan\n7355.5\n1,832.8\n2,430,098.0\n58,511.7\n2,497,798.0\n280,598.5\n297,854.8\n73,735.7\n597,527.6\n0.0\n131,683.2\n3,879,197.9\n424,676.9\n0.0\n413,975.8\n0.0\n11,266.6\n25,326.6 4,754,443.8\nFeb\n7457.3\n2,086.4\n2,409,398.2\n58,304.5\n2,477,246.4\n291,567.7\n305,980.4\n73,847.9\n588,796.4\n0.0\n123,683.2\n3,861,122.0\n449,879.1\n0.0\n421,729.2\n11,266.6\n11,266.6\n24,881.2 4,768,878.1\nMar\n7612.1\n1,423.3\n2,510,951.1\n58,315.0\n2,578,301.4\n290,006.1\n311,092.0\n74,405.9\n506,719.1\n0.0\n108,106.2\n3,868,630.7\n573,809.8\n0.0\n438,461.8\n11,266.6\n11,266.6\n24,640.9 4,916,809.8\nApr\n7758.5\n5,061.6\n2,575,573.8\n58,346.2\n2,646,740.1\n299,136.9\n317,629.3\n80,067.6\n574,185.2\n0.0\n171,635.9\n4,089,395.1\n519,330.5\n0.0\n361,565.5\n0.0\n11,266.6\n23,321.3 5,004,879.1\nMay\n8005.8\n3,602.5\n2,644,003.9\n58,364.1\n2,713,976.2\n282,597.7\n332,211.2\n79,203.4\n674,068.8\n0.0\n118,100.1\n4,200,157.3\n438,306.5\n0.0\n374,720.6\n0.0\n11,266.6\n26,430.9 5,050,881.9\nJun\n8106.8\n3,701.2\n2,743,164.8\n58,364.1\n2,813,336.8\n270,213.2\n313,154.7\n79,502.7\n546,356.7\n0.0\n134,140.9\n4,156,705.0\n554,032.6\n0.0\n390,530.0\n0.0\n11,266.6\n28,174.9 5,140,709.1\nJul\n8243.2\n9,125.9\n2,690,977.0\n58,350.7\n2,766,696.7\n346,442.2\n313,391.2\n75,483.3\n552,519.8\n0.0\n90,761.4\n4,145,294.6\n522,523.5\n0.0\n429,065.6\n0.0\n11,266.6\n29,891.3 5,138,041.5\nAug\n8854.6\n4,363.6\n2,849,745.9\n58,341.8\n2,921,305.9\n289,814.6\n278,711.3\n74,820.4\n629,146.7\n0.0\n45,096.0\n4,238,894.9\n458,749.8\n0.0\n488,344.9\n0.0\n11,266.6\n30,579.6 5,227,835.9\nSep\n9423.3\n4,176.7\n2,926,587.6\n58,880.3\n2,999,067.9\n337,034.7\n270,825.2\n74,238.6\n522,187.7\n0.0\n114,909.8\n4,318,263.9\n541,267.4\n0.0\n419,987.3\n0.0\n11,266.6\n30,126.8 5,320,912.0\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2016 \nNote:\nRBZ - Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe\nDMBs - Deposit Money Banks (Commercial Banks and Merchant Banks)\nOBIs - Other Banking institutions (Building Sicieties)\nTABLE 3.1: MONETARY AGGREGATES\nUS$ Thousands\n \n \nS10 \n \n \n \nUS$ Thousands\nEnd of\nNET FOREIGN \nASSETS \nTotal Foreign \nAssets\nLiabilities \\2\nNET \nDOMESTIC \nASSETS \nDOMESTIC \nCREDIT\nClaims on \nGovernment \n(net) \nRBZ\nDMBs\nOBIs\nClaims on \nPublic \nEnterprises \nClaims on \nPrivate \nSector\nRBZ\nDMBs\nOBIs\nOTHER \nITEMS \n(NET) \nBROAD \nMONEY \n(M3) \n2009\n-278,784.49\n1,072,911.46\n \n-1,351,696.0\n1,660,033.9\n723,950.3\n-1,857.6\n-1,857.6\n0.0\n0.0\n25,498.0\n700,309.9\n16,553.5\n636,385.6\n47,370.8\n936,083.6\n1,381,249.4\n2010\n-140,293.98\n1,174,644.56\n \n-1,314,938.5\n2,467,902.3\n1,694,451.8\n-5,656.9\n-4,729.2\n0.2\n-927.9\n22,907.5\n1,677,201.2\n12,925.5\n1,539,154.5\n125,121.2\n773,450.5\n2,327,608.3\n2011\n-296,486.94\n1,055,987.41\n \n-1,352,474.4\n3,396,888.3\n2,798,126.8\n-1,834.8\n-1,834.8\n0.0\n0.0\n44,924.5\n2,755,037.2\n44,539.3\n2,377,457.1\n333,040.7\n598,761.5\n3,100,401.4\n2012\n-435,528.84\n1,089,808.49\n \n-1,525,337.3\n4,322,201.0\n3,788,468.5\n176,058.4\n-11,097.8\n185,922.5\n1,233.6\n51,716.9\n3,560,693.2\n40,636.3\n3,065,153.8\n454,903.2\n533,732.4\n3,886,672.1\n2013\n-810,172.35\n1,042,165.96\n \n-1,852,338.3\n4,742,497.4\n4,068,697.5\n357,997.4\n-1,182.3\n319,016.2\n40,163.5\n60,645.0\n3,650,055.2\n35,116.1\n3,053,645.3\n561,293.9\n673,799.9\n3,932,325.1\n2014\n-1,750,112.68\n(132,686.92)\n \n-1,617,425.8\n5,130,451.6\n4,378,654.6\n515,636.4\n-25,063.7\n487,962.9\n52,737.2\n66,750.2\n3,796,268.1\n34,726.3\n3,010,101.6\n751,440.3\n751,796.9\n4,403,120.1\n2015\nJan\n-714,190.62\n830,959.41\n \n-1,545,150.0\n5,054,316.0\n4,231,495.4\n544,026.1\n-12,594.0\n504,696.7\n51,923.4\n64,967.7\n3,622,501.6\n34,725.3\n2,835,002.6\n752,773.8\n822,820.5\n4,340,125.3\nFeb\n-763,306.53\n737,833.47\n \n-1,501,140.0\n5,101,193.5\n4,249,052.3\n549,179.2\n-12,908.0\n510,080.3\n52,007.0\n68,944.3\n3,630,928.8\n34,725.3\n2,824,415.9\n771,787.7\n852,141.2\n4,337,887.0\nMar\n-565,959.32\n816,079.57\n \n-1,382,038.9\n4,936,279.4\n4,371,027.6\n537,675.3\n-22,274.1\n500,344.5\n59,604.9\n71,543.2\n3,761,809.1\n31,409.0\n2,960,892.4\n769,507.7\n565,251.8\n4,370,320.1\nApr\n-636,028.06\n755,493.40\n \n-1,391,521.5\n5,074,872.7\n4,529,777.2\n665,258.8\n98,377.6\n498,836.6\n68,044.6\n102,474.3\n3,762,044.1\n31,558.0\n2,948,993.7\n781,492.4\n545,095.4\n4,438,844.6\nMay\n-681,066.49\n811,200.44\n \n-1,492,266.9\n5,169,034.0\n4,817,875.2\n950,594.0\n97,847.8\n784,428.5\n68,317.8\n104,306.3\n3,762,974.9\n31,155.6\n2,960,917.8\n770,901.6\n351,158.7\n4,487,967.5\nJun\n-775,512.62\n926,353.71\n \n-1,701,866.3\n5,319,522.4\n4,869,072.4\n1,074,237.6\n91,807.5\n904,112.3\n78,317.8\n53,148.2\n3,741,686.6\n51,689.8\n2,900,630.1\n789,366.8\n450,450.0\n4,544,009.7\nJul\n-723,772.77\n843,689.23\n \n-1,567,462.0\n5,197,733.1\n4,981,511.5\n1,160,044.8\n243,082.9\n845,865.3\n71,096.6\n48,641.8\n3,772,824.9\n66,722.4\n2,910,157.5\n795,945.0\n216,221.6\n4,473,960.3\nAug\n-727,785.66\n867,447.06\n \n-1,595,232.7\n5,200,833.8\n5,029,107.1\n1,192,006.7\n244,517.6\n860,228.9\n87,260.2\n56,508.0\n3,780,592.5\n92,768.9\n2,875,477.3\n812,346.3\n171,726.7\n4,473,048.2\nSep\n-715,689.39\n889,018.56\n \n-1,604,707.9\n5,301,713.1\n5,079,842.4\n1,182,354.0\n254,297.8\n838,982.9\n89,073.3\n54,523.7\n3,842,964.7\n67,359.3\n2,956,930.6\n818,674.8\n221,870.7\n4,586,023.7\nOct\n-822,417.21\n784,372.60\n \n-1,606,789.8\n5,423,243.6\n5,196,662.7\n1,253,218.7\n271,997.2\n890,154.0\n91,067.5\n84,877.1\n3,858,567.0\n75,959.6\n2,950,844.9\n831,762.5\n226,580.9\n4,600,826.4\nNov\n-771,547.97\n667,350.67\n \n-1,438,898.6\n5,516,731.6\n5,345,272.0\n1,359,827.4\n314,096.4\n954,556.6\n91,174.4\n83,806.0\n3,901,638.6\n77,442.5\n2,981,759.1\n842,437.0\n171,459.6\n4,745,183.7\nDec\n-683,664.57\n796,212.39\n \n-1,479,877.0\n5,449,086.9\n5,560,695.5\n1,590,109.9\n357,307.3\n1,119,720.1\n113,082.5\n134,914.6\n3,835,671.0\n96,088.9\n2,874,287.6\n865,294.5\n-111,608.6\n4,765,422.3\n2016\nJan\n-688,591.44\n758,634.57\n \n-1,447,226.0\n5,443,035.2\n5,476,442.4\n1,530,792.2\n355,230.5\n1,068,095.4\n107,466.4\n145,507.6\n3,800,142.6\n93,049.5\n2,860,825.0\n846,268.2\n-33,407.2\n4,754,443.8\nFeb\n-780,139.70\n679,001.86\n \n-1,459,141.6\n5,549,017.8\n5,489,962.3\n1,671,934.4\n418,006.5\n1,153,295.1\n100,632.7\n120,445.0\n3,697,582.8\n74,614.5\n2,773,512.1\n849,456.3\n59,055.5\n4,768,878.1\nMar\n-728,823.68\n687,149.82\n \n-1,415,973.5\n5,645,633.4\n5,542,678.3\n1,691,128.7\n446,003.9\n1,166,120.4\n79,004.4\n179,370.7\n3,672,178.9\n56,342.7\n2,774,147.9\n841,688.3\n102,955.1\n4,916,809.8\nApr\n-803,151.98\n637,447.51\n \n-1,440,599.5\n5,808,031.0\n5,623,621.7\n1,804,057.3\n456,287.0\n1,226,195.8\n121,574.4\n185,698.9\n3,633,865.5\n58,614.2\n2,736,322.0\n838,929.3\n184,409.4\n5,004,879.1\nMay\n-897,595.53\n623,538.08\n \n-1,521,133.6\n5,948,477.4\n5,627,841.4\n1,834,775.4\n468,433.1\n1,241,961.8\n124,380.4\n197,207.6\n3,595,858.4\n58,864.7\n2,691,318.7\n845,675.0\n320,636.1\n5,050,881.9\nJun\n-682,717.98\n667,173.21\n \n-1,349,891.2\n5,823,427.1\n5,719,589.2\n1,948,003.0\n508,837.0\n1,305,509.6\n133,656.4\n199,989.6\n3,571,596.6\n49,967.1\n2,681,469.9\n840,159.6\n103,837.9\n5,140,709.1\nJul\n-569,021.47\n663,489.32\n \n-1,232,510.8\n5,707,063.0\n5,759,394.1\n2,028,573.1\n552,972.5\n1,342,573.5\n133,027.1\n242,550.6\n3,488,270.3\n50,177.0\n2,571,743.7\n866,349.6\n-52,331.0\n5,138,041.5\nAug\n-572,883.43\n661,991.90\n \n-1,234,875.3\n5,800,719.3\n5,753,421.7\n2,026,952.7\n583,837.7\n1,320,529.8\n122,585.2\n238,843.8\n3,487,625.2\n52,542.1\n2,572,338.2\n862,744.9\n47,297.6\n5,227,835.9\nSep\n-572,131.98\n636,418.94\n \n-1,208,550.9\n5,893,044.0\n5,829,096.5\n2,092,955.9\n602,271.5\n1,359,348.4\n131,336.0\n215,863.7\n3,520,276.9\n53,467.1\n2,605,032.7\n861,777.1\n63,947.5\n5,320,912.0\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2016 \nNote:\nRBZ - Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe\nDMBs - Deposit Money Banks (Commercial Banks and Merchant Banks)\nOBIs - Other Banking institutions (Building Sicieties)\nTABLE 3.2: BROAD MONEY SURVEY\n \n \nS11 \n \n \n \nEnd of \nNET \nFOREIGN \nASSETS \n Total \nForeign \nAssets\n Liabilities \nNET \nDOMESTIC \nASSETS \nDOMESTIC \nCREDIT\n Claims on \nGovernment \n(net) \nRBZ\nDMBs\n \nOBIs\n Claims on \nPublic \nEnterprises \n Claims on \nPrivate \nSector\nRBZ\nDMBs\nOBIs\nOTHER \nITEMS \n(NET) \nBROAD \nMONEY \n(M3) \n \nBroad \nMoney \n(M3) \n \nDomestic \nCredit \n \nClaims \non \nPrivate \nSector\n2009\n26,314.88\n-517.75\n26,832.6\n144,736.2\n96,198.3\n-435.2\n-435.2\n0.0\n0.0\n2,769.7\n93,863.8\n-7,572.3\n88,829.1\n12,607.0\n48,537.8\n171,051.0\n14.1%\n15.3%\n15.5%\n2010\n116,717.58\n179,819.36\n-63,101.8\n-85,407.8\n130,555.6\n-523.1\n-815.6\n300.1\n-7.6\n1,201.0\n129,877.7\n-945.2\n119,963.6\n10,859.3\n-215,963.3\n31,309.8\n1.4%\n8.3%\n8.4%\n2011\n24,582.01\n29,394.75\n-4,812.7\n-12,756.7\n50,334.2\n-207.2\n-207.2\n0.0\n0.0\n2,887.1\n47,654.3\n-957.7\n35,712.8\n12,899.2\n-63,090.9\n11,825.3\n0.4%\n1.8%\n1.8%\n2012\n-94,629.12\n26,397.46\n-121,026.6\n156,644.5\n167,516.4\n95,348.0\n-63.0\n95,410.9\n0.0\n252.4\n71,916.0\n-885.3\n68,894.3\n3,906.9\n-10,871.9\n62,015.4\n1.6%\n4.6%\n2.1%\n2013\n191,626.53\n185,511.04\n6,115.5\n-66,411.8\n-22,612.8\n26,199.6\n5.8\n26,263.8\n-70.1\n-199.9\n-48,612.5\n0.0\n-52,550.5\n3,938.0\n-43,799.0\n125,214.7\n3.3%\n-0.6%\n-1.3%\n2014\n40,492.90\n62,580.06\n \n-22,087.1\n-52,838.5\n25,722.4\n53,210.7\n-11,032.2\n44,484.8\n19,758.1\n89.2\n-27,577.5\n1.0\n-26,693.6\n-884.9\n-78,560.9\n-12,345.5\n-0.3%\n0.6%\n-0.7%\n2015\nJan\n5,210.76\n-65,220.31\n70,431.1\n-68,504.1\n-147,158.2\n28,389.7\n12,469.7\n16,733.8\n-813.8\n-1,782.4\n-173,765.5\n0.0\n-175,099.0\n1,333.5\n78,654.1\n-63,293.4\n-1.4%\n-3.4%\n-4.6%\nFeb\n-49,115.91\n-93,125.93\n44,010.0\n46,877.5\n17,556.9\n5,153.1\n-314.0\n5,383.6\n83.5\n3,976.6\n8,427.2\n0.0\n-10,586.7\n19,013.9\n29,320.6\n-2,238.4\n-0.1%\n0.4%\n0.2%\nMar\n197,347.21\n78,246.10\n \n119,101.1\n-164,914.1\n121,975.3\n-11,503.9\n-9,366.0\n-9,735.8\n7,597.9\n2,598.9\n130,880.3\n-3,316.3\n136,476.5\n-2,280.0\n-286,889.4\n32,433.1\n0.7%\n2.9%\n3.6%\nApr\n-70,068.75\n-60,586.18\n-9,482.6\n138,593.3\n158,749.6\n127,583.5\n120,651.7\n-1,507.9\n8,439.7\n30,931.2\n234.9\n149.0\n-11,898.7\n11,984.7\n-20,156.4\n68,524.5\n1.6%\n3.6%\n0.0%\nMay\n-45,038.42\n55,707.04\n \n-100,745.5\n94,161.3\n288,098.0\n285,335.2\n-529.8\n285,591.8\n273.1\n1,832.0\n930.9\n-402.4\n11,924.1\n-10,590.8\n-193,936.7\n49,122.9\n1.1%\n6.4%\n0.0%\nJun\n-94,446.14\n115,153.27\n \n-209,599.4\n150,488.4\n51,197.2\n123,643.6\n-6,040.3\n119,683.9\n10,000.0\n-51,158.1\n-21,288.3\n20,534.2\n-60,287.7\n18,465.2\n99,291.2\n56,042.3\n1.2%\n1.1%\n-0.6%\nJul\n51,739.85\n-82,664.47\n134,404.3\n-121,789.3\n112,439.1\n85,807.2\n151,275.4\n-58,247.0\n-7,221.2\n-4,506.4\n31,138.3\n15,032.7\n9,527.4\n6,578.2\n-234,228.4\n-70,049.4\n-1.5%\n2.3%\n0.8%\nAug\n-4,012.89\n23,757.82\n \n-27,770.7\n3,100.7\n47,595.6\n31,961.9\n1,434.7\n14,363.6\n16,163.6\n7,866.2\n7,767.5\n26,046.5\n-34,680.2\n16,401.3\n-44,494.9\n-912.2\n0.0%\n1.0%\n0.2%\nSep\n12,096.27\n21,571.50\n \n-9,475.2\n100,879.2\n50,735.3\n-9,652.6\n9,780.2\n-21,245.9\n1,813.1\n-1,984.3\n62,372.2\n-25,409.6\n81,453.3\n6,328.5\n50,144.0\n112,975.5\n2.5%\n1.0%\n1.6%\nOct\n-106,727.83\n-104,645.96\n-2,081.9\n121,530.5\n116,820.4\n70,864.7\n17,699.4\n51,171.1\n1,994.2\n30,353.4\n15,602.3\n8,600.4\n-6,085.7\n13,087.7\n4,710.2\n14,802.7\n0.3%\n2.3%\n0.4%\nNov\n50,869.25\n-117,021.94\n167,891.2\n93,488.0\n148,609.3\n106,608.7\n42,099.2\n64,402.6\n106.9\n-1,071.0\n43,071.6\n1,482.9\n30,914.2\n10,674.5\n-55,121.3\n144,357.2\n3.1%\n2.9%\n1.1%\nDec\n87,883.40\n128,861.72\n \n-40,978.3\n-67,644.7\n215,423.5\n230,282.5\n43,210.9\n165,163.5\n21,908.1\n51,108.6\n-65,967.5\n18,646.4\n-107,471.5\n22,857.6\n-283,068.2\n20,238.7\n0.4%\n4.0%\n-1.7%\n2016\nJan\n-20,906.51\n(34,042.69)\n \n13,136.2\n9,928.0\n-58,954.0\n-33,562.5\n23,678.3\n-51,624.8\n-5,616.0\n4,597.4\n-29,989.0\n2,500.0\n-13,462.6\n-19,026.4\n68,882.0\n-10,978.5\n-0.2%\n-1.1%\n-0.8%\nFeb\n-91,548.26\n(79,632.71)\n \n-11,915.5\n105,982.5\n13,519.9\n141,142.2\n62,776.1\n85,199.8\n-6,833.7\n-25,062.5\n-102,559.8\n-18,435.0\n-87,312.9\n3,188.1\n92,462.7\n14,434.3\n0.3%\n0.2%\n-2.7%\nMar\n51,316.02\n8,147.96\n \n43,168.1\n96,615.7\n52,716.0\n19,194.3\n27,997.4\n12,825.3\n-21,628.3\n58,925.6\n-25,403.9\n-18,271.7\n635.8\n-7,768.0\n43,899.6\n147,931.7\n3.1%\n1.0%\n-0.7%\nApr\n-74,328.30\n(49,702.30)\n \n-24,626.0\n162,397.6\n80,943.4\n112,928.5\n10,283.1\n60,075.4\n42,570.0\n6,328.3\n-38,313.4\n2,271.5\n-37,825.9\n-2,759.0\n81,454.2\n88,069.3\n1.8%\n1.5%\n-1.0%\nMay\n67,954.04\n(13,909.43)\n \n-80,534.1\n140,446.4\n4,219.7\n30,718.1\n12,146.1\n15,766.0\n2,806.0\n11,508.7\n-38,007.1\n250.4\n-45,003.2\n6,745.7\n136,226.7\n46,002.9\n0.9%\n0.1%\n-1.0%\nJun\n214,877.55\n43,635.12\n \n171,242.4\n-125,050.3\n91,747.9\n113,227.7\n40,403.9\n63,547.8\n9,276.0\n2,782.0\n-24,261.7\n-8,897.6\n-9,848.8\n-5,515.3\n-216,798.2\n89,827.2\n1.8%\n1.6%\n-0.7%\nJul\n113,696.51\n(3,683.89)\n \n117,380.4\n-116,364.1\n39,804.8\n80,570.1\n44,135.6\n37,063.9\n-629.3\n42,561.0\n-83,326.3\n210.0\n-109,726.3\n26,190.0\n-156,168.9\n-2,667.6\n-0.1%\n0.7%\n-2.3%\nAug\n-3,861.96\n(1,497.42)\n \n-2,364.5\n93,656.3\n-5,972.4\n-1,620.4\n30,865.2\n-22,043.8\n-10,441.9\n-3,706.9\n-645.1\n2,365.0\n594.5\n-3,604.7\n99,628.7\n89,794.3\n1.7%\n-0.1%\n0.0%\nSep\n751.45\n(25,572.96)\n \n26,324.4\n92,324.7\n75,674.8\n66,003.2\n18,433.8\n38,818.7\n8,750.8\n-22,980.1\n32,651.7\n925.0\n32,694.5\n-967.8\n16,649.8\n93,076.1\n1.8%\n1.3%\n0.9%\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2016 \nNote:\nRBZ - Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe\nDMBs - Deposit Money Banks (Commercial Banks and Merchant Banks)\nOBIs - Other Banking institutions (Building Sicieties)\nTABLE 3.3: ANALYSIS OF MONTHLY CHANGES IN MONEY SUPPLY\nUS$ Thousands\n \n \nS12 \n \n \n \nEnd of \nNET \nFOREIGN \nASSETS \n Total \nForeign \nAssets\nLiabilities \nRBZ\n \nDMBs\n \nOBIs\nNET \nDOMESTIC \nASSETS \nDOMESTIC \nCREDIT\n Claims on \nGovernment \n(net) \nRBZ\nDMBs\n \nOBIs\n Claims on \nPublic \nEnterprises \n Claims on \nPrivate \nSector\n \nRBZ\n \nDMBs\n \nOBIs\nOTHER \nITEMS \n(NET) \nBROAD \nMONEY (M3) \n \nBroad \nMoney \n(M3) \n \nDomestic \nCredit \n \nClaims \non \nPrivate \nSector\n2010\n138,490.5\n101,733.1\n36,757.4\n-141,632.9\n104,900.3\n-24.8\n807,868.4\n970,501.5\n-3,799.3\n-2,871.6\n0.2\n-927.9\n-2,590.5\n976,891.3\n-3,628.0\n902,768.9\n77,750.4\n-162,633.2\n946,358.9\n68.5%\n134.1%\n139.5%\n2011\n-156,193.0\n-118,657.1\n-37,535.8\n-1,363.1\n13,206.8\n25,692.2\n928,986.1\n1,103,675.0\n3,822.1\n2,894.4\n-0.2\n927.9\n22,016.9\n1,077,836.0\n31,613.8\n838,302.6 207,919.6\n-174,689.0\n772,793.1\n33.2%\n65.1%\n64.3%\n2012\n-139,041.9\n33,821.1\n-172,863.0\n-2,908.6\n177,406.0\n-1,634.4\n925,312.7\n990,341.7\n177,893.2\n-9,262.9\n185,922.5\n1,233.6\n6,792.4\n805,656.0\n-3,903.1\n687,696.6 121,862.5\n-65,029.0\n786,270.8\n25.4%\n35.4%\n29.2%\n2013\n-374,643.5\n-47,642.5\n-327,001.0\n989.6\n319,316.8\n6,694.5\n420,296.5\n280,229.0\n181,938.9\n9,915.4\n133,093.6\n38,929.9\n8,928.1\n89,362.0\n-5,520.2\n-11,508.5\n106,390.7\n140,067.4\n45,653.0\n1.2%\n7.4%\n2.5%\n2014\n82,840.8\n-152,071.7\n234,912.5\n-127,369.6\n-131,012.2\n23,469.3\n387,954.1\n309,957.1\n157,639.0\n-23,881.4\n168,946.7\n12,573.7\n6,105.2\n146,212.9\n-389.8\n-43,543.7\n190,146.4\n77,997.0\n470,795.0\n12.0%\n7.6%\n4.0%\n2015\nJan\n132,431.5\n-178,961.3\n311,392.8\n-141,597.9\n-198,281.1\n28,486.1\n319,048.5\n245,588.9\n185,227.8\n-11,412.3\n184,880.3\n11,759.9\n4,414.7\n55,946.4\n-390.8\n-120,031.2 176,368.4\n73,459.6\n451,480.0\n11.6%\n6.2%\n1.6%\nFeb\n36,127.1\n-294,685.4\n330,812.5\n-142,138.7\n-217,181.2\n28,507.4\n279,980.3\n134,866.3\n122,671.7\n-11,726.2\n122,554.5\n11,843.4\n8,255.0\n3,939.6\n-390.8\n-192,169.1 196,499.5\n145,114.0\n316,107.4\n7.9%\n3.3%\n0.1%\nMar\n250,879.1\n-205,308.8\n456,187.9\n-294,509.5\n-187,715.9\n26,037.5\n25,501.8\n190,918.6\n47,442.1\n-21,094.5\n49,095.3\n19,441.3\n-7,984.8\n151,461.2\n-3,336.1\n-33,095.8\n187,893.1\n-165,416.8\n276,380.8\n6.8%\n4.6%\n4.2%\nApr\n59,815.5\n-308,111.1\n367,926.6\n-261,255.8\n-130,095.6\n23,424.8\n148,570.5\n379,639.8\n188,341.5\n99,556.4\n60,904.0\n27,881.1\n24,181.6\n167,116.7\n-3,187.1\n-19,566.9\n189,870.6\n-231,069.3\n208,386.1\n4.9%\n9.1%\n4.6%\nMay\n-95,449.8\n-379,009.3\n283,559.6\n-283,804.9\n-23,610.5\n23,855.8\n257,686.8\n679,564.0\n482,132.6\n99,026.6\n354,951.8\n28,154.2\n25,922.7\n171,508.7\n-3,589.5\n4,881.3\n170,216.9\n-421,877.2\n162,237.0\n3.8%\n16.4%\n4.8%\nJun\n-180,094.9\n-200,283.4\n20,188.5\n-48,600.0\n14,958.5\n13,453.0\n400,538.7\n695,004.5\n575,620.5\n92,986.5\n444,479.8\n38,154.2\n-20,025.0\n139,409.0\n16,964.5\n-55,223.4\n177,667.9\n-294,465.8\n220,443.8\n5.1%\n16.7%\n3.9%\nJul\n-22,698.6\n-183,460.8\n160,762.2\n-96,131.8\n-83,111.7\n18,481.3\n272,589.1\n776,284.9\n736,056.5\n289,241.2\n415,882.2\n30,933.0\n-28,752.0\n68,980.4\n31,997.2\n-103,031.0 140,014.2\n-503,695.8\n249,890.4\n5.9%\n18.5%\n1.9%\nAug\n-100,052.1\n-212,180.1\n112,128.0\n-60,845.6\n-63,177.9\n11,895.4\n251,024.5\n794,638.6\n754,533.2\n270,492.4\n448,362.7\n35,678.2\n-13,816.8\n53,922.1\n58,043.6\n-141,232.5 137,110.9\n-543,614.1\n150,972.4\n3.5%\n18.8%\n1.4%\nSep\n-179,455.4\n-216,884.3\n37,428.9\n19,340.3\n-46,073.7\n-10,695.4\n376,976.5\n812,660.2\n739,918.1\n290,213.2\n412,213.7\n37,491.3\n-17,867.0\n90,609.0\n32,634.0\n-64,459.1\n122,434.1\n-435,683.7\n197,521.1\n4.5%\n19.0%\n2.4%\nOct\n-223,571.1\n-214,670.1\n-8,901.0\n34,361.2\n-13,602.2\n-11,858.0\n367,137.9\n865,327.7\n782,714.1\n286,430.3\n457,069.2\n39,214.6\n12,502.1\n70,111.5\n41,234.4\n-65,906.0\n94,783.1\n-498,189.8\n143,566.8\n3.2%\n20.0%\n1.9%\nNov\n-3,723.5\n-160,163.5\n156,440.0\n18,611.0\n-162,923.9\n-12,127.1\n333,441.6\n992,339.8\n897,401.8\n328,127.9\n511,078.6\n58,195.3\n17,145.1\n77,793.0\n42,717.2\n-55,036.1\n90,111.8\n-658,898.2\n329,718.1\n7.5%\n22.8%\n2.0%\nDec\n35,736.8\n-99,967.3\n135,704.1\n95,379.1\n-219,844.2\n-11,239.0\n326,266.8\n1,182,041.9\n1,074,473.5\n382,371.0\n631,757.3\n60,345.2\n68,164.4\n39,403.9\n61,363.6\n-135,814.0 113,854.3\n-855,775.0\n362,003.6\n8.2%\n27.0%\n1.0%\n2016\nJan\n25,599.2\n-72,324.8\n97,924.0\n83,389.7\n-170,029.2\n-11,284.5\n388,719.3\n1,244,947.0\n986,766.1\n367,824.5\n563,398.7\n55,543.0\n80,539.8\n177,641.0\n58,324.2\n25,822.4\n93,494.4\n-856,227.7\n414,318.5\n9.5%\n29.4%\n4.9%\nFeb\n-16,833.2\n-58,831.6\n41,998.4\n108,661.8\n-139,327.3\n-11,332.9\n447,824.3\n1,240,909.9\n1,122,755.2\n430,914.6\n643,214.9\n48,625.8\n51,500.7\n66,654.0\n39,889.2\n-50,903.8\n77,668.6\n-793,085.7\n430,991.1\n9.9%\n29.2%\n1.8%\nMar\n-162,864.4\n-128,929.8\n-33,934.6\n217,549.1\n-169,893.9\n-13,720.6\n709,354.1\n1,171,650.7\n1,153,453.4\n468,278.0\n665,775.9\n19,399.5\n107,827.5\n-89,630.2\n24,933.7\n-186,744.5\n72,180.6\n-462,296.6\n546,489.7\n12.5%\n26.8%\n-2.4%\nApr\n-167,123.9\n-118,045.9\n-49,078.0\n223,580.0\n-163,052.9\n-11,449.1\n733,158.4\n1,093,844.4\n1,138,798.4\n357,909.4\n727,359.2\n53,529.8\n83,224.6\n-128,178.6\n27,056.2\n-212,671.7\n57,436.9\n-360,686.0\n566,034.5\n12.8%\n24.1%\n-3.4%\nMay\n-216,529.0\n-187,662.4\n-28,866.7\n315,851.6\n-274,592.8\n-12,392.1\n779,443.5\n809,966.1\n884,181.4\n370,585.4\n457,533.3\n56,062.7\n92,901.3\n-167,116.6\n27,709.1\n-269,599.0\n74,773.4\n-30,522.6\n562,914.4\n12.5%\n16.8%\n-4.4%\nJun\n92,794.6\n-259,180.5\n351,975.1\n-51,292.1\n-287,828.7\n-12,854.3\n503,904.7\n850,516.8\n873,765.5\n417,029.5\n401,397.3\n55,338.7\n146,841.4\n-170,090.0\n-1,722.7\n-219,160.2\n50,792.9\n-346,612.1\n596,699.4\n13.1%\n17.5%\n-4.5%\nJul\n154,751.3\n-180,199.9\n334,951.2\n-104,005.1\n-218,055.8\n-12,890.3\n509,329.9\n777,882.6\n868,528.4\n309,889.6\n496,708.2\n61,930.5\n193,908.8\n-284,554.6\n-16,545.4 -338,413.9\n70,404.6\n-268,552.7\n664,081.2\n14.8%\n15.6%\n-7.5%\nAug\n154,902.2\n-205,455.2\n360,357.4\n-112,782.5\n-233,541.4\n-14,033.5\n599,885.4\n724,314.5\n834,946.0\n339,320.1\n460,300.9\n35,325.0\n182,335.8\n-292,967.3\n-40,226.8 -303,139.1\n50,398.7\n-124,429.1\n754,787.7\n16.9%\n14.4%\n-7.7%\nSep\n143,557.4\n-252,599.6\n396,157.0\n-125,536.2\n-257,589.8\n-13,031.0\n591,330.9\n749,254.1\n910,601.9\n347,973.7\n520,365.5\n42,262.7\n161,340.0\n-322,687.8\n-13,892.2 -351,897.9\n43,102.3\n-157,923.2\n734,888.3\n16.0%\n14.7%\n-8.4%\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2016 \nNote:\nRBZ - Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe\nDMBs - Deposit Money Banks (Commercial Banks and Merchant Banks)\nOBIs - Other Banking institutions (Building Sicieties)\nTABLE 3.4: ANALYSIS OF YEARLY CHANGES IN MONEY SUPPLY\nUS$ Thousands\n \n \nS13 \n \n \n \n \nA GR IC U LTU R E\nC ON S TR U C TION\nC OM M U N IC A TION\nD IS TR IB U TION\nFIN A N C IA L \nFIN A N C IA L\nM A N U FA C TU R IN G\nM IN IN G\nS ER V IC ES\nTR A N S POR T\nIN D IV ID U A LS\nC ON GLOM ER A TES\nTOTA L\nEnd o f \n \nIN V ES TM EN T\nOR GA N IS A TION S\n \n \n \n \n \n2009\n110,230.4\n12,406.6\n10,948.3\n151,169.9\n345.0\n32,093.2\n116,375.5\n36,259.7\n35,593.3\n12,726.1\n23,212.5\n1,016.1\n542,376.7\n2010\n238,969.8\n24,075.5\n15,855.7\n225,277.0\n384.6\n72,693.1\n218,621.4\n71,729.9\n112,325.2\n22,015.6\n86,980.6\n1,122.1\n1,090,050.4\n2011\n366,827.1\n36,043.9\n24,836.9\n323,322,2\n3,720.8\n87,963.3\n310,488.5\n75,310.4\n191,534.5\n55,295.7\n180,205.0\n4,726.2\n1,660,274.6\n2012\n444,341.0\n32,622.8\n37,353.2\n428,782.2\n8,513.2\n31,513.9\n414,044.9\n148,927.9\n233,864.4\n33,116.1\n288,628.5\n9,370.9\n2,111,078.9\n2013\n533,165.2\n42,285.1\n17,617.9\n435,613.1\n5,047.0\n62,165.8\n389,181.2\n115,404.6\n379,809.3\n37,409.1\n369,838.8\n18,252.9\n2,405,790.0\n2014\n565,840.1\n46,298.5\n42,604.8\n437,975.3\n47,805.8\n88,485.5\n478,895.5\n220,501.3\n481,497.5\n43,449.8\n543,038.5\n5,957.7\n3,002,529.6\n2015\nJan\n541,656.5\n46,681.6\n39,906.8\n445,656.6\n21,454.5\n131,350.1\n466,896.6\n207,686.6\n452,817.5\n47,945.7\n557,066.9\n1,401.2\n2,960,820.4\nFeb\n538,722.0\n42,062.8\n47,395.1\n446,647.8\n21,790.0\n117,681.6\n461,237.6\n214,420.4\n463,884.6\n48,357.0\n544,838.5\n1,416.2\n2,948,453.6\nMar\n549,118.0\n42,010.1\n44,087.2\n448,278.7\n76,302.3\n110,180.3\n473,978.1\n203,327.9\n466,104.7\n48,938.0\n550,140.6\n1,339.6\n3,013,805.6\nApr\n556,457.4\n30,687.3\n44,546.9\n451,852.9\n65,696.1\n72,653.7\n457,797.1\n202,418.2\n518,353.6\n47,653.8\n551,662.8\n990.1\n3,000,770.0\nMay\n577,258.6\n31,400.7\n44,839.1\n456,652.1\n64,792.3\n75,682.2\n460,700.3\n192,377.2\n545,363.4\n50,061.9\n561,058.3\n1,034.4\n3,061,220.5\nJun\n576,485.1\n29,649.0\n56,936.5\n463,750.7\n20,117.9\n91,678.4\n407,949.0\n181,512.7\n512,108.4\n40,839.7\n590,917.1\n965.9\n2,972,910.2\nJul\n589,866.7\n27,447.9\n56,456.1\n474,568.7\n21,025.9\n92,335.6\n418,612.0\n186,238.8\n416,928.9\n41,201.6\n579,629.0\n941.4\n2,905,252.7\nAug\n580,775.3\n28,148.8\n58,618.6\n460,451.4\n22,509.2\n105,466.9\n411,831.6\n176,732.7\n440,470.4\n41,154.5\n571,926.0\n886.9\n2,898,972.1\nSep\n598,429.9\n28,307.9\n59,213.0\n443,604.1\n22,711.9\n102,015.0\n421,228.0\n174,144.2\n467,804.5\n43,051.0\n569,250.1\n929.5\n2,930,689.0\nOct\n609,537.2\n33,868.4\n53,813.7\n466,727.6\n21,566.0\n104,959.3\n447,136.6\n141,401.6\n484,254.8\n40,156.6\n573,330.4\n907.7\n2,977,660.0\nNov\n650,547.2\n28,696.7\n49,784.9\n440,864.2\n12,868.9\n104,288.1\n428,393.1\n152,136.9\n444,207.8\n40,760.5\n543,920.4\n696.2\n2,897,164.8\nDec\n590,610.6\n30,958.8\n44,706.5\n366,799.2\n13,354.6\n87,897.5\n450,208.5\n163,452.9\n475,424.5\n40,154.3\n518,998.3\n527.5\n2,783,093.0\n2016\nJan\n577,684.4\n35,033.6\n35,535.9\n379,618.2\n13,329.2\n68,325.8\n476,677.0\n158,150.5\n410,992.6\n40,295.6\n535,379.3\n380.2\n2,731,402.2\nFeb\n539,562.8\n35,885.1\n37,857.4\n374,835.1\n13,285.9\n63,301.8\n473,970.3\n155,889.4\n415,520.6\n40,862.5\n531,789.5\n365.3\n2,683,125.7\nMar\n586,349.7\n39,180.5\n41,037.5\n371,809.6\n13,397.9\n63,061.4\n444,769.1\n156,209.2\n402,900.5\n44,606.7\n588,882.7\n410.7\n2,752,615.5\nApr\n527,545.8\n46,612.5\n40,624.2\n379,572.0\n13,428.1\n69,469.7\n437,795.4\n142,682.1\n421,335.6\n43,921.4\n645,037.3\n9,410.0\n2,777,434.0\nMay\n522,239.8\n40,194.4\n38,496.8\n358,042.5\n13,280.8\n65,381.2\n439,295.5\n145,180.0\n401,304.1\n41,908.5\n651,719.3\n9,579.0\n2,726,621.9\nJun\n510,016.8\n39,316.9\n36,866.1\n361,138.1\n12,764.5\n68,850.3\n433,145.3\n143,595.6\n476,484.5\n42,179.6\n650,071.4\n9,739.2\n2,784,168.3\nJul\n501,744.6\n43,266.6\n12,746.6\n287,960.5\n11,403.0\n64,344.7\n423,354.4\n141,639.6\n489,050.6\n40,059.9\n652,366.8\n9,804.6\n2,677,741.9\nAug\n498,489.6\n43,265.5\n26,005.4\n295,108.0\n11,957.4\n69,959.8\n423,824.7\n139,556.7\n458,763.3\n44,237.3\n636,726.8\n10,497.1\n2,658,391.5\nSep\n487,504.2\n42,900.7\n20,644.2\n338,165.8\n11,960.4\n154,582.0\n409,891.0\n142,259.6\n400,059.8\n40,609.7\n636,000.8\n11,273.3\n2,695,851.6\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2016 \nTABLE 3.5: Sectoral Analysis of Commerical Banks' Loans and Advances\nUS$ Thousands\n \n \nS14 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAGRICULTURE CONSTRUCTION COMMUNICATION\nDISTRIBUTION\nFINANCIAL \nFINANCIAL\nMANUFACTURING\nMINING\nSERVICES\nTRANSPORT INDIVIDUALS CONGLOMERATES\nTOTAL\nEnd of\n \nINVESTMENT\nORGANISATIONS\n \n \n \n \n \n2009\n61,792.7\n \n6,467.2\n \n35,365.8\n \n81,470.7\n \n45,127.5\n \n68,001.8\n \n111,397.9\n \n30,218.3\n \n480,954.6\n \n14,728.8\n \n180,117.5\n \n3,415.5\n \n1,119,058.5\n \n2010\n113,727.1\n \n13,189.9\n \n52,087.1\n \n195,080.2\n \n84,886.8\n \n146,548.7\n \n144,660.9\n \n67,916.4\n \n504,291.2\n \n17,349.7\n \n300,489.1\n \n5,962.4\n \n1,646,189.5\n \n2011\n120,665.7\n \n35,860.2\n \n107,439.2\n \n295,439.3\n \n94,854.2\n \n277,933.7\n \n267,305.3\n \n69,436.0\n \n518,311.2\n \n24,462.2\n \n444,051.7\n \n15,849.9\n \n2,271,608.5\n \n2012\n96,098.4\n \n50,492.7\n \n126,343.5\n \n379,068.0\n \n198,323.3\n \n509,241.6\n \n280,975.4\n \n95,457.1\n \n582,286.2\n \n41,852.2\n \n538,135.2\n \n26,491.3\n \n2,924,764.8\n \n2013\n94,346.3\n \n52,722.4\n \n141,401.4\n \n338,625.9\n \n223,223.8\n \n754,145.4\n \n339,305.6\n \n99,583.3\n \n754,116.1\n \n41,527.2\n \n440,197.9\n \n97,771.1\n \n3,376,966.4\n \n2014\n147,242.4\n \n60,358.1\n \n118,725.7\n \n328,729.5\n \n325,746.6\n \n950,304.9\n \n290,329.3\n \n118,977.8\n \n964,815.0\n \n47,574.3\n \n638,061.1\n \n92,040.8\n \n4,082,906.3\n \n2015\nJan\n155,304.2\n63,950.4\n136,066.9\n349,099.7\n294,145.5\n809,684.0\n314,319.6\n113,452.0\n1,034,514.7\n48,876.5\n606,370.3\n78,746.0\n4,004,529.8\nFeb\n151,740.1\n63,112.6\n109,807.6\n370,581.8\n314,944.7\n784,737.6\n309,307.9\n120,255.1\n1,028,160.1\n43,112.0\n606,650.6\n78,891.2\n3,981,301.2\nMar\n199,484.8\n63,709.2\n116,397.4\n378,460.0\n351,448.0\n762,380.7\n373,911.9\n99,744.6\n912,654.4\n42,478.9\n644,951.3\n72,605.2\n4,018,226.6\nApr\n186,896.3\n65,974.0\n130,284.9\n380,884.8\n330,001.9\n799,952.4\n373,648.3\n109,735.0\n944,772.9\n44,964.9\n653,801.0\n75,850.9\n4,096,767.2\nMay\n185,803.2\n73,167.5\n111,512.1\n523,774.7\n299,659.2\n801,335.5\n419,453.7\n113,355.0\n1,041,392.8\n50,057.9\n619,767.9\n71,388.8\n4,310,668.3\nJun\n187,657.0\n76,777.8\n109,336.0\n498,031.3\n304,087.2\n877,042.8\n338,069.8\n67,556.6\n1,131,497.1\n43,949.0\n651,072.8\n72,166.9\n4,357,244.2\nJul\n180,261.3\n80,536.4\n106,645.3\n452,744.1\n295,611.1\n911,363.8\n360,746.5\n88,518.4\n971,759.9\n53,101.6\n647,215.1\n70,618.8\n4,219,122.4\nAug\n168,075.2\n86,038.9\n108,477.7\n472,875.1\n335,158.3\n784,616.6\n401,830.1\n76,647.0\n1,042,260.4\n55,455.9\n657,177.1\n51,922.5\n4,240,535.0\nSep\n197,641.5\n85,842.6\n112,415.3\n462,925.6\n349,564.2\n831,813.0\n379,121.4\n71,090.0\n1,033,106.7\n53,348.1\n676,308.0\n55,759.2\n4,308,935.5\nOct\n219,922.3\n85,382.0\n116,874.4\n447,200.7\n331,543.6\n821,640.8\n378,568.5\n68,298.7\n1,100,719.7\n55,846.7\n648,757.5\n67,353.2\n4,342,108.3\nNov\n212,806.1\n85,815.7\n98,468.4\n465,089.7\n334,835.6\n846,959.0\n363,754.4\n71,866.2\n1,074,141.8\n56,110.3\n665,421.1\n64,630.3\n4,339,898.7\nDec\n196,092.9\n88,273.0\n102,636.9\n518,411.4\n336,909.2\n864,491.7\n307,845.0\n63,337.5\n1,163,771.1\n57,410.5\n639,985.6\n66,435.7\n4,405,600.5\n2016\nJan\n231,827.3\n101,724.1\n93,544.2\n517,089.2\n325,203.1\n977,272.1\n345,812.2\n62,026.3\n1,083,702.7\n61,755.6\n618,080.1\n58,808.7\n4,476,845.6\nFeb\n226,568.3\n105,747.9\n97,684.4\n525,070.9\n339,839.0\n896,869.2\n326,026.0\n59,381.3\n1,047,904.6\n63,248.3\n634,478.3\n63,017.8\n4,385,835.9\nMar\n243,546.9\n102,238.4\n116,471.1\n582,943.5\n362,058.8\n879,340.8\n368,689.6\n60,514.0\n402,900.5\n62,839.4\n642,779.4\n61,037.6\n4,556,027.1\nApr\n243,151.6\n102,234.0\n112,219.5\n569,660.7\n360,299.5\n907,855.6\n335,068.6\n71,721.0\n1,156,122.6\n63,858.0\n628,901.1\n61,087.0\n4,612,179.4\nMay\n236,180.5\n97,008.6\n120,726.3\n593,284.9\n371,034.5\n923,580.9\n356,500.9\n99,176.4\n1,107,956.8\n61,396.5\n607,501.4\n64,066.3\n4,638,413.9\nJun\n218,386.8\n103,914.2\n134,181.8\n596,904.8\n362,400.2\n973,333.3\n316,490.8\n58,856.9\n1,128,688.7\n72,063.3\n601,813.8\n61,833.2\n4,628,867.8\nJul\n207,280.2\n99,727.9\n138,781.2\n616,359.8\n348,779.7\n1,035,697.0\n370,456.9\n63,986.1\n1,114,413.7\n65,391.9\n622,329.2\n69,058.9\n4,752,262.6\nAug\n233,004.5\n97,248.8\n153,590.8\n578,487.3\n365,366.8\n997,123.0\n356,522.0\n64,413.7\n1,227,979.0\n67,005.8\n621,307.8\n73,076.2\n4,835,125.8\nSep\n236,724.3\n101,117.1\n155,483.5\n597,290.0\n346,375.9\n1,046,195.2\n366,312.8\n57,885.0\n1,365,673.5\n73,805.9\n595,219.8\n70,669.7\n5,012,752.7\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2016 \nTABLE 3.6: Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks' Deposits\nUS$ Thousands\n \n \nS15 \n \n \nEnd of\nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\n INTERNET\nEnd of\nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\n INTERNET\n2015\n2015\nJan\n3,659.00\n11.81\n154.43\n311.94\n352.18\n113.46\nJan\n170.77\n29.55\n1,174.09\n1124.49\n16,903.26\n37.60\nFeb\n3,221.13\n13.69\n141.79\n275.8\n334.62\n104.62\nFeb\n172.25\n32.23\n1,140.94\n1027.88\n16,160.42\n39.94\nMar\n3,801.96\n11.11\n131.97\n298.30\n364.69\n111.70\nMar\n191.64\n30.33\n1183.64\n1110.17\n18211.89\n44.48\nApr\n3,919.47\n10.81\n133.99\n299.67\n341.22\n112.38\nApr\n180.34\n26.98\n1151.25\n1107.52\n17269.69\n43.55\nMay\n3,467.10\n13.08\n128.76\n316.66\n389.97\n124.50\nMay\n179.76\n27.38\n1052.50\n1123.77\n18684.62\n43.22\nJun\n3,014.73\n15.35\n123.53\n333.65\n438.72\n136.62\nJun\n196.41\n31.85\n1121.24\n1038.18\n17478.24\n47.17\nJul\n4,010.26\n12.64\n154.61\n332.37\n391.04\n128.61\nJul\n199.10\n34.00\n1288.23\n1167.43\n18670.44\n49.36\nAug\n3,299.06\n11.39\n193.36\n313.18\n391.19\n133.55\nAug\n153.13\n28.05\n1373.48\n1122.22\n19750.59\n46.52\nSep\n3,762.74\n12.93\n131.89\n318.75\n396.28\n396.28\nSep\n164.31\n31.15\n1196.87\n1103.91\n19133.21\n50.40\nOct\n3,964.53\n11.84\n149.41\n334.93\n434.71\n151.02\nOct\n156.43\n30.775\n1295.03\n1152.83\n22166.45\n54.05\nNov\n3,551.40\n12.02\n130.20\n347.68\n416.95\n154.38\nNov\n143.44\n32.19\n1206.16\n1151.34\n21390.18\n51.34\nDec\n4,167.88\n10.95\n146.60\n411.34\n477.51\n213.28\nDec\n155.04\n27.246\n1359.876\n1183.57\n22904.33\n52.59\nAnnual \nTotal\n43,839.25\n147.62\n1,720.54\n3,894.27\n4,729.07\n1,880.40\nAnnual \nTotal\n2,062.62\n361.73\n14,543.30\n13,413.30\n228,723.31\n560.22\n2016\n2016\nJan\n3,385.87\n11.10\n137.39\n331.52\n388.89\n167.68\nJan\n132.26\n24.62\n1328.93\n1104.45\n19956.07\n49.89\nFeb\n3,448.15\n11.86\n138.75\n312.12\n389.26\n167.93\nFeb\n148.42\n30.26\n1289.46\n1067.13\n19793.73\n54.57\nMar\n3,460.22\n11.26\n142.08\n288.82\n417.13\n255.93\nMar\n152.47\n29.65\n1455.70\n962.91\n21731.49\n61.86\nApr\n3,564.32\n9.65\n180.12\n247.60\n427.29\n168.31\nApr\n161.73\n24.97\n1962.64\n841.34\n21086.57\n59.85\nMay\n3,869.19\n10.83\n214.79\n203.25\n479.93\n217.91\nMay\n199.26\n29.11\n2779.90\n675.85\n23292.99\n83.15\nJun\n3,870.19\n10.27\n203.90\n131.40\n465.10\n174.10\nJun\n268.19\n33.50\n3203.80\n741.94\n23321.17\n87.96\nJul\n3,911.78\n9.19\n240.04\n166.30\n491.22\n218.04\nJul\n242.37\n31.08\n3946.34\n1052.84\n24538.83\n102.75\nAug\n3,928.66\n7.92\n238.03\n165.92\n535.39\n230.62\nAug\n253.94\n27.77\n4038.12\n1156.38\n26009.65\n109.49\nSep\n4,382.93\n10.48\n237.25\n167.66\n533.91\n215.92\nSep\n288.52\n32.49\n4421.91\n1188.53\n27299.97\n99.96\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2016 \nTABLE 4.1 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS TRANSACTIONAL ACTIVITY\nValues of Transactions (US$ in millions)\nTABLE 4.2 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS TRANSACTIONAL ACTIVITY\nVolumes of Transactions (in thousands)\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nEnd of\nNominal Lending \nRates2\nIndividuals \nCorporate\nSavings\n3 Months\n2015\n2015\nJan\n6.00-35.00\n14.16\n9.66\nJan\n0.15-8.00\n3.00-17.00\nFeb \n4.30-33.50\n14\n9.73\nFeb \n0.50-12.00\n1.00-17.00\nMar\n4.30-33.50\n13.24\n8.75\nMar\n0.50-12.00\n1.00-17.00\nApr\n4.30-31.00\n12.71\n8.84\nApr\n0.30-8.00\n1.00-17.00\nMay\n5.00-31.00\n12.74\n8.79\nMay\n0.30-8.00\n1.00-17.00\nJun\n5.00-31.00\n11.94\n8.42\nJun\n0.30-8.00\n1.00-17.00\nJul\n5.00-31.00\n11.86\n8.56\nJul\n0.30-8.00\n1.00-15.00\nAug\n4.30-26.00\n11.96\n8.51\nAug\n0.30-8.00\n1.00-15.00\nSep\n4.30-25.00\n11.81\n8.47\nSep\n0.30-8.00\n1.00-16.00\nOct\n4.00-18.00\n10.98\n7.28\nOct\n0.50-8.00\n1.00-17.00\nNov\n4.00-16.25\n12.2\n7.67\nNov\n0.75-8.00\n1.00-17.00\nDec\n6.00-16.00\n11.99\n7.57\nDec\n0.50-8.00\n0.75-17.00\n2016\n2016\nJan\n6.00-22.00\n12.08\n7.38\nJan\n0.50-8.00\n0.75-17.00\nFeb\n4.00-22.00\n11.48\n7.29\nFeb\n0.50-8.00\n0.75-17.00\nMar\n4.00-22.00\n11.44\n7.16\nMar\n0.50-8.00\n0.75-17.00\nApr\n4.00-22.00\n11.5\n7.2\nApr\n0.50-8.00\n0.75-17.00\nMay\n4.00-18.00\n11.43\n7.35\nMay\n0.50-8.00\n0.75-17.00\nJun\n4.00-18.00\n11.4\n7.48\nJun\n0.50-6.00\n0.75-17.00\nJul\n4.00-18.00\n10.69\n6.79\nJul\n0.50-6.00\n0.75-17.00\nAug\n4.00-18.00\n10.67\n6.84\nAug\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-17.00\nSep\n4.00-18.00\n10.66\n6.95\nSep\n0.50-6.00\n1.00-17.00\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2016\nNotes\nTABLE 5.2 : BANKS DEPOSIT RATES (percent per annum)1\n1. The range of rates qouted by banks during the \nperiod.\n2. Three (3) months deposit rates revised to exclude \nrates on inactive or dormant accounts.\nTABLE 5.1: LENDING RATES (percent per annum)1\n1. Table revised, to separate weighted lending rates for \nindividuals and corporate bodies. \n2. Nominal Lending Rates depict the range of rates quoted by \nbanks.\nWeighted Average Lending Rates3 \nCommercial Banks\nCommercial Banks\nEnd of \n \n \n \n \nUS$ Millions\nEnd of\nIndustrial\nMining\nMarket Capitalisation\n2015\nJan\n164.90\n58.13\n4,365.14\nFeb\n167.16\n55.38\n4,353.38\nMar\n158.22\n43.92\n4,117.08\nApr\n156.23\n42.93\n4,066.07\nMay\n152.96\n44.45\n3,978.06\nJun\n148.4\n44.3\n3,803.80\nJul\n145.35\n39.36\n3,812.65\nAug\n135.43\n35.34\n3,552.02\nSep\n131.93\n24.36\n3,444.50\nOct\n130.83\n23.57\n3,416.11\nNov\n117.55\n22.33\n3,141.68\nDec\n114.85\n23.72\n3,073.41\n2016\nJan\n103.04\n19.53\n2,790.40\nFeb\n99.40\n19.14\n2,692.30\nMar\n97.17\n19.53\n2,645.06\nApr\n105.79\n20.16\n2,862.61\nMay\n104.70\n25.54\n2,881.34\nJun\n101.04\n24.70\n2,780.90\nJul\n98.84\n25.72\n2,772.04\nAug\n99.47\n26.32\n2,734.33\nSep\n98.96\n26.61\n2,725.13\nTABLE: 5.3: ZIMBABWE STOCK MARKET STATISTICS\nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE),2016\nIndices\n \n \nS18 \n \n \n \nFOOD \nINFLATION\nALL\nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES \nCLOTHING\nHSING, \nWATER,\nFURNITURE\nHEALTH\nTRANSPORT\nCOMMUNICATION\nRECREATION &\nEDUCATION\nRESTAURANTS \n&\nMISC.\nTOTAL \nNON\nFOOD & \nITEMS\n& TOBACCO\nFOOTWEAR\nELECTRICTY, \nGAS\nAND\nCULTURE\nHOTELS\nGOODS &\nFOOD\nNON \nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES\n& OTHER\nEQUIPMENT\nSERVICES\nFUELS\nWEIGHTS\n4.38\n6.05\n17.74\n9.91\n2.16\n9.76\n3.41\n2.1\n5.67\n1.38\n3.91\n66.47\n33.53\n100\n2010\n-0.2\n-0.2\n0.2\n0.0\n0.1\n-0.2\n-0.3\n-0.2\n0.0\n0.5\n0.1\n0.1\n0.6\n0.3\n2011\n0.1\n0.2\n0.6\n0.3\n0.0\n0.5\n0.9\n0.2\n0.5\n0.7\n0.5\n0.4\n0.5\n0.4\n2012\n0.0\n0.0\n0.9\n0.1\n0.2\n0.6\n0.0\n0.0\n1.1\n0.3\n0.2\n0.2\n0.3\n0.3\n2013\n0.4\n0.0\n0.3\n-0.1\n0.2\n0.1\n-1.2\n-0.1\n0.9\n0.2\n-0.1\n0.1\n-0.2\n0.0\n2014\n0.1\n0.0\n0.0\n-0.2\n0.1\n0.1\n0.0\n0.0\n0.4\n-0.1\n-0.2\n-0.2\n-0.2\n-0.1\n2015\nJan\n-0.04\n-0.01\n0.08\n0.07\n0.06\n-0.97\n-13.41\n0.02\n-0.08\n-0.48\n0.30\n-0.69\n0.40\n-0.34\nFeb\n0.25\n-0.35\n-0.09\n-0.11\n-0.02\n-0.41\n-0.10\n-0.17\n0.00\n-0.28\n0.10\n-0.13\n0.05\n-0.07\nMar\n0.12\n-0.27\n-0.06\n-0.02\n-0.05\n0.02\n0.00\n0.03\n0.00\n0.12\n0.10\n-0.03\n-0.03\n-0.03\nApr\n-0.01\n-0.71\n-3.35\n-0.46\n-0.05\n-0.15\n-0.13\n-0.07\n0.59\n0.41\n-0.04\n-1.01\n-0.63\n-0.89\nMay\n-0.17\n-0.41\n0.18\n-0.25\n0.10\n-0.25\n-0.02\n-0.11\n0.00\n-0.08\n-0.44\n-0.10\n-0.37\n-0.19\nJun\n0.36\n-0.06\n-0.02\n-0.07\n-0.17\n0.06\n0.01\n-0.09\n0.00\n-0.07\n0.11\n0.01\n-0.45\n-0.14\nJul\n-0.08\n0.05\n-0.56\n-0.82\n0.15\n-0.09\n-0.02\n-0.14\n7.48\n-0.02\n0.03\n0.47\n-0.81\n0.06\nAug\n-0.27\n-0.01\n0.02\n-0.14\n-0.04\n-0.29\n-0.06\n-0.26\n0.00\n-0.14\n-0.09\n-0.10\n-0.75\n-0.31\nSep\n-0.05\n0.00\n-0.62\n-0.52\n0.04\n-0.42\n-0.38\n-0.01\n0.00\n1.28\n-0.30\n-0.31\n-0.47\n-0.36\nOct\n-0.43\n-0.31\n-0.08\n-0.32\n0.61\n-0.47\n0.02\n-0.14\n0.00\n-0.18\n0.12\n-0.17\n-0.53\n-0.29\nNov\n-0.15\n-0.19\n-0.01\n-0.24\n0.00\n-0.08\n-0.23\n-0.02\n2.83\n-0.03\n-0.02\n0.22\n0.04\n0.16\nDec\n-0.41\n-0.15\n0.18\n-0.07\n-0.06\n-0.25\n-0.03\n0.09\n0.00\n-0.07\n-0.30\n-0.06\n-0.21\n-0.11\n2016\nJan\n0.05\n-0.02\n-0.04\n-0.30\n-0.15\n-0.37\n0.00\n-0.18\n0.00\n-0.16\n-0.29\n-0.13\n0.13\n-0.05\nFeb\n-0.14\n0.00\n-0.12\n-0.19\n-0.17\n-0.37\n-0.13\n-0.01\n0.00\n-0.17\n0.06\n-0.14\n-0.03\n-0.10\nMar\n-0.15\n-0.17\n-1.03\n-0.73\n-0.13\n-0.30\n0.42\n-0.04\n3.36\n-0.62\n-0.60\n-0.11\n-0.13\n-0.12\nApr\n0.03\n-0.14\n-0.02\n-0.32\n0.00\n0.07\n-0.08\n-0.02\n-0.01\n-0.09\n-0.35\n-0.08\n-0.51\n-0.21\nMay\n-0.29\n-0.22\n0.12\n-0.11\n-0.18\n-0.11\n-1.61\n0.06\n0.00\n0.02\n-0.33\n-0.12\n-0.49\n-0.24\nJun\n0.07\n-0.21\n0.58\n0.03\n0.15\n-0.08\n-0.01\n-0.23\n2.65\n0.31\n0.09\n0.44\n-0.35\n0.19\nJul\n0.01\n-0.15\n0.04\n0.05\n-0.15\n-0.03\n-0.36\n0.09\n0.00\n0.04\n-0.30\n-0.03\n-0.52\n-0.19\nAug\n-0.06\n-0.22\n0.00\n-0.03\n-0.02\n-0.13\n-0.02\n-0.10\n0.00\n0.01\n0.13\n-0.04\n-0.31\n-0.13\nSep\n0.10\n-0.03\n-1.11\n-0.27\n-0.03\n-0.08\n-0.09\n-0.26\n0.00\n0.01\n0.10\n-0.34\n-0.06\n-0.26\n Source :ZIMSTATS, 2016\nNON-FOOD INFLATION\nTABLE 5.4 : MONTHLY INFLATION -- PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \\1\n( DECEMBER 2012 = 100)\n \n \nS19 \n \n \n \n \nFOOD \nINFLATION\nALL\nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES \nCLOTHING\nHSING, \nWATER,\nFURNITURE\nHEALTH\nTRANSPORT\nCOMMUNICATI\nON\nRECREATION &\nEDUCATION\nRESTAURANT\nS &\nMISC.\nTOTAL NON\nFOOD & \nITEMS\n& TOBACCO\nFOOTWEAR\nELECTRICTY, \nGAS\nAND\nCULTURE\nHOTELS\nGOODS &\nFOOD\nNON \nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES\n& OTHER\nEQUIPMENT\nSERVICES\nFUELS\nWEIGHTS\n4.38\n6.05\n17.74\n9.91\n2.16\n9.76\n3.41\n2.10\n5.67\n1.38\n3.91\n66.47\n33.53\n100.00\n2010\n-0.5\n-0.5\n0.4\n-0.1\n0.3\n-0.3\n-0.6\n-0.5\n0.3\n1.2\n0.3\n0.3\n1.4\n0.6\n2011\n0.3\n0.5\n1.1\n0.7\n0.0\n1.1\n1.8\n0.3\n0.9\n1.2\n0.9\n0.7\n0.8\n0.7\n2012\n-0.1\n-0.1\n1.7\n0.2\n0.3\n1.1\n0.0\n0.0\n2.2\n0.6\n0.4\n0.4\n0.6\n0.5\n2013\n0.8\n0.0\n0.6\n-0.2\n0.4\n0.2\n-2.3\n-0.2\n1.8\n0.3\n-0.1\n0.3\n-0.3\n0.1\n2014\n0.2\n0.0\n-0.1\n-0.5\n0.2\n0.3\n-0.1\n-0.1\n2.2\n-0.3\n-0.6\n0.1\n-0.6\n-0.1\n2015\nJan\n0.2\n0.0\n0.2\n-0.1\n0.3\n-0.7\n-13.4\n-0.1\n-9.2\n-1.3\n0.2\n-1.6\n-0.1\n-1.1\nFeb\n0.2\n-0.5\n0.1\n-0.1\n0.2\n-1.2\n-13.5\n-0.3\n-0.1\n-1.0\n0.2\n-0.8\n0.1\n-0.5\nMAr\n0.3\n-0.6\n-0.1\n-0.1\n0.0\n-1.4\n-13.5\n-0.1\n-0.1\n-0.6\n0.5\n-0.8\n0.4\n-0.4\nApr\n0.4\n-1.3\n-3.5\n-0.6\n-0.1\n-0.5\n-0.2\n-0.2\n0.6\n0.2\n0.2\n-1.2\n-0.6\n-1.0\nMay\n-0.1\n-1.4\n-3.2\n-0.7\n0.0\n-0.4\n-0.1\n-0.2\n0.6\n0.4\n-0.4\n-1.1\n-1.0\n-1.1\nJun\n0.2\n-1.2\n-3.2\n-0.8\n-0.1\n-0.3\n-0.1\n-0.3\n0.6\n0.3\n-0.4\n-1.1\n-1.4\n-1.2\nJul\n0.1\n-0.4\n-0.4\n-1.1\n0.1\n-0.3\n0.0\n-0.3\n7.5\n-0.2\n-0.3\n0.4\n0.1\n-0.3\nAug\n0.0\n0.0\n-0.6\n-1.0\n-0.1\n-0.3\n-0.1\n-0.5\n7.5\n-0.2\n0.1\n0.4\n0.0\n-0.4\nSep\n-0.4\n0.0\n-1.1\n-1.5\n0.2\n-0.8\n-0.5\n-0.4\n7.5\n1.1\n-0.4\n0.1\n-0.4\n-0.6\nOct\n-0.7\n-0.3\n-0.7\n-1.0\n0.6\n-1.2\n-0.4\n-0.4\n0.0\n1.0\n-0.3\n-0.6\n-1.7\n-1.0\nNov\n-0.6\n-0.5\n-0.7\n-1.1\n0.6\n-1.0\n-0.6\n-0.2\n2.8\n1.1\n-0.2\n-0.3\n-1.0\n-0.5\nDec\n-1.0\n-0.6\n0.1\n-0.6\n0.5\n-0.8\n-0.2\n-0.1\n2.8\n-0.3\n-0.2\n0.0\n-0.7\n-0.2\n2016\nJan\n-0.5\n-0.4\n0.1\n-0.6\n-0.2\n-0.7\n-0.3\n-0.1\n2.8\n-0.3\n-0.6\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nFeb\n-0.5\n-0.2\n0.0\n-0.6\n-0.4\n-1.0\n-0.2\n-0.1\n0.0\n-0.3\n-0.6\n-0.3\n-0.1\n-0.3\nMar\n-0.2\n-0.2\n-1.2\n-1.2\n-0.4\n-1.0\n0.3\n-0.2\n3.4\n-0.9\n-0.9\n-0.4\n0.0\n-0.3\nApr\n-0.3\n-0.3\n-1.2\n-1.2\n-0.3\n-0.6\n0.2\n-0.1\n3.3\n-0.8\n-1.0\n-0.3\n-0.7\n-0.4\nMay\n-0.4\n-0.5\n-0.9\n-1.2\n-0.3\n-0.3\n-1.3\n0.0\n3.4\n-0.7\n-1.3\n-0.3\n-1.1\n-0.6\nJun\n-0.2\n-0.6\n0.7\n-0.4\n0.0\n-0.1\n-1.7\n-0.2\n2.6\n0.2\n-0.6\n0.2\n-1.3\n-0.3\nJul\n-0.2\n-0.6\n0.7\n0.0\n-0.2\n-0.2\n-2.0\n-0.1\n2.7\n0.4\n-0.5\n0.3\n-1.4\n-0.2\nAug\n0.0\n-0.6\n0.6\n0.1\n0.0\n-0.2\n-0.4\n-0.3\n2.7\n0.4\n-0.1\n0.4\n-1.2\n-0.1\nSep\n0.1\n-0.4\n-1.1\n-0.3\n-0.2\n-0.2\n-0.5\n-0.3\n0.0\n0.1\n-0.1\n-0.4\n-0.9\n-0.6\nSource :ZIMSTATS, 2016\nTABLE 5.5 : QUARTERLY INFLATION -- PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \\1\n( DECEMBER 2012 = 100)\nNON-FOOD INFLATION\n \n \nS20 \n \n \n \n \n \nFOOD INFLATION\nALL\nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES \nCLOTHING\nHSING, WATER,\nFURNITURE\nHEALTH\nTRANSPORT\nCOMMUNIC\nATION\nRECREATION &\nEDUCATION\nRESTAURAN\nTS &\nMISC.\nTOTAL \nNON\nFOOD & \nITEMS\n& TOBACCO\nFOOTWEAR\nELECTRICTY, \nGAS\nAND\nCULTURE\nHOTELS\nGOODS &\nFOOD\nNON ALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES\n& OTHER\nEQUIPMENT\nSERVICES\nFUELS\nWEIGHTS\n4.38\n6.05\n17.74\n9.91\n2.16\n9.76\n3.41\n2.1\n5.67\n1.38\n3.91\n66.47\n33.53\n100\n2010\n-2.0\n-6.1\n8.2\n-1.4\n0.6\n5.3\n-4.1\n-2.0\n3.4\n9.6\n-0.8\n2.7\n4.2\n3.1\n2011\n0.1\n1.5\n4.2\n3.1\n-0.3\n7.6\n0.9\n0.1\n3.9\n4.6\n4.3\n3.0\n3.8\n3.3\n2012\n-0.8\n0.8\n11.9\n2.3\n1.6\n2.0\n8.1\n0.8\n8.9\n6.2\n2.8\n3.5\n4.6\n3.7\n2013\n4.1\n-0.2\n4.5\n0.0\n2.9\n5.3\n-10.2\n-0.7\n10.7\n1.6\n0.8\n1.6\n1.7\n1.6\n2014\n1.9\n-0.4\n0.9\n-2.2\n0.7\n0.7\n-3.7\n-0.8\n16.0\n0.8\n-2.0\n1.2\n-3.1\n-0.2\n2015\n Jan\n0.5\n0.0\n-0.2\n-1.9\n1.2\n0.2\n-13.7\n-0.4\n4.3\n-2.2\n-1.8\n-0.6\n-2.7\n-1.3\nFeb\n0.7\n-0.3\n-0.1\n-1.9\n1.1\n-0.3\n-13.8\n-0.6\n4.1\n-2.4\n-1.8\n-0.7\n-2.9\n-1.4\nMar\n0.9\n-0.5\n0.6\n-1.8\n1.0\n-0.3\n-13.8\n-0.5\n4.3\n-2.3\n-1.4\n-0.4\n-2.8\n-1.2\nApr\n0.6\n-1.1\n-2.6\n-1.5\n0.8\n-0.8\n-13.9\n-0.9\n-7.0\n-0.8\n-1.4\n-2.5\n-2.9\n-2.6\nMay\n0.3\n-1.4\n-2.4\n-1.5\n0.9\n-1.2\n-13.9\n-0.9\n-7.1\n-0.8\n-1.4\n-2.6\n-3.0\n-2.7\nJun\n0.7\n-1.5\n-2.4\n-1.6\n0.5\n-1.1\n-13.9\n-0.9\n-7.1\n-0.8\n-1.4\n-2.6\n-3.3\n-2.8\nJul\n0.8\n-1.6\n-3.2\n-2.4\n0.5\n-1.1\n-13.8\n-0.9\n-1.9\n-1.6\n-1.0\n-2.4\n-3.6\n-2.8\nAug\n0.6\n-1.5\n-3.2\n-2.4\n0.4\n-1.7\n-13.8\n-1.1\n-1.9\n-1.8\n0.1\n-2.4\n-3.6\n-2.8\nSep\n0.5\n-1.7\n-4.2\n-2.6\n0.2\n-2.5\n-14.0\n-1.0\n-1.9\n-0.1\n-0.3\n-2.8\n-3.7\n-3.1\nOct\n-0.1\n-2.0\n-4.3\n-2.8\n0.9\n-2.6\n-14.0\n-1.1\n-1.9\n-0.3\n-0.2\n-3.0\n-4.0\n-3.3\nNov\n-0.5\n-2.3\n-4.3\n-2.9\n0.8\n-2.8\n-14.2\n-1.1\n11.1\n0.3\n-0.3\n-1.8\n-3.9\n-2.5\nDec\n-0.9\n-2.4\n-4.3\n-2.9\n0.6\n-3.2\n-14.2\n-0.9\n11.1\n0.4\n-0.4\n-1.9\n-3.7\n-2.5\n2016\nJan\n-0.8\n-2.4\n-4.4\n-3.3\n0.4\n-2.7\n-0.9\n-1.1\n11.2\n0.8\n-1.0\n-1.3\n-4.0\n-2.2\nFeb\n-1.2\n-2.1\n-4.4\n-3.4\n0.2\n-2.6\n-1.0\n0.2\n11.2\n1.0\n-1.2\n-1.4\n-4.0\n-2.2\nMar\n-1.4\n-2.0\n-5.4\n-4.0\n0.1\n-2.9\n-0.6\n-1.0\n14.9\n0.2\n-1.9\n-1.4\n-4.1\n-2.3\nApr\n-1.4\n-1.4\n-2.1\n-3.9\n0.2\n-2.7\n-0.5\n-0.9\n14.2\n-0.3\n-2.2\n-0.5\n-4.0\n-1.6\nMay\n-1.5\n-1.2\n-2.2\n-3.8\n-0.1\n-2.6\n-2.1\n-0.8\n14.2\n-0.2\n-2.1\n-0.5\n-4.1\n-1.7\nJun\n-1.8\n-1.4\n-1.6\n-3.7\n0.2\n-2.7\n-2.1\n-0.9\n17.2\n0.2\n-2.1\n-0.1\n-4.0\n-1.4\nJul\n-1.7\n-1.6\n-1.0\n-2.8\n-0.1\n-2.7\n-2.4\n-0.7\n9.1\n0.3\n-2.4\n-0.6\n-3.8\n-1.6\nAug\n-1.5\n-1.8\n-1.0\n-2.7\n-0.1\n-2.5\n-2.4\n-0.5\n9.1\n0.4\n-2.2\n-0.5\n-3.3\n-1.4\nSep\n-1.4\n-1.8\n-1.5\n-2.5\n-0.1\n-2.2\n-2.1\n-0.8\n9.1\n-0.8\n-1.8\n-0.6\n-2.9\n-1.3\nSource :ZIMSTATS,2016\nTABLE 5.6 : ANNUAL INFLATION -- PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \\1\n( DECEMBER 2012 = 100)\nNON-FOOD INFLATION\n \n \nS21 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nEnd of\nJun-15\nJul-15\nAug-15\nSep-15 Oct-15\nNov-15\nDec-15\nJan-16\nFeb-16\nMar-16\nApr-16\nMay-16\nJun-16\nJul-16\nAug-16\nSep-16\nMerchandise Imports (excl. energy)\n304.8\n \n294.0\n \n221.7\n \n339.1\n \n302.0\n \n272.3\n \n264.4\n \n240.3\n \n225.0\n \n212.1\n \n232.4\n \n172.9\n \n247.2\n \n209.1\n \n263.6\n \n226.5\n \n- Consumption Goods\n162.8\n \n158.0\n \n138.1\n \n184.1\n \n153.2\n \n141.6\n \n141.9\n \n128.3\n \n119.4\n \n113.5\n \n109.4\n \n86.8\n \n115.5\n \n100.3\n \n126.0\n \n121.5\n \n- Capital Goods\n90.4\n \n85.8\n \n38.8\n \n109.6\n \n102.6\n \n93.6\n \n73.2\n \n68.0\n \n67.0\n \n65.6\n \n62.6\n \n44.8\n \n66.7\n \n52.1\n \n62.5\n \n48.0\n \n- Intermediate Goods\n51.6\n \n50.2\n \n44.8\n \n45.4\n \n46.2\n \n37.1\n \n49.3\n \n44.0\n \n38.7\n \n33.0\n \n60.4\n \n41.3\n \n65.1\n \n56.7\n \n75.1\n \n57.0\n \nEnergy (Fuel & Electricity)\n85.0\n \n89.1\n \n65.4\n \n127.0\n \n70.6\n \n71.2\n \n76.1\n \n62.9\n \n62.7\n \n56.2\n \n59.1\n \n42.6\n \n76.3\n \n65.5\n \n67.1\n \n56.6\n \nService Payments\n116.1\n \n126.7\n \n140.6\n \n127.3\n \n129.9\n \n109.6\n \n133.4\n \n111.1\n \n89.5\n \n91.5\n \n102.5\n \n104.0\n \n85.2\n \n99.9\n \n122.1\n \n74.5\n \n- Technical, Professional & consult\n65.1\n \n61.4\n \n48.3\n \n63.6\n \n76.0\n \n56.6\n \n76.6\n \n46.7\n \n38.1\n \n42.3\n \n59.7\n \n64.1\n \n39.8\n \n52.6\n \n66.9\n \n37.7\n \n- Software\n5.2\n \n6.3\n \n4.4\n \n4.7\n \n5.2\n \n5.6\n \n5.7\n \n7.2\n \n6.8\n \n5.4\n \n5.0\n \n5.5\n \n10.1\n \n15.4\n \n6.4\n \n3.0\n \n- Other (tourism, edu, freight etc)\n45.8\n \n59.0\n \n87.8\n \n59.0\n \n48.8\n \n47.4\n \n51.1\n \n57.2\n \n44.6\n \n43.8\n \n37.8\n \n34.4\n \n35.3\n \n31.9\n \n48.7\n \n33.8\n \nIncome Payments (Profits, Dividends\n47.4\n \n63.6\n \n46.5\n \n38.2\n \n26.0\n \n24.7\n \n29.0\n \n22.4\n \n17.6\n \n12.7\n \n18.4\n \n6.4\n \n25.9\n \n11.3\n \n9.0\n \n7.9\n \nCapital Remittances (outward)\n113.5\n \n84.1\n \n54.2\n \n88.2\n \n72.0\n \n85.1\n \n78.4\n \n71.4\n \n61.6\n \n65.9\n \n55.6\n \n45.6\n \n37.8\n \n34.4\n \n28.6\n \n49.9\n \n- External Loan Repayments \n91.6\n \n68.8\n \n44.9\n \n60.8\n \n55.1\n \n54.9\n \n59.9\n \n48.1\n \n43.0\n \n55.0\n \n45.2\n \n35.5\n \n21.4\n \n28.8\n \n17.0\n \n43.1\n \n- Foreign Investment\n21.9\n \n15.2\n \n9.3\n \n27.4\n \n16.9\n \n30.1\n \n18.5\n \n23.3\n \n18.6\n \n10.9\n \n10.4\n \n10.1\n \n16.4\n \n5.6\n \n11.6\n \n6.8\n \nOther Payments\n0.3\n \n1.0\n \n0.9\n \n0.6\n \n1.6\n \n0.7\n \n0.7\n \n0.5\n \n1.0\n \n0.8\n \n1.0\n \n0.2\n \n0.5\n \n0.7\n \n0.2\n \n1.9\n \nTOTAL\n667.1\n \n658.4\n \n529.3\n \n720.5\n \n602.2\n \n563.5\n \n582.0\n \n508.5\n \n457.4\n \n439.2\n \n469.2\n \n371.7\n \n472.8\n \n420.9\n \n490.6\n \n417.3\n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2016\nTable 6.1: Monthly Cross Border Payments (US$ Millions)\n \n \nS22 \n \n \n \n \n \nAgriculture\nHorticulture Manufacturing\nMining\nTobacco\nTourism\n Transport & \nOther Services\nTotal\nEnd of \nTelecom\nJan-15\n14.6\n \n2.2\n \n31.4\n \n214.0\n \n108.3\n \n7.3\n \n39.8\n \n0.7\n \n418.1\n \nFeb-15\n14.4\n \n1.0\n \n27.4\n \n142.2\n \n55.8\n \n7.6\n \n44.6\n \n0.1\n \n293.1\n \nMar-15\n18.4\n \n3.3\n \n25.2\n \n161.9\n \n27.9\n \n10.1\n \n31.3\n \n0.4\n \n278.4\n \nApr-15\n8.9\n \n1.9\n \n17.4\n \n166.0\n \n63.1\n \n10.6\n \n38.0\n \n2.0\n \n307.8\n \nMay-15\n10.3\n \n1.8\n \n22.8\n \n154.0\n \n25.4\n \n12.5\n \n16.4\n \n0.1\n \n243.2\n \nJun-15\n10.6\n \n1.3\n \n21.9\n \n195.9\n \n14.1\n \n12.6\n \n27.7\n \n2.7\n \n286.8\n \nJul-15\n12.6\n \n2.3\n \n30.3\n \n100.1\n \n16.1\n \n16.7\n \n26.0\n \n0.5\n \n204.5\n \nAug-15\n11.7\n \n1.5\n \n14.1\n \n148.4\n \n17.8\n \n16.1\n \n17.0\n \n0.3\n \n226.9\n \nSep-15\n18.1\n \n2.9\n \n28.0\n \n150.1\n \n66.2\n \n15.7\n \n22.8\n \n0.5\n \n304.2\n \nOct-15\n10.2\n \n2.1\n \n23.8\n \n56.6\n \n21.9\n \n14.0\n \n39.2\n \n9.3\n \n177.1\n \nNov-15\n8.5\n \n2.8\n \n19.2\n \n68.2\n \n36.0\n \n11.0\n \n144.1\n \n0.4\n \n290.1\n \nDec-15\n19.3\n \n1.7\n \n23.8\n \n231.4\n \n32.3\n \n10.0\n \n21.4\n \n0.2\n \n339.9\n \nJan-16\n10.4\n \n1.9\n \n12.0\n \n149.9\n \n121.6\n \n0.00\n15.3\n \n3.4\n \n296.7\n \nFeb-16\n15.4\n \n2.2\n \n11.3\n \n64.6\n \n42.5\n \n4.9\n \n20.6\n \n1.9\n \n136.6\n \nMar-16\n15.5\n \n2.2\n \n10.5\n \n202.9\n \n29.9\n \n4.7\n \n23.0\n \n7.9\n \n262.1\n \nApr-16\n7.9\n \n2.9\n \n7.2\n \n69.2\n \n84.3\n \n9.9\n \n12.3\n \n0.2\n \n193.9\n \nMay-16\n9.2\n \n2.3\n \n13.0\n \n206.9\n \n21.9\n \n14.5\n \n20.2\n \n0.2\n \n288.2\n \nJun-16\n6.9\n \n1.7\n \n9.2\n \n101.4\n \n18.4\n \n13.2\n \n18.4\n \n4.0\n \n173.2\n \nJul-16\n8.6\n \n2.1\n \n9.1\n \n258.2\n \n6.8\n \n13.1\n \n12.4\n \n2.3\n \n312.6\n \nAug-16\n15.3\n \n4.8\n \n8.2\n \n187.6\n \n10.2\n \n16.1\n \n21.4\n \n1.0\n \n264.6\n \nSep-16\n13.8\n \n5.8\n \n8.6\n \n151.5\n \n9.7\n \n19.1\n \n19.8\n \n3.1\n \n231.4\n \n Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2016\nTable 6.2: Monthly Cross Border Receipts (Millions)\n \n \nS23 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nEnd of\n2001\n2002\n2003\n2004\n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\n2014\n2015\nLong-Term External Debt\n3,255\n3,327\n3,644\n3,927\n3,805\n3,965\n4,032\n4,464\n4,951\n5,175\n6,096\n6,607\n7,370\n8,444\n8,426\nGovernment\n2,328\n2,376\n2,617\n2,844\n2,895\n3,024\n3,054\n3,464\n4,037\n4,095\n4,638\n4,929\n5,012\n4,522\n5,293\nBilateral Creditors\n1,115\n1,107\n1,255\n1,455\n1,438\n1,520\n1,520\n1,863\n2,308\n2,325\n2,597\n2,694\n2,928\n2,445\n3,310\nMultilateral Creditors\n1,213\n1,269\n1,362\n1,389\n1,457\n1,504\n1,524\n1,592\n1,729\n1,770\n2,041\n2,235\n2,084\n2,078\n1,982\nPrivate Creditors\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n10\n10\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPublic Enterprises\n568\n616\n698\n714\n709\n766\n790\n825\n857\n938\n1,092\n1,198\n1,356\n1,661\n1,220\nBilateral Creditors\n315\n351\n403\n442\n439\n464\n474\n497\n453\n238\n711\n703\n858\n1,155\n760\nMultilateral Creditors\n253\n265\n295\n272\n270\n302\n316\n327\n403\n700\n382\n495\n498\n506\n460\nPrivate Creditors\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nMonetary Authorities\n292\n279\n288\n291\n144\n130\n137\n140\n140\n138\n127\n125\n125\n120\n110\nMultilateral Creditors - IMF\n292\n279\n288\n291\n144\n130\n137\n140\n140\n138\n127\n125\n125\n120\n110\nPrivate\n67\n56\n41\n78\n57\n45\n51\n35\n57\n142\n366\n480\n1,002\n2,261\n1,913\nShort-Term External Debt\n167\n183\n169\n144\n173\n281\n387\n226\n1,198\n1,382\n1,286\n891\n1,564\n2,394\n2,258\nSupplier's Credits\n13\n26\n51\n69\n107\n122\n178\n41\n193\n286\n134\n30\n0\n0\n0\nReserve Bank\n642\n642\n615\n615\n614\n587\n587\nPrivate\n154\n157\n118\n75\n66\n159\n209\n185\n363\n454\n537\n246\n950\n1,807\n1,671\nTotal External Debt\n3,422\n3,510\n3,812\n4,071\n3,978\n4,246\n4,607\n4,690\n6,289\n6,695\n7,382\n7,498\n8,934\n10,838\n10,684\nSource: Ministry of Finance & Economic Development, 2016 ; Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2016\nTABLE 6.3: ZIMBABWE: EXTERNAL DEBT OUTSTANDING BY DEBTOR \n(US$ millions)\n \n \nS24 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nEnd of\n2001\n2002\n2003\n2004\n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\n2014\n2015\n(US$ millions)\nTotal Medium to Long-Term External Debt\n3,255\n3,327\n3,644\n3,927\n3,805\n3,965\n4,032\n4,464\n5,091\n5,313\n6,096\n6,607\n7,370\n8,444\n8,426\nPublic and Publicly Guaranteed Debt \n3,188\n3,271\n3,603\n3,849\n3,748\n3,920\n3,981\n4,429\n5,676\n5,813\n6,345\n6,742\n6,982\n6,768\n7,100\nBilateral Creditors\n1,430\n1,458\n1,658\n1,897\n1,877\n1,984\n1,994\n2,360\n2,761\n2,563\n3,307\n3,397\n3,786\n3,479\n3,960\nMultilateral Creditors\n1,758\n1,813\n1,945\n1,952\n1,871\n1,936\n1,976\n2,059\n2,272\n2,608\n2,423\n2,730\n2,582\n2,704\n2,553\nPrivate Creditors\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n10\n10\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPrivate Non-Guaranteed Long term\n67\n56\n41\n78\n57\n45\n51\n35\n57\n142\n366\n480\n1,002\n2,261\n1,913\nShort-Term External Debt\n167\n183\n169\n144\n173\n281\n387\n226\n1198\n1382\n1,286\n891\n1,564\n2,394\n2,258\n Public and Publicly Guaranteed Debt\n13\n26\n51\n69\n107\n122\n178\n41\n193\n286\n134\n30\n0\n0\n0\n Reserve Bank\n642\n642\n615\n615\n614\n587\n587\n Private\n154\n157\n118\n75\n66\n159\n209\n185\n363\n454\n537\n246\n950\n1,807\n1,671\nTotal External Debt\n3,422\n3,510\n3,812\n4,071\n3,978\n4,246\n4,419\n4,690\n6,289\n6,695\n7,382\n7,498\n8,934\n10,838\n10,684\nGross Domestic Product\n10,887\n6,715\n5,037\n4,299\n2,918\n6,645\n4,000\n3,175\n8157\n9457\n10,956\n12,472\n12,973\n14,068\n13,891\nExternal Debt / GDP\n31.4%\n52.3%\n75.7%\n94.7%\n136.3%\n63.9%\n110.5%\n147.7%\n77.1%\n70.8%\n67.4%\n60.1%\n68.9%\n77.0%\n76.9%\nSource: Ministry of Finance & Economic Development, 2016 ; Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2016\nTABLE 6.4: External Debt Outstanding by Source\n(US$ millions)\n \nS\n \n \n \n \nTABLE 6.5 EXTERNAL DEBT SERVICE AND DEBT SERVICE RATIOS\n (US$ MILLIONS)\nEnd of\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\n2014\n2015\nGovernment\n170\n188\n170\n172\n240\n240\n173.3\nCapital\n131\n154\n142\n136\n156\n156\n130.4\nInterest\n39\n34\n28\n36\n84\n84\n43\nParastatals\n43\n36\n30\n0\n0\n0\n0\nCapital\n34\n29\n25\n0\n0\n0\n0\nInterest\n8\n7\n5\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPrivate\n51\n50\n239\n359\n360\n315\n418.1\nCapital\n45\n43\n178\n281\n315\n270\n255\nInterest\n6\n8\n60\n78\n45\n45\n163.1\nTotal\n264\n274\n438\n530\n600\n555\n591.4\nCapital\n211\n226\n345\n417\n471\n426\n385.4\nInterest\n53\n48\n94\n114\n129\n129\n206\nExports of Goods\nand Services\n1591\n3541\n4771\n4076\n3849\n4480\n3841.9\nDebt Service ratio\n16.6%\n7.7%\n9.2%\n13.0%\n15.6%\n12.4%\n15%\nCapital Service Ratio\n13%\n6%\n7%\n10%\n12%\n10%\n10%\nInterest Service ratio\n3%\n1%\n2%\n3%\n3%\n3%\n5%\nNote: Figures reflect scheduled debt service.\n \nSource: Ministry of Finance & Economic Development, 2016 ; Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2016\n \n \nS26 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n TABLE 7.1: REAL GROSS DOMESTIC AND NATIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA AT MARKET PRICES\n US$ Millions\n Gross\nNet Investment Gross\n Gross\n Gross\n Domestic\nIncome Paid\n National\n Domestic National\nGross Domestic\nGross national\nEnd of\n Product\nto Other\n Product\n Product Product\nProduct\nProduct\nPeriod\nCountries\n \n2009\n8,157.1\n-83.6\n8,073.5\n8,157.1\n8,073.5\n667.0\n660.1\n2010\n9,456.8\n-84.8\n9,372.0\n9,085.0\n9,042.7\n736.2\n732.8\n2011\n10,956.2\n-210.4\n10,745.8\n10,166.6\n10,066.7\n815.9\n807.9\n2012\n12,472.4\n-217.9\n12,174.8\n11,240.8\n11,120.6\n860.7\n851.5\n2013\n13,490.2\n-225.7\n13,264.6\n11,744.8\n11,602.1\n874.5\n863.9\n2014\n14,197.0\n-1,116.4\n13,483.2\n12,197.0\n11,172.9\n885.1\n810.8\n \n \n Source : Zimstat, 2016\nCurrent Prices\nConstant Prices\n Constant Prices\nPer Capita\n \n \nS27 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAgriculture\n Mining \nElectricity\nFinance\nDistribution\n Transport\n Public\nHunting and\n and\nManufacturing and\nConstruction\n and\n Real\nHotels and\nand\nAdministration\n Other\nEnd of\n Fishing\n Quarrying\n Water\nInsurance Estate Restaurants Communication\nEducation\nHealth\n Services\nTotal\n \n2009\n1038\n802\n1066\n279\n137\n572\n110\n1207\n1080\n186\n210\n35\n342\n7065\n2010\n1157\n802\n1109\n359\n182\n638\n126\n1376\n1137\n292\n304\n102\n390\n7974\n2011\n1222\n1006\n1293\n436\n289\n704\n193\n1397\n1320\n321\n518\n109\n453\n9261\n2012\n1377\n1064\n1420\n448\n376\n943\n303\n1601\n1334\n383\n710\n119\n416\n10494\n2013\n1364\n1187\n1457\n492\n399\n1073\n341\n1909\n1374\n402\n879\n123\n400\n11400\n \n \n2014\n1704\n1157\n1450\n546\n426\n1154\n385\n1927\n1478\n436\n1021\n125\n404\n12213\n Source : Zimstat, 2016\n2 . Includes domestic services and allowance for imputed banking service charges .\nTABLE 7.2 : GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT FACTOR COST BY INDUSTRY\n US$ Millions\n (at current prices )\n \n \nS28 \n \n \n \n \n \n Net\n Private\n Gross\n Net\nExpenditure\n Private\n Gvt\n non-profit\n fixed\n Increase\n Total\n export of\n on gross\n consumption current\n making\n captital\n in\n Statistical\n domestic\n goods and\n domestic\nEnd of\nexpenditure bodies\n formation\n stocks\ndiscrepancy\n expenditure\n services\n product\n2009\n9,797.5\n672.4\n412.7\n959.7\n272.3\n0.0\n12,114.7\n-3,957.6\n8,157.1\n2010\n8,150.0\n1,078.6\n543.5\n2,048.5\n210.9\n0.0\n12,064.5\n-2,619.2\n9,445.3\n2011\n11,182.1\n1,804.8\n555.0\n2,063.8\n389.6\n0.0\n15,995.3\n-5,039.0\n10,956.2\n2012\n11,761.0\n1,978.6\n566.5\n2,079.2\n-392.2\n0.0\n15,993.1\n-3,600.3\n12,392.8\n2013\n13,027.2\n2,113.2\n788.6\n1,752.8\n5.4\n0.0\n17,687.1\n-4,196.9\n13,490.2\n2014\n11,521.7\n3,415.2\n992.3\n1,873.4\n5.8\n0.0\n18,211.0\n-3,611.4\n14,196.9\n Source : Zimstat, 2016\n(at current prices)\nUS$ Millions\nTABLE 7.3: EXPENDITURE ON GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT/1\n \nS\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nEnd of\n Gold\nPlatinum\nPalladium\nNickel\nCopper\nCoal\nChrome\nRhodium Other/1\nTotal\n2009\n157.2\n239.1\n0.0\n62.2\n15.4\n58.0\n18.4\n24.1\n47.0\n621.3\n2010\n380.4\n409.1\n100.7\n111.2\n28.5\n97.0\n56.9\n50.3\n12.9\n1246.9\n2011\n655.7\n538.3\n178.3\n175.5\n50.9\n103.9\n73.1\n52.4\n25.8\n1853.9\n2012\n782.8\n464.5\n148.6\n112.4\n39.2\n75.8\n49.0\n31.2\n22.2\n1723.9\n2013\n622.0\n554.0\n205.8\n158.1\n44.2\n90.8\n35.9\n32.9\n17.9\n1761.1\n2014\n615.8\n495.3\n212.5\n202.4\n39.9\n88.3\n40.3\n35.6\n149.1\n1850.7\n2014\nJan\n44.0\n42.4\n16.7\n15.2\n3.6\n7.7\n3.2\n2.4\n12.7\n137.0\nFeb\n42.7\n41.4\n17.1\n15.4\n3.3\n7.4\n3.6\n2.6\n14.0\n134.6\nMar\n48.9\n39.9\n16.6\n11.2\n3.0\n8.1\n3.9\n2.6\n5.7\n135.3\nApr\n47.5\n39.8\n1.7\n14.7\n3.1\n0.0\n4.2\n2.7\n1.3\n115.0\nMay\n47.9\n47.6\n21.5\n20.9\n3.8\n9.5\n3.1\n3.0\n14.7\n172.1\nJun\n46.5\n52.4\n24.7\n22.5\n3.8\n6.3\n3.4\n4.3\n14.9\n178.7\nJul\n56.2\n40.5\n19.1\n18.7\n3.2\n7.3\n3.0\n2.7\n16.0\n166.5\nAug\n54.2\n44.6\n21.5\n19.8\n3.5\n7.8\n3.0\n3.2\n16.2\n173.8\nSep\n60.7\n39.8\n19.5\n19.7\n2.4\n8.4\n2.7\n3.1\n15.9\n172.3\nOct\n53.0\n33.1\n16.1\n13.5\n3.1\n8.8\n3.2\n2.7\n13.6\n147.1\nNov\n49.2\n38.6\n19.6\n16.0\n3.5\n8.7\n3.4\n3.3\n12.2\n154.5\nDec\n64.9\n35.4\n18.3\n14.8\n3.5\n8.2\n3.6\n3.0\n12.0\n163.7\n2015\nJan\n48.6\n35.4\n17.8\n13.6\n3.1\n9.6\n2.0\n3.0\n8.0\n141.0\nFeb \n50.7\n35.8\n18.3\n16.0\n2.9\n8.4\n2.1\n3.0\n9.1\n146.4\nMar\n62.4\n31.5\n17.0\n15.1\n2.9\n6.1\n1.6\n2.7\n8.2\n147.5\nApr\n56.5\n33.8\n17.9\n13.2\n3.0\n4.3\n1.1\n2.8\n7.8\n140.4\nMay\n56.0\n28.1\n15.2\n12.2\n2.8\n5.1\n1.3\n2.3\n8.1\n131.1\nJun\n66.0\n20.5\n10.7\n8.8\n2.4\n5.6\n1.5\n1.6\n8.8\n125.9\nSource: Zimstat, 2016\n1. Other minerals include Ferrosilicon, Iron ore, Iron pyrites and magnesite\nTable 7.4: MINERAL PRODUCTION\nUS$ Millions\n \nS\n \n \nEnd of\nBy Hwange \nPower station\nBy Kariba \nPower \nStation\nBy Other \nPower Station\nIPPs\nTotal from \nZimbabwe\n2010\n2,635.6\n \n5,762.8\n \n74.5\n \n-\n8,472.9\n \n2011\n3,420.0\n \n5,201.8\n \n397.4\n \n-\n9,019.2\n \n2012\n3,133.2\n \n5,387.3\n \n442.1\n \n-\n8,962.7\n \n2013\n3,826.9\n \n4,981.8\n \n506.1\n \n-\n9,314.8\n \n2014\n3,460.2\n \n5,402.4\n \n559.3\n28.9\n \n9,814.9\n \n2015\n3,945.9\n \n4,939.2\n \n583.1\n \n43.0\n \n9,511.2\n \n2015\nJan\n322.2\n418.5\n49.7\n2.6\n792.9\nFeb\n202.0\n376.2\n44.2\n2.6\n625.0\nMar\n228.6\n463.8\n50.5\n2.6\n745.5\nApr\n254.7\n446.6\n42.3\n10.8\n754.4\nMay\n262.3\n492.8\n51.3\n6.3\n812.7\nJun\n395.1\n465.0\n47.5\n3.9\n911.5\nJul\n470.1\n470.0\n58.4\n3.3\n1001.8\nAug\n369.4\n491.7\n50.0\n2.4\n913.5\nSep\n357.2\n341.0\n51.5\n2.4\n752.1\nOct\n339.9\n360.1\n45.2\n1.9\n747.1\nNov\n382.5\n303.6\n45.4\n2.4\n733.9\nDec\n361.9\n309.9\n47.2\n1.8\n720.8\n2016\nJan\n367.3\n281.5\n38.5\n3.8\n691.1\nSource:Zimstat ,2016\nTable 7.5: Electricity Energy Produced and Distributed\nInterconnected System\nGeneration Sent Out\n \n \nS31 \n \n \n \n \n \n(2009=100)\nFood-stuffs \n(including \nstockfeeds)\nDrink and \nTobacco\nTextiles \nincluding \nginning\nClothing \nand \nFootwear\nWood and \nFurniture\nPaper, \nPrinting and \nPublishing\nChemical and \nPetroleum \nProducts\nNon-metalic \nMineral Products\nMetals and \nMetal Products\nTransport and \nTransport \nEquipment\nOther \nManufacturing \nGroups\nAll \nManufacturing \nGroups\nWeight\n252\n118\n28\n79\n24\n68\n172\n46\n103\n20\n89\n1000\n2011\nMean\n100.7\n112.5\n107.4\n88.3\n97.0\n116.5\n101.3\n111.5\n102.5\n97.8\n103.2\n103.2\n2012\nMean\n101.4\n108.1\n117.5\n95.2\n90.7\n106.8\n96.1\n106.9\n82.4\n101.1\n97.1\n99.3\n2013\nMean\n98.7\n88.8\n86.1\n94.3\n104.8\n104.0\n98.8\n121.6\n76.3\n100.7\n82.5\n94.7\n2014\nMean\n98.3\n97.2\n80.4\n82.1\n104.4\n101.3\n90.4\n131.1\n69.8\n61.8\n68.5\n91.4\n2014:Jan\n86.0\n65.7\n47.6\n82.7\n89.2\n99.9\n90.4\n110.7\n63.9\n60.9\n43.6\n78.6\nFeb\n92.8\n88.8\n64.7\n87.1\n94.4\n115.0\n98.7\n122.3\n76.6\n67.5\n56.8\n89.6\nMar\n87.6\n83.2\n61.3\n93.6\n86.0\n104.2\n92.0\n108.8\n69.7\n60.9\n48.5\n83.8\nApr\n93.6\n92.7\n53.5\n92.7\n98.6\n100.0\n92.9\n108.5\n73.7\n65.0\n47.3\n86.6\nMay\n94.5\n87.6\n66.8\n82.4\n83.8\n95.0\n82.6\n114.4\n65.3\n56.5\n56.8\n83.5\nJun\n98.9\n97.9\n93.6\n88.0\n89.7\n108.3\n94.0\n138.5\n68.0\n58.1\n63.3\n92.0\nJul\n103.9\n115.8\n124.7\n61.0\n103.2\n92.9\n90.4\n147.6\n69.5\n59.2\n66.7\n93.7\nAug\n95.6\n113.6\n116.1\n64.4\n101.6\n92.0\n88.8\n142.3\n70.1\n58.0\n65.6\n90.7\nSep\n117.4\n124.7\n114.8\n85.2\n102.6\n97.2\n88.0\n154.0\n69.4\n60.5\n72.4\n100.5\nOct\n119.5\n95.5\n99.2\n89.9\n143.0\n79.3\n89.3\n142.3\n74.8\n65.0\n59.5\n96.4\nNov\n98.1\n109.4\n84.4\n96.5\n163.7\n101.1\n87.2\n153.6\n78.3\n67.7\n97.2\n98.6\nDec\n105.7\n107.9\n72.4\n81.7\n92.5\n97.6\n89.3\n132.0\n65.9\n58.2\n63.1\n91.8\n2015:Jan\n97.3\n109.0\n67.1\n79.1\n84.3\n97.4\n89.7\n135.0\n66.1\n58.6\n64.8\n89.6\nFeb\n121.3\n121.7\n75.3\n97.9\n179.0\n107.3\n97.5\n153.2\n73.5\n65.6\n74.0\n105.7\nMar \n105.4\n110.3\n67.8\n91.0\n145.7\n96.3\n85.6\n141.0\n67.0\n59.6\n68.0\n94.1\nApr\n101.4\n114.7\n69.2\n88.4\n152.4\n99.5\n84.9\n146.5\n70.1\n61.5\n69.2\n94.5\nMay\n104.4\n110.9\n67.2\n85.6\n160.2\n95.7\n82.9\n141.1\n68.2\n59.9\n67.0\n93.4\nJun\n102.4\n113.7\n67.7\n91.2\n171.3\n97.3\n84.1\n145.7\n70.7\n62.5\n69.8\n95.1\nSource:Zimstat ,2016\nTABLE 7.6: VOLUME OF MANUFACTURING INDEX (VMI)\n \n \nS32", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/Quarterly_Economic_Reviews/qersept2016.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "27b28daa9ea523c28814ce9222034d4c", "text": "About us\nWhat we do\nPublications\nNewsroom\nContact us\nSARB POLICY RATE 6.75% \n\n24 Apr 2026\n\nCPI 3.1% \n\nMar 2026\n\nPPI 1.8% \n\nFeb 2026\n\nPRIME 10.25% \n\n24 Apr 2026\n\nR2030\n\t\n\nR209\n\t\n\nSABOR\n\t\n\nZARONIA\n\t\nZAR/USD\n\t\n16.6276\n\nZAR/GBP\n\t\n22.4116\n\nZAR/EUR\n\t\n19.4385\n\nZAR/JPY\n\t\n0.1041\nHome Publications\n \n\nPUBLICATION DETAILS\n\nTitle :\nLesetja Kganyago | Exchange rates and tariffs\nPublished Date:\n2025-10-10\nLast Modified Date:\n2025-10-10, 19:50\nCategory:\nSpeeches > Speeches by Governors | Media > Media Releases | What's New\n\nAddress by the Governor of the South African Reserve Bank at the Kgalema Motlanthe Foundation Drakensberg Inclusive Growth Forum.\n\nAttachments:\nLesetja Kganyago | Exchange rates and tariffs\nBack\nQuick links\nFrequently asked questions\nGold Coins Purchased from the Public\nCareers\nInternet banking\nForms\nExtranets\nWhistleblowing\nPromotion of Access to Information Manual\nSARB Group Privacy Notice\nProcurement\nFraud and scams\nRSS feed subscription\nDisclaimer\nSitemap\nCookie policy\nContact\n\nTo contact us, click here\n\nTelephone: 0861 127 272 \n\n370 Helen Joseph Street,\n\nPretoria, 0002\n\nP O Box 427,\n\nPretoria, 0001\n\nDownload app\nQuarterly Bulletin\nSocial Media\n \nSupported Browsers\n \nThe South African Reserve Bank © Copyright 2020.", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-04-27", "url": "https://www.resbank.co.za/en/home/publications/publication-detail-pages/speeches/speeches-by-governors/2025/kganyago-rates-tariffs"}
{"doc_id": "f9b982f4cc139228d24f4edb03416c0e", "text": "i \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY 2023 \n \n2 \n \nTABLE OF CONTENTS \n \nSELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS ................................................................................. 3 \nOVERVIEW .................................................................................................................................. 4 \nINTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICE DEVELOPMENTS ........................................... 5 \nPrecious Metals .......................................................................................................................... 5 \nBase Metals ................................................................................................................................ 5 \nCopper ........................................................................................................................................ 5 \nBrent Crude Oil............................................................................................................................. 6 \nMERCHANDISE TRADE DEVELOPMENTS......................................................................... 6 \nSTOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS ................................................................................... 11 \nZimbabwe Stock Exchange ........................................................................................................ 11 \nVictoria Falls Stock Exchange ................................................................................................... 13 \nVFEX Market Capitalization..................................................................................................... 13 \nINFLATION OUTTURN ........................................................................................................... 13 \nMonthly Inflation .................................................................................................................... 13 \nNATIONAL PAYMENTS SYSTEM ........................................................................................ 14 \nZimbabwe Electronic Transfer Settlement System (ZETSS) ............................................. 14 \nCash Transactions ................................................................................................................... 14 \nMobile and Internet Based Transactions .............................................................................. 14 \nCard Based Transactions ....................................................................................................... 15 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n3 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2022 \n \nDecember \n2023 \n \nJanuary \n \nMonth-on- Month \nChange (%) \n \nReserve Money2 (M0) (ZW$ millions) \n104,043.82 \n122,997.66 \n18.22 \nMoney Supply2 (M3) (ZW$ millions) \n2,338,226.98 \n2,697,360.47 \n12.89 \nAnnual Inflation1 (%) \n \n105.50 \n101.5 \n-4.0a \nMonthly Inflation1 (%) \n1.30 \n0.7 \n-0.6a \n \nNational Payment System Transactions2 \n(ZW$ billions) \n \n4,990.33 \n4,002.95 \n-19.79 \nNominal Lending Rate2 \n(% per annum) \n100.00-290.00 \n100.00-240.00 \n \nSources: \n1. Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZIMSTAT) \n2. Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) \na- Percentage point. \nSELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS \n \n \n \n4 \n \nOVERVIEW \nThe domestic economy was characterised by \nrelative stability in the month of January 2023, \nwith monthly inflation falling from 1.3% in \nDecember 2022 to 0.7% in January 2023. \nAnnual headline inflation also declined from \n105.5% in December 2023 to 101.5% in \nJanuary 2023. \n \nOn the monetary front, valuation effects on \ndollar deposits, remained the biggest driver of \ndomestic broad money growth. Month-on-\nmonth, broad money increased by 15.36% in \nJanuary 2023, compared to 12.89% recorded in \nDecember 2022. \n \nA relatively weak US dollar and global \nexpectations for the Fed Res to progressively \nsoften its monetary policy stance influenced \ninternational commodity price developments \nduring the month under review. Prices of gold, \nplatinum, copper and crude oil firmed, while \nnickel and palladium prices registered declines. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nThe country’s exports declined by 32% to \nUS$428.9 million in the reporting month. This \nwas largely attributable to the fall in tobacco \nexports on account of seasonality. In addition, \nsupply side constraints also affected gold and \nPGMs exports, during the month of January \n2023. \n \nSimilarly, merchandise imports declined by \n5.3% during the month under review, compared \nto December 2022. This was driven by the fall \nin imports of petroleum fuels. The country’s \nmonthly net external trade position widened \nfrom a deficit of US$97.3 million in December \n2022, to a deficit of US$170.8 million in \nJanuary 2023. \n \nThe general slowdown in economic activities \nwhich characterised the month of January saw \nthe country’s National Payment Systems (NPS) \nprocess transactions valued at ZW$4.0 trillion, \ndown from ZW$4.99 trillion in the previous \nmonth. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n5 \n \n \n \nINTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICE \nDEVELOPMENTS \n \nInternational monthly average prices for gold, \nplatinum, copper, and crude oil firmed, while \nthose for palladium and nickel retreated in \nJanuary \n2023. \nCommodity \nmarket \ndevelopments were largely influenced by a \nweaker U.S dollar, amid growing expectations \nof less aggressive interest rate hikes by the US \nFederal Reserve Bank. \n \nPrecious Metals \n \n Gold \nGold prices increased by 5.7% to US$1,898.95 \nper ounce in January 2023, from US$1,795.97 \nper ounce recorded in the previous month. \nPrices rose as the US dollar retreated, after U.S. \neconomic data cemented expectations of a less-\nhawkish US Federal Reserve Bank monetary \npolicy stance. \n \nPlatinum \nPlatinum prices also extended gains by 4.3%, \nfrom a monthly average of US$1,011.50 per \nounce in the preceding month to US$1,055.26 \nper ounce, during the month under analysis. \nThe increase was largely on account of \nprospects of a rise in investment demand as \nwell as the picking industrial demand in China. \n \nPalladium \nDuring the month under review, palladium \nprices declined by 4.68%, from US$1,820.88 \nper ounce recorded in December 2022 to \nUS$1,735.71 per ounce in January 2023. Prices \ndeclined on fears of low demand induced by a \nglobal economic recession, as well as \ndisruptions to global operations in the semi-\nconductor industry. Figure 1 shows precious \nmetal price developments for the period from \nFebruary 2022 to January 2023. \n Figure 1: Precious Metal Prices (US$/oz.) \nSource: Bloomberg, 2022 \n \n \nBase Metals \n \nCopper \n \nThe reporting month saw copper prices rise by \n7.4%, from US$8,425.2 per tonne in the \nprevious month to US$9,052.29 per tonne. \nPrices rose to record highs underpinned by a \nweaker US dollar and prospects of an increase \nin demand in China, the world’s top metals \nconsumer, following the re-opening of its \neconomy. \n \nNickel \nNickel prices tumbled on anticipation of easing \nsupply \ntightness, \namid \nexpectations \nof \nincreased supply of nickel plate from \n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1000\n1200\n1400\n600\n1100\n1600\n2100\n2600\n3100\nFeb-22\nMar-22\nApr-22\nMay-22\nJun-22\nJul-22\nAug-22\nSep-22\nOct-22\nNov-22\nDec-22\nJan-23\nUS$/oz.\nGold\nPalladium\nPlatinum\n \n \n \n6 \n \nTsingshan Holding Group, a giant Chinese \nnickel producer. This development outweighed \nthe support from prospects of demand recovery \nin China. Prices declined by 1.1%, from a \nmonthly average of US$28,681.85 per tonne in \nthe prior month to US$28,354.14 per tonne, \nduring the month under review. Figure 2 shows \nthe developments in base metal prices for the \nperiod from February 2022 to January 2023. \n \nFigure 2: Base Metal Prices (US$/ton) \nSource: Bloomberg, 2022 \n \nBrent Crude Oil \nBrent Crude oil prices rebounded on account of \ndemand recovery in top importer, China, \nfollowing the relaxation of strict Covid-19 \npandemic restrictions. These developments \noutweighed concerns about the potential \nnegative impact of a global economic recession \non the demand of the commodity. Prices \nincreased by 3.3%, from US$81.54 per barrel \nin December 2022 to US$84.24 per barrel in \nJanuary 2023. \n \n \n \n \n \nFigure 3: Crude Oil Prices (US$/barrel) \n \nSource: Bloomberg, 2022 \n \nMERCHANDISE \nTRADE \nDEVELOPMENTS \n \nTotal merchandise trade for the month of \nJanuary 2023 amounted to US$1,028.7 million, \n24.6% lower than the outturn of US$1,363.9 \nmillion, recorded in the previous month. The \nslowdown was underpinned by marked \ndeclines in both merchandise imports and \nexports. Compared to the corresponding month \nin 2022, total merchandise trade in the \nreporting month was lower by 2.6%. \n \nFigure 4 shows monthly developments in the \ncountry’s merchandise trade for 2022 and \n2023. \n \n \n \n \n \n5,000\n10,000\n15,000\n20,000\n25,000\n30,000\n35,000\n4,000\n5,000\n6,000\n7,000\n8,000\n9,000\n10,000\n11,000\nFeb-22\nMar-22\nApr-22\nMay-22\nJun-22\nJul-22\nAug-22\nSep-22\nOct-22\nNov-22\nDec-22\nJan-23\nNickel US$/ton\nCopper US$/ton\nCopper\nNickel (RHS)\n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\n140\nFeb-22\nMar-22\nApr-22\nMay-22\nJun-22\nJul-22\nAug-22\nSep-22\nOct-22\nNov-22\nDec-22\nJan-23\nUS$/barrel\n \n \n \n7 \n \n \nFigure 4: Merchandise Trade (US$ m) \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2022 \n \nMerchandise Exports \n \nDuring the month under review, the country’s \nexports stood at US$428.9 million, down from \nUS$633.3 million recorded in December 2022. \nThe significant drop was largely attributable to \nthe decrease in export earnings for gold, \ntobacco and PGMs on account of tapered global \nprices, particularly for metals. \nThe slump in gold exports during the month \nunder \nreview \nwas \nalso \nattributable \nto \nproduction disruptions due to waterlogging in \nmine pits, particularly for the small-scale \nminers. \nThe country’s export earnings for the reporting \nmonth were 21.1% lower than in the \ncorresponding month in 2022. \nTable 1 shows developments in the country’s \nexports for the months of December 2022 and \nJanuary 2023. \n \nTable 1: Exports Classified by Harmonized \nCommodity Description and Code System \n \nDec-22 \n(US$m) \nJan-23 \n(US$m) \nDec-Jan \nChanges \n(%) \nShare of \nExports \n(%) \nJan’ 23 \nTotal \nExports \n633.3 \n428.9 \n-32.3 \n100.0 \nOf Which: \n \n \n \n \nGold \n143.3 \n105.3 \n-26.5 \n24.6 \nPGMs \n176.5 \n141.4 \n-19.9 \n33.0 \nTobacco (Inc. \ncigarettes) \n191.2 \n58.1 \n-69.6 \n13.6 \nIndustrial \ndiamonds \n11.3 \n29.1 \n157.5 \n6.8 \nMineral \nsubstances \n25.3 \n25.9 \n2.4 \n6.0 \nFerrochromi\num \n12.4 \n23.9 \n92.7 \n5.6 \nCoal \n17.2 \n17.4 \n1.2 \n4.1 \nChromium \nores \n& \nconcentrates \n3.9 \n3.4 \n-12.8 \n0.8 \nBlack tea \n0.8 \n1.3 \n62.5 \n0.3 \nCane Sugar \n0.1 \n0.9 \n800.0 \n0.2 \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Calculations, 2022 \n*PGMs Include Nickel mattes, nickel ores & \nconcentrates and platinum \n \nThe country’s exports for the month of January \n2023 were predominantly destined for the \nSADC region, with South Africa absorbing \n42.6% of the total. Other notable export \ndestinations \nincluded \nthe \nUnited \nArab \nEmirates, 29.9%; China, 9.2%; Belgium, 4.8%; \nand Mozambique, 3.7%. Figure 5 shows the \ncountry’s major export markets, during the \nmonth under analysis. \n \n \n \n0.0\n100.0\n200.0\n300.0\n400.0\n500.0\n600.0\n700.0\n800.0\n2022\n2023\n \n \n \n8 \n \nFigure 5: Top Ten Merchandise Export \nDestinations (% Share) \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Calculations, 2022 \n \nMerchandise Imports \nThe country’s import bill for the month of \nJanuary 2023 amounted to US$599.7 million, \nrepresenting a 5.3% decrease from US$633.5 \nmillion recorded in the preceding month. \nSimilarly, imports in the month under review \nwere 17.9% lower than in the comparable \nmonth in 2022, as shown in Figure 6. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFigure 6: Merchandise Imports classified by \nHS Codes (US$ m) \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Computations, 2022 \n \nDuring the month under review, diesel, \nunleaded petrol and electricity constituted the \nbulk of the country’s imports, accounting for \n8.7%, 5.3% and 4.3% of the total, respectively. \nElectricity imports rose as the country imported \nenergy from the region to cover the shortfall \ncaused by power generation disruptions at the \ncountry’s thermal power station in Hwange. \nTable 2 shows major commodity imports for \nthe months of December 2022 and January \n2023, respectively. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n42.6\n29.9\n9.2\n4.8\n3.7\n1.6\n1.1\n0.9\n0.6\n0.6\n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\n50.0\nSouth Africa\nUnited Arab Emirates\nChina\nBelgium\nMozambique\nZambia\nNetherlands\nIndonesia\nTurkey\nViet Nam\n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n700\n800\n900\n2022\n2023\n \n \n \n9 \n \nTable 2: Imports Classified by Harmonised \nCommodity Description and Code System \n \nDec-22 \n(US$m) \nJan-23 \n(US$m) \nDec-Jan \nChanges \n(%) \nShare \nof Total \nImports \n(%) \nTotal \nImports \n760.1 \n599.7 \n-21.1 \n100.0 \nOf which \n \n \n \n \nDiesel \n75.5 \n52.1 \n-30.9 \n8.7 \nUnleaded \npetrol \n45.2 \n31.5 \n-30.3 \n5.3 \nElectricity \n20.2 \n25.5 \n26.2 \n4.3 \nFertilizer \nChemicals \n13.8 \n36.2 \n162.4 \n6.0 \nCrude \nsoya \nbean oil \n25.7 \n13.2 \n-48.8 \n2.2 \nWheat \n7.3 \n9.4 \n29.8 \n1.6 \nRice \n11.2 \n9.2 \n-17.8 \n1.5 \nMaize \n(Excluding \nSeed) \n4.0 \n7.5 \n86.3 \n1.3 \nLP Gas \n8.2 \n6.7 \n-18.9 \n1.1 \nMachinery \n2.8 \n6.5 \n132.5 \n1.1 \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Calculations, 2022 \nThe country continued to source most of its \nnon-fuel imports from South Africa and China, \nwhile fuel came from Singapore. Imports from \nSouth Africa accounted for 36.0%, China 5.3%, \nSingapore 13.7%, and the balance from other \ntrading partners, as shown in Figure 7. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFigure 7: Top Ten Merchandise Import \nSources (% Share) \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Calculations, 2022 \n \nMerchandise Trade Balance \nThe afore-mentioned trade developments \nresulted in the widening of the country’s \nmonthly net external trade position, from a \ndeficit of US$97.3 million in December 2022 \nto a deficit of US$170.8 million in January \n2023. Figure 8 shows the country’s trade \nbalance for the months of December 2022 and \nJanuary 2023. \n \nFigure 8: Merchandise Trade Balance \n(US$ m) \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Computations, 2022 \n36.0\n15.3\n13.7\n4.7\n4.0\n3.4\n2.2\n2.0\n1.6\n1.5\nSouth…\nChina\nSingapore\nMauritius\nZambia\nMozambi…\nIndia\nUnspecified\nGermany\nHong Kong\n633.3\n428.9\n730.6\n599.7\n-97.3\n-170.8\n-300.0\n-200.0\n-100.0\n0.0\n100.0\n200.0\n300.0\n400.0\n500.0\n600.0\n700.0\n800.0\nDec-22\nJan-23\nExports\nImports\nTrade Balance\n \n \n \n10 \n \nOn a year-on-year basis, the country’s trade \nposition worsened from a deficit of US$89.6 \nmillion in the corresponding month in 2022 to \nUS$97.3 million, during the month under \nreview. \n \nMONETARY DEVELOPMENTS1 \n \nBroad money (M3) stock amounted to \nZW$2,697.36 \nbillion \nin \nJanuary \n2023, \ncompared to ZW$2,338.23 billion recorded in \nDecember 2022. \nThe money stock was composed of foreign \ncurrency deposits, 60.30%; local currency \ndeposits, 39.52%; and currency in circulation, \n0.18%. Figure 9 shows the composition of \nmoney supply. \n \nFigure 9: Composition of Money Supply \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2022 \n \nMonth-on-month, broad money increased by \n15.36% in January 2023, compared to 12.89% \nrecorded in December 2022. The growth \nlargely reflected increases of ZW$299.00 \nbillion and ZW$59.61 billion in foreign \n \n1All monetary numbers valued in ZW$ since the \nadoption of an interbank market determined exchange \nrate in February 2019. \ncurrency accounts (FCAs) and local currency \ndeposits, respectively. Growth in foreign \ncurrency accounts (FCAs) deposits partly \nreflected revaluation element due to exchange \nrate movement. \nDuring the month under review, domestic \nclaims increased by 15.51%, compared to \n13.94% recorded in the previous month. The \ngrowth in domestic claims was due to an \nincrease of ZW$246.63 billion in credit to the \nprivate sector. \nOn an annual basis, broad money registered an \nincrease of 473.37%, up from 391.88% in \nDecember \n2022. \nThe \nforeign \ncurrency \ncomponent of broad money increased by \n722.82%, while the local currency component \nincreased by 292.58%. \nThe growth in foreign currency deposits, from \nZW$197.68 billion in January 2022 to \nZW$1,626.59 billion in January 2023, was \nlargely attributable to valuation changes owing \nto exchange rate movements. The official \nexchange rate depreciated by 590.09%, from \nZW$115.42 per US$1 to ZW$796.52 per \nUS$1, over the period January 2022 to January \n2023, thus contributing to the increase in the \nlocal currency equivalent of the FCA deposits. \nThe annual growth in broad money was mainly \ndriven by increases of ZW$1,091.25 billion \n(447.61%) in credit to the private sector, and \nZW$387.35 billion (645.64%) in net claims on \nGovernment. Net claims on Government, \nhowever, includes the accounting treatment of \nthe drawdowns on the Special Drawing Rights \nLocal \nCurrency \nTransferabl\ne deposits\n28.77%\nForeign \nCurrency \nDeposits\n60.30%\nTime \nDeposits\n10.20%\nCurrency in \nCirculation\n0.18%\nNCDs\n0.56%\n \n \n \n11 \n \n(SDRs), which does not constitute actual \nlending to Government. \nCredit to the private sector was mainly \nchanneled \ntowards \nthe \nagriculture \nand \nhousehold sectors, which received 23.03% and \n22.35% of the total credit, respectively. The \nmanufacturing and distribution sectors received \n12.77% and 11.88% of the credit, respectively. \nPrivate sector credit shares for the rest of the \neconomic sectors are shown in Figure 10. \n \nFigure 10: Distribution of Private Sector \nCredit \n \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2022 \n \nCredit to the private sector was largely utilized \nfor recurrent expenditures, 31.92%; inventory \nbuild-up, \n30.73%; \nand \nfixed \ncapital \ninvestments, 17.33%. \n \n \n \nSTOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS \n \nZimbabwe Stock Exchange \n \nThe Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) started \nthe year 2023 on a positive trajectory, despite it \nbeing a season where most investors will be re-\norganizing their portfolios after profit taking \nduring the festive season. \n \n In line with the positive trading, the Medium \nCap, All Share, Top15, Top 10 and Small Cap \nIndices added 31.54%, 17.03%, 15.55%, \n12.29%, and 10.23% to close at 48 200.90 \npoints, 22 813.24 points, 15 526.17 points, 13 \n824.24 and 498 286.56 points, respectively. \nThe mining index also added 0.04% to close the \nmonth at 25,496.86 points, compared to \n25,487.77 points recorded in December 2022. \nFigure 11: ZSE All Share, Top 10 and \nMining Indices \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2022 \nHouseholds\n22.35%\nAgriculture\n23.03%\nMining\n9.56%\nManufacturing\n12.77%\nDistribution\n11.88%\nConstruction\n1.70%\nTransport & \nCommunicat\nions\n2.12%\nServices\n10.80%\nFinancial Org. \n& Investments\n5.75%\nOther\n0.04%\n4,800\n7,800\n10,800\n13,800\n16,800\n19,800\n22,800\n25,800\n28,800\n31,800\n5100\n8100\n11100\n14100\n17100\n20100\n23100\n26100\n29100\n32100\n31-Jan-22\n28-Feb-22\n31-Mar-22\n30-Apr-22\n31-May-22\n30-Jun-22\n31-Jul-22\n31-Aug-22\n30-Sep-22\n31-Oct-22\n30-Nov-22\n31-Dec-22\n31-Jan-23\nAll Share Index\nTop 10 Index\nMining Index\n \n \n \n12 \n \nHowever, the cumulative volume and value of \nshares traded declined by 78.26% and 58.07% \nto 102.79 million and ZW$11.64 billion, from \n472.93 \nmillion \nand \nZW$27.75 \nbillion, \nrespectively, recorded in the prior month. \n \nThe proportion of foreign purchases to the \nvalue of shares traded improved to 7.13%, \ncompared to 0.76% recorded in December \n2022. An improvement in the foreign position, \nfrom -ZW$21.62 billion in December \n2022 to -ZW$2.80 billion in January 2023 was \nalso realised. \n \nFigure 12: ZSE Monthly Volumes and Values \nTraded \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2022 \n \nOwing to the bullish sentiments exhibited on \nthe local bourse, in January 2023, the ZSE \nadded ZW$415.17 billion, or 20.30% worth of \ncapitalization to close at ZW$2 460.04 billion. \nOn a year-on-year basis, ZSE capitalization \ngrew by ZW$984.82 billion, or 66.74%, from \nZW$1 475.22 billion recorded in January 2022. \nZSE Performance Against Inflation \n \nHigh inflation is normally associated with \nincreased stock market activities, as investors \nshift from low real returns on money market \ninvestments, and hedge in stock market \nportfolios. However, the introduction of gold \ncoins in July 2022 saw ZSE activities reducing \ndespite the rise in inflation. This was because \nthe gold coins provided an alternative \ninvestment option, which cushioned investors \nfrom potential inflation losses. Figure 13 shows \ndevelopments on inflation and the ZSE All \nShare Index. \nFigure 13: Inflation and ZSE All Share Index \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT and RBZ, 2023 \n \n \n \n \n0\n2,400\n4,800\n7,200\n9,600\n12,000\n14,400\n16,800\n19,200\n21,600\n24,000\n26,400\n28,800\n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1,000\n1,200\n1,400\n1,600\n1,800\n2,000\nJan-22\nFeb-22\nMar-22\nApr-22\nMay-22\nJun-22\nJul-22\nAug-22\nSep-22\nOct-22\nNov-22\nDec-22\nJan-23\nVALUE TRADED ($ MILLIONS)\nVOLUME TRADED (MILIONS)\nVolume\nValue\n-40%\n-20%\n0%\n20%\n40%\n60%\n80%\n100%\n120%\n140%\n160%\nJan-21\nMar-21\nMay-21\nJul-21\nSep-21\nNov-21\nJan-22\nMar-22\nMay-22\nJul-22\nSep-22\nNov-22\nJan-23\nZSE All Share Index\nInflation\n \n \n \n13 \n \nVictoria Falls Stock Exchange \n \nThe Victoria Falls Stock Exchange (VFEX) \nrecovered from losses incurred in the previous \nmonth. Resultantly, the VFEX All Share Index \nadded 17.17% to close at 111.11 points, from \n94.83 points recorded in the prior month. \n \nOn an annual basis, the VFEX All Share Index \nadded 3.44% to 111.11 points in January 2023, \ncompared to 107.42 points recorded in January \n2022. Figure 14 shows the developments on the \nVFEX All Share Index for the period from 31st \nJanuary 2022 to 31st January 2023. \nFigure 14: Victoria Falls Stock Exchange All \nShare Index \n \nSource: \nVictoria \nFalls \nStock \nExchange \n(VFEX), 2022 \n \nVFEX Market Capitalization \n \nOwing to the positive momentum on the VFEX \nduring the month under analysis, market \ncapitalization increased to US$0.63 billion, \nfrom US$0.44 billion recorded in December \n2022. This reflected an increase of US$0.19 \nbillion or 42.28% over the month. \nINFLATION OUTTURN \nAnnual Inflation \nAnnual headline inflation continued to slow \ndown, declining from 105.5% in December \n2022 to 101.5% in January 2023. This followed \ndeclines in both annual food and non-food \ninflation. \n \nAnnual food inflation fell from 162.7% in \nDecember 2022, to 153.3% in January 2023. \nFood inflation contributed 52.92 percentage \npoints to the annual inflation, during the month \nunder review. \n \nYear- on- year, non-food inflation also \ndecelerated from 75.96% in December 2022 to \n74.21% in January 2023. This was largely on \naccount of declines in housing, water, \nelectricity and gas and other fuels, transport and \nmiscellaneous goods and services. The non-\nfood component contributed about 48.59 \npercentage point to inflation during the \nreporting month. \nMonthly Inflation \n \nMonthly inflation fell from 1.3% in December \n2022 to 0.7% in January 2023, on account of \nthe decline in food inflation, which more than \noffset the increase in non-food inflation. \nMonthly food inflation decelerated from 2.1% \nin December 2022 to 0.4% in January 2023. \n \nFigure \n15 \nshows \nmonthly \ninflation \ndevelopments for the period from September \n2021 to January 2023. \n \n \n \n 80.00\n 90.00\n 100.00\n 110.00\n 120.00\n 130.00\n 140.00\n 150.00\n31-Jan-22\n28-Feb-22\n31-Mar-22\n30-Apr-22\n31-May-22\n30-Jun-22\n31-Jul-22\n31-Aug-22\n30-Sep-22\n31-Oct-22\n30-Nov-22\n31-Dec-22\n31-Jan-23\n \n \n \n14 \n \nFigure 15: Month-on-Month Inflation (%) \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2023 \n \nMonthly non-food inflation rose from 0.6% in \nDecember 2022 to 1.0% in January 2023, \nlargely driven by increases in housing, water, \nelectricity and gas and other fuels sub-category. \nPartially offsetting the increases were declines \nin communication, miscellaneous goods and \nservices, and clothing and footwear, among \nothers. \nNATIONAL PAYMENTS SYSTEM \n \nThe value of transactions processed through the \nNational Payment Systems (NPS) stood at \nZW$4.0 trillion in January 2023, down from \nZW$4.99 trillion in the previous month. NPS \ntransaction volumes decreased by 21% to 62.47 \nmillion in the month under analysis. \n \nZimbabwe Electronic Transfer Settlement \nSystem (ZETSS) \n \nThe value of Real Time Gross Settlement \n(RTGS) transactions declined by 29.09%, from \nZW$3.1 trillion in the previous month to close \nat ZW$2.35 trillion in January 2023. \nFigure 15: ZETSS Volumes and Values \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2022 \n \nCash Transactions \n \nCash-based \ntransactions \ndecreased \nfrom \nZW$182.41 billion in December 2022 to \nZW$173.09 billion in January 2023. \n \nMobile and Internet Based Transactions \n \nMobile \nand \ninternet-based \ntransactions \namounted to ZW$1.35 trillion, during the \nmonth under analysis, representing a decrease \nof 0.71% from ZW$1.36 trillion recorded in \nDecember 2022. \n \n \n-2.00\n3.00\n8.00\n13.00\n18.00\n23.00\n28.00\nSep-21\nOct-21\nNov-21\nDec-21\nJan-22\nFeb-22\nMar-22\nApr-22\nMay-22\nJun-22\nJul-22\nAug-22\nSep-22\nOct-22\nNov-22\nDec-22\nJan-23\nFeb-23\nFood and non alcoholic beverages\nNon food\nAll Items\n -\n 500.0\n 1,000.0\n 1,500.0\n 2,000.0\n 2,500.0\n 3,000.0\n 3,500.0\n 4,000.0\n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1000\n1200\n1400\nJan-22\nFeb-22\nMar-22\nApr-22\nMay-22\nJun-22\nJul-22\nAug-22\nSep-22\nOct-22\nNov-22\nDec-22\nJan-23\nValue in ZW$ Billions\nVolume in Thousands\nVolume\nValue\n \n \n \n15 \n \nCard Based Transactions \n \nCard-based transactions decreased by 4.48% to \nZW$309.15 billion in January 2023, from \nZW$323.65 billion recorded in the previous \nmonth. \n \n \n \nMARCH 2023 \n \nRESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE\n \n16 \n \nStatistical Tables \n \nMonetary Statistics \n 1. Depository Corporations Survey \n \n \n \n18 \n 2. Central Bank Survey \n \n \n \n \n \n19 \n \n3. Other Depository Corporations Survey \n \n \n \n20 \n Other Depository Corporations \n \n4.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n21 \n 4.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n \n22 \n Commercial Banks \n 5.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n23 \n 5.2 Liabilities \n \n \n24 \n Building Societies \n 6.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n25 \n 6.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n26 \n Sectoral Analysis of Bank Loans and Advances and Deposits \n \n7.1 Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks Loans and Advances \n27 \n \n7.2 Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks Deposits \n \n \n28 \n Interest Rates \n \n8.1 Lending Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n29 \n \n8.2 Banks Deposit Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n30 \n \n Inflation \n \n9.1 Monthly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n31 \n \n9.2 Yearly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n32 \n \n External Statistics \n 11. Exchange Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n33 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n17 \n \nZimbabwe Stock Exchange \n 12. Zimbabwe Stock Market Statistics \n \n \n 34 \n \n National Payments System Statistics \n \n \n \n13.1 Values of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n \n35 \n \n13.2 Volumes of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n 36 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n 18 \n \n \n TABLE 1: DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS SURVEY ($'000)\nJan-22\nFeb-22\nMar-22\nApr-22\nMay-22\nJun-22\nJul-22\nAug-22\nSep-22\nOct-22\nNov-22\nDec-22\nJan-23\nNet Foreign Assets\n-440,559,292.65\n-471,346,132.81\n-543,454,309.01\n-607,806,554.74\n-1,139,041,286.30\n-1,440,376,428.47\n-1,799,900,028.55 -1,795,279,800.26\n-1,954,300,330.22\n-2,033,984,124.20\n-2,085,714,926.41\n-2,349,872,967.37 -2,877,479,313.00\nCentral Bank(net)\n-569,288,849.11\n-608,788,967.34\n-717,594,313.10\n-794,405,282.55\n-1,478,375,394.21\n-1,802,992,102.87\n-2,132,218,475.50\n-2,281,673,543.14\n-2,540,535,213.92\n-2,594,453,844.31\n-2,593,755,912.16\n-2,828,947,111.97\n-3,452,276,894.90\nForeign Assets\n109,944,109.47\n122,234,641.17\n141,438,330.50\n158,513,090.57\n295,543,148.83\n378,268,469.49\n460,906,552.27\n464,424,207.59\n423,342,143.07\n420,613,636.26\n461,596,127.82\n575,414,250.75\n457,046,789.46\nForeign Liabilities\n679,232,958.58\n731,023,608.52\n859,032,643.60\n952,918,373.12\n1,773,918,543.05\n2,181,260,572.36\n2,593,125,027.77\n2,746,097,750.73\n2,963,877,356.98\n3,015,067,480.57\n3,055,352,039.98\n3,404,361,362.72\n3,909,323,684.36\nOther Depository Corporations(net)\n128,729,556.46\n137,442,834.53\n174,140,004.09\n186,598,727.81\n339,334,107.92\n362,615,674.40\n332,318,446.95\n486,393,742.88\n586,234,883.70\n560,469,720.11\n508,040,985.75\n479,074,144.60\n574,797,581.91\nForeign Assets\n154,189,107.72\n168,007,189.86\n208,203,548.17\n225,189,855.37\n412,863,198.66\n445,895,292.17\n432,930,547.04\n606,589,993.46\n730,519,889.15\n714,553,928.34\n647,684,732.33\n656,889,016.74\n771,701,557.95\nForeign Liabilities\n25,459,551.26\n30,564,355.32\n34,063,544.08\n38,591,127.56\n73,529,090.74\n83,279,617.76\n100,612,100.09\n120,196,250.58\n144,285,005.45\n154,084,208.23\n139,643,746.58\n177,814,872.15\n196,903,976.04\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n910,997,169.52\n977,472,347.72\n1,132,547,895.53 1,279,179,159.36\n2,110,584,970.23\n2,560,072,662.03\n3,007,213,667.92\n3,404,193,526.10\n3,871,453,855.67\n3,914,796,933.13\n4,157,026,534.98\n4,688,099,950.20\n5,574,839,779.69\nDomestic Claims\n332,913,297.54\n374,469,353.19\n425,899,133.67\n507,567,798.80\n671,650,524.63\n767,813,894.49\n911,956,758.63\n1,183,994,022.32\n1,371,017,098.26\n1,420,546,462.01\n1,634,150,767.46\n1,861,880,517.07\n2,150,668,598.95\nClaims on Central Government(net)\n59,994,722.44\n73,245,394.75\n79,099,806.11\n102,141,792.11\n115,763,515.83\n104,672,040.45\n130,502,205.15\n236,159,688.17\n270,091,555.64\n263,657,275.07\n350,064,095.72\n454,800,752.22\n447,342,287.14\nClaims on Central Government\n98,638,404.95\n108,304,664.41\n112,202,570.05\n128,369,548.84\n154,985,706.21\n180,922,921.25\n192,199,618.57\n350,494,976.12\n408,193,113.30\n426,472,842.49\n532,069,052.32\n613,516,289.65\n760,521,954.63\nCentral Bank\n58,376,473.14\n59,042,533.92\n61,616,251.17\n64,387,188.48\n84,007,587.20\n93,971,712.93\n100,589,783.20\n250,194,418.13\n264,613,071.80\n274,598,654.32\n333,135,150.34\n324,557,907.30\n440,486,151.70\nODCs\n40,261,931.81\n49,262,130.49\n50,586,318.88\n63,982,360.36\n70,978,119.01\n86,951,208.31\n91,609,835.37\n100,300,557.99\n143,580,041.50\n151,874,188.17\n198,933,901.98\n288,958,382.34\n320,035,802.93\nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n38,643,682.51\n35,059,269.66\n33,102,763.94\n26,227,756.73\n39,222,190.39\n76,250,880.80\n61,697,413.42\n114,335,287.95\n138,101,557.65\n162,815,567.42\n182,004,956.59\n158,715,537.42\n313,179,667.49\nCentral Bank\n34,616,718.72\n30,651,524.77\n27,772,263.84\n18,570,911.58\n31,804,638.17\n66,024,646.77\n52,333,907.68\n106,442,851.55\n129,394,309.01\n156,141,911.29\n175,273,582.39\n150,848,789.30\n271,358,342.10\nODCs\n4,026,963.79\n4,407,744.89\n5,330,500.10\n7,656,845.15\n7,417,552.22\n10,226,234.03\n9,363,505.74\n7,892,436.40\n8,707,248.64\n6,673,656.14\n6,731,374.21\n7,866,748.12\n41,821,325.38\nClaims on Other Sectors\n272,918,575.10\n301,223,958.44\n346,799,327.56\n405,426,006.70\n555,887,008.81\n663,141,854.04\n781,454,553.48\n947,834,334.15\n1,100,925,542.62\n1,156,889,186.94\n1,284,086,671.74\n1,407,079,764.84\n1,703,326,311.81\nOther Financial Corporations\n7,156,496.45\n7,232,833.43\n7,747,219.19\n8,597,004.25\n9,322,673.95\n10,177,451.55\n14,828,545.88\n17,449,153.84\n18,825,212.19\n143,782,090.97\n143,554,205.91\n157,280,627.89\n170,561,799.59\nState and Local Government\n165,393.19\n159,634.04\n254,314.27\n252,621.77\n289,002.10\n226,287.26\n349,675.75\n287,141.09\n306,328.41\n341,962.52\n303,552.08\n282,613.13\n251,239.62\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n21,803,605.08\n29,207,585.84\n26,468,620.27\n29,392,849.46\n56,904,036.69\n65,013,584.08\n85,546,713.45\n123,920,817.60\n133,928,821.97\n145,038,366.23\n150,370,660.24\n161,107,427.42\n197,474,355.41\nPrivate Sector\n243,793,080.38\n264,623,905.12\n312,329,173.83\n367,183,531.22\n489,371,296.07\n587,724,531.15\n680,729,618.39\n806,177,221.63\n947,865,180.05\n867,726,767.22\n989,858,253.51\n1,088,409,096.41\n1,335,038,917.19\nCentral Bank\n2,037,282.78\n2,225,330.75\n2,894,116.58\n2,976,897.26\n3,866,159.54\n5,462,482.88\n7,151,212.10\n8,394,127.31\n10,349,380.21\n12,722,796.25\n13,419,306.74\n13,440,308.49\n14,320,237.34\nODCs\n241,755,797.60\n262,398,574.37\n309,435,057.25\n364,206,633.96\n485,505,136.53\n582,262,048.27\n673,578,406.29\n797,783,094.32\n937,515,799.83\n855,003,970.96\n976,438,946.77\n1,074,968,787.92\n1,320,718,679.85\nOther Items(Net)\n-578,083,871.97 -603,002,994.53 -706,648,761.86 -771,611,360.55 -1,438,934,445.60\n-1,792,258,767.54\n-2,095,256,909.29 -2,220,199,503.78\n-2,500,436,757.40\n-2,494,250,471.13\n-2,522,875,767.52\n-2,826,219,433.14\n-3,424,171,180.73\nShares and Other Equity\n-526,564,518.35\n-560,858,506.65\n-647,259,441.19\n-736,032,264.92\n-1,471,834,260.31\n-1,750,654,766.50\n-2,109,505,152.97\n-2,196,010,760.22\n-2,353,032,948.01\n-2,415,295,348.56\n-2,460,253,452.61\n-2,498,410,570.61\n-2,986,715,368.94\nLiabilities to Other Financial Corporations\n230,518.83\n226,799.73\n810,634.46\n486,772.48\n321,776.02\n345,211.38\n1,339,092.93\n555,226.55\n587,178.66\n762,462.53\n339,615.56\n752,479.25\n675,534.11\nRestricted Deposits\n2,167,260.87\n2,173,882.06\n2,994,403.00\n4,012,319.51\n15,942,230.19\n17,330,528.77\n31,949,181.65\n37,970,261.21\n33,027,186.30\n47,084,275.28\n59,785,332.00\n34,134,982.33\n42,852,548.97\nDeposits and Securities Excluded from Base Money\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nOther Items(net)\n-53,917,133.32\n-44,545,169.67\n-63,194,358.13\n-40,078,187.62\n16,635,808.50\n-59,279,741.20\n-19,040,030.90\n-62,714,231.31\n-181,018,174.35\n-126,801,860.37\n-122,747,262.48\n-362,696,324.10\n-480,983,894.87\nBroad Money-M3\n470,437,876.87\n506,126,214.91\n589,093,586.52\n671,372,604.62\n971,543,683.94\n1,119,696,233.56\n1,207,313,639.37\n1,608,913,725.83\n1,917,153,525.45\n1,880,812,808.93\n2,071,311,608.56\n2,338,226,982.83\n2,697,360,466.69\nSecurities Other than Shares Included in Broad \nMoney\n3,685,330.94\n4,456,190.77\n4,510,894.76\n4,246,927.92\n6,165,343.44\n7,157,937.12\n8,137,874.02\n12,785,574.75\n14,047,495.34\n15,558,863.88\n13,438,521.87\n14,148,964.76\n15,056,472.03\nBroad Money-M2\n466,752,545.93\n501,670,024.14\n584,582,691.76\n667,125,676.69\n965,378,340.49\n1,112,538,296.45\n1,199,175,765.34\n1,596,128,151.09\n1,903,106,030.11\n1,865,253,945.05\n2,057,873,086.69\n2,324,078,018.07\n2,682,303,994.66\nOther Deposits\n39,287,825.08\n47,514,738.37\n54,149,202.92\n52,644,036.06\n69,998,821.83\n80,890,863.60\n94,202,100.47\n134,172,529.07\n157,067,992.76\n166,451,245.87\n189,198,137.65\n233,411,780.44\n275,038,711.32\nNarrow Money-M1\n427,464,720.85\n454,155,285.76\n530,433,488.84\n614,481,640.63\n895,379,518.67\n1,031,647,432.84\n1,104,973,664.87\n1,461,955,622.01\n1,746,038,037.35\n1,698,802,699.18\n1,868,674,949.05\n2,090,666,237.62\n2,407,265,283.35\nTransferable Deposits\n425,262,736.08\n451,539,424.76\n527,204,673.89\n610,992,302.31\n892,270,006.18\n1,028,183,547.50\n1,100,888,777.34\n1,457,941,576.91\n1,742,120,578.98\n1,694,712,870.55\n1,864,566,202.51\n2,086,456,095.48\n2,402,524,498.19\n Of which Foreign Currency Accounts\n197,684,662.27\n225,776,364.73\n275,166,409.09\n302,163,673.09\n559,139,763.68\n657,889,184.94\n688,836,308.19\n991,098,612.31\n1,196,206,879.78\n1,131,298,129.20\n1,211,793,829.42\n1,327,590,772.37\n1,626,587,667.25\nCurrency Outside Depository Corporations\n2,201,984.76\n2,615,861.00\n3,228,814.95\n3,489,338.32\n3,109,512.49\n3,463,885.34\n4,084,887.53\n4,014,045.11\n3,917,458.37\n4,089,828.63\n4,108,746.53\n4,210,142.14\n4,740,785.16\nMemorandum Items\nReserve Money\n26,507,534.88\n27,813,513.74\n27,885,251.69\n29,229,891.83\n29,220,297.03\n33,547,982.93\n35,521,743.90\n37,466,335.66\n87,098,435.56\n92,268,161.94\n98,860,662.38\n104,043,818.23\n122,997,662.08\nFCAs as a Percentage of Deposits in M3\n42.2%\n44.8%\n47.0%\n45.2%\n57.7%\n58.9%\n57.2%\n61.8%\n62.5%\n60.3%\n58.6%\n56.9%\n60.4%\nEnd Period Exchange Rate\n115.42\n124.02\n142.42\n159.35\n301.50\n370.96\n443.88\n546.83\n621.89\n632.77\n654.93\n684.33\n796.52\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2022\nNotes:\n(i) Depository corporations survey - formerly Monetary Survey.\n(ii) Broad money redefined using IMF's Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual of 2000. Major changes include exclusion of Government deposits held by banks from broad money.\n(iii) Transferable deposits made up of demand and savings deposits.\n(iv) NCDs are also referred to as securities included in broad money.\n(v) All classes of time deposits, short and long term are classified as time deposits, which are also termed other deposits.\n(vi) Credit to the private sector now excludes claims on other financial corporations, as well as claims on state and local government (local authorities)\n(vii) Depository corporations made up of the Central Bank and other depository corporations\n(viii) Other depository corporations (ODCs) - Commercial banks, merchant banks, building societies and POSB.\n(ix) In December 2017, the statistics were adjusted in restrospect by reclassifying Securities issued under Aftrades from claims on government to claims on central bank\n(x) In December 2017, the statistics were adjusted in restrospect by reclassifying amounts accessed by banks under the Aftrades from liabilities to Other Depository corporations and Other Financial Corporations to liabilities to Central Bank \n(xi) In December 2018, statistics were revised from November 2017 due to reclassification of lines of credit (foreign liabilities) that were initially classified as deposits included in broad money\n(xii) All monetary and financial statistics are valued in ZWL$ since the introduction of the interbank foreign exchange market in February 2019\n \n \n \n19 \n \n \nJan-22\nFeb-22\nMar-22\nApr-22\nMay-22\nJun-22\nJul-22\nAug-22\nSep-22\nOct-22\nNov-22\nDec-22\nJan-23\nNet Foreign Assets\n-569,288,849.11 -608,788,967.34 -717,594,313.10 -794,405,282.55 -1,478,375,394.21 -1,802,992,102.87 -2,132,218,475.50\n-2,281,673,543.14 -2,540,535,213.92\n-2,594,453,844.31\n-2,593,755,912.16\n-2,828,947,111.97 -3,452,276,894.90\nClaims on Non Residents\n109,944,109.47\n122,234,641.17\n141,438,330.50\n158,513,090.57\n295,543,148.83\n378,268,469.49\n460,906,552.27\n464,424,207.59\n423,342,143.07\n420,613,636.26\n461,596,127.82\n575,414,250.75\n457,046,789.46\nOfficial Reserves Assets\n88,142,478.36\n98,842,512.26 111,766,758.89 124,451,895.50\n233,057,350.27\n280,735,044.65\n350,631,779.92\n329,592,679.60\n270,927,656.44\n265,887,215.65\n301,307,551.70\n404,381,641.59\n255,951,265.50\nOther Foreign Assets\n21,801,631.11\n23,392,128.91\n29,671,571.60\n34,061,195.07\n62,485,798.57\n97,533,424.84\n110,274,772.35\n134,831,527.99\n152,414,486.62\n154,726,420.61\n160,288,576.12\n171,032,609.16\n201,095,523.96\nLess Liabilities to Non Residents\n679,232,958.58\n731,023,608.52\n859,032,643.60\n952,918,373.12\n1,773,918,543.05\n2,181,260,572.36\n2,593,125,027.77\n2,746,097,750.73\n2,963,877,356.98\n3,015,067,480.57\n3,055,352,039.98\n3,404,361,362.72\n3,909,323,684.36\nShort Term Liabilities\n288,043,621.76 314,055,031.14 380,818,044.00 425,900,083.60\n785,737,559.16\n951,983,480.17\n1,127,013,639.61\n1,336,300,564.04\n1,387,742,749.22\n1,398,159,992.55\n1,431,029,164.32\n1,673,917,354.18\n1,888,346,517.34\nOther Foreign Liabilities*\n391,189,336.81 416,968,577.38 478,214,599.59 527,018,289.52\n988,180,983.89\n1,229,277,092.19\n1,466,111,388.17\n1,409,797,186.69\n1,576,134,607.76\n1,616,907,488.02\n1,624,322,875.66\n1,730,444,008.54\n2,020,977,167.02\n of which blocked funds\n226,575,523.87 239,652,643.98 276,151,105.21 306,560,929.76\n570,884,144.99\n716,116,832.50\n852,249,186.55\n678,512,698.97\n762,984,490.22\n783,864,733.61\n742,874,154.66\n798,115,768.44\n918,840,100.80\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n595,796,383.98 636,602,481.08 745,479,564.79 823,635,174.38\n1,507,595,691.24\n1,836,540,085.80\n2,167,740,219.40\n2,319,139,878.80 2,627,633,649.47\n2,686,722,006.25\n2,692,616,574.53\n2,932,990,930.20\n3,575,274,556.98\nDomestic Claims\n45,764,983.60\n56,431,583.21\n59,280,671.72\n73,729,321.44\n98,948,909.09\n86,265,289.61\n121,100,451.59\n232,699,771.22\n241,166,538.97\n235,988,125.06\n281,625,189.08\n301,167,715.61\n316,983,028.59\nNet Claims on Central Government\n23,759,754.43\n28,391,009.15\n33,843,987.33\n45,816,276.90\n52,202,949.03\n27,947,066.17\n48,255,875.52\n143,751,566.58\n135,218,762.79\n118,456,743.03\n157,861,567.95\n173,709,118.00\n169,127,809.59\nClaims on Central Government\n58,376,473.14\n59,042,533.92\n61,616,251.17\n64,387,188.48\n84,007,587.20\n93,971,712.93\n100,589,783.20\n250,194,418.13\n264,613,071.80\n274,598,654.32\n333,135,150.34\n324,557,907.30\n440,486,151.70\nOf which: Securities Other than Shares\n5,709,408.86\n5,698,904.28\n5,628,648.40\n5,618,143.81\n5,618,143.81\n5,618,143.81\n11,099,253.33\n16,894,372.03\n24,148,817.33\n32,085,268.08\n58,861,123.74\n95,209,423.88\n115,768,163.17\nLoans\n52,667,064.29\n53,343,629.64\n55,987,602.77\n58,769,044.66\n78,389,443.38\n88,353,569.12\n89,490,529.87\n233,300,046.10\n240,464,254.47\n242,513,386.24\n274,274,026.60\n229,348,483.42\n324,717,988.53\n Loans and Advances\n19,335,445.61\n19,998,243.11\n22,642,216.24\n25,423,658.13\n45,044,056.85\n55,008,182.59\n56,145,143.34\n62,658,197.28\n69,822,405.65\n71,871,537.43\n103,632,177.79\n62,318,200.45\n71,425,804.92\nAmounts Due from Gvt including SDR Draw\n29,720,052.83\n29,733,820.69\n29,733,820.69\n29,733,820.69\n29,733,820.69\n29,733,820.69\n29,733,820.69\n167,030,282.97\n167,030,282.97\n167,030,282.97\n167,030,282.97\n167,030,282.97\n253,292,183.61\n Export Incentives\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n0.00\n0.00\nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n34,616,718.72\n30,651,524.77\n27,772,263.84\n18,570,911.58\n31,804,638.17\n66,024,646.77\n52,333,907.68\n106,442,851.55\n129,394,309.01\n156,141,911.29\n175,273,582.39\n150,848,789.30\n271,358,342.10\nOf which: Deposits\n34,616,718.72\n30,651,524.77\n27,772,263.84\n18,570,911.58\n31,804,638.17\n66,024,646.77\n52,333,907.68\n106,442,851.55\n129,394,309.01\n156,141,911.29\n175,273,582.39\n150,848,789.30\n271,358,342.10\nOther \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nClaims on Other Sectors\n22,005,229.17\n28,040,574.06\n25,436,684.39\n27,913,044.54\n46,745,960.06\n58,318,223.45\n72,844,576.07\n88,948,204.64\n105,947,776.18\n117,531,382.02\n123,763,621.12\n127,458,597.61\n147,855,219.00\nOther Financial Corporations\n1,979,866.38\n1,974,819.36\n2,314,886.09\n2,401,359.00\n2,324,560.64\n2,384,730.70\n3,057,198.60\n3,073,237.98\n3,202,283.90\n3,211,903.39\n3,213,198.55\n3,255,765.14\n3,948,256.71\nState and Local Government\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n17,988,080.01\n23,840,423.94\n20,227,681.72\n22,534,788.28\n40,555,239.89\n50,471,009.86\n62,636,165.37\n77,480,839.35\n92,396,112.07\n101,596,682.38\n107,131,115.83\n110,762,523.98\n129,586,724.95\nPrivate Sector\n2,037,282.78\n2,225,330.75\n2,894,116.58\n2,976,897.26\n3,866,159.54\n5,462,482.88\n7,151,212.10\n8,394,127.31\n10,349,380.21\n12,722,796.25\n13,419,306.74\n13,440,308.49\n14,320,237.34\nClaims on Other Depository Corporations\n5,611,159.51\n5,710,038.84\n10,763,971.69\n11,883,261.39\n7,158,720.77\n9,947,986.79\n11,136,478.88\n26,441,912.94\n40,716,900.04\n42,205,302.85\n34,171,755.59\n25,067,909.55\n41,863,876.44\nOf which: Loans\n5,611,159.51\n5,710,038.84\n10,763,971.69\n11,883,261.39\n7,158,720.77\n9,947,986.79\n11,136,478.88\n26,441,912.94\n40,716,900.04\n42,205,302.85\n34,171,755.59\n25,067,909.55\n41,863,876.44\nOther Liabilities to ODCs\n92,445,342.97\n98,771,358.77 116,286,172.05 137,938,275.04\n213,473,187.99\n234,624,636.96\n352,778,125.95\n516,479,509.63\n514,761,587.21\n554,976,245.35\n681,837,090.96\n691,773,493.01\n730,178,997.29\nOf which: Aftrades Balances\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n Securities\n55,087,092.35\n61,186,545.74\n73,725,582.36\n89,206,766.33\n136,605,367.17\n87,602,175.66\n162,206,231.00\n198,762,582.78\n247,261,242.79\n280,589,071.79\n355,098,840.61\n373,445,723.64\n355,071,440.18\nOther Items(Net)\n-636,865,583.85 -673,232,217.80 -791,721,093.43 -875,960,866.59 -1,614,961,249.38 -1,974,951,446.35 -2,388,281,414.87\n-2,576,477,704.28 -2,860,511,797.67\n-2,963,504,823.70\n-3,058,656,720.83\n-3,298,528,798.05 -3,946,606,649.23\nShares and Other Equity\n-657,568,133.29\n-700,269,272.95\n-804,754,190.04\n-896,652,942.69\n-1,694,545,332.44\n-2,081,541,626.90\n-2,495,937,680.26\n-2,662,572,351.10 -2,881,231,066.44\n-2,968,624,968.16\n-3,039,020,578.83\n-3,212,151,922.95\n-3,698,960,271.11\nOther Items(Net)\n18,270,195.89\n24,793,374.40\n8,861,949.04\n14,428,570.19\n62,648,230.22\n89,106,052.63\n71,183,746.71\n43,541,395.78\n-13,728,304.53\n-44,526,215.42\n-90,829,827.08\n-125,791,521.97\n-321,990,757.97\nLiabilities to Other Resident Sectors\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nDeposits and Securities Excluded from Base Mon\n2,432,353.55\n2,243,680.76\n4,171,147.57\n6,263,505.92\n16,935,852.85\n17,484,127.93\n36,472,518.68\n42,553,251.05\n34,447,573.30\n49,646,359.89\n71,193,685.08\n39,414,646.86\n74,344,379.84\nMonetary Base Incl. foreign currency clearing balances\nMonetary Base \n26,507,534.88\n27,813,513.74\n27,885,251.69\n29,229,891.83\n29,220,297.03\n33,547,982.93\n35,521,743.90\n37,466,335.66\n87,098,435.56\n92,268,161.94\n98,860,662.38\n104,043,818.23\n122,997,662.08\nBond Coins\n99,710.20\n99,710.26\n99,710.34\n99,710.39\n99,710.43\n99,710.48\n99,710.54\n99,710.59\n99,710.63\n99,711.37\n99,645.37\n99,645.38\n99,645.41\nBond Notes\n4,993,493.48\n5,093,893.85\n5,240,635.11\n6,014,484.37\n6,165,661.88\n6,165,333.25\n6,412,784.04\n6,554,970.13\n6,740,568.25\n7,012,718.25\n7,260,471.73\n7,472,198.27\n7,439,947.85\nLiabilities to ODCs\n21,414,331.20\n22,619,909.63\n22,544,906.25\n23,115,697.08\n22,954,924.72\n27,282,939.21\n29,009,249.32\n30,811,654.95\n80,258,156.68\n85,155,732.33\n91,500,545.27\n96,471,974.58\n115,458,068.82\n Local Currency Reserve Deposits\n20,405,761.19\n20,827,919.34\n21,544,621.25\n23,011,606.47\n22,855,505.72\n27,182,574.21\n28,909,888.55\n30,691,239.95\n36,208,286.92\n39,251,684.88\n45,031,513.47\n51,076,733.16\n56,112,655.93\n Foreign Currency Reserve Deposits\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n43,949,504.76\n45,803,682.45\n46,368,666.81\n45,294,876.43\n59,244,974.53\n Exess reserves \n1,008,570.00\n1,791,990.29\n1,000,284.99\n104,090.61\n99,419.00\n100,364.99\n99,360.78\n120,414.99\n100,364.99\n100,364.99\n100,364.99\n100,364.99\n100,438.36\nPrivate Deposits\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2022\n NB: * Other Foreign Liabilities include blocked funds amounting to USD2.2 billion assumed by the Central Bank on behalf of Government.\nTABLE 2: CENTRAL BANK SURVEY ($'000)\n \n \n \n20 \n \n \n TABLE 3 : OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS SURVEY ( $ '000)\nJan-22\nFeb-22\nMar-22\nApr-22\nMay-22\nJun-22\nJul-22\nAug-22\nSep-22\nOct-22\nNov-22\nDec-22\nJan-23\nNet Foreign Assets\n128,729,556.46\n137,442,834.53\n174,140,004.09\n186,598,727.81\n339,334,107.92\n362,615,674.40\n332,318,446.95\n486,393,742.88\n586,234,883.70\n560,469,720.11\n508,040,985.75\n479,074,144.60\n574,797,581.91\nClaims on Non Residents\n154,189,107.72\n168,007,189.86\n208,203,548.17\n225,189,855.37\n412,863,198.66\n445,895,292.17\n432,930,547.04\n606,589,993.46\n730,519,889.15\n714,553,928.34\n647,684,732.33\n656,889,016.74\n771,701,557.95\nOf Which: Foreign Currency\n53,378,295.56\n62,064,505.14\n76,544,189.30\n74,716,879.90\n142,118,888.84\n138,347,101.06\n159,024,593.55\n263,637,446.30\n292,402,245.17\n300,240,300.44\n286,365,213.60\n295,435,074.49\n381,966,212.75\nDeposits\n100,442,493.68\n105,505,734.50\n131,168,592.72\n149,819,045.33\n269,570,369.89\n305,551,872.73\n271,679,250.85\n340,293,581.80\n435,192,058.43\n412,875,019.01\n359,879,184.65\n359,872,194.36\n387,899,225.52\nOther\n368,318.48\n436,950.21\n490,766.14\n653,930.14\n1,173,939.93\n1,996,318.38\n2,226,702.64\n2,658,965.36\n2,925,585.55\n1,438,608.89\n1,440,334.07\n1,581,747.89\n1,836,119.68\nLess Liabilities to Non Residents\n25,459,551.26\n30,564,355.32\n34,063,544.08\n38,591,127.56\n73,529,090.74\n83,279,617.76\n100,612,100.09\n120,196,250.58\n144,285,005.45\n154,084,208.23\n139,643,746.58\n177,814,872.15\n196,903,976.04\nOf Which: Deposits\n12,879,965.61\n16,242,284.31\n18,274,727.25\n20,748,904.55\n40,784,068.98\n50,378,763.77\n58,733,325.78\n65,301,846.77\n82,156,742.51\n90,971,607.55\n92,797,127.97\n89,384,232.63\n93,815,500.56\nLoans\n12,579,585.65\n14,322,071.01\n15,788,816.82\n17,842,223.01\n32,745,021.76\n32,900,853.99\n41,878,774.31\n54,894,403.81\n62,128,262.94\n63,112,600.68\n46,846,618.61\n88,430,639.51\n103,088,475.48\nOther\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n339,241,242.96\n365,997,720.68\n410,548,022.91\n479,033,352.08\n628,106,440.87\n753,463,074.66\n866,386,967.85\n1,113,922,948.02 1,325,580,796.37 1,313,691,175.57 1,547,753,523.21 1,849,663,031.57 2,086,330,268.75\nDomestic Claims\n287,148,313.94\n318,037,769.98\n366,618,461.95\n433,838,477.37\n572,701,615.54\n681,548,604.87\n790,856,307.03\n951,294,251.11 1,129,850,559.29 1,184,558,336.95 1,352,525,578.38 1,560,712,801.46\n1,833,685,570.36\nNet Claims on Central Government\n36,234,968.02\n44,854,385.60\n45,255,818.78\n56,325,515.21\n63,560,566.80\n76,724,974.28\n82,246,329.63\n92,408,121.59\n134,872,792.86\n145,200,532.03\n192,202,527.77\n281,091,634.22\n278,214,477.55\nClaims on Central Government\n40,261,931.81\n49,262,130.49\n50,586,318.88\n63,982,360.36\n70,978,119.01\n86,951,208.31\n91,609,835.37\n100,300,557.99\n143,580,041.50\n151,874,188.17\n198,933,901.98\n288,958,382.34\n320,035,802.93\nSecurities\n40,241,600.55\n49,241,790.83\n50,566,914.20\n63,944,817.59\n70,936,834.65\n86,890,010.11\n91,509,184.64\n100,187,059.48\n143,464,932.04\n151,757,709.91\n198,814,372.89\n288,843,960.96\n319,807,352.36\nLoans\n20,331.26\n20,339.66\n19,404.68\n37,542.77\n41,284.36\n61,198.20\n100,650.73\n113,498.51\n115,109.46\n116,478.26\n119,529.09\n114,421.39\n228,450.57\nOther \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n4,026,963.79\n4,407,744.89\n5,330,500.10\n7,656,845.15\n7,417,552.22\n10,226,234.03\n9,363,505.74\n7,892,436.40\n8,707,248.64\n6,673,656.14\n6,731,374.21\n7,866,748.12\n41,821,325.38\nOf which: Deposits\n4,026,963.79\n4,407,744.89\n5,330,500.10\n7,656,845.15\n7,417,552.22\n10,226,234.03\n9,363,505.74\n7,892,436.40\n8,707,248.64\n6,673,656.14\n6,731,374.21\n7,866,748.12\n41,821,325.38\nOther \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nClaims on Other Sectors\n250,913,345.93\n273,183,384.38\n321,362,643.17\n377,512,962.15\n509,141,048.74\n604,823,630.59\n708,609,977.40\n858,886,129.52\n994,977,766.44 1,039,357,804.92 1,160,323,050.62 1,279,621,167.24\n1,555,471,092.81\nOther Financial Corporations\n5,176,630.07\n5,258,014.07\n5,432,333.10\n6,195,645.25\n6,998,113.31\n7,792,720.84\n11,771,347.28\n14,375,915.86\n15,622,928.29\n140,570,187.59\n140,341,007.36\n154,024,862.75\n166,613,542.88\nState and Local Government\n165,393.19\n159,634.04\n254,314.27\n252,621.77\n289,002.10\n226,287.26\n349,675.75\n287,141.09\n306,328.41\n341,962.52\n303,552.08\n282,613.13\n251,239.62\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n3,815,525.07\n5,367,161.90\n6,240,938.55\n6,858,061.18\n16,348,796.81\n14,542,574.22\n22,910,548.08\n46,439,978.25\n41,532,709.91\n43,441,683.85\n43,239,544.41\n50,344,903.44\n67,887,630.46\nPrivate Sector\n241,755,797.60\n262,398,574.37\n309,435,057.25\n364,206,633.96\n485,505,136.53\n582,262,048.27\n673,578,406.29\n797,783,094.32\n937,515,799.83\n855,003,970.96\n976,438,946.77 1,074,968,787.92\n1,320,718,679.85\nClaims on the Central Bank\n119,546,045.14\n125,057,527.45\n145,073,995.32\n163,091,388.64\n239,321,897.04\n269,492,980.99\n318,260,082.09\n414,080,563.81\n503,930,421.77\n528,892,917.07\n579,137,110.76\n655,646,094.75\n706,967,379.44\nCurrency\n2,891,218.92\n2,577,743.10\n2,111,530.50\n2,624,856.44\n3,155,859.82\n2,801,158.38\n2,427,607.04\n2,640,635.61\n2,922,820.51\n3,022,600.98\n3,251,370.57\n3,361,701.51\n2,798,808.10\nReserves\n116,654,826.22\n122,479,784.35\n142,962,464.82\n160,466,532.20\n236,166,037.22\n266,691,822.61\n315,832,475.04\n411,439,928.20\n501,007,601.27\n525,870,316.09\n575,885,740.19\n652,284,393.24\n704,168,571.34\nSecurities\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nOther Claims\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nLiabilities to the Central Bank\n2,688,568.50\n2,120,361.21\n2,137,854.54\n2,173,014.02\n2,383,304.12\n2,898,518.67\n2,814,941.97\n3,230,742.76\n3,720,151.81\n28,072,180.28\n19,973,470.74\n10,597,782.72\n4,974,293.62\nOther Items(Net)\n64,764,547.62\n74,977,215.54\n99,006,579.83\n115,723,499.90\n181,533,767.59\n194,679,992.54\n239,914,479.29\n248,221,124.14\n304,480,032.88\n371,687,898.16\n363,935,695.20\n356,098,081.93\n449,348,387.42\nShares and Other Equity\n131,003,614.94\n139,410,766.30\n157,494,748.85\n160,620,677.78\n222,711,072.13\n330,886,860.40\n386,432,527.29\n466,561,590.88\n528,198,118.44\n553,329,619.60\n578,767,126.22\n713,741,352.34\n712,244,902.17\nLiabilities to other ressident sectors\n230,518.83\n226,799.73\n810,634.46\n486,772.48\n321,776.02\n345,211.38\n1,339,092.93\n555,226.55\n587,178.66\n762,462.53\n339,615.56\n752,479.25\n675,534.11\nOther Items(Net)\n-66,469,586.15\n-64,660,350.49\n-59,298,803.48\n-45,383,950.36\n-41,499,080.56\n-136,552,079.25\n-147,857,140.93\n-218,895,693.28\n-224,305,264.21\n-182,404,183.97\n-215,171,046.59\n-358,395,749.66\n-263,572,048.85\nDeposits and Securities Included in Broad Money\n467,970,799.42\n503,440,555.21\n584,688,027.00\n665,632,079.89\n967,440,548.79\n1,116,078,749.06\n1,198,705,414.81\n1,600,316,690.89 1,911,815,680.07 1,874,160,895.68 2,055,794,508.96 2,328,737,176.16\n2,661,127,850.66\nDeposits Included in Broad Money\n464,285,468.48\n \n498,984,364.44\n \n580,177,132.24\n \n661,385,151.97\n \n961,275,205.35\n \n1,108,920,811.95\n \n1,190,567,540.78\n \n1,587,531,116.15 1,897,768,184.73 1,858,602,031.80 2,042,355,987.09 2,314,588,211.40\n2,646,071,378.63\nTransferable Deposits\n424,997,643.40\n \n451,469,626.06\n \n526,027,929.32\n \n608,741,115.91\n \n891,276,383.52\n \n1,028,029,948.34\n \n1,096,365,440.31\n \n1,453,358,587.07 1,740,700,191.97 1,692,150,785.93 1,853,157,849.44 2,081,176,430.96\n2,371,032,667.32\n of which FCAs\n197,673,919.07\n \n225,769,411.82\n \n275,160,384.59\n \n301,286,745.34\n \n558,605,268.37\n \n657,871,279.96\n \n688,801,163.42\n \n991,050,824.09 1,196,071,655.58 1,131,156,966.82 1,211,583,916.42 1,325,367,130.51\n1,623,313,580.02\nOther Deposits\n39,287,825.08\n47,514,738.37\n54,149,202.92\n52,644,036.06\n69,998,821.83\n80,890,863.60\n94,202,100.47\n134,172,529.07\n157,067,992.76\n166,451,245.87\n189,198,137.65\n233,411,780.44\n275,038,711.32\nMoney Market Instruments\n3,685,330.94\n \n4,456,190.77\n \n4,510,894.76\n \n4,246,927.92\n \n6,165,343.44\n \n7,157,937.12\n \n8,137,874.02\n \n12,785,574.75\n14,047,495.34\n15,558,863.88\n13,438,521.87\n14,148,964.76\n15,056,472.03\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2022\n \n \n \n \n21 \n \n \nForeign\nTOTAL\nEnd of\nNotes\nBond\n&\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \nLocal\nOther \n Notes &\nCoin\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\n1\noca\nGovernemt\nOther\n2\nGovernment\nLocal \nPublic \n Institutional \nOther cliams\nContigent Assets\nOther Assets\nNon Financial \nCoins\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\nGovernment\nEnterprises\nUnits\nAssets\n2020\nJan\n183.4\n \n3,176.6\n \n13,217.3\n \n1,073.2\n \n8,142.0\n \n1,811.4\n4,372.4\n20.1\n125.5\n15.0\n5.1\n12.2\n326.1\n12,115.8\n946.9\n2,965.9\n4,191.6\n9,691.7\n62,392.3\nFeb\n267.1\n \n3,136.4\n \n13,817.0\n \n1,504.5\n \n8,642.5\n \n1,532.9\n4,293.1\n20.1\n117.4\n15.5\n5.1\n11.6\n329.5\n13,632.6\n973.7\n5,441.7\n12,758.8\n10,338.7\n76,838.2\nMar\n263.6\n \n3,607.6\n \n16,167.1\n \n2,214.4\n \n12,681.9\n \n2,497.5\n4,775.6\n19.2\n0.1\n20.8\n4.4\n11.4\n765.8\n16,323.6\n1,103.1\n7,917.3\n7,042.4\n11,309.5\n86,725.4\nApr\n298.5\n \n3,642.9\n \n17,926.4\n \n1,523.3\n \n13,697.1\n \n3,056.3\n4,716.9\n18.1\n0.1\n18.4\n4.5\n9.7\n834.7\n17,280.6\n1,104.9\n7,642.8\n8,200.2\n11,988.1\n91,963.5\nMay\n330.0\n \n3,581.8\n \n21,376.4\n \n1,749.6\n \n15,757.4\n \n3,130.4\n4,579.1\n17.0\n0.1\n45.8\n4.5\n9.6\n768.0\n20,291.6\n1,280.4\n7,042.0\n8,823.5\n12,139.9\n100,927.2\nJun\n606.6\n \n9,584.7\n \n29,457.9\n \n3,974.7\n \n35,786.5\n \n7,527.5\n6,264.7\n13.8\n0.1\n90.1\n4.3\n9.4\n2,010.8\n30,567.5\n2,011.1\n24,299.3\n17,433.0\n23,843.0\n193,485.0\nJul\n690.8\n \n18,357.0\n \n54,139.7\n \n5,578.7\n \n42,159.7\n \n11,399.9\n6,760.1\n13.4\n0.0\n74.6\n4.3\n12.6\n1,025.8\n36,840.5\n3,070.4\n28,551.1\n14,418.6\n24,902.0\n247,999.1\nAug\n975.1\n \n28,776.0\n \n54,868.5\n \n4,623.1\n \n41,100.2\n \n14,219.2\n6,883.5\n13.1\n0.0\n39.1\n14.0\n14.7\n1,046.3\n43,502.9\n3,130.9\n25,354.6\n14,240.7\n26,391.3\n265,193.4\nSep\n1,084.2\n \n30,217.6\n \n56,679.6\n \n4,426.6\n \n39,530.8\n \n14,126.8\n6,676.2\n12.9\n0.0\n107.8\n9.6\n22.3\n1,050.4\n45,297.5\n3,822.4\n28,289.4\n20,662.0\n27,055.5\n279,071.4\nOct\n1,064.2\n \n32,235.0\n \n66,948.5\n \n4,457.3\n \n40,092.7\n \n13,530.7\n8,068.2\n12.3\n20.1\n222.0\n17.6\n22.2\n1,019.0\n53,116.5\n3,869.6\n29,764.7\n19,044.4\n27,327.7\n300,832.8\nNov\n1,063.6\n \n34,673.9\n \n73,237.2\n \n4,211.3\n \n41,173.6\n \n14,134.7\n8,961.5\n11.6\n0.0\n268.2\n20.0\n16.8\n1,269.9\n60,179.7\n3,678.7\n29,821.2\n19,694.9\n27,426.0\n319,842.9\nDec\n1,177.8\n \n39,886.8\n \n76,076.5\n \n5,771.7\n \n38,623.2\n \n10,803.6\n12,072.8\n11.2\n0.0\n252.2\n23.3\n26.8\n1,269.0\n69,691.0\n4,566.9\n29,608.0\n15,822.0\n36,808.1\n342,490.8\n2021\nJan\n1,483.3\n \n42,733.9\n \n77,994.4\n \n13,109.2\n \n40,071.8\n \n10,922.0\n10,322.7\n10.2\n0.0\n212.4\n16.7\n18.0\n1,264.3\n77,984.0\n5,315.2\n25,036.2\n15,951.2\n41,028.5\n363,474.0\nFeb\n1,735.4\n \n41,180.7\n \n76,140.3\n \n17,748.1\n \n39,141.4\n \n6,341.4\n15,612.1\n9.2\n0.0\n238.0\n24.1\n22.7\n1,493.7\n84,845.3\n5,413.6\n28,339.2\n19,441.2\n42,761.3\n380,487.7\nMar\n1,457.1\n \n40,953.3\n \n83,032.1\n \n6,945.5\n \n42,516.8\n \n8,733.6\n17,602.7\n8.4\n19.2\n449.7\n15.2\n21.7\n1,400.3\n90,291.7\n4,912.2\n32,908.1\n22,849.5\n40,104.9\n394,221.9\nApr\n1,699.7\n \n40,964.4\n \n85,330.2\n \n6,844.8\n \n49,733.4\n \n7,679.0\n19,384.3\n7.7\n19.2\n571.8\n19.9\n12.7\n1,336.7\n104,118.1\n5,432.6\n34,537.9\n25,207.8\n41,034.6\n423,934.8\nMay\n1,906.1\n \n30,579.1\n \n94,330.9\n \n7,907.2\n \n63,644.8\n \n11,582.4\n19,197.1\n7.0\n152.7\n611.0\n21.8\n16.6\n1,263.7\n111,185.7\n5,063.0\n35,592.3\n24,975.4\n40,256.6\n448,293.6\nJun\n1,702.8\n \n30,255.6\n \n75,795.2\n \n25,605.9\n \n72,780.6\n \n17,601.3\n17,610.8\n6.5\n19.5\n1,385.2\n17.9\n77.8\n1,511.9\n125,592.3\n5,203.8\n26,856.5\n29,616.4\n42,418.7\n474,058.5\nJul\n2,139.9\n \n30,509.1\n \n104,983.5\n \n17,817.9\n \n82,032.9\n \n25,314.3\n23,160.6\n6.0\n290.8\n1,264.1\n17.3\n67.8\n1,351.1\n135,107.8\n5,762.2\n26,869.2\n33,897.2\n42,726.7\n533,318.3\nAug\n2,551.1\n \n33,323.4\n \n93,806.9\n \n11,919.2\n \n72,753.9\n \n25,194.9\n35,371.1\n5.4\n339.7\n1,111.2\n22.5\n63.9\n1,583.3\n150,558.7\n7,014.2\n32,281.1\n34,820.2\n46,819.4\n549,540.1\nSep\n2,853.7\n \n38,500.1\n \n100,996.0\n \n8,626.8\n \n68,707.9\n \n25,023.4\n36,196.3\n5.1\n366.9\n948.5\n21.1\n62.5\n1,531.1\n154,818.9\n6,587.8\n31,981.0\n35,461.8\n45,544.7\n558,233.5\nOct\n2,611.1\n \n50,074.7\n \n108,009.2\n \n9,575.8\n \n89,822.4\n \n26,924.2\n43,786.5\n4.3\n188.1\n1,054.2\n21.2\n75.4\n1,683.9\n172,358.5\n6,987.7\n49,581.0\n47,370.6\n47,611.9\n657,740.6\nNov\n2,721.5\n \n53,424.3\n \n107,781.7\n \n15,560.6\n \n74,072.3\n \n29,748.5\n47,418.1\n3.7\n187.0\n2,678.7\n21.2\n74.8\n1,882.5\n195,765.6\n7,682.2\n52,327.7\n45,567.2\n54,967.5\n691,885.0\nDec\n2,838.3\n \n50,031.0\n \n118,451.3\n \n13,654.0\n \n91,352.6\n \n33,690.9\n41,452.1\n3.0\n186.0\n6,192.4\n21.1\n167.5\n2,998.6\n212,438.0\n14,917.3\n60,917.0\n48,759.9\n71,817.7\n769,888.8\n2022\nJan\n2,891.2\n \n53,378.3\n \n116,654.8\n \n13,232.3\n \n69,668.2\n \n30,774.3\n40,241.6\n2.4\n186.8\n2,906.7\n20.3\n163.0\n4,023.2\n228,616.6\n16,284.0\n53,627.8\n55,303.6\n85,737.0\n773,712.0\nFeb\n2,577.7\n \n62,064.5\n \n122,479.8\n \n17,480.5\n \n76,802.2\n \n28,703.5\n49,241.8\n1.6\n0.0\n3,242.5\n20.3\n158.1\n5,761.9\n249,205.9\n16,681.8\n55,099.6\n59,171.4\n86,732.0\n835,425.0\nMar\n2,111.5\n \n76,544.2\n \n142,962.5\n \n19,239.6\n \n87,884.5\n \n43,284.1\n50,566.9\n0.9\n0.0\n2,970.2\n19.4\n253.4\n6,635.8\n296,282.4\n16,435.1\n65,660.6\n69,287.0\n94,293.1\n974,431.2\nApr\n2,624.9\n \n74,716.9\n \n160,466.5\n \n28,352.1\n \n123,190.3\n \n26,628.8\n63,944.8\n0.2\n0.0\n2,583.9\n37.5\n252.4\n7,258.1\n338,207.2\n30,154.8\n53,372.3\n73,993.0\n90,352.8\n1,076,136.5\nMay\n3,155.9\n \n142,118.9\n \n236,166.0\n \n35,928.9\n \n207,812.8\n \n61,757.6\n70,936.8\n0.0\n155.0\n3,762.8\n41.3\n289.0\n16,588.0\n455,287.9\n36,125.5\n134,993.5\n111,577.7\n130,617.1\n1,647,314.7\nJun\n2,801.2\n \n138,347.1\n \n266,691.8\n \n45,952.0\n \n241,920.1\n \n63,631.8\n86,890.0\n0.0\n654.0\n5,297.4\n61.2\n226.3\n14,282.6\n549,799.2\n38,578.3\n169,511.8\n130,604.3\n205,601.3\n1,960,850.3\nJul\n2,427.6\n \n159,024.6\n \n315,832.5\n \n39,388.2\n \n230,432.5\n \n41,246.8\n91,509.2\n0.0\n394.3\n4,940.5\n100.7\n349.7\n22,911.0\n638,556.7\n45,361.4\n144,090.2\n143,606.3\n242,024.6\n2,122,196.7\nAug\n2,640.6\n \n263,637.4\n \n411,439.9\n \n69,203.5\n \n311,107.0\n \n29,186.6\n100,187.1\n0.0\n330.1\n6,912.2\n113.5\n287.1\n46,504.1\n764,466.3\n46,788.2\n167,029.4\n251,442.9\n244,934.2\n2,716,210.1\nSep\n3,030.7\n \n289,230.8\n \n504,071.1\n \n75,446.7\n \n417,007.1\n \n18,185.0\n143,464.9\n0.0\n267.4\n8,265.9\n115.1\n306.3\n41,560.9\n902,078.3\n51,664.5\n146,133.1\n231,760.0\n285,781.8\n3,118,369.8\nOct\n3,022.6\n \n300,240.3\n \n525,870.3\n \n104,483.2\n \n389,979.7\n \n22,895.3\n151,757.7\n0.0\n204.7\n4,590.6\n116.5\n342.0\n43,335.5\n936,397.1\n58,632.8\n165,306.9\n267,183.8\n298,996.3\n3,273,355.4\nNov\n3,251.4\n \n286,365.2\n \n575,885.7\n \n111,716.1\n \n342,790.1\n \n17,089.0\n198,814.4\n0.0\n142.0\n6,078.2\n119.5\n303.6\n43,195.4\n1,042,144.5\n73,069.8\n170,944.8\n232,107.1\n302,373.7\n3,406,390.5\nDec\n3,361.7\n \n295,435.1\n \n652,284.4\n \n119,932.8\n \n351,906.8\n \n7,965.4\n288,844.0\n0.0\n20,072.7\n8,831.7\n114.4\n282.6\n30,272.3\n1,143,910.8\n84,048.5\n159,126.2\n234,748.7\n418,944.7\n3,820,082.5\n2023\nJan\n4,923.3\n \n379,841.7\n \n704,168.6\n \n151,980.1\n \n389,342.8\n \n-1,443.6\n319,807.4\n0.0\n23,774.5\n8,624.7\n228.5\n251.2\n44,113.2\n1,348,919.7\n137,477.6\n227,545.4\n251,246.0\n451,149.8\n4,441,950.8\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2022\nNotes\n1.Government securities includes treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households and other financial corporations.\nPublic \nEnterprises\nTABLE 4.1: OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS -ASSETS\n$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \n \n22 \n \nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nCapital\nContigent\nOther\nTOTAL\nand\nLiablities\nLiablities\nEnd of\nDemand\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nReserves\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\n2020\nJan\n28,570.4\n3,605.9\n2,358.3\n34,534.5\n1,299.1\n92.6\n35,926.3\n255.6\n3,114.7\n185.8\n336.1\n140.1\n12,285.7\n2,965.9\n7,182.1\n62,392.3\nFeb\n37,082.9\n3,939.6\n2,215.0\n43,237.5\n1,674.9\n78.2\n44,990.7\n260.1\n3,357.7\n189.6\n767.7\n154.9\n12,930.2\n5,441.7\n8,745.6\n76,838.2\nMar\n37,923.6\n4,998.7\n2,361.6\n45,283.9\n1,721.0\n409.0\n47,413.9\n476.8\n4,874.8\n258.4\n314.6\n339.9\n15,172.3\n7,917.3\n9,957.3\n86,725.4\nApr\n42,102.4\n5,060.0\n2,530.7\n49,693.1\n1,805.2\n516.3\n52,014.6\n337.6\n4,931.9\n346.4\n312.9\n233.2\n16,105.4\n7,642.8\n10,038.7\n91,963.5\nMay\n48,595.9\n6,274.7\n2,847.3\n57,717.9\n1,840.2\n630.7\n60,188.8\n359.2\n5,129.7\n536.7\n469.1\n365.4\n16,562.4\n7,042.0\n10,273.9\n100,927.2\nJun\n86,454.7\n6,715.3\n4,040.8\n97,210.8\n2,277.4\n1,479.4\n100,967.5\n863.2\n11,761.8\n887.6\n959.9\n348.2\n32,058.2\n24,299.3\n21,339.3\n193,485.0\nJul\n113,233.5\n7,957.5\n6,089.8\n127,280.8\n2,997.8\n1,731.9\n132,010.5\n1,024.3\n14,962.8\n1,387.9\n2,114.7\n348.7\n37,319.8\n28,551.1\n30,279.2\n247,999.1\nAug\n126,039.2\n8,814.1\n5,476.0\n140,329.3\n2,942.4\n850.8\n144,122.5\n1,111.7\n16,780.7\n1,837.1\n3,844.1\n422.5\n40,894.6\n25,354.6\n30,825.6\n265,193.4\nSep\n130,929.6\n9,728.6\n6,981.5\n147,639.7\n2,655.6\n1,531.5\n151,826.9\n1,083.9\n15,206.4\n1,863.1\n2,956.8\n372.2\n42,400.0\n28,289.4\n35,072.8\n279,071.4\nOct\n141,293.3\n12,094.6\n8,429.2\n161,817.1\n2,769.1\n1,799.7\n166,385.9\n1,231.9\n14,868.4\n1,812.7\n4,513.6\n441.7\n43,466.4\n29,764.7\n38,347.5\n300,832.8\nNov\n156,892.5\n13,732.4\n9,029.7\n179,654.6\n2,622.0\n1,569.9\n183,846.6\n1,237.3\n14,800.8\n1,489.5\n5,726.8\n423.6\n46,209.7\n29,821.2\n36,287.5\n319,842.9\nDec\n174,270.2\n16,788.9\n9,949.2\n201,008.3\n2,806.1\n4,340.0\n208,154.4\n1,436.2\n14,145.4\n1,318.6\n757.0\n292.0\n54,752.7\n29,608.0\n32,026.4\n342,490.8\n2021\nJan\n188,337.3\n17,667.3\n11,376.7\n217,381.3\n2,730.8\n5,453.7\n225,565.8\n1,422.4\n15,750.7\n391.1\n600.9\n376.7\n58,123.9\n25,036.2\n36,206.3\n363,474.0\nFeb\n189,154.3\n18,991.1\n14,072.8\n222,218.2\n2,959.1\n4,788.2\n229,965.5\n1,457.4\n15,908.6\n409.2\n581.4\n609.9\n63,583.8\n28,339.2\n39,632.7\n380,487.7\nMar\n193,674.2\n21,569.9\n14,209.4\n229,453.4\n4,691.2\n4,875.8\n239,020.5\n1,641.2\n14,997.2\n75.4\n1,378.2\n408.9\n67,061.8\n32,908.1\n36,730.7\n394,221.9\nApr\n219,936.5\n23,818.3\n13,746.7\n257,501.5\n2,725.1\n5,382.5\n265,609.2\n1,503.8\n15,748.4\n176.5\n939.0\n409.9\n68,812.8\n34,537.9\n36,197.4\n423,934.8\nMay\n232,585.8\n26,296.1\n18,415.5\n277,297.4\n2,205.9\n6,832.6\n286,335.9\n1,525.8\n16,063.1\n654.2\n540.1\n429.0\n69,567.0\n35,592.3\n37,586.2\n448,293.6\nJun\n249,167.5\n27,977.7\n21,449.6\n298,594.8\n2,906.1\n6,295.3\n307,796.2\n1,559.7\n15,430.6\n662.3\n939.0\n462.6\n72,403.8\n26,856.5\n47,947.9\n474,058.5\nJul\n271,359.4\n31,671.3\n23,074.4\n326,105.1\n3,016.7\n5,050.7\n334,172.4\n1,523.2\n16,041.4\n706.9\n750.8\n552.8\n76,406.3\n26,869.2\n76,295.4\n533,318.3\nAug\n275,007.8\n29,893.2\n29,352.2\n334,253.2\n3,661.5\n5,912.2\n343,826.8\n1,873.1\n18,699.5\n1,444.4\n2,300.1\n478.6\n82,627.2\n32,281.1\n66,009.2\n549,540.1\nSep\n301,829.4\n30,564.7\n26,426.5\n358,820.7\n3,719.1\n3,512.9\n366,052.6\n3,191.9\n16,236.1\n1,453.1\n71.3\n375.4\n84,564.6\n31,981.0\n54,307.5\n558,233.5\nOct\n350,366.7\n33,145.0\n27,967.9\n411,479.6\n2,824.1\n3,162.8\n417,466.5\n3,729.7\n21,509.9\n1,095.3\n1,109.9\n503.1\n92,871.8\n49,581.0\n69,873.5\n657,740.6\nNov\n363,455.0\n33,905.6\n33,256.8\n430,617.4\n3,325.7\n2,899.2\n436,842.3\n4,007.8\n19,465.9\n2,726.5\n1,556.1\n347.1\n104,310.9\n52,327.7\n70,300.6\n691,885.0\nDec\n396,412.5\n33,935.5\n37,464.8\n467,812.7\n3,922.1\n4,020.7\n475,755.5\n3,696.3\n23,643.2\n2,808.1\n2,405.3\n139.8\n128,421.4\n60,917.0\n72,102.3\n769,888.8\n2022\nJan\n392,702.2\n32,298.0\n39,346.3\n464,346.5\n2,962.5\n4,027.0\n471,336.0\n3,685.3\n25,398.5\n2,688.6\n1,416.9\n230.5\n144,852.4\n53,627.8\n70,476.0\n773,712.0\nFeb\n413,978.3\n37,494.3\n47,592.5\n499,065.1\n3,229.3\n4,407.7\n506,702.1\n4,456.2\n30,483.6\n2,120.4\n1,769.7\n226.8\n153,788.5\n55,099.6\n80,778.2\n835,425.0\nMar\n488,137.1\n37,893.9\n54,213.9\n580,244.9\n3,062.2\n5,330.5\n588,637.7\n4,510.9\n33,995.7\n2,137.9\n3,281.0\n810.6\n175,156.3\n65,660.6\n100,240.6\n974,431.2\nApr\n562,613.7\n46,129.7\n52,760.1\n661,503.5\n6,377.5\n7,656.8\n675,537.9\n4,246.9\n38,472.7\n2,173.0\n3,877.2\n486.8\n178,614.3\n53,372.3\n119,355.4\n1,076,136.5\nMay\n830,166.0\n61,112.6\n70,113.9\n961,392.5\n7,310.9\n7,417.6\n976,120.9\n6,165.3\n73,411.8\n2,383.3\n3,241.0\n321.8\n243,544.4\n134,993.5\n207,132.5\n1,647,314.7\nJun\n961,316.9\n66,716.9\n81,118.5\n1,109,152.4\n5,627.3\n10,226.2\n1,125,005.9\n7,157.9\n83,048.1\n2,898.5\n4,589.8\n345.2\n355,060.9\n169,511.8\n213,232.2\n1,960,850.3\nJul\n1,016,820.2\n79,550.5\n94,495.2\n1,190,865.8\n1,789.6\n9,363.5\n1,202,018.9\n8,137.9\n100,313.8\n2,814.9\n5,020.5\n1,339.1\n419,883.3\n144,090.2\n238,578.1\n2,122,196.7\nAug\n1,367,431.3\n85,931.5\n134,512.9\n1,587,875.7\n2,415.4\n7,892.4\n1,598,183.5\n12,785.6\n119,851.6\n3,230.7\n5,771.2\n555.2\n491,336.5\n167,029.4\n317,466.4\n2,716,210.1\nSep\n1,648,027.7\n92,678.5\n157,504.6\n1,898,210.8\n1,482.9\n8,707.2\n1,908,401.0\n14,047.5\n143,842.3\n3,720.2\n9,246.7\n587.2\n553,942.2\n146,133.1\n338,449.6\n3,118,369.8\nOct\n1,615,381.5\n76,774.2\n166,880.7\n1,859,036.4\n2,028.0\n6,673.7\n1,867,738.0\n15,558.9\n153,649.9\n28,072.2\n8,610.3\n762.5\n581,740.3\n165,306.9\n451,916.4\n3,273,355.4\nNov\n1,771,644.8\n81,518.1\n189,465.9\n2,042,628.9\n1,547.6\n6,731.4\n2,050,907.9\n13,438.5\n139,370.8\n19,973.5\n10,489.1\n339.6\n612,977.2\n170,944.8\n387,949.1\n3,406,390.5\nDec\n1,990,867.6\n90,317.0\n234,004.4\n2,315,189.0\n2,754.1\n7,866.7\n2,325,809.8\n14,149.0\n177,214.1\n10,597.8\n15,234.4\n752.5\n750,161.5\n159,126.2\n367,037.4\n3,820,082.5\n2023\nJan\n2,270,946.6\n100,094.1\n275,805.1\n2,646,845.8\n1,676.5\n41,821.3\n2,690,343.7\n15,056.5\n196,129.5\n4,974.3\n12,291.7\n675.5\n881,874.7\n227,545.4\n413,059.5\n4,441,950.8\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2022\nTABLE 4.2 : OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS - LIABILITIES \nDeposits\nAmounts Owing to\n$ millions\n \n \n \n23 \n \n \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nForeign\nBond\nNotes\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \nLocal\nPublic\nOther \nContigent \nNon Financial \n Notes &\n&\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment1\nLocal Governemt\nPublic Enterprises\nOther2\nGovernment\nGovernment\nEnterprises\n Institutional Units3\nOther claims\nAssets\nOther Assets\nAssets\nCoins\nCoin\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\n2020\nJan\n165.80\n \n2,845.62\n \n12,018.43\n \n708.00\n \n7,706.57\n \n1,811.38\n \n4,029.43\n \n-\n \n125.52\n \n14.97\n \n5.11\n \n12.17\n \n326.11\n \n10,766.91\n \n77.59\n \n2,965.93\n \n3,395.90\n \n8,058.15\n \n55,033.6\n \nFeb\n251.70\n \n2,756.57\n \n12,731.97\n \n889.16\n \n8,264.76\n \n1,532.87\n \n3,877.19\n \n-\n \n117.45\n \n13.99\n \n5.15\n \n11.56\n \n329.47\n \n11,656.91\n \n88.37\n \n5,441.70\n \n11,907.90\n \n8,653.69\n \n68,530.4\n \nMar\n242.41\n \n3,063.92\n \n14,545.58\n \n1,948.14\n \n12,381.17\n \n2,497.47\n \n4,373.76\n \n-\n \n0.08\n \n20.23\n \n4.39\n \n11.39\n \n765.82\n \n14,041.67\n \n127.46\n \n7,917.31\n \n5,718.53\n \n9,244.62\n \n76,904.0\n \nApr\n263.29\n \n3,147.75\n \n16,673.44\n \n1,287.51\n \n13,285.14\n \n3,056.32\n \n4,235.96\n \n-\n \n0.08\n \n18.39\n \n4.47\n \n9.75\n \n834.72\n \n14,864.30\n \n129.90\n \n7,642.80\n \n6,534.14\n \n9,703.93\n \n81,691.9\n \nMay\n284.33\n \n3,144.57\n \n19,827.46\n \n1,553.68\n \n15,003.29\n \n3,130.38\n \n4,160.50\n \n-\n \n0.12\n \n45.79\n \n4.53\n \n9.61\n \n768.01\n \n17,762.27\n \n143.44\n \n7,042.04\n \n6,012.40\n \n9,845.09\n \n88,737.5\n \nJun\n515.11\n \n8,372.39\n \n26,368.55\n \n3,570.85\n \n34,550.44\n \n7,527.46\n \n5,841.98\n \n-\n \n0.12\n \n90.14\n \n4.29\n \n9.41\n \n2,010.79\n \n26,638.87\n \n215.56\n \n24,299.33\n \n14,590.26\n \n18,983.05\n \n173,588.6\n \nJul\n577.99\n \n16,536.53\n \n49,470.13\n \n4,219.81\n \n40,259.84\n \n11,399.93\n \n6,357.84\n \n-\n \n-\n \n74.57\n \n4.33\n \n12.61\n \n1,025.78\n \n33,054.99\n \n229.06\n \n28,551.07\n \n10,247.64\n \n19,646.49\n \n221,668.6\n \nAug\n821.16\n \n26,519.73\n \n49,165.59\n \n4,265.44\n \n38,763.72\n \n14,219.24\n \n6,484.68\n \n-\n \n-\n \n39.07\n \n14.05\n \n14.74\n \n1,046.29\n \n38,741.31\n \n231.00\n \n25,354.64\n \n9,460.49\n \n19,961.16\n \n235,102.3\n \nSep\n891.26\n \n27,646.41\n \n51,169.67\n \n3,898.65\n \n38,420.20\n \n14,126.83\n \n6,354.19\n \n-\n \n-\n \n107.40\n \n9.61\n \n22.30\n \n1,050.38\n \n41,088.91\n \n228.95\n \n28,289.36\n \n17,608.70\n \n19,375.08\n \n250,287.9\n \nOct\n896.48\n \n29,309.79\n \n60,589.19\n \n3,602.58\n \n38,877.31\n \n13,530.74\n \n7,763.97\n \n-\n \n20.06\n \n109.83\n \n17.57\n \n22.18\n \n1,019.00\n \n48,440.92\n \n268.07\n \n29,764.70\n \n15,978.22\n \n19,616.63\n \n269,827.2\n \nNov\n919.42\n \n31,596.89\n \n67,899.10\n \n3,494.87\n \n39,693.38\n \n14,134.74\n \n7,098.29\n \n-\n \n0.02\n \n110.37\n \n20.00\n \n16.81\n \n1,269.94\n \n54,496.74\n \n259.90\n \n29,821.16\n \n16,683.48\n \n19,526.70\n \n287,041.8\n \nDec\n1,019.76\n \n36,507.59\n \n70,392.07\n \n4,949.48\n \n37,346.17\n \n10,803.58\n \n9,985.57\n \n-\n \n-\n \n1.18\n \n23.30\n \n26.76\n \n1,269.01\n \n62,953.03\n \n718.16\n \n29,608.01\n \n12,793.91\n \n28,230.82\n \n306,628.4\n \n2021\nJan\n1,237.43\n \n39,565.64\n \n71,463.64\n \n12,288.89\n \n39,092.85\n \n10,921.99\n \n8,281.80\n \n-\n \n-\n \n1.18\n \n16.67\n \n18.01\n \n1,264.28\n \n71,090.96\n \n718.83\n \n25,036.22\n \n12,333.21\n \n32,123.11\n \n325,454.7\n \nFeb\n1,320.27\n \n38,100.03\n \n69,341.48\n \n16,867.76\n \n38,108.83\n \n6,341.39\n \n12,518.15\n \n-\n \n-\n \n1.26\n \n24.15\n \n22.69\n \n1,493.66\n \n77,324.34\n \n774.89\n \n28,339.17\n \n15,953.14\n \n33,612.14\n \n340,143.4\n \nMar\n1,244.16\n \n38,369.53\n \n76,479.44\n \n5,317.61\n \n41,401.24\n \n8,733.65\n \n15,889.61\n \n-\n \n19.21\n \n34.56\n \n15.17\n \n21.67\n \n1,309.75\n \n80,607.03\n \n878.97\n \n32,908.13\n \n19,302.34\n \n30,861.86\n \n353,393.9\n \nApr\n1,430.83\n \n38,008.89\n \n79,592.64\n \n5,639.40\n \n48,564.03\n \n7,679.05\n \n18,267.01\n \n-\n \n19.23\n \n62.89\n \n19.86\n \n12.71\n \n1,336.70\n \n91,062.16\n \n956.75\n \n34,537.88\n \n21,214.88\n \n32,383.77\n \n380,788.7\n \nMay\n1,648.09\n \n28,677.21\n \n87,611.51\n \n6,479.66\n \n59,745.10\n \n11,582.44\n \n18,846.75\n \n-\n \n152.75\n \n93.37\n \n21.77\n \n16.58\n \n1,263.75\n \n94,790.46\n \n990.41\n \n35,592.28\n \n21,398.95\n \n31,307.45\n \n400,218.5\n \nJun\n1,419.27\n \n28,452.53\n \n69,413.26\n \n24,215.35\n \n70,835.98\n \n17,601.31\n \n17,152.75\n \n-\n \n19.46\n \n92.91\n \n17.91\n \n77.79\n \n1,511.86\n \n106,954.15\n \n1,247.08\n \n26,856.45\n \n26,444.57\n \n33,288.94\n \n425,601.6\n \nJul\n1,794.72\n \n29,100.73\n \n97,429.50\n \n15,901.02\n \n79,937.02\n \n25,314.30\n \n21,665.10\n \n-\n \n290.76\n \n47.39\n \n17.32\n \n67.80\n \n1,351.13\n \n117,348.16\n \n1,301.18\n \n26,869.18\n \n29,079.64\n \n33,587.68\n \n481,102.6\n \nAug\n2,137.72\n \n31,734.84\n \n85,441.98\n \n9,099.10\n \n70,391.64\n \n25,194.95\n \n31,434.20\n \n-\n \n339.72\n \n51.28\n \n22.49\n \n63.94\n \n1,583.28\n \n132,522.63\n \n1,337.19\n \n32,281.12\n \n30,022.43\n \n37,697.05\n \n491,355.6\n \nSep\n2,417.81\n \n36,259.54\n \n93,032.71\n \n6,164.78\n \n66,640.78\n \n25,023.38\n \n31,460.81\n \n-\n \n366.88\n \n57.60\n \n21.07\n \n62.45\n \n1,531.08\n \n134,780.92\n \n1,342.62\n \n31,980.97\n \n30,439.34\n \n34,630.85\n \n496,213.6\n \nOct\n1,993.06\n \n47,379.62\n \n99,470.02\n \n7,339.71\n \n86,302.62\n \n26,924.18\n \n37,639.16\n \n-\n \n188.07\n \n121.59\n \n21.20\n \n75.41\n \n1,683.89\n \n149,477.36\n \n1,523.34\n \n49,580.96\n \n40,853.06\n \n36,664.31\n \n587,237.6\n \nNov\n2,168.80\n \n49,327.15\n \n100,125.90\n \n12,723.73\n \n71,667.33\n \n29,748.47\n \n41,015.56\n \n-\n \n187.03\n \n999.12\n \n21.24\n \n74.76\n \n1,882.53\n \n168,661.25\n \n1,484.24\n \n52,327.68\n \n40,073.22\n \n43,878.52\n \n616,366.5\n \nDec\n2,315.32\n \n46,412.99\n \n109,803.84\n \n10,942.92\n \n87,347.07\n \n33,690.93\n \n38,610.29\n \n-\n \n185.99\n \n4,146.13\n \n21.09\n \n167.53\n \n2,798.61\n \n184,836.87\n \n3,368.75\n \n60,916.98\n \n41,811.67\n \n59,011.63\n \n686,388.6\n \n2022\nJan\n2,359.27\n \n49,206.02\n \n108,119.97\n \n10,419.90\n \n66,808.45\n \n30,774.31\n \n38,636.84\n \n-\n \n186.80\n \n801.50\n \n20.33\n \n163.02\n \n3,628.73\n \n199,495.34\n \n2,997.94\n \n53,627.76\n \n47,405.91\n \n69,989.80\n \n684,641.9\n \nFeb\n1,971.78\n \n57,553.54\n \n112,522.99\n \n14,300.66\n \n70,750.63\n \n28,703.53\n \n44,705.21\n \n-\n \n-\n \n976.55\n \n20.34\n \n158.06\n \n5,367.16\n \n215,520.37\n \n3,055.50\n \n55,099.61\n \n53,459.12\n \n70,832.47\n \n734,997.5\n \nMar\n1,541.49\n \n70,856.33\n \n130,423.48\n \n15,503.46\n \n82,662.70\n \n43,284.13\n \n44,874.23\n \n-\n \n-\n \n1,380.20\n \n19.40\n \n253.42\n \n6,240.94\n \n258,715.05\n \n3,092.69\n \n65,660.61\n \n58,874.69\n \n76,938.87\n \n860,321.7\n \nApr\n1,939.64\n \n70,204.43\n \n144,168.02\n \n23,452.88\n \n117,033.42\n \n26,628.79\n \n57,772.47\n \n-\n \n-\n \n722.54\n \n37.54\n \n252.44\n \n6,858.06\n \n305,476.79\n \n4,348.46\n \n53,372.28\n \n62,788.55\n \n71,414.75\n \n946,471.1\n \nMay\n2,397.94\n \n131,996.38\n \n211,837.59\n \n31,586.61\n \n190,366.81\n \n61,757.62\n \n64,373.91\n \n-\n \n154.99\n \n1,559.14\n \n41.28\n \n289.00\n \n16,193.81\n \n398,048.90\n \n4,712.74\n \n134,993.54\n \n94,851.60\n \n111,543.84\n \n1,456,705.7\n \nJun\n2,263.18\n \n127,839.16\n \n234,109.43\n \n40,937.28\n \n219,607.39\n \n63,631.76\n \n83,690.44\n \n-\n \n653.97\n \n2,159.12\n \n61.20\n \n226.29\n \n13,888.60\n \n478,163.38\n \n8,954.46\n \n169,511.81\n \n110,528.09\n \n168,440.54\n \n1,724,666.1\n \nJul\n1,578.47\n \n147,217.74\n \n284,912.89\n \n34,334.13\n \n202,815.28\n \n41,246.78\n \n86,971.63\n \n-\n \n394.34\n \n1,852.14\n \n100.65\n \n349.68\n \n22,516.21\n \n556,692.12\n \n9,737.92\n \n144,090.18\n \n129,869.55\n \n192,524.32\n \n1,857,204.0\n \nAug\n1,630.70\n \n247,190.46\n \n377,078.80\n \n64,650.96\n \n273,181.97\n \n29,186.59\n \n95,346.12\n \n-\n \n330.12\n \n3,556.96\n \n113.50\n \n287.14\n \n26,564.57\n \n681,253.30\n \n11,493.92\n \n167,029.36\n \n238,442.98\n \n194,745.11\n \n2,412,082.6\n \nSep\n1,791.71\n \n270,594.59\n \n465,301.31\n \n68,020.95\n \n370,323.69\n \n18,184.96\n \n134,414.53\n \n-\n \n267.40\n \n4,916.56\n \n115.11\n \n306.33\n \n21,773.50\n \n806,774.24\n \n12,680.89\n \n146,133.14\n \n215,417.68\n \n219,933.24\n \n2,756,949.8\n \nOct\n1,704.79\n \n281,204.64\n \n480,106.49\n \n94,573.08\n \n343,440.15\n \n22,895.35\n \n136,939.74\n \n-\n \n204.69\n \n2,201.55\n \n116.48\n \n341.96\n \n22,935.50\n \n852,069.39\n \n15,525.65\n \n165,306.91\n \n232,188.99\n \n245,924.22\n \n2,897,679.6\n \nNov\n1,644.95\n \n259,109.18\n \n533,438.97\n \n101,870.32\n \n299,715.01\n \n17,089.04\n \n180,534.44\n \n-\n \n141.97\n \n2,292.28\n \n119.53\n \n303.55\n \n22,178.73\n \n960,814.77\n \n15,450.39\n \n170,944.78\n \n196,338.19\n \n250,551.19\n \n3,012,537.3\n \nDec\n1,778.71\n \n263,863.65\n \n603,136.26\n \n110,935.77\n \n299,087.30\n \n7,965.37\n \n266,725.41\n \n-\n \n79.26\n \n3,887.78\n \n114.42\n \n282.61\n \n30,272.25\n \n1,066,654.12\n \n16,130.63\n \n159,126.16\n \n189,560.01\n \n344,235.10\n \n3,363,834.8\n \n2023\nJan\n2,391.61\n \n340,953.56\n \n654,740.29\n \n143,455.70\n \n335,380.17\n \n(1,443.59)\n \n301,026.07\n \n-\n \n105.97\n \n4,873.87\n \n228.45\n \n251.24\n \n44,113.17\n \n1,307,512.98\n \n17,767.70\n \n227,545.42\n \n204,830.78\n \n374,080.77\n \n3,957,814.2\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2022\n1.Government securities include treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households and other financial corporations, \nTABLE 5.1: COMMERCIAL BANKS -ASSETS\n$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \n \n24 \n \nZWL$ millions\nEnd of\nDemand\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nCapital\nContigent\nOther\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\nand\nLiablities\nLiablities\nTOTAL\nReserves\n2020\nJan\n27,276.4\n1,787.3\n1,876.0\n30,939.8\n1,026.0\n76.3\n32,042.1\n232.1\n2,170.0\n185.8\n236.2\n140.1\n10,357.6\n2,965.9\n6,703.8\n55,033.6\nFeb\n35,796.5\n1,869.8\n1,712.8\n39,379.1\n1,404.1\n62.2\n40,845.3\n238.9\n2,391.2\n189.6\n209.2\n154.9\n10,877.8\n5,441.7\n8,181.8\n68,530.4\nMar\n36,078.2\n2,458.2\n1,884.9\n40,421.2\n1,430.6\n393.1\n42,245.0\n468.8\n3,731.4\n258.4\n181.2\n339.9\n12,487.9\n7,917.3\n9,274.0\n76,904.0\nApr\n40,156.4\n2,457.6\n2,078.8\n44,692.9\n1,514.8\n496.9\n46,704.6\n333.2\n3,779.7\n346.4\n172.1\n233.2\n13,105.1\n7,642.8\n9,374.8\n81,691.9\nMay\n46,306.1\n2,502.0\n2,405.7\n51,213.8\n1,399.0\n611.4\n53,224.1\n324.9\n3,968.6\n536.7\n319.4\n365.4\n13,454.1\n7,042.0\n9,502.3\n88,737.5\nJun\n67,548.1\n17,859.0\n3,562.0\n88,969.1\n1,931.1\n1,453.1\n92,353.3\n856.9\n9,116.9\n887.6\n681.7\n348.2\n24,773.8\n24,299.3\n20,270.9\n173,588.6\nJul\n89,092.1\n20,865.7\n5,595.6\n115,553.4\n2,671.5\n1,702.4\n119,927.3\n1,014.3\n11,100.4\n1,387.9\n1,907.7\n348.7\n28,563.5\n28,551.1\n28,867.6\n221,668.6\nAug\n102,750.2\n20,005.2\n4,891.9\n127,647.3\n2,577.9\n824.8\n131,049.9\n1,101.5\n12,302.3\n1,837.1\n3,658.1\n412.5\n30,713.4\n25,354.6\n28,672.9\n235,102.3\nSep\n104,770.7\n24,130.0\n6,488.3\n135,389.0\n2,548.1\n1,496.4\n139,433.5\n1,063.5\n11,363.7\n1,863.1\n2,831.0\n372.2\n32,694.4\n28,289.4\n32,377.1\n250,287.9\nOct\n114,057.9\n26,079.1\n7,702.2\n147,839.2\n2,666.6\n1,767.2\n152,273.0\n1,089.2\n11,137.3\n1,812.7\n4,232.9\n441.7\n33,811.1\n29,764.7\n35,264.5\n269,827.2\nNov\n129,129.6\n26,871.0\n8,262.1\n164,262.8\n2,369.5\n1,538.3\n168,170.5\n1,100.4\n11,019.9\n1,489.5\n5,403.8\n423.6\n36,278.2\n29,821.2\n33,334.7\n287,041.8\nDec\n146,151.8\n27,804.4\n8,926.9\n182,883.1\n2,547.6\n4,309.9\n189,740.6\n1,239.9\n10,924.0\n1,318.6\n316.6\n292.0\n43,984.3\n29,608.0\n29,204.3\n306,628.4\n2021\nJan\n158,888.8\n28,456.6\n10,150.2\n197,495.5\n2,580.8\n5,423.4\n205,499.8\n1,142.5\n12,732.6\n391.1\n519.6\n376.7\n50,147.7\n25,036.2\n29,608.5\n325,454.7\nFeb\n162,092.2\n26,146.3\n12,239.7\n200,478.2\n2,809.1\n4,762.5\n208,049.7\n1,150.4\n12,833.2\n409.2\n540.7\n609.9\n54,930.3\n28,339.2\n33,280.7\n340,143.4\nMar\n165,101.1\n30,313.5\n12,276.4\n207,691.0\n4,541.2\n4,845.3\n217,077.6\n1,331.7\n11,620.2\n75.4\n1,136.7\n408.9\n58,208.9\n32,908.1\n30,626.5\n353,393.9\nApr\n191,923.5\n31,441.3\n11,549.5\n234,914.3\n2,195.0\n5,346.7\n242,455.9\n1,190.1\n11,503.5\n176.5\n757.1\n409.9\n60,361.3\n34,537.9\n29,396.5\n380,788.7\nMay\n194,108.9\n40,921.9\n15,896.4\n250,927.2\n1,705.9\n6,802.1\n259,435.2\n1,186.9\n11,783.3\n654.2\n145.2\n429.0\n61,202.0\n35,592.3\n29,790.4\n400,218.5\nJun\n211,950.0\n40,878.5\n18,536.0\n271,364.4\n2,696.6\n6,202.3\n280,263.2\n1,211.8\n11,575.5\n662.3\n368.5\n462.6\n63,417.5\n26,856.5\n40,783.7\n425,601.6\nJul\n226,860.1\n48,928.9\n19,775.4\n295,564.4\n2,991.7\n5,012.2\n303,568.3\n1,169.2\n12,552.8\n706.9\n476.2\n552.8\n66,514.1\n26,869.2\n68,693.1\n481,102.6\nAug\n237,167.0\n38,425.4\n25,114.2\n300,706.5\n3,601.5\n5,873.7\n310,181.7\n1,216.2\n13,354.7\n1,444.4\n1,678.3\n478.6\n72,123.3\n32,281.1\n58,597.3\n491,355.6\nSep\n263,598.2\n37,954.3\n21,954.4\n323,506.9\n3,643.0\n3,469.0\n330,618.9\n2,141.0\n11,770.4\n1,453.1\n-110.6\n375.4\n71,255.0\n31,981.0\n46,729.4\n496,213.6\nOct\n299,038.0\n50,766.0\n22,882.7\n372,686.7\n2,824.1\n3,023.7\n378,534.5\n2,411.8\n14,077.4\n1,095.3\n1,109.9\n503.1\n78,644.6\n49,581.0\n61,280.0\n587,237.6\nNov\n307,063.4\n52,309.9\n27,875.3\n387,248.6\n3,325.7\n2,764.9\n393,339.3\n2,869.4\n12,437.2\n2,726.5\n1,352.5\n347.1\n89,288.6\n52,327.7\n61,678.3\n616,366.5\nDec\n334,599.0\n58,318.5\n30,455.6\n423,373.1\n3,842.1\n3,855.7\n431,070.9\n3,027.0\n13,896.4\n2,808.1\n1,693.3\n139.8\n109,665.4\n60,917.0\n63,170.8\n686,388.6\n2022\nJan\n346,619.5\n43,438.8\n31,158.1\n421,216.4\n2,962.5\n3,864.8\n428,043.7\n2,995.6\n14,406.9\n2,688.6\n1,043.2\n230.5\n122,752.1\n53,627.8\n58,853.6\n684,641.9\nFeb\n358,979.4\n51,510.7\n38,313.7\n448,803.8\n3,229.3\n4,248.7\n456,281.8\n3,834.1\n16,267.7\n2,120.4\n1,338.1\n226.8\n130,981.3\n55,099.6\n68,847.8\n734,997.5\nMar\n422,934.6\n58,283.5\n42,258.5\n523,476.6\n3,062.2\n5,171.3\n531,710.2\n3,850.2\n18,374.8\n2,137.9\n2,779.1\n810.6\n149,781.8\n65,660.6\n85,216.5\n860,321.7\nApr\n479,558.7\n74,880.3\n40,491.0\n594,930.0\n6,377.5\n7,486.7\n608,794.2\n3,792.3\n21,445.6\n2,173.0\n3,173.0\n486.8\n149,610.1\n53,372.3\n103,623.7\n946,471.1\nMay\n666,937.8\n137,419.9\n55,389.8\n859,747.5\n7,310.9\n7,249.8\n874,308.3\n5,769.3\n39,105.1\n2,383.3\n2,207.5\n321.8\n214,978.6\n134,993.5\n182,638.3\n1,456,705.7\nJun\n773,692.7\n154,956.9\n63,511.7\n992,161.3\n4,597.1\n10,018.0\n1,006,776.4\n6,743.2\n42,701.8\n2,898.5\n3,389.3\n345.2\n307,341.8\n169,511.8\n184,958.1\n1,724,666.1\nJul\n810,906.6\n173,134.0\n74,324.5\n1,058,365.1\n717.0\n9,153.8\n1,068,235.9\n7,994.5\n54,168.7\n2,814.9\n2,948.9\n1,339.1\n355,597.9\n144,090.2\n220,013.9\n1,857,204.0\nAug\n1,100,922.1\n219,798.6\n110,595.1\n1,431,315.7\n790.2\n7,675.2\n1,439,781.1\n12,484.6\n64,160.3\n3,230.7\n2,791.8\n555.2\n421,880.4\n167,029.4\n300,169.0\n2,412,082.6\nSep\n1,328,584.6\n256,980.2\n127,051.1\n1,712,616.0\n1,482.9\n8,473.0\n1,722,571.9\n13,789.2\n81,182.4\n3,720.2\n5,632.9\n587.2\n465,063.9\n146,133.1\n318,269.0\n2,756,949.8\nOct\n1,365,908.5\n205,688.8\n128,186.9\n1,699,784.2\n813.8\n6,314.3\n1,706,912.3\n14,933.2\n83,998.0\n28,072.2\n4,282.4\n762.5\n486,396.6\n165,306.9\n407,015.5\n2,897,679.6\nNov\n1,481,503.5\n243,239.9\n146,530.0\n1,871,273.4\n291.3\n6,366.6\n1,877,931.3\n12,665.1\n67,318.9\n19,973.5\n5,349.1\n339.6\n514,200.0\n170,944.8\n343,815.1\n3,012,537.3\nDec\n1,697,008.7\n235,271.2\n181,090.6\n2,113,370.5\n1,514.4\n7,399.5\n2,122,284.4\n13,296.8\n106,071.5\n10,597.8\n9,610.4\n752.5\n621,113.3\n159,126.2\n320,981.8\n3,363,834.8\n2023\nJan\n2,139,458.0\n78,197.7\n215,537.0\n2,433,192.7\n214.3\n41,333.8\n2,474,740.8\n12,923.7\n123,605.0\n4,974.3\n5,669.1\n675.5\n723,452.2\n227,545.4\n384,228.1\n3,957,814.2\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2022\nTABLE 5.2 : COMMERCIAL BANKS - LIABILITIES\nDeposits\nAmounts Owing to\n \n \n \n25 \n \n \nForeign\nOther Assets\nNon Financial \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nNotes\nAssets\nBond\n&\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \n Notes &\nCoin\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment1\nLocal Governemt\nPublic Enterprises\nOther2\nMortgages\nGovernment\nOther\nCoins\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\n2020\nJan\n16.3\n \n322.3\n1,106.8\n \n361.8\n421.8\n \n-\n \n283.0\n \n20.1\n-\n \n-\n \n478.2\n \n-\n \n1,498.8\n \n717.5\n1,552.8\n \n6,779.5\n \nFeb\n14.5\n \n368.2\n977.2\n \n612.5\n370.5\n \n-\n \n357.1\n \n20.1\n-\n \n1.5\n \n503.6\n \n-\n \n2,097.7\n \n735.9\n1,538.8\n \n7,597.4\n \nMar\n20.1\n \n529.4\n1,423.7\n \n261.8\n282.6\n \n-\n \n341.6\n \n19.2\n-\n \n0.6\n \n526.4\n \n-\n \n2,406.4\n \n1165.6\n1,914.1\n \n8,891.5\n \nApr\n33.1\n \n493.1\n914.2\n \n232.1\n384.9\n \n-\n \n424.3\n \n18.1\n-\n \n-\n \n525.9\n \n-\n \n2,568.2\n \n1528.5\n2,134.4\n \n9,256.8\n \nMay\n39.7\n \n434.7\n1,248.4\n \n192.3\n725.0\n \n-\n \n382.4\n \n17.0\n-\n \n-\n \n517.6\n \n-\n \n2,793.4\n \n2669.6\n2,146.1\n \n11,166.3\n \nJun\n88.7\n \n1167.9\n2,857.8\n \n395.9\n1,222.0\n \n-\n \n385.4\n \n13.8\n-\n \n-\n \n653.4\n \n-\n \n4,663.9\n \n2688.0\n4,712.1\n \n18,848.8\n \nJul\n109.1\n \n1780.7\n3,878.9\n \n1342.9\n1,879.4\n \n-\n \n346.6\n \n13.4\n-\n \n-\n \n585.7\n \n-\n \n5,648.0\n \n3879.5\n4,927.7\n \n24,391.8\n \nAug\n142.9\n \n2175.5\n4,799.3\n \n341.7\n2,310.6\n \n-\n \n294.6\n \n13.1\n-\n \n-\n \n688.7\n \n-\n \n6,552.1\n \n4480.3\n6,104.6\n \n27,903.4\n \nSep\n179.8\n \n2469.9\n4,547.1\n \n504.6\n1,027.7\n \n-\n \n218.3\n \n12.9\n-\n \n0.4\n \n741.5\n \n-\n \n6,518.3\n \n2774.9\n6,503.8\n \n25,499.1\n \nOct\n149.1\n \n2787.0\n5,056.1\n \n778.9\n1,182.4\n \n-\n \n206.5\n \n12.3\n-\n \n112.2\n \n772.3\n \n-\n \n6,874.4\n \n2795.4\n6,537.1\n \n27,263.4\n \nNov\n104.3\n \n2935.7\n4,448.9\n \n691.0\n1,412.8\n \n-\n \n1,666.7\n \n11.6\n-\n \n157.8\n \n930.4\n \n-\n \n7,498.6\n \n2571.1\n6,712.9\n \n29,141.9\n \nDec\n116.2\n \n3210.3\n5,085.9\n \n802.0\n1,183.4\n \n-\n \n1,830.2\n \n11.2\n-\n \n251.1\n \n1,008.4\n \n-\n \n8,562.3\n \n2559.4\n7,352.9\n \n31,973.2\n \n2021\nJan\n188.7\n \n2943.3\n5,986.5\n \n793.8\n843.5\n \n-\n \n1,783.8\n \n10.2\n-\n \n211.3\n \n1,091.3\n \n0.0\n \n9,329.1\n \n2980.3\n7,685.1\n \n33,846.9\n \nFeb\n345.7\n \n2762.9\n6,004.8\n \n811.1\n984.2\n \n-\n \n2,731.0\n \n9.2\n-\n \n236.8\n \n2,089.3\n \n-\n \n8,950.2\n \n2949.2\n7,790.6\n \n35,665.0\n \nMar\n168.3\n \n2278.9\n6,313.1\n \n1594.4\n1,028.2\n \n-\n \n1,341.7\n \n8.4\n-\n \n415.1\n \n1,242.4\n \n-\n \n10,867.7\n \n3027.5\n7,841.0\n \n36,126.8\n \nApr\n206.9\n \n2702.1\n5,302.6\n \n1156.7\n1,085.4\n \n-\n \n871.7\n \n7.7\n-\n \n508.9\n \n1,581.5\n \n-\n \n14,233.6\n \n3431.1\n7,237.9\n \n38,326.2\n \nMay\n210.3\n \n1687.6\n5,962.2\n \n1250.9\n3,847.1\n \n-\n \n116.9\n \n7.0\n-\n \n517.7\n \n1,568.8\n \n-\n \n17,154.9\n \n2927.9\n7,532.9\n \n42,784.2\n \nJun\n249.6\n \n1649.7\n6,202.6\n \n1163.8\n1,866.7\n \n-\n \n204.6\n \n6.5\n-\n \n588.0\n \n1,851.9\n \n-\n \n18,795.4\n \n2580.9\n7,701.1\n \n42,860.7\n \nJul\n283.7\n \n1212.2\n7,193.4\n \n1892.7\n1,875.4\n \n-\n \n1,143.4\n \n6.0\n-\n \n447.3\n \n1,963.2\n \n-\n \n18,280.3\n \n3923.5\n7,695.6\n \n45,916.5\n \nAug\n352.8\n \n1408.8\n7,869.3\n \n2537.6\n2,316.2\n \n-\n \n3,535.6\n \n5.4\n-\n \n399.5\n \n2,101.3\n \n-\n \n19,422.2\n \n3837.6\n7,666.6\n \n51,453.0\n \nSep\n349.8\n \n1926.6\n7,608.5\n \n2430.2\n1,941.4\n \n-\n \n4,314.6\n \n5.1\n-\n \n205.2\n \n2,231.7\n \n-\n \n20,461.1\n \n4013.2\n9,460.7\n \n54,948.1\n \nOct\n411.5\n \n2396.2\n8,221.0\n \n2162.4\n3,421.5\n \n-\n \n5,627.7\n \n4.3\n-\n \n271.1\n \n2,539.5\n \n-\n \n22,881.3\n \n5432.3\n9,501.3\n \n62,870.1\n \nNov\n339.8\n \n3578.4\n7,561.6\n \n2568.8\n2,299.5\n \n-\n \n5,882.7\n \n3.7\n-\n \n566.4\n \n2,788.5\n \n-\n \n27,326.1\n \n4400.3\n9,614.3\n \n66,930.0\n \nDec\n351.1\n \n3217.3\n8,557.8\n \n2619.2\n3,620.2\n \n-\n \n2,353.6\n \n3.0\n-\n \n1,189.0\n \n2,786.9\n \n-\n \n33,115.3\n \n5610.8\n11,334.1\n \n74,758.3\n \n2022\nJan\n324.6\n \n3504.3\n8,506.5\n \n2680.3\n2,631.0\n \n-\n \n1,110.8\n \n2.4\n-\n \n1,487.3\n \n2,967.6\n \n-\n \n35,913.5\n \n6693.8\n14,008.7\n \n79,830.9\n \nFeb\n411.5\n \n4021.5\n9,763.6\n \n3069.7\n5,678.0\n \n-\n \n4,048.9\n \n1.6\n-\n \n1,465.4\n \n3,241.1\n \n-\n \n39,977.5\n \n4511.5\n13,964.4\n \n90,154.6\n \nMar\n354.3\n \n4413.6\n11,882.6\n \n3691.3\n4,932.3\n \n-\n \n5,235.0\n \n0.9\n-\n \n1,590.0\n \n3,888.3\n \n-\n \n42,741.3\n \n9086.6\n15,421.2\n \n103,237.4\n \nApr\n546.4\n \n3054.1\n15,585.8\n \n4857.7\n5,768.6\n \n-\n \n5,714.4\n \n0.2\n-\n \n1,861.4\n \n4,143.7\n \n-\n \n48,582.4\n \n9654.2\n16,999.2\n \n116,768.1\n \nMay\n639.5\n \n8326.7\n23,817.6\n \n4251.9\n16,001.6\n \n-\n \n6,150.9\n \n0.0\n-\n \n1,486.3\n \n8,474.8\n \n-\n \n74,864.0\n \n14793.9\n17,091.2\n \n175,898.5\n \nJun\n418.5\n \n8464.3\n32,497.6\n \n3807.5\n21,184.8\n \n-\n \n2,639.3\n \n0.0\n-\n \n1,340.0\n \n10,851.1\n \n-\n \n85,145.9\n \n18155.8\n35,128.1\n \n219,633.0\n \nJul\n700.4\n \n9914.6\n30,660.3\n \n4983.4\n24,902.9\n \n-\n \n4,077.6\n \n0.0\n-\n \n1,411.5\n \n13,722.1\n \n-\n \n98,066.0\n \n9998.6\n45,127.9\n \n243,565.1\n \nAug\n863.8\n \n14422.1\n33,703.2\n \n4483.0\n34,971.8\n \n-\n \n4,379.8\n \n0.0\n-\n \n2,106.6\n \n16,515.4\n \n-\n \n115,491.9\n \n8745.3\n45,694.0\n \n281,377.1\n \nSep\n1,086.8\n \n14998.2\n37,911.3\n \n7470.1\n45,094.8\n \n-\n \n8,440.8\n \n0.0\n-\n \n1,302.8\n \n17,996.8\n \n-\n \n129,242.7\n \n11630.7\n60,830.4\n \n336,005.2\n \nOct\n1,158.3\n \n14768.7\n44,296.5\n \n10013.7\n44,664.1\n \n-\n \n14,109.9\n \n0.0\n-\n \n1,142.4\n \n16,817.7\n \n-\n \n123,793.8\n \n30036.4\n47,678.2\n \n348,479.7\n \nNov\n1,449.3\n \n22456.9\n41,398.0\n \n9771.8\n41,317.6\n \n-\n \n17,572.6\n \n0.0\n-\n \n2,085.3\n \n16,785.8\n \n-\n \n136,029.9\n \n30694.0\n46,275.8\n \n365,836.9\n \nDec\n1,470.7\n \n23012.7\n48,533.8\n \n8913.7\n50,229.0\n \n-\n \n21,411.1\n \n0.0\n19,993.4\n \n2,176.2\n \n17,693.7\n \n-\n \n119,322.3\n \n39279.1\n69,102.5\n \n421,138.1\n \n2023\nJan\n2,402.7\n \n32405.1\n47,062.6\n \n8410.8\n50,364.6\n \n-\n \n17,976.2\n \n0.0\n23,668.5\n \n2,406.3\n \n18,311.0\n \n-\n \n132,757.4\n \n41367.4\n69,570.1\n \n446,702.8\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2022\nNotes\n1.Government securities include treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households and other financial corporations, \nTABLE 6.1: BUILDING SOCIETIES -ASSETS\n$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \n \n26 \n \nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nCapital\nOther\nTOTAL\nand\nLiablities\nEnd of\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nReserves\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\n2020\nJan\n2,894.8\n398.4\n3,293.3\n273.1\n15.0\n3,581.4\n34.7\n944.7\n0.0\n100.0\n0.0\n1,699.9\n418.8\n6,779.5\nFeb\n3,118.5\n419.8\n3,538.4\n270.9\n15.0\n3,824.3\n32.5\n966.5\n0.0\n558.5\n0.0\n1,714.1\n501.5\n7,597.4\nMar\n3,978.7\n384.4\n4,363.1\n290.4\n15.0\n4,668.5\n19.3\n1,143.4\n0.0\n133.4\n0.0\n2,335.6\n591.3\n8,891.5\nApr\n4,097.6\n354.9\n4,452.5\n290.4\n15.0\n4,757.9\n15.6\n1,152.3\n0.0\n140.8\n0.0\n2,628.1\n562.1\n9,256.8\nMay\n5,615.0\n370.0\n5,985.0\n441.2\n15.0\n6,441.2\n45.6\n1,161.2\n0.0\n149.8\n0.0\n2,708.1\n660.4\n11,166.3\nJun\n7,327.5\n405.9\n7,733.4\n346.2\n15.0\n8,094.6\n17.6\n2,644.8\n0.0\n278.2\n0.0\n6,867.2\n946.4\n18,848.8\nJul\n10,284.7\n427.7\n10,712.4\n326.2\n15.0\n11,053.7\n21.3\n3,862.4\n0.0\n207.1\n0.0\n8,010.7\n1,236.7\n24,391.8\nAug\n10,984.4\n502.7\n11,487.1\n364.5\n15.0\n11,866.6\n21.4\n4,478.3\n0.0\n186.1\n10.0\n9,438.3\n1,902.7\n27,903.4\nSep\n10,408.2\n403.5\n10,811.8\n107.5\n15.0\n10,934.3\n31.7\n3,842.7\n0.0\n125.8\n0.0\n8,069.6\n2,495.1\n25,499.1\nOct\n11,881.7\n628.7\n12,510.4\n102.5\n15.0\n12,627.9\n154.0\n3,731.0\n0.0\n280.6\n0.0\n7,991.8\n2,478.1\n27,263.4\nNov\n13,173.5\n668.5\n13,842.1\n252.5\n15.0\n14,109.6\n148.2\n3,781.0\n0.0\n323.0\n0.0\n8,200.8\n2,579.4\n29,141.9\nDec\n15,585.8\n797.7\n16,383.5\n258.5\n15.0\n16,657.0\n207.5\n3,221.3\n0.0\n440.4\n0.0\n9,002.7\n2,444.3\n31,973.2\n2021\nJan\n17,060.5\n985.1\n18,045.7\n150.0\n15.0\n18,210.7\n291.2\n3,018.1\n0.0\n81.3\n0.0\n6,054.0\n6,191.6\n33,846.9\nFeb\n18,610.7\n1,047.5\n19,658.2\n150.0\n15.0\n19,823.2\n318.2\n3,075.5\n0.0\n40.7\n0.0\n6,533.5\n5,874.0\n35,665.0\nMar\n18,562.7\n1,070.5\n19,633.2\n150.0\n15.0\n19,798.2\n320.8\n3,377.0\n0.0\n241.5\n0.0\n6,727.5\n5,661.8\n36,126.8\nApr\n19,021.2\n1,353.2\n20,374.5\n500.0\n15.0\n20,889.5\n325.0\n4,244.8\n0.0\n181.9\n0.0\n6,267.0\n6,418.0\n38,326.2\nMay\n22,332.1\n1,453.5\n23,785.6\n500.0\n15.0\n24,300.6\n350.2\n4,279.9\n0.0\n394.8\n0.0\n6,067.1\n7,391.6\n42,784.2\nJun\n22,784.4\n1,675.4\n24,459.8\n209.5\n70.5\n24,739.8\n359.1\n3,855.1\n0.0\n570.4\n0.0\n6,623.0\n6,713.2\n42,860.7\nJul\n25,425.9\n1,997.8\n27,423.7\n25.0\n15.0\n27,463.7\n365.2\n3,488.6\n0.0\n274.6\n0.0\n7,194.2\n7,130.1\n45,916.5\nAug\n27,475.7\n2,728.9\n30,204.6\n60.0\n15.0\n30,279.6\n668.2\n5,344.8\n0.0\n621.9\n0.0\n7,683.7\n6,854.8\n51,453.0\nSep\n29,023.8\n2,834.6\n31,858.5\n76.0\n15.2\n31,949.7\n1,062.2\n4,465.7\n0.0\n181.9\n0.0\n10,227.1\n7,061.5\n54,948.1\nOct\n30,925.8\n4,239.0\n35,164.7\n0.0\n30.0\n35,194.8\n1,329.1\n7,432.5\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n10,906.3\n8,007.4\n62,870.1\nNov\n34,486.8\n4,344.1\n38,830.8\n0.0\n15.0\n38,845.9\n1,149.7\n7,028.7\n0.0\n203.6\n0.0\n11,575.7\n8,126.5\n66,930.0\nDec\n33,974.4\n4,856.8\n38,831.3\n80.0\n15.0\n38,926.3\n1,750.9\n9,746.8\n0.0\n712.0\n0.0\n15,101.8\n8,520.4\n74,758.3\n2022\nJan\n31,695.1\n5,983.6\n37,678.7\n0.0\n15.0\n37,693.7\n1,771.4\n10,991.6\n0.0\n373.7\n0.0\n18,063.5\n10,937.0\n79,830.9\nFeb\n37,132.1\n7,089.1\n44,221.1\n0.0\n15.0\n44,236.1\n1,703.8\n14,215.9\n0.0\n431.6\n0.0\n18,241.5\n11,325.7\n90,154.6\nMar\n44,187.4\n6,190.7\n50,378.1\n0.0\n15.0\n50,393.1\n1,742.3\n15,620.9\n0.0\n501.9\n0.0\n20,548.8\n14,430.4\n103,237.4\nApr\n52,979.2\n6,553.0\n59,532.2\n0.0\n15.0\n59,547.2\n1,536.3\n17,027.1\n0.0\n704.1\n0.0\n23,099.0\n14,854.4\n116,768.1\nMay\n86,411.7\n6,683.0\n93,094.7\n0.0\n15.0\n93,109.8\n1,477.7\n34,306.7\n0.0\n1,033.4\n0.0\n22,645.2\n23,325.7\n175,898.5\nJun\n98,008.7\n8,427.1\n106,435.9\n1,030.1\n15.0\n107,481.1\n1,496.4\n40,346.3\n0.0\n1,200.6\n0.0\n42,213.2\n26,895.5\n219,633.0\nJul\n111,583.1\n9,489.2\n121,072.3\n1,072.6\n15.0\n122,159.9\n1,225.0\n46,145.1\n0.0\n2,071.5\n0.0\n55,131.6\n16,832.0\n243,565.1\nAug\n133,071.2\n11,398.3\n144,469.5\n1,625.2\n15.0\n146,109.7\n1,382.6\n55,691.4\n0.0\n2,979.3\n0.0\n60,157.4\n15,056.7\n281,377.1\nSep\n143,338.6\n28,284.7\n171,623.3\n0.0\n15.0\n171,638.3\n1,339.9\n62,659.9\n0.0\n3,613.8\n0.0\n79,343.1\n17,410.1\n336,005.2\nOct\n122,775.3\n20,897.6\n143,672.9\n1,214.2\n15.0\n144,902.1\n1,707.3\n69,651.9\n0.0\n4,327.9\n0.0\n86,799.2\n41,091.4\n348,479.7\nNov\n130,892.9\n23,401.5\n154,294.3\n1,256.4\n13.0\n155,563.7\n1,855.1\n72,052.0\n0.0\n5,140.0\n0.0\n89,895.0\n41,331.2\n365,836.9\nDec\n149,207.3\n30,517.1\n179,724.4\n1,239.7\n103.8\n181,068.0\n1,933.7\n71,142.6\n0.0\n5,623.9\n0.0\n118,486.1\n42,883.8\n421,138.1\n2023\nJan\n161,506.8\n31,099.4\n192,606.2\n1,462.2\n121.0\n194,189.4\n3,214.4\n72,524.5\n0.0\n6,622.6\n0.0\n144,335.3\n25,816.5\n446,702.8\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2022\nAmounts Owing to\nTABLE 6.2: BUILDING SOCIETIES -LIABILITIES\n$ millions\n \n \n \n27 \n \n \n \nAGRICULTURE\nCONSTRUCTION\nCOMMUNICATION\nDISTRIBUTION\nFINANCIAL &\nFINANCIAL\nMANUFACTURING\nMINING\nSERVICES\nTRANSPORT\nINDIVIDUALS\nCONGLOMERATES\nTOTAL\nEND OF\n \n \n \nINVESTMENTS\nORGANISATIONS\n \n \n \n \n2020\nJan\n4,084,551.94\n155,581.93\n40,879.89\n1,241,096.72\n54,212.81\n1,614,135.86\n1,136,124.87\n905,568.16\n799,835.71\n83,887.62\n1,594,904.42\n3,435.36\n11,714,215.29\nFeb\n4,492,412.28\n157,892.05\n54,850.75\n1,305,056.27\n51,575.18\n1,667,015.97\n1,328,895.13\n875,096.28\n827,340.38\n103,240.64\n1,837,059.21\n1,195.35\n12,701,629.50\nMar\n5,400,573.75\n137,553.14\n109,432.30\n1,355,737.76\n60,656.39\n2,181,804.45\n1,514,365.26\n1,743,391.37\n911,567.97\n129,647.77\n2,083,395.02\n30,866.95\n15,658,992.12\nApr\n5,497,243.24\n144,302.16\n94,782.20\n1,298,701.43\n50,563.13\n2,200,545.77\n1,762,996.43\n1,756,962.25\n1,057,031.75\n149,805.94\n2,211,133.89\n33,524.86\n16,257,593.05\nMay\n6,753,987.64\n152,161.11\n176,776.32\n1,688,453.47\n61,403.01\n2,272,323.33\n2,155,232.06\n2,018,291.52\n1,335,664.72\n161,892.59\n2,646,269.59\n56,873.34\n19,479,328.70\nJun\n8,233,748.36\n178,010.08\n127,961.90\n3,248,219.37\n64,989.86\n5,469,986.07\n3,799,659.67\n4,379,017.69\n1,983,339.32\n277,602.32\n3,665,408.84\n46,384.96\n31,474,328.45\nJul\n8,927,920.73\n256,440.30\n209,123.91\n4,249,101.81\n34,055.90\n7,106,442.23\n5,125,740.57\n5,385,837.14\n2,413,677.93\n418,160.11\n4,321,918.71\n46,630.64\n38,495,049.96\nAug\n9,773,178.50\n269,675.36\n194,537.60\n5,470,092.50\n33,043.10\n7,946,261.68\n6,723,930.20\n5,651,838.11\n3,103,883.15\n446,084.37\n5,291,100.20\n48,922.44\n44,952,547.19\nSep\n10,508,860.18\n202,928.95\n203,610.78\n4,810,727.31\n29,975.80\n1,041,079.17\n7,136,261.66\n4,099,760.81\n3,255,496.85\n517,871.73\n6,526,576.15\n48,754.08\n38,381,903.47\nOct\n12,296,430.45\n302,589.49\n251,238.66\n9,053,118.05\n28,434.20\n8,136,185.80\n6,305,609.42\n6,351,785.61\n3,855,757.60\n649,444.55\n7,243,034.96\n49,339.03\n54,522,967.83\nNov\n14,705,718.28\n553,426.67\n299,226.19\n10,178,453.66\n26,676.82\n9,457,279.18\n7,442,871.42\n6,834,160.25\n4,193,059.76\n959,134.44\n7,919,442.36\n50,802.65\n62,620,251.69\nDec\n19,070,900.24\n557,071.84\n265,529.08\n10,043,351.16\n24,925.66\n9,451,197.42\n8,214,424.44\n7,599,398.94\n4,750,996.82\n1,556,410.92\n9,213,845.68\n46,489.85\n70,794,542.04\n1,000.00\n2021\nJan\n23,978,167.35\n610,696.11\n267,400.20\n9,997,383.02\n66,046.86\n9,811,097.63\n7,641,910.42\n7,176,322.97\n4,807,054.16\n1,685,871.14\n10,092,630.46\n47,525.58\n76,182,105.93\nFeb\n24,581,772.22\n653,205.48\n285,830.69\n10,330,772.00\n65,231.37\n10,024,935.09\n7,949,013.06\n6,754,180.16\n5,018,015.84\n1,766,077.92\n10,905,948.39\n47,678.08\n78,382,660.29\nMar\n28,741,816.74\n737,140.48\n320,102.45\n10,604,119.56\n76,828.95\n10,517,753.11\n9,428,559.85\n8,179,722.05\n5,701,289.52\n1,822,019.95\n12,528,176.45\n33,915.52\n88,691,444.62\nApr\n31,859,146.34\n675,080.87\n347,881.04\n12,101,683.31\n205,760.21\n12,046,268.54\n10,788,214.39\n8,802,924.25\n6,559,969.13\n1,831,534.43\n14,724,055.16\n36,984.33\n99,979,501.99\nMay\n34,645,328.64\n713,518.48\n292,339.75\n13,012,546.01\n70,347.70\n10,160,360.67\n11,287,317.39\n8,318,871.52\n7,438,997.57\n1,831,015.12\n17,169,532.74\n10,879.19\n104,951,054.78\nJune\n36,527,537.18\n993,308.60\n357,200.72\n14,622,859.32\n69,173.21\n12,832,747.32\n12,635,012.94\n7,938,660.25\n9,226,503.32\n1,903,845.82\n19,986,300.49\n40,765.72\n117,133,914.90\nJul\n39,160,305.59\n1,280,558.68\n411,253.92\n16,562,010.52\n62,624.82\n13,792,648.82\n12,583,048.87\n8,567,557.82\n10,717,151.04\n1,820,088.91\n22,581,130.29\n13,756.78\n127,552,136.06\nAug\n41,218,056.27\n1,372,177.00\n431,669.10\n15,667,033.13\n66,504.42\n14,701,546.35\n13,446,660.94\n8,828,791.19\n11,500,069.82\n1,942,139.38\n27,299,685.30\n15,470.31\n136,489,803.20\nSep\n41,133,553.69\n1,649,182.17\n433,781.15\n16,702,896.26\n321,991.18\n15,183,417.18\n15,271,161.92\n9,065,558.07\n11,973,442.27\n2,145,369.49\n30,851,901.80\n19,863.23\n144,752,118.41\nOct\n48,491,758.71\n1,644,045.10\n477,340.76\n20,072,721.66\n337,273.51\n16,644,705.00\n17,906,042.38\n10,150,149.70\n8,544,940.34\n2,418,354.85\n35,641,091.07\n17,894.63\n162,346,317.71\nNov\n48,945,526.55\n1,598,923.06\n394,575.79\n20,998,777.03\n434,931.56\n16,621,266.44\n19,372,274.14\n10,802,887.56\n8,904,904.88\n2,882,220.06\n40,009,482.19\n18,275.25\n170,984,044.50\nDec\n54,028,791.83\n1,778,880.47\n556,046.62\n24,450,917.17\n570,685.08\n10,955,470.21\n22,025,406.62\n10,538,491.23\n14,437,886.10\n2,996,425.00\n43,047,088.39\n29,601.16\n185,415,689.87\n2022\nJan\n58,163,723.79\n2,180,551.47\n576,438.12\n26,576,317.70\n366,231.45\n8,887,534.55\n23,074,734.84\n11,840,524.88\n15,743,736.46\n3,516,259.69\n47,325,078.28\n29,564.68\n198,280,695.90\nFeb\n59,500,669.71\n2,289,260.81\n618,640.14\n27,925,301.74\n641,435.03\n9,370,886.67\n27,976,121.59\n13,027,815.12\n20,505,827.49\n3,747,288.27\n51,007,737.28\n19,692.27\n216,630,676.11\nMar\n66,551,117.83\n2,538,377.08\n656,335.46\n29,688,979.74\n660,584.49\n10,903,917.10\n32,629,411.62\n15,688,496.07\n38,075,386.72\n4,471,441.45\n58,500,950.68\n802,168.34\n261,167,166.58\nApr\n74,441,781.12\n4,219,500.30\n1,441,218.07\n33,136,441.44\n673,885.92\n13,157,284.33\n34,426,878.27\n18,261,710.29\n39,043,359.76\n5,001,307.17\n63,176,517.86\n40,089.64\n287,019,974.16\nMay\n101,753,100.08\n5,120,524.84\n3,358,419.20\n50,514,059.33\n760,401.23\n12,433,390.50\n42,057,624.50\n28,724,818.35\n48,088,662.73\n6,286,840.17\n76,655,600.16\n34,456.76\n375,787,897.73\nJune\n118,753,588.99\n6,209,658.53\n2,293,665.50\n64,942,949.99\n869,273.19\n23,897,585.00\n58,442,367.18\n37,195,284.13\n62,467,707.84\n9,414,912.48\n96,536,183.00\n43,204.15\n481,066,380.00\nJuly\n133,779,414.05\n7,610,614.14\n3,684,426.07\n77,836,080.20\n938,367.98\n30,537,997.95\n69,408,788.72\n46,181,587.44\n72,642,938.51\n10,449,582.51\n111,094,524.49\n46,145.73\n564,210,467.80\nAug\n165,210,571.41\n10,163,176.69\n2,624,492.88\n93,899,073.61\n1,266,729.80\n39,544,245.28\n87,691,102.84\n58,330,938.20\n97,552,420.83\n10,450,507.09\n131,625,765.29\n154,457.59\n698,513,481.52\nSept\n201,167,878.53\n11,330,918.80\n5,038,300.39\n110,956,484.03\n1,297,748.50\n44,492,682.69\n101,816,518.33\n92,708,096.37\n88,483,494.42\n11,685,667.87\n152,934,863.30\n276,752.34\n822,189,405.58\nOct\n223,506,677.74\n12,026,669.50\n4,229,873.27\n113,451,159.15\n1,302,041.27\n46,399,745.17\n110,333,025.84\n79,715,558.05\n89,501,330.53\n9,611,322.30\n175,816,703.56\n178,607.79\n866,072,714.17\nNov\n232,953,535.08\n16,431,625.92\n11,131,139.79\n118,284,970.84\n1,687,527.03\n42,192,397.26\n124,017,335.43\n75,874,234.73\n94,636,395.62\n12,440,947.33\n207,085,835.54\n197,473.26\n936,933,417.83\nDec\n253,185,165.18\n19,199,455.89\n10,466,455.02\n135,037,685.07\n1,551,994.21\n70,805,600.30\n136,576,579.60\n94,115,141.69\n123,404,532.09\n12,079,018.68\n235,371,108.06\n173,717.07\n1,091,966,452.83\n2023\nJan\n299,237,745.06\n22,096,826.86\n11,001,194.94\n154,399,125.00\n2,073,794.79\n72,677,263.10\n165,905,496.48\n124,259,994.28\n140,303,195.37\n16,560,714.33\n290,446,774.71\n286,968.13\n1,299,249,093.07\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2022\n/1 Including the only merchant bank still in operation.\n TABLE 7.1 : SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS LOANS AND ADVANCES\n$ ('000)\n \n \n \n28 \n \nEND OF\nAGRICULTURE CONSTRUCTION\nCOMMUNICATIONS\nDISTRIBUTION\nFINANCIAL &\nFINANCIAL\nMANUFACTURING\nMINING\nSERVICES\nTRANSPORT\nINDIVIDUALS\nCONGLOMERATES\nTOTAL\nINVESTMENTS ORGANISATIONS\n \n2020\nJan\n2,173,633.03\n972,609.19\n3,182,087.13\n4,279,565.75\n1,757,297.12\n4,791,990.63\n2,791,625.15\n2,223,774.14\n9,875,803.48\n609,781.65\n2,838,775.94\n81,735.21\n35,578,678.43\nFeb\n2,492,591.77\n1,191,731.68\n3,340,863.80\n8,721,475.95\n1,919,428.47\n5,869,104.19\n3,481,495.51\n2,729,161.98\n10,202,203.60\n760,155.34\n3,574,134.47\n82,845.83\n44,365,192.59\nMar\n2,678,262.66\n1,449,645.90\n3,231,058.97\n11,715,273.88\n2,114,093.03\n6,507,000.01\n4,576,971.82\n3,048,053.49\n11,490,205.21\n947,918.17\n4,257,117.74\n72,082.86\n52,087,683.73\nApr\n2,854,374.82\n1,118,295.51\n3,492,330.52\n5,271,473.36\n1,999,901.13\n6,191,170.71\n4,276,817.19\n3,727,579.43\n14,060,717.80\n713,406.98\n4,444,924.89\n83,109.30\n48,234,101.64\nMay\n3,866,781.11\n1,163,944.89\n4,713,727.59\n7,932,403.43\n1,991,042.58\n7,151,451.48\n5,858,495.15\n5,031,912.53\n13,907,794.76\n944,318.05\n5,060,401.34\n88,613.61\n57,710,886.51\nJun\n7,228,784.40\n1,963,030.85\n5,393,404.53\n14,526,855.63\n3,997,135.72\n12,452,202.49\n11,386,156.55\n9,507,719.09\n22,807,615.50\n1,630,544.88\n9,798,261.20\n121,561.20\n100,813,272.04\nJul\n9,091,726.77\n2,629,847.13\n6,043,418.97\n19,096,889.49\n4,988,887.74\n15,446,649.70\n15,274,687.36\n7,918,819.51\n31,916,392.56\n2,035,354.71\n15,762,315.16\n147,865.97\n130,352,855.06\nAug\n9,462,082.74\n2,865,950.88\n6,582,519.60\n19,234,703.99\n5,333,846.88\n16,821,248.59\n17,017,042.14\n7,304,595.82\n35,312,317.72\n2,217,425.46\n16,548,990.51\n134,271.10\n138,834,995.43\nSep\n9,832,514.38\n3,139,646.07\n7,166,350.39\n20,531,087.56\n5,145,328.35\n9,505,277.06\n17,311,149.20\n10,234,597.66\n39,731,086.51\n2,011,372.45\n16,155,747.87\n148,612.60\n140,912,770.08\nOct\n9,923,335.07\n3,346,982.41\n9,919,999.10\n22,567,492.87\n6,180,403.26\n21,021,376.92\n20,667,754.18\n10,950,177.78\n41,131,626.19\n2,597,408.09\n18,072,164.45\n176,961.04\n166,555,681.37\nNov\n10,683,513.83\n3,732,868.95\n9,809,491.39\n28,228,980.99\n6,029,490.43\n17,343,347.49\n23,027,365.97\n14,471,556.33\n47,870,360.42\n2,986,050.60\n19,045,412.04\n209,168.81\n183,437,607.25\nDec\n10,252,495.91\n4,965,472.75\n12,171,250.70\n30,987,168.50\n5,959,867.34\n19,653,397.02\n25,666,591.10\n13,188,851.04\n55,454,341.21\n3,901,504.33\n22,313,591.00\n519,773.38\n205,034,304.27\n1,000.00\n2021\nJan\n12,195,945.09\n4,725,946.72\n13,067,828.56\n32,314,625.60\n6,804,952.50\n19,638,789.03\n27,577,248.19\n13,566,042.79\n60,234,250.60\n3,993,814.34\n22,146,327.53\n314,523.37\n216,580,294.30\nFeb\n12,215,925.38\n4,335,293.23\n13,268,343.18\n31,820,079.48\n6,327,338.72\n19,480,197.75\n27,088,789.92\n11,873,767.24\n62,647,881.89\n3,583,509.91\n23,594,651.47\n323,276.77\n216,559,054.94\nMar\n12,086,596.94\n5,009,117.91\n15,457,881.64\n33,668,114.17\n7,879,623.60\n17,019,379.33\n29,927,193.06\n12,664,366.44\n68,761,992.24\n4,513,060.17\n25,352,486.13\n371,874.60\n232,711,686.23\nApr\n14,293,712.79\n6,264,137.34\n17,624,611.65\n35,860,252.53\n7,955,587.69\n18,411,151.82\n32,890,743.11\n11,445,151.89\n81,410,668.87\n4,248,558.67\n27,176,673.47\n411,001.01\n257,992,250.84\nMay\n14,731,869.47\n5,542,211.64\n19,231,383.69\n37,283,237.74\n7,903,622.65\n19,756,317.30\n33,027,214.88\n22,796,168.05\n84,596,653.48\n4,504,355.67\n28,445,264.85\n378,185.06\n278,196,484.46\nJun\n15,628,935.51\n6,154,316.52\n20,722,752.27\n39,604,431.48\n7,861,552.67\n21,455,061.82\n36,502,664.43\n23,449,074.86\n92,196,178.85\n4,756,434.86\n29,731,644.54\n415,508.64\n298,478,556.45\nJul\n14,899,561.10\n6,742,913.66\n25,082,739.85\n39,720,936.02\n9,580,503.84\n24,570,675.98\n38,875,306.10\n31,312,003.24\n94,151,108.53\n5,021,547.73\n32,324,374.53\n568,402.62\n322,850,073.17\nAug\n14,056,945.25\n6,611,127.05\n26,897,316.63\n39,624,666.33\n9,778,338.93\n27,046,620.96\n40,693,944.15\n26,504,554.01\n84,766,848.12\n4,915,399.24\n33,960,935.12\n645,902.41\n315,502,598.18\nSep\n14,777,285.47\n6,264,492.08\n27,413,062.10\n45,375,795.43\n10,337,697.22\n25,786,388.31\n43,113,093.01\n30,700,846.40\n95,985,614.84\n5,605,871.74\n37,606,703.52\n687,817.24\n343,654,667.37\nOct\n14,923,669.66\n8,437,829.51\n26,583,413.65\n47,841,912.79\n11,477,927.22\n29,796,762.93\n51,676,553.79\n49,115,499.00\n111,611,484.23\n5,940,819.15\n35,043,857.03\n618,831.05\n393,068,559.99\nNov\n14,147,912.21\n7,546,852.86\n27,174,334.28\n44,238,573.41\n11,949,923.74\n27,199,271.57\n52,401,389.32\n49,817,772.34\n115,576,831.01\n5,911,967.57\n37,770,843.26\n751,068.72\n394,486,740.29\nDec\n16,522,401.63\n9,204,283.51\n26,835,545.00\n47,381,404.66\n15,303,976.78\n43,092,763.28\n57,822,911.04\n61,555,101.22\n122,091,550.61\n6,093,367.35\n40,046,246.70\n1,319,573.65\n447,269,125.42\n2022\nJan\n17,399,268.45\n9,928,816.10\n28,146,847.17\n46,285,881.10\n15,060,177.49\n34,087,881.41\n60,888,346.70\n38,232,883.69\n135,579,116.46\n6,454,492.58\n32,504,960.47\n745,336.00\n425,314,007.61\nFeb\n20,260,983.50\n9,641,974.72\n32,159,803.23\n50,825,844.50\n15,235,028.54\n35,068,548.54\n49,157,612.17\n43,769,514.96\n146,423,512.16\n7,768,846.48\n36,257,363.98\n724,522.36\n447,293,555.15\nMar\n22,638,817.86\n11,683,937.35\n34,271,841.32\n61,002,811.60\n20,352,647.27\n34,501,628.57\n57,839,997.29\n60,678,395.30\n173,444,002.60\n9,467,563.85\n43,160,654.72\n970,393.82\n530,012,691.56\nApr\n26,926,844.72\n12,304,918.39\n34,924,202.54\n67,201,357.79\n21,444,798.07\n38,606,872.21\n61,303,321.13\n64,980,792.31\n216,612,532.66\n10,455,473.89\n45,951,692.03\n939,217.87\n601,652,023.61\nMay\n39,564,579.03\n21,954,770.23\n42,666,739.38\n108,620,498.72\n28,757,840.78\n54,108,110.44\n88,717,845.18\n107,568,244.73\n291,739,801.56\n14,310,137.61\n65,853,453.06\n1,190,747.91\n865,052,768.60\nJun\n45,956,287.64\n26,686,177.09\n47,155,850.80\n128,881,143.56\n23,783,755.16\n60,238,449.95\n105,247,922.50\n120,389,795.99\n326,034,986.61\n17,068,663.50\n108,828,797.15\n1,325,268.69\n1,011,597,098.65\nJul\n40,699,352.12\n28,329,526.03\n45,417,841.09\n128,847,329.07\n21,958,796.02\n62,326,844.37\n103,536,398.88\n112,642,685.48\n401,574,353.33\n17,902,000.20\n112,555,899.49\n1,117,408.25\n1,076,908,434.33\nAug\n68,438,409.63\n39,107,020.53\n53,616,955.67\n171,501,037.83\n25,370,674.58\n68,913,237.19\n162,326,617.25\n137,243,494.58\n538,409,018.36\n23,523,309.06\n146,121,882.24\n1,197,164.45\n1,435,768,821.37\nSep\n81,174,128.75\n51,501,554.76\n58,104,791.47\n204,056,688.73\n63,246,197.07\n174,562,749.46\n172,521,502.90\n138,936,277.91\n626,755,883.05\n25,607,188.82\n182,077,675.02\n11,177,650.78\n1,789,722,288.71\nOct\n83,201,043.64\n63,984,990.31\n67,031,137.91\n207,367,773.63\n40,617,325.27\n155,873,800.58\n179,051,392.63\n157,121,308.46\n575,293,016.53\n27,092,268.91\n201,852,712.89\n3,193,614.07\n1,761,680,384.82\nNov\n88,153,064.47\n61,978,896.61\n78,744,676.95\n236,152,455.10\n39,915,042.93\n100,872,718.26\n214,281,243.03\n200,240,592.45\n606,580,960.90\n32,903,876.70\n233,604,874.73\n119,223.24\n1,893,547,625.35\nDec\n106,799,918.36\n60,886,327.29\n73,518,960.29\n260,923,049.61\n48,959,835.11\n122,528,998.69\n242,741,914.11\n171,982,170.05\n747,151,447.16\n37,453,518.81\n270,164,633.75\n10,753,958.63\n2,153,864,731.86\n2023\nJan\n114,820,700.76\n79,460,381.87\n82,589,902.30\n305,204,829.91\n45,118,619.63\n135,072,311.14\n263,222,364.10\n223,632,204.71\n896,980,184.31\n37,534,721.96\n288,326,194.21\n7,916,696.92\n2,479,879,111.81\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2022\n TABLE 7.2: SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS DEPOSITS \n$ ('000)\n \n \n \n29 \n \n \nEnd of\nNominal \nLending Rates 1\nIndividuals \nCorporate\n2020\nJan\n5.00-65.00\n16.56\n17.20\nFeb\n5.00-65.00\n16.92\n16.68\nMar\n5.00-65.00\n19.65\n17.21\nApr\n5.00-65.00\n18.57\n18.69\nMay\n5.00-65.00\n18.06\n18.07\nJune\n5.00-65.00\n20.04\n17.38\nJuly\n5.00-65.00\n18.87\n20.11\nAug\n6.00-65.00\n19.14\n18.99\nSep\n6.00-65.00\n20.65\n25.09\nOct\n6.00-65.00\n26.04\n26.68\nNov\n6.00-65.00\n30.32\n27.67\nDec\n6.00-65.00\n32.11\n26.91\n2021\nJan\n6.00-65.00\n32.65\n24.77\nFeb\n6.00-85.00\n36.67\n21.36\nMar\n6.00-85.00\n35.83\n22.61\nApr\n6.00-85.00\n35.22\n22.59\nMay\n6.00-85.00\n34.84\n21.76\nJun\n6.00-85.00\n36.25\n22.46\nJul\n6.00-85.00\n36.56\n21.66\nAug\n6.00-85.00\n41.06\n39.65\nSep\n6.00-85.00\n40.61\n39.50\nOct\n6.00-85.00\n41.86\n45.81\nNov\n6.00-8500\n39.13\n38.10\nDec\n6.00-8500\n39.34\n37.94\n2022\nJan\n15.00-85.00\n39.32\n39.62\nFeb\n15.00-85.00\n40.55\n64.02\nMar\n15.00-85.00\n40.74\n43.88\nApr\n15.00-85.00\n38.15\n45.56\nMay\n15.00-85.00\n38.01\n47.25\nJun\n15.00-85.00\n38.45\n48.25\nJul\n80.00-240.00\n82.75\n165.45\nAug\n80.00-230.00\n88.46\n155.96\nSep\n100.00-230.00\n98.07\n158.46\nOct\n100.00-290.00\n99.37\n115.26\nNov\n100.00-290.00\n99.03\n110.97\nDec\n100.00-290.00\n99.02\n110.83\n2023\nJan\n100.00-240.00\n90.05\n116.03\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2022\nNotes\nTABLE 8.1: LENDING RATES (percent per annum)\n1. Nominal lending rates depict the range of rates quoted by banks.\n Commercial Banks\nWeighted Lending Rates\n \n \n \n30 \n \n \nTABLE 8.2 : BANK DEPOSIT RATES (percent per annum)\nEND OF\nSAVINGS\n3 MONTHS\n2020\nJan\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nFeb\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nMar\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nApr\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nMay\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nJun\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nJul\n0.22-12.00\n1.33-14.00\nAug\n0.50-15.00\n1.00-20.28\nSep\n0.50-15.00\n1.00-20.28\nOct\n0.50-15.00\n1.00-20.28\nNov\n0.50-15.00\n1.00-20.28\nDec\n0.50-15.00\n1.00-20.28\n2021\nJan\n0.22-12.00\n2.00-21.50\nFeb\n0.22-12.00\n2.00-21.50\nMar\n0.22-12.00\n2.00-21.50\nApr\n0.22-12.00\n2.00-21.50\nMay\n0.22-12.00\n2.00-21.50\nJun\n0.25-12.00\n2.00-26.00\nJul\n0.50-12.00\n2.00-26.00\nAug\n0.50-12.00\n2.00-26.00\nSep\n0.50-12.00\n2.00-26.00\nOct\n0.50-12.00\n2.00-26.00\nNov\n0.50-12.00\n2.00-26.00\nDec\n0.50-12.00\n2.00-26.00\n2022\nJan\n0.50-12.00\n2.00-26.00\nFeb\n0.50-12.00\n2.00-26.00\nMar\n0.50-12.00\n2.00-26.00\nApr\n0.50-12.50\n2.00-30.00\nMay\n0.50-12.50\n2.00-32.00\nJun\n0.50-12.50\n2.00-32.00\nJul\n40.00\n80.00-92.00\nAug\n40.00\n80.00-92.00\nSep\n40.00\n80.00-92.00\nOct\n40.00\n80.00-92.00\nNov\n40.00\n80.00-92.00\nDec\n40.00\n80.00-95.00\n2023\nJan\n40.00\n80.00-110.00\n Source:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2022\n* Deposit rates depict the range of rates qouted by banks. \nCOMMERCIAL BANKS\n \n \n \n31 \n \nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES \nCLOTHING \n&\nHOUSING, \nWATER,\nFURNITURE\nHEALTH\nTRANSPORT\nCOMMUNIC\nATION\nRECREATION &\nEDUCATION\nRESTAUR\nANTS &\nMISC.\n& TOBACCO\nFOOTWEAR\nELECTRICTY, \nGAS\nAND\nCULTURE\nHOTELS\nGOODS &\n& OTHER\nEQUIPMENT\nSERVICES\nFUELS\nWEIGHTS\n4.90\n4.35\n27.62\n5.29\n1.42\n8.39\n2.65\n2.27\n4.25\n1.08\n6.46\n68.70\n31.30\n100\n2020\nJan\n1.83\n3.84\n0.60\n1.50\n5.32\n2.24\n2.77\n2.01\n9.39\n2.72\n1.86\n1.99\n2.55\n2.23\nFeb\n8.48\n10.01\n2.27\n7.00\n21.56\n9.62\n220.04\n17.96\n94.95\n2.92\n30.86\n18.41\n6.81\n13.52\nMar\n28.76\n37.12\n57.14\n29.35\n27.28\n18.10\n4.26\n58.79\n0.66\n17.49\n22.67\n32.44\n17.69\n26.59\nApr\n26.21\n13.46\n3.05\n24.06\n25.07\n8.87\n3.05\n9.42\n1.13\n21.08\n15.12\n11.38\n28.37\n17.64\nMay\n28.90\n18.99\n3.42\n21.36\n18.30\n22.97\n4.22\n10.04\n0.02\n29.69\n23.31\n15.41\n14.72\n15.13\nJun\n35.25\n48.84\n7.52\n38.21\n43.77\n32.48\n23.24\n39.46\n0.87\n32.46\n29.51\n27.61\n37.73\n31.66\nJul\n33.30\n35.93\n12.07\n32.45\n27.35\n50.65\n118.89\n17.13\n1.14\n37.84\n34.77\n33.76\n37.99\n35.53\nAug\n9.71\n7.52\n2.82\n7.83\n7.02\n11.02\n19.57\n7.75\n79.86\n8.40\n11.19\n10.03\n6.30\n8.44\nSep\n2.53\n1.71\n3.01\n1.52\n2.59\n1.69\n19.84\n5.79\n23.42\n0.33\n7.26\n5.08\n2.08\n3.83\nOct\n5.68\n2.51\n15.42\n0.95\n1.12\n3.02\n3.78\n1.59\n4.91\n4.22\n4.46\n5.33\n3.00\n4.37\nNov\n3.70\n3.73\n3.35\n2.02\n0.66\n3.60\n0.39\n1.74\n0.71\n4.36\n2.09\n2.63\n3.39\n3.15\nDec\n4.58\n3.08\n0.52\n3.26\n1.73\n3.61\n1.17\n1.26\n0.18\n2.12\n3.82\n2.63\n6.54\n4.22\n2021\nJan\n4.43\n1.15\n4.84\n3.35\n8.08\n3.87\n0.71\n1.72\n0.06\n8.48\n4.67\n3.70\n7.84\n5.43\nFeb\n3.27\n0.94\n3.21\n1.77\n2.48\n4.22\n0.01\n-0.51\n0.13\n1.94\n4.81\n2.73\n4.42\n3.45\nMar\n1.45\n0.57\n1.61\n1.45\n3.68\n1.32\n5.08\n1.18\n0.54\n3.50\n3.14\n2.06\n2.52\n2.26\nApr\n3.38\n2.21\n2.01\n4.06\n4.60\n1.86\n0.07\n2.09\n0.59\n4.67\n3.52\n2.60\n2.51\n2.56\nMay\n2.01\n1.25\n0.97\n5.35\n2.91\n1.99\n0.35\n19.13\n0.00\n24.14\n6.26\n3.75\n0.95\n2.54\nJun\n2.76\n3.05\n9.71\n4.36\n3.19\n3.40\n1.57\n1.87\n5.60\n1.84\n4.09\n4.38\n3.21\n3.88\nJul\n3.38\n2.21\n2.01\n4.06\n4.60\n1.86\n0.07\n2.09\n0.59\n4.67\n3.52\n2.60\n2.51\n2.56\nAug\n5.59\n5.06\n2.54\n5.65\n6.39\n4.78\n7.61\n3.06\n0.36\n4.99\n6.34\n4.95\n3.14\n4.18\nSep\n6.54\n4.91\n4.61\n5.18\n6.28\n4.95\n3.56\n3.68\n0.74\n5.01\n3.75\n4.67\n4.82\n4.73\nOct\n5.31\n4.86\n1.77\n5.84\n6.88\n9.33\n7.92\n5.31\n2.58\n8.60\n5.55\n5.56\n7.56\n6.40\nNov\n4.58\n3.82\n4.44\n3.97\n5.53\n5.57\n9.37\n3.25\n1.28\n10.88\n5.70\n5.21\n6.51\n5.76\nDec\n6.95\n5.56\n3.59\n4.88\n5.33\n6.79\n0.31\n4.03\n0.57\n6.23\n8.38\n5.76\n6.22\n5.76\n2022\nJan\n3.61\n2.94\n5.30\n5.11\n4.86\n4.40\n0.81\n5.66\n3.15\n7.36\n4.55\n4.25\n6.79\n5.34\nFeb\n6.72\n8.06\n4.19\n5.64\n5.06\n7.09\n1.66\n4.73\n7.84\n5.44\n7.85\n6.03\n8.25\n6.99\nMar\n5.66\n7.74\n2.20\n4.67\n6.46\n12.17\n7.55\n3.74\n3.25\n4.62\n7.86\n6.54\n6.03\n6.31\nApr\n15.35\n11.00\n22.17\n11.99\n13.57\n12.88\n0.73\n11.93\n19.15\n25.76\n9.44\n13.27\n18.47\n15.55\nMay\n16.22\n24.96\n8.28\n15.58\n21.21\n22.21\n1.83\n13.45\n10.48\n15.30\n24.07\n16.91\n25.95\n20.97\nJun\n25.84\n26.87\n41.42\n31.94\n35.89\n36.98\n14.77\n23.74\n8.37\n22.62\n25.66\n29.83\n31.68\n30.70\nJul\n19.38\n13.04\n43.58\n22.31\n27.94\n21.44\n3.73\n11.61\n7.95\n15.76\n18.93\n22.42\n29.08\n25.56\nAug\n15.49\n15.58\n6.64\n10.54\n13.24\n7.39\n5.81\n8.81\n8.58\n12.92\n13.21\n10.62\n14.25\n12.38\nSep\n3.96\n4.87\n12.08\n1.02\n3.47\n2.16\n8.64\n4.45\n30.04\n2.62\n1.70\n5.15\n1.75\n3.47\nOct\n1.82\n2.58\n4.21\n2.06\n2.05\n2.09\n6.83\n4.45\n2.15\n3.29\n4.27\n3.24\n3.06\n3.15\nNov\n1.47\n1.98\n1.15\n1.73\n1.45\n1.95\n7.54\n2.94\n5.24\n6.76\n4.42\n2.62\n0.92\n1.80\nDec\n2.69\n2.82\n0.75\n2.33\n2.13\n3.04\n4.59\n2.47\n0.37\n1.85\n2.89\n2.36\n2.50\n2.42\n2023\nJan\n0.92\n0.54\n3.11\n0.99\n0.91\n1.27\n0.88\n0.86\n0.87\n0.72\n0.35\n1.27\n0.86\n1.07\nSource:Zimstat, 2022\nFOOD & NON \nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES\nALL \nITEMS\n(February 2019 = 100)\nTOTAL NON\n \n \n \n32 \n \nFOOD \nINFLATION\nALCO HO LIC \nCLO T HING\nHO US ING , \nW AT E R,\nFURNIT URE\nMIS C.\nFO O D & \nB E VE RAG E S \n& \nE LE CT RICT Y, \nG AS\nAND\nRE CRE AT IO N &\nRE S T AURANT S \n&\nG O O DS &\nT O T AL NO N\nNO N \nALCO HO LIC \nALL\n& T O B ACCO\nFO O T W E AR\n& O T HE R\nE Q UIP ME NT\nCULT URE\nHO T E LS\nS E RVICE S\nFO O D\nB E VE RAG E S\nIT E MS\nFUE LS\nWEIGHTS\n4.90\n4.35\n27.62\n5.29\n1.42\n8.39\n2.65\n2.27\n4.25\n1.08\n6.46\n68.70\n31.30\n100\n2020\nFeb\n710.29\n629.57\n603.89\n254.34\n523.95\n785.04\n498.64\n946.38\n604.12\n262.80\n507.72\n839.15\n462.64\n540.16\nMar\n807.36\n721.94\n814.31\n444.09\n667.21\n1001.14\n585.97\n989.48\n975.94\n252.31\n582.94\n995.50\n616.11\n676.39\nApr\n980.03\n825.86\n873.49\n456.99\n799.24\n1048.61\n622.22\n984.76\n1017.34\n233.23\n590.62\n1097.13\n663.66\n765.57\nMay\n953.34\n881.65\n935.22\n461.76\n878.64\n1062.84\n664.43\n761.68\n847.15\n223.43\n739.67\n1254.79\n700.38\n785.55\nJun\n842.04\n863.68\n411.42\n725.77\n1040.97\n613.71\n937.83\n875.68\n226.03\n764.10\n1184.15\n678.29\n835.56\n737.26\nJul\n914.97\n925.92\n424.89\n761.12\n913.86\n750.68\n2013.62\n739.27\n196.93\n812.65\n1138.04\n755.27\n976.73\n837.53\nAug\n842.90\n895.39\n374.89\n735.12\n909.62\n611.88\n1405.52\n702.75\n413.11\n810.44\n1058.99\n698.90\n865.48\n761.02\nSep\n770.81\n761.81\n323.45\n638.97\n772.72\n519.65\n1681.32\n619.53\n508.37\n742.51\n820.76\n619.77\n724.40\n659.40\nOct\n544.43\n544.11\n252.56\n452.09\n554.64\n404.46\n1593.73\n454.72\n505.13\n536.36\n639.65\n470.47\n472.40\n471.25\nNov\n473.41\n464.54\n244.29\n385.99\n456.13\n376.50\n1404.55\n368.00\n420.46\n386.63\n509.46\n413.85\n385.02\n401.66\nDec\n437.80\n412.80\n163.67\n350.75\n401.81\n341.52\n1400.70\n348.33\n420.53\n330.15\n434.93\n350.17\n346.40\n348.59\n2021\nJan\n451.53\n399.55\n174.78\n358.95\n414.96\n348.54\n1370.61\n347.06\n376.10\n354.29\n449.65\n357.69\n369.43\n362.63\nFeb\n425.04\n358.36\n177.30\n336.52\n334.15\n326.47\n359.53\n277.07\n144.52\n349.97\n340.25\n297.07\n358.96\n321.59\nMar\n313.69\n236.18\n79.30\n242.33\n253.65\n265.87\n363.15\n140.26\n144.23\n296.40\n270.14\n206.00\n299.81\n240.55\nApr\n231.12\n201.33\n76.01\n178.83\n185.47\n239.16\n349.55\n121.37\n180.66\n238.80\n226.98\n178.93\n216.60\n194.07\nMay\n162.05\n156.40\n71.83\n142.05\n148.33\n181.30\n332.85\n139.66\n180.59\n224.31\n181.76\n150.75\n178.60\n161.91\nJun\n99.10\n77.51\n75.32\n82.76\n78.24\n119.54\n256.74\n75.07\n193.77\n149.35\n126.46\n105.12\n108.76\n106.64\nJul\n54.42\n33.47\n59.60\n43.58\n46.40\n48.44\n63.09\n52.59\n192.16\n89.35\n73.95\n57.33\n55.09\n56.37\nAug\n48.62\n30.42\n59.15\n40.69\n45.54\n40.10\n46.78\n45.94\n63.03\n83.38\n66.37\n50.07\n50.47\n50.25\nSep\n54.44\n34.53\n61.63\n45.76\n50.77\n44.60\n26.84\n43.02\n33.07\n91.94\n60.93\n49.48\n54.52\n51.55\nOct\n53.91\n37.62\n42.51\n52.82\n59.36\n53.46\n31.90\n48.25\n30.12\n100.00\n62.62\n49.81\n61.35\n54.49\nNov\n55.23\n37.74\n44.01\n55.75\n67.07\n56.38\n43.70\n50.46\n30.85\n112.50\n68.38\n53.57\n65.39\n58.40\nDec\n58.74\n41.06\n48.41\n58.21\n72.99\n61.17\n42.48\n54.57\n31.36\n121.06\n75.77\n57.74\n64.91\n60.74\n2022\nJan\n57.49\n43.55\n49.06\n60.90\n67.83\n61.99\n42.62\n60.55\n35.42\n118.79\n75.57\n58.59\n63.31\n60.61\nFeb\n62.76\n53.68\n50.47\n67.02\n72.05\n66.45\n44.98\n69.00\n45.86\n126.30\n80.66\n63.69\n69.29\n66.11\nMar\n69.51\n64.64\n51.34\n72.32\n76.66\n84.28\n48.39\n73.28\n49.79\n128.76\n88.93\n70.87\n75.09\n72.70\nApr\n93.55\n79.70\n82.80\n90.98\n98.73\n106.12\n49.43\n92.38\n53.56\n177.97\n103.32\n90.62\n104.05\n96.43\nMay\n120.52\n121.78\n96.06\n109.52\n134.07\n147.00\n51.63\n83.21\n69.66\n158.16\n137.39\n114.79\n154.57\n131.74\nJun\n170.03\n173.04\n152.72\n164.89\n208.25\n227.24\n71.33\n122.53\n74.10\n210.83\n186.59\n167.17\n224.80\n191.56\nJul\n211.82\n201.99\n255.69\n211.35\n277.03\n290.11\n77.60\n143.28\n86.85\n243.77\n229.24\n218.79\n308.97\n256.94\nAug\n241.07\n232.24\n269.94\n225.77\n301.31\n299.82\n74.63\n156.86\n102.14\n269.73\n250.51\n236.02\n353.03\n285.01\nSep\n232.79\n232.09\n296.36\n212.89\n290.70\n289.18\n83.20\n158.77\n160.94\n261.32\n243.60\n237.59\n339.73\n280.40\nOct\n221.77\n224.88\n305.85\n201.70\n273.06\n263.38\n81.35\n156.66\n159.83\n243.66\n239.43\n230.17\n321.32\n268.79\nNov\n212.20\n219.12\n293.08\n195.20\n258.64\n250.91\n78.32\n155.88\n170.00\n230.89\n235.31\n222.02\n299.20\n254.96\nDec\n199.74\n210.82\n282.31\n188.01\n247.74\n238.60\n85.92\n152.06\n169.46\n217.25\n218.34\n212.68\n285.19\n243.76\n2023\nJan\n191.94\n203.56\n274.38\n176.72\n234.66\n228.44\n86.05\n140.60\n163.49\n197.61\n205.57\n203.71\n263.81\n229.83\nSource:Zimstat, 2022\nTABLE 9.2 : YEARLY INFLATION - % CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \n(February 2019 = 100)\nNON-FOOD INFLATION\nHE ALT H\nT RANS P O RT\nCO MMUNICAT IO N\nE DUCAT IO N\n \n \n \n33 \n \n \nUSA\nSOUTH ARFICAN\nBOTSWANA\nJAPANESE\nEURO\nPOUND\nEND OF\nDollar\nRAND\nPULA\nYEN\nSTERLING\n2020\nJan\n17.100\n1.1883\n1.5922\n0.1564\n19.0000\n22.5000\nFeb\n17.680\n1.1779\n1.6073\n0.1608\n19.2174\n22.9610\nMar\n21.160\n1.2709\n1.8384\n0.1970\n23.5111\n26.1235\nApr\n25.000\n1.3448\n2.0542\n0.2321\n27.1739\n30.8642\nMay\n25.000\n1.3736\n2.0695\n0.2333\n27.1739\n30.8642\nJun\n32.350\n1.8876\n2.7638\n0.3007\n36.4229\n40.5346\nJul\n68.943\n4.1073\n5.9515\n0.6457\n79.5784\n87.2651\nAug\n81.604\n4.7435\n7.0151\n0.7697\n96.5746\n107.2191\nSep\n82.250\n4.9133\n7.1482\n0.7790\n97.0112\n106.6580\nOct\n81.370\n4.9403\n7.1042\n0.7734\n95.7690\n105.5999\nNov\n81.679\n5.2531\n7.3127\n0.7827\n96.6100\n107.8000\nDec\n81.815\n5.4767\n7.5022\n0.7878\n99.5164\n109.9537\n2021\nJan\n82.070\n5.4208\n7.4794\n0.7914\n99.9148\n111.9300\nFeb\n83.461\n5.6470\n7.6491\n0.7927\n100.9497\n115.5931\nMar\n83.996\n5.5989\n7.6072\n0.7732\n100.0262\n116.3990\nApr\n84.503\n5.8973\n7.8165\n0.7766\n102.4094\n117.7721\nMay\n84.726\n6.1449\n7.9642\n0.7720\n103.3021\n120.1879\nJun\n85.423\n5.9577\n7.8205\n0.7730\n101.6496\n118.3071\nJul\n85.637\n5.8616\n7.7630\n0.7816\n101.7414\n119.4212\nAug\n85.908\n5.8726\n7.7403\n0.7818\n101.5523\n118.4462\nSep\n87.665\n5.7988\n7.7321\n0.7833\n101.7268\n117.8528\nOct\n97.136\n6.4164\n8.5674\n0.8544\n113.3967\n133.9944\nNov\n102.075\n6.5794\n8.8336\n0.9441\n123.0208\n146.6991\nDec\n108.666\n6.8292\n9.2257\n0.9441\n123.0208\n108.6660\n2022\nJan\n115.422\n7.4069\n9.8109\n0.9995\n128.8401\n154.8332\nFeb\n124.019\n8.0738\n10.7214\n1.0732\n138.2625\n165.6148\nMar\n142.424\n9.8091\n12.4763\n1.1665\n159.0161\n186.8670\nApr\n159.348\n10.0334\n13.1064\n1.2217\n167.9530\n199.4880\nMay\n290.888\n18.7787\n24.3182\n2.2757\n312.8351\n367.1438\nJun\n366.269\n22.5194\n29.7593\n2.6861\n382.8607\n444.3572\nJul\n416.289\n25.2673\n33.2407\n3.1299\n425.1560\n507.7061\nAug\n546.825\n32.3336\n42.8164\n3.9498\n548.9033\n638.9381\nSep\n621.532\n34.5376\n46.4284\n4.2999\n609.9716\n691.9517\nOct\n632.137\n34.7014\n47.2839\n4.2742\n628.8500\n732.8998\nNov\n654.865\n38.5947\n51.0140\n4.7279\n677.5889\n784.3319\nDec\n671.447\n39.5836\n52.6414\n5.0669\n715.4935\n809.2610\n2023\nJan\n779.310\n44.7401\n60.5524\n5.9802\n844.9280\n961.8245\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2022\n TABLE 11 : SELECTED INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE RATES\n1. ZWL$ dollar per unit of foreign currency\n \n \n \n34 \n \n \nEND OF\nMarket Capitalisation\nAll Share*\nZWL$ millions\n2020\nJan\n332.9\n344.9\n304.86\n179,559,446\n43,426.5\nFeb\n473.13\n826.73\n360.13\n172,678,984\n60,987.5\nMar\n456.21\n720.47\n425.24\n237,667,043\n58,612.1\nApr\n488.60\n826.64\n269.66\n107,308,931\n63,387.9\nMay\n1180.14\n1582.86\n568.96\n218,832,930\n152,719.7\nJune*\n1788.75\n3995.48\n379.93\n519,901,300\n228,577.1\nAug\n1389.23\n3709.15\n1,026.76\n164,501,200\n175,678.4\nSep\n1638.17\n4128.52\n4,640.88\n1,093,040,821\n206,502.5\nOct\n1476.87\n3792.35\n986.70\n397,006,127\n179,690.0\nNov\n1595.59\n3322.22\n4,103.78\n470,899,659\n193,270.8\nDec\n2636.34\n4134.09\n2,734.50\n316,737,200\n317,879.3\n2021\nJan\n3600.82\n4356.74\n3,513.59\n2,477,166,688\n434,856.23\nFeb\n4154.37\n6683.44\n1,529.25\n149,031,800\n501,184.95\nMar\n4489.47\n5315.39\n4,517.14\n203,633,747\n531,742.64\nApr\n4641.11\n5061.28\n3,075.98\n223,494,202\n540,745.24\nMay\n5428.28\n6820.54\n3,917.41\n188,748,200\n634,011.15\nJun\n6194.88\n6211.49\n4458.87\n248,500,624\n745,175.95\nJul\n6818.29\n6621.17\n2921.32\n181,010,800\n803,900.15\nAug\n6652.31\n6115.85\n3456.94\n147,232,800\n792,291.48\nSep\n8580.16\n6014.53\n4730.25\n2,909,442,557\n1,032,472.92\nOct\n11329.48\n6652.04\n5661.76\n108,843,000\n1,378,227.92\nNov\n 10695.57\n7193.11\n9883.24\n791,653,520\n1,290,069.75\nDec\n12079.74\n7815.37\n17577.25\n228,225,060\n1,317,205.11\n2022\nJan\n12079.74\n8196.79\n3704.23\n82,402,101\n1,475,217.45\nFeb\n14990.42\n9300.03\n7979.35\n156,327,700\n1,863,028.60\nMar\n15858.92\n11289.34\n8186.00\n117,815,800\n1,964,738.42\nApr\n28391.75\n30527.28\n11366.89\n193,411,483\n3,547,347.52\nMay\n23072.46\n20021.24\n8211.45\n195,475,400\n2,893,011.70\nJune\n19791.94\n20021.24\n14570.16\n271,227,100\n2,439,165.45\nJuly\n16594.91\n20021.24\n23673.34\n239,937,180\n2,068,222.01\nAug\n13705.12\n15473.37\n8674.85\n139,225,500\n1,685,592.28\nSept\n14771.65\n18929.75\n5128.54\n137,092,750\n1,819,157.07\nOct\n15072.14\n23659.53\n8657.90\n201,566,548\n1,826,101.68\nNov\n14577.46\n25478.67\n7680.78\n90,311,600\n1,610,203.36\nDec\n19493.85\n25487.77\n27753.79\n472,926,200\n2,044,869.14\n2023\nJan\n22628.32\n25496.86\n11041.40\n98,176,100\n2,442,215.69\nSource:Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2022\n*All Share index was introduced in January, 2018\n**As at 26 June 2020\nTABLE 12: ZIMBABWE STOCK MARKET STATISTICS\n Market Turnover \nZWL$ million \nVolume of Shares\nMining\nIndices\n \n \n \n35 \n \nEND OF\nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\n INTERNET\n2020\nJan\n47841.3\n1.8\n5236.3\n115.2\n21247.9\n9646.8\nFeb\n41637.6\n4.7\n5431.8\n136.9\n22589.7\n9633.8\nMar\n60804.1\n4.1\n7252.9\n268.0\n27993.6\n14411.4\nApr\n47525.5\n-\n4150.6\n82.6\n18299.2\n11481.8\nMay\n59271.1\n-\n7426.0\n349.8\n24851.5\n19593.2\nJun\n91311.3\n-\n9752.7\n516.6\n26042.5\n25842.3\nJul\n127743.2\n-\n14741.1\n1028.7\n26033.3\n35199.7\nAug\n143042.1\n-\n14953.6\n1547.5\n27217.6\n34505.0\nSep\n203172.0\n-\n18252.3\n1963.0\n26441.0\n41958.4\nOct\n198863.6\n-\n22482.3\n2163.3\n42767.7\n46270.4\nNov\n236231.6\n-\n23936.7\n2151.6\n36475.7\n54797.8\nDec\n302661.2\n-\n30061.0\n1935.3\n45278.1\n67038.2\n2021\nJan\n255551.3\n-\n21042.2\n2300.3\n35349.1\n66624.4\nFeb\n226335.8\n-\n22882.6\n2288.9\n36434.4\n63598.2\nMar\n320422.1\n-\n28569.9\n3316.6\n44524.0\n86463.9\nApr\n288958.8\n-\n30071.5\n2807.0\n44131.6\n90580.4\nMay\n361427.1\n-\n36765.1\n3193.7\n49745.8\n89471.3\nJun\n388757.5\n-\n38540.1\n3200.0\n51437.4\n115145.7\nJul\n379659.9\n-\n45808.1\n2489.1\n57565.8\n145027.0\nAug\n397539.0\n-\n52853.9\n4086.0\n60908.4\n159206.6\nSep\n477933.6\n-\n52262.7\n4179.5\n64139.2\n181194.8\nOct\n481180.9\n-\n53165.9\n3839.9\n65329.0\n197972.5\nNov\n621896.7\n-\n56025.3\n4877.0\n63017.5\n252407.9\nDec\n747035.6\n-\n67903.9\n4705.5\n76511.6\n264749.2\n2022\nJan\n802677.7\n-\n55961.6\n5074.7\n53456.3\n218545.3\nFeb\n672723.0\n-\n59581.6\n5607.0\n66812.0\n238910.8\nMar\n961452.0\n-\n75050.7\n7882.2\n82886.9\n342168.7\nApr\n976617.2\n-\n89192.6\n8391.5\n89672.0\n293204.6\nMay\n1205990.0\n-\n110807.3\n13712.8\n106881.8\n469185.2\nJune\n1601225.3\n-\n134551.0\n18810.6\n123721.3\n618347.5\nJuly\n1754112.0\n-\n170480.6\n20413.1\n172562.5\n713401.1\nAug\n2334295.0\n-\n152343.4\n31418.6\n178188.9\n826377.1\nSep\n2793056.6\n-\n177701.7\n35144.4\n202368.1\n872807.4\nOct\n2728731.3\n-\n186478.9\n50202.3\n209758.0\n622412.8\nNov\n3370779.9\n-\n202876.2\n61086.7\n213295.3\n734610.6\nDec\n3310814.9\n-\n246783.6\n76872.0\n249516.4\n1106346.5\n2023\nJan\n2347582.7\n-\n240010.3\n69143.5\n238455.3\n1107756.4\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2022\nTABLE 13.1 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS \n Values of Transactions (ZWL$ millions)\n \n \n \n36 \n \n \nEND OF\nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\n INTERNET\n2020\nJan\n943.3\n4.6\n23649.0\n199.9\n139278.2\n671.7\nFeb\n916.1\n8.9\n21652.2\n196.6\n149671.5\n647.8\nMar\n1068.5\n7.4\n22588.1\n234.3\n173042.2\n661.2\nApr\n515.1\n-\n11036.4\n36.4\n131190.0\n998.0\nMay\n674.1\n-\n14711.6\n231.2\n150936.1\n705.3\nJun\n907.8\n-\n14420.9\n286.1\n135524.3\n1390.4\nJul\n918.4\n-\n15786.5\n251.4\n121072.4\n791.9\nAug\n789.4\n-\n13536.2\n248.2\n127308.6\n702.1\nSep\n911.9\n-\n15524.1\n309.8\n125059.2\n783.2\nOct\n990.2\n-\n19138.6\n398.8\n191148.8\n735.8\nNov\n971.3\n-\n17584.9\n430.0\n101305.8\n755.6\nDec\n1100.0\n-\n19404.0\n453.0\n115290.2\n820.1\n2021\nJan\n720.0\n-\n9849.3\n229.0\n94691.4\n872.2\nFeb\n806.0\n-\n12309.3\n527.8\n90078.0\n754.9\nMar\n1112.8\n-\n15178.8\n751.0\n105272.0\n1003.7\nApr\n951.7\n-\n15185.0\n605.5\n97253.3\n1040.1\nMay\n1029.8\n-\n16511.3\n664.4\n103708.7\n994.8\nJun\n1076.9\n-\n14797.9\n581.9\n99349.6\n982.1\nJul\n1028.2\n-\n15217.6\n551.0\n102587.6\n980.8\nAug\n1045.0\n-\n14624.5\n475.4\n105269.7\n955.8\nSep\n1193.1\n-\n15397.6\n492.2\n104141.9\n2092.6\nOct\n1114.2\n-\n18207.4\n434.5\n107294.6\n2342.6\nNov\n1144.9\n-\n17435.9\n477.0\n98386.5\n2322.9\nDec\n1220.3\n-\n20029.6\n519.5\n106428.6\n2580.6\n2022\nJan\n957.9\n-\n15480.2\n439.9\n83661.8\n1902.9\nFeb\n981.0\n-\n15190.4\n433.7\n78916.1\n1895.3\nMar\n1242.3\n-\n16967.6\n519.1\n87501.1\n2128.6\nApr\n1073.0\n-\n15906.2\n458.0\n82673.4\n1937.6\nMay\n1213.5\n-\n16069.9\n477.8\n78385.2\n2001.2\nJune\n1190.3\n-\n15304.7\n474.2\n75631.7\n1705.1\nJuly\n1115.8\n-\n16063.8\n517.0\n88030.6\n1866.7\nAug\n1028.0\n-\n13686.8\n489.1\n76957.8\n1623.7\nSep\n1084.6\n-\n13084.7\n455.5\n71362.1\n2225.2\nOct\n969.3\n-\n12986.8\n510.9\n67641.7\n1825.4\nNov\n1001.4\n-\n12324.1\n499.9\n59151.5\n2430.2\nDec\n1013.6\n-\n14316.9\n616.7\n60584.5\n2469.8\n2023\nJan\n918.9\n-\n11734.0\n444.0\n47675.8\n1693.0\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2022\nTABLE 13.2 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS \n Volumes of Transactions (000's)", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/Monthly_Economic_Reviews/Monthly_Economic_Review_January_2023.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "4785cefbe98c8516e2809f0fce4ff44e", "text": "Vol. 25 No. 29 \n \n \nWeek Ending \n21st July 2023 \nWeekly Economic \nHighlights \nTABLE OF CONTENTS \n \n1. \nOVERVIEW ................................................................................................ 1 \n2. \nINTEREST RATES .................................................................................... 1 \n3. \nCLEARING AND SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY ...................................... 3 \n4. \nTOBACCO SALES ..................................................................................... 5 \n5. \nINTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICE DEVELOPMENTS ......... 5 \n6. \nEQUITY MARKETS.................................................................................. 7 \n7. \nGREEDFLATION AND IMPLICATIONS ON DOMESTIC \nINFLATION .............................................................................................. 11 \n \n \n \n \n1. \nOVERVIEW \n \nThis report provides an analysis of the developments in the money and capital markets for the \nweek ending 21st July 2023. The report also covers developments in the tobacco, mineral \ncommodities, and stock markets during the week. The last section of the report presents a review \nof Greedflation and its implications on domestic inflation. \n \n \nThe Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) and the Victoria Falls Stock Exchange (VEFX) exhibited \nnegative sentiments during the week under review. The value of transactions processed through \nthe National Payment System (NPS) was higher during the week under analysis, largely \nreflecting increases in RTGS transactions. \n \n \nThe deposit rates for the domestic currency deposits remained unchanged, while the performance \nof ZWL lending rates for loans to individuals and corporates was mixed during the week under \nanalysis. The volume and value of tobacco sales as at the end of the week under review were \nhigher compared to the corresponding period in 2022. Prices of the golden leaf were, however, \nlower during the same period. \n \n \n2. \nINTEREST RATES \n \nLocal Currency (ZWL) Deposit Rates \n \nMinimum and maximum ZWL deposit rates for savings deposits and deposits rates for 1-month, \n6-month and 12-month tenor remained largely unchanged, during the week under review. \nMinimum deposits rates for deposits of 3-month tenor were, however, marginally lower during \nthe same period. Commercial banks continued to offer high deposit rates for long-term deposits \nas banks seek to encourage long-term deposits amid higher demand for local currency credit. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nTable 1: Average Deposit Rates (per annum) \nDate \nSavings deposits (%) \n \n1- Month deposit \nrates (%) \n \n3- Month deposit \nrates (%) \n \n6- Month deposit \nrates (%) \n \n12- Month deposit \nrates (%) \n \nMinimum \n(%) \nMaximum \n(%) \nMinimum \n(%) \nMaximum \n(%) \nMinimum \n(%) \nMaximum \n(%) \nMinimum \n(%) \nMaximum \n(%) \nMinimum \n(%) \nMaximum \n(%) \n30-Jun-23 \n34.67 \n33.86 \n59.00 \n69.17 \n59.00 \n68.00 \n59.17 \n68.64 \n61.64 \n66.00 \n7-Jul-23 \n \n35.00 \n33.86 \n59.00 \n68.06 \n59.00 \n68.00 \n59.17 \n68.64 \n61.64 \n66.00 \n14-Jul-23 \n34.29 \n33.14 \n59.00 \n69.33 \n59.53 \n67.89 \n59.17 \n68.64 \n61.64 \n66.00 \n21-Jul-23 \n \n34.29 \n33.14 \n59.00 \n69.33 \n59.22 \n67.89 \n59.17 \n68..64 \n61.64 \n66.00 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2023 \n \n \nLocal Currency Lending Rates \n \nThe minimum ZWL lending rates for both corporate and individual clients increased during the \nperiod of analysis. Maximum ZWL lending rates for both individual and corporate clients \nregistered a marginal decrease. The downward adjustments in maximum lending rates for \ncorporates are likely to continue, boosting borrowing by firms, amid prevailing tight liquidity \nconditions in the market. The ZWL lending rates are shown in Table 2. \n \n \nTable 2: Lending Rates (per annum) \nDate \nMinimum (%) \nMaximum (%) \nMinimum (%) \nMaximum (%) \n \nIndividual Clients \n \n Corporate Clients \n23-Jun-23 \n76.22 \n103.85 \n92.19 \n167.80 \n30-Jun-23 \n76.33 \n103.82 \n92.64 \n168.45 \n7-July-23 \n75.87 \n104.03 \n93.19 \n167.52 \n14-July-23 \n76.65 \n104.13 \n93.30 \n167.36 \n21-Jul-23 \n77.80 \n104.12 \n94.60 \n167.29 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2023 \n \nForeign Currency (USD) Deposit Rates \n \nThe minimum and maximum savings and deposits rates on foreign currency deposits for all \ntenors remained largely unchanged, during the week under review. The average foreign currency \ndeposits rates for all tenors are shown in Table 3. \n \n \n \n \n \nTable 3: Average Foreign Currency Deposit Rates (per annum) \n \nDate \nSavings deposits (%) \n1- Month deposit \nrates (%) \n \n3- Month deposit \nrates (%) \n \n6-Month deposit \nrates (%) \n \n12- Month deposit \nrates (%) \n \nMinimum \n(%) \nMaximum \n(%) \nMinimum \n(%) \nMaximum \n(%) \nMinimum \n(%) \nMaximum \n(%) \nMinimum \n(%) \nMaximum \n(%) \nMinimum \n(%) \nMaximum \n(%) \n30-June-23 \n1.27 \n1.81 \n3.19 \n4.50 \n3.36 \n5.00 \n3.35 \n5.27 \n3.43 \n5.50 \n7-July-23 \n1.27 \n1.81 \n3.15 \n4.50 \n3.36 \n5.00 \n3.35 \n5.27 \n3.43 \n5.50 \n14-July-23 \n1.27 \n1.81 \n3.15 \n4.50 \n3.36 \n5.00 \n3.35 \n5.27 \n3.43 \n5.50 \n21-Jul-23 \n1.27 \n1.81 \n3.15 \n4.50 \n3.36 \n5.00 \n3.35 \n5.27 \n3.43 \n5.50 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2023 \n \n \n \nForeign Currency (USD) Lending Rates \n \n \nMinimum and Maximum foreign currency (FCA) lending rates for both individual and corporate \nclients declined marginally, during the week ending 21st July 2023. The reduction in FCA lending \nrates for individual and corporate clients is a positive development for corporate and individual \nclients as it encourages borrowing to boost production in the economy. \n \nTable 4: Lending Rates (per annum) \nDate \nMinimum (%) \nMaximum (%) \nMinimum (%) \nMaximum (%) \n \nIndividual Clients \n \n Corporate Clients \n16-Jun-23 \n11.51 \n13.06 \n8.03 \n14.19 \n23-Jun-23 \n11.35 \n13.06 \n8.02 \n14.31 \n30-Jun-23 \n11.33 \n13.09 \n8.05 \n14.39 \n7-July-23 \n11.38 \n13.06 \n8.01 \n14.35 \n14-July-23 \n11.35 \n13.07 \n7.99 \n14.36 \n21-Jul-23 \n11.33 \n13.06 \n7.97 \n14.35 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2023 \n3. \nCLEARING AND SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY \n \nThe value of transactions processed through the National Payment System (NPS) increased from \nZW$5.01 trillion in the previous week to ZW$5.64 trillion, during the week under analysis. The \nReal Time Gross Settlement RTGS transaction values were 18% higher to close at ZW$5.14 \ntrillion, during the week under analysis. The value of NPS transactions during the week were \ndistributed as shown in Figure 1. \n \n \n Figure 1: Composition of NPS Transactions in Value Terms \n \n Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2023 \n \n \n \nDuring the week under review, the volume of transactions processed through the NPS declined \nby 16.19% to close at 8.52 million. This largely reflected increases in RTGS transaction volumes. \nThe NPS transaction volumes were distributed as follows: Mobile, 79.15%; POS, 17.87%; \nRTGS, 2.01%; and ATM, 0.97%, shown in Figure 2. \n \n Figure 2: Composition of NPS Transactions in Volume Terms \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2023 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nRTGS\n90,99%\nPOS\n3,11%\nATM\n1,87%\nMOBILE\n4,03%\nRTGS\nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\nRTGS; 2,01%\nPOS; 17,87%\nATM; 0,97%\nMOBILE; 79,15%\nRTGS\nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\n \n \nTable 5: National Payment Systems Activity \nPAYMENT \nSTREAM \nWEEK ENDING \n 14 July 2023 \nWEEK ENDING \n \n21 July 2023 \n% CHANGE FROM \nLAST WEEK \nPROPORTION \n% \n \nValues in ZW$ Millions \n \n \nRTGS \n4,343,237.90 \n5,135,854.23 \n18.25% \n90.99% \nPOS \n221,747.77 \n175,482.76 \n-20.86% \n3.11% \nATM \n135,540.67 \n105,455.17 \n-22.20% \n1.87% \nMOBILE \n308,482.03 \n227,744.32 \n-26.17% \n4.03% \nTOTAL \n5,009,008.38 \n5,644,536.48 \n12.69% \n100% \nVolumes \n \n \nRTGS \n163,962 \n171,607 \n 4.66% \n2.01% \nPOS \n1,606,023 \n1,523,452 \n-5.14% \n17.87% \nATM \n105,122 \n82,260 \n-21.75% \n0.97% \nMOBILE \n8,294,486 \n6,745,706 \n-18.67% \n79.15% \nTOTAL \n10,169,593 \n8,523,025 \n-16.19% \n100% \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2023 \n \n4. \nTOBACCO SALES \nAs at the 21st of July 2023, or the 93rd day of the tobacco selling season, a cumulative total of \n291.81 million kilograms of tobacco had been sold, compared to a cumulative total of 199.86 \nmillion kilograms sold during the same period in 2022. The turnover realized from the sales \namounted to US$884.42 million, a 44.9% increase, compared to US$610.50 million realized \nduring the same period in 2022. \n \nTable 6: Weekly Cumulative Tobacco Sales: Day 93 (21st July 2023) \n \n2022 \n2023 \nVariance (%) \nCumulative Quantity Sold (million \nkgs) \n199,863,657 \n291,809,894 \n46.00 \nAverage Price (US$/kg) \n3.05 \n3.03 \n-0.78 \nCumulative value (US$ million) \n610,497,401 \n884,424,807 \n44.87 \n Source: Tobacco Industry and Marketing Board (TIMB), 2023 \n \nThe golden leaf was sold at a lower average price of US$3.03/kg, during the week under review, \ndown from US$3.05/kg realized during the same period in 2022. \n5. \nINTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICE DEVELOPMENTS \n \nAverage international prices for gold, platinum, palladium and crude oil rose, while copper and \nnickel prices retreated, during the week under review. Table 7 shows developments in prices for \nselected commodities, during the week under review. \n \n \n \n \nTable 7: Metals and Crude Oil Prices: Week ending 21st July 2023 \n \nGold \nPlatinum \nPalladium \nCopper \nNickel \nCrude Oil \n2023 \nUS$/ounce \nUS$/ounce \nUS$/ounce \nUS$/tonne \nUS$/tonne \nUS$/barrel \nWeekly Average \n(10- 14 July) \n1,943.49 \n944.20 \n1,258.70 \n8,529.80 \n21,238.00 \n79.69 \n17-July \n1,952.33 \n971.00 \n1,268.00 \n8,494.50 \n21,135.00 \n78.70 \n18-July \n1,968.48 \n985.00 \n1,311.00 \n8,436.00 \n20,950.00 \n79.68 \n19-July \n1,976.75 \n986.50 \n1,316.50 \n8,485.00 \n21,550.00 \n79.42 \n20-July \n1,978.80 \n972.50 \n1,301.50 \n8,480.00 \n21,305.00 \n80.29 \n21-July \n1,962.20 \n960.50 \n1,290.50 \n8,434.00 \n21,095.00 \n80.90 \nWeekly Average \n(17- 21 July) \n1,967.71 \n975.10 \n1,297.50 \n8,465.90 \n21,207.00 \n79.80 \nWeekly Change (%) \n1.25 \n3.27 \n3.08 \n-0.75 \n-0.15 \n0.13 \nSource: BBC, KITCO and Bloomberg 2023 \n \nGold \n \nGold prices continued on a positive momentum, rising by 1.25%, to US$1,967.71 per ounce \nduring the week ending 21st July 2023. The persistent uncertainty surrounding central bank \nmonetary policies and the persistent concern over inflation, contributed to a steady but cautious \ninvestor sentiment, prompting some to turn to gold as a safe haven asset. \n \nPlatinum \nPlatinum prices surged by 3.27%, from a weekly average of US$944.20 per ounce in the prior \nweek to US$975.10 per ounce, during the reporting week. Prices increased in response to a \nweaker U.S. dollar and expectations that the Federal Reserve would end its interest rate hiking \ncycle. \n \nPalladium \nPalladium prices rose by 3.08%, from a weekly average of US$1,258.70 per ounce in the \nprevious week to US$1,297.50 per ounce, during the week under analysis. Prices were boosted \nchiefly by a weaker U.S. dollar. \n \nCopper \nCopper prices eased by 0.75%, from an average of US$8,529.80 per tonne in the previous week \nto US$8,465.90 per tonne, during the week ending 21st July 2023. The prices were weighed down \nby the gradual slowing down in the pace of economic recovery in China, the top consumer of \nmetals. \n \n \nNickel \nNickel prices declined by 0.15%, from a weekly average of US$21,238.00 per tonne in the prior \nweek to US$21,207.00 per tonne, during the reporting week. Prices were pulled back by the \nbearish overall macro sentiment in China, which limited support for industrial metals. \n \nBrent Crude Oil \nDuring the week ending 21st July 2023, average prices for crude oil increased by 0.13% to \nUS$79.80 per barrel, from US$79.69 per barrel recorded in the previous week. Prices continued \nrising, buoyed by the growing evidence of supply shortages in the coming months and rising \ntensions between Russia and Ukraine. \n \n \nExchange Rate Developments \n \nInterbank Market \nThe Zimbabwe dollar (ZW$) appreciated by 6.8% on the interbank market, from an average of \nZW$5,111.28 per US$1 in the previous week to ZW$4,764.23 per US$1, during the week under \nreview. Table 8 shows selected foreign currency exchange rates. \n \nTable 8: Selected Exchange Rates (ZW$ per unit of foreign currency) \n2023 \nUSD \nZAR \nGBP \nBWP \nEURO \nWeekly Average (10- 14 July) \n5,111.2780 \n280.1690 \n6,620.3339 \n383.5115 \n6,857.9754 \n17-July \n4,883.8208 \n270.2703 \n6,393.4241 \n372.1901 \n5,483.5826 \n18-July \n4,876.2022 \n273.9726 \n6,386.3941 \n371.3468 \n5,489.8963 \n19-July \n4,771.3854 \n270.2703 \n6,213.3422 \n365.5543 \n5,356.8785 \n20-July \n4,752.2714 \n266.6667 \n6,144.4590 \n362.1819 \n5,329.7116 \n21-July \n4,537.4909 \n256.4103 \n5,841.8253 \n345.8222 \n5,053.9010 \nWeekly Average (17 -21 July) \n4,764.2341 \n267.5180 \n6,195.8889 \n363.4191 \n5,342.7940 \nAppr (-)/Depr (+) (%) of the ZWL \n-6.8 \n-4.5 \n-6.4 \n-5.2 \n-5. 6 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2023 \n \n \n \n6. EQUITY MARKETS \n \n \nDuring the week ending 21st July 2023, both the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) and the \nVictoria Stock Exchange (VFEX) traded in a negative trajectory. This was, in part, on account \nof tight liquidity conditions in the market. As such, the ZSE and VFEX All Share indices lost \n8.63% and 3.22% to close the week at 120 454.28 points and 71.05 points, respectively. \n \n \n \nZimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) Developments \n \nThe Top 10, Top 15, Medium and Small Cap indices declined by 11.82%, 9.88%, 2.46% and \n2.24% to 55 695.42 points, 77 666.80 points, 443 209.79 points and 2 111 765.23 points, \nrespectively. The resource index, however, gained 14.39% to close the week at 99 881.72 points, \ncompared to 87 315.32 points recorded in the previous week. \n \nFigure 3 shows developments on the ZSE’s All Share, Top 10 and Mining indices from 22nd July \n2022 to 21st July 2023. \n \nFigure 3: ZSE All Share, Top 10 and Mining Indices \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2023 \n \nThe decline in the mainstream index emanated from losses in share prices of OK Zimbabwe \nLimited (22.02%), First Mutual Holdings Limited (20.00%), Zimre Holdings Limited (17.65%), \nEcocash Holdings Zimbabwe Limited (16.49%) and Delta Corporation Limited (16.38%). \n \nPartially offsetting the abovementioned losses were share price increases for Rainbow Tourism \nGroup Limited (15.62%), First Mutual Properties Limited (13.07%), TSL Limited (12.96%), \nMashonaland Holdings Limited (9.52%) and Fidelity Life Assurance Limited (5.05%). The \n10 100\n16 600\n23 100\n29 600\n36 100\n42 600\n49 100\n55 600\n62 100\n68 600\n75 100\n81 600\n88 100\n0\n20 000\n40 000\n60 000\n80 000\n100 000\n120 000\n140 000\n160 000\n180 000\n22-Jul-22\n05-Aug-22\n19-Aug-22\n02-Sep-22\n16-Sep-22\n30-Sep-22\n14-Oct-22\n28-Oct-22\n11-Nov-22\n25-Nov-22\n09-Dec-22\n23-Dec-22\n06-Jan-23\n20-Jan-23\n03-Feb-23\n17-Feb-23\n03-Mar-23\n17-Mar-23\n31-Mar-23\n14-Apr-23\n28-Apr-23\n12-May-23\n26-May-23\n09-Jun-23\n23-Jun-23\n07-Jul-23\n21-Jul-23\nMining Index\nAll Share and Top 10 Indices\nAll Share Index (ZSE)\nTop 10 Index\nMining Index\n \nincrease in the resource index emanated from a 14.39% gain in the RioZim Limited counter, \nduring the week under analysis. \n \nMarket Turnover \nThe cumulative value of shares traded on the ZSE increased by 34.64% to ZW$11 910.48 \nmillion, compared to ZW$8 846.24 billion recorded in the prior week. In the same vein, \ncumulative volumes of shares traded amounted to 28.49 million shares, representing an increase \nof 18.04% compared to 24.14 million shares recorded in the previous week. \n \nFigure 4 shows the trend in daily market turnover for the period from 22nd July 2023 to 21st July \n2023. \nFigure 4: Market Turnover \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2023 \n \n \nMarket Capitalisation \nReflecting the bearish sentiments on the ZSE during the week under review, the market lost \n9.85%, or ZW$1 047.48 billion worth of capitalization to close at ZW$9 591.31 billion, \ncompared to ZW$10 638.80 billion registered in the previous week. Figure 5 shows the evolution \nof market capitalization for the period from 22nd July 2022 to 21st July 2023. \n \n \n \n0\n2 200\n4 400\n6 600\n8 800\n11 000\n13 200\n15 400\n17 600\n19 800\n22-Jul-22\n05-Aug-22\n19-Aug-22\n02-Sep-22\n16-Sep-22\n30-Sep-22\n14-Oct-22\n28-Oct-22\n11-Nov-22\n25-Nov-22\n09-Dec-22\n23-Dec-22\n06-Jan-23\n20-Jan-23\n03-Feb-23\n17-Feb-23\n03-Mar-23\n17-Mar-23\n31-Mar-23\n14-Apr-23\n28-Apr-23\n12-May-23\n26-May-23\n09-Jun-23\n23-Jun-23\n07-Jul-23\n21-Jul-23\nZW$ (Million)\nNotable Trades: 31.45 million \nAriston Holdings Limited \nshares and 4.26 million Delta \nHoldings Limited shares \nexchanged hands at \nZW$15.02/share and \nZW$4077/share, respectively.\nNegotiated deal: 61.16 million \nLafarge Cement Zimbabwe \nLimited shares exchanged \nhands at ZW$312.65/share\n \n \n \nFigure 5: Market Capitalization \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2023 \n \n \nVictoria Falls Stock Exchange (VFEX) Developments \nThe decline in the VFEX mainstream index was a result of share price declines for African Sun \nLimited (13.55%), Simbisa Brands Limited (10.37%), Padenga Holdings Limited (6.24%), \nInnscor African Limited (3.00%) and SeedCo International VX (1.70%). Partially offsetting the \nabovementioned losses was an increase in the share price of Bindura Nickel Corporation (BNC) \n(40.78%) and Axia Corporation Limited (1.39%) counters. \n \nVFEX Market Turnover \nThe cumulative volume and value of shares traded on the VFEX declined by 70.61% and 64.96% \nto 1.16 million shares and ZW$0.34 million, respectively \n \nVFEX Market Capitalization \nReflecting the negative trading on the VFEX during the week under analysis, the market lost \n1.97% worth of capitalization to close at US$1.21 billion, compared to US$1.24 billion \nregistered in the prior week. \n \n \n \n \n0\n1 500\n3 000\n4 500\n6 000\n7 500\n9 000\n10 500\n12 000\n13 500\n15 000\n16 500\n18 000\n19 500\n22-Jul-22\n05-Aug-22\n19-Aug-22\n02-Sep-22\n16-Sep-22\n30-Sep-22\n14-Oct-22\n28-Oct-22\n11-Nov-22\n25-Nov-22\n09-Dec-22\n23-Dec-22\n06-Jan-23\n20-Jan-23\n03-Feb-23\n17-Feb-23\n03-Mar-23\n17-Mar-23\n31-Mar-23\n14-Apr-23\n28-Apr-23\n12-May-23\n26-May-23\n09-Jun-23\n23-Jun-23\n07-Jul-23\n21-Jul-23\n$ Billions\n \n \nFigure 6 shows the trend in the VFEX All Share Index for the period from 22nd July 2022 to \n21st July 2023. \nFigure 6: VFEX All Share Index\n \nSource: Victoria Falls Stock Exchange (VFEX), 2023 \n7. \nGREEDFLATION AND IMPLICATIONS ON DOMESTIC INFLATION \nZimbabwe witnessed increased inflationary pressures in May and June 2023 driven primarily by \nbehavioural factors as opposed to the common aggregate demand and supply side factors. Some \nFirms took advantage of the transitory exchange rate volatility witnessed during the same period \nto unjustifiably increase prices under the guise of cushioning themselves against potential \nexchange losses. Of particular concern was the fact that the price adjustments were not in sync \nwith the observed degree of exchange rate depreciation on both the parallel and official markets \nbut the quest to maximize profits. \n \nThis phenomenon of increasing prices in pursuit of maximizing corporate profits has become a \nrecent concern in inflation dynamics in most economies and is termed greedflation. Precisely, \ngreedflation is a situation where the increase in inflation is driven by corporate greed. It is \ncharacterised by a profit-price spiral where companies exploit inflation developments by \nconcomitantly raising prices to drive up their profit margins. This suggests that the rising costs \nof goods and services observed in consumer prices are not only due to increases in the cost of \n70\n80\n90\n100\n110\n120\n130\n140\n150\n \ninputs such as labour and raw materials but are also explained in part by the pricing behaviour \nof companies. \n \nGreedflation is more common where companies enjoy near-monopoly power or dominant market \npositions in their industries. These structures give companies considerable control over pricing \nand consumers have little choice but to bear the higher costs of goods and services given the \nlimited availability of substitutes. This lack of competition can exacerbate inflationary pressures \ncaused by corporate greed, leading to even higher consumer prices where demand remains \nelevated regardless of increases in prices. Aggregate demand has remained elevated in most \ncountries reflecting pent up demand from Covid-19 and this has allowed companies to sustain \nhigher profits. \n \nGreedflation tendencies have been observed globally in recent times as Advanced economies \nincluding the United States of America, the European bloc and the United Kingdom experienced \ntheir highest levels of inflation since the 1980s. Recent developments on the inflation front in \nboth advanced and emerging market economies have shown that the rise in general prices was \nmore persistent than originally thought. One factor that could explain this, is the behaviour of \ncorporates. Particularly the market structures of their industries, resultant pricing behaviour and \npursuit of super-normal profits. \n \nFor example, the IMF highlighted that more than half of Europe’s inflation over the past two \nyears has been a result of companies profiteering. According to the IMF calculations corporate \nprofits accounted for 45% of price increases since the beginning of 2022. In addition, Cristine \nLagarde, the President of the European Central Bank (ECB), highlighted that ‘firms have been \nable to increase their profit margins on the back of mismatches between supply and demand, and \nthe uncertainty created by high and volatile inflation’. ECB data has shown that inflation was \nbeing driven by an increase in firm profits, indicating that the increase in energy costs from the \nRussia-Ukraine conflict could have provided cover to prop up profit margins. \n \n \nZimbabwe may be experiencing a similar trend as advanced economies albeit in different \neconomic circumstances. Average profit margins for the select companies in the retail, \nbeverages and manufacturing sector in the country were stable below 30% from 2011 to \n2016. However, average profit margins rose above 30% in 2018 and reached 57% by 2022 \nfor some companies, a period where inflation reached its highest levels in a decade and \ncurrency reforms drove volatility in the exchange rate. \n \nConsistent with the characteristics of greedflation these dynamics reflect the tendency to \nengage in forward pricing as companies in Zimbabwe are raising prices higher than the \nunderlying costs they are facing, particularly during periods of increased exchange rate \nvolatility. This profit-price spiral has an overall negative impact on the general price level in \nthe economy, and points to the role of corporate greed in stoking inflationary pressures in the \ndomestic economy. \n \nThe bold policy measures announced by the Bank and Government for tackling the transitory \nprice and exchange rate volatility in May and June 2023 have gone a long way in fostering \nexchange rate stability in the economy. This has brought normalcy in the price and exchange \nrate dynamics in the economy. Precisely, the wholesale auction system is exerting a dual \neffect of mopping up excess liquidity and re-establishing the optimal mix of the dual \ncurrencies, thus sustaining the current exchange rate and price stability. \n \nThese measures have seen substantial correction in the exchange rate which had overshot its \nequilibrium, and a concomitant decline in local currency prices. Positively, the month-on-\nmonth inflation which stood at 74.5% in June 2023, significantly reversed in July 2023 to \nminus 15.3%. Similarly, the annual inflation which had risen from 86.5% in May 2023, to \n175.8% in June 2023, fell significantly to 101.3% in July 2023. The exchange rate is expected \nto continue to stabilise in the short to medium and result in inflation reverting to its pre-May \n2023 monthly trajectory. \n \n \nWhile controlling inflation is purely the mandate of the Bank, greedflation raises questions \nregarding ethical business practices and unfair competition which may require intervention \nand consumer safety nets, provided by statutory bodies such as Competition and Tariff \nCommission and the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). As such, in addition to the bold \nmonetary policy measures by the Bank, the current strong and effective monitoring and \nsurveillance by the FIU is critical in eliminating incidences of greedflation through exchange \nrate manipulation and abnormal pricing and profiteering practices. \n \n \n \n \n \n \nRESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE \n \n APPENDIX 1: FOREIGN EXCHANGE AUCTION RESULTS FOR MAINFX1 AND WHOLESALEFX 2 \n Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2023 \n \n1 Main Foreign Currency Auction. The Auction is normally conducted every Tuesday every week. \n2 Wholesale Foreign Currency Auction (Wholesale FX). The RBZ MPC resolutions dated 6 June 2023 resolved that with effect from 7 June 2023, the Bank shall sell foreign currency at the market-determined exchange \nrate through banks to support and strengthen the foreign exchange interbank market, and banks shall in turn sell the foreign currency to their customers. \n \n \nWHOLESALEFX \n 11-July-23 14-July-23 18-July-23 20-July-23 \nTotal \nBids (US$ dollars) \n 5,830,000.00 \n 5,295,000.00 \n11,597,990.00 \n 6,383,500.00 \n \nAmount Allotted (US$ dollars) \n 5,640,000.00 \n4,845,000.00 \n11,597,990.00 \n5,702,700.00 \nHighest Rate \n5,353.72 \n5,037.37 \n4,900.15 \n4,711.74 \nLowest Bid \nRate \n4,900.00 \n4,700.00 \n4,500.00 \n4,450.00 \nLowest Bid Rate Allotted \n4,900.00 \n4,700.00 \n4,500.00 \n4,450.00 \nWeighted Average Rate \n4,998.84 \n4,883.32 \n4,771.39 \n4,537.49 \nNumber of Bids Received \n10 \n10 \n15 \n13 \nNumber of Bids Rejected \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n \n \nAPPENDIX 2: SUMMARY OF FOREIGN CURRENCY AUCTION ALLOTMENTS BY PURPOSE \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2023 \n \nPurpose \nMAINFX \n 27-June-23 04-July-23 11-July-23 18-July-23 \nRaw Materials \n263,556.10 \n205,209.91 \n180,699.78 \n88,053.07 \nMachinery and Equipment \n126,774.66 \n64,869.77 \n60,672.58 \n222,278.65 \nConsumables \n(Incl. Spares, Tyres, \nPackaging) \n5,000.00 \n- \n21,558.24 \n33,459.80 \nPharmaceuticals and \nChemicals \n- \n- \n3,000.00 \n- \nServices (Loans, Dividends \nand Disinvestments) \n205,064.31 \n183,004.64 \n150,000.00 \n198,688.63 \nRetail and Distribution \n177,411.76 \n127,837.25 \n44,200.00 \n- \nFuel, Electricity and Gas \n- \n- \n- \n- \nPaper and Packaging \n19,516.90 \n- \n- \n- \nTOTAL \n797,323.53 \n580,921.57 \n460,130.60 \n542,480.15", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/Weekly_Economic_Highlights/WEEKLY_ECONOMIC_HIGHLIGHTS_21_JULY_2023_Volume_25_Number_29_.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "cba67a8124f69333f0a6998b0b082882", "text": "i \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nDECEMBER 2021 \n \n2 \n \nTABLE OF CONTENTS \n \nSELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS ................................................................................. 3 \nINTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICE DEVELOPMENTS ........................................... 4 \nPrecious Metals .......................................................................................................................... 4 \nBase Metals ................................................................................................................................ 4 \nMONETARY DEVELOPMENTS .............................................................................................. 5 \nSTOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS ..................................................................................... 7 \nINFLATION OUTTURN ............................................................................................................. 7 \nAnnual Inflation ........................................................................................................................ 7 \nMonthly Inflation ...................................................................................................................... 8 \nNATIONAL PAYMENTS SYSTEM .......................................................................................... 8 \nZimbabwe Electronic Transfer Settlement System (ZETSS) ............................................... 8 \nCash Transactions ..................................................................................................................... 9 \nMobile and Internet Based Transactions ................................................................................ 9 \nCard Based Transactions ......................................................................................................... 9 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n3 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2021 \n \nNovember \n \n2021 \n \nDecember \n \nMonth-on- \nmonth change \n(%) \n \nReserve Money2 (M0) (ZW$ millions) \n28,185.08 \n25,944.263 \n-7.95 \nMoney Supply2 (M3) (ZW$ millions) \n437,916.02 \n475,361.523 \n \n8.55 \nAnnual Inflation1 (%) \n58.40 \n60.74 \n2.34a \n \nMonthly Inflation1 (%) \n5.76 \n5.76 \n0.00a \n \nBlended Annual Inflation1 (%) \n25.76 \n24.92 \n-0.84a \nBlended Monthly Inflation1 (%) \n2.13 \n2.06 \n-0.07a \nNational Payment System Transactions2 \n(ZW$ billions) \n998.22 \n1118.62 \n12.06 \nNominal Lending Rate2 \n(% per annum) \n6.00-85.00 \n6.00-85.00 \n \nSources: \n1. Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency. \n2. Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. \n3. Provisional until external audit is completed. \na- Percentage point. \nSELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS \n \n \n \n4 \n \nINTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICE \nDEVELOPMENTS \n \nInternational commodity prices for selected \nprecious metals, base metals, and crude oil, \nwere largely subdued, during the month of \nDecember 2021. This was largely due to a \nstronger US dollar and investor concerns over \nthe effects of the Covid-19 omicron variant, on \nglobal economic recovery. \n \nPrecious Metals \n \n Gold \nOn a month-on-month basis, gold prices \nretreated by 1.6%, from a monthly average of \nUS$1,820.26 per ounce in November 2021 to \nUS$1,790.63 per ounce, during the month \nunder \nreview. \nThis \nfollowed \ninvestor \nexpectations that the US Federal Reserve \nwould accelerate stimulus tapering, amid \ngrowing concerns over rising US inflation. The \nstronger greenback also exerted downward \npressure on gold prices, which was, however, \ncapped by the demand of the yellow metal as a \nsafe-haven asset. \n \nPlatinum \nPlatinum prices retreated by 8.6%, from a \nmonthly average of US$1,034.95 per ounce in \nthe previous month to US$946.39 per ounce, \nduring the month under analysis. Prices were \nweighed down by subdued demand for \nindustrial metals, particularly in China and \nEurope. Furthermore, the investment demand \noutlook for the metal was dented by a stronger \nUS dollar. Figure 1 shows the evolution of \nprecious metal prices for the period from \nDecember 2020 to December 2021. \n Figure 1: Precious Metal Prices (US$/oz.) \nSource: Bloomberg, 2021 \n \nBase Metals \n \nCopper \nCopper prices declined by 2.4%, from an \naverage \nof \nUS$9,765.48 \nper \ntonne \nin \nNovember 2021, to US$9,530.48 per tonne in \nDecember 2021. Prices were also weighed \ndown by a stronger US dollar, and fears of \nwaning demand, amid signs of economic \nslowdown in China, the top consumer of the \nbase metal. \n \nNickel \nDuring the month under review, nickel prices \nretreated due to concerns over slowing demand \nfor the metal, as Covid-19 omicron variant \ncases surged. Slackening demand from the \nstainless-steel industry, particularly in China, \nalso exerted downward pressure on the price of \nthe base metal. Prices retreated by 0.3%, to a \nmonthly average of US$19,911.86 per tonne in \n600\n800\n1000\n1200\n1400\n1600\n1800\n2000\n2200\nDec-20\nJan-21\nFeb-21\nMar-21\nApr-21\nMay-21\nJun-21\nJul-21\nAug-21\nSep-21\nOct-21\nNov-21\nDec-21\nUS$/oz.\nGold\nPlatinum\n \n \n \n5 \n \nDecember 2021, from US$19,964.48 per tonne \nrecorded in the prior month. Figure 2 shows \ndevelopments in base metal prices for the \nperiod from December 2020 to December \n2021. \nFigure 2: Base Metal Prices (US$/ton) \nSource: Bloomberg, 2021 \n \n \nBrent Crude Oil \nBrent crude oil prices remained bearish, on \nconcerns over waning demand, as some \ncountries \nstarted \nto \nre-impose \ntravel \nrestrictions, to curb rising Covid-19 omicron \nvariant cases. In addition, fears of a global glut, \nfollowing reports by the Energy Information \nAdministration (EIA), indicating that the global \noil market was in surplus, negatively impacted \non prices. Against this backdrop, prices eased \nby 8.0%, to close the month under review at an \naverage of US$74.53 per barrel, from an \n \n1All monetary numbers valued in ZW$ since the \nadoption of an interbank market determined exchange \nrate in February 2019. \naverage of US$80.99 per barrel in the previous \nmonth. The developments on oil prices, for the \nperiod from December 2020 to December \n2021, are as shown in Figure 3. \n \nFigure 3: International Crude Oil Prices \n(US$/barrel) \n \nSource: Bloomberg, 2021 \n \n \nMONETARY DEVELOPMENTS1 \n \nBroad money amounted to ZW$475.36 billion \nin December 2021, compared to ZW$437.92 \nbillion in November 2021. The money stock \nwas composed of 55.18% in local currency \ndeposits and 44.33% in foreign currency \ndeposits. Currency in circulation constituted \nthe remainder of 0.49% of total money supply. \nFigure 4 shows the composition of money \nsupply. \n5,000\n7,000\n9,000\n11,000\n13,000\n15,000\n17,000\n19,000\n21,000\n4,000\n5,000\n6,000\n7,000\n8,000\n9,000\n10,000\n11,000\nDec-20\nFeb-21\nApr-21\nJun-21\nAug-21\nOct-21\nDec-21\nNickel US$/ton\nCopper US$/ton\nCopper\nNickel (RHS)\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\nDec-20\nJan-21\nFeb-21\nMar-21\nApr-21\nMay-21\nJun-21\nJul-21\nAug-21\nSep-21\nOct-21\nNov-21\nDec-21\nUS$/barrel\n \n \n \n6 \n \nFigure 4: Composition of Money Supply \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2021 \n \nDuring the month under review, domestic \nclaims rose by 16.61%, to ZW$340.29 billion. \nThe growth was driven by expansions of \n35.79% in net claims on Government, and \n10.56% in credit to the private sector. The \ngrowth in net claims on Government was an \naccounting entry reflecting the country’s \ndrawdowns of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) \nallocations from the IMF. \nOn an annual basis, broad money registered a \ngrowth of 131.83%, down from 485.55% in \nDecember 2020. The local currency deposits \ncomponent in broad money grew by 161.21%; \nand foreign currency deposits by 103.13%; \nwhile currency in circulation increased by \n93.86%, over the year to December 2021. \nIn particular, the increase foreign currency \ndeposits from ZW$103.73 billion in December \n2020 to ZW$210.70 billion in December 2021, \nwas largely due to an increase in the value of \nforeign currency accounts (FCA) deposits from \nUS$1.27 billion in December 2020 to US$1.94 \nbillion in December 2021. Revaluation due to \nexchange rate movements also contributed to \nthe increase in the local currency equivalent of \nthe FCA deposits. \nThe annual growth in broad money was largely \ndue to increases of 574.75% and 270.05% in \ncredit to other financial corporations and net \nclaims on Government, respectively. Banking \nsector credit to Government was mainly in the \nform of Treasury bill holdings by banks. Credit \nto private sector rose by 198.58%, while claims \non public non-financial corporations increased \nby 190.54%. \nCredit to the private sector mainly benefited the \nagriculture and household sectors, which \nreceived 29.14% and 23.22% of the total credit, \nrespectively. \nThe \ndistribution \nand \nmanufacturing sectors also received 13.19% \nand 11.88%, respectively, while credit shares \nfor the rest of the economic sectors are shown \nin Figure 5. \nFigure 5: Distribution of Private Sector \nCredit \n \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2021 \nCredit to the private sector was largely \nchanneled towards inventory build-up, which \ntook up 34.0% of the credit, while other \nrecurrent expenditures consumed 27.20% of \nLocal \nCurrency \nTransferabl\ne deposits\n46.54%\nForeign \nCurrency \nDeposits\n44.33%\nTime \nDeposits\n7.87%\nCurrency in \nCirculation\n0.49%\nNCDs\n0.77%\nHouseholds\n23.22%\nAgriculture\n29.13%\nMining\n5.68%\nManufacturing\n11.88%\nDistribution\n13.19%\nConstruction\n0.96%\nTransport & \nCommunicati\nons\n1.92%\nServices\n7.79%\nFinancial Org. \n& Investments\n6.22%\nOther\n0.02%\n \n \n \n7 \n \nthe credit. The private sector utilized about \n17.64% of credit for fixed capital investment. \n \n \nSTOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS \n \nDuring the month of December 2021, the \nZimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) recovered \nfrom the loss in the previous month, resulting \nin all major indices registering gains. \nThe All Share, Top 10 and Medium Cap indices \nadded 1.19%, 1.45% and 0.19% to close at 10 \n822.36 points, 6 811.43 points and 20 407.26 \npoints, respectively. \nThe resources index also gained 8.65% to close \nat 7 815.37 points. \nFigure 6: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange All \nShare and Top 10 Indices \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2021 \nAs a result of trading activity which was \nconcentrated in some selected high value \ncounters, the cumulative value of shares traded \nincreased by 77.85% to ZW$17.58 billion \ndespite the 71.17% decline in the volume of \nshares, amounting to 228.23 million. \n \nThe proportion of foreign purchases to the \nvalue of shares traded declined to 3.92%, from \n4.06% recorded in November 2021. The month \nunder review saw the net foreign position \nimprove to ZW$332 million, from -ZW$3.77 \nbillion recorded in the previous month. \n \nFigure 7: ZSE Monthly Volumes and Values \nTraded \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2021 \nOwing to positive trading on the local bourse, \nthe ZSE gained ZW$27.14 billion or 2.10% \nworth of capitalization, to close at ZW$1.32 \ntrillion in December 2021. \nINFLATION OUTTURN \n \nAnnual Inflation \n \nAnnual headline inflation rose by 2.34 \npercentage points to 60.74% in December \n2021, from 58.4% in November 2021. This was \n0.00\n2,000.00\n4,000.00\n6,000.00\n8,000.00\n10,000.00\n12,000.00\n200\n2200\n4200\n6200\n8200\n10200\n12200\n31-Dec-20\n31-Jan-21\n28-Feb-21\n31-Mar-21\n30-Apr-21\n31-May-21\n30-Jun-21\n31-Jul-21\n31-Aug-21\n30-Sep-21\n31-Oct-21\n30-Nov-21\n31-Dec-21\nAll Share Index\nTop 10 Index\nMining Index\n0\n2,000\n4,000\n6,000\n8,000\n10,000\n12,000\n14,000\n16,000\n18,000\n0\n400\n800\n1,200\n1,600\n2,000\n2,400\n2,800\nDec-20\nJan-21\nFeb-21\nMar-21\nApr-21\nMay-21\nJun-21\nJul-21\nAug-21\nSep-21\nOct-21\nNov-21\nDec-21\nValues Traded (ZW$ millions)\nVolumes Traded (milions)\nVolume\nTurnover\n \n \n \n8 \n \nlargely on account of the increase in non-food \ninflation. \n \nAnnual non-food inflation rose to 57.57% in \nDecember 2021, from 53.57% in November \n2021. Major drivers of non-food inflation were \nrecreation and culture, miscellaneous goods \nand services, \ntransport, \nhousing, water, \nelectricity, gas and other fuels and health \namong others. Year-on-year food inflation \ndeclined from 65.39% in November 2021, to \n64.91% in December 2021. \n \nBlended annual inflation2 fell by 0.84 \npercentage points to 24.9% in December 2021, \nfrom 25.8% in November 2021. \n \n \nMonthly Inflation \n \nThe \nZW$ \nmonthly \ninflation \nremained \nunchanged at 5.76% in December 2021, as the \nincrease in non-food inflation was offset by the \ndecrease in food inflation. \n \nNon-food \ninflation \nincreased \nby \n0.20 \npercentage points, from 5.21% in November \n2021 to 5.41% in December 2021. Food \ninflation posted a monthly decline of 0.29 \npercentage points, from 6.51% November 2021 \nto 6.22% in December 2021. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2The Zimbabwe National Statistical Agency (ZIMSTAT) \ncommenced publication of the blended CPI inflation in June \n2020. The blended CPI inflation combines the average changes \nFigure 8: Month-on-Month Inflation (%) \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2021 \n \nMonthly blended inflation, at 2.06% in \nDecember 2021, reflected a 0.07 percentage \npoint decline from 2.13% recorded in \nNovember 2021. \n \nNATIONAL PAYMENTS SYSTEM \n \nDuring the month of December 2021, the value \nof transactions processed through the National \nPayments System (NPS) increased by 12.01% \nto ZW$1.12 trillion, from ZW$998.22 billion \nin November 2021. The volume of NPS \ntransactions increased by 8.36%, from 119.67 \nmillion in the previous month to 130.77 \nmillion, during the month under review. \n \nZimbabwe Electronic Transfer Settlement \nSystem (ZETSS) \n \nReal Time Gross Settlement System (RTGS) \ntransactions increased by 20.12% to 747.04 \nbillion in December 2021. RTGS transaction \nvolumes at 1.12 million, reflected a 6.58% \nin price of goods and services sold in the two main currencies \nin circulation, namely the ZW$ and the US$. \n0.00%\n1.00%\n2.00%\n3.00%\n4.00%\n5.00%\n6.00%\n7.00%\n8.00%\nDec-20\nJan-21\nFeb-21\nMar-21\nApr-21\nMay-21\nJun-21\nJul-21\nAug-21\nSep-21\nOct-21\nNov-21\nDec-21\nFood\nNon-Food\nOverall\n \n \n \n9 \n \nincrease, from 1.14 million recorded in the \nprevious month. \nFigure 9: ZETSS Volumes and Values \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2021 \n \nCash Transactions \nCash based transactions increased by 33.04% \nto ZW$23.60 billion in December 2021. \n \nMobile and Internet Based Transactions \n \nThe value of Mobile and internet-based \ndeclined to ZW$298.98 billion in December \n2021, from ZW$315.43 billion in the preceding \nmonth. \n \nCard Based Transactions \n \nCard-based transactions rose by 19.22% to \nZW$72.61 billion, during the month under \nanalysis. \n \nRESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE \n -\n 200.0\n 400.0\n 600.0\n 800.0\n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1000\n1200\n1400\nDec-20\nJan-21\nFeb-21\nMar-21\nApr-21\nMay-21\nJun-21\nJul-21\nAug-21\nSep-21\nOct-21\nNov-21\nDec-21\nValue in ZW$ Billions\nVolume in Thousands\nVolume\nValue\n \n10 \n \nStatistical Tables \n \nMonetary Statistics \n 1. Depository Corporations Survey \n \n \n \n12 \n 2. Central Bank Survey \n \n \n \n \n \n \n13 \n \n3. Other Depository Corporations Survey \n \n \n \n \n14 \n Other Depository Corporations \n \n4.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n15 \n 4.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n16 \n Commercial Banks \n 5.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n17 \n 5.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n18 \n Building Societies \n 6.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n19 \n 6.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n20 \n Sectoral Analysis of Bank Loans and Advances and Deposits \n \n7.1 Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks Loans and Advances \n21 \n \n7.2 Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks Deposits \n \n \n22 \n Interest Rates \n \n8.1 Lending Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n23 \n \n8.2 Banks Deposit Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n24 \n \n Inflation \n \n9.1 Monthly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n25 \n \n9.2 Yearly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n26 \n \n External Statistics \n 11. Exchange Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n27 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n11 \n \nZimbabwe Stock Exchange \n 12. Zimbabwe Stock Market Statistics \n \n \n \n 28 \n \n National Payments System Statistics \n \n \n \n \n13.1 Values of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n 29 \n \n13.2 Volumes of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n 30 \n \nMerchandise Trade \n 14. Merchandise Trade Statistics \n \n \n \n \n 31 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n12 \n \n \n TABLE 1: DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS SURVEY ($'000)\nDec-20\nJan-21\nFeb-21\nMar-21\nApr-21\nMay-21\nJun-21\nJul-21\nAug-21\nSep-21\nOct-21\nNov-21\nDec-21\nNet Foreign Assets\n-316,766,634.64\n-328,526,094.64\n-340,106,496.40\n-327,297,184.10\n-319,268,915.42\n-328,642,322.20\n-303,317,411.71\n-290,181,081.59\n-301,865,260.30\n-305,499,835.09\n-324,477,572.55\n-370,161,253.86\n-361,298,424.39\nCentral Bank(net)\n-392,036,907.50\n-406,631,588.87\n-411,000,792.44\n-404,663,451.67\n-402,310,198.93\n-418,533,821.61\n-408,677,935.81\n-412,168,208.49\n-411,964,116.26\n-421,707,589.69\n-470,115,861.82\n-508,301,508.78\n-513,012,570.17\nForeign Assets\n14,624,495.02\n18,687,105.42\n17,867,062.65\n23,240,104.56\n18,115,014.41\n20,334,177.22\n33,139,183.22\n21,826,441.05\n106,247,419.80\n103,693,307.78\n112,328,386.14\n121,543,899.79\n134,462,902.43\nForeign Liabilities\n406,661,402.52\n425,318,694.30\n428,867,855.10\n427,903,556.24\n420,425,213.34\n438,867,998.83\n441,817,119.03\n433,994,649.54\n518,211,536.06\n525,400,897.47\n582,444,247.96\n629,845,408.57\n647,475,472.60\nOther Depository Corporations(net)\n75,270,272.86\n78,105,494.23\n70,894,296.04\n77,366,267.57\n83,041,283.51\n89,891,499.41\n105,360,524.10\n121,987,126.91\n110,098,855.96\n116,207,754.60\n145,638,289.27\n138,140,254.92\n151,714,145.79\nForeign Assets\n89,458,700.13\n93,882,385.99\n86,920,278.98\n92,405,865.60\n98,837,092.48\n106,013,344.18\n120,848,426.81\n138,070,452.02\n129,258,797.35\n132,491,806.64\n167,213,200.68\n157,654,795.78\n175,421,218.57\nForeign Liabilities\n14,188,427.27\n15,776,891.76\n16,025,982.94\n15,039,598.02\n15,795,808.97\n16,121,844.77\n15,487,902.71\n16,083,325.11\n19,159,941.39\n16,284,052.04\n21,574,911.41\n19,514,540.86\n23,707,072.78\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n521,691,490.51\n549,010,656.62\n566,288,275.77\n561,575,884.82\n581,351,630.28\n610,249,806.36\n606,251,821.19\n620,837,934.22\n631,052,096.29\n670,098,627.13\n742,039,356.10\n808,077,271.24\n836,659,942.26\nDomestic Claims\n101,159,726.29\n108,399,214.96\n127,374,579.36\n124,267,139.59\n149,907,978.82\n158,719,727.00\n170,177,222.61\n186,187,386.15\n207,406,481.73\n225,085,581.53\n262,344,428.58\n291,811,266.12\n340,286,879.84\nClaims on Central Government(net)\n23,276,846.68\n15,698,011.65\n25,682,635.40\n19,242,767.82\n28,124,843.48\n29,989,668.04\n23,670,319.48\n31,250,109.35\n38,932,426.18\n42,462,267.46\n58,595,877.36\n61,571,905.79\n83,610,072.33\nClaims on Central Government\n37,789,748.86\n34,941,802.63\n43,864,745.10\n43,295,379.13\n47,281,011.39\n47,535,251.17\n42,113,825.79\n45,934,145.83\n55,528,235.16\n59,818,762.06\n75,251,019.59\n80,526,247.04\n98,427,828.73\nCentral Bank\n25,693,679.77\n24,602,411.40\n24,790,733.37\n25,677,529.11\n27,876,847.35\n28,316,386.84\n24,485,145.35\n22,756,201.65\n22,783,534.64\n23,601,353.60\n31,443,314.61\n33,086,870.64\n56,954,683.52\nODCs\n12,096,069.09\n10,339,391.23\n19,074,011.73\n17,617,850.02\n19,404,164.04\n19,218,864.33\n17,628,680.44\n23,177,944.18\n32,744,700.51\n36,217,408.46\n43,807,704.98\n47,439,376.40\n41,473,145.20\nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n14,512,902.18\n19,243,790.98\n18,182,109.70\n24,052,611.30\n19,156,167.92\n17,545,583.13\n18,443,506.31\n14,684,036.48\n16,595,808.98\n17,356,494.60\n16,655,142.23\n18,954,341.25\n14,817,756.40\nCentral Bank\n10,172,875.57\n13,790,121.07\n13,393,897.55\n19,176,804.49\n13,773,623.14\n10,713,013.71\n12,148,239.95\n9,633,323.77\n10,683,637.28\n13,843,620.82\n13,492,383.23\n16,055,165.40\n10,797,060.87\nODCs\n4,340,026.60\n5,453,669.91\n4,788,212.16\n4,875,806.82\n5,382,544.78\n6,832,569.42\n6,295,266.36\n5,050,712.71\n5,912,171.70\n3,512,873.79\n3,162,759.00\n2,899,175.85\n4,020,695.53\nClaims on Other Sectors\n77,882,879.61\n92,701,203.31\n101,691,943.96\n105,024,371.77\n121,783,135.35\n128,730,058.96\n146,506,903.14\n154,937,276.80\n168,474,055.55\n182,623,314.07\n203,748,551.22\n230,239,360.33\n256,676,807.51\nOther Financial Corporations\n606,276.57\n396,273.97\n881,815.56\n2,676,383.43\n4,857,921.34\n2,161,647.81\n4,230,396.18\n4,434,113.69\n4,734,034.05\n4,598,468.25\n4,840,748.10\n6,128,229.51\n9,710,262.81\nState and Local Government\n37,924.29\n28,196.82\n31,854.73\n30,050.30\n20,366.90\n23,547.12\n84,251.94\n73,757.06\n69,366.22\n67,566.82\n79,689.27\n78,428.17\n170,565.46\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n2,578,274.18\n8,366,572.13\n8,849,870.48\n7,837,908.59\n9,126,830.60\n9,187,412.56\n12,075,547.93\n10,556,580.34\n13,825,015.06\n17,770,427.55\n20,820,033.41\n22,393,447.91\n23,865,846.53\nPrivate Sector\n74,660,404.58\n83,910,160.40\n91,928,403.19\n94,480,029.44\n107,778,016.50\n117,357,451.47\n130,116,707.10\n139,872,825.71\n149,845,640.23\n160,186,851.44\n178,008,080.43\n201,639,254.74\n222,930,132.71\nCentral Bank\n703,343.34\n744,529.53\n755,476.31\n910,752.95\n1,181,305.42\n1,264,177.93\n1,489,123.82\n1,556,259.01\n1,663,062.31\n1,700,948.01\n1,791,428.18\n1,962,988.42\n1,984,236.72\nODCs\n73,957,061.25\n83,165,630.87\n91,172,926.88\n93,569,276.49\n106,596,711.09\n116,093,273.55\n128,627,583.28\n138,316,566.70\n148,182,577.92\n158,485,903.44\n176,216,652.26\n199,676,266.32\n220,945,895.99\nOther Items(Net)\n-420,531,764.21 -440,611,441.66 -438,913,696.40 -437,308,745.22 -431,443,651.46 -451,530,079.36 -436,074,598.58 -434,650,548.07 -423,645,614.57 -445,013,045.60 -479,694,927.52 -516,266,005.13 -496,373,062.42\nShares and Other Equity\n-390,151,578.46\n-408,061,464.88\n-410,347,885.65\n-411,006,941.09\n-396,650,639.28\n-415,482,334.99\n-421,159,006.94\n-420,923,101.54\n-420,402,750.57\n-426,036,485.00\n-473,248,083.80\n-509,275,252.67\n-502,021,854.19\nLiabilities to Other Financial Corporations\n292,018.63\n376,668.85\n609,870.31\n408,850.46\n409,882.68\n429,002.92\n462,598.19\n552,817.90\n478,578.47\n375,417.86\n503,055.71\n347,091.09\n139,767.85\nRestricted Deposits\n835,126.11\n718,690.98\n252,287.94\n71,982.41\n72,859.61\n67,378.71\n73,532.53\n85,289.04\n2,097,859.91\n3,600,957.03\n6,496,099.45\n4,400,595.12\n6,915,475.67\nDeposits and Securities Excluded from Base Money\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nOther Items(net)\n-31,507,330.50\n-33,645,336.61\n-29,427,969.01\n-26,782,637.00\n-35,275,754.48\n-36,544,126.00\n-15,451,722.36\n-14,365,553.48\n-5,819,302.38\n-22,952,935.50\n-13,445,998.89\n-11,738,438.67\n-1,406,451.73\nBroad Money-M3\n204,924,855.86\n220,484,561.98\n226,181,779.37\n234,278,700.72\n262,082,714.87\n281,607,484.16\n302,934,409.48\n330,656,852.64\n329,186,835.99\n364,598,792.04\n417,561,783.55\n437,916,017.39\n475,361,517.87\nSecurities Other than Shares Included in Broad Money\n1,436,202.84\n1,422,437.87\n1,457,355.54\n1,641,213.33\n1,503,791.55\n1,525,849.38\n1,559,661.34\n1,523,179.12\n1,873,132.76\n3,191,934.31\n3,729,670.68\n4,007,812.73\n3,696,333.82\nBroad Money-M2\n203,488,653.02\n219,062,124.11\n224,724,423.83\n232,637,487.38\n260,578,923.31\n280,081,634.78\n301,374,748.14\n329,133,673.52\n327,313,703.23\n361,406,857.73\n413,832,112.87\n433,908,204.66\n471,665,184.05\nOther Deposits\n9,906,844.70\n11,351,477.37\n13,946,713.28\n14,168,053.71\n13,701,776.00\n18,359,658.93\n21,395,598.04\n23,035,262.46\n27,051,555.67\n26,380,655.25\n27,904,757.23\n33,209,817.65\n37,402,963.80\nNarrow Money-M1\n193,581,808.32\n207,710,646.74\n210,777,710.55\n218,469,433.68\n246,877,147.31\n261,721,975.85\n279,979,150.10\n306,098,411.06\n300,262,147.56\n335,026,202.48\n385,927,355.64\n400,698,387.01\n434,262,220.25\nTransferable Deposits\n192,383,729.76\n206,490,526.41\n209,569,292.32\n216,776,481.85\n245,066,101.47\n259,978,003.99\n277,785,152.96\n303,724,801.01\n297,965,557.69\n333,108,841.78\n383,724,566.36\n398,514,604.13\n431,948,432.28\n Of which Foreign Currency Accounts\n103,728,205.33\n108,593,568.84\n109,661,714.64\n115,035,082.24\n117,770,638.10\n127,553,941.47\n133,630,862.77\n141,174,811.64\n133,774,214.78\n151,057,377.09\n179,312,075.75\n181,547,992.63\n210,704,070.51\nCurrency Outside Depository Corporations\n1,198,078.56\n1,220,120.33\n1,208,418.23\n1,692,951.82\n1,811,045.84\n1,743,971.86\n2,193,997.15\n2,373,610.05\n2,296,589.87\n1,917,360.70\n2,202,789.29\n2,183,782.87\n2,313,787.98\nMemorandum Items\nReserve Money\n18,762,395.12\n21,824,780.59\n22,377,634.26\n19,248,051.52\n22,620,090.06\n26,215,258.96\n24,844,800.65\n24,944,722.36\n28,495,115.00\n26,242,897.53\n24,355,818.80\n28,185,078.58\n25,944,260.02\nFCAs as a Percentage of Deposits in M3\n50.9%\n49.5%\n48.7%\n49.5%\n45.2%\n45.6%\n44.4%\n43.0%\n40.9%\n41.7%\n43.2%\n41.7%\n44.5%\nEnd Period Exchange Rate\n81.79\n82.68\n83.89\n84.40\n84.50\n84.73\n85.42\n85.64\n86.06\n87.67\n97.14\n105.67\n108.67\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2021\nNotes:\n(i) Depository corporations survey - formerly Monetary Survey.\n(ii) Broad money redefined using IMF's Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual of 2000. Major changes include exclusion of Government deposits held by banks from broad money.\n(iii) Transferable deposits made up of demand and savings deposits.\n(iv) NCDs are also referred to as securities included in broad money.\n(v) All classes of time deposits, short and long term are classified as time deposits, which are also termed other deposits.\n(vi) Credit to the private sector now excludes claims on other financial corporations, as well as claims on state and local government (local authorities)\n(vii) Depository corporations made up of the Central Bank and other depository corporations\n(viii) Other depository corporations (ODCs) - Commercial banks, merchant banks, building societies and POSB.\n(ix) In December 2017, the statistics were adjusted in restrospect by reclassifying Securities issued under Aftrades from claims on government to claims on central bank\n(x) In December 2017, the statistics were adjusted in restrospect by reclassifying amounts accessed by banks under the Aftrades from liabilities to Other Depository corporations and Other Financial Corporations to liabilities to Central Bank \n(xi) In December 2018, statistics were revised from November 2017 due to reclassification of lines of credit (foreign liabilities) that were initially classified as deposits included in broad money\n(xii) All monetary and financial statistics are valued in ZWL$ since the introduction of the interbank foreign exchange market in February 2019\n \n \n \n13 \n \n \nDec-20\nJan-21\nFeb-21\nMar-21\nApr-21\nMay-21\nJun-21\nJul-21\nAug-21\nSep-21\nOct-21\nNov-21\nDec-21\nNet Foreign Assets\n-392,036,907.50 -406,631,588.87 -411,000,792.44 -404,663,451.67 -402,310,198.93 -418,533,821.61 -408,677,935.81 -412,168,208.49 -411,964,116.26 -421,707,589.69 -470,115,861.82 -508,301,508.78 -513,012,570.17\nClaims on Non Residents\n14,624,495.02\n18,687,105.42\n17,867,062.65\n23,240,104.56\n18,115,014.41\n20,334,177.22\n33,139,183.22\n21,826,441.05\n106,247,419.80\n103,693,307.78\n112,328,386.14\n121,543,899.79\n134,462,902.43\nOfficial Reserves Assets\n2,786,278.07\n6,677,598.06\n5,651,394.24\n11,051,852.30\n7,205,335.48\n9,390,079.67\n22,273,252.21\n11,141,648.17\n95,273,718.45\n91,410,691.55\n98,733,481.46\n106,788,388.55\n113,865,495.69\nOther Foreign Assets\n11,838,216.95\n12,009,507.37\n12,215,668.41\n12,188,252.26\n10,909,678.93\n10,944,097.54\n10,865,931.01\n10,684,792.88\n10,973,701.35\n12,282,616.24\n13,594,904.67\n14,755,511.24\n20,597,406.74\nLess Liabilities to Non Residents\n406,661,402.52\n425,318,694.30\n428,867,855.10\n427,903,556.24\n420,425,213.34\n438,867,998.83\n441,817,119.03\n433,994,649.54\n518,211,536.06\n525,400,897.47\n582,444,247.96\n629,845,408.57\n647,475,472.60\nShort Term Liabilities\n187,885,613.69\n192,806,142.21\n194,818,587.99\n195,017,951.26\n196,412,895.15\n215,118,073.59\n219,691,932.32\n215,528,229.57\n219,582,935.92\n224,780,986.78\n250,088,131.95\n270,427,009.64\n276,458,350.87\nOther Foreign Liabilities*\n218,775,788.84\n232,512,552.09\n234,049,267.11\n232,885,604.97\n224,012,318.18\n223,749,925.24\n222,125,186.70\n218,466,419.97\n298,628,600.14\n300,619,910.70\n332,356,116.01\n359,418,398.93\n371,017,121.73\n of which blocked funds\n177,624,192.87\n190,969,111.27\n191,664,044.89\n191,174,087.59\n181,636,605.52\n181,088,588.70\n179,118,601.53\n175,855,465.58\n173,053,746.34\n173,544,785.11\n191,359,585.62\n207,901,480.94\n215,193,860.69\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n410,799,302.62\n428,456,369.46\n433,378,426.70\n423,911,503.19\n424,930,288.99\n444,749,080.57\n433,522,736.46\n437,112,930.85\n440,459,231.26\n447,950,487.22\n494,471,680.62\n536,486,587.36\n538,956,830.20\nDomestic Claims\n17,721,762.12\n18,864,046.83\n20,211,944.02\n14,624,071.75\n24,589,033.83\n28,240,574.97\n25,962,204.03\n25,193,941.68\n27,281,606.24\n29,006,431.90\n40,400,891.34\n41,254,735.58\n70,963,422.00\nNet Claims on Central Government\n15,520,804.20\n10,812,290.33\n11,396,835.82\n6,500,724.62\n14,103,224.21\n17,603,373.13\n12,336,905.40\n13,122,877.88\n12,099,897.36\n9,757,732.78\n17,950,931.38\n17,031,705.25\n46,157,622.65\nClaims on Central Government\n25,693,679.77\n24,602,411.40\n24,790,733.37\n25,677,529.11\n27,876,847.35\n28,316,386.84\n24,485,145.35\n22,756,201.65\n22,783,534.64\n23,601,353.60\n31,443,314.61\n33,086,870.64\n56,954,683.52\nOf which: Securities Other than Shares\n6,035,224.38\n6,165,262.55\n6,095,109.16\n5,962,815.29\n5,871,229.64\n5,850,605.06\n5,809,922.68\n5,803,706.31\n5,778,201.73\n5,767,697.15\n5,748,064.63\n5,737,560.05\n5,725,696.74\nLoans\n19,658,455.39\n18,437,148.85\n18,695,624.21\n19,714,713.82\n22,005,617.72\n22,465,781.78\n18,675,222.67\n16,952,495.34\n17,005,332.91\n17,833,656.45\n25,695,249.98\n27,349,310.60\n51,228,986.78\n Loans and Advances\n15,645,165.82\n14,425,116.65\n14,682,354.29\n15,701,443.90\n17,997,932.14\n18,458,096.20\n14,666,539.96\n12,945,598.08\n12,997,746.30\n13,884,037.90\n15,157,333.07\n16,805,093.22\n17,897,368.08\n Legacy Debt\n401,723.73\n400,466.35\n401,704.08\n401,704.08\n396,119.73\n396,119.74\n397,116.86\n395,331.42\n396,020.77\n338,052.70\n6,926,351.06\n6,932,651.53\n29,720,052.86\n Export Incentives\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n10,172,875.57\n13,790,121.07\n13,393,897.55\n19,176,804.49\n13,773,623.14\n10,713,013.71\n12,148,239.95\n9,633,323.77\n10,683,637.28\n13,843,620.82\n13,492,383.23\n16,055,165.40\n10,797,060.87\nOf which: Deposits\n10,172,875.57\n13,790,121.07\n13,393,897.55\n19,176,804.49\n13,773,623.14\n10,713,013.71\n12,148,239.95\n9,633,323.77\n10,683,637.28\n13,843,620.82\n13,492,383.23\n16,055,165.40\n10,797,060.87\nOther \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nClaims on Other Sectors\n2,200,957.92\n8,051,756.50\n8,815,108.19\n8,123,347.12\n10,485,809.62\n10,637,201.84\n13,625,298.64\n12,071,063.80\n15,181,708.88\n19,248,699.12\n22,449,959.96\n24,223,030.33\n24,805,799.35\nOther Financial Corporations\n188,349.05\n204,933.06\n703,425.29\n703,645.95\n1,533,608.33\n1,602,101.94\n1,591,946.54\n1,600,109.77\n1,616,633.50\n1,675,284.36\n1,710,457.33\n1,936,149.98\n1,940,319.92\nState and Local Government\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n1,309,265.53\n7,102,293.92\n7,356,206.59\n6,508,948.22\n7,770,895.87\n7,770,921.98\n10,544,228.28\n8,914,695.01\n11,902,013.06\n15,872,466.74\n18,948,074.45\n20,323,891.94\n20,881,242.71\nPrivate Sector\n703,343.34\n744,529.53\n755,476.31\n910,752.95\n1,181,305.42\n1,264,177.93\n1,489,123.82\n1,556,259.01\n1,663,062.31\n1,700,948.01\n1,791,428.18\n1,962,988.42\n1,984,236.72\nClaims on Other Depository Corporations\n3,684,021.80\n2,564,013.70\n2,678,324.79\n2,055,511.30\n2,433,322.77\n3,018,822.69\n3,426,911.18\n3,478,459.37\n3,525,244.71\n3,296,141.91\n3,969,162.49\n4,856,091.33\n4,919,969.82\nOf which: Loans\n3,684,021.80\n2,564,013.70\n2,678,324.79\n2,055,511.30\n2,433,322.77\n3,018,822.69\n3,426,911.18\n3,478,459.37\n3,525,244.71\n3,296,141.91\n3,969,162.49\n4,856,091.33\n4,919,969.82\nOther Liabilities to ODCs\n53,880,036.70\n52,386,928.65\n59,780,016.83\n67,223,250.63\n68,479,829.04\n74,078,427.51\n91,366,745.03\n90,755,541.83\n61,697,091.96\n61,027,807.98\n75,694,008.33\n84,609,743.32\n108,149,998.58\nOf which: Aftrades Balances\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n Securities\n22,262,484.07\n29,594,641.97\n31,870,831.11\n32,826,932.93\n33,556,990.26\n41,514,984.85\n45,976,776.82\n46,605,622.19\n40,728,575.10\n41,191,755.29\n51,891,284.90\n53,851,878.52\n72,821,158.38\nOther Items(Net)\n-443,273,555.40 -459,415,237.58 -470,268,174.72 -474,455,170.78 -466,387,761.43 -487,568,110.43 -495,500,366.27 -499,196,071.64 -471,349,472.27 -476,675,721.39 -525,795,635.11 -574,985,503.78 -571,223,436.96\nShares and Other Equity\n-442,191,359.79\n-459,147,547.11\n-467,159,156.05\n-471,095,071.67\n-458,343,431.18\n-477,762,942.16\n-486,305,203.47\n-488,981,304.19\n-491,527,426.67\n-501,914,984.05\n-555,638,121.13\n-604,000,281.44\n-620,887,582.17\nOther Items(Net)\n-3,242,652.80\n-1,473,280.48\n-4,426,426.77\n-4,965,601.97\n-9,430,994.41\n-10,971,526.97\n-9,911,933.75\n-10,996,966.63\n17,593,977.36\n20,921,508.79\n23,131,653.99\n23,458,496.35\n41,146,119.65\nLiabilities to Other Resident Sectors\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nDeposits and Securities Excluded from Base Mon\n2,160,457.19\n1,205,590.01\n1,317,408.10\n1,605,502.86\n1,386,664.16\n1,166,358.70\n716,770.95\n782,199.17\n2,583,977.04\n4,317,753.87\n6,710,832.03\n5,556,281.32\n8,518,025.55\nMonetary Base Incl. foreign currency clearing balances\nMonetary Base \n18,762,395.12\n21,824,780.59\n22,377,634.26\n19,248,051.52\n22,620,090.06\n26,215,258.96\n24,844,800.65\n24,944,722.36\n28,495,115.00\n26,242,897.53\n24,355,818.80\n28,185,078.58\n25,944,260.02\nBond Coins\n2,375,925.99\n99,709.66\n99,709.73\n99,709.87\n99,709.99\n99,710.09\n99,710.14\n99,710.17\n99,710.20\n99,710.12\n99,710.10\n99,710.13\n99,710.16\nBond Notes\n99,709.69\n2,603,693.97\n2,847,426.23\n3,050,378.36\n3,152,287.93\n3,550,401.56\n3,797,075.30\n4,413,772.03\n4,650,584.97\n4,671,398.41\n4,714,194.39\n4,805,542.45\n5,052,397.24\nLiabilities to ODCs\n16,386,469.12\n19,121,376.95\n19,430,498.30\n16,097,963.29\n19,368,092.13\n22,565,147.30\n20,948,015.21\n20,431,240.16\n23,744,819.84\n21,471,789.00\n19,541,914.31\n23,279,826.00\n20,792,152.63\n Reserve Deposits\n2,199,092.20\n2,444,129.79\n4,799,500.58\n5,160,139.38\n5,730,094.93\n6,659,921.67\n7,269,076.19\n7,862,360.46\n8,219,597.38\n9,255,653.80\n9,541,310.72\n18,709,286.01\n19,781,787.64\n Exess reserves \n14,187,376.93\n16,677,247.16\n14,630,997.72\n10,937,823.91\n13,637,997.20\n15,905,225.63\n13,678,939.03\n12,568,879.69\n15,525,222.46\n12,216,135.19\n10,000,603.59\n4,570,539.99\n1,010,364.99\nPrivate Deposits\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2021\n NB: * Other Foreign Liabilities include blocked funds amounting to USD2.2 billion assumed by the Central Bank on behalf of Government.\nTABLE 2: CENTRAL BANK SURVEY ($'000)\n \n \n \n14 \n \n \n \n \n TABLE 3 : OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS SURVEY ( $ '000)\nDec-20\nJan-21\nFeb-21\nMar-21\nApr-21\nMay-21\nJun-21\nJul-21\nAug-21\nSep-21\nOct-21\nNov-21\nDec-21\nNet Foreign Assets\n75,270,272.86\n78,105,494.23\n70,894,296.04\n77,366,267.57\n77,366,267.57\n77,366,267.57\n105,360,524.10\n121,987,126.91\n110,098,855.96\n116,207,754.60\n145,638,289.27\n138,140,254.92\n151,714,145.79\nClaims on Non Residents\n89,458,700.13\n93,882,385.99\n86,920,278.98\n92,405,865.60\n92,405,865.60\n92,405,865.60\n120,848,426.81\n138,070,452.02\n129,258,797.35\n132,491,806.64\n167,213,200.68\n157,654,795.78\n175,421,218.57\nOf Which: Foreign Currency\n39,886,775.04\n42,733,946.30\n41,025,473.91\n40,953,342.99\n40,953,342.99\n40,953,342.99\n30,255,551.49\n30,509,126.94\n32,270,386.66\n38,500,097.41\n50,074,676.36\n53,424,260.93\n50,030,986.41\nDeposits\n49,426,810.30\n50,993,755.75\n45,711,660.09\n51,250,447.13\n51,250,447.13\n51,250,447.13\n90,381,891.07\n107,347,245.84\n96,773,959.39\n93,731,294.28\n116,746,591.30\n103,820,731.58\n125,043,551.30\nOther\n145,114.78\n154,683.94\n183,144.98\n202,075.48\n202,075.48\n202,075.48\n210,984.25\n214,079.24\n214,451.29\n260,414.95\n391,933.02\n409,803.27\n346,680.86\nLess Liabilities to Non Residents\n14,188,427.27\n15,776,891.76\n16,025,982.94\n15,039,598.02\n15,039,598.02\n15,039,598.02\n15,487,902.71\n16,083,325.11\n19,159,941.39\n16,284,052.04\n21,574,911.41\n19,514,540.86\n23,707,072.78\nOf Which: Deposits\n3,826,796.90\n4,683,800.54\n4,962,383.04\n4,425,775.68\n4,425,775.68\n4,425,775.68\n4,258,022.10\n3,965,803.90\n6,985,643.39\n4,034,436.70\n7,964,589.56\n7,991,662.41\n11,564,286.23\nLoans\n10,361,630.37\n11,093,091.22\n11,063,599.89\n10,613,822.34\n10,613,822.34\n10,613,822.34\n11,229,880.61\n12,117,521.21\n12,174,298.00\n12,249,615.34\n13,610,321.85\n11,522,878.45\n12,142,786.55\nOther\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n127,131,173.37\n140,672,048.38\n153,013,944.93\n153,685,960.87\n153,685,960.87\n153,685,960.87\n194,736,649.82\n205,599,205.54\n216,305,273.04\n245,756,879.91\n269,505,972.41\n296,436,293.39\n319,731,034.22\nDomestic Claims\n83,427,964.18\n89,535,168.13\n107,162,635.34\n109,643,067.84\n109,643,067.84\n109,643,067.84\n144,215,018.58\n160,993,444.47\n180,124,875.49\n196,079,149.63\n221,943,537.24\n250,556,530.54\n269,323,457.84\nNet Claims on Central Government\n7,756,042.48\n4,885,721.32\n14,285,799.58\n12,742,043.20\n12,742,043.20\n12,742,043.20\n11,333,414.08\n18,127,231.47\n26,832,528.82\n32,704,534.68\n40,644,945.98\n44,540,200.54\n37,452,449.68\nClaims on Central Government\n12,096,069.09\n10,339,391.23\n19,074,011.73\n17,617,850.02\n17,617,850.02\n17,617,850.02\n17,628,680.44\n23,177,944.18\n32,744,700.51\n36,217,408.46\n43,807,704.98\n47,439,376.40\n41,473,145.20\nSecurities\n12,072,773.09\n10,322,702.11\n19,049,865.62\n17,602,682.71\n17,602,682.71\n17,602,682.71\n17,610,769.74\n23,160,619.26\n32,722,213.67\n36,196,334.62\n43,786,500.90\n47,418,135.58\n41,452,052.93\nLoans\n23,296.00\n16,689.12\n24,146.11\n15,167.30\n15,167.30\n15,167.30\n17,910.70\n17,324.92\n22,486.84\n21,073.85\n21,204.08\n21,240.82\n21,092.28\nOther \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n4,340,026.60\n5,453,669.91\n4,788,212.16\n4,875,806.82\n4,875,806.82\n4,875,806.82\n6,295,266.36\n5,050,712.71\n5,912,171.70\n3,512,873.79\n3,162,759.00\n2,899,175.85\n4,020,695.53\nOf which: Deposits\n4,340,026.60\n5,453,669.91\n4,788,212.16\n4,875,806.82\n4,875,806.82\n4,875,806.82\n6,295,266.36\n5,050,712.71\n5,912,171.70\n3,512,873.79\n3,162,759.00\n2,899,175.85\n4,020,695.53\nOther \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nClaims on Other Sectors\n75,671,921.69\n84,649,446.81\n92,876,835.77\n96,901,024.65\n96,901,024.65\n96,901,024.65\n132,881,604.50\n142,866,213.00\n153,292,346.67\n163,374,614.95\n181,298,591.25\n206,016,330.00\n231,871,008.16\nOther Financial Corporations\n407,927.51\n191,340.91\n178,390.27\n1,972,737.48\n1,972,737.48\n1,972,737.48\n2,638,449.64\n2,834,003.91\n3,117,400.54\n2,923,183.89\n3,130,290.76\n4,192,079.54\n7,769,942.90\nState and Local Government\n37,924.29\n28,196.82\n31,854.73\n30,050.30\n30,050.30\n30,050.30\n84,251.94\n73,757.06\n69,366.22\n67,566.82\n79,689.27\n78,428.17\n170,565.46\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n1,269,008.65\n1,264,278.21\n1,493,663.89\n1,328,960.37\n1,328,960.37\n1,328,960.37\n1,531,319.65\n1,641,885.33\n1,923,001.99\n1,897,960.80\n1,871,958.96\n2,069,555.97\n2,984,603.82\nPrivate Sector\n73,957,061.25\n83,165,630.87\n91,172,926.88\n93,569,276.49\n93,569,276.49\n93,569,276.49\n128,627,583.28\n138,316,566.70\n148,182,577.92\n158,485,903.44\n176,216,652.26\n199,676,266.32\n220,945,895.99\nClaims on the Central Bank\n77,254,382.86\n79,477,691.43\n74,589,859.15\n84,489,214.72\n84,489,214.72\n84,489,214.72\n77,498,004.69\n107,123,354.33\n95,651,746.77\n103,849,755.97\n110,620,327.00\n110,503,175.07\n121,289,617.10\nCurrency\n1,177,847.43\n1,483,283.31\n1,738,717.73\n1,457,136.40\n1,457,136.40\n1,457,136.40\n1,702,788.29\n2,139,872.15\n2,453,705.30\n2,853,747.83\n2,611,115.20\n2,721,469.71\n2,838,319.42\nReserves\n76,076,535.42\n77,994,408.12\n72,851,141.43\n83,032,078.32\n83,032,078.32\n83,032,078.32\n75,795,216.40\n104,983,482.18\n93,198,041.47\n100,996,008.14\n108,009,211.79\n107,781,705.36\n118,451,297.69\nSecurities\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nOther Claims\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nLiabilities to the Central Bank\n1,318,615.34\n391,146.93\n409,213.89\n75,373.50\n75,373.50\n75,373.50\n662,275.52\n706,879.99\n1,023,363.18\n1,453,072.21\n1,095,299.01\n2,726,544.67\n2,808,102.91\nOther Items(Net)\n32,232,558.32\n27,949,664.25\n28,329,335.68\n40,370,948.20\n40,370,948.20\n40,370,948.20\n26,314,097.93\n61,810,713.27\n58,447,986.04\n52,718,953.48\n61,962,592.81\n61,896,867.55\n68,073,937.82\nShares and Other Equity\n52,039,781.33\n51,086,082.23\n56,811,270.41\n60,088,130.57\n60,088,130.57\n60,088,130.57\n65,146,196.53\n68,058,202.65\n71,124,676.10\n75,878,499.05\n82,390,037.34\n94,725,028.77\n118,865,727.97\nLiabilities to other ressident sectors\n292,018.63\n376,668.85\n609,870.31\n408,850.46\n408,850.46\n408,850.46\n462,598.19\n552,817.90\n478,578.47\n375,417.86\n503,055.71\n347,091.09\n139,767.85\nOther Items(Net)\n-20,099,241.64\n-23,513,086.84\n-29,091,805.04\n-20,126,032.83\n-20,126,032.83\n-20,126,032.83\n-39,294,696.79\n-6,800,307.28\n-13,155,268.53\n-23,534,963.43\n-20,930,500.24\n-33,175,252.31\n-50,931,558.00\nDeposits and Securities Included in Broad Money\n202,401,446.22\n218,777,542.62\n223,908,240.98\n231,052,228.44\n231,052,228.44\n231,052,228.44\n300,097,173.91\n327,586,332.45\n326,404,128.99\n361,964,634.51\n415,144,261.68\n434,576,548.31\n471,445,180.01\nDeposits Included in Broad Money\n200,965,243.38\n \n217,355,104.75\n \n222,450,885.44\n \n229,411,015.11\n \n229,411,015.11\n \n229,411,015.11\n \n298,537,512.57\n \n326,063,153.33\n \n324,530,996.23\n \n358,772,700.20\n \n411,414,591.01\n \n430,568,735.58\n \n467,748,846.19\n \nTransferable Deposits\n191,058,398.68\n \n206,003,627.38\n \n208,504,172.16\n \n215,242,961.41\n \n215,242,961.41\n \n215,242,961.41\n \n277,141,914.54\n \n303,027,890.88\n \n297,479,440.56\n \n332,392,044.95\n \n383,509,833.78\n \n397,358,917.93\n \n430,345,882.39\n \n of which FCAs\n102,824,762.68\n \n108,386,216.00\n \n109,466,728.50\n \n114,435,612.97\n \n114,435,612.97\n \n114,435,612.97\n \n133,608,092.81\n \n141,156,359.97\n \n133,760,212.96\n \n151,047,925.52\n \n179,306,272.75\n \n181,546,290.69\n \n210,688,453.17\n \nOther Deposits\n9,906,844.70\n11,351,477.37\n13,946,713.28\n14,168,053.71\n14,168,053.71\n14,168,053.71\n21,395,598.04\n23,035,262.46\n27,051,555.67\n26,380,655.25\n27,904,757.23\n33,209,817.65\n37,402,963.80\nMoney Market Instruments\n1,436,202.84\n \n1,422,437.87\n \n1,457,355.54\n \n1,641,213.33\n \n1,641,213.33\n \n1,641,213.33\n \n1,559,661.34\n \n1,523,179.12\n \n1,873,132.76\n \n3,191,934.31\n \n3,729,670.68\n \n4,007,812.73\n \n3,696,333.82\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2021\n \n \n \n \n15 \n \n \nForeign\nTOTAL\nEnd of\nNotes\nBond\n&\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \nLocal\nOther \n Notes &\nCoin\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\n1\noca\nGovernemt\nOther2\nGovernment\nLocal \nPublic \n Institutional \nOther cliams\nContigent Assets\nOther Assets\nNon Financial \nCoins\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\nGovernment\nEnterprises\nUnits\nAssets\n2018\nJan\n23.4\n \n66.9\n \n2,528.5\n \n291.2\n \n111.9\n \n81.9\n2,336.0\n34.5\n23.5\n65.9\n26.3\n20.6\n155.3\n3,461.2\n74.6\n501.0\n457.8\n700.8\n10,961.1\nFeb\n20.0\n \n46.8\n \n2,516.8\n \n347.6\n \n114.2\n \n96.2\n2,313.4\n33.5\n23.5\n66.1\n24.3\n21.1\n145.4\n3,527.1\n22.2\n507.8\n434.5\n697.8\n10,958.3\nMar\n16.7\n \n57.9\n \n2,457.7\n \n312.8\n \n139.2\n \n99.5\n2,434.8\n32.8\n23.5\n66.7\n19.2\n15.9\n127.5\n3,637.8\n24.2\n504.1\n487.4\n710.3\n11,168.1\nApr\n14.9\n \n61.9\n \n2,423.5\n \n337.0\n \n120.8\n \n78.5\n2,558.9\n32.0\n24.7\n67.0\n13.4\n20.9\n121.2\n3,674.0\n22.1\n532.0\n459.2\n715.7\n11,277.5\nMay\n14.2\n \n71.7\n \n2,543.0\n \n477.8\n \n138.6\n \n85.7\n2,814.9\n30.9\n25.0\n66.9\n8.4\n20.9\n134.4\n3,740.3\n12.0\n458.9\n457.2\n718.2\n11,819.1\nJun\n9.0\n \n58.5\n \n3,081.0\n \n509.8\n \n120.0\n \n84.1\n2,865.3\n30.1\n26.2\n66.5\n7.4\n19.4\n196.4\n3,829.3\n38.6\n551.4\n448.1\n730.7\n12,671.8\nJul\n20.6\n \n61.9\n \n3,450.6\n \n466.4\n \n111.6\n \n95.4\n3,291.4\n33.3\n0.0\n67.5\n4.5\n21.0\n182.0\n3,500.6\n153.9\n611.4\n472.5\n732.0\n13,276.5\nAug\n23.1\n \n72.3\n \n3,475.7\n \n377.8\n \n105.3\n \n66.3\n3,362.8\n32.2\n0.0\n67.3\n7.1\n20.6\n186.7\n3,585.1\n102.0\n647.7\n489.9\n736.1\n13,358.0\nSep\n18.2\n \n61.5\n \n3,781.6\n \n398.1\n \n159.1\n \n78.0\n3,145.7\n31.2\n45.2\n68.1\n5.4\n20.4\n212.2\n3,734.2\n119.7\n637.4\n527.8\n742.6\n13,786.4\nOct\n39.9\n \n70.4\n \n3,771.3\n \n368.3\n \n185.5\n \n51.4\n3,105.9\n30.2\n45.2\n68.4\n4.6\n9.4\n188.8\n3,838.0\n132.0\n647.5\n537.8\n743.0\n13,837.7\nNov\n30.6\n \n84.6\n \n3,696.3\n \n300.6\n \n209.8\n \n63.9\n3,172.9\n28.9\n45.2\n68.7\n7.0\n8.1\n217.7\n3,813.2\n141.9\n633.2\n581.9\n742.4\n13,846.8\nDec\n20.5\n \n94.5\n \n3,949.5\n \n439.6\n \n235.5\n \n74.8\n3,044.1\n28.0\n43.4\n69.2\n6.2\n9.2\n204.3\n3,870.5\n151.2\n573.8\n612.5\n812.4\n14,239.0\n2019\nJan\n49.0\n \n113.4\n \n3,901.0\n \n401.9\n \n261.6\n \n46.1\n3,038.3\n27.3\n94.6\n68.7\n4.4\n8.1\n189.2\n3,773.5\n109.1\n517.2\n592.3\n827.7\n14,023.5\nFeb\n59.7\n \n256.8\n \n3,764.8\n \n357.1\n \n570.4\n \n205.7\n3,076.4\n26.5\n60.5\n2.0\n5.8\n7.7\n208.3\n3,991.5\n100.5\n490.7\n669.1\n880.0\n14,733.6\nMar\n62.5\n \n263.2\n \n3,891.0\n \n432.9\n \n739.3\n \n55.1\n3,028.8\n25.5\n61.5\n4.5\n4.3\n9.5\n340.7\n3,845.0\n129.0\n523.7\n954.5\n1,205.2\n15,576.2\nApr\n45.2\n \n363.5\n \n4,153.9\n \n578.9\n \n1,031.9\n \n91.7\n2,921.3\n25.0\n61.8\n4.0\n4.0\n9.6\n407.8\n3,899.7\n131.9\n620.5\n1,135.4\n1,304.8\n16,790.9\nMay\n98.7\n \n484.2\n \n4,089.2\n \n694.1\n \n1,890.1\n \n154.1\n2,912.7\n23.9\n62.1\n4.2\n3.9\n9.4\n636.8\n4,303.9\n144.3\n910.1\n2,031.0\n1,532.3\n19,985.1\nJun\n126.3\n \n882.2\n \n4,518.6\n \n560.2\n \n2,383.0\n \n538.9\n2,918.5\n22.6\n63.1\n6.6\n3.9\n8.7\n929.4\n5,011.5\n163.0\n1,606.5\n1,621.9\n2,120.4\n23,485.3\nJul\n232.4\n \n968.8\n \n5,605.6\n \n370.4\n \n3,738.0\n \n801.9\n2,962.9\n22.2\n103.4\n5.5\n2.2\n9.0\n164.6\n5,364.7\n228.7\n1,587.7\n2,124.1\n2,345.3\n26,637.3\nAug\n184.4\n \n1,150.4\n \n7,956.5\n \n527.8\n \n3,904.2\n \n1,050.7\n3,409.1\n21.5\n103.9\n6.8\n1.0\n9.2\n212.5\n5,764.9\n263.2\n2,614.6\n2,149.5\n2,623.2\n31,953.4\nSep\n124.5\n \n2,108.5\n \n9,128.1\n \n874.0\n \n5,678.3\n \n1,575.7\n3,577.4\n20.9\n27.0\n6.5\n1.4\n9.4\n187.5\n6,456.9\n389.5\n3,707.8\n3,665.5\n3,549.9\n41,088.9\nOct\n144.3\n \n1,906.0\n \n11,613.0\n \n2,511.0\n \n7,644.9\n \n907.0\n3,749.0\n20.2\n27.1\n5.3\n1.1\n7.9\n254.8\n7,393.9\n400.9\n4,081.1\n2,230.5\n3,580.5\n46,478.4\nNov\n128.8\n \n2,243.1\n \n11,417.7\n \n2,236.3\n \n8,417.4\n \n940.7\n4,150.2\n19.6\n27.1\n11.8\n1.4\n8.7\n248.8\n9,260.2\n442.8\n3,148.3\n2,272.9\n4,208.0\n49,183.9\nDec\n169.8\n \n2,526.2\n \n13,994.1\n \n1,254.7\n \n8,415.7\n \n1,984.1\n4,090.0\n18.2\n24.7\n20.7\n1.3\n8.1\n268.6\n10,562.1\n556.7\n4,867.7\n3,517.6\n8,485.9\n60,766.3\n2020\nJan\n183.4\n \n3,176.6\n \n13,217.3\n \n1,073.2\n \n8,142.0\n \n1,811.4\n4,372.4\n20.1\n125.5\n15.0\n5.1\n12.2\n326.1\n12,115.8\n946.9\n2,965.9\n4,191.6\n9,691.7\n62,392.3\nFeb\n267.1\n \n3,136.4\n \n13,817.0\n \n1,504.5\n \n8,642.5\n \n1,532.9\n4,293.1\n20.1\n117.4\n15.5\n5.1\n11.6\n329.5\n13,632.6\n973.7\n5,441.7\n12,758.8\n10,338.7\n76,838.2\nMar\n263.6\n \n3,607.6\n \n16,167.1\n \n2,214.4\n \n12,681.9\n \n2,497.5\n4,775.6\n19.2\n0.1\n20.8\n4.4\n11.4\n765.8\n16,323.6\n1,103.1\n7,917.3\n7,042.4\n11,309.5\n86,725.4\nApr\n298.5\n \n3,642.9\n \n17,926.4\n \n1,523.3\n \n13,697.1\n \n3,056.3\n4,716.9\n18.1\n0.1\n18.4\n4.5\n9.7\n834.7\n17,280.6\n1,104.9\n7,642.8\n8,200.2\n11,988.1\n91,963.5\nMay\n330.0\n \n3,581.8\n \n21,376.4\n \n1,749.6\n \n15,757.4\n \n3,130.4\n4,579.1\n17.0\n0.1\n45.8\n4.5\n9.6\n768.0\n20,291.6\n1,280.4\n7,042.0\n8,823.5\n12,139.9\n100,927.2\nJun\n606.6\n \n9,584.7\n \n29,457.9\n \n3,974.7\n \n35,786.5\n \n7,527.5\n6,264.7\n13.8\n0.1\n90.1\n4.3\n9.4\n2,010.8\n30,567.5\n2,011.1\n24,299.3\n17,433.0\n23,843.0\n193,485.0\nJul\n690.8\n \n18,357.0\n \n54,139.7\n \n5,578.7\n \n42,159.7\n \n11,399.9\n6,760.1\n13.4\n0.0\n74.6\n4.3\n12.6\n1,025.8\n36,840.5\n3,070.4\n28,551.1\n14,418.6\n24,902.0\n247,999.1\nAug\n975.1\n \n28,776.0\n \n54,868.5\n \n4,623.1\n \n41,100.2\n \n14,219.2\n6,883.5\n13.1\n0.0\n39.1\n14.0\n14.7\n1,046.3\n43,502.9\n3,130.9\n25,354.6\n14,240.7\n26,391.3\n265,193.4\nSep\n1,084.2\n \n30,217.6\n \n56,679.6\n \n4,426.6\n \n39,530.8\n \n14,126.8\n6,676.2\n12.9\n0.0\n107.8\n9.6\n22.3\n1,050.4\n45,297.5\n3,822.4\n28,289.4\n20,662.0\n27,055.5\n279,071.4\nOct\n1,064.2\n \n32,235.0\n \n66,948.5\n \n4,457.3\n \n40,092.7\n \n13,530.7\n8,068.2\n12.3\n20.1\n222.0\n17.6\n22.2\n1,019.0\n53,116.5\n3,869.6\n29,764.7\n19,044.4\n27,327.7\n300,832.8\nNov\n1,063.6\n \n34,673.9\n \n73,237.2\n \n4,211.3\n \n41,173.6\n \n14,134.7\n8,961.5\n11.6\n0.0\n268.2\n20.0\n16.8\n1,269.9\n60,179.7\n3,678.7\n29,821.2\n19,694.9\n27,426.0\n319,842.9\nDec\n1,177.8\n \n39,886.8\n \n76,076.5\n \n5,771.7\n \n38,623.2\n \n10,803.6\n12,072.8\n11.2\n0.0\n252.2\n23.3\n26.8\n1,269.0\n69,691.0\n4,566.9\n29,608.0\n15,822.0\n36,808.1\n342,490.8\n2021\nJan\n1,483.3\n \n42,733.9\n \n77,994.4\n \n13,109.2\n \n40,071.8\n \n10,922.0\n10,322.7\n10.2\n0.0\n212.4\n16.7\n18.0\n1,264.3\n77,984.0\n5,315.2\n25,036.2\n15,951.2\n41,028.5\n363,474.0\nFeb\n1,735.4\n \n41,180.7\n \n76,140.3\n \n17,748.1\n \n39,141.4\n \n6,341.4\n15,612.1\n9.2\n0.0\n238.0\n24.1\n22.7\n1,493.7\n84,845.3\n5,413.6\n28,339.2\n19,441.2\n42,761.3\n380,487.7\nMar\n1,457.1\n \n40,953.3\n \n83,032.1\n \n6,945.5\n \n42,516.8\n \n8,733.6\n17,602.7\n8.4\n19.2\n449.7\n15.2\n21.7\n1,400.3\n90,291.7\n4,912.2\n32,908.1\n22,849.5\n40,104.9\n394,221.9\nApr\n1,699.7\n \n40,964.4\n \n85,330.2\n \n6,844.8\n \n49,733.4\n \n7,679.0\n19,384.3\n7.7\n19.2\n571.8\n19.9\n12.7\n1,336.7\n104,118.1\n5,432.6\n34,537.9\n25,207.8\n41,034.6\n423,934.8\nMay\n1,906.1\n \n30,579.1\n \n94,330.9\n \n7,907.2\n \n63,644.8\n \n11,582.4\n19,197.1\n7.0\n152.7\n611.0\n21.8\n16.6\n1,263.7\n111,185.7\n5,063.0\n35,592.3\n24,975.4\n40,256.6\n448,293.6\nJun\n1,702.8\n \n30,255.6\n \n75,795.2\n \n25,605.9\n \n72,780.6\n \n17,601.3\n17,610.8\n6.5\n19.5\n1,385.2\n17.9\n77.8\n1,511.9\n125,592.3\n5,203.8\n26,856.5\n29,616.4\n42,418.7\n474,058.5\nJul\n2,139.9\n \n30,509.1\n \n104,983.5\n \n17,817.9\n \n82,032.9\n \n25,314.3\n23,160.6\n6.0\n290.8\n1,264.1\n17.3\n67.8\n1,351.1\n135,107.8\n5,762.2\n26,869.2\n33,897.2\n42,726.7\n533,318.3\nAug\n2,551.1\n \n33,323.4\n \n93,806.9\n \n11,919.2\n \n72,753.9\n \n25,194.9\n35,371.1\n5.4\n339.7\n1,111.2\n22.5\n63.9\n1,583.3\n150,558.7\n7,014.2\n32,281.1\n34,820.2\n46,819.4\n549,540.1\nSep\n2,853.7\n \n38,500.1\n \n100,996.0\n \n8,626.8\n \n68,707.9\n \n25,023.4\n36,196.3\n5.1\n366.9\n948.5\n21.1\n62.5\n1,531.1\n154,818.9\n6,587.8\n31,981.0\n35,461.8\n45,544.7\n558,233.5\nOct\n2,611.1\n \n50,074.7\n \n108,009.2\n \n9,575.8\n \n89,822.4\n \n26,924.2\n43,786.5\n4.3\n188.1\n1,054.2\n21.2\n75.4\n1,683.9\n172,358.5\n6,987.7\n49,581.0\n47,370.6\n47,611.9\n657,740.6\nNov\n2,721.5\n \n53,424.3\n \n107,781.7\n \n15,560.6\n \n74,072.3\n \n29,748.5\n47,418.1\n3.7\n187.0\n2,678.7\n21.2\n74.8\n1,882.5\n195,765.6\n7,682.2\n52,327.7\n45,567.2\n54,967.5\n691,885.0\nDec\n2,838.3\n \n50,031.0\n \n118,451.3\n \n13,654.0\n \n91,352.6\n \n33,690.9\n41,452.1\n3.0\n186.0\n6,192.4\n21.1\n167.5\n2,998.6\n212,438.0\n14,917.3\n60,917.0\n48,759.9\n71,817.7\n769,888.8\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2021\nNotes\n1.Government securities includes treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households and other financial corporations.\nPublic \nEnterprises\nTABLE 4.1: OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS -ASSETS\n$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \n \n16 \n \n \nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nCapital\nContigent\nOther\nTOTAL\nand\nLiablities\nLiablities\nEnd of\nDemand\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nReserves\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\n2018\nJan\n4,640.2\n1,008.1\n1,454.0\n7,102.2\n406.5\n107.3\n7,616.1\n65.1\n444.8\n115.1\n49.1\n2.6\n1,645.3\n501.0\n522.1\n10,961.1\nFeb\n4,633.7\n989.2\n1,458.8\n7,081.7\n418.7\n101.2\n7,601.7\n75.4\n435.4\n111.2\n92.8\n2.9\n1,620.1\n507.8\n511.0\n10,958.3\nMar\n4,732.9\n1,007.5\n1,491.0\n7,231.4\n365.0\n114.7\n7,711.0\n77.3\n460.8\n140.5\n89.2\n6.9\n1,654.7\n504.1\n523.4\n11,168.1\nApr\n4,907.7\n1,066.6\n1,374.6\n7,349.0\n387.8\n95.6\n7,832.3\n84.0\n453.1\n82.4\n68.8\n16.1\n1,641.9\n532.0\n567.0\n11,277.5\nMay\n5,172.9\n1,138.2\n1,442.5\n7,753.6\n442.8\n107.4\n8,303.8\n88.0\n554.0\n101.5\n94.9\n19.9\n1,671.5\n458.9\n526.5\n11,819.1\nJune\n5,650.6\n1,274.7\n1,459.1\n8,384.4\n438.0\n89.2\n8,911.6\n66.8\n554.0\n119.8\n173.4\n21.6\n1,707.5\n551.4\n565.7\n12,671.8\nJuly\n5,902.3\n1,415.3\n1,501.5\n8,819.1\n424.4\n33.1\n9,276.7\n89.5\n545.1\n118.9\n132.9\n32.6\n1,846.0\n611.4\n623.4\n13,276.5\nAug\n6,005.7\n1,362.6\n1,524.2\n8,892.5\n399.6\n32.4\n9,324.5\n66.5\n535.4\n137.0\n119.5\n33.3\n1,882.9\n647.7\n611.2\n13,358.0\nSep\n6,281.7\n1,421.8\n1,489.0\n9,192.4\n439.0\n44.6\n9,676.1\n52.4\n559.4\n142.2\n129.1\n46.6\n1,913.4\n637.4\n629.7\n13,786.4\nOct\n6,345.7\n1,390.0\n1,427.8\n9,163.5\n435.2\n52.2\n9,650.8\n61.7\n581.4\n147.6\n93.4\n42.0\n1,957.6\n647.5\n655.7\n13,837.7\nNov\n6,419.8\n1,329.4\n1,430.4\n9,179.6\n366.8\n48.7\n9,595.1\n50.9\n543.1\n213.7\n74.8\n42.3\n1,991.6\n633.2\n702.1\n13,846.8\nDec\n6,601.1\n1,322.2\n1,508.9\n9,432.2\n394.5\n41.3\n9,868.0\n58.6\n524.7\n229.6\n187.8\n39.0\n2,057.7\n573.8\n699.7\n14,239.0\n2019\nJan\n6,626.6\n1,155.9\n1,466.8\n9,249.4\n381.0\n42.2\n9,672.5\n59.3\n530.5\n239.5\n188.3\n39.2\n2,047.0\n517.2\n729.8\n14,023.5\nFeb\n7,168.7\n1,155.1\n1,473.2\n9,797.1\n387.8\n44.5\n10,229.3\n71.8\n782.0\n158.9\n151.7\n42.6\n2,145.1\n490.7\n661.5\n14,733.6\nMar\n7,435.2\n1,127.0\n1,437.1\n9,999.2\n372.7\n47.9\n10,419.9\n74.5\n933.8\n165.8\n140.9\n42.7\n2,349.0\n523.7\n925.8\n15,576.2\nApr\n7,968.0\n1,243.3\n1,795.8\n11,007.1\n390.9\n55.9\n11,453.8\n90.8\n652.7\n148.3\n173.5\n28.8\n2,551.4\n620.5\n1,071.0\n16,790.9\nMay\n9,316.8\n1,379.0\n1,932.4\n12,628.2\n462.9\n48.9\n13,139.9\n139.4\n1,053.9\n148.8\n206.7\n46.5\n2,556.6\n910.1\n1,783.2\n19,985.1\nJun\n11,021.9\n1,573.5\n1,737.2\n14,332.6\n422.0\n44.5\n14,799.2\n171.7\n1,607.6\n150.3\n216.7\n43.6\n3,240.7\n1,606.5\n1,649.0\n23,485.3\nJul\n13,014.4\n1,661.3\n1,949.2\n16,624.9\n432.6\n50.6\n17,108.1\n168.2\n1,710.5\n152.0\n225.8\n27.4\n3,522.6\n1,587.7\n2,135.1\n26,637.3\nAug\n15,189.7\n1,798.7\n1,922.5\n18,910.9\n639.1\n59.2\n19,609.3\n202.9\n2,064.4\n155.0\n116.2\n28.0\n4,061.0\n2,614.6\n3,102.0\n31,953.4\nSep\n18,834.0\n2,049.2\n1,925.3\n22,808.5\n549.2\n54.5\n23,412.2\n219.9\n2,989.7\n155.9\n182.3\n23.3\n5,510.0\n3,707.8\n4,887.7\n41,088.9\nOct\n23,441.5\n2,298.0\n1,891.9\n27,631.4\n526.0\n68.6\n28,226.0\n205.7\n3,020.7\n159.1\n211.3\n24.6\n5,937.5\n4,081.1\n4,612.3\n46,478.4\nNov\n25,114.5\n2,868.9\n2,123.8\n30,107.2\n878.6\n99.1\n31,084.9\n235.1\n2,966.0\n175.3\n275.5\n50.5\n6,404.3\n3,148.3\n4,844.2\n49,183.9\nDec\n27,842.2\n3,238.9\n2,192.0\n33,273.1\n1,067.2\n118.5\n34,458.8\n244.0\n3,020.4\n179.5\n326.4\n119.4\n10,212.4\n4,867.7\n7,337.7\n60,766.3\n2020\nJan\n28,570.4\n3,605.9\n2,358.3\n34,534.5\n1,299.1\n92.6\n35,926.3\n255.6\n3,114.7\n185.8\n336.1\n140.1\n12,285.7\n2,965.9\n7,182.1\n62,392.3\nFeb\n37,082.9\n3,939.6\n2,215.0\n43,237.5\n1,674.9\n78.2\n44,990.7\n260.1\n3,357.7\n189.6\n767.7\n154.9\n12,930.2\n5,441.7\n8,745.6\n76,838.2\nMar\n37,923.6\n4,998.7\n2,361.6\n45,283.9\n1,721.0\n409.0\n47,413.9\n476.8\n4,874.8\n258.4\n314.6\n339.9\n15,172.3\n7,917.3\n9,957.3\n86,725.4\nApr\n42,102.4\n5,060.0\n2,530.7\n49,693.1\n1,805.2\n516.3\n52,014.6\n337.6\n4,931.9\n346.4\n312.9\n233.2\n16,105.4\n7,642.8\n10,038.7\n91,963.5\nMay\n48,595.9\n6,274.7\n2,847.3\n57,717.9\n1,840.2\n630.7\n60,188.8\n359.2\n5,129.7\n536.7\n469.1\n365.4\n16,562.4\n7,042.0\n10,273.9\n100,927.2\nJun\n86,454.7\n6,715.3\n4,040.8\n97,210.8\n2,277.4\n1,479.4\n100,967.5\n863.2\n11,761.8\n887.6\n959.9\n348.2\n32,058.2\n24,299.3\n21,339.3\n193,485.0\nJul\n113,233.5\n7,957.5\n6,089.8\n127,280.8\n2,997.8\n1,731.9\n132,010.5\n1,024.3\n14,962.8\n1,387.9\n2,114.7\n348.7\n37,319.8\n28,551.1\n30,279.2\n247,999.1\nAug\n126,039.2\n8,814.1\n5,476.0\n140,329.3\n2,942.4\n850.8\n144,122.5\n1,111.7\n16,780.7\n1,837.1\n3,844.1\n422.5\n40,894.6\n25,354.6\n30,825.6\n265,193.4\nSep\n130,929.6\n9,728.6\n6,981.5\n147,639.7\n2,655.6\n1,531.5\n151,826.9\n1,083.9\n15,206.4\n1,863.1\n2,956.8\n372.2\n42,400.0\n28,289.4\n35,072.8\n279,071.4\nOct\n141,293.3\n12,094.6\n8,429.2\n161,817.1\n2,769.1\n1,799.7\n166,385.9\n1,231.9\n14,868.4\n1,812.7\n4,513.6\n441.7\n43,466.4\n29,764.7\n38,347.5\n300,832.8\nNov\n156,892.5\n13,732.4\n9,029.7\n179,654.6\n2,622.0\n1,569.9\n183,846.6\n1,237.3\n14,800.8\n1,489.5\n5,726.8\n423.6\n46,209.7\n29,821.2\n36,287.5\n319,842.9\nDec\n174,270.2\n16,788.9\n9,949.2\n201,008.3\n2,806.1\n4,340.0\n208,154.4\n1,436.2\n14,145.4\n1,318.6\n757.0\n292.0\n54,752.7\n29,608.0\n32,026.4\n342,490.8\n2021\nJan\n188,337.3\n17,667.3\n11,376.7\n217,381.3\n2,730.8\n5,453.7\n225,565.8\n1,422.4\n15,750.7\n391.1\n600.9\n376.7\n58,123.9\n25,036.2\n36,206.3\n363,474.0\nFeb\n189,154.3\n18,991.1\n14,072.8\n222,218.2\n2,959.1\n4,788.2\n229,965.5\n1,457.4\n15,908.6\n409.2\n581.4\n609.9\n63,583.8\n28,339.2\n39,632.7\n380,487.7\nMar\n193,674.2\n21,569.9\n14,209.4\n229,453.4\n4,691.2\n4,875.8\n239,020.5\n1,641.2\n14,997.2\n75.4\n1,378.2\n408.9\n67,061.8\n32,908.1\n36,730.7\n394,221.9\nApr\n219,936.5\n23,818.3\n13,746.7\n257,501.5\n2,725.1\n5,382.5\n265,609.2\n1,503.8\n15,748.4\n176.5\n939.0\n409.9\n68,812.8\n34,537.9\n36,197.4\n423,934.8\nMay\n232,585.8\n26,296.1\n18,415.5\n277,297.4\n2,205.9\n6,832.6\n286,335.9\n1,525.8\n16,063.1\n654.2\n540.1\n429.0\n69,567.0\n35,592.3\n37,586.2\n448,293.6\nJun\n249,167.5\n27,977.7\n21,449.6\n298,594.8\n2,906.1\n6,295.3\n307,796.2\n1,559.7\n15,430.6\n662.3\n939.0\n462.6\n72,403.8\n26,856.5\n47,947.9\n474,058.5\nJul\n271,359.4\n31,671.3\n23,074.4\n326,105.1\n3,016.7\n5,050.7\n334,172.4\n1,523.2\n16,041.4\n706.9\n750.8\n552.8\n76,406.3\n26,869.2\n76,295.4\n533,318.3\nAug\n275,007.8\n29,893.2\n29,352.2\n334,253.2\n3,661.5\n5,912.2\n343,826.8\n1,873.1\n18,699.5\n1,444.4\n2,300.1\n478.6\n82,627.2\n32,281.1\n66,009.2\n549,540.1\nSep\n301,829.4\n30,564.7\n26,426.5\n358,820.7\n3,719.1\n3,512.9\n366,052.6\n3,191.9\n16,236.1\n1,453.1\n71.3\n375.4\n84,564.6\n31,981.0\n54,307.5\n558,233.5\nOct\n350,366.7\n33,145.0\n27,967.9\n411,479.6\n2,824.1\n3,162.8\n417,466.5\n3,729.7\n21,509.9\n1,095.3\n1,109.9\n503.1\n92,871.8\n49,581.0\n69,873.5\n657,740.6\nNov\n363,455.0\n33,905.6\n33,256.8\n430,617.4\n3,325.7\n2,899.2\n436,842.3\n4,007.8\n19,465.9\n2,726.5\n1,556.1\n347.1\n104,310.9\n52,327.7\n70,300.6\n691,885.0\nDec\n396,412.5\n33,935.5\n37,464.8\n467,812.7\n3,922.1\n4,020.7\n475,755.5\n3,696.3\n23,643.2\n2,808.1\n2,405.3\n139.8\n128,421.4\n60,917.0\n72,102.3\n769,888.8\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2021\nTABLE 4.2 : OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS - LIABILITIES \nDeposits\nAmounts Owing to\n$ millions\n \n \n \n17 \n \n \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nForeign\nBond\nNotes\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \nLocal\nPublic\nOther \nContigent \nNon Financial \n Notes &\n&\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment1\nLocal Governemt\nPublic Enterprises\nOther2\nGovernment\nGovernment\nEnterprises\n Institutional Units3\nOther claims\nAssets\nOther Assets\nAssets\nCoins\nCoin\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\n2018\nJan\n22.40\n \n64.10\n \n2,294.49\n \n192.08\n \n103.42\n \n81.91\n \n2,143.23\n \n-\n \n23.45\n \n65.90\n \n26.32\n \n20.59\n \n154.85\n \n2,451.11\n \n28.68\n \n500.96\n \n294.22\n \n538.92\n \n9,006.6\n \nFeb\n18.34\n \n43.97\n \n2,296.76\n \n223.72\n \n108.28\n \n96.17\n \n2,109.34\n \n-\n \n23.45\n \n66.10\n \n24.29\n \n21.11\n \n145.03\n \n2,461.49\n \n28.67\n \n507.82\n \n290.62\n \n536.35\n \n9,001.5\n \nMar\n14.81\n \n53.62\n \n2,238.77\n \n240.67\n \n124.48\n \n99.51\n \n2,164.00\n \n-\n \n23.45\n \n66.69\n \n19.16\n \n15.90\n \n127.10\n \n2,535.82\n \n30.40\n \n504.13\n \n325.78\n \n552.34\n \n9,136.6\n \nApr\n13.47\n \n56.67\n \n2,207.91\n \n274.97\n \n116.75\n \n78.50\n \n2,314.90\n \n-\n \n24.75\n \n66.97\n \n13.44\n \n20.89\n \n120.77\n \n2,519.81\n \n28.31\n \n531.98\n \n298.96\n \n554.95\n \n9,244.0\n \nMay\n12.85\n \n62.77\n \n2,308.95\n \n339.50\n \n130.13\n \n85.74\n \n2,562.36\n \n-\n \n24.97\n \n66.94\n \n8.44\n \n20.88\n \n134.01\n \n2,556.25\n \n23.90\n \n458.93\n \n307.90\n \n555.31\n \n9,659.8\n \nJune\n7.48\n \n52.61\n \n2,848.51\n \n331.76\n \n117.26\n \n84.05\n \n2,538.32\n \n-\n \n26.19\n \n66.55\n \n7.44\n \n19.43\n \n196.00\n \n2,662.21\n \n25.46\n \n551.39\n \n302.93\n \n563.41\n \n10,401.0\n \nJuly\n17.85\n \n54.25\n \n3,189.62\n \n281.13\n \n109.31\n \n95.43\n \n2,949.15\n \n-\n \n-\n \n67.49\n \n4.51\n \n21.01\n \n181.99\n \n2,414.59\n \n26.03\n \n611.36\n \n322.53\n \n565.15\n \n10,911.4\n \nAug\n21.01\n \n67.83\n \n3,196.71\n \n232.34\n \n102.46\n \n66.26\n \n3,014.90\n \n-\n \n-\n \n67.29\n \n7.05\n \n20.62\n \n186.74\n \n2,490.99\n \n29.82\n \n647.67\n \n329.42\n \n566.33\n \n11,047.4\n \nSep\n16.25\n \n58.19\n \n3,487.91\n \n305.30\n \n137.84\n \n78.01\n \n2,789.78\n \n-\n \n45.21\n \n68.09\n \n5.42\n \n20.39\n \n212.17\n \n2,577.06\n \n36.68\n \n637.41\n \n357.43\n \n571.83\n \n11,405.0\n \nOct\n33.06\n \n67.98\n \n3,505.83\n \n272.14\n \n173.15\n \n51.45\n \n2,728.83\n \n-\n \n45.21\n \n68.41\n \n4.59\n \n9.35\n \n188.83\n \n2,697.37\n \n38.71\n \n647.52\n \n353.24\n \n569.20\n \n11,454.9\n \nNov\n25.84\n \n81.42\n \n3,384.38\n \n264.64\n \n198.18\n \n63.91\n \n2,793.90\n \n-\n \n45.21\n \n68.65\n \n6.99\n \n8.13\n \n217.69\n \n2,672.32\n \n46.06\n \n633.21\n \n406.55\n \n569.81\n \n11,486.9\n \nDec\n18.17\n \n89.91\n \n3,736.98\n \n317.34\n \n224.44\n \n74.84\n \n2,633.69\n \n-\n \n43.37\n \n69.16\n \n6.20\n \n9.18\n \n204.31\n \n2,707.60\n \n53.75\n \n573.76\n \n406.16\n \n633.85\n \n11,802.7\n \n2019\nJan\n42.05\n \n106.91\n \n3,766.70\n \n338.09\n \n249.77\n \n46.14\n \n2,621.20\n \n-\n \n61.02\n \n68.66\n \n4.41\n \n8.06\n \n189.15\n \n2,594.53\n \n33.84\n \n517.24\n \n428.82\n \n649.94\n \n11,726.5\n \nFeb\n52.63\n \n238.67\n \n3,601.94\n \n293.36\n \n549.59\n \n205.65\n \n2,675.29\n \n-\n \n60.52\n \n2.00\n \n5.84\n \n7.71\n \n208.31\n \n2,784.17\n \n31.04\n \n490.74\n \n472.78\n \n696.82\n \n12,377.1\n \nMar\n59.17\n \n244.62\n \n3,729.81\n \n393.22\n \n712.08\n \n55.05\n \n2,635.68\n \n-\n \n61.52\n \n4.53\n \n4.27\n \n9.53\n \n340.66\n \n2,660.90\n \n25.33\n \n523.72\n \n755.57\n \n971.53\n \n13,187.2\n \nApr\n40.82\n \n331.97\n \n3,876.83\n \n492.10\n \n981.80\n \n91.75\n \n2,590.97\n \n-\n \n61.79\n \n3.95\n \n3.98\n \n9.62\n \n407.85\n \n2,721.57\n \n24.55\n \n620.52\n \n935.27\n \n1,002.47\n \n14,197.8\n \nMay\n94.59\n \n444.70\n \n3,886.07\n \n571.50\n \n1,747.69\n \n154.08\n \n2,508.43\n \n-\n \n62.12\n \n4.20\n \n3.93\n \n9.43\n \n636.78\n \n3,056.86\n \n34.46\n \n910.14\n \n1,832.95\n \n1,142.77\n \n17,100.7\n \nJun\n119.69\n \n810.71\n \n4,104.17\n \n413.18\n \n2,244.98\n \n538.88\n \n2,596.97\n \n-\n \n63.09\n \n6.62\n \n3.89\n \n8.73\n \n929.36\n \n3,667.45\n \n37.02\n \n1,606.53\n \n1,374.23\n \n1,621.33\n \n20,146.8\n \nJul\n224.75\n \n791.31\n \n5,081.19\n \n275.44\n \n3,602.89\n \n801.93\n \n2,640.55\n \n-\n \n103.36\n \n5.49\n \n2.18\n \n9.00\n \n164.58\n \n4,043.75\n \n32.65\n \n1,587.68\n \n1,873.44\n \n1,722.66\n \n22,962.9\n \nAug\n178.74\n \n1,054.06\n \n7,123.10\n \n461.83\n \n3,778.75\n \n1,050.74\n \n3,106.90\n \n-\n \n103.86\n \n6.78\n \n1.04\n \n9.21\n \n212.50\n \n4,430.78\n \n37.42\n \n2,614.64\n \n1,744.16\n \n1,989.27\n \n27,903.8\n \nSep\n108.51\n \n1,915.41\n \n8,246.09\n \n676.17\n \n5,563.16\n \n1,575.75\n \n3,240.85\n \n-\n \n26.96\n \n6.47\n \n1.37\n \n9.40\n \n187.53\n \n4,993.71\n \n42.30\n \n3,707.80\n \n3,074.10\n \n2,440.63\n \n35,816.2\n \nOct\n138.01\n \n1,702.35\n \n10,537.81\n \n2,437.08\n \n7,376.80\n \n906.98\n \n3,416.23\n \n-\n \n27.05\n \n5.29\n \n1.15\n \n7.94\n \n254.84\n \n5,859.32\n \n41.94\n \n4,081.09\n \n1,658.19\n \n2,434.21\n \n40,886.3\n \nNov\n113.92\n \n2,078.54\n \n10,430.55\n \n2,073.35\n \n7,977.27\n \n940.70\n \n3,737.72\n \n-\n \n27.15\n \n11.83\n \n1.37\n \n8.74\n \n248.79\n \n7,670.96\n \n42.07\n \n3,148.28\n \n1,627.27\n \n3,059.40\n \n43,197.9\n \nDec\n158.44\n \n2,300.01\n \n12,821.54\n \n934.73\n \n7,898.48\n \n1,984.08\n \n3,716.31\n \n-\n \n24.75\n \n20.65\n \n1.33\n \n8.11\n \n268.61\n \n8,976.00\n \n61.84\n \n4,867.67\n \n2,740.16\n \n6,935.56\n \n53,718.3\n \n2020\nJan\n165.80\n \n2,845.62\n \n12,018.43\n \n708.00\n \n7,706.57\n \n1,811.38\n \n4,029.43\n \n-\n \n125.52\n \n14.97\n \n5.11\n \n12.17\n \n326.11\n \n10,766.91\n \n77.59\n \n2,965.93\n \n3,395.90\n \n8,058.15\n \n55,033.6\n \nFeb\n251.70\n \n2,756.57\n \n12,731.97\n \n889.16\n \n8,264.76\n \n1,532.87\n \n3,877.19\n \n-\n \n117.45\n \n13.99\n \n5.15\n \n11.56\n \n329.47\n \n11,656.91\n \n88.37\n \n5,441.70\n \n11,907.90\n \n8,653.69\n \n68,530.4\n \nMar\n242.41\n \n3,063.92\n \n14,545.58\n \n1,948.14\n \n12,381.17\n \n2,497.47\n \n4,373.76\n \n-\n \n0.08\n \n20.23\n \n4.39\n \n11.39\n \n765.82\n \n14,041.67\n \n127.46\n \n7,917.31\n \n5,718.53\n \n9,244.62\n \n76,904.0\n \nApr\n263.29\n \n3,147.75\n \n16,673.44\n \n1,287.51\n \n13,285.14\n \n3,056.32\n \n4,235.96\n \n-\n \n0.08\n \n18.39\n \n4.47\n \n9.75\n \n834.72\n \n14,864.30\n \n129.90\n \n7,642.80\n \n6,534.14\n \n9,703.93\n \n81,691.9\n \nMay\n284.33\n \n3,144.57\n \n19,827.46\n \n1,553.68\n \n15,003.29\n \n3,130.38\n \n4,160.50\n \n-\n \n0.12\n \n45.79\n \n4.53\n \n9.61\n \n768.01\n \n17,762.27\n \n143.44\n \n7,042.04\n \n6,012.40\n \n9,845.09\n \n88,737.5\n \nJun\n515.11\n \n8,372.39\n \n26,368.55\n \n3,570.85\n \n34,550.44\n \n7,527.46\n \n5,841.98\n \n-\n \n0.12\n \n90.14\n \n4.29\n \n9.41\n \n2,010.79\n \n26,638.87\n \n215.56\n \n24,299.33\n \n14,590.26\n \n18,983.05\n \n173,588.6\n \nJul\n577.99\n \n16,536.53\n \n49,470.13\n \n4,219.81\n \n40,259.84\n \n11,399.93\n \n6,357.84\n \n-\n \n-\n \n74.57\n \n4.33\n \n12.61\n \n1,025.78\n \n33,054.99\n \n229.06\n \n28,551.07\n \n10,247.64\n \n19,646.49\n \n221,668.6\n \nAug\n821.16\n \n26,519.73\n \n49,165.59\n \n4,265.44\n \n38,763.72\n \n14,219.24\n \n6,484.68\n \n-\n \n-\n \n39.07\n \n14.05\n \n14.74\n \n1,046.29\n \n38,741.31\n \n231.00\n \n25,354.64\n \n9,460.49\n \n19,961.16\n \n235,102.3\n \nSep\n891.26\n \n27,646.41\n \n51,169.67\n \n3,898.65\n \n38,420.20\n \n14,126.83\n \n6,354.19\n \n-\n \n-\n \n107.40\n \n9.61\n \n22.30\n \n1,050.38\n \n41,088.91\n \n228.95\n \n28,289.36\n \n17,608.70\n \n19,375.08\n \n250,287.9\n \nOct\n896.48\n \n29,309.79\n \n60,589.19\n \n3,602.58\n \n38,877.31\n \n13,530.74\n \n7,763.97\n \n-\n \n20.06\n \n109.83\n \n17.57\n \n22.18\n \n1,019.00\n \n48,440.92\n \n268.07\n \n29,764.70\n \n15,978.22\n \n19,616.63\n \n269,827.2\n \nNov\n919.42\n \n31,596.89\n \n67,899.10\n \n3,494.87\n \n39,693.38\n \n14,134.74\n \n7,098.29\n \n-\n \n0.02\n \n110.37\n \n20.00\n \n16.81\n \n1,269.94\n \n54,496.74\n \n259.90\n \n29,821.16\n \n16,683.48\n \n19,526.70\n \n287,041.8\n \nDec\n1,019.76\n \n36,507.59\n \n70,392.07\n \n4,949.48\n \n37,346.17\n \n10,803.58\n \n9,985.57\n \n-\n \n-\n \n1.18\n \n23.30\n \n26.76\n \n1,269.01\n \n62,953.03\n \n718.16\n \n29,608.01\n \n12,793.91\n \n28,230.82\n \n306,628.4\n \n2021\nJan\n1,237.43\n \n39,565.64\n \n71,463.64\n \n12,288.89\n \n39,092.85\n \n10,921.99\n \n8,281.80\n \n-\n \n-\n \n1.18\n \n16.67\n \n18.01\n \n1,264.28\n \n71,090.96\n \n718.83\n \n25,036.22\n \n12,333.21\n \n32,123.11\n \n325,454.7\n \nFeb\n1,320.27\n \n38,100.03\n \n69,341.48\n \n16,867.76\n \n38,108.83\n \n6,341.39\n \n12,518.15\n \n-\n \n-\n \n1.26\n \n24.15\n \n22.69\n \n1,493.66\n \n77,324.34\n \n774.89\n \n28,339.17\n \n15,953.14\n \n33,612.14\n \n340,143.4\n \nMar\n1,244.16\n \n38,369.53\n \n76,479.44\n \n5,317.61\n \n41,401.24\n \n8,733.65\n \n15,889.61\n \n-\n \n19.21\n \n34.56\n \n15.17\n \n21.67\n \n1,309.75\n \n80,607.03\n \n878.97\n \n32,908.13\n \n19,302.34\n \n30,861.86\n \n353,393.9\n \nApr\n1,430.83\n \n38,008.89\n \n79,592.64\n \n5,639.40\n \n48,564.03\n \n7,679.05\n \n18,267.01\n \n-\n \n19.23\n \n62.89\n \n19.86\n \n12.71\n \n1,336.70\n \n91,062.16\n \n956.75\n \n34,537.88\n \n21,214.88\n \n32,383.77\n \n380,788.7\n \nMay\n1,648.09\n \n28,677.21\n \n87,611.51\n \n6,479.66\n \n59,745.10\n \n11,582.44\n \n18,846.75\n \n-\n \n152.75\n \n93.37\n \n21.77\n \n16.58\n \n1,263.75\n \n94,790.46\n \n990.41\n \n35,592.28\n \n21,398.95\n \n31,307.45\n \n400,218.5\n \nJun\n1,419.27\n \n28,452.53\n \n69,413.26\n \n24,215.35\n \n70,835.98\n \n17,601.31\n \n17,152.75\n \n-\n \n19.46\n \n92.91\n \n17.91\n \n77.79\n \n1,511.86\n \n106,954.15\n \n1,247.08\n \n26,856.45\n \n26,444.57\n \n33,288.94\n \n425,601.6\n \nJul\n1,794.72\n \n29,100.73\n \n97,429.50\n \n15,901.02\n \n79,937.02\n \n25,314.30\n \n21,665.10\n \n-\n \n290.76\n \n47.39\n \n17.32\n \n67.80\n \n1,351.13\n \n117,348.16\n \n1,301.18\n \n26,869.18\n \n29,079.64\n \n33,587.68\n \n481,102.6\n \nAug\n2,137.72\n \n31,734.84\n \n85,441.98\n \n9,099.10\n \n70,391.64\n \n25,194.95\n \n31,434.20\n \n-\n \n339.72\n \n51.28\n \n22.49\n \n63.94\n \n1,583.28\n \n132,522.63\n \n1,337.19\n \n32,281.12\n \n30,022.43\n \n37,697.05\n \n491,355.6\n \nSep\n2,417.81\n \n36,259.54\n \n93,032.71\n \n6,164.78\n \n66,640.78\n \n25,023.38\n \n31,460.81\n \n-\n \n366.88\n \n57.60\n \n21.07\n \n62.45\n \n1,531.08\n \n134,780.92\n \n1,342.62\n \n31,980.97\n \n30,439.34\n \n34,630.85\n \n496,213.6\n \nOct\n1,993.06\n \n47,379.62\n \n99,470.02\n \n7,339.71\n \n86,302.62\n \n26,924.18\n \n37,639.16\n \n-\n \n188.07\n \n121.59\n \n21.20\n \n75.41\n \n1,683.89\n \n149,477.36\n \n1,523.34\n \n49,580.96\n \n40,853.06\n \n36,664.31\n \n587,237.6\n \nNov\n2,168.80\n \n49,327.15\n \n100,125.90\n \n12,723.73\n \n71,667.33\n \n29,748.47\n \n41,015.56\n \n-\n \n187.03\n \n999.12\n \n21.24\n \n74.76\n \n1,882.53\n \n168,661.25\n \n1,484.24\n \n52,327.68\n \n40,073.22\n \n43,878.52\n \n616,366.5\n \nDec\n2,315.32\n \n46,412.99\n \n109,803.84\n \n10,942.92\n \n87,347.07\n \n33,690.93\n \n38,610.29\n \n-\n \n185.99\n \n4,146.13\n \n21.09\n \n167.53\n \n2,798.61\n \n184,836.87\n \n3,368.75\n \n60,916.98\n \n41,811.67\n \n59,011.63\n \n686,388.6\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2021\nNotes\n1.Government securities include treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households and other financial corporations, \nTABLE 5.1: COMMERCIAL BANKS -ASSETS\n$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \n \n18 \n \n \nZWL$ millions\nEnd of\nDemand\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nCapital\nContigent\nOther\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\nand\nLiablities\nLiablities\nTOTAL\nReserves\n2018\nJan\n4,640.2\n369.3\n903.3\n5,912.7\n301.3\n85.0\n6,299.0\n53.6\n418.7\n115.1\n26.2\n2.4\n1,205.0\n501.0\n385.6\n9,006.6\nFeb\n4,633.7\n375.8\n920.2\n5,929.7\n298.5\n78.6\n6,306.8\n58.1\n409.1\n111.2\n59.1\n2.4\n1,174.8\n507.8\n372.1\n9,001.5\nMar\n4,732.9\n368.8\n930.7\n6,032.4\n244.7\n92.4\n6,369.5\n61.1\n419.5\n140.5\n54.8\n6.4\n1,196.4\n504.1\n384.3\n9,136.6\nApr\n4,907.7\n394.4\n874.8\n6,176.9\n243.4\n72.8\n6,493.1\n67.4\n413.5\n82.4\n35.2\n15.7\n1,201.5\n532.0\n403.4\n9,244.0\nMay\n5,172.9\n416.2\n917.2\n6,506.3\n246.2\n85.2\n6,837.7\n66.8\n514.1\n101.5\n63.7\n19.4\n1,224.6\n458.9\n373.2\n9,659.8\nJun\n5,650.6\n504.3\n897.4\n7,052.2\n254.8\n66.9\n7,373.9\n45.0\n514.7\n119.8\n116.5\n21.1\n1,259.1\n551.4\n399.5\n10,401.0\nJul\n5,902.3\n527.0\n901.0\n7,330.3\n296.0\n12.2\n7,638.4\n72.0\n507.6\n118.9\n102.5\n16.8\n1,380.1\n611.4\n463.6\n10,911.4\nAug\n6,005.7\n540.8\n930.8\n7,477.3\n266.6\n11.5\n7,755.3\n46.4\n501.5\n137.0\n101.3\n15.4\n1,408.6\n647.7\n434.3\n11,047.4\nSep\n6,281.7\n556.4\n927.2\n7,765.3\n273.0\n23.5\n8,061.8\n40.9\n503.5\n142.2\n108.4\n21.1\n1,434.8\n637.4\n454.9\n11,405.0\nOct\n6,340.3\n509.5\n898.1\n7,747.9\n284.2\n31.1\n8,063.2\n49.3\n525.1\n147.6\n72.2\n16.5\n1,461.0\n647.5\n472.6\n11,454.9\nNov\n6,411.0\n503.9\n861.0\n7,775.9\n232.8\n27.6\n8,036.4\n41.2\n487.5\n213.7\n58.6\n17.8\n1,490.0\n633.2\n508.4\n11,486.9\nDec\n6,582.3\n495.0\n910.9\n7,988.3\n255.0\n19.7\n8,262.9\n43.3\n469.5\n229.6\n147.5\n15.6\n1,551.3\n573.8\n509.2\n11,802.7\n2019\nJan\n6,603.6\n440.8\n919.5\n7,964.0\n240.5\n20.5\n8,225.0\n42.6\n475.0\n239.5\n130.2\n14.4\n1,545.2\n517.2\n537.2\n11,726.5\nFeb\n7,129.0\n426.7\n923.8\n8,479.6\n248.9\n22.8\n8,751.4\n57.3\n647.5\n158.9\n119.1\n14.4\n1,626.6\n490.7\n511.1\n12,377.0\nMar\n7,350.5\n451.8\n915.0\n8,717.3\n225.9\n26.4\n8,969.6\n56.8\n778.3\n165.8\n108.4\n17.0\n1,804.3\n523.7\n763.2\n13,187.2\nApr\n7,861.8\n447.1\n1,280.5\n9,589.3\n260.3\n34.4\n9,884.1\n76.0\n487.7\n148.3\n145.3\n14.8\n1,935.7\n620.5\n885.4\n14,197.8\nMay\n9,143.2\n544.3\n1,412.7\n11,100.2\n309.4\n27.5\n11,437.1\n126.8\n789.2\n148.8\n164.7\n16.0\n1,916.9\n910.1\n1,591.0\n17,100.7\nJun\n10,758.5\n567.5\n1,279.7\n12,605.8\n290.5\n23.1\n12,919.4\n159.0\n1,271.1\n150.3\n161.8\n16.5\n2,409.1\n1,606.5\n1,453.0\n20,146.8\nJul\n12,675.9\n672.2\n1,367.7\n14,715.9\n357.4\n29.4\n15,102.7\n146.4\n1,254.8\n152.0\n205.6\n10.4\n2,583.9\n1,587.7\n1,919.4\n22,962.9\nAug\n14,591.5\n825.3\n1,330.1\n16,747.0\n592.1\n38.0\n17,377.1\n182.4\n1,525.0\n155.0\n88.0\n24.5\n3,065.7\n2,614.6\n2,871.4\n27,903.8\nSep\n18,105.1\n947.3\n1,354.6\n20,407.1\n504.3\n33.3\n20,944.7\n205.7\n2,120.6\n155.9\n115.4\n23.3\n3,933.6\n3,707.8\n4,609.2\n35,816.2\nOct\n22,636.1\n1,003.6\n1,292.7\n24,932.3\n489.1\n47.4\n25,468.8\n200.2\n2,159.7\n159.1\n135.3\n24.6\n4,347.1\n4,081.1\n4,310.3\n40,886.3\nNov\n24,297.0\n1,057.2\n1,633.8\n26,988.0\n843.6\n78.9\n27,910.5\n227.7\n2,089.7\n175.3\n154.3\n48.0\n4,931.5\n3,148.3\n4,512.6\n43,197.9\nDec\n26,909.1\n1,184.4\n1,638.8\n29,732.2\n823.2\n102.9\n30,658.3\n231.6\n2,097.0\n179.5\n209.4\n119.4\n8,414.9\n4,867.7\n6,940.7\n53,718.3\n2020\nJan\n27,276.4\n1,787.3\n1,876.0\n30,939.8\n1,026.0\n76.3\n32,042.1\n232.1\n2,170.0\n185.8\n236.2\n140.1\n10,357.6\n2,965.9\n6,703.8\n55,033.6\nFeb\n35,796.5\n1,869.8\n1,712.8\n39,379.1\n1,404.1\n62.2\n40,845.3\n238.9\n2,391.2\n189.6\n209.2\n154.9\n10,877.8\n5,441.7\n8,181.8\n68,530.4\nMar\n36,078.2\n2,458.2\n1,884.9\n40,421.2\n1,430.6\n393.1\n42,245.0\n468.8\n3,731.4\n258.4\n181.2\n339.9\n12,487.9\n7,917.3\n9,274.0\n76,904.0\nApr\n40,156.4\n2,457.6\n2,078.8\n44,692.9\n1,514.8\n496.9\n46,704.6\n333.2\n3,779.7\n346.4\n172.1\n233.2\n13,105.1\n7,642.8\n9,374.8\n81,691.9\nMay\n46,306.1\n2,502.0\n2,405.7\n51,213.8\n1,399.0\n611.4\n53,224.1\n324.9\n3,968.6\n536.7\n319.4\n365.4\n13,454.1\n7,042.0\n9,502.3\n88,737.5\nJun\n67,548.1\n17,859.0\n3,562.0\n88,969.1\n1,931.1\n1,453.1\n92,353.3\n856.9\n9,116.9\n887.6\n681.7\n348.2\n24,773.8\n24,299.3\n20,270.9\n173,588.6\nJul\n89,092.1\n20,865.7\n5,595.6\n115,553.4\n2,671.5\n1,702.4\n119,927.3\n1,014.3\n11,100.4\n1,387.9\n1,907.7\n348.7\n28,563.5\n28,551.1\n28,867.6\n221,668.6\nAug\n102,750.2\n20,005.2\n4,891.9\n127,647.3\n2,577.9\n824.8\n131,049.9\n1,101.5\n12,302.3\n1,837.1\n3,658.1\n412.5\n30,713.4\n25,354.6\n28,672.9\n235,102.3\nSep\n104,770.7\n24,130.0\n6,488.3\n135,389.0\n2,548.1\n1,496.4\n139,433.5\n1,063.5\n11,363.7\n1,863.1\n2,831.0\n372.2\n32,694.4\n28,289.4\n32,377.1\n250,287.9\nOct\n114,057.9\n26,079.1\n7,702.2\n147,839.2\n2,666.6\n1,767.2\n152,273.0\n1,089.2\n11,137.3\n1,812.7\n4,232.9\n441.7\n33,811.1\n29,764.7\n35,264.5\n269,827.2\nNov\n129,129.6\n26,871.0\n8,262.1\n164,262.8\n2,369.5\n1,538.3\n168,170.5\n1,100.4\n11,019.9\n1,489.5\n5,403.8\n423.6\n36,278.2\n29,821.2\n33,334.7\n287,041.8\nDec\n146,151.8\n27,804.4\n8,926.9\n182,883.1\n2,547.6\n4,309.9\n189,740.6\n1,239.9\n10,924.0\n1,318.6\n316.6\n292.0\n43,984.3\n29,608.0\n29,204.3\n306,628.4\n2021\nJan\n158,888.8\n28,456.6\n10,150.2\n197,495.5\n2,580.8\n5,423.4\n205,499.8\n1,142.5\n12,732.6\n391.1\n519.6\n376.7\n50,147.7\n25,036.2\n29,608.5\n325,454.7\nFeb\n162,092.2\n26,146.3\n12,239.7\n200,478.2\n2,809.1\n4,762.5\n208,049.7\n1,150.4\n12,833.2\n409.2\n540.7\n609.9\n54,930.3\n28,339.2\n33,280.7\n340,143.4\nMar\n165,101.1\n30,313.5\n12,276.4\n207,691.0\n4,541.2\n4,845.3\n217,077.6\n1,331.7\n11,620.2\n75.4\n1,136.7\n408.9\n58,208.9\n32,908.1\n30,626.5\n353,393.9\nApr\n191,923.5\n31,441.3\n11,549.5\n234,914.3\n2,195.0\n5,346.7\n242,455.9\n1,190.1\n11,503.5\n176.5\n757.1\n409.9\n60,361.3\n34,537.9\n29,396.5\n380,788.7\nMay\n194,108.9\n40,921.9\n15,896.4\n250,927.2\n1,705.9\n6,802.1\n259,435.2\n1,186.9\n11,783.3\n654.2\n145.2\n429.0\n61,202.0\n35,592.3\n29,790.4\n400,218.5\nJun\n211,950.0\n40,878.5\n18,536.0\n271,364.4\n2,696.6\n6,202.3\n280,263.2\n1,211.8\n11,575.5\n662.3\n368.5\n462.6\n63,417.5\n26,856.5\n40,783.7\n425,601.6\nJul\n226,860.1\n48,928.9\n19,775.4\n295,564.4\n2,991.7\n5,012.2\n303,568.3\n1,169.2\n12,552.8\n706.9\n476.2\n552.8\n66,514.1\n26,869.2\n68,693.1\n481,102.6\nAug\n237,167.0\n38,425.4\n25,114.2\n300,706.5\n3,601.5\n5,873.7\n310,181.7\n1,216.2\n13,354.7\n1,444.4\n1,678.3\n478.6\n72,123.3\n32,281.1\n58,597.3\n491,355.6\nSep\n263,598.2\n37,954.3\n21,954.4\n323,506.9\n3,643.0\n3,469.0\n330,618.9\n2,141.0\n11,770.4\n1,453.1\n-110.6\n375.4\n71,255.0\n31,981.0\n46,729.4\n496,213.6\nOct\n299,038.0\n50,766.0\n22,882.7\n372,686.7\n2,824.1\n3,023.7\n378,534.5\n2,411.8\n14,077.4\n1,095.3\n1,109.9\n503.1\n78,644.6\n49,581.0\n61,280.0\n587,237.6\nNov\n307,063.4\n52,309.9\n27,875.3\n387,248.6\n3,325.7\n2,764.9\n393,339.3\n2,869.4\n12,437.2\n2,726.5\n1,352.5\n347.1\n89,288.6\n52,327.7\n61,678.3\n616,366.5\nDec\n334,599.0\n58,318.5\n30,455.6\n423,373.1\n3,842.1\n3,855.7\n431,070.9\n3,027.0\n13,896.4\n2,808.1\n1,693.3\n139.8\n109,665.4\n60,917.0\n63,170.8\n686,388.6\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2021\nTABLE 5.2 : COMMERCIAL BANKS - LIABILITIES\nDeposits\nAmounts Owing to\n \n \n \n19 \n \nForeign\nOther Assets\nNon Financial \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nNotes\nAssets\nBond\n&\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \n Notes &\nCoin\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment1\nLocal Governemt\nPublic Enterprises\nOther2\nMortgages\nGovernment\nOther\nCoins\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\n2018\nJan\n0.9\n \n2.3\n \n197.4\n \n98.7\n \n7.8\n \n-\n \n129.8\n \n34.5\n \n-\n \n-\n \n413.2\n \n-\n \n508.7\n \n144.9\n \n136.1\n \n1,674.3\n \nFeb\n1.5\n \n1.8\n \n172.4\n \n123.5\n \n5.5\n \n-\n \n141.3\n \n33.5\n \n-\n \n-\n \n414.8\n \n-\n \n507.9\n \n125.7\n \n135.7\n \n1,663.6\n \nMar\n1.4\n \n3.4\n \n175.9\n \n72.1\n \n14.1\n \n-\n \n212.6\n \n32.8\n \n-\n \n-\n \n411.4\n \n-\n \n539.4\n \n142.8\n \n132.3\n \n1,738.2\n \nApr\n1.1\n \n4.3\n \n185.5\n \n61.9\n \n3.6\n \n-\n \n184.4\n \n32.0\n \n-\n \n-\n \n413.3\n \n-\n \n582.7\n \n141.6\n \n135.2\n \n1,745.7\n \nMay\n1.0\n \n7.6\n \n196.3\n \n138.2\n \n8.1\n \n-\n \n191.0\n \n30.9\n \n-\n \n-\n \n415.0\n \n-\n \n608.4\n \n128.1\n \n137.4\n \n1,862.0\n \nJune\n1.2\n \n4.9\n \n188.6\n \n177.8\n \n1.9\n \n-\n \n266.2\n \n30.1\n \n-\n \n-\n \n413.9\n \n-\n \n614.3\n \n124.0\n \n141.5\n \n1,964.5\n \nJuly\n1.8\n \n6.6\n \n207.1\n \n185.1\n \n1.7\n \n-\n \n283.2\n \n33.3\n \n-\n \n-\n \n423.5\n \n-\n \n636.1\n \n128.2\n \n141.1\n \n2,047.7\n \nAug\n1.6\n \n3.7\n \n224.7\n \n145.3\n \n2.4\n \n-\n \n288.9\n \n32.2\n \n-\n \n-\n \n428.2\n \n-\n \n579.4\n \n139.1\n \n143.7\n \n1,989.2\n \nSep\n1.9\n \n2.9\n \n245.6\n \n92.6\n \n20.8\n \n-\n \n291.1\n \n31.2\n \n-\n \n-\n \n430.3\n \n-\n \n650.2\n \n148.1\n \n144.4\n \n2,059.1\n \nOct\n4.9\n \n2.1\n \n220.0\n \n95.8\n \n11.9\n \n-\n \n318.9\n \n30.2\n \n-\n \n-\n \n427.7\n \n-\n \n639.8\n \n154.2\n \n147.0\n \n2,052.5\n \nNov\n3.6\n \n2.9\n \n243.3\n \n35.7\n \n10.4\n \n-\n \n320.7\n \n28.9\n \n-\n \n-\n \n433.5\n \n-\n \n635.7\n \n148.0\n \n145.8\n \n2,008.5\n \nDec\n2.3\n \n4.3\n \n157.4\n \n121.3\n \n10.4\n \n-\n \n339.4\n \n28.0\n \n-\n \n-\n \n444.8\n \n-\n \n645.9\n \n179.7\n \n151.9\n \n2,085.6\n \n2019\nJan\n6.3\n \n4.6\n108.2\n \n63.5\n10.9\n \n0.0\n343.8\n \n27.3\n33.6\n \n0.0\n438.0\n \n0.0\n649.3\n \n136.7\n151.2\n \n1973.3\nFeb\n5.4\n \n17.6\n120.6\n \n62.8\n18.1\n \n-\n \n339.6\n \n26.5\n-\n \n-\n \n416.1\n \n-\n \n696.1\n \n171.1\n156.7\n \n2,030.8\n \nMar\n2.6\n \n18.0\n126.3\n \n38.6\n23.9\n \n-\n \n331.7\n \n25.5\n-\n \n-\n \n415.1\n \n-\n \n710.1\n \n172.1\n207.4\n \n2,071.2\n \nApr\n3.7\n \n30.6\n220.3\n \n85.0\n47.6\n \n-\n \n271.6\n \n25.0\n-\n \n-\n \n414.1\n \n-\n \n705.0\n \n169.0\n276.2\n \n2,247.8\n \nMay\n3.9\n \n38.4\n162.2\n \n115.4\n139.0\n \n-\n \n345.5\n \n23.9\n-\n \n-\n \n406.2\n \n-\n \n776.6\n \n165.7\n363.4\n \n2,540.1\n \nJun\n6.3\n \n69.8\n361.6\n \n144.5\n132.4\n \n-\n \n265.8\n \n22.6\n-\n \n-\n \n421.7\n \n-\n \n873.6\n \n210.5\n473.0\n \n2,981.8\n \nJul\n6.5\n \n174.7\n473.9\n \n89.7\n131.1\n \n-\n \n258.3\n \n22.2\n-\n \n-\n \n416.0\n \n-\n \n934.6\n \n203.1\n565.6\n \n3,275.8\n \nAug\n5.5\n \n94.5\n758.0\n \n60.6\n115.5\n \n-\n \n247.4\n \n21.5\n-\n \n-\n \n418.1\n \n-\n \n970.6\n \n345.1\n567.6\n \n3,604.2\n \nSep\n15.8\n \n180.3\n831.8\n \n195.4\n104.2\n \n-\n \n267.6\n \n20.9\n-\n \n-\n \n499.1\n \n-\n \n1,137.6\n \n528.8\n1,042.2\n \n4,823.6\n \nOct\n6.2\n \n198.7\n997.2\n \n72.2\n243.7\n \n-\n \n268.8\n \n20.2\n-\n \n-\n \n429.8\n \n-\n \n1,286.7\n \n503.4\n1,069.3\n \n5,096.2\n \nNov\n11.9\n \n156.1\n872.3\n \n159.7\n426.0\n \n-\n \n338.6\n \n19.6\n-\n \n-\n \n443.5\n \n-\n \n1,357.4\n \n575.8\n1,068.7\n \n5,429.6\n \nDec\n9.2\n \n223.9\n1,016.9\n \n317.4\n492.3\n \n-\n \n308.3\n \n18.2\n-\n \n-\n \n454.5\n \n-\n \n1,413.5\n \n700.6\n1,470.0\n \n6,424.9\n \n2020\nJan\n16.3\n \n322.3\n1,106.8\n \n361.8\n421.8\n \n-\n \n283.0\n \n20.1\n-\n \n-\n \n478.2\n \n-\n \n1,498.8\n \n717.5\n1,552.8\n \n6,779.5\n \nFeb\n14.5\n \n368.2\n977.2\n \n612.5\n370.5\n \n-\n \n357.1\n \n20.1\n-\n \n1.5\n \n503.6\n \n-\n \n2,097.7\n \n735.9\n1,538.8\n \n7,597.4\n \nMar\n20.1\n \n529.4\n1,423.7\n \n261.8\n282.6\n \n-\n \n341.6\n \n19.2\n-\n \n0.6\n \n526.4\n \n-\n \n2,406.4\n \n1165.6\n1,914.1\n \n8,891.5\n \nApr\n33.1\n \n493.1\n914.2\n \n232.1\n384.9\n \n-\n \n424.3\n \n18.1\n-\n \n-\n \n525.9\n \n-\n \n2,568.2\n \n1528.5\n2,134.4\n \n9,256.8\n \nMay\n39.7\n \n434.7\n1,248.4\n \n192.3\n725.0\n \n-\n \n382.4\n \n17.0\n-\n \n-\n \n517.6\n \n-\n \n2,793.4\n \n2669.6\n2,146.1\n \n11,166.3\n \nJun\n88.7\n \n1167.9\n2,857.8\n \n395.9\n1,222.0\n \n-\n \n385.4\n \n13.8\n-\n \n-\n \n653.4\n \n-\n \n4,663.9\n \n2688.0\n4,712.1\n \n18,848.8\n \nJul\n109.1\n \n1780.7\n3,878.9\n \n1342.9\n1,879.4\n \n-\n \n346.6\n \n13.4\n-\n \n-\n \n585.7\n \n-\n \n5,648.0\n \n3879.5\n4,927.7\n \n24,391.8\n \nAug\n142.9\n \n2175.5\n4,799.3\n \n341.7\n2,310.6\n \n-\n \n294.6\n \n13.1\n-\n \n-\n \n688.7\n \n-\n \n6,552.1\n \n4480.3\n6,104.6\n \n27,903.4\n \nSep\n179.8\n \n2469.9\n4,547.1\n \n504.6\n1,027.7\n \n-\n \n218.3\n \n12.9\n-\n \n0.4\n \n741.5\n \n-\n \n6,518.3\n \n2774.9\n6,503.8\n \n25,499.1\n \nOct\n149.1\n \n2787.0\n5,056.1\n \n778.9\n1,182.4\n \n-\n \n206.5\n \n12.3\n-\n \n112.2\n \n772.3\n \n-\n \n6,874.4\n \n2795.4\n6,537.1\n \n27,263.4\n \nNov\n104.3\n \n2935.7\n4,448.9\n \n691.0\n1,412.8\n \n-\n \n1,666.7\n \n11.6\n-\n \n157.8\n \n930.4\n \n-\n \n7,498.6\n \n2571.1\n6,712.9\n \n29,141.9\n \nDec\n116.2\n \n3210.3\n5,085.9\n \n802.0\n1,183.4\n \n-\n \n1,830.2\n \n11.2\n-\n \n251.1\n \n1,008.4\n \n-\n \n8,562.3\n \n2559.4\n7,352.9\n \n31,973.2\n \n2021\nJan\n188.7\n \n2943.3\n5,986.5\n \n793.8\n843.5\n \n-\n \n1,783.8\n \n10.2\n-\n \n211.3\n \n1,091.3\n \n0.0\n \n9,329.1\n \n2980.3\n7,685.1\n \n33,846.9\n \nFeb\n345.7\n \n2762.9\n6,004.8\n \n811.1\n984.2\n \n-\n \n2,731.0\n \n9.2\n-\n \n236.8\n \n2,089.3\n \n-\n \n8,950.2\n \n2949.2\n7,790.6\n \n35,665.0\n \nMar\n168.3\n \n2278.9\n6,313.1\n \n1594.4\n1,028.2\n \n-\n \n1,341.7\n \n8.4\n-\n \n415.1\n \n1,242.4\n \n-\n \n10,867.7\n \n3027.5\n7,841.0\n \n36,126.8\n \nApr\n206.9\n \n2702.1\n5,302.6\n \n1156.7\n1,085.4\n \n-\n \n871.7\n \n7.7\n-\n \n508.9\n \n1,581.5\n \n-\n \n14,233.6\n \n3431.1\n7,237.9\n \n38,326.2\n \nMay\n210.3\n \n1687.6\n5,962.2\n \n1250.9\n3,847.1\n \n-\n \n116.9\n \n7.0\n-\n \n517.7\n \n1,568.8\n \n-\n \n17,154.9\n \n2927.9\n7,532.9\n \n42,784.2\n \nJun\n249.6\n \n1649.7\n6,202.6\n \n1163.8\n1,866.7\n \n-\n \n204.6\n \n6.5\n-\n \n588.0\n \n1,851.9\n \n-\n \n18,795.4\n \n2580.9\n7,701.1\n \n42,860.7\n \nJul\n283.7\n \n1212.2\n7,193.4\n \n1892.7\n1,875.4\n \n-\n \n1,143.4\n \n6.0\n-\n \n447.3\n \n1,963.2\n \n-\n \n18,280.3\n \n3923.5\n7,695.6\n \n45,916.5\n \nAug\n352.8\n \n1408.8\n7,869.3\n \n2537.6\n2,316.2\n \n-\n \n3,535.6\n \n5.4\n-\n \n399.5\n \n2,101.3\n \n-\n \n19,422.2\n \n3837.6\n7,666.6\n \n51,453.0\n \nSep\n349.8\n \n1926.6\n7,608.5\n \n2430.2\n1,941.4\n \n-\n \n4,314.6\n \n5.1\n-\n \n205.2\n \n2,231.7\n \n-\n \n20,461.1\n \n4013.2\n9,460.7\n \n54,948.1\n \nOct\n411.5\n \n2396.2\n8,221.0\n \n2162.4\n3,421.5\n \n-\n \n5,627.7\n \n4.3\n-\n \n271.1\n \n2,539.5\n \n-\n \n22,881.3\n \n5432.3\n9,501.3\n \n62,870.1\n \nNov\n339.8\n \n3578.4\n7,561.6\n \n2568.8\n2,299.5\n \n-\n \n5,882.7\n \n3.7\n-\n \n566.4\n \n2,788.5\n \n-\n \n27,326.1\n \n4400.3\n9,614.3\n \n66,930.0\n \nDec\n351.1\n \n3217.3\n8,557.8\n \n2619.2\n3,620.2\n \n-\n \n2,353.6\n \n3.0\n-\n \n1,189.0\n \n2,786.9\n \n-\n \n33,115.3\n \n5610.8\n11,334.1\n \n74,758.3\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2021\nNotes\n1.Government securities include treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households and other financial corporations, \nTABLE 6.1: BUILDING SOCIETIES -ASSETS\n$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \n \n20 \n \n \nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nCapital\nOther\nTOTAL\nand\nLiablities\nEnd of\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nReserves\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\n2018\nJan\n544.7\n497.1\n1,041.7\n105.2\n16.4\n1,163.3\n22.8\n26.1\n0.0\n22.9\n0.2\n362.1\n77.0\n1,674.3\nFeb\n512.0\n480.5\n992.5\n120.3\n16.8\n1,129.5\n28.5\n26.3\n0.0\n33.6\n0.5\n366.0\n79.2\n1,663.6\nMar\n535.1\n507.8\n1,042.9\n120.3\n16.5\n1,179.7\n27.5\n41.3\n0.0\n34.5\n0.5\n378.2\n76.5\n1,738.2\nApr\n568.0\n452.6\n1,020.5\n144.4\n17.0\n1,181.9\n27.9\n39.7\n0.0\n33.6\n0.4\n358.5\n103.7\n1,745.7\nMay\n613.8\n475.1\n1,089.0\n196.6\n16.4\n1,302.0\n32.4\n40.0\n0.0\n31.2\n0.5\n363.1\n92.8\n1,862.0\nJune\n658.5\n507.9\n1,166.5\n183.2\n16.4\n1,366.0\n33.1\n39.3\n0.0\n56.9\n0.4\n363.5\n105.2\n1,964.5\nJuly\n770.2\n542.9\n1,313.1\n128.5\n15.0\n1,456.6\n28.7\n37.5\n0.0\n30.4\n15.8\n378.9\n99.8\n2,047.7\nAug\n703.4\n534.7\n1,238.0\n133.0\n15.0\n1,386.0\n31.3\n33.9\n0.0\n18.3\n17.9\n385.8\n116.0\n1,989.2\nSep\n749.8\n502.3\n1,252.2\n166.0\n15.1\n1,433.2\n22.8\n55.9\n0.0\n20.7\n25.5\n388.6\n112.3\n2,059.1\nOct\n772.5\n471.9\n1,244.4\n151.0\n15.1\n1,410.5\n23.7\n56.3\n0.0\n21.2\n25.5\n389.9\n125.4\n2,052.5\nNov\n699.9\n511.9\n1,211.9\n134.0\n15.1\n1,360.9\n21.0\n55.6\n0.0\n16.2\n24.5\n396.1\n134.2\n2,008.5\nDec\n713.2\n540.0\n1,253.1\n139.6\n15.1\n1,407.8\n26.5\n55.3\n0.0\n40.2\n23.4\n400.1\n132.3\n2,085.6\n2019\nJan\n633.8\n490.2\n1,124.0\n140.5\n15.0\n1,279.6\n27.9\n55.5\n0.0\n58.1\n24.8\n392.8\n134.7\n1,973.3\nFeb\n661.3\n492.3\n1,153.6\n138.8\n15.0\n1,307.4\n25.8\n134.5\n0.0\n32.6\n28.2\n366.7\n135.6\n2,030.8\nMar\n655.2\n473.9\n1,129.1\n146.8\n15.0\n1,290.9\n29.0\n155.6\n0.0\n32.5\n25.7\n391.4\n146.2\n2,071.2\nApr\n782.3\n460.0\n1,242.3\n130.5\n14.9\n1,387.7\n26.0\n165.0\n0.0\n28.2\n14.1\n457.7\n169.2\n2,247.8\nMay\n895.0\n464.3\n1,359.4\n153.5\n15.0\n1,527.9\n23.9\n264.7\n0.0\n41.9\n30.6\n477.5\n173.6\n2,540.1\nJun\n1,154.3\n406.8\n1,561.1\n131.5\n15.0\n1,707.7\n23.9\n336.5\n0.0\n54.8\n27.1\n664.7\n167.0\n2,981.8\nJul\n1,192.2\n538.1\n1,730.3\n75.2\n14.9\n1,820.4\n33.0\n455.7\n0.0\n20.2\n17.0\n739.6\n189.9\n3,275.8\nAug\n1,424.7\n542.9\n1,967.6\n47.0\n15.0\n2,029.6\n31.8\n539.4\n0.0\n28.2\n3.5\n777.8\n193.9\n3,604.2\nSep\n1,686.2\n524.9\n2,211.1\n44.9\n15.0\n2,271.0\n25.5\n869.0\n0.0\n66.9\n0.0\n1,352.0\n239.1\n4,823.6\nOct\n1,920.1\n548.8\n2,468.8\n36.9\n15.0\n2,520.7\n16.7\n861.0\n0.0\n76.0\n0.0\n1,362.8\n259.0\n5,096.2\nNov\n2,394.7\n441.2\n2,835.9\n35.0\n15.0\n2,886.0\n18.6\n876.3\n0.0\n121.1\n2.5\n1,246.7\n278.3\n5,429.6\nDec\n2,713.3\n481.5\n3,194.7\n244.0\n15.0\n3,453.8\n23.7\n923.5\n0.0\n117.1\n0.0\n1,563.0\n343.9\n6,424.9\n2020\nJan\n2,894.8\n398.4\n3,293.3\n273.1\n15.0\n3,581.4\n34.7\n944.7\n0.0\n100.0\n0.0\n1,699.9\n418.8\n6,779.5\nFeb\n3,118.5\n419.8\n3,538.4\n270.9\n15.0\n3,824.3\n32.5\n966.5\n0.0\n558.5\n0.0\n1,714.1\n501.5\n7,597.4\nMar\n3,978.7\n384.4\n4,363.1\n290.4\n15.0\n4,668.5\n19.3\n1,143.4\n0.0\n133.4\n0.0\n2,335.6\n591.3\n8,891.5\nApr\n4,097.6\n354.9\n4,452.5\n290.4\n15.0\n4,757.9\n15.6\n1,152.3\n0.0\n140.8\n0.0\n2,628.1\n562.1\n9,256.8\nMay\n5,615.0\n370.0\n5,985.0\n441.2\n15.0\n6,441.2\n45.6\n1,161.2\n0.0\n149.8\n0.0\n2,708.1\n660.4\n11,166.3\nJun\n7,327.5\n405.9\n7,733.4\n346.2\n15.0\n8,094.6\n17.6\n2,644.8\n0.0\n278.2\n0.0\n6,867.2\n946.4\n18,848.8\nJul\n10,284.7\n427.7\n10,712.4\n326.2\n15.0\n11,053.7\n21.3\n3,862.4\n0.0\n207.1\n0.0\n8,010.7\n1,236.7\n24,391.8\nAug\n10,984.4\n502.7\n11,487.1\n364.5\n15.0\n11,866.6\n21.4\n4,478.3\n0.0\n186.1\n10.0\n9,438.3\n1,902.7\n27,903.4\nSep\n10,408.2\n403.5\n10,811.8\n107.5\n15.0\n10,934.3\n31.7\n3,842.7\n0.0\n125.8\n0.0\n8,069.6\n2,495.1\n25,499.1\nOct\n11,881.7\n628.7\n12,510.4\n102.5\n15.0\n12,627.9\n154.0\n3,731.0\n0.0\n280.6\n0.0\n7,991.8\n2,478.1\n27,263.4\nNov\n13,173.5\n668.5\n13,842.1\n252.5\n15.0\n14,109.6\n148.2\n3,781.0\n0.0\n323.0\n0.0\n8,200.8\n2,579.4\n29,141.9\nDec\n15,585.8\n797.7\n16,383.5\n258.5\n15.0\n16,657.0\n207.5\n3,221.3\n0.0\n440.4\n0.0\n9,002.7\n2,444.3\n31,973.2\n2021\nJan\n17,060.5\n985.1\n18,045.7\n150.0\n15.0\n18,210.7\n291.2\n3,018.1\n0.0\n81.3\n0.0\n6,054.0\n6,191.6\n33,846.9\nFeb\n18,610.7\n1,047.5\n19,658.2\n150.0\n15.0\n19,823.2\n318.2\n3,075.5\n0.0\n40.7\n0.0\n6,533.5\n5,874.0\n35,665.0\nMar\n18,562.7\n1,070.5\n19,633.2\n150.0\n15.0\n19,798.2\n320.8\n3,377.0\n0.0\n241.5\n0.0\n6,727.5\n5,661.8\n36,126.8\nApr\n19,021.2\n1,353.2\n20,374.5\n500.0\n15.0\n20,889.5\n325.0\n4,244.8\n0.0\n181.9\n0.0\n6,267.0\n6,418.0\n38,326.2\nMay\n22,332.1\n1,453.5\n23,785.6\n500.0\n15.0\n24,300.6\n350.2\n4,279.9\n0.0\n394.8\n0.0\n6,067.1\n7,391.6\n42,784.2\nJun\n22,784.4\n1,675.4\n24,459.8\n209.5\n70.5\n24,739.8\n359.1\n3,855.1\n0.0\n570.4\n0.0\n6,623.0\n6,713.2\n42,860.7\nJul\n25,425.9\n1,997.8\n27,423.7\n25.0\n15.0\n27,463.7\n365.2\n3,488.6\n0.0\n274.6\n0.0\n7,194.2\n7,130.1\n45,916.5\nAug\n27,475.7\n2,728.9\n30,204.6\n60.0\n15.0\n30,279.6\n668.2\n5,344.8\n0.0\n621.9\n0.0\n7,683.7\n6,854.8\n51,453.0\nSep\n29,023.8\n2,834.6\n31,858.5\n76.0\n15.2\n31,949.7\n1,062.2\n4,465.7\n0.0\n181.9\n0.0\n10,227.1\n7,061.5\n54,948.1\nOct\n30,925.8\n4,239.0\n35,164.7\n0.0\n30.0\n35,194.8\n1,329.1\n7,432.5\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n10,906.3\n8,007.4\n62,870.1\nNov\n34,486.8\n4,344.1\n38,830.8\n0.0\n15.0\n38,845.9\n1,149.7\n7,028.7\n0.0\n203.6\n0.0\n11,575.7\n8,126.5\n66,930.0\nDec\n33,974.4\n4,856.8\n38,831.3\n80.0\n15.0\n38,926.3\n1,750.9\n9,746.8\n0.0\n712.0\n0.0\n15,101.8\n8,520.4\n74,758.3\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2021\nAmounts Owing to\nTABLE 6.2: BUILDING SOCIETIES -LIABILITIES\n$ millions\n \n \n \n21 \n \n \n \nAGRICULTURE\nCONSTRUCTION\nCOMMUNICATION\nDISTRIBUTION\nFINANCIAL &\nFINANCIAL\nMANUFACTURING\nMINING\nSERVICES\nTRANSPORT\nINDIVIDUALS\nCONGLOMERATES\nTOTAL\nEND OF\n \n \n \nINVESTMENTS\nORGANISATIONS\n \n \n \n \n1,000.0\n2018\nJan\n479,109.65\n59,336.80\n9,442.40\n289,531.26\n20,569.74\n258,034.97\n271,453.81\n106,425.09\n390,052.89\n32,328.60\n617,302.95\n14,394.66\n2,547,982.83\nFeb\n488,203.10\n59.,977.6\n9,271.60\n315,569.60\n20,133.10\n258,263.60\n285,045.10\n108,649.00\n393,604.90\n31,636.60\n618,377.40\n15,010.60\n2,543,764.60\nMar\n484,764.71\n64,826.47\n11,050.47\n344,731.34\n15,203.35\n274,150.22\n303,649.15\n114,431.85\n363,449.40\n32,793.42\n640,496.88\n19,893.14\n2,669,440.41\nApr\n485,790.00\n63,948.20\n10,904.16\n344,532.06\n15,015.25\n271,071.77\n294,270.80\n112,692.09\n333,633.78\n31,103.49\n631,920.52\n22,066.04\n2,616,948.15\nMay\n501,783.67\n63,555.32\n10,933.54\n362,939.63\n15,079.82\n358,553.35\n317,666.65\n117,123.00\n338,846.30\n31,523.13\n651,443.97\n24,226.37\n2,793,674.76\nJun\n475,105.71\n66,796.85\n13,907.73\n385,583.32\n15,079.82\n344,917.25\n323,212.12\n117,146.59\n335,216.91\n34,457.61\n655,427.02\n34,163.40\n2,801,014.33\nJul\n463,286.30\n70,905.22\n18,924.14\n383,314.68\n14,976.42\n140,624.55\n274,507.82\n113,776.27\n309,209.52\n37,473.99\n652,652.69\n34,402.12\n2,514,053.73\nAug\n470,756.06\n79,237.13\n15,167.31\n331,672.76\n15,021.94\n144,100.73\n271,000.50\n111,960.21\n306,022.68\n37,341.23\n666,649.40\n34,402.12\n2,483,332.08\nSep\n451,745.26\n79,055.66\n15,021.57\n341,851.68\n15,021.94\n144,799.61\n263,994.22\n112,656.60\n320,788.50\n36,914.64\n666,971.46\n64,407.07\n2,513,228.20\nOct\n453,068.26\n74,931.80\n16,036.47\n389,851.74\n15,156.78\n165,252.71\n268,933.16\n111,956.57\n313,376.79\n36,118.55\n680,445.74\n12,855.74\n2,537,984.32\nNov\n444,130.81\n133,137.60\n14,884.08\n313,732.96\n15,156.79\n165,419.77\n269,459.88\n149,908.15\n316,738.77\n45,693.19\n679,403.72\n12,265.36\n2,559,931.07\nDec\n492,669.93\n78,176.72\n15,958.03\n340,422.71\n14,425.48\n165,648.71\n253,354.25\n113,596.48\n347,242.19\n40,695.42\n669,879.64\n12,254.30\n2,544,323.87\n2019\nJan\n525,176.71\n80,480.87\n20,199.44\n349,755.63\n15,294.02\n158,458.90\n255,380.42\n123,772.79\n358,554.22\n42,355.54\n666,797.13\n16,335.67\n2,612,561.33\nFeb\n521,988.10\n79,066.70\n10,931.07\n352,797.81\n14,699.04\n80,894.67\n253,027.00\n124,474.74\n389,522.96\n40,923.52\n644,320.94\n11,446.61\n2,524,093.15\nMar\n538,072.74\n87,791.29\n18,211.46\n379,233.06\n14,556.67\n205,466.51\n270,360.07\n133,324.78\n407,637.99\n43,541.36\n731,600.28\n11,476.62\n2,841,272.85\nApr\n584,205.29\n96,516.86\n22,430.89\n421,676.71\n15,968.00\n236,000.25\n310,449.68\n193,315.77\n387,730.25\n44,465.66\n788,749.65\n14,486.65\n3,115,995.66\nMay\n712,661.52\n98,826.58\n27,802.41\n466,619.97\n17,425.91\n317,055.80\n368,550.63\n250,912.54\n441,731.01\n43,682.62\n901,283.38\n14,096.64\n3,660,649.01\nJun\n940,505.81\n82,926.78\n30,534.65\n566,391.10\n169,400.79\n876,820.36\n354,648.58\n331,070.01\n404,941.11\n49,207.29\n898,523.53\n14,258.87\n4,719,228.88\nJul\n1,060,152.38\n108,889.32\n38,005.81\n685,729.84\n22,484.81\n470,421.82\n497,581.30\n333,137.40\n643,721.98\n51,560.67\n1,111,698.00\n7,683.18\n5,031,066.50\nAug\n1,163,054.33\n117,882.86\n40,904.57\n720,937.57\n15,289.60\n524,650.14\n575,937.12\n378,008.67\n742,674.56\n51,710.40\n1,202,415.06\n5,830.84\n5,539,295.71\nSep\n1,379,203.16\n101,683.93\n20,216.16\n755,828.88\n15,563.75\n1,430,322.28\n520,659.81\n487,089.86\n594,143.27\n59,974.64\n1,004,073.32\n6,055.40\n5,087,524.40\nOct\n1,917,349.77\n103,708.96\n20,826.53\n798,377.18\n24,574.74\n1,447,865.67\n603,692.16\n541,020.28\n618,349.57\n61,677.92\n1,112,873.33\n4,322.02\n7,530,493.20\nNov\n1,916,599.14\n103,450.14\n22,381.71\n878,695.26\n24,749.38\n1,566,329.25\n623,341.53\n554,037.12\n623,064.80\n61,153.08\n1,152,340.02\n4,351.76\n7,530,493.20\nDec\n3,260,641.29\n140,783.74\n27,127.10\n1,114,871.76\n48,155.61\n1,504,624.78\n1,027,373.94\n821,797.19\n823,237.53\n84,684.83\n1,428,029.37\n7,328.19\n10,288,655.30\n2020\nJan\n4,084,551.94\n155,581.93\n40,879.89\n1,241,096.72\n54,212.81\n1,614,135.86\n1,136,124.87\n905,568.16\n799,835.71\n83,887.62\n1,594,904.42\n3,435.36\n11,714,215.29\nFeb\n4,492,412.28\n157,892.05\n54,850.75\n1,305,056.27\n51,575.18\n1,667,015.97\n1,328,895.13\n875,096.28\n827,340.38\n103,240.64\n1,837,059.21\n1,195.35\n12,701,629.50\nMar\n5,400,573.75\n137,553.14\n109,432.30\n1,355,737.76\n60,656.39\n2,181,804.45\n1,514,365.26\n1,743,391.37\n911,567.97\n129,647.77\n2,083,395.02\n30,866.95\n15,658,992.12\nApr\n5,497,243.24\n144,302.16\n94,782.20\n1,298,701.43\n50,563.13\n2,200,545.77\n1,762,996.43\n1,756,962.25\n1,057,031.75\n149,805.94\n2,211,133.89\n33,524.86\n16,257,593.05\nMay\n6,753,987.64\n152,161.11\n176,776.32\n1,688,453.47\n61,403.01\n2,272,323.33\n2,155,232.06\n2,018,291.52\n1,335,664.72\n161,892.59\n2,646,269.59\n56,873.34\n19,479,328.70\nJun\n8,233,748.36\n178,010.08\n127,961.90\n3,248,219.37\n64,989.86\n5,469,986.07\n3,799,659.67\n4,379,017.69\n1,983,339.32\n277,602.32\n3,665,408.84\n46,384.96\n31,474,328.45\nJul\n8,927,920.73\n256,440.30\n209,123.91\n4,249,101.81\n34,055.90\n7,106,442.23\n5,125,740.57\n5,385,837.14\n2,413,677.93\n418,160.11\n4,321,918.71\n46,630.64\n38,495,049.96\nAug\n9,773,178.50\n269,675.36\n194,537.60\n5,470,092.50\n33,043.10\n7,946,261.68\n6,723,930.20\n5,651,838.11\n3,103,883.15\n446,084.37\n5,291,100.20\n48,922.44\n44,952,547.19\nSep\n10,508,860.18\n202,928.95\n203,610.78\n4,810,727.31\n29,975.80\n1,041,079.17\n7,136,261.66\n4,099,760.81\n3,255,496.85\n517,871.73\n6,526,576.15\n48,754.08\n38,381,903.47\nOct\n12,296,430.45\n302,589.49\n251,238.66\n9,053,118.05\n28,434.20\n8,136,185.80\n6,305,609.42\n6,351,785.61\n3,855,757.60\n649,444.55\n7,243,034.96\n49,339.03\n54,522,967.83\nNov\n14,705,718.28\n553,426.67\n299,226.19\n10,178,453.66\n26,676.82\n9,457,279.18\n7,442,871.42\n6,834,160.25\n4,193,059.76\n959,134.44\n7,919,442.36\n50,802.65\n62,620,251.69\nDec\n19,070,900.24\n557,071.84\n265,529.08\n10,043,351.16\n24,925.66\n9,451,197.42\n8,214,424.44\n7,599,398.94\n4,750,996.82\n1,556,410.92\n9,213,845.68\n46,489.85\n70,794,542.04\n1,000.00\n2021\nJan\n23,978,167.35\n610,696.11\n267,400.20\n9,997,383.02\n66,046.86\n9,811,097.63\n7,641,910.42\n7,176,322.97\n4,807,054.16\n1,685,871.14\n10,092,630.46\n47,525.58\n76,182,105.93\nFeb\n24,581,772.22\n653,205.48\n285,830.69\n10,330,772.00\n65,231.37\n10,024,935.09\n7,949,013.06\n6,754,180.16\n5,018,015.84\n1,766,077.92\n10,905,948.39\n47,678.08\n78,382,660.29\nMar\n28,741,816.74\n737,140.48\n320,102.45\n10,604,119.56\n76,828.95\n10,517,753.11\n9,428,559.85\n8,179,722.05\n5,701,289.52\n1,822,019.95\n12,528,176.45\n33,915.52\n88,691,444.62\nApr\n31,859,146.34\n675,080.87\n347,881.04\n12,101,683.31\n205,760.21\n12,046,268.54\n10,788,214.39\n8,802,924.25\n6,559,969.13\n1,831,534.43\n14,724,055.16\n36,984.33\n99,979,501.99\nMay\n34,645,328.64\n713,518.48\n292,339.75\n13,012,546.01\n70,347.70\n10,160,360.67\n11,287,317.39\n8,318,871.52\n7,438,997.57\n1,831,015.12\n17,169,532.74\n10,879.19\n104,951,054.78\nJune\n36,527,537.18\n993,308.60\n357,200.72\n14,622,859.32\n69,173.21\n12,832,747.32\n12,635,012.94\n7,938,660.25\n9,226,503.32\n1,903,845.82\n19,986,300.49\n40,765.72\n117,133,914.90\nJul\n39,160,305.59\n1,280,558.68\n411,253.92\n16,562,010.52\n62,624.82\n13,792,648.82\n12,583,048.87\n8,567,557.82\n10,717,151.04\n1,820,088.91\n22,581,130.29\n13,756.78\n127,552,136.06\nAug\n41,218,056.27\n1,372,177.00\n431,669.10\n15,667,033.13\n66,504.42\n14,701,546.35\n13,446,660.94\n8,828,791.19\n11,500,069.82\n1,942,139.38\n27,299,685.30\n15,470.31\n136,489,803.20\nSep\n41,133,553.69\n1,649,182.17\n433,781.15\n16,702,896.26\n321,991.18\n15,183,417.18\n15,271,161.92\n9,065,558.07\n11,973,442.27\n2,145,369.49\n30,851,901.80\n19,863.23\n144,752,118.41\nOct\n48,491,758.71\n1,644,045.10\n477,340.76\n20,072,721.66\n337,273.51\n16,644,705.00\n17,906,042.38\n10,150,149.70\n8,544,940.34\n2,418,354.85\n35,641,091.07\n17,894.63\n162,346,317.71\nNov\n48,945,526.55\n1,598,923.06\n394,575.79\n20,998,777.03\n434,931.56\n16,621,266.44\n19,372,274.14\n10,802,887.56\n8,904,904.88\n2,882,220.06\n40,009,482.19\n18,275.25\n170,984,044.50\nDec\n54,028,791.83\n1,778,880.47\n556,046.62\n24,450,917.17\n570,685.08\n10,955,470.21\n22,025,406.62\n10,538,491.23\n14,437,886.10\n2,996,425.00\n43,047,088.39\n29,601.16\n185,415,689.87\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2021\n/1 Including the only merchant bank still in operation.\n TABLE 7.1 : SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS LOANS AND ADVANCES\n$ ('000)\n \n \n \n22 \n \n \nEND OF\nAGRICULTURE\nCONSTRUCTION\nCOMMUNICATIONS\nDISTRIBUTION\nFINANCIAL &\nFINANCIAL\nMANUFACTURING\nMINING\nSERVICES\nTRANSPORT\nINDIVIDUALS\nCONGLOMERATES\nTOTAL\nINVESTMENTS\nORGANISATIONS\n \n2018\nJan\n380,283.82\n151,435.95\n257,298.19\n918,787.62\n365,354.65\n1,050,097.69\n652,999.03\n248,932.99\n1,757,391.82\n141,913.19\n669,049.81\n67,904.67\n6,661,449.43\nFeb\n455,217.00\n224,070.10\n263,961.90\n897,453.20\n399,016.20\n949,795.60\n674,828.40\n354,052.80\n1,701,611.40\n107,779.50\n680,060.20\n67,686.40\n6,775,532.70\nMar\n451,992.51\n142,332.94\n296,310.00\n825,805.46\n376,592.97\n1,001,674.30\n597,436.81\n253,127.37\n1,827,464.32\n163,971.73\n597,436.81\n63,604.30\n6,597,749.51\nApr\n476,448.12\n144,564.55\n310,795.64\n806,144.74\n364,824.61\n988,527.16\n649,893.01\n255,761.79\n1,892,415.24\n179,252.35\n712,565.91\n65,398.24\n6,846,591.36\nMay\n494,612.84\n152,567.38\n350,409.17\n874,140.46\n374,089.94\n1,097,970.70\n700,891.90\n271,891.95\n1,913,394.86\n186,192.54\n745,592.74\n64,970.70\n7,226,725.18\nJun\n465,983.99\n164,242.33\n391,142.28\n948,703.01\n368,260.11\n1,140,652.88\n754,981.07\n324,355.75\n2,160,400.44\n200,774.28\n779,012.77\n64,786.27\n7,763,295.19\nJul\n445,779.96\n226,432.96\n413,409.06\n955,925.58\n420,416.63\n1,120,834.75\n760,588.21\n321,078.39\n2,192,743.25\n200,523.55\n822,857.62\n64,786.27\n7,945,376.24\nAug\n429,439.90\n189,497.97\n386,595.64\n980,354.11\n429,659.69\n1,091,202.85\n782,008.68\n297,412.27\n1,968,724.01\n196,068.83\n836,719.06\n64,786.27\n7,652,469.29\nSep\n447,556.40\n206,194.07\n382,491.52\n1,186,453.67\n444,599.06\n1,070,365.05\n811,296.21\n302,579.34\n2,059,093.14\n247,105.73\n906,767.58\n84,514.52\n8,149,016.28\nOct\n445,484.37\n199,531.06\n391,968.41\n984,701.54\n469,891.89\n1,153,855.95\n846,453.28\n315,808.54\n2,110,864.21\n260,816.90\n817,328.26\n67,915.25\n8,064,619.66\nNov\n489,192.86\n194,869.35\n391,442.38\n925,081.31\n441,534.28\n1,248,555.80\n827,349.43\n316,945.54\n2,059,370.14\n261,756.52\n825,642.20\n66,458.68\n8,048,198.50\nDec\n494,011.34\n201,871.01\n531,888.27\n1,034,592.52\n428,738.69\n1,196,503.19\n823,081.93\n331,251.28\n2,063,550.83\n278,658.99\n802,507.57\n63,361.27\n8,250,016.89\n2019\nJan\n505,422.91\n391,022.03\n497,976.19\n1,034,948.23\n411,945.87\n1,187,606.66\n882,289.74\n322,030.27\n2,154,902.32\n135,871.63\n763,189.54\n63,064.29\n8,350,269.66\nFeb\n512,602.33\n374,750.61\n394,709.15\n936,123.62\n449,800.94\n904,919.42\n855,348.41\n347,405.51\n2,355,866.05\n138,685.82\n776,949.70\n63,097.10\n8,110,258.67\nMar\n526,564.16\n343,684.28\n376,205.62\n937,743.43\n393,489.35\n1,317,757.66\n861,574.88\n380,295.40\n2,099,331.11\n141,677.24\n773,726.38\n63,094.90\n8,215,144.40\nApr\n632,972.52\n255,945.64\n1,010,978.65\n90,282.62\n462,133.05\n1,535,772.61\n890,606.53\n325,814.57\n2,413,535.63\n320,213.46\n876,646.50\n90,282.62\n9,963,832.23\nMay\n832,073.61\n305,410.92\n1,321,039.68\n1,177,925.14\n522,764.91\n1,646,358.64\n1,142,369.59\n372,594.90\n2,765,341.17\n371,372.04\n965,202.73\n93,188.88\n11,515,642.20\nJun\n1,001,633.56\n309,108.92\n1,124,005.29\n1,337,171.04\n546,572.53\n2,210,293.95\n1,319,789.76\n562,858.02\n3,493,214.31\n434,828.17\n1,070,319.72\n52,118.63\n13,461,913.89\nJul\n1,171,245.37\n353,388.45\n1,504,911.45\n1,241,910.11\n654,904.72\n2,553,878.66\n1,383,215.20\n585,108.25\n4,131,588.83\n463,161.90\n1,304,402.72\n71,943.58\n15,419,659.24\nAug\n1,313,462.50\n477,215.84\n1,795,905.44\n1,687,246.36\n804,316.21\n2,591,386.51\n1,647,680.21\n1,114,306.03\n3,872,186.95\n503,541.56\n1,532,441.90\n75,829.26\n17,413,139.20\nSep\n1,581,141.69\n321,121.36\n1,934,554.37\n1,728,390.05\n952,548.31\n3,086,893.14\n1,638,855.09\n1,375,546.56\n5,961,405.34\n589,939.57\n1,848,708.36\n76,775.90\n21,272,162.40\nOct\n1,744,905.76\n796,996.55\n2,217,888.47\n2,626,316.66\n768,125.17\n3,204,019.21\n2,287,076.12\n1,889,144.71\n7,536,588.58\n510,151.50\n1,942,195.06\n48,142.75\n25,571,550.52\nNov\n1,783,345.29\n813,506.51\n2,257,181.82\n2,618,010.26\n1,287,013.83\n3,544,459.53\n2,082,447.78\n1,787,923.65\n7,794,025.96\n491,371.84\n1,920,297.35\n57,897.54\n26,437,481.36\nDec\n1,877,764.11\n950,348.83\n2,917,087.22\n3,126,494.51\n1,421,969.01\n4,411,638.37\n2,605,023.12\n1,664,547.67\n8,410,964.03\n554,937.30\n2,477,474.04\n116,789.37\n30,535,037.60\n1,000.00\n2020\nJan\n2,173,633.03\n972,609.19\n3,182,087.13\n4,279,565.75\n1,757,297.12\n4,791,990.63\n2,791,625.15\n2,223,774.14\n9,875,803.48\n609,781.65\n2,838,775.94\n81,735.21\n35,578,678.43\nFeb\n2,492,591.77\n1,191,731.68\n3,340,863.80\n8,721,475.95\n1,919,428.47\n5,869,104.19\n3,481,495.51\n2,729,161.98\n10,202,203.60\n760,155.34\n3,574,134.47\n82,845.83\n44,365,192.59\nMar\n2,678,262.66\n1,449,645.90\n3,231,058.97\n11,715,273.88\n2,114,093.03\n6,507,000.01\n4,576,971.82\n3,048,053.49\n11,490,205.21\n947,918.17\n4,257,117.74\n72,082.86\n52,087,683.73\nApr\n2,854,374.82\n1,118,295.51\n3,492,330.52\n5,271,473.36\n1,999,901.13\n6,191,170.71\n4,276,817.19\n3,727,579.43\n14,060,717.80\n713,406.98\n4,444,924.89\n83,109.30\n48,234,101.64\nMay\n3,866,781.11\n1,163,944.89\n4,713,727.59\n7,932,403.43\n1,991,042.58\n7,151,451.48\n5,858,495.15\n5,031,912.53\n13,907,794.76\n944,318.05\n5,060,401.34\n88,613.61\n57,710,886.51\nJun\n7,228,784.40\n1,963,030.85\n5,393,404.53\n14,526,855.63\n3,997,135.72\n12,452,202.49\n11,386,156.55\n9,507,719.09\n22,807,615.50\n1,630,544.88\n9,798,261.20\n121,561.20\n100,813,272.04\nJul\n9,091,726.77\n2,629,847.13\n6,043,418.97\n19,096,889.49\n4,988,887.74\n15,446,649.70\n15,274,687.36\n7,918,819.51\n31,916,392.56\n2,035,354.71\n15,762,315.16\n147,865.97\n130,352,855.06\nAug\n9,462,082.74\n2,865,950.88\n6,582,519.60\n19,234,703.99\n5,333,846.88\n16,821,248.59\n17,017,042.14\n7,304,595.82\n35,312,317.72\n2,217,425.46\n16,548,990.51\n134,271.10\n138,834,995.43\nSep\n9,832,514.38\n3,139,646.07\n7,166,350.39\n20,531,087.56\n5,145,328.35\n9,505,277.06\n17,311,149.20\n10,234,597.66\n39,731,086.51\n2,011,372.45\n16,155,747.87\n148,612.60\n140,912,770.08\nOct\n9,923,335.07\n3,346,982.41\n9,919,999.10\n22,567,492.87\n6,180,403.26\n21,021,376.92\n20,667,754.18\n10,950,177.78\n41,131,626.19\n2,597,408.09\n18,072,164.45\n176,961.04\n166,555,681.37\nNov\n10,683,513.83\n3,732,868.95\n9,809,491.39\n28,228,980.99\n6,029,490.43\n17,343,347.49\n23,027,365.97\n14,471,556.33\n47,870,360.42\n2,986,050.60\n19,045,412.04\n209,168.81\n183,437,607.25\nDec\n10,252,495.91\n4,965,472.75\n12,171,250.70\n30,987,168.50\n5,959,867.34\n19,653,397.02\n25,666,591.10\n13,188,851.04\n55,454,341.21\n3,901,504.33\n22,313,591.00\n519,773.38\n205,034,304.27\n1,000.00\n2021\nJan\n12,195,945.09\n4,725,946.72\n13,067,828.56\n32,314,625.60\n6,804,952.50\n19,638,789.03\n27,577,248.19\n13,566,042.79\n60,234,250.60\n3,993,814.34\n22,146,327.53\n314,523.37\n216,580,294.30\nFeb\n12,215,925.38\n4,335,293.23\n13,268,343.18\n31,820,079.48\n6,327,338.72\n19,480,197.75\n27,088,789.92\n11,873,767.24\n62,647,881.89\n3,583,509.91\n23,594,651.47\n323,276.77\n216,559,054.94\nMar\n12,086,596.94\n5,009,117.91\n15,457,881.64\n33,668,114.17\n7,879,623.60\n17,019,379.33\n29,927,193.06\n12,664,366.44\n68,761,992.24\n4,513,060.17\n25,352,486.13\n371,874.60\n232,711,686.23\nApr\n14,293,712.79\n6,264,137.34\n17,624,611.65\n35,860,252.53\n7,955,587.69\n18,411,151.82\n32,890,743.11\n11,445,151.89\n81,410,668.87\n4,248,558.67\n27,176,673.47\n411,001.01\n257,992,250.84\nMay\n14,731,869.47\n5,542,211.64\n19,231,383.69\n37,283,237.74\n7,903,622.65\n19,756,317.30\n33,027,214.88\n22,796,168.05\n84,596,653.48\n4,504,355.67\n28,445,264.85\n378,185.06\n278,196,484.46\nJun\n15,628,935.51\n6,154,316.52\n20,722,752.27\n39,604,431.48\n7,861,552.67\n21,455,061.82\n36,502,664.43\n23,449,074.86\n92,196,178.85\n4,756,434.86\n29,731,644.54\n415,508.64\n298,478,556.45\nJul\n14,899,561.10\n6,742,913.66\n25,082,739.85\n39,720,936.02\n9,580,503.84\n24,570,675.98\n38,875,306.10\n31,312,003.24\n94,151,108.53\n5,021,547.73\n32,324,374.53\n568,402.62\n322,850,073.17\nAug\n14,056,945.25\n6,611,127.05\n26,897,316.63\n39,624,666.33\n9,778,338.93\n27,046,620.96\n40,693,944.15\n26,504,554.01\n84,766,848.12\n4,915,399.24\n33,960,935.12\n645,902.41\n315,502,598.18\nSep\n14,777,285.47\n6,264,492.08\n27,413,062.10\n45,375,795.43\n10,337,697.22\n25,786,388.31\n43,113,093.01\n30,700,846.40\n95,985,614.84\n5,605,871.74\n37,606,703.52\n687,817.24\n343,654,667.37\nOct\n14,923,669.66\n8,437,829.51\n26,583,413.65\n47,841,912.79\n11,477,927.22\n29,796,762.93\n51,676,553.79\n49,115,499.00\n111,611,484.23\n5,940,819.15\n35,043,857.03\n618,831.05\n393,068,559.99\nNov\n14,147,912.21\n7,546,852.86\n27,174,334.28\n44,238,573.41\n11,949,923.74\n27,199,271.57\n52,401,389.32\n49,817,772.34\n115,576,831.01\n5,911,967.57\n37,770,843.26\n751,068.72\n394,486,740.29\nDec\n16,522,401.63\n9,204,283.51\n26,835,545.00\n47,381,404.66\n15,303,976.78\n43,092,763.28\n57,822,911.04\n61,555,101.22\n122,091,550.61\n6,093,367.35\n40,046,246.70\n1,319,573.65\n447,269,125.42\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2021\n TABLE 7.2: SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS DEPOSITS \n$ ('000)\n \n \n \n23 \n \n \nEnd of\nNominal \nLending \nRates 1\nIndividuals \nCorporate\n2019\nJan\n4.00-18.00\n9.47\n7.40\nFeb\n4.00-18.00\n9.23\n7.30\nMar\n4.00-18.00\n9.23\n7.31\nApr\n4.00-18.00\n9.30\n7.38\nMay\n4.00-22.00\n9.31\n7.33\nJun\n4.00-22.00\n9.15\n7.67\nJul\n4.00-35.00\n9.54\n8.40\nAug\n5.00-55.00\n14.37\n18.43\nSep\n5.00-65.00\n14.64\n19.81\nOct\n5.00-65.00\n15.59\n19.66\nNov\n5.00-65.00\n15.06\n18.00\nDec\n5.00-65.00\n16.08\n18.31\n2020\nJan\n5.00-65.00\n16.56\n17.20\nFeb\n5.00-65.00\n16.92\n16.68\nMar\n5.00-65.00\n19.65\n17.21\nApr\n5.00-65.00\n18.57\n18.69\nMay\n5.00-65.00\n18.06\n18.07\nJune\n5.00-65.00\n20.04\n17.38\nJuly\n5.00-65.00\n18.87\n20.11\nAug\n6.00-65.00\n19.14\n18.99\nSep\n6.00-65.00\n20.65\n25.09\nOct\n6.00-65.00\n26.04\n26.68\nNov\n6.00-65.00\n30.32\n27.67\nDec\n6.00-65.00\n32.11\n26.91\n2021\nJan\n6.00-65.00\n32.65\n24.77\nFeb\n6.00-85.00\n36.67\n21.36\nMar\n6.00-85.00\n35.83\n22.61\nApr\n6.00-85.00\n35.22\n22.59\nMay\n6.00-85.00\n34.84\n21.76\nJun\n6.00-85.00\n36.25\n22.46\nJul\n6.00-85.00\n36.56\n21.66\nAug\n6.00-85.00\n41.06\n39.65\nSep\n6.00-85.00\n40.61\n39.50\nOct\n6.00-85.00\n41.86\n45.81\nNov\n6.00-8500\n39.13\n38.10\nDec\n6.00-8500\n39.34\n37.94\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2021\nNotes\nTABLE 8.1: LENDING RATES (percent per annum)\n1. Nominal lending rates depict the range of rates quoted by banks.\nCommercial Banks\nWeighted Lending Rates\n \n \n \n24 \n \n \nTABLE 8.2 : BANK DEPOSIT RATES (percent per annum)\nEND OF\nSAVINGS\n3 MONTHS\n2019\nJan\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nFeb\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-6.75\nMar\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nApr\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nMay\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nJun\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nJul\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nAug\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nSep\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nOct\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nNov\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nDec\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\n2020\nJan\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nFeb\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nMar\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nApr\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nMay\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nJun\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nJul\n0.22-12.00\n1.33-14.00\nAug\n0.50-15.00\n1.00-20.28\nSep\n0.50-15.00\n1.00-20.28\nOct\n0.50-15.00\n1.00-20.28\nNov\n0.50-15.00\n1.00-20.28\nDec\n0.50-15.00\n1.00-20.28\n2021\nJan\n0.22-12.00\n2.00-21.50\nFeb\n0.22-12.00\n2.00-21.50\nMar\n0.22-12.00\n2.00-21.50\nApr\n0.22-12.00\n2.00-21.50\nMay\n0.22-12.00\n2.00-21.50\nJun\n0.25-12.00\n2.00-26.00\nJul\n0.50-12.00\n2.00-26.00\nAug\n0.50-12.00\n2.00-26.00\nSep\n0.50-12.00\n2.00-26.00\nOct\n0.50-12.00\n2.00-26.00\nNov\n0.50-12.00\n2.00-26.00\nDec\n0.50-12.00\n2.00-26.00\n Source:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2021\n* Deposit rates depict the range of rates qouted by banks. \nCOMMERCIAL BANKS\n \n \n \n25 \n \nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES \nCLOTHING \n&\nHOUSING, \nWATER,\nFURNITURE\nHEALTH\nTRANSPORT\nCOMMUNIC\nATION\nRECREATION \n&\nEDUCATION\nRESTAUR\nANTS &\nMISC.\nTOTAL NON\n& TOBACCO\nFOOTWEAR\nELECTRICTY, \nGAS\nAND\nCULTURE\nHOTELS\nGOODS &\nFOOD\n& OTHER\nEQUIPMEN\nT\nSERVICES\nFUELS\nWEIGHTS\n4.90\n4.35\n27.62\n5.29\n1.42\n8.39\n2.65\n2.27\n4.25\n1.08\n6.46\n68.70\n31.30\n100\n2018\nJan\n0.17\n0.67\n0.02\n0.55\n0.10\n0.00\n-0.04\n1.78\n0.00\n-0.16\n0.64\n0.26\n0.39\n0.30\nFeb\n0.26\n0.91\n0.01\n0.43\n0.00\n-0.02\n0.15\n0.90\n0.00\n0.01\n0.21\n0.19\n-0.18\n0.08\nMar\n0.13\n-0.34\n-0.74\n0.46\n0.18\n-1.29\n-1.60\n1.58\n0.01\n-0.14\n-0.55\n0.09\n-0.03\n-0.25\nApr\n0.20\n0.34\n-0.01\n0.00\n0.10\n-0.32\n-0.21\n-0.10\n0.63\n1.85\n0.26\n0.11\n0.02\n0.08\nMay\n-0.03\n0.10\n0.00\n-0.12\n0.03\n0.14\n-0.01\n0.08\n0.00\n0.05\n0.33\n0.03\n0.02\n0.03\nJun\n0.60\n0.14\n-0.16\n-0.48\n0.38\n0.19\n0.10\n-0.25\n0.00\n0.26\n1.00\n0.04\n-0.23\n-0.05\nJul\n0.43\n0.38\n0.00\n0.40\n0.31\n0.17\n0.08\n0.65\n7.16\n3.20\n0.75\n1.09\n0.74\n0.98\nAug\n0.13\n0.45\n0.00\n0.91\n0.24\n0.47\n0.00\n-0.23\n0.00\n0.11\n0.34\n0.28\n0.62\n0.39\nSep\n0.22\n1.35\n0.53\n2.79\n1.90\n0.51\n0.32\n0.22\n0.00\n0.28\n0.07\n0.85\n1.05\n0.92\nOct\n7.89\n45.88\n2.94\n26.86\n12.94\n19.13\n1.39\n27.66\n0.00\n9.86\n13.64\n14.66\n20.12\n16.44\nNov\n7.21\n10.63\n4.80\n9.12\n3.36\n2.31\n0.18\n16.33\n0.35\n9.29\n15.42\n6.50\n14.53\n9.20\nDec\n10.22\n8.07\n2.77\n8.07\n8.49\n28.61\n1.26\n3.19\n0.00\n13.84\n10.07\n9.01\n9.07\n9.03\n2019\nJan\n13.35\n1.04\n4.35\n9.46\n11.64\n47.25\n1.12\n11.01\n0.10\n11.73\n6.72\n12.83\n6.94\n10.75\nFeb\n2.94\n5.94\n2.77\n2.73\n2.93\n-7.70\n0.14\n3.42\n0.02\n2.20\n4.34\n0.70\n3.56\n1.67\nMar\n14.29\n5.56\n2.34\n5.20\n2.30\n3.06\n0.14\n3.92\n3.66\n4.54\n5.16\n4.05\n5.10\n4.38\nApr\n12.05\n6.57\n0.65\n5.84\n19.90\n3.40\n3.50\n5.36\n6.93\n19.74\n5.35\n4.45\n7.85\n5.52\nMay\n21.57\n11.89\n2.54\n11.51\n16.85\n16.18\n31.21\n29.81\n3.05\n6.67\n8.96\n10.12\n17.63\n12.54\nJun\n40.94\n59.89\n18.11\n63.80\n46.53\n41.90\n2.32\n35.38\n0.06\n28.71\n36.63\n31.23\n55.07\n39.26\nJul\n23.72\n27.68\n9.19\n27.01\n43.32\n26.39\n7.48\n36.17\n11.05\n30.51\n39.79\n21.72\n19.90\n21.04\nAug\n18.09\n10.81\n13.65\n11.18\n7.47\n32.66\n67.86\n12.65\n4.09\n8.67\n18.77\n17.79\n18.55\n18.07\nSep\n11.01\n17.47\n15.52\n14.73\n18.68\n16.83\n1.29\n18.03\n4.10\n8.42\n35.01\n16.63\n19.55\n17.72\nOct\n42.80\n37.15\n38.63\n35.12\n34.80\n26.55\n9.15\n31.78\n5.47\n37.99\n30.03\n32.90\n48.35\n38.75\nNov\n16.54\n18.35\n5.83\n25.67\n18.49\n9.68\n13.01\n20.59\n17.10\n36.46\n23.89\n13.94\n22.63\n17.46\nDec\n11.51\n13.48\n31.25\n17.51\n12.74\n11.82\n1.43\n5.70\n0.17\n15.52\n18.28\n17.14\n15.75\n16.55\n2020\nJan\n1.83\n3.84\n0.60\n1.50\n5.32\n2.24\n2.77\n2.01\n9.39\n2.72\n1.86\n1.99\n2.55\n2.23\nFeb\n8.48\n10.01\n2.27\n7.00\n21.56\n9.62\n220.04\n17.96\n94.95\n2.92\n30.86\n18.41\n6.81\n13.52\nMar\n28.76\n37.12\n57.14\n29.35\n27.28\n18.10\n4.26\n58.79\n0.66\n17.49\n22.67\n32.44\n17.69\n26.59\nApr\n26.21\n13.46\n3.05\n24.06\n25.07\n8.87\n3.05\n9.42\n1.13\n21.08\n15.12\n11.38\n28.37\n17.64\nMay\n28.90\n18.99\n3.42\n21.36\n18.30\n22.97\n4.22\n10.04\n0.02\n29.69\n23.31\n15.41\n14.72\n15.13\nJun\n35.25\n48.84\n7.52\n38.21\n43.77\n32.48\n23.24\n39.46\n0.87\n32.46\n29.51\n27.61\n37.73\n31.66\nJul\n33.30\n35.93\n12.07\n32.45\n27.35\n50.65\n118.89\n17.13\n1.14\n37.84\n34.77\n33.76\n37.99\n35.53\nAug\n9.71\n7.52\n2.82\n7.83\n7.02\n11.02\n19.57\n7.75\n79.86\n8.40\n11.19\n10.03\n6.30\n8.44\nSep\n2.53\n1.71\n3.01\n1.52\n2.59\n1.69\n19.84\n5.79\n23.42\n0.33\n7.26\n5.08\n2.08\n3.83\nOct\n5.68\n2.51\n15.42\n0.95\n1.12\n3.02\n3.78\n1.59\n4.91\n4.22\n4.46\n5.33\n3.00\n4.37\nNov\n3.70\n3.73\n3.35\n2.02\n0.66\n3.60\n0.39\n1.74\n0.71\n4.36\n2.09\n2.63\n3.39\n3.15\nDec\n4.58\n3.08\n0.52\n3.26\n1.73\n3.61\n1.17\n1.26\n0.18\n2.12\n3.82\n2.63\n6.54\n4.22\n2021\nJan\n4.43\n1.15\n4.84\n3.35\n8.08\n3.87\n0.71\n1.72\n0.06\n8.48\n4.67\n3.70\n7.84\n5.43\nFeb\n3.27\n0.94\n3.21\n1.77\n2.48\n4.22\n0.01\n-0.51\n0.13\n1.94\n4.81\n2.73\n4.42\n3.45\nMar\n1.45\n0.57\n1.61\n1.45\n3.68\n1.32\n5.08\n1.18\n0.54\n3.50\n3.14\n2.06\n2.52\n2.26\nApr\n3.38\n2.21\n2.01\n4.06\n4.60\n1.86\n0.07\n2.09\n0.59\n4.67\n3.52\n2.60\n2.51\n2.56\nMay\n2.01\n1.25\n0.97\n5.35\n2.91\n1.99\n0.35\n19.13\n0.00\n24.14\n6.26\n3.75\n0.95\n2.54\nJun\n2.76\n3.05\n9.71\n4.36\n3.19\n3.40\n1.57\n1.87\n5.60\n1.84\n4.09\n4.38\n3.21\n3.88\nJul\n3.38\n2.21\n2.01\n4.06\n4.60\n1.86\n0.07\n2.09\n0.59\n4.67\n3.52\n2.60\n2.51\n2.56\nAug\n5.59\n5.06\n2.54\n5.65\n6.39\n4.78\n7.61\n3.06\n0.36\n4.99\n6.34\n4.95\n3.14\n4.18\nSep\n6.54\n4.91\n4.61\n5.18\n6.28\n4.95\n3.56\n3.68\n0.74\n5.01\n3.75\n4.67\n4.82\n4.73\nOct\n5.31\n4.86\n1.77\n5.84\n6.88\n9.33\n7.92\n5.31\n2.58\n8.60\n5.55\n5.56\n7.56\n6.40\nNov\n4.58\n3.82\n4.44\n3.97\n5.53\n5.57\n9.37\n3.25\n1.28\n10.88\n5.70\n5.21\n6.51\n5.76\nDec\n6.95\n5.56\n3.59\n4.88\n5.33\n6.79\n0.31\n4.03\n0.57\n6.23\n8.38\n5.41\n6.22\n5.76\nSource:Zimstat, 2021\nFOOD & NON \nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES\nALL \nITEMS\nTABLE 9.1 : MONTHLY INFLATION - % CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \n(February 2019 = 100)\n \n \n \n26 \n \nFOOD \nINFLATION\nALCO HO LIC \nCLO T HING\nHO US ING , \nW AT E R,\nFURNIT URE\nMIS C.\nFO O D & \nB E VE RAG E S \n& \nE LE CT RICT Y, \nG AS\nAND\nRE CRE AT IO N &\nRE S T AURANT S \n&\nG O O DS &\nT O T AL NO N\nNO N \nALCO HO LIC \nALL\n& T O B ACCO\nFO O T W E AR\n& O T HE R\nE Q UIP ME NT\nCULT URE\nHO T E LS\nS E RVICE S\nFO O D\nB E VE RAG E S\nIT E MS\nFUE LS\nWEIGHTS\n4.90\n4.35\n27.62\n5.29\n1.42\n8.39\n2.65\n2.27\n4.25\n1.08\n6.46\n68.70\n31.30\n100\n2018\nJan\n1.83\n4.12\n-0.52\n9.00\n1.82\n1.30\n0.41\n7.95\n-2.25\n1.63\n6.64\n2.45\n6.17\n3.52\nFeb\n2.04\n5.21\n-0.65\n8.71\n1.84\n1.17\n0.56\n8.96\n-2.25\n1.45\n6.31\n2.41\n4.35\n2.98\nMar\n2.02\n4.81\n-1.32\n8.52\n1.91\n-0.35\n-1.03\n10.48\n-2.24\n1.30\n5.35\n2.37\n4.54\n2.68\nApr\n2.34\n5.14\n-1.36\n8.45\n2.06\n-0.67\n-1.28\n10.36\n-3.58\n2.84\n5.70\n2.26\n4.94\n2.71\nMay\n2.18\n5.15\n-1.36\n8.30\n1.96\n-0.58\n-1.30\n10.67\n-3.58\n3.29\n6.14\n2.28\n4.89\n2.71\nJun\n2.58\n5.27\n-0.70\n7.36\n2.38\n-0.20\n-1.20\n10.20\n-3.58\n3.26\n6.85\n2.48\n5.12\n2.91\nJul\n2.83\n5.66\n-0.71\n7.86\n2.68\n0.20\n-1.04\n10.86\n6.31\n5.42\n7.53\n3.94\n6.35\n4.29\nAug\n3.15\n6.03\n-0.77\n8.78\n2.89\n0.67\n-1.07\n10.47\n6.31\n5.53\n7.84\n4.22\n7.52\n4.83\nSep\n3.35\n6.98\n-0.47\n10.60\n4.77\n1.49\n-0.89\n10.00\n6.31\n5.77\n7.79\n4.83\n7.94\n5.39\nOct\n10.81\n53.83\n2.20\n35.57\n17.08\n19.61\n0.11\n36.24\n6.31\n15.68\n19.31\n18.71\n26.78\n20.85\nNov\n18.47\n69.14\n7.04\n46.01\n20.56\n22.02\n0.34\n56.70\n8.23\n27.34\n36.21\n26.02\n42.71\n31.01\nDec\n30.21\n81.48\n10.48\n57.08\n30.80\n56.47\n1.61\n60.45\n8.22\n44.26\n48.82\n37.08\n53.68\n42.09\n2019\nJan\n47.34\n82.13\n15.27\n71.00\n45.88\n130.41\n2.79\n75.00\n8.32\n61.45\n57.81\n54.26\n63.71\n56.90\nFeb\n51.28\n91.22\n18.46\n74.92\n50.16\n112.71\n2.78\n79.38\n8.34\n64.99\n64.31\n55.04\n69.84\n59.39\nMar\n72.67\n102.55\n22.14\n83.18\n53.34\n122.10\n4.59\n83.51\n12.30\n72.72\n73.75\n61.19\n78.55\n66.80\nApr\n93.08\n115.13\n22.94\n93.88\n83.66\n130.40\n8.49\n93.54\n19.33\n103.06\n82.56\n68.17\n92.52\n75.86\nMay\n134.80\n140.46\n26.07\n116.47\n114.54\n167.32\n42.36\n151.04\n22.97\n116.49\n98.28\n85.94\n126.43\n97.85\nJun\n228.95\n283.96\n49.13\n256.29\n213.17\n278.58\n45.52\n240.71\n23.05\n177.91\n168.24\n142.84\n251.94\n175.66\n2020\nFeb\n710.29\n629.57\n603.89\n254.34\n523.95\n785.04\n498.64\n946.38\n604.12\n262.80\n507.72\n839.15\n462.64\n540.16\nMar\n807.36\n721.94\n814.31\n444.09\n667.21\n1001.14\n585.97\n989.48\n975.94\n252.31\n582.94\n995.50\n616.11\n676.39\nApr\n980.03\n825.86\n873.49\n456.99\n799.24\n1048.61\n622.22\n984.76\n1017.34\n233.23\n590.62\n1097.13\n663.66\n765.57\nMay\n953.34\n881.65\n935.22\n461.76\n878.64\n1062.84\n664.43\n761.68\n847.15\n223.43\n739.67\n1254.79\n700.38\n785.55\nJun\n842.04\n863.68\n411.42\n725.77\n1040.97\n613.71\n937.83\n875.68\n226.03\n764.10\n1184.15\n678.29\n835.56\n737.26\nJul\n914.97\n925.92\n424.89\n761.12\n913.86\n750.68\n2013.62\n739.27\n196.93\n812.65\n1138.04\n755.27\n976.73\n837.53\nAug\n842.90\n895.39\n374.89\n735.12\n909.62\n611.88\n1405.52\n702.75\n413.11\n810.44\n1058.99\n698.90\n865.48\n761.02\nSep\n770.81\n761.81\n323.45\n638.97\n772.72\n519.65\n1681.32\n619.53\n508.37\n742.51\n820.76\n619.77\n724.40\n659.40\nOct\n544.43\n544.11\n252.56\n452.09\n554.64\n404.46\n1593.73\n454.72\n505.13\n536.36\n639.65\n470.47\n472.40\n471.25\nNov\n473.41\n464.54\n244.29\n385.99\n456.13\n376.50\n1404.55\n368.00\n420.46\n386.63\n509.46\n413.85\n385.02\n401.66\nDec\n437.80\n412.80\n163.67\n350.75\n401.81\n341.52\n1400.70\n348.33\n420.53\n330.15\n434.93\n350.17\n346.40\n348.59\n2021\nJan\n451.53\n399.55\n174.78\n358.95\n414.96\n348.54\n1370.61\n347.06\n376.10\n354.29\n449.65\n357.69\n369.43\n362.63\nFeb\n425.04\n358.36\n177.30\n336.52\n334.15\n326.47\n359.53\n277.07\n144.52\n349.97\n340.25\n297.07\n358.96\n321.59\nMar\n313.69\n236.18\n79.30\n242.33\n253.65\n265.87\n363.15\n140.26\n144.23\n296.40\n270.14\n206.00\n299.81\n240.55\nApr\n231.12\n201.33\n76.01\n178.83\n185.47\n239.16\n349.55\n121.37\n180.66\n238.80\n226.98\n178.93\n216.60\n194.07\nMay\n162.05\n156.40\n71.83\n142.05\n148.33\n181.30\n332.85\n139.66\n180.59\n224.31\n181.76\n150.75\n178.60\n161.91\nJun\n99.10\n77.51\n75.32\n82.76\n78.24\n119.54\n256.74\n75.07\n193.77\n149.35\n126.46\n105.12\n108.76\n106.64\nJul\n54.42\n33.47\n59.60\n43.58\n46.40\n48.44\n63.09\n52.59\n192.16\n89.35\n73.95\n57.33\n55.09\n56.37\nAug\n48.62\n30.42\n59.15\n40.69\n45.54\n40.10\n46.78\n45.94\n63.03\n83.38\n66.37\n50.07\n50.47\n50.25\nSep\n54.44\n34.53\n61.63\n45.76\n50.77\n44.60\n26.84\n43.02\n33.07\n91.94\n60.93\n49.48\n54.52\n51.55\nOct\n53.91\n37.62\n42.51\n52.82\n59.36\n53.46\n31.90\n48.25\n30.12\n100.00\n62.62\n49.81\n61.35\n54.49\nNov\n55.23\n37.74\n44.01\n55.75\n67.07\n56.38\n43.70\n50.46\n30.85\n112.50\n68.38\n53.57\n65.39\n58.40\nDec\n158.74\n141.06\n148.41\n158.21\n172.99\n161.17\n142.48\n154.57\n131.36\n221.06\n175.77\n57.74\n64.91\n60.74\nSource:Zimstat, 2021\nTABLE 9.2 : YEARLY INFLATION - % CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \n(February 2019 = 100)\nNON-FOOD INFLATION\nHE ALT H\nT RANS P O RT\nCO MMUNICAT IO N\nE DUCAT IO N\n \n \n \n27 \n \n \nUSA\nSOUTH ARFICAN\nBOTSWANA\nJAPANESE\nEURO\nPOUND\nEND OF\nDollar\nRAND\nPULA\nYEN\nSTERLING\n2019\nMar\n3.0120\n0.2064\n0.2789\n0.0272\n3.3832\n3.9363\nApr\n3.2614\n0.2275\n0.3031\n0.0292\n3.6490\n4.2209\nMay\n5.2635\n0.3550\n0.4831\n0.0483\n5.8585\n6.6391\nJun\n6.6220\n0.4673\n0.6231\n0.0615\n7.5245\n8.3906\nJul\n9.1900\n0.6494\n0.8621\n0.0846\n10.0000\n11.1111\nAug\n10.512\n0.6833\n0.9458\n0.0940\n11.6288\n12.8226\nSep\n15.200\n1.0234\n1.3883\n0.1415\n16.5699\n18.7643\nOct\n16.120\n1.0804\n1.4721\n0.1491\n17.5217\n20.4051\nNov\n15.970\n1.0800\n1.4600\n0.1500\n17.6600\n20.5800\nDec\n16.530\n1.1400\n1.5400\n0.1500\n18.3700\n21.6900\n2020\nJan\n17.100\n1.1883\n1.5922\n0.1564\n19.0000\n22.5000\nFeb\n17.680\n1.1779\n1.6073\n0.1608\n19.2174\n22.9610\nMar\n21.160\n1.2709\n1.8384\n0.1970\n23.5111\n26.1235\nApr\n25.000\n1.3448\n2.0542\n0.2321\n27.1739\n30.8642\nMay\n25.000\n1.3736\n2.0695\n0.2333\n27.1739\n30.8642\nJun\n32.350\n1.8876\n2.7638\n0.3007\n36.4229\n40.5346\nJul\n68.943\n4.1073\n5.9515\n0.6457\n79.5784\n87.2651\nAug\n81.604\n4.7435\n7.0151\n0.7697\n96.5746\n107.2191\nSep\n82.250\n4.9133\n7.1482\n0.7790\n97.0112\n106.6580\nOct\n81.370\n4.9403\n7.1042\n0.7734\n95.7690\n105.5999\nNov\n81.679\n5.2531\n7.3127\n0.7827\n96.6100\n107.8000\nDec\n81.815\n5.4767\n7.5022\n0.7878\n99.5164\n109.9537\n2021\nJan\n82.070\n5.4208\n7.4794\n0.7914\n99.9148\n111.9300\nFeb\n83.461\n5.6470\n7.6491\n0.7927\n100.9497\n115.5931\nMar\n83.996\n5.5989\n7.6072\n0.7732\n100.0262\n116.3990\nApr\n84.503\n5.8973\n7.8165\n0.7766\n102.4094\n117.7721\nMay\n84.726\n6.1449\n7.9642\n0.7720\n103.3021\n120.1879\nJun\n85.423\n5.9577\n7.8205\n0.7730\n101.6496\n118.3071\nJul\n85.637\n5.8616\n7.7630\n0.7816\n101.7414\n119.4212\nAug\n85.908\n5.8726\n7.7403\n0.7818\n101.5523\n118.4462\nSep\n87.665\n5.7988\n7.7321\n0.7833\n101.7268\n117.8528\nOct\n97.136\n6.4164\n8.5674\n0.8544\n113.3967\n133.9944\nNov\n102.075\n6.5794\n8.8336\n0.9441\n123.0208\n146.6991\nDec\n107.957\n6.7944\n9.1985\n0.9481\n122.0437\n143.6303\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2021\n TABLE 11 : SELECTED INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE RATES\n1. ZWL$ dollar per unit of foreign currency\n \n \n \n28 \n \n \nMarket Capitalisation\nEND OF\nAll Share*\nZWL$ millions\n2018\nJan\n91.3\n130.4\n31.4\n55,032,220\n8,652.9\nFeb\n88.0\n124.9\n63.7\n138,142,187\n8,386.0\nMar\n87.0\n125.1\n40.3\n108,997,097\n8,290.4\nApr\n98.7\n124.4\n44.4\n206,342,675\n9,405.3\nMay\n108.3\n151.5\n59.3\n129,155,586\n10,393.2\nJun\n102.9\n161.3\n73.0\n234,834,368\n9,792.2\nJul\n114.3\n164.0\n114.9\n624,256,160\n10,969.7\nAug\n117.3\n161.3\n50.5\n142,150,599\n12,475.4\nSep\n115.1\n163.8\n61.1\n197,401,341\n12,265.5\nOct\n163.8\n217.3\n449.6\n316,060,000\n17,960.0\nNov\n160.4\n208.6\n118.0\n153,874,660\n17,316.6\nDec\n146.2\n227.7\n93.0\n144,479,601\n19,424.4\n2019\nJan\n157.5\n213.1\n110.3\n122,778,938\n20,888.4\nFeb\n148.1\n206.9\n295.8\n229,935,122\n19,773.4\nMar\n121.7\n194.0\n70.8\n123,398,632\n16,084.9\nApr\n133.7\n186.5\n116.5\n134,394,898\n17,502.7\nMay\n188.1\n225.8\n193.5\n237,334,372\n24,920.0\nJun\n204.8\n255.3\n235.5\n293,138,775\n27,017.2\nJul\n187.1\n244.6\n191.0\n163,556,663\n24,636.1\nAug\n166.36\n269.6\n109.0\n117,688,558\n21,742.2\nSep\n232.52\n317.8\n166.6\n335,373,041\n30,527.2\nOct\n232.86\n276.3\n208.4\n203,004,611\n30,390.0\nNov\n240.81\n344.4\n130.0\n129,886,035\n31,226.3\nDec\n230.08\n316.7\n194.2\n190,880,245\n29,767.1\n2020\nJan\n332.9\n344.9\n304.86\n179,559,446\n43,426.5\nFeb\n473.13\n826.73\n360.13\n172,678,984\n60,987.5\nMar\n456.21\n720.47\n425.24\n237,667,043\n58,612.1\nApr\n488.60\n826.64\n269.66\n107,308,931\n63,387.9\nMay\n1180.14\n1582.86\n568.96\n218,832,930\n152,719.7\nJune*\n1788.75\n3995.48\n379.93\n519,901,300\n228,577.1\nAug\n1389.23\n3709.15\n1,026.76\n164,501,200\n175,678.4\nSep\n1638.17\n4128.52\n4,640.88\n1,093,040,821\n206,502.5\nOct\n1476.87\n3792.35\n986.70\n397,006,127\n179,690.0\nNov\n1595.59\n3322.22\n4,103.78\n470,899,659\n193,270.8\nDec\n2636.34\n4134.09\n2,734.50\n316,737,200\n317,879.3\n2021\nJan\n3600.82\n4356.74\n3,513.59\n2,477,166,688\n434,856.23\nFeb\n4154.37\n6683.44\n1,529.25\n149,031,800\n501,184.95\nMar\n4489.47\n5315.39\n4,517.14\n203,633,747\n531,742.64\nApr\n4641.11\n5061.28\n3,075.98\n223,494,202\n540,745.24\nMay\n5428.28\n6820.54\n3,917.41\n188,748,200\n634,011.15\nJun\n6194.88\n6211.49\n4458.87\n248,500,624\n745,175.95\nJul\n6818.29\n6621.17\n2921.32\n181,010,800\n803,900.15\nAug\n6652.31\n6115.85\n3456.94\n147,232,800\n792,291.48\nSep\n8580.16\n6014.53\n4730.25\n2,909,442,557\n1,032,472.92\nOct\n11329.48\n6652.04\n5661.76\n108,843,000\n1,378,227.92\nNov\n 10695.57\n7193.11\n9883.24\n791,653,520\n1,290,069.75\nDec\n10822.36\n7815.37\n17577.25\n228,225,060\n1,317,205.11\nSource:Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2021\n*All Share index was introduced in January, 2018\n**As at 26 June 2020\nIndices\nTABLE 12: ZIMBABWE STOCK MARKET STATISTICS\n Market Turnover \nZWL$ million \nVolume of Shares\nMining\n \n \n \n29 \n \n \nEND OF\nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\n INTERNET\n2018\nJan\n5548.1\n4.9\n663.5\n21.3\n2318.8\n1006.1\nFeb\n4706.6\n4.5\n594.0\n13.9\n2015.1\n831.0\nMar\n6300.4\n4.5\n654.2\n12.5\n2657.1\n864.8\nApr\n5786.8\n3.3\n640.9\n11.5\n3002.6\n822.6\nMay\n7298.4\n4.2\n819.7\n10.5\n3550.1\n968.6\nJun\n7997.3\n4.7\n779.4\n8.3\n3724.3\n1135.5\nJul\n8290.0\n4.0\n790.0\n9.4\n4446.7\n1262.5\nAug\n7762.9\n2.9\n811.2\n14.0\n4558.5\n1255.0\nSep\n7155.0\n4.0\n842.5\n17.0\n4462.4\n1393.1\nOct\n8230.5\n4.2\n821.3\n17.9\n4607.4\n1428.2\nNov\n7922.5\n3.7\n657.5\n19.9\n3964.8\n1026.7\nDec\n8355.2\n2.8\n917.2\n14.6\n4833.8\n1102.9\n2019\nJan\n6903.0\n2.9\n1294.0\n16.9\n3608.8\n1056.2\nFeb\n8337.0\n4.0\n1330.6\n17.2\n3594.5\n1093.6\nMar\n9881.5\n3.9\n1399.5\n18.3\n4080.7\n1250.6\nApr\n10321.4\n3.1\n1590.1\n14.0\n4949.3\n1408.5\nMay\n14670.3\n4.2\n1397.5\n11.8\n6692.5\n1897.8\nJun\n17881.2\n3.7\n1464.7\n30.1\n7130.0\n2539.8\nJul\n23309.9\n3.7\n1806.5\n36.6\n9137.4\n3295.8\nAug\n23596.6\n2.4\n2181.6\n38.5\n11077.6\n3493.6\nSep\n30328.1\n3.8\n3029.9\n51.9\n15112.0\n5337.7\nOct\n39413.7\n3.9\n3621.6\n67.1\n16588.3\n6237.0\nNov\n40871.8\n3.5\n4199.3\n67.4\n13537.8\n7200.3\nDec\n49579.8\n2.8\n5695.4\n97.2\n19356.7\n8724.0\n2020\nJan\n47841.3\n1.8\n5236.3\n115.2\n21247.9\n9646.8\nFeb\n41637.6\n4.7\n5431.8\n136.9\n22589.7\n9633.8\nMar\n60804.1\n4.1\n7252.9\n268.0\n27993.6\n14411.4\nApr\n47525.5\n-\n4150.6\n82.6\n18299.2\n11481.8\nMay\n59271.1\n-\n7426.0\n349.8\n24851.5\n19593.2\nJun\n91311.3\n-\n9752.7\n516.6\n26042.5\n25842.3\nJul\n127743.2\n-\n14741.1\n1028.7\n26033.3\n35199.7\nAug\n143042.1\n-\n14953.6\n1547.5\n27217.6\n34505.0\nSep\n203172.0\n-\n18252.3\n1963.0\n26441.0\n41958.4\nOct\n198863.6\n-\n22482.3\n2163.3\n42767.7\n46270.4\nNov\n236231.6\n-\n23936.7\n2151.6\n36475.7\n54797.8\nDec\n302661.2\n-\n30061.0\n1935.3\n45278.1\n67038.2\n2021\nJan\n255551.3\n-\n21042.2\n2300.3\n35349.1\n66624.4\nFeb\n226335.8\n-\n22882.6\n2288.9\n36434.4\n63598.2\nMar\n320422.1\n-\n28569.9\n3316.6\n44524.0\n86463.9\nApr\n288958.8\n-\n30071.5\n2807.0\n44131.6\n90580.4\nMay\n361427.1\n-\n36765.1\n3193.7\n49745.8\n89471.3\nJun\n388757.5\n-\n38540.1\n3200.0\n51437.4\n115145.7\nJul\n379659.9\n-\n45808.1\n2489.1\n57565.8\n145027.0\nAug\n397539.0\n-\n52853.9\n4086.0\n60908.4\n159206.6\nSep\n477933.6\n-\n52262.7\n4179.5\n64139.2\n181194.8\nOct\n481180.9\n-\n53165.9\n3839.9\n65329.0\n197972.5\nNov\n621896.7\n-\n56025.3\n4877.0\n63017.5\n252407.9\nDec\n747035.6\n-\n67903.9\n4705.5\n66814.2\n232161.3\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2021\nTABLE 13.1 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS \n Values of Transactions (ZWL$ millions)\n \n \n \n30 \n \n \nEND OF\nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\n INTERNET\n2018\nJan\n 548.1 \n22.7\n20981.2\n449.6\n100593.9\n501.8\nFeb\n 457.2 \n22.5\n18869.0\n292.2\n89584.3\n463.8\nMar\n 545.2 \n23.7\n21996.8\n268.4\n116120.0\n510.5\nApr\n 505.5 \n17.4\n21170.0\n253.6\n117616.8\n457.0\nMay\n 611.1 \n21.2\n23278.2\n213.2\n137423.0\n496.6\nJun\n 553.6 \n22.5\n23790.0\n175.2\n156609.8\n502.2\nJul\n 560.2 \n20.1\n25075.5\n223.1\n169416.8\n559.6\nAug\n 553.0 \n15.1\n25249.9\n317.4\n164918.0\n518.7\nSep\n 543.0 \n19.4\n24918.0\n300.8\n161289.5\n511.3\nOct\n 571.6 \n20.4\n21025.4\n345.5\n161427.4\n496.0\nNov\n 477.4 \n16.7\n17845.4\n334.9\n133862.1\n430.6\nDec\n 478.6 \n13.0\n27419.1\n236.2\n161540.7\n409.1\n2019\nJan\n401.5\n12.2\n40613.8\n232.6\n135481.1\n413.4\nFeb\n456.5\n16.4\n27811.2\n226.8\n119081.1\n463.6\nMar\n525.9\n15.4\n30417.6\n248.9\n142597.8\n441.0\nApr\n535.0\n13.7\n32092.5\n168.8\n157348.3\n390.1\nMay\n642.6\n14.7\n15542.6\n121.4\n166491.6\n494.3\nJun\n706.0\n13.3\n18012.1\n79.6\n160873.0\n486.8\nJul\n983.5\n13.6\n20465.4\n99.6\n170823.3\n638.2\nAug\n872.9\n9.0\n21919.8\n85.2\n179281.2\n542.3\nSep\n1010.7\n11.9\n22749.6\n62.4\n200441.9\n679.4\nOct\n1079.4\n12.7\n23191.6\n65.0\n206621.5\n1099.3\nNov\n982.1\n10.3\n25737.5\n225.2\n152919.9\n2044.1\nDec\n1003.8\n7.6\n27800.5\n385.5\n146316.6\n1273.6\n2020\nJan\n943.3\n4.6\n23649.0\n199.9\n139278.2\n671.7\nFeb\n916.1\n8.9\n21652.2\n196.6\n149671.5\n647.8\nMar\n1068.5\n7.4\n22588.1\n234.3\n173042.2\n661.2\nApr\n515.1\n-\n11036.4\n36.4\n131190.0\n998.0\nMay\n674.1\n-\n14711.6\n231.2\n150936.1\n705.3\nJun\n907.8\n-\n14420.9\n286.1\n135524.3\n1390.4\nJul\n918.4\n-\n15786.5\n251.4\n121072.4\n791.9\nAug\n789.4\n-\n13536.2\n248.2\n127308.6\n702.1\nSep\n911.9\n-\n15524.1\n309.8\n125059.2\n783.2\nOct\n990.2\n-\n19138.6\n398.8\n191148.8\n735.8\nNov\n971.3\n-\n17584.9\n430.0\n101305.8\n755.6\nDec\n1100.0\n-\n19404.0\n453.0\n115290.2\n820.1\n2021\nJan\n720.0\n-\n9849.3\n229.0\n94691.4\n872.2\nFeb\n806.0\n-\n12309.3\n527.8\n90078.0\n754.9\nMar\n1112.8\n-\n15178.8\n751.0\n105272.0\n1003.7\nApr\n951.7\n-\n15185.0\n605.5\n97253.3\n1040.1\nMay\n1029.8\n-\n16511.3\n664.4\n103708.7\n994.8\nJun\n1076.9\n-\n14797.9\n581.9\n99349.6\n982.1\nJul\n1028.2\n-\n15217.6\n551.0\n102587.6\n980.8\nAug\n1045.0\n-\n14624.5\n475.4\n105269.7\n955.8\nSep\n1193.1\n-\n15397.6\n492.2\n104141.9\n2092.6\nOct\n1114.2\n-\n18207.4\n434.5\n107294.6\n2342.6\nNov\n1144.9\n-\n17435.9\n477.0\n98386.5\n2322.9\nDec\n1220.3\n-\n20029.6\n519.5\n106448.3\n2555.6\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2021\nTABLE 13.2 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS \n Volumes of Transactions (000's)\n \n \n \n31 \n \n \nEND OF\nEXPORTS\nIMPORTS\nTOTAL TRADE TRADE BALANCE\n2018\nJan\n251.2\n489.7\n740.9\n-238.5\nFeb\n346.3\n574.9\n921.2\n-228.6\nMar\n288.6\n605.8\n894.3\n-317.2\nApr\n329.6\n544.1\n873.7\n-214.5\nMay\n267.2\n532.4\n799.6\n-265.2\nJun\n384.6\n614.6\n999.3\n-230.0\nJul\n340.3\n560.0\n900.3\n-219.7\nAug\n449.3\n576.5\n1025.9\n-127.2\nSep\n353.4\n577.1\n930.5\n-223.7\nOct\n448.6\n592.3\n1040.9\n-143.7\nNov\n471.7\n628.7\n1100.4\n-157.0\nDec\n364.8\n494.7\n859.5\n-129.9\nTotal\n4,295.63\n6,790.84\n11,086.47\n-2,495.21\n2019\nJan\n292.6\n336.8\n629.4\n-44.2\nFeb\n348.4\n370.5\n718.9\n-22.1\nMar\n295.9\n329.0\n624.9\n-33.1\nApr\n277.0\n416.7\n693.7\n-139.7\nMay\n343.2\n436.8\n780.0\n-93.6\nJun\n239.8\n458.5\n698.3\n-218.7\nJul\n299.5\n357.0\n656.5\n-57.5\nAug\n345.4\n384.2\n729.60\n-38.80\nSep\n378.4\n403.9\n782.30\n-25.50\nOct\n483.3\n400.6\n883.90\n82.70\nNov\n475.2\n431.2\n906.40\n44.00\nDec\n489.1\n418.8\n907.90\n70.30\nTotal\n4,267.80\n4,744.00\n9,011.80\n-476.20\n2020\nJan\n397.7\n383.5\n781.27\n14.18\nFeb\n365.5\n455.3\n820.89\n-89.81\nMar\n272.1\n450.5\n722.56\n-178.45\nApr\n200.5\n224.7\n425.20\n-24.23\nMay\n298.7\n361.1\n659.80\n-62.40\nJun\n330.0\n407.3\n737.32\n-77.28\nJul\n286.4\n345.8\n632.20\n59.31\nAug\n389.3\n404.9\n794.25\n-15.62\nSep\n398.8\n441.4\n840.21\n-42.57\nOct\n439.4\n490.2\n929.60\n-50.80\nNov\n528.9\n509.7\n1038.60\n19.20\nDec\n488.3\n527.2\n1015.50\n-38.90\n4,395.70\n5,001.70\n9,397.40\n-487.37\n2021\nJan\n282.9\n528.4\n811.30\n-245.5\nFeb\n340.8\n529.1\n869.90\n-188.3\nMar\n461.8\n605.3\n1067.10\n-143.5\nApr\n444.7\n566.6\n1011.30\n-121.9\nMay\n487.0\n591.5\n1078.50\n-104.5\nJun\n502.5\n622.2\n1124.70\n-119.7\nJul\n628.5\n667.6\n1296.10\n-39.1\nAug\n597.2\n628.7\n1225.90\n-31.5\nSep\n514.3\n665.1\n1179.40\n-150.8\nOct\n535.4\n712.9\n1248.30\n-177.5\nNov\n647.2\n683.1\n1330.30\n-35.9\nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2021\nTABLE 14 : MERCHANDISE TRADE STATISTICS\n (US$ millions)", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/Monthly_Economic_Reviews/Monthly-Economic-Review-December-2021.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "95ea69514946c7d7c5e3ab752a0dea94", "text": "i \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJUNE 2021 \n \n2 \n \nTABLE OF CONTENTS \n \nSELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS ................................................................................. 3 \nINTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICE DEVELOPMENTS ........................................... 4 \nPrecious Metals .......................................................................................................................... 4 \nBase Metals ................................................................................................................................ 4 \nMERCHANDISE TRADE DEVELOPMENTS......................................................................... 5 \nMerchandise Exports ................................................................................................................ 5 \nMerchandise Imports ................................................................................................................ 7 \nMerchandise Trade Balance ..................................................................................................... 8 \nMONETARY DEVELOPMENTS .............................................................................................. 9 \nSTOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS ................................................................................... 10 \nINFLATION OUTTURN ........................................................................................................... 11 \nAnnual Inflation ...................................................................................................................... 11 \nMonthly Inflation .................................................................................................................... 11 \n \nNATIONAL PAYMENTS SYSTEM ........................................................................................ 12 \nZimbabwe Electronic Transfer Settlement System (ZETSS) ............................................. 12 \nCash Transactions ................................................................................................................... 12 \nMobile and Internet Based Transactions .............................................................................. 12 \nCard Based Transactions ....................................................................................................... 12 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n3 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2021 \n \nMay \n \n2021 \n \nJune \n \nMonth-on- \nMonth Change \n(%) \n \nReserve Money2 (M0) (ZW$ millions) \n26,215.26 \n \n24,844.80 \n \n-5.23 \nMoney Supply2 (M3) (ZW$ millions) \n281,607.48 \n \n302,934.41 \n \n7.57 \nAnnual Inflation1 (%) \n161.91 \n106.64 \n-55.27a \n \nBlended Annual Inflation1 (%) \n74.57 \n40.91 \n-33.26a \nMonthly Inflation1 (%) \n2.54 \n3.88 \n1.34a \n \nBlended Monthly Inflation1 (%) \n1.80 \n4.49 \n2.69a \nNational Payment System Transactions2 \n(ZW$ billions) \n540.60 \n597.08 \n10.45 \nNominal Lending Rate2 \n(% per annum) \n6.00-85.00 \n6.00-85.00 \n \nSources: \n1. Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency. \n2. Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. \na- Percentage point. \nSELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS \n \n \n \n4 \n \nINTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICE \nDEVELOPMENTS \n \nDuring the month of June 2021, international \nmonthly average prices for gold, nickel and \nBrent crude oil firmed. However, copper and \nplatinum prices retreated. \n \n Precious Metals \n \n Gold \nGold prices were relatively steady, rising by a \nmarginal 0.02%, from a monthly average of \nUS$1,845.96 per ounce in the previous month, \nto US$1,846.27 per ounce, during the month \nunder review. The slight rise in bullion prices \nwas largely on account of prospects of strong \nsafe haven demand for the yellow metal, amid \ngrowing concerns about a spike in Covid-19 \ninfections. \n \nPlatinum \nPlatinum prices eased by 6.9%, from an average \nof US$1,215.85 per ounce in May 2021, to \nU$1,131.82 per ounce in June 2021. This was \nlargely due to slackening industrial demand, \nparticularly in China. The Asian giant’s \neconomy announced plans to cut demand for \ncommodities in order to contain raw material \ncosts, amid inflation fears. Figure 1 shows the \nevolution of precious metal prices for the period \nfrom June 2020 through to June 2021. \n \n \n \n \n Figure 1: Precious metal prices (US$/oz.) \nSource: Bloomberg, 2021 \n \nBase Metals \n \nCopper \nCopper prices retreated by 5.0% to a monthly \naverage of US$9,667.28 per tonne, from \nUS$10,172.20 per tonne recorded in the \nprevious month. Prices declined following the \nstrengthening of the US dollar and signs of \nwaning demand in China, the metal’s top \nconsumer. \n \nNickel \nNickel prices further strengthened on investor \noptimism about global economic recovery, \nthough volumes traded remained low because of \ninvestor concerns about sluggish demand in \nChina. In addition, proposed Russian taxes on \nnickel exports and strong demand in the spot \nmarket by alloy makers strengthened prices. The \nprice of the base metal increased by 1.6%, to \nclose the month under review at an average of \nUS$17,883.38 per tonne, from an average of \nUS$17,599.30 per tonne in the previous month. \n600\n800\n1000\n1200\n1400\n1600\n1800\n2000\n2200\nJun-20\nJul-20\nAug-20\nSep-20\nOct-20\nNov-20\nDec-20\nJan-21\nFeb-21\nMar-21\nApr-21\nMay-21\nJun-21\nUS$/oz.\nGold\nPlatinum\n \n \n \n5 \n \nFigure 2: Base metal prices (US$/ton) \nSource: Bloomberg, 2021 \n \nBrent Crude Oil \nBrent crude oil prices remained buoyant during \nthe month under analysis, supported by bullish \nsignals from the Organisation of Petroleum \nExporting Countries (OPEC), following the \ngroup’s \ndecision \nto \ncontinue \ncurtailing \nproduction in order to shore up prices. In \naddition, falling crude oil inventories in the US, \nthe world’s largest economy, also supported \nprices. As a result, prices rose by 7.4%, from a \nmonthly average of US$68.16 per barrel \nrecorded in May 2021, to an average of \nUS$73.20 per barrel in June 2021. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFigure 3 shows developments in Brent crude oil \nprices for the period from June 2020 to June \n2021. \nFigure 3: International crude oil prices \n(US$/barrel) \n \nSource: Bloomberg, 2021 \n \n \nMERCHANDISE \nTRADE \nDEVELOPMENTS \n \nTotal merchandise trade rose by 6.7%, from \nUS$994.3 million in May to US$1,060.6 million \nin June 2021. Increases in both merchandise \nexports and imports underpinned the rise in total \nmerchandise trade, during the month under \nreview. On a year- on- year basis, total \nmerchandise trade rose by a marked 43.9%, \nfrom US$737.1 million recorded in the \ncorresponding month in 2020. \n \nMerchandise Exports \n \nThe country’s merchandise exports increased by \n3.2%, from US$487.0 million in May to \nUS$502.5 million in June 2021. Compared to \nthe corresponding month in 2020, merchandise \n5,000\n7,000\n9,000\n11,000\n13,000\n15,000\n17,000\n19,000\n21,000\n4,000\n5,000\n6,000\n7,000\n8,000\n9,000\n10,000\n11,000\nJun-20\nAug-20\nOct-20\nDec-20\nFeb-21\nApr-21\nJun-21\nNickel US$/ton\nCopper US$/ton\nCopper\nNickel (RHS)\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\nJun-20\nJul-20\nAug-20\nSep-20\nOct-20\nNov-20\nDec-20\nJan-21\nFeb-21\nMar-21\nApr-21\nMay-21\nJun-21\nUS$/barrel\n \n \n \n6 \n \nexports for the reporting month were 52.5% \nhigher. Figure 4 shows developments in the \ncountry’s merchandise exports for the month \nunder review. \nFigure 4: Merchandise Exports (US$ m) \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2021 \n \n \nThe country’s export earnings were driven by \nthe platinum group metals at US$238.6 million; \ngold, US$141.5 million; ferro-chrome, US$28.2 \nmillion; and tobacco, US$23.1 million, during \nthe month under review. Firming global \ncommodity prices also boosted the country’s \nexports. Table 1 shows developments in the \ncountry’s exports for the months of May and \nJune 2021, respectively. \n \n \n \n1 PGMs include nickel mattes, nickel ores & concentrates \nand platinum \nTable 1: Exports Classified by Harmonised \nCommodity Description and Code System \nCommodity \n \nMay-21 \nJune-21 \nShare in \nJune 2021 \nExports (%) \nTotal Exports \n487.0 \n502.5 \n100.0 \nOf Which: \n \n \n \nPlatinum \nGroup \nof \nMetals (PGMs1) \n212.3 \n238.6 \n47.5 \nGold \n78.5 \n141.5 \n28.2 \nFerro-chromium \n7.2 \n28.2 \n5.6 \nTobacco (Inc. \ncigarettes) \n113.1 \n23.1 \n4.6 \nIndustrial diamonds \n22.8 \n16.2 \n3.2 \nCoal \n6.9 \n7.1 \n1.4 \nMacadamia nuts \n1.1 \n3.9 \n0.8 \nChromium ores and \nconcentrates \n6.0 \n3.6 \n0.7 \nCan Sugar \n1.5 \n2.6 \n0.5 \nGranite \n2.1 \n2.5 \n0.5 \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Calculations, 2021 \n \nDuring the month of June 2021, the country’s \nexports were mainly destined for South Africa \n(30.8%), followed by U.A.E (29.7%) and \nMozambique (9.8%). Figure 5 shows the \ncountry’s major export markets, during the \nmonth under review. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n2020\n2021\n \n \n \n7 \n \nFigure 5: Top Ten Merchandise Export \nDestinations (% share) \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Calculations, 2021 \n \nMerchandise Imports \n \nMerchandise imports increased by 10.0%, from \nUS$507.3 million in May 2021 to US$558.1 \nmillion in June 2021. Similarly, imports for the \nreporting month were 37.0% higher than in the \ncorresponding month in 2020, as shown in \nFigure 6. \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFigure 6: Merchandise Imports classified by \nHS Codes 2020 & 2021 (US$ m) \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Computations, 2021 \n \nDuring the month under review, the country’s \nimports were dominated by imports of fertilisers \n(8.5%), diesel (4.9%) and crude soybean oil \n(4.2%). The procurement of Covid-19 vaccines \nalso contributed to the growth of the country’s \nimport bill. However, import growth was \nsomewhat moderated, as domestic electricity \ngeneration improved and food self- sufficiency \nwas achieved. Table 2 shows imports of major \ncommodities for the months of May and June \n2021. \n \n \n30.80%\n29.70%\n9.80%\n1.80%\n1.10%\n0.60%\n0.20%\n0.10%\n0.06%\n0.05%\nSouth Africa\nUnited Arab Emirates\nMozambique\nBelgium\nZambia\nBotswana\nNetherlands\nMalawi\nSingapore\nUnited Kingdom\n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n2020\n2021\n \n \n \n8 \n \nTable 2: Imports Classified by Harmonised \nCommodity Description and Code \nSystem \nCommodity \n May 21 \nUS$ m \nJune 21 \nUS$ m \nShare in \nJune \n2021 \nImports \n(%) \nTotal Exports \n507.3 \n558.1 \n100.0 \nOf Which: \n \n \n \nFertilizer \nChemicals \n11.7 \n47.5 \n8.5 \nDiesel \n29.6 \n27.5 \n4.9 \nCrude soya bean \noil \n17.2 \n23.3 \n4.2 \nElectricity \n9.8 \n13.5 \n2.4 \nWheat \n2.8 \n11.4 \n2.0 \nRice \n16.1 \n11.0 \n2.0 \nMachinery \n3.1 \n10.2 \n1.8 \nCovid-19 \nVaccines \n1.5 \n7.9 \n1.4 \nMedicaments \n9.3 \n6.7 \n1.2 \nUnleaded petrol \n6.8 \n6.6 \n1.2 \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Calculations, 2021 \nThe country’s imports for the month of June \n2021, were mainly sourced from South Africa \n(48.9%), China (10.1%), Singapore (6.0%), \nMozambique (3.3%) and other markets, as \nshown in Figure 7. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFigure 7: Top Ten Merchandise Import \nSources (% share) \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Calculations, 2021 \n \nMerchandise Trade Balance \n \nThe \ncountry’s \nmonthly \ntrade \nbalance \nsignificantly widened, from a deficit of US$20.3 \nmillion in May to a deficit of US$55.5 million \nin June 2021. This was on account increases in \nimports relative to exports. Figure 8 shows the \ncountry’s trade balance for the period from \nJanuary 2020 to June 2021. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n48.9%\n10.1%\n6.0%\n3.3%\n2.8%\n2.7%\n2.4%\n2.2%\n2.0%\n1.7%\nSouth Africa\nChina\nSingapore\nMozambique\nZambia\nMauritius\nUnited Kingdom\nIndia\nRussian Federation\nHong Kong\n \n \n \n9 \n \nFigure 8: Merchandise Trade Balance \n(US$ m) \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Computations, 2020 \n \nOn a year- on- year basis, the country’s trade \nbalance narrowed from a deficit of US$76.0 \nmillion in the corresponding month in 2020 to \nUS$55.5 million, during the month under \nreview. \n \nMONETARY DEVELOPMENTS2 \n \nDuring the month of June 2021, broad money \n(M3) increased by 7.57% to ZW$302.93 billion, \nfrom ZW$281.61 billion recorded in May 2021. \nThe money stock was composed of local \ncurrency transferrable deposits, 47.59%; foreign \ncurrency deposits, 44.11%, time deposits, \n \n2All monetary numbers valued in ZW$ since the adoption \nof an interbank market determined exchange rate in \nFebruary 2019. \n7.06%; currency in circulation, 0.72%; and \nnegotiable certificates of deposits, 0.52%. \n \nYear –on- year, the foreign currency component \nof broad money grew by 131.59%, from \nZW$57.70 billion in June 2020 to ZW$133.63 \nbillion in June 2021. The increase partly \nreflected \nrevaluation \nchanges, \nowing \nto \nmovement of the exchange rate from ZW$57.36 \nper US$1 in June 2020 to ZW$85.42 per US$1 \nin June 2021. \nLocal currency deposits in broad money also \nregistered a growth of 301.96% on an annual \nbasis, while currency in circulation increased by \n81.48%. \nFigure 9: Composition of Money Supply \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2021 \n \nBroad money grew year on year, by 203.48% in \nJune 2021, largely reflecting increases in credit \nto private sector, 304.26%; and net claims on \nGovernment, 109.72%. The 203.48% annual \n-400.0\n-200.0\n0.0\n200.0\n400.0\n600.0\nJun-20\nJul-20\nAug-20\nSep-20\nOct-20\nNov-20\nDec-20\nJan-21\nFeb-21\nMar-21\nApr-21\nMay-21\nJun-21\nExports\nImports\nTrade Balance\nLocal \nCurrency \nTransferable \ndeposits\n47.59%\nForeign \nCurrency \nDeposits\n44.11%\nTime \nDeposits\n7.06%\nCurrency in \nCirculation\n0.72%\nNCDs\n0.52%\n \n \n \n10 \n \ngrowth in broad money in June 2021 compares \nwith 575% in June 2020. \nOn a month-on-month basis, domestic credit \nincreased by 7.22% to ZW$170.18 billion. The \ngrowth was largely driven by an increase of \n10.87% in credit to the private sector. Partially \noffsetting the increase was a decline of 21.07% \nin net claims to Government. \nCredit to the private sector was mainly extended \ntowards \nagriculture, \n31.18%; \nhouseholds, \n17.06%; distribution, 12.48%; manufacturing, \n10.79%; financial organisations, 11.02%; and \nservices, 7.88%; as shown in Figure 10. \n \nFigure 10: Distribution of Private Sector Credit \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2021 \n \nCredit to the private sector was largely \nchanneled towards inventory build-up, 36.33%; \nother recurrent expenditures, 29.57%; and fixed \ncapital investment, 18.10%. \n \n \nSTOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS \n \nThe Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) was \ncharacterized by bullish sentiments during the \nmonth of June 2021, thereby extending the \npositive streak for the eighth consecutive month. \nThis resulted in all major indices registering \ngains. \n \nThe All Share, Top 10, Top 15 and Medium Cap \nindices gained 14.12%, 4.97%, 7.98% and \n24.54% to close at 6 194.88 points, 3 154.44 \npoints, 3 658.89 points and 17 272.09 points, \nrespectively. The resource index, however, shed \n8.93% to close at 6 211.49 points. \n \nFigure 11: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange All \nShare and Top 10 Indices \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2021 \n \nOn an annual basis, the All Share, Top 10 and \nmining indices gained 246.32%, 155.88% and \n55.46%, up from 1 788.75 points, 1 232.79 \npoints and 3 995.48 points recorded in June \n2020, respectively. \nHouseholds\n17.06%\nAgriculture\n31.18%\nMining\n6.78%\nManufacturing\n10.79%\nDistribution\n12.48%\nConstruction\n0.85%\nTransport & \nCommunicati\nons\n1.93%\nServices\n7.88%\nFinancial Org. \n& Investments\n11.02%\nOther\n0.03%\n0.00\n2,100.00\n4,200.00\n6,300.00\n8,400.00\n10,500.00\n12,600.00\n14,700.00\n200\n1200\n2200\n3200\n4200\n5200\n6200\n30-Jun-20\n31-Jul-20\n31-Aug-20\n30-Sep-20\n31-Oct-20\n30-Nov-20\n31-Dec-20\n31-Jan-21\n28-Feb-21\n31-Mar-21\n30-Apr-21\n31-May-21\n30-Jun-21\nAll Share Index\nTop 10 Index\nMining Index\n \n \n \n11 \n \n As a result of positive trading during the period \nunder analysis, the cumulative volume and \nvalue of shares traded increased to 228.38 \nmillion \nshares \nand \nZW$4.46 \nbillion, \nrespectively. \n \nThe proportion of foreign purchases, to the \nvalue of shares traded declined to 3.36%, \ncompared to 8.49% recorded in the previous \nmonth. Concomitantly, the net foreign position \nwas an outflow of ZW$1.81 billion, compared \nto a net outflow of ZW$483.80 million recorded \nduring the month of May 2021. \n \nFigure 12: ZSE Monthly Volumes and Values \nTraded \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2021 \nDuring the month of June 2021, ZSE market \ncapitalization increased by ZW$111.16 billion \nor 17.53% to ZW$745.18 billion. On a year-on-\nyear basis, market capitalization increased by \n226.01%, from ZW$228.58 billion recorded in \nJune 2020. \n \n3The Zimbabwe National Statistical Agency (ZIMSTAT) \ncommenced publication of the blended CPI inflation in June \n2020. The blended CPI inflation combines the average changes \nINFLATION OUTTURN \n \nAnnual Inflation \n \nAnnual inflation fell to 106.64% in June 2021, \nfrom 161.91% in May 2021. The slow- down in \nannual inflation was attributable to declines in \nboth food and non-food inflation. \nAnnual food inflation fell from 161.91% in May \n2021 to 108.64% in June 2021. This followed \nthe improvement in food supply, due to the good \n20/21 agricultural season. \nYear-on-year \nnon-food \ninflation \nalso \ndecelerated to 105.12% in June 2021, from \n150.75% in May 2021. \nAnnual blended CPI inflation3 slowed down to \n40.91% in June 2021, from 94.70% in April \n2021 and 74.57% in May 2021. \n \nMonthly Inflation \n \nThe ZW$ monthly inflation stood at 3.88% in \nJune 2021, up from 2.54% in May 2021. The \nacceleration in month- on- month inflation, \nfollowed increases in both food and non-food \ninflation. \nMonthly food inflation increased from 0.95% in \nMay 2021 to 3.21% in June 2021. Month-on- \nmonth non-food inflation also rose from 3.75% \nin May 2021 to 4.38% in June 2021. The trend \nin month-on-month inflation is shown in Figure \n13. \nin price of goods and services sold in the two main currencies in \ncirculation, namely the ZW$ and the US$. \n0\n500\n1,000\n1,500\n2,000\n2,500\n3,000\n3,500\n4,000\n4,500\n5,000\n0\n400\n800\n1,200\n1,600\n2,000\n2,400\n2,800\nJun-20\nJul-20\nAug-20\nSep-20\nOct-20\nNov-20\nDec-20\nJan-21\nFeb-21\nMar-21\nApr-21\nMay-21\nJun-21\nValues Traded (ZW$ millions)\nVolumes Traded (milions)\nVolume\nTurnover\n \n \n \n12 \n \n \n \nFigure 13: Month-on-Month Inflation (%) \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2021 \n \nOn a month-on-month basis, the blended \ninflation rate accelerated from 1.79% in May \n2021 to 4.45% in June 2021. \n \n \nNATIONAL PAYMENTS SYSTEM \n \nThe \nNational \nPayments \nSystem \n(NPS) \nprocessed \ntransactions \nworth \nZW$597.08 \nbillion in June 2021, up from ZW$540.60 \nbillion in May 2021. NPS transaction volumes \nwere 4.43% higher and closed the month under \nanalysis at 117.46 million. \nZimbabwe Electronic Transfer Settlement \nSystem (ZETSS) \n \nDuring the month of June 2021, Real Time \nGross Settlement System (RTGS) transactions \nstood \nat \nZW$388.76 \nmillion, \nup \nfrom \nZW$361.43 billion in May 2021. \n \n \nFigure 14: ZETSS Volumes and Values \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2021 \n \nCash Transactions \nCash based transactions amounted to ZW$15.12 \nbillion in June 2021, up from ZW$13.46 billion \nin May 2021. \nMobile and Internet Based Transactions \n \nDuring the month under analysis, mobile and \ninternet-based transactions stood at ZW$166.58 \nbillion, a 19.66% increase from ZW$139.22 \nbillion recorded in May 2021. \nCard Based Transactions \n \nCard-based transactions rose by 4.46% to \nZW$41.47 \nbillion \nin \nJune \n2021, \nfrom \nZW$39.96 billion in the preceding month. \n \nRESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE \n0.00%\n10.00%\n20.00%\n30.00%\n40.00%\n50.00%\n60.00%\nJun-20\nJul-20\nAug-20\nSep-20\nOct-20\nNov-20\nDec-20\nJan-21\nFeb-21\nMar-21\nApr-21\nMay-21\nJun-21\nFood\nNon-Food\nOverall\n -\n 100.0\n 200.0\n 300.0\n 400.0\n 500.0\n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1000\n1200\nJun-20\nJul-20\nAug-20\nSep-20\nOct-20\nNov-20\nDec-20\nJan-21\nFeb-21\nMar-21\nApr-21\nMay-21\nJun-21\nValue in ZW$ Billions\nVolume in Thousands\nVolume\nValue\n \n13 \n \nStatistical Tables \n \nMonetary Statistics \n 1. Depository Corporations Survey \n \n \n \n15 \n 2. Central Bank Survey \n \n \n \n \n \n \n16 \n \n3. Other Depository Corporations Survey \n \n \n \n \n17 \n Other Depository Corporations \n \n4.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n18 \n 4.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n19 \n Commercial Banks \n 5.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n20 \n 5.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n21 \n Building Societies \n 6.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n22 \n 6.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n23 \n Sectoral Analysis of Bank Loans and Advances and Deposits \n \n7.1 Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks Loans and Advances \n24 \n \n7.2 Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks Deposits \n \n \n25 \n Interest Rates \n \n8.1 Lending Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n26 \n \n8.2 Banks Deposit Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n27 \n \n Inflation \n \n9.1 Monthly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n28 \n \n9.2 Yearly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n29 \n External Statistics \n \n10. Total External Debt Outstanding by Debtor \n \n \n \n30 \n 11. Exchange Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n31 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n14 \n \n12. Zimbabwe Stock Market Statistics \n \n \n \n \n 32 \n \n 13. National Payments System Statistics \n \n \n \n \n13.1 Values of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n 33 \n \n13.2 Volumes of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n 34 \n \n14. Merchandise Trade Statistics \n \n \n \n \n \n 35 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n15 \n \n \n TABLE 1: DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS SURVEY ($'000)\nJun-20\nJul-20\nAug-20\nSep-20\nOct-20\nNov-20\nDec-20\nJan-21\nFeb-21\nMar-21\nApr-21\nMay-21\nJun-21\nNet Foreign Assets\n-234,278,568.81\n-309,340,585.00\n-323,918,937.77\n-317,370,813.35\n-327,434,598.03\n-322,916,992.61\n-316,766,634.64\n-328,526,094.64\n-340,106,496.40\n-327,297,184.10\n-319,268,915.42\n-328,642,322.20\n-303,317,411.71\nCentral Bank(net)\n-275,623,563.54\n-366,357,650.73\n-391,303,802.50\n-386,104,783.47\n-398,503,742.75\n-398,165,536.09\n-392,036,907.50\n-406,631,588.87\n-411,000,792.44\n-404,663,451.67\n-402,310,198.93\n-418,533,821.61\n-408,677,935.81\nForeign Assets\n17,845,745.97\n23,630,101.57\n27,645,575.83\n24,043,853.69\n24,017,722.16\n23,436,187.04\n14,624,495.02\n18,687,105.42\n17,867,062.65\n23,240,104.56\n18,115,014.41\n20,334,177.22\n33,139,183.22\nForeign Liabilities\n293,469,309.50\n389,987,752.30\n418,949,378.32\n410,148,637.16\n422,521,464.91\n421,601,723.13\n406,661,402.52\n425,318,694.30\n428,867,855.10\n427,903,556.24\n420,425,213.34\n438,867,998.83\n441,817,119.03\nOther Depository Corporations(net)\n41,344,994.73\n57,017,065.73\n67,384,864.72\n68,733,970.12\n71,069,144.72\n75,248,543.48\n75,270,272.86\n78,105,494.23\n70,894,296.04\n77,366,267.57\n83,041,283.51\n89,891,499.41\n105,360,524.10\nForeign Assets\n53,130,231.08\n72,022,862.19\n84,210,291.97\n83,986,978.02\n85,970,018.68\n90,081,991.05\n89,458,700.13\n93,882,385.99\n86,920,278.98\n92,405,865.60\n98,837,092.48\n106,013,344.18\n120,848,426.81\nForeign Liabilities\n11,785,236.35\n15,005,796.46\n16,825,427.25\n15,253,007.90\n14,900,873.96\n14,833,447.57\n14,188,427.27\n15,776,891.76\n16,025,982.94\n15,039,598.02\n15,795,808.97\n16,121,844.77\n15,487,902.71\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n334,099,369.96\n441,599,870.68\n470,066,520.53\n471,206,354.87\n497,207,430.71\n507,265,762.28\n521,691,490.51\n549,010,656.62\n566,288,275.77\n561,575,884.82\n581,351,630.28\n610,249,806.36\n606,251,821.19\nDomestic Claims\n50,113,139.15\n59,894,402.15\n62,852,286.66\n63,493,587.42\n80,786,149.78\n88,712,115.98\n101,159,726.29\n108,399,214.96\n127,374,579.36\n124,267,139.59\n149,907,978.82\n158,719,727.00\n170,177,222.61\nClaims on Central Government(net)\n11,286,874.74\n14,475,978.36\n11,939,163.62\n9,165,660.28\n16,233,346.76\n18,766,373.80\n23,276,846.68\n15,698,011.65\n25,682,635.40\n19,242,767.82\n28,124,843.48\n29,989,668.04\n23,670,319.48\nClaims on Central Government\n22,643,966.48\n25,495,963.30\n25,856,421.22\n24,510,261.70\n26,940,376.62\n28,442,906.62\n37,789,748.86\n34,941,802.63\n43,864,745.10\n43,295,379.13\n47,281,011.39\n47,535,251.17\n42,113,825.79\nCentral Bank\n16,374,954.71\n18,731,582.60\n18,958,846.78\n17,824,429.35\n18,854,638.49\n19,461,417.62\n25,693,679.77\n24,602,411.40\n24,790,733.37\n25,677,529.11\n27,876,847.35\n28,316,386.84\n24,485,145.35\nODCs\n6,269,011.77\n6,764,380.71\n6,897,574.44\n6,685,832.35\n8,085,738.13\n8,981,489.00\n12,096,069.09\n10,339,391.23\n19,074,011.73\n17,617,850.02\n19,404,164.04\n19,218,864.33\n17,628,680.44\nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n11,357,091.74\n11,019,984.94\n13,917,257.60\n15,344,601.42\n10,707,029.86\n9,676,532.82\n14,512,902.18\n19,243,790.98\n18,182,109.70\n24,052,611.30\n19,156,167.92\n17,545,583.13\n18,443,506.31\nCentral Bank\n9,877,720.74\n9,288,102.23\n13,066,429.55\n13,813,071.38\n8,907,284.36\n8,106,585.00\n10,172,875.57\n13,790,121.07\n13,393,897.55\n19,176,804.49\n13,773,623.14\n10,713,013.71\n12,148,239.95\nODCs\n1,479,371.00\n1,731,882.71\n850,828.05\n1,531,530.04\n1,799,745.50\n1,569,947.81\n4,340,026.60\n5,453,669.91\n4,788,212.16\n4,875,806.82\n5,382,544.78\n6,832,569.42\n6,295,266.36\nClaims on Other Sectors\n38,826,264.41\n45,418,423.79\n50,913,123.04\n54,327,927.14\n64,552,803.02\n69,945,742.18\n77,882,879.61\n92,701,203.31\n101,691,943.96\n105,024,371.77\n121,783,135.35\n128,730,058.96\n146,506,903.14\nOther Financial Corporations\n753,439.03\n1,010,123.42\n298,579.49\n338,002.03\n1,398,438.67\n1,450,895.49\n606,276.57\n396,273.97\n881,815.56\n2,676,383.43\n4,857,921.34\n2,161,647.81\n4,230,396.18\nState and Local Government\n23,225.26\n25,961.37\n27,859.83\n35,174.26\n34,462.77\n28,449.36\n37,924.29\n28,196.82\n31,854.73\n30,050.30\n20,366.90\n23,547.12\n84,251.94\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n5,863,041.63\n5,154,947.39\n3,941,697.68\n4,796,976.15\n6,006,655.50\n5,000,659.17\n2,578,274.18\n8,366,572.13\n8,849,870.48\n7,837,908.59\n9,126,830.60\n9,187,412.56\n12,075,547.93\nPrivate Sector\n32,186,558.49\n39,227,391.60\n46,644,986.05\n49,157,774.70\n57,113,246.08\n63,465,738.17\n74,660,404.58\n83,910,160.40\n91,928,403.19\n94,480,029.44\n107,778,016.50\n117,357,451.47\n130,116,707.10\nCentral Bank\n185,977.83\n184,094.09\n184,679.11\n185,814.45\n1,223,752.47\n697,643.23\n703,343.34\n744,529.53\n755,476.31\n910,752.95\n1,181,305.42\n1,264,177.93\n1,489,123.82\nODCs\n32,000,580.66\n39,043,297.50\n46,460,306.94\n48,971,960.25\n55,889,493.61\n62,768,094.94\n73,957,061.25\n83,165,630.87\n91,172,926.88\n93,569,276.49\n106,596,711.09\n116,093,273.55\n128,627,583.28\nOther Items(Net)\n-283,986,230.81 -381,705,468.53 -407,214,233.87 -407,712,767.45 -416,421,280.93 -418,553,646.30 -420,531,764.21 -440,611,441.66 -438,913,696.40 -437,308,745.22 -431,443,651.46 -451,530,079.36 -436,074,598.58\nShares and Other Equity\n-265,536,483.62\n-359,843,502.38\n-393,275,806.44\n-386,761,250.11\n-392,085,071.73\n-397,700,402.79\n-390,151,578.46\n-408,061,464.88\n-410,347,885.65\n-411,006,941.09\n-396,650,639.28\n-415,482,334.99\n-421,159,006.94\nLiabilities to Other Financial Corporations\n348,181.06\n348,728.32\n422,486.38\n372,163.87\n441,747.71\n423,616.80\n292,018.63\n376,668.85\n609,870.31\n408,850.46\n409,882.68\n429,002.92\n462,598.19\nRestricted Deposits\n3,417,797.70\n1,726,243.32\n4,057,817.74\n1,036,012.77\n1,208,834.37\n2,648,204.14\n835,126.11\n718,690.98\n252,287.94\n71,982.41\n72,859.61\n67,378.71\n73,532.53\nDeposits and Securities Excluded from Broad Money\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nOther Items(net)\n-22,215,725.96\n-23,936,937.79\n-18,418,731.56\n-22,359,693.99\n-25,986,791.29\n-23,925,064.43\n-31,507,330.50\n-33,645,336.61\n-29,427,969.01\n-26,782,637.00\n-35,275,754.48\n-36,544,126.00\n-15,451,722.36\nBroad Money-M3\n99,820,801.15\n132,259,285.68\n146,147,582.76\n153,835,541.52\n169,772,832.69\n184,348,769.67\n204,924,855.86\n220,484,561.98\n226,181,779.37\n234,278,700.72\n262,082,714.87\n281,607,484.16\n302,934,409.48\nSecurities Other than Shares Included in Broad Money\n863,206.40\n1,024,311.11\n1,111,664.44\n1,083,907.10\n1,231,944.90\n1,237,340.99\n1,436,202.84\n1,422,437.87\n1,457,355.54\n1,641,213.33\n1,503,791.55\n1,525,849.38\n1,559,661.34\nBroad Money-M2\n98,957,594.75\n131,234,974.57\n145,035,918.32\n152,751,634.42\n168,540,887.79\n183,111,428.68\n203,488,653.02\n219,062,124.11\n224,724,423.83\n232,637,487.38\n260,578,923.31\n280,081,634.78\n301,374,748.14\nOther Deposits\n4,017,695.39\n6,047,153.88\n5,431,611.26\n6,935,433.58\n8,397,139.11\n8,997,813.50\n9,906,844.70\n11,351,477.37\n13,946,713.28\n14,168,053.71\n13,701,776.00\n18,359,658.93\n21,395,598.04\nNarrow Money-M1\n94,939,899.37\n125,187,820.69\n139,604,307.06\n145,816,200.84\n160,143,748.68\n174,113,615.18\n193,581,808.32\n207,710,646.74\n210,777,710.55\n218,469,433.68\n246,877,147.31\n261,721,975.85\n279,979,150.10\nTransferable Deposits\n93,730,970.73\n123,981,130.10\n138,523,712.90\n144,756,556.77\n159,085,591.39\n173,047,801.52\n192,383,729.76\n206,490,526.41\n209,569,292.32\n216,776,481.85\n245,066,101.47\n259,978,003.99\n277,785,152.96\n Of which Foreign Currency Accounts\n57,701,775.14\n79,076,606.18\n86,014,194.25\n92,191,134.58\n97,621,848.10\n102,185,943.24\n103,728,205.33\n108,593,568.84\n109,661,714.64\n115,035,082.24\n117,770,638.10\n127,553,941.47\n133,630,862.77\nCurrency Outside Depository Corporations\n1,208,928.64\n1,206,690.59\n1,080,594.16\n1,059,644.06\n1,058,157.28\n1,065,813.65\n1,198,078.56\n1,220,120.33\n1,208,418.23\n1,692,951.82\n1,811,045.84\n1,743,971.86\n2,193,997.15\nMemorandum Items\nReserve Money\n12,651,566.81\n16,145,434.53\n12,383,054.95\n12,732,319.53\n15,522,125.70\n18,424,345.96\n18,762,395.12\n21,824,780.59\n22,377,634.26\n19,248,051.52\n22,620,090.06\n26,215,258.96\n24,844,800.65\nFCAs as a Percentage of Deposits in M3\n58.5%\n60.3%\n59.3%\n60.3%\n57.9%\n55.8%\n50.9%\n49.5%\n48.7%\n49.5%\n45.2%\n45.6%\n44.4%\nEnd Period Exchange Rate\n57.36\n76.76\n83.40\n81.44\n81.35\n81.82\n81.79\n82.68\n83.89\n84.40\n84.50\n84.73\n85.42\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2021\nNotes:\n(i) Depository corporations survey - formerly Monetary Survey.\n(ii) Broad money redefined using IMF's Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual of 2000. Major changes include exclusion of Government deposits held by banks from broad money.\n(iii) Transferable deposits made up of demand and savings deposits.\n(iv) NCDs are also referred to as securities included in broad money.\n(v) All classes of time deposits, short and long term are classified as time deposits, which are also termed other deposits.\n(vi) Credit to the private sector now excludes claims on other financial corporations, as well as claims on state and local government (local authorities)\n(vii) Depository corporations made up of the Central Bank and other depository corporations\n(viii) Other depository corporations (ODCs) - Commercial banks, merchant banks, building societies and POSB.\n(ix) In December 2017, the statistics were adjusted in restrospect by reclassifying Securities issued under Aftrades from claims on government to claims on central bank\n(x) In December 2017, the statistics were adjusted in restrospect by reclassifying amounts accessed by banks under the Aftrades from liabilities to Other Depository corporations and Other Financial Corporations to liabilities to Central Bank \n(xi) In December 2018, statistics were revised from November 2017 due to reclassification of lines of credit (foreign liabilities) that were initially classified as deposits included in broad money\n(xii) All monetary and financial statistics are valued in ZWL$ since the introduction of the interbank foreign exchange market in February 2019\n \n \n \n16 \n \n \nJun-20\nJul-20\nAug-20\nSep-20\nOct-20\nNov-20\nDec-20\nJan-21\nFeb-21\nMar-21\nApr-21\nMay-21\nJun-21\nNet Foreign Assets\n-275,623,563.54\n-366,357,650.73\n-391,303,802.50\n-386,104,783.47\n-398,503,742.75\n-398,165,536.09\n-392,036,907.50\n-406,631,588.87\n-411,000,792.44\n-404,663,451.67\n-402,310,198.93\n-418,533,821.61\n-408,677,935.81\nClaims on Non Residents\n17,845,745.97\n23,630,101.57\n27,645,575.83\n24,043,853.69\n24,017,722.16\n23,436,187.04\n14,624,495.02\n18,687,105.42\n17,867,062.65\n23,240,104.56\n18,115,014.41\n20,334,177.22\n33,139,183.22\nOfficial Reserves Assets\n9,522,205.82\n12,511,281.83\n15,651,918.68\n12,374,572.35\n12,357,598.03\n11,668,298.64\n2,786,278.07\n6,677,598.06\n5,651,394.24\n11,051,852.30\n7,205,335.48\n9,390,079.67\n22,273,252.21\nOther Foreign Assets\n8,323,540.15\n11,118,819.74\n11,993,657.14\n11,669,281.34\n11,660,124.13\n11,767,888.40\n11,838,216.95\n12,009,507.37\n12,215,668.41\n12,188,252.26\n10,909,678.93\n10,944,097.54\n10,865,931.01\nLess Liabilities to Non Residents\n293,469,309.50\n389,987,752.30\n418,949,378.32\n410,148,637.16\n422,521,464.91\n421,601,723.13\n406,661,402.52\n425,318,694.30\n428,867,855.10\n427,903,556.24\n420,425,213.34\n438,867,998.83\n441,817,119.03\nShort Term Liabilities\n134,067,700.58\n179,874,148.53\n193,114,218.14\n190,611,160.64\n190,817,851.33\n189,287,948.45\n187,885,613.69\n192,806,142.21\n194,818,587.99\n195,017,951.26\n196,412,895.15\n215,118,073.59\n219,691,932.32\nOther Foreign Liabilities*\n159,401,608.92\n210,113,603.77\n225,835,160.18\n219,537,476.52\n231,703,613.58\n232,313,774.68\n218,775,788.84\n232,512,552.09\n234,049,267.11\n232,885,604.97\n224,012,318.18\n223,749,925.24\n222,125,186.70\n of which blocked funds\n131,743,040.88\n171,686,088.39\n184,824,435.01\n179,488,881.37\n191,557,287.91\n191,564,844.22\n177,624,192.87\n190,969,111.27\n191,664,044.89\n191,174,087.59\n181,636,605.52\n181,088,588.70\n179,118,601.53\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n288,275,130.35\n382,503,085.26\n403,686,857.45\n398,837,103.00\n414,025,868.46\n416,589,882.06\n410,799,302.62\n428,456,369.46\n433,378,426.70\n423,911,503.19\n424,930,288.99\n444,749,080.57\n433,522,736.46\nDomestic Claims\n10,707,313.49\n13,930,835.24\n9,173,375.62\n8,137,864.08\n16,330,004.87\n15,975,321.34\n17,721,762.12\n18,864,046.83\n20,211,944.02\n14,624,071.75\n24,589,033.83\n28,240,574.97\n25,962,204.03\nNet Claims on Central Government\n6,497,233.96\n9,443,480.36\n5,892,417.23\n4,011,357.97\n9,947,354.13\n11,354,832.62\n15,520,804.20\n10,812,290.33\n11,396,835.82\n6,500,724.62\n14,103,224.21\n17,603,373.13\n12,336,905.40\nClaims on Central Government\n16,374,954.71\n18,731,582.60\n18,958,846.78\n17,824,429.35\n18,854,638.49\n19,461,417.62\n25,693,679.77\n24,602,411.40\n24,790,733.37\n25,677,529.11\n27,876,847.35\n28,316,386.84\n24,485,145.35\nOf which: Securities Other than Shares\n6,441,291.52\n6,348,432.53\n6,274,326.46\n6,194,697.32\n6,101,509.11\n6,051,655.92\n6,035,224.38\n6,165,262.55\n6,095,109.16\n5,962,815.29\n5,871,229.64\n5,850,605.06\n5,809,922.68\nLoans\n9,933,663.19\n12,383,150.07\n12,684,520.32\n11,629,732.03\n12,753,129.37\n13,409,761.69\n19,658,455.39\n18,437,148.85\n18,695,624.21\n19,714,713.82\n22,005,617.72\n22,465,781.78\n18,675,222.67\n Loans and Advances\n5,927,212.09\n8,377,024.21\n8,672,446.67\n7,617,711.22\n8,740,654.93\n9,388,431.71\n15,645,165.82\n14,425,116.65\n14,682,354.29\n15,701,443.90\n17,997,932.14\n18,458,096.20\n14,666,539.96\n Legacy Debt\n394,885.26\n394,560.01\n400,507.80\n400,454.97\n400,908.59\n409,764.14\n401,723.73\n400,466.35\n401,704.08\n401,704.08\n396,119.73\n396,119.74\n397,116.86\n Export Incentives\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n9,877,720.74\n9,288,102.23\n13,066,429.55\n13,813,071.38\n8,907,284.36\n8,106,585.00\n10,172,875.57\n13,790,121.07\n13,393,897.55\n19,176,804.49\n13,773,623.14\n10,713,013.71\n12,148,239.95\nOf which: Deposits\n9,877,720.74\n9,288,102.23\n13,066,429.55\n13,813,071.38\n8,907,284.36\n8,106,585.00\n10,172,875.57\n13,790,121.07\n13,393,897.55\n19,176,804.49\n13,773,623.14\n10,713,013.71\n12,148,239.95\nOther \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nClaims on Other Sectors\n4,210,079.53\n4,487,354.87\n3,280,958.40\n4,126,506.11\n6,382,650.74\n4,620,488.72\n2,200,957.92\n8,051,756.50\n8,815,108.19\n8,123,347.12\n10,485,809.62\n10,637,201.84\n13,625,298.64\nOther Financial Corporations\n198,722.36\n199,979.99\n200,871.01\n194,092.65\n191,304.06\n192,148.23\n188,349.05\n204,933.06\n703,425.29\n703,645.95\n1,533,608.33\n1,602,101.94\n1,591,946.54\nState and Local Government\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n3,825,379.33\n4,103,280.79\n2,895,408.28\n3,746,599.01\n4,967,594.21\n3,730,697.26\n1,309,265.53\n7,102,293.92\n7,356,206.59\n6,508,948.22\n7,770,895.87\n7,770,921.98\n10,544,228.28\nPrivate Sector\n185,977.83\n184,094.09\n184,679.11\n185,814.45\n1,223,752.47\n697,643.23\n703,343.34\n744,529.53\n755,476.31\n910,752.95\n1,181,305.42\n1,264,177.93\n1,489,123.82\nClaims on Other Depository Corporations\n2,836,488.36\n2,971,403.60\n3,064,656.78\n2,842,129.71\n2,887,258.50\n2,988,284.32\n3,684,021.80\n2,564,013.70\n2,678,324.79\n2,055,511.30\n2,433,322.77\n3,018,822.69\n3,426,911.18\nOf which: Loans\n2,836,488.36\n2,971,403.60\n3,064,656.78\n2,842,129.71\n2,887,258.50\n2,988,284.32\n3,684,021.80\n2,564,013.70\n2,678,324.79\n2,055,511.30\n2,433,322.77\n3,018,822.69\n3,426,911.18\nOther Liabilities to ODCs\n20,777,523.67\n31,484,074.13\n36,504,621.50\n37,868,889.89\n35,078,524.21\n43,158,130.62\n53,880,036.70\n52,386,928.65\n59,780,016.83\n67,223,250.63\n68,479,829.04\n74,078,427.51\n91,366,745.03\nOf which: Aftrades Balances\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n Securities\n11,137,597.35\n13,291,243.49\n14,580,745.12\n13,851,775.48\n9,084,137.29\n11,687,723.67\n22,262,484.07\n29,594,641.97\n31,870,831.11\n32,826,932.93\n33,556,990.26\n41,514,984.85\n45,976,776.82\nOther Items(Net)\n-295,508,852.17\n-397,084,920.55\n-427,953,446.54\n-425,725,999.11\n-429,887,129.29\n-440,784,407.01\n-443,273,555.40\n-459,415,237.58\n-470,268,174.72\n-474,455,170.78\n-466,387,761.43\n-487,568,110.43\n-495,500,366.27\nShares and Other Equity\n-296,849,225.12\n-396,135,173.94\n-433,060,072.45\n-427,106,363.79\n-433,463,716.88\n-441,933,638.10\n-442,191,359.79\n-459,147,547.11\n-467,159,156.05\n-471,095,071.67\n-458,343,431.18\n-477,762,942.16\n-486,305,203.47\nOther Items(Net)\n-2,077,424.75\n-2,675,989.93\n-2,358,189.93\n-3,416,387.63\n-3,309,230.72\n-3,537,819.62\n-3,242,652.80\n-1,473,280.48\n-4,426,426.77\n-4,965,601.97\n-9,430,994.41\n-10,971,526.97\n-9,911,933.75\nLiabilities to Other Resident Sectors\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nDeposits and Securities Excluded from Base Mon\n3,417,797.70\n1,726,243.32\n7,464,815.83\n4,796,752.30\n6,885,818.31\n4,687,050.70\n2,160,457.19\n1,205,590.01\n1,317,408.10\n1,605,502.86\n1,386,664.16\n1,166,358.70\n716,770.95\n0.17\nMonetary Base \n12,651,566.81\n16,145,434.53\n12,383,054.95\n12,732,319.53\n15,522,125.70\n18,424,345.96\n18,762,395.12\n21,824,780.59\n22,377,634.26\n19,248,051.52\n22,620,090.06\n26,215,258.96\n24,844,800.65\nBond Coins\n99,710.08\n99,709.22\n99,709.27\n99,709.34\n99,709.54\n99,709.66\n2,375,925.99\n99,709.66\n99,709.73\n99,709.87\n99,709.99\n99,710.09\n99,710.14\nBond Notes\n1,570,979.64\n1,797,797.97\n1,955,979.19\n2,044,143.53\n2,022,625.16\n2,029,709.06\n99,709.69\n2,603,693.97\n2,847,426.23\n3,050,378.36\n3,152,287.93\n3,550,401.56\n3,797,075.30\nLiabilities to ODCs\n10,419,558.83\n11,457,457.43\n10,063,539.06\n10,250,353.16\n13,378,590.41\n15,910,190.58\n16,386,469.12\n19,121,376.95\n19,430,498.30\n16,097,963.29\n19,368,092.13\n22,565,147.30\n20,948,015.21\n Reserve Deposits\n890,125.59\n1,049,647.55\n1,237,283.94\n1,401,898.97\n1,678,661.09\n2,008,569.51\n2,199,092.20\n2,444,129.79\n4,799,500.58\n5,160,139.38\n5,730,094.93\n6,659,921.67\n7,269,076.19\n Exess reserves \n9,529,433.25\n10,407,809.87\n8,826,255.12\n8,848,454.19\n11,699,929.32\n13,901,621.07\n14,187,376.93\n16,677,247.16\n14,630,997.72\n10,937,823.91\n13,637,997.20\n15,905,225.63\n13,678,939.03\nPrivate Deposits\n561,318.26\n2,790,469.91\n263,827.44\n338,113.50\n21,200.60\n384,736.66\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2021\n Provisional until audit is completed\n NB: * Other Foreign Liabilities include blocked funds amounting to USD2.2 billion assumed by the Central Bank on behalf of Government.\nTABLE 2: CENTRAL BANK SURVEY ($'000)\n \n \n \n17 \n \n \n \n \n \n TABLE 3 : OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS SURVEY ( $ '000)\nJun-20\nJul-20\nAug-20\nSep-20\nOct-20\nNov-20\nDec-20\nJan-21\nFeb-21\nMar-21\nApr-21\nMay-21\nJun-21\nNet Foreign Assets\n41,344,994.73\n57,017,065.73\n67,384,864.72\n68,733,970.12\n71,069,144.72\n75,248,543.48\n75,270,272.86\n78,105,494.23\n70,894,296.04\n77,366,267.57\n77,366,267.57\n77,366,267.57\n105,360,524.10\nClaims on Non Residents\n53,130,231.08\n72,022,862.19\n84,210,291.97\n83,986,978.02\n85,970,018.68\n90,081,991.05\n89,458,700.13\n93,882,385.99\n86,920,278.98\n92,405,865.60\n92,405,865.60\n92,405,865.60\n120,848,426.81\nOf Which: Foreign Currency\n9,729,549.76\n18,357,028.29\n28,776,016.24\n30,217,561.04\n32,235,029.76\n34,673,918.84\n39,886,775.04\n42,733,946.30\n41,025,473.91\n40,953,342.99\n40,953,342.99\n40,953,342.99\n30,255,551.49\nDeposits\n43,314,001.39\n53,559,656.10\n55,319,393.27\n53,657,586.61\n53,623,468.12\n55,308,353.64\n49,426,810.30\n50,993,755.75\n45,711,660.09\n51,250,447.13\n51,250,447.13\n51,250,447.13\n90,381,891.07\nOther\n86,679.92\n106,177.81\n114,882.47\n111,830.36\n111,520.80\n99,718.57\n145,114.78\n154,683.94\n183,144.98\n202,075.48\n202,075.48\n202,075.48\n210,984.25\nLess Liabilities to Non Residents\n11,785,236.35\n15,005,796.46\n16,825,427.25\n15,253,007.90\n14,900,873.96\n14,833,447.57\n14,188,427.27\n15,776,891.76\n16,025,982.94\n15,039,598.02\n15,039,598.02\n15,039,598.02\n15,487,902.71\nOf Which: Deposits\n3,767,028.56\n5,065,144.06\n5,996,405.81\n4,800,281.08\n4,449,027.74\n4,387,729.22\n3,826,796.90\n4,683,800.54\n4,962,383.04\n4,425,775.68\n4,425,775.68\n4,425,775.68\n4,258,022.10\nLoans\n8,018,207.80\n9,940,652.40\n10,829,021.44\n10,452,726.81\n10,451,846.22\n10,445,718.35\n10,361,630.37\n11,093,091.22\n11,063,599.89\n10,613,822.34\n10,613,822.34\n10,613,822.34\n11,229,880.61\nOther\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n56,705,559.53\n71,245,059.44\n74,011,298.35\n79,943,074.31\n91,947,346.14\n105,610,829.31\n127,131,173.37\n140,672,048.38\n153,013,944.93\n153,685,960.87\n153,685,960.87\n153,685,960.87\n194,736,649.82\nDomestic Claims\n39,405,825.66\n45,963,566.91\n53,678,911.04\n55,355,723.35\n64,456,144.91\n72,736,794.64\n83,427,964.18\n89,535,168.13\n107,162,635.34\n109,643,067.84\n109,643,067.84\n109,643,067.84\n144,215,018.58\nNet Claims on Central Government\n4,789,640.77\n5,032,498.00\n6,046,746.39\n5,154,302.32\n6,285,992.63\n7,411,541.18\n7,756,042.48\n4,885,721.32\n14,285,799.58\n12,742,043.20\n12,742,043.20\n12,742,043.20\n11,333,414.08\nClaims on Central Government\n6,269,011.77\n6,764,380.71\n6,897,574.44\n6,685,832.35\n8,085,738.13\n8,981,489.00\n12,096,069.09\n10,339,391.23\n19,074,011.73\n17,617,850.02\n17,617,850.02\n17,617,850.02\n17,628,680.44\nSecurities\n6,264,725.96\n6,760,053.73\n6,883,528.44\n6,676,225.73\n8,068,172.39\n8,961,484.35\n12,072,773.09\n10,322,702.11\n19,049,865.62\n17,602,682.71\n17,602,682.71\n17,602,682.71\n17,610,769.74\nLoans\n4,285.81\n4,326.98\n14,046.00\n9,606.62\n17,565.74\n20,004.65\n23,296.00\n16,689.12\n24,146.11\n15,167.30\n15,167.30\n15,167.30\n17,910.70\nOther \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n1,479,371.00\n1,731,882.71\n850,828.05\n1,531,530.04\n1,799,745.50\n1,569,947.81\n4,340,026.60\n5,453,669.91\n4,788,212.16\n4,875,806.82\n4,875,806.82\n4,875,806.82\n6,295,266.36\nOf which: Deposits\n1,479,371.00\n1,731,882.71\n850,828.05\n1,531,530.04\n1,799,745.50\n1,569,947.81\n4,340,026.60\n5,453,669.91\n4,788,212.16\n4,875,806.82\n4,875,806.82\n4,875,806.82\n6,295,266.36\nOther \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nClaims on Other Sectors\n34,616,184.88\n40,931,068.91\n47,632,164.65\n50,201,421.03\n58,170,152.28\n65,325,253.46\n75,671,921.69\n84,649,446.81\n92,876,835.77\n96,901,024.65\n96,901,024.65\n96,901,024.65\n132,881,604.50\nOther Financial Corporations\n554,716.67\n810,143.43\n97,708.48\n143,909.38\n1,207,134.60\n1,258,747.26\n407,927.51\n191,340.91\n178,390.27\n1,972,737.48\n1,972,737.48\n1,972,737.48\n2,638,449.64\nState and Local Government\n23,225.26\n25,961.37\n27,859.83\n35,174.26\n34,462.77\n28,449.36\n37,924.29\n28,196.82\n31,854.73\n30,050.30\n30,050.30\n30,050.30\n84,251.94\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n2,037,662.29\n1,051,666.60\n1,046,289.40\n1,050,377.14\n1,039,061.29\n1,269,961.90\n1,269,008.65\n1,264,278.21\n1,493,663.89\n1,328,960.37\n1,328,960.37\n1,328,960.37\n1,531,319.65\nPrivate Sector\n32,000,580.66\n39,043,297.50\n46,460,306.94\n48,971,960.25\n55,889,493.61\n62,768,094.94\n73,957,061.25\n83,165,630.87\n91,172,926.88\n93,569,276.49\n93,569,276.49\n93,569,276.49\n128,627,583.28\nClaims on the Central Bank\n29,919,616.89\n54,830,533.49\n55,843,634.83\n57,763,783.89\n68,012,702.35\n74,300,828.81\n77,254,382.86\n79,477,691.43\n74,589,859.15\n84,489,214.72\n84,489,214.72\n84,489,214.72\n77,498,004.69\nCurrency\n461,761.08\n690,816.60\n975,094.30\n1,084,208.81\n1,064,177.41\n1,063,605.07\n1,177,847.43\n1,483,283.31\n1,738,717.73\n1,457,136.40\n1,457,136.40\n1,457,136.40\n1,702,788.29\nReserves\n29,457,855.81\n54,139,716.89\n54,868,540.52\n56,679,575.08\n66,948,524.94\n73,237,223.74\n76,076,535.42\n77,994,408.12\n72,851,141.43\n83,032,078.32\n83,032,078.32\n83,032,078.32\n75,795,216.40\nSecurities\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nOther Claims\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nLiabilities to the Central Bank\n887,577.50\n1,387,934.10\n1,837,109.59\n1,863,123.11\n1,812,655.13\n1,489,512.69\n1,318,615.34\n391,146.93\n409,213.89\n75,373.50\n75,373.50\n75,373.50\n662,275.52\nOther Items(Net)\n11,732,305.51\n28,161,106.86\n33,674,137.93\n31,313,309.81\n38,708,845.99\n39,937,281.45\n32,232,558.32\n27,949,664.25\n28,329,335.68\n40,370,948.20\n40,370,948.20\n40,370,948.20\n26,314,097.93\nShares and Other Equity\n31,312,741.50\n36,291,671.56\n39,784,266.01\n40,345,113.68\n41,378,645.15\n44,233,235.31\n52,039,781.33\n51,086,082.23\n56,811,270.41\n60,088,130.57\n60,088,130.57\n60,088,130.57\n65,146,196.53\nLiabilities to other ressident sectors\n348,181.06\n348,728.32\n422,486.38\n372,163.87\n441,747.71\n423,616.80\n292,018.63\n376,668.85\n609,870.31\n408,850.46\n408,850.46\n408,850.46\n462,598.19\nOther Items(Net)\n-19,928,617.05\n-8,479,293.02\n-6,532,614.47\n-9,403,967.74\n-3,111,546.88\n-4,719,570.65\n-20,099,241.64\n-23,513,086.84\n-29,091,805.04\n-20,126,032.83\n-20,126,032.83\n-20,126,032.83\n-39,294,696.79\nDeposits and Securities Included in Broad Money\n98,050,554.25\n128,262,125.18\n141,396,163.08\n148,677,044.43\n163,016,490.87\n180,859,372.79\n202,401,446.22\n218,777,542.62\n223,908,240.98\n231,052,228.44\n231,052,228.44\n231,052,228.44\n300,097,173.91\nDeposits Included in Broad Money\n97,187,347.86\n \n127,237,814.07\n \n140,284,498.63\n \n147,593,137.33\n \n161,784,545.97\n \n179,622,031.80\n \n200,965,243.38\n \n217,355,104.75\n \n222,450,885.44\n \n229,411,015.11\n \n229,411,015.11\n \n229,411,015.11\n \n298,537,512.57\n \nTransferable Deposits\n93,169,652.47\n \n121,190,660.19\n \n134,852,887.37\n \n140,657,703.75\n \n153,387,406.86\n \n170,624,218.30\n \n191,058,398.68\n \n206,003,627.38\n \n208,504,172.16\n \n215,242,961.41\n \n215,242,961.41\n \n215,242,961.41\n \n277,141,914.54\n \n of which FCAs\n57,701,775.14\n \n79,076,606.18\n \n82,607,196.16\n \n88,430,395.05\n \n91,944,864.16\n \n100,147,096.67\n \n102,824,762.68\n \n108,386,216.00\n \n109,466,728.50\n \n114,435,612.97\n \n114,435,612.97\n \n114,435,612.97\n \n133,608,092.81\n \nOther Deposits\n4,017,695.39\n6,047,153.88\n5,431,611.26\n6,935,433.58\n8,397,139.11\n8,997,813.50\n9,906,844.70\n11,351,477.37\n13,946,713.28\n14,168,053.71\n14,168,053.71\n14,168,053.71\n21,395,598.04\nMoney Market Instruments\n863,206.40\n \n1,024,311.11\n \n1,111,664.44\n \n1,083,907.10\n \n1,231,944.90\n \n1,237,340.99\n \n1,436,202.84\n \n1,422,437.87\n \n1,457,355.54\n \n1,641,213.33\n \n1,641,213.33\n \n1,641,213.33\n \n1,559,661.34\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2021\n \n \n \n18 \n \n \nForeign\nTOTAL\nEnd of\nNotes\nBond\n&\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \nLocal\nOther \n Notes &\nCoin\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\n1\noca\nGovernemt\nOther2\nGovernment\nLocal \nPublic \n Institutional \nOther cliams\nContigent Assets\nOther Assets\nNon Financial \nCoins\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\nGovernment\nEnterprises\nUnits\nAssets\n2018\nJan\n23.4\n \n66.9\n \n2,528.5\n \n291.2\n \n111.9\n \n81.9\n2,336.0\n34.5\n23.5\n65.9\n26.3\n20.6\n155.3\n3,461.2\n74.6\n501.0\n457.8\n700.8\n10,961.1\nFeb\n20.0\n \n46.8\n \n2,516.8\n \n347.6\n \n114.2\n \n96.2\n2,313.4\n33.5\n23.5\n66.1\n24.3\n21.1\n145.4\n3,527.1\n22.2\n507.8\n434.5\n697.8\n10,958.3\nMar\n16.7\n \n57.9\n \n2,457.7\n \n312.8\n \n139.2\n \n99.5\n2,434.8\n32.8\n23.5\n66.7\n19.2\n15.9\n127.5\n3,637.8\n24.2\n504.1\n487.4\n710.3\n11,168.1\nApr\n14.9\n \n61.9\n \n2,423.5\n \n337.0\n \n120.8\n \n78.5\n2,558.9\n32.0\n24.7\n67.0\n13.4\n20.9\n121.2\n3,674.0\n22.1\n532.0\n459.2\n715.7\n11,277.5\nMay\n14.2\n \n71.7\n \n2,543.0\n \n477.8\n \n138.6\n \n85.7\n2,814.9\n30.9\n25.0\n66.9\n8.4\n20.9\n134.4\n3,740.3\n12.0\n458.9\n457.2\n718.2\n11,819.1\nJun\n9.0\n \n58.5\n \n3,081.0\n \n509.8\n \n120.0\n \n84.1\n2,865.3\n30.1\n26.2\n66.5\n7.4\n19.4\n196.4\n3,829.3\n38.6\n551.4\n448.1\n730.7\n12,671.8\nJul\n20.6\n \n61.9\n \n3,450.6\n \n466.4\n \n111.6\n \n95.4\n3,291.4\n33.3\n0.0\n67.5\n4.5\n21.0\n182.0\n3,500.6\n153.9\n611.4\n472.5\n732.0\n13,276.5\nAug\n23.1\n \n72.3\n \n3,475.7\n \n377.8\n \n105.3\n \n66.3\n3,362.8\n32.2\n0.0\n67.3\n7.1\n20.6\n186.7\n3,585.1\n102.0\n647.7\n489.9\n736.1\n13,358.0\nSep\n18.2\n \n61.5\n \n3,781.6\n \n398.1\n \n159.1\n \n78.0\n3,145.7\n31.2\n45.2\n68.1\n5.4\n20.4\n212.2\n3,734.2\n119.7\n637.4\n527.8\n742.6\n13,786.4\nOct\n39.9\n \n70.4\n \n3,771.3\n \n368.3\n \n185.5\n \n51.4\n3,105.9\n30.2\n45.2\n68.4\n4.6\n9.4\n188.8\n3,838.0\n132.0\n647.5\n537.8\n743.0\n13,837.7\nNov\n30.6\n \n84.6\n \n3,696.3\n \n300.6\n \n209.8\n \n63.9\n3,172.9\n28.9\n45.2\n68.7\n7.0\n8.1\n217.7\n3,813.2\n141.9\n633.2\n581.9\n742.4\n13,846.8\nDec\n20.5\n \n94.5\n \n3,949.5\n \n439.6\n \n235.5\n \n74.8\n3,044.1\n28.0\n43.4\n69.2\n6.2\n9.2\n204.3\n3,870.5\n151.2\n573.8\n612.5\n812.4\n14,239.0\n2019\nJan\n49.0\n \n113.4\n \n3,901.0\n \n401.9\n \n261.6\n \n46.1\n3,038.3\n27.3\n94.6\n68.7\n4.4\n8.1\n189.2\n3,773.5\n109.1\n517.2\n592.3\n827.7\n14,023.5\nFeb\n59.7\n \n256.8\n \n3,764.8\n \n357.1\n \n570.4\n \n205.7\n3,076.4\n26.5\n60.5\n2.0\n5.8\n7.7\n208.3\n3,991.5\n100.5\n490.7\n669.1\n880.0\n14,733.6\nMar\n62.5\n \n263.2\n \n3,891.0\n \n432.9\n \n739.3\n \n55.1\n3,028.8\n25.5\n61.5\n4.5\n4.3\n9.5\n340.7\n3,845.0\n129.0\n523.7\n954.5\n1,205.2\n15,576.2\nApr\n45.2\n \n363.5\n \n4,153.9\n \n578.9\n \n1,031.9\n \n91.7\n2,921.3\n25.0\n61.8\n4.0\n4.0\n9.6\n407.8\n3,899.7\n131.9\n620.5\n1,135.4\n1,304.8\n16,790.9\nMay\n98.7\n \n484.2\n \n4,089.2\n \n694.1\n \n1,890.1\n \n154.1\n2,912.7\n23.9\n62.1\n4.2\n3.9\n9.4\n636.8\n4,303.9\n144.3\n910.1\n2,031.0\n1,532.3\n19,985.1\nJun\n126.3\n \n882.2\n \n4,518.6\n \n560.2\n \n2,383.0\n \n538.9\n2,918.5\n22.6\n63.1\n6.6\n3.9\n8.7\n929.4\n5,011.5\n163.0\n1,606.5\n1,621.9\n2,120.4\n23,485.3\nJul\n232.4\n \n968.8\n \n5,605.6\n \n370.4\n \n3,738.0\n \n801.9\n2,962.9\n22.2\n103.4\n5.5\n2.2\n9.0\n164.6\n5,364.7\n228.7\n1,587.7\n2,124.1\n2,345.3\n26,637.3\nAug\n184.4\n \n1,150.4\n \n7,956.5\n \n527.8\n \n3,904.2\n \n1,050.7\n3,409.1\n21.5\n103.9\n6.8\n1.0\n9.2\n212.5\n5,764.9\n263.2\n2,614.6\n2,149.5\n2,623.2\n31,953.4\nSep\n124.5\n \n2,108.5\n \n9,128.1\n \n874.0\n \n5,678.3\n \n1,575.7\n3,577.4\n20.9\n27.0\n6.5\n1.4\n9.4\n187.5\n6,456.9\n389.5\n3,707.8\n3,665.5\n3,549.9\n41,088.9\nOct\n144.3\n \n1,906.0\n \n11,613.0\n \n2,511.0\n \n7,644.9\n \n907.0\n3,749.0\n20.2\n27.1\n5.3\n1.1\n7.9\n254.8\n7,393.9\n400.9\n4,081.1\n2,230.5\n3,580.5\n46,478.4\nNov\n128.8\n \n2,243.1\n \n11,417.7\n \n2,236.3\n \n8,417.4\n \n940.7\n4,150.2\n19.6\n27.1\n11.8\n1.4\n8.7\n248.8\n9,260.2\n442.8\n3,148.3\n2,272.9\n4,208.0\n49,183.9\nDec\n169.8\n \n2,526.2\n \n13,994.1\n \n1,254.7\n \n8,415.7\n \n1,984.1\n4,090.0\n18.2\n24.7\n20.7\n1.3\n8.1\n268.6\n10,562.1\n556.7\n4,867.7\n3,517.6\n8,485.9\n60,766.3\n2020\nJan\n183.4\n \n3,176.6\n \n13,217.3\n \n1,073.2\n \n8,142.0\n \n1,811.4\n4,372.4\n20.1\n125.5\n15.0\n5.1\n12.2\n326.1\n12,115.8\n946.9\n2,965.9\n4,191.6\n9,691.7\n62,392.3\nFeb\n267.1\n \n3,136.4\n \n13,817.0\n \n1,504.5\n \n8,642.5\n \n1,532.9\n4,293.1\n20.1\n117.4\n15.5\n5.1\n11.6\n329.5\n13,632.6\n973.7\n5,441.7\n12,758.8\n10,338.7\n76,838.2\nMar\n263.6\n \n3,607.6\n \n16,167.1\n \n2,214.4\n \n12,681.9\n \n2,497.5\n4,775.6\n19.2\n0.1\n20.8\n4.4\n11.4\n765.8\n16,323.6\n1,103.1\n7,917.3\n7,042.4\n11,309.5\n86,725.4\nApr\n298.5\n \n3,642.9\n \n17,926.4\n \n1,523.3\n \n13,697.1\n \n3,056.3\n4,716.9\n18.1\n0.1\n18.4\n4.5\n9.7\n834.7\n17,280.6\n1,104.9\n7,642.8\n8,200.2\n11,988.1\n91,963.5\nMay\n330.0\n \n3,581.8\n \n21,376.4\n \n1,749.6\n \n15,757.4\n \n3,130.4\n4,579.1\n17.0\n0.1\n45.8\n4.5\n9.6\n768.0\n20,291.6\n1,280.4\n7,042.0\n8,823.5\n12,139.9\n100,927.2\nJun\n606.6\n \n9,584.7\n \n29,457.9\n \n3,974.7\n \n35,786.5\n \n7,527.5\n6,264.7\n13.8\n0.1\n90.1\n4.3\n9.4\n2,010.8\n30,567.5\n2,011.1\n24,299.3\n17,433.0\n23,843.0\n193,485.0\nJul\n690.8\n \n18,357.0\n \n54,139.7\n \n5,578.7\n \n42,159.7\n \n11,399.9\n6,760.1\n13.4\n0.0\n74.6\n4.3\n12.6\n1,025.8\n36,840.5\n3,070.4\n28,551.1\n14,418.6\n24,902.0\n247,999.1\nAug\n975.1\n \n28,776.0\n \n54,868.5\n \n4,623.1\n \n41,100.2\n \n14,219.2\n6,883.5\n13.1\n0.0\n39.1\n14.0\n14.7\n1,046.3\n43,502.9\n3,130.9\n25,354.6\n14,240.7\n26,391.3\n265,193.4\nSep\n1,084.2\n \n30,217.6\n \n56,679.6\n \n4,426.6\n \n39,530.8\n \n14,126.8\n6,676.2\n12.9\n0.0\n107.8\n9.6\n22.3\n1,050.4\n45,297.5\n3,822.4\n28,289.4\n20,662.0\n27,055.5\n279,071.4\nOct\n1,064.2\n \n32,235.0\n \n66,948.5\n \n4,457.3\n \n40,092.7\n \n13,530.7\n8,068.2\n12.3\n20.1\n222.0\n17.6\n22.2\n1,019.0\n53,116.5\n3,869.6\n29,764.7\n19,044.4\n27,327.7\n300,832.8\nNov\n1,063.6\n \n34,673.9\n \n73,237.2\n \n4,211.3\n \n41,173.6\n \n14,134.7\n8,961.5\n11.6\n0.0\n268.2\n20.0\n16.8\n1,269.9\n60,179.7\n3,678.7\n29,821.2\n19,694.9\n27,426.0\n319,842.9\nDec\n1,177.8\n \n39,886.8\n \n76,076.5\n \n5,771.7\n \n38,623.2\n \n10,803.6\n12,072.8\n11.2\n0.0\n252.2\n23.3\n26.8\n1,269.0\n69,691.0\n4,566.9\n29,608.0\n15,822.0\n36,808.1\n342,490.8\n2021\nJan\n1,483.3\n \n42,733.9\n \n77,994.4\n \n13,109.2\n \n40,071.8\n \n10,922.0\n10,322.7\n10.2\n0.0\n212.4\n16.7\n18.0\n1,264.3\n77,984.0\n5,315.2\n25,036.2\n15,951.2\n41,028.5\n363,474.0\nFeb\n1,735.4\n \n41,180.7\n \n76,140.3\n \n17,748.1\n \n39,141.4\n \n6,341.4\n15,612.1\n9.2\n0.0\n238.0\n24.1\n22.7\n1,493.7\n84,845.3\n5,413.6\n28,339.2\n19,441.2\n42,761.3\n380,487.7\nMar\n1,457.1\n \n40,953.3\n \n83,032.1\n \n6,945.5\n \n42,516.8\n \n8,733.6\n17,602.7\n8.4\n19.2\n449.7\n15.2\n21.7\n1,400.3\n90,291.7\n4,912.2\n32,908.1\n22,849.5\n40,104.9\n394,221.9\nApr\n1,699.7\n \n40,964.4\n \n85,330.2\n \n6,844.8\n \n49,733.4\n \n7,679.0\n19,384.3\n7.7\n19.2\n571.8\n19.9\n12.7\n1,336.7\n104,118.1\n5,432.6\n34,537.9\n25,207.8\n41,034.6\n423,934.8\nMay\n1,906.1\n \n30,579.1\n \n94,330.9\n \n7,907.2\n \n63,644.8\n \n11,582.4\n19,197.1\n7.0\n152.7\n611.0\n21.8\n16.6\n1,263.7\n111,185.7\n5,063.0\n35,592.3\n24,975.4\n40,256.6\n448,293.6\nJun\n1,702.8\n \n30,255.6\n \n75,795.2\n \n25,605.9\n \n72,780.6\n \n17,601.3\n17,610.8\n6.5\n19.5\n1,385.2\n17.9\n77.8\n1,511.9\n125,592.3\n5,203.8\n26,856.5\n29,616.4\n42,418.7\n474,058.5\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2021\nNotes\n1.Government securities includes treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households and other financial corporations.\nPublic \nEnterprises\nTABLE 4.1: OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS -ASSETS\n$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \n \n19 \n \n \nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nCapital\nContigent\nOther\nTOTAL\nand\nLiablities\nLiablities\nEnd of\nDemand\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nReserves\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\n2018\nJan\n4,640.2\n1,008.1\n1,454.0\n7,102.2\n406.5\n107.3\n7,616.1\n65.1\n444.8\n115.1\n49.1\n2.6\n1,645.3\n501.0\n522.1\n10,961.1\nFeb\n4,633.7\n989.2\n1,458.8\n7,081.7\n418.7\n101.2\n7,601.7\n75.4\n435.4\n111.2\n92.8\n2.9\n1,620.1\n507.8\n511.0\n10,958.3\nMar\n4,732.9\n1,007.5\n1,491.0\n7,231.4\n365.0\n114.7\n7,711.0\n77.3\n460.8\n140.5\n89.2\n6.9\n1,654.7\n504.1\n523.4\n11,168.1\nApr\n4,907.7\n1,066.6\n1,374.6\n7,349.0\n387.8\n95.6\n7,832.3\n84.0\n453.1\n82.4\n68.8\n16.1\n1,641.9\n532.0\n567.0\n11,277.5\nMay\n5,172.9\n1,138.2\n1,442.5\n7,753.6\n442.8\n107.4\n8,303.8\n88.0\n554.0\n101.5\n94.9\n19.9\n1,671.5\n458.9\n526.5\n11,819.1\nJune\n5,650.6\n1,274.7\n1,459.1\n8,384.4\n438.0\n89.2\n8,911.6\n66.8\n554.0\n119.8\n173.4\n21.6\n1,707.5\n551.4\n565.7\n12,671.8\nJuly\n5,902.3\n1,415.3\n1,501.5\n8,819.1\n424.4\n33.1\n9,276.7\n89.5\n545.1\n118.9\n132.9\n32.6\n1,846.0\n611.4\n623.4\n13,276.5\nAug\n6,005.7\n1,362.6\n1,524.2\n8,892.5\n399.6\n32.4\n9,324.5\n66.5\n535.4\n137.0\n119.5\n33.3\n1,882.9\n647.7\n611.2\n13,358.0\nSep\n6,281.7\n1,421.8\n1,489.0\n9,192.4\n439.0\n44.6\n9,676.1\n52.4\n559.4\n142.2\n129.1\n46.6\n1,913.4\n637.4\n629.7\n13,786.4\nOct\n6,345.7\n1,390.0\n1,427.8\n9,163.5\n435.2\n52.2\n9,650.8\n61.7\n581.4\n147.6\n93.4\n42.0\n1,957.6\n647.5\n655.7\n13,837.7\nNov\n6,419.8\n1,329.4\n1,430.4\n9,179.6\n366.8\n48.7\n9,595.1\n50.9\n543.1\n213.7\n74.8\n42.3\n1,991.6\n633.2\n702.1\n13,846.8\nDec\n6,601.1\n1,322.2\n1,508.9\n9,432.2\n394.5\n41.3\n9,868.0\n58.6\n524.7\n229.6\n187.8\n39.0\n2,057.7\n573.8\n699.7\n14,239.0\n2019\nJan\n6,626.6\n1,155.9\n1,466.8\n9,249.4\n381.0\n42.2\n9,672.5\n59.3\n530.5\n239.5\n188.3\n39.2\n2,047.0\n517.2\n729.8\n14,023.5\nFeb\n7,168.7\n1,155.1\n1,473.2\n9,797.1\n387.8\n44.5\n10,229.3\n71.8\n782.0\n158.9\n151.7\n42.6\n2,145.1\n490.7\n661.5\n14,733.6\nMar\n7,435.2\n1,127.0\n1,437.1\n9,999.2\n372.7\n47.9\n10,419.9\n74.5\n933.8\n165.8\n140.9\n42.7\n2,349.0\n523.7\n925.8\n15,576.2\nApr\n7,968.0\n1,243.3\n1,795.8\n11,007.1\n390.9\n55.9\n11,453.8\n90.8\n652.7\n148.3\n173.5\n28.8\n2,551.4\n620.5\n1,071.0\n16,790.9\nMay\n9,316.8\n1,379.0\n1,932.4\n12,628.2\n462.9\n48.9\n13,139.9\n139.4\n1,053.9\n148.8\n206.7\n46.5\n2,556.6\n910.1\n1,783.2\n19,985.1\nJun\n11,021.9\n1,573.5\n1,737.2\n14,332.6\n422.0\n44.5\n14,799.2\n171.7\n1,607.6\n150.3\n216.7\n43.6\n3,240.7\n1,606.5\n1,649.0\n23,485.3\nJul\n13,014.4\n1,661.3\n1,949.2\n16,624.9\n432.6\n50.6\n17,108.1\n168.2\n1,710.5\n152.0\n225.8\n27.4\n3,522.6\n1,587.7\n2,135.1\n26,637.3\nAug\n15,189.7\n1,798.7\n1,922.5\n18,910.9\n639.1\n59.2\n19,609.3\n202.9\n2,064.4\n155.0\n116.2\n28.0\n4,061.0\n2,614.6\n3,102.0\n31,953.4\nSep\n18,834.0\n2,049.2\n1,925.3\n22,808.5\n549.2\n54.5\n23,412.2\n219.9\n2,989.7\n155.9\n182.3\n23.3\n5,510.0\n3,707.8\n4,887.7\n41,088.9\nOct\n23,441.5\n2,298.0\n1,891.9\n27,631.4\n526.0\n68.6\n28,226.0\n205.7\n3,020.7\n159.1\n211.3\n24.6\n5,937.5\n4,081.1\n4,612.3\n46,478.4\nNov\n25,114.5\n2,868.9\n2,123.8\n30,107.2\n878.6\n99.1\n31,084.9\n235.1\n2,966.0\n175.3\n275.5\n50.5\n6,404.3\n3,148.3\n4,844.2\n49,183.9\nDec\n27,842.2\n3,238.9\n2,192.0\n33,273.1\n1,067.2\n118.5\n34,458.8\n244.0\n3,020.4\n179.5\n326.4\n119.4\n10,212.4\n4,867.7\n7,337.7\n60,766.3\n2020\nJan\n28,570.4\n3,605.9\n2,358.3\n34,534.5\n1,299.1\n92.6\n35,926.3\n255.6\n3,114.7\n185.8\n336.1\n140.1\n12,285.7\n2,965.9\n7,182.1\n62,392.3\nFeb\n37,082.9\n3,939.6\n2,215.0\n43,237.5\n1,674.9\n78.2\n44,990.7\n260.1\n3,357.7\n189.6\n767.7\n154.9\n12,930.2\n5,441.7\n8,745.6\n76,838.2\nMar\n37,923.6\n4,998.7\n2,361.6\n45,283.9\n1,721.0\n409.0\n47,413.9\n476.8\n4,874.8\n258.4\n314.6\n339.9\n15,172.3\n7,917.3\n9,957.3\n86,725.4\nApr\n42,102.4\n5,060.0\n2,530.7\n49,693.1\n1,805.2\n516.3\n52,014.6\n337.6\n4,931.9\n346.4\n312.9\n233.2\n16,105.4\n7,642.8\n10,038.7\n91,963.5\nMay\n48,595.9\n6,274.7\n2,847.3\n57,717.9\n1,840.2\n630.7\n60,188.8\n359.2\n5,129.7\n536.7\n469.1\n365.4\n16,562.4\n7,042.0\n10,273.9\n100,927.2\nJun\n86,454.7\n6,715.3\n4,040.8\n97,210.8\n2,277.4\n1,479.4\n100,967.5\n863.2\n11,761.8\n887.6\n959.9\n348.2\n32,058.2\n24,299.3\n21,339.3\n193,485.0\nJul\n113,233.5\n7,957.5\n6,089.8\n127,280.8\n2,997.8\n1,731.9\n132,010.5\n1,024.3\n14,962.8\n1,387.9\n2,114.7\n348.7\n37,319.8\n28,551.1\n30,279.2\n247,999.1\nAug\n126,039.2\n8,814.1\n5,476.0\n140,329.3\n2,942.4\n850.8\n144,122.5\n1,111.7\n16,780.7\n1,837.1\n3,844.1\n422.5\n40,894.6\n25,354.6\n30,825.6\n265,193.4\nSep\n130,929.6\n9,728.6\n6,981.5\n147,639.7\n2,655.6\n1,531.5\n151,826.9\n1,083.9\n15,206.4\n1,863.1\n2,956.8\n372.2\n42,400.0\n28,289.4\n35,072.8\n279,071.4\nOct\n141,293.3\n12,094.6\n8,429.2\n161,817.1\n2,769.1\n1,799.7\n166,385.9\n1,231.9\n14,868.4\n1,812.7\n4,513.6\n441.7\n43,466.4\n29,764.7\n38,347.5\n300,832.8\nNov\n156,892.5\n13,732.4\n9,029.7\n179,654.6\n2,622.0\n1,569.9\n183,846.6\n1,237.3\n14,800.8\n1,489.5\n5,726.8\n423.6\n46,209.7\n29,821.2\n36,287.5\n319,842.9\nDec\n174,270.2\n16,788.9\n9,949.2\n201,008.3\n2,806.1\n4,340.0\n208,154.4\n1,436.2\n14,145.4\n1,318.6\n757.0\n292.0\n54,752.7\n29,608.0\n32,026.4\n342,490.8\n2021\nJan\n188,337.3\n17,667.3\n11,376.7\n217,381.3\n2,730.8\n5,453.7\n225,565.8\n1,422.4\n15,750.7\n391.1\n600.9\n376.7\n58,123.9\n25,036.2\n36,206.3\n363,474.0\nFeb\n189,154.3\n18,991.1\n14,072.8\n222,218.2\n2,959.1\n4,788.2\n229,965.5\n1,457.4\n15,908.6\n409.2\n581.4\n609.9\n63,583.8\n28,339.2\n39,632.7\n380,487.7\nMar\n193,674.2\n21,569.9\n14,209.4\n229,453.4\n4,691.2\n4,875.8\n239,020.5\n1,641.2\n14,997.2\n75.4\n1,378.2\n408.9\n67,061.8\n32,908.1\n36,730.7\n394,221.9\nApr\n219,936.5\n23,818.3\n13,746.7\n257,501.5\n2,725.1\n5,382.5\n265,609.2\n1,503.8\n15,748.4\n176.5\n939.0\n409.9\n68,812.8\n34,537.9\n36,197.4\n423,934.8\nMay\n232,585.8\n26,296.1\n18,415.5\n277,297.4\n2,205.9\n6,832.6\n286,335.9\n1,525.8\n16,063.1\n654.2\n540.1\n429.0\n69,567.0\n35,592.3\n37,586.2\n448,293.6\nJun\n249,167.5\n27,977.7\n21,449.6\n298,594.8\n2,906.1\n6,295.3\n307,796.2\n1,559.7\n15,430.6\n662.3\n939.0\n462.6\n72,403.8\n26,856.5\n47,947.9\n474,058.5\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2021\nTABLE 4.2 : OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS - LIABILITIES \nDeposits\nAmounts Owing to\n$ millions\n \n \n \n20 \n \n \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nForeign\nBond\nNotes\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \nLocal\nPublic\nOther \nContigent \nNon Financial \n Notes &\n&\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment1\nLocal Governemt\nPublic Enterprises\nOther2\nGovernment\nGovernment\nEnterprises\n Institutional Units3\nOther claims\nAssets\nOther Assets\nAssets\nCoins\nCoin\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\n2018\nJan\n22.40\n \n64.10\n \n2,294.49\n \n192.08\n \n103.42\n \n81.91\n \n2,143.23\n \n-\n \n23.45\n \n65.90\n \n26.32\n \n20.59\n \n154.85\n \n2,451.11\n \n28.68\n \n500.96\n \n294.22\n \n538.92\n \n9,006.6\n \nFeb\n18.34\n \n43.97\n \n2,296.76\n \n223.72\n \n108.28\n \n96.17\n \n2,109.34\n \n-\n \n23.45\n \n66.10\n \n24.29\n \n21.11\n \n145.03\n \n2,461.49\n \n28.67\n \n507.82\n \n290.62\n \n536.35\n \n9,001.5\n \nMar\n14.81\n \n53.62\n \n2,238.77\n \n240.67\n \n124.48\n \n99.51\n \n2,164.00\n \n-\n \n23.45\n \n66.69\n \n19.16\n \n15.90\n \n127.10\n \n2,535.82\n \n30.40\n \n504.13\n \n325.78\n \n552.34\n \n9,136.6\n \nApr\n13.47\n \n56.67\n \n2,207.91\n \n274.97\n \n116.75\n \n78.50\n \n2,314.90\n \n-\n \n24.75\n \n66.97\n \n13.44\n \n20.89\n \n120.77\n \n2,519.81\n \n28.31\n \n531.98\n \n298.96\n \n554.95\n \n9,244.0\n \nMay\n12.85\n \n62.77\n \n2,308.95\n \n339.50\n \n130.13\n \n85.74\n \n2,562.36\n \n-\n \n24.97\n \n66.94\n \n8.44\n \n20.88\n \n134.01\n \n2,556.25\n \n23.90\n \n458.93\n \n307.90\n \n555.31\n \n9,659.8\n \nJune\n7.48\n \n52.61\n \n2,848.51\n \n331.76\n \n117.26\n \n84.05\n \n2,538.32\n \n-\n \n26.19\n \n66.55\n \n7.44\n \n19.43\n \n196.00\n \n2,662.21\n \n25.46\n \n551.39\n \n302.93\n \n563.41\n \n10,401.0\n \nJuly\n17.85\n \n54.25\n \n3,189.62\n \n281.13\n \n109.31\n \n95.43\n \n2,949.15\n \n-\n \n-\n \n67.49\n \n4.51\n \n21.01\n \n181.99\n \n2,414.59\n \n26.03\n \n611.36\n \n322.53\n \n565.15\n \n10,911.4\n \nAug\n21.01\n \n67.83\n \n3,196.71\n \n232.34\n \n102.46\n \n66.26\n \n3,014.90\n \n-\n \n-\n \n67.29\n \n7.05\n \n20.62\n \n186.74\n \n2,490.99\n \n29.82\n \n647.67\n \n329.42\n \n566.33\n \n11,047.4\n \nSep\n16.25\n \n58.19\n \n3,487.91\n \n305.30\n \n137.84\n \n78.01\n \n2,789.78\n \n-\n \n45.21\n \n68.09\n \n5.42\n \n20.39\n \n212.17\n \n2,577.06\n \n36.68\n \n637.41\n \n357.43\n \n571.83\n \n11,405.0\n \nOct\n33.06\n \n67.98\n \n3,505.83\n \n272.14\n \n173.15\n \n51.45\n \n2,728.83\n \n-\n \n45.21\n \n68.41\n \n4.59\n \n9.35\n \n188.83\n \n2,697.37\n \n38.71\n \n647.52\n \n353.24\n \n569.20\n \n11,454.9\n \nNov\n25.84\n \n81.42\n \n3,384.38\n \n264.64\n \n198.18\n \n63.91\n \n2,793.90\n \n-\n \n45.21\n \n68.65\n \n6.99\n \n8.13\n \n217.69\n \n2,672.32\n \n46.06\n \n633.21\n \n406.55\n \n569.81\n \n11,486.9\n \nDec\n18.17\n \n89.91\n \n3,736.98\n \n317.34\n \n224.44\n \n74.84\n \n2,633.69\n \n-\n \n43.37\n \n69.16\n \n6.20\n \n9.18\n \n204.31\n \n2,707.60\n \n53.75\n \n573.76\n \n406.16\n \n633.85\n \n11,802.7\n \n2019\nJan\n42.05\n \n106.91\n \n3,766.70\n \n338.09\n \n249.77\n \n46.14\n \n2,621.20\n \n-\n \n61.02\n \n68.66\n \n4.41\n \n8.06\n \n189.15\n \n2,594.53\n \n33.84\n \n517.24\n \n428.82\n \n649.94\n \n11,726.5\n \nFeb\n52.63\n \n238.67\n \n3,601.94\n \n293.36\n \n549.59\n \n205.65\n \n2,675.29\n \n-\n \n60.52\n \n2.00\n \n5.84\n \n7.71\n \n208.31\n \n2,784.17\n \n31.04\n \n490.74\n \n472.78\n \n696.82\n \n12,377.1\n \nMar\n59.17\n \n244.62\n \n3,729.81\n \n393.22\n \n712.08\n \n55.05\n \n2,635.68\n \n-\n \n61.52\n \n4.53\n \n4.27\n \n9.53\n \n340.66\n \n2,660.90\n \n25.33\n \n523.72\n \n755.57\n \n971.53\n \n13,187.2\n \nApr\n40.82\n \n331.97\n \n3,876.83\n \n492.10\n \n981.80\n \n91.75\n \n2,590.97\n \n-\n \n61.79\n \n3.95\n \n3.98\n \n9.62\n \n407.85\n \n2,721.57\n \n24.55\n \n620.52\n \n935.27\n \n1,002.47\n \n14,197.8\n \nMay\n94.59\n \n444.70\n \n3,886.07\n \n571.50\n \n1,747.69\n \n154.08\n \n2,508.43\n \n-\n \n62.12\n \n4.20\n \n3.93\n \n9.43\n \n636.78\n \n3,056.86\n \n34.46\n \n910.14\n \n1,832.95\n \n1,142.77\n \n17,100.7\n \nJun\n119.69\n \n810.71\n \n4,104.17\n \n413.18\n \n2,244.98\n \n538.88\n \n2,596.97\n \n-\n \n63.09\n \n6.62\n \n3.89\n \n8.73\n \n929.36\n \n3,667.45\n \n37.02\n \n1,606.53\n \n1,374.23\n \n1,621.33\n \n20,146.8\n \nJul\n224.75\n \n791.31\n \n5,081.19\n \n275.44\n \n3,602.89\n \n801.93\n \n2,640.55\n \n-\n \n103.36\n \n5.49\n \n2.18\n \n9.00\n \n164.58\n \n4,043.75\n \n32.65\n \n1,587.68\n \n1,873.44\n \n1,722.66\n \n22,962.9\n \nAug\n178.74\n \n1,054.06\n \n7,123.10\n \n461.83\n \n3,778.75\n \n1,050.74\n \n3,106.90\n \n-\n \n103.86\n \n6.78\n \n1.04\n \n9.21\n \n212.50\n \n4,430.78\n \n37.42\n \n2,614.64\n \n1,744.16\n \n1,989.27\n \n27,903.8\n \nSep\n108.51\n \n1,915.41\n \n8,246.09\n \n676.17\n \n5,563.16\n \n1,575.75\n \n3,240.85\n \n-\n \n26.96\n \n6.47\n \n1.37\n \n9.40\n \n187.53\n \n4,993.71\n \n42.30\n \n3,707.80\n \n3,074.10\n \n2,440.63\n \n35,816.2\n \nOct\n138.01\n \n1,702.35\n \n10,537.81\n \n2,437.08\n \n7,376.80\n \n906.98\n \n3,416.23\n \n-\n \n27.05\n \n5.29\n \n1.15\n \n7.94\n \n254.84\n \n5,859.32\n \n41.94\n \n4,081.09\n \n1,658.19\n \n2,434.21\n \n40,886.3\n \nNov\n113.92\n \n2,078.54\n \n10,430.55\n \n2,073.35\n \n7,977.27\n \n940.70\n \n3,737.72\n \n-\n \n27.15\n \n11.83\n \n1.37\n \n8.74\n \n248.79\n \n7,670.96\n \n42.07\n \n3,148.28\n \n1,627.27\n \n3,059.40\n \n43,197.9\n \nDec\n158.44\n \n2,300.01\n \n12,821.54\n \n934.73\n \n7,898.48\n \n1,984.08\n \n3,716.31\n \n-\n \n24.75\n \n20.65\n \n1.33\n \n8.11\n \n268.61\n \n8,976.00\n \n61.84\n \n4,867.67\n \n2,740.16\n \n6,935.56\n \n53,718.3\n \n2020\nJan\n165.80\n \n2,845.62\n \n12,018.43\n \n708.00\n \n7,706.57\n \n1,811.38\n \n4,029.43\n \n-\n \n125.52\n \n14.97\n \n5.11\n \n12.17\n \n326.11\n \n10,766.91\n \n77.59\n \n2,965.93\n \n3,395.90\n \n8,058.15\n \n55,033.6\n \nFeb\n251.70\n \n2,756.57\n \n12,731.97\n \n889.16\n \n8,264.76\n \n1,532.87\n \n3,877.19\n \n-\n \n117.45\n \n13.99\n \n5.15\n \n11.56\n \n329.47\n \n11,656.91\n \n88.37\n \n5,441.70\n \n11,907.90\n \n8,653.69\n \n68,530.4\n \nMar\n242.41\n \n3,063.92\n \n14,545.58\n \n1,948.14\n \n12,381.17\n \n2,497.47\n \n4,373.76\n \n-\n \n0.08\n \n20.23\n \n4.39\n \n11.39\n \n765.82\n \n14,041.67\n \n127.46\n \n7,917.31\n \n5,718.53\n \n9,244.62\n \n76,904.0\n \nApr\n263.29\n \n3,147.75\n \n16,673.44\n \n1,287.51\n \n13,285.14\n \n3,056.32\n \n4,235.96\n \n-\n \n0.08\n \n18.39\n \n4.47\n \n9.75\n \n834.72\n \n14,864.30\n \n129.90\n \n7,642.80\n \n6,534.14\n \n9,703.93\n \n81,691.9\n \nMay\n284.33\n \n3,144.57\n \n19,827.46\n \n1,553.68\n \n15,003.29\n \n3,130.38\n \n4,160.50\n \n-\n \n0.12\n \n45.79\n \n4.53\n \n9.61\n \n768.01\n \n17,762.27\n \n143.44\n \n7,042.04\n \n6,012.40\n \n9,845.09\n \n88,737.5\n \nJun\n515.11\n \n8,372.39\n \n26,368.55\n \n3,570.85\n \n34,550.44\n \n7,527.46\n \n5,841.98\n \n-\n \n0.12\n \n90.14\n \n4.29\n \n9.41\n \n2,010.79\n \n26,638.87\n \n215.56\n \n24,299.33\n \n14,590.26\n \n18,983.05\n \n173,588.6\n \nJul\n577.99\n \n16,536.53\n \n49,470.13\n \n4,219.81\n \n40,259.84\n \n11,399.93\n \n6,357.84\n \n-\n \n-\n \n74.57\n \n4.33\n \n12.61\n \n1,025.78\n \n33,054.99\n \n229.06\n \n28,551.07\n \n10,247.64\n \n19,646.49\n \n221,668.6\n \nAug\n821.16\n \n26,519.73\n \n49,165.59\n \n4,265.44\n \n38,763.72\n \n14,219.24\n \n6,484.68\n \n-\n \n-\n \n39.07\n \n14.05\n \n14.74\n \n1,046.29\n \n38,741.31\n \n231.00\n \n25,354.64\n \n9,460.49\n \n19,961.16\n \n235,102.3\n \nSep\n891.26\n \n27,646.41\n \n51,169.67\n \n3,898.65\n \n38,420.20\n \n14,126.83\n \n6,354.19\n \n-\n \n-\n \n107.40\n \n9.61\n \n22.30\n \n1,050.38\n \n41,088.91\n \n228.95\n \n28,289.36\n \n17,608.70\n \n19,375.08\n \n250,287.9\n \nOct\n896.48\n \n29,309.79\n \n60,589.19\n \n3,602.58\n \n38,877.31\n \n13,530.74\n \n7,763.97\n \n-\n \n20.06\n \n109.83\n \n17.57\n \n22.18\n \n1,019.00\n \n48,440.92\n \n268.07\n \n29,764.70\n \n15,978.22\n \n19,616.63\n \n269,827.2\n \nNov\n919.42\n \n31,596.89\n \n67,899.10\n \n3,494.87\n \n39,693.38\n \n14,134.74\n \n7,098.29\n \n-\n \n0.02\n \n110.37\n \n20.00\n \n16.81\n \n1,269.94\n \n54,496.74\n \n259.90\n \n29,821.16\n \n16,683.48\n \n19,526.70\n \n287,041.8\n \nDec\n1,019.76\n \n36,507.59\n \n70,392.07\n \n4,949.48\n \n37,346.17\n \n10,803.58\n \n9,985.57\n \n-\n \n-\n \n1.18\n \n23.30\n \n26.76\n \n1,269.01\n \n62,953.03\n \n718.16\n \n29,608.01\n \n12,793.91\n \n28,230.82\n \n306,628.4\n \n2021\nJan\n1,237.43\n \n39,565.64\n \n71,463.64\n \n12,288.89\n \n39,092.85\n \n10,921.99\n \n8,281.80\n \n-\n \n-\n \n1.18\n \n16.67\n \n18.01\n \n1,264.28\n \n71,090.96\n \n718.83\n \n25,036.22\n \n12,333.21\n \n32,123.11\n \n325,454.7\n \nFeb\n1,320.27\n \n38,100.03\n \n69,341.48\n \n16,867.76\n \n38,108.83\n \n6,341.39\n \n12,518.15\n \n-\n \n-\n \n1.26\n \n24.15\n \n22.69\n \n1,493.66\n \n77,324.34\n \n774.89\n \n28,339.17\n \n15,953.14\n \n33,612.14\n \n340,143.4\n \nMar\n1,244.16\n \n38,369.53\n \n76,479.44\n \n5,317.61\n \n41,401.24\n \n8,733.65\n \n15,889.61\n \n-\n \n19.21\n \n34.56\n \n15.17\n \n21.67\n \n1,309.75\n \n80,607.03\n \n878.97\n \n32,908.13\n \n19,302.34\n \n30,861.86\n \n353,393.9\n \nApr\n1,430.83\n \n38,008.89\n \n79,592.64\n \n5,639.40\n \n48,564.03\n \n7,679.05\n \n18,267.01\n \n-\n \n19.23\n \n62.89\n \n19.86\n \n12.71\n \n1,336.70\n \n91,062.16\n \n956.75\n \n34,537.88\n \n21,214.88\n \n32,383.77\n \n380,788.7\n \nMay\n1,648.09\n \n28,677.21\n \n87,611.51\n \n6,479.66\n \n59,745.10\n \n11,582.44\n \n18,846.75\n \n-\n \n152.75\n \n93.37\n \n21.77\n \n16.58\n \n1,263.75\n \n94,790.46\n \n990.41\n \n35,592.28\n \n21,398.95\n \n31,307.45\n \n400,218.5\n \nJun\n1,419.27\n \n28,452.53\n \n69,413.26\n \n24,215.35\n \n70,835.98\n \n17,601.31\n \n17,152.75\n \n-\n \n19.46\n \n92.91\n \n17.91\n \n77.79\n \n1,511.86\n \n106,954.15\n \n1,247.08\n \n26,856.45\n \n26,444.57\n \n33,288.94\n \n425,601.6\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2021\nNotes\n1.Government securities include treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households and other financial corporations, \nTABLE 5.1: COMMERCIAL BANKS -ASSETS\n$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \n \n21 \n \nZWL$ millions\nEnd of\nDemand\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nCapital\nContigent\nOther\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\nand\nLiablities\nLiablities\nTOTAL\nReserves\n2018\nJan\n4,640.2\n369.3\n903.3\n5,912.7\n301.3\n85.0\n6,299.0\n53.6\n418.7\n115.1\n26.2\n2.4\n1,205.0\n501.0\n385.6\n9,006.6\nFeb\n4,633.7\n375.8\n920.2\n5,929.7\n298.5\n78.6\n6,306.8\n58.1\n409.1\n111.2\n59.1\n2.4\n1,174.8\n507.8\n372.1\n9,001.5\nMar\n4,732.9\n368.8\n930.7\n6,032.4\n244.7\n92.4\n6,369.5\n61.1\n419.5\n140.5\n54.8\n6.4\n1,196.4\n504.1\n384.3\n9,136.6\nApr\n4,907.7\n394.4\n874.8\n6,176.9\n243.4\n72.8\n6,493.1\n67.4\n413.5\n82.4\n35.2\n15.7\n1,201.5\n532.0\n403.4\n9,244.0\nMay\n5,172.9\n416.2\n917.2\n6,506.3\n246.2\n85.2\n6,837.7\n66.8\n514.1\n101.5\n63.7\n19.4\n1,224.6\n458.9\n373.2\n9,659.8\nJun\n5,650.6\n504.3\n897.4\n7,052.2\n254.8\n66.9\n7,373.9\n45.0\n514.7\n119.8\n116.5\n21.1\n1,259.1\n551.4\n399.5\n10,401.0\nJul\n5,902.3\n527.0\n901.0\n7,330.3\n296.0\n12.2\n7,638.4\n72.0\n507.6\n118.9\n102.5\n16.8\n1,380.1\n611.4\n463.6\n10,911.4\nAug\n6,005.7\n540.8\n930.8\n7,477.3\n266.6\n11.5\n7,755.3\n46.4\n501.5\n137.0\n101.3\n15.4\n1,408.6\n647.7\n434.3\n11,047.4\nSep\n6,281.7\n556.4\n927.2\n7,765.3\n273.0\n23.5\n8,061.8\n40.9\n503.5\n142.2\n108.4\n21.1\n1,434.8\n637.4\n454.9\n11,405.0\nOct\n6,340.3\n509.5\n898.1\n7,747.9\n284.2\n31.1\n8,063.2\n49.3\n525.1\n147.6\n72.2\n16.5\n1,461.0\n647.5\n472.6\n11,454.9\nNov\n6,411.0\n503.9\n861.0\n7,775.9\n232.8\n27.6\n8,036.4\n41.2\n487.5\n213.7\n58.6\n17.8\n1,490.0\n633.2\n508.4\n11,486.9\nDec\n6,582.3\n495.0\n910.9\n7,988.3\n255.0\n19.7\n8,262.9\n43.3\n469.5\n229.6\n147.5\n15.6\n1,551.3\n573.8\n509.2\n11,802.7\n2019\nJan\n6,603.6\n440.8\n919.5\n7,964.0\n240.5\n20.5\n8,225.0\n42.6\n475.0\n239.5\n130.2\n14.4\n1,545.2\n517.2\n537.2\n11,726.5\nFeb\n7,129.0\n426.7\n923.8\n8,479.6\n248.9\n22.8\n8,751.4\n57.3\n647.5\n158.9\n119.1\n14.4\n1,626.6\n490.7\n511.1\n12,377.0\nMar\n7,350.5\n451.8\n915.0\n8,717.3\n225.9\n26.4\n8,969.6\n56.8\n778.3\n165.8\n108.4\n17.0\n1,804.3\n523.7\n763.2\n13,187.2\nApr\n7,861.8\n447.1\n1,280.5\n9,589.3\n260.3\n34.4\n9,884.1\n76.0\n487.7\n148.3\n145.3\n14.8\n1,935.7\n620.5\n885.4\n14,197.8\nMay\n9,143.2\n544.3\n1,412.7\n11,100.2\n309.4\n27.5\n11,437.1\n126.8\n789.2\n148.8\n164.7\n16.0\n1,916.9\n910.1\n1,591.0\n17,100.7\nJun\n10,758.5\n567.5\n1,279.7\n12,605.8\n290.5\n23.1\n12,919.4\n159.0\n1,271.1\n150.3\n161.8\n16.5\n2,409.1\n1,606.5\n1,453.0\n20,146.8\nJul\n12,675.9\n672.2\n1,367.7\n14,715.9\n357.4\n29.4\n15,102.7\n146.4\n1,254.8\n152.0\n205.6\n10.4\n2,583.9\n1,587.7\n1,919.4\n22,962.9\nAug\n14,591.5\n825.3\n1,330.1\n16,747.0\n592.1\n38.0\n17,377.1\n182.4\n1,525.0\n155.0\n88.0\n24.5\n3,065.7\n2,614.6\n2,871.4\n27,903.8\nSep\n18,105.1\n947.3\n1,354.6\n20,407.1\n504.3\n33.3\n20,944.7\n205.7\n2,120.6\n155.9\n115.4\n23.3\n3,933.6\n3,707.8\n4,609.2\n35,816.2\nOct\n22,636.1\n1,003.6\n1,292.7\n24,932.3\n489.1\n47.4\n25,468.8\n200.2\n2,159.7\n159.1\n135.3\n24.6\n4,347.1\n4,081.1\n4,310.3\n40,886.3\nNov\n24,297.0\n1,057.2\n1,633.8\n26,988.0\n843.6\n78.9\n27,910.5\n227.7\n2,089.7\n175.3\n154.3\n48.0\n4,931.5\n3,148.3\n4,512.6\n43,197.9\nDec\n26,909.1\n1,184.4\n1,638.8\n29,732.2\n823.2\n102.9\n30,658.3\n231.6\n2,097.0\n179.5\n209.4\n119.4\n8,414.9\n4,867.7\n6,940.7\n53,718.3\n2020\nJan\n27,276.4\n1,787.3\n1,876.0\n30,939.8\n1,026.0\n76.3\n32,042.1\n232.1\n2,170.0\n185.8\n236.2\n140.1\n10,357.6\n2,965.9\n6,703.8\n55,033.6\nFeb\n35,796.5\n1,869.8\n1,712.8\n39,379.1\n1,404.1\n62.2\n40,845.3\n238.9\n2,391.2\n189.6\n209.2\n154.9\n10,877.8\n5,441.7\n8,181.8\n68,530.4\nMar\n36,078.2\n2,458.2\n1,884.9\n40,421.2\n1,430.6\n393.1\n42,245.0\n468.8\n3,731.4\n258.4\n181.2\n339.9\n12,487.9\n7,917.3\n9,274.0\n76,904.0\nApr\n40,156.4\n2,457.6\n2,078.8\n44,692.9\n1,514.8\n496.9\n46,704.6\n333.2\n3,779.7\n346.4\n172.1\n233.2\n13,105.1\n7,642.8\n9,374.8\n81,691.9\nMay\n46,306.1\n2,502.0\n2,405.7\n51,213.8\n1,399.0\n611.4\n53,224.1\n324.9\n3,968.6\n536.7\n319.4\n365.4\n13,454.1\n7,042.0\n9,502.3\n88,737.5\nJun\n67,548.1\n17,859.0\n3,562.0\n88,969.1\n1,931.1\n1,453.1\n92,353.3\n856.9\n9,116.9\n887.6\n681.7\n348.2\n24,773.8\n24,299.3\n20,270.9\n173,588.6\nJul\n89,092.1\n20,865.7\n5,595.6\n115,553.4\n2,671.5\n1,702.4\n119,927.3\n1,014.3\n11,100.4\n1,387.9\n1,907.7\n348.7\n28,563.5\n28,551.1\n28,867.6\n221,668.6\nAug\n102,750.2\n20,005.2\n4,891.9\n127,647.3\n2,577.9\n824.8\n131,049.9\n1,101.5\n12,302.3\n1,837.1\n3,658.1\n412.5\n30,713.4\n25,354.6\n28,672.9\n235,102.3\nSep\n104,770.7\n24,130.0\n6,488.3\n135,389.0\n2,548.1\n1,496.4\n139,433.5\n1,063.5\n11,363.7\n1,863.1\n2,831.0\n372.2\n32,694.4\n28,289.4\n32,377.1\n250,287.9\nOct\n114,057.9\n26,079.1\n7,702.2\n147,839.2\n2,666.6\n1,767.2\n152,273.0\n1,089.2\n11,137.3\n1,812.7\n4,232.9\n441.7\n33,811.1\n29,764.7\n35,264.5\n269,827.2\nNov\n129,129.6\n26,871.0\n8,262.1\n164,262.8\n2,369.5\n1,538.3\n168,170.5\n1,100.4\n11,019.9\n1,489.5\n5,403.8\n423.6\n36,278.2\n29,821.2\n33,334.7\n287,041.8\nDec\n146,151.8\n27,804.4\n8,926.9\n182,883.1\n2,547.6\n4,309.9\n189,740.6\n1,239.9\n10,924.0\n1,318.6\n316.6\n292.0\n43,984.3\n29,608.0\n29,204.3\n306,628.4\n2021\nJan\n158,888.8\n28,456.6\n10,150.2\n197,495.5\n2,580.8\n5,423.4\n205,499.8\n1,142.5\n12,732.6\n391.1\n519.6\n376.7\n50,147.7\n25,036.2\n29,608.5\n325,454.7\nFeb\n162,092.2\n26,146.3\n12,239.7\n200,478.2\n2,809.1\n4,762.5\n208,049.7\n1,150.4\n12,833.2\n409.2\n540.7\n609.9\n54,930.3\n28,339.2\n33,280.7\n340,143.4\nMar\n165,101.1\n30,313.5\n12,276.4\n207,691.0\n4,541.2\n4,845.3\n217,077.6\n1,331.7\n11,620.2\n75.4\n1,136.7\n408.9\n58,208.9\n32,908.1\n30,626.5\n353,393.9\nApr\n191,923.5\n31,441.3\n11,549.5\n234,914.3\n2,195.0\n5,346.7\n242,455.9\n1,190.1\n11,503.5\n176.5\n757.1\n409.9\n60,361.3\n34,537.9\n29,396.5\n380,788.7\nMay\n194,108.9\n40,921.9\n15,896.4\n250,927.2\n1,705.9\n6,802.1\n259,435.2\n1,186.9\n11,783.3\n654.2\n145.2\n429.0\n61,202.0\n35,592.3\n29,790.4\n400,218.5\nJun\n211,950.0\n40,878.5\n18,536.0\n271,364.4\n2,696.6\n6,202.3\n280,263.2\n1,211.8\n11,575.5\n662.3\n368.5\n462.6\n63,417.5\n26,856.5\n40,783.7\n425,601.6\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2021\nTABLE 5.2 : COMMERCIAL BANKS - LIABILITIES\nDeposits\nAmounts Owing to\n \n \n \n22 \n \n \nForeign\nOther Assets\nNon Financial \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nNotes\nAssets\nBond\n&\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \n Notes &\nCoin\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment1\nLocal Governemt\nPublic Enterprises\nOther2\nMortgages\nGovernment\nOther\nCoins\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\n2018\nJan\n0.9\n \n2.3\n \n197.4\n \n98.7\n \n7.8\n \n-\n \n129.8\n \n34.5\n \n-\n \n-\n \n413.2\n \n-\n \n508.7\n \n144.9\n \n136.1\n \n1,674.3\n \nFeb\n1.5\n \n1.8\n \n172.4\n \n123.5\n \n5.5\n \n-\n \n141.3\n \n33.5\n \n-\n \n-\n \n414.8\n \n-\n \n507.9\n \n125.7\n \n135.7\n \n1,663.6\n \nMar\n1.4\n \n3.4\n \n175.9\n \n72.1\n \n14.1\n \n-\n \n212.6\n \n32.8\n \n-\n \n-\n \n411.4\n \n-\n \n539.4\n \n142.8\n \n132.3\n \n1,738.2\n \nApr\n1.1\n \n4.3\n \n185.5\n \n61.9\n \n3.6\n \n-\n \n184.4\n \n32.0\n \n-\n \n-\n \n413.3\n \n-\n \n582.7\n \n141.6\n \n135.2\n \n1,745.7\n \nMay\n1.0\n \n7.6\n \n196.3\n \n138.2\n \n8.1\n \n-\n \n191.0\n \n30.9\n \n-\n \n-\n \n415.0\n \n-\n \n608.4\n \n128.1\n \n137.4\n \n1,862.0\n \nJune\n1.2\n \n4.9\n \n188.6\n \n177.8\n \n1.9\n \n-\n \n266.2\n \n30.1\n \n-\n \n-\n \n413.9\n \n-\n \n614.3\n \n124.0\n \n141.5\n \n1,964.5\n \nJuly\n1.8\n \n6.6\n \n207.1\n \n185.1\n \n1.7\n \n-\n \n283.2\n \n33.3\n \n-\n \n-\n \n423.5\n \n-\n \n636.1\n \n128.2\n \n141.1\n \n2,047.7\n \nAug\n1.6\n \n3.7\n \n224.7\n \n145.3\n \n2.4\n \n-\n \n288.9\n \n32.2\n \n-\n \n-\n \n428.2\n \n-\n \n579.4\n \n139.1\n \n143.7\n \n1,989.2\n \nSep\n1.9\n \n2.9\n \n245.6\n \n92.6\n \n20.8\n \n-\n \n291.1\n \n31.2\n \n-\n \n-\n \n430.3\n \n-\n \n650.2\n \n148.1\n \n144.4\n \n2,059.1\n \nOct\n4.9\n \n2.1\n \n220.0\n \n95.8\n \n11.9\n \n-\n \n318.9\n \n30.2\n \n-\n \n-\n \n427.7\n \n-\n \n639.8\n \n154.2\n \n147.0\n \n2,052.5\n \nNov\n3.6\n \n2.9\n \n243.3\n \n35.7\n \n10.4\n \n-\n \n320.7\n \n28.9\n \n-\n \n-\n \n433.5\n \n-\n \n635.7\n \n148.0\n \n145.8\n \n2,008.5\n \nDec\n2.3\n \n4.3\n \n157.4\n \n121.3\n \n10.4\n \n-\n \n339.4\n \n28.0\n \n-\n \n-\n \n444.8\n \n-\n \n645.9\n \n179.7\n \n151.9\n \n2,085.6\n \n2019\nJan\n6.3\n \n4.6\n108.2\n \n63.5\n10.9\n \n0.0\n343.8\n \n27.3\n33.6\n \n0.0\n438.0\n \n0.0\n649.3\n \n136.7\n151.2\n \n1973.3\nFeb\n5.4\n \n17.6\n120.6\n \n62.8\n18.1\n \n-\n \n339.6\n \n26.5\n-\n \n-\n \n416.1\n \n-\n \n696.1\n \n171.1\n156.7\n \n2,030.8\n \nMar\n2.6\n \n18.0\n126.3\n \n38.6\n23.9\n \n-\n \n331.7\n \n25.5\n-\n \n-\n \n415.1\n \n-\n \n710.1\n \n172.1\n207.4\n \n2,071.2\n \nApr\n3.7\n \n30.6\n220.3\n \n85.0\n47.6\n \n-\n \n271.6\n \n25.0\n-\n \n-\n \n414.1\n \n-\n \n705.0\n \n169.0\n276.2\n \n2,247.8\n \nMay\n3.9\n \n38.4\n162.2\n \n115.4\n139.0\n \n-\n \n345.5\n \n23.9\n-\n \n-\n \n406.2\n \n-\n \n776.6\n \n165.7\n363.4\n \n2,540.1\n \nJun\n6.3\n \n69.8\n361.6\n \n144.5\n132.4\n \n-\n \n265.8\n \n22.6\n-\n \n-\n \n421.7\n \n-\n \n873.6\n \n210.5\n473.0\n \n2,981.8\n \nJul\n6.5\n \n174.7\n473.9\n \n89.7\n131.1\n \n-\n \n258.3\n \n22.2\n-\n \n-\n \n416.0\n \n-\n \n934.6\n \n203.1\n565.6\n \n3,275.8\n \nAug\n5.5\n \n94.5\n758.0\n \n60.6\n115.5\n \n-\n \n247.4\n \n21.5\n-\n \n-\n \n418.1\n \n-\n \n970.6\n \n345.1\n567.6\n \n3,604.2\n \nSep\n15.8\n \n180.3\n831.8\n \n195.4\n104.2\n \n-\n \n267.6\n \n20.9\n-\n \n-\n \n499.1\n \n-\n \n1,137.6\n \n528.8\n1,042.2\n \n4,823.6\n \nOct\n6.2\n \n198.7\n997.2\n \n72.2\n243.7\n \n-\n \n268.8\n \n20.2\n-\n \n-\n \n429.8\n \n-\n \n1,286.7\n \n503.4\n1,069.3\n \n5,096.2\n \nNov\n11.9\n \n156.1\n872.3\n \n159.7\n426.0\n \n-\n \n338.6\n \n19.6\n-\n \n-\n \n443.5\n \n-\n \n1,357.4\n \n575.8\n1,068.7\n \n5,429.6\n \nDec\n9.2\n \n223.9\n1,016.9\n \n317.4\n492.3\n \n-\n \n308.3\n \n18.2\n-\n \n-\n \n454.5\n \n-\n \n1,413.5\n \n700.6\n1,470.0\n \n6,424.9\n \n2020\nJan\n16.3\n \n322.3\n1,106.8\n \n361.8\n421.8\n \n-\n \n283.0\n \n20.1\n-\n \n-\n \n478.2\n \n-\n \n1,498.8\n \n717.5\n1,552.8\n \n6,779.5\n \nFeb\n14.5\n \n368.2\n977.2\n \n612.5\n370.5\n \n-\n \n357.1\n \n20.1\n-\n \n1.5\n \n503.6\n \n-\n \n2,097.7\n \n735.9\n1,538.8\n \n7,597.4\n \nMar\n20.1\n \n529.4\n1,423.7\n \n261.8\n282.6\n \n-\n \n341.6\n \n19.2\n-\n \n0.6\n \n526.4\n \n-\n \n2,406.4\n \n1165.6\n1,914.1\n \n8,891.5\n \nApr\n33.1\n \n493.1\n914.2\n \n232.1\n384.9\n \n-\n \n424.3\n \n18.1\n-\n \n-\n \n525.9\n \n-\n \n2,568.2\n \n1528.5\n2,134.4\n \n9,256.8\n \nMay\n39.7\n \n434.7\n1,248.4\n \n192.3\n725.0\n \n-\n \n382.4\n \n17.0\n-\n \n-\n \n517.6\n \n-\n \n2,793.4\n \n2669.6\n2,146.1\n \n11,166.3\n \nJun\n88.7\n \n1167.9\n2,857.8\n \n395.9\n1,222.0\n \n-\n \n385.4\n \n13.8\n-\n \n-\n \n653.4\n \n-\n \n4,663.9\n \n2688.0\n4,712.1\n \n18,848.8\n \nJul\n109.1\n \n1780.7\n3,878.9\n \n1342.9\n1,879.4\n \n-\n \n346.6\n \n13.4\n-\n \n-\n \n585.7\n \n-\n \n5,648.0\n \n3879.5\n4,927.7\n \n24,391.8\n \nAug\n142.9\n \n2175.5\n4,799.3\n \n341.7\n2,310.6\n \n-\n \n294.6\n \n13.1\n-\n \n-\n \n688.7\n \n-\n \n6,552.1\n \n4480.3\n6,104.6\n \n27,903.4\n \nSep\n179.8\n \n2469.9\n4,547.1\n \n504.6\n1,027.7\n \n-\n \n218.3\n \n12.9\n-\n \n0.4\n \n741.5\n \n-\n \n6,518.3\n \n2774.9\n6,503.8\n \n25,499.1\n \nOct\n149.1\n \n2787.0\n5,056.1\n \n778.9\n1,182.4\n \n-\n \n206.5\n \n12.3\n-\n \n112.2\n \n772.3\n \n-\n \n6,874.4\n \n2795.4\n6,537.1\n \n27,263.4\n \nNov\n104.3\n \n2935.7\n4,448.9\n \n691.0\n1,412.8\n \n-\n \n1,666.7\n \n11.6\n-\n \n157.8\n \n930.4\n \n-\n \n7,498.6\n \n2571.1\n6,712.9\n \n29,141.9\n \nDec\n116.2\n \n3210.3\n5,085.9\n \n802.0\n1,183.4\n \n-\n \n1,830.2\n \n11.2\n-\n \n251.1\n \n1,008.4\n \n-\n \n8,562.3\n \n2559.4\n7,352.9\n \n31,973.2\n \n2021\nJan\n188.7\n \n2943.3\n5,986.5\n \n793.8\n843.5\n \n-\n \n1,783.8\n \n10.2\n-\n \n211.3\n \n1,091.3\n \n0.0\n \n9,329.1\n \n2980.3\n7,685.1\n \n33,846.9\n \nFeb\n345.7\n \n2762.9\n6,004.8\n \n811.1\n984.2\n \n-\n \n2,731.0\n \n9.2\n-\n \n236.8\n \n2,089.3\n \n-\n \n8,950.2\n \n2949.2\n7,790.6\n \n35,665.0\n \nMar\n168.3\n \n2278.9\n6,313.1\n \n1594.4\n1,028.2\n \n-\n \n1,341.7\n \n8.4\n-\n \n415.1\n \n1,242.4\n \n-\n \n10,867.7\n \n3027.5\n7,841.0\n \n36,126.8\n \nApr\n206.9\n \n2702.1\n5,302.6\n \n1156.7\n1,085.4\n \n-\n \n871.7\n \n7.7\n-\n \n508.9\n \n1,581.5\n \n-\n \n14,233.6\n \n3431.1\n7,237.9\n \n38,326.2\n \nMay\n210.3\n \n1687.6\n5,962.2\n \n1250.9\n3,847.1\n \n-\n \n116.9\n \n7.0\n-\n \n517.7\n \n1,568.8\n \n-\n \n17,154.9\n \n2927.9\n7,532.9\n \n42,784.2\n \nJun\n249.6\n \n1649.7\n6,202.6\n \n1163.8\n1,866.7\n \n-\n \n204.6\n \n6.5\n-\n \n588.0\n \n1,851.9\n \n-\n \n18,795.4\n \n2580.9\n7,701.1\n \n42,860.7\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2021\nNotes\n1.Government securities include treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households and other financial corporations, \nTABLE 6.1: BUILDING SOCIETIES -ASSETS\n$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n \n \n \n23 \n \n \nDebt Securities\nForeign Liabilities\nCapital\nOther\nTOTAL\nand\nLiablities\nEnd of\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nReserves\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\n2018\nJan\n544.7\n497.1\n1,041.7\n105.2\n16.4\n1,163.3\n22.8\n26.1\n0.0\n22.9\n0.2\n362.1\n77.0\n1,674.3\nFeb\n512.0\n480.5\n992.5\n120.3\n16.8\n1,129.5\n28.5\n26.3\n0.0\n33.6\n0.5\n366.0\n79.2\n1,663.6\nMar\n535.1\n507.8\n1,042.9\n120.3\n16.5\n1,179.7\n27.5\n41.3\n0.0\n34.5\n0.5\n378.2\n76.5\n1,738.2\nApr\n568.0\n452.6\n1,020.5\n144.4\n17.0\n1,181.9\n27.9\n39.7\n0.0\n33.6\n0.4\n358.5\n103.7\n1,745.7\nMay\n613.8\n475.1\n1,089.0\n196.6\n16.4\n1,302.0\n32.4\n40.0\n0.0\n31.2\n0.5\n363.1\n92.8\n1,862.0\nJune\n658.5\n507.9\n1,166.5\n183.2\n16.4\n1,366.0\n33.1\n39.3\n0.0\n56.9\n0.4\n363.5\n105.2\n1,964.5\nJuly\n770.2\n542.9\n1,313.1\n128.5\n15.0\n1,456.6\n28.7\n37.5\n0.0\n30.4\n15.8\n378.9\n99.8\n2,047.7\nAug\n703.4\n534.7\n1,238.0\n133.0\n15.0\n1,386.0\n31.3\n33.9\n0.0\n18.3\n17.9\n385.8\n116.0\n1,989.2\nSep\n749.8\n502.3\n1,252.2\n166.0\n15.1\n1,433.2\n22.8\n55.9\n0.0\n20.7\n25.5\n388.6\n112.3\n2,059.1\nOct\n772.5\n471.9\n1,244.4\n151.0\n15.1\n1,410.5\n23.7\n56.3\n0.0\n21.2\n25.5\n389.9\n125.4\n2,052.5\nNov\n699.9\n511.9\n1,211.9\n134.0\n15.1\n1,360.9\n21.0\n55.6\n0.0\n16.2\n24.5\n396.1\n134.2\n2,008.5\nDec\n713.2\n540.0\n1,253.1\n139.6\n15.1\n1,407.8\n26.5\n55.3\n0.0\n40.2\n23.4\n400.1\n132.3\n2,085.6\n2019\nJan\n633.8\n490.2\n1,124.0\n140.5\n15.0\n1,279.6\n27.9\n55.5\n0.0\n58.1\n24.8\n392.8\n134.7\n1,973.3\nFeb\n661.3\n492.3\n1,153.6\n138.8\n15.0\n1,307.4\n25.8\n134.5\n0.0\n32.6\n28.2\n366.7\n135.6\n2,030.8\nMar\n655.2\n473.9\n1,129.1\n146.8\n15.0\n1,290.9\n29.0\n155.6\n0.0\n32.5\n25.7\n391.4\n146.2\n2,071.2\nApr\n782.3\n460.0\n1,242.3\n130.5\n14.9\n1,387.7\n26.0\n165.0\n0.0\n28.2\n14.1\n457.7\n169.2\n2,247.8\nMay\n895.0\n464.3\n1,359.4\n153.5\n15.0\n1,527.9\n23.9\n264.7\n0.0\n41.9\n30.6\n477.5\n173.6\n2,540.1\nJun\n1,154.3\n406.8\n1,561.1\n131.5\n15.0\n1,707.7\n23.9\n336.5\n0.0\n54.8\n27.1\n664.7\n167.0\n2,981.8\nJul\n1,192.2\n538.1\n1,730.3\n75.2\n14.9\n1,820.4\n33.0\n455.7\n0.0\n20.2\n17.0\n739.6\n189.9\n3,275.8\nAug\n1,424.7\n542.9\n1,967.6\n47.0\n15.0\n2,029.6\n31.8\n539.4\n0.0\n28.2\n3.5\n777.8\n193.9\n3,604.2\nSep\n1,686.2\n524.9\n2,211.1\n44.9\n15.0\n2,271.0\n25.5\n869.0\n0.0\n66.9\n0.0\n1,352.0\n239.1\n4,823.6\nOct\n1,920.1\n548.8\n2,468.8\n36.9\n15.0\n2,520.7\n16.7\n861.0\n0.0\n76.0\n0.0\n1,362.8\n259.0\n5,096.2\nNov\n2,394.7\n441.2\n2,835.9\n35.0\n15.0\n2,886.0\n18.6\n876.3\n0.0\n121.1\n2.5\n1,246.7\n278.3\n5,429.6\nDec\n2,713.3\n481.5\n3,194.7\n244.0\n15.0\n3,453.8\n23.7\n923.5\n0.0\n117.1\n0.0\n1,563.0\n343.9\n6,424.9\n2020\nJan\n2,894.8\n398.4\n3,293.3\n273.1\n15.0\n3,581.4\n34.7\n944.7\n0.0\n100.0\n0.0\n1,699.9\n418.8\n6,779.5\nFeb\n3,118.5\n419.8\n3,538.4\n270.9\n15.0\n3,824.3\n32.5\n966.5\n0.0\n558.5\n0.0\n1,714.1\n501.5\n7,597.4\nMar\n3,978.7\n384.4\n4,363.1\n290.4\n15.0\n4,668.5\n19.3\n1,143.4\n0.0\n133.4\n0.0\n2,335.6\n591.3\n8,891.5\nApr\n4,097.6\n354.9\n4,452.5\n290.4\n15.0\n4,757.9\n15.6\n1,152.3\n0.0\n140.8\n0.0\n2,628.1\n562.1\n9,256.8\nMay\n5,615.0\n370.0\n5,985.0\n441.2\n15.0\n6,441.2\n45.6\n1,161.2\n0.0\n149.8\n0.0\n2,708.1\n660.4\n11,166.3\nJun\n7,327.5\n405.9\n7,733.4\n346.2\n15.0\n8,094.6\n17.6\n2,644.8\n0.0\n278.2\n0.0\n6,867.2\n946.4\n18,848.8\nJul\n10,284.7\n427.7\n10,712.4\n326.2\n15.0\n11,053.7\n21.3\n3,862.4\n0.0\n207.1\n0.0\n8,010.7\n1,236.7\n24,391.8\nAug\n10,984.4\n502.7\n11,487.1\n364.5\n15.0\n11,866.6\n21.4\n4,478.3\n0.0\n186.1\n10.0\n9,438.3\n1,902.7\n27,903.4\nSep\n10,408.2\n403.5\n10,811.8\n107.5\n15.0\n10,934.3\n31.7\n3,842.7\n0.0\n125.8\n0.0\n8,069.6\n2,495.1\n25,499.1\nOct\n11,881.7\n628.7\n12,510.4\n102.5\n15.0\n12,627.9\n154.0\n3,731.0\n0.0\n280.6\n0.0\n7,991.8\n2,478.1\n27,263.4\nNov\n13,173.5\n668.5\n13,842.1\n252.5\n15.0\n14,109.6\n148.2\n3,781.0\n0.0\n323.0\n0.0\n8,200.8\n2,579.4\n29,141.9\nDec\n15,585.8\n797.7\n16,383.5\n258.5\n15.0\n16,657.0\n207.5\n3,221.3\n0.0\n440.4\n0.0\n9,002.7\n2,444.3\n31,973.2\n2021\nJan\n17,060.5\n985.1\n18,045.7\n150.0\n15.0\n18,210.7\n291.2\n3,018.1\n0.0\n81.3\n0.0\n6,054.0\n6,191.6\n33,846.9\nFeb\n18,610.7\n1,047.5\n19,658.2\n150.0\n15.0\n19,823.2\n318.2\n3,075.5\n0.0\n40.7\n0.0\n6,533.5\n5,874.0\n35,665.0\nMar\n18,562.7\n1,070.5\n19,633.2\n150.0\n15.0\n19,798.2\n320.8\n3,377.0\n0.0\n241.5\n0.0\n6,727.5\n5,661.8\n36,126.8\nApr\n19,021.2\n1,353.2\n20,374.5\n500.0\n15.0\n20,889.5\n325.0\n4,244.8\n0.0\n181.9\n0.0\n6,267.0\n6,418.0\n38,326.2\nMay\n22,332.1\n1,453.5\n23,785.6\n500.0\n15.0\n24,300.6\n350.2\n4,279.9\n0.0\n394.8\n0.0\n6,067.1\n7,391.6\n42,784.2\nJun\n22,784.4\n1,675.4\n24,459.8\n209.5\n70.5\n24,739.8\n359.1\n3,855.1\n0.0\n570.4\n0.0\n6,623.0\n6,713.2\n42,860.7\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2021\nAmounts Owing to\nTABLE 6.2: BUILDING SOCIETIES -LIABILITIES\n$ millions\n \n \n \n24 \n \n \nAGRICULTURE\nCONSTRUCTION\nCOMMUNICATION\nDISTRIBUTION\nFINANCIAL &\nFINANCIAL\nMANUFACTURING\nMINING\nSERVICES\nTRANSPORT\nINDIVIDUALS\nCONGLOMERATES\nTOTAL\nEND OF\n \n \n \nINVESTMENTS\nORGANISATIONS\n \n \n \n \n2018\nJan\n479,109.65\n59,336.80\n9,442.40\n289,531.26\n20,569.74\n258,034.97\n271,453.81\n106,425.09\n390,052.89\n32,328.60\n617,302.95\n14,394.66\n2,547,982.83\nFeb\n488,203.10\n59.,977.6\n9,271.60\n315,569.60\n20,133.10\n258,263.60\n285,045.10\n108,649.00\n393,604.90\n31,636.60\n618,377.40\n15,010.60\n2,543,764.60\nMar\n484,764.71\n64,826.47\n11,050.47\n344,731.34\n15,203.35\n274,150.22\n303,649.15\n114,431.85\n363,449.40\n32,793.42\n640,496.88\n19,893.14\n2,669,440.41\nApr\n485,790.00\n63,948.20\n10,904.16\n344,532.06\n15,015.25\n271,071.77\n294,270.80\n112,692.09\n333,633.78\n31,103.49\n631,920.52\n22,066.04\n2,616,948.15\nMay\n501,783.67\n63,555.32\n10,933.54\n362,939.63\n15,079.82\n358,553.35\n317,666.65\n117,123.00\n338,846.30\n31,523.13\n651,443.97\n24,226.37\n2,793,674.76\nJun\n475,105.71\n66,796.85\n13,907.73\n385,583.32\n15,079.82\n344,917.25\n323,212.12\n117,146.59\n335,216.91\n34,457.61\n655,427.02\n34,163.40\n2,801,014.33\nJul\n463,286.30\n70,905.22\n18,924.14\n383,314.68\n14,976.42\n140,624.55\n274,507.82\n113,776.27\n309,209.52\n37,473.99\n652,652.69\n34,402.12\n2,514,053.73\nAug\n470,756.06\n79,237.13\n15,167.31\n331,672.76\n15,021.94\n144,100.73\n271,000.50\n111,960.21\n306,022.68\n37,341.23\n666,649.40\n34,402.12\n2,483,332.08\nSep\n451,745.26\n79,055.66\n15,021.57\n341,851.68\n15,021.94\n144,799.61\n263,994.22\n112,656.60\n320,788.50\n36,914.64\n666,971.46\n64,407.07\n2,513,228.20\nOct\n453,068.26\n74,931.80\n16,036.47\n389,851.74\n15,156.78\n165,252.71\n268,933.16\n111,956.57\n313,376.79\n36,118.55\n680,445.74\n12,855.74\n2,537,984.32\nNov\n444,130.81\n133,137.60\n14,884.08\n313,732.96\n15,156.79\n165,419.77\n269,459.88\n149,908.15\n316,738.77\n45,693.19\n679,403.72\n12,265.36\n2,559,931.07\nDec\n492,669.93\n78,176.72\n15,958.03\n340,422.71\n14,425.48\n165,648.71\n253,354.25\n113,596.48\n347,242.19\n40,695.42\n669,879.64\n12,254.30\n2,544,323.87\n2019\nJan\n525,176.71\n80,480.87\n20,199.44\n349,755.63\n15,294.02\n158,458.90\n255,380.42\n123,772.79\n358,554.22\n42,355.54\n666,797.13\n16,335.67\n2,612,561.33\nFeb\n521,988.10\n79,066.70\n10,931.07\n352,797.81\n14,699.04\n80,894.67\n253,027.00\n124,474.74\n389,522.96\n40,923.52\n644,320.94\n11,446.61\n2,524,093.15\nMar\n538,072.74\n87,791.29\n18,211.46\n379,233.06\n14,556.67\n205,466.51\n270,360.07\n133,324.78\n407,637.99\n43,541.36\n731,600.28\n11,476.62\n2,841,272.85\nApr\n584,205.29\n96,516.86\n22,430.89\n421,676.71\n15,968.00\n236,000.25\n310,449.68\n193,315.77\n387,730.25\n44,465.66\n788,749.65\n14,486.65\n3,115,995.66\nMay\n712,661.52\n98,826.58\n27,802.41\n466,619.97\n17,425.91\n317,055.80\n368,550.63\n250,912.54\n441,731.01\n43,682.62\n901,283.38\n14,096.64\n3,660,649.01\nJun\n940,505.81\n82,926.78\n30,534.65\n566,391.10\n169,400.79\n876,820.36\n354,648.58\n331,070.01\n404,941.11\n49,207.29\n898,523.53\n14,258.87\n4,719,228.88\nJul\n1,060,152.38\n108,889.32\n38,005.81\n685,729.84\n22,484.81\n470,421.82\n497,581.30\n333,137.40\n643,721.98\n51,560.67\n1,111,698.00\n7,683.18\n5,031,066.50\nAug\n1,163,054.33\n117,882.86\n40,904.57\n720,937.57\n15,289.60\n524,650.14\n575,937.12\n378,008.67\n742,674.56\n51,710.40\n1,202,415.06\n5,830.84\n5,539,295.71\nSep\n1,379,203.16\n101,683.93\n20,216.16\n755,828.88\n15,563.75\n1,430,322.28\n520,659.81\n487,089.86\n594,143.27\n59,974.64\n1,004,073.32\n6,055.40\n5,087,524.40\nOct\n1,917,349.77\n103,708.96\n20,826.53\n798,377.18\n24,574.74\n1,447,865.67\n603,692.16\n541,020.28\n618,349.57\n61,677.92\n1,112,873.33\n4,322.02\n7,530,493.20\nNov\n1,916,599.14\n103,450.14\n22,381.71\n878,695.26\n24,749.38\n1,566,329.25\n623,341.53\n554,037.12\n623,064.80\n61,153.08\n1,152,340.02\n4,351.76\n7,530,493.20\nDec\n3,260,641.29\n140,783.74\n27,127.10\n1,114,871.76\n48,155.61\n1,504,624.78\n1,027,373.94\n821,797.19\n823,237.53\n84,684.83\n1,428,029.37\n7,328.19\n10,288,655.30\n2020\nJan\n4,084,551.94\n155,581.93\n40,879.89\n1,241,096.72\n54,212.81\n1,614,135.86\n1,136,124.87\n905,568.16\n799,835.71\n83,887.62\n1,594,904.42\n3,435.36\n11,714,215.29\nFeb\n4,492,412.28\n157,892.05\n54,850.75\n1,305,056.27\n51,575.18\n1,667,015.97\n1,328,895.13\n875,096.28\n827,340.38\n103,240.64\n1,837,059.21\n1,195.35\n12,701,629.50\nMar\n5,400,573.75\n137,553.14\n109,432.30\n1,355,737.76\n60,656.39\n2,181,804.45\n1,514,365.26\n1,743,391.37\n911,567.97\n129,647.77\n2,083,395.02\n30,866.95\n15,658,992.12\nApr\n5,497,243.24\n144,302.16\n94,782.20\n1,298,701.43\n50,563.13\n2,200,545.77\n1,762,996.43\n1,756,962.25\n1,057,031.75\n149,805.94\n2,211,133.89\n33,524.86\n16,257,593.05\nMay\n6,753,987.64\n152,161.11\n176,776.32\n1,688,453.47\n61,403.01\n2,272,323.33\n2,155,232.06\n2,018,291.52\n1,335,664.72\n161,892.59\n2,646,269.59\n56,873.34\n19,479,328.70\nJun\n8,233,748.36\n178,010.08\n127,961.90\n3,248,219.37\n64,989.86\n5,469,986.07\n3,799,659.67\n4,379,017.69\n1,983,339.32\n277,602.32\n3,665,408.84\n46,384.96\n31,474,328.45\nJul\n8,927,920.73\n256,440.30\n209,123.91\n4,249,101.81\n34,055.90\n7,106,442.23\n5,125,740.57\n5,385,837.14\n2,413,677.93\n418,160.11\n4,321,918.71\n46,630.64\n38,495,049.96\nAug\n9,773,178.50\n269,675.36\n194,537.60\n5,470,092.50\n33,043.10\n7,946,261.68\n6,723,930.20\n5,651,838.11\n3,103,883.15\n446,084.37\n5,291,100.20\n48,922.44\n44,952,547.19\nSep\n10,508,860.18\n202,928.95\n203,610.78\n4,810,727.31\n29,975.80\n1,041,079.17\n7,136,261.66\n4,099,760.81\n3,255,496.85\n517,871.73\n6,526,576.15\n48,754.08\n38,381,903.47\nOct\n12,296,430.45\n302,589.49\n251,238.66\n9,053,118.05\n28,434.20\n8,136,185.80\n6,305,609.42\n6,351,785.61\n3,855,757.60\n649,444.55\n7,243,034.96\n49,339.03\n54,522,967.83\nNov\n14,705,718.28\n553,426.67\n299,226.19\n10,178,453.66\n26,676.82\n9,457,279.18\n7,442,871.42\n6,834,160.25\n4,193,059.76\n959,134.44\n7,919,442.36\n50,802.65\n62,620,251.69\nDec\n19,070,900.24\n557,071.84\n265,529.08\n10,043,351.16\n24,925.66\n9,451,197.42\n8,214,424.44\n7,599,398.94\n4,750,996.82\n1,556,410.92\n9,213,845.68\n46,489.85\n70,794,542.04\n2021\nJan\n23,978,167.35\n610,696.11\n267,400.20\n9,997,383.02\n66,046.86\n9,811,097.63\n7,641,910.42\n7,176,322.97\n4,807,054.16\n1,685,871.14\n10,092,630.46\n47,525.58\n76,182,105.93\nFeb\n24,581,772.22\n653,205.48\n285,830.69\n10,330,772.00\n65,231.37\n10,024,935.09\n7,949,013.06\n6,754,180.16\n5,018,015.84\n1,766,077.92\n10,905,948.39\n47,678.08\n78,382,660.29\nMar\n28,741,816.74\n737,140.48\n320,102.45\n10,604,119.56\n76,828.95\n10,517,753.11\n9,428,559.85\n8,179,722.05\n5,701,289.52\n1,822,019.95\n12,528,176.45\n33,915.52\n88,691,444.62\nApr\n31,859,146.34\n675,080.87\n347,881.04\n12,101,683.31\n205,760.21\n12,046,268.54\n10,788,214.39\n8,802,924.25\n6,559,969.13\n1,831,534.43\n14,724,055.16\n36,984.33\n99,979,501.99\nMay\n34,645,328.64\n713,518.48\n292,339.75\n13,012,546.01\n70,347.70\n10,160,360.67\n11,287,317.39\n8,318,871.52\n7,438,997.57\n1,831,015.12\n17,169,532.74\n10,879.19\n104,951,054.78\nJun\n36,527,537.18\n993,308.60\n357,200.72\n14,622,859.32\n69,173.21\n12,832,747.32\n12,635,012.94\n7,938,660.25\n9,226,503.32\n1,903,845.82\n19,986,300.49\n40,765.72\n117,133,914.90\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2021\n/1 Including the only merchant bank still in operation.\n TABLE 7.1 : SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS LOANS AND ADVANCES\n$ ('000)\n \n \n \n25 \n \n \nEND OF\nAGRICULTURE\nCONSTRUCTION\nCOMMUNICATIONS\nDISTRIBUTION\nFINANCIAL &\nFINANCIAL\nMANUFACTURING\nMINING\nSERVICES\nTRANSPORT\nINDIVIDUALS\nCONGLOMERATES\nTOTAL\nINVESTMENTS\nORGANISATIONS\n \n2018\nJan\n380,283.82\n151,435.95\n257,298.19\n918,787.62\n365,354.65\n1,050,097.69\n652,999.03\n248,932.99\n1,757,391.82\n141,913.19\n669,049.81\n67,904.67\n6,661,449.43\nFeb\n455,217.00\n224,070.10\n263,961.90\n897,453.20\n399,016.20\n949,795.60\n674,828.40\n354,052.80\n1,701,611.40\n107,779.50\n680,060.20\n67,686.40\n6,775,532.70\nMar\n451,992.51\n142,332.94\n296,310.00\n825,805.46\n376,592.97\n1,001,674.30\n597,436.81\n253,127.37\n1,827,464.32\n163,971.73\n597,436.81\n63,604.30\n6,597,749.51\nApr\n476,448.12\n144,564.55\n310,795.64\n806,144.74\n364,824.61\n988,527.16\n649,893.01\n255,761.79\n1,892,415.24\n179,252.35\n712,565.91\n65,398.24\n6,846,591.36\nMay\n494,612.84\n152,567.38\n350,409.17\n874,140.46\n374,089.94\n1,097,970.70\n700,891.90\n271,891.95\n1,913,394.86\n186,192.54\n745,592.74\n64,970.70\n7,226,725.18\nJun\n465,983.99\n164,242.33\n391,142.28\n948,703.01\n368,260.11\n1,140,652.88\n754,981.07\n324,355.75\n2,160,400.44\n200,774.28\n779,012.77\n64,786.27\n7,763,295.19\nJul\n445,779.96\n226,432.96\n413,409.06\n955,925.58\n420,416.63\n1,120,834.75\n760,588.21\n321,078.39\n2,192,743.25\n200,523.55\n822,857.62\n64,786.27\n7,945,376.24\nAug\n429,439.90\n189,497.97\n386,595.64\n980,354.11\n429,659.69\n1,091,202.85\n782,008.68\n297,412.27\n1,968,724.01\n196,068.83\n836,719.06\n64,786.27\n7,652,469.29\nSep\n447,556.40\n206,194.07\n382,491.52\n1,186,453.67\n444,599.06\n1,070,365.05\n811,296.21\n302,579.34\n2,059,093.14\n247,105.73\n906,767.58\n84,514.52\n8,149,016.28\nOct\n445,484.37\n199,531.06\n391,968.41\n984,701.54\n469,891.89\n1,153,855.95\n846,453.28\n315,808.54\n2,110,864.21\n260,816.90\n817,328.26\n67,915.25\n8,064,619.66\nNov\n489,192.86\n194,869.35\n391,442.38\n925,081.31\n441,534.28\n1,248,555.80\n827,349.43\n316,945.54\n2,059,370.14\n261,756.52\n825,642.20\n66,458.68\n8,048,198.50\nDec\n494,011.34\n201,871.01\n531,888.27\n1,034,592.52\n428,738.69\n1,196,503.19\n823,081.93\n331,251.28\n2,063,550.83\n278,658.99\n802,507.57\n63,361.27\n8,250,016.89\n2019\nJan\n505,422.91\n391,022.03\n497,976.19\n1,034,948.23\n411,945.87\n1,187,606.66\n882,289.74\n322,030.27\n2,154,902.32\n135,871.63\n763,189.54\n63,064.29\n8,350,269.66\nFeb\n512,602.33\n374,750.61\n394,709.15\n936,123.62\n449,800.94\n904,919.42\n855,348.41\n347,405.51\n2,355,866.05\n138,685.82\n776,949.70\n63,097.10\n8,110,258.67\nMar\n526,564.16\n343,684.28\n376,205.62\n937,743.43\n393,489.35\n1,317,757.66\n861,574.88\n380,295.40\n2,099,331.11\n141,677.24\n773,726.38\n63,094.90\n8,215,144.40\nApr\n632,972.52\n255,945.64\n1,010,978.65\n90,282.62\n462,133.05\n1,535,772.61\n890,606.53\n325,814.57\n2,413,535.63\n320,213.46\n876,646.50\n90,282.62\n9,963,832.23\nMay\n832,073.61\n305,410.92\n1,321,039.68\n1,177,925.14\n522,764.91\n1,646,358.64\n1,142,369.59\n372,594.90\n2,765,341.17\n371,372.04\n965,202.73\n93,188.88\n11,515,642.20\nJun\n1,001,633.56\n309,108.92\n1,124,005.29\n1,337,171.04\n546,572.53\n2,210,293.95\n1,319,789.76\n562,858.02\n3,493,214.31\n434,828.17\n1,070,319.72\n52,118.63\n13,461,913.89\nJul\n1,171,245.37\n353,388.45\n1,504,911.45\n1,241,910.11\n654,904.72\n2,553,878.66\n1,383,215.20\n585,108.25\n4,131,588.83\n463,161.90\n1,304,402.72\n71,943.58\n15,419,659.24\nAug\n1,313,462.50\n477,215.84\n1,795,905.44\n1,687,246.36\n804,316.21\n2,591,386.51\n1,647,680.21\n1,114,306.03\n3,872,186.95\n503,541.56\n1,532,441.90\n75,829.26\n17,413,139.20\nSep\n1,581,141.69\n321,121.36\n1,934,554.37\n1,728,390.05\n952,548.31\n3,086,893.14\n1,638,855.09\n1,375,546.56\n5,961,405.34\n589,939.57\n1,848,708.36\n76,775.90\n21,272,162.40\nOct\n1,744,905.76\n796,996.55\n2,217,888.47\n2,626,316.66\n768,125.17\n3,204,019.21\n2,287,076.12\n1,889,144.71\n7,536,588.58\n510,151.50\n1,942,195.06\n48,142.75\n25,571,550.52\nNov\n1,783,345.29\n813,506.51\n2,257,181.82\n2,618,010.26\n1,287,013.83\n3,544,459.53\n2,082,447.78\n1,787,923.65\n7,794,025.96\n491,371.84\n1,920,297.35\n57,897.54\n26,437,481.36\nDec\n1,877,764.11\n950,348.83\n2,917,087.22\n3,126,494.51\n1,421,969.01\n4,411,638.37\n2,605,023.12\n1,664,547.67\n8,410,964.03\n554,937.30\n2,477,474.04\n116,789.37\n30,535,037.60\n1,000.00\n2020\nJan\n2,173,633.03\n972,609.19\n3,182,087.13\n4,279,565.75\n1,757,297.12\n4,791,990.63\n2,791,625.15\n2,223,774.14\n9,875,803.48\n609,781.65\n2,838,775.94\n81,735.21\n35,578,678.43\nFeb\n2,492,591.77\n1,191,731.68\n3,340,863.80\n8,721,475.95\n1,919,428.47\n5,869,104.19\n3,481,495.51\n2,729,161.98\n10,202,203.60\n760,155.34\n3,574,134.47\n82,845.83\n44,365,192.59\nMar\n2,678,262.66\n1,449,645.90\n3,231,058.97\n11,715,273.88\n2,114,093.03\n6,507,000.01\n4,576,971.82\n3,048,053.49\n11,490,205.21\n947,918.17\n4,257,117.74\n72,082.86\n52,087,683.73\nApr\n2,854,374.82\n1,118,295.51\n3,492,330.52\n5,271,473.36\n1,999,901.13\n6,191,170.71\n4,276,817.19\n3,727,579.43\n14,060,717.80\n713,406.98\n4,444,924.89\n83,109.30\n48,234,101.64\nMay\n3,866,781.11\n1,163,944.89\n4,713,727.59\n7,932,403.43\n1,991,042.58\n7,151,451.48\n5,858,495.15\n5,031,912.53\n13,907,794.76\n944,318.05\n5,060,401.34\n88,613.61\n57,710,886.51\nJun\n7,228,784.40\n1,963,030.85\n5,393,404.53\n14,526,855.63\n3,997,135.72\n12,452,202.49\n11,386,156.55\n9,507,719.09\n22,807,615.50\n1,630,544.88\n9,798,261.20\n121,561.20\n100,813,272.04\nJul\n9,091,726.77\n2,629,847.13\n6,043,418.97\n19,096,889.49\n4,988,887.74\n15,446,649.70\n15,274,687.36\n7,918,819.51\n31,916,392.56\n2,035,354.71\n15,762,315.16\n147,865.97\n130,352,855.06\nAug\n9,462,082.74\n2,865,950.88\n6,582,519.60\n19,234,703.99\n5,333,846.88\n16,821,248.59\n17,017,042.14\n7,304,595.82\n35,312,317.72\n2,217,425.46\n16,548,990.51\n134,271.10\n138,834,995.43\nSep\n9,832,514.38\n3,139,646.07\n7,166,350.39\n20,531,087.56\n5,145,328.35\n9,505,277.06\n17,311,149.20\n10,234,597.66\n39,731,086.51\n2,011,372.45\n16,155,747.87\n148,612.60\n140,912,770.08\nOct\n9,923,335.07\n3,346,982.41\n9,919,999.10\n22,567,492.87\n6,180,403.26\n21,021,376.92\n20,667,754.18\n10,950,177.78\n41,131,626.19\n2,597,408.09\n18,072,164.45\n176,961.04\n166,555,681.37\nNov\n10,683,513.83\n3,732,868.95\n9,809,491.39\n28,228,980.99\n6,029,490.43\n17,343,347.49\n23,027,365.97\n14,471,556.33\n47,870,360.42\n2,986,050.60\n19,045,412.04\n209,168.81\n183,437,607.25\nDec\n10,252,495.91\n4,965,472.75\n12,171,250.70\n30,987,168.50\n5,959,867.34\n19,653,397.02\n25,666,591.10\n13,188,851.04\n55,454,341.21\n3,901,504.33\n22,313,591.00\n519,773.38\n205,034,304.27\n2021\nJan\n12,195,945.09\n4,725,946.72\n13,067,828.56\n32,314,625.60\n6,804,952.50\n19,638,789.03\n27,577,248.19\n13,566,042.79\n60,234,250.60\n3,993,814.34\n22,146,327.53\n314,523.37\n216,580,294.30\nFeb\n12,215,925.38\n4,335,293.23\n13,268,343.18\n31,820,079.48\n6,327,338.72\n19,480,197.75\n27,088,789.92\n11,873,767.24\n62,647,881.89\n3,583,509.91\n23,594,651.47\n323,276.77\n216,559,054.94\nMar\n12,086,596.94\n5,009,117.91\n15,457,881.64\n33,668,114.17\n7,879,623.60\n17,019,379.33\n29,927,193.06\n12,664,366.44\n68,761,992.24\n4,513,060.17\n25,352,486.13\n371,874.60\n232,711,686.23\nApr\n14,293,712.79\n6,264,137.34\n17,624,611.65\n35,860,252.53\n7,955,587.69\n18,411,151.82\n32,890,743.11\n11,445,151.89\n81,410,668.87\n4,248,558.67\n27,176,673.47\n411,001.01\n257,992,250.84\nMay\n14,731,869.47\n5,542,211.64\n19,231,383.69\n37,283,237.74\n7,903,622.65\n19,756,317.30\n33,027,214.88\n22,796,168.05\n84,596,653.48\n4,504,355.67\n28,445,264.85\n378,185.06\n278,196,484.46\nJun\n15,628,935.51\n6,154,316.52\n20,722,752.27\n39,604,431.48\n7,861,552.67\n21,455,061.82\n36,502,664.43\n23,449,074.86\n92,196,178.85\n4,756,434.86\n29,731,644.54\n415,508.64\n298,478,556.45\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2021\n TABLE 7.2: SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS DEPOSITS \n$ ('000)\n \n \n \n26 \n \n \nEnd of\nNominal \nLending \nRates 1\nIndividuals \nCorporate\n2019\nJan\n4.00-18.00\n9.47\n7.40\nFeb\n4.00-18.00\n9.23\n7.30\nMar\n4.00-18.00\n9.23\n7.31\nApr\n4.00-18.00\n9.30\n7.38\nMay\n4.00-22.00\n9.31\n7.33\nJun\n4.00-22.00\n9.15\n7.67\nJul\n4.00-35.00\n9.54\n8.40\nAug\n5.00-55.00\n14.37\n18.43\nSep\n5.00-65.00\n14.64\n19.81\nOct\n5.00-65.00\n15.59\n19.66\nNov\n5.00-65.00\n15.06\n18.00\nDec\n5.00-65.00\n16.08\n18.31\n2020\nJan\n5.00-65.00\n16.56\n17.20\nFeb\n5.00-65.00\n16.92\n16.68\nMar\n5.00-65.00\n19.65\n17.21\nApr\n5.00-65.00\n18.57\n18.69\nMay\n5.00-65.00\n18.06\n18.07\nJune\n5.00-65.00\n20.04\n17.38\nJuly\n5.00-65.00\n18.87\n20.11\nAug\n6.00-65.00\n19.14\n18.99\nSep\n6.00-65.00\n20.65\n25.09\nOct\n6.00-65.00\n26.04\n26.68\nNov\n6.00-65.00\n30.32\n27.67\nDec\n6.00-65.00\n32.11\n26.91\n2021\nJan\n6.00-65.00\n32.65\n24.77\nFeb\n6.00-85.00\n36.67\n21.36\nMar\n6.00-85.00\n35.83\n22.61\nApr\n6.00-85.00\n35.22\n22.59\nMay\n6.00-85.00\n34.84\n21.76\nJun\n6.00-85.00\n36.25\n22.46\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2021\nNotes\nTABLE 8.1: LENDING RATES (percent per annum)\n1. Nominal lending rates depict the range of rates quoted by banks.\nCommercial Banks\nWeighted Lending Rates\n \n \n \n27 \n \n \nTABLE 8.2 : BANK DEPOSIT RATES (percent per annum)\nEND OF\nSAVINGS\n3 MONTHS\n2019\nJan\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nFeb\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-6.75\nMar\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nApr\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nMay\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nJun\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nJul\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nAug\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nSep\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nOct\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nNov\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nDec\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\n2020\nJan\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nFeb\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nMar\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nApr\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nMay\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nJun\n0.22-12.00\n1.00-8.00\nJul\n0.22-12.00\n1.33-14.00\nAug\n0.50-15.00\n1.00-20.28\nSep\n0.50-15.00\n1.00-20.28\nOct\n0.50-15.00\n1.00-20.28\nNov\n0.50-15.00\n1.00-20.28\nDec\n0.50-15.00\n1.00-20.28\n2021\nJan\n0.22-12.00\n2.00-21.50\nFeb\n0.22-12.00\n2.00-21.50\nMar\n0.22-12.00\n2.00-21.50\nApr\n0.22-12.00\n2.00-21.50\nMay\n0.22-12.00\n2.00-21.50\nJun\n0.25-12.00\n2.00-26.00\n Source:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2021\n* Deposit rates depict the range of rates qouted by banks. \nCOMMERCIAL BANKS\n \n \n \n28 \n \nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES \nCLOTHING \n&\nHOUSING, \nWATER,\nFURNITURE\nHEALTH\nTRANSPORT\nCOMMUNIC\nATION\nRECREATION \n&\nEDUCATION\nRESTAUR\nANTS &\nMISC.\nTOTAL NON\n& TOBACCO\nFOOTWEAR\nELECTRICTY, \nGAS\nAND\nCULTURE\nHOTELS\nGOODS &\nFOOD\n& OTHER\nEQUIPMEN\nT\nSERVICES\nFUELS\nWEIGHTS\n4.90\n4.35\n27.62\n5.29\n1.42\n8.39\n2.65\n2.27\n4.25\n1.08\n6.46\n68.70\n31.30\n100\n2018\nJan\n0.17\n0.67\n0.02\n0.55\n0.10\n0.00\n-0.04\n1.78\n0.00\n-0.16\n0.64\n0.26\n0.39\n0.30\nFeb\n0.26\n0.91\n0.01\n0.43\n0.00\n-0.02\n0.15\n0.90\n0.00\n0.01\n0.21\n0.19\n-0.18\n0.08\nMar\n0.13\n-0.34\n-0.74\n0.46\n0.18\n-1.29\n-1.60\n1.58\n0.01\n-0.14\n-0.55\n0.09\n-0.03\n-0.25\nApr\n0.20\n0.34\n-0.01\n0.00\n0.10\n-0.32\n-0.21\n-0.10\n0.63\n1.85\n0.26\n0.11\n0.02\n0.08\nMay\n-0.03\n0.10\n0.00\n-0.12\n0.03\n0.14\n-0.01\n0.08\n0.00\n0.05\n0.33\n0.03\n0.02\n0.03\nJun\n0.60\n0.14\n-0.16\n-0.48\n0.38\n0.19\n0.10\n-0.25\n0.00\n0.26\n1.00\n0.04\n-0.23\n-0.05\nJul\n0.43\n0.38\n0.00\n0.40\n0.31\n0.17\n0.08\n0.65\n7.16\n3.20\n0.75\n1.09\n0.74\n0.98\nAug\n0.13\n0.45\n0.00\n0.91\n0.24\n0.47\n0.00\n-0.23\n0.00\n0.11\n0.34\n0.28\n0.62\n0.39\nSep\n0.22\n1.35\n0.53\n2.79\n1.90\n0.51\n0.32\n0.22\n0.00\n0.28\n0.07\n0.85\n1.05\n0.92\nOct\n7.89\n45.88\n2.94\n26.86\n12.94\n19.13\n1.39\n27.66\n0.00\n9.86\n13.64\n14.66\n20.12\n16.44\nNov\n7.21\n10.63\n4.80\n9.12\n3.36\n2.31\n0.18\n16.33\n0.35\n9.29\n15.42\n6.50\n14.53\n9.20\nDec\n10.22\n8.07\n2.77\n8.07\n8.49\n28.61\n1.26\n3.19\n0.00\n13.84\n10.07\n9.01\n9.07\n9.03\n2019\nJan\n13.35\n1.04\n4.35\n9.46\n11.64\n47.25\n1.12\n11.01\n0.10\n11.73\n6.72\n12.83\n6.94\n10.75\nFeb\n2.94\n5.94\n2.77\n2.73\n2.93\n-7.70\n0.14\n3.42\n0.02\n2.20\n4.34\n0.70\n3.56\n1.67\nMar\n14.29\n5.56\n2.34\n5.20\n2.30\n3.06\n0.14\n3.92\n3.66\n4.54\n5.16\n4.05\n5.10\n4.38\nApr\n12.05\n6.57\n0.65\n5.84\n19.90\n3.40\n3.50\n5.36\n6.93\n19.74\n5.35\n4.45\n7.85\n5.52\nMay\n21.57\n11.89\n2.54\n11.51\n16.85\n16.18\n31.21\n29.81\n3.05\n6.67\n8.96\n10.12\n17.63\n12.54\nJun\n40.94\n59.89\n18.11\n63.80\n46.53\n41.90\n2.32\n35.38\n0.06\n28.71\n36.63\n31.23\n55.07\n39.26\nJul\n23.72\n27.68\n9.19\n27.01\n43.32\n26.39\n7.48\n36.17\n11.05\n30.51\n39.79\n21.72\n19.90\n21.04\nAug\n18.09\n10.81\n13.65\n11.18\n7.47\n32.66\n67.86\n12.65\n4.09\n8.67\n18.77\n17.79\n18.55\n18.07\nSep\n11.01\n17.47\n15.52\n14.73\n18.68\n16.83\n1.29\n18.03\n4.10\n8.42\n35.01\n16.63\n19.55\n17.72\nOct\n42.80\n37.15\n38.63\n35.12\n34.80\n26.55\n9.15\n31.78\n5.47\n37.99\n30.03\n32.90\n48.35\n38.75\nNov\n16.54\n18.35\n5.83\n25.67\n18.49\n9.68\n13.01\n20.59\n17.10\n36.46\n23.89\n13.94\n22.63\n17.46\nDec\n11.51\n13.48\n31.25\n17.51\n12.74\n11.82\n1.43\n5.70\n0.17\n15.52\n18.28\n17.14\n15.75\n16.55\n2020\nJan\n1.83\n3.84\n0.60\n1.50\n5.32\n2.24\n2.77\n2.01\n9.39\n2.72\n1.86\n1.99\n2.55\n2.23\nFeb\n8.48\n10.01\n2.27\n7.00\n21.56\n9.62\n220.04\n17.96\n94.95\n2.92\n30.86\n18.41\n6.81\n13.52\nMar\n28.76\n37.12\n57.14\n29.35\n27.28\n18.10\n4.26\n58.79\n0.66\n17.49\n22.67\n32.44\n17.69\n26.59\nApr\n26.21\n13.46\n3.05\n24.06\n25.07\n8.87\n3.05\n9.42\n1.13\n21.08\n15.12\n11.38\n28.37\n17.64\nMay\n28.90\n18.99\n3.42\n21.36\n18.30\n22.97\n4.22\n10.04\n0.02\n29.69\n23.31\n15.41\n14.72\n15.13\nJun\n35.25\n48.84\n7.52\n38.21\n43.77\n32.48\n23.24\n39.46\n0.87\n32.46\n29.51\n27.61\n37.73\n31.66\nJul\n33.30\n35.93\n12.07\n32.45\n27.35\n50.65\n118.89\n17.13\n1.14\n37.84\n34.77\n33.76\n37.99\n35.53\nAug\n9.71\n7.52\n2.82\n7.83\n7.02\n11.02\n19.57\n7.75\n79.86\n8.40\n11.19\n10.03\n6.30\n8.44\nSep\n2.53\n1.71\n3.01\n1.52\n2.59\n1.69\n19.84\n5.79\n23.42\n0.33\n7.26\n5.08\n2.08\n3.83\nOct\n5.68\n2.51\n15.42\n0.95\n1.12\n3.02\n3.78\n1.59\n4.91\n4.22\n4.46\n5.33\n3.00\n4.37\nNov\n3.70\n3.73\n3.35\n2.02\n0.66\n3.60\n0.39\n1.74\n0.71\n4.36\n2.09\n2.63\n3.39\n3.15\nDec\n4.58\n3.08\n0.52\n3.26\n1.73\n3.61\n1.17\n1.26\n0.18\n2.12\n3.82\n2.63\n6.54\n4.22\n2021\nJan\n4.43\n1.15\n4.84\n3.35\n8.08\n3.87\n0.71\n1.72\n0.06\n8.48\n4.67\n3.70\n7.84\n5.43\nFeb\n3.27\n0.94\n3.21\n1.77\n2.48\n4.22\n0.01\n-0.51\n0.13\n1.94\n4.81\n2.73\n4.42\n3.45\nMar\n1.45\n0.57\n1.61\n1.45\n3.68\n1.32\n5.08\n1.18\n0.54\n3.50\n3.14\n2.06\n2.52\n2.26\nApr\n3.38\n2.21\n2.01\n4.06\n4.60\n1.86\n0.07\n2.09\n0.59\n4.67\n3.52\n2.60\n2.51\n2.56\nMay\n2.01\n1.25\n0.97\n5.35\n2.91\n1.99\n0.35\n19.13\n0.00\n24.14\n6.26\n3.75\n0.95\n2.54\nJun\n2.76\n3.05\n9.71\n4.36\n3.19\n3.40\n1.57\n1.87\n5.60\n1.84\n4.09\n4.38\n3.21\n3.88\nSource:Zimstat, 2021\nFOOD & NON \nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES\nALL \nITEMS\nTABLE 9.1 : MONTHLY INFLATION - % CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \n(February 2019 = 100)\n \n \n \n29 \n \nFOOD \nINFLATION\nALCO HO LIC \nCLO T HING\nHO US ING , \nW AT E R,\nFURNIT URE\nMIS C.\nFO O D & \nB E VE RAG E S \n& \nE LE CT RICT Y, \nG AS\nAND\nRE CRE AT IO N &\nRE S T AURANT S \n&\nG O O DS &\nT O T AL NO N\nNO N \nALCO HO LIC \nALL\n& T O B ACCO\nFO O T W E AR\n& O T HE R\nE Q UIP ME NT\nCULT URE\nHO T E LS\nS E RVICE S\nFO O D\nB E VE RAG E S\nIT E MS\nFUE LS\nWEIGHTS\n4.90\n4.35\n27.62\n5.29\n1.42\n8.39\n2.65\n2.27\n4.25\n1.08\n6.46\n68.70\n31.30\n100\n2018\nJan\n1.83\n4.12\n-0.52\n9.00\n1.82\n1.30\n0.41\n7.95\n-2.25\n1.63\n6.64\n2.45\n6.17\n3.52\nFeb\n2.04\n5.21\n-0.65\n8.71\n1.84\n1.17\n0.56\n8.96\n-2.25\n1.45\n6.31\n2.41\n4.35\n2.98\nMar\n2.02\n4.81\n-1.32\n8.52\n1.91\n-0.35\n-1.03\n10.48\n-2.24\n1.30\n5.35\n2.37\n4.54\n2.68\nApr\n2.34\n5.14\n-1.36\n8.45\n2.06\n-0.67\n-1.28\n10.36\n-3.58\n2.84\n5.70\n2.26\n4.94\n2.71\nMay\n2.18\n5.15\n-1.36\n8.30\n1.96\n-0.58\n-1.30\n10.67\n-3.58\n3.29\n6.14\n2.28\n4.89\n2.71\nJun\n2.58\n5.27\n-0.70\n7.36\n2.38\n-0.20\n-1.20\n10.20\n-3.58\n3.26\n6.85\n2.48\n5.12\n2.91\nJul\n2.83\n5.66\n-0.71\n7.86\n2.68\n0.20\n-1.04\n10.86\n6.31\n5.42\n7.53\n3.94\n6.35\n4.29\nAug\n3.15\n6.03\n-0.77\n8.78\n2.89\n0.67\n-1.07\n10.47\n6.31\n5.53\n7.84\n4.22\n7.52\n4.83\nSep\n3.35\n6.98\n-0.47\n10.60\n4.77\n1.49\n-0.89\n10.00\n6.31\n5.77\n7.79\n4.83\n7.94\n5.39\nOct\n10.81\n53.83\n2.20\n35.57\n17.08\n19.61\n0.11\n36.24\n6.31\n15.68\n19.31\n18.71\n26.78\n20.85\nNov\n18.47\n69.14\n7.04\n46.01\n20.56\n22.02\n0.34\n56.70\n8.23\n27.34\n36.21\n26.02\n42.71\n31.01\nDec\n30.21\n81.48\n10.48\n57.08\n30.80\n56.47\n1.61\n60.45\n8.22\n44.26\n48.82\n37.08\n53.68\n42.09\n2019\nJan\n47.34\n82.13\n15.27\n71.00\n45.88\n130.41\n2.79\n75.00\n8.32\n61.45\n57.81\n54.26\n63.71\n56.90\nFeb\n51.28\n91.22\n18.46\n74.92\n50.16\n112.71\n2.78\n79.38\n8.34\n64.99\n64.31\n55.04\n69.84\n59.39\nMar\n72.67\n102.55\n22.14\n83.18\n53.34\n122.10\n4.59\n83.51\n12.30\n72.72\n73.75\n61.19\n78.55\n66.80\nApr\n93.08\n115.13\n22.94\n93.88\n83.66\n130.40\n8.49\n93.54\n19.33\n103.06\n82.56\n68.17\n92.52\n75.86\nMay\n134.80\n140.46\n26.07\n116.47\n114.54\n167.32\n42.36\n151.04\n22.97\n116.49\n98.28\n85.94\n126.43\n97.85\nJun\n228.95\n283.96\n49.13\n256.29\n213.17\n278.58\n45.52\n240.71\n23.05\n177.91\n168.24\n142.84\n251.94\n175.66\n2020\nFeb\n710.29\n629.57\n603.89\n254.34\n523.95\n785.04\n498.64\n946.38\n604.12\n262.80\n507.72\n839.15\n462.64\n540.16\nMar\n807.36\n721.94\n814.31\n444.09\n667.21\n1001.14\n585.97\n989.48\n975.94\n252.31\n582.94\n995.50\n616.11\n676.39\nApr\n980.03\n825.86\n873.49\n456.99\n799.24\n1048.61\n622.22\n984.76\n1017.34\n233.23\n590.62\n1097.13\n663.66\n765.57\nMay\n953.34\n881.65\n935.22\n461.76\n878.64\n1062.84\n664.43\n761.68\n847.15\n223.43\n739.67\n1254.79\n700.38\n785.55\nJun\n842.04\n863.68\n411.42\n725.77\n1040.97\n613.71\n937.83\n875.68\n226.03\n764.10\n1184.15\n678.29\n835.56\n737.26\nJul\n914.97\n925.92\n424.89\n761.12\n913.86\n750.68\n2013.62\n739.27\n196.93\n812.65\n1138.04\n755.27\n976.73\n837.53\nAug\n842.90\n895.39\n374.89\n735.12\n909.62\n611.88\n1405.52\n702.75\n413.11\n810.44\n1058.99\n698.90\n865.48\n761.02\nSep\n770.81\n761.81\n323.45\n638.97\n772.72\n519.65\n1681.32\n619.53\n508.37\n742.51\n820.76\n619.77\n724.40\n659.40\nOct\n544.43\n544.11\n252.56\n452.09\n554.64\n404.46\n1593.73\n454.72\n505.13\n536.36\n639.65\n470.47\n472.40\n471.25\nNov\n473.41\n464.54\n244.29\n385.99\n456.13\n376.50\n1404.55\n368.00\n420.46\n386.63\n509.46\n413.85\n385.02\n401.66\nDec\n437.80\n412.80\n163.67\n350.75\n401.81\n341.52\n1400.70\n348.33\n420.53\n330.15\n434.93\n350.17\n346.40\n348.59\n2021\nJan\n451.53\n399.55\n174.78\n358.95\n414.96\n348.54\n1370.61\n347.06\n376.10\n354.29\n449.65\n357.69\n369.43\n362.63\nFeb\n425.04\n358.36\n177.30\n336.52\n334.15\n326.47\n359.53\n277.07\n144.52\n349.97\n340.25\n297.07\n358.96\n321.59\nMar\n313.69\n236.18\n79.30\n242.33\n253.65\n265.87\n363.15\n140.26\n144.23\n296.40\n270.14\n206.00\n299.81\n240.55\nApr\n231.12\n201.33\n76.01\n178.83\n185.47\n239.16\n349.55\n121.37\n180.66\n238.80\n226.98\n178.93\n216.60\n194.07\nMay\n162.05\n156.40\n71.83\n142.05\n148.33\n181.30\n332.85\n139.66\n180.59\n224.31\n181.76\n150.75\n178.60\n161.91\nJune\n99.10\n77.51\n75.32\n82.76\n78.24\n119.54\n256.74\n75.07\n193.77\n149.35\n126.46\n105.12\n108.76\n106.64\nSource:Zimstat, 2021\nTABLE 9.2 : YEARLY INFLATION - % CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \n(February 2019 = 100)\nNON-FOOD INFLATION\nHE ALT H\nT RANS P O RT\nCO MMUNICAT IO N\nE DUCAT IO N\n \n \n \n30 \n \n \n \n \n(US$ MILLIONS)\nEnd Period\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\n2014\n2015\n2016\n2017\n2018\n2019\nEst\nLong-Term External Debt\n6,326\n6,556\n7,713\n8,125\n8,655\n10,234\n9,341\n9,305\n9,555\n9,827\n10,557\nGovernment\n5,304\n5,039\n6,128\n6,321\n6,172\n6,192\n6,097\n6,015\n6,200\n6,306\n6,930\nBilateral Creditors\n3,703\n3,402\n4,087\n4,087\n4,088\n4,115\n4,115\n4,129\n4,194\n4,261\n4,892\nMultilateral Creditors\n1,591\n1,627\n2,041\n2,235\n2,084\n2,078\n1,982\n1,886\n2,006\n2,045\n2,069\nPrivate Creditors\n10\n10\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPublic Enterprises\n825\n825\n1,092\n1,198\n1,356\n1,661\n1,220\n1,370\n1,406\n1,426\n1,165\nBilateral Creditors\n497\n497\n711\n703\n858\n1,155\n760\n779\n843\n898\n783\nMultilateral Creditors\n327\n327\n382\n495\n498\n506\n460\n591\n562\n528\n381\nPrivate Creditors\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nMonetary Authorities\n140\n550\n127\n125\n125\n120\n110\n0\n0\n0\n0\nMultilateral Creditors - IMF\n140\n550\n127\n125\n125\n120\n110\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPrivate\n57\n142\n366\n480\n1,002\n2,261\n1,913\n1,920\n1,949\n2,095\n2,431\nShort-Term External Debt\n1,348\n2,040\n1,286\n891\n1,564\n2,394\n2,258\n2,304\n2,299\n2,374\n3,799\nSupplier's Credits\n193\n286\n134\n30\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nReserve Bank\n998\n1,300\n615\n615\n614\n587\n587\n573\n507\n441\n2,463\nPrivate\n156\n454\n537\n246\n950\n1,807\n1,671\n1,731\n1,792\n1,933\n1,336\nTotal External Debt\n7,674\n8,596\n8,999\n9,016\n10,219\n12,628\n11,599\n11,610\n11,854\n13,134\n14,324\nSource: Ministry of Finance & Economic Development, 2020; & Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020\nTABLE 10: ZIMBABWE: EXTERNAL DEBT OUTSTANDING BY DEBTOR (INCLUDING ALL ARREARS)\n \n \n \n31 \n \n \nUSA\nSOUTH ARFICAN\nBOTSWANA\nJAPANESE\nEURO\nPOUND\nEND OF\nDollar\nRAND\nPULA\nYEN\nSTERLING\n2019\nMar\n3.0120\n0.2064\n0.2789\n0.0272\n3.3832\n3.9363\nApr\n3.2614\n0.2275\n0.3031\n0.0292\n3.6490\n4.2209\nMay\n5.2635\n0.3550\n0.4831\n0.0483\n5.8585\n6.6391\nJun\n6.6220\n0.4673\n0.6231\n0.0615\n7.5245\n8.3906\nJul\n9.1900\n0.6494\n0.8621\n0.0846\n10.0000\n11.1111\nAug\n10.512\n0.6833\n0.9458\n0.0940\n11.6288\n12.8226\nSep\n15.200\n1.0234\n1.3883\n0.1415\n16.5699\n18.7643\nOct\n16.120\n1.0804\n1.4721\n0.1491\n17.5217\n20.4051\nNov\n15.970\n1.0800\n1.4600\n0.1500\n17.6600\n20.5800\nDec\n16.530\n1.1400\n1.5400\n0.1500\n18.3700\n21.6900\n2020\nJan\n17.100\n1.1883\n1.5922\n0.1564\n19.0000\n22.5000\nFeb\n17.680\n1.1779\n1.6073\n0.1608\n19.2174\n22.9610\nMar\n21.160\n1.2709\n1.8384\n0.1970\n23.5111\n26.1235\nApr\n25.000\n1.3448\n2.0542\n0.2321\n27.1739\n30.8642\nMay\n25.000\n1.3736\n2.0695\n0.2333\n27.1739\n30.8642\nJun\n32.350\n1.8876\n2.7638\n0.3007\n36.4229\n40.5346\nJul\n68.943\n4.1073\n5.9515\n0.6457\n79.5784\n87.2651\nAug\n81.604\n4.7435\n7.0151\n0.7697\n96.5746\n107.2191\nSep\n82.250\n4.9133\n7.1482\n0.7790\n97.0112\n106.6580\nOct\n81.370\n4.9403\n7.1042\n0.7734\n95.7690\n105.5999\nNov\n81.679\n5.2531\n7.3127\n0.7827\n96.6100\n107.8000\nDec\n81.815\n5.4767\n7.5022\n0.7878\n99.5164\n109.9537\n2021\nJan\n82.070\n5.4208\n7.4794\n0.7914\n99.9148\n111.9300\nFeb\n83.461\n5.6470\n7.6491\n0.7927\n100.9497\n115.5931\nMar\n83.996\n5.5989\n7.6072\n0.7732\n100.0262\n116.3990\nApr\n84.503\n5.8973\n7.8165\n0.7766\n102.4094\n117.7721\nMay\n84.726\n6.1449\n7.9642\n0.7720\n103.3021\n120.1879\nJun\n85.423\n5.9577\n7.8205\n0.7730\n101.6496\n118.3071\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2021\n TABLE 11 : SELECTED INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE RATES\n1. ZWL$ dollar per unit of foreign currency\n \n \n \n32 \n \n \nMarket Capitalisation\nEND OF\nAll Share*\nZWL$ millions\n2018\nJan\n91.3\n130.4\n31.4\n55,032,220\n8,652.9\nFeb\n88.0\n124.9\n63.7\n138,142,187\n8,386.0\nMar\n87.0\n125.1\n40.3\n108,997,097\n8,290.4\nApr\n98.7\n124.4\n44.4\n206,342,675\n9,405.3\nMay\n108.3\n151.5\n59.3\n129,155,586\n10,393.2\nJun\n102.9\n161.3\n73.0\n234,834,368\n9,792.2\nJul\n114.3\n164.0\n114.9\n624,256,160\n10,969.7\nAug\n117.3\n161.3\n50.5\n142,150,599\n12,475.4\nSep\n115.1\n163.8\n61.1\n197,401,341\n12,265.5\nOct\n163.8\n217.3\n449.6\n316,060,000\n17,960.0\nNov\n160.4\n208.6\n118.0\n153,874,660\n17,316.6\nDec\n146.2\n227.7\n93.0\n144,479,601\n19,424.4\n2019\nJan\n157.5\n213.1\n110.3\n122,778,938\n20,888.4\nFeb\n148.1\n206.9\n295.8\n229,935,122\n19,773.4\nMar\n121.7\n194.0\n70.8\n123,398,632\n16,084.9\nApr\n133.7\n186.5\n116.5\n134,394,898\n17,502.7\nMay\n188.1\n225.8\n193.5\n237,334,372\n24,920.0\nJun\n204.8\n255.3\n235.5\n293,138,775\n27,017.2\nJul\n187.1\n244.6\n191.0\n163,556,663\n24,636.1\nAug\n166.36\n269.6\n109.0\n117,688,558\n21,742.2\nSep\n232.52\n317.8\n166.6\n335,373,041\n30,527.2\nOct\n232.86\n276.3\n208.4\n203,004,611\n30,390.0\nNov\n240.81\n344.4\n130.0\n129,886,035\n31,226.3\nDec\n230.08\n316.7\n194.2\n190,880,245\n29,767.1\n2020\nJan\n332.9\n344.9\n304.86\n179,559,446\n43,426.5\nFeb\n473.13\n826.73\n360.13\n172,678,984\n60,987.5\nMar\n456.21\n720.47\n425.24\n237,667,043\n58,612.1\nApr\n488.60\n826.64\n269.66\n107,308,931\n63,387.9\nMay\n1180.14\n1582.86\n568.96\n218,832,930\n152,719.7\nJune*\n1788.75\n3995.48\n379.93\n519,901,300\n228,577.1\nAug\n1389.23\n3709.15\n1,026.76\n164,501,200\n175,678.4\nSep\n1638.17\n4128.52\n4,640.88\n1,093,040,821\n206,502.5\nOct\n1476.87\n3792.35\n986.70\n397,006,127\n179,690.0\nNov\n1595.59\n3322.22\n4,103.78\n470,899,659\n193,270.8\nDec\n2636.34\n4134.09\n2,734.50\n316,737,200\n317,879.3\n2021\nJan\n3600.82\n4356.74\n3,513.59\n2,477,166,688\n434,856.23\nFeb\n4154.37\n6683.44\n1,529.25\n149,031,800\n501,184.95\nMar\n4489.47\n5315.39\n4,517.14\n203,633,747\n531,742.64\nApr\n4641.11\n5061.28\n3,075.98\n223,494,202\n540,745.24\nMay\n5428.28\n6820.54\n3,917.41\n188,748,200\n634,011.15\nJune\n6194.88\n6211.49\n4458.87\n248,500,624\n745,175.95\nSource:Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2021\n*All Share index was introduced in January, 2018\n**As at 26 June 2020\nTABLE 12: ZIMBABWE STOCK MARKET STATISTICS\n Market Turnover \nZWL$ million \nVolume of Shares\nMining\nIndices\n \n \n \n33 \n \n \nEND OF\nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\n INTERNET\n2018\nJan\n5548.1\n4.9\n663.5\n21.3\n2318.8\n1006.1\nFeb\n4706.6\n4.5\n594.0\n13.9\n2015.1\n831.0\nMar\n6300.4\n4.5\n654.2\n12.5\n2657.1\n864.8\nApr\n5786.8\n3.3\n640.9\n11.5\n3002.6\n822.6\nMay\n7298.4\n4.2\n819.7\n10.5\n3550.1\n968.6\nJun\n7997.3\n4.7\n779.4\n8.3\n3724.3\n1135.5\nJul\n8290.0\n4.0\n790.0\n9.4\n4446.7\n1262.5\nAug\n7762.9\n2.9\n811.2\n14.0\n4558.5\n1255.0\nSep\n7155.0\n4.0\n842.5\n17.0\n4462.4\n1393.1\nOct\n8230.5\n4.2\n821.3\n17.9\n4607.4\n1428.2\nNov\n7922.5\n3.7\n657.5\n19.9\n3964.8\n1026.7\nDec\n8355.2\n2.8\n917.2\n14.6\n4833.8\n1102.9\n2019\nJan\n6903.0\n2.9\n1294.0\n16.9\n3608.8\n1056.2\nFeb\n8337.0\n4.0\n1330.6\n17.2\n3594.5\n1093.6\nMar\n9881.5\n3.9\n1399.5\n18.3\n4080.7\n1250.6\nApr\n10321.4\n3.1\n1590.1\n14.0\n4949.3\n1408.5\nMay\n14670.3\n4.2\n1397.5\n11.8\n6692.5\n1897.8\nJun\n17881.2\n3.7\n1464.7\n30.1\n7130.0\n2539.8\nJul\n23309.9\n3.7\n1806.5\n36.6\n9137.4\n3295.8\nAug\n23596.6\n2.4\n2181.6\n38.5\n11077.6\n3493.6\nSep\n30328.1\n3.8\n3029.9\n51.9\n15112.0\n5337.7\nOct\n39413.7\n3.9\n3621.6\n67.1\n16588.3\n6237.0\nNov\n40871.8\n3.5\n4199.3\n67.4\n13537.8\n7200.3\nDec\n49579.8\n2.8\n5695.4\n97.2\n19356.7\n8724.0\n2020\nJan\n47841.3\n1.8\n5236.3\n115.2\n21247.9\n9646.8\nFeb\n41637.6\n4.7\n5431.8\n136.9\n22589.7\n9633.8\nMar\n60804.1\n4.1\n7252.9\n268.0\n27993.6\n14411.4\nApr\n47525.5\n-\n4150.6\n82.6\n18299.2\n11481.8\nMay\n59271.1\n-\n7426.0\n349.8\n24851.5\n19593.2\nJun\n91311.3\n-\n9752.7\n516.6\n26042.5\n25842.3\nJul\n127743.2\n-\n14741.1\n1028.7\n26033.3\n35199.7\nAug\n143042.1\n-\n14953.6\n1547.5\n27217.6\n34505.0\nSep\n203172.0\n-\n18252.3\n1963.0\n26441.0\n41958.4\nOct\n198863.6\n-\n22482.3\n2163.3\n42767.7\n46270.4\nNov\n236231.6\n-\n23936.7\n2151.6\n36475.7\n54797.8\nDec\n302661.2\n-\n30061.0\n1935.3\n45278.1\n67038.2\n2021\nJan\n255551.3\n-\n21042.2\n4532.1\n35306.3\n64996.4\nFeb\n226335.8\n-\n22882.6\n2288.9\n36383.0\n61941.7\nMar\n320422.1\n-\n28569.9\n3316.6\n44524.0\n86463.9\nApr\n288958.8\n-\n30071.5\n2807.0\n44131.6\n90580.4\nMay\n361427.1\n-\n36765.1\n3193.7\n49745.8\n89471.3\nJun\n388757.5\n-\n38540.1\n3200.0\n51437.4\n115145.7\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2021\nTABLE 13.1 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS \n Values of Transactions (ZWL$ millions)\n \n \n \n34 \n \n \nEND OF\nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\nINTERNET\n2018\nJan\n 548.1 \n22.7\n20981.2\n449.6\n100593.9\n501.8\nFeb\n 457.2 \n22.5\n18869.0\n292.2\n89584.3\n463.8\nMar\n 545.2 \n23.7\n21996.8\n268.4\n116120.0\n510.5\nApr\n 505.5 \n17.4\n21170.0\n253.6\n117616.8\n457.0\nMay\n 611.1 \n21.2\n23278.2\n213.2\n137423.0\n496.6\nJun\n 553.6 \n22.5\n23790.0\n175.2\n156609.8\n502.2\nJul\n 560.2 \n20.1\n25075.5\n223.1\n169416.8\n559.6\nAug\n 553.0 \n15.1\n25249.9\n317.4\n164918.0\n518.7\nSep\n 543.0 \n19.4\n24918.0\n300.8\n161289.5\n511.3\nOct\n 571.6 \n20.4\n21025.4\n345.5\n161427.4\n496.0\nNov\n 477.4 \n16.7\n17845.4\n334.9\n133862.1\n430.6\nDec\n 478.6 \n13.0\n27419.1\n236.2\n161540.7\n409.1\nAnnual Total\n 6,404.4 \n234.6 271,618.6 3,410.1 1,670,402.1 \n 5,857.13 \n2019\nJan\n401.5\n12.2\n40613.8\n232.6\n135481.1\n413.4\nFeb\n456.5\n16.4\n27811.2\n226.8\n119081.1\n463.6\nMar\n525.9\n15.4\n30417.6\n248.9\n142597.8\n441.0\nApr\n535.0\n13.7\n32092.5\n168.8\n157348.3\n390.1\nMay\n642.6\n14.7\n15542.6\n121.4\n166491.6\n494.3\nJun\n706.0\n13.3\n18012.1\n79.6\n160873.0\n486.8\nJul\n983.5\n13.6\n20465.4\n99.6\n170823.3\n638.2\nAug\n872.9\n9.0\n21919.8\n85.2\n179281.2\n542.3\nSep\n1010.7\n11.9\n22749.6\n62.4\n200441.9\n679.4\nOct\n1079.4\n12.7\n23191.6\n65.0\n206621.5\n1099.3\nNov\n982.1\n10.3\n25737.5\n225.2\n152919.9\n2044.1\nDec\n1003.8\n7.6\n27800.5\n385.5\n146316.6\n1273.6\n2020\nJan\n943.3\n4.6\n23649.0\n199.9\n139278.2\n671.7\nFeb\n916.1\n8.9\n21652.2\n196.6\n149671.5\n647.8\nMar\n1068.5\n7.4\n22588.1\n234.3\n173042.2\n661.2\nApr\n515.1\n-\n11036.4\n36.4\n131190.0\n998.0\nMay\n674.1\n-\n14711.6\n231.2\n150936.1\n705.3\nJun\n907.8\n-\n14420.9\n286.1\n135524.3\n1390.4\nJul\n918.4\n-\n15786.5\n251.4\n121072.4\n791.9\nAug\n789.4\n-\n13536.2\n248.2\n127308.6\n702.1\nSep\n911.9\n-\n15524.1\n309.8\n125059.2\n783.2\nOct\n990.2\n-\n19138.6\n398.8\n191148.8\n735.8\nNov\n971.3\n-\n17584.9\n430.0\n101305.8\n755.6\nDec\n1100.0\n-\n19404.0\n453.0\n115290.2\n820.1\n2021\nJan\n720.0\n-\n9849.3\n229.0\n94691.4\n872.2\nFeb\n806.0\n-\n12309.3\n527.8\n90078.0\n754.9\nMar\n1112.8\n-\n15178.8\n751.0\n105272.0\n1003.7\nApr\n951.7\n-\n15185.0\n605.5\n97253.3\n1040.1\nMay\n1029.8\n-\n16511.3\n664.4\n103708.7\n994.8\nJun\n1076.9\n-\n14797.9\n581.9\n99349.6\n982.1\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2021\nTABLE 13.2 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS \n Volumes of Transactions (000's)\n \n \n \n35 \n \n \nEND OF\nEXPORTS\nIMPORTS\nTOTAL TRADE TRADE BALANCE\n2018\nJan\n251.2\n489.7\n740.9\n-238.5\nFeb\n346.3\n574.9\n921.2\n-228.6\nMar\n288.6\n605.8\n894.3\n-317.2\nApr\n329.6\n544.1\n873.7\n-214.5\nMay\n267.2\n532.4\n799.6\n-265.2\nJun\n384.6\n614.6\n999.3\n-230.0\nJul\n340.3\n560.0\n900.3\n-219.7\nAug\n449.3\n576.5\n1025.9\n-127.2\nSep\n353.4\n577.1\n930.5\n-223.7\nOct\n448.6\n592.3\n1040.9\n-143.7\nNov\n471.7\n628.7\n1100.4\n-157.0\nDec\n364.8\n494.7\n859.5\n-129.9\nTotal\n4,295.63\n6,790.84\n11,086.47\n-2,495.21\n2019\nJan\n292.6\n336.8\n629.4\n-44.2\nFeb\n348.4\n370.5\n718.9\n-22.1\nMar\n295.9\n329.0\n624.9\n-33.1\nApr\n277.0\n416.7\n693.7\n-139.7\nMay\n343.2\n436.8\n780.0\n-93.6\nJun\n239.8\n458.5\n698.3\n-218.7\nJul\n299.5\n357.0\n656.5\n-57.5\nAug\n345.4\n384.2\n729.60\n-38.80\nSep\n378.4\n403.9\n782.30\n-25.50\nOct\n483.3\n400.6\n883.90\n82.70\nNov\n475.2\n431.2\n906.40\n44.00\nDec\n489.1\n418.8\n907.90\n70.30\nTotal\n4,267.80\n4,744.00\n9,011.80\n-476.20\n2020\nJan\n397.7\n383.5\n781.27\n14.18\nFeb\n365.5\n455.3\n820.89\n-89.81\nMar\n272.1\n450.5\n722.56\n-178.45\nApr\n200.5\n224.7\n425.20\n-24.23\nMay\n298.7\n361.1\n659.80\n-62.40\nJun\n330.0\n407.3\n737.32\n-77.28\nJul\n286.4\n345.8\n632.20\n59.31\nAug\n389.3\n404.9\n794.25\n-15.62\nSep\n398.8\n441.4\n840.21\n-42.57\nOct\n439.4\n490.2\n929.60\n-50.80\nNov\n528.9\n509.7\n1038.60\n19.20\nDec\n488.3\n527.2\n1015.50\n-38.90\n4,395.70\n5,001.70\n9,397.40\n-487.37\n2021\nJan\n282.9\n460.3\n743.20\n-177.4\nFeb\n340.8\n451.9\n792.70\n-111.1\nMar\n461.8\n527.2\n989.00\n-65.4\nApr\n444.7\n489.9\n934.60\n-45.2\nMay\n486.8\n503.1\n989.91\n-16.2\nJun\n502.5\n558.1\n1060.60\n-55.6\nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2021\nTABLE 14 : MERCHANDISE TRADE STATISTICS\n (US$ millions)", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/Monthly_Economic_Reviews/Monthly-Economic-Review-June-2021-.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "1d51998d866bd2cee79fe36a13b2c04d", "text": "Vol. 27 No. 43 \n \nWeek Ending \n24th October 2025 \n \nWeekly Economic \nHighlights \nVol. 27 No. 37 \nTABLE OF CONTENTS \n \n1. \nOVERVIEW ............................................................................ 1 \n2. \nINTEREST RATES ................................................................ 2 \n3. \nEQUITY MARKETS .............................................................. 3 \n4. \nCLEARING AND SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY .................. 5 \n5. \nENERGY PRICES .................................................................. 5 \n6. \nGOLD PM FIX, MOSI-OA-TUNYA GOLD COINS AND \nGOLD BACKED DIGITAL TOKENS (GBDT) .................. 5 \n7. \nEXTERNAL SECTOR ........................................................... 6 \n \n \n \n \n1 \n1. OVERVIEW \nThis report summarises major developments in the monetary and financial sectors of the economy during the \nweek ending 24th October 2025. It includes updates on domestic money and capital markets, national payment \nsystems, exchange rates, and global commodity prices. \nDuring the week under review, both local and foreign currency deposits rates remained unchanged across all \ntenors. Local currency lending rates increased for all maturities, save for minimum individuals rates which \ndeclined. Foreign currency lending rates decreased for all maturities, save for maximum individual rates which \nincreased. The minimum lending rates for corporate clients in foreign currency remained unchanged. \nDuring the week ending 24th October 2025 both the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) and the Victoria Falls \nStock Exchange (VFEX) exhibited bullish sentiments. As such, the ZSE and VFEX All share indices added \n2.67% and 2.5% to close at 205.93 points and 160.12 points, respectively. \nThe total value of transactions processed through the National Payment Systems platforms decreased by \n2.46% to ZiG37.91 billion from ZiG38.86 billion in the previous week. This decrease is highly attributed to \nReal-Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) system. The volume of transactions processed, however, increased by \n11.84% from 15.17 million to 16.96 million during the same period. \nThe Zimbabwe Gold Currency (ZiG) appreciated by 0.34% to ZiG26.55 per US dollar during the week ending \n24th October 2025, from an average of ZiG26.64 per 1US dollar recorded in the prior week. \nInternational commodity prices for gold, platinum and palladium retreated during the week ending 24th \nOctober 2025, while lithium prices remained unchanged from the previous week level. Prices for nickel and \nBrent crude oil, however, increased during the same week. \nGold price fell on account of renewed optimism over a potential breakthrough in the US-China trade war, \nwhich reduced safe-haven demand for the yellow metal. Platinum prices fell amid a strengthening U.S. dollar, \nshifting expectations around monetary policy tightening and lessened safe-haven demand. For palladium, a \nstronger US dollar and shifting expectations about Fed policy weighed on all dollar-denominated \ncommodities, including palladium, supporting the price decline. However, nickel prices increased due to \nexpectations of a more favourable monetary policy such as a possible Fed rate cut has prompted speculative \nbuying in base metals. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2 \n2. INTEREST RATES \n \nAverage commercial bank deposit rates (Local Currency (ZiG) (%) \nZiG Deposit rates \n03 Oct 2025 \n10 Oct 2025 \n17 Oct 2025 \n24 Oct 2025 \nSavings \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n3.75 \n3.75 \n3.75 \n3.75 \nMaximum \n4.08 \n4.08 \n4.08 \n4.08 \n1-month deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n6.63 \n6.63 \n6.63 \n6.63 \nMaximum \n11.04 \n11.04 \n11.04 \n11.04 \n3-months deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n6.90 \n6.90 \n6.90 \n6.90 \nMaximum \n10.79 \n10.79 \n10.79 \n10.79 \n6-months deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n6.51 \n6.51 \n6.51 \n6.51 \nMaximum \n10.39 \n10.39 \n10.39 \n10.39 \n12-months deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n6.52 \n6.52 \n6.52 \n6.52 \nMaximum \n11.10 \n11.10 \n11.10 \n11.10 \nOver 1 year \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n6.53 \n6.53 \n6.53 \n6.53 \nMaximum \n11.11 \n11.11 \n11.11 \n11.11 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n \nAverage commercial bank deposit rates (Foreign Currency (US$) (%) \nUS$ Deposit rates \n03 Oct 2025 \n10 Oct 2025 \n17 Oct 2025 \n24 Oct 2025 \nSavings \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n1.61 \n1.61 \n1.61 \n1.61 \nMaximum \n1.94 \n1.94 \n1.94 \n1.94 \n1-month deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n3.92 \n3.92 \n3.92 \n3.92 \nMaximum \n6.67 \n6.67 \n6.67 \n6.67 \n3-month deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n4.46 \n4.46 \n4.46 \n4.46 \nMaximum \n7.70 \n7.70 \n7.70 \n7.70 \n6-month deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n4.26 \n4.26 \n4.26 \n4.26 \nMaximum \n7.65 \n7.65 \n7.65 \n7.65 \n12-Month deposit \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n4.56 \n4.56 \n4.56 \n4.56 \nMaximum \n8.00 \n8.00 \n8.00 \n8.00 \nOver 1 year \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n4.67 \n4.67 \n4.67 \n4.67 \nMaximum \n7.72 \n7.72 \n7.72 \n7.72 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n3 \nCommercial bank weighted lending rates (Local Currency (ZiG) (%) \nZiG Lending rates \n03 Oct 2025 \n10 Oct 2025 \n17 Oct 2025 \n24 Oct 2025 \nIndividuals \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n43.52 \n43.53 \n43.52 \n43.50 \nMaximum \n49.08 \n49.08 \n49.13 \n49.16 \nCorporates \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n40.40 \n40.43 \n40.42 \n40.46 \nMaximum \n46.22 \n46.80 \n46.34 \n46.35 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n \nCommercial bank weighted lending rates (Foreign Currency (US$) (%) \nUS$ Lending rates \n03 Oct 2025 \n10 Oct 2025 \n17 Oct 2025 \n24 Oct 2025 \nIndividuals \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n13.69 \n13.68 \n13.69 \n13.68 \nMaximum \n17.81 \n17.80 \n17.85 \n17.86 \nCorporates \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n10.50 \n10.29 \n10.22 \n10.22 \nMaximum \n16.23 \n16.09 \n16.05 \n16.04 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n \nCommercial banks and building societies mortgage lending rates (%) \nMortgage Lending \nrates \n03 Oct 2025 \n10 Oct 2025 \n17 Oct 2025 \n24 Oct 2025 \nZiG Lending rates \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n25.00 \n25.00 \n25.00 \n25.00 \nMaximum \n50.00 \n50.00 \n50.00 \n50.00 \nUS$ Lending rates \n \n \n \n \nMinimum \n10.00 \n10.00 \n10.00 \n10.00 \nMaximum \n18.00 \n18.00 \n18.00 \n18.00 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n3. EQUITY MARKETS \n \nZSE Indicators \n \n \nAll Share \nIndex \n(points) \nTop 10 \nIndex \n(points) \nTop 15 \nIndex \n(points) \nMedium Cap \n(points) \nSmall Cap \n(points) \nMining \nIndex \n(points) \nGrand \nMarket Cap \n(ZiG billion) \nMarket \nTurnover \n(ZiG million) \nVolume of \nShares \n(million) \n03-Oct-25 \n205.16 \n203.87 \n208.11 \n228.45 \n100.11 \n123.58 \n63.89 \n58.44 \n12.54 \n10-Oct-25 \n197.85 \n194.45 \n200.61 \n229.82 \n100.11 \n108.64 \n60.85 \n102.34 \n61.37 \n17-Oct-25 \n200.58 \n197.76 \n203.42 \n230.23 \n100.11 \n108.64 \n62.38 \n149.44 \n30.00 \n24-Oct-25 \n205.93 \n202.05 \n209.26 \n240.75 \n100.11 \n108.64 \n65.19 \n80.48 \n9.06 \nWeekly \nChange (%) \n2.67 \n2.17 \n2.87 \n4.57 \n0.00 \n0.00 \n4.50 \n(46.15) \n(69.80) \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2025 \n \nVFEX Indicators \nDate \n \nAll Share Index \nPoints \nGrand Market Capitalisation \n(US$ billion) \nMarket Turnover (US$ \nmillion) \nVolume of Shares (million) \n03-Oct-25 \n147.38 \n1.75 \n2.87 \n22.28 \n10-Oct-25 \n156.10 \n1.86 \n1.45 \n4.20 \n17-Oct-25 \n156.11 \n1.86 \n1.86 \n4.84 \n24-Oct-25 \n160.12 \n1.91 \n1.86 \n14.89 \nWeekly Change (%) \n2.57 \n2.69 \n0.00 \n207.64 \nSource: Victoria Falls Stock Exchange, 2025 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n4 \n \nFigure 1: ZSE and VFEX Indicators \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange and Victoria Falls Stock Exchange, 2025 \n \n \n0\n50,000\n100,000\n150,000\n200,000\n250,000\n300,000\n18-Jul-25\n25-Jul-25\n01-Aug-25\n08-Aug-25\n15-Aug-25\n22-Aug-25\n29-Aug-25\n05-Sep-25\n12-Sep-25\n19-Sep-25\n26-Sep-25\n03-Oct-25\n10-Oct-25\n17-Oct-25\n24-Oct-25\nZiG Thousands\nZSE Market Turnover \n40\n45\n50\n55\n60\n65\n70\n75\n80\n18-Jul-25\n25-Jul-25\n01-Aug-25\n08-Aug-25\n15-Aug-25\n22-Aug-25\n29-Aug-25\n05-Sep-25\n12-Sep-25\n19-Sep-25\n26-Sep-25\n03-Oct-25\n10-Oct-25\n17-Oct-25\n24-Oct-25\nZiG Billion\nZSE Market Capitalisation \n100\n105\n110\n115\n120\n125\n130\n135\n140\n145\n150\n155\n160\n165\n18-Jul-25\n25-Jul-25\n01-Aug-25\n08-Aug-25\n15-Aug-25\n22-Aug-25\n29-Aug-25\n05-Sep-25\n12-Sep-25\n19-Sep-25\n26-Sep-25\n03-Oct-25\n10-Oct-25\n17-Oct-25\n24-Oct-25\nIndex\nVFEX All Share Index \n0\n500\n1000\n1500\n2000\n2500\n18-Jul-25\n25-Jul-25\n01-Aug-25\n08-Aug-25\n15-Aug-25\n22-Aug-25\n29-Aug-25\n05-Sep-25\n12-Sep-25\n19-Sep-25\n26-Sep-25\n03-Oct-25\n10-Oct-25\n17-Oct-25\n24-Oct-25\nUS$ Thousand\nVFEX Market Turnover \n1.2\n1.3\n1.4\n1.5\n1.6\n1.7\n1.8\n1.9\n2\n18-Jul-25\n25-Jul-25\n01-Aug-25\n08-Aug-25\n15-Aug-25\n22-Aug-25\n29-Aug-25\n05-Sep-25\n12-Sep-25\n19-Sep-25\n26-Sep-25\n03-Oct-25\n10-Oct-25\n17-Oct-25\n24-Oct-25\nUS$ Billion\nVFEX Market Capitalisation \n90\n110\n130\n150\n170\n190\n210\n230\n250\n270\n18-Jul-25\n25-Jul-25\n01-Aug-25\n08-Aug-25\n15-Aug-25\n22-Aug-25\n29-Aug-25\n05-Sep-25\n12-Sep-25\n19-Sep-25\n26-Sep-25\n03-Oct-25\n10-Oct-25\n17-Oct-25\n24-Oct-25\nIndices\nZSE Indices \nAll Share Index (ZSE)\nTop 10 Index\nMining Index\n \n \n5 \n4. CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY \n Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n5. ENERGY PRICES \n \nEnergy Prices \n \n03-Sept 2025 \n10-Oct 2025 \n17-Oct 2025 \n24-Oct 2025 \nDomestic Energy Prices \nUS$ \nUS$ \nUS$ \nUS$ \nDiesel 50/ litre \n1.55 \n1.55 \n1.57 \n1.57 \nPetrol Blend E5/ litre \n1.55 \n1.55 \n1.57 \n1.57 \nLP Gas / kg \n1.45 \n1.45 \n1.48 \n1.48 \n \n \n \n \n \nInternational Energy Prices \n(Weekly average) \nUS$/barrel \nUS$/barrel \nUS$/barrel \nUS$/barrel \nCrude Oil Prices \n65.66 \n65.10 \n61.88 \n63.78 \n Source: Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory Authority and BBC 2025 \n \n6. GOLD PM FIX, MOSI-OA-TUNYA GOLD COINS AND GOLD BACKED DIGITAL TOKENS \n(GBDT) \n \nGold PM Fix and Gold Backed Digital Token Prices \nDate \nGold PM Fix \nGBDT ZiG Price per Mg \nGBDT US$ Price per Mg \nUS$/oz \nBuy \nSell \nBuy \nSell \n20-Oct-25 \n4,224.75 \n3.43 \n3.80 \n0.1290 \n0.1426 \n21-Oct-25 \n4,294.35 \n3.49 \n3.85 \n0.1312 \n0.1450 \n22-Oct-25 \n4,169.60 \n3.38 \n3.73 \n0.1274 \n0.1408 \n23-Oct-25 \n4,070.00 \n3.30 \n3.64 \n0.1243 \n0.1374 \n24-Oct-25 \n4,143.75 \n3.36 \n3.71 \n0.1266 \n0.1399 \nSource: London Bullion Market Association and Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n \n \n \nPAYMENT STREAM \nWEEK ENDING \n17 October 2025 \nWEEK ENDING \n24 October 2025 \nWEEKLY \nCHANGE (%) \n \nVALUES \n \nRTGS \n32,083,469,073.86 \n29,291,915,118.28 \n(8.70) \nOf which ZiG \n10,345,014,339.10 \n 7,692,601,213.40 \n(25.64) \nOf which US$ transactions \n(ZiG Equivalent) \n21,738,454,734.76 \n21,599,313,904.88 \n(0.64) \nPOS \n1,453,419,139.32 \n2,365,721,635.59 \n62.77 \nATM \n1,247,173,888.67 \n1,769,001,711.52 \n41.84 \nMOBILE BANKING \n182,846,494.66 \n389,140,557.14 \n112.82 \nMOBILE MONEY \n3,693,888,021.15 \n3,772,756,893.55 \n2.14 \nZIPIT MOBILE \n202,769,607.63 \n318,228,781.67 \n56.94 \nTOTAL \n38,863,566,225.29 \n37,906,764,697.75 \n(2.46) \n \nVOLUMES \n \nRTGS \n162,250 \n242,840 \n49.67 \nOf which ZiG \n63,288 \n91,874 \n45.17 \nOf which US$ \n98,962 \n150,966 \n52.55 \nPOS \n1,431,685 \n2,112,797 \n47.57 \nATM \n140,517 \n248,827 \n77.08 \nMOBILE BANKING \n207,822 \n440,380 \n111.90 \nMOBILE MONEY \n13,025,562 \n13,620,097 \n4.56 \nZIPIT MOBILE \n200,750 \n299,617 \n49.25 \nTOTAL \n15,168,586 \n16,964,558 \n11.84 \n \n \n6 \nMosi-oa-Tunya Gold Coin Prices \nGold Coin \nPrice \n20-Oct-25 \n21-Oct-25 \n22-Oct-25 \n23-Oct-25 \n24-Oct-25 \n1.00Oz \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ \n4,435.99 \n4,509.07 \n4,378.08 \n4,273.50 \n4,350.94 \nZiG \n118,045.56 \n119,843.35 \n116,115.00 \n113,306.72 \n115,384.52 \n0.50Oz \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ \n2,217.99 \n2,254.53 \n2,189.04 \n2,136.75 \n2,175.47 \nZiG \n59,022.78 \n59,921.67 \n58,057.50 \n56,653.36 \n57,692.26 \n0.25Oz \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ \n1,109.00 \n1,127.27 \n1,094.52 \n1,068.38 \n1,087.73 \nZiG \n29,511.39 \n29,960.84 \n29,028.75 \n28,326.68 \n28,846.13 \n0.10Oz \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ \n443.60 \n450.91 \n437.81 \n427.35 \n435.09 \nZiG \n11,804.56 \n11,984.33 \n11,611.50 \n11,330.67 \n11,538.45 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n \n7. EXTERNAL SECTOR \n \n \nExchange Rate Developments (ZiG per Unit of foreign currency) \n \n \nUSD \nZAR \nGBP \nBWP \nEURO \nWeekly Average \n(13 Oct – 17 Oct) \n26.6401 \n1.5349 \n35.6619 \n1.8724 \n31.0097 \n20-Oct \n26.6109 \n1.5340 \n35.7610 \n1.8631 \n31.0643 \n21-Oct \n26.5783 \n1.5401 \n35.5790 \n1.8635 \n30.9172 \n22-Oct \n26.5219 \n1.5253 \n35.5011 \n1.8595 \n30.8039 \n23-Oct \n26.5138 \n1.5193 \n35.3734 \n1.8510 \n30.7534 \n24-Oct \n26.5195 \n1.5284 \n35.3095 \n1.8526 \n30.7719 \nWeekly Average \n(20 Oct – 24 Oct) \n \n26.5489 \n \n \n1.5294 \n \n35.5048 \n \n1.8579 \n \n30.8621 \nAppr (-)/Depr (+) (%) of the \nZWG \n(0.34) \n(0.36) \n(0.44) \n(0.77) \n(0.48) \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n \nInternational Commodity Prices \n \nGold \nPlatinum \nPalladium \nNickel \nLithium \n \nUS$/oz \nUS$/ounce \nUS$/ounce \nUS$/tonne \nUS$/tonne \nWeekly Average \n(13 Oct – 17 Oct) \n4,237.89 \n1,654.80 \n1,531.40 \n15,185.60 \n9,600.00 \n20-Oct \n4,323.80 \n1,610.00 \n1,479.00 \n15,222.00 \n9,600.00 \n21-Oct \n4,131.70 \n1,540.00 \n1,429.00 \n15,175.00 \n9,600.00 \n22-Oct \n4,085.40 \n1,601.00 \n1,430.00 \n15,163.00 \n9,600.00 \n23-Oct \n4,108.50 \n1,629.00 \n1,431.00 \n15,363.00 \n9,600.00 \n24-Oct \n4,081.20 \n1,615.00 \n1,448.00 \n15,361.00 \n9,600.00 \nWeekly Average \n(20 Oct – 24 Oct) \n4,146.12 \n1,599.00 \n1,443.40 \n15,256.80 \n9,600.00 \nWeekly change (%) \n(2.17) \n(3.37) \n(5.75) \n0.47 \n0.00 \nSource: BBC, KITCO and Bloomberg, 2025 \n \n \n \n \n7 \nFigure 3: Weekly International Commodity Price Developments (18th July 2025– 24th October 2025) \n \n \n \n \n \nSource: BBC, KITCO and Bloomberg, 2025 \n \nRESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE \nOCTOBER 2025 \n800.00\n1000.00\n1200.00\n1400.00\n1600.00\n1800.00\n18-Jul\n25-Jul\n1-Aug\n8-Aug\n15-Aug\n22-Aug\n29-Aug\n5-Sep\n12-Sep\n19-Sep\n26-Sep\n3-Oct\n10-Oct\n17-Oct\n24-Oct\nUS$/oz\nPalladium\n7,600\n7,900\n8,200\n8,500\n8,800\n9,100\n9,400\n9,700\n18-Jul\n25-Jul\n1-Aug\n8-Aug\n15-Aug\n22-Aug\n29-Aug\n5-Sep\n12-Sep\n19-Sep\n26-Sep\n3-Oct\n10-Oct\n17-Oct\n24-Oct\nUS$/tonne\nLithium \n14,600\n14,800\n15,000\n15,200\n15,400\n15,600\n15,800\n16,000\n18-Jul\n25-Jul\n1-Aug\n8-Aug\n15-Aug\n22-Aug\n29-Aug\n5-Sep\n12-Sep\n19-Sep\n26-Sep\n3-Oct\n10-Oct\n17-Oct\n24-Oct\nUS$/tonne\nNickel\n50\n55\n60\n65\n70\n75\n80\n18-Jul\n25-Jul\n1-Aug\n8-Aug\n15-Aug\n22-Aug\n29-Aug\n5-Sep\n12-Sep\n19-Sep\n26-Sep\n3-Oct\n10-Oct\n17-Oct\n24-Oct\nUS$/barrel\nCrude oil \n3,000\n3,250\n3,500\n3,750\n4,000\n4,250\n4,500\n18-Jul\n25-Jul\n01-Aug\n08-Aug\n15-Aug\n22-Aug\n29-Aug\n05-Sep\n12-Sep\n19-Sep\n26-Sep\n03-Oct\n10-Oct\n17-Oct\n24-Oct\nUS$/oz\nGold\n1,100\n1,200\n1,300\n1,400\n1,500\n1,600\n1,700\n1,800\n18-Jul\n25-Jul\n1-Aug\n8-Aug\n15-Aug\n22-Aug\n29-Aug\n5-Sep\n12-Sep\n19-Sep\n26-Sep\n3-Oct\n10-Oct\n17-Oct\n24-Oct\nUS$/tonne\nPlatinum", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/Weekly_Economic_Highlights/WEEKLY_ECONOMIC_HIGHLIGHTS_24_OCTOBER_2025_Volume_27_Number_43.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "40c88612d2ba4ee71290c460135d7b0f", "text": "1\n \nPRESS STATEMENT \n21 November 2024 \n \nSTATEMENT OF THE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE \n \nIssued by Lesetja Kganyago, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank \nSince our previous meeting, the global macroeconomic context has become more \nchallenging. The dollar has appreciated against most currencies, including the rand. \nLonger-term interest rates have risen, in the United States and across the globe. \nShort-term rate expectations have likewise shifted up. \nIn general, monetary policy in major economies remains restrictive, and headline \ninflation has slowed. While this has provided some room for major central banks to \nease rates further, over the past two months,1 new inflation pressures and \nheightened uncertainty suggest diminished policy space. With underlying inflation \nstill above target, in several economies, there are risks of policy reversals. \nTurning to South Africa, we continue to see a growth recovery taking hold, after a \nweak economic performance through 2023 and the first half of 2024. \nIn the near term, we expect output to benefit from a variety of tailwinds, including \nlower inflation, higher disposable income, and extra spending from pension \nwithdrawals via the new Two-Pot system.2 \n \n1 The European Central Bank cut by 25bps in October, and the Bank of England and US Federal \nReserve did the same in November. \n2 Other factors supporting near-term growth are base effects and rising confidence. Regarding the \nTwo Pot system, withdrawals are now expected to be R51 billion for the current quarter, compared \nwith a previous forecast of R40 billion, with a larger proportion of withdrawals now expected to be \nused for consumption rather than debt repayments. \n \n2\nIt is unclear how much this will boost the third-quarter growth numbers, which are \ndue in a few weeks.3 The data flow has been mixed lately, with some indicators \ndisappointing, while others have been positive. For instance, recent manufacturing \ndata was subdued, but mining was stronger. Encouragingly, the most recent labour \nforce survey showed relatively large and broad-based job gains, and lower \nunemployment. \nOver the medium term, we still expect a sustained improvement in growth as reforms \ntake effect.4 Our forecast now extends out to 2027, and we see growth reaching 2% \nin that year. \nThe risks to the growth outlook are assessed to be balanced. \nGiven mixed data outcomes, it is possible that near-term growth could fall short of \ncurrent projections. At the same time, growth could be higher from next year, given \nongoing reforms. These include structural reforms, especially in the network sectors, \nsuch as electricity and transport. Furthermore, the recent positive outlook on South \nAfrica’s credit rating, from Standard & Poor’s, points to an improving country risk \npremium. These factors suggest upside risks to the longer-term growth forecast. \nMoving to consumer prices, headline inflation has dipped below our target range, \nreaching 2.8% in October. Goods prices have slowed more than those for services5, \nwhich mainly reflects the benefits of a stronger exchange rate and a lower oil price, \nrelative to last year.6 These temporary supply shocks are likely to keep inflation \nbelow 4% until mid-2025. \nThereafter, we see inflation modestly higher relative to our September projections, \nreaching 4.6% from late 2025, rather than 4.4%.7 This is primarily because of a \nhigher electricity price assumption. At the same time, core inflation is marginally \nlower for this year and next year, which reflects recent data outcomes. We continue \n \n3 The latest projections show 0.5% growth in the third quarter and 0.7% growth in the fourth, little \nchanged from the September forecast, which had 0.6% growth in both quarters (quarter-on-quarter). \n4 Growth for 2024 remains 1.1%, 2025 is 1.7% (up from 1.6%) and 2026 remains 1.8%. \n5 For the October CPI print, goods inflation was 1.4% and services was 4.4%. \n6 The implied starting point of the rand/dollar exchange rate is 17.74, for 2024Q4, with 17.96 for \n2025Q1. Note also that fuel prices fell by 19.1% in October, year-on-year. \n7 In the current forecast, inflation reaches 4.6% in 2025Q4 and stays there throughout 2026. \nPreviously, inflation was at 4.4% from 2025Q4 to 2026Q2, and 4.3% for 2026Q3 and 2026Q4 \n \n3\nto see headline inflation stabilising near our midpoint objective over the forecast \nhorizon.8 \nIn this context, we anticipate inflation expectations will moderate further. These \nexpectations have been quite backward-looking, with higher past inflation projected \nwell into the future. Survey expectations remain above our midpoint objective.9 We \nexpect that our policy stance, and the experience of lower inflation, will anchor \nexpectations more firmly at lower levels. \nThe risks to the inflation outlook are assessed as balanced. \nIn the near term, inflation appears well contained. However, the medium-term \noutlook is highly uncertain, with material upside risks. These include higher prices for \nfood, electricity and water, as well as insurance premiums and wage settlements. \nAgainst this backdrop, the MPC decided to reduce the policy rate by 25 basis points, \nto 7.75%, with effect from 22 November 2024. The decision was unanimous. \nThe Committee agreed that reducing the level of policy restrictiveness is still \nconsistent with achieving the inflation target. \nThe risk outlook, however, requires a cautious approach. \nGlobal interest rates could well shift higher again, and the recent rand depreciation \ndemonstrates how rapidly changes in the global environment can affect South Africa. \nThe forecast sees rates easing further in future, stabilising a bit above 7%. But this \nrate path from the Quarterly Projection Model remains a broad policy guide. The \nMPC would like to emphasise that its decisions will be made on a meeting-by-\nmeeting basis, with no forward guidance and no pre-commitment to any specific rate \npath. Such decisions will continue to be outlook dependent, responsive to data \ndevelopments, and sensitive to the balance of risks to the forecast. \nThere are scenarios where inflation is higher than in our baseline. During the \nmeeting, the MPC explored two such risk cases. One assumed higher administered \n \n8 The projections are modestly higher than in the previous forecast round, mainly due to higher \nelectricity prices. Headline now averages 4.6% in 2026, versus 4.4% previously. \n9 Average BER survey expectations for 2 years ahead were at 4.8% in the most recent survey, as \nnoted in the previous MPC statement. Market-based expectations, from breakevens, are around 5.4% \nfor the longer-term, 10-year measure, while medium-term expectations, up to 5-years, are around \n4.3% \n \n4\nprice inflation.10 The other envisioned a more difficult external environment, with a \nweaker rand and higher oil prices.11 \nWe also considered a favourable scenario where geopolitical tensions subside and \nthe oil price falls.12 \nThese scenarios underscored the uncertainty surrounding the outlook. \nGiven a challenging external environment, it remains crucial to sustain domestic \nreform momentum. This entails both structural reforms to support growth capacity, \nand macroeconomic efforts to rebuild fiscal and monetary policy space. \nThe MPC’s main contribution is to deliver low and stable inflation, with well-anchored \ninflation expectations. \nAdditional measures that would improve economic conditions include reaching a \nprudent public debt level, further repairing and strengthening network industries, \nlowering administered price inflation, and keeping real wage growth in line with \nproductivity gains. \n \nLesetja Kganyago \nGOVERNOR \n \nThe next statement of the Monetary Policy Committee will be released on 30 January \n2025. \nThe MPC dates for 2025 are as follows: \n30 January \n20 March \n29 May \n \n10 This scenario assumed a 25% bulk-price increase for electricity, as well as higher water price \nincreases. Relative to the baseline, electricity inflation is higher by around 5-6pp through 2025 and \n2026, while water inflation is around 3-5pp higher. \n11 This scenario had oil prices about 11% higher than in the baseline, from 2025-2027, with the rand \nweakening to a low of 19.54 per US dollar. \n12 This scenario had oil prices about 4% lower than in the baseline, with the rand appreciating to a \nhigh of 16.02 per US dollar. \n \n5\n31 July \n18 September \n20 November \n \nContact person: \nThoraya Pandy \n0824168416 \nmedia@resbank.co.za", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/MPC_Statements/Statement of the Monetary Policy Committee November 2024.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "ec8fc4457dfba7e08fb91bf09df9be92", "text": "MONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW \nJULY 2013 \nSelected Economic Indicators \n2 \nStock Market Developments \n3 \nInflation \n6 \nNational Payments System \n7 \nStatistical Tables \n9 \n \n \nMonetary Developments \n5 \nINSIDE THIS ISSUE: \n \nPAGE \nSELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS \n2 \n \n2013 \nJune \n2013 \nJuly \nZ.S.E. Mining Index1 \n73.29 \n66.77 \nZ.S.E. Industrial Index1 \n211.19 \n232.87 \nMoney Supply (Total Bank Deposits) (US$)2 \n3.84 billion \n3.85 billion \nMoney Supply (M3) Annual Growth2 \n6.91% \n4.26% \nYearly Inflation3 \n1.86% \n1.25% \nSources: \n1 Zimbabwe Stock Exchange \n2 Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe \n3 ZIMSTAT \n \n \n \nMonth on \nMonth \nChange \n-8.90% \n10.27% \n0.44% \n0.44% \n-0.38% \n \nSTOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS \n \nDuring the month of July 2013, trading on the \nZimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) continued to \nrise as investors took strategic positions ahead \nof the harmonized general elections. \n \nLiquidity challenges in the economy, however, \ncontinued to constrain the participation of local \ninvestors. On the other hand, foreign investors \nincreased their dominance on the local bourse. \n \nThe repositioning of portfolios pushed up the \nvolumes traded by 32.95%, from 224.08 \nmillion shares in June, to 297.91 million shares \nin July 2013. Over the same period, the value \nof shares traded also rose by 7.11% to \nUS$43.53 million. \nConsequently, between June and July 2013, \nthe industrial index gained 10.27% to close \nthe period under review at 232.87 points. On \na year-to-date basis, the industrial index \ngained 53.9%. The mining index, however, \nfell by 8.9%, from 73.29 points in June to \n66.77 points in July 2013, while on a year-to\n-date basis, it gained 0.72%. \n \nTrading on the local bourse was largely \ndriven by foreign investors. Purchases by \nforeign investors were recorded at US$18.44 \nmillion in July 2013, against US$23.15 \nmillion in June. Over the same period, sales \nby foreign investors rose by 59.89%, from \nUS$9.57 million to US$15.30 million. \n \n2 3 \n \n2 4 \nMarket capitalization gained 10.45%, from \nUS$5.44 billion in June to US$6 billion in \nJuly 2013, largely driven by industrial blue \nchip counters. \n \n \nMONETARY DEVELOPMENTS \n \nAnnual broad money growth continued on a \ndownward trend, declining from 6.91% in \nJune 2013 to 4.26% in July 2013. The \ndecline is partly reflective of the slowdown \nin economic activity. On a month on month \nbasis, money supply recorded a marginal \nincrease of 0.4% to US$3 854.9 million in \nJuly 2013, from US$3 838.2 million in June \n2013. \nThe month on month increase in broad \nmoney was on the back of expansions of \nUS$62.6 million in under-30 day deposits, \nand US$49.1 million in demand deposits. \nPartially offsetting these increases were \ndeclines of US$73.2 million and US$21.8 \nmillion in over-30 day and savings deposits, \nrespectively. \nMirroring developments in broad money, \nannual growth in credit to the private sector, \ndeclined by 4.9 percentage points from \n18.4% in June to 13.5% in July. On a month \non month basis, credit to the private sector, \nhowever, grew by 0.8% in July 2013, from \nUS$3 666.23 million in June 2013 to \nUS$3 671.8 million. \n \nThe loan to deposit ratio rose to 95.3% in \nJuly 2013, compared to 87.5% in July 2012, \n3.1 \n3.2 \n3.3 \n3.4 \n3.5 \n3.6 \n3.7 \n3.8 \n3.9 \n4.0 \n4.1 \n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n35\nApr\nMay\nJun\nJul\nAug\nSep\nOct\nNov\nDec\nJan\nFeb\nMar\nApr\nMay\nJun\nJul\nUS$ Billions\n%\nMoney Supply\nM3\nM3 Annual Growth\n2012 2013 \n \n3 5 \nreflective of growth in loans and advances. \n \nIn the absence of alternative financial \ninstruments, credit to the private sector \ncontinued to be driven by loans and \nadvances, which were partly sustained by \noffshore lines of credit, as the local \neconomy \ncontinued \nto \nface \nliquidity \nLoans and advances increased largely due to \ndemand for credit in manufacturing (19.43%), \nagriculture \n(17.27%) \nand \ndistribution \n(16.62%) activities. Households accounted \nfor 18.50% of total loans and advances to \nthe private sector. \n \nCredit to the private sector was mainly \nutilized for asset purchases (37.65%) as well \nas inventory build-up (36.74%). Loans and \nadvances utilized for fixed investment activity \nhave remained low, with the procurement of \nplant and equipment accounting for 2.91% \nand pre and post shipment financing at 2.19%, \nof total loans and advances. \n \n \nINFLATION DEVELOPMENTS \n \nAnnual Inflation \n \nAnnual headline inflation decelerated further, \nfor the fifth consecutive month, to 1.25% in \nJuly 2013, from 1.87% in June 2013, on \naccount of declines in both food and non food \ninflation. \n \nAnnual food and non alcoholic beverages \ninflation declined from 2.90% in June 2013, \nto 1.74% in July 2013 while non-food \ninflation slowed down to 1% in July from \n1.35% in June 2013. \n \nDecline in annual food inflation was largely \ndue to falling prices of milk, cheese and eggs; \nsugar, \njam, \nhoney, \nchocolate \nand \nconfectionery; and mineral waters, soft drinks, \nconstraints. The contribution of offshore \nlines of credit in total credit to the private \nsector, increased from 4.77% in July 2012 \nto 12.36% in July 2013. \n \nAdvances to the private sector were made \nup of loans and advances, 84.59%; \nmortgages advanced by building societies, \n8.51%; bills discounted, 3.46%; bankers’ \nacceptances, 1.48%; and other investments, \n1.97%. \n4 \n \n6 \nfruit and vegetable juices, as a result of \nimproved supply of these items on the \nmarket. \nto -0.38% in July, from -0.13% in June 2013, \nfollowing declines in the prices of food and \nnon alcoholic beverages. \n \nMonthly \nfood \nprices \neased \nby \n0.81 \npercentage points to -1.14% in July, from \n-0.33% in June 2013, on the back of declines \nin the prices of fruits, -3.83%; vegetables, \n-2.98%; meat, -1.95%; sugar, jam, honey, \nchocolate and confectionery, -1.44%; milk, \ncheese and eggs, -0.58%; and oils and \nfats, -0.45%. \n \nMonthly non-food prices also fell to -0.004% \nin July, from -0.03% in June 2013, largely \ndue to declines in the prices of electricity, \ngas and other fuels, alcoholic beverages, \nfurniture and equipment, communication and \nhealth services. \n \n \nInflation Outlook \nInflation developments in the domestic \neconomy, in the short to medium term, will \ncontinue to be influenced by movements \ninternational oil prices, US$/rand exchange \nrate, world food prices, as well as the level of \naggregate demand. \n \nThe upward trend in international oil prices \nsince April 2013, if sustained, is expected to \nexert inflationary pressures in the domestic \neconomy. \n \nFurther, the improvement in the global \neconomy, as manifested in the recovery of \nthe Euro zone and better than anticipated \n \nAnnual non-food inflation also eased to 1% in \nJuly, from 1.35% in June 2013, following the \nsoftening of communication, recreation and \ncultural service prices. \n \nInflationary pressures under this category \nlargely emanated from increases in housing \nrentals, prices of alcoholic beverages and \ntobacco as well as transport, health and \neducational services. \n \nMonth-on-Month Inflation \n \nMonth-on-month inflation decelerated further \n7 \noutput in China, India and the USA during \nthe first half of 2013, is also expected to \nincrease the demand for crude oil, thereby \npushing up international commodity prices. \n \nContinued disturbances in oil producing \ncountries, among them Egypt, are expected \nto exert upward pressure on international oil \nprices, \nwith \nadverse \nimplications \nfor \ndomestic inflation. \n \n \nNATIONAL \nPAYMENTS \nSYSTEM \nDEVELOPMENTS \n \nZimbabwe Electronic Transfer Settlement \nSystem (ZETSS) \nThe value of transactions processed through \nthe RTGS system in July 2013 increased by \n11.60% to US$3.96 billion, from US$3.54 \nbillion in June 2013. On the other hand, the \nvolume of transactions also registered an \nincrease of 10.79%, from 185 802 to 205 854 \nduring the same period. \nCard Systems \nThe total value of card based transactions \nrose by 11.93%, from US$298.40 million in \nJune to US$334 million in July 2013. \nMobile and Internet Based Transactions \nThe value of mobile and internet based \ntransactions also increased by 13.69%, from \nUS$266.70 million in June to US$303.20 \nmillion in July 2013. \n \nCheques \nIn value terms, cheque transactions increased \nfrom US$5.90 million in June 2013 to \nUS$12.30 million in July 2013. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nReserve Bank of Zimbabwe \nAugust 2013 \n8 \n9 \nSTATISTICAL TABLES \nCONTENTS \n \nTable \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nPage \n \n \n1. Monetary Statistics \n \n \n1.1 Monetary Aggregates \n \n \n \n \n \n11 \n \n1.2 Broad Money Survey \n \n \n \n \n \n12 \n \n1.3 Analysis of Monthly Changes in Money Supply \n \n13 \n \n1.4 Analysis of Yearly Changes in Money Supply \n \n \n14 \n \n \n2. Sectoral Analysis of Bank Loans and Advances and Deposits \n \n \n2.1 Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks Loans and Advances 15 \n \n2.2 Sectoral Analysis of Merchant Banks Loans and Advances \n16 \n \n2.3 Sectoral Analysis of Merchant Acceptances \n \n \n17 \n \n2.4 Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks Deposits \n \n18 \n \n2.5 Sectoral Analysis of Merchant Banks Deposits \n \n19 \n \n3. External Statistics \n \n \n3.1 Total External Debt Outstanding by Debtor \n \n \n20 \n \n4. Interest Rates \n \n \n4.1 Lending Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n21 \n \n4.2 Banks Deposit Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n22 \n \n5. Inflation \n \n \n5.1 Monthly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n23 \n \n5.2 Yearly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n24 \n \n6. Exchange Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n25 \n \n \n \n \n \nSTATISTICAL TABLES \nCONTENTS \n \nTable \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nPage \n \n \n7. Commercial Banks \n \n \n7.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n26 \n \n7.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n \n27 \n \n8. Accepting Houses \n \n \n8.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n28 \n \n8.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n \n29 \n \n 9. Building Societies \n \n \n9.1 Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n30 \n \n9.2 Liabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n \n31 \n \n10. Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Statistics \n \n \n \n \n32 \n \n11. Savings with Financial Institutions \n \n \n \n \n33 \n \n12. Analysis of Liquid Assets of Monetary Banks \n \n \n \n34 \n \n13. ZETSS, Cheques and Cards Activity \n \n \n \n \n35 \n \n10 \n11 \nTABLE 1.1 : MONETARY AGGREGATES \n US$ Thousands \n \n2012 \n2013 \n \nJuly \nAugust \nSeptember \nOctober \nNovember \nDecember \nJanuary \nFebruary \nMarch \nApril \nMay \nJune \nJuly \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nRBZ Demand Deposits \n80.1 \n80.9 \n82.1 \n80.7 \n79.6 \n80.8 \n78.6 \n78.3 \n77.3 \n 78.6 \n74.5 \n73.0 \n73.5 \nComm. Banks Dem. Deposits \n1,875,149.3 \n1,826,752.4 \n1,869,138.7 \n1,894,495.7 \n1,804,260.4 \n1,981,218.7 \n1,924,517.4 \n1,875,465.4 \n1,860,664.0 \n1,979,220.0 \n 1,932,968.10 \n 1,874,568.0 \n 1,926,968.5 \nMerchant Banks Dem. Deposits \n110,779.0 \n106,955.1 \n102,471.0 \n112,805.6 \n105,260.2 \n108,094.7 \n106,935.2 \n102,797.7 \n104,281.4 \n107,324.1 \n \n112,173.40 \n 114,560.5 \n 111,261.06 \nM1 \n1,986,008.4 \n1,933,788.4 \n1,971,691.8 \n2,017,382.0 \n1,909,600.2 \n2,089,394.2 \n2,031,531.2 \n1,978,341.4 \n1,965,022.7 \n2,086,622.6 \n2,045,215.9 \n 1,989,201.5 \n 2,038,302.96 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nComm. Banks Savings Deposits \n162,953.0 \n171,279.3 \n189,287.9 \n182,029.0 \n288,914.0 \n253,471.9 \n193,007.6 \n192,683.5 \n201,459.2 \n194,873.4 \n \n221,622.3 \n 229,386.7 \n 201,667.79 \nBuilding Soc. Savings Deposits \n168,562.6 \n171,825.0 \n176,983.1 \n164,699.0 \n163,276.1 \n180,152.6 \n159,093.7 \n168,605.4 \n168,484.1 \n170,975.7 \n \n192,634.8 \n 189,753.8 \n 195,606.6 \nP O S B Savings Deposits \n51,631.2 \n51,322.2 \n51,747.0 \n50,457.0 \n55,822.7 \n54,893.7 \n55,832.5 \n56,274.2 \n57,860.7 \n55,236.9 \n \n56,544.5 \n 60,117.8 \n 60,162.5 \nComm. Banks U-30 Day Deposits \n668,743.8 \n716,241.3 \n648,981.9 \n781,995.1 \n593,873.6 \n613,008.0 \n632,215.7 \n708,500.6 \n734,849.5 \n786,076.0 \n \n637,041.1 \n 629,544.6 \n 663,617.3 \nMerchant Banks U-30 Day Deposits \n36,431.8 \n39,907.3 \n60,358.5 \n35,887.6 \n69,265.1 \n67,930.5 \n91,671.2 \n65,975.9 \n62,324.3 \n64,604.1 \n \n67,104.2 \n 56,223.1 \n 82,650.4 \nBuilding Soc. U- 30 Day Deposits \n53,684.5 \n59,216.0 \n70,300.4 \n98,536.7 \n73,514.3 \n65,572.4 \n60,885.9 \n77,091.9 \n82,098.1 \n81,944.39 \n \n122,672.1 \n 119,217.4 \n 121,325.5 \nM2 \n3,128,015.2 \n3,143,579.4 \n3,169,350.6 \n3,320,987.1 \n3,154,266.0 \n3,324,423.3 \n3,224,237.8 \n3,247,472.9 \n3,272,098.6 \n3,440,333.1 \n3,342,834.9 \n 3,273,444.8 \n 3,363,333.0 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nComm. Banks O-30 Day Deposits \n327,819.8 \n192,982.4 \n311,167.7 \n235,566.9 \n424,351.9 \n314,380.7 \n351,356.6 \n297,613.9 \n249,558.5 \n223,799.1 \n \n387,930.6 \n 268,082.1 \n 219,826.9 \nMerchant Banks O-30 Day Deposits \n65,758.0 \n64,463.7 \n56,445.3 \n60,561...8 \n46,439.3 \n44,191.4 \n21,339.0 \n55,714.0 \n52,841.7 \n56,349.4 \n \n54,361.5 \n 52,329.5 \n 27,019.2 \nBuilding Soc. O- 30 Day Deposits \n156,055.2 \n170,113.2 \n172,761.3 \n165,382.5 \n179,493.1 \n184,561.2 \n192,823.3 \n194,226.7 \n203,912.9 \n226,550.8 \n \n212,044.5 \n 222,591.8 \n 222,795.8 \nBuilding Soc. Class C Deposits \n0.0 \n0.0 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n \n \nBuilding Soc. Other Share Deposits \n10,141.6 \n10,141.6 \n10,141.6 \n10,141.6 \n10,141.6 \n10,141.6 \n10,141.6 \n10,141.6 \n11,266.6 \n11,266.6 \n \n11,266.5 \n 11,266.6 \n 11,266.6 \nP O S B Time Deposits \n9,770.5 \n8,018.0 \n8,316.8 \n11,324.0 \n9,964.9 \n8,973.9 \n8,497.2 \n8,447.9 \n8,845.8 \n8,443.5 \n \n9,703.5 \n 10,492.4 \n 10,680.2 \nM3 \n3,697,560.4 \n3,589,298.3 \n3,728,183.4 \n3,813,963.8 \n3,824,656.8 \n3,886,672.1 \n3,808,395.5 \n3,813,616.9 \n3,798,524.1 \n3,966,742.5 \n \n4,018,141.5 \n 3,838,207.3 \n 3,854,921.7 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n12 \nTABLE 1.2 : BROAD MONEY SURVEY \n US$ Thousands \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJULY \nAUGUST \nSEPTEMBER \nOCTOBER \nNOVEMBER \nDECEMBER \nJANUARY \nFEBRUARY \nMARCH \nAPRIL \nMAY \nJUNE \nJULY \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nNET FOREIGN ASSETS \n-366,349.80 \n-459,138.70 \n-447,672.70 \n-417,840.40 \n-340,899.70 \n-435,528.80 \n-485,643.40 \n-478,669.10 \n-627,094.50 \n-477,210.6 \n-488,616.3 \n-770,401.9 \n-822,415.5 \n \n Assets \n1,010,995.60 \n918,272.00 \n952,305.80 \n964,367.00 \n1,063,411.00 \n1,089,808.50 \n994,812.70 \n988,575.61 \n867,399.60 \n983,189.5 \n1,065,690.2 \n994,502.1 \n967,794.1 \n \n Reserve Bank (RBZ) \n443,530.60 \n392,913.30 \n431,019.90 \n402,814.90 \n385,911.70 \n447,988.80 \n454,346.10 \n421,879.25 \n367,092.80 \n412,155.0 \n471,664.8 \n461,797.0 \n362,306.8 \n \n Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) \n543,103.30 \n497,720.10 \n490,916.00 \n527,291.20 \n635,377.30 \n599,274.60 \n507,151.40 \n529,296.47 \n469,834.90 \n537,446.4 \n547,557.0 \n488,238.1 \n536,681.8 \n \n Other Banking Institutions \n(OBIs) \\1 \n24,361.70 \n27,638.60 \n30,369.90 \n34,260.90 \n42,122.10 \n42,545.10 \n33,315.20 \n37,399.89 \n30,471.90 \n33,588.1 \n46,468.4 \n44,467.0 \n68,805.5 \n \n Liabilities \\2 \n-1,377,345.40 \n-1,377,410.80 \n-1,399,978.50 \n-1,382,207.30 \n-1,404,310.70 \n-1,525,337.30 \n-1,480,456.00 \n-1,467,244.71 \n-1,494,494.10 \n-1,460,400.2 \n-1,554,306.5 \n-1,764,904.0 \n-1,790,209.6 \n \n RBZ \n1,142,322.10 \n1,144,176.70 \n1,149,650.90 \n1,147,233.00 \n1,147,319.70 \n1,149,161.20 \n1,149,023.60 \n1,141,623.47 \n1,135,073.40 \n1,140,521.7 \n1,134,105.5 \n1,138,062.0 \n1,143,126.7 \n \n DMBs \n217,204.30 \n216,220.20 \n233,273.50 \n211,042.10 \n233,317.40 \n352,118.40 \n311,214.10 \n303,476.08 \n337,091.10 \n293,394.4 \n393,575.8 \n600,126.4 \n625,430.1 \n \n OBIs \n17,818.90 \n17,013.80 \n17,054.10 \n23,932.20 \n23,673.70 \n24,057.80 \n20,218.40 \n22,145.17 \n22,329.60 \n26,484.0 \n26,625.2 \n26,715.6 \n21,652.8 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nNET DOMESTIC ASSETS \n4,063,910.10 \n4,048,437.10 \n4,175,856.10 \n4,231,804.20 \n4,165,556.50 \n4,322,201.00 \n4,294,038.70 \n4,292,286.03 \n4,425,618.60 \n4,443,953.2 \n4,506,758.0 \n4,608,609.2 \n4,677,337.2 \n \nDOMESTIC CREDIT \n3,362,641.70 \n3,396,416.20 \n3,469,968.40 \n3,502,649.80 \n3,620,952.20 \n3,788,468.50 \n3,777,967.90 \n3,781,756.54 \n3,845,110.10 \n3,808,385.3 \n3,871,013.0 \n3,936,046.1 \n3,966,266.5 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Claims on Government (net) \n79,337.50 \n73,155.70 \n73,214.80 \n80,219.70 \n80,710.40 \n176,058.40 \n166,842.30 \n153,163.97 \n170,638.10 \n180,007.9 \n212,221.9 \n206,189.6 \n232,272.7 \n \n RBZ \n-1,522.60 \n-1,502.40 \n-1,514.60 \n-11,344.70 \n-11,034.80 \n-11,097.80 \n-1,225.80 \n-1,192.38 \n-1,179.60 \n-1,180.8 \n-1,179.7 \n-1,828.4 \n-3,487.6 \n \n DMBs \n80,860.20 \n74,658.00 \n74,729.30 \n90,330.70 \n90,511.60 \n185,922.50 \n167,834.50 \n154,122.73 \n151,543.00 \n160,538.4 \n192,880.2 \n187,784.4 \n215,526.7 \n \n OBIs \n0 \n0 \n0 \n1,233.60 \n1,233.60 \n1,233.60 \n233.6 \n233.63 \n20,274.70 \n20,650.2 \n20,521.4 \n20,233.6 \n20,233.6 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Claims on Public Enterprises \n49,615.70 \n49,289.80 \n46,060.70 \n49,641.40 \n51,464.50 \n51,716.90 \n52,261.10 \n53,708.48 \n54,091.40 \n58,973.6 \n63,604.9 \n63,628.7 \n62,174.3 \n \n RBZ \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n \n DMBs \n49,615.70 \n49,289.80 \n46,060.70 \n49,641.40 \n51,464.50 \n51,716.90 \n52,261.10 \n53,708.48 \n54,091.40 \n58,973.6 \n63,604.9 \n63,628.7 \n62,174.3 \n \n Agri-PEs \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n \n \n Other \n49,615.70 \n49,289.80 \n46,060.70 \n49,641.40 \n51,464.50 \n51,716.90 \n52,261.10 \n53,708.48 \n3,620,380.60 \n58,973.6 \n63,604.9 \n63,628.7 \n62,174.3 \n \n OBIs \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Claims on Private Sector \n3,233,688.50 \n3,273,970.70 \n3,350,693.00 \n3,372,788.70 \n3,488,777.20 \n3,560,693.20 \n3,558,864.50 \n3,574,884.08 \n3,620,380.60 \n3,569,403.8 \n3,595,186.2 \n3,666,227.8 \n3,671,819.5 \n \n RBZ \n38,792.30 \n41,323.60 \n42,548.20 \n42,122.00 \n41,521.50 \n40,636.30 \n41,014.10 \n41,015.10 \n41,041.10 \n41,014.1 \n40,128.8 \n40,128.8 \n36,146.1 \n \n DMBs \n2,797,404.90 \n2,823,945.60 \n2,897,885.30 \n2,890,646.50 \n2,996,259.40 \n3,065,153.80 \n3,057,321.20 \n3,065,133.69 \n3,111,948.80 \n3,058,690.9 \n3,063,681.6 \n3,125,352.0 \n3,133,523.7 \n \n OBIs \n397,491.40 \n408,701.50 \n410,259.50 \n440,020.20 \n450,996.30 \n454,903.20 \n460,529.20 \n468,735.29 \n467,417.70 \n469,698.7 \n491,375.8 \n500,747.0 \n502,149.7 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nOTHER ITEMS (NET) \n701,268.40 \n652,020.90 \n705,887.60 \n729,154.40 \n544,604.30 \n533,732.40 \n516,070.80 \n510,529.50 \n580,508.50 \n635,567.9 \n635,745.0 \n672,563.1 \n711,070.7 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nBROAD MONEY (M3) \n3,697,560.40 \n3,589,298.30 \n3,728,183.40 \n3,813,963.80 \n3,824,656.80 \n3,886,672.10 \n3,808,395.40 \n3,813,616.93 \n3,798,524.10 \n3,966,742.5 \n4,018,141.5 \n3,838,207.3 \n3,854,921.7 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n13 \nTABLE 1.3 : ANALYSIS OF MONTHLY CHANGES IN MONEY SUPPLY (M3) \n US$ Thousands \n1. Finance houses, building societies and P. O. S. B. \n2. Sign reversal. \n3. Net Domestic Assets consist of domestic credit and other items net. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJULY \nAUGUST \nSEPTEMBER \nOCTOBER \nNOVEMBER \nDECEMBER \nJANUARY \nFEBRUARY \nMARCH \nAPRIL \nMAY \nJUNE \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nNET FOREIGN ASSETS \n8,902.80 \n-92,789.00 \n11,466.10 \n29,832.30 \n76,940.70 \n-94,629.10 \n-50,114.50 \n6,974.25 \n-148,425.4 \n149,883.9 \n-11,405.7 \n-281,785.6 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Assets \n2,966.70 \n-92,723.60 \n34,033.80 \n12,061.10 \n99,044.00 \n26,397.50 \n-94,995.80 \n-6,237.07 \n-121,176.0 \n115,789.9 \n82,500.7 \n-71,188.1 \n Reserve Bank (RBZ) \n4,282.20 \n-50,617.30 \n38,106.70 \n-28,205.00 \n-16,903.20 \n62,077.10 \n6,357.30 \n-32,466.80 \n-54,786.5 \n45,062.2 \n59,509.8 \n-9,867.8 \n Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) \n-4,416.00 \n-45,383.20 \n-6,804.10 \n36,375.10 \n108,086.10 \n-36,102.60 \n-92,123.20 \n22,145.09 \n-59,461.6 \n67,611.5 \n10,110.6 \n-59,318.9 \n Other Banking Institutions (OBIs) \\1 \n3,100.50 \n3,276.90 \n2,731.30 \n3,891.00 \n7,861.20 \n423 \n-9,229.80 \n4,084.65 \n-6,928.0 \n3,116.2 \n12,880.3 \n-2,001.4 \n Liabilities \\2 \n5,936.10 \n-65.4 \n-22,567.70 \n17,771.10 \n-22,103.40 \n-121,026.60 \n44,881.30 \n13,211.32 \n-27,249.4 \n34,093.9 \n-93,906.3 \n-210,597.5 \n RBZ \n-2,828.50 \n1,854.60 \n5,474.20 \n-2,417.90 \n86.7 \n1,841.50 \n-137.6 \n-7,400.09 \n-6,550.1 \n5,448.4 \n-6,416.2 \n3,956.5 \n DMBs \n889.8 \n-984.1 \n17,053.30 \n-22,231.40 \n22,275.20 \n118,801.00 \n-40,904.20 \n-7,738.03 \n33,615.1 \n-43,696.7 \n100,181.4 \n206,550.6 \n OBIs \n-3,997.50 \n-805.1 \n40.3 \n6,878.20 \n-258.6 \n384.1 \n-3,839.40 \n1,926.80 \n184.4 \n4,154.5 \n141.2 \n90.4 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nNET DOMESTIC ASSETS \\3 \n98,386.90 \n-15,473.10 \n127,419.00 \n55,948.10 \n-66,247.70 \n156,644.50 \n-28,162.20 \n-1,752.72 \n133,332.6 \n18,334.6 \n62,804.8 \n101,851.2 \nDOMESTIC CREDIT \n135,309.30 \n33,774.50 \n73,552.20 \n32,681.40 \n118,302.40 \n167,516.40 \n-10,500.60 \n3,788.59 \n63,353.6 \n-36,724.9 \n62,627.7 \n65,033.1 \n Claims on Government (net) \n-2,855.70 \n-6,181.90 \n59.1 \n7,004.90 \n490.8 \n95,348.00 \n-9,216.10 \n-13,678.34 \n17,474.1 \n9,369.8 \n32,214.0 \n-6,032.3 \n RBZ \n583.5 \n20.3 \n-12.2 \n-9,830.10 \n309.9 \n-63 \n9,872.00 \n33.43 \n12.8 \n-1.2 \n1.1 \n-648.7 \n DMBs \n-3,235.60 \n-6,202.10 \n71.3 \n15,601.40 \n180.9 \n95,410.90 \n-18,088.00 \n-13,711.77 \n-2,579.8 \n8,995.5 \n32,341.8 \n-5,095.8 \n OBIs \n-203.6 \n0 \n0 \n1,233.60 \n0 \n0 \n-1,000.00 \n0.0 \n20,041.1 \n375.5 \n-128.8 \n-287.8 \n Claims on Public Enterpris \n304.3 \n-325.8 \n-3,229.10 \n3,580.70 \n1,823.10 \n252.4 \n544.3 \n1,447.33 \n382.9 \n4,882.2 \n4,631.3 \n23.8 \n RBZ \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n DMBs \n304.3 \n-325.8 \n-3,229.10 \n3,580.70 \n18231 \n252.4 \n544.3 \n1,447.33 \n382.9 \n4,882.2 \n4,631.3 \n23.8 \n Agri-PEs \n0 \n-4,771.80 \n-4,772.80 \n-4,773.80 \n-4,774.80 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n-5,259.3 \n Other \n304.3 \n4,446.00 \n1,543.70 \n8,354.50 \n6,597.90 \n252.4 \n544.3 \n1,447.33 \n382.9 \n4,882.2 \n4,631.3 \n5,283.1 \n OBIs \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n Claims on Private Sector \n137,860.60 \n40,282.20 \n76,722.30 \n22,095.70 \n115,988.50 \n71,916.00 \n-1,828.70 \n16,019.59 \n45,496.5 \n-50,976.8 \n25,782.4 \n71,041.6 \n RBZ \n-4,967.00 \n2,531.30 \n1,224.60 \n-426.2 \n-600.5 \n-885.3 \n377.8 \n1.0 \n-1.0 \n0.0 \n-885.3 \n0.0 \n DMBs \n133,666.60 \n26,540.70 \n73,939.70 \n-7,238.70 \n105,612.90 \n68,894.30 \n-7,832.60 \n7,812.52 \n46,815.1 \n-53,257.8 \n4,990.7 \n61,670.4 \n OBIs \n9,161.00 \n11,210.10 \n1,558.00 \n29,760.70 \n10,976.10 \n3,906.90 \n5,626.00 \n8,206.07 \n-1,317.5 \n2,281.0 \n21,677.1 \n9,371.2 \nOTHER ITEMS (NET) \n-36,922.40 \n-49,247.60 \n53,866.80 \n23,266.70 \n-184,550.10 \n-10,871.90 \n-17,661.60 \n-5,541.30 \n69,979.0 \n55,059.4 \n177.1 \n36,818.1 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nBROAD MONEY (M3) \n107,289.70 \n-108,262.00 \n138,885.10 \n85,780.40 \n10,692.90 \n62,015.40 \n-78,276.70 \n5,221.54 \n-15,092.8 \n168,218.4 \n51,399.0 \n-179,934.2 \nGROWTH RATES \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Broad Money (M3) \n3.00% \n-2.90% \n3.90% \n2.30% \n0.30% \n1.60% \n-2.00% \n0.14% \n-0.4% \n4.4% \n1.3% \n-4.5% \n Domestic Credit \n4.20% \n1.00% \n2.20% \n0.90% \n3.40% \n4.60% \n-0.30% \n0.10% \n1.7% \n-1.0% \n1.6% \n1.7% \n Claims on Private Sector \n4.50% \n1.20% \n2.30% \n0.70% \n3.40% \n2.10% \n-0.10% \n0.45% \n1.3% \n-1.4% \n0.7% \n2.0% \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJULY \n \n \n-52,013.6 \n \n-26,708.0 \n-99,490.2 \n48,443.7 \n24,338.5 \n-25,305.6 \n5,064.8 \n25,303.6 \n-5,062.8 \n \n68,728.0 \n30,220.4 \n26,083.2 \n-1,659.1 \n27,742.3 \n0.0 \n-1,454.4 \n0.0 \n-1,454.4 \n-5,260.3 \n3,805.9 \n0.0 \n5,591.7 \n-3,982.7 \n8,171.7 \n1,402.7 \n38,507.5 \n \n16,714.4 \n \n0.4% \n0.8% \n0.2% \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJULY \nAUGUST \nSEPTEMBER \nOCTOBER \nNOVEMBER \nDECEMBER \nJANUARY \nFEBRUARY \nMARCH \nAPRIL \nMAY \nJUNE \nJULY \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nNET FOREIGN ASSETS \n-89,936.30 \n-190,761.00 \n-131,411.50 \n-100,210.80 \n-19,830.80 \n-139,041.90 \n-211,017.80 \n-408,762.52 \n-268,481.4 \n-146,235.3 \n-116,519.4 \n-395,149.4 \n-456,065.7 \n Assets \n-42,038.00 \n-142,367.40 \n-71,725.60 \n-81,928.20 \n36,818.40 \n33,821.10 \n-99,644.30 \n-321,764.74 \n-149,564.2 \n-66,182.3 \n50,744.2 \n-13,526.8 \n-43,201.5 \n Reserve Bank (RBZ) \n-5,809.40 \n-77,953.30 \n-5,234.10 \n-34,371.40 \n-34,330.10 \n33,849.90 \n23,562.10 \n-129,087.95 \n-120,111.9 \n-97,956.8 \n15,270.3 \n22,548.6 \n-81,223.8 \n Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) \n10,917.80 \n-76,767.00 \n-84,133.70 \n-68,113.20 \n53,083.10 \n-22,552.60 \n-134,496.90 \n-207,670.13 \n-38,404.5 \n23,160.4 \n16,001.4 \n-59,281.2 \n-6,421.5 \n Other Banking Institutions (OBIs) \n\\1 \n10,917.80 \n12,352.80 \n17,642.10 \n20,556.40 \n18,065.40 \n22,523.80 \n11,290.50 \n14,993.34 \n8,952.2 \n8,614.1 \n19,472.4 \n23,205.8 \n44,443.8 \n Liabilities \\2 \n-47,898.30 \n-48,393.50 \n-59,685.90 \n-18,282.60 \n-56,649.10 \n-172,863.00 \n-111,373.40 \n-86,997.79 \n-118,917.3 \n-80,053.1 \n-167,263.6 \n-381,622.6 \n-412,864.3 \n RBZ \n-28,246.40 \n-27,498.90 \n-21,730.40 \n-33,783.90 \n-20,811.30 \n-2,908.60 \n-9,155.50 \n-20,012.20 \n-23,389.5 \n-17,346.3 \n-10,305.8 \n-7,088.6 \n804.6 \n DMBs \n78,373.30 \n79,089.80 \n89,568.80 \n53,504.60 \n79,315.30 \n177,406.00 \n121,978.00 \n105,662.89 \n140,952.3 \n92,713.4 \n172,628.6 \n383,811.9 \n408,225.7 \n OBIs \n-2,228.60 \n-3,197.30 \n-8,152.60 \n-1,438.00 \n-1,854.90 \n-1,634.40 \n-1,449.10 \n1,347.09 \n1,354.5 \n4,686.0 \n4,940.8 \n4,899.3 \n3,834.0 \nNET DOMESTIC ASSETS \\3 \n880,494.10 \n827,621.50 \n830,303.80 \n860,964.80 \n755,911.50 \n925,312.70 \n874,388.80 \n844,811.73 \n628,387.0 \n659,222.6 \n554,475.7 \n643,086.0 \n613,427.0 \nDOMESTIC CREDIT \n864,860.40 \n822,357.30 \n802,510.00 \n795,755.70 \n873,159.50 \n990,341.70 \n986,989.40 \n963,317.91 \n842,942.1 \n786,202.9 \n731,055.8 \n708,713.7 \n603,624.8 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Claims on Government (net) \n81,808.40 \n75,191.50 \n74,845.90 \n82,122.60 \n82,338.10 \n177,893.20 \n168,720.90 \n154,919.99 \n81,055.3 \n91,424.1 \n133,685.7 \n123,996.4 \n152,935.2 \n DMBs \n80,860.20 \n74,658.00 \n74,729.30 \n90,330.70 \n90,511.60 \n185,922.50 \n167,834.50 \n154,123.73 \n60,198.4 \n70,439.5 \n112,834.8 \n103,688.6 \n134,666.5 \n OBIs \n0 \n0 \n0 \n1,233.60 \n1,233.60 \n1,233.60 \n233.6 \n233.625 \n20,274.7 \n20,446.7 \n20,297.6 \n20,030.1 \n20,233.6 \n Claims on Public Enterprises \n5,300.20 \n7,279.80 \n-3,179.60 \n49.8 \n9,427.10 \n6,792.40 \n7,557.90 \n9,664.95 \n24,274.7 \n27,528.6 \n31,812.4 \n14,317.4 \n12,558.6 \n RBZ \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n DMBs \n5,300.20 \n7,279.80 \n-3,179.60 \n49.8 \n9,427.10 \n6,792.40 \n7,557.90 \n9,664.95 \n24,122.0 \n27,528.6 \n31,812.4 \n14,317.4 \n12,558.6 \n Agri-PEs \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n-1.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n-1.0 \n-4,771.8 \n Other \n5,300.20 \n7,279.80 \n-3,179.60 \n49.8 \n9,427.10 \n6,793.40 \n7,557.90 \n9,665.95 \n24,123.0 \n27,528.6 \n31,812.4 \n14,318.4 \n17,330.4 \n OBIs \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n Claims on Private Sector \n777,751.70 \n739,886.00 \n730,843.70 \n713,583.30 \n781,394.30 \n805,656.00 \n810,710.60 \n798,732.97 \n737,764.8 \n667,250.2 \n565,557.7 \n570,399.9 \n438,131.0 \n RBZ \n665 \n1,765.10 \n-9,455.10 \n-9,387.20 \n-3,975.50 \n-3,903.10 \n-5,788.80 \n-7,388.11 \n-6,693.9 \n-3,088.9 \n-7,047.9 \n-3,630.4 \n-2,646.2 \n DMBs \n616,003.90 \n597,497.20 \n617,287.40 \n574,157.10 \n654,515.10 \n687,696.60 \n691,818.10 \n687,296.33 \n627,797.4 \n545,532.3 \n441,516.4 \n461,613.7 \n336,118.8 \n OBIs \n161,082.90 \n140,623.70 \n123,011.40 \n148,813.50 \n130,854.70 \n121,862.50 \n124,681.30 \n118,824.75 \n116,661.3 \n124,806.8 \n131,089.3 \n112,416.6 \n104,658.3 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nOTHER ITEMS (NET) \n15,633.70 \n5,264.20 \n27,793.80 \n65,209.10 \n-117,248.00 \n-65,029.00 \n-112,600.70 \n-118,506.18 \n-214,555.1 \n-126,980.3 \n-176,580.1 \n-65,627.7 \n9,802.2 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nBROAD MONEY (M3) \n790,557.90 \n636,860.50 \n698,892.30 \n760,753.90 \n736,080.70 \n786,270.80 \n663,371.00 \n436,049.20 \n359,905.6 \n512,987.3 \n437,956.1 \n247,936.6 \n157,361.3 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nGROWTH RATES \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Broad Money (M3) \n27.20% \n21.60% \n23.10% \n24.90% \n23.80% \n25.40% \n21.10% \n12.91% \n10.5% \n14.9% \n12.2% \n6.9% \n4.3% \n Domestic Credit \n34.60% \n31.90% \n30.10% \n29.40% \n31.80% \n35.40% \n35.40% \n34.18% \n28.1% \n26.0% \n23.3% \n22.0% \n18.0% \n Claims on Private Sector \n31.70% \n29.20% \n27.90% \n26.80% \n28.90% \n29.20% \n29.50% \n28.77% \n25.6% \n23.0% \n18.7% \n18.4% \n13.5% \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nTABLE 1.4 : ANALYSIS OF YEARLY CHANGES IN MONEY SUPPLY (M3) \n \n \n \n \n$ Thousands \n \n \n \n \n14 \n15 \nTABLE 2.1 : SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS LOANS AND ADVANCES \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ Thousands \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAGRICULTURE \nCONSTRUCTION \nCOMMUNICA-\nTION \nDISTRIBU-\nTION \nFINANCIAL \n& \nFINANCIAL \nMANUFAC-\nTURING \nMINING \nSERVICES TRANSPORT \nINDIVIDUALS \nCONGLOMER-\nATES/1 \nTOTAL \nEND OF \n \n \n \n \nINVEST-\nMENTS \nORGANISA-\nTIONS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n363,990.9 \n39,589.6 \n27,332.8 \n322,510.1 \n8,749.9 \n74,636.2 \n336,196.7 \n77,655.7 \n198,437.3 \n52,515.7 \n171,956.3 \n1,013.2 \n1,674,584.5 \nFEBRUARY \n352,190.20 \n36,718.69 \n26,551.03 \n284,567.87 \n9,291.08 \n85,886.99 \n336,261.49 \n88,738.25 \n202,845.20 \n53,191.93 \n172,424.01 \n1,567.65 \n1,650,234.17 \nMARCH \n354,440.8 \n37,811.0 \n31,484.9 \n328,381.1 \n8,193.5 \n92,178.6 \n324,375.5 \n108,000.1 \n205,453.7 \n32,088.9 \n174,479.6 \n1,583.8 \n1,698,471.4 \nAPRIL \n341,893.5 \n30,462.0 \n33,633.8 \n358,038.0 \n5,558.5 \n78,498.4 \n334,699.5 \n110,765.7 \n220,956.5 \n26,181.8 \n179,845.8 \n1,355.3 \n1,721,888.8 \nMAY \n375,541.0 \n30,286.7 \n31,158.4 \n350,097.9 \n7,623.4 \n97,695.7 \n327,187.7 \n113,796.7 \n207,041.1 \n28,432.9 \n202,146.6 \n1,738.3 \n1,772,746.5 \nJUNE \n402,314.1 \n30,399.7 \n37,466.6 \n356,842.2 \n7,580.8 \n28,025.9 \n337,059.2 \n130,973.8 \n201,898.0 \n40,295.4 \n219,606.7 \n1,649.8 \n1,794,112.2 \nJULY \n416,536.2 \n26,795.9 \n36,424.2 \n369,410.8 \n8,174.0 \n26,119.1 \n348,484.2 \n136,934.2 \n203,314.6 \n36,869.5 \n249,542.8 \n3,382.6 \n1,861,988.0 \nAUGUST \n422,545.8 \n30,950.3 \n43,395.1 \n390,558.4 \n8,333.0 \n29,323.9 \n348,252.0 \n146,338.5 \n173,945.4 \n55,950.3 \n254,919.8 \n3,523.5 \n1,907,991.4 \nSEPTEMBER \n431,501.7 \n36,637.9 \n38,487.8 \n384,840.8 \n6,828.2 \n37,420.1 \n396,813.5 \n145,657.9 \n219,452.1 \n29,378.2 \n254,248.3 \n5,036.1 \n1,986,302.5 \nOCTOBER \n444,653.7 \n33,583.2 \n34,764.4 \n411,489.2 \n9,551.4 \n29,439.4 \n401,206.1 \n144,223.4 \n230,809.2 \n35,103.6 \n271,795.8 \n6,715.9 \n2,053,335.2 \nNOVEMBER \n444,527.3 \n33,548.0 \n37,207.3 \n428,008.3 \n10,704.6 \n32,236.2 \n417,838.2 \n142,715.0 \n228,088.4 \n36,568.0 \n267,282.0 \n8,055.2 \n2,087,778.7 \nDECEMBER \n444,341.0 \n32,622.8 \n37,353.2 \n428,782.2 \n8,513.2 \n31,513.9 \n414,044.9 \n148,927.9 \n233,864.4 \n33,116.1 \n288,628.5 \n9,370.9 \n2,111,078.9 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n450,170.0 \n31,073.4 \n38,762.3 \n426,050.9 \n11,967.9 \n31,547.4 \n417,961.3 \n144,645.1 \n237,323.7 \n33,906.5 \n300,841.1 \n9,373.1 \n2,133,622.7 \nFREBRUARY \n494,536.6 \n33,786.9 \n28,372.0 \n439,556.7 \n14,811.4 \n33,948.5 \n409,692.7 \n128,242.7 \n303,269.9 \n38,235.9 \n298,171.5 \n3,685.5 \n2,226,310.2 \nMARCH \n467,873.97 \n41,532.7 \n68,987.2 \n433,337.1 \n16,118.8 \n34,704.7 \n471,204.9 \n159,925.7 \n307,134.7 \n44,413.57 \n370,123.5 \n4,491.7 \n2,419,848.6 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAPRIL \n455,178.9 \n43,628.2 \n23,433.4 \n428,381.7 \n14,997.8 \n35,589.1 \n444,798.7 \n135,046.2 \n288,857.6 \n45,643.6 \n377,037.0 \n7,693.7 \n2,300,585.8 \nMAY \n484,635.0 \n38,637.2 \n27,795.2 \n455,737.9 \n14,699.1 \n35,106.1 \n465,890.2 \n115,457.8 \n301,547.9 \n52,075.2 \n382,172.8 \n5,034.0 \n2,378,788.7 \nJUNE \n489,730.1 \n37,474.3 \n38,198.7 \n425,521.3 \n7,310.7 \n53,815.0 \n454,368.5 \n110,349.9 \n295,432.3 \n51,453.6 \n385,769.7 \n11,033.4 \n2,360,457.5 \nJULY \n483,103.7 \n40,342.5 \n33,494.3 \n464,921.7 \n6,869.2 \n38,522.6 \n541,025.9 \n116,557.1 \n307,117.5 \n48,218.0 \n426,582.7 \n4,455.3 \n2,511,210.5 \n1. These are large corporation with business operations covering across a number of sectors. \nTABLE 2.2 :SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF MERCHANT BANKS LOANS AND ADVANCES \n \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ Thousands \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAGRICULTURE \nCONSTRUCTION DISTRIBUTION \nFINANCIAL \nFINANCIAL \nMANUFACTUR-\nING \nMINING \nSERVICES TRANSPORT INDIVIDUALS CONGLOM-\nERATES \nTOTAL \nEND OF \n \n \n \nINVESTMENT ORGANISATIONS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAPRIL \n43,485.3 \n10,392.5 \n61,081.2 \n19,067.3 \n19,238.3 \n57,209.2 \n43,704.5 \n106,196.8 \n36,968.1 \n84,346.1 \n4,839.5 \n486,528.7 \nMAY \n78,656.9 \n13,181.3 \n27,476.1 \n12,928.2 \n22,947.0 \n62,231.5 \n79,196.3 \n74,699.3 \n47,191.6 \n115,625.4 \n8,319.3 \n542,453.4 \nJUNE \n99,949.6 \n12,989.0 \n55,552.6 \n15,544.8 \n22,884.4 \n64,832.4 \n58,599.9 \n91,171.3 \n33,744.2 \n125,204.9 \n7,515.8 \n587,988.8 \nJULY \n57,212.2 \n15,008.9 \n28,053.9 \n25,999.1 \n48,343.1 \n66,151.0 \n76,442.2 \n92,251.0 \n46,904.3 \n111,009.8 \n4,461.3 \n571,836.8 \nAUGUST \n49,200.5 \n14,198.6 \n38,216.6 \n26,733.6 \n27,.22.2 \n54,208.9 \n65,862.8 \n65,893.7 \n44,173.3 \n114,603.8 \n7,371.6 \n507,485.6 \nSEPTEMBER \n57,953.8 \n14,365.5 \n37,230.9 \n27,211.1 \n27,365.5 \n54,699.3 \n67,007.8 \n69,196.8 \n43,515.1 \n119,899.9 \n7,225.4 \n525,670.8 \nOCTOBER \n62,501.8 \n15,369.1 \n50,322.8 \n13,991.3 \n43,176.3 \n76,085.7 \n 84,137.4 \n74,481.1 \n36,442.3 \n 159,860.1 \n7,139.6 \n 623,507.5 \nNOVEMBER \n79,498.6 \n17,399.0 \n51,214.2 \n37,028.4 \n41,525.2 \n68,737.1 \n65,831.1 \n81,757.5 \n41,273.6 \n165,811.3 \n8,614.2 \n658,690.2 \nDECEMBER \n69,626.60 \n17,100.57 \n61,871.18 \n35,218.31 \n38,605.14 \n76,364.84 \n79,801.05 \n85,485.21 \n45,026.61 \n166,500.19 \n8,482.65 \n684,082.4 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n67,517.6 \n16,163.5 \n56,807.8 \n18,616.7 \n58,326.4 \n78,419.6 \n89,890.9 \n106,553.9 \n18,590.6 \n144,497.3 \n15,986.5 \n671,370.7 \nFEBRUARY \n58,292.9 \n21,826.4 \n56,104.4 \n18,101.2 \n62,883.5 \n78,714.5 \n89,292.0 \n117,785.5 \n17,680.2 \n128,827.9 \n9,967.9 \n668,578.1 \nMARCH \n69,856.5 \n16,673.4 \n60,104.1 \n16,684.4 \n58,510.5 \n72,517.4 \n97,158.1 \n88,814.4 \n14,831.7 \n173,486.3 \n17,657.4 \n686,294.1 \nAPRIL \n63,793.8 \n17,080.4 \n63,074.6 \n20,726.0 \n58,308.4 \n70,475.5 \n89,412.8 \n87,962.4 \n15,412.2 \n174,072.5 \n18,871.2 \n680,189.8 \nMAY \n67,425.0 \n17,232.4 \n66,358.3 \n21,534.7 \n59,449.7 \n72,998.8 \n89,738.5 \n84,961.5 \n15,028.8 \n189,089.0 \n18,888.7 \n702,705.4 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJUNE \n68,762.1 \n16,928.9 \n64,967.8 \n11,199.2 \n57,389.1 \n72,983.6 \n94,193.4 \n98,762.3 \n13,866.1 \n176,186.3 \n18,800.0 \n694,038.7 \nJULY \n66,851.1 \n15,061.8 \n64,398.0 \n11,134.2 \n34,750.7 \n77,551.0 \n100,908.8 \n109,118.2 \n14,701.2 \n162,459.7 \n15,995.4 \n672,930.0 \n16 \n17 \nTABLE 2.3 :SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF MERCHANT BANKS ACCEPTANCES \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ Thousands \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAGRICULTURE \nDISTRIBUTION \nFINANCIAL \nFINANCIAL \nMANUFACTURING \nMINING \nSERVICES \nTRANSPORT \nINDIVIDUALS \nCONGLOMERATES \nTOTAL \nEND OF \n \n \nINVESTMENT ORGANISATIONS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n15,494.8 \n1,897.5 \n0.0 \n479,6 \n31,053.3 \n31,756.6 \n20,082.4 \n0.0 \n1,516.1 \n3,623.5 \n105,903.9 \n FEBRUARY \n 16,359.6 \n483.9 \n0.0 \n734.6 \n32,663.4 \n15,907.7 \n5,112.6 \n0.0 \n301.8 \n0.0 \n71,563.6 \nMARCH \n15,328.4 \n4,816.6 \n0.0 \n734.6 \n33,053.5 \n22,330.2 \n3,206.4 \n0.0 \n301.8 \n0.0 \n75,436.7 \nAPRIL \n7,793.4 \n831.6 \n0.0 \n180.6 \n19,825.5 \n23,032.0 \n12,462.5 \n102.0 \n189.3 \n0.0 \n69,482.2 \nMAY \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n2,055.8 \n14,431.9 \n15,786.1 \n17,666.6 \n589.7 \n2,850.8 \n836.1 \n54,217..1 \nJUNE \n1,031.1 \n1,011.3 \n0.0 \n1,875.2 \n13,904.0 \n21,823.7 \n16,562.2 \n0.0 \n189.3 \n836.1 \n57,233.0 \nJULY \n125.6 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n7,054.0 \n19,331.9 \n14,121.2 \n1,533.9 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n42,166.6 \nAUGUST \n0.0 \n913.3 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n13,898.0 \n13,694.7 \n18,347.2 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n46,853.3 \nSEPTEMBER \n0.0 \n11,242.5 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n12,193.0 \n15,228.3 \n3,969.9 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n42,633.7 \nOCTOBER \n0.0 \n1,135.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n2,134.9 \n28,261.6 \n204.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n31,735.5 \nNOVEMBER \n8,373.2 \n3,045.0 \n11,889.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n11,190.4 \n0.0 \n34,497.7 \nDECEMBER \n6,559.3 \n1,430.0 \n14,889.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n11,190.4 \n70.0 \n34,138.7 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n70.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n3,641.0 \n18,088.3 \n1,189.0 \n11,190.4 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n34,178.7 \nFEBRUARY \n100.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n8,000.0 \n14,889.0 \n1,569.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n24,558.3 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nMARCH \n70.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n7,860.0 \n0.0 \n154.0 \n0.0 \n15,400.0 \n0.0 \n23,484.0 \nAPRIL \n5,100.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n7,620.0 \n14,889.0 \n278.0 \n0.0 \n15,200.0 \n0.0 \n43,087.0 \nMAY \n5,100.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n7,500.0 \n6,330.8 \n2,109.4 \n0.0 \n1,000.0 \n0.0 \n22,040.2 \nJUNE \n5,100.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n5,760.0 \n0.0 \n212.0 \n0.0 \n15,210.0 \n0.0 \n26,282.0 \nJULY \n5,100.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n7,000.0 \n0.0 \n212.0 \n0.0 \n15,110.0 \n0.0 \n27,422.0 \n18 \n TABLE 2.4 : SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS DEPOSITS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ Thousands \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nEND OF \nAGRICUL-\nTURE \nCONSTRUC-\nTION \nCOMMUNI-\nCATIONS \nDISTRIBU-\nTION \nFINANCIAL \n& \nFINANCIAL MANUFACTUR-\nING \nMINING \nSERVICES TRANSPORT \nINDIVIDUALS \nCONGLOMERATES \nTOTAL \n \n \n \n \n \nINVEST-\nMENTS \nORGANISA-\nTIONS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n137,919.4 \n35,324.8 \n106,812.5 \n296,807.8 \n116,945.8 \n277,304.7 \n268,525.2 \n119,278.5 \n515,754.9 \n21,989.9 \n431,208.6 \n14,582.8 \n2,342,454.9 \n FEBRUARY \n132,404.53 \n36,283.33 \n110,794.26 \n341,462.75 \n99,165.46 \n288,834.34 \n264,450.53 \n104,923.38 \n577,378.61 \n22,873.9 \n467,084.94 \n14,234.06 \n2,459,890.1 \nMARCH \n121,233.1 \n38,555.4 \n124,038.5 \n348,687.2 \n93,320.0 \n263’552.7 \n276,941.5 \n76,084.4 \n629,624.3 \n24,984.1 \n468,608.5 \n14,756.2 \n2,480,386.1 \nAPRIL \n127,168.8 \n39,606.6 \n115,033.7 \n331,306.5 \n83,707.8 \n289,829.1 \n276,208.7 \n75,855.9 \n644,979.8 \n24,822.5 \n465,129 \n14,829.3 \n2,488,477.6 \nMAY \n124,277.7 \n43,333.7 \n142,130.1 \n370,561.1 \n93,500.0 \n249,454.2 \n299,116.6 \n86,314.7 \n648,511.1 \n28,279.3 \n516,523.0 \n16,891.5 \n2,618,892.9 \nJUNE \n84,589.8 \n51,354.0 \n132,428.7 \n351,179.8 \n98,785.6 \n375,613.6 \n214,696.7 \n76,370.1 \n727,955.7 \n36,208.4 \n456,454.4 \n18,727.6 \n2,624,364.4 \nJULY \n106,470.8 \n47,401.0 \n131,489.0 \n345,036.3 \n70,487,9 \n397,969.7 \n213,370.5 \n89,915.4 \n726,447.6 \n46,000.4 \n505,054.1 \n29,735.3 \n2,709,378.0 \nAUGUST \n99,151.6 \n49,226.4 \n116,820.6 \n363,080.1 \n382,619.4 \n71,775.9 \n216,433.0 \n73,978.5 \n737,065.6 \n48,183.8 \n488,183.8 \n28,785.3 \n2,663,379.8 \nSEPTEMBER \n113,907.6 \n43,671.0 \n125,801.3 \n276,363.0 \n177,790.6 \n429,596.7 \n228,342.2 \n82,777.7 \n651,389.2 \n48,764.9 \n517,788.8 \n29,019.9 \n2,725,213.0 \nOCTOBER \n101,122.4 \n48,716.9 \n155,798.3 \n313,982.4 \n257,300.6 \n409,730.0 \n245,131.8 \n83,995.5 \n661,217.2 \n48,396.8 \n534,643.6 \n26,158.0 \n2,886,193.5 \nNOVEMBER \n104,695.1 \n53,233.8 \n151,359.5 \n348,390.4 \n185,802.5 \n464,782.4 \n269,513.8 \n85,906.9 \n962,840.9 \n47,647.2 \n548,847.7 \n23,130.6 \n3,246,150.7 \nDECEMBER \n96,098.4 \n50,492.7 \n126,343.5 \n379,068.0 \n198,323.3 \n509,241.6 \n280,975.4 \n95,457.1 \n582,286.2 \n41,852.2 \n538,135.2 \n26,491.3 \n2,924,764.8 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n91,648.8 \n48,329.1 \n128,426.0 \n351,566.7 \n212,401.7 \n494,823.6 \n252,389.7 \n93,470.0 \n658,260.1 \n44,091.4 \n512,289.8 \n32,145.9 \n2,919,842.6 \nFEBRUARY \n96,796.5 \n48,491.5 \n147,571.5 \n360,757.9 \n 147,995.9 \n 578,306.4 \n284,603.8 \n64,530.5 \n679,554.8 \n41,983.6 \n516,431.2 \n25,275.3 \n2,991.999.1 \nMARCH \n96,752.8 \n44,883.3 \n139,327.8 \n354,627.8 \n155,915.2 \n610,758.4 \n290,072.8 \n87,143.0 \n594,397.7 \n38,345.5 \n523,913.8 \n141,404.6 \n3,077,542.7 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAPRIL \n98,671.0 \n49,093.8 \n152,390.8 \n350,269.2 \n166,578.5 \n545,118.2 \n311,310.8 \n105,766.9 \n638,341.8 \n39,837.1 \n533,691.3 \n99,053.9 \n3,090,123.4 \nMAY \n114,053.3 \n55,427.4 \n142,023.3 \n389,384.7 \n255,352.1 \n484,429.7 \n318,129.4 \n92,777.2 \n700,668.7 \n46,593.8 \n578,509.2 \n32,297.7 \n3,209,646.5 \nJUNE \n116,635.2 \n58,578.8 \n147,313.8 \n447,394.5 \n183,146.3 \n352,600.3 \n366,824.2 \n96,685.8 \n701,195.7 \n46,578.5 \n597,373.1 \n104,843.6 \n3,219,169.8 \nJULY \n108,086.6 \n46,449.5 \n120,982.3 \n380,448.8 \n178,341.4 \n677,700.7 \n301,575.9 \n97,583.8 \n710,856.1 \n39,395.9 \n487,954.4 \n102,531.4 \n3,251,906.9 \n19 \n TABLE 2.5 : SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF MERCHANT BANKS DEPOSITS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ Thousands \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAGRICUL-\nTURE \nCOMMUNICA-\nTIONS \nCONSTRUC-\nTION \nDISTRIBU-\nTION \nFINANCIAL \n& \nFINANCIAL MANUFACTUR-\nING \nMINING \nSERVICES \nTRANSPORT \nINDIVIDUALS \nCONGLOMER-\nATES \nTOTAL \nEND OF \n \n \n \n \nINVEST-\nMENTS \nORGANISA-\nTIONS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n11,744.1 \n8,250.4 \n7.1 \n3,238.1 \n129,742.5 \n80,306.4 \n17,664.5 \n9,146.5 \n158,059.3 \n1,650.5 \n113,108.8 \n3,038.0 \n535,956.3 \nFEBRUARY \n14,684.8 \n5,815.5 \n6.8 \n23,523.2 \n131,181.2 \n95,143.4 \n21,911.4 \n22,184.5 \n131,968.5 \n1,350.6 \n149,680.8 \n3,038.0 \n600,488.7 \n MARCH \n 46,519.8 \n 5,039.7 \n1,662.6 \n4,119.3 \n127,903.5 \n 91,695.5 \n 17,886.8 \n 39,142.1 \n143,818.6 \n 4,669.7 \n 83,525.1 \n28,564.2 \n594,546.8 \nAPRIL \n24,233.2 \n8,046.5 \n1,868.8 \n27,036.4 \n121,160.1 \n109,064.2 \n36,456.3 \n30,240.9 \n151,505.2 \n4,892.5 \n75,547.7 \n29,200.4 \n619,252.1 \nMAY \n10,329.7 \n6,452.6 \n1,765.0 \n12,678.2 \n115,998.5 \n103,213.2 \n35,266.7 \n25,989.8 \n183,915.3 \n6,141.2 \n63,313.3 \n39,110.5 \n604,173.9 \nJUNE \n10,271.8 \n7,330.0 \n1,698.4 \n9,186.1 \n134,312.0 \n129,103.5 \n26,823.0 \n22,693.9 \n173,514.3 \n4,286.6 \n62,007.9 \n30,818.9 \n612,046.3 \nJULY \n4,473.9 \n5,298.2 \n270.1 \n27,217.9 \n132,809.8 \n98,744.9 \n30,365.9 \n21,415.7 \n217,331.4 \n2,077.4 \n57,143.0 \n33,601.7 \n630,749.9 \nAUGUST \n6,744.1 \n6,765.6 \n288.6 \n26,394.2 \n123,569.3 \n83,662.1 \n33,578.1 \n18,015.7 \n222,325.8 \n2,979.2 \n92,733.9 \n33,058.9 \n650,115.6 \nSEPTEMBER \n16,997.7 \n8,628.2 \n300.8 \n27,315.7 \n124,411.1 \n85,232.7 \n50,279.5 \n27,896.5 \n208,113.3 \n2,000.9 \n85,429.2 \n34,840.8 \n671,446.4 \nOCTOBER \n4,473.9 \n5,298.2 \n270.1 \n3,119.1 \n124,342.3 \n115,774.8 \n30,524.5 \n21,415.7 \n191,204.2 \n2,077.4 \n153,329.1 \n32,049.8 \n683,879.0 \nNOVEMBER \n12,872.8 \n10,868.0 \n13,414.5 \n1,649.6 \n174,107.7 \n60,405.7 \n18,484.7 \n35,828.3 \n188,441.9 \n4,251.7 \n203,879.7 \n27,745.0 \n751,949.6 \nDECEMBER \n12,164.3 \n5,900.3 \n14,197.9 \n3,080.8 \n173,009.4 \n60,501.2 \n17,631.4 \n137,537.4 \n198,977.5 \n2,664.8 \n79,504.3 \n32,534.7 \n737,703.9 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n11,723.2 \n6,581.0 \n10,921.0 \n751.4 \n180,889.6 \n64,042.8 \n16,845.3 \n28,513.2 \n215,563.4 \n2,547.7 \n113,832.1 \n34,578.4 \n686,789.2 \nFEBRUARY \n10,020.1 \n7,034.4 \n11,383.1 \n1,419.4 \n196,108.5 \n51,751.6 \n16,973.1 \n28,365.1 \n187,610.2 \n6,432.7 \n70,211.6 \n34,798.8 \n622,108.3 \n MARCH \n58,914.7 \n8,588.1 \n7,605.8 \n1,590.7 \n142,308.7 \n90,728.3 \n28,015.0 \n25,273.9 \n185,705.5 \n1,965.0 \n164,230.8 \n29,295.2 \n744,221.5 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAPRIL \n31,659.0 \n5,702.7 \n18,835.7 \n1,538.1 \n177,040.5 \n97,838.1 \n22,611.8 \n28,606.2 \n187,727.7 \n3,883.5 \n139,589.7 \n31,245.5 \n746,278.5 \nMAY \n17,827.5 \n5,756.6 \n18,786.2 \n1,258.9 \n187,857.9 \n99,688.5 \n19,315.6 \n44,794.2 \n197,568.8 \n3,436.3 \n132,325.5 \n31,463.1 \n760,079.2 \nJUNE \n4,255.3 \n6,236.6 \n10,753.7 \n1,131.2 \n156,052.6 \n105,613.0 \n18,935.8 \n59,790.7 \n184,390.9 \n3,652.3 \n107,354.6 \n30,017.1 \n688,183.8 \nJULY \n6,597.9 \n9,544.9 \n22,034.9 \n17,579.6 \n155,178.3 \n101,057.7 \n5,786.5 \n25,167.1 \n139,688.0 \n2,369.4 \n102,677.4 \n25,029.7 \n612,711.4 \n20 \nTABLE 3.1: ZIMBABWE: EXTERNAL DEBT OUTSTANDING BY DEBTOR (INCLUDING ALL ARREARS BUT EXCLUDING PENALTIES) \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nEnd Period \n2001 \n2002 \n2003 \n2004 \n2005 \n2006 \n2007 \n2008 \n2009 \n2010 \n2011 \n(US$ millions) \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nLong-Term External Debt \n3,255 \n3,327 \n3,644 \n3,927 \n3,805 \n3,965 \n4,032 \n4,464 \n4951 \n5175 \n6,101 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nGovernment \n2,328 \n2,376 \n2,617 \n2,844 \n2,895 \n3,024 \n3,054 \n3,464 \n4037 \n4095 \n4,315 \nBilateral Creditors \n1,115 \n1,107 \n1,255 \n1,455 \n1,438 \n1,520 \n1,520 \n1,863 \n2308 \n2325 \n2,481 \nMultilateral Creditors \n1,213 \n1,269 \n1,362 \n1,389 \n1,457 \n1,504 \n1,524 \n1,592 \n1729 \n1770 \n1,834 \nPrivate Creditors \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n10 \n10 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nPublic Enterprises \n568 \n616 \n698 \n714 \n709 \n766 \n790 \n825 \n857 \n938 \n1,139 \nBilateral Creditors \n315 \n351 \n403 \n442 \n439 \n464 \n474 \n497 \n453 \n238 \n672 \nMultilateral Creditors \n253 \n265 \n295 \n272 \n270 \n302 \n316 \n327 \n403 \n700 \n467 \nPrivate Creditors \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nMonetary Authorities \n292 \n279 \n288 \n291 \n144 \n130 \n137 \n140 \n140 \n138 \n127 \nMultilateral Creditors - IMF \n292 \n279 \n288 \n291 \n144 \n130 \n137 \n140 \n140 \n138 \n127 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nPrivate \n67 \n56 \n41 \n78 \n57 \n45 \n51 \n35 \n57 \n142 \n647 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nShort-Term External Debt \n167 \n183 \n169 \n144 \n173 \n281 \n387 \n226 \n1198 \n1382 \n932 \nSupplier's Credits \n13 \n26 \n51 \n69 \n107 \n122 \n178 \n41 \n193 \n286 \n34 \nReserve Bank \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n642 \n642 \n642 \nPrivate \n154 \n157 \n118 \n75 \n66 \n159 \n209 \n185 \n363 \n454 \n256 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nTotal External Debt/1 \n3,422 \n3,510 \n3,812 \n4,071 \n3,978 \n4,246 \n4,607 \n4,690 \n6289 \n6695 \n7,160 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nGross Domestic Product \n10,887 \n6,715 \n5,037 \n4,299 \n2,918 \n6,645 \n4,000 \n3,175 \n6133 \n7433 \n8,865 \nExternal Debt / GDP \n31.4% \n52.3% \n75.7% \n94.7% \n136.3% \n63.9% \n110.5% \n147.7% \n102.5% \n90.1% \n80.8% \n/1 Total external debt excludes penalties \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSOURCE: Ministry of Finance and \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n21 \nTABLE 4.1 LENDING RATES (percent per annum)1 \n \nCommercial Banks \nMerchant Banks \n \n \n \n \nWeighted Average Lending \nRates3 \n \nWeighted Average Lending \nRates3 \n \n \nEnd Period \nNominal \nLending \nRates2 \nIndividuals \nCorporate \nNominal \nLending \nRates2 \nIndividuals \nCorporate \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nMar \n8.00-30.00 \n16.04 \n12.53 \n14.00-35.00 \n18.17 \n13.26 \n \n \nApr \n8.00-30.00 \n15.00 \n13.06 \n13.00-25.00 \n18.37 \n16.36 \n \n \nMay \n6.00-30.00 \n14.98 \n11.86 \n15.00-30.00 \n15.78 \n14.47 \n \n \nJun \n6.00-35.00 \n13.81 \n11.58 \n15.00-30.00 \n17.86 \n14.05 \n \n \nJul \n6.00-35.00 \n14.32 \n10.88 \n15.00-30.00 \n17.92 \n13.93 \n \n \nAug \n6.00-35.00 \n15.65 \n10.74 \n15.00-30.00 \n17.94 \n13.95 \n \n \nSep \n6.00-35.00 \n13.25 \n11.14 \n15.00-30.00 \n17.98 \n13.92 \n \n \nOct \n6.00-35.00 \n13.35 \n11.03 \n13.00-30.00 \n17.98 \n13.95 \n \n \nNov \n6.00-35.00 \n15.25 \n10.88 \n13.00-25.00 \n17.91 \n14.42 \n \n \nFeb \n10.00-35.00 \n14.83 \n10.53 \n13.00-25.00 \n17.93 \n14.36 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nNotes \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1. Table revised, to separate weighted lending rates for individuals and corporate bodies. \n \n2. Nominal Lending Rates depict the range of rates quoted by banks. \n \n \n \n \n3. Lending rates exclude rates on staff loans. \nDec \n10.00-35.00 \n15.08 \n10.40 \n15.00-25.00 \n17.93 \n14.43 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n10.00-35.00 \n15.58 \n10.81 \n13.00-25.00 \n17.96 \n14.42 \n \n \nApr \n3.00-35.00 \n14.58 \n9.66 \n14.00-25.00 \n17.77 \n14.35 \n \n \nMar \n6.00-35.00 \n14.32 \n10.19 \n14.00-25.00 \n17.80 \n14.35 \n \n \nMay \n9.00-35.00 \n14.25 \n9.89 \n13.00-23.00 \n17.66 \n17.02 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJun \n9.00-35.00 \n14.29 \n9.46 \n15.00-22.50 \n17.78 \n16.89 \n \n \nJul \n6.00-35.00 \n14.39 \n9.65 \n15.00-28.00 \n17.70 \n16.97 \n \n \n22 \nTABLE 4.2 : BANKS DEPOSIT RATES (percent per annum)1 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCOMMERCIAL BANKS \nACCEPTING HOUSES \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nEND OF \nSAVINGS \n3 MONTHS \n3 MONTHS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n 2011 \n \n \n \nAPRIL \n0.35-6.00 \n0.15-17.00 \n10.00-17.00 \nMAY \n0.30-5.00 \n0.15-17.00 \n10.00-17.00 \nJUNE \n0.15-5.00 \n0.15-17.00 \n10.00-17.00 \nJULY \n0.15-5.00 \n0.10-17.00 \n10.00-17.00 \nAUGUST \n0.15-5.00 \n0.10-17.00 \n11.00-17.00 \nSEPTEMBER \n0.15-5.00 \n0.10-17.00 \n10.00-17.00 \nOCTOBER \n0.15-5.00 \n0.10-17.00 \n10.00-17.00 \nNOVEMBER \n0.15-5.00 \n0.10-17.00 \n10.00-17.00 \nDECEMBER \n0.15-5.00 \n0.10-18.00 \n10.00-17.00 \n \n \n \n \n20122 \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n0.15-5.00 \n5.00-18.00 \n10.00-17.00 \nFEBRUARY \n0.15-5.00 \n5.00-18.00 \n10.00-17.00 \nMARCH \n0.01-12.00 \n5.00-20.00 \n7.00-17.00 \nAPRIL \n0.00-12.00 \n5.00-20.00 \n8.00-17.00 \nMAY \n0.00-12.00 \n5.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nJUNE \n0.00-12.00 \n5.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nJULY \n0.00-12.00 \n5.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nAUGUST \n0.00-12.00 \n5.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nSEPTEMBER \n0.00-12.00 \n5.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nOCTOBER \n0.00-12.00 \n5.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nNOVEMBER \n0.15-8.00 \n4.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nDECEMBER \n0.15-8.00 \n4.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n0.15-8.00 \n4.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nFEBRUARY \n0.15-8.00 \n4.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nMARCH \n0.15-8.00 \n4.00-20.00 \n8.00-12.00 \nAPRIL \n0.15-8.00 \n4.00-20.00 \n8.00-12.00 \nMAY \n0.15-8.00 \n4.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \nJUNE \n0.15-8.00 \n4.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1. \nThe range of rates qouted by banks during the period. \n2. \nThree (3) months deposit rates revised to exclude rates on inactive or dormant \naccounts. \n \n \nJULY \n0.15-8.00 \n3.00-20.00 \n6.00-17.00 \n23 \nTABLE 5.1 : MONTHLY INFLATION -- PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \\1 \n( DECEMBER 2012 = 100) \n1. Source: ZIMSTATS. To reflect changing expenditure \npatterns, ZIMSTAT introduced a revised CPI basket and \nrebased CPI figures to December 2012=100. \n \nNON-FOOD INFLATION \nFOOD \nINFLA-\nTION \nALL \n \nALCO-\nHOLIC \nBEVER-\nAGES \nCLOTH-\nING \nHSING, \nWATER, \nFURNITURE \nHEALTH TRANSPORT \nCOMMUNI-\nCATION \nRECREATION & EDUCATION \nRESTAU-\nRANTS & \nMISC. \nTOTAL \nNON \nFOOD & \nITEMS \n \n& TO-\nBACCO \nFOOT-\nWEAR \nELEC-\nTRICTY, \nGAS \nAND \n \n \n \nCULTURE \n \nHOTELS \nGOODS & \nFOOD \nNON \nALCO-\nHOLIC \nBEVER-\nAGES \n \n \n \n \n& OTHER \nEQUIPMENT \n \n \n \n \n \nSERVICES \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFUELS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nWEIGHTS \n4.38 \n6.05 \n17.74 \n9.91 \n2.16 \n9.76 \n3.41 \n2.1 \n5.67 \n1.38 \n3.91 \n66.47 \n33.53 \n100 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n-0.54 \n0.00 \n0.00 \n0.00 \n0.01 \n0.00 \n0.00 \n0.01 \n0.00 \n0.01 \n-0.52 \n-0.06 \n0.32 \n0.07 \nFEBRUARY \n 2.75 \n0.37 \n0.41 \n0.20 \n1.51 \n1.65 \n-0.17 \n-0.08 \n0.08 \n0.77 \n1.11 \n0.72 \n1.40 \n0.95 \nMARCH \n0.47 \n0.04 \n0.03 \n0.36 \n0.06 \n0.49 \n-0.20 \n0.13 \n0.00 \n-1.11 \n0.08 \n0.15 \n0.32 \n0.21 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAPRIL \n0.19 \n-0.10 \n1.68 \n0.00 \n0.27 \n0.00 \n-13.15 \n0.00 \n4.01 \n0.20 \n-0.30 \n0.11 \n-0.49 \n-0.03 \nMAY \n-0.01 \n0.17 \n0.02 \n-0.28 \n-0.08 \n-0.73 \n-0.06 \n-0.49 \n0.00 \n0.05 \n-0.30 \n-0.17 \n-0.28 \n-0.21 \nJUNE \n0.17 \n-0.03 \n-0.01 \n-0.02 \n-0.05 \n-0.14 \n-0.33 \n0.12 \n0.00 \n-0.15 \n0.06 \n-0.03 \n-0.33 \n-0.13 \nJULY \n-0.16 \n0.11 \n-0.01 \n-0.20 \n-0.04 \n0.31 \n-0.04 \n-0.11 \n0.00 \n0.02 \n-0.04 \n0.00 \n-1.14 \n-0.38 \n24 \nTABLE 5.2 : YEARLY INFLATION -- PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \\1 \n(DECEMBER 2012 = 100) \n1. Source: ZIMSTATS. To reflect changing expenditure \npatterns, ZIMSTAT introduced a revised CPI basket and \nrebased CPI figures to December 2012=100. \n \nNON-FOOD INFLATION \nFOOD \nINFLATION \nALL \n \nALCO-\nHOLIC \nBEVER-\nAGES \nCLOTHING \nHSING, \nWATER, \nFURNI-\nTURE \nHEALTH \nTRANSPORT \nCOMMU-\nNICATION \nRECREA-\nTION & \nEDUCA-\nTION \nRESTAU-\nRANTS & \nMISC. \nTOTAL \nNON \nFOOD & \nITEMS \n \n& TO-\nBACCO \nFOOTWEAR \nELEC-\nTRICTY, GAS \nAND \n \n \n \nCULTURE \nHOTELS \nGOODS & \nFOOD \nNON ALCO-\nHOLIC \nBEVER-\nAGES \n \n \n \n \n& OTHER \nEQUIP-\nMENT \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSERVICES \n \n \n \n \n \nFUELS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nWEIGHTS \n4.38 \n6.05 \n17.74 \n9.91 \n2.16 \n9.76 \n3.41 \n2.1 \n5.67 \n1.38 \n3.91 \n66.47 \n33.53 \n100 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n3.83 \n-0.74 \n10.70 \n0.65 \n1.94 \n6.42 \n-0.36 \n1.92 \n12.96 \n1.92 \n1.32 \n1.91 \n3.72 \n2.51 \nFEBRUARY \n5.77 \n-0.74 \n7.11 \n0.64 \n3.23 \n8.31 \n-0.01 \n-0.19 \n13.05 \n 3.01 \n 1.95 \n2.91 \n4.67 \n2.98 \nMARCH \n6.24 \n-0.80 \n5.48 \n0.70 \n3.28 \n8.73 \n-0.05 \n-0.19 \n8.37 \n1.71 \n1.64 \n2.04 \n4.18 \n2.76 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAPRIL \n3.57 \n5.86 \n-0.40 \n4.40 \n0.90 \n3.77 \n7.70 \n-13.33 \n-1.28 \n12.54 \n1.63 \n1.21 \n1.94 \n2.53 \nMAY \n5.88 \n-0.38 \n3.95 \n0.66 \n3.60 \n6.85 \n-13.13 \n-0.83 \n12.56 \n1.44 \n1.04 \n1.54 \n3.54 \n2.20 \nJUNE \n5.40 \n-0.50 \n2.65 \n0.16 \n3.03 \n6.85 \n-13.40 \n-0.33 \n7.75 \n1.35 \n1.22 \n1.35 \n2.90 \n1.87 \nJULY \n4.83 \n0.14 \n2.54 \n-0.05 \n2.84 \n4.96 \n-13.47 \n-0.61 \n12.70 \n0.71 \n1.00 \n1.00 \n1.74 \n1.25 \n25 \n TABLE 6 : SELECTED INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE RATES \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSA \nBW \nJAPANESE \nEUROPEAN \nPOUND \nEND OF \nRAND/1 \nPULA/1 \nYEN/1 \nCURRENCY/2 \nSTERLING/2 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n7.82 \n7.32 \n76.20 \n1.32 \n1.60 \nFEBRUARY \n7.47 \n7.13 \n80.28 \n1.35 \n1.60 \nMARCH \n7.59 \n7.29 \n81.92 \n1.33 \n1.59 \nAPRIL \n7.82 \n7.41 \n80.78 \n1.32 \n1.61 \nMAY \n8.14 \n7.63 \n79.80 \n1.28 \n1.59 \nJUNE \n8.38 \n7.77 \n79.42 \n1.25 \n1.56 \nJULY \n8.18 \n7.74 \n78.23 \n1.23 \n1.57 \nAUGUST \n8.45 \n7.80 \n78.47 \n1.25 \n1.58 \nSEPTEMBER \n8.23 \n7.65 \n77.50 \n1.29 \n1.63 \nOCTOBER \n8.64 \n7.88 \n79.78 \n1.30 \n1.61 \nNOVEMBER \n8.78 \n7.95 \n80.94 \n1.30 \n1.60 \nDECEMBER \n8.48 \n7.88 \n86.06 \n1.32 \n1.62 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJANUARY \n9.03 \n8.05 \n90.90 \n1.36 \n1.58 \nFEBRUARY \n8.84 \n8.04 \n92.36 \n1.31 \n1.52 \nJUNE \n9.94 \n8.60 \n98.74 \n1.31 \n1.53 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1. Foreign currency per US Dollar. \n \n \n \n \n2. US Dollar per unit of foreign currency. \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nMARCH \n9.26 \n8.30 \n94.13 \n1.28 \n1.51 \nAPRIL \n8.98 \n8.10 \n97.76 \n1.31 \n1.55 \nMAY \n10.08 \n8.65 \n100.85 \n1.30 \n1.52 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJULY \n9.83 \n8.49 \n98.31 \n1.33 \n1.53 \n26 \nTABLE 7.1: COMMERCIAL BANKS - ASSETS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ Millions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nLiquid Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSecurities \n \n \nLoans & Contingent \nOther \nNon Financial \nTotal \nEnd of \nNotes \n \n \n \n \n \n \nTotal \nOther Balances Advances \nAssets \nAssets \nAssets \nAssets \n \n& \nBalances \nBalances \nBalances \n \n \n \n Liquid \nwith RBZ \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCoin \nwith \nwith Other \nat \nTrade \nTreasury Agric PEs \n Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nat Banks \nRBZ \nBanks \nForeign \nBanks \nBills \nBills \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Jan \n255.1 \n258.7 \n91.1 \n382.3 \n109.8 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n1,097.0 \n120.3 \n1,988.3 \n262.6 \n135.2 \n316.4 \n3,919.8 \nFeb \n242.8 \n335.2 \n90.0 \n489.4 \n121.3 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n1,278.7 \n102.7 \n1,978.3 \n265.7 \n138.9 \n329.6 \n4,093.8 \n Mar \n285.0 \n444.6 \n103.2 \n217.6 \n140.4 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n1,191.3 \n34.7 \n2,040.5 \n337.0 \n152.8 \n339.6 \n4,095.9 \n Apr \n306.5 \n459.1 \n128.5 \n197.4 \n217.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n1,308.5 \n32.8 \n2,068.4 \n348.9 \n180.2 \n342.0 \n4,280.7 \n May \n316.3 \n441.8 \n113.2 \n210.5 \n225.8 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n1,307.6 \n32.2 \n2,156.2 \n388.5 \n182.5 \n384.1 \n4,451.3 \nJun \n297.2 \n413.2 \n98.2 \n245.8 \n232.6 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n1,287.1 \n32.4 \n2,140.6 \n369.7 \n228.5 \n386.3 \n4,444.7 \n Jul \n329.9 \n403.3 \n108.9 \n211.0 \n205.1 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n1,258.2 \n25.0 \n2,359.7 \n370.0 \n242.7 \n393.3 \n4,648.8 \n Aug 331.2 \n363.1 \n97.7 \n165.3 \n211.6 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n1,168.8 \n24.9 \n2,404.0 \n385.9 \n221.3 \n390.1 \n4,594.9 \n Sep \n299.3 \n381.7 \n109.8 \n185.2 \n175.2 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n1,151.3 \n25.1 \n2,498.0 \n390.6 \n240.1 \n390.4 \n4,695.4 \nOct \n331.5 \n368.4 \n127.1 \n191.5 \n174.2 \n7.4 \n0.0 \n1,200.1 \n25.0 \n2,530.01 \n372.3 \n246.6 \n389.6 \n4,763.6 \nNov \n306.6 \n358.3 \n119.3 \n325.9 \n188.1 \n7.5 \n0.0 \n1306.0 \n25.5 \n2,591.9 \n348.3 \n234.4 \n394.1 \n4,900.0 \nDec \n375.9 \n374.7 \n131.1 \n219.7 \n190.8 \n8.2 \n0.0 \n1,300.4 \n27.7 \n2,631.6 \n375.3 \n255.7 \n389.0 \n4,980.0 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Jan \n323.4 \n378.5 \n103.4 \n182.3 \n247.8 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n1,235.5 \n52.2 \n2,694.9 \n386.1 \n205.7 \n386.7 \n4,961.1 \nFeb \n292.2 \n357.7 \n120.5 \n234.6 \n239.9 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n1,244.9 \n27.7 \n2,289.3 \n328.8 \n208.0 \n388.3 \n4,887.0 \nMar \n271.6 \n345.7 \n196.1 \n198.9 \n265.3 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n1,277.6 \n26.1 \n2,715.8 \n367.2 \n228.8 \n388.0 \n5,003.5 \nApr \n263.8 \n383.6 \n201.1 \n272.9 \n289.9 \n75.3 \n5.2 \n1,491.7 \n26.3 \n2,595.8 \n341.3 \n207.0 \n382.1 \n5,044.2 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n May \n250.9 \n400.9 \n198.2 \n296.7 \n253.5 \n75.4 \n5.3 \n1,480.8 \n25.8 \n2,673.2 \n389.8 \n208.0 \n382.9 \n5,160.5 \nJun \n227.2 \n416.4 \n171.9 \n257.5 \n271.8 \n75.5 \n5.3 \n1,425.8 \n26.0 \n2,698.3 \n364.1 \n217.8 \n384.6 \n5,116.5 \nJul \n266.5 \n352.8 \n164.2 \n266.1 \n263.8 \n110.2 \n6.4 \n1429.9 \n26.5 \n2701.3 \n337.1 \n229.8 \n387.0 \n5,111.7 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n27 \nTABLE 7.2: COMMERCIAL BANKS - LIABILITIES \nUS$ Millions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nDeposits \n \n \n \nAmounts Owing to \nCapital \nContingent \nOther \nTotal \nOf which \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nand \nLiabilities Liabilities Liabilities Liabilities \nto the \nEnd of \nDemand \nSavings and \nShort-term \nLong-term \nTotal \nForeign \nLiabilities \nRBZ \nOther Banks Reserves \n \n \n \nPublic \n \n \n \n \n Deposits \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n1,830.5 \n740.1 \n170.2 \n2,740.8 \n143.6 \n0.0 \n47.3 \n426.6 \n262.6 \n298.9 \n3,919.8 \n2,740.8 \nFeb \n1,980.9 \n745.4 \n197.8 \n2,924.1 \n163.3 \n0.0 \n23.5 \n437.8 \n265.7 \n281.4 \n4,095.8 \n2,924.1 \n Mar \n1,944.7 \n699.6 \n322.7 \n2,967.0 \n149.2 \n0.0 \n25.4 \n437.5 \n337.0 \n262.4 \n4,178.6 \n2,967.0 \n Apr \n1,932,8 \n722.1 \n350.4 \n3,005.3 \n155.1 \n0.0 \n23.8 \n440.3 \n348.9 \n307.3 \n4,280.7 \n3,005.3 \n May \n1,886.1 \n802.5 \n462.2 \n3,150.9 \n175.3 \n0.0 \n23.2 \n483.6 \n388.5 \n229.7 \n4,451.3 \n3,150.9 \nJun \n1,889.3 \n899.4 \n391.7 \n3,180.4 \n170.9 \n0.0 \n21.5 \n503.9 \n369.7 \n198.2 \n4,444.7 \n3,180.4 \nJul \n1,957.8 \n873.6 \n500.6 \n3,331.9 \n172.8 \n0.0 \n22.7 \n539.0 \n370.0 \n212.4 \n4,648.8 \n3,331.9 \nAug \n1,919.2 \n930.2 \n374.3 \n3,223.6 \n172.2 \n0.0 \n22.1 \n562.5 \n385.9 \n228.5 \n4,594.9 \n3,223.6 \n Sep \n1,962.6 \n883.0 \n490.0 \n3,335.6 \n183.9 \n0.0 \n20.5 \n552.6 \n390.6 \n205.8 \n4,689.0 \n3,335.6 \n Oct \n1,997.7 \n1,011.7 \n413.6 \n3,422.9 \n168.1 \n0.0 \n20.5 \n562.9 \n372.3 \n216.7 \n4,763.6 \n3,422.9 \n Nov \n1,895.8 \n966.6 \n679.6 \n3,542.0 \n192.9 \n0.0 \n38.2 \n562.2 \n348.3 \n216.4 \n4,900.0 \n3,542.0 \n Dec \n2,090.5 \n922.3 \n507.5 \n3,520.4 \n212.5 \n0.0 \n30.8 \n618.5 \n375.3 \n222.5 \n4,980.0 \n3,520.4 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n2,032.2 \n866.1 \n552.4 \n3,450.7 \n266.1 \n0.0 \n27.8 \n623.9 \n386.1 \n206.5 \n4,961.1 \n3,450.7 \nFeb \n1,987.8 \n933.3 \n491.5 \n3,412.5 \n258.1 \n0.0 \n32.4 \n631.9 \n328.8 \n223.3 \n4,887.0 \n3,417.9 \nMar \n1,960.1 \n976.3 \n451.1 \n3,387.3 \n290.9 \n0.0 \n32.8 \n687.7 \n367.2 \n237.6 \n5,003.5 \n3,387.3 \nApr \n 2,074.5 \n1,046.3 \n379.5 \n3,500.3 \n 247.6 \n0.0 \n37.9 \n667.2 \n341.3 \n249.8 \n5,044.2 \n3,500.3 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n May \n2,066.0 \n913.0 \n479.9 \n3,459.0 \n346.5 \n0.0 \n81.8 \n674.4 \n389.8 \n209.0 \n5,160.4 \n3,459.0 \n Jun \n2,013.9 \n919.6 \n298.9 \n3,232.4 \n553.0 \n0.0 \n74.1 \n702.3 \n364.1 \n190.6 \n5,116.5 \n3,232.4 \n Jul \n2,054.1 \n916.2 \n245.9 \n3,216.2 \n578.3 \n0.0 \n77.5 \n699.7 \n337.1 \n202.9 \n 5,111.7 \n3,216.2 \n28 \nTABLE 8.1 : ACCEPTING HOUSES - ASSETS \nUS$ Millions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nLiquid Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nLoans & Contingent \nOther \nNon Financial \nTotal \nEnd of \nNotes \n \n \n \n \n \nTotal \nOther \nBalances Advances \nAssets \nAssets \nAssets \nAssets \n \n& \nBalances Balances Balances \n \n \nLiquid \nwith RBZ \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCoin \nwith \nwith Other \nat \nTrade \nTreasury \n Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nat Banks \nRBZ \nBanks \nForeign \nBanks \nBills \nBills \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAug \n0.8 \n0.6 \n31.8 \n0.4 \n5.5 \n0.0 \n39.2 \n0.0 \n223.3 \n36.7 \n59.5 \n22.7 \n381.4 \nSep \n0.9 \n3.7 \n27.8 \n5.5 \n3.1 \n0.0 \n40.9 \n0.0 \n228.0 \n36.8 \n56.1 \n22.1 \n383.9 \nOct \n2.8 \n0.4 \n28.4 \n1.6 \n3.3 \n0.4 \n36.9 \n0.0 \n208.9 \n37.1 \n53.5 \n22.4 \n358.7 \nNov \n1.7 \n0.5 \n30.2 \n1.2 \n3.3 \n0.4 \n37.3 \n0.0 \n235.9 \n37.1 \n53.6 \n22.4 \n386.3 \nDec \n2.2 \n1.0 \n26.1 \n1.4 \n3.3 \n0.4 \n34.4 \n0.0 \n239.2 \n37.2 \n69.1 \n22.3 \n402.3 \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n1.5 \n2.7 \n28.6 \n0.0 \n3.4 \n0.0 \n36.2 \n0.0 \n236.7 \n34.8 \n60.2 \n29.1 \n397.0 \nFeb \n4.7 \n1.5 \n18.4 \n0.0 \n4.5 \n0.0 \n26.9 \n0.0 \n245.7 \n34.8 \n63.9 \n28.9 \n398.2 \nMar \n2.5 \n1.1 \n7.3 \n-3.1 \n1.2 \n0.0 \n8.9 \n0.0 \n260.3 \n34.2 \n50.4 \n28.8 \n382.6 \nApr \n2.7 \n1.3 \n20.1 \n-1.9 \n1.2 \n0.0 \n23.4 \n0.0 \n254.9 \n34.2 \n51.7 \n27.7 \n392.0 \nMay \n2.4 \n4.1 \n18.6 \n-2.4 \n4.5 \n0.0 \n27.3 \n0.0 \n253.4 \n34.6 \n63.0 \n12.7 \n391.0 \nJun \n2.4 \n3.6 \n7.9 \n1.1 \n9.1 \n0.0 \n24.1 \n0.0 \n260.3 \n34.6 \n51.4 \n35.2 \n405.6 \nJul \n1.9 \n1.3 \n2.8 \n2.2 \n3.4 \n0.0 \n11.6 \n0.0 \n264.0 \n34.8 \n51.7 \n35.5 \n397.6 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n29 \nTABLE 8.2 : ACCEPTING HOUSES - LIABILITIES \nUS$ Millions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nOf which \n \n \nDeposits \n \n \n \nAmounts Owing to \nCapital \nContingent \nOther \nTotal \nLiabilities to the \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nand \nLiabilities \nLiabilities \nLiabilities \nPublic \nEnd of Demand Savings and \nShort-term \nLong-term \nTotal \nForeign \nLiabilities \nRBZ \nOther \nBanks \nReserves \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Deposits \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Jun \n136.9 \n91.2 \n33.7 \n261.8 \n44.6 \n0.0 \n1.7 \n-22.4 \n49.6 \n144.0 \n479.3 \n261.8 \n Jul \n110.8 \n36.4 \n69.2 \n216.4 \n43.6 \n0.0 \n1.0 \n-33.1 \n37.5 \n138.1 \n403.5 \n216.4 \n Aug \n107.0 \n42.6 \n64.5 \n214.1 \n43.1 \n0.0 \n1.0 \n-96.8 \n36.7 \n183.3 \n381.4 \n214.1 \n Sep \n102.5 \n60.4 \n56.4 \n219.3 \n42.8 \n0.0 \n2.7 \n-47.9 \n36.8 \n130.2 \n383.9 \n219.3 \n Oct \n122.8 \n35.9 \n60.6 \n219.3 \n39.8 \n0.0 \n2.7 \n-51..1 \n37.1 \n110.9 \n358.7 \n219.3 \n Nov \n105.3 \n69.3 \n46.4 \n221.0 \n39.9 \n0.0 \n2.7 \n-69.7 \n37.1 \n155.2 \n386.3 \n221.0 \n Dec \n108.1 \n67.9 \n44.2 \n220.2 \n44.5 \n0.0 \n2.7 \n-60.9 \n37.2 \n158.5 \n402.3 \n220.2 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Jan \n106.9 \n91.7 \n21.3 \n220.0 \n44.8 \n0.0 \n2.7 \n-72.4 \n34.8 \n167.2 \n397.0 \n220.0 \n Feb \n102.8 \n66.0 \n55.7 \n224.5 \n45.3 \n0.0 \n2.7 \n-77.8 \n34.8 \n168.7 \n398.2 \n224.5 \n Mar \n104.3 \n62.3 \n52.8 \n219.5 \n45.8 \n0.0 \n1.2 \n-97.3 \n34.2 \n179.3 \n382.6 \n219.5 \n Apr \n107.3 64.6 \n56.3 \n228.3 \n 45.4 \n0.0 \n1.2 -98.1 \n34.2 \n 181.1 \n392.0 \n228.3 \n May \n112.2 \n67.1 \n54.4 \n233.6 \n46.7 \n0.0 \n1.2 \n-99.4 \n34.6 \n174.3 \n391.0 \n233.6 \n Jun \n114.6 \n56.2 \n52.3 \n223.1 \n46.7 \n0.0 \n1.2 \n-91.2 \n34.6 \n191.2 \n405.6 \n223.1 \n Jul \n111.3 \n82.7 \n27.0 \n220.9 \n47.1 \n0.0 \n1.2 \n-94.1 \n34.8 \n187.8 \n397.6 \n220.9 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n30 \nTABLE 9.1 : BUILDING SOCIETIES - ASSETS \nUS$ Millions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nLiquid Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nNotes \nBalances \nTrade \nTreasury \nTotal \nMortgage \nOther \nOther \nNon Finan-\ncial \nTotal \nEnd of \n& \nwith Other \nBills \nBills \nLiquid \nAdvances \nAdvances \nAssets \nAssets \n Assets \n \nCoin \nBanks \n \n \n Assets \n \n \n \n \n \n \nat Banks \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Jan \n20.1 \n80.8 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n100.9 \n207.2 \n80.6 \n17.6 \n112.2 \n518.5 \n Feb \n13.3 \n99.2 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n112.6 \n226.5 \n81.0 \n19.3 \n112.5 \n551.8 \n Mar \n15.8 \n109.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n124.7 \n221.5 \n83.1 \n19.7 \n112.7 \n561.6 \n Apr \n18.2 \n99.7 \n0.2 \n0.0 \n118.0 \n215.5 \n85.5 \n23.7 \n111.3 \n554.0 \n May \n19.6 \n93.7 \n0.2 \n0.0 \n113.4 \n219.7 \n93.3 \n24.5 \n113.0 \n564.0 \n Jun \n15.7 \n102.2 \n0.2 \n0.0 \n118.1 \n239.5 \n96.5 \n25.6 \n114.6 \n594.3 \n Jul \n19.6 \n108.6 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n128.2 \n242.3 \n101.3 \n26.2 \n116.2 \n614.3 \n Aug \n18.7 \n113.1 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n131.8 \n248.8 \n104.7 \n27.5 \n118.2 \n630.9 \n Sep \n18.6 \n131.9 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n150.5 \n248.8 \n105.6 \n29.2 \n118.9 \n653.0 \n Oct \n20.1 \n123.0 \n0.0 \n1.0 \n144.0 \n266.6 \n116.7 \n28.9 \n118.9 \n675.1 \n Nov \n22.5 \n125.0 \n0.0 \n1.0 \n148.6 \n277.2 \n117.8 \n33.4 \n117.4 \n694.3 \n Dec \n29.2 \n133.2 \n0.0 \n1.0 \n163.4 \n278.1 \n118.3 \n30.2 \n126.9 \n716.9 \n Feb \n20.2 \n164.3 \n0.0 \n0.0 \n84.5 \n291.8 \n117.9 \n35.3 \n121.4 \n734.2 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Jan \n20.4 \n125.5 \n0.2 \n0.0 \n146.1 \n283.2 \n118.5 \n36.1 \n121.4 \n705.3 \n Mar \n18.8 \n129.1 \n0.2 \n20.0 \n168.1 \n291.4 \n116.9 \n39.5 \n121.4 \n737.3 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Apr \n16.9 \n159.8 \n0.2 \n20.2 \n197.2 \n294.8 \n115.5 \n39.5 \n122.1 \n769.1 \n May \n30.2 \n179.6 \n0.2 \n20.3 \n230.0 \n307.3 \n120.3 \n40.4 \n121.9 \n820.0 \n Jun \n28.6 \n178.8 \n0.0 \n20.0 \n227.3 \n314.2 \n122.4 \n44.6 \n121.8 \n830.3 \n Jul \n26.1 \n207.4 \n0.0 \n20.0 \n253.5 \n312.4 \n123.1 \n48.6 \n121.6 \n859.2 \n31 \nTABLE 9.2 : BUILDING SOCIETIES - LIABILITIES \nUS$ Millions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nOf which \n \nDeposits \nCapital \nOther \nTotal \nLiabilities to the \n \n \n \n \nand \nLiabilities \n Liabilities \nPublic \nEnd of \nSavings and \nShort-term \nLong-term \nTotal \nReserves \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Deposits \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2011 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Jan \n72.6 \n70.1 \n142.8 \n105.8 \n34.6 \n283.1 \n142.8 \n Feb \n78.8 \n76.2 \n155.0 \n107.6 \n36.1 \n298.7 \n155.0 \n Mar \n87.0 \n83.0 \n170.1 \n108.6 \n11.8 \n318.7 \n170.1 \n Apr \n90.1 \n85.0 \n175.1 \n110.6 \n16.4 \n332.1 \n175.1 \n May \n95.5 \n102.5 \n197.9 \n112.7 \n21.6 \n364.9 \n197.9 \n Jun \n124.6 \n77.4 \n202.0 \n116.7 \n50.6 \n369.4 \n202.0 \n Jul \n146.7 \n68.1 \n214.8 \n119.0 \n70.0 \n403.9 \n214.8 \n Aug \n149.9 \n80.6 \n230.6 \n122.0 \n67.7 \n420.3 \n230.6 \n Sep \n149.4 \n93.2 \n242.6 \n123.1 \n77.5 \n443.3 \n242.6 \n Oct \n154.3 \n93.0 \n247.3 \n125.8 \n13.7 \n453.8 \n247.3 \n Nov \n158.3 \n123.9 \n282.4 \n129.0 \n89.2 \n500.6 \n282.4 \n Dec \n186.4 \n100.7 \n287.0 \n121.3 \n96.7 \n505.1 \n287.0 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Jan \n201.3 \n94.2 \n295.5 \n127.3 \n95.7 \n518.5 \n295.5 \n Feb \n209.9 \n115.3 \n325.2 \n129.9 \n96.7 \n551.8 \n325.2 \n Mar \n182.1 \n152.2 \n334.3 \n129.6 \n76.7 \n540.7 \n334.3 \n Apr \n205.3 \n126.2 \n331.5 \n131.9 \n90.5 \n554.0 \n331.5 \n May \n242.1 \n93.4 \n335.5 \n136.3 \n70.4 \n564.0 \n335.5 \n Jun \n260.1 \n109.7 \n369.7 \n141.8 \n82.7 \n594.3 \n369.7 \n Jul \n233.2 \n156.1 \n389.3 \n145.7 \n79.3 \n614.3 \n389.3 \n Aug \n231.0 \n170.1 \n401.2 \n150.0 \n79..8 \n630.9 \n401.2 \n Sep \n247.3 \n172.8 \n420.0 \n153.1 \n80.0 \n653.0 \n420.0 \n Oct \n263.2 \n165.4 \n428.6 \n159.8 \n27.5 \n675.1 \n428.6 \n Nov \n246.8 \n179.5 \n426.3 \n165.5 \n28.2 \n694.3 \n426.3 \n Dec \n255.8 \n184.6 \n440.3 \n177.8 \n28.1 \n716.9 \n440.3 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Jan \n230.0 \n192.8 \n422.8 \n180.3 \n102.3 \n705.3 \n422.8 \n Feb \n255.7 \n194.2 \n449.9 \n183.7 \n100.6 \n734.2 \n449.9 \n Mar \n250.6 \n203.9 \n454.5 \n187.2 \n95.7 \n737.3 \n454.5 \n Apr \n252.9 \n226.6 \n479.5 \n190.6 \n22.3 \n769.3 \n479.5 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n May \n315.3 \n212.0 \n527.4 \n193.3 \n23.4 \n820.0 \n527.4 \n Jun \n309.0 \n222.6 \n531.6 \n198.3 \n100.4 \n830.3 \n531.6 \n Jul \n339.1 \n222.8 \n561.9 \n202.0 \n95.3 \n859.2 \n561.9 \n32 \nTable 10: ZIMBABWE STOCK MARKET STATISTICS \n \n \n \n \n \nIndices \nUS$ Millions \n \nIndustrial \nMining \nMarket Capitalisation \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n138.52 \n79.09 \n3,422.20 \nFeb \n146.03 \n95.39 \n3,696.60 \nMar \n136.76 \n85.01 \n3,458.10 \nApr \n129.55 \n97.15 \n3,303.40 \nMay \n132.03 \n83.73 \n3,351.20 \nJun \n131.96 \n75.70 \n3,341.46 \nJul \n132.92 \n112.12 \n3,445.93 \nAug \n132.27 \n89.04 \n3,434.00 \nSep \n146.00 \n96.00 \n3,822.80 \nOct \n154.47 \n93.66 \n4,033,76 \nNov \n150.16 \n68.74 \n3,890.9 \nDec \n152.40 \n65.12 \n3,963.50 \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJan \n179.34 \n84.07 \n4,700.33 \nFeb \n182.3 \n72.01 \n4,748.24 \nMar \n183.88 \n66.21 \n4,726.34 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) \n \nApr \n189.66 \n71.98 \n4,894.68 \nMay \n212.72 \n73.99 \n5,471.22 \nJun \n211.19 \n73.29 \n5,436.57 \nJul \n232.87 \n66.77 \n5,9136.78 \n33 \nTABLE 11 : SAVINGS /1 WITH FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ Millions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCommercial \nMerchant \n \nBuilding \n \nEnd of \nBanks \nBanks \nOther/2 \nSocieties \nTOTAL \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJanuary \n910.3 \n110.9 \n52.3 \n295.5 \n1,369.0 \nFebruary \n943.2 \n123.2 \n57.0 \n325.2 \n1,448.6 \nMarch \n1,022.3 \n178.3 \n56.0 \n334.3 \n1,590.9 \nApril \n1,072.5 \n160.3 \n54.2 \n331.5 \n1,618.5 \nMay \n1,264.8 \n169.0 \n55.4 \n335.5 \n1,824.7 \nJune \n1,291.1 \n124.9 \n58.3 \n369.7 \n1,844.0 \nJuly \n1,374.2 \n105.6 \n61.4 \n389.3 \n1,930.5 \nAugust \n1,304.5 \n107.1 \n59.3 \n401.2 \n1,872.1 \nSeptember \n1,373.0 \n116.8 \n60.1 \n420.0 \n1,969.9 \nOctober \n1,425.3 \n96.4 \n61.8 \n428.6 \n2,012.1 \nNovember \n1,646.2 \n115.7 \n67.2 \n426.3 \n2,255.4 \nDecember \n1,429.8 \n112.1 \n63.9 \n440.3 \n2,046.1 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJanuary \n1,418.5 \n113.0 \n64.3 \n422.8 \n2,018.6 \nFebruary \n1,424.8 \n121.7 \n64.7 \n449.9 \n2,061.1 \nMarch \n1,427.3 \n115.2 \n66.7 \n454.5 \n2,063.6 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1/ Comprises all deposits other than demand deposits. \n2/ Includes People’s Own Savings Bank (POSB). \n \n \nApril \n1,425.8 \n121.0 \n63.9 \n479.5 \n2,090.1 \nMay \n1,393.0 \n121.5 \n66.2 \n527.4 \n2,108.0 \nJune \n1,218.4 \n108.6 \n70.6 \n531.6 \n1,929.2 \nJuly \n1,162.1 \n109.7 \n70.8 \n561.9 \n1,904.5 \n34 \nTABLE 12 : ANALYSIS OF LIQUID ASSETS OF MONETARY BANKS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$ Millions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCommercial Banks \nAccepting Houses \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nLiquid \nPrescribed \nExcess \nLiquid \nPrescribed \nExcess \n \nassets \nliquid \nliquid \nassets \nliquid \nLiquid \nEnd of \nheld \nassets/1 \nassets \nheld \nassets/1 \nassets \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJanuary \n1,097.0 \n685.2 \n411.8 \n75.1 \n62.2 \n12.9 \nFebruary \n1,278.7 \n731.5 \n548.2 \n44.8 \n64.4 \n-19.6 \nMarch \n1,273.6 \n741.8 \n531.8 \n95.1 \n62.3 \n32.8 \nApril \n1,308.5 \n751.3 \n557.2 \n72.3 \n62.6 \n9.8 \nMay \n1,307.6 \n787.7 \n519.9 \n51.0 \n63.6 \n-12.6 \nJune \n1,287.5 \n795.1 \n492.4 \n44.9 \n65.4 \n-20.5 \nJuly \n1,258.2 \n833.0 \n425.2 \n37.9 \n54.1 \n-16.2 \nAug \n1,168.8 \n805.9 \n362.9 \n39.2 \n53.5 \n-14.4 \nSeptember \n1,151.3 \n833.9 \n317.4 \n40.9 \n54.8 \n-13.9 \nOctober \n1,200.1 \n855.7 \n344.4 \n36.9 \n54.8 \n-17.9 \nNovember \n1,306.0 \n885.5 \n420.5 \n37.3 \n55.2 \n-18.0 \nDecember \n1,300.4 \n880.1 \n420.3 \n34.4 \n55.1 \n-20.6 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJanuary \n1,235.5 \n862.7 \n372.8 \n36.2 \n55.0 \n-18.8 \nFebruary \n1,244.9 \n854.5 \n390.4 \n26.9 \n56.1 \n-29.2 \nMarch \n1,277.6 \n846.8 \n430.8 \n8.9 \n54.9 \n-46.0 \nApril \n1,491.7 \n875.1 \n616.6 \n23.4 \n57.1 \n-33.6 \nMay \n1,480.8 \n864.7 \n616.1 \n27.3 \n58.4 \n-31.1 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1/ With effect from 1 August 2010, the prescribed liquid asset ratio was reviewed from 10% to 20% of liabilities to the public. \nJune \n1,425.8 \n808.1 \n617.7 \n24.1 \n55.8 \n-31.7 \nJuly \n1,429.9 \n804.1 \n625.9 \n11.6 \n55.2 \n-43.6 \n35 \nTABLE 13 : ZETSS, CHEQUES AND CARDS ACTIVITY. \nUS$ Millions \nMONTH \nZETSS VALUES \nCHEQUE VALUES \nCARD VALUES \nMOBILE & INTERNET \n \n \n \n \n \n2012 \n \n \n \n \nJan \n2,439.7 \n5.3 \n137.2 \n60.8 \nFeb \n2,920.1 \n6.1 \n137.1 \n77.2 \nMar \n3,242.8 \n6.8 \n156.4 \n104.1 \nApr \n2,948.5 \n5.5 \n160.5 \n68.6 \nMay \n3,237.4 \n5.0 \n189.6 \n82.0 \nJun \n3,407.3 \n6.5 \n177.7 \n93.5 \nJul \n3,321.0 \n6.7 \n169.1 \n135.6 \nAug \n3,417.3 \n6.1 \n218.4 \n98.3 \nSep \n3,043.2 \n5.6 \n235.5 \n149.2 \nOct \n3,630.7 \n6.6 \n232.9 \n196.9 \nNov \n3,526.0 \n5.9 \n240.8 \n197.3 \nDec \n3,584.7 \n5.0 \n308.9 \n220.3 \nAnnual Total \n38,718.7 \n71.1 \n2,364.1 \n1,483.8 \nFeb \n2,968.0 \n5.5 \n260.5 \n199.3 \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n \n \n \n \nJan \n3,563.8 \n5.2 \n254.4 \n205.2 \nMar \n3,340.0 \n15.2 \n312.4 \n220.6 \n \n \n \n \n \nApr \n3,535.6 \n16.6 \n328.2 \n283.6 \nMay \n3,915.3 \n15.4 \n332.6 \n364.0 \nJun \n3,544.3 \n5.9 \n298.4 \n266.7 \nJul \n3,955.5 \n12.3 \n334.0 \n303.2", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/MPC_Statements/July2013.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "92ab5997737c7dd628eeea9e2534540e", "text": "QUARTERLY \nECONOMIC \nREVIEW \n \n \n \nSEPTEMBER 2022 \n \n \n \n \n2 \nCONTENTS \n1. OVERVIEW ....................................................................................................... 5 \n2. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS ................................ 6 \n3. DOMESTIC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS ...........................................12 \n4. MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS .................................................................18 \n5. STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS ........................................................20 \n6. PAYMENT, CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES ................21 \n7. FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS ..........................................................................24 \n \n \n \n \n3 \nList of Figures \nFigure 1: Precious Mineral Prices (US$/ounce) ............................................................................. 8 \nFigure 2: Base Metal Prices (US$/tonne) ....................................................................................... 8 \nFigure 3: Brent Crude Oil Prices (US$/barrel) ............................................................................... 9 \nFigure 4: Quarterly Merchandise Total Trade (US$ m) ................................................................. 9 \nFigure 5: Zimbabwe’s major export destinations, 2022Q2 .......................................................... 10 \nFigure 6: Quarterly Merchandise Imports (US$m) ....................................................................... 10 \nFigure 7: Major Merchandise Import Sources (% Share) ............................................................. 11 \nFigure 8: Merchandise Trade Balance (US$ m) ............................................... 11 \nFigure 9: Exchange Rate Developments: January 2021 to June 2022 .......................................... 12 \nFigure 10: Quarterly Fresh Milk Output (litres) ........................................................................... 14 \nFigure 11: Quarterly Developments in Gold Output .................................................................... 15 \nFigure 12: Quarterly Trends in Platinum Output (kg) .................................................................. 15 \nFigure 13: Quarterly Trends in Palladium Output (kg) ................................................................ 15 \nFigure 14: Quarterly trends in Nickel Output ............................................................................... 16 \nFigure 15: Quarterly trends in Chrome Ore Output ...................................................................... 16 \nFigure 16: Quarterly Trends in Coal Output ................................................................................. 16 \nFigure 17: Quarterly Power Output by IPPs. ................................................................................ 17 \nFigure 18: Quarterly Inflation Profile (%) .................................................................................... 18 \nFigure 19: Monthly Inflation Profile (%)...................................................................................... 18 \nFigure 20: Broad Money Developments ....................................................................................... 19 \nFigure 21: Distribution of Private Sector Credit ........................................................................... 19 \nFigure 22: ZSE All Share and Top 10 and Mining Indices .......................................................... 20 \nFigure 23: Market Capitalization .................................................................................................. 21 \nFigure 24: ZSE Market Turnover ................................................................................................. 21 \nFigure 25: Values and Volumes of RTGS Transactions ............................................................... 22 \nFigure 26: Retail Transaction Values ........................................................................................... 23 \nFigure 27: Retail Transaction Volumes ........................................................................................ 23 \nFigure 28: Collateral: January 2021 to June 2022 ........................................................................ 23 \nFigure 29: Government Tax Revenue Structure ........................................................................... 25 \nFigure 30: Composition of Government Expenditure (%): Q3 2022 ........................................... 25 \nFigure 31: Budget balance (ZW$ billion) ..................................................................................... 26 \n \n \n4 \nList of Tables \n \nTable 1: World Economic Growth Rates ........................................................................................ 6 \nTable 2: International Commodity Prices: July -Sept 2022 ............................................................ 7 \nTable 3: Quarterly Merchandise Exports (US$ m) ....................................................................... 10 \nTable 4: Quarterly Merchandise Imports (US$ m) ....................................................................... 11 \nTable 5: Cumulative Tobacco Sales in 2021 and 2022 ................................................................ 13 \nTable 6: Cattle Slaughters ............................................................................................................. 13 \nTable 7: Quarterly Pig Slaughters ................................................................................................. 14 \nTable 8: Quarterly Mineral Output Statistics ................................................................................ 14 \nTable 9: Quarterly Power Output .................................................................................................. 17 \nTable 10: Key Stock Market Indicators ........................................................................................ 20 \nTable 11: Consolidated Transactional Activities .......................................................................... 22 \nTable 12: Payment Systems Access Points and Devices .............................................................. 24 \nTable 13: Summary of Second and Third Quarter 2022 Fiscal Position (ZW$ million) .............. 24 \nTable 14: Summarized Government Spending (ZW$ million)..................................................... 25 \n1. \nOVERVIEW \n \n \nDuring the third quarter of 2022, the global \neconomy was characterised by heightened \ninflationary pressures, tightening global financial \nconditions, geo-political tensions emanating \nfrom the Russia-Ukraine crisis and lingering \nCovid-19 related uncertainties. Resultantly, \nprospects for global economic growth in the short \nto medium term remain subdued, with real GDP \ngrowth of 3.2% expected in 2022 and 2.7% in \n2023. \nOn the domestic front, significant gains were \nmade in reigning-in inflation during the quarter \nunder review as monthly inflation fell from a \npeak of 30.7% in June 2022 to 3.47% in \nSeptember 2022. The successful disinflation \nderives from the Bank’s tight monetary policy \nstance, coupled with the value for money \nprinciple adopted by government, to curb \nspeculative pricing by its suppliers of goods and \nservices. \n \nThe quarter under review saw total merchandise \ntrade increase by 3.8% to US$3,845.4 million, \nfrom US$3,706.0 million recorded in the \ncomparable quarter in 2021. On a quarter-on-\nquarter basis, total merchandise trade grew by \n2.8%, from US$3,742.2 million in the preceding \nquarter. The increase in total merchandise trade \nwas on account of a significant rise in imports. \n \nBroad money stock stood at ZW$1 917.15 billion \nin September 2022, up from ZW$1 119.70 billion \nin June 2022. This was driven by valuation \neffects on foreign currency deposits, on account \nof nominal exchange rate depreciation. The local \ncurrency eased against the US dollar, from \nZW$370.96 per US$1 in June 2022 to \nZW$621.89 per US$1 in September 2022. \nOn the capital market, the Zimbabwe Stock \nExchange was characterised by negative trading, \nduring the quarter under review. As a result, all \nthe major indices declined, with the All Share, \nTop 10, Top 15, Medium Cap and Small Cap \nIndices shedding 25.37%, 25.53%, 26.75%, \n26.69% and 5.84% to close at 14 771.65 points, \n9 140.55 points, 10 051.47 points, 29 051.67 \npoints and 483 615.64 points, respectively. \n \nThe country’s National Payment Systems (NPS) \nwere buoyant, with the value of transactions \nprocessed through them increasing by 78% to \nZW$10.43 trillion, from ZW$5.86 trillion \nrecorded in the previous quarter. NPS transaction \nvolumes, however, decreased by 2% to 287.80 \nmillion, during the third quarter of 2022 from \n293.93 million in the second quarter. \n \nGovernment revenue inflows amounted to \nZW$652.76 billion, during the quarter under \nreview against expenditures of ZW$657.38 \nbillion, culminating in a budget deficit of \nZW$4.62 billion. The budget deficit was largely \nfinanced from domestic sources. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n6 \n \n2. \nINTERNATIONAL \nECONOMIC \nDEVELOPMENTS \nThe global economy continued to be adversely \naffected \nby \nelevated \ninflation \npressures, \ntightening global financial conditions, associated \nwith expectations of interest rate hikes by major \ncentral banks, and the negative spill-over effects \nfrom the Russia-Ukraine crisis. Furthermore, \nlingering waves of the Covid-19 pandemic \ncontinued to disrupt economic activity in most \nregions, \nduring \nthe \nquarter \nending \n30th \nSeptember 2022. \nTable 1 summarizes global economic growth \ndevelopments and prospects for selected regions \nand countries. \nTable 1: World Economic Growth Rates \n (2021 -2023) \nCountry/Group \n2021 \n2022 \n2023 \n \nEst (%) \nProj (%) \nWorld Output \n6.1 \n3.2 \n2.7 \nAdvanced Economies \n5.2 \n2.4 \n1.1 \no/w: United States \n5.7 \n1.6 \n1.0 \n Euro-Area \n5.2 \n3.1 \n0.5 \nEmerging Market & \nDeveloping Economies \n6.6 \n3.7 \n3.7 \no/w: China \n8.1 \n3.2 \n4.4 \n India \n8.7 \n6.8 \n6.1 \nSub Saharan Africa \n4.7 \n3.6 \n3.7 \no/w: Nigeria \n3.6 \n3.2 \n3 \n South Africa \n4.9 \n2.1 \n1.1 \nSources: IMF World Economic Outlook Update (October 2022) \nThe \nInternational \nMonetary \nFund \n(IMF) \nprojected global economic activity to slow down \nto 3.2 % in 2022, from 6.0% in 2021. Global \neconomic growth was projected to moderate \nfurther to 2.7% in 2023, marking the weakest \ngrowth profile since 2001, except for the 2009 \nglobal financial crisis and the acute phase of the \nCovid-19 pandemic. \nGrowth in advanced economies is projected to \ndecelerate from 5.2% in 2021 to 2.4% and 1.1% \nin 2022 and 2023 respectively, on account of \ncontractions in the US and European economies. \nGrowth in the United States is projected to \ndecline from 5.7% in 2021 to 1.6% and 1.0% in \n2022 and 2023, respectively. \nIn emerging market and developing economies, \ngrowth is projected at 3.7% for both 2022 and \n2023. The projected slowdown in China’s GDP \ngrowth in 2022 is attributed to Covid-19 \noutbreaks and lockdowns, as well as the \nworsening property market crisis. \nIn emerging and developing Europe, growth is \nprojected to be stagnant in 2022 and expected to \nrise marginally to 0.6% in 2023. The weak \neconomic performance in the region is largely \nattributable to the expected 3.4% contraction in \nthe Russian economy in 2022 and 2.3% in 2023, \ndue to disturbances emanating from its war with \nUkraine. The contraction in the Russian \neconomy, however, is expected to be moderated \nby the resilience of its crude oil exports and \nstrong domestic demand. \nThe growth outlook for the Sub-Saharan Africa \ngroup is slightly weaker than what was forecast \nin July 2022, with a decline from 4.7% in 2021 \nto 3.6% and 3.7% in 2022 and 2023, respectively. \nThe projected weaker outlook reflects lower real \nGDP growth in trading partner economies, tight \n7 \n \nfinancial and monetary conditions, and a \nnegative shift in commodity terms of trade. \nNotably, the region’s biggest economies of \nNigeria and South Africa are projected to grow \nby 3.2% and 2.1%, respectively, in 2022. \nRisks to the global economic outlook continue to \nbe elevated as the world grapples with the \nadverse impact of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, a \nslowdown in global economic activity and \nlingering effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. \nINTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICE \nDEVELOPMENTS \nOn the global markets, prices for selected \nprecious metals, base metals, and crude oil, \nsharply declined on account of a stronger US \ndollar. The US dollar strengthened due to the US \nFederal Reserve’s hawkish monetary policy \nstance. The developments in selected commodity \nprices for the third quarter of 2022 are as shown \nin Table 2. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nTable 2: International Commodity Prices: \nJuly -Sept 2022 \n Source: World Bank and Bloomberg, 2022 \n \nPrecious Metals \nGold prices suffered heavy losses during the third \nquarter of 2022, as geopolitical instability and \nsoaring global inflation were overshadowed by a \nstronger US dollar and the hawkish tone from the \nUS Federal Reserve. Prices retreated from an \naverage of US$1,873.37 per ounce in the second \nquarter of 2022 to US$1,728.00 per ounce, during \nthe quarter under analysis. \nPlatinum prices were largely subdued on the back of \nthe strengthening US dollar, which dampened the \ninvestment demand outlook for the metal. The US \ndollar continued to be boosted by investor \nexpectations of further interest rate hikes by major \nCentral Banks as they battle to tame inflation. \nFurthermore, the slowdown in global demand from \nthe automotive industries, particularly in China, also \nexerted downward pressure on prices of the metal. \n \nGold \nPlatinum \nCopper \nNickel \nBrent Crude \nOil \n \nUS$/oz \nUS$/oz \nUS$/tonn\ne \nUS$/tonne \nUS$/Barrel \n2022 \nQ2 \nAverage \n1,873.37 \n959.85 \n9,547.74 \n28,952.58 \n111.26 \nJuly-22 \n1,737.61 \n870.69 \n7,558.84 \n21,483.81 \n104.58 \nAug-22 \n1,764.14 \n910.09 \n7,989.81 \n22,036.59 \n97.56 \nSept-22 \n1,682.24 \n881.25 \n7,747.38 \n22,773.61 \n90.73 \n2022 \nQ3 \nAverage \n1,728.00 \n887.34 \n7,765.34 \n22,098.00 \n97.62 \n2022 Q21- \n2022Q3 \nChanges \n(%) \n-7.8 \n-7.6 \n-18.7 \n-23.7 \n-12.3 \n8 \n \nPalladium prices also marginally declined on \naccount of a stronger US dollar, coupled with \ninvestor concerns over slackening demand in \nChina, owing to stringent Covid-19 lockdowns. \nThe decline was, however, moderated by \ndwindling stockpiles in major source markets. \nPrices eased by 0.8%, from an average of \nUS$2,096.44 per ounce in the second quarter of \n2022 to US$2,079.06 per ounce, during the \nreporting quarter. \nThe developments in precious metal prices for \nthe period from January 2021 to September 2022 \nare as shown in Figure 1. \nFigure \n1: \nPrecious \nMineral \nPrices \n(US$/ounce) \n \nSource: Bloomberg, 2022 \nBase Metals \nCopper prices retreated further, shedding 18.7%, \nfrom US$9,547.74 per tonne in the second \nquarter of 2022 to US$7,765.34 per tonne in the \nthird quarter. Prices declined due to the \nstrengthening US dollar as well as signs of \nslowing demand in China. \n \nNickel prices declined by 23.7% during the \nquarter ending September 2022, from an average \nof US$28,952.58 per tonne in the second quarter \nof 2022 to US$ 22,098.00 per ounce. Prices were \nadversely affected by a stronger US dollar, \ncoupled \nwith \nweak \ndemand \nin \nChina. \nDevelopments in copper and nickel prices are as \nshown in Figure 2. \n \nFigure 2: Base Metal Prices (US$/tonne) \n \nSource: Bloomberg, 2022 \n \nBrent Crude Oil \nBrent crude oil prices reversed gains recorded in \nthe second quarter of 2022 as concerns about \nsluggish global demand, rising stockpiles as well \nas interest rate hikes by major central banks \nimpacted negatively on prices. These factors \njointly dampened the demand outlook for the \ncommodity. Prices registered a 12.3%, decline \nfrom a quarterly average of US$111.26 per barrel \nin the second quarter of 2022, to close the quarter \nunder review at an average of US$97.62 per \nbarrel. \n \n700\n800\n900\n1,000\n1,100\n1,200\n1,300\n1,100\n1,500\n1,900\n2,300\n2,700\n3,100\nJan-21\nMar-21\nMay-21\nJul-21\nSep-21\nNov-21\nJan-22\nMar-22\nMay-22\nJul-22\nSep-22\nGold\nPalladium\nPlatinum (RHS)\n15,000\n20,000\n25,000\n30,000\n35,000\n40,000\n7,500\n8,000\n8,500\n9,000\n9,500\n10,000\n10,500\nMar-21\nMay-21\nJul-21\nSep-21\nNov-21\nJan-22\nMar-22\nMay-22\nJul-22\nSep-22\nCopper\nNickel (RHS)\n9 \n \nFigure 3: Brent Crude Oil Prices (US$/barrel) \n \nSource: Bloomberg, 2022 \n \nMERCHANDISE TRADE \nDEVELOPMENTS \nTotal merchandise trade stood at US$3,845.4 \nmillion in the third quarter of 2022, a 3.8% \nincrease from US$3,706.0 million recorded in \nthe comparable quarter in 2021. Compared to the \npreceding quarter, total merchandise trade grew \nby 2.8%, from US$3,742.2 million. The increase \nwas on the back of the substantial growth in \nimports, during the quarter under review. \n \nFigure 4 shows total merchandise trade \ndevelopments during the second quarter of 2022 \nand the third quarters of 2021 and 2022. \n \nFigure 4: Quarterly Merchandise Total Trade \n(US$ m) \n \nSource: Zimstat, 2022 \n \nMerchandise Export Developments \nDuring the third quarter of 2022, the country \nexported merchandise to the tune of US$1,594.3 \nmillion, a 2.9% decline from US$1,641.4 million \nrecorded in the comparable quarter in 2021. This \noutturn was also 8.5% lower, compared to \nUS$1,741.6 million realized in the second \nquarter of 2022, as shown in Figure 5. \nThe decline in export earnings was mainly \nattributed to the tapering prices for gold, chrome, \nand the platinum group of metals (PGMs). \nPrecious metals were negatively affected by the \nstrengthening of the US dollar, accentuated by \nthe hawkish tone from the US Federal Reserve. \nIn addition, the slowdown in economic activity \nand resurgence of Covid-19 infections with \nattendant stringent lockdown measures in China, \ndampened demand prospects for industrial \nmetals. \nThe country’s export basket in the third quarter \nof 2022 was dominated by primary commodities, \nwith gold, PGMs and tobacco exports, jointly \naccounting for 78.6% of total exports, as shown \nin Table 3. \n50.00\n60.00\n70.00\n80.00\n90.00\n100.00\n110.00\n120.00\n130.00\nJan-21\nMar-21\nMay-21\nJul-21\nSep-21\nNov-21\nJan-22\nMar-22\nMay-22\nJul-22\nSep-22\n3,706.0 \n3,742.2 \n3,845.4 \n -\n 500.0\n 1,000.0\n 1,500.0\n 2,000.0\n 2,500.0\n 3,000.0\n 3,500.0\n 4,000.0\n 4,500.0\n2021Q3\n2022Q2\n2022Q3\n10 \n \nTable 3: Quarterly Merchandise Exports (US$ m) \n \n2022Q2 \n \n2022Q3 \n \n2021Q2-\n2022Q3 \nChanges \n(%) \nShare of \nExports \n(%) 2022 \nQ3 \nTotal Exports \n1,641.4 1,594.3 \n-2.9 \n100.0 \nOf Which: \nGold \n495.0 \n534.2 \n7.9 \n33.5 \nPGMs \n710.2 \n539.8 \n-24.0 \n33.9 \nTobacco (inc. \ncigarettes) \n127.9 \n179.2 \n40.1 \n11.2 \nFerrochromium \n97.2 \n108.5 \n11.7 \n6.8 \nCoal \n33.3 \n38.5 \n15.7 \n2.4 \nOther mineral \nsubstances \n4.2 \n30.9 \n632.5 \n1.9 \nIndustrial \ndiamonds \n37.2 \n18.3 \n-50.8 \n1.1 \nCane sugar \n5.6 \n13.0 \n132.2 \n0.8 \nGranite \n5.6 \n11.2 \n99.3 \n0.7 \nGinned cotton \n0.4 \n7.5 \n1,998.8 \n0.5 \nSource: Zimstat & RBZ Calculations 2022 \nMajor Merchandise Export Destinations \nThe country’s exports for the quarter under \nreview were mainly destined for South Africa \n(40.1%), the United Arab Emirates (34.2%) and \nother jurisdictions, as shown in Figure 5. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFigure \n5: \nZimbabwe’s \nmajor \nexport \ndestinations (Q3 2022) \n \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Computations \n \nMerchandise Import Developments \n \nThe country’s import bill grew to US$2,251.1 \nmillion during the third quarter of 2022, an \nincrease of about 14.6% from US$1,964.4 \nmillion, recorded in the corresponding quarter in \n2021. Compared to the second quarter of 2022, \nimports for the reporting quarter were 7.2% \nhigher. Figure 6 depicts developments on \nquarterly merchandise imports. \n \nFigure 6: Quarterly Merchandise Imports \n(US$m) \n \nSource: Zimstat, 2022 \n40.1\n34.2\n4.5\n5.9\n4.1\n1.9\n0.9\n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\n50.0\nSouth Africa\nUnited Arab Emirates\nBelgium\nChina\nMozambique\nZambia\nItaly\n1,964.4\n2,100.9\n2,251.1\n2021Q3\n2022Q2\n2022Q3\n11 \n \nThe country’s import basket was largely \ndominated by fuel, food, and electricity imports, \nas shown in Table 4. \n \nTable 4: Quarterly Merchandise Imports \n(US$ m) \n \n2022Q2 \n2022Q3 \nChanges \n(%) \nShare \nof \nImports \n(%) \nQ3 \n2022 \nTotal Imports \n2,100.9 \n2,251.1 \n7.2 \n100.0 \nOf Which: \n \n \n \n \nDiesel \n224.4 \n205.6 \n-8.4 \n9.1 \nUnleaded petrol \n96.0 \n99.7 \n3.8 \n4.4 \nCrude soya bean \noil \n80.3 \n75.0 \n-6.5 \n3.3 \nElectricity \n42.4 \n54.5 \n28.3 \n2.4 \nRice \n36.9 \n40.1 \n8.7 \n1.8 \nChemicals \n22.1 \n29.0 \n31.0 \n1.3 \nWheat \n29.8 \n27.8 \n-7.0 \n1.2 \nMedicaments \n15.8 \n27.0 \n71.0 \n1.2 \nJet A1 Fuel \n16.3 \n18.0 \n10.0 \n0.8 \nLPG Gas \n18.1 \n17.9 \n-0.8 \n0.8 \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Computations 2022 \nMajor Import Sources \nThe country’s imports for the third quarter of \n2022 were mainly sourced from South Africa \n(37.7%), China (14.0%), Singapore (13.6%), \nMozambique, 3.8%, Zambia, 3.6% and other \nmarkets, as shown in Figure 7. \n \n \n \n \n \nFigure 7: Major Merchandise Import Sources \n(% Share) \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT & RBZ Computations 2022 \nTRADE BALANCE \nThe country’s trade balance widened from a \ndeficit of US$459.5 million in the second quarter \nof 2022, to a deficit of US$656.8 million in the \nthird quarter, as shown in Figure 8. \nFigure \n8: \nMerchandise \nTrade \nBalance \n(US$ m) \nSource: Zimstat & RBZ Computations-2022 \n37.7\n14.0\n13.6\n3.3\n3.6\n3.8\n2.3\n3.4\n1.4\n1.2\n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\nSouth Africa\nChina\nSingapore\nUnited Arab Emirates\nZambia\nMozambique\nMauritius\nIndia\nArgentina\nBelarus\n-1000\n-500\n0\n500\n1000\n1500\n2000\n2500\n2021Q3\n2022Q2\n2022Q3\nExports\nImports\nTrade Balance\n12 \n \nOn a year-on-year basis, the country’s trade \nbalance worsened from a deficit of US$222.8 \nmillion in the comparable quarter in 2021 to a \ndeficit of US$656.8 million in the reporting \nquarter \nEXCHANGE RATE DEVELOPMENTS \nThe end period interbank exchange rate \ndepreciated by about 68.0% against the US \ndollar, from ZW$370.96 per US$1 in the second \nquarter of 2022 to ZW$621.89 per US$1 in the \nthird quarter. However, parallel market exchange \nrates were largely stable during the third quarter \nof 2022, following the implementation of tight \nmonetary policy measures by the Bank, coupled \nwith the implementation of the value for money \nprinciple by Government. \nForeign exchange rate premiums significantly \ndeclined, from elevated levels of above 140% in \nthe second quarter of 2022, to levels of between \n5% and 15% in the reporting quarter. The \nstability of the parallel market exchange rate has \ngone a long way in eliminating arbitrage \nopportunities, which were fuelling forward \npricing by economic agents and, hence \nfomenting adverse inflation expectations. Figure \n9 shows developments on the official and parallel \nmarket exchange rates and the premium. \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFigure 9: Exchange Rate Developments: \nJanuary 2021 to June 2022 \nSource: RBZ and Market Surveys \nOn the back of the tight monetary policy stance \npursued by the Bank, coupled with the value for \nmoney principle adopted by Government, the \nofficial and parallel market foreign exchange \nrates are expected to converge in the outlook \nperiod, thereby fostering price stability and \nanchoring inflation expectations. \n \n3. \nDOMESTIC \nECONOMIC \nDEVELOPMENTS \n \nREAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS \n \nAGRICULTURE \n \nCrops \nTobacco \nCumulative tobacco sales as at 30th September \n2022 stood at 208,279,247 kilograms sold at an \naverage price of US$3.06 per kilogram. This was \nslightly lower than 210,725,122 kilograms which \n0.0%\n50.0%\n100.0%\n150.0%\n200.0%\n250.0%\n300.0%\n350.0%\n0.00\n100.00\n200.00\n300.00\n400.00\n500.00\n600.00\n700.00\n800.00\n900.00\n2-Jan\n2-Mar\n2-May\n2-Jul\n2-Sep\n2-Nov\n2-Jan\n2-Mar\n2-May\n2-Jul\n2-Sep\nPREMIUM (%)\nOFFICIAL RATES\nPARALLEL RATES (Transfer)\n13 \n \nwere sold at an average price of US$2.79/kg by \nthe same time last year. The total value of the \ngolden leaf sold during the selling season stood \nat US$636.98 million, up from US$588.86 \nmillion realised in the same period in 2021. \n \nTable 5 summarises the tobacco sales statistics \nas at end of September 2022. \n \nTable 5: Cumulative Tobacco Sales in 2021 \nand 2022 \n2022 \n2021 \nVariance \n(%) \nTotal quantity \nsold (million \nkgs) \n208 \n211 \n-1.16 \nTotal value \n(US$ million) \n637 \n589 \n8.17 \nAverage price \n(US$)/kg \n3.06 \n2.79 \n9.44 \nSource: TIMB, 2022. \nWheat \nWheat production increased in 2022, with the \nestimated planted area rising to 80 883 hectares, \nfrom 66 976 hectares in the previous season. \nResultantly, wheat output is expected at around \n375 000 tonnes, a significant increase from \n337 212 tonnes produced in 2021. Wheat \nproduction benefited from adequate water \navailability as well as dedicated supply of \nelectricity for irrigation of the crop. \n \nCotton \nSeed cotton deliveries at the end of September \n2022 stood at 54 267 596.1 kilograms, up from \n29,085,589 kg delivered during the comparable \nquarter in 2021. The crop benefited from support \nthrough the Government funded free input \nscheme. \n \n \nLivestock \nThe increase in livestock slaughters in the third \nquarter of 2022 pointed to an improvement in the \nperformance of the livestock subsector in 2022. \n \nCattle \nDuring the third quarter of 2022, cattle slaughters \nin the formal sector stood at 90 820 head, up by \n14.32% from the 79 446 head slaughtered in the \nsame quarter in 2021. This was also 10.32% \nhigher than the 82 323 head slaughtered in the \nsecond quarter of 2022. \n \nThe higher output marked the progressive \nrecovery of the beef industry owing to increased \ndemand, better disease control, supported by \nready availability of feeds, grazing and water. \nTable 6 shows quarterly cattle slaughters in 2021 \nand 2022. \n \nTable 6: Cattle Slaughters \n \n2021 \n2022 \n% Change \nQ1 \n62 929 \n81 249 \n29.11 \nQ2 \n72 699 \n82 323 \n13.24 \nQ3 \n79 446 \n90 820 \n14.32 \nTotal \n215 074 \n254 392 \n18.28 \nSource: Ministry of Lands, Agriculture, Fisheries, Water, \nand Rural Development, 2022 \nPigs \nPig slaughters stood at 57 992 head in the third \nquarter of 2022, up from 50 434 head in the \ncomparable quarter in 2021 and 54 647 head in \nthe preceding quarter of 2022. Table 7 gives \nstatistical information on pig slaughters for the \nfirst, second and third quarters of 2021 and 2022. \n \n \n \n14 \n \nTable 7: Quarterly Pig Slaughters \n2021 \n2022 \n% Change \nQ1 \n45 246 \n55 440 \n22.53 \nQ2 \n47 325 \n54 647 \n15.47 \nQ3 \n50 434 \n57 992 \n14.99 \nTotal \n143 005 \n168 079 \n17.53 \nSource: Ministry of Lands, Agriculture, Fisheries, Water \nand Rural Development, 2022. \nDairy \nFresh milk output increased to 23.50 million \nlitres in the third quarter of 2022, from 20.81 \nmillion litres recorded in the same quarter in \n2021. Compared to the second quarter of 2022, \nmilk output in the third quarter was 6.9% higher. \nFigure 10 shows the trend in quarterly fresh milk \nproduction since 2020. \n \n Figure 10: Quarterly Fresh Milk Output \n(litres) \n \nSource: Ministry of Lands, Agriculture, Water and Rural \nDevelopment, 2022 \nThe progressive increase in milk output was \npartly attributed to the investment in herd size \nand \nequipment \nunder \nthe \nTranZ \nDVC \nprogramme as well as government support under \nthe Presidential silage programme. \n \n \n \n \nMINING \n \nThe mining sector registered strong growth \nduring the third quarter of 2022, largely on \naccount of key minerals including gold, PGMs, \ndiamond and nickel. The underperformance of \nchrome, however, weighed down mining sector \noutput, during the quarter under analysis, as \nshown in Table 8. \n \nTable 8: Quarterly Mineral Output Statistics \n \nQ3 \n2022 \nQ3 \n 2021 \nChange \n(%) \nGold (kg) \n10,222.9 \n9,422.7 \n8.49 \nPlatinum (kg) \n4,485.2 \n3,597.5 \n24.68 \nPalladium (kg) \n3,780.6 \n3,106.8 \n21.69 \nRhodium (kg) \n396.8 \n327.3 \n21.23 \nIridium (kg) \n168.7 \n143.1 \n17.89 \nRuthenium(kg) \n377.4 \n304.9 \n23.78 \nDiamonds (cts) \n1,329,806.7 \n1,243,079.7 \n6.98 \nChrome (MT) \n373,968.2 \n481,287.6 \n-22.30 \nNickel (MT) \n4,837.0 \n4,022.1 \n20.26 \nCopper (MT) \n3,056.7 \n2,196.5 \n39.16 \nCobalt (MT) \n52.8 \n88.5 \n-40.34 \nCoal (MT) \n1,018,507.0 \n1,153,391.2 \n-11.69 \nLithium (MT) \n35,866.0 \n3,521.0 \n918.63 \nPhosphate (T) \n6,956.0 \n12,087 \n-42.45 \nGranite (MT) \n121,351.7 \n49,996.9 \n142.72 \nSource: Ministry of Mines and Mining Development, 2022 \n \nGold \nGold output stood at 10 222.9 tonnes in the third \nquarter of 2022, surpassing the output in the \ncomparable quarter in 2021 by 8.5%. This was \nlargely driven by increased throughput from all \nplayers. \n \nGold largely benefitted from the incentive \nsystem introduced during the second quarter of \n2021, which spurred deliveries to Fidelity Gold \nRefiners (FGR), as well as investments in mine \ndevelopment, plant and machinery and new \nprojects. \n10\n12\n14\n16\n18\n20\n22\n24\n26\nQ1:2020\nQ2:2020\nQ3:2020\nQ4:2020\nQ1:2021\nQ2:2021\nQ3:2021\nQ4:2021\nQ1:2022\nQ2:2022\nQ3:2022\nMillions\n15 \n \nFigure 11 shows quarterly developments in gold \noutput by category. \n \nFigure 11: Quarterly Developments in Gold \nOutput \n \nSource: Ministry of Mines and Mining Development, 2022 \n \nPGMS \nDuring the quarter ended 30th September 2022, \nplatinum output stood at 4 485.2 kg, representing \na 24.7% increase compared to the same quarter \nin 2021. Similarly, palladium output at 3 780.6 \nwas 21.7% above the same quarter in 2021. \nFigure 12 and 13 shows the platinum and \npalladium production trends. \n \nFigure 12: Quarterly Trends in Platinum \nOutput (kg) \n \nSource: Ministry of Mines and Mining Development, 2022 \n \nFigure 13: Quarterly Trends in Palladium \nOutput (kg) \n \nSource: Ministry of Mines and Mining Development, 2022 \n \n \nNickel \nNickel output at 4 837 tonnes in the third quarter \nof 2022, surpassed output in both the comparable \nquarter and previous quarter by 20.3% and \n53.8%, respectively. Nickel production was, in \nlarge part, boosted by investments in the PGMs. \nTrends in nickel output during the reporting \nquarter are shown in Figure 14. \n \n0\n2,000\n4,000\n6,000\n8,000\n10,000\n12,000\nQ3 2021\nQ2 2022\nQ3 2022\nKg\nSecondary Producers (Kg)\nSmall Scale Producers (kg)\nLarge Scale Producers (kg)\n0\n500\n1000\n1500\n2000\n2500\n3000\n3500\n4000\n4500\n5000\nQ3 2021\nQ2 2022\nQ3 2022\nKg\n0\n500\n1000\n1500\n2000\n2500\n3000\n3500\n4000\nQ3 2021\nQ2 2022\nQ3 2022\nKg\n16 \n \nFigure 14: Quarterly trends in Nickel Output \n \nSource: Ministry of Mines and Mining Development, 2022 \n \nChrome \nChrome production was subdued during the third \nquarter of 2022, largely due to the Covid-19 \ninduced \neconomic \nslowdown \nin \nChina’s \nferrochrome industry, the major consumer of the \ncountry’s output. In addition, power outages also \nnegatively impacted the local smelting industry, \nreducing intake of ore from the mines. \nConsequently, chrome output in the third quarter \nof 2022 stood at 373 968.20 tonnes, 22.3%, lower \nthan in the comparable quarter in 2021, as shown \nin Figure 15. \n \nFigure 15: Quarterly trends in Chrome Ore \nOutput \n \nSource: Ministry of Mines and Mining Development, 2022 \nCoal \nCoal output stood at 1.018 million tonnes in the \nthird quarter of 2022, down by 11.7% from the \noutput in the comparable quarter in 2021. The \noutput in the quarter under review, however, \nsurpassed the output in the second quarter by \n12.4%. Figure 16 shows the quarterly coal \nproduction trends. \n \nFigure 16: Quarterly Trends in Coal Output \nSource: Ministry of Mines and Mining Development, 2022 \n \nCoal output was adversely affected by capital \nchallenges that resulted in some players failing to \nproduce for significant periods, during the third \nquarter of 2022. \n \nDiamond \nDiamond output amounted to 1.329 million \ncarats in the third quarter of 2022. This was 7% \nand 40% more than in the comparable quarter in \n2021 and the second quarter of 2022, \nrespectively. The ramping up of production \nacross the three key producers, due to increased \ninvestments in processing plant and machinery, \ndrove diamond output. \n \n \n0\n1000\n2000\n3000\n4000\n5000\n6000\nQ3 2021\nQ1 2022\nQ2 2022\nQ3 2022\ntonne\n481287.68\n396990.74\n373968.20\n0\n100000\n200000\n300000\n400000\n500000\n600000\nQ3 2021\nQ2 2022\nQ3 2022\ntonnes\n0\n200000\n400000\n600000\n800000\n1000000\n1200000\nQ3 2021\nQ2 2022\nQ3 2022\n17 \n \nELECTRICITY \n \nTotal power generated during the third quarter of \n2022 amounted to 2,354.80 GWh, up by 6.0 \npercent from the 2,221.52 GWh produced in the \nthird quarter of 2021. The increase was largely \ndue to Kariba Power Station whose output \nincreased by about 1.64 percent, more than \noffsetting declines in generation at thermal \npower stations. The third quarter output was, \nhowever, 2.57 percent lower than the 2 416.87 \nGWh produced in the second quarter of 2022. \nThe fall in the quarterly generation was attributed \nto the marginal decline at Kariba and low \nthroughput from the thermal stations. \nKariba Power Station accounted for about 69% \nof total production during the third quarter of \n2022, while Independent Power Producers (IPPs) \ncontributed about 4.08% to total power output. \nTable 9 shows power output statistics from the \nmajor power stations and independent power \nproducers. \n \nTable 9: Quarterly Power Output \n \n2021 \n2022 \n \nQ3 \nQ2 \nQ3 \n Kariba \n1,423.72 \n1 647.49 \n1,575.25 \n Hwange \n720.70 \n 621.73 \n642.02 \nBulawayo \n13.47 \n 2.13 \n9.92 \n Munyati \n23.90 \n 18.85 \n18.88 \n Harare \n21.17 \n 10.08 \n12.67 \n IPPs \n18.56 \n 116.60 \n96.07 \n Total \n(GWh) \n2,221.52 \n2 416.87 \n2,258.79 \nSource: ZERA ZPC, 2022 \nDuring the third quarter of 2022 IPPs produced \n96.07 GWh of electric energy, up from 18.56 \nGWh produced in the same period in 2021. The \nincrease in IPP’s output was due to the additional \ncapacity, following the commissioning of the \nZimbabwe ZhongXin Electrical Energy (ZZEE) \nand Solgas Energy, which came on board in \n2022. \nFigure 17 shows the trend of quarterly electricity \nproduction by IPP’s from Q1 2021 to Q3 2022. \nFigure 17: Quarterly Power Output by IPPs. \n \nSource: ZERA, ZPC 2022 \n \nINFLATION DEVELOPMENTS \nAnnual headline inflation stood at 280.4% in the \nthird quarter of 2022, up from 191.6% in June \n2022. This followed increases in both annual \nfood and non-food inflation. \n \nAnnual food inflation rose from 224.8% in June \n2022 to 339.7% in September 2022, contributing \n142.4 percentage points to the September 2022 \ninflation rate. The major drivers of food inflation \nwere bread and cereals; meat; oils and fats; milk, \ncheese, and eggs; and vegetables. Increases in \ninternational prices of wheat and rice, pushed up \nfood prices, during the quarter under review. \n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\n140\n2021\nQ1\n2021\nQ2\n2021\nQ3\n2021\nQ4\n2022\nQ1\n2022\nQ2\n2022\nQ3\nGWhs\n18 \n \nYear-on-year non-food inflation also increased \nfrom 167.2% at the end of the second quarter of \n2022 to 237.6% in September 2022. Housing, \nwater, \nelectricity, \ngas \nand \nother \nfuels; \ncommunication; recreation and culture; and \neducation drove non-food inflation, during the \nquarter under analysis. Figure 18 shows the \nannual inflation developments since December \n2020. \n \nFigure 18: Quarterly Inflation Profile (%) \nSource: Zimstat 2022 \n \nMonth-on-month inflation declined in the third \nquarter of 2022, following the hiking of the Bank \npolicy rate, coupled with the value money \nprinciple adopted by government. Monthly \ninflation ended the third quarter of 2022 at 3.5%, \ndown from 30.7% in the previous quarter. The \nfall in monthly inflation was reflected in declines \nin both food and non-food inflation \n \nMonthly food inflation ended the quarter under \nreview at 1.8%, driven by fruits, meat, \nvegetables, milk, cheese, and eggs subcategories, \namong others. \n \nMonth on month non-food inflation stood at \n5.2% in September 2022, mainly driven by \nhousing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels, \ncommunication, and education. \n \nFigure 19: Monthly Inflation Profile (%) \nSource: Zimstat 2022 \nBlended Consumer Price Inflation \nAnnual blended CPI inflation increased from \n70.0% in the previous quarter to 107.5% in the \nquarter under review. Monthly blended CPI \ninflation, however, fell from 18.0% in June 2022 \nto 2.5% in September 2022. \n \n4. \nMONETARY DEVELOPMENTS \n \nBroad money stock stood at ZW$1 917.15 billion \nas at end September 2022, compared to \nZW$1 119.70 billion in June 2022. This largely \nreflected quarterly expansion of 81.82% in the \nZimbabwe dollar equivalent of foreign currency \naccounts (FCA) deposits in money supply. The \nincrease in foreign currency deposits largely \nreflected the movement in the exchange rate, \nfrom ZW$370.96 per US$1 in June 2022 to \nZW$621.89 per US$1 in September 2022. \n \nAs at end September 2022, foreign currency \ndeposits accounted for 62.39% of broad money, \nfollowed by local currency deposits, at 37.40%; \n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\nFood\nNon-Food\nAll Items\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n35\nOct-21\nNov-21\nDec-21\nJan-22\nFeb-22\nMar-22\nApr-22\nMay-22\nJun-22\nJul-22\nAug-22\nSep-22\nFood\nNon-Food\nOverall\n19 \n \nwhile currency in circulation constituted the \nbalance of 0.20%. The local currency component \nof deposits also rose by 56.44% over the quarter \nto September 2022, reflecting the impact of \ncredit creation and intermediation activities by \nbanks. Figure 20 shows the components of broad \nmoney and annual growth rates. \n \nFigure 20: Broad Money Developments \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2022 \n \nDomestic Credit \nDomestic credit registered a quarter-on-quarter \ngrowth of 80.28%, from ZW$767.81 billion in \nJune 2022 to ZW$1 371.02 billion in September \n2022. The growth was largely driven by \nincreases of ZW$360.14 billion (61.28%) in \ncredit to the private sector; net claims on \nGovernment, ZW$165.42 billion (158.04%); and \npublic \nnon-financial \nenterprises, \nZW$8.65 \nbillion (106.00%). Net credit to Government \nincluded the accounting treatment of drawdowns \non Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) reserves by \nGovernment. \n \nCredit to the private sector mainly benefited the \nagriculture and household sectors, which \nreceived 24.47% and 18.60% of the total credit, \nrespectively. The distribution and manufacturing \nsectors \nreceived \n13.50% \nand \n12.38%, \nrespectively. Private sector credit shares for the \nrest of the economic sectors are shown in Figure \n21. \n \nFigure 21: Distribution of Private Sector \nCredit \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe \n \nCredit to the private sector was largely channeled \ntowards inventory build-up, 35.49%; other \nrecurrent expenditures, 31.16%; and fixed capital \ninvestments, 15.83%. \n \nInterest Rates \nDuring the quarter ending September 2022, \nnominal lending rates quoted by banks ranged \nbetween 7% and 200%, following the tightening \nof monetary policy. Time deposit rates for 60-\nday and 90-day tenures averaged 60.55% and \n61.08%, respectively, while the average savings \nrates were quoted at up to a maximum of 20.25% \nduring the quarter under review. \n \n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n0\n500\n1,000\n1,500\n2,000\n2,500\nMar-20\nMay-20\nJul-20\nSep-20\nNov-20\nJan-21\nMar-21\nMay-21\nJul-21\nSep-21\nNov-21\nJan-22\nMar-22\nMay-22\nJul-22\nSep-22\n%\nZW$ Billions\nNCDs\nCurrency in Circulation\nTime Deposits\nForeign Currency Deposits\nLocal Currency Transferable Deposits\nHouseholds\n18.60%\nAgriculture\n24.47%\nMining\n11.28%\nManufacturing\n12.38%\nDistribution\n13.50%\nConstruction\n1.38%\nTransport & \nCommunications\n2.03%\nServices\n10.76%\nFinancial Org. \n& Investments\n5.57%\nOther\n0.04%\n20 \n \n5. \nSTOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS \nNotwithstanding the recovery of the stock market \nindices from the losses in previous months, the \nquarter-on-quarter changes to September 2022 \nshowed that the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange \n(ZSE) traded in a negative trajectory. As a result, \nall the major indices declined, with the All Share, \nTop 10, Top 15, Medium Cap and Small Cap \nIndices shedding 25.37%, 25.53%, 26.75%, \n26.69% and 5.84% to close at 14 771.65 points, \n9 140.55 points, 10 051.47 points, 29 051.67 \npoints and 483 615.64 points, respectively, as \nshown in Table 10. \nTable 10: Key Stock Market Indicators \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2022 \nThe resources index also declined by 5.45% to \n18 929.75 points, during the same quarter, \ncompared to 20 021.24 points recorded in the \nprior quarter. \nOn a year-on-year basis, however, the All Share, \nTop 10, Top 15, Medium Cap and Small Cap \nindices increased by 72.16%, 88.19%, 80.18%, \n90.23% and 41.03%, from 8 580.16 points 4 \n857.20 points, 5 578.65 points, 20 599.24 points \nand 254 232.90 points recorded in September \n2021, respectively. \n \nFigure 22 shows the developments of the ZSE \nAll Share, Top 10 and Mining Indices for the \nperiod from September 2021 to September 2022. \nFigure 22: ZSE All Share and Top 10 and \nMining Indices \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange 2022 \n \nMarket Capitalisation and Turnover \n \nOwing to the bearish sentiments exhibited on the \nlocal bourse in the third quarter of 2022, the ZSE \nshed ZW$620.01 billion, or 25.42% worth of \ncapitalization over the quarter, to close at \nZW$1 819.16 billion. On a year-on-year basis, \nhowever, market capitalization added 76.19% \nduring the quarter ending September 2022, from \nZW$1 032.47 billion recorded in the quarter \nended September 2021. \n \nFigure \n23 \nshows \nmarket \ncapitalization \ndevelopments for the period from 30th September \n2021 to 30th September 2022. \n \n2,500\n5,000\n7,500\n10,000\n12,500\n15,000\n17,500\n20,000\n22,500\n25,000\n27,500\n30,000\n30-Sep-21\n31-Oct-21\n30-Nov-21\n31-Dec-21\n31-Jan-22\n28-Feb-22\n31-Mar-22\n30-Apr-22\n31-May-22\n30-Jun-22\n31-Jul-22\n31-Aug-22\n30-Sep-22\nAll Share Index\nTop 10 Index\nMining Index\nZSE Indicator \n \nJune-22 \n \nSept-22 \n \nChange (%) \nAll \nShare \nIndex (points) \n19,791.94 \n14 771.65 \n-25.37 \nTop 10 Index \n(points) \n12,273.75 \n9 140.55 \n-25.53 \nTop 15 Index \n(points) \n13 721.95 \n10 051.47 \n-26.75 \nMedium Cap \nIndex (points) \n39,627.35 \n29 051.67 \n-26.69 \nSmall \nCap \nIndex (points) \n513,602.97 \n483 615.64 \n-5.84 \nMining Index \n(points) \n20,021.24 \n18 929.75 \n-5.45 \nVolume \nof \nshares traded \n(m) \n660.11 \n516.26 \n-21.79 \nMarket \nTurnover \n($m) \n34 148.50 \n37 476.72 \n9.75 \nZSE \nCapitalization \n($m) \n2 439 165.45 \n1 819 157.07 \n-25.42 \nNet \nForeign \nPosition ($m) \n-4 437.44 \n-308.02 \n93.06 \n21 \n \nFigure 23: Market Capitalization \n \n Source: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2022 \nDue to tight liquidity conditions during the \nperiod under review, the cumulative volume of \nshares traded on the stock market declined by \n21.79% to 516.26 million shares, compared to \n660.11 million shares recorded in the prior \nquarter. Over the same period, the cumulative \nvalues of shares traded amounted to ZW$37.48 \nbillion, an increase of 9.75%, compared to \nZW$34.15 billion recorded in the previous \nquarter. \n \nFigure 24 shows developments in market \nturnover volumes and values for the period from \n30th September 2021 to 30th September 2022. \n \nFigure 24: ZSE Market Turnover \n \n Source: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2022 \n \nForeign investor participation, as measured by its \ncontribution to the value of shares traded \ndeclined to 0.19%, compared to 3.26% recorded \nin the second quarter of 2022. Concomitantly, \nthe net foreign position improved to -ZW$308.02 \nmillion \nin \nthe \nreporting \nquarter, \nfrom \n-ZW$4 437.44 million recorded during the \nquarter ended June 2022. \n \n6. \nPAYMENT, \nCLEARING \nAND \nSETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES \n \nThe value of transactions processed through the \nNational Payment Systems increased by 78% to \nZW$10.43 trillion in the quarter ending 30th \nSeptember 2022, from ZW$5.86 trillion recorded \nin the quarter ending 30th June 2022. However, \nNPS transaction volumes decreased by 2% to \n287.80 million in the third quarter of 2022, from \n293.93 million in the second quarter. \n \nTable 11 provides the statistical information on \nvarious payment streams for the quarters ending \nJune 2022 and September 2022. \n8.0\n458.0\n908.0\n1,358.0\n1,808.0\n2,258.0\n2,708.0\n3,158.0\n3,608.0\n30-Sep-21\n31-Oct-21\n30-Nov-21\n31-Dec-21\n31-Jan-22\n28-Feb-22\n31-Mar-22\n30-Apr-22\n31-May-22\n30-Jun-22\n31-Jul-22\n31-Aug-22\n30-Sep-22\n0\n990\n1,980\n2,970\n3,960\n4,950\n5,940\n6,930\n7,920\n8,910\n9,900\n10,890\n11,880\n30-Sep-21\n31-Oct-21\n30-Nov-21\n31-Dec-21\n31-Jan-22\n28-Feb-22\n31-Mar-22\n30-Apr-22\n31-May-22\n30-Jun-22\n31-Jul-22\n31-Aug-22\n30-Sep-22\nMillions\nBlock Trade: Meikles Ltd \n(122.90 million shares, worth \n22 \n \nTable \n11: \nConsolidated \nTransactional \nActivities \nValues in ZW$ Million \n \nQ2 \nQ3 \nChang\ne \nProportio\nn \n2022 \n2022 \nRTGS \n3,783,832.7 \n6,881,463.5 \n82% \n117.42% \nPOS \n334,550.9 \n500,525.7 \n50% \n8.54% \nATMS \n40,914.9 \n86,975.5 \n113% \n1.48% \nMOBILE \n320,275.02 \n553,119.4 \n73% \n9.44% \nINTERNET \n1,380,737.3 \n2,412,585.7 \n75% \n41.17% \nTOTAL \n5,860,310.8 \n10,434,669,8 \n78% \n178.06% \nVolumes \n \nRTGS \n3,476,844 \n3,228,451 \n-7% \n1.10% \n \nPOS \n44,288,565 \n41,043,315 \n-7% \n13.96% \n \nATMs \n1,409,898 \n1,461,636 \n4% \n0.50% \n \nMOBILE \n239,109,443 \n236,350,506 \n-1% \n80.41% \n \nINTERNET \n5,643,947 \n5,715,633 \n1% \n1.94% \n \nTOTAL \n293,928,697 \n287,799,541 \n-2% \n97.91% \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe \n \nLARGE VALUE PAYMENTS \nZimbabwe \nElectronic \nTransfer \nand \nSettlement System \nThe value of transactions processed through the \nRTGS system increased by 82%, from \nZW$3.78 trillion in the second quarter of 2022, \nto ZW$6.88 trillion for the quarter ending 30th \nSeptember 2022. RTGS transaction volumes, \nhowever, decreased by 7% to 3.23 million in the \nthird quarter, as shown in Figure 25. \nFigure 25: Values and Volumes of RTGS \nTransactions \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2022 \n \nRetail Payments \n \nThe aggregate values of retail transactions \nincreased by 71.12% to ZW$3.55 trillion in the \nquarter under review, from ZW$2.08 billion \nrecorded in the quarter ended 30th June 2022. \nRetail volumes declined by 2.02% to 284.57 \nmillion in the third quarter of 2022, from 290.45 \nmillion in the previous quarter. \n \nFigures 26 and 27 shows the trend in aggregate \nvalues and volumes of retail transactions, from \nthe quarter ending 30th September 2020 to \nquarter ending 30th September 2022. \n3000\n3050\n3100\n3150\n3200\n3250\n3300\n3350\n3400\n3450\n3500\n3550\n0.00\n1000.00\n2000.00\n3000.00\n4000.00\n5000.00\n6000.00\n7000.00\n8000.00\n2021\nQ3\n2021\nQ4\n2022\nQ1\n2022\nQ2\n2022\nQ3\nRTGS Volumes Thousands\nRTGS Values Billions \nVolumes\nValues\n23 \n \nFigure 26: Retail Transaction Values \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2022 \nFigure 27: Retail Transaction Volumes \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2022 \n \n \n \n \n \n1 The local collateral figure comprises of Cheque, Zimswitch, \nChengetedzai Deposit Corporation settlement system \nCollateral1 \n \nThe value of collateral for cheque, retail \npayments and central securities depository \nsettlement systems increased to ZW$18.50 \nbillion in the quarter ended 30th September 2022, \nfrom ZW$8.99 billion recorded in the quarter \nended 30th June 2022, as shown in Figure 28. \n \nFigure 28: Collateral: January 2021 to June \n2022 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2022 \nThe Victoria Falls Exchange collateral for the \nquarter ended 30th September 2022 was \nUS$318.85 million. It remained stable and \nadequately covered the risk levels associated \nwith the platform’s transactional activities. \n \n \n \n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n0\n500\n1,000\n1,500\n2,000\n2,500\n3,000\nMobile in Billions\nOther Retail Values in Billions\nPOS\nATMS\nINTERNET\nMOBILE\n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\n300\n350\n400\n450\n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\n50.0\n60.0\n2020 Q3\n2020 Q4\n2021 Q1\n2021 Q2\n2021 Q3\n2021 Q4\n2022 Q1\n2022 Q2\n2022 Q3\nMobile Volumes in Millions\nOther Retai Volumes in Millions\nPOS\nATMs\nINTERNET\nMOBILE\n0\n2,000\n4,000\n6,000\n8,000\n10,000\n12,000\n14,000\n16,000\n18,000\n20,000\nQ1\n2021\nQ2\n2021\nQ3\n2021\nQ4\n2021\nQ1\n2022\nQ2\n2022\nQ3\n2022\nMILLIONS\n24 \n \nAccess Points and Devices \nDuring the quarter under review, the POS \npopulation increased to 135,346, from 134,051 \nrecorded in the quarter ended 30th June 2022. \nThere were 7.76 million active mobile financial \nservices subscribers registered in the quarter \nended 30th September 2022, from 6.96 million \nrecorded in the previous quarter. \nTable 12 shows payment access points and \ndevices for the first, second and third quarters for \n2022. \n \nTable 12: Payment Systems Access Points and \nDevices \n \nQuarter \nending \nMarch \n2022 \nQuarter \nending \nJune \n2022 \nQuarter \nending \nSeptember \n2022 \nPAYMENT SYSTEMS ACCESS POINTS \nMobile \nBanking \nagents \n \n52,719 \n \n52,983 \n \n53,248 \nATMs \n401 \n401 \n405 \nPOS \n130,492 \n134,051 \n135,346 \nPAYMENT SYSTEMS ACCESS DEVICES \nDebit Cards \n6,090,898 6,491,778 \n5,455,222 \nCredit Cards \n13,309 \n13,976 \n14,989 \nPrepaid Cards \n141,635 \n121,188 \n128,390 \nMobile \nBanking \nsubscribers \n7,122,895 6,964,193 \n7,761,222 \nInternet \nBanking \nsubscribers \n595,939 \n624,706 \n629,308 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2022 \n7. \nFISCAL DEVELOPMENTS \nFiscal developments in the third quarter of 2022 \nresulted in cumulative revenues of ZW$652.76 \nbillion, against cumulative expenditure of \nZW$657.38 billion. This culminated in a budget \ndeficit of ZW$4.62 billion. Table 13 shows the \nsummarised fiscal positions during the second \nand third quarter of 2022. \nTable 13: Summary of Fiscal Position \n(ZW$ m) \nQ2 \nQ3 \nRevenue \n324 826.08 \n652 757.51 \nTax revenue \n304 979.36 \n616 258.71 \nNon-Tax Revenue \n19 846.71 \n36 498.80 \nExpenditure \n341 224.52 \n657 380.06 \nCurrent \nExpenditure \n255 007.02 \n539 184.04 \no/w employment costs \n101 107.64 \n226 950.66 \nCapital Expenditure \n78 217.50 \n118 196.03 \nOverall Balance \n-16 398.44 \n-4 622.55 \nSource: Ministry of Finance and Economic \nDevelopment, 2022 \nGovernment Revenue \nFiscal revenues at ZW$652.76 billion in the third \nquarter of 2022, were 24.9% above the target of \nZW$522.73 billion. The fiscal revenues also \nsurpassed the previous quarter revenues of \nZW$323.83 by 101.0%, largely attributable to \nimproved efficiency in tax revenue collections. \nFigure 29 depicts the structure of government tax \nrevenue. \n25 \n \nFigure \n29: \nGovernment \nTax \nRevenue \nStructure \nSource: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, \n2022 \nGovernment revenues comprised of 94.4% in tax \nrevenues and 5.6% in non-tax revenues. Taxes \non income and profits contributed 36%; Value \nadded tax 22%; exercise duties 12%; taxes on \nfinancial and capital transactions 9%; and taxes \non gross revenue 7%. \nGovernment Expenditure \nCumulative government spending amounted to \nZW$657.38 billion in the third quarter of 2022, \ncomprising of ZW$539.18 billion in current \nexpenditure and ZW$118.20 billion in capital \nexpenditure. Table 14 shows a summary of \nGovernment expenditure in the second and third \nquarters of 2022. \n \n \n \n \nTable \n14: \nSummary \nof \nGovernment \nExpenditure (ZW$ m) \n \nQ2 2022 \nQ3 2022 \nTotal Expenditure \n341 224.52 \n657 380.06 \nCurrent Expenditure \n255 007.02 \n539 184.04 \nEmployment Costs \n101 107.64 \n226 950.66 \nOperations and \nMaintenance \n146 148.10 \n301 466.62 \nInterest On debt \n2 153.43 \n1 316.50 \nTransfers to \nProvincial and Local \nAuthorities \n5 597.85 \n9 450.25 \nCapital Expenditure \n86 217.50 \n118 196.03 \nSource: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, \n2022 \nExpenditure on operations and maintenance \naccounted for 46% of total expenditure, \nemployment costs, 34.5%; capital expenditure, \n18.0%; and transfers to Provincial and Local \nauthorities, 1.4%, as shown in Figure 30. \nFigure 30: Composition of Government \nExpenditure (%): Q3 2022 \n \n \nSource: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, \n2022 \n \nTax on Income \nand Profits\n36%\nCustoms \nduties\n6%\nExcise duties\n12%\nTaxes on \nSpecific \nServices\n2%\nValue Added \nTax (VAT)\n22%\nTax on gross \nRevenue\n7%\nTaxes on \nfinancial and \ncapital \ntransactions \n9%\nOther Indirect \ntaxes \n0%\nNon-tax \nRevenue\n6%\nOperations and \nMaintanance\n46%\nTransferes to Provincial \nCouncils and Local \nAuthorities\n1%\nEmployment \nCosts\n35%\nCapital \nExpenditure\n18%\n26 \n \nOverall Budget Balance \nThe fiscal developments in the third quarter of \n2022 culminated in a budget deficit of ZW$4.62 \nbillion, which was largely financed from \ndomestic sources. Figure 31 shows the quarterly \ndevelopments in the overall budget balance in \n2022. \n \nFigure 31: Budget balance (ZW$ billion) \nSource: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, \n2022 \n \n \n \nRESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE \nDECEMBER 2022 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n (100.00)\n -\n 100.00\n 200.00\n 300.00\n 400.00\n 500.00\n 600.00\n 700.00\nRevenue\nExpenditure\nOverall Balance\nQ2\nQ3\nSTATISTICAL TABLES \n1. Depository Corporation Survey S1 \n2. Central Bank Survey S2 \n3. Other Depository Corporation Survey S3 \n \n4. Liabilities and Assets of the Central Bank \n4.1.Reserve Bank: Assets \n \n \n \n S4 \n \n4.2.Reserve Bank: liabilities S5 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n5. Other Depository Corporation \n5.1.Other Depository Asset S6 \n5.2.Other Depository Liabilities S7 \n \n6. Commercial Banks \n6.1.Commercial Banks: Assets \n \n S8 \n6.2.Commercial Banks: Liabilities \n S9 \n7. Building Societies \n \n \n \n \n \n \n7.1.Building Societies: Assets \n \n S10 \n \n7.2.Building Societies: Liabilities S11 \n \n \n8. Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks \n8.1.Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Banks’ Loans and Advances S12 \n8.2.Sectoral Analysis of Commercial Bank’s Deposits \n \n S13 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n9. National Payment Systems \n \n \n9.1.Values of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS14 \n9.2.Volumes of Transactions \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS14 \n \n10. Interest Rates, Security Yields and Prices \n10.1. Lending Rates \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS15 \n10.2. Deposit Rates S15 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n11. Stock Exchange Indices \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS16 \n \n12. Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n12.1. Monthly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS17 \n12.2. Quarterly Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS18 \n12.3. Annual Inflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS19 \n \n13. Balance of Payments \n13.1. Cross Border Payments \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS20 \n13.2. Cross Border Receipts \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS21 \n \n28 \n \nJun-21\nSep-21\nDec-21\nMar-22\nJun-22\nJul-22\nAug-22\nSep-22\nNet Foreign Assets\n-303,317,411.71\n-305,499,835.09\n-361,298,424.39\n-543,454,309.01\n-1,440,376,428.47\n-1,799,900,028.55\n-1,795,279,800.26\n-1,954,300,330.22\nCentral Bank(net)\n-408,677,935.81\n-421,707,589.69\n-513,012,570.17\n-717,594,313.10\n-1,802,992,102.87\n-2,132,218,475.50\n-2,281,673,543.14\n-2,540,535,213.92\nForeign Assets\n33,139,183.22\n103,693,307.78\n134,462,902.43\n141,438,330.50\n378,268,469.49\n460,906,552.27\n464,424,207.59\n423,342,143.07\nForeign Liabilities\n441,817,119.03\n525,400,897.47\n647,475,472.60\n859,032,643.60\n2,181,260,572.36\n2,593,125,027.77\n2,746,097,750.73\n2,963,877,356.98\nOther Depository Corporations(net)\n105,360,524.10\n116,207,754.60\n151,714,145.79\n174,140,004.09\n362,615,674.40\n332,318,446.95\n486,393,742.88\n586,234,883.70\nForeign Assets\n120,848,426.81\n132,491,806.64\n175,421,218.57\n208,203,548.17\n445,895,292.17\n432,930,547.04\n606,589,993.46\n730,519,889.15\nForeign Liabilities\n15,487,902.71\n16,284,052.04\n23,707,072.78\n34,063,544.08\n83,279,617.76\n100,612,100.09\n120,196,250.58\n144,285,005.45\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n606,251,821.19\n670,098,627.13\n836,659,942.26\n1,132,547,895.53\n2,560,072,662.03\n3,007,213,667.92\n3,404,193,526.10\n3,871,453,855.67\nDomestic Claims\n170,177,222.61\n225,085,581.53\n340,286,879.84\n425,899,133.67\n767,813,894.49\n911,956,758.63\n1,183,994,022.32\n1,371,017,098.26\nClaims on Central Government(net)\n23,670,319.48\n42,462,267.46\n83,610,072.33\n79,099,806.11\n104,672,040.45\n130,502,205.15\n236,159,688.17\n270,091,555.64\nClaims on Central Government\n42,113,825.79\n59,818,762.06\n98,427,828.73\n112,202,570.05\n180,922,921.25\n192,199,618.57\n350,494,976.12\n408,193,113.30\nCentral Bank\n24,485,145.35\n23,601,353.60\n56,954,683.52\n61,616,251.17\n93,971,712.93\n100,589,783.20\n250,194,418.13\n264,613,071.80\nODCs\n17,628,680.44\n36,217,408.46\n41,473,145.20\n50,586,318.88\n86,951,208.31\n91,609,835.37\n100,300,557.99\n143,580,041.50\nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n18,443,506.31\n17,356,494.60\n14,817,756.40\n33,102,763.94\n76,250,880.80\n61,697,413.42\n114,335,287.95\n138,101,557.65\nCentral Bank\n12,148,239.95\n13,843,620.82\n10,797,060.87\n27,772,263.84\n66,024,646.77\n52,333,907.68\n106,442,851.55\n129,394,309.01\nODCs\n6,295,266.36\n3,512,873.79\n4,020,695.53\n5,330,500.10\n10,226,234.03\n9,363,505.74\n7,892,436.40\n8,707,248.64\nClaims on Other Sectors\n146,506,903.14\n182,623,314.07\n256,676,807.51\n346,799,327.56\n663,141,854.04\n781,454,553.48\n947,834,334.15\n1,100,925,542.62\nOther Financial Corporations\n4,230,396.18\n4,598,468.25\n9,710,262.81\n7,747,219.19\n10,177,451.55\n14,828,545.88\n17,449,153.84\n18,825,212.19\nState and Local Government\n84,251.94\n67,566.82\n170,565.46\n254,314.27\n226,287.26\n349,675.75\n287,141.09\n306,328.41\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n12,075,547.93\n17,770,427.55\n23,865,846.53\n26,468,620.27\n65,013,584.08\n85,546,713.45\n123,920,817.60\n133,928,821.97\nPrivate Sector\n130,116,707.10\n160,186,851.44\n222,930,132.71\n312,329,173.83\n587,724,531.15\n680,729,618.39\n806,177,221.63\n947,865,180.05\nCentral Bank\n1,489,123.82\n1,700,948.01\n1,984,236.72\n2,894,116.58\n5,462,482.88\n7,151,212.10\n8,394,127.31\n10,349,380.21\nODCs\n128,627,583.28\n158,485,903.44\n220,945,895.99\n309,435,057.25\n582,262,048.27\n673,578,406.29\n797,783,094.32\n937,515,799.83\nOther Items(Net)\n-436,074,598.58\n-445,013,045.60\n-496,373,062.42\n-706,648,761.86\n-1,792,258,767.54\n-2,095,256,909.29\n-2,220,199,503.78\n-2,500,436,757.40\nShares and Other Equity\n-421,159,006.94\n-426,036,485.00\n-502,021,854.19\n-647,259,441.19\n-1,750,654,766.50\n-2,109,505,152.97\n-2,196,010,760.22\n-2,353,032,948.01\nLiabilities to Other Financial Corporations\n462,598.19\n375,417.86\n139,767.85\n810,634.46\n345,211.38\n1,339,092.93\n555,226.55\n587,178.66\nRestricted Deposits\n73,532.53\n3,600,957.03\n6,915,475.67\n2,994,403.00\n17,330,528.77\n31,949,181.65\n37,970,261.21\n33,027,186.30\nDeposits and Securities Excluded from Base Money\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nOther Items(net)\n-15,451,722.36\n-22,952,935.50\n-1,406,451.73\n-63,194,358.13\n-59,279,741.20\n-19,040,030.90\n-62,714,231.31\n-181,018,174.35\nBroad Money-M3\n302,934,409.48\n364,598,792.04\n475,361,517.87\n589,093,586.52\n1,119,696,233.56\n1,207,313,639.37\n1,608,913,725.83\n1,917,153,525.45\nSecurities Other than Shares Included in Broad Money\n1,559,661.34\n3,191,934.31\n3,696,333.82\n4,510,894.76\n7,157,937.12\n8,137,874.02\n12,785,574.75\n14,047,495.34\nBroad Money-M2\n301,374,748.14\n361,406,857.73\n471,665,184.05\n584,582,691.76\n1,112,538,296.45\n1,199,175,765.34\n1,596,128,151.09\n1,903,106,030.11\nOther Deposits\n21,395,598.04\n26,380,655.25\n37,402,963.80\n54,149,202.92\n80,890,863.60\n94,202,100.47\n134,172,529.07\n157,067,992.76\nNarrow Money-M1\n279,979,150.10\n335,026,202.48\n434,262,220.25\n530,433,488.84\n1,031,647,432.84\n1,104,973,664.87\n1,461,955,622.01\n1,746,038,037.35\nTransferable Deposits\n277,785,152.96\n333,108,841.78\n431,948,432.28\n527,204,673.89\n1,028,183,547.50\n1,100,888,777.34\n1,457,941,576.91\n1,742,120,578.98\n Of which Foreign Currency Accounts\n133,630,862.77\n151,057,377.09\n210,704,070.51\n275,166,409.09\n657,889,184.94\n688,836,308.19\n991,098,612.31\n1,196,206,879.78\nCurrency Outside Depository Corporations\n2,193,997.15\n1,917,360.70\n2,313,787.98\n3,228,814.95\n3,463,885.34\n4,084,887.53\n4,014,045.11\n3,917,458.37\nMemorandum Items\nReserve Money\n24,844,800.65\n26,242,897.53\n25,944,260.02\n27,885,251.69\n33,547,982.93\n35,521,743.90\n37,466,335.66\n87,098,435.56\nFCAs as a Percentage of Deposits in M3\n44.4%\n41.7%\n44.5%\n47.0%\n58.9%\n57.2%\n61.8%\n62.5%\nEnd Period Exchange Rate\n85.42\n87.67\n108.67\n142.42\n370.96\n443.88\n546.83\n621.89\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2022\nNotes:\n(i) Depository corporations survey - formerly Monetary Survey.\n(ii) Broad money redefined using IMF's Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual of 2000. Major changes include exclusion of Government deposits held by banks from broad money.\n(iii) Transferable deposits made up of demand and savings deposits.\n(iv) NCDs are also referred to as securities included in broad money.\n(v) All classes of time deposits, short and long term are classified as time deposits, which are also termed other deposits.\n(vi) Credit to the private sector now excludes claims on other financial corporations, as well as claims on state and local government (local authorities)\n(vii) Depository corporations made up of the Central Bank and other depository corporations\n(viii) Other depository corporations (ODCs) - Commercial banks, merchant banks, building societies and POSB.\n(ix) In December 2017, the statistics were adjusted in restrospect by reclassifying Securities issued under Aftrades from claims on government to claims on central bank\n(x) In December 2017, the statistics were adjusted in restrospect by reclassifying amounts accessed by banks under the Aftrades from liabilities to Other Depository corporations and Other Financial Corporations to liabilities to Ce\n(xi) In December 2018, statistics were revised from November 2017 due to reclassification of lines of credit (foreign liabilities) that were initially classified as deposits included in broad money\n(xii) All monetary and financial statistics are valued in $ since the introduction of the interbank foreign exchange market in February 2019\n(xii) All monetary and financial statistics are valued in ZWL$ since the introduction of the interbank foreign exchange market in February 2019\n TABLE 1: DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS SURVEY (ZWL$ '000)\n29 \n \nJun-21\nSep-21\nDec-21\nMar-22\nJun-22\nJul-22\nAug-22\nSep-22\nNet Foreign Assets\n-408,677,935.81 -421,707,589.69 -513,012,570.17\n-717,594,313.10 -1,802,992,102.87 -2,132,218,475.50 -2,281,673,543.14\n-39,349,960.03\nClaims on Non Residents\n33,139,183.22\n103,693,307.78\n134,462,902.43\n141,438,330.50\n378,268,469.49\n460,906,552.27\n464,424,207.59\n6,464,247.45\nOfficial Reserves Assets\n22,273,252.21\n91,410,691.55\n113,865,495.69\n111,766,758.89\n280,735,044.65\n350,631,779.92\n329,592,679.60\n1,511,299.58\nOther Foreign Assets\n10,865,931.01\n12,282,616.24\n20,597,406.74\n29,671,571.60\n97,533,424.84\n110,274,772.35\n134,831,527.99\n4,952,947.87\nLess Liabilities to Non Residents\n441,817,119.03\n525,400,897.47\n647,475,472.60\n859,032,643.60\n2,181,260,572.36\n2,593,125,027.77\n2,746,097,750.73\n45,814,207.48\nShort Term Liabilities\n219,691,932.32\n224,780,986.78\n276,458,350.87\n380,818,044.00\n951,983,480.17\n1,127,013,639.61\n1,336,300,564.04\n32,602,281.08\nOther Foreign Liabilities*\n222,125,186.70\n300,619,910.70\n371,017,121.73\n478,214,599.59\n1,229,277,092.19\n1,466,111,388.17\n1,409,797,186.69\n13,211,926.40\n of which blocked funds\n179,118,601.53\n173,544,785.11\n215,193,860.69\n276,151,105.21\n716,116,832.50\n852,249,186.55\n678,512,698.97\n762,984,490.22\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n433,522,736.46\n447,950,487.22\n538,956,830.20\n745,479,564.79\n1,836,540,085.80\n2,167,740,219.40\n2,319,139,878.80\n2,627,633,649.47\nDomestic Claims\n25,962,204.03\n29,006,431.90\n70,963,422.00\n59,280,671.72\n86,265,289.61\n121,100,451.59\n232,699,771.22\n241,166,538.97\nNet Claims on Central Government\n12,336,905.40\n9,757,732.78\n46,157,622.65\n33,843,987.33\n27,947,066.17\n48,255,875.52\n143,751,566.58\n135,218,762.79\nClaims on Central Government\n24,485,145.35\n23,601,353.60\n56,954,683.52\n61,616,251.17\n93,971,712.93\n100,589,783.20\n250,194,418.13\n264,613,071.80\nOf which: Securities Other than Shares\n5,809,922.68\n5,767,697.15\n5,725,696.74\n5,628,648.40\n5,618,143.81\n11,099,253.33\n16,894,372.03\n24,148,817.33\nLoans\n18,675,222.67\n17,833,656.45\n51,228,986.78\n55,987,602.77\n88,353,569.12\n89,490,529.87\n233,300,046.10\n240,464,254.47\n Loans and Advances\n14,666,539.96\n13,884,037.90\n17,897,368.08\n22,642,216.24\n55,008,182.59\n56,145,143.34\n62,658,197.28\n69,822,405.65\n Legacy Debt\n397,116.86\n338,052.70\n29,720,052.86\n29,733,820.69\n29,733,820.69\n29,733,820.69\n167,030,282.97\n167,030,282.97\n Export Incentives\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\n3,611,565.85\nLess Liabilities to Central Government\n12,148,239.95\n13,843,620.82\n10,797,060.87\n27,772,263.84\n66,024,646.77\n52,333,907.68\n106,442,851.55\n129,394,309.01\nOf which: Deposits\n12,148,239.95\n13,843,620.82\n10,797,060.87\n27,772,263.84\n66,024,646.77\n52,333,907.68\n106,442,851.55\n129,394,309.01\nOther \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nClaims on Other Sectors\n13,625,298.64\n19,248,699.12\n24,805,799.35\n25,436,684.39\n58,318,223.45\n72,844,576.07\n88,948,204.64\n105,947,776.18\nOther Financial Corporations\n1,591,946.54\n1,675,284.36\n1,940,319.92\n2,314,886.09\n2,384,730.70\n3,057,198.60\n3,073,237.98\n3,202,283.90\nState and Local Government\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n10,544,228.28\n15,872,466.74\n20,881,242.71\n20,227,681.72\n50,471,009.86\n62,636,165.37\n77,480,839.35\n92,396,112.07\nPrivate Sector\n1,489,123.82\n1,700,948.01\n1,984,236.72\n2,894,116.58\n5,462,482.88\n7,151,212.10\n8,394,127.31\n10,349,380.21\nClaims on Other Depository Corporations\n3,426,911.18\n3,296,141.91\n4,919,969.82\n10,763,971.69\n9,947,986.79\n11,136,478.88\n26,441,912.94\n40,716,900.04\nOf which: Loans\n3,426,911.18\n3,296,141.91\n4,919,969.82\n10,763,971.69\n9,947,986.79\n11,136,478.88\n26,441,912.94\n40,716,900.04\nOther Liabilities to ODCs\n91,366,745.03\n61,027,807.98\n108,149,998.58\n116,286,172.05\n234,624,636.96\n352,778,125.95\n516,479,509.63\n514,761,587.21\nOf which: Aftrades Balances\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n Securities\n45,976,776.82\n41,191,755.29\n72,821,158.38\n73,725,582.36\n87,602,175.66\n162,206,231.00\n198,762,582.78\n247,261,242.79\nOther Items(Net)\n-495,500,366.27 -476,675,721.39 -571,223,436.96\n-791,721,093.43 -1,974,951,446.35 -2,388,281,414.87 -2,576,477,704.28 -2,860,511,797.67\nShares and Other Equity\n-486,305,203.47\n-501,914,984.05\n-620,887,582.17\n-804,754,190.04\n-2,081,541,626.90\n-2,495,937,680.26\n-2,662,572,351.10\n-2,881,231,066.44\nOther Items(Net)\n-9,911,933.75\n20,921,508.79\n41,146,119.65\n8,861,949.04\n89,106,052.63\n71,183,746.71\n43,541,395.78\n-13,728,304.53\nLiabilities to Other Resident Sectors\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nDeposits and Securities Excluded from Base Money\n716,770.95\n4,317,753.87\n8,518,025.55\n4,171,147.57\n17,484,127.93\n36,472,518.68\n42,553,251.05\n34,447,573.30\nMonetary Base \n24,844,800.65\n26,242,897.53\n25,944,260.02\n27,885,251.69\n33,547,982.93\n35,521,743.90\n37,466,335.66\n87,098,435.56\nBond Coins\n99,710.14\n99,710.12\n99,710.16\n99,710.34\n99,710.48\n99,710.54\n99,710.59\n99,710.63\nBond Notes\n3,797,075.30\n4,671,398.41\n5,052,397.24\n5,240,635.11\n6,165,333.25\n6,412,784.04\n6,554,970.13\n6,740,568.25\nLiabilities to ODCs\n20,948,015.21\n21,471,789.00\n20,792,152.63\n22,544,906.25\n27,282,939.21\n29,009,249.32\n30,811,654.95\n80,258,156.68\n Reserve Deposits\n7,269,076.19\n9,255,653.80\n19,781,787.64\n21,544,621.25\n27,182,574.21\n28,909,888.55\n30,691,239.95\n36,208,286.92\n Exess reserves \n13,678,939.03\n12,216,135.19\n1,010,364.99\n1,000,284.99\n100,364.99\n99,360.78\n120,414.99\n100,364.99\nPrivate Deposits\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 2022\n NB: * Other Foreign Liabilities include blocked funds amounting to USD2.2 billion assumed by the Central Bank on behalf of Government.\n TABLE 2: CENTRAL BANK SURVEY (ZWL$'000) \n30 \n \nJun-21\nSep-21\nDec-21\nMar-22\nJun-22\nJul-22\nAug-22\nSep-22\nNet Foreign Assets\n105,360,524.10\n116,207,754.60\n151,714,145.79\n174,140,004.09\n362,615,674.40\n332,318,446.95\n486,393,742.88\n586,234,883.70\nClaims on Non Residents\n120,848,426.81\n132,491,806.64\n175,421,218.57\n208,203,548.17\n445,895,292.17\n432,930,547.04\n606,589,993.46\n730,519,889.15\nOf Which: Foreign Currency\n30,255,551.49\n38,500,097.41\n50,030,986.41\n76,544,189.30\n138,347,101.06\n159,024,593.55\n263,637,446.30\n292,402,245.17\nDeposits\n90,381,891.07\n93,731,294.28\n125,043,551.30\n131,168,592.72\n305,551,872.73\n271,679,250.85\n340,293,581.80\n435,192,058.43\nOther\n210,984.25\n260,414.95\n346,680.86\n490,766.14\n1,996,318.38\n2,226,702.64\n2,658,965.36\n2,925,585.55\nLess Liabilities to Non Residents\n15,487,902.71\n16,284,052.04\n23,707,072.78\n34,063,544.08\n83,279,617.76\n100,612,100.09\n120,196,250.58\n144,285,005.45\nOf Which: Deposits\n4,258,022.10\n4,034,436.70\n11,564,286.23\n18,274,727.25\n50,378,763.77\n58,733,325.78\n65,301,846.77\n82,156,742.51\nLoans\n11,229,880.61\n12,249,615.34\n12,142,786.55\n15,788,816.82\n32,900,853.99\n41,878,774.31\n54,894,403.81\n62,128,262.94\nOther\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nNet Domestic Assets (NDA)\n194,736,649.82\n245,756,879.91\n319,731,034.22\n410,548,022.91\n753,463,074.66\n866,386,967.85\n1,113,922,948.02\n1,325,580,796.37\nDomestic Claims\n144,215,018.58\n196,079,149.63\n269,323,457.84\n366,618,461.95\n681,548,604.87\n790,856,307.03\n951,294,251.11\n1,129,850,559.29\nNet Claims on Central Government\n11,333,414.08\n32,704,534.68\n37,452,449.68\n45,255,818.78\n76,724,974.28\n82,246,329.63\n92,408,121.59\n134,872,792.86\nClaims on Central Government\n17,628,680.44\n36,217,408.46\n41,473,145.20\n50,586,318.88\n86,951,208.31\n91,609,835.37\n100,300,557.99\n143,580,041.50\nSecurities\n17,610,769.74\n36,196,334.62\n41,452,052.93\n50,566,914.20\n86,890,010.11\n91,509,184.64\n100,187,059.48\n143,464,932.04\nLoans\n17,910.70\n21,073.85\n21,092.28\n19,404.68\n61,198.20\n100,650.73\n113,498.51\n115,109.46\nOther \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \nLess Liabilities to Central Governm\n6,295,266.36\n3,512,873.79\n4,020,695.53\n5,330,500.10\n10,226,234.03\n9,363,505.74\n7,892,436.40\n8,707,248.64\nOf which: Deposits\n6,295,266.36\n3,512,873.79\n4,020,695.53\n5,330,500.10\n10,226,234.03\n9,363,505.74\n7,892,436.40\n8,707,248.64\nOther \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nClaims on Other Sectors\n132,881,604.50\n163,374,614.95\n231,871,008.16\n321,362,643.17\n604,823,630.59\n708,609,977.40\n858,886,129.52\n994,977,766.44\nOther Financial Corporations\n2,638,449.64\n2,923,183.89\n7,769,942.90\n5,432,333.10\n7,792,720.84\n11,771,347.28\n14,375,915.86\n15,622,928.29\nState and Local Government\n84,251.94\n67,566.82\n170,565.46\n254,314.27\n226,287.26\n349,675.75\n287,141.09\n306,328.41\nPublic Non Financial Corporations\n1,531,319.65\n1,897,960.80\n2,984,603.82\n6,240,938.55\n14,542,574.22\n22,910,548.08\n46,439,978.25\n41,532,709.91\nPrivate Sector\n128,627,583.28\n158,485,903.44\n220,945,895.99\n309,435,057.25\n582,262,048.27\n673,578,406.29\n797,783,094.32\n937,515,799.83\nClaims on the Central Bank\n77,498,004.69\n103,849,755.97\n121,289,617.10\n145,073,995.32\n269,492,980.99\n318,260,082.09\n414,080,563.81\n503,930,421.77\nCurrency\n1,702,788.29\n2,853,747.83\n2,838,319.42\n2,111,530.50\n2,801,158.38\n2,427,607.04\n2,640,635.61\n2,922,820.51\nReserves\n75,795,216.40\n100,996,008.14\n118,451,297.69\n142,962,464.82\n266,691,822.61\n315,832,475.04\n411,439,928.20\n501,007,601.27\nSecurities\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nOther Claims\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nLiabilities to the Central Bank\n662,275.52\n1,453,072.21\n2,808,102.91\n2,137,854.54\n2,898,518.67\n2,814,941.97\n3,230,742.76\n3,720,151.81\nOther Items(Net)\n26,314,097.93\n52,718,953.48\n68,073,937.82\n99,006,579.83\n194,679,992.54\n239,914,479.29\n248,221,124.14\n304,480,032.88\nShares and Other Equity\n65,146,196.53\n75,878,499.05\n118,865,727.97\n157,494,748.85\n330,886,860.40\n386,432,527.29\n466,561,590.88\n528,198,118.44\nLiabilities to other ressident sectors\n462,598.19\n375,417.86\n139,767.85\n810,634.46\n345,211.38\n1,339,092.93\n555,226.55\n587,178.66\nOther Items(Net)\n-39,294,696.79\n-23,534,963.43\n-50,931,558.00\n-59,298,803.48\n-136,552,079.25\n-147,857,140.93\n-218,895,693.28\n-224,305,264.21\nDeposits and Securities Included in Bro\n300,097,173.91\n361,964,634.51\n471,445,180.01\n584,688,027.00\n1,116,078,749.06\n1,198,705,414.81\n1,600,316,690.89\n1,911,815,680.07\nDeposits Included in Broad Money\n298,537,512.57\n \n358,772,700.20\n \n467,748,846.19\n \n580,177,132.24\n \n1,108,920,811.95\n \n1,190,567,540.78\n \n1,587,531,116.15\n \n1,897,768,184.73\n \nTransferable Deposits\n277,141,914.54\n \n332,392,044.95\n \n430,345,882.39\n \n526,027,929.32\n \n1,028,029,948.34\n \n1,096,365,440.31\n \n1,453,358,587.07\n \n1,740,700,191.97\n \n of which FCAs\n133,608,092.81\n \n151,047,925.52\n \n210,688,453.17\n \n275,160,384.59\n \n657,871,279.96\n \n688,801,163.42\n \n991,050,824.09\n \n1,196,071,655.58\n \nOther Deposits\n21,395,598.04\n26,380,655.25\n37,402,963.80\n54,149,202.92\n80,890,863.60\n94,202,100.47\n134,172,529.07\n157,067,992.76\nMoney Market Instruments\n1,559,661.34\n \n3,191,934.31\n \n3,696,333.82\n \n4,510,894.76\n \n7,157,937.12\n \n8,137,874.02\n \n12,785,574.75\n \n14,047,495.34\n \n Source: Reserve Bankof Zimbabwe, 2022\n TABLE 3 : OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS SURVEY ( ZWL$ '000)\n31 \n \n \nZWL$ Thousands\nEnd of\nGold\nOther\nTotal\nTreasury Bills\nCentral\nBanks\nOther\nGovt.\nOther\nOther Assets\nTOTAL\nGovernment\nStock\n2021\nJan\n172,422.4\n18,514,683.1\n18,687,105.4\n6,165,262.6\n18,437,148.8\n2,564,013.7\n7,845,851.8\n0.0\n205,904.7\n6,726,004.2\n60,631,291.2\nFeb\n164,474.3\n17,693,200.2\n17,857,674.5\n6,095,109.2\n18,695,624.2\n2,678,324.8\n8,110,252.7\n0.0\n704,855.5\n6,818,055.7\n60,959,896.5\nMar\n159,880.8\n23,080,223.7\n23,240,104.6\n5,962,815.3\n19,714,713.8\n2,055,511.3\n7,418,491.6\n0.0\n704,855.5\n7,993,138.8\n67,089,630.8\nApr\n167,570.1\n17,947,444.3\n18,115,014.4\n5,871,229.6\n22,005,617.7\n2,433,322.8\n8,948,936.8\n0.0\n1,536,872.8\n13,430,548.5\n72,341,542.6\nMay\n171,432.2\n20,162,745.0\n20,334,177.2\n5,850,605.1\n22,465,781.8\n3,018,822.7\n9,030,329.0\n0.0\n1,606,872.8\n15,447,639.2\n77,754,227.8\nJun\n168,571.5\n32,968,499.7\n33,137,071.2\n5,809,922.7\n18,675,222.7\n3,426,911.2\n12,018,425.8\n0.0\n1,606,872.8\n13,139,983.0\n87,814,409.3\nJul\n178,555.8\n21,647,885.2\n21,826,441.0\n5,803,706.3\n16,952,495.3\n3,478,459.4\n10,464,191.0\n0.0\n1,606,872.8\n14,712,334.1\n74,844,499.9\nAug\n177,982.1\n106,069,437.7\n106,247,419.8\n5,778,201.7\n17,005,332.9\n3,525,244.7\n13,574,836.0\n0.0\n1,606,872.8\n15,941,939.8\n163,679,847.8\nSep\n173,237.9\n103,520,069.9\n103,693,307.8\n5,767,697.2\n17,833,656.5\n3,296,141.9\n17,005,018.5\n0.0\n2,243,680.6\n15,544,611.3\n165,384,113.7\nOct\n199,208.6\n112,129,177.5\n112,328,386.1\n5,748,064.6\n25,695,250.0\n3,969,163.2\n20,206,279.4\n0.0\n2,243,680.6\n14,447,196.8\n184,638,020.7\nNov\n215,992.0\n121,327,907.8\n121,543,899.8\n5,737,560.0\n27,349,310.6\n4,856,091.3\n21,759,542.1\n0.0\n2,463,488.2\n15,868,332.7\n199,578,224.8\nDec\n225,772.8\n134,237,129.6\n134,462,902.4\n5,725,696.7\n51,228,986.8\n4,919,969.8\n22,342,311.1\n0.0\n2,463,488.2\n-8,097,011.0\n213,046,344.1\n2022\nJan\n235,763.3\n109,708,346.2\n109,944,109.5\n5,709,408.9\n52,667,064.3\n5,611,159.5\n19,041,740.9\n0.0\n2,963,488.2\n15,554,203.8\n211,491,175.1\nFeb\n270,813.7\n121,963,827.5\n122,234,641.2\n5,698,904.3\n53,343,629.6\n5,710,038.8\n25,077,085.8\n0.0\n2,963,488.2\n16,236,739.6\n231,264,527.6\nMar\n312,775.9\n141,125,554.6\n141,438,330.5\n5,628,648.4\n55,987,602.8\n10,763,971.7\n22,095,456.7\n0.0\n3,341,227.6\n40,479,788.1\n279,735,025.8\nApr\n347,339.4\n158,165,751.2\n158,513,090.6\n5,618,143.8\n58,769,044.7\n11,883,261.4\n24,571,816.9\n0.0\n3,341,227.6\n44,921,831.2\n307,618,416.2\nMay\n656,689.2\n294,886,459.6\n295,543,148.8\n5,618,143.8\n78,389,443.4\n7,158,720.8\n43,404,732.4\n0.0\n3,341,227.6\n54,019,333.5\n487,474,750.3\nJun\n790,541.7\n377,477,927.8\n378,268,469.5\n5,618,143.8\n88,353,569.1\n9,947,986.8\n54,976,995.8\n0.0\n3,341,227.6\n73,353,516.5\n613,859,909.2\nJul\n1,622,450.3\n457,498,669.8\n459,121,120.0\n11,099,253.3\n89,490,529.9\n11,136,478.9\n69,403,348.4\n0.0\n3,441,227.6\n75,423,298.3\n719,115,256.5\nAug\n3,853,408.2\n460,570,799.4\n464,424,207.6\n16,894,372.0\n233,300,046.1\n26,441,912.9\n85,506,977.0\n0.0\n3,441,227.6\n95,708,175.1\n925,716,918.4\nSep\n1,213,569.6\n422,128,573.4\n423,342,143.1\n24,148,817.3\n240,464,254.5\n40,716,900.0\n102,506,548.5\n0.0\n3,441,227.6\n159,983,505.1\n994,603,396.2\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2022\nTABLE 4.1: RESERVE BANK - ASSETS\n Foreign Assets\nLoans and advances\nInvestments\n32 \n \n \n TABLE 4.2 RESERVE BANK: LIABILITIES\nCapital\nand\nForeign\ngeneral\nEnd of\nBond Notes in \nCirculation\nBond Coins in \nCirculation\nBond Notes and\nBankers Deposits \nOther Deposits\nGovt. Deposits\nTotal Deposits\nLiabilities\nreserve\nOther Liabilities\nTOTAL\ncoins* issued\n2021\nJan\n2,603,694.0\n99,709.7\n2,703,403.6\n20,920,048.1\n21,688,620.0\n10,307,762.6\n52,916,430.7\n425,318,694.3\n-459,147,547.1\n38,840,309.7\n60,631,291.2\nFeb\n2,847,426.2\n99,709.7\n2,947,136.0\n22,660,783.0\n24,907,445.2\n9,862,815.0\n57,431,043.2\n428,867,855.1\n-467,159,156.0\n38,873,018.4\n60,959,896.5\nMar\n3,050,378.4\n99,709.9\n3,150,088.2\n20,092,956.4\n30,447,666.0\n15,728,217.8\n66,268,840.2\n427,903,556.2\n-471,095,071.7\n40,862,217.8\n67,089,630.8\nApr\n3,152,287.9\n99,710.0\n3,251,997.9\n22,781,563.8\n31,557,045.4\n10,326,569.7\n64,665,179.0\n420,425,213.3\n-458,343,431.2\n42,342,583.6\n72,341,542.6\nMay\n3,550,401.6\n99,710.1\n3,650,111.7\n25,208,126.4\n29,954,715.7\n7,106,858.3\n62,269,700.5\n438,867,998.8\n-477,762,942.2\n50,729,358.9\n77,754,227.8\nJun\n3,797,075.3\n99,710.1\n3,896,785.4\n31,010,207.0\n35,366,426.1\n12,123,477.0\n78,500,110.2\n441,336,133.8\n-486,305,203.5\n50,386,583.4\n87,814,409.3\nJul\n4,413,772.0\n99,710.2\n4,513,482.2\n25,268,616.0\n39,365,261.3\n9,556,162.6\n74,190,039.9\n433,994,649.5\n-488,981,304.2\n51,127,632.5\n74,844,499.9\nAug\n4,650,585.0\n99,710.2\n4,750,295.2\n27,516,749.2\n19,263,821.8\n10,650,081.3\n57,430,652.3\n518,211,536.1\n-491,527,426.7\n74,814,790.9\n163,679,847.8\nSep\n4,671,398.4\n99,710.1\n4,771,108.5\n26,137,503.7\n18,736,378.0\n13,828,878.2\n58,702,759.9\n525,400,897.5\n-501,914,984.0\n78,424,331.9\n165,384,113.7\nOct\n4,714,194.4\n99,710.1\n4,813,904.5\n23,893,054.5\n25,896,593.1\n13,263,310.5\n63,052,958.1\n582,444,248.0\n-555,638,121.1\n89,965,031.3\n184,638,020.7\nNov\n4,805,542.4\n99,710.1\n4,905,252.6\n30,737,671.8\n27,610,522.4\n15,013,224.4\n73,361,418.5\n629,845,408.6\n-604,000,281.4\n95,466,426.5\n199,578,224.8\nDec\n5,052,397.2\n99,710.2\n5,152,107.4\n30,869,294.1\n32,084,904.4\n8,908,029.2\n71,862,227.7\n647,475,472.6\n-620,887,582.2\n109,444,118.6\n213,046,344.1\n2022\nJan\n4,993,493.5\n99,710.2\n5,093,203.7\n28,440,230.1\n32,419,816.6\n32,678,210.2\n93,538,256.8\n679,232,958.6\n-657,568,133.3\n91,194,889.3\n211,491,175.1\nFeb\n5,093,893.8\n99,710.3\n5,193,604.1\n30,520,031.8\n31,781,304.4\n28,848,204.3\n91,149,540.6\n731,023,608.5\n-700,269,273.0\n104,167,047.3\n231,264,527.6\nMar\n5,240,635.1\n99,710.3\n5,340,345.4\n35,666,987.9\n32,359,947.9\n25,890,825.5\n93,917,761.3\n859,032,643.6\n-804,754,190.0\n126,198,465.5\n279,735,025.8\nApr\n6,014,484.4\n99,710.4\n6,114,194.8\n35,882,452.7\n39,908,611.5\n16,181,306.8\n91,972,371.0\n952,918,373.1\n-896,652,942.7\n153,266,420.0\n307,618,416.2\nMay\n6,165,661.9\n99,710.4\n6,265,372.3\n41,961,381.1\n73,732,194.5\n27,396,848.5\n143,090,424.1\n1,773,918,543.0\n-1,694,545,332.4\n258,745,743.3\n487,474,750.3\nJun\n6,165,333.2\n99,710.5\n6,265,043.7\n57,428,589.8\n134,105,399.5\n61,011,771.2\n252,545,760.5\n2,181,260,572.4\n-2,081,541,626.9\n255,330,159.5\n613,859,909.2\nJul\n6,412,784.0\n99,710.5\n6,512,494.6\n67,625,923.7\n183,776,332.7\n49,354,263.3\n300,756,519.7\n2,593,125,027.8\n-2,495,937,680.3\n314,658,894.7\n719,115,256.5\nAug\n6,554,970.1\n99,710.6\n6,654,680.7\n149,247,595.6\n237,114,720.8\n102,864,089.4\n489,226,405.8\n2,746,097,750.7\n-2,662,572,351.1\n346,310,432.3\n925,716,918.4\nSep\n6,740,568.3\n99,710.6\n6,840,278.9\n153,102,864.5\n227,519,780.3\n126,701,556.5\n507,324,201.3\n2,963,877,357.0\n-2,881,231,066.4\n397,792,625.5\n994,603,396.2\nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2022\n*Bond coins first issued in December 2014\n* Bond Notes issued on 28 November 2016\nZWL$ Thousands\nDeposits\n33 \n \n \nForeign\nTOTAL\nEnd of\nNotes\nBond\n&\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \nLocal\nOther \n Notes &\nCoin\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernme\nLocal \nOther\n2\nGovernment\nLocal \nPublic \n Institutional Other cliams Contigent Assets Other Assets Non Financial \nCoins\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks\nNon-residents\nSecurities securities\nGovernment Enterprises\nUnits\nAssets\n2021\nJan\n1,483.3\n \n42,733.9\n \n77,994.4\n \n13,109.2\n \n40,071.8\n \n10,922.0\n10,322.7\n10.2\n0.0\n212.4\n16.7\n18.0\n1,264.3\n77,984.0\n5,315.2\n25,036.2\n15,951.2\n41,028.5\n363,474.0\nFeb\n1,735.4\n \n41,180.7\n \n76,140.3\n \n17,748.1\n \n39,141.4\n \n6,341.4\n15,612.1\n9.2\n0.0\n238.0\n24.1\n22.7\n1,493.7\n84,845.3\n5,413.6\n28,339.2\n19,441.2\n42,761.3\n380,487.7\nMar\n1,457.1\n \n40,953.3\n \n83,032.1\n \n6,945.5\n \n42,516.8\n \n8,733.6\n17,602.7\n8.4\n19.2\n449.7\n15.2\n21.7\n1,400.3\n90,291.7\n4,912.2\n32,908.1\n22,849.5\n40,104.9\n394,221.9\nApr\n1,699.7\n \n40,964.4\n \n85,330.2\n \n6,844.8\n \n49,733.4\n \n7,679.0\n19,384.3\n7.7\n19.2\n571.8\n19.9\n12.7\n1,336.7\n104,118.1\n5,432.6\n34,537.9\n25,207.8\n41,034.6\n423,934.8\nMay\n1,906.1\n \n30,579.1\n \n94,330.9\n \n7,907.2\n \n63,644.8\n \n11,582.4\n19,197.1\n7.0\n152.7\n611.0\n21.8\n16.6\n1,263.7\n111,185.7\n5,063.0\n35,592.3\n24,975.4\n40,256.6\n448,293.6\nJun\n1,702.8\n \n30,255.6\n \n75,795.2\n \n25,605.9\n \n72,780.6\n \n17,601.3\n17,610.8\n6.5\n19.5\n1,385.2\n17.9\n77.8\n1,511.9\n125,592.3\n5,203.8\n26,856.5\n29,616.4\n42,418.7\n474,058.5\nJul\n2,139.9\n \n30,509.1\n \n104,983.5\n \n17,817.9\n \n82,032.9\n \n25,314.3\n23,160.6\n6.0\n290.8\n1,264.1\n17.3\n67.8\n1,351.1\n135,107.8\n5,762.2\n26,869.2\n33,897.2\n42,726.7\n533,318.3\nAug\n2,551.1\n \n33,323.4\n \n93,806.9\n \n11,919.2\n \n72,753.9\n \n25,194.9\n35,371.1\n5.4\n339.7\n1,111.2\n22.5\n63.9\n1,583.3\n150,558.7\n7,014.2\n32,281.1\n34,820.2\n46,819.4\n549,540.1\nSep\n2,853.7\n \n38,500.1\n \n100,996.0\n \n8,626.8\n \n68,707.9\n \n25,023.4\n36,196.3\n5.1\n366.9\n948.5\n21.1\n62.5\n1,531.1\n154,818.9\n6,587.8\n31,981.0\n35,461.8\n45,544.7\n558,233.5\nOct\n2,611.1\n \n50,074.7\n \n108,009.2\n \n9,575.8\n \n89,822.4\n \n26,924.2\n43,786.5\n4.3\n188.1\n1,054.2\n21.2\n75.4\n1,683.9\n172,358.5\n6,987.7\n49,581.0\n47,370.6\n47,611.9\n657,740.6\nNov\n2,721.5\n \n53,424.3\n \n107,781.7\n \n15,560.6\n \n74,072.3\n \n29,748.5\n47,418.1\n3.7\n187.0\n2,678.7\n21.2\n74.8\n1,882.5\n195,765.6\n7,682.2\n52,327.7\n45,567.2\n54,967.5\n691,885.0\nDec\n2,838.3\n \n50,031.0\n \n118,451.3\n \n13,654.0\n \n91,352.6\n \n33,690.9\n41,452.1\n3.0\n186.0\n6,192.4\n21.1\n167.5\n2,998.6\n212,438.0\n14,917.3\n60,917.0\n48,759.9\n71,817.7\n769,888.8\n2022\nJan\n2,891.2\n \n53,378.3\n \n116,654.8\n \n13,232.3\n \n69,668.2\n \n30,774.3\n40,241.6\n2.4\n186.8\n2,906.7\n20.3\n163.0\n4,023.2\n228,616.6\n16,284.0\n53,627.8\n55,303.6\n85,737.0\n773,712.0\nFeb\n2,577.7\n \n62,064.5\n \n122,479.8\n \n17,480.5\n \n76,802.2\n \n28,703.5\n49,241.8\n1.6\n0.0\n3,242.5\n20.3\n158.1\n5,761.9\n249,205.9\n16,681.8\n55,099.6\n59,171.4\n86,732.0\n835,425.0\nMar\n2,111.5\n \n76,544.2\n \n142,962.5\n \n19,239.6\n \n87,884.5\n \n43,284.1\n50,566.9\n0.9\n0.0\n2,970.2\n19.4\n253.4\n6,635.8\n296,282.4\n16,435.1\n65,660.6\n69,287.0\n94,293.1\n974,431.2\nApr\n2,624.9\n \n74,716.9\n \n160,466.5\n \n28,352.1\n \n123,190.3\n \n26,628.8\n63,944.8\n0.2\n0.0\n2,583.9\n37.5\n252.4\n7,258.1\n338,207.2\n30,154.8\n53,372.3\n73,993.0\n90,352.8\n1,076,136.5\nMay\n3,155.9\n \n142,118.9\n \n236,166.0\n \n35,928.9\n \n207,812.8\n \n61,757.6\n70,936.8\n0.0\n155.0\n3,762.8\n41.3\n289.0\n16,588.0\n455,287.9\n36,125.5\n134,993.5\n111,577.7\n130,617.1\n1,647,314.7\nJun\n2,801.2\n \n138,347.1\n \n266,691.8\n \n45,952.0\n \n241,920.1\n \n63,631.8\n86,890.0\n0.0\n654.0\n5,297.4\n61.2\n226.3\n14,282.6\n549,799.2\n38,578.3\n169,511.8\n130,604.3\n205,601.3\n1,960,850.3\nJul\n2,427.6\n \n159,024.6\n \n315,832.5\n \n39,388.2\n \n230,432.5\n \n41,246.8\n91,509.2\n0.0\n394.3\n4,940.5\n100.7\n349.7\n22,911.0\n638,556.7\n45,361.4\n144,090.2\n143,606.3\n242,024.6\n2,122,196.7\nAug\n2,640.6\n \n263,637.4\n \n411,439.9\n \n69,203.5\n \n311,107.0\n \n29,186.6\n100,187.1\n0.0\n330.1\n6,912.2\n113.5\n287.1\n46,504.1\n764,466.3\n46,788.2\n167,029.4\n251,442.9\n244,934.2\n2,716,210.1\nSep\n3,030.7\n \n289,230.8\n \n504,071.1\n \n75,446.7\n \n417,007.1\n \n18,185.0\n143,464.9\n0.0\n267.4\n8,265.9\n115.1\n306.3\n41,560.9\n902,078.3\n51,664.5\n146,133.1\n231,760.0\n285,781.8\n3,118,369.8\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2022\nNotes\n1.Government securities includes treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households and other financial corporations.\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\nPublic \nEnterprises\nTABLE 5.1: OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS -ASSETS\nZWL$ millions\n34 \n \n \nForeign Liabilities\nCapital\nContigent\nOther\nTOTAL\nand\nLiablities\nLiablities\nEnd of\nDemand\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository Government \nTotal\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial Reserves\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\n2021\nJan\n188,337.3\n17,667.3\n11,376.7\n217,381.3\n2,730.8\n5,453.7\n225,565.8\n1,422.4\n15,750.7\n391.1\n600.9\n376.7\n58,123.9\n25,036.2\n36,206.3\n363,474.0\nFeb\n189,154.3\n18,991.1\n14,072.8\n222,218.2\n2,959.1\n4,788.2\n229,965.5\n1,457.4\n15,908.6\n409.2\n581.4\n609.9\n63,583.8\n28,339.2\n39,632.7\n380,487.7\nMar\n193,674.2\n21,569.9\n14,209.4\n229,453.4\n4,691.2\n4,875.8\n239,020.5\n1,641.2\n14,997.2\n75.4\n1,378.2\n408.9\n67,061.8\n32,908.1\n36,730.7\n394,221.9\nApr\n219,936.5\n23,818.3\n13,746.7\n257,501.5\n2,725.1\n5,382.5\n265,609.2\n1,503.8\n15,748.4\n176.5\n939.0\n409.9\n68,812.8\n34,537.9\n36,197.4\n423,934.8\nMay\n232,585.8\n26,296.1\n18,415.5\n277,297.4\n2,205.9\n6,832.6\n286,335.9\n1,525.8\n16,063.1\n654.2\n540.1\n429.0\n69,567.0\n35,592.3\n37,586.2\n448,293.6\nJun\n249,167.5\n27,977.7\n21,449.6\n298,594.8\n2,906.1\n6,295.3\n307,796.2\n1,559.7\n15,430.6\n662.3\n939.0\n462.6\n72,403.8\n26,856.5\n47,947.9\n474,058.5\nJul\n271,359.4\n31,671.3\n23,074.4\n326,105.1\n3,016.7\n5,050.7\n334,172.4\n1,523.2\n16,041.4\n706.9\n750.8\n552.8\n76,406.3\n26,869.2\n76,295.4\n533,318.3\nAug\n275,007.8\n29,893.2\n29,352.2\n334,253.2\n3,661.5\n5,912.2\n343,826.8\n1,873.1\n18,699.5\n1,444.4\n2,300.1\n478.6\n82,627.2\n32,281.1\n66,009.2\n549,540.1\nSep\n301,829.4\n30,564.7\n26,426.5\n358,820.7\n3,719.1\n3,512.9\n366,052.6\n3,191.9\n16,236.1\n1,453.1\n71.3\n375.4\n84,564.6\n31,981.0\n54,307.5\n558,233.5\nOct\n350,366.7\n33,145.0\n27,967.9\n411,479.6\n2,824.1\n3,162.8\n417,466.5\n3,729.7\n21,509.9\n1,095.3\n1,109.9\n503.1\n92,871.8\n49,581.0\n69,873.5\n657,740.6\nNov\n363,455.0\n33,905.6\n33,256.8\n430,617.4\n3,325.7\n2,899.2\n436,842.3\n4,007.8\n19,465.9\n2,726.5\n1,556.1\n347.1\n104,310.9\n52,327.7\n70,300.6\n691,885.0\nDec\n396,412.5\n33,935.5\n37,464.8\n467,812.7\n3,922.1\n4,020.7\n475,755.5\n3,696.3\n23,643.2\n2,808.1\n2,405.3\n139.8\n128,421.4\n60,917.0\n72,102.3\n769,888.8\n2022\nJan\n392,702.2\n32,298.0\n39,346.3\n464,346.5\n2,962.5\n4,027.0\n471,336.0\n3,685.3\n25,398.5\n2,688.6\n1,416.9\n230.5\n144,852.4\n53,627.8\n70,476.0\n773,712.0\nFeb\n413,978.3\n37,494.3\n47,592.5\n499,065.1\n3,229.3\n4,407.7\n506,702.1\n4,456.2\n30,483.6\n2,120.4\n1,769.7\n226.8\n153,788.5\n55,099.6\n80,778.2\n835,425.0\nMar\n488,137.1\n37,893.9\n54,213.9\n580,244.9\n3,062.2\n5,330.5\n588,637.7\n4,510.9\n33,995.7\n2,137.9\n3,281.0\n810.6\n175,156.3\n65,660.6\n100,240.6\n974,431.2\nApr\n562,613.7\n46,129.7\n52,760.1\n661,503.5\n6,377.5\n7,656.8\n675,537.9\n4,246.9\n38,472.7\n2,173.0\n3,877.2\n486.8\n178,614.3\n53,372.3\n119,355.4\n1,076,136.5\nMay\n830,166.0\n61,112.6\n70,113.9\n961,392.5\n7,310.9\n7,417.6\n976,120.9\n6,165.3\n73,411.8\n2,383.3\n3,241.0\n321.8\n243,544.4\n134,993.5\n207,132.5\n1,647,314.7\nJun\n961,316.9\n66,716.9\n81,118.5\n1,109,152.4\n5,627.3\n10,226.2\n1,125,005.9\n7,157.9\n83,048.1\n2,898.5\n4,589.8\n345.2\n355,060.9\n169,511.8\n213,232.2\n1,960,850.3\nJul\n1,016,820.2\n79,550.5\n94,495.2\n1,190,865.8\n1,789.6\n9,363.5\n1,202,018.9\n8,137.9\n100,313.8\n2,814.9\n5,020.5\n1,339.1\n419,883.3\n144,090.2\n238,578.1\n2,122,196.7\nAug\n1,367,431.3\n85,931.5\n134,512.9\n1,587,875.7\n2,415.4\n7,892.4\n1,598,183.5\n12,785.6\n119,851.6\n3,230.7\n5,771.2\n555.2\n491,336.5\n167,029.4\n317,466.4\n2,716,210.1\nSep\n1,648,027.7\n92,678.5\n157,504.6\n1,898,210.8\n1,482.9\n8,707.2\n1,908,401.0\n14,047.5\n143,842.3\n3,720.2\n9,246.7\n587.2\n553,942.2\n146,133.1\n338,449.6\n3,118,369.8\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2022\nTABLE 5.2 : OTHER DEPOSITORY CORPORATIONS - LIABILITIES \nZWL$ millions\nDeposits\nAmounts Owing to\nDebt Securities\n35 \n \n \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nForeign\nBond\nNotes\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \nLocal\nPublic\nOther \nContigent \nNon Financial \n Notes &\n&\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment\n1Local GovernemtPublic Enterprises\nOther\n2 Government Government\nEnterprises\n Institutional Units\n3 Other claims\nAssets\nOther Assets\nAssets\nCoins\nCoin\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks Non-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\n2021\nJan\n1,237.43\n \n39,565.64\n \n71,463.64\n \n12,288.89\n \n39,092.85\n \n10,921.99\n \n8,281.80\n \n-\n \n-\n \n1.18\n \n16.67\n \n18.01\n \n1,264.28\n \n71,090.96\n \n718.83\n \n25,036.22\n \n12,333.21\n \n32,123.11\n \n325,454.7\n \nFeb\n1,320.27\n \n38,100.03\n \n69,341.48\n \n16,867.76\n \n38,108.83\n \n6,341.39\n \n12,518.15\n \n-\n \n-\n \n1.26\n \n24.15\n \n22.69\n \n1,493.66\n \n77,324.34\n \n774.89\n \n28,339.17\n \n15,953.14\n \n33,612.14\n \n340,143.4\n \nMar\n1,244.16\n \n38,369.53\n \n76,479.44\n \n5,317.61\n \n41,401.24\n \n8,733.65\n \n15,889.61\n \n-\n \n19.21\n \n34.56\n \n15.17\n \n21.67\n \n1,309.75\n \n80,607.03\n \n878.97\n \n32,908.13\n \n19,302.34\n \n30,861.86\n \n353,393.9\n \nApr\n1,430.83\n \n38,008.89\n \n79,592.64\n \n5,639.40\n \n48,564.03\n \n7,679.05\n \n18,267.01\n \n-\n \n19.23\n \n62.89\n \n19.86\n \n12.71\n \n1,336.70\n \n91,062.16\n \n956.75\n \n34,537.88\n \n21,214.88\n \n32,383.77\n \n380,788.7\n \nMay\n1,648.09\n \n28,677.21\n \n87,611.51\n \n6,479.66\n \n59,745.10\n \n11,582.44\n \n18,846.75\n \n-\n \n152.75\n \n93.37\n \n21.77\n \n16.58\n \n1,263.75\n \n94,790.46\n \n990.41\n \n35,592.28\n \n21,398.95\n \n31,307.45\n \n400,218.5\n \nJun\n1,419.27\n \n28,452.53\n \n69,413.26\n \n24,215.35\n \n70,835.98\n \n17,601.31\n \n17,152.75\n \n-\n \n19.46\n \n92.91\n \n17.91\n \n77.79\n \n1,511.86\n \n106,954.15\n \n1,247.08\n \n26,856.45\n \n26,444.57\n \n33,288.94\n \n425,601.6\n \nJul\n1,794.72\n \n29,100.73\n \n97,429.50\n \n15,901.02\n \n79,937.02\n \n25,314.30\n \n21,665.10\n \n-\n \n290.76\n \n47.39\n \n17.32\n \n67.80\n \n1,351.13\n \n117,348.16\n \n1,301.18\n \n26,869.18\n \n29,079.64\n \n33,587.68\n \n481,102.6\n \nAug\n2,137.72\n \n31,734.84\n \n85,441.98\n \n9,099.10\n \n70,391.64\n \n25,194.95\n \n31,434.20\n \n-\n \n339.72\n \n51.28\n \n22.49\n \n63.94\n \n1,583.28\n \n132,522.63\n \n1,337.19\n \n32,281.12\n \n30,022.43\n \n37,697.05\n \n491,355.6\n \nSep\n2,417.81\n \n36,259.54\n \n93,032.71\n \n6,164.78\n \n66,640.78\n \n25,023.38\n \n31,460.81\n \n-\n \n366.88\n \n57.60\n \n21.07\n \n62.45\n \n1,531.08\n \n134,780.92\n \n1,342.62\n \n31,980.97\n \n30,439.34\n \n34,630.85\n \n496,213.6\n \nOct\n1,993.06\n \n47,379.62\n \n99,470.02\n \n7,339.71\n \n86,302.62\n \n26,924.18\n \n37,639.16\n \n-\n \n188.07\n \n121.59\n \n21.20\n \n75.41\n \n1,683.89\n \n149,477.36\n \n1,523.34\n \n49,580.96\n \n40,853.06\n \n36,664.31\n \n587,237.6\n \nNov\n2,168.80\n \n49,327.15\n \n100,125.90\n \n12,723.73\n \n71,667.33\n \n29,748.47\n \n41,015.56\n \n-\n \n187.03\n \n999.12\n \n21.24\n \n74.76\n \n1,882.53\n \n168,661.25\n \n1,484.24\n \n52,327.68\n \n40,073.22\n \n43,878.52\n \n616,366.5\n \nDec\n2,315.32\n \n46,412.99\n \n109,803.84\n \n10,942.92\n \n87,347.07\n \n33,690.93\n \n38,610.29\n \n-\n \n185.99\n \n4,146.13\n \n21.09\n \n167.53\n \n2,798.61\n \n184,836.87\n \n3,368.75\n \n60,916.98\n \n41,811.67\n \n59,011.63\n \n686,388.6\n \n2022\nJan\n2,359.27\n \n49,206.02\n \n108,119.97\n \n10,419.90\n \n66,808.45\n \n30,774.31\n \n38,636.84\n \n-\n \n186.80\n \n801.50\n \n20.33\n \n163.02\n \n3,628.73\n \n199,495.34\n \n2,997.94\n \n53,627.76\n \n47,405.91\n \n69,989.80\n \n684,641.89\n \nFeb\n1,971.78\n \n57,553.54\n \n112,522.99\n \n14,300.66\n \n70,750.63\n \n28,703.53\n \n44,705.21\n \n-\n \n-\n \n976.55\n \n20.34\n \n158.06\n \n5,367.16\n \n215,520.37\n \n3,055.50\n \n55,099.61\n \n53,459.12\n \n70,832.47\n \n734,997.53\n \nMar\n1,541.49\n \n70,856.33\n \n130,423.48\n \n15,503.46\n \n82,662.70\n \n43,284.13\n \n44,874.23\n \n-\n \n-\n \n1,380.20\n \n19.40\n \n253.42\n \n6,240.94\n \n258,715.05\n \n3,092.69\n \n65,660.61\n \n58,874.69\n \n76,938.87\n \n860,321.67\n \nApr\n1,939.64\n \n70,204.43\n \n144,168.02\n \n23,452.88\n \n117,033.42\n \n26,628.79\n \n57,772.47\n \n-\n \n-\n \n722.54\n \n37.54\n \n252.44\n \n6,858.06\n \n305,476.79\n \n4,348.46\n \n53,372.28\n \n62,788.55\n \n71,414.75\n \n946,471.05\n \nMay\n2,397.94\n \n131,996.38\n \n211,837.59\n \n31,586.61\n \n190,366.81\n \n61,757.62\n \n64,373.91\n \n-\n \n154.99\n \n1,559.14\n \n41.28\n \n289.00\n \n16,193.81\n \n398,048.90\n \n4,712.74\n \n134,993.54\n \n94,851.60\n \n111,543.84\n \n1,456,705.70\n \nJun\n2,263.18\n \n127,839.16\n \n234,109.43\n \n40,937.28\n \n219,607.39\n \n63,631.76\n \n83,690.44\n \n-\n \n653.97\n \n2,159.12\n \n61.20\n \n226.29\n \n13,888.60\n \n478,163.38\n \n8,954.46\n \n169,511.81\n \n110,528.09\n \n168,440.54\n \n1,724,666.09\n \nJul\n1,578.47\n \n147,217.74\n \n284,912.89\n \n34,334.13\n \n202,815.28\n \n41,246.78\n \n86,971.63\n \n-\n \n394.34\n \n1,852.14\n \n100.65\n \n349.68\n \n22,516.21\n \n556,692.12\n \n9,737.92\n \n144,090.18\n \n129,869.55\n \n192,524.32\n \n1,857,204.02\n \nAug\n1,630.70\n \n247,190.46\n \n377,078.80\n \n64,650.96\n \n273,181.97\n \n29,186.59\n \n95,346.12\n \n-\n \n330.12\n \n3,556.96\n \n113.50\n \n287.14\n \n26,564.57\n \n681,253.30\n \n11,493.92\n \n167,029.36\n \n238,442.98\n \n194,745.11\n \n2,412,082.57\n \nSep\n1,791.71\n \n270,594.59\n \n465,301.31\n \n68,020.95\n \n370,323.69\n \n18,184.96\n \n134,414.53\n \n-\n \n267.40\n \n4,916.56\n \n115.11\n \n306.33\n \n21,773.50\n \n806,774.24\n \n12,680.89\n \n146,133.14\n \n215,417.68\n \n219,933.24\n \n2,756,949.83\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2022\nTABLE 6.1: COMMERCIAL BANKS -ASSETS\nZWL$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n36 \n \n \n \nZWL$ millions\nEnd of\nDemand\nSavings\nTime Deposits Total Deposits Other Depository Government \nTotal\nDebt Securities Foreign Liabilities\nRBZ\nOther Depository Other Finacial \nCapital\nContigent\nOther\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\nand\nLiablities\nLiablities\nTOTAL\nReserves\n2021\nJan\n158,888.8\n28,456.6\n10,150.2\n197,495.5\n2,580.8\n5,423.4\n205,499.8\n1,142.5\n12,732.6\n391.1\n519.6\n376.7\n50,147.7\n25,036.2\n29,608.5\n325,454.7\nFeb\n162,092.2\n26,146.3\n12,239.7\n200,478.2\n2,809.1\n4,762.5\n208,049.7\n1,150.4\n12,833.2\n409.2\n540.7\n609.9\n54,930.3\n28,339.2\n33,280.7\n340,143.4\nMar\n165,101.1\n30,313.5\n12,276.4\n207,691.0\n4,541.2\n4,845.3\n217,077.6\n1,331.7\n11,620.2\n75.4\n1,136.7\n408.9\n58,208.9\n32,908.1\n30,626.5\n353,393.9\nApr\n191,923.5\n31,441.3\n11,549.5\n234,914.3\n2,195.0\n5,346.7\n242,455.9\n1,190.1\n11,503.5\n176.5\n757.1\n409.9\n60,361.3\n34,537.9\n29,396.5\n380,788.7\nMay\n194,108.9\n40,921.9\n15,896.4\n250,927.2\n1,705.9\n6,802.1\n259,435.2\n1,186.9\n11,783.3\n654.2\n145.2\n429.0\n61,202.0\n35,592.3\n29,790.4\n400,218.5\nJun\n211,950.0\n40,878.5\n18,536.0\n271,364.4\n2,696.6\n6,202.3\n280,263.2\n1,211.8\n11,575.5\n662.3\n368.5\n462.6\n63,417.5\n26,856.5\n40,783.7\n425,601.6\nJul\n226,860.1\n48,928.9\n19,775.4\n295,564.4\n2,991.7\n5,012.2\n303,568.3\n1,169.2\n12,552.8\n706.9\n476.2\n552.8\n66,514.1\n26,869.2\n68,693.1\n481,102.6\nAug\n237,167.0\n38,425.4\n25,114.2\n300,706.5\n3,601.5\n5,873.7\n310,181.7\n1,216.2\n13,354.7\n1,444.4\n1,678.3\n478.6\n72,123.3\n32,281.1\n58,597.3\n491,355.6\nSep\n263,598.2\n37,954.3\n21,954.4\n323,506.9\n3,643.0\n3,469.0\n330,618.9\n2,141.0\n11,770.4\n1,453.1\n-110.6\n375.4\n71,255.0\n31,981.0\n46,729.4\n496,213.6\nOct\n299,038.0\n50,766.0\n22,882.7\n372,686.7\n2,824.1\n3,023.7\n378,534.5\n2,411.8\n14,077.4\n1,095.3\n1,109.9\n503.1\n78,644.6\n49,581.0\n61,280.0\n587,237.6\nNov\n307,063.4\n52,309.9\n27,875.3\n387,248.6\n3,325.7\n2,764.9\n393,339.3\n2,869.4\n12,437.2\n2,726.5\n1,352.5\n347.1\n89,288.6\n52,327.7\n61,678.3\n616,366.5\nDec\n334,599.0\n58,318.5\n30,455.6\n423,373.1\n3,842.1\n3,855.7\n431,070.9\n3,027.0\n13,896.4\n2,808.1\n1,693.3\n139.8\n109,665.4\n60,917.0\n63,170.8\n686,388.6\n2022\nJan\n346,619.5\n43,438.8\n31,158.1\n421,216.4\n2,962.5\n3,864.8\n428,043.7\n2,995.6\n14,406.9\n2,688.6\n1,043.2\n230.5\n122,752.1\n53,627.8\n58,853.6\n684,641.9\nFeb\n358,979.4\n51,510.7\n38,313.7\n448,803.8\n3,229.3\n4,248.7\n456,281.8\n3,834.1\n16,267.7\n2,120.4\n1,338.1\n226.8\n130,981.3\n55,099.6\n68,847.8\n734,997.5\nMar\n422,934.6\n58,283.5\n42,258.5\n523,476.6\n3,062.2\n5,171.3\n531,710.2\n3,850.2\n18,374.8\n2,137.9\n2,779.1\n810.6\n149,781.8\n65,660.6\n85,216.5\n860,321.7\nApr\n479,558.7\n74,880.3\n40,491.0\n594,930.0\n6,377.5\n7,486.7\n608,794.2\n3,792.3\n21,445.6\n2,173.0\n3,173.0\n486.8\n149,610.1\n53,372.3\n103,623.7\n946,471.1\nMay\n666,937.8\n137,419.9\n55,389.8\n859,747.5\n7,310.9\n7,249.8\n874,308.3\n5,769.3\n39,105.1\n2,383.3\n2,207.5\n321.8\n214,978.6\n134,993.5\n182,638.3\n1,456,705.7\nJun\n773,692.7\n154,956.9\n63,511.7\n992,161.3\n4,597.1\n10,018.0\n1,006,776.4\n6,743.2\n42,701.8\n2,898.5\n3,389.3\n345.2\n307,341.8\n169,511.8\n184,958.1\n1,724,666.1\nJul\n810,906.6\n173,134.0\n74,324.5\n1,058,365.1\n717.0\n9,153.8\n1,068,235.9\n7,994.5\n54,168.7\n2,814.9\n2,948.9\n1,339.1\n355,597.9\n144,090.2\n220,013.9\n1,857,204.0\nAug\n1,100,922.1\n219,798.6\n110,595.1\n1,431,315.7\n790.2\n7,675.2\n1,439,781.1\n12,484.6\n64,160.3\n3,230.7\n2,791.8\n555.2\n421,880.4\n167,029.4\n300,169.0\n2,412,082.6\nSep\n1,328,584.6\n256,980.2\n127,051.1\n1,712,616.0\n1,482.9\n8,473.0\n1,722,571.9\n13,789.2\n81,182.4\n3,720.2\n5,632.9\n587.2\n465,063.9\n146,133.1\n318,269.0\n2,756,949.8\n Source:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2022\nTABLE 6.2 : COMMERCIAL BANKS - LIABILITIES\nDeposits\nAmounts Owing to\n37 \n \n \nForeign\nOther Assets Non Financial \nTOTAL\nEnd of\nNotes\nAssets\nBond\n&\nBalances\nBalances with\nBalances\nOther Claims \n Notes &\nCoin\nwith\nOther Depository \nwith\non\nGovernment\n1 Local Governemt Public Enterprises\nOther\n2\nMortgages Government\nOther\nCoins\nRBZ\nCorporations\nForeign Banks Non-residents\nSecurities\nsecurities\n2021\nJan\n188.7\n \n2943.3\n5,986.5\n \n793.8\n843.5\n \n-\n \n1,783.8\n \n10.2\n-\n \n211.3\n \n1,091.3\n \n0.0\n \n9,329.1\n \n2980.3\n7,685.1\n \n33,846.9\n \nFeb\n345.7\n \n2762.9\n6,004.8\n \n811.1\n984.2\n \n-\n \n2,731.0\n \n9.2\n-\n \n236.8\n \n2,089.3\n \n-\n \n8,950.2\n \n2949.2\n7,790.6\n \n35,665.0\n \nMar\n168.3\n \n2278.9\n6,313.1\n \n1594.4\n1,028.2\n \n-\n \n1,341.7\n \n8.4\n-\n \n415.1\n \n1,242.4\n \n-\n \n10,867.7\n \n3027.5\n7,841.0\n \n36,126.8\n \nApr\n206.9\n \n2702.1\n5,302.6\n \n1156.7\n1,085.4\n \n-\n \n871.7\n \n7.7\n-\n \n508.9\n \n1,581.5\n \n-\n \n14,233.6\n \n3431.1\n7,237.9\n \n38,326.2\n \nMay\n210.3\n \n1687.6\n5,962.2\n \n1250.9\n3,847.1\n \n-\n \n116.9\n \n7.0\n-\n \n517.7\n \n1,568.8\n \n-\n \n17,154.9\n \n2927.9\n7,532.9\n \n42,784.2\n \nJun\n249.6\n \n1649.7\n6,202.6\n \n1163.8\n1,866.7\n \n-\n \n204.6\n \n6.5\n-\n \n588.0\n \n1,851.9\n \n-\n \n18,795.4\n \n2580.9\n7,701.1\n \n42,860.7\n \nJul\n283.7\n \n1212.2\n7,193.4\n \n1892.7\n1,875.4\n \n-\n \n1,143.4\n \n6.0\n-\n \n447.3\n \n1,963.2\n \n-\n \n18,280.3\n \n3923.5\n7,695.6\n \n45,916.5\n \nAug\n352.8\n \n1408.8\n7,869.3\n \n2537.6\n2,316.2\n \n-\n \n3,535.6\n \n5.4\n-\n \n399.5\n \n2,101.3\n \n-\n \n19,422.2\n \n3837.6\n7,666.6\n \n51,453.0\n \nSep\n349.8\n \n1926.6\n7,608.5\n \n2430.2\n1,941.4\n \n-\n \n4,314.6\n \n5.1\n-\n \n205.2\n \n2,231.7\n \n-\n \n20,461.1\n \n4013.2\n9,460.7\n \n54,948.1\n \nOct\n411.5\n \n2396.2\n8,221.0\n \n2162.4\n3,421.5\n \n-\n \n5,627.7\n \n4.3\n-\n \n271.1\n \n2,539.5\n \n-\n \n22,881.3\n \n5432.3\n9,501.3\n \n62,870.1\n \nNov\n339.8\n \n3578.4\n7,561.6\n \n2568.8\n2,299.5\n \n-\n \n5,882.7\n \n3.7\n-\n \n566.4\n \n2,788.5\n \n-\n \n27,326.1\n \n4400.3\n9,614.3\n \n66,930.0\n \nDec\n351.1\n \n3217.3\n8,557.8\n \n2619.2\n3,620.2\n \n-\n \n2,353.6\n \n3.0\n-\n \n1,189.0\n \n2,786.9\n \n-\n \n33,115.3\n \n5610.8\n11,334.1\n \n74,758.3\n \n2022\nJan\n324.6\n \n3504.3\n8,506.5\n \n2680.3\n2,631.0\n \n-\n \n1,110.8\n \n2.4\n-\n \n1,487.3\n \n2,967.6\n \n-\n \n35,913.5\n \n6693.8\n14,008.7\n \n79,830.9\n \nFeb\n411.5\n \n4021.5\n9,763.6\n \n3069.7\n5,678.0\n \n-\n \n4,048.9\n \n1.6\n-\n \n1,465.4\n \n3,241.1\n \n-\n \n39,977.5\n \n4511.5\n13,964.4\n \n90,154.6\n \nMar\n354.3\n \n4413.6\n11,882.6\n \n3691.3\n4,932.3\n \n-\n \n5,235.0\n \n0.9\n-\n \n1,590.0\n \n3,888.3\n \n-\n \n42,741.3\n \n9086.6\n15,421.2\n \n103,237.4\n \nApr\n546.4\n \n3054.1\n15,585.8\n \n4857.7\n5,768.6\n \n-\n \n5,714.4\n \n0.2\n-\n \n1,861.4\n \n4,143.7\n \n-\n \n48,582.4\n \n9654.2\n16,999.2\n \n116,768.1\n \nMay\n639.5\n \n8326.7\n23,817.6\n \n4251.9\n16,001.6\n \n-\n \n6,150.9\n \n0.0\n-\n \n1,486.3\n \n8,474.8\n \n-\n \n74,864.0\n \n14793.9\n17,091.2\n \n175,898.5\n \nJun\n418.5\n \n8464.3\n32,497.6\n \n3807.5\n21,184.8\n \n-\n \n2,639.3\n \n0.0\n-\n \n1,340.0\n \n10,851.1\n \n-\n \n85,145.9\n \n18155.8\n35,128.1\n \n219,633.0\n \nJul\n700.4\n \n9914.6\n30,660.3\n \n4983.4\n24,902.9\n \n-\n \n4,077.6\n \n0.0\n-\n \n1,411.5\n \n13,722.1\n \n-\n \n98,066.0\n \n9998.6\n45,127.9\n \n243,565.1\n \nAug\n863.8\n \n14422.1\n33,703.2\n \n4483.0\n34,971.8\n \n-\n \n4,379.8\n \n0.0\n-\n \n2,106.6\n \n16,515.4\n \n-\n \n115,491.9\n \n8745.3\n45,694.0\n \n281,377.1\n \nSep\n1,086.8\n \n14998.2\n37,911.3\n \n7470.1\n45,094.8\n \n-\n \n8,440.8\n \n0.0\n-\n \n1,302.8\n \n17,996.8\n \n-\n \n129,242.7\n \n11630.7\n60,830.4\n \n336,005.2\n \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2022\nNotes\n1.Government securities include treasuary bills and bonds\n2.Includes bankers acceptances, discounted bills and negotiable certificates of deposits.\n3.Includes households and other financial corporations, \nTABLE 7.1: BUILDING SOCIETIES -ASSETS\nZWL$ millions\nDebt Securities\nLoans and Advances\n38 \n \n \nDebt Securities Foreign Liabilities\nCapital\nOther\nTOTAL\nand\nLiablities\nEnd of\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nTotal Deposits \nOther Depository\nGovernment \nTotal\nRBZ Other Depository Other Finacial \nReserves\nfrom the public\nCorporations\n Corporations\n Corporations\n2021\nJan\n17,060.5\n985.1\n18,045.7\n150.0\n15.0\n18,210.7\n291.2\n3,018.1\n0.0\n81.3\n0.0\n6,054.0\n6,191.6\n33,846.9\nFeb\n18,610.7\n1,047.5\n19,658.2\n150.0\n15.0\n19,823.2\n318.2\n3,075.5\n0.0\n40.7\n0.0\n6,533.5\n5,874.0\n35,665.0\nMar\n18,562.7\n1,070.5\n19,633.2\n150.0\n15.0\n19,798.2\n320.8\n3,377.0\n0.0\n241.5\n0.0\n6,727.5\n5,661.8\n36,126.8\nApr\n19,021.2\n1,353.2\n20,374.5\n500.0\n15.0\n20,889.5\n325.0\n4,244.8\n0.0\n181.9\n0.0\n6,267.0\n6,418.0\n38,326.2\nMay\n22,332.1\n1,453.5\n23,785.6\n500.0\n15.0\n24,300.6\n350.2\n4,279.9\n0.0\n394.8\n0.0\n6,067.1\n7,391.6\n42,784.2\nJun\n22,784.4\n1,675.4\n24,459.8\n209.5\n70.5\n24,739.8\n359.1\n3,855.1\n0.0\n570.4\n0.0\n6,623.0\n6,713.2\n42,860.7\nJul\n25,425.9\n1,997.8\n27,423.7\n25.0\n15.0\n27,463.7\n365.2\n3,488.6\n0.0\n274.6\n0.0\n7,194.2\n7,130.1\n45,916.5\nAug\n27,475.7\n2,728.9\n30,204.6\n60.0\n15.0\n30,279.6\n668.2\n5,344.8\n0.0\n621.9\n0.0\n7,683.7\n6,854.8\n51,453.0\nSep\n29,023.8\n2,834.6\n31,858.5\n76.0\n15.2\n31,949.7\n1,062.2\n4,465.7\n0.0\n181.9\n0.0\n10,227.1\n7,061.5\n54,948.1\nOct\n30,925.8\n4,239.0\n35,164.7\n0.0\n30.0\n35,194.8\n1,329.1\n7,432.5\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n10,906.3\n8,007.4\n62,870.1\nNov\n34,486.8\n4,344.1\n38,830.8\n0.0\n15.0\n38,845.9\n1,149.7\n7,028.7\n0.0\n203.6\n0.0\n11,575.7\n8,126.5\n66,930.0\nDec\n33,974.4\n4,856.8\n38,831.3\n80.0\n15.0\n38,926.3\n1,750.9\n9,746.8\n0.0\n712.0\n0.0\n15,101.8\n8,520.4\n74,758.3\n2022\nJan\n31,695.1\n5,983.6\n37,678.7\n0.0\n15.0\n37,693.7\n1,771.4\n10,991.6\n0.0\n373.7\n0.0\n18,063.5\n10,937.0\n79,830.9\nFeb\n37,132.1\n7,089.1\n44,221.1\n0.0\n15.0\n44,236.1\n1,703.8\n14,215.9\n0.0\n431.6\n0.0\n18,241.5\n11,325.7\n90,154.6\nMar\n44,187.4\n6,190.7\n50,378.1\n0.0\n15.0\n50,393.1\n1,742.3\n15,620.9\n0.0\n501.9\n0.0\n20,548.8\n14,430.4\n103,237.4\nApr\n52,979.2\n6,553.0\n59,532.2\n0.0\n15.0\n59,547.2\n1,536.3\n17,027.1\n0.0\n704.1\n0.0\n23,099.0\n14,854.4\n116,768.1\nMay\n86,411.7\n6,683.0\n93,094.7\n0.0\n15.0\n93,109.8\n1,477.7\n34,306.7\n0.0\n1,033.4\n0.0\n22,645.2\n23,325.7\n175,898.5\nJun\n98,008.7\n8,427.1\n106,435.9\n1,030.1\n15.0\n107,481.1\n1,496.4\n40,346.3\n0.0\n1,200.6\n0.0\n42,213.2\n26,895.5\n219,633.0\nJul\n111,583.1\n9,489.2\n121,072.3\n1,072.6\n15.0\n122,159.9\n1,225.0\n46,145.1\n0.0\n2,071.5\n0.0\n55,131.6\n16,832.0\n243,565.1\nAug\n133,071.2\n11,398.3\n144,469.5\n1,625.2\n15.0\n146,109.7\n1,382.6\n55,691.4\n0.0\n2,979.3\n0.0\n60,157.4\n15,056.7\n281,377.1\nSep\n143,338.6\n28,284.7\n171,623.3\n0.0\n15.0\n171,638.3\n1,339.9\n62,659.9\n0.0\n3,613.8\n0.0\n79,343.1\n17,410.1\n336,005.2\n Source:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2022\nAmounts Owing to\nTABLE 7.2: BUILDING SOCIETIES -LIABILITIES\nZWL$ millions\n39 \n \n \n TABLE 8.1: SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS LOANS AND ADVANCES\n$ ('000)\n \nAGRICULTURE\nCONSTRUCTION\nCOMMUNICATION\nDISTRIBUTION\nFINANCIAL &\nFINANCIAL\nMANUFACTURING\nMINING\nSERVICES\nTRANSPORT\nINDIVIDUALS\nCONGLOMERATES\nTOTAL\nEND OF\n \n \n \nINVESTMENTS\nORGANISATIONS\n \n \n \n \n2021\nJan\n23,978,167.4\n610,696.1\n267,400.2\n9,997,383.0\n66,046.9\n9,811,097.6\n7,641,910.4\n7,176,323.0\n4,807,054.2\n1,685,871.1\n10,092,630.5\n47,525.6\n76,182,105.9\nFeb\n24,581,772.2\n653,205.5\n285,830.7\n10,330,772.0\n65,231.4\n10,024,935.1\n7,949,013.1\n6,754,180.2\n5,018,015.8\n1,766,077.9\n10,905,948.4\n47,678.1\n78,382,660.3\nMar\n28,741,816.7\n737,140.5\n320,102.5\n10,604,119.6\n76,828.9\n10,517,753.1\n9,428,559.8\n8,179,722.0\n5,701,289.5\n1,822,020.0\n12,528,176.5\n33,915.5\n88,691,444.6\nApr\n31,859,146.3\n675,080.9\n347,881.04\n12,101,683.3\n205,760.2\n12,046,268.5\n10,788,214.4\n8,802,924.2\n6,559,969.1\n1,831,534.4\n14,724,055.2\n36,984.3\n99,979,502.0\nMay\n34,645,328.6\n713,518.5\n292,339.8\n13,012,546.0\n70,347.7\n10,160,360.7\n11,287,317.4\n8,318,871.5\n7,438,997.6\n1,831,015.1\n17,169,532.7\n10,879.2\n104,951,054.8\nJune\n36,527,537.2\n993,308.6\n357,200.7\n14,622,859.3\n69,173.2\n12,832,747.3\n12,635,012.9\n7,938,660.3\n9,226,503.3\n1,903,845.8\n19,986,300.5\n40,765.7\n117,133,914.9\nJul\n39,160,305.6\n1,280,558.7\n411,253.9\n16,562,010.5\n62,624.8\n13,792,648.8\n12,583,048.9\n8,567,557.8\n10,717,151.0\n1,820,088.9\n22,581,130.3\n13,756.8\n127,552,136.1\nAug\n41,218,056.3\n1,372,177.0\n431,669.1\n15,667,033.1\n66,504.4\n14,701,546.3\n13,446,660.9\n8,828,791.2\n11,500,069.8\n1,942,139.4\n27,299,685.3\n15,470.3\n136,489,803.2\nSep\n41,133,553.7\n1,649,182.2\n433,781.1\n16,702,896.3\n321,991.2\n15,183,417.2\n15,271,161.9\n9,065,558.1\n11,973,442.3\n2,145,369.5\n30,851,901.8\n19,863.2\n144,752,118.4\nOct\n48,491,758.7\n1,644,045.1\n477,340.8\n20,072,721.7\n337,273.5\n16,644,705.0\n17,906,042.4\n10,150,149.7\n8,544,940.3\n2,418,354.8\n35,641,091.1\n17,894.6\n162,346,317.7\nNov\n48,945,526.6\n1,598,923.1\n394,575.8\n20,998,777.0\n434,931.6\n16,621,266.4\n19,372,274.1\n10,802,887.6\n8,904,904.9\n2,882,220.1\n40,009,482.2\n18,275.2\n170,984,044.5\nDec\n54,028,791.8\n1,778,880.5\n556,046.6\n24,450,917.2\n570,685.1\n10,955,470.2\n22,025,406.6\n10,538,491.2\n14,437,886.1\n2,996,425.0\n43,047,088.4\n29,601.2\n185,415,689.9\n2022\nJan\n58,163,723.8\n2,180,551.5\n576,438.1\n26,576,317.7\n366,231.4\n8,887,534.5\n23,074,734.8\n11,840,524.9\n15,743,736.5\n3,516,259.7\n47,325,078.3\n29,564.7\n198,280,695.9\nFeb\n59,500,669.7\n2,289,260.8\n618,640.1\n27,925,301.7\n641,435.0\n9,370,886.7\n27,976,121.6\n13,027,815.1\n20,505,827.5\n3,747,288.3\n51,007,737.3\n19,692.3\n216,630,676.1\nMar\n66,551,117.8\n2,538,377.1\n656,335.5\n29,688,979.7\n660,584.5\n10,903,917.1\n32,629,411.6\n15,688,496.1\n38,075,386.7\n4,471,441.5\n58,500,950.7\n802,168.3\n261,167,166.6\nApr\n74,441,781.1\n4,219,500.3\n1,441,218.1\n33,136,441.4\n673,885.9\n13,157,284.3\n34,426,878.3\n18,261,710.3\n39,043,359.8\n5,001,307.2\n63,176,517.9\n40,089.6\n287,019,974.2\nMay\n101,753,100.1\n5,120,524.8\n3,358,419.2\n50,514,059.3\n760,401.2\n12,433,390.5\n42,057,624.5\n28,724,818.4\n48,088,662.7\n6,286,840.2\n76,655,600.2\n34,456.8\n375,787,897.7\nJun\n118,753,589.0\n6,209,658.5\n2,293,665.5\n64,942,950.0\n869,273.2\n23,897,585.0\n58,442,367.2\n37,195,284.1\n62,467,707.8\n9,414,912.5\n96,536,183.0\n43,204.2\n481,066,380.0\nJul\n133,779,414.0\n7,610,614.1\n3,684,426.1\n77,836,080.2\n938,368.0\n30,537,998.0\n69,408,788.7\n46,181,587.4\n72,642,938.5\n10,449,582.5\n111,094,524.5\n46,145.7\n564,210,467.8\nAug\n165,210,571.4\n10,163,176.7\n2,624,492.9\n93,899,073.6\n1,266,729.8\n39,544,245.3\n87,691,102.8\n58,330,938.2\n97,552,420.8\n10,450,507.1\n131,625,765.3\n154,457.6\n698,513,481.5\nSep\n201,167,878.5\n11,330,918.8\n5,038,300.4\n110,956,484.0\n1,297,748.5\n44,492,682.7\n101,816,518.3\n92,708,096.4\n88,483,494.4\n11,685,667.9\n152,934,863.3\n276,752.3\n822,189,405.6\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2022\n40 \n \n \n \nEND OF\nAGRICULTURE\nCONSTRUCTION\nCOMMUNICATIONS\nDISTRIBUTION\nFINANCIAL&INV\nESTMENT\nFINANCIAL ORG\nMANUFACTURING\nMINING\nSERVICES\nTRANSPORT\nINDIVIDUALS\nCONGLOMERATES\nTOTAL\n2021\nJan\n12,195,945.1\n4,725,946.7\n13,067,828.6\n32,314,625.6\n6,804,952.5\n19,638,789.0\n27,577,248.2\n13,566,042.8\n60,234,250.6\n3,993,814.3\n22,146,327.5\n314,523.4\n216,580,294.3\nFeb\n12,215,925.4\n4,335,293.2\n13,268,343.2\n31,820,079.5\n6,327,338.7\n19,480,197.8\n27,088,789.9\n11,873,767.2\n62,647,881.9\n3,583,509.9\n23,594,651.5\n323,276.8\n216,559,054.9\nMar\n12,086,596.9\n5,009,117.9\n15,457,881.6\n33,668,114.2\n7,879,623.6\n17,019,379.3\n29,927,193.1\n12,664,366.4\n68,761,992.2\n4,513,060.2\n25,352,486.1\n371,874.6\n232,711,686.2\nApr\n14,293,712.8\n6,264,137.3\n17,624,611.6\n35,860,252.5\n7,955,587.7\n18,411,151.8\n32,890,743.1\n11,445,151.9\n81,410,668.9\n4,248,558.7\n27,176,673.5\n411,001.0\n257,992,250.8\nMay\n14,731,869.5\n5,542,211.6\n19,231,383.7\n37,283,237.7\n7,903,622.6\n19,756,317.3\n33,027,214.9\n22,796,168.0\n84,596,653.5\n4,504,355.7\n28,445,264.8\n378,185.1\n278,196,484.5\nJun\n15,628,935.5\n6,154,316.5\n20,722,752.3\n39,604,431.5\n7,861,552.7\n21,455,061.8\n36,502,664.4\n23,449,074.9\n92,196,178.9\n4,756,434.9\n29,731,644.5\n415,508.6\n298,478,556.4\nJul\n14,899,561.1\n6,742,913.7\n25,082,739.8\n39,720,936.0\n9,580,503.8\n24,570,676.0\n38,875,306.1\n31,312,003.2\n94,151,108.5\n5,021,547.7\n32,324,374.5\n568,402.6\n322,850,073.2\nAug\n14,056,945.2\n6,611,127.0\n26,897,316.6\n39,624,666.3\n9,778,338.9\n27,046,621.0\n40,693,944.2\n26,504,554.0\n84,766,848.1\n4,915,399.2\n33,960,935.1\n645,902.4\n315,502,598.2\nSep\n14,777,285.5\n6,264,492.1\n27,413,062.1\n45,375,795.4\n10,337,697.2\n25,786,388.3\n43,113,093.0\n30,700,846.4\n95,985,614.8\n5,605,871.7\n37,606,703.5\n687,817.2\n343,654,667.4\nOct\n14,923,669.7\n8,437,829.5\n26,583,413.6\n47,841,912.8\n11,477,927.2\n29,796,762.9\n51,676,553.8\n49,115,499.0\n111,611,484.2\n5,940,819.2\n35,043,857.0\n618,831.0\n393,068,560.0\nNov\n14,147,912.2\n7,546,852.9\n27,174,334.3\n44,238,573.4\n11,949,923.7\n27,199,271.6\n52,401,389.3\n49,817,772.3\n115,576,831.0\n5,911,967.6\n37,770,843.3\n751,068.7\n394,486,740.3\nDec\n16,522,401.6\n9,204,283.5\n26,835,545.0\n47,381,404.7\n15,303,976.8\n43,092,763.3\n57,822,911.0\n61,555,101.2\n122,091,550.6\n6,093,367.4\n40,046,246.7\n1,319,573.7\n447,269,125.4\n2022\nJan\n17,399,268.4\n9,928,816.1\n28,146,847.2\n46,285,881.1\n15,060,177.5\n34,087,881.4\n60,888,346.7\n38,232,883.7\n135,579,116.5\n6,454,492.6\n32,504,960.5\n745,336.0\n425,314,007.6\nFeb\n20,260,983.5\n9,641,974.7\n32,159,803.2\n50,825,844.5\n15,235,028.5\n35,068,548.5\n49,157,612.2\n43,769,515.0\n146,423,512.2\n7,768,846.5\n36,257,364.0\n724,522.4\n447,293,555.2\nMar\n22,638,817.9\n11,683,937.4\n34,271,841.3\n61,002,811.6\n20,352,647.3\n34,501,628.6\n57,839,997.3\n60,678,395.3\n173,444,002.6\n9,467,563.9\n43,160,654.7\n970,393.8\n530,012,691.6\nApr\n26,926,844.7\n12,304,918.4\n34,924,202.5\n67,201,357.8\n21,444,798.1\n38,606,872.2\n61,303,321.1\n64,980,792.3\n216,612,532.7\n10,455,473.9\n45,951,692.0\n939,217.9\n601,652,023.6\nMay\n39,564,579.0\n21,954,770.2\n42,666,739.4\n108,620,498.7\n28,757,840.8\n54,108,110.4\n88,717,845.2\n107,568,244.7\n291,739,801.6\n14,310,137.6\n65,853,453.1\n1,190,747.9\n865,052,768.6\nJun\n45,956,287.6\n26,686,177.1\n47,155,850.8\n128,881,143.6\n23,783,755.2\n60,238,450.0\n105,247,922.5\n120,389,796.0\n326,034,986.6\n17,068,663.5\n108,828,797.1\n1,325,268.7\n1,011,597,098.7\nJul\n40,699,352.1\n28,329,526.0\n45,417,841.1\n128,847,329.1\n21,958,796.0\n62,326,844.4\n103,536,398.9\n112,642,685.5\n401,574,353.3\n17,902,000.2\n112,555,899.5\n1,117,408.2\n1,076,908,434.3\nAug\n68,438,409.6\n39,107,020.5\n53,616,955.7\n171,501,037.8\n25,370,674.6\n68,913,237.2\n162,326,617.3\n137,243,494.6\n538,409,018.4\n23,523,309.1\n146,121,882.2\n1,197,164.4\n1,435,768,821.4\nSep\n81,174,128.7\n51,501,554.8\n58,104,791.5\n204,056,688.7\n63,246,197.1\n174,562,749.5\n172,521,502.9\n138,936,277.9\n626,755,883.0\n25,607,188.8\n182,077,675.0\n11,177,650.8\n1,789,722,288.7\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2022\n TABLE 8.2: SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS DEPOSITS \n$ ('000)\n41 \n \n \nEnd of\nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\n INTERNET\nEnd of\nZETSS \nCHEQUE \nPOS\nATM\nMOBILE\n INTERNET\n2021\n2021 \n Jan \n 255,551.32 \n - \n21,042.23\n 2,300.31 35,349.13 66,624.38 \n Jan \n 720.03 \n - \n9,849.33\n 228.95 94,691.39 872.24 \n Feb \n 226,335.83 \n - \n22,882.64\n 2,288.90 36,434.44 63,598.24 \n Feb \n 805.99 \n - \n12,309.28\n 527.83 90,078.04 754.86 \n Mar \n 320,422.14 \n - \n28,569.92\n 3,316.59 44,523.99 86,463.87 \n Mar \n 1,112.80 \n - \n15,178.81\n 751.04 105,271.97 1,003.73 \n Apr \n 288,958.76 \n - \n30,071.50\n 2,807.02 44,131.56 90,580.45 \n Apr \n 951.67 \n - \n15,184.98\n 605.53 97,253.26 1,040.08 \n May \n 361,427.10 \n - \n36,765.06\n 3,193.67 49,745.80 89,471.34 \n May \n 1,029.79 \n - \n16,511.28\n 664.43 103,708.73 994.81 \n Jun \n 388,757.52 \n - \n38,540.10\n 3,200.04 51,437.41 115,145.66 \n Jun \n 1,076.92 \n - \n14,797.88\n 581.86 99,349.63 982.07 \n Jul \n 379,659.93 \n - \n45,808.07\n 2,489.07 57,565.84 145,026.95 \n Jul \n 1,028.17 \n - \n15,217.56\n 550.97 102,587.60 980.77 \n Aug \n 397,539.02 \n - \n52,853.87\n 4,086.04 60,908.40 159,206.60 \n Aug \n 1,045.02 \n - \n14,624.45\n 475.41 105,269.73 955.77 \n Sep \n 477,933.57 \n - \n52,262.68\n 4,179.52 64,139.24 181,194.82 \n Sep \n 1,193.13 \n - \n15,397.64\n 492.21 104,141.94 2,092.60 \n Oct \n 481,180.88 \n - \n53,165.93\n 3,839.95 65,329.02 197,972.49 \n Oct \n 1,114.18 \n - \n18,207.42\n 434.49 107,294.58 2,342.61 \n Nov \n 621,896.69 \n - \n56,025.31\n 4,877.03 63,017.52 252,407.92 \n Nov \n 1,144.91 \n - \n17,435.88\n 477.03 98,386.51 2,322.92 \n Dec \n 747,035.61 \n - \n67,903.92\n 4,705.45 76,511.57 264,749.24 \n Dec \n 1,220.28 \n - \n20,029.57\n 519.50 106,428.62 2,580.64 \n2022\n2022\n Jan \n 802,677.72 \n - \n55,961.62\n 5,074.74 53,456.29 218,545.32 \n Jan \n 957.90 \n - \n15,480.23\n 439.87 83,661.76 1,902.89 \n Feb \n 672,722.97 \n - \n59,581.58\n 5,607.02 66,811.97 238,910.83 \n Feb \n 981.01 \n - \n15,190.39\n 433.68 78,916.08 1,895.33 \n Mar \n 961,452.00 \n - \n75,050.75\n 7,882.23 82,886.94 342,168.72 \n Mar \n 1,242.33 \n - \n16,967.63\n 519.12 87,501.09 2,128.58 \n Apr \n 976,617.19 \n - \n 89,192.57 8,391.54 89,671.98 293,204.61 \n Apr \n 1,073.00 \n - \n15,906.24\n 457.99 82,673.39 1,937.64 \n May \n 1,205,990.00 \n - \n110,807.30\n 13,712.78 106,881.76 469,185.15 \n May \n 1,213.50 \n - \n16,069.94\n 477.80 78,385.20 2,001.20 \n Jun \n 1,601,225.31 \n134,550.97\n 18,810.59 123,721.28 618,347.53 \n Jun \n 1,190.30 \n - \n15,304.67\n 474.16 75,631.66 1,705.09 \n Jul \n 1,754,111.97 \n - \n170,480.64\n 20,413.15 172,562.48 713,401.10 \n Jul \n 1,115.80 \n - \n16,063.84\n 517.03 88,030.56 1,866.70 \n Aug \n 2,334,295.00 \n - \n152,343.37\n 31,418.59 178,188.87 826,377.12 \n Aug \n 1,028.04 \n - \n13,686.77\n 489.08 76,957.81 1,623.75 \n Sep \n 2,793,056.56 \n - \n177,701.71\n 35,144.35 202,368.06 872,807.43 \n Sep \n 1,084.61 \n - \n13,818.44\n 455.52 71,362.13 2,225.19 \nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2022\nTABLE 9.1 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS TRANSACTIONAL ACTIVITY\nValues of Transactions (ZWL$ in millions)\nTABLE 9.2 : ZETSS AND RETAIL PAYMENTS TRANSACTIONAL ACTIVITY\nVolumes of Transactions (in thousands)\n42 \n \n \nEnd of\nNominal Lending \nRates2\nIndividuals \nCorporate\nSavings\n3 Months2\n2021\n2021\nJan\n6.00-65.00\n32.65\n24.77\nJan\n0.22-12.00\n2.00-21.50\nFeb\n6.00-85.00\n36.67\n21.36\nFeb\n0.22-12.00\n2.00-21.50\nMar\n6.00-85.00\n35.83\n22.61\nMar\n0.22-12.00\n2.00-21.50\nApr\n6.00-85.00\n35.22\n22.59\nApr\n0.22-12.00\n2.00-21.50\nMay\n6.00-85.00\n34.84\n21.76\nMay\n0.22-12.00\n2.00-21.50\nJun\n6.00-85.00\n36.25\n22.46\nJun\n0.25-12.00\n2.00-26.00\nJul\n6.00-85.00\n36.56\n21.66\nJul\n0.50-12.00\n2.00-26.00\nAug\n6.00-85.00\n41.06\n39.65\nAug\n0.50-12.00\n2.00-26.00\nSep\n6.00-85.00\n40.61\n39.50\nSep\n0.50-12.00\n2.00-26.00\nOct\n6.00-85.00\n41.86\n45.81\nOct\n0.50-12.00\n2.00-26.00\nNov\n6.00-8500\n39.13\n38.10\nNov\n0.50-12.00\n2.00-26.00\nDec\n6.00-8500\n39.34\n37.94\nDec\n0.50-12.00\n2.00-26.00\n2022\n2022\nJan\n15.00-8500\n39.32\n39.62\nJan\n0.50-12.00\n2.00-26.00\nFeb\n15.00-8500\n40.55\n64.02\nFeb\n0.50-12.00\n2.00-26.00\nMar\n15.00-8500\n40.74\n43.88\nMar\n0.50-12.00\n2.00-26.00\nApr\n15.00-8500\n38.15\n45.56\nApr\n0.50-12.50\n2.00-30.00\nMay\n15.00-8500\n38.01\n47.25\nMay\n0.50-12.50\n2.00-32.00\nJun\n15.00-8500\n38.45\n48.25\nJun\n0.50-12.50\n2.00-32.00\nJul\n80.00-240.00\n82.75\n165.45\nJul\n40.00\n80.00-92.00\nAug\n80.00-230.00\n88.46\n155.96\nAug\n40.00\n80.00-92.00\nSep\n100.00-230.00\n98.07\n158.46\nSep\n40.00\n80.00-92.00\n Source:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2022\nNotes\n3. Lending rates exclude rates on staff loans. \n TABLE 10.2 : BANKS DEPOSIT RATES (percent per annum)1\n1. The range of rates qouted by banks during the period.\n2. Three (3) months deposit rates revised to exclude rates on \ninactive or dormant accounts.\nTABLE 10.1: LENDING RATES (percent per annum)1\n1. Table revised, to separate weighted lending rates for individuals and \ncorporate bodies. \n2. Nominal Lending Rates depict the range of rates quoted by banks.\nWeighted Average Lending Rates3 \nCommercial Banks\nCommercial Banks\nEnd of \n43 \n \n \nEnd of\nAll Share\nMining\nVolume of Shares\nMarket Turnover\nMarket Capitalisation\n2021\nJan\n3,600.82\n4,356.74\n3,513.59\n2,477,166,688.00\n434,856.23\nFeb\n4,154.37\n6,683.44\n1,529.25\n149,031,800.00\n501,184.95\nMar\n4,489.47\n5,315.39\n4,517.14\n203,633,747.00\n531,742.64\nApr\n4,641.11\n5,061.28\n3,075.98\n223,494,202.00\n540,745.24\nMay\n5,428.28\n6,820.54\n3,917.41\n188,748,200.00\n634,011.15\nJun\n6,194.88\n6,211.49\n4,458.87\n248,500,624.00\n745,175.95\nJul\n6,818.29\n6,621.17\n2,921.32\n181,010,800.00\n803,900.15\nAug\n6,652.31\n6,115.85\n3,456.94\n147,232,800.00\n792,291.48\nSep\n8,580.16\n6,014.53\n4,730.25\n2,909,442,557.00\n1,032,472.92\nOct\n11,329.48\n6,652.04\n5,661.76\n108,843,000.00\n1,378,227.92\nNov\n 10,695.57\n7,193.11\n9,883.24\n791,653,520.00\n1,290,069.75\nDec\n12,079.74\n7,815.37\n17,577.25\n228,225,060.00\n1,317,205.11\n2022\nJan\n12,079.74\n8,196.79\n3,704.23\n82,402,101.00\n1,475,217.45\nFeb\n14,990.42\n9,300.03\n7,979.35\n156,327,700.00\n1,863,028.60\nMar\n15,858.92\n11,289.34\n8,186.00\n117,815,800.00\n1,964,738.42\nApr\n28,391.75\n30,527.28\n11,366.89\n193,411,483.00\n3,547,347.52\nMay\n23,072.46\n20,021.24\n8,211.45\n195,475,400.00\n2,893,011.70\nJun\n19,791.94\n20,021.24\n14,570.16\n271,227,100.00\n2,439,165.45\nJul\n16,594.91\n20,021.24\n23,673.34\n239,937,180.00\n2,068,222.01\nAug\n13,705.12\n15,473.37\n8,674.85\n139,225,500.00\n1,685,592.28\nSep\n14,771.65\n18,929.75\n5,128.54\n137,092,750.00\n1,819,157.07\nSource:Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2022\n**As at 30 September 2020\nZW$\nTABLE 11: ZIMBABWE STOCK MARKET STATISTICS\nIndices\n*All Share index was \n44 \n \n \nFOOD \nINFLATION\nALL\nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES \nCLOTHING\nHOUSING, \nWATER,\nFURNITURE\nHEALTH\nTRANSPORT\nCOMMUNICATION\nRECREATION &\nEDUCATION\nRESTAURANTS \n&\nMISC.\nTOTAL \nNON\nFOOD & \nITEMS\n& TOBACCO\nFOOTWEAR\nELECTRICTY, \nGAS\nAND\nCULTURE\nHOTELS\nGOODS &\nFOOD\nNON \nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES\n& OTHER\nEQUIPMENT\nSERVICES\nFUELS\nWEIGHTS\n4.9\n4.3\n27.6\n5.3\n1.4\n8.4\n2.7\n2.3\n4.3\n1.1\n6.5\n68.7\n31.3\n100\n2021\nJan\n4.43\n1.15\n4.84\n3.35\n8.08\n3.87\n0.71\n1.72\n0.06\n8.48\n4.67\n3.70\n7.84\n5.43\nFeb\n3.27\n0.94\n3.21\n1.77\n2.48\n4.22\n0.01\n-0.51\n0.13\n1.94\n4.81\n2.73\n4.42\n3.45\nMar\n1.45\n0.57\n1.61\n1.45\n3.68\n1.32\n5.08\n1.18\n0.54\n3.50\n3.14\n2.06\n2.52\n2.26\nApr\n3.38\n2.21\n2.01\n4.06\n4.60\n1.86\n0.07\n2.09\n0.59\n4.67\n3.52\n2.60\n2.51\n2.56\nMay\n2.01\n1.25\n0.97\n5.35\n2.91\n1.99\n0.35\n19.13\n0.00\n24.14\n6.26\n3.75\n0.95\n2.54\nJun\n2.76\n3.05\n9.71\n4.36\n3.19\n3.40\n1.57\n1.87\n5.60\n1.84\n4.09\n4.38\n3.21\n3.88\nJul\n3.38\n2.21\n2.01\n4.06\n4.60\n1.86\n0.07\n2.09\n0.59\n4.67\n3.52\n2.60\n2.51\n2.56\nAug\n5.59\n5.06\n2.54\n5.65\n6.39\n4.78\n7.61\n3.06\n0.36\n4.99\n6.34\n4.95\n3.14\n4.18\nSep\n6.54\n4.91\n4.61\n5.18\n6.28\n4.95\n3.56\n3.68\n0.74\n5.01\n3.75\n4.67\n4.82\n4.73\nOct\n5.31\n4.86\n1.77\n5.84\n6.88\n9.33\n7.92\n5.31\n2.58\n8.60\n5.55\n5.56\n7.56\n6.40\nNov\n4.58\n3.82\n4.44\n3.97\n5.53\n5.57\n9.37\n3.25\n1.28\n10.88\n5.70\n5.21\n6.51\n5.76\nDec\n6.95\n5.56\n3.59\n4.88\n5.33\n6.79\n0.31\n4.03\n0.57\n6.23\n8.38\n5.76\n6.22\n5.76\n2022\nJan\n3.61\n2.94\n5.30\n5.11\n4.86\n4.40\n0.81\n5.66\n3.15\n7.36\n4.55\n4.25\n6.79\n5.34\nFeb\n6.72\n8.06\n4.19\n5.64\n5.06\n7.09\n1.66\n4.73\n7.84\n5.44\n7.85\n6.03\n8.25\n6.99\nMar\n5.66\n7.74\n2.20\n4.67\n6.46\n12.17\n7.55\n3.74\n3.25\n4.62\n7.86\n6.54\n6.03\n6.31\nApr\n15.35\n11.00\n22.17\n11.99\n13.57\n12.88\n0.73\n11.93\n19.15\n25.76\n9.44\n13.27\n18.47\n15.55\nMay\n16.22\n24.96\n8.28\n15.58\n21.21\n22.21\n1.83\n13.45\n10.48\n15.30\n24.07\n16.91\n25.95\n20.97\nJun\n25.84\n26.87\n41.42\n31.94\n35.89\n36.98\n14.77\n23.74\n8.37\n22.62\n25.66\n29.83\n31.68\n30.70\nJul\n19.38\n13.04\n43.58\n22.31\n27.94\n21.44\n3.73\n11.61\n7.95\n15.76\n18.93\n22.42\n29.08\n25.56\nAug\n15.49\n15.58\n6.64\n10.54\n13.24\n7.39\n5.81\n8.81\n8.58\n12.92\n13.21\n10.62\n14.25\n12.38\nSep\n3.96\n4.87\n12.08\n1.02\n3.47\n2.16\n8.64\n4.45\n30.04\n2.62\n1.70\n5.15\n1.75\n3.47\n Source:Zimstat, 2022\nNON-FOOD INFLATION\nTABLE 12.1 : MONTHLY INFLATION -- PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX\n( FEBRUARY 2019 = 100)\n45 \n \n \nFOOD \nINFLATION\nALL\nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES \nCLOTHING\nHOUSING, WATER,\nFURNITURE\nHEALTH\nTRANSPORT\nCOMMUNICATION\nRECREATION &\nEDUCATION\nRESTAURANT\nS &\nMISC.\nTOTAL NON\nFOOD & \nITEMS\n& TOBACCO\nFOOTWEAR\nELECTRICTY, GAS\nAND\nCULTURE\nHOTELS\nGOODS &\nFOOD\nNON \nALCOHOLIC \nBEVERAGES\n& OTHER\nEQUIPMENT\nSERVICES\nFUELS\nWEIGHTS\n4.90\n4.35\n27.62\n5.29\n1.42\n8.39\n2.65\n2.27\n4.25\n1.08\n6.46\n68.70\n31.30\n100.00\n2021\nJan\n19.4\n13.3\n8.2\n8.9\n8.9\n10.7\n11.5\n2.3\n4.8\n1.0\n15.6\n10.9\n9.2\n13.3\nFeb\n20.0\n12.8\n5.3\n8.8\n8.6\n12.7\n12.2\n1.9\n2.5\n0.4\n12.9\n13.9\n9.3\n13.7\nMar\n15.4\n9.4\n2.7\n9.9\n6.7\n14.8\n9.7\n5.8\n2.4\n0.7\n14.5\n13.1\n8.7\n11.5\nApr\n5.8\n3.2\n6.1\n4.3\n7.3\n6.6\n5.1\n1.5\n17.0\n9.2\n9.9\n6.5\n8.8\n7.5\nMay\n4.5\n3.6\n3.8\n8.0\n7.7\n4.3\n5.5\n21.5\n16.8\n33.0\n11.5\n7.5\n5.2\n6.5\nJun\n5.9\n6.1\n12.0\n11.1\n7.2\n6.4\n2.0\n22.4\n22.7\n30.8\n12.5\n10.0\n5.9\n8.2\nJul\n8.4\n6.6\n13.0\n14.4\n11.1\n7.4\n2.0\n23.9\n6.2\n32.3\n14.5\n11.1\n6.8\n9.3\nAug\n12.2\n10.6\n14.8\n14.7\n14.8\n10.4\n9.4\n7.2\n6.6\n11.9\n14.6\n12.4\n9.1\n11.0\nSep\n16.3\n12.6\n9.4\n15.6\n18.3\n12.0\n11.5\n9.1\n1.7\n15.4\n14.2\n12.7\n10.8\n11.9\nOct\n18.5\n15.6\n9.2\n17.6\n20.8\n20.2\n20.3\n12.5\n3.7\n19.7\n16.5\n16.0\n16.3\n16.1\nNov\n17.3\n14.2\n11.2\n15.8\n19.9\n21.1\n22.2\n12.7\n4.7\n26.4\n15.8\n16.2\n20.1\n17.9\nDec\n17.8\n14.9\n10.1\n15.4\n18.8\n23.3\n18.4\n13.1\n4.5\n27.9\n20.9\n17.1\n21.7\n19.0\n2022\nJan\n15.9\n12.8\n13.9\n14.6\n16.6\n17.7\n10.6\n13.5\n5.1\n26.5\n19.8\n15.6\n20.8\n17.8\nFeb\n18.3\n17.4\n13.6\n16.5\n16.0\n19.4\n2.8\n15.1\n11.9\n20.3\n22.2\n16.5\n22.8\n19.2\nMar\n16.8\n19.9\n12.1\n16.2\n17.3\n25.4\n10.2\n14.8\n14.9\n18.4\n21.6\n17.8\n22.6\n19.8\nApr\n30.1\n29.2\n30.1\n23.8\n27.0\n35.6\n10.1\n21.6\n32.7\n38.7\n27.3\n28.0\n36.0\n31.4\nMay\n41.7\n49.4\n35.2\n35.5\n46.5\n54.8\n10.3\n31.7\n35.9\n51.7\n46.5\n41.1\n58.2\n48.6\nJun\n68.7\n76.0\n87.1\n70.8\n87.1\n89.0\n17.7\n57.1\n42.7\n77.8\n70.6\n71.9\n96.5\n82.7\nJul\n74.6\n79.2\n119.9 \n86.5\n110.7\n103.3\n21.2\n56.7\n29.2\n63.7\n85.4\n85.8\n114.1\n98.5\nAug\n73.5\n65.8\n116.5 \n83.8\n96.9\n78.6\n26.0\n50.3\n27.0\n60.3\n69.2\n75.8\n94.2\n84.4\nSep\n43.3\n37.0\n71.6 \n36.6\n49.9\n33.2\n19.2\n26.8\n52.4\n34.1\n36.9\n42.4\n50.0\n46.0\nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2022\nTABLE 12.2 : QUARTERLY INFLATION -- PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \n(FEBRUARY 2019 = 100)\nNON-FOOD INFLATION\n46 \n \n \nFOOD \nINFLATION\nALCOHOLIC \nCLOTHING\nHOUS ING, \nW ATER,\nFURNITURE\nMIS C.\nFOOD & \nBEVERAGES \n& \nELECTRICTY, \nGAS\nAND\nRECREATION &\nRES TAURANTS \n&\nGOODS &\nTOTAL NON\nNON \nALCOHOLIC \nALL\n& TOBACCO\nFOOTW EAR\n& OTHER\nEQUIP MENT\nCULTURE\nHOTELS\nS ERVICES\nFOOD\nBEVERAGES\nITEMS\nFUELS\nWEIGHTS\n4.90\n4.35\n27.62\n5.29\n1.42\n8.39\n2.65\n2.27\n4.25\n1.08\n6.46\n68.70\n31.30\n100\n2021\nJan\n451.53\n399.55\n174.78\n358.95\n414.96\n348.54\n1370.61\n347.06\n376.10\n354.29\n449.65\n357.69\n369.43\n362.63\nFeb\n425.04\n358.36\n177.30\n336.52\n334.15\n326.47\n359.53\n277.07\n144.52\n349.97\n340.25\n297.07\n358.96\n321.59\nMar\n313.69\n236.18\n79.30\n242.33\n253.65\n265.87\n363.15\n140.26\n144.23\n296.40\n270.14\n206.00\n299.81\n240.55\nApr\n231.12\n201.33\n76.01\n178.83\n185.47\n239.16\n349.55\n121.37\n180.66\n238.80\n226.98\n178.93\n216.60\n194.07\nMay\n162.05\n156.40\n71.83\n142.05\n148.33\n181.30\n332.85\n139.66\n180.59\n224.31\n181.76\n150.75\n178.60\n161.91\nJun\n99.10\n77.51\n75.32\n82.76\n78.24\n119.54\n256.74\n75.07\n193.77\n149.35\n126.46\n105.12\n108.76\n106.64\nJul\n54.42\n33.47\n59.60\n43.58\n46.40\n48.44\n63.09\n52.59\n192.16\n89.35\n73.95\n57.33\n55.09\n56.37\nAug\n48.62\n30.42\n59.15\n40.69\n45.54\n40.10\n46.78\n45.94\n63.03\n83.38\n66.37\n50.07\n50.47\n50.25\nSep\n54.44\n34.53\n61.63\n45.76\n50.77\n44.60\n26.84\n43.02\n33.07\n91.94\n60.93\n49.48\n54.52\n51.55\nOct\n53.91\n37.62\n42.51\n52.82\n59.36\n53.46\n31.90\n48.25\n30.12\n100.00\n62.62\n49.81\n61.35\n54.49\nNov\n55.23\n37.74\n44.01\n55.75\n67.07\n56.38\n43.70\n50.46\n30.85\n112.50\n68.38\n53.57\n65.39\n58.40\nDec\n58.74\n41.06\n48.41\n58.21\n72.99\n61.17\n42.48\n54.57\n31.36\n121.06\n75.77\n57.74\n64.91\n60.74\n2022\nJan\n57.49\n43.55\n49.06\n60.90\n67.83\n61.99\n42.62\n60.55\n35.42\n118.79\n75.57\n58.59\n63.31\n60.61\nFeb\n62.76\n53.68\n50.47\n67.02\n72.05\n66.45\n44.98\n69.00\n45.86\n126.30\n80.66\n63.69\n69.29\n66.11\nMar\n69.51\n64.64\n51.34\n72.32\n76.66\n84.28\n48.39\n73.28\n49.79\n128.76\n88.93\n70.87\n75.09\n72.70\nApr\n93.55\n79.70\n82.80\n90.98\n98.73\n106.12\n49.43\n92.38\n53.56\n177.97\n103.32\n90.62\n104.05\n96.43\nMay\n120.52\n121.78\n96.06\n109.52\n134.07\n147.00\n51.63\n83.21\n69.66\n158.16\n137.39\n114.79\n154.57\n131.74\nJun\n170.03\n173.04\n152.72\n164.89\n208.25\n227.24\n71.33\n122.53\n74.10\n210.83\n186.59\n167.17\n224.80\n191.56\nJul\n211.82\n201.99\n255.69\n211.35\n277.03\n290.11\n77.60\n143.28\n86.85\n243.77\n229.24\n218.79\n308.97\n256.94\nAug\n241.07\n232.24\n269.94\n225.77\n301.31\n299.82\n74.63\n156.86\n102.14\n269.73\n250.51\n236.02\n353.03\n285.01\nSep\n232.79\n232.09\n296.36\n212.89\n290.70\n289.18\n83.20\n158.77\n160.94\n261.32\n243.60\n237.59\n339.73\n280.40\nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2022\nTABLE 12.3 : YEARLY INFLATION - % CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX \n(February 2019 = 100)\nCOMMUNICATION\nTRANS P ORT\nHEALTH\nEDUCATION\nNON-FOOD INFLATION\n47 \n \n \n \nEnd of\nJun-21\nSep-21\nDec-21\nJan-22\nFeb-22 Mar-22 Apr-22 May-22 Jun-22 Jul-22\nAug-22 Sep-22\nTotal \n(Q3 2022)\nMerchandise Imports (excl. energy)\n342.5\n \n413.4\n \n364.4\n \n363.0\n \n292.8\n \n364.4\n \n368.7\n \n335.1\n \n323.2\n \n428.4\n \n386.5\n \n389.0\n \n1,204.0\n \n- Consumption Goods\n146.2\n \n156.0\n \n106.9\n \n90.1\n \n101.3\n \n115.4\n \n104.0\n \n100.4\n \n96.5\n \n96.5\n \n99.8\n \n93.9\n \n290.2\n \n- Capital Goods\n141.6\n \n150.5\n \n156.4\n \n135.6\n \n108.3\n \n151.4\n \n158.2\n \n137.5\n \n138.6\n \n138.6\n \n190.6\n \n161.1\n \n490.3\n \n- Intermediate Goods\n54.7\n \n107.0\n \n101.1\n \n137.3\n \n83.2\n \n97.5\n \n106.4\n \n97.2\n \n88.1\n \n88.1\n \n138.0\n \n131.6\n \n357.7\n \nEnergy (Fuel & Electricity)\n77.0\n \n86.1\n \n95.4\n \n165.9\n \n99.2\n \n108.8\n \n92.6\n \n123.0\n \n149.2\n \n169.0\n \n155.2\n \n201.8\n \n525.9\n \nService Payments\n51.4\n \n57.3\n \n64.0\n \n62.8\n \n51.6\n \n61.2\n \n55.6\n \n60.7\n \n90.9\n \n70.9\n \n67.2\n \n65.4\n \n203.6\n \n- Technical, Professional & consult\n21.1\n \n24.9\n \n37.6\n \n38.0\n \n17.6\n \n31.9\n \n26.6\n \n33.4\n \n50.2\n \n38.9\n \n34.0\n \n25.9\n \n98.8\n \n- Software\n7.2\n \n5.3\n \n6.4\n \n3.6\n \n10.0\n \n7.4\n \n4.9\n \n9.0\n \n5.0\n \n11.1\n \n7.4\n \n10.9\n \n29.3\n \n- Other (tourism, edu, freight etc)\n23.1\n \n27.1\n \n20.1\n \n21.2\n \n24.0\n \n22.0\n \n24.1\n \n18.3\n \n35.7\n \n21.0\n \n25.8\n \n28.6\n \n75.5\n \nIncome Payments (Profits, Dividends)\n32.2\n \n59.7\n \n23.4\n \n113.3\n \n12.3\n \n19.6\n \n20.9\n \n77.3\n \n83.4\n \n38.2\n \n41.8\n \n16.1\n \n96.1\n \nCapital Remittances (outward)\n81.0\n \n49.1\n \n44.3\n \n42.4\n \n32.9\n \n44.2\n \n24.4\n \n29.9\n \n38.8\n \n58.2\n \n81.4\n \n57.3\n \n196.9\n \n- External Loan Repayments \n63.7\n \n45.1\n \n36.2\n \n29.2\n \n19.1\n \n41.6\n \n15.4\n \n25.6\n \n30.0\n \n49.7\n \n33.0\n \n49.2\n \n131.9\n \n- Disinvestments\n11.1\n \n3.8\n \n7.5\n \n2.7\n \n3.4\n \n0.4\n \n7.4\n \n1.3\n \n1.8\n \n5.0\n \n7.6\n \n3.2\n \n15.7\n \n- Cross Border Investment\n6.3\n \n0.2\n \n0.5\n \n10.5\n \n10.4\n \n2.2\n \n1.6\n \n3.0\n \n7.0\n \n3.5\n \n40.8\n \n4.9\n \n49.2\n \nOther Payments\n17.4\n \n12.8\n \n13.4\n \n12.0\n \n9.9\n \n11.9\n \n10.7\n \n15.1\n \n15.6\n \n15.3\n \n11.6\n \n13.4\n \n40.3\n \nTOTAL\n601.4\n \n678.5\n \n604.9\n \n759.4\n \n498.6\n \n610.1\n \n572.7\n \n641.0\n \n701.2\n \n780.1\n \n743.7\n \n743.0\n \n2,266.8\n \nTable 13.1: Monthly Cross Border Payments (US$ Millions)\n48 \n \n \n \nAgriculture\nHorticulture\nManufacturing\nMining\nTobacco\nTourism\n Transport & \nOther Services\nTotal\nEnd of \nTelecom\n2021\nJan\n24.0\n3.4\n8.5\n496.8\n25.0\n0.6\n6.5\n1.9\n566.6\nFeb\n11.4\n2.0\n14.3\n384.3\n24.9\n0.5\n6.8\n1.0\n445.2\nMar\n17.7\n2.2\n12.1\n221.7\n28.3\n1.3\n23.8\n0.8\n307.8\nApr\n5.5\n1.6\n12.3\n290.2\n19.0\n0.5\n10.9\n0.5\n340.3\nMay\n11.4\n2.1\n10.9\n261.1\n20.7\n2.0\n13.3\n0.9\n322.2\nJun\n6.0\n3.2\n14.0\n249.0\n20.0\n0.6\n21.6\n0.6\n314.8\nJul\n13.2\n4.4\n16.1\n679.0\n45.9\n2.0\n12.8\n0.4\n773.7\nAug\n13.4\n2.9\n16.1\n327.7\n25.7\n1.9\n16.9\n0.2\n404.7\nSep\n10.3\n6.4\n14.1\n499.0\n33.7\n0.7\n13.0\n0.4\n577.5\nOct\n17.2\n3.5\n17.6\n520.8\n81.2\n0.5\n16.9\n0.1\n657.8\nNov\n18.9\n4.6\n19.5\n280.7\n188.8\n0.8\n15.1\n0.3\n528.6\nDec\n20.3\n4.0\n20.4\n801.4\n62.3\n1.3\n21.3\n0.1\n931.1\n2022\nJan\n34.4\n6.4\n15.7\n222.2\n54.3\n6.5\n15.6\n0.2\n355.1\nFeb\n13.7\n2.9\n10.5\n364.1\n85.4\n14.2\n18.0\n0.0\n508.8\nMar\n13.2\n3.2\n13.2\n548.9\n91.2\n26.1\n12.8\n0.1\n708.4\nApr\n10.0\n1.7\n16.0\n525.9\n58.9\n30.9\n9.0\n0.1\n652.4\nMay\n10.4\n2.1\n13.0\n533.3\n75.6\n82.7\n16.2\n0.1\n733.4\nJun\n5.5\n2.4\n16.3\n468.2\n79.0\n9.7\n12.5\n0.0\n593.6\nJul\n10.9\n2.6\n17.0\n665.4\n128.1\n44.2\n15.3\n0.2\n883.8\nAug\n5.4\n3.9\n14.7\n481.2\n59.9\n15.2\n13.6\n0.1\n593.9\nSep\n7.2\n4.5\n17.3\n272.2\n67.4\n12.0\n12.9\n1.3\n394.8\nSource:Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2022 \nTable 13.2: Monthly Cross Border Receipts (US$Millions)", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/Quarterly_Economic_Reviews/QUARTERLY_ECONOMIC_REVIEW_Sept_22.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "1bc86e1074bc72313c136e4c1b1ec1de", "text": "FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n1 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \n \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL \nSTABILITY \nREPORT \n \n \n \n \nJUNE 2022 \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n1 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nCONTENTS \nCONTENTS .......................................................................................................................... 1 \nLIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................... 5 \nLIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................. 7 \nLIST OF BOXES .................................................................................................................. 9 \nLIST OF ACRONYMS ........................................................................................................ 10 \nGOVERNOR’S STATEMENT ............................................................................................. 13 \nFOREWORD ...................................................................................................................... 15 \nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................... 16 \n1 \nECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS....................................................... 18 \n1.1 \nGlobal Developments ............................................................................................ 18 \n1.1.1 \nOutput ............................................................................................................. 18 \n1.1.2 \nInflation ........................................................................................................... 19 \n1.1.3 \nOil Prices ........................................................................................................ 20 \n1.1.4 \nFood Prices ..................................................................................................... 20 \n1.1.5 \nInternational Stock Markets ............................................................................ 21 \n1.1.6 \nForeign Exchange Markets ............................................................................. 22 \n1.1.7 \nMonetary Policy Rates .................................................................................... 23 \n1.2 \nDomestic Macroeconomic Developments ............................................................. 25 \n1.2.1 \nOutput Growth ................................................................................................ 25 \n1.2.2 \nInflation ........................................................................................................... 26 \n1.2.3 \nFiscal Operations of the Federal Government ................................................ 27 \n1.2.4 \nExternal Reserves .......................................................................................... 29 \n1.2.5 \nRisks to the External Reserves ....................................................................... 30 \n2 \nDEVELOPMENTS IN THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM ....................................................... 32 \n2.1 \nMonetary and Credit Developments ...................................................................... 32 \n2.1.1 \nMarket Structure of the Banking Industry ........................................................ 33 \n2.1.2 \nConsumer Credit ............................................................................................. 33 \n2.1.3 \nSectoral Distribution of Credit ......................................................................... 34 \n2.2 \nOther Financial Institutions .................................................................................... 34 \n2.2.1 \nDevelopment Finance Institutions ................................................................... 36 \n2.2.2 \nPrimary Mortgage Banks ................................................................................ 38 \n2.2.3 \nFinance Companies ........................................................................................ 41 \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n2 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n2.2.4 \nMicrofinance Banks ........................................................................................ 44 \n2.2.5 \nCapacity Building Programme ........................................................................ 47 \n2.3 \nFinancial Markets .................................................................................................. 48 \n2.3.1 \nMoney Market ................................................................................................. 48 \n2.3.2 \nCapital Market ................................................................................................. 53 \n2.4 \nReal Sector Interventions ...................................................................................... 61 \n2.4.1 \nAgricultural Policy Support .............................................................................. 62 \n2.4.2 \nSmall and Medium Enterprises & Industrial Policy Support ............................ 63 \n2.4.3 \nReal Sector Policy Support ............................................................................. 64 \n2.5 \nExport Policy Support ............................................................................................ 65 \n2.5.1 \nNon-oil Export Stimulation Facility .................................................................. 65 \n2.5.2 \nExport Facilitation Initiative ............................................................................. 65 \n2.6 \nEnergy Policy Support ........................................................................................... 65 \n2.6.1 \nPower and Airline Intervention Fund ............................................................... 65 \n2.6.2 \nNigerian Electricity Market Stabilisation Facility .............................................. 65 \n2.6.3 \nNigeria Bulk Electricity Trading – Payment Assurance Facility ....................... 66 \n2.6.4 \nNational Mass Metering Programme .............................................................. 66 \n2.7 \nInstitutional Support and Financial Inclusion ......................................................... 66 \n2.7.1 \nNational Collateral Registry ............................................................................ 66 \n2.8 \nFinancial Inclusion ................................................................................................. 67 \n3 \nREGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY ACTIVITIES .................................................... 70 \n3.1 \nFinancial Soundness Indicators............................................................................. 70 \n3.1.1 \nAsset-Based Indicators ................................................................................... 70 \n3.1.2 \nCapital-Based Indicators ................................................................................. 71 \n3.1.3 \nIncome and Expense Based Indicators .......................................................... 72 \n3.2 \nThe Banking Industry Stress Tests ........................................................................ 73 \n3.2.1 \nSolvency Stress Test ...................................................................................... 73 \n3.2.2 \nLiquidity Stress Test ....................................................................................... 77 \n3.2.3 \nMaturity Mismatch ........................................................................................... 78 \n3.2.4 \nContagion Risk Analysis ................................................................................. 79 \n3.3 \nSupervision of Banks ............................................................................................. 81 \n3.3.1 \nExamination .................................................................................................... 81 \n3.3.2 \nForeign Exchange Examination ...................................................................... 82 \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n3 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n3.3.3 \nNon-Interest Banks ......................................................................................... 82 \n3.3.4 \nSupervision of Domestic Systemically Important Banks ................................. 82 \n3.3.5 \nAsset Management Corporation of Nigeria ..................................................... 83 \n3.3.6 \nCross Border Supervision of Nigerian Banks .................................................. 83 \n3.3.7 \nCredit Risk Management System ................................................................... 83 \n3.3.8 \nCredit Bureaux ................................................................................................ 84 \n3.4 \nSupervision of Other Financial Institutions ............................................................ 85 \n3.5 \nOther Developments in the Financial System ....................................................... 85 \n3.5.1 \nAnti-Money Laundering, Combating the Financing of Terrorism ..................... 85 \n3.5.2 \nCapacity Building and Collaboration on AML/CFT/CPF .................................. 86 \n3.5.3 \nActivities of the Financial Services Regulation Coordinating Committee ........ 86 \n3.5.4 \neNaira ............................................................................................................. 87 \n3.5.5 \nRisk- Based Cybersecurity Assessment ......................................................... 88 \n3.5.6 \nNigeria Sustainable Banking Principles .......................................................... 88 \n3.5.7 \nPost IFRS Implementation .............................................................................. 88 \n3.5.8 \nImplementation of Basel III ............................................................................. 89 \n3.5.9 \nInternal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process ............................................ 89 \n3.6 \nFinancial Literacy and Consumer Education ......................................................... 89 \n3.7 \nConsumer Protection Compliance Examination of OFIs ....................................... 89 \n3.8 \nComplaints Management and Resolution .............................................................. 89 \n4 \nDEVELOPMENTS IN THE PAYMENTS SYSTEM ...................................................... 93 \n4.1 \nBank Verification Number Operations ................................................................... 93 \n4.2 \nNigeria Electronic Fraud Forum ............................................................................. 93 \n4.3 \nLicensing of Payments System Participants .......................................................... 93 \n4.3.1 \nExamination of Payments System Participants ............................................... 94 \n4.4 \nCheque Standards and Cheque Printers Accreditation Scheme ........................... 95 \n4.5 \nOther Payments System Initiatives ........................................................................ 95 \n4.6 \nPayments System Statistics and Trend ................................................................. 95 \n4.6.1 \nLarge Value Payments ................................................................................... 95 \n4.6.2 \nRetail Payments .............................................................................................. 95 \n5 \nPENSIONS .................................................................................................................. 97 \n5.1 \nOther Developments in the Nigerian Pension Industry .......................................... 98 \n5.1.1 \nRevised Share Capital Requirement for Licensed Pension Fund Administrators\n \n98 \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n4 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n5.1.2 \nRevised Regulation for the Administration of Retirement and Terminal Benefits\n \n99 \n5.1.3 \nOperational Framework for Co-Investment ..................................................... 99 \n6 \nINSURANCE .............................................................................................................. 100 \n6.1 \nAssets and Premium Income............................................................................... 100 \n6.2 \nKey Insurance Industry Financial Soundness Indicators ..................................... 100 \n6.2.1 \nCapital Adequacy Ratio ................................................................................ 100 \n6.2.2 \nLiquidity Ratio ............................................................................................... 100 \n6.2.3 \nCombined Ratio of the Insurance Industry .................................................... 101 \n6.2.4 \nPremium Debtors .......................................................................................... 101 \n6.2.5 \nRetention Ratio ............................................................................................. 101 \n6.3 \nKey Insurance Industry Regulatory/Supervisory Developments .......................... 102 \n7 \nRISKS TO THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM ....................................................................... 103 \n7.1 \nCredit Risk ........................................................................................................... 103 \n7.2 \nLiquidity Risk ....................................................................................................... 103 \n7.3 \nMarket Risk ......................................................................................................... 104 \n7.4 \nOperational Risk .................................................................................................. 105 \n7.5 \nMacroeconomic Risk ........................................................................................... 105 \n8 \nOUTLOOK ................................................................................................................. 106 \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n5 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nLIST OF FIGURES \nFIGURE 1.1 GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GROWTH %) ..................................................................... 25 \nFIGURE 1.2 INFLATIONARY TREND (YEAR-ON-YEAR) .......................................................................... 27 \nFIGURE 1.3 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL OPERATIONS (N BILLION) ............................................. 27 \nFIGURE 1.4 FGN EXTERNAL AND DOMESTIC DEBT COMPOSITION (N BILLION) ................................. 28 \nFIGURE 1.5 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DOMESTIC DEBT STOCK ........................................................... 29 \nFIGURE 1.6 EXTERNAL RESERVES POSITION (US$ MILLIONS) ............................................................. 30 \nFIGURE 2.1 CONCENTRATION RATIOS OF THE BANKING INDUSTRY ASSETS AND DEPOSITS ............. 33 \nFIGURE 2.2 CONSUMER CREDIT .......................................................................................................... 33 \nFIGURE 2.3 CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET OF OFIS ....................................................................... 36 \nFIGURE 2.4 CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET OF DFIS ........................................................................ 37 \nFIGURE 2.5 TOTAL ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OF DFIS .......................................................................... 37 \nFIGURE 2.6 CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET OF PMBS (N'BN) .......................................................... 39 \nFIGURE 2.7 COMPOSITION OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OF PRIMARY MORTGAGE BANKS ............... 39 \nFIGURE 2.8 CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET OF FCS ......................................................................... 42 \nFIGURE 2.9 COMPOSITION OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OF FCS ......................................................... 43 \nFIGURE 2.10 BALANCE SHEET OF MFBS .............................................................................................. 45 \nFIGURE 2.11 COMPOSITION OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OF MFBS .................................................... 46 \nFIGURE 2.12 MONEY MARKET RATES FOR FIRST HALF OF 2022 ....................................................... 48 \nFIGURE 2.13 INTEREST RATES SPREAD .............................................................................................. 49 \nFIGURE 2.14 PRIMARY MARKET: NIGERIAN TREASURY BILLS ALLOTMENT (%) ................................. 50 \nFIGURE 2.15 PRIMARY MARKET: NIGERIAN TREASURY BILLS TRANSACTIONS (N'BILLION) ............... 50 \nFIGURE 2.16 NTBS OUTSTANDING AT END-JUNE 2022 (PER CENT AND IN N'BN) ............................. 51 \nFIGURE 2.17 INVESTORS’ & EXPORTERS’ RATE ................................................................................. 52 \nFIGURE 2.18 YIELD CURVE ................................................................................................................... 58 \nFIGURE 3.1 BANKING INDUSTRY NPLS TO GROSS LOANS ................................................................... 70 \nFIGURE 3.2 BANKING INDUSTRY LIQUIDITY INDICATORS (%) ............................................................. 70 \nFIGURE 3.3 BANKING INDUSTRY REAL ESTATE INDICATORS (%) ........................................................ 71 \nFIGURE 3.4 BANKING INDUSTRY CAPITAL ADEQUACY INDICATORS (%) ............................................ 72 \nFIGURE 3.5 NON-PERFORMING LOANS NET OF PROVISION TO CAPITAL RATIO ................................ 72 \nFIGURE.3.6 BANKING INDUSTRY CAR (PER CENT)............................................................................... 74 \nFIGURE 3.7 CREDIT CONCENTRATION RISK ......................................................................................... 75 \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n6 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nFIGURE 3.8 SECTORAL CONCENTRATION OF CREDIT .......................................................................... 76 \nFIGURE 3.9 IMPACT OF INTEREST RATE SHOCKS ON CAR .................................................................. 77 \nFIGURE 3.10 INDUSTRY LIQUIDITY RATIOS AT PERIODS 1-5 AND CUMULATIVE 30-DAY SHOCKS ..... 77 \nFIGURE 3.11 NETWORK ANALYSIS BASED ON INTERBANK EXPOSURES ............................................. 80 \nFIGURE 3.12 NUMBER OF COMPLAINTS RECEIVED ............................................................................ 90 \nFIGURE 3.13 DISTRIBUTION OF COMPLAINTS BY CATEGORY: JANUARY TO JUNE 2022 .................... 90 \nFIGURE 3.14 COMPLAINTS RESOLVED AND CLOSED .......................................................................... 91 \nFIGURE 3.15 COMPLAINTS RESOLVED/CLOSED .................................................................................. 91 \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n7 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nLIST OF TABLES \nTABLE 1:1 GLOBAL GROWTH ............................................................................................................... 19 \nTABLE 1:2 GLOBAL INFLATION ............................................................................................................ 20 \nTABLE 1:3 OIL PRICES (US$ PER BARREL) ............................................................................................ 20 \nTABLE 1:4 WORLD FOOD PRICE INDEX ................................................................................................ 21 \nTABLE 1:5 INDICES OF SELECTED STOCK MARKETS ............................................................................ 22 \nTABLE 1:6 PERFORMANCE OF SELECTED CURRENCIES ....................................................................... 23 \nTABLE 1:7 POLICY RATES OF SELECTED COUNTRIES ........................................................................... 24 \nTABLE 1:8 SECTORAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO REAL GDP ........................................................................ 26 \nTABLE 1:9 FOREIGN EXCHANGE FLOWS THROUGH THE CBN (US$ BILLION) ..................................... 30 \nTABLE 2:1 GROWTH RATES OF MONETARY AGGREGATES ................................................................. 32 \nTABLE 2:2 SECTORAL ALLOCATION OF CREDIT ................................................................................... 34 \nTABLE 2:3 COMPOSITION OF OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ........................................................ 35 \nTABLE 2:4 FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS OF PMBS ...................................................................................... 40 \nTABLE 2:5 FINANCIAL POSITION OF FCS .............................................................................................. 42 \nTABLE 2:6 HIGHLIGHTS OF FINANCIAL POSITION OF MFBS ................................................................ 45 \nTABLE 2:7 MATURITY STRUCTURE OF LOANS AND ADVANCES AND DEPOSIT LIABILITIES ............. 47 \nTABLE 2:8 INTERVENTIONS AT THE INTERBANK FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET ............................. 51 \nTABLE 2:9 NGX ASI, EQUITY AND DEBT MARKET CAPITALISATION .................................................. 53 \nTABLE 2:10 NEW ISSUES ..................................................................................................................... 54 \nTABLE 2:11 NIGERIAN EXCHANGE LIMITED INDICES ......................................................................... 55 \nTABLE 2:12 DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN PORTFOLIO PARTICIPATION IN EQUITIES TRADING ........... 56 \nTABLE 2:13 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS TRANSACTIONS ............................. 56 \nTABLE 2:14 TRANSACTIONS ON AFEX (N’M) ....................................................................................... 57 \nTABLE 2:15 VOLUME AND VALUE OF TRANSACTIONS ON AFEX (N’M) .............................................. 57 \nTABLE 2:16 GEZAWA COMMODITY MARKET AND EXCHANGE (GCMX) TRANSACTIONS ................ 57 \nTABLE 2:17 LAGOS COMMODITIES AND FUTURES EXCHANGE (LCFE) TRANSACTIONS (N’M) ........ 58 \nTABLE 2:18 S&P/FMDQ SOVEREIGN BOND INDEX .............................................................................. 60 \nTABLE 2:19 CIS FUNDS ......................................................................................................................... 61 \nTABLE 2:20 TRANSACTIONS ON THE NATIONAL COLLATERAL REGISTRY PORTAL ............................. 66 \nTABLE 2:21 WOMEN AND WOMEN-OWNED BUSINESSES TRANSACTIONS ON THE NATIONAL \nCOLLATERAL REGISTRY PORTAL ................................................................................................... 67 \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n8 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nTABLE 2:22 FINANCIAL INCLUSION STATISTICS ................................................................................. 69 \nTABLE 3:1 SELECTED FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS INDICATORS OF THE NIGERIAN BANKING INDUSTRY 73 \nTABLE 3:2 BANKING INDUSTRY BASELINE SELECTED KEY INDICATORS .............................................. 73 \nTABLE 3:3 CREDIT DEFAULT SHOCKS ................................................................................................... 74 \nTABLE 3:4 CREDIT CONCENTRATION RISK ........................................................................................... 75 \nTABLE3:5 STRESS TEST ON OIL AND GAS EXPOSURES ........................................................................ 76 \nTABLE 3:6 LIQUIDITY STRESS TEST RESULTS........................................................................................ 78 \nTABLE 3:7 MATURITY PROFILE OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES AT END-JUNE 2022 ................................ 78 \nTABLE 3:8 TEST RESULTS FOR SYSTEM-WIDE MATURITY MISMATCH AT END-JUNE 2022 ................ 79 \nTABLE 3:9 PERCENTAGE OF ASSETS UNENCUMBERED AFTER FIRE SALES ......................................... 81 \nTABLE 3:10 CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEM .............................................................................. 84 \nTABLE 3:11 CREDIT BUREAUX STATISTICS ........................................................................................... 84 \nTABLE 3:12 ENAIRA WALLET HOLDERS ............................................................................................... 87 \nTABLE 3:13 MINTING AND HOLDINGS OF ENAIRA .............................................................................. 87 \nTABLE 3:14 NSBP STATISTICS AT END-JUNE 2022 ............................................................................... 88 \nTABLE 4:1 BVN STATISTICS .................................................................................................................. 93 \nTABLE 4:2 PAYMENTS SYSTEM PARTICIPANTS .................................................................................... 94 \nTABLE 4:3 ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ............................................................................................. 96 \nTABLE 5:1 PENSION ASSETS................................................................................................................. 98 \nTABLE 6:1 KEY INDICATORS ...............................................................................................................100 \nTABLE 6:2 INSURANCE INDUSTRY DASHBOARD ...............................................................................101 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n9 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nLIST OF BOXES \nBOX 1: CBN COUNTER-MEASURES TO MITIGATE THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC.31 \nBOX 2: LIQUIDITY STRESS TEST ASSUMPTIONS ................................................................................... 75 \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n10 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nLIST OF ACRONYMS \nAMCON \nAsset Management Corporation of Nigeria \nAML/CFT \nAnti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism \nASI \nAll Share Index \nBDCs \nBureaux de Change \nBOA \nBank of Agriculture \nBOI \nBank of Industry \nBRICS \nBrazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa \nBVN \nBank Verification Number \nCACS \nCommercial Agriculture Credit Scheme \nCAR \nCapital Adequacy Ratio \nCBN \nCentral Bank of Nigeria \nCCP \nCentral Counterparties \nCIS \nCollective Investment Scheme \nCMNBs \nCommercial, Merchant and Non-interest Banks \nCMOs \nCapital Market Operators \nCOB \nCurrency Outside Banks \nCRMS \nCredit Risk Management System \nDAX \nDeutscher Aktienindex (German stock index of 30 major German \ncompanies) \nDCs \nDepository Corporations \nDFIs \nDevelopment Finance Institutions \nDVP \nDelivery Versus Payment \nEBAs \nEligible Bank Assets \nECB \nEuropean Central Bank \nEGX CASE \n30 \nEgypt Stock Exchange (Cairo and Alexandria Stock Exchange) 30 \nStock Index \nETF \nExchange Traded Funds \nFAO \nFood and Agriculture Organisation \nFATF \nFinancial Action Task Force \nFCs \nFinance Companies \nFGN \nFederal Government of Nigeria \nFMBN \nFederal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria \nFRACE \nFinancial Regulation Advisory Council of Experts \nFSIs \nFinancial Soundness Indicators \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n11 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nFSR \nFinancial Stability Report \nFSRCC \nFinancial Services Regulation Co-ordinating Committee \nGDP \nGross Domestic Product \nGSE \nGhanaian Stock Exchange \nGSI \nGlobal Standing Instruction \nHHI \nHerfindahl-Hirschman Index \nICE \nIntercontinental Exchange \nIFRS \nInternational Financial Reporting Standards \nIMF \nInternational Monetary Fund \nKYC \nKnow Your Customer \nLDR \nLoan-Deposit Ratio \nM1 \nNarrow Money Supply \nM2 \nBroad Money Supply \nM3 \nM2 plus CBN Bills held by the money holding sectors \nMENA \nMiddle East and North African Countries \nMFBs \nMicrofinance Banks \nMSMEs \nMicro, Small and Medium Enterprises \nMHSs \nMoney Holding Sectors \nMICEX \nMoscow Interbank Currency Exchange \nMoUs \nMemoranda of Understanding \nMPR \nMonetary Policy Rate \nNAICOM \nNational Insurance Commission \nNAV \nNet Asset Value \nNBS \nNational Bureau of Statistics \nNCR \nNational Collateral Registry \nNDC \nNet Domestic Credit \nNDIC \nNigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation \nNEXIM \nNigerian Export-Import Bank \nNGX \nNigerian Exchange Limited \nNIBSS \nNigeria Inter-bank Settlement System \nNMRC \nNigeria Mortgage Re-finance Company Plc \nNPLs \nNon-Performing Loans \nNSBP \nNigeria Sustainable Banking Principles \n \nNSE 20 \nNairobi Stock Exchange 20-Share Index \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n12 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nNSE ASI \nNigerian Stock Exchange All-Share Index \nNYMEX \nNew York Mercantile Exchange \nOBB \nOpen Buy Back \nODCs \nOther Depository Corporations \nOFIs \nOther Financial Institutions \nOPEC \nOrganisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries \nORB \nOPEC Reference Basket \nPAIF \nPower and Aviation Infrastructure Fund \nPENCOM \nNational Pension Commission of Nigeria \nPFAs \nPension Fund Administrators \nPFCs \nPension Fund Custodians \nPMBs \nPrimary Mortgage Banks \nPoS \nPoint of Sale \nPSV 2020 \nPayments System Vision 2020 \nROA \nReturn on Assets \nROE \nReturn on Equity \nRTGS \nReal-Time Gross Settlement \nSANEF \nShare Agent Network Facilities \nSDRs \nSpecial Drawing Rights \nS&P/TSX \nStandards and Poor’s Composite Index of the Toronto Stock Exchange \nSEC \nSecurities and Exchange Commission \nSIF \nSecurities Issuers Forum \nSMEs \nSmall and Medium Enterprises \nSRE \nSupervisory Review and Evaluation \nWAMZ \nWest African Monetary Zone \nWEO \nWorld Economic Outlook \nWTI \nWest Texas Intermediate \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n13 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nGOVERNOR’S STATEMENT \nThis edition of the Financial Stability Report highlights developments in the financial system \nduring the first half of 2022. The supply chain disruptions following the Russia-Ukraine \nconflict, the spillovers from sanctions imposed on Russia, as well as the lingering headwinds \nassociated with the COVID-19 pandemic, resulted in a weakening of the global economy. \nConsequently, global output for 2022 was projected at 3.20 per cent, 2.9 percentage points \nlower than the 6.10 per cent recorded in 2021. \nThe GDP growth in advanced economies was projected to slow to 2.50 per cent in 2022, \ncompared with 5.20 per cent in 2021. For the USA, Japan and the Euro Area, growth was \nestimated at 2.30, 1.70 and 2.60 per cent, respectively, compared with 5.70, 1.70 and 5.40 \nper cent recorded in 2021. Similarly, growth in Emerging Markets and Developing Economies \n(EMDEs) was projected at 3.60 per cent in 2022, compared with the 6.80 per cent recorded \nin 2021. Growth in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was projected at 3.80 per cent, lower than 4.60 \nper cent achieved in 2021. \nGlobal inflationary pressures heightened during the review period, driven by the disruptions \nto supply chains, resulting in tightening global financial conditions as most central banks \npursued aggressive monetary policy stance. Other ramifications include declining global \ntrade and growing risks to financial stability. \n \nIn Nigeria, the economy continued its recovery, albeit at a slower pace, as GDP grew by 3.32 \nper cent in the first half of 2022, compared with 4.02 per cent in the second half of 2021. The \ngrowth was driven by the non-oil sector, specifically, the services and agriculture sub-\nsectors. The performance of these sub-sectors was due to the sustained and targeted \ninterventions by the fiscal and monetary authorities. Total credit to the private sector \ncontinued to grow during the review period, with increased lending to the real sector and \nhouseholds, in line with the Bank’s policies to encourage lending to key sectors of the \neconomy. The exchange rate remained stable owing to improved foreign exchange liquidity \nin the system, particularly from non-oil sources. \n \nThe Bank continued the implementation of various regulatory and supervisory measures, \nincluding the Global Standing Instruction (GSI) and Guidelines for Credit Guarantee \nCompanies, to moderate risks and promote the soundness and stability of the banking \nsystem in the short to medium term. These measures reinforced the health and resilience of \nthe Nigerian banking system as it remained safe, sound and stable. \nThe Nigerian pension industry continued to improve its performance in the review period, \nwith growth in total enrolment in pension schemes and assets under management. \nFurthermore, the recapitalisation exercise initiated to enhance the resilience of pension fund \nadministrators was successfully concluded. Similarly, the Nigerian insurance industry \ncontinued to grow with the sustained implementation of ongoing policy programmes and \ndevelopment of new initiatives intended to reposition the industry for enhanced \ncontribution to the economy. Insurance penetration was potentially deepened by the \nlicensing of seven micro-insurance companies by the National Insurance Commission \n(NAICOM). \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n14 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nThe overall economic outlook for both the global and domestic economies in the short- to \nmedium-term remains uncertain. The effects of supply chain disruptions occasioned by the \nRussian-Ukraine crisis, elevated global inflation, the lingering impact of the Covid-19 \npandemic, as well as the broad shocks to foreign capital flows following rate hikes by most \nadvanced economies continue to dampen growth expectations. However, efforts to resolve \nthe Russia-Ukraine crisis has resulted in partial lift on grain exports with positive impact in \nthe short- to medium-term growth expectations. On the domestic front, the economy is \nexpected to sustain its growth trajectory, owing to the continued rise in oil prices, rebound in \nmanufacturing activities, and sustained policy support. However, persisting security \nchallenges and infrastructure deficit are major headwinds that could undermine the outlook \nfor growth. The Bank will continue to provide policy support to priority sectors to support \ngrowth. \nGodwin I. Emefiele, CON \nGovernor, Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n15 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nFOREWORD \nThe first half of 2022 witnessed a downward trend in global growth, with tight monetary policy \nstance of most monetary authorities in response to the unprecedented rising inflationary \npressures, contributing to the general decline in output and constrained access to global \ncapital. The attendant tighter financial conditions posed considerable risk to financial stability \nowing to their tendency to induce debt distress, especially in emerging markets and \ndeveloping economies. \nThe Nigerian economy sustained the positive performance in the last six quarters, driven \nlargely by the continuous growth in the non-oil sector. Nigeria’s economic growth is projected \nto decline to 3.40 per cent, while inflation is expected to moderate to 16.10 per cent in 2022. \nHowever, the Nigerian NGX All-Share Index increased by 21.31 per cent in the first half of \n2022. \nSustained implementation of the appropriate mix of monetary and, micro and \nmacroprudential policies continued to yield positive results, as most financial soundness \nindicators were within the prudential requirements. Furthermore, results of stress tests \nshowed the resilience of the banking system and its ability to cope with severe \nmacroeconomic shocks. Other sub-sectors, including pension, capital market and insurance \ncontinued to contribute immensely to the resilience and stability of the financial system. \nThis edition of the FSR is divided into six sections. The first section examines global and \ndomestic trends. Section 2 discusses financial system developments, while the third \nhighlights key stability issues, as well as regulatory and supervisory activities. Section 4 \ndiscusses key developments in the payments system, while sections 5 and 6 focus on the \npension and insurance sub-sectors respectively. The key risks and the outlook for financial \nstability are presented in sections 7 and 8, respectively. \nThe Report provides insights on financial system conditions and the near-term outlook \nincluding risks and vulnerabilities, as well as the Bank's continuous efforts at promoting a \nsafe and resilient financial system in Nigeria. \nThe public is assured of the commitment of the Bank and other regulators in the financial \nsystem to ensuring a sound financial system that supports inclusive growth and sustainable \neconomic development. \n \nAishah N. Ahmad, CFA \nDeputy Governor, Financial System Stability \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n16 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY \nThe Russia-Ukraine crisis and the resurgence of Covid-19 in China disrupted the global \nsupply chains, heightened commodity prices, and fuelled inflationary pressures. \nFurthermore, rising inflation prompted the adoption of tight monetary policy stance by most \ncentral banks which led to tightening financial conditions with attendant risk to financial \nstability. Consequently, growth of the global economy earlier projected at 4.40 per cent for \n2022 was revised to 3.20 per cent, lower than 6.10 per cent recorded in 2021. \nGrowth in Sub-Saharan Africa was estimated at 3.80 per cent in 2022, a moderated from \n4.60 per cent achieved in 2021. In Nigeria, growth for the first half of 2022 declined to 3.32 \nper cent, from 4.02 per cent in the second half of 2021. This was due mainly to the lingering \neffects of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, which disrupted supply chains and heightened prices of \nraw materials and operational costs. Consequently, annual growth was projected to \nmoderate to 3.40 per cent in 2022, from 3.60 per cent in 2021. \nGlobal prices continued its upward trend in the first half of 2022, reflecting supply-side \nconstraints and lingering effects of an accommodative monetary policy stance adopted to \nameliorate the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. In line with global trends, Inflationary \npressures in Nigeria rose in the first half of 2022, owing largely to domestic security \nchallenges which continued to impact on crude oil production, agricultural output and food \nsupply as well as spill over effects of Russia-Ukraine crisis, which increased freight costs \nand commodity prices. However, inflationary pressures are expected to moderate slightly \nfrom 17.00 per cent in 2021 to 16.10 per cent in 2022. \nGross external reserves at end-June 2022 decreased by 2.66 per cent to US$39.16 billion, \nfrom US$40.23 billion at end-December 2021. The low accretion to reserves was due mainly \nto reduction in crude oil production and high debt-service obligations. \nThe Bank sustained its implementation of various supervisory measures including virtual \nexaminations, the Global Standing Instruction (GSI) policy, and also issued guidelines for \ncredit guarantee companies. This boosted public confidence in the banking industry and \nenhanced safety and soundness of banks, as evidenced by the Financial Soundness \nIndicators (FSIs), which were within prudential requirements. \nThe ratio of non-performing loans net of provisions to capital for commercial, merchant and \nnon-interest banks (CMNBs) increased marginally to 4.95 per cent at end-June 2022, from \n4.85 per cent at end-December 2021. Similarly, the ratio of interest margin to gross income \ndecreased marginally to 47.93 per cent during the review period, from 48.59 per cent at end-\nDecember 2021. Also, the ratio of non-interest expenses to gross income declined to 65.04 \nper cent at end-June 2022, from 65.14 per cent at end-December 2021. The ratio of \npersonnel expenses to non-interest expenses declined to 25.47 per cent at end-June 2022, \nfrom 29.38 per cent at end-December 2021. \nResults of the stress test showed that the banking industry could withstand a shock of “up to \n100 per cent increase” in the industry NPLs, as the post-shock industry CAR would remain \nabove the regulatory requirement of 10 per cent. The sector concentration stress test showed \nthat the industry could withstand “up to 20.00 per cent shock” to oil and gas exposures as \npost-shock CAR would decline marginally below the regulatory requirement. The results also \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n17 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nshowed resilience to obligor credit concentration risk as the CAR remained above the \nregulatory threshold of 10.0 per cent. \n \nThe Bank sustained its interventions to households and businesses adversely impacted by \nthe Covid-19 pandemic through the implementation of the Healthcare Sector Intervention \nFacility and Targeted Credit Facility, amongst others. \nSimilarly, the Bank continued its efforts to ensure that financial institutions comply with the \nredesigned Credit Risk Management System (CRMS) thereby strengthening credit \nadministration as indicated by improved credit records. Thus the total number of credit \nrecords on the database increased by 10.00 per cent relative to the preceding period. \nConsumer confidence in the banking industry was enhanced with the resolution of 1,399 \ncomplaints entailing refunds to the complainants and closure of 1,321 customers’ complaints \nagainst financial institutions during the review period. The total complaints resolved and \nclosed increased by 4.7 and 20.64 per cents, respectively. \n \nIn the first half of 2022, the Bank sustained its efforts in the implementation of eNaira, Africa’s \nfirst Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC), extended the charges-free regime for eNaira \ntransactions, and commenced the integration of the digital currency with Nigeria Inter-Bank \nSettlement System (NIBSS) instant payment platform. At end-June 2022, the number of \neNaira wallet downloads, onboarded customers and activated wallets were 807,920; \n244,340; and 182,790, respectively. These indicate increases of 32.45, 35.52, and 45.11 per \ncents, respectively, above the levels at end-December 2021. \n \nThe capital market recorded bullish performance as evidenced by an increase in aggregate \nmarket capitalisation by 21.31 per cent to N50.18 trillion, at end-June 2022, from N43.12 \ntrillion, at end-December 2021. The pension industry also grew with total enrolment in \npension schemes, increasing by 1.25 per cent to 9.71 million, from 9.59 million in the \nprevious half year, largely driven by the increased adoption of the Contributory Pension \nScheme (CPS) by States and Local Governments as well as the steady uptake of the Micro \nPension Plan in the informal sector. The net pension Assets under Management (AuM) grew \nby 6.30 per cent to N14.27 trillion, from N13.42 trillion at end-December 2021. Similarly, the \ninsurance industry recorded an increase in its total assets by 2.41 per cent to N2.28 trillion, \nfrom N2.23 trillion at end-December 2021. The net premium income and gross claims rose \nby 16.89 and 7.71 per cent to N260.34 billion and N174.78 billion at end-June 2022, from \nN222.72 billion and N162.27 billion at end-December 2021, respectively. \n \nThe key risks to financial system stability during the review period include elevated inflation, \nexchange rate pressures, spill-over effects of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, shortage of \npetroleum products, cyber-risk from increased use of digital financial services, as well as \nincreased operating costs and operational risks. Consequently, the Bank and other financial \nsector regulators implemented appropriate measures to mitigate these risks. Overall, the \noutlook for financial stability remained optimistic, given the robust policy measures adopted \nby the Bank and other financial sector regulators towards enhancing the resilience of the \nfinancial system. \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n18 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \n1 \nECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS \n1.1 Global Developments \n1.1.1 Output \nGlobal output weakened considerably in the first half of 2022, owing mainly to the Russia-\nUkraine crisis, which disrupted demand and supply chains in many countries. This \ndevelopment resulted in increased commodities prices including food, oil and natural gas. \nSimilarly, the economic downturn, in China, due largely to the resurgence of COVID-19 \npandemic and the attendant lockdowns also exacerbated the global slowdown. In addition, \nthe tight monetary policy stance of most central banks in response to rising inflationary \npressures contributed significantly to the general decline in output growth. The attendant \ntighter financial conditions pose considerable risk to financial stability due to its tendency to \ninduce debt distress, especially in emerging markets and developing economies. \nConsequently, global output growth in 2022 is projected at 3.20 per cent, lower than the 6.10 \nper cent recorded in 2021. \n \nIn the advanced economies, growth was projected to moderate to 2.50 per cent in 2022, \ncompared with 5.20 per cent in 2021. In the United States (US), growth was estimated at \n2.30 per cent in 2022, compared with 5.70 per cent in 2021, attributed largely to tighter \nmonetary policy and lower-than-expected consumer spending. Similarly, in the Euro area, \noutput was expected to soften to 2.60 per cent in 2 022, from 5.40 per cent in 2021, reflecting \nspill over from the Russia-Ukraine crisis and tight monetary conditions. In Japan, however, \ngrowth was projected to remain flat at 1.70 per cent in 2022. \n \nIn Emerging Market and Developing Economies (EMDEs), growth was projected at 3.60 per \ncent in 2022, compared with 6.80 per cent in 2021. This was largely a reflection of a slow \ngrowth in China which was projected at 3.30 per cent in view of Covid-19 induced lockdowns, \ncompared with 8.10 per cent in 2021. Similarly, Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region \nwas expected to grow by 4.90 per cent during the review period, compared with 5.80 per \ncent in 2021. Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was estimated at 3.80 per cent, compared \nwith 4.60 per cent recorded in 2021. In line with the global trend, growth in Nigeria was \nprojected to moderate to 3.40 per cent in 2022, from 3.60 per cent in 2021. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n19 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \nTable 1:1 Global Growth \nRegion/Country \nYear-on-Year (%) \n \n2017 \n2018 \n2019 \n2020 \n2021 \nWorld \n3.75 \n3.57 \n2.84 \n–3.12 \n5.88 \nAdvanced Economies \n2.46 \n2.25 \n1.74 \n–4.54 \n5.20 \nUnited States \n2.26 \n2.92 \n2.29 \n–3.41 \n5.97 \nEuro Area \n2.63 \n1.85 \n1.50 \n–6.34 \n5.04 \nJapan \n1.68 \n0.56 \n0.02 \n–4.59 \n2.36 \nUnited Kingdom \n1.74 \n1.25 \n1.43 \n–9.85 \n6.76 \nCanada \n3.04 \n2.43 \n1.86 \n–5.31 \n5.69 \nEmerging \nMarket \nand \nDeveloping \nEconomies \n4.77 \n4.58 \n3.67 \n–2.07 \n6.38 \nChina \n6.95 \n6.75 \n5.95 \n2.34 \n8.02 \nMiddle East and Central Asia \n2.48 \n2.17 \n1.48 \n-2.79 \n4.11 \nSub-Saharan Africa \n2.95 \n3.28 \n3.13 \n–1.66 \n3.70 \n*Nigeria \n0.82 \n1.91 \n2.27 \n–1.92 \n3.40 \nSource: IMF’s World Economic Outlook Update, July, 2022, *National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) \n1.1.2 Inflation \nGlobal inflation remained elevated during the first half of 2022, mainly reflecting disruptions \nto supply value chains by the Russia-Ukraine crisis, resulting in the rising prices of food, \nenergy and other commodities. The development induced many central banks to switch to \ntight monetary policy mode to tame inflation. \nInflation in Advanced Economies was expected to accelerate to 6.60 per cent in 2022, \ncompared with 3.10 per cent in 2021. The United States, Japan and the United Kingdom \nwere expected to record higher inflation rates of 7.70, 1.90 and 9.10 per cent in 2022, \nrespectively, compared with 4.30, 0.80 and 2.20 per cent in 2021. \nSimilarly, inflation in EMDEs was projected to increase to 9.50 per cent in 2022, compared \nwith 5.90 per cent in 2021. SSA was expected to experience inflation of 12.20 per cent in \n2022, compared with 11.00 per cent in 2021. In Nigeria, however, inflation was expected to \nmoderate slightly to 16.10 per cent in 2022, from 17.00 per cent in 2021. \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n20 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nTable 1:2 Global Inflation \nRegion/Country \n2017 \n2018 \n2019 \n2020 \n2021 \n2022 \nAdvanced Economies \n1.70 \n2.00 \n1.40 \n0.70 \n3.10 \n6.60 \n United States \n2.10 \n2.40 \n1.80 \n1.20 \n4.30 \n7.70 \n Euro Area \n1.50 \n1.80 \n1.20 \n0.30 \n2.20 \n7.30 \n Japan \n0.50 \n1.00 \n0.50 \n-1.20 \n0.80 \n1.90 \n United Kingdom \n2.70 \n2.50 \n1.80 \n0.90 \n2.20 \n9.10 \nEmerging Markets and Developing \nEconomies \n4.40 \n4.90 \n5.10 \n5.20 \n5.90 \n9.50 \nSub-Saharan Africa \n10.60 \n8.30 \n8.10 \n10.20 \n11.00 \n12.20 \nNigeria \n16.50 \n12.10 \n11.40 \n13.20 \n17.00 \n16.10 \nSource: WEO Update, July 2022 \n \n1.1.3 Oil Prices \nThe prices of crude oil increased significantly in the review period, owing to the disruption in \nthe supply chain following the Russia-Ukraine crisis, and rising global demand owning to \nsustained increase in economic activities. The OPEC Reference Basket (ORB) rose by 50.98 \nper cent to US$117.72 pb at end-June 2022, compared with US$77.97 pb at end-December \n2021. The ICE Brent also increased by 52.08 per cent to US$119.78 pb at end-June 2022, \nover US$78.76 pb at end-December 2021. In the same vein, the West Texas Intermediate \n(WTI) rose by 120.38 per cent to US$114.84 pb at end-June 2022, compared with US$52.11 \npb at end-December 2021. Similarly, the Bonny Light rose by 69.29 per cent to US$126.00 \npb at end-June 2022, compared with US$74.43 pb at end-December 2021. \n \nTable 1:3 Oil Prices (US$ per barrel) \n CRUDE OIL TYPES\\DATES \nEnd-Dec. \n2018 \nEnd-Dec. \n2019 \nEnd-Dec. \n2020 \nEnd-Dec. \n2021 \nEnd-Jun. \n2022 \nOPEC \nReference \nBasket \n(ORB) (US$) \n69.78 \n64.04 \n41.47 \n77.97 \n117.72 \nICE Brent (US$) \n68.94 \n61.19 \n46.20 \n78.76 \n119.78 \nWest Texas Intermediate \n(WTI) (US$) \n61.81 \n55.47 \n42.71 \n52.11 \n114.84 \nBonny Light (US$) \n72.11 \n65.63 \n41.53 \n74.43 \n126.00 \nSource: OPEC and Reuters \n1.1.4 Food Prices \nThe Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Food Price Index increased by 15.41 per cent \nto 154.30 points at end-June 2022, compared with 133.70 points at end-December 2021. \nThe above development was due, mainly to the rise in the prices of meat, dairy, cereals, \nvegetable oils, and sugar products. \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n21 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nThe Meat Price Index increased by 12.25 per cent to 124.60 points at end-June 2022, \ncompared with 111.00 points at end-December 2021; while the Dairy Price Index increased \nby 16.43 per cent to 150.20 points at end-June 2022, over the level of 129.00 at end-\nDecember 2021. Also, the Cereals Price Index increased by 18.36 per cent to 166.30 points \nat end-June 2022, compared with 140.50 points at end-December 2021, while the Vegetable \nOil and Sugar Price Indices rose by 18.66 and 0.77 per cent, to 211.80 and 117.30 points at \nend-June 2022, compared with 178.50 and 116.40 points at end-December 2021, \nrespectively. The upward trend in the various indices was attributed to supply constraint \ninduced by the Russia-Ukraine crisis and low inventory levels for most items. \n \nTable 1:4 World Food Price Index \n \nEnd-Dec. 2018 \nEnd-Dec. 2019 \nEnd-Dec. 2020 \nEnd-Dec. 2021 \nEnd-Jun. \n2022 \nFood Price Index \n92.20 \n101.00 \n108.60 \n133.70 \n154.30 \nMeat \n92.90 \n106.60 \n94.80 \n111.00 \n124.60 \nDairy \n97.80 \n103.50 \n109.20 \n129.00 \n150.20 \nCereals \n101.1 \n97.40 \n116.40 \n140.50 \n166.30 \nVegetable Oils \n76.84 \n101.50 \n131.20 \n178.50 \n211.80 \nSugar \n78.30 \n83.00 \n87.10 \n116.40 \n117.30 \nSource: Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). \n \n1.1.5 International Stock Markets \nInternational stock markets generally recorded a bearish performance during the review \nperiod, reflecting a shift in investors’ preference from equity market to fixed income securities \nin response to rising interest rates. \nIn North America, the United States S&P 500, the Canadian S&P/TSX Composite, and the \nMexican Bolsa indices decreased by 21.36, 11.72, and 10.94 per cent, to 3,752.71, \n18,713.62 and 47,337.65, from 4,772.14, 21,198.03 and 53,150.36, respectively. Similarly, \nin South America, the Brazilian Bovespa Stock and the Colombian COLCAP indices \ndecreased by 6.69 and 4.60 per cent to 97,805.61 and 1,346.03, respectively, while the \nArgentine Merval index increased by 4.22 per cent to 87,023.10. \nIn the European stock markets, the UK FTSE 100, France CAC 40 and the Germany DAX \nindices decreased by 3.22, 17.54, and 19.89 per cent, respectively, relative to their levels at \nend-December 2021. \nIn Asia, the Japan NIKKEI 225, China Shanghai SEA, and India BSE Sensex decreased by \n8.33, 6.62 and 8.99 per cent, respectively, compared with their levels at end-December 2021. \nIn Africa, the South African JSE All-Share Index, the Kenyan Nairobi NSE 20, Egyptian EGX \nCASE 30, and Ghanaian GSE All Share Index declined by 10.01, 15.23, 22.79, and 8.86 per \ncent, respectively, while the Nigerian NGX All-Share Index increased by 21.31 per cent. \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n22 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nTable 1:5 Indices of Selected Stock Markets \nCountry \nIndex \nEnd-Dec 2019 \n(1) \nEnd-Dec 2020 \n(2) \nEnd-Dec 2021 \n(3) \nEnd-June \n2022 (4) \n% Change \n(4) & (3) \nAFRICA \nNigeria \nNGX All-Share \nIndex \n26,842.07 \n40,270.72 \n42,716.44 \n51,817.59 \n21.31 \nSouth Africa \nJSE All-Share \nIndex \n57,084.10 \n59,408.68 \n73,709.39 \n66,334.42 \n-10.01 \nKenya \nNairobi NSE 20 \nShare index \n2,654.39 \n1,868.39 \n1,902.57 \n1,612.89 \n-15.23 \nEgypt \nEGX CASE 30 \n13,961.56 \n10,845.26 \n11,949.18 \n9,225.61 \n-22.79 \nGhana \nGSE All-Share \nIndex \n2,257.15 \n1,939.14 \n2,793.24 \n2,545.79 \n-8.86 \nNORTH AMERICA \nUS \nS&P 500 \n3,230.78 \n3,756.07 \n4,772.14 \n3,752.71 \n-21.36 \nCanada \nS&P/TSX \nComposite \n17,063.43 \n17,433.36 \n21,198.03 \n18,713.62 \n-11.72 \nMexico \nBolsa \n43,541.02 \n44,066.88 \n53,150.36 \n47,337.65 \n-10.94 \nSOUTH AMERICA \nBrazil \nBovespa Stock 115,645.00 \n119,017.20 \n104,822.00 \n97,805.61 \n-6.69 \nArgentina \nMerval \n41,671.41 \n51,226.49 \n83,500.11 \n87,023.10 \n4.22 \nColumbia \nCOLCAP \n1,662.42 \n1,437.89 \n1,410.97 \n1,346.03 \n-4.60 \nEUROPE \nUK \nFTSE 100 \n7,542.44 \n6,460.52 \n7,384.54 \n7,146.66 \n-3.22 \nFrance \nCAC 40 \n5,978.06 \n5,551.41 \n7,153.03 \n5,898.63 \n-17.54 \nGermany \nDAX \n13,249.01 \n13,718.78 \n15,884.86 \n12,724.61 \n-19.89 \nASIA \nJapan \nNIKKEI 225 \n23,656.62 \n27,444.17 \n28,791.71 \n26,393.04 \n-8.33 \nChina \nShanghai SE A \n3,195.98 \n3,640.46 \n3,814.30 \n3,561.90 \n-6.62 \nIndia \nBSE Sensex \n41,253.74 \n47,905.84 \n58,253.82 \n53,018.94 \n-8.99 \nBloomberg: https://www.bloomberg.com \n \n1.1.6 Foreign Exchange Markets \nMajor currencies depreciated against the US dollar during the first half of 2022, owing to the \ntight monetary policy stance of the US Federal Reserve (the Fed) during the period. In \nEurope, the British pound sterling and the Euro depreciated by 10.81 and 7.95 per cent, \nrespectively while the Russian rubble appreciated by 27.32 per cent. The strong performance \nof the Russian rubble was underpinned by various capital control measures imposed by the \ngovernment to mitigate the impact of sanctions imposed by the West. \n \nIn Asia, the Japanese yen, the Chinese renminbi, and the Indian rupee depreciated by 17.96, \n5.35 and 6.28 per cent, respectively. In North America, the performance was mixed as the \nMexican peso recorded an appreciation of 1.13 per cent during the review period, while the \nCanadian dollar depreciated by 1.57 per cent. In South America, the Brazilian real \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n23 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nappreciated by 5.57 per cent, while the Argentine and the Colombian pesos depreciated by \n21.88 and 2.01 per cent, respectively. \nIn Africa, the Nigerian naira, South African rand, Kenyan shilling, Egyptian pound and \nGhanaian cedi depreciated against the US dollar by 0.42, 1.94, 6.11, 19.59 and 31.27 per \ncent, respectively. \nThe developments in the various foreign exchange markets heightened foreign exchange \nrisk of the banks, particularly in the EMDEs. \n \nTable 1:6 Performance of Selected Currencies \nCountry/Region \nCurrency \nEnd-\nDecember \n2019 (1) \nEnd-\nDecember \n2020 (2) \nEnd-\nDecember \n2021 (3) \nEnd-June \n2022 (4) \n% Change (-\nApp/+Dep) \n(4) & (3) \nAFRICA \nNigeria \nNaira \n364.51 \n390.35 \n412.99 \n414.72 \n0.42 \nSouth Africa \nRand \n14.00 \n14.69 \n15.97 \n16.28 \n1.94 \nKenya \nShilling \n101.36 \n102.66 \n111.11 \n117.90 \n6.11 \nEgypt \nPound \n16.04 \n15.73 \n15.72 \n18.80 \n19.59 \nGhana \nCedi \n5.75 \n5.87 \n6.14 \n8.06 \n31.27 \nNORTH AMERICA \nCanada \nDollar \n1.30 \n1.27 \n1.27 \n1.29 \n1.57 \nMexico \nPeso \n18.94 \n19.88 \n20.34 \n20.11 \n-1.13 \nSOUTH AMERICA \nBrazil \nReal \n4.02 \n5.19 \n5.57 \n5.26 \n-5.57 \nArgentina \nPeso \n59.87 \n84.15 \n102.74 \n125.22 \n21.88 \nColombia \nPeso \n3286.84 \n3430.77 \n4071.48 \n4153.19 \n2.01 \nEUROPE \nUK \nPound \n0.75 \n0.73 \n0.74 \n0.82 \n10.81 \nEuro Area \nEuro \n0.89 \n0.82 \n0.88 \n0.95 \n7.95 \nRussia \nRuble \n62.00 \n74.05 \n75.26 \n54.70 \n-27.32 \nASIA \nJapan \nYen \n108.65 \n103.30 \n115.08 \n135.75 \n17.96 \nChina \nRenminbi \n6.96 \n6.53 \n6.36 \n6.70 \n5.35 \nIndia \nRupee \n71.35 \n73.07 \n74.34 \n79.01 \n6.28 \nPTP= Period to Period ; YTD = Year to Date \n Source: Bloomberg \n \n1.1.7 Monetary Policy Rates \nDevelopments in monetary policy were mixed during the review period. Most central banks \ncommenced monetary policy normalisation in response to inflationary pressure that \naccompanied the prolonged period of monetary policy accommodation. \n \nIn the advanced economies, the Bank of England, the Fed, Bank of Canada, Bank of Korea, \nthe Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the Reserve Bank of Australia increased policy rates, \nfrom 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 1.00, 0.75 and 0.10 per cent, to 1.25, 1.75, 1.50, 2.00, 2.00 and 0.85 \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n24 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \nper cent, respectively. The Bank of Japan and the European Central Bank, however, \nmaintained policy rates at -0.10 and 0.00 per cent, respectively. \nIn Asia, the Bank of Indonesia maintained its policy rate at 3.50 per cent, while Bank Negara \nMalaysia increased its rate to 2.00 per cent, from the level of 1.75 per cent at the end of the \nprevious period. In the BRICS, the Central Bank of Brazil, Reserve Bank of India, and South \nAfrican Reserve Bank increased policy rates to 13.50, 4.90 and 4.25 per cent, relative to \n9.25, 4.00 and 3.75 per cent, respectively, while Bank of Russia and the Peoples’ Bank of \nChina reduced rates to 6.50 and 3.70 per cent, from 7.50 and 3.80 per cent, respectively. \n \nAll the emerging market economies reported upon during the period signalled a tight \nmonetary policy stance. The Bank of Mexico, Central Bank of Chile and the Bank of the \nRepublic (Colombia), increased their policy rates to 7.75, 9.00 and 7.50 per cent, relative to \n4.00, 4.00 and 3.00 per cent, respectively. Similarly in Africa, the Central Bank of Egypt, \nBank of Ghana, and Central Bank of Nigeria increased policy rates to 11.25, 19.00 and 13.00 \nper cent, compared with 8.25, 14.50 and 11.50 per cent, respectively. \n{{ \nTable 1:7 Policy Rates of Selected Countries \nCountry/Region \nJun-21 \nJul-21 \nAug-21 \nSep-21 \nOct-21 \nNov-21 Dec-21 \nJun-22 \nDeveloped Economies \nJapan \n-0.10 \n-0.10 \n-0.10 \n-0.10 \n-0.10 \n-0.10 \n-0.10 \n-0.10 \nEurope \n0.00 \n0.00 \n0.00 \n0.00 \n0.00 \n0.00 \n0.00 \n0.00 \nUK \n0.10 \n0.10 \n0.10 \n0.10 \n0.10 \n0.10 \n0.25 \n1.25 \nUS \n0.25 \n0.25 \n0.25 \n0.25 \n0.25 \n0.25 \n0.25 \n1.75 \nCanada \n0.25 \n0.25 \n0.25 \n0.25 \n0.25 \n0.25 \n0.25 \n1.50 \nSouth Korea \n0.50 \n0.50 \n0.75 \n0.75 \n1.00 \n1.00 \n1.00 \n1.75 \nNew Zealand \n0.25 \n0.25 \n0.25 \n0.25 \n0.5 \n0.75 \n0.75 \n2.00 \nAustralia \n0.10 \n0.10 \n0.10 \n0.10 \n0.10 \n0.10 \n0.10 \n0.85 \nAsia \nIndonesia \n3.50 \n3.50 \n3.50 \n3.50 \n3.50 \n3.50 \n3.50 \n3.50 \nMalaysia \n1.70 \n1.70 \n1.70 \n1.70 \n1.70 \n1.70 \n1.75 \n2.00 \nBRICS \nBrazil \n4.25 \n4.25 \n5.25 \n5.25 \n7.75 \n7.75 \n9.25 \n13.50 \nRussia \n5.50 \n6.50 \n6.50 \n6.75 \n7.50 \n7.50 \n7.50 \n6.50 \nIndia \n4.00 \n4.00 \n4.00 \n4.00 \n4.00 \n4.00 \n4.00 \n4.90 \nChina \n3.80 \n3.80 \n3.80 \n3.80 \n3.80 \n3.80 \n3.80 \n3.70 \nSouth Africa \n3.75 \n3.75 \n3.75 \n3.75 \n3.75 \n3.75 \n3.75 \n4.25 \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n25 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nOther Emerging Economies & South America \nMexico \n4.25 \n4.25 \n4.50 \n4.75 \n4.75 \n5.00 \n5.00 \n7.75 \nChile \n0.75 \n0.75 \n1.50 \n1.50 \n2.75 \n2.75 \n4.00 \n9.00 \nColombia \n2.00 \n2.00 \n2.00 \n2.00 \n2.50 \n2.50 \n3.00 \n7.50 \nAfrica \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nEgypt \n8.25 \n8.25 \n8.25 \n8.25 \n8.25 \n8.25 \n8.25 \n11.25 \nGhana \n13.50 \n13.50 \n13.50 \n13.50 \n13.50 \n14.50 \n14.50 \n19.00 \nNigeria \n11.50 \n11.50 \n11.50 \n11.50 \n11.50 \n11.50 \n11.50 \n13.00 \nSource: www.cbrates.com, www.tradingeconomics.com, relevant central bank websites. \n \n1.2 Domestic Macroeconomic Developments \n1.2.1 Output Growth \nThe Nigerian economy continued its recovery in the first half of 2022, albeit at a slower pace \nrelative to the level in the preceding half year. Output grew by 3.32 per cent in the first half \nof 2022, compared with 4.01 per cent in the second half of 2021.The moderation in growth \nwas due to the negative impact of the Russia-Ukraine crisis and the lingering security \nchallenges, particularly in the major food producing areas. These developments resulted in \nmajor economic and financial shocks which induced inflationary and exchange rate \npressures. \n \nFigure 1.1 Gross Domestic Product (Growth %) \n \nSource: National Bureau of Statistics \nThe non-oil sector remained the major driver of growth, owing to the improved performance \nof the services sectors. The non-oil sector contributed 4.97 percentage points to output in \nthe first half of 2022. However, the oil sector, however, contracted, contributing negative 1.64 \npercentage points to the growth in GDP. \n \n \n2.38\n2.42\n-2.18\n(1.70)\n2.70 \n4.01\n3.32\nH2 2018\nH2 2019\nH1 2020\nH2 2020\nH1 2021\nH2 2021\nH1 2022\nPER CENT\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n26 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \nTable 1:8 Sectoral Contributions to real GDP \nSource: National Bureau of Statistics \n \nIn terms of relative sectoral contribution to real GDP growth, the Services sector maintained \nits steady improvement, contributing 3.87 percentage points, compared with 3.50 percentage \npoints in the preceding half year, while the contribution of the agriculture sector dropped \nmarginally to 0.50 percentage point from 0.68 percentage point in the preceding half of 2021. \nThe improvement in the Services sector was due to the growth in ICT, while the slow growth \nin agriculture sector was owing to a decline in crop production arising from the lingering \nsecurity challenges in the food producing areas. The contribution of the industry sector, \nhowever, was negative (-0.05 percentage point). \n1.2.2 Inflation \nInflationary pressures heightened in the first half of 2022, driven, largely by the continued \nincrease in both core and food components. Headline inflation (year-on-year) rose to 18.60 \nper cent in June 2022, compared with 15.63 per cent in the second half of 2021. The 12-\nmonth-moving-average headline inflation, however, moderated slightly to 16.54 per cent at \nend-June 2022, compared with 16.95 per cent at end-December 2021. \nFood inflation (year-on-year) increased to 20.60 per cent, compared with 17.37 per cent in \nthe second half of 2021, largely driven by the lingering insecurity, particularly in the food \nproducing areas and supply chain disruptions induced by the Russia-Ukraine crisis. Core \ninflation also rose to 15.75 per cent, compared with 13.87 per cent in the second half of \n2021. The rise was due, mainly, to increased electricity tariffs, high price of Automotive Gas \nOil (AGO) and scarcity of Premium Motor Spirit (PMS). \n \n \n \n \n \nSector \nH1 2021 \nH2 2021 \nH1 2022 \nAgriculture \n0.41 \n0.68 \n0.50 \n Of which: Crop Production \n0.38 \n0.68 \n0.45 \nIndustry \n-0.02 \n-0.17 \n-1.05 \n Of which: Oil \n-0.66 \n-0.69 \n-1.64 \n Manufacturing \n0.32 \n0.29 \n 0.42 \nServices \n2.31 \n3.50 \n3.87 \n Of which: ICT \n0.95 \n1.02 \n1.49 \nGDP Growth \n2.70 \n4.01 \n3.32 \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n27 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \nFigure 1.2 Inflationary Trend (Year-on-Year) \n \nSource: National Bureau of Statistics \n1.2.3 Fiscal Operations of the Federal Government \nProvisional data on Federal Government Retained Revenue, at N2,134.47 billion in the first \nhalf of 2022, fell short of the budget benchmark by 60.30 per cent, reflecting the subsisting \nrevenue challenges. Provisional aggregate expenditure, at N8,368.06 billion in the first half \nof 2022, was below the prorated budget by 2.30 per cent, owing to the shortfall in capital \nexpenditure. Consequently, the fiscal operations of the Federal Government resulted in an \noverall deficit of N6,233.60 billion, indicative of an expansionary policy stance. \n \nFigure 1.3 Federal Government Fiscal Operations (N Billion) \n \nSource: OAGF & CBN Staff Estimate \n \nThe gap between total revenue and expenditure was bridged by borrowing from domestic \nand external sources. The consolidated public debt stock at end-March 2022 stood at \nN41,604.06 billion, comprising 60.06 per cent and 39.94 per cent of domestic and external \ndebt, respectively. The total public debt stock indicated an increase of 5.18 per cent over the \nlevel at end-December 2021. The debt stock represented 27.34 per cent of GDP, which was \nbelow the Medium-Term Debt Strategy (MTDS) threshold of 40.0 per cent. \n \n \n17.95\n15.63\n18.60\n13.09\n13.87\n15.75\n21.83\n17.37\n20.60\n2021 H1\n2021 H2\n2022 H1\nHeadline (Y-on-Y)\nCore (Y-on-Y)\nFood (Y-on-Y)\n1,947.08\n2,045.69\n2,303.58\n2,129.08\n2,134.47\n4,716.36\n5,511.53\n6,632.05\n6,003.52\n8,368.06\n-2,769.28\n-3,465.84\n-4,328.47\n-3,874.44\n-6,233.60\n-8,000.00\n-6,000.00\n-4,000.00\n-2,000.00\n0.00\n2,000.00\n4,000.00\n6,000.00\n8,000.00\n10,000.00\n2020 First Half\n2020 Second Half\n2021 First Half\n2021 Second Half\n2022 First Half\nRetained Revenue\nAggregate expenditure\nOverall Balance\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n28 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \nThe total domestic debt of N24,986.87 billion at end-March 2022, reflected an increase of \nN286.67 billion or 1.16 per cent, compared with N23,700.80 billion at end-December 2021. \nThe increase was driven, largely, by Nigerian Treasury Bills, FGN Savings Bond and FGN \nBonds issues. The FGN portion constituted 80.62 per cent, while states and FCT held 19.38 \nper cent. \nAt end-March 2022, the FGN domestic debt stood at N20,144.03 billion (54.80 per cent of \ntotal FGN debt), while the FGN external debt was N16,617.19 billion (45.20 per cent) (Fig \n1.4). FGN Bond issues maintained its dominance, accounting for 70.70 per cent of the total \ndomestic debt, followed by Treasury Bills (21.88 per cent), Promissory Notes (3.79 per cent), \nFGN Sukuk (3.03 per cent), and others1 (0.60 per cent). \nNigeria’s consolidated external debt comprised multilateral, commercial and bilateral loans, \nwhich accounted for 47.43, 39.83 and 11.25 per cent, respectively, while ‘other’2 loans \nconstituted 1.50 per cent. \nFigure 1.4 FGN External and Domestic Debt Composition (N Billion) \n \nSource: Debt Management Office \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1 This includes Treasury bonds (0.38 per cent), Green bonds (0.13 per cent) and FGN Savings bonds (0.09 per \ncent). \n2 Promissory Notes. \n12,470.4 \n13,710.9 \n15,573.0 \n15,855.2 \n16,617.2 \n16,513.9 \n17,631.8 \n18,232.9 \n19,242.6 \n20,144.0 \n -\n 5,000.0\n 10,000.0\n 15,000.0\n 20,000.0\n 25,000.0\n 30,000.0\n 35,000.0\n 40,000.0\n -\n 5,000.0\n 10,000.0\n 15,000.0\n 20,000.0\n 25,000.0\n2021 Q1\n2021 Q2\n2021 Q3\n2021 Q4\n2022 Q1\nExternal Debt\nDomestic Debt\nTotal Debt\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n29 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nFigure 1.5 Federal Government Domestic Debt Stock \n \n Source: Debt Management Office \n1.2.4 External Reserves \n \nAt end-June 2022, gross external reserves decreased by 2.66 per cent to US$39.16 \nbillion, from US$40.23 billion at end-December 2021. A breakdown of the reserves \nindicated that the CBN, FGN and Federation holdings were 96.84, 3.07 and 0.09 per \ncent, respectively. The currency composition showed that 76.59 per cent of the reserves \nwas held in US dollars, 12.88 per cent in SDRs, 9.32 per cent in Renminbi and 1.21 per \ncent in other currencies. \n \nTotal inflow to the external reserves was US$16.40 billion in the first half of 2022, \ncompared with US$26.01 billion in the second half of 2021, reflecting a decrease of 36.95 \nper cent. The higher inflow in the preceding half was attributed largely to non-recurring \ninflows of US$3.34 billion (SDR allocation) and US$4.0 billion (proceeds of the FGN \nEuro bond issuance). \n \nTotal outflow decreased by 24.16 per cent to US$16.89 billion, compared with US$22.27 \nbillion in the second half of 2021, owing largely to a decrease in the Bank’s intervention \nat the foreign exchange market. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n70.7%\n21.9%\n3.8% 3.0%\n0.6%\nFGN Bonds\nTreasury Bills\nPromissory Notes\nFGN Sukuk\nOthers\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n30 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nFigure 1.6 External Reserves Position (US$ Millions) \n \n \nTable 1:9 Foreign Exchange Flows through the CBN (US$ billion) \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1.2.5 Risks to the External Reserves \nThe level of external reserves remained a key factor in the stability of the financial system. \nDownside risks to the external reserves include: \n• Low inflows from crude oil & gas revenue. The non-receipt of inflows from crude oil \nand gas sales despite the rise in oil prices has continued to impact negatively on \naccretion to the reserves. This was attributed to reduction in crude oil production, \namong others. \n• Rising foreign loan repayment obligations. The increase in the foreign debt profile is \nan indication that foreign debt service payments are likely to increase, and would \nnegatively affect the level of reserves. \n• Global inflationary pressures. Global inflation is expected to remain elevated a \nsituation that was previously anticipated, necessitating the hike in interest rates by the \n -\n 5,000.00\n 10,000.00\n 15,000.00\n 20,000.00\n 25,000.00\n 30,000.00\n 35,000.00\n 40,000.00\n 45,000.00\nGross Foreign Reserves\nPeriod \nInflow \nUS$ billion \nOutflow \nUS$ billion \nNet flow \nUS$ billion \nH1 – 2021 \n 14.06 \n 17.65 \n (3.59) \nH2 – 2021 \n 26.01 \n22.27 \n 3.74 \nH1 – 2022 \n16.40 \n16.89 (0.49) \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n31 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nFed and other major central banks. This scenario poses a threat to reserves accretion \nas foreign investors move assets from emerging economies to advanced economies \nfor expected higher returns. \n• Lead-up to the 2023 general elections. There is the expectation of increased foreign \nexchange demand pressure resulting from uncertainties surrounding the conduct of \nthe 2023 general elections. \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n32 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n2 \n DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM \n2.1 Monetary and Credit Developments \nBroad money supply (M3) grew by 10.00 per cent to N48,890.24 billion at end-June 2022. \nThe development reflected an increase in domestic claims (17.88 per cent), arising from \n31.61 and 12.44 per cent growth in net claims on the central government and claims on \n‘other’ sectors, respectively. The increase in claims on ‘other’ sectors reflected improved \ncredit delivery to the real economy. \n \nThe growth in total monetary liabilities was due, mainly, to the rise in transferable deposits \n(16.61 per cent) and other deposits (8.19 per cent). The growth in transferable deposit was \ndue, largely, to the increase in transferable deposits of commercial and merchant banks, \nwhile the increase in other deposits was hinged on the 13.40 per cent rise in foreign currency \ndeposits. Narrow money supply (M1) rose by 12.69 per cent to N20,347.59 billion at end-\nJune 2022, compared with N18,055.86 billion at end-December 2021. The growth in M1 was \ndue to rise in demand for cash as inflationary pressures persisted in the economy. \n \nTable 2:1 Growth Rates of Monetary Aggregates \n% Change (Over preceding December) \nDec 20 \nJun 21 \nDec 21 \nJun 22 \nForeign Assets (Net) \n50.95 \n-18.73 \n-1.71 \n-34.73 \nNet Domestic Asset \n3.55 \n7.64 \n16.95 \n21.93 \n Domestic Claims \n12.71 \n6.85 \n17.25 \n17.88 \n Claims on Central Government (Net) \n13.81 \n0.88 \n15.96 \n31.61 \n Claims on Other Sectors \n12.30 \n9.15 \n17.75 \n12.44 \n Other Items (Net) \n108.48 \n11.97 \n23.78 \n8.60 \n Currency Outside Depository Corporations \n23.38 \n-9.91 \n17.74 \n-7.46 \n Transferable Deposits \n54.69 \n3.25 \n14.15 \n16.61 \nNarrow Money Supply (M1) \n48.74 \n1.17 \n14.72 \n 12.69 \n Other Deposits \n20.63 \n3.86 \n16.63 \n8.19 \nMonetary Liabilities (M2) \n31.00 \n2.73 \n15.83 \n 10.02 \n Securities Other than Shares \n-81.98 \n-39.82 \n-99.92 \n-681.36 \n Total Monetary Liabilities (M3) \n11.63 \n1.56 \n12.63 \n10.00 \nSource: Statistics Department, Central Bank of Nigeria \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n33 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n2.1.1 Market Structure of the Banking Industry \nDuring the review period, six banks accounted for 68.79 and 66.69 per cent of total deposits \nand assets, compared with 63.88 and 63.79 per cent in the second half of 2021, respectively, \nreflecting an increase in concentration. This was consistent with the Herfindahl Hirschman \nIndices (HHI) of 954.53 and 933.89, for deposits and assets, respectively, compared with \n847.43 for deposits and 854.24 for assets at end-December 2021. The shares of individual \nbanks ranged from 0.07 to 15.56 per cent in deposits and 0.33 to 17.04 per cent in assets. \nFigure 2.1 Concentration Ratios of the Banking Industry Assets and Deposits \n \nSource: Research Department, Central Bank of Nigeria \n \n2.1.2 Consumer Credit \nConsumer credit outstanding, which accounted for 7.22 per cent of total credit to the private \nsector, declined by 6.78 per cent to ₦1,933.18 billion at end-June 2022, compared with \nN2,073.76 billion at end-December 2021. The decrease was due, largely, to the reduction in \npersonal loans, owing to the rise in lending rates. \nFigure 2.2 Consumer Credit \n0.00\n200.00\n400.00\n600.00\n800.00\n1000.00\n0.00\n20.00\n40.00\n60.00\n80.00\nDec-20\nFeb-21\nApr-21\nJun-21\nAug-21\nOct-21\nDec-21\nFeb-22\nApr-22\nJun-22\nHHI\nConcentration Ratio\nCR(Deposits)\nCR( Assets)\nCR( Largest-Deposits)\nCR (Largest-Assets)\nHHI (Deposits) (rhs)\nHHI (Assets) (rhs)\n0.00\n500.00\n1,000.00\n1,500.00\n2,000.00\n2,500.00\n0.00\n1.00\n2.00\n3.00\n4.00\n5.00\n6.00\n7.00\n8.00\n9.00\n10.00\nJun-20\nDec_20\nJun_21\nDec_21\nJun_22\n₦'Billion\nRatio (%)\nRatio of consumer credit to claims on private sector (lhs)\nConsumer credit (rhs)\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n34 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n2.1.3 Sectoral Distribution of Credit \nTotal credit to various sectors of the economy grew by 10.12 per cent to N26,846.40 billion \nat end-June 2022, owing, largely, to a 12.41 per cent increase in credit to N14,624.15 billion \nin the Services Sector. Also, credit to Agriculture and Industry increased by 11.84 and 6.87 \nper cent to ₦1,630.38 billion and ₦10,591.87 billion, respectively. \nServices and Industry remained the dominant sectors, accounting for 54.47 and 39.45 per \ncent of the total credit, respectively, compared with 53.36 and 40.66 per cent at end-\nDecember 2021. The share of Agricultural Sector increased by 0.09 percentage point to 6.07 \nper cent, compared with 5.98 per cent, at end-December 2021. \nThe improved flow of credit to the real sector reflected the Bank’s sustained effort in \nsupporting productivity and, real output growth and employment generation in the economy. \nTable 2:2 Sectoral Allocation of Credit \nITEM \nJun-21 \nDec-21 \nJun-22 \nPercentage Share in Total \n % \nChange \nBetween \n(=N='m) \n(=N='m) \n(=N='m) \nJun-\n21 \nDec-\n21 \nJun-22 \n(2) &(3) \n(1) &(3) \n (1) \n (2) \n (3) \n (4) \n (5) \n(6) \n \n \nSECTORAL \nCREDIT \nALLOCATION \n \n \n \n \n \n[a] Agriculture \n1,154.69 \n1,457.82 \n1,630.381 \n5.27 \n5.98 \n6.07 \n11.84 \n41.20 \n[b] Industry \n9,274.05 \n9,911.14 \n10,591.87 \n42.36 \n40.66 \n39.45 \n6.87 \n14.21 \n of which Construction \n \n1,096.19 \n \n1,069,500.7 \n1,177.24 \n5.00 \n4.40 \n4.39 \n10.07 \n7.39 \n[c] Services \n \n11,466.57 \n \n13,009.23 \n14,624.15 \n52.37 \n53.36 \n54.47 \n12.41 \n27.54 \n of which Trade/General \nCommerce \n \n1,376.32 \n \n1,708.38 \n1,913.39 \n6.30 \n7.00 \n7.13 \n12.00 \n39.02 \nTOTAL \n \nPRIVATE \nSECTOR \nCREDIT \n \n21,895.31 \n \n24,378.19 \n26,846.40 \n100.0 \n100.0 \n100.00 \n10.12 \n22.61 \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \n2.2 Other Financial Institutions \nThe total number of Other Financial Institutions (OFIs) increased by 15 to 6,697 at end-June \n2022, compared with 6,682 at end-December 2021. The increase was due to the licensing \nof six Finance Companies (FCs) and nine Microfinance Banks (MFBs) in the review period. \nThe 6,697 OFIs comprised Seven Development Finance Institutions (DFIs), 875 MFBs, 106 \nFCs, 34 Primary Mortgage Banks (PMBs) and 5,675 Bureaux-de-change (BDCs) (Table \n2.31). \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n35 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \nTable 2:3 Composition of Other Financial Institutions \nS/N \nType \nNumber of Institutions \nat end-December, 2021 \nNumber of Institutions \nat end-June, 2022 \n1 \nMicrofinance Banks \n866 \n875 \n2 \nBureaux De Change \n5,675 \n5,675 \n3 \nFinance Companies \n100 \n106 \n4 \nDevelopment \nFinance \nInstitutions \n7 \n7 \n5 \nPrimary Mortgage Banks \n34 \n34 \n \nTotal \n6,682 \n6,697 \n \nThe total assets of OFIs, excluding BDCs, increased by 8.10 per cent to N5,646.65 billion at \nend-June 2022, from the level of N5,223.66 billion recorded at end-December 2021. This \nwas due largely to increase in investments, cash and bank balances, net loans and advances \nand placements. Investments increased by 21.24 per cent to N1,231.45 billion, at end-June \n2022, from N1,015.71 billion at end-December 2021, while cash and bank balances \nincreased by 16.04 per cent to N263.82 billion, from N227.37 billion. \nSimilarly, net loans and advances and placements increased by 3.19 per cent and 5.58 per \ncent to N3,023.61 billion and N708.54 billion at end-June 2022, from N2,930.06 billion and \nN671.07 billion, respectively, at the end of the preceding period. \nAggregate shareholders’ funds grew by 6.91 per cent to N733.92 billion at end-June 2022, \ncompared with N686.47 billion at end-December 2021, owing to compliance with the new \nminimum capital requirement for MFBs and the accretion to reserves. \n \n´Due to other banks’ and borrowings increased by 218.64 per cent and 16.81 per cent to \nN157.94 billion and N2,125.76 billion, at end-June 2022, compared with N49.57 billion and \nN1,819.87 billion, respectively, at end-December 2021. Similarly, deposit liabilities increased \nby 7.21 per cent to N1,186.56 billion at end-June 2022, from N1,106.79 billion, at end-\nDecember 2021, while long-term liabilities decreased by 25.27 per cent to N521.94 billion \nfrom N698.45 billion. \n \n \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n36 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \nFigure 2.3 Consolidated Balance Sheet of OFIs \n \n \n \n \n \n2.2.1 Development Finance Institutions \nThe total assets of the development finance sub-sector grew by 9.16 per cent to N3,334.06 \nbillion at end-June 2022, from the level of N3,054.33 billion at end-December 2021. The \nincrease was due largely to investments and placements which grew by 23.37 per cent and \n8.79 per cent to N1,121.46 billion and N466.51 billion at end-June 2022, from N909.04 billion \nand N428.81 billion, respectively, at end-December 2021. Net loans and advances increased \nby 0.83 per cent to N1,598.62 billion at end-June 2022, compared with N1,585.39 billion at \nend-December 2021. \nThe growth in assets was driven mainly by the 19.24 per cent increase in borrowings to \nN1,886.72 billion at end-June 2022, from N1,582.32 billion at end-December 2021.The \naggregate shareholders’ funds increased by 4.07 per cent to N471.67 billion at end-June \n2022, from N453.24 billion at end-December 2021, due to accretion of N18.43 billion to \nreserves. Deposit liabilities also increased by 8.45 per cent to N558.36 billion at end-June \n2022, from N514.85 billion at end-December 2021; while other liabilities decreased by 15.40 \nper cent to N371.03 billion from N438.60 billion. \nDFI: \n58.47%\nPMB: \n9.68%\nFC: 6.94%\nMFB: \n24.91%\nTotal Assets of OFIs at End-Dec. 2021\nDFI\nPMB\nFC\nMFB\nDFI: \n59.04%\nPMB: \n9.32%\nFC: 6.68%\nMFB: 24.95%\nTotal Assets of OFIs at End- Jun. 2022\nDFI\nPMB\nFC\nMFB\n0\n500\n1,000\n1,500\n2,000\n2,500\n3,000\n3,500\nN'Billions\nDec-21\nJun-22\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n37 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \nThe breakdown of the total assets by institutions, indicated that the Bank of Industry (BOI), \nDevelopment Bank of Nigeria (DBN), Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria (FMBN), Nigerian \nExport-Import Bank (NEXIM) accounted for 59.83, 14.91, 14.46 and 6.49 per cent, \nrespectively. Furthermore, Nigeria Mortgage Refinance Company (NMRC), Bank of \nAgriculture (BOA) and The Infrastructure Bank (TIB), accounted for 2.58, 1.66 and 0.07 per \ncent, respectively. The BOI, DBN, FMBN, NEXIM, BOA and NMRC accounted for 48.75, \n20.06, 19.31, 8.53, 1.80 and 1.55 per cent of total net loans and advances, respectively. \nFigure 2.4 Consolidated Balance Sheet of DFIs \n \n \nFigure 2.5 Total Assets and Liabilities of DFIs \n \nCash & \nBank \nBalances\n0.03%\nPlacement\ns\n14.04%\nInvestment\n29.76%\nNet Loans & \nAdvances\n51.91%\nOther \nAssets\n2.22%\nFixed \nAssets\n2.04%\nAssets of DFIs at End- Dec. 2021\nTotal Assets of N3,054.33 billion\nCash & Bank \nBalances\n0.66%\nPlacements\n13.99%\nInvestment\n33.64%\nNet Loans & \nAdvances\n47.95%\nOther Assets\n1.82%\nFixed Assets\n1.95%\nAssets of DFIs at End- Jun. 2022\nTotal Assets of N3,334.06 billion\n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1,000\n1,200\n1,400\n1,600\n1,800\n2,000\nN'billion\nDec-21\nJun-22\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n38 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \n2.2.2 Primary Mortgage Banks \nThe total assets of the sub-sector increased by 4.14 per cent to N526.53 billion, at end-June \n2022, compared with N505.61 billion, at end-December 2021, owing largely to increases in \nnet loans and advances, as well as balances with banks. Net loans and advances and \nbalances with banks increased by 4.32 per cent and 31.77 per cent to N287.97 billion and \nN23.64 billion at end-June 2022, compared with N276.03 billion and N17.94 billion, \nrespectively, at end-December 2021. Placements with banks increased by 4.63 per cent to \nN77.35 billion at end-June 2022, from the level of N73.93 billion at end-December 2021, \nwhile short-term investments declined by 36.26 per cent to N4.39 billion from N6.88 billion. \nThe shareholders’ funds increased by 26.75 per cent to N41.23 billion at end-June 2022, \nfrom N32.53 billion at end-December 2021, owing to accretion to reserves. Long-term loans \nand other liabilities also increased to N86.30 billion and N203.71 billion at end-June 2022, \nfrom N77.06 billion and N194.26 billion at end-December 2021, indicating increases of \n11.99 and 4.87 per cent, respectively. \nCash & \nBank \nBalanc…\nPlacement\ns…\nInvestment\n29.76%\nNet Loans & \nAdvances\n51.91%\nOther \nAssets\n2.22%\nFixed \nAssets\n2.04%\nAssets of DFIs at End- Dec. 2021\nTotal Liabilities of N3,054.33 billion\nPaid-up \nCapital\n7.16%\nReserves\n6.99%\nDeposits\n16.75%\nBorrowings\n56.58%\nDue to \nBanks\n0.09%\nOther \nLiabilities\n11.13%\nLong-term \nLiabilities\n1.30%\nLiabilities of DFIs at End- Jun. 2022\nTotal Liabilities of N3,054.33 billion\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n39 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nFigure 2.6 Consolidated Balance Sheet of PMBs (N'BN) \n \nFigure 2.7 Composition of Assets and Liabilities of Primary Mortgage Banks \n \nCash & \nShort-\nTerm …\nInvestmen\nt…\nNet \nLoans & \nAdvanc…\nOther \nAssets\n10.57%\nFixed \nAssets\n3.90%\nAssets of PMBs at End- Dec. 2021\nTotal Assets of N526.53 \nbillion\nCash & \nShort-\nTerm …\nInvestme\nnt…\nNet Loans \n& \nAdvance…\nOther \nAssets\n10.56%\nFixed \nAssets\n3.78%\nAssets of PMBs at End- Jun. 2022\nTotal Assets of N526.53 billion\n-100\n-50\n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\n300\n350\nAssets and Liabilities\nDec-21\nJun-22\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n40 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \nTable 2:4 Financial Highlights OF PMBs \n \nEnd-December \n2021 \n (N’ billion) \nEnd-June 2022 \n (N’ billion) \nChange \n(N’ billion) \n% Change \nTotal Assets \n505.61 \n526.53 \n20.92 \n4.14 \nNet Loans and Advances \n276.03 \n287.97 \n11.93 \n4.32 \nInvestments \n58.97 \n57.81 \n(1.15) \n(1.95) \nOther Assets \n53.42 \n55.62 \n2.20 \n4.11 \nCash and Short-Term Funds \n97.45 \n105.24 \n7.79 \n8.00 \nReserves \n(76.18) \n(69.55) \n6.62 \n8.70 \nDeposit liabilities \n180.20 \n174.20 \n(6.00) \n(3.33) \nOther liabilities \n194.26 \n203.71 \n9.46 \n4.87 \nLong-term Liabilities \n77.06 \n86.30 \n9.24 \n11.99 \nShareholders’ funds \n32.53 \n41.23 \n8.70 \n26.75 \n \nInvestible funds available to the PMB sub-sector at end-June 2022 amounted to N31.41 \nbillion. The funds were sourced mainly from increases in long-term loans and other liabilities \nPaid-up \nCapital, \n21.50%\nReserves, \n-15.02%\nDeposits, \n35.64%\nDue to \nBanks, \n4.27%\nLong-term \nLiabilities, \n15.24%\nOther \nLiabilities, \n38.42%\nLiabilities of PMBs at End- Dec. 2021\nTotal Liabilties of N526.53 billion\nPaid-up \nCapital, \n21.04%\nReserves, \n-13.21%\nDeposits, \n33.09%\nDue to \nBanks, \n4.01%\nLong-term \nLiabilities, \n16.39%\nOther \nLiabilities, \n38.69%\nLiabilities of PMBs at End- Jun. 2022\nTotal Liabilities of N526.53 billion\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n41 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nby N9.24 billion and N9.46 billion, respectively and were mainly utilised to increase loans \nand advances, as well as cash and short-term funds. \nThe capital adequacy ratio of the PMBs increased to 12.09 per cent at end-June 2022, \ncompared with 9.95 per cent at end-December 2021 and was above the regulatory minimum \nof 10.00 per cent. The increase in the CAR was due to additional capital injection, which \nimpacted positively on shareholders’ funds. Also, the Liquidity Ratio increased to 49.34 per \ncent at end-June 2022, compared with 43.65 per cent at end-December 2021 and surpassed \nthe prudential minimum of 20.00 per cent. Similarly, asset quality improved as non-\nperforming loans (NPL) ratio reduced by 21.63 percentage points to 27.28 per cent at end-\nJune 2022, compared with 48.91 per cent at end-December 2021. The NPL ratio, however, \nremained above the regulatory maximum of 10.00 per cent. \n \n2.2.3 Finance Companies \nDuring the review period, six new FCs were granted licences, bringing the total to 106 at \nend-June 2022, compared with 100 at end-December 2021. Similarly, the total assets of FCs \nincreased by 4.10 per cent to N377.47 billion at end-June 2022, from N362.62 billion at end-\nDecember 2021. The development was attributed largely to the six newly licenced FCs and \nincreases in net loans and advances and other assets. \nAt end-June 2022, net loans and advances increased by 8.88 per cent to N181.80 billion and \nother assets by 13.84 per cent to N66.20 billion; compared with N166.98 billion and N58.15 \nbillion, respectively, at end-December 2021. Furthermore, fixed assets increased by 7.89 per \ncent to N49.79 billion at end-June 2022, from N46.15 billion at end-December 2021. \nInvestments, however, decreased by 35.43 per cent to N12.76 billion at end-June 2022, from \nthe level of N19.76 billion recorded at end-December 2021. \n \nTotal borrowings and other liabilities increased by 0.63 and 8.42 per cent to N239.04 billion \nand N89.31 billion at end-June 2022, compared with N237.55 billion and N82.38 billion at \nend-December 2021, respectively. Similarly, shareholders’ funds increased by 15.54 per \ncent to N47.18 billion at end-June 2022, compared with N40.84 billion at end-December \n2021, resulting from additional capital injection and accretion to reserves. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n42 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \nTable 2:5 Financial Position of FCs \n \n \nEnd-December 2021 \n(N’ billion) \nEnd-June 2022 \n \n(N’ billion) \n% Change \n \nTotal Assets \n362.62 \n377.47 \n4.10 \nCash in Vault \n2.37 \n2.23 \n(5.94) \nBalances with Banks \n27.32 \n27.67 \n1.28 \nNet Loans and Advances \n166.98 \n181.80 \n8.88 \nInvestments \n19.76 \n12.76 \n(35.43) \nPlacements \n41.89 \n37.02 \n(11.62) \nFixed Assets \n46.15 \n49.79 \n7.89 \nBorrowings \n237.55 \n239.04 \n0.63 \nOther Liabilities \n82.38 \n89.31 \n8.42 \nShareholder’s Funds \n40.84 \n47.18 \n15.54 \nPaid up capital \n25.65 \n29.40 \n14.62 \nReserves \n15.19 \n17.78 \n 17.09 \n \nFigure 2.8 Consolidated Balance Sheet of FCs \n \n \n \n0\n25\n50\n75\n100\n125\n150\n175\n200\n225\n250\n275\n(N'Billion)\nDec-21\nJun-22\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n43 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nFigure 2.9 Composition of Assets and Liabilities of FCs \n \n \n \nInvestible funds at end-June 2022 amounted to N26.86 billion, compared with N42.17 billion \nat end-December 2021. The decline was mainly due to reduction in other liabilities and \nborrowings. The funds were sourced mainly from increases in paid-up capital and other \nliabilities by N3.75 billion and N6.93 billion, as well as decreases in placements and \ninvestments by N4.87 billion and N7.00 billion, respectively. The funds were utilised mainly \nto increase loans and advances, and other assets. \nThe CAR for the subsector was 11.24 per cent at end-June 2022, compared with 11.12 per \ncent at end-December 2021, while NPL ratio declined to 19.17 per cent from 19.91 per cent \nover the same period, reflecting an improvement in asset quality and loan repayment. \n \nCash & Bank \nBalances\n8.19%\nPlacements\n11.55%\nInvestment\n5.45%\nNet Loans & \nAdvances\n46.05%\nOther \nAssets\n16.04%\nFixed \nAssets\n12.73%\nAssets of FCs at End- Dec. 2021\nTotal Assets of N377.47 billion\nCash & Bank \nBalances, \n7.92%\nPlacements, \n9.81%\nInvestments, \n3.38%\nNet Loans & \nAdvances, \n48.16%\nOther \nAssets, \n17.54%\nFixed \nAssets, \n13.19%\nAssets of FCs at End- Jun. 2022\nTotal Assets of N377.47 billion\nPaid-up \nCapital, \n7.07%\nReserves, \n4.19%\nBorrowings\n65.51%\nLong-term \nLiabilities, \n0.51%\nOther \nLiabilities, \n22.72%\nLiabilities of FCs at End- Dec. 2021\nTotal Liabilities of N377.47 billion\nPaid-up \nCapital, \n7.79%\nReserves, \n4.71%\nBorrowing\ns 63.33%\nLong-term \nLiabilities, \n0.51%\nOther \nLiabilities, \n23.66%\nLiabilities of FCs at End- Jun. 2022\nTotal Liabilities of N377.47 billion\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n44 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n2.2.4 Microfinance Banks \nDuring the review period, nine Unit MFBs were licensed, bringing the total to 875 (9 National, \n134 State and 732 Unit MFBs), compared with 866 (9 National, 134 State and 723 Unit \nMFBs) at end-December 2021. \n \n \nThe total assets of the subsector increased by 8.26 per cent to N1,408.58 billion, at end-\nJune 2022, from N1,301.11 billion, at end-December 2021. The increase was due to the \nnewly licensed MFBs and growth in net loans and advances, cash and bank balances, and \nfixed assets. Similarly, net loans and advances increased by 5.94 per cent to N955.23 billion, \nat end-June 2022, compared with N901.66 billion, at end-December 2021, while fixed assets \nincreased by 141.93 per cent to N35.45 billion, at end-June 2022, from N14.65 billion, at \nend-December 2021. Cash increased by 96.09 per cent to N32.74 billion, at end-June 2022, \ncompared with N16.70 billion, at end-December 2021. \nShareholders’ funds increased by 8.74 per cent to N173.83 billion at end-June 2022, \ncompared with N159.86 billion at end-December 2021, owing largely to capital injection and \nretained earnings. Similarly, takings from other banks increased by 707.52 per cent to \nN133.93 billion at end-June 2022, from N16.58 billion at end-December 2021, while deposits \nincreased by 10.26 per cent to N453.99 billion, from N411.74 billion. However, long-term \nloans declined by 12.95 per cent to N390.36 billion at end-June 2022, from N448.43 billion \nat end-December 2021. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n45 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \nTable 2:6 Highlights of Financial Position of MFBs \n \n \nEnd-December 2021 \n(N’ Billion) \nEnd-June 2022 \n(N’ Billion) \nChange \n(N’ \nBillion) \n% \nChange \n \nTotal Assets \n1,301.11 \n1,408.58 \n107.48 \n8.26 \nPlacement with Banks \n126.45 \n127.67 \n1.22 \n0.97 \nNet Loans and Advances \n901.66 \n955.23 \n53.57 \n5.94 \nFixed Assets \n14.65 \n35.45 \n20.80 \n141.93 \nPaid up capital \n93.73 \n119.26 \n25.53 \n27.23 \nReserves \n66.13 \n54.57 \n(11.55) \n(17.74) \nShareholder’s Funds \n159.86 \n173.83 \n13.98 \n8.74 \nDeposits \n411.74 \n453.99 \n42.25 \n10.26 \nTakings from Other Banks 16.58 \n133.93 \n117.34 \n707.52 \nLong \nTerm \nLoans/On-\nlending \n448.43 \n390.36 \n(58.08) \n(12.95) \nOther Liabilities \n264.49 \n256.48 \n(8.01) \n(3.03) \nFigure 2.10 Balance Sheet of MFBs \n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n700\n800\n900\n1,000\n1,100\nN\"Billion\nDec-21\nJun-22\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n46 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \n \nFigure 2.11 Composition of Assets and Liabilities of MFBs \n \n \n \nInvestible funds at end-June 2022 amounted to N190.32 billion, compared with N183.67 \nbillion at end-December 2021. The funds were sourced mainly from additional paid-up capital \n(N25.53 billion), deposits (N42.25 billion) and takings from other banks (N117.34 billion). The \nfunds were utilised mainly to increase net loans and advances by N53.57 billion, fixed assets \n(N20.80 billion), investments (N11.47 billion) and cash and bank balances (N10.84 billion) \nas well as reduction in long-term loans (N58.08 billion). \nCash & Bank \nBalances\n13.31%\nPlacements\n9.72%\nInvestment\n2.15%\nNet Loans & \nAdvances\n69.29%\nOther \nAssets\n4.40%\nFixed \nAssets\n1.13%\nAssets of MFBs at End- Dec. 2021\nTotal Assets of N1,408.58 billion\nCash & Bank \nBalances\n13.06%\nPlacements\n9.06%\nInvestment\n2.79%\nNet Loans & \nAdvances\n67.82%\nOther \nAssets\n4.74%\nFixed \nAssets\n2.52%\nAssets of MFBs at End- Jun. 2022\nTotal Assets of N1,408.58 billion\nPaid-up \nCapital, \n7.20%\nReserves, \n5.08%\nDeposits, \n31.65%\nTakings \nfrom \nOther \nBanks, \n1.27%\nLong-term \nLiabilities, \n34.47%\nOther \nLiabilities, \n20.33%\nLiabilities of FCs at End- Dec. 2021\nTotal Liabilities of N1,408.58 billion\nPaid-up \nCapital, \n8.47%\nReserves, \n3.87%\nDeposits, \n32.23%\nTakings from \nOther Banks, \n9.51%\nLong-term \nLiabilities, \n27.71%\nOther \nLiabilities, \n18.21%\nLiabilities of MFBs at End- Jun. 2022\nTotal Liabilities of N1,408.58 billion\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n47 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \nThe capital adequacy and liquidity ratios of the subsector improved to 15.51 and 75.71 per \ncent at end-June 2022, compared with 15.42 and 78.01 per cent, respectively, at end-\nDecember 2021. The ratios were above the minimum regulatory requirements of 10.00 and \n20.00 per cent, respectively. Portfolio-At-Risk (PAR) rose to 8.68 per cent in the first half of \n2022, from 5.94 per cent at end-December 2021. \n \n2.2.4.1 Maturity Structure of Loans and Advances and Deposit Liabilities \nCredits with maturity period of more than a year accounted for 58.90 per cent of the total \nloans and advances at end-June 2022, reflecting an increase of 37.79 percentage points, \nfrom the level of 21.11 per cent recorded at end-December 2021. Loans and advances with \nmaturity periods of less than one year accounted for 41.10 per cent, compared with 78.89 \nper cent at end-December 2021. \n \nThe deposit structure remained largely short-term, as those of less than one-year maturity \naccounted for 81.33 per cent, a decrease of 5.03 percentage points, from the level of 86.36 \nper cent recorded at end-December 2021. Conversely, deposits of over one-year maturity \naccounted for 18.67 per cent, reflecting an increase of 5.03 percentage points, from the level \nof 13.64 per cent at end-December 2021. \n \nTable 2:7 Maturity Structure of Loans and Advances and Deposit Liabilities \nDec-21 \nJun-22 \nTenor/Period \nLoans and \nAdvances \nDeposits \nTenor/Period \nLoans and \nAdvances \nDeposits \n \n% \n% \n \n% \n% \n0-30 Days \n21.69 \n40.38 \n0-30 Days \n10.32 \n31.90 \n31-60 Days \n7.59 \n7.58 \n31-60 Days \n3.81 \n10.08 \n61-90 Days \n7.86 \n11.99 \n61-90 Days \n4.48 \n11.35 \n91-180 Days \n22.48 \n15.03 \n91-180 Days \n12.25 \n16.56 \n181-360 Days \n19.27 \n11.38 \n181-360 Days \n10.24 \n11.45 \nShort-Term \n78.89 \n86.36 \nShort-Term \n41.10 \n81.33 \nAbove 360 Days \n21.11 \n13.64 \nAbove 360 Days \n58.90 \n18.67 \nTotal \n100 \n100 \nTotal \n100 \n100 \n2.2.5 Capacity Building Programme \nAs part of capacity building efforts, 308 staff of MFBs were certified by the Chartered Institute \nof Bankers of Nigeria (CIBN), on completion of the Microfinance Certification Programme \nduring the review period. Consequently, the total number of certified staff increased to 8,100 \nat end-June 2022, from 7,792 at end-December 2021. \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n48 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n2.3 Financial Markets \nThe Bank adopted a contractionary monetary policy stance, in response to the lingering \ninflationary and exchange rate pressures. Thus, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) \nincreased the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) from 11.50 per cent to 13.00 per cent while \nsustaining an asymmetric corridor of +100/-700 basis points for Standing Lending Facility \n(SLF) and Standing Deposit Facility (SDF). The Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) and Liquidity \nRatio (LR) were also maintained at 27.50 and 30.00 per cent, respectively. \n \n2.3.1 Money Market \nThe major activities that impacted the money market included fiscal flows, conduct of open \nmarket and discount window operations and government securities auctions, foreign \nexchange interventions and cash reserve ratio operations. The open-buy-back (OBB) and \nunsecured interbank call weighted daily average opened at 5.50 and 13.00 per cent on \nJanuary 4 and 11, 2022, respectively, compared with 11.69 per cent and 9.82 per cent on \nJuly 1 and 7, 2021, respectively. The rates peaked at 15.29 and 16.00 per cent for OBB and \nunsecured interbank call on January 17 and 21, 2022, respectively. The rates, thereafter, \nmoderated to 13.63 per cent on June 30, 2022, for OBB, and 14.00 per cent on June 29, \n2022 for unsecured interbank calls. \nThe monthly average OBB and inter-bank call rates closed at 10.89 and 11.10 per cent at \nend-June 2022, compared with 12.59 and 13.42 per cent, respectively, at end-December \n2021. This reflected improved liquidity conditions occasioned by the maturing CBN and NTB \nbills. The OBB weighted daily average rates ranged between 0.57 and 15.29 per cent, \ncompared with a range 3.52 and 21.34 per cent in the second half of 2021. Similarly, the \ninter-bank call rates ranged between 4.50 and 16.00 per cent, compared with 4.00 and 25.00 \nper cent in the second half of 2021. \n \nFigure 2.12 Money Market Rates for First Half of 2022 \n \n \nJAN\nFEB\nMAR\nAPR\nMAY\nJUN\nInter-Bank Call (%)\n14.31\n9.30\n4.50\n8.67\n8.38\n11.10\nOpen-Buy-Back (OBB) (%)\n8.51\n6.10\n6.62\n7.49\n9.39\n10.89\nMPR (%)\n11.50\n11.50\n11.50\n11.50\n11.95\n13.00\nCall NIBOR (%)\n11.05\n8.17\n7.91\n8.40\n10.40\n11.80\n30-day NIBOR\n8.96\n9.24\n8.19\n8.18\n9.51\n8.52\n0.00\n2.00\n4.00\n6.00\n8.00\n10.00\n12.00\n14.00\n16.00\nPer Cent\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n49 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n2.3.1.1 Developments in Interest Rates \nLending transactions increased by 9.56 per cent to N25,586.61 billion in the review period, \ncompared with N23,354.01 billion in the second half of 2021. The average maximum lending \nrate rose marginally by 0.96 percentage point to 28.47 per cent from, 27.51 per cent in the \nsecond half of 2021. Similarly, the prime lending rate increased by 0.24 percentage point to \n11.91 per cent from, 11.67 per cent in the second half of 2021. The maximum lending rate \nremained above the inflation rate of 18.60 per cent at end-June 2022, while the prime lending \nrate was negative in real terms. \nThe weighted average term-deposit rate dipped by 0.39 percentage point to 3.80 per cent, \nleading to a wider spread between the deposit and lending rates. The spread between the \naverage term deposit and maximum lending rates widened to 26.78 percentage points in the \nfirst half of 2022 from, 25.66 percentage points in the second half of 2021. \nFigure 2.13 Interest Rates Spread \n \n2.3.1.2 Nigerian Treasury Bills \nNigerian Treasury Bills (NTBs) of 91-, 182- and 364-day tenors, totaling N2,415.58 billion, \nwere issued and allotted in the first half of 2022. This indicated a decrease of N54.28 billion \nor 2.20 per cent, compared with the N2,469.86 billion issued in the preceding period. \nSimilarly, total subscription was N4,663.18 billion during the first half of 2022, indicating a \ndecrease of N453.55 billion or 8.86 per cent, compared with N5,116.73 billion recorded in \nthe preceding period. Average marginal rates ranged between 1.7400– 2.5000 per cent for \nthe 91-day, 3.0000 – 3.8900 per cent for the 182-day and 4.000 – 6.4900 per cent for the \n364-day tenors, respectively. \n \n \n \n \n22.00\n23.00\n24.00\n25.00\n26.00\n27.00\n28.00\n29.00\n30.00\n31.00\nPer cent\nInterest rate spread - Max Lending Minus Weighted Av. Savings/Term Rate\nInterest rate spread - Max Lending Minus Weighted Av. Deposit rate(Demand, Saving, Time/Term)\nSavings/Term Rate\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n50 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nFigure 2.14 Primary Market: Nigerian Treasury Bills Allotment (%) \n \n \nFigure 2.15 Primary Market: Nigerian Treasury Bills Transactions (N'Billion) \n \n \n \nIn the review period, commercial banks took up N1,782.22 billion or 73.78 per cent, \ncompared with N1,696.13 billion or 68.67 per cent in the preceding period. Merchant banks \naccounted for N68.87 billion or 2.85 per cent, as against N89.10 billion or 3.61 per cent, in \nthe preceding period, while mandate and internal funds customers of the CBN took up \nN564.50 billion or 23.37 per cent, compared with N551.38 billion or 22.32 per cent in the \nsecond half of 2021. \nThe NTBs outstanding at end-June 2022 stood at N4,504.80 billion. The holding structure \nindicated that parastatals accounted for N1,212.03 billion (26.91 per cent), commercial banks \nN2,275.12 billion (50.50 per cent), CBN mandate and internal fund customers accounted for \n69%\n4%\n20%\n2%\n5%\nDMBs\nMBs\nMandate & Internal Customers\nCBN Branches\nCBN Take-up\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1000\n1200\n1400\n1600\nJul-21\nJul-21\nAug-21\nAug-21\nAug-21\nAug-21\nSep-21\nSep-21\nSep-21\nSep-21\nSep-21\nOct-21\nOct-21\nOct-21\nOct-21\nNov-21\nNov-21\nNov-21\nNov-21\nDec-21\nDec-21\nDec-21\nDec-21\nDec-21\nJan-22\nJan-22\nJan-22\nJan-22\nFeb-22\nFeb-22\nFeb-22\nFeb-22\nMar-22\nMar-22\nMar-22\nMar-22\nMar-22\nApr-22\nApr-22\nApr-22\nApr-22\nMay-22\nMay-22\nMay-22\nMay-22\nJun-22\nIssues\nSubscription\nRepayment\nAve. Rates %\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n51 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nN988.26 billion (21.94 per cent), while merchant banks accounted for N29.38 billion (0.65 \nper cent). In the preceding period, the NTBs outstanding amounted to N2,991.87 billion, \ncomprising parastatals N1,566.31 billion (52.35 per cent), commercial banks holdings of \nN728.95 billion (24.36 per cent), CBN mandate and internal fund customers N682.58 billion \n(22.81 per cent) and merchant banks N14.03 billion (0.47 per cent). \nFigure 2.16 NTBs Outstanding at End-June 2022 (Per cent and in N'BN) \n \n \n2.3.1.3 Foreign Exchange Market: US Dollar Sales and Purchases \nThe total foreign exchange sales by the Bank in the first half of 2022 amounted to \nUS$9,229.27 million, compared with US$10,543.52 million in the second half of 2021, \nreflecting a decrease of 12.47 per cent. A breakdown indicated that retail spot sales \namounted to US$622.92 million; invisible trade sales, US$856.81 million; I&E window, \nUS$2,075.45 million; SMEs, US$834.74 million; and Retail forwards sales, US$4,839.35 \nmillion. Furthermore, the Bank purchased US$1,325.43 million, resulting in net sales of \nUS$7,903.83 million. \nForwards contracts, totaling US$7,008.27 million matured, while US$3,846.64 million was \noutstanding at end-June 2022. \n \n \nTable 2:8 Interventions at the Interbank Foreign Exchange Market \nFX Transactions \nEnd-Dec 21 \nEnd-June 22 \n \nSales \nPurchases \nSales \nPurchases \n \n($ million) \n($ million) \n($ million) \n($ million) \n1212.03, 27%\n2275.12, 50%\n988.26, 22%\n29.38, 1%\nParastatals\nCommercial banks\nCBN\nMerchant banks\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n52 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nSMIS Spot \n615.07 \n622.92 \n \nInvisible Trade \n1,041.00 \n \n856.81 \n \nSME \n793.13 \n834.74 \n \nI&E \n3,316.91 \n2,075.45 \n \nSMIS Forwards \n4,777.42 \n4,839.35 \n \nIOCs \n807.65 \n \n1,325.43 \nTotal \n10,543.53 \n807.65 \n9,229.27 \n1,325.43 \n \n2.3.1.4 Exchange Rate Movement at the Investors’ & Exporters’ Window \nThe rate at the I&E window opened at N417.00/US$ on January 4, 2022 and closed at \nN414.00/US$ at end-June, 2022, reflecting 0.72 per cent appreciation. \n \nFigure 2.17 Investors’ & Exporters’ Rate \n \n412.00\n413.00\n414.00\n415.00\n416.00\n417.00\n418.00\nJan-22\nFeb-22\nMar-22\nApr-22\nMay-22\nJun-22\n(N/US$)\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n53 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n2.3.1.5 Over-the-Counter Foreign Exchange Futures \nThe notional amount of over-the-counter foreign exchange (OTC FX) futures executed, \nmatured and outstanding during the review period stood at US$1,437.90 million, \nUS$3,001.44 million, and US$3,768.37 million, respectively, at end-June 2022, compared \nwith US$3,577.39 million, US$2,496.85 million and US$5,331.89 million at end-December \n2021. \n \n2.3.1.6 Naira/Yuan Bilateral Currency Swap Agreement \nA total of CNY1,263.51 million was sold at end-June 2022, compared with CNY 2,093.51 \nmillion sold in the second half of 2021. A total of CNY7,043.57 million was sold from inception \nto end-June 2022. \n2.3.2 Capital Market \nThe Nigerian capital market was bullish as evidenced by the positive performance in the \nequities, debt and Exchange Traded Fund (ETF) segments. Consequently, aggregate \nMarket Capitalisation increased by 21.31 per cent to close at N50.18 trillion, at end-June \n2022, from N43.12 trillion at end-December 2021. The equities and debt segments increased \nby 25.29 and 25.31 per cent to N27.94 trillion and N22.23 trillion respectively, and the ETF \ncomponent appreciated by 2.05 per cent to close at N7.45 billion. \nTable 2:9 NGX ASI, Equity and Debt Market Capitalisation \n \nEnd-\nDecember \n2020 \nEnd-June \n2021 \nEnd-\nDecember \n2021 \nEnd-June \n2022 \n% Change \nNGX ASI \n40,270.72 \n37,907.28 \n42,716.44 \n51,817.59 \n21.31 \nAggregate Market Cap (N’Trn) \n39.73 \n38.19 \n43.12 \n50.18 \n16.37 \nEquity Market Cap (N’Trn) \n21.06 \n19.76 \n22.30 \n27.94 \n25.29 \nDebt Market Cap (N’Trn) \n17.50 \n17.39 \n17.74 \n22.23 \n25.31 \n Of which \nGovernment Debt \n \n16.67 \n19.02 \n21.34 \n12.20 \n Corporate Debt \n0.51 \n0.72 \n0.72 \n0.74 \n2.92 \nExchange Traded Funds Market \nCap (N’ Bn) \n20.00 \n12.20 \n7.30 \n7.45 \n2.05 \nSource: NGX \nIn the first half of 2022, 16 new issues valued ₦534.50 billion were approved and listed, \ncomprising six equity issues (₦124.10 billion) and 10 corporate bonds (₦410.40 billion), \ncompared with 9 issues which comprised two equity issues valued (₦7.44 billion) and 7 \ncorporate bonds (₦291.65 billion) in the second half of 2021 (table 2.10). The six equity issues \nincluded one Initial Public Offering (IPO), three rights issues and two public offers. There were \nno supranational bonds issued in the review period. However, there were 17 FGN bonds issued \nat end-June 2022, compared with 15 FGN bonds issued in the preceding period reflecting a \nreduction of 13.33 per cent \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n54 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \nTable 2:10 New Issues \nType \nNumber of Issues \nValue of Issues (N’Bn) \n \nDec-21 \nJun-22 Change \n% \nDec-21 \nJun-22 Change \n% \nIPO \n- \n1 \n \n- \n111.8 \n- \nPublic Offer/Offer for Sale \n- \n2 \n- \n- \n9.9 \n- \nPrivate Placement \n1 \n- \n- \n3.3 \n- \nRights \n1 \n3 \n200.00 \n4.14 \n2.5 \n-39.61 \nTotal Equities \n2 \n6 \n200.00 \n7.44 \n124.2 \n1569.35 \nCorporate Bonds \n7 \n10 \n42.86 \n291.65 \n410.4 \n40.72 \nSub-national Bonds \n- \n- \n \n- \n- \n \nFGN Bonds \n17 \n15 \n-11.76 \n1,192.01 \n1,555.70 \n30.51 \nEurobond (415.58/$) \n0 \n1 \n \n- \n519.475 \n \nTotal Debt \n24 \n26 \n8.33 1,483.66 2,485.58 \n67.53 \nTotal (Equities & Debt) \n26 \n32 \n23.08 1,491.10 2,609.78 \n75.02 \nSource: SEC, DMO \n \n2.3.2.1 Equities Market \n2.3.2.1.1 Nigerian Exchange Limited \nThe Nigerian Exchange Limited (NGX) All Share Index (ASI) and equities market \ncapitalisation experienced a bullish trend in the first half of 2022. The NGX ASI rose to \n51,817.59 points at end-June 2022, from 42,716.44 points at end-December 2021, attaining \na level of 53,098.46 points on May 13, 2022, reflecting a 14-year high since 2008. The \nimpressive performance reflected improved earnings, dividends reinvestment and the roll out \nof two exchange traded derivatives, the NGX 30 Index Futures and NGX Pension Index \nFutures. The NGX equities market capitalisation closed at N27.94 trillion, indicating an \nincrease of 25.00 per cent compared with N22.3 trillion at end-December 2021. \nGenerally, sectoral performance was impressive during the review period as 14 out of 17 \nindices closed the half year on a positive note. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n55 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \n \nTable 2:11 Nigerian Exchange Limited Indices \nIndex \nDec-20 \nJun-21 \nH1 YTD \nDec-21 \nJun-22 \n \nChange \n% \nNGX 30 \n1,640.11 \n1,594.87 \n-2.76 \n1,722.30 \n1,887.62 \n9.60 \nNGX AFR Div. Yield \n2,017.91 \n2,329.50 \n15.44 \n2559.43 \n3,191.06 \n24.68 \nNGX ASeM \n729.87 \n703.94 \n-3.55 \n670.65 \n658.99 \n-1.74 \nNGX Banking \n393.02 \n366.47 \n-6.76 \n406.07 \n397.79 \n-2.04 \nNGX CG \n1,220.61 \n1,199.29 \n-1.75 \n1,278.00 \n1,319.70 \n3.26 \nNGX Consumer Goods \n573.35 \n600.88 \n4.80 \n589.28 \n623.99 \n5.89 \nNGX Growth \n991.89 \n1,028.75 \n3.72 \n1,269.66 \n1,487.20 \n17.13 \nNGX Industrial \n2,052.33 \n1,887.76 \n-8.02 \n2,008.30 \n2,152.24 \n7.17 \nNGX Insurance \n189.50 \n203.84 \n7.57 \n198.11 \n178.33 \n-9.98 \nNGX Lotus Islamic \n2,846.19 \n2,760.73 \n-3.00 \n3,009.51 \n3,251.25 \n8.03 \nNGX Main-Board \n1,725.91 \n1,600.77 \n-7.25 \n1,748.37 \n2,274.79 \n30.11 \nNGX MERI GROWTH \n1,654.15 \n1,789.98 \n8.21 \n1,805.02 \n2,364.94 \n31.02 \nNGX MERI VALUE \n1,851.31 \n1,801.66 \n-2.68 \n2,134.95 \n2,167.09 \n1.51 \nNGX Oil/Gas \n226.20 \n313.08 \n38.41 \n345.01 \n545.34 \n58.06 \nNGX Pension \n1,388.64 \n1,479.77 \n6.56 \n1,624.09 \n1,823.58 \n12.28 \nNGX Premium \n3,470.77 \n3,527.67 \n1.64 \n4,167.78 \n4,924.13 \n18.15 \nNGX-AFR Bank Value \n1,113.18 \n1,057.09 \n-5.04 \n1,038.82 \n925.95 \n-10.87 \nSource: NGX Reports \nForeign Portfolio Investment (FPI) inflows totalled N120.51 billion, while divestments \n(outflows) stood at N122.97 billion, reflecting a net outflow of N2.46 billion in the first half of \n2022. In comparison, inflows in the second half of 2021 amounted to N99.64 billion, while \ndivestments stood at N112.90 billion, reflecting a net outflow of N13.26 billion. \n \nForeign Portfolio flows accounted for 14.65 per cent of total equity transactions in the review \nperiod, compared with 24.58 per cent in the preceding period. Domestic transactions \naccounted for the balance of 85.35 per cent in the equity market, compared with 75.42 per \ncent in the preceding period. The net capital outflow experienced during the period reflected \nthe impact of interest rate hikes in advanced economies. Despite the FPI net outflows, the \nmarket was resilient owing to increased participation of domestic investors following low \ninterest rates in the money market and government securities, as well as impressive \nperformance by listed companies and expected dividend payout. \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n56 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \nTable 2:12 Domestic and Foreign Portfolio Participation in Equities Trading \nPeriod \nH1 2021 \nH2 2021 \nH1 2022 \n% Change \nTotal Equities Transactions N'Billion \n1,034.42 \n864.81 \n1,662.05 \n 92.19 \nForeign Portfolio Transactions N'Billion 221.96 \n212.54 \n243.48 \n 14.56 \nForeign % \n21.46 \n24.58 \n14.65 \n-40.40 \nDomestic Transactions N'Billion \n812.46 \n652.27 \n1,418.54 \n 117.48 \nDomestic % \n78.54 \n75.42 \n85.35 \n 13.17 \nForeign Inflow N'Billion \n105.24 \n99.64 \n120.51 \n 20.95 \nForeign Outflow N'Billion \n116.72 \n112.90 \n122.97 \n 8.92 \nNSE ASI \n37,907.28 \n42,716.44 \n51,817.59 \n 21.31 \nMarket Capitalization \n19,760.39 \n22,296.84 \n27,935.36 \n 25.29 \n \n2.3.2.1.2 National Association of Securities Dealers \nThe National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) Unlisted Securities Index appreciated \nby 2.74 per cent, to 763.24 points at end-June 2022, from 742.85 points at end-December \n2021. Similarly, the market capitalisation increased by 59.72 per cent to N1,004.74 billion at \nend-June 2022, from N629.03 billion at end-December 2021. Further analysis showed that \n3,225 shares worth N21.30 billion were traded in the first half of 2022, compared with 12,483 \nshares valued N23.69 billion traded in the second half of 2021, reflecting a decrease of \n599.75 and 10.09 per cent, respectively, compared with the level in the preceding period. \nTable 2:13 National Association of Securities Dealers Transactions \n \n2020 \nTotal \nH1 2021 \nH2 2021 \nH1 2022 \nChange \n% \nUnlisted Index (Points) \n733.00 \n754.88 \n742.85 \n763.24 \n1.10 \nMarket Cap (N’Bn) \n525.94 \n536.58 \n629.03 \n1,004.74 \n87.25 \nVolume(N'000) \n7,930 \n466,360 \n12,483 \n3,225 \n599.75 \nValue (N'000) \n12,676 \n9,151 \n23,693 \n21,304.58 \n134.23 \nSource: NASD Reports \n2.3.2.2 Commodities Market \nCommodities exchanges are critical for enabling investment diversification, risk \nmanagement, price discovery and transactional efficiency. The Exchanges provide facilities, \nregulations, and standards for orderly, efficient and transparent trading of designated \ncommodities. At end-June 2022, five commodity exchanges were in operation, trading mostly \nin agricultural produce. \n2.3.2.2.1 AFEX Commodities Exchange \nThe overall value and volume of commodity transactions at the AFEX Commodities \nExchange increased by 97.42 per cent to N88,681.26 billion at end-June 2022, from \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n57 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nN44,920.15 billion at end-December 2021. The value of cashews traded increased \nsignificantly by 256.98 per cent, while sorghum and sesame also increased by 586.53 and \n649.39 per cent, respectively. The values of maize and cocoa traded increased by 72.02 and \n47.70 per cent, respectively. \n \nTable 2:14 Transactions on AFEX (N’M) \nProduct \nCashew \nGinger \nMaize \nPaddy \nRice \nSoybeans \nCocoa \nSesame \nSorghum \nGrand Total \nH1 \n2021 \n2,037.15 1,165.41 \n64,336.38 \n858.65 \n1,735.07 \n2,121.32 \n384.12 \n5,018.19 \n77,656.37 \nH2 \n2021 \n480.42 \n445.71 \n35,676.73 \n1,263.95 \n2,722.30 \n3,405.04 \n429.84 \n496.35 \n44,920.15 \nH1 \n2022 \n1,710.21 1,496.95 \n61,372.18 \n3,532.79 \n8,911.11 \n5,029.26 3,221.16 \n3,407.59 \n88,681.26 \n% \nChange \n256.98 \n235.86 \n72.02 \n179.50 \n227.34 \n47.70 \n649.39 \n586.53 \n97.42 \n \nTable 2:15 Volume and Value of Transactions on AFEX (N’M) \n2021H1 \n2021H2 \n2022H1 \nTotal Volume \n(kg) \n417,686,542 \n184,960,516 \n311,276,230 \nValue(N’M) \n77,656.37 \n44,920.15 \n88,681.26 \n \n2.3.2.2.2 Gezawa Commodity Market and Exchange \nGezawa Commodity Market and Exchange Limited (GCMX) traded a total of 244,930 metric \ntonnes of maize and soybeans valued ₦55.09 million in the review period. \nTable 2:16 Gezawa Commodity Market and Exchange (GCMX) Transactions \nPRODUCT \nMAIZE \nSOYBEANS \nGRAND \nTOTAL \n(N’M) \nTOTAL \nVOLUME \n(KG) \n2021H2 \n19,360.00 \n- \n19,360.00 \n82,400 \n2022H1 \n45,045.65 \n10,050.00 \n55,095.65 \n244,930 \n \n2.3.2.2.3 Prime Commodity Exchange \nPrime Commodity Exchange Limited (PCX) in the review period reported no trading \nactivities. \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n58 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n2.3.2.2.4 Nigeria Commodity Exchange \nThere was no trading on the Nigeria Commodity Exchange (NCX) during the review period. \nHowever, the Bank’s efforts in repositioning the NCX to a world-class commodity exchange \nwas sustained. \n \n2.3.2.2.5 Lagos Commodities and Futures Exchange \nTrading activities on the Lagos Commodities and Futures Exchange (LCFE) commenced in \nthe first half of 2021. However, there were no trades recorded in the second half of 2021 and \nfirst half of 2022. At end-June 2021, a total of 556 metric tonnes valued ₦98.26 million was \ntraded in 36 deals. \nTable 2:17 Lagos Commodities and Futures Exchange (LCFE) Transactions (N’M) \nProduct \nMaize \nPaddy Rice \nSoybean \nGrand Total \nTotal Volume \n(Kg) \nH1 2021 \n41.46 \n49.02 \n \n7.77 \n \n98.26 \n556,000 \nH2 2021 \n- \n- \n- \n- \n- \nH1 2022 \n- \n- \n- \n- \n- \n \n2.3.2.3 Bonds \nTotal bonds outstanding at end-June 2022 stood at N16.72 trillion, reflecting an increase of \n1.13 per cent, compared with N20.99 trillion recorded at end-December 2021. This \ncomprised FGN Bonds (N15.19 trillion or 90.87 per cent), FGN Saving Bonds (N20.87 billion \nor 0.13 per cent), FGN Sukuk (N612.56 billion or 3.66 per cent), FGN Green Bonds (N25.69 \nbillion or 0.15 per cent), FRN Treasury Bonds (N75.99 billion or 0.46 per cent), FGN \nPromissory Notes (N475.87 billion or 2.85 per cent), Sub-National Bonds (N65.96 billion or \n0.39 per cent), and Corporate Bonds (N248.89 billion or 1.49 per cent). \n \n2.3.2.4 FGN Bonds \nFGN Bonds new issues and re-openings of N1,125.00 billion were offered during the review \nperiod, indicating an increase of 32.35 per cent above N850.00 billion auctioned in the \nsecond half of 2021. The public subscription and sales decreased to N2,852.56 billion and \nN1,805.45 billion in the first half of 2022, compared with N1,630.92 billion and N1,192.01 \nbillion in the second half of 2021, respectively. \nAlthough the yield curve for the review period was normal, however, there was a downward \nshift compared with the preceding period, which reflected improved investors’ sentiments. \n \nFigure 2.18 Yield Curve \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n59 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \nSource: FMDQ-OTC Plc \n \n2.3.2.4.1 FGN Savings Bonds \nA total of ₦7.46 billion was allotted during the review period, indicating an increase of ₦3.92 \nbillion or 111.00 per cent, compared with ₦3.53 billion at end-December 2021. The increase \nwas attributed to a higher subscription from targeted investors. The range of coupon rates \nincreased to 7.2200 to 9.4700 per cent and 8.2200 to 10.4700 per cent for the 2- and 3-year \ntenors, respectively, compared with 7.3220 to 8.8640 per cent and 7.8990 to 9.8640 per cent \nfor the 2- and 3-year tenors respectively, in the preceding period. Consequently, total value \nof FGN Savings Bonds outstanding at end-June 2022 was ₦20.87 billion. \n \n2.3.2.4.2 Green Bonds \nThere was no issue of Green Bonds and six (6) transactions during the review period \ncompared with no transactions in the preceding period. The value of the transactions was \nN1.69 billion. Total Green bonds outstanding at end-June 2022 was N25.69 billion. \n \n2.3.2.4.3 FGN Sukuk Bond \nThere was no issue of FGN Sukuk Bond during the review period, compared with N250 billion \nissued in the preceding period. Consequently, the total outstanding stood at N362.56 billion \nat end-June 2022. Also, Sukuk transactions on the FMDQ exchange were valued at N76.81 \nbillion, in contrast to N115.37 billion traded in the preceding half year. \n \n \n2.00%\n7.00%\n12.00%\n17.00%\n22.00%\n0.00\n5.00\n10.00\n15.00\n20.00\n25.00\n30.00\nYield %\nTime to Maturity\n30/06/2021\n30/06/2022\n31/12/2021\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n60 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n2.3.2.4.4 Sub-National Bonds \nDuring the review period, one sub-national bond worth N27.19 billion was issued, six state \nbonds amounting to N8.40 billion matured, while N113.34 billion was redeemed by five \nstates. The total outstanding balance stood at N65.96 billion at end-June 2022, compared \nwith N160.51 billion at end-December 2021. \nIn the preceding period, three sub-national bonds amounting to N3.08 billion matured, while \nnine states redeemed bonds amounting to N40.15 billion. \nDuring the review period, total value of transactions in Sub-national bonds on the FMDQ \nexchange amounted to N0.6 billion from N0.29 billion in the preceding half year, representing \nan increase of 107 per cent. However, the total number of deals decreased by 29 per cent \nto 5 from 7. \n \n2.3.2.4.5 Corporate Bonds \nCorporate bonds worth N811.45 billion were outstanding at end-June 2022, compared with \nN767.84 billion at end-December 2021. Corporate Bonds worth N185.80 billion listed, while \nN1.00 billion matured and N658.69 billion were redeemed in the review period. \nIn addition, total value of transactions in corporate bonds on the FMDQ exchange amounted \nto N258 billion up from N27.04 billion in the preceding half year, indicating an increase of \n852.85 per cent. Also, the total number of deals increased by 146.00 per cent to 96 from 12. \n \n2.3.2.4.6 Bonds - Secondary Market \nThe S&P FMDQ Sovereign Bond Index appreciated by 9.00 per cent to 621.69 points at end-\nJune 2022, from 570.38 points at the end of the preceding period. The total debt market \ncapitalisation on the FMDQ Securities Limited (FMDQ) was ₦28.07 trillion at end-June 2022, \nan increase of 7.10 per cent, compared with ₦26.21 trillion in the second half of 2021. \n \nTable 2:18 S&P/FMDQ Sovereign Bond Index \nS&P/FMDQ Nigeria \nSovereign Bond Index \nIndex \nPoints \n% \nChange \nDebt Market \nCapitalisation ₦’Trn) \n% Change \n2021 H1 \n532.98 \n \n24.18 \n \n2021 H2 \n570.38 \n7.02 \n26.21 \n8.40 \n2022 H1 \n621.69 \n9.00 \n28.07 \n7.10 \nSource: FMDQ \nDuring the review period, two new participants were admitted on the Exchange. The value of \nsecurities admitted was N175.05 billion and the value of securities settled was N16.16 billion, \nwhich were mainly corporate bonds and commercial paper. \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n61 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n2.3.2.5 Mutual Funds \n \nThe Net Asset Value (NAV) of the Collective Investment Schemes (CIS) rose by 15.45 per \ncent to N1.50 trillion at end-June 2022, compared to N1.30 trillion at end-December 2021, \nreflecting increased investment in the review period. \nTable 2:19 CIS Funds \n \nCIS Net Asset Value (N’Trn) \nPercentage change \nover preceding half \nyear \n(%) \nH2 2020 \n1.49 \n \nH1 2021 \n1.25 \n-15.99 \nH2 2021 \n1.30 \n4.08 \nH1 2022 \n1.50 \n15.45 \n \n \n \n \n \n2.3.2.6 Other Key Developments in the Capital Market \nDuring the review period: \n \ni. \nThe Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) \n• mandated \nthe \napplication \nof \nRule 95 \non all \nPrivately Managed \nDiscretionary/Non-discretionary portfolios to ensure the protection of investor \nfunds; \n• provided guidance on Rule 465, which amended the contents of Trust Deeds \nregarding the maximum allowable total expenses of a Collective Investment \nSchemes (CIS) from 5.00 per cent to 3.50 per cent of Net Asset Value; and \n• commenced the implementation of 100 per cent custody requirement in the \nCIS to protect investors. Consequently, all clients’ assets are to be held under \nindependent custodial agreements in custodial banks. \nii. \nThe NGX introduced two exchange traded derivatives, the NGX 30 Index Futures and \nNGX Pension Index Futures during the review period. \n \n \n2.4 Real Sector Interventions \nThe Bank’s interventions continued to facilitate the flow of credit to projects with potential to \ncatalyse and transform the productive base of the economy. The interventions are designed \nto stimulate private sector investment to priority sectors, promote the generation of \nsustainable jobs, support households’ income and consumption, boost non-oil exports and \nsustain economic growth. \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n62 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n2.4.1 Agricultural Policy Support \n2.4.1.1 Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme \nIn the first half of 2022, a total of 13,194 loans, valued ₦3.22 billion, were guaranteed under \nthe Scheme, compared with 21,872 loans, valued ₦3.62 billion in the preceding period. This \nindicated decreases of 39.7 and 11.2 per cent in number and value of loans guaranteed, \nrespectively. A total of 11,773 loans, valued ₦2.14 billion, were repaid at end-June 2022, \ncompared with 13,349 loans, valued ₦2.01 billion, repaid at end-December 2021, reflecting \na decrease of 11.81 per cent in number and an increase of 6.47 per cent in value of repaid \nloans. \n2.4.1.2 Commercial Agriculture Credit Scheme \nThe sum of ₦28.30 billion was disbursed in the first half of 2022, reflecting an increase of \n113.26 per cent, compared with ₦13.27 billion in the second half of 2021. A total of ₦32.86 \nbillion was repaid in the review period, indicating a decrease of 31.51 per cent, compared \nwith ₦48.14 billion in the second half of 2021. \n2.4.1.3 Anchor Borrowers’ Programme \nThe sum of ₦35.52 billion was disbursed in the first half of 2022 to 28,876 smallholder \nfarmers for production of major agricultural commodities, compared with ₦246.67 billion \ndisbursed to 679,776 farmers in the preceding period. A total of 128,579 hectares of land \nwere cultivated, compared with 1,123,684 hectares in the second half of 2021, reflecting a \ndecrease of 88.56 per cent. The sum of ₦42.99 billion was repaid in the review period, \ncompared with ₦196.48 billion in the preceding period, reflecting a decrease of 78.12 per \ncent. \n2.4.1.4 Accelerated Agriculture Development Scheme \nThe sum of ₦1.50 billion was disbursed in the first half of 2022, compared with ₦0.04 billion \nin the second half of 2021. Repayments under the Scheme amounted to ₦4.37 billion in the \nreview period, compared with ₦5.31 billion in the preceding period. \n \n2.4.1.5 Paddy Aggregation Scheme \nThe sum of ₦6.20 billion was released in the review period, while no disbursement was made \nin the second half of 2021. There was no repayment as it was not due in the period under \nreview, while the sum of ₦4.66 billion was repaid in the second half of 2021. \n2.4.1.6 National Food Security Programme \nThere were no disbursements in the review and preceding periods under the Programme. \nHowever, repayments of ₦2.03 billion were made in the first half of 2022, compared with \n₦2.30 billion in the second half of 2021, indicating a decrease of 11.74 per cent. \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n63 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n2.4.2 Small and Medium Enterprises & Industrial Policy Support \n2.4.2.1 Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Fund \nDuring the review period, there was no disbursement, compared with ₦0.69 billion disbursed \nin the second half of 2021. A total of ₦2.52 billion was repaid in the review period, compared \nwith ₦2.81 billion in the second half of 2021, reflecting a decrease of 10.32 per cent. \n2.4.2.2 Agribusiness/Small and Medium Enterprises Investment Scheme \nIn the review period, the sum of ₦1.60 billion was disbursed for 2,720 projects, compared \nwith ₦22.92 billion disbursed for 8,538 projects in the second half of 2021. This indicated \ndecreases of 93.02 and 68.14 per cent in value and number of projects, respectively. \nRepayments in the review period amounted to ₦7.65 billion, compared with ₦1.16 billion in \nthe second half of 2021, indicating an increase of 559.48 per cent. \n2.4.2.3 Creative Industry Financing Initiative \nThere was no disbursement in the first half of 2022, compared with ₦0.26 billion disbursed \nfor 31 projects in the second half of 2021. The sum of ₦0.28 billion was repaid in the period \nunder review, compared with ₦0.25 billion repaid in the second half of 2021, reflecting an \nincrease of 11.98 per cent. \n2.4.2.4 Targeted Credit Facility \nDuring the review period, the sum of ₦24.37 billion was disbursed to 50,302 beneficiaries, \ncompared with ₦69.90 billion disbursed to 136,532 beneficiaries in the second half of 2021, \nreflecting decreases of 65.14 and 63.16 per cent in value and number of beneficiaries, \nrespectively. There was no repayment in the review period. \n2.4.2.5 Nigeria Youth Investment Fund \nDuring the period under review, there was no disbursement, compared with ₦0.88 billion \ndisbursed in the second half of 2021. The sum of ₦0.28 billion was repaid in the period under \nreview, compared with ₦2.61 billion in the preceding period. \n2.4.2.6 Tertiary Institutions Entrepreneurship Scheme \nThe sum of ₦0.26 billion was disbursed to 53 beneficiaries, compared with N0.03 billion \ndisbursed to 6 beneficiaries in the preceding period, indicating an increase of 806.42 per \ncent. There was no repayment as all the facilities were still under moratorium. \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n64 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n2.4.3 Real Sector Policy Support \n2.4.3.1 Real Sector Support Facility \nThe Real Sector Support Facility (RSSF) had been discontinued since 2018. However, the \nsum of ₦21.65 billion was repaid from outstanding disbursements, compared with ₦6.62 \nbillion in the preceding period. \n \n2.4.3.2 RSSF - Differentiated Cash Reserve Requirement \nThe sum of ₦210.29 billion was disbursed to 34 projects in the first half of 2022, compared \nwith ₦476.30 billion disbursed to 39 projects in the second half of 2021, reflecting decreases \nof 55.85 and 12.82 per cent in terms of total amount disbursed and number of projects \nfinanced, respectively. The sum of ₦18.49 billion was repaid in the review period, compared \nwith ₦0.08 billion in the preceding period. \n2.4.3.3 COVID-19 Intervention for the Manufacturing Sector \nIn the review period, the sum of ₦413.81 billion was disbursed for 50 projects, compared \nwith no disbursement in the second half of 2021. The sum of ₦12.01 billion was repaid, while \nno repayment was made in the preceding period as the facilities were then under moratorium. \n2.4.3.4 Healthcare Sector Intervention Facility \nThe sum of ₦17.21 billion was disbursed for 11 projects in the first half of 2022, compared \nwith ₦11.05 billion in the second half of 2021, representing 55.75 per cent increase. The sum \nof ₦6.12 billion was repaid, while no repayment was made in the preceding period, as most \nfacilities were then under moratorium. \n2.4.3.5 Healthcare Sector Research and Development Intervention (Grant) Scheme \nThe sum of ₦0.02 billion was released in the first half of 2022, compared with ₦0.03 billion \nin the second half of 2021, reflecting a decrease of 46.36 per cent. \n2.4.3.6 Textile Sector Intervention Facility \nThere was no disbursement in the review period, as against the sum of ₦0.90 billion was \ndisbursed to two projects in the second half of 2021. The sum of ₦8.62 billion was repaid in \nthe review period, compared with ₦3.27 billion in the second half of 2021. \n2.4.3.7 CBN-BOI Industrial Facility \nIn the first half of 2022, ₦50.00 billion was released under this intervention to BOI, compared \nwith zero disbursement in the second half of 2021. \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n65 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n2.4.3.8 Presidential Fertilizer Initiative \nThere were no disbursements in both the review and preceding periods. However, the sum \nof ₦3.00 billion was repaid in the first half of 2022, compared with ₦2.75 billion in the second \nhalf of 2021. \n \n2.4.3.9 Intervention Facility for the National Gas Expansion Programme \nIn the review period, the sum of ₦26.00 billion was disbursed for four projects, compared \nwith ₦24.00 billion for four projects in the second half of 2021. There was no repayment, as \nthe facilities were under moratorium. \n \n2.4.3.10 \n Shared Agent Network Expansion Facility \nThere was no disbursement under the Facility in both the review and preceding periods. The \nsum of ₦0.37 billion was repaid in the first half of 2022, compared with ₦0.14 billion in the \nsecond half of 2021. \n \n2.5 Export Policy Support \n2.5.1 Non-oil Export Stimulation Facility \nThere was no disbursement in the period under review, compared with ₦1.75 billion in the \nsecond half of 2021. The sum of ₦2.00 billion was repaid, compared with ₦3.88 billion in the \npreceding period. \n2.5.2 Export Facilitation Initiative \nThe sum of ₦36.00 billion was disbursed for five projects in the review period, while there \nwas no disbursement in the second half of 2021. There was no repayment as the facilities \nwere under moratorium. \n \n2.6 Energy Policy Support \n2.6.1 Power and Airline Intervention Fund \nThe review period recorded no disbursement, as against ₦0.99 billion in the preceding \nperiod. However, the sum of ₦15.91 billion was repaid, compared with ₦6.56 billion in the \nsecond half of 2021. \n \n2.6.2 Nigerian Electricity Market Stabilisation Facility \nThe sum of ₦34.36 billion was disbursed in the review period, under Phase 2 of the Nigerian \nElectricity Market Stabilisation Facility (NEMSF), compared with ₦96.71 billion in the second \nhalf of 2021. No repayment was made as the facilities were under moratorium. \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n66 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nMeanwhile, the sum of ₦10.91 billion, was repaid in the first half of 2022, under Phase 1 of \nthe NEMSF, compared with ₦14.53 billion in the second half of 2021. \n2.6.3 Nigeria Bulk Electricity Trading – Payment Assurance Facility \nDuring the review period, ₦26.93 billion was disbursed, compared with ₦301.35 billion to \nNigeria Bulk Electricity Trading Plc (NBET Plc), through BOI in the second half of 2021, \nreflecting a decrease of 91.06 per cent. The sum of ₦322.87 billion was repaid in the first \nhalf of 2022, while there was no repayment in the preceding period. \n2.6.4 National Mass Metering Programme \nIn the first half of 2022, the sum of ₦199.90 million was disbursed, compared with ₦11.79 \nbillion in the second half of 2021, reflecting a decrease of 98.31 per cent. There was no \nrepayment as the facilities were under moratorium. \n2.7 Institutional Support and Financial Inclusion \n2.7.1 National Collateral Registry \nThe performance indicators of the National Collateral Registry (NCR) trended downwards, \nindicating decreased lending against movable assets offered as collateral by individuals and \nMSME borrowers in the review period. \nA total of 44 financial institutions registered 37,444 financing statements valued ₦221.20 \nbillion and US$19.80 million in respect of 38,744 borrowers, compared with 52,085 financing \nstatements valued ₦6.87 trillion and US$827.50 million in favour of 53,291 borrowers \nrecorded in the second half of 2021. In addition, a total of 63,992 searches were conducted \nin the review period, compared with 67,215 in the second half of 2021, reflecting a decrease \nof 4.79 per cent. \nTable 2:20 transactions on the National Collateral Registry Portal \nDebtor \nType \nNumber of \nFinancing \nStatements \nNumber of \nBorrowers \nCurrency \nValue of Financing Statements \n(‘ billion) \n \nH2 \n2021 \nH1 \n2022 \nH2 \n2021 \nH1 \n2022 \n \nH2 2021 \nH1 2022 \nIndividual \n50,245 \n34,061 \n51,154 \n34,919 \nNGN \n6,712.69 \n114.62 \nLarge \nBusiness \n194 \n201 \n249 \n294 \nNGN \n130.13 \n25.70 \nUSD \n0.76 \n0.004 \nEUR \n0.00 \n0.00011 \nMedium \nBusiness \n919 \n1,669 \n1,047 \n1,884 \nNGN \n21.63 \n61.99 \nUSD \n0.07 \n0.02 \nMicro \nBusiness \n58 \n159 \n70 \n172 \nNGN \n1.11 \n1.51 \nUSD \n0.0005 \n0.00 \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n67 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nSmall \nBusiness \n669 \n1,354 \n771 \n1,475 \nNGN \n10.90 \n17.39 \nTotal \n52,085 \n37,444 \n53,291 \n38,744 \nNGN \n6,876.46 \n221.20 \nUSD \n0.83 \n0.03 \nEUR \n0.00 \n0.00011 \nFurther analysis showed that a total of 17,986 or 48.03 per cent of the total financing \nstatements were in respect of 18,360 women and women-owned enterprises, representing \n47.39 per cent of the total number of borrowers. \n \nTable 2:21 Women and Women-owned Businesses transactions on the National Collateral Registry \nPortal \n \nFrom inception to end-June 2022, a total of 139 financial institutions had registered 248,036 \nfinancing statements valued ₦15,358.44 billion, US$2.43 billion, €0.11 billion, and \n£27,352.00. An analysis of these figures showed that 105,296, representing 42.45 per cent \nof the total financing statements valued ₦267.37 billion and US$4.62 million were registered \nin respect of women and women-owned enterprises by 98 financial institutions. \n2.8 Financial Inclusion \nThe Bank sustained its efforts towards economic recovery post Covid-19 era, by embarking \non initiatives towards building a more inclusive, equitable and resilient economy. In the \nreview period, some bank branches remained closed to customers as a result of the Covid-\n19 containment measures. However, most bank branches and other financial service access \npoints continued to provide in-person services to customers. Similarly, the delivery of \nDebtor Type \nNumber of \nFinancing \nStatements \nNumber of \nwomen and \nWomen-owned \nEnterprises \nCurrency \nValue of Financing Statements \n(‘ billions) \n \nH2 \n2021 \nH1 \n2022 \nH2 \n2021 \nH1 \n2022 \n \nH2-2021 \nH1-2022 \nIndividual \n22,421 \n17,561 \n19,631 \n17,832 \nNGN \n30.85 \n59.33 \nLarge \nBusiness \n22 \n12 \n28 \n32 \nNGN \n0.37 \n0.22 \nMedium \nBusiness \n211 \n260 \n214 \n302 \nNGN \n1.74 \n3.50 \nMicro \nBusiness \n5 \n17 \n4 \n23 \nNGN \n0.06 \n0.05 \nSmall \nBusiness \n114 \n136 \n131 \n171 \nNGN \n1.10 \n1.46 \nTotal \n22,773 \n17,986 \n20,008 \n18,360 \nNGN \n34.12 \n64.56 \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n68 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nservices through alternative channels, such as ATMs, PoS, Agent locations and mobile \napplications, was maintained. \nUsing the Bank Verification Number (BVN) count as an estimate of the number of new \nentrants into the banking system, it was revealed that a total of 3,577,980 new BVNs were \nissued in the review period, compared with 3,173,274 in the first half of 2021. Out of this \nfigure, 1,370,875 females were registered in the second half of 2022, compared with \n1,461,132 females in the preceding period. \nIn the first half of 2022, the financial sector recorded an increase in the number of agent \nlocations where financial services could be accessed. At end-June 2022, SANEF reported a \ntotal of 1,249,845 agents under its agent expansion scheme, compared with 1,002,514 \nagents onboarded at end-December 2021. In terms of access points per capita, 1,179 agents \nserved 100,000 adults in the first half of 2022, compared with 946 agents per 100,000 adults \nin the second half of 2021. Furthermore, the number of active PoS and ATMs stood at 19,355 \nand 915,519, respectively, at end-June 2022, compared with 19,156 ATMs deployed and \n638,983 active PoS at end-June, 2021. \n \nThe total number of deposit accounts by regulated financial institutions increased to 198.82 \nmillion at end-December 2021, compared with 185.33 million at end-June 2021. \nIn addition, from the industry data, the total number of credit accounts marginally rose to \n12.33 million (made up of 4.28 million in CMBs and 8.05 million accounts in MFBs) at end-\nDecember 2021, from 11.60 million accounts (made up of 4.33 million in CMBs and 7.27 \nmillion accounts in MFBs) at end-June 2021. \nA total of 247,331 new agents were onboarded during the review period, compared with \n225,854 in the preceding period. A total of 1,249,845 agents were registered under the \nSANEF agent expansion scheme. In terms of access point per capita, 1,179 agents were \nserving 100,000 adults in the first half of 2022, compared with 946 agents per 100,000 adults \nrecorded in the second half of 2021. Furthermore, the number of active PoS at end-March \n2022 stood at 737,502. During the period under review, the number of deposit and credit \naccounts increased to 229.87 million and 15.72 million, from 198.82 million and 12.33 million \nat end-December 2021, respectively. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n69 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \nTable 2:22 Financial Inclusion Statistics \nINDICATOR \nEND-DECEMBER 2021 \nEND-JUNE 2022 \n New BVN Registration \n3,173,274 \n3,577,980 \n New BVN Registration \n(Female) \n1,461,132 \n1,370,875 \nTotal Agents \n1,002,514 \n1,249,845 \n \nNos Of Onboarded (New) \nAgents \n225,854 \n247,331 \n \nNos \nOf \nAgents \nPer \n100,000 Adults \n946 \n1,179 \n \nActive PoS Deployed \n645,500 \n871,591 \n \nNos Of Deposit Accounts \n(Million) \n198.82 \n229.87 \n \nNos Of Credit Accounts \n(Million) \n12.33 \n15.72 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n70 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \n3 \nREGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY ACTIVITIES \n3.1 Financial Soundness Indicators \n3.1.1 Asset-Based Indicators \n3.1.1.1 Non-Performing Loans Ratio \nThe quality of banks’ assets, measured by the ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs) to gross \nloans, was 4.95 per cent at end-June 2022, compared with 4.93 per cent at end-December \n2021. \nFigure 3.1 Banking Industry NPLs to Gross Loans \n \n3.1.1.2 Core Liquid Assets to Total Assets and Short-term Liabilities \nThe ratio of core liquid assets to total assets decreased by 0.46 percentage point to 20.08 \nper cent at end-June 2022, from 20.54 per cent at end-December 2021. Similarly, the ratio \nof core liquid assets to short-term liabilities declined by 0.34 percentage point to 29.61 per \ncent at end-June 2022, compared with 29.95 per cent at end-December 2021. The decline \nwas due to increased lending to the real sector and households, in line with the Bank’s \npolicies to encourage lending to key sectors of the economy. \nFigure 3.2 Banking Industry Liquidity Indicators (%) \n \n6.41 \n6.02 \n5.70 \n4.93 \n4.95 \n 4.50\n 4.70\n 4.90\n 5.10\n 5.30\n 5.50\n 5.70\n 5.90\n 6.10\n 6.30\n 6.50\n 6.70\n End Jun. 2020\n End Dec. 2020\n End Jun. 2021\n End Dec. 2021\n End Jun. 2022\n18.16 \n22.58 \n20.98 \n20.54 \n20.08 \n27.33 \n32.58 \n30.78 \n29.95 \n29.61 \n -\n 5.00\n 10.00\n 15.00\n 20.00\n 25.00\n 30.00\n 35.00\n End Jun. 2020\n End Dec. 2020\n End Jun. 2021\n End Dec. 2021\n End Jun. 2022\nLiquid assets (core) to total assets*\nLiquid assets (core) to short-term liabilities*\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n71 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n3.1.1.3 Exposure of Banking System to Real Estate Subsector \nThe banks’ exposure to the real estate sub-sector (residential and commercial) declined \nmarginally in the review period. The ratio of residential real estate loans to total gross loans \ndecreased by 0.01 percentage point to 0.21 per cent at end-June 2022, from 0.22 per cent \nat end-December 2021. Similarly, the ratio of commercial real estate loans to total gross \nloans declined by 0.17 percentage point to 2.50 per cent at end-June 2022, compared with \n2.67 per cent at end-December 2021. \n \nFigure 3.3 Banking Industry Real Estate Indicators (%) \n \n3.1.2 Capital-Based Indicators \nThe banking industry’s solvency, measured by qualifying capital to risk-weighted assets, \ndeclined to 14.11 per cent at end-June 2022, compared with 14.55 per cent at end-December \n2021, owing largely to growth in risk assets and loan loss provisions. Similarly, the regulatory \ntier-1 capital to risk-weighted assets decreased to 12.19 per cent at end-June 2022, from \n12.46 per cent at end-December 2021. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n0.30 \n0.28 \n0.24 \n0.22 \n0.21 \n3.28 \n2.96 \n2.80 \n2.67 \n2.50 \n -\n 0.50\n 1.00\n 1.50\n 2.00\n 2.50\n 3.00\n 3.50\n 4.00\n End Jun. 2020\n End Dec. 2020\n End Jun. 2021\n End Dec. 2021\n End Jun. 2022\nResidential real estate loans to total gross loans\nCommercial real estate loans to total gross loans\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n72 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nFigure 3.4 Banking Industry Capital Adequacy Indicators (%) \n \nThe capacity of the banks’ capital to withstand losses declined as the ratio of non-performing \nloans net of provisions to capital increased to 5.18 per cent at end-June 2022, from 1.22 per \ncent at end-December 2021. This was due mainly to some NPLs being written-off against \nprovisions, hence, reducing the quantum of provisions which resulted in a higher indicator at \nend-June 2022. \nFigure 3.5 non-performing loans net of provision to capital Ratio \n \n3.1.3 Income and Expense Based Indicators \nThe ratio of interest margin to gross income decreased marginally by 0.66 percentage point \nto 47.93 per cent during the review period, compared with 48.59 per cent at end-June 2022. \nSimilarly, the ratio of non-interest expenses to gross income declined by 0.10 percentage \npoint to 65.04 per cent at end-June 2022, relative to 65.14 per cent at end-December 2021. \n14.96 \n15.05 \n15.46 \n14.55 \n14.11 \n13.04 \n12.76 \n13.07 \n12.46 \n12.19 \n -\n 2.00\n 4.00\n 6.00\n 8.00\n 10.00\n 12.00\n 14.00\n 16.00\n 18.00\n End Jun. 2020\n End Dec. 2020\n End Jun. 2021\n End Dec. 2021\n End Jun. 2022\nRegulatory capital to risk-weighted assets*\nRegulatory Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets*\n2.24 \n1.52 \n0.62 \n1.22 \n5.81 \n -\n 1.00\n 2.00\n 3.00\n 4.00\n 5.00\n 6.00\n 7.00\n 8.00\n End Jun. 2020\n End Dec. 2020\n End Jun. 2021\n End Dec. 2021\n End Jun. 2022\nP\ne\nr\nc\ne\nn\nt\na\ng\ne\ns\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n73 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nThe ratio of personnel expenses to non-interest expenses declined to 25.47 per cent at end-\nJune 2022, from 29.38 per cent at end-December 2021. \nTable 3:1 Selected Financial Soundness Indicators of the Nigerian Banking Industry \n2020 \n2021 \n2022 \nEnd Jun \nEnd Dec \nEnd Jun \nEnd Dec \nEnd June \nAssets Based Indicators \nNon-performing loans to total gross loans * \n6.41 \n6.02 \n5.70 \n4.93 \n4.95 \nLiquid assets (core) to total assets* \n18.16 \n22.58 \n20.98 \n20.54 \n20.08 \nLiquid assets (core) to short-term liabilities* \n27.33 \n32.58 \n30.78 \n29.95 \n29.61 \nResidential real estate loans to total gross loans \n0.30 \n0.28 \n0.24 \n0.22 \n0.21 \nCommercial real estate loans to total gross loans \n3.28 \n2.96 \n2.80 \n2.67 \n2.50 \nCapital Based Indicators \nRegulatory capital to risk-weighted assets* \n14.96 \n15.05 \n16.46 \n14.55 \n14.11 \nRegulatory Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets* \n13.04 \n12.76 \n13.07 \n12.46 \n12.19 \nNonperforming loans net of provisions to capital * \n2.24 \n1.52 \n0.62 \n1.22 \n5.81 \nReturn on assets* \n2.50 \n2.17 \n1.21 \n2.31 \n2.01 \nIncome and Expense Based Indicators \nInterest margin to gross income* \n56.79 \n56.43 \n58.71 \n48.59 \n47.93 \nNoninterest expenses to gross income* \n55.26 \n61.59 \n72.57 \n65.14 \n65.04 \nPersonnel expenses to noninterest expenses \n32.68 \n29.37 \n28.09 \n29.38 \n25.47 \n \n*FSIs are computed based on IMF-FSI Manual. \n \n3.2 The Banking Industry Stress Tests \nThe Bank continued to conduct top-down solvency and liquidity stress testing to identify and \nanalyse banking industry vulnerabilities and risks with a view to assessing the soundness \nand stability of the financial system. \n3.2.1 Solvency Stress Test \n3.2.1.1 Baseline Position \nThe baseline CAR, LR and NPL ratio were 14.11, 42.63 and 4.95 per cent, respectively. \nAlso, Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) stood at 1.40 and 17.30 per cent, \nrespectively, at end-June 2022. \n \nTable 3:2 Banking Industry Baseline Selected Key Indicators \n \nCAR \nLR \nNPLs \nROA \nROE \nDec 2021 (%) \n14.53 \n41.33 \n4.80 \n2.31 \n27.47 \nJun 2022 (%) \n14.11 \n42.63 \n4.95 \n1.40 \n17.30 \nPercentage \nPoints \nChange \n-0.42 \n1.30 \n0.15 \n-1.10 \n-13.20 \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n74 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nFigure.3.6 Banking Industry CAR (per cent) \n \n \n3.2.1.2 Credit Risk \nAnalysis of general credit risk revealed that shocks of 15, 20, 30 and 50 per cent increases \nin NPLs would result in the banking industry CAR declining to 13.80, 13.64, 13.49 and 13.17 \nper cent, respectively, from the baseline of 14.11 per cent. Similarly, a shock of 100 per cent \nincrease in NPLs would lead to a decrease of banking industry CAR to 10.88 per cent. \nThe stress test revealed that the banking industry could withstand a shock of “up to 100 per \ncent increase” in the industry NPLs, as the industry CAR would remain above the regulatory \nrequirement of 10 per cent. \nTable 3:3 Credit Default Shocks \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSimilarly, analysis of obligor credit concentration shocks of five largest corporate credit \nfacilities shifting from performing loans to sub-standard and sub-standard to doubtful would \nresult in banking industry CAR declining to 13.63 and 12.88 per cent, respectively, from 14.11 \nper cent. In addition, a shock of five largest corporate credit facilities shifting from doubtful to \nlost would result in banking industry CAR declining to 11.52 per cent. The result of the tests \nshowed resilience to obligor credit concentration risk as the CAR would remain above the \n10.00 per cent regulatory threshold under stress test scenarios 1, 2 and 3. \n \n \n15.21\n15.27\n14.54 14.93\n14.83\n15.46\n14.53\n14.11\n0.00\n5.00\n10.00\n15.00\n20.00\nDec '18\nJun' 19\nDec' 19\nJun' 20\nDec' 20\nJun' 21\nDec-21\nJun-22\nPer cent\nSingle Factor Shocks \nDecember 2021 \nJune 2022 \nBaseline CAR (%) \n14.53 \n14.11 \n10% NPLs increase \n14.19 \n13.80 \n15% NPLs increase \n14.03 \n13.64 \n20% NPLs increase \n13.86 \n13.49 \n30% NPLs increase \n13.53 \n13.17 \n50% NPLs increase \n12.86 \n12.53 \n100% NPLs increase \n11.13 \n10.88 \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n75 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nTable 3:4 Credit Concentration Risk \n \nFigure 3.7 Credit Concentration Risk \n \n \n3.2.1.3 Sectoral Credit Concentration Risk \nA breakdown of banking industry total credit by sector at end-June 2022 showed that the Oil \n& Gas sector accounted for 22.04; Manufacturing 16.71; General 10.67; Government 8.83; \nGeneral Commerce 7.37; Agriculture 6.17 and Others 28.21 per cent. \n \n \n \n14.11\n13.63\n12.88\n11.62\n0.00\n2.00\n4.00\n6.00\n8.00\n10.00\n12.00\n14.00\n16.00\nBaseline\nScenario 1: Five largest\ncorporate credit facilities\nshifted from Sub-standard\nto Doubtful (10% provision)\nScenario 2: Five largest\ncorporate credit facilities\nshifted from Doubtful to\nLost (50% provision)\nScenario 3: Five largest\ncorporate credit facilities\nshifted from Doubtful to\nLost (100% provision)\nCAR (%)\n \nDecember \n2021 \nJune 2022 \nBaseline CAR (%) \n 14.53 \n 14.11 \nSingle Factor Credit Concentration Shocks \nScenario 1 \nFive largest corporate credit facilities shifted from performing loans to \nsub-standard (10% provision) \n14.04 \n13.63 \nScenario 2 \nFive largest corporate credit facilities shifted from sub-standard to \ndoubtful (50% provision) \n13.31 \n12.88 \nScenario 3 \nFive largest corporate credit facilities shifted from doubtful to lost (100% \nprovision) \n12.05 \n11.62 \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n76 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nFigure 3.8 Sectoral Concentration of Credit \n \n \nThe results of sectoral credit concentration risks showed that 20.00 per cent default on total \nexposure to Oil & Gas could result in CAR decreasing to 13.44 per cent, while a 50.00 per \ncent default on total exposure to Oil & Gas could lead to the industry CAR declining to 9.73 \nper cent. Thus, the sector concentration stress test showed that the banking industry could \nwithstand “up to 20.00 per cent shock” to Oil and Gas exposures. \n \nTable3:5 Stress Test on Oil and Gas Exposures \n \nIndustry CAR (%) \nBaseline CAR \n14.11 \n20% Default on total exposure to Oil and Gas \n13.44 \n50% Default on total exposure to Oil and Gas \n9.73 \n \n3.2.1.4 Interest Rate Risk \nThe stress test on the net position of interest-sensitive instruments showed that the industry \ncould maintain a stable solvency position to interest rate shock of “up to 1000 basis points \ndownward shift in yield curve” as the post-shock CAR of 12.12 per cent remained above the \nregulatory threshold of 10.00 per cent. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n22.04%\n16.71%\n8.83%\n10.67%\n7.37%\n6.17%\n28.21%\nOil and Gas\nManufacturing\nGovernment\nGeneral\nGen Comm\nAgriculture\nOthers\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n77 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nFigure 3.9 Impact of Interest Rate Shocks on CAR \n \n \n3.2.2 Liquidity Stress Test3 \nThe stress test results revealed that after a one-day run scenario, the LR of the industry \ncould decline from the 42.69 per cent baseline position to 32.73 per cent. However, under \nthe 5-day and 30-day scenarios, the LR for the industry could decline to 14.71 and 9.58 per \ncent, which could result in liquidity shortfalls of N3.87 trillion and N4.84 trillion, respectively. \n \nFigure 3.10 Industry Liquidity Ratios at Periods 1-5 and cumulative 30-day Shocks \n \n \n \n \n3 Liquidity stress tests were conducted at end-June 2022 using the Implied Cash Flow Analysis and Maturity Mismatch/Rollover Risk \napproaches to assess the resilience of individual banks and the banking industry to liquidity and funding shocks. \n14.11\n13.11\n12.12\nBaseline CAR\n500 bps downward shift in yield\ncurve\n1000 bps downward shift in yield\ncurve\n42.69\n32.73\n28.58\n24.28\n19.69\n14.71\n9.58\n0.00\n5.00\n10.00\n15.00\n20.00\n25.00\n30.00\n35.00\n40.00\n45.00\n50.00\nPre-Shock\nAfter Day 1\nAfter Day 2\nAfter Day 3\nAfter Day 4\nAfter Day 5\nAfter cum 30\ndays\nPer cent\nDec-20\nJun-21\nDec-21\nJun-22\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n78 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nTable 3:6 Liquidity Stress Test Results \nScenario \nBanks with \nLiquidity Ratios (LR) < 30% \nDecember 2021 \nDecember \n2021 \nJune 2022 \nIndustry LR \n(%) \nShortfall to 30% LR \nthreshold \n (N’ billion) \nTest 1.1: Implied Cash Flow Test \nTest 1.1: Implied Cash \nFlow Test \nDay 1 \n9 \n13 \n32.73 \nNil \nDay 2 \n14 \n19 \n28.58 \n431.96 \nDay 3 \n19 \n21 \n24.28 \n1,623.78 \nDay 4 \n20 \n21 \n19.69 \n2,760.48 \nDay 5 \n21 \n23 \n14.71 \n3,865.63 \nImplied Cash Flow Test \n(30 Days) \n22 \n24 \n9.58 \n4,836.98 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n3.2.3 Maturity Mismatch \nThe industry’s baseline assets and liabilities maturity profile at end-June 2022 showed an \nexcess of N1,427.74 trillion in assets over liabilities. Further analysis revealed that the short-\nend of the market (≤90 day bucket) was adequately funded. \nTable 3:7 Maturity Profile of Assets and Liabilities at End-June 2022 \nBucket \nLiabilities \nAssets \nMismatch \nCumulative \nMismatch \nN Billion \n≤30 days \n 33,948.91 \n 20,530.76 \n13,428.21 \n13,428.21 \n 31-90 days \n 4,933.13 \n 3,839.70 \n1,099.74 \n14,527.95 \n91-180 days \n 1,584.54 \n 3,904.52 \n(2,296.94) \n12,231.01 \n181-365 days \n 1,168.38 \n 4,099.75 \n(2,912.36) \n9,318.65 \n1-3 years \n 2,200.01 \n 5,529.72 \n(3,310.55) \n6,008.11 \n>3 years \n 3,185.51 \n 10,543.78 \n(7,320.42) \n(1,312.31) \nTotal \n47,020.48 \n48,448.23 \n(1,427.74) \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n79 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nTable 3:8 Test Results for System-wide Maturity Mismatch at End-June 2022 \n \nTest 2A \nDescriptive Maturity \nMismatch. \n(No consideration of \nrollover) \nTest 2B \nStatic Rollover risk Analysis. \n(No possibility to close liquidity \ngaps in other buckets) \nTest 2C \nDynamic Rollover risk test. \n(Free assets used to close \nliquidity gaps in other buckets) \nN ‘billion \nNo of banks \nwith \nmismatch \nN ’billion \nNo of banks \nwith \nmismatch \nN ‘billion \nNo of banks \nwith mismatch \n≤30 days \n18,704.88 \n4 \n11,915.10 \n4 \n(36.96) \n4 \n31-90 days \n6,380.16 \n5 \n(287.84) \n15 \n(175.46) \n6 \n91-180days \n2,966.75 \n10 \n(2,636.89) \n26 \n(495.59) \n9 \n181-365days \n2,355.37 \n14 \n(3,281.88) \n28 \n(484.58) \n10 \n1-3 Years \n1,957.03 \n18 \n(3,989.71) \n29 \n(1,248.85) \n14 \nAbove 3 years \n(2,071.54) \n29 \n(7,358.27) \n29 \n(5,392.04) \n23 \nTotal \n30,292.64 \n(5,639.50) \n(7,833.49) \n \nThe test results under 2A revealed that the banking industry was adequately funded except \nfor the “above 3 years” bucket, while under Tests 2B and 2C the industry had mismatches \nof N5.64 trillion and N7.83 trillion, respectively. These indicated increases of N1.27 trillion \nand N0.13 trillion under the Test 2B and Test 2C, respectively, relative to end-December \n2021 test result. \n3.2.4 Contagion Risk Analysis \nThe contagion risk analysis depicted an increase in interconnectedness through inter-bank \nplacements and takings. The total exposure increased by 49.04 per cent to ₦597.49 billion \nat end-June 2022, from ₦352.86 billion at end-December 2021. Further analysis revealed \nthat six banks accounted for ₦387.30 billion or 64.82 per cent of total placements, while \nanother six banks accounted for ₦432.14 billion or 72.33 per cent of total takings. The \nexposures were within the safety corridor of the inter-bank market operations and therefore \ndid not pose any significant threat to financial system stability, as all placements were \nsecured. \n \n \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n80 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nFigure 3.11 Network Analysis based on Interbank Exposures \n \n \n \n \nBox 2: Liquidity Stress Test Assumptions \nImplied Cash Flow Analysis \nThe Implied Cash Flow Analysis (ICFA) assessed the ability of the banking \nsystem to withstand unanticipated substantial withdrawals of deposits, short-\nterm wholesale and long-term funding over 5 days and cumulative 30 days, \nwith specific assumptions on fire sale of assets. \nThe test assumed gradual average outflows of 3.8, 5.0 and 1.5 per cent of \ntotal deposits, short-term funding and long-term funding respectively, over a \n5-day period and a cumulative average outflow of 22.0, 11.0 and 1.5 per cent \nof total deposits, short-term funding and long-term funding respectively, on a \n30-day balance. It also assumed that the assets in Table 3.10 would remain \nunencumbered after a fire sale. \n \n \n \n \nThe Maturity Mismatch/Rollover Risk \nThis assessed funding maturity mismatch and rollover risk for assets and \nliabilities in the 1-30 and 31-90 day buckets, with assumptions of availability \nof funding from the CBN and intra-group as described below: \n \nNode colour representation \nBlue = Placement only \nDeep Blue = Net Placement \nRed = Takings only \nPurple = Net Takings \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n81 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \ni. Test 2a: Descriptive Maturity Mismatch assumed that the baseline \nmismatch remained, but 5 per cent of total deposits would be made available \nby the CBN and the intra-group; \n \nii. Test 2b: Static Rollover Risk assumed that 80.0 and 72.0 per cent of the \nfunding in the 1-30 and 31-90 day buckets would be rolled over, with no \npossibility to close the funding gap from other buckets. However, 5 per cent \nof the total deposits would still be available from the CBN and the intra-\ngroup; and \n \niii. Test 2c: Dynamic Rollover Risk made the same assumption as in 2b \nabove, but with the option of closing the liquidity gap from other buckets. \n \nTable 3:9 Percentage of Assets Unencumbered after Fire Sales \nItem \nNo \nAssets \n% \nUnencumbered \n1. \nCash and cash equivalents \n100 \n2. \nCurrent account with CBN \n100 \n3. \nGovernment bonds, treasury bills and other \nassets with 0% risk-weighting \n66.5 \n4. \nCertificates of deposit held \n66.5 \n5. \nOther short-term investments \n49 \n6. \nCollateralized placements and money at call \n49 \n7. \nCRR \n100 \n \n \n \n \n \n3.3 Supervision of Banks \nThe Bank maintained its supervisory and surveillance activities in the banking sector towards \npromoting a safe, stable and sound financial system. These activities included offsite \nappraisal of banks’ requests and periodic returns, regular onsite assessments and issuance \nof guidance notes to banks. \n3.3.1 Examination \nThe joint CBN and NDIC Risk Asset Examination (RAE) of 31 banks (commercial, merchant \nand non-interest) was carried out in the review period to evaluate the quality of the banks’ \nassets and ensure the adequacy of loan loss provisioning. The banks were generally \ncompliant with extant regulations. However, some infractions were observed and regulatory \nactions taken. \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n82 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nThe CBN also monitored the banks’ implementation of the recommendations from the \nprevious risk-based supervision reports during the period. The findings showed that banks \nhad largely implemented the recommendations. \n3.3.2 Foreign Exchange Examination \nA routine examination of 29 Authorised Dealers (ADs), consisting of 25 commercial and four \nmerchant banks, was carried out on banks’ foreign exchange activities to assess compliance \nwith extant regulations, identify and address anomalies, customer complaints, and other \nemerging issues. \nIn addition, spot checks on customers’ applications under the RT200 scheme and utilisation \nof Invisibles were conducted. In line with extant regulations, appropriate regulatory actions \nwere taken where infractions were observed. \n \n3.3.3 Non-Interest Banks \nDuring the review period, a non-interest microfinance bank (MFB) was licensed, bringing the \ntotal number of Non-interest Financial Institutions (NIFIs) in operation to nine, comprising \nthree banks, two non-interest windows and four MFBs. \n \nA compendium of the Resolutions of the Financial Regulation Advisory Council of Experts \n(FRACE) Series 1 was published during the review period to engender comprehensive \nunderstanding of NIFIs products and services. \n \nThe total assets of non-interest banks (NIBs) stood at N547.08 billion at end-June 2022, \nrepresenting 0.84 per cent of total banking industry assets. Additionally, their total deposits \nand total credits of N199.35 billion and N208.20 billion represented 0.47 and 0.77 per cent \nof the industry deposit and credit, respectively. \n3.3.4 Supervision of Domestic Systemically Important Banks \nIn the review period, the Bank conducted a bi-annual assessment of banks in accordance \nwith the Framework for the Regulation and Supervision of Domestic Systemically Important \nBanks (D-SIBs). Five banks maintained the designation as D-SIBs and continue to be \nsubjected to enhanced supervision in view of the significant impact of the failure of any of \nthe institutions on the financial system. \n \nAt end-June 2022, the five D-SIBs accounted for N37.73 trillion (57.62 per cent) of the \nindustry’s total assets of N65.48 trillion, compared with N34.20 trillion (57.73 per cent) in the \npreceding period. Similarly, D-SIBs held N25.41 trillion (60.45 per cent) of total industry \ndeposits of N42.03 trillion, as against N23.06 trillion (60.02 per cent) of total industry deposits \nin the preceding period. Also, D-SIBs accounted for N15.22 trillion (56.25 per cent) of the \naggregate industry credit of N27.06 trillion, compared with N13.78 trillion (56.05 per cent) of \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n83 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nthe aggregate industry credit in the preceding period. The D-SIBs were compliant with the \nprudential requirements during the review period. \n3.3.4.1 Recovery and Resolution Plans \nThe D-SIBs submitted their Recovery and Resolution Plans (RRPs) in compliance with the \nD-SIB Supervisory Framework. Some lapses were observed in the RRPs, and the affected \nD-SIBs were required to address them in their subsequent submissions. \n3.3.5 Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria \nThe value of AMCON’s liabilities increased marginally to N5.72 trillion at end-June 2022, \nfrom N5.54 trillion at end-December 2021. Of this amount, the combined value of the \nAMCON Note of N3.86 trillion and Loan of N500.00 billion represented 76.26 per cent of the \ntotal liabilities. The Note would mature on December 27, 2023, while the N500.00 billion Loan \nis due for redemption on December 30, 2022. The Corporation’s total assets, net of \nimpairment, stood at N896.49 billion at end-June 2022, representing 15.58 per cent of the \ntotal liabilities. \nDuring the review period, cash recoveries stood at N17.08 billion, while total assets forfeited \nin settlement of loans was N633.22 million. These brought the cumulative recoveries to \nN971.13 billion, comprising cash of N549.89 billion, and asset and shares forfeiture of \nN421.24 billion. \n3.3.6 Cross Border Supervision of Nigerian Banks \n3.3.6.1 Foreign Subsidiaries of Nigerian Banks \nAt end-June 2022, the number of offshore entities of Nigerian banks was 64, comprising 55 \nsubsidiaries, four representative offices, one affiliate, three international branches and one \nagent banking arrangement. \nThe virtual risk-based supervision (RBS) examination of four offshore banking subsidiaries \nof a bank was conducted during the review period. The examination of the entities was a \nmeans of assessing the financial soundness of the banks and their compliance with extant \nlaws and regulations, validating the returns submitted by the parent bank and addressing \nsupervisory concerns noted in the operations of the offshore subsidiaries. \n \n3.3.7 Credit Risk Management System \nThe Credit Risk Management System (CRMS) database remained a veritable source of \ncredit information and an additional risk management tool for the banking industry. \nAt end-June 2022, total number of credit facilities on the CRMS database stood at \n34,344,280 reflecting an increase of 17.56 per cent over the end-December 2021 position of \n29,213,129. The number comprised 33,491,862 credit facilities to individuals and 852,418 to \nnon-individuals. \nHowever, the total number of facilities with outstanding balances on the CRMS database, \nincreased by 9.12 per cent to 5,344,602 at end-June 2022, from 4,898,075 at end-December \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n84 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n2021. The former number was made up of 5,260,750 credit facilities to individuals and 83,852 \nto non-individuals. \n \nTable 3:10 Credit Risk Management System \nBorrowers from the Banking Industry (Commercial, Merchant and Non-Interest Banks) \nDescription \n \n \nDecember 2021 \nJune 2022 \nAbsolute \nChange: \nIncrease/ \n(decrease) \n% \nChange \n \n* Total No. of Credit/facilities \nreported on the CRMS: \n29,213,129 \n34,344,280 \n5,131,151 \n17.56 \nIndividuals \n28,338,562 \n33,491,862 \n5,153,300 \n18.18 \nNon-Individuals \n874,567 \n852,418 \n-22,149 \n-2.53 \n* Total No. of Outstanding \nCredit facilities on the CRMS: \n4,898,075 \n5,344,602 \n446,527 \n9.12 \nIndividuals \n4,779,565 \n5,260,750 \n481,185 \n10.07 \nNon-Individuals \n118,510 \n83,852 \n-34,658 \n-29.24 \n* The figures include borrowers with multiple loans and/or credit lines \n3.3.8 Credit Bureaux \nThe number of licensed credit bureaux remained three at end-June 2022. The aggregate \ncredit records in the databases of the credit bureaux stood at 186.51 million, reflecting an \nincrease of 25.27 million (15.67 per cent) from 161.24 million at end-December 2021. Also, \nthere was a 6.44 per cent increase in the average number of subscribers which was \nattributed mainly to credit growth, increased coverage of the credit reporting system and \nimproved awareness of the role of credit bureaux in the management of credit risk. The Bank \ncontinued to conduct routine offsite and onsite supervisory activities of the bureaux in the \nreview period. \n \nTable 3:11 Credit Bureaux Statistics \nS/N \nCRC \nCredit \nBureau Ltd \nCR \nServices \nCredit Bureau \nPlc \nFirst \nCentral \nCredit Bureau \nLtd \nTotal \n1 \nNumber \nof \ncredit \nrecords \n66,732,752 \n64,100,565 \n55,681,214 \n186,514,531 \n2 \nValue of Credit Facilities \n(N’Tn) \n36.84 \n27.65 \n33.63 \n 98.12 \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n85 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n3 \nNumber of borrowers \n27,892,377 \n17,842,523 \n20,323,840 \n66,058,740 \n4 \nNumber of subscribers \n1,667 \n691 \n1,394 \n3,752 \n \n3.4 Supervision of Other Financial Institutions \nDuring the review period, the Bank conducted target examination and Anti-Money \nLaundering, Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) examination of 204 OFIs. The \ntarget examination was conducted on 114 MFBs to ascertain their capital in line with the re-\ncapitalisation deadline of April 2022. \nThe onsite AML/CFT examination of 90 OFIs, comprising 48 MFBs, four DFIs, 26 FCs and \n12 PMBs, was conducted to ascertain their compliance with the extant AML/CFT regulations. \nFurthermore, the Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (ML/FT) risks of the OFIs \nwere evaluated in line with the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering \nin West Africa (GIABA) assessment requirements. The examination revealed some \ninfractions and appropriate regulatory actions were taken on the affected institutions. \n \n3.5 Other Developments in the Financial System \n3.5.1 Anti-Money Laundering, Combating the Financing of Terrorism \nThe Bank, in collaboration with relevant agencies, sustained efforts aimed at maintaining a \nrobust and effective Anti-Money Laundering, Combating the Financing of Terrorism and \nCountering Proliferation Financing (AML/CFT/CPF) regime equipped to respond to evolving \nrisks and vulnerabilities in the financial system. \nDuring the review period, the following laws and regulations came into effect to strengthen \nAML/CFT/CPF regime in Nigeria: \n▪ The Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act (MLPPA), 2022; \n▪ The Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act (TPPA), 2022; \n▪ The Proceed of Crimes Act (POCA), 2022; \n▪ Regulations for the Implementation of Targeted Financial Sanctions on Terrorism \nFinancing; and \n▪ Regulations for the Implementation of Targeted Financial Sanctions on Proliferation \nFinancing. \nThe Bank also issued the “CBN Anti-Money Laundering, Combating the Financing of \nTerrorism and Countering Proliferation Financing of Weapons of Mass Destruction in \nFinancial Institutions Regulations 2022”, which replaced the CBN AML/CFT Regulations \n2013. The new regulation aims to safeguard financial institutions from being used for \nfinancial crimes through: adoption of appropriate policies to comply with AML/CFT/CPF \nregulations; formulation and implementation of internal controls and procedures to deter \ncriminals; and adoption of risk-based approach in identification, assessment and \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n86 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nmanagement of money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing risks, among \nothers. \n \nIn addition, the Bank issued a guidance note on the CBN AML/CFT/CPF Regulations 2022 \nto OFIs to address challenges in the sub-sector and enable OFIs develop and implement \neffective risk-based AML/CFT/CPF programmes in line with the provisions of extant \nAML/CFT/CPF laws and regulations. \n \n3.5.2 Capacity Building and Collaboration on AML/CFT/CPF \nIn the first half of 2022, the Bank conducted AML/CFT/CPF training for 630 staff of CMBs, \nMFBs, PMBs, DFIs, FCs and BDCs, and participated in the Financial Action Task Force \n(FATF) Standard Training to promote and deepen implementation of AML/CFT/CPF \nmeasures. \nThe Bank also participated in the 37th Plenary organised by the GIABA held in Saly, Senegal, \nas part of its collaborative effort with domestic and international stakeholders. \n \n3.5.2.1 Anti-Money Laundering, Combating the Financing of Terrorism Cross-Border \nExamination \nDuring the review period, on-site cross-border examination was conducted on two foreign \nsubsidiaries of Nigerian banks to assess their compliance with home and host countries’ \nAML/CFT laws and regulations. The examination revealed no issues of regulatory concern. \n3.5.3 Activities of the Financial Services Regulation Coordinating Committee \nThe Financial Services Regulation Coordinating Committee (FSRCC) is an inter-agency \nbody set-up by the CBN Act 2007 to promote financial system stability. Section 44 of the Act \nmandates the FSRCC, amongst others, to co-ordinate the supervision of financial institutions \nespecially conglomerates; reduce arbitrage opportunities usually created by differing \nregulation and supervision standards amongst supervisory authorities; and eliminate any \ninformation gap encountered by any regulatory agency in its relationship with any group of \nfinancial intermediaries. \nThe FSRCC comprises of the CBN, SEC, Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC), \nNational Insurance Commission (NAICOM), Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), National \nPension Commission (PenCom), Federal Ministry of Finance, Budget and National Planning, \nand other observer members. \nDuring the review period, the FSRCC continued its sensitisation against the activities of \nPonzi schemes and illegal fund operators (IFOs). It published notices on the websites of all \nmember agencies, and in ten National Dailies including one television station, cautioning the \ngeneral public against patronising IFOs. \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n87 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n3.5.4 eNaira \n3.5.4.1 Developments on eNaira Implementation \nIn the first half of 2022, the Bank sustained the implementation of eNaira, Africa’s first \nCentral Bank Digital Currency (CBDC). The Bank extended the charges-free regime \nfor transactions to promote eNaira adoption, and embarked on “Project Jaeger” aimed \nat upgrading the eNaira technology stack for efficiency, robustness, scalability, in-\nhouse control, and cyber and operational resilience. \n \nA combo version of eNaira speed wallet app was developed for flexibility and ease of \naccessibility. Web merchant wallet was also developed with functionalities that meet \nusers’ \nrequirements, \nincluding \ndashboard \nanalytics, \ncentralised \naccount \nmanagement, payment approval workflows, and sub-wallets for big merchants. \nFurthermore, the Bank developed an in-house Compliance & Anti-Money Laundering \n(CAML) solution for eNaira operations, and referral functionality with incentives to \nencourage eNaira wallet holders to onboard potential users and drive adoption of the \ndigital currency. \nThe Bank sustained its collaboration with domestic and international organisations \ntowards continuous improvement of the eNaira services, and hosted delegates from \nthe Bank of Uganda and Central Bank of Zimbabwe on eNaira study tour. \n \n3.5.4.2 eNaira Statistics and Trends \nThe number of eNaira wallet downloads, onboarded customers and activated wallets \nwere 807,920; 244,340; and 182,790, respectively at end-June 2022, reflecting \nincreases of 32.45, 35.52, and 45.11 per cent over the preceding period figures. \nTable 3:12 eNaira Wallet Holders \n \nDec-21 \nJun-22 % Change \n \n \n \neNaira Wallets Downloads \n610,000 \n807,920 \n32.45 \nOnboarded Customers \n180,300 \n244,340 \n35.52 \nActivated Wallets \n125,970 \n182,790 \n45.11 \n \nThe total eNaira minted remained N2 billion, while eNaira in circulation stood at N1.55 \nbillion, leaving the balance of N0.45 billion with the CBN at end-June 2022. Of the \ntotal eNaira in circulation, N0.86 billion was held by financial institutions while N0.68 \nbillion was with consumers and merchants. \nTable 3:13 Minting and Holdings of eNaira \n \nDec-21 \nJun-22 % Change \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n88 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \neNaira Minted \nN2 Billion \nN2 Billion \neNaira in Circulation: \n940,450,000 \n1,545,350,000 \n64.32 \n In FIs' wallets \n866,080,000 \n861,570,000 \n-0.52 \nIn \nConsumers \n/ \nMerchants' \nwallets \n74,370,000 \n683,780,000 \n819.43 \n - In Stock with CBN \n1,059,550,000 \n454,650,000 \n-57.09 \n \n3.5.5 Risk- Based Cybersecurity Assessment \nThe report of the CBN/NDIC Supervisory Review and Evaluation (SRE) of the annual \ncybersecurity self-assessment of the relevant Financial Institutions as stipulated in the CBN \nRisk-based Cybersecurity Framework and Guidelines was issued during the review period. \nBanks were required to correct observed lapses and provide appropriate updates. \n3.5.6 Nigeria Sustainable Banking Principles \nAt end-June 2022, the total number of women in the banking industry was 25,997, \nrepresenting 43.69 per cent of the total employees in the industry. Similarly, women had a \ntotal of 892 (34.76 per cent) top management positions, and 82 (23.63 per cent) board \npositions in the industry, compared with total female representation of 34,352 (36.90 per \ncent) in the industry, with 662 (32.00 per cent) at senior management and 91 (29.55 per cent) \nat board at end-December 2021. \nTable 3:14 NSBP Statistics at end-June 2022 \n \nFEMALE REPRESENTATION IN THE BANKING INDUSTRY AS AT END-JUNE 2022 \nS/N \nItem \nBanking Industry \nFemale Representation \nPercentage \nof \nFemale \nRepresentation (%) \n1 \nTotal Employees \n 59,505 25,997 \n43.69 \n2 \nStaff \nin \nManagement \nPosition \n 2,566 892 \n34.76 \n3 \nBoard Members \n 347 82 \n23.63 \n \nThe banking industry has made considerable progress in its response to the needs of the \nplanet, human rights and support to the disadvantaged groups since the adoption of the \nNSBP. Banks have also continued to develop capacity of staff and board members on \nsustainability and collaborate in developing the right governance structure to implement the \nNSBP. \n \n3.5.7 Post IFRS Implementation \nThe Bank wound down the four-year IFRS 9 transitional arrangement on December 31, \n2021. The transitional programme mitigated the day-one impact of the implementation of the \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n89 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nExpected Credit Loss (ECL) model of credit impairment, thereby engendering financial \nsystem stability. Consequently, audited financial statements of banks at end-June 2022 did \nnot contain the IFRS 9 day-one impact on capital adequacy ratio (CAR). \n \n3.5.8 Implementation of Basel III \nThe parallel run for the implementation of Basel III continued in the review period. The \nparallel run entails the rendition of returns by banks on the Basel III requirements alongside \nthe Basel II returns. The feedback from the banks and other stakeholders recommended for \nfurther review of the Guidelines and reporting templates to enhance clarity and regulatory \nexpectations. \n \n3.5.9 Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process \nThe CMBs submitted their 2022 Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP) \nreports during the review period for the annual Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process \n(SREP). The SREP was completed and the outcome would be integrated in the respective \nbanks’ Risk Based Supervisory Reports for 2022. The SREP revealed increased significance \nand complexity of cyber security, climate and sustainability risks in banks. The analysis of \nthe reports also revealed that banks deployed various techniques for risk identification and \nmateriality assessment; including stress testing methodologies to ensure capital adequacy. \nIn all, the ICAAP documents substantially met the regulatory expectations. \n \n \n3.6 Financial Literacy and Consumer Education \nThe Bank sustained the implementation of several initiatives in its efforts to deepen financial \nliteracy and consumer education during the review period, including: Financial Literacy \nAwareness Workshops in collaboration with the Shared Agent Network Expansion Facility \n(SANEF); Global Money Week in collaboration with Bankers’ Committee; Training of Trainers \nProgrammes for various segments of the society such as faith-based organisations, youth \ngroups and market associations. \n \n \n3.7 Consumer Protection Compliance Examination of OFIs \nThe Bank conducted on-site Consumer Protection Compliance Examination of 18 OFIs to \nassess compliance with the provisions of the 2020 Guide to Charges by Banks, Other \nFinancial Institutions and Non-Bank Financial Institutions, and the Consumer Protection \nRegulations (CPR). Non-compliant banks were notified of the violations and directed to make \nrefunds to all affected customers as well as adopt measures to prevent reoccurrence. \n \n3.8 Complaints Management and Resolution \nThe total number of complaints received against financial institutions in the period under \nreview were 2,432, indicating a 2.05 per cent decrease from 2,483 in the second half of 2021. \nOut of the complaints received, 2,261 (93.00 per cent) were against banks and 171 (7.00 per \ncent) were against OFIs. \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n90 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \nFurther analysis indicated that Electronic/Cards related complaints constituted the highest at \n845 (34.75 per cent), followed by Fraud with 697 (28.66 per cent), Account Management 644 \n(26.48 per cent), Excess Charges 115 (4.73 per cent), while Others accounted for 131 (5.38 \nper cent). \n \nFigure 3.12 Number of Complaints Received \n \nFigure 3.13 Distribution of Complaints by Category: January to June 2022 \n \n \n \nDuring the review period, a total of 1,399 complaints were resolved with refunds to the \ncomplainants, an increase of 63 (4.71 per cent) over the 1,336 recorded in the preceding \nperiod. Also, complaints closed increased by 226 (20.64 per cent) to 1,321, as against the \nELECTRONIC/CARDS\n35%\nFRAUD 29%\nACCOUNT MGT 26%\nEXCESS CHARGES \n5%\nOTHERS 5%\nELECTRONIC/CARDS\nFRAUD\nACCOUNT MGT\nEXCESS CHARGES\nOTHERS\n-100\n100\n300\n500\n700\n900\n1100\n1300\n984\n681\n547\n134\n137\n845\n697\n644\n115\n131\nJul to Dec 21\nJan to Jun 22\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n91 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n1,095 recorded in the preceding period. The resolved cases included outstanding complaints \nfrom the preceding period. \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFigure 3.14 Complaints Resolved and Closed \n \n \n \n \nFigure 3.15 Complaints Resolved/Closed \n \n173\n278\n227\n212\n307\n202\n1399\n137\n419\n205\n166\n230\n164\n1321\n310\n697\n432\n378\n537\n366\n2720\n0\n500\n1000\n1500\n2000\n2500\n3000\nJAN\nFEB\nMAR\nAPR\nMAY\nJUN\nTOTAL\nNO. OF CASES RESOLVED\nNO. OF CASES CLOSED\nTOTAL\nELECTRONIC/CARDS\n34%\nFRAUD 28%\nACCOUNT MGT \n24%\nEXCESS CHARGES \n6%\nOTHERS 8%\nELECTRONIC/CARDS\nFRAUD\nACCOUNT MGT\nEXCESS CHARGES\nOTHERS\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n92 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \nTotal claims in respect of the complaints stood at N8.13 billion and US$0.01 million in the \nfirst half of 2022, compared with N15.88 billion and US$50.89 million in the second half of \n2021, while total refunds amounted to N3.36 billion and US$0.03 million, compared with \nN6.04 billion and US$0.94 million in the second half of 2021. \n \nA total of 10 penalties were imposed on 5 financial institutions for various infractions during \nthe period under review, compared with 24 imposed on 11 financial institutions in the \npreceding period. \n \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n93 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n4 \nDEVELOPMENTS IN THE PAYMENTS SYSTEM \nThe Bank continued to implement policies and initiatives to improve the safety and efficiency \nof the Nigerian payments system. \n4.1 Bank Verification Number Operations \nThe Bank conducted an assessment of 28 banks and the Nigerian Interbank Settlement \nSystem (NIBSS) to ascertain compliance with the Regulatory Framework for BVN Operations \nand Watch-List for the Nigerian Banking Industry in the review period. The assessment \nrevealed some infractions and regulatory actions were taken. \n \nAlso, 2,722,518 BVNs were enrolled, bringing total BVN enrolment to 54,651,086, reflecting \nan increase of 5.24 per cent over 51,928,568 enrolments at end-December 2021. The \nnumber of accounts linked with BVNs was 130,569,656 out of 148,462,947 active customer \naccounts, while the number of watch-listed BVNs associated with fraud and deceased \npersons stood at 6,047 and 11,871, respectively. \n \nTable 4:1 BVN Statistics \n \nEnd-December 2021 \nEnd-June 2022 \n% \nBVN enrolment \n51,928,568 \n54,651,086 \n5.24 \nAccounts linked with BVN \n117,551,302 \n130,569,656 \n11.07 \nActive Accounts \n134,007,725 \n148,462,947 \n10.79 \nWatch-listed BVNs (Fraudulent) \n5,347 \n6,047 \n13.09 \nWatch-listed BVNs (Deceased) \n9,300 \n11,871 \n27.65 \n \n4.2 Nigeria Electronic Fraud Forum \nDuring the first half of 2022, the Steering Committee of the Nigeria Electronic Fraud Forum \nmet once. The Forum sustained its efforts at reducing the incidence of fraud, enriching the \nquality of regulatory reporting by banks and Payments Service Providers (PSPs), as well as \nimproving time taken to conclude investigations, prosecution and adjudication of reported e-\nfraud cases. \n \n4.3 Licensing of Payments System Participants \nIn the review period, 47 companies were issued with Approvals-in-Principle, comprising 43 \nin Payment Solution Services (PSS), two in Switching & Processing, and two in Mobile \nMoney Operator (MMO) categories. In addition, 21 companies were issued with commercial \nlicences, consisting of 17 in the PSS and four in the Switching & Processing categories. \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n94 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nFurthermore, two new Payment Service Banks (PSBs) were issued commercial licences, \nbringing the total number of licensed PSBs to five. \n \nTable 4:2 Payments System Participants \nLicence Type \nDec 2021 \nJun 2022 \nAccredited Cheque Printers \n8 \n8 \nCard Schemes \n8 \n47 \nMobile Money Operator Licence Category \n15 \n16 \nSwitching/Processing Licence Category \n9 \n13 \nPayment Solution Services Licence Category \nPayment Terminal Services Provider (PTSP) Authorisation \n \n15 \n19 \nPayment Solution Service Provider (PSSP) Authorisation \n30 \n39 \nSuper-Agent Authorisation \n \n16 \n20 \nTotal \n101 \n122 \n \n4.3.1 Examination of Payments System Participants \nAs part of efforts to sustain a safe, reliable and efficient payments system, the Bank assessed \npayments service providers to ascertain the institutions’ compliance with the relevant \nframework and guidelines for the payments system. \nAlso, during the review period, onsite assessments were carried out on one Switch, one \nMMO and two PSSPs, while off-site assessments were conducted on six PSPs. \nFurthermore, the Bank facilitated the resolution of disputes among banks, government \nagencies and PSPs. \n \n \n4 Reduction in the number of card scheme participant is as a result of re-categorisation of one of the scheme – leading to \nremoval of Genesis Card \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n95 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n4.4 Cheque Standards and Cheque Printers Accreditation Scheme \nIn line with the provisions of the Nigeria Cheque Printers’ Accreditation Scheme (NICPAS), \nthe Bank conducted accreditation of the Nigeria cheque printers. At the end of the exercise, \nfive security printing companies were re-accredited, while the number of cheque \npersonalisers remained seven. \n \n4.5 Other Payments System Initiatives \nDuring the review period, the Bank issued the following two circulars: \n• Review of Operations of the NIBSS Instant Payment and Other Electronic Payment \nOptions with Similar Features, to increase allowable limit subject to enhanced \nsecurity; and \n• Review of the Industry Quick Response (QR) Code Presentment Options to clarify \nthat QR code for payment shall be based on merchant or consumer presented mode. \n \nThe Pan African Payments and Settlement System (PAPSS) was also launched to facilitate \ncross border transactions in local currency, reduce cost and enhance efficiency of cross \nborder payments within Africa. The Bank completed integration with the system and issued \nGuidelines for the operation of PAPSS in Nigeria. \n4.6 Payments System Statistics and Trend \n4.6.1 Large Value Payments \nThe volume of inter-bank fund transfers through the RTGS system increased to 149,035 at \nend-June 2022, from 145,919 at end-December 2021, reflecting an increase of 2.14 per cent. \nAlso, the value of inter-bank fund transfers increased to N36,913.90 billion at end-June 2022, \nfrom N32,329.86 billion at end-December 2021, reflecting an increase of 14.18 per cent. The \nincrease was due largely to bulk upload of government payments through the system. \n \n4.6.2 Retail Payments \n4.6.2.1 Cheque Clearing \nThe volume and value of cheques cleared, decreased to 2,077,679 and N1,593.43 billion at \nend-June 2022, from 2,201,288 and N1,623.60 billion at end-December 2021, respectively. \nThese outcomes indicated decreases of 5.62 and 1.86 per cent in volume and value, \nrespectively, reflecting customers’ preference for electronic transactions. \n \n4.6.2.2 Electronic Transactions \nThe volume and value of electronic transactions increased by 7.40 per cent and 21.83 per \ncent to 10,680,942,112 and N719,936.06 billion, respectively, during the review period. The \nincreased usage of electronic payments for banking transactions was due to the convenience \nprovided by the channels and increased public confidence in the banking system. \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n96 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nTable 4:3 Electronic Transactions \n \n \n \n \nPayment Channel \nNumber of Connected \nTerminals \nVolume of Transactions \n% Change \nVolume \nIncrease/ \n(decrease) \nValue N’ Billion \n% Change \nValue \nIncrease/ \n(decrease) \nDec \nJun \nJul-Dec 2021 \nJan-Jun 2022 \nJul-Dec 2021 \nJan-Jun 2022 \n2021 \n2022 \nATMs \n19,355 \n19,355 \n835,543,307 \n 711,706,025 \n-14.82 \n11,979.56 \n 12,638.70 \n5.50 \nPOS \n915,519 \n1,299,738 \n1,605,676,367 \n 1,710,287,421 \n6.52 \n14,497.23 \n 15,757.58 \n8.69 \nMobile Money \nN/A \nN/A \n907,635,620 \n 610,140,165 \n-32.78 \n9,845.08 \n 13,955.42 \n41.75 \nOnline \nTransfers \n(Internet/Web) \nN/A \nN/A \n5,686,501,437 \n 6,487,165,303 \n14.08 \n299,607.75 \n 348,298.64 \n16.25 \nMobile App \nN/A \nN/A \n456,086,385 \n 803,155,047 \n76.10 \n28,883.64 \n 51,405.12 \n77.97 \nUSSD \nN/A \nN/A \n273,941,359 \n 267,040,368 \n-2.52 \n2,490.45 \n 2,270.28 \n-8.84 \nDirect Debit \nN/A \nN/A \n52,200,105 \n 51,924,429 \n-0.53 \n12,629.20 \n 14,583.09 \n15.47 \nACH/NEFT \nN/A \nN/A \n127,735,908 \n 39,523,354 \n-69.06 \n210,993.92 \n 261,027.23 \n23.71 \nTotal \n \n \n9,945,320,488 \n10,680,942,112 \n7.40 \n590,926.83 \n 719,936.06 \n21.83 \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n97 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n5 \nPENSIONS \nDuring the review period, the National Pension Commission (PenCom) sustained its efforts \nat promoting the adoption of the Contributory Pension Scheme (CPS) by sub-national \ngovernments and the informal sector. Pension fund assets were diversified to include \ninvestments in infrastructure and other alternative asset classes. Also, PenCom continued \nits drive to improve operational efficiency, effectiveness and quality of service delivery of the \nPension Funds Administrators (PFAs) as well as enhance public enlightenment. \n \nTotal membership of the Scheme grew by 0.12 million to 9.71 million at end-June 2022, from \n9.59 million at end-December 2021. The growth was largely driven by the increased adoption \nof the CPS by States and Local Governments as well as the steady uptake of the Micro \nPension Plan in the informal sector. \n \nThe net Pension Assets under Management (AuM) grew by 6.30 per cent to N14.27 trillion \nat end-June 2022, from N13.42 trillion at end-December 2021. The growth in AuM resulted \nfrom returns on Investment and contributions received during the review period. The assets \nwere predominantly invested in FGN securities, while the balance was invested in other asset \nclasses such as State Government Securities, Ordinary Shares, Corporate Debt Securities, \nLocal Money Market Instruments, Supranational Bonds, Mutual Funds, Infrastructure Funds \nand Private Equity Funds. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n98 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nTable 5:1 PENSION ASSETS \n \n \n \n5.1 Other Developments in the Nigerian Pension Industry \n \n5.1.1 Revised \nShare \nCapital \nRequirement \nfor \nLicensed \nPension \nFund \nAdministrators \nAt the expiration of the deadline of April 2022 for the implementation of the new Minimum \nRegulatory Capital (Shareholders’ Funds), requirement of N5.00 billion for Pension Fund \nAdministrators (PFAs), all the PFAs had complied. However, the number of the PFAs \nreduced to 20 from 22 owing to mergers and acquisitions. \nASSET CLASSES\nASSET CLASSES\nEXISTING \nSCHEMES\nCPFAs\nFUND I\nFUND II\nFUND III\nFUND IV\nFUND V\nFUND VI \nActive\nFUND VI \nRETIREE\nTOTAL PENSION \nFUND ASSETS\n₦ 'Million\n₦ 'Million\n₦ 'Million\n₦ 'Million\n₦ 'Million\n₦ 'Million\n₦ 'Million\n₦ 'Million\n₦ 'Million\n₦ 'Million\nDOMESTIC ORDINARY SHARES\n110,336.64\n32,459.37\n6,231.47\n668,327.43\n138,842.38\n12,002.05\n0.03\n915.20\n40.35\n826,358.91\nFOREIGN ORDINARY SHARES\n0.00\n99,905.99\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nTOTAL FGN SECURITES\n795,408.08\n761,352.21\n25,672.04\n3,991,622.80\n2,657,565.81\n761,515.71\n96.94\n13,120.96\n1,540.25\n7,451,134.52\n * FED. GOVT BONDS\n748,487.73\n414,793.74\n18,535.30\n3,823,854.31\n2,575,044.18\n729,917.91\n23.78\n7,513.98\n1,235.20\n7,156,124.66\n * TREASURY BILLS\n39,835.54\n300,796.28\n6,847.37\n68,841.41\n40,159.55\n18,660.03\n70.05\n297.31\n128.83\n135,004.56\n * AGENCY BONDS (NMRC)\n0.00\n583.86\n30.01\n8,542.84\n3,507.64\n1,161.16\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n13,241.65\n * SUKUK BONDS \n6,402.24\n630.28\n258.32\n76,061.81\n31,322.90\n10,767.40\n3.11\n5,309.67\n176.22\n123,899.42\n * GREEN BONDS\n682.57\n44,548.05\n1.04\n14,322.43\n7,531.54\n1,009.22\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n22,864.23\nSTATE GOVT SECURITIES\n16,531.62\n18,959.52\n731.04\n60,153.32\n49,694.42\n14,895.32\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n160,965.25\nCORP. DEBT SECURITIES\n108,436.96\n238,143.11\n9,263.22\n428,932.42\n296,716.74\n107,352.34\n3.04\n696.91\n69.79\n1,189,614.52\n * CORPORATE BONDS (HTM)\n95,202.33\n13,087.92\n9,243.46\n397,301.86\n285,498.15\n105,930.25\n3.04\n696.91\n69.79\n907,033.70\n * CORPORATE BONDS (AFS)\n11,646.44\n221,738.55\n0.00\n11,423.90\n4,174.47\n806.03\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n249,789.39\n * CORPORATE INFRASTRUCTURE BONDS\n1,588.19\n3,316.64\n19.76\n15,794.90\n4,687.29\n616.06\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n26,022.85\n * CORPORATE GREEN BONDS\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n4,411.75\n2,356.83\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n6,768.58\nMONEY MKT INSTR.\n254,431.83\n193,946.85\n11,981.68\n843,083.86\n631,509.32\n205,435.81\n137.37\n7,684.68\n1,283.39\n1,701,116.11\nFIXED DEPOSIT/ BANK ACCEPTANCE\n224,325.03\n174,622.82\n11,050.64\n730,283.01\n564,372.30\n185,416.40\n121.86\n7,610.35\n1,277.89\n1,899,080.32\nCOMMERCIAL PAPERS\n29,223.65\n6,075.64\n931.04\n112,800.85\n67,137.02\n20,019.40\n15.51\n74.33\n5.49\n236,282.93\nFOREIGN MONEY MKT INSTR.\n883.15\n13,248.39\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n14,131.54\nMUTUAL FUNDS\n2,619.98\n21,305.88\n782.72\n27,392.94\n3,021.30\n507.41\n0.00\n411.11\n90.41\n56,131.74\nOPEN/CLOSE FUNDS\n2,500.77\n20,960.88\n782.72\n25,740.51\n2,860.27\n507.41\n0.00\n411.11\n90.41\n53,854.07\nREITs\n119.21\n345.00\n0.00\n1,652.43\n161.03\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n2,277.67\nSUPRA-NATIONAL BONDS\n512.99\n0.00\n39.13\n3,207.33\n3,540.88\n766.28\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n8,066.61\nINFRASTRUCTURE FUNDS\n5,222.02\n10,600.87\n990.08\n71,067.68\n290.59\n200.48\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n88,371.71\nREAL ESTATE \n111,398.44\n124,195.75\n0.00\n620.00\n6.01\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n236,220.19\nPRIVATE EQUITIES\n338.78\n13,608.25\n1.13\n24,626.79\n291.10\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n38,866.05\nCASH & OTHER ASSETS\n31,910.90\n10,053.87\n2,885.75\n118,482.39\n75,464.18\n21,689.13\n47.92\n1,985.50\n342.56\n262,862.19\n CURRENT NET ASSET VALUE \n1,437,148.24\n1,524,531.67\n58,578.24\n6,237,516.96\n3,856,942.72\n1,124,364.53\n285.31\n24,814.36\n3,366.74\n14,267,548.79\nUNAUDITED REPORT ON PENSION FUNDS INDUSTRY PORTFOLIO FOR THE PERIOD ENDED 30 JUNE 2022\nAPPROVED EXISTING SCHEMES, CLOSED PENSION FUND ADMINISTRATORS AND RSA FUNDS (INCLUDING UNREMITTED CONTRIBUTIONS @CBN & LEGACY FUNDS) \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n99 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n5.1.2 Revised Regulation for the Administration of Retirement and Terminal \nBenefits \nDuring the review period, the PenCom issued revised Regulation for the \nAdministration of Retirement and Terminal Benefits, which is aimed at enhancing the \nefficiency of pension administration in the Country. \n \n5.1.3 Operational Framework for Co-Investment \nDuring the review period, the PenCom also issued the Operational Framework for Co-\nInvestment by PFAs aimed at establishing standards and procedures, enhancing \ndiversification of AuM and improving returns on investment. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n100 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \n6 \nINSURANCE \nDevelopments in the insurance industry sector were mixed in the review period as \ntotal assets grew, while premium income declined. The industry, however, remained \nstable as solvency, liquidity and other key indicators were in healthy position. \n6.1 Assets and Premium Income \nThe total assets of the insurance industry increased by 2.41 per cent to ₦2.28 trillion at end-\nJune 2022, from ₦2.23 trillion at end-December 2021. Also, gross premium income \nincreased by 19.62 per cent to ₦369.21 billion in the first half of 2022, above the \nN308.65 billion recorded in the second half of 2021. Furthermore, net premium income \ngrew by 16.89 per cent to N260.34 billion at end-June 2022, from ₦222.72 billion at end-\nDecember 2021, while gross claims rose by 7.71 per cent to ₦174.78 billion in the review \nperiod, from ₦162.27 billion in the preceding period. The growth in assets and premium \nincome was due to increased uptake of insurance policies. \n \nTable 6:1 Key indicators \nPeriod \nSecond Half of 2021 \nFirst Half of 2022 \n% Change \nGross Premium Income \n308,645,033,675.40 \n369,210,079,717.00 \n19.62 \nNet Premium Income \n222,720,012,192.40 \n260,335,407,430.00 \n16.89 \nTotal (Gross) Claims \n162,274,280,542.00 \n174,782,571,381.00 \n7.71 \nTotal Assets \n2,230,165,942,794.00 \n2,283,895,468,476.00 \n2.41 \n \n6.2 Key Insurance Industry Financial Soundness Indicators \n6.2.1 Capital Adequacy Ratio \nThe industry remained solvent in the review period as the CAR, measured by capital to total \nassets, was above the regulatory threshold of 40 per cent. However, the CAR declined by \n0.69 percentage points to 42.21 per cent at end-June 2022, from 42.90 per cent at end-\nDecember 2021, driven largely by the recognition of the IFRS 9 impairment charges. \n6.2.2 Liquidity Ratio \nThe industry maintained adequate liquidity position in the review period, with liquidity ratio \nstaying above the regulatory benchmark of 100.00 per cent. The liquidity ratio, measured by \nratio of liquid assets to current liabilities, was 116.65 per cent at end-June 2022, a decrease \nof 4.40 percentage points from the level of 121.05 per cent at end-December 2021. \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n101 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n6.2.3 Combined Ratio of the Insurance Industry \nThe combined ratio of the industry, expressed as the sum of claims and expenses divided \nby the earned premium, was within the regulatory limit of 75.00 per cent. It decreased by \n6.89 percentage points to 66.38 per cent at end-June 2022, from 73.34 per cent at end-\nDecember 2021, indicating improved profitability of the industry. \n \n6.2.4 Premium Debtors \nPremium debtors, measured as a percentage of gross premium, deteriorated by 3.63 \npercentage points to 8.69 per cent at end-June 2022, from 5.06 per cent at end-December \n2021. The increase was due largely to the higher volume of insurance cover in the first half \nof the year. \n6.2.5 Retention Ratio \nThe retention ratio, measured as the percentage of insurance premium retained to total \npremium generated, declined marginally by 0.27 percentage points to 71.87 per cent at end-\nJune 2022, from 72.14 per cent at end-December 2021. \n \nTable 6:2 Insurance Industry Dashboard \nKEY INDICATORS \nDec-21 \nJun-22 \nCAR (Capital/Total Asset) \n42.90 \n42.21 \nLiquidity Ratio (liquid assets/current liabilities) \n121.05 \n116.65 \nClaims Ratio % \n41.65 \n33.59 \nExpense Ratio % \n31.68 \n32.79 \nCombined Ratio % \n73.34 \n66.38 \ninvestment to Total Assets Ratio % \n70.19 \n64.82 \nChange in Gross Written Premium (in %) \n23.82 \n36.96 \nChange in Net Written Premium (in %) \n29.82 \n35.57 \nChange in Capital & Surplus (in %) \n14.47 \n3.03 \nPremium Debtors as a % of Equity \n2.34 \n5.74 \nPremium Debtors as a % of Total Assets \n1.30 \n2.93 \nPremium Debtors as a % of Gross Premium \n5.06 \n8.69 \nRetention Ratio (in %) \n72.14 \n71.87 \nReturn on Assets (in %) \n1.09 \n1.33 \n \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n102 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n6.3 Key Insurance Industry Regulatory/Supervisory Developments \nDuring the review period, key development in the Nigerian insurance industry included: \ni. \nThe commissioning of the National Insurance Commission (NAICOM) reporting \nportal (portal.naicom.gov.ng) by the Honourable Minister of Finance, Budget and \nNational Planning in May 2022; \nii. \nThe notification for the cancellation of certificates of registration of two insurance \ncompanies by NAICOM; \niii. \nGrant of licences by NAICOM to seven micro-insurance companies to boost \ninsurance penetration; and \niv. \nConduct of onsite Risk Based examination by NAICOM on seven insurance \ncompanies. The examinations focused on corporate governance, risk \nmanagement and internal controls, solvency and liquidity of insurance institutions. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n103 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n7 \nRISKS TO THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM \n7.1 Credit Risk \n \n \nRisk Rating (Medium Risk, Stable) \n \nBanking industry credit risk remained stable during the review period. Although the non-\nperforming loans ratio remained below the regulatory limit of 5 per cent, there was a marginal \nincrease to 4.95 per cent at end-June 2022, from 4.85 per cent at end-December 2021. \nCredit risks is expected to remain stable in the second half of 2022. However, there are \ndownside risks due to the lingering challenges in the business environment and the imminent \ntransition to a full interest rate regime on loans that were granted forbearance in the wake of \nthe Covid-19 pandemic. Sustained implementation of various regulatory and supervisory \nmeasures, including the Global Standing Instruction (GSI) and Guidelines for Regulation and \nSupervision of Credit Guarantee Companies in Nigeria, is expected to moderate the risks in \nthe short to medium-term. \n \n7.2 Liquidity Risk \nRisk Rating (Low Risk, Stable) \n \nIndustry liquidity remained healthy and stable during the review period and was above the \nregulatory threshold of 30.00 per cent. Banking industry liquidity ratio increased to 42.6 per \ncent at end-June 2022, compared with 41.33 per cent at end-December 2021. The liquidity \ncoverage ratio for the industry stood at 42.60 per cent at end-June 2022, compared with \n41.30 per cent at end-December 2021, driven by the increase in high quality liquid assets \nduring the period. The weighted average Open Buy Back rate stood at 10.89 per cent at end-\nJune 2022, compared with 12.75 per cent at end-December 2021, reflecting higher liquidity \nin the banking system. \n15.02\n14.82\n14.97\n11.67\n9.33\n6.1\n6.41\n6.02\n5.7\n4.85\n4.95\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\n10\n11\n12\n13\n14\n15\n16\nJun-17\nDec-17\nJun-18\nDec-18\nJun-19\nDec-19\nJun-20\nDec-20\nJun-21\nDec-21\nJun-22\nNPL RATIO\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n104 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \n \nLiquidity risk is expected to remain low and stable in the short to medium-term and the \nbanking industry is expected to maintain a robust liquidity position and resilience to short-\nterm liquidity shocks. However, downside risks persisted, including rollover risk, asset and \nliability mismatches and funding gaps at the short-term maturity buckets. \n7.3 Market Risk \nRisk Rating (Medium Risk, Trending up) \nExchange rates remained generally stable at the Investors and Exporters (I&E) window \nduring the period under review. The naira depreciated slightly against the United States \ndollar to N414.72/US$1 at end-June 2022, compared with N412.99/US$1 at end-December \n2021. \n \n \nAlthough the Nigerian capital market recorded significant gains during the period under \nreview, market risk could trend upwards in the short term, owing to the risk of continued \ncapital reversal, oil price shocks, rising inflation and the steepening of the yield curve driven \n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n16\n18\nOPEN BUY BACK (OBB) RATE (%)\n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n700\n08/01/2022\n7/21/2022\n07/08/2022\n6/29/2022\n6/20/2022\n06/07/2022\n5/27/2022\n5/18/2022\n05/06/2022\n4/25/2022\n04/12/2022\n3/30/2022\n3/22/2022\n03/11/2022\n03/02/2022\n2/21/2022\n02/10/2022\n02/01/2022\n1/21/2022\n01/12/2022\n12/31/2021\n12/20/2021\n12/09/2021\n11/30/2021\n11/19/2021\n11/10/2021\n11/01/2021\n10/21/2021\n10/11/2021\n9/29/2021\n9/20/2021\n09/09/2021\n8/31/2021\n8/20/2021\n08/11/2021\n08/02/2021\n7/19/2021\n07/08/2021\nExchange Rate Movements at the I and E Window\nUSD\nEuro\nPound Sterling\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n105 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nby the hike in policy rates. The regulatory measures put in place would moderate this trend \nin the short-to medium term. \n \n7.4 Operational Risk \nRisk Rating (High, Trending up) \n \nLingering structural rigidities continued to pose threats in the review period. The rise in \noperating cost as a result of security and power challenges, as well as high energy prices \nheightened operational risks. Cybersecurity challenges also remained elevated during the \nperiod, with incidents of social engineering, unauthorised access to confidential information, \ninsider threats and third-party risks. Reported losses from cases of fraud and forgeries in \nbanks increased to N2.71 billion in the first half of 2022, from N1.64 billion in the second half \nof 2021. The banks reported 67,878 cases of fraud and forgeries in the first half of 2022, \ncompared with 46,761 cases in the preceding period. \nOperational risk could remain high with an upward trend in the short to medium term. \n7.5 Macroeconomic Risk \nRisk Rating (High Risk, Trending up) \nDuring the review period, the global economy witnessed an unprecedented rise in inflation \nfollowing sustained increases in the prices of food, energy, and other commodities. These \nconditions were exacerbated by the Russian-Ukraine crisis, which resulted in supply chain \ndisruptions and the lingering headwinds associated with the Covid-19 pandemic. The \noutbreak of the Marburg virus disease (MVD) and Monkey Pox virus, as declared by the \nWorld Health Organisation (WHO), posed additional risk to the global macroeconomic \nenvironment. \nAvailable data indicated that global investors rebalanced their portfolios away from gold and \nequities to fixed income securities, to take advantage of rising yields in the advanced \neconomies, with adverse implications for access to global capital by developing economies. \nThis would further slow global economic recovery and increase the risk of tightened global \nfinancial conditions. \nMacroeconomic risks remained elevated in the short to medium-term, with heightened debt \ndefault risks in EMDEs and increasing risk of broad economic slowdown or global recession. \n \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n106 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n8 \nOUTLOOK \nThe medium-term economic outlook for the global and domestic economies is uncertain \nowing to the effects of the Russian-Ukraine crisis, elevated global inflation and the lingering \nimpact of the Covid-19 pandemic and the threat of Marburg and Monkey Pox virus diseases. \nAlso, rising levels of corporate and public debt in most economies as well as the broad \nshocks to foreign capital flows following the sustained interest rate hike by most central banks \ncontinued to depress the outlook. Though aggregate global demand remained robust, the \nsupply-side constraints continued to undermine the recovery effort, at least in the short to \nmedium-term. Global growth is thus confronted with significant headwinds which could \nfurther derail current growth projections. \n \nOn the domestic front, the Nigerian economy is expected to sustain its growth trajectory, \nowing largely to the increasing contribution of the non-oil sector, and the sustained policy \nsupport. However, the trend in key macroeconomic variables indicate the likelihood of \nsubdued output growth in 2022 owing to strong headwinds, including the shocks from the \nexternal environment, persisting security challenges, and infrastructure deficit. Furthermore, \ninflationary pressures are expected to continue in the build-up to the 2023 general elections, \ngiven to the likelihood of increased spending. However, appropriate policy measures put in \nplace by the monetary and fiscal authorities are expected to moderate the risks. \n \nTo contain inflationary pressures many central banks will continue with tighter monetary \npolicy stance. This will reduce credit origination and increase non-performing loans, with \nincreasing financial system vulnerability in the short-to medium term. Financial regulators \nneed to continuously assess and monitor existing and emerging risks, and vulnerabilities to \nthe financial system with a view to deploying appropriate macro and micro prudential tools \nto mitigate them. \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – JUNE 2022 \n107 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nACKNOWLEDGEMENTS \nLIST OF MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS \n1. V.O. Ururuka (PhD.) \nFinancial Policy and Regulation Department \n2. J. A. Mohammed \nDitto \n3. M.L. Garo \nDitto \n4. \nA. Sylvanus-Dannana \nDitto \n5. L. Mohammed \nDitto \n6. \nO. Abraham \nDevelopment Finance Department \n7. \nV.U Oboh \nMonetary Policy Department \n8. \nJ. Yakubu \nResearch Department \n9. \nN.A. Akwashiki \nBanking Supervision Department \n10. \nA. Gambo \nStatistics Department \n11. \nI. P. Akinbolaji \nRisk Management Department \n12. \nE.O. Shonibare \nDitto \n13. \nPhebian N. Bewaji \nFinancial Markets Department \n14. \nV. A. Martins \nOther Financial Institutions Supervision Department \n15. \nL.A. Sawa \nReserve Management Department \n16. M.K. Muazu \nConsumer Protection Department \n17. \nH. Abdullahi \nBanking Services Department \n18. \nA. A. Isa-Olatinwo \nPayments System Management Department \n19. O. Umeano \nSecurities and Exchange Commission \n20. \nM. Mammada \nNigerian Insurance Commission \n21. \nP. Aghahowa \nNational Pension Commission \n \nThe Report is produced and supervised by the Financial Policy and Regulation Department \n \nCHIBUZO A. EFOBI \nDirector, Financial Policy and Regulation Department", "source": "BOG", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/Financial_Stability_Reports/FSR JUNE 2022 -  COMPLETED.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "9c3005aac98ecedecef8f4990c0d6f0b", "text": "q \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nBANK OF GHANA \nMONETARY POLICY REPORT \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nMarch 2026 \nB\nA\nN\nK\nO\nF\nG\nH\nA\nN\nA\nE\nS\nT\n.\n1\n9\n5\n7\n \n \nThe Monetary Policy Report highlights the economic and financial sector assessments that the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) \nconsidered prior to the policy decision during the 129th meetings held on March 16-18, 2026. \nMonetary Policy Objective in Ghana \nThe primary objective of the Bank of Ghana is to ensure stability in the general level of prices, which has been defined as maintaining \ninflation over the medium term, within a band of 8±2 percent. The Bank is also expected to support the general economic policy of \nthe government, promote economic growth and development, foster the effective and efficient operation of the banking and credit \nsystem, and contribute to the promotion and maintenance of financial stability. \n \nMonetary Policy Strategy \nTo achieve the objective of price stability, the Bank of Ghana has been granted operational independence to use whichever policy \ntools it sees appropriate to stabilise inflation around the target band. The Bank of Ghana’s framework for conducting monetary \npolicy is Inflation Targeting (IT), in which the central bank uses the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) as the primary policy tool to set \nthe monetary policy stance and anchor inflation expectations in the economy. \n \nThe MPC Process \nThe MPC is a statutorily constituted body established by the Bank of Ghana (Amendment) Act, 2016 (Act 918), to formulate monetary \npolicy. The MPC consists of seven members – five from the Bank of Ghana (including the Governor, who is the Chairman) and two \nexternal members appointed by the Board of the Bank. The MPC meeting dates are determined at the beginning of each year. The \nMPC meets bi-monthly to assess economic conditions and risks to the inflation outlook, after which a policy decision is made on \npositioning the MPR. Each decision signals a monetary policy stance of tightening (increase), easing (decrease) or no change (stay \nput). The policy decision is arrived at by consensus, with each member stating reasons underlying a preferred MPR decision. \nSubsequently, the decision is announced at a press conference held after each MPC meeting and a press release is issued to financial \nmarkets and the public. \n \n©Research Department, Bank of Ghana MPC Report – April 2026 \nwww.bog.gov.gh \n \n \n \n 1 | Page \n \nTable of Contents \n \nOVERVIEW OF KEY CONSIDERATIONS OF THE MPC ................................................................................. 2 \n1. GLOBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS........................................................................................................ 3 \n1.0 HIGHLIGHTS ....................................................................................................................................................... 3 \n1.1 GLOBAL GROWTH DEVELOPMENTS .................................................................................................................. 3 \n1.2 GLOBAL PRICE DEVELOPMENTS ....................................................................................................................... 4 \n1.3 GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS DEVELOPMENTS ............................................................................................. 4 \n1.4 CURRENCY MARKETS ........................................................................................................................................ 5 \n1.5 GLOBAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK AND RISKS ...................................................................................................... 7 \n2. EXTERNAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS ......................................................................................................... 8 \n2.0 HIGHLIGHTS ....................................................................................................................................................... 8 \n2.1 COMMODITY PRICE TRENDS ............................................................................................................................. 8 \n2.2 TRADE BALANCE ................................................................................................................................................ 9 \n2.3 INTERNATIONAL RESERVES ............................................................................................................................. 10 \n2.4 EXTERNAL SECTOR OUTLOOK ........................................................................................................................ 10 \n3. REAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS .................................................................................................................. 11 \n3.0 HIGHLIGHTS ..................................................................................................................................................... 11 \n3.1 ECONOMIC GROWTH ....................................................................................................................................... 11 \n3.2 TRENDS IN REAL SECTOR INDICATORS ........................................................................................................... 11 \n3.3 LABOUR MARKET ACTIVITY ........................................................................................................................... 12 \n3.4 COMPOSITE INDEX OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ................................................................................................. 12 \n3.5 CONSUMER AND BUSINESS SURVEYS ............................................................................................................... 13 \n4. FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS ................................................................................................................................ 16 \n4.0 HIGHLIGHTS ..................................................................................................................................................... 16 \n4.1 REVENUE AND GRANTS .................................................................................................................................... 16 \n4.2 EXPENDITURES ................................................................................................................................................. 16 \n4.3 BUDGET BALANCE AND FINANCING ................................................................................................................ 17 \n4.4 PUBLIC DEBT ANALYSIS .................................................................................................................................. 19 \n4.5 RISKS TO THE OUTLOOK.................................................................................................................................. 20 \n5. MONETARY AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS...................................................................................... 21 \n5.0 HIGHLIGHTS ..................................................................................................................................................... 21 \n5.1 DEVELOPMENTS IN MONETARY AGGREGATES ............................................................................................... 21 \n5.2 RESERVE MONEY ............................................................................................................................................. 23 \n5.3 DEPOSIT MONEY BANKS CREDIT DEVELOPMENTS ........................................................................................ 24 \n5.4 MONEY MARKET DEVELOPMENTS .................................................................................................................. 25 \n5.5 STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS ................................................................................................................... 27 \n5.6 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................................... 27 \n6. BANKING SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS AND MACROPRUDENTIAL RISK ASSESSMENT ................ 29 \n6.0 HIGHLIGHTS ..................................................................................................................................................... 29 \n6.1 BANKS’ BALANCE SHEET ................................................................................................................................. 29 \n6.2 CREDIT RISK .................................................................................................................................................... 31 \n6.3 FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS INDICATORS .............................................................................................................. 32 \n6.4 CREDIT CONDITIONS SURVEY ......................................................................................................................... 35 \n6.5 MACROPRUDENTIAL RISK ASSESSMENT ......................................................................................................... 36 \n6.6 CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK ........................................................................................................................... 39 \n7. PRICE DEVELOPMENTS .................................................................................................................................. 40 \n7.0 HIGHLIGHTS ..................................................................................................................................................... 40 \n7.1 DOMESTIC PRICE DEVELOPMENTS ................................................................................................................. 40 \n7.2 INFLATION RISK ASSESSMENT AND OUTLOOK ............................................................................................... 42 \nAPPENDIX ................................................................................................................................................................ 43 \n \n \n 2 | Page \n \nOverview of Key Considerations of the MPC \n \nGlobal economic conditions remained resilient despite rising geopolitical tensions. The Middle East conflict \ndisrupted supply chains and heightened oil price volatility, increasing global uncertainty. Although headline inflation \ndeclined in most economies, higher energy prices pose renewed risks. Global financing conditions, while still supportive, \nmay tighten if geopolitical pressures intensify. \n \nDomestic economic activity strengthened in 2025, supported by robust non‑oil sector performance. Real GDP \ngrew by 6.0 percent, while non‑oil GDP expanded by 7.6 percent. High‑frequency indicators showed continued \nmomentum, with the CIEA rising by 8.4 percent in January 2026. Growth was driven by stronger private sector credit, \nincreased industrial output, and higher consumption levels. \n \nInflation eased significantly, reflecting broad-based declines across key components. Headline inflation fell to 3.3 \npercent in February 2026 from 5.4 percent in December 2025. Core inflation also moderated, and expectations across \nconsumers, businesses, and the financial sector remained anchored. The disinflation trend was supported by tight \nmonetary policy, cedi appreciation, and improved food supply conditions. \n \nExternal sector performance remained strong, underpinned by a widening trade surplus. The trade surplus \nincreased to US$3.7 billion in the first two months of 2026, supported by higher gold export earnings and modest import \ngrowth. Gross reserves rose to US$14.5 billion (5.8 months of import cover), compared to US$13.8 billion at \nend‑December 2025. \n \nThe exchange rate remained broadly stable, supported by strong external buffers. Improved reserve levels and \nfavourable trade outcomes helped maintain stability in the cedi. Continued reserve accumulation under the national \nreserve programme is expected to strengthen FX conditions further. \n \nMonetary aggregates continued to moderate, reflecting restrained liquidity conditions. Reserve money contracted \nby 0.5 percent year‑on‑year in February 2026, while broad money growth slowed to 16.0 percent. Short‑term interest \nrates declined sharply, and average lending rates fell to 19.2 percent from 30.1 percent a year earlier. Private sector \ncredit recovery continued gradually. \n \nBanking sector conditions improved, supported by stronger balance sheet performance. Total assets increased, \ndriven by higher deposits, borrowings, and investment growth of 57.5 percent. Financial soundness indicators \nstrengthened across profitability, liquidity, and solvency. The NPL ratio declined to 18.7 percent, though it remains a \nkey vulnerability requiring sustained regulatory action. \n \nThe MPC noted improving domestic conditions but highlighted rising global risks. Inflation is projected to remain \nwithin the medium‑term target band, despite upside risks from higher global oil prices. With domestic conditions \nfavourable and real rates high, the Committee reduced the Monetary Policy Rate by 150 basis points to 14.0 percent. \n \n \n \n \n 3 | Page \n \n1. Global Economic Developments \n \n1.0 Highlights \nRecent data suggests continued global economic resilience, although the momentum is likely to soften going forward. \nGlobal headline inflation was on a downward trajectory, but recent geopolitical events in the Middle East may reverse \nthis trend. Global financial conditions remain accommodative but face possible risks associated with the Iran War. In \nthe local FX market, the cedi recovered strongly in February 2026. \n \n1.1 Global Growth Developments \nGDP outturn for the fourth quarter of 2025 has shown that the global economy was resilient in 2025, but the growth \nmomentum has eased in some countries, such as the United States and those in the Euro area. Moving to Q1 of 2026, \nhigh-frequency data points to a pick-up in activity in the near term, with both manufacturing and services activity being \nexpansionary. Reflecting continuing activity, both consumer and business confidence indices rose in January 2026. \nHowever, recent geopolitical developments and past disruptions may dim the outlook if they persist. For instance, the \nsurge in oil prices coming out of the 28th of February war by the US and Israel against Iran has led to a spike in oil \nprices above $100/barrel. If the war should last beyond three weeks, analyst projects a significant upward repricing of \noil in the near term of $100-$120/barrel. Higher energy prices will feed into transportation costs, industrial input costs, \nhousehold expenditures, and broader price increases across economies. \n \nTable 1.1: Overview of the World Economic Outlook Projections \n \n \nConsequently, Central banks may find it harder to ease monetary policy if inflation remains elevated, potentially \ndelaying interest rate cuts. Higher oil prices will also significantly boost import bills, worsening trade balances. Beyond \nprices, supply disruptions are beginning to emerge as crude trade is halted significantly along the Strait of Hormuz and \nthe Suez Canal corridor, which accounts for about 30% of crude transit due to the war. The Rerouting of maritime traffic \naround Africa’s Cape of Good Hope and disruptions to air cargo operations will create logistical bottlenecks. Rising \ninsurance costs for shipping and pressure on freight rates will increase trade costs. Moreover, the war will add to the \nexisting economic and policy uncertainty, which may impact consumption and investment. Financial stability concerns \nare emerging as major stock indices in the U.S., Europe, and Asia experienced declines following reports of airstrikes \nand attacks. Investors have sought traditional safe-haven assets such as gold and the U.S. dollar, which appreciated amid \nthe turmoil, with implications for Emerging Market currencies. In addition, the 2025 Tariff Wars are not fully resolved, \nwith the Trump Administration resorting to the Trade Act of 1974 to continue to impose 10% tariff on all countries \ndespite the U.S Supreme Court ruling on February 20 against previous tariffs. Furthermore, the global economy faces \nwidespread concerns about AI; both as a bubble that might burst and as a force driving job losses. \n \n \n 4 | Page \n \nDiscounting the effect of the current war, the IMF projects that global growth will remain steady at 3.3% for 2026 and \n3.2% for 2027. These projections will most likely change in the next review window to reflect current geopolitical \nconditions. \n \n1.2 Global Price Developments \nGlobal headline inflation is on a downward trajectory, but recent geopolitical events in the Middle East may reverse this \ntrend. The dynamics of headline inflation will reflect the recent surge in oil prices in the near term. Brent crude oil \naveraged $64 per barrel in January 2026 but has surged above $100 per barrel as the war persists. The FAO Food Price \nIndex was up by 0.9 percent in the month of February 2026, supported by sustained demand and subdued supply. Even \nthough core inflation is currently showing signs of easing, a possible rise in input costs due to the war may reverse this \ntrend. However, expectations of headline and core inflation for 2026 and 2027 remain unchanged. The path of global \ninflation in the near term will depend on how the war evolves. A prolonged war will drive up energy costs and feed into \ntransportation costs, industrial input costs, household expenditures, and translate into broader price increases across \neconomies. Capital Economics projects that a sustained $100 crude price could add 0.6 to 0.7 percentage points to global \ninflation. However, a quick return to normalcy will have a minimal impact on inflation. \n \nFigure 1.1: Headline Inflation in Advanced and Emerging Market Economies \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana, Trading Economics \n \n1.3 Global Financial Markets Developments \nGlobal financial conditions have eased considerably since April 2025 across both advanced and emerging-market \neconomies, supported by accommodative policy stances from major central banks. However, long-term bond yields \nremain elevated, reflecting investor expectations that inflation will stay higher for long. Equity markets have come under \npressure amid the uncertainty created by the Iran war and its implications for the global monetary policy outlook, with \nthe tension also weighing on the sovereign spreads of several African countries. \n \nEmerging-market (EM) portfolio flows declined sharply to $14.3 billion in February 2026, down from $98.8 billion in \nJanuary, driven by weakening investor risk appetite. Looking ahead, global financial conditions may tighten in the near \nterm if the Iran conflict persists. The associated surge in oil prices risks reversing the ongoing disinflation process, which \ncould complicate central banks’ efforts to ease monetary policy, potentially delaying planned interest rate cuts. \nReflecting these developments, long-term bond yields have risen sharply while sovereign spreads have begun to widen. \nAt the same time, equity performance has softened in recent weeks, and portfolio flows to EMs have weakened. The \npersistence of these dynamics could ultimately lead to tighter global financial conditions. \n \n \n \n 5 | Page \n \nTable 1.2: Monetary Policy Stance of Selected Central Banks \n \nSource: Growth Rate (World Bank); Debt/GDP (IMF) Policy Rates (Trading Economics) \n \n1.4 Currency Markets \nOn the international currency market, the U.S. dollar index is strengthening amid safe-haven demand as the escalating \nMiddle East conflict and rising oil prices unsettled financial markets. The strengthened dollar put some pressure on some \nEMDE currencies. \n \nIn the domestic FX market, the cedi faced pressures in January due to frontloading of imports ahead of the Lunar \ncelebrations in China and other parts of Asia. The currency, however, recovered from losses of the past month and \nappreciated in February due to the sharp fall in FX demand following the onset of the lunar celebration. The forex market \nwas also supported with increased inflows from mining and remittances. This coincided with market players' adoption \nof a wait-and-see approach, even as the cedi appreciated further, strengthening the currency. In the outlook, the U.S.-\nIsrael-Iran war may make it difficult for GoldBod to export Gold to the UAE, which will affect FX inflows. It may lead \nto a higher energy import bill and put pressure on the cedi. The strengthening of the dollar may also have adverse \nimplications for the local currency. Further pressures are expected from dividend payments scheduled for March 2026. \nHowever, BoG’s $1 Billion FX intermediation is expected to improve liquidity in the FX market. \n \nIn the interbank market, the cedi depreciated by 2.21 percent, 2.26 percent, and 2.84 percent against the dollar, pound, \nand euro, respectively, on a year-to-date basis. This is against a depreciation of 5.34 percent, 5.87 percent, and 5.81 \npercent against the dollar, pound, and euro, respectively, during the same period in 2025. However, the cedi was less \nvolatile during the first 49 transaction days in 2026 compared to the last four years. \n \nThe cedi depreciated by 0.45 percent, and 0.04 percent, in nominal trade-weighted terms and nominal forex transaction \nweighted terms, respectively, against Ghana’s major trading partners on a year-to-date basis in February 2026. Over the \nsame period in 2025, the cedi experienced a depreciation of 5.87% and 5.67%, in nominal trade-weighted terms and \nnominal forex transaction-weighted terms, respectively. \n \n \n \n \nCountry\nPolicy rate -\nPrevious (%)\nPolicy Rate \nCurrent (%)\nForecast\nInflation \nJanuary, 2026\nInflation \nFebruary, 2026 Real rate Infl Target\nOverall \nFiscal \nDeficit \n(2024,% \nof GDP)\nGDP \nGrowth \n(Dec.2024)\nGross \nDebt/GDP\n(2024,%)\nYTD \nDepr/App\nr 11th \nMarch \n2026\nU.S \n3.75\n3.75\n3.75\n2.4\n2.4\n1.4\n2%\n-8\n2.8\n122.3\nEuro Area\n2.15\n2.15\n2.15\n1.7\n1.9\n0.25\n< 2%\n-3.1\n0.9\n87.2\n-1.55\nUK\n3.75\n3.75\n3.75\n3\n0.8\n2%\n-5.7\n1.1\n101.2\n-0.47\nJapan\n0.75\n0.75\n0.75\n1.5\n-0.75\n2%\n-1.5\n0.1\n236.1\n-1.41\nRussia\n16.00\n15.50\n15.50\n6\n5.9\n9.6\n4%\n-1.6\n4.3\n20.3\nIndia\n5.25\n5.25\n5.25\n2.75\n3.21\n2.04\n4±2%\n-7.9\n6.5\n81.6\n-2.33\nBrazil\n15.00\n15.00\n15.00\n4.44\n3.81\n11.19\n4.5±1.5%\n-6.2\n3.4\n87.0\n6.17\nTurkey\n38.00\n37.00\n35.00\n30.65\n31.53\n5.47\n5±2%\n-4.6\n3.3\n24\n-2.57\nMalaysia\n2.75\n2.75\n2.75\n1.6\n1.2\n3% - 4%\n-3.9\n5.1\n70.1\n3.62\nIndonesia\n4.75\n4.75\n4.75\n3.6\n4.76\n0.0\n3.5% ± 1%\n-2.3\n5\n40.2\n1.07\nChile\n4.50\n4.50\n4.25\n2.8\n2.4\n2.10\n3±1%\n-2.8\n2.6\n41.7\n0.46\nGhana\n18.00\n15.50\n15.50\n3.8\n3.3\n12.2\n8±2%\n-7.3\n5.7\n70.3\n-3.42\nSouth Africa\n6.75\n6.75\n6.75\n3.5\n3.3\n3%±1%\n-5.8\n0.5\n76.0\n0.44\nNigeria\n27.00\n26.50\n25.00\n15.1\n11.40\n6% -9%\n-1.6\n4.1\n39.3\n5.03\nKenya\n9.00\n8.75\n8.75\n4.4\n4.3\n4.45\n2.5-7.5%\n-5.8\n4.7\n67.3\n-0.22\nZambia\n14.25\n13.50\n13.50\n9.4\n7.5\n6\n6%-8%\n-3.3\n4\n114.9\n13.59\nMorocco\n2.25\n2.25\n2.00\n-0.8\n3.1\n-3.9\n3.8\n67.7\n-2.74\nAngola\n18.50\n17.50\n17.00\n14.6\n13.35\n4.2\n9-11%\n-1\n4.4\n59.9\n-0.44\nEgypt\n20.00\n19.00\n19.00\n11.9\n13.4\n5.6\n7± 2%\n-7.1\n2.4\n90.9\n-8.23\nSource: Growth rate(World Bank); Debt/GDP (IMF)\nPolicy Rates (Trading Economics), YTD depreciation/appreciation is from Bloomberg\n \n 6 | Page \n \nTable 1.3: Interbank Exchange Rates \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \nTable 1.4: Nominal Effective Exchange Rate \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \nNote: TWI and FXTWI are index measures of the value, in nominal terms, of the cedi relative to Ghana’s top three currencies: Euro, the Pound \nand the US dollar. \n \nIn real bilateral terms, the cedi appreciated by 0.19 percent, 1.11 percent, and 0.37 percent, against the dollar, pound, \nand euro, respectively, on a year-to-date basis in February 2026. Comparatively, the cedi experienced a depreciation in \nreal terms of 3.64 percent, 3.20 percent, and 2.88 percent, respectively, against the dollar, pound, and the euro over the \nsame period in 2025. \n \nIn real trade-weighted and real forex transaction related terms against the three major currencies (i.e., US dollar, the \nEuro and Pound), the cedi appreciated by 0.41 percent and 0.22 percent on a year-to-date basis in February 2026. For \nthe same period in 2025, the cedi depreciated by 3.01 percent, and 3.57 percent, in real trade-weighted terms and forex \ntransaction-weighted terms, respectively. \n \n \n \n \n \n \nExchange Rate Movements\nUS$/GHC*\nMonthly \ndepreciation/a\nppreciation\nYear-to-Date \ndepreciation/\nappreciation\nGBP/GHC*\nMonthly \ndepreciation/a\nppreciation\nYear-to-Date \ndepreciation/\nappreciation\nEuro/GHC*\nMonthly \ndepreciation/\nappreciation\nYear-to-Date \ndepreciation/a\nppreciation\n2024\nJan\n12.0356\n-1.3\n-1.29\n15.3027\n-1.1\n-1.11\n13.0547\n0.5\n0.55\nFeb\n12.4642\n-3.4\n-4.69\n15.8022\n-3.2\n-4.23\n13.5234\n-3.5\n-2.94\nMar\n12.8770\n-3.2\n-7.74\n16.2617\n-2.8\n-6.94\n13.9031\n-2.7\n-5.59\nApr\n13.2739\n-3.0\n-10.50\n16.6243\n-2.2\n-8.97\n14.1900\n-2.0\n-7.50\nMay\n14.1301\n-6.1\n-15.92\n17.9996\n-7.6\n-15.92\n15.3345\n-7.5\n-14.40\nJune\n14.5860\n-3.1\n-18.55\n18.4375\n-2.4\n-17.92\n15.6270\n-1.9\n-16.00\nJuly\n14.9009\n-2.1\n-20.27\n19.1305\n-3.6\n-20.89\n16.1065\n-3.0\n-18.50\nAug\n15.1899\n-1.9\n-21.79\n19.9261\n-4.0\n-24.05\n16.7828\n-4.0\n-21.79\nSep\n15.8000\n-3.9\n-24.81\n21.1823\n-5.9\n-28.56\n17.6108\n-4.7\n-25.46\nOct\n16.3000\n-3.1\n-27.12\n20.9700\n1.0\n-27.83\n17.6992\n-0.5\n-25.84\nNov\n15.2700\n6.7\n-22.20\n19.3592\n8.3\n-21.83\n16.1291\n9.7\n-18.62\nDec\n14.7000\n3.9\n-19.18\n18.4008\n5.2\n-17.76\n15.2141\n6.0\n-13.72\n2025\nJan\n15.3001\n-3.9\n-3.92\n19.0003\n-3.2\n-3.16\n15.9012\n-4.3\n-4.32\nFeb\n15.5300\n-1.5\n-5.34\n19.5484\n-2.8\n-5.87\n16.1524\n-1.6\n-5.81\nMar\n15.5300\n0.0\n-5.34\n20.0951\n-2.7\n-8.43\n16.8068\n-3.9\n-9.48\nApr\n14.1500\n9.8\n3.89\n18.8769\n6.5\n-2.52\n16.0640\n4.6\n-5.29\nMay\n10.2800\n37.6\n43.00\n13.8529\n36.3\n32.83\n11.6675\n37.7\n30.40\nJune\n10.3100\n-0.3\n42.58\n14.1252\n-1.9\n30.27\n12.1138\n-3.7\n25.59\nJuly\n10.5000\n-1.8\n40.00\n13.8942\n1.7\n32.44\n12.0150\n0.8\n26.63\nAug\n11.4000\n-7.9\n28.95\n15.3997\n-9.8\n19.49\n13.3360\n-9.9\n14.08\nSep\n12.4200\n-8.2\n18.36\n16.7031\n-7.8\n10.16\n14.5859\n-8.6\n4.31\nOct\n10.9000\n13.9\n34.86\n14.3003\n16.8\n28.67\n12.5667\n16.1\n21.07\nNov\n11.2700\n-3.3\n30.43\n14.8995\n-4.0\n23.50\n13.0531\n-3.7\n16.56\nDec\n10.4500\n7.8\n40.67\n14.0579\n6.0\n30.89\n12.2728\n6.4\n23.97\n2026\nJan\n10.9500\n-4.6\n-4.57\n15.0240\n-6.4\n-6.43\n13.0112\n-5.7\n-5.68\nFeb\n10.6865\n2.5\n-2.21\n14.3825\n4.5\n-2.26\n12.6312\n3.0\n-2.84\nMonth\n2021=100\nMonthly CHG(%)\nYear-to-Date (%)\nFXTWI\n TWI\nFXTWI\n TWI FXTWI\n TWI\n2025\nJan-25\n38.19\n42.96\n-4.07\n-4.07\n-4.07\n-4.07\nFeb-25\n37.61\n42.23\n-1.54\n-1.73\n-5.67\n-5.87\nMar-25\n37.47\n40.78\n-0.38\n-3.54\n-6.07\n-9.61\nApr-25\n40.95\n43.06\n8.50\n5.28\n2.95\n-3.82\nMay-25\n56.35\n59.15\n27.33\n27.20\n29.47\n24.42\nJun-25\n55.99\n57.15\n-0.63\n-3.49\n29.03\n21.78\nJul-25\n55.16\n57.73\n-1.51\n1.00\n27.95\n22.56\nAug-25\n50.69\n52.11\n-8.82\n-10.78\n21.60\n14.22\nSep-25\n46.52\n47.70\n-8.97\n-9.25\n14.57\n6.28\nOct-25\n53.10\n55.18\n12.39\n13.55\n25.16\n18.98\nNov-25\n51.33\n53.11\n-3.45\n-3.88\n22.57\n25.18\nDec-25\n55.28\n56.63\n7.15\n6.21\n28.11\n29.83\nJan-26\n51.21\n52.08\n-7.96\n-8.75\n-7.96\n-8.75\nFeb-26\n55.26\n56.38\n7.33\n7.64\n-0.04\n-0.45\n2026\n \n 7 | Page \n \n \nTable 1.5: Real Bilateral Exchange Rate \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \nTable 1.6: Real Effective Exchange Rate for Major Trade Partners \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n1.5 Global Economic Outlook and Risks \nPrior to the US-Israel-Iran war, the global economy was resilient. Inflation was on a downward trajectory, and financial \nconditions were improving markedly. However, a prolonged war could push up oil prices above $100/barrel and lead to \na resurgence in global inflation. This would force central banks to pause or even reverse the recent policy easing cycles, \nspook financial markets and lead to the repricing of risky assets. Tighter financial conditions, along with uncertainty \nassociated with the war, may severely weigh on growth outlook. Weaker global growth will negatively impact Ghana’s \nexports and reserve buildup. Against this backdrop, the country faces an elevated risk of inflation from the external \nenvironment. \n \n \nRER Index (Jan.2021=100) MONTHLY CHANGE (Index)\nYear-to-Date (%)\nMonth\nEUR\nGBP\nUSD\nEUR\nGBP\nUSD\nEUR\nGBP\nUSD\n2025\nJan-25\n97.81\n89.38\n82.94\n-2.12\n-1.18\n-2.98\n-2.12\n-1.18\n-2.98\nFeb-25\n97.04\n87.64\n82.41\n-0.75\n-1.99\n-0.64\n-2.88\n-3.20\n-3.64\nMar-25\n92.78\n85.11\n82.42\n-4.64\n-2.97\n0.01\n-7.66\n-6.26\n-3.63\nApr-25\n97.47\n90.79\n90.92\n4.81\n6.25\n9.34\n-2.47\n0.39\n6.06\nMay-25\n134.99\n123.62\n125.81\n27.79\n26.55\n27.73\n26.01\n26.84\n32.11\nJun-25\n127.62\n118.89\n123.48\n-5.77\n-3.98\n-1.89\n21.74\n23.93\n30.83\nJul-25\n130.24\n122.15\n121.90\n2.01\n2.67\n-1.29\n23.31\n25.96\n29.94\nAug-25\n115.49\n108.35\n110.49\n-12.78\n-12.74\n-10.33\n13.51\n16.53\n22.70\nSep-25\n106.42\n100.78\n102.07\n-8.52\n-7.51\n-8.25\n6.14\n10.26\n16.32\nOct-25\n122.59\n116.52\n115.72\n13.19\n13.51\n11.80\n18.52\n22.38\n26.19\nNov-25\n119.37\n113.29\n113.33\n-2.69\n-2.85\n-2.11\n16.33\n20.17\n24.64\nDec-25\n128.03\n120.54\n123.34\n6.76\n6.02\n8.11\n21.98\n24.97\n30.75\n2026\nJan-26\n118.59\n110.78\n114.20\n-7.95\n-8.81\n-8.00\n-7.95\n-8.81\n-8.00\nFeb-26\n128.50\n121.89\n123.56\n7.71\n9.12\n7.58\n0.37\n1.11\n0.19\nMonth\nINDEX (2021=100)\nMONTHLY CHG\nYear-to-Date (%)\nRFXTWIRTWI\nRFXTWIRTWI\nRFXTWI\nRTWI\n2025\nJan-25\n84.13\n94.93\n-2.87\n-2.15\n-2.87\n-2.15\nFeb-25\n83.56\n94.13\n-0.68\n-0.84\n-3.57\n-3.01\nMar-25\n83.23\n90.64\n-0.40\n-3.86\n-3.98\n-6.98\nApr-25\n91.40\n95.97\n8.94\n5.56\n5.31\n-1.04\nMay-25\n126.44\n132.70\n27.71\n27.68\n31.55\n26.93\nJun-25\n123.69\n126.28\n-2.22\n-5.09\n30.03\n23.21\nJul-25\n122.53\n128.38\n-0.95\n1.63\n29.37\n24.47\nAug-25\n110.82\n114.17\n-10.57\n-12.44\n21.90\n15.07\nSep-25\n102.37\n105.33\n-8.25\n-8.40\n15.46\n7.94\nOct-25\n116.25\n121.11\n11.94\n13.03\n25.55\n19.94\nNov-25\n113.78\n118.01\n-2.17\n-2.63\n23.94\n17.83\nDec-25\n123.63\n126.72\n7.96\n6.88\n30.00\n23.48\n2026\nJan-26\n114.45\n117.30\n-8.01\n-8.03\n-8.01\n-8.03\nFeb-26\n123.90\n127.25\n7.62\n7.82\n0.22\n0.41\nRTWI and FXRTWI\n \n 8 | Page \n \n2. External Sector Developments \n \n2.0 Highlights \nThe external sector maintained a robust performance in the first two months of the year, posting a significant trade \nsurplus driven mainly by increased gold export earnings. The large trade surplus supported the buildup in international \nreserves during the period under review. \n \n2.1 Commodity Price Trends \nOn the international commodities market, prices of Ghana’s major export commodities recorded mixed movements. \nCocoa futures experienced a steep decline, dropping by 63.7 percent to an average of US$3,608.56 per tonne in February \n2026 from US$9,946.79 per tonne in February 2025. Year to date, the cocoa bean has lost 38.8 percent of its value due \nto persistently weak global demand, leading to a buildup of unsold cocoa stocks across West African ports. \n \nCrude oil prices dropped by 7.5 percent year-on-year to average US$69.37 per barrel in February 2026, down from \nUS$74.95 per barrel in the same period in 2024, mainly due to weak global demand amid an oversupplied market. In \nthe first two months of the year, crude oil prices have risen by 12.6 percent, driven by fears of potential supply disruptions \ndue to the ongoing conflict in the Middle East. \n \nGold prices remained firm, soaring by 72.8 percent year-on-year to US$5,007 per fine ounce in February 2026, up from \nUS$2,897.26 per fine ounce in February 2025, driven by U.S. Fed rate cuts, geopolitical and geoeconomic tensions, and \nincreased demand from central banks around the world. Year-to-date, the price of the yellow metal has risen by 16.0 \npercent as persisting geopolitical tensions have spurred safe-haven demand. \n \n \n \nSource: Reuters \n \n \n \n \n Source: Reuters \n \n \n \n \nSource: Reuters \n \n \n \n \n Source: BoG Staff Compilations \n \n \n \n \n \n \n -\n 2,000.00\n 4,000.00\n 6,000.00\n 8,000.00\n 10,000.00\n 12,000.00\nDec-20\nMar-21\nJun-21\nSep-21\nDec-21\nMar-22\nJun-22\nSep-22\nDec-22\nMar-23\nJun-23\nSep-23\nDec-23\nMar-24\nJun-24\nSep-24\nDec-24\nMar-25\nJun-25\nSep-25\nDec-25\nFigure 2.1: International Cocoa Prices (US$/Metric Tonne) \n -\n 20.00\n 40.00\n 60.00\n 80.00\n 100.00\n 120.00\n 140.00\nDec-20\nMar-21\nJun-21\nSep-21\nDec-21\nMar-22\nJun-22\nSep-22\nDec-22\nMar-23\nJun-23\nSep-23\nDec-23\nMar-24\nJun-24\nSep-24\nDec-24\nMar-25\nJun-25\nSep-25\nDec-25\nFigure 2.2: International Brent Crude Oil Prices (US$/Barrel)\n -\n 1,000.00\n 2,000.00\n 3,000.00\n 4,000.00\n 5,000.00\nDec-20\nMar-21\nJun-21\nSep-21\nDec-21\nMar-22\nJun-22\nSep-22\nDec-22\nMar-23\nJun-23\nSep-23\nDec-23\nMar-24\nJun-24\nSep-24\nDec-24\nMar-25\nJun-25\nSep-25\nDec-25\nFigure 2.3: International Gold Prices (US$/Fine Ounce)\n0.00\n50.00\n100.00\n150.00\n200.00\n250.00\n300.00\nDec-20\nMar-21\nJun-21\nSep-21\nDec-21\nMar-22\nJun-22\nSep-22\nDec-22\nMar-23\nJun-23\nSep-23\nDec-23\nMar-24\nJun-24\nSep-24\nDec-24\nMar-25\nJun-25\nSep-25\nDec-25\nFigure 2.4: Commodities Price Index\n \n 9 | Page \n \n \n2.1.1 Commodity Price Index \nThe overall weighted average price index of Ghana's three major export commodities (cocoa, gold, and crude oil) \nrecorded a year-to-date increase of 5.6 percent to 261.72 in February 2026. This performance was mainly on account of \nincreases in the gold and oil sub-indices, which rose by 16.0 percent, and 12.3 percent, respectively. In contrast, the \ncocoa sub-index contracted by 38.8 percent during the period under review. \n \nOn a year-on-year basis, the composite commodity price index increased by 16.4 percent, primarily driven by a \nsubstantial 72.8 percent increase in the gold price sub-index. In contrast, the cocoa and crude oil price sub-indices \nregistered declines of 63.7 percent, and 7.5 percent, respectively. \n \n2.2 Trade Balance \nIn the first two months of 2026, the economy recorded a higher trade surplus of US$3.69 billion, representing a 72.7 \npercent improvement over the US$2.14 billion recorded during the same period in 2025. The stronger trade performance \nwas due to a substantial increase in export earnings, while import demand dipped during the period. \n \nThe value of exports surged to US$6.21 billion in the first two months of 2026, up from US$4.69 billion in the same \nperiod of 2025, driven mainly by higher gold exports. Gold export receipts increased by 84.1 percent to US$4.26 billion \nfrom US$2.31 billion during the period under review, on account of increases in both the volume and price of gold. The \nvolume of gold exports increased by 5.2 percent to 903,877.5 fine ounces, while the average price rose by 74.9 percent \nto settle at US$4,710 per fine ounce during the same review period. \n \nIn the first two months of the year, export receipts from the export of cocoa beans and related products declined to \nUS$956.34 million, compared with US$1.19 billion recorded over the same period in 2025. This contraction was largely \nattributable to weak global demand for cocoa, despite modest price improvements during the review period. \n \n Crude oil exports fell by 22.3 percent to US$451.47 million during the first two months of 2026, down from US$581.3 \nmillion in the comparative period in 2025. Crude oil prices remained subdued during the period, averaging US$67.7 per \nbarrel compared with US$76.7 per barrel in the corresponding period. Similarly, receipts from other exports (excluding \ngold, cocoa, and crude oil) largely comprising non-traditional exports, declined by 9.3 percent to US$540.82 million \nfrom US$596.25 million during the same review period. \n \nTotal import bill, on the other hand, recorded a modest decline of 1.3 percent to US$2.52 billion during the first two \nmonths of 2026 compared to US$2.55 billion recorded in the same period in 2025. This outcome reflected increased \ndemand for oil and gas imports, while non-oil imports contracted over the review period. Oil and gas imports rose \nmarginally by 3.5 percent to US$852.7 million from US$823.7 million in the same period in 2025 due to increased \ndemand for crude oil by local refineries, while non-oil imports declined to US$1.66 billion from US1.72 billion during \nthe same reference period. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n 10 | Page \n \n \nTable 2.1: Trade Balance (US$ million) \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n \n2.3 International Reserves \nAt the end of February 2026, Ghana’s stock of Gross International Reserves (GIR) amounted to US$14.47 billion, \nsufficient to provide 5.8 months of import cover for goods and services. This represented an increase from the end-\nDecember 2025 level of US$13.83 billion, equivalent to 5.7 months of import cover. Under the IMF-ECF Program \ndefinition, Net International Reserves (NIR), which excludes the Petroleum funds and encumbered assets, stood at \nUS$5.65 billion as of end-February 2026. \n \n2.4 External Sector Outlook \nOverall, Ghana’s external sector outlook remains broadly positive, notwithstanding the increasingly challenging global \nenvironment. The outlook for the prices of the country’s major export commodities appears mixed. An assessment of \nthe potential implications of the ongoing conflict in the Middle East suggests that Ghana’s external sector remains \nresilient, underpinned by a sustained current account surplus and adequate reserve buffers. \n \n \n \n 11 | Page \n \n3. Real Sector Developments \n \n3.0 Highlights \nGrowth for 2025 was robust, exceeding initial expectations. Economic activity in the first quarter of 2026 is also \nexpected to remain firm. This is supported by the latest high-frequency real sector indicators, which point to a sustained \npickup in economic activity in January 2026. Consumer and business confidence also continued to reflect positive \nsentiments about macroeconomic conditions. \n \n3.1 Economic Growth \nThe latest provisional data from the Ghana Statistical Service showed that real GDP grew by 6.0 percent in 2025, \ncompared with 5.8 percent in 2024. Non-oil GDP growth accelerated to 7.6 percent from 6.1 percent over the same \ncomparative period. The growth outturn was largely driven by the services and agriculture sectors, which recorded \ngrowth rates of 8.1 percent and 6.8 percent respectively. Industry, on the other hand, grew at a slower pace of 2.3 percent \ndue to a decline in oil production. \n \n3.2 Trends in Real Sector Indicators \nConsumer Spending \nConsumer spending, proxied by domestic VAT collections and retail sales, posted a positive performance in January \n2026 compared with the corresponding period in 2025. Domestic VAT collections increased by 7.1 percent on a year-\non-year basis to GH¢1,799.39 million, from GH¢1,680.59 million. However, on a month-on-month basis, domestic \nVAT declined by 13.1 percent in January 2026 from GH¢2,069.63 million in the preceding month. \n \nRetail sales increased by 16.6 percent (year-on-year) to GH¢277.88 million in January 2026, up from the GH¢238.38 \nmillion recorded in the same period in 2025. Compared to December 2025, however, retail sales declined by 41.1 \npercent. \n \nManufacturing Activities \nActivities in the manufacturing sub-sector, gauged by trends in the collection of direct taxes and private sector workers’ \ncontributions to the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) Pension Scheme (Tier-1), recorded a positive \nperformance in January 2026. Total Direct Taxes collected increased by 9.0 percent to GH¢5,802.49 million in January \n2026, compared with GH¢5,322.11 million recorded in January 2025. Conversely, on a month-on-month basis, total \nDirect Taxes collected for January 2026 declined by 64.4 percent from GH¢16,305.27 million collected in December \n2025. In terms of contributions of the various sub-tax categories, Corporate tax accounted for 40.7 percent, Income tax \n(PAYE and self-employed) accounted for 40.3 percent, while “Other Tax Sources” contributed 18.9 percent. \n \nTotal private sector workers’ contribution to the SSNIT Pension Scheme (Tier-1) went up by 16.8 percent in year-on-\nyear terms to GH¢551.97 million in January 2026 from GH¢472.62 million collected during the corresponding period \nin 2025. \n \nConstruction Sector Activities \nActivity in the construction sub-sector, proxied by the volume of cement sales, declined by 7.7 percent (year-on-year) \nin January 2026 to 206,798.89 tonnes, compared with 223,936.19 tonnes recorded a year ago. On a month-on-month \nbasis, total cement sales remained largely unchanged in January 2026 compared with the 207,929.45 tonnes recorded in \nDecember 2025. The year-on-year decline in total cement sales was due to a slowdown in construction activities during \nthe review period. \n \n \n \n 12 | Page \n \nVehicle Registration \nTransport sector activities, gauged by new vehicle registrations by the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Authority (DVLA), \nincreased by 33.5 percent to 39,421 in January 2026 from 29,521 vehicles registered during the corresponding period of \n2025. On a month-on-month basis, DVLA vehicle registrations improved significantly from the 10,613 vehicles \nrecorded in the preceding month. \n \nIndustrial Consumption of Electricity \nIndustrial consumption of electricity improved by 7.6 percent in January 2026 to 314.29 gigawatts, as against 292.14 \ngigawatts recorded for the corresponding period in 2025. However, on a month-on-month basis, electricity consumed \nby industries in January 2025 remained relatively unchanged from the 316.27 gigawatts utilised in December 2025. \n \nPassenger Arrivals \nPassenger arrivals increased by 8.7 percent in year-on-year terms to 110,087 in January 2026, up from 101,237 arrivals \nrecorded a year ago. However, compared to a month earlier, passenger arrivals recorded at the international airport and \nthe land borders went down by 18.9 percent. \n \nPorts and Harbours Activity \nInternational trade at the country’s two main harbours (Tema and Takoradi), as measured by laden container traffic for \ninbound and outbound containers, improved during the period under review. Total container traffic increased by 13.6 \npercent, year-on-year, to 74,508 in January 2026, up from 65,594 recorded for a similar period in 2025. On a month-on-\nmonth basis, total container traffic declined by 9.8 percent when compared to 82,624 recorded in December 2025. \n \n3.3 Labour Market Activity \nPrivate Sector Pension Contributors \nTotal number of private sector SSNIT contributors, which partially gauges employment conditions, improved by 7.1 \npercent to 1,130,757 in January 2026, compared with 1,055,959 for the same period in 2025. On a month-on-month \nbasis, total number of private sector SSNIT contributors remained largely unchanged from the 1,125,258 individuals \nrecorded in December 2025. \n \nAdvertised Jobs \nThe number of jobs advertised in selected print1 and online2 media, which partially gauges labour demand in the \neconomy, decreased in February 2026 relative to what was observed in the corresponding period a year ago. In total, \n3,244 job adverts were recorded as compared with 3,411 for the same period in 2025, indicating a decline of 4.9 percent \n(year-on-year). On a month-on-month basis, the number of job vacancies in February 2026 declined marginally by 1.0 \npercent from the 3,276 jobs advertised in January 2026. Cumulatively, for the first two months of 2026, the total number \nof advertised jobs remained largely unchanged at 6,520, compared to 6,465 recorded during the same period in 2025. \n \n3.4 Composite Index of Economic Activity \nThe Bank’s real Composite Index of Economic Activity (CIEA) recorded an annual growth of 8.4 percent in January \n2026, compared to a growth of 6.0 percent for the corresponding period of 2025. Increased credit to the private sector \nby banks, industrial production, international trade activities, and consumption of goods and services by households and \nfirms contributed to the improvement in economic activity during the period. \n \n \n1 The Daily Graphic newspaper was used to represent print media because it is the most widely circulated daily in Ghana. \n2 These are job adverts posted on the websites of the 10 main online job advertising/employment companies in Ghana. \n \n 13 | Page \n \n3.5 Consumer and Business Surveys \nThe latest confidence surveys conducted in February 2026 reflected positive consumer and business sentiments. The \nConsumer Confidence Index improved to 117.7 in February 2026 from 116.4 in December 2025, on account of easing \ninflationary pressures and optimism about future economic conditions. Similarly, the Business Confidence Index \nincreased to 110.1 from 107.7 in the same comparative period, as firms cited the realisation of their operational targets \nand expressed optimism about industry prospects amid improving macroeconomic conditions. \n \nFigure 3.1a: High Frequency Economic Indicators \n \n \nSources: Bank of Ghana, Various Stakeholders\n...Domestic VAT collections and retail sales declined in January 2026 \ncompared to December 2025...\n...Labour hiring conditions, proxied by the number of private sector \nworkers contributing to SSNIT, remained largely unchanged...\n...Labour market conditions softened in January 2026 relative to December \n2025...\n...Construction activities, proxied by cement sales, remained largely \nunchanged in January 2026 compared to December 2025...\n...Port activity decreased in January 2026 compared to the previous month...\n...Tourist arrivals declined in January 2026 compared to December 2025... \n150\n170\n190\n210\n230\n250\n270\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nSep-24\nNov-24\nJan-25\nMar-25\nMay-25\nJul-25\nSep-25\nNov-25\nJan-26\nCement Sales\n35\n45\n55\n65\n75\n85\n95\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nSep-24\nNov-24\nJan-25\nMar-25\nMay-25\nJul-25\nSep-25\nNov-25\nJan-26\nThousands\nPort Activity (Container Traffic)\n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\n140\n160\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nSep-24\nNov-24\nJan-25\nMar-25\nMay-25\nJul-25\nSep-25\nNov-25\nJan-26\nThousands\nTourist Arrivals\n600\n700\n800\n900\n1000\n1100\n1200\n1300\n1400\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nSep-24\nNov-24\nJan-25\nMar-25\nMay-25\nJul-25\nSep-25\nNov-25\nJan-26\nThousands\nNumber of Private Sector Contributors to SSNIT\nThousands, tons\n 200.00\n 700.00\n 1,200.00\n 1,700.00\n 2,200.00\n 2,700.00\n 40.00\n 90.00\n 140.00\n 190.00\n 240.00\n 290.00\n 340.00\n 390.00\n 440.00\n 490.00\n 540.00\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nSep-24\nNov-24\nJan-25\nMar-25\nMay-25\nJul-25\nSep-25\nNov-25\nJan-26\nMillion, GHC\nMillion, GHC\nRetail Sales and Domestic VAT collection\nRetail Sales, Left\nDomestic VAT\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n700\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nSep-24\nNov-24\nJan-25\nMar-25\nMay-25\nJul-25\nSep-25\nNov-25\nJan-26\nMillion GHC\nSSNIT Contributions from Private Sector\nPanel 1:\nGhana's Leading Indicators of Economic Activity\n \n 14 | Page \n \nFigure 3.1b: High Frequency Economic Indicators \n \n \n \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana, Various Stakeholders\n...Commercial banks' credit to the private sector remained largely unchanged in \nJanuary 2026 relative to the pevious month...\n...Industrial activity, proxied by industrial consumption of electricity, remained \nrelatively unchanged in January 2026...\n...Exports declined while imports remained largely unchanged in January \n2026 compared to December 2025...\n0\n1000\n2000\n3000\n4000\n5000\n6000\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nSep-24\nNov-24\nJan-25\nMar-25\nMay-25\nJul-25\nSep-25\nNov-25\nJan-26\nMillion, USD\nImports\nExports\nImports and Exports\n220\n240\n260\n280\n300\n320\n340\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nSep-24\nNov-24\nJan-25\nMar-25\nMay-25\nJul-25\nSep-25\nNov-25\nJan-26\nGWh\nIndustrial Consumption of Electricity\n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nSep-24\nNov-24\nJan-25\nMar-25\nMay-25\nJul-25\nSep-25\nNov-25\nJan-26\nBillion, GHC\nDMB's Credit to Private Sector\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nSep-24\nNov-24\nJan-25\nMar-25\nMay-25\nJul-25\nSep-25\nNov-25\nJan-26\nPercent, y-o-y\nReal CIEA\n-8\n-4\n0\n4\n8\n12\n16\nJan-25\nFeb-25\nMar-25\nApr-25\nMay-25\nJun-25\nJul-25\nAug-25\nSep-25\nOct-25\nNov-25\nDec-25\nJan-26\nPercent, y-o-y\nCement Sales (Tons)\nPort Activity\nSSNIT Contr by Pte Sector\nExports\nIndustrial Cons of Electricity\nDMB's Credit to Pte Sector\nImports\nTourist Arrivals\nDom VAT\nReal CIEA growth (%)\nContribution to Real CIEA growth\n500\n1000\n1500\n2000\n2500\n3000\n3500\n4000\n4500\n5000\nFeb-24\nApr-24\nJun-24\nAug-24\nOct-24\nDec-24\nFeb-25\nApr-25\nJun-25\nAug-25\nOct-25\nDec-25\nFeb-26\nJob Adverts\nPanel 2:\nGhana's Leading Indicators of Economic Activity\n...On a year-on-year basis, the real CIEA grew by 8.4 percent in January 2026, \ncompared with a growth of 6.0 percent in January 2025...\n...The growth in the real CIEA was driven by a pick-up in DMB’s Credit to the \nPrivate Sector, Industrial Consumption of Electricity, Exports, SSNIT Contributions \nfrom the Private Sector, Port Activity, Tourist Arrivals and Domestic VAT...\n...Demand for labour, proxied by the number of job adverts (in print and \nonline media), declined marginally in February 2026...\nNumber of advertised jobs\n \n 15 | Page \n \nFigure 3.1c: High Frequency Economic Indicators \n \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana, Various Stakeholders\n...Business Confidence improved as firms cited the realisation of operational \ntargets and expressed optimism about industry prospects amid improving \nmacroeconomic conditions...\n...Vehicle registration surged in January 2026 compared to the month before...\n...Consumer confidence improved on account of easing inflationary \npressures and optimism about future economic conditions...\n0\n5000\n10000\n15000\n20000\n25000\n30000\n35000\n40000\n45000\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nSep-24\nNov-24\nJan-25\nMar-25\nMay-25\nJul-25\nSep-25\nNov-25\nJan-26\nVehicle Registration\n110.1\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\n100\n110\n120\nFeb-24\nApr-24\nJun-24\nAug-24\nOct-24\nDec-24\nFeb-25\nApr-25\nJun-25\nAug-25\nOct-25\nDec-25\nFeb-26\nIndex\nBusiness Confidence Index\n117.7\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\n100\n110\n120\n130\nFeb-24\nApr-24\nJun-24\nAug-24\nOct-24\nDec-24\nFeb-25\nApr-25\nJun-25\nAug-25\nOct-25\nDec-25\nFeb-26\nIndex\nConsumer Confidence Index\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n16\n18\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nSep-24\nNov-24\nJan-25\nMar-25\nMay-25\nJul-25\nSep-25\nNov-25\nJan-26\nBillion, GHC\nDomestic taxes, Direct\n...Domestic tax collection decreased in January 2026 compared to December \n2025...\n2.7 \n6.8 \n7.2 \n2.3 \n6.2 \n8.1 \n-4.0\n-2.0\n0.0\n2.0\n4.0\n6.0\n8.0\n10.0\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\n2023\n2024\n2025\nPercent\nAgricuture\nIndustry\nServices\nAnnual sectoral real GDP growth rate, y/y \n5.8\n6.0\n6.1\n7.6\n0.0\n2.0\n4.0\n6.0\n8.0\n10.0\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\n2023\n2024\n2025\nPercent\nOil GDP\nNon-Oil GDP\nAnnual real GDP growth rate, y/y \n...Real Oil and Non-Oil GDP grew by 6.0 percent and 7.6 percent respectively \nin 2025, compared with growth rates of 5.8 percent and 6.1 percent \nrespectively in 2024... \n...The Services and Agriculture sectors drove growth in 2025, recording growth rates \nof 8.1 percent and 6.8 percent respectively, relative to growth rates of 6.2 percent \nand 2.7 percent in 2024...\nPanel 3:\nGhana's Leading Indicators of Economic Activity\nNumber of vehicles\n \n 16 | Page \n \n \n4. Fiscal Developments \n \n4.0 Highlights \nThe provisional January-December 2025 fiscal performance on commitment basis indicates that: Fiscal performance \nfor 2025 was marked by improved revenue buoyancy amid shortfalls in revenue outturns from targets. Total government \nexpenditure for 2025 reflects deliberate fiscal restraint and improved expenditure control. Shortfalls in revenue \nperformance was more than offset by a corresponding cut in government’s spending. The fiscal deficit for the period \nunder review was 1.0 percent of GDP, against the target of 2.8 percent of GDP. The primary balance recorded a surplus \nof 2.6 percent of GDP, against a primary surplus target of 1.5 percent of GDP. The overall fiscal deficit was financed \nfrom domestic and foreign sources. \n \n4.1 Revenue and Grants \nTotal Revenue & Grants for 2025 amounted to GH¢224,883.7 million (16.1% of GDP), lower than the target of \nGH¢229,949.7 million (16.4% of GDP). Over the review period, domestic revenue totalled GH¢223,059.1 million \n(15.9% of GDP), below the target of GH¢227,275.1 million (16.2% of GDP). The revenue outcomes reflected \nunderperformances for tax revenue, oil and gas receipts, as well as grants. Tax revenue, comprising taxes on income & \nproperty, taxes on domestic goods and services, international trade taxes, and oil and gas related taxes, was \nGH¢183,987.2 million (13.1% of GDP), lower than the target of GH¢189,964.6 million (13.6% of GDP). This \nrepresented a negative deviation of 3.1 percent over the target, signalling systemic revenue leakages. \n \nNon-Tax Revenue, totalled GH¢27,870.1 million, above the target of GH¢26,548.0 million by 5.0 percent. Compared \nwith the outturn for 2024, this translates into a year-on-year growth of 0.5 percent. This performance was mainly due to \nlower than programmed Dividend/Interest & Profits from Oil (CAPI) as well as Yield from Capping Policy for the \ncollection period. \n \nOil and gas receipts were GH¢8,711.0 million lower than the target of GH¢16,514.3 million by 47.3 percent. This tax \ntype also recorded a year-on-year decline of 56.1 percent. Other revenue of GH¢10,335.6 million was above its target \nof GH¢9,568.9 million, therefore overperforming its target by 8.0 percent. This outturn is 109.7 percent above \nGH¢4,928.5 million collected in the corresponding period of 2024. Grants received for January-December 2025 totalled \nGH¢1,824.6 million, a shortfall of 31.8 percent from the programmed target of GH¢2,674.6 million for the review \nperiod. This outturn was also higher than GH¢1,715.7 million received in the corresponding period of 2024, translating \ninto a year-on-year growth of 6.3 percent. \n \n4.2 Expenditures \nTotal expenditures and net lending for the review period, totalled GH¢233,778.8 million. This was below the target of \nGH¢269,496.1 million by 13.3 percent. \n \nCompensation of Employees was GH¢78,970.1 million, higher than the target of GH¢76,203.2 million. This outturn \nwas above its target by 3.6 percent and recorded a 17.5 percent year-on-year growth. In terms of fiscal flexibility, \ncompensation of employees constituted 35.4 percent of domestic revenue mobilised during the period under review. \n \nUse of Goods and Services totalled GH¢6,089.6 million, lower than the expected target of GH¢6,671.1 million by 8.7 \npercent. This points to some restraint on the part of the government to control discretionary spending. This expense was \nalso lower than GH¢11,509.0 million received in the corresponding period of 2024, reflecting a year-on-year decline of \n47.1 percent. \n \nTotal interest payments of GH¢49,891.1 million was above the target of GH¢46,792.3 million for the review period. \nThis outturn is 6.6 percent above the GH¢46,792.3 million recorded in the corresponding period of 2024. The reduced \ninterest payment was mainly on account of lower domestic interest payments as well as the appreciation of the local \ncurrency on the external side. \n \n \n 17 | Page \n \nGrants to other Government units amounted to GH¢57,719.7 million, higher than the target of GH¢46,425.5 million, \nresulting in a positive deviation of 5.8 percent. It also recorded a year-on-year growth of 24.3 percent. \n \nCapital Expenditure for the period under review was GH¢20,235.3 million (1.4% of GDP), lower than the programmed \ntarget of GH¢32,661.6 million (2.3% of GDP) by 38 percent. This outturn represented a year-on-year decline of 31.1 \npercent over the outturn of 2024. \n \nOther Expenditure for 2025 was GH¢17,873.8 million, 50.3 percent below the target of GH¢35,948.5 million. This \noutturn compares with GH¢23,993.3 million, recorded in the corresponding period of 2024. \n \nTable 4.1: Revenue and Grants \n \nSource: Ministry of Finance \n \n4.3 Budget Balance and Financing \nGovernment budgetary operations resulted in an overall budget deficit (commitment) of GH¢13,856.3 million (1.0% of \nGDP) for the period of January-December 2025. This was lower than the expected target of GH¢39,546.3 million (2.8% \nof GDP). The corresponding primary balance was a surplus of 2.6 percent of GDP, against a primary surplus target of \n1.5 percent of GDP. On cash basis, the overall deficit was GH¢43,400.0 million compared with the target of \nGH¢52,613.9 million. This translates into 3.1 percent of GDP compared with a target of 3.8 percent of GDP. The overall \nfiscal deficit of GH¢43,400.0 million was financed from domestic and foreign sources. Domestic financing (net) was \nGH¢38,550.9 million, higher than the outturn of GH¢41,536.7 million recorded in the same period in 2024. Foreign \nfinancing recorded a net outflow of GH¢6,011.7 million (0.4% of GDP), lower than the target of GH¢19,980.5 million \n(1.4 % of GDP). \n \nIn GH¢ unless otherwise stated\n2024\n2025\n2025\n2025\nProv\nBudget\nProv\nProg\nOutturn\nRevised\nOutturn\nQ1-Q4\nI. REVENUES\nTotal Revenue & Grants\n186,593.3\n229,949.7\n224,883.7\n229,949.7\n-2.2\n20.5\n (per cent of GDP)\n15.9\n16.4\n16.1\n16.4\nDomestic Revenue\n184,877.6\n227,275.1\n223,059.1\n227,275.1\n-1.9\n20.7\n (per cent of GDP)\n15.7\n16.2\n15.9\n16.2\nTax Revenue\n151,155.0\n189,964.6\n183,987.2\n189,964.6\n-3.1\n21.7\n (per cent of GDP)\n12.9\n13.6\n13.1\n13.6\nTaxes on Income and Property\n78,742.0\n97,761.9\n95,238.5\n97,761.9\n-2.6\n21.0\n (per cent of GDP)\n6.7\n7.0\n6.8\n7.0\nPersonal\n23,604.5\n29,051.1\n26,889.3\n29,051.1\nCompany Taxes\n33,919.4\n45,870.8\n46,453.9\n45,870.8\nCompany Taxes on Oil\n7,356.8\n5,220.3\n3,914.2\n5,220.3\nOther Direct Taxes\n13,861.3\n17,619.7\n17,981.0\n17,619.7\nTaxes on Domestic Goods and Services\n60,499.2\n73,757.1\n74,202.1\n73,757.1\n0.6\n22.6\n (per cent of GDP)\n5.1\n5.3\n5.3\n5.3\nExcises\n6,799.9\n8,140.1\n5,655.9\n8,140.1\nVAT\n33,683.8\n42,984.9\n42,904.2\n42,984.9\nNational Health Insurance Levy (NHIL) \n7,160.3\n8,571.5\n9,897.6\n8,571.5\nGETFund Levy\n7,160.6\n8,571.9\n9,838.9\n8,571.9\nCommunication Service Tax\n931.1\n1,114.6\n1,984.3\n1,114.6\nE-Transaction Levy\n2,024.1\n517.7\n812.7\n517.7\nCovid-19 Health Levy\n2,739.4\n3,856.4\n3,108.4\n3,856.4\nInternational Trade Taxes\n19,917.5\n26,013.0\n23,304.5\n26,013.0\n-10.4\n17.0\n (per cent of GDP)\n1.7\n1.9\n1.7\n1.9\nImport Duties\n19,917.5\n26,013.0\n23,304.5\n26,013.0\nTax Refunds\n-8,003.7\n-7,567.4\n-8,757.9\n-7,567.4\n15.7\n9.4\n (per cent of GDP)\n-0.7\n-0.5\n-0.6\n-0.5\nSocial Contributions\n1,060.5\n1,193.5\n866.2\n1,193.5\n-27.4\n-18.3\n (per cent of GDP)\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\nNon-Tax Revenue\n27,733.6\n26,548.0\n27,870.1\n26,548.0\n5.0\n0.5\n (per cent of GDP)\n2.4\n1.9\n2.0\n1.9\nOther Revenue\n4,928.5\n9,569.0\n10,335.6\n9,569.0\n8.0\n109.7\n (per cent of GDP)\n0.4\n0.7\n0.7\n0.7\nGrants\n1,715.7\n2,674.6\n1,824.6\n2,674.6\n-31.8\n6.3\n (per cent of GDP)\n0.1\n0.2\n0.1\n0.2\nProject Grants\n1,715.7\n2,674.6\n1,824.6\n2,674.6\nProgramme Grants\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nDeviation Y-O-Y Growth\n \n 18 | Page \n \n \n \n \n \nTable 4.2: Expenditure \n \nSource: Ministry of Finance \n \n \nChart 4.1: Budget Balance and Financing \n \nSource: Ministry of Finance \n \nIn GH¢ unless otherwise stated\n2024\n2025\n2025\n2025\nProv\nBudget\nProv\nProg\nOutturn\nRevised\nOutturn\nQ1-Q4\nII. EXPENDITURE\nTotal Expenditure (Commitment)\n226,243.5\n269,496.1\n233,778.8\n269,496.1\n-13.3\n3.3\n(percent of GDP)\n19.2\n19.2\n16.7\n19.2\nCompensation of Employees\n67,189.0\n76,203.2\n78,970.1\n76,203.2\n3.6\n17.5\nWages & Salaries\n60,351.6\n68,197.3\n70,987.9\n68,197.3\n(percent of GDP)\n5,131.0\n4,871.2\n5,070.5\n4,871.2\nSocial Contributions\n6,837.4\n8,005.9\n7,982.2\n8,005.9\nUse of Goods and Services\n11,509.0\n6,671.1\n6,089.6\n6,671.1\n-8.7\n-47.1\n(percent of GDP)\n1.0\n0.5\n0.4\n0.5\nInterest Payment\n46,792.3\n59,866.1\n49,891.1\n59,866.1\n-16.7\n6.6\n(percent of GDP)\n4.0\n4.3\n3.6\n4.3\nDomestic\n40,058.4\n51,154.9\n41,317.7\n51,154.9\nExternal\n6,733.9\n8,711.2\n8,573.4\n8,711.2\nSubsidies \n208.9\n342.0\n91.2\n342.0\n-73.3\n-56.3\n(percent of GDP)\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nGrants to Other Government Units\n46,425.5\n54,566.6\n57,719.7\n54,566.6\n5.8\n24.3\n(percent of GDP)\n3.9\n3.9\n4.1\n3.9\nSocial Benefits\n736.8\n3,237.0\n2,908.0\n3,237.0\n-10.2\n294.7\n(percent of GDP)\n0.1\n0.2\n0.2\n0.2\nOther Expenditure\n23,993.3\n35,948.5\n17,873.8\n35,948.5\n-50.3\n-25.5\n(percent of GDP)\n2.0\n2.6\n1.3\n2.6\nCapital Expenditure\n29,388.7\n32,661.6\n20,235.3\n32,661.6\n-38.0\n-31.1\n(percent of GDP)\n2.5\n2.3\n1.4\n2.3\nDomestic Financed\n14,732.6\n21,006.1\n14,822.9\n21,006.1\nForeign Financed\n14,656.1\n11,655.5\n5,412.5\n11,655.5\nOutstanding Current Year Expenditure Claims\n49,237.2\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nDeviation Y-O-Y Growth\n \n 19 | Page \n \n4.4 Public Debt Analysis \nThe debt to GDP ratio reduced sharply due to the appreciation of the local currency, reduced borrowing cost, high \nprimary surplus, effective debt management and higher estimated GDP in 2025. The rate of debt accumulation has \ndeclined on the back of these developments, resulting in the decreases in the stock of total public debt at the end of \nDecember 2025. In addition, improved macroeconomic developments have reduced the cost of debt service, however, \nthe conclusion of the external debt restructuring may result in some legacy issues. \n \nThe stock of public debt decreased to 45.3 percent of the estimated GDP in Dec. 2025 from 61.8 percent of GDP in Dec. \n2024. Similarly rate of debt accumulation shifted from 19.1 percent in 2024 to negative 11.8 percent by December 2025. \n \nThe provisional debt stock of central government and guaranteed debt stood at GH¢640.99 billion (45.3% of GDP) at \nend-December 2025 from GH¢726.7 billion (61.8% of GDP) at end-Dec 2024. Out of the total public debt, external debt \nwas GH¢307.2 billion (21.7% of GDP) and domestic debt totalled GH¢333.8 billion (23.6% of GDP). The sharp decline \nis reflected in both external and domestic debt-to-GDP ratios. The decline in the public debt was largely due to \nappreciation of the local currency, increased amortisation, and prudent borrowing practices, reduced borrowing cost and \nfiscal discipline resulting in the higher primary surplus. \n \nThe external debt increased in foreign currency terms to reflect new loan disbursement, but in local currency terms, it \ndecreased from GH¢416.8 billion in Dec 2024 to GH¢307.2 billion in December 2025. The decline was mainly driven \nby strong performance of the Cedi and principal repayments of both Eurobonds and multilateral debt, resulting in a \nreduction in the external debt stock denominated in local currency by GH¢125.2 billion (9% of estimated GDP). \n \nThe domestic debt, on the other hand, increased modestly from GH¢309.8 billion to GH¢333.8 billion despite the \nreduction in the domestic debt to GDP. The rise reflects government’s plan to borrow to build buffers to meet its financial \nobligations. The increase in domestic debt came largely from the short-term instruments. \n \nTable 4.3: Public Debt \nSource: Bank of Ghana, Ministry of Finance \n \n \n \n \n 20 | Page \n \n4.5 Risks to the Outlook \nGovernment overperformed in terms of its key fiscal anchor for 2025, reflecting a primary surplus on commitment basis \nof 2.6 percent of GDP. This outcome had a damping effect on government’s debt stock and improved sustainability \ngoing forward. \n \nGovernment is committed to sustaining the improvement by respecting the targets and programmes outlined in the 2026 \nbudget. Revenue mobilisation is expected to improve with the steady implementation of the new revenue measures \noutlined in the 2026 budget and the infusion of technology and AI, not only to plug revenue loopholes but also to enhance \nefficiency in collections. \nExpenditure control and efficiency gains are expected with the scale-up in the implementation of the commitment \nauthorisation and commencement of the operations of the value for money activity. \n \nIn addition, continued fiscal consolidation efforts will help reduce debt accumulation and debt service costs. Also, \nsustained improvements in real growth, lower real interest rate and exchange rate stability remain key to achieving \nmedium-term debt sustainability. Completion of the remaining external debt restructuring negotiations may create \npotential short-term external payments challenges, and this may have implications for the domestic currency, and more \ndomestic savings would be needed to meet future external debt service obligations. High Reserves accumulation remains \nkey to meet high external debt service payments, and appreciable reserves would be required to contain the exchange \nrate pressures. \n \n \n21 \n \nPUBLIC \n5. Monetary and Financial Developments \n \n5.0 Highlights \nGrowth in monetary aggregates slowed in February 2026 relative to February 2025, consistent with the objective of \nanchoring inflation expectations. Broad money supply (M2+) growth was lower at 16.0 percent in February 2026 \ncompared to 33.1 percent in the previous year, while reserve money contracted by 0.5 percent year-on-year in February \n2026, relative to a growth of 68.8 percent in February 2025. Nominal credit growth year-on-year remained subdued as \nbanks continued to favour Bank of Ghana and Government securities. Real private sector credit, however, recorded \nmodest gains, aided by strong disinflation and gradually improving borrowing conditions. Short-term interest rates fell \nsharply on a year-on-year basis, consistent with reductions in the monetary policy rate, while medium-to-long-term \nyields held steady. Financial market activity continued to post a strong performance in the first two months of 2026, \nwith the GSE Composite Index recording notable gains. Market capitalisation also increased on the back of improved \ninvestor sentiment and stronger profitability among listed firms. These developments underscored a gradual \nimprovement in financing conditions and investor confidence, thereby reinforcing overall stability in the macroeconomy. \n \n5.1 Developments in Monetary Aggregates \n \nMoney Supply \nAnnual growth in broad money supply (M2+) decelerated to 16.0 percent in February 2026 from 33.1 percent in February \n2025, marking a significant slowdown in liquidity expansion. This outcome reflected a decline in contributions from \nNet Foreign Assets (NFA), while the contribution of Net Domestic Assets (NDA) remained moderate, consistent with \nlow liquidity creation in the banking system. \n \nThe contribution of NFA to overall liquidity growth declined markedly to 5.7 percent in February 2026, compared with \n27.3 percent a year earlier. This moderation was driven primarily by valuation effects associated with the appreciation \nof the cedi in 2025, which reduced the domestic-currency value of foreign-denominated assets. \n \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n \nThe contribution of NDA to M2+ growth increased to 10.3 percent from 5.8 percent in February 2025. This development \nwas largely underpinned by increases in Net Claims on Government (NCG) and Other Items (Net). The contribution of \nNCG to NDA growth was 3.2 percent in February 2026, compared to a contribution of negative 0.4 percent a year earlier, \nreflecting in part an increased preference for government securities by the banks. Other Items (Net) accounted for 18.5 \npercent of the growth in M2+ growth, compared with negative 5.2 percent in February 2025. These upward pressures \n-20.00\n0.00\n20.00\n40.00\n60.00\n80.00\nper cent\nChart 5.1: M2+ Growth and its Sources (%contributions)\nNet Foreign Assets\nNDA\nTotal Liquidity (M2+)\nSource: Bank of Ghana\n \n22 \n \nPUBLIC \non NDA were, however, partially offset by a decline in the contribution of claims on the private sector (including public \nenterprises) during the review period. \n \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n \nIn terms of the composition of M2+ growth, the contribution of savings and time deposits increased to 8.0 percent from \n6.2 percent a year earlier, while the contribution of demand deposits increased marginally to 9.7 percent from 9.5 percent \nin February 2025, consistent with the trend of stable deposit mobilisation by banks. In contrast, the contribution of \ncurrency declined sharply to 2.8 percent, from 9.4 percent in the previous year, reflecting restrained cash demand. \nForeign currency deposits (FCDs) exerted a significant drag on money supply growth, with its contribution declining to \nnegative 4.5 percent in February 2026, compared with 7.6 percent in February 2025. This reversal largely reflected \nvaluation effects from the appreciation of the domestic currency in 2025, as well as a stronger preference for cedi-\ndenominated assets amid improved confidence in domestic financial conditions. \n \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n \n \n-60.00\n-40.00\n-20.00\n0.00\n20.00\n40.00\n60.00\n80.00\nper cent\nChart 5.2: Banking Sector NDA and its Sources; per cent contributions\n NCG\n Claims on Priv. Sect. (Incl. PE's)\n BOG OMO Steril. Acc.\n OIN\nNDA\nSource: Bank of Ghana\n-10.00\n0.00\n10.00\n20.00\n30.00\n40.00\n50.00\npercent\nCurr.\nDem. Dep\nSav and Time Dep.\nFCDs\nTotal Liquidity (M2+)\nSource: Bank of Ghana\nChart 5.3: M2+ growth and its component (% contributions)\n \n23 \n \nPUBLIC \n5.2 Reserve Money \nReserve Money (RM) growth moderated significantly in February 2026 relative to February 2025, underpinned by the \nrelatively tight monetary policy stance of the Bank of Ghana during the review period. Accordingly, RM contracted 0.5 \npercent in February 2026 compared with the growth of 47.8 percent recorded in February 2025. \n \nThe decline in RM growth was primarily driven by a contraction in Net Domestic Assets (NDA) of the central bank. \nNDA contribution to RM growth declined to negative 24.3 percent in February 2026, compared to a contribution of 10.8 \npercent in February 2025, on account of intensified Open Market Operations (OMO) aimed at sterilising excess liquidity. \nThis was, however, moderated by an increase in Net Claims on Government (NCG) and Other Items (Net). \n \nDevelopments in Net Foreign Assets (NFA) also contributed to the decline in RM growth. Although NFA increased on \na year-on-year basis to GH¢91,519.5 million in February 2026 from GH¢58,014.9 million in February 2025, the pace \nof accumulation slowed considerably relative to the strong external inflows recorded in the previous year. The \nmoderation partly reflected valuation effects associated with the appreciation of the cedi in 2025, which reduced the \ndomestic-currency value of foreign-denominated assets. As a result, the contribution of NFA to RM growth declined to \n23.8 percent in February 2026, from 58.1 percent a year earlier. \n \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n \n \n-100.0\n-50.0\n0.0\n50.0\n100.0\n150.0\nPer cent\nChart 5.4: RM Growth and Contribution from NFA and NDA\nNDA\nNFA\nRM growth (y-on-y)\nSource: Bank of Ghana\n-100.0\n-80.0\n-60.0\n-40.0\n-20.0\n0.0\n20.0\n40.0\n60.0\n80.0\n100.0\n120.0\nChart 5.5: BOG NDA and Its Sources (% Contributions)\nNCG\nNC_DMBs\nOMO Ster. A/c\nOIN\nNDA\nSource: Bank of Ghana\n \n24 \n \nPUBLIC \n5.3 Deposit Money Banks Credit Developments \nCredit conditions in the banking sector remained subdued in February 2026, reflecting banks’ cautious risk-taking stance \nand a continued preference for Government and Bank of Ghana securities. Total net credit flows slowed to \nGH¢14,571.66 million (15.6 percent) as at end-February 2026, compared with GH¢18,881.31 million (25.3 percent) in \nFebruary 2025. The decline was a result of a marked reduction in lending to the public sector, alongside softer credit \nexpansion to the private economy. \n \nCredit to the public sector contracted significantly during the review period. Public sector credit declined by \nGH¢1,762.62 million (-27.8 percent) in February 2026, in contrast with the GH¢357.58 million (6.0 percent) expansion \nrecorded a year earlier. This decline reflected the ongoing fiscal consolidation, which had resulted in reduced \ngovernment borrowing from the banking system during the period. \n \nNotwithstanding a moderation in growth in credit to the public sector, the private sector remained the primary recipient \nof new lending. Private sector credit expanded by GH¢16,334.27 million (18.7 percent) between February 2025 and \nFebruary 2026, although this reflected a moderation from the increase of GH¢18,523.73 million (26.9 percent growth) \nrecorded a year earlier. The private sector’s share of total outstanding credit, however, increased to 95.8 percent from \n93.7 percent in February 2025. Nominal private sector credit stood at GH¢103,667.90 million at end-February 2026, \ncompared with GH¢87,333.63 million recorded in February 2025. \n \nSectoral breakdown of private-sector credit flows indicated that the Services sector received the largest proportion of \nannual credit flows of GH¢9,164.21 million (32.6 percent) in February 2026, significantly higher than the flows of \nGH¢5,305.02 million (23.2 percent) recorded same time last year. The Mining and Quarrying sector also received \nincreased flows of GH¢2,965.95 million (110.2 percent) in February 2026 compared with GH¢451.11 million (20.1 \npercent) a year earlier. Credit flows to the transport, storage and communication sector, however, declined significantly \nduring the period under review. \n \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n \n \nChart 5.6: Sectoral Shares in Credit to the Private sector (%)\nFeb-25\nFeb-26\n \n25 \n \nPUBLIC \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n \nIn real terms, private sector credit growth remained positive, supported by the significant decline in inflation. Real \nprivate sector credit grew by 14.9 percent in February 2026, compared to 3.1 percent in February 2025. This reflected \nan improving trend in real private sector growth since the second half of 2025. Real private sector credit growth remained \nmarginally above its long-term trend level in February 2026. \n \n5.4 Money Market Developments \nInterest rate developments in February 2026 showed broad declines consistent with the easing cycle initiated by the \nBank of Ghana since the second half of 2025 and the continued trend in disinflation. These movements contrast sharply \nwith conditions in February 2025, when rates remained elevated, consistent with tight monetary conditions aimed at \nanchoring inflation expectations. \n \nThe Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) declined significantly to 15.5 percent in February 2026, from 27.0 percent in February \n2025. The 11.5 percentage points reduction in the MPR reflected the cumulative policy easing undertaken in 2025 and \n2026, as inflation pressures abated and the macroeconomic environment stabilised. The corresponding downward \nadjustment in the overnight reverse repo and deposit rates reinforced the easing monetary policy stance. \n \nShort-term money market conditions broadly mirrored developments at the policy level. The Interbank Weighted \nAverage Rate declined to 12.6 percent in February 2026 from 27.0 percent a year earlier, indicating a declining cost of \novernight borrowing. Similarly, the average lending rate of banks eased to 19.2 percent from 30.1 percent in February \n2025, reflecting a pass-through of the reduction in policy rate to market rates. Real rates, however, remained broadly \npositive on account of the faster pace of disinflation relative to the declines in nominal rates during the review period. \n \nDevelopments in the Treasury bill market were consistent with the general decline in interest rates. The 91-day, 182-\nday, and 364-day Treasury bill rates declined sharply to 9.0 percent, 10.8 percent, and 11.5 percent, respectively, \ncompared with 26.9 percent, 27.7 percent, and 28.9 percent a year earlier. This decline reflects sustained investor demand \nat the short end of the curve and ongoing efforts to reduce Government’s domestic financing costs. Rates on medium- \nto long-term Government securities such as the 2-year, 3-year, 5-year, 6-year, 7-year, 10-year, 15-year, and 20-year \nbonds, however, remained broadly unchanged, given limited activity in that segment of the market. \n-22.00\n-17.00\n-12.00\n-7.00\n-2.00\n3.00\n8.00\n13.00\n18.00\n23.00\nChart 5.7: Growth in Real Private Sector Credit (RGPSC) vs. MA Trend\nRGPSC\nTrend\n \n26 \n \nPUBLIC \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n \n \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n \n \n0.00\n10.00\n20.00\n30.00\n40.00\n50.00\n60.00\nChart 5.8: MPR, Depo, Reverse Repo, Interbank and T-bill Rates and Inflation \nReverse Repo(Daily)\nMPR\nDepo Rate\n 91-Day T-bill rate\n Inter-Bank rate\nInflation\n8.0\n13.0\n18.0\n23.0\n28.0\n33.0\nChart 5.9: Yield Curve\nFeb-25\nFeb-26\n \n27 \n \nPUBLIC \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n \n5.5 Stock Market Developments \nActivity on the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) strengthened in February 2026, supported by improved investor sentiment, \nstronger corporate earnings, and continued macroeconomic stability. The GSE Composite Index (GSE-CI) closed the \nmonth at 12,869.2 points, compared with 5,659.8 points in February 2025, representing a growth rate of 127.4 percent. \nThis marked improvement reflects sustained buying interest across key counters, improved profitability among listed \nfirms, and renewed portfolio inflows as inflation eased and financial conditions stabilised. Sectoral performance was \nbroadly positive, with notable contributions from the Food and Beverage Agriculture, Distribution, and Finance and IT \nsectors with annual growth rates of 178.7, 175.9 percent, 168.3 percent and 157.4 percent, respectively. \n \nThe GSE Financial Stocks Index (GSE-FI) also recorded significant growth, rising to 7,692.9 points in February 2026 \nfrom 2,814.3 points a year earlier. The strong performance of financial stocks mirrors the sector’s continued recovery \nfollowing balance-sheet adjustments undertaken in the aftermath of the Domestic Debt Exchange Programme (DDEP) \nand enhanced earnings performance in the financial system. \n \nMarket capitalisation continued its upward trajectory, increasing to GH¢235,736.20 billion at end-February 2026 from \nGH¢127,820.29 billion in February 2025. This represents a substantial expansion in overall market value, driven \nprimarily by appreciable gains in share prices across both financial and non-financial sectors. The sharp rise in market \ncapitalisation also reflects renewed investor confidence in the equity market, improved corporate performance, and the \nbroader macroeconomic gains achieved during the year. \n \n5.6 Conclusion \nMonetary developments in February 2026 remained relatively tight compared to monetary conditions in the same period \nlast year. Growth in both broad money (M2+) and reserve money moderated sharply in February 2026 relative to the \nelevated levels observed in February 2025, while nominal credit growth moderated over the review period, \nnotwithstanding the pickup in real private sector credit growth over the same comparative period. \n \nIn the money market, short-term interest rates declined on a year-on-year basis, in line with Government’s fiscal \nconsolidation efforts. Policy rate adjustments flowed through the market, with declines in the interbank rate and average \n-30.00\n-20.00\n-10.00\n0.00\n10.00\n20.00\n30.00\n40.00\n50.00\npercent\nChart 5.10: Real Interest Rates and Inflation\nReal MPR\nReal 91 Day T-bill Rate\nReal Interbank Rate\nReal Lending Rate\nReal Deposit Rate\nInflation\n \n28 \n \nPUBLIC \nlending rate easing the cost of financing for firms and households. Notwithstanding the substantial fall in inflation, real \ninterest rates remained positive, reinforcing the Bank’s relatively tight policy stance despite the nominal easing. \n \nActivity on the Ghana Stock Exchange continued to pick up in February 2026, with the GSE Composite Index and GSE \nFinancial Index recording substantial year-on-year gains. Market capitalisation expanded markedly, driven by broad \nshare price appreciation—particularly among financial, IT, and distribution sectors. The recovery in stock valuations \nreflects improved profitability of listed firms, renewed investor confidence, and a stabilising macroeconomic \nenvironment. \n \n \n \n \n29 \n \nPUBLIC \n6. Banking Sector Developments and Macroprudential Risk Assessment \n \n6.0 Highlights \nThe banking sector posted a strong performance during the first two months of 2026, on the back of sustained growth \nin total assets and deposits. The industry’s balance sheet was robust, with growth in assets in February 2026 funded \nprincipally by deposits and other funding sources. The industry was profitable as profit-before-tax (PBT) and profit-\nafter-tax (PAT) for February 2026 was higher compared to profits in February 2025. The Financial Soundness \nIndicators (FSIs) for the banking sector, except for core liquidity and profitability, remained broadly positive with \nimprovements in solvency, efficiency and asset quality indicators in February 2026 relative to February 2025. The \nindustry’s Non-Performing Loans (NPL) improved in February 2026 on account of a higher growth in loans and \nadvances relative to a contraction in the NPL stock. The outlook for the banking sector remains largely stable, dependent \non banks’ adherence to the NPL regulatory guidelines and enforcement of strict credit underwriting standards. \nFinancial intermediation by banks is expected to pick up as monetary policy continues to ease, which can lead to \nexpansion in credit to the private sector as an engine of growth and spur the real sector activities in the domestic \neconomy. \n \n6.1 Banks’ Balance Sheet \nTotal assets of the banking industry grew by 21.0 percent (year-on-year) to GH¢465.4 billion as at February 2026, lower \nthan the 34.0 percent growth recorded in the same period of 2025. Domestic assets picked up by 28.8 percent in February \n2026, from 29.3 percent in February 2025, while foreign assets contracted by 36.9 percent in February 2026 from a \ngrowth of 83.2 percent during the same period a year ago. Consequently, the share of domestic assets improved to 93.8 \npercent from 88.0 percent during the reference period, while the share of foreign assets in total assets declined to 6.2 \npercent in February 2026 from 12.0 percent in a similar period in 2025. \n \nIn terms of components, growth in investments surged significantly in February 2026 relative to February 2025 on \naccount of the pick-up in rates on the money market during the review period. Investments grew by 57.5 percent in \nFebruary 2026 to GH¢192.8 billion, compared to a growth of 8.6 percent recorded in February 2025. The significant \ngrowth in investments reflected in growth in short-term investments, which grew to 130.1 percent in February 2026 \nfrom 1.6 percent in February 2025, on account of the increase in rates on the money market. Long-term investments, \nhowever, contracted by 1.4 percent in February 2026 compared to a growth rate of 14.7 percent in February 2025. \n \nCredit growth slowed in the industry in February 2026. Gross loans and advances grew by 15.6 percent to GH¢108.2 \nbillion at end-February 2026 from 25.2 percent in February 2025. Growth in net loans and advances (gross loans adjusted \nfor provisions and interest in suspense) also decreased to 20.5 percent from 25.3 percent over the same review period. \n \nDeposits remained the main source of funding for the banking sector, growing by 18.0 percent to GH¢338.5 billion as \nat end-February 2026 from GH¢286.9 billion in February 2025, driven mainly by increases in deposits from domestic \nsources. The industry’s shareholders’ funds position (comprising paid-up capital and reserves) continued to improve on \naccount of the strong profit outturn and some recapitalisation efforts of banks. Accordingly, shareholders’ funds grew \nby 44.1 percent to GH¢60.6 billion as at end-February 2026 compared to a 40.0 percent growth in February 2025. \nBorrowings also grew by 40.3 percent to GH¢39.8 billion in February 2026, compared to a growth of 96.0 percent \nrecorded a year earlier. \n \n \n \n \n \n30 \n \nPUBLIC \n \nTable 6.1: Key Developments in DMBs’ Balance Sheet \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n \n \n6.1.1 Asset and Liability Structure \nThe asset structure of the industry’s balance sheet in February 2026 reflected the rebalancing of banks’ portfolio in \nfavour of investments. Consequently, investments (comprising bills, securities, and equity) were the largest component \nof total assets, with its share improving from 31.8 percent to 41.4 percent compared to the same period in 2025, following \na pickup in rates on the money market during the review period. The share of cash and bank balances in total assets, \nhowever, decreased from 38.9 percent in February 2025 to 30.3 percent in February 2026 on account of portfolio \nrebalancing away from less risky assets. Similarly, the proportion of net advances in total assets was stable at 20.0 \npercent from 20.1 percent while the share of non-earning assets (fixed assets and other assets) declined from 9.2 percent \nto 8.4 percent during the review period. \n \nOn the liability side, the share of deposits in banks’ liabilities and shareholders’ funds decreased to 72.7 percent in \nFebruary 2026 from 74.6 percent in February 2025, reflecting the slowdown in deposit growth in 2026. The increase in \nborrowings, however, translated into an increased share of 8.5 percent in February 2026 from 7.4 percent in February \n2025. The proportion of shareholders’ funds in banks’ total funding also improved to 13.1 percent in February 2026 \nfrom 11.0 percent a year earlier, while the share of other liabilities declined from 6.9 percent to 5.5 percent during the \nsame comparative period. \n \n \n \n \n \nFeb-25\nDec-25\nFeb-26\nFeb-25\nDec-25\nFeb-26\nFeb-25\nFeb-26\nTOTAL ASSETS\n384,726.3\n \n446,900.7\n \n465,378.9\n \n34.0\n \n21.5\n \n21.0\n \n100.0\n \n100.0\n \nA. Foreign Assets\n46,029.9\n \n26,464.7\n \n29,029.8\n \n83.2\n \n(41.0)\n \n(36.9)\n \n12.0\n \n6.2\n \nB. Domestic Assets\n338,696.4\n \n420,436.0\n \n436,349.1\n \n29.3\n \n30.2\n \n28.8\n \n88.0\n \n93.8\n \n Investments\n122,401.1\n \n175,444.0\n \n192,801.7\n \n8.6\n \n55.2\n \n57.5\n \n31.8\n \n41.4\n \n i. Bills\n54,493.3\n \n109,333.5\n \n125,411.2\n \n1.6\n \n139.8\n \n130.1\n \n14.2\n \n26.9\n \n ii. Securities\n67,494.3\n \n65,296.4\n \n66,553.4\n \n14.7\n \n(2.7)\n \n(1.4)\n \n17.5\n \n14.3\n \n Advances (Net)\n77,089.5\n \n94,425.4\n \n92,892.8\n \n25.3\n \n19.3\n \n20.5\n \n20.0\n \n20.0\n \n of which Foreign Currency\n23,423.4\n \n20,861.4\n \n21,458.4\n \n7.9\n \n(9.7)\n \n(8.4)\n \n6.1\n \n4.6\n \n Gross Advances\n93,670.3\n \n110,972.7\n \n108,241.9\n \n25.2\n \n16.2\n \n15.6\n \n24.3\n \n23.3\n \n Other Assets\n25,403.4\n \n27,793.9\n \n28,164.0\n \n48.7\n \n16.4\n \n10.9\n \n6.6\n \n6.1\n \n Fixed Assets\n9,484.5\n \n10,639.6\n \n10,544.3\n \n14.3\n \n19.2\n \n11.2\n \n2.5\n \n2.3\n \nTOTAL LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL\n384,726.3\n \n446,900.7\n \n465,378.9\n \n34.0\n \n21.5\n \n21.0\n \n100.0\n \n100.0\n \nTotal Deposits\n286,920.9\n \n325,262.7\n \n338,546.1\n \n27.9\n \n17.8\n \n18.0\n \n74.6\n \n72.7\n \n of which Foreign Currency\n91,510.3\n \n71,597.0\n \n75,036.1\n \n27.0\n \n(16.2)\n \n(18.0)\n \n23.8\n \n16.1\n \nTotal Borrowings\n28,334.1\n \n37,850.3\n \n39,757.6\n \n96.0\n \n35.6\n \n40.3\n \n7.4\n \n8.5\n \n Foreign Liabilities\n6,923.6\n \n4,934.8\n \n4,143.3\n \n3.5\n \n(13.9)\n \n(40.2)\n \n1.8\n \n0.9\n \n i. Short-term borrowings\n2,560.0\n \n2,377.5\n \n1,551.6\n \n13.8\n \n32.1\n \n(39.4)\n \n0.7\n \n0.3\n \n ii. Long-term borrowings\n2,746.0\n \n1,337.3\n \n1,296.5\n \n(27.4)\n \n(52.9)\n \n(52.8)\n \n0.7\n \n0.3\n \n iii. Deposits of non-residents\n1,570.9\n \n1,184.7\n \n1,267.2\n \n138.7\n \n10.0\n \n(19.3)\n \n0.4\n \n0.3\n \n Domestic Liabilities\n335,415.0\n \n383,618.5\n \n400,465.3\n \n34.5\n \n19.1\n \n19.4\n \n87.2\n \n86.1\n \n i. Short-term borrowing\n21,244.1\n \n31,658.0\n \n34,712.2\n \n200.5\n \n46.2\n \n63.4\n \n5.5\n \n7.5\n \n ii. Long-term Borrowings\n1,784.0\n \n2,477.5\n \n2,197.3\n \n31.6\n \n52.7\n \n23.2\n \n0.5\n \n0.5\n \n iii. Domestic Deposits\n285,350.0\n \n324,078.0\n \n337,278.9\n \n27.5\n \n17.8\n \n18.2\n \n74.2\n \n72.5\n \nOther Liabilities\n26,527.9\n \n24,155.0\n \n25,634.0\n \n51.2\n \n4.3\n \n(3.4)\n \n6.9\n \n5.5\n \nPaid-up capital\n17,118.3\n \n21,741.5\n \n21,717.0\n \n31.3\n \n27.0\n \n26.9\n \n4.4\n \n4.7\n \nShareholders' Funds\n42,175.6\n \n58,335.4\n \n60,758.2\n \n40.0\n \n46.3\n \n44.1\n \n11.0\n \n13.1\n \n (GH ¢'million)\nY-on-Y Growth (%)\nShares (%)\nTable 5.1: Key Developments in DMBs' Balance Sheet\n \n31 \n \nPUBLIC \nFigure 6.1: Developments in Banks’ Balance Sheet & Asset Quality \n \n Source: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n6.1.2 Share of Banks’ Investments \nBills (short-term debt instruments) constituted the largest component of banks’ investment portfolio with its share \nincreasing from 44.5 percent in February 2025 to 65.0 percent in February 2026. The share of long-term securities, \nhowever, declined from 55.1 percent in February 2025 to 34.5 percent in February 2026, in line with the contraction in \nits growth recorded during the reference period. Equity investments remained negligible, although their share increased \nmarginally from 0.3 percent in February 2025 to 0.4 percent in February 2026. \n \n6.2 Credit Risk \nThe industry’s asset quality improved in February 2026 relative to February 2025, reflecting a decline in both the non-\nperforming loan (NPL) ratio and the NPL stock during the review period. \n \n \n \n47.6\n44.5\n62.3 \n65.0 \n52.2\n55.1\n37.2 \n34.5 \n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\n50.0\n60.0\n70.0\n80.0\n90.0\n100.0\nFeb-24\nFeb-25\nDec-25\nFeb-26\nComponents of Banks' Investments (% share)\nBills\nSecurities\nShares & Other Equities\n30.2 \n38.9 \n30.9 \n30.3 \n39.3 \n31.8 \n39.3 \n41.4 \n21.4 \n20.1 \n21.1 \n20.0 \n9.1 \n9.2 \n8.7 \n8.4 \n -\n 10.0\n 20.0\n 30.0\n 40.0\n 50.0\n 60.0\n 70.0\n 80.0\n 90.0\n 100.0\nFeb-24\nFeb-25\nDec-25\nFeb-26\nAsset Structure of Banks (%) \nCash and Due from Banks\nInvestments\nNet Advances\nOthers\n78.2 \n74.6 \n72.8 \n72.7 \n5.0 \n7.4 \n8.5 \n8.5 \n10.5 \n11.0 \n13.1 \n13.1 \n6.1 \n6.9 \n5.4 \n5.5 \n -\n 10.0\n 20.0\n 30.0\n 40.0\n 50.0\n 60.0\n 70.0\n 80.0\n 90.0\n 100.0\nFeb-24\nFeb-25\nDec-25\nFeb-26\nLiability Structure of Banks (%)\nTotal Deposits\nTotal Borrowings\nShareholders' Funds\nOther Liabilities\n92.0 \n93.2 \n95.7 \n95.8 \n8.0 \n6.8 \n4.3 \n4.2 \n -\n 20.0\n 40.0\n 60.0\n 80.0\n 100.0\nComponents of Banks' Credit Portfolio (%)\nPrivate sector\nPublic sector\n3.6\n2.9\n11.0\n8.6\n4.0\n25.9\n6.3\n32.6\n5.1\n3.8\n5.3\n11.0\n9.1\n3.1\n23.0\n4.1\n36.7\n3.8\n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\nAgric, Forest. & Fishing\nMining & Quarrying\nManufacturing\nConstruction\nElect., Water & Gas\nCommerce and Finance\nTransp., Stor. & Commu.\nServices\nMiscellaneous\nDistribution of Credit by Sector (%)\nFeb-26\nFeb-25\n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\n50.0\n60.0\nAgric, Forest. & Fishing\nMining & Quarrying\nManufacturing\nConstruction\nElect., Water & Gas\nCommerce and Finance\nTransp., Stor. & Commu.\nServices\nMiscellaneous\n51.6\n11.0\n18.5\n31.7\n14.6\n21.2\n50.3\n17.4\n14.1\n54.7\n10.2\n11.3\n28.8\n3.7\n20.3\n37.8\n13.7\n10.4\nNPL ratio in each Sector (%)\nFeb-26\nFeb-25\n \n32 \n \nPUBLIC \n6.2.1 Credit Portfolio Analysis \nThe stock of gross loans and advances increased by 15.6 percent in February 2026 to GH¢108.2 billion, compared to a \ngrowth of 25.2 percent in February 2025, reflecting increases in private sector credit. Private sector credit (comprising \ncredit to private enterprises and households) grew by 18.7 percent to GH¢103.7 billion in February 2026 compared to a \ngrowth of 26.9 percent in the previous year. However, public sector credit contracted by 27.8 percent to GH¢4.6 billion \nat end-February 2026 after the growth of 6.0 percent in February 2025. Consequently, the share of private sector credit \nin total credit rose to 95.8 percent in February 2026 from 93.2 percent in February 2025, while the share of public sector \ndeclined to 4.2 percent from 6.8 percent a year earlier. \n \nIn terms of the distribution of credit by sectors, the services sector remained the largest beneficiary of the industry’s \ncredit, accounting for a share of 36.7 percent at end-February 2026 (from 32.6 percent in February 2025), followed by \nthe commerce and finance sector with a share of 23.0 percent (from 25.9 percent in February 2025). The share for the \nmanufacturing sector remained at 11.0 over the period. These three sectors constituted 70.8 percent of total credit in \nFebruary 2026, compared with 69.5 percent in February 2025. The electricity, water and gas sector was the lowest \nrecipient of total credit with a share of 3.1 percent in February 2026, compared to 4.0 percent recorded a year earlier. \n \n6.2.2 Off-Balance Sheet Activities \nOff-balance sheet transactions (largely trade finance and guarantees) declined during the review period. Banks’ \ncontingent liabilities contracted by 13.0 percent to GH¢20.4 billion as at end-February 2026, from GH¢23.4 billion as \nat end-February 2025 (y/y growth of 0.3 percent). In relative terms, contingent liabilities as a percentage of total \nliabilities also declined to 5.0 percent in February 2026 from 6.8 percent in February 2025. \n \n6.2.3 Asset Quality \nAsset quality risks remained elevated in February 2026, even though the industry’s NPL ratio declined to 18.4 percent \nin February 2026 from 22.6 percent in February 2025. Similarly, the NPL ratio adjusted for the fully provisioned loan \nloss category declined from 8.9 percent to 5.4 percent during the same comparative period. The NPL stock also \ncontracted by 5.8 percent to GH¢19.9 billion in February 2026 compared with a growth of 14.9 percent recorded in \nFebruary 2025. \n \nDecomposition of the NPL showed that the private sector accounted for the most non-performing loans, in line with its \ndominant holdings in total credit. The proportion of NPLs attributable to the private sector increased to 98.1 percent in \nFebruary 2026 from 96.2 percent in February 2025, while that of the public sector declined to 1.9 percent from 3.8 \npercent a year earlier. \n \nThe decline in the industry NPL ratio year-on-year reflected improvements in asset quality across all but the agriculture, \nforestry and fishing sector during the review period. Accordingly, the NPL ratio in the agriculture, forestry and fishing \nsector increased from 51.6 percent to 54.7 percent during the review period. All other sectors recorded improvements in \nasset quality during the review period. \n \n6.3 Financial Soundness Indicators \nThe financial soundness indicators in February 2026 were broadly positive following improvements in solvency, \nefficiency, and asset quality indicators. Liquidity and profitability indicators, however, moderated during the review \nperiod. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n33 \n \nPUBLIC \nFigure 6.2: Key Financial Soundness Indicators \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n \n6.3.1 Liquidity Indicators \nThe industry’s liquidity position remained strong in February 2026; however, performance across liquidity indicators \nwas uneven, with a notable divergence between core liquidity and broad liquidity measures. This suggests that while \naggregate funding capacity remains adequate, underlying structural liquidity dynamics may require closer monitoring \nto ensure sustained short-term resilience. Core liquidity declined in February 2026 as industry players decreased their \ncash and bank holdings, while broad liquidity increased due to the surge in investments. The ratio of core liquid assets \n(mainly cash and due from banks) to total deposits decreased from 52.1 percent at end-February 2025 to 41.6 percent in \nFebruary 2026, while the ratio of core liquid assets to total assets also decreased from 38.9 percent to 30.3 percent over \nthe same comparative period. However, the ratio of broad liquid assets to total deposits increased from 94.6 percent to \n98.3 percent while the ratio of broad liquid assets to total assets increased to 71.5 percent from 70.6 percent during the \nreview period. \n \n6.3.2 Capital Adequacy Ratio \nThe industry’s solvency position, measured by the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR), stood at 18.6 percent in February \n2026, up from 12.1 percent a year earlier and above the prudential minimum of 13 percent. This improvement in the \nsolvency of the banking sector was due to the recapitalisation efforts by undercapitalised banks. \n \n6.3.3 Profitability \nProfitability of the banking sector as at end-February 2026 increased relative to the outturn as at end- February 2025. \nThe industry recorded profit-after-tax (PAT) of GH¢2.5 billion as at end-February 2026 compared to GH¢2.0 billion in \nthe same period a year earlier. As a result, growth in PAT increased to 24.1 percent in February 2026 from 23.1 percent \nin the previous year. Similarly, profit-before-tax (PBT) recorded a growth of 21.0 percent in February 2026 relative to \na growth of 20.7 percent in February 2025. \n2.0\n1.7\n9.7\n1.5\n1.4\n1.1\n6.4\n1.0\n0.0\n2.0\n4.0\n6.0\n8.0\n10.0\n12.0\n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\n50.0\n60.0\n70.0\n80.0\n90.0\nFeb-24\nFeb-25\nDec-25\nFeb-26\nEfficiency Indicators (%)\nCost to income\nOperational Cost to gross income\nCost to total assets (RHS)\nOperational Cost to total assets (RHS)\n32.7\n28.5\n30.8\n24.3\n5.2\n4.7\n5.7\n4.6\n -\n 5.0\n 10.0\n 15.0\n 20.0\n 25.0\n 30.0\n 35.0\nFeb-24\nFeb-25\nDec-25\nFeb-26\nProfitability (%)\nReturn On Equity (%) after tax\nReturn On Assets (%) before tax\n9.8 \n8.9 \n5.0 \n5.4 \n24.6 \n22.6 \n18.9 \n18.4 \n -\n 5.0\n 10.0\n 15.0\n 20.0\n 25.0\n 30.0\n -\n 5,000.0\n 10,000.0\n 15,000.0\n 20,000.0\n 25,000.0\nFeb-24\nFeb-25\nDec-25\nFeb-26\nAsset Quality\nSUB-STD (GH¢m)\nDOUBTFUL (GH¢m)\nLOSS (GH¢m)\nAdjusted NPL Ratio (%)\nNPL Ratio (% Right Axis)\n47.5 \n46.3 \n44.1 \n43.9 \n13.9 \n14.0 \n17.9 \n17.5 \n8.7 \n12.1 \n17.5 \n18.6 \n 10.0\n 20.0\n 30.0\n 40.0\n 50.0\n 60.0\n -\n 2.0\n 4.0\n 6.0\n 8.0\n 10.0\n 12.0\n 14.0\n 16.0\n 18.0\n 20.0\n Feb-24\n Feb-25\n Dec-25\n Feb-26\nSolvency (%)\n RWA/Total Assets\nCAR (with Reliefs)\n CAR\n \n34 \n \nPUBLIC \n \nExcept for other income, which recorded a higher growth rate in 2026 relative to 2025, all income lines grew in February \n2026, but at a slower pace compared to the same period last year. Growth in net interest income was lower at 6.2 percent \nin 2026 from 11.0 percent in 2025, reflecting the decline in growth in interest income, which was due to the decline in \nlending rates and rates on money market instruments during the review period. Fees and commissions, however, \ncontracted by 0.6 percent in 2026 relative to a growth of 35.8 percent in 2025. \n \nSimilar declines in growth in cost lines outweighed the impact of the decline in growth in income lines on the bottom \nline. The industry’s operating expenses grew by 6.1 percent in February 2026, compared to 24.7 percent in 2025, \nreflecting the moderation in growth in staff costs and non-staff related expenses. Provisions for depreciation, bad debt, \nand impairment losses on financial assets also grew by 43.4 percent in February 2026 compared to the 55.5 percent \ncontraction recorded in February 2025. \n \nFigure 6.3: Composition of Income, Cost and Borrowing \n \n Source: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n(a) Return on Assets and Return on Equity \nProfitability indicators for the banking sector declined in February 2026. The sector’s Return on Assets (ROA) declined \nmarginally to 4.6 percent in February 2026 from 4.7 percent in February 2025. In addition, banks’ Return on Equity \n(ROE) decreased to 24.3 percent in February 2026 from 28.5 percent in February. \n \n(b) Interest Margin and Spread \nInterest spread for the industry narrowed from 2.0 percent in February 2025 to 1.5 percent in February 2026. The \ndecrease in spread resulted from the marginal decline in interest payable to 0.7 percent from 0.9 percent a year earlier. \nGross yields also declined to 2.2 percent in February 2026 compared to 2.8 percent a year ago. The ratio of gross income \nto total assets (asset utilisation) also dropped from 2.2 percent to 2.0 percent, whereas the profitability ratio recorded an \nincrease from 23.3 percent in February 2025 to 26.2 percent in February 2026. \n33.2\n34.8\n34.4\n32.0\n41.7\n46.2\n43.6\n46.2\n10.7\n4.2\n3.8\n5.7\n14.4\n14.8\n18.2\n16.0\n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\n50.0\n60.0\n70.0\n80.0\n90.0\n100.0\nComposition of Cost (%)\nInterest Expense\nOperating Expense\nTotal Provision\nTax\n42.6\n42.7\n47.1\n44.3\n37.0\n35.7\n29.2\n29.2\n10.6\n12.5\n10.6\n11.3\n9.9\n9.1\n13.0\n15.2\n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\n50.0\n60.0\n70.0\n80.0\n90.0\n100.0\nComposition of Banks' Income (%)\nInvestments\nLoans\nFees & Commissions\nOther Income\n54.7\n58.3\n81.3\n90.2\n92.8\n45.3\n41.7\n18.7\n9.8\n7.2\n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\n50.0\n60.0\n70.0\n80.0\n90.0\n100.0\nFeb-23\nFeb-24\nFeb-25\nDec-25\nFeb-26\nBanks' Borrowing by Source (% of Total)\n Domestic Borrowing\n Foreign Borrowing\n28.5\n37.3\n48.2\n64.0\n54.5\n71.5\n62.7\n51.8\n36.0\n45.5\n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\n50.0\n60.0\n70.0\n80.0\n90.0\n100.0\nFeb-23\nFeb-24\nFeb-25\nDec-25\nFeb-26\nBanks' External Borrowing by Maturity (% of \nTotal)\nShort-term borrowings\nLong term borrowings\n \n35 \n \nPUBLIC \n(c) Composition of Banks’ Income \nInterest income from investments continued to be the largest component of banks’ total income in February 2026, with \nits share increasing from 42.7 percent to 44.3 percent during the review period. The share of interest income from loans \ndeclined from 35.7 percent to 29.2 percent. The share of banks’ income from fees and commissions, likewise, decreased \nfrom 12.5 percent to 11.3 percent, while the share of income from other sources increased from 9.1 percent to 15.2 \npercent during the same reference period. \n \n6.3.4 Operational Efficiency \nThe banking sector was relatively cost-efficient as a result of the slowdown in the growth of operating expenses during \nthe period under review. The cost-to-income ratio fell from 76.7 percent in February 2025 to 73.8 percent in February \n2026, while the cost-to-total assets ratio also declined marginally from 1.7 percent to 1.5 percent. The operational cost \nto gross income ratio increased marginally from 50.0 percent to 50.1 percent, whereas the operational cost to total asset \nratio improved from 1.1 percent to 1.0 percent over the same comparative period. \n \n6.3.5 Banks’ Counterparty Relationships \nTotal offshore balances contracted by 35.8 percent to GH¢27.0 billion in February 2026, compared to the 102.6 percent \ngrowth recorded in the previous year. This was largely driven by contractions in nostro balances and placements. Nostro \nbalances contracted by 46.4 percent in February 2026 compared with a growth of 89.9 percent in February 2025. Growth \nin industry placements also contracted by 28.1 percent in February 2026 compared to the growth of 113.6 percent during \nthe same period last year. Consequently, the ratio of offshore balances to net worth decreased significantly to 44.4 \npercent in February 2026 from 99.8 percent in February 2025. \n \nThe share of banks’ external borrowings in total borrowings declined to 7.2 percent in February 2026 from 18.7 percent \nin February 2025, while the share of domestic borrowings increased to 92.8 percent from 81.3 percent in February 2025. \nBanks’ external borrowings were largely short-term in nature, as the share of short-term borrowings in total external \nborrowings increased to 54.5 percent, from 48.2 percent, while the share of long-term borrowings declined to 45.5 \npercent, from 51.8 percent a year earlier. \n \n6.4 Credit Conditions Survey \nBanks reported a net tightening in the stance on loans to corporates in the February 2026 Credit Conditions Survey round \ncompared to the December 2025 survey round. The net tightening in the overall credit stance to corporates was due to a \nnet tightening stance on all sub-categories except for small and medium enterprises. Banks project the overall stance on \nloans to corporates to ease in the next two months of 2026 from a projected net ease in the stance on all sub-categories. \n \nThe stance on loans to households, however, eased during the first two months of 2026. The net easing in the overall \ncredit stance to households was due to the eased stance on loans for house purchases, consumer credit and other lending. \nBanks projected a further easing in the overall stance on household loans in the next two months, driven by an easing in \nthe stance on loans for consumer credit and other lending. \n \nThe February 2026 survey round pointed to a softening in the overall demand for credit by corporates, which reflected \nin increases in demand for loans for all sub-categories. Credit demand by corporates is, however, projected to be stronger \nin March and April 2026. \n \nBanks reported an increase in the demand for loans by households in the first two months of 2026, driven by increases \nin demand for loans for house purchases as well as consumer credit. Demand for household loans is projected to pick \nup further in the next two months of 2026. \n \n \n \n36 \n \nPUBLIC \nFigure 6.4: Credit Conditions Survey Results \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n6.5 Macroprudential Risk Assessment \n \nCredit-to-GDP3 \nThe Credit-to-GDP4 gap widened slightly in February 2026 relative to the level reported at the previous MPC meeting, \nthough it remains negative. This negative gap indicates limited systemic vulnerabilities from excessive credit growth \nand supports a measured expansion of credit, underpinned by improving macroeconomic conditions and prudent credit \nrisk management. \n \nFigure 6.6: Credit-to-GDP Gap \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n \n3 The Credit-to-GDP gap is an early warning signal that measures excessive credit growth by comparing the private sector credit-to-GDP ratio to its optimal trend. \nA positive gap signals that credit levels have surpassed their sustainable or optimal trend, highlighting potential risks of credit overheating in the economy. \n4 The Credit-to-GDP gap is an early warning signal that measures excessive credit growth by comparing the private sector credit-to-GDP ratio to its optimal trend. \nA positive gap signals that credit levels have surpassed their sustainable or optimal trend, highlighting potential risks of credit overheating in the economy. \n (30.00)\n (20.00)\n (10.00)\n -\n 10.00\n 20.00\n 30.00\n 40.00\n 50.00\n 60.00\nNPR (%)\n Loans for house purchase\n Consumer credit and other lending\n Overall stance to Households\nHouseholds\nIndex, a rise denotes \ntightening\n (30.00)\n (20.00)\n (10.00)\n -\n 10.00\n 20.00\n 30.00\n 40.00\n 50.00\nNPR (%)\n Loans for house purchase\n Loans for consumer credit\n Overall Household demand for loans\nHouseholds\nIndex, a rise denotes \nincrease in demand\n (20.00)\n (15.00)\n (10.00)\n (5.00)\n -\n 5.00\n 10.00\n 15.00\n 20.00\n 25.00\nNPR (%)\n Small and Medium Enterprises\n Large Enterprises\n Overall Credit Stance for Enterprises\n Short term enterprise loans\n Long term enterprise loans\nIndex, a rise \ndenotes tightening\nCorporates\n-30.00\n-20.00\n-10.00\n0.00\n10.00\n20.00\n30.00\n40.00\nNPR (%)\n Overall Demand for credit\n Small and Medium Enterprises\n Large Enterprises\n Short term\n Long term\nIndex, a rise denotes \nincrease in demand\nCorporates\n (5.00)\n (4.00)\n (3.00)\n (2.00)\n (1.00)\n -\n 1.00\n 2.00\n 3.00\n2008Q1\n2008Q4\n2009Q3\n2010Q2\n2011Q1\n2011Q4\n2012Q3\n2013Q2\n2014Q1\n2014Q4\n2015Q3\n2016Q2\n2017Q1\n2017Q4\n2018Q3\n2019Q2\n2020Q1\n2020Q4\n2021Q3\n2022Q2\n2023Q1\n2023Q4\n2024Q3\n2025Q2\n2026Q1\n CTGDP_GAP\nLOWER_THRESHOLD\n \n37 \n \nPUBLIC \nBanking Sector Soundness Index (BSSI)5 \nThe banking sector’s soundness improved year-on-year and strengthened relative to the level reported at the previous \nMPC. This reflects marked moderation in financial stability risks relative to the preceding year. The moderation in risks \nstems from improvements in solvency, asset quality, sustained profitability, adequate liquidity, and efficiency. \nAccordingly, the Banking Sector Soundness Index (BSSI)6, which tracks soundness of the industry, trended upward \nsignificantly in February 2026 compared to February 2025. The observed improvement was driven by increased \nrecapitalisation, a slowdown in the build-up of non-performing loans, sound credit and liquidity risks management, \nanchored on improved corporate governance systems and the sustained recovery in macroeconomic fundamentals. The \noutlook of the banking sector remains positive, underpinned by a favourable macroeconomic environment, enhanced \nsupervision, improved capital buffers, sustained earnings, and further strengthening of risk management systems. \n \nFigure 6.7: Banking Sector Soundness Index (BSSI) \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n \n \nFSI Heatmap7 \nThe heatmap of financial soundness indicators continued to show a sound banking sector. The heatmap showed that the \nbanking sector remains well-capitalised, profitable, cost-efficient, and liquid as at end-February 2026. Asset quality \nmeasures have improved over the same period (now the 3rd-best performing period); however, NPLs remain elevated, \nand the enforcement of prudential NPL-reduction measures is expected to help banks reduce NPLs amid improving \nmacroeconomic outcomes. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n5 The BSSI is a composite index that combines a set of financial soundness indicators relating to capital adequacy, asset quality, management efficiency, earnings, \nand liquidity. An upward-trending BSSI connotes a general improvement in the performance of the banking system. \n6 The BSSI is a composite index that combines a set of financial soundness indicators relating to capital adequacy, asset quality, management efficiency, earnings, \nand liquidity. An upward-trending BSSI connotes a general improvement in the performance of the banking system. \n7 The heat map is a quartile-based analysis that reflects the performance of the banking system over a period of time (using monthly \ndata), starting from January 2007 to date. \n \n0.000\n0.200\n0.400\n0.600\n0.800\nFeb-07\nFeb-08\nFeb-09\nFeb-10\nFeb-11\nFeb-12\nFeb-13\nFeb-14\nFeb-15\nFeb-16\nFeb-17\nFeb-18\nFeb-19\nFeb-20\nFeb-21\nFeb-22\nFeb-23\nFeb-24\nFeb-25\nFeb-26\nBSSI and its Long-term trend\nCore BSSI\nLong-term trend\nMean\n \n38 \n \nPUBLIC \nTable 6.2: Heatmap \n \n \nColor Code \nGreen \nBlue \nYellow \nRed \nPerforming Period \n1st Best \n2nd Best \n3rd Best \n4th Best \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n \nSystemic Risk Survey- January 2026 \nThe Bank of Ghana conducts a Systemic Risk Survey (SRS) of banks to assess their perception of risks to, and level of \nconfidence in, the financial system. The SRS is a semi-annual survey aimed at tracking banks’ perception of financial \nstability risks in a forward-looking manner. The results of the survey conducted in January 2026 suggest that banks \nexpect risks to banking sector soundness and macroeconomic stability to moderate further over the next one year. In the \noutlook, banks expect risks to soundness to moderate, driven by perceived improvements in liquidity, asset quality and \nsolvency conditions. However, risks emanating from earnings are perceived to be high in the near to medium term, \ndriven mainly by the current low-interest-rate environment. \n \nFigure 6.8: Decomposition of the Overall FSI Risk Index- 1year ahead \n \n \nFSIs\nDec-22\nFeb-23 Dec-23 Feb-24 Mar-24 Jun-24 Sep-24 Dec-24 Feb-25 Mar-25 Jun-25\nSep-25\nDec-25 Feb-26\nCapital Adequacy\nRegulatory capital to risk weighted assets (Threshold)\n15.44\n \n12.60\n \n13.87\n \n13.58\n \n15.88\n \n14.27\n \n14.38\n \n14.00\n \n14.35\n \n17.10\n \n19.29\n \n17.52\n \n17.51\n \n18.65\n \nRegulatory capital to risk weighted assets (Distribution)\n15.44\n \n12.60\n \n13.87\n \n13.58\n \n15.88\n \n14.27\n \n14.38\n \n14.00\n \n14.35\n \n17.10\n \n19.29\n \n17.52\n \n17.51\n \n18.65\n \nRegulatory tier I capital to risk-weighted assets\n14.25\n \n10.74\n \n11.04\n \n11.03\n \n13.56\n \n11.46\n \n11.51\n \n11.13\n \n11.74\n \n14.89\n \n16.62\n \n14.75\n \n15.58\n \n16.90\n \nAsset Quality\nNonperforming loans net of loan-loss provision to capital\n10.32\n \n8.48\n \n14.55\n \n17.09\n \n19.45\n \n15.36\n \n12.29\n \n11.10\n \n10.82\n \n11.98\n \n8.32\n \n8.32\n \n7.62\n \n7.51\n \nNonperforming loans to total gross loans\n16.59\n \n16.56\n \n20.58\n \n24.61\n \n26.74\n \n24.13\n \n22.77\n \n21.79\n \n22.57\n \n23.44\n \n23.09\n \n20.43\n \n18.92\n \n18.40\n \nBanks provisions to NPL\n83.58\n \n84.41\n \n73.19\n \n72.03\n \n71.70\n \n75.66\n \n78.35\n \n78.74\n \n78.42\n \n76.67\n \n80.73\n \n79.10\n \n78.82\n \n77.08\n \nEarnings\nReturn on assets\n(3.83)\n \n5.07\n \n5.37\n \n5.20\n \n5.63\n \n5.40\n \n5.05\n \n5.04\n \n4.67\n \n4.96\n \n5.61\n \n5.70\n \n5.66\n \n4.62\n \nReturn on equity\n(25.48)\n \n32.39\n \n34.16\n \n32.72\n \n36.36\n \n35.25\n \n32.12\n \n30.84\n \n28.51\n \n29.92\n \n32.21\n \n31.61\n \n30.81\n \n24.27\n \nInterest margin to gross income\n47.82\n \n46.38\n \n51.80\n \n53.58\n \n54.23\n \n51.41\n \n51.10\n \n50.92\n \n51.72\n \n51.82\n \n50.11\n \n50.16\n \n50.75\n \n49.85\n \nLiquidity\nCore liquid assets to total assets\n27.53\n \n26.65\n \n29.34\n \n29.22\n \n31.00\n \n34.47\n \n35.39\n \n36.16\n \n37.41\n \n36.24\n \n27.50\n \n27.22\n \n28.78\n \n29.53\n \nCore liquid assets to short-term liabilities\n33.21\n \n32.79\n \n35.47\n \n35.40\n \n37.34\n \n41.39\n \n42.54\n \n43.31\n \n45.23\n \n43.47\n \n33.68\n \n33.00\n \n35.29\n \n36.14\n \nCore liquid assets to total deposits\n36.47\n \n35.35\n \n37.61\n \n37.37\n \n40.06\n \n45.31\n \n46.82\n \n48.16\n \n50.15\n \n48.20\n \n37.73\n \n37.65\n \n39.54\n \n40.60\n \nBroad liquid assets to total assets \n59.45\n \n62.47\n \n65.72\n \n68.40\n \n68.38\n \n67.55\n \n67.58\n \n66.87\n \n69.08\n \n69.44\n \n69.67\n \n69.65\n \n67.85\n \n70.78\n \nBroad liquid assets to short-term liabilities\n71.71\n \n76.87\n \n79.46\n \n82.88\n \n82.34\n \n81.10\n \n81.23\n \n80.09\n \n83.53\n \n83.30\n \n85.31\n \n84.46\n \n83.20\n \n86.61\n \nEfficiency\nNoninterest expenses to gross income\n97.04\n \n43.64\n \n43.04\n \n41.01\n \n38.86\n \n37.65\n \n39.43\n \n40.83\n \n38.63\n \n37.78\n \n35.70\n \n34.98\n \n35.20\n \n38.29\n \nPersonnel expenses to gross income\n16.45\n \n15.03\n \n15.67\n \n16.27\n \n16.19\n \n16.62\n \n16.67\n \n16.45\n \n18.21\n \n17.25\n \n16.71\n \n16.78\n \n17.11\n \n18.92\n \n-2.00\n-1.50\n-1.00\n-0.50\n0.00\n0.50\n1.00\n1.50\n2.00\n2.50\nJan-23\nJul-23\nJan-24\nJul-24\nJan-25\nJul-25\nJan-26\nSolvency Risk\nAsset Quality Risk\nExpense/Efficiency Risk\nEarnings Risk\nLiquidity Risk\nFSI Index\n \n39 \n \nPUBLIC \n \nGenerally, the perception of the likelihood and impact of risks emanating from the macroeconomy is expected to \nmoderate in the near to medium term. Additionally, banks are largely optimistic about the stability of the financial \nsystem in the near to medium term. \n \nFigure 6.9: Perceived Likelihood of Occurrence vis-à-vis Greatest Impact of Risks \n \n \n \n6.6 Conclusion and Outlook \nThe banking sector’s performance in the first two months of 2026 reaffirmed its resilience amid improving macro-\nfinancial conditions. Growth in assets improved in February 2026 relative to February 2025, driven principally by strong \ngrowth in both deposits and other funding sources. Robust asset growth, predominantly due to a pickup in investment \nholdings, reflected a cautious portfolio rebalancing strategy in response to credit risk considerations. Financial soundness \nindicators generally improved year-on-year, except for core liquidity, which warrants close monitoring given its potential \nimplications for short-term funding stability. The industry’s solvency position improved in February 2026 relative to \nFebruary 2025, with the industry Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) improving due to recapitalisation of the sector as well \nas sustained profitability in the industry. Although the NPL ratio moderated, asset quality concerns remain, representing \nan upside risk to the banking sector. Overall, the industry’s outlook remains stable, conditional on the recapitalisation \nof the sector by the end of March 2026, as well as the implementation of Bank of Ghana’s NPL regulatory guidelines to \naddress asset quality concerns in the sector. \n \nThe macroprudential risk assessment shows that, generally, risks to financial stability have moderated. The negative \ncredit-to-GDP gap supports measures designed to improve credit delivery, without significant risk build-up, provided \nbanks maintain sound credit risk management practices and systems. Systemic risks within the sector have remained \nbroadly subdued due to the strong solvency and earnings positions of banks supported by adequate liquidity \nconditions. There has been a continuous, gradual improvement in key asset quality indicators, suggesting that credit \nrisk management has improved, though NPLs remain elevated. The banking sector appears well-positioned to contain \nrisks from potential adverse macroeconomic shocks in the outlook. \n \n \n \n \n40 \n \nPUBLIC \n7. Price Developments \n \n7.0 Highlights \nHeadline inflation continued its downward trend, reflecting broad-based declines across both food and non-food \ncomponents of the consumer price index (CPI). This disinflation has been primarily driven by tight monetary policy \nstance, ongoing fiscal consolidation measures, and the strong recovery of the cedi. In the outlook, inflation is projected \nto converge into the medium-term target band of 8 percent ± 2. \n \n7.1 Domestic Price Developments \nHeadline inflation continued its downward trend, declining to 3.8 percent in January 2026 from 5.4 percent in December \n2025, and further declining to 3.3 percent in February 2026. This outturn marked a consecutive fourteen-month decline \nin headline inflation. \nOn the back of a bumper harvest, food inflation declined to 3.9 percent in January 2026 from 4.9 percent in December \n2025. Non-food inflation also moderated on the back of a tight policy stance to 3.9 percent in January 2026 from 5.8 \npercent in December 2025. In February, however, it edged up slightly to 4.0 percent on the back of increasing utility \ncosts. Despite the uptick, the Bank’s core inflation measure, which excludes energy and utility items, continued to \ndecline. Core inflation declined from 4.6 percent in December 2025 to 3.4 percent in January 2026 and 3.1 percent in \nFebruary 2026. \n \nFigure 7.1: Year-on-Year Inflation \n \nSource: GSS and Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \nOn a month-on month basis, headline inflation declined from 0.9 percent in December 2025 to 0.2 percent in January \n2026 but picked up in February 2026 to 0.8 percent. Monthly food inflation followed a downward trend, declining from \n4.9 percent in December 2025 to 3.9 percent in January 2026 and further to 2.4 percent in February 2026. Monthly non-\nfood inflation, however, fell from 5.8 percent in December 2025 to 3.9 percent in January 2026, but increased slightly \nto 4.0 percent in February 2026. \n \n \n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\nFeb-23\nApr-23\nJun-23\nAug-23\nOct-23\nDec-23\nFeb-24\nApr-24\nJun-24\nAug-24\nOct-24\nDec-24\nFeb-25\nApr-25\nJun-25\nAug-25\nOct-25\nDec-25\nFeb-26\nYear on Year Inflation\nHeadline\nLower Band\nUpper Band\n \n41 \n \nPUBLIC \nFigure 7.2: Headline vs Core Inflation (%) \n \nSource: GSS and Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \nFigure 7.3: Month-on-Month Inflation (%) \n \nSource: Ghana Statistical Service \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\nFeb-24\nMar-24\nApr-24\nMay-24\nJun-24\nJul-24\nAug-24\nSep-24\nOct-24\nNov-24\nDec-24\nJan-25\nFeb-25\nMar-25\nApr-25\nMay-25\nJun-25\nJul-25\nAug-25\nSep-25\nOct-25\nNov-25\nDec-25\nJan-26\nFeb-26\nHeadline vs Core Inflation (%)\nCore 1 (Excluding Fuel, and Utilities)\nHeadline Inflation\n-3\n-2\n-1\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\nFeb-\n24\nMar-\n24\nApr-\n24\nMay\n-24\nJun-\n24\nJul-\n24\nAug-\n24\nSep-\n24\nOct-\n24\nNov-\n24\nDec\n-24\nJan-\n25\nFeb-\n25\nMar-\n25\nApr-\n25\nMay\n-25\nJun-\n25\nJul-\n25\nAug-\n25\nSep-\n25\nOct-\n25\nNov-\n25\nDec\n-25\nJan-\n26\nFeb-\n26\nHeadline\n1.6\n0.8\n1.8\n3.2\n2.9\n2.1\n-0.7\n2.8\n0.9\n2.6\n1.8\n1.7\n1.3\n0.2\n0.8\n0.7\n-1.2\n0.7\n-1.3\n0.9\n-0.4\n0.9\n0.9\n0.2\n0.8\nFood\n1.9\n1.0\n2.1\n2.7\n5.1\n1.7\n-2.2\n4.2\n0.3\n3.8\n2.8\n2.0\n1.8\n-0.2\n0.9\n0.9\n-0.5\n0.6\n-2.5\n0.6\n-0.9\n1.1\n1.1\n1.1\n0.2\nNon-food\n1.3\n0.7\n1.5\n3.6\n0.9\n2.4\n0.7\n1.6\n1.3\n1.5\n0.9\n1.4\n1.1\n0.4\n0.7\n0.6\n-1.8\n0.7\n-0.1\n1.1 0.04 0.8\n0.6\n-0.4\n1.2\nMonthly Inflation\n \n42 \n \nPUBLIC \nTable 7.1: CPI Components \n \n \n7.2 Inflation Risk Assessment and Outlook \nIn the outlook, headline inflation is expected to return to the medium-term target of 8 ± 2 percent, barring any shocks. \nUpside risks from geopolitical tensions in the Middle East, however, remain significant, highlighting the importance of \nmaintaining an appropriate monetary stance going forward. \n \n \nDecision on the Monetary Policy Rate \nThe Committee observed a marked improvement in macroeconomic conditions, with inflation expectations broadly \nanchored, strengthened external buffers, and renewed confidence in the economy. They further noted that headline \ninflation is expected to trend below the midpoint of the medium-term target of 8 ± 2 percent in the first quarter of 2026. \nLooking ahead, the Committee noted that upward adjustments in utility tariffs and geopolitical tensions could exert some \nupside risks to the inflation outlook. Notwithstanding this, the maintenance of an appropriate monetary policy stance, \nstrong sterilisation efforts, ongoing fiscal consolidation, and adequate reserve buffers was expected to steer inflation \nback to the medium-term target of 8 ± 2. \n \nGiven these considerations, the Committee, in a majority decision, voted to lower the Monetary Policy Rate by 150 basis \npoints to 14 percent. Looking ahead, the Committee noted that they will continue to assess incoming data and take \nappropriate policy decisions, as needed, to reinforce the disinflation trend. \n \n \n \nWeghts\nDec\nDec\nJan\nFeb\nMar\nJun\nSep\nOct\nNov\nDec\nJan\nFeb\n(%)\nOverall \n100.0\n23.2\n23.8\n23.5\n23.1\n22.4\n13.7\n9.4\n8.0\n6.3\n5.4\n3.8\n3.3\nFood and Beverages\n42.7\n28.7\n27.8\n28.6\n28.1\n26.5\n16.3\n10.8\n9.5\n6.6\n4.9\n3.9\n2.4\nNon-food\n57.4\n18.7\n20.3\n19.2\n18.8\n18.7\n11.4\n8.2\n6.8\n6.1\n5.8\n3.9\n4.0\nAlcoholic Beverages, Tobacco & Narcotics\n3.9\n38.2\n28.4\n27.2\n25.6\n23.8\n16.0\n15.4\n10.4\n7.9\n8.7\n2.4\n3.3\nClothing and footwear\n8.0\n22.3\n20.0\n19.8\n19.2\n19.3\n17.2\n11.0\n9.5\n9.9\n9.9\n4.8\n4.0\nHousing and Utilities\n10.2\n19.5\n26.3\n24.6\n24.3\n25.1\n24.9\n15.8\n13.9\n13.2\n11.8\n9.3\n12.6\nFurnishings, Household Equipment\n3.2\n26.9\n16.7\n15.3\n15.4\n15.3\n10.5\n8.7\n6.4\n5.7\n5.3\n4.3\n3.3\nHealth\n0.7\n23.0\n21.4\n18.4\n16.6\n16.8\n11.3\n7.8\n6.2\n6.0\n6.1\n4.9\n4.2\nTransport\n10.5\n4.4\n16.8\n16.9\n17.9\n16.8\n-8.5\n-3.9\n-4.0\n-4.8\n-5.0\n-5.9\n-7.5\nInformation and Communication\n3.6\n14.2\n12.0\n11.6\n10.8\n10.8\n10.4\n3.1\n3.3\n3.0\n2.6\n2.4\n0.8\nRecreation & Culture\n3.5\n24.9\n17.4\n17.4\n16.5\n20.7\n20.1\n16.6\n15.1\n12.8\n12.7\n10.7\n10.3\nEducation\n6.6\n13.9\n19.1\n13.9\n12.3\n11.3\n6.0\n4.5\n4.3\n3.9\n3.8\n4.1\n7.1\nRestaurants and accommodation services\n4.3\n28.0\n16.5\n16.5\n14.2\n13.3\n9.6\n7.8\n7.4\n6.8\n7.0\n5.5\n6.2\nInsurance and Financial services\n0.4\n8.1\n16.5\n15.4\n16.1\n16.6\n15.9\n6.6\n2.8\n2.7\n3.6\n8.0\n8.8\nPersonal care, social protection & Miscellaneous services\n2.5\n31.1\n19.3\n17.9\n17.1\n17.4\n11.4\n9.6\n7.4\n9.7\n8.3\n4.8\n3.8\n2023\nCPI Components (%)\n2024\n2025\n2026\nSource: Ghana Statistical Service\n \n43 \n \nPUBLIC \nAPPENDIX \n \nTable A.1: Fiscal Indicators \n \n \n \n \nTable A.2: Key Monetary and Financial Indicators \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n \n \nIn GH¢ unless otherwise stated\n2024\n2025\n2025\n2025\nProv\nBudget\nProv\nProg\nOutturn\nRevised\nOutturn\nQ1-Q4\nTotal Revenue & Grants\n186,593.3\n229,949.7\n224,883.7\n229,949.7\n-2.2\n20.5\n (per cent of GDP)\n15.9\n16.4\n16.1\n16.4\nTotal Expenditure (Commitment)\n226,243.5\n269,496.1\n233,778.8\n269,496.1\n-13.3\n3.3\n (percent of GDP)\n14.3\n14.1\n13.1\n14.1\nOverall Balance (Commitment)\n-92,647.2\n-39,546.3\n-13,856.3\n-39,546.3\n-65.0\n-85.0\n(percent of GDP)\n-7.9\n-2.8\n-1.0\n-2.8\nPrimary Balance (Commitment)\n-45,855.0\n20,319.8\n36,034.8\n20,319.8\n77.3\n-178.6\n (percent of GDP)\n-3.9\n1.5\n2.6\n1.5\nArrears clearance (net change)\n31,236.6\n-13,067.6\n-29,543.7\n-13,067.6\n126.1\n-194.6\no/w Clearance of Arrears/BTAs\n-36,279.5\n-13,067.6\n-18,067.6\n-13,067.6\no/w Clearance Energy Sector Related Arrears\n0.00\n0.00\n-11,476.1\n0.00\no/w Payables build-up\n67,516.1\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nOverall Balance (cash)\n-61,410.6\n-52,613.9\n-43,400.0\n-52,613.9\n-17.5\n-29.3\n (percent of GDP)\n-5.2\n-3.8\n-3.1\n-3.8\nPrimary Balance (Cash)\n-14,618.4\n7,252.2\n6,491.1\n7,252.2\n-10.5\n-144.4\n (percent of GDP)\n-1.2\n0.5\n0.5\n0.5\nNominal GDP \n1,176,219.9\n1,400,006.1\n1,400,006.1\n1,400,006.1\nDeviation Y-O-Y Growth\n \n44 \n \nPUBLIC \nTable A.3: Sources of Growth in Total Liquidity (GH¢ Millions, unless otherwise stated) \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n \nTable A.4: Sources of Growth in Reserve Money (GH¢ Millions, unless otherwise stated) \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n45 \n \nPUBLIC \n \nTable A.5: DMB’s Credit Allocations (GH¢ Millions, unless otherwise stated) \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \nTable A.6: Performance of the GSE-CI by Sectors \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n \nTable A.7: Market Capitalisation by Sectors \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n \n \nMONTH\nF&B\nMAN\nFINANCE\nDISTR\nMINING\nIT\nAGRIC\nOIL\nETFund\nEDUC\nAD.& PROD.\nGSE-CI\nFeb-25\n2578.0\n1795.3\n2814.3\n5381.80\n229.44\n113.6\n5262.0\n40.8\n9826.8\n90.9\n100.0\n5,659.8\nDec-25\n3581.9\n1820.6\n4647.2\n13214.55\n229.88\n164.0\n11164.0\n41.3\n12993.6\n90.9\n100.0\n8,770.3\nJan-26\n3605.6\n1820.6\n4932.4\n13234.12\n261.92\n164.0\n12520.0\n41.3\n12634.1\n90.9\n100.0\n9,006.5\nFeb-26\n7184.5\n2444.6\n7692.9\n14443.16\n264.22\n217.1\n14520.0\n41.3\n14453.6\n90.9\n100.0\n12,869.2\nMon. Chg\nABS\n3578.81\n624.00\n2760.46\n1209.04\n2.30\n53.12\n2000.00\n0.00\n1819.41\n0.00\n0.00\n3862.69\n(%)\n99.26\n34.28\n55.97\n9.14\n0.88\n32.39\n15.97\n0.00\n14.40\n0.00\n0.00\n42.89\nYtd\nABS\n3602.54\n624.00\n3045.71\n1228.61\n34.34\n53.12\n3356.00\n0.00\n1459.92\n0.00\n0.00\n4098.95\n(%)\n100.58\n34.28\n65.54\n9.30\n14.94\n32.39\n30.06\n0.00\n11.24\n0.00\n0.00\n46.74\nYoy\nABS\n4606.48\n649.24\n4878.58\n9061.36\n34.77\n103.53\n9258.00\n0.44\n4626.80\n0.00\n0.00\n7209.44\nSECTOR\nMONTH\nF&B\nMAN\nFINANCE\nDISTR\nMINING\nIT\nAGRIC\nOIL\nETFund\nEDUC\nAD.& PROD.\nMarket Cap\nFeb-25\n2,214.20\n \n1,289.3\n \n36,874.04\n \n2,312.5\n \n27,048.0\n \n38,518.3\n \n915.6\n \n17,393.9\n \n1234.24\n9.61\n10.70\n127820.29\nDec-25\n3,076.48\n \n1,307.4\n \n55,180.93\n \n5,678.0\n \n27,098.9\n \n55,607.6\n \n1,942.5\n \n17,582.3\n \n1632.00\n9.61\n10.70\n172042.59\nJan-26\n3,096.86\n \n1,307.4\n \n57,948.81\n \n5,686.5\n \n30,876.6\n \n55,608.9\n \n2,178.5\n \n17,582.3\n \n1586.85\n9.61\n10.70\n178835.59\nFeb-26\n6,170.68\n \n1,755.6\n \n94,893.76\n \n6,206.0\n \n31,147.3\n \n73,618.3\n \n2,526.5\n \n17,582.3\n \n1815.37\n9.61\n10.70\n235736.20\nMon. Chg\nABS\n3073.82\n448.13\n36944.95\n519.50\n270.75\n18009.36\n348.00\n0.00\n228.52\n0.00\n0.00\n56900.61\n(%)\n99.26\n34.28\n63.75\n9.14\n0.88\n32.39\n15.97\n0.00\n14.40\n0.00\n0.00\n31.82\nYtd\nABS\n3094.20\n448.13\n39712.83\n527.91\n4048.45\n18010.72\n583.94\n0.00\n183.37\n0.00\n0.00\n63693.61\n(%)\n100.58\n34.28\n71.97\n9.30\n14.94\n32.39\n30.06\n0.00\n11.24\n0.00\n0.00\n37.02\nYoy\nABS\n3956.48\n466.25\n58019.72\n3893.50\n4099.34\n35100.02\n1610.89\n188.41\n581.13\n0.00\n0.00\n107915.91\n(%)\n178.69\n36.16\n157.35\n168.37\n15.16\n91.13\n175.94\n1.08\n47.08\n0.00\n0.00\n84.43\nSECTOR\n \n46 \n \nPUBLIC \nTable A.8: Asset and Liability Structure of the Banking Sector \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n \nTable A.9: Credit Growth \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n \nTable A.10: Contingent Liabilities \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n \n \n \n \nFeb-23\nFeb-24\nFeb-25\nDec-25\nFeb-26\nComponents of Assets (% of Total)\nCash and Due from Banks\n28.0\n30.2\n38.9\n30.9\n30.3\nInvestments\n35.9\n39.3\n31.8\n39.3\n41.4\nNet Advances\n26.7\n21.4\n20.1\n21.1\n20.0\nOthers\n9.4\n9.1\n9.2\n8.7\n8.4\nComponents of Liabilities and Shareholders' Funds (% of Total)\nTotal Deposits\n75.4\n \n78.2\n \n74.6\n \n72.8\n \n72.7\n \nTotal Borrowings\n7.6\n \n5.0\n \n7.4\n \n8.5\n \n8.5\n \nShareholders' Funds\n9.4\n \n10.5\n \n11.0\n \n13.1\n \n13.1\n \nOther Liabilities\n7.4\n \n6.1\n \n6.9\n \n5.4\n \n5.5\n \nFeb-24\nFeb-25\nDec-25\nFeb-26\nFeb-25\nFeb-26\nPublic Sector\n5,979.06\n6,336.64\n4,783.02\n4,574.02\n6.0\n-27.8\nPrivate Sector\n68,809.90\n87,333.63\n106,189.69\n103,667.90\n26.9\n18.7\n - Private Enterprises\n50,145.60\n62,954.05\n74,923.73\n73,410.80\n25.5\n16.6\n o/w Foreign\n2,871.36\n4,178.77\n4,825.31\n4,235.42\n45.5\n1.4\n Indigeneous\n47,274.24\n58,775.28\n70,098.42\n69,175.38\n24.3\n17.7\n - Households\n17,620.52\n21,765.83\n27,705.56\n27,755.47\n23.5\n27.5\nGross Loans\n74,788.96\n93,670.27\n110,972.72\n108,241.92\n25.2\n15.6\nEconomic Sector\nGh¢million\ny/y growth (%)\nFeb-24\nFeb-25\nDec-25\nFeb-26\nContingent Liabilities (GH¢million)\n23,348.18\n \n23,414.18\n \n16,144.33\n \n20,361.17\n \nGrowth (y-o-y)\n15.4\n0.3\n-32.6\n-13.0\n% of Total Liabilities\n9.1\n6.8\n4.2\n5.0\n \n47 \n \nPUBLIC \nTable A.11: Distribution of Loans and NPLs by Economic Sector (%) \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n \nTable A.12: Liquidity Ratios \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n \nTable A.13: Profitability Indicators (%) \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n \n \na. Public Sector\n8.0\n5.5\n6.8\n3.8\n4.3\n2.5\n4.2\n1.9\n i. Government\n2.7\n1.7\n1.6\n1.0\n0.7\n0.9\n0.6\n1.0\n ii. Public Institutions\n1.8\n0.7\n1.4\n0.2\n1.1\n0.4\n1.0\n0.4\n iii. Public Enterprises\n3.5\n3.1\n3.8\n2.6\n2.5\n1.2\n2.6\n0.5\nb. Private Sector\n92.0\n94.5\n93.2\n96.2\n95.7\n97.5\n95.8\n98.1\n i. Private Enterprises\n67.0\n83.0\n67.2\n83.4\n67.5\n84.8\n67.8\n84.5\n o/w Foreign\n3.8\n2.0\n4.5\n2.4\n4.3\n4.7\n3.9\n1.9\n Indigeneous\n63.2\n81.0\n62.7\n81.0\n63.2\n80.1\n63.9\n82.7\n ii. Households\n23.6\n11.1\n23.2\n11.9\n25.0\n12.3\n25.6\n13.1\n iii. Others\n1.4\n0.5\n2.8\n0.9\n3.2\n0.4\n2.3\n0.4\nShare in \nNPLs\nShare in Total \nCredit\nShare in \nNPLs\nFeb-24\nFeb-25\nDec-25\nFeb-26\nShare in Total \nCredit\nShare in \nNPLs\nShare in Total \nCredit\nShare in \nNPLs\nShare in \nTotal Credit\nFeb-24\nFeb-25\nDec-25\nFeb-26\nLiquid Assets (Core) - (GH¢'million)\n86,707.40\n \n149,495.17\n \n138,039.57\n \n140,799.24\n \nLiquid Assets (Broad) -(GH¢'million)\n199,176.39\n \n271,482.77\n \n312,669.47\n \n332,763.90\n \nLiquid Assets to total deposits (Core)-%\n38.6\n \n52.1\n \n42.4\n \n41.6\n \nLiquid Assets to total deposits (Broad)- %\n88.8\n \n94.6\n \n96.1\n \n98.3\n \nLiquid assets to total assets (Core)- %\n30.2\n \n38.9\n \n30.9\n \n30.3\n \nLiquid assets to total assets (Broad)- %\n69.4\n \n70.6\n \n70.0\n \n71.5\n \nFeb-24\nFeb-25\nDec-25\nFeb-26\nGross Yield\n3.1\n2.8\n16.9\n2.2\nInterest Payable\n1.0\n0.9\n5.4\n0.7\nSpread\n2.1\n2.0\n11.5\n1.5\nAsset Utilitisation\n2.6\n2.2\n13.1\n2.0\nInterest Margin to Total Assets\n1.4\n1.1\n6.6\n1.0\nInterest Margin to Gross income\n53.6\n51.7\n50.8\n49.9\nProfitability Ratio\n21.8\n23.3\n25.7\n26.2\nReturn On Equity (%) after tax\n32.7\n28.5\n30.8\n24.3\nReturn On Assets (%) before tax\n5.2\n4.7\n5.7\n4.6\n \n48 \n \nPUBLIC \nTable A.14: DMBs’ Income Statement \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n \nTable A.15: Developments in Offshore Balances \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \nFeb-24\nFeb-25\nDec-25\nFeb-26\nFeb-25\nDec-25\nFeb-26\nInterest Income\n5,896.8\n \n6,690.6\n \n44,575.0\n \n6,903.9\n \n13.5\n \n15.8\n3.2\nInterest Expenses\n(1,924.3)\n \n(2,279.3)\n \n(14,942.9)\n \n(2,220.4)\n \n18.5\n \n14.7\n(2.6)\nNet Interest Income\n3,972.6\n \n4,411.3\n \n29,632.1\n \n4,683.5\n \n11.0\n \n16.4\n6.2\nFees and Commissions (Net)\n785.3\n \n1,066.7\n \n6,206.0\n \n1,060.7\n \n35.8\n \n9.5\n(0.6)\nOther Income\n732.1\n \n772.6\n \n7,602.2\n \n1,430.5\n \n5.5\n \n30.3\n85.1\nOperating Income\n5,489.9\n \n6,250.6\n \n43,440.3\n \n7,174.7\n \n13.9\n \n17.5\n14.8\nOperating Expenses \n(2,421.7)\n \n(3,019.8)\n \n(18,908.4)\n \n(3,203.0)\n \n24.7\n \n14.0\n6.1\n Staff Cost (deduct)\n(1,206.0)\n \n(1,553.0)\n \n(9,991.5)\n \n(1,777.5)\n \n28.8\n \n21.5\n14.5\n Other operating Expenses \n(1,215.7)\n \n(1,466.9)\n \n(8,916.9)\n \n(1,425.5)\n \n20.7\n \n6.6\n(2.8)\nNet Operating Income\n3,068.3\n \n3,230.7\n \n24,531.9\n \n3,971.7\n \n5.3\n \n20.4\n22.9\nTotal Provision (Loan losses, Depreciation & \n(619.0)\n \n(275.2)\n \n(1,641.4)\n \n(394.8)\n \n(55.5)\n \n(57.1)\n43.4\nIncome Before Tax\n2,449.3\n \n2,955.5\n \n22,890.5\n \n3,577.0\n \n20.7\n \n38.4\n21.0\nTax\n(836.2)\n \n(969.1)\n \n(7,914.9)\n \n(1,111.7)\n \n15.9\n \n29.6\n14.7\nNet Income\n1,613.1\n \n1,986.4\n \n14,975.6\n \n2,465.3\n \n23.1\n \n43.5\n24.1\nGross Income\n7,414.2\n \n8,529.9\n \n58,383.2\n \n9,395.1\n \n15.0\n \n16.8\n10.1\n (GH ¢'million)\nY-o-y Growth (%)\nFeb-24\nFeb-25\nDec-25\nFeb-26\nOffshore balances as % to Networth\n69.0\n99.8\n41.9\n44.4\nAnnual Growth in Offshore balances (%)\n22.0\n102.6\n-41.1\n-35.8\nAnnual Growth in Nostro Balances (%)\n-20.8\n89.9\n-61.3\n-46.4\nAnnual Growth in Placement (%)\n120.3\n113.6\n-21.0\n-28.1", "source": "BOG", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/Monetary_Policy_Reports/Monetary-Policy-Report-March-2026.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "d003d48d7bf8b9d5cfbfc3363825e96c", "text": "PUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nThe Monetary Policy Report highlights the economic and financial sector assessments that the Monetary Policy \nCommittee (MPC) considered prior to the policy decision during the 120th meeting held in September 2024. \nMonetary Policy Objective in Ghana \nThe primary objective of the Bank of Ghana is to ensure stability in the general level of prices which has been defined \nas maintaining inflation over the medium term, within a band of 8± 2 percent. Without limiting the primary objective, \nthe Bank is also expected to support the general economic policy of the government, promote economic growth and \ndevelopment, foster the effective and efficient operation of the banking and credit system; and contribute to the \npromotion and maintenance of financial stability. \nMonetary Policy Strategy \nTo achieve the objective of price stability, Bank of Ghana was granted operational independence to use whichever \npolicy tools it sees appropriate to stabilise inflation around the target band. The Bank of Ghana’s framework for \nconducting monetary policy is Inflation Targeting (IT), in which the central bank uses the Monetary Policy Rate \n(MPR) as the primary policy tool to set the monetary policy stance and anchor inflation expectations in the economy. \nThe MPC Process \nThe MPC is a statutorily constituted body established by the Bank of Ghana (Amendment) Act, Act 2016 (Act 918) to \nformulate monetary policy. The MPC consists of seven members – five from the Bank of Ghana (including the \nGovernor who is the Chairman) and two external members appointed by the Board of the Bank. The MPC meeting \ndates are determined at the beginning of each year. The MPC meets bi-monthly to assess economic conditions and \nrisks to the inflation outlook, after which a policy decision is made on positioning the MPR. Each decision signals a \nmonetary policy stance of tightening (increase), easing (decrease) or no change (stay put). The policy decision is \narrived at by consensus with each member stating reasons underlying a preferred MPR decision. Subsequently, the \ndecision is announced at a press conference held after each MPC meeting and a press release issued to financial \nmarkets and the public. \n©Research Department, Bank of Ghana MPC Report – September 2024 \nwww.bog.gov.gh \n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n1 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nTable of Contents \n \nOVERVIEW ......................................................................................................................................................................... 2 \n1. GLOBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS ................................................................................................................. 3 \n1.0 HIGHLIGHTS ................................................................................................................................................................ 3 \n1.1 GLOBAL GROWTH DEVELOPMENTS ........................................................................................................................... 3 \n1.2 GLOBAL PRICE DEVELOPMENTS ................................................................................................................................ 4 \n1.3 GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS DEVELOPMENTS ....................................................................................................... 5 \n1.4 CURRENCY MARKETS ................................................................................................................................................. 5 \n1.5 GLOBAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK AND RISKS ................................................................................................................ 8 \n2. EXTERNAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS .................................................................................................................. 9 \n2.0 HIGHLIGHTS ................................................................................................................................................................ 9 \n2.1 COMMODITY PRICE TRENDS ....................................................................................................................................... 9 \n2.2 TRADE BALANCE ....................................................................................................................................................... 10 \n2.3 INTERNATIONAL RESERVES ...................................................................................................................................... 10 \n2.4 COMMODITY PRICE OUTLOOK ................................................................................................................................. 11 \n3. REAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS ........................................................................................................................... 12 \n3.0 HIGHLIGHTS .............................................................................................................................................................. 12 \n3.1 ECONOMIC GROWTH ................................................................................................................................................ 12 \n3.2 TRENDS IN REAL SECTOR INDICATORS .................................................................................................................... 12 \n3.3 LABOUR MARKET ACTIVITY..................................................................................................................................... 14 \n3.4 COMPOSITE INDEX OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (CIEA).............................................................................................. 14 \n3.5 CONSUMER AND BUSINESS SURVEYS ........................................................................................................................ 14 \n4. MONETARY AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS ............................................................................................... 18 \n4.0 HIGHLIGHTS .............................................................................................................................................................. 18 \n4.1 DEVELOPMENTS IN MONETARY AGGREGATES ........................................................................................................ 18 \n4.2 RESERVE MONEY ...................................................................................................................................................... 19 \n4.3 DEPOSIT MONEY BANKS CREDIT DEVELOPMENTS .................................................................................................. 20 \n4.4 MONEY MARKET DEVELOPMENTS ........................................................................................................................... 21 \n4.5 STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS ............................................................................................................................ 21 \n4.6 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................................................. 22 \n5. BANKING SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS ................................................................................................................... 23 \n5.0 HIGHLIGHTS .............................................................................................................................................................. 23 \n5.1 BANKS’ BALANCE SHEET .......................................................................................................................................... 23 \n5.2 CREDIT RISK ............................................................................................................................................................. 25 \n5.3 FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS INDICATORS ........................................................................................................................ 27 \n5.4 CREDIT CONDITIONS SURVEY ................................................................................................................................... 29 \n5.5 CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK .................................................................................................................................... 30 \n6. FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS ......................................................................................................................................... 32 \n6.0 HIGHLIGHTS .............................................................................................................................................................. 32 \n6.1 TOTAL REVENUE AND GRANTS ................................................................................................................................... 32 \n6.2 TOTAL EXPENDITURES .............................................................................................................................................. 33 \n6.3 BUDGET BALANCE AND FINANCING .......................................................................................................................... 34 \n6.4 PUBLIC DEBT ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................................................ 36 \n6.5 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................................................. 36 \n7. PRICE DEVELOPMENTS ........................................................................................................................................... 37 \n7.0 HIGHLIGHTS .............................................................................................................................................................. 37 \n7.1 DOMESTIC INFLATION ............................................................................................................................................... 37 \nFIGURE 7.4 INFLATION FOR LOCALLY PRODUCED AND IMPORTED ITEMS (%) ............................................................ 38 \nTABLE 7.1 CPI COMPONENTS ......................................................................................................................................... 39 \n7.2 INFLATION RISK ASSESSMENT AND OUTLOOK ......................................................................................................... 39 \n \n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n2 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nOverview \nGlobal growth continued at a steady pace in the second quarter of 2024, supported by stronger spending, a resilient services \nsector, and declining crude oil prices. However, continued weakness in the manufacturing sector, moderating growth momentum \nin China, cooling labour markets in advanced economies, escalating geopolitical tensions, and rising uncertainties related to \nelections in many countries could potentially weigh on growth prospects in the second half of 2024. The latest projections by the \nInternational Monetary Fund forecasts growth to remain unchanged at 3.2 percent for 2024 and increase slightly to 3.3 percent in \n2025. \n \nGlobal inflation continues to slow down, on account of declining crude oil and food prices and moderating wage growth. \nCore inflation has also declined in both advanced and emerging market economies, with the weakening US dollar playing a crucial \nrole in alleviating inflationary pressures for Emerging Market and Developing Economies. Looking ahead, the ongoing global \ndisinflation is expected to continue, albeit at a slower pace. \n \nCentral banks in major advanced economies have begun the much-anticipated policy easing cycle amid declining inflation \nrates. The Federal Reserve Bank, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England have all reduced their policy rates in recent \nmonths as inflation gradually approaches targets in these countries and areas. \n \nProvisional GDP data from the Ghana Statistical Service for the second quarter of 2024 indicated a stronger growth \noutturn than expected. Real GDP grew by 6.9 percent in the second quarter of 2024, compared with 2.5 percent in the \ncorresponding quarter of 2023, and 4.7 percent in the first quarter of 2024. Trends in the Bank’s high frequency real sector \nindicators also point to a sustained pickup in economic activity, together with a rebound in both consumer and business confidence. \n \nDomestic price developments since the last MPC indicate that the disinflation process remains on track. This was largely \nsupported by the still tight monetary policy stance and easing food inflation. Headline inflation has declined consistently since the \nlast MPC to 20.4 percent in August, from 22.8 percent in June, and 20.9 percent in July 2024, driven mainly by food inflation. \n \nProvisional data on budget execution from January to July 2024 indicated an overall fiscal deficit (commitment basis) of \n2.4 percent of GDP, against the budget target of 2.8 percent of GDP. The deficit of GH¢24.8 billion was financed from \ndomestic (GH¢ 24.2 billion) and foreign (GH¢17.4 billion) sources. The primary balance for the period was a deficit of GH¢3.8 \nbillion (0.4% of GDP), against a primary deficit target of GH¢3.5 billion (0.3% of GDP). \n \nThe banking sector’s performance continued to improve, with assets growing at 38.7 percent at end-August 2024, \ncompared to 19.6 percent in August 2023. Both pre-tax and after-tax profits were higher in the first eight months of 2024 relative \nto the same period last year. With regards to solvency, the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) of the industry stood at 10.3 percent in \nAugust 2024, higher than the 7.5 percent recorded in August 2023. With reliefs, CAR was 13.8 percent in August 2024, compared \nto 14.2 percent in August 2023. \n \nThe external payment position was strong in the first eight months. The trade balance recorded a provisional surplus of \nUS$2.78 billion, higher than the surplus of US$1.66 billion recorded in the corresponding period of 2023. The surplus was \nprimarily driven by an increase in gold and crude oil exports. The strong buildup in international reserves continued into August \n2024. Gross International Reserves increased by US$1.58 billion to US$7.50 billion at end-August 2024, equivalent to 3.4 months \nof import cover. \n \nAfter coming under pressure in May and June, the exchange rate has generally stabilized. The observed stability beyond the \nfirst half of the year, is mainly driven by the maintenance of a still tight monetary policy stance and improved forex liquidity \nsupport. From the beginning of the year to 25th September 2024, the Ghana cedi depreciated by 24.3 percent against the US dollar. \nBetween June 2024 and September 25, 2024, the depreciation of the cedi stood at 7.1 percent. \n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n3 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n1. Global Economic Developments \n \n1.0 Highlights \nSince the last Monetary Policy Committee, the external environment has improved as global economic activity \nremained resilient in the second quarter of 2024. Global growth has been supported by private and government \nspending, a resilient services sector and declining oil prices. Additionally, the anticipated policy easing cycle initiated \nby major central banks in advanced economies, in response to declining inflation rates, have also been supportive of \ngrowth. The latest projections by the International Monetary Fund forecasts growth to remain unchanged at 3.2 \npercent for 2024 and increase slightly to 3.3 percent in 2025. \n \nGlobal inflation continues to slow down, on account of declining crude oil and food prices, and moderating wage \ngrowth. Core inflation has also declined in both advanced and emerging market economies, with the weakening US \ndollar playing a crucial role in alleviating inflationary pressures for Emerging Market and Developing Economies. \n \n1.1 Global Growth Developments \nGlobal growth continued at a steady pace in the second quarter of 2024, supported by stronger spending, a resilient \nservices sector, and declining crude oil prices. However, continued weakness in the manufacturing sector, moderating \ngrowth momentum in China, cooling labour markets in advanced economies, escalating geopolitical tensions, and \nrising uncertainties related to elections in many countries could potentially weigh on growth prospects in the second \nhalf of 2024. Economic activity in the third quarter of the year is expected to slow down, reflecting weakness in \nmanufacturing due to higher borrowing costs and lower export demand. The latest IMF World Economic Outlook \ngrowth projections remain unchanged at 3.2 percent for 2024 and 3.3 percent in 2025. \n \nIn the outlook, the balance of risks to growth remains on the downside. Incoming high frequency data points to a \nslowdown in activity in major economies such as the US and China. Interest rates remain relatively high, despite the \nresumption of rate cuts by major central banks, and the continuing weakness in manufacturing may likely spill over to \nthe services sector. Also, geopolitical tensions in the Middle East and the escalation of the war between Russia and \nUkraine are key downside risks to global growth. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n4 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nTable 1.1: Global Growth Projections (%) \n \nSource: IMF, WEO Julyl 2024, Update \n \n \n1.2 Global Price Developments \nGlobal disinflation has continued amid a relatively tight monetary policy, declining oil prices and moderating wage \ngrowth. Inflation is steadily declining towards central bank targets in many advanced economies, supported by \nmoderating services inflation. Declining prices also reflect falling oil prices due to weaker-than-expected demand, \nespecially in China, and a drop in the FAO Food Price Index in August on account of falling cereal, meat and dairy \nprices. Meanwhile, headline inflation expectations for 2025 remain broadly unchanged, but projections have been \nrevised lower for 2026, reflecting continued tightening policy stance and the gradual decline in headline and core \ninflation. In the outlook, the ongoing global disinflation is expected to continue, although at a slower pace. \n \nFigure 1.1: Headline Inflation Rates (%) \n \n \nSource: Bank of Gana, /Trading Economics \n \n \n \nOverview of the World Economic Outlook Projections\n(Percent change)\nEstimates\n2023\n2024\n2025\nWorld \n3.3\n3.2\n3.3\nAdvanced Economies\n1.7\n1.7\n1.8\nUnited States \n2.5\n2.6\n1.9\nEuro Area\n0.5\n0.9\n1.5\nGermany\n–0.2\n0.2\n1.3\nFrance\n1.1\n0.9\n1.3\nItaly\n0.9\n0.7\n0.9\nSpain\n2.5\n2.4\n2.1\nJapan \n1.9\n0.7\n1.0\nUnited Kingdom\n0.1\n0.7\n1.5\nCanada\n1.2\n1.3\n2.4\nOther Advanced Economies\n1.8\n2.0\n2.2\nEmerging Market and Developing Economies\n4.4\n4.3\n4.3\nChina\n5.2\n5.0\n4.5\nIndia\n8.2\n7.0\n6.5\nRussia\n3.6\n3.2\n1.5\nBrazil\n2.9\n2.1\n2.4\nMexico\n3.2\n2.2\n1.6\nSub-Saharan Africa \n3.4\n3.7\n4.1\nNigeria\n2.9\n3.1\n3.0\nSouth Africa\n0.7\n0.9\n1.2\nYear over Year\nProjections\n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n5 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n1.3 Global Financial Markets Developments \nGlobal financial conditions are expected to ease in the near term as major advanced economy central banks have begun \nthe anticipated easing cycle amid declining inflation rates. The US Federal Reserve cut its policy rate by 50 basis points \n(bps) in September 2024 and has signalled another rate cut by the end of the year amid moderating wage growth and \nlower inflation. Also, the European Central Bank has resumed its easing cycle after periods of sluggish growth and \ncooling inflation. Additionally, the Bank of England has started to ease its policy rate as headline inflation hit the 2.0 \npercent target. The expectation of lower policy rates has brought down long-term bond yields and driven a recovery in \nequity prices. Reflecting falling yields in advanced economies, portfolio flows to emerging market economies have \nstrengthened as investors search for higher yields. \n \n \nTable 1.2: Monetary Policy Stance of Selected Central Banks \n \nSource: Growth Rate (World Bank); Debt/GDP (IMF) Policy Rates (Trading Economics) \n \n1.4 Currency Markets \nOn the international currency market, the US dollar weakened in July and August as investors anticipated a rate cut in \nSeptember. The rate of depreciation of the Ghana cedi has declined since May 2024 on both the interbank and forex \nbureau markets. The easing pressure reflected positive sentiments from Bank of Ghana’s improved forex liquidity \nsupport, and the revision of advanced payment guidelines for importers. \n \nRecent policy easing by the US Federal Reserve together with continued market support from the Central Bank is \nexpected to provide some cushion to the cedi and help stabilize the forex market. However, uncertainties surrounding \nthe cocoa syndicated loan and the expected forex obligations as part of the debt restructuring may weigh on the \ncurrency. Pressures could also come from seasonal demand in the fourth quarter, and election-related expenditures. \n \nOn the interbank market, the cedi depreciated by 21.8 percent, 24.1 percent and 21.8 percent against the dollar, the \npound sterling, and the euro, respectively, on a year-to-date basis in August 2024. This is against a depreciation of 22.2 \npercent, 26.1 percent and 23.5 percent, respectively, during the same comparative period in 2023. \nCountry\nPolicy rate -\nPrevious (%)\nPolicy Rate \nCurrent (%)\nForecast\nInflation \nJuly, 2024\nInflation \nAugust, 2024 Real rate Infl Target\nOverall \nFiscal \nDeficit \n(2023,% \nof GDP)\nGDP \nGrowth \n(Dec.2023)\nGross \nDebt/GDP\n(2023,%)\nYTD \nDepr/Sept\n. 17th\nU.S \n5.5\n5.0\n4.75\n2.9\n2.5\n2.5\n2%\n-8.8\n2.5\n122.1\nEuro Area\n4.25\n3.65\n3.65\n2.6\n2.2\n1.45\n< 2%\n-3.5\n0.4\n88.6\n0.33\nUK\n5.25\n5.0\n5.0\n2.2\n2.2\n2.8\n2%\n-6\n0.1\n101.1\n3.08\nJapan\n0.25\n0.25\n0.25\n2.8\n3\n-2.75\n2%\n-5.8\n1.9\n252.4\n0.13\nRussia\n18\n19\n20\n9.1\n9.1\n9.9\n4%\n-2.3\n3.6\n19.7\n-0.74\nIndia\n6.5\n6.5\n6.5\n3.6\n3.65\n2.85\n4±2%\n-8.6\n7.8\n82.7\n-0.82\nBrazil\n10.5\n10.5\n10.75\n4.5\n4.24\n6.26\n4.5±1.5%\n-7.9\n2.9\n84.7\n-12.82\nTurkey\n50\n50\n50\n61.78\n51.97\n-1.97\n5±2%\n-5.5\n4.5\n28.9\n-12.93\nMalaysia\n3\n3\n3.0\n2.0\n1.0\n3% - 4%\n-4.4\n3.7\n67.3\n-3.56\nIndonesia\n6.25\n6.25\n6.25\n2.13\n2.1\n4.13\n3.5% ± 1%\n-1.6\n5\n39.9\n-0.02\nChile\n5.75\n5.5\n5.25\n4.6\n4.7\n0.8\n3±1%\n-2.2\n0.2\n39.4\n-4.8\nGhana\n29\n29\n28\n20.9\n20.4\n8.6\n8±2%\n-4.6\n2.3\n86.1\n-24.16\nSouth Africa\n8.25\n8.25\n8\n4.6\n4.4\n3.85\n3% -6%\n-6\n0.6\n73.9\n4.22\nNigeria\n26.25\n26.75\n26.75\n33.4\n32.15\n-5.4\n6% -9%\n-4.2\n2.9\n46.3\n-44.38\nKenya\n13\n12.75\n12.75\n4.3\n4.4\n8.35\n2.5-7.5%\n-5.3\n5.5\n73.3\n21.63\nZambia\n13.5\n13.5\n14.25\n15.4\n15.5\n-2\n9%\n-6.8\n4.3\n115.2\n-2.36\nMorocco\n3\n2.75\n2.75\n1.3\n1.5\n-4.4\n3\n70.6\n1.26\nAngola\n19.5\n19.5\n20.0\n31.1\n30.53\n-11.03\n9-11%\n-0.1\n0.5\n84.5\n-10.54\nEgypt\n27.25\n27.25\n27.25\n25.7\n26.2\n1.05\n7± 2%\n-5.8\n3.8\n95.9\n-36.17\n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n6 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n \n \nTable 1.3: Interbank Exchange Rates \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \nThe cedi depreciated by 28.3 percent in nominal trade weighted terms and 28.0 percent in forex transaction weighted \nterms, respectively, on a year-to-date basis in August 2024. This is against a depreciation of 28.8 percent and 30.3 \npercent, respectively, in the same period in 2023. \n \nIn real bilateral terms, the cedi depreciated by 14.7 percent, 17.1 percent and 14.3 percent against the dollar, the pound \nsterling and the euro, respectively, on a year-to-date basis in August 2024. Comparatively, for the corresponding period \nin 2023, the cedi’s real exchange rate depreciated by 13.6 percent, 18.9 percent, and 14.4 percent. \n \nThe cedi depreciated by 14.6 percent and 14.7 percent in real trade weighted terms and real forex transaction weighted \nterms, respectively, on a year-to-date basis, in August 2024. This compares with a depreciation of 14.7 percent and \n13.7 percent for the same period in 2023. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nUS$/GHC*\nMonthly \ndepreciation/a\nppreciation\nYear-to-Date \ndepreciation/\nappreciation\nGBP/GHC*\nMonthly \ndepreciation/a\nppreciation\nYear-to-Date \ndepreciation/\nappreciation\nEuro/GHC*\nMonthly \ndepreciation/\nappreciation\nYear-to-Date \ndepreciation/a\nppreciation\n2022\nJan\n6.0236\n-0.3\n-0.29\n8.0882\n0.5\n0.48\n6.7506\n1.1\n1.15\nFeb\n6.6004\n-8.7\n-9.00\n8.8568\n-8.7\n-8.24\n7.4100\n-8.9\n-7.85\nMar\n7.1122\n-7.2\n-15.55\n9.3515\n-5.3\n-13.09\n7.8986\n-6.2\n-13.55\nApr\n7.1128\n0.0\n-15.56\n8.9333\n4.7\n-9.02\n7.4963\n5.4\n-8.91\nMay\n7.1441\n-0.4\n-15.93\n9.0041\n-0.8\n-9.74\n7.6650\n-2.2\n-10.92\nJune\n7.2305\n-1.2\n-16.93\n8.8043\n2.3\n-7.69\n7.5797\n1.1\n-9.92\nJuly\n7.6120\n-5.0\n-21.10\n9.2642\n-5.0\n-12.27\n7.7658\n-2.4\n-12.07\nAug\n8.2325\n-7.5\n-27.04\n9.5872\n-3.4\n-15.23\n8.2909\n-6.3\n-17.64\nSep\n9.6048\n-14.3\n-37.47\n10.7017\n-10.4\n-24.06\n9.4147\n-11.9\n-27.47\nOct\n13.0086\n-26.2\n-53.83\n14.9541\n-28.4\n-45.65\n12.8610\n-26.8\n-46.91\nNov\n13.1044\n-0.7\n-54.17\n15.6919\n-4.7\n-48.21\n13.5813\n-5.3\n-49.72\nDec\n8.5760\n52.8\n-29.97\n10.3118\n52.2\n-21.19\n9.1457\n48.5\n-25.34\n2023\nJan\n10.7997\n-20.6\n-20.59\n13.2863\n-22.4\n-22.39\n11.7262\n-22.0\n-22.01\nFeb\n11.0135\n-1.9\n-22.13\n13.3699\n-0.6\n-22.87\n11.7182\n0.1\n-21.95\nMar\n11.0137\n0.0\n-22.13\n13.6218\n-1.8\n-24.30\n11.9657\n-2.1\n-23.57\nApr\n10.9516\n0.6\n-21.69\n13.7624\n-1.0\n-25.07\n12.0876\n-1.0\n-24.34\nMay\n10.9715\n-0.2\n-21.83\n13.5888\n1.3\n-24.12\n11.6978\n3.3\n-21.82\nJune\n10.9972\n-0.2\n-22.02\n13.9879\n-2.9\n-26.28\n12.0073\n-2.6\n-23.83\nJuly\n11.0034\n-0.1\n-22.06\n14.1482\n-1.1\n-27.12\n12.1272\n-1.0\n-24.59\nAug\n11.0192\n-0.1\n-22.17\n13.9514\n1.4\n-26.09\n11.9473\n1.5\n-23.45\nSep\n11.1285\n-1.0\n-22.94\n13.5935\n2.6\n-24.14\n11.7774\n1.4\n-22.35\nOct\n11.4963\n-3.2\n-25.40\n13.9399\n-2.5\n-26.03\n12.1438\n-3.0\n-24.69\nNov\n11.6206\n-1.1\n-26.20\n14.6821\n-5.1\n-29.77\n12.6756\n-4.2\n-27.85\nDec\n11.8800\n-2.2\n-27.81\n15.1334\n-3.0\n-31.86\n13.1264\n-3.4\n-30.33\n2024\nJan\n12.0356\n-1.3\n-1.29\n15.3027\n-1.1\n-1.11\n13.0547\n0.5\n0.55\nFeb\n12.4642\n-3.4\n-4.69\n15.8022\n-3.2\n-4.23\n13.5234\n-3.5\n-2.94\nMar\n12.8770\n-3.2\n-7.74\n16.2617\n-2.8\n-6.94\n13.9031\n-2.7\n-5.59\nApr\n13.2739\n-3.0\n-10.50\n16.6243\n-2.2\n-8.97\n14.1900\n-2.0\n-7.50\nMay\n14.1301\n-6.1\n-15.92\n17.9996\n-7.6\n-15.92\n15.3345\n-7.5\n-14.40\nJune\n14.5860\n-3.1\n-18.55\n18.4375\n-2.4\n-17.92\n15.6270\n-1.9\n-16.00\nJuly\n14.9009\n-2.1\n-20.27\n19.1305\n-3.6\n-20.89\n16.1065\n-3.0\n-18.50\nAug\n15.1899\n-1.9\n-21.79\n19.9261\n-4.0\n-24.05\n16.7828\n-4.0\n-21.79\n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n7 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nTable 1.4: Nominal Effective Exchange Rate \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n \nTable 1.5: Real Bilateral Exchange Rate \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2021=100\nMonthly CHG(%)\nYear-to-Date (%)\nFXTWI\n TWI\nFXTWI\n TWI FXTWI\n TWI\n2023\nJan-23\n53.91\n58.69\n-26.12\n-27.59\n-26.12\n-27.59\nFeb-23\n53.00\n58.90\n-1.72\n0.35\n-28.29\n-27.15\nMar-23\n52.87\n57.65\n-0.25\n-2.17\n-28.60\n-29.90\nApr-23\n53.09\n57.14\n0.40\n-0.89\n-28.09\n-31.05\nMay-23\n53.12\n58.45\n0.07\n2.25\n-28.00\n-28.11\nJun-23\n52.89\n57.30\n-0.43\n-2.02\n-28.55\n-30.69\nJul-23\n52.82\n56.85\n-0.14\n-0.78\n-28.74\n-31.71\nAug-23\n52.82\n57.46\n-0.01\n1.06\n-28.75\n-30.32\nSep-23\n52.44\n58.22\n-0.71\n1.30\n-29.67\n-28.62\nOct-23\n50.77\n56.37\n-3.30\n-3.29\n-33.94\n-32.85\nNov-23\n50.07\n54.33\n-1.39\n-3.75\n-35.80\n-37.83\nDec-23\n48.92\n52.54\n-2.36\n-3.41\n-39.01\n-42.52\n2024\nJan-24\n48.36\n52.70\n-1.15\n0.30\n-1.15\n0.30\nFeb-24\n46.71\n50.96\n-3.54\n-3.42\n-4.73\n-3.11\nMar-24\n45.22\n49.38\n-3.30\n-3.20\n-8.18\n-6.41\nApr-24\n43.91\n48.38\n-2.97\n-2.06\n-11.40\n-8.60\nMay-24\n41.18\n44.77\n-6.63\n-8.05\n-18.78\n-17.35\nJun-24\n39.94\n43.83\n-3.11\n-2.16\n-22.48\n-19.88\nJul-24\n39.05\n42.49\n-2.28\n-3.14\n-25.27\n-23.65\nAug-24\n38.23\n40.96\n-2.14\n-3.76\n-27.95\n-28.29\nRER Index (Jan.2021=100)\nMONTHLY CHANGE (Index) Year-to-Date (%)\nMonth\nEUR\nGBP\nUSD\nEUR\nGBP\nUSD\nEUR\nGBP\nUSD\n2023\nJan-23\n91.29\n89.44\n81.79\n-25.37\n-25.51\n-24.79\n-25.37\n-25.51\n-24.79\nFeb-23\n92.93\n90.51\n81.24\n1.75\n1.19\n-0.68\n-23.17\n-24.03\n-25.63\nMar-23\n88.73\n86.44\n79.97\n-4.73\n-4.70\n-1.59\n-28.99\n-29.86\n-27.64\nApr-23\n89.30\n86.33\n81.93\n0.64\n-0.14\n2.39\n-28.25\n-28.48\n-24.59\nMay-23\n96.24\n90.58\n85.45\n7.23\n4.71\n4.15\n-18.91\n-23.90\n-19.42\nJun-23\n96.86\n91.24\n87.72\n0.65\n0.72\n2.58\n-18.16\n-23.03\n-16.36\nJul-23\n99.54\n93.88\n90.62\n2.69\n2.81\n3.21\n-14.98\n-19.58\n-12.63\nAug-23\n100.03\n94.40\n89.89\n0.49\n0.55\n-0.81\n-14.42\n-18.92\n-13.55\nSep-23\n103.16\n98.44\n90.45\n3.03\n4.11\n0.62\n-10.95\n-14.04\n-12.84\nOct-23\n100.32\n96.19\n88.09\n-2.84\n-2.33\n-2.68\n-14.10\n-16.70\n-15.87\nNov-23\n98.42\n93.25\n88.67\n-1.93\n-3.15\n0.65\n-16.30\n-20.38\n-15.11\nDec-23\n95.90\n91.11\n87.82\n-2.62\n-2.35\n-0.96\n-19.35\n-23.21\n-16.22\n2024\nJan-24\n98.89\n92.57\n87.94\n3.02\n1.57\n0.14\n3.02\n1.57\n0.14\nFeb-24\n96.51\n90.72\n85.73\n-2.46\n-2.03\n-2.58\n0.63\n-0.43\n-2.44\nMar-24\n93.63\n88.07\n83.15\n-3.08\n-3.01\n-3.11\n-2.43\n-3.45\n-5.63\nApr-24\n93.00\n87.65\n81.79\n-0.68\n-0.59\n-1.66\n-3.13\n-4.06\n-7.38\nMay-24\n88.40\n82.92\n79.12\n-5.20\n-5.59\n-3.38\n-8.49\n-9.88\n-11.01\nJun-24\n89.04\n83.17\n78.84\n0.73\n0.30\n-0.34\n-7.70\n-9.54\n-11.39\nJul-24\n88.04\n81.90\n78.66\n-1.14\n-1.56\n-0.24\n-8.93\n-11.25\n-11.66\nAug-24\n83.90\n77.84\n76.56\n-4.93\n-5.21\n-2.74\n-14.30\n-17.05\n-14.71\n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n8 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nTable 1.6: Real Effective Exchange Rate for Major Trade Partners \n \n Source: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n \n1.5 Global Economic Outlook and Risks \nGlobal growth remained strong in the second quarter of 2024, and the ongoing disinflation also continued. Amid falling \nprices, policy easing has begun in major advanced economies and the US dollar index has declined due to the expected \nrate cuts. Reflecting the anticipated policy easing cycle, pressures on emerging market currencies have moderated, \nwhile portfolio flows to emerging markets and developing economies have strengthened. In the outlook, the ongoing \nglobal disinflation is expected to continue, albeit at a slower pace. The expectation for lower policy rates has brought \ndown long-term bond yields, supported a rebound in equity prices, and led to a strengthening of portfolio flows to \nemerging market and developing economies in recent months as investors search for higher yields. Further declines in \nthe policy rate in advanced economies is expected to result in an ease in global financial conditions in the near term. \n \n \nMonth\nINDEX (2021=100)\nMONTHLY CHG\nYear-to-Date (%)\nRFXTWI\nRTWI\nRFXTWI\nRTWI\nRFXTWI\nRTWI\n2023\nJan-23\n82.64\n89.80\n-24.85\n-25.31\n-24.85\n-25.31\nFeb-23\n82.26\n91.00\n-0.46\n1.32\n-25.43\n-23.66\nMar-23\n80.74\n87.31\n-1.88\n-4.23\n-27.79\n-28.88\nApr-23\n82.59\n88.02\n2.24\n0.81\n-24.92\n-27.85\nMay-23\n86.39\n94.24\n4.39\n6.58\n-19.43\n-19.43\nJun-23\n88.46\n95.09\n2.34\n0.92\n-16.62\n-18.34\nJul-23\n91.34\n97.80\n3.16\n2.77\n-12.95\n-15.06\nAug-23\n90.72\n98.12\n-0.68\n0.32\n-13.73\n-14.69\nSep-23\n91.53\n100.94\n0.88\n2.80\n-12.73\n-11.47\nOct-23\n89.14\n98.22\n-2.68\n-2.77\n-15.75\n-14.56\nNov-23\n89.47\n96.60\n0.37\n-1.68\n-15.32\n-16.49\nDec-23\n88.49\n94.36\n-1.11\n-2.37\n-16.60\n-19.25\n2024\nJan-24\n88.83\n96.79\n0.39\n2.51\n0.39\n2.51\nFeb-24\n86.63\n94.48\n-2.54\n-2.44\n-2.14\n0.13\nMar-24\n84.01\n91.66\n-3.12\n-3.07\n-5.33\n-2.94\nApr-24\n82.71\n90.91\n-1.56\n-0.83\n-6.98\n-3.80\nMay-24\n79.87\n86.61\n-3.56\n-4.96\n-10.79\n-8.95\nJun-24\n79.67\n87.09\n-0.25\n0.55\n-11.06\n-8.35\nJul-24\n79.40\n86.18\n-0.34\n-1.06\n-11.44\n-9.50\nAug-24\n77.13\n82.34\n-2.95\n-4.65\n-14.73\n-14.59\nRTWI and FXRTWI\n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n9 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n2. External Sector Developments \n \n2.0 Highlights \nThe external payment position continues to improve, characterized by a higher trade surplus, and strong reserves \nbuild-up. International reserves have been boosted, driven by a significant improvement in the current account balance \n—on account of gold exports and remittance inflows— and lower net outflows from the financial account driven in \nlarge part by improved FDI inflows, lower portfolio reversals, lower interest payments on public debt, and financial \ninflows from the IMF and World Bank. These developments resulted in an overall balance of payments surplus of \nUS$942.0 million for the first half of 2024 compared, with a deficit of US$341.0 million recorded for the first half of \n2023. \n \n2.1 Commodity Price Trends \n Cocoa prices declined for the second consecutive month into August 2024, by 7.3 percent, to settle at an average price \nof US$7,409.5 per tonne. This was partly due to an improved outlook for the 2024/25 crops season in West Africa \ndespite the extreme weather conditions and diseases experienced in some cocoa growing areas. From the beginning of \nthe year to August 2024, cocoa prices increased significantly by 74.9 percent. \n \nBrent crude oil prices declined by 5.9 percent to settle at an average price of US$78.92 per barrel in August 2024. \nPrices fell on concerns about slowing demand in China and the US. On year-to-date basis, oil prices increased by 2.1 \npercent, largely on concerns about supply disruptions due to geopolitical tensions and planned output cuts by OPEC+. \n \nIn contrast, gold prices rose by 3.3 percent relative to the previous month to average US$2,469.39 per fine ounce in \nAugust 2024. From the beginning of the year to August 2024, gold prices have increased by 21.3 percent, largely \nexplained by the expectation of rates cuts by the US Federal Reserve and geopolitical tensions, both of which boosted \nthe safe-haven appeal of the metal. \n \n2.1.1 Commodity Price Index \nThe weighted average price of the three major commodities exported by Ghana (cocoa, gold, and crude oil) fell by 1.6 \npercent to 188.7 in August 2024. The decrease was on account of a fall in the cocoa and crude oil sub-indices (by 7.3% \nand 5.9%, respectively), which more than offset the increase (3.2%) in the gold sub-index. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n10 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSource: Reuters \n \n \n \n \n Source: Reuters \n \n2.2 Trade Balance \nIn the first eight months of 2024, the trade balance recorded a provisional surplus of US$2.78 billion, higher than the \nsurplus of US$1.66 billion recorded in the corresponding period of 2023. The improved trade surplus resulted from a \nhigher increase in exports relative to imports. \n \nTotal exports increased by 22.3 percent to US$12.92 billion, largely driven by a robust increase in gold and crude oil \nexports, notwithstanding the sharp drop in cocoa exports. The value of gold exports increased by 62.2 percent to \nUS$7.27 billion, driven by both volume and prices. The volume of gold exports increased by 38.1 percent to 3.37 \nmillion ounces. The average realized price for gold increased by 17.5 percent to US$2,154.2 per fine ounce. Earnings \nfrom crude oil exports increased by 16.9 percent to US$2.77 billion, due largely to higher production volumes from \nthe Jubilee Field. Earnings from cocoa exports (both beans and products), in contrast, dropped by 42.7 percent, from \nUS$1.60 billion in the first eight months of 2023 to US$917.8 million in August 2024. This reflected the challenges \nin the cocoa sector, including extreme weather conditions, diseases and smuggling. Earnings from “other exports” \n(including non-traditional exports) declined by 8.2 percent to US$1.97 billion. \n \nOn the import side, the total imports bill rose by 14.0 percent to US$10.14 billion in the first eight months of the year, \ndriven by both oil and non-oil imports. Oil imports increased by 3.6 percent to US$3.0 billion, with non-oil imports \nincreasing by 19.0 percent to US$7.1 billion. \n \n2.3 International Reserves \nThe strong buildup in international reserves continued into August 2024. Gross international reserves increased by \nUS$1.58 billion to US$7.50 billion at end-August 2024, equivalent to 3.4 months of import cover. Net international \nreserves also increased by US$1.73 billion to US$4.92 billion at end-August 2024. The higher build-up in Gross \nReserves was largely on account of the strong performance of the domestic gold purchase programme. \nFigure 2.1: International Cocoa Prices (US$/metric tonnes) \n \nSource: Reuters \nFigure 2.2: International Brent Crude Oil Prices (US$ per barrel) \n \nSource: Reuters \nFigure 2.3: International Gold Prices (US$ per ounce) \n \nFigure 2.4: Commodity Price Index \n \n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n11 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n \n2.4 Commodity Price Outlook \nTrends in the prices of Ghana’s major export commodities were mixed. Cocoa prices stabilised well below peaks \nreached in April, as favourable weather contributed to an improved outlook for the 2024/2025 crop season in West \nAfrica. The oil market is expected to remain elevated on concerns of escalating geopolitical tensions in the Middle \nEast, announcement by OPEC+ of delay in increasing output until December, and reduced inventories. This is despite \nthe increasing demand worries in China and the US on the back of slowing economic activity. Looking ahead to the \nend of the year, the balance of payments is projected to record a surplus, driven by increased exports, stronger \nremittance growth, and lower government external payments. \n \nTable 2.1: Trade Balance (US$ million) \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n \n Table 1\n2022\n2023\n2024\nAbs Y/Y\nRel Y/Y\n Jan - Aug \n Jan - Aug \n Jan - Aug \nChg\nChg\nTrade Balance\n1,562.2\n1,663.3\n2,775.6\n1,112.3\n66.9\nTrade Bal (% GDP)\n2.1\n2.2\n3.3\nTotal Exports\n11,819.9\n10,561.1\n12,920.0\n2,358.9\n22.3\nGold ( $'M)\n4,226.7\n4,479.0\n7,265.9\n2,786.9\n62.2\n Volume (fine ounces)\n2,350,515.8\n2,443,278.1\n3,372,974.5\n929,696.4\n38.1\n Unit Price ($/fine ounce)\n1,798.2\n1,833.2\n2,154.2\n321.0\n17.5\nCocoa Beans ( $'M)\n959.3\n1,050.0\n424.5\n-625.5\n-59.6\n Volume (tonnes)\n388,254.2\n428,970.7\n157,205.0\n-271,765.8\n-63.4\n Unit Price ($/tonne)\n2,470.9\n2,447.7\n2,700.3\n252.6\n10.3\nCocoa Products ( $'M)\n660.1\n550.5\n493.3\n-57.3\n-10.4\n Volume (tonnes)\n213,505.3\n169,182.6\n122,937.7\n-46,244.8\n-27.3\n Unit Price ($/tonne)\n3,091.7\n3,254.2\n4,012.5\n758.4\n23.3\nCrude Oil ( $'M)\n3,827.8\n2,369.8\n2,765.0\n395.2\n16.7\n Volume (barrels)\n36,312,333.0\n29,480,554.0\n33,485,643.0\n4,005,089.0\n13.6\n Unit Price ($/bbl)\n105.4\n80.4\n82.6\n2.2\n2.7\nOther Exports\n2,146.0\n2,111.8\n1,971.3\n-140.5\n-6.7\no/w: Non-Tradional Exports\n1,656.6\n1,613.3\n1,481.6\n-131.7\n-8.2\nTotal Import\n10,257.7\n8,897.8\n10,144.4\n1,246.7\n14.0\n Non-Oil\n7,014.8\n6,001.5\n7,142.9\n1,141.4\n19.0\n Oil and Gas\n3,242.9\n2,896.2\n3,001.5\n105.3\n3.6\n of which: Products\n3,109.4\n2,634.2\n2,754.0\n119.8\n4.5\nCrude Oil ( $'M)\n 21.20 113.72 95.77 \n-17.9\n-15.8\nVolume (barrels)\n 203,488 1,510,925 1,142,386 \n-368,539.5\n-24.4\nUnit Price ($/bbl)\n 104.16 75.26 83.83 \n8.6\n11.4\nGas ( $'M)\n 112.31 148.27 151.71 \n3.4\n2.3\nVolume (MMBtu)\n 14,470,136 17,122,679 17,292,781 \n170,101.2\n1.0\nUnit Price ($ mmBtu)\n 7.76 8.66 8.77 \n0.1\n1.3\n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n12 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n3. Real Sector Developments \n \n3.0 Highlights \nThe domestic economy continues to recover, evidenced by the stronger-than-expected GDP growth outturn for the \nsecond quarter of the year. Growth in the second half of the year is also expected to be firm. This sentiment is supported \nby the latest high frequency real sector indicators, which point to a sustained pickup in economic activity in July 2024, \ncompared to a year ago. Consumer and business confidence have also rebounded, amidst improving macroeconomic \nconditions. \n \n3.1 Economic Growth \nProvisional GDP data from the Ghana Statistical Service for the second quarter of 2024 indicated a stronger growth \noutturn, with real GDP growth of 6.9 percent in the second quarter of 2024, compared with 2.5 percent in the \ncorresponding quarter of 2023, and 4.7 percent in the first quarter of 2024. Non-oil GDP growth was 7.0 percent, \ncompared with 3.1 percent in the same period of 2023. The growth outturn was largely driven by a strong performance \nin the industry sector, which grew by 9.3 percent, having contracted by 2.6 percent in the same period last year. The \nservices and agricultural sectors also grew by 5.8 percent and 5.4 percent, respectively. \n \n \nFigure 3.1: Quarterly GDP Growth (y/y, %) \n \nSource: Ghana Statistical Service \n \n \n3.2 Trends in Real Sector Indicators \nConsumer Spending \nConsumer spending, proxied by domestic VAT collections and retail sales, posted a positive performance in July 2024, \ncompared with the corresponding period in 2023. It increased by 46.2 percent on a year-on-year basis to GH¢1.33 \nbillion in July 2024, from GH¢906.60 million in July 2023. Cumulatively, total domestic VAT for the first seven \nmonths of 2024 went up by 19.2 percent to GH¢8.91 billion, compared with GH¢7.48 billion for the corresponding \nperiod of last year. \n \nRetail sales increased by 27.4 percent (year-on-year) to GH¢214.64 million in July 2024, up from the GH¢168.46 \nmillion recorded in the same period in 2023. On a month-on-month basis, retail sales improved marginally by 2.6 \n3.9 \n4.6 \n3.0 \n3.8 \n3.1 \n2.5 \n2.2 \n3.8 \n4.8 \n6.9 \n4.8 \n6.1 \n3.8 \n4.2 \n4.4 \n3.1 \n2.4 \n3.4 \n4.3 \n7.0 \n2022Q1\n2022Q2\n2022Q3\n2022Q4\n2023Q1\n2023Q2\n2023Q3\n2023Q4\n2024Q1\n2024Q2\nOil GDP\nNon-Oil GDP\n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n13 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \npercent in July 2024, from GH¢209.13 million in the preceding month. In cumulative terms, sales for the first seven \nmonths of 2024 went up by 21.7 percent, due to increased household consumption. \n \nManufacturing Activities \nActivities in the manufacturing sub-sector, gauged by trends in the collection of direct taxes and private sector workers’ \ncontributions to the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) Pension Scheme (Tier-1), increased in July \n2024. Total direct taxes collected increased by 40.4 percent (year-on-year) to GH¢4.59 billion in July 2024, relative to \nGH¢3.27 billion recorded for the same period in 2023. Cumulatively, the total amount collected for the first seven \nmonths of 2024 went up by 44.5 percent to GH¢37.70 billion, from GH¢26.09 billion for the same period in 2023. In \nterms of contributions of the various sub-tax categories, income tax (PAYE and self-employed) accounted for 43.5 \npercent, corporate tax accounted for 33.1 percent, while “Other Tax Sources” contributed 23.4 percent. \n \nTotal private sector workers’ contribution to the SSNIT Pension Scheme (Tier-1) increased by 29.4 percent in year-\non-year terms to GH¢472.81 million in July 2024, from GH¢365.26 million collected during the corresponding period \nin 2023. Cumulatively, for the first seven months of 2024, the contribution grew by 25.6 percent to GH¢2.84 billion, \nrelative to GH¢2.26 billion recorded in the same period in 2023. \n \nConstruction Sector Activities \nActivity in the construction sub-sector, proxied by the volume of cement sales, increased by 22.4 percent (year-on-\nyear) in July 2024 to 238,167.80 tonnes, up from 194,597.00 tonnes recorded a year ago. On a month-on-month basis, \nit increased by 3.8 percent in July 2024 compared with 229,351.36 tonnes recorded in June 2024. Sales for the first \nseven months of 2024 went up by 3.3 percent to 1.60 million tonnes, from 1.55 million tonnes for the same period in \n2023. The relative improvement in total cement sales, year-on-year, was due to an uptick in construction activities \nduring the review period. \n \nVehicle Registration \nTransport sector activities, gauged by new vehicle registrations by the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Authority \n(DVLA), increased by 24.3 percent to 14,912 in July 2024, from 12,000 vehicles registered during the corresponding \nperiod of 2023. Cumulatively, vehicles registered by the DVLA within the first seven months of 2024 increased by \n13.5 percent to 111,156, from 97,975 recorded a year ago. \n \nIndustrial Consumption of Electricity \nIndustrial consumption of electricity declined by 9.0 percent in July 2024 to 283.26 gigawatts, as against 311.35 \ngigawatts recorded for the corresponding period in 2023. In cumulative terms, electricity consumed by industries for \nthe first seven months of 2024 decreased by 7.5 percent to 1,963.46 gigawatts, from 2,122.09 gigawatts for the \ncorresponding period a year ago. \n \nPassenger Arrivals \nPassenger arrivals increased by 16.8 percent on year-on-year terms to 121,995 in July 2024, up from 104,460 arrivals \nrecorded a year ago. Compared to June 2024, passenger arrivals went up by 15.8 percent. For the first seven months \nof 2024, there were 724,412 arrivals recorded at the international airport and the land borders, compared with 616,101 \nfor the corresponding period in 2023, representing a growth of 17.6 percent. \n \n \n \n \n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n14 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nPorts and Harbours Activity \nInternational trade at the country’s two main harbours (Tema and Takoradi), as measured by laden container traffic for \ninbound and outbound containers, improved during the period under review. Total container traffic increased by 2.6 \npercent, year-on-year, to 58,330 in July 2024, from 56,860 in July 2023. Cumulatively, total container traffic for the \nfirst seven months of 2024 went up by 12.3 percent to 401,845, compared with 357,680 for the corresponding period \nof last year. \n \n3.3 Labour Market Activity \nPrivate Sector Pension Contributors \nTotal number of private sector contributors to the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT), which \npartially gauges employment conditions, went up by 2.7 percent to 1,018,445 in July 2024, compared with 991,922 \nfor the same period in 2023. The cumulative number of private sector contributors increased by 5.1 percent in the first \nseven months of the year to 7,156,941, from 6,806,775 recorded over the corresponding period in 2023. \n \nAdvertised Jobs \nThe number of jobs advertised in selected print1 and online2 media, which partially gauges labour demand in the \neconomy, increased in August 2024 relative to what was observed in the corresponding period a year ago. In total, \n3,123 job adverts were recorded, as compared with 2,775 for the same period in 2023, indicating an improvement of \n12.5 percent (year-on-year). However, on a month-on-month basis, the number of job vacancies declined in August \n2024 by 22.4 percent, from the 4,027 jobs advertised in July 2024. The total number of advertised jobs for the first \nseven months of the year went up by 9.5 percent to 24,428, compared with 22,303 recorded during the same period in \n2023. \n \n3.4 Composite Index of Economic Activity (CIEA) \nThe Bank’s updated real Composite Index of Economic Activity (CIEA) recorded an annual growth of 1.6 percent in \nJuly 2024, compared to a contraction of 2.8 percent for the corresponding period of 2023. Construction activities, \nconsumption demand by households and firms, exports, imports, and tourist arrivals contributed to the improvement \nin economic activity during the period. \n \n3.5 Consumer and Business Surveys \nThe latest confidence surveys conducted in August 2024 showed a rebound in both consumer and business confidence. \nThe Consumer Confidence Index improved to 87.6 in August 2024, from 81.2 in June 2024, on account of easing \ninflationary pressures, which has led to optimism about future economic conditions. Similarly, the Business \nConfidence Index increased to 91.1 from 88.8 as firms met their short-term targets and expressed positive sentiments \nabout company and industry prospects amidst improving macroeconomic conditions. The survey findings were broadly \nin line with observed trends in Ghana’s Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI), which improved to 51.1 in August 2024 \nfrom 50.1 in the previous month. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1 The Daily Graphic newspaper was used to represent print media because it is the most widely circulated daily in Ghana. \n2 These are job adverts posted on the websites of the 10 main online job advertising/employment companies in Ghana. \n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n15 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n \nFigure 3.2: High Frequency Economic Indicators \n \nSources: Bank of Ghana, Various Stakeholders\n...Retail sales improved while Domestic VAT collections declined in July 2024 \ncompared to June 2024...\n...Labour hiring conditions, proxied by the number of private sector \nworkers contributing to SSNIT, remained largely unchanged...\n...Labour market conditions improved in July 2024 relative to June 2024...\n...Construction activities, proxied by cement sales, increased in July 2024 \ncompared to June 2024...\n...Port activity improved in July 2024 compared to the previous month...\n...Passenger arrivals increased in July 2024 compared to June 2024... \n150\n170\n190\n210\n230\n250\n270\n290\nJul-22\nSep-22\nNov-22\nJan-23\nMar-23\nMay-23\nJul-23\nSep-23\nNov-23\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nCement Sales\n30\n35\n40\n45\n50\n55\n60\n65\nJul-22\nSep-22\nNov-22\nJan-23\nMar-23\nMay-23\nJul-23\nSep-23\nNov-23\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nThousands\nPort Activity (Container Traffic)\n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\n140\nJul-22\nSep-22\nNov-22\nJan-23\nMar-23\nMay-23\nJul-23\nSep-23\nNov-23\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nThousands\nPassenger Arrivals\n500\n600\n700\n800\n900\n1000\n1100\n1200\nJul-22\nSep-22\nNov-22\nJan-23\nMar-23\nMay-23\nJul-23\nSep-23\nNov-23\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nThousands\nNumber of Private Sector Contributors to SSNIT\nThousands, tons\n 200.00\n 400.00\n 600.00\n 800.00\n 1,000.00\n 1,200.00\n 1,400.00\n 1,600.00\n 1,800.00\n 2,000.00\n 2,200.00\n 40.00\n 90.00\n 140.00\n 190.00\n 240.00\n 290.00\n 340.00\nJul-22\nSep-22\nNov-22\nJan-23\nMar-23\nMay-23\nJul-23\nSep-23\nNov-23\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nMillion, GHC\nMillion, GHC\nDomestic VAT collection and Retail Sales\nRetail Sales, Left\nDomestic VAT\n100\n150\n200\n250\n300\n350\n400\n450\n500\n550\n600\nJul-22\nSep-22\nNov-22\nJan-23\nMar-23\nMay-23\nJul-23\nSep-23\nNov-23\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nMillion GHC\nSSNIT Contributions from Private Sector\nPanel 1:\nGhana's Leading Indicators of Economic Activity\n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n16 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana, Various Stakeholders\n...Commercial banks' credit to the private sector improved in July 2024 relative \nto the pevious month...\n...Industrial activity, proxied by industrial consumption of electricity, \nincreased...\n...Imports improved while Exports remained largely unchanged in July 2024 \ncompared to June 2024...\n600\n800\n1000\n1200\n1400\n1600\n1800\n2000\nJul-22\nSep-22\nNov-22\nJan-23\nMar-23\nMay-23\nJul-23\nSep-23\nNov-23\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nMillion, USD\nImports\nExports\nImports and Exports\n220\n240\n260\n280\n300\n320\n340\nJul-22\nSep-22\nNov-22\nJan-23\nMar-23\nMay-23\nJul-23\nSep-23\nNov-23\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nGWh\nIndustrial Consumption of Electricity\n45\n50\n55\n60\n65\n70\n75\n80\n85\nJul-22\nSep-22\nNov-22\nJan-23\nMar-23\nMay-23\nJul-23\nSep-23\nNov-23\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nBillion, GHC\nDMB's Credit to Private Sector\n-10\n-8\n-6\n-4\n-2\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\nJul-22\nSep-22\nNov-22\nJan-23\nMar-23\nMay-23\nJul-23\nSep-23\nNov-23\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nPercent, y-o-y\nReal CIEA\n-16\n-8\n0\n8\n16\n24\nJul-23\nAug-23\nSep-23\nOct-23\nNov-23\nDec-23\nJan-24\nFeb-24\nMar-24\nApr-24\nMay-24\nJun-24\nJul-24\nPercent, y-o-y\nCement Sales (Tons)\nPort Activity\nSSNIT Contr by Pte Sector\nExports\nIndustrial Cons of Electricity\nDMB's Credit to Pte Sector\nImports\nPassenger Arrivals\nDom VAT\nReal CIEA growth (%)\nContribution to Real CIEA growth\n500\n1000\n1500\n2000\n2500\n3000\n3500\n4000\n4500\nAug-22\nOct-22\nDec-22\nFeb-23\nApr-23\nJun-23\nAug-23\nOct-23\nDec-23\nFeb-24\nApr-24\nJun-24\nAug-24\nJob Adverts\nPanel 2:\nGhana's Leading Indicators of Economic Activity\n...On a year-on-year basis, the real CIEA grew by 1.6 percent in July 2024, \ncompared with a contraction of 2.8 percent in July 2023...\n...The growth in the real CIEA was driven by a pick-up in Cement Sales, Domestic \nVAT, Exports, Imports, Passenger Arrivals and Port Activity...\n...Demand for labour, proxied by the number of job adverts (in print and \nonline media), declined in August 2024...\nNumber of advertised jobs\n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n17 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n \n \n \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana, Various Stakeholders\n...Business confidence increased as firms met their short-term targets and \nexpressed positive sentiments about company and industry prospects amidst \nimproving macroeconomic conditions ....\n...Vehicle registration increased in July 2024 compared to the month before...\n...Consumer confidence improved on account of easing inflationary \npressures which has led to optimism about future economic conditions ...\n0\n5000\n10000\n15000\n20000\n25000\n30000\nJul-22\nSep-22\nNov-22\nJan-23\nMar-23\nMay-23\nJul-23\nSep-23\nNov-23\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nVehicle Registration\n91.1\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\n100\n110\nAug-22\nOct-22\nDec-22\nFeb-23\nApr-23\nJun-23\nAug-23\nOct-23\nDec-23\nFeb-24\nApr-24\nJun-24\nAug-24\nIndex\nBusiness Confidence Index\n87.6\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\n100\n110\nAug-22\nOct-22\nDec-22\nFeb-23\nApr-23\nJun-23\nAug-23\nOct-23\nDec-23\nFeb-24\nApr-24\nJun-24\nAug-24\nIndex\nConsumer Confidence Index\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\nJul-22\nSep-22\nNov-22\nJan-23\nMar-23\nMay-23\nJul-23\nSep-23\nNov-23\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nBillion, GHC\nDomestic taxes, Direct\n...Domestic tax collection decreased in July 2024 compared to June 2024...\n4.4 \n5.4 \n-2.6 \n9.3 \n6.0 \n5.8 \n-4.0\n-2.0\n0.0\n2.0\n4.0\n6.0\n8.0\n10.0\n12.0\n2022Q4\n2023Q1\n2023Q2\n2023Q3\n2023Q4\n2024Q1\n2024Q2\nPercent\nAgricuture\nIndustry\nServices\nAnnual sectoral real GDP growth rate, y/y \n2.5 \n6.9 \n3.1 \n7.0 \n0.0\n2.0\n4.0\n6.0\n8.0\n2022Q4\n2023Q1\n2023Q2\n2023Q3\n2023Q4\n2024Q1\n2024Q2\nPercent\nOil GDP\nNon-Oil GDP\nAnnual real GDP growth rate, y/y \n...Real Oil and Non-Oil GDP grew by 6.9 percent and 7.0 percent respectively \nin 2024Q2, compared with growth rates of 2.5 percent and 3.1 percent \nrespectively in the corresponding period of 2023... \n...The 2024Q2 growth outturn was largely driven by the industry sector, which grew \nby 9.3 percent, having contracted by 2.6 percent same time last year...\nPanel 3:\nGhana's Leading Indicators of Economic Activity\nNumber of vehicles\n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n18 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n4. Monetary and Financial Developments \n \n4.0 Highlights \nDevelopments in August 2024 showed a decline in total liquidity relative to the corresponding period in 2023. Annual \ngrowth in M2+ declined to 37.1 percent in August 2024, relative to 40.8 percent in August 2023, due to a moderation \nin the pace of growth in Net Domestic Assets of depository institutions. In contrast, Net Foreign Assets of depository \ninstitutions increased significantly, reflecting a net build-up in foreign assets. The decline in broad money supply was \nreflected in a slower pace of growth in demand deposits, savings and time deposits, and foreign currency deposits. \nGrowth in currency held by the public, however, increased over the same comparative period. Private sector credit \ncontinued to grow at 21.7 percent (year-on-year) in August 2024, from a year-on-year growth of 10.7 percent in August \n2023. \n \n4.1 Developments in Monetary Aggregates \nMoney Supply \nIn August 2024, there was a decline in the annual growth in broad money supply (M2+) relative to the corresponding \nperiod of 2023, mainly driven by moderation in the pace of growth in the Net Domestic Assets (NDA) of depository \ninstitutions, underpinned by the tight monetary policy stance. In contrast, Net Foreign Assets (NFA) of the depository \ninstitutions increased significantly, reflecting a net build-up in foreign assets. Annual growth in M2+ declined to 37.1 \npercent in August 2024, relative to 40.8 percent in the corresponding period of 2023. The contribution of NDA to the \ngrowth of M2+ decreased to 10.6 percent from 33.7 percent, while that of NFA increased to 26.5 percent from 7.0 \npercent, over the same comparative period. In terms of annual growth rates, NDA expanded by 10.4 percent in August \n2024, relative to 30.9 percent in August 2023, while NFA expanded by 1,745.8 percent, relative to 76.7 percent, over \nthe same comparative period. \n \n \n \nFigure 4.1a: M2+ Growth and its Sources \n(% Contributions) \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n-30.00\n-10.00\n10.00\n30.00\n50.00\n70.00\n90.00\nNet Foreign Assets\nNDA\nTotal Liquidity (M2+)\nFigure 4.1b: Banking Sector NDA and its Sources \n(% Contributions) \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n-100.00\n NCG\n Claims on Priv. Sect. (Incl. PE's)\n BOG OMO Steril. Acc.\n OIN\n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n19 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nFigure 4.2: M2+ and its Components (% Contributions) \n \nThe decline in the contribution of the NDA in the growth of M2+ was mainly driven by contraction in the Net Claims \non Government (NCG), and moderated by increased investments in BOG bills and Other Items (Net) (OIN). \n \nThe decline in the growth of M2+, largely reflected in declines in the growth in demand deposits, savings and time \ndeposits, and foreign currency deposits relative to same period in 2023. Growth in currency with the public, however, \nincreased over the same comparative period. \n \n4.2 Reserve Money \nGrowth in Reserve Money (RM) continued to increase in August 2024, largely on the back of significant expansion in \nthe Net Foreign Assets (NFA), driven by proceeds from Gold for Reserve (G4R) Programme, forex purchases, and \nsome inflows from the IMF. The growth in RM was also underpinned by the dynamic Cash Reserve Requirement \n(CRR), which led to an increase in reserves by Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) to shore up regulatory reserves. Annual \ngrowth in RM increased significantly to 86.2 percent in August 2024 from 25.5 percent recorded in the corresponding \nperiod of 2023. \n \nGrowth in NDA declined on the back of contraction in the NCG, reflecting the lingering impact of the Domestic Debt \nExchange Programme (DDEP) on the Central Bank balance sheet. Meanwhile, net claims on DMBs declined, due to \nthe build-up in foreign currency deposits of banks with the Central Bank. The contribution of NDA to the growth in \nRM declined to 15.0 percent in August 2024 from 30.6 percent recorded in August 2023. In contrast, the contribution \nof the NFA to the growth in RM increased to 71.2 percent from negative 5.1 percent recorded over the same \ncomparative period in 2023. \n \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n-2.00\n8.00\n18.00\n28.00\n38.00\n48.00\n58.00\nChart 2: M2+ Growth and its Components (% Contributions)\nCurr.\nDem. Dep\nSav and Time Dep.\nFCDs\nTotal Liquidity (M2+)\n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n20 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n \n \n4.3 Deposit Money Banks Credit Developments \nTotal DMBs’ credit to the private sector and public institutions grew by 19.7 percent in August 2024, compared to a \ngrowth of 9.6 percent recorded in August 2023. Credit to the private sector increased by 21.7 percent in August 2024, \ncompared to 10.7 percent growth recorded in the corresponding period of 2023. Private sector credit accounted for \n100.50 percent of the flow in total outstanding credit in August 2024, relative to 100.34 percent recorded in the \ncorresponding period of 2023. The top five sectors with significant share of credit flows were: services (30.5%); \ncommerce and finance (25.6%); import trade (12.1%); manufacturing (10.9%); and construction (7.3%). \n \nTotal outstanding credit to the private sector at the end of August 2024 was GH¢80.32 billion, compared with GH¢66.0 \nbillion recorded in August 2023. In real terms, credit to the private sector increased by 1.1 percent, relative to a \ncontraction of 21.0 percent recorded over the same comparative period last year. Growth in real private sector credit \nremained above the long-run trend during the review month. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFigure 4.3a: RM Growth and Contribution from NFA and NDA (%) \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n-150.0\n-100.0\n-50.0\n0.0\n50.0\n100.0\n150.0\n200.0\n250.0\nNDA\nNFA\nRM growth (y-on-y)\nFigure 4.3b: BOG NDA and its Sources (% Contributions) \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n-80.0\n-30.0\n20.0\n70.0\n120.0\n170.0\n220.0\n270.0\nNCG\nNC_DMBs\nOMO Ster. A/c\nOIN\nNDA\nFigure 4.4a: Shares in Annual Flow of Credit to the Private Sector (%) \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana \nAug-23\nAug-24\nFigure 4.4b: Annual Growth in Real Private Sector Credit (%) \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n-40\n-30\n-20\n-10\n0\n10\n20\n30\nSep-16\nMar-17\nSep-17\nMar-18\nSep-18\nMar-19\nSep-19\nMar-20\nSep-20\nMar-21\nSep-21\nMar-22\nSep-22\nMar-23\nSep-23\nMar-24\nSep-24\nRGPSC\nTrend\n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n21 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n \n4.4 Money Market Developments \nOn year-on-year basis, money market interest rates broadly trended downwards. The 91-day and 182-day Treasury bill \nrates decreased to 24.85 percent and 26.76 percent, respectively, in August 2024, from 26.35 percent and 27.84 percent \nin the corresponding period in 2023. The rate on the 364-day instrument declined to 27.90 percent in August 2024 \nfrom 30.88 percent in August 2023. Interest rates on longer-dated instruments, however, remained stable. Rates on \nthe 2-year, 3-year, 5-year, 6-year, 7-year, 10-year, 15-year, and 20-year bonds remained at 21.50 percent, 29.85 \npercent, 22.30 percent, 21.75 percent, 18.10 percent, 19.75 percent, 19.75 percent, and 20.20 percent, respectively, due \nto the non-issuance of these instruments during the review period. \n \nThe Interbank Weighted Average Rate (IWAR) increased to 28.84 percent in August 2024, from 26.59 percent in \nAugust 2023, underpinned by sustained liquidity withdrawal from the market. However, the average lending rates of \nbanks declined marginally to 30.79 percent in August 2024, from 31.78 percent in the corresponding period of 2023, \nmainly reflecting the transmission of the declines in Treasury bill rates. \n \n \n4.5 Stock Market Developments \nThe Ghana Stock Exchange Composite Index (GSE-CI) increased to 4,359.85 points in August 2024, from 3,084.79 \npoints recorded in the corresponding period of 2023. This reflected a year-on-year gain of 41.3 percent, compared to \n23.0 percent growth in August 2023. The performance of the GSE-CI was driven by improved demand for equities, \nbecause of the shift in investor appetite following the closure of the bonds market and the significant recovery in the \nprofitability of listed financial institutions. The main sectors that contributed to the gains recorded were food and \nbeverages, manufacturing, distribution, finance, ETFund and agriculture. \n \nThe GSE-Financial Stocks Index (GSE-FI) closed at 2,118.06 points, reflecting a gain of 20.6 percent compared to a \nloss of 15.6 percent over the same comparative period last year. The gain in the GSE-FSI was mainly on the back of \nimproved profitability of listed financial institutions. \n \n \n \n \n \nFigure 4.5: MPR, Interbank and T-bill Rates (%)\nSource: Bank of Ghana \n7.00\n17.00\n27.00\n37.00\n47.00\n57.00\n67.00\n77.00\nAug-22\nOct-22\nDec-22\nFeb-23\nApr-23\nJun-23\nAug-23\nOct-23\nDec-23\nFeb-24\nApr-24\nJun-24\nAug-24\nMPR\n 91-Day T-bill rate\n Interbank rate\nInflation\nFigure 4.6: Real Interest Rates (%) \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n-30.00\n20.00\n70.00\nAug-22\nOct-22\nDec-22\nFeb-23\nApr-23\nJun-23\nAug-23\nOct-23\nDec-23\nFeb-24\nApr-24\nJun-24\nAug-24\nReal MPR\nReal 91 Day T-bill Rate\nReal Interbank Rate\nReal Lending Rate\nReal Deposit Rate\nInflation\nFigure 4.7: Yield Curve (%) \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n15.00\n20.00\n25.00\n30.00\n35.00\nAug-23\nAug-24\n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n22 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nFigure 4.8: GSE Composite Index \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n \n \nFigure 4.9: GSE Financial Stock Index \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n \n \nTotal market capitalisation of the GSE at the end of August 2024 was GH¢92.04 billion, representing a year-on-year \ngrowth of 25.7 percent, compared with a growth of 13.7 percent in August 2023. The increase in market capitalization \nwas mainly driven by appreciation in share prices in the food & beverages, manufacturing, distribution, finance, \nmining, and IT sectors. \n \nTable 4.1: Performance of Ghana Stock Exchange \n \nSource: Ghana Stock Exchange and Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n4.6 Conclusion \nDevelopments in monetary aggregates for August 2024 pointed to a decline in the annual growth in broad money \nsupply (M2+) relative to the corresponding period of 2023. This was largely driven by a moderation in the pace of \ngrowth in the NDA of depository institutions. Net Foreign Assets of the depository institutions increased significantly, \nreflecting a net build-up in foreign assets. Interest rates broadly showed downward trends at the short-end of the \nprimary market, on year-on-year basis. The Ghana Stock Exchange Composite Index recorded significant year-on-\nyear gains in August 2024, reflecting a shift in the demand for equities due to the adverse shocks to bond prices and \nthe closure of the bonds market on account of the DDEP. Investor appetite for stocks was also reinforced by the \nsignificant improvement in the profitability of listed financial institutions. \n \n \n \n1900\n2400\n2900\n3400\n3900\n4400\n4900\n2022\n2023\n2024\n1600\n1700\n1800\n1900\n2000\n2100\n2200\n2300\n2022\n2023\n2024\nY-T-D\nAug-22\nDec-22\nMar-23\nJun-23\nAug-23\nSep-23\nDec-23\nMar-24\nJun-24\nJul-24\nAug-24\n2023\n2024\n2024\nGSE CI\n2508.99\n2443.91\n2745.33 2808.03\n3084.79\n3172.35 3130.23\n3456.2 3829.61 4493.92 4359.85\n22.95\n41.33\n39.28\nGSE FI\n2079.94\n2052.59\n1806.67 1691.91\n1756.12\n1890.13 1901.57 2001.47 2115.04\n2101.9 2118.06\n(15.57)\n20.61\n11.38\nMarket Capitalization\n64445.45 64507.32 67846.89 70238.82 73250.18 74189.35 73893.17 77701.17 85096.58 93348.22 92041.99\n13.66\n25.65\n24.56\nChanges\nY-O-Y\n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n23 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n5. Banking Sector Developments \n \n5.0 Highlights \nThe banking sector continued to record improved performance, with assets growing at 38.7 percent at end-August \n2024, compared to a growth of 19.6 percent in August 2023. Both pre-tax and after-tax profits were higher in the first \neight months of 2024 relative to the same period last year. The Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) stood at 10.3 percent \nin August 2024, higher than the 7.5 percent recorded in August 2023. With reliefs, CAR was 13.8 percent in August \n2024, compared to 14.2 percent in August 2023. Liquidity and efficiency ratios also improved during the first eight \nmonths of the year, highlighting that, broadly, key financial soundness indicators were improving. Despite these \nimprovements, the Non-Performing Loan (NPL) ratio was 24.3 percent in August 2024, up from 20.0 percent in August \n2023. \n \n5.1 Banks’ Balance Sheet \nTotal assets of the banking sector grew by 38.7 percent to GH¢339.3 billion as at August 2024, compared with 19.6 \npercent growth recorded in August 2023, driven by robust growth in deposits and other funding sources. Foreign assets \ngrew by 71.2 percent in August 2024, compared to 48.6 percent in August 2023, while domestic assets went up by \n35.9 percent in August 2024, compared to 17.7 percent in August 2023. The share of foreign assets in total assets \nincreased to 9.7 percent from 7.8 percent, while the share of domestic assets declined to 90.3 percent from 92.2 percent, \nduring the reference period. \n \nBanks’ investments grew by 20.2 percent to GH¢116.7 billion in August 2024, up from 19.9 percent growth recorded \nin August 2023. Investments in long-term instruments shot up by 37.4 percent from a negative growth of 28.6 percent \nrecorded in August 2023, reflecting in part the reclassification of the restructured cocoa bills to bonds and exchange \nrate effects. Investments in short-term bills increased by 3.7 percent in August 2024, compared to the growth of 242.6 \npercent recorded in the previous year. This resulted in the share of short-term bills falling to 15.1 percent in August \n2024, from 20.2 percent in August 2023. The mixed developments in bills and securities culminated in a declined share \nof investments in total assets of 34.4 percent in August 2024, from 39.7 percent in August 2023. \n \nCredit growth continued to pick up within the banking sector. Gross loans and advances grew by 19.7 percent to \nGH¢86.7 billion in August 2024, compared to 9.6 percent in August 2023. Growth in net loans and advances (gross \nloans adjusted for provisions and interest in suspense) increased significantly, from 5.7 percent in August 2023 to 13.8 \npercent in August 2024. \n \nDeposits of GH¢254.8 billion as at end-August 2024 remained the main source of funding for the banking sector. \nHowever, growth in deposits moderated from 38.9 percent in August 2023 to 34.2 percent in August 2024. In cedi \nterms, the foreign currency component of deposits grew by 33.9 percent to GH¢83.1 billion in August 2024, compared \nto a growth of 48.6 percent a year ago, a signal that the overall growth in total deposits was partly driven by currency \ndepreciation. \n \nBorrowings in August 2024 surged by 86.4 percent to GH¢25.8 billion, from a decline of 41.0 percent in August 2023, \ndriven largely by significant growth in domestic short-term borrowings as well as an increase in foreign short-term \nborrowings. Long-term foreign borrowings grew by 9.9 percent in August 2024, from a contraction of 31.9 percent in \nAugust 2023. Meanwhile, long-term domestic borrowings recorded a contraction of 30.5 percent, compared to the \nprevious year’s growth of 56.5 percent. \n \n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n24 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nThe industry’s shareholders’ funds (comprising paid-up capital and reserves) grew by 39.9 percent to GH¢33.4 billion \nin August 2024, compared to a contraction of 10.3 percent in August 2023. The increase in shareholders’ funds was \ndue to capital injection by shareholders, as well as the ploughing back of profits. \n \nTable 5.1: Key Developments in DMBs' Balance Sheet \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n \n \n5.1.1 Asset and Liability Structure \nThe asset structure of the industry’s balance sheet in August 2024 reflected banks’ preference for more liquid assets. \nCash and bank balances replaced investments as the largest component of total assets following the introduction of the \ndynamic Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR). Accordingly, the share of cash and bank balances rose from 25.9 percent in \nAugust 2023 to 35.6 percent at end-August 2024 as banks increased reserves in compliance with the new cash reserve \nrequirements. Investments (comprising bills, securities, and equity) was the second largest component of banks’ assets, \nalthough its share in total assets declined to 34.4 percent in August 2024, from 39.7 percent in August 2023. \nInvestments, and cash and bank balances together accounted for 70.0 percent of total assets in August 2024, compared \nto a share of 65.6 percent in August 2023. Notwithstanding the moderate pick-up in credit growth, net loans and \nadvances constituted the third-largest component of total assets, recording a share of 20.8 percent in August 2024, \ndown from 25.3 percent in August 2023. Non-earning assets (fixed assets and other assets) in banks’ total assets \nincreased marginally in share to 9.3 percent in August 2024 percent, from 9.2 percent during a similar period in 2023. \n \nThe funding structure of banks continued to be dominated by deposits. However, the share of deposits in banks’ \nliabilities and shareholders’ funds declined to 75.1 percent in August 2024, from 77.6 percent in the corresponding \nperiod last year, following the moderation in growth. The share of borrowings rose to 7.6 percent in August 2024, from \nAug-23\nJun-24\nAug-24\nAug-23\nJun-24\nAug-24\nAug-23\nAug-24\nTOTAL ASSETS\n244,724.3\n \n323,177.5\n \n339,329.5\n \n19.6\n \n33.3\n \n38.7\n \n100.0\n \n100.0\n \nA. Foreign Assets\n19,158.3\n \n33,010.0\n \n32,800.6\n \n48.6\n \n57.6\n \n71.2\n \n7.8\n \n9.7\n \nB. Domestic Assets\n225,566.0\n \n290,167.5\n \n306,528.9\n \n17.7\n \n31.0\n \n35.9\n \n92.2\n \n90.3\n \n Investments\n97,077.8\n \n107,211.3\n \n116,692.1\n \n19.9\n \n19.2\n \n20.2\n \n39.7\n \n34.4\n \n i. Bills\n49,469.5\n \n42,796.0\n \n51,304.4\n \n242.6\n \n7.3\n \n3.7\n \n20.2\n \n15.1\n \n ii. Securities\n47,348.1\n \n64,078.7\n \n65,051.1\n \n(28.6)\n \n28.6\n \n37.4\n \n19.3\n \n19.2\n \n Advances (Net)\n61,883.1\n \n69,104.7\n \n70,450.3\n \n5.7\n \n10.3\n \n13.8\n \n25.3\n \n20.8\n \n of which Foreign Currency\n20,910.1\n \n24,333.5\n \n23,566.9\n \n11.8\n \n10.4\n \n12.7\n \n8.5\n \n6.9\n \n Gross Advances\n72,429.4\n \n84,530.0\n \n86,677.4\n \n9.6\n \n15.6\n \n19.7\n \n29.6\n \n25.5\n \n Other Assets\n14,375.8\n \n21,961.5\n \n22,038.8\n \n34.8\n \n49.3\n \n53.3\n \n5.9\n \n6.5\n \n Fixed Assets\n7,539.0\n \n8,582.7\n \n8,769.0\n \n38.3\n \n15.1\n \n16.3\n \n3.1\n \n2.6\n \nTOTAL LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL\n244,724.3\n \n323,177.5\n \n339,329.5\n \n19.6\n \n33.3\n \n38.7\n \n100.0\n \n100.0\n \nTotal Deposits\n189,863.8\n \n245,880.2\n \n254,758.0\n \n38.9\n \n31.1\n \n34.2\n \n77.6\n \n75.1\n \n of which Foreign Currency\n62,048.6\n \n81,228.3\n \n83,068.6\n \n48.6\n \n29.8\n \n33.9\n \n25.4\n \n24.5\n \nTotal Borrowings\n13,851.8\n \n23,168.3\n \n25,815.9\n \n(41.0)\n \n44.4\n \n86.4\n \n5.7\n \n7.6\n \n Foreign Liabilities\n6,104.3\n \n7,487.5\n \n7,246.0\n \n(55.0)\n \n(0.8)\n \n18.7\n \n2.5\n \n2.1\n \n i. Short-term borrowings\n1,362.2\n \n2,490.6\n \n2,165.2\n \n(77.9)\n \n33.2\n \n58.9\n \n0.6\n \n0.6\n \n ii. Long-term borrowings\n3,854.7\n \n4,015.1\n \n4,234.5\n \n(31.9)\n \n(2.5)\n \n9.9\n \n1.6\n \n1.2\n \n iii. Deposits of non-residents\n884.3\n \n940.6\n \n821.6\n \n(48.7)\n \n(39.1)\n \n(7.1)\n \n0.4\n \n0.2\n \n Domestic Liabilities\n213,884.2\n \n281,979.5\n \n297,426.2\n \n30.9\n \n33.2\n \n39.1\n \n87.4\n \n87.7\n \n i. Short-term borrowing\n6,551.3\n \n15,230.3\n \n17,967.7\n \n(36.5)\n \n83.0\n \n174.3\n \n2.7\n \n5.3\n \n ii. Long-term Borrowings\n2,083.5\n \n1,432.3\n \n1,448.6\n \n56.5\n \n(17.6)\n \n(30.5)\n \n0.9\n \n0.4\n \n iii. Domestic Deposits\n188,979.5\n \n244,939.5\n \n253,936.4\n \n40.0\n \n31.7\n \n34.4\n \n77.2\n \n74.8\n \nOther Liabilities\n16,560.7\n \n21,093.0\n \n24,627.7\n \n(6.9)\n \n32.6\n \n48.7\n \n6.8\n \n7.3\n \nPaid-up capital\n10,432.1\n \n13,023.9\n \n13,769.8\n \n1.6\n \n24.8\n \n32.0\n \n4.3\n \n4.1\n \nShareholders' Funds\n23,878.4\n \n32,307.2\n \n33,399.8\n \n(10.3)\n \n44.9\n \n39.9\n \n9.8\n \n9.8\n \n (GH ¢'million)\nY-on-Y Growth (%)\nShares (%)\n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n25 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n5.7 percent in August 2023, in line with the observed strong growth in total borrowings. The share of shareholders’ \nfunds in banks’ liabilities and shareholders’ funds, on the other hand, remained stable at 9.8 percent while the share of \nother liabilities increased to 7.5 percent in August 2024, from 7.0 percent over the same comparative period last year. \n \n5.1.2 Share of Banks’ Investments \nLong-term securities constituted the largest component of banks’ investment portfolio, increasing from 48.8 percent \nin August 2023 to 55.7 percent in August 2024. Bills (short-term debt instruments) was the second largest component \nof banks’ investment portfolio. Its share, however, dropped from 51.0 percent in August 2023 to 44.0 percent in August \n2024, in line with the moderation in growth recorded during the reference period. The share of equity investments \nremained negligible at 0.3 percent during the period under review. \n \nFigure 5.1: Developments in Banks’ Balance Sheet & Asset Quality \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n \n5.2 Credit Risk \nThe industry’s asset quality deteriorated in August 2024 relative to the same period in August 2023. The elevated \ncredit risk was broad-based with increases in non-performing loan (NPL) ratios in all economic sectors except for the \nmining and quarrying sector. \n \n17.8\n51.0\n39.9 \n44.0 \n81.9\n48.8\n59.8 \n55.7 \n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\n100\nAug-22\nAug-23\nJun-24\nAug-24\nComponents of Banks' Investments (% share)\nBills\nSecurities\nShares & Other Equities\n23.9\n25.9\n35.8 \n35.6 \n39.6\n39.7\n33.2 \n34.4 \n28.6\n25.3\n21.4 \n20.8 \n7.9 \n9.2 \n9.6 \n9.3 \n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\n100\nAug-22\nAug-23\nJun-24\nAug-24\nAsset Structure of Banks (%) \nCash and Due from Banks\nInvestments\nNet Advances\nOthers\n66.8 \n77.6 \n76.1 \n75.1 \n11.5 \n5.7 \n7.2 \n7.6 \n13.0 \n9.8 \n10.0 \n9.8 \n8.7 \n7.0 \n6.8 \n7.5 \n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\n100\nAug-22\nAug-23\nJun-24\nAug-24\nLiability Structure of Banks (%)\nTotal Deposits\nTotal Borrowings\nShareholders' Funds\nOther Liabilities\n90.2 \n91.1\n92.4 \n92.7\n9.8 \n8.9\n7.6 \n7.3\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\n100\nComponents of Banks' Credit Portfolio (%)\nPrivate sector\nPublic sector\n3.2\n3.5\n10.7\n9.2\n4.8\n20.9\n7.1\n34.1\n6.5\n3.6\n3.2\n10.7\n8.9\n4.4\n23.8\n7.0\n33.0\n5.4\n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\nAgric, Forest. & Fishing\nMining & Quarrying\nManufacturing\nConstruction\nElect., Water & Gas\nCommerce and Finance\nTransp., Stor. & Commu.\nServices\nMiscellaneous\nDistribution of Credit by Sector (%)\nAug-24\nAug-23\n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\n50.0\n60.0\nAgric, Forest. & Fishing\nMining & Quarrying\nManufacturing\nConstruction\nElect., Water & Gas\nCommerce and…\nTransp., Stor. &…\nServices\nMiscellaneous\n40.7\n15.4\n14.1\n34.3\n8.7\n23.1\n25.2\n17.6\n7.9\n56.2\n13.0\n17.5\n35.3\n17.4\n23.3\n52.3\n18.6\n14.5\nNPL ratio in each Sector (%)\nAug-24\nAug-23\n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n26 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n5.2.1 Credit Portfolio Analysis \nThe pick-up in credit growth recorded in August 2024 was driven by an increase in credit to the private sector. The \nstock of gross loans and advances increased by 19.7 percent in August 2024 to GH¢86.7 billion, compared to an annual \ngrowth of 9.6 percent in August 2023. Private sector credit (comprising credit to private enterprises and households) \nalso went up by 21.7 percent to GH¢80.3 billion in August 2024, compared to 10.6 percent recorded in the previous \nyear. Public sector credit, however, posted a contraction of 1.1 percent to GH¢6.4 billion at end-August 2024, \ncompared to a contraction of 0.3 percent in August 2023. Consequently, the share of private sector credit in total credit \ninched up to 92.7 percent in August 2024, from 91.1 percent in August 2023, while that of public sector credit declined \nto 7.3 percent, from 8.9 percent over the same period a year earlier. \n \nIn terms of the sectoral distribution of credit, the services sector accounted for the largest share of 33.0 percent as at \nend-August 2024 (from 34.1 percent in August 2023), followed by the commerce and finance sectors with a share of \n23.8 percent (from 20.9 percent in August 2023), while the manufacturing sector maintained its share of 10.7 percent. \nTogether, these sectors accounted for 67.5 percent of total credit (compared with 65.7 percent in August 2023). The \nmining and quarrying sector was the lowest recipient of industry credit with a share of 3.2 percent (down marginally \nfrom 3.5 percent in August 2023). \n \n5.2.2 Off-Balance Sheet Transactions \nOff-balance sheet transactions (largely trade finance and guarantees) increased during the review period. Contingent \nliabilities grew by 50.2 percent to GH¢27.1 billion as at end-August 2024, from GH¢18.0 billion as at end-August \n2023. Accordingly, banks’ contingent liabilities as a percentage of total liabilities increased from 8.2 percent in August \n2023 to 8.9 percent in August 2024. \n \n5.2.3 Asset Quality \nThe banking industry’s asset quality declined during the period under review. The industry’s NPL ratio rose to 24.3 \npercent in August 2024, from 20.0 percent in August 2023. When adjusted for the fully provisioned loan loss category, \nthe industry’s NPL ratio also increased from 9.0 percent in August 2023 to 10.6 percent in August 2024, reflecting \nincreasing shares of both sub-standard and loss loans in the NPL stock. The rise in the NPL ratio was attributable to \nthe higher growth in the NPL stock (45.2% year-on-year growth) relative to the growth in total loans (19.7% year-on-\nyear growth). The industry’s NPL stock increased by 45.2 percent to GH¢21.1 billion in August 2024, from GH¢14.5 \nbillion in August 2023, reflecting a deterioration in both domestic and foreign currency-denominated loans. \n \nThe private sector was the largest recipient of the industry’s credit and accounted for the largest share of NPLs as at \nend-August 2024. The proportion of NPLs attributable to the private sector increased marginally from 95.0 percent in \nAugust 2023 to 96.0 percent in August 2024, while that of the public sector declined from 5.0 percent in August 2024 \nto 4.0 at end-August 2024. \n \nThe mining and quarrying sector recorded an NPL ratio of 13.0 percent in August 2024, which was the lowest among \nthe economic sectors. This figure was down from 15.4 percent in August 2023, the only instance of an improvement \nin NPL ratio between August 2023 and August 2024 among the sectors. The agriculture, forestry and fishing sector \nmaintained its position as the sector with the highest NPL ratio of 56.2 percent (from 40.7 percent in August 2023). It \nwas followed closely by the transportation, storage, and communication sector with an NPL ratio of 52.3 percent (from \n25.2 percent). The construction sector dropped to third place with an NPL ratio of 35.3 percent (from 34.3 percent). \nThis was followed by the commerce and finance sector with an NPL ratio of 23.3 percent (from 23.1 percent) and then \nthe services sector at 18.6 percent (from 17.6 percent). The manufacturing and electricity, water and gas sectors had \nNPL ratios of 17.5 percent and 17.4 percent, respectively, (from 14.1 percent and 8.7 percent). \n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n27 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n \n5.3 Financial Soundness Indicators \nTrends in the industry’s Financial Soundness Indicators (FSIs) were mixed during the period under review. \n \n Figure 5.2: Key Financial Soundness Indicators \n \n Source: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n \n5.3.1 Liquidity Indicators \nThe industry’s liquidity position remained strong in August 2024, with improvements in both core and broad measures \nfollowing the increase in the cash reserve requirement. The ratio of core liquid assets (mainly cash and due from banks) \nto total deposits increased from 33.4 percent in August 2023 to 47.4 percent in August 2024, while the ratio of core \nliquid assets to total assets increased from 25.9 percent to 35.6 percent. The ratio of broad liquid assets to total deposits \nalso increased from 84.4 percent to 93.1 percent, while the ratio of broad liquid assets to total assets ratio increased \nfrom 65.5 percent to 69.9 percent over the review period. \n \n5.3.2 Capital Adequacy Ratio \nThe industry’s solvency position, measured by the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR), stood at 10.2 percent in August \n2024, higher than the 7.5 percent recorded in August 2023. This development was on account of the rebound in \nprofitability following the DDEP implementation, as well as the ongoing recapitalisation of the sector. With reliefs, \nCAR was 13.8 percent in August 2024, compared to 14.2 percent in August 2023. \n \n5.3.3 Profitability \nThe banking industry remained profitable for the first eight months of 2024, recording a growth of 19.4 percent (to \nGH¢10.3 billion) in profit-before-tax (PBT), and a growth of 17.6 percent (to GH¢6.7 billion) in profit-after-tax (PAT). \n7.4\n8.6\n5.4\n7.2\n4.9\n5.8\n3.5\n4.7\n0.0\n1.0\n2.0\n3.0\n4.0\n5.0\n6.0\n7.0\n8.0\n9.0\n10.0\n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\n50.0\n60.0\n70.0\n80.0\n90.0\nAug-22\nAug-23\nJun-24\nAug-24\nEfficiency Indicators (%)\nCost to income\nOperational Cost to gross income\nCost to total assets (RHS)\nOperational Cost to total assets (RHS)\n23.0\n36.9\n35.3\n31.4\n4.7\n5.4\n5.4\n4.9\n -\n 5.0\n 10.0\n 15.0\n 20.0\n 25.0\n 30.0\n 35.0\n 40.0\nAug-22\nAug-23\nJun-24\nAug-24\nProfitability (%)\nReturn On Equity (%) after tax\nReturn On Assets (%) before tax\n6.6 \n3.8 \n9.0 \n10.8 \n10.6 \n17.3 \n14.3 \n20.0 \n24.2 \n24.3 \n -\n 5.0\n 10.0\n 15.0\n 20.0\n 25.0\n 30.0\n -\n 5,000.0\n 10,000.0\n 15,000.0\n 20,000.0\n 25,000.0\nAug-21\nAug-22\nAug-23\nJun-24\nAug-24\nAsset Quality\nLOSS (GH¢m)\nDOUBTFUL (GH¢m)\nSUB-STD (GH¢m)\nAdjusted NPL Ratio (%)\nNPL Ratio (% Right Axis)\n14.2 \n13.7 \n7.5 \n10.2 \n -\n 2.0\n 4.0\n 6.0\n 8.0\n 10.0\n 12.0\n 14.0\n 16.0\n 18.0\n 10.0\n 15.0\n 20.0\n 25.0\n 30.0\n 35.0\n 40.0\n 45.0\n 50.0\n 55.0\nAug-23\nOct-23\nDec-23\nFeb-24\nApr-24\nJun-24\nAug-24\nSolvency (%)\nRWA/Total Assets\n CAR (with Reliefs)\nCAR (w/o Reliefs)\n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n28 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nThis was relative to GH¢8.6 billion in PBT and GH¢5.7 billion in PAT recorded in August 2023, both of which were \nmoderations in growth. \n \nLargely, all income lines grew, but at a slower pace, in August 2024 compared to the same period last year. Net interest \nincome picked up by 16.9 percent to GH¢15.8 billion, lower than the corresponding growth of 37.9 percent in 2023. \nOn year-on-year terms, interest income improved by 18.7 percent to GH¢24.1 billion, up from GH¢20.3 billion in \nAugust 2023. Interest expenses also increased to GH¢8.4 billion, up from GH¢6.9 billion in August 2023, representing \na growth rate of 22.1 percent relative to the 37.5 percent growth recorded in August 2023. The slowdown in growth in \nnet interest income was attributable to the lower rates on lending and money market instruments in August 2024 \ncompared to August 2023. \n \n Figure 5.3: Composition of Income, Cost and Borrowings \n \n Source: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculation \n \nNet fees and commissions recorded a slower growth of 22.9 percent, from 27.3 percent a year ago, while “other \nincome” contracted by 2.9 percent to GH¢3.3 million, from GH¢3.4 billion (64.6% growth) during the same review \nperiod. These developments resulted in a 10.9 percent growth in the industry’s net operating income, compared with \nthe 39.9 percent growth recorded in August 2023. \n \nThe cost lines also recorded similar increases but at lower growth rates compared to the same period in 2023. The \nindustry’s operating expenses grew by 18.9 percent in August 2024, compared to 40.1 percent in 2023, on the back of \nlower growth in staff costs and other operating (administrative) expenses. Provisions for depreciation, bad debt and \nimpairment losses on financial assets, however, contracted by 19.2 percent, compared to 34.4 percent increase recorded \nin August 2023 on account the domestic debt restructuring. \n \n33.0\n32.6\n35.2\n34.3\n41.5\n41.8\n43.3\n42.8\n11.7\n11.5\n6.0\n8.0\n13.8\n14.1\n15.6\n14.9\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\n100\nComposition of Cost (%)\nInterest Expense\nOperating Expense\nTotal Provision\nTax\n45.3\n40.8\n42.0\n41.6\n31.9\n35.5\n36.3\n36.2\n12.2\n11.2\n11.4\n11.8\n10.6\n12.6\n10.2\n10.5\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\n100\nComposition of Banks' Income (%)\nInvestments\nLoans\nCommissions & Fees\nOther Income\n44.6\n49.6\n62.3\n71.9\n75.2\n55.4\n50.4\n37.7\n28.1\n24.8\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\n100\nAug-21\nAug-22\nAug-23\nJun-24\nAug-24\nBanks' Borrowing by Source (% of Total)\n Domestic Borrowing\n Foreign Borrowing\n51.8\n52.2\n26.1\n38.3\n33.8\n48.2\n47.8\n73.9\n61.7\n66.2\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\n100\nAug-21\nAug-22\nAug-23\nJun-24\nAug-24\nBanks' External Borrowing by Maturity (% of \nTotal)\nShort-term borrowings\nLong term borrowings\n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n29 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n(a) Return on Assets and Return on Equity \nThe banking sector’s profitability indicators, namely, return-on-assets (ROA) and return-on-equity (ROE), moderated \nduring the period under review following the slowdown in growth of PBT and PAT. The ROE declined from 36.9 \npercent to 31.4 percent in August 2024, while the ROA moderated to 4.9 percent from 5.4 percent over the same \ncomparative period. \n \n(b) Interest Margin and Spread \nInterest spreads for the banking sector widened to 8.3 percent in August 2024, from 8.1 percent in August 2023. The \nincrease in spreads was on the back of a decline in interest payable to 3.9 percent, from 4.1 percent a year earlier, while \ngross yields remained unchanged during the reference period. The interest margin to total assets ratio also fell to 4.6 \npercent from 5.5 percent, while interest margin to gross income increased marginally to 50.8 percent from 50.5 percent \nduring the period under review. The ratio of gross income to total assets (asset utilisation) declined to 9.1 percent from \n10.9 percent in August 2023, while the profitability ratio increased marginally to 21.5 percent from 21.3 percent over \nthe review period. \n \n(c) Composition of Banks’ Income \nIncome from investments remained the largest component of banks’ total income, with its share growing to 41.6 \npercent from 40.8 percent in August 2023. The share of interest income from loans also rose to 36.2 percent from 35.5 \npercent, in line with the increase in gross advances during the year. The share of banks’ income from fees and \ncommissions, similarly, increased to 11.8 percent from 11.2 percent, while the share of income from other sources \ndeclined to 10.5 percent from 12.6 percent. \n \n5.3.4 Operational Efficiency \nThe industry’s efficiency generally improved on the back of the slowdown in growth of operating expenses during the \nreview period. The cost-to-income ratio improved to 78.5 percent from 78.7 percent in August 2023, while cost-to-\ntotal assets ratio improved to 7.2 percent from 8.6 percent. The operational cost-to-total assets ratio also went down to \n4.7 percent from 5.8 percent while the ratio of operational cost to total income improved to 51.6 percent in August \n2024 from 53.0 percent. \n \n5.3.5 Banks’ Counterparty Relationships \nTotal offshore balances grew by 88.6 percent to GH¢29.3 billion in August 2024, compared to the 39.7 percent growth \nrecorded in the previous year, driven largely by growth in nostro balances and placements. Nostro balances grew by \n99.6 percent, compared with a growth of 12.9 percent in August 2023. Growth in industry placements was also higher \nat 81.5 percent, compared to the growth of 67.1 percent during the same period last year. Accordingly, the ratio of \noffshore balances to net worth increased to 87.6 percent, from 65.0 percent in August 2023. \n \nThe share of banks’ external borrowings in total borrowings declined to 24.8 percent from 37.7 percent in August \n2023, while the share of domestic borrowings increased to 75.2 percent from 62.3 percent over the same period. Banks’ \nexternal borrowings were directed towards long-term instruments, although the share of long-term borrowings in total \nexternal borrowings declined to 66.2 percent in August 2024 from 73.9 percent in August 2023, while the share of \nshort-term borrowings increased to 33.8 percent from 26.1 percent over the same period. \n \n5.4 Credit Conditions Survey \nResults of the August 2024 Credit Conditions Survey indicated a net easing in the overall stance on loans to enterprises \nbetween July and August 2024, on the back of a net easing in the stance on loans to large enterprises. Banks projected \n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n30 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nthat their overall stance on enterprise loans would tighten in the next two months, from net tightening in all components \nof enterprise loans. \n \nThe overall stance on loans to households also eased marginally during the August 2024 survey round from a net ease \nin the stance on consumer credit whereas the stance on loans for house purchases tightened in August 2024. Over the \nnext two months, banks projected a further net easing in the overall stance on loans to households, which would be \nreflected in loans for house purchases and consumer credit. \n \nThe August 2024 survey further indicated an increase in overall demand for enterprise loans from net increases in all \ncomponents of enterprise loans except long-term loans. Banks projected that demand for corporate loans would \ncontinue to increase in the next two months, driven by net increases in the demand for all categories of enterprise loans. \nCredit demand by households, on the other hand, softened between July and August 2024, from a net decrease in the \ndemand for mortgages and consumer credit and other lending. Over the next two months, however, banks projected a \npickup in the demand for consumer credit to drive an increase in the overall demand for household loans. \n \n Figure 5.4: Credit Conditions Survey Results \n \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n \n5.5 Conclusion and Outlook \nThe banking sector’s performance in August 2024 pointed to continuing recovery from the macroeconomic challenges \nsince the 2022 crisis. The Capital Adequacy Ratio adjusted for regulatory reliefs was above the required minimum as \nat end-August 2024, reflecting the rebound in profitability following the Domestic Debt Exchange Programme \n-10\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\nNPR (%)\nSmall and Medium Enterprises\nLarge Enterprises\nOverall Credit Stance for Enterprises\nShort term enterprise loans\nLong term enterprise loans\nIndex, a rise denotes tightening\nCorporates\n-5\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n35\nNPR (%)\nLoans for house purchase\nConsumer credit and other lending\nOverall stance to Households\nIndex, a rise denotes tightening\nHouseholds\n-40\n-30\n-20\n-10\n0\n10\n20\n30\nOverall Demand for credit\nSmall and Medium Enterprises\nLarge Enterprises\nShort term\nLong term\nIndex, a rise denotes increase in demand\nCorporates\n-40\n-30\n-20\n-10\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\nNPR (%)\nLoan for house purchase\nLoan for consumer credit\nOverall Household demand for loans\nIndex, a rise denotes increase in demand\nHouseholds\n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n31 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nimplementation, as well as the ongoing recapitalisation of the sector. The banking sector was also profitable, with \nimprovements in liquidity and efficiency during the review period. Asset quality concerns, however, remained a strain \non the performance of the sector. The industry’s outlook remains stable, contingent on the recapitalisation of the sector \nby the 2025 deadline and enforcement of stringent credit underwriting standards, and intensification of loan recovery \nefforts to address asset quality concerns in the sector. \n \n \n \n \n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n32 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n \n6. Fiscal Developments \n \n6.0 Highlights \nProvisional data on budget execution from January to July 2024 indicated an overall fiscal deficit (commitment basis) \nof 2.4 percent of GDP, against the budget target of 2.8 percent of GDP. The deficit of GH¢24.8 billion was financed \nfrom domestic (GH¢ 24.2 billion) and foreign (GH¢17.4 billion) sources. The primary balance for the period was a \ndeficit of GH¢3.8 billion (0.4% of GDP), against a primary deficit target of GH¢3.5 billion (0.3% of GDP) \n \n6.1 Total Revenue and Grants \nTotal revenue and grants as of July 2024 was GH¢89.35 billion (8.8% of GDP), slightly higher than the target of \nGH¢88.74 billion (8.7 % of GDP). The outturn represented an excess of 0.7 percent over the target and a year-on-year \ngrowth of 27.5 percent. Domestic revenue totalled GH¢88.90 billion (8.7% of GDP), marginally above the target of \nGH¢86.86 billion (8.5% of GDP). \n \nTax revenue (comprising taxes on income & property, taxes on domestic goods and services and international trade \ntaxes, excluding oil and gas related taxes) was GH¢72.20 billion (7.1% of GDP), higher than the target of GH¢69.62 \nbillion (6.8% of GDP). \n \nTaxes on income and property (made up of personal income tax, company taxes, royalties from oil and minerals, and \nother direct taxes) totalled GH¢35.15 billion (3.4% of GDP), 13.1 percent above the target of GH¢31.07 billion (3.0% \nof GDP). All the components exceeded their targets except personal taxes and company taxes on oil. The total \ncollections from this tax handle was also higher than the GH¢27.56 billion collected in the corresponding period of \n2023, reflecting a year-on-year growth of 27.5 percent. \n \nTaxes on domestic goods and services (consisting of Domestic VAT, Excise Duty, GET Fund Levy, National Health \nInsurance Levy (NHIL) and Communication Service Tax) totalled GH¢31.10 billion (3.0% of GDP), falling by 9.1 \npercent below the target of GH¢34.18 billion. On year-on-year basis, the outturn represented a growth of 26.7 percent. \n \nNon-tax revenue raked in GH¢13.12 billion, slightly lower than the target of GH¢13.13 billion and represented a year-\non-year growth of 35.7 percent. \n \nTaxes on international trade (comprising mainly import duties) was GH¢10.21 billion, above the target of GH¢9.21 \nbillion by 10.8 percent. This tax handle also recorded a year-on-year growth of 38.3 percent. \n \n“Other revenue” of GH¢2.92 billion failed to meet its target of GH¢3.58 billion, recording a negative deviation of 18.4 \npercent. However, this outturn was above the total of GH¢2.86 billion collected in the corresponding period of 2023, \nreflecting a year-on-year increase of 2.0 percent. \n \nGrants received over the review period totalled GH¢457.3 million, significantly below GH¢1.88 billion programmed \nfor the review period, thus falling below its target by 75.7 percent. The outturn was also lower than GH¢1.03 billion \nreceived in the corresponding period of 2023. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n33 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nTable 6.1: Total Revenue and Grants \n \n Source: Ministry of Finance \n \n6.2 Total Expenditures \nTotal expenditures (including arrears clearance and discrepancy) for the review period totalled GH¢116.66 billion \n(11.4% of GDP). This was below the target of GH¢117.45 billion (11.5% of GDP). It also represented a 41.2 percent \nyear-on-year growth. \n \nCompensation of employees (including wages and salaries, pensions & gratuities, and other wage related expenditure) \nwas GH¢35.24 billion, marginally higher than the target of GH¢35.19 billion, and a year-on-year growth of 25.7 \npercent. In terms of fiscal flexibility, compensation of employees constituted 39.6 percent of domestic revenue \nmobilized during the period under review. \n \nUse of goods and services totalled GH¢7.96 billion, higher than the expected target of GH¢4.67 billion, an overrun of \n70.5 percent. This expense was also higher than the GH¢7.43 billion recorded in the corresponding period of 2023, \nreflecting a year-on-year expansion of 7.1 percent. \n \nTotal interest payments of GH¢20.97 billion fell below the programmed target of GH¢25.19 billion. This compares \nwith GH¢15.91 billion recorded in the corresponding period of 2023. The fall in interest payments was mainly on \naccount of a partial freeze on external debt service. \n \nGrants to other government units (made up of National Health Fund, Education Trust Fund, Road Fund, Energy Fund, \nDistrict Assemblies Common Fund, Retention of IGFs, transfer to GNPC, Ghana Infrastructure Fund and other \nearmarked funds) was GH¢22.67 billion, higher than the expected target of GH¢20.71 billion, resulting in an overrun \nof 9.3 percent. It also recorded a year-on-year growth of 42.3 percent. \n \nMillion Ghana Cedis\n2023\n2024\n2024\n2024\n2024\n2024\nJAN-JUL\nQ1+Q2\nJAN-JUL\nJAN-JUL\nDEYIATION\nY-O-Y\nOUTTURN OUTTURN\nOUTTURN\nPROG\nOYER(+)/ BELOW(-\nGROWTH\nTAX REVENUE\n55,981.9\n \n59,696.6\n \n72,159.50\n \n69,619.0\n \n3.6\n \n28.9\n \nTAXES ON INCOME & PROPERTY\n27,563.2\n \n28,676.0\n \n35,152.23\n \n31,069.0\n \n13.1\n \n27.5\n \nPersonal\n9,653.6\n \n9,418.3\n \n12,174.03\n \n12,240.1\n \n(0.5)\n \n26.1\n \nCompanies\n11,348.6\n \n12,152.2\n \n14,248.56\n \n11,356.4\n \n25.5\n \n25.6\n \nCompany Taxes on Oil\n1,833.5\n \n1,821.9\n \n1,821.88\n \n2,564.8\n \n(29.0)\n \n(0.6)\n \nOthers \n4,727.4\n \n5,283.6\n \n6,907.76\n \n4,907.7\n \n40.8\n \n46.1\n \nTAXES ON DOMESTIC GOODS AND SERYICES\n24,529.0\n \n25,966.6\n \n31,066.8\n \n34,175.7\n \n(9.1)\n \n26.7\n \nExcises\n3,189.8\n \n3,250.8\n \n3,813.9\n \n5,112.7\n \n(25.4)\n \n19.6\n \nVAT\n13,330.5\n \n14,312.2\n \n17,065.2\n \n17,596.2\n \n(3.0)\n \n28.0\n \nNational Health Insurance Levy (NHIL) \n2,960.4\n \n3,066.4\n \n3,685.5\n \n3,982.9\n \n(7.5)\n \n24.5\n \nGETFund Levy\n2,961.2\n \n3,066.5\n \n3,685.6\n \n3,983.9\n \n(7.5)\n \n24.5\n \nCommunication Service Tax\n375.4\n \n367.3\n \n465.3\n \n692.4\n \n(32.8)\n \n24.0\n \nE-Transaction Levy\n537.0\n \n810.5\n \n1,006.2\n \n1,128.8\n \n(10.9)\n \n87.4\n \nCovid-19 Health Levy\n1,174.6\n \n1,092.8\n \n1,345.2\n \n1,678.8\n \n(19.9)\n \n14.5\n \nTAXES ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE\n7,381.3\n \n8,386.2\n \n10,206.1\n \n9,211.6\n \n10.8\n \n38.3\n \nImports Duty\n7,381.3\n \n8,386.2\n \n10,206.1\n \n9,211.6\n \nTAX REFUND\n(3,491.6)\n \n(3,332.2)\n \n(4,265.7)\n \n(4,837.3)\n \n(11.8)\n \n22.2\n \nSOCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS\n565.0\n \n692.6\n \n692.6\n \n536.7\n \n29.1\n \n22.6\n \nNON-TAX REVENUE\n9,674.3\n \n11,265.1\n \n13,124.3\n \n13,127.4\n \n(0.0)\n \n35.7\n \nOTHER REVENUE\n2,861.8\n \n2,539.5\n \n2,919.5\n \n3,579.8\n \n(18.4)\n \n2.0\n \nDOMESTIC REVENUE\n69,083.0\n \n74,193.7\n \n88,895.9\n \n86,862.9\n \n2.3\n \n28.7\n \nGRANTS\n1,025.1\n \n457.3\n \n457.3\n \n1,879.7\n \n(75.7)\n \n(55.4)\n \nProject Grants\n1,025.1\n \n457.3\n \n457.3\n \n1,153.4\n \nProgramme Grants\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n726.3\n \nTOTAL REVENUE & GRANTS\n70,108.1\n \n74,651.0\n \n89,353.2\n \n88,742.62\n \n0.69\n \n27.5\n \n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n34 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nCapital expenditure was GH¢16.02 billion (1.6% of GDP), lower than the programmed target of GH¢20.27 billion \n(2.0% of GDP). This outturn represented a year-on-year growth of 67.5 percent. \n \n“Other expenditure” for the first seven months of 2024 was GH¢13.29 billion, 24.4 percent above the target of \nGH¢10.68 billion. Out of this, energy sector payment shortfalls totalled GH¢10.60 billion (1.0% of GDP), higher than \nthe programmed target of GH¢4.76 billion (0.5% of GDP). The outturn of GH¢13.29 billion dwarfs the GH¢ 5.52 \nbillion recorded in the corresponding period of 2023. \n \nTable 6.2: Total Expenditures \n \nSource: Ministry of Finance \n \n \n6.3 Budget Balance and Financing \nGovernment budgetary operations resulted in an overall budget deficit of GH¢24.78 billion (2.4% of GDP) on \ncommitment basis for the period of Jan-July 2024. This was lower than the targeted deficit of GH¢28.71 billion (2.8% \nof GDP). In addition, the primary balance recorded a deficit of 0.4 percent of GDP, against a target of 0.3 percent of \nGDP. On cash basis, the overall budget deficit was GH¢39.62 billion (3.9% of GDP) compared to the target of \nGH¢35.79 billion (3.5% of GDP). The primary deficit on cash basis was GH¢18.65 billion (1.8% of GDP) compared \nto GH¢10.61 billion (1.0% of GDP). \n \nThe overall balance of GH¢24.78 billion was financed largely from domestic sources. Domestic financing (net) was \nGH¢24.23 billion (2.4% of GDP), higher than GH¢19.63 billion (2.3% of GDP) recorded in the same period in 2023. \nForeign financing recorded a net inflow of GH¢17.41 billion (1.7% of GDP), higher than the programmed target of \nGH¢14.62 billion (1.4% of GDP). \n \n \n \nMillion Ghana Cedis\n2023\n2024\n2024\n2024\n2024\n2024\nJAN-JUL\nQ1+Q2\nJAN-JUL\nJAN-JUL\nDEYIATION\nY-O-Y\nOUTTURN\nOUTTURN OUTTURN\nYROG\nOYER(+)/ BELOW(-)\nGROWTH\nCompensation of Employees\n28,031.9\n \n29,298.2\n \n35,237.4\n \n35,193.4\n \n0.1\n \n25.7\n \nWages & Salaries\n24,906.5\n \n26,278.3\n \n31,345.9\n \n31,885.4\n \n(1.7)\n \n25.9\n \nSocial Contributions\n3,125.4\n \n3,019.9\n \n3,891.4\n \n3,308.0\n \n17.6\n \n24.5\n \nUse of Goods and Services\n7,432.0\n \n5,773.9\n \n7,961.6\n \n4,669.5\n \n70.5\n \n7.1\n \nInterest Payment\n15,909.2\n \n19,028.5\n \n20,969.8\n \n25,186.2\n \n(16.7)\n \n31.8\n \nDomestic\n14,674.0\n \n18,463.1\n \n20,326.2\n \n20,662.2\n \n(1.6)\n \n38.5\n \nExternal (Due)\n1,235.3\n \n565.4\n \n643.6\n \n4,524.0\n \n(85.8)\n \n(47.9)\n \nSubsidies \n0.0\n145.3\n145.3\n173.7\n(16.4)\n \nGrants to Other Government Un\n15,933.7\n \n19,698.3\n \n22,669.7\n \n20,741.9\n \n9.3\n \n42.3\n \nSocial Benefits\n221.7\n \n376.8\n \n376.8\n \n535.0\n \n(29.6)\n \n70.0\n \nOther Expenditure\n5,517.4\n \n12,976.9\n \n13,287.5\n \n10,679.4\n \n24.4\n \n140.8\n \no/w Energy Sector Payment Sh\n3,043.1\n \n10,600.6\n \n10,600.6\n \n4,761.7\n \n122.6\n \n248.3\n \nCapital Expenditure\n9,559.6\n \n13,914.8\n \n16,016.7\n \n20,270.4\n \n(21.0)\n \n67.5\n \nDomestic financed\n2,699.4\n \n7,450.3\n \n8,275.9\n \n11,152.9\n \n(25.8)\n \n206.6\n \nForeign financed\n6,860.2\n \n6,464.4\n \n7,740.9\n \n9,117.5\n \n(15.1)\n \n12.8\n \nTOTAL EXPENDITURE\n82,605.4\n \n101,212.7\n \n116,664.8\n \n117,449.5\n \n(0.7)\n \n41.2\n \n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n35 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nTable 6.3: Budget Balance and Financing \n \nSource: Ministry of Finance \n \n \n \n \n \nMillion Ghana Cedis\n2023\n2024\n2024\n2024\n2024\n2024\nJAN-JUL\nQ1+Q2\nJAN-JUL\nJAN-JUL\nDEYIATION\nY-O-Y\nOUTTURN OUTTURN\nOUTTURN\nPROG\nOYER(+)/ BELOW(-)\nGROWTH\nRevenue & Grants\n70,108.1\n \n74,651.0\n \n89,353.2\n \n88,742.6\n \n0.69\n \n27.5\n \nExpenditure\n82,605.4\n \n101,212.7\n \n116,664.8\n \n117,449.5\n \n(0.7)\n \n41.2\n \nOverall balance (commitment)\n(23,806.5)\n \n(26,561.8)\n \n(24,776.1)\n \n(28,706.9)\n \n(13.7)\n \n4.1\n \n(percent of GDP)\n(2.8)\n \n(2.6)\n \n(2.4)\n \n(2.8)\n \nPayables/Arrears Clearance (Net)\n328.1\n \n(14,848.0)\n \n(14,848.0)\n \n(7,087.8)\n \n109.5\n \n(4,625.3)\n \no/w Clearance of Arrears\n(8,142.3)\n \n(19,383.5)\n \n(19,383.5)\n \n(7,087.8)\n \n173.5\n \n138.1\n \no/w Payables build-up\n8,470.4\n \n4535.5\n4535.5\n0.0\no/w Outstanding payables build-up repo\n8,470.4\n \n4535.5\n4535.5\n0.0\nOverall balance (cash)\n(12,169.3)\n \n(41,409.8)\n \n(39,624.1)\n \n(35,794.7)\n \n10.7\n \n225.6\n \n(percent of GDP)\n(1.4)\n \n(4.1)\n \n-3.9\n-3.5\nDiscrepancy\n(11,309.1)\n \n5,278.1\n \n2,535.6\n \n2,535.6\n \n(122.4)\n \nOverall balance (incl. Divestiture and Discrep\n(23,478.4)\n \n(41,409.8)\n \n(42,159.7)\n \n(35,794.7)\n \n17.8\n79.6\n \n(percent of GDP)\n(2.8)\n \n(4.1)\n \n-4.1\n-3.5\nFinancing\n23,478.4\n \n36,131.7\n \n39,624.1\n \n35,794.7\n \n10.7\n \n68.8\n \nForeign (net)\n3,992.9\n \n16,424.4\n \n17,407.6\n \n14,618.5\n \n19.1\n \n336.0\n \nBorrowing\n7,335.1\n \n17,503.4\n \n18,779.8\n \n16,624.1\n \n13.0\n \n156.0\n \nProject loans\n5,835.1\n \n6,007.2\n \n7,283.6\n \n7,964.1\n \n(8.5)\n \n24.8\n \nProgramme Loans\n1500.0\n11,496.2\n \n11,496.2\n \n8,660.0\n \n32.8\n \n666.4\n \nSovereign Bond\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nAmortisation (due)\n(3,342.2)\n \n(1,078.9)\n \n(1,372.2)\n \n(2,005.6)\n \n(31.6)\n \n(58.9)\n \nDomestic (net)\n19,629.7\n \n21,603.3\n \n24,232.8\n \n21,953.8\n \n10.4\n \n23.4\n \nBanking\n10,073.6\n \n(3,146.8)\n \n(2,259.0)\n \n28,518.2\n \n(107.9)\n \n(122.4)\n \nBank of Ghana\n3,016.6\n \n(4,075.0)\n \n(3,187.2)\n \n0.0\n(205.7)\n \no/w SDR \n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nComm. Banks\n7,057.1\n \n928.2\n \n928.2\n \n28,518.2\n \n(96.7)\n \n(86.8)\n \nNon-banks\n4,883.9\n \n24,750.1\n \n0.0\n0.0\n(100.0)\n \nOther Domestic\n4,672.2\n \n0.0\n26,491.8\n \n11,958.3\n \no/w Buffer for Auction Shortfalls\n-\n \n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\no/w Domestic Standard Loan\n-120.5\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nGhana Petroleum Funds\n(521.9)\n \n(814.1)\n \n(934.3)\n \n(630.5)\n \n48.2\n \n79.0\n \nTransfer to Ghana Petroleum Funds\n(1,481.3)\n \n(1,336.7)\n \n(1,737.6)\n \n(2,101.7)\n \n(17.3)\n \n17.3\n \no/w Stabilisation Fund \n(1,036.9)\n \n(935.7)\n \n(1,216.3)\n \n(1,471.2)\n \n(17.3)\n \n17.3\n \no/w Heritage Fund \n(444.4)\n \n(401.0)\n \n(521.3)\n \n(630.5)\n \n(17.3)\n \n17.3\n \nTransfer from Stabilisation Fund\n959.5\n522.6\n803.3\n \n1,471.2\n \n(45.4)\n \n(16.3)\n \nSinking Fund\n377.6\n(1,082.0)\n \n(1,082.0)\n \n(147.1)\n \n635.4\n \n(386.5)\n \nContingency Fund\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nNominal GDP (Including Oil)\n841,632.9\n \n1,020,179.9\n \n1,020,179.9\n \n1,020,179.9\n \nNominal GDP (Excluding oil)\n803,900.9\n \n904,452.9\n \n904,452.9\n \n904,452.9\n \n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n36 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n6.4 Public Debt Analysis \nThe stock of public debt at the end of July 2024 stood at GH¢761.3 billion, showing an increase of GH¢152.7 billion \nover the end-December 2023 stock of GH¢608.58 billion. This was largely due to net exchange rate effect and the \ndepreciation of the Ghanaian cedi. \n \nTable 6.4: Public Debt \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana, Ministry of Finance \n \n6.5 Conclusion \nBudget execution for the period January to July 2024 showed a revenue outturn that was slightly above target and a \ntotal expenditure that was marginally below target. The revenue overperformance was largely on account of higher-\nthan-programmed receipts from tax revenue for the period. The expenditure performance on the other hand was partly \nattributed to reduced spending on debt servicing, and lower-than-programmed capital expenditures. These \ndevelopments resulted in an overall budget deficit (commitment) which was below the target, and mainly financed \nfrom domestic sources. \n \n \n \n2023\n2024\n2024\n2024\n2024\n2024\n2024\n2024\nJul 2024 -Dec \n2023\nDECEMBER\nJANUARY\nFEBRUARY\nMARCH\nAPRIL\nMAY\nJUNE\nJULY \nCHANGE \nTOTAL DOMESTIC DEBT (GH¢m)\n257,295.9\n265,610.2\n275,784.5\n282,922.8\n284,791.2\n287,013.2\n289,990.1\n290,908.2\n33,612.3\n SHORT TERM\n67,069.0\n75,095.3\n82,105.8\n89,076.2\n89,081.7\n90,982.3\n93,542.5\n94,678.6\n27,609.6\n MEDIUM-TERM\n123,633.0\n123,930.0\n125,794.3\n126,023.5\n126,816.4\n127,084.2\n127,374.6\n127,368.4\n3,735.5\n LONG-TERM\n65,138.6\n65,138.6\n66,494.0\n66,494.0\n67,684.1\n67,684.1\n67,771.6\n67,661.5\n2,522.9\n STANDARD LOANS\n1,455.3\n1,446.4\n1,390.4\n1,329.1\n1,209.0\n1,262.5\n1,301.4\n1,199.6\n(255.7)\nHOLDINGS OF DOMESTIC DEBT (GH¢m)\n255,840.6\n264,163.9\n274,394.0\n281,593.7\n283,582.3\n285,750.7\n288,688.7\n289,708.6\n33,868.0\n BANKING SYSTEM\n130,576.8\n134,125.8\n140,141.1\n141,325.8\n139,616.4\n137,635.8\n136,270.9\n134,021.8\n3,445.0\n NON-BANK\n112,206.7\n116,972.5\n120,950.6\n127,045.8\n130,759.8\n134,916.1\n139,211.1\n142,125.5\n29,918.7\n FOREIGN SECTOR (Non-Resident)\n13,057.0\n13,065.6\n13,302.3\n13,222.1\n13,206.1\n13,198.7\n13,206.7\n13,561.3\n504.2\nTOTAL EXTERNAL(US$m)\n30,156.2\n30,597.1\n30,658.7\n30,946.5\n30,929.5\n31,061.8\n31,037.3\n31,566.3\n1,410.1\n MULTILATERAL\n9,115.0\n9,638.9\n9,682.8\n9,981.6\n10,003.9\n10,029.9\n10,056.6\n10,541.7\n1,426.7\n BILATERAL\n5,456.9\n5,395.5\n5,413.0\n5,404.4\n5,374.2\n5,469.9\n5,430.5\n5,465.1\n8.2\n COMMERCIAL\n15,584.3\n15,562.6\n15,562.9\n15,560.4\n15,551.4\n15,562.0\n15,550.2\n15,559.5\n(24.8)\nTOTAL EXTERNAL(GH¢m)\n351,283.6\n367,734.1\n380,241.3\n398,442.2\n409,840.1\n438,123.7\n452,160.3\n470,366.5\n119,082.9\nTOTAL PUBLIC DEBT (GH¢m)\n608,579.5\n633,344.4\n656,025.8\n681,365.0\n694,631.3\n725,136.9\n742,150.4\n761,274.7\n152,695.2\nEXCHANGE RATE (End Period Selling MOF)\n11.6488\n12.0186\n12.4024\n12.8752\n13.2508\n14.1049\n14.5683\n14.9009\nMEMORANDUM ITEMS\nNOMINAL GDP ( GH¢m)\n841,632.9\n1,020,179.9\n1,020,179.9\n1,020,179.9\n1,020,179.9\n1,020,179.9\n1,020,179.9\n1,020,179.9\nTOTAL DEBT /GDP RATIO (%) \n72.31\n62.08\n64.30\n66.79\n68.09\n71.08\n72.75\n74.62\nEXTERNAL DEBT/GDP \n41.7\n36.0\n37.3\n39.1\n40.2\n42.9\n44.3\n46.1\nDOMESTIC DEBT/GDP \n30.6\n26.0\n27.0\n27.7\n27.9\n28.1\n28.4\n28.5\nEXTERNAL DEBT/TOTAL DEBT \n57.7\n58.1\n58.0\n58.5\n59.0\n60.4\n60.9\n61.8\nDOMESTIC DEBT/TOTAL DEBT \n42.3\n41.9\n42.0\n41.5\n41.0\n39.6\n39.1\n38.2\n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n37 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n7. Price Developments \n \n7.0 Highlights \nDomestic price developments since the last Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting indicate a disinflation process \nthat remains on track. This was largely supported by the still tight monetary policy stance and easing food inflation. \nHeadline inflation has declined consistently since the last MPC to 20.4 percent in August, from 22.8 percent in June, \nand 20.9 percent in July 2024, driven mainly by food inflation. The Bank’s main core measure of inflation, which \nisolates prices of energy and utility items from the consumer basket, eased to 19.4 percent in August 2024 from 22.1 \npercent in June. \n \n7.1 Domestic Inflation \nDomestic price developments indicate that the disinflation process remains on track. Headline inflation decreased to \n20.4 percent in August 2024, down from 22.8 percent in June 2024 and 25.8 percent in March. The August outturn \nmarked a continuous decline in headline inflation over the past five-months. \n \nThe decline in headline inflation observed for the month of August was primarily on the back of food inflation. Food \ninflation declined to 19.1 percent in August, down from 24.0 percent in June and 29.6 percent in March. In contrast, \nnon-food inflation was stickier, dropping marginally to 21.5 percent in August, from 21.6 percent in June and 22.6 \npercent in March. \n \nIn line with headline inflation, underlying inflationary pressures, as proxied by the Bank’s core measure of inflation, \nhave also broadly eased. Core inflation, which isolates prices of energy and utility items from the consumer basket, \neased to 19.4 percent in August 2024, from 22.1 percent in June, and 26.3 percent in March 2024. \n \nFigure 7.1: Headline Inflation \n \nSource: GSS and Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \nFigure 7.2: Headline vs Core Inflation (%) \n \nSource: GSS and Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n4\n14\n24\n34\n44\n54\n64\nAug-21\nNov-21\nFeb-22\nMay-22\nAug-22\nNov-22\nFeb-23\nMay-23\nAug-23\nNov-23\nFeb-24\nMay-24\nAug-24\nHeadline\nLower Band\nUpper Band\n4\n14\n24\n34\n44\n54\n64\nDec-20\nMar-21\nJun-21\nSep-21\nDec-21\nMar-22\nJun-22\nSep-22\nDec-22\nMar-23\nJun-23\nSep-23\nDec-23\nMar-24\nJun-24\nCore 1 (Excluding\nFuel, and Utilities)\nHeadline Inflation\n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n38 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nOn month-on-month basis, headline inflation also fell to -0.7 percent in August 2024, down from 2.9 percent in June \n2024 and 0.8 percent in March 2024. The decline in headline inflation was primarily driven by food inflation which \nfell to -2.2 percent in August 2024, lower than the 5.1 percent recorded in June 2024, and 1.0 percent recorded in \nMarch 2024. Monthly non-food inflation, in contrast was stickier, as it recorded 0.7 percent in August, 0.9 percent in \nJune and 0.7 percent in March. \n \nFigure 7.3 Month-on-Month Inflation (%) \n \nSource: GSS and Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \nInflation for locally imported items also decreased in August 2024 to 22.2 percent, down from 25.1 percent and the \n26.7 percent recorded in June and March respectively. Similarly, inflation for imported items, decreased to 16.1 percent \nin August, from 17.5 percent in June and 23.8 percent in March 2024. \n \nFigure 7.4 Inflation for Locally Produced and Imported Items (%) \n \nSource: GSS and Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \nAn analysis of inflation by sub-groups showed broad declines across the non-food CPI components. Specifically, from \nJune 2024 to August 2024, inflation declined for the following sub-groups: Alcoholic beverages, tobacco & narcotics \n(25% in August vs 32.3% in June 2024), clothing & footwear (17.9% vs 18.2%), furnishings & household equipment \n(12.6% vs 17.0%), health (20.6% vs 22.6%), recreation & culture (19.6 vs 20.5%), hotels, cafes & restaurants (29.5% \nvs 30.7%), and personal care & miscellaneous goods (14.9% vs 19.5%). \n \n2.9\n5.1\n0.9\n2.1\n1.7\n2.4\n-0.7\n-2.2\n0.7\n-4\n-2\n0\n2\n4\n6\nHeadline\nFood\nNon-food\nAug-23\nSep-23\nOct-23\nNov-23\nDec-23\nJan-24\nFeb-24\n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\n50.0\n60.0\n70.0\nJan-22\nFeb-22\nMar-22\nApr-22\nMay-22\nJun-22\nJul-22\nAug-22\nSep-22\nOct-22\nNov-22\nDec-22\nJan-23\nFeb-23\nMar-23\nApr-23\nMay-23\nJun-23\nJul-23\nAug-23\nSep-23\nOct-23\nNov-23\nDec-23\nJan-24\nFeb-24\nMar-24\nApr-24\nMay-24\nJun-24\nJul-24\nAug-24\nLocally produced Items\nImported Items\n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n39 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nTable 7.1 CPI Components \n \nSource: GSS and Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n7.2 Inflation Risk Assessment and Outlook \nSince the first quarter of 2024, headline inflation has declined for five consecutive months by 5.4 percentage points. \nCore inflation has also dropped sharply over the same comparative period by 6.9 percentage points, an indication that \nthe disinflation process is set to continue, anchored on a tight monetary policy stance and improved exchange rate \nstability. The latest forecasts show that inflation will continue to ease towards the target range of 13-17 percent for the \nyear and steadily decline towards the medium-term target of 8±2 percent by the end of 2025, barring unanticipated \nshocks. Risks such as shocks to crude oil prices from rising geopolitical tensions, upward utility tariff adjustments and \nfood supply bottlenecks will need to be monitored closely. These risks are expected to be moderated by tight monetary \nconditions, improved reserve buffers and tight liquidity management. \n \nDecision on the Monetary Policy Rate \nGiven the assessment of the various sectors of the economy and the implication for the inflation outlook, the Monetary \nPolicy Committee decided to lower the Monetary Policy Rate by 200 basis points to 27.0 percent. \n \n \n \n \nWeghts\nDec\nDec\nDec\nMar\nJun\nAug\nSept\nDec\nJan\nFeb\nMar\nApr\nMay\nJun\nJul\nAug\n(%)\nOverall \n100.0\n10.4\n12.6\n54.1\n45.0\n42.5\n40.1\n38.1\n23.2\n23.5\n23.2\n25.8\n25.0\n23.1\n22.8\n20.9\n20.4\nFood and Beverages\n43.1\n14.1\n12.8\n59.7\n50.8\n54.2\n51.9\n49.3\n28.7\n27.1\n27.0\n29.6\n26.8\n22.6\n24.0\n21.5\n19.1\nNon-food\n56.9\n7.7\n12.5\n49.9\n40.6\n33.4\n30.9\n29.3\n18.7\n20.5\n20.0\n22.6\n23.5\n23.6\n21.6\n20.5\n21.5\nAlcoholic Beverages, Tobacco & Narcotics\n3.7\n6.0\n9.6\n38.5\n41.2\n43.9\n46.4\n49.4\n38.2\n38.5\n38.5\n41.0\n39.4\n34.2\n32.3\n26.8\n25.0\nClothing and footwear\n8.1\n7.9\n8.6\n41.9\n38.3\n33.9\n35.4\n32.5\n22.3\n22.8\n22.5\n24.5\n23.8\n20.5\n18.2\n16.9\n17.9\nHousing and Utilities\n10.2\n20.1\n20.7\n82.3\n64.7\n49.2\n42.2\n28.6\n19.5\n22.6\n22.9\n24.9\n28.1\n26.9\n26.0\n28.6\n31.8\nFurnishings, Household Equipment\n3.2\n4.7\n9.6\n71.5\n67.4\n54.2\n52.6\n44.9\n26.9\n27.6\n25.4\n23.0\n21.3\n17.9\n17.0\n14.3\n12.6\nHealth\n0.7\n6.0\n6.0\n34.4\n27.9\n37.2\n38.3\n31.3\n23.0\n26.6\n28.1\n32.0\n31.2\n26.5\n22.6\n21.2\n20.6\nTransport\n10.1\n4.8\n17.6\n71.4\n52.0\n32.3\n26.4\n25.9\n4.4\n5.6\n3.5\n7.9\n10.3\n20.3\n19.0\n18.1\n17.4\nInformation and Communication\n3.6\n7.0\n9.0\n21.5\n15.8\n21.6\n20.4\n21.1\n14.2\n13.6\n13.5\n15.2\n14.7\n13.2\n10.4\n10.1\n12.4\nRecreation & Culture\n3.5\n1.8\n11.4\n42.4\n32.8\n29.7\n28.7\n30.1\n24.9\n25.9\n25.6\n29.4\n28.7\n24.1\n20.5\n17.1\n19.6\nEducation\n6.5\n0.2\n1.0\n11.3\n7.9\n14.3\n13.0\n11.3\n13.9\n19.8\n19.7\n23.7\n23.4\n25.2\n20.9\n18.0\n22.0\nHotels, cafes and restaurants\n4.6\n5.4\n8.9\n9.2\n6.9\n4.7\n7.6\n19.5\n28.0\n29.2\n31.9\n32.7\n33.9\n31.6\n30.7\n28.3\n29.5\nInsurance and Financial services\n0.2\n3.3\n6.3\n10.8\n10.5\n10.7\n11.1\n5.0\n8.1\n8.6\n8.9\n9.3\n9.6\n8.7\n6.2\n11.3\n12.4\nPersonal care, social protection & Miscellaneous services\n2.4\n3.8\n10.6\n60.9\n53.7\n55.1\n56.3\n49.2\n31.1\n32.0\n30.3\n33.5\n31.9\n24.3\n19.5\n16.0\n14.9\n2023\n2024\nCPI Components (%)\nSource: Ghana Statistical Service\n2020\n2021\n2022\n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n40 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nAPPENDIX \n \nTable A1: Sources of Growth in Total Liquidity (GH¢ Millions, unless otherwise stated) \n \n Source: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \nTable A2: Sources of Growth in Reserve Money (GH¢ Millions, unless otherwise stated) \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \nAppendix 1: Sources of Growth in Total Liquidity (M2+) (millions of Ghana cedis unless otherwise stated)\nAug-22\nDec-22\nAug-23\nDec-23\nMar-24\nApr-24\nMay-24\nJun-24\nJul-24\nAug-24\n1 Net Foreign Assets\n(13987.40)\n(10321.15)\n(3262.56)\n21710.89\n34085.37\n37191.77\n42110.69\n49084.99\n53866.25\n53694.05\n Bank of Ghana\n(14375.54)\n(17487.62)\n(16909.37)\n4021.06\n13251.29\n14414.95\n16083.20\n23057.19\n27477.05\n27734.59\n Commercial Banks\n388.14\n7166.46\n13646.81\n17689.83\n20834.09\n22776.82\n26027.49\n26027.80\n26389.20\n25959.46\n2 Net Domestic Assets\n166443.23\n190587.99\n217857.65\n228308.31\n227034.13\n232413.29\n233977.14\n231954.03\n233815.58\n240594.18\n3 ow: Claims on government (net)\n111504.72\n127515.37\n144411.94\n115681.46\n118345.15\n121337.10\n122803.48\n117391.93\n118552.67\n131576.91\n4 ow: Claims on Private sector( Incl. PE's)\n74602.10\n85078.76\n87747.26\n86096.51\n86193.53\n87069.71\n90489.46\n93719.28\n94573.89\n96451.37\n BOG OMO Sterilisation Acc.\n(5842.44)\n(7725.48)\n(34729.01)\n(24795.37)\n(22605.87)\n(17663.12)\n(16510.59)\n(16244.51)\n(21158.62)\n(26026.81)\n5 Total Liquidity (M2+)\n152455.83\n180266.84\n214595.09\n250019.20\n261119.50\n269605.06\n276087.83\n281039.02\n287681.83\n294288.23\n6 ow: Broad Money Supply (M2)\n110233.88\n135142.49\n154965.77\n185425.80\n190181.12\n197131.66\n198666.17\n203530.25\n209091.58\n214821.11\n7 ow: Foreign Currency Deposits(¢million)\n42221.95\n45124.35\n59629.32\n64593.40\n70938.38\n72473.40\n77421.66\n77508.78\n78590.25\n79467.11\nChange from previous year (in per cent)\n8 Net Foreign Assets\n(175.84)\n(237.04)\n(76.67)\n(310.35)\n(383.89)\n(457.88)\n(1069.85)\n7455.25\n(1952.81)\n(1745.76)\n9 Net Domestic Assets\n58.36\n48.87\n30.89\n19.79\n3.67\n6.65\n10.74\n11.00\n8.47\n10.44\n10 ow: Claims on government (net)\n56.79\n69.31\n29.51\n(9.28)\n(17.95)\n(16.71)\n(14.98)\n(14.41)\n(16.78)\n(8.89)\n11 ow: Claims on Private sector( Incl. PE's)\n33.12\n37.70\n17.62\n1.20\n(2.36)\n(0.01)\n4.10\n6.69\n7.05\n9.92\n12 ow: BOG OMO Sterilisation Acc.\n18.45\n(36.62)\n(494.43)\n(220.96)\n17.62\n9.53\n46.78\n40.44\n37.64\n25.06\n12 Total Liquidity (M2+)\n23.40\n32.98\n40.76\n38.69\n26.15\n29.91\n33.41\n34.07\n35.28\n37.14\n13 Broad Money Supply (M2)\n14.73\n27.81\n40.58\n37.21\n28.39\n30.99\n33.15\n35.62\n36.68\n38.62\n14 Foreign Currency Deposits (FCDs)\n53.72\n51.33\n41.23\n43.15\n20.53\n27.07\n34.08\n30.16\n31.70\n33.27\nCummulative change from previous year end (in per cent)\n15 Net Foreign Assets\n(285.72)\n(237.04)\n(68.39)\n(310.35)\n57.00\n71.30\n93.96\n126.08\n148.11\n147.31\n16 Net Domestic Assets\n30.01\n48.87\n14.31\n19.79\n(0.56)\n1.80\n2.48\n1.60\n2.41\n5.38\n17 o/w: Claims on government (net)\n48.05\n69.31\n13.25\n(9.28)\n2.30\n4.89\n6.16\n1.48\n2.48\n13.74\n18 Broad Money(M2+)\n12.47\n32.98\n19.04\n38.69\n4.44\n7.83\n10.43\n12.41\n15.06\n17.71\nAnnual per cent contribution to money growth\n19 Net Foreign Assets\n(26.25)\n(13.17)\n7.03\n17.77\n22.27\n22.93\n22.45\n23.11\n26.70\n26.54\n20 NDA\n49.65\n46.15\n33.72\n20.92\n3.88\n6.98\n10.96\n10.96\n8.58\n10.60\n21 Total Liquidity (M2+)\n23.40\n32.98\n40.76\n38.69\n26.15\n29.91\n33.41\n34.07\n35.28\n37.14\nMemorandum items\n22 Reserve Money \n49977.35\n68103.84\n62730.87\n87987.66\n89011.62\n105041.20\n108282.66\n110578.33\n108211.32\n116795.08\n23 NFA ($million)\n(1699.05)\n(1203.49)\n(296.08)\n1827.52\n2647.00\n2801.87\n2980.21\n3365.21\n3632.66\n3534.85\n24 Currency ratio\n0.18\n0.21\n0.17\n0.18\n0.18\n0.18\n0.19\n0.19\n0.19\n0.20\n25 FCD/M2+ \n0.28\n0.25\n0.28\n0.26\n0.27\n0.27\n0.28\n0.28\n0.27\n0.27\n26 FCD/Total Deposit \n0.33\n0.30\n0.33\n0.30\n0.32\n0.32\n0.33\n0.33\n0.33\n0.32\n27 RM multiplier\n2.21\n1.98\n2.47\n2.11\n2.14\n1.88\n1.83\n1.84\n1.93\n1.84\nAppendix 2: Sources of Growth in Reserve Money (millions of Ghana cedis unless otherwise stated)\nAug-22\nDec-22\nAug-23\nDec-23\nMar-24\nApr-24\nMay-24\nJun-24\nJul-24\nAug-24\n1 Net Foreign Assets ( NFA)\n(14375.5) (17487.6)\n(16909.4) 4021.1\n13251.3\n14415.0\n16083.2\n23057.2\n27477.0\n27734.6\n2 Net Domestic Assets ( NDA)\n64352.9\n85591.5\n79640.2\n84278.4\n75760.0\n90626.2\n92199.5\n87521.1\n80734.3\n89060.5\nof which:\n3 ow: Claims on government (net)\n63633.4\n78871.2\n87652.7\n54356.1\n50086.8\n54517.7\n57065.6\n55138.4\n56916.9\n64947.6\n4 Claims on DMB's (net)\n(7136.8)\n(4057.4)\n(9085.2)\n(9878.4)\n(16020.1)\n(12880.5)\n(11917.0) (13451.5) (19716.9) (18523.3)\n5 OMO Sterilisation Account.\n(5842.4)\n(7725.5)\n(34729.0) (24795.4)\n(22605.9)\n(17663.1)\n(16510.6) (16244.5) (21158.6) (26026.8)\n6 Reserve Money ( RM)\n49977.4\n68103.8\n62730.9\n88299.4\n89011.3\n105041.2\n108282.7 110578.3 108211.3 116795.1\n7 ow:Currency \n23075.4\n31420.6\n31284.1\n37620.7\n39677.6\n41690.8\n43382.7\n44895.6\n46752.9\n48951.9\n8 DMB's reserves\n22516.9\n31727.8\n25768.0\n38050.2\n42754.5\n56616.6\n58160.8\n58972.2\n54035.5\n60668.6\n9 Non-Bank deposits\n4385.0\n4955.3\n5678.8\n12628.5\n6579.2\n6733.8\n6739.1\n6710.6\n7422.9\n7174.5\nChange from previous year (in per cent)\n10 Net Foreign Assets\n(167.9)\n(312.0)\n17.6\n(123.0)\n(155.3)\n(162.8)\n(193.8)\n(267.7)\n(274.5)\n(264.0)\n11 Net Domestic Assets\n292.7\n144.6\n23.8\n(1.5)\n(7.4)\n(1.6)\n16.9\n15.0\n5.6\n11.8\n12 ow: Claims on government (net)\n143.5\n168.4\n37.7\n(31.1)\n(42.5)\n(38.2)\n(34.7)\n(33.5)\n(34.4)\n(25.9)\n13 Claims on DMB's (net)\n1183.2\n243.9\n(27.3)\n(143.5)\n(62.2)\n(40.6)\n(91.5)\n(58.2)\n(138.0)\n(103.9)\n14 OMO Sterilisation Account.\n18.4\n(36.6)\n(494.4)\n(221.0)\n17.6\n9.5\n46.8\n40.4\n37.6\n25.1\n15 Reserve Money ( RM)\n15.6\n57.5\n(7.9)\n29.7\n0.8\n19.0\n22.6\n25.2\n22.6\n32.3\n16 ow:Currency \n6.0\n44.3\n(0.4)\n19.7\n5.5\n10.8\n15.3\n19.3\n24.3\n30.1\nCumulative change from previous year end (in per cent)\n17 Net Foreign Assets ( NFA)\n(274.3)\n(312.0)\n(3.3)\n(123.0)\n229.5\n258.5\n300.0\n473.4\n583.3\n589.7\n18 Net Domestic Assets ( NDA)\n83.9\n144.6\n(7.0)\n(1.5)\n(10.1)\n7.5\n9.4\n3.8\n(4.2)\n5.7\n19 o/w: Claims on government (net)\n116.5\n168.4\n11.1\n(31.1)\n(7.9)\n0.3\n5.0\n1.4\n4.7\n19.5\n20 Reserve Money ( RM)\n15.6\n57.5\n(7.9)\n29.7\n0.8\n19.0\n22.6\n25.2\n22.6\n32.3\nAnnual per cent contribution\n21 Net Foreign Assets\n(94.64)\n(59.51)\n(5.07)\n31.58\n64.31\n54.06\n53.85\n59.04\n71.18\n71.17\n22 Net Domestic Assets ( NDA)\n127.71\n116.99\n30.59\n(1.93)\n(10.42)\n(2.18)\n21.57\n18.33\n7.01\n15.02\n23 RM growth ( y-o-y)\n33.07\n57.48\n25.52\n29.65\n53.89\n51.88\n75.42\n77.37\n78.19\n86.18\n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n41 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n Table A.3: Asset and Liability Structure of the Banking Sector \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \nTable A.4: Credit Growth \n \n Source: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \nTable A.5: Contingent Liabilities \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAug-21\nAug-22\nAug-23\nJun-24\nAug-24\nCash and Due from Banks\n18.6\n \n23.9\n \n25.9\n \n35.8\n \n35.6\n \nInvestments\n48.3\n \n39.6\n \n39.7\n \n33.2\n \n34.4\n \nNet Advances\n25.4\n \n28.6\n \n25.3\n \n21.4\n \n20.8\n \nOthers\n7.7\n \n7.9\n \n9.2\n \n9.6\n \n9.3\n \nComponents of Liabilities and Shareholders' Funds (% of Total)\nTotal Deposits\n67.1\n \n66.8\n \n77.6\n \n76.1\n \n75.1\n \nTotal Borrowings\n11.3\n \n11.5\n \n5.7\n \n7.2\n \n7.6\n \nShareholders' Funds\n14.1\n \n13.0\n \n9.8\n \n10.0\n \n9.8\n \nOther Liabilities\n7.5\n \n8.7\n \n7.0\n \n6.8\n \n7.5\n \nComponents of Assets (% of Total)\nAug-22\nAug-23\nJun-24\nAug-24\nAug-23\nAug-24\nPublic Sector\n6,452.26\n \n6,430.55\n6,416.98\n6,359.32\n-0.3\n-1.1\nPrivate Sector\n59,648.67\n \n65,998.88\n78,113.05\n80,318.06\n10.6\n21.7\n - Private Enterprises\n43,930.46\n \n47,982.93\n57,447.21\n58,327.82\n9.2\n21.6\n o/w Foreign\n6,717.59\n \n3,393.85\n4,469.18\n4,008.61\n-49.5\n18.1\n Indigenous\n37,212.87\n \n44,589.08\n52,978.03\n54,319.21\n19.8\n21.8\n - Households\n13,837.50\n \n16,925.84\n19,289.09\n20,189.70\n22.3\n19.3\nGross Loans\n66,100.9\n72,429.4\n84,530.0\n86,677.4\n9.6\n19.7\nEconomic Sector\nGh¢million\ny/y growth (%)\nAug-21\nAug-22\nAug-23\nJun-24\nAug-24\nContingent Liabilities (GH¢million)\n14,997.9\n \n23,097.1\n \n18,046.7\n \n25,657.6\n \n27,114.8\n \nGrowth (y-o-y)\n39.1\n \n54.0\n \n(21.9)\n \n29.0\n \n50.2\n \n% of Total Liabilities\n10.6\n13.0\n8.2\n8.8\n8.9\n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n42 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nTable A.6: Distribution of Loans and NPLs by Economic Sector (%) \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n \nTable A.7: Liquidity Ratios \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n \nTable A.8: Profitability Indicators (%) \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \na. Public Sector\n9.8\n4.1\n8.9\n5.0\n7.6\n4.4\n7.3\n4.0\n i. Government\n5.1\n1.6\n3.5\n3.2\n2.7\n1.2\n2.2\n1.1\n ii. Public Institutions\n1.8\n0.2\n1.7\n0.0\n1.6\n0.1\n1.6\n0.0\n iii. Public Enterprises\n2.8\n2.4\n3.7\n1.8\n3.3\n3.1\n3.5\n3.0\nb. Private Sector\n90.2\n95.9\n91.1\n95.0\n92.4\n95.6\n92.7\n96.0\n i. Private Enterprises\n66.5\n84.4\n66.2\n84.7\n68.0\n83.7\n67.3\n83.6\n o/w Foreign\n10.2\n10.5\n4.7\n2.5\n5.3\n2.2\n4.6\n2.2\n Indigeneous\n56.3\n73.9\n61.6\n82.2\n62.7\n81.5\n62.7\n81.4\n ii. Households\n20.9\n9.2\n23.4\n9.6\n22.8\n11.1\n23.3\n11.5\n iii. Others\n2.8\n2.3\n1.5\n0.7\n1.6\n0.8\n2.1\n0.9\nShare in NPLs Share in Total \nCredit\nShare in NPLs\nAug-22\nAug-23\nJun-24\nAug-24\nShare in Total \nCredit\nShare in NPLs Share in Total \nCredit\nShare in NPLs Share in Total \nCredit\nJun-21\nJun-22\nJun-23\nApr-24\nJun-24\nLiquid Assets (Core) - (GH¢'million)\n33,656.1\n \n46,726.4\n \n67,100.0\n \n107,918.8\n \n115,827.0\n \nLiquid Assets (Broad) -(GH¢'million)\n109,129.9\n \n127,547.3\n \n156,811.9\n \n213,585.9\n \n222,701.8\n \nLiquid Assets to total deposits (Core)-%\n30.5\n \n35.6\n \n35.8\n \n45.7\n \n47.1\n \nLiquid Assets to total deposits (Broad)- %\n98.9\n \n97.1\n \n83.6\n \n90.4\n \n90.6\n \nLiquid assets to total assets (Core)- %\n20.7\n \n23.4\n \n27.7\n \n35.2\n \n35.8\n \nLiquid assets to total assets (Broad)- %\n67.0\n \n63.8\n \n64.7\n \n69.6\n \n68.9\n \nAug-22\nAug-23\nJun-24\nAug-24\nGross Yield\n10.1\n12.2\n9.4\n12.2\nInterest Payable\n3.6\n4.1\n3.0\n3.9\nSpread\n6.5\n8.1\n6.4\n8.3\nAsset Utilitisation\n9.4\n10.9\n7.1\n9.1\nInterest Margin to Total Assets\n4.8\n5.5\n3.7\n4.6\nInterest Margin to Gross income\n51.1\n50.5\n51.4\n50.8\nProfitability Ratio\n21.0\n21.3\n23.5\n21.5\nReturn On Equity (%) after tax\n23.0\n36.9\n35.3\n31.4\nReturn On Assets (%) before tax\n4.7\n5.4\n5.4\n4.9\n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n43 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nTable A.9: DMBs’ Income Statement \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n \nTable A.10: Developments in Offshore Balances \n \nAug-\n21 \nAug-\n22 \nAug-\n23 \nJun-\n24 \nAug-\n24 \nOffshore balances as % to Networth \n27.1 \n41.7 \n65.0 \n92.6 \n87.6 \nAnnual Growth in Offshore Balances (%) \n-36.4 \n74.6 \n39.7 \n71.4 \n88.6 \nAnnual Growth in Nostro Balances (%) \n-36.7 \n48.9 \n12.9 \n73.6 \n99.6 \nAnnual Growth in Placement (%) \n-36.1 \n112.8 \n67.1 \n69.4 \n81.5 \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAug-22\nAug-23\nJun-24\nAug-24\nAug-23\nJun-24\nAug-24\nInterest Income\n14,759.1\n \n20,330.3\n \n17,980.5\n \n24,126.8\n \n37.7\n \n19.1\n18.7\nInterest Expenses\n(4,985.5)\n \n(6,853.8)\n \n(6,180.4)\n \n(8,368.5)\n \n37.5\n \n18.6\n22.1\nNet Interest Income\n9,773.6\n \n13,476.4\n \n11,800.0\n \n15,758.3\n \n37.9\n \n19.4\n16.9\nFees and Commissions (Net)\n2,342.3\n \n2,982.9\n \n2,620.1\n \n3,666.8\n \n27.3\n \n16.8\n22.9\nOther Income\n2,036.4\n \n3,350.9\n \n2,352.5\n \n3,252.3\n \n64.6\n \n(16.2)\n(2.9)\nOperating Income\n14,152.3\n \n19,810.2\n \n16,772.7\n \n22,677.4\n \n40.0\n \n12.3\n14.5\nOperating Expenses \n(6,261.2)\n \n(8,770.0)\n \n(7,594.1)\n \n(10,429.5)\n \n40.1\n \n15.5\n18.9\n Staff Cost (deduct)\n(3,350.5)\n \n(4,193.9)\n \n(3,813.7)\n \n(5,202.4)\n \n25.2\n \n22.2\n24.0\n Other operating Expenses \n(2,910.7)\n \n(4,576.0)\n \n(3,780.4)\n \n(5,227.0)\n \n57.2\n \n9.3\n14.2\nNet Operating Income\n7,891.1\n \n11,040.2\n \n9,178.6\n \n12,247.9\n \n39.9\n \n9.9\n10.9\nTotal Provision (Loan losses, Depreciation \n& others)\n(1,798.1)\n \n(2,416.6)\n \n(1,048.2)\n \n(1,953.6)\n \n34.4\n \n(39.5)\n(19.2)\nIncome Before Tax\n6,093.0\n \n8,623.7\n \n8,130.4\n \n10,294.3\n \n41.5\n \n22.8\n19.4\nTax\n(2,076.3)\n \n(2,957.0)\n \n(2,733.8)\n \n(3,632.3)\n \n42.4\n \n17.8\n22.8\nNet Income\n4,016.7\n \n5,666.6\n \n5,396.5\n \n6,662.0\n \n41.1\n \n25.5\n17.6\nGross Income\n19,137.8\n \n26,664.1\n \n22,953.1\n \n31,045.9\n \n39.3\n \n14.0\n16.4\n (GH ¢'million)\nY-on-y Growth (%)\n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n44 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nTable A.11 Fiscal Indicators \n \nSource: Ministry of Finance \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nMillion Ghana Cedis\n2023\n2024\n2024\n2024\n2024\n2024\nJAN-JUL\nQ1+Q2\nJAN-JUL\nJAN-JUL\nDEYIATION\nY-O-Y\nOUTTURN\nOUTTURN\nOUTTURN\nPROG\nOYER(+)/ BELOW(-)\nGROWTH\nDomestic Revenue\n69,083.0\n \n74,193.7\n \n88,895.9\n \n86,862.9\n \n2.3\n \n28.7\n \n (percent of GDP)\n8.2\n \n7.3\n \n8.7\n \n8.5\n \n2.3\n \n6.2\n \nDomestic expenditure\n71,145.1\n \n70,441.7\n \n85,418.6\n \n83,145.8\n \n2.7\n \n20.1\n \n (percent of GDP)\n8.5\n \n6.9\n \n8.4\n \n8.2\n \n2.7\n \n(1.0)\n \nDomestic Primary Balance\n(2,062.1)\n \n3,752.0\n \n3,477.3\n \n3,717.1\n \n(6.5)\n \n(268.6)\n \n (percent of GDP)\n(0.2)\n \n0.4\n \n0.3\n \n0.4\n \n(6.5)\n \n(239.1)\n \nPrimary Balance (Commitment)\n(7,897.2)\n \n(2,255.2)\n \n(3,806.3)\n \n(3,520.7)\n \n8.1\n \n(51.8)\n \n (percent of GDP)\n(0.9)\n \n(0.2)\n \n(0.4)\n \n(0.3)\n \n8.1\n \n(60.2)\n \nPrimary Balance (Cash)\n(7,569.1)\n \n(17,103.2)\n \n(18,654.3)\n \n(10,608.5)\n \n75.8\n \n146.5\n \n (percent of GDP)\n(0.9)\n \n(1.7)\n \n(1.8)\n \n(1.0)\n \n75.8\n \n103.3\n \nNon-Oil Primary Balance\n(14,273.4)\n \n(23,064.0)\n \n(25,951.5)\n \n(19,594.4)\n \n32.4\n \n81.8\n \n (percent of GDP)\n(1.7)\n \n(2.3)\n \n(2.5)\n \n(1.9)\n \n32.4\n \n50.0\n \nOverall Balance (Commitment)\n(23,806.5)\n \n(21,283.7)\n \n(24,776.1)\n \n(28,706.9)\n \n(13.7)\n \n4.1\n \n (percent of GDP)\n(2.8)\n \n(2.1)\n \n(2.4)\n \n(2.8)\n \n(13.7)\n \n(14.1)\n \nOverall Balance (cash, discrepancy)\n(23,478.4)\n \n(36,131.7)\n \n(39,624.1)\n \n(35,794.7)\n \n10.7\n \n68.8\n \n (percent of GDP)\n(2.8)\n \n(3.5)\n \n(3.9)\n \n(3.5)\n \n10.7\n \n39.2\n \nOil Revenue\n6,704.2\n \n5,960.8\n \n7,297.3\n \n8,985.9\n \n(18.8)\n \n8.8\n \n (percent of GDP)\n0.8\n \n0.6\n \n0.7\n \n0.9\n \n(18.8)\n \n(10.2)\n \nNon-Oil Revenue and Grants\n63,403.8\n \n68,690.2\n \n82,055.9\n \n79,756.7\n \n2.9\n \n29.4\n \n (percent of GDP)\n7.5\n \n6.7\n \n8.0\n \n7.8\n \n2.9\n \n6.8\n \nBenchmark Oil Revenue\n4,937.8\n \n4,455.7\n \n5,792.1\n \n7,005.5\n \n(17.3)\n \n17.3\n \n (percent of GDP)\n0.6\n \n0.4\n \n0.6\n \n0.7\n \n(17.3)\n \n(3.2)\n \nAnnual Budget Funding Amount (ABFA)\n3,456.4\n \n3,119.0\n \n4,054.5\n \n4,903.9\n \n(17.3)\n \n17.3\n \n (percent of GDP)\n0.4\n \n0.3\n \n0.4\n \n0.5\n \n(17.3)\n \n(3.2)\n \nNominal GDP \n841,632.9\n \n1,020,179.9\n \n1,020,179.9\n \n1,020,179.9\n \nNon-Oil Nominal GDP \n803,900.9\n \n904,452.9\n \n904,452.9\n \n904,452.9\n \n \nMonetary Policy Report, BOG Research Department – September 2024 \n45 | Page \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n \nTable A.12: Headline Inflation \n \n \n \n \nCombined\nFood\nNon-food\nCombined\nFood\nNon-food\nCore 1\nCore 2\nCore 3\nCore 4\nDec-20\n10.4\n14.1\n7.7\n0.9\n1.5\n0.4\n11.2\n8.5\n11.4\n8.3\nDec-21\n12.6\n12.8\n12.5\n1.2\n1.2\n1.2\n11.9\n11.9\n11.5\n10.7\nDec-22\n54.1\n59.7\n49.9\n3.8\n4.1\n3.6\n53.2\n53.5\n54.4\n47.2\n2023\nJan\n53.6\n61.0\n47.9\n1.7\n2.8\n0.8\n52.8\n52.8\n54.0\n45.7\nFeb\n52.8\n59.1\n47.9\n1.9\n2.0\n1.7\n52.0\n52.3\n53.4\n45.6\nMar\n45.0\n50.8\n40.6\n-1.2\n-0.9\n-1.5\n44.6\n45.4\n46.7\n39.0\nApr\n41.2\n48.7\n35.4\n2.4\n4.3\n0.7\n41.7\n41.1\n43.4\n35.6\nMay\n42.2\n51.8\n34.6\n4.8\n6.2\n3.5\n42.8\n40.8\n45.3\n35.0\nJun\n42.5\n54.2\n33.4\n3.2\n3.9\n2.6\n43.5\n40.9\n46.1\n34.8\nJul\n43.1\n55.0\n33.8\n3.6\n3.8\n3.4\n44.2\n41.5\n47.2\n35.6\nAug\n40.1\n51.9\n30.9\n-0.2\n-0.3\n-0.2\n41.0\n38.3\n44.0\n32.5\nSept\n38.1\n49.3\n29.3\n1.9\n1.6\n2.1\n39.0\n35.3\n40.0\n29.5\nOct\n35.2\n44.8\n27.7\n0.6\n0.1\n1.0\n36.2\n33.1\n37.2\n28.3\nNov\n26.4\n32.2\n21.7\n1.5\n0.8\n2.2\n27.2\n24.8\n28.6\n22.9\nDec\n23.2\n28.7\n18.7\n1.2\n1.3\n1.0\n24.2\n22.3\n25.5\n20.7\n2024\nJan\n23.5\n27.1\n20.5\n2.0\n1.6\n2.4\n24.2\n22.4\n25.4\n21.8\nFeb\n23.2\n27.0\n20.0\n1.6\n2.0\n1.3\n24.0\n22.2\n25.0\n21.8\nMar\n25.8\n29.6\n22.6\n0.8\n1.0\n0.7\n26.3\n24.0\n27.2\n23.8\nApr\n25.0\n26.8\n23.5\n1.8\n2.1\n1.5\n24.8\n22.9\n25.9\n22.9\nMay\n23.1\n22.6\n23.6\n3.2\n2.7\n3.6\n22.6\n21.5\n23.2\n21.9\nJune\n22.8\n24.0\n21.6\n2.9\n5.1\n0.9\n22.1\n19.5\n23.2\n19.1\nJuly\n20.9\n21.5\n20.5\n2.1\n1.7\n2.4\n19.9\n16.7\n20.8\n17.3\nAug\n20.4\n19.1\n21.5\n-0.7\n-2.2\n0.7\n19.4\n16.9\n20.0\n18.9\nSource: Ghana Statistical Service\nMonthly Changes in CPI (%)\nAnnual Changes in CPI (%)\nCore Inflation (%)\nBank of Ghana", "source": "BOG", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/Monetary_Policy_Reports/MP-Report-September-2024.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "52b0b14fd032a0896d6e87ee9eb81d2d", "text": "FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n1 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL \nSTABILITY \nREPORT \n \n \n \n \nDECEMBER 2019 \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \ni \n \n \n \nContents \nLIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................................... v \nLIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................................ vi \nLIST OF BOXES................................................................................................................................. vii \nLIST OF ACRONYMS ...................................................................................................................... viii \nGOVERNOR’S STATEMENT ............................................................................................................ 1 \nFOREWORD ......................................................................................................................................... 2 \nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................... 3 \n1 \nECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS ................................................................ 5 \n1.1 \nGlobal Developments .......................................................................................................... 5 \n1.1.1 \nOutput ............................................................................................................................. 5 \n1.1.2 \nInflation ........................................................................................................................... 6 \n1.1.3 \nOil Prices ....................................................................................................................... 7 \n1.1.4 \nFood Prices ................................................................................................................... 8 \n1.1.5 \nInternational Stock Markets ........................................................................................ 8 \n1.1.6 \nForeign Exchange Markets ....................................................................................... 10 \n1.1.7 \nMonetary Policy Rates ............................................................................................... 12 \n1.2 \nDomestic Developments ................................................................................................... 14 \n1.2.1 \nOutput ........................................................................................................................... 14 \n1.2.2 \nInflation ......................................................................................................................... 15 \n1.2.3 \nExternal Sector ........................................................................................................... 16 \n1.2.4 \nFiscal Operations........................................................................................................ 18 \n1.1.8 \nRisks from Global Economic Developments .......................................................... 19 \n2 \nDEVELOPMENTS IN THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM ............................................................... 20 \n2.1 \nMonetary and Credit Developments ................................................................................ 20 \n2.1.1 \nAggregate Credit to the Domestic Economy .......................................................... 21 \n2.1.2 \nClassification of Private Sector Credit ..................................................................... 23 \n2.1.3 \nMonetary Base ............................................................................................................ 25 \n2.1.4 \nMaturity Structure of Bank Deposits and Credits .................................................. 25 \n2.1.5 \nMarket Structure of the Banking Industry ............................................................... 26 \n2.1.6 \nRisks to the Domestic Economy .............................................................................. 27 \n2.2 \nLicensing of Financial Institutions .................................................................................... 27 \n2.2.1 \nAssets and Liabilities of Other Financial Institutions ............................................. 28 \n2.2.2 \nDevelopment Finance Institutions ............................................................................ 28 \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \nii \n \n \n \n2.2.3 \nPrimary Mortgage Banks ........................................................................................... 29 \n2.2.4 \nFinance Companies ................................................................................................... 29 \n2.2.5 \nMicrofinance Banks .................................................................................................... 30 \n2.2.6 \nMicrofinance Certification Programme .................................................................... 31 \n2.2.7 \nBank Verification Number Enrolment for MFB Customers .................................. 31 \n2.2.8 \nDevelopments in the Bureaux de Change Sub-sector ......................................... 31 \n2.3 \nFinancial Markets ............................................................................................................... 32 \n2.3.1 \nThe Money Market ..................................................................................................... 32 \n2.3.2 \nThe Capital Market ..................................................................................................... 35 \n2.3.3 \nRisks to Stability in the Financial Markets .............................................................. 38 \n2.4 \nReal Sector Interventions .................................................................................................. 38 \n2.4.1 \nAgricultural Policy Support ........................................................................................ 38 \n2.4.2 \nSmall and Medium Enterprises& Industrial Policy Support ................................. 40 \n2.4.3 \nReal Sector Policy Support ....................................................................................... 40 \n2.5 \nExport Policy Support ........................................................................................................ 41 \n2.5.1 \nNon-oil Export Stimulation Facility ........................................................................... 41 \n2.5.2 \nExport Development Facility ..................................................................................... 41 \n2.6 \nEnergy Policy Support ....................................................................................................... 41 \n2.6.1 \nPower and Airline Intervention Fund ....................................................................... 41 \n2.6.2 \nNigerian Electricity Market Stabilisation Facility .................................................... 42 \n2.6.3 \nNigeria Bulk Electricity Trading Payment Assurance Facility .............................. 42 \n2.7 \nInstitutional Support and Financial Inclusion .................................................................. 42 \n2.7.1 \nNational Collateral Registry ...................................................................................... 42 \n2.7.2 \nShared Agent Network Expansion Facility ............................................................. 42 \n2.7.3 \nFinancial Inclusion ...................................................................................................... 43 \n2.8 \nFinancial Literacy ............................................................................................................... 43 \n2.8.1 \nWorld Savings Day 2019 ........................................................................................... 43 \n2.8.2 \nPilot Test of Financial Education Curriculum ......................................................... 43 \n2.8.3 \nNational Peer Group Educator Programme ........................................................... 44 \n2.8.4 \nCBN Fair ...................................................................................................................... 44 \n2.8.5 \nFinancial Education Programme for Faith – Based Organisations ..................... 44 \n3 \nREGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY ACTIVITIES ............................................................ 45 \n3.1 \nFinancial Soundness Indicators ....................................................................................... 45 \n3.1.1 \nAsset-Based Indicators.............................................................................................. 45 \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \niii \n \n \n \n3.1.2 \nCapital-Based Indicators ........................................................................................... 46 \n3.1.3 \nIncome and Expense Based Indicators .................................................................. 47 \n3.2 \nThe Banking Industry Stress Tests .................................................................................. 47 \n3.2.1 \nSolvency Stress Test ................................................................................................. 47 \n3.2.2 \nLiquidity Stress Test ................................................................................................... 52 \n3.2.3 \nAssets and Liabilities Maturity Mismatch ................................................................ 53 \n3.2.4 \nContagion Risk Analysis ............................................................................................ 55 \n3.3 \nSupervision of Banks ......................................................................................................... 58 \n3.3.1 \nBank Examination ...................................................................................................... 58 \n3.3.2 \nEnhanced Supervision of Domestic Systemically Important Banks ................... 58 \n3.3.3 \nRecovery and Resolution Planning ......................................................................... 58 \n3.3.4 \nForeign Exchange Examination ............................................................................... 59 \n3.3.5 \nRisk-Based Cyber-Security Assessment ................................................................ 59 \n3.3.6 \nDevelopments in Non-Interest Banking .................................................................. 59 \n3.3.7 \nAsset Management Corporation of Nigeria ............................................................ 60 \n3.3.8 \nCross Border Supervision of Nigerian Banks......................................................... 60 \n3.3.9 \nCredit Risk Management System ............................................................................ 62 \n3.3.10 \nCREDIT BUREAUX ................................................................................................... 63 \n3.3.11 \nOther Developments in the Financial System ........................................................ 64 \n3.3.12 \nComplaints Management and Resolution............................................................... 65 \n4 \nTHE PAYMENTS SYSTEM ...................................................................................................... 67 \n4.1 \nDevelopments in the Payments System ......................................................................... 67 \n4.1.1 \nBank Verification Number Operations and Watch-list .......................................... 67 \n4.1.2 \nExamination of Payments Service Providers ......................................................... 67 \n4.1.3 \nLicensing of Payments Service Providers .............................................................. 67 \n4.1.4 \nNigeria Cheque Standards and Cheque Printers Accreditation Scheme .......... 67 \n4.1.5 \nCash-less Nigeria ....................................................................................................... 68 \n4.1.6 \nPayments System Vision 2020 ................................................................................ 68 \n4.2 \nPayments System Statistics and Trends ........................................................................ 68 \n4.2.1 \nLarge Value Payments .............................................................................................. 68 \n4.2.2 \nRetail Payments.......................................................................................................... 69 \n4.3 \nRisks to the Payments System ........................................................................................ 69 \n5 \nKey Risks to the Financial System ...................................................................................... 71 \n5.1 \nCredit Risk ........................................................................................................................... 71 \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \niv \n \n \n \n5.2 \nLiquidity Risk ....................................................................................................................... 71 \n5.3 \nMarket Risk ......................................................................................................................... 72 \n6 \nOUTLOOK ................................................................................................................................... 74 \n \n \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \nv \n \n \n \nLIST OF FIGURES \nFIGURE 1.1 GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GROWTH %) ..................................................................................... 14 \nFIGURE 1.2 SHARES OF OIL AND NON-OIL SECTORS IN REAL GDP (%) ............................................................... 15 \nFIGURE 1.3 INFLATIONARY TRENDS (YEAR-ON-YEAR) ........................................................................................ 16 \nFIGURE 1.4 GROSS EXTERNAL RESERVES SHOWING CBN, FGN & FEDERATION PORTIONS .............................. 18 \nFIGURE 1.5 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL OPERATIONS (N BILLION) ............................................................. 19 \nFIGURE 2.1 TRENDS IN MONETARY AGGREGATES .............................................................................................. 21 \nFIGURE 2.2 CREDIT TO THE ECONOMY ................................................................................................................ 21 \nFIGURE 2.3 CONSUMER CREDIT ........................................................................................................................... 23 \nFIGURE 2.4 SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF CREDIT ............................................................................................... 23 \nFIGURE 2.6 MONETARY BASE AND ITS COMPONENTS ....................................................................................... 25 \nFIGURE 2.7 DISTRIBUTION OF BANK LOANS AND ADVANCES BY MATURITY .................................................... 26 \nFIGURE 2.8 MATURITY STRUCTURE OF BANK DEPOSITS .................................................................................... 26 \nFIGURE 2.9 CONCENTRATION RATIOS OF THE BANKING INDUSTRY ASSETS AND DEPOSITS ............................ 27 \nFIGURE 2.10 MONEY MARKET RATE MOVEMENTS JANUARY – DECEMBER, 2019 ............................................ 33 \nFIGURE 2.11 YIELD CURVE FOR NIGERIA ............................................................................................................. 36 \nFIGURE 2.12 BANK VERIFICATION NUMBER STATISTICS (2019) ......................................................................... 43 \nFIGURE 3.1 BANKING INDUSTRY NPLS TO GROSS LOANS AT END-DECEMBER 2019 ......................................... 45 \nFIGURE 3.2 BANKING INDUSTRY LIQUIDITY INDICATORS................................................................................... 46 \nFIGURE 3.3 BANKING INDUSTRY CAPITAL ADEQUACY INDICATORS .................................................................. 46 \nFIGURE 3.4 BANKING INDUSTRY CAR (PER CENT) ............................................................................................... 48 \nFIGURE 3.5 CREDIT CONCENTRATION RISK ......................................................................................................... 49 \nFIGURE 3.6 SECTORAL CONCENTRATION OF CREDIT .......................................................................................... 50 \nFIGURE 3.7 IMPACT OF INTEREST RATE SHOCKS ON CAR................................................................................... 51 \nFIGURE 3.8 IMPACT OF INTEREST RATE SHOCKS ON ROA AND ROE .................................................................. 51 \nFIGURE 3.9 INDUSTRY LIQUIDITY RATIOS AT PERIODS 1-5 AND CUMULATIVE 30-DAY SHOCKS ...................... 53 \nFIGURE 3.10 NETWORK ANALYSIS BASED ON INTERBANK EXPOSURES ............................................................ 55 \nFIGURE 3.11 TIERED STRUCTURE OF UNSECURED PLACEMENTS AND TAKINGS ............................................... 56 \nFIGURE 3.12 NUMBER OF COMPLAINTS RECEIVED (JAN -DEC 2019) ................................................................. 65 \nFIGURE 3.13 DISTRIBUTION OF COMPLAINTS RECEIVED (IN PERCENTAGES) IN 2019 ....................................... 66 \nFIGURE 5.1 NON-PERFORMING LOANS RATIO .................................................................................................... 71 \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \nvi \n \n \n \nLIST OF TABLES \nTABLE 1:1 GLOBAL GROWTH ................................................................................................................................. 6 \nTABLE 1:2 GLOBAL INFLATION ............................................................................................................................... 7 \nTABLE 1:3 WORLD FOOD PRICE INDEX .................................................................................................................. 8 \nTABLE 1:4 INDICES OF SELECTED STOCK MARKETS ............................................................................................... 9 \nTABLE 1:5 TRENDS IN SELECTED CURRENCIES ..................................................................................................... 11 \nTABLE 1:6 POLICY RATES OF SELECTED COUNTRIES /REGIONS .......................................................................... 13 \nTABLE 1:7 SECTORAL CONTRIBUTION TO REAL GDP........................................................................................... 14 \nTABLE 1:8 CHANGES (PER CENT) IN REAL GDP BY SECTOR ................................................................................. 15 \nTABLE 1:9 FOREIGN EXCHANGE FLOWS THROUGH THE CBN (US$ MILLION) .................................................... 17 \nTABLE 1:10 STRUCTURE OF THE RESERVES ......................................................................................................... 17 \nTABLE 2:1 GROWTH RATES OF MONETARY AGGREGATES ................................................................................. 22 \nTABLE 2:2 SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF PRIVATE SECTOR CREDIT .................................................................... 24 \nTABLE 2:3 CONCENTRATION RATIOS OF THE BANKING INDUSTRY ASSETS AND DEPOSITS .............................. 28 \nTABLE 2:4 PRIMARY MORTGAGE BANKS FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS ..................................................................... 29 \nTABLE 2:5 FINANCIAL POSITION OF FINANCE COMPANIES AT END-DECEMBER 2019 ...................................... 30 \nTABLE 2:6 FINANCIAL POSITIONOF MICROFINANCE BANKS AT END-DECEMBER 2019 ..................................... 31 \nTABLE 2:7 OUTSTANDING BONDS (N’BILLION) ................................................................................................... 35 \nTABLE 2:8 DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN PORTFOLIO PARTICIPATION IN EQUITIES TRADING ................................ 37 \nTABLE 3:1 SELECTED FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS INDICATORS OF THE NIGERIAN BANKING INDUSTRY ............... 47 \nTABLE 3:2 BANKING INDUSTRY BASELINE SELECTED KEY INDICATORS.............................................................. 48 \nTABLE 3:3 CREDIT DEFAULT SHOCKS .................................................................................................... 48 \nTABLE 3:4 CREDIT CONCENTRATION RISK ........................................................................................................... 49 \nTABLE 3:5 STRESS TEST ON OIL AND GAS EXPOSURES ....................................................................................... 50 \nTABLE 3:6 IMPACT OF SELECTED SHOCKS ON CAR, ROA AND ROE .................................................................... 52 \nTABLE 3:7 LIQUIDITY STRESS TEST RESULTS (POST-SHOCK) ............................................................................... 53 \nTABLE 3:8 MATURITY PROFILE OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES AT END-DEC 2019 ................................................. 54 \nTABLE 3:9 TEST RESULTS FOR SYSTEM-WIDE MATURITY MISMATCH ................................................................ 54 \nTABLE 3:10 RESULT OF NET INTERBANK UNSECURED EXPOSURES ON CAPITAL ADEQUACY RATIO ................ 56 \nTABLE 3:11 BORROWERS FROM THE BANKING SECTOR** ................................................................................. 63 \nTABLE 3:12 CREDIT RECORDS OF PRIVATE CREDIT BUREAUX AT END-DECEMBER, 2019 .................................. 63 \nTABLE 3:13 CREDIT RECORDS OF PRIVATE CREDIT BUREAUX AT END-JUNE 2019 ............................................. 63 \nTABLE 4:1 LICENSED PAYMENTS SERVICEPROVIDERS ........................................................................................ 67 \nTABLE 4:2 ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS .............................................................................................................. 69 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \nvii \n \n \n \nLIST OF BOXES \nBOX 1 IMF MONETARY AGGREGATE REPORTING FORMAT ............................................................................... 20 \nBOX 2: LIQUIDITY STRESS TEST ASSUMPTIONS ................................................................................................... 57 \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \nviii \n \n \n \nLIST OF ACRONYMS \nAMCON \nAsset Management Corporation of Nigeria \nAML/CFT \nAnti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism \nBDCs \nBureaux de Change \nBOI \nBank of Industry \nBOA \nBank of Agriculture \nBRICS \nBrazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa \nBVN \nBank Verification Number \nCACS \nCommercial Agriculture Credit Scheme \nCAR \nCapital Adequacy Ratio \nCBN \nCentral Bank of Nigeria \nCOB \nCurrency Outside Banks \nCRMS \nCredit Risk Management System \nDAX \nDeutscher Aktienindex (German stock index of 30 major German companies) \nDFIs \nDevelopment Finance Institutions \nDMBs \nDeposit Money Banks \nEBAs \nEligible Bank Assets \nECB \nEuropean Central Bank \nEGX CASE 30 \nEgypt Stock Exchange (Cairo and Alexandria Stock Exchange) 30 Stock Index \nFAO \nFood and Agriculture Organisation \nFATF \nFinancial Action Task Force \nFCs \nFinance Companies \nFGN \nFederal Government of Nigeria \nFMBN \nFederal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria \nFRACE \nFinancial Regulation Advisory Council of Experts \nFSIs \nFinancial Soundness Indicators \nFSR \nFinancial Stability Report \nFSRCC \nFinancial Services Regulation Co-ordinating Committee \nGDP \nGross Domestic Product \nGSE \nGhanaian Stock Exchange \nHHI \nHerfindahl-Hirschman Index \nICE \nIntercontinental Exchange \nIFRS \nInternational Financial Reporting Standards \nIMF \nInternational Monetary Fund \nKYC \nKnow Your Customer \nM1 \nNarrow Money Supply \nM2 \nBroad Money Supply \nM3 \nM2 plus CBN Bills held by the money holding sectors \nMENA \nMiddle East and North African Countries \nMFBs \nMicrofinance Banks \nMICEX \nMoscow Interbank Currency Exchange \nMoUs \nMemoranda of Understanding \nMHSs \nMoney Holding Sectors \nMPR \nMonetary Policy Rate \nNBS \nNational Bureau of Statistics \nNCR \nNational Collateral Registry \nNDC \nNet Domestic Credit \nNDIC \nNigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation \nNEXIM \nNigerian Export-Import Bank \nNIBSS \nNigerian Inter-bank Settlement System \nNMRC \nNigeria Mortgage Re-finance Company Plc \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \nix \n \n \n \nNPLs \nNon-Performing Loans \nNSE ASI \nNigerian Stock Exchange All-Share Index \nNSE 20 \nNairobi Stock Exchange 20-Share Index \nNYMEX \nNew York Mercantile Exchange \nOBB \nOpen Buy Back \nOFIs \nOther Financial Institutions \nOPEC \nOrganisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries \nORB \nOPEC Reference Basket \nPAIF \nPower and Aviation Infrastructure Fund \nPENCOM \nNational Pension Commission of Nigeria \nPFAs \nPension Fund Administrators \nPFCs \nPension Fund Custodians \nPMBs \nPrimary Mortgage Banks \nPoS \nPoint of Sale \nPSV 2020 \nPayments System Vision 2020 \nROA \nReturn on Assets \nROE \nReturn on Equity \nRTGS \nReal-Time Gross Settlement System \nSANEF \nShared Agent Network Expansion Facilities \nS&P/TSX \nStandards and Poor’s Composite Index of the Toronto Stock Exchange \nSEC \nSecurities and Exchange Commission \nSMEs \nSmall and Medium Enterprises \nWAMZ \nWest African Monetary Zone \nWEO \nWorld Economic Outlook \nWTI \nWest Texas Intermediate \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n1 \n \n \n \nGOVERNOR’S STATEMENT \n \nIn 2019, the global economy grew by 2.9 per cent, indicating a slowdown from the \n3.6 per cent recorded in 2018. This was attributed mainly to the trade war between \nthe United States (US) and China, weak investment in advanced economies as well \nas financial vulnerabilities across emerging and developing economies. In response, \nmany central banks implemented accommodative monetary policies to bolster \noutput. \n \nInflation in advanced economies slowed down to 1.40 per cent at end-December \n2019, compared with 2.00 per cent in 2018, owing to weak aggregate demand \nacross some key economies. Global inflation was, however, projected to rise to 1.70 \nper cent, following the US and China’s commitment to the first phase of a new trade \nagreement. \n \nOutput in the domestic economy increased by 2.27 per cent in 2019, compared with \n1.91 per cent in the preceding year. Real gross domestic product grew by 2.55 per \ncent in the second half, compared with the 2.12 per cent recorded in the first half of \n2019. The increased growth was attributed mainly to the enhanced flow of credit to \nthe private sector and interventions by the Bank as well as by the fiscal authorities. \nAgriculture, services and the construction sectors were the main contributors to the \ngrowth of the economy. Inflationary pressures increased in the second half of 2019 \nas headline inflation rose to 11.98 per cent at end-December 2019 from 11.22 per \ncent at end-June 2019. \n \nThe Bank’s contractionary monetary policy stance was moderated through \ninterventions to encourage credit flow to the productive sectors of the economy. The \ninterventions focused on the priority sectors, such as agriculture, manufacturing, and \noil and gas, to stimulate value-chain development and conserve foreign exchange \nreserves. \n \nThe banking industry remained stable and resilient in the face of external and \ndomestic challenges. The financial soundness indicators of the industry remained \nrobust as assets and capital base indicators were above regulatory thresholds, \nproviding confidence to businesses, investors and households. \nGoing forward, the Bank will continue to ensure the resilience of the economy \nthrough the adoption of appropriate policy interventions for inclusive and sustainable \neconomic growth. \n \nGodwin I. Emefiele, CON \nGovernor, Central Bank of Nigeria \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n2 \n \n \n \nFOREWORD \nGlobal growth remained subdued in the second half of 2019, reflecting the impact of \nthe trade war between the US and China, geo-political uncertainties, and reduced \ninvestments. However, the stock markets remained resilient, reflecting confidence \nand the accommodative policy stance of major central banks. Growth in the \neconomies of oil exporting countries rebounded with the increase in oil prices, driven \nmainly by the implementation of production cuts by OPEC+. \n \nIn the foreign exchange market, the performance of the US dollar relative to other \nmajor currencies was mixed. The British pound appreciated on the back of the Brexit \ndeal, the euro depreciated, owing to fears of near-term recession, and the Japanese \nyen weakened, following under-performance of the external sector. \n \nIn Nigeria, the performance of the economy improved in the second half of 2019, \ndriven by growth in the non-oil sector and the rise in crude oil prices. To further spur \ngrowth, the Bank sustained its interventions in critical sectors of the economy. \n \nTo ensure the safety and soundness of the banking system, the CBN continued with \nthe enhanced supervisory regime for Domestic Systemically Important Banks. The \nBank also ensured compliance with the requirements of the IFRS, Basel II/III and \nCode of Corporate Governance, among others, to promote financial system stability. \n \nThis edition of the Financial Stability Report is in six sections. Section one reviews \nglobal and domestic developments. Section two discusses developments in the \nfinancial system, while section three covers regulatory and supervisory activities and \nhighlights key stability issues. Key developments in the payments system are \ndiscussed in section four, while sections five and six highlight the key risks and the \noutlook for the financial system. \n \nThis Report is intended to contribute to financial stability by improving the \nunderstanding of risks in the financial environment and the Bank’s response to \ndevelopments in the system. It is, therefore, highly recommended to market \nparticipants, investors, the academia and the general public. \n \nAishah N. Ahmad, CFA \nDeputy Governor, Financial System Stability \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n3 \n \n \n \nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY \n \nIn 2019, the global economy witnessed a slowdown in growth in all economic blocs, \nexcept Sub-Saharan Africa. The lower growth was attributed mainly to the trade war \nbetween the US and China, weak investment in advanced economies, as well as \nfinancial vulnerabilities across emerging and developing economies. In response, \nmany central banks implemented accommodative monetary policies to spur output. \nInflation in advanced economies and Sub-Saharan Africa slowed down to 1.40 and \n8.4 per cent at end-December 2019 compared with 2.00 and 8.5 per cent in 2018 \nrespectively. The decrease was due to weak aggregate demand and muted wage \ngrowth across some key economies. However, in emerging markets and developing \neconomies, inflation rose to 5.1 per cent at end-December 2019 from 4.8 per cent in \n2018. \n \nMost global stock markets rebounded in the review period, showing resilience in the \nface of severe macroeconomic challenges. In the US, the performance of the market \nwas driven by improved investors’ confidence, favourable domestic economic \nconditions, as well as expected ease in trade tensions with China. In Europe, the \nstock market performance was supported by Brexit negotiations and international \ndiversification of portfolios. However, in Africa, developments in the major Stock \nExchange markets were mixed. \n \n \nOutput in the domestic economy increased in the second half of 2019 as real gross \ndomestic product grew by 2.55 per cent in the second half, compared with 2.12 per \ncent in the first half of 2019. The performance of the economy was attributed mainly \nto the enhanced flow of credit to the private sector, the Bank’s continued intervention \nin the real sector and fiscal interventions. Agriculture, services and the construction \nsectors were the main contributors to the growth of the economy. Inflationary \npressures increased in the second half of 2019 as inflation increased to 11.98 per \ncent at end-December 2019 from 11.22 per cent at end-June 2019. \n \nThe Bank’s contractionary monetary policy stance was moderated through \ninterventions to encourage credit flow to the productive sectors of the economy. \nBroad money supply, M3, grew by 6.22 per cent at end-December 2019 relative to \n4.03 per cent at end-June 2019. Net aggregate credit to the economy grew by 27.33 \nper cent at end-December 2019, reflecting the increase in both net claims on the \nFederal Government and credit to the private sector. Also, the monetary base grew \nby 20.75 per cent, reflecting the increase in net domestic assets. \n \nMoney market rates closed lower at the interbank market, with the overnight call and \nopen buy back rates trading below their levels in the preceding half year. In the \ncapital market, the Nigerian Stock Exchange All Share Index and market \ncapitalisation decreased, reflecting bearish conditions in the market. \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n4 \n \n \n \nIn the banking sector, the composite risk ratings of banks remained stable. The \ncapital adequacy ratio of the industry declined marginally to 14.57 per cent, from \n15.27 per cent in the first half of 2019. Asset quality improved, as the non-performing \nloan ratio declined to 6.10 per cent at end-December 2019, from 9.33 per cent at \nend-June 2019. Also, earnings measured by return on assets and return on equity \nrecorded modest improvements. The payments system witnessed significant \nincrease in the number of operators, further deepening access to electronic \nchannels. \n \nOverall, the projected GDP growth of 2.50 per cent in 2020 was predicated on the \nimplementation of robust monetary and fiscal policies, improved global and domestic \neconomic activities, and stable crude oil prices. \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n5 \n \n \n \n1 \nECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS \n1.1 Global Developments \n1.1.1 Output \nGlobal output growth decelerated to 2.9 per cent in 2019, from 3.6 per cent in 2018, \nowing largely to the trade war between the United States of America (US) and the \nPeople’s Republic of China (China), weak investment in advanced economies, and \nfinancial vulnerabilities across emerging markets and developing economies. In \nresponse, many central banks during the review period implemented accommodative \nmonetary policies in order to bolster output. \n \nOutput in advanced economies declined to 1.7 per cent in 2019 from 2.2 per cent in \n2018. The slowdown was largely attributed to the US-China trade war and weak \ninvestment in the euro area and the United Kingdom. In the US, output declined to \n2.3 per cent in 2019, compared with 2.9 per cent in 2018 and was projected to \ndecline further to 2.0 per cent in 2020, despite the policy rate cuts by the US Federal \nReserve. The downward projection was driven by rising unemployment, weak \naggregate demand and spill-over effect from the US-China trade war. \nIn the euro area, growth decreased to 1.2 per cent in 2019, from 1.9 per cent in \n2018. The decline was due to slowdown in economic activities in Germany, France \nand Italy. However, growth in the euro area was expected to inch up to 1.3 per cent \nin 2020, partly as a result of the accommodative monetary policy stance of the \nEuropean Central Bank (ECB). The UK economy slowed down marginally to 1.3 per \ncent in 2019, from 1.4 per cent in 2018 but was projected to stabilise at 1.4 per cent \nin 2020, based on the expected orderly exit from the European Union. Japan’s \neconomy grew by 1.0 per cent in 2019, compared with 0.3 per cent in 2018, owing to \nincrease in private consumption and public spending. Growth in Japan was expected \nto moderate to 0.7 per cent in 2020, attributed partly to the increase in the \nconsumption tax rate. \nThe Emerging Markets and Developing Economies (EMDEs) faced severe economic \nshocks in 2019 as a result of the wider global economic slowdown. Growth in \nEMDEs declined to 3.7 per cent in 2019, from 4.5 per cent in 2018, but was \nexpected to recover in 2020 to 4.4 per cent. The increase was expected to be driven \nby recovery in the emerging market economies and the ongoing structural reforms in \nChina. \nGrowth in the Middle East and Central Asia region moderated to 0.8 percent in 2019, \nfrom 1.9 per cent in 2018, and was expected to rise to 2.9 per cent in 2020. The \nupward projection was based on higher government spending in non-oil sector and \nimproved oil revenue generation in Saudi Arabia and other oil-exporting countries in \nthe region. However, the prospects for several economies in the region remained \nsubdued, owing to rising geopolitical tensions. \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n6 \n \n \n \nIn Sub-Saharan Africa, output rose marginally to 3.3 per cent in 2019, from 3.2 per \ncent in 2018, and was projected to increase to 3.5 per cent in 2020. The marginal \ngrowth was attributed to the relative improvement in Nigeria’s economy, which grew \nby 2.3 per cent and is projected to grow by 2.5 per cent in 2020 on the backdrop of \nexpected stable oil production and favourable international oil prices. Although \noutput in South Africa moderated to 0.4 per cent in 2019 from 0.8 per cent in 2018, \nreflecting the impact of workers’ strikes in the mining sector, deterioration in \nelectricity generation, and weak agricultural production, the overall economy was \nexpected to recover to 0.8 per cent in 2020. \n \nTable 1:1 Global Growth \nRegion/Country \nYear \n2018 \n2019 \n2020* \nWorld \n3.6 \n2.9 \n3.3 \nAdvanced Economies \n2.2 \n1.7 \n1.6 \nUnited States \n2.9 \n2.3 \n2.0 \nEuro Area \n1.9 \n1.2 \n1.3 \nJapan \n0.3 \n1.0 \n0.7 \nUnited Kingdom \n1.3 \n1.3 \n1.4 \nCanada \n1.9 \n1.5 \n1.8 \nEmerging Market and Developing \nEconomies \n4.5 \n3.7 \n4.4 \nChina \n6.6 \n6.1 \n6.0 \nMiddle East and Central Asia \n1.9 \n0.8 \n2.8 \nSub-Saharan Africa \n3.2 \n3.3 \n3.5 \nNigeria \n1.9 \n2.3 \n2.5 \nSouth Africa \n0.8 \n0.4 \n0.8 \nSource: IMF’s World Economic Outlook, January Update, 2020 \n*Projections \n1.1.2 Inflation \n \nInflation (year-on-year) in advanced economies slowed down to 1.40 per cent at end-\nDecember 2019, compared with 2.00 per cent in 2018. The decrease was due to \nweak aggregate demand and muted wage growth across some key economies. \nInflation was, however, projected to rise to 1.70 per cent with the commitment of the \nUS and China to the first phase of a new trade agreement. \n \nIn the US, inflation slowed down to 1.80 per cent in 2019 from 2.40 per cent in 2018, \nattributable to decline in the prices of services and low inflation expectations. The US \nFederal Reserve was expected to cut rates further in 2020 to stimulate aggregate \ndemand. Consequently, inflation was expected to increase to 2.30 per cent in 2020. \n \nIn the euro area, inflation remained below the ECB’s target of 2.00 per cent as it \ndecreased to 1.20 per cent in 2019 from 1.80 per cent in 2018, driven by weak \naggregate demand. Inflation was, however, projected to rise to 1.40 per cent in 2020, \npartly reflecting the continued accommodative monetary policy stance of the ECB. \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n7 \n \n \n \nInflation in the UK declined to 1.80 per cent in 2019 from 2.50 per cent in 2018 as \nprices continued to moderate, driven largely by prices of clothing and footwear, food \nand non-alcoholic beverages. \n \nIn Japan, inflation remained at 1.00 per cent in 2019. However, it was projected to \nrise slightly to 1.30 per cent in 2020, owing to expected increases in food and \nhousing prices. \n \nIn Emerging Market and Developing Economies, inflation moved upward to 5.10 per \ncent in 2019 from 4.80 per cent in 2018, reflecting a modest strengthening in \naggregate demand in some economies. Inflation was, however, projected to decline \nto 4.60 per cent in 2020. \n \nIn Middle East and Central Asia, inflation declined from 9.90 per cent in 2018 to 8.2 \nper cent in 2019, but was projected at 9.1 per cent in 2020, owing to increases in \ninflation in Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan. \n \nIn Sub-Saharan Africa, inflation declined to 8.40 per cent in 2019, from 8.50 per cent \nin 2018, and was projected to decline further to 8.00 per cent in 2020. However, \ninflation in Nigeria was expected to increase to 11.70 per cent in 2020, from 11.30 \nper cent in 2019, largely driven by food inflation and increasing fiscal deficit. Inflation \nin South Africa declined to 4.40 per cent in 2019, from 4.60 per cent in 2018, \nprimarily driven by declining costs of transport, food and non-alcoholic beverages, \nand was projected at 5.2 per cent in 2020. \n \nTable 1:2 Global Inflation \nRegion/Country \n2018 \n2019 \n2020* \nAdvanced Economies \n2.0 \n1.4 \n1.7 \nUnited States \n2.4 \n1.8 \n2.3 \nEuro Area \n1.8 \n1.2 \n1.4 \nJapan \n1.0 \n1.0 \n1.3 \nUnited Kingdom \n2.5 \n1.8 \n1.9 \nEmerging Markets and Developing \nEconomies \n4.8 \n5.1 \n4.6 \nMiddle East and Central Asia \n9.9 \n8.2 \n9.1 \nSub-Saharan Africa \n8.5 \n8.4 \n8.0 \nNigeria \n12.1 \n11.3 \n11.7 \nSouth Africa \n4.6 \n4.4 \n5.2 \nSource: IMF’s World Economic Outlook, October 2019 \n*Projections \n \n1.1.3 Oil Prices \nOil prices in the second half of 2019 were influenced by geopolitical risks in the \nMiddle East, optimism around the new trade deal between the US and China, and \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n8 \n \n \n \nproduction cuts by OPEC+ countries. The recovery of oil prices continued from \nDecember 2018 with the prices of OPEC Basket, Bonny Light and UK Brent standing \nat US$66.28, US$70.37 and US$69.00 per barrel respectively at end-December \n2019, compared with US$56.94, US$58.16 and US$56.69 per barrel at end-\nDecember 2018. \n1.1.4 Food Prices \nAt end-December 2019, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) food price \nindex rose to 181.70, from 161.47 index points at end-June 2019. The rise was \nattributed to increases in the prices of vegetable oils, sugar and dairy. \nThe FAO Meat Price Index rose by 9.37 per cent to 191.60 points at end-December \n2019, from 175.19 index points at end-June 2019, reflecting a rise in pork prices as \npre-festive demand soared against limited supply. The FAO Dairy Price index \ndecreased marginally by 0.17 per cent to 198.9 points at end-December 2019, from \n199.24 at end-June 2019. Weak global demand in butter and whole milk powder \ncontributed to the marginal decrease in the dairy price index. The FAO Cereal Price \nindex declined to 164.30 index points (5.15 per cent) at end-December 2019, from \n173.23 index points at end-June 2019, reflecting improved supply conditions of \ncereals. \n \nThe FAO Vegetable Oil Price Index rose by 31.28 per cent to 164.70 index points at \nend-December 2019, from 125.46 index points at end-June 2019. The increase was \ndriven by improved quotations for palm oil, soy, sunflower oil and rapeseed oil. \n \nThe FAO Sugar Price Index rose to190.30 points at end-December 2019, up by 3.81 \nper cent, compared with 183.31 index points at end-June 2019. The recovery in the \nprice of sugar was driven by the rise in the price of crude oil. This led to increased \nethanol production by sugarcane suppliers in Brazil, resulting in reduced sugar \navailability in the global market. \n \nTable 1:3 World Food Price Index \nDecember \n2018 \nJune 2019 \nDecember \n2019 \nFood Price Index \n161.47 \n172.70 \n181.70 \nMeat \n162.35 \n175.19 \n191.60 \nDairy \n169.98 \n199.24 \n198.90 \nCereals \n167.79 \n173.23 \n164.30 \nVegetable Oils \n125.81 \n125.46 \n164.70 \nSugar \n179.56 \n183.31 \n190.30 \nSource: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), January 2020 \n1.1.5 International Stock Markets \nMost stock markets rebounded in the review period, reflecting the resilience of the \nglobal economy in the face of severe macroeconomic challenges. \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n9 \n \n \n \nNorth American markets rebounded with the exception of the Canadian S&P/TSX \nComposite which declined marginally. The US S&P 500 and the Mexican Bolsa \nindices strengthened by 9.80 and 0.9 per cent, to 3,230.78 and 43,541.02 at end-\nDecember 2019, respectively, from 2,941.76 and 43,161.17 at end-June 2019. The \nUS market performance was driven by improved investors’ confidence, favourable \ndomestic economic conditions and expected ease in trade tensions with China. In \nSouth America, the Brazilian Bovespa Stock and Colombian COLCAP indices \nrecovered significantly by 14.50 and 7.50 per cent to 115,645.30 and 1,662.42, at \nend-December 2019, respectively, from 100,000.97 and 1,548.98 at end-June 2019, \nreflecting growing investors’ confidence. The Argentine Merval, however, declined by \n0.30 per cent to 41,671.41 at end-December 2019 from 41,796.36 at end-June 2019 \nas a result of prevailing currency and debt crises. \n \nIn Europe, the British FTSE 100, the French CAC 40 and the German DAX 30 \nindices rallied by 1.60, 1.80 and 1.40 per cent respectively, despite sluggish \neconomic growth. The increases were driven by monetary policy accommodation, \nBrexit negotiation and international diversification of portfolios. \n \nIn Asia, the Japanese Nikkei 225, the Chinese Shanghai Stock Exchange-A and the \nIndian BSE Sensex indices increased by 11.20, 2.40 and 4.70 per cent respectively. \nThe Chinese index recovery was as a result of the signing of the first phase of the \ntrade agreement with the US. \n \nIn Africa, the Nigerian NSE All-Share Index, the Egypt EGX CASE 30 and Ghanaian \nGSE All-Share Index decreased by 10.40, 1.00, and 5.70 per cent respectively. The \ndeclines were due to domestic macroeconomic uncertainties and the spill-over \neffects of US-China trade tensions. The Kenyan Nairobi NSE 20 and South African \nJSE All-Share Index increased by 0.80 and 2.70 per cent respectively, owing to \nrenewed investors’ confidence. \n \n \n \n \n \nTable 1:4 Indices of Selected Stock Markets \n \nCountry \nIndex \n31-Dec-18 \n30-Jun-19 \n31-Dec-19 \nDec 31, 2018 \n- Dec 31, \n2019 % \nChange \nJune 30 - \nDecember \n31, 2019 % \nChange \nAFRICA \n \n \n \n \n \n \nNigeria \nNSE All-Share Index \n31,430.50 \n29,966.87 \n26,842.07 \n-14.6 \n-10.4 \nSouth Africa \nJSE All-Share Index \n52,736.86 \n55,572.25 \n57,084.10 \n8.2 \n2.7 \nKenya \nNairobi NSE 20 \nShare index \n2,833.84 \n2,632.48 \n2,654.39 \n-6.3 \n0.8 \nEgypt \nEGX CASE 30 \n13,035.77 \n14,100.74 \n13,961.56 \n7.1 \n-1.0 \nGhana \nGSE All-Share Index \n2,499.33 \n2,394.82 \n2,257.15 \n-9.7 \n-5.7 \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n10 \n \n \n \nNORTH \nAMERICA \n \n \n \n \n \n \nUS \nS&P 500 \n2,506.85 \n2,941.76 \n3,230.78 \n28.9 \n9.8 \nCanada \nS&P/TSX Composite \n14,322.86 \n17,442.52 \n17,063.43 \n19.1 \n-2.2 \nMexico \nBolsa \n41,640.27 \n43,161.17 \n43,541.02 \n4.6 \n0.9 \nSOUTH \nAMERICA \n \n \n \n \n \n \nBrazil \nBovespa Stock \n87,887.26 \n100,967.20 \n115,645.30 \n31.6 \n14.5 \nArgentina \nMerval \n30,292.55 \n41,796.36 \n41,671.41 \n37.6 \n-0.3 \nColumbia \nCOLCAP \n1,325.93 \n1,548.98 \n1,662.42 \n25.4 \n7.3 \nEUROPE \n \n \n \n \n \n \nUK \nFTSE 100 \n6,728.13 \n7,425.63 \n7,542.44 \n12.1 \n1.6 \nFrance \nCAC 40 \n4,730.69 \n5,871.09 \n5,978.06 \n26.4 \n1.8 \nGermany \nDAX \n10,558.96 \n13,207.14 \n13,385.93 \n26.8 \n1.4 \nASIA \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJapan \nNIKKEI 225 \n20,014.77 \n21,275.92 \n23,656.62 \n18.2 \n11.2 \nChina \nShanghai SE A \n2,611.38 \n3,119.99 \n3,195.98 \n22.4 \n2.4 \nIndia \nBSE Sensex \n36,068.33 \n39,394.64 \n41,253.74 \n14.4 \n4.7 \nSource: Bloomberg \n1.1.6 Foreign Exchange Markets \nDevelopments in the foreign exchange markets were mixed during the review period. \nIn Europe, the euro depreciated against the US dollar by 1.12 per cent, compared \nwith the 1.14 per cent at end-June 2019. The depreciation at end-December 2019, \nreflected the risk of near-term recession and return to accommodative monetary \npolicy. The Russian ruble, however, continued its appreciation against the dollar by \ngaining 1.98 per cent at end-December 2019; a reflection of the continued recovery \nin oil prices. Similarly, the British pound appreciated by 4.52 per cent on account of \nthe Brexit deal. \n \nIn Asia, the Japanese yen depreciated marginally against the US dollar by 0.66 per \ncent as a result of weak external sector performance. The Chinese Renminbi \ndepreciated against the dollar by 1.29 per cent, against the backdrop of trade \ntensions between the US and China and weak domestic demand. Also, the Indian \nRupee depreciated by 2.31 per cent, as growth slowed in 2019, amid concerns about \nthe health of the non-bank financial sector. \n \nIn North America, the Canadian dollar and the Mexican peso appreciated by 0.77 \nand 1.48 per cent respectively, after successive policy rate cuts by the US Federal \nReserve. These performances reflected slightly weaker outcomes when compared \nwith the 3.82 and 2.24 per cent appreciation respectively, at end-June 2019. In \nSouth America, the Argentine peso depreciated against the US dollar by 29.11 per \ncent, owing to weak macroeconomic conditions and rising risk of debt default. The \ncurrency depreciated by 11.26 per cent at end-June 2019. The Brazilian real and the \nColombian peso depreciated by 4.23 and 2.28 per cent respectively, owing to weak \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n11 \n \n \n \nglobal trade and slowdown in economic activities, in contrast to the 0.52 and 1.18 \nper cent appreciation, respectively recorded at end-June 2019. \n \nIn Africa, the Nigerian naira marginally depreciated against the US dollar by 0.03 per \ncent, at end-December 2019, following shocks from external developments, in \ncontrast to a 0.03 per cent appreciation at end-June 2019.The Ghanaian cedi \ndepreciated against the dollar by 4.87 and 10.05 per cent, at end-December 2019 \nand end-June 2019, respectively. In contrast, at end-December 2019, the South \nAfrican rand, Kenyan shilling and the Egyptian pound appreciated by 0.57, 0.93 and \n4.05 per cent, respectively, against the US dollar on account of increased portfolio \ninvestments. At end-June 2019, both the South African rand and the Egyptian pound \nstrengthened against the US dollar by 1.92 and 7.37 per cent respectively, while the \nKenyan shilling lost value by 0.44 per cent. \n \nTable 1:5 Trends in Selected Currencies \n \nCurrency \n28-Jun-19 \n31-Dec-19 \n Jun 19 - Dec 19 (% \nApp/Dep) \nAFRICA \n \n \n \n \nNigeria \nNaira \n306.90 \n307.00 \n-0.03 \nSouth Africa \nRand \n14.08 \n14.00 \n0.57 \nKenya \nShilling \n102.30 \n101.36 \n0.93 \nEgypt \nPound \n16.69 \n16.04 \n4.05 \nGhana \nCedi \n5.47 \n5.75 \n-4.87 \nNORTH AMERICA \n \n \n \n \nCanada \nDollar \n1.31 \n1.30 \n0.77 \nMexico \nPeso \n19.22 \n18.94 \n1.48 \nSOUTH AMERICA \n \n \n \n \nBrazil \nReal \n3.85 \n4.02 \n-4.23 \nArgentina \nPeso \n42.44 \n59.87 \n-29.11 \nColombia \nPeso \n3211.86 \n3286.84 \n-2.28 \nEUROPE \n \n \n \n \nUK \nPound \n0.78 \n0.75 \n4.52 \nEuro Area \nEuro \n0.88 \n0.89 \n-1.12 \nRussia \nRuble \n63.23 \n62.00 \n1.98 \nASIA \n \n \n \n \nJapan \nYen \n107.93 \n108.65 \n-0.66 \nChina \nRenminbi \n6.87 \n6.96 \n-1.29 \nIndia \nRupee \n69.70 \n71.35 \n-2.31 \nSource: bloomberg \n \n \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n12 \n \n \n \n1.1.7 Monetary Policy Rates \nMost central banks lowered policy rates, while the others held rates constant. The \nUS Federal Reserve cut policy rate by 25 basis points in July, September and \nOctober 2019. Similarly, the Reserve Bank of Australia, Bank of Korea, Bank \nIndonesia and Bank Negara Malaysia lowered rates by 25 basis points each, while \nthe Reserve Bank of New Zealand cut its rate by 50 basis points. \n \nIn the BRICS, the Central Bank of Brazil, the Central Bank of Russian Federation, \nReserve Bank of India, Peoples’ Bank of China and the South African Reserve Bank \nreduced their policy rates in the second half of 2019 in response to the weakening \nglobal economy. \n \nIn South America, Banco de Mexico and the Central Bank of Chile reduced the \npolicy rates by 25 basis points each. However, Banco de la Republica de Colombia \nheld its policy rate constant at 4.25 per cent throughout 2019. \n \nIn Africa, the Central Bank of Egypt reduced the policy rate by 100 basis points in the \nreview period in response to low inflation. However, the Central Bank of Nigeria and \nthe Bank of Ghana held rates constant at 13.50 and 16.00 per cent respectively, in \norder to rein in inflation and attract portfolio inflows. \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n13 \n \n \n \nTable 1:6 Policy Rates of Selected Countries /Regions \nCountry/Region \nDec. \n2018 \nJan. \n2019 \nFeb. \n2019 \nMar. \n2019 \nApr. \n2019 \nMay. \n2019 \nJun. \n2019 \n \nJul. \n2019 \nAug. \n2019 \nSep. \n2019 \nOct. \n2019 \nNov. \n2019 \nDec. \n2019 \n \nDeveloped Economies \nJapan \n-0.1 \n-0.1 \n-0.1 \n-0.1 \n-0.1 \n-0.1 \n-0.1 \n \n-0.1 \n-0.1 \n-0.1 \n-0.1 \n-0.1 \n-0.1 \nEuro Zone \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \nUK \n0.75 \n0.75 \n0.75 \n0.75 \n0.75 \n0.75 \n0.75 \n \n0.75 \n0.75 \n0.75 \n0.75 \n0.75 \n0.75 \nUS \n2.25-\n2.50 \n2.25-\n2.50 \n2.25-\n2.50 \n2.25-\n2.50 \n2.25-\n2.50 \n2.25-\n2.50 \n2.25-\n2.50 \n \n2.00-\n2.25 \n2.00-\n2.25 \n1.75-\n2.00 \n1.50-\n1.75 \n1.50-\n1.75 \n1.50-\n1.75 \nCanada \n1.75 \n1.75 \n1.75 \n1.75 \n1.75 \n1.75 \n1.75 \n \n1.75 \n1.75 \n1.75 \n1.75 \n1.75 \n1.75 \nSouth Korea \n1.80 \n1.80 \n1.80 \n1.80 \n1.80 \n1.80 \n1.80 \n \n1.80 \n1.50 \n1.50 \n1.25 \n1.25 \n1.25 \nNew Zealand \n1.75 \n1.75 \n1.75 \n1.75 \n1.75 \n1.50 \n1.50 \n \n1.50 \n1.00 \n1.00 \n1.00 \n1.00 \n1.00 \nAustralia \n1.50 \n1.50 \n1.50 \n1.50 \n1.50 \n1.50 \n1.25 \n \n1.00 \n1.00 \n1.00 \n0.75 \n0.75 \n0.75 \n \nASEAN \nIndonesia \n6.00 \n6.00 \n6.00 \n6.00 \n6.00 \n6.00 \n6.00 \n \n5.75 \n5.50 \n5.25 \n5.00 \n5.00 \n5.00 \nMalaysia \n3.25 \n3.25 \n3.25 \n3.25 \n3.25 \n3.00 \n3.00 \n \n3.00 \n3.00 \n3.00 \n3.00 \n3.00 \n3.00 \n \nBRICS \nBrazil \n6.50 \n6.50 \n6.50 \n6.50 \n6.50 \n6.50 \n6.50 \n \n6.00 \n6.00 \n6.00 \n5.50 \n5.50 \n4.50 \nRussia \n7.75 \n7.75 \n7.75 \n7.75 \n7.75 \n7.75 \n7.75 \n \n7.25 \n7.25 \n7.00 \n6.50 \n6.50 \n6.25 \nIndia \n6.25 \n6.25 \n6.5 \n6.5 \n6.5 \n6.5 \n6.5 \n \n6.5 \n6.25 \n6.25 \n6.00 \n6.00 \n5.75 \nChina \n4.35 \n4.35 \n4.35 \n4.35 \n4.35 \n4.35 \n4.35 \n \n4.35 \n4.25 \n4.20 \n4.20 \n4.15 \n4.15 \nSouth Africa \n6.75 \n6.75 \n6.75 \n6.75 \n6.75 \n6.75 \n6.75 \n \n6.50 \n6.50 \n6.50 \n6.50 \n6.50 \n6.50 \n \nOther Emerging Economics and South America \nMexico \n7.50 \n7.50 \n7.50 \n7.50 \n7.50 \n7.50 \n7.50 \n \n7.50 \n8.00 \n7.75 \n7.75 \n7.50 \n7.25 \nChile \n2.75 \n2.76 \n3.00 \n3.00 \n3.00 \n3.00 \n2.63 \n \n2.50 \n2.50 \n2.06 \n1.94 \n1.75 \n1.75 \nColombia \n4.25 \n4.25 \n4.25 \n4.25 \n4.25 \n4.25 \n4.25 \n \n4.25 \n4.25 \n4.25 \n4.25 \n4.25 \n4.25 \n \nAfrica \n \nEgypt \n16.75 \n16.75 \n15.75 \n15.75 \n15.75 \n15.75 \n15.75 \n \n15.75 \n14.25 \n13.25 \n13.25 \n12.25 \n12.25 \nGhana \n17 \n17 \n16 \n16 \n16 \n16 \n16 \n \n16 \n16 \n16 \n16 \n16 \n16 \nNigeria \n14 \n14 \n14 \n13.50 \n13.50 \n13.50 \n13.50 \n \n13.50 \n13.50 \n13.5 \n13.5 \n13.5 \n13.5 \nSource: www.cbrates.com \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n14 \n \n \n \n1.2 Domestic Developments \nOutput increased in the second half of 2019, compared with the level in the first half \nof 2019. The growth was attributed mainly to the enhanced flow of credit to the \nprivate sector, which increased aggregate demand in the economy. Furthermore, the \nBank’s continued intervention in the real sector and fiscal interventions by the \nFederal Government supported the growth outcome. \n1.2.1 Output \nReal gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 2.55 per cent in the second half, \ncompared with the 2.12 per cent recorded in the first half of 2019. \n \nFigure 1.1 Gross Domestic Product (Growth %) \n \nNon-oil GDP grew by 2.26 per cent in real terms in the second half of 2019, \ncompared with 1.64 per cent in the first half of 2019.The percentage share of the \nnon-oil sector to the total GDP stood at 92.68 per cent, compared with 91.02 per \ncent in the first half of 2019. \nIn terms of sectoral contribution, the services sector accounted for the largest share \n(53.64 per cent), followed by the agricultural sector (26.09 per cent) and industry \n(20.27 per cent). \nTable 1:7 Sectoral Contribution to Real GDP \nSector \nH1 2019 \nH2 2019 \nAgriculture \n22.78 \n26.09 \nIndustry \n23.34 \n20.27 \nManufacturing \n9.08 \n8.74 \nConstruction \n4.45 \n3.44 \nServices \n38.32 \n53.64 \nTrade \n16.47 \n15.23 \nCrude Petroleum & Natural Gas \n9.02 \n7.32 \nQuarrying and Other Minerals \n0.11 \n0.14 \n0.72\n2.11\n1.50\n2.38\n2.12\n2.55\n0.00\n0.50\n1.00\n1.50\n2.00\n2.50\n3.00\nH1 2017\nH2 2017\nH1 2018\nH2 2018\nH1 2019\nH2 2019\nPER CENT\nREAL GDP\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n15 \n \n \n \nAgriculture and construction sectors grew by 2.31 and 1.31 per cent in the second \nhalf of 2019, compared with 1.79 and 0.67 per cent, respectively, in the first half of \n2019, while the trade subsector declined from -0.25 in the first half of 2019 to -0.58 \nper cent in the second half of 2019. \nTable 1:8 Changes (per cent) in Real GDP by Sector \nSector \nH1 2019 \nH2 2019 \nAgriculture \n1.79 \n2.31 \nManufacturing \n-0.13 \n1.24 \nConstruction \n0.67 \n1.31 \nServices \n1.94 \n2.60 \nTrade \n-0.25 \n-0.58 \nCrude Petroleum & Natural Gas \n7.17 \n6.36 \nQuarrying and Other Minerals \n-3.48 \n-5.63 \n \n1.2.1.1 Oil Sector \nOil GDP increased by 6.36 per cent in the second half of 2019, indicating a decline \nof 0.91 percentage point below the growth in the first half of 2019. Consequently, the \npercentage share of the oil sector in real GDP fell from 8.98 per cent in the first half \nof 2019 to 7.32 per cent at end-December 2019. \n \nFigure 1.2 Shares of Oil and Non-Oil Sectors in Real GDP (%) \n \n1.2.2 Inflation \nThe All-items Composite Consumer Price Index (CPI) stood at 307.5 at end-\nDecember 2019, compared with 289.7 in the first half of 2019 and 274.57 at end-\nDecember 2018. The index for the second half of 2019 was higher than the level in \nthe first half of 2019 by 6.1 per cent. Consequently, the headline inflation (year-on-\nyear), increased to 11.98 per cent at end-December 2019, from 11.22 per cent at \nend-June 2019. The development was attributed largely to increases in both food \nand non-food categories. \n \n9.07\n8.19\n8.98\n7.32\n90.93\n91.81\n91.02\n92.68\n0\n50\n100\nH1 2018\nH2 2018\nH1 2019\nH2 2019\nPEERCENT \nOil\nNon-oil\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n16 \n \n \n \nThe 12-month-moving-average headline inflation stood at 11.40 per cent in \nDecember 2019, compared with 11.30 and 12.10 per cent in June 2019 and the \ncorresponding half of 2018 respectively. Core inflation stood at 9.33 per cent at end-\nDecember 2019, reflecting 0.49 percentage point above the level at end-June 2019, \nbut was 0.47 percentage point below the level in December 2018. Significant \nincreases were recorded in the prices of food and non-alcoholic beverages, clothing \nand footwear, transport, health, and miscellaneous goods. \n \nHowever, food inflation, which comprised farm produce and processed food, rose to \n14.67 per cent at end-December 2019, from 13.56 per cent (year-on-year) at end-\nJune 2019. Increases in the prices of processed foods and some farm produce \n(bread & cereal, potatoes, yam &other tubers, fish, meat, and oil & fats) resulted in \nthe rise in the index. Imported food inflation increased to 16.04 per cent (year-on-\nyear) at end-December 2019, from 15.75 per cent at end-June 2019. The increase in \nfood inflation was 0.38 percentage point above the level in the corresponding period \nof 2018. \n \nFigure 1.3 Inflationary Trends (Year-on-Year) \n \n \n1.2.3 External Sector \n1.2.3.1 Foreign Exchange Flows \nForeign exchange inflow through the CBN amounted to US$25.83 billion in the \nsecond half of 2019, a decline of 16.2 per cent from the level in the preceding half-\nyear. The development was as a result of the fall in non-oil receipts. On the other \nhand, foreign exchange outflow through the CBN rose by 10.13 per cent to \nUS$31.77 billion, compared with US$28.85 billion recorded in the first half of 2019. \nThe increase in outflow, relative to the level in the first half of 2019, reflected the rise \nin third-party MDAs transfers and interbank utilization. Total foreign exchange \ntransactions through the CBN resulted in a net outflow of US$5.94 billion in the \nsecond half of 2019, compared with the net inflow of US$1.97 billion in the preceding \nhalf-year. \n \n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n16\nH2 18\nH1 19\nH2 19\nPer cent\nHeadline (Y-o-Y)\nCore (Y-o-Y)\nFood (Y-o-Y)\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n17 \n \n \n \nTable 1:9 Foreign Exchange Flows through the CBN (US$ million) \nPeriod \nInflow \nOutflow \nNet flow \nH2 – 2019 \n25,831.30 \n31,769.24 \n(5,937.84) \nH1 – 2019 \n30,819.73 \n28,846.76 \n1,972.97 \nH2 – 2018 \n28,734.71 \n33,390.29 \n(4,655.58) \n1.2.3.2 External Reserves \nGross external reserves stood at US$38.09 billion at end-December 2019, from \nUS$44.75 billion at end-June 2019, reflecting a decrease of US$6.66 billion. The \nexternal reserves position could cover 9.11 months of import of goods and services. \nTotal inflow during the period under review amounted to US$25.94 billion, compared \nwith US$30.82 billion in the first half of 2019, reflecting decreases of US$4.88 billion \nor 15.83 per cent. Total outflow increased to US$32.30 billion, from US$28.85 billion \nin the first half of 2019, reflecting increases of US$3.45 billion or 11.96 per cent. \n \nThe breakdown showed that the CBN, FGN and the Federation accounted for \nUS$31.67 billion, US$6.10 billion and US$0.325biillion,representing 83.14, 16.01 \nand 0.85 per cent respectively, at end-December 2019. In terms of the currency \ncomposition, the US dollar at US$32.50 billion constituted 85.3 per cent; special \ndrawing rights at US$2.07 billion (5.4 per cent); Chinese Renminbi, US$3.16 billion \n(8.1 per cent) and “others” accounted for the balance. \n \nTable 1:10 Structure of the Reserves \n \nDec'19 \nUS$ \nmillions \nProportion \nof \nReserves \n(Dec'19) \nJun'19 \nUS$ \nmillions \nProportion \nof \nReserves \n(Jun'19) \n% Change \n(Jun-Dec \n'19) \nFederation \n325 \n0.85 \n361.00 \n0.80 \n- \n9.97 \nFederal Government \n6,098.10 \n16.01 \n7,519.04 \n16.67 \n- \n18.90 \nCentral Bank of \nNigeria \n31,669.10 \n83.14 \n37,224.37 \n82.53 \n- \n14.92 \nTotal \n38,092.20 \n100.00 \n45,104.41 \n100.00 \n- \n15.55 \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n18 \n \n \n \nFigure 1.4 Gross External Reserves Showing CBN, FGN & Federation Portions \n \n \n \n1.2.4 Fiscal Operations1 \nThe estimated Federal Government retained revenue of N2,677.54 billion in the \nsecond half of 2019 was lower than the proportionate budget estimate by 36.7 per \ncent. However, the retained revenue estimate rose above the level in the preceding \nhalf by 26.9 per cent. \nAnalysis of the retained revenue revealed that the share from Federation Account \nwas N1,653.14 billion or 61.7 per cent; VAT Pool Account, N83.35 billion or 3.1 per \ncent; Federal Government Independent Revenue, N286.35 billion or 10.7 per cent; \nShare of Exchange Gain, N27.06 billion or 1.0 per cent; and Excess Non-oil, N4.91 \nbillion or 0.2 per cent. Others (including FGN’s share of Signature Bonus and \nrevenues from Special Accounts) accounted for the balance of N622.73 billion or \n23.3 per cent. The decline in retained revenue relative to the proportionate budget \nestimate was attributed largely to the drop in the share from the Federation Account. \nAggregate expenditure of the Federal Government in the second half of 2019 stood \nat N4,488.49 billion, which was 13.5 per cent below the proportionate budget \nestimate and 8.5 per cent below the level in the preceding period. The breakdown \n \n1 Data from January to March, 2019 were2019were obtained from OAGF, while those for April to June were CBN staff estimates. \n -\n 5.00\n 10.00\n 15.00\n 20.00\n 25.00\n 30.00\n 35.00\n 40.00\n 45.00\n 50.00\nBillions\nCBN\nFGN\nFED\nTOTAL RESERVES\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n19 \n \n \n \nshowed that recurrent and capital expenditures accounted for 78.1 and 16.7 per cent \nrespectively, while transfers accounted for the balance of 5.2 per cent. Analysis of \nthe recurrent expenditure showed that the non-debt obligations accounted for 65.7 \nper cent, while debt service payments accounted for the remaining 34.3 per cent. \nOverall, the fiscal operations of the Federal Government in the second half of 2019 \nresulted in a notional deficit of N1,810.95 billion as against the proportionate budget \ndeficit of N959.24 billion and the deficit of N2,792.56 billion recorded in the first half \nof the year. The deficit was financed, largely from domestic sources. \nFigure 1.5 Federal Government Fiscal Operations (N billion) \n \n Sources: OAGF & CBN \n \nThe domestic debt stock of the Federal Government at end-September 2019 stood \nat N13,901.55 billion, representing 3.6 per cent increase over the N13,412.80 billion \nrecorded at end-June 2019. At 72.5 per cent, FGN Bonds constituted the largest \nshare of the total domestic debt stock, while Nigerian Treasury Bills and Promissory \nNotes constituted 19.1 and 5.9 per cent respectively. Others were: FGN Sukuk (1.4 \nper cent); Nigerian Treasury Bonds (0.9 per cent); Green Bond (0.2 per cent); and \nFGN Savings Bond (0.1 per cent). \n1.1.8 Risks from Global Economic Developments \nBased on the review of global economic developments and events during the \nsecond half of 2019, the following risks were identified: \n• \ncontinued sluggish global economic recovery, geopolitical and trade tensions \ncould slow output growth and reduce capital inflows; and \n• decline in crude oil prices could widen the current account deficit with adverse \neffects on external reserves position, exchange rate stability and fiscal \nbalances. \n \n1,952.16 \n1,734.52 \n2,677.54 \n3,717.62 \n2,776.92 \n4,488.49 \n(1,765.46)\n(1,042.40)\n(1,810.95)\n (3,000.00)\n (2,000.00)\n (1,000.00)\n -\n 1,000.00\n 2,000.00\n 3,000.00\n 4,000.00\n 5,000.00\n2nd Half 2018\nHalf year 2019\n2nd Half 2019\nRevenue\nExpenditure\nFiscal Balance\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n20 \n \n \n \n2 \nDEVELOPMENTS IN THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM \n2.1 Monetary and Credit Developments2 \nBroad money supply (M3) grew by 6.22 per cent at end-December 2019, compared \nwith 4.03 per cent recorded at end-June 2019. This was below the indicative \nannualised benchmark of 16.08 per cent for 2019. The growth was mainly due to an \nincrease of 27.3 per cent in domestic credit (net) of the banking system. \nCorrespondingly, the increase in total monetary liabilities was driven by 13.7 and 6.0 \nper cent growth in other deposits and currency outside depository corporations \nrespectively. \n \nNarrow money (M1) increased by 0.13 per cent to N10,530.30 billion at end-\nDecember 2019, from N10,397.70 billion at end-December 2018, compared with a \ndecrease of 0.09 per cent at end-June 2019. The increase in M1 was due to the rise \nin currency outside depository corporations and other deposits by 6.03 per cent and \n0.21 per cent respectively. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2 June 2019 figures are provisional. \nNew Reporting Format Definitions \nSector \nSub-Sector \nFinancial corporations \nDepository Corporations \n Central bank \n Other depository corporations \nDeposit-taking corporations except Central bank \nMoney Market Funds \nOther Financial Corporations \nNon-MMF investment funds \nOFIs (except insurance corporations and pension funds) \nFinancial auxiliaries \nInsurance corporations \nPension funds \nNonfinancial corporations \nPublic nonfinancial corporations \nPrivate non-financial corporations \nForeign-controlled nonfinancial corporations \nGeneral government \nCentral government \nState government \nLocal government \nOther Resident Sector \nHouseholds \nNon-Profit Institutions Serving Households \nNonresident \nNonresidents \nBox 1 IMF Monetary Aggregate Reporting Format \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n21 \n \n \n \n Figure 2.1 Trends in Monetary Aggregates \n \nThe intermediation efficiency, measured by the proportion of currency outside \ndepository corporations to total monetary liabilities, stood at 5.80 per cent at end-\nDecember 2019, reflecting an increase of 0.90 percentage point above the level at \nend-June 2019. The proportion of time and savings deposits to total monetary \nliabilities increased by 2.4 percentage points above the level at end-June 2019. \n \n2.1.1 Aggregate Credit to the Domestic Economy \nAggregate credit to the domestic economy (net) grew by 27.33 per cent to \nN36,182.60 billion in the second half of 2019, compared with 12.75 per cent at end-\nJune 2019. The growth was attributed to the 92.95 per cent and 13.61 per cent \nincreases in net claims on the Federal Government and private sector respectively. \nAggregate credit to the domestic economy (net) contributed 23.9 percentage points \nto the overall growth of broad money at end-December 2019. \n \nFigure 2.2 Credit to the Economy \n \n2.1.1.1 Claims on the Federal Government \nNet claims on the Federal Government stood at N9,482.86 billion at end-December \n2019, showing an increase of 92.95 per cent over the level of N4,914.71 billion at \nend-December 2018. The growth was much higher than the 55.67 per cent in the \nfirst half of 2019. Net claims on the Federal Government contributed 14.0 percentage \npoints to the growth of total monetary assets. \n0\n5,000\n10,000\n15,000\n20,000\n25,000\n30,000\n35,000\n40,000\nDec 2017\nJun 2018\nDec 2018\nJun 2019\nDec 2019\nMonetary Aggregates (N'B)\nM1\nM3\nCOB\nTD\n0\n2,000\n4,000\n6,000\n8,000\n10,000\n -\n 10,000\n 20,000\n 30,000\n 40,000\nDec 17\nJun 18\nDec 18\nJun 19\nDec 19\nN Billion\nN Billion\n Claims on Private Sector (LHS)\nDomestic Claims (LHS)\nClaims on Central Government (Net) (RHS)\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n22 \n \n \n \n2.1.1.2 Aggregate Claims on Other Sectors \nBanking system credit to Other Sectors stood at N26,699.79 billion at end-December \n2019, reflecting an increase of 9.8 percentage points over the N24,387.86 billion at \nend-June 2019. The increase was driven mainly by 50 per cent growth in claims on \nthe public non-financial corporations and 15 per cent increase in claims on the \nprivate sector. Claims on the private sector contributed 9.8 percentage points to the \ngrowth in total monetary assets. \n \nTable 2:1 Growth Rates of Monetary Aggregates \n% Change (Over \npreceding December) \nJun 17 \n \nDec 17 \n \nJun 18* Dec 18* \nJun 19** \nDec \n19** \nDomestic Claims \n1.67 \n-2.31 \n-5.22 \n9.48 \n12.75 \n27.33 \n Claims \non \nCentral \nGovernment3 (Net) \n5.47 \n-16.41 \n-36.18 \n32.37 \n55.67 \n92.95 \n Claims on Private Sector \n-1.42 \n-1.53 \n-4.37 \n-10.65 \n2.13 \n15.58 \nForeign Assets (Net) \n-2.60 \n43.47 \n7.71 \n7.87 \n-16.00 \n-50.97 \nOther Items (Net) \n139.68 \n380.91 \n-11.31 \n3.92 \n33.74 \n-36.24 \nTotal \nMonetary \nAssets \n(M3) \n2.97 \n12.28 \n1.25 \n14.90 \n4.03 \n6.22 \nOther Deposits \n-3.46 \n23.10 \n2.63 \n10.86 \n9.34 \n13.68 \nMoney Supply (M1) \n-3.09 \n8.98 \n-0.27 \n9.68 \n-8.61 \n1.28 \nCurrency \nOutside \nDepository Corporations \n-18.82 \n-2.21 \n-14.74 \n7.03 \n-13.23 \n6.03 \n Transferable Deposits \n29.96 \n11.94 \n3.09 \n10.29 \n-7.57 \n0.21 \n Monetary Liabilities (M2) \n-3.30 \n17.09 \n1.48 \n10.39 \n2.28 \n8.80 \nSecurities \nOther \nthan \nShares \n29.08 \n-7.77 \n0.02 \n38.75 \n11.43 \n-4.63 \nTotal Monetary Liabilities \n(M3) \n2.97 \n12.28 \n1.25 \n14.90 \n4.03 \n6.22 \nSource: CBN \n*Revised; **Provisional \n2.1.1.3 Net Foreign Assets of the Banking System \nNet foreign assets of the banking system declined by 50.97 per cent to N5,806.32 \nbillion at end-December 2019, from N11,841.70 billion at end-December 2018, \nreflecting a reduction in foreign assets of banks. Compared with N9,946.58 billion at \nend-June 2019, the rate of decline of the net foreign assets was higher at end-\nDecember 2019. Net foreign assets contributed 18.45 percentage points to the \ndecline of M3 in the second half of 2019. \n \n3 Central Government is used interchangeably with Federal Government \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n23 \n \n \n \n2.1.1.4 Consumer Credit \nConsumer credit outstanding at end-December 2019 increased by 27.00 per cent to \nN963.74 billion from N753.85 billion at end-June 2019. This accounted for 6.32 per \ncent of banks’ outstanding claims on the private sector and was 3.27 percentage \npoints higher than the level at end-June 2019. \n \nFigure 2.3 Consumer Credit \n \n2.1.2 Classification of Private Sector Credit \nThe contributions of agriculture, trade, government and services sectors to total \ncredit increased to 4.49, 7.26, 8.96 and 37.71 per cent at end-December 2019, \nrespectively, compared with 4.20, 6.57, 8.75 and 36.49 per cent, respectively, at \nend-June 2019. However, the contributions of the construction and industry sectors \ndeclined to 4.21 and 37.37 per cent from 4.39 and 39.59 per cent in the preceding \nhalf year. \n \nFigure 2.4 Sectoral Distribution of Credit \n \n \n \n \n \n0.00\n1.00\n2.00\n3.00\n4.00\n5.00\n6.00\n7.00\n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1000\n1200\nDec 17\nJun 18\nDec 18\nJun 19\nDec 19\nRatio (%)\nN Billion\nConsumer Credit\nRatio of claims on private sector (rhs)\n0.00\n1,000,000.00\n2,000,000.00\n3,000,000.00\n4,000,000.00\n5,000,000.00\n6,000,000.00\n7,000,000.00\nServices\nIndustry\nTrade/General\nCommerce\nGovernment\nAgriculture\nConstruction\n(N' Million)\n June 19\n Dec 19\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n24 \n \n \n \n \nTable 2:2 Sectoral Distribution of Private Sector Credit \n \nFigure ITEM \nJun-19 \nDec-19 \nPercentage \nShare in Total \n% \n(=N='m) \n(=N='m) \nJun-19 \nDec-19 \n(1)&(2) \n '(1) \n '(2) \n '(3) \n '(4) \n \n [a] Agriculture \n636,075.50 \n772,375.40 \n4.20 \n4.49 \n21.43 \n [b] Industry \n 5,991,837.90 \n \n6,423,322.30 39.59 \n37.37 \n7.20 \n Mining & Quarrying \n \n8,663.40 \n \n11,309.70 0.06 \n0.07 \n30.55 \n Manufacturing \n2,318,168.60 \n2,622,539.80 \n15.32 \n15.26 \n13.13 \n Oil & Gas: \n3,329,468.70 \n3,416,254.50 \n22.00 \n19.88 \n2.61 \nof which Downstream, \nNatural Gas and Crude \nOil Refining \n3,329,468.70 \n3,416,254.50 \n \n22.00 \n \n19.88 \n \n2.61 \nPower and Energy \n \n335,537.10 \n \n373,218.30 \n \n2.22 \n \n2.17 \n \n11.23 \nof which IPP and Power \nGeneration \n \n335,537.10 \n 373,218.30 \n2.22 \n \n2.17 \n \n11.23 \n [c] Construction \n \n664,870.40 \n \n723,147.80 \n \n4.39 \n \n4.21 \n \n8.77 \n [d] Trade/General Commerce \n 994,182.60 \n \n1,247,374.30 \n \n6.57 \n \n7.26 \n \n25.47 \n [e] Government \n \n1,323,643.20 \n \n1,539,224.70 \n \n8.75 \n \n8.96 \n \n16.29 \n[f] Services \n \n5,522,249.60 \n \n6,482,321.20 \n \n36.49 \n \n37.71 \n \n17.39 \n Real Estate \n \n582,960.47 \n \n604,972.90 \n \n3.85 \n \n3.52 \n \n3.78 \n Finance, Insurance and \nCapital Market \n \n1,131,299.61 \n 1,272,063.84 \n7.48 \n \n7.40 \n \n12.44 \n Education \n 60,377.00 \n \n58,378.68 \n \n0.40 \n \n0.34 \n \n(3.31) \n Oil & Gas \n \n1,061,733.82 \n \n1,162,529.01 \n \n7.02 \n \n6.76 \n \n9.49 \n of which \nUpstream and Oil \n& Gas Services \n \n1,061,733.80 \n \n1,162,529.00 \n \n7.02 \n \n6.76 \n \n9.49 \n Power and Energy \n 295,457.18 \n \n298,232.96 \n \n1.95 \n \n1.74 \n \n0.94 \nof which Power \nTransmission \nand Distribution \n \n295,457.18 \n \n298,232.96 \n \n1.95 \n \n1.74 \n \n0.94 \n Others \n \n2,390,421.49 \n \n3,086,143.83 \n \n15.80 \n \n17.96 \n \n29.10 \n of which: \nGeneral \n \n1,015,494.89 \n \n1,430,065.05 \n \n6.71 \n \n8.32 \n \n40.82 \nInformation & \nCommunication \n \n689,204.70 \n 882,938.35 \n \n4.55 \n \n5.14 \n \n28.11 \nTransportation & \nStorage \n \n317,069.43 \n \n396,198.85 \n \n2.10 \n \n2.31 \n \n24.96 \n TOTAL \n \n15,132,859.00 \n 17,187,765.70 \n100.00 \n \n100.00 \n \n13.58 \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n25 \n \n \n \n2.1.3 Monetary Base \nThe monetary base at end-December 2019 grew by 20.75 per cent to N8,669.83 \nbillion, compared with N7,180.01 billion at end-December 2018. The upward \nmovement on the asset side reflected, mainly, an increase of 51.19 per cent in net \ndomestic assets. Correspondingly, the upward movement on the liability side \nreflected, mainly, a 28.38 per cent increase in liabilities of other depository \ncorporations. The growth in monetary base was higher than the position at end-June \n2019. The monetary base of N8,669.83 billion, at end-December 2019 represented \nan increase of 20.63 per cent over the N7,187.18 billion at end-June 2019. \n \n \nFigure 2.5 Monetary Base and its Components \n \n2.1.3.1 Currency-in–Circulation and Banks’ Current Account Balances with \nthe CBN \nThe Currency-in-Circulation increased by 4.86 per cent to N2,442.99 billion at end-\nDecember 2019, accounting for 28.18 per cent growth in Monetary Base. Similarly, \nthe banks’ current account balances with the CBN increased by 0.21 per cent \ntoN8,507.26 billion at end-December 2019. \n \n2.1.4 Maturity Structure of Bank Deposits and Credits \nCommercial banks’ outstanding credit at end-December 2019 showed that maturities \nfor short-term credit accounted for 51.73 per cent, compared with 47.00 per cent at \nend-June 2019. Medium-term4 and long-term5 credits decreased to 17.37 and 30.90 \nper cent at end-December 2019, from 18.90 and 34.10 per cent respectively, at end-\n \n4Medium term implies maturities ≥1yr and < 3yrs. \n5 Long term implies maturities of 3yrs and above. \nJun-17\nDec-17\nJun-18\nDec-18\nJun-19\nDec-19\nNFA\n7,628.44\n10,825.68\n11,572.17\n12,126.99\n9,283.82\n7,657.57\nNDA\n7,819.80\n7,831.13\n7,652.97\n10,292.31\n13,470.27\n15,612.31\nOIN\n(9,967.92)\n(12,173.00)\n(12,854.56)\n15,239.29\n15,566.91\n(14,600.05)\nMB\n5,480.32\n6,483.80\n6,360.58\n7,180.01\n7,187.18\n8,669.83\n(20,000.00)\n(15,000.00)\n(10,000.00)\n(5,000.00)\n0.00\n5,000.00\n10,000.00\n15,000.00\n20,000.00\nN'Billion\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n26 \n \n \n \nJune 2019. Consequently, short-term maturities maintained dominance in the credit \nmarket. \n \nFigure 2.6 Distribution of Bank Loans and Advances by Maturity \n \nThe analysis of deposit liabilities of banks showed that short-term deposits with \ntenors below one year constituted 90.32 per cent of the total (73.0 per cent had a \nmaturity of less than 30 days), compared with 87.69 per cent at end-June 2019. \nMedium and long-term deposits constituted 4.0 and 5.7 per cent of total deposits at \nend-December 2019, compared with 4.24 and 8.07 per cent at end-June 2019 \nrespectively. \n \n Figure 2.7 Maturity Structure of Bank Deposits \n \n \n2.1.5 Market Structure of the Banking Industry \nIn the last half of 2019, the structure of the Nigerian banking industry remained \nsubstantially the same, with the six largest banks accounting for 62.96 per cent of \ntotal deposits and 62.59 per cent of total assets. The remaining twenty-one banks \nhad market shares ranging from 0.02 to 5.94 per cent in deposits, and 0.08 to 5.24 \nper cent in assets, compared with market shares ranging between 0.10 to 4.31 per \ncent in deposits and 0.08 to 5.20 per cent in assets at end-June 2019 respectively. \nThe market share of the largest bank with respect to deposits and assets stood at \n14.97 and 14.71 per cent at end-December 2019, compared with 14.94 and 13.20 \nper cent at end-June 2019, respectively. \n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\nDec 16\nJun 17\nDec 17\nJun 18\nDec 18\nJun 19\nDec-19\nPer cent\nShort term\nMedium-term\nLong-Term\n0.00\n2.00\n4.00\n6.00\n8.00\n10.00\n80.00\n85.00\n90.00\n95.00\n100.00\nDec 16\nJun17\nDec17\nJun18\nDec18\nJun19\nDec19\nPer cent\nPer cent\nShort term\nMedium-term\nLong-Term\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n27 \n \n \n \nThe Herfindhal Hirschman Indices6 of 833.96 in deposits and 838.56 in assets at \nend-December 2019, compared with 664.08 and 608.64 at end-June 2019, reflected \nan increase in the concentration ratio. \n \nFigure 2.8 Concentration Ratios of the Banking Industry Assets and Deposits \n \n \n2.1.6 Risks to the Domestic Economy \nGrowth recovery remained modest and is vulnerable to: \n• the increasing claims on the Federal Government, which may compound the \ncrowding out effect on credit to the private sector, and increase pressure on \ndomestic interest rates. \n• decline volatility in crude oil prices below the budget benchmark, which may \nlimit the effectiveness of the 2020 budget. \n• weakening world aggregate demand, which may pass through to the domestic \neconomy and dampen the tempo of economic activities. \n2.2 Licensing of Financial Institutions \nThe number of licensed Other Financial Institutions (OFIs) stood at 6,190 at end-\nDecember 2019, compared with 5,820 at end-June 2019.The OFIs comprised seven \n(7) Development Finance Institutions (DFIs), 911 Microfinance Banks (MFBs), 74 \nFinance Companies (FCs), 34 Primary Mortgage Banks (PMBs) and 5,164 Bureaux \nde Change (BDCs) at end-December 2019. \n \n \n \n \n6 HHI is a measure of the size of firms in relation to the industry and an indicator of the amount of competition among them. It is defined as the sum of the squares of \nthe market shares of the firms within the industry. \nAn HHI below 0.01 (or 100) indicates a highly competitive industry. \nbelow 0.15 (or 1,500) indicates an un-concentrated industry. \nbetween 0.15 to 0.25 (or 1,500 to 2,500) indicates moderate concentration. \nabove 0.25 (above 2,500) indicates high concentration. \n0.00\n200.00\n400.00\n600.00\n800.00\n1000.00\n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\nJun 18\nDec 18\nJun 19\nDec 19\nHHI\nCR\nCR(Deposits)\nCR( Assets)\nCR( Largest-Deposits)\nCR (Largest-Assets)\nHHI (Deposits) (rhs)\nHHI (Assets) (rhs)\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n28 \n \n \n \nTable 2:3 Concentration Ratios of the Banking Industry Assets and Deposits \n \nS/N \nType \n Total Licensed \nInstitutions as at \nJune 30, 2019 \n Total Licensed \nInstitutions as at \nDecember 31, 2019 \n1 \nMicrofinance Banks \n907 \n911 \n2 \nBureaux De Change \n4,798 \n5,164 \n3 \nFinance Companies \n73 \n74 \n4 \nDevelopment Finance Institutions \n7 \n7 \n5 \nPrimary Mortgage Banks \n35 \n34 \n \nTotal \n5,820 \n6,190 \n \n2.2.1 Assets and Liabilities of Other Financial Institutions \nThe total assets of the sub-sector, excluding the BDCs, increased by 10.11 per cent \nto N3,183.50 billion at end-December 2019, from N2,891.18 billion at end-June \n2019. The increase was attributed largely to the injection of additional capital by the \nnewly licensed OFIs, mobilization of additional deposits and increase in liabilities due \nto other banks by the institutions. \n \nNet loans and advances increased by 12.79 per cent to N1,667.01 billion at end-\nDecember 2019, from N1,477.95 billion at end-June 2019. Also, total deposits \nincreased by 5.33 per cent to N750.02 billion at end-December 2019, from N712.10 \nbillion at end-June 2019, owing largely to improved deposits by PMBs and MFBs. \nHowever, shareholders’ funds unimpaired by losses decreased by 1.51 per cent to \nN475.27 billion at end-December 2019, from N482.53 billion at end-June 2019, \nowing largely to increased provisioning. \n \n2.2.2 Development Finance Institutions \n \nThe total assets of the DFIs increased by 6.96 per cent to N2,021.18 billion at end-\nDecember 2019 from N1,889.71 billion at end-June 2019. Further analysis showed \nthat net loans and advances increased by 12.37 per cent to N1,092.90 billion at end-\nDecember 2019 from N972.56 billion at end-June 2019, owing largely to increased \nlong-term borrowings. \nShareholders’ funds decreased by 9.04 per cent to N271.14 billion at end-December \n2019, from N298.08 billion at end-June 2019. Further analysis showed that the \ndecrease in the shareholders’ funds was due mainly to operational losses reported \nby some DFIs in the review period. \nThe Bank of Industry (BOI), Development Bank of Nigeria (DBN) and Federal \nMortgage Bank of Nigeria (FMBN) accounted for 51.52, 23.19 and 12.97 per cent, \nrespectively, of the total assets of the DFIs, while Nigerian Export-Import Bank \n(NEXIM), Nigeria Mortgage Refinancing Company (NMRC), Bank of Agriculture \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n29 \n \n \n \n(BOA) and The Infrastructure Bank (TIB) accounted for 5.72, 3.45, 2.87 and 0.28 per \ncent, respectively. Similarly, BOI, FMBN, DBN, NEXIM, NMRC and BOA accounted \nfor 65.94, 15.60, 8.90, 4.32, 3.32 and 1.92 per cent of net loans and advances \nrespectively. \n \n2.2.3 Primary Mortgage Banks \nThe number of Primary Mortgage Banks (PMBs) stood at 34 (22 State and 12 \nNational) at end-December 2019, compared with 35 (23 State and 12 National) at \nend-June 2019.The reduction was due to the merger of FBN Mortgages Limited and \nTrust Bond Mortgage Bank Plc to form First Trust Mortgage Bank Plc. \nThe total assets of the sub-sector decreased by 3.55 per cent to N432.05 billion at \nend-December 2019, from N447.93 billion at end-June 2019. The decrease was due \nto reduction in cash at hand by 4.32 per cent to N0.68 billion, in non-current assets \nheld for sale by 7.98 per cent to N52.59 billion and in investment in quoted shares by \n39.67 per cent to N9.96 billion. \n \nThe CAR for the sub-sector stood at 12.31 per cent at end-December 2019, which \nwas above the regulatory minimum of 10 per cent. The average liquidity ratio stood \nat 97.01 per cent at end-December 2019, compared with 98.37 per cent at end-June \n2019. \nTable 2:4 Primary Mortgage Banks Financial Highlights \n \nEnd-December \n2019 \n (N’ billion) \nEnd-June 2019 \n (N’ billion) \n% Change \nTotal assets \n432.05 \n447.93 \n(3.55) \nLoans and \nadvances \n238.49 \n228.86 \n4.21 \nPlacements with \nbanks \n40.87 \n43.91 \n(6.92) \nInvestment in \nQuoted Shares \n9.96 \n16.51 \n(39.67) \nDeposit liabilities \n143.56 \n150.24 \n(4.45) \nOther liabilities \n158.96 \n166.25 \n(4.38) \nShareholders’ funds \n53.17 \n55.67 \n(4.49) \n \n \n2.2.4 Finance Companies \nThe number of FCs stood at 74 at end-December 2019, compared with 73 at end-\nJune 2019. The total assets of the sub-sector increased by 71.58 per cent to \nN233.42 billion at end-December 2019, from N136.04 billion at end-June 2019, \nowing largely to increased borrowings and shareholders’ funds. \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n30 \n \n \n \n \nBorrowings increased by 77.38 per cent to N153.40 billion at end-December 2019, \nfrom N86.48 billion at end-June 2019. Shareholders’ funds increased by 59.97 per \ncent to N37.29 billion at end-December 2019, from N23.31 billion at end-June 2019, \nas a result of increases of N3.80 billion and N10.17 billion in paid-up capital and \nreserves, respectively. Also, net loans and advances increased by 25.32 per cent to \nN80.13 billion at end-December 2019, from N63.94 billion at end-June 2019. \n \nTable 2:5 Financial Position of Finance Companies at end-December 2019 \n \n Selected Items \nEnd-December \n2019 \n(N’ billion) \nEnd-June 2019 \n(N’ billion) \nChange \n(N’ \nbillion) \n% Change \n \nTotal Assets \n233.42 \n136.04 \n97.38 \n71.58 \nCash in Vault \n2.14 \n0.88 \n1.26 \n143.18 \nBalances \nwith \nBanks \n12.65 \n6.79 \n5.86 \n86.30 \nLoans \nand \nAdvances \n80.13 \n63.94 \n16.19 \n25.32 \nInvestments \n11.64 \n14.60 \n(2.96) \n(20.27) \nFixed Assets \n46.28 \n13.35 \n32.93 \n246.67 \nBorrowings \n153.40 \n86.48 \n66.92 \n77.38 \nShareholders’ \nFunds \n37.29 \n23.31 \n13.98 \n59.97 \nPaid-up capital \n20.69 \n16.89 \n3.80 \n22.50 \nReserves \n16.60 \n6.43 \n10.17 \n158.16 \n \n2.2.5 Microfinance Banks \nThe number of MFBs was 911(comprising 10 national, 135 state and 766 unit) at \nend-December 2019, following the licensing of 4 new institutions, compared with a \ntotal of 907 (comprising 9 national, 136 state and 762 unit) at end-June 2019. \n \nThe total assets of MFBs increased to N496.85 billion at end-December 2019, from \nN417.50 billion at end-June 2019, reflecting an increase of 19.01 per cent. Net loans \nand advances increased by 20.17 per cent to N255.47 billion at end-December \n2019, from N212.59 billion at end-June 2019. \n \nThe shareholders’ funds increased by 7.77 per cent toN113.67 billion at end-\nDecember 2019 from N105.47 billion at end-June 2019, owing to capital injection \nand accretion to reserves. Also, total deposit liabilities increased by 14.81 per cent to \nN250.17 billion at end-December 2019 from N217.90 billion at end-June 2019. \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n31 \n \n \n \nTable 2:6 Financial Positionof Microfinance Banks at end-December 2019 \n \n Selected Items \nEnd-December \n2019 \n(N’ billion) \nEnd-June 2019 \n(N’ billion) \nChange \n(N’ billion) \n% Change \n \nTotal Assets \n496.85 \n417.50 \n79.35 \n19.01 \nCash in Vault \n5.11 \n4.36 \n0.75 \n17.20 \nBalances \nwith \nBanks \n66.18 \n40.34 \n25. 84 \n64.06 \nPlacements \nwith \nBanks \n83.93 \n82.04 \n1.89 \n2.30 \nLoans \nand \nAdvances \n255.47 \n212.59 \n42.88 \n20.17 \nShort-Term \nInvestments \n28.09 \n27.53 \n0.56 \n2.03 \nFixed Assets \n22.53 \n18.57 \n3.96 \n21.32 \nDeposits \n250.17 \n217.90 \n32.27 \n14.81 \nShareholder’s \nFunds \n113.67 \n105.47 \n8.20 \n7.77 \nPaid-up Capital \n78.80 \n62.53 \n16.27 \n26.02 \n \n2.2.6 Microfinance Certification Programme \nFollowing the certification of 360 candidates during the review period, the total \nnumber of certified candidates stood at 6,692 at end-December 2019, compared with \n6,332 at end-June 2019. \n2.2.7 Bank Verification Number Enrolment for MFB Customers \nCustomer Bank Verification Number (BVN) enrolment data submitted by 457 MFBs \nshowed that 1,828,570 (20.59 per cent) out of 8,879,118 customers had enrolled as \nat end-December 2019. \n \n2.2.8 Developments in the Bureaux de Change Sub-sector \n2.2.8.1 AML/CFT Examination \nThe Bank conducted on-site risk-based AML/CFT examination of 152 BDCs during \nthe review period. The examination reports revealed infractions of extant regulations \nand erring institutions were appropriately sanctioned. \n \n2.2.8.2 Bi-Annual CBN/ABCON Meeting \nThe Bank held the second bi-annual meeting with ABCON in December 2019.The \nmeeting resolved that: \n• BDCs should continue using NGAAP in preparing Audited Financial \nStatements, pending the completion of discussions with the Financial \nReporting Council (FRC) on the adoption of IFRS; and \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n32 \n \n \n \n• ABCON should develop a Code of Business Ethics for its members. \n \n2.2.8.3 Sensitization Workshop for BDCs \nThe Bank organised a sensitization workshop for BDC operators in preparation for \nthe Mutual Evaluation Exercise (MEE) by the Inter-Governmental Action Group \nAgainst Money Laundering (GIABA) during the review period. The MEE was \nconducted, and the key findings included: knowledge gap on the part of operators, \ninsufficient customer due diligence and inadequate rendition of reports. \n2.3 Financial Markets \nIn a bid to contain inflationary pressures and consolidate the gains from improved \nforeign exchange management, the Bank’s monetary policy stance remained largely \nnon-expansionary in the second half of 2019. In that regard, the Bank retained the \nMonetary Policy Rate (MPR) at 13.50 per cent, with the asymmetric corridor of +200 \nand -500 basis points around the MPR for the standing lending and deposit facilities, \nrespectively. In the same vein, the Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) on deposits and the \nliquidity ratio were retained at 22.50 and 30.00 per cent, respectively. \n \n2.3.1 The Money Market \nActivities in the money market during the review period depicted varying liquidity \nconditions in the banking system. Open Market Operations (OMO), Cash Reserve \nRequirement debits and sale of foreign exchange to authorized dealers through the \nwholesale and retail secondary market interventions constituted the major \nwithdrawals from the system. \n \n2.3.1.1 Interest Rate Movements \nOn July 1, 2019, the Open-Buyback (OBB) daily average rate opened at 8.83 per \ncent, compared to 17.26 per cent on January 2, 2019. The rate peaked at 44.05 and \n28.17 per cent on February 2 and September 16, 2019 and thereafter declined to \n4.04 and 2.38 per cent on June 28 and December 23, 2019 respectively. \nFurthermore, the OBB rate ranged from 4.04 - 44.05 per cent in the first half of 2019 \ncompared to 2.38 - 28.17 per cent in the second half of 2019. \n \nThe unsecured inter-bank call weighted daily average rate opened at 10.00 per cent \non July 1, 2019, compared to 20.00 per cent on January 9, 2019. The rate peaked at \n23.94 and 25.00 per cent on February 5 and September 13, 2019 and thereafter \ndeclined to 4.00 and 2.00 per cent on April 01, and December 09, 2019 respectively. \nFurthermore, the inter-bank call rate ranged from 4.00 – 23.00 per cent in the first \nhalf of 2019, compared to 2.00 - 25.00 percent in the second half of 2019. \n \nThe monthly average OBB and inter-bank call rates closed at 3.18 and 3.72 per cent \nat end-December 2019, compared to 7.67 and 6.88 per cent recorded at end-June \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n33 \n \n \n \n2019 respectively, owing to higher liquidity conditions arising from fiscal activities \nand monetary operations of the Bank. \nFigure 2.9 Money Market Rate Movements January – December, 2019 \n \n \n2.3.1.2 Nigerian Treasury Bills \nDuring the review period, total subscriptions for 91, 182 and 364-day tenor Nigerian \nTreasury Bills (NTBs) stood at N5,455.24 billion, compared with N4,153.63 billion in \nthe first half of 2019, indicating an increase of 31.34 per cent. Average marginal \nrates ranged between 4.0000 - 11.1000 per cent for the 91-day, 5.0000 - 11.9499 \nper cent for the 182-day and 5.4950 - 13.3000 per cent for the 364-day tenors. \nThe total NTBs issued and allotted for 91, 182 and 364-day tenors stood at \nN1,716.77 billion in the second half of 2019. This indicated an increase of 16.48 per \ncent, compared with the N1,473.84 billion in the preceding period. \nA breakdown of the total allotment showed that commercial banks (including foreign \ninvestors) took up N1,003.05 billion or 58.43 per cent, merchant banks N33.40 billion \nor 1.95 per cent, while mandate and internal-funds customers (including parastatals), \nN680.31 billion or 39.63 per cent during the review period. Comparatively, in the first \nhalf of 2019, commercial banks (including foreign investors) took up N766.37 billion \nor 52.00 per cent, merchant banks N52.94 billion or 3.59 per cent, while mandate \nand internal-funds customers (including parastatals) N581.08 billion or 39.43 per \ncent. CBN-take up accounted for N73.45 billion or 4.98 per cent. \nThe NTBs outstanding at end-December 2019 showed that commercial banks \naccounted for 37.71 per cent, parastatals, 53.62 per cent and merchant banks, 0.71 \nper cent, while the CBN accounted for 7.97 per cent. \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n34 \n \n \n \n2.3.1.3 The Foreign Exchange Market \nDuring the review period, the Bank sustained its foreign exchange intervention via \nthe Retail Secondary Market Intervention Sales (SMIS) window for some critical \nareas, such as agriculture, airline, petroleum, raw materials and machinery. \nSimilarly, the Bank continued its supply of foreign exchange for invisible trade \ntransactions, such as personal and business travels, medical expenses and school \nfees. The SMEs, oil companies and the Investors and Exporters (I & E) windows also \nserved to provide easy access to foreign exchange, while sales to BDC segment \nwere sustained. Also, the Bank continued its active participation in the Naira-Settled \nOTC Futures Market. \nThe Bi-lateral Currency Swap Agreement between the Bank and the People’s Bank \nof China was sustained through the CBN Renminbi Retail SMIS auction sales. This \narrangement has helped in improving foreign exchange management since its \ninception in 2018. \n2.3.1.4 Exchange Rate Movement \nAt the inter-bank segment of the foreign exchange market, the rate opened at \nN306.90/US$ on July 1, 2019 and closed at N307.00/US$ on December 31, 2019. \nThe rate at the I & E window opened at N360.57/US$ on July 1, 2019 and closed at \nN364.51/US$ on December 31, 2019, representing a depreciation of 1.09 per cent at \nthe I & E segment. At the BDC segment, Naira depreciated by 0.56 per cent as it \nopened and closed at N360.00/US$ and N362.00/US$ respectively. \n2.3.1.5 Foreign Exchange Transactions \nThe total foreign exchange sales by the Bank in the second half of 2019 amounted to \nUS$13,765.44 million. A breakdown of the total showed that interbank spot sales \namounted to US$2,032.38 million, invisibles US$551.20 million, I & E, US$5,491.89 \nmillion and SMEs US$832.00 million. Inter-bank forwards sales amounted to \nUS$4,857.96 million. The sum of US$5,098.53 million forward contracts matured, \nwhile US$3,806.29 million was outstanding at end-December 2019. \nIn the first half of 2019, the total CBN foreign exchange sales at the inter-bank \nsegment amounted to US$8,370.04 million, of which spot sales amounted to \nUS$2,142.68 million and invisibles US$550.70 million. The sum of US$810.00 million \nwas sold to support SMEs, US$212.15 million at the I & E window and US$4,654.55 \nmillion as Inter-bank forward sales. \nDuring the review period, the notional amount of OTC FX Futures contracts executed \nstood at US$7,039.48 million. The sum of US$6,696.43 million matured, with the \ncumulative amount outstanding of US$10,667.75 million at end-December 2019. \nComparatively, the notional amount of the OTC FX Futures contracts executed stood \nat US$8,035.40 million. The sum of US$3,483.05 million matured, with the sum of \nUS$9,324.71 million outstanding at end-June 2019. \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n35 \n \n \n \n2.3.2 The Capital Market \n2.3.2.1 The Bond Market \nTotal bonds outstanding at end-December 2019 amounted to N10,407.70 billion, \ncomprising FGN bonds (N9,389.72 billion or 90.22%), FGN Sukuk (N200.00 billion or \n1.92%) and sub-national bonds (N278.66 billion or 2.68%). Others were sub-national \nsukuk (N2.65 billion or 0.03%), FGN Green bonds (N25.69 billion or 0.25%), FGN \nsavings bonds (N12.67 billion or 0.12%), and corporate bonds (N474.81 billion or \n4.56%). Total bonds outstanding at end-December 2019 were 5.53 per cent higher \nthan the N9,862.76 billion recorded at end-June 2019 (Table 2.1). \n \nTable 2:7 Outstanding Bonds (N’Billion) \nBond Issuer \nJune, 2019 \nDecember,2019 \n% Change \nProportion of \nTotal (June, \n2019) \nProportion of \nTotal \n(December, \n2019) \nFGN Bonds \n8,840.30 \n9,389.72 \n6.21 \n89.62 \n90.22 \nSub-National \nBonds \n384.09 \n278.66 \n(27.45) \n3.89 \n2.68 \nCorporate Bonds \n389.92 \n474.81 \n21.77 \n3.95 \n4.56 \n*FGN Savings \n10.43 \n12.67 \n21.48 \n0.11 \n0.12 \nSukuk - FGN \n200.00 \n200.00 \n0.00 \n2.03 \n1.92 \nSukuk - Sub-\nNational \n3.83 \n2.65 \n(30.81) \n0.04 \n0.03 \nGreen - FGN \n10.69 \n25.69 \n140.32 \n0.11 \n0.25 \nGreen - \nCorporate \n23.50 \n23.50 \n0.00 \n0.24 \n0.23 \nTotal (N) \n9,862.76 \n10,407.70 \n100 \n100 \nSource: FMDQ OTC/ *CBN \n2.3.2.2 Federal Government of Nigeria Bonds \nNew issues and re-openings of FGN bonds valued N890.00 billion were auctioned \nduring the review period, indicating an increase of 27.14 per cent over the N700.00 \nbillion auctioned in the first half of 2019. Public subscriptions and sales increased to \nN1,353.78 billion and N1,035.36 billion in the second half of 2019, compared with \nN1,160.45 billion and N615.39 billion in the first half of 2019 respectively. \nThe yield curve shifted downwards when compared with the position in the preceding \nperiod, reflecting lower yields in the market. Similarly, yields were significantly lower \nat both ends of the curve vis-à-vis previous periods (Figure 2.9). \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n36 \n \n \n \nFigure 2.10 Yield Curve for Nigeria \n \nSource: FMDQ-OTC Plc \n2.3.2.2.1 Federal Government of Nigeria Savings Bonds \nDuring the review period, FGN Savings Bonds (FGNSB) worth N3.01 billion were \nissued and allotted, compared with N2.75 billion recorded in the preceding period, \nindicating an increase of N266.73 million or 9.71 per cent. The increase was \nattributed to government’s efforts at encouraging retail savings in the Country. The \nnew issues were for the 2- and 3-year tenors, with coupon rates ranging 9.0910 - \n11.2440 per cent and 10.0910 - 12.2440 per cent respectively. The coupon rates in \nthe preceding period ranged from 11.2760 – 12.1250 per cent and 12.2760 - \n13.1250 per cent for the 2- and 3-year tenors respectively. Consequently, the total \nvalue of FGNSB outstanding at end-December 2019 were N12.67 billion, compared \nwith N10.43 billion at end-June 2019 (Table 2.1). \n2.3.2.2.2 Green Bonds \nThere was no new issuance of Green Bonds during the review period. However, a \ntotal of N25.69 billion FGN Green Bonds were outstanding at end-December 2019. \nThe 5- and 7-Year instruments were issued at a coupon rate of 13.4800 per cent in \nDecember, 2017 and 14.5000 per cent in June 2019. The bond was issued to \nfinance sustainable development projects with positive impact on the environment \nand the economy (Table 2.1). \n \n2.00%\n7.00%\n12.00%\n17.00%\n22.00%\n0.00\n5.00\n10.00\n15.00\n20.00\n25.00\n30.00\nYield %\nTime to Maturity\n28/06/2019\n31/12/2018\n31/12/2019\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n37 \n \n \n \n2.3.2.2.3 FGN Sukuk \nThe FGN sukuk outstanding remained at N200.00 billion at end-December 2019 as \nthere was no new issue in the period under review. (Table 2.1). \n2.3.2.2.4 Sub-National Bonds \nDuring the review period, sub-national bonds worth N132.14 billion were \noutstanding. Three states’ bonds worth N8.11 billion matured, while eleven states \nredeemed N163.84 billion. There was no new issuance. \n2.3.2.3 Corporate Bonds \nCorporate bonds worth N474.81billion were outstanding at end-December 2019, \ncompared with N389.92 billion at end-June 2019. During the review period, \ncorporate bonds worth N5.33billion were redeemed, while the sum of N45.00 billion \nwas issued. \n2.3.2.4 The Equities Market \nThe Nigeria Stock Exchange All Share Index (NSE- ASI) closed at 26,842.07 at end-\nDecember 2019, representing a decrease of 10.42 per cent from the 29,966.87 at \nend-June 2019. Market capitalization (MC) also closed lower at N12,958.38 billion, \nrepresenting a decrease of 1.87 per cent from the N13,205.54 billion at the end of \nthe preceding period. \n \nForeign portfolio investment (FPI) inflows in the second half of 2019 totalled N204.16 \nbillion, while divestments (outflows) stood at N265.60 billion, reflecting a net FPI \noutflow of N61.44 billion. In comparison, inflows in the first half of 2019 amounted to \nN221.61 billion, while divestments stood at N250.18 billion, reflecting a net FPI \noutflow of N28.58 billion (Table 2.3). \n \nOverall, FPI flows accounted for 55.89 per cent of total equity transactions in the \nperiod, compared to 43.47 per cent recorded in the preceding period. Domestic \ntransactions accounted for the balance of 44.11 per cent, compared with 56.53 per \ncent in the preceding period (Table 2.3). \nTable 2:8 Domestic and Foreign Portfolio Participation in Equities Trading \n \n \nPeriod\nTotal\nForeign \n% \nForeign\nDomestic \n% \nDomestic\nForeign \nInflow\nForeign \nOutflow\nNSE ASI\nMarket \nCapitalization \nH2 2019\n840.53\n \n469.76\n \n55.89\n \n370.77\n \n44.11\n \n204.16\n \n265.60\n \n26,842.07\n \n12,958.38\n \nH1 2019\n1,087.53\n \n472.79\n \n43.47\n \n614.76\n \n56.53\n \n221.61\n \n250.18\n \n29,966.87\n \n13,205.54\n \nH2 2018\n807.14\n \n419.39\n \n51.96\n \n387.75\n \n48.04\n \n195.80\n \n223.59\n \n31,430.50\n \n11,720.72\n \nH1 2018\n1,597.25\n \n799.71\n \n50.07\n \n797.54\n \n49.93\n \n380.65\n \n419.06\n \n38,278.55\n \n13,866.42\n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n38 \n \n \n \n2.3.3 Risks to Stability in the Financial Markets \n✓ The financial markets remained vulnerable to risks from FPI outflows and oil \nprice shocks; \n✓ Preference for government securities by banks threatening lending to the real \nsector; and \n✓ Decline in yields as a result of demand pressure from capital flow reversals. \n \n2.4 Real Sector Interventions \nThe Bank continued with its intervention programmes to boost productivity in the real \nsector of the economy. \n2.4.1 Agricultural Policy Support \n2.4.1.1 Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme \nIn the second half of 2019, a total of 16,922 loans from 93 Participating Financial \nInstitutions (PFIs), valued ₦2.38 billion, were guaranteed under the scheme, \ncompared with 11,981 loans, valued ₦1.68 billion, in the first half of 2019. This \nindicated increases of 41.2 and 41.6 per cent in the number and value of loans \nguaranteed respectively. \nAt end-December 2019, 15,212 loans, valued ₦2.10 billion, were repaid, compared \nwith 8,676 loans, valued at ₦1.32 billion repaid in the first half of 2019. The \nperformance reflected increases of 75.3 and 59.0 per cent in the number and value \nof loans repaid respectively. \n2.4.1.2 Commercial Agriculture Credit Scheme \nThe sum of ₦14.85 billion was disbursed to 9 PFIs for 12 projects in the second half \nof 2019, compared with ₦4.84 billion disbursed to 5 PFIs for 6 projects in the first \nhalf of 2019. A total of ₦13.04 billion from 19 banks for 135 projects was repaid in \nthe review period, compared with ₦23.91 billion from 13 banks for 139 projects in the \nfirst half of 2019. \n2.4.1.3 Anchor Borrowers’ Programme \nIn the review period, the sum of ₦54.32 billion was disbursed through 6 PFIs to \n348,719 smallholder farmers located in 35 states for the production of rice, tomato, \ncassava, cotton, maize, sorghum, soya bean and sesame. This represented \nincreases of 103.6 and 46.5 per cent, compared with the ₦26.67 billion disbursed to \n237,967 farmers, respectively, in the first half of 2019. Furthermore, a total of \n404,842 hectares of land were cultivated, compared with 259,086 hectares in the \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n39 \n \n \n \npreceding period. Repayments amounted to ₦17.24 billion, compared with ₦2.89 \nbillion in the first half of 2019. \n2.4.1.4 Accelerated Agriculture Development Scheme \nThe Accelerated Agriculture Development Scheme (AADS) has both public and \nprivate windows. The public window funds the provision of critical infrastructure for \nsmallholder farmers in designated locations, while the private window provides credit \nfacilities at a single-digit interest rate. \nDuring the review period, disbursements under the scheme increased by ₦4.61 \nbillion to ₦5.98 billion through 2 PFIs for 4 projects, compared with ₦1.37 billion \ndisbursed for 1 project in the first half of 2019. The projects covered poultry, \ncassava, fish, maize and livestock farming. \n2.4.1.5 Paddy Aggregation Scheme \nThe Bank approved the implementation of the second phase of the Paddy \nAggregation Scheme (PAS II) to rice millers to enable them to purchase home-grown \npaddy at single digit interest rate of 5 per cent. The approved tenor for PAS II is 24 \nmonths with a bullet repayment expected at the end of the tenor. \nThe sum of ₦3.50 billion was released for 3 projects in the review period, compared \nwith ₦27.70 billion released for 12 projects in the first half of 2019. \nThe sum of ₦2.08 billion was repaid by 1 PFI in respect of 2 projects, leaving an \noutstanding balance of ₦50.62 billion at end-December 2019. \n2.4.1.6 Maize Aggregation Scheme \nThe Maize Aggregation Scheme is a working capital facility introduced to improve \naccess by feed millers, poultry farmers, silo and warehouse operators, and \nconfectionery companies to affordable credit for the purchase of home-grown maize. \nIn the second half of 2019, the sum of ₦4.3 billion was released to 2 PFIs in respect \nof 3 projects under the Scheme. \n2.4.1.7 National Food Security Programme \nIn continuation of efforts to support Government’s Strategic Grains Reserves and \npromote large-scale investments in agriculture, the sum of ₦14.50 billion was \ndisbursed through 3 PFIs for 3 projects in the review period, compared with ₦8.90 \nbillion disbursed through 2 PFIs for 2 projects in the first half of 2019. Repayments in \nthe review period amounted to ₦5.55 billion, compared with ₦2.60 billion in the first \nhalf of 2019. \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n40 \n \n \n \n2.4.2 Small and Medium Enterprises& Industrial Policy Support \n2.4.2.1 Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Fund \nIn the second half of 2019, the sum of ₦2.00 billion was disbursed through 1 PFI for \n1 state government-sponsored project, compared with ₦625.55 million for 1,103 \nprojects in the first half of 2019. Repayments during the period stood at ₦2.11 billion, \ncompared with ₦3.63 billion in the preceding period. \n2.4.2.2 Agribusiness/ Small and Medium Enterprises Investment Scheme \nThe sum of ₦10.83 billion was disbursed through 10 PFIs for 3,337 projects, \ncompared with ₦1.29 billion for 595 projects in the first half year of 2019. The \nimprovement in disbursements was due to increased awareness of the scheme \nfollowing the establishment of NIRSAL Microfinance Bank. Repayment in the review \nperiod was ₦2.87 million, compared with ₦0.98 million in the preceding period. \n2.4.3 Real Sector Policy Support \n2.4.3.1 Real Sector Support Facility \nUnder the Programme, ₦6.70 billion was released through one PFI for one project, \ncompared with ₦40.00 billion for one project in the first half of 2019. Also, ₦218.36 \nmillion was repaid in the review period, compared with ₦2.90 billion in the preceding \nperiod. \n2.4.3.2 RSSF Using Differentiated Cash Reserve Ratio \nIn the second half of 2019, the sum of ₦82.50 billion was disbursed for 46 projects, \ncompared with ₦75.55 billion for 18 projects in the first half of 2019. There was no \nrepayment in the review period as all the loans were under moratorium. \n2.4.3.3 Textile Sector Intervention Facility \nThe sum of ₦19.67 billion was disbursed to 10 projects through the Bank of Industry, \nthe managing agent, during the period under review. The increased momentum of \nactivities followed the signing of MOUs among uniformed parastatals, textiles \ncompanies, cotton producers and ginners, under the Textile Revival Policy of the \nBank. Repayments in the review period stood at ₦3.11 billion, compared with \n₦884.38 million in the preceding period. \n2.4.3.4 CBN-BOI Industrial Facility \nThe facility was provided by the Bank to the BOI to enhance financing of the \nindustrial sector through investments in value-added projects. Cumulative financing \nremained unchanged at ₦100.00 billion for 60 projects. There was no repayment as \nall facilities were still under moratorium. \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n41 \n \n \n \n2.4.3.5 Federal Government of Nigeria Special Presidential Fertilizer Initiative \nThe Special Presidential Fertilizer Initiative was established to increase fertilizer \nproduction by domestic blending plants aimed at improving availability and \naffordability for Nigerian farmers. The sum of ₦1.75 billion was repaid while the \nnumber of functional blending plants increased to 22 from 18. \n2.4.3.6 Small and Medium Enterprises Credit Guarantee Scheme \nThere was no activity under the Scheme in the second half of 2019. Thus, \ncumulative guarantees issued remained unchanged at ₦4.25 billion for 88 projects. \n2.4.3.7 Creative Industry Financing Initiative \nThe Creative Industry Financing Initiative (CIFI) was introduced in collaboration with \nthe Bankers’ Committee in the first half of 2019 to improve access to long-term, low-\ninterest funds by entrepreneurs and investors in the creative industry and information \ntechnology (IT) sub-sectors. \nThe initiative commenced with the disbursement of the sum of ₦410.62 million \nthrough two PFIs for 12 projects in the second half of 2019. Analysis of the \ndisbursement by project type indicated that two movie production obtained ₦135.00 \nmillion; two cinema, ₦183.62 million; seven fashion-related, ₦42.00 million; and one \nIT, ₦50.00 million. \n2.5 Export Policy Support \n2.5.1 Non-oil Export Stimulation Facility \nDisbursement of ₦1.50 billion for one project was made in the second half of 2019 \ncompared with ₦8.00 billion disbursed to two projects in the first half of 2019. The \nsum of ₦2.47 billion was repaid, compared with ₦1.00 billion in the preceding period. \n2.5.2 Export Development Facility \nDuring the review period, the sum of ₦9.38 billion was disbursed through NEXIM for \n28 projects across agriculture, industry and services sectors. The Facility is aimed at \ndeepening access to credit for export-oriented investments and enhancing foreign \nexchange earnings for the economy. \n2.6 Energy Policy Support \n2.6.1 Power and Airline Intervention Fund \nIn the second half of 2019, ₦3.76 billion was released through the BOI for two power \nprojects, while no disbursement was made in the preceding period. One of the \ndisbursements was for a fresh captive project to increase capacity utilisation in a \nmanufacturing firm while the other was an additional funding to complete an on-grid \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n42 \n \n \n \nproject. The sum of ₦26.90 billion was repaid in respect of 68 projects, compared \nwith ₦12.72 billion in the first half of 2019. \n2.6.2 Nigerian Electricity Market Stabilisation Facility \nA total amount of ₦6.1 billion was disbursed through BOI to the Nigerian Electricity \nSupply Industry Stabilisation Strategy Limited at end-December 2019 to refinance \neligible market participants. The sum of ₦10.25 billion was repaid in the review \nperiod, compared with ₦9.36 billion in the first half of 2019. \n2.6.3 Nigeria Bulk Electricity Trading Payment Assurance Facility \nIn the second half of 2019, ₦62.68 billion was disbursed to the Nigeria Bulk \nElectricity Trading Plc. through BOI to ensure payment of at least 80 per cent of the \ninvoice amount due to power generating companies and guarantee sustainable \nsupply of power to the national grid. This amount was lower than the ₦248.40 billion \ndisbursed for the same purpose in the first half of 2019. All the facilities were still \nunder moratorium. \n2.7 Institutional Support and Financial Inclusion \n2.7.1 National Collateral Registry \nDuring the review period, 20 financial institutions registered on the National \nCollateral Registry portal. Analysis of the registered financial institutions by category \nof licence, showed one commercial bank, 12 microfinance banks, one finance \ncompany and six non-bank financial institutions. This compared favourably with 15 \nfinancial institutions that registered on the portal in the first half of 2019. \nA total of 26,782 financing statements valued ₦125.23 billion, US$29.13 million and \n€0.07 million were registered in favour of 44,890 borrowers, compared with 10,580 \nfinancing statements valued ₦65.75 billion and US$12.28 million in favour of 19,228 \nborrowers in the preceding period. In addition, a total of 32,519 searches were \nconducted on the portal by financial institutions and public users. \n2.7.2 Shared Agent Network Expansion Facility \nThis is a long-term financing facility to enable licensed Super Agents and Mobile \nMoney Operators to expand capacity and increase access points across the \nCountry, with the goal of accelerating and deepening financial inclusion. Although \nthere was no disbursement during the review period, utilization of previous \ndisbursements led to the roll-out of an additional 148,652 agents in the period, \nbringing the cumulative number of agents across the country to 236,940. This \nshowed an attainment of 229 agents per 100,000 adults at end-December 2019 \ncompared with 128 agents per 100,000 adults at end-June 2019. \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n43 \n \n \n \n2.7.3 Financial Inclusion \nDuring the review period, the number of agents on-boarded through SANEF initiative \nincreased to 236,940 at end-December 2019, from 130,794 at end-June 2019. This \nshowed that the Country attained 229 agents per 100,000 Adults at end-December \n2019 against the end-June 2019 figure of 128 per 100,000 adults. \n \nFigure 2.11 Bank Verification Number Statistics (2019) \n \n \n2.8 Financial Literacy \nThe Bank carried out the following activities in the second half of 2019 towards \nenhancing consumer education and financial literacy. \n2.8.1 World Savings Day 2019 \nThe Bank, in collaboration with other financial sector regulators and supervisors, the \nBankers’ Committee and relevant stakeholders commemorated the 2019 World \nSavings Day (WSD) with the theme: “Savings Give Life a Lift”. The Bank marked the \nWSD mentoring students in selected public secondary schools across the six (6) \nGeo-Political zones of Nigeria (Oyo, Sokoto, Bayelsa, Enugu, Niger, Gombe). \nRelevant information was conveyed to over 76,296 students from 611 schools \nacross the country. \n \n2.8.2 Pilot Test of Financial Education Curriculum \nThe Bank, in conjunction with the National Education Research Development \nCouncil, conducted a pilot test on its Financial Education Curriculum in Katsina \nState. This was done to assess students’ understanding of the subject and ensure \nstandardisation of teaching methodology by the financial literacy teachers prior to the \nNational roll-out of the Financial Education Curriculum. \n0\n5,000,000\n10,000,000\n15,000,000\n20,000,000\n25,000,000\n30,000,000\n35,000,000\n40,000,000\n45,000,000\nJUNE 2019\nDECEMBER 2019\n38,268,539\n40,442,267\n30,500,000\n31,300,000\nTotal registered BVN\nTotal Active BVN\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n44 \n \n \n \n2.8.3 National Peer Group Educator Programme \nIn continuation of the National Peer Group Educator Programme being implemented \nin collaboration with the German Development Corporation(GIZ), EFInA, Federal \nMinistry of Youth & Sports and National Youth Service Corps (NYSC), the Bank \nconducted a Train-the-Trainers exercise for 113 Volunteer Corps Members (VCM) in \nEdo, Gombe and Jigawa States. \n2.8.4 CBN Fair \nThe CBN Fair was held in Osogbo, Ilorin, Jos, Lafia, Kano and Dutse during the \nreview period in order to improve financial literacy amongst Nigerians. A total of 526 \npeople attended the Fair in Jos, while 1,537, 488, 615, 660 and 2,391 attended in \nLafia, Dutse, Ilorin, Kano and Osogbo, respectively. \n \n2.8.5 Financial Education Programme for Faith – Based Organisations \nUnder the pilot Targeted Financial Education programme for faith-based \norganizations, the Bank engaged Methodist Church, Abuja Diocese and Nasrullahi-l- \nFathi Society of Nigeria (NASFAT) to train participants on financial literacy. The \npurpose of the training was to coach the participants to become master trainers that \nwould in turn disseminate the knowledge acquired to other members and the public. \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n45 \n \n \n \n3 \nREGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY ACTIVITIES \n3.1 Financial Soundness Indicators \n3.1.1 Asset-Based Indicators \n3.1.1.1 Non-Performing Loans to Gross Loans \nThe quality of bank assets improved in the second half of 2019, as the ratio of non-\nperforming loans (NPLs) to gross loans declined to 6.10 per cent at end-December \n2019, from 9.33 per cent at end-June 2019. The improvement was largely due to \nefficient credit risk management by banks and regulatory actions by the Bank. \n \nFigure 3.1 Banking Industry NPLs to Gross Loans at end-December 2019 \n \n \n3.1.1.2 Core Liquid Assets to Total Assets and Short-term Liabilities \nThe ratio of core liquid assets to total assets increased marginally by 0.51 \npercentage point to 22.99 per cent at end-December 2019, from 22.48 per cent \nrecorded in the first half of 2019. Furthermore, the ratio of core liquid assets to short-\nterm liabilities improved by 0.21 percentage point to 35.32 per cent in the review \nperiod, compared with 35.11 per cent at end-June 2019. The marginal improvements \nwere attributed to banks’ increased investment in risk-free government securities. \n11.67\n9.33\n6.1\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\nEnd Dec.2018\nEnd Jun. 2019\nEnd Dec.2019\nNPL Ratio\nNPL Ratio\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n46 \n \n \n \nFigure 3.2 Banking Industry Liquidity Indicators \n \n3.1.2 Capital-Based Indicators \nThe ratio of regulatory capital to risk weighted assets decreased by 0.70 percentage \npoint to 14.57 per cent at end-December 2019, compared with 15.27 per cent at end-\nJune 2019. Also, the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets decreased by 0.79 \npercentage point to 12.76 per cent at end-December 2019, from 13.55 per cent at \nend-June 2019. The decreases reflected impairments from the IFRS 9 Transitional \nAdjustments. \nFigure 3.3 Banking Industry Capital Adequacy Indicators \n \n \nThe ratio of non-performing loans net of provision to capital for the industry declined \nfurther to negative 11.10 per cent at end-December 2019, from negative 3.90 per \ncent at end-June 2019. This was due to the loan loss provisioning under IFRS 9. \n20.06 \n22.64 \n22.48 \n29.50 \n34.15 \n35.11 \n -\n 5.00\n 10.00\n 15.00\n 20.00\n 25.00\n 30.00\n 35.00\n 40.00\nEnd Jun. 2018\nEnd Dec. 2018\nEnd Jun. 2019\nP\ne\nr\nc\ne\nn\nt\na\ng\ne\ns\nLiquid assets (core) to total assets*\nLiquid assets (core) to short-term liabilities*\n -\n 2.00\n 4.00\n 6.00\n 8.00\n 10.00\n 12.00\n 14.00\n 16.00\nEnd Dec. 2018\nEnd Jun. 2019\nEnd Dec. 2019\nPercentages\nRegulatory capital to risk-weighted assets*\nRegulatory Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets*\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n47 \n \n \n \nHowever, the Return on Assets (ROA) improved slightly by 0.05 percentage point to \n2.53 per cent at end-December 2019, from 2.48 per cent recorded at end-June 2019. \n3.1.3 Income and Expense Based Indicators \nThe ratio of interest margin to gross income decreased to 61.66 per cent during the \nreview period, from 63.25 per cent at end-June 2019. However, the ratio of non-\ninterest expenses to gross income increased to 64.00 per cent at end-December \n2019, from 62.65 per cent recorded in the preceding half. The ratio of personnel \nexpenses to non-interest expenses increased to 34.61 per cent at end-December \n2019, from 32.76 per cent at end-June 2019. \nTable 3:1 Selected Financial Soundness Indicators of the Nigerian Banking \nIndustry \n \n \n*FSIs are computed based on IMF guidelines. \n**The indicators for the period end-June 2018 are revised \n \n3.2 The Banking Industry Stress Tests \n3.2.1 Solvency Stress Test \n3.2.1.1 Baseline Position \nThe baseline CAR and NPL ratios in the period under review were 14.54 and 6.03 \nper cent respectively, while ROA and ROE stood at 0.28 and 3.70 per cent \nrespectively, at end-December 2019. \nEnd Jun\nEnd Dec\nEnd Jun\nEnd Dec\nEnd Jun\nEnd Dec\nNonperforming loans to total gross loans *\n15.01\n14.81\n12.45\n11.67\n9.33\n6.03\nLiquid assets (core) to total assets*\n17.43\n18.81\n20.06\n22.64\n22.48\n22.99\nLiquid assets (core) to short-term liabilities*\n25.81\n27.18\n29.50\n34.15\n35.11\n35.32\nRegulatory capital to risk-weighted assets*\n11.55\n10.48\n12.11\n15.21\n15.27\n14.57\nRegulatory Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted \nassets*\n9.34\n8.43\n10.01\n13.54\n13.55\n12.76\nNonperforming loans net of provisions to \ncapital *\n18.69\n23.89\n-2.07\n0.05\n-3.90\n-11.10\nReturn on assets*\n2.65\n2.42\n1.82\n2.03\n2.48\n2.53\nInterest margin to gross income*\n57.67\n61.19\n59.28\n67.27\n63.25\n61.66\nNoninterest expenses to gross income*\n52.03\n58.22\n64.07\n60.90\n62.65\n64.00\nPersonnel expenses to noninterest expenses\n34.51\n33.44\n30.48\n34.19\n32.76\n34.61\n3. Income and Expense Based Indicators\n1. Assets Based Indicators\nIndicators\n2017\n2018**\n2019\n2. Capital Based Indicators\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n48 \n \n \n \nTable 3:2 Banking Industry Baseline Selected Key Indicators \n \nCAR \nLR \nNPLs \nROA \nROE \nDec 2019 (%) \n14.54 \n45.53 \n6.03 \n0.28 \n3.70 \nJun 2019 (%) \n15.27 \n51.68 \n9.33 \n2.53 \n3.52 \nPercentage Points \nChange \n(0.61) \n(6.15) \n(3.33) \n(2.25) \n0.18 \n \nFigure 3.4 Banking Industry CAR (per cent) \n \n \n \n3.2.1.2 Credit Risk \nThe stress test revealed that the banking industry could withstand a shock of “up to \n100 per cent increase” in the industry NPLs, as the CAR remained above 10 per \ncent. However, the industry was vulnerable to shocks “above 100 per cent increase” \nin NPLs as the industry CAR would fall below 10 per cent. \n \nTable 3:3 Credit Default Shocks \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n14.74\n14.78\n11.51\n10.23\n12.08\n15.21\n15.27\n14.54\n0.00\n5.00\n10.00\n15.00\n20.00\nJun ' 16\nDec ' 16\nJun ' 17\nDec '17\nJun ' 18\nDec '18\nJun' 19\nDec' 19\nPer cent\nBanking Industry CAR \nSingle Factor \nShocks \nDecember 2019 \nJune 2019 \nBaseline CAR \n14.54 \n15.27 \n10% NPLs increase 14.11 \n14.82 \n15% NPLs increase 13.89 \n14.60 \n20% NPLs increase 13.68 \n14.37 \n30% NPLs increase 13.24 \n13.92 \n50% NPLs increase 12.35 \n13.01 \n100% NPLs \nincrease \n10.05 \n9.96 \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n49 \n \n \n \nSimilarly, the credit concentration stress test showed resilience of the banking \nindustry as CAR remained above the 10 per cent regulatory threshold under \nscenarios 1, 2 and 3 in Table 3.4. \n \nTable 3:4 Credit Concentration Risk \n \nFigure 3.5 Credit Concentration Risk \n \n \n \n3.2.1.3 Sectoral Credit Concentration Risk \nA breakdown of banking industry total credit by sector at end-December 2019 \nshowed that the oil and gas sector accounted for 22.60 per cent; manufacturing, \n19.34 per cent; government, 15.14 per cent; general, 5.30 per cent; general \ncommerce, 10.40 per cent; finance and insurance, 2.80 per cent; and others, 24.42 \nper cent. \n \n7 Performing Loans \n14.54\n13.99\n13.15\n11.71\n0.00\n2.00\n4.00\n6.00\n8.00\n10.00\n12.00\n14.00\n16.00\nBaseline\nScenario 1: Five largest\ncorporate credit facilities\nshifted from Sub-standard to\nDoubtful (10%)\nScenario 2: Five largest\ncorporate credit facilities\nshifted from Doubtful to Lost\n(50%)\nScenario 3: Five largest\ncorporate credit facilities\nshifted from Doubtful to Lost\n(100%)\n \nDec 2019 \nJun 2019 \nBaseline CAR \n14.54 \n15.27 \nSingle Factor Credit Concentration Shocks \nScenario 1 \nFive largest corporate credit facilities shifted from pass-through7to \nsub-standard (10%) \n13.99 \n14.71 \nScenario 2 \nFive largest corporate credit facilities shifted from sub-standard to \ndoubtful (50%) \n13.15 \n13.87 \nScenario 3 \nFive largest corporate credit facilities shifted from doubtful to lost \n(100%) \n11.71 \n12.44 \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n50 \n \n \n \nFigure 3.6 Sectoral Concentration of Credit \n \n \nThe results of the stress test showed that the banking industry withstood up to 50 per \ncent shock to oil and gas exposures as the post-shock CAR stood at 10.64 per cent. \n \nTable 3:5 Stress Test on Oil and Gas Exposures \n \nIndustry CAR (%) \nBaseline CAR \n14.54 \n30% Default on total exposure to Oil and Gas \n13.84 \n50% Default on total exposure to Oil and Gas \n10.64 \n \n3.2.1.4 Interest Rate Risk \n \nThe stress test on the net position of interest-sensitive instruments showed that the \nindustry maintained a stable solvency position to interest rate shock of “up to 1000 \nbasis points downward shift in yield curve” as the post-shock CAR declined from \n14.54 to 12.66 per cent. However, the interest rate shocks had significant adverse \nimpact on the ROA and ROE. \n22.64%\n19.37%\n15.17%\n5.25%\n10.37%\n2.81%\n24.39%\nOil and Gas\nManufacturing\nGovernment\nGeneral\nGen Comm\nFinance and Insurance\nOthers\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n51 \n \n \n \nFigure 3.7 Impact of Interest Rate Shocks on CAR \n \n \nFigure 3.8 Impact of Interest Rate Shocks on ROA and ROE \n \n \n14.54\n13.60\n12.66\nBaseline CAR\n500 bps downward shift in yield\ncurve\n1000 bps downward shift in yield\ncurve\n0.28\n-0.27\n-0.82\n3.70\n-3.67\n-11.04\n-12.00\n-10.00\n-8.00\n-6.00\n-4.00\n-2.00\n0.00\n2.00\n4.00\n6.00\nBaseline\n500 bps downward shift in yield curve\n1000 bps downward shift in yield\ncurve\nROA\nROE\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n52 \n \n \n \nTable 3:6 Impact of Selected Shocks on CAR, ROA and ROE \n \nBanking \nIndustry \n(%) \nBaseline ROA \n0.28 \nBaseline ROE \n3.70 \nImpact of Downward Shift in Yield Curve Shocks on CAR \n \n500 bps downward shift in yield curve \n13.60 \n1000 bps downward shift in yield curve \n12.66 \nImpact of Downward Shift in Yield Curve Shocks on ROA \n \n500 bps downward shift in yield curve \n-0.27 \n1000 bps downward shift in yield curve \n-0.82 \nImpact of Downward Shift in Yield Curve Shocks on ROE \n \n500 bps downward shift in yield curve \n-3.67 \n1000 bps downward shift in yield curve \n-11.04 \n \n3.2.2 Liquidity Stress Test8 \nThe stress test revealed that after a one-day run scenario, the liquidity ratio for the \nindustry declined to 31.14 per cent from the 45.55 per cent baseline position. \nSimilarly, under the 5-day and 30-day scenarios, the liquidity ratio declined to 12.30 \nand 7.55 per cent, indicating N2.58 trillion and N3.12 trillion liquidity shortfalls \nrespectively. \n \n \n \n \n8 Liquidity stress tests were conducted at end-Dec 2019 using the Implied Cash Flow Analysis (ICFA) and Maturity \nMismatch/Rollover Risk approaches to assess the resilience of individual banks and the banking industry to liquidity and \nfunding shocks. \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n53 \n \n \n \nFigure 3.9 Industry Liquidity Ratios at Periods 1-5 and cumulative 30-day \nShocks \n \n \n \nTable 3:7 Liquidity Stress Test Results (Post-Shock) \nScenario \nBanks with \nLiquidity Ratios (LR) < 30% \nDec 2019 \nJune 2019 \n(25 DMBs) \nDec 2019 \n(26 DMBs) \nLR (%) \nShortfall to 30% LR \nthreshold \n (N’ billion) \nTest 1.1: Implied Cash Flow Test \nTest 1.1: Implied Cash \nFlow Test \nDay 1 \n12 \n12 \n31.14 \nNil \nDay 2 \n15 \n15 \n26.80 \n564.75 \nDay 3 \n15 \n16 \n22.33 \n1,264.77 \nDay 4 \n16 \n16 \n17.63 \n1,920.62 \nDay 5 \n16 \n18 \n12.30 \n2,584.95 \nImplied Cash Flow \nTest (30 Days) \n18 \n18 \n7.55 \n3,121.38 \n \n3.2.3 Assets and Liabilities Maturity Mismatch \n \nThe industry baseline assets and liabilities maturity profile at end-December 2019 \nrevealed that the shorter end of the market (≤90 day bucket) were adequately \nfunded. Further analysis showed that in the ≤30 day bucket, six banks were not \nadequately funded, while in the 31-90 day bucket, eight banks had funding gaps. \nHowever, the cumulative industry assets and liabilities profile showed an excess of \nN4.25 trillion assets over liabilities. \n \n \n \n45.55\n31.14\n26.80\n22.33\n17.63\n12.30\n7.55\n-5\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n35\n40\n45\n50\n55\nPre-Shock\nAfter Day 1\nAfter Day 2\nAfter Day 3\nAfter Day 4\nAfter Day 5\nAfter cum 30 days\nJun-18\nDec-18\nJun-19\nDec-19\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n54 \n \n \n \nTable 3:8 Maturity Profile of Assets and Liabilities at end-Dec 2019 \nBucket \nLiabilities \nAssets \nMismatch \nCumulative \nMismatch \nN Billion \n≤30days \n 19,229.65 \n 12,675.77 \n6,553.88 \n6,553.88 \n 31-90 days \n 3,166.20 \n 2,903.41 \n262.80 \n6,816.68 \n91-180 days \n 1,107.91 \n 1,986.10 \n(878.19) \n5,938.49 \n181-365 days \n 831.49 \n 3,911.22 \n(3,079.73) \n2,858.76 \n1-3 years \n 1,177.66 \n 3,483.73 \n(2,306.07) \n552.69 \n>3 years \n 1,874.26 \n 6,675.84 \n(4,801.58) \n(4,248.89) \nTotal \n 27,387.17 \n 31,636.06 \n(4,248.89) \n \n \nTable 3:9 Test Results for System-wide Maturity Mismatch \n \nTest 2A \nDescriptive Maturity \nMismatch. \n(No consideration of \nrollover) \nTest 2B \nStatic Rollover risk \nAnalysis. \n(No possibility to close \nliquidity gaps in other \nbuckets) \nTest 2C \nDynamic Rollover risk test. \n(Free assets used to close \nliquidity gaps in other \nbuckets) \n \nN ‘billion \nNo of \nbanks \nwith \nmismatch \nN ’billion \nNo of \nbanks \nwith \nmismatch \nN ’billion \nNo of banks \nwith \nmismatch \n \n≤30 days \n9,795.79 \n2 \n5,949.86 \n5 \n(1,171.36) \n5 \n \n31-90 days \n3,495.46 \n5 \n(623.74) \n13 \n(403.73) \n6 \n \n91-180days \n2,354.47 \n7 \n(1,099.77) \n22 \n(242.11) \n7 \n \n181-365days \n152.93 \n15 \n(3,329.18) \n24 \n(1,005.43) \n9 \n1-3 Years \n922.31 \n19 \n(2,659.37) \n24 \n(1,212.86) \n13 \nAbove 3 \nyears \n(1,563.95) \n24 \n(4,801.58) \n25 \n(4,098.45) \n17 \nTotal \n15,157.00 \n(6,563.78) \n(8,133.93) \n \nTable 3.9 revealed that under Test 2A (Descriptive Maturity Mismatch) the banking \nindustry was adequately funded, while under Test 2B (Static Rollover Risk Analysis) \nand 2C (Dynamic Rollover Risk Analysis) the industry had mismatches of N6.56 \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n55 \n \n \n \ntrillion and N8.13 trillion respectively. These represented increases of N0.4 trillion \nand N0.9 trillion under the Test 2B and Test 2C respectively, relative to end-June \n2019. \n3.2.4 Contagion Risk Analysis \n \nContagion risk analysis showed a 16.00 per cent decrease in exposure and \ninterconnectedness through interbank placements and takings at end-December \n2019, compared with the end-June 2019 position. Two banks were central in the \nnetwork as they were exposed to five counterparties. \nSix banks accounted for N463 billion or 90.00 per cent of total placements and N466 \nbillion or 91.00 per cent of total takings, of which N409 billion or 88.00 per cent was \nprovided by the top four placers of funds. \nFigure 3.10 Network Analysis based on Interbank Exposures \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n56 \n \n \n \nFigure 3.11 Tiered Structure of Unsecured Placements and Takings \n \n \n \n \n3.2.4.1 Unsecured Placements \nThe results of simulated conditional counterparty default shock from unsecured \ninterbank loans indicated that all banks maintained CAR above 10 per cent. \n \nTable 3:10 Result of Net Interbank Unsecured Exposures on Capital Adequacy \nRatio \n \nLending Banks \nBank 5 \nBank 10 \nBank 24 \nBank 14 \nIndustry \nPre-Test CAR(%) \n14.79 \n18.76 \n13.54 \n16.09 \n14.54 \nPost-Test CAR(%) \n14.56 \n12.07 \n12.77 \n16.08 \n14.48 \nPlacements (N’ \nBillion) \n3.64 \n7.82 \n2.0 \n0.03 \n13.49 \n \n \n \nNode colour representation\nBlue\n= Lenders,\nDeep Blue= Net Placement\nRed\n= Borrowers\nPurple= Net Takings\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n57 \n \n \n \nBox 2: Liquidity Stress Test Assumptions \nImplied Cash Flow Analysis \nThe Implied Cash Flow Analysis (ICFA) assessed the ability of the banking system to \nwithstand unanticipated substantial withdrawals of deposits, short-term wholesale and long-\nterm funding over 5 days and cumulative 30 days, with specific assumptions on fire sale of \nassets. The test assumed gradual average outflows of 3.8, 5.0 and 1.5 per cent of total \ndeposits, short-term funding and long-term funding respectively, over a 5-day period and a \ncumulative average outflow of 22.0, 11.0 and 1.5 per cent of total deposits, short-term \nfunding and long-term funding respectively, on a 30-day balance. It also assumed that the \nassets in Table 3.10 would remain unencumbered after a fire sale. \n \nThe Maturity Mismatch/Rollover Risk \nThis approach assessed funding maturity mismatch and rollover risk for assets and \nliabilities in the 1-30 and 31-90 day buckets, with assumptions of availability of funding from \nthe CBN and intra-group as described below: \n \ni. Test 2a: Descriptive Maturity Mismatch assumed that the baseline mismatch remained, \nbut 5 per cent of total deposits would be made available from the CBN and the intra-group; \n \nii. Test 2b: Static Rollover Risk assumed that 80.0 and 72.0 per cent of the funding in the \n1-30 and 31-90 day buckets would be rolled over, with no possibility to close the funding \ngap from other buckets. However, 5 per cent of the total deposits would still be available \nfrom the CBN and the intra-group; and \n \niii. Test 2c: Dynamic Rollover Risk made the same assumption as in 2b above, but with \nthe option of closing the liquidity gap from other buckets. \n \nTable 3. 1: Percentage of Assets Unencumbered after Fire Sales \nItem \nNo \nAssets \n% \nUnencumbered \n1. \nCash and cash equivalents \n100 \n2. \nCurrent account with CBN \n100 \n3. \nGovernment bonds, treasury bills and other assets \nwith 0% risk-weighting \n66.5 \n4. \nCertificates of deposit held \n66.5 \n5. \nOther short-term investments \n49 \n6. \nCollateralized placements and money at call \n49 \n7. \nCRR \n100 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n58 \n \n \n \n3.3 Supervision of Banks \n3.3.1 Bank Examination \nThe Joint CBN/NDIC Risk Assets Examination of banks was conducted to determine \nthe quality of bank assets and the adequacy of loan-loss provisioning. The \nexamination of 15 banks and the three financial holding companies as at June 30, \n2019 was conducted between July and August 2019, being the first tranche for the \nyear. Similarly, the risk-based examination of 11 banks for the period ended \nSeptember 30, 2019 was conducted between October and November 2019. The \nexamination revealed that the banking industry remained resilient to emerging risks \nand vulnerabilities. \nThe risk-based examination of the specialised financial institutions, three credit \nbureaux and AMCON, was also conducted during the period under review. \nFurthermore, the Bank, in collaboration with the host supervisors, conducted the \nroutine examination of the foreign subsidiaries of some Nigerian banks. \nThe Bank conducted AML/CFT risk-based examination to ensure that previous \nrecommendations were implemented and penalties imposed based on the \nAdministrative Sanction Regulations 2018. \n3.3.2 Enhanced Supervision of Domestic Systemically Important Banks \n \nThe Domestic Systemically Important Banks (D-SIBs), in line with extant regulations, \nwere subjected to an enhanced supervisory regime. \n \nAt end-December 2019, the D-SIBs accounted for 62.47 per cent (N25.19 trillion) of \nthe industry total assets of N40.33 trillion. Similarly, they accounted for 65.92 per \ncent (N15.87 trillion) of total industry deposits of N24.07 trillion and 64.26 per cent \n(N11.29 trillion) of the aggregate industry credits of N17.57 trillion. \nThe D-SIBs were largely compliant with capital adequacy and liquidity ratio \nrequirements during the period under review. These stood at 17.93 and 40.37 per \ncent respectively, compared with 19.98 per cent and 49 per cent at end June 2019. \nIn terms of asset quality, the non-performing loans ratio of D-SIBs improved to 5.19 \nper cent at end-December 2019 from 6.12 at end-June 2019, which was better than \nindustry non-performing loans ratio of 6.03 per cent. \n3.3.3 Recovery and Resolution Planning \nAs part of the enhanced supervision of D-SIBs, an onsite validation of their Recovery \nand Resolution Plans (RRP) was conducted in the second half of 2019. \n \nThe key findings from the exercise included: \n1. lack of evidence of robust discussion around the development of the RRP at \nboard level; \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n59 \n \n \n \n2. absence of robust assessment of the criticality of identified functions/services for \nthe financial system; and \n3. failure to properly integrate the RRP into the enterprise risk management \nframework of some banks. \nAppropriate recommendations were made to the affected banks for remediation. \n \n3.3.4 Foreign Exchange Examination \n \nThe routine onsite review of the foreign exchange operations of 27 Authorized \nDealers (ADs), consisting of 23 commercial banks and four merchant banks, was \nconducted during the year. This was to assess compliance with extant foreign \nexchange rules and regulations and review the utilization of foreign exchange \nacquired for eligible transactions. \n3.3.5 Risk-Based Cyber-Security Assessment \nBanks were required to conduct self-assessment in line with the Cybersecurity \nFramework and Guidelines to assess their level of compliance. The reports on the \nmaiden self-assessment revealed vulnerabilities and risks emanating from direct \nconnections and exposures to third-party service providers, phishing, insider threats \nand shortage of cybersecurity man-power. \nMeanwhile, the Bank established an e-portal for reporting cyber incidents and \nthreats, with a view to promoting information sharing and preventing cyber-attacks. \nFurthermore, the Bank sustained cybersecurity collaboration with banks and \nPayment Service Providers (PSPs) through workshops and periodic meetings with \ntheir Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs). \nThe report of the cybersecurity spot-check conducted by the Bank during the period \nrevealed that banks had: \n(i) \nstrong Board of Directors and Senior Management commitment to managing \ncyber risks; \n(ii) \nqualified CISOs with responsibility for managing cyber risks; and \n(iii) \nenhanced their cybersecurity awareness programmes and incident response \nplans, among others. \n3.3.6 Developments in Non-Interest Banking \nTAJ Bank Limited commenced operations as a Non-Interest Bank (NIB) with regional \nauthorization with two (2) branches in Abuja and Kano. Also, SunTrust Bank Limited \nwas granted approval to operate an NIB window. \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n60 \n \n \n \n3.3.6.1 Islamic Financial Services Board Standard Implementation \nThe Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) Standards 4, 15 and 16 on Disclosure \nRequirements, Capital Adequacy Computation and Supervisory Review Process, \nrespectively, were adopted for the non-interest banking segment, effective January \n1, 2020. The standards for Non-Interest Financial Institutions (NIFIs) are the \nequivalent of the Basel II & III standards for conventional banks. \n3.3.7 Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria \nThe carrying value of AMCON’s liabilities stood at N5.71 trillion at end-December \n2019, with AMCON Notes of N4.028 trillion and Loan (Debenture) of N500 billion \naccounting for 80 per cent of the liabilities. The carrying value of assets, net of \nimpairment, increased to N950.16 billion at end-December 2019, from N827.59 \nbillion at end-June 2019. \nThe Corporation made cash recoveries of N28.55 billion in 2019 from asset sales \nand repayment of facilities. The total recoveries from inception to end-December \n2019 amounted to N1.032 trillion, consisting of: cash N395.95 billion; asset forfeiture \nN271.77 billion; shares forfeiture N134.98 billion; and clawback/repurchases \nN229.08 billion on defective eligible bank assets. Contributions to the Banking Sector \nResolution Cost Fund by the CBN and the participating banks for the year 2019 \namounted to N240.11 billion. \nDuring the review period, the National Assembly carried out a second amendment to \nthe AMCON Act 2010 to ascribe additional functions to AMCON, strengthen its \npowers to execute its mandate in obtaining value from assets acquired and increase \nthe size of its Board. The AMCON Amendment Act 2019 was signed into law by the \nPresident on July 29, 2019. \n3.3.8 Cross Border Supervision of Nigerian Banks \n3.3.8.1 Foreign Subsidiaries of Nigerian Banks \nThe number of offshore subsidiaries of Nigerian banks at end-December 2019 was \n60, compared with 58 at end-June 2019, following the establishment of subsidiaries \nin Guinea and Kenya during the review period. \nThe number of representative offices reduced to five in the second quarter of 2019, \ncompared to six at end-June 2019. The number of affiliates and international \nbranches remained at one and two respectively, thus bringing the total number of \noffshore entities to 68. \n3.3.8.2 Onsite Examination of Offshore Subsidiaries of Banks \nThe examination of four subsidiaries was conducted in collaboration with the host \nsupervisors in Guinea, Sierra Leone, New York and the United Kingdom in 2019.The \nexamination revealed that two subsidiaries had composite risk rating of ‘High’, while \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n61 \n \n \n \ntwo had “Moderate” risk rating. The subsidiaries were directed to take appropriate \nremedial actions to address the concerns. \nThe Framework on Cross Border Supervision was reviewed to incorporate the \nprovisions of the Revised Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision \nand complement other regulations governing the operations of banks in Nigeria. \nAlso, Guidelines for the Assessment of Country Risk were developed. \n3.3.8.3 Developments in College of Supervisors \nThe Bank hosted the College of Supervisors for FBN and UBA groups to discuss \nissues relating to the improvement of risk management practices within the groups. \nThe Bank also participated in the 5th Ecobank Transnational Incorporated (ETI) \nCollege of Supervisors meeting in Cote d’Ivoire, First Rand Limited College of \nSupervisors meeting in Pretoria, South Africa and Stanbic IBTC College of \nSupervisors meeting in Pretoria, South Africa. During the meetings, the Bank signed \na Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the home regulators. \nGuidelines for the establishment and operations of College of Supervisors were \ndeveloped for Nigeria in line with the principles and recommendations for effective \nsupervisory colleges issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision \n(BCBS). \n3.3.8.4 Supervisory Collaborations \n3.3.8.4.1 Community of African Banking Supervisors \nDuring the review period, the Bank’s mandate in the Community of African Banking \nSupervisors (CABS) Working Group (WG) on Crisis Management and Banking \nResolution was expanded to include Fintech. Consequently, the Bank developed a \nthree-year work plan for the WG on assessing the developments in Fintech, building \ncapacity on crisis resolution preparedness and supervision. \n \nIn collaboration with the Association of African Central Banks (AACB) Secretariat, \nthe Bank administered questionnaires to all forty-one member countries of the \nAACB. The aim was to assess the adequacy of legal frameworks of member \ncountries and compliance with the requirements of Financial Stability Board Key \nAttributes for Effective Resolution Regimes. \n3.3.8.4.2 Technical Assistance \nThe Bank hosted two teams of examiners from the Bank of Uganda on AML and \nmarket risk study tours in line with the Bank’s initiative to enhance the capacity of \nbank supervisors in Africa. In addition, it serves as a forum to provide technical \nassistance to other supervisors. \n3.3.8.4.3 College of Supervisors of the West African Monetary Zone \nThe Bank attended the 32nd, 33rd, 34th and 35th meetings of the College of \nSupervisors of the West African Monetary Zone (CSWAMZ) to review developments \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n62 \n \n \n \nin the banking systems across the Zone. The College also discussed issues on the \nimplementation of the IFRS, Basel Accord, Integrated Regulatory Solution (IRS) and \nother relevant matters concerning financial system stability in the sub-region. \n3.3.8.4.4 Financial Stability Board Regional Consultative Group for Sub-\nSaharan Africa \nThe Bank attended the meeting of the Financial Stability Board Regional \nConsultative Group for Sub-Saharan Africa in Cape Town, South Africa to discuss \nissues on financial vulnerabilities, FSB work plan, Cyber Risk and Financial \nConglomerate Supervision. \n3.3.8.4.5 Capacity building in collaboration with AFRITAC West II \nThe Bank, in conjunction with the International Monetary Fund and AFRITAC West \nII, organised two workshops on Basel Core Principles Self-Assessment Methodology \nand Cross Border Supervision during the review period. Participants at the workshop \nwere drawn from the West African Monetary Institute (WAMI) and member states of \nthe WAMZ. \n3.3.9 Credit Risk Management System \nThe Bank continued the offsite Credit Risk Management System (CRMS) \ncompliance status checks in line with the requirements of the “Regulatory Guidelines \nfor the Operation of the Redesigned Credit Risk Management System for \nCommercial, Merchant and Non-Interest Banks”. The Bank also continued the \nphased deployment of the redesigned CRMS to OFIs. During the review period, the \nNDIC and AMCON were granted access to manage records of banks-in-liquidation \nand transferred eligible bank assets respectively. \nAt end- December 2019, the total number of credit facilities reported/created on the \ndatabase stood at 10,694,298, reflecting a 61.41per cent increase over the end-June \n2019 position of 6,625,415. The number comprised 10,083,010 individual and \n611,288 corporates borrowers. The total number of facilities with outstanding \nbalances on the database stood at 2,534,836 at end-December 2019, compared with \n1,866,468 at end-June 2019, representing a 58.42per cent increase. This number \nwas made up of 2,448,230 individuals and 86,606 corporates. \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n63 \n \n \n \nTable 3:11 Borrowers from the Banking Sector** \nDescription \n \n \n \nJune 2019 \nDecember \n2019 \nAbsolute \nChange: \nIncrease/ \n(decrease) \n% Change \n* Total No. of Credit/facilities \nreported on the CRMS: \n6,625,415 \n10,694,298 \n4,068,883 \n61.41 \nIndividuals \n6,061,303 \n10,083,010 \n4,021,707 \n66.35 \nCorporates \n564,112 \n 611,288 \n47,176 \n8.36 \n* Total No. of Outstanding Credit \nfacilities on the CRMS: \n1,600,072 \n2,534,836 \n934,764 \n58.42 \nIndividuals \n1,504,782 \n2,448,230 \n943,448 \n62.70 \nCorporates \n95,290 \n86,606 \n-8,684 \n-9.11 \n* The figures include borrower(s) with multiple loans and/or credit lines. \n** Commercial, Merchant and Non-Interest Banks only \n3.3.10 CREDIT BUREAUX \nThe number of Credit Bureaux remained unchanged at end-December 2019. The \nCBN, in conjunction with the International Finance Corporation and other industry \nstakeholders, commenced the process of reviewing the Credit Reporting Act 2017, to \nincorporate, among others, a section on the responsibilities of credit information \nproviders. \n \nTable 3:12 Credit Records of Private Credit Bureaux at end-December, 2019 \nS/N \n \nCredit Bureau 1 \nCredit Bureau 2 \nCredit Bureau 3 \n1 \nNumber \nof \ncredit \nrecords \n34,335,089 \n29,013,592 \n28,990,813 \n2 \nNumber \nof \nsubscribers \n1,340 \n543 \n1,096 \n3 \nValue \nof \nCredit \nFacilities \nN22.356 trillion \nN28.589 trillion \nN19.622 trillion \n4 \nNumber of borrowers \n17,850,915 \n62,125,898 \n16,432,102 \n \n \nTable 3:13 Credit Records of Private Credit Bureaux at end-June 2019 \nS/N \n \nCRC Credit \nBureau \nCredit Registry \nFirst Central \nCredit Bureau \n1 \nNumber of credit records \n34,005,061 \n27,010,552 \n27,400 ,810 \n2 \nNumber of subscribers \n1,310 \n533 \n1,042 \n3 \nValue of Credit Facilities \nN20.2400 trillion \nN24.554 trillion \nN17.112 trillion \n4 \nNumber of borrowers \n16,850,300 \n51,300,844 \n15,926,300 \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n64 \n \n \n \n3.3.11 Other Developments in the Financial System \n3.3.11.1 \n Automation of AML/CFT Processes \nTowards the automation of AML/CFT reporting, banks were directed to render \nreturns on foreign currency transactions, politically exposed persons and three-tiered \nKYC via the AML/CFT Data Rendition, Analysis and Processing Software (ADRAPS) \nsolution with effect from January 2, 2020. \n3.3.11.2 \nMutual Evaluation Exercise by the Inter-Governmental Action \nGroup Against Money Laundering in West Africa \nIn compliance with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) requirements, the \nIntergovernmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) \nconducted the second round of Mutual Evaluation Exercise (MEE) for Nigeria in the \nsecond half of the year. The evaluation assessed the technical compliance and the \neffectiveness of the AML/CFT regimes of the Bank and the financial institutions \nunder its purview, using accepted international standards, particularly the FATF 40 \nRecommendations. \n3.3.11.3 \nAML/CFT Cross Border Examination \nThe AML/CFT cross-border examination of the subsidiaries of Nigerian banks in \nKenya, Mozambique, Rwanda, Mali and Ghana was conducted to assess \ncompliance with the Bank’s AML/CFT Regulations, 2013, vis-a-vis the host countries’ \nAML/CFT laws and regulations. \n3.3.11.4 \nUpdate On IFRS 9 Implementation \nThe Bank continued with the monitoring of the implementation of IFRS 9 Standard \non Financial Instruments during the review period. The joint CBN/NDIC IFRS 9 \nImplementation Project Team continued to pilot the process to ensure seamless and \nminimal disruption to financial system stability. In addition, the second IFRS 9-related \nRisk Asset Examination and Assessment (RAEA) was conducted for all banks. \n3.3.11.5 \nUpdate on IFRS 16 \nThe Bank continued to monitor financial institutions compliance with the \nrequirements of IFRS 16 (Leases) which became effective from January 1, 2019. \n3.3.11.5.1 \nUpdate On Basel II/III Implementation \nThe following draft guidelines on Basel III standards were exposed to the industry \nand other stakeholders: \n• Liquidity Coverage Ratio; \n• Liquidity Monitoring Tools; \n• Liquidity Risk Management and Internal Liquidity Adequacy Assessment \nProcess (ILAAP); \n• Leverage Ratio (LeR) Requirements; \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n65 \n \n \n \n• Large Exposures; \n• Regulatory Capital; and \n• Revised Guidelines on Supervisory Review Process of Internal Capital \nAdequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP). \n3.3.11.6 \nCorporate Governance Scorecard \nDuring the review period, 20 banks were assessed using the Corporate Governance \nScorecard to ascertain their level of compliance with the CBN Code of Corporate \nGovernance for Banks and Discount Houses. The exercise was to ensure that sound \ncorporate governance practices are entrenched in the banking industry. \nRecommendations from the scorecard assessments were communicated to the \nrespective institutions towards improving their levels of compliance. \n3.3.12 Complaints Management and Resolution \n \nThe Bank received 1,604 complaints from consumers of financial services in the \nperiod under review, reflecting an increase of 76 complaints, compared with 1,528 \nreceived in the first half of 2019. The complaints received were in respect of alleged \nexcess/unauthorized charges, fraud, guarantees, account management, ATM \ndispense errors, fund transfers, among others. \nFigure 3.12 Number of Complaints Received (Jan -Dec 2019) \n \n \nA total of 1,236 complaints were resolved / closed during the second half of 2019, \ncompared with 1,548 resolved / closed cases in the first half of 2019. Consequently, \nthe total refunds by banks to customers at end-December 2019 stood at \nN1,424,854,363, compared with N7,229,172,501 at end-June 2019. \n \n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\n300\n350\n400\nJAN\nFEB\nMAR\nAPRIL\nMAY\nJUNE\nJULY\nAUG\nSEPT\nOCT\nNOV\nDEC\n96\n269\n298\n193\n294\n378\n289\n235\n224\n364\n256\n236\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n66 \n \n \n \nFigure 3.13 Distribution of Complaints Received (in Percentages) in 2019 \n \n \n3.3.12.1 \nConsumer Protection Compliance Examination \nThe Bank conducted compliance examination on some banks in line with the \nprovisions of the Guide to Charges by Banks and Other Financial Institutions in \nNigeria, 2017.The exercise covered the following areas: \n1. \nCharges for Issuance of Hardware Token; \n2. \nCommission/Charges on Deposits into Domiciliary Accounts; \n3. \nPayment of Interest on Savings Accounts; \n4. \nForeign Currency Card Maintenance fee; \n5. \nInterest on CBN Intervention Loans; and \n6. \nImplementation of the new Consumer Complaints Management System. \n \nThe examination showed compliance levels of 90.91 percent for charges for \nissuance of hardware token, 100.0 per cent for commission/charges on deposits into \ndomiciliary accounts, 72.73 per cent for payment of interest on savings accounts, \n90.91 per cent for foreign currency card maintenance fee and 100.0 per cent for \nInterest on CBN intervention loans. \nA review of the implementation of recommendations from previous examinations \nrevealed a compliance level of 81.82 per cent, while resolution of outstanding \ncomplaints was 23.87 per cent. \n3.3.12.2 \nThe Consumer Protection Regulation 2019 \nThe Bank issued the Consumer Protection Regulations for financial institutions \nregulated by the CBN in December 2019.The Regulations provide minimum \n14.78 15.45\n0.7\n4.02\n10.98\n12.26\n0.1\n0.1\n9.13\n0.51\n14.97 14.59\n0.67\n1.72\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n16\n18\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n67 \n \n \n \nstandards on fair treatment of consumers, disclosure and transparency, responsible \nbusiness conduct, complaints handling and redress, and sanctions regime. \n4 \nTHE PAYMENTS SYSTEM \n4.1 Developments in the Payments System \n4.1.1 Bank Verification Number Operations and Watch-list \nBank Verification Number remains a credible unique identifier that assists financial \ninstitutions, credit bureaux and law enforcement agencies in reducing frauds and \nother financial crimes in the financial system. At end–December 2019, the number of \nBVNs stood at 40,442,267, reflecting an increase of 5.68 per cent over the \n38,268,639 recorded at end-June, 2019. The number of accounts linked with BVN \nwas 53,351,720 out of 79,312,615 active customer accounts, while 2,189 customers’ \nBVNs were watch-listed at end-December, 2019. \n \n[[ \n4.1.2 Examination of Payments Service Providers \nThe Bank sustained its oversight of licensed Payments Service Providers (PSPs) \nand assessed their compliance with relevant regulations during the review period. \nThe on-site examination of 22 PSPs revealed some infractions of extant guidelines \nand erring institutions were appropriately sanctioned. \n4.1.3 Licensing of Payments Service Providers \nDuring the review period, 14 Payments Service Providers (PSPs) were licensed, \ncomprising one mobile money operator, seven payment solution service providers, \ntwo switching companies and four super agents, bringing the number of PSPs to 110 \nat end-December 2019. \n \nTable 4:1 Licensed Payments ServiceProviders \nLicence Type \nNumber \nJun 2019 \n Dec 2019 \nCard Schemes \n6 \n6 \nMobile Money Operators \n26 \n27 \nPayment Solution Service Providers \n15 \n22 \nPayment Terminal Service Providers \n21 \n21 \nSwitching Companies \n7 \n9 \nThird-Party Processors \n4 \n4 \nSuper Agents \n5 \n9 \nNon-Bank Acquirers \n5 \n5 \nAccredited Cheque Printers \n7 \n7 \nTotal \n 96 \n 110 \n \n4.1.4 Nigeria Cheque Standards and Cheque Printers Accreditation Scheme \nDuring the review period, the following activities were conducted: \n• Accreditation of cheque personalizers based on the revised Nigeria Cheque \nStandards; \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n68 \n \n \n \n• Sensitisation of stakeholders; \n• Development of draft QR code standards; and \n• Issuance of the cheque standards sanctions grid. \n \nThe old and new cheques would be in use concurrently till end-August 2020. \nThereafter, only cheques that conform with the new standards would be allowed in \nthe clearing system. \n \n4.1.5 Cash-less Nigeria \nDuring the review period, the Bank re-introduced processing charges on cash \ndeposits in six States and the FCT. In addition, the cash-less policy on deposits and \nwithdrawals above the specified thresholds was to be extended to other states on \nMarch 31, 2020. \n \n4.1.6 Payments System Vision 2020 \nThe review of the Payments System Vision 2020 (PSV2020) document to \nincorporate QR codes, contactless payments, request to pay, cybersecurity, open \nbanking, big data, distributed ledger technology, amongst others, commenced in the \nsecond half of 2019. In addition, the Bank, through the Payments Scheme Boards, \nSpecial Interest Working Groups and Initiative Working Groups, issued the following \nCirculars: \n \na. Regulation for the Operation of Indirect Participants in the Payments System. \nb. Circular on “Pre-Authorisation of Cards in Nigeria” to enable dual messaging \nformat for POS and sales completion of cards transactions. \nc. Regulation on “Electronic Payments and Collections of Public and Private \nSectors in Nigeria” to guide the end-to-end electronic payment of salaries, \npensions and other remittances, suppliers and revenue collections in Nigeria. \nd. Regulation on “Liberalisation of Cash Out Pricing” to remove ceilings on \nmobile money pricing in Nigeria. \ne. Circular on “Operation of Mobile Money Wallets by Deposit Money Banks” \nexempting banks from seeking the licence to operate mobile money wallets. \n4.2 Payments System Statistics and Trends \n4.2.1 Large Value Payments \nThe volume of inter-bank fund transfers through the CBN Real Time Gross \nSettlement (RTGS) system decreased by 29,508, or 5.36 per cent to 520,735 at end-\nDecember 2019 from 550,243 at end-June 2019 owing to the increased usage of \nother payment channels. However, the value of transactions increased by N6,613.62 \nbillion or 2.92 per cent to N232,889.46 billion at end-December 2019, from \nN226,275.85 billion at end-June 2019. \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n69 \n \n \n \n4.2.2 Retail Payments \n4.2.2.1 Cheque Clearing \nThe volume of cheques cleared decreased to 3,858,700 at end-December 2019, \nfrom 3,953,848at end-June 2019, indicating a decline of 2.41 per cent, while the \nvalue cleared decreased by 2.65 per cent to N2,210.75 billion at end-December \n2019, from N2,270.92 billion at end-June 2019. \n4.2.2.2 Electronic Transactions \nThe volume of electronic transactions rose by 377,666,775 or 28.78 per cent to \n1,689,770,459 at end-December 2019, from 1,312,103,684 at end-June 2019, \nreflecting increased usage of electronic channels. Also, the value increased by \nN11,249.88 billion or 14.45 per cent to N89,129.05 billion at end-December 2019, \nfrom N77,879.17 billion at end-June 2019. \n \n4.2.2.2.1 Mobile Money Transactions \nThe volume and value of mobile money transactions increased by 160.08 per cent \nand 58.48 per cent or 272.49 million and N3,115.22 billion respectively, over the \nlevels of 104.77 million and N1,965.74 billion recorded at end-June 2019. The \nincreases were attributed to the positive impact of agent expansion network, \nentrance of new players and improved confidence in the efficiency of the system. \n \n \nTable 4:2 Electronic Transactions \nPayment \nChannel \nNumber of Terminals \nNumber of Transactions \n% Change \n(Volume) \nValue N’ Billion \n% \nChange \n(Value) \nJun \nDec \nJun-2019 \nDec-2019 \nJun-2019 \n Dec-2019 \n2019 \n2019 \nATMs \n18,913 \n19,129 \n424,619,677 \n415,200,245 \n-2.22% \n3,238.43 \n3,274.18 \n1.10% \nPOS \n166,078 \n186,774 \n187,695,159 \n250,919,023 \n33.68% \n1,383.62 \n1,821.13 \n31.62% \nMobile \nMoney \n- \n- \n104,773,933 \n272,491,275 \n160.08% \n1,965.74 \n3,115.22 \n58.48% \nInternet \n(Web) \n- \n- \n47,976,900 \n55,520,107 \n15.72% \n223.90 \n254.24 \n13.55% \nNIP \n \n \n504,160,651 \n641,624,578 \n27.27% \n49,350.18 \n55,872.39 \n13.22% \ne-Bills Pay \n \n \n616,651 \n483,154 \n-21.65% \n281.56 \n371.02 \n31.77% \nREMITA \n \n \n21,614,846 \n26,866,362 \n24.30% \n9,839.29 \n10,885.34 \n10.63% \nNAPS \n \n \n20,645,867 \n26,665,715 \n29.16% \n11,596.45 \n13,535.53 \n16.72% \nTotal \n \n \n1,312,103,684 \n1,689,770,459 \n28.78% \n77,879.17 \n89,129.05 \n14.45% \n \n4.3 Risks to the Payments System \nGenerally, the Nigerian payments system remained resilient. However, the under-\nlisted risks existed: \n \n• Threat of cyber-attacks on the payments system infrastructure, especially with \nthe increase in technological innovations and digitization of financial services. \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n70 \n \n \n \n• Fraud risk arising from SIM swaps, dormant SIM and use of stolen SIM cards \nfor USSD-mobile payments. \n• Risks arising from unauthorised access and/or disclosure of confidential \ninformation. \n• Threat of social engineering attacks against users of digital financial services, \nentailing the psychological manipulation of people into performing actions or \ndivulging confidential information. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n71 \n \n \n \n5 \nKey Risks to the Financial System \n5.1 Credit Risk \nRisk Rating (Medium Risk, Stable) \n \nTotal NPLs fell to N1,064.1 billion at end-December 2019, from N1,444.57 billion at \nend-June 2019, while the NPL ratio declined from 9.33 per cent to 6.10per cent. The \nreduction in NPL ratio reflected improvement in economic conditions, which led to \nincreased repayment by obligors, and enhanced debt recovery strategies. \n \nThe Loan-to-Deposit ratio of 65.00 per cent was prescribed for banks to boost \nprivate sector lending. This initiative positively impacted the total banking credit to \nother sectors which increased to N26,699.79 billion at end-December 2019 from \nN24,387.86 billion at end-June 2019. \n \nFigure 5.1 Non-Performing Loans Ratio \n \n \n5.2 Liquidity Risk \nRisk Rating (Medium Risk, Stable) \n \nThe average liquidity ratio of the banking industry declined to 45.55 per cent at end-\nDecember 2019, from 51.67 per cent at end-June 2019. This ratio, however, \nremained above the regulatory threshold of 30 per cent. The high liquidity position in \nthe industry reflected banks' continued preference for holding liquid assets. \nDuring the review period, the Bank restricted purchases of OMO bills to foreign \ninvestors and banks on their accounts only, thus excluding local corporates and \nindividuals from participation, both at the primary and secondary OMO markets. \nOwing to the restrictions, investors shifted attention to the NTB primary market \nleading to increased demand for NTBs which crashed interest rates to single digits. \n \n4.56\n5.34\n11.7\n12.8\n15.02\n14.82\n14.97\n11.67\n9.33\n6.1\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\n10\n11\n12\n13\n14\n15\n16\nJun-15\nDec-15\nJun-16\nDec-16\nJun-17\nDec-17\nJun-18\nDec-18\nJun-19\nDec-19\nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n72 \n \n \n \n5.3 Market Risk \nRisk Rating (Medium Risk, Trending Down) \n \nThe weighted averages rates in the interbank market declined significantly during the \nreview period as OBB and interbank call rates fell to 3.18 and 3.64 per cent at end-\nDecember 2019, from 7.67 and 6.88 per cent at end-June 2019 respectively, \nreflecting liquidity surfeit in the system. Similarly, commercial banks’ average interest \nrate on time deposits maturing in 6 and 12 months fell to 7.48 and 9.03 percent from \n10.84 and 10.57 per cent at end-December 2019. Also, the average prime lending \nrate fell to 30.72 from 31.04 per cent during the review period. \n \nIn the foreign exchange segment, rates remained stable, reflecting the Bank’s effort \nat ensuring adequate liquidity in the market, as interbank and BDC rates opened at \nN306.95 /US$ and N360.00 /US$ on July 1, 2019 respectively and closed at N \n/307.00/US$ and N362.00/ US$ on the last trading day of 2019. \nThe equities market remained bearish as investors' perception and preference for \nfixed income securities translated to a loss of 9.10 per cent, with the NSE ASI \nclosing at 26,842.07 points at end-December 2019, compared with 29,666.87 points \nat end-June 2019. In the second half of the year, exchange-traded derivatives were \nintroduced on the Nigerian bourse to broaden the options available and to support \nefficient implementation of risk management and investment strategies across \ndiverse asset classes and financial instruments. Guidelines for derivatives and \nclearing rules were issued by the SEC and NSE in the review period. \n5.4 \nOperational Risk \nRisk Rating (High risk, trending up) \n \nDuring the review period, reported cases of fraud and forgeries in DMBs increased to \n33,415 at end-December 2019, from 29,215 at end-June 2019. Similarly, the total \namount involved increased to N195.33 billion from N8.35 billion at end-June 2019, \nwhile actual losses increased to N3.02 billion at end-December 2019, from N2.38 \nbillion in the preceding half of the year. The frauds were carried out through \nsuppression of cheques, conversion of customers’ deposits, unauthorised fund \ntransfers and fraudulent ATM withdrawals. Cyber-attacks through social engineering, \nbusiness email compromise, e-skimming, identity theft, SIM swap, unauthorised \ncard-not-present and unauthorized push payment scams continued to record \nincrease on service providers’ platforms. \n \nTo check the growing trend of cyber-crime, banks and payment service providers \nwere directed to fully comply with the requirements of the CBN Cyber-Security \nFramework and Guidelines, and Framework for the Use of Unstructured \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n73 \n \n \n \nSupplementary Service Data (USSD) for Financial Services in Nigeria. Customers \nwere also continually sensitized on safe banking practices while banks were \nenjoined to implement strong authentication controls, train staff on basic security \nawareness and carry out comprehensive infrastructure risk assessments. \n \nAdditionally, industry-wide collaboration was sustained between the Nigerian \nCommunications Commission (NCC) and other key stakeholders to enable effective \nprotection of the Country’s information and communication infrastructure and \nnetworks. \n5.5 \nMacroeconomic Risk \nRisk Rating (Medium Risk, Stable) \n \nDuring the period under review, the Federal Government launched the Strategic \nRevenue Growth Initiative (SRGI) to replace the ERGP upon its expiration in 2020. \nThe SRGI is targeted at rapidly boosting government revenue across the oil and \nnon-oil sectors and consolidating the gains of the previous framework. In addition, \nthe extension of the compliance date on the OPEC production cap, minimal pipeline \ndisruptions and recovery in crude oil prices reduced the overall risk to the 2019 \nbudget. \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n74 \n \n \n \n6 \nOUTLOOK \nGlobal growth in 2020 was projected to increase to 3.30 per cent from 2.90 per cent \nin 2019. While growth in advanced economies was projected to decline to 1.60 per \ncent in 2020 from 1.70 per cent in 2019, growth in emerging markets and developing \neconomies, and Sub-Saharan Africa was projected to increase to 4.4 and 3.50 per \ncent from 3.70 and3.30 per cent in 2019 respectively. \n \nInflation in advanced economies was projected to increase to 1.70 per cent in 2020, \nfrom 1.40 per cent in 2019. Inflation in emerging markets and developing economies, \nand Sub-Saharan Africa was estimated to increase to 4.60 and 8.00 per cent in 2020 \nfrom 5.10 and 8.40 per cent in 2019, respectively. Overall, it was envisaged that \ngrowth of the global economy would be shaped by increased optimism, including \nbroad-based accommodative monetary policy, US-China trade negotiations and \ndiminished fears of a no-deal Brexit. \n \nThe outlook for Nigeria remained positive, albeit with the threat inflationary \npressures and low oil prices. Growth in Nigeria was projected to increase to 2.50 per \ncent in 2020 from 2.30 per cent in 2019, while inflation was projected to increase to \n11.70 per cent in 2020 from 11.30 per cent at end-December 2019. \nIn 2019, the banking industry recorded a significant reduction in the total non-\nperforming loans ratio, which should be sustained in 2020 through the introduction of \nvarious policy measures. Furthermore, the implementation of increased Loans-to-\nDeposit ratio requirement is expected to improve the intermediation role of banks to \npriority sectors while the Bank would sustain its development finance interventions \naimed at stimulating finance to the real sector. \nThe general positive outlook for the domestic economy is premised on expansion of \nthe non-oil sector, stability in foreign exchange market and a resilient financial \nsystem. The Bank would reinforce this outcome in 2020 by sustaining its \ncollaboration with the fiscal authorities and other financial services regulators. \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2019 \n \n75 \n \n \n \nACKNOWLEDGEMENTS \nList of Major Contributors \n1 \nH. Mahmud (PhD.) \nFinancial Policy and Regulation Department \n2 \nI. S. Tukur \nDitto \n3 \nJ. M. Gana \nDitto \n4 \nV. O. Ururuka (PhD.) \nDitto \n5 \nH. J. Audu \nDitto \n6 \nJ. A. Mohammed \nDitto \n7 \nY. Babade \nDitto \n8 \nU. Babale \nDitto \n9 \nV. K. Johnson \nDitto \n10 \nO. I. Adebowale \nDevelopment Finance Department \n11 \nU. B. Ndako \nMonetary Policy Department \n12 \nO. O. Mbutor \nResearch Department \n13 \nA. Shebe \nBanking Supervision Department \n14 \nSalihu \nStatistics Department \n15 \nE. O. Shonibare (Mrs) \nRisk Management Department \n16 \nM. Ashiru \nFinancial Markets Department \n17 \nV. A. Martins \nOther Financial Institutions Supervision \nDepartment \n18 \nM. M. Farouk \nReserve Management Department \n19 \nA. M. M. Mwelfwang \nConsumer Protection Department \n20 \nH. Abdullahi \nBanking Services Department \n21 \nA. A. Isa-Olatinwo \nPayments System Management Department \n \nThe Report is produced and supervised by the Financial Policy and Regulation \nDepartment \n \nKEVIN N. AMUGO \nDirector, Financial Policy and Regulation Department", "source": "BOG", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/Financial_Stability_Reports/FSR Dec 2019.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "c3ac6f46bc22dd13ed149c354475b59b", "text": "PUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nBANK OF GHANA \nMONETARY POLICY REPORT \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nMay 2025 \nB\nA\nN\nK\nO\nF\nG\nH\nA\nN\nA\nE\nS\nT\n.\n1\n9\n5\n7\n \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nThe Monetary Policy Report highlights the economic and financial sector assessments that the Monetary Policy \nCommittee (MPC) considered prior to the policy decision during the 124th meeting held in May 2025. \nMonetary Policy Objective in Ghana \nThe primary objective of the Bank of Ghana is to ensure stability in the general level of prices which has been \ndefined as maintaining inflation over the medium term, within a band of 8± 2 percent. Without limiting the \nprimary objective, the Bank is also expected to support the general economic policy of the government, promote \neconomic growth and development, foster the effective and efficient operation of the banking and credit system; \nand contribute to the promotion and maintenance of financial stability. \n \nMonetary Policy Strategy \nTo achieve the objective of price stability, Bank of Ghana was granted operational independence to use whichever \npolicy tools it sees appropriate to stabilise inflation around the target band. The Bank of Ghana’s framework for \nconducting monetary policy is Inflation Targeting (IT), in which the central bank uses the Monetary Policy Rate \n(MPR) as the primary policy tool to set the monetary policy stance and anchor inflation expectations in the \neconomy. \n \nThe MPC Process \nThe MPC is a statutorily constituted body established by the Bank of Ghana (Amendment) Act, Act 2016 (Act 918) \nto formulate monetary policy. The MPC consists of seven members – five from the Bank of Ghana (including the \nGovernor who is the Chairman) and two external members appointed by the Board of the Bank. The MPC meeting \ndates are determined at the beginning of each year. The MPC meets bi-monthly to assess economic conditions \nand risks to the inflation outlook, after which a policy decision is made on positioning the MPR. Each decision \nsignals a monetary policy stance of tightening (increase), easing (decrease) or no change (stay put). The policy \ndecision is arrived at by consensus with each member stating reasons underlying a preferred MPR decision. \nSubsequently, the decision is announced at a press conference held after each MPC meeting and a press release \nissued to financial markets and the public. \n \n©Research Department, Bank of Ghana MPC Report – May 2025 \nwww.bog.gov.gh \n \n \n \n1 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nTable of Contents \n \n \nOVERVIEW ......................................................................................................................................................... 2 \n1. GLOBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS ................................................................................................. 3 \n1.0 HIGHLIGHTS ................................................................................................................................................ 3 \n1.1 GLOBAL GROWTH DEVELOPMENTS ........................................................................................................... 3 \n1.2 GLOBAL PRICE DEVELOPMENTS ................................................................................................................ 4 \n1.3 GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS DEVELOPMENTS ....................................................................................... 4 \n1.4 CURRENCY MARKETS ................................................................................................................................. 5 \n2. EXTERNAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS .................................................................................................. 8 \n2.0 HIGHLIGHTS ................................................................................................................................................ 8 \n2.1 COMMODITY PRICE TRENDS ....................................................................................................................... 8 \n2.2 TRADE BALANCE ......................................................................................................................................... 9 \n2.3 CURRENT ACCOUNT .................................................................................................................................. 10 \n2.4 CAPITAL AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS ....................................................................................................... 10 \n2.5 INTERNATIONAL RESERVES ...................................................................................................................... 10 \n2.6 EXTERNAL SECTOR OUTLOOK.................................................................................................................. 10 \n3. REAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS ........................................................................................................... 12 \n3.0 HIGHLIGHTS .............................................................................................................................................. 12 \n3.1 TRENDS IN REAL SECTOR INDICATORS .................................................................................................... 12 \n3.2 LABOUR MARKET ACTIVITY ..................................................................................................................... 13 \n3.3 COMPOSITE INDEX OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ........................................................................................... 13 \n3.4 CONSUMER AND BUSINESS SURVEYS ........................................................................................................ 14 \n4. MONETARY AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS ............................................................................... 18 \n4.0 HIGHLIGHTS .............................................................................................................................................. 18 \n4.1 DEVELOPMENTS IN MONETARY AGGREGATES ........................................................................................ 18 \n4.2 RESERVE MONEY....................................................................................................................................... 19 \n4.3 DEPOSIT MONEY BANKS CREDIT DEVELOPMENTS .................................................................................. 20 \n4.4 MONEY MARKET DEVELOPMENTS ........................................................................................................... 21 \n4.5 STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS ............................................................................................................ 22 \n4.6 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................................. 23 \n5. BANKING SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS ................................................................................................... 24 \n5.0 HIGHLIGHTS .............................................................................................................................................. 24 \n5.1 BANKS’ BALANCE SHEET .......................................................................................................................... 24 \n5.2 CREDIT RISK .............................................................................................................................................. 26 \n5.3 FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS INDICATORS ........................................................................................................ 28 \n5.4 CREDIT CONDITIONS SURVEY ................................................................................................................... 31 \n5.5 CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK .................................................................................................................... 32 \n6. PRICE DEVELOPMENTS ........................................................................................................................... 33 \n6.0 HIGHLIGHTS .............................................................................................................................................. 33 \n6.1 DOMESTIC INFLATION ............................................................................................................................... 33 \n6.2 INFLATION RISK ASSESSMENT AND OUTLOOK......................................................................................... 35 \nAPPENDIX ..................................................................................................................................................... 36 \n \n \n \n \n2 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nOverview \nGlobal economic developments in the first four months of the year were characterised by low \ngrowth prospects, unsynchronised disinflation outcomes, and restrictive global financial \nconditions, driven largely by significant headwinds associated with the trade policy shifts in the United \nStates. The potential spillover effects of the imposition of the trade tariffs by the United States and \ncounter-tariff measures have heightened policy uncertainty, weakened investor sentiments, and lowered \nglobal growth prospects. In the event, monetary policy decisions by central banks have been mixed, \nreflecting divergence in inflation outcomes. While some countries have adopted a tighter-for-longer \nstance, others have cut policy rates, citing gradual ease in inflation towards central bank targets \n \nOn the domestic front, the Bank’s high frequency real sector indicators point to a sustained \npickup in economic activity. The updated Composite Index of Economic Activity increased by 2.3 \npercent, year-on-year, in March 2025, compared with 1.0 percent over the same period last year, mainly \ndriven by exports, credit to the private sector, and construction activities. In addition, the Ghana \nPurchasing Managers’ Index rose above the 50 point-benchmark as output and new orders increased, \nsignalling improved growth prospects. \n \nHeadline inflation has declined consecutively in the first four months of the year by 2.6 percentage \npoints to 21.2 percent in April 2025, driven by both food and non-food inflation. A confluence of \nfactors, including the tight monetary policy stance, stepped-up liquidity sterilization efforts, downward \nrevisions in ex-pump petroleum prices, and exchange rate stability have supported the gradual decline \nin inflation. \n \nThe external sector has continued to improve, with a record provisional current account surplus \nof US$2.1 billion in the first quarter of 2025, driven mainly by higher prices and increased \nproduction volumes of gold and cocoa, and strong remittance inflows. The current account surplus, \ntogether with net outflows in the capital and financial account, resulted in an overall Balance of \nPayments surplus of US$1.1 billion. The strong external performance resulted in significant reserve \naccumulation. \n \nThe cedi has rebounded strongly against the major trading currencies, driven by a combination of \nfactors, including the tight monetary policy stance, ongoing fiscal consolidation, record reserve \naccumulation, strict enforcement of foreign exchange market rules, and improved market sentiment. \n \nThe banking sector performance remained stable in April 2025. The sector continued to record \nstrong growth in assets, driven by increases in domestic deposits and other funding sources. Although \ngrowth moderated, profit picked up in the first four months of the year relative to the same period last \nyear. The Financial Soundness Indicators generally recorded improvements in April 2025 relative to \nApril 2024. There was a significant improvement in solvency and liquidity measures although \nprofitability indicators moderated. Non-performing loans ratio also improved on account of higher \ncredit growth. \n \n \n \n \n3 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n1. Global Economic Developments \n \n1.0 Highlights \nRecent U.S. policy shifts have given rise to increased trade and economic policy uncertainty and \ndimmed global growth prospects. The global disinflation process has mostly stalled, and headline \ninflation has been revised slightly upwards in some countries. Financial conditions remain restrictive, \nreflecting still high policy rates and long-term bond yields. In the local forex market, the Ghana cedi \nmade significant gains in recent months, supported by both domestic and external factors. \n \n1.1 Global Growth Developments \nGlobal economic developments in the first four months of the year were characterised by low growth \nprospects, unsynchronised disinflation outcomes, and restrictive global financial conditions, driven \nlargely by significant headwinds associated with the trade policy shifts in the United States. The \npotential spillover effects of the imposition of the trade tariffs by the United States and counter-tariff \nmeasures have heightened policy uncertainty, weakened investor sentiments, and lowered global \ngrowth prospects. In the event, monetary policy decisions by central banks have been mixed, reflecting \ndivergence in inflation outcomes. While some countries have adopted a tighter-for-longer stance, others \nhave cut policy rates, citing gradual ease in inflation towards central bank targets. Against this backdrop, \nthe IMF projects that global growth will decline from 3.3 percent in 2024 to 2.8 percent in 2025, before \npicking up to 3.0 percent in 2026. The growth downgrades are broad-based across advanced and \nemerging market economies. \n \nTable 1.1: Global Growth Projections (%) \nSource: IMF, WEO April 2025, Update \n \n \n \n \n \n4 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n1.2 Global Price Developments \nThe global disinflation process has mostly stalled, and headline inflation has been revised slightly \nupwards in some countries. A renewed uptick in food prices, persistence in services inflation, and a \nresurgence in core goods inflation continue to exert upward pressures on global headline inflation. The \nFAO food price index increased in April 2025 due to supply constraints and stronger import demand. \nIn particular, services inflation remained persistent, largely on account of relatively higher wages. \nHowever, oil prices fell owing to OPEC+ countries’ decision to unwind production cuts slightly from \nApril 2025. In the outlook, inflation is expected to decline amid lower oil prices and a broad-based \ndowngrade of global growth. \n \n Figure 1.1: Headline Inflation Rates (%) \n \n \nSource: Bank of Gana, /Trading Economics \n \n1.3 Global Financial Markets Developments \nGlobal financial conditions remain restrictive, reflecting still high policy rates and long-term bond \nyields. Major central banks such as the Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan held policy rates steady \namid trade tensions and high uncertainty. However, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England \nlowered their policy rates due to growing confidence that inflation was on track and returning to the \ntarget. Moreover, policy rate decisions remained diverse across Emerging Market and Developing \nEconomies (EMDEs). Higher term premiums have kept long-term yields higher, while equity markets \nhave been volatile amid rising uncertainty. In the outlook, financial conditions will remain tight in the \nnear-term. Higher policy rates and long-term bond yields could continue to keep financing conditions \ntight. The uncertainty about how central banks will navigate the difficult trade-offs they face amid tariffs \ncould trigger a disruptive repricing of risky assets, sharp tightening of financial conditions, and an \nappreciation of the US dollar. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n5 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nTable 1.2: Monetary Policy Stance of Selected Central Banks \n \nSource: Growth Rate (World Bank); Debt/GDP (IMF) Policy Rates (Trading Economics) \n \n1.4 Currency Markets \nThe cedi has rebounded strongly against the major trading currencies driven by a combination of factors. \nStrong reserve build-up, tight monetary policy stance, ongoing fiscal consolidation, strict enforcement \nof foreign exchange market rules, and improved market sentiment supported the cedi recovery. On the \nexternal front, the weakness of the dollar due to weak growth in the U.S., trade policy uncertainty, \nadjustment in demand for dollar assets, and recovery in the Euro Area also helped improved the cedi’s \nperformance. In the interbank market, the cedi appreciated by 3.9 percent against the dollar, and \ndepreciated by 2.5 percent and 5.3 percent against the pound sterling, and the euro, respectively, on a \nyear-to-date basis. This is against a depreciation of 10.5 percent, 9.0 percent, and 7.5 percent against \nthe dollar, the pound sterling, and the euro, respectively, during the same period in 2024. The cedi was \nrelatively more volatile during the first 95 transaction days in 2025 compared to other years. \n \nTable 1.3: Interbank Exchange Rates \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \nCountry\nPolicy rate -\nPrevious (%)\nPolicy Rate \nCurrent (%)\nForecast\nInflation \nMarch, \n2025\nInflation April, \n2025\nReal rate\nInfl Target\nOverall \nFiscal \nDeficit \n(2024,\n% of \nGDP)\nGDP Growth \n(Dec.2024)\nGross \nDebt/GDP\n(2024,%)\nYTD \nDepr/16th \nMay 2025\nU.S \n4.5\n4.5\n4.5\n2.4\n2.3\n2.2\n2%\n-7.3\n2.8\n120.8\nEuro Area\n2.65\n2.4\n2.40\n2.2\n2.2\n0.2\n< 2%\n-3.1\n0.9\n87.7\n7.61\nUK\n4.5\n4.25\n4\n2.6\n1.7\n2%\n-5.7\n1.1\n101.2\n5.88\nJapan\n0.5\n0.5\n0.5\n3.6\n-3.1\n2%\n-2.5\n0.1\n236.7\n7.01\nRussia\n21\n21\n20\n10.3\n10.2\n10.8\n4%\n-2.2\n4.1\n20.3\n40.04\nIndia\n6.25\n6\n6\n3.34\n3.16\n3.09\n4±2%\n-7.4\n6.5\n81.3\n0.11\nBrazil\n14.25\n14.75\n14.75\n5.48\n5.53\n9.22\n4.5±1.5%\n-6.6\n3.4\n87.3\n9.04\nTurkey\n42.5\n46\n42.5\n38.1\n37.86\n8.14\n5±2%\n-5.2\n3.2\n26\n-8.99\nMalaysia\n3\n3\n3.0\n1.4\n1.6\n3% - 4%\n-4\n5.1\n70.4\n4.16\nIndonesia\n5.75\n5.75\n5.75\n1.03\n2.0\n3.8\n3.5% ± 1%\n-2.3\n5\n40.2\nChile\n5\n5\n5\n4.9\n4.5\n0.5\n3±1%\n-2.7\n2.6\n42.0\nGhana\n27\n28\n22.4\n21.2\n6.8\n8±2%\n-7.7\n5.7\n70.5\n19.29\nSouth Africa\n7.5\n7.5\n7.5\n2.7\n4.8\n3% -6%\n-6.1\n0.6\n76.4\n4.43\nNigeria\n27.5\n27.5\n27.5\n24.23\n23.71\n3.79\n6% -9%\n-3.4\n3.4\n52.9\n-3.55\nKenya\n10.75\n10\n10\n3.6\n4.1\n5.9\n2.5-7.5%\n-5.5\n4.5\n65.6\n0.05\nZambia\n14\n14.5\n14.5\n16.5\n16.5\n-2\n6%-8%\n-3.3\n4\n114.9\n3.76\nMorocco\n2.5\n2.25\n2.25\n1.6\n0.7\n-4.1\n3.2\n70\nAngola\n19.5\n19.5\n19.0\n23.9\n22.32\n-2.82\n9-11%\n-1\n4.5\n62.5\nEgypt\n27.25\n25.5\n24.00\n13.6\n13.9\n11.6\n7± 2%\n-7.1\n2.4\n90.9\n1.41\nUS$/GHC*\nMonthly \ndepreciation/a\nppreciation\nYear-to-Date \ndepreciation/\nappreciation\nGBP/GHC*\nMonthly \ndepreciation/a\nppreciation\nYear-to-Date \ndepreciation/\nappreciation\nEuro/GHC*\nMonthly \ndepreciation/\nappreciation\nYear-to-Date \ndepreciation/a\nppreciation\n2023\nJan\n10.7997\n-20.6\n-20.59\n13.2863\n-22.4\n-22.39\n11.7262\n-22.0\n-22.01\nFeb\n11.0135\n-1.9\n-22.13\n13.3699\n-0.6\n-22.87\n11.7182\n0.1\n-21.95\nMar\n11.0137\n0.0\n-22.13\n13.6218\n-1.8\n-24.30\n11.9657\n-2.1\n-23.57\nApr\n10.9516\n0.6\n-21.69\n13.7624\n-1.0\n-25.07\n12.0876\n-1.0\n-24.34\nMay\n10.9715\n-0.2\n-21.83\n13.5888\n1.3\n-24.12\n11.6978\n3.3\n-21.82\nJune\n10.9972\n-0.2\n-22.02\n13.9879\n-2.9\n-26.28\n12.0073\n-2.6\n-23.83\nJuly\n11.0034\n-0.1\n-22.06\n14.1482\n-1.1\n-27.12\n12.1272\n-1.0\n-24.59\nAug\n11.0192\n-0.1\n-22.17\n13.9514\n1.4\n-26.09\n11.9473\n1.5\n-23.45\nSep\n11.1285\n-1.0\n-22.94\n13.5935\n2.6\n-24.14\n11.7774\n1.4\n-22.35\nOct\n11.4963\n-3.2\n-25.40\n13.9399\n-2.5\n-26.03\n12.1438\n-3.0\n-24.69\nNov\n11.6206\n-1.1\n-26.20\n14.6821\n-5.1\n-29.77\n12.6756\n-4.2\n-27.85\nDec\n11.8800\n-2.2\n-27.81\n15.1334\n-3.0\n-31.86\n13.1264\n-3.4\n-30.33\n2024\nJan\n12.0356\n-1.3\n-1.29\n15.3027\n-1.1\n-1.11\n13.0547\n0.5\n0.55\nFeb\n12.4642\n-3.4\n-4.69\n15.8022\n-3.2\n-4.23\n13.5234\n-3.5\n-2.94\nMar\n12.8770\n-3.2\n-7.74\n16.2617\n-2.8\n-6.94\n13.9031\n-2.7\n-5.59\nApr\n13.2739\n-3.0\n-10.50\n16.6243\n-2.2\n-8.97\n14.1900\n-2.0\n-7.50\nMay\n14.1301\n-6.1\n-15.92\n17.9996\n-7.6\n-15.92\n15.3345\n-7.5\n-14.40\nJune\n14.5860\n-3.1\n-18.55\n18.4375\n-2.4\n-17.92\n15.6270\n-1.9\n-16.00\nJuly\n14.9009\n-2.1\n-20.27\n19.1305\n-3.6\n-20.89\n16.1065\n-3.0\n-18.50\nAug\n15.1899\n-1.9\n-21.79\n19.9261\n-4.0\n-24.05\n16.7828\n-4.0\n-21.79\nSep\n15.8000\n-3.9\n-24.81\n21.1823\n-5.9\n-28.56\n17.6108\n-4.7\n-25.46\nOct\n16.3000\n-3.1\n-27.12\n20.9700\n1.0\n-27.83\n17.6992\n-0.5\n-25.84\nNov\n15.2700\n6.7\n-22.20\n19.3592\n8.3\n-21.83\n16.1291\n9.7\n-18.62\nDec\n14.7000\n3.9\n-19.18\n18.4008\n5.2\n-17.76\n15.2141\n6.0\n-13.72\n2025\nJan\n15.3001\n-3.9\n-3.92\n19.0003\n-3.2\n-3.16\n15.9012\n-4.3\n-4.32\nFeb\n15.5300\n-1.5\n-5.34\n19.5484\n-2.8\n-5.87\n16.1524\n-1.6\n-5.81\nMar\n15.5300\n0.0\n-5.34\n20.0951\n-2.7\n-8.43\n16.8068\n-3.9\n-9.48\nApr\n14.1500\n9.8\n3.89\n18.8769\n6.5\n-2.52\n16.0640\n4.6\n-5.29\n \n6 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nConsidering the currency movements of major trading partners, the cedi appreciated by 5.3 percent and \n8.5 percent in nominal trade weighted terms, and forex transaction weighted terms, respectively, in the \nmonth of April 2025. This is against a depreciation of 2.1 percent, and 3.0 percent, in nominal trade \nweighted terms and nominal foreign exchange transaction weighted terms, respectively, over the same \nperiod in 2024. \n \nTable 1.4: Nominal Effective Exchange Rate \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \nIn real bilateral terms, the cedi appreciated by 9.3 percent, 6.3 percent and 4.8 percent against the dollar, \nthe pound sterling, and the euro, respectively, in April 2025. Comparatively, for the corresponding \nperiod in 2024, the cedi’s real exchange rate depreciated by 1.7 percent, 0.6 percent, and 0.7 percent, \nagainst the dollar, the pound sterling, and the euro, respectively over the same period 2024. \n \nTable 1.5: Real Bilateral Exchange Rate \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \nMonth\n2021=100\nMonthly (%)\nYear-to-Date (%)\nFXTWI\n TWI\nFXTWI\n TWI FXTWI\n TWI\nJan-24\n48.36\n52.70\n-1.15\n0.30\n-1.15\n0.30\nFeb-24\n46.71\n50.96\n-3.54\n-3.42\n-4.73\n-3.11\nMar-24\n45.22\n49.38\n-3.30\n-3.20\n-8.18\n-6.41\nApr-24\n43.91\n48.38\n-2.97\n-2.06\n-11.40\n-8.60\nMay-24\n41.18\n44.77\n-6.63\n-8.05\n-18.78\n-17.35\nJun-24\n39.94\n43.83\n-3.11\n-2.16\n-22.48\n-19.88\nJul-24\n39.05\n42.49\n-2.28\n-3.14\n-25.27\n-23.65\nAug-24\n38.23\n40.96\n-2.14\n-3.76\n-27.95\n-28.29\nSep-24\n36.72\n39.07\n-4.12\n-4.82\n-33.23\n-34.47\nOct-24\n35.68\n38.67\n-2.91\n-1.03\n-37.10\n-35.86\nNov-24\n38.18\n42.26\n6.55\n8.49\n-28.12\n-24.33\nDec-24\n39.74\n44.70\n3.93\n5.46\n-23.09\n-17.54\nJan-25\n38.19\n42.96\n-4.07\n-4.07\n-4.07\n-4.07\nFeb-25\n37.61\n42.23\n-1.54\n-1.73\n-5.67\n-5.87\nMar-25\n37.47\n40.78\n-0.38\n-3.54\n-6.07\n-9.61\nApr-25\n40.95\n43.06\n8.50\n5.28\n2.95\n-3.82\nRER Index (Jan.2021=100)\nMONTHLY CHANGE (Index)\nYear-to-Date (%)\nMonth\nEUR\nGBP\nUSD\nEUR\nGBP\nUSD\nEUR\nGBP\nUSD\nJan-24\n98.89\n92.57\n87.94\n3.0\n1.6\n0.1\n3.0\n1.6\n0.1\nFeb-24\n96.52\n91.08\n85.74\n-2.5\n-1.6\n-2.6\n0.6\n0.0\n-2.4\nMar-24\n93.63\n88.07\n83.15\n-3.1\n-3.4\n-3.1\n-2.4\n-3.4\n-5.6\nApr-24\n93.00\n87.56\n81.79\n-0.7\n-0.6\n-1.7\n-3.1\n-4.1\n-7.4\nMay-24\n88.40\n82.92\n79.12\n-5.2\n-5.6\n-3.4\n-8.5\n-9.9\n-11.0\nJun-24\n89.04\n83.17\n78.84\n0.7\n0.3\n-0.3\n-7.7\n-9.5\n-11.4\nJul-24\n88.04\n81.90\n78.66\n-1.1\n-1.6\n-0.2\n-8.9\n-11.2\n-11.7\nAug-24\n83.92\n77.84\n76.56\n-4.9\n-5.2\n-2.7\n-14.3\n-17.0\n-14.7\nSep-24\n82.36\n75.56\n75.54\n-1.9\n-3.0\n-1.4\n-16.4\n-20.6\n-16.3\nOct-24\n82.09\n76.12\n73.76\n-0.3\n0.7\n-2.4\n-16.8\n-19.7\n-19.1\nNov-24\n92.79\n84.37\n80.80\n11.5\n9.8\n8.7\n-3.4\n-8.0\n-8.7\nDec-24\n99.88\n90.44\n85.41\n7.1\n6.7\n5.4\n4.0\n-0.7\n-2.8\nJan-25\n97.81\n89.38\n82.94\n-2.1\n-1.2\n-3.0\n-2.1\n-1.2\n-3.0\nFeb-25\n97.08\n87.64\n82.41\n-0.7\n-2.0\n-0.6\n-2.9\n-3.2\n-3.6\nMar-25\n92.78\n85.11\n82.42\n-4.6\n-3.0\n0.0\n-7.7\n-6.3\n-3.6\nApr-25\n97.47\n90.79\n90.92\n4.8\n6.3\n9.3\n-2.5\n0.4\n6.1\n \n7 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nThe cedi appreciated by 5.6 percent and 8.9 percent in real trade weighted terms and real forex \ntransaction weighted terms, respectively in April 2025. These compared with depreciation of \n0.83 percent and 1.56 percent, respectively, in real trade weighted terms and forex transaction \nweighted terms for the same period in 2024. \n \n \nTable 1.6: Real Effective Exchange Rate for Major Trade Partners \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nRTWI and FXRTWI\nMonth\nINDEX (2021=100)\nMONTHLY CHG\nYear-to-Date (%)\nRFXTWI\nRTWI RFXTWI\nRTWI\nRFXTWI\nRTWI\nJan-24\n88.83\n96.79\n0.39\n2.50\n0.39\n2.50\nFeb-24\n86.63\n94.52\n-2.54\n-2.40\n-2.14\n0.17\nMar-24\n84.01\n91.66\n-3.12\n-3.12\n-5.33\n-2.95\nApr-24\n82.72\n90.93\n-1.56\n-0.80\n-6.98\n-3.77\nMay-24\n79.87\n86.61\n-3.56\n-4.99\n-10.79\n-8.95\nJun-24\n79.67\n87.09\n-0.25\n0.55\n-11.06\n-8.36\nJul-24\n79.40\n86.18\n-0.34\n-1.06\n-11.44\n-9.50\nAug-24\n77.13\n82.35\n-2.95\n-4.64\n-14.73 -14.59\nSep-24\n76.04\n80.81\n-1.43\n-1.91\n-16.37 -16.78\nOct-24\n74.41\n80.39\n-2.19\n-0.51\n-18.91 -17.38\nNov-24\n81.73\n90.33\n8.95\n11.00\n-8.27\n-4.46\nDec-24\n86.54\n96.97\n5.56\n6.84\n-2.24\n2.68\nJan-25\n84.13\n94.93\n-2.87\n-2.15\n-2.87\n-2.15\nFeb-25\n83.56\n94.13\n-0.68\n-0.84\n-3.57\n-3.01\nMar-25\n83.23\n90.64\n-0.40\n-3.86\n-3.98\n-6.98\nApr-25\n91.40\n95.97\n8.94\n5.56\n5.31\n-1.04\n \n8 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n2. External Sector Developments \n \n2.0 Highlights \nGhana’s external sector remained strong in the first quarter of 2025 with improved reserve \naccumulation. The strong performance was on the back of a robust current account surplus, driven \nmainly by higher commodity prices and increased production volumes of key export commodities, \nespecially gold and cocoa. \n \n2.1 Commodity Price Trends \nOn the international commodities market, prices of Ghana’s major export commodities continued to \nrally with the exception of crude oil, which saw some marginal decline in prices. Cocoa futures averaged \nUS$8,533.86 per tonne in April 2025, recording a 5.8 percent increase compared to the previous month. \nOn a year-on-year basis, cocoa prices dropped by 15.7 percent, mainly due to improved production. \n \nIn contrast, crude oil prices declined by 7.2 percent to close at an average of US$66.30 per barrel in \nApril 2025, driven by slower demand, particularly in China. Compared to a year earlier, crude oil prices \ndeclined by 25.5 percent, due to low demand and the decision by OPEC for a bigger than expected \noutput hike in May 2025. \n \nGold continued to soar, reaching a record average price of US$3,218.2 per fine ounce in April 2025. \nThis represented an increase of 7.8 percent over the previous month. The surge in gold prices was \nlargely driven by concerns over the economic impact of the newly announced tariffs by the U.S. \ngovernment. Relative to the same period last year, gold prices increased by 37.9 percent in April 2025, \nfrom US$2,334.16 in April 2024. \n \n2.1.1 Commodity Price Index \nThe weighted average price of the three major export commodities by Ghana (cocoa, gold, and crude \noil) rose in April 2025 to 224.2 from 212.7 in the previous month, representing an uptick of 5.4 percent. \nThe increase was driven by the gold and cocoa sub-indices, which went up by 7.8 percent, and 5.8 \npercent, respectively, while the crude oil sub-index dropped by 7.2 percent. On a year-on-year basis, \nthe composite commodity price index increased by 8.0 percent from 207.7 in April 2024, stemming \nfrom a 37.9 percent increase in the gold sub-index, while the cocoa and crude oil sub-indices recorded \ndeclines of 15.7 percent and 25.5 percent, respectively. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n9 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2.2 Trade Balance \nThe trade balance for the first four months of the year showed a surplus of US$4.14 billion, significantly \nhigher than US$759.3 million recorded in the comparative period in 2024. The value of exports surged \nto US$9.3 billion in April 2025 from US$5.8 billion in the same period in 2024 (60.5% year-on-year \ngrowth), driven primarily by cocoa and gold exports. Cocoa exports, both beans and products increased \nsignificantly to US$1.8 billion from US$579.7 million in the same period in 2024, driven by higher \nvolumes and prices. \n \nThe value of gold exports shot up by 76.4 percent to US$5.24 billion. The volume of gold exports \nincreased by 24.4 percent to 1.84 million fine ounces, largely on the back of increased output from \nregulated small-scale gold mines. The average realized price also increased by 41.8 percent to \nUS$2,855.0 per fine ounce in April 2025 compared to US$2,014.0 in April 2024. \n \nCrude oil exports, however, dropped by 23.8 percent to US$972.0 million in the first quarter of 2025, \ndue to both lower volumes and prices. The volume fell by 36.8 percent to 13.24 billion barrels in April \n2025 from 15.26 billion barrels during the same period last year. The average price of crude oil for the \nperiod recorded a decline of 12.1 percent to US$73.4 per barrel from US$83.6 per barrel in April 2024. \nOther exports, including non-traditional exports, increased by 29.1 percent to US$1.27 billion from \nUS$985.8 million during the same review period. \n \nFigure 2.1: International Cocoa Prices (US$/metric tonnes) \n \nSource: Reuters \n 1,000.00\n 3,000.00\n 5,000.00\n 7,000.00\n 9,000.00\n 11,000.00\n 13,000.00\nJan-18\nMar-18\nMay-18\nJul-18\nSep-18\nNov-18\nJan-19\nMar-19\nMay-19\nJul-19\nSep-19\nNov-19\nJan-20\nMar-20\nMay-20\nJul-20\nSep-20\nNov-20\nJan-21\nMar-21\nMay-21\nJul-21\nSep-21\nNov-21\nJan-22\nMar-22\nMay-22\nJul-22\nSep-22\nNov-22\nJan-23\nMar-23\nMay-23\nJul-23\nSep-23\nNov-23\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nSep-24\nNov-24\nJan-25\nMar-25\nFigure 2.2: International Brent Crude Oil Prices (US$ per \nbarrel) \n \nSource: Reuters \n -\n 20.00\n 40.00\n 60.00\n 80.00\n 100.00\n 120.00\n 140.00\nFeb-18\nApr-18\nJun-18\nAug-18\nOct-18\nDec-18\nFeb-19\nApr-19\nJun-19\nAug-19\nOct-19\nDec-19\nFeb-20\nApr-20\nJun-20\nAug-20\nOct-20\nDec-20\nFeb-21\nApr-21\nJun-21\nAug-21\nOct-21\nDec-21\nFeb-22\nApr-22\nJun-22\nAug-22\nOct-22\nDec-22\nFeb-23\nApr-23\nJun-23\nAug-23\nOct-23\nDec-23\nFeb-24\nApr-24\nJun-24\nAug-24\nOct-24\nDec-24\nFeb-25\nApr-25\nFigure 2.3: International Gold Prices (US$ per ounce) \n \nSource: Reuters \n -\n 500.00\n 1,000.00\n 1,500.00\n 2,000.00\n 2,500.00\n 3,000.00\n 3,500.00\nFeb-18\nApr-18\nJun-18\nAug-18\nOct-18\nDec-18\nFeb-19\nApr-19\nJun-19\nAug-19\nOct-19\nDec-19\nFeb-20\nApr-20\nJun-20\nAug-20\nOct-20\nDec-20\nFeb-21\nApr-21\nJun-21\nAug-21\nOct-21\nDec-21\nFeb-22\nApr-22\nJun-22\nAug-22\nOct-22\nDec-22\nFeb-23\nApr-23\nJun-23\nAug-23\nOct-23\nDec-23\nFeb-24\nApr-24\nJun-24\nAug-24\nOct-24\nDec-24\nFeb-25\nApr-25\nFigure 2.4: Commodity Price Index \n \nSource: BOG Staff Computations \n 60.00\n 80.00\n 100.00\n 120.00\n 140.00\n 160.00\n 180.00\n 200.00\n 220.00\n 240.00\nAug-19\nOct-19\nDec-19\nFeb-20\nApr-20\nJun-20\nAug-20\nOct-20\nDec-20\nFeb-21\nApr-21\nJun-21\nAug-21\nOct-21\nDec-21\nFeb-22\nApr-22\nJun-22\nAug-22\nOct-22\nDec-22\nFeb-23\nApr-23\nJun-23\nAug-23\nOct-23\nDec-23\nFeb-24\nApr-24\nJun-24\nAug-24\nOct-24\nDec-24\nFeb-25\nApr-25\n \n10 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nTotal imports, on the other hand, recorded a marginal increase of 2.7 percent to US$5.2 billion during \nthe first four months of 2025 from US$5.1 billion in the corresponding period of 2024 due to a pick-up \nin oil imports, while non-oil imports remained virtually flat. Oil imports increased by 6.9 percent to \nUS$1.7 billion, whereas non-oil imports remained broadly unchanged at US$3.5 billion in April 2025. \n \n2.3 Current Account \nThe current account recorded a surplus of US$2.1 billion in the first quarter of 2025, compared to a \nsurplus of US$66.1 million recorded during the same period in 2024. The higher current account surplus \nwas driven mainly by higher cocoa and gold exports. Payments for services, however, increased by 66.2 \npercent to US$1.2 billion, driven largely by freight and insurance, trade related services, financial \nservices, and travel. Income payments to non-residents amounted to US$1.2 billion on net basis driven \nprimarily by interest payments on government external debt. Private remittance flows remained \nvirtually unchanged at around US$1.4 billion. \n \n2.4 Capital and Financial Accounts \nThe capital account recorded net transfers of US$31.1 million in the first quarter of 2025. The sum of \nthe surpluses in the current and capital account amounted to US$ 2.2 billion, putting the country in a \nnet lending position with the rest of the world. Consequently, there was net acquisition of financial \nassets in the financial account amounting to US$2.1 billion in the first quarter of 2025, significantly \nhigher than the US$357.7 million recorded during the same period in 2024. Other investment was \nUS$1.4 billion, driven largely by increased currency and deposits in the nostro accounts of the \ncommercial banks. Reserve assets of the Bank of Ghana improved significantly from US391.1 million \nto US$1.1 billion largely due to the Bank of Ghana’s gold purchase program. There were, however, net \nFDI inflows and net portfolio inflows of US$389.2 million, and US$136.5 million, respectively. \n \n2.5 International Reserves \nAt the end of April 2025, the stock of Gross International Reserves (GIR) stood at US$10.7 billion, \nenough to provide cover for 4.7 months of import of goods and services. This compares with the end-\nDecember 2024 position of US$9.0 billion (equivalent to 4 months of imports cover). The programme \nNet International Reserves (NIR) recorded a build-up of US$1.5 billion to US$3.4 billion in April 2025, \nalready surpassing the end-June 2025 target build-up of US$493 million. \n \n2.6 External Sector Outlook \nThe outlook for the external sector is positive despite the resumption of external debt service following \nthe restructuring of Ghana’s external debt. Increased production volumes of Ghana’s key export \ncommodities, high commodities prices, and improved remittances flows will drive the strong external \nsector performance. Commitment to the implementation of policies and reforms under the IMF \nprogramme will restore investor confidence and attract more capital inflows. In addition, the \noperationalization of the GoldBod will further enhance the Gold for Reserves programme of the Bank \nof Ghana. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n11 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nTable 2.1: Trade Balance (US$ million) \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n \n Table 1\n2023\n2024\n2025\nAbs Y/Y\nRel Y/Y\n Jan - Apr \n Jan - Apr \n Jan - Apr \nChg\nChg\nTrade Balance\n1,392.2\n759.3\n4,138.7\n3,379.4\n445.1\nTrade Bal (% GDP)\n1.7\n0.9\n4.7\nTotal Exports\n5,553.4\n5,813.0\n9,328.8\n3,515.8\n60.5\nGold ( $'M)\n2,169.7\n2,972.3\n5,243.4\n2,271.1\n76.4\n Volume (fine ounces)\n1,177,988.5\n1,475,865.1\n1,836,581.8\n360,716.6\n24.4\n Unit Price ($/fine ounce)\n1,841.9\n2,014.0\n2,855.0\n841.0\n41.8\nCocoa Beans ( $'M)\n896.3\n369.0\n1,258.5\n889.5\n241.1\n Volume (tonnes)\n361,260.5\n137,443.8\n251,621.5\n114,177.8\n83.1\n Unit Price ($/tonne)\n2,481.2\n2,684.5\n5,001.5\n2,317.0\n86.3\nCocoa Products ( $'M)\n278.2\n210.7\n582.0\n371.3\n176.3\n Volume (tonnes)\n85,174.0\n59,215.6\n80,981.5\n21,765.9\n36.8\n Unit Price ($/tonne)\n3,265.7\n3,557.8\n7,186.9\n3,629.1\n102.0\nCrude Oil ( $'M)\n1,164.9\n1,275.3\n972.0\n-303.3\n-23.8\n Volume (barrels)\n14,304,062.0\n15,258,677.0\n13,235,030.0\n-2,023,647.0\n-13.3\n Unit Price ($/bbl)\n81.4\n83.6\n73.4\n-10.1\n-12.1\nOther Exports\n1,044.3\n985.8\n1,272.9\n287.1\n29.1\no/w: Non-Tradional Exports\n794.7\n740.6\n987.3\n246.7\n33.3\nTotal Import\n4,161.2\n5,053.8\n5,190.2\n136.4\n2.7\n Non-Oil\n2,691.8\n3,478.1\n3,506.3\n28.2\n0.8\n Oil and Gas\n1,469.4\n1,575.7\n1,683.9\n108.2\n6.9\n of which: Products\n1,291.8\n1,373.9\n1,560.2\n186.4\n13.6\nGas\n67.8\n71.1\n78.6\n7.5\n10.5\nCrude Oil \n109.8\n130.8\n45.1\n-85.6\n-65.5\n \n12 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n3. Real Sector Developments \n \n3.0 Highlights \nThe Bank’s high frequency real sector indicators pointed to a sustained pickup in economic activity in \nMarch 2025 compared to the same period a year ago. Port activity, credit to the private sector by banks, \nexports, and cement sales, contributed to the improvement in economic activity during the period. \nConsumer and business confidence also continued to increase in line with improving macroeconomic \nconditions. \n \n3.1 Trends in Real Sector Indicators \n \nConsumer Spending \nConsumer spending, proxied by domestic Value Added Tax (VAT) collections and retail sales, posted \na positive performance in March 2025. Domestic VAT collections improved by 32.5 percent on a year-\non-year basis to GH¢1.52 billion from GH¢1.15 billion. Cumulatively for the first quarter of 2025, \ndomestic VAT went up by 33.2 percent to GH¢4.82 billion compared with GH¢3.62 billion for the \ncorresponding period of last year. \n \nRetail sales increased by 34.1 percent (year-on-year) to GH¢268.00 million in March 2025, up from the \nGH¢199.80 million recorded in the same period of 2024. On a month-on-month basis, it increased by \n16.5 percent in March 2025 from GH¢230.07 million in the preceding month. In cumulative terms, \nsales for the first quarter of 2025 went up by 33.0 percent. \n \nManufacturing Activities \nActivities in the manufacturing sub-sector, gauged by trends in the collection of direct taxes and private \nsector workers’ contributions to the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) Pension \nScheme (Tier-1), posted a positive outturn in March 2025. Direct tax collections increased by 42.5 \npercent (year-on-year) to GH¢8.72 billion in March 2025, relative to GH¢6.12 billion recorded in the \nsame period of 2024. Cumulatively, total direct taxes collected for the first quarter of 2025 went up by \n49.4 percent to GH¢18.96 billion, from GH¢12.69 billion for the same period in 2024. In terms of \ncontributions of the various sub-tax categories, Corporate tax accounted for 58.9 percent, Income tax \n(PAYE and self-employed) accounted for 24.7 percent, while “Other Tax Sources” contributed 16.4 \npercent. \n \nTotal private sector workers’ contribution to the SSNIT Pension Scheme (Tier-1) increased by 23.2 \npercent on year-on-year basis to GH¢487.16 million in March 2025, from GH¢395.34 million collected \nduring the corresponding period in 2024. Cumulatively, for the first quarter of 2025, the contribution \ngrew by 28.0 percent to GH¢1.43 billion, relative to GH¢1.12 billion recorded in the same period of \n2024. \n \nConstruction Sector Activities \nActivity in the construction sub-sector, proxied by the volume of cement sales, improved by 8.6 percent \n(year-on-year) in March 2025 to 253,754.47 tonnes, up from 233,741.82 tonnes recorded a year ago. \nOn a month-on-month basis, it increased by 10.8 percent when compared with 229,018.45 tonnes \nrecorded in February 2024. Cement sales for the first quarter of 2025 went up by 2.4 percent to \n706,709.11 tonnes. \n \n \n13 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nVehicle Registration \nTransport sector activities, gauged by new vehicle registrations, increased by 44.5 percent to 19,208 in \nMarch 2025, from 13,297 vehicles registered during the corresponding period of 2024. Cumulatively, \nvehicles registered in the first quarter of 2025 increased by 32.8 percent to 69,797 year-on-year. \n \nIndustrial Consumption of Electricity \nIndustrial consumption of electricity declined marginally by 1.1 percent in March 2025 to 285.98 \ngigawatts, as against 289.02 gigawatts recorded for the corresponding period in 2024. In cumulative \nterms, consumption for the first quarter of 2025 remained largely unchanged at 860.19 gigawatts \ncompared to 858.62 gigawatts consumed for the corresponding period a year ago. \n \nPassenger Arrivals \nPassenger arrivals declined by 10.3 percent on year-on-year terms to 98,146 in March 2025, down from \n109,380 arrivals recorded a year ago. On a month-on-month basis, however, tourist arrivals increased \nby 2.2 percent. For the first quarter of 2025, there were 295,415 arrivals recorded at the international \nairport and the land borders, compared with 308,024 for the corresponding period in 2024, representing \na decline of 4.1 percent. \n \nPorts and Harbours Activity \nInternational trade at the country’s two main harbours (Tema and Takoradi), as measured by laden \ncontainer traffic for inbound and outbound containers, improved during the period under review. Total \ncontainer traffic increased by 22.0 percent (year-on-year) to 73,577 in March 2025. In cumulative terms, \ntotal container traffic for the first quarter of 2025 went up by 20.5 percent to 205,145 year-on-year. \n \n3.2 Labour Market Activity \n \nPrivate Sector Pension Contributors \nTotal number of private sector SSNIT contributors, which partially gauges employment conditions, \nimproved marginally by 0.8 percent to 1,040,013 in March 2025, compared with 1,031,788 for the same \nperiod in 2024. On a month-on-month basis, total number of private sector contributors remained \nlargely unchanged from the 1,044,974 individuals recorded in February 2025. \n \nAdvertised Jobs \nThe number of jobs advertised in selected print and online media, which partially gauges labour demand \nin the economy, increased in April 2025 relative to what was observed in the corresponding period a \nyear ago. In total, 3,388 job adverts were recorded as compared with 3,045 for the same period in 2024, \nindicating an increment of 11.3 percent (year-on-year). Similarly, on a month-on-month basis, the \nnumber of job vacancies in April 2025 increased by 6.4 percent. Cumulatively, for the first four months \nof 2025, the total number of advertised jobs went up by 15.0 percent to 13,036, year-on-year. \n \n3.3 Composite Index of Economic Activity \nThe Bank’s updated real Composite Index of Economic Activity (CIEA) recorded an annual growth of \n2.3 percent in March 2025, compared to a growth of 1.0 percent for the corresponding period of 2024. \nInternational trade activities, increased credit to the private sector by banks and construction activities \ncontributed to the improvement in economic activity during the period. \n \n \n14 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n3.4 Consumer and Business Surveys \nThe latest confidence surveys conducted in April 2025 showed significant improvement in both \nconsumer and business confidence. The Consumer Confidence Index improved to 103.6 in April 2025 \nfrom 100.2 in February 2025 on account of easing inflationary pressures and optimism about future \neconomic conditions. Similarly, the Business Confidence Index increased to 102.2 from 99.7 in the \nsame comparative period as firms met their short-term targets and expressed positive sentiments about \ncompany and industry prospects in line with improving macroeconomic conditions. Results from the \nconfidence surveys were aligned with the observed trend in Ghana’s Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) \nwhich also signaled an improvement in business conditions. The PMI rose to 52.6 in April 2025 from \n50.6 in March 2025 mainly due to increases in output and new orders. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n15 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nFigure 3.1: High Frequency Economic Indicators \n \n \n \nSources: Bank of Ghana, Various Stakeholders\n...Retail sales improved while domestic VAT collections declined in March 2025 \ncompared to February 2025...\n...Labour hiring conditions, proxied by the number of private sector \nworkers contributing to SSNIT, remained largely unchanged...\n...Labour market conditions improved in March 2025 relative to February \n2025...\n...Construction activities, proxied by cement sales, improved in March \n2025 compared to February 2025...\n...Port activity increased in March 2025 compared to the previous month...\n...Tourist arrivals remained largely unchanged in March 2025 \ncompared to February 2025... \n150\n170\n190\n210\n230\n250\n270\nMar-23\nMay-23\nJul-23\nSep-23\nNov-23\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nSep-24\nNov-24\nJan-25\nMar-25\nCement Sales\n35\n40\n45\n50\n55\n60\n65\n70\n75\n80\nMar-23\nMay-23\nJul-23\nSep-23\nNov-23\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nSep-24\nNov-24\nJan-25\nMar-25\nThousands\nPort Activity (Container Traffic)\n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\n140\nMar-23\nMay-23\nJul-23\nSep-23\nNov-23\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nSep-24\nNov-24\nJan-25\nMar-25\nThousands\nTourist Arrivals\n500\n600\n700\n800\n900\n1000\n1100\n1200\nMar-23\nMay-23\nJul-23\nSep-23\nNov-23\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nSep-24\nNov-24\nJan-25\nMar-25\nThousands\nNumber of Private Sector Contributors to SSNIT\nThousands, tons\n 200.00\n 400.00\n 600.00\n 800.00\n 1,000.00\n 1,200.00\n 1,400.00\n 1,600.00\n 1,800.00\n 2,000.00\n 2,200.00\n 40.00\n 90.00\n 140.00\n 190.00\n 240.00\n 290.00\n 340.00\n 390.00\n 440.00\n 490.00\nMar-23\nMay-23\nJul-23\nSep-23\nNov-23\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nSep-24\nNov-24\nJan-25\nMar-25\nMillion, GHC\nMillion, GHC\nRetail Sales and Domestic VAT collection\nRetail Sales, Left\nDomestic VAT\n100\n150\n200\n250\n300\n350\n400\n450\n500\n550\n600\nMar-23\nMay-23\nJul-23\nSep-23\nNov-23\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nSep-24\nNov-24\nJan-25\nMar-25\nMillion GHC\nSSNIT Contributions from Private Sector\nPanel 1:\nGhana's Leading Indicators of Economic Activity\n \n16 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n \n \n \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana, Various Stakeholders\n...Commercial banks' credit to the private sector improved in March 2025 \nrelative to the pevious month...\n...Industrial activity, proxied by industrial consumption of electricity, \nremained broadly unchanged...\n...Exports increased while Imports remained largely in March 2025 compared \nto February 2025...\n600\n800\n1000\n1200\n1400\n1600\n1800\n2000\n2200\n2400\n2600\nMar-23\nMay-23\nJul-23\nSep-23\nNov-23\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nSep-24\nNov-24\nJan-25\nMar-25\nMillion, USD\nImports\nExports\nImports and Exports\n220\n240\n260\n280\n300\n320\n340\nMar-23\nMay-23\nJul-23\nSep-23\nNov-23\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nSep-24\nNov-24\nJan-25\nMar-25\nGWh\nIndustrial Consumption of Electricity\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\n100\nMar-23\nMay-23\nJul-23\nSep-23\nNov-23\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nSep-24\nNov-24\nJan-25\nMar-25\nBillion, GHC\nDMB's Credit to Private Sector\n-10\n-8\n-6\n-4\n-2\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\nMar-23\nMay-23\nJul-23\nSep-23\nNov-23\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nSep-24\nNov-24\nJan-25\nMar-25\nPercent, y-o-y\nReal CIEA\n-8\n-4\n0\n4\n8\n12\nMar-24\nApr-24\nMay-24\nJun-24\nJul-24\nAug-24\nSep-24\nOct-24\nNov-24\nDec-24\nJan-25\nFeb-25\nMar-25\nPercent, y-o-y\nCement Sales (Tons)\nPort Activity\nSSNIT Contr by Pte Sector\nExports\nIndustrial Cons of Electricity\nDMB's Credit to Pte Sector\nImports\nTourist Arrivals\nDom VAT\nReal CIEA growth (%)\nContribution to Real CIEA growth\n500\n1000\n1500\n2000\n2500\n3000\n3500\n4000\n4500\n5000\nApr-23\nJun-23\nAug-23\nOct-23\nDec-23\nFeb-24\nApr-24\nJun-24\nAug-24\nOct-24\nDec-24\nFeb-25\nApr-25\nJob Adverts\nPanel 2:\nGhana's Leading Indicators of Economic Activity\n...On a year-on-year basis, the real CIEA grew by 2.3 percent in March 2025, \ncompared with a growth of 1.0 percent in March 2024...\n...The growth in the real CIEA was driven by a pick-up in Port Activity, Exports,\nDMB’s Credit to the Private Sector and Cement Sales...\n...Demand for labour, proxied by the number of job adverts (in print and \nonline media), increased in April 2025...\nNumber of advertised jobs\n \n17 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana, Various Stakeholders\n...Business Confidence improved as firms met their short-term targets and \nexpressed positive sentiments about company and industry prospects in line \nwith improving macroeconomic conditions...\n...Vehicle registration declined in March 2025 compared to the month before...\n...Consumer Confidence improved on account of easing inflationary \npressures and optimism about future economic conditions...\n0\n5000\n10000\n15000\n20000\n25000\n30000\n35000\nMar-23\nMay-23\nJul-23\nSep-23\nNov-23\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nSep-24\nNov-24\nJan-25\nMar-25\nVehicle Registration\n102.2\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\n100\n110\nApr-23\nJun-23\nAug-23\nOct-23\nDec-23\nFeb-24\nApr-24\nJun-24\nAug-24\nOct-24\nDec-24\nFeb-25\nApr-25\nIndex\nBusiness Confidence Index\n103.6\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\n100\n110\nApr-23\nJun-23\nAug-23\nOct-23\nDec-23\nFeb-24\nApr-24\nJun-24\nAug-24\nOct-24\nDec-24\nFeb-25\nApr-25\nIndex\nConsumer Confidence Index\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n16\nMar-23\nMay-23\nJul-23\nSep-23\nNov-23\nJan-24\nMar-24\nMay-24\nJul-24\nSep-24\nNov-24\nJan-25\nMar-25\nBillion, GHC\nDomestic taxes, Direct\n...Domestic tax collection increased in March 2025 compared to February \n2025...\nPanel 3:\nGhana's Leading Indicators of Economic Activity\nNumber of vehicles\n \n18 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n4. Monetary and Financial Developments \n \n \n4.0 Highlights \nGrowth in monetary aggregates has been largely constrained in the first four months of the year, \nunderpinned by the tight monetary policy stance and effective liquidity management. There was a strong \nexpansion in the Net Foreign Assets, largely due to the Central Bank’s accumulation of monetary gold. \nAnnual growth in credit to the private sector increased in nominal terms, supported by the pick-up in \nreal sector activities observed over the comparative period. Money market rates broadly trended \ndownwards at the short end of the primary market on a year-on-year basis. \n \n4.1 Developments in Monetary Aggregates \n \nMoney Supply \nDevelopments in monetary aggregates for April 2025 showed a deceleration in the pace of growth in \nbroad money supply (M2+), driven by contraction in Net Domestic Assets (NDA) of depository \ncorporations, tight monetary policy stance and strong liquidity management. The Net Foreing Asset \n(NFA), however, expanded significantly. Annual growth in M2+ declined to 26.7 percent in April 2025, \nrelative to 29.9 percent in the corresponding period of 2024. The contribution of NFA increased to 36.1 \npercent from 22.9 percent, while that of NDA decreased to negative 9.4 percent from 7.0 percent, over \nthe same comparative period. \n \n \n \nSources: Bank of Ghana \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n-10.00\n0.00\n10.00\n20.00\n30.00\n40.00\n50.00\n60.00\n70.00\nFigure 4.1a: M2+ Growth and its Sources \n(% Contributions)\nNet Foreign Assets\nNDA\nTotal Liquidity (M2+)\n-40.00\n-20.00\n0.00\n20.00\n40.00\n60.00\n80.00\n100.00\nFigure 4.1b: Banking Sector NDA and its \nSources (% Contributions)\n NCG\n Claims on Priv. Sect. (Incl. PE's)\n BOG OMO Steril. Acc.\n OIN\nNDA\n \n19 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nFigure 4.2: M2+ and its Components (% Contributions) \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n \nIn terms of annual growth rates, NDA recorded a negative growth of 10.9 percent percent in April 2025 \nrelative to 6.7 percent in April 2024, while NFA expanded by 261.7 percent relative to 457.9 percent, \nover the same comaprative period. The decline in the contribution of the NDA to the growth of M2+ \nwas mainly driven by contractions in Net Claims on Government (NCG) and increased sterilization \nthrough the issuance of Bank of Ghana bills. This was moderated by increases in claims on private and \npublic sector and expansion in the Other Items Net. \n \nAnalysis of the components of M2+ showed that the moderation in the growth in M2+ reflected in \ndecreased growth in demand deposit, saving and time deposits, and foreign currency deposits. Growth \nin currency with the public, however, increased significantly. \n \n4.2 Reserve Money \nGrowth in Reserve Money (RM) moderated significantly in April 2025, mainly induced by a contraction \nin the NDA, reflecting increased sterilization and a decline in Net Claims on Government; the NFA, \nhowever, expanded considerably, largely on the back of inflows from Gold for Reserve (G4R) \nProgramme, forex purchases, and proceeds from the IMF Extended Credit Facility (ECF). Annual \ngrowth in reserve money declined to 37.99 percent in April 2025, from a growth of 51.88 percent \nrecorded in the corresponding period of 2024. \n \nThe NDA of the Central Bank declined due to a contraction in net Claims on Government (NCG) and \nClaims on Deposit Money Banks (DMBs), as well as increased Open Market Operations (OMO). The \ncontribution of NDA to the growth in RM decreased to negative 40.5 percent in April 2025 compared \nto negative 2.2 percent recorded in April 2024. In contrast, the contribution of the NFA to the growth \nin RM increased to 78.5 percent, relative to 54.1 percent, over the same comparative period. \n \n-2.00\n8.00\n18.00\n28.00\n38.00\n48.00\n58.00\nper cent\nCurr.\nDem. Dep\nSav and Time Dep.\nFCDs\nTotal Liquidity (M2+)\n \n20 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n \n4.3 Deposit Money Banks Credit Developments \nDeposit Money Banks’ (DMBs’) credit to the private sector and public institutions increased by \nGH¢13.60 billion (17.4%) in April 2025 compared to an increase of GH¢5.58 billion (7.7%) recorded \nin April 2024. The increase in credit flows was largely due to an expansion of credit to the private \nsector. Credit to the private sector increased by GH¢14.31 billion (19.9%) in April 2025 compared to \nan increase of GH¢6.98 billion (10.8%) recorded in the corresponding period of 2024. The increased \nflow of credit to the private sector was on the back of increased domestic currency credit. \nPrivate sector credit accounted for 105.2 percent of the flow in total outstanding credit in April 2025, \nrelative to 125.1 percent recorded in the corresponding period of 2024. The top five sectors with \nsignificant share of credit flows are: services (52.0%); commerce and finance (28.5%); manufacturing \n(12.5%); construction (8.3%); and agriculture, forestry and fisheries (4.8%). \nOutstanding credit to the private sector at the end of April 2025 was GH¢86.16 billion, compared with \nGH¢71.86 billion recorded in April 2024. In real terms, it contracted marginally by 1.1 percent relative \nto 11.5 percent contraction recorded over the same comparative period. \n \n \n \n \n \n-60.0\n-40.0\n-20.0\n0.0\n20.0\n40.0\n60.0\n80.0\n100.0\n120.0\n140.0\nFigure 4.3a: RM Growth and Contribution \nfrom NFA and NDA (%)\nNDA\nNFA\nRM growth (y-on-y)\n-100.0\n-50.0\n0.0\n50.0\n100.0\n150.0\n200.0\nFigure 4.3b: BOG NDA and Its Sources (% \nContributions)\nNCG\nNC_DMBs\nOMO Ster. A/c\nOIN\nNDA\n \n21 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n \n \n4.4 Money Market Developments \nInterest rates continue to trend downward at the short-end of the primary market. The 91-day and 182-\nday Treasury bill rates decreased to 15.47 percent and 16.23 percent respectively, in April 2025, from \n25.68 percent and 28.03 percent, respectively, in the corresponding period of 2024. Similarly, the rate \non the 364-day instrument declined to 18.62 percent in April 2025 from 28.64 percent in April 2024. \nRates on the 2-year, 3-year, 5-year, 6-year, 7-year, 10-year, 15-year, and 20-year bonds remained \nbroadly stable at 21.50 percent, 29.85 percent, 22.30 percent, 21.75 percent, 18.10 percent, 19.75 \npercent, 19.75 percent, and 20.20 respectively, due to the non-issuance of these instruments during the \nreview period. \n \nThe Interbank Weighted Average Rate (IWAR) decreased to 26.92 percent in April 2025 from 28.68 \npercent in April 2024. Similarly, the average lending rates of banks declined to 27.40 percent in April \n2025 from 31.25 percent, recorded in the corresponding period of 2024, reflecting the pass-through \neffect of declines in the rates on the primary market. \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana \nFigure 4.4a: Sectoral Shares in Credit to the Private \nSector (%)\nApr-24\nApr-25\n-32.00\n-27.00\n-22.00\n-17.00\n-12.00\n-7.00\n-2.00\n3.00\n8.00\n13.00\nFigure 4.4b: Growth in Real Private Sector \nCredit (RGPSC) vs. Trend\nRGPSC\nTrend\n7.00\n17.00\n27.00\n37.00\n47.00\n57.00\nFigure 4.5a: MPR, Interbank and T-bill \nRates and Inflation (%)\nMPR\n 91-Day T-bill\nrate\n Inter-Bank rate\nInflation\n15.00\n17.00\n19.00\n21.00\n23.00\n25.00\n27.00\n29.00\n31.00\nFigure 4.5b: Yield Curve (Year-on-Year, \n%) \nApr-24\nApr-25\n \n22 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n4.5 Stock Market Developments \nThe Ghana Stock Exchange Composite Index (GSE-CI) recorded a year-on-year gain of 65.3 percent \nin April 2025 compared to a growth of 34.5 percent in April 2024. The robust performance of the GSE-\nCI was underpinned by improved investor appetite, driven by significant recovery in the profitability of \nlisted financial institutions and improved liquidity on that segment of the market. The main sectors that \ncontributed to the gains were the food and beverages, manufacturing, distribution, finance, agriculture, \nand ETFund sectors. The GSE-Financial Stocks Index (GSE-FI) closed at 3112.17 points, reflecting a \ngain of 52.2 percent compared to a gain of 16.3 percent, over the same comparative period. \n \nTotal market capitalisation at the end of April 2025 was GH¢135.97 billion, representing a year-on-\nyear growth of 69.30 percent. The increase in market capitalization was mainly driven by appreciation \nin share prices, underpinned by renewed investor confidence, particularly in the food and beverages, \nmanufacturing, distribution, finance, mining, IT and ETFund sectors. This was also supported by the \nissuance of new shares by CAL bank and ADB. \n \nTable 4.1: Performance of Ghana Stock Exchange \n \nSource: Ghana Stock Exchange and Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n \n \nY-T-D\nApr-23\nDec-23\nMar-24\nApr-24\nJun-24\nSep-24\nDec-24\nFeb-25\nMar-25\nApr-25\n2024\n2025\n2025\nGSE CI\n2741.46\n3130.234988\n3456.197369\n3687.09\n3829.61\n4369.44\n4888.53\n5659.76\n6217.9\n6095.57\n34.49\n65.32\n24.69\nGSE FI\n1758.28\n1901.574601\n2001.470083\n2044.36\n2115.04\n2190.37\n2380.79\n2814.3\n3059.3\n3112.17\n16.27\n52.23\n30.72\nMarket Capitalization\n68278.45\n73893.17\n77701.17\n80315.67\n85096.58\n99101.87\n111356.09\n127820.29\n136998.73\n135974.37\n17.63\n69.30\n22.11\nChanges\nY-O-Y\n1900\n2900\n3900\n4900\n5900\nFigure 4.6a: GSE Composite Index\n2023\n2024\n2025\n1600\n1800\n2000\n2200\n2400\n2600\n2800\n3000\n3200\nFigure 4.6b: GSE Financial Stocks Index\n2023\n2024\n2025\n \n23 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n4.6 Conclusion \nGrowth in monetary aggregates has been largely constrained in the first four months of the year, \nunderpinned by tight monetary policy stance and effective liquidity management. Growth in reserve \nmoney moderated significantly in April 2025, mainly induced by a contraction in the NDA, reflecting \nincreased sterilization and decline in net claims on Government. Annual growth in credit to the private \nsector increased in nominal terms, supported by the pick-up in real sector activities. Money market rates \nbroadly trended downwards at the short-end of the primary market on a year-on-year basis. The \nInterbank Weighted Average Rate (IWAR) increased, reflecting the transmission of the hike in \nmonetary policy rate to the interbank market in March 2025. In contrast, the average lending rates of \nbanks decreased significantly, reflecting the pass-through effect of declines in the Government’s short-\nterm rate. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n24 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n5. Banking Sector Developments \n \n5.0 Highlights \nThe banking sector performance remained stable in April 2025. The sector continued to record strong \ngrowth in assets driven by increases in domestic deposits and other funding sources. Financial \nSoundness Indicators (FSIs) generally recorded positive improvements. There was a significant \nimprovement in solvency and liquidity measures although profitability indicators moderated. The \nquality of assets in the industry proxied by the Non-Performing Loans (NPL) ratio also improved on \naccount of higher credit growth. \n \n5.1 Banks’ Balance Sheet \nTotal assets of the banking sector grew by 27.2 percent to GH¢390.1 billion in April 2025 relative to a \ngrowth of 28.8 percent in April 2024. In terms of components, foreign assets grew by 49.0 percent in \nApril 2025, up from 47.5 percent in April 2024, while domestic assets picked up by 24.9 percent in \nApril 2025 compared to 21.7 percent a year earlier. Consequently, the share of foreign assets in total \nassets improved to 11.1 percent in April 2025 from 9.5 percent in April 2024 while the share of domestic \nassets declined to 88.9 percent from 90.5 percent over the same comparative period. \n \nGrowth in investments remained relatively flat at 27.8 percent in April 2025 compared to a growth rate \nof 27.1 percent in the prior year. The stock of investments stood at GH¢135.4 billion with a fairly equal \ndistribution between bills and securities. Investments in securities grew moderately by 10.0 percent in \nrelative to a growth of 22.0 percent a year earlier. Growth in short-term bills on the other hand, surged \nby 51.7 percent in April 2025 from 34.6 percent in April 2024 on account of an uptick in banks’ holdings \nof Bank of Ghana bills during the review period. \n \nCredit growth picked up more strongly in April 2025 relative to April 2024, reflecting the gradual \nrebound in economic activity. Credit grew by 17.4 percent in April 2025 to GH¢91.5 billion. Growth \nin net loans and advances (gross loans adjusted for provisions and interest in suspense) also surged by \n18.7 percent to GH¢74.6 billion in April 2025 relative to a growth rate of 0.9 percent in a similar period \nin 2024. \n \nThe strong growth in assets was funded by improvement in domestic deposits, borrowings and other \nfunding sources. Total deposits remained the main source of funding for the banking sector. Total \ndeposits grew by 22.6 percent to GH¢85.4 billion in April 2025 relative to 28.4 percent in April 2024. \nBorrowings, on the other hand, grew strongly by 69.1 percent to GH¢32.9 billion in April 2025 \ncompared to a growth of 22.5 percent in April 2024. The strong growth in borrowings was principally \ndue to a strong growth in both short-term and long-term domestic borrowings, while long-term foreign \nborrowings contracted during the review period. \n \nBanks’ shareholders’ funds position continued to improve on the back of the ongoing recapitalization \nof the sector and a continuous pickup in profits across the industry. Accordingly, total shareholders’ \nfunds grew by 42.6 percent to GH¢43.9 billion as at end-April 2025 from 46.1 percent in April 2024, \nreflecting increases in paid-up capital and the banks’ reserves. \n \n \n \n \n25 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nTable 5.1: Key Developments in DMBs' Balance Sheet \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n \n \n5.1.1 Asset and Liability Structure \nThe asset structure of the industry’s balance sheet in April 2025 indicated banks’ preference for less \nrisky assets. Cash and bank balances continued to be the largest component of total assets, with its share \nincreasing to 36.6 percent from 35.2 percent in April 2024. Investments (comprising bills, securities, \nand equity) also recorded a marginal increase in its share to 34.7 percent from 34.5 percent in the \npreceding year. Investments and cash and bank balances together accounted for 71.3 percent of total \nassets in April 2025, compared to a share of 69.7 percent in April 2024. Notwithstanding the stronger \ngrowth in credit in April 2025 relative to April 2024, the share of net loans and advances in total assets \ndeclined to 19.3 percent from 20.5 percent during the review period. The proportion of non-earning \nassets (fixed assets and other assets) in banks’ total assets, however, dropped slightly to 9.4 percent, \nfrom 9.8 percent during the review period. \n \nOn the liability side, the share of deposits in banks’ liabilities and shareholders’ funds declined to 74.2 \npercent in April 2025, down from 77.0 percent in April 2024, reflecting the moderation in deposit \ngrowth during the review period. In contrast, the share of borrowings ballooned to 8.4 percent in April \n2025 from 6.3 percent in April 2024, while the share of shareholders’ funds in banks’ liabilities and \nshareholders’ funds picked up to 11.3 percent from 10.1 percent over the same comparative period. The \nproportion of other liabilities was 5.8 percent in April 2025, down from 6.6 percent recorded a year \nearlier. \n \n \n \n \n \nApr-24\nFeb-25\nApr-25\nApr-24\nFeb-25\nApr-25\nApr-24\nApr-25\nTOTAL ASSETS\n306,785.1\n \n384,726.3\n \n390,142.3\n \n28.8\n \n34.0\n \n27.2\n \n100.0\n \n100.0\n \nA. Foreign Assets\n29,114.9\n \n46,029.9\n \n43,371.9\n \n47.5\n \n83.2\n \n49.0\n \n9.5\n \n11.1\n \nB. Domestic Assets\n277,670.2\n \n338,696.4\n \n346,770.3\n \n27.1\n \n29.3\n \n24.9\n \n90.5\n \n88.9\n \n Investments\n105,930.0\n \n122,401.1\n \n135,382.7\n \n27.1\n \n8.6\n \n27.8\n \n34.5\n \n34.7\n \n i. Bills\n44,903.7\n \n54,493.3\n \n68,116.9\n \n34.6\n \n1.6\n \n51.7\n \n14.6\n \n17.5\n \n ii. Securities\n60,763.4\n \n67,494.3\n \n66,849.0\n \n22.0\n \n14.7\n \n10.0\n \n19.8\n \n17.1\n \n Advances (Net)\n62,810.4\n \n77,089.5\n \n74,559.5\n \n0.9\n \n25.3\n \n18.7\n \n20.5\n \n19.1\n \n of which Foreign Currency\n22,602.9\n \n23,423.4\n \n21,562.0\n \n2.6\n \n7.9\n \n(4.6)\n \n7.4\n \n5.5\n \n Gross Advances\n77,938.6\n \n93,670.3\n \n91,533.9\n \n7.7\n \n25.2\n \n17.4\n \n25.4\n \n23.5\n \n Other Assets\n21,229.5\n \n25,403.4\n \n26,133.4\n \n42.9\n \n48.7\n \n23.1\n \n6.9\n \n6.7\n \n Fixed Assets\n8,401.6\n \n9,484.5\n \n9,787.5\n \n14.1\n \n14.3\n \n16.5\n \n2.7\n \n2.5\n \nTOTAL LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL\n306,785.1\n \n384,726.3\n \n390,142.3\n \n28.8\n \n34.0\n \n27.2\n \n100.0\n \n100.0\n \nTotal Deposits\n236,260.2\n \n286,920.9\n \n289,545.2\n \n28.4\n \n27.9\n \n22.6\n \n77.0\n \n74.2\n \n of which Foreign Currency\n75,692.5\n \n91,510.3\n \n85,409.6\n \n26.0\n \n27.0\n \n12.8\n \n24.7\n \n21.9\n \nTotal Borrowings\n19,469.0\n \n28,334.1\n \n32,923.0\n \n22.5\n \n96.0\n \n69.1\n \n6.3\n \n8.4\n \n Foreign Liabilities\n6,547.5\n \n6,923.6\n \n6,075.6\n \n(19.4)\n \n3.5\n \n(7.2)\n \n2.1\n \n1.6\n \n i. Short-term borrowings\n1,999.0\n \n2,560.0\n \n2,288.9\n \n13.4\n \n13.8\n \n14.5\n \n0.7\n \n0.6\n \n ii. Long-term borrowings\n3,801.5\n \n2,746.0\n \n2,263.8\n \n(18.7)\n \n(27.4)\n \n(40.4)\n \n1.2\n \n0.6\n \n iii. Deposits of non-residents\n731.4\n \n1,570.9\n \n1,422.6\n \n(48.6)\n \n138.7\n \n94.5\n \n0.2\n \n0.4\n \n Domestic Liabilities\n268,542.4\n \n335,415.0\n \n340,090.3\n \n29.0\n \n34.5\n \n26.6\n \n87.5\n \n87.2\n \n i. Short-term borrowing\n12,444.3\n \n21,244.1\n \n26,524.1\n \n55.3\n \n200.5\n \n113.1\n \n4.1\n \n6.8\n \n ii. Long-term Borrowings\n1,224.3\n \n1,784.0\n \n1,846.1\n \n(15.1)\n \n31.6\n \n50.8\n \n0.4\n \n0.5\n \n iii. Domestic Deposits\n235,528.8\n \n285,350.0\n \n288,122.7\n \n29.0\n \n27.5\n \n22.3\n \n76.8\n \n73.9\n \nOther Liabilities\n20,217.8\n \n26,527.9\n \n22,438.1\n \n23.4\n \n47.0\n \n11.0\n \n6.6\n \n5.8\n \nPaid-up capital\n13,033.2\n \n17,118.3\n \n17,282.9\n \n24.9\n \n31.3\n \n32.6\n \n4.2\n \n4.4\n \nShareholders' Funds\n30,837.7\n \n42,175.6\n \n43,964.3\n \n46.1\n \n40.0\n \n42.6\n \n10.1\n \n11.3\n \n (GH ¢'million)\nY-on-Y Growth (%)\nShares (%)\n \n26 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nFigure 5.1: Developments in Banks’ Balance Sheet & Asset Quality \n \n Source: Bank of Ghana \n \n5.1.2 Share of Banks’ Investments \nThe structure of banks’ investment portfolio changed in April 2025 relative to the April 2024 position. \nShort-term bills overtook securities to become the largest component of banks’ investment portfolio \nwith a share of 50.3 percent, compared to 42.4 percent in April 2024. Consequently, the share of \nsecurities declined to 49.4 percent from 57.4 percent in the same corresponding period last year. The \nshare of equity investments remained fairly unchanged at 0.3 percent compared 0.2 percent in April \n2024. \n \n5.2 Credit Risk \nThe industry’s exposure to credit risk improved between April 2024 and April 2025, as indicated by a \ndecline in the industry non-performing loan (NPL) ratio during the review period but remained elevated \nin April 2025. \n \n \n \n \n27 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n5.2.1 Credit Portfolio Analysis \nThe stock of gross loans and advances (domestic and foreign) recorded a growth of 17.4 percent to \nGH¢91.5 billion at end-April 2025 relative to 7.7 percent growth recorded in a similar period last year. \nIn terms of components, private sector credit (comprising credit to private enterprises and households) \nposted a significant growth of 20.8 percent to GH¢86.8 billion in April 2025, up from 10.8 percent in \nthe same period in 2024. Public sector credit, on the other hand, contracted further by 11.7 percent to \nGH¢5.4 billion at end-April 2025 after 18.7 percent contraction recorded in April 2024. Accordingly, \nthe share of private sector credit in total credit rose to 94.2 percent in April 2025, up from 92.2 percent \nin April 2024, while the share of public sector credit declined to 5.8 percent in April 2025, down from \n7.8 percent a similar period in 2024. \n \nIn terms of the distribution of credit by sectors, the services sector accounted for the largest share of \n35.6 percent as at end-April 2025 (33.2 percent in April 2024), followed by the commerce and finance \nsector with a share of 25.3 percent in April 2025 (23.0 percent in April 2024), while the manufacturing \nsector accounted for a share of 10.9 percent (10.6 percent in April 2024). Together, these sectors \naccounted for 71.8 percent of total credit in April 2025, compared with 66.7 percent in April 2024. The \nmining and quarrying sector remained the lowest recipient of industry credit, with its share dropping \nmarginally from 3.2 percent in April 2024 to 2.7 percent at end-April 2025. \n \n5.2.2 Off-Balance Sheet Transactions \nOff-balance sheet transactions (largely trade finance and guarantees) contracted during the review \nperiod. Contingent liabilities declined by 14.1 percent to GH¢21.0 billion as at end-April 2025, from \nGH¢24.4 billion as at end-April 2024. In line with this contraction, the ratio of contingent liabilities to \ntotal liabilities declined to 6.1 percent in April 2025, from 8.8 percent the previous year. \n \n5.2.3 Asset Quality \nThe industry’s asset quality improved during the period under review. The industry’s NPL ratio reduced \nto 23.6 percent in April 2025, from 25.7 percent in April 2024. When adjusted for the fully provisioned \nloan loss category, it declined to 9.0 percent in April 2025 from 11.1 percent in April 2024. The decrease \nin the NPL ratio was attributable to the higher growth in total loans relative to the growth in NPL stock. \nThe industry’s NPL stock grew by 8.7 percent to GH¢21.7 billion in April 2025, up from GH¢20.0 \nbillion in April 2024. \n \nDecomposition of the NPL stock indicated that the private sector accounted for the larger share of non-\nperforming loans, in line with its larger share of industry credit. The proportion of NPLs attributable to \nthe private sector picked up to 93.4 percent in April 2025, from 91.0 percent in April 2024, while that \nof the public sector decreased to 6.6 percent in April 2025, from 9.0 percent in a similar period 2024. \n \nThe agriculture, forestry, and fishing sector recorded the highest NPL ratio of 62.1 percent, up from \n58.7 percent in April 2024, followed by the transportation, storage, and communications sector with \n53.9 percent in April 2025 (representing a pickup from 49.0 percent in 2024). The NPL ratio of the \nconstruction sector, however, recorded the largest improvement from 41.3 percent in 2024 to 30.3 \npercent in April 2025 to round up the top three sectoral NPL ratios. The mining and quarrying sector \naccounted for the lowest NPL ratio of 9.8 percent, also improving from 14.4 percent in April 2024. \n \n28 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n \n5.3 Financial Soundness Indicators \nTogether with the improvement in asset quality indicators, other key financial soundness indicators \n(FSIs) also improved pointing to a liquid and profitable banking sector with improving capital buffers. \n \nFigure 5.2: Key Financial Soundness Indicators \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n \n \n5.3.1 Liquidity Indicators \nThe industry’s liquidity position remained robust in April 2025, with improvements in the core \nmeasures following the increase in the sector’s holdings of cash and bank balances. The ratio of core \nliquid assets to total deposits improved to 49.3 percent in April 2025, up from 45.7 percent in April \n2024, while core liquid assets to total assets ratio improved to 36.6 percent in April 2025 from 35.2 \npercent over the same comparative period in 2024. The ratio of broad liquid assets to total deposits \nsimilarly rose to 95.9 percent in April 2025, from 90.4 percent in April 2024 while the broad liquid \nassets to total assets also improved to 71.2 percent from 69.6 percent over the same comparative period \na year ago. \n \n5.3.2 Capital Adequacy Ratio \nThe industry’s solvency position, measured by the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) adjusted for \nregulatory reliefs, stood at 17.5 percent in April 2025, above the 15.5 percent ratio recorded in April \n2024. The CAR without the DDEP-related reliefs also improved significantly from 11.5 percent in April \n2024 to 15.8 percent in April 2025. The higher CAR reflected a build-up in capital buffers on the back \nof the on-going recapitalisation exercise and profit retention policy. \n \n4.5\n3.8\n1.7\n3.5\n3.0\n2.5\n1.1\n2.3\n0.0\n0.5\n1.0\n1.5\n2.0\n2.5\n3.0\n3.5\n4.0\n4.5\n5.0\n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\n50.0\n60.0\n70.0\n80.0\n90.0\nApr-23\nApr-24\nFeb-25\nApr-25\nEfficiency Indicators (%)\nCost to income\nOperational Cost to gross income\nCost to total assets (RHS)\nOperational Cost to total assets (RHS)\n36.3\n35.0\n28.5\n30.0\n5.5\n5.4\n4.7\n5.0\n -\n 5.0\n 10.0\n 15.0\n 20.0\n 25.0\n 30.0\n 35.0\n 40.0\nApr-23\nApr-24\nFeb-25\nApr-25\nProfitability (%)\nReturn On Equity (%) after tax\nReturn On Assets (%) before tax\n4.2 \n7.6 \n11.1 \n8.9 \n9.0 \n14.3 \n18.0 \n25.7 \n22.6 \n23.6 \n -\n 5.0\n 10.0\n 15.0\n 20.0\n 25.0\n 30.0\n -\n 5,000.0\n 10,000.0\n 15,000.0\n 20,000.0\n 25,000.0\nApr-22\nApr-23\nApr-24\nFeb-25\nApr-25\nAsset Quality\nSUB-STD (GH¢m)\nDOUBTFUL (GH¢m)\nLOSS (GH¢m)\nAdjusted NPL Ratio (%)\nNPL Ratio (% Right Axis)\n15.5 \n17.5 \n11.5 \n15.8 \n 10.0\n 20.0\n 30.0\n 40.0\n 50.0\n 60.0\n -\n 2.0\n 4.0\n 6.0\n 8.0\n 10.0\n 12.0\n 14.0\n 16.0\n 18.0\n 20.0\nApr-24\nJun-24\nAug-24\nOct-24\nDec-24\nFeb-25\nApr-25\nSolvency (%)\nRWA/Total Assets\n CAR (with Reliefs)\n CAR (w/o Reliefs)\n \n29 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n5.3.3 Profitability \nThe banking industry remained profitable for the first four months of 2025, recording higher profit-\nbefore-tax (PBT) and profit-after-tax (PAT). Growth in PAT however, moderated during the period \nunder review. \n \nGenerally, all income lines grew in April 2025 relative to the same period last year. Net interest income \npicked up by 15.5 percent to GH¢9.2 billion in April 2025, although the growth was lower than the 22.4 \npercent recorded in April 2024. In year-on-year terms, interest income improved to GH¢13.9 billion, \nup from GH¢12.0 billion, suggesting a modest growth of 15.9 percent relative to 19.4 percent in April \n2024. The slower pace of growth in interest income was partially due to the relatively lower rates of \nreturn on money market instruments as well as a decline in lending rates influenced by current \nmacroeconomic developments. Interest expenses also picked up to GH¢4.7 billion in April 2025, \nregistering a growth rate of 16.5 percent, up from 14.0 percent in April 2024. Among others, the increase \nin interest expenses was due to the increase in borrowings. \n \nNet fees and commissions recorded a higher growth of 26.2 percent in April 2025 from 12.8 percent in \nsimilar period a year ago. Equally, other income recorded significant growth of 27.8 percent to GH¢2.0 \nbillion in April 2025 compared to a contraction of 20.8 percent in April 2024. The combined effect of \nthe changes in the different income lines culminated in an overall growth in the industry’s operating \nincome to GH¢13.2 billion in April 2025 from GH¢11.1 billion, representing a significant growth of \n18.8 percent relative to 12.3 percent in April 2024. Similarly, gross income expanded to GH¢17.9 \nbillion in April 2025 (18.2% year-on-year growth). \n \nWith the exception of provisions, cost lines recorded similar higher growths in April 2025 relative to \nthe same period in 2024. The industry’s operating expenses grew by 23.0 percent in April 2025, \ncompared to 11.9 percent in April 2024 mainly due to strong growth in staff costs and other operating \n(administrative) expenses. Impairment losses on financial assets as well as provisions for bad debt and \ndepreciation, however, contracted by 24.2 percent in April 2025. \n \nThe industry’s profit-before-tax (PBT) grew by 21.9 percent during the first four months of 2025 to \nGH¢6.4 billion, up from GH¢5.2 billion registered during the same corresponding period in 2024. Also, \nprofit-after-tax (PAT) grew by 22.0 percent to GH¢4.3 billion in April 2025, from GH¢3.5 billion \n(24.6% growth) recorded during the same period a year ago. \n \n(a) Return on Assets and Return on Equity \nThe banking sector’s profitability indicators, namely, return-on-assets (ROA) and return-on-equity \n(ROE), moderated during the period under review. The ROE declined to 30.0 percent in April 2025, \ndown from 35.0 percent in April 2024, while ROA was 5.0 percent, also down from 5.4 percent in April \n2024. \n \n(b) Interest Margin and Spread \nApart from the profitability ratio, all profitability indicators moderated in April 2025 relative to April \n2024. Interest spread narrowed to 4.0 percent in April 2025, down from 4.3 percent in April 2024. The \ndecline in spread was due to a fall in gross yields to 5.8 percent in April 2025, from 6.3 percent in April \n2024. Interest payable also recorded a marginal decline to 1.8 percent in April 2025, from 2.0 percent \nin similar period a year ago. The interest margin to total assets ratio also inched down to 2.4 percent in \nApril 2025 from 2.6 percent in April 2024, while the interest margin to gross income ratio declined to \n \n30 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n51.3 percent in April 2025 from 52.5 percent during the same period last year. Similarly, the ratio of \ngross income to total assets (asset utilisation) declined from 4.9 percent in April 2024 to 4.6 percent in \nApril 2025. The profitability ratio, however, rose from 23.1 percent in April 2024 to 23.8 percent in \nApril 2025. \n \n(c) Composition of Banks’ Income \nIncome from investments remained the largest component of banks’ total income in April 2025, with \nits share rising to 43.9 percent, from 42.8 percent in April 2024 following the growth in total \ninvestments. The share of interest income from loans, however, dipped to 33.6 percent in April 2025 \nfrom 36.3 percent in April 2024. The share of banks’ income from fees and commissions grew slightly \nfrom 10.5 percent in April 2024 to 11.2 percent in April 2025. Similarly, the share of income from other \nsources picked up to 11.3 percent in April 2025. \n \nFigure 5.3: Composition of Income, Cost and Borrowings \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n \n \n5.3.4 Operational Efficiency \nThe industry’s efficiency improved marginally, notwithstanding the increase in growth in interest and \noperating expenses during the review period. The cost-to-income ratio declined from 76.9 percent in \nApril 2024, to 76.2 percent in April 2025 and cost-to-total assets ratio improved to 3.5 percent in April \n2025, from 3.8 percent in April 2024. The operational cost-to-total assets ratio also improved marginally \nto 2.3 percent in April 2025, from 2.5 percent in April 2024 and the ratio of operational cost to total \nincome improved to 49.9 percent in April 2025, from 50.3 percent during the corresponding period in \n2024. \n \n34.6\n35.0\n34.8\n34.5\n40.0\n42.4\n46.2\n45.2\n10.6\n7.5\n4.2\n4.8\n14.9\n15.1\n14.8\n15.6\n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\n50.0\n60.0\n70.0\n80.0\n90.0\n100.0\nComposition of Cost (%)\nInterest Expense\nOperating Expense\nTotal Provision\nTax\n38.8\n42.8\n42.7\n43.9\n35.9\n36.3\n35.7\n33.6\n10.5\n10.5\n12.5\n11.2\n14.8\n10.4\n9.1\n11.3\n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\n50.0\n60.0\n70.0\n80.0\n90.0\n100.0\nComposition of Banks' Income (%)\nInvestments\nLoans\nFees & Commissions\nOther Income\n44.6\n59.5\n70.2\n81.3\n86.2\n55.4\n40.5\n29.8\n18.7\n13.8\n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\n50.0\n60.0\n70.0\n80.0\n90.0\n100.0\nApr-22\nApr-23\nApr-24\nFeb-25\nApr-25\nBanks' Borrowing by Source (% of Total)\n Domestic Borrowing\n Foreign Borrowing\n61.0\n27.4\n34.5\n48.2\n50.3\n39.0\n72.6\n65.5\n51.8\n49.7\n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\n50.0\n60.0\n70.0\n80.0\n90.0\n100.0\nApr-22\nApr-23\nApr-24\nFeb-25\nApr-25\nBanks' External Borrowing by Maturity (% of Total)\nShort-term borrowings\nLong term borrowings\n \n31 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n5.3.5 Banks’ Counterparty Relationships \nTotal offshore balances grew by 53.2 percent to GH¢39.21 billion, up from 50.2 percent recorded in \nApril 2024. The ratio of offshore balances to net worth rose to 89.2 percent from 83.0 percent during \nthe corresponding period in 2024. Growth in industry placements with foreign counterparties, however, \nrecorded a marginal decline of 84.4 percent in April 2025 from 87.5 percent recorded a similar period \na year earlier. Growth in nostro balances also dipped from 23.3 percent in April 2024 to 18.7 percent in \nApril 2025. \n \nThe share of banks’ external borrowings in total borrowings declined to 13.8 percent in April 2025, \ndown from 29.8 percent in April 2024, while the share of domestic borrowings grew to 86.2 percent in \nApril 2025 from 70.2 percent in April 2024. Banks’ external borrowings were tilted towards short-term \nsegment of the market with the share of short-term borrowings picking up to 50.3 percent, from 34.5 \npercent in a similar period a year ago. Long term instruments, however, declined to 49.7 percent in \nApril 2025, down from 65.5 percent in April 2024. \n \n5.4 Credit Conditions Survey \nResults of the April 2025 Credit Conditions Survey suggested a marginal net tightening in the overall \ncredit stance on loans to enterprises between February and April 2025, on the back of a net ease in the \nstance in all components of enterprise loans except loans to large enterprises. Banks, however, projected \ntheir overall stance on enterprise loans to ease between May and June 2025, from a net ease in the stance \non all components of enterprise loans. \n \nThe overall stance on loans to households eased marginally during the April 2025 survey round from \nnet eases in both components of household loans (namely, loans for house purchase and consumer credit \nand other lending). Over the next two months, banks project a further easing in the overall stance on \nloans to households, driven largely by positive sentiments towards economic activity. \n \nOn the demand side, the April 2025 survey indicated an increase in overall demand for enterprise loans \nfor both short term and long-term instruments. Banks projected a softening in demand for corporate \nloans over the next two months, driven by decreased demand for all corporate loans with the exception \nof large enterprises. \n \nCredit demand by households recorded a net increase between March and April 2025, from a net \nincrease in the demand for both mortgages and consumer credit and other lending. Over the next two \nmonths, banks expect a further increase in the demand for both consumer credit and loans for house \npurchases to drive an increase in the overall demand for household loans. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n32 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nFigure 5.4: Credit Conditions Survey Results \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana \n \n5.5 Conclusion and Outlook \nThe banking sector rebounded in performance with improvement in solvency, liquidity, asset quality \nand efficiency. The sector’s performance, however, continues to be moderated by the lingering effects \nof the macroeconomic challenges and the DDEP. The sustained increases in profits are projected to \nboost the capital levels of banks and support recapitalisation efforts. Asset quality, although moderating, \nremains elevated and poses a key risk in the outlook, and will have to be monitored closely to minimise \nits impact on the sector. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n-20.00\n-10.00\n0.00\n10.00\n20.00\n30.00\n40.00\n50.00\n60.00\nNPR (%)\nLoans for house purchase\nConsumer credit and other lending\nOverall stance to Households\nIndex, a rise denotes tightening\nHouseholds\n-30.00\n-20.00\n-10.00\n0.00\n10.00\n20.00\n30.00\n40.00\nNPR (%)\nLoans for house purchase\nLoans for consumer credit\nOverall Household demand for loans\nIndex, a rise denotes increase in demand\nHouseholds\n-20.00\n-10.00\n0.00\n10.00\n20.00\n30.00\n40.00\n50.00\n60.00\nNPR (%)\nSmall and Medium Enterprises\nLarge Enterprises\nOverall Credit Stance for Enterprises\nShort term enterprise loans\nLong term enterprise loans\nIndex, a rise denotes tightening\nCorporates\n-30.00\n-20.00\n-10.00\n0.00\n10.00\n20.00\n30.00\n40.00\nNPR (%)\nOverall Demand for credit\nSmall and Medium Enterprises\nLarge Enterprises\nShort term\nLong term\nIndex, a rise denotes increase in demand\nCorporates\n \n33 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n6. Price Developments \n \n6.0 Highlights \nDomestic inflation has declined consistently for the first four months of the year 2025, cumulatively \ndropping by 2.6 percentage points since December 2024. The decline has been driven by a tight \nmonetary policy stance, liquidity sterilization efforts, downward revision in ex-pump petroleum prices, \nand stability in the exchange rate. Staff projections show a high probability of inflation getting to within \n12.0 percent by the end of 2025 and further down to the medium-term target of 8 ± 2 percent. \n \n6.1 Domestic Inflation \nDomestic inflation has declined consistently for the first four months of the year 2025. The decline has \nbeen broad-based, with both food and non-food inflation recording appreciable declines. Headline \ninflation eased to 21.2 percent in April 2025 from 23.5 percent in January, 23.1 percent in February, \nand 22.4 percent in March 2025—a cumulative drop of 2.6 percentage points since December 2024. \nFood inflation decreased to 25.0 percent in April 2025 from 26.5 percent in March, 28.1 percent in \nFebruary, and 28.3 percent in January, representing a cumulative drop of 2.8 percentage points. \nSimilarly, non-food inflation fell to 17.9 percent in April from 18.7 percent in March, 18.8 percent in \nFebruary, and 19.2 percent in January, a cumulative decline of 2.4 percentage points since December \n2024. The decline has been driven by a variety of factors, including continued maintenance of a tight \nmonetary policy stance, stepped-up liquidity sterilization efforts through open market operations \nactivity, downward revision in ex-pump petroleum prices, stability in the exchange rate (which is \nimpacting favorably on imports), a gradual re-anchoring of inflation expectations, and ongoing \nabsorptive fiscal consolidation efforts which is well aligned with the 2025 budget. \n \nThe Bank’s main measure of core inflation continues to ease since the last MPC meeting in March 2025. \nInflation, excluding energy and utility items from the consumer basket, eased to 21.0 percent in April \n2025 from 22.4 percent in February. The April 2025 inflation expectation measures, as derived from \nthe Bank’s Quarterly Projection model, the yield curve, and surveys of businesses, consumers and the \nfinancial sector indicated continued easing of expectations. \n \nSource: GSS and Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\nApr-22\nJun-22\nAug-22\nOct-22\nDec-22\nFeb-23\nApr-23\nJun-23\nAug-23\nOct-23\nDec-23\nFeb-24\nApr-24\nJun-24\nAug-24\nOct-24\nDec-24\nFeb-25\nApr-25\nFigure 6.1a: Year on Year Inflation\nHeadline\nLower Band\nUpper Band\n4\n14\n24\n34\n44\n54\n64\nApr-22\nJun-22\nAug-22\nOct-22\nDec-22\nFeb-23\nApr-23\nJun-23\nAug-23\nOct-23\nDec-23\nFeb-24\nApr-24\nJun-24\nAug-24\nOct-24\nDec-24\nFeb-25\nApr-25\nFigure 6.1b: Headline vs Core Inflation \n(%)\nCore 1 (Excluding\nFuel, and Utilities)\nHeadline Inflation\n \n34 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nOn a month-on-month basis, headline inflation softened to 0.8 percent in April 2025 from 1.3 percent \nin February 2025. Monthly food inflation decreased to 0.9 percent from 1.8 percent in February 2025. \nSimilarly, month-on-month non-food inflation has halved since the last MPC meeting, declining to 0.7 \npercent in April 2025 from 1.4 percent in February. \n \nInflation has broadly declined across all subgroups since the last MPC, except for Insurance & financial \nservices and Transport, where April figures for 2025 were higher than 2024 April’s. \n \nFigure 6.2: Month-on-Month Inflation (%) \n \nSource: Ghana Statistical Service \n \n \n \n \n \nTable 6.1 CPI Components \n \nSource: Ghana Statistical Service \n \n-3\n-2\n-1\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\nApr-\n23\nMay-\n23\nJun-\n23\nJul-\n23\nAug-\n23\nSep-\n23\nOct-\n23\nNov-\n23\nDec-\n23\nJan-\n24\nFeb-\n24\nMar-\n24\nApr-\n24\nMay-\n24\nJun-\n24\nJul-\n24\nAug-\n24\nSep-\n24\nOct-\n24\nNov-\n24\nDec-\n24\nJan-\n25\nFeb-\n25\nMar-\n25\nApr-\n25\nHeadline\n2.4\n4.8\n3.2\n3.6\n-0.2\n1.9\n0.3\n1.8\n1.2\n2.0\n1.6\n0.8\n1.8\n3.2\n2.9\n2.1\n-0.7\n2.8\n0.9\n2.6\n1.8\n1.7\n1.3\n0.2\n0.8\nFood\n4.3\n6.2\n3.9\n3.8\n-0.3\n1.6\n-0.3\n1.2\n1.3\n1.6\n1.9\n1.0\n2.1\n2.7\n5.1\n1.7\n-2.2\n4.2\n0.3\n3.8\n2.8\n2.0\n1.8\n-0.2\n0.9\nNon-food\n0.7\n3.5\n2.6\n3.4\n-0.2\n2.1\n0.9\n2.3\n1.0\n2.4\n1.3\n0.7\n1.5\n3.6\n0.9\n2.4\n0.7\n1.6\n1.4\n1.6\n0.7\n1.4\n0.9\n0.7\n0.7\nWeghts\nDec\nDec\nDec\nJan\nFeb\nMar\nApr\nJul\nDec\nJan\nFeb\nMar\nApr\n(%)\nOverall \n100.0\n12.6\n54.1\n23.2\n23.5\n23.2\n25.8\n25.0\n20.9\n23.8\n23.5\n23.1\n22.4\n21.2\nFood and Beverages\n42.7\n12.8\n59.7\n28.7\n27.1\n27.0\n29.6\n26.8\n21.5\n27.8\n28.6\n28.1\n26.5\n25.0\nNon-food\n57.4\n12.5\n49.9\n18.7\n20.5\n20.0\n22.6\n23.5\n20.5\n20.3\n19.2\n18.8\n18.7\n17.9\nAlcoholic Beverages, Tobacco & Narcotics\n3.9\n9.6\n38.5\n38.2\n38.5\n38.5\n41.0\n39.4\n26.8\n28.4\n27.2\n25.6\n23.8\n24.0\nClothing and footwear\n8.0\n8.6\n41.9\n22.3\n22.8\n22.5\n24.5\n23.8\n16.9\n20.0\n19.8\n19.2\n19.3\n19.7\nHousing and Utilities\n10.2\n20.7\n82.3\n19.5\n22.6\n22.9\n24.9\n28.1\n28.6\n26.3\n24.6\n24.3\n25.1\n22.5\nFurnishings, Household Equipment\n3.2\n9.6\n71.5\n26.9\n27.6\n25.4\n23.0\n21.3\n14.3\n16.7\n15.3\n15.4\n15.3\n15.1\nHealth\n0.7\n6.0\n34.4\n23.0\n26.6\n28.1\n32.0\n31.2\n21.2\n21.4\n18.4\n16.6\n16.8\n15.0\nTransport\n10.5\n17.6\n71.4\n4.4\n5.6\n3.5\n7.9\n10.3\n18.1\n16.8\n16.9\n17.9\n16.8\n14.9\nInformation and Communication\n3.6\n9.0\n21.5\n14.2\n13.6\n13.5\n15.2\n14.7\n10.1\n12.0\n11.6\n10.8\n10.8\n10.9\nRecreation & Culture\n3.5\n11.4\n42.4\n24.9\n25.9\n25.6\n29.4\n28.7\n17.1\n17.4\n17.4\n16.5\n20.7\n22.8\nEducation\n6.6\n1.0\n11.3\n13.9\n19.8\n19.7\n23.7\n23.4\n18.0\n19.1\n13.9\n12.3\n11.3\n11.7\nRestaurants and accommodation services\n4.3\n8.9\n9.2\n28.0\n29.2\n31.9\n32.7\n33.9\n28.3\n16.5\n16.5\n14.2\n13.3\n10.7\nInsurance and Financial services\n0.4\n6.3\n10.8\n8.1\n8.6\n8.9\n9.3\n9.6\n11.3\n16.5\n15.4\n16.1\n16.6\n16.9\nPersonal care, social protection & Miscellaneous services\n2.5\n10.6\n60.9\n31.1\n32.0\n30.3\n33.5\n31.9\n16.0\n19.3\n17.9\n17.1\n17.4\n17.2\n2023\nCPI Components (%)\n2024\n2025\nSource: Ghana Statistical Service\n2021\n2022\n \n35 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \n \n \n6.2 Inflation Risk Assessment and Outlook \nStaff projections show a high probability of inflation getting to within 12.0 percent by the end of 2025 \nand further down to the medium-term target of 8 ± 2 percent. Inflation projections are subject to both \nupside and downside risks. In the balance, risks to the inflation outlook are tilted to the downside. On \nthe upside, the residual effect of prior food supply disruptions that affected food prices, broader supply \nchain challenges, and escalating trade tensions could impact inflation forecasts. We expected these \nupside risks to be outweighed by the stability in the exchange rate and the falling crude oil prices which \nis expected to lead to a significant fall in ex-pump prices feeding into lowering transport fares. \nCurrently, GPRTU has announced a 15.0 percent reduction in transport fares, effective 26 May 2025. \nThis is expected to dampen the pressures on food and non-food inflation. Also, there are expectations \nof a downward review of utility tariffs and calls on trading associations like GUTA to begin reducing \nprices. We also see a gradual re-anchoring of inflation expectations and ongoing absorptive fiscal \nconsolidation efforts which are well aligned with the 2025 budget. \n \nDecision on the Monetary Policy Rate \nThe Committee took note of the latest forecast which points to continued easing of inflationary pressures \non the back of tight monetary policy stance, exchange rate stability, and fiscal consolidation. Despite \nthese positive developments, the Committee took the view that the current level of inflation remained \nhigh relative to the medium-term target. These will require maintaining the tight stance to reinforce the \ndisinflation process. Under the circumstances, the Committee, by a unanimous decision, maintained the \npolicy rate at 28.0 percent. \n \nThe Committee took additional policy measures to amend the Dynamic Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR). \nThe CRR for all banks will now be maintained in their respective currencies. This means that foreign \ncurrency reserves for foreign currency deposits and domestic currency reserves for domestic currency \ndeposits. This policy measure became effective on June 5, 2025. \n \n \n \n36 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nAPPENDIX \n \nTable A1: Sources of Growth in Total Liquidity (GH¢ Millions, unless otherwise stated) \n \n Source: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \nTable A2: Sources of Growth in Reserve Money (GH¢ Millions, unless otherwise stated) \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \nAppendix 1: Sources of Growth in Total Liquidity (M2+) (millions of Ghana cedis unless otherwise stated)\nApr-23\nDec-23\nMar-24\nApr-24\nJun-24\nSep-24\nDec-24\nFeb-25\nMar-25\nApr-25\n1 Net Foreign Assets\n(10392.27)\n21710.89\n34085.37\n37191.77\n49084.99\n65801.73\n87417.32\n97486.68\n102671.42\n134538.64\n Bank of Ghana\n(22971.16)\n4021.06\n13251.29\n14414.95\n23057.19\n34489.38\n47647.12\n58014.87\n65439.11\n96889.98\n Commercial Banks\n12578.90\n17689.83\n20834.09\n22776.82\n26027.80\n31312.35\n39770.20\n39471.81\n37232.31\n37648.65\n2 Net Domestic Assets\n217920.46\n228308.31\n227034.13\n232413.29\n231954.03\n245378.55\n242321.48\n240088.97\n241260.50\n207122.20\n3 ow: Claims on government (net)\n145678.43\n115681.46\n118345.15\n121337.10\n117391.93\n130147.19\n113291.69\n124364.42\n114016.14\n82368.43\n4 ow: Claims on Private sector( Incl. PE's)\n87074.43\n86096.51\n86193.53\n87069.71\n93719.28\n101487.64\n105901.21\n103849.81\n104292.76\n101571.63\n BOG OMO Sterilisation Acc.\n(19524.09)\n(24795.37)\n(22605.87)\n(17663.12)\n(16244.51)\n(21138.18)\n(18142.88)\n(23038.55)\n(35561.16)\n(44085.11)\n5 Total Liquidity (M2+)\n207528.19\n250019.20\n261119.50\n269605.06\n281039.02\n311180.28\n329738.77\n337575.65\n343931.92\n341660.84\n6 ow: Broad Money Supply (M2)\n150496.16\n185425.80\n190181.12\n197131.66\n203530.25\n229253.49\n247761.93\n249466.30\n255756.31\n259872.37\n7 ow: Foreign Currency Deposits(¢million)\n57032.04\n64593.40\n70938.38\n72473.40\n77508.78\n81926.79\n81976.84\n88109.36\n88175.61\n81788.48\nChange from previous year (in per cent)\n8 Net Foreign Assets\n803.01\n(310.35)\n(383.89)\n(457.88)\n7455.25\n(3972.59)\n302.64\n245.06\n201.22\n261.74\n9 Net Domestic Assets\n51.63\n19.79\n3.67\n6.65\n11.00\n11.10\n6.14\n6.49\n6.27\n(10.88)\n10 ow: Claims on government (net)\n59.92\n(9.28)\n(17.95)\n(16.71)\n(14.41)\n9.93\n(2.07)\n0.89\n(3.66)\n(32.12)\n11 ow: Claims on Private sector( Incl. PE's)\n28.71\n1.20\n(2.36)\n(0.01)\n6.69\n15.14\n23.00\n23.83\n21.00\n16.66\n12 ow: BOG OMO Sterilisation Acc.\n(299.42)\n(220.96)\n17.62\n9.53\n40.44\n42.22\n26.83\n22.82\n(57.31)\n(149.59)\n12 Total Liquidity (M2+)\n45.57\n38.69\n26.15\n29.91\n34.07\n41.99\n31.89\n33.06\n31.71\n26.73\n13 Broad Money Supply (M2)\n43.05\n37.21\n28.39\n30.99\n35.62\n44.50\n33.62\n34.95\n34.48\n31.83\n14 Foreign Currency Deposits (FCDs)\n52.66\n43.15\n20.53\n27.07\n30.16\n35.38\n26.91\n27.99\n24.30\n12.85\nCummulative change from previous year end (in per cent)\n15 Net Foreign Assets\n0.69\n(310.35)\n57.00\n71.30\n126.08\n203.08\n302.64\n11.52\n17.45\n53.90\n16 Net Domestic Assets\n14.34\n19.79\n(0.56)\n1.80\n1.60\n7.48\n6.14\n(0.92)\n(0.44)\n(14.53)\n17 o/w: Claims on government (net)\n14.24\n(9.28)\n2.30\n4.89\n1.48\n12.50\n(2.07)\n9.77\n0.64\n(27.30)\n18 Broad Money(M2+)\n15.12\n38.69\n4.44\n7.83\n12.41\n24.46\n31.89\n2.38\n4.30\n3.62\nAnnual per cent contribution to money growth\n19 Net Foreign Assets\n(6.48)\n17.77\n22.27\n22.93\n23.11\n30.80\n26.28\n27.29\n26.27\n36.11\n20 NDA\n52.05\n20.92\n3.88\n6.98\n10.96\n11.19\n5.60\n5.77\n5.45\n(9.38)\n21 Total Liquidity (M2+)\n45.57\n38.69\n26.15\n29.91\n34.07\n41.99\n31.89\n33.06\n31.71\n26.73\nMemorandum items\n22 Reserve Money \n69161.50\n87987.66\n89011.62\n105041.20\n110578.33\n120771.47\n130481.72\n140992.88\n143154.12\n144944.32\n23 NFA ($million)\n(948.93)\n1827.52\n2647.00\n2801.87\n3365.21\n4164.67\n5946.76\n6277.31\n6611.17\n9508.03\n24 Currency ratio\n0.18\n0.18\n0.18\n0.18\n0.19\n0.20\n0.24\n0.22\n0.22\n0.22\n25 FCD/M2+ \n0.27\n0.26\n0.27\n0.27\n0.28\n0.26\n0.25\n0.26\n0.26\n0.24\n26 FCD/Total Deposit \n0.32\n0.30\n0.32\n0.32\n0.33\n0.32\n0.31\n0.32\n0.31\n0.29\n27 RM multiplier\n2.18\n2.11\n2.14\n1.88\n1.84\n1.90\n1.90\n1.77\n1.79\n1.79\nAppendix 2: Sources of Growth in Reserve Money (millions of Ghana cedis unless otherwise stated)\nApr-23\nDec-23\nMar-24\nApr-24\nJun-24\nSep-24\nDec-24\nFeb-25\nMar-25\nApr-25\n1 Net Foreign Assets ( NFA)\n(22971.2) 4021.1\n13251.3\n14415.0\n23057.2\n34489.4\n47647.1\n58014.9\n65439.1\n96890.0\n2 Net Domestic Assets ( NDA)\n92132.7\n84278.4\n75760.0\n90626.2\n87521.1\n86282.1\n82834.6\n82978.0\n77715.0\n48054.3\nof which:\n3 ow: Claims on government (net)\n88150.9\n54356.1\n50086.8\n54517.7\n55138.4\n69537.6\n56031.5\n60833.1\n56703.2\n25904.3\n4 Claims on DMB's (net)\n(9161.5)\n(9878.4)\n(16020.1) (12880.5)\n(13451.5) (26897.1) (21783.3) (21892.5) (15238.3) (16298.0)\n5 OMO Sterilisation Account.\n(19524.1) (24795.4) (22605.9) (17663.1)\n(16244.5) (21138.2) (18142.9) (23038.5) (35561.2) (44085.1)\n6 Reserve Money ( RM)\n69161.5\n88299.4\n89011.3\n105041.2\n110578.3 120771.5 130481.7 140992.9 143154.1 144944.3\n7 ow:Currency \n31338.5\n37620.7\n39677.6\n41690.8\n44895.6\n52752.8\n64127.7\n61029.7\n61995.8\n62695.6\n8 DMB's reserves\n32532.0\n38050.2\n42754.5\n56616.6\n58972.2\n60760.4\n58769.1\n72109.5\n73241.6\n74243.3\n9 Non-Bank deposits\n5290.9\n12628.5\n6579.2\n6733.8\n6710.6\n7258.3\n7584.9\n7853.7\n7916.7\n8005.4\nChange from previous year (in per cent)\n10 Net Foreign Assets\n(1680.9)\n(123.0)\n(155.3)\n(162.8)\n(267.7)\n(312.1)\n1084.9\n509.3\n393.8\n572.1\n11 Net Domestic Assets\n101.3\n(1.5)\n(7.4)\n(1.6)\n15.0\n8.2\n(1.7)\n12.1\n2.6\n(47.0)\n12 ow: Claims on government (net)\n104.1\n(31.1)\n(42.5)\n(38.2)\n(33.5)\n11.5\n3.1\n10.3\n13.2\n(52.5)\n13 Claims on DMB's (net)\n(190.0)\n(143.5)\n(62.2)\n(40.6)\n(58.2)\n(131.1)\n(120.5)\n(48.5)\n4.9\n(26.5)\n14 OMO Sterilisation Account.\n(299.4)\n(221.0)\n17.6\n9.5\n40.4\n42.2\n26.8\n22.8\n(57.3)\n(149.6)\n15 Reserve Money ( RM)\n1.6\n29.7\n0.8\n19.0\n25.2\n36.8\n47.8\n8.1\n9.7\n11.1\n16 ow:Currency \n(0.3)\n19.7\n5.5\n10.8\n19.3\n40.2\n70.5\n(4.8)\n(3.3)\n(2.2)\nCumulative change from previous year end (in per cent)\n17 Net Foreign Assets ( NFA)\n31.4\n(123.0)\n229.5\n258.5\n473.4\n757.7\n1084.9\n21.8\n37.3\n103.3\n18 Net Domestic Assets ( NDA)\n7.6\n(1.5)\n(10.1)\n7.5\n3.8\n2.4\n(1.7)\n0.2\n(6.2)\n(42.0)\n19 o/w: Claims on government (net)\n11.8\n(31.1)\n(7.9)\n0.3\n1.4\n27.9\n3.1\n8.6\n1.2\n(53.8)\n20 Reserve Money ( RM)\n1.6\n29.7\n0.8\n19.0\n25.2\n36.8\n47.8\n8.1\n9.7\n11.1\nAnnual per cent contribution\n21 Net Foreign Assets\n(51.73)\n31.58\n64.31\n54.06\n59.04\n79.93\n49.41\n58.06\n58.63\n78.52\n22 Net Domestic Assets ( NDA)\n98.21\n(1.93)\n(10.42)\n(2.18)\n18.33\n10.27\n(1.64)\n10.75\n2.20\n(40.53)\n23 RM growth ( y-o-y)\n46.48\n29.65\n53.89\n51.88\n77.37\n90.20\n47.77\n68.81\n60.83\n37.99\n \n37 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nTable A.3: Asset and Liability Structure of the Banking Sector \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n \nTable A.4: Credit Growth \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n \nTable A.5: Contingent Liabilities \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n \nTable A.6: Distribution of Loans and NPLs by Economic Sector (%) \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \nApr-22\nApr-23\nApr-24\nFeb-25\nApr-25\nComponents of Assets (% of Total)\nCash and Due from Banks\n21.7\n29.3\n35.2\n38.9\n36.6\nInvestments\n43.2\n35.0\n34.5\n31.8\n34.7\nNet Advances\n27.4\n26.1\n20.5\n20.1\n19.3\nOthers\n7.7\n9.6\n9.8\n9.2\n9.4\nComponents of Liabilities and Shareholders' Funds (% of Total)\nTotal Deposits\n65.5\n \n77.2\n \n77.0\n \n74.6\n \n74.2\n \nTotal Borrowings\n13.3\n \n6.7\n \n6.3\n \n7.4\n \n8.4\n \nShareholders' Funds\n13.7\n \n8.9\n \n10.1\n \n11.0\n \n11.3\n \nOther Liabilities\n7.6\n \n7.2\n \n6.6\n \n6.9\n \n5.8\n \nApr-23\nApr-24\nFeb-25\nApr-25\nApr-24\nApr-25\nPublic Sector\n7,483.53\n \n6,082.98\n6,336.64\n5,371.95\n-18.7\n-11.7\nPrivate Sector\n64,875.46\n \n71,855.61\n87,333.63\n86,812.87\n10.8\n20.8\n - Private Enterprises\n47,380.35\n \n52,269.44\n62,954.05\n60,583.75\n10.3\n15.9\n o/w Foreign\n3,200.58\n \n3,525.57\n4,178.77\n3,830.60\n10.2\n8.7\n Indigeneous\n44,179.77\n \n48,743.87\n58,775.28\n56,753.14\n10.3\n16.4\n - Households\n15,721.79\n \n18,353.83\n21,765.83\n22,971.64\n16.7\n25.2\nGross Loans\n72,359.0\n77,938.6\n93,670.3\n91,533.9\n7.7\n17.4\nEconomic Sector\nGh¢million\ny/y growth (%)\nApr-22\nApr-23\nApr-24\nFeb-25\nApr-25\nContingent Liabilities (GH¢million)\n20,116.1\n \n19,743.0\n \n24,400.1\n \n23,414.2\n \n20,950.2\n \nGrowth (y-o-y)\n45.0\n-3.8\n23.6\n0.3\n-14.1\n% of Total Liabilities\n12.0\n9.1\n8.8\n6.8\n6.1\na. Public Sector\n11.2\n6.3\n7.8\n9.0\n6.8\n7.6\n5.8\n6.6\n i. Government\n5.0\n4.5\n2.7\n3.0\n1.6\n1.7\n1.5\n1.6\n ii. Public Institutions\n2.7\n0.0\n1.7\n2.2\n1.4\n1.8\n1.0\n1.2\n iii. Public Enterprises\n3.6\n1.8\n3.5\n3.8\n3.8\n4.1\n3.3\n3.7\nb. Private Sector\n88.8\n93.7\n92.2\n91.0\n93.2\n92.4\n94.2\n93.4\n i. Private Enterprises\n61.4\n84.4\n67.1\n61.2\n67.2\n62.5\n65.7\n60.0\n o/w Foreign\n4.8\n2.7\n4.5\n5.4\n4.5\n5.1\n4.2\n4.8\n Indigeneous\n56.6\n81.7\n62.5\n55.8\n62.7\n57.4\n61.6\n55.3\n ii. Households\n24.5\n9.2\n23.5\n27.9\n23.2\n26.5\n24.9\n29.0\n iii. Others\n2.8\n0.1\n1.6\n1.9\n2.8\n3.3\n3.5\n4.4\nShare in \nNPLs\nShare in Total \nCredit\nShare in \nNPLs\nApr-23\nApr-24\nFeb-25\nApr-25\nShare in Total \nCredit\nShare in \nNPLs\nShare in Total \nCredit\nShare in \nNPLs\nShare in Total \nCredit\n \n38 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nTable A.7: Liquidity Ratios \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \nTable A.8: Profitability Indicators (%) \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \nTable A.9: DMBs’ Income Statement \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \n \n \n \n \n \nApr-22\nApr-23\nApr-24\nFeb-25\nApr-25\nLiquid Assets (Core) - (GH¢'million)\n42,150.6\n \n69,897.1\n \n107,918.8\n \n149,495.2\n \n142,771.0\n \nLiquid Assets (Broad) -(GH¢'million)\n125,785.5\n \n153,075.8\n \n213,585.9\n \n271,482.8\n \n277,736.9\n \nLiquid Assets to total deposits (Core)-%\n33.1\n \n38.0\n \n45.7\n \n52.1\n \n49.3\n \nLiquid Assets to total deposits (Broad)- %\n98.9\n \n83.2\n \n90.4\n \n94.6\n \n95.9\n \nLiquid assets to total assets (Core)- %\n21.7\n \n29.3\n \n35.2\n \n38.9\n \n36.6\n \nLiquid assets to total assets (Broad)- %\n64.7\n \n64.3\n \n69.6\n \n70.6\n \n71.2\n \nApr-23 Apr-24 Feb-25 Apr-25\nGross Yield\n6.2\n6.3\n2.8\n5.8\nInterest Payable\n2.1\n2.0\n0.9\n1.8\nSpread\n4.0\n4.3\n2.0\n4.0\nAsset Utilitisation\n5.6\n4.9\n2.2\n4.6\nInterest Margin to Total Assets\n2.7\n2.6\n1.1\n2.4\nInterest Margin to Gross income\n48.3\n52.5\n51.7\n51.3\nProfitability Ratio\n20.9\n23.1\n23.3\n23.8\nReturn On Equity (%) after tax\n36.3\n35.0\n28.5\n30.0\nReturn On Assets (%) before tax\n5.5\n5.4\n4.7\n5.0\nApr-23\nApr-24\nFeb-25\nApr-25\nApr-24\nFeb-25\nApr-25\nInterest Income\n10,048.7\n \n12,002.0\n \n6,690.6\n \n13,905.0\n \n19.4\n \n13.5\n15.9\nInterest Expenses\n(3,545.3)\n \n(4,041.7)\n \n(2,279.3)\n \n(4,708.8)\n \n14.0\n \n18.5\n16.5\nNet Interest Income\n6,503.4\n \n7,960.2\n \n4,411.3\n \n9,196.2\n \n22.4\n \n11.0\n15.5\nFees and Commissions (Net)\n1,408.5\n \n1,589.2\n \n1,066.7\n \n2,006.0\n \n12.8\n \n35.8\n26.2\nOther Income\n1,997.3\n \n1,581.9\n \n772.6\n \n2,022.2\n \n(20.8)\n \n5.5\n27.8\nOperating Income\n9,909.2\n \n11,131.3\n \n6,250.6\n \n13,224.4\n \n12.3\n \n13.9\n18.8\nOperating Expenses \n(4,487.8)\n \n(5,020.0)\n \n(3,019.8)\n \n(6,174.2)\n \n11.9\n \n24.7\n23.0\n Staff Cost (deduct)\n(2,112.1)\n \n(2,526.9)\n \n(1,553.0)\n \n(3,132.8)\n \n19.6\n \n28.8\n24.0\n Other operating Expenses \n(2,375.7)\n \n(2,493.1)\n \n(1,466.9)\n \n(3,041.5)\n \n4.9\n \n20.7\n22.0\nNet Operating Income\n5,421.4\n \n6,111.3\n \n3,230.7\n \n7,050.2\n \n12.7\n \n5.3\n15.4\nTotal Provision (Loan losses, Depreciation & \nothers)\n(1,087.7)\n \n(863.4)\n \n(275.2)\n \n(654.2)\n \n(20.6)\n \n(55.5)\n(24.2)\nIncome Before Tax\n4,333.6\n \n5,247.9\n \n2,955.5\n \n6,396.1\n \n21.1\n \n20.7\n21.9\nTax\n(1,525.3)\n \n(1,748.3)\n \n(969.1)\n \n(2,127.7)\n \n14.6\n \n15.9\n21.7\nNet Income\n2,808.3\n \n3,499.6\n \n1,986.4\n \n4,268.4\n \n24.6\n \n23.1\n22.0\nGross Income\n13,454.5\n \n15,173.1\n \n8,529.9\n \n17,933.2\n \n12.8\n \n15.0\n18.2\n (GH ¢'million)\nY-on-y Growth (%)\n \n39 \n \nPUBLIC \nPUBLIC \nTable A.10: Developments in Offshore Balances \n \nSource: Bank of Ghana Staff Calculations \n \nTable A.11: Headline Inflation \n \nApr-22\nApr-23\nApr-24\nFeb-25\nApr-25\nOffshore balances as % to Networth\n38.9\n80.7\n83.0\n99.8\n89.2\nAnnual Growth in Offshore balances (%)\n19.6\n64.7\n50.2\n102.6\n53.2\nAnnual Growth in Nostro Balances (%)\n5.9\n98.9\n23.3\n89.9\n18.7\nAnnual Growth in Placement (%)\n35.9\n33.8\n87.5\n113.6\n84.4\nCombined\nFood\nNon-food\nCombined\nFood\nNon-food\nCore 1\nCore 2\nCore 3\nCore 4\n100\n42.7\n57.3\n100\n42.7\n57.3\n93.8\n60.2\n87.0\n50.7\nDec-20\n10.4\n14.1\n7.7\n0.9\n1.5\n0.4\n11.2\n8.5\n11.4\n8.3\nDec-21\n12.6\n12.8\n12.5\n1.2\n1.2\n1.2\n11.9\n11.9\n11.5\n10.7\nDec-22\n54.1\n59.7\n49.9\n3.8\n4.1\n3.6\n53.2\n53.5\n54.4\n47.2\nDec-23\n23.2\n28.7\n18.7\n1.2\n1.3\n1.0\n24.2\n22.3\n25.5\n20.7\n2024\nJan\n23.5\n27.1\n20.5\n2.0\n1.6\n2.4\n24.2\n22.4\n25.4\n21.8\nFeb\n23.2\n27.0\n20.0\n1.6\n2.0\n1.3\n24.0\n22.2\n25.0\n21.8\nMar\n25.8\n29.6\n22.6\n0.8\n1.0\n0.7\n26.3\n24.0\n27.2\n23.8\nApr\n25.0\n26.8\n23.5\n1.8\n2.1\n1.5\n24.8\n22.9\n25.9\n22.9\nMay\n23.1\n22.6\n23.6\n3.2\n2.7\n3.6\n22.6\n21.5\n23.2\n21.9\nJun\n22.8\n24.0\n21.6\n2.9\n5.1\n0.9\n22.1\n19.5\n23.2\n19.1\nJul\n20.9\n21.5\n20.5\n2.1\n1.7\n2.4\n19.9\n16.7\n20.8\n17.3\nAug\n20.4\n19.1\n21.5\n-0.7\n-2.2\n0.7\n19.4\n16.9\n20.0\n18.9\nSep\n21.5\n22.1\n20.9\n2.8\n4.2\n1.6\n20.8\n17.6\n21.5\n18.4\nOct\n22.1\n22.8\n21.5\n0.9\n0.3\n1.4\n21.4\n19.5\n22.2\n19.1\nNov\n23.0\n25.9\n20.7\n2.6\n3.8\n1.6\n22.4\n18.7\n23.2\n17.6\nDec\n23.8\n27.8\n20.3\n1.8\n2.8\n0.7\n23.1\n18.5\n24.0\n17.1\n2025\nJan\n23.5\n28.3\n19.2\n1.7\n2.0\n1.4\n22.8\n18.0\n23.7\n16.3\nFeb\n23.1\n28.1\n18.8\n1.3\n1.8\n0.9\n22.4\n17.5\n23.3\n15.8\nMar\n22.4\n26.5\n18.7\n0.2\n-0.2\n0.7\n21.8\n17.9\n22.5\n16.0\nApr\n21.2\n25.0\n17.9\n0.8\n0.9\n0.7\n21.0\n18.0\n21.7\n16.0\nSource: Ghana Statistical Service\nMonthly Changes in CPI (%)\nAnnual Changes in CPI (%)\nCore Inflation (%)\nBank of Ghana", "source": "BOG", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/Monetary_Policy_Reports/Monetary-Policy-Report-May-2025.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "e0be3e28d8b311b26134dc2804a54c36", "text": "1 \n \n \nBANK OF GHANA \nMONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE \nPRESS RELEASE \n26 November 2025 \n \nGood afternoon, ladies and gentlemen of the press. \nThe Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) held its 127th meeting from November 24 – \n26, 2025, to evaluate recent economic developments and assess risks to the outlook \nfor inflation and growth. This briefing summarises the key discussions and the \nCommittee's decision on the Monetary Policy Rate. \n \nIn the global context, growth has held steady despite major policy shifts, \nsupported by easing financial conditions and fiscal stimulus in many countries. \nNotwithstanding the steady growth conditions, the outlook remains fragile amid a still \nvolatile trade environment and ongoing geopolitical tensions. Global headline inflation \nhas eased further on the back of lower energy and food prices. However, the pace of \nease in inflation remains uneven, especially for countries adversely impacted by the \nvolatile trade environment. The ease in global financing conditions since April 2025, \ndriven in part by declining long-term bond yields and stronger equity markets has \nhelped moderate external financing risks. Central banks are monitoring these \ndevelopments closely and policy decisions in the months ahead will be driven by \nincoming data, especially on the trajectory of inflation. \n \nOn the domestic front, growth continues to gain momentum. Following the strong \nGDP outturn of 6.3 percent in the first half of the year, the Monthly Indicator of \nEconomic Growth, recently released by the Ghana Statistical Service, point to a \nprovisional growth of 5.1 percent in August 2025 compared with 4.9 percent in same \nmonth of last year, driven by the services and agriculture sectors. \n \nThe Composite Index of Economic Activity is also posting strong gains. At the \nend of September, the Bank’s updated Composite Index of Economic Activity (CIEA) \nrecorded a strong growth outturn of 9.6 percent, compared to 2.9 percent growth for \nthe corresponding period of 2024. Industrial production, international trade activities, \ncredit to the private sector, and consumption contributed to the increase in the Index \nover the period. The latest confidence surveys, conducted in October 2025, reflected \ncontinued optimism on current and future economic conditions. Also, Ghana’s \nPurchasing Managers’ Index improved on account of new orders in response to the \nincreased pace of economic activity. Taken together, these gains indicate that the \nnegative output gap is closing. The expectation is that, should this momentum be \nmaintained in September 2025, the GDP growth outturn for the year will remain strong. \nInflation decline in the year has been steady and on target. From 23.5 percent in \nJanuary 2025, headline inflation has eased to the Bank’s central target of 8.0 percent \nin October. The decline was broad based as both food and non-food inflation are \n \n2 \n \ncurrently in single digits, the first since July 2021. The sustained disinflation has been \ndriven by the continued maintenance of a tight monetary policy stance, sustained fiscal \nconsolidation efforts, a stable currency, and relative improvement in food supply. Also, \nthe Bank’s core inflation measure, which excludes energy and utility, has declined, \nreflecting significant moderation in underlying inflationary pressures. Price \nexpectations by consumers, businesses, and the banking sector for the next year \nsignalled well-anchored inflation expectations. The Bank’s latest near-term forecasts \nshow that inflation will continue to decline and settle between 6-8 percent by the end \nof the year. \n \nInterest rates have generally declined in line with the reduction in the Monetary \nPolicy Rate. The interbank weighted average rate declined to 21.0 percent in October \n2025, from 27.7 percent in the same month of 2024. The interest equivalent of the 91-\nday benchmark rate eased to 10.6 percent in October 2025, from 25.8 percent in \nOctober 2024. Also, average bank lending rate declined to 22.2 percent compared \nwith 30.5 percent in the same comparative period. This has triggered a gradual \nrecovery in private sector credit growth. From 7.1 percent contraction in May 2025, \nprivate sector credit growth, in real terms, has improved to 5.4 percent in October \n2025. \n \nBudget performance over the first nine months was marked by strong fiscal \nconsolidation. Revenue and grants fell below the target by 4.7 percent, while \nexpenditure was below the target by 15 percent. This resulted in an overall fiscal deficit \non commitment basis of 1.5 percent of GDP, better than the target deficit of 3.2 percent \nof GDP. The primary balance on commitment basis, recorded a surplus of 1.6 percent \nof GDP, compared with the target of 1.0 percent. As at end-October 2025, the total \npublic debt stock was at 45.0 percent of GDP, compared with 61.8 percent of GDP at \nend-December 2024. The decline in the public debt was attributed to effective debt \nmanagement, reduced borrowing costs, and appreciation of the local currency. \n \nDeposit money banks remain sound, profitable and well capitalised. The financial \nsoundness indicators, including solvency, profitability, asset quality, and efficiency \nindicators all point to relative improvement in year-on-year terms. The Non-Performing \nLoan (NPL) ratio declined to 19.5 percent in October 2025, from 22.7 percent in \nOctober 2024, driven by pickup in bank credit and contraction in the stock of NPLs. \nHowever, credit risks remain elevated and looking ahead, policy actions to recapitalise \nthe few undercapitalised banks and full implementation of the new regulatory \nguidelines aimed at reducing NPLs would further strengthen the banking industry. \n \nThe external sector conditions remain favourable. The current account improved \nsignificantly in the first nine months of 2025 to a surplus of US$3.8 billion compared to \nUS$553.6 million for the same period in 2024. The trade surplus increased to US$7.5 \nbillion on the back of a surge in gold and cocoa export earnings. Private inward \ntransfers remained high at U$6.0 billion at the end of the third quarter. The current \naccount surplus, together with favourable balances in the capital and financial \naccounts, translated into an overall balance of payment surplus of US$1.8 billion and \nsupported an accumulation of reserve assets to US$11.4 billion in October 2025, \nequivalent to 4.8 months of import cover. Reserves are projected to increase further \nby year end. The reserve accumulation efforts have helped provide cushion for the \ncurrency, with the cedi strengthening against the major trading currencies. In the year \n \n3 \n \nto 21st November 2025, the cedi recorded an appreciation of 32.2 percent against the \nUS dollar. \n \nIn taking the policy decision, the view of the Committee was that overall \nmacroeconomic conditions have broadly improved. Given the anticipated significant \ndecline in inflation by the end of the year, the tight monetary policy stance, the \nsignificant build-up of reserves which is providing anchor for exchange rate stability, \nthe Bank projects a continued stable inflation profile around the target and well into \nthe first half of 2026. This is against the backdrop that current risks in the outlook to \nshift the path of inflation away from target have moderated significantly. Hence, the \nprevailing high real interest rates provides some scope to ease policy to further boost \nthe growth recovery efforts. \n \nGiven these considerations, the Committee, by a majority decision, voted to lower the \nMonetary Policy Rate further by 350 basis points to 18.0 percent. The Committee will \ncontinue to monitor developments and take the appropriate policy decisions to ensure \nsound and stable macroeconomic conditions. \nAdditional Measure \nIn addition to the policy rate reduction, the Bank will return to the use of the 14-day \nbill as its main instrument for conducting Open Market Operations. \n \nInformational Note \nThe next Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting is scheduled for January 26-28, \n2026. The meeting will conclude on January 28, 2026, with the announcement of the \npolicy decision.", "source": "BOG", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///SARB/MPC_Statements/MPC-Press-Release-November-2025.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "3cc2e000804620cdb1cfd603a5f55dcd", "text": "MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT \n \nISSUED \n \nIN TERMS OF THE RESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE ACT \nCHAPTER 22:15, SECTION 46 \n \nBy \n \nDR. G. GONO \nGOVERNOR \n \nRESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE \n \nJANUARY 2012 \n2 \n \nTABLE OF CONTENTS \n1. \nINTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND ....................................................................................... 5 \n2. \nGLOBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS ................................................................................... 7 \nImplications of the Global Developments on SADC and Zimbabwe ............................................................. 10 \nInternational Commodity Price Developments .................................................................................................... 10 \n3. \nECONOMIC OUTLOOK ................................................................................................................ 12 \nExternal Sector Developments .................................................................................................................................... 16 \n4. \nMONETARY DEVELOPMENTS .................................................................................................. 17 \nMonetary Developments ............................................................................................................................................... 17 \nBank Lending ...................................................................................................................................................................... 19 \nPrivate Sector Credit ....................................................................................................................................................... 21 \nSectoral Distribution of Credit .................................................................................................................................... 21 \nInterest Rates ..................................................................................................................................................................... 22 \n5. \nFINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS .................................................................................. 23 \nARCHITECTURE OF THE BANKING SECTOR ................................................................................................ 25 \nRECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BANKING SECTOR ............................................................................ 26 \nBarbican Bank ..................................................................................................................................................................... 26 \nRenaissance Merchant Bank Limited ........................................................................................................................... 26 \nSTATUS OF BANKING SECTOR CAPITALISATION..................................................................................... 26 \nSTRENGTHENING THE TROUBLED BANK RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK...................................... 30 \nENHANCEMENT OF BANKING SECTOR STABILITY ................................................................................. 31 \nRisk-Based Supervision .................................................................................................................................................... 31 \nEffective Supervision of Banking Groups .................................................................................................................. 31 \nStress Testing ....................................................................................................................................................................... 32 \nEnterprise-wide Risk Management ............................................................................................................................... 33 \nEnhancement of Corporate Governance ...................................................................................................................... 33 \nCredit Reference Bureau .................................................................................................................................................. 34 \nDisclosure Requirements ................................................................................................................................................. 34 \nPrudential Liquidity Ratios ........................................................................................................................................... 35 \nFINANCIAL STABILITY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK ............................................................................. 35 \nMulti-disciplinary Financial Stability Committee .................................................................................................... 38 \nContingency Planning ....................................................................................................................................................... 39 \nBASEL II IMPLEMENTATION .................................................................................................................................. 39 \nMICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS ........................................................................................................................... 40 \nUndesirable Methods of Conducting Business ......................................................................................................... 41 \n3 \n \nMicrofinance Core Client Protection Principles ....................................................................................................... 41 \nTimely Renewal of Microfinance Licences ............................................................................................................... 42 \nDraft Microfinance Bill .................................................................................................................................................... 42 \nFINANCIAL INCLUSION ............................................................................................................................................. 42 \nLender of Last Resort (LOLR) ...................................................................................................................................... 44 \nNostro Accounts ................................................................................................................................................................ 45 \nSTATUTORY RESERVE BALANCES ............................................................................................................................ 45 \n6. \nNATIONAL PAYMENT SYSTEMS .............................................................................................. 46 \nReal Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) System ......................................................................................................... 46 \nRETAIL PAYMENT STREAMS ...................................................................................................................................... 46 \nCheque Payment Stream ................................................................................................................................................ 46 \nAutomated Teller Machines (ATMs) ......................................................................................................................... 47 \nPoint of Sale (POS) ............................................................................................................................................................ 47 \nMobile Payments ............................................................................................................................................................... 47 \nInternet Banking ............................................................................................................................................................... 48 \nMeasures to Alleviate Market Liquidity Challenges ........................................................................................... 48 \n7. \nTightening of Anti Money Laundering Measures .......................................................................... 49 \n8. \nPOLICY ADVICE ............................................................................................................................ 51 \nESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE ............................................................... 51 \nGOLD TRADING POLICY ................................................................................................................................................. 52 \nSECURITISATION OF ZIMBABWE ASSETS ............................................................................................................. 52 \nSpecial Purpose Vehicle ................................................................................................................................................. 53 \nSecuritization Anchored on Real Estate .................................................................................................................. 53 \nMineral Based Securitization ....................................................................................................................................... 54 \n9. \nCONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................. 56 \n \nList of Tables \nTable 1: Summary of World Output ................................................................................................................................. 8 \nTable 2: Debt and Other Indicators for Selected Advanced Economies ‐Oct 2011 ...................................... 8 \nTable 3: Market Share of Weak and Troubled Banks ............................................................................................. 24 \nTable 4: Structure of Banking Sector ............................................................................................................................. 25 \nTable 5: Capitalization of the Banking Sector as at 31 December 2011 ......................................................... 27 \nTable 6: Mobile Banking Products Introduced By banks ...................................................................................... 43 \nTable 7: Notice Periods for High Value Cash Withdrawals .................................................................................. 49 \n \n \n4 \n \nList of Figures \nFigure 1: Commodity Prices .............................................................................................................................................. 11 \nFigure 2: Crude Oil Prices US$/barrel ........................................................................................................................... 12 \nFigure 3: GDP Growth (%) ................................................................................................................................................. 13 \nFigure 4: Annual Headline Inflation (%) ...................................................................................................................... 15 \nFigure 7: Deposits (US$M) ................................................................................................................................................. 18 \nFigure 8: Year on Year Growth in Deposits ................................................................................................................. 19 \nFigure 9: Loan to Deposit Ratio ....................................................................................................................................... 20 \nFigure 10: Composition of Claims on Private Sector .............................................................................................. 21 \nFigure 11: Sectoral Distribution of Loans and Advances as at 2 December 2011 ...................................... 22 \nFigure 12: Conceptual Framework for Financial Stability Assessment .......................................................... 36 \n \n \n5 \n \n1. \nINTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND \n \n1.1 \nThis Monetary Policy Statement issued in terms of Section 46 of the Reserve \nBank Act (Chapter 22:15), is presented at a time when the economy is \nexposed once again to financial and economic vulnerabilities emanating \nfrom the continued fragility of the global economy, due to weak global \ngrowth and emerging financial turbulences. \n \n1.2 \nAdverse developments in the global economy continue to orchestrate knock \non effects on emerging and developing economies through negative external \nshocks. The impact of these turbulences that has had debilitating effects on \nglobal capital markets are currently being transmitted to developing \ncountries such as Zimbabwe particularly amplified by increased \nglobalization and regionalism. \n \n1.3 \nZimbabwe remains susceptible to the vagaries of the adverse external \nmacroeconomic environment, particularly within the aegis of the multiple \ncurrency system which is typified by limited macroeconomic policy \ninstruments. In essence, lack of potent policy instruments to absorb both \ndomestic and external shocks relegates Zimbabwean policy makers to mere \nobservers and pray that global developments remain favourable. \n \n1.4 \nThe pertinent question for Zimbabwe which we should grapple with in 2012 \nis whether the country can sustain the growth trajectory witnessed since the \nonset of the multicurrency system in the face of stalling global economic \nactivity, under the same monetary regime. Despite limited integration with \nthe capital markets in advanced economies, the costs and risks of a fall from \n6 \n \nthe country’s growth path attained in the past 3 years remain disconcertingly \nhigh. \n \n1.5 \nAlthough the Zimbabwean economy is projected to further grow by 9.4% in \n2012, downside risks in the form of firming global food and fuel prices, \namplified by the likelihood of a drought affecting the country and some parts \nof the region, will potentially have adverse ramifications on the budget. \n \n1.6 \nIn view of the country’s high commodity dependency, declines in global \nactivity and commodity prices will have inescapable consequences for the \ncountry’s export earnings, and hence its output, incomes, and fiscal \nrevenues. Diaspora remittances and investment flows are likely to weaken, \nwith knock-on effects on domestic demand, banking sector liquidity and \nloan quality, resulting in more difficult credit conditions. \n \n1.7 \nUnder the multicurrency system, the country has virtually lost monetary \npolicy autonomy, making it difficult for the country to intervene with \nappropriate stimulus packages in the event of exogenous shocks. As a result, \nthe onus should be on caution and preparation for action, being conscious of \nthe absence of adequate foreign exchange reserve buffers to respond to \nexogenous shocks.  \n \n1.8 \nThe meaningful recovery of the Zimbabwean economy is also contingent \nupon increased financial intermediation by the country’s banking sector. The \nintermediary role of banks remains critical in the re-deployment of surplus \ninvestible funds into key productive sectors of the economy. This is \nparticularly so given persistent liquidity challenges that have lingered in the \neconomy since the introduction of the multiple currency system. \n7 \n \n1.9 \nAgainst the background of serious developmental constraints imposed by \npersistent liquidity challenges, this Monetary Policy accords great \nprominence to policy measures geared at promoting financial sector stability \nto ensure the safety and soundness of the banking system. As such, the \ntheme of this Monetary Policy Statement is Ensuring Financial Sector \nStability. Accordingly, the need to strengthen financial regulation and \nsupervision to mitigate underlying risks that have accompanied the multiple \ncurrency system ranks high on our priorities. \n \n1.10 Within this context, this Monetary Policy, therefore, treads a fine line \nbetween addressing the domestic economic challenges and exogenous \nshocks from the adverse effects of an impending global downturn. \n \n2. \nGLOBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS \n \n2.1 \nGlobal economic activity slowed down from 5.1% in 2010 to 3.8% in 2011 \non account of the negative repercussions of the sovereign debt crisis that \nengulfed the Euro Zone and the US as well as a severe earthquake that hit \nJapan earlier in the year. These adverse developments have in turn \noccasioned uncertainty over global economic performance in the outlook. \n \n \n \n8 \n \nTable 1: Summary of World Output \n  \n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012F \n2013F\nWorld Output \n2.8%\n‐0.7%\n5.1%\n3.8%\n3.3% \n3.9%\nEmerging and Developing \nEconomies \n6.0%\n2.8%\n7.3%\n6.2%\n5.4% \n5.9%\nAdvanced Economies \n0.1%\n‐3.7%\n3.1%\n1.6%\n1.2% \n1.9%\nLatin America & Caribbean \n4.3%\n‐1.7%\n6.1%\n4.6%\n3.6% \n3.9%\nSub‐Saharan Africa \n5.6%\n2.8%\n5.4%\n4.9%\n5.5% \n5.3%\nSource: World Economic Outlook Update (January 2012) \n2.2 \nIn the backdrop of the sovereign debt crisis, economic activity in advanced \neconomies slowed down in 2011 culminating in a mild recession in the euro \nzone. Concerns about sovereign debt sustainability in the European \nMonetary Union are becoming increasingly endemic. The recent contagion \nto countries initially thought to have relatively solid public finances can \npotentially dampen economic growth prospects initially anticipated. \n \nTable 2: Debt and Other Indicators for Selected Advanced Economies -Oct \n2011 \nCountry \nTotal Debt \nGDP at \nConstant \nPrices \nTotal \nDebt/GDP \nPer Capita \nDebt \nTotal \nDebt/Exports \n  \n(US$bn) \nUS$bn \nPercent \nUS$ \nPercent \nGreece \n465.0 \n207.7 \n223.9 \n41,082.8 \n2,052.2 \nItaly \n2,447.2 \n1,563.0 \n156.6 \n40,461.4 \n545.8 \nJapan \n14,223.0 \n6,982.8 \n203.7 \n111,595.9 \n1,636.2 \nPortugal \n230.9 \n201.7 \n114.5 \n21,694.5 \n472.1 \nSpain \n932.5 \n859.8 \n108.5 \n20,235.5 \n368.6 \nUSA \n15,071.7 \n13,287.9 \n113.4 \n48,178.2 \n82.0 \nSource: World Economic Outlook (September 2011) \n \n9 \n \n2.3 It is evident that the Euro-zone and Japan are in debt distress with countries \nsuch as Spain, Greece and Portugal, and Italy having very high debt to GDP \nratios of over 100% and debt to export ratios of over 300%. This implies that \nthese countries would find it extremely difficult to repay their loans within a \nshort period of time. \n \n2.4 The moderation of global demand for goods and services is envisaged to \nretard economic growth. This is a result of aggressive fiscal consolidation \nmeasures instituted to ensure long-term fiscal and debt sustainability in some \nmajor economies, tight financing conditions and low confidence levels as a \nresult of concerns over sovereign debt risks. In addition, the adverse impact \nof early supply-chain disruptions following the earthquake that hit Japan \nearlier in the year, and high commodity prices, also negatively affected \nglobal economic recovery. \n \n2.5 Notwithstanding these negative global developments, economic activity in \nemerging market economies remains relatively strong, underpinned by \nincreased domestic demand and increased external trade with rapidly \ngrowing Asian countries such as China and India. Against this background, \ngrowth is estimated to have expanded by 4.9%, in the Sub-Saharan Africa \nregion in 2011, also immensely benefiting from robust private and public \nconsumption. \n \n2.6 \nDespite moderation in output growth, economic activity in emerging market \neconomies remains elevated. The decline in commodity prices and the slow-\ndown in global growth have had a mitigatory effect on inflationary \npressures. \n10 \n \nImplications of the Global Developments on SADC and Zimbabwe \n \n2.7 Subdued global economic recovery and the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro- \nzone have combined to increase the fragility of economic activity in the \nregion, given the strong economic and trade synergies between SADC and \nEurope. \n \n2.8 The negative effects of the sovereign debt crisis have largely been \ntransmitted through declining trade opportunities as global trade shrinks, \nremittances, aid, and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. In addition, the \ndeterioration in terms of trade occasioned by depressed international \ncommodity prices also affects commodity dependent countries in the region \nsuch as Zimbabwe. \n \nInternational Commodity Price Developments \n \n2.9 \nInternational commodity prices which started the year on a solid footing \nbenefiting from the recovery of the global economy and accompanying \ndemand in 2010, however, lost this momentum in the second half of 2011. In \nparticular, commodity prices for platinum, copper and nickel retreated in the \nsecond half of 2011, on the back of the impact of the sovereign debt crisis on \nthe performance of Euro-zone and US economies. \n \n \n11 \n \nFigure 1: Commodity Prices \n \nSource: Bloomberg \n \n2.10 Gold prices, however, remained buoyant largely benefiting from the \nweakening of the US$, which increased its demand as a safe investment \nhaven. On the other hand, crude oil prices firmed to levels above the \nUS$100/barrel mark, on the back of political instability experienced in North \nAfrica and the Middle East for the greater part of 2011. \n \n2.11 Despite the marginal retreat in commodity prices as shown in the graphs \nabove, international commodity prices remained favourable. \n \n \n \n0\n5000\n10000\n15000\n20000\n25000\n30000\n35000\n4 Jan'11\n28‐Jan\n23‐Feb\n21‐Mar\n14‐Apr\n13‐May\n9‐Jun\n5‐Jul\n29‐Jul\n26‐Aug\n21‐Sep\n17‐Oct\n10‐Nov\n6‐Dec\nCopper and Nickel Prices\nCopper us$/tonne\nNickel us$/tonne\n0\n500\n1000\n1500\n2000\n2500\n4 Jan'11\n28‐Jan\n23‐Feb\n21‐Mar\n14‐Apr\n13‐May\n9‐Jun\n5‐Jul\n29‐Jul\n26‐Aug\n21‐Sep\n17‐Oct\n10‐Nov\n6‐Dec\nGold and Platinum Prices\nGold us$/oz\nPlatinum us$/oz\n12 \n \nFigure 2: Crude Oil Prices US$/barrel \n \nSource: Bloomberg \n \n3. \nECONOMIC OUTLOOK \n \n3.1 \nAgainst the background of relatively favourable commodity prices coupled \nwith a stable macroeconomic environment, the Zimbabwean economy which \ngrew by 8.4% in 2010 is estimated to have grown by 9.3% in 2011. \nExpansion in economic activity in 2011 was underpinned by growth in \nmining (25.8%), agriculture 7.4%), finance and insurance (24%), \ndistribution and tourism (10.3%) and manufacturing (3.5%). \n \n3.2 \nThe recovery in the manufacturing sector, however, remains sluggish on the \nback of lack of long term finance to recapitalize operations as well as the \nnegative repercussions of frequent power outages. \n \n0.00\n20.00\n40.00\n60.00\n80.00\n100.00\n120.00\n140.00\n4 Jan'11\n18‐Jan\n1‐Feb\n15‐Feb\n1‐Mar\n15‐Mar\n29‐Mar\n12‐Apr\n28‐Apr\n13‐May\n30‐May\n13‐Jun\n27‐Jun\n11‐Jul\n25‐Jul\n10‐Aug\n24‐Aug\n7‐Sep\n21‐Sep\n5‐Oct\n19‐Oct\n2‐Nov\n16‐Nov\n30‐Nov\n14‐Dec\n13 \n \nFigure 3: GDP Growth (%) \n \n \nSource: Ministry of Finance \n3.3 \nEconomic activity is projected to further grow by 9.4% in 2012, underpinned \nby strong performance in finance, 23%; mining, 15.9%; tourism, 13.7%; and \nagriculture, 11.6%. Downside risks to the outlook, however, include the \nfollowing: \n \ni. \nThe likelihood of an unfavourable agriculture season characterized by delays \nin the distribution of subsidized inputs, late onset of the rainy season and \nmid season dry spells; \nii. \nErratic power supply and rising utility costs; \niii. \nDilapidated infrastructure; \niv. \nUncertainty with regards to the implementation of the indigenization and \neconomic empowerment policy; \nv. \nPolitical uncertainty surrounding the impending elections; and \n‐14.8%\n5.4%\n8.1%\n9.3%\n9.4%\n‐20.0%\n‐15.0%\n‐10.0%\n‐5.0%\n0.0%\n5.0%\n10.0%\n15.0%\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011Est\n2012F\n14 \n \nvi. \nSlow-down in export demand as global economic activity decelerates. \n \n3.4 \nPrice stability experienced under the multiple currency system also provided \nan enabling business environment in 2011. \n \nInflation Developments \n \n3.5 \nReflecting sustained price stability that has typified the multiple currency \nsystem, annual inflation remained low and stable in 2011 at levels below \n5%. As depicted in the figure below, annual headline inflation which stood \nat 3.5% in January 2011, decelerated significantly to 2.5% in May 2011. \nInflation, however, took an upward trend, rising to 4.9% in December 2011. \n \n3.6 \nNotwithstanding the rise in inflation between January and December 2011, \nZimbabwe’s annual headline inflation compares favourably with regional \neconomies and is aligned with the SADC macroeconomic convergence \ntarget of 5%. \n \n \n \n \n15 \n \nFigure 4: Annual Headline Inflation (%) \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT and SARB \n \n3.7 \nDuring 2011, notable food price increases were registered for vegetables, \nmeat and mineral waters, soft drinks and fruit juices. Notwithstanding these \nadverse price developments, annual food inflation which commenced the \nyear at 6.8%, declined to 2.3% in May 2011, before rising to 5.8% in \nDecember 2011. \n \n3.8 \n On the other hand, non food inflation which stood at 2.2% in January 2011 \nreceded to 0.6% in May, before accelerating to 4.5% by December 2011. \nRising domestic electricity tariffs, gas and other fuel prices, rentals and \npassenger transport fares spurred non-food inflation over the period January \nto December 2011. \n \n‐6\n‐4\n‐2\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n‐\nFeb‐10\nMar‐10\nApr‐10\nMay‐10\nJun‐10\nJul‐10\nAug‐10\nSep‐10\nOct‐10\nNov‐10\nDec‐10\nJan‐11\nFeb‐11\nMar‐11\nApr‐11\nMay‐11\nJun‐11\nJul‐11\nAug‐11\nSep‐11\nOct‐11\nNov‐11\nDec‐11\nPercent (%)\nInflation Y.O.Y\nZimbabwe\nSA\n16 \n \n3.9 \nThe appreciation of the South African Rand against the US$, over the period \nup to September 2011, also generated adverse inflationary pressures. This \nnotwithstanding, inflationary pressures in the domestic economy were \nsomewhat dampened by the weakening of the South African rand over the \nperiod September to November 2011 whose pass through effects are \ntransmitted through imports. \n \n3.10 In the outlook, inflation pressures are likely to emanate from rising global \nfood prices, exchange rate movements between the rand and the US$ as well \nas rising wage demands from both the private and public sectors. The \nenvisaged stabilization of international oil prices is, however, likely to \ndampen inflationary pressures in the Zimbabwean economy in 2012. \n \nExternal Sector Developments \n \n3.11 In the backdrop of favourable international commodity prices and improved \nindustrial capacity utilization, merchandise exports increased significantly \nby 30.2% from US$3 380 million in 2010 to US$4 339 million in 2011. This \nnotwithstanding, imports which grew by 23.3% from U$5 161.8 million in \n2010 to US$6 365.4 million in 2011, thereby surpassing exports earnings. \n \n3.12 This development culminated in the recurrence of an unsustainable current \naccount deficit estimated at US$1 887 million in 2011, representing 23.4% \nof GDP. The financing of the current account balance has, however, \nremained a challenge in the backdrop of subdued capital account inflows. \n \n17 \n \n3.13 Although the capital account is estimated to have improved from a surplus \nof US$617.5 million in 2010 to a surplus US$1 219.6 million in 2011, the \ninflows remain inadequate to finance the current account deficit projected \nfor 2011. Accordingly, the overall balance of payments (BOP) position is \nprojected to remain precariously difficult, particularly in view of reserve \ninadequacy and sluggish growth in manufactured exports. \n \n3.14 It is against this background that the country continues to finance the \nbalance of payments deficits through the accumulation of external payment \narrears. This exceptional mode of financing the balance of payments \nmilitates against initiatives geared at securing long term offshore financing \nto support sustained economic recovery. \n \n3.15 In the outlook, the dampening effect of the Eurozone debt crisis on \ninternational commodity prices, diaspora remittances, and capital inflow is \nexpected to have negative repercussions on Zimbabwe. In addition, erratic \nrainfalls experienced in the 2011/12 farming season are likely to necessitate \nthe importation of grain to augment domestic output to ensure food security. \nThese negative developments are expected to reinforce each other to worsen \nthe country’s external sector position. \n \n4. \nMONETARY DEVELOPMENTS \nMonetary Developments \n \n4.1 \nIn the backdrop of growing depositor confidence, broad money supply, \ncurrently defined as total banking sector deposits, exhibited an upward trend, \n18 \n \nover the period January to November 2011, increasing by an average of \nUS$88.4 million on a monthly basis. \n \nFigure 5: Deposits (US$M) \n \n \n4.2 \nAccordingly, consolidated deposits1 held by banks amounted to US$3 254.5 \nmillion as at 30 November 2011, representing an increase of US$958.2 \nmillion (41.7%), compared with US$2 296.3 million realized during the \ncomparative period in 2010. Year on year growth in deposits has, however, \nprogressively declined from 80% in September 2010 to 40% in September \n2011 before marginally rising to about 50% in November 2011 as shown in \nthe figure below. \n \n \n \n                                                             \n1 These are net of interbank deposits \n0.0\n500.0\n1000.0\n1500.0\n2000.0\n2500.0\n3000.0\n3500.0\nOct‐10\nNov‐10\nDec‐10\nJan‐11\nFeb‐11\nMar‐11\nApr‐11\nMay‐11\nJun‐11\nJul‐11\nAug‐11\nSep‐11\nOct‐11\nNov‐11\n19 \n \nFigure 6: Year on Year Growth in Deposits \n \n \n4.3 \nDeposits in the banking sector continue to be of a short term nature, thereby \npresenting worrisome vulnerabilities in the sector. In this regard, short term \ndeposits, which comprise of demand, savings and under 30-day deposits, \nconstituted 89.3% of the total deposits in the banking sector as at 30 \nNovember 2011. The high concentration of short term transitory deposits \npartially reflects that economic agents are largely using the banking system \nfor facilitating salary payments rather than deliberate and planned savings. \n \nBank Lending \n \n4.4 \nIn concordance with the expansion in the country’s deposit base, total credit \nto the private sector grew by 84.3% or US$1 317.9 million, from US$1 \n563.9 million in November 2010 to US$2 881.9 million in November \n2011.This development though promotive of private sector led growth still \n0%\n20%\n40%\n60%\n80%\n100%\n120%\n140%\nOct‐10\nNov‐10\nDec‐10\nJan‐11\nFeb‐11\nMar‐11\nApr‐11\nMay‐11\nJun‐11\nJul‐11\nAug‐11\nSep‐11\nOct‐11\nNov‐11\nSource: RBZ\n20 \n \nfalls short of credit required to support fast paced economic growth that \nmeaningfully creates jobs and uplift the general standards of living for the \ngenerality of Zimbabweans. \n \n4.5 \nAgainst the background of expanded credit and growth in the deposit base, \nthe loan to deposit ratio2 increased appreciably from 61.9% as at 31 \nDecember 2010 to over 71.7% by the end of December 2011. If offshore \nlines of credit are included the loans to deposit ratio for December 2011 \nexceeds 87%. \n \nFigure 7: Loan to Deposit Ratio \n \n \n4.6 Consistent with the transitory nature of deposits coupled with the attendant \nliquidity challenges, banking sector credit has also largely been short-term in \nnature. \n                                                             \n2 Loans exclude offshore lines of credit \n0.0%\n10.0%\n20.0%\n30.0%\n40.0%\n50.0%\n60.0%\n70.0%\n80.0%\nSource: RBZ\n \nP\n \n4.7 C\nm\nb\n \nF\n \nS\n \n4.8 \nL\nd\nc\nt\n \nPrivate Se\nCredit to \nmortgages, \nbills discou\nFigure 8: C\nSectoral D\nLoans and\ndistribution\ncommunic\ntotal loans \n0%\n10%\n20%\n30%\n40%\n50%\n60%\n70%\n80%\n90%\n100%\nOct 10\nLoans \nector Cred\nthe privat\n6.2%; ban\nunted; 2.3%\nCompositio\nDistributio\nd advances\nn (17%),\nation (16%\nand advan\nOct‐10\nNov‐10\nDec‐10\n& Advances\ndit \nte sector \nnker’s acce\n%. \non of Clai\non of Cred\n extended \n, agricult\n%), service\nnces to indi\nJan‐11\nFeb‐11\nComposition\nMortgages\n21 \ncomprised\neptances, 5\nms on Pri\ndit \nby the ba\nture (16%\nes (15%), \nividuals am\nMar‐11\nApr‐11\nn of Claims o\nBills Discounted\nd of loan\n5.8%; other\nivate Secto\nanking sec\n%), and \nand minin\nmounted to\nMay‐11\nJun‐11\nJul‐11\non Private Sec\nBankers  Acc\nns and ad\nr investme\nor \ntor largely\nmanufact\nng (6.4%) \no 15%. \nJul‐11\nAug‐11\nSep‐11\nctor\nceptances\nO\ndvances, 8\nents, 2.7%;\ny benefited\nturing (18\nsectors, w\nOct‐11\nNov‐11\nOther Investments\n83%; \n; and \n \nd the \n8%), \nwhile \n \nF\nD\n \n I\n \n4.9 \nL\nh\nh\nm\n \n4.10 T\nin\nle\nq\nb\n \nT\nI\nFigure 9: S\nDecember \n \n \nInterest R\nLending an\nhigh, largel\nhigh associ\nmoney mark\nThe absenc\nnterest rate\nending rate\nquoting len\nbetween 0.1\nTransport, 3.04%\nndividuals, 15.81%\nSectoral D\n2011 \nRates \nnd investm\nly sustaine\niated risks\nket. \nce of a func\ne range qu\nes quoted b\nnding rates\n15% and 1\nServices, 15\n%\nDistribution, \nistribution\nment rates \nd by persis\n, limited l\nctioning m\nuoted by b\nby banks ra\ns of around\n7%. \n5.21%\n16.90%\n22 \nn of Loans\nquoted by\nstent liquid\nlines of cr\nmoney mark\nbanks. As \nanged betw\nd 20%. Tim\ns and Adv\ny banks h\ndity shorta\nredit and t\nket has res\nat end of\nween 8% a\nme deposi\nMin\nvances as a\nhave remai\nages, high c\nthe absenc\nsulted in th\nf October 2\nand 32% w\nit rates, ho\nAgriculture, 16\nning, 6.42%\nat 2 \nined relati\ncredit dem\nce of an ac\nhe widenin\n2011, nom\nwith most b\nowever, ran\n6.32%\nConstruc\nCommunic\nFinancial F\nManufactu\n \nively \nmand, \nctive \nng of \nminal \nanks \nnged \nction, 4.17%\nation, 1.42%\nFirms, 2.63%\nring, 18.08%\n23 \n \n4.11 Notwithstanding the realization of positive real interest rates on investment \ndeposits, term deposits have remained low on the backdrop of high \nopportunity cost of holding the deposits. \n \n4.12 Despite high lending rates charged by banks, savings and demand deposits, \nwhich constitute the bulk of the deposits, continue to attract low interest \nrates and high transaction charges. This negative development continues to \nmilitate against efforts geared at promoting a savings culture among the \nbanking public. In turn this compounds the country’s liquidity situation \nwhich also hamstrings the economic recovery process. \n \n5. \nFINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS \n \n5.1 \nThe banking sector remained in a safe and sound condition in 2011 \nnotwithstanding underlying risks posed by the operating environment \nnotably volatile deposits, absence of an active inter-bank market and lack of \nan effective lender of last resort function, market illiquidity, cash based \ntransactions and limited access to external credit lines. \n \n5.2 \nThe weak and troubled banks in the sector are few, small and of low \nsystemic importance. Collectively, as at 31 December 2011, these \ninstitutions had a combined market share below 5% in terms of total \nassets, deposits and loans, as depicted in the table below: \n \n \n24 \n \nTable 3: Market Share of Weak and Troubled Banks \nInstitutions  \nMarket Share of \nAssets \nMarket Share of \nDeposits \nMarket Share of \nLoans \nStrong  Banks\n \n95.86%\n97.33%\n96.16%\nWeak & Troubled Banks\n \n4.14%\n2.67%\n3.84%\n \n5.3 \nDespite attendant challenges, the banking sector experienced marked \nimprovement in its intermediary role, which has resulted in improved \nfinancial support to the key productive sectors of the economy. \n \n5.4 \nThe Reserve Bank has, however, noted with concern the gradual \ndeterioration in asset quality as reflected by the level of non-performing \nloans which is now trending towards the watch list category. Asset quality \nchallenges can potentially heighten liquidity risks given the current \noperating environment where credit is largely financed by volatile short term \ndeposits. In this regard, it is imperative that banking institutions enhance \ntheir credit risk management systems with special emphasis on credit \nassessment, origination, administration, monitoring and control standards. \n \n5.5 \nDespite well-documented benefits that accompanied the adoption of multiple \ncurrencies, a new set of challenges for the banking sector including frauds \nand robberies has emerged. Within this context, the Reserve Bank issued a \ncircular on enhancement of security arrangements at branches in 2009. \nWhilst satisfactory response to this call has been recorded in the urban areas, \nthe Reserve Bank notes that there is great scope to enhance security \n25 \n \narrangements by banks in outlying branches. This is evidenced by numerous \nincidences where outlying branches have been targeted by robbers. \n \n5.6 \nIt is against this background that the Reserve Bank urges banking \ninstitutions to tighten security systems in all branches to mitigate operational \nrisks that have affected banks under the multiple currency system. \n \nARCHITECTURE OF THE BANKING SECTOR \n \n5.7 \nAs at 31st December 2011, there were 26 operational banking institutions \n(including POSB), 16 asset management companies and 157 microfinance \ninstitutions under the supervision of the Reserve Bank. \n \nTable 4: Structure of Banking Sector \nType of institution \nNumber \nCommercial Banks* \n17 \nMerchant Banks \n4 \nBuilding Societies \n4 \nSavings Bank \n1 \nFinance Houses \n0 \nDiscount Houses \n0 \nTotal Banking Institutions \n26 \nAsset Management Companies \n16 \nMicrofinance institutions \n157 \n *Excludes Barbican Bank which was re-licensed but is not yet operational. \n \n26 \n \nRECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BANKING SECTOR \n \nBarbican Bank \n \n5.8 \nFollowing the unbundling of ZABG, Barbican Bank was re-licensed \ntogether with Royal Bank and Trust Bank. Barbican Bank has, however, not \nbeen able to resume operations within the 12 months period provided in \nsection 14 (1) (i) of the Banking Act [Chapter 24:20]. \n \n5.9 \nIn view of the expiry of Barbican Bank’s licence on 30 September 2011, the \nReserve Bank notified the bank of its intention to cancel the banking licence \nin terms of the provisions of the Banking Act. The bank appealed to the \nMinister of Finance and the Reserve Bank is still awaiting the Minister’s \nresponse. \n \n \nRenaissance Merchant Bank Limited \n \n5.10 Pursuant to the expiry of the initial six-month curatorship period on 2 \nDecember 2011, the Reserve Bank extended the period of curatorship to 3 \nFebruary 2012. The curatorship period has now been extended to 3 March \n2012 to enable the Curator to finalise recapitalization initiatives currently \nunderway. \n \nSTATUS OF BANKING SECTOR CAPITALISATION \n \n5.11 As at 31 December 2011, 20 out of 25 operating banking institutions \n(excluding POSB) were in compliance with the prescribed minimum capital \nrequirements, while all the 16 asset management companies were compliant \n27 \n \nwith the minimum capital requirement of $500,000. The table below shows \nthe capitalization status of the banking sector as at 31 December 2011. \nTable 5: Capitalization of the Banking Sector as at 31 December 2011 \n \nINSTITUTION\nDeclared Core \nCapital  as at 31 \nDecember 2011\nPrescribed \nMinimum Capital \nCOMMERCIAL BANKS\nCBZ BANK \n65,219,416.00\n12,500,000.00\nSTANCHART  \n53,204,639.00\n12,500,000.00\nBARCLAYS BANK\n33,374,247.00\n12,500,000.00\nBANCABC  \n32,075,487.14\n12,500,000.00\nSTANBIC BANK \n31,974,967.00\n12,500,000.00\nZB BANK \n20,695,741.00\n12,500,000.00\nNMB BANK \n19,788,114.00\n12,500,000.00\nMBCA BANK \n19,484,022.00\n12,500,000.00\nMETROPOLITAN BANK  \n17,955,298.00\n12,500,000.00\nFBC BANK \n16,824,331.00\n12,500,000.00\nINTERFIN BANK \n16,275,804.88\n12,500,000.00\nAGRIBANK \n14,144,691.57\n12,500,000.00\nTN BANK \n13,380,596.00\n12,500,000.00\nTRUST BANK \n12,764,043.00\n12,500,000.00\nKINGDOM BANK \n4,203,203.00\n12,500,000.00\nROYAL BANK \n3,422,410.00\n12,500,000.00\nZABG BANK \n(15,348,157.00)\n12,500,000.00\nMERCHANT BANKS\nTETRAD INVESTMENT \n12,726,213.00\n10,000,000.00\nECOBANK  \n10,883,265.00\n10,000,000.00\nGENESIS INVESTMENT \n(3,204,691.00)\n10,000,000.00\nRENAISSANCE  \n(Under Curatorship) \nBUILDING SOCIETIES\nCBZ BUILDING SOCIETY \n22,705,129.00\n10,000,000.00\nCABS \n14,351,109.00\n10,000,000.00\nFBC BUILDING SOCIETY \n13,545,567.00\n10,000,000.00\nZB BUILDING SOCIETY \n13,401,494.58\n10,000,000.00\nSAVINGS BANK\nPOSB \n10,797,887.00\n‐\n28 \n \n5.12 Kingdom Financial Holdings Limited (KFHL) has now concluded an \nagreement with Afrasia Bank Limited (ABL) domiciled in Mauritius where \nABL will inject equity capital of $9.5 million. \n \n5.13 Following this injection, Kingdom Bank will be in compliance with the \nminimum capital requirements. In addition, the bank is in the process of \nraising supplementary capital of $10 million. \n \n5.14 The Reserve Bank has noted that despite several extensions of \nrecapitalisation deadlines, a few banking institutions have failed to \nconclude their recapitalisation initiatives. As such there is no prudential \nbasis for the continued existence of such entities. \n \n5.15 Accordingly, the undercapitalised institutions should do the honourable \nthing and voluntarily surrender their licences to the supervisory \nauthorities, failing which they will be dealt with in line with the Reserve \nBank’s Troubled and Insolvent Bank Resolution Policy. \n \n5.16 As you may recall, from my previous Monetary Policy Statements, the \nReserve Bank granted several recapitalisation deadline extensions to allow \nfor the finalization of the various lethargic and protracted recapitalization \ninitiatives that were purportedly at various stages of implementation. \n \n5.17 We note as Supervisory Authorities, that these troubled banking institutions \nare conspicuously oblivious of the clear global trends towards consolidation \namong banks. \n \n29 \n \n5.18 Since 2005, the Reserve Bank has advocated for consolidations through \nmergers and acquisitions as laudable market-oriented solutions to troubled \nbanking institutions. \n \n5.19 Globally, mergers and acquisitions have become a major strategic option for \nbanking aimed at entrenching a strong, efficient and diversified financial \nsector that ensures the safety of depositors’ funds, plays an active \ndevelopmental role in the economy, and competes effectively in the global \nfinancial system. \n \n5.20 Accordingly, all non-compliant institutions, including those previously \nissued with special dispensations for compliance with minimum capital \nrequirements, have up to 14 February 2012 to finalise their \nrecapitalisation initiatives or consummate their mergers and acquisitions. \n \n5.21 By no later than 29 February 2012, the Reserve Bank shall engage those \ninstitutions that would have failed to identify credible partners and conclude \nthe recapitalization transactions. The Reserve Bank will deal decisively, with \nall non compliant institutions in terms of the Troubled and Insolvent Bank \nPolicy by no later than 31 March 2012. \n \n5.22 It follows that, with effect from 1 April 2012, any banking institution that \nis not compliant with the minimum capital requirements shall not be allowed \nto conduct banking business. \n \n5.23 For the avoidance of doubt, all dispensations for compliance with minimum \ncapital requirements granted to non-compliant institutions are hereby \n30 \n \nrevoked with immediate effect, and superseded by the timeframes detailed \nherein. \n \nSTRENGTHENING \nTHE \nTROUBLED \nBANK \nRESOLUTION \nFRAMEWORK \n \n5.24 Globally, the robustness of the legal framework has been noted to be a \nfundamental factor in determining the efficacy of the bank resolution \nframework. \n \n5.25 Our past experiences have shown that the current bank resolution \nframework, as contained in several statutes including the Banking Act, \nDeposit Protection Corporation Bill, Troubled Financial Institutions \n(Resolution) Act, Companies Act, and Insolvency Act is out of sync with \nbest practice. \n \n5.26 As Regulatory Authorities, the Reserve Bank, in liaison with other key \nstakeholders, is committed to ensuring that the legal and regulatory \nframework for the banking sector remains relevant and robust to deal with \ncurrent and future challenges. \n \n5.27 In pursuit of this objective, the Banking Laws will be amended to strengthen \nthe Troubled and Insolvent Bank Resolution Framework incorporating \nPrompt Corrective Actions (PCAs). \n \n \n \n31 \n \nENHANCEMENT OF BANKING SECTOR STABILITY \n \nRisk-Based Supervision \n \n5.28 The Reserve Bank’s supervisory framework will continue to be underpinned \nby Risk-Based supervision methodologies, which place emphasis on the \naccurate determination of the risk profiles of banking institutions and \nadequacy of risk management systems. The Risk-Based Supervision \nframework also provides for on-going interaction among supervisors, banks \nand external auditors through prudential meetings. \n \n5.29 Risk-Based Supervision provides a solid foundation for implementation of \nthe Basel II/III framework. \n \nEffective Supervision of Banking Groups \n \n5.30 A number of banking institutions have used associate entities in their group \nstructures as conduits for indulgence in regulatory arbitrage, and \nengagement in non-permissible activities. A number of banking institutions \nhave used associate entities in their group structures as conduits for \nindulgence in regulatory arbitrage, and engagement in non-permissible \nactivities. \n \n5.31 The unfounded litigations on the legality and scope of the Reserve Bank’s \njurisdiction over Bank Holding Companies clearly demonstrates the level of \nignorance of the provisions of Banking Laws by the shareholders. \n32 \n \n5.32 For the avoidance of doubt, it must be noted that the Reserve Bank is \nempowered under section 45(1) (a) of the Banking Act [Chapter 24:20], to \nmonitor and supervise associates of banking institutions including their \nholding companies. \n \n5.33 As Monetary Authorities, we reiterate that Bank Holding Companies are still \nsubject to oversight by the Reserve Bank. As such, no person shall obtain \nsignificant shareholding holding in or be appointed to the board/ senior \nmanagement of a Bank Holding Company without the approval of the \nReserve Bank. \n \n5.34 The Reserve Bank will continue to apply the consolidated supervision \napproach in order to control the risks associated with financial \nconglomerates. \n \nStress Testing \n \n5.35 The Reserve Bank already requires banking institutions to conduct periodic \nstress testing, for own internal use, as part of their risk management \npractices and processes as stipulated in its various prudential guidelines. \n \n5.36 Going forward, with effect from quarter ending 31 March 2012, every \nbanking institution would be required to submit stress test results to the \nReserve Bank within 30 days from the end of each quarter. \n \n33 \n \n5.37 Meanwhile, the Reserve Bank will continue to conduct independent stress \ntests, using its own methodologies, to gauge the potential vulnerability of \nindividual banks and the entire banking system. \n \n5.38 The Reserve Bank will hold Prudential Meetings to discuss banking \ninstitutions’ stress test results. Banking institutions that fail stress tests and \nhave no demonstrable mitigatory measures in place will be subjected to \nappropriate supervisory action by the Central Bank. \n \nEnterprise-wide Risk Management \n \n5.39 Banking institutions are again encouraged to manage risk in a coordinated \nand integrated way across the entire business. The Reserve Bank is calling \nupon banking institutions to build capacity in this regard. \n \nEnhancement of Corporate Governance \n \n5.40 The resurgence of corporate governance ills that be-devilled our financial \nservices sector during 2003/4 period and caused a near-collapse of the \nbanking sector is likely to erode financial sector stability and confidence in \nthe banking system. \n \n5.41 Recent developments at ReNaissance Merchant Bank are a case in point. \nDepositors’ funds were siphoned under a well orchestrated and calculated \nfraudulent intricate web of related party transactions. \n \n34 \n \n5.42 In view of the corporate governance deficiencies prevalent in owner-\nmanaged institutions, the Reserve Bank wishes to remind the banking sector \nthat no shareholder with a 10% stake or more shall form part of management \nof the banking institution or bank holding company, or be chairperson of the \nboard. \n \n5.43 All banking institutions are expected to comply with this requirement on an \non-going basis. To reinforce these requirements, the Reserve Bank will re-\nissue enhanced Corporate Governance Guidelines No. 01-2012/BSD, \nwhich will be circulated to the market no later than 31 March 2012. \n \nCredit Reference Bureau \n \n5.44 The Reserve Bank welcomes efforts by Government as announced by the \nMinister of Finance in the 2012 National Budget presentation on the need to \nestablish a Credit Reference Bureau. Its establishment will help the banking \nsector to manage the growing credit risk by limiting borrower leverage. \n \n5.45 As Monetary Authorities we once again reiterate calls for all relevant key \nplayers to set up a credit reference bureau. \n \nDisclosure Requirements \n \n5.46 As part of on-going efforts to promote transparency and enhance market \ndiscipline, the Reserve Bank, with immediate effect, shall publish, on its \nweb-site, on a quarterly basis, the performance of each banking institution. \n35 \n \n5.47 The Reserve Bank will, however, discuss with banking institutions’ \nmanagement, the performance of their respective institutions prior to posting \nthe same on the web site to ensure accuracy and objectivity of the status \nreports. \n \nPrudential Liquidity Ratios \n \n5.48 The Prudential Liquidity Ratios (PLRs) will be raised from the current \n25% to 27.5% by 31 March 2012 and 30% by end of May 2012. \n \nFINANCIAL STABILITY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK \n \n5.49 Financial stability is regarded as an important economic policy objective in \nmost countries. The recent global financial crisis has drawn increased \nattention on the need for rigorous on-going financial stability assessments. \n \n5.50 There is consensus among policymakers, market practitioners, and \nacademics that financial system stability is affected by factors endogenous to \nthe financial system as well as the exogenous factors. \n \n5.51 As such, a comprehensive framework for financial stability assessment \nshould take into account inter-linkages between the external sector, domestic \nsector and the financial sector. \n \n5.52 The COMESA Framework for Assessing and Maintaining Financial \nStability developed in 2009 anchored on three schematic stages: on-going \n36 \n \nsurveillance, diagnostic assessment and policy action, takes into account the \nsectoral interlinkages as shown in the diagram below. \n \nFigure 10: Conceptual Framework for Financial Stability Assessment \n \n \n \n5.53 Zimbabwe being a member of COMESA has adopted the COMESA \nFramework for Financial Stability Assessment in its entirety. \n \n5.54 Regulatory authorities will henceforth periodically conduct rigorous \nassessments of the state of financial stability using Quantitative and \nQualitative methodologies. A wide range of analytical tools and techniques \n37 \n \nincluding macro-prudential analysis, macro-stress testing, and scenario \nanalysis will be adopted. \n \n5.55 A formal framework for financial stability assessment will: \n \nƒ facilitate early identification of sources of risks (to stability) and of potential \nvulnerabilities that could threaten financial stability; \nƒ promote rigorous, accurate and systematic assessment of the present degree \nof financial stability as well as the outlook ahead; \nƒ facilitate the evaluation of ability of the financial system to absorb shocks \nshould the risks identified materialize; \nƒ provide lead time for appropriate policy responses; and \nƒ promote adoption of preventive and timely remedial (risk mitigation) \npolicies and/or restore the system to stability (via resolution of problems) \nwhen preventive and remedial action fail. \n \n5.56 As Monetary authorities, we are mindful of the fact that financial stability is \ndependent on the collective stability of all components of the financial \nsystem including financial markets, financial institutions and the financial \ninfrastructure, as well as the real sector and global developments. \n \n5.57 The intertwining relationships between these financial sub-sectors, the real \neconomy, and the global financial system, create a dangerous amplification \nmechanism and vicious feedback loops that can lead to a crippling effect to \nour domestic economy. \n \n38 \n \n5.58 In Zimbabwe, the general belief that “light-touch” regulation and market \ndiscipline for other financial services players other than banks would suffice, \nwas proved wrong in the case of ReNaissance Merchant Bank, which \nhighlighted the need for “a systemic dimension” to financial sector \nregulation. \n \n5.59 The existence of fragmented supervision between the Central Bank and \nother financial sector regulators presents potential loopholes and fertile \nground for regulatory arbitrage to the detriment of financial sector stability. \n \n5.60 Cognisant of the intricate inter-connectedness of all facets of the financial \nsystem, the real economy and the global financial markets, and in a bid to \nclose the regulatory gaps, the sectoral Supervisory Authorities in Zimbabwe \nhave constituted a Multi-disciplinary Financial Stability Committee. \n \nMulti-disciplinary Financial Stability Committee \n \n5.61 The Reserve Bank, the Insurance and Pensions Commission (IPEC), the \nSecurities Commission (SEC), and the Deposit Protection Board (DPB) have \nnow jointly constituted a Multi-disciplinary Financial Stability Committee. \n \n5.62 The Committee shall be chaired on a quarterly rotational basis by the four \nfinancial services regulators, namely Reserve Bank, IPEC, SEC, and the \nDeposit Protection Board. The Reserve Bank will provide the Secretariat \nServices to the Committee. \n \n39 \n \n5.63 The financial services regulators have already signed a Memorandum of \nUnderstanding (MoU) to formalise their co-operation. \n \nContingency Planning \n \n5.64 An appropriate framework for financial stability assessment requires policy \nactions to be taken in the event of potential risks crystallising. \n \n5.65 Thus, the Reserve Bank and other key stakeholders will be working on a \nframework for contingency planning and systemic crisis management \nincorporating a set of identified policies, actions and processes necessary for \nthe prevention, management and containment of banking systemic distress. \n \n5.66 Banking institutions will be required, in terms of the framework, to establish \ncontingency plans for the management and control of risk exposures. The \nplans will also provide preventative measures and promote proactive \nmanagement and control of any business interruption. \n \nBASEL II IMPLEMENTATION \n \n5.67 The Reserve Bank has noted that most banking institutions have made \nsignificant progress in their Basel II preparations. The Reserve Bank will \ncontinue to engage banks in order to facilitate smooth implementation of \nbanking institutions’ Basel II plans as well as provide necessary guidance \nthrough seminars and workshops. \n \n40 \n \n5.68 The Reserve Bank has recalibrated the regime of provisions for loan losses \nto bring them in line with the Reserve Bank’s 10-tier Supervisory Rating \nSystem contained in Guideline No.1-2011/BSD: Technical Guidance on the \nImplementation of the Revised Capital Adequacy Framework in Zimbabwe. \n5.69 The revised provisioning levels, which become operational with effect from \n1 March 2012 are meant to ensure that loan loss provisions remain \nsufficient to absorb expected losses. \n \nMICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS \n \n5.70 There are 157 licensed microfinance institutions operating under the \nsupervision of the Reserve Bank. The microfinance sector in Zimbabwe is \ncurrently facing a number of challenges including insufficient funding, \ninadequate IT infrastructure and absence of a Credit Reference Bureau. \n \n5.71 As part of the initiatives to improve the availability of funding to the sector, \nthe Zimbabwe Association of Microfinance Institutions (ZAMFI), \nspearheaded the establishment of a microfinance wholesale fund. The fund is \nexpected to provide a source of affordable wholesale funding for the \nMicrofinance Sector. \n \n5.72 The Reserve Bank is currently working on an appropriate Performance \nEvaluation Framework to enable evaluation of the impact of microfinance \nactivities and facilitate appropriate policy intervention. \n \n \n41 \n \nUndesirable Methods of Conducting Business \n \n5.73 The Reserve Bank continues to receive complaints from microfinance clients \nregarding unethical and undesirable business practices such as inadequate \ndisclosure of business conditions and abusive debt collection practices \nincluding disposal of pledged collateral without following due legal \nprocedures. \n \n5.74 As Supervisory Authorities, we are also concerned that some Microfinance \nInstitutions are illegally taking deposits from members of the public, which \nare disguised as bilateral loans, thus posing a threat to financial stability. \n \n5.75 Moneylenders are not deposit taking institutions. Members of the public are \nhereby advised against dealing with such unscrupulous institutions. \n \n5.76 Microfinance Institutions are sternly warned that failure to comply with laws \nand regulations when conducting microfinance activities will lead to the \nimposition of appropriate supervisory action, including cancellation or non-\nrenewal of licences. \n \nMicrofinance Core Client Protection Principles \n \n5.77 Microfinance institutions are once again urged to observe the internationally \nagreed Core Client Protection Principles (CCCP) for microfinance in \nconducting their microfinance business. \n \n42 \n \nTimely Renewal of Microfinance Licences \n \n5.78 Microfinance Institutions are hereby reminded that operating licences should \nbe renewed at least two months before date of expiry. Failure to renew the \noperating licence before expiry will render the activities of the concerned \nmicrofinance illegal. \nDraft Microfinance Bill \n \n5.79 A Draft Microfinance Bill is currently under consideration by the Reserve \nBank, the Ministry of Finance and other microfinance stakeholders. The Bill \nonce promulgated is expected to address some of the problems facing the \nsector such as tenure of licences, consumer protection issues and transparent \npricing in line with international developments in the microfinance sector. \n \nFINANCIAL INCLUSION \n \n \n5.80 There is growing consensus that financial inclusion - access to financial \nservices at a reasonable cost to the majority of the population - is critical for \neconomic growth and development, poverty alleviation and the attainment of \nthe Millennium Development Goals (MGDs). \n \n5.81 The Reserve Bank has keen interest in promoting an inclusive financial \nsystem and is working closely with key stakeholders in that regard. \n \n5.82 As Monetary Authorities, we are pleased to note the increasing number of \nbanking institutions venturing into mobile banking. As at 31 January 2012, \nfifteen (15) banking institutions had introduced mobile banking products in \n43 \n \npartnership with mobile network operators in majority of the cases as shown \nbelow. \n \nTable 6: Mobile Banking Products Introduced By banks \nInstitution\nMobile Network \nOperator \nMobile Banking Platform / Brand \nName \n1. \nFBC Bank \nNet One/ Telecel\nZIPIT */ One Wallet \n2. \nKingdom \nTelecel\nKineto Mobile/Kingdom Cellcard\n3. \nPOSB \nNet One/ Telecel\nZIPIT\n4. \nCABS \nNet One/ Telecel\nZIPIT / Textacash \n5. \nMetropolitan \nNet One/ Telecel\nZIPIT, Metbank mobile \n6. \n FBC Building Society \nNet One/ Telecel\nZIPIT\n7. \nInterfin \nNet One/ Telecel\nZIPIT\n8. \nBarclays \nInbuilt Plaform \n9. \nTN Bank \nEconet\nEcocash\n10.  Tetrad \nTelecel\ne‐Mali\n11. CBZ \nAll\nE‐Tranzact /CBZ mobile/ ZIPIT\n12. Stanchart \nNet One/ Telecel\nZIPIT\n13. Trust \nAll\nE‐Tranzact/Bank at Ease\n14. ZB \nE‐Solutions \n15. ZABG \nE‐Solutions \n* ZIPIT * ‐ ZIMSWITCH based platform. Currently eight banks are on the platform with a target \nof including all banks which are members of Zimswitch.  \n \n5.83 The Reserve Bank requires all banking institutions to put in place \nappropriate risk management structures and processes to facilitate on-going \n44 \n \nmonitoring of all risks associated with mobile banking products and other \nelectronic service delivery channels. \n \n5.84 All banking institutions are required to seek prior approval of the \nReserve Bank before launching new products. As part of the approval \nprocess, the applicant bank is required to secure the relevant sign offs by \ntheir new product development committee or department, risk management, \ninternal audit, compliance and the board. Where external parties are \ninvolved, appropriate Service Level Agreements should be put in place to \nstipulate the roles and responsibilities of all parties. \n \nLender of Last Resort (LOLR) \n \n5.85 As Monetary Authorities, we remain indebted to the Minister of Finance for \nhis support in concerted efforts geared at resuscitating the lender of last \nresort (LOLR) function of the Central Bank. This is evidenced by the recent \ninjection of US$20 million to further boost the LOLR facility. This amount \nis over and above the existing US$7 million. Once the funds have been \ntransferred to the Reserve Bank’s accounts, banks with the requisite \ncollateral can start accessing it. Additionally, the advanced negotiations with \nAfreximbank are envisaged to culminate in the further boosting of the LOLR \nfacility by an additional US$80 million. \n \n5.86 We would also like to implore the market players to deal amongst \nthemselves as we continue to observe that while some banks are facing \n45 \n \nliquidity challenges, others are sitting on large balances on their RTGS \naccounts or in their Nostro accounts. \n \nNostro Accounts \n \n5.87 A worrisome development has emerged in the banking sector, whereby \nsome banks are maintaining huge idle balances in their Nostro accounts. \nThis development has occurred at a time when liquidity conditions have \nremained tight in the domestic economy. Against the background of this \nregrettable  development,  we  urge  banks  to  release  some  of  these \nbalances  held  with  foreign  banks  to  the  local  market  to  improve \nthe  liquidity  situation  and  support  key  productive  sectors  of  the \neconomy. \n \nSTATUTORY RESERVE BALANCES \n \n5.88 In his Press Statement on the Post Budget Developments in the Economy, \nthe Honorable Minister of Finance announced that Treasury would be \nissuing instruments to deal with the outstanding amounts of Statutory \nReserve balances at the Reserve Bank. These amounts to US$83.4 million. \nThe Ministry of Finance in close collaboration with the Reserve Bank is \nworking on the appropriate modalities. \n \n \n \n46 \n \n6. \nNATIONAL PAYMENT SYSTEMS  \n \n6.1 \nDuring 2011 the financial system witnessed a significant growth of \nelectronic transactions with US$ 34 billion achieved representing an increase \nof 56% from US$22 billion recorded in the 2010. \n \nReal Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) System  \n \n \n6.2 \nTotal RTGS system values amounted to US$33 billion for the year 2011, an \nincrease of 51% from US$21 billion recorded in the year 2010. The total \nvolume of transactions for the same period were 2 million and 1.6 million \nrespectively representing a 28% increase as shown in figure below. \n \nRETAIL PAYMENT STREAMS  \n \nCheque Payment Stream \n \n6.3 \nThe cheque payment stream remained available to a selected group of \ncustomers on a Know Your Customer basis consistent with the risk profile \nof the payment stream. \n \n6.4 \nA total of 259 000 transactions valued at US$65 million were cleared in \n2011, compared to 174 000 transactions valued at US$42 million in 2010. \nThis represents increased values and volumes of 52% and 49%, respectively. \n \n47 \n \nAutomated Teller Machines (ATMs) \n \n6.5 \nTransactions processed through ATMs amounted to US$905 million during \nthe year 2011, an increase of 190% from US$312 million recorded for in the \nyear 2010. ATM transactions constituted 56% of the total retail transactions \nin terms of value, indicating a high propensity of cash usage by the \ntransacting public. \n \n6.6 \nWe therefore, encourage the market to move towards the use of other \nelectronic means of payment which are now available in the country to \nreduce the risk of moving around with cash. \n \nPoint of Sale (POS) \n \n6.7 \nIn 2011, POS machines recorded an aggregate of 4.2 million transactions \nwhen compared to 1.3 million in 2010. The values registered increased \nconcomitantly by 384% to US$249 million as compared to US$51 million. \n \n6.8 \nWithin this context, banking sector players and key stakeholders are urged to \nincrease the population and spread of POS machines throughout the country \nto facilitate transactions of a retail nature and for the effective reaching out \nof communities in outlying areas. \n \nMobile Payments \n \n6.9 \nReflecting increased use of mobile banking facilities, the value of mobile \npayment transactions increasing by 575% to US$8.1 million in 2011 from \n48 \n \nUS$1.2 million in 2010. Similarly, the volume of mobile payment \ntransactions increased phenomenally by 446% to 2.3 million in 2011from \n0.4 million in 2010 \n \nInternet Banking \n \n6.10 Internet banking constitutes 30% of the total retail values. During 2011, \ninternet values increased significantly by 132% to US$532 million from \nUS$230 million in 2010. Concomitantly, volumes increased from 85 000 in \n2010 to 196 000 in 2011. \n \nMeasures to Alleviate Market Liquidity Challenges  \n \n6.11 The Money Market is currently inundated with challenges resulting from the \nworsening liquidity, delayed cash payments and illegal externalization of \ncash. \n \n6.12 In line with the Honourable Minister of Finance’s Press Statement on Post \nBudget Developments in the Economy, issued on 25 January 2012, there is \nneed to institute staggering payments for High Value Transactions in order \nto allow banks sufficient time to prepare for such transactions. \n \n6.13 In order to facilitate country-wide smooth payment transactions as well as \ncurbing illegal externalization of cash, all Financial Institutions are being \ncalled upon to moderate instant cash withdrawals to a maximum of \nUS$10,000. \n \n49 \n \n6.14 Cash withdrawals for High Value Transactions that are above US$10,000 \nwould require the following Notice Periods; \n \nTable 7: Notice Periods for High Value Cash Withdrawals \nAmount \nUSD \nRequired Notice Period to the Bank \n10,001 – 20,000 \n24 hrs (1 working day ) \n20,001 – 30,000 \n48 hrs (2 working days) \n30,001 – 40,000 \n72 hrs (3 working days) \n40,001 – 50,000 \n96 hrs (4 working days) \n50,001 and above \n120 hrs (5 working days) \n \n6.15 To compliment these measures, the banking public is strongly encouraged to \nuse the Real Time Gross Settlement system (RTGS), Credit Cards and other \napproved electronic money transfer systems in settling their day-to-day \nfinancial transactions. \n \n7. \nTightening of Anti Money Laundering Measures \n \n7.1 \nIn line with the Reserve Bank’s mandate under the Bank Use Promotion and \nSuppression of Money Laundering Act [Chapter 24:24] and pursuant to the \ncountry’s international AML / CFT obligations, the Reserve Bank is \nstepping up the fight against money laundering. \n \n7.2 \nThe Reserve Bank has an obligation to ensure that the country’s financial \nsystem does not become either a safe haven or conduit for proceeds of crime \nas this would tarnish the country’s image. \n50 \n \n7.3 \nThe advent of dollarization and the country’s predominantly cash economy \nhave opened up the country to increased money laundering risk from \ncriminals, both local and foreign, both individuals and organized syndicates. \n \n7.4 \nThe Reserve Bank is responding to the increased threat by tightening anti-\nmoney laundering measures to ensure that banks and other designated \ninstitutions comply with AML / CFT requirements to prevent the institutions \nfrom being used to facilitate money laundering. \n \n7.5 \nThe law requires banks and other designated institutions such as insurance \ncompanies, asset managers, stockbrokers, and casinos to implement stringent \nanti money laundering measures and to report all suspected cases of money \nlaundering and terrorist financing to the Central Bank’s financial intelligence \nunit. \n \n7.6 \nThe Reserve Bank has noted with concern that some banks and designated \ninstitutions are not complying with their AML /CFT statutory obligations \nand, in particular, are not submitting Suspicious Transaction Reports to the \nfinancial intelligence unit. The Reserve Bank would like to sound a warning \nthat all the delinquent institutions will soon be brought to book and dealt \nwith in terms of the law. \n \n7.7 \nZimbabwe’s membership of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti Money \nLaundering Group (ESAAMLG) obliges it to implement the FATF “Forty \nplus Nine” recommendations. These are measures designed to strengthen \nand harmonize member countries’ legal and institutional AML / CFT \n51 \n \nframeworks to ensure a coordinated regional and international approach in \nthe fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. \n \n7.8 \nThe Reserve Bank is working closely with Government and with national \nlaw enforcement agencies to implement the FATF standards and ensure that \nthe country does not become the weakest link in the regional and \ninternational fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. \n \n8. \nPOLICY ADVICE \n \nESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE  \n \n8.1. The Honourable Minster of Finance in his 2012 National Budget announced \nthe concept of cluster-driven growth strategy in which provinces will be \ndeveloped according to their respective resource endowments. Zimbabwe \nhas over the last decade been receiving adverse publicity a situation that has \nbeen compounded by the enactment of the repressive Zimbabwe Democracy \nEconomic Recovery Act 2001, which has aggravated the deterioration in the \ncountry’s macroeconomic conditions. \n \n8.2. It is pleasing to note that Government has already agreed to the \nestablishment of an International Financial Centre. In this respect, the \nMinistry of Finance together with the Reserve Bank are seized with the \ndrafting of the Legal and Administrative Framework. The IFC will provide a \nconducive environment for foreign direct investment through the free flow \nof capital and improved market liquidity. \n52 \n \nGOLD TRADING POLICY  \n \n8.3. Following the liberalisation of trade in gold in February 2009, Monetary \nAuthorities have noted with great concern, an increase in illegal trade in \nGold that has also given birth to rampant smuggling of our country’s \nprecious minerals. \n \n8.4. Regrettably, numerous individuals and companies that are in possession of \nGold Buying Permits are misusing these permits and smuggling this \nprecious mineral, thereby prejudicing the National Economy of the export \nearnings. \n \n8.5. In view of this negative development, as Monetary Authorities, we take this \nopportunity to remind the Mining Sector to adhere to the current policy \non trade of gold. \n \nSECURITISATION OF ZIMBABWE ASSETS \n \n8.6. In view of persistent liquidity challenges that have conspired with limited \naccess to offshore credit lines to hamstring the attainment of fast paced \ngrowth, serious considerations must be accorded to asset securitization as a \nviable option to address recurrent liquidity challenges in Zimbabwe. \nSecuritization of Zimbabwe’s assets can be structured in such a way that \nfinancial resources can be mobilized in aid of the following; \n \ni.) \nMobilize resources for the development of infrastructure; \n53 \n \nii.) \nRaise funds for investment purposes; \niii.) \nSettle or restructure national debt; \niv.) \nAlleviate liquidity challenges that the financial sector is facing; \nv.) \n Transform maturity profiles of deposits, from short to medium or long \nterm; \nvi.) \nPool resources that are backed by domestic assets, for sustainable \nempowerment of the people. \nSpecial Purpose Vehicle \n \n8.7. The securitization of national assets including mineral resources can be \nstructured through a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). The SPV is a legal \nentity specifically and solely created for the purpose of holding the assets \nsought to be transferred by the originator and the issuance of securities. It \ntherefore acts as an intermediary between the originator and investor. \n \nSecuritization Anchored on Real Estate \n \n8.8. In Zimbabwe, both residential and commercial real estate are mostly \nmortgage free, however, these are illiquid assets. There is, therefore, need to \nunlock the economic potential of these assets by securitizing and \ntransforming them into liquid assets through real estate-backed security \n(REBS) that will represent a claim on the cash flows from equity \ninvestments in local companies ear-marked for indigenization. Funds to \npurchase these equities can be obtained from offshore sources and backed by \nreal estate in Zimbabwe. \n \n54 \n \n8.9. The offshore loans can be secured from international investors who are \nlooking for investments in emerging markets and diversifying from US \ndollar backed assets. \n \n8.10. REBS can be based on residential and commercial properties. A residential \nproperty-backed security (RPBS) will be secured by single or several \nhousehold real estates in the same neighbourhood. A commercial property-\nbacked security (CPBS) will be secured by commercial and industrial \nproperties, such as apartment buildings, retail or office properties, hotels, \nprivate schools, industrial and commercial sites. \n \n8.11. This securitization structure will be private sector driven and voluntary. \n \n8.12. This proposed resource mobilization and investment structure will dilute the \nimpact of sanctions and bring significant liquidity into the economy, thereby \nlaying a suitable foundation for economic recovery, whilst indigenizing the \neconomy. \n \n8.13. This will represent a broad based economic empowerment program which \nwould also create employment and additional wealth. \nMineral Based Securitization   \n \n8.14. Zimbabwe is endowed with vast mineral wealth which remains largely \nuntapped; in order to unlock value from the country’s mineral wealth, \nmining claims can be used as a form of payment to cooperating partners that \n55 \n \nclear Zimbabwe’s debt. In this regard mineral claims in the gold, platinum \nand ferro-alloys sub sectors can be securitized. \n \n8.15. This option involves external new borrowing by the country to retire the \ntotality or part of external debt, using identified public assets as collateral. \nValuation of these assets, in foreign currency, gives an indication of how \nmuch the country can borrow under this option. The same concept can be \napplied to the post reform agriculture sector. \n \nAgriculture and Mining Mechanization \n \n8.16. The nation will recall that the agricultural mechanization program \nspearheaded by the Reserve Bank laid a solid foundation for improved \nagricultural production and enhanced the country’s food security. The \nprogram was, however, not completed to cater for all the potential \nbeneficiaries countrywide. To further consolidate the bold strides attained by \nthis program, it is our recommendation that the responsible Ministry should \nattach prominence to the completion of this program. \n \n8.17. This is particularly so because there are many would- be beneficiaries who \nwere not accommodated during the agricultural mechanization phases \nundertaken with the assistance of the Reserve Bank, yet they have a dying \nneed of agricultural machinery. Against this background, we urge \nGovernment to resume the mechanization program with the support of \nTreasury, through the fine-tuning of the previous phases of the program with \n56 \n \nspecial attention to ensuring equity in terms of geographical or beneficiary \nselection. \n \n8.18. In the same vein, the importance of the mining sector in its contribution to \nthe Gross Domestic Product and the indigenization and economic \nempowerment process which should promote the Small to Medium Scale \nEntreprises (SMEs) cannot be over-emphasized. Against this background, \nwe recommend that Government through the appropriate Ministry should \nembark on a mining sector mechanization program that will see a \ncoordinated tie -up of owners of mining claims, producers of machinery and \nthose who market the minerals. \n \n8.19. The Reserve Bank also urges Local Authorities to move with speed to deal \ndecisively with the resurgence of cholera and typhoid. Our experience in \n2008 with such epidemics makes it very painful when lives are lost \nneedlessly. The meaningful recovery of the Zimbabwean economy is \ncentered around the well-being of the generality of the population of which \ngood health is an important aspect. \n \n9. \nCONCLUSION \n \n9.1 \nThe successful orientation of the Zimbabwean economy on a sustained \nrecovery and growth path requires that the country’s unsustainable external \ndebt be resolved expeditiously. Delays in the resolution of the country’s \nexternal debt continue to militate against efforts by both the public and \n57 \n \nprivate sectors to mobilize external lines of credit to recapitalize their \noperations and finance critical projects. \n \n9.2 \nAn effective debt resolution strategy if timely implemented will undoubtedly \nunlock the much needed external lines of credit under any monetary regime. \nThe resolution of the country’s external debt is thus a vital cog in adequately \ncomplementing policy measures geared at attaining an all-encompassing \neconomic recovery process that is inclusive and sustained. \n \n9.3 \nIn addition, the need for an adequately capitalized financial system in \nsupporting private sector led growth cannot be over-emphasized. As \nMonetary Authorities we, therefore, urge banking institutions to ensure that \ntheir operations are adequately capitalized in order to meaningfully mobilize \nsavings for on lending to the productive sectors of the economy and ensure \nfinancial sector stability. \n \n9.4 \nWe also urge banking institutions to move with the times and embrace new \nfinancial products such as mobile banking and e-banking in order to \neffectively reach out to the unbanked sections of our country that reside in \noutlying areas where the physical banking infrastructure is under-developed. \n \nTHANK YOU \n \n DR. G. GONO \nGOVERNOR \nRESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE \nJANAURY 2012", "source": "RBZ", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///RBZ/Monetary_Policy_Statements/mpsjan2012Zim.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "babb76671082a63b20f74df64a42ea9d", "text": "JANUARY 2018 \nMONETARY POLICY STATEMENT \nENHANCING FINANCIAL STABILITY TO PROMOTE \nBUSINESS CONFIDENCE \nRESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE \nBY DR. J P. MANGUDYA \nGOVERNOR \n2 \nCONTENTS \n \nSECTION 1 ............................................................................................................................. 4 \nINTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................... 4 \nSECTION 2 .............................................................................................................................. 7 \nEVALUATION OF 2017 MONETARY POLICY INTEVENTIONS ............................... 7 \nSECTION 3 ........................................................................................................................... 20 \nGLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS ..................................... 20 \nSECTION 4 ........................................................................................................................... 23 \nBALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEVELOPMENTS ............................................................ 23 \nSECTION 5 ........................................................................................................................... 28 \nMONETARY AND INFLATION DEVELOPMENTS .................................................... 28 \nSECTION 6 ............................................................................................................................ 35 \nFINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS ..................................................................... 35 \nSECTION 7 ............................................................................................................................ 45 \nPOLICY MEASURES TO ENHANCE FINANCIAL STABILITY AND TO \nPROMOTE BUSINESS CONFIDENCE IN THE ECONOMY ..................................... 45 \nSECTION 8 ............................................................................................................................ 55 \nCONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 55 \n \n \n \n3 \nLIST OF FIGURES \nFigure 1: Distribution of Payments Systems Volumes 2017 .................................................. 11 \nFigure 2: Payment Systems Values for 2017 ......................................................................... 11 \nFigure 3: Total RTGS Transactional Activities from 2009 to 2017 ....................................... 12 \nFigure 4: Total Electronic Transactional Payments from 2009 to 2017 ................................. 12 \nFigure 5: SIRESS Transaction Values (ZAR billion) ............................................................. 14 \nFigure 6: Cumulative Credit Redistry Inquiries as at 31 Dec 2017 ........................................ 18 \nFigure 7: Commodity Price Indices (2010=100): 2012 to November 2017 ........................... 21 \nFigure 8: Merchandise Exports and Imports (US$ m) ............................................................ 23 \nFigure 9: Balance of Payments Developments: 2009-2017 .................................................... 24 \nFigure 10: Monetary Developments ....................................................................................... 28 \nFigure 11:Composition of Broad Money ................................................................................ 29 \nFigure 12: Average Monthly RTGS Account Balances ......................................................... 30 \nFigure 13: Annual Inflation Profile (%) ................................................................................. 31 \nFigure 14: Sectoral Distribution of Loans as at 31 December 2017…………..……………..36 \nFigure 15: Trend in Non-Performing Loans 2011 – December 2017 ..................................... 39 \nFigure 16: Prudential Liquidity Ratio Trend (%) ................................................................... 40 \nFigure 17: Growth of Active & Women Clients ..................................................................... 44 \n \nLIST OF TABLES \nTable 1: Cumulative Export Incentives (5 May 2016 – 31 December 2017) ........................... 8 \nTable 2: Payment System Transactional Activities for 2016 and 2017 .................................. 10 \nTable 3: Payment Access Points and Devices for 2016 and 2017 .......................................... 13 \nTable 4: Gold Deliveries to FPR from January to December 2017 ........................................ 15 \nTable 5: Financial Inclusion Indicators Dec 2016-2017 ......................................................... 15 \nTable 6: Global Economic Growth and Outlook (%) ............................................................. 20 \nTable 7: Foreign Currency Receipts (2016-2017) .................................................................. 25 \nTable 8: Foreign Payments 2016-2017 (US$ millions) .......................................................... 26 \nTable 9: ZSE Indices as at 31 December 2017 ....................................................................... 30 \nTable 10: Regional & International Annual Inflation Trends ................................................. 32 \nTable 11: Architecture of the Banking Sector ........................................................................ 34 \nTable 12: Other Operating Institutions ................................................................................... 34 \nTable 13: Financial Soundness Indicators .............................................................................. 35 \nTable 14: Banking Sector Capitalisation (US$ millions) ....................................................... 37 \nTable 15: Projected Housing Development ............................................................................ 38 \nTable 16: Deposit insurance Payments as at 31 December 2017.............................................41 \nTable 17: Microfinance Performance Indicators, Sept 2016-Sept 2017…………………..…43 \n \n \n4 \nSECTION 1 \nINTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY \n \nThis Monetary Policy Statement is issued in terms of Section 46 of the Reserve Bank of \nZimbabwe Act [Chapter 22:15] which requires the Bank to issue a statement containing a \ndescription of the monetary policy to be followed by the Bank during the next succeeding six \nmonths, and a statement of the reasons for those policies; a statement of the principles that \nthe Bank proposes to follow in the implementation of the monetary policy; and an evaluation \nof the monetary policy and its implementation for the last preceding six months. \n \nThe Statement comes at a time when the economy is experiencing renewed hope and \nconfidence ushered in by the new economic dispensation, following the formation of a new \nleaner cabinet by His Excellency, the President, in November 2017. This renewed hope and \nconfidence would need to be supported by going back to basics to restore business \nconfidence and to foster discipline within the national economy. Accordingly, this Monetary \nPolicy Statement seeks to buttress this confidence trajectory by putting in place measures that \ngradually liberalise the foreign currency market in order to indicate that the country is ‘open \nfor business’. \n \nThe Bank has continued to make concerted efforts to address cash shortages, which are a \ndirect reflection of the tight foreign currency macro-economic environment that is \nexacerbated by the transmission impact of the persistent fiscal deficit on the financial sector. \nAddressing this current macro-economic imbalance requires a sharp rise in foreign exchange \nreserves and an improvement in the fiscal balance. It is against this backdrop that the \ninterventions by the Bank in the foreign exchange market through nostro stabilisation \nfacilities have greatly assisted the economy to meet the ever growing demand for foreign \nexchange and, in doing so, stabilising parallel market activities and sustaining the financing \nof critical imports such as fuel, electricity, cash, medicines and essential consumer goods. In \naddition, policy interventions to promote exports continue to bear fruit as evidenced by the \ncontinued narrowing of the current account deficit. In this regard, Zimbabwe’s current \naccount balance is now within the international best practice range and also consistent with \nmacroeconomic convergence targets under the SADC and COMESA guidelines. \n \n5 \nThis, notwithstanding, the country’s high import dependency continues to exert pressure on \nforeign exchange earnings, thus fueling parallel market activities for foreign exchange. This \neconomic situation is compounded by the growing fiscal deficit which remains the major \ndriver of increased deposits or money supply in the banking sector, creating foreign currency \nliquidity shortages in the economy and causing inflationary pressures through domestic \nmonetary emission on the RTGS platform. \n \nOpening up of the economy to business is therefore the most sustainable cure for the major \nchallenges the country is facing. Opening Zimbabwe for business means attracting \ninvestment, foreign and domestic, that is required to increase production, jobs, fiscal space, \nexports and eventually the happiness index for Zimbabweans. It moves the economy beyond \nstabilisation. Opening up the economy also calls for local business to improve on their \nefficiencies and competitiveness in order to brace for competition from foreign investors. \n \nThe Bank is convinced that by opening up the economy for business, the country has struck \nthe right chord for the sustainable transformation of the economy. It is in this optimistic \ncontext that the Bank is coming up with measures to gradually open the foreign currency \nmarket in order to restore investor confidence within the economy under the new narrative to \nopen Zimbabwe for business. Specifically the measures presented in this Statement are \nmeant to address the following: \ni. Further promoting the use of mobile and electronic payment systems (plastic money); \nii. Enhancing the use of the local generated RTGS funds to generate exports; \niii. Improving the foreign currency market; \niv. Enhancing rewards to exporters and reducing cost of doing export business; \nv. Providing generators of forex assurances of ease of access to foreign currency; \nvi. Enhancing foreign currency retention threshold; \nvii. Enhancing nostro stabilisation facilities to provide assurances to foreign exchange \nearners of forex availability and to meet the import requirements of essential \ncommodities; \nviii. Improving ease of access to productive facilities; \nix. Addressing the needs of the diasporans; \nx. Reinforcing the arrears clearance and re-engagement programme; \n6 \nxi. \nProviding guidance on the continuation of the multi-currency system; \nxii. Providing guidance on the Presidential Amnesty on externalised assets and funds; and \nxiii. Providing update on the acceptability of the 99-year land leases as collateral at banks. \n \nThe rest of this Monetary Policy Statement is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the \nprevious monetary policy actions and policy interventions. Section 3 reviews the global and \nregional economic developments. Section 4 looks at the balance of payments developments, \nSection 5 discusses monetary and inflation developments. Section 6 gives developments in \nthe financial sector. Section 7 presents new measures to enhance financial stability and \nconfidence within the economy, while Section 8 is the conclusion of the Statement. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n7 \nSECTION 2 \nEVALUATION OF 2017 MONETARY POLICY INTEVENTIONS \na) Nostro Stabilisation Facilities \nThe intervention by the Bank in the foreign exchange market through drawdowns from the \nnostro stabilisation facilities amounting to US$1.1 billion during 2017 immensely assisted to \nstabilise the forex market and to sustain financing of critical imports such as fuel, electricity, \nmedicines, fertilisers, agro-chemicals, soya crude oil for cooking oil, cash imports and raw \nmaterials for industry. Drawdowns from these facilities together with the utilization of bond \nnotes in an amount of $290 million as at end December 2017 went a long way to stabilise \nshortages of cash in the country. The worst could have happened especially in September \n2017 had it not been for the positive impact of the nostro stabilisation facilities on the \neconomy. \n \nA good number of firms in the manufacture of food products, packaging, fertilisers, agro-\nchemicals and fuel distribution have greatly benefitted from the nostro stabilisation facilities \nand the Statutory Instrument that was put in place by Government to support local \nproduction. \n \nb) Performance and Impact of the Export Incentive Scheme \nIn order to ensure that Zimbabwean exports are competitive under the auspices of a \ndollarized economy, the Bank established the US$200 million and US$300 million export \nincentive facilities which are monetised by bond notes. Since its inception in 2016, the export \nincentive scheme has enhanced competitiveness of Zimbabwe’s exports and this has \nsignificantly contributed to the growth of exports which grew by 36% from US$2.8 billion in \n2016 to US$3.8 billion in 2017 \n \nTable 1 shows the cumulative export incentive and bond notes disbursed, and export receipts \ngenerated since inception of the export incentive scheme in May 2016. \n \n \n \n \n8 \n \nTable 1: Cumulative Export Receipts & Incentive Amounts (5 May 2016 – 31 Dec 2017) \nSector \nExport Receipts \n(USD) \n \nIncentive Amounts \n(USD) \n \nBond Notes issued to \nBanks \n(USD) \nMining excluding Gold \n2,645,809,356 \n58,268,089 \n56 000 000 \nServices \n744,571,608 \n37,233,513 \n35 000 000 \nAgriculture excluding greenleaf \nTobacco \n426,171,579 \n21,308,579 \n20 000 000 \nManufacturing \n342,711,939 \n18,016,967 \n17 500 000 \nOther \n37,152,463 \n1,857,624 \n 1 800 000 \n \nSubtotal \n4,196,416,945 \n136,684,772 \n \n130,300,000 \nTobacco Growers \n1,202,247,760 \n59,700,402 \n59 700 402 \n \nGold - Producers \n1,282,023,093 \n59,313,208 \n59 200 000 \n \nDiaspora Remittances \n782,193,277 \n41,504,573 \n40 999 600 \nGrand Total \n 7,462,881,075 \n 297,202,955 \n \n290,200,000 \n \nSource: RBZ \n \nc) Afreximbank Backed Interbank Market Facility (AFTRADES) \nThe Bank has continued to use Aftrades as its Lender of Last Resort window and for \npromoting interbank finance facility. The Aftrades facility, which was established in 2015 at \na limit of US$200 million went a long way in alleviating liquidity shortages during 2017. The \nfacility will run for another two years until February 2019. Total trades amounted to \nUS$399.5 million in 2017. \n \nd) Savings Bonds \nThe Bank introduced 7% tax-free Savings Bonds in September 2017 to mop up excess \nliquidity within the market and, in so doing, providing investors with a platform for \nincreasing savings within the country. \n9 \n \nAs at the end of 2017, a total of US$165 million had been raised through Savings Bonds. The \nBank enhanced the features of the Savings Bonds in December 2017 to include Prescribed \nAsset Status it order to enhance its marketability. \n \ne) Usage of Electronic and Mobile Banking Systems (Plastic Money) \nThe Bank is encouraged by the quantum leap in the usage of electronic and mobile banking \nsystems (plastic money) by the Zimbabwean banking public. \n \nThe Bank’s plastic money policy thrust has been a resounding success in the economy as \nexhibited by the unprecedented increases in values, volumes, devices and access points. This \nis largely attributable to collaborative efforts, commitment, action and market innovation \nwhich have continued to drive the plastic money revolution. \n \nThe growth in the use of plastic money, away from cash transactions, was phenomenal in \n2017 to the extent that more than 96% of the $97.5 billion - from the 1 billion transactions - \nprocessed in the entire country in 2017 were through electronic and mobile banking systems \nas shown in Table 2 below. Figures 1 and 2 show the distribution of payment systems by \nvalue and volume, respectively. \n \nMobile payments constituted the bulk of payment streams in volume terms in 2017. In value \nterms, the RTGS constituted the largest contribution at more than 63% as shown in Table 2. \nOn a comparison basis aggregate electronic means of payments in terms of values and \nvolumes grew significantly by 41% and 164%, respectively, in 2017. This growth can be \nattributed to the high usage, increased infrastructure and diversity of innovative payment \nsystems products or services approved during the period under review. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n10 \nTable 2: Payment System Transactional Activities for 2016 and 2017 \nPAYMENT \nSTREAMS \n2016 \n \n%age \n2017 \nProportion of \nTotal 2017 \n \n \nValues \nRTGS \n \n48,109,325,214.79 \n \n69.51% \n \n61,719,667,657.05 \n63.28% \nCHEQUE \n \n113,083,273.59 \n \n0.16% \n \n69,437,643.79 \n0.07% \nPOS \n \n2,898,437,870.85 \n \n4.20% \n \n6,635,840,710.92 \n6.77% \nATMS \n \n2,283,533,146.98 \n \n3.32% \n \n427,973,605.99 \n0.44% \nCASH \nWITHDRAWALS \n74,83687,051 \n \n10.84% \n3647133052 \n3.69% \nMOBILE \n \n5,815,862,225.76 \n \n8.38% \n \n18,020,733,457.33 \n18.46% \nINTERNET \n \n2,503,914,145.97 \n \n3.61% \n \n7,021,588,382.39 \n7.29% \n \nTOTAL VALUE \n \n69,207,842,928.94 \n \n100% \n \n97,542,374,509.48 \n100.00% \n \n \nVolumes \nRTGS \n \n2,901,664 \n \n0.76% \n \n5,903,136 \n0.58% \nCHEQUE \n \n347,735 \n \n0.09% \n \n320,341 \n0.03% \nPOS \n \n52,407,464 \n \n13.65% \n \n214,857,784 \n21.22% \n \nCASH \n16,252,259 \n \n4.25% \n24,675,581 \n2.43% \n \nATMs \n \n12,332,547 \n \n3.20% \n \n8,098,497 \n0.79% \n \nMOBILE \n \n298,586,190 \n \n77.78% \n \n754,742,123 \n74.52% \n \nINTERNET \n \n1,110,366 \n \n0.27% \n \n4,248,650 \n0.43% \n \nTOTAL \n \n383,938,226 \n \n100% \n \n 1,012,846,112 \n 100% \n \n \n11 \nReal Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) System \nA total of 5.9 million transactions valued at US$61.7 billion were processed through the \nRTGS system during the year 2017. The RTGS volumes and values increased by 103% and \n28%, respectively, compared to the same period in 2016. Figure 3 illustrates the RTGS \nactivities over the past nine years. \nFigure 1: Distribution of Payment Systems Volumes 2017 \n \nSource: RBZ \nFigure 2: Payment Systems Values for 2017 \n \nSource: RBZ \nRTGS, 0.60% \nCHEQUE, \n0.03% \nPOS, 21.74% \nATMs, 0.82% \nMOBILE , \n76.38% \nINTERNET , \n0.43% \nVOLUMES 2017 \nRTGS \nCHEQUE \nPOS \nATMs \nMOBILE \nINTERNET \nRTGS \n65.73% \nCHEQUE \n0.07% \nPOS \n7.07% \nATMS \n0.46% \nMOBILE \n19.19% \nINTERNET \n7.48% \nRTGS \nCHEQUE \nPOS \nATMS \nMOBILE \nINTERNET \n12 \nFigure 3: Total RTGS Transactional Activities from 2009 to 2017 \n \n \n \nFigure 4: Total Electronic Transactional Payments from 2009 to 2017 \n \n \n \nThe number of point of sale (POS) deployed increased significantly by 84% to 59,939 in \n2017. All access points recorded a positive growth during the year under review except \nATMs as shown in Table 3. \n \n \n0.0 \n1.5 \n3.0 \n4.5 \n6.0 \n '- \n 17,500,000,000 \n 35,000,000,000 \n 52,500,000,000 \n 70,000,000,000 \n 2009 \n 2010 \n 2011 \n 2012 \n 2013 \n 2014 \n 2015 \n 2016 \n 2017 \nVolumes in Millions \nBillions \nANNUAL RTGS VALUES \n '- \n 250,000,000 \n 500,000,000 \n 750,000,000 \n 1,000,000,000 \n0 \n25 \n50 \n75 \n100 \n2009 \n2010 \n2011 \n2012 \n2013 \n2014 \n2015 \n2016 \n2017 \nMillions \nBillions \nValues \nVolumes \n13 \nTable 3: Payment Access Points and Devices for 2016 and 2017 \nPayment Systems Access Points \n% Change for \n2016/17 \n \n2016 \n2017 \n \nDifference \nMobile Money \nAgents \n40,590 \n44,793 \n4,203 \n10% \nATMs \n569 \n563 \n-6 \n-1% \nPOS \n32,629 \n59,939 \n27,310 \n84% \nNFC \n- \n6,063 \n5,902 \nQR Code \n1065 \n7,075 \n6,010 \n564% \nPayment Systems Access Devices \n \nDebit Cards \n3,127,153 \n4,281,683 \n1,154,530 \n37% \nCredit Cards \n16,030 \n17,411 \n1,381 \n9% \nPrepaid Cards \n43,288 \n63,987 \n20,699 \n48% \nMobile Payment \nSubscribers \n3,279,049 \n4,611,608 \n1,332,559 \n41% \nInternet Banking \nSubscribers \n168,339 \n277,674 \n109,335 \n65% \n \n \nThe value of Mobile Financial Services (MFS) transactions for the year stood at US$18 \nbillion, an increase of 210% from the US$5.8 billion recorded in 2016. The volume of MFS \ntransactions also increased by 153% to 754.7 million in 2017 from the 298.6 million recorded \nin 2016. \n \nRegional Payments Developments \nThe Central Bank is committed to regional payment system initiatives and has encouraged \nbanks and other payment service providers to utilise the SADC Integrated Regional \nElectronic Settlement System (SIRESS) platform to settle regional cross-border transactions. \n14 \nSince the implementation of SIRESS in July 2013, the number of local banks participating on \nSIRESS has risen to 15 whilst transactional values have also increased as shown in Figure 5. \n \nFigure 5: SIRESS Transaction Values (ZAR billion) \n \n \nNotwithstanding, the positive developments in the transactional activities on SIRESS, more \nstill needs to be done to increase customer awareness and understanding of the payment \nplatform’s benefits. Accordingly, financial institutions are urged to implement the \nappropriate education and awareness programs to bolster the use of the SIRESS platform. \n \nf) Financial Inclusion & Sustainable Economic Development Facilities \nIn the 2017 Mid-term Monetary Policy, the Bank introduced nine (9) productive finance \nfacilities earmarked for promoting production (exports, gold, tourism, horticulture) business \nlinkages and empowerment facilities (youth, women, people with disabilities, tertiary \nstudents). These financial inclusion and empowerment facilities targeting groups such as \nwomen, SMEs and youth have played a significant role in ensuring access to formal financial \nservices by these marginalised groups in support of the National Financial Inclusion Strategy. \n \n 2.30 \n 8.92 \n 11.88 \n 11.56 \n - \n 5.00 \n 10.00 \n 15.00 \n2014 \n2015 \n2016 \n2017 \nBillions \n15 \nAs at the end of 2017, total disbursements under all the facilities amounted to US$122 \nmillion, with over 50% being for capital expenditure. Disbursement under the gold support \nfacility amounted to US$74 million. This facility together with the periodic onsite \nmonitoring by the Gold Mobilisation Technical Committee greatly contributed to the increase \nin gold deliveries to Fidelity Printers and Refiners (FPR) from 21.439 tonnes in 2016 to \n24.843 tonnes in 2017, with small scale gold producers accounting for 53% of total gold \noutput as shown in Table 4. \n \nTable 4: Gold Deliveries (Kgs) to FPR from January to December 2017 \n2017 \n \nPrimary \nSmall Scale \nTotal \nJan \n 923.00 \n 713.51 \n 1,636.51 \nFeb \n 768.38 \n 686.61 \n 1,454.99 \nMarch \n 862.54 \n 682.83 \n 1,545.36 \nApril \n 866.95 \n 622.39 \n 1,489.34 \nMay \n 1,045.33 \n 874.99 \n 1,920.32 \nJune \n 908.11 \n 1,045.97 \n 1,954.08 \nJuly \n 963.62 \n 1,127.73 \n 2,091.15 \nAugust \n 1,109.91 \n 1,466.39 \n 2,576.30 \nSeptember \n 1,045.97 \n 1,448.98 \n 2,494.95 \nOctober \n 1,098.51 \n 1,672.11 \n 2,770.62 \nNovember \n 1,021.78 \n 1,288.92 \n 2,310.70 \nDecember \n 1,053.40 \n 1,546.16 \n 2,599.56 \nTOTAL \n 11,667.50 \n 13,176.37 \n 24,843.87 \n \nSource: Fidelity Printers and Refiners \n \nThe support for tobacco through the Tobacco Industry and Marketing Board (TIMB) \namounted to $28 million. This support is expected to produce 44 million kilograms of \ntobacco. \n \n16 \nThese facilities which are priced at all-in interest rates ranging between 7.5% for exporters \nand 10% for non-exporting activities have had significant impact in supporting production for \nboth local consumption (import substitution) and export generation. The funded activities \nhave been instrumental in developing various value chains particularly in agriculture \nincluding horticulture, mining, manufacturing and tourism. Encouragingly the facilities have \nresulted in improvement in financial inclusion indicators as shown in Table 5. \n \nTable 5: Financial Inclusion Indicators - Dec 2016-17 \nIndicator \nDec 2016 \nDec 2017 Change % \nValue of loans to SMEs ($ m) \n131.69 \n146.22 11.03% \nPercentage of loans to SMEs over total \nloans \n3.57% \n3.75% 0.18% \nNumber of SMEs with bank accounts \n71,730 \n76,524 6.68% \nNumber of Women with Bank Accounts \n769,883 \n935,994 21.58% \nValue of Loans to Women ($ m) \n277.30 \n310.78 12.07% \nNumber of Loans to Youth \n38,400 \n61,529 60.23% \nValue of Loans to Youth ($ m) \n58.41 \n138.93 137.85% \nTotal number of Bank Accounts \n1.49 m \n3.07 m 106.04% \nNumber of Low Cost Accounts \n1.20 m \n3.02 m 151.67% \n \n \nFurther, in line with the financial inclusion thrust, a number of banking and microfinance \ninstitutions have up-scaled their financial support to some irrigation schemes which were \nrehabilitated by Government. Notable impact has been recorded in Manicaland, \nMatabeleland, Midlands and Mashonaland provinces in respect of banana production, \nlivestock production, mining and horticulture, respectively. \n \nThe Credit Guarantee Scheme, which is managed under the Export Credit Guarantee \nCompany, is now fully operational. As part of efforts to strengthen the role of microfinance \nin the economy and up-scale the capacity of the sector to manage the empowerment facilities, \n17 \nthe Bank embarked on capacity building of microfinance institutions on risk management, \ncorporate governance and compliance, among others. \n \nMost banking institutions have embraced the low cost accounts model. The number of ‘no \nfrills’ accounts with minimum affordable requirements in the banking sector recorded a \n151.67% increase from 1.20 million as at 31 December 2016 to 3.02 million as at 31 \nDecember 2017. \n \ng) Financial Literacy \nFinancial literacy is key in raising awareness of financial services among economic agents \nparticularly the marginalised groups; ensuring responsible access to and usage of financial \nservices; and in promoting adequate protection of consumers of financial services. As part of \nincreasing awareness of the integrated approach to financial education and financial \ninclusion, the Bank in collaboration with development partners, conducted a number of \nfinancial literacy stakeholders workshops during 2017. As at end December 2017, around \n75% of the population was financially literate \n \nFinancial literacy capacity building programs will continue during 2018, with the assistance \nof development partners, including the World Bank and the International Labour \nOrganisation. In view of the low levels of financial literacy across the population, the Bank \nwill roll-out targeted financial education programs, which will be implemented through \nvarious delivery channels such as print and electronic media. Further, cognisant of the \ncritical need to embed financial literacy from early childhood development in building a \nfinancially literate nation, the Bank has initiated engagement processes with stakeholders to \npromote appropriate financial literacy content in the education curricula. \n \nh) Credit Infrastructure \nThe Bank has made significant progress in enhancing the credit infrastructure through the \nestablishment of a Credit Registry and operationalising the Collateral Registry. The \nimprovement in the credit reporting environment is expected to improve the general credit \nculture across economic sectors. \n \n18 \ni) Credit Registry \nAs at 31 December 2017, the Credit Registry system had a total of 350,000 banking sector \ncredit records, which are updated on a continuous basis. There are currently 104 subscribers \nin the Credit Registry system comprising of banks, Microfinance Institutions and other non-\nbank subscribers. Utilisation of the Credit Registry continued to increase with cumulative \naccess of 116,489 reports as at 31 December 2017 as shown in the Figure 6. \n \nFigure 6: Cumulative Credit Registry Inquiries as at 31 Dec 2017 \n \n \nThe process of broadening the subscriber base and data providers such as microfinance \ninstitutions and other non-bank subscribers is already in progress. Meanwhile, banking \ninstitutions and the microfinance sector are expected to prime their systems and to re-orient \ncredit practices in order to take full advantage of the collateral registry system, which is \nanticipated to promote financial inclusion. \n \nj) Collateral Registry \nThe Movable Property Security Interests Act [Chapter 14:35] was gazetted in July 2017 \npaving the way for establishment of the Collateral Registry. Numerous preparatory activities \nhave been successfully undertaken including the drafting of Movable Property Security \n3736 \n13009 \n23997 \n38917 \n62041 \n80453 \n96650 \n116489 \n3736 \n9273 \n10988 \n14920 \n23124 \n18412 \n16197 \n19839 \n0 \n20000 \n40000 \n60000 \n80000 \n100000 \n120000 \n140000 \nMay \nJune \nJuly \nAugust \nSeptember \nOctober \nNovember \nDecember \nCumulative Inquriries \nMonthly Inquiries \n19 \nInterests Regulations. It is anticipated that the Regulations shall be gazetted during the first \nquarter of 2018 and the Collateral Registry will be operational by 30 June 2018. \n \n \n \nk) Developmental Financial Institutions (DFIs) \nDevelopmental financial institutions play a critical role in the provision of long-term \nfinancing for the reconstruction and expansion of the physical and social infrastructure. \nAgainst this background, the Bank is pleased to note the significant progress in the \ntransformation of Industrial Development Corporation of Zimbabwe (IDCZ) into a \ndevelopment financial institution as a critical factor in the re-industrialisation agenda through \nprovision of industrial financing and enterprise development for small, medium and large \nenterprises. \n \nThe transformation of IDCZ is expected to complement initiatives by commercial banks, \nwhich are also expected to re-orient their lending in line with the developmental thrust \nenunciated in the National Budget Statement for 2018. \n \nl) Basel II/III Implementation \nThe Bank continued to provide tailored technical assistance to banking institutions to \ncapacitate the sector in the implementation of Basel II. Meanwhile, the Basel Committee on \nBank Supervision concluded the outstanding components of the Basel III framework in \nDecember 2017. In this regard, the Reserve Bank is in the process of developing the Basel \nIII capital and liquidity frameworks to improve the quality, consistency and transparency of \ncapital and reduce pro-cyclicality, as well as, enhance liquidity management. \n \nm) International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 \nThe Bank made significant progress in the adoption and implementation of IFRS9. A \nquantitative impact assessment conducted during the course of 2017 on the impact on capital \nlevels, showed that all banking institutions remain adequately capitalized. As part of the final \nphase of IFRS 9 implementation, banking institutions are required to submit IFRS 9 \ncompliant financial statements as at 31 December 2017 to the Bank by 31 March 2018. \n \n20 \n \nSECTION 3 \nGLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS \n \nThe global upswing in economic activity, which started in the second half of 2016 is \nstrengthening, supported by robust growth in emerging economies. As a result, global \neconomic activity is projected to improve from a growth of 3.2% registered in 2016 to 3.7% \nin 2017 and 3.9% in 2018. Table 6 shows global economic growth developments for selected \nregions and countries. \n \nTable 6: Global Economic Growth & Outlook (%) \n \n2014 \n2015 \n2016 \nEst. \n2017 \nProj. \n2018 \nProj. \nWorld Output \n3.4 \n3.2 \n3.2 \n3.7 \n3.9 \nAdvanced Economies \n1.9 \n2.1 \n1.7 \n2.3 \n2.3 \n US \n2.4 \n2.6 \n1.5 \n2.3 \n2.7 \n Euro Area \n0.9 \n2.0 \n1.8 \n2.4 \n2.2 \n Japan \n0.0 \n1.2 \n0.9 \n1.8 \n1.2 \nEmerging & Developing \nEconomies \n4.6 \n4.1 \n4.4 \n4.7 \n4.9 \n China \n7.3 \n6.9 \n6.7 \n6.8 \n6.6 \n India \n7.2 \n7.6 \n7.1 \n6.7 \n7.4 \nSub-Saharan Africa \n5.1 \n3.4 \n1.4 \n2.7 \n3.3 \n Zimbabwe* \n3.8 \n1.1 \n0.7 \n3.7 \n4.5 \nLatin America \nCaribbean \n1.3 \n0.1 \n-0.7 \n1.3 \n1.9 \n \nSource: IMF World Economic Outlook Update (January2018), \n *Ministry of Finance and Economic Development and RBZ projections \n \nDespite this development, growth remains weak in some countries, with inflation below \ntarget in most advanced economies. Growth in China, India and other parts of emerging Asia \nremains strong, while several commodity dependent economies in Latin America and sub-\nSaharan Africa show some signs of improvement. \n21 \n \nIn sub-Saharan Africa, growth is estimated at an average of 2.7 percent in 2017, up from 1.4 \npercent recorded in 2016. Growth is expected to further increase to 3.3 percent in 2018, with \nsizable differences across countries. This growth remains below the previous growth rates of \nabove 5% recorded in 2014. There are, however, mounting vulnerabilities in the region, \nnotably, rising public debt, financial sector strains and low external buffers. Public debt is \nhigh not only in oil exporting countries but in many fast-growing economies as well. \n \nThe improved global economic performance in 2018 has spill over effects on demand for \nZimbabwean commodities and hence increased economic activity in the domestic economy. \n \nCommodity Price Developments \nInternational commodity prices continued their recovery from the rock-bottom levels \nregistered at the beginning of 2016, although they remained depressed compared to the levels \nthat were attained in 2012. More specifically, energy, base metals, precious metals and \nagricultural commodity prices showed some resilience in 2017 due to strong demand, \nparticularly from China’s property, infrastructure, and manufacturing sectors and amid \nvarious supply bottlenecks globally. Figure 7 shows trends in commodity price indices. \n \nFigure 7: Commodity Price Indices (2010 = 100): 2012 to November 2017 \n \nSource: World Bank \n \n \n30. \n62.5 \n95. \n127.5 \n160. \n2012M02 \n2012M05 \n2012M08 \n2012M11 \n2013M02 \n2013M05 \n2013M08 \n2013M11 \n2014M02 \n2014M05 \n2014M08 \n2014M11 \n2015M02 \n2015M05 \n2015M08 \n2015M11 \n2016M02 \n2016M05 \n2016M08 \n2016M11 \n2017M02 \n2017M05 \n2017M08 \n2017M11 \nEnergy \nAgriculture \nBase Metals \nPrecious Metals \n22 \n \nPrecious Metal Prices \nGold prices rallied in 2017, mainly on account of their safe haven status amid geopolitical \ntensions and the weakening of the U.S. dollar. On the other hand, platinum prices largely \ntraded unchanged in 2017, on the back of weak investment demand. \n \nBase Metal and Crude Oil Prices \nBase metal prices firmed in 2017, underpinned by strong demand from China, on account of \npositive economic growth outlook for the Asian’s giant economy, the world’s largest \nconsumer of base metals. Furthermore, supply concerns in some of the world’s base metal \nproducers supported international prices for base metals. \n \nCrude oil prices also firmed, buoyed by declining global inventories as a result of efforts by \nOPEC to curb production. In addition, supply concerns in the Middle East that emanated \nfrom geopolitical tensions between oil rich countries and strong global demand, supported oil \nprices. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n23 \n \n \nSECTION 4 \nBALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEVELOPMENTS \n \nConsistent with developments in the sub-Saharan African economies, the country’s external \nsector position is showing signs of improvement, on account of policy measures being taken \nby Government and the Reserve Bank to boost exports and contain the import demand. \n \nMerchandise Trade Developments \nOver the period January to November 2017, total merchandise trade (exports and imports) \nstood at US$8,408.5 million, representing a 15.8% increase from US$7,262.5 million \nrecorded over the corresponding period in 2016. The increase was on account of increases in \nmerchandise exports and imports of 36.8% and 4.5%, respectively. Consequently, for the \nperiod under review, the country’s trade deficit narrowed from US$2,181.6 million in 2016 to \nUS$1,456.7 million in 2017. A narrowed trade deficit reduces pressure on foreign exchange \nreserves. \n \nMerchandise exports for the period January to November 2017 increased by 36.8%, from \nUS$2,540.4 million realized in 2016 to US$3,475.9 million in 2017, as illustrated in Figure 8. \nThe increase in the year on year merchandise exports was mainly on account of increases in \nexports of nickel (mattes, ores & concentrates), gold, ferrochrome and black tea. Exports \ncomposition remained unchanged showing Zimbabwe’s dependence on the export of \ncommodities. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n24 \nFigure 8: Merchandise Exports and Imports (US$ m) \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT \nGold, flue-cured tobacco, nickel (mattes, ores & concentrates) ferrochrome and diamonds \ndominated the country’s exports, contributing about 80% of total export earnings. The \ncountry’s exports were mainly destined for the SADC region with South Africa and \nMozambique absorbing 62.8% and 10.5%, respectively. The country’s major exports to \nSouth Africa include platinum group of metals (PGMs), gold and nickel. These commodities \nare further exported to their final destination by South Africa. \n \nTotal merchandise imports for the period January to November 2017 amounted to \nUS$4,932.6 million, a 4.5% increase from US$4,722.0 million realized over the \ncorresponding period in 2016. The increase in merchandise imports was mainly attributable \nto increases in importation of energy (fuel and electricity), maize seed, machinery, fertilizers \nand medicines. The country sourced its imports mainly from South Africa (40.5%), \nSingapore (22.4%), China (8.8%), Zambia (2.5%) and Japan (2.5%). \n \nReflecting the combined effects of positive developments on merchandise trade in 2017 and \nthe need to boost domestic production for both export and local consumption through \nimportation of raw materials and intermediate goods, the current account deficit is estimated \nto have slightly increased from US$591.3 million in 2016 to US$618.1 million in 2017. \n \n \n \n0 \n150 \n300 \n450 \n600 \nJan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov \nMonthly MERCHANDISE Exports:2017 \n0 \n125 \n250 \n375 \n500 \nJan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov \n 2017 Monthly Merchandise Imports \n25 \nFigure 9: Balance of Payments Developments: 2009- 2017 \n \nSource: RBZ \n \n \nInternational Money Transfers \nFor the year 2017, inward international remittances amounted to US$1.4 billion compared to \nUS$1.6 billion received in 2016 representing an 11% decrease. Of the US$1.4 billion, \nDiaspora remittances amounted to US$698.9 million. The Bank is encouraged by the trend \nwhere Authorised Dealers are investing in enabling technologies that broaden financial \ninclusion, reduce remittances cost and increase remittance access points for the convenience \nof senders and recipients. These efforts towards formalization of remittances is key in \nbuilding sufficient capacity for leveraging on the developmental impact of remittances. \n \nForeign Currency Receipts on a Cash Basis \nConsistent with improvement in export generation, global foreign currency receipts, on a \ncash basis, for the year 2017 amounted to US$5.6 billion, compared to US$5.5 billion \nreceived during the same period in 2016, representing a 1.4% increase in foreign currency \nreceipts into the economy. Table 7 shows the breakdown of foreign currency receipts by \nsource. \n \n \n \n-3938 \n-2625 \n-1313 \n0 \n1313 \n2625 \n2009 \n2010 \n2011 \n2012 \n2013 \n2014 \n2015 \n2016 \n2017 \nCurrent Account \nCapital Account \nFinancial Account \nOverall Balance \n26 \nTable 7: Foreign Currency Receipts (2016 and 2017) \nType of Receipt \n2017 \nUS$ millions \n2016 \nUS$ millions \n% Change \nExport Proceeds \n3,519.70 \n2,994.00 \n17.6% \nInternational Remittances \n1,412.01 \n1,589.96 \n-11.2% \nLoan Proceeds \n545.49 \n519.49 \n5.0% \nIncome receipts \n58.87 \n332.70 \n-82.3% \nForeign Investment \n26.98 \n48.97 \n-44.9% \nTOTAL \n5,563.05 \n5,485.12 \n1.4% \n \nSource: RBZ \n \nForeign Currency Utilisation on a Cash Basis \nWhile total foreign currency receipts increased and remain comparable relative to receipts in \nother countries in the region, the benefits of such receipts continue to be outweighed by the \ncountry’s huge import bill. In 2017, global foreign payments amounted to US$4.81 billion, \nrepresenting a 6% decline from US$5.14 billion recorded in 2016. Table 8 shows foreign \npayments for 2016 and 2017. \n \nTable 8: Foreign Payments 2016 and 2017(US$ Millions) \nCategory \n2017 \n2016 \nChange % \nContribution 2017 \nMerchandise Imports (excl. \nenergy) \n2,641.9 \n2,587.3 \n2% \n55% \n- Consumption Goods \n1,055.9 \n1,310.1 \n-19% \n22% \n- Capital Goods \n802.6 \n664.6 \n21% \n17% \n- Intermediate Goods \n783.3 \n612.7 \n28% \n16% \nEnergy (Fuel & Electricity) \n735.9 \n757.0 \n-3% \n15% \nService Payments \n782.1 \n1,091.9 \n-28% \n16% \n- Technical, Professional & \nconsult \n286.4 \n527.7 \n-46% \n6% \n27 \nCategory \n2017 \n2016 \nChange % \nContribution 2017 \n- Software \n44.9 \n73.2 \n-39% \n1% \n- Other (tourism, \neducation, freight etc) \n450.8 \n490.9 \n-8% \n9% \nIncome Payments (Profits, \nDividends) \n155.7 \n147.5 \n6% \n3% \nCapital Remittances \n(outward) \n489.1 \n546.0 \n-10% \n10% \n- External Loan \nRepayments \n418.7 \n423.2 \n-1% \n9% \n- Disinvestments \n53.3 \n117.7 \n-55% \n1% \n- Cross Border Investment \n17.1 \n5.1 \n236% \n0% \nOther Payments \n4.2 \n7.8 \n-47% \n0.1% \nTotal \n4,808.8 \n5,137.5 \n-6% \n100% \n \nSource: RBZ \n \nAlthough there was a decline in foreign payments in 2017 relative to 2016, payments for \ncapital and intermediate goods increased, against a notable decline in payments for \nconsumption/manufactured goods. This development points to efficient utilisation of foreign \ncurrency towards the productive sectors of the economy, in line with various Government \nstrategies anchored on promoting domestic production. The Bank shall, therefore, continue to \nenhance the current compliance-monitoring framework to ensure continued allocation of \nforeign exchange in terms of the Foreign Exchange Priority List Guideline towards the \nproductive sectors in order to increase exports whilst at the same time providing assurances \nto the earners of foreign exchange of the availability of their funds on demand. \n \nFinancial Account Developments \nThe financial account balance continued to narrow down in 2017, on account of declining \ninflows of short and long term debt, subdued foreign direct and portfolio investment inflows. \nNet debt creating inflows declined from US$1,014.1 million in 2015 to US$544.7 million in \n2016 and US$315.6 million in 2017. Similarly, net foreign direct investment into the country \nis estimated to have declined from US$343 million in 2016 to US$235.4 million in 2017, \nwhile net portfolio investment inflows declined from - US$80 million to - US$41 million. \n28 \nGovernment is putting in place measures to promote both foreign direct investment and \nportfolio investment. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n29 \nSECTION 5 \nMONETARY AND INFLATION DEVELOPMENTS \n \nMonetary conditions have generally remained accommodative and supportive of real \neconomic activity. Broad money1 recorded an annual growth of 47.97%, from $5 420.01 \nmillion in November 2016 to $8 020.03 million in November 2017. The growth was reflected \nin increases in transferable (demand) deposits, 58.99%; and negotiable certificates of deposits \n(NCDs)2, 51.57%. Time deposits, however, declined by 1.18%. \n \nFigure 10: Monetary Developments \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2017 \n \nTransferable or transitory deposits, at 77.11% of total deposits, continued to dominate money \nsupply. These are made up of demand and savings deposits. During the period under review, \nbroad money was made up of transferable or transitory deposits, 77.11%; time deposits, \n18.08%; currency in circulation, 3.98% (bond notes and coins); and negotiable certificates of \ndeposits, 0.83%. \n \n \n \n1 Beginning January 2017, broad money is redefined using IMF’s Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual of 2000. The \nmajor change is the exclusion of Government deposits held by banks from broad money. \n2 NCDs are also referred to as securities included in broad money \n-16 \n0 \n16 \n31 \n47 \n63 \n '- \n 2.3 \n 4.5 \n 6.8 \n 9.0 \n41365 \nOct-13 Apr-14 Oct-14 Apr-15 Oct-15 Apr-16 Oct-16 Apr-17 Oct-17 \n% \nUS$ BILLIONS \nM3 \nM3 Annual Growth rate \n30 \nFigure 11: Composition of Broad Money \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2017 \n \nDomestic Credit \nBank lending to local economic agents grew by 44.31%, from $7 554.07 million in \nNovember 2016 to $10 637.23 million in November 2017. Of this growth, net credit to \nGovernment rose by 70.45% to $6 271.02 million, while credit to the private sector rose by \n6.97% to $3 705.5 million. The increase in credit to Government continues to reflect \nincreased reliance by Government on the banking sector to finance its budget deficit. \n \nThe substantial increase in money supply is therefore a reflection of the expansionary fiscal \nstance which has continued to increase RTGS money from $954 in 2016 to US$1,732 million \nin 2017 as shown in Figure 12. \n \nThe increase in the RTGS position was largely driven by increased Government financing \nthrough the overdraft at the central bank and the issuance of Treasury Bills and Bonds, which \nincreased from $3.2 billion in 2016 to $5.2 billion at the end of 2017. The increase of around \n$2 billion largely arose from securities issued for Government projects which include the \nfinancing of grain producers as well as for financing agriculture. \n \n \nTransferable \nDeposits \n77.11% \nOther Deposits \n(Time) \n18.08% \nNCDs \n0.83% \nBond Notes and \nCoins \n3.98% \n31 \nFigure 12: Average Monthly RTGS Account Balances \n \n \nUnder dollarization financing of the deficit should ideally be from foreign sources in order to \nmitigate the domestic creation of money which is not matched by foreign exchange. It is in \nthis context that the Bank will continue to ensure that the level of money supply is supportive \nof the desired inflation target of between 3-7%, consistent with the SADC macroeconomic \nconvergence target for inflation. \n \nDevelopments on Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) \nBullish trends were experienced on the local bourse during 2017 as the mainstream industrial \nindex gained by 130.4% to 333.02 points whilst the resources index put on 143.42% to 142.4 \npoints. Speculative tendencies largely drove the resurgence of the stock market in 2017. \nReflecting this, the total market capitalization rose to well over US$15.2 billion in November \n2017, before retreating to US$9.6 billion by year end. The stock market, however, \nexperienced net capital outflow of US$101 million from foreigners. \nTable 9: ZSE Indices as at 31 December 2017 \n \n31-Dec-16 \n31-Dec-17 \nCHANGE (%) \nIndustrial Index \n144.53 \n333.02 \n130.42 \nMining Index \n58.50 \n142.40 \n143.42 \nMarket Capitalisation (US$m) \n4,007.96 \n9,580.57 \n139.04 \n \n '- \n 600,000,000.00 \n 1,200,000,000.00 \n 1,800,000,000.00 \n 2,400,000,000.00 \nJanuary \nMarch \nMay \nJuly \nSeptember November \nBillions \n2016 \n2017 \n32 \nInflation Developments \nSince climbing out of deflation in February 2017, annual headline inflation has remained in \nthe acceptable range to close the year at 3.46%. The average inflation for 2017 was 1%. \n \nFigure 13: Annual Inflation Profile (%) \n \nSource: Zimstat, 2018 \n \nThe positive rate of inflation, as reflected in increases in prices of most commodities, was on \nthe back of speculative and profiteering tendencies; pass-through effects of parallel market \npremiums on foreign exchange; shortages of some imported basic commodities; as well as \nsome external factors such as firming South African rand and strengthening oil prices. \n \nFood Inflation \nFood inflation surged from -0.30% in January 2017 to 5.65% in November 2017, before \naccelerating further to 6.60% in December 2017. The increase in food inflation was largely \ndriven by prices of meat; vegetables; and fish. Decline in the prices of bread and cereals, \nresponding to the 2016/17 bumper harvest, however, partially offset the price increases in \nother categories. \n \nThe increase in food inflation was partly due to supply factors, particularly in relation to \nmeat, poultry and fish, while the sourcing of foreign exchange on alternative markets \nescalated the production costs. Reduced livestock slaughters due to improved pastures and \nthe impact of the avian flu on poultry production, negatively affected the supply of beef, pork \nand chicken. \n-5. \n-2.25 \n0.5 \n3.25 \n6. \n1/1/14 \n3/1/14 \n5/1/14 \n7/1/14 \n9/1/14 \n11/1/14 \n1/1/15 \n3/1/15 \n5/1/15 \n7/1/15 \n9/1/15 \n11/1/15 \n1/1/16 \n3/1/16 \n5/1/16 \n7/1/16 \n9/1/16 \n11/1/16 \n1/1/17 \n3/1/17 \n5/1/17 \n7/1/17 \n9/1/17 \n11/1/17 \nFood Inflation \nNon-Food Inflation \nAll Items \n33 \nNon-Food Inflation \nAnnual non-food inflation also accelerated from -0.82% in January 2017 to close the year at \n2.0%, largely driven by increases in the furniture and household equipment; recreation and \nculture; and clothing and footwear subcategories. Increases in non-food prices were largely \ninduced by the parallel market premiums on foreign exchange. \n \nRegional Inflation Developments \nZimbabwe’s inflation rate, hitherto the lowest in SADC, is now comparable with low \ninflation countries such as Botswana and Tanzania, as shown in Table 10. \n \nTable 10: Regional and International Annual Inflation Trends \n \nZim \nSA \nBots \nMoz \nTanz \nZamb \nMal \nUSA \nJan \n-0.1 \n6.6 \n3.1 \n20.6 \n5.2 \n7.0 \n18.2 \n2.5 \nFeb \n0.1 \n6.3 \n3.4 \n20.9 \n5.5 \n6.8 \n16.1 \n2.7 \nMar \n0.2 \n6.1 \n3.5 \n21.6 \n6.4 \n6.7 \n15.8 \n2.4 \nApr \n0.5 \n5.3 \n3.4 \n21.3 \n6.4 \n6.7 \n14.6 \n2.2 \nMay \n0.7 \n5.4 \n3.5 \n20.5 \n6.1 \n6.5 \n12.3 \n1.9 \nJun \n0.3 \n5.1 \n3.5 \n18.1 \n5.4 \n6.8 \n11.3 \n1.6 \nJul \n0.14 \n4.6 \n3.4 \n16.17 \n5.2 \n6.6 \n10.2 \n1.7 \nAug \n0.14 \n4.8 \n3.4 \n14.35 \n5.0 \n6.3 \n9.3 \n1.9 \nSep \n0.78 \n5.1 \n3.2 \n10.76 \n5.3 \n6.6 \n8.4 \n2.2 \nOct \n2.2 \n4.8 \n3.0 \n10.7 \n5.1 \n6.4 \n8.3 \n2.0 \nNov \n3.0 \n4.6 \n2.9 \n7.2 \n4.4 \n6.3 \n7.7 \n2.2 \nDec \n3.5 \nn/a \n3.2 \n5.7 \n4.0 \n6.1 \nn/a \n2.1 \n \n Source: ZIMSTAT, Country’s Central Banks, 2017 \n \nThe annual inflation of 3.5% for December 2017 is within the SADC convergence \nbenchmark of between 3 to 7 %. \n \n34 \nInflation Outlook \nIn the outlook period, the risk of inflation would be mitigated by the positive domestic and \ninternational goodwill, following the new economic and political dispensation in the country, \nwhich is already having some dampening effects on speculative tendencies, as well as on \nadverse inflationary expectations. On the other hand, external factors such as further \nstrengthening of the South African rand; the US dollar; high demand for imported goods and \nservices; and surge in oil prices, may continue to put pressure on domestic prices. \n \nThe Bank will, therefore continue to closely monitor price movements, and take pre-emptive \nand corrective measures to contain inflation to the SADC target of between 3 - 7% by year-\nend. Anticipated reduction in food imports and food prices, following the bumper harvest in \nthe 2016/17 agricultural season, and the average 2017/18 cropping season, will dampen \nprices and moderate inflation during year. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n35 \nSECTION 6 \nFINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS \n \nNineteen banking institutions were operating as at 31 December 2017, as shown in Table 11. \n Table 11: Architecture of the Banking Sector \nType of Institution \nNumber \nCommercial Banks \n13 \nBuilding Societies \n5 \nSavings Bank \n1 \nTotal Banking Institutions \n19 \n \n \nIn addition, the institutions indicated in Table 12 are also under the purview of the Reserve \nBank. \n \nTable 12: Other Operating Institutions \nCredit-only-MFIs \n178 \nDeposit-taking MFIs \n4 \nDevelopment \nFinancial \nInstitutions \n(SMEDCO and IDBZ) \n2 \n \n \nPerformance of the Banking Sector \nThe performance of the banking sector was satisfactory over the year to 31 December 2017, \nas reflected by the improvement in the key risk and performance indicators. Total assets \nincreased to $11.25 billion while capitalisation and profitability indicators also reflect \nimproved performance. The financial soundness indicators for the review period are \nprovided in Table 13. \n \n \n \n36 \nTable 13: Financial Soundness Indicators \nKey Indicators \nBenchm\nark \nDec-16 \nJun-17 \nSep-17 \n \nDec-17 \nTotal Assets \n- \n$8.73bn \n$9.65bn \n$10.26bn \n$11.25bn \nTotal Loans \n- \n$3.69bn \n$3.64bn \n$3.73bn \n$3.80bn \nNet Capital Base \n- \n$1.34bn \n$1.38bn \n$1.43bn \n$1.58bn \nTotal Deposits \n- \n$6.51bn \n$6.99bn \n$7.62bn \n$8.48bn \nNet Profit \n- \n$181.06m \n$100.59m \n$160.73m \n$241.94m \nReturn on Assets \n- \n2.26% \n1.26% \n1.89% \n2.61% \nReturn on Equity \n- \n12.64% \n6.80% \n11.15% \n15.48% \nCapital Adequacy \nRatio \n12% \n23.70% \n26.89% \n26.98% \n27.63% \nLoans to Deposits \n70% \n56.64% \n52.11% \n49.01% \n44.81% \nNon-Performing \nLoans Ratio \n5% \n7.87% \n7.95% \n8.63% \n7.08% \nProvisions to \nAdversely \nClassified Loans \n- \n68.51% \n126.29% \n83.37% \n90.26% \nLiquidity Ratio \n30% \n61.91% \n66.87% \n62.49% \n62.62% \nCost to Income \nRatio \n \n79.20% \n72.50% \n77.02% \n75.36% \n \n \n37 \nBanking Sector Deposits \nAs shown in Table 13, banking sector deposits (including inter-bank deposits) increased by \n26.47%, from $6.99 billion as at 30 June 2017 to $8.48 billion as at 31 December 2017. The \nnotable increase in deposits was partly attributable to increased export receipts, expansionary \nimpact of government expenditure and multiplier effect of new deposits. \n \nLoans and Advances \nBanking sector loans and advances increased from $3.69 billion as at 30 June 2017 to $3.80 \nbillion as at 31 December 2017. Banking institutions have continued to support the \nproductive sectors of the economy. Lending to the productive sectors constituted 73.64% of \ntotal sector loans as at 31 December 2017 as shown in Figure 14. \n \nFigure 14: Sectoral Distribution of Loans as at 31 December 2017 \n \nCapitalisation \nThe aggregate core capital increased by 10.48%, from $1.24 billion as at 30 June 2017 to \n$1.37 billion as at 31 December 2017, on the back of improved earnings performance. All \nbanking institutions are in compliance with minimum capital requirements as shown in Table \n14. \n \n \n \nCONSUMPTIVE \n18.60% \nOTHER \n7.76% \nAGRICULTURAL \n15.34% \nMANUFACTURING \n17.29% \nMORTGAGES \n13.16% \nSTATE AND ENTERPRISES \n2.12% \nTRADE AND SERVICES \n0.91% \nMINING \n3.18% \n[CATEGORY NAME] \n[VALUE] \n[CATEGORY NAME] \n[VALUE] \nFINANCIAL FIRMS \n8.29% \nPRODUCTIVE \n73.64% \n38 \n \nTable 14: Banking Sector Capitalisation (US$ million) \nInstitution \nCore Capital \nas at 30 June \n2016 \n(US$ \nmillion) \nCore Capital \nas at 31 Dec \n2017 (US$ \nmillion) \nPrescribed Minimum \nCapital requirements \n(US$ million) \n CBZ Bank* \n238.9 \n218.41 \n25 \n Stanbic Bank \n120.75 \n135.52 \n25 \n Barclays Bank \n67.55 \n79.22 \n25 \n BancABC \n74.35 \n75.96 \n25 \n Ecobank \n64.86 \n73.95 \n25 \n Steward Bank \n46.16 \n71.91 \n25 \n Standard Chartered Bank \n66.68 \n71.34 \n25 \n FBC Bank \n63.99 \n70.37 \n25 \n ZB Bank \n60.32 \n65.16 \n25 \n NMB Bank \n53.85 \n61.31 \n25 \n Agribank \n52.35 \n55.54 \n25 \n MBCA Bank \n50.57 \n54.52 \n25 \n Metbank \n39.87 \n44.99 \n25 \nBUILDING SOCIETIES \n \n \n \nCABS Building Society \n114.44 \n127.75 \n20 \nFBC Building Society \n43.75 \n47.48 \n20 \nNational Building Society \n20.57 \n43.84 \n20 \nZB Building Society \n17.36 \n18.38 \n20 \nSAVINGS BANK \n \n \n \nPOSB \n44.88 \n53.83 \n- \nTotal \n1,241.25 \n1,369.48 \n- \n \n* including CBZ Building Society \n \nAll banking institutions were adequately capitalised as at 31 December 2017. The average \ncapital adequacy and tier 1 ratios were 27.63% and 23.97%, against the required minimum of \n12% and 8%, respectively. \n \n \n \n39 \nHousing Development \nThe provision of housing is a critical pillar in the infrastructure eco-system of an economy. In \nthis regard, the Reserve Bank opened up the building society segment to allow other banking \ninstitutions such as commercial banks, to offer mortgages to deepen the sector. As at 31 \nDecember 2017, the banking sector funded a total of 5,700 new housing units valued at \n$172.08 million and is projected increase to 11,611 units valued at $365.63 million as at 31 \nDecember 2018 as indicated in the Table 15. \n \nTable 15: Projected Housing Development \n \nActual 31.12.17 \nProjected 31.12.18 \nCategory \nNo of units Value ($) \nNo of units Value ($) \nHigh Density \n \n3,843 \n 53,299,678 \n 7,975 \n 207,901,869.24 \nMedium Density \n \n910 \n 42,812,586 \n 2,820 \n 73,464,304.54 \nLow Density \n \n905 \n 57,526,175 \n 743 \n 57,270,886.34 \nSub-Total \n \n5,658 \n 153,638,439 \n 11,537 \n 338,637,060 \nCommercial \n \n42 \n 18,442,315 \n 74 \n 26,988,807.30 \nGrand Total \n \n5,700 \n 172,080,754 \n 11,611 \n 365,625,867 \n \n \nIt is encouraging to note that the highest number of housing units continues to be targeted at \nlow income households in the high density areas. Significant imbalances, however, exist in \nthe housing market, wherein demand outstrips supply and to this end, the banking sector \nplays a central role in bridging this gap. Against this background, banking institutions are \nurged to come up with innovative affordable mortgage funding models in order to meet the \never increasing housing demand. \n \nNon-Performing Loans \n40 \nThe quality of the banking sector loan portfolios has improved over the years. The ratio of \nnon-performing loans (NPLs) was 7.08% as at 31 December 2017, down from 7.87% as at 31 \nDecember 2016 as banks continue to strengthen their credit risk management systems, in the \naftermath of balance sheet clean up through disposals of NPLs to ZAMCO. \nFigure 15: Trend in Non-Performing Loans 2011 – December 2017 \n \n \nZAMCO \nAs at 31 December 2017, ZAMCO had acquired NPLs amounting to $987 million. These \nacquisitions have assisted banks to clean up their balance sheets so that they are better able to \nsupport the economy through provision of credit. ZAMCO has now embarked on the \nResolution and Recovery phase of its operating cycle. In this phase, all efforts are devoted \ntowards implementing recovery strategies and collecting from the borrowers whose NPLs \nhave been acquired by ZAMCO. \n \nEarnings \nThe net profit for the period ended 31 December 2017 amounted to $241.94 million, \nrepresenting an increase of 33.91%, from $181.06 million reported in the corresponding \nperiod in 2016. Eighteen (18) out of 19 operating banking institutions recorded profits during \nthe period ended 31 December 2017. \n \n7.55% \n13.46% \n15.92% \n20.45% \n15.91% \n14.27% \n10.81% 10.74% \n7.87% 8.39% 7.95% 8.63% \n7.08% \n0% \n6% \n11% \n17% \n22% \n2011 \n2013 \nDec-14 \nMar-16 \nDec-16 \nJun-17 \nDec-17 \nLevel of NPL Ratio \n41 \nLiquidity \nThe average prudential liquidity ratio of 62.62% for the banking sector as at 31 December \n2017, was above the regulatory requirement of 30%. All banks were compliant with the \nminimum prudential liquidity ratio as at 31 December 2017. Figure 16 shows the trend in the \nbanking sector average prudential liquidity ratio since March 2014. \n \nFigure 16: Prudential Liquidity Ratio Trend (%) \n \n \nNotwithstanding the high average prudential liquidity ratios recorded across the sector, the \nunderlying foreign currency shortages due to structural challenges in the economy have also \naffected the banking industry. Various measures, including the increased usage of digital \nplatforms, are envisaged to ease the demand for physical cash. \n \nDeposit Insurance Payments \nAs at 31 December 2017, a total of 11,744 out of 54,909 depositors by number had been \ncompensated out of the Deposit Protection Fund in respect of the failed contributory \ninstitutions under liquidation. In monetary terms $3.2 million was paid, which represents \n50% of the total exposure of $6.4 million. Table 16 provides a synopsis of deposit insurance \npayments for the period under review. \n \n \n38.08 \n40.86 39.99 \n37.18 36.61 38.14 \n43.13 \n45.43 \n49.63 \n52.47 \n61.91 \n66.87 \n62.49 62.62 \n25. \n36.25 \n47.5 \n58.75 \n70. \nMar-14 Jun-14 Sept-14 Dec-14 Mar-15 Jun-15 Sept-15 Dec-15 Mar-16 Jun-16 Dec-16 Jun-17 Sept-17 Dec-17 \n42 \nTable 16: Deposit Insurance Payments as at 31 December 2017 \n \nTotal \nDepositors \nGross \nDeposits \n($ m) \nExposure \n(Deposits \npayable at \n$500) \nNo. of \nDepositors \nPaid to \nDate \nValue of \nDeposits \npaid ($'000) \n% Paid to \nExposure \nRoyal \nBank \n5,453 \n2.57 \n472,207 \n3,105 \n356 \n75.5% \nTrust Bank 2,958 \n11.48 \n328,516 \n415 \n146 \n44.6% \nGenesis \n86 \n1.43 \n11,810 \n62 \n9 \n74.7% \nAllied \nBank \n9,228 \n14.32 \n1,248,307 \n1,529 \n534 \n42.8% \nInterfin \nBank \n13,021 \n137.34 \n918,814 \n682 \n260 \n28.3% \nAfrAsia \n24,163 \n18.56 \n3,439,276 \n5,951 \n1,936 \n56.3% \nTotal \n54,909 \n185.69 \n6,418,930 \n11,744 \n3,241 \n50.5% \n \n \nThe deadline for Genesis depositors to receive compensation from the deposit protection fund \nlapsed on 30 June 2017 in terms of section 38(5b) of the Deposit Protection Corporation Act \n[Chapter 24:29]. Payments in respect of liquidation will, however, remain in force in \naccordance with the framework and parameters as provided in the Companies Act [Chapter \n24:03] as read together with the Insolvency Act [Chapter 6:04]. \n \nFinancial Stability Stress Tests \nAs part of measures to promote financial sector stability, the Reserve Bank in collaboration \nwith the World Bank and other financial sector regulators, shall assess the effectiveness of \nexisting frameworks to respond to crisis situations in line with international best practices, \nduring the first quarter of 2018. Further, in keeping with its mandate of promoting financial \nstability, the Reserve Bank shall conduct comprehensive financial stability stress tests on the \nbanking sector in September 2018 to assess impact and resilience of their portfolios and \nultimately capital and liquidity. \n \n \n \n43 \nOTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BANKING SECTOR \n \nBarclays Bank of Zimbabwe Limited \nFMB Capital Holdings Plc of Malawi acquired 81% of Barclays Bank Plc Shares in Afcarme \nin October 2017, resulting in an effective shareholding of 42.68% in Barclays Bank of \nZimbabwe. \n \nTime Bank of Zimbabwe Limited \nThe Bank and Time Bank of Zimbabwe Limited have had historical disputes, which have \nbeen the subject of various litigation and Time Bank has not been operating as a banking \ninstitution. A resolution has since been reached and Time Bank will resume banking \noperations subject to prior inspections by the Bank to ensure that the institution puts in place \nthe necessary capital and banking systems and structures. \n \nZimbabwe Women Microfinance Bank \nThe Women’s Bank, which was licenced on 14 September 2017 as a deposit-taking \nmicrofinance institution, is finalising the relevant processes, systems and infrastructure in \npreparation for a pre-opening assessment by the Bank before the institution is authorised to \nopen its doors to the public. It is envisaged that the institution will contribute towards the \nfinancial inclusion agenda and play an important role of engendering a savings culture among \nlow-income groups. \n \nLegal Developments \nThe Bank, in collaboration with the Ministry of Finance is working on a Microfinance \nAmendment Bill. The Bill seeks to address the following among other issues: \na) provide for perpetual licences for deposit-taking microfinance institutions, subject to \ncancellation in the event of breach of the law, in the same manner as other banking \ninstitutions; \nb) extend the tenure of the licence for credit-only microfinance institutions from the current \none year to five years; and \n44 \nc) enhance corporate governance systems and risk management practices within the \nmicrofinance sector. \n \nPerformance of the Microfinance Sector \nThe performance of the microfinance sector remained largely stable over the year, in terms of \nboth outreach and loan portfolio growth. The performance of the sector is expected to \nimprove on the back of anticipated improvements in operating environment in the outlook \nperiod. A comparison of the key microfinance sector indicators for December 2016 and 2017 \nis provided in Table 17. \n \nTable 17: Microfinance Performance Indicators, Sept 2016 – Sept 2017 \nIndicator \nSept 16 \nDec 16 \nMar 17 \nJun 17 \nSept 17 \nNumber of Licensed Institutions \n169 \n185 \n180 \n187 \n189 \nTotal Loans (US$m) \n200.80 \n206.28 \n215.24 \n229.44 \n238.60 \nTotal Assets (US$m) \n255.32 \n275.04 \n291.89 \n297.85 \n341.17 \nTotal Deposits (DTMFIs) \n(US$m) \n2.10 \n4.19 \n5.12 \n6.62 \n5.65 \nNumber of Savings Accounts \n(DTMFIs) \n1,060 \n1,411 \n1,993 \n2,265 \n2,848 \nPortfolio at Risk (PaR>30 \ndays)* (%) \n6.11 \n8.34 \n7.52 \n6.46 \n7.68 \nNumber of Active Clients \n263,806 \n290,552 \n257,498 \n322,728 \n254,094 \nNumber of Outstanding Loans \n279,148 \n352,225 \n620,728 \n372,837 \n295,547 \nNumber of Branches \n595 \n659 \n648 \n698 \n681 \n \n* Portfolio at Risk [30] days-The value of all loans outstanding that have one or more instalments of \nprincipal past due more than [30] days. This includes the entire unpaid principal balance, including both \nthe past due and future instalments, but not accrued interest. It also includes loans that have been \nrestructured or rescheduled. \n \nThe microfinance sector registered a 33.68% growth in total assets over the year from \n$255.21 million as at 30 September 2016 to $341.17 million as at 30 September 2017. The \n45 \nfour (4) operational DTMFI had a market share of 25.32% of the total microfinance sector \nloans as at 30 September 2017. Women continue to benefit from facilities that are targeted at \nthe marginalized and low income, with loans to the women accounting for 38.36% of the \ntotal sector loan book. Figure 17 indicates the trend in microfinance women borrowers. \n \nFigure 17: Growth of Active & Women Clients \n \n \nFor the nine months ended 30 September 2017, credit only microfinance institutions posted \nan aggregate profit of $13.34 million while the deposit taking microfinance institutions’ sub-\nsector recorded $1.27 million. A total of forty-six credit-only microfinance institutions \nposted losses largely due to unsustainably high cost structures and high levels of delinquent \nloans, while in the DTMFI subsector, one (1) institution posted losses largely due to the \nabsorption of start-up costs. The industry Operating Self Sufficiency ratio 123.95% is above \nthe break-even point of 100%, indicating that the microfinance sector in Zimbabwe is \nsustainable. \n \n \n \n 58,325 \n 96,749 \n 150,188 \n 205,282 \n 205,940 \n 290,552 \n 254,094 \n 16,159 \n 31,453 \n 54,622 \n 67,536 \n 71,811 \n 128,337 \n 97,470 \n '- \n 75,000 \n 150,000 \n 225,000 \n 300,000 \n 375,000 \n31-Dec-11 \n31-Dec-12 \n31-Dec-13 \n31-Dec-14 \n31-Dec-15 \n31-Dec-16 \n30-Sept-17 \nNumber of total clients \nNumber of female clients \n46 \nSECTION 7 \nPOLICY MEASURES TO ENHANCE FINANCIAL STABILITY AND TO \nPROMOTE BUSINESS CONFIDENCE IN THE ECONOMY \n \nIn order to enhance business confidence and credibility under the ‘Zimbabwe is open for \nbusiness’ narrative, supportive monetary and fiscal measures are essential to walk the talk to \nimprove the monetary environment which is characterized by tight foreign currency liquidity. \nThe panacea for the challenge of tight foreign currency is to increase production, exports, \nforeign direct investment, diaspora remittances, loans and putting in place measures to \nprotect investors’ funds. In line with this narrative and to enhance the ease of doing business \nin the economy, the following measures are being put in place with immediate effect to \ngradually liberalise the foreign currency market and promote business confidence. \n \n1. Enhancing the Nostro Stabilisation Facilities to Support Foreign Payments \nThe Bank is enhancing the Nosto Stabilisation facilities by US$400 million to support the \nfollowing: \n \na) To provide assurances that international remittances and individual foreign \ncurrency inflows received through normal banking channels are available for use \nwhen required by the owners; \n \nb) To meet the foreign exchange requirements for the importation of essential \nrequirements that include fuel, medications, electricity, cash imports, and \nindustrial raw materials for the manufacture of cooking oil, other food products, \npackaging, exports, etc. \n \nc) Refining the operation of the Portfolio Investment Fund by ensuring that all \nportfolio investment inflows are ring-fenced to meet the portfolio investment \noutflows which shall be processed by giving priority to capital before capital \nappreciation (profits) and dividends. This policy measure is necessary to augment \nthe current US$5 million that has been provided in the Fund as seed capital and to \nfurther provide assurances to investors that Zimbabwe is open for business. \n \n \n \n \n47 \n2. Provision of Investment Guarantees to Protect Investors’ Funds \nThe Bank is working with the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) to put in place a \nUS$1.5 billion facility that is earmarked for the provision of guarantees (US$1 billion) to \ninvestments coming into the country and for liquidity support (US$500 million). Such \nguarantees and liquidity support are necessary to protect investors’ funds from country risk, \nand in doing so, enhancing investor confidence. \n \n3. Provision of 7% tax-free savings bonds on non-resident transferable funds \nIn order to provide return on remittable funds currently held in Non-Resident Transferrable \nAccounts in respect of in-country funds such as dividends and profits due to non-residents \nthat cannot be immediately remitted as a result of the current foreign currency shortages, such \nfunds can now be invested in tax-free savings bonds at a coupon rate of 7%. This \ncompensation process is necessary to assure investors of returns on their idle funds seated at \nbanks. \n \n4. Enhanced Export Incentive Scheme for Horticulture, Cotton, Macadamia and Gold \nThe economy’s foreign currency inflows are on a positive trajectory, largely on account of \nincreasing export receipts that grew by 36% in 2017 from the 2016 level. It is therefore \nimportant to sustain this momentum for increased foreign currency inflows. Accordingly, the \ncurrent export incentive scheme that is funded by bond notes shall be maintained to promote \nexport competitiveness at the current thresholds. The scheme which was adjusted to 12.5% \nfor tobacco growers starting this year shall be tweaked to 10% for horticulture, cotton, \nmacadamia and gold producers. \n \n5. Increasing tobacco and gold support facilities \nIn order to enhance foreign currency inflows from tobacco and gold production, the tobacco \ninput finance facility has been increased from the $28 million disbursed in 2017 to $70 \nmillion, while the gold support facility has been increased from $74 million (disbursed to 255 \nentities) in 2017 to $150 million. \n \nFinancing tobacco and gold and other exportable products such as horticulture, mining, \ntourism, etc, using RTGS funds seated at banks is beneficial for generating foreign exchange \nfor the country. Further, and in line with the tobacco finance order, deserving tobacco \n48 \nmerchants shall be granted authority by the Bank to use RTGS money to purchase tobacco \nfrom the auction floors. This dispensation shall also apply to deserving cotton merchants. \n6. Establishment of Offshore Financial Service Centre \nThe Bank is currently working on a legal framework to operationalize the establishment of an \noffshore financial service centre within the context of the Special Economic Zones (SEZ) \nprogramme. The legal framework is built on providing investors with the supportive policy \nenvironment and guidelines to pursue various investment options in the financial service \ncentre. \n \n7. Purchase of gold for value addition \nThe jewellery industry remains key in promoting value addition which is in sync with \nGovernment policy on mineral beneficiation. In order to enhance the gold industry’s \ncontribution to this value addition objective, priority shall be given to export oriented \njewellery production, where the jewellery manufacturer shall retain 100% of the foreign \ncurrency generated from the value added component for use in their business operations. \nApproved jewellery manufacturers to meet local demand shall be availed not more than 3 kgs \nper quarter through Fidelity Printers and Refiners under a properly monitored arrangement to \nguard against abuse of this facility. \n \n8. Enhancing the Ease of Access to Productive Sector Facilities \nThe Bank has put in place measures to ensure ease of access to the productive sector facilities \nthat are earmarked for the promotion of exports, production, empowerment and business \nlinkages. This measure is necessitated by the need to address concerns raised by both \nbusiness and individuals on the difficulties confronted in accessing these facilities. It is \ntherefore necessary to ensure that final beneficiaries have ease access to funding for them to \nexpeditiously promote production and exports. \n \n9. Upwards Review of Threshold for Exports by Individuals \nIn order to improve ease of doing export business by individuals, going forward the threshold \nfor value of goods that can be exported by an individual without completing export forms, \nForm CD1, has been increased from the current US$1,000 to US$2,000. Sale proceeds would \nneed to be repatriated into the country. \n49 \n \n \n \n10. Upwards Review of Foreign Currency Retention Thresholds \nIn recognition of the need to ensure continuous generation of foreign exchange, the foreign \ncurrency retention threshold for all services and products except gold, diamonds, platinum, \nchrome and tobacco remains at 100% of export receipts for exporters’ use in their business \noperations within an extended period of up to 14 days from the receipt of funds. The retention \nthreshold for private owned diamond firms, platinum and chrome producers has been \nincreased from 20% to 35% whilst that for gold, public owned diamond firms and tobacco \nremain as per current policy. \n \n11. Downward Review of Cost of Export Documents \nThe current charges based on Exchange Control’s flagging system on the exports of non-\ncompliant exporters are high. Given the need to facilitate exports at the same time affording \nexporters an opportunity to comply with the Presidential Amnesty on illegally externalized \nforeign currency and assets, the maximum fixed administrative charge to access exports \ndocuments has been reduced from $50 to $20 per export transaction. \n \n12. Establishment of an Investment Desk to Cater for the Diasporans \nThere has been increased calls for the establishment of a desk to facilitate Zimbabweans in \nthe diaspora to participate in the development of their country through mobilizing \ninvestments into all sectors of the economy. Already, there has been a positive response to \nthese calls as evidenced by the numerous enquiries from Diasporans and international \ninvestors. Consistent with the tenets of the ease of doing business, in an open business \nenvironment, the Bank has established a desk to assist those in the diaspora to get involved in \nthe investment opportunities within the national economy. \n \n13. Issuance of Diaspora Tobacco & Gold Production Financing Bonds \nTobacco and gold exports contribute significantly to the country’s export receipts. The \ntobacco and gold sectors, if sustainably and adequately funded, have the potential to generate \nmore foreign currency for the country. The Bank has also noted that small and start-up \ncompanies in the tobacco sector are failing to access offshore funding in line with the tobacco \nfinancing order. \n50 \n \nIn order to allow Zimbabweans in the diaspora to participate fully, or on a twinning \narrangement basis, in the turnaround of the country’s economy and exports generation, the \nBank has opened up the issuance of well secured Tobacco and Gold Production Financing \nBonds to diaspora investors. \n \nThe Diaspora Tobacco Production Financing Bond will be issued to Zimbabweans in the \ndiaspora to finance tobacco production. Bond holders will be paid capital plus interest as \nsingle bullet payment at the end of the tobacco season. \n \nThe Diaspora Gold Production Financing Bond will be issued to Zimbabweans in the \ndiaspora to finance gold production by small scale gold miners. Coupon payments will be \nmade on monthly basis as gold is sold to Fidelity Printers and Refiners. \n \n14. Incentive for Diaspora Investments Accounts in Zimbabwe \nIn an effort to facilitate inward investments by Zimbabweans in the diaspora, going forward, \nZimbabweans in the diaspora can open Diaspora Investment Accounts with local banks of \ntheir choice. The accounts which shall be for savings/investment purposes or for holding \nfunds earmarked for undertaking investment projects in Zimbabwe, shall be funded from \noffshore and shall be entitled to a 7% Diaspora Remittance Incentive from the RBZ over and \nabove the interest offered by the bank. These accounts shall be ring-fenced against \ncomingling with RTGS money. \n \n15. Payment Arrangements for the Sale of Immovable Property & Management Fees \nThe Bank has noted the irregular execution of Zimbabwean immovable property sales, where \nsettlement of funds is being done offshore. Stakeholders in the property market sector are \nadvised that such practices are not consistent with current Exchange Control rules and \nregulations. Accordingly all receipts from the sale of immovable properties in Zimbabwe \nshould be received into the country and accounted for through normal banking channels. \nExceptions to this policy position require prior Exchange Control authority. \n \n51 \nSimilarly, the current policy that limits the annual payment of management, technical or \nconsultancy fees to 3% of annual revenue shall continue to apply to all businesses with \nexceptions requiring prior Exchange Control approval. \n \n16. Further Promoting the Use of Plastic Money Towards a Cash-lite Society \nThe Bank is further accelerating efforts towards a cash-lite society by the adoption of friendly \nbanking and plastic money payment platforms such as tap-and-go systems and pre-funded \ncards to enhance the ease of transacting and ease of passage at tollgates within the country. \nThis measure is intended to further promote the use of plastic money which significantly \ngrew by 210% in 2017 from the 2016 position to reach a coverage of more than 80% of total \nretail transactions in the country. \n \n17. Curbing of Multi-Pricing System & Refusal of Plastic Money \nGovernment is putting in place measures to curb the multi-pricing system within the \neconomy. Multi-pricing and refusal to accept plastic money is counter-productive to the \nsuccessful and unparalleled efforts achieved so far in the promotion and usage of plastic \nmoney in Zimbabwe. Businesses will need to be reminded to show respect to consumers and \nto exercise self-discipline under the new economic dispensation. It is against this background \nthat the 2018 Finance Bill which has now gone through Parliament and now awaits approval \nby the Senate is making these malpractice of multi-pricing and the refusal of plastic money \nillegal. \n \n18. Strengthening Financial Credibility \nIn line with the lending powers of the Bank to Government as provided for in Section 11 1(a) \nof the Reserve Bank Act [Chapter 22:15], the Bank is putting in place measures to ensure that \nthe lending limit to Government does not exceed the regulated 20% of the previous year’s \nrevenue of the State. This measure is necessary in order to comply with good corporate \ngovernance and to mitigate the unintended consequences of excess Government overdraft on \nthe economy. \n \n19. Strengthening of Liquidity Management Systems \nTo ensure stability of the monetary system, the Bank is strengthening its liquidity \nmanagement systems to mop RTGS money and make it more attractive for investment. The \n52 \nBank will achieve this through issuance of medium-term government paper to improve \nmonetary policy stance on the economy by signalling and developing a yield curve which \nalso helps in the development of a local bond market. Already the Bank has issued a 7% \nsavings bond, whose uptake has been satisfactory, raising $165 million in three months, \nOctober to December 2017. \n \nFurther, the reintroduction of an auction system for Treasury Bills and Bonds will bring in \ntransparency as well as allow a discernible yield curve to be developed. The Bank is also \nassessing the possibility of reintroducing Open Market Operation (OMO) tools during the \ncourse of the year in order to deal with excess liquidity in the market. \n \n20. Acceptance of 99-Year Land Leases as Security by Banks \nIn line with the current economic dispensation’s aspiration to transform agriculture into \nviable business proposition and taking into account of the significant improvements made by \nGovernment on the 99-year leases to enhance the security of tenure of the lease and making it \nbankable and transferrable, the Bank has agreed with banking institutions for them to accept \nthe 99-year leases as security for accessing credit from financial institutions in line with the \nprovisions of the leases. \n \n21. Policy Note on the Presidential Amnesty on Externalised Forex and Assets \nFollowing the announcement of the Presidential Amnesty on externalised foreign currency \nand assets by His Excellency, the President, the Bank is encouraged by the overwhelming \nresponse from Zimbabweans desiring to comply with the amnesty arrangements. The \nresponses have been positive from both individuals and corporates in respect of foreign \ncurrency (and not decommissioned or demonetised local currency) that was externalized by \ncommission or omission or under the liberalized Exchange Control framework with such \nforeign currency banked offshore or used to acquire foreign assets. \n \nThe response to date demonstrates the willingness by corporates and individuals to comply \nwith these arrangements. Already, bank deposits have been increasing on account of funds \nbeing channelled into the formal system, as corporates and individuals take heed of the \namnesty to repatriate externalized funds and/or deposit funds in the banking system. The \n53 \nBank is offering 7% tax-free savings bonds for funds to be repatriated under the amnesty \ndispensation where funds were externalised under the auspices of free funds. \n \nIt is essential to note that the requirement for the disclosure of foreign assets as is required by \nthe Amnesty is in compliance with international best practice and is therefore not unique to \nZimbabwe. Almost all jurisdictions make such disclosures mandatory. In any case, all \npayments need to be bonafide to satisfy the Know Your Customer (KYC) and Customer Due \nDiligence (CDD) banking principles. The Amnesty which pertains to externalised foreign \ncurrency and assets bought outside Zimbabwe using foreign currency that belonged to \nZimbabwe through acts or commissions as given below does not affect funds and assets \nacquired by Zimbabweans in the diaspora. \n \ni. Export of any currency above permissible thresholds; \nii. Smuggling of gold or other precious stones; \niii. Non-repatriation of export proceeds due to the country; \niv. Undervaluation of exports and overvaluation of imports and retention of funds offshore; \nv. Trade mis-invoicing by importers to evade customs duties, VAT, or income taxes; \nvi. Non-return of temporary exports and disguised exports of samples; \nvii. Payments for imports of goods and services whose corresponding value has not been \nreceived into the country; \nviii. Remittance of funds used for investments offshore without Exchange Control approval; \nix. Offshore retention of funds realised from sale of local assets for example, shares in local \ncompanies to foreign residents; \nx. Offshore retention of investment income such as dividends, profits and management fees \ndue to the country; \nxi. Remittance of funds for repayment of fictitious offshore loans; \nxii. Fictitious and unreasonable management fees and technical fees; \nxiii. Settlement of purchase prices offshore, for an immoveable property situated in \nZimbabwe; \nxiv. Operation of illegal offshore bank accounts by individuals and companies funded from \nZimbabwe; \n54 \nxv. Offshore retention of sale proceeds realised from smuggled goods or minerals; and \nxvi. Any other unauthorised offshore retention of funds without Exchange Control approval. \n \n22. Policy Note on the Continuation of the Multi-Currency System \nGovernment’s policy stance on currency reform that pertains to de-dollarisation is well \ndocumented as was clearly articulated by his Excellency, the President. Government is quite \naware that the most important economic fundamentals that the country would need to achieve \nbefore any currency reform begins are a healthier foreign exchange buffer sufficient to cover \nat least 3 months of imports and reducing fiscal deficit to sustainable levels as defined in the \nReserve Bank of Zimbabwe Act. These fundamentals which are critical to ensure free \nconvertibility are still weak or fragile for a currency reform. It is against this reality that the \ncountry continues to use the multi-currency system. \n \nIn future, when the said economic fundamentals become strong, the road map for currency \nreform in Zimbabwe will be predicated or tailor-made along the currency board (CB) and/or \ngold standard (GS) mechanisms that are stringent monetary rules, the two special features of \nwhich are high credibility of monetary authorities and the existence of self-adjustment (non-\ndiscretionary) mechanism. \n \nThe CB and GS systems have a mechanism that links the demand and supply of money to the \nbalance of payments which is essential for convertibility and for the quick elimination of \nimbalances within the economy. These systems basically take the form of a monetary \n‘constitution’ which is characterised by a higher level of credibility and confidence. \n \n23. Policy Note on Accelerated Arrears Clearance and Re-Engagement Programme \nIn line with the new economic order, Government is intensifying the re-engagement process \nwith the international community to improve international relations and to resolve the \nexternal payment arrears to the remaining International Financial Institutions (IFIs) as well as \nbilateral creditors. In this regard, Government will follow the previously agreed process for \nclearing external payment arrears to IFIs, which was endorsed by the IFIs and Bilateral \nCreditors at a meeting held on the side lines of the Annual Meetings of the IMF and World \nBank in Lima, Peru, in October 2015. \n55 \n \nThe successful resolution of arrears to IFIs will pave way for Government to negotiate debt \nrestructuring mechanisms with the Paris Club creditors. The ensuing improvement in \neconomic activity following successful re-engagement will significantly reduce the country’s \nrisk premium and unlock offshore credit lines at affordable interest rates. Access to foreign \nfinance, which has been significantly limited over the past seventeen years now, is critical to \nincrease foreign currency buffer for the country. \nIn addition, Government will also be in a position to actively engage the donor community to \ncomplement Government support to targeted social and developmental programmes. The \nenvisaged high economic growth rates to be experienced will go a long way for the country \nto sustain appropriate debt levels, increase fiscal space, jobs, production and exports. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n56 \n \nSECTION 8 \nCONCLUSION \n \nThe narrative “open for business” means that Zimbabwe is ready and willing to embrace a \nparadigm shift to attract investors, both local and foreign, for the total transformation of the \neconomy in respect of increased production, jobs, exports, fiscal space, access to capital and \nforeign finance. Improvement in these economic variables will greatly benefit the monetary \nenvironment and, in doing so, enhancing financial stability and confidence within the \nnational economy. A healthy foreign exchange buffer will strengthen the value of RTGS \nfunds and gradually reduce cash shortages. \n \n“Open for business” is not just a narrative. It calls for a dramatic change in the conduct of \nbusiness from the business as usual approach. We need to walk the talk to re-balance the \neconomy through a tight rein on fiscal deficit - increasing revenue collections and holding \nexpenditures constant - whilst at the same time enhancing Zimbabwe’s access to foreign \nfinance and increasing foreign inflows from exports and international remittances. These \nmeasures will be buttressed by accelerating the arrears clearance and re-engagement \nprogramme under the Lima, Peru, principles of engagement with the International Financial \nInstitutions and Development Partners. \n \nThe policy measures enunciated in this Statement should therefore be seen as the initial move \nto gradually open the foreign currency market to show that Zimbabwe is open for business. \n2018 should therefore be a defining year for Zimbabwe. The future of Zimbabwe is in our \nhands. \n \n \nI THANK YOU \n \nDR J.P.MANGUDYA \nGOVERNOR", "source": "RBZ", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///RBZ/Monetary_Policy_Statements/mpsfeb2018Zim.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "85e8580f22690bbd548ad08a11a2480b", "text": "R\nE\nS\nE\nR\nV\nE\nB\nA\nN\nK\nO\nF\nZ\nI\nM\nB\nA\nB\nW\nE\nSTAYING THE COURSE TO PRICE STABILITY \n9 AUGUST 2023\nMID-TERM MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT \nBy\nJOHN PANONETSA MANGUDYA\nGOVERNOR\n2 \n \n \nTABLE OF CONTENTS \nLIST OF TABLES ..................................................................................................................... 4 \nSECTION ONE: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND................................................... 5 \nSECTION TWO: ASSESSMENT OF PREVIOUS MONETARY POLICY ........................... 8 \nBank Policy Rates ................................................................................................................... 9 \nForeign Exchange Market .................................................................................................... 12 \nSECTION THREE: RECENT ECONOMIC AND INFLATION DEVELOPMENTS .......... 19 \nInflation Developments ............................................................................................................ 20 \nReserve Money Developments ................................................................................................. 22 \nBroad Money Developments .................................................................................................... 23 \nStock Market Developments .................................................................................................... 24 \nSECTION FOUR: CONDITION AND PERFORMANCE OF THE BANKING SECTOR .. 27 \nBanking Sector Developments ............................................................................................. 37 \nPerformance of the Microfinance Sector .............................................................................. 40 \nNational Financial Inclusion Strategy II Implementation .................................................... 42 \nNATIONAL PAYMENT SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENTS ..................................................... 50 \nSECTION FIVE: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEVELOPMENTS ..................................... 56 \nForeign Payments Performance ............................................................................................... 58 \nSECTION SIX: NEW MONETARY POLICY MEASURES ................................................. 60 \nSECTION SEVEN: ECONOMIC OUTLOOK ....................................................................... 62 \nSECTION EIGHT: CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 63 \n \n3 \n \nTABLE OF FIGURES \nFigure 1:Annual M3 Growth (ZWL Component) Vs ZWL Depreciation (%) ............ 10 \nFigure 2:Exchange Rate Premium (%) Official versus Parallel Market Exchange rate \nMay 2023 to Aug 2023 ................................................................................................. 13 \nFigure 3: Interbank Market Activity ............................................................................. 16 \nFigure 4: Monthly Inflation Developments (%) ........................................................... 21 \nFigure 5: Annual Inflation Developments .................................................................... 21 \nFigure 6: Components of Reserve money as at the of end June 2023 .......................... 22 \nFigure 7: Monetary Developments (ZW$ Billion) ....................................................... 23 \nFigure 8: Contributions to Money Supply Growth (%) ................................................ 24 \nFigure 9: ZSE All Share, Top 10 and Mining Indices .................................................. 25 \nFigure 10: Victoria Falls Stock Exchange All Share Index .......................................... 26 \nFigure 11: Digital: Asset Mix as at 30 June 2023......................................................... 31 \nFigure 12: Sectoral Distribution of Loans as at 30 June 2023 ...................................... 32 \nFigure 13: Trend in Non- Performing Loans ................................................................ 33 \nFigure 14: Banking Sector Income Mix as at 30 June 2023 ......................................... 34 \nFigure 15: Returns on Assets and Earnings as at 30 June 2023 ................................... 35 \nFigure 16: Prudential Liquidity Ratio Trend ................................................................ 36 \nFigure 17: Trend in Banking Sector Deposits .............................................................. 36 \nFigure 18: Value of Registered Securities as at 24 July 2023 ...................................... 45 \nFigure 19: Searches by Client as at 24 July 2023 ......................................................... 46 \nFigure 20: Types of Collateral ...................................................................................... 46 \nFigure 21: Cumulative Loan Records per Credit Reporting Institution ....................... 47 \nFigure 22: Credit Registry Usage Status ....................................................................... 48 \nFigure 23: New to Financing as at 30 June 2023 .......................................................... 49 \nFigure 24: Credit Registry Loans by Gender and Age ................................................. 49 \nFigure 25: Digital Payments Transaction Values and Volumes from Jan-June 2023 .. 50 \nFigure 26: Interoperability Transactions: values and vol Jan 22 to Jun23 ................... 51 \nFigure 27: Current Account Developments (US$ millions) ......................................... 56 \n \n \n4 \n \nLIST OF TABLES \nTable 1: Foreign Exchange Auctions Data as of 21 July 2023 ..................................... 14 \nTable 2: Wholesale FX Auction Results - 20 July 2023 .............................................. 15 \nTable 3: Trading by Bureaux De Change: 02 Jan to 30 June 2023 .............................. 17 \nTable 4: Total Foreign Currency Receipts as at 30 June 2023 (US$ Millions) ............ 18 \nTable 5: Gold Deliveries for 2023 ................................................................................ 20 \nTable 6 Banking Sector Architecture ............................................................................ 27 \nTable 7: Financial Soundness Indicators ...................................................................... 28 \nTable 8: Banking Sector Capitalisation Levels............................................................. 29 \nTable 9 Financial Inclusion Indicators .......................................................................... 44 \nTable 10: Payment Access Points and Devices as of June 2023 .................................. 52 \nTable 11: Foreign Payments by Category in USD Millions (Jan –Jun 2023) .............. 59 \n5 \n \nSECTION ONE: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND \n1. \nThis Mid-Term Monetary Policy Review Statement (the Statement) is issued at a \ntime when the economy is on the right track toward sustained price and exchange \nrate stability. The measures in this Statement are, therefore, primarily aimed at \nensuring that the country stays on course or continues to hold on to the right path \nof the progress that it has attained on the price and financial stability fronts. \nPrecisely, the Statement, which is issued in terms of Section 46 of the Reserve \nBank Act [Chapter 22:15], will evaluate the monetary policy stance and policies \npursued by the Bank in the past six months ended 30 June 2023 and outline the \nmonetary policy stance to be pursued by the Bank in the next six months. \n \n2. \nThe country experienced significant exchange rate depreciation between April and \nJune 2023 driven by both demand and supply factors, which exerted significant \npass-through to inflation. The demand factors mainly reflected elevated demand \nfor foreign currency for store-of-value purposes. The effect of the high demand \nfor foreign currency on the economy was coupled with the sudden decline in the \ndemand for local currency due to speculative behaviour, including exchange rate \nindexation at excessively undervalued or over-depreciated exchange rates. In \naddition, supply factors emanating from a transitory decline in foreign currency \nreceipts on account of declining export commodity prices such as the Platinum \nGroup of Metals (PGMs). The adverse supply trends have, however, since \nreversed. \n \n3. \nThe bold policy intervention measures instituted by the Government and Bank for \ntackling the transitory price and exchange rate volatility have gone a long way in \narresting the instabilities and bringing the much-needed normalcy in the price and \nexchange rate dynamics and calmness in domestic markets. This normalcy will be \ncritical to anchor the robust economic growth projected at 5.3% in 2023, supported \nby a good performance by the agriculture and mining sectors, recovery in tourism \nand expected improvements in electricity generation in the second half of the year. \n6 \n \n4. \nThe country’s macroeconomic fundamentals have remained strong to support and \nsustain the current price and exchange rate stability as attested by the continued \nfavourable balance of payments, low growth in money supply, and a safe and \nsound banking sector. Precisely, the country’s balance of payments current \naccount has been in a surplus position since 2019 and is projected to close the year \n2023 with a surplus of US$274.5 million. On the monetary front, money supply \ngrowth has been under control as evidenced by the slow growth in local currency \nlending since January 2023. \n \n5. \nSimilarly, the financial sector has remained safe and sound with adequately \ncapitalised institutions that can underwrite lending to support the growth \ntrajectory. The strong monetary and financial position has been corroborated by \nsustained fiscal stability where the Government continues to manage its fiscal \nposition within internationally acceptable ranges of fiscal deficits of below 3%. \n \n6. \nThe strong macroeconomic fundamentals obtaining in the economy suggest that \nthe exchange rate instability witnessed between May and June 2023 was not a \nresult of monetary factors but a reflection of adverse behavioural factors and \ninsatiable demand for foreign currency by economic agents. The measures \ninstituted by the Bank, which include further liberalisation of the exchange rate, \ntighter monetary policy and the introduction of gold coins and gold-backed digital \ntokens are bearing fruit as evidenced by the current firming and relatively stable \nexchange rate dynamics. \n \n7. \nThe ongoing intervention in the foreign exchange market through the wholesale \nauction system is exerting a dual effect of mopping up excess liquidity and re-\nestablishing the optimal mix of the dual currencies, thus sustaining the current \nexchange rate and price stability. As a result of the adroit policy measures, the \ncountry witnessed a significant correction in the exchange rate which had overshot \n7 \n \nits equilibrium. The correction in the exchange rate has led to a concomitant \ncorrection in prices. \n \n8. \nAs a result, the steep increase in month-on-month inflation from 15.7% in May to \n74.5% in June 2023, significantly reversed in July 2023 to minus 15.3%. Similarly, \nthe annual inflation which had risen from 86.5% in May 2023 to 175.8% in June \n2023, fell to 101.3% in July 2023. \n \n9. \nThe Bank remains confident that the continued sale of gold coins and gold-backed \ndigital tokens will sustainably take away steam from the store-of-value demand \nfor local currency during the short to medium term, with positive spinoffs on the \nsubstance of the obtaining price and exchange rate stability. Furthermore, the \nBank’s strategic resolve for continued monetary prudence will add further impetus \nto the positive prospects of the local currency over the medium term. In addition, \nthe ongoing monitoring and surveillance by the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) \nwill effectively minimise incidences of exchange rate manipulation and abnormal \npricing practices. \n \n10. The rest of the Statement is organised as follows: Section two assesses the \neffectiveness of previous monetary policy measures; Section three highlights the \nrecent economic developments; Section four provides financial sector \ndevelopments, Section five covers Balance of Payments developments and \noutlook, Section six provides the new monetary policy stance for the next six \nmonths, Section seven outlines the economic and inflation outlook and lastly \nSection eight concludes the Statement. \n \n\n \n8 \n \nSECTION TWO: ASSESSMENT OF PREVIOUS MONETARY POLICY \n \n11. The Monetary Policy measures announced in February 2023 have gone a long way \nto foster stability in the economy as reflected by the sustained decline in annual \ninflation from 101.5% in January to 75.2% in April 2023. The economy, however, \nsaw a re-emergence of inflationary pressures in the economy during the second \nquarter of 2023, mainly driven by exchange rate depreciation. The exchange rate \ndepreciated on account of a temporal foreign currency shortages as commodity \nprices declined, while the demand for foreign currency for store-of-value purposes \nincreased. \n \n12. In view of the above, a combination of supply and demand management policy \nmeasures instituted by Government and the Bank, coupled with market discipline \nmeasures instituted by the FIU were critical to stabilise the market and foster \nconfidence in the economy. \n \nMoney Market Liquidity \n13. The tight monetary policy stance adopted by the Bank was maintained throughout \nthe first half of 2023. The Bank continued to mop up excess liquidity from the \nmarket through the issuance of Non-Negotiable Certificates of Deposit (NNCDs). \nIn this regard, the outstanding NNCDs as of 14 July 2023 amounted to ZW$163.5 \nbillion. \n \n \n \n9 \n \nLender of Last Resort Facility \n14. The month of June 2023 saw significant depreciation of the exchange rate which \ncoincided with the second Quarterly Payment Date (QPD) for corporate taxes. \nSignificant liquidity was withdrawn from the market through the QPD and most \nbanks saw their liquidity levels dwindling resulting in three banks approaching the \nBank for support through the lender of last resort (LOLR) facility. The outstanding \namount under the LOLR facility was ZW$32.5 billion as of 14 July 2023. \n \nBank Policy Rates \n15. The Bank policy rate which had been pegged at 150% per annum since February \n2023, was reviewed downwards by the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) to \n140% effective 1st April 2023, in line with the downward trend in annual inflation. \nHowever, the re-emergence of exchange rate volatility witnessed from mid-April \n2023, reversed the downward inflation trajectory thus compelling the MPC to \nreview the Bank policy rate upwards, from 140% to the current level of 150% per \nannum. \n\n16. The increase in the policy rate was moderate as the Bank noted that exchange rate \ndepreciation and inflation pressures were not emanating from increased money \nsupply due to borrowing for speculative purposes. As shown in Figure 1, the \nexchange rate depreciation witnessed in May 2023 was de-linked from \ndevelopments in the money-supply growth nexus. \n\n10 \n \nFigure 1:Annual M3 Growth (ZWL Component) Vs ZWL Depreciation (%) \n \n \nMedium-Term Bank Accommodation Facility (MBA) \n17. The MBA which was introduced in 2019 has immensely supported the productive \nsectors of the economy. The outstanding balance as of 14 July 2023 was ZW$36.5 \nbillion. The MBA rate has been adjusted in tandem with the benchmark Bank \npolicy rate in response to inflation developments. As such, the lending rate for \nMBA Facility for the productive sectors, including individuals and MSMEs is \ncurrently at 75% while the Bank policy rate is at 150% after the upward \nadjustments of interest rates on 6 June 2023 following the resurgence of inflation \npressures in the economy. \n \n18. The continued alignment of the MBA rate with the policy rate is important to curb \narbitrage borrowing opportunities from the window. The Bank continues to \nmonitor the MBA window to ensure that it is not used for speculative purposes. \n \n \nMicro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) Facility \n19. To avert the collapse of the MSME sector, which was adversely affected by the \nCovid-19 pandemic, the Bank introduced the MSME facility. This intervention, \n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n700\n800\n900\nJan-22\nFeb-22\nMar-22\nApr-22\nMay-22\nJun-22\nJul-22\nAug-22\nSep-22\nOct-22\nNov-22\nDec-22\nJan-23\nFeb-23\nMar-23\nApr-23\nMay-23\nAnnual Growth in Money Supply\nAnnual Depreciation\n11 \n \nwhich is availed to the MSME sector through banks is offered at 75%. The \noutstanding amount under this facility was ZW$2.1 billion as at 14 July 2023. \n \n Deposit Interest Rates \n20. Consistent with the expected inflation profile, savings and time deposit rates in \nlocal currency was reduced from 40% and 80% per annum to 30% and 50%, \nrespectively on 1 February 2023. The Bank maintained the minimum deposit rates \non savings and time deposits at 30% and 50% per annum, respectively since 1 \nFebruary 2023. This is critical to support the savings culture in the country. \n \nStatutory Reserves \n21. The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) reviewed upwards the statutory reserve \nrequirements on local currency deposits, with effect from 7 June 2023. Statutory \nreserve requirements for local currency demand and call deposits were increased \nfrom 10% to 15%, while savings and time deposits were maintained at 5%. The \nstatutory reserve balances increased from ZW$109 billion on 1 June 2023 to \nZW$197.28 billion as of 14 July 2023 partly due to the policy change as well as \nthe increase in the local currency deposit base, emanating from FX purchases. \n \n22. Foreign currency statutory reserve requirements for demand and call deposits were \nmaintained at 10%, while savings and time deposits were maintained at 5%. \nReflecting increased deposits in foreign currency accounts, foreign currency \nstatutory reserve balances increased from US$70.34 million on 6 June 2023 to \nUS$158.82 million as of 14 July 2023. \n \n \n \n \n12 \n \nGold Coins and Gold-Backed Digital Tokens \n23. The gold coins, which were introduced as an alternative store of value, continued \nto be a critical monetary policy instrument, mopping up over ZW$35 billion from \na total of 36,059 coins as of 14 July 2023. The first maturity after the 180 days \nvesting period was 25 January 2023 and only 769 gold coins (2% of the total sold) \nhave been redeemed so far, bearing testimony that it is indeed considered a store-\nof-value. \n \n24. To complement the sale of physical gold coins and expand the value-preserving \ninstruments available in the economy, enhance the divisibility of the investment \ninstruments and widen their access and usage by the public, the Bank introduced \nGold-Backed Digital Tokens (GBDT) on 12 May 2023. The GBDT is fully backed \nby physical gold held by the Bank. \n\n25. As at 21 July 2023, the Bank had conducted 11 issuances of GBDT, receiving a \ntotal of 590 applications to purchase tokens valued at ZW$50.50 billion and \nUS$7,794.87. The Bank, therefore, issued 325,024,524 milligrams equivalent to \n325.02 kgs of gold. \n \n Foreign Exchange Market \n26. The Bank continued to enhance the efficiency and operations of the foreign \nexchange market by strengthening the Willing-Buyer Willing-Seller trading \narrangement. The introduction of the wholesale foreign exchange auction to \naddress the supply side in the interbank foreign exchange market on the back of \nthe recent liberalization of the exchange rate has seen the parallel market exchange \nrate premium declining significantly from more than 100% during May 2023 to \nbelow 20% and this is expected to narrow further as the parallel market exchange \nrate appreciates. \n13 \n \n27. These interventions in the foreign exchange market supported by tight monetary \npolicy, have resulted in the elimination of foreign exchange distortions and \narbitrage opportunities in the economy. The local currency has as a result begun \nappreciating against the US dollar since mid-June 2023, as the market corrects \ntowards the market clearing equilibrium. The ZW$/US$ exchange rate gained \nfrom ZW$6,926.58 as at 21 June 2023 to ZW$4,771.38 as at 19 July 2023. Figure \n2 shows developments in the foreign exchange market for the period from \nSeptember 2021 to July 2023. \n \nFigure 2:Exchange Rate Premium (%) Official versus Parallel Market \nExchange rate May 2023 to Aug 2023 \n \nSource: RBZ and Market Intelligence Surveys, 2023 \n \n28. In the short term, the Bank will continue implementing tight monetary policy \nmeasures to ensure the parallel market premiums remain at acceptable \ninternational levels of less than 20%. \n \n \n \nϬ͘Ϭй\nϮϬ͘Ϭй\nϰϬ͘Ϭй\nϲϬ͘Ϭй\nϴϬ͘Ϭй\nϭϬϬ͘Ϭй\nϭϮϬ͘Ϭй\n14 \n \nForeign Currency Auction \n29. During the first seven months of 2023, the Bank allotted a total of US$382.93 \nmillion through the Retail Auction System, representing 69.45% of total bids \nsubmitted. Since inception of the Auction System in June 2020, a total of US$4.09 \nbillion has been allotted, representing 85% of the total bids submitted. \n \nTable 1: Foreign Exchange Auctions Data as of 21 July 2023 \nDate \nUS$ Total Bids \nUS$ Allotted \nShare of Allotted \n2020 total \n645,295,466.94 \n624,933,976.75 \n96.80% \n2021 total \n2,031,648,018.52 \n1,971,446,836.20 \n97.00% \n2022 total \n1,220,873,179.99 \n1,114,154,170.50 \n91.30% \nJan-23 \n82,345,695.49 \n57,686,081.37 \n70.10% \nFeb-23 \n82,352,443.87 \n76,616,769.35 \n93.00% \nMar-23 \n77,699,985.11 \n76,714,051.24 \n98.70% \nApr-23 \n85,184,767.82 \n81,185,667.39 \n95.30% \nMay-23 \n186,235,738.62 \n79,280,528.30 \n42.60% \nJun-23 \n35,809,997.09 \n9,865,704.61 \n27.60% \nJul-23 \n1,743,257.84 \n1,583,532.52 \n91% \nTotal 2023 \n551,371,885.84 \n382,932,334.78 \n69.45% \nGrand Total \n4,449,188,551.29 \n4,093,467,318.23 \n92.00% \n \n30. With effect from 13 June 2023, the Main and SME Auctions were merged into one \nRetail Auction with a maximum amount of US$5 million per week. The minimum \nbid for the Retail Auction is US$1,500 and the maximum is US$50,000. \n \n \n \n15 \n \nWholesale Foreign Currency Auction \n31. On 7 June 2023, the Bank further liberalised the foreign exchange market and \nintroduced the Wholesale Foreign Exchange Auction in a bid to strengthen the \ninterbank foreign exchange market under the Willing-Buyer Willing-Seller \n(WBWS) arrangement. Under this arrangement, the Bank auctions foreign \nexchange to Authorised Dealers at market-determined exchange rates for them to \nonward sell to their customers. \n \n32. Since inception, the Bank has held 12 wholesale auctions, with banks submitting \nbids of around 32% of the amount on offer, largely due to the tight local currency \nliquidity conditions prevailing in the market. \n \nTable 2: Wholesale FX Auction Results - 20 July 2023 \nDate \nBids \nWeighted \nAuction \nRate (AR) \nUS$ Total \nBids \nUS$ Allotted \nShare of \nAllotted \n7-Jun-23 \n19 \n4,868.52 \n12,993,000.00 \n11,080,000.00 \n85.28% \n13-Jun-23 \n17 \n5,978.68 \n16,437,460.00 \n15,137,460.00 \n92.09% \n16-Jun-23 \n14 \n6,713.35 \n10,635,904.00 \n6,990,750.00 \n65.73% \n20-Jun-23 \n12 \n6,926.58 \n10,614,000.00 \n10,614,000.00 \n100.00% \n27-Jun-23 \n12 \n6,326.59 \n13,107,000.00 \n13,107,000.00 \n100.00% \n29-Jun-23 \n8 \n5,739.80 \n3,592,000.00 \n2,940,000.00 \n81.85% \n4-Jul-23 \n11 \n5,395.96 \n4,327,000.00 \n3,727,000.00 \n86.13% \n6-Jul-23 \n10 \n5,251.06 \n4,460,100.00 \n4,460,100.00 \n100.00% \n11-Jul-23 \n10 \n4,998.84 \n5,830,000.00 \n5,640,000.00 \n96.74% \n14-Jul-23 \n10 \n4,883.82 \n5,295,000.00 \n4,845,000.00 \n91.50% \n18-Jul-23 \n15 \n4,771.39 \n11,597,990.00 \n11,597,990.00 \n100.00% \n20-Jul-23 \n11 \n4,537.49 \n6,383,500.00 \n5,705,700.00 \n89% \nTotal \n149 \n \n105,272,954.00 95,845,000.00 \n91% \n16 \n \n33. The Bank has allotted US$95.85 million under the Wholesale Foreign Exchange \nAuction, representing 91% of the total bids submitted. On average 12 bids were \nreceived per auction, with bids that were way below the market rates, not allotted \nas they presented arbitrage threats. \n \n34. The Wholesale Foreign Exchange Auction System has strengthened the interbank \nforeign exchange market under the Willing-Buyer Willing-Seller (WBWS) and \nremained central to the determination of the market exchange rate. \n \n Willing-Buyer Willing-Seller Market \n35. To complement the Wholesale Foreign Exchange Auction, banks have also been \nbuying foreign currency from the market for trading on the Interbank Foreign \nExchange Market. Cumulative purchases and sales on the Willing-buyer Willing-\nseller market in 2023 were US$112.57 million and US$107.19 million, \nrespectively. \n \nFigure 3: Interbank Market Activity \n \n1.00\n11.00\n21.00\n31.00\n41.00\n51.00\n61.00\n71.00\n12 April – 31 Dec 2022\nJan to 6 June 2023\n7 June – 19 July 2023\nUS$ Millions\nPeriod\nPurchases by banks from customers\nSales by banks to customers\nSales to RBZ\n17 \n \n Bureaux de Change \n36. As from 2 January 2023 to 30 June 2023 a cumulative total of US$10.5 million \nwas traded through the Bureaux de Change, as shown in Table 3. \n \nTable 3: Trading by Bureaux De Change: 02 Jan to 30 June 2023 \nDESCRIPTION \nAMOUNT (US$) \n% \nCONTRIBUTION \n PERSONAL TRAVEL ALLOWANCE 4,613,812 \n44% \n DOMESTIC UTILIZATION \n 4,450,844 \n43% \n EDUCATION \n 490,538 \n5% \n BUSINESS TRAVEL ALLOWANCE 385,301 \n4% \n INVENTORY \n 208,530 \n2% \n SOCIAL WELFARE \n 109,521 \n1% \n SUBSCRIPTIONS \n 77,995 \n1% \n SPARES & MACHINERY \n 38,347 \n0% \n MEDICAL \n 31,229 \n0% \n AIR FARES \n 14,563 \n0% \n RAW MATERIALS \n 19,116 \n0% \n SOFTWARES \n 15,914 \n0% \n OTHER \n 2,930 \n0% \n PENSION \n 220 \n0% \n TOTAL \n 10,458,860.84 \n100% \n \nForeign Currency Receipts \n37. The positive trajectory in foreign currency receipts continued during the first half \nof 2023, with total receipts increasing by 3.5% to US$ 5.595 billion compared to \nUS$ 5.405 billion during the comparable period in 2022. The increase in foreign \ncurrency receipts was driven by exports (55%) and diaspora remittances (16%), as \nshown in Table 4. \n18 \n \n Table 4: Total Foreign Currency Receipts as at 30 June 2023 (US$ Millions) \nType of Receipt \n 2023 \n2022 \n% Change \n \n \nAmount \n(US$ \nMillions) \n% \nContribution \nAmount \n(US$ \nMillions) \n% \nContribution \nExport \nProceeds \n \n3,055 \n55% \n3,420 \n63% \n-10.7% \nInternational \nRemittances \nDiaspora \nRemittances \n919 \n16% \n797 \n15% \n15.3% \nNGOs \n514 \n9% \n575 \n11% \n-10.5% \nLoan \nProceeds \n \n919 \n16% \n428 \n8% \n114.6% \nIncome \nreceipts \n \n63 \n1% \n82 \n2% \n-23.7% \nForeign \nInvestment \n \n127 \n2% \n104 \n2% \n22.1% \nTOTAL \n \n5,596 \n100% \n5,406 \n100% \n3.5% \n Source: RBZ 2023 \n \n \n \n19 \n \nSECTION THREE: RECENT ECONOMIC AND INFLATION \nDEVELOPMENTS \n \n38. Reflecting waning global economic growth prospects, the IMF’s World Economic \nOutlook July 2023 is now forecasting a GDP decline from 3.5 % in 2022 to 3.0 % \nin 2023. The decline would be mainly driven by advanced economies whose \ngrowth is expected to fall from 2.7 % in 2022 to 1.5 percent in 2023. Global \nheadline inflation is, however, expected to start to moderate from 8.7% in 2022 to \n6.8% in 2023, benefiting from lower commodity prices, particularly oil. \n \n39. Despite the recent volatility in the exchange rate, the domestic economic prospects \nremain robust with economic growth projected at 5.3% in 2023, up from the initial \nforecast of 3.8%. This growth is on account of better performance by agriculture, \nmining, ICT and tourism, supported by expected improvements in electricity \ngeneration in the second half of the year. \n \n40. The strong growth in the agricultural sector is driven mainly by projected growth \nin maize, tobacco, wheat, and cotton. Maize output is expected to be more than 2 \nmillion tonnes in 2023, up from 1.5 million tonnes in 2022. Tobacco output \nreached a record high of 295 million kilograms in 2023. \n\n41. The mining sector also continues to support growth, benefiting largely from \nongoing investments in lithium production, following a rise in global demand for \nthe manufacture of batteries for electrical vehicles. \n \n42. Gold deliveries that had been affected by incessant rains, particularly for small-\nscale and artisanal miners, during the beginning of the year have shown significant \nimprovement. Cumulative gold deliveries stood at 14 181 kg by June 2023, as \nshown in Table 5. \n\n \n20 \n \nTable 5: Gold Deliveries for 2023 \n \nJan \nFeb \nMar \nApr \nMay \nJun \nTotal \nPrimary \nProducers \n(Kg) \n \n935 \n \n756 \n \n823 \n \n903 \n \n1,070 \n \n1,033 \n \n5,520 \nSmall Scale \nProducers \n(Kg) \n \n961 \n \n1,139 \n \n1,579 \n \n1,473 \n \n1,806 \n \n1,702 \n \n8,661 \nTotal (Kg) \n \n1,896 \n \n1,895 \n \n2,403 \n \n2,377 \n \n2,876 \n \n2,735 \n \n14,181 \nAverage price \n(USD/Oz) \n \n1,899 \n \n1,855 \n \n1,913 \n \n1,974 \n \n1,993 \n \n1,944 \n \n1,910 \nSource: Fidelity Gold Refineries, 2023 \n \nINFLATION DEVELOPMENTS \n43. Inflation maintained a downward trend declining from 101.5% in December 2022 \nto 75.2% in April 2023, on account of tight monetary conditions. Inflationary \npressures, however, re-emerged from April to June 2023, driven mainly by \nexchange rate depreciation. Accordingly, inflation increased to 86.5% and 175.8% \nin May and June 2023. Similarly, monthly inflation which was stable since the \nbeginning of the year rose in May to 15.7% and peaked at 74.5% in June 2023. \n \n44. Inflationary pressures, however, dissipated following the recent bold measures put \nin place by Government and the Bank, which included the liberalisation of the \nexchange rate supported by the takeover of the Bank's external liabilities and the \nrequirement for duties and taxes to be paid in local currency which increased the \ndemand for the local currency. As a result of the appreciating exchange rate, \nmonthly inflation declined from the peak of 74.5% in June 2023 to minus 15.3% \nin July 2023 as shown in Figure 4. \n \n\n \n21 \n \nFigure 4: Monthly Inflation Developments (%) \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2023 \n \n \n45. Similarly, annual inflation which rose sharply in June 2023 to 175.8% reversed \nsharply to 101.3% in July 2023 and is expected to progressively decline in the near \nterm as the measures took full effect. \n \nFigure 5: Annual Inflation Developments \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2023 \n \n-20.0\n-10.0\n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\n50.0\n60.0\n70.0\n80.0\nM-O-M (%)\nM-O-M Inflation Rate (%)\n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\n300\nAll Items\nFood and non alcoholic beverages\nNon food\n22 \n \n RESERVE MONEY DEVELOPMENTS \n \n46. Reserve money stock stood at ZW$1 064.89 billion in June 2023, compared to \nZW$104.04 billion recorded in December 2022. The increase was largely due to real \ngrowth in foreign currency statutory reserves as well as valuation changes associated \nwith exchange rate depreciation. Of the 923.51% growth in reserve money for the \nperiod December 2022 to June 2023, 764.06% was attributed to valuation changes. \nThe inter-bank exchange rate moved from ZW$684.3339 per US$1 as at the end of \nDecember 2022 to ZW$5 739.80 per US$1 as at the end of June 2023. \n \n47. In US dollar terms, the value of foreign currency-denominated statutory reserves \nincreased from US$66.19 million in December 2022 to US$157.25 million in June \n2023. The local currency statutory reserves increased from ZW$58.75 billion in \nDecember 2022 to ZW$182.61 billion in June 2023. As a result, total statutory \nreserves (local and foreign currency components), constituted 99.02% of total \nreserve money, as shown in Figure 6. \n \nFigure 6: Components of Reserve money as at the of end June 2023 \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2023 \nCurrency Issued\n0.97%\nRTGS Balances\n0.01%\nZWL Statutory \nReserves\n17.15%\nForeign Currency \nStats Reserves\n81.87%\n23 \n \n BROAD MONEY DEVELOPMENTS \n \n48. Broad money (M3) amounted to ZW$14 275.48 billion as at the end of June 2023, \ncompared to ZW$2 338.23 billion recorded in December 2022. The increase largely \nreflected an expansion of ZW$10 977.60 billion in foreign currency accounts \ndeposits, reflecting exchange rate movement. \n \n49. Foreign currency deposits constituted 81.51% of total money supply as of June 2023, \nwhile local currency deposits accounted for 18.43%, and currency in circulation, \n0.06%. Figure 7 shows monetary developments for the period December 2021 to \nJune 2023. \n \nFigure 7: Monetary Developments (ZW$ Billion) \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2023 \n \n50. On an annual basis, broad money grew by 1 174.94% in June 2023, largely reflecting \nexchange rate movements. As such, the increase in foreign currency accounted for \n980.36 percentage points of the 1 174.94% annual increase in money supply. Local \ncurrency deposits contributed 194.19 percentage points to the annual increase in \nbroad money (M3). \nϬ\nϮ͕ϬϬϬ\nϰ͕ϬϬϬ\nϲ͕ϬϬϬ\nϴ͕ϬϬϬ\nϭϬ͕ϬϬϬ\nϭϮ͕ϬϬϬ\nϭϰ͕ϬϬϬ\nϭϲ͕ϬϬϬ\n&ŽƌĞŝŐŶƵƌƌĞŶĐLJĐĐŽƵŶƚƐ\n>ŽĐĂůƵƌƌĞŶĐLJĞƉŽƐŝƚƐ\nƵƌƌĞŶĐLJŝŶŝƌĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ\n24 \n \nFigure 8: Contributions to Money Supply Growth (%) \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2023 \n \n STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS \n51. During the first half of the year 2023, the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) was \nlargely characterized by high speculative tendencies as investors sought safe haven \nin some selected stocks with strong balance sheets, in line with limited investment \noptions on the money market. Consequently, all the major indices registered gains, \nwith the ZSE All Share, Top 10, Medium Cap and Small Cap indices adding \n779.30%, 655.69%, 1 090.87% and 322.81% to close at 171 408.90 points, 93 \n034.57 points, 436 363.92 points and 1 911 327.14 points, from 19 493.85 points, \n12 311.13 points, 36 642.44 points and 452 056.95 points recorded as at end of \nDecember 2022, respectively. \n \n52. In the same vein, the resource index increased by 106% to close at 76 960.49 \npoints, compared to 25 487.77 points recorded as at the end of 2022. On a year-\non-year basis, the ZSE All Share, Top 10 and Mining Indices gained 766.05%, \n658% and 284.39%, from 19 791.94 points, 12 273.75 points and 20 021.24 points \n-200\n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1000\n1200\n1400\nClaims on Private Sector\nNet Claims on Gvt\nClaims on Other Sectors\nResidual of NFA and OIN\nAnnual Growth\n25 \n \nrecorded in June 2022, respectively. Figure 9 shows developments of the ZSE All \nShare, Top 10 and mining indices for the period June 2022 to June 2023. \n \nFigure 9: ZSE All Share, Top 10 and Mining Indices \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2023 \n \nVictoria Falls Stock Exchange (VFEX) \n53. The Victoria Falls Stock Exchange (VFEX) was characterized by bearish \nsentiments during the period under analysis. As a result, the VFEX All Share index \ndeclined by 30.56% to close the second half of 2023 at 76.17 points, from 109.69 \npoints recorded in December 2022. On an annual basis, the VFEX All Share index \nlost 33.99%, from 115.39 points recorded in June last year. \n \n \n \n \n \n15,000\n21,000\n27,000\n33,000\n39,000\n45,000\n51,000\n57,000\n63,000\n69,000\n75,000\n81,000\n87,000\n1000\n21000\n41000\n61000\n81000\n101000\n121000\n141000\n161000\n181000\nAll Share Index\nTop 10 Index\nMining Index\n26 \n \nFigure 10: Victoria Falls Stock Exchange All Share Index \n \nSource: Victoria Falls Stock Exchange, 2023 \n \nMarket Capitalization \n54. Despite the bearish sentiments that characterized the VFEX during the first half of \n2023, market capitalization rose by 202.51% to US$1.29 billion, compared to \nUS$424.83 million recorded in December 2022. The increase in VFEX \ncapitalization was largely attributed to a notable number of new listings, beginning \nin the year 2023. This culminated in an increase in the number of outstanding \nissued shares on the VFEX market. \n \n0.00\n20.00\n40.00\n60.00\n80.00\n100.00\n120.00\n140.00\n160.00\n180.00\n27 \n \nSECTION FOUR: CONDITION AND PERFORMANCE OF THE BANKING \nSECTOR \n \n55. The banking sector continued to demonstrate resilience on the back of a broad \nrange of complementary fiscal and monetary stabilisation measures, to foster and \nenhance price and financial stability. Banking institutions continue to adapt to the \ndynamic operating environment by reconfiguring their business models, including \nthe digitisation of banking services. This has gone a long way in providing \nconvenient and modern banking services to the banking public, as well as fostering \ninclusivity. The architecture of the banking sector is shown in Table 6. \n \nTable 6 Banking Sector Architecture \nType of Institution \nNumber \nCommercial Banks \n14 \nBuilding Societies \n4 \nSavings Bank (POSB) \n1 \nTotal Banking Institutions \n19 \nOther Financial Institutions Under the Supervision of Reserve Bank \nCredit-only-MFIs \n208 \nDeposit-taking MFIs \n8 \nDevelopment Financial Institutions (SMEDCO, IDBZ, IDCZ and \nAFC Land & Development Bank) \n4 \nTotal Other Institutions \n220 \nTotal Number of Institutions \n239 \n \nFinancial Soundness Indicators \n56. Banking sector performance remained satisfactory, as reflected by adequate \ncapitalisation, strong asset quality, adequate liquidity and sustained profitability, \namong other key financial soundness metrics as depicted in Table 7. \n \n \n \n28 \n \nTable 7: Financial Soundness Indicators \nKey Indicators \nBenchmark \nJun-22 \nSep-22 \nDec-22 \nMar-23 \nJun-23 \nTotal Assets ($tn) \n- \n1.94 \n3.11 \n3.81 \n5.68 \n27.28 \nTotal Loans & \nAdvances ($tn) \n- \n0.60 \n1.01 \n1.29 \n1.97 \n10.19 \nNet Capital Base \n($tn) \n- \n0.35 \n0.54 \n0.75 \n1.01 \n5.95 \nCore Capital ($tn) \n- \n0.28 \n0.44 \n0.61 \n0.80 \n5.05 \nTotal Deposits \n($tn) \n- \n1.12 \n1.91 \n2.29 \n3.17 \n14.66 \nNet Profit ($tn) \n- \n0.18 \n0.34 \n0.50 \n0.21 \n4.55 \nReturn on Assets \n- \n8.67% \n16.48% \n17.43% \n4.92% \n26.11% \nReturn on Equity \n- \n31.60% \n53.19% \n54.33% \n16.62% \n74.60% \nCapital Adequacy \nRatio \n12% \n33.87% \n35.45% \n37.15% \n41.05% \n40.48% \nTier 1 Ratio \n8% \n18.84% \n23.97% \n26.92% \n27.85% \n35.35% \nLoans to Deposits \nRatio \n- \n53.69% \n52.83% \n55.67% \n56% \n55% \nNPLs Ratio \n5% \n1.50% \n1.41% \n1.58% \n3.30% \n3.62% \nLiquidity Ratio \n30% \n60.78% \n59.51% \n59.50% \n57.65% \n59.88% \n \nBanking Sector Capitalization \n57. As at 30 June 2023, the banking sector was adequately capitalized and all banking \ninstitutions were in compliance with the prescribed tier 1 and minimum capital \nadequacy ratios of 8% and 12%, respectively. The average capital adequacy and \ntier 1 ratios were 40.48% and 35.35%, respectively. \n \n58. Aggregate core capital increased from $611.11 billion as at 31 December 2022 to \n$5.05 trillion as at 30 June 2023. The growth in core capital was mainly attributed \nto capitalisation of retained earnings. The retained earnings for some banking \ninstitutions are largely composed of revaluation gains from investment properties \nand translation gains from foreign exchange-denominated assets. \n \n59. As at 30 June 2023, fifteen (15) out of 18 banking institutions (excluding POSB) \nreported core capital levels that was above the minimum capital requirements as \nshown in Table 8. \n \n29 \n \nTable 8: Banking Sector Capitalisation Levels \nInstitution \nReported \nCore \nCapital as at 30 \nJune 2023 (ZW$) \nReported \nCore Capital \n30 June 2023 \nCapital \nAdequacy \nRatio \n(CAR). \n(Min 12%) \nCompliance Status \n** (US$) \nCOMMERCIAL BANKS \nAFC Commercial \nBank \n228,481,595,385.56 \n39,806,570.03 \n37.17% Compliant \nBancABC \n185,557,005,916.16 \n32,328,152.90 \n20.86% Compliant \nFirst Capital Bank 195,409,479,574.26 \n34,044,672.70 \n27.48% Compliant \nCBZ Bank \n457,094,633,576.87 \n79,636,040.31 \n20.58% Compliant \nEcobank \n320,360,900,889.71 \n55,813,986.30 \n35.85% Compliant \nFBC Bank \n324,467,654,842.01 \n56,529,474.08 \n20.49% Compliant \nNedbank \n235,164,498,779.95 \n40,970,880.27 \n46.40% Compliant \nMetbank \n665,123,169,344.68 115,879,232.95 \n78.11% Compliant \nNMB Bank \n266,130,254,841.21 \n46,365,802.93 \n27.87% Compliant \nStanbic Bank \n551,853,335,593.19 \n96,145,111.43 \n24.31% Compliant \nStandard \nChartered Bank \n114,412,040,320.69 \n19,933,119.28 \n43.58% \nCompliant on CAR and \nNon-Compliant with the \nprescribed minimum core \ncapital \nSteward Bank \n217,816,814,889.39 \n37,948,528.33 \n50.35% Compliant \nTime Bank \n3,197,923,519.16 \n557,149.32 \n65.24% \nCompliant on CAR and \nNon-Compliant with the \nprescribed minimum core \ncapital \nZB Bank \n348,682,807,786.56 \n60,748,291.70 \n22.16% Compliant \nBUILDING SOCIETIES \nCABS \n566,087,904,508.32 \n98,625,089.58 \n44.17% Compliant \nFBC Building \nSociety \n140,056,441,210.69 \n24,400,943.65 \n41.67% Compliant \nNational Building \nSociety \n123,871,993,860.57 \n21,581,253.36 \n24.55% Compliant \nZB Building \nSociety \n25,821,970,809.20 \n4,498,760.99 \n46.36% \nCompliant on CAR and \nNon-Compliant with the \nprescribed minimum core \ncapital \nSAVINGS BANK \nPOSB \n79,337,623,371.34 \n13,822,376.61 \n40.19% No prescribed minimum \ncapital requirement \n* The prescribed minimum capital requirements is ZW$ equivalent to US$30 million for \nTier I banking institutions and US$20 million for Tier II banking institutions including \nbuilding societies. \n** Willing buyer willing seller exchange rate (US$1: 5,739.7961) as at 30 June 2023 \n30 \n \n60. Standard Chartered Bank’s compliance will be addressed through the acquisition \nof the banking institution by FBC Holdings Limited (FBCH), which is currently \nbeing finalised. \n \n61. ZB Building Society capitalisation is also dependent on the outcome of the current \nstrategic initiatives within the Group. \n \n62. In line with the approval to recommence banking business, Time Bank was \npermitted to gradually meet the prescribed minimum capital requirements in terms \nof its strategy which provides for a phased approach to conduct banking activities. \n \n63. As previously communicated, the deadline for compliance with the minimum \ncapital requirements by non-compliant banks was extended by a further 12 months \nto 31 December 2023, to allow for the completion of the recapitalisation \nprocesses. \n \n64. Banking institutions are employing a number of capital preservation strategies, \nwhich include investing in gold coins and investment properties, lending in US$, \nas well as maintaining a portion of their capital in US$. \n \n65. The Bank continues to monitor capitalisation of banking institutions, given that a \nwell-capitalised banking sector is an engine for sustainable economic growth and \ndevelopment \n \nBanking Sector Asset Structure \n66. Total banking sector assets increased from $3.81 trillion as at 31 December 2022 \nto $27.28 trillion as at 30 June 2023 as shown in Figure 11. \n \n \n \n31 \n \nFigure 11: Digital: Asset Mix as at 30 June 2023 \n \n \nBanking Sector Loans and Advances \n67. Aggregate banking sector loans and advances increased by 7.9 times from $1.29 \ntrillion as at 31 December 2022 to $10.19 trillion as at 30 June 2023. The increase \nwas largely attributed to an increase in foreign currency-denominated loans, which \nconstituted 94% of the sector’s loan book. \n \n68. Total loans to total deposit ratio for the banking sector remained relatively stable \nat 55% as at 30 June 2023 from 55.67% at the end of 2022. The foreign currency \nloans to foreign currency deposits ratio was 60% during the same period. \n \n69. The banking institutions continued to contribute to economic recovery and growth \nby channelling resources to the productive sectors of the economy. The loans to \nthe productive sectors constituted 77.67% of total loans as at 30 June 2023. Figure \n12 shows the sectoral distribution as at 30 June 2023. \n \nŽŵĞƐƚŝĐEŽƚĞƐ\nĂŶĚŽŝŶ\nϬ͘ϭϴй\nĂůĂŶĐĞƐǁŝƚŚ\nĞŶƚƌĂůĂŶŬ\nϭϯ͘ϮϬй\nĂůĂŶĐĞƐǁŝƚŚ\nŽŵĞƐƚŝĐ\nĂŶŬŝŶŐ\n/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ\nϭ͘ϵϴй\nƐƐĞƚƐŝŶƚƌĂŶƐŝƚ\nϬ͘Ϯϳй\nĂůĂŶĐĞƐǁŝƚŚ\n&ŽƌĞŝŐŶ\n/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚ\nĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĐĂƐŚ\nϮϬ͘ϱϮй\n^ĞĐƵƌŝƚŝĞƐŶĚ\n/ŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚƐ\nϵ͘ϭϰй\n>ŽĂŶƐ͕ĚǀĂŶĐĞƐ͕\nĂŶŬĞƌƐ\nĐĐĞƉƚĂŶĐĞƐĂŶĚ\n>ĞĂƐĞƐ\nϯϮ͘ϴϮй\n&ŽƌĞŝŐŶůĂŝŵƐ;/ŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ\nŝůůƐŽĨdžĐŚĂŶŐĞͿ\nϬ͘ϲϭй\nZĞƉŽƐƐĞƐƐĞĚ\nWƌŽƉĞƌƚŝĞƐͬƐƐĞƚƐ\nϬ͘Ϯϰй\n&ŝdžĞĚƐƐĞƚƐ\nϭϬ͘Ϯϵй\nKƚŚĞƌƐƐĞƚƐ\nϱ͘ϭϲй\nKĨĨͲĂůĂŶĐĞ\n^ŚĞĞƚ/ƚĞŵƐ\nϱ͘ϱϴй\n32 \n \nFigure 12: Sectoral Distribution of Loans as at 30 June 2023 \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe \n \nAsset Quality \n \n70. Asset quality remains satisfactory. The aggregate non-performing ratio (NPL) of \n3.62% as at 30 June 2023 was within the Bank’s risk appetite, as well as the \ninternationally acceptable threshold of 5%. The ratio increased from 1.58% as at \n31 December 2022 owing largely to revaluation effects on foreign currency \ndenominated non-performing loans. Figure 13 shows the trend in the level of \nNPLs from December 2020 to June 2023. \n \n \n \nConsumptive, \n12.05%\nOther, 10.28%\nAgricultural, \n17.48%\nManufacturing, \n12.24%\nCommercial, \n6.42%\nMining, \n11.78%\nDstribution, \n14.19%\nConstruction, \n1.78%\nTransport, 1.39%\nCommunication, \n1.17%\nFinancial, 6.37%\nMortgage, 4.84%\nProductive, \n77.67%\n33 \n \nFigure 13: Trend in Non- Performing Loans \n \n \n71. The Bank will continue to monitor credit risk in the sector. \n \nBanking Sector Profitability \n72. All banking institutions were profitable with reported aggregate profits of $4.55 \ntrillion for the period ended 30 June 2023, compared to $181.25 billion reported \nin the corresponding period in 2022. The growth in the banking sector income \nlargely emanated from non-interest income, which constituted 92.51% of total \nincome ($6.01 trillion) as at 30 June 2023. The income mix for the sector is \ndepicted in Figure 14. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n0.31\n0.36\n0.55\n0.61\n0.94\n1.5\n1.41\n1.58\n3.3\n3.62\n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\nDec-20\nMar-21\nJun-21\nSep-21\nDec-21\nJun-22\nSep-22\nDec-22\nMar-23\nJun-23\nNPL Performance (%)\nPeriod\nNPL\nBenchmark\n34 \n \nFigure 14: Banking Sector Income Mix as at 30 June 2023 \n \n \n73. Reflecting the movement in the exchange rate, the total non-interest income ($5.56 \ntrillion) mainly consists of revaluation gains from investment properties (70.78%), \nfees and commissions (14.78%) and foreign exchange gains (14.45%). \n \n74. The return on assets and return on equity ratios were 26.11% and 74.60% as at 30 \nJune 2023, compared to 8.67% and 31.60% as at 30 June 2022, respectively. The \ntrend of banking sector profitability indicators over the period 31 March 2021 to \n30 June 2023 is shown in Figure 15. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nInterest Income from Loans \nAdvances and Leases\n5.80%\nInterest Income on \nBalances with Banking \nInstitutions\n0.23%\nInterest Income on \nInvestments and \nSecurities\n1.53%\nForeign Exchange\n13.35%\nFees and Commission\n13.66%\nOther Non Interest \nIncome\n65.43%\n35 \n \nFigure 15: Returns on Assets and Earnings as at 30 June 2023 \n \n \nBanking Sector Deposits and Liquidity \n75. As at 30 June 2023, the sector’s average prudential liquidity ratio was 59.88%, \nlargely reflecting high stock of liquid assets in the sector. The trend in the \nprudential liquidity ratio from 31 December 2020 to 30 June 2023 is shown in \nFigure 16. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n0.96%\n4.78%\n8.23% 12.04%\n3.39%\n8.67%\n16.48%\n17.43%\n4.92%\n26.11%\n5.90%\n18.71%\n31.87%\n43.16%\n12.43%\n31.60%\n53.25%\n53.19%\n16.62%\n74.06%\n0%\n10%\n20%\n30%\n40%\n50%\n60%\n70%\n80%\nMar-21\nJun-21\nSep-21\nDec-21\nMar-22\nJun-22\nSep-22\nDec-22\nMar-23\nJun-23\nReturn on Assets\nReturn on Equity\n36 \n \nFigure 16: Prudential Liquidity Ratio Trend \n \n76. Total deposits increased from $2.29 trillion as at 31 December 2022 to $14.66 \ntrillion as at 30 June 2023. The increase was mainly driven by growth in foreign \ncurrency deposits. Commercial banking sub-sector deposits constituted 87.75% of \ntotal banking sector deposits. Foreign currency deposits accounted for 88% of total \ndeposits as at 30 June 2023. The trend of banking sector deposits over the period \n30 June 2021 to 30 June 2023 is shown in Figure 17. \n \nFigure 17: Trend in Banking Sector Deposits \n \n73.06%\n66.89%\n64.37%\n62.09%\n52.83%\n59.50%\n57.65%\n59.88%\n30%\n30%\n30%\n30%\n30%\n30%\n30%\n30%\nDEC-20\nJUN-21\nDEC-21\nJUN-22\nSEP-22\nDEC-22\nMAR-23\nJUN-23\nPLR\nregulatory benchmark\n311.50\n367.02\n476.35\n1,124.73\n1,911.57\n2,286.92\n3,125.59 \n14,659.97\n30-JUN-21\n30-SEP-21\n31-DEC-21\n30-JUN-22\n30-SEP-22\n31-DEC-22\n31-MAR-\n23\n30-JUN-23\nZW$ Billions\n37 \n \n \nBanking Sector Developments \n \nBank Charges \n77. Having regard to the need to strike a balance between business viability and the \nprovision of affordable and accessible products and services in the spirit of \npromoting financial inclusion, the Bank continues to monitor bank charges, in \ncollaboration with the Bankers Association of Zimbabwe. \n \n78. Against this background and cognizant of the relative exchange rate stability in \nthe economy, the pricing model agreed between the Bank and Bankers Association \nof Zimbabwe in May 2022 will be maintained. The said pricing model allows \nconsideration of a review periodically, having regard to factors affecting such \npricing including exchange rate movements. \n \n79. The Bank will continue to monitor the terms and conditions of business activities \nto ensure adherence to the pricing model, fair business practices and reasonable \npricing in line with the Banking Act, and the Consumer Protection Framework. \n \nClimate Risk Management \n80. The Bank issued a Climate Risk Management Guideline to the banking sector in \nApril 2023 in line with international developments. The Guideline seeks to \nstrengthen the resilience of the banking system to climate-related risks by \npromoting the development and implementation of sound climate risk \nmanagement practices and methodologies, taking cognisance of physical and \ntransition risks associated with climate risk. \n \nModel Risk Management \n81. Banking institutions are increasingly relying on modelling in most aspects of their \ndecision-making on the back of a more complex and diverse range of activities \n38 \n \nthat include risk management, capital adequacy calculations, pricing of loans, and \nstress testing. \n \n82. In line with best practice, the Bank issued a Model Risk Management Prudential \nStandard in July 2023. The Standard provides for sound development, \nimplementation, and rigorous model validation as vital elements of model risk \nmanagement in regulated institutions. \n \nContingency Planning \n83. The Bank, in collaboration with other domestic financial sector regulatory \nagencies under the auspices of the Multidisciplinary Financial Stability \nCommittee, is in the process of operationalizing the Contingency Planning & \nSystemic Crisis Management Framework. The Framework seeks to strengthen \ncrisis preparedness capabilities through requisite institutional arrangements, \nresolution planning, techniques, strategies, funding arrangements, and cross-\nborder cooperation, in line with best practices. Enhancement of the legal \nframework is also underway. \n \n \nSustainability \n84. Sustainability is transitioning to the fore of the global financial landscape by \nbecoming a strategic priority, against the realisation that strong, resilient and \nsustainable institutions contribute meaningfully to inclusive sustainable economic \ndevelopment and attainment of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). \n \n85. In this regard, the Bank remains resolutely focused on the implementation of \nsustainable banking practices in the financial sector and is working closely with \nthe sector in the implementation of the sustainability standards under the \nSustainability Standards & Certification Initiative (SSCI) being driven by the \nEuropean Organization for Sustainable Development (EOSD). It is envisaged that \n39 \n \nsustainability-certified institutions will play a catalytic role in the growth and \nsustainable development of the economy. \n \n86. As at 30 June 2023, 14 banking institutions including, one (1) deposit-taking \nmicrofinance institution (Zimbabwe Women’s Microfinance Bank Limited) were \nparticipating under the Central Bank-led Sustainability Standards and Certification \nInitiative. \n \n87. In light of the envisaged benefits of sustainability certification, participating \nbanking institutions have scaled up efforts to accelerate the implementation \nprocess and to build the requisite capacity at the management and board level. \n \nDraft Microfinance Regulations \n88. The proposed Microfinance Regulations, necessary for the Microfinance Act \n[Chapter 24:30] now await gazetting. The draft Microfinance Regulations are \naimed at operationalizing certain sections of the Microfinance Act including \nminimum capital, shareholding limits and asset quality requirements. \n \n89. Additional proposals are being made to shareholding and governance regulatory \nframework to provide different thresholds for credit-only institutions which are \nusually financed through entity’s shareholders as opposed to institutions that are \nfunded through deposit-taking. \n \nRegulatory Framework for Bank Resolution \n90. The Bank, in liaison with the Deposit Protection Corporation, has completed the \ndrafting of the enhanced legal framework for bank resolution and crisis \nmanagement. The draft layman’s Bill will now be undergoing peer review with \nthe International Monetary Fund and the International Association of Deposit \nInsurers. \n \n40 \n \nPerformance of the Microfinance Sector \n91. Microfinance is increasingly considered a key instrument in the implementation \nof effective and sustainable strategies aimed at poverty alleviation and inclusive \neconomic development. The microfinance sector in Zimbabwe continues to \ncontribute towards the attainment of Zimbabwe’s 2030 Vision of ‘an Upper \nMiddle-Income Society by 2030’ through the provision of essential financial \nservices to low-income and marginalised communities and their micro and small \nenterprises. \n \n92. On aggregate, the sector registered growth in all the main performance indicators \nover the review period, including loan portfolio, capitalization level, profitability \nand deposits mobilization by the deposit-taking microfinance subsector. As at 30 \nJune 2023 there were 216 registered microfinance institutions, comprising 208 \ncredit-only and eight (8) deposit-taking microfinance institutions. \n \nMicrofinance Sector Capitalization \n93. The microfinance sector registered a 596.83% increase in aggregated equity from \n$35.91 billion as at 31 December 2022 to $250.23 billion as at 30 June 2023. The \nincrease was attributed to organic growth and fresh capital injection by some \nmicrofinance institutions. \nCapitalisation of Deposit-taking Microfinance Institutions \n94. Three out of seven operating DTMFIs were compliant with the minimum capital \nrequirement of ZW$5 million as at 30 June 2023, and these were African Century \nLimited, InnBucks Microbank and Success Microfinance Bank. The non-\ncompliant DTMFIs are at various stages of capital raising initiatives and they \ncontinue to submit on a quarterly basis, updates on their re-capitalisation \ninitiatives. \n \n95. As at 30 June 2023, the aggregate core capital for the DTMFI sub-sector was \n$131.32 billion, a significant increase from $29.49 billion as at 31 December 2022. \n41 \n \nThe increase was largely driven by fresh capital injections, as well as organic \ngrowth. \n \n96. A total of 170 out of 208 credit-only microfinance institutions were compliant with \nthe minimum capital requirements of ZW$ equivalent of USD25,000. The non-\ncompliant credit-only microfinance institutions are putting in place re-\ncapitalization strategies to comply with the requirements and to facilitate the \nunderwriting of more meaningful businesses. \n \nLoan Portfolio \n97. Total loans for the microfinance sector increased by 672.66% from ZW$46.01 \nbillion as at 31 December 2022, to ZW$355.50 billion as at 30 June 2023. The \nsector registered an improvement in the loan portfolio quality as evidenced by a \ndecrease in the portfolio-at-risk (>30 days) ratio from 10.95% to 9.48% over the \nsame period. \n \nProfitability \n98. The microfinance sector registered significant progress with an aggregate net \nprofit of $145.52 billion for six months ended 30 June 2023, from $4.93 billion \nrecorded during the comparable period in 2022. The increase, which exceeded the \nannual inflation of 175.8% as at 30 June 2023, was largely attributed to improved \noperational efficiency as reflected by an improvement in the average operational \nself-sufficiency (OSS) ratio to 230.39% for the six months ended 30 June 2023 \nfrom 202.50% registered in the comparative period in 2022, against the \ninternational benchmark of 100%. \n \nDeposits Mobilisation \n99. Aggregate deposits for the deposit-taking microfinance sub-sector increased by \n456.89% from $9.58 billion as at 31 December 2022, to $53.35 billion as at 30 \nJune 2023. While the deposit levels remain low, the trend in the level of deposits \nin the sector reflects growing consumer confidence in the sector. \n42 \n \n \nNational Financial Inclusion Strategy II Implementation \n100. Financial inclusion remains a key priority area and a strategic goal for financial \nmarkets development, and a major driver for inclusive economic development in \nline with the country’s development aspirations as outlined in the National \nDevelopment Strategy 1, under the mantra ‘leaving no one and no place behind’. \n \n101. Following the launch of the National Financial Inclusion Strategy II on 31 October \n2022, the Bank continues to champion a number of initiatives as part of the NFIS \nII implementation process. \n \nFinancial Literacy Program \n102. Financial Literacy is one of the pillars of financial stability as it equips consumers \nof financial services with knowledge and skills to make more informed financial \ndecisions. Given that improving financial literacy is a long-term behavioural \nchange, the Bank will continue to champion and coordinate financial literacy \nprograms among both adult consumers of financial services and young people. \n \n103. Financial literacy programs were held in four (4) provinces under the Global \nMoney Week celebrations from 6-31 March 2023. The Bank continued to receive \nand provide financial literacy to visiting school children. Further, the Bank has \nembarked on financial inclusion campaigns across the country’s provinces through \nvarious platforms including the NDS I dissemination programmes spearheaded by \nthe Ministry of Finance and Economic Development \n \n104. The Bank is developing a National Financial Literacy Framework to facilitate a \ncoordinated approach to financial literacy. Engagement with various stakeholders \nis currently underway before finalizing the framework. \n \n \n \n43 \n \nThematic Working Group Meetings \n105. As part of a coordinated approach to implementing financial Inclusion, NFIS II \nThematic Working Groups Meetings were held in June and July 2023 to finalise \nthe activities for the ten thematic areas under NFI II. \n \nFinancial Inclusion Indicators \n106. Following the launch of National Financial Inclusion Strategy II in October 2022, \nthere has been notable progress in access to formal financial services by the \ntargeted groups such as women, SMEs and youth. The financial inclusion \nindicators in the Table 9 reflect the improvement since December 2021. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n44 \n \nTable 9 Financial Inclusion Indicators \n \n107. While the FinScope Consumer and MSME surveys indicate significant progress \non the access strand, in terms of usage, utilization of financial services by the \nmarginalised groups remains low. Loans to MSMEs, women and youth as at 30 \nIndicator \nDec-21 \nMar-22 \nJun-22 \nSept-22 \nDec 22 \nMarch 23 \nJune 2023 \nNumber of Loans to \nMSMEs \n35,224 \n22,657 \n37,590 \n13,461 \n24,987 \n25,162 \n9,307 \nNominal Value of \nloans \nto \nMSMEs \n(ZW$ Million) \n10,280.92 \n13,928.18 \n34,021.15 \n39,909.51 \n \n49,714.31 \n \n74,605.00 \n \n433,852.86 \nAverage \nloans \nto \nMSMEs as % of total \nbank loans \n3.9 \n4.63 \n5.54 \n4.33 \n4.15 \n3.87 \n4.58 \nNumber of Loans to \nWomen \n173,810 \n178,897 \n189,861 \n188,815 \n \n177,671 \n165,459 \n206,886 \nNominal Value of \nLoans \nto \nWomen \n(ZW$ Million) \n14,666.06 \n16,296.10 \n42,972.89 \n43,861.11 \n49,854.41 \n84,043.37 \n345,070.99 \nAverage \nloans \nto \nwomen as a % of total \nbank loans \n5.57 \n5.42 \n7.00 \n4.76 \n4.16 \n4.36 \n3.64 \nNumber of Loans to \nYouth \n75,188 \n77,864 \n85,562 \n66,432 \n65,098 \n71,429 \n54,309 \nNominal Value of \nLoans to Youth (ZW$ \nMillion) \n6,249.97 \n8,132.97 \n12,717.06 \n18,633.57 \n37,629.77 \n55,616.63 \n257,604.92 \nAverage loans to the \nyouth as a % of total \nbank loans \n2.37 \n2.7 \n2.07 \n2.02 \n3.14 \n2.88 \n2.72 \nTotal \nnumber \nof \nActive \nBank \nAccounts (Million) \n8.17 \n7.76 \n6.95 \n8.31 \n7.36 \n7.23 \n7.33 \nNumber of Low-Cost \nBank \nAccounts \n(Million) \n4.78 \n4.83 \n4.22 \n3.69 \n4.35 \n2.34 \n2.35 \n45 \n \nJune 2023 accounted for 4.58%, 3.64% and 2.72% of total bank and microfinance \nloans. Various initiatives are underway to increase the usage of financial services \namong the marginalised groups. \n \nCollateral Registry Update \n108. Cognisant of the need for access to credit for the greater part of the country’s \npopulation, the Bank launched an online Collateral Registry in terms of the \nMovable Property Security Interest [Chapter 14:35]. \n \n109. As at 30 June 46 institutional users had been registered in the system since the \ncommencement date was gazetted on 4 November 2022. Registered institutions \ninclude banks, microfinance institutions and law firms. \n \n110. The Collateral Registry system recorded 377 active registered security interests \nwith a total loan amount of ZW$620.02 billion as at 24 July 2023 as shown in \nFigure 18. \n \nFigure 18: Value of Registered Securities as at 24 July 2023 \n \n \n111. In addition, 323 searches were conducted during the same period as shown in \nFigure 19: \n \n46 \n \nFigure 19: Searches by Client as at 24 July 2023 \n \n \n112. The types of collateral registered in the system are shown below. \n \nFigure 20: Types of Collateral \n \n113. The operationalisation of the collateral registry marks a critical milestone in access \nto credit and will facilitate borrowing opportunities for micro, small to medium \nenterprises in the outlook period. \n114. As part of its communication strategy to promote awareness and ensure effective \noperationalization of the Collateral Registry, the Bank conducted training and \n3\n71\n180\n4\n63\n3\n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\nBuilding Society\nCommercial\nBank\nCredit Only\nMicrofinance\nInstitution\nDevelopment\nFinance\nInstitution\nPublic Searches\nSavings Bank\n3\n113\n1\n16\n8\n382\n19\n10\n1\n57\n26\n190\n1\n1\n19\n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\n300\n350\n400\n450\n47 \n \nawareness workshops in Harare, Bulawayo, Gweru, Masvingo, Mutare and \nBeitbridge between April and July 2023. \n \n115. The workshops targeted banking institutions, microfinance institutions, MSMEs \nand Law firms. The Bank will continue to drive the communication strategy to \nensure awareness and full adoption of the Registry across the country. \n \nCredit Information Sharing Environment \n116. The credit databases at the Credit Registry and the three private bureaus continue \nto offer reference points for lenders to check the credit worthiness of clients during \norigination and through the cycle of the loans. The four credit reporting institutions \nin the country held 22.96 million searchable records as at 30 June 2023. Figure 21 \nindicates the cumulative records per institution. \n \nFigure 21: Cumulative Loan Records per Credit Reporting Institution \n \n117. \n118. In the Credit Registry the open and closed loan records were at 28.61% and \n71.39% of the total loan records of 2.26 million as at 30 June 2023, respectively. \nRegistered subscribers accessing the Credit Registry database were 243 as at 30 \nJune 2023. \n119. Credit Registry inquiries have been on an upward trajectory reflecting growth in \nusage as depicted in Figure 22. \n16.86\n2.26\n1.95\n1.89\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n16\n18\nFCB\nCredit Registry\nXDS\nFincheck\nNumber of Loan Records \n(Millions)\n48 \n \n \nFigure 22: Credit Registry Usage Status \n \n120. Gender distribution of loans is generally skewed towards male borrowers who \nconstituted 68.01% while female borrowers constituted 31.99% of loan contracts \nin the Credit Registry. Over the year there were more women accessing to financial \nservices for the first time compared to men as indicated in Figure 23. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n13,011 \n116,491 \n261,801 \n440,407 \n566,298 \n700,662 \n813,298 \n976,491 \n1,317,853 \n1,956,678 \n2,252,821 \n2,750,658 \n3,393,569 \n -\n 500,000\n 1,000,000\n 1,500,000\n 2,000,000\n 2,500,000\n 3,000,000\n 3,500,000\n 4,000,000\nJun-17\nDec-17\nJun-18\nDec-18\nJun-19\nDec-19\nJun-20\nDec-20\nJun-21\nDec-21\nJun-22\nDec-22\nJun-23\nCumulative Inquiries \n49 \n \nFigure 23: New to Financing as at 30 June 2023 \n \n121. In terms of age and gender distribution, the 31-40- and 41-50-years age groups \ndominate the number of borrowings with male borrowers dominating in both age \ngroups as shown in Figure 24. \n \nFigure 24: Credit Registry Loans by Gender and Age \n \n31.92%\n30.19%\n0%\n20%\n40%\n60%\n80%\n100%\nFemale\nMale\n57,837 \n157,478 \n552,071 \n456,476 \n206,652 \n61,020 \n18,854 \n69,948 \n290,805 \n213,946 \n90,313 \n17,710 \n -\n 100,000\n 200,000\n 300,000\n 400,000\n 500,000\n 600,000\n0-25\n26-30\n31-40\n41-50\n51-60\n61+\nNumber of Loan Contracts\nNumber of Loan Contracts by Men\nNumber of Loan Contracts Women\n50 \n \nNATIONAL PAYMENT SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENTS \n\n122. The payment systems services sector comprising 24 payment system providers \nand 25 participant banks remained sound, safe, and recorded significant \nimprovements. During the six months to June 2023, aggregate digital payments \ntransaction values increased by an average of 40%, whilst volumes fell by a \nmarginal 4% as shown in Figure 25. \n \nFigure 25: Digital Payments Transaction Values and Volumes from Jan-June \n2023 \n \n *Digital Payments Include Transactions conducted on the RTGS, Card, Mobile Money, \nMobile Apps, and Online platforms \n \n123. During the six months to June 2023, a total of 376.6 million transactions valued at \nZW$83.6 trillion were processed through the national payment system. \n \nReal Time Gross Settlement System (RTGS \n124. RTGS continues to dominate because it caters to large value transactions with a \nvalue of ZW$48.0 trillion during the first half of 2023. On the SADC Real Gross \nSettlement System (SADC-RTGS), the 14 Zimbabwean participant banks \n50\n52\n54\n56\n58\n60\n62\n64\n66\n68\n0\n5,000\n10,000\n15,000\n20,000\n25,000\n30,000\nJan-23\nFeb-23\nMar-23\nApr-23\nMay-23\nJun-23\nVolumes in millions\nValues in billions\n TRANSACTION VALUES IN BILLIONS\n TRANSACTION VOLUMES IN MILLIONS\n51 \n \nprocessed 2,159 transactions valued at ZAR3.1 billion during the six months ended \nJune 2023. \n \nInteroperability \n125. The country continued to witness growth in interoperability transactions with the \nvalue processed for retail digital transactions reaching ZW$187.5 billion in June \n2023, as shown in Figure 26. \n \nFigure 26: Interoperability Transactions: values and vol Jan 22 to Jun23 \n \n \n \nAccess Devices and Points \n126. All access devices, except credit cards, recorded growth during the period under \nreview as shown in Table 10. \n52 \n \nTable 10: Payment Access Points and Devices as of June 2023 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n% \nCHANGE \n \nJan-23 \nFeb-23 \nMar-23 \nApr-23 \nMay-23 \nJun-23 \nATMs \n410 \n410 \n412 \n412 \n413 \n413 \n0.24% \nPOS \n134,746 \n131,927 \n133,205 \n133,527 \n134,454 \n132,171 \n0.69% \nMPOS \n30,920 \n30,896 \n30,429 \n30,394 \n30,256 \n30,141 \n-0.45% \nPAYMENTS SYSTEMS ACCESS DEVICES \nDebit \nCards \n5,550,881 5,799,800 5,892,135 5,698,111 5,740,254 5,706,854 \n-0.58% \nCredit \nCards \n15,132 \n15,514 \n15,764 \n15,814 \n16,049 \n16,209 \n1.00% \nPrepaid \nCards \n134,363 \n138,963 \n132,684 \n134,848 \n138,034 \n139,690 \n1.20% \nMobile \nBanking \nSubscribers \n7,283,840 8,125,125 7,097,833 7,554,180 7,760,726 7,915,941 \n2.00% \nInternet \nBanking \nSubscribers \n626,579 \n606,373 \n626,313 \n542,135 \n546,185 \n551,647 \n1.00% \n \nSWIFT ISO 20022 Migration from MT Messages \n127. Local financial institutions successfully upgraded their SWIFT infrastructure for \nincoming Cross Border Payments and Reporting plus (CBPR+) on the \nimplementation of the ISO20022 standard, in line with the SWIFT set deadline of \nMarch 2023. Banks continue to work towards ensuring full compliance with the \nother outstanding SWIFT Cross Border outgoing payment processes for the \nCBPR+ ISO 20022 program and SADC-RTGS going live in August 2023. \n \n \n \n53 \n \nCybersecurity Management \n128. To manage cyber security risk on payment cards, the market is urged to ensure \nthat all card access devices and POS as well as MPOS access points are EMV \ncompliant by October 2023. \n \nAnti-Money Laundering and Counter-Financing of Terrorism (AML-CFT) \n129. The Bank continues to implore the financial sector to deploy risk-based systems \nin their surveillance of elevated threats especially given the dynamic digital \ninnovations taking place worldwide. Board understanding of AML/CFT issues as \nwell as internal controls are now critical areas for oversight. The Bank continued \nto offer training programs to ensure compliance with AML/CFT regulations. \n \n Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS) \n130. The Bank is implementing the PAPSS, which is a continental RTGS system being \npromoted by the African Export and Import Bank (Afreximbank) as the settlement \nbank. The payment system is meant to complement and interoperate with the \nexisting cross-border payment schemes currently in operation. PAPSS is aimed at \nconnecting all banks, non-banks, switches, and regional systems in Africa to \nenhance cross-border payment efficiency across Africa. \n \nConsumer Protection in Digital Financial Services \n131. The Bank continued to promote informed conflict resolution and management \nprocesses based on the rights, fairness, transparency and interests of consumers. \nThe Bank continued to participate in efforts to educate the transacting public \nthrough various platforms including roadshows which have been a huge success \nin enhancing financial literacy and digital financial services awareness. \n \n54 \n \n132. Under Fintech developments, the Bank’s focus is to ensure consumers are at the \ncenter of innovation without jeopardising financial stability and in line with \nAML/CFT issues. \n \nCentral Bank Digital Currency and Tokenization Projects \n133. Following Cabinet approval in July 2022 for the Bank to pursue the roadmap for \nthe introduction of a Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC), the Bank continues \nto make steady progress on the project. In this regard, a consumer survey was \ncarried out during which 3,260 responses were received from the public. \nNotwithstanding the observed limited knowledge about CBDCs, 71.7% of the \nrespondents confirmed their willingness to use a CBDC if the Bank introduced it. \nIt is in this evidence-based context that the Bank proposes to take the road towards \nCBDC in measured stages as the result of the survey gives the Bank sufficient \nimpetus to move to the next stage. \n \n134. Given the above, the Bank has accelerated efforts toward the digitization of gold \nthrough gold-backed digital tokens (GBDT). The GBDT will primarily serve as \nan alternative investment instrument which shall be scaled up to be used for \ntransactional purposes by the public. The GBDT allows investors to preserve their \nvalue, but above all allows for divisibility, as the milligram is one thousandth of a \ngram. \n \n135. Similar to the physical gold coins introduced by the Bank in 2022, the GBDTs \nwere introduced in response to continued strong domestic investor demand for \nconvenient and reliable market-based instruments for value preservation. The \nGBDTs are, therefore, an added convenient instrument that allows investors to \nenjoy the same value preservation benefits of physical gold without the security \nrisk and indivisibility of holding physical gold coins. \n \n55 \n \n136. Given the above, the potential of the GBDTs to transform the investment and \ncurrency markets is immense. Continued uptake of the GBDTs is, therefore, \nenvisaged to sustainably anchor inflation and exchange rate expectations. \n \n137. On account of their effectiveness in mopping liquidity, the GBDTs have since \nproved to be an effective monetary policy instrument with strong potential to help \nrestore normalcy to the domestic financial and capital markets within the short \nterm. In addition, the divisibility nature of the digital gold tokens conforms to the \nnational objective of leaving no one and no place behind in national development \ninitiatives. This is again in line with the Bank’s longstanding commitment towards \nfinancial inclusion as it enhances access and affordability for a wide cross-section \nof economic agents across all income brackets. \n\n138. The Bank is at an advanced stage in preparations for the rolling out of GBDTs for \ntransactional purposes in Phase II of the project under the code or name ZiG, which \nstands for Zimbabwe Gold. It is envisaged that the transactional phase will see \nGBDTs complimenting the demand for the US dollar in domestic transactions as \nretailers will be offered a safer, more convenient, and value-preserving medium of \nexchange. As such, appropriate awareness campaigns would be conducted in all \nprovinces and districts of the country to educate the public on the use and benefits \nof GBDT. \n\n139. Consultations with various stakeholders including the Confederation of Zimbabwe \nIndustries (CZI) and the Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC) and \nthe Retailers Association of Zimbabwe (RAZ) have already been undertaken and \nbanks are now configuring their systems to allow for the issuance of cards which \nwill be denominated in ZiG. \n56 \n \nSECTION FIVE: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEVELOPMENTS \n \n140. The current account balance is estimated to have narrowed to a surplus of US$38.3 \nmillion in the first half of 2023, compared to a surplus of US$397.9 million for the \nsame period in 2022. This followed a more significant trade deficit, as exports \ncontracted, while imports increased. The current account was further weighed \ndown by services and primary income account that also registered the deficits. \nRemittances and other transfers (secondary income flows), however, remained \nresilient, thereby offsetting the deficits in the services and primary income \naccounts. \n \n141. This, notwithstanding, the estimated current account balance is projected to \nstrengthen in the second half of the year on account of projected bullish tobacco, \ngold and lithium export performance and resilient diaspora remittances. \n \nFigure 27: Current Account Developments (US$ millions) \n \nSource: RBZ and ZIMSTAT Estimates, 2023 \n \n142. Merchandise exports declined by 8.2%, from US$3 479.0 million in the first half \nof 2022 to US$3 194.2 million for the corresponding period in 2023, mainly \n-600\n-400\n-200\n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1000\n2022Q1\n2022Q2\n2022Q3\n2022Q4\n2023Q1\n2023Q2\nTrade Bal\nServices Bal\nBal on Primary Income\nBal on secondary Income\nCurrent Account Bal\n57 \n \nweighed down by the subdued performance in mineral exports. Mineral exports, \nwhich account for the largest share of merchandise exports, declined by 12.5%, \nfrom US$2 898.9 million in the first half of 2022 to US$2 5836.8 million, during \nthe period under review. The decline in exports followed the continued softening \nof key commodity prices largely on account of faltering global growth prospects. \n \n143. The country’s agricultural exports increased by 15.9%, from US$399.9 million in \nthe first half of 2022 to US$463.5 million in 2023, during the period under review, \ndriven by tobacco exports. Horticultural exports were, however, subdued owing to \nlagged effects of higher input costs for fertilizer, chemicals, fuel, packaging, and \nlabour, which increased significantly in 2022. \n \n144. Manufactured exports increased by 7.6%, from US$180.6 million recorded in the \nfirst half of 2022 to US$193.84 million in the corresponding half in 2023, largely \ndriven by rising tobacco cigarette exports. Low competitiveness, which emanated \nfrom high production and market development costs and antiquated machinery, \nhowever, continued to adversely affect manufactured exports. \n \n145. Merchandise imports registered a 3% increase, from US$3 965.3 million in the \nfirst half of 2022 to US$3 849.4 million in 2023, driven by growth in fuel, \nmachinery, and electricity imports. As the economy expands, so does its capacity \nto absorb imports that feed into the production process. The country’s import bill \nwas, however, moderated by reduced crude oil, edible oils and fertilizer prices. \n \nInternational Remittances \n146. As at 30 June 2023, total international remittances through official channels \namounted to US$1,433 million, an increase of 4% from US$1,371 million during \nthe same period in 2022. Of the total amount, diaspora remittances amount to \nUS$919 million, a 15% increase from US$797 million received during the same \n58 \n \nperiod in the year 2022. International remittances received through the normal \nbanking system on behalf of International Organizations (NGOs) amounted to \nUS$514 million, an 11% decrease the from previous year of US$574 million. Of \nthe total diaspora remittances, 29% came from South Africa followed by the \nUnited Kingdom (22%). \n \n Foreign Payments Performance \n147. The total foreign inflows of US$5.6 billion for the first six months of 2023 were \nagainst a total of foreign payments of US$4.4 billion, resulting in net foreign \ncurrency inflows of US$1.2 billion. This, coupled with restrictive monetary policy \nfurther testifies to the soundness of the economy’s external and monetary \nfundamentals that are envisaged to sustain favourable exchange rate and inflation \ndynamics in the short to medium term. \n \n148. For the first half of 2023, Authorised Dealers processed foreign payments \namounting to US$4.39 billion. This represented a 14.8% increase, \nfrom US$ 3.83 billion recorded for the same period in 2022. The upward trajectory \nin foreign payments shows the increased capital absorptive capacity as the \neconomy grows. \n\n149. The foreign payments were mainly towards capital and raw materials/intermediate \ngoods, and this has gone a long way in enhancing industry capacity utilisation. \nAlso, of significance are foreign payments for fuel that have continued to increase \ndriven by domestic demand thereby offsetting the positive impact of the decline \nin global energy prices. Table 11 shows foreign payments by category. \n \n \n \n59 \n \nTable 11: Foreign Payments by Category in USD Millions (Jan –Jun 2023) \n2023 \n2022 \n% Variance \nContribution \n2023 \nContribution \n2022 \nMerchandise Imports (excl. energy) \n 2,351.4 \n 2,078.6 \n13% \n54% \n54% \n- Raw Materials & Intermediate \nGoods \n 777.4 \n 622.5 \n25% \n18% \n16% \n- Capital Goods \n 951.1 \n 837.3 \n14% \n22% \n22% \n- Consumption & Finished \nManufactured Goods \n 622.9 \n 618.8 \n1% \n14% \n16% \nEnergy (Fuel & Electricity) \n 938.7 \n 742.0 \n27% \n21% \n19% \n- Fuel \n 871.0 \n 694.0 \n25% \n20% \n18% \n- Electricity \n 67.7 \n 47.9 \n41% \n2% \n1% \nService Payments \n 421.5 \n 384.9 \n10% \n10% \n10% \n- Technical, Professional & \nconsultancy \n 189.9 \n 193.0 \n-2% \n4% \n5% \n- Software \n 61.2 \n 40.7 \n50% \n1% \n1% \n- Other (tourism, edu, freight etc) \n 170.4 \n 151.2 \n13% \n4% \n4% \nIncome Payments (Profits, \nDividends) \n 150.7 \n 327.2 \n-54% \n3% \n9% \n- Dividends \n 86.3 \n 269.1 \n-68% \n2% \n7% \n- Interest Payments \n 16.4 \n 8.5 \n93% \n0.4% \n0.2% \n- Other (Salaries, Expats, Rental) \n 48.0 \n 49.6 \n-3% \n1% \n1% \nCapital Remittances (Outward) \n 418.1 \n 216.0 \n94% \n10% \n6% \n- External Loan Repayments \n 327.9 \n 170.4 \n92% \n7% \n4% \n- Disinvestments \n 49.8 \n 17.0 \n194% \n1.1% \n0.4% \n- Foreign Investment \n 40.4 \n 28.7 \n41% \n0.9% \n0.75% \nOther Payments \n 111.4 \n 77.5 \n44% \n2.5% \n2.0% \n- Card Payments \n 100.2 \n 58.2 \n72% \n2% \n2% \n- Refunds \n 11.1 \n 19.3 \n-42% \n0.3% \n0.5% \nTotal \n4 391.8 \n3 826.2 \n14.8% \n100% \n100% \nSource: RBZ (2023) \n\n \n60 \n \nSECTION SIX: NEW MONETARY POLICY MEASURES \n \n150. The policy measures pursued by the Bank during the first half of the year 2023, \nthrough its implicit monetary policy anchor of a combination of using the Bank \npolicy rates and exchange rate targeting have brought stability in prices and the \nexchange rate and sanity and calmness in the domestic markets. The calmness in \nthe domestic markets ably attests to the fact that the economy is on the right track \nto price and exchange rate stability and the need to stay the course of the right \npolicy mix remains critical. \n \n151. In view of the above context, the Bank will continue to implement a tight monetary \npolicy stance for the next six months to sustainably anchor inflation and exchange \nrate expectations. The tight monetary policy path will be anchored on the \nfollowing measures: \n \nInterest rates \ni. \nThe Bank policy rate which is currently at 150% will be reviewed in line \nwith developments in the month-on-month inflation; \nii. \nThe medium-term accommodation lending rate which is currently at 75% \nwill also continue to be reviewed in line with inflation developments and \nlong-term productive sector funding needs; \niii. \nThe Bank policy rate remains the minimum lending rate for all banks; and \niv. \nThe deposit interest rates on savings and time deposits which are currently \npegged at 30% and 50% per annum, respectively, will also be reviewed in \nline with inflation developments. \n \nStatutory Reserves \n152. The statutory reserve requirements continue to play a significant role in mopping \nexcess liquidity and ensuring the continued safety and soundness of the domestic \n61 \n \nbanking sector. In this regard, the current statutory reserve requirements levels on \nlocal and foreign currency demand and call deposits will remain at 15% and 10%, \nrespectively. The statutory reserve requirements on savings and time deposits \nwould remain at 5% across all deposits to support domestic savings. The Bank will \nreview the statutory reserve requirements consistent with monetary and financial \nconditions. \n \nNon-negotiable Certificate of Deposits \n153. The Bank shall strengthen the operation of the Non-negotiable Certificate of \nDeposits (NNCDs) which are being used to mop excess local currency liquidity \nthrough the introduction of NNCD maturity profiles of 7,14, 21 and 30 days with \nimmediate effect. \n \nGold coins and gold-backed digital tokens \n154. The Bank is at an advanced stage in the preparations for the eventual rolling out \nof GBDT for transactional purposes in Phase II of the project under the code or \nname ZiG, which stands for Zimbabwe Gold. It is envisaged that the transactional \nphase will see GBDT complementing the use of the US dollar in domestic \ntransactions. \n \n155. The Bank will conduct appropriate awareness campaigns in all national provinces \nand districts of the country to educate the public on the use and benefits of GBDT. \nThe GBDT are envisaged to form the basis for the development of the country’s \ncentral bank digital currency (CBDC) since ZiG in its current form and design \nexhibits most of the characteristics of a CBDC. \n \nAuction System \n156. The foreign currency auction system remains a critical source of foreign currency \nfor the economy. As such, the Bank shall continue with the current auction system \n62 \n \nin place and further liberalise the use of foreign exchange from the wholesale \nauction system by allowing banks to meet bonafide small foreign payment \nrequirements for their customers, including individuals and Micro, Small and \nMedium Enterprises (MSMEs) in order to enhance financial inclusion. \n \nLocalisation of Tobacco Production Financing \n157. In terms of Section 4 of the Exchange Control (Tobacco Finance) Order, Statutory \nInstrument 61 of 2004, tobacco merchants are required to source offshore \nfinancing to produce and buyback green leaf tobacco. Tobacco merchants who fail \nto secure offshore financing are required to apply to the Bank for authority to raise \nfunds on the local market. \n \n158. With immediate effect, there will be no restrictions on the use of locally sourced \nfunds to support the production of tobacco in the country. \n \n159. Considering this development, the Exchange Control (Tobacco Finance) Order, \nStatutory Instrument 61 of 2004 shall be amended to take account of this change. \n \nRegularisation of Tourism Agreements with External Partners \n160. The Bank is granting a moratorium to all tourism operators who have unregistered \ntourism agreements and unapproved offshore accounts to regularise the \nagreements and offshore foreign currency accounts, with the Bank before 31 \nAugust 2023. \n \nSECTION SEVEN: ECONOMIC OUTLOOK \n161. The bold measures put in place by the Bank and Government which include a \ncombination of the further liberalisation of the foreign exchange market, continued \nmopping of excess liquidity through the wholesale auction and digital gold-backed \ntokens coupled with measures to strengthen demand for local currency and \noperationalisation of the blocked funds debt assumption by Government have \n63 \n \nstabilised the exchange rate and firmly anchored inflation expectations. The robust \nmacroeconomic fundamentals are expected to anchor and sustain the current \nstability in the medium to long term. \n \nInflation Outlook \n162. The upward trend of month-on-month inflation which sharply reversed in July \n2023 to minus 15.3% is expected to continue to correct in August 2023. In the \noutlook, monthly inflation is expected to continue to decline with annual inflation \nexpected to end the year between 60% and 70%. \n \nBalance of Payments Outlook \n163. On the external front, the current account surplus is envisaged to narrow slightly \nto US$274.5 million in 2023, from US$305.0 million in 2022, driven by robust \nperformance in the export receipts and transfers in the form of diaspora \nremittances and humanitarian transfers, against the relatively elevated external \npayments. \n \n164. Merchandise exports are envisaged to close the year at US$7 121.8 million, a 1.7% \nincrease from US$7 000.2 million in 2022, driven by surging gold, lithium, \ndiamond and tobacco exports notwithstanding subdued PGMs exports as their \nprices remain depressed. On the other hand, merchandise imports are projected to \nclose the year at US$8 343.2 million, 2.6% up from US$8 131.8 million in 2022, \ndriven by increases in grain, fuel, machinery, and electricity imports. \n \nSECTION EIGHT: CONCLUSION \n165. The economy has responded favourably to the measures put in place by \nGovernment and the Bank to address the volatility in the foreign exchange market. \nTo ensure the full benefits of these measures and to sustainably anchor the inflation \n64 \n \nexpectations, the Bank’s current monetary policy stance will be maintained during \nthe six months to December 2023, with appropriate revisions being done in line \nwith inflation developments. \n \n166. More importantly, the robust macroeconomic fundamentals as attested by a \nhealthy balance of payments, fiscal sustainability, higher manufacturing sector \ncapacity utilisation, improved foreign currency receipts relative to foreign \npayments and continued monetary restraint will anchor the obtaining price and \nexchange rate stability in the medium to long term. In this context, the Bank \nstrongly believes that the current stability is sustainable in the medium to long \nterm. \n \nI Thank You \n \n \n \nDr. John P Mangudya \nGovernor \n \n \nR\nE\nS\nE\nR\nV\nE\nB\nA\nN\nK\nO\nF\nZ\nI\nM\nB\nA\nB\nW\nE\nReserve Bank of Zimbabwe \nMachel Avenue Box 1283\n \n Tel: \n \nEmail: info@rbz.co.zw \nReserve Bank of Zimbabwe \nBox 399 Bulawayo, Zimbabwe \nTel: \nEmail: info@rbz.co.zw \n www.rbz.co.zw\n@ReserveBankZim\n@ReserveBankZim", "source": "RBZ", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///RBZ/Monetary_Policy_Statements/Mid-Term_Monetary_Policy_Statement_2023Zim.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "f3084795a245e72d09a1b9592781d584", "text": "FOSTERING PRICE, CURRENCY AND EXCHANGE RATE STABILITY\n THROUGH BALANCING\n CONFIDENCE-TRUST-CREDIBILITY-EFFICIENCY-STABILITY-GROWTH \n06 FEBRUARY 2025\nMONETARY POLICY\nSTATEMENT\n2025\nBy\nDR. J. MUSHAYAVANHU\nGOVERNOR \n2 \n \n \nTABLE OF CONTENTS \nLIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................................... 4 \nSECTION ONE ........................................................................................................... 5 \nINTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND ................................................................. 5 \nSECTION TWO .......................................................................................................... 8 \nMONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS ...................................................... 8 \nSECTION THREE .................................................................................................... 16 \nRECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS.............................................................. 16 \nSECTION FOUR ...................................................................................................... 31 \nEXTERNAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS .............................................................. 31 \nSECTION FIVE ........................................................................................................ 35 \nCONDITION AND PERFORMANCE OF THE BANKING SECTOR .................... 35 \nSECTION SIX .......................................................................................................... 57 \nNEW MONETARY POLICY MEASURES .............................................................. 57 \nSECTION SEVEN .................................................................................................... 74 \nECONOMIC OUTLOOK .......................................................................................... 74 \nSECTION EIGHT ..................................................................................................... 75 \nCONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 75 \n \n3 \n \nTABLE OF FIGURES \nFigure 1: ZiG/US$ Exchange Rates and Premium April 2024 to Jan 2025..................... 9 \nFigure 2: Bank Policy Rates and Versus Lending Rates (%) ........................................ 10 \nFigure 3: Weekly Change in ZiG Loans ...................................................................... 10 \nFigure 4 : Foreign Currency Reserve Cover of ZiG Reserve Money and Deposits ....... 12 \nFigure 5: Global Growth 2019 to 2026 ........................................................................ 17 \nFigure 6: Global Inflation 2019 to 2026 ....................................................................... 19 \nFigure 7: Gold Prices US$/Oz January 2023 to December 2024 .................................. 21 \nFigure 8: PGMs Prices US$/Oz ................................................................................... 22 \nFigure 9: Brent Crude Oil ............................................................................................ 22 \nFigure 10: Components of Reserve Money (31 December 2024) ................................. 24 \nFigure 11: Foreign Currency and Local Currency Deposits ......................................... 24 \nFigure 12: Month-on-Month Growth in Broad Money (May - December 2024) .......... 25 \nFigure 13: Loan to Deposit Ratio (5 April 2024 – 10 January 2025) ............................ 26 \nFigure 14: Foreign and Local Currency Loans ............................................................. 26 \nFigure 15: ZSE Market Capitalization (ZW$ billions) ................................................. 27 \nFigure 16: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange All Share, Top 10 and Mining Indices ............. 27 \nFigure 17: Victoria Falls Stock Exchange All Share Index .......................................... 28 \nFigure 18: CPI Categories Monthly Inflation Changes (Dec 2024- Jan 2025) .............. 29 \nFigure 19: ZiG Contributions to Non-food inflation (May 2024 to Jan 2025) .............. 29 \nFigure 20: Month-on-Month ZiG Inflation Rates (May 2024 - Jan 2025) .................... 30 \nFigure 21: USD Annual CPI Inflation Jan 2023 to Jan 2025 ........................................ 30 \nFigure 22: Current Account Developments (US$ millions) .......................................... 32 \nFigure 23: Gold Purchases in Kgs (January to December 2024) .................................. 33 \nFigure 24: Asset Mix as at 31 December 2024............................................................. 37 \nFigure 25: Sectoral Distribution of Loans as at 31 December 2024 .............................. 38 \nFigure 26: Trend in Non- Performing Loans ................................................................ 39 \nFigure 27: Banking Sector Income Mix as at 31 December 2024 ................................. 39 \nFigure 28: Survey Results on Gender Diversity in the Financial Sector ....................... 46 \nFigure 29: Cumulative Loan Records per Credit Reporting Institution ........................ 48 \nFigure 30: Distribution of Inquiries per Credit Reporting Institution ........................... 49 \nFigure 31: Cumulative Credit Registry Usage Status .................................................. 49 \nFigure 32: Distribution of Loans Age & Gender .......................................................... 50 \nFigure 33: Value of Registered Securities as at 31 December 2024 ............................. 50 \nFigure 34: Number of Security Interest Notices ........................................................... 51 \nFigure 35: Types of Collateral as at 31 December 2024 ............................................... 51 \nFigure 36: Searches by Client as at 31 December 2024................................................ 52 \nFigure 37: Movable Collateral Pledged to Secure Agricultural Sector Loans ............... 52 \nFigure 38: Payment Systems in Zimbabwe .................................................................. 53 \nFigure 39: Interoperability Transaction Values and Volumes from April - Dec 2024 ... 55 \nFigure 40: Reserve Bank Monetary Policy Framework (2025) .................................... 59 \n4 \n \nLIST OF TABLES \nTable 1: Key Monetary and Financial Statistics ......................................................... 14 \nTable 2: Total Foreign Currency Receipts for 2023 and 2024 (US$ Millions) ........... 31 \nTable 3: Foreign Payments by Category in USD Millions (2023-2024) ..................... 34 \nTable 4: Banking Sector Architecture ........................................................................ 35 \nTable 5: Financial Soundness Indicators .................................................................... 36 \nTable 6: Reported Core Capital as at 31 December 2024 ........................................... 36 \nTable 7: Microfinance Key Performance Indicators ................................................... 43 \nTable 8: DTMFIs Sub-sector Deposits and Liquidity ................................................. 44 \nTable 9: Financial Inclusion Indicators ...................................................................... 47 \nTable 10: Payment Access Points and Devices as of December 2024 ........................ 54 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n5 \n \nSECTION ONE \nINTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND \n \n1. \nThe 2025 Monetary Policy Statement is issued in terms of Section 46 of the Reserve \nBank of Zimbabwe Act [Chapter 22:15]. The Statement is being issued at a time \nwhen the economy is experiencing relative inflation and exchange rate stability. The \nstability reflects the tight monetary policy stance maintained by the Reserve Bank \nduring the last quarter of 2024, following the upward review of the Bank Policy \nRate and statutory reserve requirements. \n \n2. \nGreater exchange rate flexibility in the foreign exchange interbank market, \nanchored by tight monetary conditions, has also gone a long way in supporting the \ncurrent stability. Specifically, strategic foreign exchange interventions by the \nReserve Bank have helped clear the market and enabled the smooth flow of foreign \nexchange to the market. Going forward, the Reserve Bank will continue to deepen \nthe Willing-Buyer Willing-Seller (WBWS) foreign exchange interbank market to \nenhance price discovery and market efficiency. \n \n3. \nThe increased foreign currency inflows during the second half of 2024 was also \ncrucial in providing foreign exchange liquidity, thereby supporting the country's \nbalance of payments and maintaining the current account in a surplus position for \nthe rest of the year. The surplus on the current account is projected to further \nimprove in 2025. \n \n4. \nMore importantly, the increased foreign currency inflows have allowed the build-\nup of foreign reserves, including gold, to support currency and exchange rate \nstability. In addition to covering local currency reserve money, foreign currency \nreserves also cover the entire local currency deposit base. The Reserve Bank will \ncontinue to accumulate reserves to provide adequate backing for ZiG stability. \n \n6 \n \n5. \nNotwithstanding the positive developments on the inflation and exchange rate front, \nthe tight monetary policy resulted in some temporary liquidity challenges with \nnegative repercussions on economic activity. To ease the flow of funds in the \ninterbank market, the Reserve Bank introduced an intra-day facility for banks, \nwhich eliminated payment gridlocks. The liquidity situation is expected to further \nimprove through disbursements under the Targeted Finance Facility (TFF) to \nsupport productive sectors of the economy. The liquidity challenges also partly \nreflected the general inclination of economic agents, in a dollarized economy, to \nspend local currency while reserving foreign currency for store of value purposes. \n \n6. \nGoing forward, as price and exchange rate stability is further entrenched, the \nReserve Bank will continue to delicately balance the trade-off between growth and \ninflation. As such, the Reserve Bank will ensure that its current monetary policy \nstance remains supportive of the envisaged growth of 6% in 2025. \n \n7. \nAs part of the preparation of this Monetary Policy Statement, the Reserve Bank had \nextensive stakeholder1 engagements and consultations to leverage critical feedback \nand inputs required in mapping the monetary policy priorities for 2025. \n \n8. \nThe consultative meetings revealed broad acceptance of the ZiG by the market. The \nstakeholders commended the relative stability of the ZiG and implored the Reserve \nBank to continue to stay the course of tight monetary policy to enhance confidence \nin the local currency and increase its usage, while ensuring adequate liquidity to \nsupport economic activity. Stakeholders highlighted that building confidence in the \nlocal currency would take time and required consistent policies, and walking the \ntalk in implementing policies that promote price, currency and exchange rate \nstability. \n \n1 The key stakeholders included the Bankers Association of Zimbabwe (BAZ), Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries \n(CZI), Confederation of Zimbabwe Retailers (CZR), Retailers Association of Zimbabwe (RAZ), Chamber of Mines \n(COM), Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC), Zimbabwe Farmers’ Union (ZFU), Commercial Farmers' Union (CFU), \nZimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC), the Zimbabwe Tobacco Association (ZTA), The Asset Managers, \nTransporters Associations, the CEO Africa Round Table, and Telecoms Operators Association of Zimbabwe (Econet, \nNetone, Telecel, and Telone) , Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (POTRAZ). \n \n7 \n \n9. \nCritically, stakeholders highlighted that policies that narrow the foreign exchange \npremium, reduce inflation and the cost of banking services as well as improving \nboth the quantum and quality of ZiG bank notes would enhance confidence building \nin the local currency. \n \n10. The Reserve Bank broadly concurred with the insightful submissions by \nstakeholders and is convinced that consolidating price and exchange rate stability is \na pre-condition for enhancing confidence in the use of the local currency. In this \nregard, the Monetary Policy thrust aims to consolidate the gains of the ZiG to date \nconsidering the vulnerabilities and fragilities in the interbank foreign exchange \nmarket and the liquidity conditions. \n \n11. The Reserve Bank will continue with the tight monetary policy stance whose \noverarching objective is to foster Central Bank policy credibility and trust under the \nBack-to-Basics Strategy. In this regard, the monetary policy strategy will be \nanchored on three interwoven strategic pillars which are (i) Consolidating Price, \nCurrency and Exchange Rate Stability; (ii) Enhancing Monetary Stability, \nResearch, Policy and Data Integrity; and (iii) Maintaining Safety, Soundness and \nIntegrity of the Financial Sector. \n \n12. This Monetary Policy Statement outlines the policy stance of the Reserve Bank \nduring the first half of 2025, informed by the above three strategic pillars. \n \n13. The subsequent sections of the Monetary Policy Statement are presented as follows: \n• \nSection 2: Monetary and Financial Conditions \n• \nSection 3: Recent Economic Developments \n• \nSection 4: External Sector Developments \n• \nSection 5: Condition and Performance of the Banking Sector \n• \nSection 6: New Monetary Policy Measures \n• \nSection 7: Economic Outlook \n• \nSection 8: Conclusion \n \n \n8 \n \nSECTION TWO \nMONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS \n \n14. The Monetary Policy measures implemented by the Reserve Bank since the \nintroduction of the ZiG have delivered exchange rate and inflation stability. This \nlargely reflects the effectiveness of the Reserve Bank’s tight monetary policy stance \nsustained since April 2024. \n \n15. The tight monetary policy stance was further consolidated in September 2024 to \naddress attendant risks to inflation and exchange rate stability through the upward \nreview of the Bank Policy Rate and statutory reserves. This resulted in the \ndissipation of inflationary pressures since October 2024. Monthly ZiG inflation, \ntherefore, declined from a peak of 37.2% in October 2024, to 3.7% in December \n2024. The decline mainly reflected stability in the exchange rate, as evidenced by \nthe significant narrowing of parallel market premiums. The Reserve Bank remains \ncommitted to ensuring sustained price stability that has been experienced in the last \nquarter of 2024. \n \nExchange Rate Developments \n16. The interbank exchange rate and the parallel exchange rate remained stable since \nOctober 2024. The exchange rate premium has been contained since October 2024. \nFigure 1 shows the evolution of the interbank and parallel market exchange rates \nand the premium for the period from 15 April 2024 to 23 January 2025. \n9 \n \nFigure 1: ZiG/US$ Exchange Rates and Premium April 2024 to Jan 2025 \n \nSource: RBZ and Market Intelligence Surveys, 2025 \n \n17. The stability in the exchange rate has gone a long way in supporting the \ndisinflation trend witnessed during the last quarter of 2024. \n \nInterest Rates \n18. The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) reviewed the Bank Policy Rate from 20% \nto 35% effective 27 September 2024, to curtail exchange rate and inflation \npressures. Concomitantly, minimum and maximum corporate lending rates \nincreased from 24.2% to 40% and 32.4% to 45.6%, respectively. Figure 2 shows the \ndevelopments on the Bank Policy Rate, vis-a-vis lending rates since the introduction \nof the ZiG in 2024. \n \n19. Following the upward review of the Bank Policy Rate, the overnight \naccommodation rate rose to 40%, in line with the Reserve Bank’s tight monetary \nstance. The overnight accommodation window remains available to assist banks \nfacing liquidity challenges. There was minimal reliance on the lender of last resort \nfacility as most banks relied on the liquidation of NNCDs to meet their liquidity \nneeds. \n0.0%\n20.0%\n40.0%\n60.0%\n80.0%\n100.0%\n120.0%\n140.0%\n160.0%\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n35\n40\n13-Apr-24\n28-Apr-24\n13-May-24\n28-May-24\n12-Jun-24\n27-Jun-24\n12-Jul-24\n27-Jul-24\n11-Aug-24\n26-Aug-24\n10-Sep-24\n25-Sep-24\n10-Oct-24\n25-Oct-24\n09-Nov-24\n24-Nov-24\n09-Dec-24\n24-Dec-24\n08-Jan-25\n23-Jan-25\nExchang eRates\nPREMIUM (%)\nINTERBANK RATE\nPARALLEL RATES (Transfer)\n10 \n \nFigure 2: Bank Policy Rates and Versus Lending Rates (%) \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n20. The monetary policy measures also assisted in slowing credit growth, thereby \nimpacting positively on inflation and the exchange rate. Figure 3 shows weekly \nchanges in ZiG loans. \nFigure 3: Weekly Change in ZiG Loans \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n \n15\n20\n25\n30\n35\n40\n45\n50\nApr-24\nMay-24\nJun-24\nJul-24\nAug-24\nSep-24\nOct-24\nNov-24\nDec-24\n Policy Rate (%)\nMax_Ind_Weigh_Lending_rate\nMax_Corp_Weigh_Lending_rate\nMin_Ind_Weigh_Lending_rate\nMin_Corp_Weigh_Lending_rate\n-10.0%\n-5.0%\n0.0%\n5.0%\n10.0%\n15.0%\n20.0%\n10-Apr-24\n10-May-24\n10-Jun-24\n10-Jul-24\n10-Aug-24\n10-Sep-24\n10-Oct-24\n10-Nov-24\n10-Dec-24\n10-Jan-25\n11 \n \nStatutory Reserves \n21. Statutory reserve requirements on both local and foreign currency deposits were \nstandardised at 30%, from 15% for demand and call deposits, and 15% for savings \nand time deposits, up from 5%. \n \n22. The adjustment of the statutory reserve requirements on 27 September 2024, further \ntightened market liquidity, withdrawing around ZiG1.2 billion from the market. The \nincrease in statutory reserves and continued use of non-negotiable certificates of \ndeposit (NNCDs) enabled the Reserve Bank to maintain optimal money market \nliquidity. \n \n23. The Optimal Liquidity Level (OLL) which had been set at ZiG166.3 million in April 2024 \nwas raised to ZiG500 million on 30 September 2024, in line with increases in the value of \ntransactions processed through the Zimbabwe Electronic Transfer and Settlement System \n(ZETSS). \n \n24. Reflecting the tight liquidity conditions during the last quarter of 2024, NNCDs \ndeclined to as low as ZiG25 million on 13 November 2024 and have remained stable \nwithin the envisaged thresholds. \n \n Targeted Finance Facility \n25. While the primary objective of the increase in the Bank Policy Rate and statutory \nreserve requirements, was part of the Reserve Bank’s tight monetary policy stance \nit, however, resulted in constrained liquidity. To balance stability and economic \ngrowth, the Reserve Bank introduced the Targeted Finance Facility (TFF) funded \nfrom the statutory reserves of banks, to increase lending to productive sectors by \nbanks. Funded from the statutory reserves already held at the Reserve Bank, the \nTFF is geared at augmenting lending by banks. \n \n \n \n12 \n \nGold and Foreign Currency Reserves \n26. Since April 2024, the Reserve Bank embarked on a reserves accumulation strategy \ncomprising of foreign currency and precious metals (mainly gold), from mining \nroyalties, direct currency purchases from the interbank market and outright gold \npurchases. The reserves accumulation strategy is centred around ensuring that, at \nany point, the ZiG component of reserve money is fully backed. \n \n27. Consequently, the total holdings of gold and foreign reserves have since increased \nby 87%, from US$285 million in April 2024 to around US$550 million as at end of \nJanuary 2025. This has also ensured the full coverage of the total ZiG deposits in \nthe economy of around ZiG13 billion, thereby supporting the Reserve Bank’s \ncurrency and exchange rate stability objectives. \n \n28. Figure 4 shows the foreign currency reserve cover of ZiG reserve money and \ndeposits. \n \nFigure 4 : Foreign Currency Reserve Cover of ZiG Reserve Money and \nDeposits \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n16\n5 Apr 24\n31-May-24\n5-Jul-24\n20-Sep-24\n16-Oct-24\n29-Oct-24\n31-Oct-24\n4-Nov-24\n7-Nov-24\n13-Nov-24\n15-Nov-24\n19-Nov-24\n2-Dec-24\n5-Dec-24\n9-Dec-24\n12-Dec-24\n16-Dec-24\n18-Dec-24\n24-Dec-24\n30-Dec-24\n2-Jan-25\n6-Jan-25\n8-Jan-25\n10-Jan-25\n14-Jan-25\n16-Jan-25\n20-Jan-25\n22-Jan-25\nZiG' Billion\nZiG Reserve Money\n ZiG Deposits (Mkt )\nReserve Cover\n13 \n \n29. Based on the current trends of foreign exchange inflows, including in-kind royalties, \nthe reserve accumulation strategy for 2025 will result in a significant improvement \nin foreign reserves holdings at the Reserve Bank. \n \n Foreign Exchange Market \n30. Improved exchange rate flexibility on the WBWS foreign exchange market has \nfostered a market-driven and transparent exchange rate management system, while \nimproving the accessibility of foreign currency in the market. \n \n31. The Reserve Bank has been strategically intervening in the WBWS foreign \nexchange market, by injecting foreign currency, when necessary, to ensure that \nthere is sufficient liquidity to meet market demand using export surrender proceeds. \n \n32. The Reserve Bank sold a total of US$407.4 million on the WBWS platform from \nApril to December 2024. The foreign currency uptake by banks on the WBWS \naveraged 70%, largely due to tight ZiG liquidity conditions. \n \n33. The Reserve Bank continues to intervene in the interbank foreign exchange market, \nwith about US$35 million having been injected in January 2025. \n \nKey Monetary and Financial Indicators \n34. The Reserve Bank considers communication as an important monetary policy tool \nto anchor inflation and exchange rate expectations. As such, the Reserve Bank will \nregularly publish key indicators underpinning the foregoing monetary and financial \nconditions. The indicators for the period April 2024 to January 2025, are shown in \nTable 1. \n \n14 \n \nTable 1: Key Monetary and Financial Statistics \n \n \n30-Apr-24 \n30-Jun-24 \n30-Sep-24 \n31-Oct-24 \n30-Nov-24 \n31-Dec-24 \n31-Jan-25 \nInflation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nZiG Month-on-Month (%) \n- \n0.04 \n5.8 \n37.2 \n11.7 \n3.7 \n10.5 \nUSD Month-on-Month (%) \n \n-0.29 \n0.73 \n0.65 \n0.09 \n0.6 \n11.5 \nMonetary \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nReserve Money (ZiG Million) \n720 \n1,225 \n2,254 \n3,345 \n3,539 \n3,511 \n3,454 \n Total ZiG Deposits – (Million) \n7,195 \n9,274 \n10,705 \n11,603 \n13,293 \n11,664 \n12,466 \nReserve Cover (ZiG Million) \n6,633 \n8,040 \n10,418 \n14,046 \n13,272 \n13,594 \n14,455 \nFinancial Sector \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nNon-Performing Loans Ratio \n(Benchmark=5%)2 \nN/A \n2.02 \n3.19 \nN/A \nN/A \n3.37 \nN/A \nMoney Market \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nMarket Position (including \nNNCDs) (ZiG Million) \n1,602 \n1,781 \n498 \n868 \n1,900 \n1,445 \n949 \nExternal Sector \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCash and Nostro Balances \n(US$ million) \n151 \n214 \n196 \n230 \n182 \n186 \n186 \nGold Holdings Kgs \n1,500 \n1,612 \n1,948 \n2,107 \n2,565 \n2,626 \n2,689 \nGold Holdings Value (USD \nmillions) \n113 \n120 \n167 \n188 \n218 \n220 \n241 \nOther Reserves (In kind \nmineral royalties) \n12 \n42 \n56 \n122 \n121 \n121 \n122 \nTotal Reserve Covering ZiG \n(US million) \n276 \n376 \n419 \n540 \n521 \n527 \n548 \nAverage Pipeline Forex \nDemand (USD million) \n25.40 \n33.50 \n44.20 \n19.70 \n23.97 \n23.00 \n17.30 \nWBWS Exchange Rate \n13.4301 \n13.7031 \n24.8831 \n28.6802 \n25.4513 \n25.7985 \n26.3656 \nImplied Exchange Rate (ZiG \nBank Deposits- over Foreign \nCurrency Reserves) \n26.0688 \n24.6649 \n25.5489 \n23.6911 \n25.4915 \n22.1344 \n22.7387 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n35. As shown in Table 1, the Reserve Bank has been pursuing prudent money supply \nmanagement with reserve money kept under control and not exceeding the targeted \nZiG4 billion for 2024. \n \n \n2 N/A= Data not available monthly but quarterly. \n15 \n \n36. The Reserve Bank’s foreign reserves accumulation strategy in 2024, has resulted \nin its gold holdings increasing from 1.5 tonnes to 2.7 tonnes. The monetary value \nof gold together with other foreign currencies ended the year at over half a billion \nUS dollars which is more than three times cover of reserve money. \n \n37. The pipeline demand reflects the amount of foreign currency invoices submitted \nto banks by their customers, for foreign payments which awaits payment. Since \nJune 2024, the value of pipeline demand has averaged US$15-20 million per week, \nan amount that the Reserve Bank has been clearing using the intervention \nresources accumulated to date. \n \n16 \n \nSECTION THREE \nRECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS \n \nGLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS \nEconomic Growth \n38. The post-pandemic recovery in global output continued to exhibit resilience, with \ngrowth holding steady and the progressive decline in inflation facilitating a soft-\nlanding. \n \n39. As such, monetary easing continued to support growth recovery in both Advanced \nEconomies (AEs) and Emerging Market and Developing Economies (EMDEs). \nNevertheless, regional divergences persist, and the medium-term outlook remains \nbenign, characterised by below average growth. \n \n40. Importantly, uncertainties dominate the outlook owing to heightened geo-political \ntensions and trade policy shifts, as well as elevated global public debt levels that \nthreaten to trap the global economy in a low growth-high debt mode. \n \n41. Against this background, the IMF’s October 2024 World Economic Outlook and \nits January 2025 update, projected that global growth would firm up slightly, from \n3.2 percent in 2024 and stabilise at 3.3 percent in 2025 and 2026, as shown in \nFigure 5. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n17 \n \nFigure 5: Global Growth 2019 to 2026 \n \nSource: IMF World Economic Outlook, January 2025 Update \n \n42. Looking ahead, the global growth outlook remains conditioned by downside risks \nfrom resurgent price pressures, intensified protectionism and heightened trade \npolicy uncertainty, as well as climate related natural disasters. Furthermore, \nrenewed fiscal pressures and currency volatility in Emerging Market Economies \nremain a concern. In Advanced Economies, growth is expected to rise from 1.7 \npercent in 2024 to 1.9 percent in 2025. The expansion of economic activity in AEs, \nhowever, masks divergent growth forecasts between the US and the Euro-Area. \n \n43. In the US, growth projections were revised upwards to 2.7 percent for 2025 \nunderpinned by robust aggregate demand, a less restrictive monetary policy \nstance, favourable financial conditions, and stronger investment. In the Euro-Area, \ngrowth is expected to gradually firm-up from 0.8 percent in 2024 to 1.0 percent in \n2025, with performance weighed by geo-political tensions, weaker market \nsentiment, underwhelming manufacturing sector performance particularly in \nGermany and heightened policy uncertainty. More generally, the scarring effects \nof the recent energy price shock continue to weigh on growth prospects in Europe. \n \n44. Growth performance in EMDEs is estimated to have remained subdued at 4.2 \npercent in 2024 and is expected to remain stable in 2025. This largely reflects the \ngrowth constraining effects of elevated trade and policy uncertainty, alongside low \n-20\n-10\n0\n10\n20\n30\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\n2023\n2024E\n2025F\n2026F\nGlobal Growth\nAEs\nEMDEs\nSSA\n18 \n \ndemand. While the stimulus package measures enunciated by the Chinese \nauthorities in November 2024 brought optimism, the property market drag, and \nsubdued consumption continued to dampen growth performance to below \npotential levels. In India, growth is expected to remain robust and stable at 6.5 \npercent in 2025 and 2026. \n \n45. In Sub- Saharan Africa (SSA), real GDP growth is estimated at 3.8 percent in 2024 \nand projected to recover to 4.2 percent in 2025 and remain broadly stable in 2026. \nThe growth recovery reflects the waning effects of prior adverse weather shocks \ninduced by the El Nino phenomenon, as well as the gradual easing of supply chain \nbottlenecks. \n \n46. Notably, SSA growth performance reflects the expansion of activity in SSA \nregion’s largest economies —South Africa and Nigeria. South Africa’s growth is \nexpected to rise from 0.8 percent in 2024 to 1.5 percent in 2025, benefiting from \nimproved power supply and easing inflation. \n \n47. In Nigeria, growth is projected to rise from 2.9 percent in 2024 to 3.1 and 3.2 \npercent in 2025 and 2026, respectively, spurred by improved services sector \nactivity and enhanced business confidence. Nonetheless, growth in Sub-Saharan \nAfrica remains insufficient to raise per-capita income, narrow attendant income \ngaps and foster sustained and inclusive economic development. \n \n48. Going forward, growth prospects in SSA remain challenged by multiple \nheadwinds from the recurrence of devastating climate shocks, food and energy \ninsecurity, spillovers from regional conflicts, volatile global financial and \ncommodity markets, as well as the funding squeeze and liquidity stress. \n \n49. Meanwhile, high debt service costs continue to crowd-out priority social and \ninvestment spending, further diminishing fiscal space. At the same time, inflation \nremains above target in many countries, with rising social tensions posing \nchallenges for necessary macroeconomic adjustments. In addition, an escalation \n19 \n \nof conflicts in Sudan and in the Middle East, could trigger energy and food price \ninflation in the region, while high global interest rates could further compound \ndebt vulnerabilities. \n \nGlobal Inflation \n50. Global inflation continued on a downward path, with progress stalling in some \ncountries, while services inflation remained high in other countries. \n \n51. The general decline in global inflation reflected the dampening effects of \nsynchronised monetary tightening, with the recent declining nominal wage growth \nand normalisation of labour markets, providing additional disinflation impetus. \n \n52. It is against this background that global inflation declined from 6.7 percent in 2023 \nto 5.7 percent in 2024 and is projected to decline further to 4.2 percent and 3.5 \npercent in 2025 and 2026, respectively. Nevertheless, pockets of elevated inflation \nremain mostly in EMDEs, developing Europe and Latin America. \n \n53. In the SSA region, inflation remained in double digits in many countries owing to \ncurrency pressures and high food prices reflecting the repercussions of adverse \nweather conditions on food supply and prices. Figure 6 shows the general decline \nin global inflation. \nFigure 6: Global Inflation 2019 to 2026 \n \nSource: IMF World Economic Outlook, January 2025 Update \n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\n2023\n2024E\n2025F\n2026F\nGlobal\nAEs\nEMDEs\nSSA\n20 \n \n54. Despite the notable disinflation strides, the hard-won gains are challenged by \nrenewed risks from the energy price shock, appreciation of the US dollar and the \nuncertain price effects of tariffs. \n \n55. Moreover, inflation expectations in advanced economies have drifted significantly \nabove central bank targets, signaling a real risk of de-anchoring. At the same time, \ncapital flow reversals occasioned by divergent monetary policy paths could exert \nadditional currency and inflationary pressures. Further, commodity price spikes \ncould be detrimental to current disinflation efforts. \n \n56. Meanwhile, global financial conditions remain largely accommodative despite \nheightened policy uncertainties. Nonetheless, financial conditions in EMDEs have \nslightly tightened against the backdrop of the dollar appreciation prompted by \nexpectations of new tariffs and higher interest rates in the US. \n \n57. In parallel, fiscal and inflation concerns in advanced economies are expected to \nexert undue pressure on long term rates, which further compounds the cost of \nborrowing in EMDEs. \n \n58. Considering the significant challenges facing the global economy, policymakers \nare focusing on balancing the important trade-offs between inflation and economic \nactivity. Concurrently, calls have strengthened to replenish fiscal buffers, fortify \nthe foundations for growth through scaled-up structural reform efforts and efforts \nto strengthen global cooperative efforts to safeguard the benefits of multilateral \ntrade. \n \n Global Price Developments for Selected Commodities \n Gold \n59. Gold prices remained buoyant in 2024, reaching a peak of US$2,700 per ounce in \nOctober 2024, as shown in Figure 7. The uptick in gold prices reflected heightened \ngeopolitical tensions, sustained demand from central banks, and the onset of U.S. \n21 \n \nmonetary policy easing. Central banks in EMDEs increased their gold holdings in \n2024 as they diversified their international reserve portfolios away from the dollar. \nContinued safe-haven demand for gold, on the back of geopolitical tensions, and \nfinancial and policy uncertainties, will likely sustain the higher gold prices in the \nnear term. \n \nFigure 7: Gold Prices US$/Oz January 2023 to December 2024 \n \n \nSource: World Bank Commodity Prices, 2024 \n \n Platinum Group of Metals (PGMs) \n60. PGMs prices remained subdued in 2025 as shown in Figure 8, largely reflecting \nslowing activity in the automotive sector, as the energy transition to renewables \ngains momentum. In the outlook period, the demand for PGMs is likely to remain \nsubdued owing to the shifting structure of the automative sector against the growth \nin the electric vehicles sub-sector. These developments will weigh down prices, \nwith negative spillovers to Zimbabwe’s export proceeds. \n \n 300\n 600\n 900\n 1,200\n 1,500\n 1,800\n 2,100\n 2,400\n 2,700\n 3,000\nMar-19\nJun-19\nSep-19\nDec-19\nMar-20\nJun-20\nSep-20\nDec-20\nMar-21\nJun-21\nSep-21\nDec-21\nMar-22\nJun-22\nSep-22\nDec-22\nMar-23\nJun-23\nSep-23\nDec-23\nMar-24\nJun-24\nSep-24\nDec-24\nMar-25\nJun-25\nSep-25\nDec-25\nMar-26\nJun-26\nSep-26\nDec-26\n22 \n \n \nFigure 8: PGMs Prices US$/Oz \n \n \n \nSource: Johnson Matthey, 2025 \n \nBrent Crude Oil \n \n61. Oil prices declined by 2.3%, from US$82.6/barrel in 2023 to US$80.7/barrel in \n2024. Strong global growth in the production of oil, against subdued demand \nexerted downward pressure on prices. Nevertheless, heightened geopolitical risks \nin the Middle East, and continued voluntary production restrictions \namong Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC+) members, \npartially supported the prices. The economic weaknesses and concerns about \nsubdued oil consumption in China are expected to continue weighing down prices \nin 2025, as shown in Figure 9. \n \nFigure 9: Brent Crude Oil \n \nSource: World Bank Commodity Prices, 2024 \n -\n 500\n 1,000\n 1,500\n 2,000\n 2,500\n 3,000\n 3,500\nMar-19\nJun-19\nSep-19\nDec-19\nMar-20\nJun-20\nSep-20\nDec-20\nMar-21\nJun-21\nSep-21\nDec-21\nMar-22\nJun-22\nSep-22\nDec-22\nMar-23\nJun-23\nSep-23\nDec-23\nMar-24\nJun-24\nSep-24\nDec-24\nMar-25\nJun-25\nSep-25\nDec-25\nMar-26\nJun-26\nSep-26\nDec-26\nPlatinum\nplatinum forecast\nPalladium\npalladium forecast\n -\n 20.00\n 40.00\n 60.00\n 80.00\n 100.00\n 120.00\n 140.00\nJan-19\nMay-19\nSep-19\nJan-20\nMay-20\nSep-20\nJan-21\nMay-21\nSep-21\nJan-22\nMay-22\nSep-22\nJan-23\nMay-23\nSep-23\nJan-24\nMay-24\nSep-24\nJan-25\nMay-25\nSep-25\nJan-26\nMay-26\nSep-26\n23 \n \nREAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS \n62. The economy is estimated to have grown by 2% in 2024, mainly due to the poor \nperformance of the agriculture sector, occasioned by the severe drought. In 2025, \nhowever, the economy is expected to rebound and grow by 6% owing to an \nimproved agricultural season. In addition, the prevailing price and exchange rate \nstability is expected to underpin the envisaged growth trajectory. \n \nMONETARY DEVELOPMENTS \n \nReserve Money Developments \n63. Total reserve money, inclusive of foreign currency statutory reserves, stood at \nZiG20.40 billion as at 31 December 2024. This largely reflect an expansion in the \nforeign currency component of reserve money in September 2024, following the \nupward review in statutory reserves. \n \n64. The local currency component of reserve money, which the Reserve Bank tracks \nfor monetary policy purposes, has been stable, increasing from ZiG3.3 billion in \nOctober 2024 and to ZiG3.5 billion in December 2024. This followed the tight \nmonetary policy stance pursued by the Bank during the last quarter of 2024. \n \n65. Consistent with the target of 5% month-on-month inflation set by the Bank for \n2024, the local currency component of reserve money was successfully contained \nat below the target of ZiG4 billion, which saw inflation falling to 3.7% by 31 \nDecember 2024. Looking ahead, the tight monetary policy stance will be \nmaintained in 2025, to consolidate the gains achieved in 2024. \n \n \n24 \n \nFigure 10: Components of Reserve Money (31 December 2024) \n \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024 \n \n66. The reserve money stock as at 31 December 2024 largely comprise of foreign \ncurrency statutory reserves, 67.38%, and foreign currency excess reserves, at \n15.30%, as shown in Figure 10. \n \nBroad Money Developments \n67. Broad money (M3) amounted to ZiG87.45 billion in December 2024, largely due \nto the foreign currency component of deposits, which constituted 83% of total \ndeposits as shown in Figure 11. The growth in money supply, reflected \nfluctuations in the exchange rate, particularly the significant once-off depreciation \nin September 2024. \nFigure 11: Foreign Currency and Local Currency Deposits \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \nLocal Currency Issued\n0.89%\nZiG Statutory Reserves\n14.48%\nForeign Currency Statutory \nReserves\n67.38%\nZiG Excess Reserves\n1.95%\nForeign Currency \nExcess Reserves\n15.30%\n40%\n50%\n60%\n70%\n80%\n90%\n100%\n5/4/2024\n19-Apr-24\n03-May-24\n17-May-24\n31-May-24\n14-Jun-24\n28-Jun-24\n12-Jul-24\n26-Jul-24\n09-Aug-24\n23-Aug-24\n06-Sep-24\n20-Sep-24\n04-Oct-24\n18-Oct-24\n01-Nov-24\n15-Nov-24\n29-Nov-24\n13-Dec-24\n27-Dec-24\n10-Jan-25\nForeign Currency\nLocal Currency\n25 \n \n \n68. Following the tightening of monetary policy, growth in the local currency \ncomponent of broad money fell significantly, from 16% in May 2024 to 9% in \nDecember 2024. This significantly contributed to the relative stability in the \nexchange rate, with positive benefits to inflation. \n \n69. Figure 12 shows the monthly developments in the local currency component of \nmoney supply, since the launch of the re-calibrated Monetary Policy Statement, in \nApril 2024. \n \n Figure 12: Month-on-Month Growth in Broad Money (May - December 2024) \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n70. Money supply growth as at 31 December 2024 was underpinned by the increase \nin domestic credit to ZiG74.54 billion in December 2024, from ZiG38.04 billion \nin June 2024. The expansion in domestic credit due to the growth in credit to the \nprivate sector, from ZiG26.71 billion to ZiG55.48 billion, was largely in the form \nof loans and advances. Over the same period, net claims on Government increased \nfrom ZiG9.91 billion to ZiG17.32 billion. \n \n71. Loans and advances to the private sector were largely driven by the foreign \ncurrency component, which accounted for 88% of total credit, partly explained by \nmovements in the exchange rate. The ZiG loans-to-deposits ratio increased from \n30% in April 2024 to 50% in December 2024, while the USD loans-to-credit ratio \n-5.0\n0.0\n5.0\n10.0\n15.0\n20.0\nMay-24\nJun-24\nJul-24\nAug-24\nSep-24\nOct-24\nNov-24\nDec-24\n26 \n \nrose marginally, from 56.88% to 59.41% over the same period. Evidently, the local \ncurrency portfolio of bank loans has been increasing since the beginning of the \nimplementation of the re-calibrated monetary policy framework in April 2024, as \nshown in Figure 13. \n \nFigure 13: Loan to Deposit Ratio (5 April 2024 – 10 January 2025) \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n72. The proportion of local currency loans to total loans, which declined to 9.69% \nafter the depreciation of exchange rate on 27 September 2024, had increased to \n11.46% by the week ending 10 January 2025. \n \nFigure 14: Foreign and Local Currency Loans \n \n Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n10.00%\n20.00%\n30.00%\n40.00%\n50.00%\n60.00%\n70.00%\n80.00%\n5/4/2024\n19-Apr-24\n03-May-24\n17-May-24\n31-May-24\n14-Jun-24\n28-Jun-24\n12-Jul-24\n26-Jul-24\n09-Aug-24\n23-Aug-24\n06-Sep-24\n20-Sep-24\n04-Oct-24\n18-Oct-24\n01-Nov-24\n15-Nov-24\n29-Nov-24\n13-Dec-24\n27-Dec-24\n10-Jan-25\nForeign Currency\nLocal Currency\nAggregate\n40%\n50%\n60%\n70%\n80%\n90%\n100%\n5/4/2024\n19-Apr-24\n03-May-24\n17-May-24\n31-May-24\n14-Jun-24\n28-Jun-24\n12-Jul-24\n26-Jul-24\n09-Aug-24\n23-Aug-24\n06-Sep-24\n20-Sep-24\n04-Oct-24\n18-Oct-24\n01-Nov-24\n15-Nov-24\n29-Nov-24\n13-Dec-24\n27-Dec-24\n10-Jan-25\nForeign Currency\nLocal Currency\n27 \n \n STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS \nZimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) \n73. In line with the tight liquidity conditions that prevailed in the economy since \nOctober 2024, the ZSE was characterised by bearish sentiment during the last \nquarter of 2024. Market capitalisation declined from ZiG 89.6 billion in October \n2024 to close the year at ZiG 66.2 billion, as shown in Figure 15. \n Figure 15: ZSE Market Capitalization (ZW$ billions) \n \n Source: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2024 \n \n74. The bearish conditions on the ZSE since October 2024 were also discernible from \nthe various sub-indices, as shown in Figure 16. \n \nFigure 16: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange All Share, Top 10 and Mining Indices \n \nSource: Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 2024 \n0\n50\n100\nDec-23\nJan-24\nFeb-24\nMar-24\nApr-24\nMay-24\nJun-24\nJul-24\nAug-24\nSep-24\nOct-24\nNov-24\nDec-24\n0.00\n40.00\n80.00\n120.00\n160.00\n200.00\n240.00\n280.00\n320.00\n360.00\n400.00\n0\n40\n80\n120\n160\n200\n240\n280\n320\n360\n400\nDec-23\nJan-24\nFeb-24\nMar-24\nApr-24\nMay-24\nJun-24\nJul-24\nAug-24\nSep-24\nOct-24\nNov-24\nDec-24\nAll Share Index\nTop 10 Index\nMining Index\n28 \n \n Victoria Falls Stock Exchange (VFEX) \n75. The Victoria Falls Stock Exchange (VFEX) All Share Index was relatively stable \nsince the second half of 2024, as shown in Figure 17. \n \nFigure 17: Victoria Falls Stock Exchange All Share Index \n \n Source: Victoria Falls Stock Exchange, 2024 \n \nINFLATION DEVELOPMENTS \n76. Monthly ZiG inflation declined, following the monetary policy measures \nintroduced on 27 September 2024. Monthly inflation decelerated by 8.0 \npercentage points, from 11.7% in November 2024 to 3.7% in December \n2024, driven by both food and non-food inflation. The decline in inflation \nwas attributed to the stability in the monetary conditions which dampened \ninflationary pressures. \n \n77. Monthly ZiG inflation stood at 10.5% in January 2025 mainly driven by a \nonce-off huge increase in rentals of 51.6%. The weight of the rentals \nsubcategory is 19.83% of the total CPI basket. The high increase in rental \ninflation in January 2025 resulted in the subcategory contributing 6.3% of \nthe headline month-on-month inflation of 10.5% which is 60.2%. All other \nsubcategories increased moderately, as shown in Figure 18. \n10\n30\n50\n70\n90\n110\n130\n150\n170\nDec-23\nJan-24\nFeb-24\nMar-24\nApr-24\nMay-24\nJun-24\nJul-24\nAug-24\nSep-24\nOct-24\nNov-24\nDec-24\n29 \n \nFigure 18: CPI Categories Monthly Inflation Changes (Dec 2024- Jan 2025) \n \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2025 \n \n78. On average from May 2024 to January 2025, transport, and housing, water, \nelectricity, gas and other fuels and transport were the largest contributors to \nmonthly non-food inflation, as shown in Figure 19. \n \nFigure 19: ZiG Contributions to Non-food inflation (May 2024 to Jan 2025) \n \n \nSource: ZIMSTAT, 2025 \n \n79. Consequent to the broad-based decline in inflation since October 2024, all \nother price indices in the economy declined. These include the Producer \nPrice Index (PPI), Producer Price Index Agriculture (PPIA), Civil \n6.8\n4.5\n2.8\n51.6\n2.3\n0.6\n-1.0\n7.2\n4.0\n1.8\n7.9\n1.5\n0.0\n2.4\n10.5\n-10.0\n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\n50.0\n60.0\nFood & non-alcoholic beverages\nAlcoholic beverages & tobacco\nClothing & footwear\nActual rentals for housing\nElectricity, gas and other fuels\nWater supply and miscellaneous services relating to…\nMaintenance and repair of the dwelling\nFurniture and equipment\nHealth\nTransport\nCommunication\nRecreation and culture\nEducation\nRestaurants and hotels\nOverall CPI\n-100%\n-80%\n-60%\n-40%\n-20%\n0%\n20%\n40%\n60%\n80%\n100%\nMay-24\nJun-24\nJul-24\nAug-24\nSep-24\nOct-24\nNov-24\nDec-24\nJan-25\nALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES & TOBACCO\nCLOTHING & FOOTWEAR\nHOUSING, WATER, ELECTRICITY, GAS & OTHER FUELS\nFURNITURE AND EQUIPMENT\nHEALTH\nTRANSPORT\nCOMMUNICATION\nRECREATION AND CULTURE\nEDUCATION\nRESTAURANTS AND HOTELS\nMISCELLANEOUS GOODS AND SERVICES\n30 \n \nEngineering Materials Price Index (CEMPI) and Civil Engineering Plant \nPrice Index (CEPPI). Figure 20 shows the month-on-month ZiG inflation \nrates for PPI, PPIA, CEMPI, CEPPI and CPI. \n \nFigure 20: Month-on-Month ZiG Inflation Rates (May 2024 - Jan 2025) \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n80. Prices in US dollars remained low and stable since June 2023. In January \n2025, however, month-on-month US$ inflation recorded large monthly \nincrease of 11.5% in January 2025 up from 0.6% in December 2024. This \nwas driven in part by food inflation which registered an increase of 16.9%, \ncontributing 5.3 percentage points to total inflation. Figure 21 shows the \nUSD Annual inflation from January 2023 to January 2025. \n \nFigure 21: USD Annual CPI Inflation Jan 2023 to Jan 2025 \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n-10\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\nMay-24\nJun-24\nJul-24\nAug-24\nSep-24\nOct-24\nNov-24\nDec-24\nJan-25\nPPI\nPPIA\nCEMPI\nCEPPI\nCPI\n-10\n-5\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n35\nJan-23\nFeb-23\nMar-23\nApr-23\nMay-23\nJun-23\nJul-23\nAug-23\nSep-23\nOct-23\nNov-23\nDec-23\nJan-24\nFeb-24\nMar-24\nApr-24\nMay-24\nJun-24\nJul-24\nAug-24\nSep-24\nOct-24\nNov-24\nDec-24\nJan-25\n31 \n \nSECTION FOUR \nEXTERNAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS \n \n BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEVELOPMENTS \nForeign Currency Receipts \n81. Total foreign currency receipts for 2024 amounted to US$13 316.2 million, \nrepresenting a 21.0% increase from US$11 009.3 million received in 2023, as \nshown in Table 2. \n \nTable 2: Total Foreign Currency Receipts for 2023 and 2024 (US$ Millions) \nType of Receipt \n2024 \n2023 \n% Change \n \n \nAmount \n(US$ \nMillions) \n% \nContribution \nAmount \n(US$ \nMillions) \n% \nContribution \n \nExport \nProceeds \n \n7,879.1 \n59.2% \n6,056.7 \n55% \n30.1% \nInternational \nRemittances \nDiaspora \nRemittances \n2,152.5 \n16.2% \n1,804.0 \n16% \n19.3% \nNGOs \n1,182.5 \n8.9% \n1,206.9 \n11% \n-2.0% \nLoan \nProceeds \n \n1,589.8 \n11.9% \n1,454.7 \n13% \n9.3% \nIncome \nreceipts \n \n125.1 \n0.9% \n111.4 \n1% \n12.3% \nForeign \nInvestment \n \n387.1 \n2.9% \n375.6 \n3.4% \n3.1% \nTOTAL \n \n13,316.2 \n100% \n11,009.3 \n100% \n21.0% \n Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \nCurrent Account Developments \n82. The improved foreign currency inflows resulted in improved current account \nperformance. Preliminary estimates indicate that the current account recorded a \nsurplus of US$501.2 million in 2024, representing a significant improvement \nfrom a surplus of US$133.9 million recorded in 2023. This followed strong \nremittance inflows and higher export growth relative to imports. \n32 \n \n83. The current account surplus was, however, moderated by services and primary \nincome accounts that remained in deficit. Figure 22 shows developments in the \ncurrent account. \nFigure 22: Current Account Developments (US$ millions) \n \nSource: RBZ and ZIMSTAT Estimates, 2025 \n \n84. Merchandise exports stood at US$7.9 billion in 2024. The robust performance was \nmainly driven by exports of gold and tobacco. \n \n85. Mineral exports, which constituted the largest share of merchandise exports, grew \nby 7.8%, from US$5.4 billion in 2023 to US$5.9 billion in 2024. Gold exports \nrecorded a remarkable increase of 37% to US$2.5 billion in 2024, from US$1.8 \nbillion in 2023. This was largely driven by both higher production volumes and \nfavourable global gold prices. Gold purchases by Fidelity Gold Refiners (Private) \nLimited (FGR) increased from 30.1 tonnes in 2023 to 36.5 tonnes in 2024, \nrepresenting a 21% growth illustrated in Figure 23. \n \n-600\n-400\n-200\n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1000\n1200\n2022Q1\n2022Q2\n2022Q3\n2022Q4\n2023Q1\n2023Q2\n2024Q2\n2024Q3\n2024Q4\nTrade Bal\nServices Bal\nBal on Primary Income\nBal on secondary Income\nCurrent Account Bal\n33 \n \nFigure 23: Gold Purchases in Kgs (January to December 2024) \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n86. The country’s import bill rose by 4.9%, from US$8.7 billion in 2023 to US$9.1 \nbillion in 2024. This was driven by increases in imports of food, fuel, raw \nmaterials, vehicles, and manufactured goods, as the economy continued to expand. \n \n87. The food import bill rose significantly by 55.2%, from US$628.9 million in 2023 \nto US$976.1 million in 2024. This was underpinned by grain imports, necessitated \nby the EL Nino-induced drought that adversely affected the 2023/24 agricultural \nseason. Maize imports increased from US$149 million in 2023 to US$574.6 \nmillion in 2024. While the overall import bill increased, moderating prices for \nedible oils and fertilizers, partially offset the increase. \n \nTransfers \n88. Personal transfers increased by 18.1%, from US$2.2 billion in 2023 to US$2.6 \nbillion in 2024. This was attributable to higher remittances, which positively \nimpacted on the current account balance. \n Foreign Currency Payments \n89. Total foreign currency payments funded through Authorised Dealers increased by \n0.7% from US$9.3 billion in 2023 to US$9.4 billion recorded in 2024. Table 3 \nshows foreign payments by category. \n \n 1,000\n 1,400\n 1,800\n 2,200\n 2,600\n 3,000\n 1,000\n 1,500\n 2,000\n 2,500\n 3,000\n 3,500\n 4,000\n 4,500\nJan\nFeb\nMar\nApr May\nJun\nJul\nAug\nSep\nOct\nNov Dec\nUS$ / Ounce\nKGs\nGold Output_23\nGold Output_24\nPrice_23\nPrice_24\n34 \n \nTable 3: Foreign Payments by Category in USD Millions (2023-2024) \n \n2024 \n2023 \n% Variance Contribution \n2024 \nContribution \n2023 \nMerchandise Imports (excl. \nenergy) \n5,033.82 \n4,907.62 \n3% \n54% \n53% \n- Raw Materials & Intermediate \nGoods \n1,625.71 \n1,628.77 \n0% \n17% \n17% \n- Capital Goods \n 1,758.64 \n1,953.94 \n-10% \n19% \n21% \n- Consumption & Finished \nManufactured Goods \n1,649.46 \n1,324.90 \n24% \n18% \n14% \nEnergy (Fuel & Electricity) \n1,752.28 \n1,948.94 \n-10% \n19% \n21% \n- Fuel \n1,574.24 \n1,774.35 \n-11% \n17% \n19% \n- Electricity \n 178.04 \n 174.60 \n2% \n2% \n2% \nService Payments \n1,019.52 \n 943.42 \n8% \n11% \n10% \n- Technical, Professional & \nconsultancy \n 423.52 \n 455.04 \n-7% \n5% \n5% \n- Software \n 167.80 \n 136.90 \n23% \n2% \n1% \n- Other (tourism, edu, freight \netc) \n 428.20 \n 351.49 \n22% \n5% \n4% \nIncome Payments (Profits, \nDividends) \n 409.84 \n 333.78 \n23% \n4% \n4% \n- Dividends \n 220.82 \n 169.02 \n31% \n2% \n2% \n- Interest Payments \n 26.20 \n 39.06 \n-33% \n6.0% \n0.4% \n- Other (Salaries, Expats, Rental) \n 162.82 \n 125.70 \n30% \n2% \n1% \nCapital Remittances (Outward) \n 908.44 \n944.17 \n-4% \n10% \n10% \n- External Loan Repayments \n 696.77 \n 765.56 \n-9% \n7% \n8% \n- Disinvestments \n 106.82 \n 86.05 \n24% \n1.1% \n0.9% \n- Foreign Investment \n 104.85 \n 92.56 \n13% \n1.1% \n1.0% \nOther Payments \n 263.61 \n246.94 \n7% \n2.8% \n2.6% \n- Card Payments \n 228.51 \n208.95 \n9% \n2.4% \n2% \n- Refunds \n 35.10 \n37.99 \n-7.6% \n0.4% \n0.4% \nTotal \n9,387.52 \n9.324.88 \n0.7% \n100% \n100% \nSource: RBZ (2024) \n \n35 \n \nSECTION FIVE \nCONDITION AND PERFORMANCE OF THE BANKING SECTOR \n \n90. The financial soundness metrics as at 31 December 2024 indicate that the banking \nsector remains safe and sound and continues to contribute to economic growth. \nTable 4 shows the banking sector architecture. \n Table 4: Banking Sector Architecture \nType of Institution \nNumber \nCommercial Banks \n14 \nBuilding Societies \n4 \nSavings Bank (POSB) \n1 \nTotal Banking Institutions \n19 \nOther Financial Institutions Under the Supervision of Reserve Bank \nCredit-only-MFIs \n268 \nDeposit-taking MFIs \n9 \nDevelopment Financial Institutions (SMEDCO, IDBZ, IDCZ and \nAFC Land & Development Bank) \n4 \nTotal Other Institutions \n281 \nTotal Number of Institutions \n300 \nSource: RBZ (2024) \n \n91. Mukuru Financial Services Zimbabwe Limited was registered to conduct deposit-\ntaking microfinance business on 2 October 2024 and commenced operations on \n17 December 2024. \n \nFinancial Soundness Indicators \n92. The Banking sector recorded satisfactory financial performance during the year \nended 31 December 2024, as reflected by the key financial soundness indicators \ndepicted in Table 5. \n \n \n \n \n36 \n \nTable 5: Financial Soundness Indicators \nKey Indicators \nBenchmark \nDec-23 \n(ZW$) \nMar-24 \n(ZW$) \nJun-24 \nSep-24 \nDec-24 \nTotal Assets \n- \nZW$34.41tn ZW$106.82tn ZiG77.55bn ZiG139.20bn ZiG161.39bn \nTotal Loans & \nAdvances \n- \nZW$11.26tn ZW$40.09tn ZiG27.45bn ZiG51.41bn \nZiG55.93bn \nNet Capital Base \n- \nZW$7.77tn ZW$24.61tn ZiG16.45bn ZiG33.47bn ZiG38.29bn \nCore Capital \n- \nZW$6.31tn ZW$20.12tn ZiG14.02bn ZiG27.40bn ZiG33.42bn \nTotal Deposits \n- \nZW$19.47tn ZW$6.65tn ZiG43.60bn ZiG76.10bn ZiG89.07bn \nNet Profit \n- \nZW$5.77tn ZW$14.77tn ZiG10.42bn ZiG20.57bn ZiG26.68bn \nReturn on Assets \n- \n23.97% \n22.83% \n13.37% \n20.84% \n24.72% \nReturn on Equity \n- \n68.99% \n61.33% \n35.74% \n55.87% \n65.62% \nCapital Adequacy \nRatio \n \n12% \n37.34% \n36.98% \n46.15% \n36.96% \n34.89% \nTier 1 Ratio \n8% \n25.77% \n30.39% \n40.13% \n32.41% \n31.67% \nLoans to Deposits Ratio \n- \n49.27% \n53.98% \n52.51% \n56.93% \n58.83% \nNPLs Ratio \n5% \n2.09% \n2.17% \n2.02% \n3.19% \n3.37% \nPrudential Liquidity \nRatio \n30% \n60.53% \n61.95% \n59.52% \n57.53% \n58.84% \nSource: RBZ (2024) \n \nBanking Sector Capitalization \n93. As at 31 December 18 out of 19 banking institutions reported core capital above \nthe minimum regulatory capital requirement, as shown in Table 6. \nTable 6: Reported Core Capital as at 31 December 20243 \nBanking Institution \nReported Core Capital (ZiG) \nUS$ Equivalent (US$1: \nZiG25.7985) \nMinimum Regulatory \nCapital (US$) \nCBZ Bank \n6,156,382,138 \n238,633,336 \nUS$30 million \nStanbic Bank \n4,023,534,494 \n155,960,016 \nUS$30 million \nCABS \n2,854,303,566 \n110,638,353 \nUS$30 million \nEcobank Zimbabwe \n2,648,821,301 \n102,673,461 \nUS$30 million \nZB Bank \n2,449,978,912 \n94,965,944 \nUS$30 million \nNMB Bank \n1,943,473,064 \n75,332,793 \nUS$30 million \nMetbank Limited \n1,924,919,838 \n74,613,634 \nUS$30 million \nFBC Bank \n1,745,333,597 \n67,652,522 \nUS$30 million \nFirst Capital Bank \n1,357,182,533 \n52,607,032 \nUS$30 million \nNedbank Zimbabwe \n1,306,855,641 \n50,656,264 \nUS$30 million \nAFC Commercial Bank \n1,078,490,497 \n41,804,387 \nUS$30 million \nBancABC \n1,041,825,905 \n40,383,196 \nUS$30 million \nSteward Bank \n1,007,043,489 \n39,034,962 \nUS$30 million \nPOSB \n908,886,348 \n35,230,201 \n US$20 million* \nFBC Crown \n869,026,103 \n33,685,140 \nUS$30 million \nNational Building Society \n836,964,199 \n32,442,359 \nUS$20 million \nFBC Building Society \n607,551,645 \n23,549,883 \nUS$20 million \nZB Building Society \n539,165,566 \n20,899,105 \nUS$20 million \nSource: RBZ (2024) \n \n3 *POSB, which is established in terms of the POSB Act [Chapter 24:10] does not have minimum capital \nrequirements. The institution however benchmarks with tier II banking institutions that have a capital requirement \nof ZiG equivalent US$20 million. \n37 \n \n94. Time Bank, with a reported core capital of equivalent to US$4.52 million as at 31 \nDecember 2024, was authorised to commence limited commercial banking \nactivities (without taking deposits) in August 2022. \n \n95. The Reserve Bank will leverage on the external audit reports in verification of the \ndeclared capital positions submitted by banking institutions. \n \nBanking Sector Asset Structure \n96. Total banking sector assets increased from ZiG77.55 billion as at 30 June 2024 to \nZiG161.39 billion as at 31 December 2024. The asset mix remained skewed \ntowards loans & advances, which accounted for 31.39% of total banking sector \nassets as at 31 December 2024 compared to 32.25% in June 2024, as shown in \nFigure 24. \n \nFigure 24: Asset Mix as at 31 December 2024 \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024 \n \nBanking Sector Loans and Advances \n97. As at 31 December 2024, aggregate banking sector loans and advances amounted \nto ZiG55.93 billion, representing a 102% increase from ZiG27.45 billion reported \nas at 30 June 2024. The increase was largely attributed to the revaluation of foreign \nDomestic Notes & Coins\n6.57%\nBalances with Central Bank\n18.11%\nBalances with Domestic \nBanks\n3.15%\nAssets in Transit\n0.17%\nBalances with Foreign \nInstitutions\n5.50%\nSecurities & Investments\n12.37%\nLoans & Advances\n31.39%\nForeign Claims\n0.55%\nRepossessed Assets\n0.14%\nFixed Assets\n9.05%\nOther Assets\n8.89%\nOff-Balance Sheet Assets\n4.10%\n38 \n \ncurrency denominated loans, which accounted for 88.17% of the banking sector \naggregate loans. As at 20 January 2025, the loans and advances amounted to \nZiG50.33 billion. \n \n98. The banking sector continued to support the funding requirements of the \nproductive sectors of the economy as evidenced by loans to the productive sectors, \nwhich constituted 72.25% of total loans as at 31 December 2024. Figure 25 shows \nthe sectoral distribution of loans as at 31 December 2024. \n \nFigure 25: Sectoral Distribution of Loans as at 31 December 2024 \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024 \n \n99. Lending to productive sectors namely agriculture and manufacturing, accounted \nfor 14.72%, and14.94%, of total loans, respectively. \nAsset Quality \n100. Banking sector asset quality remained satisfactory. As at 31 December 2024, the \nsector reported an aggregate non-performing loans to total loans ratio (NPL) of \n3.37%, compared to 2.02% as at 30 June 2024. The ratio was within the \ninternationally acceptable threshold of 5%. Figure 26 shows the trend in the level \nof NPLs from 31 December 2021 to 31 December 2024. \nIndividuals & \nHouseholds\n25.51%\nOther\n2.24%\nProductive Sectors\n72.25%\n39 \n \nFigure 26: Trend in Non- Performing Loans \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 2024 \n \nBanking Sector Profitability \n101. Banking sector aggregate profit amounted to ZiG26.68 billion (US$1.03 billion) \nfor the year ended 31 December 2024, representing a 6.95% increase from \nUS$944.37 million reported in the corresponding period in 2023. The income mix \nfor the sector is depicted in the Figure 27. \nFigure 27: Banking Sector Income Mix as at 31 December 2024 \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 2024 \n0.55%\n0.61%\n1.57%\n3.62%\n2.34%\n2.09%\n2.17%\n2.02%\n3.19%\n3.37%\n0.00%\n1.00%\n2.00%\n3.00%\n4.00%\n5.00%\n6.00%\nDec-21\nJun-22\nDec-22\nJun-23\nSep-23\nDec-23\nMar-24\nJun-24\nSep-24\nDec-24\nNPL Ratio\nBenchmark\nInterest Income from \nLoans & Advances, \n13.46%\nInterest Income on \nBalances with Banks, \n0.49%\nInterest Income on \nInvestments & \nSecurities, 1.81%\nForeign Exchange, \n11.79%\nFees and \nCommission, 21.80%\nNet Gains on \nRevaluation of \nForeign Currency \nAssets, 34.42%\nNet Gains on \nRevaluation of \nInvestment \nProperties, 13.39%\nOther Non Interest \nIncome, 2.84%\n40 \n \n102. The return on assets and return on equity ratios were 24.72% and 65.62% as at 31 \nDecember 2024, compared to 23.97% and 68.99% as at 31 December 2023, \nrespectively. \n \nBanking Sector Deposits and Liquidity \n103. As at 31 December 2024 all banking institutions reported prudential liquidity \nratios which exceeded the regulatory minimum of 30%. The banking sector’s \naverage prudential liquidity ratio was 58.84%. This notwithstanding, limited \ntrading on the interbank market, resulted in temporary liquidity shocks for some \nbanking institutions, underscoring the need for effective liquidity risk \nmanagement. \n \n104. Total banking sector deposits continued on an upward trajectory, increasing from \nZiG43.60 billion reported as at 30 June 2024 to ZiG89.07 billion as at 31 \nDecember 2024, mainly driven by translation of foreign currency denominated \ndeposits due to exchange rate movements. Foreign currency deposits accounted \nfor 86.17% of total deposits as at 31 December 2024. As at 20 January total \ndeposits amounted to ZiG86.75 billion. \n \nBanking Sector Developments \n \nUse of Artificial Intelligence in the Banking Sector \n105. The role of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in banking is expected to continue growing \nin the years to come. Against this background, the Reserve Bank will continue to \nmonitor and assess the use of AI based applications. \n \n106. In the second half of 2024, the Bank conducted a survey to assess the financial \nservices sector’s adoption, application, and readiness for AI. Preliminary survey \nresults depicted a growing AI maturity, with many institutions establishing \nfoundational risk management and reporting systems, notably automated report \n41 \n \ngeneration and real-time compliance tracking. Advanced tools, like predictive \ncompliance modelling and NPL for regulatory analysis, remain largely unadopted. \n \n107. Overall, the banking and microfinance sectors are in the early stages of AI \ngovernance, underscoring the need for clear, comprehensive AI strategies and \npolicies to guide its use in financial services. \n \nCyber Resilience \n \n108. In 2024, the Reserve Bank conducted a cyber resilience assessment for the banking \nand microfinance sectors to evaluate readiness against cyber threats. The \nassessment indicated satisfactory cyber maturity across most institutions, with \nwell-established risk management systems safeguarding critical data and \nsupporting effective threat detection and response. \n \n109. The survey noted that the majority of institutions have developed cyber resilience \nstrategies, while the rest are in the process of developing cyber resilience \nstrategies. It was also noted that the majority of the financial institutions are \ncarrying out cyber awareness programs. \n \n110. The Reserve Bank will continue monitoring sector resilience and share specific \nreports with the market to encourage adherence to best practices. \n \nSustainable Banking Practices \n \n111. In light of the growing frequency and severity of climate-related events, including \ndroughts, floods, wildfires, and heatwaves, there is an increasing demand for \nbanking institutions to effectively manage financial risks while playing an active \nrole in promoting adoption of sustainable banking practices. \n \n42 \n \n112. Against this background, the Reserve Bank continues to work closely with \nfinancial institutions towards creating strong, resilient, and inclusive financial \ninstitutions that contribute meaningfully to sustainable economic development. \n \n113. As at 31 December 2024, 15 out of 19 banking institutions, two (2) development \nfinance institutions and one (1) deposit-taking microfinance institution were \nundergoing the Sustainability Standards Certification Initiative (SSCI) program \nbeing spearheaded by European Organisation for Sustainable Development \n(EOSD). As such, banking institutions are at various stages of implementing the \nmodules under the SSCI certification program. \n \n114. The Reserve Bank conducted a survey in December 2024 to assess progress by \nbanking institutions integrating sustainability issues into their business strategies, \ngovernance and internal control systems. \n \n115. The survey revealed that 56% of the banking institutions had successfully \nintegrated sustainability into their business models and had board members with \nrelevant expertise in sustainability, climate risk, or environmental, social, and \ngovernance (ESG) issues. \n \n116. In addition, 32% of the banking institutions reported to have board approved \nsustainable finance policies or frameworks in place, while some of the institutions \nhave sustainability related matters covered in other existing policies. \n \nPerformance of the Microfinance Sector \n117. The microfinance sector continues to play a critical role in promoting financial \ninclusion, improvement of livelihoods and contributing to sustainable economic \ngrowth. \n \n43 \n \n118. The key performance indicators for microfinance sector (deposit-taking and credit-\nonly microfinance institutions) over the period 31 December 2023 to 31 \nDecember 2024 is indicated in Table 7. \n \nTable 7: Microfinance Key Performance Indicators \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 2024 \n \nMicrofinance Sector Capitalization \n119. As at 31 December 2024, the microfinance sector registered an aggregate equity \nof ZiG2.52 billion, up from ZiG1.20 billion as at 30 June 2024. \n \n120. Of the eight (8) operating DTMFIs, four (4) were non-compliant with the new \nminimum capital requirement of US$5 million for deposit-taking microfinance \ninstitutions. \n \n \n4 Portfolio at Risk [30] days-The value of all loans outstanding that have one or more instalments of \nprincipal past due more than [30] days. This includes the entire unpaid principal balance, including both \nthe past due and future instalments, but not accrued interest. It also includes loans that have been \nrestructured or rescheduled. \nIndicator \nDec 2023 \nMar 2024 \nJun 2024 \nSept 2024 \nDec 2024 \nTotal Loans \nZW$741.61b ZW$2.76tn \nZiG2.14b \nZiG4,43b \nZiG4.94b \nTotal Assets \nZW$1.29tn ZW$4.80tn \nZiG3.49b \nZiG7.37b \nZiG8.30b \nTotal Equity \nZW$337.18b ZW$1.56tn \nZiG1.20b \nZiG2.36bn \nZiG2.52b \nNet Profit \nZW$221.92b ZW$652.28b ZiG358.57m ZiG681.96m ZiG939.95m \nTotal Deposits \nZW$110.16b ZW$551.78b ZiG432.02m ZiG978.51m ZiG1.35b \nAverage Operational Self-\nSufficiency (OSS) \n184.46% \n173.00% \n182.36% \n192.13% \n183.32% \nPortfolio at Risk (PaR>30 days)4 \n11.29% \n10.63% \n10.88% \n9.93% \n11.40% \nNumber of Outstanding Loans \n361,684 \n420,055 \n563,521 \n786,706 \n931,665 \nNumber of Active Loan Clients \n334,396 \n362,415 \n401,964 \n549,413 \n531,691 \nNumber of Female Borrowers \n153,754 \n155,465 \n176,502 \n247,401 \n255,350 \nLoans to Female Borrowers \nZW$293.32b ZW$2.84tn ZiG664.68m ZiG1.52 bn \nZiG1.75b \nNumber of Branches and \nAgencies \n1,152 \n1,224 \n1,343 \n3,106 \n2,991 \n44 \n \n121. Table 8 shows the capital levels for the operational DTMFIs as at 31 December \n2024. \n \nTable 8: DTMFIs Sub-sector Deposits and Liquidity \n \nInstitution \nCore Capital 31.12.2024 \n(ZiG million) \nCore Capital 31.12.2024 \n(US$ million) * \nAfrican Century Limited \n256.04 \n9.92 \nInnbucks MicroBank \n230.01 \n8.92 \nSuccess Microfinance Bank \n176.92 \n6.86 \nMukuru Financial Services \n128.99 \n5.00 \nGetBucks Microfinance Bank \n85.46 \n3.31 \nEmpowerBank Limited \n24.34 \n0.94 \nZimbabwe \nWomen’s \nMicrofinance Bank \n34.62 \n1.34 \nLion Microfinance Bank \n25.95 \n1.01 \nTotal \n962.34 \n37.30 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 2024 \n \n122. The DTMFIs subsector recorded an increase in deposits from ZiG432.02 million \nas at 30 June 2024 to ZiG1.35 billion as at 31 December 2024, largely driven by \nforeign currency deposits which accounted for 98% of the total microfinance \ndeposits. \n \n123. As at 31 December 2024, all DTMFIs reported prudential liquidity ratios above \nthe prudential minimum threshold of 30%. \n \n45 \n \nFINANCIAL INCLUSION \n124. The Reserve Bank continues to spearhead the implementation of the National \nFinancial Inclusion Strategy (NFIS) II, through partnerships and collaborations \nwith key stakeholders and implementing partners, to ensure an inclusive financial \nsector in Zimbabwe. \n \nFinancial Inclusion Governance Structures \n125. Zimbabwe adopted a consultative Governance and Coordination model \ncomprising the National Financial Inclusion Steering Committee, National \nFinancial Inclusion Technical Committee, National Financial Inclusion Secretariat \nand Thematic Working Groups. \n \n126. The operational financial inclusion governance structures which are critical to the \neffective implementation and stakeholder buy-in of financial inclusion strategies \nwill commence in 2025. \n \nMonitoring & Evaluation Framework Training \n127. A comprehensive and robust financial inclusion data base, disaggregated by \ngender, age, disability and geographic area, is critical in informing financial \ninclusion initiatives and interventions. In this regard, the Financial Inclusion \nMonitoring and Evaluation Framework (M&E) has been finalised, with the \nfinancial inclusion dashboard that now includes disaggregated financial inclusion \ndata on all targeted segments. \n \n128. The financial inclusion dashboard will be used to monitor progress with regards \nto the effectiveness of the various financial inclusion initiatives on the level of \nuptake and usage of financial services by the marginalised and underserved target \ngroups. \n \n46 \n \nSurvey on Women Participation in Decision Making \n129. The Reserve Bank continues to promote gender diversity as part of women \nempowerment programs. In pursuit of fulfilment of the Maya Declaration and the \nDenarau Action Plan to promote gender equality and women empowerment, the \nReserve Bank carried out a survey in 2024 to ascertain the proportion of women \nin decision making positions within banking and microfinance institutions. \n \n130. The results of the survey conducted point to low level of women in decision-\nmaking levels in the banking and microfinance sectors. Results for 51 financial \ninstitutions that responded to the survey are shown in Figure 28. \n \nFigure 28: Survey Results on Gender Diversity in the Financial Sector \n \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 2024 \n131. Under-representation of women in decision-making roles has the potential to limit \ndiverse perspectives and innovative financial solutions to challenges faced by \nwomen. \n \n132. Against this background, banks, deposit-taking and credit-only microfinance \ninstitutions are encouraged to take steps to ensure gender diversity. \n \nSavings and Credit Cooperative Society (SACCOS) \n133. SACCOs are critical in facilitating financial inclusion and inculcating a savings \nculture at grassroots level. \n186\n103\n43\n9\n180\n92\n1108\n574\n1009\n914\n2091\n1876\n275\n195\n83\n80\n0\n500\n1000\n1500\n2000\n2500\nMale\nFemale\nMale\nFemale\nMale\nFemale\nMale\nFemale\nMale\nFemale\nMale\nFemale\nMale\nFemale\nMale\nFemale\nBoard of\nDirectors (Non -\nExecutive\nDirectors)\nChief Executive\nOfficer/Managing\nDirector\nExecutive\nManagement\nMiddle\nManagement\nSupervisors\nNon-managerial\nEntry Level\nGraduate Trainees\n47 \n \n134. Given the importance of SACCOs and the potential impact on financial stability, \nthe availability of data is essential for enhanced oversight in the sector. In this \nregard, the Reserve Bank will continue to collaborate with the relevant \nstakeholders. \n \nFinancial Inclusion of Forcibly Displaced Persons (FDPS) \n135. In line with developments in other jurisdictions, plans are underway to incorporate \nforcibly displaced persons as part of the target segments in the National Financial \nInclusion Strategy. \n \n \nFinancial Inclusion Indicators \n136. Table 9 highlights key Financial Inclusion Indicators. \n \nTable 9: Financial Inclusion Indicators \n \nIndicator \n \nSept 23 \nDec 23 \nMar 24 \nJune 24 \nSept24 \nDec 24 \nNumber of Loans to MSMEs \n9,467 \n8,307 \n8,237 \n8,660 \n7,861 \n11,927 \nValue of loans to MSMEs \nZW$387.13bn \nZW$583.75bn \nZW$1,71tn \nZiG1.55bn \nZiG \n3.24bn \nZiG \n5,45bn \nAverage loans to MSMEs as \n% of total bank loans \n3.87 \n4.96 \n3.73 \n5.25 \n7.55 \n7.53 \nNumber of Loans to Women \n200,894 \n185,326 \n190,501 \n189,763 \n204,560 \n319,634 \nValue of Loans to Women \nZW$448.39bn \nZW$912.75bn \nZW$3.04tn \nZiG2.38bn \nZiG4.22bn \nZiG \n4.90bn \nAverage loans to women as a \n% of total bank loans \n4.48 \n7.76 \n6.62 \n8.05 \n9.86 \n6.77 \nNumber of Loans to Youth \n65,587 \n57,216 \n58,636 \n52,392 \n61,968 \n73,770 \nValue of Loans to Youth \nZW$329.79bn \nZW$370.51bn \nZW$1.41tn \nZiG1.19bn \nZiG2.89bn \nZiG2.76bn \nAverage loans to the youth as \na % of total bank loans \n3.29 \n3.15 \n3.08 \n4.03 \n6.75 \n3.81 \nTotal number of Active Bank \nAccounts (Million) \n8.02 \n7.69 \n7.02 \n6.62 \n7.29 \n7.53 \nNumber of Low-Cost Bank \nAccounts (Million) \n3.5 \n3.75 \n3.63 \n3.82 \n3.38 \n3.37 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n48 \n \n137. The on-going implementation of the National Financial Inclusion Strategy II \ncontinues to witness significant inroads into the financial inclusion of the \nmarginalised target groups namely the micro, small and medium enterprises, \nwomen and youth as reflected by the financial inclusion indicators during the \nperiod from September 2023 to December 2024. \n \nCREDIT INFRASTRUCTURE \n \nCredit Registry \n138. Financial institutions and other stakeholders continued to utilise the Credit \nRegistry and private credit bureaus during the year to December 2024. The credit \ninformation sharing environment facilitates effective credit risk management and \ndecision-making which ultimately fosters financial inclusion and promote \nfinancial stability. \n \n139. As at 31 December 2024, all the credit reporting institutions maintained 23.51 \nmillion searchable records. The distribution of credit records by institution is \nshown in Figure 29. \n \nFigure 29: Cumulative Loan Records per Credit Reporting Institution \n \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\nFCB\nCredit Registry\nXDS\nFincheck\n18.2\n2.75\n2.2\n0.36\nNumber of Loan Records \n(Millions)\n49 \n \n140. In addition, the distribution of inquiries across credit reporting institutions is \nillustrated in the Figure 30. \n \n Figure 30: Distribution of Inquiries per Credit Reporting Institution \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 2024 \n \n141. As at 31 December 2024, statistics from the Credit Registry reveal a 27.76% \nincrease in cumulative inquiries, rising from 4,085,598 on 31 December 2023, as \nshown in Figure 31. \n \n Figure 31: Cumulative Credit Registry Usage Status \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024 \nFCB\n39.58%\nCredit Registry\n53.93%\nXDS\n5.37%\nFincheck\n1.12%\n4,085,598\n4,434,010\n4,701,891\n5,040,450\n5,219,776\n0\n1,000,000\n2,000,000\n3,000,000\n4,000,000\n5,000,000\n6,000,000\nDec-23\nMar-24\nJun-24\nSep-24\nDec-24\n50 \n \n142. |Figure 32 shows the distribution of loans to individual borrowers by age and \ngender in the Credit Registry database as at 31 December 2024. \n \nFigure 32: Distribution of Loans Age & Gender \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024 \nCollateral Registry \n143. As at 31 December 2024, there were 2,481 active registrations in the Collateral \nRegistry with a total principal value of ZiG42.19 billion. Microfinance institutions \nwere the major users of the Collateral Registry with 1,185 registrations, followed \nby banks with 1,135 entries. In terms of value of movable collateral, banking \ninstitutions recorded a total of ZiG20.99 billion, while law firms registered a total \nvalue of ZiG20.75 billion on behalf of clients, as shown in Figure 33. \n \nFigure 33: Value of Registered Securities as at 31 December 2024 \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024 \n74,843\n181,170\n665,283\n560,640\n256,791\n79,739\n22,695\n80,497\n350,121\n266,539\n115,591\n24,591\n0\n100,000\n200,000\n300,000\n400,000\n500,000\n600,000\n700,000\n18-25\n26-30\n31-40\n41-50\n51-60\n61+\nNumber of Loan Contracts\nNumber of Loan Contracts by Men\nNumber of Loan Contracts Women\n1135\n1185\n151\n5\n5\nZWG20.998 billion\nZWG374.107 \nMillion\nZWG20.748 billion\nZWG39.381 Million\nZWG34.647 Million\nZWG0.000 billion\nZWG5.000 billion\nZWG10.000 billion\nZWG15.000 billion\nZWG20.000 billion\nZWG25.000 billion\n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1000\n1200\n1400\nBANKING\nINSTITUTIONS\nMICROFINANCE\nINSTITUTIONS\nLAW FIRMS\nCONTRACT\nFINANCIERS\nOTHER\nCREDITORS\nNUMBER OF ACTIVE SECURITY INTEREST NOTICES\n PRINCIPAL AMOUNT (ZwG)\n51 \n \n144. The Collateral Registry recorded a cumulative 4,516 security interest notices in \nmovable assets since commencement in November 2022, comprising 2,481 (55%) \nactive security interest notices, and 2,035 (45%) expired registrations as shown in \nFigure 34. \n \nFigure 34: Number of Security Interest Notices \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n145. Lending institutions continue to expand the types of movable assets which qualify \nas collateral. During the year to 31 December 2024 collateral included household \ngoods, private vehicles, trucks, agricultural equipment and shares, as shown in \nFigure 35. \n \nFigure 35: Types of Collateral as at 31 December 2024 \n \n*Other includes motorcycles, trailers and other movable assets that are yet to be classified in the Collateral \nRegistry system. \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024 \n \nACTIVE\n55%\nEXPIRED\n45%\n389\n11246910\n16\n3286111\n179\n191\n205321\n802\n1079\n1199\n1609\n2549\n0\n500\n1000\n1500\n2000\n2500\n3000\nOther\nFutures\nNegotiable Instruments\nAccounts Receivable\nStock of Raw Materials\nManufacturing Equipment\nIndustrial Equipment\nLivestock\nAgriculture Equipment\nNGCBs\nHousehold Goods\n52 \n \n146. MFIs also registered the highest number of security interests searches as shown in \nFigure 36. \n \n Figure 36: Searches by Client as at 31 December 2024 \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \n147. Within the agricultural sector movable assets pledged to secure loans were \ndominated by Notarial General Covering Bonds (NGCBs) as at 31 December \n2024, as shown in Figure 37. \n \nFigure 37: Movable Collateral Pledged to Secure Agricultural Sector Loans \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024 \n \n2\n2\n8\n8\n19\n170\n316\n907\n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n700\n800\n900\n1000\nCompany\nIndividual\nContract\nFinancing\n(e.g. contract\nfarming for\nCotton,\nTobacco etc)\nDevelopment\nFinance\nInstitution\nLaw Firm\nPublic\nSearches\nBank\nMicrofinance\nInstitution\n406\n217\n74\n66\n62\n60\n7\n7\n5\n4\n2\n1\n37\n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\n300\n350\n400\n450\nNGCBs\nAgriculture Equipment\nHousehold Goods\nTrucks\nSaloon Cars\nLivestock\nCession Agreement\nIndustrial Equipment\nBuses\nStock of Raw Materials\nManufacturing Equipment\nConstruction Equipment\nOther\n53 \n \nNATIONAL PAYMENT SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENTS \n \n148. During 2024, the payment system services sector demonstrated stability and \nsafety, with steady transaction growth indicating a healthy financial environment. \nFigure 38 shows the payment system in Zimbabwe. \n \nFigure 38: Payment Systems in Zimbabwe \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024 \nReal Time Gross Settlement System (RTGS) \n149. The RTGS system was upgraded in November 2024, to ensure that the system \ncomplies with ISO (International Organization for Standardization) 20022 \nstandards. This was aimed at enhancing the efficiency, security, and effectiveness \nof the system, ultimately benefiting financial institutions, customers and the \neconomy. \n \n150. During 2024 the values of transactions processed through the RTGS System were \nZiG266.89 billion and US$29.02 billion, with volumes at 5.52 million and 5.83 \nmillion, respectively. \n \n \n \n \n26\n17\n14\n19\n24\n5\n3\n16\n2\n10\n10\n3\n9\n1\n1\n1\n1\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n54 \n \nAccess Devices and Points \n151. All access devices, except for ATMs, recorded growth during the year 2024, as \nshown in Table 10. \n \nTable 10: Payment Access Points and Devices as of December 2024 \nPAYMENTS SYSTEMS ACCESS POINTS \n \nJul-24 \nAug-24 \nSep-24 \nOct-24 \nNov-24 \nDec-24 \nATMs \n416 \n422 \n402 \n406 \n407 \n407 \nPOS \n133,961 \n134,284 \n135,996 \n135,614 \n136,743 \n137,304 \nMPOS \n28,390 \n28,390 \n28,397 \n28,374 \n28,355 \n28,354 \nPAYMENTS SYSTEMS ACCESS DEVICES \nDebit \nCards \n5,791,591 5,810,174 5,872,074 5,853,971 5,849,894 \n5,866,859 \nCredit \nCards \n19,010 \n19,477 \n19,540 \n19,967 \n20,075 \n20,111 \nPrepaid \nCards \n140,686 \n140,729 \n143,598 \n145,593 \n147,892 \n149,474 \nMobile \nMoney \nSubscribers \n9,680,737 9,762,205 9,955,399 9,937,069 9,886,704 \n9,959,866 \nInternet \nBanking \nSubscribers \n544,388 \n556,126 \n554,563 \n546,769 \n549,348 \n551,655 \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2024 \nInteroperability \n152. The interoperability values for retail digital transactions reached the ZiG$1.8 \nbillion mark in December 2024, a significant increase from less than ZiG200 \nmillion in June 2024, as shown in Figure 39. \n \n55 \n \nFigure 39: Interoperability Transaction Values and Volumes (Apr- Dec 2024) \n \n \nSource: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2025 \n \nSWIFT ISO 20022 Migration from MT Messages \n153. The Banking community continued to work towards full compliance with SWIFT \ncross-border payment processes for the ISO 20022 program, after successfully \nimplementing incoming and outgoing cross border payments and reporting plus \n(CBPR+). \n \nCybersecurity Management \n154. To mitigate risks associated with cyber threats and technological disruptions, the \nReserve Bank is strengthening the regulatory framework governing the National \nPayment Systems. Regular assessments of system resilience and the \nimplementation of best practices in cybersecurity will continue to be prioritized. \n155. All stakeholders in the financial services sector are expected to effectively \ncollaborate, embrace the risk-based approach, and work towards ensuring the \nsuccess of the related cyber control measures. \n \n0.0\n0.5\n1.0\n1.5\n2.0\n2.5\n0.0\n0.2\n0.4\n0.6\n0.8\n1.0\n1.2\n1.4\n1.6\n1.8\n2.0\n30-Apr-24\n31-May-24\n30-Jun-24\n31-Jul-24\n31-Aug-24\n30-Sep-24\n31-Oct-24\n30-Nov-24\n31-Dec-24\nVolumes Millions\nValues Billions\nValues LHS\nVolumes RHS\n56 \n \nAnti-Money Laundering and Counter-Financing of Terrorism (AML-CFT) \n156. The payments sector has maintained a strong commitment to adhering to Anti-\nMoney Laundering (AML) and Counter Financing of Terrorism (CFT) \ninternational standards and regulatory requirements. This is reflected through the \nstrengthening of internal controls, compliance programs and risk management \nframeworks by payment service providers (PSPs). \n \n Regional And International Developments \n157. The Bank continued to collaborate with other Central Banks and international \norganizations to enhance cross-border payment systems and enforce international \nbest practices in the market. \n \n158. Local banks continued to integrate with the regional payment systems which \ninclude the Pan African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS), COMESA’s \nREPSS (Regional Payment and Settlement System) and SADC RTGS System. \n \n \n \n \n \n57 \n \nSECTION SIX \nMONETARY POLICY MEASURES \n \n159. Price stability is the overriding objective of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe’s \nMonetary policy framework. Accordingly, the policy measures implemented by \nthe Reserve Bank during the last quarter of 2024 have resulted in the relative \nexchange rate and inflation stability in the economy. The gains made on the \nexchange rate and inflation front have laid a solid foundation for continued \nstability in the economy, going forward. \n \nMonetary Policy Strategic Thrust \n160. The Reserve Bank recently finalised its Strategy Plan (2025-2029), which has been \nreconfigured to focus exclusively on its core mandate of maintaining price and \nfinancial stability. This has been aligned to the “Back-to-Basics” thrust of the \nReserve Bank with a priority focus to balance “Confidence-Trust-Credibility-\nEfficiency-Stability-Growth” outcomes. \n \n161. In this strategy, the Reserve Bank aims to further entrench sustained price, \ncurrency and exchange rate stability in the economy to consolidate the gains made \non ZiG, thus far. \n \n162. The key imperatives of the Monetary Policy Framework under the reconfigured \nReserve Bank Strategy Plan, which benefited from extensive stakeholder \nconsultations, include:- \ni. \nOptimal Money Supply Management; \nii. \nModernisation of monetary policy formulation, implementation, monitoring \nand impact evaluation; \niii. \nAllowing greater flexibility and deepening of the interbank foreign exchange \nmarket; \n58 \n \niv. \nAccumulation of adequate foreign reserves to back ZiG and boost import \ncover; \nv. \nEffective Monetary Policy communication and stakeholder engagement; \nvi. \nLeveraging on fintechs, financial sector innovation and digitalisation; \nvii. \nStrengthening financial sector stability through effective surveillance; \nviii. \nFostering sustainability in the financial sector; \nix. \nEntrenching financial inclusion; and \nx. \nEffective coordination and congruence of monetary and fiscal policies, \nincluding prudent liquidity management. \n \nMonetary Policy Framework (2025) \n163. The Monetary Policy Framework for 2025 will be underpinned by three strategic \npillars aligned to the RBZ Strategy Plan (2025-2029), namely: \n(i) \nConsolidating Price, Currency and Exchange Rate Stability; \n(ii) \nEnhancing Monetary Stability, Research, Policy and Data Integrity; and \n(iii) \nMaintaining Safety, Soundness, Resilience and Integrity of the Financial \nSector (see Figure 40). \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n59 \n \nFigure 40: Reserve Bank Monetary Policy Framework (2025) \n \n \n \n164. The Reserve Bank will implement well sequenced monetary policy measures \nguided by the foregoing strategic pillars of the monetary policy strategy. The \nsequencing and timing of the monetary policies will be based on a continuous \nmonitoring and assessment of domestic, monetary and financial conditions, as well \nas global economic conditions. \n \n165. Consequently, the Reserve Bank will maintain a tight monetary policy stance and \nmake appropriate reviews, consistent with inflation and exchange rate \ndevelopments. \n \n \n60 \n \nMONETARY POLICY MEASURES \n \n166. In line with statutory requirements, this Monetary Policy Statement outlines policy \nmeasures for the ensuing six months. The monetary policy stance for the first half \nof 2025 will, therefore, be aimed at consolidating stability and supporting \neconomic growth, premised on the following policy measures and considerations: \n \n(a) \nReview of Exporters’ Foreign Currency Retention Threshold \n167. In order to guarantee continued stability in the interbank foreign exchange market \nthrough augmenting the supply of foreign currency, as well as building the critical \nforeign currency reserves needed to anchor the ZiG, the foreign currency retention \nlevel for exporters has been reduced from 75% to 70%, with immediate effect. \nThis implies that the effective surrender portion of export proceeds has been \nincreased from 25% to 30%. \n \n168. This review is consistent with the increased use of ZiG in the economy. The \nadditional 5% will ensure that exporters mobilise sufficient ZiG to meet local \ncurrency obligations and other expenses, including tax payments, going forward. \n \n(b) \nIntroducing a US Dollar Denominated Deposit Facility (USDDDF) \n169. In order to ensure preservation of value, exporters with no immediate use of the \nZiG equivalent of the additional 5% of the export surrender proceeds will have an \noption to invest the funds in a USDDDF at the Reserve Bank which they can \nwithdraw in ZiG on demand, at the prevailing interbank exchange rate on the \nsettlement date. \n \n61 \n \n(c) \nRefinement of the Foreign Exchange Management System \n \ni. \nClarification of the Interbank Foreign Exchange Trading Guidelines \n170. In order to engender greater flexibility and deepen the foreign exchange market, \nwhile enhancing its efficiency and the price discovery mechanism, the Reserve \nBank is further refining and clarifying the Interbank Foreign Exchange Trading \nGuidelines to Authorised Dealers, as follows: \n• \nThe 5% trading margin as communicated in the previous Interbank Foreign \nExchange Trading Guidelines issued at the inception of the Willing-Buyer \nWilling-Seller Foreign Exchange Trading Arrangements on 3 May 2024, was \nonly applicable for the determination of the starting exchange rate, following \nthe introduction of the new currency, ZiG. \n• \nAccordingly, Authorised Dealers are expected to on-sell foreign exchange \npurchased from willing sellers, including the Reserve Bank, at a margin \nconsistent with international best practices. \n \nii. \nRemoval of Limits on Foreign Exchange Trading \n171. The limits on funds that can be accessed from the Foreign Exchange Interbank \nMarket that had been set at US$500,000 and US$100,000 for Primary and \nSecondary users of foreign exchange, respectively, per week, per entity as stated \nin Section 3.1 of Exchange Control Circular 4 of 2022, have been removed with \nimmediate effect. \n \n172. The Reserve Bank will issue streamlined Foreign Exchange Interbank Market \nGuidelines to operationalise the refinements on the exchange rate management \nsystem and removal of foreign exchange trading limits. \n \niii. \nReview of Prepaid International Debit and Credit Cards Limit \n173. In order to promote the use of the prepaid international debit and credit cards, the \nReserve Bank has, with immediate effect, reviewed upwards the annual limit from \n62 \n \nUS$500,000 (Five hundred thousand United States Dollars) to US$1,000,000 \n(One million United States Dollars). \n \n174. This review will also enhance the ease of doing business and reduce the use of \nforeign currency cash for cross-border transactions. \n \niv. \nForeign Currency Exposure Limits \n175. The single currency and the overall foreign exchange risk exposure limits are \ncritical risk management tools for managing foreign exchange exposures of banks. \nThese limits are prescribed under the Banking Regulations S. I. 205 of 2000 at \n10% and 20% of net capital base, respectively. \n \n176. However, as provided under the Banking Regulations, the Reserve Bank has been \ngranting temporary exemptions on a case-by-case basis given the multicurrency \nframework and its impact on the banking institutions’ balance sheets. \n \n177. In order to allow ZiG to gain prominence in the multicurrency system and align \nwith the prescribed foreign currency exposure limits under the Banking \nRegulations, the Reserve Bank will set upper limits to facilitate winding down, by \nbanking institutions, that are currently over-exposed in foreign currency. \n \n(d) \nSustainable Accumulation of Gold and Foreign Currency Reserves \n178. Since the introduction of ZiG in April 2024, the Reserve Bank embarked on a \nreserves accumulation strategy focused on ensuring that the ZiG component of \nreserve money is fully backed, at all times. The total holdings of gold and foreign \ncurrency reserves have increased by about 90%, from US$285 million in April \n2024 to around US$550 million (ZiG14.3 billion) as at end of January 2025, \nthereby providing more than 3 times cover for reserve money of ZiG3.5 billion. \n \n179. Consistent with its monetary policy objectives of ensuring currency and exchange \nrate stability, the Reserve Bank is committed to the continued accumulation of \nreserves to cover ZiG reserve money in the economy. The Reserve Bank will \n63 \n \nleverage its foreign reserves build-up strategy on the anticipated increase in gold \nproduction (from 36 tonnes in 2024 to a projected 40 tonnes in 2025), through in-\nkind royalties, purchase of foreign exchange export surrender proceeds and from \nwilling sellers of foreign exchange in the WBWS market. \n \n180. The reserves accumulation strategy of the Reserve Bank in 2025, will therefore, \nshift focus towards building-up a buffer of usable official reserves to adequately \ncover ZiG and to meet regional benchmarks of months of import cover. The \nforeign reserves accumulation framework will be guided by the strategic intent to \nensure an optimal and balanced portfolio mix between gold and foreign currency \ncash (liquidity management) to facilitate timely interventions in the foreign \nexchange market. \n \n181. The Reserve Bank has, therefore, since May 2024 been building internal capacities \nand capabilities for the implementation of a robust and prudent reserve \nmanagement strategy that will guarantee value preservation and sustainable \ngrowth in foreign currency reserves. \n \n(e) \nInterest rates \ni. \nBank Policy Rate \n \n182. The Bank Policy rate, which is currently at 35% per annum, is assessed to be \nappropriate to support the current tight monetary policy stance and the envisaged \neconomic growth. As such, the policy rate will be maintained at the current level \nof 35% per annum and reviewed by the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), from \ntime to time, based on inflation developments and other market fundamentals. \n \n64 \n \nii. \nMinimum Deposit Interest Rates and Promotion of a Savings Culture \n183. Considering recent stakeholder concerns and the need to reward depositors, the \nminimum interest rates for savings and time deposits in both ZiG and USD have \nbeen reviewed upwards, with immediate effect, as follows: \n \nCurrency/Term \nSavings Deposit Rates \nTime Deposit Rates \n \nOld \nNew \nOld \nNew \nZiG Deposits \n3.5% \n5% \n5% \n7.5% \nUSD Deposits \n1% \n2.5% \n2.5% \n4% \n \n184. The Reserve Bank encourages banks to offer depositors more than the stipulated \nminimum deposit rates, to promote a banking and savings culture in the economy. \n \n185. Depositors should take advantage of these interest rates to place their savings in \nthese interest-bearing savings and time deposit accounts as opposed to non-\ninterest-bearing current accounts. The Reserve Bank has engaged the Bankers \nAssociation of Zimbabwe (BAZ) to ensure that the banking system encourages \ntheir depositors to make use of these interest-bearing deposit accounts through \nawareness campaign programmes and promotions. \n \n(f) \nStatutory Reserves \n186. Statutory reserves were increased and standardised to 30% for demand deposits \nand 15% for savings and fixed deposits in both local and foreign currency. This \nadjustment has been key in sustaining the current tight liquidity in the economy, \nwhich has assisted in stabilising inflation and the exchange rate. The statutory \nreserve ratios, therefore, remain unchanged. \n \n187. The Reserve Bank will review the statutory reserve requirements when \nappropriate, consistent with prevailing monetary and financial conditions. \n \n65 \n \n(g) \nThe Targeted Finance Facility (TFF) and Access to WBWS \nInterbank Foreign Exchange Market \n188. In January 2025, the Reserve Bank introduced the Targeted Finance Facility (TFF) \nto enhance banks’ support to productive sectors. The TFF is financed from the \npool of banks’ statutory reserves held at the Reserve Bank, implying that there is \nno new money created to finance it. The operational modalities of the TFF have \nalready been issued to banks. \n \n189. In order to address working capital challenges recently experienced by some \nwholesalers and retailers, the TFF has been extended to these critical sectors to \nenable them to restock. \n \n190. To ensure the effectiveness of the TFF facility in supporting productive sectors, \nbeneficiaries of the funds can access the WBWS Interbank Foreign Exchange \nMarket to access the requisite foreign currency, upon submitting bonafide invoices \nto support their critical import requirements. \n \n(h) \nCurrency Management \n191. Cognisant of the need to ensure the optimal distribution of ZiG notes in the \neconomy, particularly for ease of access in the remote areas and to further entrench \nfinancial inclusion, the Reserve Bank is embarking on an intensive and extensive \neducational campaign programme and other initiatives, working with key \nstakeholders in the communities. \n \n192. The Reserve Bank is also working on enhancing the quality and design of ZiG \nbank notes in line with international standards. The rollout of the improved high \nquality ZiG notes will be communicated in due course. \n \n(i) \nFunctional and Presentation Currency - Financial Reporting \n193. Given the need to ensure comparability of financial statements, the Reserve Bank, \nfollowing consultations with the Public Accountants and Auditors Board (PAAB), \n66 \n \nrequires that all entities adopt a common presentation currency, ZiG, for reporting \npurposes, with immediate effect, including for the 2024 audited financial \nstatements. This requirement is consistent with the increase in the number and \nvalue of transactions settled in ZiG since its introduction on 5 April 2024. \n \n194. Government and other regulatory bodies, such as the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange \n(ZSE), the Securities and Exchange Commission of Zimbabwe (SECZim) and the \nInsurance and Pension Commission (IPEC) will issue statements to enforce the \nnew reporting requirements by all entities. \n \n(j) \nLiquidity Management \n195. The tight monetary policy stance of the Reserve Bank comes with inevitable \nliquidity squeeze, necessary to instil market discipline and curtail disruptive \nspeculative behaviour in the economy. Excess liquidity in the money market \nalways has a damaging effect and curtails the Central Bank’s quest to maintain \nprice, currency and exchange rate stability. \n \n196. In view of the above, the Reserve Bank continues to closely monitor liquidity \nlevels and developments, and to take necessary measures to ensure optimal \nliquidity and guarantee the smooth and efficient operation of the national payments \nsystem. The operational interventions by the Reserve Bank in the money market \nwill always be guided by the need to balance stability and growth. \n \n(k) \nPromoting Inter-Bank Market Trading \n197. The Reserve Bank is concerned that trading on the inter-bank market has remained \nlow, largely due to the evident market segmentation. Lack of trading on the inter-\nbank market necessitates the Reserve Bank to accommodate individual banks in \nshort positions, as opposed to settling the net market position through the “Lender \nof Last Resort” window. \n \n67 \n \n198. In this regard, following extensive consultations with the market, the Reserve \nBank is working with the Bankers Association of Zimbabwe (BAZ) to resuscitate \na vibrant inter-bank money market to enhance the monetary policy transmission \nchannel in the economy. Banks are, therefore, encouraged to set counterparty \nlimits among themselves that promote a vibrant and efficient inter-bank money \nmarket, which is vital for monetary policy effectiveness. \n \n(l) \nBank and Transaction Charges \n199. Domestic stakeholders consulted by the Reserve Bank bemoaned the current high \nlevels of bank charges obtaining in the banking sector. The Reserve Bank will \ncontinue to ensure that banks strictly adhere to a policy compelling them to \nexempt from bank charges, all accounts that maintain a balance below US$100 or \nits equivalent in ZiG. In addition, Point of Sale (POS) transactions for amounts \nless than US$5 or its equivalent in ZiG are also exempted from transaction \ncharges, for both banking institutions and Payment System Providers (PSPs). \n \n200. The Reserve Bank is also working with BAZ and PSPs to come up with \nmechanisms to minimise bank charges and encourage use of e-cash to promote \nZiG. These mechanisms will be finalised and communicated before the end of the \nfirst half of 2025. \n \n(m) \nPromoting Digital Payments and Use of Point of Sale (POS) \nMachines \n201. In line with the policy stance to enhance digital transactions in the economy, Banks \nand Payments System Providers (PSPs) are directed with immediate effect to \nensure that every business account (new and existing) is issued with a Point of \nSale (POS) machine or any other approved digital mechanism which can facilitate \ntransactions in both ZiG and USD. Any dormant POS machines or digital \ntransactional gadgets should be reported to the Reserve Bank Toll Free Hotline \n(0800 6009). \n \n68 \n \n202. To promote the use of normal banking channels on all domestic trading \ntransactions, the Reserve Bank further advises all Local Authorities and other \nlicencing entities to ensure that all applicants for trading licences (individuals or \ncorporates) have a bank account and a functional POS machine at the point of \nlicencing and/or renewal. \n \n(n) \nDiscriminatory Pricing Practices in Telecommunications \n203. The Reserve Bank has received complaints from stakeholders during the \nconsultative meetings alleging that some mobile money operators are applying \ndiscriminatory pricing practices against ZiG in preference for USD transactions. \nFor instance, promotions for internet data packages are only available in US \ndollars and not in ZiG. \n \n204. The Reserve Bank has since engaged the regulatory authority, Postal and \nTelecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (POTRAZ), and the \nTelecommunications Operators Association of Zimbabwe (TOAZ). The Reserve \nBank, through the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) will continue to monitor \nadherence to this requirement by TOAZ members. \n \n205. The industry players have agreed to rationalise their pricing structures. This will \nallow their customers to purchase internet data packages using their currency of \nchoice. \n \n(o) \nCapital Flows Management – Trade and Investment Facilitation \n206. The management of capital flows is considered an important part of the \nmacroprudential policy toolkit for developing countries, which remains \ninstrumental in offsetting systemic risk externalities. \n \n207. Consistent with SADC’s capital flows management framework, currently under \nimplementation in the Committee of Central Bank Governors (CCBG) grouping, \na modern framework of administration of foreign currency flows has been adopted \nto protect and safeguard regional economies from macro-financial instability. \n69 \n \n208. In this regard, and in line with regional standards, the Reserve Bank, as part of its \nreorientation of the strategic thrust, has, therefore, created new structures that \nensure: - \ni. Macro-prudential management of cross-border capital flows that encourage \ncompanies to grow globally from a domestic base, and facilitate trade \n(exports and imports) and investment (debt and equity); \nii. Effective risk-based surveillance of cross-border capital flows; \niii. Robust cross-border reporting systems to effectively track foreign currency \nflows; and \niv. Simplification of foreign exchange transactions administration for ease of \ndoing cross-border trading and investment. \n \n(p) \nOther Monetary Policy Support Measures \n \ni. \nSustainable Banking Practices \n209. The Reserve Bank has positively noted that banking institutions are at various \nstages of integrating sustainability considerations into their overall business \nstrategies and Board Governance systems. \n \n210. As a way to enhance effectiveness of the processes, all banking institutions are \nrequired to nominate suitably qualified and/or experienced Board Sustainability \nChampions and advise the Reserve Bank by 31 March 2025. \n \nii. \nClimate Risk Management \n211. The Reserve Bank continues to focus on potential risks to financial stability from \nclimate change. In this regard, and in line with requirements stipulated in the \nClimate Risk Management Guideline 01-2023/BSD, banking institutions are \nrequired to submit to the Reserve Bank their institutional climate risk profiles as \nat 31 December 2024, by 31 March 2025. The risk profiles should clearly indicate \nsectoral and portfolio exposures to climate risks. \n \n70 \n \niii. \nCyber Resilience in the Banking and Microfinance Sectors \n212. The increasing sophistication of cyber threats poses significant risks to the \nfinancial sector, making cyber resilience critical for maintaining public trust, \nprotecting sensitive data, and ensuring uninterrupted financial services. \nAccordingly, the Reserve Bank places greater emphasis on strengthening sector-\nwide frameworks to address these risks and ensure financial system stability. \n \n213. In order to enhance cybersecurity, all banking and deposit-taking microfinance \ninstitutions are required to conduct annual cybersecurity audits. The audit reports \nmust be shared with the Reserve Bank at the same time they are submitted to the \nBoard’s Audit Committee. \n \niv. \nRisk Management Framework for Artificial Intelligence \n214. The Reserve Bank acknowledges the transformative potential of Artificial \nIntelligence (AI) in enhancing efficiency, decision-making, and customer service \nin the financial sector. However, the Reserve Bank also recognizes various risks \nassociated with the use of AI. \n \n215. In this regard, financial institutions are required to put in place robust risk \nmanagement systems, taking into account issues of data security, ethical concerns \nand operational vulnerabilities. \n \n216. Similarly, the Reserve Bank has embarked on a financial innovation, fintechs and \ndigitalisation strategy, to enhance operational efficiency, robust risk management \nand keep abreast with global technological developments. \n \nv. \nLending Practices of Microfinance Institutions \n217. Following extensive stakeholder consultations, the Reserve Bank has received \ncomplaints on predatory lending practices by some microfinance institutions, in \nviolation of the Microfinance Act [Chapter 24:30] and Consumer Protection \nFramework No. 1-2017/BSD. The complaints include unethical and \n71 \n \nunprofessional loan collection methodologies, over-deductions on customers’ \nsalaries and illegal disposal of collateral. \n \n218. Against this background, the Reserve Bank is intensifying its surveillance of \nmicrofinance institutions to ensure compliance with the Microfinance Act and \nConsumer Protection Framework. Appropriate supervisory actions will be \ninstituted against non-compliant institutions. The Reserve Bank will provide a \nreport back to stakeholders in the Mid-term Monetary Policy Statement in August \n2025. \n \nvi. \nPromoting Financial Inclusion in Remote and Under-served \nCommunities \n219. The Reserve Bank remains committed to the fostering of financial inclusion and \nallowing wider access to financial services, including ZiG to remote and under-\nserved communities, including designated growth points. \n \n220. To promote widespread establishment of bureaux de change operators in remote \nand under-served communities, the Reserve Bank has, with immediate effect, \nexempted licencing fees for opening of branches in these areas. \n \nvii. \nTaking of Deposits by Unlicensed Entities \n221. The Reserve Bank has noted with concern that some members of the public \ncontinue to place deposits with institutions and individuals that are not authorised \nto take deposits, including credit-only microfinance institutions, under the guise \nof “high returns on investments”. \n \n222. Members of the public are advised that only registered banking and deposit-taking \nmicrofinance institutions (microfinance banks) are authorised to mobilise deposits \nfrom the public. For the avoidance of doubt, credit-only microfinance institutions \nare not authorised to take deposits. A list of registered deposit-taking microfinance \ninstitutions is available on the Reserve Bank website (www.rbz.co.zw). \n72 \n \n223. The Reserve Bank will take appropriate supervisory action, including cancellation \nof the registration certificate, in terms of the Microfinance Act, against non-\ncompliant credit-only microfinance institutions that take deposits. \n \n224. Members of the public are, therefore, warned against facilitating illegal deposit-\ntaking by entities that are not authorised to take deposits as they risk losing their \nfunds with no recourse to the Reserve Bank. \n \nviii. \nAbuse of safe deposit boxes to by-pass formal banking channels \n225. The Reserve Bank has noted with concern the increasing abuse of safe deposit \nboxes and the proliferation of “shadow banks”. It has been observed that some \nbusinesses are not banking all or most of their cash receipts and are, instead, \nkeeping such cash in safe deposit boxes held with financial institutions and \nsecurity companies. \n \n226. This trend is not only a violation of the Bank Use Promotion and Suppression of \nMoney Laundering Act [Chapter 24:24] which requires businesses to bank all their \ncash receipts, but it also promotes tax evasion and money laundering. \n \n227. The Reserve Bank is working with the Financial Intelligence Unit and other Law \nEnforcement Agencies to curtail such practices and encourage the use of normal \nbanking channels, in line with the Bank Use Promotion and Suppression of Money \nLaundering Act [Chapter 24:24]. \n \n(q) \nFiscal and Monetary Policy Complementarity \n \n228. It is essential that there is complementarity and cohesion between fiscal and \nmonetary policies. This Monetary Policy Statement is, accordingly, aligned with \nthe following key imperatives highlighted in the 2025 National Budget and \nanticipated to be critical anchors to the National Development Strategy 2 (NDS2), \nand Vision 2030: \n73 \n \na. \nPrice Stability: The Reserve Bank will use available monetary policy \ntools as enunciated in this Monetary Policy Statement to anchor price \nstability. \nb. \nExchange Rate Stability: This Monetary Policy Statement has \namplified measures to enhance the efficiency of the willing-buyer \nwilling-seller foreign exchange rate system, in order to promote price \ndiscovery. \nc. \nMaintenance of tight monetary policy: The Reserve Bank is \ncommitted to a tight monetary policy stance. \nd. \nBank charges: In collaboration with banks, the Reserve Bank will \ncontinue to explore ways to reduce transaction costs in the banking sector \nto address public concerns on high bank charges. \ne. \nFinancial Inclusion: The Reserve Bank is working with banks and non-\nbanking institutions to facilitate the continued development of tailor-\nmade products and services for the unbanked segment of the population. \nf. \nEconomic Growth: The measures contained in this Monetary Policy \nStatement are aligned to the achievement of the envisaged 6% economic \ngrowth for 2025. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n74 \nSECTION SEVEN \nECONOMIC OUTLOOK \n229. The monetary policy measures outlined above are expected to anchor inflation and\nexchange rate expectations and support the envisaged growth of 6% in 2025. The \nimplementation of these measures will be sustained to create a track record of \nsound monetary policy performance, critical for fostering Central Bank policy \ncredibility. At the same time, the favourable economic growth for 2025 will \nbenefit from the anticipated recovery in agriculture and the power sector. \nInflation Outlook \n230. The commitment by the Reserve Bank to pursue optimal monetary policies\nthrough prudent reserve money targeting and strategic interventions in the foreign \nexchange market will stabilise the exchange rate, which is a key driver of price \ndynamics in a multi-currency environment. As such, the inflation trajectory is \nexpected to continue on a downward trend, with month-on-month inflation \nprojected to average below 3% in 2025, consistent with exchange rate stability. \n231. Given the base effects caused by the spike in monthly inflation in October 2024,\nannual inflation is expected to be elevated from April 2025 to September 2025 \nbefore significantly moderating to end the year between 20-30%. \nBalance of Payments Outlook \n232. The country’s current account balance is expected to further improve from a\nsurplus of US$501.2 million in 2024 to a surplus of US$611.6 million in 2025 \nreflecting anticipated stronger export performance and continued robust personal \ntransfers inflows (remittances). \n75 \nSECTION EIGHT \nCONCLUSION \n233. The Reserve Bank remains firmly committed to maintaining price stability\nexperienced since April 2024, through prudent monetary policy actions. The \nmeasures announced in this Monetary Policy Statement will consolidate these \ngains and address emerging risks to the outlook. Going forward, the overriding \nobjective of the monetary policy is to continue engendering confidence in the local \ncurrency, through policy consistency, to foster sustainable macroeconomic \nstability. \n234. The Reserve Bank will also continue to strike a delicate balance between its\ninflation reduction objective and supporting robust economic growth, in view of \nthe trade-off between the two objectives. In this regard, the Reserve Bank will \nprudently calibrate the liquidity conditions in the market to curb speculative \nactivities. \n76 \n \nKEY MESSAGE \n \nThe Reserve Bank will continue walking the talk in implementing policies that \npromote price, currency and exchange rate stability; and will maintain the tight \nmonetary policy stance with the overarching objective to foster Central Bank \npolicy consistency and credibility. \n \n• The measures announced in this Monetary Policy consolidate the gains of ZiG \nto date and address potential risks over the outlook period. \n \n• The Reserve Bank will, thus continue to maintain a delicate balance between \nits inflation reduction objective and supporting robust economic growth. \n \n• The Monetary Authorities will carefully manage liquidity conditions in the \nmarket to curb speculative activities while ensuring that the economy \ncontinues to grow at the envisaged 6% for 2025. \n \n \n \n \nI Thank You \n \n \nDr. J. Mushayavanhu \nGOVERNOR", "source": "RBZ", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///RBZ/Monetary_Policy_Statements/MPS_February_06_2025zim (1).pdf"}
{"doc_id": "cc111c8956bba191138f049cdbf00c5f", "text": "CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA’S COMMUNIQUE NO. 57 OF THE \nMONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE, AUGUST 5, 2008 \n \nThe Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) met today August 5, 2008 and reviewed \nextensively the major macroeconomic developments in the domestic and global \neconomy during the first seven months of 2008. In addition, it assessed the \noutlook for the rest of the year. The MPC noted that key domestic macroeconomic \noutcomes were mixed. The international financial markets deteriorated further \nwhile there was a marked slowdown in global economic activities and acceleration \nin inflation. The US dollar continued to fall against major currencies while the \ninternational crude oil prices remained high in the first seven months of 2008. \nSpecifically, on the domestic scene, inflation pressures have mounted and most \nkey interest rates maintained an upward trend. The naira exchange rate, however, \nremained fairly stable. There has been strong liquidity upsurge mainly due to rise \nin fiscal expenditures. Overall, the outlook for the rest of the year remains \nuncertain. These concerns posed serious challenges to the Committee in its \nconsideration of the appropriate monetary policy actions to be taken. \n \nThe Committee recognized that the current rate of inflation year–on-year requires \nurgent attention because of the adverse effects of inflation on the economic well \nbeing of the citizens. Aggregate demand has been at very high levels due to large \npublic as well as private expenditures. Domestic liquidity management as a result \nhas posed a major challenge. The MPC, therefore, restated its commitment to \nprice stability through the pursuit of appropriate monetary policy to rein in the \nemerging inflationary pressures. \n \n \n \nKEY MACROECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS \nInflation \nThe Committee noted the sharp rise in the year-on-year inflation rate of 12.0 per \ncent compared with 7.8, 8.2 and 9.7 per cent recorded in March, April and May \n2008, respectively. The increase in the inflation rate was traceable to the sharp rise \nin the prices of food and fuel, particularly diesel. Food inflation on a year-on-year \nbasis was 18.1 per cent in June as against 14.7 per cent in May. Although, the \noutlook for inflation based on current trajectory raised serious policy concerns for \nthe MPC, the Committee noted that moderation in inflation could be expected by \nthe end of the year if the projected good agricultural performance and rice import \nintervention scheme are sustained, coupled with a credible slowdown of both \npublic and private expenditures. \n \nOutput \nAggregate output measured by real gross domestic product (GDP) at 1990 \nconstant basic prices, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) was \nestimated to have grown by 6.65 per cent in the second quarter of 2008, compared \nwith the provisional growth rate of 5.54 per cent in the first quarter of 2008 and \n5.43 per cent in the second quarter of 2007. The growth in the second quarter of \n2008 was largely driven by the non-oil sector, which grew by 8.82 per cent. The \nNBS projects a favourable outlook for output in 2008 on the assumption of \nprojected strong growth in the non-oil sectors, particularly agriculture and \nservices. \n \nMoney and Credit \nProvisional data show that broad money (M2) growth over the end-December \n2007 level continued to be excessive at 37.7, 34.3, 29.9 and 37.4 per cent in \nMarch, April, May and June 2008, respectively. The growth in M2 was driven \n \n2\nlargely by the growth in credit to the core private sector, complemented by growth \nin net foreign assets. The threat of sustained rapid growth in money and credit \naggregates for the remainder of the year remains strong against the backdrop of \nthe prospect of further liquidity injections during the third and fourth quarters as \ngovernments intensify efforts to fully implement their annual budgets by the end \nof the year and as preparations are made for the end of year festivities. \n \nExternal Sector Developments \nThe MPC noted with satisfaction the continued increase in international reserves. \nThe gross external reserves amounted to US$60.31 billion as at July 31, 2008 \nrepresenting an increase of US$8.98 billion over the level in December 2007. The \nlevel of external reserves is likely to remain high in the remainder of the year \npartly owing to the expectations that oil prices would remain at elevated levels and \npartly to private capital inflows. \n \nThe MPC noted that the exchange rate of the naira has generally been stable. The \nstaff assessment is that there would be continued orderliness in the foreign \nexchange market in the remaining months of the year. \n \nInterest Rates \nThe MPC noted the upward movement of most key interest rates in response to the \nprevailing market conditions. The average inter-bank call rate edged up by about \n0.2 percentage point to 10.40 per cent in June, 2008. It rose to 13.95 per cent at \nend July 2008. Rates on time deposits of various maturities as well as the \nmaximum lending rate also rose. \n \n \n \n \n3\nFiscal Operations \nThe Committee noted that the total federally-collected revenue for the first half of \n2008 was about 21.71 per cent higher than the proportionate budget estimate for \nthe period. The MPC noted with concern the huge liquidity injection from the \nfiscal arm which emanated from the sharing of part of the excess crude proceeds \nand the enhanced regular Federation account allocations. It noted the negative \nimpact these have had on overall liquidity and the threat posed to macroeconomic \nstability from other disbursements scheduled for the remaining part of 2008. The \nMPC also noted that moderating the impact of fiscal operations on liquidity \nthrough innovative mechanisms involving monetization would be worthwhile for \nensuring that macroeconomic stability is maintained. \n \nThe Outlook and Policy Considerations \nThe MPC noted that in the short term, the expected good harvest of agricultural \nproducts and the implementation of the rice import intervention scheme by the \nFederal Government are likely to exert a downward pressure on food prices and, \nhence, headline inflation. This notwithstanding, current projections indicate that \ninflation rate may remain in the double-digit zone, if the current trajectory is \nmaintained till the end of the year. The Committee expects that, the sustenance of \na restrictive monetary policy stance to counter balance the excessive expansionary \nfiscal stance, anchored on a more intense liquidity mop-up operations, could \ndeliver a lower headline inflation outcome by the end of the year than current \nforecasts suggest. \n \nDecisions \nThe Committee decided as follows: \n1. The MPR will remain unchanged at 10.25 per cent since the core inflation \nis expected to remain at a relatively moderate level. \n \n4\n2. After reviewing developments in the financial market and the misplaced \nperceptions that the interest rate trends are linked to the requirement of a \ncommon year-end, the MPC decided that the common year-end for banks \nwould no longer be a requirement and therefore left the decision to the \ndiscretion of the banks. \n3. In order to ensure a transparent pricing regime in the money market and \nthereby foster healthier competition, banks are required to fully disclose to \nthe public their deposit rates as well as their base lending rates and other \ncharges for all the sectors of the economy. These should be published on \ntheir respective websites and updated daily. The banks are required to \nreport these rates to the CBN to enable the Bank to publish a summary of \nthe rates for each deposit money bank every month. \n \nProfessor Chukwuma C. Soludo, CFR \nGovernor, \nCentral Bank of Nigeria, Abuja \n \nAugust 5, 2008 \n \n5", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/mpc communique no. 57, august 5, 2008.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "20bea933e8fe2edd408388d3b0112502", "text": "1 \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA COMMUNIQUÉ NO. 130 OF THE MONETARY \nPOLICY COMMITTEE MEETING HELD ON THURSDAY 28th MAY 2020, WITH \nPERSONAL STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS \nThe Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) met on 28th May, 2020 in an environment \nof severe macroeconomic shock caused by the fatal spread of the Novel \nCOVID-19 Pandemic, which first started as a health crisis in December 2019 in \nChina and quickly morphed into a global economic crisis in the ensuing months. \nThe pandemic induced economic shock is mainly characterized by disruptions \nto the global supply chain, on account of the mitigating measures put in place \nby various governments to contain the spread of the disease. The effects on the \nglobal economy have been unprecedented and indeed severe. These include \nsignificant stock market crashes; exchange rate volatilities; rising corporate and \npublic debt; rising levels of unemployment; tightening financial conditions; \ncapital flow reversals; and negative shocks to commodity prices, to mention a \nfew. \nUnder this period of economic crisis, the Committee assessed the developments \nin the global and domestic economic environments in the first five (5) months of \n2020, and the outlook for the rest of the year. Ten (10) members of the \nCommittee were in attendance. \nGlobal Economic Developments \nThe Committee reviewed developments in the global economy, noting the swift \nand widespread monetary and fiscal stimulus responses to mitigate the \n \n2 \n \nClassified as Confidential \neconomic crisis and avoid economic recession. They observed that since the \nduration of the pandemic is unknown, forecasts for global growth projection for \n2020 differs amongst institutions and central banks. While the IMF output growth \nforecast for 2020 was downgraded by 3.0 per cent in 2020, compared with an \ninitial growth projection of 3.3 per cent, the forecast by the Organisation for \nEconomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) showed a moderation in \nglobal output growth from 2.9 per cent in 2019 to 2.4 per cent in 2020 and 3.3 \nper cent in 2021. Most central banks in Emerging and Developing Economies \n(EMDEs) have mixed forecasts, reflecting the intensity of the demand and supply \nshocks, as well as the effectiveness of the mitigating measures and stimulus by \ntheir monetary and fiscal authorities. \nThe MPC noted that inflation in most Advanced Economies remained largely \nbelow their 2.0 per cent long-run targets. This was partly due to suppressed \naggregate demand, occasioned by the lockdown, with resulting low \nexpectations of future income, forcing spending to be directed to only essential \ngoods and services. \nThe Committee, however, noted that, although, recent monetary decisions in \nmost advanced economies had been accommodative, portfolio flow reversals \nfrom Emerging and Developing Economies had continued, indicating general \nrebalancing of portfolios toward cash and gold as safe assets by investors. This \ndevelopment has resulted in renewed pressure on exchange rates of some \nEmerging and Developing Economies with a likely pass-through to their \ndomestic prices. In addition, a likely medium-term impact of these synchronized \nliquidity injections and other forms of monetary accommodation is the \ncompounding of the already huge global corporate and public debt portfolios \nwhich may result in a spike in global debt post-COVID-19. \n \n \n3 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nDomestic Economic Developments \nAvailable output data from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) showed that \nreal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by 1.87 per cent in the first quarter of \n2020 compared with 2.55 and 2.10 per cent in the preceding and \ncorresponding quarters of 2019, respectively. This was driven largely by 5.06 per \ncent growth in the oil sector and 1.55 per cent in the non-oil sector. The \neconomy, however, expanded by 2.27 per cent in 2019, the most since 2015, \ncompared to 1.91 per cent in 2018. \nThe Manufacturing and non-Manufacturing Purchasing Manager’s Indices \n(PMIs) declined significantly to 42.4 and 25.3 index points, respectively, in May \n2020, compared with 51.1 and 49.2 index points in March 2020. The contraction \nin the manufacturing and non-manufacturing PMIs was attributed to slower \ngrowth in production, new orders, employment level, raw materials and input \nprices. The employment level index for the manufacturing and non-\nmanufacturing PMIs also contracted further to 25.5 and 32.0 index points, \nrespectively, in May 2020 compared with 47.1 and 47.3 index points in March \n2020. Generally, the purchasing managers’ activities in May 2020, were largely \naffected by the lockdown of the global economy to curtail the spread of the \nCOVID-19 pandemic. \nIn the light of the above developments, the Monetary Policy Committee \ncommended the Bank’s effort on the recent measures put in place to mitigate \nthe economic impact of the twin shocks on the Nigerian economy. The \nCommittee expressed support for the sustenance of the broad-based stimulus \nand liquidity facilities to curb the adverse effects of the shocks. \nThe Committee also noted with concern the persisting uptick in inflation for the \neighth consecutive month as headline inflation (year-on-year) rose to 12.34 per \ncent in April 2020 from 12.26 per cent in March 2020. The uptick largely reflected \n \n4 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nthe increase in both the food and core components, which rose to 15.03 and \n9.98 per cent in April 2020 from 14.98 and 9.73 per cent in March 2020, \nrespectively. The MPC noted that the recent increase in inflationary pressure was \nlargely due to a combination of factors including; disruptions in supply chain \nowing to restrictions on inter-state travels; reduced domestic supply of foreign \nexchange; continued impact of deteriorating domestic infrastructure; and \nspillover effects of the Pandemic on global supplies, amongst others. Against this \nbackground, the Committee emphasized the need to sustain measures already \nput in place to maintain price stability. It noted that as the supply of goods and \nservices increase, following the gradual easing of the lockdown and return of \neconomic activities, there would be increase in aggregate supply. \nOn monetary aggregates, the Committee noted the marginal growth in broad \nmoney (M3) to 2.66 per cent in April 2020 from 2.42 per cent in March 2020, \nlargely due to increases in Net Domestic and Foreign Assets. The growth in M3 \nwas, however, significantly below the indicative benchmark of 13.09 per cent for \n2020. Aggregate Net Credit also grew significantly by 8.07 per cent in April 2020 \ncompared with 4.90 per cent in March 2020, although this remained below the \nindicative benchmark of 16.85 per cent for the year. The Committee, therefore, \nobserved that there was relative scope for increased money supply to fund \neconomic activities and boost output recovery. \nIn the review period, money market rates remained relatively stable reflecting \nthe prevailing high liquidity condition in the banking system. Accordingly, \nweighted average Inter-bank call and Open Buy Back (OBB) rates decreased to \n7.33 and 5.52 per cent in April from 10.29 and 11.78 per cent in March 2020, \nrespectively. \nThe Committee observed that though the equities market was largely bearish in \nthe first quarter of 2020, moderate improvement continued to be recorded \nsince the beginning of the second quarter. Consequently, the All-Share Index \n \n5 \n \nClassified as Confidential \n(ASI) and Market Capitalization (MC) increased by 18.33 per cent a piece, \nbetween end-March 2020 and May 22, 2020. This bullish trend reflected \nimproved investor sentiments in response to the mitigating measures introduced \nat the onset of the pandemic by the monetary and fiscal authorities and \npositive outlook in the global oil market. The MPC expressed confidence that the \ncurrent monetary and fiscal policy measures would further strengthen investor \nconfidence. \nThe Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) ratio decreased to 6.58 per cent at end-April \n2020 compared with 10.95 per cent in the corresponding period of 2019 due \nlargely to recoveries, write offs and disposals. The development was adjudged \nby the Committee as a sign of reasonable stability in the banking system and \nurged the Bank to maintain its toolkit of prudential and regulatory measures to \nensure that NPLs stay below the prudential benchmark of 5.0 per cent. \nOutlook \nThe overall medium-term outlook for the global economy remains broadly \nuncertain as the COVID-19 pandemic and associated containment measures \ncontinue to disrupt normal economic activities across the globe. The global \neconomy remains largely confronted with several headwinds, some of which \ninclude: weak aggregate demand due to declining consumer and investor \nconfidence; disruption in global supply chains; shocks to oil and other \ncommodity prices; continued lull in global financial markets; adverse shocks to \nglobal capital flows; as well as rising corporate debt in the advanced \neconomies and public debt in some Emerging Market and Developing \nEconomies. \nAvailable data on key macroeconomic variables in the domestic economy \nindicate that the economy achieved a positive output growth during the first \nquarter of 2020. The Committee noted that even if the lag effects of COVID-19 \n \n6 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nresult in a low negative output growth in the second quarter of 2020, it could \nquickly be reversed to avoid a recession by Q3 2020 based on the far-reaching \nmeasures taken by the monetary and fiscal authorities to mitigate the \ncombined effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and oil price shock. Projections by \nboth the IMF and Federal Government indicate that the economy would \ncontract in 2020 by -3.40 per cent. Given more recent developments, however, \nCBN Staff projections indicate a somewhat less pessimistic range of contraction. \nThis forecast is underlined by the measures to curtail the rapid spread of COVID-\n19; improvement in crude oil prices which stood at about US$34.8 per barrel as \nat 28th May 2020. The moderate recovery in crude oil prices would reduce the \npressure on the external reserves and government revenue. Headwinds to \ngrowth, however, remains the legacy issues of the persistent infrastructural and \nsecurity challenges. \nThe Committee’s Considerations \nCentral to the Committee’s considerations were the impact of the COVID-19 \npandemic, the oil price shock and the likely short to medium-term \nconsequences on the Nigerian economy. In particular, the Committee \nacknowledged the gradual improvement in macroeconomic variables \nparticularly the improvement in the equities market, the containment measures \nof the COVID-19 induced health crisis, as well as, the impact of the increase in \ncrude oil price on the external reserves. \nThe Committee noted the stability in the banking system shown by the increase \nin total asset by 18.8 per cent and total deposits by 25.52 per cent (year-on-\nyear). The performance of the Loan-to-Deposit Ratio (LDR) policy which was \nintroduced in July 2019 showed that total credits increased by N3.1 trillion or \n20.45 per cent, with manufacturing, retail & consumer loans, general commerce \nand agriculture as major beneficiaries. \n \n7 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nThe Committee recognised that under the N100 billion Healthcare Sector \nIntervention Fund, the Bank has approved and disbursed N10.15 billion for some \nprojects for the establishment of advanced diagnostic and health centres and \nthe expansion of some pharmaceutical plants for essential drugs and \nintravenous fluids. As part of the N1trillion intervention targeted at Agriculture \nand Manufacturing firms, the Bank has disbursed N93.2bn under the Real Sector \nSupport Fund to boost local manufacturing and production across critical \nsectors. This consists of over 44 greenfield and brownfield projects. The Bank has \nalso approved N10.9 billion to 14,331 beneficiaries under the N50 billion Targeted \nCredit Facility for households and SME's, out of which N4.1billion has been \ndisbursed \nto \n5,868 \nsuccessful \nbeneficiaries. \nThe \nCommittee \ndirected \nManagement to reach out to the banks to encourage them to offer and \ndisburse these funds to those priority sectors of the economy so as to stimulate \naggregate demand and create more jobs. \nThe MPC appraised the Federal Government’s resolve to maintain the core of its \nspending plans for 2020 as this remained vital for the attainment of the much-\nneeded economic recovery. It also applauded the government’s efforts at \nrevising the oil price benchmark downwards to reflect prevailing conditions. It \nreiterated the urgent need for the Government to improve tax collections, \nthrough a gradual, but purposeful diversification of the economy’s revenue \nbase. The Committee also urged Government to remain focused on the \nimplementation of the revised 2020 - 2022 Medium Term Expenditure Framework \n(MTEF) as the basis for sustainable fiscal policy. \nThe MPC emphasized the need for Government to work towards a gradual \nreopening of the economy in line with recommendations of the Presidential Task \nForce (PTF) and advice from medical experts, insisting that efforts must be \ndirected at saving not only lives but also livelihoods. This is to enable the \nresumption of economic activities necessary to stimulate growth, accelerate the \n \n8 \n \nClassified as Confidential \npace of recovery and restore livelihoods, particularly the vulnerable in our \nsociety. \nOn prices, the MPC expressed concern about the heightened inflationary \npressure attributed to a combination of monetary and structural factors. While \nprice stability remains the Bank’s primary mandate, the Committee expressed \nthe need for a balanced approach in supporting growth in the face of rising \ndomestic prices. \nWith respect to output, the Committee urged the Federal Government to \ncontinue exploring options of partnership with the private sector to fund \ninvestment in infrastructure. This would aid employment generation, support \nproduction and boost output growth. The Committee also reiterated the need \nfor foreign and domestic investments to support growth in key sectors of our \neconomy, including Nigerian auto manufacturing, aviation and rail industries. \nThe Committee expects that on the backdrop of the various stimulus packages \nand increased credit at lower interest rates, the impact of the COVID-19 \npandemic would be relatively less severe than had earlier been expected and \nthe reversal in growth deceleration would become more optimistic. \nThe Committee commended the Bank’s role in effective oversight of the \nbanking system, as evidenced by the relative stability in key financial soundness \nindicators and systemic resilience of the banking sector, in the face of severe \nexternal shocks. \nOn the choice before the Committee, the MPC observed the weakening of the \nglobal macroeconomic environment due to the adverse impacts of COVID-19 \nand drop in crude oil prices, which has resulted in negative output in most \neconomies. The MPC also feels that the logical expectation is that to ensure that \nthe global economy reverses from the recession timely, what policy makers must \ndo is to take actions that will necessarily stimulate growth and recovery. For \n \n9 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nNigeria, although the Q1 2020 GDP turned out pleasantly at 1.87 per cent and \nrate of inflation somewhat moderated, Nigeria may escape a recession if \nconcerted efforts are sustained to stimulate output. \nAccordingly, on balance on whether to hold, loosen, or tighten, the MPC was of \nthe view that tightening of policy stance is for now inappropriate. This is because \ntightening will result in further contraction of aggregate demand, leading to \ndecline in output. Tightening will also increase cost of credit and reduce \ninvestment and impact negatively on output growth. \nAs regards the option of holding previous policy stance, the MPC felt that a hold \nmay indicate that the monetary authorities are insensitive to prevailing weak \neconomic conditions. There is, therefore, the need to signal a direction towards \nimmediate recovery. The Monetary Policy Committee also feels that a hold \ndecision may slowdown the trajectory of the weakened economy, compared \nwith a loosening stance, thereby slackening output growth, \nOn loosening, whereas the Monetary Policy Committee is concerned that \nexcess liquidity engendered by loosening may overshoot the economy’s \nabsorptive capacity and accelerate inflationary pressure, it nevertheless feels \nthat given the slow rate of acceleration of inflation, the accommodative stance \nwill stimulate aggregate demand and supply in the short term. This is because \nan accommodative stance, through a lowering of the policy rate will stimulate \ncredit expansion to critically important sectors that will also stimulate \nemployment and revive economic activity for quick growth recovery. \nThe MPC noted that if all stimulus packages already announced by the Bank \nsuch as concessionary rates, loan restructuring, and targeted loans to \nagriculture, manufacturing and health sector are well utilized, this will produce \nthe desired impetus needed to boost economic recovery in Nigeria. \nThe Committee’s Decision \n \n10 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nAfter reviewing the three options, the MPC noted that the imperative for \nmonetary policy at the May 2020 meeting was to strike a balance between \nsupporting the recovery of output growth while maintaining stable price \ndevelopment across inflation, the exchange rate and market interest rates. To \nthis end, the Committee noted that the Cash Reserve Requirement (CRR) was \nrecently adjusted upwards as a means of tightening the stance of policy. In its \nresponse to the COVID-19 pandemic, however, the Bank reduced interest rates \nassociated with all CBN interventions from 9 to 5 per cent. Increasing MPR at this \nstage will thus be counter-intuitive and will result in upward pressure on retail \nmarket rates. \nThe Committee maintained that although a sharp decline in output growth is \nexpected in Q2 2020 and maybe the third quarter, if the current stimulus \ninitiatives are properly implemented, the economy would reverse to positive \ngrowth by the fourth quarter. Hence the optimism on the part of the Committee \nthat the economy may not slide into recession. \nIn view of the foregoing, the Committee decided by a unanimous vote to \nreduce the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) and to hold all other policy parameters \nconstant. Seven (7) members voted for a reduction of the policy rate by 100 \nbasis points, two (2) members by 150 basis points and one (1) member by 200 \nbasis points. \n \nIn summary, the MPC voted to: \nI. Reduce the MPR to 12.5 per cent; \nII. Retain the Asymmetric Corridor of +200/-500 basis points around the MPR; \nIII. Retain the CRR at 27.5 per cent; and \nIV. Retain the Liquidity Ratio at 30 per cent. \n \n11 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nThank you. \nGodwin I. Emefiele \nGovernor, Central Bank of Nigeria \n28th May 2020 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n12 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nPERSONAL STATEMENTS BY THE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE MEMBERS \n1. ADAMU, EDWARD LAMETEK \nThe global economy continues to be heavily burdened by the fallouts of the \nnovel corona virus pandemic. The economic costs of lockdowns, border \nclosures and restrictions on movement of goods and services have been \nenormous - and still counting in many respects. Amongst others, output, \nemployment and fiscal sustainability have been adversely impacted across the \nglobe. In many countries, the quantum of stimulus has either gotten close or \nsurpassed anything seen in recent times. Notwithstanding the massive fiscal \nstimuli and the desperate attempts by monetary authorities to ease liquidity \nconditions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) currently sees global output \nreceding by about 6.0 percentage points to -3.0 per cent in 2020, from 2.9 per \ncent in 2019. As the world comes to terms with the reality that COVID-19 could \nbe around for much longer than did previous strains of the corona virus, and \nthat the costs could continue to build, the appetite for reopening economies \nhas increasingly strengthened. Early reopening/resumption of economic activity \nappears to be the surest way to halt the global economic descent; in fact, \nmany analysts believe that it would pave the way for liquidity injections to \ngenerate real dividends. \n \nIn the midst of the uncertainties created by COVID-19, Nigeria’s Q1 output \ngrowth turned out to be much better than most observers had expected. At \n1.87 per cent growth rate, the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) lost less than \n0.5 percentage points in growth relative to Q1 2019. This development \nilluminates an opportunity for escaping a recession in 2020 with growth-inducing \npolicies in the rest of the year. Understandably, monetary policy alone cannot \nassure that outcome but could play a vital role. And so, I voted to ease the \npolicy stance at the May 2020 meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee \n \n13 \n \nClassified as Confidential \n(MPC). Nothing in my view could be more urgent than supporting output and \nemployment \nthat \nhad \nborne \nthe \nmost \nimpact \nof \nthe \npandemic. \nNotwithstanding the growth performance in Q1, the odds are that year 2020 \ncould post an overall contraction in real GDP, principally because of the \ndeleterious effects of lockdown and movement restrictions, unless economic \npolicies generally prioritize economic activity in the rest of the year. Both \nindustrial production and the purchasing manager’s indices declined in Q1 \n2020. Similarly, the index of mining production fell in the quarter. At 42.4 and \n25.3 index points, respectively, in May, both manufacturing and non-\nmanufacturing Purchasing Managers Indices (PMIs) show a weakening outlook \nfor output in the year. As the economy hopefully reopens, economic policy \nmust be set to lubricate the wheels of production and wealth creation without \ndelay in line with the global trend. \n \nNevertheless, easing monetary policy in the face of rising consumer price \ninflation must be assiduously defended. The major influences on consumer \nsentiment and inflation have been the pandemic-induced lockdown and \nmovement restrictions (since March 2020) as well as the partial closure of the \nnation’s land borders much earlier. These conditions have obviously resulted in \nlimited supplies of goods and services, in addition to raising transaction costs. \nUnder these circumstances, restraining demand is unlikely to address the \ninflationary pressures in the economy. I am rather persuaded by the necessity of \nincreasing output and alleviating distribution bottlenecks, particularly of food \nitems, which should help ease the pressure on consumer prices. Likewise, as the \nglobal economy gradually reopens and trade rekindles, the supply of imports \nshould improve, thereby easing scarcity of those as well. \n \nIn addition to output and prices, the economy currently bears some other \nvulnerabilities and threats which have to be considered in crafting policy at this \n \n14 \n \nClassified as Confidential \ntime. In March 2020, the price of crude oil, Nigeria’s most important export, \ncrashed, forcing immediate fiscal adjustments. The oil price shock continues to \nreverberate through the economy from the oil and gas sector. The banking \nsystem for example is heavily exposed to the sector. In April 2020, credit to the oil \nand gas sector accounted for about 26.0 per cent of the industry’s total loans \nand advances, making the sector the single most important in terms of credit \nexposure of the banking system. Related to this source of vulnerability is the \nforeign currency exposure of the industry which stood at approximately 41.0 per \ncent in April 2020. Low oil prices translate directly to low resources in the oil and \ngas sector and reduced foreign exchange inflow to the economy. Therefore, \nprotecting the financial system remains a priority going forward. Though key \nbanking system Financial Soundness Indicators (FSIs) – capital adequacy ratio, \nnon-performing loans (NPLs) ratio, earnings, etc., have thus far been quite \nrobust, the industry is not insulated from the adverse impacts of the global \neconomic and financial weakening arising from COVID-19 and soft oil prices. \nLoosening the stance of monetary policy offers some relief to the entire financial \nsector, not just banks but even more critically to the equities market that had \nshed about 11 percent in value, year-to-May 2020 \n \nIn addition to easing the lockdown and restoring supply lines, the exchange rate \nof the naira would be a key factor in the short-term evolution of inflation and \noutput. A key lesson from the 2016 stagflation is that stability of the naira \nexchange rate will be a critical element of the policy mix for rapid recovery from \nthe COVID-19 economic setbacks. In this light, it will be helpful to sustain and \ndeepen extant foreign exchange management policies including strategic \ninterventions in all segments of the FX market to ensure adequate liquidity, \nincentivizing autonomous inflows and prioritizing supply for imports of end \nproducts and intermediates that cannot be sourced locally. In this connection, I \n \n15 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nurge periodic review of the list of items that are valid/not valid for funding from \nthe official market. \n \nI share in the optimism, based on right policies, that the economy may not go \ninto a recession as a result of COVID-19, but not in failure to appreciate the \nmagnitude of impact or the risks in the horizon. In the face of increased \nuncertainty in the global economic environment, external credit lines to \ncorporates and banks in emerging markets and developing economies could \nshrink considerably in the near-term. Capital reversals have already begun in \nmany of these countries including Nigeria and stock markets could crash unless \nmonetary authorities take deliberate steps to ease liquidity in domestic markets. \n \nFinally, there is no gain saying that fiscal policy holds the thicker end of the \neconomic recovery policy lever going forward. From the monetary end, the \nrobust interventions being implemented by the CBN and other policies which \nwere underway, like the Differentiated Cash Reserves Requirement (DCRR) and \nthe minimum Loan-to-Deposit Ratio (LDR) before the COVID-19 pandemic, \nwould continue to increase and redirect credit to the major growth and \nemployment poles. All of those would benefit the economy more if the \norientation of fiscal policy remains complementary. In particular, policies and \nprogrammes directed at supporting production of import substitutes and \nincreased utilization of available local inputs and intermediates in production \nprocesses will give fillip to the real sector interventions by the Bank. \n \nIn consideration of the foregoing, I voted to reduce the Monetary Policy Rate \n(MPR) by a hundred basis points while holding all other policy parameters at \ntheir levels prior to the May 2020 meeting of the MPC. \n \n \n16 \n \nClassified as Confidential \n2. ADENIKINJU, ADEOLA FESTUS \nEconomic Developments \nCovid-19 has altered significantly the global and domestic economic \nenvironment. All forecasts about the global economy has been revised \ndownwards on account of the impacts of the pandemic. It is now believed that \nmost countries will experience recession or sharp decline in GDP in 2020. The \npandemic has curtailed global demand, supply and value chains. Commodity \nprices, equity and bond markets have all taken a hit. Nigeria may likely enter \ninto another recession in 2020, albeit a shallow and brief one, depending on \nhow we respond to the opportunities and challenges that face the country. \nFrom the presentations of the Bank’s Staff, the Financial Soundness Indicators \n(FSI) remain strong. The CAR, and NPL ratio are trending in the right direction. The \nLoan to Deposit Ratio (LDR) has boosted aggregate credit to the economy \nwithout impacting negatively on the NPLs ratios as some have feared when the \npolicy was introduced in 2019. The Liquidity Ratio (LR) is above the minimum \nPrudential Guidelines. Both the ROE and ROA lie within the range for \ncomparator countries. Total Assets, total deposit and total credit also improved \nsince the last meeting of the MPC. The various stress tests also show that the \nfinancial system is robust and strong enough to withstand the shocks to the \neconomy from Covid-19 and decline in oil prices. \nThe Economic Report shows weakening domestic economic performance since \nthe March Meeting. Real GDP growth fell from 2.25% in Q4 2019 to 1.98% in Q1 \n2020. Headline inflation also rose to 12.34% in April 2020 from 12.26% in March \n2020. The increase in headline inflation was driven mainly by Transport, Food & \nnon-Alcoholic Beverages and Health items. However, looking at components of \nmonetary aggregates, growth of Broad Money (M3) and Net Domestic \nAggregates (NDA) were below their provisional benchmarks for 2020, while Net \nForeign Assets (NFA) overshot its target. Sectoral indices of the Nigeria Stock \n \n17 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nExchange were mostly negative in April. Exchange rates at both the BDC and \nI&E windows depreciated between March and April. The premium between the \nBDC and I&E rates however declined by -8.34%. Price of oil declined steeply to \nbelow US$30 per barrel in May 2020 from over US$65 per barrel in January 2020. \nThe foreign reserves rose from US$33.69 billion in March 2020 to US$36.43 billion in \nApril largely due to receipts of proceeds from IMF Rapid Financing Instrument. \nThe fiscal operations of the government remain challenging. Some proactive \nacts have been taken to protect the 2020 budget. The government slashed its \nexpenditure for 2020 from N10.594 trillion to N10.523 trillion. The country also \nreceived US$3.4 billion in Emergency Support from the IMF. The Senate \napproved the borrowing requests of N850 billion for the Federal Government. \nThe balance of trade and current account balance remain at unacceptable \nlevels for the economy. The full impacts of Covid-19 on domestic economy is still \nunclear as at this meeting as most parts of the country remains under some form \nof lockdown. The 2020 real GDP is forecasted to record negative growth. \nConsiderations \nI am glad to know that the Bank has commenced the implementation of the \nSpecial Intervention Programmes approved at the March Meeting of the MPC. \nThis will protect the real and financial sectors of the economy from the Covid-19 \nshocks. It is important that the CBN oversees effective implementation of the \nprogramme for the entire financial system – both for Deposit Money Banks and \nOther Financial Institutions. \nI want the CBN to give priority to the employment generation sectors and the \nSMEs in the implementation of the relief programmes. Special incentives should \nbe given to companies that do not lay off their employees as a result of Covid-\n19. \n \n18 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nThe effects of Covid-19 will be with us for a long term. While most countries are \nslowly getting back to work, what is still not clear to most analysts is the nature of \neconomic recovery: will it be a ‘V-shaped’, ‘U-Shaped’ or ‘W-shaped’. Almost \nwithout exception central banks across the world have downplayed the \ninflationary mandate in favour of financial stabilisation and economic recovery. \nHence, \nreducing \nmonetary \npolicy \nrates \nand \nincreasing \nmonetary \naccommodation have been the dominant response to the economic effects of \nthe pandemic. \nHowever, I also see Covid-19 as an opportunity for us to recalibrate our \neconomic policies. For instance, we need to protect our foreign reserves. It is \ncritical to ensure a realistic and stable exchange rate that protects our foreign \nreserves and support investors’ confidence in the economy. The fiscal authority \nmust use the opportunity to a) significantly cut down on the costs of \ngovernance at all levels b) permanently remove the oil subsidy and develop a \nframework for phased removal of electricity subsidy, c) passage of PIB and \nsimilar legislations that will unlock productivity and growth across the economy, \nd) implement alternative financing framework other than the budget to fund \ninfrastructural projects, e) expand tax coverage to enhance non-oil revenue, f) \nsales of abandoned government properties across the country. \nI am aware of the marginal increase in headline inflation between March and \nApril 2020, as well as the long-term threat that inflation posed to the economy. \nHowever, at this time of contraction of the economy due to exogenous shocks \non the economy, it is time to provide increased stimulus and support for the real \neconomy in order to shift Aggregate Supply curve of the economy and protect \njobs. Moreover, I am convinced that supply and structural factors have played \ndominant roles in the growth of consumer prices in the last month. \nTransportation costs, poor road networks, supply challenges associated with the \n \n19 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nlockdown and security challenges affect the extent to which monetary policy \ntools alone can align inflation rate to anticipated targets. \nDecision \nGiven all of the above considerations, I am in favour of lowering the MPR by 100 \nbasis points. It is time to send a signal of support to economic agents. Lowering \nthe policy rates will reduce costs of production and support aggregate supply, \nsomething that the economy needs at this time. It will also lower the burgeoning \ncosts of government debt. \nOn the basis of above considerations, I cast my vote as follow: \ni) Reduce MPR by 100 basis points to 12.5% \nii) Retain CRR at 27.5% \niii) Maintain Liquidity ratio at 30% \niv) Retain asymmetric corridor around the MPR at -500/+200 basis points. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n20 \n \nClassified as Confidential \n3. AHMAD, AISHAH N. \nNegative externalities arising from the covid-19 pandemic have begun to \nmanifest more fully on global financial markets and the domestic economy. \nDespite lockdown measures across much of the world from March through May, \ninfection and mortality rates have risen exponentially. According to the World \nHealth Organization, over 5.5 million infections and 350 thousand deaths have \nbeen recorded as at May 28th, 2020, up from 315 thousand and 14 thousand, \nrespectively in March. \nMeanwhile, lockdown measures continue to weigh heavily on global economic \nactivity, causing turmoil in financial markets, an unprecedented rise in \nunemployment, negative output growth, exchange rate volatilities, capital flow \nreversals and rising public debt across countries. For instance, output growth in \nthe United States contracted by 4.8 per cent in Q12020 against the expected \ngrowth of 3.8 per cent with over 40 million job losses as at April 2020. China’s \nGDP shrank by 6.8 per cent in Q12020, while the UK economy contracted by 2.0 \nper cent over the same period. \nWhilst fiscal and monetary authorities across the world continue to implement a \nspate of measures to contain the virus and mitigate the negative economic \neffects through fiscal stimulus packages, furlough of workers and sourcing of \nemergency funding from the IMF/World Bank; much is still uncertain as the \neconomic implications emerge idiosyncratically across countries. \nFor the Nigerian economy, the most pressing issue remains the double whammy \narising from the slowdown in economic activity due to coronavirus pandemic \nand the oil price crash following the collapse of the OPEC+ negotiations and the \nconsequent price war between Saudi Arabia and Russia. Although crude oil \nprices have picked up significantly (bonny light US$34.8/b as at May 28, 2020 \nfrom US$15/b on March 31, 2020), outlook for the oil market amidst softening \n \n21 \n \nClassified as Confidential \ndemand remains uncertain. These developments present significant headwinds \nfor fiscal revenues, exchange rate and domestic prices and output. \nFor instance, in response to supply constraints at the foreign exchange market, \nthe exchange rate depreciated by 5.3 per cent from N360/US$ to N380/US$. \nHeadline inflation inched up year-on-year to 12.34 per cent in April 2020 from \n12.26 per cent in March 2020 - driven primarily by disruptions in food supply \nchains and exacerbated by restrictions imposed across the country to curb \nspread of the coronavirus. Furthermore, the Manufacturing and non-\nManufacturing Purchasing Manager’s Indices (PMIs) declined significantly to \n42.4 and 25.3 index points, respectively, in May 2020, compared with 51.1 and \n49.2 index points in March 2020. All of these signal significant challenges ahead \nfor the economy. \nNotably, domestic policymakers have commenced implementation of \ncomprehensive measures earlier introduced to mitigate adverse effects of these \nshocks. Updates provided to the Committee indicate disbursements of N10.15 \nbillion from the N100 billion health sector intervention fund, N93.2 billion under \nthe N1trillion Real Sector Support Fund to boost local manufacturing, whilst over \n14,331 beneficiaries have received N10.9 billion out of the N50 billion Targeted \nCredit Facility for households and SMEs. These measures, coupled with prior \nmonetary and fiscal reforms, have kept the domestic economy resilient, blunting \nthe effects of the coronavirus on economic activity as reflected in a higher than \nanticipated Q12020 real GDP growth of 1.87 per cent (year-on-year). \nTo preserve these gains and forestall a recession, domestic productivity must be \naccelerated immediately, particularly as a number of countries contemplate \nbroad export restrictions. Thus, stimulating the manufacturing sector is mission \ncritical to support local consumption needs and reduce output gap to stem \nprice developments. In addition, focused implementation of the revised 2020-\n2022 Medium Term Expenditure Framework should be prioritized along with the \n \n22 \n \nClassified as Confidential \ncontinued implementation of the Economic Recovery and Growth Plan and the \ndiversification agenda of government. \nThe financial system remains a bright spot of the economy and is well positioned \nto support domestic output growth, and stimulate economic recovery. Even as \nthe CBN monitors the potential risks to financial stability, it is gratifying that \nfinancial soundness indicators have remained strong, despite the headwinds \nand rapid expansion of credit (gross credit increased by N3.0 trllion between \nend-May 2019 and end-April 2020) driven by the Loan to Deposit Ratio (LDR) \npolicy. Non-performing loans (NPLs) ratio stood at 6.6 per cent at end April 2020, \ncompared with 11.0 per cent at end April 2019, while other prudential ratios \nremain robust. \nThis resilience notwithstanding, the industry remains exposed to shocks from \nspillover effects of the pandemic on macroeconomic conditions. This \nunderscores the importance of regulatory measures to mitigate the effects of \nthe crisis, such as granting forbearance to banks to temporarily restructure loans \nfor businesses and households most affected by Covid-19 and the Global \nStanding Instruction policy to limit NPLs. \nAs at end-May 2020, staff reports indicate that 17 banks submitted requests to \nrestructure over 32 thousand loans for individuals and businesses impacted by \nthe pandemic, representing 32.94 per cent of total industry loan portfolio, with \nthe manufacturing and general commerce sectors constituting the bulk of the \nrestructured facilities. \nResults from ongoing impact assessment of Covid-19 effects on impairment by \nbanks, indicate modest impact given regulatory policy measures already \nimplemented. These, coupled with close monitoring by authorities and \nenhanced risk management practices by financial institutions, would help to \nmitigate the emerging risks and preserve financial system stability. \n \n23 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nPolicy decision \n \nThe coronavirus-induced global economic crisis is pervasive, with heightened \nuncertainty for the medium-term economic outlook. In Nigeria, early effects of \nthe crisis and containment measures have reflected in modest decline in output \ngrowth, exchange rate depreciation, rising public debts and domestic prices \namidst existing structural challenges. While these impacts on the Nigerian \neconomy continue to evolve, even as some resilience is acknowledged \nparticularly in healthier than expected Q12020 GDP numbers, there is urgent \nneed to maintain this trajectory to prevent a recession and engender sustained \nrecovery. \nThe rising domestic price level attributed to a combination of monetary and \nstructural factors, also poses additional risk to the muted growth environment. \nThis presents the monetary authority with a difficult tradeoff, amidst limited tools \nto balance its primary price and monetary stability remit - given the negative \ndirection of inflation and exchange rates with promoting GDP growth. \nIn my view, an aggressive move to reflate the economy should be the primary \nobjective at this time. This can be partly achieved by lowering the policy rate to \nstimulate aggregate demand and direct credit to growth-enhancing sectors of \nthe real economy. This measure would help lower domestic lending rates which \nhave trended downwards due to increasing supply of loans via the LDR policy, \nexpand access to credit, stimulate employment and improve domestic \neconomic activity. \nTo absorb excess liquidity from ongoing fiscal and monetary injections and curb \nmonetary induced inflation that may potentially arise from MPR reduction, the \nCBN has at its disposal the discretionary cash reserve requirement (CRR) \n \n24 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nimplementation framework which will be supported by issuance of new fiscal \ninstruments as the government executes its revised debt programme. \nTherefore, I vote to reduce the MPR by 150 basis points from 13.5 per cent to 12.0 \nper cent and retain the asymmetric corridor of +200/-500 basis points around the \nMPR; the CRR at 27.5 per cent; and Liquidity Ratio at 30.0 per cent. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n25 \n \nClassified as Confidential \n4. ASOGWA, ROBERT CHIKWENDU \nBackground: \nPolicymakers around the globe now face formidable challenges as they seek to \nrestore their economies following the devastating health, macroeconomic and \nsocial effects of COVID-19. This pandemic has been described as the largest \neconomic shock the world economy has witnessed in several decades. The \ncrossborder spill overs from the collapse of global manufacturing activities and \nthe disruptions to supply chains in major hubs of world trade including in China, \nUnited States and Germany is exerting a huge toll on developing countries due \nto the rapid reduction in the demand for intermediate goods and primary \ncommodities. In Nigeria, the prolonged slump in oil prices significantly reduced \ngovernment revenues, thus exacerbating the already chronic fiscal deficits, \nwhile the fall in external reserves evoked considerable negative investment \nsentiments especially for foreign portfolios. At the same time, the continued \nmarginal uptick in domestic inflation in the months of March and April presents \nadditional difficult choices to grapple with. However, the need to ensure that \ndomestic firms survive in the short term whilst ensuring that growth in the long \nterm returns to its previously expected levels remains an urgent task. The \nchallenge, therefore, is to design the best monetary policy reaction to the \npandemic taking into account these developments in domestic economy in \naddition to the global economic outlook. Such policy choices should preserve \nfinancial stability whilst at the same time ensuring that the general level of \nliquidity is consistent with the inflation focus. \nThe Global Economic Outlook and the Effects of COVID-19 \nThe COVID-19 pandemic has wreaked considerable havoc on the global \neconomy unleashing catastrophic recessions with nearly 90 percent of the world \neconomy under some form of lockdown. Revised projections suggest that the \nglobal GDP will shrink by -3. percent in 2020 (IMF), contrary to the earlier \n \n26 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nestimation of global GDP growth improvement of 3.3 percent in 2020 before the \noutbreak of the crisis. The advanced economies are expected to be hit hardest \nby this crisis. On average, the projection is that GDP in developed countries will \nshrink by 6.1 percent in 2020 while for Emerging Market and Developing \nEconomies, the expected contraction is by 1.0 percent in 2020. Specifically, for \nthe United States, GDP is now expected to contract by 5.9 percent in 2020 even \nthough an early rebound of up to 4.7 percent is tentatively forecast for 2021. \nThe Euro Area GDP is also expected to contract by 7.5 percent in 2020 but also \nforecast to rebound to 4.7 percent in 2021. For Japan, GDP is projected to \ncontract by 5.2 percent in 2020 while China’s growth is projected to decelerate \nsharply from 6.1 percent in 2019 to 1.2 percent in 2020. Commodity–dependent \ncountries have faced severe spill over brunt of the pandemic with the prices of \noil and other commodities declining across board in the first three months of \n2020. The US oil prices also plummeted into the negative territory during the \nsecond half of April as it faced limited demand and insufficient storage \ncapacity. Global trade seems to be severely hit by this health crisis and looks \nmore even volatile than gross output. Besides, financial markets across the World \nhave also witnessed a historic slump, perhaps even worse than the 2008/9 \nglobal financial crisis. Many equity markets in large and small economies have \nendured declines of 30 percent or more as a result of this pandemic and market \nliquidity has fallen significantly even for traditionally deep markets such as the \nUnited States. For Banks across the globe, the more capitalized ones have \nremained strong, but longterm rating outlook have been revised to negative for \nmany banks, especially those with recent low profitability indicators. \nCentral banks across the globe have responded strongly to stabilize the \nfinancial markets as well as restore economic activity. Many advanced \neconomies eased monetary policy rates to historic low levels and injected large \nliquidity into the financial system through a combination of both direct credit \nprovision and large-scale asset purchases. CBN staff report show that the US \n \n27 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nFederal Reserve led this aggressive cycle of monetary accommodation by \nlowering its policy rate twice within a fortnight down to the zero-lower bound \nand announced unlimited purchases of US government debt and mortgage-\nbacked obligations as well as large scale purchases of corporate bonds and \nsecurities issued by lower levels of government. The Bank of England also pushed \nits policy rate close to the zero-lower bound at 0.10 percent in March 2020 from \n0.25 percent in January 2020, while the European Central Bank besides keeping \nbenchmark policy rate at 0.0 percent, has offered low-interest loans to banks, \nsignificantly boosted asset purchases and allayed fears of member-country \ndefaults by lifting distributional restrictions on its bond-buying programmes. The \nBank of Japan also in the last three months, scaled up purchases of government \nand corporate bonds, commercial papers and exchange traded bonds. \nSimilarly, Central banks in developing and emerging markets have followed suit \nand have, besides cutting interest rates, provided additional liquidity to the \nfinancial system so as to enhance loans for firms’ recovery. The Chinese central \nbank in addition to cutting interest rates also approved 500 billion Yuan in \nfinancing to provide less expensive loans to smaller enterprises struggling to \nresume operations after the COVID-19 lockdown. CBN staff report show that the \ncentral banks of South Africa, Ghana, Kenya, Brazil and Indonesia all lowered \ntheir policy rates to varying degrees between March and May 2020. \nThe Domestic Economic Outlook: \nThe domestic economy has suffered above-average declines as a result of the \nCOVID-19 crisis but not yet as hard hit as more advanced economies. The first \nquarter 2020 GDP grew by 1.87 percent compared to 2.55 and 2.28 percent in \nquarter four and quarter three of 2019, respectively. This decline is attributed to \nthe impact of COVID-19 on general economic activities as the oil sector \ndeclined from 6.36 percent in 2019 quarter four to 5.06 percent in 2020 quarter \none, while the non-oil sector also declined from 2.26 percent in 2019 quarter four \n \n28 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nto 1.55 percent in 2020 quarter one. The Purchasing Manager’s Index for both \nmanufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors have been on the downward \ntrend since February 2020 arising from the COVID-19 pandemic and for the first \ntime in several years dropped below the 50 midpoints benchmark. The \nmanufacturing PMI stood at 42.4 index points in May 2020 compared to 51.1 \npoints in March 2020, while the non-Manufacturing PMI which dropped to 49.2 \npoints in March 2020 fell further in May 2020 to 25.3 index points. The growth \noutlook for the second and third quarters of 2020 have been revised \ndownwards, but general economic activity are gradually regaining momentum \nsince mid-May especially as the prices of crude oil rebounds. With government \nrevenues and external reserves picking up modestly as the economy start to \nreopen, and as the effects of the increased credit and fiscal stimulus kick in, \nthere are high expectations that 2020 third quarter GDP figures may possibly \nclose in at a small but positive territory. \nTwo key downside risks remain potent amid weakening of economic activity \nand lower oil prices. First, is the minor upticks in inflationary rate. Headline \ninflation rates increased further for a ninth consecutive time to 12.34 percent in \nApril 2020 from 12.26 per cent in March and 12.20 percent in February 2020. This \npersistent over shooting of the inflation target remains a key concern to the \nBank even as the marginal increases in the past eight months have been driven \nlargely by prices of food and non-alcoholic beverages. Second, is the higher \nlevels of public debt the domestic economy is exposed to in the aftermath of \nthis COVID-19 crisis which may worsen the current macroeconomic challenges \ngoing forward. CBN staff report showed that IMF approved US$3.4 billion in \nEmergency support for Nigeria to address the COVID-19 pandemic, while the \nParliament has also approved the request of N850 billion loan for the Federal \nGovernment to be sourced from the domestic capital markets so as to finance \nthe 2020 budget. While reduced interest rates may keep the cost of servicing \nthe new domestic loans low, it will be difficult not to crowd out private \n \n29 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nborrowing. Given the uncertainties about the future course of this pandemic, a \nprolonged period of weak GDP growth will further worsen the country’s debt \nburden. As such, pursuing fiscal consolidation and even fiscal austerity without \njeopardising social sector spending remains the viable option to reduce the \nmounting debt burden. \nInterestingly, threats to domestic bank stability remain minimal as at now, just as \nin the last MPC meeting. CBN staff report showed a marginal increase in the \nnon-performing loans ratio in April as compared to February 2020. Also, there \nwere modest declines in key profitability indicators (ROE and ROA), but increase \nin industry size at May 2020 still depicts a robust banking system. Even though on \naverage, the banks still have strong capital and liquidity positions despite the \nthreat of COVID-19, it is important that greater supervisory scrutiny is applied to \navoid any deterioration should the health crisis deepen any further. If more firms \nbecome distressed despite governments support for revival and the default \nrates on loans increases, the credit market may be jolted significantly. An \narsenal of macro prudential support policies is therefore necessary to maintain \nbanking sector resilience as they embark on aggressive economic recovery \nlending. \nDecision: \nWhile there are still uncertainties about the future path of the COVID-19 \npandemic, government’s current responses have been to review the associated \nmitigation measures including lockdowns and business closures with the \nassumption that the outbreak is under control. The provision of healthcare and \nsupport for individuals and households remain central focus, but support for \nbusiness recovery and survival is seen as key to curb the pandemic’s long-term \neffects. This explains why in several advanced economies, there have been \nmassive fiscal policy support through subsidies, guarantees and tax reliefs but at \nthe same time, central banks have cut policy rates and initiated other far-\n \n30 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nreaching steps to provide liquidity and maintain investor confidence. As there \nare wide projections that majority of the countries including Nigeria may plunge \ninto recession in 2020, promoting sufficient access to credit regardless of firm size \nwill be a necessary monetary policy choice despite the current inflationary \nrealities. \n My opinion therefore, is that a moderate easing of monetary policy at this May \n2020 MPC meeting will provide the right tonic for business resumption and post - \ncrisis strengthening. I will thus vote to: \n• Reduce the MPR to 12.5 % \n• Retain the CRR at 27.5% \n• Retain the Asymmetric Corridor at +200/-500 basis points \n• Retain the Liquidity Ratio at 30.0%. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n31 \n \nClassified as Confidential \n5. ISA-DUTSE, MAHMOUD \nA. INTRODUCTION \nThe debilitating impact of the Covid-19 pandemic across the world remains a \nformidable challenge. Apart from the health crisis occasioned by the virus, the \ncontainment responses of nations simultaneously triggered both demand and \nsupply shocks which combined with the precipitous drop in oil demand to make \na global recession inescapable in 2020. The widespread disruptions in \nproduction supply chains and the sharp decline in all components of aggregate \ndemand dampened expectations and heightened uncertainty in the global \neconomy. \nNigeria’s oil-dependent economy received a hard hit in the absence of \nadequate fiscal buffers to mitigate the exogenous oil price shock. Moreover, the \nsevere public cost engendered by the containment measures to stem the \nspread of Covid-19 significantly worsened the domestic economic conundrum. \nB. EXTERNAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS \nThe revised growth projections of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were \nbased on the assumption that the Corona virus pandemic would be contained \nat end-June 2020. On account of this, global growth is forecast to contract by \n3.0% in 2020 – a reduction of 6.3 percentage points from the earlier 3.3% \nprojection in January 2020. Prior to the pandemic, growth in Advanced \nEconomies was projected to decline to 1.6% in 2020 from 1.7% in 2019 due to \nsustained weakness in aggregate demand but with the current realities of \nlockdowns, these economies may contract by as much as 6.1% in 2020. Most \nEmerging Market and Developing Economies (EMDEs), including Nigeria, are \nalso expected to go into recession in 2020. As an economic bloc, output growth \nin EMDEs is projected to contract by 1.0% in 2020 as against the earlier forecast \ngrowth of 4.4% in January 2020. The Chinese and Indian economies, however, \n \n32 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nare expected to grow at a dampened pace of 1.2% and 1.9% in 2020 \ncompared with 6.1% and 4.9% in 2019, respectively. \nCentral banks around the world have joined the monetary easing ‘train’ to prop \nup consumption and investment spending with rate cuts and other stimulus \nmeasures. In countries such as Nigeria that are facing inflationary pressures, the \nargument for monetary easing hinges on the use of alternative policy \ninstruments to rein-in excess liquidity while delivering targeted credit to key \nsectors of the economy. \nThe pandemic engendered significant volatility in the global financial and \ncapital markets with key indices dipping as asset prices, market liquidity and \ninvestors’ confidence waned. EMDEs whose situation is compounded by the oil \nprice shock have continued to experience capital outflows to safer havens. \nPortfolio outflows and declining foreign exchange earnings from oil have \ncombined to result in substantial reductions to our foreign reserves. Nigeria’s \nexternal reserves fell from US$38.07 billion in December 2019 to US$33.69 billion in \nMarch 2020 before climbing to US$36.49 billion on May 21, 2020. The direct \nfallout of this is the unrelenting pressure on the foreign exchange rate as the \nmarket adjusts and stabilise at higher levels. \nThe price of Bonny Light stood at US$33.01 per barrel on May 26, 2020 compared \nwith US$67.20 per barrel on January 1, 2020.The current energy outlook indicates \nthat crude oil price may average US$34/barrel in 2020. The resulting decline in \ngovernment’s oil revenue in Nigeria and covid-related expenditure has \nnecessitated a substantial review of the 2020 budget. \nC. DOMESTIC ECONOMIC CONDITIONS \nAccording to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the Nigerian economy \nslowed to a growth rate of 1.87% in Q1 2020 compared with 2.55% in Q4 2019 \ndue to sectoral declines in agriculture, industries and services to 2.20%, 2.26% \n \n33 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nand 1.57% in Q1 2020 from 2.36%, 2.31% and 2.22% in Q4 2019, respectively. The \ndata on Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) portrays a worsening scenario as \nmanufacturing and non-manufacturing PMI decelerated steadily from 60.8 and \n62.1 index points in December 2019 to 51.1 and 49.2 index points in March 2020 \nand 42.4 and 25.3 index points in May 2020, respectively. The key factors \naccentuating the downward slide relates to the plunge in crude oil prices and \nthe Covid-19 pandemic which has drastically disrupted economic activities. \nWhile the on-going monetary and fiscal stimulus remain apt, there is the need to \nadopt further measures to stimulate the demand- and supply-sides of the \nNigerian economy to avoid or minimize the negative growth scenario of -3.4% \nprojected by the IMF for 2020. \nHeadline inflation (year-on-year) inched up to 12.34% in April 2020 from 12.26% in \nthe previous month reflecting a sustained upward trend in the general price \nlevel for the 9th consecutive month. The rise in prices is driven mainly by food \nand non-alcoholic beverages which witnessed a positive percentage change \nof 0.04 in the review period. The two components of headline inflation – food \nand core inflation – increased to 15.03% and 9.98% in April 2020 from 14.98% and \n9.73% in the preceding month, respectively. The rise is mainly attributable to the \nsignificant influence of farm produce and processed food in the inflation basket \nof goods. Although the outlook for inflation in the short term is on the upside, \nespecially given the economic shutdown and oil price shock, nonetheless there \nis hope that normalcy would gradually return, movement restrictions lifted, \nsupply chains revived and production re-started. These steps should contribute \ntowards easing pressure on prices. Many analysts forecast a modest \nimprovement in oil prices in the second half of the year. Pressures on the foreign \nexchange rate may thus subside and curtail the problem of imported inflation as \naccretions to foreign reserves gather momentum. The current strategy of \ncontrolling excess banking system liquidity through the Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) \nshould continue and implementation further strengthened. On the back of \n \n34 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nthese developments, greater focus should be on boosting aggregate demand \nand growth to steer the economy away from imminent recession. \nThe scorecard of the banking system portrays stability and resilience even in this \ndifficult era. The credit to private sector is on the rise to 7.4% in April from 5.2% in \nthe preceding month. The quantum of new credits to vital sectors of the \neconomy continues its upward path. The overall averages for both the Open \nBuy Back (OBB) and interbank rates during the period (March 25 to April 27 2020) \nwere 6.62% and 6.01%, respectively – reflecting the relative calm pervading the \nfinancial market. The banking soundness indicators are within reasonable limits. \nAlthough, the Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) at 6.6% is slightly above the \nprudential minimum of 5.0%, the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) and liquidity \nratio meet prudential requirements. Moreover, the Return on Assets (ROA), \nReturn on Equity (ROE) and Total Operating Cost to Total Operating Income \nRatio indicate that the banking system is profitable and compares quite \nfavourably with peer countries. The banking system thus is in a position, with a \nsupportive policy mix, to promote the growth agenda by channeling more \ncredit to the real economy. The Nigeria capital market index – the NSE ASI \ndeclined by 3.86% between end-February 2020 and May 22, 2020 due to the \npandemic. With the easing of national lockdown and improvement in the \nbusiness climate and investors’ confidence, a market rebound is likely in the \nnear term. \n \nC. VOTING DECISION \nIn view of the stagflation scenario confronting the economy, the tightening \noption of monetary policy is not ideal. The challenge of Covid-19 pandemic, oil \nprice shock and an economy on the brink of recession call for easing of \nmonetary conditions to stimulate growth even though we are facing inflationary \n \n35 \n \nClassified as Confidential \npressures. The earlier hike in CRR and other measures taken by the CBN are \nexpected to significantly douse the inflationary pressures. The on-going easing of \nCovid-related restrictions should also have a salutary effect on prices. A \nloosening policy option would enhance the confidence of households and \nbusinesses and promote spending. Taking all the foregoing factors into \naccount, I voted for a reduction in MPR by 100 basis points while retaining all \nother policy parameters as follows: \n• MPR at 12.50% per annum \n• The asymmetric corridor at +200/-500 basis points around the MPR \n• Liquidity ratio at 30.0% \n• CRR at 27.5% \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n36 \n \nClassified as Confidential \n6. OBADAN, MIKE IDIAHI \nThe 273rd meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee was held at a time that \nthe global economy was thrown into confusion, uncertainties and twin crises (a \nhealth crisis and an economic crisis) by the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) \npandemic – a virus outbreak which started in Wuhan, China in December 2019. \nWithin a few months, because of its nature, the virus had spread to nearly all the \ncountries of the world with very devastating implications. The virus precipitated \na health crisis which has put countries with known robust health systems off-\nbalance and also an economic crisis driven by lockdowns of economies, or \nsignificant parts thereof, restrictions of travels and movements across national \nborders and within national economies with consequent production and trade \ndisruptions, and deterioration in global financial conditions. In other words, \nmeasures aimed at containing the virus resulted in the collapse of economic \nactivities and trade. Commodity prices, except gold which appears now to be \na safe haven for investors, have experienced unprecedented declines. With \nsignificant supply surfeit in the world market for oil arising from competition \nbetween Saudi Arabia and Russia and sharply reduced global demand, the \nprice of Brent crude oil declined sharply until the last few weeks when it began \nto rebound standing at US$ 34.81per barrel as at May 28, May 2020. \nIMPACT OF COVID-19 ON GLOBAL GROWTH AND TRADE, AND MONETARY POLICY \nRESPONSE \nCOVID-19 has impacted global economic growth and trade very negatively \nand \nsharply. \nSome \nadvanced \neconomies \nand \nEMDEs \nhave \nalready \nexperienced contraction of their economies (quarter-on-quarter) in the first \nquarter of 2020: USA, -1.2%; Euro Area, -3.8%; UK, -0.2%; France, -5.8%; Spain, -\n5.2%; Italy, -4.7%; Japan, -0.9%; China, -9.8%; South Africa, 0.4%; and Nigeria, \n14.3%. Furthermore, the IMF has projected sizable negative economic growth \nrates in 2020 for the advanced economies (between -6% and -9 %), U.S (-5.9%), \n \n37 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nEuro Area (-7.5%), U.K (-6.5%). The EMDEs are projected to growth by just 1.0 \npercent while the Nigerian economy is expected to grow by -3.4 percent. \nAmong the major EMDEs, only China and India may have positive but low \ngrowths in 2020. The virus has reduced international trade volumes significantly \nand world trade is projected to contract by 11.0 percent in 2020. \nMost advanced countries have responded to the COVID-19-induced downturn \nin economic activities with robust fiscal stimulus packages and monetary \naccommodation measures. This is with a view to averting/minimising recession, \nstimulating aggregate demand, supporting recovery and sustaining stability. Of \nparticular interest to us here are the monetary measures. Most Central banks \nhave moved into monetary accommodation mode entailing huge injection of \nmonetary stimulus to help maintain a reasonable level of aggregate demand \nand restore confidence even though the injections could stoke inflation in the \nshort – medium term. Steering the economies on a positive growth trajectory \nseems to be taking precedence over the traditional price stability objectives \nduring the COVID-19 pandemic period. The monetary instruments used include \nquantitative easing and reduction of the monetary policy rate (MPR). The \nCentral Bank of Nigeria’s survey of 14 central banks revealed that 12 of them \nreduced their policy rates in the past few months, some multiple times. The Euro \nArea and Japan could not as they were already at the zero-lower-bound of \ntheir policy rates. These actions suggest that changes in the policy rates \nproduce the desired signals and effects on credit in those economies. This is a \nchallenge to Nigeria where the effectiveness of the MPR has tended to be \nundermined by the Deposit Money Banks (DMBs). The Central Bank of Nigeria \nmust continue to address the challenge so as to make the monetary policy rate \nan effective instrument especially in the direction of boosting credit to the real \nsectors of the economy at affordable interest rates. \nSTATE OF THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY \n \n38 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nThe very negative economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic has \nmanifested in very serious challenges for the Nigerian economy; major \nmacroeconomic aggregates have deteriorated while the economy is now on \nthe verge of stagflation. The devastating impact is such that the gains made on \nthe growth front in 2019 are under threat of reversal. It was only since 2019 that \nthe economy began to show meaningful signs of recovery from the 2016 \nrecession. In 2019, the economic growth rate showed consistent upward trend, \nquarter-on-quarter, culminating in 2.55 percent growth rate in the fourth quarter \nand 2.29 percent for the whole year. In the first quarter of 2020, the growth rate \ndeclined to 1.87 percent from 2.55 percent in December 2019. Notwithstanding, \nit is reassuring in relation to the contractions in many other countries in the first \nquarter as a result of COVID-19. However, in view of the fact that economic \nactivities in Nigeria were locked down from April, a more serious economic \ncontraction is likely in the second quarter. It is to be hoped that the various \nmonetary, fiscal and structural measures would assist the economy to avert a \nrecession from the 3rd quarter even though some bodies have projected \nnegative growth for the economy in 2020: IMF (-3.4%); World Bank (-3.4%); CBN (-\n2.82 to -4.2%); Federal Government (-3.5%). \nBesides the challenges in the area of growth, other aspects of the economy \nhave provided cause for strong concerns as follows: \ni. Serious weakening of the oil market entailing crash of oil prices (as low as \nUS$14.28 per barrel as of end April 2020 from a high of US$66.69 at end-\nJanuary), supply glut and weak demand arising from the closure of \nnumerous economic activities across the world. As Nigeria depends rather \nprecariously on crude oil for the bulk of its domestic revenue and foreign \nexchange earnings, the problems in the oil market have put the country’s \nfinances in serious jeopardy, constraining the government’s ability to \n \n39 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nrespond effectively, as it would wish, to the pandemic in terms of \ncontainment and stimulus packages. \nii. Continuously rising inflation due to both monetary and structural factors \nand compounded by the lockdown resulting in supply disruptions, both \nfrom domestic and external sources. All the measures of inflation \n(headline, core and food) increased in April 2020. The headline inflation \nmoved further away from the CBN target range of 6 – 9 percent from \n12.26 percent in March to 12.34 percent in April. Similarly, food inflation \nincreased from 14.98 percent in March to 15.03 percent in April. \niii. There has been a significant threat to external reserves position and \nexchange rate stability as a result of the slump in oil prices/COVID-19. \nForeign exchange earnings from exports and stock of external reserves \nhave shown a downward trend. External reserves, in particular, have \nexperienced downward volatility. From US$38.072 billion in December \n2019, it declined to US$33.69 billion in March 2020. The reserves level, \nhowever, improved to USD$36.69 billion by 14th May 2020 due to receipt of \nproceeds from the IMF’s Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI). The exchange \nrate depreciated in all segments of the foreign exchange market also \nbecause of the crash in oil market. Overall, the balance of payments and \nits components have weakened. \niv. Challenging fiscal operations of the government. Against the backdrop of \nsignificant revenue underperformance and the weakening of revenue-\ngenerating capacity induced by COVID-19 pandemic, the need of \ngovernment to contain the pandemic and save livelihoods has \nconstrained the adjustment that would have been necessary under the \nsituation of revenue shortage. Consequently, fiscal deficits have increased \nwith implications for increased domestic and external borrowing and \npublic debt build-up. As at March 2020, the Federal Government’s fiscal \ndeficit stood at -N1,392.96 billion. With domestic borrowing through bonds \n \n40 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nat N560.0 billion as financing, the net overall unfinanced deficit stood at \nN832.96 billion. In the recently revised 2020 budget occasioned by the \ncrude oil price crash, the fiscal deficit stands at N4.975 billion. With the \nnew borrowings under the COVID-19 environment, total public debt will \nfurther increase very much beyond the N27.401 trillion as at December 30, \n2019. \nNo doubt the above developments have elicited robust responses from the \nMonetary Authority which has implemented some adjustment and several \nunconventional monetary intervention measures. The Fiscal Authority is also \ndoing its best, but it is a case of the spirit is willing but the flesh is weak as it has \nhad to battle with exogenous shocks since 2015. \nHowever, going forward, two lessons must be learnt in relation to good \neconomic management. The first is the need to take diversification of the \neconomy very seriously and the second is the imperativeness of building fiscal \nbuffers. An economy that is diversified in the spheres of production, domestic \nrevenue generation and export earnings is better equipped to withstand \ninternal and external shocks, for example, the implications of the coronavirus \npandemic. Otherwise, shocks create panic in economic management \nnecessitating painful adjustment measures. Admittedly, the present government \nhas since inception strived to diversify the economy. Most of the interventions of \nthe Central Bank of Nigeria in the real sectors of the economy – agriculture and \nmanufacturing – and some service sector activities are aimed at diversification \nand self-sufficiency as well as conservation of scarce foreign exchange. A \nsuccessful diversification strategy will require the country to strengthen its \ncapacity to produce more sophisticated, higher-value goods for which demand \nexpands globally as income rises. It also requires the government to muster the \npolitical will to effectively deploy oil resources to raise productivity in the \n \n41 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nagricultural sector and acquire capabilities to produce more sophisticated, \nhigher-value goods. \nThe need to build fiscal buffers or save money for the rainy day, like the country \nis in now, cannot be overemphasised. This can be achieved by saving from oil \nearnings and undertaking aggressive non-oil revenue mobilisation. Because of \nthe absence of fiscal buffers, Nigeria is one OPEC country other than Venezuela, \nperhaps, that has very limited budgetary space to absorb the shocks from the \ncoronavirus. Hence, the country’s fiscal response to the economic fall-outs of \nthe disease is rather muted even though the government is very enthusiastic to \ndo something substantial. The government must appreciate the boom and bust \nnature of the international market for crude oil and take saving for the rainy day \nvery seriously once the good times return again. To this end, the Excess Crude \nAccount (ECA) which has no legal backing should be merged with or subsumed \nunder the Sovereign Wealth Fund which has a legal backing. Importantly, all the \ntiers of government and the National Assembly and State Houses of Assembly \nmust develop the political will to save for the rainy day as a mark of good \neconomic governance. This entails amending the Constitution as may be \nrequired and support for the Sovereign Wealth Fund. \n \nOPINION \nThe above features of the global economy and Nigerian economy, in particular, \nprovide a basis for my opinion on monetary policy direction as to whether or not \nit should be restrictive or expansionary. The monetary policy stance is already \ntight in view of the need to rein-in monetary inflation with the monetary policy \nrate at 13.5 percent and cash reserve requirement (CRR) at 27.5 percent. The \nNigerian economy, at present, requires monetary policy (and fiscal policy) \nactions that will help the economy to avert a recession or prevent prolonged \n \n42 \n \nClassified as Confidential \ncontraction and thereafter put it on a path of strong recovery from the \ncoronavirus-induced crisis. \n• Further tightening the monetary policy by raising the MPR and CRR could \nhelp douse monetary inflation. But the major driver of headline inflation for \nsome time now is food inflation driven by limited imports and structural \nfactors including the menace of herdsmen on the farms in food \nproducing areas of the country. Also, it is doubtful if raising the MPR will \nattract capital inflows at this time that EMDEs are experiencing capital \nflows reversal, pointing to portfolio rebalancing by investors towards gold \nand cash that are considered safe assets. And the Deposit Money Banks \n(DMBs) may capitalise on an increased MPR to further raise lending rates \nand hence negating the objectives of the Loans to Deposit Ratio policy. \nFinally, at this point in time, further tightening of monetary policy may be \nviewed by stakeholders as callous. A dose of inflation and public debt \nmay have to be tolerated to prevent the economy from sinking into the \nabyss. \n• Endorsing the current monetary policy stance will not be helpful in \naddressing the daunting growth challenges. \n• In view of the threat of recession, increased unemployment and poverty, \nthe suggestive monetary policy stance is easing to complement the \ncommendable monetary interventions of the CBN already being \nimplemented under the COVID-19 environment. It can be argued that \neasing of monetary policy will increase liquidity in the economy and \nworsen inflation as well as undermine the stability of the foreign exchange \nmarket and capital inflows. However, it is to be hoped that the DMBs will \nbehave well, expand credit to the real and other critical sectors of the \neconomy at reduced interest rates in support of the current efforts to put \nthe economy on a respectable growth path. Also, the CBN will need to \nensure that nothing blocks access to its various intervention programmes. \n \n43 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nIn light of the foregoing, my opinion is to reduce the MPR from 13.5 to 12.0 \npercent but leave the other parameters at their extant levels: CRR, 27.5 percent; \nLiquidity Ratio, 30.0 percent and asymmetric corridor at +200/-500 basis points \naround the MPR. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n44 \n \nClassified as Confidential \n7. OBIORA, KINGSLEY ISITUA \nFaced with the prospects of a sharply-decelerating GDP growth \nand reality of a slowly-accelerating inflation, I voted to reduce \nthe MPR by 200 basis points from 13.5 percent to 11.5 percent \nwhile retaining the CRR at 27.5 percent, the LR at 30 percent, \nand the asymmetric corridor of +200/-500 basis points around \nthe MPR. This stance should complement the measures already \ntaken by the Bank’s Management, aimed at supporting \neconomic \nactivity, \nensuring \nbanking \nsystem \nstability, \nresuscitating livelihoods and averting a recession. \n \nThe spread of the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) continues to undermine \neconomic and social activities across the world, with many countries already \nrecording negative output growth. Output in the first quarter of 2020 in the \nUnited States, the UK, and the Euro area contracted by 5.0, 2.0 and 3.8 percent, \nrespectively. Similarly, the IMF projected that the economies of Russia, South \nAfrica, and Nigeria will be in recession with an output contraction of 5.5, 5.8, and \n3.4 percent in 2020, respectively. This is in addition to the continued disruptions to \nglobal trade, fall in oil prices, volatilities in major global stock and financial \nmarkets. After weeks of lockdowns, however, several European countries and \nthe United States have announced plans to gradually reopen their economies. \nThe timing, sequencing, and pace of these plans differ across countries, \nreflecting differences in the progress of the epidemic and national preferences. \nWhile this provides some reprieve for markets, it also comes with a likelihood that \nthere may be a rebound of the pandemic as social distancing may likely be \ncompromised. \n Being an integral part of the global community, Nigeria has not escaped some \nof the negative consequences of the COVID-19. The oil price continued to fall, \nand this has adversely affected the fiscal operations of the Federal \n \n45 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nGovernment. Consequently, the Federal Government revised its Fiscal 2020 \nbudget downwards, attributing it to the slowdown in the domestic economic \nactivities and instability in the international oil price due to the COVID-19. This \ndevelopment is compounded by continued current account deficits, exchange \nrate pressure, rising inflation, and inadequate fiscal buffers – a situation that has \nrendered the country more vulnerable to shocks. \n \nDespite these headwinds, the Nigerian economy performed better than \nexpected in the first quarter of the year. Real GDP grew by 1.87 percent in the \nfirst quarter of 2020 from 2.55 and 2.10 percent in the previous and \ncorresponding quarters of 2019. It was the slowest expansion since the third \nquarter of 2018. The oil sector recorded a real growth rate of 5.06 percent in the \nfirst quarter of 2020, indicating an increase of 6.51 percentage points relative to \nthe corresponding quarter of 2019. The non-oil sector, however, grew by 1.55 \npercent in the first quarter of 2020, slower by 0.93 percentage points from the \ncorresponding quarter of 2019. The decline in output growth reflected the \npartial impact of COVID-19 lockdown on the global economy, which disrupted \nsupply chains beginning around the end of the quarter. \nComparable emerging economies fared far worse than Nigeria in the same \nquarter. Although growth in the first quarter of 2020 represents a decline of 0.68 \npercentage point when compared with the previous quarter, this performance \nwas better when compared with other emerging economies like South Africa, \nBrazil and Mexico that contracted by 1.4, 1.5 and 1.2 percent in 2019Q4 and \n2020Q1 percent, respectively. Headline inflation inched up to 12.34 percent in \nApril 2020 from 12.26 percent in March 2020 largely driven by food component. \nAlthough inflation is already above the upper limit of the indicative benchmark \nof 6-9 percent, I believe that the recent policy measures of reducing fuel pump \n \n46 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nprice and other various interventions in boosting food supply by the Bank will in \nthe short term reverse the uptick trend in the headline. \nThe discount window operation remained active during the period under review \nreflecting the Bank’s commitment to liquidity management. The short-term \ninterest rates, however, exhibited some liquidity surfeit, as the average OBB and \ninter-bank call rates opened at 3.00 and 3.50 percent respectively, on March 25, \n2020, and closed at 14.75 and 15.50 percent respectively, on April 27, 2020. The \noverall averages for the period were 6.62 and 6.01 percent, for the OBB and \nunsecured interbank call rates, respectively. \nFinancial system indicators were encouraging, with improvements to real sector \nlending, reflecting the Bank’s Loan-to-Deposit Ratio (LDR) policy. Total gross \ncredit increased by N3.041 trillion from N15.567 trillion at end-May 2019 to \nN18.608 trillion at end-April 2020. The credit growth was largely driven by \nmanufacturing, \nconsumer \ncredit, \ngeneral \ncommerce, \ninformation \nand \ncommunication, and agriculture. The increase in credit is expected to bolster \naggregate demand, investment, and job creation. Consequently, the average \nretail lending rates of DMBs and interest rate spreads moderated in the review \nperiod. This development, I believe will have a positive impact on financial \nintermediation and the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission channels. \nHowever, there are risks and vulnerabilities in the short to medium-term, which \ninclude persisting new cases of coronavirus disease and low oil prices. \nDuring the period under review, the exchange rate experienced some upward \npressure, largely due to the decline in crude oil prices. Having allowed the naira \nto move freely to a market-determined rate, it is noteworthy that activities at the \nInvestors and Exporters Window (I&E) have been relatively stable throughout the \nsecond quarter of 2020. This is not very surprising given the depression in FX \ndemand in view of the fact that global supply chains also suffered significant \ndislocations at the same time. \n \n47 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nAlthough downside risks abound, my overall outlook for the economy is more \noptimistic than most analysts seem to portray. I believe that while the economy \nwill record significant deceleration in the second quarter of the year, a strong \nrebound could be recorded in the third, reflecting the effects of many of the \nmeasures the Central Bank is putting in place at the moment. More also, with \ngradual oil price recovery, re-openings of major economies and trading routes, \nand return to international travels, Nigeria could escape two consecutive \nquarters of negative GDP growth. \nAs we deal with the associated adversities of this disease, we must \nsystematically embrace the inherent opportunities therein. I believe that in the \nmiddle of this pandemic, lies great opportunities, and there cannot be a better \ntime to make a big push, particularly given our wide negative output gap and \nwith inflation almost reaching its plateau. Given this policy scenario of \npotentially depressing growth and broadly stable inflation, I believe the right \nthing for Monetary Policy is to support growth, and on that basis, I voted to: \n▪ Reduce the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) to 11.5 percent from 13.5 \npercent; \n▪ Retain the Cash Reserve Requirement (CRR) at 27.5 percent; \n▪ Retain the Liquidity Ratio (LR) at 30.0 percent; and \n▪ Retain the asymmetric corridor at +200/–500 basis points around the MPR. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n48 \n \nClassified as Confidential \n8. SANUSI, ALIYU RAFINDADI \n1.0 \nDecision: \nI voted for a reduction in the MPR, at today's meeting, because I believe that \ndespite the threat of inflation, monetary policy easing is the optimal response to \nan impending recession. Before the lockdown of the economy, the Bank had \nsuccessfully incentivized banks to increase lending to the productive sectors of \nthe economy. The heterodox policies of the Bank have also succeeded in \nreducing deposit and lending interest rates. These developments have, \nhowever, occurred amidst tight monetary policy stance because of the threats \nto inflation. The impending recession caused by the lockdown of the economy \nin response to the COVID-19 pandemic, however, suggests that monetary policy \nshould be accommodative when the economy reopens. Monetary policy \nshould ensure that funding is not only available when firms and households \nresume production and consumption activities, but the cost is also low enough \nfor markups to be positive as well as allow demand to keep pace with the rising \noutput. Therefore, I voted for a reduction in MPR to reduce the funding cost in \nanticipation for the opening up of the economy. \n2.0 \nBackground and Justification \n2.1 \nGlobal Economic Developments \nThe global economic shutdown due to the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in the \nfall in output and prices in most of the Advanced Economies, whose inflation \nrates are lower than their long-term targets, thereby eliciting monetary policy \neasing along with expansionary policy measures. All the EMDEs reviewed, \nhowever, the declining output was associated with rising inflation rates, but \nhave eased their monetary policy stance in addition to the fiscal stimulus. These \nresponses were ultimately aimed at not only helping businesses and households \nto cope with the impending recession, but also ensure that it is short-lived. \n \n49 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nThe global economic activities have remained subdued due to the \ncontainment measures, implemented across the world, against the spread of \nthe highly infectious coronavirus disease (COVID-19). As the Advanced and \nEmerging economies simultaneously face the unprecedented health crisis, \neconomic crises that also ensued along with declining external demand, \nincreased capital outflows and collapse in assets and commodity prices. \nConsequently, the IMF revised its 2020 growth forecast for the global economy \ndownwards from 3.3% to -3.0%. Recovery is, however, expected in 2021, with a \ngrowth rate of 5.8%, if the pandemic declines in 2020Q2 and the containment \nmeasures are reversed quickly. The IMF expects negative growth in the vast \nmajority of the Advanced and Emerging economies in 2020 except, notably, \nChina and India, which are expected to grow at the low rates of 1.2% and 1.9%, \nrespectively. Nigeria is forecasted to record negative growth of -3.4% in 2020, \nand positive growth of 2.4% in 2021. The extent of the loss in global output is \nestimated to be higher than the loss recorded during the 2008 Global Financial \nCrisis (GFC). For instance, IMF estimates that the global output loss for 2020/2021 \nwill be about US$9 trillion. The US, UK and Euro area are estimated to lose \nbetween 2.0% and 3.0% of GDP weekly during the lockdown. The JP Morgan’s \nglobal composite output index has contracted from 39.2 in March 2020 to 26.5 \nin April 2020, which is lower than the lowest it reached during the 2008 GFC. \nLatest data shows that the US, UK and the Euro area recorded negative quarter-\non-quarter output growth in 2020Q1 (-1.2%, -2.0% and -3.8% respectively). Japan \nhas, however, recorded two consecutive negative quarter-on-quarter output \ngrowth of -1.9% and -0.9% in 2019Q4 and 2020Q1, respectively. Among the \nEmerging Market and Developing Economies (EMDEs), the Chinese GDP \ncontracted (q-o-q) by -9.8% in 2020Q1 for the first time since 1992; South Africa's \noutput contracted for two consecutive quarters by -0.8% and -1.4% in 2019Q4 \nand 2020Q1 respectively. Brazil, Russia and India, however, recorded low but \npositive q-o-q growths rates of 0.6%, 1.1% and 1.5%, respectively. Although \n \n50 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nNigeria’s output in 2020Q1 has also contracted q-o-q by -14.3%, the year-on-\nyear growth was positive at 1.87%. \nThe WTO forecasted global trade volume to contract by 3.0% to 32.0% in 2020. \nGlobal trade fell by 1.5% in January 2020 due to the decline in passenger travels \nand shipping, which fell by 90%. Although global exports have started to resume, \ntheir recovery is still weak. \nWhile inflation in Advanced Economies is forecasted to decline by 0.9 \npercentage point from 1.4% recorded in 2019 to 0.5 in 2020, it is expected to \ndecline by only 0.4 percentage point in the EMDEs from 5.0% in 2019 to 4.6% in \n2020 (IMF's WEO). Also, the inflation rates in the major Advanced Economies, \nincluding the US, declined in April 2020, and are well below their long-term \ntarget of 2 per cent. The declining inflation suggests that the depressing effects \nof the COVID-19 containment measures were disproportionately greater on the \naggregate demand relative to aggregate supply in this group of countries. In \nthe EMDEs, Russia, South Africa, Kenya and Egypt recorded higher inflation rates, \nin April 2020, but are within their long-term targets. China, Ghana and Nigeria, \nhowever, had higher inflation rates that were slightly above their long-term \ntargets by 0.3, 0.6 and 3.34 percentage points, respectively. Furthermore, in \nApril, the inflation rates increased in all these EMDE countries except China. The \nrising inflation rate in the EMDEs suggests that the COVID-19 containment \nmeasures has a disproportionately greater depressing effect on the aggregate \nsupply than on aggregate demand. \nThe global oil market, having suffered an unprecedented decline in April due to \noversupply caused by COVID-19 lockdown and the late agreement reached \nbetween OPEC+ countries, has started to recover in May 2020. The dip in oil \nprices, coupled with the significant volatilities in the global financial markets that \nresulted in massive capital outflows from EMDEs, have caused significant foreign \n \n51 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nexchange market pressures. These developments have led to exchange rate \nvolatilities, especially in the oil-exporting economies. \nThe global policy responses to the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic \nwas generally accommodative. Most central banks reduced their policy rates \nand embarked on quantitative easing, while the fiscal authorities announced a \nmassive fiscal stimulus aimed at supporting business and household. For \ninstance, fiscal injection in the US (US$ 2.3 trillion from the CARES Act) is \nestimated to be about 11% of its GDP. This is in addition to the US$ 488 billion Pay \nCheque Protection Programme, the US$8.3 billion from the Corona Virus \nPreparedness and response Supplemental Appropriation Act and the US$192 \nbillion Families First Coronavirus Response Act. In general, therefore, the global \nmonetary policy response to the impending COVID19-induced recession tended \ntowards easing in both the Advanced Economies that had falling inflation rates \nand in the EMDEs that had rising inflation. Between February and April 2020, \npolicy rates were reduced in the US, UK, EU, Japan, China, Brazil, India, Egypt, \nSouth Africa, Ghana and Kenya. \n2.2 \nDomestic Economic Developments and their Implications \nData from the NBS shows that the year-on-year output growth remained positive \nat 1.87 per cent in 2020Q1 compared with the 2.55%in the preceding quarter \n2019Q4. The output growth was driven by the oil sector (5.05%), which \ncontributed 9.5% of the real GDP, and the non-oil sector (1.55%), which \ncontributed 90.5% of the real GDP during the quarter. The non-oil output was \ndriven by services, agriculture and industry. Domestic output is expected to fall \nin 2020Q2, as indicated by the Purchasing Manager's Index (PMI) for the first two \nmonths of the quarter. The Manufacturing and Non-Manufacturing PMIs, for \ninstance, fell below the break-even benchmark of 50 points in April for the first \ntime in 36 months. In May 2020, the Manufacturing PMI stood at 42.4 index \n \n52 \n \nClassified as Confidential \npoints, while that of Non-Manufacturing PMI stood at 25.3 points, indicating \ncontraction compared with 51.1 and 49.2 points, respectively, in March 2020. \nAvailable data from NBS shows that headline inflation (y-o-y) had continued an \nupward trend, which started since September 2019 when the closure of all land \nborders, along with other structural factors, increased scarcity of food and other \ncommodities supply. The inflation rate (y-o-y) has increased from 12.26% in \nMarch 2020 to 12.34% in April 2020. The increase was driven by both the food \nand core components of inflation. Food price inflation (y-o-y) rose from 14.98% in \nMarch to 15.03% in April 2020, driven by prices of farm produce and imported \nfood. Core inflation (y-o-y) rose from 9.73% in March to 9.98% in April 2020, owing \nto rise in prices of processed foods, clothing & footwear, furnishing, household \nequipment, transport and health. \nData on the monetary aggregates shows that M3, the broadest money supply, \ngrew by 2.66% in April 2020 (7.9% annualized), below its provisional benchmark \nof 13.09% for 2020. Staff reports show that the growth of M3 has consistently \nbeen below its programmed target since February 2019. Reserve Money, \nhowever, grew by 41.3% to N12.250 trillion in April 2020. This was due to the \nimplementation of the recent increase in CRR, thereby overshooting its \nprovisional target of N8.625 trillion for 20020Q2. These developments suggest that \nthe stance of monetary policy has been tightened. Available data also \nsuggests that while the deposit rates continued to decline since December \n2020, the prime lending rate has also declined slightly in March 2020. The prime \nlending rate in April 2020 stood at 14.92% compared to 15.39% in April 2019. \nThese developments in interest rates are attributable to the implementation of \nthe heterodox policies by the Bank aimed at re-directing credit to the \nproductive sector , including the LDR policy. Therefore, although monetary \npolicy has been tight, implantation of the heterodox credit policy has \nsucceeded in reducing the deposit and prime lending rates. \n \n53 \n \nClassified as Confidential \n3.0 \nThe Basis for My Policy Choice \nIn choosing the appropriate policy stance today, the key consideration for me is \nto choose a policy direction that would ensure fast recovery from the COVID19-\ninduced recession. The received wisdom in monetary policy and practice is that \nduring economic recessions, monetary authorities’ response must aim at \nproviding adequate liquidity support to firms as they seek to resume or expand \nproduction and to households to support consumption. Indeed, this is the \nstandard result in the large body of the literature on economic recessions, \nincluding the Great Depression. This explains the observed coordinated \nmonetary easing in response to the COVID19-induced economic shutdown \nacross both Advanced Economies and EMDEs. The optimal response, therefore, \nis easing the monetary policy stance to allow for access to credit at a low cost. \nWhile the N3.5 trillion targeted intervention funds earlier approved by the CBN \nwould make low-cost credit available to businesses and households, lowering \nthe MPR will be complementary towards a generalized easing as the economy \ngradually opens up. In considering my options, I am therefore convinced that \nthe best option, for now, is to reduce the MPR. \n \nConsequently, I voted to: \nReduce the MPR at 12.50 per cent; \nRetain the CRR at 27.5 per cent; \nRetain the asymmetric corridor at +200/–500 basis points; and \nRetain liquidity ratio at 30.0 per cent. \n \n \n \n \n54 \n \nClassified as Confidential \n9. SHONUBI, FOLASHODUN A. \nLike many other net exporters of oil, Nigeria currently faces the twin challenge of \na global economic contraction, induced by the Coronavirus pandemic (Covid-\n19) and a significantly dislocated global oil market. Even as lockdowns are \ncautiously eased across economies, lingering effects of the disruption to \neconomic activities is expected to cause a global economic downturn, \nestimated to be more severe than during the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. At \nthe same time, the global oil market has witnessed, historically, one of the \nbiggest negative price shocks due to unprecedented demand collapse and \nsupply glut. The new uneasy normal, plagued by suppressed global demand, \nshrinking economic activities and cautious interaction in global markets, call for \nmeasures, by all nations, to decisively deal with the health challenge, while \ntaking actions that recognize idiosyncrasies of domestic macroeconomic \nenvironments, to address manifesting economic challenges and achieve a swift \neconomic recovery. \n \nGlobal and Domestic Economic Developments \nOn account of the Covid-19 pandemic, intense disruption, initially to the \nChinese economy in the first quarter, has extended to the rest of the world over \nthe second quarter of 2020. Even as China sluggishly rebounds, widespread \nlockdown, shut-ins and supply chain disruptions in other economies, have \nheightened the odds of a global economic recession in 2020. Preliminary \nestimates by the IMF projects contraction of advanced economies at 6.1 per \ncent, emerging markets and developing economies at 1.0 per cent, and sub-\nSahara Africa at 1.6 per cent. \n \nDomestic headline inflation accelerated to a two-year high of 12.34 per cent in \nApril 2020, compared to 12.26 per cent in March 2020. Disruption to production \n \n55 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nand distribution of food, as well as, other commodities due to bottlenecks arising \nfrom restrictions aimed at reducing the spread of the pandemic, has caused \nsupply shortages and increased distribution cost, which is passed to the final \nconsumer as higher prices. Food inflation reached 15.03 per cent at end-April \n2020, the highest since May 2018. Similarly, core inflation rose further to 9.98 per \ncent in April 2020, from 9.73 per cent in the previous month. \n \nOutput growth of 1.87 per cent in the first quarter of 2020, indicated a slowdown \nin the gradual pick-up observed in 2019, and reflected a muted initial impact of \nthe Covid-19 pandemic. Data from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) \nshowed that the expansion in the GDP was driven by growth of 5.06 and 1.55 \nper cent, in the oil and non-oil sectors, respectively. Manufacturing and non-\nmanufacturing PMI, however, recorded the biggest declines in recent time, to \n42.4 and 25.3 index points, respectively, in May 2020, reflecting impact of Covid-\n19 related lockdown measures on activities in the manufacturing and non-\nmanufacturing sectors. \n \nAmidst the general lull in the business environment, the banking system \ncontinued to show enduring resilience. In terms of size, industry total asset and \ndeposit base rose further at end-April 2020, maintaining the upward trend since \nthe beginning of 2020. Though industry liquidity ratio declined to 38.4 per cent, \ndue mainly to the LDR policy, which continued to promote increased credit, the \nratio remained above the regulatory threshold of 30.0 per cent. Industry capital \nadequacy ratio moderated to 14.9 per cent, as a result of increased risk \nweighted asset, which more than offset the marginal rise in qualifying capital, \nwhile the non-performing loan ratio rose marginally to 6.6 per cent. Returns on \nasset and investment were at levels that compared favourably with levels in \nsimilar jurisdictions. \n \n \n56 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nThe Nigeria fiscal space is unarguably the worst hit by the present health and \neconomic challenge. Significantly low oil price and demand has led to \ndeclining proceeds from crude oil sales. Domestic government revenue sources \nare also drying up as a result of disruptions to economic activities. Fiscal \noperation of the Federal Government remain characterised by low revenue, \nincreasing expenditure, higher deficit, as well as, growing debt stock and \nservice. \nDevelopments in the monetary sector and financial markets largely underscored \nliquidity surfeit condition, particularly in the banking system. Money market rates \nwere generally stable at lower levels. Growth in broad money (M3), at 2.66 per \ncent, annualized to 6.38 per cent, was below the indicative benchmark for 2020, \nand reflected expansion in Net Domestic and Foreign Assets. The capital market \nhas seen resurgence of bullish trends since the beginning of the second quarter, \nas yields on government fixed income securities remained low and impressive \nfirst quarter performance of quoted companies continue to attract investors. On \naccount of reduced foreign exchange earnings, lower capital inflow and \ndeclining external reserves, the external sector is grappling with pressure in the \nexchange rate market. \n \nConsiderations and Decision \nWith contraction already recorded across most advanced economies in the first \nquarter of 2020, protracted and widespread lockdowns, beyond initially \nplanned periods, has heightened the odds of recession across various \neconomies. Even as different strategies of reopening are considered and \nunparalleled combination of fiscal and monetary measures are implemented \nworldwide, impact of any sluggish recovery across only a few economies, will \nmost certainly be weighed down by larger GDP losses in most of the other \njurisdictions. Though a challenged global economy has implications for the \nNigerian \neconomy, \ncurrent \ntrends \nin \nthe \ndomestic \nmacro-economic \n \n57 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nenvironment provide some glimpse of hope and opportunity to ward-off \ndamaging spillover, if the right actions are taken timely. \n \nSustained resilience and relative stability of the banking system at this critical \ntime provides opportunity to further support the economy to overcome \nnegative impact of the crisis. Increasing bank credit, as a result of the LDR \npolicy, is a sure way to help businesses survive extended shut-down and keep \nthe productive sector functioning. I am certain that, with the progress recorded \non CBN interventions and steady rise in bank credit to the real sector, direct and \nspillover effect of the crisis will be further muted. In addition, moderated \nrebound in the capital market and low rates in the money market will allow the \nmarkets to act as effective stabilizer and channel for efficient resource \nallocation. \n \nThe recent uptick in inflation remain a source for concern, especially in the light \nof the Bank’s primary mandate of price stability. We must, however, not lose \nsight of the more urgent need to decisively limit the impact of the current \nsituation on output, employment and overall economic well-being of Nigerians. \nInterestingly, rise in the domestic general price level has been less vigorous, vis-à-\nvis pre-crisis predictions, and therefore provides some respite. Global trend show \nthat many monetary authorities have generally embraced a loosening posture, \nto promote economic recovery, even with uptick in inflation. Moreover, below \nbenchmark growth in domestic monetary aggregates indicate some slack to \naccommodate the potential money supply increase from growth in banking \nsystem credit and CBN interventions, for stimulating economic activities without \ncompelling impact on general prices. \n \nTheoretically, fiscal policy measures and stimuli to support households and small \nbusinesses in crisis, are generally the most effective. Instructively, the trend \n \n58 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nglobally show that fiscal authorities have been playing significant role in the \nefforts to combat the pandemic and address the ensuing economic challenge. \nWhile I recognize that the fiscal space has become tighter, sizeable cost \nrationalisation and judicious use of resources will allow the authority to \neffectively play the lead role in fortifying the economy. As I mentioned in my \nearlier statements, the Federal Government need to further embrace Public-\nPrivate Partnership to overcome the challenge of resource shortfall and \nefficiently close the infrastructural gap. \n \nWe can expect that the current low price of oil will affect Government revenue \nand therefore the external reserves held by the country. For us to minimize the \nimpact, current efforts to encourage local production of goods and chemicals \nthrough the import substitution policy, and discourage unnecessary imports \nshould be intensified, in order to further reduce our import bill. \n \nI believe that despite the challenges posed by the dwindling fortunes of the \nglobal economy, the current domestic macro-economic situation provides \nopportunity for us to go through the crisis with minimal negative impact. Even as \nthe possibility of a sharp contraction in the second quarter is apparent, muted \neffect on growth in the first quarter, due to pro-active measures by the \nmonetary and fiscal authorities, further highlight a glimpse of hope. As we \ncontinue to ensure that the various measures complement each other, I am \noptimistic that sustained implementation of the interventions will further \nstrengthen the ability of the economy to effectively ward-off and minimize \nimpact of the crisis. \n \nI therefore vote to: \n• Reduce the MPR to 12.50 per cent; \n• Retain asymmetric corridor of +200/-500 basis points around the MPR \n \n59 \n \nClassified as Confidential \n• Retain Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) at 27.5 per cent; and \n• Retain Liquidity Ratio (LR) at 30.0 per cent. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n60 \n \nClassified as Confidential \n10. EMEFIELE, GODWIN I. \nGOVERNOR OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA AND CHAIRMAN, MONETARY \nPOLICY COMMITTEE \nWith the extensive macroeconomic fallout over the covid-19 pandemic, \nmedium-term global outlook has waned. Extreme and atypical measures that \nwere ubiquitously rolled out by various governments – including widespread \nlockdowns and movement restrictions – have severely decimated business \ncashflows, depressed global economic prospects, and disrupted supply chains. \nAs outlook diminish, growth forecasts have significantly been downgraded. The \npreviously expected stabilisation of global output has, accordingly, been \nrevised to reflect short-term contractions. For 2020, global growth projections by \nthe IMF was reduced from an initially expected 3.3 percent expansion to a \ncontraction of 3.0 percent. This downgrade to negative growth, due to the \neffects of the covid-19 pandemic, was unanimous across all countries and \nregions. \nFor Nigeria, near-term economic sentiment has dampened; in sync with \nweakened global prospects. The impact of the ongoing outbreak on Nigeria is \nconcurrently aggravated by the significant drop in crude oil prices and the \ncontinued capital flow volatility. Together, these are causing foreign exchange \nmarket pressures, constricting fiscal maneuverability space, and dampening \neconomic outcomes. Regardless, real output recorded a positive growth of 1.9 \npercent in 2020q1. A breakdown of this outturn indicated that the oil sector, \nwith a growth of 5.1 percent during the quarter, contributed 0.5 percentage \npoint to overall GDP growth, while non-oil sector grew by 1.6 percent and \naccounted for 1.4 percentage points. Analysis by economic activity revealed \nthat the services sector contributed 0.9 percentage point to 2020q1 output \ngrowth while agriculture and industries sectors contributed 0.5 percentage \npoint each. \n \n61 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nThis breakdown continues to highlight the importance of the non-oil sector for \nthe economy and the need to accomplish the diversification of the Nigerian \neconomy. Recent realities indicate that the economy could slowdown in the \nshort-term as businesses come to standstill following lockdowns to stem \ncoronavirus. As I noted earlier, the diminished prospect, due to global \nheadwinds and local imbalances, provides opportunity for us to reposition the \neconomy, prop domestic productivity, and strengthen domestic demand. I \nnote once again the recent efforts of the CBN to stimulate the Nigerian \neconomy and reiterate that these shall proactively continue to target high \nimpact productive sectors in order to defuse the prevailing shock. \nOn domestic prices, recent data indicated that rising inflationary trend which \nbegan in September 2019 persisted in April 2019, due to structural and supply \nfactors. Year-on-year headline inflation rose by nearly 0.1 percentage point to \nabout 12.3 percent in April 2020, reflecting quickening of both food and core \ncomponents. This is attributable, in part, to the legacy effects of the border \nprotection policy, disruptions and challenges around food production belts \n(aggravated by the pandemic-induced setback to interstate food distribution \nnetwork), and continued VAT pass-through. As the spillover effects of covid-19 \nare expected to linger in the short-term together with incessant infrastructural \ndeficits and FX market fragilities, inflation inertia is projected for much of 2020. \nGiven the trade-off between output stabilisation and price stability, I note the \nimportance of a cautiously balanced and coordinated policies by fiscal and \nmonetary authorities as the CBN sustains existing inflation curbing measures. \nAnalysis of domestic liquidity conditions for April 2020 indicated a systemic \nsurfeit as money market interest rates declined and money stock expanded. \nWeighted average inter-bank call and open-buy-back rates fell from 10.3 and \n11.8 percent, respectively, in March 2020 to 7.3 and 5.5 percent in April. \nCorrespondingly, broad money supply (M3) showed an annualised expansion of \n \n62 \n \nClassified as Confidential \n8.0 percent in vis-à-vis the targeted 13.1 percent. Monetary expansion during \nthe review period reflected the substantial 22.2 percent annualised growths in \nprivate sector credits over the 2020 benchmark of 14.9 percent. \nAgain, the observed growth in credit illustrates the continued potency of the \nBank’s LDR policy and the need to sustain credit flows to the private sector, \nespecially at this critical time when the economy needs to indefatigably \nsupport its productive machinery. I note the continued moderation of NPLs ratio \nfrom 11.0 percent in April 2019 to 6.6 percent in April 2020 amidst growing \nprivate sector credits. This underlined our continued drive to de-risk lending. I re-\necho the imperatives of enhanced credit flows to strategic and high impact \nprivate sector ventures through an effective collaboration of all stakeholders, \nespecially on the backdrop of the imminent economic downturn. \nIn my consideration, I once again acknowledge that the objective of price and \nexchange rate stability remain foremost. I note also the weakened short-term \ngrowth outlook, its apparent implications for poverty, employment and \npotential output, and the almost certain economic contraction in the 2020q2. \nAs I underscore the need to abridge the lifespan of the downturn, I am firmly \ninclined towards measures to forestall a recession or at least curtail its severity, \nshould it unavoidably occur. It is expedient, now than ever, to support a growth \nobjective without losing sight of our price stability mandate. We need to prop \ndomestic liquidity and crucially awash strategic, productive, and de-risked \nprivate sector ventures with credits. On account of the recent pandemic and \nallied global shocks, this will accentuate the ongoing efforts to diversify the \neconomy, adequately support domestic productivity, and bolster aggregate \ndemand. I promote the consolidation of tailored CBN’s measures (and \ninterventions) to support critical high-impact private sector businesses and the \nvarious stimulus packages for MSMEs. \n \n63 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nI believe that an aptly timed and measured rate cut will shorten the lifespan or \nseverity of the expected contraction without significantly undermining the \nobjective of price stability. It remains imperative to ensure that the long-run \npath of output is not depressed permanently, as this will translate to long-term \nwelfare losses with entrenched poverty and unemployment. As I advocate for \nan accommodating monetary stance, I am nonetheless of the view that the \npresent rate of CRR is adequate to counteract superfluous FX market demand. I \nequally opine that the current spate of cash-injections and the various \ninterventions are sufficient to support the ease. Hence, CRR should remain \nunchanged as we loosen via the policy rate. \nOverall, I am of the view that the global and domestic economic uncertainty \nfrom the covid-19 pandemic is momentous and needs to be curtailed \nimmediately. The outbreak has not only impacted business viability, it has also \nhighlighted the importance of public services and timeous policies. There is a \ngrim possibility that a delay to act will prolong the impending contraction and \nculminate to recession. Though inflation inertia remains in the short-term, the \nlooming output distabilisation is a bigger concern at this point in time. Without \nsignificantly undermining price stability, an aptly sized easing of policy rate \ncould truncate the lifespan of the downturn as it will support domestic \nproduction, boost demand, and importantly avert job loses. Noting that an \naggressive easing could heighten FX market pressures, I opt for a prudent rate \ncut to balance the long-run objectives of exchange rate stability, price stability \nand output stabilisation. \n \n \n \n \n64 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nTherefore, I vote to: \n1. Reduce the MPR by 100 basis points to 12.5 percent; \n2. Retain the asymmetric corridor at +200/–500 basis points; \n3. Retain the CRR at 27.5 percent; and \n4. Retain liquidity ratio at 30.0 percent. \n \nGODWIN I. EMEFIELE, CON \nGovernor \nMay 2020", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/Central Bank of Nigeria Communique No 130 of the Monetary Policy Committee of May 28, 2020, with Personal Statements of Members.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "383782fe481b247af855be23256c19a3", "text": "1\nCentral Bank of Nigeria Communiqué No. 66 of the Monetary Policy \nCommittee Meeting, November 03, 2009 \n \n \nThe Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) at its meeting today reviewed the domestic and \nexternal economic and financial developments for the year so far. The international \neconomic scene, in the Committee’s view, has turned out to be better than was projected \nabout six months ago. Developed countries that were most adversely affected by the \nsevere economic and financial crises have shown some signs of improvement in terms of \noutput. However, questions remain on the durability and sustainability of the recovery. \nThere are also concerns over the high unemployment rates in these economies, although \nthe stock and housing markets showed some evidence of picking up. The financial sector \nhas been stabilized and measures are set to closely monitor and regulate it. The prices of \nprimary commodities including crude oil have risen largely due to the fiscal and \nmonetary stimulus and on news of recovery. The rise in commodity prices however has \ngiven rise to concerns about resurgence of inflation in the near future. Emerging \ncountries on their part have registered fairly good growth rates and are poised to make \nfurther gains in 2010. The main concerns in the international economy relate to the \nrobustness of the recovery and the possibility of incipient inflationary tendencies. It is \nagainst this background that the question of timing and dimension of fiscal and monetary \ntightening is being debated. \n \nThe Committee reviewed the domestic economic developments bearing in mind the \nevolving international economic and financial situation. The review underscored the \nneed for strengthening the on-going efforts at working out economic policies with \nreference to a desirable medium term path of economic growth along with price and \nfinancial stability. Monetary policy, the Committee emphasized, has to play an active \nrole in the fulfillment of this task. \n \nIn the short run, however, the space available for monetary policy is somewhat limited by \nthe uncertainty about the sustainability and robustness of economic recovery in most \nmajor trading partner countries, the fiscal constraints largely brought about by the \n \n2\ngrowing gap between the rising expenditure demands and revenue receipts and the \noverall deceleration in domestic economic activities. The Committee noted with \nsatisfaction that there has been a gradual downward movement in inflation in recent \nmonths but observed that this has mirrored essentially the slack demand. The Committee \nalso noted that structural measures currently being undertaken to strengthen the banking \nsector and to foster financial stability would pave the way for improved effectiveness of \nmonetary policy in the short to medium term. The Committee welcomed the recent \nupward movement in the prices of crude oil in international markets and hoped that it will \nbe sustained in the near future. It considered the external payments situation to be \nmanageable. In the Committee’s view, the behavior of short term money market interest \nrates and exchange rates is in general consistent with the market fundamentals. \n \n Key Macro-economic and Financial Developments \n \nOutput and Prices: Data on real GDP growth for Quarter 3 of 2009 is not yet firm but the \nprovisional estimate of the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) is 7.58 per cent. The NBS \nreported that in Quarters I and II, output grew by 4.50 per cent and 7.22 per cent, \nrespectively. The Committee felt that on the basis of the output growth recorded thus far \nand other indicators, growth in 2009 would remain robust. \n \nThe inflation rate as measured by the year-on-year increase in ‘all items’ consumer price \nindex was 10.4 per cent in September 2009. This outcome is lower than the headline \ninflation of 15.1 per cent in December 2008 and lower than the average headline inflation \nof 12.6 per cent for the first 9 months of the year. Food inflation has been between 12.5 \nand 13.0 per cent in Q III of the year. \n \nMonetary and Financial Market Developments: Broad money (M2) at the end of \nSeptember 2009 showed an increase of 5.6 per cent on a year-on-year basis. The year-on-\nyear movement in narrow money (M1) was negative 4.2 per cent as at end-September \n2009 mainly on account of the decline in demand deposits. The trends in money supply \nmovement reflect the fall in net foreign assets and slowdown in credit to private sector. \n \n3\nThis implied that the aggregate demand is not adequate, suggesting the need for the \ncontinuation of an accommodative monetary policy. \n \nNotwithstanding the low monetary growth, money market rates, reflected market \nrealities. With the inter-bank money market guarantees in place and the measures to \nstrengthen the banking sector, confidence in the money market has improved. This is \nreflected in the downward movement in the daily unsecured call rates. The average call \nrate for September 2009 was 9.98 per cent compared with 10.38 per cent in August and \n17.64 per cent in July. The secured open buy-back (OBB) rate was 6.71 per cent for \nSeptember, 2009, a shade higher than the 6.67 per cent in August but lower than the 7.47 \nper cent in July. The spread representing the counterparty credit risk thus narrowed to \n327 basis points in September as against 365 basis points in August and 1017 basis points \nin July. In October, the call rate averaged 6.95 per cent while the average OBB rate was \n6.08 per cent, the spread being mere 87 basis points. \n \nThe Committee noted that in October excess reserves of banks with the CBN were high \nwith the average daily excess reserves exceeding the average in any of the preceding four \nmonths of the year. Some banks took recourse to standing deposit facilities with sharp \nincrease since the middle of the month. No bank accessed the standing lending facilities \nduring the same period. While this could be considered a structural phenomenon in view \nof the mid-month Federation Accounts Allocations, the sharp recourse to standing deposit \nfacility and non-use of the standing lending facility in the latter-half of the month seem to \nsuggest that there is scope to reset the rates on standing facilities so as to eliminate \nperverse incentives and encourage banks to enlarge their asset portfolios in a prudent \nmanner. \n \nStock market developments continued to be marked by caution. In October 2009, the \nyear-on-year declines in the average share price index and market capitalization were \n47.0 per cent and 42.4 per cent respectively. The declines, however, are an improvement \nover the average declines of 57.6 per cent in the share prices and 50.7 per cent in market \ncapitalization in the first nine months of the year. This may be attributable to the \n \n4\nemerging news that the financial conditions of the domestic banking sector has been \nstrengthened by the injection of funds by the CBN and the major stock markets of the \nworld have shown improved investor sentiments following reports of imminent recovery \nin the medium term. \n \nExternal Sector Developments: The foreign exchange market has been stable. The \nofficial exchange rate stood at an average of N149.3578 per US dollar in October 2009. \nThe inter-bank market rate averaged N150.1252/$US. There was thus a slight \nappreciation of the Naira during the month. The spread between the rates has continued \nto be insignificant. \n \nForeign exchange reserves stood at US$43.34 billion as at end September 2009, an \nimprovement of about US$ 1.64 billion over August, mainly owing to the receipt of the \nSDR allocation. As at October 30, 2009, foreign exchange reserves are provisionally \nestimated to be US$43.05 billion. Crude oil prices in the international markets have \nedged upward in recent weeks. If the current oil price trend is sustained and if the \nexpected recovery in both developed and emerging countries is realized, there will be \nfurther improvement in the level of foreign exchange reserves, with implications for \nliquidity and exchange rate management. The Committee will continue to ensure stable \nexchange rates determined by market forces. \n \nThe Committee’s Considerations \n \nThe Committee observed that while inflation has decelerated, it is important to recognize \nthat seasonal factors and the planned deregulation of the prices of petroleum products \npose a major risk to inflation outlook in the near to medium term. It is this context that \nheightens the criticality of the policy dilemma now being faced by the Central Bank of \nNigeria (CBN). Providing further impetus to the current accommodative monetary policy \ncould be inflationary in the short to medium term whereas the gap between the likely \noutput growth and the trend rate of growth as well as the fragility of economic recovery \nin many of the systemically important countries point to the need for maintaining \n \n5\nmonetary accommodation along with reasonable fiscal stimulus. The Committee also \nnoted the existing paradox of the co-existence of system-wide liquidity shortages as \nreflected in the data on monetary and credit aggregates and abundant liquidity with some \nbanks as evidenced from the data on standing facilities. The CBN, in the light of these \nconsiderations, has to take a balanced view of the measures required for fostering growth \nprospects and containing inflationary pressures on a sustained basis and also to further \nstrengthen the liquidity management. \n \nDecisions \n \nIn the light of the above, the Committee took the following decisions: \n \n1. The Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) will remain unchanged at 6 per cent, but an \nasymmetric corridor of interest rates around the MPR is introduced. The rate on \nthe standing lending facility will remain at 200 basis points above the MPR, while \nthe rate on the standing deposit facility will be 400 basis points below the MPR. \n \n2. There will be quantitative easing to bridge the gap currently estimated at about \nN500 billion between the levels of the current monetary aggregates and the \nbenchmark levels for 2009. The modalities for quantitative easing include \ninvestments in bonds to be issued by Asset Management Company (AMC). The \nsetting up of AMC, however, is subject to the approval of the National Assembly. \nOther modalities include the redemption of promissory notes issued by the \nFederal Ministry of Finance as well as by the CBN in connection with the \nretirement of debt and liabilities arising from purchase and assumption of failed \nbanks. \n \n3. Purchase of loans by banks under the AMC will be based on terms aimed at \nstrengthening the balance sheets with a focus on asset quality, improving liquidity \nand capital adequacy as well as on reducing debt overhang relating to the stock \nmarket in order to stimulate activity in the capital market. \n \n \n6\n4. With effect from November 16, 2009, the temporary ban placed by the CBN on \nthe use of Bankers’ Acceptances (BAs) and Commercial Papers (CPs) will be \nlifted. Guidelines will be issued by the CBN prior to that date. \n \n5. In view of the fact that the audit of banks have been concluded and adequate \nprovisions have been made for non-performing loans and to stimulate credit \ngrowth and strengthen banks’ balance sheets, the 1 per cent general provision on \nperforming loans contained in the existing prudential guidelines is hereby waived \nfor the year 2009 as a countercyclical measure. New prudential guidelines will be \nissued before the end of Q1 2010. \n \nThe totality of these measures is aimed at improving system liquidity and financial \nstability to regenerate confidence in the Nigerian markets and to further stimulate growth. \nThe MPC is conscious of the upside risks as a result of quantitative easing but holds the \nview that progress in the execution of capital projects and favourable outlook on \nagricultural output growth will moderate the upside risks. The priority, therefore, is to \nstimulate growth in output and to ensure financial stability with a view to improving the \neffectiveness of monetary policy. \n \nSanusi Lamido Sanusi \nGovernor, \nCentral Bank of Nigeria \nAbuja \n \nNovember 3, 2009", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/MPC_Communique_for_the_meeting_of_November_0311 2009.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "384633f403232b33e05180b8fc90ceed", "text": "Table B.1.1:\nSummary of\nFederal\nGovernment\nFinances (N'\nMillion)\nItem\n1981\n1982\n1983\nTotal\nFederally\nCollected\nRevenue\n13290.5\n11433.7\n10508.7\nOil Revenue\n8564.4\n7814.9\n7253\nNon- Oil\nRevenue\n4726.1000000000004 3618.8\n3255.7\nFederation\nAccount\n10182.799999999999 9884.9\n9798.6\nFed Govt\nRetained\nRevenue\n7511.6\n5819.1\n6272\nTotal\nExpenditure\n11413.7\n11923.2\n9636.5\nRecurrent\nExpenditure1\n4846.7\n5506\n4750.8\nCapital\nExpenditure2\n6567\n6417.2\n4885.7\nCurrent\nSurplus(+)/\nDeficit(-)\n2664.9\n313.10000000000002\n1521.2\n% of GDP\n5.5962180326361004 0.63807742848478732 2.864385326\nOverall\nSurplus(+)/\nDeficit(-)\n-3902.1000000000004 -6104.1\n-3364.5\n% of GDP\n-8.194304621242571\n-12.439758643289652 -6.33527769\nNominal\nGDP\n47619.66\n49069.279999999999\n53107.38\nFinancing:\n3902.1000000000004 6104.1\n3364.5\nForeign (net) 464.4\n263.5\n1106.900000\nDomestic\n(net)\n4200.8\n3402\n7057\nBanking\nSystem (net)\nof which:\n3018\n3989.2\n5296.3\nCBN\n3624.1\n2989.2\n3271.2\nDeposit\nMoney Banks\n-\n-\n-\nNon Bank\nPublic\n1182.8\n412.8\n1760.7\nOther\nFunds3\n-763.1\n2438.6\n-4799.39999\nSources:\nFederal\nMinistry of\nFinance &\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nNotes:\n1Includes\ninterest\npayments on\ndebt service,\nother\ntransfers and\nextra-\nbudgetary\nitems\n2Includes\ncapital\nrepayments\non debt\nservice,\nother\ntransfers and\nnet lending\n3Includes\nPublic,\nSpecial and\nTrust Funds,\nTreasury\nClearance\nFunds,\nexcess\nreserves, etc\nMinus (-)\ndenotes\nincrease;\nPlus (+)\ndenotes\ndecrease\n4Revised\n5Provisional\nTable B.1.2:\nFederal\nGovernment\nRecurrent\nExpenditure (N'\nMillion)\nFunction\n1981\n1982\n1983\nAdministration 914.91105020318321 1039.3670419911953 896.808017\n1. General\nadministration\n914.91105020318321 1039.3670419911953 896.808017\n2. Defence\n-\n-\n-\n3. Internal\nSecurity\n-\n-\n-\n4. National\nAssembly\n-\n-\n-\nSocial and\nCommunity\nServices\n294.7465430635512\n334.8411220228017\n288.914493\n5. Education\n165.42735212777967 187.93055085224069 162.154097\n6. Health\n84.457536121458403 95.946353990292366 82.7864036\n7. Other social\nand community\nservices\n44.861654814313127 50.964217180268655 43.9739925\nEconomic\nServices\n175.65115913195615 199.54510949317077 172.175609\n8. Agriculture\n13.027660430071114 14.799822214696919 12.7698865\n9. Construction 96.66455652443841\n109.81390393949656 94.7518879\n10. Transport &\nCommunication\n32.415281070098203 36.824754486962412 31.7738909\n11. Other\neconomic\nservices\n33.543661107348456 38.1066288520149\n32.8799441\nTransfers\n3461.3912476013093 3932.2467264928323 3392.90187\n12. Public debt\nservicing\n1027.4071205835871 1167.1660317191556 1007.07816\n13. Pensions\nand gratuities\n210.39158694547916 239.0113020656959\n206.228640\n14.\nContingencies/\nsubventions\n8.7193002878428718 9.9053928208601416 8.54677446\n15. Other/\nOther CFR\ncharges\n2214.8732397844001 2516.1639998871206 2171.04829\nTOTAL3\n4846.7\n5506\n4750.8\nSources:\nFederal\nRepublic of\nNigeria Official\nGazettes and\nthe various\nstates' official\nGazettes\nNote:\n3Excludes\ninterest\npayments on\ndebt service,\nother transfers\nand extra-\nbudgetary\nitems\nTable B.1.3:\nFederal\nGovernment\nCapital\nExpenditure\n(N' Million)\nAdmin-\n% of\nEconomic\nYear\nistration\nTotal\nServices\n1981\n720.1\n10.96543322673976\n3629.4\n1982\n385.4\n6.0057345882939597 2542.5\n1983\n1098.2\n22.477843502466381 2290.69999999\n1984\n262.7\n6.4071608009560732 656.3\n1985\n459.6\n8.4103427452559156 892.7\n1986\n264.8\n3.105502650466764\n1099.90000000\n1987\n1816.2\n28.500588466065125 2159.69999999\n1988\n1898.6\n22.764715051378285 2128.69999999\n1989\n2617.5\n17.410420311159296 3926.3\n1990\n2919.9\n12.141663132157381 3485.7\n1991\n3345\n11.8027303296649\n3145\n1992\n5118.5\n12.872422560501768 2336.69999999\n1993\n8081.7\n14.82831759685001\n18344.7\n1994\n8785.1\n12.387634785379795 27102.7999999\n1995\n13337.8\n11.010390603137074 43149.2\n1996\n14863.6\n6.9806313264260913 117829.1\n1997\n49549\n18.375185470738735 169613.1\n1998\n35270.400000000001 11.413792701727681 200861.9\n1999\n42737.2\n8.5812914786248786 323580.799999\n2000\n53279.5\n22.250699412697966 111508.6\n2001\n49254.9\n11.227557092431784 259757.8\n2002\n73577.399999999994 22.894341587058982 215333.4\n2003\n87958.9\n36.393528358633823 97982.1\n2004\n137765.85\n39.221594306049816 167721.799999\n2005\n171574.13523020002 33.028689862783224 265034.672880\n2006\n185224.25081580001 33.53168217137371\n262207.292574\n2007\n226974.40434701598 29.893325505454392 358375.646608\n2008\n287103.5850780037\n29.878920084409621 504286.873618\n2009\n315880\n27.40111034004164\n506010\n2010\n264554.18840399996 29.931346153948812 412245.207159\n2011\n232600\n25.323897659227001 386500\n2012 1\n190500\n21.776406035665293 321000\nSources:\nFederal\nMinistry of\nFinance,\nOffice of the\nAccountant-\nGeneral of\nthe\nFederation\nNote:\n1Provisional\nFor 2012,\nthis\nincludes\nN874.76b\nof\nbudgetary\ncapital\nexpenditure\nand\nN137.56b\nof transfers\nTable B.1.4:\nFederal\nGovernment's\nDomestic\nDebt\nOutstanding\n(N' Million)\nYear\nTreasury\nFGN\nTreasury\nBills\nBonds1\nCertificates/\nPromissory No\n1981\n5782\n…\n2057.6\n1982\n9782\n…\n1668.6\n1983\n13476\n…\n4894.3999999\n1984\n15476\n…\n6413.1\n1985\n16976\n…\n6654.1\n1986\n16976\n…\n6654.7\n1987\n25226\n…\n6654.1\n1988\n35476\n…\n6794.6\n1989\n24126\n…\n6944.6\n1990\n25476\n…\n34214.6\n1991\n57763.1\n…\n34214.6\n1992\n119752.8\n…\n35241.4\n1993\n116380.7\n…\n36584.300000\n1994\n170925.9\n…\n37342.699999\n1995\n276905.2\n…\n23596.3\n1996\n179628\n…\n…\n1997\n364523.5\n…\n…\n1998\n378530.1\n…\n…\n1999\n361758.4\n…\n…\n2000\n465535.7\n…\n…\n2001\n584535.80000000005 …\n…\n2002\n733762.5\n…\n…\n2003\n825050\n72560\n…\n2004\n871577\n72560\n…\n2005\n854828.4\n250830\n…\n2006\n1667689.1\n643940\n…\n2007\n2533265.2999999998 1186160\n…\n2008\n471929.42800000001 1445599.5819999999 …\n2009\n797482.446\n1974926.57\n63030\n2010\n1277100\n2901600\n…\n2011\n1727910\n3541200\n…\n2012\n2122926.9569999999 4080048.8479999998\nSource:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nand Debt\nManagement\nOffice\nNotes:\n1Issuance of\nFGN Bonds\ncommenced\nin 2003.\n22009 figure\nis Promissory\nNote while\nthe rest are\nTreasury\nCertificates.\n\"…\" Indicates\n\"Not\nAvailable\"\nTable B1.5:\nHoldings of\nFederal\nGovernment's\nDomestic\nDebt\nOutstanding\n(N' Million)\nYear\nCBN\nCommercial Banks\nMerchant Bank\n1981\n4523.6000000000004 1773.9\n69.400000000\n1982\n6488.9\n2818.6\n174.7\n1983\n10402.200000000001 5140.3999999999996 385.5\n1984\n9531.7000000000007 8726.1\n894\n1985\n9905.5\n10254.9\n1133.9000000\n1986\n16103.3\n4422\n148.19999999\n1987\n17646.900000000001 7572.7\n285.39999999\n1988\n26636\n7309.6\n167.9\n1989\n15647.7\n3614\n84.6\n1990\n27380.799999999999 8702.4\n362.1\n1991\n62294.3\n6813.5\n673\n1992\n138769.60000000001 5535.1\n693.3\n1993\n202434.7\n29535.4\n9344\n1994\n308440.81349961\n38901.1\n8371\n1995\n414285.93392921\n20539.8\n1755.8\n1996\n312804.26257656998 47243.3\n8821.9\n1997\n403301.54926672002 39402.199999999997 5697.9\n1998\n454910.50820316997 48795.3\n8879.7000000\n1999\n530420.82642499998 188165.5\n13325.3\n2000\n511445.78956614999 277345.7\n14711.1\n2001\n738585.36609865993 202966.2\n…\n2002\n532453.19999999995 461357\n…\n2003\n592234.1\n371370.4\n…\n2004\n441590\n605185.1\n…\n2005\n188298.9\n613285.19999999995 …\n2006\n652493.09897227993 972689.1\n…\n2007\n97038.493432179996 1958335.8865813201 …\n2008\n289370\n1482160\n0\n2009\n323180\n1274580\n284720\n2010\n343140\n2605010\n144370\n2011\n348000\n3790800\n147200\n2012\n398268.27514500002 3580423.5738000004 160318.87385\nSource:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nand Debt\nManagement\nOffice\nNote: 1 2008\nto 2012\nfigures are\nSinking Fund\nwhile the\nrest are\nMerchant\nBanks\n\"…\" Indicates\n\"Not\nAvailable\"\nTable B.1.6:\nNigeria's\nExternal\nDebt\nOutstanding\n(N' Million)\nYears\nMultilateral\nParis Club\nLondon\nClub\n1981\n179.6\n1975.9\n0\n1982\n530.4\n5474.4\n1981.7\n1983\n566.4\n6002.2\n2758.8\n1984\n1271.2\n6360.4\n5443.7\n1985\n1293.5\n7726.4\n6164.3\n1986\n4670.7\n21725.3\n8444.70000000\n1987\n8781.5\n63205.599999999999 6766.5\n1988\n9991.7999999999993 75445.3\n14986.1\n1989\n21473.599999999999 121229.6\n42840\n1990\n34606.300000000003 154550.6\n53431.8\n1991\n39458.300000000003 173051.2\n58238.1\n1992\n89274.3\n324729.90000000002 41890.6\n1993\n81456.3\n400380.9\n45323.8\n1994\n97056.6\n404212.6\n45367.9\n1995\n97042\n476731.2\n44990\n1996\n102630\n420002\n44946\n1997\n96199\n417568.8\n44946\n1998\n93214\n458257.8\n44946\n1999\n361194.9\n1885664.8\n187627.1\n2000\n379043\n2320269\n223832.6\n2001\n313504.7\n2475509.4\n228950.2\n2002\n375700.1\n3220823.5\n182964.5\n2003\n413877.7\n3737279.9\n196156.9\n2004\n384248.7\n4196844.5999999996 196155.5\n2005\n330654.40000000002 2028580.1\n189768.4\n2006\n332219.2\n0\n0\n2007\n363448.79087999999 0\n0\n2008\n464557.84560000006 0\n0\n2009\n524204.60580000008 0\n0\n2010\n635447.72160000005 0\n0\n2011\n723122.96840000001 0\n0\n2012\n727322.43030000001\nSources:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria and\nDebt\nManagement\nOffice\nTable B.2.1:\nSummary of\nState\nGovernments'\nand Federal\nCapital\nTerritory\nFinances (N'\nMillion)\n1981\n1982\n1983\nTotal\nRevenue\n4874.8\n4561.5\n4329.399999\n(i)\nFederation\nAccount1\n3825.6\n3245.7\n2958.5\n(ii) Value\nAdded Tax\n-\n-\n-\n(iii) Internal\nRevenue\n142.6\n74.900000000000006 38\n(iv) Grants &\nOthers\n906.6\n1240.9000000000001 1332.9\n(v)\nStabilization\nFunds\nReceipts\n-\n-\n-\n(vi) Others\nRecurrent\nExpenditure\n4611\n4733.8999999999996 5262.1\nCurrent\nSurplus (+)/\nDeficit (-)\n263.8\n-172.4\n-932.7\nCapital\nExpenditure\n6379.9\n5946.6\n5828.8\nExtra-\nbudgetary\nExpenditure6\nTotal\nExpenditure\n10990.9\n10680.5\n11090.9\nOverall\nSurplus (+)/\nDeficit (-)\n-6116.0999999999995 -6119\n-6761.5\nFinancing\n6116.1\n6119\n6761.5\n(a) Internal\nLoans2\n558.9\n546.79999999999995 -737\n(b) External\nLoans\n1167.4000000000001 1331.2\n1652.8\n(c) Opening\nCash Balance\n-\n-\n-\n(d) Other\nFunds3\n4389.8\n4241\n5845.7\nSources:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria/\nOffices of the\nAccountant\nGeneral of\nthe States\nand Federal\nCapital\nTerritory\n(FCT)\nNote: F.C.T.\nfinances are\nincluded as\nfrom 1990\n1Statutory\nAllocations\n(Gross)\n2Internal\nLoans\ninclude\nCapital\nReceipts for\n1986-1989\n3Positive\n(+) sign\nconnotes\ndecrease\nwhile\nnegative (-)\nsign connotes\nincrease in\nOther Funds\n4Revised\n5Provisional\n6 Includes\ncontribution\nto external\ndebt fund\nand other\ndeductions at\nsource\n\"-\" Indicates\n\"Not\nAvailable\"\nTable B.3.1:\nSummary of\nLocal\nGovernments'\nFinances (N'\nMillion)\n1993\n1994\n1995\nCURRENT\nREVENUE\n19874.5\n19223.100000000002 24412.7\n(i) Federation\nAccount3\n18316.400000000001 17321.3\n17875.5\n(ii) State\nAllocation\n253.1\n466.4\n625.4\n(iii) Value\nAdded Tax\n0\n0\n3558.1\n(iv) Internally\nGenerated\nRevenue\n1035.5999999999999 1205.9000000000001 2110.80000\n(v) Grants &\nOthers4\n269.39999999999998 229.5\n242.9\nRECURRENT\nEXPENDITURE\n13966.5\n14884.2\n16317.2\nCurrent\nSurplus(+)/\nDeficit(-)\n5908\n4338.9000000000015 8095.5\nCAPITAL\nEXPENDITURE\n5508.8\n4082.9\n6126.1\nTOTAL\nEXPENDITURE\n19475.3\n18967.100000000002 22443.3000\nOverall\nSurplus(+)/\nDeficit(-)\n399.20000000000073 256\n1969.39999\nFINANCING\n-399.20000000000073 -256\n-1969.3999\n(a) Loans\n39.9\n71.5\n50.5\n(b) Opening\nCash Balance\n-\n-\n-\n(c) Other\nFunds5\n-439.1000000000007\n-327.49999999999636 -2019.9\nSource:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nNotes: Local\nGovernment\nSurvey\ncommenced in\n1993\n1Revised\n2Provisional\n3Made up of\nGross\nStatutory\nAllocation,\nExchange\nGain, Share of\nExcess Crude,\nFGN refund to\nLocal\nGovernments\nand\nAugmentation\n4Include\nStabilization\nFund and Gen.\nEcology\n5Positive (+)\nsign connotes\ndecrease while\nnegative (-)\nsign connotes\nincrease in\n'Other Funds'.\nTable B3.2\nLocal\nGovernments\nTotal\nOutstanding\nDebts1\nState\nNo\nof\nLGs\n2007\n2008\n2009\nAbia\n17\n152129880.54000002 55761371.349685714 27184252\nAdamawa\n21\n1571624000\n64406475.125364378 15679516\nAkwa Ibom\n31\n24200000\n12399019.283784235 30344301\nAnambra\n21\n1441285571\n21691436.082418371 41070000\nBauchi\n20\n1348314695.49\n78164179.697969943 15676688\nBayelsa\n8\n149910000\n3296457.3016185616 10321000\nBenue\n23\n1044821586.76\n28811426.437935423 11133234\nBorno\n27\n833942152.96000004 3985728.760421792\n90535555\nCross River\n18\n638301557.90999985 35049974.937046394 60834044\nDelta\n25\n1557724238.51\n80836144.407208189 29875288\nEbonyi\n13\n22644250.850000001 9737394.2876690608 70793675\nEdo\n18\n292408591.36000001 50450176.421426252 13522350\nEkiti\n16\n492950990\n1665619335.9326885 16580503\nEnugu\n17\n598457160\n24996056.081544518 12402100\nGombe\n11\n90277350.589999989 15897517.909805905 11002084\nImo\n27\n281331303\n30423237.177467413 11111434\nJigawa\n27\n436996625.02999997 4983437.0705266669 45804352\nKaduna\n23\n245541100\n43889536.318227254 88083911\nKano\n44\n2380799295.3599997 95759560.120738104 19205677\nKatsina\n34\n27614417.919999998 10446980.387684396 16306112\nKebbi\n21\n235249182\n30035941.241398703 34831286\nKogi\n21\n819025596.97000003 19270311.182367235 22104049\nKwara\n16\n1193574573.5800002 16403036.467884939 83945156\nLagos\n20\n257096570.98000002 16568802.782770744 13803308\nNassarawa\n13\n819594856.72000003 9734883.9342366643 94254917\nNiger\n25\n377575959.52000004 7200418.4252301361 30444532\nOgun\n20\n0\n15178834.452753296 49678967\nOndo\n18\n427201291.25\n23136872.226906329 46065481\nOsun\n30\n75710261.219999999 977858.31807278958 40560166\nOyo\n33\n557656130\n198752494.42217597 21764696\nPlateau\n17\n1026388200.92\n24401018.568936992 25492571\nRivers\n23\n1303877990.6500001 4782187.5225900952 54287827\nSokoto\n23\n277926360\n33520653.316295564 88690832\nTaraba\n16\n3196446950\n59338386.033132873 13305781\nYobe\n17\n42802020\n56266327.897133395 71751044\nZamfara\n14\n581733966.81999993 14597687.894868024 23217272\nFct\n6\n540641890.75\n39354542.969716713 14424713\nTotal\n774 25363776568.66\n2906125702.7477007 63745916\nSource:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nAnnual\nSurvey\nNote:\n1Provisional", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/Annual_Reports/2012 Statistical Bulletin Public Finance Statistics.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "d157fde757419efae481d4b06b0a0b58", "text": "1 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCentral Bank of Nigeria Communiqué No. 98 of the \nMonetary Policy Committee Meeting of Monday 24th \nand Tuesday 25th November, 2014 \n \nThe Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) met on November 24th and \n25th 2014 against the backdrop of moderate but uneven growth in \nthe global economy and build up of vulnerabilities in the domestic \neconomy. In attendance were all 11 members, following the \nexpiration of the tenure of Dr. Kingsley C. Moghalu as a Deputy \nGovernor of the Bank on 5th November 2014. The Committee \nreviewed key developments in the global and domestic economies \nduring the first ten months of 2014 and assessed the short-to-medium \nterm risks to price and financial stability as well as the outlook for the \nrest of the year up to the first half of 2015. \n \n \n2 \n \nInternational Economic Developments \nThe global economic space continued to be dominated by strong \ndownside risks to growth, including the softening commodity prices, \nrising geo-political tensions, and heightening threats to financial \nmarkets in the emerging and frontier economies in the aftermath of \nthe termination of Quantitative Easing by the US Federal Reserve at \nthe end of October 2014. Developments in the international oil \nmarket have intensified the risks and vulnerabilities faced by oil \nexporting countries in the wake of a new episode of falling oil prices. \nThe uncertainty is complicated by the absence of clear signals on \nhow far and how long this episode would last. While the revenue \nimpact of falling oil prices was severest on the oil exporting countries, \nit was largely positive on the oil importing countries led by the United \nStates, which has also emerged as a major oil exporter. \nWith considerable divergence across regions, global growth picked \nup in the second half of 2014 at a lower than predicted pace. In \nview of the perceived vulnerabilities and associated risks, the \nInternational Monetary Fund (IMF) has recently downgraded its \nglobal growth forecast for 2015 to 3.3 per cent from an earlier \nprojection of 3.7 per cent. The expected tepid performance in 2015 \n3 \n \nreflects the impact of the strong headwinds arising from the \nnegative spillover effects of the unwinding of the US monetary \nstimulus, deteriorating geo-political tensions in many regions, \nuncertainty about the direction of the US-led economic sanctions on \nRussia; a development which in combination with the shale oil \nrevolution has created a glut in the oil market at below long run \nprice trends, unsustainable fiscal stance and absence of fiscal \nbuffers in a number of countries and declining aggregate demand \nin others. These risks were, however, moderated by the expansionary \nmonetary stimulus of the European Central Bank and the Bank of \nJapan which has led to increased consumption, particularly in the \nwake of falling oil prices. \nGrowth in the advanced economies is projected at 1.8 per cent in \n2014 compared with 1.2 and 1.4 per cent in 2012 and 2013, \nrespectively. The US is estimated to grow at 2.2 per cent in 2014, \ndriven by strong private consumption, export growth, and \ncontraction in imports. A stronger dollar, softening global growth, \nand sharp financial market correction could, however, undermine \nconfidence and favorable terms of trade. In addition, the growth \ncould be met by rising wage demands, obviating the Federal \n4 \n \nReserve’s early normalization of monetary policy with negative \nimpact on global interest rates. \n \nIn the United Kingdom, at 3.2 per cent in 2014, output has remained \nabove its long run average compared with 0.3 and 1.7 per cent in \n2012 and 2013, respectively. The Euro area performance, however, \nseem to be at variance with the trend in other key advanced \neconomies. Fundamental fiscal headwinds, high unemployment, \nand weak bank lending extended into Q3 of 2014, reflecting largely \nthe failure of its comprehensive assessment program designed to \nreduce financial fragmentation. The Committee observed that the \nmonetary stimulus of the ECB has neither stimulated aggregate \ndemand nor restored growth to a sustainable long run path as the \nprospects of a deepening recession looms large. A key for the ECB is \nthat decoupling the euro zone from the US monetary conditions \nwould create its own shocks but the impact would be even more \nsevere when the Federal Reserve commences monetary policy \nnormalization. An uptick in global demand, a weakening euro and \nthe ECB’s monetary stimulus could create a benign environment for \ngrowth. The depth of the slowdown, however, suggests that the ECB \n5 \n \nmay need to implement full quantitative easing to return the Euro \narea to its long run growth path. \n \nThe emerging markets and frontier economies remain constrained \nby \nlimited \nmacroeconomic \nspace \nto \nimplement \ndemand-\nenhancing monetary stimuli. A retrenchment of portfolio flows has \nalready begun following the end of Quantitative Easing by the \nFederal Reserve, thus scaling up exchange rate pressures. Thus, \ngrowth has been revised downwards to 4.4 per cent in 2014 with \nChina facing its lowest growth of 7.4 per cent since 1990 due to the \ncooling of its property market. The divergence in the monetary \npolicy stance of the US, China, and Japan has further heightened \nrisk in most emerging economies, elevating financial market fragility \nand currency risk in the balance sheet of banks and corporate \nbodies. \n \nIn Sub-Saharan Africa, growth was revised downwards to 5.1 per \ncent in 2014 from the earlier projection of 5.4 per cent to reflect the \nongoing sluggish global growth and declining commodity prices. In \naddition, political crisis, infrastructural challenges, and of late the \n6 \n \nEbola outbreak in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone have moderated \nearlier robust growth outlook. The key risks remain declining \naggregate demand, falling commodity prices, delayed recovery \nand potential intensification of the euro zone financial stress, sharp \nadjustment in the bonds and equities markets in the US, and muted \ngrowth in China. \n \nDomestic Economic and Financial Developments \nOutput \nAvailable data from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) has \nindicated that the domestic economy remains strong and resilient in \nthe face of strong global headwinds. Nevertheless, key vulnerabilities \nare emerging. Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was estimated at \n6.23 per cent for the third quarter of 2014. Although lower than the \n6.54 per cent in the preceding quarter, it was higher than the 5.2 per \ncent achieved in the corresponding period of 2013. The non-oil \nsector remained the major driver of growth recording 7.5 per cent in \ncontrast to the oil sector, which contracted by 3.6 per cent. Overall, \noutput is projected to grow at about 7.0 per cent in 2014, compared \nwith the 4.2 and 5.5 per cent, recorded in 2012 and 2013, \n7 \n \nrespectively. The Committee noted that the robust expansion in \ndomestic output in the third quarter of 2014 against the tepid growth \nin the global economy was anchored by the improved performance \nin services, agriculture, trade, and industry. \n \nThe \nCommittee \nwelcomed \nthe \nimpressive \noutput \ngrowth \nperformance but cautioned that the continuing insurgency in the \nNorth East of Nigeria in combination with other risks could adversely \naffect the growth outlook. The Committee noted with concern the \ncontinued decline in the contribution of the oil sector to growth and \nurged the political authorities for the speedy passage of the \nPetroleum Industry Bill to halt the trend. The Committee \ncommended government’s efforts to sustain the tempo of the power \nsector reforms, especially the amortization of the legacy debt owed \nto major stakeholders in the power value chain and enjoined the \npolitical authorities to fast track the implementation of other \ncomplementary measures that would improve power generation \nand distribution. \n \n \n8 \n \nEmployment \nThe November 2014 national unemployment survey by the National \nBureau of Statistics (NBS) revealed that a total of 349,343 new jobs \nwere created in Q3 of 2014 compared with 259,353 jobs in the \npreceding quarter. The Central Bank of Nigeria’s development \ninitiative under the N200 billion Commercial Agriculture Credit \nScheme (CACS) has created 166,790 jobs since inception in \nSeptember 2009. The Committee noted with satisfaction that the \nreforms in the power sector and other complementary policies if \nfollowed through; would promote investment and create the \nneeded jobs for inclusive growth and development. \n \nPrices \nInflationary pressure moderated across the three measures of \ninflation during the review period. Consequently, headline inflation \n(year-on-year) declined further to 8.5, 8.3 and 8.1 per cent in August, \nSeptember and October, respectively. Core and food inflation \ndecelerated from 6.28 and 9.68 to 6.25 and 9.34 per cent in \nSeptember and October, respectively. \n \n9 \n \nThe deceleration in food inflation was traced to the decrease in the \nprices of both processed foods (from 4.4 to 4.3 per cent) and farm \nproduce (from 5.3 to 5.0 per cent). The Committee noted with \nsatisfaction that all the measures of inflation were within single digit. \nThe Committee, however, recognized the upside risks to inflation in \nthe near-term to include increased spending in the build up to the \n2015 general elections, depreciated exchange rate arising from the \nfalling oil prices accompanied by external reserves depletion, and \nfood supply shocks arising from the increased insurgency activities in \nthe major agricultural belts of the country. The Committee was \nsatisfied, as indicated by Staff forecasts that headline inflation would \nremain well anchored at single digit within the band at year-end if \nthe necessary macroeconomic policy actions were taken. \n \nMonetary, Credit and Financial Markets’ Developments \nBroad money supply (M2) grew by 4.17 per cent in October 2014 \nover the level at end-December, 2013, which annualized to 5.01 per \ncent. The annualized growth rate reflects an improvement over the \ndecline of 6.16 per cent achieved in the corresponding period of \n2013 but lower than the growth benchmark of 15.02 per cent for \n10 \n \n2014. Net domestic credit grew by 9.09 per cent in October relative \nto the end-December 2013 level. On annualized basis, net domestic \ncredit rose by 10.91 per cent compared with the benchmark level of \n28.5 per cent for 2014. The sluggish growth in broad money was \nlargely due to Net Foreign Assets, which contracted by 18.74 per \ncent in October 2014. The tapered growth in money supply also \nhelped in moderating inflationary pressures. \n \nInterest rates in all segments of the money market showed further \nmoderation between September and October 2014, reflecting \npersisting liquidity surfeit in the banking system. Average interbank \ncall rate moderated from 10.96 to 10.81 per cent while the \ncollaterised Open Buy Back (OBB) rate moderated from 10.76 to \n10.48 per cent during the period. Both rates hovered around the \nlower band of the MPR during the period. The Committee, however, \nnoted that the structure of rates at the retail end of the credit market \ndid not significantly reflect banking system liquidity conditions as \nboth the prime and maximum lending rates remained largely \nelevated. The maximum lending rate declined marginally from 25.77 \nto 25.75 per cent between September and October while the prime \n11 \n \nlending rate on the other hand increased from 16.44 to 16.48 per \ncent. The high interest rates notwithstanding, credit to private sector \nrose by 7.75 per cent during the period. To improve the efficiency of \nmonetary policy, the Committee, urged the Bank to ensure that \ncredit levels reflected liquidity conditions in the banking system. \n \nThe bearish conditions in the capital market continued as the \nequities market indicators trended downwards in the review period. \nThe All-Share Index (ASI) declined by 17.9 per cent from 41,329.19 to \n33,962.18 between December 31, 2013 and November 21, 2014. \nAlso, Market Capitalization (MC) decreased by 15.0 per cent from \n₦13.23 trillion to ₦11.24 trillion during the same period. The decline in \nequities market performance was largely due to increased capital \noutflows, as some foreign investors sold off, amidst concerns over \ncurrency depreciation in the face of the steady declines in external \nreserves and international crude oil prices. \nExternal Sector Developments \nDevelopments in the external sector since September 2014, \nmanifested in a buildup of pressures in the foreign exchange market. \nWhile the Bank sustained its efforts to maintain the stability of the \n12 \n \nnaira exchange rate at the rDAS window, a considerable degree of \nweakening was recorded at both the interbank and Bureau de \nChange (BDCs) segments. \n \nThe exchange rate at the rDAS window during the review period \nopened at ₦157.31/US$ and closed at ₦157.32/US$, reflecting a \nmarginal depreciation of ₦0.01. To maintain and stabilize the \nexchange rate at that level, gross official reserves declined from \nUS$40.7 billion on 17th September, 2014 to $36.75 billion at end-\nOctober 2014. From year to date, substantial currency depreciation \nhas occurred in comparator oil exporting countries but the naira has \ndepreciated by only 1.74 per cent. \n \nAt the interbank segment, the naira depreciated by ₦1.75 or 1.06 per \ncent to $/₦165.55 from $/₦163.80. In the same vein, the exchange \nrate depreciated by ₦1.00 or 1.19 per cent from US$/₦169.00 to \n$/₦170.00 at the BDC segment. The depreciation at both the \ninterbank and the BDC segments largely reflected recent demand \npressures arising from the falling oil prices and dwindling external \nreserves. As part of the demand management measures, the Bank in \n13 \n \ntwo recent circulars excluded certain import items from the rDAS \nwindow. Despite the tight measures, the high demand for foreign \nexchange has continued unabated. This demand does not seem to \nhave any bearing on the genuine foreign exchange needs of the \ncountry, which the Bank stands ready and has the capacity to meet. \nThe current level of external reserves provides approximately 7 \nmonths of imports cover. \nCommittee’s Consideration \nThe Committee noted with satisfaction the deceleration in all the \nthree measures of inflation since September 2014; a development \nwhich has provided headroom for policy flexibility and maneuver. \nThe robust output expansion amidst strong headwinds arising from a \nweakening of the international oil market gives credence to the \nefficacy of our macroeconomic policy. The Committee also noted \nthat unlike in previous episodes, the current downturn in oil prices is \nnot transitory but appears to be permanent; being a product of \ntechnological advancement. Currently, the US which use to be \nNigeria’s former major oil export destination now meets on average \n80 per cent of its domestic oil demand from local shale oil retorting \n14 \n \ntechnology production and exports over 8 million barrels of crude oil \ndaily. \n \nThe Committee found credence in the permanency theory of \ncurrent oil price dynamics in the fact that the political restiveness in \nthe Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has not created \nuncertainty in oil supplies as both Libya and Iraq (Southern) have \nopen and strong supply lines in the market. A nuclear deal with Iran \ncould further complicate the situation, opening up the supply space \nfor new oil supplies from Iran. \nAvailable data shows that a number of 6-month oil futures are \ncurrently signed at below US$70/barrel while improvements in \ntechnology have driven down the break-even cost of shale oil \nproduction to an average range of US$52-US$70 per barrel. In the \nlight of this development, the Committee is of the view that the oil \nprice benchmark of US$73/barrel proposed in the 2015 Federal \nGovernment \nbudget \nmay \nbe \noverly \noptimistic, \nrequiring \nconsiderable caution on the budget’s revenue projections. A weak \npublic finance may impinge adversely on growth prospects as it \n15 \n \nshows up in reduction in critical public and private consumption and \ninvestment spending. \n \nWithout prejudice to this position, the Committee is of the view that \nthe softening crude oil prices could provide necessary leverage for \nthe fiscal authority to reduce budgetary outlays on fuel subsidy and \nchannel such savings to growth enhancing sectors of the economy. \nThe Committee took note of the supportive fiscal stance in this \nregard and public commitment to take advantage of the low oil \nprice to reduce fuel subsidy spending and liberalize prices as in \nmany emerging economies. Furthermore, the Committee expressed \nsatisfaction with the recent demand management measures \nannounced by the fiscal authorities to contain pressure in both the \ngoods and money markets and provide some respite in the near \nterm. \n \nNotwithstanding, efforts should be geared towards addressing the \nbinding supply side constraints such as the insecurity, infrastructural, \nand institutional challenges. The Committee also noted the gradual \nimprovement in labor market conditions which resulted in the \n16 \n \nadditional employment of 349,343 in the third quarter of 2014. The \ndominance of the informal sector in the new jobs profile, suggests \nthe preponderance of underemployment over the unemployment \nphenomenon, requiring intensification of reforms to unlock the \ngrowth potential of the formal sector. \n \nGiven the not too impressive fiscal revenue outlook, the Committee \nchallenged the sub-national governments to seize this unique \nopportunity to reduce reliance on allocations from the Federation \nAccount in funding their operations. To this end, the Committee \ncommended \nthe \nefforts \nof \nsome \nstates \nwhich \nrecorded \nunprecedented growth in Internally Generated Revenues (IGRs) in \n2013. Consequently, the Committee enjoined other states of the \nFederation to emulate these states by strengthening their IGR \nmechanisms with a view to minimizing reliance on FAAC allocations \nwith attendant disruptions to their budget implementation arising \nfrom dwindling oil revenues. \n \nA major issue considered by the Committee, however, was the \ndeclining level of external reserves, which arose from demand and \n17 \n \nsupply constraints. On the supply side, the falling oil price has \nconsiderably reduced the accretion to external reserves thus \nconstraining the ability of the Bank to continually defend the naira \nand sustain the stability of the naira exchange rate. The supply side is \nfurther weakened by the commencement of normalization of \nmonetary policy by the US Federal Reserve following the termination \nof the third quantitative easing on 29th October, 2014; a \ndevelopment which has accentuated capital outflows. These \ndevelopments are against the backdrop of considerable loss of \nfiscal space following from our inability to build sufficient reserves \nduring the boom days. \n \nOn the demand side, the pressures in the foreign exchange market \nwere aided mostly by the excess liquidity conditions in the banking \nsystem and speculative activities. It has become increasingly \nworrisome that improvement in liquidity conditions in the banking \nsystem, designed to enhance the resilience and stability of the \nbanking system, has not translated to increased credit expansion to \nthe real sector to engender inclusive growth and boost employment. \nRather, it has led to an upward pressure in the foreign exchange \n18 \n \nmarket and Standing Deposit Facility window of the Bank while \nbanks continually exercise a cautious approach to lending. \n \nAgainst this background, the Committee is of the view that the \ncurrent challenge requires bold policy moves on both the demand \nand supply sides of the foreign exchange market. Consequently, \nbold policy and administrative measures in the management of the \nnation’s stock of foreign exchange reserves have become inevitable \nin order to align the market towards its long-run equilibrium path. \n \nOn this note, the Committee wishes to reiterate that the Bank \nremains committed to a stable exchange rate within the limits of \navailable resources and would continue to maintain sufficiently \nstrong level of external reserves to meet its short term obligations and \nother regular balance of payments commitments. Without prejudice \nto this commitment, our foreign exchange management framework \nwould have zero tolerance for infractions and would penalize \neconomic agents whose primary objective is to speculate in the \nNigerian market. \n \nThe Committee is fully aware of the short run implications of a tight \nmonetary policy stance on lending and growth. However, available \n19 \n \ndata indicates that banking system liquidity has been lavishly \ndeployed in pursuit of speculative foreign exchange trading at the \nshort-end of the market. While the Committee remains fully \ncommitted to the goal of promoting inclusive growth through lower \ninterest rates in the medium- to long-term, banks as agents of \nfinancial intermediation have a critical role to play in the nation’s \ndevelopment process. A banking system with an overly high profit \nmotive negates the core tenets of banking and purpose of a \nbanking license. Under the circumstance, monetary policy must be \nbold and emphatic on the goals macroeconomic management \nseeks to achieve and encourage the flow of credit along those lines. \n \nThe current situation demands that the Bank confronts the issue of \ndeclining external reserves head-on in order to strengthen the value \nof the domestic currency. Consequently, stabilizing prices and \nmaintaining exchange rate stability and charting a sustainable path \nfor medium to long-term growth are the immediate top priorities. The \nCommittee remains committed to these in order to sustain the \ncredibility of our policies and anchor the expectations of our core \nstakeholders. \n \n20 \n \nIn the Committee’s opinion, a more flexible naira in the face of non-\nexistent fiscal buffers was the most viable policy option at a time of \nheightened demand pressure for foreign exchange and falling oil \nprices. The Committee was, therefore, of the view that if it failed in \ntaking the right policy actions now, the market would force the Bank \nto take more drastic actions in the future with far less foreign \nexchange reserves. Also, given the level of excess liquidity in the \nbanking system, it becomes imperative for the Bank to address the \nsources of the foreign exchange demand pressure. \n \nIn the light of the above considerations, the Committee was of the \nopinion that the economy stood to gain by: \na) Further tightening of monetary policy stance to anchor inflation \nexpectations; and \nb) Allowing some flexibility in the exchange rate to stem \nspeculative activities and depletion of reserves. \nConsequently, the Committee decided as follows: \nDecision \nHaving considered all the issues above the Committee decided as \nfollows: \n21 \n \na) Nine members voted to increase the MPR to 13 per cent while \ntwo members voted to retain the MPR at 12 per cent \nb) Ten members voted for a symmetric corridor of +/- 200 basis \npoints around the MPR, while one member voted for an \nasymmetric corridor of +200 and -500 basis points around the \nMPR \nc) All the 11 members voted to increase CRR on Private Sector \ndeposits from 15 to 20 per cent with immediate effect \nd) All the 11 members voted to retain CRR on Public Sector \ndeposits at 75 per cent \ne) All the 11 members voted to move the midpoint of the official \nwindow of the foreign exchange market from ₦155/US$ to \n₦168/US$ \nf) All the 11 members voted to widen the band around the \nmidpoint of the exchange rate from +/-3 per cent to +/-5 per \ncent. \ng) All the 11 members voted to retain the net open foreign \nexchange trading position at 1 per cent. \n22 \n \nConsequently, the MPC decided as follows: \ni. \nIncrease the MPR by 100 basis points from 12.00 to 13.00 per \ncent; \nii. \nIncrease the CRR on private sector deposits by 500 basis points \nfrom 15.00 to 20.00 per cent with immediate effect; \niii. \nMove the midpoint of the official window of the foreign \nexchange market from ₦155/US$ to ₦168/US$; \niv. \nWiden the band around the midpoint by 200 basis points from \n+/-3 per cent to +/-5 per cent; \nv. \nRetain public sector CRR at its current level of 75.00 per cent; \nvi. \nMaintain a symmetric corridor of +/- 200 basis points around the \nMPR; and \nvii. \nRetain the net open foreign exchange trading position at 1.00 \nper cent. \nI thank you all for Listening \nGodwin I. Emefiele, CON \nGovernor \nCentral Bank of Nigeria \n25th November, 2014 \n \n23 \n \nPERSONAL \nSTATEMENTS \nBY \nMEMBERS \nOF \nTHE \nMONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE \n \n \n1.0 ADELABU, ADEBAYO \n \nCurrent macroeconomic conditions revealed a relative fair \nperformance albeit build-up of vulnerabilities to shocks in the global \nenvironment. It is remarkable that the uptick in inflation, particularly \nheadline inflation which peaked at 8.5 per cent in August 2014, has \nsubsided with deceleration observed in September and October. \nOutput expansion is equally on solid footing with the estimated GDP \ngrowth of 6.23 per cent for the third quarter of 2014 comparing \nfavorably with the long term trend. It is equally remarkable to \nobserve that the robust output growth is beginning to translate to \nimprovement in the labour market condition with the latest data \nfrom the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) indicating the creation of \nabout 350, 000 new jobs in the third quarter of 2014. \nThese developments ought to provide space for considerable \ndegree of flexibility in the stance of monetary policy in order to \nsupport the existing reform measures that would unlock the \npotentials of the formal sector particularly when cognizance is taken \n24 \n \nthat almost 50 per cent of the newly created jobs were in the \ninformal sector. The major challenge to monetary policy however is \nthe financial market condition, emanating from rising vulnerability to \nadverse \nconditions \nin \nthe \nglobal \nenvironment. \nSignificant \ndepreciation was not only recorded in all the three segments of the \nforeign exchange market but wide divergence in rates was equally \nprevalent among these markets, heightening the risk of arbitrage, \namong others. In addition, the equities market continued to show \ndepreciation with All Share index shedding about 15 per cent \nbetween end-December 2013 and end-October 2014. The most \nworrisome aspect of this development, however, is that the country \nappears to be the only one among emerging and frontier \neconomies that recorded loss in the capital market as other \ncountries such as South Africa, Egypt, Ghana, and Kenya recorded \nmodest gains in their stock exchange markets during the period. This \nis indicative of heightened risk profile of the domestic economy. \nAgainst this background, the challenges in the macroeconomy must \nbe confronted frontally with appropriate policy tools in order to \navoid risking credibility of monetary policy. The overarching issue \nnow is the need to contain the pressure in the foreign exchange \n25 \n \nmarket with a view to bolstering the naira, which has been \nplummeting in the recent times. The threats are coming from both \nthe supply and demand ends of the market. From the supply side, \nweakening oil price has shrunk the current account surplus thereby \nreducing accretion to reserves and by extension the Bank’s ability to \nsustain the exchange rate. It is pertinent to bring to bear that \ndevelopment in the crude oil market does not suggest that the \npresent softening in price is a transitory ones like the one \nexperienced in 2008 given that the underlying currents are different \nin a significant way. The major underlying factor for price softening is \nimprovement in shale oil technology which is being subject to further \nrefinement by the day. In addition, the supply side is weakened by \nthe termination of quantitative easing and commencement of \nmonetary policy normalization in a number of developed economies \nwhich have led to retrenchment of portfolio flows in a number of \nemerging economies. \nThe issues however appear stronger on the demand side. Demand \npressure has scaled up to unrivalled magnitude in the last couple of \nmonths. Available data indicated that less than 20 per cent of the \ndemands in the foreign exchange market were due to divestment \n26 \n \nby foreign investors thereby suggesting speculative demand. This \ncould have only been aided by liquidity condition in the banking \nsector. This issue raises the question of the relative tightness of the \nmarkets. The current monetary policy measures have been in place \nfor a while as the last increase in the CRR was done in March 2014. \nThe implication is that the dynamic of adjustment by economic \nagents would have neutralized the effect of these measures. For \nexample, data on money market rates revealed that both the \ninterbank and Overnight Buy Back (OBB) rates have been at the \nlower end of the Monetary Policy Rates in the last couple of months. \nAgain, the Broad Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) revealed \nmonetary easing for most parts of 2014. At the last meeting, the \nchallenge was quite anticipated but consideration was given to the \nneed to give some breathing space to the DMBs in view of their rising \ncost profile upon the understanding that such excess liquidity would \nbe channeled to growth enhancing sectors. Available data in the \nrecent times, however, have shown otherwise. \nBesides, the rising demand pressure is also an indication of price \nmisalignment that characterizes a dysfunctional market. Effective \nmarket correction therefore, should involve proper alignment of \n27 \n \nprice; otherwise the burden of administrative measures may be too \nheavy in as much as arbitrage opportunity exists. Thus, I am of the \nview that the subsisting mid-point exchange of ₦155/US$ should be \nallowed to adjust towards the market equilibrium while the band \nshould equally be widened to improve space for monetary policy \noperations. \nAs I have always advocated, broad based economic reform \nmeasures are required to open up macroeconomic space to \ninvestment particularly foreign direct investment. The major source of \npressure in the foreign exchange market is the continuously \nelongating list of imported items particularly refined petroleum \nproducts. In addition to the ongoing power sector reform therefore, \na robust import substitution strategy is critical with particular \nreference to fixing the moribund domestic refineries. Until this is \nachieved, the domestic monetary policy would continue to be \nvulnerable to the vagary of the global environment. \nAgainst the background that the present challenge requires policy \nresponse from both the supply and demand sides of the foreign \nexchange market, I will like to vote for further tightening using the \ninstruments of both the MPR and CRR. In addition, I recommend a \n28 \n \nshift in the rDAS exchange rate mid-point to a more competitive \nlevel with a view to correcting market malfunctioning and closing \nopportunity for arbitrage, among others. \nConsequently, I vote for an increase in the private sector CRR by 500 \nbasis points to 20 per cent and MPR by 100 basis points to 13 per \ncent with symmetric corridor of 200 basis points. I would like the \npublic sector CRR retained at 75 per cent while the midpoint \nexchange rate be moved to ₦168/US$ with a symmetric band of 5.0 \nper cent. \n2.0 ALADE, SARAH O. \n \nThis MPC meeting is coming at a period of great uncertainty in \nthe Nigerian economy. Although GDP remains robust and \ninflation is trending downwards, low international oil prices and \ndwindling foreign reserves is a cause for concern in the midst of \nintense pressure on the foreign exchange rate. The Naira has \nweakened 8 percent at the interbank segment since the last \nMPC despite interventions and regulations to prevent speculative \nattack on the currency. On the fiscal side, government budget \nhas been constrained by revenue shortfall following the \ncontinuing decline of oil prices. The global economic outlook is \nclouded by risks from weak activity in the Eurozone, ongoing \ngeopolitical risks, and the timing of the anticipated Federal \nReserve monetary tightening. All these developments suggest \nthat monetary policy at this time must be responsive and clear in \ncommunicating its stance to restore stability and confidence. \n \n29 \n \nGlobal economic environment is showing strong growth clouded \nwith uncertainties. The IMF in its last World Economic Outlook (WEO) \ndowngraded global growth to 3.3 percent from 3.7 percent in the \nprevious projections. There are marked divergences among \ncountries both in terms of growth and monetary policy, leading to \nvolatility in debt and foreign exchange markets. The United States \nand Britain are expected to stay on stronger growth trajectory, while \nthe euro zone, Japan, Russia and China are showing some signs of \nslow down. In the emerging market countries, India, Indonesia and \nSouth Africa are set to recover steadily. In the United States, the \neconomy is growing at an above trend with strong job growth. In \nOctober 2014, the unemployment rate fell to 5.8 percent suggesting \na stronger job market growth. Third quarter GDP growth was at 3.9 \npercent, against the estimate of 3.3 percent, pointing to \nstrengthening fundamentals that should support the economy for \nthe rest of the year. \n \nIn emerging market and developing countries growth projection is \nslightly lowered to 4.6 percent from 4.8 percent previously projected \non the back of tight financial conditions from the US, and possible \n30 \n \ncapital reversal in most emerging markets including Nigeria. Under \nthese uncertain conditions, monetary policy at this time should be \nfocused at minimizing the downside risks and restoring confidence in \nthe economy. \n \nGross Domestic Product (GDP) is showing strong momentum, \nalthough risks remain. The 2014 third quarter GDP grew by 6.23 \npercent, a decrease from the 6.54 percent recorded in the second \nquarter, but higher than the 5.17 percent recorded in the \ncorresponding period in 2013. The decline was driven mainly by the \noil sector which declined by 3.6 percent in the Third Quarter of 2014, \nalthough lower than the 5.47 percent decline in the Second Quarter \nof 2014. The Oil sector contributed approximately 10.45 percent to \nreal GDP in the third quarter of 2014, lower from the 10.76 percent \ncontribution in the Second Quarter of 2014, and the 11.51 percent \ncontribution recorded during the Third Quarter of 2013. The decrease \nwas driven by decreased oil production as third quarter production \nstood at 2.15 mbpd compared to 2.26 mbpd in the same period in \n2013. The non-oil sector grew by 7.51 percent in the third quarter, \nalthough lower than 8.46 percent recorded in the corresponding \n31 \n \nperiod in 2013, it is higher than the 6.71 percent recorded in the \nsecond quarter of 2014. However, the security situation in the \nNortheast, the food producing belt of the nation may affect non-oil \nsector growth and food inflation in the medium to long-term. \n \nHeadline inflation is trending downwards, but some risks remain. \nHeadline inflation decreased to 8.1 percent in October from 8.3 \nrecorded in September. The decrease is as a result of muted \nincrease in core index and a decrease in food inflation. The food \ninflation decreased to 9.3 percent in October, down by 0.4 \npercentage points from 9.7 percent recorded in September. This is \nthe second consecutive month that food prices have been relatively \nmuted. The ease in the increase in food prices was as a result of \nslower increases in imported and local food production. Staff \nprojection suggests a benign outlook in inflation with headline \ninflation expected to end the year in single digit. Despite this, the risk \nto inflation in the short-term is on the upside due to election-related \nspending in the build-up to 2015 general elections and food supply \nshocks arising from insurgency activities in the North-Eastern region, \nthe food basket of the nation. \n32 \n \nThe banking system liquidity continues to be high, suggesting that \nsome measure is needed to reign in the excess liquidity. Banking \nsystem deposits at the CBN deposit lending facility has consistently \nbeen high reaching N800 billion on some days during the review \nperiod. Even with open market operations, Interbank-call and OBB \nrates during the review period traded below the standing deposit \nfacility rate reflecting the quantum of liquidity in the system. There is \ntherefore, need to sterilize some of these liquidity through increase in \ncash reserve requirements to avoid distortion in the system and to \nminimize the feedback effect on inflation. \n \nNaira has come under intense pressure in the last couple of weeks \nleading to depletion of the Reserve. The naira has come under \nintense pressure since the last MPC, depreciating by about 8 percent \nat the interbank market and about 1.7 percent in the official market. \nAs at November, 2014, foreign exchange reserves stood at $37billion, \nas foreign investors repatriate their investments in the face of \nimproved investment climate in the US and greater uncertainty in \nthe domestic market. The market reaction to end of tapering by the \nUS Fed is already causing reversal of capital flows to emerging \nmarkets including Nigeria. This has resulted in the weakening of \n33 \n \ncurrencies. Naira in addition, has come under pressure because of \nthe country’s dependence on oil which price has fallen by more \nthan 30% in recent months with the attendant consequence on \ngovernment revenue and external reserves. In order to allow \nmonetary policy to sustain price stability and minimize the impact of \nthe capital reversal on the nation’s current account it is important to \nadjust the currency. \n \nThe flexibility will not only reduce the pressure on the exchange rate, \nit will help conserve external reserves. The adjustment in the \nexchange rate and falling oil prices will no doubt exert pressure on \ninflation, therefore, it is important for the Bank to increase efforts to \nmaintain the rate within the band. \n \nAgainst this background, I support an increase in Monetary Policy \nRate, flexibility in exchange rate, an increase in Private Sector Cash \nReserve Requirement (CRR) and retention of 75 percent of Public \nSector Cash Reserve Requirement (CRR) to ensure macroeconomic \nstability. \n \n34 \n \n \n3.0 BALAMI, DAHIRU HASSAN \n \nGLOBAL ECONOMY \nGrowth- Global growth remains weak through the year 2014 and into \nthe half of year 2015. The International Monetary Fund/World Bank \nmarked down growth rate of 3.3 per cent in September as against \n3.4 in August and 3.7 in April; and 3 per cent in 2014. This is due to \nweaker growth in US Projected at 1.7 per cent for 2014 and 3 per \ncent for 2015.The Euro zone recorded a 1.1 growth rate in 2014 and \n1.5 for the 2015.Accumulated evidence of weakness in Euro zone in \nthe month of September slowdown in the GDP growth. Growth is \nexpected to remain uneven across emerging markets and \ndeveloping countries. These markets were projected to grow at 4.6 \nin 2014 before strengthening to 5.2 per cent in 2015.In China the \ngrowth rate is projected to average out to 7.4 per cent which was \nconsistent throughout .The slow growth is not unconnected to the \ngeopolitical risk at the global level which include renewed tension \nbetween Russia and Ukraine, and the middle east (Libya, Iraq and \nSyria) in which further tension in the region will have the potential of \ncausing disruption to energy markets and reduction in investor risk \n35 \n \nappetite and business confidence. For example in UK, there is \nslowing down of manufacturing exports. It should be noted that in \nChina one of Nigeria’s biggest trading partner industrial production \nhas slowed down to 6.9 per cent in August the lowest rate since \nDecember 2008 partly due to political unrest in Hong Kong. Tight \nmonetary policy had also weighed on the growth outlook. \nInternational Oil and Gas prices \nThe price of crude oil in the international market has remained fairly \nstable despite tension in the Middle East at above its $103 per barrel. \nHowever, the OPEC reference basket of 12 crudes continued to \ntrend downwards and stood at $78.08/b on 14th November 2014. \nUSA which was the greatest oil importer internally satisfies 89 per cent \nof its domestic demand with only 11 per cent to import. The US \ncontinues to take less and less from Nigeria’s crude supply. The low \nlevel of growth in Europe, Japan, Germany and Brazil has implication \non the demand for the crude supply from Nigeria. \nInflation \nInflation has been subdued in 2014 and 2013.In the Euro zone \ninflation has fallen to 0.3 per cent in September from 0.4 per cent \nrevised in August due to lower commodity prices, weakening in \n36 \n \nbusiness confidence particularly in Germany, higher exchange rate, \nlower crude oil prices, some utility price effects following commodity \nprice. Weaker domestic demand and negative output gaps in \nadvance economies. In emerging countries inflation is projected to \ndecline from 6 per cent to 5 per cent in 2015. \nInterest rate \nInterest rate in Euro zone and UK has remained low. It is also low in \nChina one of the biggest trading partners to Nigeria. The ECB has \nalso cut its policy rates and asset purchase. \nDomestic Economy \nGrowth in the domestic economy is projected to firm up (6.54per \ncent) in 2014 despite the various challenges which include insecurity \nparticularly Boko Haram in the northeast, decline in the exportation \nand demand of the Nigeria crude particularly by the US, falling price \nof its Nigerian crude oil from $115.62 per barrel in June 2014 to $78.08 \nper barrel in November 2014, rising level of domestic debt, pressure \non the Naira, unemployment, inequality and poverty, reduced \nagricultural output, and inadequate infrastructure and rising import \ndemand. \n37 \n \nThe sliding oil prices from $115 per barrel in June 2014, $81.97 at the \nend of October 2014, to about $78.08 per barrel in November 14th \n2014 was the lowest the price has fallen in years and its implication \non government meeting its statutory obligation will affect the \nworking of the economy negatively. There is also the problem of oil \ntheft and vandalization of oil and gas infrastructure. There is growth \nin Nigeria but this does not reflect in the living standard index. \nThe implication of declining oil price often result in further tightening \nof monetary policy to pressure macroeconomic stability. It could \nlead to high interest rate and superior returns on investment. In \nmoney market which could have negative effects on the nations \nstock market. It may moderate the cost of fuel importation which is \nknown to be a burden on the finances of the economy. It will lead to \nreduction in the level of foreign exchange reserve and exchange \nrate because 95 % of foreign exchange comes from oil exportation \nand the erosion of external reserve given the mounting and \ncontinuous pressure from beneficiaries. \n \n \n \n38 \n \nChallenges of the Economy \n How to sustain the stability in Naira exchange rate? \n How to manage the vulnerability to capital flow record? \n How to build focal buffers to ensure against global shock? \n How to manage inflation and exchange rate expectation? \n How to safeguard the financial system? \nExchange Rate \nIn the month of October 2014, the Naira slipped 0.27 per cent. The \ncurrency fell 0.15% by Monday 27th 2014 against the dollar on its \ninterbank market due to surge in dollar demand. This is despite about \n$112 million in sales by an oil company (₦165 to dollar compared to \n₦164.7 at the close of Friday the 24th). The Naira came under \npressure in the last five weeks owing to concern over falling global oil \nprices which led to offshore investment cutting back their position in \nlocal debt market repatriating their fund(167 -169)and due to \nshortage of dollars on the interbank markets, higher demand \ncoupled with declining global oil prices. It is doubted if the CBN can \ncontinue to support the Naira. The pressure is partly due to Dollar \ndemands from politicians holding their asset in hard currency ahead \nof election next year. The naira is also expected to experience \n39 \n \nfurther pressure as the liquidity position worsens with AMCON \ninjection in October. Foreign exchange market will experience \nfurther volatility as well as additional idle funds to the coffers of the \nBanks (devaluation may be the ultimate goal). There is likelihood of \nincrease in inflation thereby eroding the consumer purchasing \npower. The consumer inflation for September rose to 8.3% according \nto NBS. \nPolicy Options \n I vote that the MPR be raised to 13% with a corridor of +/-100 \nbasis point. \n Retain the public sector Cash Reserve Requirement at 75%. \n Raise the private sector CRR at 20% from 15%. \n Retain the liquidity ratio at 30%. \n \nRaising the MPR could improve the attraction of Nigeria’s asset to \nforeign investors due to the consequent higher risk adjusted real \nreturns on Nigeria’s assets as well as attracting new investors (FDI) to \nour capital market. \n \n40 \n \nReason for raising CRR is that DMB are holding excess reserve \naveraging over 300 billion and injecting further addition of 866 billion \nNaira through the maturing AMCON in October, will also assist in \nreducing the level of banking sector liquidity in the economy. It \nshould be noted that keeping banking rate at its current rate for too \nlong is likely to offset these effects risked unbalancing recovery and \ngrowth in the economy. \n \n4.0 BARAU, SULEIMAN \nBackground \nThe current MPC is taking place at a time of significant, almost \nunprecedented, \nseries \nof \ndevelopments \nfrom \nthe \nexternal \nenvironment. Firstly, decline in oil price was noted during the last \nMPC but it was initially interpreted in the context of normal market \nvolatility. The sustained decline in oil price actually started in June \nbut it remained above the psychological floor of $100/per barrel. As \nat November 20, 2014 Bonny Light was trading at $78.91pb, \ncompared to $88.51pb as at end of October, 2014. \nSecondly, the possible termination plan of the Assets Purchase \nProgram (APP) of Fed by the Federal Open Market Committee \n41 \n \n(FMOC) was expected to be announced in October, 2014. \nHowever, FOMC’s statement at its September meeting was also not \nconclusive as to the actual date the asset purchase program will \nend. However, the favourable unemployment and inflation numbers \nmet the conditions for the end of QE3 and the decision to terminate \nin October was made. \nWithin the domestic environment, Headline Inflation (HI) declined to \n8.06% in October compared to 8.3% in September. Core Inflation \n(CI) also declined to 6.25% in October compared to 6.28% in \nSeptember. Food Inflation (FI) also recorded a decline to 9.34% in \nOctober from 9.68% in September. \nThe level of foreign reserves witnessed a decline to $36.25 billion in \nOctober from $38.20 billion in September. The source of downward \npressure continued to be, reduced inflow due to oil theft and the \nrapid decline in oil price. There was also reversal of foreign portfolio \nflows which reduced supply and increased demand. The pressure \nwas compounded by increased demand at both rDAS and \ninterbank segments as the sustained decline in oil price and end of \nQE3 by the Fed, made market operators and end users (including \n42 \n \nforeign investors) to quickly bring forward their demand in order to \nhedge against foreign exchange rate risks. \nThe exchange rate continued to come under pressure at all \nsegments of the market in view of the foregoing developments. The \nNaira depreciated to ₦159.99, ₦176.90 and ₦179.50 or by 1.71%, \n8.63% and 6.21% at rDAS, Interbank and BDC markets respectively \nduring review period. In addition, the premium between rDAS, \nInterbank and BDC segments widened by 10.57% and 12.19% \nrespectively. \nNigerian banking remains strong, liquid and profitable. Total assets, \ncredit and deposits grew by 1.7%, 4.25% and 0.52% between \nSeptember and October respectively. Liquidity ratio at 44.65% in \nOctober, though below the 45.41% recorded in September, remains \nvery strong. Industry liquidity in the context of declining reserves and \nexchange rate concern remains a pressure point for the MPC. \n2.0 \nIssues and Pressure Points \nThe successes recorded by the MPC, over the last few years, in \nmaintaining price stability and particularly in keeping inflation at \nsingle digit is being aggressively threatened by the following recent \ndevelopments and outlook; \n43 \n \n \nLiquidity – CBN’s QE strategy following the global financial crises of \n2008, the creation of AMCON and continued monetization of Excess \nCrude Account (ECA) has kept the banking system largely awash \nwith liquidity. This has been exacerbated by CBN’s balance sheet \nexpansion (balance sheet almost doubled between 2007 and 2013) \nthrough various interventions and fiscal expansion through deficit \nfinancing. I have further concerns over the outlook for liquidity in \n2015 given that it is an election year. Current liquidity and outlook is \nclearly a threat to price stability with particular emphasis on our \nsingle digit inflation credentials. \n \nPrice stability is further threatened by the likely removal of subsidy on \npetroleum products. The end of the Asset Purchase Programme \n(APP) under QE3 in the US by the Fed and the sustained decline in oil \nprice has combined to put pressure on the exchange rate of the \nNaira and the level of foreign reserves. The end of the APP has \nimpacted exchange rate and reserves in the context of some \ndramatic exit of portfolio investment and the reduction of portfolio \ninflows. The Nigerian Stock Market witnessed 9.78% month to date \n44 \n \n(MTD) and 18.04% year to date (YTD) decline in All Share Index (ASI) \nand 10.08% MTD and 15.44% YTD decline in market capitalization by \nNovember 21. \n \nThe reduction in the international price of our crude which impacted \nexchange rate and reserves, caused a massive change in market \nperception of CBN’s ability to hold exchange rate current levels, \nmade market operators to subsequently bring forward their foreign \nexchange demand and enabled some to take long positions in \nexchange, all supported by current liquidity in the system. \n \nThe outlook for oil price is disturbing. Firstly, the Organization of Oil \nExporting Countries (OPEC) does not have the consensus of its \nmembers on the control of production and exports, which has been \na tool used to control the market and ultimately the price of oil. It \nwould appear that OPEC’s strategy is to favour market determined \nprice system. Saudi Arabia, the largest exporter of oil among the \nOPEC countries is the champion of this strategy going forward. \nOPEC’s meeting of 27/11/14 is therefore not likely to reverse the \ndeclining trend in oil price. Import from the US has reduced because \n45 \n \nof the discovery of Shale Oil. The US is forecast to soon meet all its \ndemand for oil in the medium term if oil price can continue to \nsupport the cost of Shale Oil production. \n \nSecondly, global demand continues to be weak due to slow \nrecovery particularly in the Euro area and slower growth rate from \nemerging markets such as China and India. \n \nThirdly, in the current war in Ukraine, oil price is clearly being used as \na weapon against Russia. Given Russia’s reliance on oil (50% of \nrevenues), the lack of interest in stemming the declining tide in price \nby the advanced economies of the West can clearly be \nappreciated. \n \nIn the light of the foregoing, the reversal of flows and the declining oil \nprice will combine to continue to put pressure on our foreign reserves \nand exchange rate. Inflation is forecast to accelerate gradually over \nthe next six months into 2015 according to staff estimates. \n \n46 \n \n3.0 \nWay Forward \nIn the light of the foregoing, I have come to the following conclusion: \ni. \nThat it is sensible to continue with the current tightening stance \nin policy; \nii. \nThat though markets have already factored in the impact of \nthe stoppage of the Assets Purchase Programme by the US and \nthat we remain an attractive investment destination, the \nradical reduction of ASI and Market Capitalization on the NSE, \ndoes suggest significant exit of foreign investment and that \nwould be the direction of things unless something is done; \niii. \nThat oil price decline may continue and that would put further \npressure on government revenues, reserves and exchange \nrate; \niv. \nThat there is still evidence of huge liquidity in the banking \nsystem occasioned by fiscal operations and CBN’s prior years \nbalance sheet growth. This was aggravated by the recent \nrepayment of private investors by AMCON. This should elicit \nfurther tightening and the removal of liquidity from the system; \nand \n47 \n \nv. \nThat inflation outlook is negative. This calls for further tightening. \nvi. \nThat the main focus of this MPC meeting should be to address \nexchange rate and declining foreign reserves challenges. \nMPC’s position has been that the Naira exchange rate stability \nwould continue to be guaranteed but not at all cost. Several \nmeasures have been put in place to contain demand pressures \nin the past with some limited success. However, the supply side \nof foreign exchange, which is outside the control of MPC has \nalways been a source of concern for policy and has rendered \ndemand management measures as very short term and \nineffective. The current challenge to supply due to declining oil \nprice, leaves MPC with no option than to allow the Naira \nexchange rate band to move, in order to secure a minimum \nlevel of foreign reserves that would guarantee overall \nmacroeconomic stability. \n4.0 \nRecommendations \nIt is in the light of the above that I voted as follows today; \n That we maintain the Tight Monetary Policy stance; \n That we increase the MPR to 13%; \n48 \n \n That we maintain the Symmetric Corridor of minus and plus 2% \naround the MPR for SDF and SLF respectively; \n That we maintain CRR on Public Sector deposits at 75%; \n That we increase the CRR on private sector deposits to 20%; \n That we move the mid-point of rDAS sales rate to N168/USD; \n That we widen the band around the mid-rate to (minus/plus \n5%) from (minus/plus 3%); \n That we keep the Net Open Position (NOP) limit at 1% of \nShareholders Funds. \n \n5.0 DANIEL-NWAOBIA, ANASTASIA \nRecovery in the global economy has continued at a gradual pace. \nDeveloped economies have recorded mixed performances but \ninflation is significantly lower than the target of most monetary \nauthorities in those jurisdictions. This indicates that those economies \nare not functioning close to maximum capacity, with wide output \ngaps and weak labour markets. Lower growth in emerging market \neconomies—notably China, which is a major buyer of Nigeria crude \nposes considerable risk for the economy which is heavily reliant on oil \nexports. \n49 \n \n \nOutlook for domestic output in the coming months is largely positive \ndue to the sustained implementation of the on-going economic \nreforms through the Federal Government transformation agenda. In \nparticular, the continued implementation of the power sector \nreform, as well as all the accompanying investments in the sector is \nexpected to improve power generation and supply. \n \nHowever, developments in the external environment, particularly the \ndecline in oil prices pose a threat to public sector revenue in the \nmedium-term with negative consequences for achieving fiscal \nstability. Non-oil revenue is also not performing well implying that \nFederal Government Budget could be constrained if this trend \ncontinues. \n \nGiven perceived country risk due to the 2015 national elections and \nthe winding down of quantitative easing in the US, foreign portfolio \ninvestors may cautiously participate in our capital market. Monetary \npolicy should therefore continue to anticipate divestments from the \ncapital market in the coming months. \n50 \n \n \nThe exchange rate was relativley stable at the RDAS segment while it \ndepreciated at the BDC and Inter-bank segments of the market due \nlargely to reduced sales of foreign exchange from oil companies. \nFalling oil prices have seen the naira trading around the ₦165 to the \ndollar which is above the reference trading band of US$-₦155 (+/-\n3%), while the external reserves stood at US$37bn, covering about 6 - \n7 months of imports. Also, the ongoing capital outflows and renewed \nforeign exchange intervention could potentially deplete the foreign \nexchange reserves at a fast pace. Consequently, efforts need to be \nmade to stabilize the naira in the short run. \n \nThe year-on-year headline inflation which accelerated to 8.5 per \ncent in August, 2014 from 8.3 per cent in July 2014 fell to 8.3 and 8.06 \nper cent in September and October, 2014, respectively. Staff \nprojections for the next six months indicate that the year-on-year \nheadline inflation would increase from 8.4 per cent in November to \n8.5, 9.1, 9.2, 9.6 and 10.0 per cent in December, January, February, \nMarch and April 2015, respectively. Thus, though inflationary pressure \nis expected to remain subdued in 2014, policy action would be \n51 \n \nneeded to ensure that the downside risk to inflation is minimized in \nthe first quarter of 2015. \n \nThe main challenges to monetary policy currently are: excessive \nliquidity in the banking system, pressure on the exchange rate and \ndecline in external reserves. Other policy challenges include: \nimproving the performance of non-oil revenue and VAT to enhance \nfiscal sustainability; and reduction in the interest rate as well as \nensuring the flow of credit to the real economy. Consequently, \nstrategic efforts need be made towards addressing the issue of high \ninterest rates as well as ensure the flow of credit to the real economy \nin order to engender growth and create employment. \n \nGiven the current challenges to monetary policy, particularly \nexcessive liquidity in the banking system, pressure on the exchange \nrate and decline in external reserves, I will advise that the monetary \npolicy stance be tightened further. \n \n \n \n52 \n \nConsequently, I vote as follows: \n(i) \nThe Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) to be increased by 100 \nbasis point from 12% to 13 % while maintaining the existing \ncorridor of +/- 2% for the inter-meeting period. \n(ii) \nThe Private sector CRR should be increased by 500 basis \npoints from 15 to 20 per cent, given the current banking \nsystem liquidity profile. \n(iii) \nThe public sector CRR should however, be retained at its \ncurrent level of 75 per cent. \n(iv) The current policy on foreign exchange (mid-point and \nexchange rate band of ₦155/US$1 +/- 3%) needs to be \nadjusted. The mid-point could be adjusted to ₦168/US$1 \nwhile the exchange rate band of +/- 3% could be \nwidened to +/- 5% in order to minimize the pressure on the \nexchange rate. The Bank should, however continue to \nintervene in the market when necessary. \n(v) \nThe current net open foreign exchange trading position \nshould be retained at 1 per cent. \n \n \n \n53 \n \n6.0 GARBA, ABDUL-GANIYU \nBackground \nMay 2013 offered emerging nations a foretaste of what they will \nface in a post-quantitative easing era. The “Bernanke effect” - the \neffects of Bernanke’s perceived miscommunication of his forward \nguidance about the timing of US tapering in May 2013 unsettled \nglobal financial markets. The miscommunication unsettled investor’s \nconfidence who responded with a global selloff in most stock \nmarkets. In emerging markets, the problem was worse in intensity \nand scope: it affected yields on government securities, exchange \nrates and commodity prices in addition to stock prices and market \ncapitalization. Most emerging markets opened themselves to strong \ncontagion effects in the way they went about attracting portfolio \nflows to build reserves, stimulate asset price recovery in the stock \nmarkets and stabilize or engineer appreciation in their domestic \ncurrencies. \nFor emerging markets clearly, May 2013 was a game changer \nwhether they realized it or not. It signaled the beginning of the end \nof the honeymoon with investors who responded to the high country \nrisk premiums offered by emerging markets. The portfolio flows \n54 \n \nfunded public deficits and asset price bubbles hence, giving the \nillusions of recoveries in capital markets that had been decimated \nby the flight of 2008-2009. \nThe events of May 2013 signaled a coming turbulence. Therefore, \nwhile the turbulence appears more intense now hence, more \nobvious, the tide turned not in October-November 2014 but in May \n2013. In the aftermath of May 2013, the long run trend of the \nNigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) in terms of indexes and market \ncapitalization has been downward. In addition, the exchange rate \nspread steadily widened. Between May 2013 and November 2014, \nthe global political and economic environment became more risky \nand uncertain. In addition to the growing global security challenges \nand the strategic political-economic conflicts between Russia and \nthe West, the growing disconnect between the United States and \nEurope in terms of paths of their economies and monetary policy \nstance has been systematically unsettling key financial and \ncommodity markets to the dis-advantage of vulnerable emerging \nmarkets. It is important to understand the secular nature of the \ncurrent problems to inform a correct analysis of strategic and policy \noptions. \n55 \n \nI had repeatedly expressed concern about the exposure to portfolio \nflows. In my personal statement at the end of May 2013 MPC, I \nargued after observing the pull back of portfolio flows in March and \nApril 2013 that “there is need for further adjustments (of portfolio \nflows) to levels that would not threaten the financial and economic \nstability of Nigeria. Human history and Nigeria’s recent history \nprovides strong foundation to expect that the flows are reversible \nwhile sound theoretical and empirical analysis provides sound \nfoundations in support of a claim that the net flows are non-positive \nin the medium term.” I had no doubts that future stability of prices, \nof the exchange rate, of the financial system and of the economy \nwas at risk if volatile financial flows are incentivized to grow beyond \na destabilization threshold. Also, that the real choice was between \ninevitably short term stability and, medium to long term stability. MPC \ncommuniqués repeatedly urged fiscal authorities to build buffers to \nsupport a more effective monetary policy strategy. “Real fiscal \nsavings” would have significantly limited public debt and the \nopportunities for hot money in Nigeria. \nLessons of history - Mexican currency crisis of 1993-94, the Asian crisis \nof 1997-98 and the Russian currency crisis of 1998 - offer clear lessons \n56 \n \nabout the likely path and consequences of unwise and untimely \nmonetary response to speculative attack. In the case of Nigeria with \nmultiple and segmented markets, a widening spread was inevitable \ngiven the events in the aftermath of May 2013. The spread between \nBDC and RDAS/WDAS rose from an average of ₦2.05 between \nJanuary and April 2013 to ₦6.64 between May and December 2014 \nand November 24, the spread was ₦25 (about 16% of the RDAS \nexchange rate). It is obvious that the size of the spread was a strong \nincentive for arbitrage, rule-violations in forex use, currency \nsubstitution and for short positions against the Naira. The loss of about \n40% in the price of crude oil simply made a problem that has been \nbuilding since May 2013 more visible. In my view, the falling price of \ncrude oil was simply a trigger. It is important to see beyond the \ntrigger factors to the structural vulnerabilities, market functioning \nproblems and failures to rein-in fiscal deficits, public debt and dis-\nsavings that are the real problems. \nWe have emphasized repeatedly that it is important to see beyond \nthe short term to develop a medium and long term forward looking \nperspective and to build long term resilience. The Gulf Cooperation \ncountries are estimated to have saved about 2.5 trillion US$ in foreign \n57 \n \nreserves during the longest oil boom in human history. In addition, \nthey seemed to have invested wisely through their Sovereign Wealth \nFunds to develop their economies and secure the medium to long \nterm interests of their commonwealths. Their case seems to offer \npositive lessons. \nDecision \nMy concern at this November 2014 MPC is short, medium and long \ntermed. In the short term I am convinced that the MPC must direct \nthe economy away from the paths of Mexico (1993-4), Asian Tigers \n(1997-8) and Russia (1998). We cannot afford a “confidence cycle” \nthat destroys the capacity of the monetary authorities to influence \nthe path of the economy. Medium to long term, we have to address \nthe key vulnerabilities in economic policies (monetary and fiscal), \nmarket functioning and disconnect between financial and real \nsectors. If we think through carefully and analyze the path of the \neconomy from 2004 (pre-banking consolidation) to date, it will \nbecome obvious that a short-sighted perspective is dangerous. \nMy vote at this last MPC meeting of 2014 addresses short term, \nmedium and long term paths of the economy. It takes due account \n58 \n \nof current realities and expectations that are influencing the pricing \nof Nigeria’s country risks by speculators (revealed by the spread \nbetween Euro Bonds and FGN Bonds) and of the pricing of the Naira \nin the Inter-Bank market and other markets. It is clear that the market \nhas increasing moved well outside the band announced in 2011 \nafter the events of May 2013. \nI vote for moving the mid-point of the band and the width of the \nband. My vote is informed by a clear analysis of the paths of the \neconomy in the short to medium terms and the urgency of \neliminating an “arbitrage spread” that is fuelling the speculative \nattack on the Naira, currency substitution and sharp practices. I am \nconvinced that moving the mid-point and the width of the band is \njust a first step towards correcting the weak mechanism design that \ninevitably segments the forex market creating an “arbitrage \nspread”. Market segmentation and arbitrage spread make \narbitrage, currency substitution, sharp practices and short positions \nrational. Auction theory is clear that in repeated auctions such as \nRDAS/WDAS, the likelihood of collusion is very strong. Indeed, at least \nthree Nigerian studies have provided strong evidence of collusive \nbehaviours in Nigerian foreign exchange auction markets. \n59 \n \nA silver lining for policy implementation is that collusion in the \nNigerian forex auction market is easy to detect. A closing of the \nspread between the highest and the lowest bids that opens an \n“arbitrage spread” is a strong signal of the high likelihood of collusive \nbehavior. Rational bidders who are driven purely by profit are best \nserved by widening spreads even when a widening spread could \ndestroy the currency. It is important therefore, to ensure that the \nauction systems in the financial markets are no longer rigged against \nthe goals of monetary policy or the commonwealth. The Monetary \nPolicy Implementation process would support policy effectiveness if \nit gives priority to quick detection and punishment of collusive \nbehaviours. This will help to sustain the closing of the “arbitrage \nspread”. \nAt the September meeting, I voted for tightening because I was \nconvinced that it was necessary to sterilize the “inverted \nintermediation liquidity” that was sitting idle in the SDF window daily. I \nwas also convinced that tightening was necessary to sterilize the \nexpected “AMCON injection” of N876 billion into the banking system \nin October when it redeemed maturing Series V zero coupon \nAMCON Bond. I was convinced that such an injection will inevitably \n60 \n \nadd to the size of the inverted intermediation liquidity and provide \nmore ammunition for currency substitution, short positions hence, \npressure on the Naira. The data confirmed my expectations. It is \ntherefore clear to me that sterilizing inverted intermediation liquidity \nmust be a fundamental principle of monetary policy. This is because \ninverted intermediation liquidity is a “costly noise” in the monetary \npolicy process. Minimizing inverted intermediation liquidity is \ntherefore, necessary to minimize (1) its collateral damages on market \nfunctioning and macroeconomic stability and (2) to improve the \neffectiveness of monetary policy. I vote therefore, for increasing the \nprivate sector CRR from 15% to 20%. This significantly minimizes the \ncollateral damages of inverted intermediation liquidity. Analysis of \nprevious CRR increases has shown them to be very effective in \nstemming artificial pressures on the Naira but with a lag. The lag \neffect is actually the implementation lag. The old argument was that \nbecause of reserve averaging, it was necessary to effect the CRR \ndeductions at the end of the cycle. Policy effectiveness demands a \nzero implementation lag this time. In addition, closer supervision is \nnecessary to minimize the effectiveness of “policy neutralizing \nmoves”. \n61 \n \nI voted to maintain MPR at 12%. I understand the argument about \ncompensating for country risks to attract portfolio flows. However, I \nam not convinced by the argument. I am more convinced by the \nmedium to long term argument. In any case, the effects of MPR \nincreases are asymmetrical because of the asymmetries in the \nmoney market: wholesale borrowers with high interest rate elasticities \nare unlikely to be affected while retail sector borrowers with low \ninterest rate elasticities are most likely to be adversely affected. This \nwould heighten the risk of NPLs. \nI have consistently expressed my preference for asymmetric corridors \naround the MPR. My argument consistently has been that it is \nnecessary to improve the functioning of the interbank market. I also \nbelieve that economic agents respond to incentives. Therefore, \nimproving market functioning by a creative use of incentives is far \nmore critical to the effectiveness of monetary policies. Given that it is \nwell established that financial markets malfunction when incentives \nare distorted to favour the greedy and powerful whose allegiance is \nto a corrupted idea of self-worth, much efforts must be devoted to \nimproving market functioning. At this last MPC of 2014, I maintain the \nvote for an asymmetric corridor of -5 and +2 around the MPR. \n62 \n \nThe real challenge for economic management (monetary, fiscal \nand political economy) in 2015 and the medium term remains that \nof steering the economy seamlessly through the coming turbulence \nwhen the US Fed begins to increase rates and Europe and Japan \nremain weak. I therefore, feel compelled again to draw attention to \n(1) the fact that monetary policy is not a panacea (a cure all); (2) \nthe urgency of a rule-based and performance oriented forward \nlooking fiscal strategy and budgeting system and (3) the urgency of \neliminating all forms of distortions embedded the fiscal system and \nmonetary policy that undermine market functioning. The economic \ncircumstance of Nigeria today is best viewed as an opportunity for \npolicy makers on the monetary and fiscal sides to work together to \nbuild medium to long term resilience of the economy through \ncreative approaches to vulnerabilities, systemic coordination, \ncommitment problems and market functioning problems. \n \n7.0 LAWSON, I. STANLEY \n \nThe Global Economy \nThe Quantitative Easing program by the US Federal Reserve was \nterminated at the end of October 2014 and interest rates are \n63 \n \nexpected to rise thus ushering in a gradual transition to a regime of \ntightening in 2015. Plagued by strong vulnerabilities and associated \ndownside risks to growth, which is fuelled by rising geo-political \ntensions and increasing threats to financial markets in the emerging \nand frontier economies, the global economy is presently witnessing \nmoderate but uneven growth. Consequently, the International \nMonetary Fund (IMF) has recently downgraded its global growth \nforecast for 2015 to 3.3 per cent from an earlier projection of 3.7 per \ncent. Global growth may be further depressed by various existing \nand escalating regional conflicts. \nDriven by strong private consumption, export growth, and \ncontraction in imports, the US however continues to provide \nconsiderable tail wind as its economy expanded by 3.5% in Q3, 2014, \ncompared with a growth of 2.6% in Q2, 2014. Unemployment has \nfallen steadily month on month from 6.2% in July to 5.8% in October. \nThe Euro area continues to witness slight inflationary pressures as \ninflation rose from 0.3% in September 2014 to 0.4% in October 2014. \nUnemployment remained high at 11.5% in September while the \nECB’s policy rate remains unchanged at 0.05%. An uptick in global \n64 \n \ndemand, a weakening euro and the ECB’s monetary stimulus could \ncreate a benign environment for growth. \nGrowth in the emerging markets and frontier economies has been \nrevised downwards in 2014 to 4.4% with China witnessing its lowest \noutput growth of 7.4% since 1990. The GDP growth in China also \nslowed down from 7.5% in Q2 to 7.3% in Q3, 2014. \nFalling crude oil prices have exposed and intensified the risks and \nvulnerabilities faced by oil exporting countries. The sharp southward \ntrend in oil prices is due mainly to diminishing demand by the US, \nincreased supply by the US and other countries as well as the US \nproxy war with Russia. All of these have converged to inflict a drastic \nand direct negative impact on Nigeria’s foreign reserve. \nStaff research shows that growth in Sub Saharan African countries \ncontinues to be robust though marked down to 5.1% in 2014 from the \nearlier projection of 5.4% due to the contagious ripple effect of the \non-going sluggish global growth. Other downside risk factors that \nmay further dampen output growth of the region are external \nvulnerabilities, political crises, security threats and infrastructural \nchallenges in most countries of the region. \n \n65 \n \nThe Domestic Economy \nThe domestic economy though in a decline mode, has remained \ncomparatively strong and resilient with a real GDP growth of 6.23% in \nQ3, 2014, down from 6.54% in the preceding quarter. The main \nsectors contributing to the growth have remained services, \nagriculture and trade. Employment improved as a total of 349,343 \njobs were created in Q3, 2014 as against 259,353 created in Q2, \n2014. Inflationary pressure moderated across the three measures of \ninflation during the review period. Headline Inflation dropped \nsteadily from 8.5% in August to 8.1% in October; though this trend is \nexpected to reverse in the near term and trend northwards due to \nupside risks associated with increased spending in the build-up to the \nupcoming general elections in 2015, a potential hike in food inflation \narising from exchange rate pressures, and an expected increase in \nconsumption expenditure towards year end festivities. Staff forecasts \nhowever suggest that despite all of these, headline inflation would \nremain well anchored at single digit within the band at year-end. \nStaff research indicates that Interest rates in all segments of the \nmoney market showed further moderation between September and \nOctober 2014, reflecting persisting excess liquidity in the banking \n66 \n \nsystem. Available data also indicate that banking system liquidity \nhas been lavishly deployed in pursuit of speculative foreign \nexchange trading at the short-end of the market. \nThe maximum lending rate declined marginally from 25.77 to 25.75 \nper cent between September and October while the prime lending \nrate on the other hand increased from 16.44 to 16.48 per cent. \nWorthy of note, however, is the fact that developments in the \nexternal sector, particularly the oil industry in the recent past has \nmanifested in a build-up of pressures in the foreign exchange \nmarket. An attempt to maintain and stabilize the exchange rate at \nthe existing rDAS level saw gross official reserves decline from US$40.7 \nbillion in the middle of September, 2014 to $36.75 billion at end-\nOctober 2014. The Naira depreciation at both the interbank and the \nBDC segments of the market largely reflected recent demand \npressures arising from the falling oil prices, dwindling external \nreserves, and the resultant speculative posturing of economic \nagents. \nOf paramount concern is the declining level of external reserves \narising from demand and supply constraints. While excess liquidity \nconditions in the system and significant speculative activities \n67 \n \ncontinued to aid and catalyze demand pressures on the foreign \nexchange market, the falling oil prices steadily and considerably \nreduced the accretion to the external reserves. \nConsidering all the above, it is my candid opinion that firm and \ndrastic measures must be taken to stem speculative demand of \nforeign exchange and save the external reserves from further \ndepletion. I am also mindful of the need to avoid a situation of \nreverse capital flows especially on the back of the Fed’s termination \nof Quantitative Easing in October 2014. \nConclusion \nI am mindful of the enormous key risks and several challenges that \nwe face as a nation at this time of continued declining oil prices. \nThese risks and challenges which are diverse in content and effect, \ninclude high interest rates which negatively impacts credit extension \nto the real sector, high bank liquidity which is being channeled to \nspeculative foreign exchange positions, declining oil prices which is \nnegatively impacting our foreign reserves, domestic security \nchallenges with its attendant impact on food inflation, increasing \npressure on the exchange rate, and capital reverse flow challenges \nespecially in the face of the Fed’s termination of Quantitative Easing. \n68 \n \nI am reasonably persuaded that these risks and challenges, \nespecially in the face of non-existent fiscal buffers, are at this time \nbest mitigated using drastic and pointed monetary policy \nadjustments. \nI therefore vote as follows: \n1. \nIncrease the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) by 100 basis points to \n13% from 12% with a symmetric corridor of +/- 200 basis points \naround the MPR \n2. \nIncrease Cash Reserve Requirement (CRR) on private sector \nfunds to 20% from 15%, effective immediately. \n3. \nRetain CRR on public sector funds at 75%. \n4. \nMove the midpoint of the official window of the foreign \nexchange market to ₦168/US$ from ₦155/US$ and widen the \nband around the midpoint to +/-5% from +/-3%. \n5. \nRetain the foreign exchange trading position at 1 per cent. \n \n \n \n \n69 \n \n8.0 SALAMI, ADEDOYIN \nWith inflation remaining within band, reflecting on, and responding \nto the challenge posed by declining international price of crude oil \nprovided the background to this meeting of the MPC. \n \nSince conclusion of the MPC meeting, oil price has dropped below \nUS$70/barrel. Worse still, Bloomberg reports analysis by the \nInternational Energy Agency (IEA) which shows that US production of \noil, currently at 9million barrels, is set to rise further in 2015. In addition, \nthe IEA suggests that 80 per cent of US Shale oil is commercially \nviable at US48/barrel. In other words, the challenge of low oil prices is \nlikely \nto \nremain \nfor \na \nwhile \n– \nsee \nhttp://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014 – 11 – 30/oil – slumps – \nbelow – 65 – amid –opec – inaction – to – stem – glut.html. \n \nThe impact of declining oil prices on Nigeria is not difficult to discern \n– FOREX Reserve fall as export revenues drop; currency comes under \npressure as expectation of adjustment heighten; the threat to \ninflation also rises. Beyond these, the threat of disintermediation rises \nas currency substitution deepens. Systemic inefficiencies and \n70 \n \nperverse incentives mean that various ‘games’ to take advantage \nof arbitrage opportunities become irresistibly attractive – no matter \nhow much moral suasion regulators try. I have always struggled to \nunderstand the effectiveness of moral suasion in a framework that is \nat best amoral! \n \nWhilst arriving at the decision to tighten, in the circumstances of the \nmeeting was, for me, only difficult in the sense that whatever we \ndecided had to be viewed as being, at best, a short term decision \nprior to a whole strategic review of the direction and steps for \nmonetary policy. \n \nI have maintained for a while that when this day arrives – not if - , we \nwould have to decide the direction to go. For ease of recollection, \nuntil now, the strategy for managing inflation, which only kicked–in \nupon restoration of stability after the banking crisis, was to use a \nstable (or is it strong) currency to dis–inflate the economy. The \nstability of the currency derived from competitive (high) interest rates \nto attract foreign savings in the belief (hope) that as oil prices rise, \n71 \n \nbuffers would be rebuilt! As we now know, while inflation has \nmoderated, neither fiscal nor FOREX buffers have been rebuilt!!! \n \n The impact of widening the band within which the Naira fluctuates \nfrom 3 per cent to 5 per cent around the new mid – point of \nN168/US$ and raising the Monetary Policy Rate, measures which I \nsupport without reservation, will, in the short – term depend on what \nhappens to oil prices. As noted earlier, oil prices have, since the MPC \nrose from its meeting, eased further. Determination of an \nappropriate value for a currency is always a challenge – it is at best \nan imprecise exercise. Looking at various measures, the dollarization \nrate and the effective exchange rate give values ranging between \n₦167.4/US$ and ₦189.99/US$. \n \nWhether our chosen mid – point of ₦168/US$ is bold enough or not \nwill be revealed in time – maybe not as long as we may hope. \nHowever, this price point for the Naira and the band adopted bring \nboth the ‘Official’ and Interbank market exchange rates in - band. \n \n72 \n \nAs for the Monetary Policy Rate and the higher liquidity ratio, the \nincrease of 100bps for which I voted will hopefully help in stemming \ncapital outflow whilst the higher liquidity ratio of 20per cent should \noffer further protection to the currency pending resolution of issues \nabout strategic direction/framework for monetary policy. \n \nIn my judgment, the present situation requires greater boldness in \nreforming systemic inefficiencies. I have argued consistently for \nconsolidation of our FOREX Markets. Continuing to use the R/WDAS is \nsimply to afford subsidies, unfairly, to a section of our population. This \nsegmentation must be removed very urgently. It does us no credit \nand perpetuates a financial market subsidy enjoyed by a few – very \nsimilar to the subsidy on fuel!!! \n \nThere are some very contentious and difficult conversations ahead. \nThe proverbial wisdom of Solomon will be required as we seek to \nnavigate the challenges ahead with minimum damage to our \nnational economy. \n \n \n73 \n \n9.0 UCHE, CHIBUIKE U \nAlthough various Nigerian governments have since the country’s first \noil boom in the early 1970s consistently made public their \ndetermination to diversify the country’s oil dependent economy, \nvery little progress has been made in this direction till date. The \nrecent sharp and continuing decline in world crude oil prices have \nagain aptly brought out the need and urgency for government to \ntake this matter more seriously. Current data show that crude oil \nprices continue to fall with no clear indication as to when this will \nabet. A direct consequence of this is that the Nigerian government is \nclearly struggling to meet its budgeted obligations for the current \nyear. The basis for next year’s budget, which is still on the drawing \nboard, is also being revisited. The fact that the government has been \nforced to introduce austerity measures, a few months before the \n2015 general elections, no doubt underlines the gravity of the current \noil price driven economic downturn. \nBy far the greatest effect of the declining oil revenue on the Nigerian \neconomy is its impact on the exchange rate of the Naira. In recent \ntimes, we have seen a widening divergence between the interbank \nmarket rate, the Bureau de Change rate and the official exchange \n74 \n \nrate of the Naira. This has challenged the official position and \ndetermination of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to defend the \nvalue of the Naira. Perhaps more important is the fact that the \nincreasingly divergent rates of exchange for the Naira in the official \nand parallel markets have created huge arbitrage opportunities for \ndiverse \nstakeholders. \nUnder \nsuch \ncircumstances, \ncurrency \nspeculation has gained traction in our economy. With declining \nreserves, the ability of the CBN to defend the Naira at the current \nofficial exchange rate is questionable. \nIn the light of the above, it is my humble view that the time has \ncome for the Naira to be devalued in order to take into \nconsideration the new economic realities of our time. I am therefore \nin full support of the MPC decision to devalue the Naira. I am \nhowever convinced that unless Nigeria is able to rapidly expand and \ndiversify its economic base, this singular act may not be enough to \nstem the pressure on the country’s currency. It is on the basis of the \nabove that I have also come to the conclusion that there is need to \nfurther tighten money supply in the country. In my view, the \npreferable way to do this is to increase CRR on private sector \ndeposits held in Nigerian banks. While tightening money supply will \n75 \n \nincrease interest rates, which will be detrimental to the interest of the \nproductive sectors of our economy, the inflation and possibly other \ndevaluation consequences of doing nothing will in my view be even \nmore detrimental to the said sectors of our economy. \nIn the past, I have also proposed that CRR on public sector deposits \nbe increased to 100 per cent. At the very least this will help correct \nthe anomaly where government departments and agencies hold \nhuge amounts of money in current accounts attracting little or no \ninterests while at the same time borrowing funds at double digit \ninterest rates from banks. The implication of the above is that \nGovernment, because of the personal corrupt interests of its decision \nmakers and officers, subsidize bank profits at the expense of \npromoting national economic development. Despite the obvious \nadvantages of implementing its Treasury Single Account policy, \nprivate interests of policy makers have continued to help subvert this \nlaudable government policy. \nInterestingly, CBN investigations have revealed that banks have \nbeen sabotaging the current CBN regulation of charging 75 per cent \nCRR on government deposits by underreporting government \ndeposits. This in my view is economic sabotage. I strongly urge the \n76 \n \nmanagement of the CBN to stop treating such fraudulent acts with \nkid gloves. This is because there will be no incentive for Nigerian \nbanks to stop such dishonest practices unless it becomes clear to \nthem that the costs of operating outside the law outweigh the \nbenefits. In the light of the above evidence of widespread abuse of \nexisting CRR rules on public sector deposits, I see no need to \ncontinue to propose further increases to the CRR on such deposits at \nthe present time. \nAlthough I \nsupport \nmonetary \ntightening \nunder \nour \ncurrent \ncircumstances, I oppose that this be done through increase in MPR. \nThis is because I do not believe that we should be involved in \nformulating policies that will encourage the inflow of short term \nforeign capital which in the past constituted a major hindrance to \nour ability to grow our national reserves in a sustainable manner. The \nargument that increasing MPR at the present time may provide \nadditional incentives for short term foreign portfolio investors in \nNigeria not to flee has not been well thought through. In my view, \nthis is unlikely to result in the speculated outcome as there are \nseveral more important factors, like increasing national risks and \nopportunities and developments in other jurisdictions that determine \n77 \n \nthe behavior of foreign portfolio managers. While I would not at this \nstage recommend that restrictions be placed on capital account \nmovements in Nigeria, I am of the view that it would be an error to \ncontinue to overtly encourage the inflow of speculative short term \ncapital into our troubled economy. \nPerhaps a more important reason why I have refused to endorse the \ntightening of monetary policy through the instrument of MPR is the \nfact that our current MPR is already very high and by far above out \ninflation rate. Further increasing this will have a negative effect on \nour already high cost of credit to the real sector. Although various \nNigerian governments in the past made explicit their determination \nto develop the real sector of our economy, the recent deterioration \nin oil prices has now made the diversification of our mono product \neconomy a national emergency. \n In the light of the above factors, I hereby vote as follows: (1). To \nmove the midpoint of the official window of the foreign exchange \nmarket from ₦155/US$ to ₦168/US$; (2) to retain MPR at 12 per cent \nwith interest rate corridor of + 200/- 200 basis points; (3) to increase \nCRR on private sector deposits from 15 per cent to 20 per cent; (4) to \nretain CRR on public sector deposits at 75 per cent until the time \n78 \n \nwhen the CBN is able to effectively enforce the current policy, and; \n(6) to retain Liquidity Ratio at 30 per cent. \n \n10. YAHAYA, SHEHU \n \nI vote for a tightening of monetary policy to increase the MPR by 100 \nbasis points and to raise the CRR for private sector deposits to 20%. \nAll other variables and corridors to remain the same. Steps should \nalso be taken to re-align the value of the Naira to better reflect its \nreal exchange rate. My reasons are based on the current global \nfinancial and economic situation and the developments in the \nNigerian economy. \nGlobal Economic Developments \nClearly, the most important development which has the most \nsignificant effect on the Nigerian economy is the fall in the price of \ncrude oil. The price of Nigeria’s Bonny light crude has experienced a \nmore or less continuous fall in price from over US$110/barrel in mid-\n2013 to around US$78 this month, which is lower than it has been for \nmore than 3 years. Oil demand forecast for next year is also down. \nGiven the dependence of the country on oil revenues for foreign \n79 \n \nexchange earnings and government revenue, this obviously has a \nnumber of implications for the Economy. \nGrowth in the global economy, although providing a mixed picture, \nis generally tepid for the country’s main trading partners. There is \nfairly clear economic recovery in the US and UK, very slow and \nuneven recovery in the EU. China, although still enjoying a high \ngrowth rate, is experiencing a bit of a slowdown in its growth rates, \nJapan is stagnating, Brazil is in recession, while India is holding up. \nOverall, there does not appear to be near term prospects for clear \nand decisive spurts of international demand for Nigeria’s exports. \nGrowth in SSA remains strong, although it will require concerted \nefforts to limit the negative economic effects of EVD. \nOn the other hand, there is no concern at the moment for global \ninflationary pressures, as prices in the US, EU, Japan and China are \ngenerally on a downward trend. Foods, including cereal prices are \nalso stable. \nThe prospect for higher interest rates in the US is still present, given \nthe termination of QE3, despite the declared objective by the FOMC \nthat Federal funds rates are likely to remain at the current levels for \n80 \n \nsome time. The EU, Japan and lately China are all easing monetary \npolicy to stimulate growth in their economies. \nDevelopments in the Domestic Economy \nThe decline in international oil prices has had a significant impact on \nthe Naira exchange rate in the inter-bank market and BDC, on \nreserves, the capital market, as well as the distributable pool \naccount for the three tiers of government. Reserves have declined \nby a little over 14% during the year to just over US$ 36 billion in \nOctober, the ASI in the capital market has fallen by 11.6% since 2014 \nand market capitalization by a similar level. \nIn respect of the Naira exchange rate, it has obviously been a \nchallenge to try and maintain the rate around the 3% margin in \nRDAS. It has involved the deployment of significant amounts of \nexternal reserves to help shore up the currency. Further depreciation \nof the Naira will obviously impact significantly on future price levels \nand capital flows. \nGrowth rate of GDP remains solid at 6.23% in Q3 of 2014, mainly \ndriven by the non-oil sector and about 350,000 jobs have been \ngenerated in the economy during the quarter, although more than \n81 \n \nhalf of the jobs were in the insecure informal sector. There are some \nconcerns though with respect to Net domestic credit to the private \nsector which, at 9.3% this year, are both lower than the target rates. \nInflation has fallen to 8.1% in September 2014, mostly due to the fall in \nfood prices, although core inflation has also eased. However, the \ninflation outlook is upward-trending up to mid-2015. \nExpenditure of the federal government for the first half of 2014 was \nnearly 10% lower than the first half of 2013. Net credit to the federal \ngovernment this year is also lower than last year. Generally, the \nfederal government has been able to keep the deficit/GDP ratio \nlow. The main challenge is to extend this fiscal rectitude to the state \ngovernment level and to maintain the necessary discipline for all \nlevels of government during the election period in the face of \nmounting pressures for supplementary allocations. \nSummary and Conclusion \nThe main challenge facing the economy relates to the rapid decline \nin the price of crude oil in the past five months and its impact on the \nexchange rate, price levels, capital market, government revenue \nand business confidence. Tackling this problem requires a judicious \n82 \n \ncombination of fiscal, monetary and broader development policies. \nSome policies have already been articulated by the government to \nhelp rationalize the demand for foreign exchange and stabilize the \nvalue of the Naira \nFrom the monetary side, the current imperative is to deploy the \nnecessary tools to help stem excess liquidity in the economy and \nrationalize the demand for foreign exchange, provide necessary \nincentives to portfolio investors, preserve external reserves and \nmaintain confidence in the system. \nAccordingly, I vote to: \n Raise the CRR on private sector deposits from 15-20% \n Raise the MPR by 100 basis points to 13% \n Take steps to re-align the value of the Naira to better reflect its \nreal exchange and stave off speculative demand. \n \n \n \n \n83 \n \n11. EMEFIELE, I. GODWIN, GOVERNOR OF THE CENTRAL \n BANK OF NIGERIA AND CHAIRMAN, MONETARY POLICY \n COMMITTEE \n \nIn the last couple of months, the domestic economy broadly \ncontinued to be resilient to the strong global headwinds as well as \nthe spillover effects of exogenous factors especially when compared \nto its peers. At 6.23 percent in 2014Q3, although lower than the 6.54 \npercent recorded in the preceding quarter, the rate of economic \nexpansion remained robust. This reflected the significant growth in \nkey non-oil sectors especially services, agriculture and industry. The \naverage growth rate of 6.3 percent in the first three quarters of 2013 \nis remarkable given the tepid growth in the global economy and \nrecomputed domestic growth rates of 4.2 percent and 5.5 percent \nfor 2012 and 2013, respectively; following the GDP Rebasing Exercise. \nIn addition, the economy enjoyed a considerable degree of price \nstability as year-on-year consumer price inflation remained within the \ntarget band of 6 to 9 percent across all three measures of inflation in \n2014Q3. During the third quarter of the year, the economy created \n349,343 jobs with the private sector contributing almost 60 percent of \nthat number. The country’s financial system continues to look good \nbased on fundamental measures of stability, even though there is \n84 \n \nalways room for improvement. These developments provide \nreinforcing insulants for the economy particularly as staff forecasts \nsuggest continued robustness of growth and declining inflation in the \nnear-term. \nNonetheless, a number of vulnerabilities and risks are imminent \nespecially in the foreign exchange market. Demand pressure \nintensified at the domestic foreign exchange market causing a \nconsiderable degree of weakening of the domestic currency at \nboth the interbank and Bureau de Change (BDC) segments. During \nthe review period, the naira depreciated by 1.06 percent to \n₦165.55/US$ from ₦163.80/US$ and by 1.19 percent from ₦169.00/US$ \nto ₦170.00/US$ at the interbank and BDC segments, respectively. At \nthe official rDAS window, relative stability was experienced as the \nnaira depreciated marginally by ₦0.01k to ₦157.32/US$. The relative \nstability at the official window reflected the huge outlay of external \nreserves used by the CBN to defend the naira. \nTo maintain and stabilize the exchange rate over the course of this \nyear, the Bank has utilised considerable amount of its reserves to \nmaintain the value of the Naira. In contrast to the inflows of foreign \ncurrency during the same period, the CBN has had a deficit of flows. \n85 \n \nConsequently, the level of gross official reserves declined from \nUS$40.7 billion on 17th September 2014 to $36.75 billion at end-\nOctober 2014. From year to date, comparable oil exporting \ncountries have experienced substantial currency depreciation \nwhereas the naira has depreciated by only 1.74 percent. The \ndepreciation at both the interbank and the BDC segments largely \nreflected recent demand pressures arising from the falling oil prices \nand dwindling external reserves reinforced by the outflow of capital \nattributable to the end of the US Fed stimulus programme in October \n2014. \nWith regards to the foreign exchange market and inflationary \npressure, the domestic economy is exposed to a number of potential \nrisks both globally and locally. The main global realities includes: (i) \nthe sustained fall in oil prices; (ii) the end of Quantitative Easing by \nthe US Federal Reserve, which implied that the monthly injection of \nabout US$85 billion into the global economy suddenly ended; and \n(iii) subsisting sanctions against Russia for its alleged role in the on-\ngoing crisis in Ukraine. The bleak outlook provided by the IMF \nfollowing its lowered forecast for global economic expansion could \n86 \n \nimply a fall in the demand for oil which in addition to the shale oil \noperation of the US further depresses the international price of oil. \nSince the beginning of the year, oil prices have plunged by almost \n40 percent, from a peak of US$116 per barrel in January 2014 to as \nlow as US$72 per barrel. Evidences suggest that improvements in \ntechnology have lowered the break-even cost of shale oil \nproduction to an average range of US$52-US$70 per barrel. I believe \nthat this has caused a downward shift to occur in the oil demand \nfunction making the prevailing fall in oil prices non-transient. \nContinued decline in the price of oil has great ramifications for \nstability at the foreign exchange market, as it undermines the CBN’s \nflexibility at applying the external reserves for interventions. \nFurther pressure on the external reserves and domestic monetary \npolicy is due to the US Fed’s decision to normalize its monetary policy \nby stopping the massive injection of liquidity into the global \neconomy. The resultant repatriation of capital from domestic \neconomy particularly with relatively moderate level of market rates \nintensifies the pressure on the domestic currency and the external \nreserves. With the CBN’s ability to defend the naira and sustain the \nstability of the naira exchange rate being constrained by the \n87 \n \ndepleting reserves, a widening arbitrage premium opened up at the \nforeign exchange market between the rDAS exchange rate and the \nrates in the other segments. \nAnother prominent issue I considered in this respect is that the \ndemand pressure in the foreign exchange market is invigorated \nessentially by the liquidity surfeit in the banking system and \nspeculative activities. As banks remained cautious to lending, the \nsturdy liquidity condition failed to bring about increased credit to the \nreal sector to engender inclusive growth and boost employment but \nwas instead applied to the foreign exchange market and Standing \nDeposit Facility window of the CBN. Accordingly, I am of the view \nthat the prevailing challenge calls for unhesitant measures in the \nmanagement of the nation’s stock of foreign exchange reserves in \norder to align the market towards its long-run equilibrium path. \nOn domestic prices, I note the satisfying outlook based on Staff \nestimates that suggest a continued stability in consumer price \ninflation within a single-digit range in the near-term if appropriate \npolicy measures were adopted. I also recognize the upside risks to \ninflation in the near term to include intensified fiscal activities and \nspending in the run-up to the 2015 General Elections, pass-through \n88 \n \nfrom depreciating exchange rate following heightened pressure at \nthe foreign exchange market, and food supply shocks arising from \nthe increased insurgency activities in the major agricultural belts of \nthe country. Besides, the impressive output growth recorded in the \nyear to date could be hampered in the future if the insurgency in the \nNorth East of the country is not abated, and bleak global outlook \ncontinued. \nIn this regard, I believe that bold policy action should be taken to \ndampen the effects of prevailing unsavoury conditions and shield \nthe economy against potential upside risks. While I acknowledge the \nshort-run ramifications of tightening of monetary conditions on credit, \naggregate demand and growth, it will be sub-optimal not to act \ndecisively and immediately, especially as the cost of postponing \nsuch action will only increase exponentially. Given that the \noverriding objective of the CBN is to ensure price stability, I believe \nthat: \n A decision to tighten monetary policy will shield the economy \nfrom the imminent global and domestic risks while ensuring that \ninflationary pressure and inflation expectations are well \nanchored; \n89 \n \n A decision to raise the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) can be \nexpected to increase capital inflows into the country, which \nshould improve accretion to reserves; \n An increase in the CRR will dampen excess liquidity available to \nbanks for speculative and arbitrage activities and moderate \nthe pressure in the foreign exchange market; \n A gradual realignment of the official rDAS exchange rate with \nthe rates in the other segments, reduces the currently attractive \npremium and discourages arbitrage tendencies in the market; \nand \n A lower value of the naira would also make Nigerian exports \ncheaper, which should encourage other countries to buy more \nNigerian goods with a potential for increased job creation in \nthe domestic economy. \n \n \n \n \n90 \n \nIn the light of the above, I vote as follows: \n1. Increase the MPR by 100 basis points from 12.0 to 13.0 \npercent; \n2. Increase the CRR on private sector deposits by 500 basis \npoints from 15.0 to 20.0 percent with immediate effect; \n3. Move the midpoint of the official window of the foreign \nexchange market from ₦155/US$ to ₦168/US$; \n4. Widen the band around the midpoint by 200 basis points \nfrom ±3.0 percent to ±5.0 percent; \n5. Retain public sector CRR at its current level of 75.0 percent; \n6. Maintain a symmetric corridor of ±200 basis points around the \nMPR; and \n7. Retain the net open foreign exchange trading position at 1.0 \npercent.", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/Central Bank of Nigeria Communique No  98 November 2014.doc (With Personal Statements).pdf"}
{"doc_id": "803f4079bcd7c5cd9e8f46f8361d508b", "text": "1 \n \nCentral Bank of Nigeria Communiqué No. 79 of the Monetary Policy \nCommittee Meeting, October 10, 2011 \n \nThe Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) held an extraordinary \nmeeting on 10th October, 2011 in response to unusual developments \nin the global and domestic economy, with potential negative \nimpact on domestic liquidity conditions and renewed threats to \nprice and exchange rate stability. \nThe global economic horizon remains highly uncertain, with the signs \ngetting more ominous as policy makers find it increasingly difficult to \ntake the necessary economic decisions that may avert a new wave \nof recession. Three self-reinforcing negatives continue to define the \nglobal economy: the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, significant \nundercapitalization of internationally-active banks, and negative \nmarket sentiment leading to continuing flight to cash as a safe \nhaven and deleveraging. The first and second aspects intensify the \nthird, and without confidence and some appetite for financial assets \nand credit, the debt crisis and financial solvency concerns in turn \nbecome deeper. \nAs a result of these concerns about the Eurozone, coupled with the \nUS deficit problem, inflation in emerging markets, debates about a \nsoft or hard-landing in China and other pessimistic scenarios, there is \na trend towards reversal of capital flows to emerging and frontier \nmarkets, and a recent depreciation in the national currencies of \n2 \n \nmany economies in Asia and Latin America including India, \nIndonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and \nMexico, among others. In Africa, the national currencies of Kenya, \nSouth Africa, Gabon, Ghana and Nigeria have also been under \npressure. Central banks have generally responded through direct \nintervention in the foreign exchange market to stabilize the currency \nand, in some cases, a significant hike in policy rates. It is worthy of \nnote that fund managers have not been eager to exit environments \nwith relatively high real rates of interest and benign inflation outlook. \n \nThe Domestic Economy and Committee’s Deliberations \nThe growth outlook for the economy does not appear to have \nchanged much, driven largely by the positive forecasts for the non-\noil sector as noted in the last MPC communiqué. Inflation had come \ndown to 9.3 per cent in August but, as indicated in the same \ncommuniqué, a combination of monetary, fiscal and structural \nfactors continue to advise against complacency. \nThe naira has come under increasing pressure, and has recently \ntraded outside the band of N150 +/- 3.0 per cent. In the \nCommittee’s view, the increasing pressure on the domestic currency \nhas been emanating from a number of sources not all of which can \nbe addressed by purely monetary interventions. First, there are \nconcerns about the likely impact of a double dip recession on oil \n3 \n \nprices and already declining foreign reserves. Second, there are also \nconcerns about the delay in implementing fundamental economic \ndecisions that will shore up reserves. Specifically, it is estimated that \nsimply passing the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) and removing subsidies \non Premium Motor Spirit (PMS) will add at least US$10 billion to \nnational reserves annually. The petroleum subsidy for 2011 alone is \nestimated to be about US$6 billion. A substantial part of oil \nproduction (about 40 per cent) is currently in deep offshore wells. \nBased on the terms agreed in the 1990s when oil price was under \nUS$30, royalty from oil wells deeper than 1,000 metres is zero per cent \nand the nation is paid only 20 per cent of the profit by oil companies \nafter deducting their expenses. As a result, the country has had \nlimited benefits from high oil prices and increasing output, with most \nof the gains going to multinational oil companies under an \ninequitable fiscal arrangement. \n \nSimilarly, the Committee expressed concerns about the genuineness \nof demand for petroleum imports. This year alone, oil importers have \nbought over US$7.0 billion from wDAS, thereby, depleting the \nNation’s external reserves. This demand, in the Committee’s view, \nmight have been fuelled by rent-seeking and subsidies. \n \nIt is imperative that the enabling legislation for correcting fiscal terms \nbe put in place under a Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) that reflects \n4 \n \ninternational best practice. Unfortunately, discordant voices are \ndelaying these processes to the long-term detriment of the \neconomy. Whereas the labour unions have genuine concerns \nabout the impact of subsidy removal on the poorer segments of \nsociety, the stark reality is that the country is living above its means. \n \nThe Greek government recently passed a budget in which 33,000 \npublic sector workers had to be retrenched as a result of failure to \ntake difficult but necessary economic decisions in the past. Nigeria \ncannot afford to delay, any further, the reforms of the petroleum \nindustry. \n \nThird, the draft 2012 budget and the underlying assumptions are \nbased on an oil price of US$75 per barrel and an output of 2.4 million \nbarrels per day. This makes the 2012 budget even more \nexpansionary than the 2011 budget and further dampens any hope \nfor an early fiscal retrenchment. The fiscal authorities have clearly \nsignaled a commitment to medium-term consolidation and indeed \nthe projected deficit in 2012 is lower than the deficit in the 2011 \nbudget. This notwithstanding, the projected increase in spending, \nparticularly the high levels of recurrent expenditure, would suggest \nincreasing pressure on prices in general. \n \n5 \n \nFourth, structural bottlenecks in the Nigerian economy that \nperpetuate import dependence make import-demand highly \ninelastic. \nFinally, real interest rates have been low, partly driven by a cautious \napproach to monetary tightening at a time of financial system \ninstability. Although the MPC recognized inflationary pressures and \nhas consistently acted prudently in policy tightening based on \nexpectations, a gradualist approach has been the pattern thus far, \ngiven the situation with the banking system and equity markets. \n \nPolicy Issues and Dilemmas \nIn the face of the spectre of declining oil prices, declining foreign \nreserves, increased demand for foreign exchange, fiscal dominance \nand capital flow reversals, monetary policy must bear a larger \nburden of economic adjustment. The MPC has, therefore, to make \ndifficult choices, each of which has clear costs and benefits. \nOne option is protecting reserves by reducing the supply of dollars at \nthe wDAS. This will lead to a rapid depreciation of the currency and \nthe emergence of a parallel market, leading to further pressures on \nthe Naira, imported inflation and a general loss of confidence on the \npart of investors. \nIndeed, the impact on price and exchange rate stability will be such \nas to undermine the key mandates of the Central Bank. Given the \n6 \n \nhighly inelastic demand for imports, it is doubtful that increasing the \ncost of dollars will significantly reduce quantity demanded. Indeed, \ngenuine demand will be compounded by high levels of speculative \ndemand. \nA second option is to address monetary and liquidity conditions \nmore aggressively. By tightening liquidity and raising domestic \ninterest rates, a number of advantages follow. First, this is the logical \nresponse to fiscal expansion, especially with the anticipated capital \nreleases in the fourth quarter as well as repayment of backlog of \nNigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) debt to the \nFederation \naccount. \nSecond, \nit \nprovides \nan \nincentive \nfor \nreallocation of portfolios by improving real returns of holding the \nnaira as a store of value. Third, it increases, after a lag, the rates paid \non deposits and savings, thus reversing any tendency towards \ndisintermediation and capital flight. Finally, it increases the cost of \nforeign currency positions held for speculative purposes, and \nreduces the tendency to pre-pay dollar obligations with naira \nliabilities. \nThe option has disadvantages in the form of high lending rates, \nfinancial cost to the banking system and possible losses on fixed \nincome instruments due to capital losses. Besides, tightening of \nliquidity would run the risk of slowdown in credit growth. \n7 \n \nHaving considered the pros and cons of each option (and \ncombinations of options), the Committee is of the view that given \nthe completion of shareholder meetings on all banks and approvals \nfrom the courts for many, the risks to the banking system of tighter \nliquidity conditions have been significantly reduced, as the banks \nare in the process of receiving all approvals and fresh capital \nincluding AMCON bonds. \nNow that the \nbanking system \nrecapitalization is complete, monetary policy can be freed from \nconcerns about its impact on financial system stability. \nThe Committee reaffirmed its belief that maintaining exchange rate \nstability, especially in times of global uncertainty, is crucial to the \nmandate of price stability. Moreover, the interest of the economy is \nbest served, by maintaining an unequivocal stance of non-\naccommodative \nmonetary \npolicy, \ngiven \nthe \nexisting \nfiscal \nconditions. \nThe Committee also reaffirmed its commitment to improving returns \non naira assets and protecting the capital of investors against \nerosion due to huge exchange rate losses, in order to encourage \nappropriate asset allocation decisions. \nThe Committee recognized the need to remain very clear on the \nBank’s primary mandate and maintain the credibility it has \nestablished so far by sending strong signals of continuing \ncommitment to price and exchange rate stability. \n8 \n \nFinally, the Committee noted that the Committee of Governors has \nalready commenced full investigation of compliance with rules \ngoverning foreign exchange transactions by authorized dealers and \nendorsed the declared commitment to sanction all infractions and \nimprove the level of supervision and compliance in the market. \n \nDecisions: \n1. The monetary policy rate (MPR) is raised by 275 basis points \nfrom 9.25 per cent to 12.0 per cent (by a vote of 8 in favor and \n1 in favor of status quo); \n2. Maintain the current symmetric corridor of +/-200 basis points \naround the MPR (by unanimous vote); \n3. The cash reserve ratio(CRR) is increased from 4.0 per cent to 8.0 \nper cent from the maintenance period beginning October 11, \n2011 by a vote of 7 to 2 (2 members voted for a 6.0 per cent \nCRR); \n4. The net open position (NOP) is reduced from 5.0 per cent to 1.0 \nper cent of share-holders funds with immediate effect and with \nfull compliance by Friday, October 14, 2011 (by unanimous \nvote); and \n9 \n \n5. It was further agreed that the reserve averaging method of \ncomputation be suspended in favour of daily maintenance \nuntil further notice. \n \n \n \nSanusi Lamido Sanusi, CON \nGovernor \nCentral Bank of Nigeria \n \nOctober 10, 2011 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n10 \n \nPERSONAL STATEMENTS BY MPC MEMBERS: \n1.0 \nALADE, SARAH \nThe renewed pressure on the foreign exchange market despite \nstrong economic fundamentals is of serious concern to the \nconduct of monetary policy. To stabilize the foreign exchange \nmarket and restore confidence in the economy, there is need for \nmonetary policy intervention to stem the sharp decline of the \nnaira and reduce the pressure in the short run. Nigeria is not alone \nas emerging markets around the world are making efforts to shore \nup their falling currencies amid concerns that the global \neconomic growth may stall. These responses have ranged from \nincreasing monetary policy rate and/or reserve requirements, or \nrestricted use of foreign reserves/sales. To rein in the intense \npressure on the foreign exchange market and better anchor \ninflation expectation, I support an increase in monetary policy \nrate and Cash Reserve Requirements (CRR). \n \nGlobal growth prospect has become grimmer. Developments in \nthe global economy over the past few weeks are a matter of \nserious concern. The downgrading of the US sovereign debt \nrating, the continuing sovereign debt crisis in the euro zone and \nvolatile commodity prices have led to increasing global anxieties. \nThese events are taking place against the backdrop of a \n11 \n \nslowdown in growth in many of the advanced economies. \nGrowth momentum is weakening in the advanced economies \namidst heightened concerns that recovery may take longer than \nearlier expected. Although Nigeria’s exports have performed well \nin the recent period, this trend is unlikely to be sustained in the \nface of weakening global demand. This combined with intense \npressure on the foreign exchange market calls for policy \nresponses to help restore confidence and anchor inflation \nexpectation. \nWhile headline inflation declined to 9.3 percent in August, upside \nrisk to inflation still exist. The global food and energy prices remain \nelevated, and as an import dependent country, global food \nprices could spill over to higher domestic prices. Food inflation \ninched up to 8.7 percent in August from 7.9 percent in July even in \nthe middle of the harvest season. As global commodity prices \ncontinue to remain at an elevated level and given that the \ncountry import food stuff such as rice, there may be heighten \nupside risks to domestic inflation. \nThe planned removal of fuel subsidy and the increase in electricity \ntariff could pose upside risk to inflation in the short-run. The Federal \nGovernment resolve to remove the fuel subsidy coupled with the \nincrease in electricity tariffs is bound to increase price inflation. \nFurthermore, real interest rate compared to neighboring \ncountries continue to be negative. To attract inflows into \n12 \n \nthe country, this condition needs to be corrected with sensible \nmonetary policy tool. \n \nFourth quarter capital releases by the Federal Government is \nexpected to be huge. Expenditure in the fourth quarter is \nexpected to be expansionary as government aims to complete \ncapital projects started during the year by the end of the budget \nperiod. This bundled expenditure is bound to put upward pressure \non both inflation and exchange rate as some of the capital \nprocurement would have high import content. \n \nWhile there are still pockets of downside risks in the domestic \nbanking sector, the resolution action taken by AMCON is \nstabilizing the system. The return in confidence to the banking \nsector, and the AMCON injection of funds through sale of AMCON \nbonds could impact the level of liquidity in the banking sector. \nRising policy rate may help channel the additional liquidity to \nproductive uses in the economy rather than non-productive and \nspeculative activities. \n \nBased on the above, I will recommend an increase in monetary \npolicy rate by 275 basis points and an increase in Cash Reserve \nRequirement (CRR) to help stabilize the currency and fend off \ninflationary pressures. \n13 \n \n2.0 BARAU, SULEIMAN \nA. \nStrictly guided by the context and framework that influenced \nmy voting decision at the last Monetary Policy Committee \nmeeting, I voted again today to support further tightening \nthrough the following specific measures; \n \nA.1 Upward adjustment of the MPR by 2.75% to 12% \nA.2 Upward adjustment of the Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) from 4.0% \nto 8%. \nA.3 Retention of symmetric corridor of plus and minus 2% around \nthe MPR (Standing Deposit Rate of 10% and Standing Lending \nRate of 14%). \nA.4 Support other administrative measures to reign in demand for \nforeign exchange namely; reduction of the Deposit Money \nbanks Net Open Position and adoption of appropriate \nsanctions for foreign exchange infractions and so on. \nB. \nThe rationale for voting the way I did is summarized as follows; \n \nB.1 \nCurrent liquidity levels have supported increased speculative \ndemand for foreign exchange. There is evidence of huge \nliquidity in the banking system as demonstrated by liquid asset \nholding of banks and their liquidity ratios. In effect, the huge \nliquidity injected in 2008 and the subsequent quantitative \neasing monetary policy measures in response to the global \n14 \n \nfinancial crises have not been mopped up in spite of the \nrecent aggressive stance. In addition, the system liquidity has \nbeen exacerbated by Governments fiscal operations including \nthe monetization of excess crude account balances. \nB.2 The liquidity outlook is also not so good in the light of \nanticipated AMCON liquidity injection and Government’s fiscal \noperations particularly relating to further drawdown from the \nExcess Crude Account and the normal year and capital \nrelated activities of Ministries, Departments and Agency of \nGovernment. \nB.3 \nThe obvious speculative attacks on the Naira in the foreign \nexchange market continued in spite of various policy measures \nrecently adopted by the MPC. Foreign reserves have \ncontinued to decline in spite of the recent significant \nimprovement in inflows from the NNPC. Speculative demand \ncould only be sustained in a regime of relatively low interest \nrates, lack of alternative profitable investment outlets, current \nand future anticipated liquidity position in the market. It has \ntherefore become necessary to take further steps to tighten \nliquidity. \nB.4 \nInflation is still a threat and further tightening stance would help \nto arrest the threat. It is recognized that the measures \nrecommended would increase money market and lending \n15 \n \nrates and may affect lending and output growth. With inflation \ntrending down, however, real interest rates would therefore be \npositive as a result of further tightening. Besides, in the context \nof current liquidity situation, liquidity outlook, threat to Naira \nexchange rates and declining foreign reserves, the measures \nrecommended become even more compelling. Given the \nstructure of our economy and observed historical reactions \nwhen the Naira depreciates, the greatest threat to inflation is a \ndepreciating Naira and we have to do whatever is necessary \nto eliminate the liquidity driven speculative demand. \nIn effect, I hold the very strong view that any depreciation in \nthe value of the Naira must be driven by fundamental and real \nfactors. I’m convinced that the recent demand pressure on \nthe Naira exchange rate is powered by factors that are \nspeculative and technical factors, of course supported by \nhuge market liquidity. \nC. \nThe measures recommended are no doubt very strong and \nwould produce unintended impact on interest rates and credit \ngrowth. I am however aware that the next MPC meeting \nscheduled to hold in November, does provide an opportunity \nfor a quick review of market developments and the measures \ntaken. \n \n16 \n \n3.0 LEMO, TUNDE \nI have closely followed the review of the domestic and international \neconomic \nand \nfinancial \nenvironments \nand \nobserved \nsome \nworrisome developments. Global economic conditions deteriorated \nas shown by the increased downside risks and sluggish growth \ncaused by fiscal constraints and declining confidence in the \nresilience of the financial system. The potential eurozone banking \nsystem undercapitalization, rising global inflationary trends, declining \npublic confidence in the euro and the US fiscal problems, are \nmanifests of uncertain global economic outlook. \nOn the domestic front, the fragile global output, negative market \nsentiments and declining international oil prices have serious \nconsequences for the domestic economy, particularly, the foreign \nexchange market and the country’s external reserves position. I \nhave also noted of late elevated forex demand, largely driven by \nspeculation which resulted in the recent trading of the naira outside \nthe band of N150 +/- 3.0 per cent. I also observed that although, \nheadline inflation declined to 9.3 per cent in August from 9.4 per \ncent, in July, 2011, inflationary pressures may persist for the rest of the \nyear due to the recent announcement effect of the proposed \nremoval of petroleum subsidy, increase in electricity charges, \nanticipated expansionary fiscal stance in the fourth quarter of 2011, \ninjection of new capital into the intervened banks by the new core \n17 \n \ninvestors and the expected liquidity injections by AMCON before the \nend of the year, as well as high household expenditures associated \nwith end of year festivities. \nOverall, the recent unusual developments evidenced in the liquidity \nsurfeit in the banking system fuelled the unprecedented demand \npressures in the foreign exchange market. This situation had negative \neffects on the level of external reserves and sustenance of \nexchange rate stability. It is, therefore, necessary that a very non – \naccommodative stance be taken by the MPC so as to halt further \ndeterioration in domestic economic conditions. \nIn view of the foregoing, I recommend further aggressive monetary \ntightening stance. In this regard, I vote for an increase of 275 basis \npoints in the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) and maintain the \nsymmetric corridor of plus or minus 2 per cent around the MPR; an \nincrease in the Cash Reserve Ratio from 4 per cent to 8 per cent and \na reduction of the Net Open Position of banks from 5 per cent of \nshareholders’ funds to 1 per cent. In conclusion, I also agree that the \nreserve averaging method of computation of Cash Reserve Ratio be \nsuspended in favour of daily maintenance until further notice. \n4.0 MOGHALU, KINGSLEY CHIEDU \nAt this Extraordinary Meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee, \nconfronted with the context of a threatening economic \nenvironment \n– \nthe \nnaira \nunder \nincreased \npressure, \nthe \n18 \n \nannouncement of the Federal Government’s plan to remove \npetroleum subsidy in the forthcoming 2012 budget and the \ninflationary expectations thus unleashed, and imminent, massive \nliquidity injections by the fiscal authorities and the Asset \nManagement Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) – the MPC clearly \nneeds to take strong action. \nThis is so especially in relation to the naira as a store of value, with \nthe markets factoring in widespread but mistaken sentiment that \nthe naira is about to be devalued. Should this mistaken notion \ntake hold, it will result in a massive run on the naira. Combined \nwith \nthe \nongoing \nand \nanticipated \nliquidity \ninjections, \na \ndepreciation of the naira at this time would undoubtedly result in \na marked increase in inflation that would have a destabilizing \nimpact on the Nigerian economy. \nIt is necessary to reassert the commitment of the Central Bank of \nNigeria to the stability of the naira and to restraining inflation in no \nuncertain terms. The restoration of increased stability to the \nbanking system through the successful recapitalization of the \neight intervened banks makes such strong action at this time \npossible without significant adverse consequences for financial \nstability. This time, however, the MPC needs to deploy a \ncombination of tools designed to prevent the excess liquidity - \nincluding within the banking system - that is feeding continued \n19 \n \nspeculation on the value of the naira. Against this backdrop, I \nvote for: \n(i) An increase of the Monetary Policy Rate by 275 basis points \nfrom the current 9.25 per cent, and maintaining a symmetric \ncorridor of plus or minus 2 per cent. \n(ii) An increase in the Cash Reserve Ratio of 100 per cent from the \ncurrent 4 per cent to 8 per cent. \n(iii) \nA reduction of the Net Open Position of banks from 5 per \ncent of shareholders’ funds to 1 per cent. \n \n5.0 OLOFIN, SAM \nThis is an emergency meeting which by its very nature suggests \nnew developments that have implications for the economy have \noccurred since our last meeting, and for which urgent corrective \nmeasures may be` required before the next statutory meeting of \nthe MPC. Without necessarily wanting to sound like an alarmist \nreading of the current situation, recent developments at the \nforeign exchange market which no doubt reflect market reaction \nto both domestic as well as external disturbances have been \nquite worrisome. The various market signals suggest a declining \nconfidence in the Naira as a store of value, and hence the \nunabated ever rising demand for the dollar. This has led to a sharp \n20 \n \ndecline in the level of foreign reserves by US$2.65 to $31.36 billion \nor nearly 8 percent decline by Oct. 6, 2011, compared with the \nfigure of $34.01 billion as at September 20, 2011. Similarly the rate \nof exchange has over the same period moved above the upper \nthree percent bound set around the target rate of N150: $1 that \nhas been sustained over the last several months. Evidence \navailable to us at this meeting shows that Reserve Money (RM) \nhas fluctuated above the quarterly indicative benchmarks set for \nquarters 1, 2 and 3, in 2011 suggesting the existence of excess \nliquidity in the system that may among other factors be fuelling \nthe hedging against the Naira, and the resulting rapid decline in \nthe level of reserves. If these facts are put side by side with the \ndevelopments in the global economy which suggest the \nlikelihood of a double-dip recession in the advanced economies \nand likely fall in demand for energy in both developed and \nemerging economies, we are likely to be confronted in the short \nto medium term with a possible decline in the price of oil which \nwould further accentuate the pressure on the Naira. \nAs a highly import depend economy with less than elastic \ndemand for imports and exports, it would be futile to contemplate \nforeign exchange adjustment or outright devaluation to ease the \npressure on the Naira. It is our strong view that not only would \ndevaluation further exacerbate the pressure on the Naira, it would \nheighten the current surge in the demand for foreign exchange. \n21 \n \nWe may therefore in no time have to be confronted with the \nbleak prospects not only of halting the accretion but of a possible \nwiping out of existing reserves! There is therefore an urgent need \nfor a combination of both administrative and appropriate \nmonetary policy measures to stem the growing speculative attack \non the Naira and level of foreign reserves. Given the current and \nforeseeable developments in a turbulent if not depressing outlook \nof the global economy, a stable exchange rate and a rising \naccretion rate in the level of reserves are about the most effective \ninsurance \nthe \neconomy \nhas \nagainst \nany \nlikely \nexternal \ndisturbances, and for being able to sustain current level of \neconomic activity as well as promote growth. \nEvery indication on the fiscal side shows that inflationary pressure \nreduction through fiscal consolidation is not likely to be \nachievable in the short term, at least not in the 2011-2012 budget \nperiods. Similarly the structural constraints to growing credit and \nlending to the real sector are not likely to improve in the short run, \ngiven the current interest inelasticity of investment in the real \nsector. We are therefore still left with a considerable room of \nleverage for a policy stance that may raise the level of interest \nrate without necessarily or unduly harming the prospects for \ngrowth in the short to medium term. Secondly we are still far \nbehind competing countries like Ghana and South Africa in \nbringing our MPR to a positive level that would make us more \n22 \n \ncompetitive in attracting both FDI and portfolio capital. A positive \nreal interest rate is also desirable for encouraging growth in \ndomestic saving. \nIn the light of the foregoing, our current challenging situation \nleaves the MPC with little or no choice but to utilize every \navailable means within its reach to halt the current run on foreign \nreserves and weakening of the Naira. This would require a \ncombination of very strong monetary tightening signal beyond \nthe symbolic levels hitherto undertaken, coupled with necessary \nadministrative measures, to arrest the growing attack on the level \nof reserves and the Naira. I would therefore vote for an upward \nadjustment of the CRR from its current level of four to eight \npercentage points, and the MPR raised by 275 basis points from its \ncurrent level of 9.25 to 12 percent, and retaining existing \nsymmetric corridor. Our next meeting within the next one month \nwould offer the opportunity for evaluating the effectiveness of \nthese measures in achieving the desired goals of reducing \ninflation rate, maintaining a stable exchange rate and drastically \nreducing the speculative demand for foreign exchange. \n \n6.0 OSHILAJA, JOHN \nInflation expectations in Nigeria are correlated with expectations \nof adverse changes in exchange rates for the Naira. Nigeria’s is \n23 \n \ncurrently a highly import-dependent economy. Accordingly, a \ngoal of Monetary Policy has to been to maintain relative price \nstability by also supporting (using tools at its disposal) relatively \nstable exchange rates. Since FY 2009, it has been the policy of \nthe Central Bank to maintain exchange rates for the US Dollar \nwithin a +/- 3% range around N 150.00; i.e. at a “quasi-pegged \nrate”. There are fundamentally only two ways to do this. The \nCentral Bank can ensure the supply of sufficient foreign currency, \nby drawing upon its reserves to meet the nation’s demands at the \ndesired price. Or, it can adjust levels of available Naira needed \nto pay for foreign currency. The first approach has been the \nCBN’s principal Exchange Rate Management strategy. This mostly \nexplains why, over a 2-year period characterized by high oil prices \nand high capacity export production, the CBN’s holdings of \nforeign \ncurrency \nreserves \nhave \nfallen \nfrom \na \nhigh \nof \napproximately N 60 billion, and have been hard pressed to \nexceed the top of a N 32-36 billion range observable so far in FY \n2011. \nSince our meeting of 20 September, despite repeatedly expressed \nconcerns about the impact of fiscally-sponsored liquidity in our \nmarkets, and measures taken to mitigate clear threats to local \ncurrency values, exchange rates for the Naira have breached \nand remained above desired target-levels. Which brings us to \nwhere we stand today – with the Naira trading as high as N 164 in \n24 \n \ninterbank markets, annual inflation at 9.3%, and the Monetary \nPolicy Rate progressively increased from 6% to 9.25% within a 12-\nmonth time span. Market behavior and expectations now seem \nto be running well ahead of policy action, thus compounding the \nCentral Bank’s targeting efforts. Fast-breaking developments of \nthe past few weeks also bring into stark relief the challenge \nMonetary Policy faces in utilizing exchange rate targeting to \nanchor price stability when Fiscal Policy is lax. The effectiveness of \nCentral Bank liquidity management tends to be harmfully diluted \nwhen Naira amounts drained by the Central Bank are inevitably \nreplenished, and thus cancelled out, by Government spending \noperations. This is the liquidity that invariably throws the currency \nmarket system out of balance by promoting disproportionately \noutsized demands for foreign currency, which thereby weakens \nthe Naira. Under these circumstances it makes little sense to \nthrow good reserves (i.e. hard currency) after bad (i.e. soft \ncurrency). Especially, when further options remain available for \ntackling demand sides of this currently, unbalanced equation. \nThe MPC decisions taken today may be characterized as a \n“stake” the Committee has driven into the ground – a stake \nbased on Central Bank Liquidity Demand Management measures. \nTethered around this stake will be a number of administrative and \nmarket-oriented measures to be rolled out, for the following \npurposes expressly: \n25 \n \n1. \nIncrease the Naira’s attractiveness as a store of value \n2. \nEnsure that non-speculative demands for foreign currency \n \ncontinue to be met \n3. \nPromote \na \nconducive \nMonetary \nenvironment \nfor \n \nenhanced Foreign Investment \nAccordingly, the first thing that has to go is the implicit cost-\nsubsidy the investing public affords governments for sovereign \nand sub-national investment securities; i.e. Bills and Bonds. Savers \nutilizing domestic fixed-income markets must be paid competitive, \nreal-term, rates of interest. Hence the MPC’s initiation of a real \ninterest rate regime, by an elevated increase in the MPR to 12%, \nwith corresponding normal symmetries for the CBN’s Deposit and \nLending Facilities; i.e. -/+ 2% respectively. \nThe second measure entails addressing the level of perverse \ninvestment incentives in the banking sector. Nigerian DMB’s \nappear to be holding (and funding) extraordinarily high levels of \nNaira assets, in the form of tax-free Government Treasury Bills and \nBonds. This represents a conversion of surplus bank liquidity into \ncomparatively risk-free assets. Most seem to be paying for these \nlucrative holdings with far cheaper deposit monies. I see nothing \nwrong with any bank turning an easy Naira profit, given prudent \nand legal opportunities to do so. However, in the current \nenvironment, I believe the costs our banks incur in temporarily \n26 \n \ntransforming such holdings into cash, to meet higher yielding \ndemands (such as for business loans), is unacceptably low. This is \nalso to say that current spreads between FGN Government \nsecurities’ yields and penal CBN repo rates – for which the same \nsecurities are required as collateral – are too low. Especially given \nthat a significant proportion of the proceeds of such credits are \nlikely to hit currency markets under fiscally-boosted demand for \nimports. The increase in the Cash Reserve Ratio is intended \nimmobilize further surplus banking liquidity; with added aims of \ncompelling our banks to moderate their current security holding \npreferences, \nand \nchallenging \ncurrent \ncash \nmanagement \npractices in the industry. \nLastly, upon our review of the available evidence, Committee \nMembers concurred with the Central Bank’s view that changes to \npresent exchange rate targets remain unwarranted. Such \nconsiderations cannot be justified by present and near-term \ntrends in the country’s current account balance. Neither would \ninvestment needs of the country be served by target-adjustment \nat this time. \nAs I see it, conditions in current Naira markets have been brought \nabout by cumulatively ineffectual Liquidity Management by the \nCentral Bank. This is not to imply that the CBN has been derelict in \nits duties. The Central Bank, in recent quarters, regrettably failed \nto adequately compensate (monetarily) for large doses of \n27 \n \nliquidity periodically injected into the financial system through \nfiscal operations of government. The heightened demand for FX \nobservable \nin \nrecent \nmonths \nreflects \nthe \nprogressive \naccumulation of this liquidity, in import bills and bank asset \nportfolios, eventually washing up, demanding to be dealt with \nonshore. What the Central Bank as our “financial weatherman” \nforecasted to be “heavy showers” (and accordingly took \nprecautions against) is turning out to be a drenching monsoon. \nCould we have done better? \nGiven the inherently political nature of these liquidity injections, \nwith attendant uncertainties around their size, distribution and \ntiming, and given the inherently conservative disposition of the \nCBN as an institution, this type of failure is understandable, and \nmay be even pardoned – occasionally. The Central Bank of \nNigeria now clearly appreciates what further needs to be \nundertaken, its gloves are off, and it is proceeding with even more \npurposeful determination. Hence, I endorse the measures agreed \nupon with fellow MPC members today, and voted accordingly. I \nhope that we will have begun to successfully engineer the desired \nturns in market conditions. However, should even further actions \nbe called for when next we meet in a month or so, then these too \nshall be voted on with due care and diligence. \n \n28 \n \n7.0 SALAMI, ADEDOYIN \n \nRecent weeks have seen the exchange rate of the Naira outside \nthe outer limit of the band of ±3% around the midpoint of \nN150/US$. Worse still market sentiment, driven by the reducing \nlevel of Nigeria’s foreign reserves and sharply increased demand \nfor foreign currency at the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) WDAS \nwindow, has begun to question the ability of the CBN to keep the \nNigerian currency stable and within the band. All this, after a \nfurther tightening of monetary conditions at the end of our last \nmeeting almost a month ago. \n \nThe importance of exchange rate policy to inflation management \ncannot be over emphasised. Significant components of our \nnational economy depend on imports – energy and food! \nAllowing the currency to lose its external value will almost certainly \nreverse the gains recorded in inflation management. Is there a \ncase for allowing erosion of the currency’s external value? \nWithout doubt, the falling level of reserves, coupled with the rising \nprospect of easing commodity prices ‐ especially for our oil \nexports, as the global economic growth slows; provide the \nstrongest reason for market doubts about the ability to sustain the \nNaira’s international value. It is thus not surprising that positions are \nbeing taken against the Naira. \n \n29 \n \n There is also evidence that the global economic environment is, \nnot unexpectedly, beginning to take an adverse toll on capital \nflows to frontier markets such as ours. In this context, continuing \nnegative inflation adjusted returns on Naira deposits undermines \nthe Naira’s attractiveness thus encouraging asset allocation \ndecisions against it. \n \nThe challenge of managing the implications of fiscal dominance \ncontinues unabated. Beyond the effect of the usual monthly \nFederation Account activity, there are a number of fiscal actions \non the immediate horizon which indicate that larger‐than‐normal \ninjections of liquidity. This is compounded by the strong liquidity \nposition of our Deposit Money Banks. \n \nSimply stated, MPC must provide a credible reason to hold Naira \ndenominated assets. This can only be done by hastening the \nprocess of restoring its attribute as a store of value. Furthermore, \nthe strong and growing sense of an imminent depreciation of the \ncurrency has to be dealt with. Given the MPC’s mandate of \nmaintaining price stability and the surrounding economic context, \ndepreciation of the Naira is not a credible option. \nThe adverse effects of higher interest rates, which are limited to \nsome sectors of the economy, are in my judgement preferable to \nthe negative economy wide impact of devaluation. I have no \n30 \n \nreservations in supporting sterilisation of the strong banking system \nliquidity by raising the Cash Reserve Ratio. Furthermore, I believe \nthat my argument on previous occasions for movement towards a \npositive ‘real’ interest rate remains valid in the present situation. I \nexpect that sterilisation of liquidity will finally begin the process of \nrestoring competition for liabilities, hitherto put in abeyance by the \nCentral Bank’s guarantee on Interbank Market transactions, \nleading, eventually, to positive real rates for domestic depositors. \n \nAs we come to the end of the process of ‘banking sector rescue’, \nit is my view that we must now revisit the definition of liquidity \nwhich had been expanded as we sought to manage the \npotential systemic dislocations arising from the spectre of bank \nfailure. \n \n8.0 GARBA, ABDUL GANIYU \nDecision: I vote for: \nI. Holding the MPR at 9.25% \nII. Maintaining the Asymmetric Corridor for SLF and SDF \nIII. Increasing the CRR from 4% to 6% \n \nObservations \nSince the last MPC Meeting in September, \n31 \n \na. the crisis in the global economy has deepened and \npolitical leaders in Europe and the Americas seem unable \nor unwilling to put together a potentially effective solution \npackage to address the debt, growth and unemployment \nproblems. \nb. The rating agencies have downgraded sovereign debts \nand banks with significant exposures to sovereign debts \nespecially in the EURO Zone and the UK raising fears of a \ndeepening of the banking/financial/economic crises in \nEurope. The volatilities in the global currency, equities and \ncommodity markets have risen and, are unlikely to abate \nsoon. \nc. Inflation has declined slightly in Nigeria. However, the \ndemand for foreign exchange has been rising well above \ntrend and had become more volatile in the last few \nweeks leading to above trend pressures on the exchange \nrate. In addition, the equities market remains bearish and \nthe job market has not shown any sign of improvement. \nThe external accounts has underperformed and coupled \nwith demand pressures, the external reserves have also \nunderperformed. \n \n32 \n \nCommitment to Stable Exchange Rate Policy and Effective \nEnforcement of Transparent and Non-Discriminatory Rules \n1. I strongly support the commitment of the MPC to a stable \nexchange rate policy: exchange rate volatilities in an uncertain \nand risky world is a potentially disastrous policy option more so, \ngiven (i) the likely adversarial effects on production and \ndistributions costs, investments, jobs, income and, well-being of \na majority of citizens and (ii) that Nigeria’s exports and imports \nare exchange rate inelastic. \n2. I also strongly support the decision of the MPC to strengthen the \nenforcement of existing rules of the game to discourage \nopportunistic and market destroying speculative behaviors that \nis, behaviors that distort the market fundamentals and by so \ndoing, undermine the effective functioning of the financial \nmarkets. I am convinced that the financial markets will work \nmore effectively if the costs of undermining the market to a \n“rouge player\nDeciding Issues \n” greatly exceed the benefits. The simple rule is: \nactual costs of rouge playing must significantly exceed actual \nand potential benefits. \n1. Evidence: The data shows that since the tightening regime \nbegan in September 2010, the liquidity (Monetary Base, M1, \nQM and M2) has risen significantly, the structures of banking \n33 \n \nsystem liabilities has shifted significantly against savings deposits \nand time deposits in favor of foreign currency deposits. Quasi \nmoney has exceeded M1 suggesting that MPR may not be as \neffective as expected in targeting the “harmful speculative \nliquidity”. I am convinced that a regime of tighter and timely \nenforcement of existing laws to de-incentivize “harmful \nspeculative activities” will be more effective. Further, a \ncomplementary rise in CRR by 200 basis points would be \nadequate to immediately reduce liquidity that may be used by \nplayers to speculate on the foreign exchange market instead \nof intermediating. \n2. Commitment to Limiting Constraints to struggling higher job \nelastic and higher value-adding Players/firms/activities: It \nseems that while MPR has so far been less effective in \n“removing harmful speculative liquidity”, its effects on lending \nrates and small business value-added and jobs may not to be \ninsignificant. In these uncertain times and with the high level of \nunemployment, small businesses can do with all the help that is \nfeasible to extent to them without adding to the uncertainties \nand menu of risks they already face. \n \n \n \n34 \n \n9.0 SANUSI, LAMIDO SANUSI \nGovernor of the Central Bank of Nigeria and Chairman of the \nMonetary Policy Committee \nThe extra ordinary Monetary Policy Committee Meeting called today \nis in recognition of the need for a more frequent review of dynamic \nglobal and domestic economic conditions that may contain threats \nto macroeconomic stability. Indeed, at the next MPC meeting in \nNovember we may find it useful to start holding monthly meetings \nuntil the situation stabilizes. \n \nWe have always known that after resolving the banking system crisis \nthe very next challenges would be the risk posed by elevated levels \nof liquidity resulting from fiscal spending, AMCON bonds (if not \ncarefully managed) and credit expansion from recapitalized banks. \nThis situation has been further compounded by the global economic \nsituation, particularly the sovereign debt, banks solvency and market \nconfidence crises in the Euro zone, the US deficit problem and risks of \ninflation and economic slowdown in key EM economies like China, \nBrazil and India. \n35 \n \n \nThe global situation has led to reversal of capital flows from EM and \nfrontier economies. In the case of Nigeria, there are genuine \nconcerns about oil price outlook with attendant impact in external \nreserves. Even though market fundamentals would suggest a slight \nmoderation, rather than a big collapse, in oil prices, markets are \nunpredictable especially when the bears take over and confidence \ndips to a level where we have mass flight to less risky assets and \ndeleveraging. \n \nThe published information about the draft 2012 budget suggests a \nbase price assumption of $75/b and output of 2.4mbpd. Our view is \nthat these assumptions are based on a rather optimistic (though not \nentirely unrealistic) set of assumptions. In any event, this would place \nspending at N4.8trillion compared to the N4.4tirllion budgeted in \n2011. With over 70% still in recurrent expenditure and given the \nhistorical tendency of revenues to fall short of projections, the real \nfiscal deficit is likely to be higher then the 2.7% projected. It is also \n36 \n \nworthy of note that the last quarter of the year is when a significant \npart of capital releases will occur. In sum, my view is that the 2012 \nbudget as proposed continues with the procyclical trend set in 2011, \neven though I must state that fiscal authorises have informed us of \nthe possibility of reviewing the bench mark price downward to $70/b \nbefore the final presentation to the legislature. Until that reduction \nmaterialises the markets will anticipate elevated fiscal spending and \nthis feeds into inflation and exchange rate expectations. \n \nThe combination of factors above has led to renewed pressures on \nthe exchange rate, with the potential, through translation effect of \ncompounding the inflationary implications of the fiscal stance. In \nview of the uncertainties in global outlook, we need to seriously \nconsider the implications of maintaining the current interest rate and \nexchange rate stance, with a view to making such adjustments are \nnecessary to avoid a rapid depletion of reserves and rapid \ndepreciation of the naira at the same time. Such an occurrence will \n37 \n \nlead to a major dent in confidence and plunge the economy into a \nself – reinforcing inflationary cycle. \nOur exchange rate stance, defined by our commitment to stability, is \ninformed by two arguments which are compelling. The first is that \nexchange rate stability is central to our price stability mandate, \ngiven pass-through effects of imported items (diesel, petrol, food, \nprocessed food, manufactures, raw materials etc) on CPI. Whereas \nthe weight of these items may be indeed smaller than that of farm \nproduce, they represent at least one class of items that we can \ninfluence through careful management of the exchange rate. The \nsecond is that a depreciation in currency does not automatically \ntranslate into improved balance of payments. The demand for \nmany imported items is highly inelastic. In the case of subsidized \npetroleum products for example, depreciation simply increases the \nnaira value of the subsidy (other things being equal). This is turn \nincreases the margin for arbitrage and rent seeking and may \nactually provide an incentive for increasing import demand. The \nperverse incentive system of petroleum subsidies may very well lead \n38 \n \nto an upward sloping demand curve, with petroleum imports \nincreasing as naira price increases rather than the inverse. In \naddition, depreciation fuels speculative demand and capital flight, \nleading both to further depreciation and reduction in reserves. For \nthis reason, while I am inclined towards flexibility in managing the \nexchange rate, I am of the firm view that any depreciation must be \na last resort and should be carefully managed and carried out from \na position of strength. We need to send clear signals of our \ncommitment to support the naira in these times. \n \nThe foregoing analysis leaves us now with a number of options at our \ndisposal. We can increase CRR, thus tightening liquidity significantly \nand depriving speculators of the liquidity to give effect to their \ndemand. This I support strongly. \n \nWe can further increase the MPR significantly both as a signal and as \nan incentive for portfolio reallocation into naira assets as real interest \nrates move well into positive territory. This also increases the holding \n39 \n \ncost of long positions. In view of progress on banking resolution I also \nsupport this measure. \n \nIn addition we need to reduce net open position limits to reduce \nspeculative holdings, and implement recommendation from the \nrecent examination of foreign exchange transactions by bank \nexaminers to address issues around non-compliance and abuse of \nexisting regulations. Appropriate sanctions must be applied. \n \nI do not support capital controls and I am pleased that all members \nagree on this point. \nMy vote is for \n1. Increase in CRR from 4% to 8%, and suspension of reserve \naveraging as the method of computation; \n2. Increase in MPR from 9.25% to 12% while maintaining symmetric \ncorridor: and \n3. Reduction in net open position limit from 5% to 1%.", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/mpc communique no 79, oct 10, 2011.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "bba5b7d21876b37ac5a26bf6d9e823f3", "text": "CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA\nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA\nEconomic Report\nFor the\nFirst Half of 2017\nEconomic Report\nFor the\nFirst Half of 2017\n© 20\nCentral Bank of Nigeria\n17 \nISSN 1597 - 2976\niii\nCentral Bank of Nigeria\nCorporate Head Office\n33 Tafawa Balewa Way\nCentral Business District\nP. M. B. 0187, Garki\nAbuja\nWebsite: www.cbn.gov.ng\nTel: +234(0)946238707\n +234(0)946238762\n +234(0)946435900\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nv\nVision\nMission\n e THE MODEL CENTRAL BANK \ndelivering PRICE and FINANCIAL SYSTEM STABILITY \nand promoting SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT”.\no be proactive in providing a stable framework for the economic development \nof Nigeria, through effective, efficient and transparent implementation of \nmonetary and exchange rate policy, and management of the financial sector.\nT\n“B\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nThe Central Bank of Nigeria\nvi\nEstablished by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Act of 1958, the \nPrincipal objects of the Bank as contained in the new CBN Act, 2007 are to\n· \nensure monetary and price stability\n· \nissue legal tender currency in Nigeria\n· \nmaintain external reserves to safeguard the international value of \n \nthe legal tender currency\n· \npromote a sound financial system in Nigeria \n· \nact as banker and provide economic and financial advice to the \n \nFederal Government of Nigeria\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nvii\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nMEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE OF GOVERNORS OF\nTHE BANK AS AT JUNE 30, 2017\n1. \nGodwin I. Emefiele, CON - \nGovernor (Chairman)\n2. \nSuleiman A. Barau, OON - \nDeputy Governor (Corporate Services)\n3. \nOkwu J. Nnanna \n - \nDeputy Governor (Financial System Stability/ Economic \nPolicy) \n4. \nAdebayo A. Adelabu \n - \nDeputy Governor (Operations)\n \nYunusa M. Sanusi \n - \nSecretary\nMEMBERS OF THE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE (MPC)\nAS AT JUNE 30, 2017\n1. \nGodwin I. Emefiele, CON - Governor (Chairman)\n2. \nSuleiman A. Barau, OON - Deputy Governor (Corporate Services)\n3. \nOkwu J. Nnanna \n - Deputy Governor (Financial System Stability/ \n \n \n \n \n \n Economic Policy) \n \n4. \nAdebayo A. Adelabu \n \n- Deputy Governor (Operations)\n5. \nDahiru Balami \n \n \n- Member\n6. \nAbdul-Ganiyu Garba \n- Member\n7. \nAdedoyin R. Salami \n \n- Member \n8. \nChibuike C. Uche \n \n- Member\n9. \nShehu Yahaya \n \n \n- Member\n \nMoses K. Tule \n \n \n- Secretary\nviii\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n1. \nDipo T. Fatokun \n \n- \nBanking & Payments System\n2. \nAhmad Abdullahi \n \n- \nBanking Supervision\n3. \nSalisu Rabeh \n \n- \nBranch Operations\n4. \nChizoba V. Mojekwu (Ms.) \n- \nCapacity Development\n5. \nUmma Dutse (Haj.) \n \n- \nConsumer Protection\n6. \nIsaac A. Okorafor* \n \n- \nCorporate Communications\n7. \nYunusa M. Sanusi \n \n- \nCorporate Secretariat\n8. \nPrescilia Eleje* \n \n- \nCurrency Operations\n9. \nMudashir A. Olaitan \n- \nDevelopment Finance\n10. \nDayo M. Arowosegbe \n- \nFinance\n11. \nAlvan E. Ikoku \n \n- \nFinancial Markets\n12. \nKevin N. Amugo \n \n- \nFinancial Policy and Regulation\n13. \nDabai M. Suleyman \n \n- \nFSS 2020\n14. \nAnthony C. Ifechikwu \n- \nGovernors' Department\n15. \nLametek E. Adamu \n \n- \nHuman Resources\n16. \nJohn I. Ayoh \n \n \n- \nInformation Technology\n17. \nVivian I. Agu (Mrs.) \n \n- \nInternal Audit\n18. \nJohnson O. Akinkunmi \n- \nLegal Services\n19. \nFaozat A. O. Bello (Mrs.) \n- \nMedical Services\n20. \nMoses K. Tule \n \n- \nMonetary Policy \n21. \nAgnes O. Martins (Mrs.) \n- \nOther Financial Institutions Supervision \n22. \nLazarus M. Agbor \n \n- \nProcurement & Support Services\n23. \nUwatt B. Uwatt \n \n- \nResearch\n24. \nThirmidhi Y. \n \n- \nReserve Management\n25. \nOluwafolakemi J. Fatogbe(Ms.)- \nRisk Management\n26. \nIbitayo O. Amu \n \n- \nSecurity Services\n27. \nMohammed Tumala M. \n- \nStatistics\n28. \nMu'azu Ibrahim \n \n- \nStrategy Management \n29. \nDauda W. Gotring \n \n- \nTrade & Exchange\n30. \nAbwaku Englama \n \n- \nSecondment to WAMI\n* Overseeing the Department\nDEPARTMENTAL DIRECTORS\nix\nBRANCH CONTROLLERS/CURRENCY OFFICERS\n1. \nObiageli A. Obiekwe (Mrs.) \n- \nAbakaliki \n2. \nBabatunde A. Amao \n \n- \nAbeokuta\n3. \nGhasarah Briget Ateh \n \n- \nAbuja\n4. \nCletus C. Iwuaru \n \n- \nAdo-Ekiti\n5. \nFatai A. Yusuf \n \n- \nAkure\n6. \nElizabeth O. Agu (Mrs.) \n- \nAsaba\n7. \nMonday C. Sokari \n \n- \nAwka\n8. \nAhmed B. Umar \n \n- \nBauchi\n9. \nRenner D. Jumbo \n \n- \nBenin\n10. \nAsma'u N. Babah (Mrs.) \n- \nBirnin-Kebbi\n11. \nGraham I. Kalio \n \n- \nCalabar\n12. \nIbrahim A. Dibola \n \n- \nDamaturu\n13. \nTijjani I. Zakirai \n \n- \nDutse\n14. \nEmmanuel C. Okonjo \n \n- \nEnugu\n15. \nShehu A. Goringo \n \n- \nGombe\n16. \nYargoje S. Saleh \n \n- \nGusau\n17. \nMusibau F. Olatinwo \n \n- \nIbadan\n18. \nEkanem N. Akpan \n \n- \nIlorin\n19. \nMohammed S. Abdullahi \n- \nJalingo \n20. \nSatu J. Jatau \n \n \n- \nJos\n21. \nBulus I. Abba \n \n- \nKaduna\n22. \nAmina P. Abubakar (Mrs.) \n- \nKano\n23. \nAbubakar H. Joda \n \n- \nKatsina\n24. \nUsman S. Sule \n \n- \nLafia\n25. \nJames O. Iyari \n \n- \nLagos\n26. \nMusa B. Bafai \n \n- \nLokoja\n27. \nIbrahim Isyaku \n \n- \nMaiduguri\n28. \nAlphonsus E. Achebe \n \n- \nMakurdi\n29. \nMas'ud T. Ibrahim \n \n- \nMinna\n30. \nBamidele B. Ibrahim \n \n- \nOsogbo\n31. \nMercy I. Ogbomon paul \n- \nOwerri\n32. \nAdekunle K. Alaka \n \n- \nPort Harcourt\n33. \nMohammed L. Idris \n \n- \nSokoto\n34. \nVeronica E. Aqua \n \n- \nUmuahia\n35. \nCletus O. Nwokoro \n \n- \nUyo\n36. \nGodwin O. Nwajana \n \n- \nYenagoa\n37. \nShuaibu Hussein \n \n- \nYola\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nxi\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nPage\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n  \nSummary\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\nxxi\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1.0 \nINTRODUCTION\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n...\n..\n1\n \n2.0 OPERATIONS OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA .. \n.. \n.. \n 2 \n \n2.1\n \n Liquidity Management \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n 2\n \n2.2 Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) Decisions\n..\n.. \n.. \n 2\n \n2.3 \nDevelopments in the Payments system\n..\n..\n..\n.. 3 \n2.3.1\nPayments System Initiatives\n..\n.. \n.. \n.. \n3\n\n\n The Bank Verification Number (BVN) Scheme .. \n3\n2.3.1.1\n\n Nigeria Electronic Fraud Forum (NeFF) .. \n.. \n4\n2.3.1.2 \n\n\n Migration from Merchant Service Charge to \n2.3.1.3 \n Interchange Fee Regime\n..\n..\n..\n4\n \n \n \n2.3.1.4 Cheque Standards and Cheque Printers \n \n \n \n \n Accreditation Scheme\n..\n..\n..\n..\n4\n \n \n \n2.3.1.5 Licensing of Payments System Participants\n..\n 4\n\n\n\n2.3.1.6 Payments System Vision 2020 (PSV 2020)\n..\n 4\n \n \n2.3.2  Retail Payments System..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n5\n\n\n\n Cheque\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n.. \n5\n2.3.2.1\n\n\n\n Electronic Payments\n..\n..\n.. \n..\n6\n2.3.2.2\n\n\n\n\nATM Transactions ..\n..\n..\n..\n 8\n2.3.2.2.1 \n \n \n2.3.2.2.2 Web Transactions .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n 9\n \n \n2.3.2.2.3 Point of Sale (PoS) Transactions .. \n.. \n 9\n\n\n2.3.2.2.4 Mobile Payments ..\n..\n..\n..\n 10\n2.3.3\nWholesale Payments System\n..\n..\n..\n..\n11\n\nReal Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) System\n..\n11\n2.3.3.1 \n\n Nigeria Inter-bank Settlement System Instant \n2.3.3.2\n Payment (NIP)\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n12\n\n Nigeria Inter-bank Settlement System Electronic \n2.3.3.3\n Fund Transfer (NEFT)\n..\n..\n..\n.. \n13\n2.3.4\nCurrency Operations\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n14\n\n2.3.4.1 Issuance of the Legal Tender\n..\n..\n..\n14\n\n2.3.4.2 Currency-in-Circulation (CIC)\n..\n..\n..\n15\n2.4\nFinancial Sector Surveillance\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n17 \n2.4.1  Banking Supervision\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n17 \n2.4.2  Routine/Target Examination\n..\n..\n..\n..\n18\n\n  Special/ Foreign Exchange Examinations ..\n..\n..\n 19\n2.4.3\n \n Banking Sector Soundness .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n19\n2.4.4\n2.4.5  Compliance with the Code of Corporate \n  Governance for Banks\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n20\n\n\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nxii\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n \n \n2.4.6  Financial Crimes Surveillance/Anti-Money Laundering\n\n\n\n/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT)..\n..\n 21\n2.4.7\nFinancial Literacy and Consumer Protection\n..\n..\n 22\n2.4.8\nFraud and Forgeries..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n 24\n2.4.9\nCross Border Activities\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n 25\n2.4.10 Update on the Implementation of the Systemic Support \nPartnership and Oliver Wyman (SPP&OW) Report\n..\n 25\n\nExamination of Other Financial Institutions\n..\n..\n26\n2.4.11 \n2.5\nForeign Exchange Market and Management\n..\n..\n..\n 26\n\n  Spot Segment of the Foreign Exchange Market\n..\n 27\n2.5.1\n\n  Forwards and Swaps..\n..\n\n..\n..\n..\n 27\n2.5.2\n\n  Exchange Rate Movements\n..\n..\n..\n..\n 28\n2.5.3\n\n\n Spot Exchange Rates\n..\n..\n..\n..\n 28\n2.5.3.1\n\n  Foreign Exchange Flows\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n 29\n2.5.4\n2.5.5  Sectoral Utilisation of Foreign Exchange ..\n..\n..\n 32\n\n  Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (NEER) and Real\n2.5.6\n  Effective Exchange Rate (REER) Indices ..\n..\n..\n 34\n2.6\nDevelopment Finance Operations\n..\n..\n..\n..\n 36\n2.6.1 Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme\nFund (ACGS)\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n 36 \n2.6.2\nInterest Drawback Programme (IDP)\n..\n..\n..\n 37\n2.6.3 Commercial Agriculture Credit Scheme (CACS) \n.. \n 37\n2.6.4 MSME Development Fund (MSMEDF)\n..\n..\n..\n 37\n\n Anchor Borrowers' Programme (ABP)..\n..\n..\n 38\n2.6.5\n\n\nPresidential Fertilizer Initiative\n..\n..\n..\n..\n 39\n2.6.6\n\n2.6.7\nNational Food Security Programme (NFSP)\n..\n..\n 39\n2.6.8  National Collateral Registry (NCR)..\n..\n..\n..\n 39\n2.6.9\nSME Credit Guarantee Scheme (SMECGS)\n..\n..\n 40\n2.6.10 Textile Sector Intervention Fund (TSIF)\n..\n..\n..\n 40\n2.6.11 Power and Airline Intervention Fund (PAIF)\n..\n..\n 41\n2.6.12 Nigeria Electricity Market Stabilisation Facility (NEMSF) ..\n 41\n2.6.13 Financial Inclusion Activities\n..\n..\n..\n..\n 41\n\n2.6.13.1 Visit of Delegates from 8 (eight) Alliance for \n Financial Inclusion (AFI) Member Countries\n..\n 41\n\n\n\n Geospatial Mapping Update\n..\n..\n..\n 41\n2.6.13.2\n2.6.14 Entrepreneurship Development Centres (EDCs)..\n..\n 42\n2.6.15 Youth Entrepreneurship Development Programme (YEDP)\n 42\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \nECONOMIC REPORT \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n 43\n3.0 \nGLOBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS \n \n 43\n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n..\n\n3.1 \nGlobal Output\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n 43\n3.2\nGlobal Commodity Prices ..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n 45 \n3.3 \nGlobal Inflation..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n 45\n3.4 \nInternational Financial Markets \n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n 47\n\n\nWorld Economic Outlook for the Rest of 2017\n..\n..\n..\n 50\n3.5\n \nxiii\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n4.0 \nDEVELOPMENTS IN THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY\n\n 53\n..\n..\n..\n\n4.1 \nMonetary and Credit Developments\n..\n..\n..\n..\n 53\n4.1.1  Reserve Money \n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n 53\n\n Broad Money (M )\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n 55\n2\n4.1.2\n4.1.3  Narrow Money (M ) ..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n 55\n1\n4.1.4  Quasi Money (QM) ..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n 55\n4.1.5  Currency-in-Circulation and Deposits at the CBN ..\n..\n 55\n4.1.6  Currency Outside Bank (COB)\n..\n..\n..\n..\n 56\n4.1.7\nDrivers of Growth in Monetary Supply\n..\n..\n..\n 57\n4.1.7.1 Net Foreign Assets (NFA) ..\n..\n..\n..\n 57\n4.1.7.2 Net Domestic Credit (NDC) ..\n..\n..\n..\n 57\n4.1.7.2.1 Net Credit to the Government (NCG) 57\n4.1.7.2.2 Credit to the Private Sector (Cp) \n 58\n4.1.7.3 Other Assets (Net) (OAN) ..\n..\n..\n..\n 58\n4.1.8  Sectoral Distribution of Credit..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n 59\n4.1.9  Maturity Structure of DMBs' Outstanding \nLoans and Advances, and Deposit Liabilities..\n..\n..\n 60\n\n\n Market Structure of the Banking Industry ..\n..\n..\n 62\n4.1.10\n\n\n Consumer Credit \n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n 63\n4.1.11\n\n\n Money Market Developments..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n 63\n4.1.12\n4.1.12.1 Money Market Assets Outstanding..\n..\n..\n64\n\n4.1.12.2 Primary Market..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n64\n\n4.1.12.3 Federal Government of Nigeria Bonds ..\n..\n66\n4.1.12.4 Open Market Operations (OMO)..\n..\n..\n 66\n4.1.12.5 OMO Auctions\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n 66\n4.1.12.6 The Two-Way Quote Trading in NTBs..\n..\n..\n 67\n4.1.12.7 Tenor Repurchase Transactions....\n..\n..\n 67\n4.1.12.8 Discount Window Operations\n..\n..\n..\n 67\n4.1.12.9 Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Standing Facilities..\n 67\n4.1.12.9.1 Standing Lending Facility (SLF)...\n..\n 67\n4.1.12.9.2 Standing Deposit Facility (SDF)...\n..\n 68\n4.1.12.10 Inter-Bank Funds Market..\n..\n..\n..\n 68\n4.1.13 Interest Rates Developments..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n 68\n4.1.13.1 Money Market Rates..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n 68\n4.1.13.1.1 Deposit Rates..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n 69\n4.1.13.1.2 Lending Rates.. ..\n..\n..\n..\n 69\n4.1.14 Institutional Savings ..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n 70\n4.1.15 Other Financial Institutions ..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n 70\n4.1.15.1 Development Finance Institutions\n\n..\n..\n..\n 70\n4.1.15.2 Microfinance Banks (MFBs)..\n..\n..\n..\n 71\n4.1.15.3 Finance Companies (FCs)..\n..\n..\n..\n 71\n\n Primary Mortgage Banks (PMBs) ..\n..\n..\n 72\n4.1.15.4\n4.1.15.5 Bureaux-De-Change (BDCs)\n..\n..\n..\n 73\n4.1.15.6 Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria\n (AMCON)....\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n 73\n4.1.16 Capital Market Developments..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n 74\nxiv\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n \n \n Institutional Developments.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n74\n4.1.16.1\n4.1.16.2 The Nigerian Stock Exchange(NSE).. \n.. \n.. \n74 \n \n New Issues Market .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n75 \n4.1.16.3\n \n The Secondary Market.. .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n75 \n4.1.16.4\n \n All-Share Index and Aggregate Market \n4.1.16.5\n Capitalisation \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n76\n4.2 Fiscal Operations \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n77\n4.2.1 Federally Collected Revenue \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n77\n4.2.1.1 Federation Account Distribution .. \n.. \n.. \n81\n4.2.1.2 VAT Pool Account .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n81\n4.2.1.3 Cumulative Distribution \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n82\n4.2.2 Federal Government Finances \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n82 \n \n Federal Government Fiscal Balance \n.. \n.. \n82\n4.2.2.1\n4.2.2.2 Federal Government Retained Revenue .. \n.. \n83 \n \n Federal Government Expenditure .. \n.. \n.. \n84 \n4.2.2.3\n4.2.3 State Government Finances \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n86 \n4.2.4 Local Government Finances \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n87 \n \n Public Debt .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n88 \n4.2.5\n \n Consolidated Government Debt .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n88\n4.2.5.1\n4.2.5.2 Domestic Debt.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n89 \n4.2.5.3 External Debt.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n89 \n4.2.5.4 Total Debt Service .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n90\n4.3 Real Sector Developments .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n91 \n \n Agriculture.. .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n91 \n4.3.1\n4.3.1.1 Agricultural Policies and Institutional Support.. .. \n91 \n4.3.1.2 Agricultural Production and Prices.. \n.. \n.. \n93 \n4.3.2 Industry.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n94 \n4.3.2.1 Industrial Policy and Institutional Support .. \n.. \n94 \n4.3.2.2 Industrial Production \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n95 \n4.3.2.3 Manufacturing \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n95 \n4.3.3 Crude Oil \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n96 \n4.3.3.1 Crude Oil Production and Demand \n.. \n.. \n96\n4.3.3.2 Crude Oil Prices.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n98 \n4.3.4 Gas \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n98 \n4.3.5 Petroleum Products .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n99 \n4.3.6 Solid Minerals .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n99 \n4.3.7 Electricity Generation \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n100 \n4.3.8 Electricity Consumption \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n100 \n4.3.9 Industrial Financing.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n100\n4.3.9.1 The Bank of Industry (BOI) .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n100\n4.3.9.2 The Nigerian Export-Import Bank (NEXIM) .. \n.. \n101\n4.3.10 Telecommunications .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n102 \n4.3.11 Consumer Prices \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n103\n4.3.11.1 Headline Inflation .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n103 \n4.3.11.2 Core Inflation.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n103\n4.3.11.3 Food Inflation.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n104\n4.3.11.4 Urban and Rural Consumer Price Indices and\n \n \n Inflation Rates \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n105\nxv\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n4.3.12 Aviation Services \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n106\n4.3.12.1 Policy and Airport Development .. \n.. \n.. \n106\n4.3.12.2 Domestic Operations \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n106\n4.3.12.3 International Operations .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n107\n4.3.13 Maritime Services .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n107\n4.3.14 Railway Services \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n107\n4.4 \nSocial Sector Developments \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n108\n \n Health .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n108\n4.4.1\n \n4.4.2 Environment .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n109\n \n4.4.3 Housing and Urban Development .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n109\n4.5 \nExternal Sector Developments \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n110 \n \n Current Account \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n110 \n4.5.1\n4.5.1.1 Trade .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n110 \n \n Services .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n114 \n4.5.1.2\n4.5.1.3 Income .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n115 \n \n Current Transfers.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n115\n4.5.1.4\n \n Capital and Financial Accounts .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n116\n4.5.2\n \n \n Foreign Direct Investment .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n116\n4.5.2.1\n \n \n Portfolio Investment .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n116\n4.5.2.2\n \n \n4.5.2.3 Other Investment \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n117\n \n Capital Importation and Capital Outflow .. \n.. \n.. \n117\n4.5.3\n4.5.4 External Reserve \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n119 \n \n \n5.0 \nINTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS\n121\n \n \n \n \n \n5.1 \nGlobal Institutions \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n121 \n5.1.1 International Monetary Fund (IMF) .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n121\n5.1.2 The World Bank/IMF Spring Meetings \n.. \n.. \n.. \n121\n5.1.3 G24 Technical Group Meeting \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n122\n5.2 Regional Institutions .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n123\n5.2.1 Ordinary Meeting of the Bureau of the Association of African \n Central Banks (AACB), Dakar, Senegal, March 8, 2017 \n... \n123\n5.2.2 2017 Association of African Central Banks (AACB) \n Continental Seminar .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n124\n5.3 \nSub-Regional Institutions \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n125\n \n Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).. \n125\n5.3.1\n5.3.2 West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) Committee of \n Governors \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n125\n5.3.3 West African Institute for Financial and Economic \n Management (WAIFEM) \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n126\n5.3.4 Meeting of the Committee of Governors of ECOWAS \n Member Central Banks \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n127\n5.3.5 Convergence Council of Ministers and Governors of Central \n Banks of WAMZ \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n129\n6.0 \nOUTLOOK FOR THE SECOND HALF OF 2017\n130\n .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \nTABLES\nxvi\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nSelected Macroeconomic and Social Indicators \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \nxxxi\n1 \n Monetary Policy Benchmarks and Outcomes \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n1 \n2 \n Monetary Policy Committee Decision During the First Half of 2017 \n.. \n3\n3 \n Licensed Payments System Participants .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n4\n4 \n Structure of the CIC .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n16\n5 \n Nominal and the Real Effective Exchange Rate Indices \n.. \n.. \n35\n6 \n Summary of MSMEDF Activities \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n38\n7 \n Number of Value of Financing Statement in the National \n \n Collateral Registry \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n40\n8 \n Summary of Projects Financed Under PAIF \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n41\n9 \n Indices of Selected International Stock Markets .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n49\n10 \n Exchange Rates of Selected Countries \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n50\n11 \n Sources and Uses of Reserve Money \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n54\n12 \n Growth in Monetary Aggregates .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n58\n13 \n Share of Credit to the Core Private Sector.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n59\n14 \n Maturity Structure of Banks Assets and Liabilities.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n61\n15 \n Bid-Cover Ratios of Selected Securities \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n65\n16 \n Money Market Rates.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n68\n17 \n DMBs Deposit and Lending Rates. .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n70\n18 \n Key Finance Companies Financial Highlights \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n72\n19 \n Key PMB Financial Highlights \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n73\n20 \n DMBs' Credit to Core Private Sector \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n132\n21 \n Money Market Rates \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n133\n22 \n Selected Interest Rates \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n133\n23 \n Open Market Operations (OMO) Sessions \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n134\n24 \n Treasury Bills: Issues and Allotments \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n135\n25 \n Monetary and Credit Developments.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n136\n26 \n Value of Money Market Assets \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n137\n27 \n Selected Interest Rates \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n138\n28 \n Federation Account Operations .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n139\n29 \n Federally Collected Revenue Distribution \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n140\n30 \n Summary of Government Finances \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n141\n31 \n Functional Classification of Federal Government Recurrent and \n \n Capital Expenditure. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n142\n32 \n Summary of Statutory & VAT Revenue Allocation to State \n \n Governments.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n143 \n33 \n Allocation to Local Government From the Federation and VAT \n \n Pool Accounts \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n145\n34 \n Consolidated Debt of the Federal Government .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n147\n35 \n External Public Debt Outstanding .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n148\n36 \n Consolidated Debt Service Payment \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n149\n37 \n Domestic Debt Service Payment of the Federal Government .. \n.. \n149\n38 \n Gross Domestic Product at 2010 Constant Basic Prices .. \n.. \n.. \n150\n39 \n Gross Domestic Product at Current Basic Prices .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n151\n40 \n Selected Real Sector Indicators.. .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n152\n41 Composite Consumer Price Index .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n154\n42 \n Urban and Rural Consumer Price Index .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n155\n43 \n Balance of Payments Analytic Presentation (US$).. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n156\n44 \n Balance of Payments Analytic Presentation (Naira) \n.. \n.. \n.. \n157\nxvii\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n45 \n Foreign Exchange Flows Through the Economy.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n158\n46 \n Nigeria's Gross External Reserves.. .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n159\n47 \n Nigeria's Foreign Exchange Cross Rates.. .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n160\n48 \n Monthly Average Exchange Rate Movement.. .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n161\n49 \n Demand and Supply of Foreign Exchange \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n162\n50 \n Sectoral Utilization of Foreign Exchange .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n163\n51 \n Total External Assets of Financial Institutions.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n164\nxviii\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFIGURES\n 1 \n Volume of Cheques Cleared.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n5 \n 2 \n Value of Cheques Cleared.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n6\n 3 \n Use of E-Payment Channels by Volume .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n6\n 4 \n Use of E-Payment Channels by Value \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n7 \n 5 \n Volume of Electronic Payments \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n7 \n 6 \n Value of Electronic Payments \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n7 \n 7 \n Volume of ATM Transactions \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n8 \n 8 \n Value of ATM Transactions.. \n.. \n .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n8\n 9 \n Volume of Web Transactions \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n9\n10 \n Value of Web Transactions .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n9\n11 \n Volume of PoS Transactions \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n10\n12 \n Value of PoS Transactions .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n10\n13 \n Volume of Mobile Transactions \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n11\n14 \n Value of Mobile Transactions \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n11\n15 \n Volume of RTGS Transactions \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n12\n16 \n Value of RTGS Transactions .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n12\n17 \n Volume of NIP Transactions .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n13\n18 \n Value of NIP Transactions .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n13\n19 \n Volume of NEFT Transactions \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n14\n20 \n Value of NEFT Transactions .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n14\n21 \n Credit Risk Management System (CRMS) Statistics.. \n.. \n.. \n18\n22 \n Demand, Supply and Net Demand of Foreign Exchange \n.. \n28\n23 \n Exchange Rate Movements.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n29\n24 \n Interbank/Bureau-de-Change Foreign Exchange (N/US$) Premium 29\n25 \n Foreign Exchange Disbursements Through the CBN.. \n.. \n.. \n31 \n26 \n Foreign Exchange Transactions Through the CBN.. \n.. \n.. \n32 \n27 \n Sectoral Utilisation of Foreign Exchange (Visibles).. \n.. \n.. \n33 \n28 \n Sectoral Utilisation of Foreign Exchange (Invisibles).. \n.. \n.. \n34 \n29 \n Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (NEER) and Real Effective \n \n Exchange Rate (REER) .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n35\n30 \n Distribution of ACGSF Loans (By Purpose).. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n36 \n31 \n Performance of the Naira against Major Currencies \n.. \n.. \n48\n32 \n Performance of the Naira against Regional Currencies \n.. \n49\n33 (a) Reserve Money and its Components: Sources \n.. \n.. \n.. \n54\n33 (b) Reserve Money and its Components: Uses \n.. \n.. \n.. \n55\n34 \n Ratio of Currency Outside Bank to Broad Money Supply \n.. \n56\n35 \n Growth in Money Supply.. .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n56\n36 \n Distribution of Aggregate Credit to the Economy \n.. \n.. \n57 \n37 \n Distribution of Private Sector Credit. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n58\n38 \n Distribution of Bank Loans and Advances by Maturity .. \n.. \n60\n39 \n Maturity Structure of Banks Deposits. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n61\n40 (a) Market Concentration Ratios of Banks (Assets and Deposits) .. \n62\n40 (b) Measures of Competition in Banks: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index \n62\n41 \n Consumer Credit and Ratio of Claims on Core Private Sector .. \n63\n42 \n Money Market Assets Outstanding.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n64\n43 \n Nigerian Treasury Bills Outstanding .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n65\nxix\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n44 \n Distribution of FGN Bonds.. .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n66\n45 \n Money Market Rates.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n69 \n46 \n Complaints Received and Resolved \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n75 \n47 \n Volume and Value of Transactions at the NSE \n.. \n.. \n.. \n76\n48 \n Aggregate Market Capitalization and NSE Value Index.. \n.. \n77 \n49 \n Structure of Gross Federation Revenue.. .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n78 \n50 \n Composition of Oil Revenue.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n79\n51 \n Composition of Non-Oil Revenue.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n80\n52 \n Composition of Federally-Collected Revenue (Net) \n.. \n.. \n81\n53 \n Cumulative Distribution to the tiers of Government and 13% \n \n Derivation Fund \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n82 \n54 \n Federal Government (FGN) Fiscal Balance.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n83\n55 \n Composition of Federal Government Retained Revenue.. \n.. \n84 \n56 \n Composition of Federal Government Expenditure.. \n.. \n.. \n85 \n57 \n Economic Classification of Federal Government Recurrent \n \n Expenditure.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n86\n58 \n Composition of Total Allocation to State Governments .. \n.. \n87 \n59 \n Composition of Statutory Allocation to Local Governments .. .. \n88\n60 \n Composition of Federal Government Consolidated Debt \n.. \n89\n61 \n Breakdown of External Debt Stock \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n90\n62 \n Breakdown of Extenal Debt Service \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n91 \n63 \n GDP Growth Rate.. .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n92\n64 \n Industrial Production Index.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n93\n65 \n Average Manufacturing Capacity Utilisation \n.. \n.. \n.. \n94\n66 \n Crude Oil Production and Exports.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n97 \n67 \n Average Spot Prices of Selected Crudes .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n98\n68 \n Gas Production and Utilization.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n99 \n69 \n Sectoral Disbursement of BOI Loans \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n101\n70 \n Sectoral Disbursement of NEXIM Loans \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n101\n71 \n Total Active Lines and Tele-density.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n102 \n72 \n Consumer Price Indices.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n103 \n73 \n Inflation Rate .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n104\n74 \n Urban and Rural Consumer Price Indices.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n106 \n75 \n Exports, Imports and Trade Balance.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n111 \n76 \n Foreign Exchange Utilisation \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n112\n77 \n Non-Oil Exports by Products.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n112\n78 \n Non-Oil Exports to the ECOWAS Sub-Region \n.. \n.. \n.. \n113\n79 \n Share of Services Out Payments.. .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n114\n80 \n Private Home Remittances.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n115\n81 \n FDI and Portfolio Investment Inflows.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n117\n82 \n Capital Importation by Sector.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n118\n83 \n Capital Outflows and Outward Transfers .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n119\n84 \n External Reserves Stock and Months of Import Commitments .. \n120\nCBN OPERATIONS:\nDevelopmental\nInitiatives \nPOLICY FRAMEWORK\nSUMMARY\nxxi\nThe Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) sustained a non-expansionary \nmonetary policy stance in the first half of 2017 to ensure \nexchange rate and price stability, as high inflation and foreign \nexchange demand pressure remained the main challenges. \nThe monetary policy rate (MPR), was retained at 14.0 per cent \nthroughout the review period, with asymmetric corridor of +200/-\n500 basis points. Similarly, the cash reserve and liquidity ratios \nwere retained at 22.5 and 30.0 per cent, respectively. Open \nmarket operations (OMO) remained the primary instrument for \nliquidity management, complemented by cash reserve \nrequirements, repo transactions and interventions in the foreign \nexchange market. The Bank also carried out its supervisory and \nregulatory activities through regular appraisal of banks' returns, \nperiodic on-site examination and special investigations, among \nothers, to foster a sound and stable financial system. \nGrowth in major monetary aggregates was generally below the \nindicative benchmarks in the first half of 2017. Reserve money, at \nN5,489.6 billion, fell by 6.2 per cent, as against the 11.4 per cent \ngrowth benchmark and 7.6 per cent decline at end-June 2016. \nSimilarly, broad money supply (M2) and narrow money supply \n(M1) fell by 7.3 and 10.7 per cent, compared with the respective \nbenchmark growth of 10.3 and 11.0 per cent. The development \nin broad money supply reflected the decrease in net foreign \nassets and other asset (net) of the banking system, which more \nthan offset the increase in domestic credit (net). Currency-in-\ncirculation and currency outside banks, at N1,873.5 billion and \nN1,477.1 billion, respectively, also fell by 14.0 and 18.9 per cent in \nthe review period. \nThe CBN continued to support the real economy through the \nimplementation of existing development finance initiatives, \nnotably the Anchor Borrowers' Programme (ABP); Commercial \nAgriculture Credit Scheme (CACS); Micro, Small and Medium \nEnterprises Development Fund (MSMEDF); Power and Airline \nIntervention Fund (PAIF); and Nigeria Electricity Market \nStabilisation Facility (NEMSF). The Bank also supported activities \nof the Youth Entrepreneurship Development Programme (YEDP), \nthe Entrepreneurship Development Centres (EDC) and the \nNational Collateral Registry (NCR).\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFinancial Sector\nSurveillance\nxxii\nThe Bank continued to accord priority to the safety, reliability \nand efficiency of the payments system, and sustained the \nimplementation of various initiatives to consolidate on the gains \nachieved thus far. Under the BVN scheme, the Bank issued a \ndraft Regulatory Framework for BVN Operations and Watch-list \nfor the Nigerian Financial System and extended the deadline for \nenrollment by customers of other financial institutions to end-\nDecember 2017. At end-June 2017, 29.6 million customers had \nbeen registered for BVN linked to 40.7 million accounts out of the \n62.6 million active customer accounts. \nThe Bank participated in the activities of the Committee on \nIdentity Management and Harmonisation of Data, set-up by the \nFederal Government to integrate identity data captured by \ndifferent organisations. Other achievements and initiatives \nincluded: development of “Smart Cities Policy framework and \nLeadership Paper”, “Framework for the Adoption of Electronic \nPayments in the Education System and Transportation Services \nin Nigeria”, “Revised Rules and Regulations on RTGS”, “Revised \nFramework for Collateral Management” for the operations of \ndeferred net settlement systems; and exposure of the revised \nNigeria Cheque Standards and guidelines on the Payments \nSystem Vision 2020 to stakeholders.\nIn the first half of 2017, liquidity was influenced by fiscal \noperations of the three tiers of government, effect of CRR \noperations, settlement of foreign exchange transactions and \nmaturity of CBN bills. To maintain optimal level of liquidity, the \nBank retained open market operations (OMO) as the main tool \nfor liquidity management, supported by reserve requirements, \nrepurchase agreements and the discount windows. The Bank \nalso introduced special windows in the foreign exchange \nmarket to address demand-supply bottlenecks and improve \noverall liquidity.\nPayments\n&\nClearing System\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nLiquidity\nManagement\nThe CBN intensified its supervisory and regulatory activities on the \nbanking system to promote the safety and soundness of \ninstitutions, and stability of the financial system. In this regard, the \nCBN/NDIC Joint Risk-based assessment of banks was conducted \nto ascertain the quality of risk assets and adequacy of loan loss \nprovisions. Routine examination was also carried out on the \nthree private credit bureaux, the Asset Management \nCorporation of Nigeria (AMCON) and two Nigerian banks' \nforeign subsidiaries. In addition, the Bank carried out the first of \nthe bi-annual examination of foreign exchange activities of \ntwenty-five (25) banks in April 2017. Furthermore, several ad-hoc \ninvestigations were conducted and the outcomes served as \nxxiii\nFinancial Sector\nSurveillance\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\ninput to the policy development process.\nTo further entrench good corporate governance codes and \npractices in the banking industry, the Bank developed a \nCorporate Governance Scorecard to monitor implementation \nof the Code by (Deposit Money Banks (DMBs). A pilot run on ten \n(10) banks, for all the categories of licences, revealed lack of \napproved strategy document in three (3) banks and general \nabsence of a unit/department for the implementation of banks' \ncorporate governance strategy.\nThe industry average capital adequacy ratio (CAR) was 11.5 per \ncent, compared with the industry threshold of 15.0 per cent for \nbanks with international authorisation and 10.0 per cent for those \nwith national and regional authorisation. The industry liquidity \nratio increased to 45.8 per cent at end-June 2017, compared \nwith 42.6 per cent at end-June 2016 and regulatory minimum of \n30.0, 20.0 and 10.0 per cent for commercial, merchant and non-\ninterest banks, respectively. The industry ratio of non-performing \nloans (NPLs) to total loans, however, deteriorated further to 15.0 \nper cent at end-June 2017, due to adverse economic conditions \n– and the poor performance of three outlier banks. \nIn the other Financial Institutions (OFIs) sub-sector, routine risk-\nbased examination of the five (5) reporting development \nfinance institutions (DFIs) revealed that the Composite Risk \nRating (CRR) of four institutions was High and one “Moderate”. \nEarnings of one institution was rated “acceptable”, one “needs \nimprovement” and three “weak”, due, mainly, to significant \ndeterioration in asset quality and high loan loss provisions. In \naddition, risk-based examinations of 226 microfinance banks \n(MFBs) and 51 finance companies (FCs) were conducted in the \nfirst half of 2017. \nA total of 1,141 and 1,270 complaints against banks and other \nfinancial institutions were received and resolved, respectively, in \nthe first half of 2017, compared with 1,473 and 1,157 received \nand resolved in the corresponding period of 2016. Compliance \nexamination on 19 banks indicated different compliance levels \nwith the regulations on consumer protection and selected \nprovisions of the Revised Guide to Bank Charges (RGBC), \nfollowing which erring banks were directed to implement \nspecific remedial actions, including refunds to customers where \napplicable. \nxxiv\nThe CBN deepened the reforms in the foreign exchange market, \nincluding regular interventions to improve liquidity in the market. \nThe introduction of special windows for investors and exporters, \nForm “Q” for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and weekly \nsales to retail end-users eased the foreign exchange market \nbottlenecks and moderated the demand pressure. Following \nsustained interventions, the end-period exchange rate of the \nnaira to the US dollar, at the BDC segment, appreciated to \nN366.00/US$ at end-June 2017, compared with N490.00/US$ at \nend-December 2016. This implied narrower arbitrage premium \nbetween naira exchange rate at the inter-bank and BDC \nsegments. \nFOREIGN EXCHANGE \nMANAGEMENT\nAggregate credit to the domestic economy grew marginally, \nmainly, as a result of the growth in net claims on the Federal \nGovernment. Net domestic credit (NDC) grew by 1.0 per cent to \nN26,921.0 billion at the end of the first half of 2017, compared \nwith 13.9 per cent at the end of the corresponding period of \n2016. Net claims on government rose by 5.9 per cent, reflecting, \nincreased holding of government securities, especially treasury \nbills by commercial banks. As in the preceding period, the \nFederal Government remained a net lender to the banking \nsystem in the review period. Credit to the private sector, \nhowever, fell marginally by 0.02 per cent to N21,978.60 billion at \nend-June 2017, in contrast to the 14.6 per cent growth in the \ncorresponding period of 2016. \nBanks' deposit and lending rates generally trended upward in \nthe first half of 2017. The average term deposit rate rose by 3.29 \npercentage points to 8.69 per cent above the level in the \ncorresponding period of 2016. Similarly, the weighted average \nprime and maximum lending rates increased to 17.21 and 29.99 \nper cent, respectively. The spread between the average term \ndeposits and maximum lending rates narrowed to 21.29 \npercentage points. Movements in money market rates reflected \nthe tight liquidity conditions in the banking system in the review \nperiod. The rates were generally higher than the levels in the \ncorresponding period of 2016. The monthly weighted average \ninter-bank and average Open-Buy-Back rates stood at 22.94 \nand 26.66 per cent, respectively, compared with 8.50 and 7.63 \nper cent in the corresponding period of 2016. The weighted \naverage Nigeria Inter-bank Offered Rate (NIBOR) for the 30-day \ntenor was 29.26 per cent, compared with the 18.64 per cent in \nthe corresponding half of 2016. With the year-on-year inflation \nrate at 16.1 per cent in June 2016, all deposit rates were negative \nin real terms.\nThe Nigerian Stock Exchange recorded improved performance \nTHE FINANCIAL \nSECTOR\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nxxv\nTHE FINANCIAL \nSECTOR\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nin the first half of 2017, due to positive investors' confidence. \nThere were twelve (12) new equity listings worth N79.35 billion in \nthe primary segment. Aggregate volume of traded securities fell \nby 19.0 per cent, while the value of traded securities rose \nsignificantly by 50.1 per cent relative to the levels in the \ncorresponding period of 2016. The aggregate market \ncapitalisation and All-Share Index (ASI) rose by 10.1 and 11.9 per \ncent, respectively, to N19.03 trillion and 33,117.48 at end-June \n2017.\nGross federally-collected revenue, at N3,020.00 billion or 5.8 per \ncent of GDP in the first half of 2017, was below the proportionate \nbudget estimate by 43.7 per cent, but 26.1 per cent above the \nlevel in the corresponding period of 2016. The shortfall relative to \nthe proportionate budget estimate reflected the decline in \nboth oil and non-oil revenue.\nThe Federal Government retained revenue, at N1,226.37 billion \nor 2.4 per cent of GDP, was 54.5 and 6.1 per cent below the \nproportionate budget estimate and the level in the \ncorresponding period of 2016, respectively. The aggregate \nexpenditure of the Federal Government in the first half of 2017 \namounted to N1,842.11 billion or 3.5 per cent of GDP and, was \n52.5 per cent below the proportionate budget estimate. The \ndecrease, relative to the proportionate budget estimate was \nattributed, largely, to low capital releases in the review period \nowing to revenue short-fall and the late passage of the 2017 \nappropriation bill. \nRecurrent and capital expenditure constituted 88.2 and 2.9 per \ncent, respectively, while statutory transfers accounted for the \nbalance of 8.9 per cent of the total. The fiscal operations of the \nFederal Government in the first half of 2017 resulted in an \nestimated overall deficit of N615.74 billion or 1.2 per cent of \nGDP, compared with the proportionate budget estimate and \nthe corresponding period of 2016, at N1,110.97 billion and \nN676.47 billion, respectively. The deficit was financed, mainly, \nfrom domestic sources.\nThe Federal Government consolidated debt stock at end-\nMarch 2017 was N16,201.29 billion or 15.6 per cent of GDP, \nrepresenting an increase of 11.4 per cent over the level at end-\nDecember 2016. Domestic debt accounted for N11,971.34 \nbillion or 73.9 per cent, while the external debt amounted to \nN4,229.95 billion (US$13.81 billion) or 26.1 per cent of the total. \nThe external debt of US$13.81 billion or 4.1 per cent of GDP \nremained within sustainable threshold of 40.0 per cent of GDP.\nTHE FISCAL\nSECTOR\nxxvi\nTHE REAL\nSECTOR\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nThe real sector continued to grapple with the challenges arising \nfrom binding infrastructure deficit, especially power supply. \nData from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) showed that \nthe gross domestic product (GDP), at 2010 constant basic \nprices, recorded a growth of 0.55 per cent in the second quarter \nof 2017, but contracted by 2.1 per cent in the corresponding \nperiod of 2016. The development reflected the effect of gradual \nincrease in aggregate demand, improved production in the \nagricultural and manufacturing sectors, and the impact of \ngovernment's effort to address infrastructure challenges. The \nagricultural sector recorded positive growth on account of \nfavourable weather conditions, sustained effort at \nstrengthening domestic production through the \nimplementation of the Agriculture Promotion Policy Framework, \nespecially, the CBN sponsored Anchor Borrower Programme \nand strong commitment to economic diversification. Notable \nactivities to promote growth in the industrial sector included: \nconstitution of the Presidential Industrial Policy and \nCompetitiveness Advisory Council, to drive the nation's \nindustrialisation agenda; commencement of the construction \nof US$100.00 million gas turbine assembly plant in Cross River \nState, to support development of gas reserve and improve gas \nsupply to thermal power plants; and continuation of the power \nsector privitisation process.\nThere was improvement in the Nigerian oil and gas industry, \nmainly, on account of ongoing peace deal in the Niger Delta. \nConsequently, average daily crude oil production was 1.62 \nmillion barrels per day (mbd) or 293.2 million barrels (mb), an \nincrease of 0.07 mbd or 4.5 per cent above the 1.55 mbd or 285.2 \nmb in the preceding half of 2016. The average spot price of \nNigeria's reference crude, the Bonny Light, increased by 7.4 and \n28.8 per cent to US$52.19 per barrel, above the levels in the \npreceding and the first halves of 2016, respectively. The price \nincrease was attributed to the continued cooperation between \nOPEC and non-OPEC producers on production cut.\nThe general price level decelerated in the first half of 2017 due, \nmainly, to moderation in non-food prices arising from stability of \nthe naira exchange rate. The all-items composite Consumer \nPrice Index (CPI) stood at 234.2 (November 2009=100), \ncompared with 213.6 and 201.7 at end-December and end-\nJune 2016, respectively. The year-on-year headline inflation \ndeclined consistently throughout the review period from 18.7 \nper cent in January to 16.1 per cent at end-June 2017, \ncompared with 18.6 and 16.5 per cent at end-December and \nend-June 2016, respectively. \nxxvii\nThe moderation of pressure in the external sector continued in \nthe first half of 2017, as reflected in significant improvement in the \noverall balance of payments position and further accretion to \nthe external reserve on account of increased price and \ndomestic production of crude oil amidst gradual recovery in the \nemerging markets. The development reflected the effect of \ntrade surplus in the goods account due to improved crude oil \nprice and export, and higher net-surplus in current transfer \noccasioned by increased inflow of workers' remittances which \nmore than offset the deficits in both the services and income \naccounts. \nThe capital and financial account recorded a net acquisition of \nfinancial assets equivalent to 0.2 per cent of GDP compared with \n7.4 per cent in the corresponding period in 2016. The stock of \nexternal reserves rose to US$30.64 billion at end-June 2017, \nenough to finance 12.3 months of current level of import of \ngoods and 8.5 months of goods and services. The increased \nresort to heterodox demand management policies by the Bank \nin the first half of 2017 had significant positive impact on the \nNigerian Foreign Exchange Market. Enhanced supply of foreign \nexchange to meet the needs of different categories of end-user, \ndirect disbursement and mandatory time frame for banks to \nmeet foreign exchange demand at the retail segment resulted \nin significant appreciation of the naira exchange rate, especially \nat the BDC segment and narrowed the arbitrage premium.\nEXTERNAL\nSECTOR\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nOUTLOOK\nFOR THE REST\nOF 2017\nGlobal GDP was projected to grow at 3.5 per cent in 2017 as the \ngradual pick-up in global economic activities and recovery is \nexpected to continue. Growth in the advanced economies was \nalso marked-up to 2.0 per cent from 1.7 per cent in 2016 due, \nlargely, to expected stronger consumer demand, investment \nand trade. In the euro area, growth was projected at 1.9 per \ncent in 2017, compared with 1.8 per cent in 2016. Growth \nprojections in Britain, Japan, Spain, Italy were revised downwards \non account of weaker-than-expected activities in the first \nquarter of 2017.\nGrowth in emerging and developing economies was projected \nto rise to 4.6 per cent in 2017, driven, mainly, by the bottoming-\nout of economic recession in some countries and firming up of \ncommodity prices. Growth in India was projected to rise to 7.2 \nper cent in 2017, above 7.1 per cent in 2016, owing to higher \ngovernment spending. In Brazil, growth was projected to \nrebound to 0.3 per cent in 2017, from a contraction of 3.6 per \ncent in 2016, due to expected moderate recovery in commodity \nprices and upswing in economic activity.\nGrowth in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region was \nprojected to decelerate to 2.6 per cent in 2017, from 5.0 per \ncent in 2016, reflecting slowdown in oil exports and political crisis \nin a number of countries in the region. Also, continued weakness \nin oil prices if sustained, could weigh further on the outlook for \nthe region. \nIn sub-Sahara Africa, growth, was projected to rise to 2.7 per \ncent in 2017, predicated on gradual rise in commodity prices \nand sustained implementation of reforms to address \nmacroeconomic imbalances. The growth was expected to be \ndriven by recovery in South Africa and Nigeria. Growth in South \nAfrica was projected at 1.0 per cent in 2017, from 0.3 per cent in \n2016. \nThe outlook for Nigeria's economy for the rest of the year signals \nmoderate improvement premised, largely, on expected fiscal \nexpansion, slowdown in inflationary pressure and increase in \nnon-oil receipts. The cautious optimism was against the \nbackdrop of persistent structural imbalances and sluggish \nrecovery of the global economy. The downward trend in \ninflationary pressure was projected to continue into the rest of \n2017 as the Bank deepens implementation of measures to curb \nexchange rate pass through and moderate pressure on \ndomestic prices. \nThe outlook for the real sector in the remaining half of 2017 is \nlargely optimistic. Government's commitment to the \nimplementation of the Economic Recovery and Growth Plan \n(ERGP) and improvement of the stock, and quality of \ninfrastructure is expected to increase domestic production as \nwell as moderate unemployment rate. In addition, CBN \ninterventions in critical sectors, further progress in government's \neffort to enhance the ease of doing business and sustain effort \nto stem insurgency in the North East as well as maintain the \npeace deal in the Niger Delta would improve the \nmacroeconomic environment and facilitate increased real \nsector productivity. \nOn the fiscal side, the passage of the 2017 appropriation bill, \nrealisation of revenue target and targeted expenditure, \nparticularly capital releases to address infrastructure deficits \nwould stimulate economic activities. Also, the Paris Club Refund \nwould assist state governments to settle accumulated salaries \nand pension arrears. Overall, these developments would \nprovide the necessary fiscal stimulus for the economy and boost \naggregate demand and output. \nxxviii\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nOUTLOOK\nFOR THE REST\nOF 2017\nxxix\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n \nThe impressive performance of the external sector is expected \nto continue into the rest of the year, premised on increased \ncrude oil price, production and export in 2017. Sustained peace \ndeal in the Niger Delta region, would provide favourable \ncondition in the near-term for stability in production. In addition \nCBN's commitment to provide the required liquidity in the \nforeign exchange market would support domestic production. \nThe non-expansionary monetary policy stance of the Bank \nwould sustain the downward trend in inflationary pressure and \nenhance the prospect of achieving exchange rate and price \nstability. \nOUTLOOK\nFOR THE REST\nOF 2017\nxxxi\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nIndicator\nJun-11\nJun-12\nJun-13\nJun-14\nJun-15\nJun-16\nJun-17 2/\nDomestic Output and Prices\nGDP* at Current Mkt Prices (N' billion)\n29,915.91\n34,643.40\n38,671.86\n42,339.35\n44,323.45\n46,172.76\n53,451.00\nGDP* at Current Mkt Prices (US$' billion)\n195.26\n219.75\n245.84\n269.17\n234.06\n227.68\n174.73\nGDP* per Capita (N)\n364,399.54\n410,384.72\n445,488.95\n474,345.55\n483,040.83\n489,480.84\n551,195.02\nGDP* per Capita (US$)\n2,378.42\n2,603.16\n2,832.02\n3,015.65\n2,550.81\n2,413.69\n1,801.88\nReal GDP** Growth (Growth Rate %)\n6.62\n3.79\n4.94\n6.38\n3.14\n-1.08\n-0.18\n Oil Sector\n17.31\n-9.19\n-13.77\n-1.23\n-7.49\n-8.15\n-7.47\n Non-oil Sector\n4.68\n6.43\n8.18\n7.44\n4.50\n-0.29\n0.58\n Sectoral Classification of GDP** (Growth Rate %)\n Agriculture\n2.58\n6.36\n2.52\n4.55\n4.07\n3.84\n3.19\n Industry\n16.14\n-0.96\n-0.85\n5.90\n-4.88\n-6.93\n-3.16\nConstruction\n3.82\n24.17\n13.96\n13.99\n8.67\n-5.83\n0.14\nTrade\n6.78\n1.61\n5.91\n5.71\n5.77\n0.99\n-2.36\n Services\n3.27\n4.90\n8.82\n7.21\n5.56\n-1.04\n0.41\nOil Production (mbd)\n2.14\n2.09\n1.99\n1.91\n1.89\n1.68\n1.62\nManufacturing Capacity Utilisation (%)\n55.73\n57.03\n57.60\n59.30\n***\n***\n***\nInflation Rate (%) (Year-over-Year)\n10.23\n12.89\n8.35\n8.17\n9.17\n16.48\n16.10\nInflation Rate (%) (12-month moving average)\n12.32\n11.32\n10.38\n8.00\n8.42\n11.37\n17.58\nCore Inflation Rate (%) (Year-over-Year) 3/\n11.52\n15.20\n5.47\n8.12\n8.40\n16.22\n12.46\nCore Inflation Rate (%) (12-month moving average) 5/\n12.10\n12.73\n10.70\n7.37\n7.01\n10.86\n16.22\nFederal Government Finance (% of GDP*)\nRetained Revenue\n4.37\n5.49\n5.07\n4.44\n3.57\n2.83\n4.69\nTotal Expenditure\n6.55\n6.39\n6.14\n5.03\n5.10\n5.45\n5.40\n Recurrent Expenditure\n5.17\n4.48\n4.43\n3.80\n4.23\n4.08\n5.01\n Of which: Interest Payments\n0.75\n0.89\n1.01\n1.13\n1.34\n1.32\n1.74\n Foreign\n0.07\n0.06\n0.08\n0.09\n0.08\n0.07\n0.10\n Domestic\n0.68\n0.83\n0.93\n1.04\n1.26\n1.25\n1.63\n Capital Expenditure and Net Lending\n1.01\n0.84\n1.29\n0.83\n0.62\n0.75\n0.00\n Transfers\n0.36\n1.06\n0.42\n0.39\n0.25\n0.62\n0.39\nCurrent Balance (Deficit(-)/Surplus(+))\n-0.80\n1.01\n0.64\n0.64\n-0.65\n-1.26\n-0.32\nPrimary Balance (Deficit(-)/Surplus(+))\n-1.42\n-0.01\n-0.06\n0.54\n-0.19\n-1.30\n1.03\nOverall Fiscal Balance (Deficit(-)/Surplus(+))\n-2.17\n-0.90\n-1.07\n-0.58\n-1.53\n-2.62\n-0.71\nFinancing\n2.42\n0.90\n1.07\n0.58\n1.53\n2.62\n0.71\n Foreign\n0.25\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n Domestic\n2.17\n0.90\n1.07\n0.58\n1.53\n2.62\n0.71\n Banking System\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n Non-bank Public\n1.59\n0.59\n1.35\n1.19\n0.74\n1.14\n0.00\n Others\n0.58\n0.31\n-0.27\n-0.61\n0.78\n1.49\n0.71\nConsolidated Government Debt Stock\n9.48\n10.14\n10.25\n10.49\n11.76\n14.94\n15.56\n External\n1.30\n1.26\n1.39\n1.72\n2.29\n3.45\n4.31\n Domestic\n8.18\n8.88\n8.86\n8.76\n9.47\n11.49\n11.26\nSelected Macroeconomic and Social Indicators 1/\nxxxii\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nSelected Macroeconomic and Social Indicators 1/ (Cont...)\nIndicator\nJun-11\nJun-12\nJun-13\nJun-14\nJun-15\nJun-16\nJun-17 2/\nMoney and Credit ( Growth Rate %)\nReserve Money\n11.88\n-9.77\n-12.64\n-5.97\n0.25\n-7.58\n-6.29\nNarrow Money (M1)\n1.18\n-2.54\n-6.49\n-2.88\n-5.25\n11.05\n-9.59\nBroad Money (M2)\n5.61\n1.35\n0.71\n3.08\n-0.54\n10.23\n-6.83\nNet Foreign Assets\n-0.81\n5.37\n1.34\n-9.49\n-14.42\n25.69\n-7.45\nNet Domestic Assets\n13.94\n-3.31\n-0.18\n18.55\n7.54\n4.14\n-6.44\nNet Domestic Credit\n2.32\n-1.01\n3.55\n3.26\n11.08\n13.93\n1.41\n Net Credit to Government\n5.22\n-63.15\n-3.63\n-19.16\n118.79\n9.66\n7.69\n Credit to Private Sector\n1.30\n3.65\n3.57\n4.88\n4.26\n14.59\n0.02\nMoney Multiplier for M2\n5.89\n5.37\n4.82\n3.38\n3.16\n4.11\n4.01\nIncome Velocity of M2\n4.92\n5.14\n4.96\n5.24\n4.71\n4.18\n4.86\nInterest Rates (% per annum)\nMonetary Policy Rate (MPR) 4/\n8.00\n12.00\n12.00\n12.00\n13.00\n12.00\n14.00\nRepurchase Rate\nReverse Repurchase Rate\nTreasury Bill Rate\n 91-day\n8.20\n14.08\n11.60\n9.98\n9.95\n8.32\n13.50\nInter-bank Call Rate\n11.15\n14.92\n11.59\n10.50\n10.85\n35.26\n13.46\nDeposit Rates\n Savings Rate\n1.40\n1.76\n2.04\n3.42\n3.60\n3.61\n4.08\n 3-months Fixed\n5.14\n7.80\n7.49\n9.30\n10.27\n6.92\n9.01\n 6-months Fixed\n5.26\n8.08\n7.07\n9.52\n10.81\n6.59\n10.68\n 12-months Fixed\n4.68\n7.51\n5.32\n9.19\n10.83\n5.17\n11.15\nPrime Lending Rate\n15.76\n16.93\n16.56\n16.50\n17.24\n16.78\n17.59\nMaximum Lending Rate\n22.02\n23.44\n24.58\n26.07\n26.84\n26.93\n30.94\nExternal Sector\nCurrent Account Balance (% of GDP*)\n6.28\n2.63\n4.50\n1.12\n-3.25\n-0.29\n2.37\n Goods Account\n11.11\n7.88\n9.48\n5.02\n-1.19\n-1.19\n2.50\n Services and Income Account\n-10.32\n-10.05\n-9.30\n-7.94\n-6.08\n-3.46\n-5.96\n Current Transfers\n5.50\n4.80\n4.32\n4.04\n4.01\n4.36\n5.82\nCapital and Financial Account Balance (% of GDP*)\n-1.24\n0.67\n0.47\n0.87\n1.63\n0.12\n3.25\nOverall Balance (% of GDP*)\n-0.29\n1.27\n0.48\n-2.04\n-2.50\n-0.68\n1.87\nExternal Reserves (US $ million)\n31,890.91\n35,412.50\n44,957.00\n37,330.03\n28,335.21\n26,505.50\n30,340.96\nNumber of Months of Import Equivalent\n6.46\n6.36\n9.86\n7.19\n6.11\n8.14\n11.11\nDebt Service Due (% of Exports of Goods and Services)\nAverage Crude Oil Price (US$/barrel)\n113.86\n115.05\n110.29\n111.29\n58.54\n40.51\n52.19\nAverage AFEM/DAS Rate (N/$1.00)+ \n153.21\n157.65\n157.30\n157.29\n189.37\n202.79\n305.90\nEnd of Period AFEM/DAS Rate (N/$1.00) \n153.31\n157.50\n157.31\n157.29\n196.95\n283.00\n305.72\nAverage Bureau de Change Exchange Rate (N/$)\n156.95\n161.22\n159.66\n169.50\n213.55\n325.00\n366.00\nEnd of Period Bureau de Change Exchange Rate (N/$)\n159.00\n164.00\n162.00\n168.00\n225.50\n348.00\n366.25\nCapital Market\nAll Share Value Index (1984=100)\n24,980.20\n21,599.57\n36,164.31\n42,482.48\n33,456.83\n29,597.79\n33,117.48\nValue of Stocks Traded (Billion Naira)\n373.50\n468.17\n1,110.38\n579.98\n557.13\n313.25\n376.77\nMarket Capitalization (Trillion Naira)\n11.20\n12.40\n17.43\n14.03\n11.42\n9.79\n11.45\nSocial Indicators\nPopulation (million)\n164.19\n168.83\n173.62\n178.52\n183.52\n188.66\n193.95\nPopulation Growth Rate (%)\n2.80\n2.81\n2.80\n2.80\n2.80\n2.80\n2.80\nLife Expectancy at Birth (Years)\n***\n***\n***\n***\n***\n***\n***\nAdult Literacy Rate (%)\n***\n***\n***\n***\n***\n***\n***\nIncidence of Poverty 5/\n***\n***\n***\n***\n***\n***\n***\n 1/ Revised\n 2/ Provisional\n 3/ Core Inflation is measured as the rate of change of all-item Consumer Price Index (CPI) less farm produce.\n 4/ MPR replaced MRR with effect from December 11, 2006.\n 5/ The incidence of poverty in Nigeria was projected to increase from 65.6 per cent in 1996 to 70.0 per cent in 2000.\n However, the result of a Nigeria Living Standard Survey of 2003/2004 from NBS (former FOS), \n showed that the incidence of poverty declined to 54.4 per cent in 2003/2004.\nThe Interbank exchange rate became the reference official rate since February 19, 2015. \n *Figures and computations are based on nominal GDP at market prices. \n **Figures and computations are based on nominal GDP by production, comprising 44 activity sectors. \n *** indicates not available\nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA\nREPORT FOR THE FIRST HALF OF 2015\n1.0 \nINTRODUCTION\nIn the first half of 2017, the Nigerian economy witnessed a confluence of global and \ndomestic headwinds, including constrained fiscal space owing to lower crude oil \nreceipts and heightened monetary policy divergence in the advanced economies, \nsuch as policy normalisation by the US Fed and excess liquidity in the banking system. \nThese developments intensified the demand pressure in the foreign exchange market, \nthereby impacting domestic prices and economic activity. Accordingly, the Bank \nretained its non-expansionary monetary policy stance to rein in inflationary pressure and \nencourage capital inflow. The Bank also introduced key reforms in the foreign exchange \nmarket, notably the special Investors' and Exporters' (I&E) Window, to improve foreign \nexchange supply from autonomous sources. Monetary targeting remained the \nframework for monetary management, with the monetary policy rate (MPR) as the \nanchor for short-term money market rates. \nOpen Market Operations (OMO) remained the Bank's key liquidity management \ninstrument, complemented by reserve requirements, repurchase agreements, standing \nfacilities and discount window operations.\nTable 1\nMonetary Policy Benchmarks and Outcomes\n(Growth in % except otherwise stated)\n \n1\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nKey Variables\nDec 2015\nJun 2016 \nDec, 2016\nJun 2017\nBenchmark\n \nOutcome\n \nBenchmark\n \nOutcome\n \nBenchmark\nOutcome\nBenchmark\nOutcome\nBroad Money (M2)\n \n15.24\n \n5.9\n \n11.0\n \n10.2\n11.0\n16.8\n10.3\n-7.3\nNarrow Money (M1)\n \n9.9\n \n24.4\n \n11.3\n \n11.1\n11.3\n29.1\n11.0\n-10.7\nBase Money (Reserve) \n \n16.8\n \n-2.0\n \n13.2\n \n-7.6\n13.2\n0.6\n11.4\n-6.1\nAggregate credit to the domestic economy (Net)\n \n29.3\n \n12.1\n \n17.9\n \n13.9\n17.9\n23.3\n17.9\n1.0\nCredit to Government (Net)\n36.0\n152.0\n47.4\n9.7\n47.43\n61.4\n33.1\n5.9\nCredit to the private sector \n26.1\n3.3\n13.4\n14.6\n13.4\n17.4\n14.9\n-0.02\nInflation rate\n8.00\n9.6\n11.9\n16.5\n11.9\n18.6\n10.7\n16.1\nReal GDP \n7.24\n3.6\n-2.1\n3.6\n-1.3\n4.1\n0.55\nSource: CBN\n2.0 \nOPERATIONS OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA\n2.1 \nLiquidity Management\nIn the first half of 2017, the monetary policy environment was shaped by a number of \nglobal and domestic headwinds. These included: lower crude oil receipts which strained \nfiscal space, monetary policy divergence in the advanced economies, demand \npressure in the foreign exchange market, excess liquidity in the banking system as well as \nrecession. The Bank's response included the adoption of non-standard monetary policies \nand measures. Consequently, the Bank retained its monetary tightening stance to \nachieve the objectives of monetary and price stability. It also deployed a combination of \npolicy tools to ensure effective liquidity management and stimulate economic recovery. \nOpen Market Operations (OMO) remained the Bank's key liquidity management \ninstrument, complemented by reserve requirements, repurchase agreements, standing \nfacilities and discount window operations.\nThe MPR was retained at 14.0 per cent with an asymmetric corridor of +200/-500 basis \npoints at the January, March and May 2017 MPC meetings. The Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) \nand Liquidity Ratio (LR) were also retained at 22.5 and 30.0 per cent, respectively. \nReserve money stood at N5,489.64 billion at end-June 2017, indicating declines of 6.1 and \n7.6 per cent below its level in the preceding and corresponding periods of 2016. The Bank \nalso introduced key innovations in the foreign exchange market, notably a special \nInvestors' and Exporters' Window, to improve foreign exchange supply from autonomous \nsources. \n2.2 Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) Decisions\nThe Monetary Policy Committee held three (3) meetings in the review period. A summary \nof the key decisions were as follows:\n2\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n3\n2.3 Developments in the Payments System \nThe Bank continued to accord priority to the safety and efficiency of the payments \nsystem in Nigeria. To this end, it sustained the implementation of the following initiatives:\n2.3.1 Payments System Initiatives\n2.3.1.1 The Bank Verification Number (BVN) Scheme\nTo consolidate on the gains achieved on the BVN scheme, the Bank/Federal \nGovernment initiated the following:\n \nDraft Regulatory Framework for BVN Operations and Watch-list for the Nigerian \nFinancial System;\n \nExtension of BVN scheme to Other Financial Institutions (OFIs), to avoid broken \nidentity link in the banking system. It is required that by end-July 2017, all customers \nof OFIs should have BVN. Any customer of OFIs without a BVN would not be \nallowed to initiate a debit transaction on his/her account; and\n \nSet up a Committee on Identity Management and Harmonisation of data, to \nintegrate identity data including the BVN captured by different organisations. The \nCommittee agreed on minimum data standards, minimum data fields and \nresolved issues on the NIN-BVN harmonisation process. \nAt end-June 2017, the BVN Project had 29,565,684 registered customers with BVNs and \n40,676,362 accounts linked with the BVN platform out of 62,615,344 active customer \naccounts.\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nTable 2\nMonetary Policy Committee Decisions During the First Half of 2017\n \n \n \n \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria MPC Communiqués\n \nDate of \nMeeting\n \nType of \nMeeting\n \nDecisions\nJanuary 2\n3\n \nand 24, 2017\n \nRegular\n \n·\n \nRetained the MPR at 14.0 per cent;\n \n·\n \nRetained the CRR at 22.5\n \nper cent;\n \n· \nRetained the LR \nat 30.0\n \nper cent; and\n· \nRetained the asymmetric corridor at +200/ -\n500 basis points around the MPR.\n \nMarch 20\n \nand 21, 2017\n \nRegular \n§ \nRetained the MPR at 14.0 per cent;\n \n§ \nRetained the CRR at 22.5\n \nper cent;\n \n§ \nRetained the LR \nat 30.0\n \nper cent; and\n§ \nRetained the asymmetric corridor at +200/ -\n500 basis points around the MPR.\n \nMay 22\n \nand \n23, 2017\n \nRegular \n§ \nRetained the MPR at 14.0 per cent;\n \n§ \nRetained the CRR at 22.5\n \nper cent;\n \n§ \nRetained the LR \nat 30.0\n \nper cent; and\n§ \nRetained the asymmetric corridor at +200/ -\n500 basis points around the MPR.\n4\n2.3.1.2 Nigeria Electronic Fraud Forum (NeFF) \nThe NeFF organised a 2-day workshop on Cybercrime from May 30 - 31, 2017 in Abuja, \nwith the theme, “Tackling Enforcement Challenges under the Cybercrime Act”. The \nworkshop provided an opportunity for the Central Bank of Nigeria, financial institutions, \nthe Ministry of Justice, law enforcement agencies, the Military and other stakeholders, to \nbrainstorm and engage the law enforcement community on the best ways to implement \nthe Cybercrime Act. \n \n2.3.1.3 Migration from Merchant Service Charge (MSC) to Interchange Fee Regime\nThe plan to migrate the Nigerian payment card industry from the use of merchant service \ncharge (MSC) to Interchange Fee Regime with effect from May, 2017 was suspended to \nenable stakeholders to resolve all the issues relating to the migration.\n2.3.1.4 Cheque Standards and Cheque Printers Accreditation Scheme\nThe draft of the revised Nigeria Cheque Standards, meant to enhance the efficiency and \nsafety of cheque clearing system, was exposed to key stakeholders in the industry. \nNotable changes in the revised version included: introduction of quick response (QR) \ncode for faster verification of cheque details; expiry date of printed cheque booklet; and \nclear zone at the back of the cheque.\n2.3.1.5 Licensing of Payments System Participants\nDuring the review period, one (1) card scheme, one (1) mobile money operator and two \n(2) Payment Solution Service Providers (PSSP), were licensed, bringing the total card \nschemes, mobile money operators and PSSPs to four (4), 23 and eight (8), respectively. \nThere were 18 PTSPs, six (6) transaction switching companies and three (3) third party \nprocessors in Nigeria at end-June 2017.\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nTable 3: Licensed Payments System Participants\nLicense -Type \nNumber\n \nDec 2016 \nJune 2017\n \nCard Schemes \n3 \n4\n \nMobile Money Operators \n22 \n23\n \nPayment Solution Service Providers \n6 \n8\n \nPayment Terminal Service Providers \n18 \n18\n \nTransaction Switching Companies \n6 \n6\n \nThird Party Processors \n3 \n3\n \nTotal \n58 \n62\n \n2.3.1.6 Payments System Vision 2020 (PSV 2020)\nIn pursuit of the attainment of the PSV 2020, significant achievements were recorded in \nthe first half of 2017. These included the exposure of the following to stakeholders: \n· \nRevised draft Guidelines for Nigeria Clearing System Rules, 2017;\n· \nRevised draft Guidelines for Direct Debit Schemes in Nigeria, 2017;\n· \nGuidelines on Bills Payment in Nigeria, 2017; and\n· \nGuidelines on Instant (Inter-bank) Electronic Funds Transfer Services in Nigeria, \n2017.\n5\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nAlso, to deepen the use of electronic payments, the following activities were undertaken:\n· \nDeveloped the “Smart Cities Policy Framework and Leadership Paper”;\n· \nDeveloped the draft “Framework for The Adoption of Electronic Payments in The \nEducation Ecosystem”; \n· \nDeveloped the draft “Strategies for the Adoption of Electronic Payments for \nTransport Services in Nigeria”;\n· \nReviewed the RTGS Rules and Regulations;\n· \nDefined the point at which settlement is final and irrevocable for four major \npayments schemes in Nigeria - RTGS, Card, Mobile and ACH/Cheque/Instant \nPayment Schemes. This is in compliance with Principle 8 of the BIS Principles for \nFinancial Market Infrastructures (PFMI) on Settlement Finality; and\n· \nReviewed the current collateral management framework for the operations of \ndeferred net settlement systems and recommended phased approach for \nmigration from fixed collateral requirement to a risk-based collateral requirement, \namong others.\n2.3.2 Retail Payments System\n2.3.2.1 Cheque \nThe volume and value of cheques cleared decreased by 14.5 and 5.2 per cent to 5.3 \nmillion and 2,781.5 billion in the first half of 2017 from 6.2 million and 2,934.7 billion in the \nN\nN\nsecond half of 2016. The decrease was attributed to consumers growing preference for \nthe use of elecronic payments.\nFigure 1\nVolume of Cheques Cleared \n(Million)\n \n \nSource: CBN \n \n7.0\n6.0\n5.0\n4.0\n5.7\n6.2\n5.3\n6\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 2\nValue of Cheques Cleared\n(N' Billion)\n \n \nSource: CBN \n3,500.0\n3,000.0\n2,500.0\n2,000.0\n1,500.0\n1,000.0\n500.0\n2,894.8\n2,934.7\n2,781.5\nFirst Half 2016\nSecond Half 2016\nFirst Half 2017\n N Billion\n2.3.2.2 Electronic Payments\nThe volume and value of electronic payments (comprising ATM, PoS, Mobile payments \nand internet) increased by 5.8 and 14.1 per cent to 461.8 million and N4,295.9 billion \nrespectively, in the first half of 2017 above 436.5 million and N3,764.9 billion in the second \nhalf of 2016. \nA breakdown of e-payment channels for the review period indicated that the ATM \nremained the most patronised, accounting for 79.4 per cent, followed by PoS terminal \nand mobile payments, with 12.9 and 5.2 per cent, respectively. The web (internet) was \nthe least patronised, accounting for 2.5 per cent of the total. In terms of value, the ATM \naccounted for 70.9 per cent; PoS, 14.2 per cent; mobile payments, 12.9 per cent and the \nweb (internet), 2.0 per cent. \nFigure 3\nUsage of E-payment Channels by Volume \n(First Half 2017, Per cent)\nSource: CBN\n \nATM \n79.4%\nPoS\n12.9%\nInternet \n2.5%\nMobile \n5.2%\n \n \n7\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 4\nUsage of E-payment Channels by Value \n(First Half 2017, Per cent)\n \nSource: CBN \nPoS \n14.2%\nMobile \n12.9%\nInternet \n2.0%\nATM\n70.9%\nFigure 5\nVolume of Electronic Payments \n(Million)\n \n \nSource: CBN \n500.0\n400.0\n300.0\n200.0\n100.0\n-\n314.6\n436.5\n461.8\nFigure 6\nValue of Electronic Payments \n(N'Billion)\n \n \nSource: CBN\n \n5,000.0\n4,000.0\n3,000.0\n2,000.0\n1,000.0\n-\nN Billion\nN Billion\n2,871.5\n3,764\n4,295.9\nFirst Half 2016 \nSecond Half 2016 \nFirst Half 2017\nFirst Half 2016 \nSecond Half 2016 \nFirst Half 2017\n \n2.3.2.2.1 \nATM Transactions\nThe number of ATMs stood at 17,712 at end-June 2017 from 17,083 in the corresponding \nperiod of 2016, representing a slight increase of 3.7 per cent. ATM transactions increased \nin both volume and value by 40.4 and 38.2 per cent to 366.8 million and N3,046.3 billion \nrespectively, in the first half of 2017, above 261.2 million and N2,204.5 billion in the \ncorresponding period of 2016, respectively.\n8\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 7\nVolume of ATM Transactions \n(Million)\n \n \nSource: CBN \n \nMilllion\n400.0\n350.0\n300.0\n250.0\n200.0\n150.0\n100.0\n50.0\n-\nFirst Half 2016\nSecond Half 2016\nFirst Half 2017\nFigure 8\nValue of ATM Transactions \n(N' Billion)\n \n \nSource: CBN \n3,500.0\n3,000.0\n2,500.0\n2,000.0\n1,500.0\n1,000.0\n500.0\n- \n2,204.5\n2,783.7\n3,046.3\nFirst Half 2016\nSecond Half 2016\nFirst Half 2017\nMilllion\n \n2.3.2.2.2 \nWeb Transactions\nThe volume and value of internet transactions increased by 113.0 and 44.3 per cent, to \n11.5 million and N83.7 billion, respectively, in the first half of 2017 above 5.4 million and \nN58.0 billion in the corresponding period of 2016. The rise was due largely to increased \nawareness and acceptance of internet payment.\n \n9\nFigure 9\nVolume of Web Transactions \n(Million)\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n \n \nSource: CBN\n \n14.0\n12.0\n10.0\n8.0\n6.0\n4.0\n2.0\n-\n5.4\n8.7\n11.5\nFigure 10\nValue of Web Transactions \n(N'Billion)\n \n \nSource: CBN \n100.0\n80.0\n60.0\n40.0\n20.0\n-\n58.0\n74.4\n83.7\nFirst Half 2016\nSecond Half 2016\nFirst Half 2017\nFirst Half 2016\nSecond Half 2016\nFirst Half 2017\nN’ Billlion\nMilllion\n2.3.2.2.3 \nPoint of Sale (PoS) Transactions\nThe number of PoS terminals in operation increased by 3.4 per cent to 125,608 at end-\nJune 2017 above 121,488 in the corresponding period of 2016. The PoS transactions \nincreased significantly both in volume and value by 134.8 and 97.8 per cent to 59.4 million \nand N610.1 billion respectively, above 25.3 million and N308.5 billion in the corresponding \nperiod of 2016. The rise in PoS transactions in both volume and value was due to \nincreased public confidence and acceptance of the terminal.\n2.3.2.2.4 \nMobile Payments\nThe volume and value of mobile payments increased by 6.6 and 83.1 per cent to 24.2 \nmillion and N555.8 billion, respectively, in the first half of 2017 above 22.7 million and \nN303.5 billion, in the corresponding period of 2016. The rise was due to continued \nacceptance of mobile payments as an alternative and conveniant mode of payment. \n10\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 11\nVolume of PoS Transactions \n(Million)\n \n \nSource: CBN \nFirst Half 2016\nSecond Half 2016\nFirst Half 2017\n70.0\n60.0\n50.0\n40.0\n30.0\n20.0\n10.0\n-\n25.3\n38.4\n59.4\nMilllion\nFigure 12\nValue of PoS Transactions \n(N'Billion) \n \nSource: CBN \nN’ Billlion\n700.0\n600.0\n500.0\n400.0\n300.0\n200.0\n100.0\n-\n308.5\n450.5\n610.1\nFirst Half 2016\nSecond Half 2016\nFirst Half 2017\n \n11\nFigure 13\nVolume of Mobile Transactions \n(Million)\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n \n \n \nSource: CBN \n \n24.5\n24.0\n23.5\n23.0\n22.5\n22.0\n21.5\nMillion\n22.7\n24.3\n24.2\nFirst Half 2016\nSecond Half 2016\nFirst Half 2017\nFigure 14\nValue of Mobile Transactions \n(N' Billion)\n \n \nSource: CBN \n600.0\n500.0\n400.0\n300.0\n200.0\n100.0\n-\n303.5\n453.4\n555.8\nNBillion\nFirst Half 2016\nSecond Half 2016\nFirst Half 2017\n2.3.3 Wholesale Payments System\n2.3.3.1 Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) System\nThe volume and value of inter-bank transfers through the RTGS System (CBN Inter-bank \nFunds Transfer System - CIFTS) increased by 14.6 per cent and 10.5 per cent to 625,788 and \nN202,664.0 billion respectively, in the first half of 2017. This was above the 546,283 and \nN183,365.0 billion recorded in 2016. The increase was attributed to the bulk upload of \ngovernment payments through the System.\n12\n2.3.3.2 Nigeria Inter-bank Settlement System Instant Payment (NIP) \nThe volume and value of the NIBSS Instant Payment transactions increased significantly \nby 167.3 and 49.7 per cent to 150.5 million and N24,491.2 billion respectively, in the first half \nof 2017 above the 56.3 million and N16,365.0 billion in the corresponding period of 2016. \nThe increase was attributed to users' preference for its quick transfer capacity.\nFigure 15\nVolume of RTGS Transactions\n(Million)\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n \n \nSource: CBN \n640,000.0\n620,000.0\n600,000.0\n580,000.0\n560,000.0\n540,000.0\n520,000.0\n500,000.0\n546,283.0\n612,843.0\n625, 788.0\nMillion\nFirst Half 2016\nSecond Half 2016\nFirst Half 2017\nFigure 16\nValue of RTGS Transactions \n(N' Billion)\n \n \nSource: CBN \n205,000.0\n200,000.0\n195,000.0\n190,000.0\n185,000.0\n180,000.0\n175,000.0\n170,000.0\nNBillion\n13\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 17\nVolume of NIP Transactions \n(Million)\n \n \nSource: CBN\n \n160.0\n140.0\n120.0\n100.0\n80.0\n60.0\n40.0\n20.0\n-\n56.3\n97.3\n150.5\nFirst Half 2016\nSecond Half 2016\nFirst Half 2017\nFigure 18\nValue of NIP Transactions \n(N'Billion)\nMillion\nNBillion\n \n \nSource: CBN \n30,000.0\n25,000.0\n20,000.0\n15,000.0\n10,000.0\n5,000.0\n-\nFirst Half 2016\nSecond Half 2016\nFirst Half 2017\n2.3.3.3 Nigeria Interbank Settlement System Electronic Fund Transfer (NEFT)\nDuring the review period the volume of NEFT transactions decreased slightly by 0.7 per \ncent to 12.9 million from 13.0 million in the first half of 2016. The value, however, increased \nby 21.6 per cent to N7,050.3 billion from N5,799.4 billion.\n \n \n \n \nSource: CBN \nFigure 19\nVolume of NEFT Transactions \n(Million)\n14\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n \n \nSource: CBN\n \n15.0\n10.0\n5.0\n-\n13.0\n12.3\n12.9\nFirst Half 2016\nSecond Half 2016\nFirst Half 2017\nFigure 20\nValue of NEFT Transactions \n(N'Billion)\n8,000.0\n7,000.0\n6,000.0\n5,000.0\n4,000.0\n3,000.0\n2,000.0\n1,000.0\n-\nNBillion\nMillion\nFirst Half 2016\nSecond Half 2016\nFirst Half 2017\n5,799.4\n6,655.6 \n7,050.3\n2.3.4 CURRENCY OPERATIONS\n2.3.4.1 Issuance of the Legal Tender\nThe Bank approved an indent of 2,674.49 million, an increase of 28.6 per cent or 595.46 \nmillion above the 2,079.03 million pieces of banknotes ordered in the preceding year to \nmeet the currency needs of the economy in 2017. The Nigerian Security Printing and \nMinting (NSPM) Plc was awarded the entire indent order. The NSPM Plc delivered 987.17 \nmillion pieces or 36.9 per cent of the total, compared with 715.54 million pieces or 34.4 per \ncent in the corresponding period of 2016. Also, 34.40 million pieces of the N100 centenary \ncommemorative banknotes were delivered in the period, out of the total of one billion \n \n15\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nawarded to Crane Currency, Sweden in 2014. This brought total delivery of the \ncentenary commemorative banknotes to 934.09 million pieces or 93.4 per cent, \nleaving a balance of 65.91 million pieces or 6.6 per cent.\nIn line with the clean notes policy, the Bank continued the processing of banknotes into \nfit for re-circulation and unfit/soiled notes for disposal. Consequently, the Bank \nproduced a draft manual on Banknote Fitness Standards to assist the public and \ncurrency stakeholders identify banknotes fit for re-circulation and those to be \nwithdrawn from circulation. A total of 1,548.27 million pieces valued at N798.86 billion \nwere processed and re-injected into circulation, while 1,382.85 million pieces of unfit \nbanknotes were withdrawn through banknotes accelerated processing activities. The \nthrust of the accelerated processing was to reduce banks' deposit processing cycle \ntime to six months from the hitherto two to five years cycle. Similarly, the Bank withdrew \na total of 32,176 pieces of counterfeit banknotes from circulation during the review \nperiod. To maintain a sustainable disposal of banknote waste, the Bank solicited \nproposals from eligible companies to facilitate a recycling arrangement that would \nconvert polymer banknote waste into plastic products for industrial and household use. \nIn the review period, the Bank intensified effort at improving cash management in \nNigeria, by organising a stakeholders' retreat from April 27-28, 2017 in Lagos. The retreat \nratified the draft clean note policy, banknote fitness standard and adopted a tiered \npricing model for depositing unprocessed lower denomination banknotes. The model \nwould prevent the re-circulation of dirty banknotes and incentivise the banks to \ndeposit the lower denomination banknotes in their vaults. In addition, the Bank \nsustained public awareness campaigns on the proper handling of banknotes, \nidentification of basic security features to deter counterfeiting, inherent dangers of the \nillegal sale of new banknotes and usage of coins in the economy. \nTo strengthen the implementation of the Nigeria Cash Holding Scheme (NCHS), the \nBank, in collaboration with NIBSS, and other stakeholders, deployed the cash activity \nreporting portal (CARP). The CARP is expected to facilitate regular cash management \ndata update within the banking industry and would go live on July 5, 2017. It would \nserve as an interim arrangement, utilising NIBBS capacity, pending the deployment of \nan Integrated Cash Management Platform (ICMP) that would provide online data \nservices.\n2.3.4.2 Currency-in-Circulation (CIC)\nCurrency-in-circulation at end-June 2017 stood at N1,873.54 billion, representing an \nincrease of 11.2 per cent over the corresponding period of 2016. There were 6,176.26 \n16\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nTable 4\nStructure of CIC\n2013\nVolume\nValue\nVolume\nValue\nVolume\nValue\nVolume\nValue\nVolume\nValue\n(million)\n(N billion)\n(million)\n(N billion)\n(million)\n(N billion)\n(million)\n(N billion)\n(million)\n(N billion)\nN2\n107.68\n0.22\n107.49\n0.21\n107.54\n0.22\n203.41\n0.22\n107.65\n0.22\nN 1\n616.25\n0.62\n616.37\n0.62\n638.87\n0.64\n734.88\n0.62\n616.56\n0.62\n*50k\n579.50\n0.29\n579.77\n0.29\n579.93\n0.29\n680.47\n0.29\n580.13\n0.29\n*25k\n347.80\n0.09\n348.23\n0.09\n348.23\n0.09\n348.25\n0.09\n*10k\n315.31\n0.03\n315.55\n0.03\n296.04\n0.03\n315.65\n0.03\n*1k\n16.70\n0.0002\n31.24\n0.00\n31.24\n0.00\n31.37\n0.0003\nSub Total\n1,983.24\n1.25\n1,998.65\n1.24\n2,001.85\n1.26\n2,314.03\n1.25\n1,304.34\n1.12\nNotes\nN1000\n954.72\n954.72\n1,055.14\n1,055.14\n951.51\n951.51\n985.13\n985.13\n1,119.84\n1,119.84\nN500\n599.75\n599.88\n617.86\n308.93\n894.52\n447.26\n1,018.04\n511.03\n1,058.29\n529.15\nN200\n449.90\n89.98\n229.86\n45.97\n367.46\n73.49\n372.32\n76.47\n501.11\n100.22\nN100\n286.20\n28.62\n300.12\n30.01\n388.25\n38.83\n546.88\n56.70\n718.89\n71.89\nN50\n433.07\n21.65\n516.55\n25.83\n304.66\n15.23\n358.30\n19.92\n397.88\n19.89\nN20\n1,125.14\n22.50\n1,065.56\n21.31\n1,169.85\n23.40\n1,109.93\n24.21\n1,061.20\n21.22\nN10\n463.81\n4.64\n612.53\n6.13\n703.59\n7.04\n744.93\n7.45\n722.92\n7.23\nN5\n455.03\n2.28\n516.72\n2.58\n906.92\n4.53\n514.65\n2.57\n596.13\n2.98\nSub-Total\n4,767.62\n1,724.27\n4,914.34\n1,495.90\n5,686.76\n1,561.29\n5,650.18\n1,683.48\n6,176.26\n1,872.42\nTotal\n6,750.86\n1,725.52\n6,912.99\n1,497.14\n7,688.61\n1,562.55\n7,964.21\n1,684.73\n7,480.60\n1,873.54\n* Note: 1k, 10k, 25k and 50k that were minted in 1991 have been de-monetized by the Management of the Bank\nSource: Planning & Logistics Office\n Table 2 :Currency Structure, 2013 - June 2016\nJun-17\n2016\n2015\n2014\nCoins\nmillion pieces of banknotes and 1,304.34 million pieces of coins valued at N1,872.24 billion \nand N1.12 billion, respectively, in circulation at end-June 2017. Thus, total currency in \ncirculation declined in value by 6.1 per cent, while the volume increased by 11.2 per cent \nover the level in the corresponding period of 2016. \nIn terms of composition, the combined number of N5, N10, N20 and N50 banknotes as \nshare of total currency in circulation in the first half of 2017 increased to 37.1 per cent, \ncompared with 34.3 per cent in the first half of 2016. The value, however, decreased to 2.7 \nper cent from 3.2 per cent in the corresponding period of 2016. At end-June 2017, the \nN1,000, N500, N200, N100, N50 and N5 banknotes in circulation rose by 13.7, 4.0, 34.6, 31.5, \n11.0 and 15.8 per cent, respectively. The N20 and N10 denominations, however, fell by 4.4 \nand 3.0 per cent, respectively, below the levels in the first half of 2016. The N1,000 and \nN500 banknotes were dominant with shares of 59.8 and 28.3 per cent, respectively, in \nvalue terms in the first half of 2017. \n348.23\n315.56\n31.24\n0.09\n0.03\n0.0003\n \n17\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n2.4 Financial Sector Surveillance\n2.4.1 Banking Supervision\nThe Bank continued its supervision and surveillance of the banking system in the first half \nof 2017 to sustain the safety and soundness of financial institutions and ensure a stable \nfinancial system. The activities included regular off-site review of banks' returns and \nperiodic on-site examination (routine monitoring and special investigations) of the level \nof compliance with the provisions of extant laws, regulations and guidelines.\nThe Bank also deployed the redesigned Credit Risk Management System (CRMS) for \ncommercial, merchant and non-interest banks and issued revised regulatory guidelines \nfor the system in the review period. The redesigned system eliminates most of the manual \nprocesses, expands the capacity to capture details of all loans (regardless of amount) \nand improves overall efficiency of the process towards ensuring financial system stability. \nThe CRMS remained a valuable platform for the management of credit information in the \nbanking industry. \nAt end-June 2017, the number of registered borrowers in the CRMS database was \n824,387, compared with 195,159 in the corresponding period of 2016. The significant rise \nwas due to increased enforcement and the capture of all loans, regardless of amount, as \nagainst only loans of N1.0 million and above. There were 755,076 individuals and 69,311 \ncorporate borrowers at end-June 2017. \nSimilarly, the number of borrowers with outstanding facilities rose significantly to 1,105,671 \nat end-June 2017, compared with 104,126 and 93,168 at end-December 2016 and end-\nJune 2016, respectively. Following the issuance of stricter guidelines, improved \ncompliance by banks and the capture of historical data on hitherto unreported credit, \nthe total number of credit facilities on the database rose to 1,905,997, compared with \n181,987 at end-December 2016 and 173,050 at end-June 2016, respectively. The number \ncomprised 1,513,452 individual and 392,545 corporate borrowers.\n18\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n1 Figures include borrower(s) with multiple loans and/or credit lines.\n \nSource: CBN \nFigure 21\nCredit Risk Management System (CRMS) Statistics\n(End-June 2017) \nNo of Registered Borrowers\nNo of Credits\n195,159 93,168 173,050\n147,828104,126 181,987\n824,387\n1,105671\n1905997\nThe three (3) existing private credit bureaux (PCB) continued to complement the CRMS in \ncredit administration and risk management process in the industry. Following stricter \nenforcement, increased surveillance, awareness campaign on credit bureaux and \ncollateral registry as well as adoption of the unique identifier, there was sustained \nimprovement in the operations of the bureaux during the first half of 2017.\n2.4.2 Routine/Target Examination\nThe CBN/NDIC Joint Risk based assessment of banks was conducted in February, 2017 to \nascertain the quality of risk assets and adequacy of loan loss provisioning required for the \napproval of publication of their 2016 annual financial statements. Report of the exercise \nwas being finalised. Similarly, pre-examination preparations for the first stage of the \nannual CBN/NDIC Joint Risk-Based Examination of fourteen (14) banks and the three (3) \nfinancial holding companies, as at 30 June, 2017, was concluded in the first half of 2017. \nThe risk-based examinations of the banks were scheduled to commence at the \nbeginning of the second half of 2017, while that of the remaining nine (9) banks, was \nscheduled to commence in October 2017, for the period ended September 30, 2017.\nThe Bank conducted routine examination of the three (3) private credit bureaux in the \nfirst half of 2017. Similarly, the target examination of the Asset Management Corporation \nof Nigeria (AMCON) was conducted in the review period. Also, the Bank, in collaboration \nwith the host supervisors, conducted the routine examination of two (2) Nigerian banks' \nforeign subsidiaries. The reports of these examinations were being finalised.\nEnd-June, 2016 \nEnd-Dec, 2016 \nEnd-June, 2017 \n19\nFollowing the successful completion of the special training code-named “iSight Project”, \nfor on-site Examiners, the Bank intensified preparation towards the deployment of the \nElectronic Line cards software. The software would provide the platform for accurate \nevaluation of banks' credit, digital repository of banks' credit performance records and \nfast-tracking the process of on-site appraisal of banks' risk assets. The software would be \ntest-run during the RBS examination at the beginning of the second half of 2017. \n2.4.3 Special/Foreign Exchange Examinations\nThe first of the bi-annual review of the foreign exchange activities of 25 banks (21 \ncommercial banks and 4 merchant banks) was conducted in April 2017 to ascertain the \nlevel of compliance with extant foreign exchange laws and regulations. The review \ncovered foreign exchange operations for the period, October 1, 2016 to March 31, 2017. \nMajor infractions observed were: non-compliance with regulations such as the \nconcessionary rates specifically provided for utilisation of funds sourced from the CBN \nSecondary Market Intervention Sales (SMIS) foreign exchange window; and non-\nissuance of certificate of capital importation (CCI) to beneficiaries within the allowable \ntime of 24 hours post receipt of funds. Others included non-repatriation of export \nproceeds within the regulated time frame; incorrect rendition of returns to the CBN; non-\ncompliance with approved Net Foreign Currency Trading Limit Positions; and lapses in \nforeign trade documentation. The reports of the examinations were being finalised for \nappropriate actions in line with the extant laws and regulations. The Bank also conducted \nseveral ad-hoc investigations in the review period. The reports of the exercises were \nprovided as input to the policy development process.\n2.4.4 Banking Sector Soundness\nAt end-June 2017, the industry average capital adequacy ratio (CAR) was 11.5 per cent, \ncompared with 14.8 per cent and 14.7 per cent at end-December 2016 and end-June \n2016, respectively. The decline in the ratio was due, mainly, to the reduction in banks' \ntotal qualifying capital arising from the absorption of impairment on non-performing \nloans and the increase in risk weighted assets following the depreciation of the naira. The \nindustry threshold, however, remained at 15.0 per cent for banks with international \nauthorisation and 10.0 per cent for banks with either national or regional authorisation. \nAsset quality of the banking industry, measured by the ratio of non-performing loans to \ntotal loans - NPL ratio - deteriorated further to 15.0 per cent at end-June 2017, compared \nwith 12.8 per cent and 10.7 per cent at end-December 2016 and end-June 2016, \nrespectively. It remained significantly above the regulatory threshold of 5.0 per cent. The \nincrease in the NPL ratio reflected further deterioration in asset quality on account of the \nadverse macroeconomic conditions – and the poor performance of three outlier banks. \nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n \n \n20\nTo address this, banks were required to intensify efforts at debt recovery, realisation of \ncollateral for lost facilities and strengthening of risk management processes. Loan loss \nprovision was 80.4 per cent at end-June 2017, as against 66.0 per cent in the \ncorresponding period of 2016.\nThe industry liquidity ratio increased from 42.6 per cent at end-June 2016 to 45.8 per cent \nat the end of the first half of 2017. The rise reflected the increase in the stock of liquid assets \nheld by banks. With the exception of three (3) commercial banks, all other banks met the \nminimum regulatory liquidity ratios of: 30.0 per cent for commercial banks; 20.0 per cent \nfor merchant banks; and 10.0 per cent for non-interest banks at end-June 2017.\n2.4.5 Compliance with the Code of Corporate Governance for Banks \nAs part of the initiatives to further entrench good corporate governance practices in the \nbanking industry, the CBN developed a Corporate Governance Scorecard, to monitor \nimplementation of the Code by banks. The scorecard assesses the extent of banks' \ncompliance with the extant Code in respect of board and management activities, \ndisclosure and transparency, treatment of shareholders and stakeholders, risk \nmanagement, ethics and professionalism. The different aspects of the scorecard were \nassigned weights based on perceived importance. \nThe scorecard seeks to achieve the following objectives:\n· \nProvide uniform basis for assessment of the status of implementation of the code of \ncorporate governance principles at individual bank and industry level;\n· \nFacilitate determination of improvement needs and encourage banks to achieve \nhigher standards;\n· \nEncourage banks to develop internal corporate governance compliance \nassessment systems to engender a process of continual improvement towards the \nenhancement of their corporate governance reporting to stakeholders;\n· \nEnhance the efficiency and sustainability of good governance practices in the \nbanking industry;\n· \nFacilitate comparisons among the banks in the industry; and\n· \nAid banks identify shortcomings in the implementation process and serve as a \ncatalyst to initiate remedial plans.\nFollowing the launch of the scorecard in March 2017, a pilot run was conducted on 10 \nbanks for all the categories of licences. The key findings were:\n· \nGeneral absence of a unit or department for the implementation of banks' \napproved strategy document. In addition, three (3) banks did not have an \napproved strategy document, while some of the available ones were not robust \nand comprehensive; and \nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n21\n· \nAll the banks complied with the requirements of the code on “size of the board”, \n“separation of duties” and “disclosure and transparency”, while 13 banks \ncomplied with the requirements on “ethics and professionalism” and “rights of \nother stakeholders”. \nOverall, two banks failed to comply with the requirements of the Code on: composition of \nthe board; board meetings; holding company and subsidiary cross directorship; \nsuccession planning; remuneration policy; limits of authority; and risk management.\nThe CBN also conducted examination of sixteen (16) banks using the Scorecard to \nascertain the level of compliance with good governance practices, while the remaining \nbanks would be examined in the second half of the year. The exercise was expected to \nenhance the supervisory mechanisms and form the basis for further policy formulation in \nthe banking industry.\n2.4.6 Financial Crimes Surveillance/Anti- Money Laundering/Combating the Financing \n \nof Terrorism (AML/CFT)\nThe Bank conducted an AML/CFT compliance examination of twenty-five (25) reporting \nbanks. The examination, which covered the period May 1, 2016 to March 31, 2017, was \nconducted at the Head offices of the banks. In addition, spot checks were carried out on \ntwo selected Lagos branches of the banks. The examination was guided by the statutory \nprovisions of the Money Laundering Prohibition Act, 2011 (as amended), the CBN's \nAML/CFT Regulations 2013 and recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force \n(FATF). The exercise revealed a number of shortcomings in the following areas: \n· \nCustomer Due Diligence (CDD): copies of identification documents such as \nInternational passports and national identification cards were not in some \ncustomer's files, while enhanced due diligence (EDD) was either not conducted \nor inadequately conducted on high risk customers;\n· \nAML/CFT Reporting software: Collation and reporting of foreign currency \ntransactions, currency transactions reports and suspicious transaction reports \nwere not fully automated in some banks. Similarly, the AML/CFT software in some \nbanks had not been subjected to independent testing to determine their \nefficacy, thereby exacerbating the risk of under reporting; \n· \nVerification of Customers' Identities: Apart from the inability to validate the \nidentities through the National Identity Management Commission and Nigeria \nCustoms Service portals, the banks complained of the mandatory levy imposed \nby the agencies. It was, however, expected that the platform being developed \nby the CBN and NIBBS in collaboration with other agencies would address the \ncomplaints;\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n22\n· \nAML/CFT Manuals/Programmes: The AML/CFT Manuals/programmes in some \nbanks did not highlight policies to address specific issues such as Shell banks and \nevaluation of new technologies for AML/CFT risks, among others;\n· \nAudit of the AML/CFT Function: There were instances of inadequate internal \ncontrol oversight over the compliance function as recommended by FATF and \nrequired by the CBN AML/CFT Regulations; and\n· \nTraining: AML/CFT knowledge gap existed in many banks. In addition, some banks \nwere unable to provide satisfactory evidence of undertaking the required \ntraining. \nOverall, there was general improvement in the AML/CFT regime of many banks as \nreflected in the general reduction in the level of infractions. \nIn the review period, the Bank reached an advanced stage in the development and \ndeployment of the AML/CFT Data Rendition, Analysis and Processing Software-\n(ADRAPS). The software will facilitate accurate collation, analysis and storage of data \nthrough the automation of banks' AML/CFT returns collation and analysis. It will also \nprovide a platform for effective off-site surveillance and easy access to data for decision \nmaking purposes. \nFollowing the release of the circular on “Need to Implement Measures to Dissuade the \nIssuance of Dud Cheques in the Nigerian Banking System”, banks commenced the \nrendition of returns on dud cheques on the CRMS platform in the first half of 2017. The \nprocess was expected to facilitate the collation and analysis of data on serial issuers of \ndud cheques and enable the banks take steps to curb the practice. \n2.4.7 Financial Literacy and Consumer Protection\nSubsequent to the deployment of the Consumer Complaints Management System \n(CCMS), the Bank continued to facilitate and promote increased user adoption among \ninternal customers and banks. It also intensified effort to address the initial challenges of \nimplementation. \nThe Bank received 1,141 complaints from consumers of financial services in the first half of \n2017, compared with 1,473 complaints received in the corresponding period of 2016. The \ncomplaints were in respect of excess/unauthorised charges, frauds, account \nmanagement, funds transfers, ATM dispense errors and dishonored guarantees. A total of \n1,270 complaints including those outstanding from 2016, were resolved or closed in the \nperiod, compared with 1,157 complaints resolved in the corresponding period of 2016. \nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n23\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nTotal claims in the review period n local and foreign currencies amounted to N14.72 \nbillion, US$2.42 million and €6,940.00, compared with N6.75 billion, US$81,023.00 and \n€19,414.62 in the corresponding period of 2016. The sum of N7.21 billion, US$2.40 million \nand €6,940.00 were refunded by financial institutions to their customers as against the \nsum of N4.63 billion, US$80,415.46 and €19,263.62, refunded in the corresponding period \nof 2016. In addition, the Bank held twelve (12) mediation meetings in the review period \nto facilitate the resolution of customer complaints, while seven (7) banks were penalised \nfor various infractions.\nCompliance Examination was conducted on 19 banks in April 2017 to ascertain their \nlevel of compliance with selected provisions of the Revised Guide to Bank Charges \n(RGBC) and the consumer protection regulations. The exercise revealed the following \nlevels of compliance in the areas examined: maximum fees applied on facilities (50.0%); \ninsurance charges applied on facilities (66.67%); management of dormant accounts \n(55.6%); and compliance with directives issued after the last examination & other \ndirectives (52.63%). Areas with dismal compliance levels included, alignment of internal \npolicies with the consumer protection framework which recorded 0.0 per cent and \noutstanding complaints with 26.2 per cent compliance level. Accordingly, the Bank \ndirected non-compliant banks to implement specific remedial actions, including \nrefunds to customers where applicable.\nAs part of the steps to facilitate the implementation of the consumer protection \nframework, the Bank exposed the draft guidelines on two principles of the Framework to \nstakeholders for comments. The guidelines were in respect of the principles of “Fair \nTreatment of Consumers” and “Disclosure & Transparency”. \nIn continuation of financial literacy activities, the Bank conducted a train-the-trainer \nprogramme, under the NYSC Peer Educator Training Initiatives, at the CBN International \nTraining Institute (ITI), Maitama, Abuja from February 13 - 17, 2017. The objective of the \nprogramme was to acquaint participants with the knowledge of various financial \nliteracy concepts and equip them with the skills to transfer the knowledge to the general \npublic. Participants at the training included representatives from the Federal Ministry of \nYouth & Sports Development, Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC), \nAssociation of non-Bank Micro Finance Institutions of Nigeria (ANMFIN) and the National \nPension Commission (PENCOM). \nThe pilot phase of the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) Peer Educator Programme \nwas held in conjunction with the Federal Ministry of Youth and Sports Development and \n24\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nother stakeholders. The Programme was held at the NYSC orientation camps in twelve (12) \nstates, namely: Sokoto, Kano, Taraba, Gombe, Plateau, Kwara, Lagos, Oyo, Abia, \nAnambra, Edo and Rivers States from May 29 to June 2, 2017. Thirty-five (35) volunteer corps \nmembers and five (5) NYSC staff were trained. The corp members were expected to share \nthe knowledge acquired with their peers and other members of the general public in their \nplaces of primary assignments, while the NYSC staff would serve as coordinators.\nSimilarly, the CBN conducted the second pilot run of the targeted financial literacy \nprogramme for Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises at the CBN Awka branch. \nParticipants were drawn from the Small and Medium Enterprises Development Agency of \nNigeria (SMEDAN), development finance office of CBN Awka branch, non-governmental \norganisations (NGOs), women organisations, farmer groups and other stakeholders.\nIn collaboration with other stakeholders, the Bank celebrated the 2017 Global Money \nWeek from March 27 to April 2, 2017. Activities to commemorate the event included \nGlobal Money Walk, Financial Literacy Fair/Exhibition and School Mentoring and Reach-\nout Programme. A total of 1,696 students across 11 schools were reached through the \nvarious activities to commemorate the 2017 Global Money Week. The CBN also \ncollaborated with the Bankers' Committee to implement the school mentoring \nprogramme in 36 states. Various school mentoring initiatives were organised for 85,233 \nstudents in 626 schools nationwide. In addition, the CBN, in conjunction with the Nigeria \nEducational Research and Development Council (NERDC), developed a draft Teachers' \nGuide for teaching financial education in basic and senior secondary schools. \n2.4.8 Fraud and Forgeries\nThere were 16,762 reported cases of fraud and forgeries (attempted and successful), \ninvolving N5.52 billion and US$ 0.124 million, compared with 9,164 cases involving N4.36 \nbillion in the corresponding period of 2016. This indicated respective increase of 82.9 and \n19.3 per cent above the number and value of cases (attempted and successful) in the first \nhalf of 2016. The actual loss by banks, however, decreased by 43.5 per cent to N0.78 billion \nand US$0.03 million, below the N1.38 billion incurred in the first half of 2016. The marked \ndecline in the actual losses to the banking industry indicated the effect of stronger internal \ncontrol measures adopted by the banks, improved use of technology and more thorough \napproach in hiring employees for sensitive areas of operation.\nSimilar to the preceding half-year, fraud and forgeries reported in the review period were \nperpetrated, mainly, by outsiders (non-bank staff), although there were instances \ninvolving banks' employees. The fraud cases included pilfering of cash, suppression and \n25\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nconversion of customer's deposits, stealing, illegal funds transfer, defalcation and \nfraudulent ATM withdrawals.\n2.4.9 Cross-Border Activities\nFollowing the approval for UBA Plc., to open a subsidiary in Mali, the number of \napproved foreign subsidiaries of Nigerian banks increased to sixty-one (61) in the first \nhalf of 2017, from sixty (60) in the corresponding half year of 2016. There were, however, \neight (8) representative offices of Nigerian banks, as against ten (10) at end-June 2016, \ndue to closure of two (2) offices.\nIn collaboration with the Association of African Central Banks (AACB), the Community \nof African Bank Supervisors (CABS) and the technical and financial support of Making \nFinance Work for Africa (MFW4A), and the CBN, organised a seminar on Crisis \nManagement and Bank Resolution from January 16 - 20, 2017, at the International \nTraining Institute (ITI), Maitama, Abuja. The Seminar, which was attended by \nparticipants from 22 African countries, focused on issues in the management of crisis \narising from systemically important financial institutions and identified different \napproaches to resolution without disrupting the broader financial system.\nIn addition, the CBN participated at the 12th BCBS-FSI High Level Meeting for Africa, \nheld in Cape Town, South Africa from January 26 - 27, 2017. The meeting focused on \n“Strengthening Financial Sector Supervision and Current Regulatory Priorities.” Similarly, \nthe 24th Meeting of the College of Supervisors for the West African Monetary Zone \n(CSWAMZ) was held in February 2017 in Liberia, while the 25th Meeting was held in May \n2017 in Ghana. The College deliberated on issues requiring supervisory cooperation in \nthe Zone. \nFurthermore, in the review period, the CBN was appointed the Chairman of the \nCommittee of African Bank Supervisors (CABS) Working Group on Crisis Management \nand Banking Resolution. The CABS is the arm of the Association of African Central Banks \n(AACB) for strengthening bank regulation and supervisory framework in Africa. The \nobjective of the Working Group is to produce a framework for Crisis Management and \nBanking Resolution for adoption by member countries of the AACB. \n2.4.10 Update on the Implementation of the Systemic Support Partnership and Oliver \nWyman (SPP&OW) Report \nThe Bank, in collaboration with the nine project workstreams and Quality Assurance \nTeam (QAT) for the Programme, had completed the development of a Financial \nSystem Stability Framework. The work streams developed a draft overarching \n26\nframework and stand-alone frameworks on the three component policy areas of \nmicroprudential supervision policy, macroprudential policy and analytical capabilities, \nand crisis management and resolution. The supporting frameworks were also developed \non data gathering and storage capabilities, IT infrastructure, stakeholder engagement \nand human capital development. The Framework covers major areas of microprudential \nsupervision policy, macroprudential policy and analytical capabilities, and crisis \nmanagement and resolution. To provide legal backing and facilitate operationalisation \nof the programme, a draft bill and overarching memorandum of understanding (MoU), \nlegal/legislative advocacy plan and implementation roadmap for the establishment of \nthe proposed Nigeria Financial System Stability Council were also developed. The \nframeworks had been scheduled for review and approval by the Programme Steering \nCommittee (PSC), made up of the CEOs of member agencies of the Financial Services \nRegulation Coordinating Committee.\n2.4.11 Examination of Other Financial Institutions\nThe Bank conducted on-site examinations of 282 Other Financial Institutions (OFIs) in the \nfirst half of 2017. The exercise involved routine risk-based examination and review of the \ninstitutions' compliance with extant AML/CFT guidelines. Routine risk-based examination \nof the five (5) reporting development finance institutions (DFIs) was conducted in the \nreview period. The examination reports revealed that the Composite Risk Rating of four \n(4) institutions was High and one (1) “Moderate”. Earnings of one (1) institution was rated \n“acceptable”, one (1) “needs improvement” and three (3) “weak”, arising, mainly, from \nsignificant deterioration in asset quality and high provisions for loan losses. The \nDevelopment Bank of Nigeria (DBN) was not examined because it was yet to commence \noperations.\nSimilarly, risk-based examination of 226 microfinance banks (MFBs) was conducted in the \nfirst half of 2017. The prudential analyses of the reports were being finalised for \nappropriate regulatory interventions. In addition, risk-based examination of 51 finance \ncompanies (FCs) was conducted in the review period. The exercise excluded 21 FCs \nawaiting CBN Board's final approval for revocation of licence. The reports of the \nexaminations were being finalised for Management approval.\n2.5 Foreign Exchange Market and Management\nIn the first half of 2017, the CBN sustained its intervention in the foreign exchange market \nto dampen demand pressure and stabilise the naira exchange rate. The Bank, on \nFebruary 20, 2017, introduced a weekly sale of foreign exchange for personal travel \nallowance (PTA), business travel allowance (BTA), school fees and medicals to end-users \nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n27\nat N375.00/1US$ through banks. On April 21, 2017, the Bank established a special window \nto cater for the foreign exchange needs of investors and exporters. Other measures \nadopted included the admittance of more BDCs for foreign exchange sales and \nincrease in the amount of weekly sales to the bureaux. These initiative boosted liquidity in \nthe foreign exchange market, eased demand pressure, and narrowed the premium \nbetween the interbank and BDC rates from 61.6 per cent at end-January 2017 to 19.8 per \ncent at end-June 2017. \nAlso, on April 18, 2017, the CBN introduced Form 'Q' through which SMEs could purchase \nUS$20,000 per quarter with the objective of improving access to foreign exchange to \nimport eligible finished and semi-finished goods for production. In a bid to reassure the \nmarket of continued availability of foreign exchange, the sale of short tenored forwards \nof 7-45 day was upheld. The foreign exchange market was further liberalised on June 5, \n2017 by allowing authorised dealers to sell their excess foreign currency trading limit \npositions without seeking prior approval from the CBN. \n2.5.1 Spot Segment of the Foreign Exchange Market\nThe cumulative sales of foreign exchange by the Bank in the first half of 2017 was US$9.84 \nbillion, increases of 22.8 and 26.1 per cent against the levels in the second and first halves \nof 2016. The aggregate foreign exchange supply to the inter-bank and BDC segments in \nthe review were US$4.01 billion and US$1.20 billion as against US$5.60 billion and US$0.02 \nbillion, respectively, in the first half of 2016. This indicated a decline of 28.4 per cent in total \nsales to the inter-bank but, a substantial increase to the BDC segment, compared with \nthe levels in the corresponding period of 2016. The observed decline in the inter-bank \nsales was attributed to the Bank's policy to prioritise foreign exchange access to the \npreferred sectors.\n2.5.2 Forwards and Swaps\nSwaps undertaken in the review period were valued at US$0.20 billion, compared with \nUS$3.10 billion and US$2.19 billion in the second and first halves of 2016, respectively. The \nsignificant reduction in the value of swaps reflected the increased confidence in the \nmarket. This accounted for 2.0 per cent of the total supply of foreign exchange. The value \nof cash-backed forward contracts disbursed at maturity was US$4.43 billion, and \naccounted for 45.0 per cent of the total, compared with US$4.17 billion in the preceding \nperiod.\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n28\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 22\nDemand, Supply and Net Demand of Foreign Exchange\n(US$' Billion)\nSource: CBN\n2.5.3 Exchange Rate Movements\nThe exchange rate of the naira to the US dollar during the review period was stable both \nat the inter-bank and BDC segments of the foreign exchange market. The development \nwas attributed to increased supply into the Market and the creation of the Investors' and \nExporters' Foreign Exchange (I&E FX) window that reduced the market demand pressure \nby facilitating market-driven transactions and catered for the foreign exchange needs of \ninvestors and exporters.\n2.5.3.1 Spot Exchange Rates\nThe average exchange rate of the naira to the US dollar at the inter-bank segment was \nN305.70/US$, representing a depreciation of 0.5 and 33.9 per cent relative to the levels in \nthe second and first halves of 2016, respectively. At the BDC segment, the naira \ndepreciated by 1.3 and 23.8 per cent, compared with the values in the preceding and \nthe corresponding halves of 2016, respectively, to N426.85/US$. Consequently, the \npremium between the average interbank/BDC rates widened to 39.6 per cent in the first \nhalf of 2017 from 38.4 per cent in the second half of 2016.\nThe end-period exchange rate of the naira to the US dollar at the inter-bank segment was \nN305.90/US$, against N305.00/US$ at end-December 2016 and N283.00/US$ at end-June \n2016. At the BDC segment, the naira exchange rate was N366.00/US$, compared with \nN490.00/US$ at end-December 2016 and N348.00/US$ at end-June 2016, while the I&E \nexchange rate closed at N366.44/US$ at end-June 2017. \n \n7,805.34 \n5,599.84 \n2,190.00 \n-\n15.50 \n8,013.00 \n704.76 \n3,097.65 \n4,167.66 \n46.31 \n9,839.01 \n4,011.98 \n198.68 \n4,426.19 \n -\n 2,000.00\n 4,000.00\n 6,000.00\n 8,000.00\n 10,000.00\n 12,000.00\nInterbank\nSwaps\nForwards\n1st half '2017\n2nd half '2016\n1st half '2016\n29\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 23\nExchange Rate Movements \n(First Half 2015 – First Half 2017) \n(N/US$)\n \n \nSource: CBN \n600.00\n500.00\n400.00\n300.00\n200.00\n100.00\n0.00\nInterbank\nBDC\nFigure 24\nInterbank/Bureau-de-Change Foreign Exchange (N/US$) Premium \n(Per cent)\n \n \nSource: CBN \n2.5.4 Foreign Exchange Flows\nAggregate foreign exchange inflow into the economy in the first half of 2017 was \nUS$34.82 billion, indicating an increase of 3.7 and 20.0 per cent above the levels in the \nsecond and first halves of 2016, respectively. Of the total, inflow through autonomous \nsources at US$18.95 billion accounted for 54.4 per cent, while inflow through the CBN was \nUS$15.87 billion and accounted for 45.6 per cent. Aggregate foreign exchange outflow \nPer cent\n80.0\n70.0\n60.0\n50.0\n40.0\n30.0\n20.0\n10.0\n0.0\nN/USS\nInterbank/BDC Premium \n5% International Benchmark\n30\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nfrom the economy rose by 1.5 and 16.7 per cent to US$13.88 billion above the levels in the \nsecond and first halves of 2016, respectively. Consequently, the net foreign exchange \nflow to the economy was US$20.94 billion, as against US$19.90 billion and US$17.12 billion, \nin the second and first halves of 2016, respectively.\nForeign exchange inflow through autonomous sources at US$18.95 billion in the first half of \n2017, showed a decline of 10.8 and 7.7 per cent, compared with US$21.24 billion and \nUS$20.51 billion in the second and first halves of 2016, respectively. The decline was mainly \ndue to the 87.6 per cent reduction in external account purchases from the level in the \npreceding period. A disaggregation of the inflow through autonomous sources showed \nthat, invisible purchases accounted for US$17.00 billion; non-oil export receipts, US$1.91 \nbillion; and external account purchases, US$0.03 billion. Of the invisible purchases, \nordinary domiciliary accounts amounted to US$10.00 billion, and total over-the-counter \n(OTC) purchase was US$7.01 billion. A further breakdown of the OTC purchases revealed \nthat “Others” amounted to US$2.90 billion, capital importation, US$2.82 billion; purchases \nby banks from oil companies, US$0.90 billion and home remittances, US$0.39 billion. \nAggregate outflow through autonomous sources amounted to US$1.10 billion, driven \nlargely by invisible import, which amounted to US$0.67billion, while visible import was \nUS$0.32 billion. These accounted for 71.1 and 28.9 per cent, respectively, of total outflow \nthrough autonomous sources.\nAt US$15.87 billion, foreign exchange inflow through the CBN rose by 28.6 and 86.9 per \ncent, above their respective levels in the second and first halves of 2016. A \ndisaggregation of foreign exchange inflow through the Bank, showed that crude oil \nreceipts was US$4.30 billion, a decline of 22.8 and 1.9 per cent below the levels in the \nsecond and first halves of 2016, respectively. Non-oil receipts through the Bank rose by \n70.9 and 181.4 per cent to US$11.57 billion above the levels in the preceding and the \ncorresponding period of 2016, respectively. The development was attributed mainly to \nthe significant increase of US$1.55 billion realised from other official receipts and US$1.06 \nbillion from foreign exchange purchases. A further breakdown of non-oil inflow through \nthe CBN indicated that interbank swaps was US$1.57 billion; TSA and third party receipts, \nUS$1.50 billion; returned payments (Wired/Cash), US$0.75 billion; unutilised funds, US$0.64 \nbillion; “Others” (unutilised IMTO receipts), US$0.31 billion; and interest on reserves and \ninvestments, US$0.14 billion.\nForeign exchange outflow through the CBN amounted to US$12.78 billion, indicating an \nincrease of 2.8 and 18.8 per cent, above the levels in the second and first halves of 2016, \nrespectively. This was due to the increased interventions in the interbank and BDC \nsegments of the foreign exchange market. Of the total outflow through the Bank, \n31\ninterbank utilisation amounted to US$9.84 billion or 77.0 per cent. This comprised foreign \nexchange forwards, US$ 4.43 billion (45.0%); inter-bank sales at US$4.01 billion (40.8%); \nBDC sales, US$1.20 billion (12.2%); and swaps, US$0.20 billion (2.0%).\nOutflow in respect of 'Other' official payments at US$1.47 billion declined by 44.9 and 13.5 \nper cent below the levels in the preceding and corresponding period of 2016. Of this, \nJoint Venture Cash (JVC) calls was US$0.86 billion; parastatals, US$0.58 billion; and \nestacode, US$0.007 billion. Outflow through 3rd party MDA transfers; external debt \nservice, drawings on letters of credit (L/Cs), Bank and SDR charges; and national priority \nprojects were US$0.98 billion, US$0.19 billion, US$0.18 billion, US$0.004 billion and US$0.001 \nbillion, respectively.\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 25\nForeign Exchange Disbursements through the CBN \n(First Half 2017)\nOverall, foreign exchange transactions through the Bank resulted in a net inflow of \nUS$3.10 billion in the first half of 2017, compared with a net outflow of US$2.26 billion and \nUS$0.09 billion, respectively in the first and second halves of 2016.\nInterbank Sales\n32.0%\nDrawings on L/Cs\n1.5%\n3rd Party MDA \ntransfers\n7.8%\nExternal debt \nservice\n1.5%\nForex special \nPayments\n0.5%\nBDC Sales\n9.6%\nForeign Exchange \nForwards\n35.3%\nOther Official \nPayments\n11.8%\nSource: CBN\n32\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 26\nForeign Exchange Transactions through the CBN\n(First Half 2017, US$' Billion)\n \nSource: CBN\n20\n15\n10\n5\n0\n-5\n8.71\n10.75\n12.35 12.42\n15.87\n12.78\n3.10\n(2.03)\n(0.07)\n1st Half 2016\n2nd Half 2016 \n1st Half 2017\nInflow \nOutflow\nNetflow\n2.5.5. Sectoral Utilisation of Foreign Exchange\nAggregate sectoral utilisation of foreign exchange in the first half of 2017 improved by 1.1 \nper cent to US$12.06 billion when compared with the level in the preceding period but \ndeclined by 8.0 per cent below the level in the corresponding period of 2016. A \ndisaggregation of sectoral utilisation showed that, visible import contracted by 11.3 and \n16.8 per cent to US$7.36 billion, relative to the levels in the preceding and corresponding \nhalves of 2016, respectively. Foreign exchange utilised for invisible import increased by \n29.3 and 10.3 per cent in the second and first halves of 2016.\nAn analysis of foreign exchange utilisation for visible import showed that utilization by the \nindustrial sector increased by 11.5 per cent and accounted for US$3.27 billion in the \nperiod under review. Food products, manufactured products, and transport sub-sectors \naccounted for US$0.64 billion, US$1.04 billion and US$0.20 billion, indicating a decline of \n19.1, 17.2 and 25.7 per cent, respectively, compared with the levels in the second half of \n2016. Similarly, foreign exchange utilised by the agricultural sector, minerals and oil \nsectors declined by 21.7, 14.1 and 27.8 per cent to US$0.12 billion, US$0.04 billion and \nUS$2.06 billion, respectively, compared with the levels in the second half of 2016.\nA breakdown of foreign exchange utilised for invisibles showed that business services, \ncommunications, educational, tourism and travel and financial services rose by 57.9, \n217.1, 103.3, 494.6 and 15.5 per cent to US$0.56 billion, US$0.14 billion, US$0.24 billion, \nUS$0.04 billion and US$3.12 billion, respectively, compared with the levels in the second \nhalf of 2016. Furthermore, foreign exchange expended on distribution services, health-\nrelated and social services as well as “other services” increased by 236.6, 93.2 and 900.9 \n33\nper cent to US$0.005 billion, US$0.002 billion and US$0.32 billion, respectively, relative to \nthe levels in the second half of 2016. Foreign exchange utilised for transport services, \nhowever, declined by 27.0 per cent to US$0.27 billion from US$0.38 billion in the \ncorresponding period of 2016.\nA breakdown of foreign exchange utilised for invisibles showed that business services, \ncommunications, educational, tourism and travel and financial services rose by 12.9, \n196.7, 94.9, 490.5 and 4.0 per cent to US$0.40 billion, US$0.13 billion, US$0.23 billion, US$0.04 \nbillion and US$2.91 billion, respectively, compared with the levels in the second half of \n2016. Furthermore, foreign exchange expended on distribution services, health-related \nand social services as well as “other services” increased by 236.8, 79.9 and 858.5 per cent \nto US$0.005 billion, US$0.002 billion and US$0.31 billion, respectively, relative to the levels in \nthe second half of 2016. Foreign exchange utilised for transport services, however, \ndeclined by 35.4 per cent to US$0.26 billion from US$0.40 billion in the corresponding \nperiod of 2016.\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 27\nSectoral Utilisation of Foreign Exchange (Visibles) \n(First Half 2017) \nIndustrial sub-\nsector\n44.3%\nFood Products\n8.6%\nManufactured \nProducts\n14.1%\nTransport sub-\nsector\n2.8%\nAgricultural sub -\nsector\n1.6%\nMinerals sub-\nsector\n0.6%\nOil sub-sector\n28.0%\nSource: CBN\n34\n2.5.6 Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (NEER) and Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) \nIndices\nThe average 13-currency Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (NEER) index increased by \n44.7 per cent to 157.98 above the level in the first half of 2016, but declined by 0.09 per \ncent, relative to the level in the second half of 2016. Similarly, the index of average Real \nEffective Exchange Rate (REER) was 85.01 per cent in the review period, a decline of 5.9 \nper cent relative to the level in the second half of 2016, but an increase of 26.7 per cent \nabove the level in the corresponding half of 2016. The development was attributed to \nhigher inflation in the domestic economy relative to major trading partners.\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 28\nSectoral Utilisation of Foreign Exchange (Invisibles) \n(First Half 2017)\nSource: CBN\nBusiness Services\n11.9%\nCommunication \nServices\n3.0%\nDistribution \nServices\n0.2%\nEducational \nServices\n5.0%\nFinancial \nServices\n66.4%\nTourism & Travel \nRelated Services\n1.0%\nTransport \nServices\n5.8%\nOther Services \nnot Included\n6.8%\n35\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 29\nNominal Effective Exchange Rate (NEER) and \nReal Effective Exchange Rate (REER) January 2016 – June 2017\n \n \nSource: CBN\n \n200.00\n150.00\n100.00\n50.00\n0.00\nN/USS\nJan-16\nMar-16 May-16\nJul-16\nSep-16\nNov-16 Jan-17\nMar-17\nMay-17\nNominal Effective Exchange Rate\nReal Effective Exchange Rate\nTable 5\nNominal and the Real Effective Exchange Rate indices \n(November 2009=100)\n2016\n \nNominal Effective \nExchange Rate \n(NEER)\n \nReal Effective \nExchange Rate \n(REER)\n \nJan\n \n97.70\n \n63.98\n \nFeb\n \n97.79 \n62.98\n \nMar \n101.65 \n64.11\n \nApr \n102.19 \n63.66\n \nMay \n100.00 \n60.89\n \nJun \n144.94 \n87.00\n \nJul \n160.52 \n95.33\n \nAug \n156.75 \n92.08\n \nSep \n157.06 \n91.57\n \nOct \n154.88 \n89.78\n \nNov \n151.21 \n87.02\n \nDec \n150.87 \n86.16\n \n2017 \n \n \nJan \n153.29 \n86.93\n \nFeb \n153.33 \n85.91\n \nMar \n154.70 \n85.34\n \nApr \n155.92 \n84.90\n \nMay \n156.87 \n83.88\n \nJun \n157.98\n \n83.08\n \nSource: CBN\n36\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n2.6 Development Finance Operations\n2.6.1 Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme (ACGS)\nIn the first half of 2017, the volume and value of loans guaranteed under the ACGS were \n21,073 and N3.07 billion, respectively, compared with 23,774 and N3.63 billion in the \ncorresponding period of 2016. An analysis of the loans guaranteed by purpose showed \nthat: food crops accounted for 14,264 (57.9 %); livestock, 1,867 (15.8%); mixed crops, \n2,097 (8.0%); cash crops, 1,587 (8.9%); fisheries, 797 (7.2%); and 'others', 461 (2.2%). An \nanalysis by category of borrower showed that: individuals accounted for N2.98 billion, \n(98.7%); informal groups, N6.00 million (0.2 %); cooperatives, N23.00 million (0.7 %); and \ncompanies, N11.00 million (0.4 %) compared with N3.33 billion (91.7%) for individuals; \ninformal groups, N0.13 billion (0.4 %); cooperatives, N0.28 billion (7.8 %); and companies, \nN0.03 billion (0.1 %) in the corresponding period of 2016. The cumulative number of loans \nguaranteed from inception of the Scheme in 1978 to end-June 2017, was 1,080,920, \nvalued at N107.04 billion.\nThe sum of N1.84 billion for 11,354 projects was repaid in the first half of 2017, compared \nwith N4.03 billion for 29,519 projects in the corresponding period of 2016. The cumulative \nrepayments from inception to end-June 2017 was N76.94 billion in respect of 826,873 \nloans.\nNo claim was settled in the review period, compared with 34 claims valued at N10.09 \nmillion settled in the first half of 2016. The cumulative number of settled claims as at end-\nJune 2017 was 17,027, valued at N651.36 million.\nFigure 30\nDistribution of ACGSF Loans (By Purpose) \n(First Half 2017)\nSource:CBN\nFood Crop\n57.9%\nMixed Crops\n8.0%\nLivestock\n15.8%\nFisheries\n7.2%\nCash Crops\n8.9%\nOthers\n2.2%\n37\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n2.6.2 Interest Drawback Programme (IDP)\nA total of 10,552 IDP rebates valued at N0.10 billion was settled in the first half of 2017, \ncompared with 6,600 valued at N0.30 billion settled in the corresponding period of 2016. \nThe total number of IDP rebates settled from inception to end-June 2017 was 319,903, \nvalued at N4.16 billion. The Scheme was introduced in 2003 to reduce the cost of \nborrowing for farmers. Those who repaid as and when due, were entitled to a rebate of \n40.0 per cent of the market interest rate at which they borrowed.\n2.6.3 Commercial Agriculture Credit Scheme (CACS)\nIn the review period, the sum of N79.56 billion was released to 35 projects, compared \nwith N35.99 billion released to 39 private projects and 4 state governments in the first half \nof 2016. An analysis of the number of projects financed by value chain revealed that the \nentire sum (100%) released for the period was for production. There were no releases for \nother aspects of the value chain in the period.\nThe cumulative amount released under CACS from inception in 2009 to end-June 2017 \nwas N472.98 billion to finance 513 projects.\nThe sum of N19.78 billion was repaid by thirteen (13) participating banks in respect of 185 \nprojects in the period under review, compared with N22.77 billion for 247 projects in the \nfirst half of 2016. This brought the cumulative repayment from inception to N244.79 billion \nat end-June 2017.\n2.6.4 Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Fund (MSMEDF)\nThe implementation of the MSMEDF continued with the disbursement of N1.59 billion in \nthe review period, compared with N16.53 billion in the corresponding period of 2016. The \nfinancial institutions that participated in the programme were six (6) banks, three (3) \nMFBs, six (6) non-governmental organisations microfinance institutions (NGO-MFIs) and \ntwelve (12) cooperative societies. In addition, one (1) state government accessed funds \nunder the programme in the review period.\nThe total sum disbursed from inception in 2012 to date was N87.28 billion, with N63.19 \nbillion (72.4%) to state governments, while the micro, small and medium enterprises \n(MSMEs) collectively accessed N24.1 billion (27.6%). The total sum of N15.39 billion was \nrepaid in the review period. The sum of N23.51 billion had been repaid from inception to \nend-June 2017.\nTable 6\nSummary of MSMEDF Activities as at June 30, 2017\n \nActivity\nFrom \nInception\n \nto \nDec 31, 2016\n Jan –\n \nJun \n2017\n \nCumulative\n(N’billion)\n \n(N’billion)\n \n(N’billion)\nDisbursement to MSMEs\n \n23.20\n \n0.89\n 24.09\nDisbursements to State \nGovernments\n \n62.49\n \n0.7\n \n63.19\nTotal Disbursements\n \n85.69\n \n1.59\n \n87.28\nUndisbursed Funds\n \n0.00\n \n0.00\n \n0.00\nRepayments Received\n \n7.07\n \n15.52\n \n22.59\nSource: CBN \n \n2.6.5 Anchor Borrowers' Programme (ABP)\nThe implementation of the Anchor Borrowers' Programme continued in the review period \nwith the disbursement of N12.57 billion to 27 projects, compared with N14.46 billion, \nmainly to the Kebbi state government for on-lending to small-holder rice farmers in the \nfirst half of 2016. This brought the cumulative disbursements to N31.52 billion for 80 projects \nsince inception. Thus far, 183,026 small-holder farmers with a total hectares of 217,750 had \nbeen financed under the Scheme. The programme was being implemented in 27 states \nwith the participation of ten (10) state-led, forty-seven (47) private-led anchors and \nthirteen (13) participating financial institutions (PFIs) (10 banks, 1 DFI, 1 MFB and 1 non-\nbank financial institution). \nThe commodities being financed under the Scheme included: rice, maize, wheat, soya \nbeans, cotton, cassava, fish and poultry. To improve its outreach and delivery, the CBN \nrecently approved the: \n· \nNigeria Incentive-Based Risk-Sharing System for Agricultural Lending (NIRSAL) as a \nPFI. Under this window, the CBN would release fund directly to NIRSAL for on-\nlending to validated farmers under the ABP;\n· \nNIRSAL Guarantee Model: the CBN would guarantee fifty per cent of the loan in \ndefault, while the remaining fifty per cent would be guaranteed by NIRSAL and \nbanks in the ratio 75:25 respectively, to encourage the participation of more \nbanks by reducing their risk exposure under the ABP;\n· \nPrime Anchor Model: Under the model, CBN would release fund directly to the \nAnchor as the obligor through the banks for on-lending to its out growers. CBN \nwould cover 50% of the loan in default while the PFI is expected to take a \nmaximum additional cover of 70% from the Anchor(s); and\n· \nState Anchor backed with Irrevocable Standing Payment Order (ISPO) Model: For \n38\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nstate governments to participate under the ABP, they would submit ISPO as \nobtained under CACS and also, provide a copy of signed agreement between \nthe state government and a processor.\n2.6.6 Presidential Fertilizer Initiative\nThe Initiative commenced in the review period to facilitate the local production of 1.0 \nmillion tonnes of blended Nitrogen, Phosphorous and Potassium (NPK) fertilizer for the 2017 \nwet season farming and 0.5 tonne for the dry-season. \nThe Initiative was aimed at:\n· \nEnhancing all-year round availability of quality fertilizer at affordable prices;\n· \nReducing food inflation and stimulating economic activities along the agriculture \nvalue chain;\n· \nCreating jobs by revamping the 28 local blending plants (12 already producing);\n· \nSavings of a projected US$200m in foreign exchange; and\n· \nSavings of about N60.00 billion in budgetary provisions for fertilizer subsidy.\n2.6.7 National Food Security Programme (NFSP)\nThe NFSP was meant to scale-up domestic production of agricultural commodities, \nenhance local milling capacity and engage a large number of small-holder farmers \nunder the out-growers scheme. A total of 8 projects valued at N24.91 billion had been \nfinanced under the Programme.\n2.6.8 National Collateral Registry (NCR) \nThe NCR was given a legal backing with the enactment of the Secured Transactions in \nMovable Assets Act in May 2017. \nThe Registry trained sixty five (65) credit managers of the First Bank of Nigeria Limited, Rand \nMerchant Bank and Heritage Bank on how to utilise its services. In addition, a \ndemonstration on the use of the NCR portal to register statements of farmers under the \nAnchor Borrowers' Programme (ABP) was carried out for staff of the Nigerian Incentive-\nBased Risk-sharing for Agricultural Lending (NIRSAL) in the review period.\nTo date, one hundred and seventeen (117) financial institutions had registered on the \nRegistry comprising, twenty six (26) banks, three (3) development finance institutions and \neighty five (85) microfinance banks.\nA total of 15,392 financing statements valued at N315.15 billion and US$20.00 million had \nbeen recorded on the NCR portal by the financial institutions from inception to date. A \nbreakdown of the number and value of financing statements by category is shown in \nTable 7:\n39\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nTable 7\nNumber and Value of Financing Statement on the \nNational Collateral Registry at end-June 2017\nDebtor Type\n \nCurrency\n \nNumber of \nFinancing \nStatement\n \nValue of \nFinancing \nStatement\n \n \n \n \nIndividual\n \nNGN\n \n11,239\n 23,245,817,012.80\n \nLarge Business \nNGN\n \n \n123,351,979,907.12\n \n \nUSD\n \n373\n \n20,000,000.00\n \nMedium\n \nNGN\n \n1,605\n \n150,328,636,929.68\n \nBusiness\n \n \n \n \nMicro Business\n \nNGN\n \n888\n \n4,641,436,077.23\n \nSmall Business\n \nNGN\n \n1,287\n \n13,583,614,996.18\n \nTotal\n \nNGN\n \n \n \n \n \n15,392\n \n315,151,484,923.01\n \n \nUSD\n \n \n20,000,000.00\n \n \nSource: CBN\n2.6.9 SME Credit Guarantee Scheme (SMECGS)\nIn the first half of 2017, no application was received under the SMECGS. Thus, the number \nand value of projects guaranteed from inception to date remained at 88 and N4.25 \nbillion, respectively.\n2.6.10 Textile Sector Intervention Fund (TSIF)\nThe TSIF was set-up by the Bank as a one-off special intervention with a seed fund of \nN50.00 billion to resuscitate the country's ailing textile industry. The Facility was for \nrestructuring existing loans of textile and garment companies. It was expected to provide \nadditional credit to promoters of these companies as part of the Bank's contribution to \nthe development of the nation's textile and garment sub-sector. The Bank of Industry \n(BOI) manages the Fund. In the first half of 2017, the sum of N10.29 billion was released for \nseventeen (17) projects, compared with N15.19 billion for fourteen (14) projects in the first \nhalf of 2016. Cumulatively, the sum of N26.39 billion had been disbursed for thirty-one (31) \nprojects.\n2.6.11 Power and Airline Intervention Fund (PAIF)\nThe sum of N4.76 billion was disbursed to one previously approved power project in the \nfirst half of the year, compared with N11.59 billion to two power and one airline projects in \nthe first half of 2016. The cumulative disbursement since inception of the Fund was \nN277.40 billion for 59 projects, comprising 43 power projects, valued at N156.64 billion and \n16 airline projects, valued at N120.76 billion.\nThe sum of ₦13.01 billion was repaid in the first half of 2017, compared with ₦11.35 billion in \nthe same period in 2016. The total repayment received under the PAIF since inception to \nend-June 2017 was ₦106.13 billion in respect of 59 projects.\n40\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n2.6.12 Nigeria Electricity Market Stabilisation Facility (NEMSF)\nThe Nigeria Electricity Market Stabilisation Facility (NEMSF) was aimed at putting the \nNigerian Electricity Supply Industry on a path to economic viability and sustainability. The \nNEMSF was meant to facilitate the settlement of legacy gas debts and payment of \noutstanding obligations due to market participants (Gascos, Gencos, TCN, Discos, \nservice providers and others along the value chain) that accrued during the Interim Rules \nPeriod (IRP Debts). \nDuring the first half of 2017, there was no disbursement but there were series of \nstakeholders meetings geared towards accelerating the disbursement of the remaining \nportion of the Facility. Cumulatively, N114.75 billion had been disbursed to twenty nine \n(29) eligible electricity market participants. The sum of N4.48 billion principal repayment \nwas received in the period under review. The total repayment under NEMSF since \ninception stood at N11.77 billion.\n2.6.13 Financial Inclusion Activities\n2.6.13.1 Visit of Delegates from 8 (eight) Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI) Member \nCountries\nThe CBN hosted the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI) – a global network of policy \nmakers/regulators instrumental to developing and promoting financial inclusion \nstrategies in member-countries. Delegates from Mozambique, Senegal, Lesotho, \nSeychelles, Sierra Leone, and Bhutan attended the 5-day programme to understudy the \nNigerian financial inclusion strzategy development & implementation processes.\n2.6.13.2 Geospatial Mapping Update \nThe Financial Inclusion Secretariat was coordinating the development of “Nigeria \nFinancial Services (NFS) Maps”, a dynamic online geospatial database of financial \nservices. The database would provide specific benefits to a wide range of stakeholders, \nincluding relevant CBN departments, Nigeria Interbank Settlement System (NIBSS), \ngovernment agencies, financial services providers, and the public.\n41\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nTable 8\nSummary of projects financed under PAIF up to June 30, 2017\nS/No\n \nType\n \nNo. of Projects\n \nAmount\n \n(N’billion)\n %\n \nRepayments\n \n(N’billion)\n \n1\n \nAirline\n \n16\n \n120.76\n \n43.5\n 55.84\n \n2\n \nPower\n \n41\n \n156.64\n \n56.5\n 50.29\n \n \nTotal\n \n57\n \n277.40\n \n100.0\n \n106.13\n \n \nSource: CBN\n42\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nIn the review period, the Bank was awarded a US$100,000 innovation grant by a financial \nsector deepening organisation, insight2impact (i2i), to support the Project. \nConsequently, a project plan was being designed for the development of the envisioned \ndatabase.\n2.6.14 Entrepreneurship Development Centres (EDCs)\nThe Bank's engagement with EDCs continued on possible areas of collaboration on \nentrepreneurship development in Nigeria. As a fall out, it was agreed that the EDCs \nshould open discussions with banks especially Sterling Bank Plc. and LAPO Microfinance \nBank that had accessed the CBN's MSMED funds to link the graduates from their centres \nto access finance. It was also agreed that the EDCs should send a proposal to the \nDirector, Corporate Communications Department for collaborations on their enterprise \nradio programme.\nThe number of participants trained by the EDCs during the review period was 6,806, \nsurpassing the target of 6,600. A total of 3,691 (52.2%) of the participants were females \nand 3,115 (45.8%) were males. A total of N2.50 billion had been accessed through banks \nand other financial institutions by graduates of EDCs since inception, while a total of \n43,350 participants had been trained.\n2.6.15 Youth Entrepreneurship Development Programme (YEDP)\nIn the review period, no additional fund was released to the Youth Entrepreneurship \nDevelopment Programme (YEDP). The sum of N618.54 million had been disbursed thus \nfar, through the Heritage Bank. Engagements with other participating financial \ninstitutions (PFIs) were on-going to make their portals available for the Programme.\n43\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nECONOMIC REPORT\n3.0\nGLOBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS\n \n3.1\nGlobal Output\n \nGlobal output picked-up in the first half of 2017. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) \nprojected global growth to rise from 3.2 per cent in 2016 to 3.5 per cent in 2017. The \ngrowth projection was due, mainly, to the anticipated cyclical recovery in global \nmanufacturing and trade. Other factors were robust growth in aggregate consumption, \nthe expectation of a lax fiscal policy stance, appropriate policy mix which buoyed \nfinancial markets and strengthened business confidence, as well as accommodative \nfinancial conditions.\nIn advanced economies, output growth rebounded, especially in the United States and \nJapan. The United States led growth in the second quarter of 2017, despite its \ndisappointing result in the first quarter, while the euro area and Japan were also \nexpanding at relatively decent rates. Overall, high-frequency indicators for the second \nquarter of 2017 provided signs of a general strengthening of activity in most advanced \neconomies. \nGDP growth in the US picked-up to 2.6 per cent in the second quarter of 2017, from 1.2 per \ncent in the first quarter. The improvement was driven largely by buoyant market \nexpectation of fiscal stimulus. The IMF has, however, marked-down growth rates from 2.3 \nper cent in 2016 to 2.1 per cent in 2017. The markdown reflected, in part the weak growth \noutturn in the first quarter of the year, and the expectation that fiscal policy would be less \nexpansionary than previously anticipated. \nThe United Kingdom economy grew by 0.3 per cent and 0.2 per cent in the first and \nsecond quarters of 2017, respectively. The IMF revised UK growth downwards by 0.3 \npercentage point for 2017, from 2.0 per cent to 1.7 per cent, reflecting a weaker-than-\nexpected activity in the first quarter as a slump in the pound and a spike in inflation \nweighed on growth.\nThe Japanese economy grew by 1.0 per cent in the second quarter of 2017, from 1.5 per \ncent in the first quarter. The country's growth was, however, revised up by the IMF from 1.0 \nper cent in 2016 to 1.3 per cent in 2017, reflecting the impact of increased private \nconsumption, investment, and export in boosting activity. \n44\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nIn the euro area, economic activity gained momentum, primarily supported by improved \ndomestic demand and inventories. Real GDP increased by 0.6 per cent, quarter-on-\nquarter, in the second quarter of 2017, following a growth of 0.5 per cent in the preceding \nquarter. \nIn emerging market and developing economies, growth outcome was heterogeneous, \nand projected to increase to 4.5 per cent in 2017, above 4.3 per cent in 2016. In China, \ngrowth is rebounding, reflecting a better-than-expected performance in the second \nquarter of 2017 and the general expectation that the country's slowdown would be less \nsevere. The expectation reflected existing policy easing, especially expansionary credit \nand public investment, as well as supply-side reforms. China's economy grew at 6.9 per \ncent apiece in the first and second quarters of 2017, compared with 6.8 per cent in the \nfourth quarter of 2016. Growth in China was projected to remain at 6.7 per cent in 2017 \nsame as in 2016.\nThe Russian economy showed signs of recovery, and was expected to exit recession in \n2017, as activity appears to be bottoming-out, reflecting the effect of higher oil prices. In \nBrazil, there was a pick-up in activity owing to the firming oil prices and a recovery in \ndomestic demand, on account of easing financial conditions and buoyed confidence. \nHowever, a lackluster investment activity and idle capacity remained major hindrances \nto growth.\nThe Indian economy grew by 7.3 per cent in the second quarter of 2017, compared with \n7.1 per cent in the first quarter and 7.6 per cent year-on-year. Growth was supported \nlargely by government and private consumption activity as well as a reduced drag from \nnet exports.\nThe sub-Saharan African (SSA) economies continued to witness tepid growth, reflecting \nsoftening commodity prices and weak activity in Nigeria and South Africa, the region's \nmajor players. In sub-Saharan Africa, a modest recovery in 2017 was foreseen. Growth was \nprojected to rise to 2.7 percent in 2017 and 3.5 percent in 2018, driven largely by \nidiosyncratic factors in the largest economies, which faced challenging macroeconomic \nconditions in 2016. In Nigeria, GDP recorded a positive growth of 0.55 per cent in the \nsecond quarter of 2017, in contrast to a negative 0.91 per cent in the preceding quarter. \nNigeria's growth has been hampered by lower oil prices, and was expected to fully \nstabilise by the fourth quarter of 2017. \n45\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nSouth Africa's economy contracted by 0.7 per cent in the first quarter of 2017, compared \nwith 0.3 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2016. Growth in South Africa was, however, \nprojected to rise to 1.0 per cent in 2017, as drought conditions ease, commodity prices \nrebound and electricity capacity expands.\n3.2 Global Commodity Prices\nGlobal commodity prices also strengthened alongside the pick-up in economic activity. \nThe rise in oil prices was, in part due to the decision of the Organisation of the Petroleum \nExporting Countries (OPEC) and non-OPEC members to cut production. In Asia and the \nUnited States, prices initially rose because of expectations of a stronger winter demand. \nHowever, a fairly mild winter subdued demand, thereby containing gas prices. The \nincreased real estate activities in China and the anticipated fiscal policy easing in the \nUnited States supported metal prices. In addition, prices rose for most food items as \nexcess supply eased. \nThe Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) Food Price Index (FFPI) rose by 5 points or \n2.89 per cent to 175.2 points at end-June 2017 above 170.3 points at end-December \n2016. The index rose by 11.29 points or 6.89 per cent from 163.9 points to 175.2 points, \ncompared with the levels in the corresponding period of 2016. The sub-indices of meat, \ndairy and cereals rose by 11.56, 8.50 and 8.48 per cent to 175.2, 209.0 and 154.3 points \nrespectively, at end-June 2017 above 157.1, 192.6 and 142.2 points at end-December \n2016. The sub-indices of meat, dairy and vegetable oil rose by 9.57, 51.50 and 0.15 per \ncent, while cereals and sugar sub-indices fell by 1.65 and 28.54 per cent, respectively, \ncompared with the levels in the corresponding period of 2016. Vegetable oil and sugar \nsub-indices fell by 11.38 and 24.87 per cent to 162.1 and 197.3 points at end-June 2017 \nbelow 183.0 and 262.6 points, respectively at end-December 2016.\n3.3 Global Inflation\nGlobal consumer price inflation generally softened reflecting the waning impact of the \nrecent commodity price rebound. Global inflation was projected to rise to 4.7 per cent in \n2017, down 0.1 percentage point from its previous forecast. This downgrade to the global \ninflation outlook for 2017 mostly reflected lower estimates for the euro area, China, India \nand the United States. \nIn advanced economies, inflation was estimated at 2.0 per cent in 2017, up from 0.8 per \ncent in 2016. Thus, headline inflation picked up due to higher commodity prices, but was \ngenerally below central banks' targets. It increased in the first quarter of 2017 due to rising \nenergy and food prices. In general, prices, however, moderated in the second quarter of \n46\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n2017, though inflationary pressures intensified in the United Kingdom on the back of a \nweaker sterling. \nIn the OECD area, annual inflation slowed to 1.9 per cent in June 2017, compared with 2.1 \nper cent in May 2017, reflecting mainly a softening in energy prices. It had increased to \n2.5 per cent in February 2017, compared with 2.3 per cent in January 2017.\nIn the United States, inflation softened from 2.5 per cent in January 2017 to 2.4 per cent in \nMarch 2017, and declined further to 1.9 per cent and 1.6 per cent in May and June, \nrespectively. Core inflation remained relatively subdued and was projected to rise more \ngradually. Euro area inflation declined from a peak of 2.0 per cent in February to 1.4 per \ncent in May and 1.3 per cent in June, 2017. Given the negative output gap in the area, \nheadline inflation was expected to remain below the European Central Bank's target for \nsome time to come.\nIn emerging market economies, inflation moderated in both the first and second \nquarters of 2017 due to weak demand, more stable economic conditions and foreign \nexchange markets. Inflation in emerging market and developing economies (excluding \nArgentina and Venezuela) was projected to rise to 4.7 per cent in 2017 from 4.4 per cent \nin 2016, mostly reflecting higher commodity prices. China's inflation moderated from 2.5 \nper cent in January 2017 to 1.5 per cent apiece in April and May, before edging \ndownwards to 1.4 per cent in June, 2017. In Brazil, inflation declined throughout the first \nhalf of 2017, from 5.4 per cent in January to 4.6 per cent and 3.0 per cent in March and \nJune, 2017 respectively. Also, Indian inflation declined during the first half, from 3.2 per \ncent in January, to 2.2 and 1.5 per cent in May and June 2017, respectively. The decline \nwas attributed to the general fall in the prices of vegetables and fruits.\nIn sub-Saharan Africa, inflation was expected to remain in double-digit levels in a few \nlarge economies, namely Nigeria, Angola and Ghana, reflecting the passthrough of \nsignificant currency depreciations. The IMF projected inflation to decelerate in the \nregion to 10.7 per cent in 2017, from 11.4 per cent in 2016. In Nigeria, inflation has steered \na downward course, declining from 18.7 per cent in January 2017 to 17.2 per cent and \n16.1 per cent in April and June 2017, respectively, reflecting primarily the appreciation of \nthe naira, owing to the effectiveness of recent measures by the Central Bank of Nigeria to \nrein-in demand pressures in the foreign exchange market. In South Africa, inflation \ngenerally declined in the first half of 2017, to 6.0, 5.3 and 5.4 per cent in March, April and \nMay 2017, respectively.\n47\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n3.4 International Financial Markets\nThe global financial market performance was mixed in the first half of 2017. The \ndevelopment was due mainly to the impact of a strong dollar, owing to intensified \nmonetary policy normalisation in the U.S., which widened the monetary policy \ndivergence in the advanced economies. Other factors were strong expectation of fiscal \nstimulus, global growth pick-up led by the U.S. economy, the easing slowdown in the \nChinese economy due to fiscal boost, intensification of inward-looking policies and \nprotectionism, as well as uncertainty surrounding the UK Government's triggering of \nArticle 50. These developments impacted investors' confidence and liquidity conditions \nin the global financial market. Accordingly, the advanced economies' policy rates \nremained largely unchanged in the review period. Despite growth concerns, some \nemerging market and developing economies raised rates ostensibly to moderate \ndomestic prices and stem foreign capital outflow. \nConsequently, the global stock market was predominantly bullish. In North America, the \nMexican Bolsa and United States S&P 500 indices increased by 9.2 and 8.2 per cent, \nrespectively, while the Canadian S&P/TSX Composite index decreased by 0.7 per cent. \nIn South America, the Argentine Merval, Colombian COLCAP and Brazilian Bovespa \nindices increased by 29.5, 8.2 and 4.4 per cent, respectively.\nIn Europe, the DAX, CAC 40 and FTSE 100 indices increased by 7.4, 5.3 and 2.4 per cent \nrespectively, while the MICEX index decreased by 15.8 per cent.\nIn Asia, India's BSE Sensex, Japan's Nikkei 225 and the China's Shanghai Stock Exchange-\nA indices increased by 16.1, 4.8 and 2.9 per cent, respectively.\nIn sub-Saharan Africa, the Nigerian NSE All-Share, Ghanaian GSE ASI, Kenyan Nairobi NSE \n20, Egyptian EGX CASE 30 and the South African JSE All-Share indices increased by 23.2, \n16.3, 13.2 and 1.9 per cent, respectively.\nThe performance of global currencies was mixed during the first half of 2017. While some \nmajor currencies appreciated against the U.S. dollar, others depreciated, especially in \nan era of a strong dollar. This development was attributed to the growth slowdown in the \nUnited States during the first quarter of 2017, as well as muted recovery in commodity \nprices, which moderated activity in Latin America and African markets. In addition, the \ndivergence of the monetary policy stance in China and Japan continued to cause \nfragilities in their financial markets. \n48\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nIn advanced economies, most currencies appreciated against the U.S. dollar. The major \nEuropean currencies, namely the euro and Russian ruble appreciated against the U.S. \ndollar by 4.6 and 23.6 per cent, respectively. The British pound, however, depreciated by \n11.7 per cent against the U.S. dollar, reflecting the continued weakening of the sterling in \nthe aftermath of the Brexit Vote. In North America, the Canadian dollar appreciated by \n6.2 per cent. In Asia, the Japanese yen also appreciated against the U.S. dollar by 7.0 per \ncent.\nIn the emerging market economies, the Brazilian real, Colombian peso and Indian rupee \nappreciated against the U.S. dollar by 19.6, 4.3 and 2.4 per cent, respectively. The \nMexican peso, Argentine peso and Chinese yuan, however, depreciated by 4.9, 22.3 \nand 4.3 per cent, respectively, against the U.S. dollar while the South African rand \nappreciated against the U.S. dollar by 18.4 per cent. \nIn sub-Saharan Africa, the Ghanaian cedi, Nigerian naira, Egyptian pound and Kenyan \nshilling depreciated against the U.S. dollar by 13.6, 35.6, 56.8 and 1.4 per cent, \nrespectively.\nFigure 31\nPerformance of the Naira against Major Currencies\n \n \n \n450.0\n400.0\n350.0\n300.0\n250.0\n200.0\n3.0\n2.5\n2.0\n1.5\n1.0\n0.5\n03/01/2017\n09/01/2017\n13/01/2017\n19/01/2017 \n25/01/2017\n31/01/2017\n06/02/2017\n10/02/2017\n16/02/2017\n22/02/2017\n28/02/2017\n06/03/2017\n10/03/2017\n16/03/2017\n22/03/2017\n28/03/2017\n07/04/2017\n13/04/2017\n21/04/2017\n27/04/2017\n04/05/2017\n10/05/2017\n16/05/2017\n22/05/2017\n26/05/2017\n02/06/2017\n08/06/2017\n14/06/2017\n20/06/2017\n28/06/2017\nUSD\nGBP\nSUR\nJPY\nSource: CBN\n49\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 32\nPerformance of the Naira against \nRegional Currencies\n \nSource: CBN\n \n03/01/2017\n09/01/2017\n13/01/2017\n19/01/2017\n25/01/2017\n31/01/2017\n06/02/2017\n10/02/2017\n16/02/2017\n22/02/2017\n28/02/2017\n06/03//2017\n10/03/2017\n16/03/2017\n22/03/2017\n28/03/2017\n03/04/2017\n07/04/2017\n13/04/2017\n21/04/2017\n27/04/2017\n04/05/2017\n10/05/2017\n16/05/2017\n22/05/2017\n26/05/2017\n02/06/2017\n08/06/2017\n14/06/2017\n20/06/2017\n26/06/2017\n30/06/2017\nNaira per WAUA\nWAUA\nCFA\nNaira per CFA Franc\n0.55\n0.5\n0.45\n450\n430\n410\n390\n370\n350\n330\n310\n290\n270\n250\nTable 9\nIndices of Selected International Stock Markets (As at June 30, 2017)\n \nCountry\nIndex\nEnd-June, 2016\nEnd-Dec, 2016\nEnd-June, 2017\n \n% Change \nJun 2016 - Jun \n2017\n \n% Change Dec \n2016 - Jun \n2017 \nAFRICA\nNigeria\nASI\n29,597.79\n26,874.62\n33,117.48\n11.9\n23.2\nSouth Africa\nJSE African AS\n52,217.72\n50,653.54\n51,611.01\n-1.2\n1.9\nKenya\nNairobi NSE 20 \n3,640.61\n3,186.21\n3,607.18\n-0.9\n13.2\nEgypt\nEGX CSE 30\n6,942.52\n12,290.61\n13,487.36\n94.3\n9.7\nGhana\nGSE All Share\n1,787.50\n1,689.18\n1,964.55\n9.9\n16.3\nNORTH AMERICA\nUS\nS&P 500\n2,098.86\n2,238.83\n2,423.41\n15.5\n8.2\nCanada\nS&P/TSX Composite\n14,064.54\n15,287.59\n15,182.19\n7.9\n-0.7\nMexico\nMexico Bolsa (IPC)\n45,966.49\n45,642.90\n49,857.49\n8.5\n9.2\nSOUTH AMERICA\nBrazil\nBovespa Stock \n51,526.93\n60,227.29\n62,899.97\n22.1\n4.4\nArgentina\nMerval \n14,683.49\n16,917.86\n21,912.63\n49.2\n29.5\nColombia\nCOLCAP\n1,313.18\n1,351.68\n1,462.90\n11.4\n8.2\nEUROPE\nUK\nFTSE 100\n6,504.33\n7,142.83\n7,312.72\n12.4\n2.4\nFrance\nCAC 40\n4,237.48\n4,862.31\n5,120.68\n20.8\n5.3\nGermany\nDAX \n9,680.09\n11,481.06\n12,325.12\n27.3\n7.4\nRussia\nMICEX\n1,891.09\n2,232.72\n1,879.50\n-0.6\n-15.8\nASIA\nJapan\nNIKKEI 225\n15,575.92\n19,114.37\n20,033.43\n28.6\n4.8\nChina\nShanghai SE A \n3,066.50\n3,249.59\n3,343.39\n9.0\n2.9\nIndia\nBSE Sensex\n26,999.72\n26,626.46\n30,921.61\n14.5\n16.1\nSource: Bloomberg\n50\n \nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n3.5 Global Economic Outlook for the Rest of 2017\nGlobal output growth was revised by the IMF in its July WEO update, to improve for 2017 at \n3.5 per cent, compared with 3.2 per cent in 2016. In the advanced economies, growth is \nprojected at 2.0 per cent in 2017, up from 1.7 per cent in 2016, due largely to expected \nstrong consumer demand, investment and trade. Moreover, inflation remains subdued \nTable 10\nExchange Rates of Selected Countries \n(Value in Currency Units to US$)\n \nCurrency\n31-Dec-15\n31-Dec-16\n30-Jun-17\nMTM % Change Dec \n31, 2015 - June 30, \n2016 %App/Dep\nYTD % \nChange \nApp/Dep\nAFRICA \nNigeria \nNaira\n197.00\n305.00\n305.90\n-0.29\n-35.60\nSouth Africa \nRand\n15.48\n13.74\n13.07\n5.13\n18.44\nKenya \nShilling\n102.30\n102.51\n103.75\n-1.20\n-1.40\nEgypt \nPound\n7.83\n18.14\n18.13\n0.06\n-56.81\nGhana\nCedi\n3.81\n4.24\n4.41\n-3.85\n-13.61\nNORTH \nAMERICA \nCanada \nDollar\n1.38\n1.34\n1.30\n3.08\n6.15\nMexico \nPeso\n17.23\n20.73\n18.12\n14.40\n-4.91\nSOUTH \nAMERICA \nBrazil \nReal\n3.96\n3.26\n3.31\n-1.51\n19.64\nArgentina \nPeso\n12.93\n15.88\n16.63\n-4.51\n-22.25\nColombia \nPeso\n 3,174.50 \n3,002.00\n \n 3,043.11 \n-1.35\n4.32\nEUROPE \nUK \nPound\n0.68\n0.81\n0.77\n5.19\n-11.69\nEuro Area \nEuro\n0.92\n0.95\n0.88\n7.95\n4.55\nRussia \nRuble\n72.85\n61.54\n58.94\n4.41\n23.60\nASIA \nJapan \nYen\n120.20\n116.96\n112.39\n4.07\n6.95\nChina \nYuan\n6.49\n6.95\n6.78\n2.51\n-4.28\nIndia\nRupee\n66.15\n67.92\n64.58\n5.17\n2.43\nSource: bloomberg \nMTM = Month to Month\nYTD = Year to Date\n51\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nand generally below targets in most advanced economies. Growth in the euro area was \nprojected at 1.9 per cent in 2017, compared with 1.8 per cent in 2016. The lower \nprojection was influenced by uncertainty surrounding the Brexit and the risks of rising \nprotectionism. Projections for other advanced economies such as Britain, Japan, Spain, \nItaly in 2017 have been revised downwards largely on account of weaker-than-\nexpected activities in the first quarter of 2017.\nGrowth in the emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) was projected to \nrise to 4.6 per cent in 2017, from 4.3 per cent in 2016, driven largely by Brazil and Russia on \nthe back of firming oil prices and recovery in commodity export. The projection was \nsupported by the bottoming-out of economic recession in some countries, the firming up \nof international crude oil and other commodity prices, and the waning of China's \neconomic reforms. China was projected to grow by 6.7 per cent in 2017. Growth in India \nwas projected to rebound to 7.2 per cent in 2017, above 7.1 per cent in 2016, owing to \nhigher government spending and data revision that showed stronger momentum in the \nfirst quarter of 2017. In Brazil, growth was projected to rise to 0.3 in 2017, from a contraction \nof 3.6 per cent in 2016, due to expected moderate recovery in commodity prices and \nupswing in economic activity. \nIn sub-Saharan Africa, growth was projected to rise to 2.7 per cent in 2017, from 1.3 per \ncent in 2016, driven by expected recovery in South Africa and Nigeria. Growth in South \nAfrica was projected at 1.0 per cent in 2017, from 0.3 per cent in 2016. Nigeria's growth \nwas projected to expand by 0.8 per cent in 2017, from a contraction of 1.6 per cent in \n2016.\nGrowth in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region was projected to decelerate \nto 2.6 per cent in 2017, down from 5.0 per cent in 2016, reflecting slowdown in activity in oil \nexports and political crisis in a number of countries in the region. Besides, continued \nweakness in oil prices, if sustained, could weigh further on the outlook for the region.\n53\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n4.0 \nDEVELOPMENTS IN THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY\n4.1 Monetary and Credit Developments\nGlobal and domestic developments influenced monetary policy environment in the first \nhalf of 2017. At the domestic front, contraction in domestic output eased as real GDP \ngrew by 0.55 per cent in the second quarter, in contrast to the contraction of 1.49 per \ncent in the second quarter of 2016. Nevertheless, high inflation and foreign exchange \ndemand pressure remained major challenges to monetary policy. Consequently, the \nBank maintained a non-expansionary monetary policy stance with the policy rate \nretained at 14.0 per cent; cash reserve ratio at 22.5 per cent; liquidity ratio at 30.0 per \ncent, and the asymmetric corridor of +200/-500 basis points around the MPR for the \nstanding lending and deposit facilities, respectively. The main instrument for liquidity \nmanagement was open market operations (OMO), complemented by cash reserve \nrequirements, repurchase transactions and interventions in the interbank foreign \nexchange market. \nGrowth in monetary aggregates fell below their targets. Broad money (M2) and narrow \nmoney (M1) supply declined, compared with their levels at the end of the corresponding \nhalf year of 2016. Similarly, both reserve money and currency outside banks fell below \ntheir targets. Aggregate credit (net) to the domestic economy grew marginally during \nthe review period, and was driven by the growth in net claims on the Federal \nGovernment and credit to the private sector. Growth in consumer credit rose in tandem \nwith the growth in credit to the private sector.\n4.1.1 Reserve Money \nAt N5,480.21 billion, reserve money fell by 6.3 per cent below its level at end-December \n2016 and the benchmark of 11.4 per cent for the fiscal 2017, compared with the decline \nof 7.6 per cent at the end of the corresponding period of 2016. The development was due \nto the decline of 4.7 and 13.5 per cent in net foreign assets and domestic assets of the \nCBN, respectively. The corresponding decrease in the uses of reserve money resulted \nfrom the decrease of 14.1and 1.7 per cent in currency-in-circulation and banks' \n54\n \n \nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nDec 14\nJun 15\nDec 15\nJun 16\nDec 16\nJun 17\nForeing assets (net)\n6,244.72\n5,795.96\n5,545.32\n6,840.43\n8,790.65\n8,378.90\n Foreign Assets\n6,244.72\n7,646.65\n5,624.69\n8,022.11\n9,248.62\n9,449.92\nForeign Liabilities\n-\n1,850.69\n79.37\n1,181.68\n457.97\n1,071.02\nNet credit to Government\n(2,141.68)\n(769.52)\n(1,653.07)\n(1,157.96)\n409.54\n728.72\n Credit to Federal Government\n922.38\n \n1,527.41\n \n2,513.98\n \n3,557.12\n5,517.01\n6,041.10\n Fed. Government Deposits\n3,064.06\n \n2,296.93\n \n4,167.05\n \n4,715.08\n5,107.47\n5,312.38\nNet claims on Private Sector\n1,833.44\n \n \n1,315.95\n \n \n1,518.85\n \n \n657.20\n(3,895.65)\n(4,517.06)\n Claims on private sector\n4,859.89\n \n5,093.07\n \n5,061.61\n \n5,375.14\n4,997.88\n5,196.37\n Private sector deposits\n3,026.44\n \n3,777.12\n \n3,542.76\n \n4,717.94\n8,893.53\n9,713.43\n Claims on Banks\n774.25\n \n1,400.08\n \n1,225.18\n \n1,295.31\n1,632.08\n1,685.32\nOTHER ITEMS (NET)\n(779.78)\n \n \n(1,796.70)\n \n \n(823.54)\n \n \n(2,263.11)\n(1,083.69)\n(795.67)\n Other Assets\n1,782.12\n \n1,641.28\n \n2,066.80\n 1,711.72\n3,343.03\n3,075.09\n Other liabilities\n2,561.90\n \n3,437.99\n \n2,890.34\n 3,974.83\n4,431.73\n3,870.76\nRESERVE MONEY\n5,930.95\n5,945.76\n5,812.74\n5,371.86\n5,847.92\n5,480.21\nCurrency in Circulation\n1,797.98\n1,562.35\n1,857.94\n1,684.58\n2,179.17\n1,873.54\nBanks Reserves\n4,132.97\n4,383.42\n3,954.80\n3,687.28\n3,668.74\n3,606.67\nReserve Money\n5,930.95\n5,945.76\n5,812.74\n5,371.86\n5,847.91\n5,480.21\nTable 11\nSources and Uses of Reserve Money\n Source: CBN\nFigure 33 (a)\nReserve Money and its Components: Sources \n(N' Billion)\n \n \nSource: CBN \n \n10,000.00\n8,000.00\n6,000.00\n4,000.00\n2,000.00\n0.00\n-2,000.00\n-4,000.00\n-6,000.00\n-8,000.00\nDec. 14\nJun. 15\nDec. 15\nJun. 16\nDec. 16\nJun. 17\nNFA\nNDA\nOIN\n55\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 33 (b)\nReserve Money and its Components: Uses \n(N' Billion) \n \nSource: CBN\n \n4.1.2 Broad Money (M2)\nThe broad measure of money supply, M2, fell by 6.8 per cent to N21,980.58 billion at end-\nJune 2017, translating to an annualized growth of negative 14.7 per cent, in contrast to \nthe growth of 10.2 per cent at the end of June 2016. The development resulted from the \ndecline of 7.5 and 10.5 percent in net foreign assets and other assets (net) of the banking \nsystem, respectively, which offset the 1.0 per cent growth in net domestic credit. \n4.1.3 Narrow Money (M1)\nNarrow money supply (M1) fell by 9.6 per cent to N10, 190.19 billion at end-June 2017, in \ncontrast to the growth of 11.1 per cent at the end of the preceding period of 2016. The \ndevelopment was due to respective decline of 18.9 and 7.8 per cent in currency outside \nbanks and demand deposits. \n4.1.4 Quasi Money (QM)\nQuasi money fell by 4.3 per cent to N11,790.4 billion at end-June 2017, in contrast to the \ngrowth of 9.6 per cent at the end of the corresponding period of 2016. This was due to the \ndecline in savings and time deposits, particularly foreign currency deposits, which fell by \n9.2 per cent.\n4.1.5 Currency-in–Circulation (CIC) and Deposits at the CBN\nCurrency-in-circulation and banks' deposits with the CBN fell by 14.0 and 1.7 per cent to \nN1,873.5 billion and N3,606.67 billion, respectively, compared with the decline of 9.3 and \n6.8 per cent at the end of the corresponding period of 2016. As a proportion of reserve \nmoney, CIC and bank reserves constituted 34.1 and 65.8 per cent, respectively. \nDec. 14 \nJun 15\nDec 15\nJun 16\nDec 16\nJun17\nRM\nCIC\nBank Reserve\n8,000.00\n6,000.00\n4,000.00\n2,000.00\n-\n56\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n4.1.6 Currency Outside Banks (COB)\nCurrency outside banks fell by 18.9 per cent to N1,477.1 billion at end-June 2017, \ncompared with the decline of 5.3 per cent at end-June 2016. This reflected increased use \nof electronic payments channels during the review period. As a percentage of broad \nmoney, COB constituted 6.7 per cent, a slight increase from 6.2 per cent at the end of the \ncorresponding period of 2016.\nFigure 34\nRatio of Currency Outside Bank to Broad Money Supply\n0.0\n5.0\n10.0\n15.0\n20.0\n25.0\nDec 14\nJun 15\nDec 15\nJun 16\nDec 16\nJun 17\nPer cent\nCOB/M2\nCOB/M1\nSource: CBN\nFigure 35\nGrowth in Money Supply \n(Per cent)\n-20.00\n-10.00\n0.00\n10.00\n20.00\n30.00\n40.00\nDec 14\nJun 15\nDec 15\nJun 16\nDec 16\nJun 17\nPer cent\nNarrow money (M1)\nBroad Money M2\nSource: CBN\n57\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n4.1.7 Drivers of Growth in Money Supply\n4.1.7.1 Net Foreign Assets (NFA)\nNet foreign assets of the banking system fell by 7.5 per cent to N8, 468.1 billion at the end \nof the review period, in contrast to the growth of 25.7 per cent at end-June 2016. As a \npercentage of M2, NFA constituted 38.5 per cent, compared with the 32.2 per cent at the \nend of the corresponding period of 2016. Also, the contribution of NFA to the growth of M2 \nwas negative 2.9 percentage points, in contrast to the positive contribution of 7.3 \npercentage points in the corresponding period of 2016. \n4.1.7.2 Net Domestic Credit (NDC)\nNet domestic credit (NDC) grew by 1.4 per cent to N26, 236.43 billion at end-June 2017, \ncompared with the growth of 13.9 per cent at the end of the corresponding period of \n2016. The development reflected the increase of 7.7 per cent in net claims on the Federal \nGovernment and the 0.02 per cent growth in private sector credit. NDC contributed 1.6 \npercentage points to the growth in broad money supply, compared with 15.0 \npercentage points at end-June 2016. \n (2,600.00)\n (600.00)\n 1,400.00\n 3,400.00\n 5,400.00\n 7,400.00\n 9,400.00\n 11,400.00\n 13,400.00\n 15,400.00\n 17,400.00\nDec 14\nJun 15\nDec 15\nJun 16\nDec 16\nJun 17\nN' Billion\nCred. to priv. sector\nNCLms On Fed.Gov.\nFigure 36\nDistribution of Aggregate Credit to the Economy\n(N' Billion)\nSource: CBN\n4.1.7.2.1 Net Credit to the Government (NCG)\nCredit to the Federal Government rose by 7.7 per cent to N5250.48 billion at the end of the \nfirst half of 2017, compared with the growth of 9.7 per cent at the end of the \ncorresponding half of 2016. The development was due to the growth in holding of \ngovernment securities, especially treasury bills by commercial banks, which rose by 9.9 \nper cent. Net claims on the Federal Government contributed 1.2 percentage points to \nthe growth of total monetary assets, compared with 0.6 percentage point at end-June \n2016.\n58\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n4.1.7.2.2 Credit to the Private Sector (CP)\nCredit to the private sector grew by 0.02 per cent to N21, 985.94 billion at end-June 2017, \ncompared with the 14.6 per cent growth at the end of the corresponding period of 2016. \nThe development owed wholly, to the 19.3 per cent growth in claims on States and Local \nGovernments as claims on the core private sector declined by 0.9 per cent. The \ncontribution of claims on the private sector to the growth of total monetary assets was \n0.02 percentage point, compared with 13.6 percentage points at the end of the \ncorresponding half of 2016.\n4.1.7.3 Other Assets (net) (OAN)\nOther assets (net) of the banking system fell by 10.5 per cent at end-June 2017, \ncompared with the decline of 33.4 per cent at the end of the corresponding period of \n2016. The development resulted wholly, from the decline in other assets (net) of the CBN. \nThe contribution of other assets (net) of the banking system to the growth of broad money \nwas 5.6 percentage points at the end of the review period.\nTable 12\nGrowth in Monetary Aggregates Over Preceding December (Per cent)\n \n \n \n \n \n \nDec ‘14\nJun ‘15\nDec ‘15\nJun ‘16\nDec ‘16\nJun ‘17\nDomestic Credit (Net)\n \n32.6\n \n11.1\n \n12.1\n \n13.9\n \n23.3\n \n1.4\nClaims on Federal Government (Net) \n \n169.3\n \n118.8\n \n152.0\n \n9.7\n \n61.4\n \n7.7\nClaims on Private Sector\n \n11.95 \n4.26 \n3.28\n \n14.59\n \n17.42\n \n0.02\nForeign Assets (Net) \n \n(19.66) \n(14.44) \n(18.73)\n 25.70\n \n61.81\n \n(7.45)\nOther Assets (Net) \n \n2.53 \n(16.88) \n1.08\n (33.38)\n \n(71.51)\n \n(10.54)\nTotal Monetary Assets (M2) \n \n20.55 \n(0.55) \n5.89\n \n10.23\n \n16.76\n \n(6.8)\nQuasi-Money \n \n38.73\n \n2.17\n \n(4.58)\n \n9.61\n \n7.52\n \n(4.30)\nMoney Supply (M1) \n \n(1.82)\n \n(5.25)\n \n24.14\n \n11.05\n \n29.12\n \n(9.59)\nTotal Monetary Assets (M2) \n \n20.55\n \n(0.54)\n \n5.90\n \n10.23\n \n16.77\n \n(6.8)\nSource: CBN\n \nFigure 37\nDistribution of Private Sector Credit (End-June 2017)\nCredit to State and \nLocal Government 5.4%\nCredit to core \nprivate sector 94.6%\nSource: CBN\n59\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nTable 13\nShare of Credit to the Core Private Sector 2016 – 2017 (per cent)\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nITEM\n16-Jun\n17-Jun\nPercentage Share \nin Total\n% Change \nBetween (1)&(2)\nN’billion\n \nN’billion\n \n16-Jun\n \n17-Jun\n \n1\n \n2\n \n3\n \n4\n \n \n[a] Agriculture\n \n \n480.64 \n \n \n501.09\n \n3.1\n \n3.2\n \n4.3\n[b] Industy\n \n \n5,887.75 \n \n \n6,222.42\n \n \n37.9\n \n \n39.6\n \n5.7\nMining & Quarrying\n \n \n16.33 \n \n \n11.42\n \n \n0.1\n \n \n0.1\n \n(30.1)\nManufacturing \n \n \n2,058.04 \n \n2,216.75\n \n \n13.2 \n \n \n14.1\n \n7.7\nOil & Gas\n \n \n3,366.15 \n \n3,528.16\n \n \n21.7\n \n \n22.5\n \n4.8\nof which DownStream, Natural Gas and \nCrude Oil Refining\n \n \n3,366.15 \n \n \n3,528.16\n \n \n21.7\n \n \n22.5\n \n4.8\nPower and Energy\n \n \n447.23 \n \n \n466.09\n \n \n2.9\n \n \n3.0\n \n4.2\nof which IPP and Power\n \nGeneration\n \n \n447.23 \n \n \n466.09\n \n \n2.9\n \n \n3.0\n \n4.2\n[c] Construction\n \n \n607.39 \n \n \n630.68\n \n \n3.9\n \n \n4.0\n \n3.8\n[d] Trade/General Commerce\n \n \n1,020.01 \n \n \n690.01 \n \n \n6.6\n \n \n6.1\n \n(5.9)\n[e] Government\n \n \n1,384.96 \n \n \n1,367.34\n \n \n8.9 \n \n \n8.7\n \n(1.3\n[f] Services\n \n \n6,156.70 \n \n \n6,028.90 \n \n \n39.6\n \n \n38.4\n \n(2.1)\nReal Estate\n \n \n716.72 \n \n \n794.60\n \n \n4.6\n \n \n5.1\n \n10.9\nFinance, Insurance and Capital Market\n \n \n856.28 \n \n \n909.86\n \n \n5.5\n \n \n5.8\n \n6.3\nEducation\n \n \n87.76 \n \n \n75.07 \n \n \n0.6\n \n \n0.5\n \n(14.5)\nOil & Gas\n \n \n1,137.00 \n \n \n1,090.55\n \n \n7.3\n \n \n6.9\n \n(4.1)\nof which Upstream and Oil & Gas Services\n \n \n1,137.00 \n \n \n1,090.55\n \n \n7.3\n \n \n6.9\n \n(4.1)\nPower and Energy\n \n \n238.00 \n \n \n302.18\n \n \n1.5\n \n \n1.9\n \n27.0\nof which Power Transmission and\n \nDistribution\n \n \n238.00 \n \n \n302.18\n \n \n1.5\n \n \n1.9\n \n27.0\nOthers\n3,120.94 \n2,856.72\n20.1\n18.2\n(8.5)\nof which: i. General\n1,326.07 \n1,282.42\n8.5 \n8.2\n(3.3)\nii. Information & Communication\n944.57 \n786.22\n6.1\n5.0\n(16.8)\niii. Transportation & Storage\n456.89 \n403.15\n2.9\n2.6\n(11.8)\nTOTAL PRIVATE SECTOR CREDIT\n15,537.45 \n15,710.57\n100.0\n100.0\nSource: CBN\n4.1.8 Sectoral Distribution of Credit\nOf the total banks' claims on core private sector, credit to the priority sectors- agriculture, \nindustry and construction-constituted 3.2, 39.6 and 4.0 per cent of the total in June 2017, \nrespectively, compared with 3.1, 37.9 and 3.9 per cent, in June 2016. As in the \ncorresponding half year, oil & gas accounted for the largest share of the industry sector \nwith 56.7 per cent at end-June 2017, while mining and quarrying accounted for the least \nshare of 0.18 per cent. In the industrial sector, manufacturing and power & energy sub-\nsectors accounted for 13.2 and 2.9 per cent, of the total credit at end-June 2017, \nrespectively. \n60\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 38\nDistribution of Bank Loans and Advances by Maturity\n \nJun 12\nDec 12\nJun 13\nDec 13\nJun 14\nDec 14\nJun 15\nDec 15' June 16 Dec 16' June '17\nShort term\nMedium-term\nLong-Term\n \n70\n60\n50\n40\n30\n20\n10\n0\nPer cent\nSource: CBN\nSimilarly, deposits of less than one-year maturity constituted 96.1 per cent (of which 74.9 \nper cent had maturity of less than 30 days), compared with 95.3 per cent at the end of the \nfirst half of 2016. Further analysis showed that the medium and long-term deposits \nconstituted 1.0 and 3.0 per cent, respectively, compared with 1.8 and 2.9 per cent at \nend-June 2016. Consequently, loan to deposit ratio fell to 79.0 per cent at end June 2017 \nfrom 80.5 per cent at end-June 2016, and reflected significant holdings of government \nsecurities by banks as claims on the core private sector also fell. \nAlthough marginal improvements were observed with the long-term deposit and credit \nstructure during the review period, the continued mis-match of deposits and loans \nstructure remained a threat to stability of banks and their ability to create long-tenored \nassets.\n4.1.9 Maturity Structure of DMBs' Outstanding Loans and Advances, and Deposit \nLiabilities\nThe structure of bank's credit in the first half of 2017 indicated that credit of short-term \nmaturities remained dominant. Credit maturing within one year accounted for 43.7 per \ncent, indicating a decline, compared with 46.0 per cent at end-June 2016. The medium-\nterm (≥1yr and < 3yrs) and long-term (3yrs and above) maturities stood at 18.4 and 37.9 \nper cent, respectively, compared with 18.1 and 35.9 per cent at the end of the \ncorresponding period of 2016. \n61\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nTable 14\nMaturity Structure of Banks Assets and Liabilities\nAssets (Loans and Advances) \nJun 15 \nDec 15 \nJun 16 \nDec 16 \nJun 17 \nTenor \n \n \n \n \n \n0-30 days \n24.3 \n24.4 \n26.6 \n27.3 \n27.9 \n31-90 days \n7.8 \n8.6 \n7.1 \n6.8 \n6.6 \n91-181 days \n7.7 \n6.9 \n7.5 \n7.2 \n4.7 \n181-365 days \n4.6 \n7.2 \n4.7 \n5.1 \n4.4 \nShort-Term \n44.5 \n47.1 \n46.0 \n46.4 \n43.7 \nMedium-Term (Above 1yr and \nbelow 3yrs) \n18.8 \n16.9 \n18.1 \n20.7 \n18.4 \nLong-Term (3 Years and Above) \n36.7 \n36.0 \n35.9 \n32.9 \n37.9 \n \n100 \n100 \n100 \n100 \n100 \nLiabilities \n \n \n \n \n \n0-30 days \n73.01 \n71.70 \n75.45 \n75.91 \n74.87 \n31-90 days \n13.61 \n15.04 \n12.69 \n11.83 \n12.88 \n91-181 days \n4.42 \n3.87 \n4.02 \n4.38 \n4.71 \n181-365 days \n4.45 \n4.78 \n3.16 \n3.51 \n3.61 \nShort-Term \n95.49 \n95.40 \n95.32 \n95.62 \n96.07 \nMedium-Term (Above 1yr and \nbelow 3yrs) \n1.83 \n1.83 \n1.82 \n1.23 \n0.98 \nLong-Term (3 Years and Above) \n2.68 \n2.77 \n2.85 \n3.15 \n2.95 \nTotal \n100 \n100 \n100 \n100 \n100 \nFigure 39\nMaturity Structure of Banks Deposits (per cent)\n0.0\n0.5\n1.0\n1.5\n2.0\n2.5\n3.0\n3.5\n0.0\n20.0\n40.0\n60.0\n80.0\n100.0\nJun 13\nDec 13\nJun 14\nDec 14\nJun 15\nDec 15\nJun 16\nDec 16\nJun 17\nPer cent\nPer cent\nShort-Term\nMedium-Term\nLong-Term (RHS)\nSource: CBN\n62\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n4.1.10 Market Structure of the Banking Industry\nThe banking sector exhibited weaker competition among players in the first half of 2017. \nThe market share of the largest bank, with respect to assets and deposits, stood at 14.8 \nand 12.9 per cent, respectively, compared with 13.5 per cent and 12.8 per cent at the \nend of the first half of 2016. Nineteen smaller banks have market shares ranging from 0.08 \nto 11.7 per cent of assets and 0.02 to 12.9 per cent of deposits. The Herfindahl-Hirschman \n2\nIndex (HHI) of the industry rose to 783.65 and 737.66 for assets and deposits from 751.17 \nand 733.37 in assets and deposit, respectively in the first half of 2016. \nThe concentration ratios of the six largest banks (CR6) were 60.11 (HHI=3,612.97) and 57.1 \nper cent (HHI=3,254.75) in assets and deposits respectively, compared with 44.89 \n(HHI=2,011.83) and 51.89 per cent (HHI=2,692.07) at the end of the first half of 2016. This \nsuggests that oligopoly is possible in the market.\nFigure 40a\nMarket Concentration Ratios of Banks (Assets and Deposits)\n \n \nSource: CBN\n80.00\n60.00\n40.00\n20.00\n0.00\nCR\nJune 15\nDec 15\nJune 16\nDec. 16\nJune 17\nCR 5 (Deposit) \nCR (Largest Deposit) \nCR 5 (Assets)\nCR (Largest Assets)\nFigure 40b\nMeasures of Competition in Banks: Herfindahl- Hirschman Index \n \n \n \n850\n800\n750\n700\n650\nJun 13\nDec 14\nJun ‘14\nDec ‘15\nJun ‘16\nDec ‘16\nJun ‘17\nHHI (Deposits)\nHHI (Assets)\nHHI\nDec ‘14\n2 HHI ranges from 0 to 10,000. HHI close to 10,000 suggests a high concentrated market, and HHI close to 0 suggests a \nmore competitive market structure. \nSource: CBN\n0.00\n1.00\n2.00\n3.00\n4.00\n5.00\n6.00\n660\n680\n700\n720\n740\n760\n780\n800\n820\n840\n860\nDec 13\nJun 14\nDec 14\nJun 15 Dec' 15 Jun 16 Dec' 15 Jun 16 Dec' 16 Jun 17\nRatio (%)\nN' Billion\nConsumer Credit\nRatio of claims on core private sector (rhs)\n63\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n4.1.11 Consumer Credit\nAt N736.19 billion, consumer credit rose by 1.8 per cent at the end of the review period, \ncompared with the growth of 11.04 per cent at the end of the corresponding period of \n2016. At that level, consumer loans constituted 3.5 per cent of total credit to the core \nprivate sector in the first half of 2017, compared with 3.8 per cent at the end of the \ncorresponding half of 2016. Thus, consumer credit constituted low risk to commercial \nbanks' exposure to the core private sector. \n4.1.12 Money Market Developments\nActivities in the money market in the first half of 2017 reflected liquidity conditions in the \nbanking system. Liquidity was influenced by the fiscal operations of the Federal \nGovernment, operational modalities of CRR, settlements of foreign exchange \ninterventions, monthly statutory allocation to the three-tiers of government, maturity of \nCBN bills and frequent conduct of open market operations. Nonetheless, demand and \nsupply of funds in the interbank market showed a preference for collateralised \ntransactions. Average short-term interest rates generally rose relative to their levels in the \ncorresponding period of 2016.\nIn addition, in an effort to achieve convergence of the various exchange rates of the \nnaira to the US dollar at the foreign exchange market, special windows were opened for \nforeign exchange transactions to accommodate investors and exporters, end-users for \ninvisible transactions (excluding international airlines ticket sales remittances) and Bills for \nCollection as well as any other trade related payment obligations under the SME \nwindow.\nFigure 41\nConsumer Credit and Ratio of Claims on Core Private Sector \n(N' Billion)\nSource: CBN\n4.1.12.1 Money Market Assets Outstanding\nProvisional data indicated that money market assets outstanding at the end of the first \nhalf of 2017 was N11,661.90 billion, showing increase of 7.3 and 11.5 per cent, above the \nlevels at end-December 2016 and the corresponding half of 2016, respectively. The \ndevelopment relative to the corresponding half year reflected, mainly, the increase of \n6.2 per cent and 27.6 per cent in FGN Bonds and treasury bills outstanding, respectively.\nA breakdown of the money market assets outstanding at the end of the first half of 2017 \nshowed that 68.0 per cent was held in FGN Bonds, 32.0 per cent were in NTBs, while \nCommercial Papers and Bankers Acceptances accounted for the balance.\nFigure 42\nMoney Market Assets Outstanding \n(End-June 2017) \n32%\n68%\nNTB\nFGN Bond\nOthers\nSource: CBN\n4.1.12.2 Primary Market\nAt the Nigerian Treasury bill auction, N521.24 billion and N471.81 billion worth of 91-day \nbills were subscribed to and allotted, respectively, with bid rates ranging from 9.00 to \n25.00 per cent, compared with the range of 3.00 to 13.00 per cent in the corresponding \nhalf of 2016. At the 182-day auction, N576.06 billion and N499.13 billion worth of bills were \nsubscribed to and allotted at the bid rates of 13.50 to 21.00 per cent, compared with the \n64\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n65\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nTable 15\n Bid-Cover Ratios of Selected Securities\nTENOR (DAY)\n \n91-day \n182-day \n364-day\n \nTOTAL \n(Nbn)\n \nTOTAL SUBSCRIPTION ( Nbn) \n521.24 \n576.06 \n2,826.12\n \n3,926.31\n \nALLOTMENT (Nbn)\n \n471.81 \n499.13 \n1,443.53\n \n2,414.47\n \nBID COVER RATIO\n \n1.10 \n1.15 \n1.96\n \n \nBID RANGE\n \n9.00 to 25.00 \n13.50 to 21.00 17.00-22.00\n \n \n \nSource: CBN\nThe bid-to-cover ratios for the various tenors were 1.1, 1.2 and 2.0 for the 91-, 182- and 364-\nday tenors, respectively. Thus, total NTBs outstanding at end-June 2016 stood at \nN3,702.83 billion, showing an increase of 27.6 per cent above the N2,901.81 billion at the \nend of the first half of 2016.\nFigure 43\nNigerian Treasury Bills Outstanding\n (N' Billion) \n2,084.6 \n2,483.3 \n2,760.7 \n2,825.0 \n2,901.8 \n3,702.83\n -\n 500.0\n 1,000.0\n 1,500.0\n 2,000.0\n 2,500.0\n 3,000.0\n 3,500.0\nFirst Half 2012 First Half 2013 First Half 2014 First Half 2015 First Half 2016 First Half 2017\nN' Billion\nSource: CBN\nrange of 4.00 to 16.99 per cent in the corresponding half of 2016. At the 364-day auction, \ntotal subscription and allotment were N2,826.12 billion and N1,443.53 billion with bid rates \nranging from 17.00 – 22.00 per cent, while the stop rates ranged from 18.45 to 18.98 per \ncent. Total subscription for all the auctions stood at N3,926.31 billion, compared with \nN4,930.03 billion in the corresponding half of 2016. The decline in the level of subscription \nwas attributed largely to the liquidity squeeze occasioned by the Bank's mop-up \nactivities around the issues period.\n66\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n4.1.12.3 Federal Government of Nigeria Bonds\nIn the review period, the CBN in collaboration with the Debt Management Office, issued \na new tranche of the 10-year FGN Bond, while 5-, 10- and 20-year tranches were re-\nopened. The term-to-maturity of the bonds ranged from 4 years, 1 month to 19 years, 10 \nmonths. Total FGN Bonds offered was N785.00 billion, while public subscription and sale \nstood at N1,237.94 billion and N849.53 billion, respectively. The high demand for the \nsecurities was attributed to the liquidity surfeit in the banking system and renewed \ninvestors' confidence. There was no maturity in the period. Thus, the total value of FGN \nbonds outstanding at end-June 2017 was N8,614.75 billion, compared with N8,153.96 \nbillion at end-June 2016, representing an increase of 5.7 per cent.\nBanks&DHs\n36%\nNon-Bank Pub\n64%\nBanks&DHs\nNon-Bank Pub\nFigure 44\nDistribution of FGN Bonds \n(End-June 2017, per cent)\nSource: CBN\n4.1.12.4 Open Market Operations (OMO)\nOpen Market Operations remained the main instrument for liquidity management \nduring the review period, using CBN bills. \n4.1.12.5 OMO Auctions\nTotal amount of CBN bills worth N3,702.96 billion was issued, while public subscription and \nsale amounted to N4,593.93 billion and N3,871.27 billion, respectively, compared with \nN1,922.45 billion, N3,867.94 billion and N2,329.75 billion offered, subscribed to and sold, \nrespectively in the second half of 2016. The tenors to maturity of the instruments ranged \nfrom 140 to 364 days in the review period, and the bid rates ranged from 16.00 - 18.86 per \ncent. The high level of activity was attributed, largely, to the monthly disbursements to \nthe three tiers of government, CBN bills maturities, yields on CBN bills and increased \n67\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nnumber of auctions during the period. The cost of liquidity management in the review \nperiod rose to N577.46 billion, compared with N122.99 billion in the corresponding period \nof 2016.\n4.1.12.6 The Two-Way Quote Trading in NTBs\nTrading at the two-way quote trading platform remained passive in the review period. \nThere was no trading at the two-way quote platform in the review period same as in the \ncorresponding half of 2016. \n4.1.12.7 Tenored Repurchase Transactions\nThe market accessed the sum of N352.66 billion at the tenored repurchase window \nbetween January and June 2017. The tenors ranged from 4 to 90 days while total interest \nthat accrued was N10.31 billion at rates ranging from 18.50 to 19.50 per cent. There was \nno Repo transaction in the corresponding period of 2016.\n4.1.12.8 Discount Window Operations\nCBN Bills worth N5.29 billion with days to maturity ranging from 6 to 129 were rediscounted \nat 18.00 to 19.10 per cent in the corresponding period of 2016. Securities valued at N35.36 \nbillion with tenors of 27 – 188 days were rediscounted at rates ranging from 16.25 to 17.15 \nper cent.\n4.1.12.9 Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Standing Facilities\nTo aid short term liquidity needs of the financial market, intraday liquidity facility was \nmade accessible as a temporary credit window to banks to meet their funding needs \nduring the operating hours of the CBN Interbank Funds Transfer System (CIFTS). The \nStanding Lending Facility (SLF) and the Standing Deposit Facility (SDF) were also available \nfor players to square up their positions at the close of business. Request for the Standing \nLending Facility (SLF) was more predominant in the review period than the standing \nDeposit facility (SDF). Applicable rates at the SLF and SDF windows were 16.00 per cent, \nand 9.00 per cent respectively.\n4.1.12.9.1 Standing Lending Facility (SLF)\nThe average request for SLF, inclusive of intra-day liquidity facility (ILF) in the first half of \n2017, amounted to N227.52 billion, in 122 transactions, while the actual daily requests \nranged from N83.61 billion to N478.54 billion. Total interest earned was N21.13 billion. In \ncomparison with the first half of 2016, SLF amounted to N42.55 billion in the 85 transaction \ndays with a total of N2.92 billion earned as interests.\n68\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n4.1.12.9.2 Standing Deposit Facility (SDF)\nThe total SDF granted in the review period stood at N45.12 billion, with interest cost at \nN1.99 billion, compared with the SDF of N102.46 billion and the interest cost of N2.84 billion \nin the corresponding period of 2016.\n4.1.12.10 Inter-Bank Funds Market\nThe total value of funds traded in the market stood at N16,681.97 billion in the first half of \n2017, compared with N513.11 billion in the corresponding period of 2016. The value of \nunsecured call transactions amounted to N1,063.36 billion or 6.37 per cent, while open \nbuy back (OBB) transactions stood at N16,681.97 billion or 93.63 per cent. The lower level \nof transactions at the unsecured segment was attributed, largely, to the dealers' \npreference for the secured transactions. \n4.1.13 Interest Rate Developments\n4.1.13.1 Money Market Rates\nAverage money market rates for interbank call and Open-Buy- Back (OBB) moved in \ntandem with the level of liquidity in the banking system for most part of the first half of \n2017. Short-term rates in all the segments of the money market were volatile and higher \nthan their levels in the corresponding period of 2016, due to fluctuation in liquidity in the \nsystem. Average inter-bank and OBB rates ranged from 3.00 to 200.00 per cent and 2.51 \nto 162.4 per cent, respectively. The weighted average monthly inter-bank rate and the \nOBB rate for the first half of 2017 were 22.94 per cent and 26.66 per cent, compared with \n8.50 per cent and 7.63 per cent in the corresponding half of 2016, respectively. The \nweighted average of the Nigeria Inter-Bank Offered Rate (NIBOR) was 29.26 per cent, \ncompared with 18.64 per cent in the corresponding half of 2016.\nTable 16\nMoney Market Rates\n (Per cent)\nWEIGHTED AVERAGE\n \nMonth\n \nMPR \nCall \nRate \nOBB\n \nNIBOR 30-\ndays\n \nJan-16\n \n14.00 \n8.29 \n8.26\n \n8.89\n \nFeb-16\n \n14.00 \n27.68 \n23.81\n \n26.18\n \nMar-16\n \n14.00 \n12.16 \n22.85\n \n21.79\n \nApr-16\n \n14.00 \n58.73 \n46.07\n \n57.40\n \nMay-16\n \n14.00 \n18.4 \n33.46\n \n36.58\n \nJun-16\n \n14.00 \n12.37 \n25.53\n \n24.71\n \nAverage 2017\n \nFirst Half\n \n14.00\n \n22.94\n \n26.66\n \n29.26\n \nAverage 2016\n \nFirst Half\n \n14.00\n \n8.50\n \n7.63\n \n18.64\n \nSource: CBN\n69\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 45\nMoney Market Rates \n(Per cent)\nSource: CBN\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\nJan 17\nFeb 17\nMar 17\nApr 17\nMay 17\nJun 17\nPer cent\n \nMPR\nCall Rate\nOBB\nNIBOR Call\n4.1.13.1.1 Deposit Rates\nDeposit rates moved in tandem with the level of banking system liquidity and generally \nrose in the first half of 2017. The average term deposit rate increased by 3.29 percentage \npoints to 8.69 per cent above its level in the corresponding half of 2016. Average rates on \ndeposits of various maturities rose from a range of 2.79 to 6.86 per cent in the first half of \n2016 to a range of 8.51 to 9.10 per cent at the end of the first half of 2017. With the year-on-\nyear inflation rate at 16.1 per cent in June 2017, all deposit rates were negative in real \nterms.\n4.1.13.1.2 Lending Rates\nThe weighted average prime and the maximum lending rates rose to 17.35 and 30.05 per \ncent, from 16.63 and 26.83 per cent in the first half of 2016. Consequently, the spread \nbetween the average term deposits and maximum lending rates narrowed by 0.05 \npercentage points to 21.38 percentage points.\n70\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n4.1.14 Institutional Savings\nAggregate financial savings declined by 4.4 per cent to N12,380.00 billion in the first half \nof 2017, compared with N12,953.7 billion at the end of the corresponding period of 2016. \nDMBs remained the dominant depository institutions in the financial system, accounting \nfor 95.2 per cent of the total financial savings, the same as in the preceding half year. \nOther saving institutions, namely PMBs, life insurance companies, pension fund \ncustodians, the Nigerian Social Insurance Trust Fund (NSITF), and MFBs accounted for the \nbalance.\n4.1.15 Other Financial Institutions\n4.1.15.1 Development Finance Institutions\nTotal assets of the five (5) reporting development finance institutions (DFIs) namely: Bank \nof Industry (BOI), Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria (FMBN), Nigerian Export-Import Bank \n(NEXIM), Bank of Agriculture (BOA) and The Infrastructure Bank (TIB) increased marginally \nby 2.1 per cent to N984.32 billion at end-June 2017, compared with N964.24 billion at end-\nDecember 2016. The Development Bank of Nigeria (DBN) was excluded as it was yet to \ncommence operations. Similarly, net loans and advances and paid-up share capital of \nthe sub-sector rose by 18.3 per cent and 0.7 per cent to N676.64 billion and N232.42 billion, \nrespectively. The shareholders' funds, however, declined by 3.3 per cent to N198.61 billion \nat the end of the first half of 2017 due, mainly, to increase in loan provisioning arising from \nhigh loan defaults. A disaggregation of the total assets by institution indicated that BOI, \nFMBN, NEXIM, BOA and TIB accounted for 67.7, 21.3, 6.9, 3.4 and 0.7 per cent, \nrespectively, of the total. Similarly, the respective institutions accounted for 74.5, 19.2, 6.1, \n0.1 and 0.1 per cent of the net loans and advances.\nTable 17\nDMBs Deposits and Lending Rates\n(Per cent)\nMonth\n \nSavings \nAverage Term \nDeposit Rates \nPrime \nLending\n Maximum \nLending\n Spread \n(AVTD-\nMXLR)\n \nJan-17\n \n4.22 \n8.51 \n16.91\n \n28.88\n \n20.37\n \nFeb-17\n \n4.22 \n8.51 \n17.13\n \n29.26\n \n20.75\n \nMar-17\n \n4.23 \n8.54 \n17.43\n \n30.18\n \n21.64\n \nApr-17\n \n4.24 \n9.1 \n17.44\n \n30.31\n \n21.21\n \nMay-17\n \n4.08 \n8.65 \n17.58\n \n30.75\n \n22.10\n \nJun-17\n \n4.08 \n8.72 \n17.59\n \n30.94\n \n22.22\n \nAverage 2016 First Half\n \n3.43 \n5.4 \n16.63\n \n26.83\n \n21.43\n \nAverage 2017 First Half\n \n4.18 \n8.67 \n17.35\n \n30.05\n \n21.38\n \n Source: CBN\n71\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n4.1.15.2 Microfinance Banks (MFBs)\nTotal assets of the 999 licensed microfinance banks (MFBs), based on provisional data at \nend-June 2017, stood at N375.17 billion and represented 6.0 per cent increase over the \nlevel at end-December 2016. Similarly, paid-up capital and shareholders' funds of MFBs \nincreased by 1.0 per cent and 14.4 per cent to N63.50 billion and N91.24 billion at end-\nJune 2017, respectively. The increase in paid-up capital and shareholders' fund was \nattributed to additional capital injection and increased operating surplus. Total deposit \nliabilities and net loans/advances increased by 7.3 and 1.5 per cent to N185.11 billion \nand N193.20 billion at end-June 2017, compared with N172.45 billion and N190.31 billion \nat end-December 2016, respectively. Aggregate reserves in the first half of 2017 \namounted to N27.72 billion, indicating a 64.1 per cent increase over N16.89 billion at end-\nDecember 2016. \nInvestible funds available to the sub-sector in the review period amounted to N31.36 \nbillion. The funds were sourced, mainly, from N12.66 billion increase in deposits, additional \nN10.83 billion accretion to reserves, N2.39 billion in takings from banks and realisation of \nother assets worth N4.87 billion. The funds were used, mainly, to increase bank balances \nby N9.52 billion, placement with banks (N7.91 billion), short term investment (N3.28 billion), \nloans and advances (N2.89 billion) and acquisition of fixed assets (N1.33 billion). The funds \nwere also used to reduce other liabilities and long-term loans by N3.76 billion and N1.64 \nbillion, respectively.\n4.1.15.3 Finance Companies (FCs)\nThe number of finance companies (FCs) at end-June 2017 stood at 77, inclusive of two (2) \nnewly licensed institutions that were yet to commence operations and five (5) that had \nreturned their licences to the CBN, pending liquidation. The total assets and liabilities of \nfinance companies (FCs) decreased marginally by 0.63 per cent to N121.02 billion at \nend-June 2017, compared with N121.79 billion at end-December 2016. The decrease in \ntotal assets was attributed to operational losses arising from the effect of the economic \ndownturn. Loans/advances increased by 1.01 per cent to N40.98 billion at the end of the \nfirst half of 2017, compared with N40.57 billion at end-December 2016. Similarly, \nshareholders' funds increased marginally to N21.87 billion at end-June 2017, above \nN21.60 billion at end-December 2016, reflecting the effect of the regulatory induced \nrecapitalisation exercise. Investments, balances with banks and fixed assets, however, \ndecreased by 7.2, 18.8 and 3.2 per cent to N14.29 billion, N2.12 billion and N13.47 billion at \nend-June 2017 below the N15.40 billion, N2.61 billion and N13.91 billion at end-December \n2016, respectively. \nInvestible funds available to the sub-sector in the review period amounted to N2.42 \nbillion. The funds were sourced from reduction in investments worth N1.09 billion, N0.49 \nbillion in balances with banks, realisation of fixed assets worth N0.43 billion and increase in \nlong-term borrowing of N0.075 billion. The funds were utilised, mainly, to reduce other \nliabilities (N1.05 billion), acquire other assets (N0.63 billion) and increase loans and \nadvances (N0.40 billion).\n \n72\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nTable 18\nKey Finance Companies Financial Highlights, June 30, 2017\n \nJune 2017 \n (N’ billion) \nDecember 2016 \n(N’ billion) \n% Change\n \nTotal Assets \n121.02 \n121.79 \n(0.63)\n \nCash in Vault \n1.69 \n1.69 \n0\n \nBalances with Banks \n2.12 \n2.61 \n(18.8)\n \nLoans and Advances \n40.98 \n40.57 \n1.0\n \nBorrowings \n71.47 \n71.53 \n0.09\n \nInvestments \n14.29 \n15.40 \n(7.2)\n \nFixed Assets \n13.47 \n13.91 \n(3.2)\n \nReserves\n \n2.75 \n2.43 \n13.2\n \nPaid-up Capital \n19.11 \n19.18 \n(0.3)\n \n \nSource: CBN\n4.1.15.4 Primary Mortgage Banks (PMBs) \nThe number of PMBs in operation was thirty-four (34) at end-June 2017, same as at end-\nDecember 2016. Following the upgrade of Safetrust Mortgage Bank Limited from state to \na national PMB, there were 11 national PMBs and 23 state PMBs at end-June 2017, \ncompared with ten (10) national and 24 state PMBs in the first half of 2016. Total loans and \nadvances, short-term investments, non-current assets held for sale, and placement with \nbanks increased by 10.0, 7.0, 3.0 and 4.0 per cent, respectively, to N169.83 billion, N9.48 \nbillion, N68.03 billion and N37.20 billion at end-June 2017. Total assets of PMBs, however, \nfell marginally by 0.8 per cent to N380.51 billion at end-June 2017, compared with N383.67 \nbillion at end-December 2016, reflecting, mainly, the decline in deposits. Shareholders' \nfunds amounted to N127.30 billion at end-June 2017, compared with N132.18 billion at \nend-December 2016, indicating 3.7 per cent decrease due, mainly, to operating losses. \nInvestible funds available to the sub-sector at end-June 2017 amounted to N39.10 billion. \n \n \n \n73\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nThe funds were sourced, mainly, from decrease in placement with banks (N20.49 billion), \nincrease in other liabilities (N10.53 billion), increase in long-term loans (N4.06 billion) and \ndecline in cash balances (N3.58 billion). The funds were utilised to increase loans and \nadvances by N15.37 billion, fund decline in placement from banks worth N14.08 billion, \nfinance increase in non-current asset investments held for sale valued at N1.67 billion and \nincreased placements with banks by N1.26 billion. \nTable 19\nKey PMB Financial Highlights as at June 30, 2017\nJune 2017\n \n(N’ billion)\n \nDecember 2016\n \n(N’ billion)\n \n% Change\nTotal Assets\n \n380.51\n \n383.67\n \n(0.8)\n \nLoans and Advances\n \n169.83 \n154.46\n \n10.0\n \nPlacement with Banks\n \n37.20 \n35.94\n \n4.0\n \nDeposit Liabilities\n \n114.98 \n115.77\n \n(0.7)\n \nOther Liabilities\n \n80.58\n \n68.06\n \n18.0\n \nShareholders’ funds\n \n127.30\n \n132.18\n \n(3.7)\n \nSource: CBN\n4.1.15.5 Bureaux-De-Change (BDCs)\nThere were 3,292 BDCs in operation in the first half of 2017, compared with 3,147 at end-\nDecember 2017. The increase was due to the licensing of 89 new BDCs and the \nreinstatement of 56 previously licensed BDCs following their successful recapitalisation. In \nthe review period, the Bank established an inter-departmental committee for effective \ncoordination and information sharing on BDCs to guide policy decision. \n4.1.15.6 Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON)\nTotal recoveries by AMCON was N39.70 billion as at May 31, 2017, made up of cash \nrecovery (N28.52 billion) and asset forfeiture (N11.18 billion). Contributions to the Banking \nSector Resolution Cost Fund for 2017 amounted to N184.98 billion at end-June 2017, while \narrears for 2016 worth N5.91 billion were collected in the review period. \n \n \n \n \n74\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n4.1.16 Capital Market Developments\n4.1.16.1 Institutional Developments\nThe Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sustained the implementation of market \ndeepening polices and on-going engagements with stakeholders to further consolidate \nthe rally in the capital market during the review period. In this regard, the Commission \nconducted target inspection of three (3) capital market operators and selected \nregistrars to verify the value of unclaimed dividends paid by registrars from November \n2015 to October 2016. In addition, the SEC approved the 2017 joint Anti-Money \nLaundering/Combating the Financial Terrorism (AML/CFT) and Prudential Inspection Plan \non capital market operators with head offices in Abuja. Furthermore, the final report on \nNational Risk Assessment was considered to highlight capital market-related findings for \nconsideration by the Commission.\nIn furtherance of the investor education initiative, the Commission considered the \nproposal by the Nigeria Educational Research and Development Council (NERDC) for \nthe introduction of capital market studies in the basic and senior secondary school \ncurricula. Other major activities of the Commission in the first half of 2017 were:\n· \nTraining of bank officials and other stakeholders on e-dividend mandate \nmanagement process and resolution of impediments in the process;\n· \nDevelopment of framework on collaboration with financial market dealers \nquotation (FMDQ) to enhance synergy and efficiency on product innovations; \nand\n· \nParticipation at the 3rd AML/CFT Stakeholders' Consultative Workshop and \nRecognition Award at the CBN International Training Institute on March 22-23, \n2017.\nWith respect to investor protection, the Commission received 164 complaints against \ncapital market operators in the first half of 2017, compared with 312 complaints received \nin the corresponding half of 2016. A total of 220 cases were resolved in the review period, \nincluding complaints carried over from the previous year.\n75\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 46\nComplaints received and resolved, end-June 2017\n312\n164\n421\n220\n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\nFirst Half 2016\nFirst Half 2017\ncomplaints received\ncomplaints resolved\nNumber of Complaints\nSource: CBN\n4.1.16.2 The Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) \nDevelopments in the Nigerian stock market during the first half of 2017 were mixed. In the \nprimary market segment, there were twelve (12) new issues, comprising eight (8) rights \nissues, three (3) bonus issues and one (1) equity conversion. No new listing was recorded \nin the debt securities segment in the review period. In the secondary segment of the \nmarket, aggregate volume of traded securities fell by 29.0 per cent to 44.2 billion shares, \nwhile the value of traded securities rose by 50.1 per cent to N468.80 billion, compared \nwith 62.0 billion shares valued at N312.2 billion in the corresponding period of 2016. \nRelative to the levels at end-June 2016, aggregate market capitalisation and All-Share \nIndex (ASI) rose by 10.0 and 11.9 per cent to N19.0 trillion and 33,117.48 at end-June 2017, \nrespectively.\n4.1.16.3 The New Issues Market \nThe Exchange recorded twelve (12) new equity listings in the first half of 2017. The new \nequity issues comprised eight (8) rights issues worth N68.38 billion, three (3) bonus issues \nworth N8.99 billion and one (1) equity conversion valued at N1.98 billion. Overall, a total \nof N79.35 billion was raised from new listings in the review period. \n4.1.16.4 The Secondary Market \nDevelopments in the secondary segment of the Nigerian Stock market were mixed in the \nfirst half of 2017. The aggregate volume of traded securities fell by 29.0 per cent to 44.2 \nbillion shares, while the value of traded securities rose by 50.1 per cent to N468.8 billion, \n76\n \nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\ncompared with 62.0 billion shares valued at N312.2 billion in the corresponding period of \n2016. The equities sub-sector maintained its dominance in the market, accounting for \n99.9 per cent and 99.8 per cent of the aggregate volume and value of transactions, \nrespectively, while the debt market accounted for the balance. Sectoral analysis of the \ndevelopments in the market indicated that the financial services sector (measured by \nvolume of transactions), remained the most active, accounting for 36.6 billion shares in \ntraded securities (82.8% of the total), valued at N214.7 billion (45.8% of the total), in \n263,465 deals, compared with 48.9 billion shares, valued at N175.9 billion in 252,377 deals \nin the first half of 2016. This was followed by the conglomerates with 2.2 billion shares \nvalued at N5.4 billion in 20,862 deals. The banking sub-sector was the most active on the \nExchange (measured by volume) with traded volume of 23.7 billion shares, valued at \nN203.3 billion in 215,587 deals.\nFigure 47\nVolume and Value of Transactions at the NSE\n0.0\n100.0\n200.0\n300.0\n400.0\n500.0\n600.0\n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\n50.0\n60.0\n70.0\nFirst half 2015\nFirst half 2016\nFirst half 2017\nValue in Naira (billion)\nVolume in Numer (Billion)\nVolume of traded securities (LHS)\nValue of securities (RHS)\nSource: Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)/Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE)\n4.1.16.5 All-Share Index and Aggregate Market Capitalisation\nThe NSE All Share Index rose by 23.2 per cent and 11.9 per cent to 33,117.48 at end-June \n2017, compared with 26,874.6 and 29,597.79 at end-December 2016 and end-June 2016, \nrespectively. Aggregate market capitalisation of listed securities closed at N19.03 trillion, \nindicating an increase of 17.5 and 10.1 per cent over the levels at end-December 2016 \nand the corresponding period of 2016, respectively. Listed equities accounted for 60.2 \nper cent of the aggregate market capitalisation, while the debt component accounted \nfor the balance of 39.8 per cent. The top twenty (20) most capitalised companies on the \nExchange accounted for 86.8 per cent (N9.94 trillion) of the total equity capitalisation \n77\nand 52.2 per cent of the aggregate (equity plus debt) market capitalisation. Eight (8) \nbanks made the list of the top twenty (20) most capitalised companies and accounted \nfor N2.6 trillion (16.8%) of the total equity market capitalisation, compared with 18.6 per \ncent in the corresponding period of 2016. As a percentage of nominal GDP, aggregate \nmarket capitalisation stood at 35.9 per cent at end-June 2017, compared with 37.8 per \ncent in the corresponding period of 2016. The development indicated lower growth of \nthe total market capitalisation as a result of the slowness in the emergence of the capital \nmarket from the era of depressed investor appetite.\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n4.2 FISCAL OPERATIONS\n4.2.1 Federation Account Operations\nProvisional federally-collected revenue (gross) in the first half of 2017 stood at N2,992.83 \nbillion or 5.6 per cent of GDP. The amount was lower than the proportionate budget \nestimate by 44.3 per cent, but was above the level in the corresponding period of 2016 by \n24.9 per cent. The drop in federally-collected revenue relative to the budget estimate \nwas attributed to the decline in both oil and non-oil revenue. Of the total revenue, oil \nconstituted 53.9 per cent, while non-oil accounted for the balance of 46.1 per cent.\nFigure 48\nAggregate Market Capitalisation and NSE Value Index\n15.5\n16\n16.5\n17\n17.5\n18\n18.5\n19\n19.5\n -\n 5,000.00\n 10,000.00\n 15,000.00\n 20,000.00\n 25,000.00\n 30,000.00\n 35,000.00\n 40,000.00\n 45,000.00\n1st Half 2014\n1st Half 2015\n1st Half 2016\n1st Half 2017\nNaira Trillion\nIndex\nNSE Index\nAggregate Market Capitalisation\nSource: SEC/NSE\n78\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 49\nStructure of Federation Revenue Gross (Per cent), \nFirst Half 2013 - 2017\n Sources: Computation based on data from:\n The Office of Accountant General of the Federation (OAGF) \n and the Federal Ministry of Finance (FMF\n75.9 \n70.5 \n59.4 \n50.2 \n53.9 \n24.1 \n29.5 \n40.6 \n49.8 \n46.1 \n 15.0\n 25.0\n 35.0\n 45.0\n 55.0\n 65.0\n 75.0\n 85.0\n 95.0\n2013\n2014\n2015\n2016\n2017\nOil Revenue\nNon-Oil Revenue\nAt N1,613.02 billion or 3.0 per cent of GDP, provisional oil revenue (gross) fell below the \nproportionate budget estimate by 40.2 per cent, but rose above the level in the first half \nof 2016 by 34.0 per cent. The drop in oil revenue relative to the proportionate budget \nestimate was attributed to the decline in the volume of production and exports during \nthe period. Relative to the budgeted benchmark of 2.2 million barrels per day (mbd), \ncrude oil production averaged 1.62 mbd. The oil revenue gross comprised: Domestic \nCrude Oil/Gas Sales, N723.25 billion (44.8%); PPT/Royalties, N645.86 billion (40.0%); Crude \nOil and Gas Exports, N213.17 billion (13.2%); and “Others”, N30.74 billion (2.0%), \nrespectively.\nEarnings lodged in Federation Account by virtue of Section 161 of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Constitution 1999 as amended\n79\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 50\nComposition of Oil Revenue, (Per cent)\nFirst Half 2017\nSources: The OAGF and the FMF\nThe sum of N460.65 billion and N13.89 billion from the oil revenue (gross) were utilised by \nthe Joint Venture Cash (JVC) calls and cost of collection by the Department of Petroleum \nResources (DPR), respectively, while N157.06 billion was transferred to “Others”. The \nbalance of N981.43 billion was, however, retained in the Federation Account for \ndistribution among the three tiers of government and the 13% Derivation Fund.\nAt N1,379.80 billion or 2.6 per cent of GDP, the provisional non-oil Revenue (gross) was \nbelow the proportionate budget estimate by 48.3 per cent, but was above the level in \nthe corresponding period of 2016 by 15.7 per cent. The decline in non-oil revenue relative \nto the budget estimate was attributed to the lull in economic activities and was reflected \nin all its components. The non-oil revenue gross comprised: Value Added Tax (VAT), \nN465.31 billion (33.7%); Corporate Tax, N365.33 billion (26.5%); Customs and Excise Duties, \nN294.84 billion (21.4%); FGN Independent Revenue, N119.38 billion (8.7%) and “Others”, \nN134.94 billion (9.7%).\n4 Include Excess Crude Revenue, Excess PPT/Royalty & NNPC Refunds\n5 Include Education Tax Fund; Customs Special Levies (Federation and Non-Federation); and National Information Technology \nDevelopment Fund (NITDF).\nCrude Oil / Gas \nExports\n13.2%\nPPT & Royalties\n40.0%\nDomestic Crude \nOil / Gas Sales\n44.8%\nOthers\n2.0%\n80\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 51\nComposition of Non-Oil Revenue, (Per cent) \nFirst Half 2017 \nSources: The OAGF and the FMF\nCorporate \nTax\n26.5%\nCustoms & \nExcise Duties\n21.4%\nValue-Added \nTax\n33.7%\nFGN \nIndependent \nRevenue\n8.7%\n'Others'\n9.7%\nThe sum of N54.64 billion, N25.42 billion, and N0.08 billion were deducted from the non-oil \nrevenue as combined cost of collection for the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) \nand Nigeria Customs Service (NCS), FIRS Tax refunds and NCS refunds, respectively, \nleaving a net distributable balance of N1,299.67 billion.\nOverall, of the N2,281.09 billion federally-collected revenue (net), N446.70 billion (19.6%), \nN134.94 billion (5.9%) and N119.38 billion (5.2%), were transferred to the VAT Pool \nAccount, Other Transfers and FG Independent Revenue, respectively. The balance of \nN1,580.07 billion (69.3%) was retained in the Federation Account for distribution to the \nthree tiers of government and the 13% Derivation Fund.\n81\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 52\nComposition of Federally Collected Revenue (Net), (Per cent)\nFirst Half 2017 \nRetained for \nDistribution to 3 tiers \nof govt. & 13% Dev. \nFund\n69.3%\nFG Indep. Rev.\n5.2%\nVAT\n19.6%\nOther Transfers\n5.9%\nSources: The OAGF and the FMF\n4.2.1.1 Federally Collected Revenue Distribution\nDistribution from the Federation Account to the three-tiers of government in the first half \nof 2017 was as follows: Federal Government, N765.17 billion; states, N388.10 billion; and \nlocal governments, N299.21 billion. The balance of N127.59 billion was shared among the \noil producing states as 13% Derivation Fund. \nThe sum of N311.75 billion was drawn-down on the Exchange Rate Differential Account \nto augment the shortfall in budgeted revenue and shared as exchange gain as follows: \nthe Federal Government, N145.98 billion; states, N74.04 billion; local governments, N57.08 \nbillion and the 13% Derivation Fund, N34.65 billion. Furthermore, the sum of N166.58 billion \nwas shared from the Excess Crude/PPT Account with the Federal Government receiving \nN76.35 billion. The state and local governments received N38.72 billion, and N29.85 \nbillion, respectively, while the 13% Derivation Fund got N21.66 billion. In addition, the \nFederal Government received N25.32 billion as the final instalment of the NNPC refund of \nindebtedness. \n4.2.1.2 VAT Pool Account\nA total of N446.70 billion accrued to the VAT Pool Account in the first half of 2017, \nrepresenting a decrease of 48.3 per cent below the proportionate budget estimate for \nthe fiscal year. The amount was distributed among the three tiers of government as \nfollows: Federal Government, N67.01 billion; state governments, N223.35 billion; and local \ngovernments, N156.35 billion.\n6Shared as follows: Federal, including Special Funds (52.68%); States (26.72%); and local governments (20.0%)\n7 Fund set aside for the oil producing state.\n82\n4.2.1.3 Cumulative Distribution \nThe total statutory revenue distributed to the three-tiers of government and the 13% \nDerivation Fund amounted to N2,530.42 billion in the first half of 2017. This was below the \n2017 proportionate budget estimate of N4,701.45 billion by 46.2 per cent, but was above \nthe N1,984.65 billion distributed in the first half of 2016 by 27.5 per cent. The amount \ncomprised the Federation Account, N1,580.07 billion (62.4%); other statutory revenue \n(including Exchange Gain, Excess Crude/PPT and NNPC Refunds), N503.66 billion (19.9%); \nand VAT Pool Account, N446.70 billion (17.7%).\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n8 Shared as follows: Federal (15.0%); States (50.0%) and local governments (35.0%)\nFigure 53\nCummulative Distributions to the Tiers of Government and \n13% Derivation Fund (N' Billion)\nFirst Half 2017\n \n \nSources: The OAGF and the FMF \n13% Derivation Fund\nLocal Governments\nState Governments\nFederal Governmment \n183.90\n542.49\n724.22\n1,079.82\n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1000\n1200\n4.2.2 Federal Government Finances\n4.2.2.1 Federal Government Fiscal Balance\nProvisional Data showed that the fiscal operations of the Federal Government in the first \nhalf of 2017 resulted in an estimated overall deficit of N379.72 billion or 0.7 per cent of \nGDP, compared with that of the proportionate budget estimate and the corresponding \nperiod of 2016 at N1,178.39 billion and N1,211.46 billion, respectively. The deficit was \nfinanced mainly from domestic sources.\n83\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n4.2.2.2 Federal Government Retained Revenue\nAt N2,505.53 billion or 4.7 per cent of GDP, the provisional retained-revenue of the Federal \nGovernment was lower than the proportionate budget estimate by 7.1 per cent. It was, \nhowever, higher than the level in the first half of 2016 by 91.9 per cent. The development \nrelative to the proportionate budget estimate was attributed to the drop in revenue from \noil and non-oil sources. A breakdown of the retained-revenue revealed that the share \nfrom the Federation Account was N765.17 billion (30.5%); Federal Government \nIndependent Revenue, N119.38 billion (4.8%); Exchange Gain, N145.98 billion (5.8%); VAT \nPool Account, N67.01 billion (2.7%); Excess Crude, N106.60 billion (4.3%); NNPC Refund, \nN25.32 billion (1.0%) and 'Others', N1,276.09 billion (50.9%).\nFigure 54\nFGN Fiscal Balance (N' Billion)\nFirst Half 2013 - 2017\n-1400.00\n-1200.00\n-1000.00\n-800.00\n-600.00\n-400.00\n-200.00\n0.00\n2013\n2014\n2015\n2016\n2017\n-415.40\n-247.66\n-676.47\n-1,211.46\n-379.72\nSource: The OAGF and the FMF\nFederation \nAccount\n30.5%\nFGN IR\n4.8%\nExchange \nGain \n5.8%\nVAT\n2.7%\nExcess \nCrude/PPT\n4.3%\nNNPC \nRefund\n1.0%\nOthers\n50.9%\n84\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 55\nComposition of Federal Government Retained Revenue, (Per cent)\nFirst Half 2017\nSources: The OAGF and the FMF\n4.2.2.3 Federal Government Expenditure \nProvisional data indicated that the aggregate expenditure of the Federal Government \nin the first half of 2017 was N2,885.25 billion or 5.4 per cent of GDP. This was below the \nproportionate budget estimate by 25.6 per cent, but was above the level in the \ncorresponding period of 2016 by 14.6 per cent. The development relative to the \nproportionate budget estimate reflected largely, non-capital releases owing to the \ndelay in the passage of the 2017 budget, extension of 2016 capital budget \nimplementation to May 5, 2017 and the need for MDAs to finalise their procurement \nprocesses. Non-debt expenditure was below the proportionate budget estimate by 33.8 \nper cent and constituted 67.8 per cent of total expenditure. Total interest payments \namounted to N927.74 billion, representing 37.0 and 32.2 per cent of Federal Government \nretained revenue and total expenditure, respectively.\n85\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 56\nComposition of Federal Government Expenditure, (Per cent)\nFirst Half 2017\nSources: The OAGF\nAt N2,676.23 billion, provisional recurrent expenditure rose by 4.1 per cent above the \nproportionate budget estimate and accounted for 92.8 per cent of total expenditure. As \na percentage of GDP, recurrent expenditure was 5.0 per cent, compared with 3.3 per \ncent in the first half of 2016. A breakdown of the recurrent expenditure showed that the \ngoods and services component, at N1,323.06 billion or 49.4 per cent of the total, fell \nbelow the proportionate budget estimate by 11.5 per cent owing largely, to the decline \nin personnel cost. Further analysis of the goods and services component showed that \npersonnel cost accounted for N723.89 billion (54.7%), while overhead cost and pension \nwere N455.89 billion (34.5%) and N143.28 billion (10.8%), respectively. \nInterest payments, which was 34.7 per cent of total recurrent expenditure or 1.7 per cent \nof GDP, rose by 0.8 per cent to N927.74 billion, compared with the proportionate budget \nestimate of N920.67 billion. Of this amount, N871.94 billion (94.0%) was expended on \ndomestic debt service, while the balance of N55.80 billion (6.0%) was for external debt \nservice. Transfers to special funds (FCT, Stabilisation Fund, Development of Natural \nResources and Ecology Fund) and “Others” accounted for N425.44 billion or 15.9 per \ncent of total recurrent expenditure. \nRecurrent \n92.8%\nTransfers\n7.2%\n9 Include interest payments on CBN Overdraft.\n86\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 57\nEconomic Classification of FG Recurrent Expenditure, (Per cent)\nFirst Half 2017\n10 Both Federation Account and Exchange Gain includes allocation to the 13% Derivation Fund\nOn a functional basis, outlay for administration was N904.30 billion and constituted 33.8 \nper cent of total recurrent expenditure. Relative to the level in the corresponding period \nof 2016, it rose by 39.3 per cent due to the increase in the allocation to all the key sub-\nsectors. Similarly, expenditure in the social and community services sector increased by \n60.2 per cent to N462.89 billion, and accounted for 17.3 per cent of the total. Also, \nspending on economic services and transfers rose by 31.9 and 39.0 per cent to N215.94 \nbillion and N1,093.07 billion and constituted 8.1 and 40.8 per cent of the total, \nrespectively. \nStatutory transfers, at N209.02 billion or 0.4 per cent of GDP, fell by 3.8 per cent, compared \nwith the proportionate budget estimate and accounted for 7.2 per cent of total \nexpenditure.\n4.2.3 State Government Finances\nProvisional data showed that the aggregate statutory allocation to state governments \nfrom the Federation Account, Excess Crude/PPT, Exchange Gain and VAT Pool Account \namounted to N908.11 billion in the first half of 2017. This was 46.5 per cent below the \nproportionate budget estimate, but was 29.6 per cent above the level in the \ncorresponding period of 2016. A breakdown showed that allocation from the Federation \nAccount was N515.69 billion (56.8%); VAT Pool Account, N223.35 billion (24.6%); \nExchange Gain, N108.69 billion (12.0%); and Excess Crude/PPT, N60.38 billion (6.6%).\nSources: The OAGF \nGoods \nand Services\n49.4%\nInterest \nPayments\n34.7%\nTransfers\n15.9%\n \n \n87\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 58\nComposition of Total Allocations to State Governments, (Per cent)\nFirst Half 2017\nSource: The FMF\nThe sum of N112.92 billion was, however, deducted as state governments' contractual \n11\nobligations from the share of Federation Account, leaving a net distributable balance \nof N402.77 billion. Of the net sum, N275.18 billion was distributed to the 36 states of the \nFederation and the balance of N127.59 billion, being 13% Derivation Fund, was allocated \nto the oil-producing states. In addition, the state governments received N112.76 billion \nfrom the distributions from Exchange Gain and Excess Crude/PPT Accounts, while the \n13% Derivation Fund got N56.31billion. \nOverall, the net aggregate allocation, including the VAT Pool Account to the states and \n13% Derivation Fund, was above the level in the first half of 2016 by 53.2 per cent. Further \nanalysis of the state governments' aggregate allocation showed that Akwa Ibom, Rivers \nand Lagos states received 8.1, 6.9 and 6.2 per cent of the total, respectively. Kwara, \nEbonyi and Ekiti states received the least with approximately 1.8 per cent each.\n4.2.4 Local Government Finances\nProvisional aggregate statutory allocation to the 774 local governments from the \nFederation Account, Exchange Gain, Excess Crude/PPT and VAT Pool Account was \nN542.49 billion in the first half of 2017, indicating a decrease of 47.1 per cent relative to the \nproportionate budget estimate. The breakdown revealed that allocations from the \nFederation Account was N299.21 billion (55.2%); Exchange Gain, N57.08 billion (10.5%); \nFederation Acct \n56.8%\nExchange Gain \n12.0%\nVAT \n24.6%\nEcess Crude/PPT \n6.6%\n11 Include contribution to external debt service fund, payments for fertilizer, State Agricultural Project, National Fadama Project \nand the National Agricultural Technology Support Programme.\n88\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n \nExcess Crude/PPT, N29.85 billion (5.5%); and VAT Pool Account, N156.35 billion (28.8%). \nAllocation to local governments on state basis indicated that Lagos, Kano and Katsina \nranked highest with 6.5, 5.8 and 4.1 per cent of the total, respectively. Conversely, Ebonyi, \nGombe and Bayelsa ranked least with 1.6, 1.5 and 1.2 per cent, respectively.\nFigure 59\nComposition of Statutory Allocations to Local Governments, (Per cent)\nFirst Half 2017\nVAT \n28.8%\nExchange Gain \n10.5%\nFederation \nAccount \n55.2%\nExcess Crude \n5.5%\nSource: The FMF\n2\n4.2.5 Public Debt\n4.2.5.1 Consolidated Federal Government Debt\nThe consolidated debt stock of the Federal Government at end-June 2017 stood at \nN16,636.33 billion or 15.6 per cent of GDP. This represented an increase of 14.4 per cent \nover the level at end-December 2016. Of the total debt stock, domestic debt was \nN12,033.45 billion or 72.3 per cent, while external debt amounted to N4,602.88 billion \n(US$15.05 billion) or 27.7 per cent of the total.\n \n \n12 Public Debt Data are sourced from the Debt Management Office (DMO)\n89\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 60\nComposition of Federal Government Consolidated Debt, (Per cent)\nEnd-March 2017\nSource: The Debt Management Office (DMO)\nExternal\n27.7%\nDomestic\n72.3%\n4.2.5.2 Domestic Debt\nAt N12,033.45 billion or 11.3 per cent of GDP, the Federal Government securitised \ndomestic debt at end-June 2017 was above the level at end-December 2016 by 8.8 per \ncent. The increase was due to the issuance of additional FGN Bonds and Nigeria Treasury \nBills (NTBs) to bridge Federal Government of Nigeria financing gap and further deepen \nthe domestic bond market. Consequently, the stock of FGN Bonds and NTBs increased \nby 13.0 and 7.5 per cent to N8,134.9 and N3,702.8 billion, respectively, above the levels at \nend-December, 2016.\nFurther analysis indicated that the holders of the total outstanding domestic debt \ninstruments were: banking system, including Sinking Fund (67.9%); and non-bank public \n(32.1 %).\n4.2.5.3 External Debt\nTotal external debt stock (Federal and states, including the Federal Capital Territory) at \nend-June 2017 was US$15.05 billion or 4.3 per cent of GDP. This represented an increase of \n31.9 per cent above the level at end-December 2016, reflecting largely, additional \nmultilateral loan of US$1.69 billion for infrastructure funding. A decomposition by holders \nindicated that 64.3 per cent of the total debt stock was owed to the multilateral creditors, \nwhile the balance of 35.7 per cent was for non-Paris bilateral and commercial debt.\n90\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 61\nBreakdown of External Debt Stock, (US$ Billion) \nFirst Half 2013 - 2017\n5.54\n6.73\n7.23\n7.99\n7.99\n9.67\n1.38\n2.65\n3.08\n3.27\n3.42\n5.37\n0.00\n2.00\n4.00\n6.00\n8.00\n10.00\n12.00\nEnd-Jun 2013\nEnd-Jun 2014\nEnd-Jun 2015\nEnd-June 2016\nEnd-Dec 2016\nEnd-June 2017\nMultilateral\nOthers\nSources: The Debt Management Office (DMO)\n4.2.5.4 Total Debt Service \nThe consolidated debt service of the Federal Government at end-June 2017 stood at \nN766.36 billion or 1.4 per cent of GDP, representing an increase of 18.9 per cent above \nthe level at end-December 2016. A breakdown showed that N56.91 billion or 7.4 per cent \nof the total was expended on external debt service, while domestic debt service \naccounted for the balance of N709.45 billion or 92.6 per cent.\nFigure 62\nBreakdown of External Debt Service, (N' Billion) \nFirst Half 2013 - 2017\n423.22 \n439.18 \n528.54 \n641.68 \n587.08 \n709.45 \n22.98 \n28.03 \n30.91 \n34.27 \n57.21 \n56.91 \n -\n 10.00\n 20.00\n 30.00\n 40.00\n 50.00\n 60.00\n 70.00\n0.00\n100.00\n200.00\n300.00\n400.00\n500.00\n600.00\n700.00\n800.00\nEnd-June 2013 End-June 2014\nEnd-June 2015 End-June 2016 End-December\n2016\nEnd-June 2017\nDomestic Debt (N' Billion) (LHS)\nExternal ($US Million) (RHS)\nSources: Computation based on data from the DMO\n91\n4.3 REAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS\nThe real sector continued to contend with the challenges arising from economic \ndownturn. There were, however, indications that the economy was gradually recovering \nfrom recession. Available data from NBS indicated that the Gross Domestic Product \n(GDP), at 2010 constant basic prices, contracted by 0.18 per cent in the first half of 2017, \nrelative to 1.08 per cent contraction in the corresponding period of 2016. The non-oil \nsector output grew by 0.58 per cent, while the oil sector output declined by 7.47 per cent. \nOn quarter on quarter basis, real GDP contracted by 0.91 per cent in the first quarter of \n2017, but grew by 0.55 per cent in the second quarter of 2017. The year-on-year headline \ninflation maintained downward trend during the period under review. The improvement \nin economic condition in the first half of 2017 was on account of the gradual increase in \naggregate demand, moderate rise in production across the sectors and the sustained \nGovernment's effort to tackle lingering energy challenges. \nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 63\nGDP Growth Rate\n (Per cent)\nSource: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)\n4.3.1 Agriculture\n4.3.1.1 Agricultural Policies and Institutional Support\nThe Federal Government continued with the implementation of the Agricultural \nPromotion Policy Framework (APPF) in the review period. This was aimed to diversify the \neconomy, ensure food security and reduce the level of poverty. \n-1.49\n-1.73\n-0.52\n-0.18\n-0.38\n-0.33\n0.72\n0.58\n-1.14\n-1.43\n-1.17\n-7.47\n-8.00\n-7.00\n-6.00\n-5.00\n-4.00\n-3.00\n-2.00\n-1.00\n0.00\n1.00\n2.00\n1st Half 2016\n2nd Half 2016\n1st Quarter 2017\n1st Half 2017\nTotal GDP\nNon-Oil GDP\nOil-GDP\n92\nThe federal government launched the 10-year Agricultural Sector Food Security and \nNutrition Strategy to guide the activities of the Ministry of Agriculture and the wider \nagricultural sector for improved nutrition in support of food security and nutrition in the \ncountry. The Strategy would ensure effective advocacy for mobilising necessary human, \nmaterial, and financial resources and encourage sustained commitment to improved \nnutrition. The Policy set out eight (8) priority areas: enhance value chains for improved \nnutrition; diversify household food production and consumption, especially, target \nwomen and increase access to food rich in micronutrients; improve food safety along \nthe value chain; and build resilience and social protection net through food nutrition \nsystems for vulnerable groups. Others include: promotion of nutrition research and \ninformation system; improving the agricultural sector capacity to address food security \nand nutrition problems; nutrition education, social marketing, behaviour change \ncommunication, and advocacy; and nutrition surveillance, monitoring and evaluation.\nThe Federal Government trained 3,000 personnel under the Agro Rangers programme to \nprotect farmers and their investments from attacks. The Agro Rangers, drawn from the \nNigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) arms squad, were trained by the \nNigerian Army in weapon handling and, thereafter, deployed to guard and protect \nfarms and ranches. The development would boost farmers' confidence to work on their \nfarms without fear of attack.\nThe Raw Materials Research and Development Council (RMRDC) provided four (4) \ntonnes of improved cotton seeds to the National Cotton Association of Nigeria \n(NACOTAN) and 10,000 seedlings of improved oil palm to farmers' Associations. This \nwould increase the availability of improved seedlings for use by farmers.\nThe Federal Government revived the School of Agriculture in Rivers State to build \ncapacity of youths in the south-south geopolitical zone on agricultural activities. Also, the \nFederal Universities of Agriculture were returned to the supervisory purview of Federal \nMinistry of Agriculture and Rural Development. The initiative was aimed at refocusing the \ninstitutions to achieve their core mandates of developing capacity in the sector. \nFurthermore, the Nigerian Export Promotion Council (NEPC) endorsed a processing and \nlogistic facility in Lily Pond, Lagos to boost export performance in the country. The Facility \nwould provide a conducive environment to service providers in shipping, warehousing, \nand inspection by customs and certification agencies to facilitate the clearance of \ngoods for export.\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n93\nAs part of the gains of the diversification drive, the country for the first time, exported \nseventy-two (72) tonnes of certified yams to the United Kingdom and United States during \nthe review period. The development would boost non-oil export contribution to foreign \nexchange earnings. \nThe sugar sub-sector was boosted with the provision of 12, 000 hectares of land to \nChinese investors by the Jigawa State Government to establish a sugar estate in Garki, \nTaura, Sule Tankarkar and Gagarawa local government areas. Also, the Dangote group \nsigned a memorandum of understanding (MoU) for an investment of N220.00 billion \ntowards the establishment of sugar estates in Obi, Awei and Doma local government \nareas of Nasarawa State. The investment involves 60,000 hectares of sugar plantation \nand two sugar factories. \nAs part of their contributions to boost capacity and increase output in the agricultural \nsector, the African Development Bank (AfDB) group, Centres for Disease Control and \nPrevention (CDC) group and the Dutch Good Growth Fund jointly committed US$31.00 \nmillion to the “Fund Agricultural Finance in Nigeria” (FAFIN). The funds would be invested \nover a two-year period to support sustainable businesses that would revolutionize the \nAgri-business landscape, improve productivity, create new jobs and strengthen the \nvalue chain.\n4.3.1.2 Agricultural Production and Prices\nAgriculture recorded positive growth in output in the first half of 2017. At 131.5 (2010=100), \nthe provisional index of agricultural production grew by 3.2 per cent, but was lower than \nthe 3.8 per cent growth in the first half of 2016. The increase in agricultural output during \nthe first half of 2017 was attributed largely to the sustained effort to strengthen domestic \nproduction through the implementation of the Agricultural Promotion Policy framework, \nespecially the CBN sponsored Anchor Borrowers Programme, strong commitment to \neconomic diversification and favourable weather conditions. \nAll the sub-sectors contributed to the improvement in growth of agricultural output during \nthe period. The output of fishery improved remarkably from a negative growth of 1.6 per \ncent in the first half of 2016 to 1.4 per cent in the first half of 2017. The crops sub-sector grew \nby 3.4 per cent; output of staples, 3.4 per cent, and “other” crops, 3.3 per cent. The output \nof forestry and livestock grew by 3.2 and 2.0 per cent, compared with 3.1, and 5.1 per \ncent, respectively, in the first half of 2016. \nA survey conducted by the Central Bank of Nigeria indicated that the domestic retail \nprices of all selected agricultural commodities increased, compared with their levels in \nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n94\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nthe first half of 2016. The price increase ranged from 5.1 per cent for cocoa to 69.0 per \ncent for groundnut oil. The development was attributed largely to the cost of production, \nincluding transportation.\nThe all-commodities price index (in dollar-terms) of Nigeria's major agricultural export \ncommodities decreased during the first half of 2017. At 67.3 (2010=100), it declined by \n28.2 per cent in contrast to an increase of 3.1 per cent in the corresponding period of \n2016. The decline was due largely to the fall in the price of cocoa by 33.0 per cent, having \nthe highest weight in the basket of monitored commodities. Cocoa prices declined due \nlargely to excessive market supply against the back drop of sales by hedge funds. \nHowever, five (5) of the six (6) commodities monitored recorded price increases of 1.4, \n4.4, 7.9, 18.5 and 24.2 per cent, for soyabeans, coffee, palm oil, copra, and cotton, \nrespectively. The development was driven by supply deficit, and seasonal factors arising \nfrom unfavourable weather conditions in major producing countries.\nThe all-commodities price index (in naira-terms) of Nigeria's major agricultural export \ncommodities increased during the first half of 2017. At 136.83 (2010=100), it increased by \n8.2 per cent compared with 7.3 per cent in the corresponding period of 2016. The \nincrease was due largely to the movements of domestic currency vis a vis the US dollar. \n4.3.2 Industry\n4.3.2.1 Industrial Policy and Institutional Support\nThe Federal Government constituted the Presidential Industrial Policy and \nCompetiveness Advisory Council to drive the nation's industrial agenda to boost the \ncontribution of the manufacturing sector to the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). \nThe terms of reference were to: make input to sectoral and industrial policy; provide \nfeedback on government policies and programmes affecting the sector; recommend \nand propose initiatives to promote competitiveness and growth of the sector; as well as \ncarry out periodic review of the performance and trends of the sector. Others were: \npropose output targets and investments for major industrial sub-sectors in the country; \nand serve as envoys of the industrial sector as a platform to facilitate effective \ncommunication on the current and emerging issues affecting the sector. \nTo support the development of Nigeria's gas reserve and improve the supply of gas to \nthermal power stations, the General Electric (GE) commenced the construction of a \nUS$100.00 million gas turbine assembly plant. The Plant, located in Calabar, Cross River \nState, would also provide repairs and servicing for gas turbines in the country. The project \nwas expected to be completed in December, 2017 and would commence operations in \n2018.\n95\n In continuation of the privatisation process, the 80.0 per cent equity holding of the \nFederal Government in the ten (10) National Integrated Power Projects (NIPP), plants \nwere being offered. The process would be done in phases, starting with the four plants \nthat do not have gas supply and have internal constraints. An offer of US$5.6 billion \n(about N1.76 trillion) was made for the assets built at a cost of US$4.00 billion (about N1.25 \ntrillion). These included the: 561mw Calabar NIPP; 500mw Omotosho NIPP; 434mw \nGeregu NIPP; and 450mw Ihovbor NIPP. \n4.3.2.2 Industrial Production\nThe data indicated a decline in activities in the industrial sector in the first half of 2017. At \n104.4 (2010=100), index of industrial production fell by 1.2 per cent, relative to the level in \nthe corresponding period of 2016. This development could be attributed to decline in the \nactivities in mining sub-sector which recorded a decline of 3.8 per cent, as a result of fall in \ncrude oil and gas production. \nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 64\nIndustrial Production Index \n(First Half 2015 - 2017, 2010=100) \nSource: Computed based on data from NBS and Manufacturing Association of Nigeria (MAN)\n -\n 50.00\n 100.00\n 150.00\n 200.00\nFirst Half 2015\n First Half 2016\nFirst Half 2017\nManufacturing\nMining\nElectricity\nIndustry\n4.3.2.3 Manufacturing\nAt 174.7 (2010=100), the index of manufacturing production in the first half of 2017, rose \nmarginally by 0.64 per cent, above the level in the corresponding period of 2016. Similarly, \ncapacity utilisation during the period rose 0.3 percentage points to 52.0 per cent, \ncompared with the level in the corresponding period of 2016. The marginal growth was as \na result of increased supply of foreign exchange which aided importation of raw material \nand intermediate inputs as well as easing in Inflationary pressures which decelerated in \ninput and output prices. \n96\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 65\nAverage Manufacturing Capacity Utilisation \n(First Half 2013-2017, Per cent)\nSource: Computed based on data from NBS and Manufacturing Association of \n Nigeria (MAN)\n4.3.3 Crude Oil \nTo enhance regulatory efficacy in the nation's oil and gas industry, the Senate in the first \nhalf of 2017 passed the Petroleum Industry Governance Bill (PIGB). The Bill covers the \nadministrative aspects, which is one of the four components of the proposed Petroleum \nIndustry Bill (PIB). The PIGB would provide a legal framework for the creation of a more \nefficient, competitive and transparent industry that would create conducive business \nenvironment for the operations of the petroleum industry and support the restructuring of \nthe Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC).\n4.3.3.1 Crude Oil Production and Demand\nAggregate crude oil production, including natural gas liquids (NGLs) and condensates \nby the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), averaged 38.44 million \nbarrels per day (mbd) in the first half of 2017. This represented a decrease of 1.4 and 1.1 \nper cent below the levels in the preceding and the corresponding halves of 2016, \nrespectively. The agreement between OPEC and some non-OPEC countries to a \nproduction cut led to a decline in production from Ecuador, Iraq, Iran, Venezuela and \nthe United Arab Emirates. Non-OPEC supply was estimated at an average of 57.71 mbd, \nindicating a 0.9 per cent increase over the corresponding half of 2016. The production \nincrease was due mainly to the return of the US oil into the market as a result of higher \ndrilling efficiencies, better “well” performance and lower wellhead breakeven prices. \nTotal world supply averaged 96.15 mbd, indicating a slight increase of 0.01 per cent \nabove the level in the first half of 2016.\n57.6\n59.3\n56.8\n51.7\n52.0\n46.0\n48.0\n50.0\n52.0\n54.0\n56.0\n58.0\n60.0\nFirst Half 2013\nFirst Half 2014\nFirst Half 2015\nFirst Half 2016\nFirst Half 2017\nPer cent\n97\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nWorld crude oil demand was estimated at an average of 95.39 mbd in the first half of \n2017, compared with 95.38 mbd in the corresponding half of 2016. This was a marginal \nincrease of 0.01 per cent, compared with the corresponding half of 2016. Of this, \ndemand from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) \ncountries averaged 46.73 mbd, while non-OECD was 48.66 mbd. The increase in \ndemand was driven largely by the demand for LPG and naphtha for the petrochemical \nindustry in China as well as jet/kerosene for the aviation sector. Demand for oil from Iran, \nIraq, UAE and Qatar also grew. Furthermore, jet/kerosene, gasoline, gas/diesel oil and \nLPG demand in Kuwait, Brazil and India; LPG, naphtha and diesel oil in Indonesia, Japan, \nand US, as well as rising demand in the transportation sector and industrial fuel \nrequirements in Canada contributed to increased global demand.\nAt an average daily production of 1.62 mbd or 293.2 million barrels (mb), Nigeria's crude \noil output increased by 0.07 mbd or 4.5 per cent above the level of 1.55 mbd or 285.2 mb \nin the preceding half of 2016. The development was due mainly to improved security in \nthe Niger Delta region occasioned by the ongoing peace deal between the Federal \nGovernment and the key stakeholders in the region. It however, decreased by 0.06 mbd \nor 3.6 per cent below the levels of 1.68 mbd or 305.8 mb in the corresponding period of \n2016. Aggregate export of crude oil for the review period was estimated at 211.7 mb or \n1.17 mbd, compared with 202.4 mb or 1.10 mbd and 223.9 mb or 1.23 mbd in the \npreceding and corresponding halves of 2016, respectively. \nFigure 66\nCrude Oil Production and Exports\n1.68\n1.55\n1.62\n1.23\n1.10\n1.17\n0.45\n0.45\n0.45\n0.0\n1.0\n2.0\nFirst Half 2016\nSecond Half 2016\nFirst Half 2017\nMillion barrels per day\nOutput\nExports\nDomestic Consumption\nSource: Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)\n \n \n98\n4.3.3.2 Crude Oil Prices\nThe average spot price of Nigeria's reference crude, the Bonny Light (37o API), at \nUS$52.19 per barrel, increased by 7.4 and 28.8 per cent above its levels in the preceding \nhalf and the first half of 2016, respectively. Similarly, the average prices of the Forcados, \nthe UK Brent, and the West Texas Intermediate rose by 8.2, 8.9, and 9.4 per cent, to \nUS$51.74, US$51.23, and US$49.43 per barrel, respectively. The marginal price increase \nwas attributed largely to the continued cooperation between OPEC and some non-\nOPEC producers for a production cut. The average price of the OPEC basket of fourteen \n(14) crude streams was US$50.21 per barrel, compared with US$45.18 per barrel and \nUS$36.32 per barrel in the preceding and the corresponding halves of 2016, representing \nan increase of 11.1 and 38.24 per cent, respectively.\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 67\nAverage Spot Prices of Selected Crudes \nSource: Reuters\n4.3.4 Gas\nThe West African Gas Limited, a joint venture company of the Nigerian National \nPetroleum Corporation (NNPC) and Sahara Energy, took delivery of two (2) liquefied \npetroleum gas (LPG) carriers from the Hyundai Mipo Dockyard in Ulsan, South Korea in the \nfirst half of 2017. The vessels, “MT Africa Gas” and “MT Sahara Gas”, have combined \ncapacity of 38,000 cubic meters (m3) and would enhance the supply of (LPG), also \nknown as domestic cooking gas.\nIn the first half of 2017, the NNPC re-opened the Aba, Mosimi, Atlas-Cove and Kano \nDepots. The re-opening of the depots has enhanced availability of the products across \nthe country. Also, various repairs were carried out on vandalised pipelines. Accordingly, \nall gas plants that were hitherto shut-down including, the Oredo Gas Plant, Sapele Gas \nPlant, Ovade Gas Plant, Oben and NGC Gas Compressors, were reactivated. \nFurthermore, the issue of condensate evacuation was addressed, resulting in increased \ngas supply across the gas plants.\n40.51\n48.59\n52.19\n39.51\n47.03\n51.23\n40.12\n47.80\n51.74\n39.29\n45.17\n49.43\n36.32\n45.18\n50.21\n0\n20\n40\n60\nFirst Half 2016\nSecond Half 2016\nFirst Half 2017\nUS Dollar per barrel\nBONNY LIGHT\nU.K. BRENT\nFORCADOS\nWEST TEXAS INTERMEDIATE\nOPEC BASKET\n99\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 68\nGas Production and Utilisation \nTotal associated gas produced in the first half of 2017 was estimated at 1,382,734.13 \nmillion standard cubic feet (mmscf), indicating an increase of 24.7 per cent and 12.5 per \ncent above the level in the corresponding period of 2016 and the preceding period, \nrespectively. Total volume of gas utilised and flared during the period was estimated at \n1,273,582.49 mmscf and 109,151.64 mmscf, indicating an increase of 24.8 and 23.6 per \ncent above their respective levels in the first half of 2016. \n4.3.5 Petroleum Products\nThe estimated quantity of petroleum products distributed by the major and independent \nmarketing companies in the period under review was 7,905.8 million litres, representing \nan increase of 65.0 per cent above the level in the first half of 2016. A disaggregation by \nproduct type showed that 6,864.8 million litres of Premium Motor Spirit (PMS), 706.2 million \nlitres of Automotive Gas Oil (AGO), 334.8 million litres of Dual Purpose Kerosene (DPK) and \n123.3 million litres of Low Pour Fuel Oil (LPFO) were distributed.\n4.3.6 Solid Minerals\nIn the review period, the Federal Government approved N30.00 billion from the Natural \nResources Development Fund (NRDF) for the Ministry of Mines and Steel Development \n(MMSD) to tackle the challenges in the sector and ensure that it plays a key role in the \neconomic diversification agenda. The Fund would provide cheap loans and grants to \nindustry participants and promote direct investment in the sector.\nIn addition, the World Bank approved US$150.00 million credit to help increase the mining \nsector's contribution to the Nigerian economy. The funds would assist in building a strong \n1,108,525.09\n1,229,359.46\n1,382,734.13\n1,020,225.66\n1,096,319.73\n1,273,582.49\n88,299.43\n133,039.73\n109,151.64\n -\n 500,000\n 1,000,000\n 1,500,000\nFirst Half 2016\nSecond Half 2016\nFirst Half 2017\nMillion Standard Cubic \nFeet (mmscf)\nGas Produced\nGas Utilised\nGas Flared\nSource: NNPC\n100\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nfoundation for mining sector development in the country. It would also enhance \ncompetitiveness by improving information infrastructure and knowledge of mining as \nwell as strengthen key government institutions and foster domestic investments in the \nsector. \nProvisional data from the Ministry of Mines and Steel Development indicated that solid \nminerals production in the first half of 2017 decreased by 11.3 per cent from the level in \nthe corresponding period of 2016 to 15.32 million tonnes. The decrease in the production \nof some principal minerals such as clay, coal, lead/zinc and laterite accounted for the \ndecline in production. \n4.3.7 Electricity Generation\nAverage electricity generation in the first half of 2017, at 3,511.62 MW/h, declined by 9.0 \nper cent, compared with 3,857.28 MW/h in the first half of 2016. The decrease was \nattributed to fall in gas supply to thermal plants and decreased generation from Shiroro \nHydro Power Plant following major repair undertaken in the review period.\n4.3.8 Electricity Consumption\nAverage electricity consumed at 3,171 MW/h, grew by 10.7 per cent, compared with the \nlevel in the same period of 2016. The increase in consumption was attributed to \nimprovement in transmission and distribution network the review period. \n4.3.9 Industrial Financing\n4.3.9.1 The Bank of Industry (BOI)\nThe total disbursed by the Bank of Industry (BOI) to various beneficiaries in the review \nperiod was N54.2 billion. This amount was 81.4 per cent higher than the level of \ndisbursement in the corresponding period of 2016. Of the total, Micro Enterprise, Small \nand Medium Enterprises and Large Enterprise sub-sectors received 10.3, 11.8 and 77.9 per \ncent, respectively. \n101\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 69\nSectoral Disbursement of BOI Loans, First Half 2017 \n4.3.9.2 The Nigerian Export-Import Bank (NEXIM)\nThe total amount disbursed by the Nigeria Export-Import Bank (NEXIM) to four (4) \nbeneficiaries in the review period was N94.52million, compared to the total disbursement \nof N1.70billion to 26 beneficiaries in the corresponding period of 2016. This amount \nrepresented a 94.4 per cent decline, compared to the disbursement in the \ncorresponding period of 2016. The decline was due to paucity of loanable funds during \nthe period. The total sectoral distribution showed that manufacturing and agriculture \nsub-sectors received 27.1 and 72.9 per cent, respectively.\nSource: Bank of Industry BOI\nFigure 70\nSectoral Disbursement of NEXIM Loans, First Half 2017 \nSource: NEXIM Bank\nAgriculture,\n72.90%\nManufacturing \n27.10%\nAgriculture,\nManufacturing \nSmall & Medium\nEnterprises\n12%\nMicro \nEnterprises\n10%\nLarge\nEnterprises\n78%\n102\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n4.3.10 Telecommunications\nThe Telecommunications sub-sector experienced a decline in the first half of 2017, \ncompared with the corresponding period of 2016. Data obtained from the National \nCommunications Commission (NCC) showed that the number of active telephone lines \nstood at 143.1 million at end-June 2017, compared with 149.8 and 154.5 million at end-\nJune and end-December 2016, respectively. The development represented a decrease \nof 4.5 per cent of active telephone lines during the review period. In addition, the \nnumber of internet users in the country declined slightly to 91.6 million at end-June 2017, \nfrom 92.1 million at end-June 2016. Similarly, teledensity stood at 102.2 per 100 inhabitants \nat end-June 2017, a decrease of 4.8 percentage points, compared with 107.0 per 100 \ninhabitants recorded at end-June 2016. However, teledensity in Nigeria continued to \nexceed the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) minimum standard of 1:100. \nThe subdued growth in the number of active telephone lines (active subscriber base) in \nthe review period, compared with end-June 2016 was largely attributed to the \nregulatory directive to all GSM operators and other network providers to deactivate all \nunregistered, pre-registered, and poorly registered SIM cards. This became necessary \nfollowing the criminal activities carried out against members of the public using \nunregistered SIM cards across networks.\nFigure 71\nTotal Active Lines and Teledensity\nSource: Nigerian Communication Commission (NCC)\n149.82\n154.53\n143.06\n107.01\n110.38\n102.2\n115,451\n127,648\n125,452\n108,000\n110,000\n112,000\n114,000\n116,000\n118,000\n120,000\n122,000\n124,000\n126,000\n128,000\n130,000\n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\n140\n160\n180\nEnd-June 2016\nEnd-Dec. 2016\nEnd-June 2017\nMillions\nMobile Phones (LHS)\nTeledensity (LHS)\nFixed (RHS)\n103\n4.3.11 Consumer Prices\nThe all-items composite Consumer Price Index (CPI) was 234.2 (November 2009=100) at \nend-June 2017, compared with 213.6 and 201.7 at end-December and end-June 2016, \nrespectively. The all-items less farm produce CPI was 223.0 at end-June 2017, compared \nwith 208.6 and 198.3 at end-December and end-June 2016, respectively. Food CPI stood \nat 246.3 at end-June 2017, compared with 218.6 and 205.4 at end-December and end-\nJune 2016, respectively.\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\n300\n1st Half 2016\n2nd Half 2016\n1st Half 2017\nCPI\nComposite\nCore\nFood\nFigure 72\nConsumer Price Indices\n(November 2009 = 100)\nSource: NBS\n4.3.11.1 Headline Inflation\nThe year-on-year headline inflation maintained a consistent decline throughout the first \nhalf of 2017. It declined from 18.7 per cent in January to 17.3 per cent in March and \nclosed at 16.1 per cent in June 2017, relative to 18.6 and 16.5 per cent in December and \nJune 2016, respectively. The deceleration in headline inflation was attributed largely to \nmoderation in non-food prices arising from improved access to foreign exchange which \nmore than offset the upward trend in food inflation. However, the 12-month moving \naverage inflation rose from 16.4 per cent in January to 17.3 per cent in March and closed \nat 17.6 per cent in June 2017, compared with 15.7 and 11.4 per cent in December and \nJune 2016. \n4.3.11.2 Core Inflation\nThe year-on-year core inflation (all-item less farm produce) decelerated from 17.9 per \ncent in January to 15.4 per cent in March and closed at 12.5 per cent in June 2017, \ncompared with 18.1 and 16.2 per cent at end-December and end-June 2016, \nrespectively. Core inflation, on a 12-month moving average basis, however, rose from \n104\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n16.0 per cent in January to 16.7 per cent in March and 16.2 per cent in June 2017, \ncompared with 15.3 per cent at end-December and 10.9 per cent at end-June 2016. The \ndevelopment was due mainly to increase in the prices of majority of the items in the \nbasket, including processed food; housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuel; clothing \nand footwear; transport; education; furnishing, household equipment and \nmaintenance; and health. Core inflation increased steadily for the first four months of the \nperiod, but declined in May and June. The decline was attributed to the sustained \ninterventions by the CBN to improve foreign exchange supply, thereby mitigating the \neffects of exchange rate pass-through to prices. \n4.3.11.3 Food Inflation\nThe year-on-year food inflation comprising farm produce, processed and imported food \nmaintained an upward trend all through the first half of 2017. It rose from 17.8 per cent in \nJanuary to 18.4 per cent in March and further to 19.9 per cent at end-June 2017, \ncompared with 17.4 and 15.3 per cent at end-December and end-June 2016, \nrespectively. The 12-month moving average food inflation also rose from 15.5 per cent in \nJanuary to 16.6 and 17.9 per cent at end-March and end-June 2017, respectively \ncompared with 15.0 and 11.7 per cent at end-December and end-June 2016. The rise in \nfood inflation was attributed mainly to food supply shortages arising from attacks on \nfarmers and their farmlands, unabated boko haram insurgency and imported food \ninflation. \nFigure 73\nInflation Rate \n(Year-on-Year, Per cent)\n25\n20\n15\n10\n5\n0\n1st Half 2015\n2nd Half 2015\n1st Half 2016 2nd Half 2016\n1st Half 2017\nHeadline\nCore\nFood\nSource: NBS\n105\n4.3.11.4 Urban and Rural Consumer Price Indices and Inflation Rates\nThe all-items Urban CPI increased to 236.2 at end-June 2017, from 216.3 and 203.4 at end-\nDecember and end-June 2016, respectively. The development was attributed largely to \nthe increase in the prices of food (11.6 per cent); food and non-alcoholic beverages \n(11.6 per cent); clothing and footwear (8.3 per cent); furnishing and household \nequipment (7.4 per cent); recreation and culture (7.2 per cent); imported food (7.1 per \ncent); transport (6.8 per cent) and; miscellaneous goods and services (6.7 per cent). \nOthers were: health (6.1 per cent); education (5.7 per cent); restaurant and hotels (5.6 \nper cent); alcoholic beverages (4.5 per cent); housing, water and electricity (4.2 per \ncent); and, communication (2.0 per cent). The year-on-year urban inflation stood at 16.1 \nper cent at end-June 2017, compared with 20.1 and 18.1 per cent at end-December and \nend-June 2016, respectively. \nSimilarly, the all-items rural CPI rose to 232.66 at end-June 2017, above 212.2 at end-\nDecember and 200.55 at end-June 2016. The increase was driven by the rise in the prices \nof food (10.9 per cent); food and non-alcoholic beverages (10.9 per cent); clothing and \nfootwear (7.1 per cent); imported food (6.5 per cent); furnishing and household (5.3 per \ncent) and; education (5.3per cent). Others were: housing and utilities (5.3 per cent); \ntransport (5.0 per cent); recreation and culture (4.8 per cent); miscellaneous goods and \nservices (4.7 per cent); health (4.7 per cent); alcohol beverages (4.0 per cent); restaurant \n(3.9 per cent) and; communications (1.0 per cent). \nUrban headline inflation was higher than the rural headline inflation by 0.2 percentage \npoint in the period under review. Urban core inflation stood at 13.6 per cent at end-June \n2017, compared with 19.6 per cent at end-December and 17.1 per cent at end-June \n2016. Urban food inflation was 20.5 per cent at end-June 2017, compared with 17.6 and \n15.7 per cent at end-December and end-June 2016, respectively. \nRural core inflation was 11.6 per cent at end-June 2017, compared with 16.8 per cent at \nend-December and 15.5 per cent at end-June 2016. Rural food inflation was 19.5 per \ncent at end-June 2017, compared with 17.1 and 14.9 per cent at end-December and \nend-June 2016, respectively. \nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n106\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 74\nUrban and Rural Consumer Price Indices \n(November 2009 = 100)\n203.4\n215.3\n236.2\n200.5\n212.2\n232.6\n180\n200\n220\n240\nFirst Half 2016\nSecond Half 2016\nFirst Half 2017\nUrban Consumer Price Index\nRural Consumer Price Index\n Source: NBS\n4.3.12 Aviation Services\n4.3.12.1 REAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS\nPolicy and Airport Development\nTo improve the safety of airline operations in the country, the Federal Government \nreconstructed the Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport's runway as well as embarked on \nextensive renovation of the airport facilities within the period. The Airport was shut down \nfor six weeks to allow for reconstruction of its runway, while the Kaduna International \nAirport was rehabilitated and used as an alternate airport during the period of closure.\nFurthermore, the standardisation process of Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport, Abuja \nand the Murtala Mohammed International Airport, Lagos, by the International Civil \nAviation Organisation (ICAO), in conjunction with the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority \n(NCAA) commenced during the period with the implementation of the Africa Indian \nFlight Region (AFI) Plan Aerodrome Certification Project. The Plan addresses three focal \nareas: establish and maintain a sustainable oversight system (infrastructure/capacity \nbuilding); assist countries to resolve identified deficiencies within reasonable time; and \nenhance aviation safety culture of African aviation service providers.\n4.3.12.2 Domestic Operations \nA total of 4,365,140 passengers were airlifted by domestic airlines in the first half of 2017. \nThis represented a 5.7 per cent decline below the 4,627,816 passengers airlifted in the \ncorresponding period of 2016. Total aircraft movement for the first half of 2017 was 89,268 \nrepresenting an increase of 8.3 per cent above the 82,448 recorded in the corresponding \nperiod of 2016. \n107\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n4.3.12.3 International Operations\nThe number of passengers airlifted by airlines on international routes in the first half of 2017 \ndeclined by 14.2 per cent to 1,864,775 compared with 2,172,588 recorded in the first half \nof 2016. Aircraft movement reduced by 2.7 per cent to 22,309 in the review period, \ncompared with 22,932 recorded in the corresponding period of the preceding year.\nCargo movement at designated airports grew by 122.1 per cent to 167 million kg from \n75.2 million kg recorded in the first half of 2016. Mail movement grew by 2,470 per cent to \n29.6 million kg in the first half of 2017, compared with 1.2 million kg recorded in the \ncorresponding period of 2016.\n4.3.13 Maritime Services\nThe Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) recorded a milestone \nduring the review period. The agency improved in International Ships and Port Facility \nSecurity (ISPS) Code compliance. The country recorded a compliance rate of about 80 \nper cent as 114 Port facilities out of the total 145 ports in Nigeria are now fully ISPS \ncompliant. Additionally, the agency engaged some schools abroad to build capacity of \n1,045 beneficiaries on sea time training.\nDuring the review period, the Federal Government granted approval to the agency to \nacquire assets that would be deployed at strategic locations to enhance its ability to \nimprove the safety of vessels within the nation's maritime domain. In view of that, the \nAgency procured 12 intervention vessels and 3 helicopters for the Nigerian Maritime \nAdministration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) to fight piracy and other illegal activities on \nthe country's territorial waters. Consequently, the agency operates 24-hour surveillance \nsystem, which captures all vessels in the Nigerian maritime domain irrespective of weather \nconditions.\nA total of 1,540 ocean going vessels berthed at Nigerian ports, compared with 2,208 \nvessels in the corresponding period of 2016, representing a decrease of 30.1 per cent \ndecrease.\nCargo throughput stood at 13,487,851 tonnes in the first half of 2017, compared with \n35,256,845 tonnes recorded in the corresponding period of 2016, representing a decline \nof 61.7 per cent.\n4.3.14 Railway Services\nDuring the review period, a total of 1,364,885 passengers and 53,055 tonnes of freight \nwere moved by trains operated by the Nigeria Railway Corporation compared with \n108 \n1,409,597 passengers and 58,403 tonnes of freight moved during the corresponding \nperiod of 2016. In other developments, the Corporation awarded contracts for the \ndesign, manufacture and supply of ten (10) standard gauge coaches for the Abuja-\nKaduna rail service. The haulage of fertilizers from Apapa port to Kaduna City and the \nconstruction of the Lagos-Ibadan standard gauge rail project also commenced.\n4.4 SOCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS\n4.4.1 Health\nDuring the review period, the Federal Government approved the third National Health \nPolicy aimed at promoting health care delivery to accelerate socio-economic \ndevelopment in the country. The Policy lays emphasis on primary healthcare as the \nbedrock of the national health system in addition to the provision of financial risk \nprotection to all Nigerians, particularly, the poor and vulnerable group. \nThe Federal Government disbursed the N16.9 billion World Bank grant to the 36 states and \nthe FCT for the implementation of the Save-One-Million-Lives (SOML) programme-for-\nResults. The objective of the Programme was to increase the utilisation and quality of high \nimpact reproductive, child health, and nutrition interventions. To further boost the health \nsector, the Government signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the \nEuropean Union (EU) on a 70 million Euro Fund to strengthen the nation's health care \nsystem and eradicate polio.\nHowever, the health sector experienced a meningitis epidemic in some parts of the \ncountry during the period under review. The Nigerian Centre for Disease Control (NCDC) \nreported a total of 14,473 suspected cases and 1,155 deaths from 25 states. The Federal \nMinistry of Health, the NCDC, the National Primary Healthcare Development Agency \n(NPHCDA), World Health Organisation (WHO), and other international development \npartners worked to control and reduce the impact of the outbreak on affected \ncommunities. Consequently, the government officially declared the end of the meningitis \noutbreak in the country in June, 2017. The declaration came four weeks after the number \nof new meningitis cases reported each week fell below the epidemic and alert thresholds \nin all the affected local government areas.\nTo improve the quality of health care delivery in the country, the Federal Government \nflagged off the “National Primary Healthcare Revitalisation Programme” to improve over \n10,000 healthcare centres across the country. The Federal Government, through the \nNPHCDA and the Federal Ministry of Health, would make at least one primary health care \ncentre in each ward across the country fully functional to deliver several health care \n109\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nservices.\nThe Government also flagged off the Health and Nutrition Emergency Response \nInitiative. Consequently, the Federal Ministry of Health delivered materials worth N4.33 \nbillion to victims of insurgency in Borno State. Similarly, the United Nations Children's Funds \n(UNICEF) donated medical equipment worth N1.20 billion to the Adamawa State \nGovernment to save mothers and children at birth. This was necessitated by the high rate \nof maternal mortality in the North East as a result of the onslaught of the Boko Haram \ninsurgency.\n4.4.2 Environment\nThe Federal Government in protecting human health, intensified effort to reduce \nemission with the adoption of the low sulphur policy. The Federal Ministry of Environment, \nin collaboration with Ministry of Trade and Investment/Standard Organisation of Nigeria \n(SON), successfully reviewed the standards of sulphur content in diesel and petro-\nproducts.\nThe World Bank continued to assist affected states in the country to address flood and \nerosion challenges. During the review period, the Nigeria Erosion and Watershed \nManagement Project (NEWMAP), under the auspices of the World Bank earmarked \nabout N6.5 billion for the restoration of the Watershed in the Lugu Dam in Sokoto State. \nThe state also committed the sum of N1.33 billion as counterpart contribution to the \nproject.\n4.4.3 Housing and Urban Development\nThe housing sector recorded a milestone during the review period. The World Bank and \nthe International Development Association (IDA), earmarked US$300 million to fast-track \nprovision of accommodation for the country's teeming population. The Nigeria Housing \nFinance Programme (NHFP) is driven by the CBN. The Bank would manage the Fund, \nwhich would be channeled towards effective development of the housing sector in the \ncountry. \nFurthermore, to address the housing deficit in the country, the Government flagged off \nthe Federal Integrated Staff Housing (FISH) programme during the period under review. \nThe FISH is a strategic initiative designed as an intervention project for massive housing \ndelivery to federal civil servants. It is also a Special Purpose Vehicle for housing delivery for \nfederal workers. The Programme which has a Federal Government seed fund of N30.00 \nbillion was being driven through strategic partnership involving relevant stakeholders in \nthe country. \n110\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n4.5 EXTERNAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS\nThe performance of the external sector in the review period improved with an overall \nbalance of payments (BOP) and current account surpluses of 1.9 and 2.4 per cent of \ngross domestic product (GDP), respectively. The development was as a result of \nimprovement in crude oil price and domestic production, and gradual economic \nrecovery in the emerging markets which bolstered global aggregate demand. The \ncapital and financial account recorded a net incurrence of financial liabilities of 3.3 per \ncent of GDP. The stock of external reserves recorded an accretion of US$3.27 billion and \nstood at US$30.34 billion at end-June, 2017. The level could finance 11.1 months of current \nlevel of import of goods and 7.7 months of goods and services. External debt stood at \nUS$15.05 billion equivalent to 8.6 per cent of GDP at end-June 2017, and remained within \nthe sustainable threshold of 40.0 per cent of GDP. The exchange rate remained stable in \nthe first half of 2017, as the premium between the inter-bank and BDC rates narrowed to \n19.8 per cent at end-June 2017 from 61.6 per cent at end-January 2017.\n4.5.1 Current Account\nAvailable data showed that the current account position improved significantly with a \nsurplus of N1,265.77 billion or 2.4 per cent of GDP as against a deficit of N134.16 billion, or \n0.3 per cent of GDP in the corresponding period in 2016. The development was attributed \nto the trade surplus recorded in the goods account occasioned by the improvement in \ncrude export; and higher net surplus in the current transfers as a result of the increased \ninflow of home remittance.\n4.5.1.1 Trade\nIn the first half of 2017, the value of aggregate external trade increased to N11,340.49 \nbillion or 21.2 per cent of GDP, above the N10,196.42 billion or 18.1 per cent of GDP and \nN7,401.03 billion, or 16.0 per cent of GDP recorded in the preceding and the \ncorresponding periods of 2016, respectively. A disaggregation of total trade showed that \nexport at N6,339.61 billion increased from N5,424.19 billion and N3,426.50 billion in the \nsecond and first halves of 2016, respectively. Further analysis revealed that crude oil and \ngas component which constituted 90.6 per cent of total export increased significantly to \nN5,745.99 billion in the review period, from N3,115.99 billion in the first half of 2016. The \ndevelopment was as a result of improvement in crude oil export. Similarly, non-oil \ncomponent, representing 1.1 per cent of GDP, increased by 91.2 per cent above N310.51 \nbillion in the first half of 2016 to N593.62 billion in the review period, accounting for 9.4 per \ncent of total export. This was attributed to increased export of agricultural produce and \nmanufactured goods.\n111\nThe value of total import increased by 25.8 per cent to N5,000.88 billion in the first half of \n2017 above the level of N3,974.53 billion in the corresponding period of 2016, on account \nof increased petroleum product import. Oil and gas import, representing 27.5 per cent of \ntotal import, increased by 49.1 per cent to N1,375.41 billion or 2.6 per cent of GDP, above \nits level in the corresponding half of 2016. Non-oil import at N3,625.47 billion constituted \n72.5 per cent of total import and represented 6.8 per cent of GDP in the review period. \nThis indicated an increase of 18.8 per cent above the level of N3,052.23 billion in the first \nhalf of 2016. \nOverall, the trade account resulted in a trade surplus of N1,338.73 billion in the review \nperiod as against a deficit of N548.03 billion in the corresponding period of 2016. \nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 75\nExport, Import and Trade Balance \n(N' Billion)\nSource: CBN\nA further breakdown of visible import by sector using data on sectoral utilisation of foreign \nexchange by banks indicated that industrial sector import accounted for 44.3 per cent, \nand oil sector, 28.0 per cent. Manufactured products, food products, transport, \nagriculture and mineral products accounted for 14.1, 8.6, 2.8, 1.6 and 0.6 per cent of total \nimport, respectively.\n3,426,498.36 \n5,424,191.36 \n6,339,612.00 \n3,974,533.16 \n4,772,224.02 \n5,000,879.06 \n (1,000,000.00)\n -\n 1,000,000.00\n 2,000,000.00\n 3,000,000.00\n 4,000,000.00\n 5,000,000.00\n 6,000,000.00\n 7,000,000.00\n1st Half 2016\n2nd Half 2016\n1st Half 2017\nN billion\n Exports\n Imports\nTrade Balance\n112\nA disaggregation of non-oil export by products revealed that agricultural, other \nproducts, manufactured, semi-manufactured and mineral products accounted for 37.6, \n27.6, 20.3, 13.2 and 1.3 per cent of total, respectively.\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 76\nForeign Exchange Utilisation in the First Half 2017 \n(Per cent) \nFigure 77\nNon-Oil Export by Products\n(First Half 2017, Per cent) \nSource: CBN\n \n \nMineral Products\n0.6%\nIndustrial \n44.3%\nManufacturig\n14.1%\nFood Product\n8.9%\nTransport\n2.8%\nAgriculture\n1.6%\nAgricultural \nProduce\n37.6%\nOthers\n27.6%\nManufactured\n13.2%\nSemi-\nManufactured2\n20.3%\nMinerals\n1.3%\nSource: CBN\nOil Sector\n28.0%\n113\nAnalysis of non-oil export to the ECOWAS sub-region showed a total value of US$146.53 \nmillion in the first half of 2017. Among member-countries, export to Ghana remained the \nhighest at US$50.68 million or 34.6 per cent of total. This was followed by Côté d'Ivoire, \nUS$32.30 million (22.1%); Niger, US$26.14 million (17.8 %); and Togo, US$12.88 million (8.8%). \nExport to Senegal was US$8.46 million (5.8%); Guinea, US$5.57 million (3.8%); Benin, \nUS$3.76 million (2.6%); and “Others” accounted for the balance. The dominant export \ncommodity to the sub-region remained instant noodles, detergents, tobacco, plastics, \ndairy products, soya beans meal, and carbonated soft drink.\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 78\nNon-oil Export to the ECOWAS sub-Region in the First Half of 2017\n(Per cent) \nOthers\n16.7%\nGhana\n34.6%\nNiger\n17.8%\nCote d'Ivoire\n22.1%\nTogo\n8.8%\nSource: CBN\nForeign Exchange Receipts by Top Hundred (100) Exporters\nAggregate value of export proceeds of the top one hundred exporters in the first half of \n2017 was US$764.82 million, an increase of 88.6 per cent above the level in the \ncorresponding period of 2016. The NNPC/PPMC ranked 1st with proceeds valued at \nUS$168.43 million for the export of NAPTHA, a petroleum by-product to the United States \nof America (USA). Olam Nigeria Limited ranked 2nd with US$150.25 million from the export \nof sesame seeds, cocoa beans and dried raw cashew nuts to The Netherlands, Greece, \nTurkey and the United Kingdom (UK). Indorama Eleme Fertilizer and Chemicals Ltd, \nranked 3rd with US$54.49 million with export of granular urea to Spain and Israel. The British \nAmerican Tobacco (BAT) Nigeria ranked 4th, with export of cigarettes to Ghana and \nCameroon amounting to US$53.95 million. The Wacot Limited, ranked 5th having \nexported ginned cotton lint and raw cashew nuts valued at US$29.14 million to India and \nChina. The 6th major exporter was Indorama Eleme Petrochemicals Company with \nexport of injection molding UV stabilizer, Silica, Prime and Film mainly to Ghana worth \nUS$20.47 million. The Atlantic Shrimpers Limited, ranked 10th having exported frozen \n114\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nshrimps and crab valued at US$5.30 million. The Metka Power West Africa Limited and \nVahl International & Natural Goods Limited were at the 98th and 99th positions with \nUS$0.26 million and US$0.25 million, respectively. Their major exports were cement and \ndried split ginger to Ghana and the USA, respectively. The Exclusive Connect Nigeria \nLimited, ranked 100th with US$0.25 million for export of charcoal dust to the UK.\n4.5.1.2 Services \nThe net deficit in the services account widened significantly to N1,639.19 billion or 3.1 per \ncent of GDP, from N763.42 billion or 1.7 per cent of GDP in the corresponding period of \n2016. This was due to higher out-payments in respect of the major components of the \nservices sub-account. A disaggregation of service payments showed that transportation \nservices constituted the bulk at N837.05 billion or 37.6 per cent of total out-payments, \ntravels was N559.26 billion and accounted for 25.1 per cent of the total, while other \nbusiness services, at N465.92 billion accounted for 20.9 per cent. Payments in respect of \ninsurance services, N153.32 billion; financial services, N53.41 billion; government services, \nN40.49 billion; royalties and licence fees, N38.58 billion; and communication services, \nN32.99 billion; accounted for 6.9, 2.4, 1.8, 1.7, and 1.5 per cent of the total, respectively. \nOthers accounted for the balance.\nFigure 79\nShare of Services Out-Payments\n(First Half 2017, Per cent\nTransport\n46.6%\nGovernment\n2.6%\nTravel\n12.5%\nOther Business \n22.6%\nFinancial\n3.3%\nInsurance\n7.0%\nRoyalties & Licence \nFees\n2.1%\nCommunications\n1.5%\nOthers\n2.1%\nSource: CBN\n115\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n4.5.1.3 Income \nTransactions in the income account resulted in a higher net deficit of N1,544.84 billion or \n2.9 per cent of GDP, compared with N835.34 billion or 1.8 per cent of GDP and N1,369.76 \nbillion or 2.4 per cent of GDP, respectively, in the first and second halves of 2016. The \ndevelopment was attributed to increased payment of dividends and distributed \nbranch profits as well as other payments to non-resident investors. The investment \nincome sub-account recorded a higher net deficit of N1,579.08 billion, compared with \nN1,399.43 billion and N852.00 billion in the preceding and corresponding periods of \n2016. On the contrary, compensation of employees' sub-component maintained a net \nsurplus balance increasing to N34.24 billion in the review period, above the levels of \nN33.11billion and N19.05 billion in the second and first halves of 2016, respectively.\n4.5.1.4 Current Transfers \nAvailable data showed a net surplus of N3,111.07 billion or 5.8 per cent of GDP in the \ncurrent transfers account during the review period. This was above the N3,014.55 billion \n(5.3 % of GDP) and N2,012.64 billion, (4.4% of GDP) in the second and first halves of 2016, \nrespectively. The development was due to the higher inflow of home remittances which \naccounted for 98.0 per cent of total inflow. At N57.88 billion in the first half of 2017, the \nnet surplus in the general government transfers (comprising payments to foreign \nembassies and international organisations) declined significantly below the level in the \ncorresponding period of 2016.\nFigure 80\nPrivate Home Remittances\n (N'billion)\n1,886.76\n3,096.21\n3,155.93\n -\n 1,000.0\n 2,000.0\n 3,000.0\n 4,000.0\nFirst Half 2016\nSecond Half 2016\nFirst Half 2017\nSource: CBN\n116\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n4.5.2 Capital and Financial Account\nIn the first half of 2017, the capital and financial account recorded a higher net foreign \nfinancial liability of N1,739.66 billion or 3.3 per cent of GDP, compared to N545.22 billion or \n1.0 per cent of GDP and N57.01billion or 0.11 per cent of GDP in the second and first halves \nof 2016, respectively. \nAanalysis of the capital and financial account showed that aggregate financial assets \n(financial outflow) increased to N1,453.83 billion in the review period above the level of \nN328.91 billion and N410.97 billion in the second and first halves of 2016. Aggregate \nforeign liabilities (financial inflows by non-resident investors into the economy) maintained \nan upward trend increasing to N3,193.49 billion above the levels of N874.13 billion and \nN467.98 billion, respectively, in the second and first halves of 2016, occasioned by \nincreased inflow of loans and portfolio investment in the review period.\n4.5.2.1 Foreign Direct Investment\nInflow of FDI into the economy increased to N532.63 billion in the first half of 2017, above \nthe level of N363.38 billion in the first half of 2016. This was as a result of increased fresh \nequity capital and higher retained earnings in Nigerian companies by non-resident \ninvestors. It, however, declined by 34.0 per cent below the N807.15 billion recorded in the \nsecond half of 2016. In terms of share in total inflow, FDI accounted for 16.7 per cent. \nResidents' outward direct investment decreased to N196.07 billion from N211.57 billion \nrecorded in the second half of 2016, but increased relative to N196.07 billion recorded in \nthe first half of 2016. This accounted for 13.5 per cent of total financial assets abroad. \nFurther analysis revealed that FDI component accounted for 13.5 per cent of total \nfinancial assets.\n4.5.2.2 Portfolio Investment\nPortfolio investment inflow comprising equity and debt securities rose to N892.06 billion \nfrom the levels of N333.12 billion and N162.12 billion in the preceding and corresponding \nhalves of 2016, respectively, in the review period. This was due largely to increased \ninvestment in government debt securities occasioned by the attractive returns on \ninvestment. A further analysis showed that, portfolio investment inflow accounted for 27.9 \nper cent of total investment in the review period. The ratio of portfolio investment to \nexternal reserves as a measure of the level of exposure of the external sector to short-term \nliabilities, was 147.0 per cent, above the 100.0 per cent international benchmark. On the \nother hand, portfolio investments abroad driven by investment in equity securities, \ndeclined during the review period to N0.51 billion from N26.27 billion and N14.41 billion in \nthe first and second halves of 2016, respectively. Its share in total assets was low at 0.03 per \ncent, reflecting the risk-averseness of resident investors.\n117\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n4.5.2.3 Other Investment\nOther investment inflow driven mainly by loans and currency & deposits was N1,768.80 \nbillion in the review period as against a repayment of N266.27 billion and N57.52 billion in \nthe second and first halves of 2016, respectively. The development was largely, due to \nfresh loans drawn by the general government and deposit money banks. Other \ninvestment inflow accounted for 55.4 per cent of total financial liabilities. On the contrary, \nother investment assets declined to N257.92 billion in the review period from N576.71 \nbillion in the corresponding period of 2016. It, however, showed an improvement, \ncompared with the level in the preceding period of 2016. Its share in total financial assets \nwas 17.7 per cent.\nFigure 81\nForeign Direct Investment and Portfolio Investment Inflows \n363.4\n807.2\n532.6\n162.1\n333.3\n862.1\n(57.52)\n(266.29)\n1768.8\n-500.0\n0.0\n500.0\n1000.0\n1500.0\n2000.0\n1st Half 2016\n2nd Half 2016\n1st Half 2017\nN' billion\nFDI Inflows\nPortfolio Inflows\nOther Investment Inflows\nSource: CBN\n4.5.3 Capital Importation and Capital Outflow \nProvisional data showed that new capital imported into the economy as reported by \nbanks, amounted to US$2.71 billion in the review period, compared with US$1.81 billion in \nthe first half of 2016. A disaggregation of capital imported by sectors showed that 39.9 per \ncent of total new capital was for purchase of shares, while investment in \ntelecommunication accounted for 11.8 per cent of the total. The servicing, oil and gas, \nproduction/manufacturing, banking and financing sectors accounted for 10.8, 10.8, 8.2, \n8.0 and 5.4 per cent of the total, respectively, while “Others” accounted for the balance. \nIn terms of the nature of capital, other investments remained dominant accounting for \n41.9 per cent of the total, followed by portfolio investment with 40.1 per cent, while FDI \ninflows accounted for 18.0 per cent. By country of origin, the United Kingdom accounted \nfor the highest inflow with 37.0 per cent of the total, followed by the United States, Belgium \nand Singapore with 18.6, 10.6, and 8.5 per cent, respectively. Other countries accounted \nfor the balance. \n118\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nProvisional data also showed that capital outflow was US$2.19 billion during the review \nperiod, compared with US$1.43 billion in the first half of 2016. Of the total amount, \nremittance of dividends by foreign investors amounted to US$1.00 billion, representing \n45.7 per cent of the total. Repayment of loans at US$0.63 billion accounted for 28.8 per \ncent, while capital transfer was US$0.56 billion, or 25.6 per cent of the total. \nFigure 82\nCapital Importation by Sector \n(First Half 2017, Per cent)\nShares 39.9\nOil & Gas 10.8\nTelecommunicat\nion 11.8\nFinancing 5.4\nBanking 8\nServicing 10.8\nProduction 8.2\nOthers 5.1\nShares\nOil & Gas\nTelecommunication\nSource: CBN\n119\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 83\nCapital Outflow and Outward Transfers \n(First Half 2017, Per cent)\nCapital Transfers\n25.8\nDividends 45.4\nLoans 28.8\nCapital Transfers\nDividends\nLoans\n4.5.4 External Reserves \nGross external reserves at end-June 2017 stood at US$30.34 billion, compared with \nUS$26.99 billion and US$26.51 billion at end-December and end-June 2016, respectively. \nThe improvement in external reserves was attributed mainly to crude oil-related receipts, \nand federal government loans, Eurobond proceeds and cash collateral. The external \nreserves position could cover 7.7 months of import of goods and services and 11.1 months \nof import of goods only. A breakdown of the external reserves by ownership showed that \nFederation was US$2.62 billion (8.6%); Federal Government, US$7.07 billion (23.3%); and \nthe CBN, US$20.64 billion (68.1%) of the total.\nSource: CBN\n120\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nFigure 84\nExternal Reserves Stock and Months of Import Commitments\n26.51\n26.99\n30.34 \n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\nFirst Half 2016\nSecond Half 2016\nFirst Half 2017\nUS$ billion\nExternal Reserves\nMonths of Import Commitments (Goods only)\nMonths of Import Commitments (Goods and Services)\nSource: CBN\n121\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n5.0 \nINTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS\n5.1 Global Institutions\n5.1.1 International Monetary Fund (IMF)\n5.1.2 The World Bank/IMF Spring Meetings\nThe 2017 Spring Meetings of the Board of Governors of the World Bank Group (WBG) and \nthe International Monetary Fund (IMF) were held in Washington D. C., USA from April 17 – \n23, 2017. In parallel with the Meetings, were the Ministers of the Inter-Governmental \nGroup of Twenty-Four (G-24) on International Monetary Affairs and Developments and \nthe International Monetary and Finance Committee (IMFC) Meetings.\nThe highlights of the discussions included:\n· \nIncreased momentum in global economic growth. It was expected that the \nEmerging Market and Developing Countries (EMDCs) would continue to \ncontribute significantly to global growth. However, downside risks from economic \nand non-economic sources remained high, including sharper than expected \ntightening of global financial conditions, inward-looking policies, and a reversal of \nfinancial regulatory reforms in systemically important advanced economies; \n· \nEfficient fiscal frameworks was essential to mobilize domestic resources to \neffectively support development efforts. There has been progress in improving tax \nrevenue-to-GDP ratios and enhancing spending efficiency in EMDCs. \nNevertheless, international partners have an important role to play in supporting \ncapacity building for revenue mobilization. The EMDCs were encouraged to \nengage in more peer learning and collaboration; and\n· \nThe IMF has a key role to play in supporting member countries to sustain recovery \nthrough monetary, fiscal, and structural policies. \nThe G-24 Ministers:\n \nExpressed support for a quota-based, adequately-resourced IMF that is less \ndependent on borrowed resources; and\n \nCalled for the full implementation of the 2010 Governance Reforms on Board \nRepresentation as well as the completion of the 15th General Review of Quotas, \nincluding a new quota formula. \nThe International Monetary and Finance Committee (IMFC):\n \nWelcomed initiatives by the IMF in providing country-specific advice on the policy \nmix that would sustain the ongoing recovery and address excessive global \n122\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nimbalances; and\n \nCalled on the IMF to promote policies that would expand opportunities; facilitate \nmultilateral solutions to meet global challenges; and strengthen the international \nmonetary system.\n5.1.3 G24 Technical Group Meeting\nThe 2017 Spring Technical Group Meeting (TGM) was held in Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia from \nFebruary 27 - 28, 2017. The Meeting discussed investment in infrastructure and managing \nstructural transformation; mobilising domestic resources for development; and \ninternational tax cooperation. \nOn infrastructure financing, there was a consensus that given the huge infrastructural \ndeficits in member-countries, budget appropriations have become grossly inadequate \nto meet the financing requirements. Thus, other domestic and external financing sources \nhave become germane. \nPolicy actions to promote long-term investments by domestic institutions were suggested \nas follows:\n· \nGovernment support for long-term investments involving designing policy \nframeworks that were supportive of long-term investing. The limited number and \nsporadic nature of investment opportunities in the infrastructure sector were \nperceived as the main barrier preventing investors from including infrastructure in \ntheir long-term investment strategy;\n· \nGovernment support, such as long-term policy planning, tax incentives and risk \ntransfer mechanisms may be required to engage investors in less liquid, long term \ninvestments in infrastructure; and \n· \nThere was need for reforming the regulatory framework for long-term investment. \nPolicymakers need to promote greater professionalism and expertise in the \ngovernance of institutional investors. Collaboration and resource-pooling can \nalso be encouraged to create institutions of sufficient scale that can implement a \nbroader investment strategy and more effective risk management systems that \ntake into account long-term risks. \nOn transformative industrial policy, the following broad lessons for industrial policymakers \nin member-countries were noted:\n· \nThe importance of productive capability building in economic development was \nhighlighted. If a policy limits the possibilities of building productive capabilities in \nthe long run, as policies like free trade or unconditional participation in global \nvalue chains (GVCs) are likely to do, it should not be adopted, or, at least, \n123\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nadopted with a deliberate plan to phase it out as soon as possible; \n=\nIndustrial policy-makers need to acquaint themselves with a range of industrial policy \nexperiences, if they were to design policies with the greatest possible effectiveness; \nand\n=\nThe recent changes in global industrial policy environment, the shrinkage in 'policy \nspace' and the rise of GVCs, have not made industrial policy irrelevant. If anything, \nthey have made it even more important for developing countries' industrial \npolicymakers to be 'smarter'. \nThe challenge that governments in developing countries face in mobilising tax revenues, \nwhich usually result in a gap between potential and actual revenues mobilised, was \nrecognised. \nThe key recommendations were that: \nl\nDomestic revenue mobilisation effort should take a broader and longer-term \nperspective; and \nl\nEffort should also be targeted at creating an environment conducive to sustainable \nrevenue mobilisation as part of a social contract between the government and the \ncitizens. This means promoting efficient, effective, equitable and sustainable revenue \npolicy and administrative strategies, and a strengthened legal framework to support \nthem.\n5.2 Regional Institutions\n5.2.1 Ordinary Meeting of the Bureau of the Association of African Central Banks \n(AACB), Dakar, Senegal, March 8, 2017\nThe Bureau of the Association of African Central Banks (AACB) held its Ordinary Meeting \nin Dakar, Senegal on March 8, 2017. The Meeting was preceded by the Technical \nMeeting of the Bureau from March 6 – 7, 2017.\nThe Meeting: \n=\nExamined the amended report of the Experts Group on the refinement of the \nconvergence criteria of the African Monetary Cooperation Programme (AMCP) and \ninstructed the Experts Group to:\n=\nProvide justifications on the selected criteria and thresholds;\n=\nPresent timelines for the creation of the African Central Bank (ACB);\n=\nSubmit the report to the member central banks and to the Regional Economic \nCommunities (RECs) for comment; and\n=\nPresent the report to the 40th Session of the Assembly of Governors scheduled \nfor August 2017 in South Africa.\n124\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n· \nSelected \"Monetary Integration Prospects in Africa: Lessons from the Experience \nof the European Monetary and Financial Integration\", as the theme for the 2017 \nSymposium, with the following sub-themes:\n \nMonetary integration: African Experience and European Experience;\n \nCoordinating and Merging Monetary and non-Monetary Blocs in Africa for \nMonetary Integration; and\n \nBanking and Financial Reforms in the Post Global Financial Crisis Era: \nLessons for Africa.\n· \nSelected \"Credible Communication Strategies for Central Banks in the Framework \nof Monetary Policy and Financial Stability\", as the theme for the 2017 Continental \nSeminar, with the following sub-themes:\n \nCentral Bank Communication and Monetary Policy Credibility;\n \nCentral Bank Communication and Financial Stability; and\n \nCross-Country Analysis on Central Banks Communication: Lessons for \nAfrican Central Banks.\n5.2.2 2017 Association of African Central Banks (AACB) Continental Seminar\nThe 2017 Association of African Central Banks (AACB) Continental Seminar was held in \nAccra, Ghana from May 3 – 5, 2017. The theme of the Seminar was “Credible \nCommunication Strategies for Central Banks in the Framework of Monetary Policy and \nFinancial Stability”. \nKey recommendations proposed at the Seminar included:\n· \nTraining journalists and engaging the media on reporting emerging crisis, its \nimplications and how it is being managed;\n· \nHaving a team of experts ready to be used in public engagement in times of \ncrises;\n· \nEnsuring coordinated communication to advise management on the \nimplications of a chosen course of action;\n· \nHaving a full-fledged and functional communication department in central \nbanks with adequate budget allocation to carry out their mandate;\n· \nHaving a definitive communication strategy for monetary policy and financial \nstability;\n· \nCommunication officials should have adequate authorisation to execute their \nmandate;\n· \nEnsuring a blend of communication experts and economists where necessary, \nwith strong collaboration between monetary policy and financial stability \ndepartments; and\n· \nEnsuring the use of appropriate methodologies for measuring the effectiveness of \nmonetary policy communication.\n125\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n5.3 \nSub-Regional Institutions \n5.3.1 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)\nThe Mid-Year Statutory Meeting of the Economic Community of West African States \n(ECOWAS) was held at Monrovia, Liberia from May 25 – June 4, 2017. The objective of the \nmeeting was to highlight the major areas of concern with respect to the implementation \nof the ECOWAS Monetary Cooperation Programme (EMCP), assess the progress made, \nas well as identify important areas that require urgent attention towards the 2020 \nmonetary integration. \nThe major outcome of the Meeting was the adoption of Morocco as a member in \nprinciple. The President of Liberia, Mrs. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, handed over the mantle of \nleadership to the President of Togo, Faure Gnassingbé, in line with the rotational principle \nof the Community.\n5.3.2 West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) Committee of Governors \nThe 34th Meeting of the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks of the West African \nMonetary Zone (WAMZ) was held in Freetown, Sierra Leone on February 9, 2017, to \ndeliberate on the status of implementation of the WAMZ Work Programme. The Report of \nthe 40th Meeting of the Technical Committee formed the basis for the deliberations. \nAfter deliberations, the Committee of Governors endorsed the following \nrecommendations for the consideration of the Convergence Council: \ni. \nThe Report on macroeconomic developments and convergence in the WAMZ at \nend-June 2016 and urged member-states to:\n· \nendeavour to diversify their economies so as to minimise the impact of \nshocks, domestic or external, as well as stimulate their economies through \ntargeted spending in growth-enhancing sectors for employment-\ngeneration and poverty-reduction;\n· \nstrengthen fiscal consolidation through expenditure rationalisation and \nrevenue mobilisation measures. Tax administration should be \nstrengthened, including enforcement strategies aimed at curbing tax \nevasion and excessive duty waivers in a bid to enhance revenue \ncollection and consequently improving on the fiscal deficit to GDP ratio; \n· \nrestrain the rising wage bill in some member countries through the \ndevelopment and implementation of public financial management \nreforms; and\n· \nensure full implementation of the CET, making efforts to resolve issues \nhindering the take-off as countries which have implemented the CET have \nnot suffered any revenue losses; \n126\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nii. \nDirected WAMI to undertake a study on the implications of fragility of member-\nstates' economies on the convergence process with implementable \nrecommendations at the next statutory meetings;\niii. \nDirected WAMI to finalise and re-present the paper on “Managing Commodity \nPrice Shocks in the WAMZ: The Role of Fiscal, Monetary and Exchange Rate \nPolicies” to the Technical Committee;\niv. \nEndorsed the transformation of WAMI into a Commission;\nv. \nApproved the roadmap leading to the establishment of the proposed WAMZ \nCommission, including the preparation of a project document, proposals for the \namendment of the WAMZ Agreement and the convening of WAMZ Heads of \nState Summit to consider and approve the establishment of the Commission;\nvi. \nUrged the beneficiary member-states to fund, on equal basis, the shortfall for the \nWAMZ Payments System Project arising from the exchange rate losses due to \nappreciation of the US-dollar against the Unit of Account;\nvii. \nDirected WAMI to prepare a proposal and seek funding for the WAMZ Payments \nand Settlement System (WAMZPSS), which will establish, among other functions, \nan inter-linkage between the RTGS of the WAMZ member-states via SWIFT to \nfacilitate cross-border trade through efficient and safe transfer of funds and also \nserve as a platform for quoting and trading in WAMZ national currencies;\nviii. \nNoted the Report on the progress made in capital market integration in West \nAfrica and urged member-states to redouble efforts to address the constraints to \ndeepening the market in the WAMZ; and\nix. \nDirected WAMI to establish three sub-committees, namely Legal and Institutional, \nPayments System, and Operations, to facilitate the work of the Experts \nCommittee on Quoting and Trading in WAMZ National Currencies.\n5.3.3 West African Institute for Financial and Economic Management (WAIFEM)\nThe 32nd Board of Governors Meeting of the West African Institute for Financial and \nEconomic Management (WAIFEM) was held in Freetown, Sierra Leone on February 9, \n2017. The Meeting was preceded by the 35th meeting of the Technical Committee held \non February 5, 2017. The Meeting was chaired by the Deputy Governor, Bank of Liberia \nand Chairman, Board of Governors of WAIFEM. The report of the Technical Committee \nformed the basis for the Board of Governors' deliberations.\nAfter deliberating on the report, the Board of Governors:\n· \nadopted the draft minutes of the 31st Meeting of the Board of Governors;\n· \nnoted the Progress Report by the Director General;\n· \napproved the Draft Revised Budget for the Year 2017;\n· \nnoted the Report on studies conducted by the Research Unit;\n· \nnoted the Progress Report on the implementation of the WAIFEM's Strategic Plan; \nand\n127\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n· \nnoted the Status Report on WAIFEM as an ECOWAS Training Institute. \n5.3.4 Meeting of the Committee of Governors of ECOWAS Member Central Banks \nThe 49th Ordinary Meeting of the Committee of Governors (CoG) of Central Banks of \nECOWAS member-states was held on February 9, 2017 in Freetown, Sierra Leone. The \nMeeting was preceded by the 30th Meeting of the Technical Committee held from \nFebruary 3 - 4, 2017. The CoG Meeting reviewed and discussed the report of the 30th \nmeeting of the Technical Committee. After deliberations, the CoG endorsed the \nfollowing recommendations:\nI. \nOn the ECOWAS Monetary Cooperation Programme in 2015 Report, the CoG \nurged Member Countries to: \nI. \nImprove the business climate with the aim of diversifying the economy, \nstrengthening growth prospects and boosting exports through:\n· \nacceleration of on-going reforms with a view to overcoming the \nconstraints impeding the development of certain sectors of the \neconomy and enhancing dynamism of economic activities and \ndiversifying the sources of growth;\n· \nstepping up effort to boost energy production and the \ndevelopment of modern infrastructure with a view to increasing \ncapacity for processing raw materials and reducing dependence \non commodity export;\n· \nimplementation of appropriate measures to curb the spread of \nterrorism through, inter alia, strengthening security arrangements, \nimproving the education system, combating youth unemployment \nand developing vulnerable areas; and\n· \nconsolidation of ongoing actions to resolve the socio-political and \nsecurity crises in the region.\nii. \nTake all necessary measures to contain the budget deficits, curtail the \nrapid growth in public debt and improve the impact of government \nexpenditure especially by: \n· \nincreasing tax revenue through modernisation of the tax \nadministration, expanding the tax base, strengthening control \nprocedures and minimising exemptions; \n· \nrationalising public sector institutions by modernising administrative \nsystems and operational procedures to minimise recurrent \nexpenditure, in particular the wage bill as well as transfers and \nsubsidies; and\n· \nenhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of public investment to \nincrease their impact on growth.\n128\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\niii. \nTo show more commitment to the monetary integration agenda by \nensuring compliance with the convergence criteria on a sustainable \nbasis;\niv. \nLiberia should fast-track effort at the de-dollarisation of its economy;\n \nv. \nWAMA urged to conduct the following studies:\na. \nThe Relationship between GDP, Growth in Money Supply and \nInflation in ECOWAS member-countries; and\nb. \nThe Sufficiency of the Convergence Criteria as Basis for Monetary \nIntegration in ECOWAS.\nII. \nThe CoG considered the Report on Exchange Rate Developments of ECOWAS \nCurrencies at end-2015 and in the first half of 2016 and urged Member States to:\ni. \nundertake structural reforms aimed at diversifying exports to \nincrease the foreign exchange earning capacity of member-states \nof ECOWAS; \nii. \ntake measures to encourage local production and consumption as \npart of the process of import substitution;\niii. \npromote the use of local currencies in domestic transactions; and\niv. \nstrengthen economic policies of member states by enhancing the \ncollaboration between monetary and fiscal authorities.\nIII. \nThe CoG considered the Report on Financial Sector Developments and Stability in \nECOWAS (First half 2016) and recommended that member countries should: \ni. \nadopt risk-based supervision and set up deposit insurance schemes \nto safeguard depositors' funds, reinforce public confidence in the \nbanking system and contribute towards financial stability; and \nii. \ninitiate the establishment of colleges of supervisors for systemically \nimportant financial institutions to guard against financial instability.\nIV. \nOn the Study on the Mechanisms for Transition to Inflation Targeting Lite (ITL) in \nECOWAS, the CoG directed WAMA to:\ni. \nconfirm whether ITL would be the optimal framework for ECOWAS \nmonetary policy; and\nii. \nundertake a study on the compatibility of the ITL framework with \nexchange rate regimes of ECOWAS member-countries. \nV. \nOn the Proposal for the Establishment of an Exchange Rate Mechanism for \nECOWAS, it was recommended that WAMA should:\ni. \nUpdate the report, taking into account, recent developments of ECOWAS \n129\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\ncurrencies;\nii. \nReview the strengths and weaknesses of the currencies of ECOWAS \nmember countries and evaluate movements towards convergence; \niii. \nConduct a study project with a view to assessing the impact of the \nproposed exchange rate mechanism on the economies of Member \nStates; and \niv. \nOrganise a meeting of exchange rate specialists to share the technical \naspects of the report.\n5.3.5 Convergence Council of Ministers and Governors of Central Banks of the WAMZ\nThe 37th Meeting of the Convergence Council of Ministers and Governors of the Central \nBanks of the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) was held in Freetown, Sierra Leone on \nFebruary 10, 2017, to deliberate on the status of implementation of the WAMZ Work \nProgramme. The Report of the 34th Meeting of the Committee of Governors formed the \nbasis for the deliberations. In a unanimous decision, the Republic of Sierra Leone was \nelected as Chair of the Convergence Council. \nFollowing deliberations on the presentations by the Committee of Governors of the \nWAMZ members, Council approved the recommendations of the Committee of \nGovernors.\n130\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n6.0 \nOUTLOOK FOR THE SECOND HALF OF 2017\nThe outlook for Nigeria's economy for the rest of the year signals moderate improvement, \npremised largely on expected fiscal expansion, slowdown in inflationary pressure, \nstability in the foreign exchange market and increase in non-oil receipts. The cautious \noptimism was against the backdrop of persisting structural rigidities and sluggish recovery \nof the global economy. \nThe outlook for the real sector for the remaining half of 2017 is largely positive. The \ncommitment of the Federal Government to implement the Economic Recovery and \nGrowth Plan (ERGP) and close dilapidated infrastructure gap is expected to increase \ndomestic production, dampen inflationary pressure and moderate unemployment. In \naddition, the CBN interventions in critical sectors, the commitment of the government to \nenhance ease of doing business through the signing of three (3) executive orders, as well \nas the sustained effort to stem insurgency in the North Eastern, would improve the \nmacroeconomic environment for increased real sector productivity, thereby returning \nthe economy to positive growth path.\nThe improved performance of the external sector was expected to be sustained into the \nsecond half of 2017. The positive outlook is premised on the fact that crude oil price and \nproduction increase in 2017. With the peace deal in the Niger Delta region, it is expected \nthat this favourable scenario would continue in the near future. On the foreign exchange \nmarket, the CBN remains committed to provide the required liquidity to support domestic \nproduction. \nOn the fiscal side, there are indications that government revenue target would be met. \nThe passage of the 2017 appropriation bill would stimulate economic activities, through \ncapital releases to address infrastructure deficits and the Paris Club refund to state \ngovernments to settle the accumulated salaries and pension arrears. These \ndevelopments would provide the necessary fiscal stimulus for the economy and boost \naggregate demand and output. The downside risk, however, is the likelihood of \nbunching capital spendings with implication for banking system liquidity. This should be \ncontained by effective fiscal/monetary policy coordination. \nIn the financial sector, with the continued monetary policy tightening stance of the Bank, \nthe prospect of achieving its objectives of monetary and price stability is bright. Also, the \nprospect for improvement in the banking sector in particular will rest, largely, on the \ngradual reversal of deterioration in asset quality of banks, which remained significantly \nabove the regulatory benchmark in the review period. The effort by the banks, in debt \nrecovery, realisation of collateral for lost facilities and strengthening of risk management \n131\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nfunctions, coupled with measures being taken by the CBN, are likely going to lead to a \nrebound in the sector. The sector, however, witnessed the emergence of digital \ncurrencies, innovation in financial technology which poses risks to monetary policy \neffectiveness. An understanding of this development alongside approaches to \novercome its downside risks is critical for the monetary authority in the coming months in \nthe year, to maintain a balance in the financial sector and ensure the achievement of \nthe Bank's mandate of price and financial system stability. \n132 \nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nTable 20\nDMBs' Credit to the Core Private Sector: (Percentage Share) \nSources\nJun-16\nDec-16\nJun-17\nAgriculture\n3.09\n3.26\n3.19\nIndustry\n37.89\n38.82\n39.61\nMining & Quarrying\n0.11\n0.13\n0.07\nManufacturing \n13.25\n13.75\n14.11\nOil & Gas\n21.66\n22.26\n22.46\nof which DownStream, Natural Gas and Crude Oil Refining\n21.66\n22.26\n22.46\nPower and Energy\n2.88\n2.68\n2.97\nof which IPP and Power Generation\n2.88\n2.68\n2.97\nConstruction\n3.91\n3.92\n4.01\nTrade/General Commerce\n6.56\n6.11\n6.11\nGovernment\n8.91\n8.45\n8.70\nServices\n39.62\n39.44\n38.38\nReal Estate\n4.61\n4.91\n5.06\nFinance, Insurance and Capital Market\n5.51\n5.82\n5.79\nEducation\n0.56\n0.54\n0.48\nOil & Gas\n7.32\n7.87\n6.94\nof which Upstream and Oil & Gas Services\n7.32\n7.87\n6.94\nPower and Energy\n1.53\n1.82\n1.92\nof which Power Transmission and Distribution\n1.53\n1.82\n1.92\nOthers\n20.09\n18.48\n18.18\nof which: i. General\n8.53\n8.16\n8.16\nii. Information & Communication\n6.08\n5.25\n5.00\niii. Transportation & Storage\n2.94\n2.80\n2.57\nTotal Private Sector Credit\n100.00\n100.00\n100.00\nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria\nShare in Outstanding (Per cent)\n133\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nTable 21\nMoney Market Rates: First Half 2017 /1\n(Per cent)\nMonth\nMPR\nInterbank Call \nRate\nOBB\nNIBOR: Call\nNIBOR: 30 Days\nNIBOR: 90 Days\nJan - 17\n14.00\n8.15 \n8.69\n9.70\n16.95\n18.44\nFeb - 17\n14.00\n27.46 \n23.60\n23.94\n16.87\n19.14\nMar - 17\n14.00\n12.56 \n21.60\n22.08\n19.99\n20.45\nApr - 17\n14.00\n64.58 \n51.04\n58.51\n55.47\n56.61\nMay - 17\n14.00\n21.29 \n39.29\n41.35\n30.48\n31.33\nJun - 17\n14.00\n13.46 \n29.57\n32.88\n30.84\n31.55\n1st Half 2017 Average\n14.00\n24.58\n28.97\n31.41\n28.43\n29.59\n1st Half 2016 Average\n11.67\n9.28\n6.75\n6.73\n9.03\n10.16\nSources: Central Bank of Nigeria and Financial Markets Dealers Association\n 1/ Revised\n n. a. means not available\nWEIGHTED AVERAGE\nTable 22\nSelected Interest Rates: First Half 2017\n(Per cent)\nMonth\nSavings\nAverage \nTerm Deposit\nPrime \nLending\nMaximum \nLending\nJan - 17\n4.22\n7.81\n16.91\n28.88\nFeb - 17\n4.22\n7.85\n17.13\n29.26\nMar - 17\n4.23\n7.85\n17.43\n30.18\nApr - 17\n4.24\n7.97\n17.44\n30.31\nMay - 17\n4.08\n7.98\n17.58\n30.75\nJun - 17\n4.08\n7.86\n17.59\n30.94\n1st Half 2017 Average\n4.18\n7.89\n17.35\n30.06\n1st Half 2016 Average\n3.43\n5.76\n16.63\n26.83\nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria\n134\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nTable 23\nOpen Market Operations (OMO) Sessions\nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria\nTotal\nAmount \nAverage\nAverage Yield\nBids\nSold\nTenor (Days)\n(%)\n(N' Million)\n(N' Million)\n2013\nJanuary\n2,958,460.00\n1,756,660.00\n77\n13.73\nFebruary\n2,302,710.00\n1,351,600.00\n105\n12.54\nMarch\n2,061,290.00\n1,265,240.00\n118\n13.30\nApril\n2,228,780.00\n1,516,690.00\n169\n13.55\nMay\n1,476,320.00\n1,127,400.00\n159\n13.22\nJune\n505,190.00\n81,950.00\n156\n14.09\nTotal\n11,532,750.00\n7,099,540.00\nAverage\n1,922,125.00\n1,183,256.67\n131\n13.40\nJuly\n1,078,590.00\n508,740.00\n161\n14.02\nAugust\n96,480.00\n91,730.00\n132\n13.37\nSeptember\n337,350.00\n150,510.00\n141\n13.41\nOctober\n1,956,950.00\n1,206,860.00\n127\n12.80\nNovember\n1,109,670.00\n791,090.00\n102\n12.52\nDecember\n797,960.00\n599,470.00\n125\n12.51\nTotal\n5,377,000.00\n3,348,400.00\nAverage\n896,166.67\n558,066.67\n131\n13.10\n2014\nJanuary\n1,271,958.85\n1,091,488.65\n118\n12.47\nFebruary\n405,786.77\n307,403.51\n130\n13.17\nMarch\n836,869.23\n714,571.36\n133\n13.76\nApril\n359,329.93\n285,940.65\n125\n12.87\nMay\n1,229,507.61\n905,994.13\n121\n11.29\nJune\n1,351,007.15\n1,179,539.92\n122\n11.20\nTotal\n5,454,459.54\n4,484,938.22\nAverage\n909,076.59\n747,489.70\n125\n12.46\nJuly\n812,923.19\n810,924.19\n129\n11.23\nAugust\n654,527.07\n654,527.07\n133\n11.24\nSeptember\n1,070,421.99\n989,578.88\n143\n11.25\nOctober\n800,935.02\n652,505.59\n164\n11.52\nNovember\n1,012,679.55\n830,230.89\n163\n11.81\nDecember\n0.00\n0.00\n0\n0.00\nTotal\n4,351,486.82\n3,937,766.62\nAverage\n870,297.36\n787,553.32\n146\n11.41\n2015\nJanuary\n1,637,224.91\n1,295,880.94\n165\n15.29\nFebruary\n279,283.49\n217,327.54\n193\n16.09\nMarch\n586,859.44\n543,859.44\n188\n16.09\nApril\n1,027,454.90\n933,744.73\n261\n16.44\nMay\n657,106.07\n524,540.43\n206\n15.24\nJune\n979,350.37\n746,365.40\n145\n14.55\nTotal\n5,167,279.18\n4,261,718.48\nAverage\n861,213.20\n710,286.41\n193\n15.61\nJuly\n963,380.00\n771,823.00\n227\n15.34\nAugust\n226,718.00\n73,269.00\n346\n16.14\nSeptember\n402,805.00\n-\n-\n-\nOctober\n-\n-\n-\n-\nNovember\n-\n-\n-\n-\nDecember\n736,952.00\n482,153.00\n303\n8.57\nTotal\n2,329,855.00\n1,327,245.00\nAverage\n582,463.75\n442,415.00\n292\n13.35\n2016\nJanuary\n913,260.00\n698,420.00\n186\n8.15\nFebruary\n630,890.00\n509,230.00\n175\n8.08\nMarch\n706,990.00\n394,630.00\n231\n8.81\nApril\n710,300.00\n363,720.00\n233\n9.72\nMay\n367,700.00\n64,630.00\n288\n10.56\nJune\n540,800.00\n299,120.00\n285\n12.93\nTotal\n3,869,940.00\n2,329,750.00\nAverage\n644,990.00\n388,291.67\n233\n9.71\nJuly\n909,780.00\n695,210.00\n233\n19.38\nAugust\n2,248,650.00\n1,728,150.00\n275\n17.87\nSeptember\n1,067,340.00\n1,057,950.00\n232\n20.64\nOctober\n832,900.00\n807,020.00\n234\n20.67\nNovember\n732,660.00\n665,570.00\n278\n17.25\nDecember\n633,140.00\n575,970.00\n266\n21.12\nTotal\n6,424,470.00\n5,529,870.00\nAverage\n1,070,745.00\n921,645.00\n253\n19.49\n2017\nJanuary\n1,237,870.00\n700,520.00\n248\n20.8925\nFebruary\n621,150.00\n619,140.00\n262\n21.0613\nMarch\n418,190.00\n391,160.00\n251\n20.9345\nApril\n376,660.00\n319,090.00\n266\n21.1100\nMay\n585,900.00\n580,080.00\n259\n21.0310\nJune\n1,354,160.00\n1,261,280.00\n252\n19.6466\nTotal\n4,593,930.00\n3,871,270.00\nAverage\n765,655.00\n645,211.67\n256\n20.78\nPeriod\n135\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nTable 24\nTreasury Bills: Issues and Allotments\n(Naira Million)\nDeposit Money \nBanks\nNon-Bank \nPublic\n2013\nJune\n397,845.75\n0.00\n152,626.18\n245,219.57\nDecember\n400,605.12\n0.00\n139,214.85\n261,390.28\nAnnual Total\n3,650,881.21\n0.00\n1,853,716.30\n1,797,164.91\nAnnual Average\n304,240.10\n0.00\n154,476.36\n149,763.74\n2014\nJune\n440,713.48\n0.00\n165,215.22\n275,498.26\nDecember\n378,130.00\n21,260.00\n132,010.00\n224,850.00\nAnnual Total\n3,879,469.09\n88,240.00\n1,985,031.81\n1,806,194.96\nAnnual Average\n323,289.09\n7,353.33\n165,419.32\n150,516.25\n2015\nJune\n380,023.16\n0.00\n212,850.32\n167,172.84\nDecember\n352,034.71\n0.00\n344,843.52\n7,191.20\nAnnual Total\n3,845,317.30\n0.00\n2,686,460.16\n1,158,857.14\nAnnual Average\n320,443.11\n0.00\n223,871.68\n96,571.43\n2016\nJune\n480,753.95\n28,000.00\n260,910.92\n191,843.03\nDecember\n347,920.69\n43,511.80\n157,769.48\n146,639.42\nAnnual Total\n4,555,502.05\n163,590.48\n2,329,090.90\n2,062,820.67\nAnnual Average\n379,625.17\n13,632.54\n194,090.91\n171,901.72\n2017\nJanuary\n441,808.31\n-\n \n340,747.79\n \n101,060.52\nFebruary\n504,833.44\n-\n \n388,414.89\n \n116,418.55\nMarch\n698,966.18\n14,130.18\n \n330,783.44\n \n354,052.56\nApril\n402,411.43\n113,050.28\n \n163,504.05\n \n125,857.10\nMay\n367,605.89\n-\n \n158,014.69\n \n209,591.19\nJune\n513,625.88\n-\n \n244,465.98\n \n269,159.90\nHalf Year Total\n2,929,251.12\n127,180.46\n1,625,930.84\n1,176,139.83\nHalf Year Average\n488,208.52\n21,196.74\n270,988.47\n196,023.30\nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria\nPeriod \nIssues\nCentral \nBank\nAllotment to Subscriber \n136\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nTable 25\nMonetary and Credit Developments 3/\n(N' Million)\nItem\nJun 2013\nDec 2013\nJun 2014\nDec 2014\nJun 2015\nDec 2015\nJun 2016\nDec 2016\nJun 2017 /4\n(1) Domestic Credit (Net)\n13,149,382.49\n14,535,204.72\n16,689,493.70\n19,273,756.71\n21,409,774.20\n21,612,452.09\n24,623,626.70\n26,857,719.34\n27,236,433.60\n(a) Claims on Federal Government (Net)\n-2,542,654.43\n-1,656,265.28\n-238,488.87\n1,147,707.24\n2,511,101.09\n2,891,946.66\n3,171,443.45\n4,875,570.30\n5,250,486.41\n By Central Bank\n-3,519,920.52\n-2,289,104.87\n-2,913,883.11\n-2,141,684.16\n-769,517.43\n-1,653,067.50\n-1,185,761.66\n109,158.25\n232,806.35\n By Commecial Banks\n937,527.48\n596,989.86\n2,629,128.88\n3,214,435.52\n3,219,301.45\n4,470,267.34\n4,179,939.12\n4,563,266.39\n4,821,703.05\n By Merchant Banks\n39,738.60\n36,606.47\n46,265.36\n74,955.88\n61,317.08\n74,746.83\n177,266.00\n203,145.66\n195,977.01\n By Non Interest Banks\n0.00\n-756.74\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n(b) Claims on Private Sector \n15,692,036.93\n16,191,470.00\n16,927,982.57\n18,126,049.46\n18,898,673.11\n18,720,505.43\n21,452,183.25\n21,982,149.04\n21,985,947.18\n By Central Bank\n4,703,313.19\n4,599,388.32\n4,702,335.98\n4,859,887.74\n5,093,071.50\n5,061,611.28\n5,402,940.93\n5,298,255.90\n5,692,288.30\n By Commercial Banks\n10,949,139.46\n11,543,649.93\n12,168,761.86\n13,179,598.11\n13,712,964.87\n13,568,543.70\n15,903,577.86\n16,500,150.26\n16,092,233.81\n By Merchant Banks\n32,218.12\n37,919.13\n40,749.44\n62,646.43\n68,535.18\n62,845.80\n111,828.57\n145,180.11\n161,090.01\n By Non Interest Banks\n7,366.15\n10,512.62\n16,135.29\n23,917.18\n24,101.56\n27,504.65\n33,835.89\n38,562.77\n40,335.06\n (i) Claims on State and Local Govts\n661,034.92\n779,126.93\n489,324.37\n538,767.32\n472,792.84\n585,060.12\n729,427.54\n989,541.97\n1,180,310.12\n By Central Bank\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n27,800.00\n300,379.00\n495,915.00\n By Commercial Banks\n660,341.02\n776,698.03\n486,924.37\n536,367.32\n471,430.12\n583,817.73\n698,822.78\n681,830.36\n678,439.76\n By Merchant Banks\n693.90\n1,428.90\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n1,650.14\n6,272.36\n4,996.57\n By Non Interest Banks\n0.00\n1,000.00\n2,400.00\n2,400.00\n1,362.72\n1,242.40\n1,154.62\n1,060.25\n958.80\n (ii) Claims on Non-Financial Public Ent's\n0.00\n23,578.28\n23,587.73\n25,590.35\n51,033.53\n25,588.01\n319,694.07\n25,603.30\n32,984.48\n By Central Bank\n0.00\n23,578.28\n23,587.73\n25,590.35\n51,033.53\n25,588.01\n319,694.07\n25,603.30\n32,984.48\n By Commercial Banks\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n By Merchant Banks\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n By Non Interest Banks\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n (iii) Claims on Other Private Sector \n15,031,002.01\n15,388,764.78\n16,415,070.47\n17,561,691.79\n18,374,846.74\n18,109,857.30\n20,403,061.64\n20,967,003.77\n20,772,652.59\n By Central Bank\n4,703,313.19\n4,575,810.04\n4,678,748.26\n4,834,297.39\n5,042,037.96\n5,036,023.27\n5,055,446.86\n4,972,273.60\n5,163,388.82\n By Commercial Banks\n10,288,798.44\n10,766,951.89\n11,681,837.48\n12,643,230.79\n13,241,534.75\n12,984,725.98\n15,204,755.08\n15,818,319.90\n15,413,794.05\n By Merchant Banks\n31,524.22\n36,490.23\n40,749.44\n62,646.43\n68,535.18\n62,845.80\n110,178.43\n138,907.76\n156,093.44\n By Non Interest Banks\n7,366.15\n9,512.62\n13,735.29\n21,517.18\n22,738.84\n26,262.25\n32,681.27\n37,502.52\n39,376.27\n(2) Foreign Assets (Net)\n9,164,430.15\n8,658,649.73\n7,673,096.58\n6,954,214.77\n5,951,452.90\n5,653,320.37\n7,105,663.47\n9,149,659.29\n8,468,080.62\n By Central Bank\n7,561,183.53\n7,043,927.36\n6,343,984.91\n6,244,718.92\n5,795,959.61\n5,545,320.51\n6,840,426.38\n8,790,652.82\n8,378,904.55\n By Commecial Banks\n1,599,504.06\n1,611,727.94\n1,317,873.30\n712,557.52\n159,892.93\n125,384.36\n254,493.47\n346,200.38\n101,695.18\n By Merchant Banks\n1,936.05\n1,089.63\n8,419.57\n-6,373.02\n-5,946.22\n-18,785.78\n8,455.14\n11,711.36\n-21,000.64\n By Non Interest Banks\n1,806.50\n1,904.80\n2,818.80\n3,311.35\n1,546.58\n1,401.28\n2,288.47\n1,094.72\n8,481.53\n(3) Other Assets (Net)\n-6,720,640.13\n-7,504,890.90\n-6,785,949.98\n-7,314,942.50\n-8,549,797.70\n-7,235,941.34\n-9,651,276.71\n-12,415,646.05\n-13,723,931.86\nTotal Monetary Assets\n15,593,172.51\n15,688,963.55\n17,576,640.29\n18,913,028.98\n18,811,429.40\n20,029,831.12\n22,078,013.46\n23,591,732.58\n21,980,582.35\nQuasi-Money /1\n8,653,623.30\n8,656,124.80\n10,480,203.25\n12,008,237.57\n12,269,037.20\n11,458,129.82\n12,559,032.07\n12,320,225.75\n11,790,391.44\nMoney Supply\n6,939,549.21\n7,032,838.75\n7,096,437.05\n6,904,791.41\n6,542,392.20\n8,571,701.30\n9,518,981.39\n11,271,506.82\n10,190,190.92\n Currency Outside Banks\n1,127,804.88\n1,446,660.40\n1,211,563.93\n1,437,397.09\n1,183,988.38\n1,456,096.85\n1,379,045.17\n1,820,415.90\n1,477,147.44\n Demand Deposits /2\n5,811,744.33\n5,586,178.35\n5,884,873.12\n5,467,394.32\n5,358,403.82\n7,115,604.46\n8,139,936.23\n9,451,090.92\n8,713,043.48\nTotal Monetary Liabilities\n15,593,172.51\n15,688,963.55\n17,576,640.29\n18,913,028.98\n18,811,429.40\n20,029,831.12\n22,078,013.46\n23,591,732.58\n21,980,582.35\nGROWTH RATE OVER THE PRECEDING \nDECEMBER (In Percentages)\nCredit to the Domestic Economy (Net)\n3.55\n14.47\n14.82\n32.60\n11.08\n12.13\n13.93\n24.27\n1.41\nCredit to the Private Sector\n3.57\n6.86\n4.55\n11.95\n4.26\n3.28\n14.59\n17.42\n0.02\nClaims on Federal Government (Net)\n-3.63\n32.50\n85.60\n169.29\n118.79\n151.98\n9.66\n68.59\n7.69\n By Central Bank\n1.52\n35.96\n-27.29\n6.44\n64.07\n22.81\n28.27\n106.60\n113.27\nClaims on State and Local Governments\n-0.73\n17.01\n-37.20\n-30.85\n-12.25\n8.59\n24.68\n69.14\n19.28\nClaims on Non-Financial Public Enterprises\n0.04\n8.53\n99.42\n-0.01\n1,149.39\n0.06\n28.83\nClaims on Other Private Sector\n3.76\n6.23\n6.67\n14.12\n4.63\n3.12\n12.66\n15.78\n-0.93\nForeign Assets (Net)\n1.34\n-4.26\n-11.38\n-19.68\n-14.42\n-18.71\n25.69\n61.85\n-7.45\nQuasi-Money \n7.33\n7.36\n21.07\n38.73\n2.17\n-4.58\n9.61\n7.52\n-4.30\nMoney Supply (M1)\n-6.49\n-5.23\n0.90\n-1.82\n-5.25\n24.14\n11.05\n31.50\n-9.59\nBroad Money (M2)\n0.71\n1.32\n12.03\n20.55\n-0.54\n5.90\n10.23\n17.78\n-6.83\nOther Assets (Net)\n-7.39\n-19.92\n9.58\n2.53\n-16.88\n1.08\n-33.38\n-71.58\n-10.54\nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria\n/1 Quasi-Money consists of Time, Savings and Foreign Currency Deposits of Deposit Money Banks excluding takings from Discount Houses.\n/2 Demand Deposits consist of state and local government as well as parastatals deposits at the CBN on the one hand, and state and local government and private sector deposits as well as demand deposits of non-financial public\n enterprises at the Deposit Money Banks on the other.\n/3 Adoption of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) and bank returns in compliance with the IFRS commenced in March 2015.\n/4 Provisional\n137\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nTable 26\nValue of Money Market Assets 1/\n(Naira Million) \n2017 /2\nJune\nDec\nJune\nDec\nJune\nDec\nJune\nDec\nJune\nTreasury Bills\n2,483,285.11\n2,581,550.64\n2,735,869.09\n2,815,523.75\n2,824,952.25\n2,772,867.04\n2,901,807.05\n3,277,278.83\n3,702,831.68\nCertificates of Deposits\n23,000.00\n20,500.00\n51,500.00\n50,954.00\n38,693.10\n75,702.83\n55,020.04\n0.00\n0.00\nCommercial Papers\n15,002.10\n9,324.80\n10,088.31\n9,822.17\n6,679.00\n6,291.85\n3,546.10\n490.47\n497.34\nBankers' Acceptances\n16,012.34\n20,469.96\n7,350.82\n8,757.23\n8,596.28\n28,417.89\n29,755.86\n27,795.30\n41,039.93\nFGN Bonds\n4,032,903.13\n4,222,037.71\n4,369,837.71\n4,792,281.22\n5,300,418.82\n5,808,140.82\n7,473,539.17\n7,564,937.47\n7,962,193.05\nFGN Savings Bonds /3\n4,754.08\nTotal\n6,570,202.67\n6,853,883.10\n7,174,645.94\n7,677,338.37\n8,179,339.46\n8,691,420.43 10,463,668.22 10,870,502.06 11,711,316.07\nTreasury Bills\n16.97\n21.60\n5.98\n9.06\n0.33\n-1.52\n4.65\n18.19\n27.60\nCertificates of Deposits\n-32.35\n-39.71\n151.22\n148.56\n-24.06\n48.57\n-27.32\n-100.00\n-100.00\nCommercial Papers\n1,328.28\n787.77\n8.19\n5.33\n-32.00\n-35.94\n-43.64\n-92.20\n-85.98\nBankers' Acceptances\n62.33\n107.53\n-64.09\n-57.22\n-1.84\n224.51\n4.71\n-2.19\n37.92\nFGN Bonds\n-1.16\n3.48\n3.50\n13.51\n10.60\n21.20\n28.67\n30.25\n6.54\nFGN Savings Bond /3\nPercentage Change of Total\n5.16\n9.70\n4.68\n12.01\n6.54\n13.21\n20.39\n25.07\n7.73\nPercentage Change Over Preceding December\nInstrument\n2014\n2013\n2016\n2015\nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria\n/1 Revised\n/2 Provisional\n/3 A new FGN security introduced in March 2017.\n138\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nTable 27\nSelected Interest Rates /1\n(End-Period Rate)\n2017\nJun\nDec\nJun\nDec\nJun\nDec\nJun\nDec\nJun\nEnd-Period Rates\nMonetary Policy Rate\n12.00\n12.00\n12.00\n13.00\n13.00\n11.00\n12.00\n14.00\n14.00\nTreasury Bills Issue Rate\n11.60\n10.97\n10.23\n10.77\n11.87\n6.21\n10.14\n17.24\n17.51\nWeighted Average Rates\nInter-bank Call Rate \n11.59\n10.75\n10.50\n24.30\n10.85\n0.77\n35.26\n10.39\n13.46\nNIBOR Call Rate\n12.22\n11.17\n10.84\n25.51\n14.07\n1.04\n20.34\n8.53\n32.88\nNIBOR 30-days\n12.32\n11.87\n12.17\n13.71\n14.54\n9.11\n17.62\n16.34\n30.84\nNIBOR 90-days\n13.31\n12.43\n13.28\n13.75\n15.30\n10.84\n18.43\n18.66\n31.55\nOpen Buy Back (OBB)\n11.19\n11.24\n10.52\n22.28\n10.65\n0.98\n21.75\n7.35\n29.57\nDeposit Money Banks (DMBs) \n(Weighted Average Rates)\nSavings Deposit Rate\n2.04\n2.53\n3.42\n3.46\n3.60\n3.33\n3.61\n4.18\n4.08\nTime Deposit Rate (3 months)\n7.49\n7.96\n9.30\n9.48\n10.27\n6.91\n6.92\n8.80\n9.01\nPrime Lending Rate\n16.56\n17.01\n16.50\n15.88\n17.24\n16.96\n16.78\n17.09\n17.59\nMaximum Lending Rate\n24.58\n24.90\n26.07\n25.91\n26.84\n26.84\n26.93\n28.55\n30.94\nSources: Financial Market Dealers Association (FMDA) and Central Bank of Nigeria\n/1 Revised\n2014\n2013\n2016\n2015\nTable 28\nFederation Account Operations\n(N' Billion)\n139\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n2013\n2014\n2015 1/\n2016 2/\n2017 2/\n 'Half Year\n1st Half\n1st Half\n1st Half\n1st Half\n1st Half\n Budget \n2017 \nTotal Revenue (Gross)\n4,806.50\n5,109.04\n3,452.84\n2,395.44\n2,992.83\n5,368.55\nOil Revenue (Gross)\n3,648.04\n3,604.39\n2,049.78\n1,203.32\n1,613.02\n2,697.72\n Crude Oil and Gas Exports\n842.94\n1,094.04\n489.49\n194.98\n213.17\n841.64\n PPT and Royalties etc.\n2,003.29\n1,713.36\n898.33\n526.82\n645.86\n1,002.69\n Domestic Crude Oil / Gas Sales\n785.17\n748.21\n607.21\n440.37\n723.25\n343.87\n Other Oil Revenue\n16.64\n48.78\n54.76\n41.15\n30.74\n479.02\n Dividend by NLNG \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n30.50\n Less:\n Deductions\n1,281.47\n1,124.72\n450.66\n241.04\n631.60\n152.50\n Oil Revenue (Net)\n2,366.57\n2,479.67\n1,599.12\n962.28\n981.43\n2,545.22\nNon-oil Revenue\n1,158.46\n1,504.64\n1,403.06\n1,192.12\n1,379.80\n2,670.83\n Corporate Tax\n341.37\n582.31\n334.30\n347.97\n365.33\n871.02\n Customs & Excise Duties\n207.20\n257.91\n265.67\n242.05\n294.84\n307.69\n Value-Added Tax (VAT)\n379.18\n407.95\n398.84\n391.18\n465.31\n900.00\n Independent Revenue of Fed. Govt.\n82.20\n134.01\n290.93\n106.62\n119.38\n403.79\n Education Tax\n51.80\n18.57\n16.38\n25.39\n41.17\n97.41\n Customs Special Levies (Federation Account)\n92.91\n44.93\n36.32\n23.11\n30.09\n50.89\n National Information Technology Dev. (NITDF)\n3.80\n2.04\n2.70\n3.95\n0.72\n12.06\n Customs Special Levies (Non-Federation Account) 5/\n0.00\n56.91\n57.92\n51.85\n62.97\n26.72\n Solid Mineral & Other Mining Revenue\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n1.26\nLess:\n Cost of Collection\n43.33\n217.35\n48.54\n46.87\n80.14\n103.64\nNon-Oil Revenue (Net)\n1,115.14\n1,287.29\n1,354.52\n1,145.24\n1,299.67\n2,567.02\nEstmiated Balances in Special Accounts for the previous year\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n6.85\nFederally-collected revenue (Net)\n3,481.71\n3,766.96\n2,953.64\n2,107.52\n2,281.09\n5,119.09\nFederation Account Allocation:\n3,481.71\n3,766.96\n2,953.64\n2,107.52\n2,281.09\n5,119.09\nTransfer to Federal Govt. Ind. Revenue\n82.20\n134.01\n290.93\n106.62\n119.38\n403.79\nTransfer to VAT Pool Account\n364.01\n391.63\n382.88\n375.53\n446.70\n864.00\nOther Tranfers 3/\n148.51\n122.46\n113.32\n104.30\n134.94\n131.69\nAmount Distributed\n2,886.98\n3,118.87\n2,166.51\n1,521.07\n1,580.07\n3,719.45\n Federal Government\n1,358.79\n1,473.20\n1,031.80\n735.40\n765.17\n1,787.19\n State Government\n689.20\n747.23\n523.34\n373.00\n388.10\n906.49\n Local Government\n531.34\n576.08\n403.48\n287.57\n299.21\n698.86\n 13% Derivation\n307.65\n322.36\n207.89\n125.10\n127.59\n326.91\nSolid Mineral Revenue\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.16\n Federal Government\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n State Government\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n Local Government\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n 13% Derivation (Solid Mineral)\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.16\nVat Pool Account\n364.01\n391.63\n382.88\n375.53\n446.70\n864.00\n FG\n54.60\n58.75\n57.43\n56.33\n67.01\n129.60\n SG\n182.00\n195.82\n191.44\n187.77\n223.35\n432.00\n LG\n127.40\n137.07\n134.01\n131.44\n156.35\n302.40\nSpecial Funds (FGN)\n107.49\n116.89\n81.87\n58.30\n60.71\n141.81\n Federal Capital Territory \n25.71\n27.97\n19.59\n13.91\n14.52\n33.93\n Ecology \n25.71\n27.97\n19.59\n13.96\n14.52\n33.93\n Statutory Stabilization\n12.86\n13.98\n9.79\n6.98\n7.26\n16.96\n Natural Resources\n43.20\n46.98\n32.90\n23.45\n24.40\n56.99\n FCT VAT\n3.64\n3.92\n3.83\n3.76\n4.47\n8.64\nOverall Balance\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nMemorandum Items\n Deductions\n1,281.47\n1,124.72\n450.66\n241.04\n631.60\n152.50\n JVC Cash calls\n571.43\n684.05\n383.66\n194.98\n460.65\n0.00\n Excess Crude Proceeds\n0.00\n182.50\n0.00\n0.00\n14.37\n0.00\n Excess PPT & Royalty\n674.07\n206.85\n15.50\n0.00\n117.17\n0.00\n Domestic Subsidy\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n DPR Cost of Collection\n0.00\n0.00\n13.52\n8.09\n13.89\n0.00\n Others\n35.96\n51.33\n37.98\n37.98\n25.52\n152.50\nTotal Non-Oil Revenue Deductions\n43.33\n217.35\n48.54\n46.87\n80.14\n103.64\n Cost of Collection \n43.33\n57.66\n48.54\n46.59\n54.64\n93.64\n 7% NCS\n14.50\n18.05\n18.60\n16.92\n20.60\n26.97\n 4% FIRS\n13.65\n23.29\n13.99\n14.02\n15.42\n30.67\n V.A.T.\n15.17\n16.32\n15.95\n15.65\n18.61\n36.00\n Non Oil Revenue (Excess)\n0.00\n159.69\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n FIRS Tax Refunds\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n25.42\n10.00\n NCS Refunds\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.29\n0.08\n0.00\n1/ Revised\n2/Provisional\n3/ Includes Education Tax, Customs Levies and NITDF\nSource: Office of the Accountant-General of the Federation (OAGF)\n140\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nTable 29\nFederally Collected Revenue Distribution\n (N' Billion)\n2013\n2014\n2015 1/\n2016 2/\n2017 2/\n 'Half Year\n1st Half\n1st Half\n1st Half\n1st Half\n1st Half\n Budget \n2017 \nStatuory Allocation\n2,886.98\n3,118.87\n2,166.51\n1,521.07\n1,580.07\n3,719.45\n Federal Government\n1,358.79\n1,473.20\n1,031.80\n735.40\n765.17\n1,787.19\n State Government\n689.20\n747.23\n523.34\n373.00\n388.10\n906.49\n Local Government\n531.34\n576.08\n403.48\n287.57\n299.21\n698.86\n 13% Derivation\n307.65\n322.36\n207.89\n125.10\n127.59\n326.91\nSolid Mineral Revenue\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.16\n Federal Government\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n State Government\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n Local Government\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n 13% Derivation (Solid Mineral)\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.16\nVat Pool Account\n364.01\n391.63\n382.88\n375.53\n446.70\n864.00\n FG\n54.60\n58.75\n57.43\n56.33\n67.01\n129.60\n SG\n182.00\n195.82\n191.44\n187.77\n223.35\n432.00\n LG\n127.40\n137.07\n134.01\n131.44\n156.35\n302.40\nDistribution from Excess Crude/PPT\n309.48\n0.00\n15.63\n0.00\n166.58\n0.00\n Federal Government\n141.84\n0.00\n7.16\n0.00\n76.35\n0.00\n State Government\n71.94\n0.00\n3.63\n0.00\n38.72\n0.00\n Local Government\n55.46\n0.00\n2.80\n0.00\n29.85\n0.00\n 13% Derivation\n40.23\n0.00\n2.03\n0.00\n21.66\n0.00\n Provisional Dist & Actual Budget (Diff)/Non-Oil Excess Revenue\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n1.59\n0.00\n0.00\n Federal Government\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.84\n0.00\n0.00\n State Government\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.42\n0.00\n0.00\n Local Government\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.33\n0.00\n0.00\n 13% Derivation\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nExchange Rate Gain\n0.00\n0.00\n210.43\n19.08\n311.75\n0.00\n Federal Government\n0.00\n0.00\n96.44\n8.91\n145.98\n0.00\n State Government\n0.00\n0.00\n48.92\n4.52\n74.04\n0.00\n Local Government\n0.00\n0.00\n37.71\n3.48\n57.08\n0.00\n 13% Derivation\n0.00\n0.00\n27.36\n2.17\n34.65\n0.00\n SURE-P/ SIGNATURE BONUS 6/\n213.30\n213.30\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n117.83\n Federal Government\n97.76\n97.76\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n62.07\n State Government\n49.58\n49.58\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n31.49\n Local Government\n38.23\n38.23\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n24.27\n 13% Derivation\n27.73\n27.73\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nNNPC Refund\n45.70\n30.47\n37.98\n37.98\n25.32\n0.00\n Federal Government\n0.00\n0.00\n37.98\n37.98\n25.32\n0.00\n State Government\n22.45\n14.97\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n Local Government\n17.31\n11.54\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n 13% Derivation\n5.94\n3.96\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nFederation Revenue Augmentation/NNPC Additional Rev.\n613.88\n0.00\n14.68\n29.40\n0.00\n0.00\n Federal Government\n281.35\n0.00\n6.73\n15.49\n0.00\n0.00\n State Government\n142.71\n0.00\n3.41\n7.86\n0.00\n0.00\n Local Government\n110.02\n0.00\n2.63\n6.06\n0.00\n0.00\n 13% Derivation\n79.80\n0.00\n1.91\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nTotal Excluding VAT\n4,069.34\n3,362.63\n2,445.23\n1,609.11\n2,083.72\n3,837.28\n Federal Government\n1,879.74\n1,570.96\n1,180.12\n798.61\n1,012.81\n1,849.26\n State Government\n975.88\n811.78\n579.30\n385.80\n500.87\n937.97\n Local Government\n752.36\n625.85\n446.62\n297.44\n386.15\n723.14\n 13% Derivation\n461.36\n354.05\n239.19\n127.26\n183.90\n326.91\nTotal Statutory Revenue and VAT Distribution 3/\n4,433.35\n3,754.26\n2,828.11\n1,984.65\n2,530.42\n4,701.45\n Federal Government\n1,934.34\n1,629.70\n1,237.55\n854.94\n1,079.82\n1,978.86\n State Government\n1,157.89\n1,007.60\n770.74\n573.57\n724.22\n1,369.97\n Local Government\n879.76\n762.92\n580.63\n428.87\n542.49\n1,025.54\n 13% Derivation\n461.36\n354.05\n239.19\n127.26\n183.90\n327.08\n1/ Revised\n2/Provisional\n3/ Includes Education Tax, Customs Levies and NITDF\nSource: Office of the Accountant-General of the Federation (OAGF)\n \n141\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nTable 30\nMoney Market Rates: First Half 2017 /1\n(Per cent)\n1/ Revised\n2/ Provisional\n3/ Includes FGN balance of special accounts, transfers to CRF and payments to FGN and other statutory benefits\n4/ Include Ways and Means Advances\n5/ Includes FCT share of VAT\n6/ Includes net deductions for loans on lent to State,local governments and Federal parastatals/companies.\nSource: Office of the Accountant-General of the Federation (OAGF)\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013 \n2014 \n2015 \n2016 1/\n2017 2/\n Half Year\n1st Half\n1st Half\n1st Half\n1st Half\n1st Half\n Budget \n2016 \nTotal Federal Government Retained Revenue\n1,960.17\n1,881.04\n1,583.19\n1,305.75\n2,505.53\n2,697.57\n Share of Federation Account (Gross)\n1,358.79\n1,473.20\n1,031.80\n735.40\n765.17\n1,787.19\n Share of VAT Pool Account\n54.60\n58.75\n57.43\n56.33\n67.01\n129.60\n Federal Government Independent Revenue\n82.20\n134.01\n290.93\n106.62\n119.38\n403.79\n Share of Excess Crude Account (incl. Augment.)\n423.19\n0.00\n7.16\n0.00\n106.60\n0.00\n Share from SURE-P Distribution \n97.76\n97.76\n0.00\n15.49\n0.00\n62.07\n Share from Excess Non-Oil \n0.00\n84.12\n0.00\n0.84\n0.00\n0.00\n NNPC Refund (Incl. Additional NNPC Share)\n0.00\n0.00\n44.71\n37.98\n25.32\n0.00\n Subsidy\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n Exchange Gain\n0.00\n0.00\n96.44\n8.91\n145.98\n0.00\n Others 3/\n(56.38)\n33.20\n54.72\n344.19\n1,276.09\n314.93\nTotal Expenditure\n2,375.56\n2,128.70\n2,259.66\n2,517.21\n2,885.25\n3,875.96\n Recurrent Expenditure \n1,714.39\n1,610.20\n1,872.80\n1,885.36\n2,676.23\n2,571.51\n Goods and Services\n1,080.61\n979.27\n1,166.06\n1,178.01\n1,323.06\n1,495.46\n Personnel Cost\n775.06\n753.13\n860.15\n890.81\n723.89\n942.03\n Pension\n66.27\n \n73.88\n \n96.01\n \n79.18\n143.28\n95.82\n Overhead Cost\n239.28\n152.26\n209.90\n208.02\n455.89\n457.61\n Interest Payments\n390.61\n477.80\n592.17\n609.52\n927.74\n920.67\n Foreign \n29.59\n \n36.37\n \n35.82\n \n30.71\n55.80\n87.94\n Domestic 4/\n361.02\n \n441.44\n \n556.35\n \n578.81\n871.94\n832.73\n Transfers\n243.17\n153.13\n114.57\n97.83\n425.44\n155.37\n Special Funds and others 5/\n243.17\n \n153.13\n \n114.57\n \n97.83\n425.44\n155.37\n Capital Expenditure & Net Lending 6/\n499.69\n353.15\n274.53\n346.18\n0.00\n1,087.25\n Domestic Financed Budgets\n499.69\n353.15\n274.53\n346.18\n0.00\n1,087.25\n Budgetary\n401.93\n255.40\n57.43\n90.79\n0.00\n1,087.25\n Subsidy\n0.00\n0.00\n61.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n SURE-P/ Loan to Ex Dom Naira Account\n97.76\n97.76\n156.10\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n Capital release 2015 7/\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n255.39\n0.00\n0.00\nTransfers\n161.49\n165.34\n112.33\n285.67\n209.02\n217.21\n NDDC\n0.00\n15.49\n7.71\n20.53\n10.23\n32.01\n NJC\n33.50\n27.92\n39.71\n35.00\n10.83\n50.00\n UBE\n38.99\n29.36\n10.30\n38.56\n15.41\n47.59\n Refund of Signature Bonuses/Others\n89.01\n92.58\n54.61\n191.59\n172.55\n87.60\nBalance Of Revenue And Expenditure\nPrimary Surplus (+)/Deficit (-)\n(24.79)\n230.14\n(84.30)\n(601.94)\n548.02\n(257.71)\nCurrent Surplus(+)/Deficit(-)\n245.78\n270.84\n(289.61)\n(579.61)\n(170.70)\n126.07\nOverall Surplus(+)/Deficit(-)\n(415.40)\n(247.66)\n(676.47)\n(1,211.46)\n(379.72)\n(1,178.39)\nFinancing:\n415.40\n247.66\n676.47\n1,211.46\n379.72\n1,178.39\n Foreign(Net)\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n533.75\n Domestic(Net)\n415.40\n247.66\n676.47\n1,211.46\n379.72\n644.64\n Banking System\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n CBN\n0.00\n0.00\n421.20\n0.20\n0.20\n0.00\n DMBs\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n Non Bank Public\n521.43\n504.00\n330.00\n524.60\n0.00\n627.14\n Privatization Proceeds\n0.00\n0.00\n72.60\n5.92\n0.00\n17.50\n Loans from Special Accts\n151.26\n36.70\n24.01\n296.51\n0.00\n0.00\n Excess Crude \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n Recoveries of Misappropriated Funds\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n Other Funds\n(257.30)\n(293.04)\n249.86\n384.42\n379.72\n533.75\nTable 31\nFunctional Classification of Federal Government Recurrent and Capital Expenditure\n (Naira Billion)\n142\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2013\n2014\n2015\n2016\n2017\n Half - Year\n Half - \nHalf - Year 1/ Half - Year 1/\nHalf - Year 1/\nTOTAL EXPENDITURE\n2,375.56\n2,128.70\n2,259.65\n2,631.65\n2,885.22\nA. RECURRENT EXPENDITURE\n1,714.39\n1,610.20\n1,872.80\n1,888.19\n2,676.20\n A1. ADMINISTRATION\n626.12\n512.59\n607.41\n649.01\n904.30\nGeneral Administration\n313.47\n203.22\n206.57\n280.36\n377.36\nDefence\n117.52\n112.80\n150.73\n137.62\n196.22\nInternal Security\n195.14\n196.57\n250.12\n231.03\n330.72\nA2. ECONOMIC SERVICES\n178.34\n106.50\n123.33\n163.75\n215.94\nAgriculture\n19.01\n19.33\n23.28\n24.76\n33.90\nRoads & Construction\n21.31\n20.53\n23.47\n25.13\n35.41\nTransport & Communications\n46.72\n46.29\n53.98\n57.65\n80.24\nOthers\n91.30\n20.35\n22.61\n56.21\n66.38\nA3. SOCIAL & COMMUNITY SERVICES\n300.67\n293.52\n339.31\n288.91\n462.89\nEducation\n138.21\n136.39\n158.83\n160.03\n225.24\nHealth\n64.80\n64.55\n76.78\n77.36\n107.56\nOthers\n97.66\n92.58\n103.69\n51.52\n130.09\nA4. TRANSFERS\n609.26\n697.60\n802.75\n786.53\n1,093.07\nPublic Debt Charges (Int)\n390.61\n477.80\n592.17\n609.52\n927.74\nDomestic\n361.02\n441.44\n556.35\n578.81\n871.94\nForeign\n29.59\n36.37\n35.82\n30.71\n55.80\nPensions & Gratuities\n66.27\n66.66\n96.01\n79.18\n106.41\nFCT & Others\n152.38\n153.13\n114.57\n97.83\n58.92\nContingencies (Others)\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nExternal Obligations\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nExtra-Budgetary Expenditure\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nDeferred Customs Duties\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nUnspecified Expenditure\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nOthers\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nB. CAPITAL EXPENDITURE\n499.69\n \n353.15\n \n274.53\n457.78\n-\nB1. ADMINISTRATION\n176.19\n \n136.65\n \n106.64\n172.38\n-\nGeneral Administration\n110.77\n \n86.20\n \n66.72\n107.85\n-\nDefence\n26.41\n \n19.89\n \n15.80\n25.54\n-\nInternal Security\n39.01\n \n30.56\n \n24.12\n38.99\n-\nB2 ECONOMIC SERVICES\n221.44\n \n142.68\n \n112.05\n194.81\n-\nAgriculture & Natural Resources\n38.22\n \n26.04\n \n21.20\n34.28\n-\nManuf., Mining & Quarrying\n12.23\n8.53\n6.48\n10.56\n-\nTransport & Communications\n51.97\n36.65\n29.51\n47.67\n-\nHousing\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nRoads & Construction \n71.15\n47.40\n38.30\n62.07\n-\nNational Priority Projects\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nJVC Calls/NNPC Priority Projects\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nPTF\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nCounterpart Funding\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nOthers\n47.86\n24.06\n16.55\n40.24\n-\nB3 SOCIAL & COMMUNITY SERVICES\n79.11\n57.90\n43.48\n70.54\n-\nEducation\n30.32\n23.23\n18.53\n30.06\n-\nHealth\n24.82\n18.96\n15.03\n24.39\n-\nOthers\n23.97\n15.71\n9.92\n16.10\n-\nB4 TRANSFERS\n22.94\n15.92\n12.36\n20.05\n-\nFinancial Obligations\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nCapital Repayments\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nDomestic\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nForeign\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nExternal Obligations\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nContingencies 2/\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nCapital Supplementation\n17.99\n12.06\n9.31\n15.09\n-\nNet Lending to States/L.G.s/Parast.\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nGrants to States\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nOthers\n4.95\n3.86\n3.05\n4.95\n-\nC. STATUTORY TRANSFERS\n161.49\n165.34\n112.33\n285.67\n209.02\nNDDC\n0.00\n15.49\n7.71\n20.53\n10.23\nNJC\n33.50\n27.92\n39.71\n35.00\n10.83\nUBE\n38.99\n29.36\n10.30\n38.56\n15.41\nOthers\n89.01\n92.58\n54.61\n191.59\n172.55\n1/ Provisional\nSources: Federal Ministry of Finance, Office of the Accountant-General of the Federation\n Central Bank of Nigeria\nTable 32\n Summary of Statutory & VAT Revenue Allocation to State Governments: First half 2017 1/\n (Naira Billion)\n143\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nGross Stat. \nAlloc.\nDeductions\n13% \nDerivation\nTotal Net \nStat. Alloc.\nAugmentatio\nn\nExcess Crude \n2/\nNNPC Refund\nSURE-P\nVAT\nTotal Gross \nAlloc.\nTotal Net \nAlloc.\nGross Stat. \nAlloc.\nDeductions\n13% \nDerivation\nTotal Net \nStat. Alloc.\nNNPC Refund\nSURE-P\nVAT\nTotal Gross \nAlloc.\nTotal Net \nAlloc.\nGross Stat. \nAlloc.\nDeductions\n13% \nDerivation\nTotal Net \nStat. Alloc.\nNNPC \nRefund/Addit\nional Fund\nExcess Crude\nExchange \nGain\nVAT\nTotal Gross \nAlloc.\nTotal Net \nAlloc.\n1\nABIA\n16.61\n0.46\n4.94\n21.09\n3.44\n1.73\n0.55\n1.20\n3.76\n32.23\n31.76\n18.45\n0.87\n3.81\n21.39\n0.37\n1.20\n4.07\n27.90\n27.03\n12.92\n0.77\n2.25\n14.41\n0.11\n0.11\n1.52\n3.98\n20.90\n20.13\n2\nADAMAWA\n18.54\n0.05\n-\n18.49\n3.84\n1.94\n0.62\n1.33\n3.91\n30.18\n30.12\n19.63\n0.46\n-\n19.17\n0.41\n1.33\n4.16\n25.53\n25.07\n13.75\n0.93\n-\n12.82\n0.09\n0.10\n1.29\n4.15\n19.37\n18.44\n3\nAKWA IBOM\n18.76\n4.93\n121.52\n135.35\n3.88\n1.96\n0.61\n1.35\n4.74\n152.82\n147.89\n19.81\n2.44\n106.46\n123.82\n0.41\n1.35\n4.42\n132.44\n130.00\n13.88\n0.70\n60.83\n74.01\n0.68\n0.73\n9.46\n4.68\n90.25\n89.55\n4\nANAMBRA\n18.73\n0.23\n-\n18.50\n3.88\n1.96\n0.62\n1.35\n4.34\n30.87\n30.64\n19.59\n0.58\n-\n19.02\n0.41\n1.35\n4.74\n26.09\n25.52\n13.72\n0.23\n-\n13.49\n0.09\n0.10\n1.28\n4.55\n19.74\n19.50\n5\nBAUCHI\n21.73\n1.44\n-\n20.28\n4.50\n2.27\n0.69\n1.56\n4.47\n35.22\n33.78\n23.57\n2.71\n-\n20.86\n0.46\n1.56\n4.82\n30.42\n27.71\n16.51\n3.47\n13.03\n0.11\n0.11\n1.54\n4.75\n23.02\n19.55\n6\nBAYELSA\n14.88\n11.43\n95.92\n99.36\n3.08\n1.55\n0.48\n1.07\n3.76\n120.74\n109.30\n17.44\n14.01\n69.07\n72.50\n0.32\n1.07\n3.91\n91.80\n77.79\n12.21\n9.62\n40.21\n42.81\n0.44\n0.46\n6.28\n3.49\n63.09\n53.47\n7\nBENUE\n20.03\n2.12\n-\n17.90\n4.15\n2.09\n0.66\n1.44\n4.27\n32.64\n30.51\n22.10\n3.11\n-\n18.99\n0.44\n1.44\n4.65\n28.63\n25.52\n15.48\n3.09\n-\n12.38\n0.10\n0.11\n1.45\n4.47\n21.60\n18.51\n8\nBORNO\n22.10\n0.20\n-\n21.89\n4.58\n2.31\n0.70\n1.59\n4.25\n35.52\n35.32\n24.48\n0.25\n-\n24.23\n0.47\n1.59\n4.60\n31.14\n30.89\n17.15\n0.09\n-\n17.06\n0.11\n0.12\n1.60\n4.42\n23.40\n23.31\n9\nCROSS RIVER\n17.41\n0.92\n0.32\n16.81\n3.60\n1.82\n0.58\n1.25\n3.85\n28.83\n27.91\n19.82\n1.52\n0.29\n18.59\n0.38\n1.25\n4.19\n25.93\n24.41\n13.88\n3.52\n-\n10.36\n0.09\n0.10\n1.30\n4.13\n19.49\n15.97\n10 DELTA\n18.75\n7.81\n95.47\n106.40\n3.88\n1.96\n0.62\n1.35\n4.72\n126.74\n118.92\n20.01\n8.80\n74.20\n85.40\n0.41\n1.35\n4.90\n100.86\n92.06\n14.01\n8.40\n49.94\n55.55\n0.53\n0.56\n7.93\n4.90\n77.88\n69.48\n11 EBONYI\n15.37\n2.93\n-\n12.45\n3.18\n1.60\n0.52\n1.11\n3.54\n25.33\n22.40\n17.63\n3.68\n-\n13.95\n0.35\n1.11\n3.79\n22.87\n19.19\n12.35\n4.45\n-\n7.90\n0.08\n0.09\n1.15\n3.68\n17.34\n12.90\n12 EDO\n17.50\n3.49\n9.35\n23.36\n3.62\n1.83\n0.61\n1.26\n4.14\n38.31\n34.82\n18.43\n4.93\n8.80\n22.29\n0.41\n1.26\n4.33\n33.22\n28.29\n12.90\n4.73\n6.06\n14.24\n0.13\n0.15\n1.99\n4.26\n25.49\n20.77\n13 EKITI\n15.51\n2.22\n-\n13.29\n3.21\n1.62\n0.52\n1.12\n3.62\n25.59\n23.37\n17.62\n3.63\n-\n13.99\n0.35\n1.12\n3.79\n22.87\n19.23\n12.34\n3.45\n-\n8.89\n0.08\n0.09\n1.15\n3.72\n17.38\n13.93\n14 ENUGU\n17.50\n0.08\n-\n17.42\n3.62\n1.83\n0.57\n1.26\n3.98\n28.75\n28.68\n19.82\n0.64\n-\n19.18\n0.38\n1.26\n4.28\n25.74\n25.10\n13.88\n0.98\n-\n12.90\n0.09\n0.10\n1.30\n4.39\n19.75\n18.77\n15 GOMBE\n16.45\n2.43\n-\n14.01\n3.41\n1.72\n0.53\n1.18\n3.58\n26.86\n24.43\n18.56\n3.16\n-\n15.40\n0.35\n1.18\n3.76\n23.85\n20.69\n13.00\n4.02\n-\n8.98\n0.08\n0.09\n1.22\n3.77\n18.16\n14.15\n16 IMO\n18.68\n2.22\n5.09\n21.56\n3.87\n1.95\n0.61\n1.34\n4.27\n35.81\n33.59\n20.49\n2.98\n \n3.54\n \n21.05\n \n0.40\n \n1.34\n \n4.49\n30.26\n27.29\n14.35\n2.74\n2.14\n13.74\n0.11\n0.12\n1.62\n4.38\n22.72\n19.98\n17 JIGAWA\n20.52\n0.36\n-\n20.16\n4.25\n2.14\n0.67\n1.48\n4.47\n33.53\n33.17\n22.04\n0.65\n \n-\n \n21.39\n \n0.45\n \n1.48\n \n4.93\n28.89\n28.24\n15.43\n0.13\n-\n15.30\n0.10\n0.11\n1.44\n4.65\n21.74\n21.60\n18 KADUNA\n23.38\n1.94\n-\n21.45\n4.84\n2.44\n0.75\n1.68\n5.17\n38.27\n36.33\n25.82\n3.10\n \n-\n \n22.72\n \n0.50\n \n1.68\n \n5.54\n33.54\n30.44\n18.08\n3.21\n-\n14.88\n0.12\n0.13\n1.69\n5.40\n25.41\n22.21\n19 KANO\n29.31\n0.58\n-\n28.73\n6.07\n3.06\n0.92\n2.11\n6.92\n48.38\n47.81\n31.26\n1.34\n \n-\n \n29.92 \n0.61\n \n2.11\n \n7.44\n41.42\n40.08\n21.89\n0.42\n-\n21.47\n0.14\n0.15\n2.05\n7.26\n31.49\n31.07\n20 KATSINA\n22.29\n0.53\n-\n21.76\n4.62\n2.33\n0.72\n1.60\n4.92\n36.47\n35.94\n24.22\n0.73\n \n-\n \n23.49\n \n0.48\n \n1.60\n \n5.37\n31.67\n30.94\n16.96\n0.71\n-\n16.25\n0.11\n0.12\n1.59\n5.35\n24.13\n23.42\n21 KEBBI\n18.64\n0.21\n-\n18.43\n3.86\n1.95\n0.60\n1.34\n3.98\n30.37\n30.15\n20.81\n0.72\n \n-\n \n20.08\n \n0.40\n \n1.34\n \n4.36\n26.90\n26.18\n14.57\n0.22\n-\n14.35\n0.10\n0.10\n1.36\n4.11\n20.24\n20.02\n22 KOGI\n18.60\n0.09\n-\n18.51\n3.85\n1.94\n0.60\n1.34\n3.97\n30.29\n30.20\n21.78\n1.37\n-\n20.41\n0.40\n1.34\n4.21\n27.73\n26.35\n15.25\n1.62\n-\n13.64\n0.10\n0.11\n1.43\n4.11\n21.00\n19.38\n23 KWARA\n16.95\n0.09\n-\n16.85\n3.51\n1.77\n0.55\n1.22\n3.58\n27.57\n27.48\n17.54\n0.78\n-\n16.76\n0.36\n1.22\n3.82\n22.95\n22.16\n12.29\n0.70\n-\n11.59\n0.08\n0.09\n1.15\n3.76\n17.36\n16.66\n24 LAGOS\n26.47\n8.93\n-\n17.54\n5.48\n2.76\n0.87\n1.90\n32.69\n70.18\n61.24\n26.40\n14.54\n-\n11.85\n0.58\n1.90\n37.44\n66.32\n51.78\n18.49\n13.93\n-\n4.56\n0.12\n0.13\n1.73\n36.74\n57.21\n43.27\n25 NASARAWA\n15.88\n1.79\n-\n14.09\n3.29\n1.66\n0.52\n1.14\n3.34\n25.83\n24.04\n18.17\n1.79\n-\n16.38\n0.34\n1.14\n3.60\n23.25\n21.46\n12.73\n0.87\n-\n11.85\n0.08\n0.09\n1.19\n3.53\n17.62\n16.74\n26 NIGER\n21.69\n1.88\n-\n19.81\n4.49\n2.26\n0.70\n1.56\n4.19\n34.89\n33.01\n23.34\n3.71\n-\n19.63\n0.46\n1.56\n4.51\n29.87\n26.16\n16.35\n3.20\n-\n13.14\n0.11\n0.11\n1.53\n4.40\n22.49\n19.29\n27 OGUN\n18.12\n0.11\n-\n18.01\n3.75\n1.89\n0.59\n1.30\n4.20\n29.86\n29.74\n18.31\n0.47\n-\n17.83\n0.39\n1.30\n4.44\n24.44\n23.97\n12.82\n0.99\n-\n11.83\n0.08\n0.09\n1.20\n4.49\n18.68\n17.70\n28 ONDO\n17.38\n2.71\n18.02\n32.69\n3.60\n1.81\n0.58\n1.25\n4.03\n46.67\n43.96\n18.34\n5.63\n14.13\n26.84\n0.38\n1.25\n4.28\n38.39\n32.75\n12.85\n6.36\n7.39\n13.88\n0.15\n0.17\n2.18\n4.20\n26.94\n20.58\n29 OSUN\n17.19\n2.69\n-\n14.50\n3.56\n1.79\n0.56\n1.24\n4.01\n28.36\n25.67\n17.97\n6.25\n-\n11.72\n0.38\n1.24\n4.39\n23.98\n17.73\n12.59\n6.75\n-\n5.84\n0.08\n0.09\n1.18\n4.17\n18.10\n11.36\n30 OYO\n21.66\n0.38\n-\n21.28\n4.48\n2.26\n0.70\n1.56\n4.97\n35.64\n35.25\n22.10\n1.25\n-\n20.85\n0.47\n1.56\n5.41\n29.54\n28.29\n15.48\n1.69\n-\n13.79\n0.10\n0.11\n1.45\n5.60\n22.73\n21.04\n31 PLATEAU\n18.19\n0.48\n6.60\n24.31\n3.77\n1.90\n0.60\n1.31\n4.08\n36.44\n35.96\n20.58\n1.39\n5.50\n24.69\n0.40\n1.31\n4.30\n32.08\n30.69\n14.41\n2.80\n-\n11.62\n0.09\n0.10\n1.35\n4.24\n20.19\n17.40\n32 RIVERS\n20.33\n0.80\n104.06\n123.59\n4.21\n2.12\n0.66\n1.46\n7.01\n139.87\n139.06\n21.25\n7.68\n68.21\n81.79\n0.44\n1.46\n6.56\n97.93\n90.25\n14.88\n8.36\n39.07\n45.60\n0.46\n0.48\n6.46\n5.90\n67.26\n58.90\n33 SOKOTO\n19.34\n0.26\n-\n19.08\n4.00\n2.02\n0.63\n1.39\n4.19\n31.57\n31.31\n21.72\n0.91\n-\n20.80\n0.42\n1.39\n4.56\n28.09\n27.18\n15.21\n0.25\n-\n14.96\n0.10\n0.11\n1.42\n4.27\n21.11\n20.86\n34 TARABA\n18.31\n0.29\n-\n18.03\n3.79\n1.91\n0.59\n1.32\n3.54\n29.46\n29.17\n18.98\n0.45\n-\n18.53\n0.39\n1.32\n3.79\n24.49\n24.03\n13.29\n1.11\n-\n12.18\n0.09\n0.09\n1.24\n3.75\n18.46\n17.35\n35 YOBE\n18.18\n0.11\n-\n18.07\n3.76\n1.90\n0.58\n1.31\n3.57\n29.29\n29.18\n19.57\n0.25\n-\n19.32\n0.38\n1.31\n3.80\n25.06\n24.81\n13.70\n0.11\n-\n13.59\n0.09\n0.10\n1.28\n3.68\n18.85\n18.74\n36 ZAMFARA\n18.23\n0.37\n-\n17.86\n3.78\n1.90\n0.60\n1.31\n4.01\n29.83\n29.46\n19.61\n0.65\n-\n18.96\n0.40\n1.31\n4.19\n25.51\n24.86\n13.73\n2.41\n-\n11.32\n0.09\n0.10\n1.28\n4.10\n19.30\n16.89\n37 Disputed Deriv.\n-\n-\n0.05\n0.05\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n0.05\n0.05\n-\n0.06\n0.04\n(0.02)\n-\n-\n-\n0.04\n(0.02)\nRivers/Akwa Disputed Fund\n-\n-\n0.01\n0.01\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n0.01\n0.01\n-\n-\n0.01\n0.01\n-\n-\n-\n0.01\n0.01\nTOTAL\n689.20\n67.60\n461.36\n1,082.96\n142.71\n71.94\n22.45\n49.58\n182.00\n1,619.25\n1,551.65\n747.23\n107.51\n354.05\n993.77\n14.97\n49.58\n195.82\n1,361.64\n1,254.14\n523.34\n107.06\n207.89\n624.17\n5.32\n5.67\n76.27\n191.44\n1,009.93\n902.88\nFIRST HALF 2014\nFIRST HALF 2015\n1/ Provisional\n2/ Includes the share of Oil-producing states from the excess crude\nSource: Federation Account Allocation, Federal Ministry of Finance.\nS/N\nSTATES\nFIRST HALF 2013\n144\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nTable 32 Contd.\n Summary of Statutory & VAT Revenue Allocation to State Governments: First Half 2017 1/\n (Naira Billion)\n1/ Provisional\n2/ Includes the share of Oil-producing states from the excess crude\nSource: Federation Account Allocation, Federal Ministry of Finance.\n \nGross Stat. \nAlloc.\nDeductions\n13% \nDerivation\nTotal Net \nStat. Alloc.\nNon-oil \nExcess\nNNPC \nRefund/Addit\nional Fund\nExcess Crude\nExchange \nGain\nVAT\nTotal Gross \nAlloc.\nTotal Net \nAlloc.\nGross Stat. \nAlloc.\nDeductions\n13% \nDerivation\nTotal Net \nStat. Alloc.\nAugment\nation\nNNPC \nRefund/Additi\nonal Fund\nExcess \nCrude\nExchange \nGain\nVAT\nTotal \nGross \nAlloc.\nTotal Net \nAlloc.\n1\nABIA\n9.21\n \n2.09\n1.15\n8.28\n0.01\n0.19\n0.13\n3.84\n14.54\n12.45\n9.58\n1.63\n1.46\n9.41\n-\n-\n1.22\n2.24\n4.58\n19.07\n17.44\n2\nADAMAWA\n9.80\n \n2.10\n-\n7.70\n0.01\n0.21\n0.12\n4.02\n14.15\n12.05\n10.20\n1.52\n-\n8.68\n-\n-\n1.02\n1.95\n4.79\n17.95\n16.43\n3\nAKWA IBOM\n9.89\n \n7.51\n40.22\n42.60\n0.01\n0.21\n0.82\n4.30\n55.45\n47.94\n10.29\n4.35\n38.58\n44.52\n-\n-\n6.69\n12.79\n5.12\n73.48\n69.13\n4\nANAMBRA\n9.78\n0.87\n-\n8.91\n0.01\n0.21\n0.12\n4.44\n14.56\n13.69\n10.18\n0.59\n-\n9.58\n-\n-\n1.02\n1.94\n5.37\n18.50\n17.91\n5\nBAUCHI\n11.77\n3.31\n-\n8.45\n0.01\n0.25\n0.14\n4.60\n16.77\n13.45\n12.24\n3.60\n-\n8.64\n-\n-\n1.22\n2.34\n5.47\n21.27\n17.66\n6\nBAYELSA\n8.70\n17.40\n21.06\n12.37\n0.01\n0.18\n0.46\n3.39\n33.81\n16.41\n9.06\n5.90\n26.85\n30.01\n-\n-\n5.38\n8.70\n4.36\n54.34\n48.44\n7\nBENUE\n11.03\n5.13\n-\n5.90\n0.01\n0.23\n0.13\n4.43\n15.84\n10.71\n11.48\n2.42\n-\n9.06\n-\n-\n1.15\n2.19\n5.24\n20.06\n17.64\n8\nBORNO\n12.22\n2.02\n-\n10.21\n0.01\n0.26\n0.15\n4.35\n16.99\n14.98\n12.72\n1.37\n-\n11.35\n-\n-\n1.27\n2.43\n5.19\n21.60\n20.24\n9\nCROSS RIVER\n9.89\n8.67\n-\n1.23\n0.01\n0.21\n0.12\n3.85\n14.08\n5.42\n10.29\n6.09\n-\n4.20\n-\n-\n1.03\n1.96\n4.66\n17.94\n11.86\n10 DELTA\n9.99\n14.45\n30.03\n25.56\n0.01\n0.21\n0.64\n4.78\n45.66\n31.21\n10.39\n9.37\n24.48\n25.50\n-\n-\n5.45\n8.78\n5.47\n54.58\n45.20\n11 EBONYI\n8.80\n0.89\n-\n7.91\n0.01\n0.19\n0.11\n3.57\n12.67\n11.79\n9.16\n0.64\n-\n8.52\n-\n-\n0.91\n1.75\n4.34\n16.16\n15.52\n12 EDO\n9.20\n6.31\n3.04\n5.93\n0.01\n0.19\n0.16\n4.30\n16.91\n10.60\n9.57\n3.97\n1.25\n6.85\n-\n-\n1.14\n2.10\n5.04\n19.11\n15.13\n13 EKITI\n8.80\n6.12\n-\n2.67\n0.01\n0.19\n0.11\n3.67\n12.76\n6.64\n9.15\n4.07\n-\n5.08\n-\n-\n0.91\n1.75\n4.35\n16.16\n12.08\n14 ENUGU\n9.89\n1.42\n-\n8.48\n0.01\n0.21\n0.12\n4.21\n14.44\n13.03\n10.29\n1.65\n-\n8.65\n-\n-\n1.03\n1.96\n5.05\n18.33\n16.68\n15 GOMBE\n9.27\n4.86\n-\n4.41\n0.01\n0.20\n0.11\n3.68\n13.27\n8.41\n9.64\n2.71\n-\n6.93\n-\n-\n0.96\n1.84\n4.36\n16.81\n14.10\n16 IMO\n10.23\n4.38\n1.13\n6.97\n0.01\n0.22\n0.14\n4.30\n16.03\n11.65\n10.64\n3.51\n1.53\n8.66\n-\n-\n1.38\n2.43\n5.15\n21.13\n17.62\n17 JIGAWA\n11.00\n0.72\n-\n10.28\n0.01\n0.23\n0.13\n4.48\n15.86\n15.13\n11.45\n0.47\n-\n10.97\n-\n-\n1.14\n2.18\n5.41\n20.18\n19.71\n18 KADUNA\n12.89\n2.36\n-\n10.53\n0.01\n0.27\n0.16\n5.30\n18.63\n16.27\n13.41\n1.69\n-\n11.72\n-\n-\n1.34\n2.56\n6.59\n23.89\n22.20\n19 KANO\n15.60\n2.09\n-\n13.51\n0.02\n0.33\n0.19\n7.16\n23.30\n21.20\n16.23\n2.14\n-\n14.09\n-\n-\n1.62\n3.10\n10.42\n31.37\n29.23\n20 KATSINA\n12.09\n1.55\n-\n10.54\n0.01\n0.25\n0.15\n5.25\n17.76\n16.21\n12.58\n1.38\n-\n11.20\n-\n-\n1.26\n2.40\n6.04\n22.28\n20.90\n21 KEBBI\n10.39\n1.68\n-\n8.71\n0.01\n0.22\n0.13\n3.99\n14.73\n13.05\n10.81\n1.27\n-\n9.54\n-\n-\n1.08\n2.06\n4.76\n18.70\n17.44\n22 KOGI\n10.87\n1.92\n-\n8.95\n0.01\n0.23\n0.13\n4.02\n15.26\n13.35\n11.31\n1.85\n-\n9.46\n-\n-\n1.13\n2.16\n4.81\n19.41\n17.56\n23 KWARA\n8.76\n2.62\n-\n6.14\n0.01\n0.18\n0.11\n3.68\n12.74\n10.12\n9.11\n1.50\n-\n7.61\n-\n-\n0.91\n1.74\n4.38\n16.14\n14.64\n24 LAGOS\n13.18\n14.22\n-\n(1.04)\n0.01\n0.28\n0.16\n36.48\n50.11\n35.90\n13.71\n8.83\n-\n4.88\n-\n-\n1.37\n2.62\n38.29\n55.99\n47.15\n25 NASARAWA\n9.07\n1.28\n-\n7.79\n0.01\n0.19\n0.11\n3.41\n12.80\n11.51\n9.44\n1.01\n-\n8.43\n-\n-\n0.94\n1.80\n4.16\n16.34\n15.33\n26 NIGER\n11.65\n4.06\n-\n7.59\n0.01\n0.25\n0.14\n4.35\n16.40\n12.34\n12.12\n1.87\n-\n10.26\n-\n-\n1.21\n2.31\n5.14\n20.79\n18.92\n27 OGUN\n9.14\n7.47\n-\n1.67\n0.01\n0.19\n0.11\n4.26\n13.71\n6.24\n9.51\n4.85\n-\n4.66\n-\n-\n0.95\n1.81\n5.17\n17.44\n12.59\n28 ONDO\n9.16\n7.22\n5.59\n7.53\n0.01\n0.19\n0.21\n4.11\n19.27\n12.06\n9.53\n4.31\n6.45\n11.67\n-\n-\n2.12\n3.68\n4.89\n26.66\n22.35\n29 OSUN\n8.97\n14.39\n-\n(5.42)\n0.01\n0.19\n0.11\n4.09\n13.37\n(1.02)\n9.33\n6.01\n-\n3.32\n-\n-\n0.93\n1.78\n4.86\n16.90\n10.89\n30 OYO\n11.03\n3.82\n-\n7.21\n0.01\n0.23\n0.13\n5.86\n17.27\n13.45\n11.48\n2.67\n-\n8.81\n-\n-\n1.15\n2.19\n7.67\n22.48\n19.81\n31 PLATEAU\n10.27\n7.36\n-\n2.92\n0.01\n0.22\n0.12\n4.05\n14.68\n7.32\n10.69\n4.75\n-\n5.94\n-\n-\n1.07\n2.04\n4.83\n18.63\n13.88\n32 RIVERS\n10.61\n11.64\n22.87\n21.84\n0.01\n0.22\n0.52\n6.05\n40.28\n28.64\n11.04\n7.39\n26.98\n30.62\n-\n-\n6.27\n9.22\n8.95\n62.45\n55.07\n33 SOKOTO\n10.84\n1.23\n-\n9.61\n0.01\n0.23\n0.13\n4.23\n15.44\n14.21\n11.28\n0.87\n-\n10.41\n-\n-\n1.13\n2.15\n4.96\n19.52\n18.65\n34 TARABA\n9.48\n2.19\n-\n7.29\n0.01\n0.20\n0.11\n3.62\n13.42\n11.23\n9.86\n2.14\n-\n7.72\n-\n-\n0.98\n1.88\n4.36\n17.09\n14.95\n35 YOBE\n9.77\n0.79\n-\n8.98\n0.01\n0.21\n0.12\n3.63\n13.73\n12.94\n10.16\n0.50\n-\n9.66\n-\n-\n1.01\n1.94\n4.35\n17.47\n16.96\n36 ZAMFARA\n9.79\n5.58\n-\n4.21\n0.01\n0.21\n0.12\n4.01\n14.14\n8.56\n10.18\n4.02\n-\n6.16\n-\n-\n1.02\n1.94\n4.74\n17.88\n13.86\n37 Disputed Deriv.\nRivers/Akwa Disputed Fund\nTOTAL\n373.00\n181.69\n125.10\n316.41\n0.42\n7.86\n-\n6.69\n187.77\n700.83\n519.14\n388.10\n112.92\n127.59\n402.77\n-\n-\n60.38\n108.69\n223.35\n908.11\n795.19\nFIRST HALF 2016\nFIRST HALF 2017\nS/N\nSTATES\nTable 33\nAllocation to Local Governments from the Federation and VAT Pools Accounts\n(Naira Billion)\n145\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n1/ Revised\n2/ Provisional\nVAT: Value Added Tax\nLGA: Local Governments Areas\nSource: Federation Account Allocation, Federal Ministry of Finance (FMF)\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS/N State\nFed. Acct.\nExcess \nCrude\nBudget \nAugmentation\nExchange \nGain\nNNPC \nRefunds\nSURE-P\nVAT\nTotal\nFed. Acct.\nExcess \nCrude\nBudget \nAugmentation\nExchange \nGain\nNNPC \nRefunds\nSURE-P\nVAT\nTotal\nFed. Acct.\nExcess \nCrude\nBudget \nAugmentation\nExchange \nGain\nNNPC \nRefunds\nSURE-P\nAdditional \nRevenue\nVAT\nTotal\n1 Abia\n11.1\n1.15\n2.3\n-\n \n0.36 \n0.80\n \n2.2\n17.9\n11.96\n \n-\n-\n-\n0.24\n0.80\n2.4\n15.4\n8.37\n0.06\n-\n0.78\n-\n-\n0.05\n2.4\n11.6\n2 Adamawa\n14.3\n1.45\n2.9\n-\n \n0.48\n \n1.03\n \n2.7\n22.8\n15.08\n \n-\n-\n-\n0.32\n1.03\n2.8\n19.3\n10.56\n0.07\n-\n0.99\n-\n-\n0.07\n2.8\n14.5\n3 Akwa-Ibom\n18.8\n1.93\n3.8\n-\n \n0.58\n \n1.35\n \n4.0\n30.5\n20.09\n \n-\n-\n-\n0.39\n1.35\n3.9\n25.7\n14.07\n0.10\n-\n1.32\n-\n-\n0.09\n4.0\n19.6\n4 Anambra\n14.1\n1.46\n2.9\n-\n \n0.50\n \n1.02\n \n3.0\n23.0\n15.16\n \n-\n-\n-\n0.33\n1.02\n3.2\n19.7\n10.62\n0.07\n-\n0.99\n-\n-\n0.07\n3.1\n14.9\n5 Bauchi\n16.3\n1.66\n3.3\n-\n \n0.49\n \n1.18\n \n3.0\n25.9\n17.21\n \n-\n-\n-\n0.33\n1.18\n3.2\n21.9\n12.06\n0.08\n-\n1.13\n-\n-\n0.08\n3.2\n16.5\n6 Bayelsa\n6.0\n0.67\n1.3\n-\n \n0.19\n \n0.43\n \n1.4\n10.1\n7.01\n \n-\n-\n-\n0.13\n0.43\n1.5\n9.0\n4.91\n0.03\n-\n0.46\n-\n-\n0.03\n1.2\n6.7\n7 Benue\n16.6\n1.80\n3.6\n-\n \n0.55\n \n1.20\n \n3.1\n26.8\n18.73\n \n-\n-\n-\n0.37\n1.20\n3.4\n23.7\n13.12\n0.09\n-\n1.23\n-\n-\n0.09\n3.2\n17.8\n8 Borno\n19.1\n1.96\n3.9\n-\n \n0.61\n \n1.37\n \n3.4\n30.3\n20.34\n \n-\n-\n-\n0.40\n1.37\n3.7\n25.8\n14.24\n0.10\n-\n1.33\n-\n-\n0.09\n3.6\n19.3\n9 Cross-River\n11.9\n1.26\n2.5\n-\n \n0.40\n \n0.85\n \n2.4\n19.3\n13.11\n \n-\n-\n-\n0.27\n0.85\n2.6\n16.8\n9.18\n0.06\n-\n0.86\n-\n-\n0.06\n2.5\n12.7\n10 Delta\n15.7\n1.62\n3.2\n-\n \n0.53\n \n1.13\n \n3.5\n25.7\n16.80\n \n-\n-\n-\n0.36\n1.13\n3.7\n21.9\n11.77\n0.08\n-\n1.10\n-\n-\n0.08\n3.6\n16.7\n11 Ebonyi\n8.5\n0.93\n1.9\n-\n \n0.28\n \n0.61\n \n1.8\n13.9\n9.70\n \n-\n-\n-\n0.18\n0.61\n1.9\n12.4\n6.79\n0.05\n-\n0.63\n-\n-\n0.04\n1.8\n9.3\n12 Edo\n11.9\n1.24\n2.5\n-\n \n0.43\n \n0.85\n \n2.6\n19.4\n12.85\n \n-\n-\n-\n0.29\n0.85\n2.7\n16.7\n9.00\n0.06\n-\n0.84\n-\n-\n0.06\n2.6\n12.6\n13 Ekiti\n9.7\n0.98\n1.9\n-\n \n0.32\n \n0.70\n \n2.1\n15.7\n10.21\n \n-\n-\n-\n0.21\n0.70\n2.1\n13.3\n7.15\n0.05\n-\n0.67\n-\n-\n0.05\n2.1\n10.0\n14 Enugu\n11.5\n1.26\n2.5\n-\n \n0.37\n \n0.82\n \n2.4\n18.8\n13.06\n \n-\n-\n-\n0.24\n0.82\n2.6\n16.7\n9.15\n0.06\n-\n0.85\n-\n-\n0.06\n2.6\n12.7\n15 Gombe\n8.4\n0.86\n1.7\n-\n0.26\n0.60\n1.6\n13.4\n8.95\n-\n-\n-\n0.17\n0.60\n1.7\n11.4\n6.27\n0.04\n-\n0.59\n-\n-\n0.04\n1.7\n8.6\n16 Imo\n16.6\n1.69\n3.3\n-\n0.52\n1.19\n3.4\n26.7\n17.50\n-\n-\n-\n0.35\n1.19\n3.6\n22.6\n12.26\n0.09\n-\n1.15\n-\n-\n0.08\n3.5\n17.1\n17 Jigawa\n17.4\n1.77\n3.5\n-\n0.56\n1.25\n3.5\n28.0\n18.39\n-\n-\n-\n0.37\n1.25\n3.9\n23.9\n12.88\n0.09\n-\n1.20\n-\n-\n0.08\n3.7\n17.9\n18 Kaduna\n18.7\n1.99\n3.9\n-\n0.61\n1.34\n3.7\n30.2\n20.68\n-\n-\n-\n0.41\n1.34\n4.0\n26.4\n14.48\n0.10\n-\n1.35\n-\n-\n0.09\n3.9\n19.9\n19 Kano\n30.6\n3.17\n6.3\n-\n0.97\n2.20\n6.6\n49.8\n32.92\n-\n-\n-\n0.64\n2.20\n7.1\n42.8\n23.06\n0.16\n-\n2.16\n-\n-\n0.15\n6.9\n32.4\n20 Katsina\n22.4\n2.41\n4.8\n-\n0.73\n1.61\n4.4\n36.4\n25.06\n-\n-\n-\n0.48\n1.61\n4.8\n32.0\n17.55\n0.12\n-\n1.64\n-\n-\n0.11\n4.8\n24.2\n21 Kebbi\n13.9\n1.52\n3.0\n-\n0.45\n1.00\n2.7\n22.6\n15.82\n-\n-\n-\n0.30\n1.00\n3.0\n20.1\n11.08\n0.08\n-\n1.04\n-\n-\n0.07\n2.8\n15.1\n22 Kogi\n14.4\n1.57\n3.1\n-\n0.45\n1.04\n2.7\n23.3\n16.35\n-\n-\n-\n0.30\n1.04\n2.9\n20.6\n11.45\n0.08\n-\n1.07\n-\n-\n0.07\n2.8\n15.5\n23 Kwara\n11.1\n1.11\n2.2\n-\n0.37\n0.80\n2.0\n17.6\n11.57\n-\n-\n-\n0.25\n0.80\n2.2\n14.8\n8.10\n0.06\n-\n0.76\n-\n-\n0.05\n2.1\n11.1\n24 Lagos\n18.6\n1.90\n3.8\n-\n0.65\n1.34\n19.3\n45.5\n19.71\n-\n-\n-\n0.43\n1.34\n21.7\n43.2\n13.80\n0.10\n-\n1.29\n-\n-\n0.09\n20.6\n35.9\n25 Nassarawa\n8.9\n0.99\n2.0\n-\n0.29\n0.64\n1.6\n14.4\n10.32\n-\n-\n-\n0.19\n0.64\n1.7\n12.9\n7.23\n0.05\n-\n0.68\n-\n-\n0.05\n1.7\n9.7\n26 Niger\n18.0\n1.84\n3.6\n-\n0.58\n1.29\n3.2\n28.5\n19.10\n-\n-\n-\n0.39\n1.29\n3.4\n24.2\n13.38\n0.09\n-\n1.25\n-\n-\n0.09\n3.4\n18.2\n27 Ogun\n13.3\n1.31\n2.6\n-\n0.44\n0.96\n2.8\n21.4\n13.63\n-\n-\n-\n0.30\n0.96\n2.9\n17.8\n9.55\n0.07\n-\n0.89\n-\n-\n0.06\n3.0\n13.5\n28 Ondo\n12.3\n1.25\n2.5\n-\n0.40\n0.88\n2.5\n19.8\n13.02\n-\n-\n-\n0.27\n0.88\n2.7\n16.8\n9.12\n0.06\n-\n0.85\n-\n-\n0.06\n2.6\n12.7\n29 Osun\n16.7\n1.70\n3.4\n-\n0.58\n1.20\n3.5\n27.0\n17.63\n-\n-\n-\n0.39\n1.20\n3.8\n23.0\n12.35\n0.09\n-\n1.15\n-\n-\n0.08\n3.6\n17.3\n30 Oyo\n21.4\n2.14\n4.2\n-\n0.70\n1.54\n4.4\n34.4\n22.24\n-\n-\n-\n0.46\n1.54\n4.7\n29.0\n15.58\n0.11\n-\n1.46\n-\n-\n0.10\n4.8\n22.0\n31 Plateau\n12.2\n1.34\n2.7\n-\n0.39\n0.88\n2.4\n19.9\n13.94\n-\n-\n-\n0.26\n0.88\n2.6\n17.7\n9.76\n0.07\n-\n0.91\n-\n-\n0.06\n2.5\n13.3\n32 Rivers\n16.0\n1.66\n3.3\n-\n0.51\n1.15\n4.7\n27.3\n17.28\n-\n-\n-\n0.34\n1.15\n4.5\n23.3\n12.10\n0.08\n-\n1.13\n-\n-\n0.08\n4.1\n17.5\n33 Sokoto\n15.4\n1.68\n3.3\n-\n0.50\n1.10\n3.0\n25.0\n17.41\n-\n-\n-\n0.34\n1.10\n3.3\n22.1\n12.19\n0.08\n-\n1.14\n-\n-\n0.08\n3.1\n16.6\n34 Taraba\n12.2\n1.26\n2.5\n-\n0.39\n0.88\n2.0\n19.2\n13.05\n-\n-\n-\n0.26\n0.88\n2.1\n16.3\n9.14\n0.06\n-\n0.85\n-\n-\n0.06\n2.1\n12.2\n35 Yobe\n11.9\n1.26\n2.5\n-\n0.39\n0.85\n2.1\n19.0\n13.12\n-\n-\n-\n0.26\n0.85\n2.2\n16.5\n9.19\n0.06\n-\n0.86\n-\n-\n0.06\n2.2\n12.3\n36 Zamfara\n11.1\n1.14\n2.3\n-\n0.34\n0.80\n2.2\n17.8\n11.85\n-\n-\n-\n0.23\n0.80\n2.2\n15.1\n8.30\n0.06\n-\n0.78\n-\n-\n0.05\n2.2\n11.4\n37 FCT Abuja\n4.7\n0.50\n1.0\n-\n0.14\n0.34\n5.6\n12.3\n5.23\n-\n-\n-\n0.09\n0.34\n6.5\n12.2\n3.67\n0.03\n-\n0.34\n-\n-\n0.02\n7.2\n11.3\nTOTAL\n531.34\n55.46\n110.02\n-\n17.31\n38.23\n127.40\n879.76\n576.08\n-\n-\n-\n11.54\n38.23\n137.07\n762.92\n403.48\n2.80\n-\n37.71\n-\n-\n2.63\n134.01\n580.63\n First Half, 2013-2017\n1st Half 2013 \n 1st Half 2014 1/\n 1st Half 2015 1/\n146\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nTable 33 Contd.\nAllocation to Local Governments from the Federation and VAT Pools Accounts\n(Naira Billion)\n1/ Revised\n2/ Provisional\nVAT: Value Added Tax\nLGA: Local Governments Areas\nSource: Federation Account Allocation, Federal Ministry of Finance (FMF)\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nS/N State\nFed. Acct.\nExcess \nCrude\nNon-Oil \nExcess \nBudget \nAugmentation\nExchange \nGain\nNNPC \nRefunds\nNLNG \nDividend\nSURE-P\nAdditional \nRevenue\nVAT\nTotal\nFed. Acct.\nExcess \nCrude\nNon-Oil \nExcess \nBudget \nAugmentation\nExchange Gain NNPC Refunds NLNG Dividend SURE-P\nAdditional \nRevenue\nVAT\nTotal\n1 Abia\n5.97\n0.01\n-\n0.07\n-\n0.13\n-\n-\n2.3\n8.5\n6.21\n0.62\n-\n1.18\n-\n-\n2.7\n10.7\n2 Adamawa\n7.53\n0.01\n-\n0.09\n-\n0.16\n-\n-\n2.7\n10.5\n7.83\n0.78\n-\n1.49\n-\n-\n3.3\n13.4\n3 Akwa-Ibom\n10.03\n0.01\n-\n0.12\n-\n0.21\n-\n-\n3.8\n14.2\n10.43\n1.04\n-\n1.99\n-\n-\n4.5\n18.0\n4 Anambra\n7.57\n0.01\n-\n0.09\n-\n0.16\n-\n-\n3.0\n10.9\n7.88\n0.79\n-\n1.50\n-\n-\n3.7\n13.8\n5 Bauchi\n8.59\n0.01\n-\n0.10\n-\n0.18\n-\n-\n3.1\n11.9\n8.94\n0.89\n-\n1.71\n-\n-\n3.6\n15.2\n6 Bayelsa\n3.50\n0.00\n-\n0.04\n-\n0.07\n-\n-\n1.2\n4.8\n3.64\n0.36\n-\n0.69\n-\n-\n1.6\n6.3\n7 Benue\n9.35\n0.01\n \n-\n \n0.11\n \n-\n \n0.20\n-\n-\n3.2\n12.9\n9.73\n0.97\n-\n1.86\n-\n-\n3.8\n16.3\n8 Borno\n10.15\n0.01\n \n-\n \n0.12\n \n-\n \n0.21\n-\n-\n3.5\n14.0\n10.56\n1.05\n-\n2.02\n-\n-\n4.2\n17.8\n9 Cross-River\n6.54\n0.01\n -\n \n0.08\n \n-\n \n0.14\n-\n-\n2.4\n9.1\n6.81\n0.68\n-\n1.30\n-\n-\n2.9\n11.7\n10 Delta\n8.39\n0.01\n \n-\n \n0.10\n \n-\n \n0.18\n-\n-\n3.6\n12.2\n8.73\n0.87\n-\n1.66\n-\n-\n4.1\n15.4\n11 Ebonyi\n4.84\n0.01\n \n-\n \n0.06\n \n-\n \n0.10\n-\n-\n1.8\n6.8\n5.04\n0.50\n-\n0.96\n-\n-\n2.1\n8.6\n12 Edo\n6.42\n0.01\n \n-\n \n0.08\n \n-\n \n0.14\n-\n-\n2.6\n9.3\n6.68\n0.67\n-\n1.27\n-\n-\n3.1\n11.7\n13 Ekiti\n5.09\n0.01\n \n-\n \n0.06\n \n-\n \n0.11\n-\n-\n2.1\n7.4\n5.30\n0.53\n-\n1.01\n-\n-\n2.5\n9.3\n14 Enugu\n6.52\n0.01\n \n-\n \n0.08\n \n-\n \n0.14\n-\n-\n2.5\n9.3\n6.78\n0.68\n-\n1.29\n-\n-\n3.0\n11.8\n15 Gombe\n4.47\n0.01\n \n-\n \n0.05\n \n-\n \n0.09\n-\n-\n1.7\n6.3\n4.65\n0.46\n-\n0.89\n-\n-\n2.0\n8.0\n16 Imo\n8.74\n0.01\n \n-\n \n0.11\n \n-\n \n0.18\n-\n-\n3.5\n12.5\n9.09\n0.91\n-\n1.73\n-\n-\n4.1\n15.9\n17 Jigawa\n9.18\n0.01\n \n-\n \n0.11\n \n-\n \n0.19\n-\n-\n3.6\n13.1\n9.55\n0.95\n-\n1.82\n-\n-\n4.3\n16.6\n18 Kaduna\n10.32\n0.01\n \n-\n \n0.13\n \n-\n \n0.22\n-\n-\n3.8\n14.5\n10.74\n1.07\n-\n2.05\n-\n-\n4.7\n18.5\n19 Kano\n16.43\n0.02\n-\n0.20\n-\n0.35\n-\n-\n6.8\n23.8\n17.10\n1.71\n-\n3.26\n-\n-\n9.1\n31.2\n20 Katsina\n12.51\n0.01\n-\n0.15\n-\n0.26\n-\n-\n4.7\n17.6\n13.02\n1.30\n-\n2.48\n-\n-\n5.5\n22.3\n21 Kebbi\n7.90\n0.01\n-\n0.10\n-\n0.17\n-\n-\n2.7\n10.9\n8.22\n0.82\n-\n1.57\n-\n-\n3.3\n13.9\n22 Kogi\n8.16\n0.01\n-\n0.10\n-\n0.17\n-\n-\n2.8\n11.2\n8.49\n0.85\n-\n1.62\n-\n-\n3.3\n14.2\n23 Kwara\n5.78\n0.01\n-\n0.07\n-\n0.12\n-\n-\n2.1\n8.1\n6.01\n0.60\n-\n1.15\n-\n-\n2.5\n10.2\n24 Lagos\n9.84\n0.01\n-\n0.12\n-\n0.21\n-\n-\n21.1\n31.2\n10.24\n1.02\n-\n1.95\n-\n-\n22.3\n35.5\n25 Nassarawa\n5.15\n0.01\n-\n0.06\n-\n0.11\n-\n-\n1.7\n7.0\n5.36\n0.53\n-\n1.02\n-\n-\n2.0\n8.9\n26 Niger\n9.54\n0.01\n-\n0.12\n-\n0.20\n-\n-\n3.3\n13.2\n9.92\n0.99\n-\n1.89\n-\n-\n3.9\n16.7\n27 Ogun\n6.80\n0.01\n-\n0.08\n-\n0.14\n-\n-\n2.8\n9.9\n7.08\n0.71\n-\n1.35\n-\n-\n3.4\n12.6\n28 Ondo\n6.50\n0.01\n-\n0.08\n-\n0.14\n-\n-\n2.6\n9.3\n6.76\n0.67\n-\n1.29\n-\n-\n3.0\n11.8\n29 Osun\n8.80\n0.01\n-\n0.11\n-\n0.19\n-\n-\n3.6\n12.7\n9.16\n0.91\n-\n1.75\n-\n-\n4.2\n16.1\n30 Oyo\n11.10\n0.01\n-\n0.13\n-\n0.23\n-\n-\n4.9\n16.4\n11.55\n1.15\n-\n2.20\n-\n-\n6.2\n21.2\n31 Plateau\n6.96\n0.01\n-\n0.08\n-\n0.15\n-\n-\n2.4\n9.6\n7.24\n0.72\n-\n1.38\n-\n-\n2.9\n12.2\n32 Rivers\n8.63\n0.01\n-\n0.10\n-\n0.18\n-\n-\n4.1\n13.1\n8.98\n0.90\n-\n1.71\n-\n-\n5.9\n17.5\n33 Sokoto\n8.69\n0.01\n-\n0.11\n-\n0.18\n-\n-\n3.1\n12.0\n9.04\n0.90\n-\n1.72\n-\n-\n3.6\n15.3\n34 Taraba\n6.51\n0.01\n-\n0.08\n-\n0.14\n-\n-\n2.0\n8.8\n6.78\n0.68\n-\n1.29\n-\n-\n2.5\n11.2\n35 Yobe\n6.55\n0.01\n-\n0.08\n-\n0.14\n-\n-\n2.1\n8.9\n6.81\n0.68\n-\n1.30\n-\n-\n2.6\n11.4\n36 Zamfara\n5.92\n0.01\n-\n0.07\n-\n0.12\n-\n-\n2.2\n8.3\n6.16\n0.61\n-\n1.17\n-\n-\n2.5\n10.5\n37 FCT Abuja\n2.61\n0.00\n-\n0.03\n-\n0.06\n-\n-\n6.3\n9.0\n2.72\n0.27\n-\n0.52\n-\n-\n7.4\n10.9\nTOTAL\n287.57\n0.33\n-\n3.48\n-\n6.06\n-\n-\n131.44\n428.87\n299.21\n29.85\n-\n57.08\n-\n-\n-\n156.35\n542.49\n 1st Half 2016 2/\n 1st Half 2017 2/\n147\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nTable 34\nConsolidated Debt of the Federal Government \n (Naira Billion)\nType\n1st Half \n2013 \n1st Half \n2014\n1st Half \n2015\n1st Half \n2016\nEnd-\nDecember \n2016\nEnd-June \n2017\nExternal Debt\n1,088.60\n1,474.93\n2,031.90\n3,187.12\n3,478.91\n4,602.88\nDomestic Debt\n6,850.75\n7,421.10\n8,396.59\n10,606.33\n11,058.20\n12,033.45\nTotal\n7,939.35\n8,896.02\n10,428.49\n13,793.45\n14,537.12\n16,636.33\nItem\n1st Half \n2013 \n1st Half \n2014\n1st Half \n2015\n1st Half \n2016\nEnd-\nDecember \n2016\nEnd-June \n2017\nCOMPOSITION OF DEBT.\nInstruments\nTreasury Bills\n2,483.3\n \n2,735.9\n2,825.0\n \n2,901.8\n \n3,277.3\n3,702.8\nTreasury Bonds\n334.6\n \n315.4\n271.2\n \n231.0\n \n216.0\n191.0\nDevelopment Stocks\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nFGN Bonds\n4,032.9\n \n4,369.8\n5,300.4\n \n7,473.5\n \n7,564.9\n8,134.9\nSpecial FGN Savings Bond\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n4.75\nPromisory Notes 2/\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n6,850.7\n \n7,421.1\n8,396.6\n \n10,606.3\n \n11,058.2\n12,033.5\nHOLDERS\nBanking System\n5,243.8\n \n5,747.1\n \n6,040.09\n \n6,927.25\n \n5,625.86\n7,859.34\nCentral Bank\n761.0\n832.1\n948.97\n689.42\n710.74\n782.18\nDeposit Money Banks (DMBs)\n4,166.1\n4,568.7\n5,091.12\n6,237.83\n4,915.12\n7,077.15\nSinking Fund\n316.7\n346.3\n394.90\n271.75\n231.75\n308.32\nNon-Bank Public\n1,607.0\n1,674.0\n1,961.60\n3,407.33\n5,200.59\n3,865.79\nTotal Debt Outstanding\n6,850.7\n7,421.1\n8,396.59\n10,606.33\n11,058.20\n12,033.45\n**Figures for 2012 have been revised\n1/ Provisional\n2/ Introduced 30th September, 2009\n Domestic Public Debt (end - Period)\n148\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nTable 35\nExternal Public Debt Outstanding\nExternal Debt Stock\n1st Half 2013 1st Half 2014\n1st Half 2015\n1st Half 2016\nEnd-\nDecember \n2016\nEnd-June \n2017\n1st Half 2013 1st Half 2014\n1st Half 2015\n1st Half 2016\nEnd-\nDecember \n2016\nEnd-June \n2017\nMULTILATERAL\n5,538.70\n6,730.45\n7,232.86\n7,991.00\n7,988.21\n9,673.99\n871.29\n1,058.63\n1,424.51\n2,261.45\n2,436.40\n2,959.27\n IBRD\n-\n-\n-\n7.25\n3.88\n124.18\n-\n-\n-\n2.05\n1.18\n37.99\n IDA\n4,777.40\n5,772.77\n6,091.45\n6,844.97\n6,669.57\n7,596.11\n751.53\n908.00\n1,199.71\n1,937.13\n2,034.22\n2,323.65\n IFAD\n83.70\n91.57\n94.80\n103.01\n107.42\n121.21\n13.17\n14.40\n18.67\n29.15\n32.76\n37.08\n ADB Group\n559.50\n748.24\n946.53\n938.91\n1,118.62\n1,740.70\n88.01\n117.69\n186.42\n265.71\n341.18\n532.48\n ADB\n21.20\n150.00\n350.00\n400.73\n403.34\n1,002.33\n3.33\n23.59\n68.93\n113.41\n123.02\n306.61\n ADF\n538.30\n598.24\n596.53\n538.18\n715.28\n738.37\n84.68\n94.10\n117.49\n152.30\n218.16\n225.87\n Others 2/\n118.10\n117.87\n100.08\n96.86\n88.72\n91.79\n18.58\n18.54\n19.71\n27.41\n27.06\n28.08\nBILATERAL\n845.40\n1,140.79\n1,583.95\n1,770.90\n1,918.06\n2,073.02\n132.99\n179.43\n311.96\n501.16\n585.01\n634.14\n Exim Bank of China\n825.40\n1,031.84\n1,388.87\n \n1,495.85\n \n1,638.06\n \n1,768.95\n \n129.84\n \n162.30\n \n273.54\n423.33\n499.61\n541.12\n French Devt. Agency (AFD)\n20.00\n108.95\n140.25\n \n182.95\n \n198.25\n \n218.25\n \n3.15\n \n17.14\n \n27.62\n51.77\n60.47\n66.76\n Others 3/\n-\n-\n \n54.83\n \n \n92.10\n \n81.75\n \n85.82\n \n-\n \n-\n \n10.80\n26.06\n24.93\n26.25\nCOMMERCIAL 4/\n36.00\n5.88\n \n-\n \n \n-\n \n-\n \n300.00\n \n5.66\n \n0.92\n \n-\n-\n-\n91.77\nEUROBOND\n500.00\n1,500.00\n1,500.00\n \n1,500.00\n \n1,500.00\n \n3,000.00\n \n78.66\n \n235.94\n \n \n295.43\n424.50\n457.50\n917.70\nTotal Debt Outstanding\n6,920.10\n9,377.12\n10,316.81\n \n11,261.90\n \n11,406.27\n \n15,047.01\n \n1,088.60\n \n1,474.93\n \n \n2,031.90\n3,187.12\n3,478.91\n4,602.88\n 1st Half 2013 1st Half 2014 1st Half 2015 1st Half 2016 \n End-\nDecember \n2016 \n 1st Half 2017 1st Half 2013 1st Half 2014 1st Half 2015 1st Half 2016 \n End-\nDecember \n2016 \n 1st Half 2017 \nMULTILATERAL\n70.91\n82.43\n \n63.39\n \n \n77.01\n \n88.31\n \n85.64\n \n11.15\n \n12.97\n \n12.30\n15.93\n26.95\n26.18\n IBRD\n-\n-\n \n-\n \n \n-\n \n-\n \n0.06\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n-\n-\n0.02\n IDA\n46.99\n58.66\n \n50.46\n \n \n63.95\n \n72.90\n \n69.01\n \n7.39\n \n9.23\n \n9.79\n13.23\n22.25\n21.10\n IFAD\n1.76\n1.62\n \n1.48\n \n \n1.66\n \n1.70\n \n2.09\n \n0.28\n \n0.25\n \n0.29\n0.34\n0.52\n0.64\n ADB Group\n18.96\n18.75\n7.60\n8.59\n9.50\n11.34\n2.98\n2.95\n1.47\n1.78\n2.90\n3.47\n ADB\n11.97\n11.76\n0.79\n1.54\n2.12\n3.88\n1.88\n1.85\n0.15\n0.32\n0.65\n1.19\n ADF\n7.00\n7.00\n6.80\n7.05\n7.39\n7.46\n1.10\n1.10\n1.32\n1.46\n2.25\n2.28\n Others 2/\n3.21\n3.40\n3.86\n2.81\n4.21\n3.15\n0.50\n0.54\n0.75\n0.58\n1.29\n0.96\nBILATERAL\n19.48\n23.17\n29.43\n30.75\n32.63\n34.02\n3.06\n3.64\n5.71\n6.36\n9.96\n10.40\n Exim Bank of China\n-\n22.79\n26.65\n28.76\n30.03\n31.48\n-\n3.59\n5.17\n5.95\n9.17\n9.62\n French Devt. Agency (AFD)\n0.04\n0.37\n1.83\n1.90\n2.38\n2.39\n0.01\n0.06\n0.36\n0.39\n0.73\n0.73\n Others 3/\n19.43\n-\n0.94\n0.09\n0.22\n0.15\n3.06\n-\n0.18\n0.02\n0.07\n0.04\nCOMMERCIAL 4/\n38.82\n6.08\n-\n-\n-\n-\n6.11\n0.96\n-\n-\n-\n-\nEUROBOND\n16.88\n45.63\n45.63\n45.63\n45.63\n45.63\n2.65\n7.18\n8.85\n9.44\n13.93\n13.95\nOTHERS 5/\n0.01\n20.87\n20.86\n12.26\n20.86\n20.86\n0.00\n3.28\n4.05\n2.54\n6.37\n6.38\nTotal Debt Service Payments\n146.09\n178.18\n159.31\n165.66\n187.43\n186.15\n22.98\n28.03\n30.91\n34.27\n57.21\n56.91\n1/ Provisional\n2/ Includes ABEDA, IDB and EDF\n3/ Exim Bank of Korea and Nig. ICT Infrast. Backbone Project.\n4/ Includes Papalanto &Omotosho, ZTE, Arcatel and SBI Holdings.\n5/ Includes Bank of England and CITIbank Lazards agency fees and Oil warrants\nSource: Debt Management Office, The Presidency, Abuja.\nExternal Debt Service Payments\nHolder\nUS $ Million\nNaira Billion\nNaira Billion\nUS $ Million\n Holder\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n149\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nTable 36\nConsolidated Debt Service Payment 1/\n (Naira Billion)\nHolders\n1st Half \n2013 \n1st Half \n2014\n1st Half \n2015\n1st Half \n2016\nEnd- \nDecember \n2016\n1st Half \n2017\nExternal Debt\n22.98\n \n28.03\n \n30.91\n \n34.27\n57.21\n56.91\nDomestic Debt\n423.22\n439.18\n528.54\n \n641.68\n587.08\n709.45\nTotal Consolidated Debt \n446.20\n467.21\n559.45\n \n675.96\n644.29\n766.36\n1/ Provisional\nSource: Debt Management Office (DMO)\nTable 37\nDebt Service Payment by the Federal Government 1/\n(By Instrument)\n (Naira Billion)\n1st Half \n2013 \n1ST HALF \n2014\n1ST HALF \n2015\n1ST HALF \n2016\nEnd- \nDecember \n2016\n1st Half \n2017\n i Treasury Bills\n170.34\n \n173.08\n \n191.04\n \n219.93\n \n115.65\n \n201.57\n ii Treasury Bonds\n18.75\n \n18.75\n \n43.75\n \n40.63\n \n13.37\n \n34.62\n iii Development Stocks\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n iv FGN Bonds\n234.13\n \n247.35\n \n293.74\n \n381.13\n \n458.05\n \n473.19\n v Savings Bonds\n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n0.07\nTotal\n423.22\n \n439.18\n \n528.54\n641.68\n587.08\n \n709.45\n1/ 2008 to 2013 Figures are Revised\nNB: Debt Service excludes sinking fund charges\nSource: Debt Management Office\nTable 38\nGross Domestic Product at 2010 Constant Basic Prices \n(Naira Billion unless otherwise stated)\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n150\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1st Half 2015 2nd Half 2015 1st Half 2016 1/ 2nd Half 2016 2/ 1st Half 2017 2/\n1. Agriculture\n6,394.42\n \n8,985.97\n \n6,654.44\n \n9,297.78\n \n6,910.26\n9,697.08\n7,130.69\n20.47\n25.47\n21.49\n27.11\n22.21\n (a) Crop Production\n5,627.04\n8,166.41\n5,840.32\n \n8,434.61\n \n6,068.95\n8,825.50\n6,272.02\n17.96\n23.10\n18.87\n24.67\n19.54\n (b) Livestock\n515.37\n571.48\n547.96\n \n603.37\n \n575.65\n609.47\n587.13\n1.69\n1.65\n1.79\n1.70\n1.83\n (c) Forestry\n77.85\n83.49\n81.09\n \n86.17\n \n83.61\n88.03\n86.36\n0.25\n0.24\n0.26\n0.25\n0.27\n (d) Fishing\n174.17\n164.59\n185.08\n \n173.62\n \n182.05\n174.08\n185.18\n0.57\n0.48\n0.57\n0.49\n0.58\n2. Industry\n6,886.47\n \n6,904.78\n \n6,550.29\n \n6,768.84\n \n6,096.27\n5,965.78\n5,903.52\n20.15\n18.54\n18.95\n16.68\n18.39\n (a) Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas\n3,558.05\n3,453.77\n3,291.61\n \n3,338.36\n \n3,023.25\n2,648.96\n2,797.40\n10.12\n9.14\n9.40\n7.41\n8.71\n (b) Solid Minerals\n45.12\n50.10\n49.28\n \n53.26\n \n31.09\n56.52\n33.77\n0.15\n0.15\n0.10\n0.16\n0.11\n (c) Manufacturing\n3,283.30\n3,400.92\n3,209.41\n \n3,377.21\n \n3,041.94\n3,260.30\n3,072.36\n9.87\n9.25\n9.46\n9.11\n9.57\n3. Construction\n1,322.85\n1,245.61\n1,437.57\n \n1,242.65\n \n1,353.69\n1,167.16\n1,355.54\n4.42\n3.40\n4.21\n3.26\n4.22\n4. Trade\n5,376.27\n5,749.52\n5,686.39\n \n6,011.20\n \n5,742.90\n5,926.17\n5,607.42\n17.49\n16.46\n17.86\n16.57\n17.47\n5. Services\n11,543.29\n \n12,743.60\n \n12,185.25\n \n13,189.53\n \n12,059.14\n13,012.80\n12,108.52\n37.48\n36.13\n37.49\n36.38\n37.71\n (a) Transport\n351.05\n419.64\n366.48\n \n438.98\n \n380.31\n428.29\n388.74\n1.13\n1.20\n1.18\n1.20\n1.21\n (b) Information and Communication\n3,579.50\n3,677.56\n3,857.96\n3,850.16\n3,960.18\n3,898.51\n3,989.00\n11.87\n10.55\n12.31\n10.90\n12.42\n (c) Utilities\n189.15\n193.29\n165.58\n201.74\n138.01\n197.23\n159.16\n0.51\n0.55\n0.43\n0.55\n0.50\n (d) Accommodation and Food Services\n282.12\n357.60\n312.49\n \n341.72\n \n290.49\n328.93\n278.89\n0.96\n0.94\n0.90\n0.92\n0.87\n (e) Finance & Insurance\n1,035.35\n947.32\n1,115.13\n \n1,008.77\n \n991.88\n1,035.63\n1,046.58\n3.43\n2.76\n3.08\n2.90\n3.26\n (f) Real Estate\n2,303.72\n2,852.01\n2,373.28\n2,891.42\n2,254.40\n2,649.21\n2,179.27\n7.30\n7.92\n7.01\n7.41\n6.79\n (g) Professional, Scientific & Technical Services\n1,091.53\n1,298.91\n1,162.07\n1,354.00\n1,162.99\n1,373.30\n1,161.22\n3.57\n3.71\n3.62\n3.84\n3.62\n (h) Administrative and Support Services Bussiness Services\n6.68\n7.30\n6.96\n7.51\n6.78\n7.59\n6.77\n0.02\n0.02\n0.02\n0.02\n0.02\n (i) Public Administration\n915.64\n959.31\n809.79\n834.99\n766.92\n802.59\n765.66\n2.49\n2.29\n2.38\n2.24\n2.38\n (j) Education\n582.10\n809.86\n623.37\n875.33\n644.44\n874.49\n643.30\n1.92\n2.40\n2.00\n2.44\n2.00\n (k) Human Health & Social Services\n228.84\n243.79\n234.00\n250.33\n231.37\n244.32\n231.41\n0.72\n0.69\n0.72\n0.68\n0.72\n (l) Arts, Entertainment & Recreation\n67.32\n61.86\n75.47\n65.86\n79.39\n67.19\n84.07\n0.23\n0.18\n0.25\n0.19\n0.26\n (m) Other Services\n910.29\n915.16\n1,082.67\n1,068.71\n1,151.96\n1,105.51\n1,174.46\n3.33\n2.93\n3.58\n3.09\n3.66\nTOTAL (GDP)\n31,523.30\n35,629.48\n32,513.94\n36,509.99\n32,162.26\n35,768.98\n32,105.70\n100.00\n100.00\n100.00\n100.00\n100.00\nNON-OIL (GDP)\n27,965.26\n32,175.72\n29,222.34\n33,171.63\n29,139.01\n33,120.02\n29,308.30\n89.88\n90.86\n90.60\n92.59\n91.29\nNET INDIRECT TAXES ON PRODUCTS\n327.11\n497.56\n312.91\n443.85\n274.26\n446.93\n264.39\nTOTAL GDP AT 2010 CONSTANT MARKET PRICES\n31,850.42\n36,127.04\n32,826.86\n36,953.84\n32,436.52\n36,215.91\n32,370.09\nTOTAL GDP GROWTH RATE (%)\n3.14\n2.47\n(1.08)\n(2.03)\n(0.18)\n OIL GDP GROWTH RATE (%)\n(7.49)\n(3.34)\n(8.15)\n(20.65)\n(7.47)\n NON-OIL GDP GROWTH RATE (%)\n4.50\n3.10\n(0.29)\n(0.16)\n0.58\nGrowth in Total GDP\n Agriculture (%)\n4.07\n3.47\n3.84\n4.29\n3.19\n Industry (%)\n(4.88)\n(1.97)\n(6.93)\n(11.86)\n(3.16)\n Construction (%)\n8.67\n(0.24)\n(5.83)\n(6.07)\n0.14\n Trade (%)\n5.77\n4.55\n0.99\n(1.41)\n(2.36)\n Services (%)\n5.56\n3.50\n(1.04)\n(1.34)\n0.41\nSource: National Bureau of Statistics\n1/ Revised\n2/ Provisional\nShare of Total GDP (Per Cent)\nActivity Sector\n1st Half 2014 2nd Half 2014 1st Half 2015 2nd Half 2015 1st Half 2016 1/ 2nd Half 2016 2/ 1st Half 2017 2/\nTable 39\nGross Domestic Product at Current Basic Prices /1\n(Naira Billion unless otherwise stated)\n151\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n1st Half 2015 2nd Half 2015 1st Half 2016 1/ 2nd Half 2016 2/ 1st Half 2017 2/\n1. Agriculture\n7,225.24\n \n10,793.37\n \n7,827.50\n \n11,809.47\n \n8,897.75\n12,625.76\n9,896.37\n17.83\n23.50\n19.43\n22.66\n18.67\n (a) Crop Production\n6,173.67\n \n9,638.90\n \n6,652.62\n \n10,537.35\n \n7,601.06\n11,282.02\n8,499.64\n15.15\n20.97\n16.60\n20.25\n16.03\n (b) Livestock\n736.22\n \n836.83\n \n821.92\n \n926.11\n \n902.80\n972.99\n962.08\n1.87\n1.84\n1.97\n1.75\n1.81\n (c) Forestry\n98.77\n \n108.97\n \n108.16\n \n114.67\n \n113.28\n122.98\n125.22\n0.25\n0.23\n0.25\n0.22\n0.24\n (d) Fishing\n216.58\n \n208.67\n \n244.80\n \n231.34\n \n280.61\n247.78\n309.42\n0.56\n0.46\n0.61\n0.44\n0.58\n2. Industry\n9,530.21\n \n8,871.98\n \n7,455.57\n \n7,618.21\n \n6,061.42\n8,311.37\n9,426.22\n16.98\n15.16\n13.24\n14.92\n17.78\n (a) Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas\n5,245.39\n \n4,371.09\n \n3,137.49\n \n2,852.92\n \n1,847.05\n3,520.27\n4,518.07\n7.15\n5.68\n4.03\n6.32\n8.52\n (b) Solid Minerals\n47.37\n \n52.90\n \n52.68\n \n56.91\n \n34.45\n67.77\n47.05\n0.12\n0.11\n0.08\n0.12\n0.09\n (c) Manufacturing\n4,237.45\n \n4,447.98\n \n4,265.40\n \n4,708.38\n \n4,179.91\n4,723.33\n4,861.09\n9.72\n9.37\n9.13\n8.48\n9.17\n3. Construction\n1,625.22\n \n1,563.60\n \n1,835.19\n \n1,637.06\n \n1,881.22\n1,725.34\n2,244.43\n4.18\n3.26\n4.11\n3.10\n4.23\n4. Trade\n7,431.15\n \n8,272.98\n \n8,538.49\n \n9,490.41\n \n9,766.09\n10,909.77\n10,465.20\n19.45\n18.89\n21.33\n19.58\n19.74\n5. Services\n16,092.79\n17,637.07\n18,244.10\n19,688.96\n19,176.31\n22,134.47\n20,982.13\n41.56\n39.19\n41.89\n39.73\n39.58\n (a) Transport\n550.71\n646.73\n614.58\n746.49\n \n716.31\n857.21\n822.20\n1.40\n1.49\n1.56\n1.54\n1.55\n (b) Information and Communication\n4,986.20\n4,602.37\n5,685.01\n5,096.07\n \n5,691.91\n5,787.59\n6,017.28\n12.95\n10.14\n12.43\n10.39\n11.35\n (c) Utilities\n279.71\n342.29\n284.54\n358.00\n \n259.47\n402.36\n336.77\n0.65\n0.71\n0.57\n0.72\n0.64\n (d) Accommodation and Food Services\n355.21\n464.57\n424.48\n469.19\n \n426.75\n498.32\n446.58\n0.97\n0.93\n0.93\n0.89\n0.84\n (e) Finance & Insurance\n1,431.02\n1,360.38\n1,674.24\n1,586.26\n1,686.93\n1,906.40\n1,953.33\n3.81\n3.16\n3.68\n3.42\n3.68\n (f) Real Estate\n3,278.91\n4,196.63\n3,626.21\n4,561.34\n3,678.47\n4,661.96\n3,977.91\n8.26\n9.08\n8.03\n8.37\n7.50\n (g) Professional, Scientific & Technical Services\n1,558.71\n1,842.84\n1,799.16\n2,128.14\n1,979.74\n2,528.02\n2,167.22\n4.10\n4.24\n4.32\n4.54\n4.09\n (h) Administrative and Support Services Bussiness Services\n9.24\n10.48\n10.46\n11.79\n11.55\n13.97\n12.63\n0.02\n0.02\n0.03\n0.03\n0.02\n (i) Public Administration\n1,265.91\n1,378.32\n1,216.61\n1,335.84\n1,305.88\n1,477.95\n1,429.03\n2.77\n2.66\n2.85\n2.65\n2.70\n (j) Education\n738.40\n1,066.01\n853.49\n1,262.85\n989.74\n1,456.21\n1,101.79\n1.94\n2.51\n2.16\n2.61\n2.08\n (k) Human Health & Social Services\n291.62\n323.40\n322.11\n360.58\n351.50\n394.08\n382.00\n0.73\n0.72\n0.77\n0.71\n0.72\n (l) Arts, Entertainment & Recreation\n90.25\n86.74\n109.93\n100.49\n126.39\n112.99\n143.77\n0.25\n0.20\n0.28\n0.20\n0.27\n (m) Other Services\n1,256.90\n1,316.31\n1,623.27\n1,671.93\n1,951.68\n2,037.41\n2,191.62\n3.70\n3.33\n4.26\n3.66\n4.13\nTOTAL (GDP)\n41,904.61\n47,139.01\n43,900.85\n50,244.11\n45,782.78\n55,706.71\n53,014.36\n100.00\n100.00\n100.00\n100.00\n100.00\nNON-OIL (GDP)\n36,659.21\n42,767.91\n40,763.36\n47,391.18\n43,935.73\n52,186.44\n48,496.29\n92.85\n94.32\n95.97\n93.68\n91.48\nNET INDIRECT TAXES ON PRODUCTS\n434.74\n658.63\n422.60\n610.18\n389.98\n695.95\n436.64\nTOTAL GDP AT CURRENT MARKET PRICES\n42,339.35\n47,797.64\n44,323.45\n50,854.28\n46,172.76\n56,402.66\n53,451.00\nTOTAL GDP GROWTH RATE (%)\n4.76\n6.59\n4.29\n10.87\n15.80\n OIL GDP GROWTH RATE (%)\n(40.19)\n(34.73)\n(41.13)\n23.39\n144.61\n NON-OIL GDP GROWTH RATE (%)\n11.20\n10.81\n7.78\n10.12\n10.38\nGrowth in Total GDP\n Agriculture (%)\n8.34\n9.41\n13.67\n6.91\n11.22\n Industry (%)\n(21.77)\n(14.13)\n(18.70)\n9.10\n55.51\n Construction (%)\n12.92\n4.70\n2.51\n5.39\n19.31\n Trade (%)\n14.90\n14.72\n14.38\n14.96\n7.16\n Services (%)\n13.37\n11.63\n5.11\n12.42\n9.42\nSource: National Bureau of Statistics\n1/ Revised\n2/ Provisional\nShare of Total GDP (Per Cent)\nActivity Sector\n1st Half 2014 2nd Half 2014 1st Half 2015 2nd Half 2015 1st Half 2016 1/ 2nd Half 2016 2/ 1st Half 2017 2/\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nTable 40\nSelected Real Sector Indicators\n(Per cent, except otherwise indicated)\n152\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n2012\n2013\n2014\n2015\n2016\n2017 /2\nFirst Half\nFirst Half\nFirst Half\nFirst Half\nFirst Half\nFirst Half\nAgricultural Production Index (2010 = 100)\nAggregate\n109.9\n112.7\n117.9\n123.4\n126.5\nCrops\n109.5\n111.6\n116.3\n121.5\n124.3\nStaples\n109.9\n112.0\n116.6\n122.0\n124.9\nOther Crops\n109.7\n118.9\n124.2\n129.5\n132.2\nLivestock\n112.9\n120.5\n126.6\n134.7\n139.8\nFishery\n112.5\n123.3\n131.5\n140.7\n141.5\nForestry\n111.7\n118.3\n125.1\n130.5\n136.0\nIndices of Average World Prices of Nigeria's Major Agricultural \nExport Commodities (2010 = 100) (Dollar Based)\nAll Commodities\n80.5\n74.7\n96.1\n92.2\n93.6\n67.3\nCocoa\n73.8\n72.1\n96.3\n95.5\n97.0\n65.1\nCoffee\n102.7\n75.8\n98.3\n86.1\n78.7\n82.2\nCotton\n92.0\n88.1\n90.0\n68.1\n66.6\n82.8\nPalm Oil\n122.0\n89.6\n93.6\n71.4\n71.8\n77.5\nCopra\n114.2\n74.2\n121.3\n99.6\n124.9\n148.0\nSoya Bean\n128.2\n138.9\n134.4\n93.0\n92.1\n93.4\nIndices of Average World Prices of Nigeria's Major Agricultural \nExport Commodities (2010 = 100) (Naira Based)\nAll Commodities\n84.4\n78.2\n100.6\n117.8\n126.4\n136.8\nCocoa\n77.4\n75.5\n100.8\n122.1\n131.1\n132.4\nCoffee\n107.7\n79.4\n102.9\n109.6\n106.4\n167.1\nCotton\n96.5\n92.2\n94.2\n87.1\n90.1\n168.3\nPalm Oil\n127.9\n93.8\n97.9\n91.1\n96.9\n157.6\nCopra\n119.8\n77.6\n126.9\n127.1\n169.0\n301.0\nSoya Bean\n134.5\n145.3\n140.7\n118.7\n124.8\n189.9\nGROWTH RATE OVER THE PRECEDING PERIOD (%)\nAgricultural Production Index (2010 = 100)\nAggregate\n4.1\n2.5\n4.6\n4.7\n3.1\nCrops\n3.8\n1.9\n4.2\n4.5\n3.0\nStaples\n4.1\n1.9\n4.1\n4.6\n3.2\nOther Crops\n4.0\n8.4\n4.4\n4.3\n2.8\nLivestock\n6.1\n6.7\n5.1\n6.4\n3.9\nFishery\n6.0\n9.6\n6.7\n7.0\n3.3\nForestry\n5.9\n5.9\n5.7\n4.3\n2.3\nIndices of Average World Prices of Nigeria's Major Agricultural \nExport Commodities (2010 = 100) (Dollar Based)\nAll Commodities\n-25.4\n-7.2\n28.7\n-4.1\n1.6\n-28.2\nCocoa\n-28.0\n-2.3\n33.7\n-0.9\n1.6\n-33.0\nCoffee\n-29.4\n-26.1\n29.6\n-12.5\n-8.6\n4.4\nCotton\n-51.1\n-4.2\n2.2\n-24.4\n-2.1\n24.2\nPalm Oil\n-9.8\n-26.5\n4.4\n-23.7\n0.6\n7.9\nCopra\n-37.0\n-35.0\n63.4\n-17.9\n25.5\n18.5\nSoya Bean\n-1.6\n8.3\n-3.2\n-30.8\n-1.0\n1.4\nIndices of Average World Prices of Nigeria's Major Agricultural \nExport Commodities (2010 = 100) (Naira Based)\nAll Commodities\n-7.4\n28.7\n17.1\n7.3\n8.2\nCocoa\n-2.5\n33.6\n21.1\n7.3\n1.0\nCoffee\n-26.3\n29.6\n6.5\n-2.9\n57.1\nCotton\n-4.5\n2.2\n-7.5\n3.5\n86.9\nPalm Oil\n-26.6\n4.3\n-6.9\n6.3\n62.7\nCopra\n-35.2\n63.4\n0.2\n33.0\n78.1\nSoya Bean\n8.1\n-3.2\n-15.6\n5.2\n52.1\nIndustrial Production Index (2010 = 100)\nIndustrial Production Index\n115.77\n114.52\n120.58\n114.23\n107.30\nManufacturing Production Index\n133.72\n162.99\n186.98\n182.78\n169.80\nMining Production Index\n106.78\n92.36\n91.35\n84.69\n77.80\nElectricity Production Index\n181.44\n191.95\n173.58\n138.73\n111.10\nCapacity Utilization Rate (%)\n57.0\n57.6\n59.3\n55.5\n51.7\nInflation Rate (12-Month Moving Average)\n11.3\n10.4\n8.0\n8.4\n11.4\n17.6\nInflation Rate (Year-on-Year)\n12.9\n8.4\n8.2\n9.2\n16.5\n16.1\nFood Inflation Rate (Year-on-Year)\n12.0\n9.6\n9.8\n10.0\n15.3\n19.9\nNon-Food Inflation Rate (Year-on-Year)\n12.7\n5.5\n8.1\n8.4\n16.2\n12.5\n1/Revised\n2/Provisional\nItem\nTable 40 cont'd\nSelected Real Sector Indicators\n(Per cent, except otherwise indicated)\n153\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n2017 2/\nFirst Half\nSecond Half\nFirst Half\nSecond Half\nFirst Half\n(1)\n(2)\n(3)\n(1) & (3)\n(2) & (3)\n(1) & (3)\n(2) & (3)\nWorld Crude Oil Production\nmillion barrels per day (mbd)\nOPEC\n37.54\n38.46\n38.86\n38.97\n38.44\n-0.42\n-0.53\n-1.08\n-1.36\nCrudes\n31.48\n32.26\n32.60\n32.84\n32.21\n-0.39\n-0.63\n-1.20\n-1.92\nNGLs and condensates\n6.06\n6.20\n6.26\n6.13\n6.23\n-0.03\n0.10\n-0.48\n1.63\nTotal non-OPEC\n57.00\n57.28\n57.13\n57.17\n57.71\n0.58\n0.54\n1.02\n0.94\nTotal World Supply\n94.54\n95.74\n95.99\n96.14\n96.15\n0.16\n0.01\n0.17\n0.01\nDemand\nOECD\n45.93\n46.44\n46.13\n46.99\n46.73\n0.60\n-0.26\n1.30\n-0.55\nNon-OECD\n46.06\n47.53\n47.04\n48.39\n48.66\n1.62\n0.27\n3.44\n0.56\nTotal World Demand\n91.99\n93.97\n93.17\n95.38\n95.39\n2.22\n0.01\n2.38\n0.01\nNigeria\nOutput\n1.89\n1.92\n1.68\n1.55\n1.62\n-0.06\n0.07\n-3.57\n4.52\nExports\n1.44\n1.47\n1.23\n1.10\n1.17\n-0.06\n0.07\n-4.88\n6.36\nDomestic Consumption\n0.45\n0.45\n0.45\n0.45\n0.45\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nAverage Spot Price of Selected Crude Oil\nat the International Oil Market (US$)\nUK Brent\n57.47\n46.89\n39.51\n47.03\n51.23\n11.72\n4.20\n29.66\n8.93\nWest Texas Intermediate (WTI)\n52.40\n44.68\n39.29\n45.17\n49.43\n10.14\n4.26\n25.81\n9.43\nBonny Light\n58.63\n47.73\n40.51\n48.59\n52.19\n11.68\n3.60\n28.83\n7.41\nForcados\n58.94\n47.86\n40.12\n47.80\n51.74\n11.62\n3.94\n28.96\n8.24\nOPEC Basket\n55.10\n44.02\n36.32\n45.18\n50.21\n13.89\n5.03\n38.24\n11.13\nGas Activities\n0.00\n0.00\n(MMm3)\n0.00\n0.00\nGas Produced\n40,430.59\n \n35,643.45\n \n32,472.43\n \n35,643.45\n \n32,472.43\n \n0.00\n-3,171.02\n(19.68)\n \n(8.90)\nTotal Gas Utilised\n34,238.58\n32,075.79\n28,009.65\n32,075.79\n28,009.65\n0.00\n-4,066.14\n(18.19)\n(12.68)\nGas Utilised as % of Gas Produced\n84.68\n89.99\n86.26\n89.99\n86.26\n0.00\n-3.73\n1.86\n(4.15)\nGas Flared\n6,192.01\n3,525.43\n4,462.79\n3,525.43\n4,462.79\n0.00\n937.36\n(27.93)\n26.59\nGas Flared as % Gas Produced\n15.32\n9.89\n13.74\n9.89\n13.74\n0.00\n3.85\n(10.24)\n38.92\nItem\n2015 1/\nAbsolute Change \nBetween\nPercentage \nChange Between\n2016 1/\nSources: OPEC, NNPC, Reuters & CBN Estimates\n1/ Revised\n2/ Provisional\nTable 41\nComposite Consumer Price Index\n(November 2009=100)\n154\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nMonthly\nIndex\nInflation\ny-o-y(%)\n12-Month\nAverage\nIndex\nInflation\n12-Month\nAverage(%)\nMonthly\nIndex\nInflation\ny-o-y(%)\nInflation\n12-Month\nAverage(%)\nMonthly\nIndex\nInflation\ny-o-y(%)\nInflation\n12-Month\nAverage(%)\n2013\nJanuary\n141.9\n9.0\n136.5\n11.9\n143.8\n11.3\n13.7\n142.3\n10.1\n11.1\nFebruary\n143.0\n9.5\n137.5\n11.7\n143.8\n11.2\n13.7\n143.3\n11.0\n11.2\nMarch\n144.0\n8.6\n138.4\n11.4\n144.8\n7.2\n13.0\n144.6\n9.5\n11.0\nApril\n144.8\n9.1\n139.4\n11.1\n144.5\n6.9\n12.3\n145.6\n10.0\n10.8\nMay\n145.8\n9.0\n140.4\n10.8\n145.2\n6.2\n11.5\n146.4\n9.3\n10.5\nJune\n146.6\n8.4\n141.4\n10.4\n145.5\n5.5\n10.7\n147.5\n9.6\n10.4\nJuly\n147.4\n8.7\n142.4\n10.0\n147.2\n6.6\n10.0\n148.4\n10.0\n10.2\nAugust\n147.8\n8.2\n143.3\n9.8\n149.1\n7.2\n9.4\n149.2\n9.7\n10.2\nSeptember\n148.9\n8.0\n144.2\n9.5\n150.0\n7.4\n8.9\n150.4\n9.4\n10.1\nOctober\n150.0\n7.8\n145.1\n9.2\n150.9\n7.6\n8.6\n151.6\n9.2\n10.0\nNovember\n151.1\n7.9\n146.1\n8.8\n151.8\n7.8\n8.1\n152.9\n9.3\n9.8\nDecember\n152.3\n8.0\n147.0\n8.5\n153.0\n7.9\n7.7\n154.3\n9.3\n9.7\n2014\nJanuary\n153.3\n8.0\n147.9\n8.4\n153.3\n6.6\n7.3\n155.5\n9.3\n9.6\nFebruary\n154.0\n7.7\n148.8\n8.3\n154.1\n7.2\n7.0\n156.5\n9.2\n9.5\nMarch\n155.2\n7.8\n149.8\n8.2\n154.7\n6.8\n7.0\n158.0\n9.3\n9.5\nApril\n156.2\n7.9\n150.7\n8.1\n155.3\n7.5\n7.0\n159.3\n9.4\n9.4\nMay\n157.4\n8.0\n151.7\n8.0\n156.3\n7.7\n7.2\n160.6\n9.7\n9.4\nJune\n158.6\n8.2\n152.7\n8.0\n157.4\n8.1\n7.4\n161.9\n9.8\n9.5\nJuly\n159.7\n8.3\n153.7\n8.0\n157.7\n7.1\n7.4\n163.1\n9.9\n9.5\nAugust\n160.4\n8.5\n154.8\n8.0\n158.4\n6.3\n7.3\n164.0\n10.0\n9.5\nSeptember\n161.3\n8.3\n155.8\n8.0\n159.4\n6.3\n7.2\n165.0\n9.7\n9.5\nOctober\n162.1\n8.1\n156.8\n8.0\n160.3\n6.3\n7.1\n165.8\n9.3\n9.5\nNovember\n163.1\n7.9\n157.8\n8.0\n161.3\n6.3\n7.0\n166.8\n9.1\n9.5\nDecember\n164.4\n8.0\n158.8\n8.0\n162.5\n6.2\n6.9\n168.4\n9.2\n9.5\n2015\nJanuary\n165.8\n8.2\n159.9\n8.1\n163.7\n6.8\n6.9\n169.8\n9.2\n9.5\nFebruary\n166.9\n8.4\n160.9\n8.1\n164.8\n7.0\n6.9\n171.1\n9.4\n9.5\nMarch\n168.4\n8.5\n162.0\n8.2\n166.2\n7.5\n6.9\n172.8\n9.4\n9.5\nApril\n169.7\n8.7\n163.2\n8.2\n167.2\n7.7\n6.9\n174.4\n9.5\n9.5\nMay\n171.6\n9.0\n164.3\n8.3\n169.2\n8.3\n7.0\n176.3\n9.8\n9.5\nJune\n173.2\n9.2\n165.5\n8.4\n170.6\n8.4\n7.0\n178.1\n10.0\n9.5\nJuly\n174.4\n9.2\n166.8\n8.5\n171.6\n8.8\n7.2\n179.5\n10.0\n9.6\nAugust\n175.4\n9.3\n168.0\n8.6\n172.7\n9.0\n7.4\n180.6\n10.1\n9.6\nSeptember\n176.5\n9.4\n169.3\n8.7\n173.7\n8.9\n7.6\n181.8\n10.2\n9.6\nOctober\n177.2\n9.3\n170.5\n8.8\n174.4\n8.7\n7.8\n182.6\n10.1\n9.7\nNovember\n178.4\n9.4\n171.8\n8.9\n175.3\n8.7\n8.0\n184.1\n10.3\n9.8\nDecember\n180.1\n9.6\n173.1\n9.0\n176.7\n8.7\n8.2\n186.2\n10.6\n9.9\n2016\nJanuary\n181.7\n9.6\n174.5\n9.1\n178.2\n8.8\n8.4\n187.9\n10.6\n10.0\nFebruary\n185.9\n11.4\n176.0\n9.4\n183.0\n11.0\n8.7\n190.5\n11.3\n10.2\nMarch\n189.9\n12.8\n177.8\n9.8\n186.4\n12.2\n9.1\n194.9\n12.7\n10.5\nApril\n193.0\n13.7\n179.8\n10.2\n189.5\n13.4\n9.6\n197.4\n13.2\n10.8\nMay\n198.3\n15.6\n182.0\n10.7\n194.7\n15.1\n10.2\n202.5\n14.9\n11.2\nJune\n201.7\n16.5\n184.4\n11.4\n198.3\n16.2\n10.9\n205.4\n15.3\n11.7\nJuly\n204.2\n17.1\n186.9\n12.0\n200.7\n16.9\n11.6\n207.9\n15.8\n12.2\nAugust\n206.3\n17.6\n189.4\n12.7\n202.4\n17.2\n12.2\n210.3\n16.4\n12.7\nSeptember\n208.0\n17.9\n192.1\n13.5\n204.3\n17.7\n13.0\n212.0\n16.6\n13.2\nOctober\n209.7\n18.3\n194.8\n14.2\n205.9\n18.1\n13.8\n213.8\n17.1\n13.8\nNovember\n211.3\n18.5\n197.5\n15.0\n207.3\n18.2\n14.5\n215.7\n17.2\n14.4\nDecember\n213.6\n18.5\n200.3\n15.7\n208.6\n18.1\n15.3\n218.6\n17.4\n14.9\n2017\nJanuary\n215.7\n18.7\n203.1\n16.4\n210.0\n17.9\n16.0\n221.4\n17.8\n15.5\nFebruary\n218.9\n17.8\n205.9\n17.0\n212.3\n16.0\n16.4\n225.8\n18.5\n16.1\nMarch\n222.7\n17.3\n208.6\n17.3\n215.1\n15.4\n16.7\n230.8\n18.4\n16.6\nApril\n226.3\n17.2\n211.4\n17.6\n217.5\n14.8\n16.8\n235.5\n19.3\n17.1\nMay\n230.5\n16.3\n214.1\n17.6\n220.0\n13.0\n16.6\n241.5\n19.3\n17.5\nJune\n234.2\n16.1\n216.8\n17.6\n223.0\n12.5\n16.2\n246.3\n19.9\n17.9\nSource: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)\nYear\n&\nMonth\nAll Item (Headline)\nAll Items less Farm Produce (Core)\nFood\nTable 42\nUrban and Rural Consumer Price Index\n(November 2009=100)\n \n155\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nAll Items\n(Headline) \nMonthly Index\nHeadline\nInflation\ny-o-y(%)\nAll Items less Farm\nProduce (Core) \nMonthly Index\nCore\nInflation\ny-o-y(%)\nFood \nMonthly\nIndex\nFood\nInflation\ny-o-y(%)\nAll Items\n(Headline) \nMonthly Index\nHeadline\nInflation\ny-o-y(%)\nAll Items less Farm\nProduce (Core) \nMonthly Index\nCore\nInflation\ny-o-y(%)\nFood \nMonthly\nIndex\nFood\nInflation\ny-o-y(%)\n2013\nJanuary\n140.8\n9.2\n142.3\n11.0\n138.6\n10.5\n143.2\n9.1\n144.9\n11.6\n145.7\n10.0\nFebruary\n142.0\n9.8\n142.3\n10.9\n139.9\n10.8\n144.1\n9.5\n144.9\n11.5\n146.4\n11.1\nMarch\n142.8\n9.3\n142.0\n7.1\n140.7\n9.0\n145.3\n8.1\n147.1\n7.2\n148.2\n9.9\nApril\n143.7\n9.7\n142.6\n7.2\n142.0\n9.7\n146.4\n8.9\n146.5\n6.9\n149.2\n10.5\nMay\n144.5\n9.4\n142.7\n6.5\n142.7\n8.9\n147.1\n8.6\n147.2\n6.0\n149.8\n9.7\nJune\n145.5\n8.4\n143.1\n5.4\n143.9\n9.5\n147.9\n8.3\n147.6\n5.6\n150.8\n9.7\nJuly\n146.3\n8.8\n145.4\n7.3\n145.0\n10.1\n148.6\n8.6\n148.8\n6.0\n151.7\n10.0\nAugust\n146.8\n8.4\n147.7\n8.0\n145.8\n10.0\n148.9\n8.1\n150.2\n6.6\n152.3\n9.5\nSeptember\n147.9\n8.0\n147.7\n7.3\n147.1\n9.6\n150.0\n8.0\n151.9\n7.5\n153.6\n9.3\nOctober\n149.1\n7.9\n148.6\n7.5\n148.3\n9.6\n151.1\n7.8\n152.8\n7.7\n154.8\n9.0\nNovember\n150.2\n8.1\n149.4\n7.6\n149.6\n9.8\n152.2\n7.8\n153.8\n7.9\n156.0\n8.9\nDecember\n151.4\n8.1\n150.4\n7.6\n151.0\n9.8\n153.3\n7.9\n155.2\n8.1\n157.4\n8.9\n2014\nJanuary\n152.2\n8.2\n150.7\n5.8\n152.3\n9.8\n154.4\n7.8\n155.5\n7.3\n158.6\n8.8\nFebruary\n153.0\n7.8\n151.6\n6.5\n153.2\n9.5\n155.1\n7.7\n156.1\n7.7\n159.5\n9.0\nMarch\n154.2\n7.9\n152.1\n7.1\n154.7\n10.0\n156.4\n7.6\n156.8\n6.6\n161.2\n8.7\nApril\n155.1\n7.9\n152.6\n7.0\n156.1\n9.9\n157.3\n7.5\n157.6\n7.5\n162.3\n8.8\nMay\n156.4\n8.2\n153.6\n7.7\n157.4\n10.3\n158.5\n7.8\n158.6\n7.7\n163.6\n9.2\nJune\n157.6\n8.4\n154.6\n8.0\n158.8\n10.3\n159.7\n8.0\n159.7\n8.2\n164.9\n9.3\nJuly\n158.7\n8.5\n155.3\n6.8\n160.1\n10.4\n160.7\n8.1\n159.8\n7.4\n166.0\n9.4\nAugust\n159.5\n8.67\n156.1\n5.7\n161.1\n10.5\n161.4\n8.37\n160.3\n6.7\n166.8\n9.5\nSeptember\n160.3\n8.36\n156.9\n6.2\n162.0\n10.1\n162.4\n8.24\n161.5\n6.3\n167.9\n9.3\nOctober\n161.1\n8.06\n157.9\n6.2\n162.7\n9.7\n163.3\n8.02\n162.4\n6.3\n168.8\n9.0\nNovember\n162.1\n7.90\n158.8\n6.3\n163.8\n9.5\n164.2\n7.90\n163.3\n6.2\n169.7\n8.8\nDecember\n163.4\n7.95\n160.1\n6.4\n165.4\n9.5\n165.5\n7.96\n164.6\n6.1\n171.2\n8.8\n2015\nJanuary\n164.7\n8.2\n161.2\n7.0\n166.9\n9.6\n166.9\n8.09\n165.8\n6.6\n172.7\n8.9\nFebruary\n165.9\n8.4\n162.4\n7.1\n168.2\n9.8\n168.0\n8.29\n166.9\n6.9\n173.9\n9.0\nMarch\n167.4\n8.6\n163.7\n7.6\n169.9\n9.8\n169.5\n8.40\n168.3\n7.3\n175.6\n9.0\nApril\n168.7\n8.7\n164.7\n7.9\n171.6\n9.9\n170.8\n8.56\n169.3\n7.4\n177.1\n9.1\nMay\n170.6\n9.1\n166.8\n8.6\n173.5\n10.3\n172.6\n8.90\n171.2\n8.0\n178.9\n9.4\nJune\n172.2\n9.2\n168.2\n8.8\n175.4\n10.5\n174.2\n9.10\n172.6\n8.1\n180.8\n9.7\nJuly\n173.3\n9.2\n169.2\n9.0\n176.7\n10.4\n175.5\n9.24\n173.7\n8.7\n182.2\n9.8\nAugust\n174.3\n9.2\n170.2\n9.0\n177.8\n10.4\n176.6\n9.38\n174.8\n9.0\n183.3\n9.9\nSeptember\n175.5\n9.5\n171.3\n9.2\n179.2\n10.6\n177.5\n9.30\n175.7\n8.7\n184.3\n9.8\nOctober\n176.2\n9.4\n172.0\n8.9\n180.1\n10.7\n178.2\n9.16\n176.4\n8.6\n185.1\n9.7\nNovember\n177.4\n9.4\n172.8\n8.8\n181.5\n10.8\n179.4\n9.26\n177.4\n8.7\n186.5\n9.9\nDecember\n179.2\n9.7\n174.3\n8.9\n183.8\n11.1\n181.1\n9.41\n178.7\n8.6\n188.6\n10.1\n2016\nJanuary\n180.8\n9.7\n175.8\n9.1\n185.5\n11.1\n182.7\n9.48\n180.2\n8.7\n190.3\n10.2\nFebruary\n186.2\n12.3\n181.2\n11.6\n187.8\n11.7\n186.0\n10.69\n184.6\n10.6\n193.2\n11.1\nMarch\n190.0\n13.5\n184.6\n12.8\n192.1\n13.1\n189.9\n12.04\n188.0\n11.7\n197.5\n12.5\nApril\n194.1\n15.1\n188.0\n14.1\n194.3\n13.2\n192.6\n12.77\n190.8\n12.7\n200.3\n13.1\nMay\n199.8\n17.1\n193.3\n15.9\n199.8\n15.2\n197.4\n14.35\n195.9\n14.4\n205.0\n14.5\nJune\n203.4\n18.1\n197.0\n17.1\n203.0\n15.8\n200.5\n15.09\n199.3\n15.5\n207.6\n14.9\nJuly\n206.1\n18.9\n199.7\n18.1\n205.7\n16.4\n202.8\n15.5\n201.5\n16.0\n209.9\n15.2\nAugust\n208.0\n19.3\n201.4\n18.4\n207.7\n16.8\n205.0\n16.1\n203.2\n16.3\n212.7\n16.0\nSeptember\n209.6\n19.5\n203.6\n18.9\n209.4\n16.9\n206.7\n16.4\n205.0\n16.7\n214.4\n16.3\nOctober\n211.3\n19.9\n205.1\n19.3\n211.3\n17.3\n208.4\n16.9\n206.5\n17.1\n216.2\n16.8\nNovember\n213.0\n20.1\n206.7\n19.6\n213.2\n17.4\n210.1\n17.1\n207.8\n17.1\n218.0\n16.9\nDecember\n215.3\n20.1\n208.5\n19.6\n216.2\n17.6\n212.2\n17.2\n208.7\n16.8\n220.8\n17.1\n2017\nJanuary\n217.5\n20.3\n210.0\n19.5\n219.1\n18.1\n214.4\n17.3\n210.0\n16.6\n223.6\n17.5\nFebruary\n220.8\n18.6\n212.7\n17.4\n223.6\n19.0\n217.5\n17.0\n212.1\n14.9\n228.0\n18.0\nMarch\n224.7\n18.3\n215.7\n16.9\n228.8\n19.1\n221.2\n16.5\n214.6\n14.2\n232.8\n17.8\nApril\n228.3\n17.6\n217.9\n15.9\n233.6\n20.2\n224.7\n16.7\n217.1\n13.8\n237.4\n18.5\nMay\n232.5\n16.3\n220.5\n14.1\n239.7\n19.9\n229.0\n16.0\n219.7\n12.1\n243.3\n18.7\nJune\n236.2\n16.2\n223.7\n13.6\n244.6\n20.5\n232.6\n16.0\n222.4\n11.5\n248.0\n19.4\nSource: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)\nYear\n&\nMonth\nUrban\nRural\nTable 43\nBalance of Payments Analytic Presentation\n(US$ Million\n156\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n1st Half 2016 1/\n2nd Half 2016 2/\n1st Half 2017 2/\nCURRENT ACCOUNT\n-576.56\n3,298.54\n4,147.40\n Goods \n-2,675.15\n2,139.09\n4,386.28\n Exports (fob) \n16,865.39\n17,838.51\n20,771.12\nOil and Gas\n15,344.74\n16,684.30\n18,826.24\nNon-oil\n1,520.65\n1,154.21\n1,944.88\n Imports (fob) \n-19,540.54\n-15,699.41\n-16,384.84\nOil\n-4,533.21\n-4,417.21\n-4,506.46\nNon-oil\n-15,007.33\n-11,282.20\n-11,878.38\nUnrecorded(TPAdj)\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n Services(net) \n-3,764.55\n-4,250.11\n-5,370.50\n Credit \n2,060.45\n1,683.20\n1,918.89\nTransportation\n890.24\n774.26\n761.59\nTravel \n677.30\n393.00\n616.92\nInsurance Services\n35.16\n44.45\n10.75\nCommunication Services\n62.11\n55.54\n136.04\nConstruction Services\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nFinancial Services\n107.61\n140.49\n124.89\nComputer & information Services\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nRoyalties and License Fees\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nGovernment Services\n249.71\n249.10\n241.75\nPersonal, cultural & recreational services\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nOther Bussiness Services\n38.32\n26.36\n26.94\n Debit \n-5,825.00\n-5,933.31\n-7,289.39\nTransportation\n-3,092.03\n-2,836.01\n-2,742.50\nTravel \n-593.93\n-485.18\n-1,832.25\nInsurance Services\n-383.90\n-310.49\n-502.35\nCommunication Services\n-125.13\n-72.15\n-108.08\nConstruction Services\n-0.26\n0.00\n-0.12\nFinancial Services\n-131.24\n-236.99\n-174.98\nComputer & information Services\n-69.87\n-78.85\n-104.15\nRoyalties and License Fees\n-126.42\n-126.42\n-126.42\nGovernment Services\n-234.92\n-178.45\n-132.67\nPersonal, cultural & recreational services\n-9.28\n-6.63\n-39.39\nOther Bussiness Services\n-1,058.03\n-1,602.13\n-1,526.48\n Income(net) \n-4,111.13\n-4,505.33\n-5,061.47\n Credit \n625.46\n625.28\n817.38\nInvestment Income\n537.41\n522.04\n705.19\nCompensation of employees\n88.04\n103.25\n112.20\n Debit \n-4,736.58\n-5,130.62\n-5,878.85\nInvestment Income\n-4,730.67\n-5,124.97\n-5,878.85\nCompensation of employees\n-5.91\n-5.65\n0.00\nCurrent transfers(net) \n9,974.27\n9,914.90\n10,193.09\n Credit \n10,523.93\n10,418.72\n10,553.32\nGeneral Government\n1,191.08\n215.89\n189.64\nOther Sectors\n9,332.85\n10,202.84\n10,363.68\nWorkers Remittance\n9,323.15\n10,183.49\n10,340.08\n Debit \n-549.66\n-503.83\n-360.23\nGeneral Government\n0.00\n-7.63\n0.00\nOther Sectors\n-549.66\n-496.20\n-360.23\nWorkers Remittance\n-364.36\n-368.85\n-236.08\nCAPITAL AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNT \n-174.11\n1,825.10\n5,699.45\n Capital account(net) \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n Credit \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n Capital Transfers(Debt Forgiveness)\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n Debit \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nCapital Transfers\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n Financial account(net) \n-174.11\n1,825.10\n5,699.45\n Assets \n-2,514.81\n-1,064.27\n-4,763.83\nDirect investment (Abroad)\n-608.97\n-696.06\n-642.40\nPortfolio investment \n-129.92\n-47.50\n-1.66\nOther investment \n-3,330.01\n252.58\n-845.12\nChange in Reserve \n1,554.09\n-573.28\n-3,274.65\n Liabilities \n2,340.70\n2,889.36\n10,463.27\n Direct Invesment in reporting economy \n1,793.30\n2,655.43\n1,745.12\nPortfolio Investment\n790.24\n1,097.44\n2,922.77\nOther investment liabilities\n-242.85\n-863.51\n5,795.38\n NET ERRORS AND OMISSIONS \n750.67\n-5,123.64\n-9,846.84\nMemorandum Items:\n1st Half 2016 1/\n2nd Half 2016 2/\n1st Half 2017 2/\nCurrent Account Balance as % of G.D.P\n-0.29\n1.78\n2.37\nCapital and Financial Account Balance as % of G.D.P\n0.12\n0.97\n3.25\nOverall Balance as % of G.D.P\n-0.68\n0.32\n1.87\nExternal Reserves - Stock (US $ million)\n26,505.50\n26,990.58\n30,340.96\nNumber of Months of Imports Equivalent\n8.14\n10.32\n11.11\nExternal Debt Stock (US$ million)\n11,261.89\n11,406.28\n15,047.01\nDebt Service Due as % of Exports of Goods Non Factor Services \nEffective Central Exchange Rate (N/$)\n202.29\n303.69\n305.20\nAverage Exchange Rate (N/$)\n202.79\n304.19\n305.70\nEnd-Period Exchange Rate (N/$)\n283.00\n305.00\n305.90\nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria\n1/ Revised\n2/ Provisional\nTable 44\nBalance of Payments Analytic Presentation\n(N' Million)\n157\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n1st Half 2016 1/\n2nd Half 2016 2/\n1st Half 2017 2/\nCURRENT ACCOUNT\n-134,155.41\n1,005,123.54\n1,265,774.32\n Goods \n-548,034.80\n651,967.35\n1,338,732.94\n Exports (fob) \n3,426,498.36\n5,424,191.36\n6,339,612.00\nOil and Gas\n3,115,986.89\n5,073,181.09\n5,745,989.51\nNon-oil\n310,511.46\n351,010.27\n593,622.50\n Imports (fob) \n-3,974,533.16\n-4,772,224.02\n-5,000,879.06\nOil\n-922,303.64\n-1,342,664.89\n-1,375,409.45\nNon-oil\n-3,052,229.52\n-3,429,559.13\n-3,625,469.61\nUnrecorded(TPAdj)\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n Services(net) \n-763,421.17\n-1,291,633.35\n-1,639,191.99\n Credit \n416,336.04\n511,747.53\n585,671.15\nTransportation\n179,239.58\n235,337.32\n232,446.59\nTravel \n137,329.79\n119,508.50\n188,294.04\nInsurance Services\n7,237.59\n13,523.18\n3,282.36\nCommunication Services\n12,356.27\n16,898.72\n41,521.46\nConstruction Services\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nFinancial Services\n21,780.34\n42,742.13\n38,119.50\nComputer & information Services\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nRoyalties and License Fees\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nGovernment Services\n50,576.77\n75,723.71\n73,784.84\nPersonal, cultural & recreational services\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nOther Bussiness Services\n7,815.70\n8,013.98\n8,222.36\n Debit \n-1,179,757.21\n-1,803,380.88\n-2,224,863.14\nTransportation\n-626,795.57\n-862,105.52\n-837,045.24\nTravel \n-120,507.28\n-147,403.34\n-559,261.44\nInsurance Services\n-77,844.30\n-94,490.72\n-153,323.60\nCommunication Services\n-24,850.25\n-21,931.90\n-32,985.41\nConstruction Services\n-54.00\n-1.28\n-36.02\nFinancial Services\n-26,500.33\n-72,107.09\n-53,405.86\nComputer & information Services\n-14,187.93\n-23,963.57\n-31,789.78\nRoyalties and License Fees\n-25,608.83\n-38,430.74\n-38,584.79\nGovernment Services\n-47,553.11\n-54,222.58\n-40,491.68\nPersonal, cultural & recreational services\n-1,882.02\n-2,015.14\n-12,023.65\nOther Bussiness Services\n-213,973.59\n-486,708.98\n-465,915.67\n Income(net) \n-835,338.31\n-1,369,758.94\n-1,544,838.06\n Credit \n126,222.58\n190,144.74\n249,479.18\nInvestment Income\n108,362.24\n158,756.39\n215,235.32\nCompensation of employees\n17,860.34\n31,388.35\n34,243.87\n Debit \n-961,560.89\n-1,559,903.69\n-1,794,317.24\nInvestment Income\n-960,366.92\n-1,558,184.80\n-1,794,317.24\nCompensation of employees\n-1,193.97\n-1,718.88\n0.00\nCurrent transfers(net) \n2,012,638.88\n3,014,548.49\n3,111,071.42\n Credit \n2,124,012.18\n3,167,722.11\n3,221,012.46\nGeneral Government\n235,294.11\n65,629.21\n57,879.42\nOther Sectors\n1,888,718.07\n3,102,092.90\n3,163,133.04\nWorkers Remittance\n1,886,757.94\n3,096,213.04\n3,155,929.36\n Debit \n-111,373.30\n-153,173.62\n-109,941.03\nGeneral Government\n0.00\n-2,312.82\n0.00\nOther Sectors\n-111,373.30\n-150,860.81\n-109,941.03\nWorkers Remittance\n-73,753.58\n-112,126.29\n-72,049.67\nCAPITAL AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNT \n57,010.71\n545,221.79\n1,739,662.60\n Capital account(net) \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n Credit \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n Capital Transfers(Debt Forgiveness)\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n Debit \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nCapital Transfers\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n Financial account(net) \n57,010.71\n545,221.79\n1,739,662.60\n Assets \n-410,967.44\n-328,905.34\n-1,453,832.17\nDirect investment (Abroad)\n-123,261.96\n-211,568.19\n-196,066.93\nPortfolio investment \n-26,273.49\n-14,405.81\n-506.08\nOther investment \n-576,713.47\n75,588.09\n-257,916.43\nChange in Reserve \n315,281.48\n-178,519.43\n-999,342.73\n Liabilities \n467,978.15\n874,127.13\n3,193,494.77\n Direct Invesment in reporting economy \n363,381.59\n807,147.87\n532,632.03\nPortfolio Investment\n162,119.57\n333,264.43\n892,064.64\nOther investment liabilities\n-57,523.02\n-266,285.17\n1,768,798.10\n NET ERRORS AND OMISSIONS \n77,144.70\n-1,550,345.33\n-3,005,436.92\nMemorandum Items:\n1st Half 2016 1/\n2nd Half 2016 2/\n1st Half 2017 2/\nCurrent Account Balance as % of G.D.P\n-0.29\n1.78\n2.37\nCapital and Financial Account Balance as % of G.D.P\n0.12\n0.97\n3.25\nOverall Balance as % of G.D.P\n-0.68\n0.32\n1.87\nExternal Reserves - Stock (US $ million)\n26,505.50\n26,990.58\n30,340.96\nNumber of Months of Imports Equivalent\n8.14\n10.32\n11.11\nExternal Debt Stock (US$ million)\n11,261.89\n11,406.28\n15,047.01\nDebt Service Due as % of Exports of Goods Non Factor Services \nEffective Central Exchange Rate (N/$)\n202.29\n303.69\n305.20\nAverage Exchange Rate (N/$)\n202.79\n304.19\n305.70\nEnd-Period Exchange Rate (N/$)\n283.00\n305.00\n305.90\nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria\n1/ Revised\n2/ Provisional\nTable 45\nForeign Exchange Flows Through the Economy\n(US$ Million)\n158\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1st Half\n1st Half\n1st Half\n1st Half\n2nd Half\n1st Half\nCATEGORY\n2013\n2014\n2015\n2016 /2\n2016 /3\n2017 /3\nINFLOW\n72,277.13\n75,643.39\n52,124.57\n29,154.54\n33,594.01\n34,816.93\nA. Through the Central Bank\n19,747.39\n22,888.76\n15,283.04\n8,713.12\n12,353.07\n15,871.01\n1. Oil \n18,971.59\n21,027.88\n9,237.67\n4,613.69\n5,566.80\n4,299.49\n2.Non-oil\n775.80\n1,860.88\n6,045.36\n4,099.43\n6,786.27\n11,571.51\n(i) Drawings on Loans/Grants\n-\n-\n-\n0.00\n0.00\n(ii) RDAS/WDAS Purchases\n20.00\n270.00\n645.04\n30.00\n106.33\n1,163.81\n(iii) Swaps\n-\n500.00\n4,060.00\n1,850.00\n2,305.02\n1,567.00\n(iv) Interest on Reserves & Investments\n30.32\n79.07\n70.41\n120.19\n100.86\n138.82\n(v) Interest Repatriated from Overseas\n0.29\n0.12\n0.24\n0.15\n0.08\n0.00\n(vi) Refund on World Bank/IBRD/IMF Loans/SDR Allocation\n-\n-\n-\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n(vii) Cash Swap IRO BDC Sales\n0.00\n48.70\n10.00\n(vii) Eurobond Proceeds - Fixed Income Securities\n7.40\n1.34\n0.00\n7.75\n0.00\n(viii) Returned Payments [Wired/Cash]\n11.21\n10.56\n194.71\n92.71\n753.67\n(ix) Unutilised funds from DAS\n134.02\n94.00\n49.97\n92.13\n644.73\n(x) Recovered Funds\n226.39\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n(xi) Other Official Receipts\n725.19\n632.67\n1,163.78\n1,854.40\n3,938.14\n864.88\n(xii) CBN Interbank Transactions\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n (xiiii) Return of Unutilised IMTO Funds\n0.00\n94.55\n310.09\n (xv) TSA and Third Party Funds\n1,498.09\n (xvi) Others (FGN Loans)\n4,620.42\nB. Through Autonomous Sources\n52,529.74\n \n52,754.63\n \n36,841.53\n \n20,441.42\n21,240.94\n18,945.92\n1. Non-Oil Exports\n1,898.23\n \n3,650.25\n \n2,431.21\n \n1,592.34\n1,706.13\n1,910.83\n2. Capital Inflow\n151.82\n \n271.85\n \n41.17\n \n58.78\n273.03\n33.80\n3. Invisibles\n50,479.70\n \n48,832.53\n \n34,369.15\n \n18,790.30\n19,261.78\n17,001.29\n (a) Ordinary Domiciliary Accounts\n11,959.46\n12,174.88\n9,994.31\n (b) Total OTC Purchases\n6,830.83\n7,086.90\n7,006.99\n (i) Oil Companies\n3,328.12\n1,690.19\n897.39\n (ii) Capital Importations\n1,738.94\n3,373.25\n2,817.11\n (iii) Home Remittances\n152.73\n268.08\n389.50\n (iv) Other OTC Purchases\n1,611.04\n1,755.38\n2,902.98\nOUTFLOW\n18,964.82\n \n29,092.93\n \n21,837.26\n \n11,880.58\n13,673.02\n13,879.61\nA. Through the Central Bank \n18,763.71\n \n28,501.99\n \n21,070.35\n \n10,742.85\n12,421.35\n12,775.68\n1. WDAS/RDAS Utilisation \n15,440.47\n \n25,172.86\n \n18,273.40\n \n7,805.33\n8,013.01\n9,835.84\n(i) WDAS/RDAS Sales\n10,711.04\n \n17,233.85 \n3,184.55\n \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n(ii) WDAS Forward/Inter-Bank FWD\n-\n \n1,075.86 \n1,339.82\n \n0.00\n4,167.66\n4,426.20\n(iii) BDC Sales\n2,263.61\n \n3,518.15\n \n1,825.41\n \n15.49\n42.93\n1,198.98\n(iv) Inter-bank Sales\n2,461.50\n \n3,345.00\n \n9,673.62\n \n5,599.84\n704.76\n4,011.98\n(v) Swaps\n4.33\n \n-\n \n2,250.00\n \n2,190.00\n3,097.65\n198.68\n(vi) Invisibles IFEM\n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n2. Drawings on L/C\n204.13\n \n194.70\n \n142.62\n \n57.13\n92.63\n184.66\n3. External Debt Service \n150.09\n \n178.18\n \n207.16\n \n166.11\n185.03\n189.83\n(i) Principal \n94.35\n \n95.88\n \n90.99\n \n84.45\n0.00\n0.00\n(ii) Interest \n5.25\n \n5.21\n \n-\n \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n(iii) Others 1/\n50.49\n \n77.09\n \n116.17\n \n81.67\n185.03\n189.83\n4. Professional Fees/Commission\n-\n \n-\n \n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n5. Govt and Int'l Grants / Contributions, Grants & Equity Invests. (AFC Equity Participation)\n-\n \n135.55\n \n-\n \n0.00\n0.00\n29.99\n6. National Independent Priority Projects (Niger-Delta Payments)\n33.33\n \n42.52\n \n91.00\n \n21.58\n3.58\n0.61\n7. Forex Special Payment (NSA) (Cash Swap/FX Advance/To MDAs)\n0.00\n252.74\n57.48\n8. Other Official Payments\n2,885.14\n2,427.90\n1,847.36\n1,699.91\n2,675.48\n1,473.57\n(i) Int'l Organisations & Embassies /4\n308.03\n176.51\n290.44\n118.19\n50.89\n(ii) Estacode\n57.62\n106.26\n522.96\n38.56\n87.72\n29.55\n(iii) Parastatals (Public Sector Uses)\n545.56\n458.29\n120.20\n278.77\n585.51\n581.35\n(iv) NNPC/JVC (JVC) Cash Calls\n1,932.07\n1,564.81\n892.52\n1,155.09\n1,847.41\n862.67\n(v) Miscellaneous (CBN Uses)\n41.85\n122.02\n21.24\n109.30\n103.93\n9. Bank Charges\n0.55\n0.05\n0.04\n0.09\n0.43\n4.72\n10. NSIA Transfer\n50.00\n-\n-\n0.00\n0.00\n11. Funds Returned to Remitters\n0.23\n45.96\n10.04\n79.93\n23.38\n12. 3rd Party MDA Transfer\n350.00\n462.79\n982.65\n1,118.53\n975.60\nB. Through Autonomous Sources\n201.11\n590.94\n766.92\n1,137.74\n1,251.67\n1,103.93\n1. Imports\n179.91\n577.23\n385.05\n326.18\n394.19\n319.12\n2. Invisibles\n21.21\n13.71\n381.87\n811.56\n857.48\n784.81\nNETFLOW THROUGH THE CBN\n983.68\n(5,613.23)\n(5,787.31)\n-2,029.72\n-68.28\n3,095.32\nNETFLOW\n53,312.31\n46,550.46\n30,287.31\n17,273.96\n19,920.99\n20,937.32\nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria\n1/ Includes penalty and service charges\n2/ Revised\n3/ Provisional\n4/ Includes IMF (SDR charges)\nTable 46\nNigeria's Gross External Reserves\n(US$ Million)\n \n159\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\nMonth\n2013\n2014\n2015\n2016\n2017\nJanuary \n45,824.44\n \n40,667.56\n \n32,385.71\n \n27,607.85\n \n28,592.98\n \nFebruary\n47,295.85\n \n36,923.61\n \n29,566.99\n \n27,811.82\n \n29,990.36\n \nMarch\n47,884.12\n \n37,399.22\n \n29,357.21\n \n27,336.38\n \n29,996.38\n \nApril\n47,903.09\n \n37,105.27\n \n29,829.75\n \n26,598.85\n \n30,749.28\n \nMay\n47,702.88\n \n35,398.10\n \n28,566.54\n \n26,594.39\n \n29,811.85\n \nJune\n44,957.00\n \n37,330.03\n \n28,335.21\n \n26,505.50\n \n30,340.96\n \nJuly\n45,834.11\n \n39,065.42\n \n31,222.81\n \n25,581.58\n \nAugust\n45,428.84\n \n38,705.71\n \n30,637.17\n \n25,031.93\nSeptember\n44,108.48\n \n38,278.62\n \n29,880.21\n \n23,806.51\nOctober\n44,155.11\n \n36,280.25\n \n30,336.36\n \n23,689.87\n \nNovember\n43,414.20\n \n35,248.66\n \n29,263.02\n \n25,081.22\n \nDecember\n42,847.31\n \n34,241.54\n \n28,284.82\n \n26,990.58\n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria\nTable 47\nNigeria's Foreign Exchange Cross Rates\nNaira per Unit of Foreign Currency (Monthly Average)\n \n160\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n2013\nPounds\nEuro\nCFAFr\nUS$ (DAS/WDAS)\nUS$ (BDC)\nJan\n248.72\n206.97\n0.31\n157.30\n159.12\nFeb\n241.10\n208.16\n0.32\n157.30\n158.70\nMar\n234.75\n201.95\n0.31\n157.31\n159.80\nApr\n238.49\n202.88\n0.31\n157.31\n159.81\nMay\n238.34\n202.34\n0.31\n157.30\n159.57\nJun\n241.11\n205.47\n0.31\n157.31\n160.98\n1st Half Average\n240.42\n204.63\n0.31\n157.30\n159.66\nJul\n236.40\n203.77\n0.31\n157.32\n162.43\nAug\n241.35\n207.23\n0.31\n157.31\n162.28\nSep\n246.97\n207.95\n0.32\n157.32\n163.14\nOct\n250.86\n212.74\n0.32\n157.42\n165.00\nNov\n250.76\n210.17\n0.32\n157.27\n167.14\nDec\n255.13\n213.41\n0.32\n157.27\n171.40\n2nd Half Average\n246.91\n209.21\n0.32\n157.32\n165.23\n2014\nPounds\nEuro\nCFAFr\nUS$ (DAS/WDAS)\nUS$ (BDC)\nJan\n256.59\n212.10\n0.32\n157.29\n171.71\nFeb\n257.81\n212.72\n0.32\n157.31\n169.45\nMar\n258.95\n215.39\n0.33\n157.30\n171.52\nApr\n260.67\n215.14\n0.33\n157.29\n170.30\nMay\n262.41\n213.98\n0.33\n157.29\n166.85\nJun\n263.29\n211.68\n0.32\n157.29\n167.17\n1st Half Average\n259.95\n213.50\n0.32\n157.29\n169.50\nJul\n265.93\n211.24\n0.32\n157.29\n167.71\nAug\n260.12\n207.41\n0.32\n157.29\n170.36\nSep\n254.06\n201.00\n0.31\n157.30\n168.64\nOct\n250.27\n197.63\n0.30\n157.31\n169.43\nNov\n249.96\n197.60\n0.30\n160.00\n175.85\nDec\n262.86\n207.16\n0.32\n169.68\n188.45\n2nd Half Average\n257.20\n203.67\n0.31\n159.81\n173.41\n2015\nPounds\nEuro\nCFAFr\nUS$ (RDAS/IFEM)\nUS$ (BDC)\nJan\n254.39\n194.85\n0.30\n169.68\n196.13\nFeb\n274.79\n204.78\n0.31\n178.54\n213.03\nMar\n295.20\n213.64\n0.32\n197.07\n222.93\nApr\n294.73\n212.54\n0.32\n197.00\n210.70\nMay\n304.79\n219.85\n0.34\n197.00\n219.55\nJun\n306.37\n220.74\n0.34\n196.92\n218.98\n1st Half Average\n288.38\n211.07\n0.32\n189.37\n213.55\nJul\n306.41\n216.87\n0.33\n196.97\n237.15\nAug\n307.21\n219.33\n0.33\n197.00\n216.64\nSep\n302.55\n221.22\n0.34\n197.00\n222.68\nOct\n302.26\n221.45\n0.34\n196.99\n224.98\nNov\n299.38\n211.53\n0.32\n196.99\n232.40\nDec\n295.39\n214.00\n0.32\n196.99\n258.30\n2nd Half Average\n302.20\n217.40\n0.33\n196.99\n232.02\n2016\nPounds\nEuro\nCFAFr\nUS$ (IFEM)\nUS$ (BDC)\nJan\n283.62\n214.09\n0.33\n197.00\n289.78\nFeb\n281.79\n218.55\n0.33\n197.00\n329.83\nMar\n280.40\n218.89\n0.33\n197.00\n320.93\nApr\n282.07\n223.46\n0.34\n197.00\n320.71\nMay\n286.33\n222.85\n0.34\n197.00\n336.93\nJun\n328.53\n260.03\n0.38\n231.76\n351.82\n1st Half Average\n290.46\n226.31\n0.34\n202.79\n325.00\nJul\n388.37\n325.90\n0.49\n294.57\n364.47\nAug\n406.13\n347.33\n0.53\n309.73\n396.15\nSep\n401.08\n342.17\n0.52\n305.23\n431.10\nOct\n375.71\n336.21\n0.51\n305.21\n462.03\nNov\n379.49\n329.83\n0.50\n305.18\n415.36\nDec\n381.39\n322.13\n0.47\n305.22\n455.26\n2nd Half Average\n388.70\n333.93\n0.50\n304.19\n420.73\n2017\nPounds\nEuro\nCFAFr\nUS$ (IFEM)\nUS$ (BDC)\nJan\n376.32\n324.37\n0.49\n305.20\n493.29\nFeb\n381.17\n324.95\n0.50\n305.31\n494.70\nMar\n378.13\n327.35\n0.50\n306.40\n429.48\nApr\n386.92\n328.15\n0.50\n306.05\n392.89\nMay\n395.04\n337.72\n0.51\n305.54\n384.48\nJun\n391.57\n343.24\n0.52\n305.72\n366.25\n1st Half Average\n384.86\n330.96\n0.50\n305.70\n426.85\nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria\nNote: The Interbank exchange rate became the reference official rate on February 18, 2015 when the RDAS segment of the FOREX market was closed by the CBN.\nTable 48\nMonthly Average Exchange Rate Movements\n(N/US$ 1.00)\n161\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n2013\nW/RDAS\nInterbank\nBDC\nJan\n157.30\n156.96\n159.12\nFeb\n157.30\n157.52\n158.70\nMar\n157.31\n158.38\n159.80\nApr\n157.31\n158.20\n159.81\nMay\n157.30\n158.02\n159.57\nJun\n157.31\n160.02\n160.98\n1st Half\n157.30\n158.18\n159.66\nEnd-Period\n157.31\n162.60\n162.00\nJul\n157.32\n161.12\n162.43\nAug\n157.31\n161.15\n162.28\nSep\n157.32\n161.96\n163.14\nOct\n157.42\n159.83\n165.00\nNov\n157.27\n158.79\n167.14\nDec\n157.27\n159.05\n171.40\n2nd Half\n157.32\n160.32\n165.23\nEnd-Period\n157.26\n159.90\n172.00\n2014\nW/RDAS\nInterbank\nBDC\nJan\n157.29\n160.23\n171.71\nFeb\n157.31\n163.62\n169.45\nMar\n157.30\n164.62\n171.52\nApr\n157.29\n162.19\n170.30\nMay\n157.29\n161.86\n166.85\nJun\n157.29\n162.82\n167.17\n1st Half\n157.29\n162.56\n169.50\nEnd-Period\n157.29\n162.95\n168.00\nJul\n157.29\n162.25\n167.71\nAug\n157.29\n161.99\n170.36\nSep\n157.30\n162.93\n168.64\nOct\n157.31\n164.64\n169.43\nNov\n160.00\n171.10\n175.85\nDec\n169.68\n180.33\n188.45\n2nd Half\n159.81\n167.21\n173.41\nEnd-Period\n169.68\n180.00\n191.50\n2015\nRDAS\nInterbank\nBDC\nJan\n169.68\n181.78\n196.13\nFeb\n169.68\n194.48\n213.03\nMar\nClosed\n197.07\n222.93\nApr\nClosed\n197.00\n210.70\nMay\nClosed\n197.00\n219.55\nJun\nClosed\n196.92\n218.98\n1st Half\nClosed\n194.04\n213.55\nEnd-Period\nClosed\n196.95\n225.50\nJul\nClosed\n196.97\n237.15\nAug\nClosed\n197.00\n216.64\nSep\nClosed\n197.00\n222.68\nOct\nClosed\n196.99\n224.98\nNov\nClosed\n196.99\n232.40\nDec\nClosed\n196.99\n258.30\n2nd Half\nClosed\n196.99\n232.02\nEnd-Period\nClosed\n197.00\n267.00\n2016\nRDAS\nInterbank\nBDC\nJan\nClosed\n197.00\n289.78\nFeb\nClosed\n197.00\n329.83\nMar\nClosed\n197.00\n320.93\nApr\nClosed\n197.00\n320.71\nMay\nClosed\n197.00\n336.93\nJun\nClosed\n231.76\n351.82\n1st Half\nClosed\n202.79\n325.00\nEnd-Period\nClosed\n283.00\n348.00\nJul\nClosed\n294.57\n364.47\nAug\nClosed\n309.73\n396.15\nSep\nClosed\n305.23\n431.10\nOct\nClosed\n305.21\n462.03\nNov\nClosed\n305.18\n415.36\nDec\nClosed\n305.22\n455.26\n2nd Half\nClosed\n304.19\n420.73\nEnd-Period\nClosed\n305.00\n490.00\n2017\nRDAS\nInterbank\nBDC\nJan\nClosed\n305.20\n493.29\nFeb\nClosed\n305.31\n494.70\nMar\nClosed\n306.40\n429.48\nApr\nClosed\n306.05\n392.89\nMay\nClosed\n305.54\n384.48\nJun\nClosed\n305.72\n366.25\n1st Half\nClosed\n305.90\n366.00\nEnd-Period\nClosed\n305.72\n366.25\nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria\n CBN closed the RDAS segment of the FOREX market on February 18, 2015.\nTable 49\nDemand and Supply of Foreign Exchange\n(US$ Million)\n \n162\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nYear/Month\nRDAS \nBDC\nRDAS - \nRDAS \nBDC\nRDAS - \nDemand\nDemand\nForward \nDemand\nDemand\nDemand\nForward \nDemand\nJanuary\nClosed\n-\n-\n-\n-\nClosed\n15.49\n-\n972.72\n300.00\n1,288.21 Closed\n-\n-\nClosed\n42.82\n370.11\n33.00\n445.93\nFebruary\nClosed\n-\n-\n-\n-\nClosed\n-\n-\n676.01\n190.00\n866.01 Closed\n-\n-\nClosed\n88.54\n374.97\n124.16\n587.67\nMarch\nClosed\n-\n-\n-\n-\nClosed\n0.01\n-\n \n1,104.11\n \n250.00\n \n1,354.12 Closed\n-\n \n-\n \nClosed\n89.50\n835.02\n219.41\n24.06\n1,167.99\nApril\nClosed\n-\n-\n-\n-\nClosed\n-\n-\n \n780.36\n \n400.00\n \n1,180.36 Closed\n-\n \n-\n \nClosed\n136.25\n824.57\n587.41\n1,548.22\nMay\nClosed\n-\n-\n-\n-\nClosed\n-\n-\n \n782.83\n \n500.00\n \n1,282.83 Closed\n-\n \n-\n \nClosed\n-\n1,080.39\n2,202.18\n144.62\n3,427.19\nJune\nClosed\n-\n3,487.76\n-\n3,487.76 Closed\n-\n-\n \n1,283.81\n \n550.00\n \n1,833.81 Closed\n-\n \n-\n \nClosed\n845.04\n941.13\n845.82\n30.00\n2,662.00\nFirst Half\nClosed\n-\n3,487.76\n-\n3,487.76 Closed\n15.50\n0.00\n5,599.83\n2,190.00\n7,805.34 Closed\n-\n \n-\n \nClosed\n1,202.15\n4,426.20\n4,011.98\n198.68\n9,839.00\nJuly\nClosed\n-\n-\n-\nClosed\n-\n698.89\n \n510.00\n \n375.00\n \n1,583.89\n \nAugust\nClosed\n-\n352.15\n-\n352.15 Closed\n-\n1,106.05\n \n59.00\n \n308.21\n \n1,473.26\n \nSeptember\nClosed\n-\n-\n-\nClosed\n-\n1,565.19\n31.50\n458.05\n2,054.74\nOctober\nClosed\n-\n-\n-\nClosed\n-\n352.15\n39.76\n1,157.62\n1,549.53\nNovember\nClosed\n-\n-\n-\nClosed\n-\n100.00\n36.00\n273.42\n412.81\nDecember\nClosed\n-\n-\n-\nClosed\n-\n345.38\n28.50\n525.35\n938.77\nSecond Half\nClosed\n-\n352.15\n-\n352.15 Closed\n-\n4,167.66\n704.76\n3,097.65\n8,013.00\nInterbank \nDemand\nRDAS \nSales\nBDC \nSales\nTotal \nSupply\n2017 First Half\nTotal \nDemand\nRDAS \nSales\nBDC \nSales\nTotal \nDemand\n2016\nInterbank \nSales*\nSwaps\nInterbank - \nForward Sales*\nInterbank \nDemand\nSwaps\nTotal \nSupply\nInterbank - \nForward Sales*\nInterbank \nSales*\nTable 50\nSectoral Utilization of Foreign Exchange\n(US Dollar)\n \n163\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n \n \n \n \n \n \n A. Imports\n14,462,883,365.74 16,631,013,170.43\n15,215,575,071.71\n8,852,611,269.25\n8,301,562,614.54\n7,364,998,409.50\n Industrial Sector\n4,041,448,121.96 4,661,644,212.04 4,493,151,505.19 2,946,712,931.16 2,929,679,901.70 \n3,266,078,241.66\n Food Products\n2,767,756,161.15 2,658,782,598.59 2,388,706,799.43 1,003,229,417.58 786,152,019.72 \n635,679,458.20\n Manufactured Products\n2,147,236,827.27 2,783,304,773.17 2,345,876,977.09 1,542,644,777.06 1,256,422,357.48 \n1,037,599,371.48\n Transport Sector\n755,204,035.53 940,834,300.06 551,500,023.46 257,479,536.32 272,896,910.30 \n202,690,647.57\n Agricultural Sector\n157,895,155.41 242,451,389.17 134,476,199.54 101,522,957.10 152,928,195.88 \n119,692,811.00\n Minerals\n164,617,930.38 180,202,551.19 272,719,634.74 43,160,449.27 50,202,867.58 \n43,125,418.58\n Oil Sector\n4,428,725,134.04 5,163,793,346.21 5,029,143,932.26 2,957,861,200.76 2,853,280,361.88 \n2,060,132,461.01\n B. Invisibles\n12,478,677,753.36 16,274,798,516.97 10,527,665,789.29 4,256,388,912.77 3,632,240,450.36 \n4,695,483,165.42\n Business Services\n589,753,886.55 1,542,253,118.81 848,445,662.91 283,899,866.62 353,915,286.76 \n558,819,878.91\n Communication Services\n262,706,450.30 374,076,738.67 349,419,890.87 63,726,178.74 43,918,637.51 139,275,231.58 \n Construction and Engineering\n11,829,909.11 45,162,720.93 49,253,638.79 257,282.43 4,219.27 - \n Distribution Services\n18,186,729.88 49,743,988.82 29,288,273.16 11,933,333.38 1,460,580.63 4,916,699.05 \n Educational Services\n104,526,083.34 140,778,938.66 244,053,566.86 316,150,957.37 116,016,787.53 235,831,630.79 \n Environmental Services\n0.00\n - \n - \n 3,500.00 - \n Financial Services\n10,811,773,101.58 13,210,340,603.21 8,257,543,710.34 3,264,410,451.02 2,702,076,304.98 3,122,109,272.19 \n Health Related and Social Services\n1,394,662.89 333,168.32 858,801.93 3,287,760.74 804,382.19 1,553,904.69 \n Tourism and Travel Related Services\n16,344,055.52 21,363,448.93 131,694,368.56 9,187,235.78 6,625,676.79 39,394,273.87 \n Recreational, Cultural and Sporting Services\n0.00 1,366,685.32 - \n 12,758.55 - \n - \n Transport Services\n546,843,850.74 722,244,970.80 451,772,572.86 241,964,311.63 375,499,225.33 \n274,136,611.37\nOther Services not Included Elsewhere\n115,319,023.45 167,134,134.50 165,375,303.01 61,558,776.51 31,915,849.37 319,445,662.97 \nTOTAL (A+B)\n26,941,561,119.10 32,905,811,687.40\n25,743,210,861.00\n13,109,000,182.02\n11,933,803,064.90\n12,060,481,574.92\nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria\n1/ Revised\n2/ Provisional\n1st Half 2016 1/\n1st Half 2014\nSECTORS\n1st Half 2015\n1st Half 2013\n2nd Half 2016 2/\n1st Half 2017 2/\nTable 51\nTotal External Assets of Financial Institutions\n(Naira Million)\n164\nCBN Economic Report for the First Half of 2017\n \n \n1st Half 2013 \n1st Half 2014 \n1st Half 2015\n1st Half 2016 1/ 2nd Half 2016 1/\n1st Half 2017 2/\n1. Monetary Authorities\n7,614,112.49\n6,724,347.45\n7,646,654.46\n8,022,108.88\n9,248,623.81\n9,449,922.16\nForeign Assets\n7,614,112.49\n6,724,347.45\n7,646,654.46\n8,022,108.88\n9,248,623.81\n9,449,922.16\nGold\n19.01\n19.01\n19.01\n19.01\n19.01\n19.01\nIMF Reserve Tranche\n22.62\n22.62\n22.62\n22.62\n22.62\n22.62\nForeign Currencies\n34,538.05\n57,913.74\n50,119.83\n80,286.35\n38,126.50\n152,856.43\nDemand Deposits at Foreign Banks\n7,188,388.24\n6,264,354.82\n7,132,975.63\n7,348,315.40\n6,165,074.42\n6,390,693.98\nof which: Domicilliary Accounts\n683,696.66\n716,973.32\n216,467.10\n1,934,552.48\n3,296,417.53\n2,079,248.89\nSecurities of Foreign Governments\n1.05\n51.36\n702.76\n828.21\n2,199,617.46\n2,205,283.74\nSDR Holdings\n391,143.51\n401,985.90\n462,814.61\n592,637.30\n611,930.37\n631,681.32\nForeign Equity\n742.55\n744.55\nFX Swap/Forward/Futures\n233,090.87\n68,620.51\nRegional Monetary Cooperation Funds\nOther Foreign Assets\n2. Semi Official Institutions\ni) BOI\n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n-\nii) Others\n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n-\n3. Deposit Money Banks\n1,986,111.81\n2,234,406.82\n1,748,403.66\n2,379,967.15\n2,076,561.44\n2,447,082.43\nTotal Assets\n9,600,224.30\n8,958,754.27\n9,395,058.12\n10,402,076.02\n11,325,185.25\n11,897,004.59\nTotal Assets (US$' Million)\n61,028.40\n56,957.90\n47,702.76\n36,756.45\n37,131.75\n38,915.34\nExchange Rate (End-period)\n157.31\n157.29\n196.95\n283.00\n305.00\n305.72\nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria\n1/ Revised\n2/ Provisional", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/Quarterly_Economic_Reports/half year 2017 innerx.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "35b4d10ea13c56100cc911eb5d2a4e9a", "text": "Central Bank of Nigeria \nPage 1 of 5 \n \nMONETARY POLICY COMMUNIQUE NO.155 \n \nDate: Tuesday, 26 November 2024 \nRef: CBN/MPC/COM/155/298 \nAttention: News Editors/Gentlemen of the Press \n \nMONETARY POLICY RATE RAISED BY 25 BASIS POINTS \nTO 27.50 PER CENT FROM 27.25 PER CENT \n \nThe Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) \nheld its 298th meeting on the 25th and 26th of November 2024 to review recent \neconomic and financial developments as well as assess the risks to the \noutlook. All twelve members of the Committee were in attendance. \n \nDecisions of the MPC \nThe Committee was unanimous in its decision to further tighten policy and thus \ndecided as follows: \n1. Raise the MPR by 25 basis points to 27.50 per cent from 27.25 per \ncent. \n2. Retain the asymmetric corridor around the MPR at +500/-100 basis \npoints. \n3. Retain the Cash Reserve Ratio of Deposit Money Banks at 50.00 per \ncent and Merchant Banks at 16 per cent. \n4. Retain the Liquidity Ratio at 30.00 per cent \n \n \n \nCentral Bank of Nigeria \nPage 2 of 5 \n \nMONETARY POLICY COMMUNIQUE NO.155 \nConsiderations \nThis meeting was held on the backdrop of renewed inflationary pressures, as \nthe headline, food and core measures rose year-on-year in October 2024. The \nCommittee was particularly concerned that all three measures also inched up \non a month-on-month basis, suggesting the persistence of price pressures, \nwith attendant adverse impacts on income and welfare of citizens. Members, \ntherefore, agreed unanimously to remain focused in addressing price \ndevelopments. \nWhile food prices remain a key contributor to the uptick, Members commended \nthe efforts of the Federal Government for the improved security, especially in \nthe North-East of the country, which would likely improve food production. The \nCommittee also noted the role of rising energy prices on the general price level \ndue to its impact on factors of production. The recent increase in the price of \nPremium Motor Spirit (PMS) has also impacted the cost of production and \ndistribution of food items and manufactured goods. The Committee was \noptimistic that the full deregulation of the downstream sub-sector of the \npetroleum industry would eliminate scarcity and stabilise price levels in the \nshort to medium term. Members thus, reiterated the need to strongly forge \nahead with the deepening collaboration between the monetary and fiscal \nauthorities to ensure the achievement of our synchronized objectives of price \nstability and sustainable growth. \nThe Committee noted the improvement in the external sector, reflected by the \nincrease in the current account surplus, enhanced remittance and capital \ninflows which have impacted the external reserves positively. This, therefore, \nsuggests that key policy measures by both the monetary and fiscal authorities \nare yielding the desired outcomes. Members, however, expressed concern \nover persisting exchange rate pressure, reflecting continued high demand in \nCentral Bank of Nigeria \nPage 3 of 5 \n \nMONETARY POLICY COMMUNIQUE NO.155 \nthe market. Consequently, the Committee urged the Bank to explore measures \nto boost market liquidity. \nMembers noted with satisfaction the continued resilience and stability of the \nbanking system despite significant exogenous and endogenous headwinds. \nKey financial soundness indicators such as the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR), \nNon-Performing Loan ratio (NPL), Liquidity Ratio (LR), amongst others, remain \nstrong. The MPC, however, called on the Bank to maintain its close \nsurveillance on the banking system to sustain compliance with regulatory \nthresholds and continued health of the industry. \n \nThe MPC acknowledged the efforts of the Bank in deepening financial \ninclusion, towards improving the transmission mechanism of monetary policy \nto enhance policy effectiveness. \n \nFrom the foregoing, Members thus focused on the optimal policy choice to \naddress the uptrend in price development, stabilize the exchange rate and \nanchor inflation expectations appropriately. \n \nKey Developments in the Domestic and Global Economies \nData from the National Bureau of Statistics showed that headline inflation \n(year-on-year) rose to 33.88 per cent in October 2024, from 32.70 per cent in \nSeptember 2024. On a month-on-month basis, it also rose to 2.64 per cent in \nOctober 2024, from 2.52 per cent in the previous month, with both the food and \ncore components contributing to the continued rise in headline inflation. Food \ninflation rose further to 39.16 per cent in October 2024, from 37.77 per cent in \nSeptember, while core inflation also rose to 28.37 per cent in October 2024, \nfrom 27.43 per cent in September. \nCentral Bank of Nigeria \nPage 4 of 5 \n \nMONETARY POLICY COMMUNIQUE NO.155 \nThe MPC, however, noted the moderation in the prices of farm produce and \ncommended the efforts of the Federal Government in driving increased \nproductivity in the agricultural sector. \nThe recovery of output growth was sustained, with Real GDP (year-on-year) \ngrowing by 3.46 per cent in the third quarter of 2024 compared with 3.19 and \n2.54 per cent in the preceding and corresponding periods, respectively. The \ngrowth was driven by both the oil and non-oil sectors, with a notable \ncontribution from the Services sector. The non-oil sector grew by 3.37 per cent \nin the third quarter compared with 2.80 per cent in the second quarter, while \nthe oil sector grew by 5.17 per cent (year-on-year), compared with 10.15 per \ncent in the preceding quarter. \nThe external reserves rose marginally to US$40.88 billion as at 21st November \n2024 from US$40.06 billion at end-October 2024, available to finance 17 \nmonths of imports. \nAt the global level, the IMF projects growth at 3.2 per cent for 2024 and 2025 \nfrom 3.3 per cent in 2023. Risks to this outlook, however, include ongoing \ngeopolitical tensions such as the lingering war between Russia and Ukraine as \nwell as the crisis in the Middle East. The deceleration in global inflation is \nexpected to continue into 2025 and move towards the long-run objectives of \nkey central banks in the advanced economies, albeit at a slow pace. This, \nhowever, faces a growing risk of reversal as talks of trade tariffs heighten, \nfollowing the outcome of the November 2024 United States elections. \nIn view of the above developments and identified risks, Members reiterated \ntheir commitment to price stability as the bedrock of a thriving Nigerian \neconomy. \nCentral Bank of Nigeria \nPage 5 of 5 \n \nMONETARY POLICY COMMUNIQUE NO.155 \nThe next meeting of the Committee is scheduled to hold on the 27th and 28th of \nJanuary 2025. \nThank you. \nOlayemi Cardoso \nGovernor, \nCentral Bank of Nigeria \n26th November 2024", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/FINAL MPC Communique No. 155 November 26 2024 15.08pm.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "e674566a506e48f9a56651f66f22fe2f", "text": "MINUTES OF THE 217TH MEETING OF THE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE \n(MPC) HELD ON MONDAY 22ND AND TUESDAY 23RD NOVEMBER, 2010 IN THE \nMPC MEETING ROOM, 11TH FLOOR, CBN, ABUJA \n \nATTENDANCE \n 1. Sanusi L. Sanusi - Governor, (Chairman) \n 2. Tunde Lemo - Deputy Governor, Member \n 3. Sarah O. Alade - Deputy Governor, Member \n 4. Suleiman Barau - Deputy Governor, Member \n 5. Kingsley Moghalu - Deputy Governor, Member \n 6. Sam O. Olofin - Board Director, Member \n 7. Adedoyin R. Salami - Member \n 8. Abdul-Ganiyu Garba - Member \n 9. John Oshilaja - Member \n 10. Chibuike U. Uche - Member \n 11. Okorie A. Uchendu - Director, MPD, Secretary \n 12. Uwatt B. Uwatt - Dep. Director, Deputy \nSecretary \n \nOBSERVERS \n1. Sam O. Oni - Director, Banking \nSupervision \n2. Charles N. O. Mordi - Director, Research \n3. Batari Musa - Director, Trade and \nExchange \n4. O. F. Owolabi - Ag. Director, Financial \nMarkets \n5. Lamido A. Yuguda - Ag. Director, Reserve \nManagement \n6. Folakemi Fatogbe - Ag. Director, Risk \nManagement \n7. Musa Amedu - Dep. Director, \nDevelopment Finance \n8. Sunny Essien - Deputy Director, \nStatistics \nABSENT WITH APOLOGIES \n1. Shehu Yahaya - Member, MPC \n2 \n \n2. Danladi Kifasi - Member, Perm. Sec., \nFed. Min. of Fin. \nDay 1:\nOpening \n1.) The meeting commenced at 10.17 a. m. with a \nprayer by John Oshilaja. The MPC was informed of the \nabsence of two members from the meeting, with \napologies. One was the Permanent Secretary, Federal \nMinistry of Finance, while the other was Dr. Shehu \nYahaya, who was bereaved. \nMinutes of the Previous Meeting \n2.) The minutes of the 216th meeting of the MPC held \non Monday 21st September, 2010 were read without any \nerror detected by members. Accordingly, based on \nmotions by Sam O. Olofin and Adedoyin Salami, the \nminutes were adopted. \nMatters Arising from the Minutes of the Last Meeting \n3.) The Chairman advised that the Banking Supervision \nDepartment (BSD) should identify the customers with \nhuge non-performing loans, and review the risks posed \nto banks if monetary policy stance was tightened. \nMembers suggested that a second look be taken at the \nindividual banks with large non-performing loans and \nproactive action taken so that another banking crisis \nwould not surface. At that point, the Deputy \nGovernor, Financial System Stability informed the \nCommittee that the BSD was working towards solving \n \n3 \n \nthe problem and would report back to the MPC on the \noutcome of efforts made towards ensuring efficient \nsupervision of the banks. \nPresentations by the Departments: \n4.0 Trends In Crude Oil Production, Prices, and \nForeign Exchange Reserves \nThe presentation by the Research Department indicated \nthat oil production in the country averaged 1.99 mbd \nin 2008, and fell to 1.82 mbd in 2009 with the lowest\nlevel being 1.60 mbd recorded in July 2009. However,\noil output rose to an average of 2.13 mbd in the \nfirst 10 months of 2010. \nMovements in oil prices were mixed. In 2008, prices \nrose from US$94.25/b in January 2008 to the highest \nlevel of US$141/b in July, before falling to \nUS$44.95/b in December 2008. In 2009, prices ranged \nbetween US$44.95/b and US$78.46/b. The upward trend \nwas sustained in 2010 with prices ranging from \nUS$76.42/b in July to US$87.45/b in November 2010. \nThe lowest price of US$76.42/b in 2010 was higher \nthan the budget price of US$60.00/b. \nThe report indicated that oil export volumes had \nrecovered in 2010 relative to 2009 on account of the \nrebound in both output and prices, but not yet to the \nlevel attained in 2008. \nExternal reserves which peaked at US$62.08 billion in \nSeptember \n2008 \nhad \nsince \ndeclined \nsteadily \nto\n4 \n \nUS$40.23 billion in April 2010 and further to \nUS$33.60 billion by end-October 2010. The major \nreason for the decline was the near exhaustion of the \nexcess crude oil account from a peak of US$20.44 \nbillion in January 2009 to US$1.99 billion at end-\nOctober 2010. The CBN portion of the external \nreserves had also been falling since August 2008 due \nto the high demand for foreign exchange. \nThe report also showed that during the period,\npayments to the joint venture partners for cash calls \nand \nsubsidy \ndeductions \nfor \nthe \nNNPC \nrose \nsignificantly. \nDiscussion \nMembers concluded that there was a puzzle to be \nunravelled to know why foreign exchange reserves had \nbeen falling, as oil production and prices were \nrising. \n5.0 Real Sector, Monetary Developments, Financial \nMarkets, Global Developments and Outlook \nThe highlights of the Economic Report presented by \nthe Monetary Policy Department were as follows: \ni) Projections by the National Bureau of Statistics \nindicated that real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) \nwould grow by 8.29 per cent in the fourth quarter of \n2010 compared with 7.86 per cent in the third\nquarter. GDP was projected to grow by 7.85 per cent \nin 2010, which would be driven by agriculture, \n5 \n \nwholesale/retail trade and services\nsectors\nwith \nrelative contributions of 2.43, 2.23 and 2.07 per \ncent, respectively. The oil sector was projected to \ngrow \nwith \nthe \npositive \ncontribution \nof \n0.63\npercentage point in the fourth quarter as against \n0.62 percentage point in the third quarter and 0.64 \npercentage point in the second quarter. In 2009, the \noil sector contributed 0.14, 0.12 and 0.34 percentage \npoints to GDP in the fourth, third and second \nquarters, respectively. \nii) The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) data \nshowed that the year-on-year headline inflation \ndecreased marginally to 13.4 per cent in October 2010 \nfrom 13.6 per cent in September 2010 and 13.7 per \ncent in August. However, core inflation rose to 13.2 \nper cent in October 2010 from 12.8 per cent in \nSeptember and 12.4 per cent in August, 2010. Food \ninflation fell to 14.1 per cent in October 2010 from \n14.6 per cent in September and 15.1 per cent in \nAugust 2010.The report noted that between 2009 and \n2010, the volatility in inflation rate had moderated \nsignificantly in response to CBN inflation control \nmeasures \nas \nwell \nas \nimproved \nmacroeconomic \nmanagement. The report, however, cautioned that \nfactors such as the anticipated injection by the \nAsset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON), \nexpected fiscal injection for 2011 election expenses \n6 \n \nas well as rising consumer spending during the end of \nthe year could pose inflationary threats in the \nmedium term. \niii) Interest rates in the major segments of the \ninterbank \nmarket \nresponded \nto \nthe \nincrease \nin \nmonetary policy rate (MPR) and liquidity swings \nexperienced during the review period. As at 15th\nNovember, 2010, interbank and OBB rates stood at \n10.56 and 8.23 per cent, respectively, trending above \nthe MPR. At the end of October and September 2010, \nthe rates in the interbank market were 8.45 and 3.19 \nper cent, respectively, while the OBB rates for the \nsame period were 7.53 and 2.92 per cent. \nThe average maximum lending rate fell to 21.85 per \ncent in October 2010 from 22.20 per cent in September \nand 22.31 per cent in August 2010. However, the \naverage prime lending rate remained at 16.66 per cent \nin both October and September 2010, having declined\nfrom 16.89 per cent in August 2010. \nThe weighted average savings rate declined marginally\nto 1.48 per cent in October 2010 from 1.49 per cent \nin September 2010. The consolidated deposit rate, \nhowever, rose to 2.31 per cent in October 2010 from \n2.07 per cent in September and 2.27 per cent in \nAugust 2010. Thus, the spread between the average \nmaximum lending rate and the consolidated deposit \nrate narrowed marginally to 19.54 per cent in October \n7 \n \n2010 from 20.14 per cent in September, 2010. \niv) At the foreign exchange market, the average \ndemand and sales per auction in October 2010 stood at \n$312.95 million and $262.50 million, respectively, \nindicating that 83.87 per cent of the demand was met, \ncompared with the average demand and sales of $439.20\nmillion and $358.60 million in September 2010, which \nindicated that 81.65 per cent of the demand was \nsatisfied. During the period 1st-15th November 2010,\nfive auctions were held at the wDAS with an average \ndemand and sales of US$206.23 million and US$168.25 \nmillion, respectively or a sales/demand ratio of\n81.58 per cent. \nOn November 15, 2010, the wDAS exchange rate closed \nat \nan \naverage \nof \nN150.29/US$ \ncompared \nwith \nN151.25/US$ \nin \nOctober \n2010, \nrepresenting \nan \nappreciation of N0.96 or 0.64 per cent. In the \ninterbank segment of the market, the average buying \nand \nselling \nrates \non \nNovember \n15, \n2010 \nwere \nN150.65/US$ and N150.75/US$, respectively, compared \nwith the rates of N151.68/US$ and N151.78/US$ in \nOctober 2010. At the BDC segment of the foreign \nexchange market, the average buying and selling rates \nrecorded on November 15, 2010 were N151.50/US$ and \nN153.50/US$, respectively, compared with the rates \nof N151.98/US$ and N153.98/US$ in October 2010. The \npremium between the average effective wDAS closing \n8 \n \nrate of N151.25/US$ and the average selling rate of \nN153.98/US$ also widened at the BDC segment to\nN2.73/US$ (1.80 per cent) in October 2010 from \nN1.96/US$ (1.30 per cent) recorded in September 2010. \nThe report noted that there were active movement of \nfunds between the money and foreign exchange markets, \nand tight liquidity conditions in the interbank \nmarket tended to appreciate the naira exchange rate. \nThe country’s gross external reserves stood at \nUS$34.27 billion on 15th November, 2010, representing \na decline of US$0.32 billion or 0.93 per cent \ncompared with US$34.59 billion recorded at end-\nSeptember 2010. The reserve level fell by US$8.2\nbillion or 19.31 per cent when compared with US$42.47\nbillion at end-December 2009. \nTotal foreign exchange inflows in October 2010 was \nUS$2.38 billion, representing a decline of US$0.32\nbillion or 11.85 per cent from the US$2.70 billion \nrecorded in September 2010. Of this inflow, crude \noil/gas revenue was US$2.22 billion or 93.26 per cent \nwhile the other inflows contributed US$0.16 billion \nor 6.74 per cent. Total outflows/payments during the \nsame period amounted to US$3.46 billion, indicating a \ndecline of US$1.62 billion or 31.89 per cent below \nthe US$5.08 billion recorded in the preceding month. \nThus, there was a net outflow of US$1.09 billion \nduring the review period. Inflows from autonomous \n9 \n \nsources \nsuch \nas \noil \ncompanies, \ninternational \ninstitutions and home remittances in September and \nOctober 2010 amounted to US$7.55 billion and US$10.43\nbillion, \nrespectively. \nAutonomous \ninflows \nfrom \nJanuary to October 2010 amounting to US$67.17\nbillion, helped to augment foreign exchange inflows \nfrom official sources and to stabilize the foreign \nexchange market. \nv) The retained revenue of the Federal Government in\nSeptember 2010 was N177.39 billion compared with an \nexpenditure of N162.49 billion, resulting in a budget \nsurplus \nof \nN14.90 \nbillion \nas \nagainst \nthe \nproportionate budget deficit of N222.15 billion for \nthe month. The actual revenue was lower than the \nproportionate monthly revenue of N207.82 billion by \nN30.43 billion or 14.64 per cent. Similarly, the \nactual expenditure was lower than the proportionate \nmonthly expenditure of N429.97 billion by N267.50 \nbillion or 62.21 per cent. The cumulative retained \nrevenue of the Federal Government from January to \nSeptember 2010 stood at N1,867.39 billion, which was \nlower than the proportionate budget revenue of \nN1,870.38 billion for the period by N2.99 billion or \n0.16 per cent. The cumulative expenditure of the \nFederal Government for the same period was estimated \nat \nN2,588.55 \nbillion \nand \nwas \nlower \nthan \nthe \nproportionate budget estimate of N3,869.91 billion by \n10 \n \nN1,281.36 billion or 33.11\nper cent.\nThe\nestimated \ndeficit resulting from the projected expenditure for \nthe period (January to September, 2010) was N721.16\nbillion. \nThe budget deficit was expected to be financed from \ninternational bonds, signature bonus from oil block\nsales and FGN share of excess crude oil account, \namong others. \nvi) The broad measure of money supply (M2) grew by\n4.25 per cent in October 2010, which when annualised,\nrepresented a growth of 5.10 per cent compared with\nthe indicative benchmark of 29.26 per cent for 2010.\nThe growth in M2 reflected mainly the substantial \ngrowth in credit to the Government. Aggregate credit \nto the economy grew by 19.69 per cent, which \nannualised to 23.63 per cent as against the target \ncredit growth of 55.54 per cent for 2010. Credit to \nthe private sector grew by 3.22 per cent in October\n2010 or 3.86 per cent on annualised basis as against \nthe benchmark of 31.54 per cent for 2010. Credit to \nthe core private sector similarly grew by 2.56 per \ncent in October 2010, annualizing to 3.07 per cent.\nCredit to the government grew substantially by 53.35\nper cent in October 2010 or 64.02 per cent on \nannualised \nbasis \ncompared \nwith 51.36 \nper \ncent \nindicative target for 2010. \nThe decline in reserve money (RM) observed in most \n11 \n \nperiods of 2009 continued into the fourth quarter of \n2010 and remained below the indicative benchmark.\nReserve money rose by 7.85 per cent to N1,449.95 \nbillion on November 15, 2010 from N1,344.41 billion \nas at end-September 2010, but was below the 2010 \nprovisional indicative benchmark of N2,232.44 billion \nfor the fourth quarter by 39.21 per cent. The reserve \nmoney (RM) forecast from end-November, 2010 to April \n2011 indicated that the RM would continue to be below \nthe \nquarterly \nindicative \nbenchmarks \nduring \nthe \nforecast period. \nAs at November 15, 2010, the DMBs’ requests for \naccess to the CBN’s Standing Lending Facility (SLF) \ntotalled N996.65 billion as against N1,094.62 billion \nin October and N73.10 billion in September, 2010.\nPatronage of the Standing Deposit Facility (SDF) fell \nto N146.65 billion on November 15, 2010 from \nN1,117.30 billion in October and N3,826.60 billion in \nSeptember \n2010, \nreflecting \nthe \ntight \nliquidity \nconditions in the money market. \nvii) There was an increase of 9.8 per cent in the All \nShare Index (ASI) of the Nigerian Stock Exchange \n(NSE) to 25,301 on November 15, 2010 from 23,050.59 \nat \nend-September \n2010. \nSimilarly, \nthe \nmarket \ncapitalisation increased by 43.1 per cent to N8.08 \ntrillion on November 15, 2010 from N5.65 trillion at \nend-September 2010. During the same period, the \n12 \n \nnumber of deals increased by 21.6 per cent as against \nthe decline in the volume and value of shares traded \non \nthe \nExchange \nby \n38.5 \nand \n62.7 \nper \ncent, \nrespectively. The increase in the ASI and MC followed \nthe listing of 15.5 billion shares of Dangote Cement \nat N135.00 per share and the supplementary listing of \n17.3 billion shares of Unity Bank on the floors of \nthe Exchange on Tuesday 26 October, 2010. \n viii) Developments in the Global Economy \nThe performance of the global economy was mixed: \n• Mild threats of inflation were observed in most \nof the countries surveyed; \n• Stock prices rose in most countries; \n• Exchange rate developments were mixed across \ncountries with appreciation in internationally \ntraded currencies and depreciation in most \nAfrican currencies; \n• All the countries surveyed maintained their \npolicy rates except Chile, China and Nigeria that \nraised their policy rates in response to threats \nof inflation; \n• Selected indicators for the US economy suggested \na slow-down in economic activities; and \n• The global commodities market was affected by\nseveral natural disasters such as severe flooding \nin China and Pakistan as well as wild firestorms \n13 \n \nin \nRussia. \nConsequently, \ncommodity \nprices, \nespecially food grains, trended upwards with the \nrisk of inflation pass-through from major food \nexporters \nto \nconsuming \ncountries \nincluding \nNigeria. \nix) Outlook for the Future \n• Money market rates and other interest rates were \nnot expected to moderate in the light of excessive \ngovernment borrowing and the common year-end for \nbanks. \n• Inflation was not expected to moderate, thus making \nthe single digit inflation target by the end of the \nyear unrealisable. \n• The growth in M2 would likely improve in the near \nterm as a result of: \no the sustained implementation of the CBN’s \nquantitative easing measures comprising the \nN300.0 billion power and aviation sector \nintervention fund and the N200.0 billion \nrestructuring and refinancing fund through the \nBank of Industry (BOI); \no huge electioneering expenditures; \no payment of FGN salary arrears following the \napproved new minimum wage to workers; \no increased consumer spending during the year-\nend festivities; and \no Commencement \nof \noperations \nby \nthe \nAsset \nManagement Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON). \n• Reserve money (RM) forecast for the period between\nNovember 2010 and April 2011 indicated that RM \nwould \ncontinue \nto \nbe \nbelow \nthe \nindicative \n14 \n \nbenchmark.\n• With the expected resumption of economic growth in \nthe \nworld’s \nlargest \nand \nemerging \neconomies, \nincreased oil demand would keep oil prices above \nthe revised budget benchmark of $60 a barrel.\nMeanwhile, forward oil prices in the New York \nMercantile Exchange were projected to range between \n$85.37 and $87.41 a barrel between end-November and \nMay 2011. \n• There was expected marginal increase in non-oil \nrevenue due to the improved efficiency of tax \ncollecting agencies. \n• Oil \nproduction \nmight \nfall \nfollowing \nrenewed \nhostilities in the Niger Delta area. \n• Rising domestic debt of government would likely \ncontinue owing to expected shortfall in government \nrevenue and planned issuance of bonds by the DMO. \n• The naira exchange rate would remain stable in the \nnear term if the liberalised exchange rate policy \nwas sustained, while foreign exchange inflows from \nautonomous sources would continue to increase\ntowards the end of the year. \n• The capital market was expected to resume its \nupward trend in the near term following ongoing \nsanitisation of the market. \n• Confidence in the capital market would return with \n15 \n \nthe commencement of operations of the AMCON.\n \nPressure Points and Policy Challenges \nc) The report identified the following pressure \npoints: \n• The \ncontinued \nunderperformance \nof \nmonetary \naggregates, relative to long – term trends; \n• inflation \nthreat \nresulting \nfrom \nanticipated \nliquidity injections; and \n• rising interbank interest rates as well as high \nbut narrowing interest rate spreads. \nThe challenges for monetary and credit policy in the \nnear term were identified as: \n• providing adequate incentives for banks to lend \nto the real sector; \n• sustaining exchange rate stability in the face of \ndeclining external reserves; and \n• moderating inflationary threats. \n6.0 Update on the Implementation of Previous MPC\nDecisions \n The updates were as follows: \n• N200.0 Billion Refinancing/Restructuring Facility: \ni. \nOf this amount, the sum of N139.199 billion had \nalready been disbursed through the BOI; \nii. N69.47 billion had been approved for disbursement \nas second tranche; and \niii. amendments to the guidelines for the scheme had \nbeen approved. \n16 \n \n• Application for Guarantee Certificate to the tune \nof N107.5 million, made up of N100.0 million to \nFirst Bank of Nigeria and N7.5 million to the \nNational Economic Reconstruction Fund (NERFUND) had \nbeen approved under the SME Credit Guarantee \nScheme. \n• Resumption of liquidity mop-up through OMO in \nSeptember 2010. \nDiscussion of the Report \nThe Committee noted that the budget deficit reported\narose \nfrom \nhuge \ngovernment \nexpenditure \nfor \nsubsidizing the consumption of petroleum products, \nand the increased wages to federal civil servants, \nthe loss of revenue through duty waiver on rice \nimports, and the joint venture cash calls, among \nothers. The Members agreed that fiscal discipline and\nstructural reforms were needed to reduce the huge \nbudget deficit. On money market rates, it was also \nnoted that the spread between the open buy back (OBB) \nand interbank rates reflected the credit risks in the \nindustry. Members were, however, informed that the \nspike in interest rates in October 2010 arose from\ninformation \nand \ncommunications \ntechnology \n(ICT) \nchallenges in the Bank when the Enterprise Resource \nPlanning (ERP) platform was undergoing upgrades. \nMembers were informed that preserving the foreign \nreserves \n17 \n \nof the country had implications for\nthe economy, \nparticularly, \nas manufacturing inputs, power, food and petroleum\nproducts were largely sourced from imports. In that \nregard, the Committee noted the limits of monetary \npolicy and emphasised the need for reforms in order \nto reduce pressure on policy. On the underperformance\nof monetary aggregates, it was agreed that the \nmonetary programme be reviewed, though the reason for \nthe underperformance was attributed to the non-\nperformance of fiscal operations. A member observed\nthat much of the domestic revenue was devoted to\nrecurrent expenditure which left very little room for \ncapital projects. Members also recognised that while\nGovernment borrowing would heighten money market \nrates, AMCON bonds expected to be issued to the banks \nwould moderate the rates. \nMembers noted that the Committee should be observant \nof \nthe development of asset bubbles in the stock market. \nThe \nChairman \nreminded \nmembers \nof \nthe \nBank’s\ncommitment to price stability, especially as the \nnumbers that resulted from the revision of the CPI by \nthe NBS, tended to suggest a heightened inflation \nthreat. Members noted that the economy was facing an \nelevated Government recurrent expenditure as well as \nan unreasonably high demand for foreign exchange. \n18 \n \nThey equally observed that the high demand for \nforeign \nexchange \nwas \nbeing \nfuelled \nby \nfiscal \nexpansion. It was also noted that exchange rate\nstability encouraged the inflow of domestic and \nforeign investment. \n \nProposals for Monetary Policy Actions \nScenario 1: Retention of the MPR at 6.25 per cent and \nthe current interest rate corridor: \nThe argument in favour of the proposal was that \nmaintaining the existing monetary policy stance would \nsustain market expectations with respect to interest \nand exchange rates, thus allowing uninterrupted \nimplementation \nof \napproved \npolicies \nand \nthe \nachievement of their objectives. \nOn the other hand, allowing the existing policy rate \nto remain would signal insensitivity to the inflation \nthreat arising from the various liquidity injections \nanticipated towards the end of the year. \nScenario 2: Raise the MPR by 25 basis points with the \ncurrent interest rate corridor retained: \nThe proposal would signal monetary policy tightening \nin \nresponse \nto \nthe \nprospects \nof \nheightened\ninflationary \npressures \narising \nfrom \nanticipated \nliquidity injections in the near term. The argument \nagainst the policy action was its potential for\nraising lending rates and frustrating the efforts so \n19 \n \nfar made towards channelling credit to the real \neconomy. Scenario 3: The MPR should be raised by 25 \nbasis points and interest rate corridor adjusted to \n+300/-200 basis points implying SLF rate of 9.5 per \ncent and SDF rate of 4.5 per cent. \nThe adoption of the proposal would signal monetary \ntightening and encourage interbank lending. The \ndownside risk would be that the DMBs might be \nencouraged to use the SDF instead of making use of \nexcess funds available at the interbank market. \nThe Committee was invited to consider the proposals \nas presented. \nDiscussion of the Proposals for Monetary Policy \nActions \nIn considering the proposals, the Chairman reminded \nmembers that the Committee could choose to leave the \nMPR unchanged, provide easy money to the Government \nand meet the foreign exchange demand. The Committee \nalso could further tighten policy, thereby increasing\nthe cost of Government borrowing, exert pressure on \ninterest rates and reduce borrowing. The Chairman \nnoted that the public debt would have been lower if \nthe \npublic \nrevenue \nwas \nearned \nfrom \ntaxes \non \ncomponents of the GDP such as agriculture, services, \nmanufacturing and value added tax like what obtains \nin other countries. A question was raised as to \nwhether the shutting down of the Class A BDCs was not \n20 \n \na signal of policy inconsistency. The Chairman stated \nthat the Class A BDCs were responsible for creating \ndistortions and speculation in the market giving the \nimpression of money laundering. A member asked \nwhether the Class A BDCs could migrate to Class B \nBDCs to which the Chairman stated that the more the \nClass B BDCs the better, so that members of the \npublic could easily access them for their foreign \nexchange needs. \nThe meeting ended on Day 1 with a prayer by L.A. \nYuguda, Acting Director of Reserve Management. \nDAY 2, 23RD November, 2010 \nThe meeting commenced with a prayer by Suleiman \nBarau, Deputy Governor, Corporate Services. \nThe Chairman reminded the members that they had \nagreed that there was need to tighten the monetary \npolicy stance and that the pursuit of exchange rate \nstability would advance the cause of price stability. \nHe noted that tightening the policy stance without \nfiscal discipline would not allow monetary policy to\nbe effective. Accordingly, tightening monetary policy \ncould take the form of increasing the MPR or \nnarrowing the interest rate corridor. He called on \nmembers to present their views before the voting. \nMembers generally agreed on the need for tightening \nmonetary policy but were divided on the modalities \nfor achieving the objective. Some argued that an increase \n21 \n \nin the MPR from the current level would not really tame \ninflation as no one knew when the 2011 budget would be \npassed and the size of the expected fiscal injections.\nConsidering the impact lag on inflation of an increase in \nthe MPR, and its likely effect on non-performing loans, \nit was agreed that the interest rate corridor should be \nreturned to symmetry for the meantime while developments \nin the economy were watched until the next meeting of the \nCommittee in January 2011. Moreover, leaving the MPR \nunchanged could make credit accessible to the real sector \nand allow room for flexibility of action at the January \n2011 MPC meeting. \n Voting and Decisions of the Meeting \n7) After deliberations, the Committee through a majority \ndecision voted to: \ni) retain the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) at 6.25 per \ncent; \nii) adjust the corridor +/- 200 basis points, implying \nthe Standing Lending Facility (SLF) rate of 8.25 per cent \nand Standing Deposit Facility (SDF) rate of 4.25 per \ncent; \niii) maintain the policy stance of a stable exchange \nrate; and \niv) continue to monitor inflationary trends with a view \nto taking appropriate steps as and when necessary. \nv) On the stance of monetary policy in the year ahead, \nthe Committee reaffirmed that monetary policy would seek \nto exert pressure on aggregate demand, thereby helping to \nlower inflation expectations. In addition, monetary \n22 \n \npolicy would stand ready to provide adequate and timely \nliquidity to support credit dynamics that would sustain \nfiscal mechanisms to bolster growth. \nAny Other Business \n8) The Deputy Governor (Economic Policy) presented a \nproposal for the 2011 calendar of MPC meetings. The \nproposal sought to shift the dates of the meetings from \nthe first week to the second or third week of the odd or \neven months so that there would be enough time to receive \ninflation and GDP data from the NBS. The Chairman noted \nthat it would be too far to hold the first meeting of the \nyear in February 2011 and decided that the first meeting \nshould be held in January 2011. \nDate of Next Meeting \n9.) The next meeting was scheduled to hold on January 24 \nand 25, 2011. \nClosing \n10.) The meeting ended at 12.22 p.m. with a prayer by \nS.O. Oni, Director, Banking Supervision Department. \n………………………… .…………………………\nCHAIRMAN \nSECRETARY \n …………………………. \n DATE", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/minutes of the 217th meeting.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "680e98639ca1bc282002a90369a69286", "text": "1 \n \n \n \n \n \nCentral Bank Of Nigeria Communique No 115 Of The Monetary Policy \nCommittee Meeting Of 25TH And 26TH September, 2017 \n \nBackground \n \nThe Monetary Policy Committee met on the 25th and 26th of September, \n2017 against the backdrop of a relatively optimistic global economy. The \nCommittee examined the global and domestic economic and financial \nenvironments up to the third quarter of 2017, and the outlook for the rest of \nthe year. The recent spate of flooding and hurricanes in some parts of the \nglobe; the flooding in Nigeria; the increasing tension between the US and \nNorth Korea, and the perception of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula as well \nas the associated geo-political tensions, were identified as key risks to global \noutput growth. \nOn the domestic front, the economy exited recession (which began in the \nfirst quarter of 2016) in the second half of 2017, with a modest positive short to \nmedium-term outlook, resulting largely from deliberate macroeconomic \nstimulus and a stable naira exchange rate. Inflation expectations also \n2 \n \nappeared anchored on the strength of prevailing tight monetary policy \nstance. Seven (7) members of the MPC were present at the meeting. \n \n \nExternal Developments \nGlobal output is projected to improve further in 2017, as growth forecast by \nthe IMF in its July World Economic Outlook (WEO) was projected at 3.5 per \ncent, up from 3.2 per cent in 2016. Output growth in some advanced \neconomies, including Japan, the Euro-area as well as some emerging market \nand developing economies is expected to improve in 2017. Nigeria, Brazil \nand South Africa, all exited recession, while Russia is likely to exit recession in \nthe fourth quarter of 2017, after a mild contraction of 0.57 per cent in the \nsecond quarter. Growth forecast for the US was revised downwards from 2.3 \nper cent to 2.1 per cent in 2017, as a result of the weak growth observed in \nthe first quarter of the year. \nThe MPC, however, noted some headwinds confronting the optimistic global \ngrowth prospects to include: recent developments on the Korean peninsula; \nthe damage to infrastructure caused by hurricanes - Harvey, Irma and Maria; \nthe lull in BREXIT negotiations and the normalization of monetary policy by the \nUS Fed, which is expected to instigate global capital flow reversal. Other \nchallenges include the continued slow pace of recovery in global oil and \nother commodity prices and China’s reduction in uptake of global \ncommodities. In addition, the Committee noted the tepid global inflation \n3 \n \nmomentum, implying that continued monetary policy normalization could be \ninjurious to global growth prospects. \nThe uptick in global inflation persisted, but moderated, in response to rising oil \nprices, continued accommodative monetary policy in the advanced \neconomies; and currency appreciation in some emerging markets and \ndeveloping countries. Average inflation for the developed economies is \nprojected at 1.9 per cent in 2017, while it is forecast to average 4.5 per cent \nin the emerging and developing economies, as prices are expected to \nmoderate due to seasonal effects. The Committee observed that the outlook \nfor global monetary policy remains predominantly accommodative, in \nsupport of recovery and growth. \n \nDomestic Output Developments \nData from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) showed that real Gross \nDomestic Product (GDP) grew by 0.55 per cent in the second quarter of 2017, \nagainst the contractions of 0.91 and 1.49 per cent in the previous quarter of \n2017, and the corresponding quarter of 2016, respectively, marking the \ntechnical exit of the Nigerian economy from recession. Non-oil real GDP grew \nby 0.45 per cent in Q2, 2017, driven largely by agriculture (3.0%), industry \n(1.1%), and construction (0.1%). The modest growth was attributed to fiscal \ninjections from the implementation of the Economic Recovery and Growth \nPlan (ERGP), and enhanced supply of foreign exchange arising from \nimproved crude oil prices. The Committee also noted the positive outlook \n4 \n \nfrom the Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) for manufacturing and non-\nmanufacturing activities, which stood at 53.6 and 54.1 index points in August \n2017, respectively, above the 50 index points benchmark, indicating \nmoderate signs of recovery. The Committee further noted that, although the \nrecovery was weak, it was hopeful that the active implementation of the \n2017 budget could boost aggregate demand and employment. \n \nDevelopments in Money and Prices \nThe Committee noted that money supply (M2) contracted by 11.06 per cent \nin August 2017 (annualised), in contrast to the provisional growth benchmark \nof 10.29 per cent for 2017. The development in M2 is largely due to the \ncontraction of 18.42 per cent in other assets net (OAN) in August 2017. \nSimilarly, M1 contracted by 12.25 per cent in August 2017, (annualised to -\n18.37 per cent). Net domestic credit (NDC) contracted by 0.14 per cent, \nannualized at -0.20 per cent, driven majorly by net credit to government, \nwhich also contracted by 1.05 per cent against the programmed growth of \n33.12 per cent. Credit to the private sector, however, grew marginally by 0.07 \nper cent in August 2017, compared with the provisional benchmark of 14.88 \nper cent. The MPC also noted the policy constraints in ensuring the flow of \ncredit to the real sector in the face of weak and underperforming monetary \naggregates. Inflationary pressure in the economy continued to moderate \nwith headline inflation (year-on-year) receding for the seventh consecutive \nmonth to 16.01 per cent in August 2017, from 16.05 per cent in July 2017. Food \n5 \n \ninflation declined slightly to 20.25 per cent in August 2017 from 20.28 per cent \nin July 2017, while core inflation increased to 12.30 per cent in August 2017 \nfrom 12.21 per cent in July 2017. This development was attributed to the \ncontraction in money supply, decline in imported food and non-food prices, \nfavourable base effects, and the moderating effects of stable exchange \nrates. The Committee, however, noted that the high food inflation was \ntraceable to rising prices of farm inputs and supply shortages, intermittent \nclashes between farmers and herdsmen, as well as weak harvest, due to \nincreased flooding of farmlands. \nMoney market interest rates oscillated in tandem with the level of liquidity in \nthe banking system as the average inter-bank call rate which opened at \n18.00 per cent on July 26, 2017, closed at 7.00 per cent on August 31, 2017. \nThe OBB rate opened at 15.03 per cent and closed lower at 7.83 per cent in \nthe same period. However, the average inter-bank call and OBB rates for the \nperiod stood at 22.63 and 39.66 per cent, respectively. The movement in net \nliquidity positions and flows reflected the effects of OMO sales; foreign \nexchange interventions; statutory revenue payments to states and local \ngovernments; remittances by Nigerian Customs and Federal Inland Revenue \nServices for FAAC meetings; and the maturity of CBN Bills. \nThe Committee noted the continuing improvement in the external reserves \nposition and the equities segment of the capital market. External reserves \nposition grew to US$32.9 billion at close of business on 25th September, 2017 \nwhile the All-Share Index (ASI) rose by 7.20 per cent from 33,117.48 on June \n6 \n \n30, 2017 to 35,504.62 on August 31, 2017. Market Capitalization (MC) \nimproved by 6.90 per cent to N12.24 trillion from N11.45 trillion during the \nsame period. Relative to end-December 2016, capital market indices rose by \n32.10 and 32.30 per cent, respectively, reflecting growing investor \nconfidence, due to improvements in foreign exchange management. \nTotal foreign exchange inflows through the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) rose \nby 1.98 per cent in August 2017, compared with the previous month. Similarly, \ntotal outflow increased by 7.03 per cent during the same period, as a result of \nincreased international remittances, inclusive of public sector and JVC \npayments; which rose by 58.59 per cent in the period under review. \nThe Committee noted the trend towards convergence between the rates at \nthe bureau-de-change (BDC) and the Nigeria Autonomous Foreign \nExchange (NAFEX) segments, as well as the stability of the exchange rate at \nthe inter-bank segment of the foreign exchange market during the review \nperiod. Similarly, the Committee noted the success of the Investor and \nExporters’ window (I &E) of the foreign exchange market and traced this not \nonly to foreign investor confidence but also to the zeal and commitment of \nNigerian exporters who have demonstrated preference for the window to the \nparallel market. The Committee observed that the I&E window has increased \nliquidity and boosted confidence in the market with over US$7.0 billion inflow \nin the last five months. The Committee will continue to introduce policies that \nwill improve the confidence of foreign investors in \nthe country’s \nmacroeconomic management regime. \n7 \n \n2.0. Overall Outlook and Risks \nAvailable data and forecast of key macroeconomic variables indicate a \nrelatively positive outlook, predicated on existing policy initiatives including \nthe ERGP. Other potential drivers of economic recovery are; the expected \nincrease in government revenue arising from favourable crude oil prices, \nstable output, and general improvements in the non-oil sector, especially, \nagriculture, industry and construction. The intervention by the CBN in the real \nsector is expected to continue to yield positive results in terms of output and \nlower consumer prices. \nThe Committee, however, noted some downside risks to the overall short- to \nmedium-term positive outlook for the economy. These include; flooding \nwhich displaced farming communities and political agitations. On the \nexternal front, the hawkish policy stance in the United States, rising geo-\npolitical tensions and sluggish output recovery in the Euro-area and Japan, \ncould slow-down the momentum of global output growth, with significant \nspillovers to emerging markets and developing countries, including Nigeria. \n \n3.0. The Considerations of the Committee \nThe Committee applauded the exit of the Nigerian economy from recession \nbut observed that the growth remains fragile and, therefore, hopes that \ncomplementary fiscal and monetary policies would sustain the growth \nmomentum. The Committee further expressed satisfaction with the gradual, \nbut consistent decline in inflation, noting, however, the substantial base \n8 \n \neffect in addition to the continuous improvement in the naira exchange rate \nacross all segments of the foreign exchange market; and considerable \nimprovement in foreign capital inflow. The Committee welcomed the steady \nimplementation of the 2017 Budget, especially, the capital component of the \nbudget, and urged increased momentum in expenditure directed at the \ngrowth-stimulating sectors of the economy in order to reduce youth \nunemployment and restiveness. \nThe Committee, however, expressed concern on the sustained pressure on \nfood prices, noting risks posed by floods, strikes and insurgencies in various \nparts of the country to food production and distribution. Regarding the tepid \nturnaround in economic activities in the second quarter of 2017, the \nCommittee emphasized that the employment gains of recovery were still \nminimal, noting that a number of important job elastic sub-sectors were still \nweak and may require more fiscal support to regain traction. The Committee, \nhowever, commended the Federal Government for issuing the Executive \nOrder aimed at improving the ease of doing business in the country. It also \nnoted the efforts of the government to create jobs in the agricultural sector \nwith the inauguration of the Presidential Committee on job creation, \ntargeting at least ten thousand jobs in each state of the Federation, over the \nnext six months through a boost in agricultural support and funding. The \nCommittee enjoins the state governments to work with the Presidential \nCommittee to actualise this plan without further delay. \n9 \n \nThe MPC also noted with satisfaction, the directive of the Federal \nGovernment to all states to promptly pay outstanding salary arrears, in order \nto boost aggregate demand. It commended efforts to clear outstanding \ncontractor arrears; prompt settlement of trade disputes with certain Unions of \norganised labour, including the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) \nand Health Workers; as well as the release of money to settle outstanding \nentitlements of the erstwhile workers of the defunct Nigeria Airways. These \nefforts, the Committee reasoned would improve aggregate demand and \nstrengthen the weak recovery. The Committee restated its commitment to \nmaintaining stability in prices, without which meaningful recovery cannot be \nachieved. In this regard, members welcomed the gradual narrowing of rate \nspreads in the foreign exchange market and urged the Bank to continue to \nmonitor and respond proactively to threats and vulnerabilities in the foreign \nexchange market. \nOn the outlook for financial stability, the Committee noted that, in spite of the \nbanking sub-sector’s resilience, the weak macroeconomic environment has \ncontinued to impact negatively on the stability of the sub-sector. The \nCommittee reiterated its call on the Bank to sustain its surveillance of deposit \nmoney banks (DMBs) activities for the purpose of prompt identification and \nmitigation of potential vulnerabilities. The Committee also called on the DMBs \nto support the quest to move the economy forward by extending reasonably \nlow priced credit to the private sector. \n \n10 \n \n4.0. The Committee’s Decisions \nIn arriving at its decision, the Committee took note of the gains so far \nachieved as a result of its earlier decisions; including the stability in the foreign \nexchange market and the moderate reduction in inflation. The option was \nwhether to hold, tighten or ease. These were subjected to extensive debate. \nAs in previous meetings, although tightening would help rein in inflation \nexpectations and strengthen the stability in the foreign exchange market, the \nCommittee felt that it would further widen the income gap, depress \naggregate demand and adversely affect credit delivery to the private \nsector. The Committee also noted that tightening may result in the deposit \nmoney banks re-pricing their assets and loans, thus raising the cost of \nborrowing and therefore heightening the already weak investment climate \nand non-performing loans. \nWith respect to loosening, the Committee believed that although while it \nwould make it more attractive for Nigerians to acquire assets at cheaper \nprices, thus increasing their net wealth, and therefore stimulate spending as \nconfidence rises, it nevertheless, felt constrained that loosening at this time \nwould exacerbate inflationary pressures and worsen the exchange rate and \ninflationary conditions. The Committee also felt that loosening will further pull \nthe real rate deeper into negative territory as the gap between the nominal \ninterest rate and inflation widens. \nOn the argument to hold, the Committee believes that the effects of fiscal \npolicy actions towards stimulating the economy have begun to manifest as \n11 \n \nevident in the exit of the economy from the fifteen-month recession. \nAlthough still fragile, the fragility of the growth makes it imperative to allow \nmore time to make appropriate complementary policy decisions to \nstrengthen the recovery. Secondly, the Committee was of the view that \neconomic activity would become clearer between now and the first quarter \nof 2018, when growth is expected to have sufficiently strengthened and gains \nin receding inflation, very obvious. The most compelling argument for a hold \nwas to achieve more clarity in the evolution of key macroeconomic \nindicators including budget implementation, economic recovery, exchange \nrate, inflation and employment generation. \nIn consideration of the headwinds confronting the domestic economy and \nthe uncertainties in the global environment, the Committee decided by a \nvote of 6 to 1 to retain the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) at 14.0 per cent \nalongside all other policy parameters. In arriving at this HOLD decision, the \nMPC commits to employing maximum flexibility to guide the economy on the \npath to optimal growth. Consequently, 6 members voted to retain the MPR \nand all other parameters at their current levels, while one member voted to \nlower the MPR to signal an ease to the current stance of tight monetary \npolicy. However, overall, majority of the members expressed a strong \ncommitment to policy flexibility that would allow the Committee to promptly \ntake the necessary actions that would promote overall macroeconomic \nstability and engender sustainable growth. \n \n12 \n \n \nIn summary, the MPC voted to: \n(i) Retain the MPR at 14.0 per cent; \n(ii) Retain the CRR at 22.5 per cent; \n(iii) Retain the Liquidity Ratio at 30.0 per cent; and \n(iv) Retain the Asymmetric corridor at +200 and -500 basis points around the \n MPR. \n \nThank you for listening. \nGodwin I. Emefiele \nGovernor, Central Bank of Nigeria \n26th September, 2017 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n13 \n \nPERSONAL STATEMENTS BY THE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE MEMBERS \n1. \nBALAMI, DAHIRU HASSAN \nThe September 2017 MPC came at a time when the economy had \ntechnically moved out of recession, but faced with the problem of \nstagflation. Inflation in the economy had fallen from a high of 16.05% at the \nend of July 2017 to a low of 16.01% by September. GDP growth had moved \nfrom -0.91% in March 2017 to 0.55% in June 2017. There has been relative \nstability in the foreign exchange market at N305.85 to the US dollar. External \nreserves have risen from US$30,869.69 million to US$32,833.80 million in \nSeptember, 2017. Another variable that has witnessed change is the higher \noil prices that have moved from US$52.59 per barrel in July to $59.51 per \nbarrel, due partly to development in the US Shale oil. It should be noted that \nalthough the economy has witnessed some positive developments, there are \ncritical areas of concern which include: unemployment, inflation and interest \nrate. It should be noted that the gap between inflation (16.01%) and MPR \n(14.0%) is still wide. \n In my opinion, unemployment is an important area that requires sound \npolicies both from the monetary and fiscal authorities, to reduce the level of \nunemployment, which would help spur growth in the economy. What can be \ndone to reduce unemployment in Nigeria by the monetary authority? In the \npast, Ministries, Departments, Agencies and Banks, would visit institutions to \ninterview potential graduates for employment positions. The situation has \nhowever changed as unemployment exists among primary and secondary \n14 \n \nschool leavers as well as graduates. It is disheartening that many graduates \nwith First Class and Second Class honours are roaming the streets without \njobs. Unemployment refers to a situation where an able-bodied individual \nwith the requisite qualification, and who wants to work, does not have a job. \nThe CBN has a responsibility to assist in reversing the situation through putting \nin policies that would facilitate or support economic growth. What can we \ndo to increase employment and livelihood among the youths? \nAs monetary authorities, there is need to intervene in the various sectors of \nthe economy that have a high propensity of employment generation such \nas: agriculture, small and medium scale entrepreneurship, establishing Silicon \nValley centres etc. Credits should also be extended to those who have \nparticipated in the various centres for entrepreneurship development, in the \ncountry. This should be in the form of seed money. The largest employer of \nlabour in Nigeria is in the private sector, and as such, should be supported. \nThe government should provide an environment for the private sector to \nthrive, so as to create job opportunities. It is true that graduates do not see \nthemselves going to the farm, and as such, the private sector should be \nsupported to provide employment for our teaming graduates. Addressing the \nissue of power/electricity by guaranteeing at least six hours a day, of \nconstant and adequate voltage power, would go a long way in assisting the \nprivate sector. For example, those in the welding and hairdressing heavily \ndepend on electricity for their businesses to run. The entrepreneurships \n15 \n \ncentres all over the country could serve as job creation centres through the \nprovision of seed money to trainees on their successful completion. \nInterest rate is another important area the monetary authorities could come \nin, at the theoretical level, lowering the MPR will lead to lowering the prime \nlending rate. This would make loanable funds relatively cheaper, which \nwould induce investors to borrow and invest, thereby creating more \nemployment opportunities, raising the level of income, output, and growth of \nthe economy. However, to lower the MPR, CBN has to study this in relation to \nthe inflation dynamics, monetary conditions, real economic activities, as well \nas inflation risks in the economy. The exchange rate as well as the global \nenvironment are areas that need to be looked into. \nCredit targeting can also be favourable to the agricultural sector. We \nhowever, have to go back in history, because a lot of intervention schemes \nhad been introduced in the past. While interventions are good, some could \ndestabilize the system. What went wrong with the previous interventions? How \ncan they be sharpened or modelled to contribute towards the effective \ngrowth and stabilisation of the economy? How can the loopholes in the past \nschemes be blocked to make them more effective because unemployment \nis worrisome? Policy makers practically want low interest rates so as to make \ncredit available to economic agents. This means that Deposit Money Banks \nshould be encouraged to direct credit to sectors with high job generation \nability. The Central Bank should design an incentive scheme that would \nencourage banks to lend direct to job creation areas such as agriculture. \n16 \n \nTaking into consideration the data available for the above variables of the \neconomy, three options are available: to hold, tighten, or to ease. In my \nopinion, at the global level, the achieved growth is fragile because of the \nglobal risks and vulnerabilities. At the domestic level, some stability has been \nachieved at the interbank foreign exchange market as well as a trendy \ngrowth of resources; inflation has gone downwards, though not as much as \nexpected; liquidity has improved, as well as return on assets (ROA) and return \non equity (ROE). \nThe GDP has also registered some positive growth, although the improvement \nwas due largely, to favourable commodity price (oil). Easing at this time will \nlead to capital flight, discourage the inflows in terms of FDIs and FPIs. Inflation \nwould rise, and the external revenue may go down. The excess liquidity to be \ncreated, as a result of the easing may destabilize the foreign exchange \nmarket, thus, draining away the gain that has been achieved. Tightening \nshould not be considered now because of the current economic condition. I \nvote to hold on, and wait for more clarity on the direction the economy is \nmoving, with the hope that the fiscal side would play its role in stimulating \ngrowth through the implementation of the 2017 budget; and putting money \ninto the hands of the various consumers, which would help stimulate \nconsumption, demand, as well as improvement in purchase manager index \nof the various sectors of the economy. \nI therefore vote for the following: \n17 \n \na. To retain the MPR at 14.0% \nb. To retain the CRR at 22.5% \nc. To retain the liquidity ratio at 30.0% \nd. To maintain the asymmetric corridor at +200/ -500 basis points around \nthe MPR \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n18 \n \n2. \nBARAU, SULEIMAN \nBackground \nThe \noverall \nmacroeconomic \ncondition \ncontinued \nto \nshow \nrelative \nimprovement. The result recently released by the National Bureau of \nStatistics (NBS) showed an expansion in economic activities by 0.55 per cent \nin the 2nd quarter, after a contraction for three successive quarters, indicating \nthat the economy is exiting recession. Inflation is still high, but receding, while \nthe imbalance in the external sector is equally waning. These developments, \nin addition to other monetary policy measures have strengthened the foreign \nexchange market and bolstered the value of the domestic currency as well \nas sustaining its stability for the past two quarters. \nThe foregoing notwithstanding, GDP growth at 0.55 per cent in the face of \nannual population growth rate of 2.7 per cent summarizes the story of the \nweak economic recovery. The tepid nature of the recovery, among other \nrisks, suggests that the likelihood of relapse cannot be completely ignored. In \nmy view therefore, the next stage of policies should not focus only on \naccelerating the pace of economic recovery, but should equally include \ncrisis mitigation measures. This would naturally entail elimination of \nuncertainties in the macroeconomic environment and rebuilding of \nconfidence among economic agents, including foreign investors. In practical \nterms, such a process would involve continuous fine-tuning of policy \npathways for managing complex interaction of many macroeconomic \nvariables with a view to promoting accelerated economic recovery, \n19 \n \nstrengthening the exit from recession, and achieving enduring economic \ngrowth. Against this perspective, it is commendable that the Federal \nGovernment has put up a number of initiatives particularly the N-power \nunder the Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP), but the speed of \nprogress may be challenged by a number of supply side bottlenecks like \nrising level of industrial unrests, political agitations, all forms of militancy and \nherdsmen activities, as well as limited fiscal space. \nUnder the present macroeconomic regime therefore, it may be expected \nthat the appropriate mode through which monetary policy could \ncomplement the various fiscal stimuli is by some easing measures. This, \nhowever, may not be the optimum path at the moment given the primacy of \nbuilding resilient macroeconomic environment. In the light of the need to \nbuild a defense around the ongoing recovery through a strong and stable \nmacroeconomic environment, I will propose that the existing measures of \nmonetary policy be retained. \nPressure Points \nGlobal Environment \nA number of issues are emerging in the global environment that may \nnegatively alter the strong rebound earlier projected for the year. Among \nothers, the condition in the global financial markets suggests the need for \ncautious optimism. Although the post Brexit economic landscape is still \nevolving as negotiation is ongoing, Britain financial authority has issued a \n20 \n \ndeadline of end-December 2017 for EU banks within UK to signal their intent \nof conversion to full-fledged UK banks. Thus, uncertainty with respect to the \npost-Brexit status of many EU banks in the UK would weigh on investors’ \nsentiment and heighten volatility in the global financial markets particularly \nthrough the channel of pound sterling denominated instruments. In a related \ndimension, the issue of monetary tightening by the US Federal Reserves may \naccelerate at a faster pace than earlier anticipated. Although the FOMC \nkept the rate unchanged at their last week meeting, emerging signals after \nthe meeting suggests that the approach would morph from gradual to a fast \ntrack model as from next month. Besides, rising geo-political tension portends \nstrong capacity to exhibit spillover and contagion to both global financial \nmarkets and output. The current frosty relationship between the Communist \nNorth Korea and the US has heightened fear of nuclear annihilations and \nweigh heavily on investors’ sentiments particularly in the equity market. In \nresponse, investors are beginning to flee to safe havens like bonds, gold, the \nYen and Swiss Franc. Among other negatives, the resultant appreciation in \nthe Yen is affecting competitiveness of Japan’s export and by extension \ntrade balance. Another Asian economy that is potentially at risk is China as \ntrade relationship with the USA could suffer setback. All these developments \nmay impinge on global growth with far reaching consequence on the fragile \nrecovery of the domestic economy. \n \n \n21 \n \nDomestic Environment \nThe headwinds within the domestic environment include the followings. \n Limited Fiscal Space: One key distinguishing feature of the current recovery \nprocess relative to the previous episodes is the apparent weakness of the \ngovernment sector. Taking the 2008/9 global financial crisis induced domestic \nfinancial crisis as an example, the fast pace of recovery at that time was \naided by strong fiscal buffer as there was a balance of about US$22 billion in \nthe Excess Crude oil Account (ECA) compared to this period when the ECA \nhas been depleted. The fiscal authority has enunciated a number of \nmeasures in the Economic Recovery and Growth including the recent \ninauguration of a Presidential Committee on Employment with a view to \nstrengthening the recovery process. In as much as these schemes are \nlaudable innovations, a key challenge is the constraint imposed by the \nlimited financial resources available to the fiscal authority. \nRising External Vulnerability: The current Moody’s rating on the country’s debt \nis B1, four levels below investment grade, while S&P global rating is a step \nlower than Moody’s. The government is planning to raise additional \nUS$3.5billion external loan to finance the budget out of which about \nUS$1.5billion would be sourced at the commercial rate in the Eurobond \nmarket. Although there is improvement in oil output, which is propelling the \ncountry out of recession, hence likely positive assessment by investors. \nNonetheless, the current rating is still below the investment grade and \n22 \n \ntherefore, new borrowing by government would most likely attract higher \npremium. This would ultimately increase the vulnerability of the economy to \nthe shocks in the global financial markets particularly through the much \nanticipated rise in the global interest rate as the US Fed commences tight \nmonetary policy stance. \nTight Credit Conditions: The banking sector has been challenged by a \nnumber of factors ranging from prudential to macroeconomic issues. The \nbenchmark interest rate is 14 per cent, which is still below the current inflation \nrate by 2 percentage point, while NPL level is rising. The level of infrastructure \nparticularly, energy and power have not shown appreciable improvement. \nThese factors would invariably feed into the credit pricing model, suggesting \nthat average lending rate cannot be lower than 20 per cent. It would be \nextremely hard for Small and Medium Scale Enterprises to operate profitably \nunder such a regime when their internal rate of return could barely exceed \n20 per cent. This development would continue to pose considerable risk to \nprivate investment in the medium term. \nRising Socio-Political Tensions and Industrial Unrest: The inflation dynamics \nreveals that headline inflation eased from 16.05 to 16.01 per cent between \nJuly and August 2017, but the principal drivers were mainly imported items like \nprocessed food, clothing, and footwear. This, more likely, reflects the stability \nin the exchange rate. The trend was however different for farm products \ndespite the fact that the current period falls within the harvesting season. \nFarm produce, fruits, vegetables, yams, potatoes and other tubers recorded \n23 \n \nan upward trend in price level during the period. This phenomenon could \nonly be attributed to supply shortfalls on the backdrop of disruption to \nagricultural production and distribution by all kinds of militancy activities \nincluding insurgency in the North-East, displacement of farming communities \nby herdsmen, activities of cattle rustlers, and various political agitations that \nhave heated the polity. The development is further complicated by \nnumerous strikes and labour unrest which had threatened the supply side of \neconomic activities. \nWay Forward \nStrengthening Confidence in the Macroeconomic Environment: An integral \npart of the ongoing recovery phase should essentially include the need to re-\nignite the confidence of economic agents, particularly foreign investors. My \nview is hinged on the thesis of self-fulfilling nature of expectation, which on \nthe other hand, is driven largely by market sentiment of optimism or \npessimism. The business confidence index has been rising, hinged basically on \nthe improvement in the foreign exchange market. This invariably suggests the \nneed to sustain the evolving stability in the foreign exchange market. \nStrengthening the foreign exchange market in the midst of rising uncertainties \nin the crude oil market must necessarily involve some trade-offs in the money \nmarket. It is desirable to reduce interest rate on the strength of supporting the \nongoing recovery, but such a pathway would be very costly to the foreign \nexchange market and by extension hurt confidence in the macroeconomic \nenvironment. Besides, it is becoming entrenched in economic literature that \n24 \n \nan expansionary monetary policy stance under a regime of unstable \nmacroeconomic fundamentals would eventually become contractionary. \nFor instance, a reduction in interest rate at such a period when global interest \nrate is rising would widen interest rate differential, leading to capital outflow \nand invariably reduce the stock of money supply. A reduction in the stock of \nmoney when demand remains constant would drive up domestic interest \nrate and ultimately slowdown investment. As such, it may be a sub-optimal \ndecision to reduce the policy rate during this phase of economic recovery. \nMitigate Exposure to External Vulnerability: One of the distinguishing features \nof the latest recession when compared with previous episodes particularly \nthe one witnessed in the mid-eighties was the low level of external debts \nwhich provided some latitude for policy manoeuvring. Among other benefits, \nit provided domestic macroeconomic policy makers with the much needed \nautonomy to explore an ingenious home grown approach without being \ncowed to accepting unfriendly conditionalities from international creditors. \nAs the economy is moving into post-recession stage and expenditure would \nbe required to stimulate economic activities, it is incumbent to preserve this \nlegacy. This is more so when cognizance is taken of the ongoing rate hike by \nthe US Fed which would generate spillover and contagion across global \nfinancial markets. With this in mind, it may be in order for government to be \ncircumspect in respect of the component of the external financing that \nwould come from the Eurobond. I would advocate that available widows \nfrom development banks should always be explored. Furthermore, protection \n25 \n \nshould be offered to the domestic currency through interest rate in order to \navert sharp depreciation that could turn repayment of external obligations to \na burden. \nActivate Macro Prudential Measures: The condition in the banking sector is a \nlittle bit complex and somehow difficult to address by the conventional \nmonetary policy tools. NPLs are significantly high and above the prudential \nlimit, while liquidity condition, on the other hand, reveals a surfeit. The \ncondition is complicated by weakness in credit growth to the private sector, \nthereby imposing strain on the foreign exchange market. Imposing additional \nCRR (conventional monetary policy tools) to address the liquidity surfeit \nwould invariably tighten credit condition and complicate the NPLs position. \nMy assessment of the nature of the liquidity surfeit reveals that it is systemic \nand time varying. Consequently, a blunt monetary policy instruments such as \nthe MPR or CRR may not be able to address the challenge. I will therefore opt \nfor the activation of macro prudential measures like systemic liquidity \nsurcharges or time varying systemic liquidity surcharges. \nDecision \nFrom the perspectives of the foregoing, strengthening the stability in the \nmacroeconomic environment appears to be imperative at the moment. To \nachieve this therefore, I would like to propose for the retention of current \nmeasures of monetary policy. \n \n26 \n \n3. \nGARBA, ABDUL-GANIYU \nDecision \n1. I vote to reduce the MPR by 50 basis points (0.5%). This implies (i) a \nreduction in the MPR from 14% to 13.5% and (ii) a reduction in Standing \nLending Facility (SLF) from 16% to 15.5% and the Standing Deposit Facility \n(SDF) from 9% to 8.5%. \n2. My vote is a vote for (i) consistency and effectiveness of monetary policy; \n(ii) growth in private investment, creation of new jobs, output growth, \nfinancial system stability and medium term macroeconomic stability; (iii) a \nshift from passive monetary policy (Hong Kong Model) to an active and \ntruly independent monetary policy (Chinese Model); (iv) substantive \nmedium term macroeconomic stability rather than a superficial (whited \nsepulcher-type) short-term stability and (v) a gradualist approach to the \nshift from passive to active monetary policy regime. \nJustification \n3. At the July meeting of the MPC, I voted for a reduction in MPR by 200 basis \npoints (2%) as the implied changes in SLF and SDF. I believe I need to \nexplain as clearly as I can why I did not maintain the vote for a 200 basis \npoint reduction in MPR or vote for passivity. \n4. First, I highlight what has not changed and which strengthen the case for \na shift from passive monetary policy of the last seven years to an active \nand independent monetary policy that is, a monetary policy that \n27 \n \npromotes domestic investment, employment, incomes, growth and well-\nbeing. Second, I will explain why I voted for a gradualist approach rather \nthan a shock therapy. \nWhat has not changed \n1. My conviction that finding the paths to low inflation growth conducive to \njob creation and economic growth, financial system stability and fiscal \nprudence are the most urgent strategic and policy priorities. I also remain \nconvinced that the “March Retreat” provided a good foundation for \nstrategic and policy progression. \n2. The urgency of building on the March Retreat which laid the following \nfoundations: (i) established humility, sincerity and integrity as the key \nprinciples for effective strategic and policy coordination; (ii) emphasized \nthe organic links between fiscal, monetary and prudential policy and the \nurgent necessity for interdependent and coordinated strategic and policy \nanalysis, choices and actions and (iii) recognized the urgent need for \ncoordinated and effective movements along the three pathways: low \ninflation conducive to growth, financial system stability (FSS) and fiscal \nprudence or discipline. I still believe strongly that unless we build on the \nfoundations of the “March retreat” we will be matching in retreat. \n3. The growing costs of willfully or inadvertently ignoring the lessons of \nNigerian and global economic history to the present and the future of \nNigeria. We know from analysis of market and macroeconomic data of \nthe last forty-five years (1972-2017) that crude prices are unstable and \n28 \n \ncontinue to have destabilizing effects on Nigeria’s public finance, current \naccount balance, money survey and monetary policy. We also know from \nanalysis of data and policy of the last thirteen years (2004-2017) that \nportfolio investors have powerful destabilizing effects on financial markets \n(money, capital, government securities and forex), interest rates, \nexchange rates, inflation, investment, employment, growth and public \nfinance. We also, know that the pathways to low inflation conducive to \ngrowth, financial system stability and fiscal prudence does not pass \nthrough a portfolio flows attracting strategy or policy. We have made this \nsame point consistently since my Personal Statement of September 2011 \nafter one year of deflationary policy appeared then to benefit foreign \nportfolio investors and hurt domestic investors. I have repeatedly drawn \nattention to the medium to long term challenges that portfolio flows pose \nto the stability of the economy. From what we now know about the cost \nof the AMCON resolution of the banking crisis and the interventions costs \nand consequences, we have a better understanding now of the width \nand depths of the impacts of portfolio flows on the Nigerian economy. The \ncommonwealth does not benefit from opening the barn doors to portfolio \nflows and the wisdom of widening the barn doors after what we know is \nharder to understand from the viewpoint of the commonwealth. \n4. The macroeconomic challenge remains overwhelming: (a) a tentative exit \nfrom technical recession driven by oil GDP – a long way from recovery to \n2014 level let alone growth from 2014 level; (b) an unemployment rate of \n29 \n \n14.2% as at 2016:Q4 (likely to be higher given the trend); (c) a 0.04% fall in \nheadline inflation driven by seasonal effects, which caused a decline in \nfood inflation of 0.03% partly offset a 0.1% rise in core inflation; (d) a \nN2.01trillion rise in public debt, a Federal deficit of N1.9 trillion in the first 8 \nmonths, debt service of N1.58 trillion (2.4 times the spending on capital \nproject); (e) rising maximum lending rate to 31.2% (by 0.26%), prime \nlending rates of 17.69% (by 0.04%) and widening interest rate spread to \n26.95% (from 26.83%); (f) a very active revolving door of liquidity – \npumping in and mopping out; (f) collapse of the interest rate corridors, \nwhich makes Standing Lending Facility and Standing Deposit Facility rates \nredundant as effective monetary policy tools; (g) 32.1% growth in All Share \nIndex driven mainly by banking stocks (58.6%) and Consumer Goods \n(31.81%) that are in turn powered by (h) a monthly average growth in \nportfolio and FDI investments in the capital market that averaged 52% \nbetween April and August 2017. \n5. The unresolved issues: (a) a forward looking medium to long term \nstrategic macroeconomic management framework for Nigeria as the \ncontext for policy analysis and choice; (b) continuing malfunctions in the \ncredit market which tends to allocate credit to sectors with traditionally \nhigh NPLs, low output and employment elasticities as well as a tendency \nto restrict access and to charge maximum rates on credit to sectors and \neconomic agents with traditionally lower NPLs and higher output and \nemployment elasticities; (c) the dominance of rent havens in both the real \n30 \n \nand financial sectors, and the public space; (d) prevalence of present \nhedonistic and backward looking orientation and (e) efficient and \neffective use of existing Nigerian capacity in all aspect of the political \neconomy. \n6. The Hong Kong model within which monetary policy has been conducted \nsince January 2012 imply a trading off of a capacity for independent \nmonetary policy. The theory is clear that the trading off of monetary policy \nindependence means that monetary policy adjustments to support the \nexchange rate could lead to a high interest rate trap. Therefore, the case \nagainst a lowering of interest has less to do with the inflation rate than with \nthe risk of reversing flows. The data is clear, when deflation began in \nSeptember 2010, the inflation rate was 13.6% and MPR was 6%. By August \n2011, MPR had been gradually raised to 8.75% and by then, the inflation \nrate had dropped more than proportionately to 9.3%. It would have \ncontinued to drop, but for the policy shock of January 2012 when the \nprice of petroleum products was suddenly raised from N65 per liter to N141 \nper liter before it was later reduced to N97 per liter. This spiked the inflation \nrate up to 12.6% in January of 2012. Back in October 2011, the only \nemergency meeting of the MPC so far, sharply raised MPR to 12% (a 2.75% \nincrease) to respond to exchange rate pressures. Thereafter, MPR \nremained at the same level even when inflation was either below or at the \nupper bound of 9% for 29 months (January 2013 to May 2015). In several \n31 \n \npersonal statements I raised concerns about a high interest rate trap just \nas most of the global central banks were then in a low interest rate trap. \n7. It is the Hong Kong model that locks the door on lower interest rates. We \nhave had two major episodes of the model and have already paid \nexcessively huge costs that has not yet been fully estimated and their \nimplications analyzed and fully understood. I cannot support a third \nepisode which started effectively this year because the implications are \nclear. I have no doubt that for Nigeria, the Chinese model is a far better \ntrading off of the dilemma because it (i) limits vulnerability to destabilizing \nfinancial flows that are far too busy plucking ripe fruits and grains and \nstoring where they had not sown and have absolutely no interest in \nexpanding the farmland, sowing and nurturing and (ii) frees monetary \npolicy to support paths to fiscal prudence and financial system stability \nand to continue the metaphor, the expanding of new farmlands and the \nplanting and nurturing of new fruit trees and grains. \nWhat has changed \n8. New empirical evidence were provided by independents and Bank Staff \non the possible impacts of alternative paths of MPR cuts. I found the new \nevidence on the impacts of rate cuts on a broad range of \nmacroeconomic variables very useful in guiding my decision. Typically, the \nimpacts were mixed as it should be given the nature of binding \nmacroeconomic constraints and the inevitability of trade-offs. The key \nissue for policy has always been which macroeconomic variables hence, \n32 \n \nunderlying interests should be assigned the greater weights given current \nmacroeconomic conditions, and future national and global outlooks. \n9. The results suggested trade-off between key nominal and real variables \n(interest rates, credits, investments, GDP, public finance and external \naccount balance which were positively impacted) and key nominal \nvariables (domestic prices and exchange rate which marginally \nincreased). In my informed judgment, I gave greater weights to interest \nrates, credits, investments, GDP, public finance and external account \nbalance. These imply a preference to Nigerian investors, workforce, \neconomic growth, a more sustainable public finance and external \nbalance. \n10. The empirical analysis of two alternative paths - a gradualist path and a \nshock therapy - suggested clearly that the gradualist path was more \nsustainable in the medium to long term. In my judgment, a significant \nmedium to long term stability trumps a superficial short term stability from \nthe perspective of the good of the commonwealth. \nInfluence on Decision \n11. My careful interpretation and analysis of the results convinced me to vote \nfor a gradualist approach in shifting from an outward-oriented passive \nmonetary policy to an inward-oriented independent monetary policy. \n12. Consequently, I moderated the rate cut of MPR to 50 basis points (0.5%) as \na first step on the paths to low inflation conducive to growth, financial \nsystem stability and fiscal prudence. \n33 \n \n13. As I concluded my last personal statement: “Lowering interest rate is just a \nfirst step towards policy consistency and policy effectiveness. It should be \na consensus point on which the monetary and fiscal authorities could \nbuild on to produce a consistent forward looking strategic framework for \ncoordinated, effective and constrained monetary, prudential and fiscal \npolicies.” \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n34 \n \n4. \nNNANNA, OKWU JOSEPH \n \nSince the July MPC meeting, growth indices have strengthened and the \nfragile macroeconomic condition has improved. Recovery in oil production, \nthe unwinding of growth related policies of the ERGP, improved access to \nforeign exchange and enhanced agriculture productivity has continued to \nprovide the needed momentum. GDP growth is propelled by agriculture \n(3.0%), industry (1.1%) and construction (0.1%) subsectors, while oil GDP \nreturned to \npositive \ngrowth. \nManufacturing \nand non-manufacturing \nPurchasing Manager’s Index (PMI) stood at 53.6 and 54.1 index points in \nAugust 2017, indicating expansion in the fifth and fourth consecutive months, \nrespectively. Similarly, production level index for manufacturing sector grew \nfor the sixth consecutive month in August 2017. At 57.4 points, the index \nindicated an increase in production at a slower rate, compared to its level in \nthe preceding month. Downside risks to the growth outlook continue to be \nthe subsisting structural rigidities, protracted impact of flooding in different \nparts of the country and uncertainty in the recovery of crude oil prices, which \nmay weaken revenues and slow down the pace of implementation of public \ninvestment. \n \nInflation moderated downwards signalling subdued inflationary pressures \nowing to the continued favourable base effect and subdued pass-through \neffect of the exchange rate appreciation on domestic prices. Headline \n35 \n \ninflation narrowed marginally by a 0.04 percentage point to 16.01 per cent in \nAugust relative to its level in July. While core inflation moderated at 12.30 per \ncent compared to 12.21 per cent in July. Food inflation remained high at \n20.26 per cent in August, but lower than the 20.28 per cent in July due to \nsubsisting supply-side disruptions associated with insecurity, higher energy \ncosts, protracted infrastructure bottlenecks and seasonality factors. \n \nFinancial conditions remain fragile due to provisioning for foreign exchange \ninterventions and open market operations, rising average interbank and \nopen buy back market rates. Consequently, the drag on financial \nintermediation and credit conditions subsisted as average inter-bank call rate \nand OBB rate rose to 22.63 and 39.66 per cent in August 2017 from 12.28 and \n19.34 per cent in July 2017, respectively. Staff estimates show that persistent \noutput gap and exchange rate contributed to the behaviour of money \nmarket rates. Banking sector credit to the core private sector contracted by \n0.36 per cent in July (-0.62 per cent on annualized basis) as a result of the \npersisting crowding-out effect of government borrowing requirements. \nMaximum and prime lending rates were elevated at 30.95 and 17.72 per cent \nin August 2017. The intervention in the foreign exchange market bolstered the \nstock market with the All Share Index (ASI) and market capitalisation (MC) \nrising by 7.2 and 6.9 per cent, respectively, reflecting buoying investor \nsentiments. \n \n36 \n \nGlobal growth is expected to remain strong, while global inflation moderated \nas oil and other commodity prices showed some moderate recovery. \nAlthough there were signs of moderation in the growth headwinds, \nnevertheless extreme global risks persisted, the Korean peninsula crisis \nremained; uncertainty over Brexit were amplified; and the outcome of the \nCatalonian independence referendum in Spain may dampen growth. Other \nrisks included the impact of hurricane across the globe, slack in China’s \ngrowth which has reduced demand for commodities; and continued \nmonetary policy normalisation by the US Fed with unintended implications for \nglobal capital flows. \n \nFiscal space to implement the Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP) \nremained delicate as the recovery in crude oil prices may be muted by the \nanticipated effect of huge investment in shale oil production. However, more \nrevenue was expected from achieving and sustaining oil production at 2.2 \nmbpd. I remain positive that that the recently launched tax amnesty \nprogramme under the Voluntary Asset and Income Declaration Scheme \n(VAIDS) would scale-up tax revenue and build buffers to cushion the impact \nof oil prices on fiscal operations. Also fiscal reforms are needed to assist in \nspeeding up capital expenditure under the ERGP. \n \nExternal sector indicators remained resilient supported by improved oil \nproduction and the effectiveness of the “investors’-exporters’” foreign \n37 \n \nexchange window in the provision of foreign exchange liquidity. The \ninterbank and BDC premium narrowed from 27.9 per cent at end-August \n2016 to 19.5 per cent at end-July 2017, 19.6 per cent at end-August 2017, and \nfurther to 19.3 per cent at September 5, 2017. This was due largely to the \nsustained interventions by CBN in the foreign exchange market and the \nincrease in the volume of external reserves. External reserves at September \n11, 2017 stood at US$32.85 higher than US$23.97 recorded in the \ncorresponding period in 2016 and could finance approximately 12 months of \nimport cover. \n \nOverall, the macroeconomic outlook was relatively favourable, driven largely \nby exchange rate stability. The risk of a reversal of the current deceleration in \nthe inflation path is very unlikely as positive core inflation shocks would \nmoderate the uptick in food inflation in the short-to-medium term. Against the \nbackdrop of fiscal dominance, despite lower than expected growth, and on \nthe balance of risks based on available data, I vote to retain the current \nstance of monetary policy tightening. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n38 \n \n5. \nSALAMI, ADEDOYIN \nAt the end of this meeting, I voted with the majority of colleagues to hold all \nmonetary policy parameters constant. \n \nAs is usual, the data for inflation was published in the run-up to the meeting. \nIn August 2017, compared to the previous month, the seasonally adjusted \nmeasures of price change (in other words, year-on-year measure) showed a \ndecline in Headline inflation to 16.01 per cent from 16.05 per cent. Similarly, in \nthe same period, Food Inflation eased from 20.28 per cent to 20.25 per cent. \nIn contrast, Core or Non-food Inflation rose to 12.30 per cent from 12.21per \ncent the previous month. These numbers, at best, indicate ‘sticky prices’ – in \nother words, the momentum propelling inflation downwards may be losing \nsteam. \n \nSlightly better picture of inflationary development is provided by the month-\non-month measures, which provide the most recent impression of price \nchange. Increases at rates of 0.97 per cent, 0.93 per cent and 1.14 per cent \nfor aggregate, Core and Food prices respectively, show a reduction in the \nrate of increase across all definitions of price. It may also be noteworthy that \nthe observed change is the lowest since the beginning of this year. Taken \ntogether, the latest data on inflation shows that, whilst prices continue to \nease, the speed of decline may be slowing. \n \n39 \n \nAhead of this meeting, the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) released data \non Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from the output side of the economy. \nThese provisional figures show positive growth of 0.55 per cent – for the first \ntime since Q4-2015. Welcome as growth is, it represents the initial positive, \nalbeit tentative steps, away from recession. The figures also provide clarity \naround the enormity of the task which Policy Managers face in trying to \nachieve rapid, sustained and sustainable growth. \n \nThe ‘big’ 6 sectors which contribute three-quarters of total output – \nAgriculture (23 per cent), Distributive Trade (17 per cent), ICT (9.5 per cent), \nManufacturing (9.38 per cent), Oil and Gas (8.99 per cent) and Real Estate \n(7.22 per cent) -, either slowed of shrank. In the aggregate, the fragility which \nthe data confirms is unsurprising – first tentative steps out of recession. It is \nhowever useful to note the slowing of growth in key sectors namely \nAgriculture and Manufacturing. \n \nThe Banking System Stability Review provided by Bank Staff points to a Sector \nstruggling to cope with the consequences of a fragile economy. \nCharacterised by high levels of liquidity – approximately 44 per cent \ncompared to regulatory requirement of 30 per cent -, and the Report authors \nstress that there is no ‘systemic distress’ in the sector, they do however note in \ntheir report that “Financial Conditions of the banks remain a concern, \nespecially the small and medium banks – due largely to the adverse external \n40 \n \nand domestic shocks/headwinds”. They continue, “…… banking industry is \nsignificantly vulnerable to the weak economic and financial conditions”. As \nthey also point out, “ …….. the key risk factors to continue to watch include \ncredit default risk, obligor and sector concentration risk and liquidity risk”. \n \nWhat is clear from my review of economic conditions is the urgent need for \neconomic policy makers to define a series of pathways to (i) lower inflation, \n(ii) lower interest rates, (iii) banking system stability and (iv) rapid, inclusive \nand sustainable growth. Fortunately, these pathways do not preclude one \neach other. In my view, they can be mutually reinforcing of each other. \n \nAs I noted earlier, the reduction in inflation is losing its steam. Presently, \ninflation remains significantly above both the CBN target range of 6-9 per \ncent and estimates of the threshold level beyond which its impact is on \noutput is adverse. This position should require a tightening of monetary policy. \nGiven the provisional nature of the latest GDP data, I can only conclude that \nactivity is fragile. I would thus like to see data covering a few more months in \ncoming to a decision. I thus vote to hold. \n \n \n \n \n \n41 \n \n6. \nUCHE, CHIBUIKE U \nDespite the fact that oil prices have again started inching upwards, our \neconomy remains in dire straits without any clear path for positive change \nahead. Bluntly put, the additional revenue being earned from oil have at \nbest brought about temporary relief for government. The structural defects in \nour national economy remain unaddressed. The confusion surrounding the \nexit of the country's economy from recession is indicative of the widespread \npessimism about the future of the Nigerian economy. \nThe poor state of the Nigerian economy is perhaps not surprising especially \ngiven the fact that the Government has done very little to operationalize its \neconomic change mantra. The inability of the Government to meaningfully \nreform its over bloated civil service has meant that most of the excessive \nmonies being injected into the economy- borrowed or printed- end up being \nused to service the recurrent needs of this inefficient government machinery. \nIt is troubling that the government is increasing its international indebtedness, \nwith attendant exchange rate risks, without a clear plan of ensuring that such \nloans will be repaid. These huge borrowings and injections into the national \neconomy also complicate monetary policy by making the future direction of \ninflation unclear. \nThe above dynamics also impact on the health of our country’s banking \nsystem. It is for instance my view that a good way of gauging the economic \nhealth of any nation is to examine the health of its banking system. This is so \n42 \n \nbecause banks essentially intermediate between surplus and deficit units of \nany economy. The success of such intermediation always depend on the \nhealth of the underlying economy that such intermediated capital is used to \nfinance. Given the current high levels of the bad debt portfolio in some \nNigerian banks, which has persisted for some time, it is clear that our banking \nsystem is inching towards being encumbered. \nIt is based on this level of increasing threats that I find calls for the further \ntightening of monetary policy to be inappropriate. An immediate \nconsequence of such a hasty action will be a corresponding rise in the \nalready high levels of the bad and doubtful debts portfolio of Nigerian banks. \nIn my view, the need to prevent another banking crisis should be of great \nimportance in the formulation of monetary policy in present day Nigeria. It is \nfor instance public knowledge that the Central Bank of Nigeria is still \ngrappling with the negative consequences on its balance sheet of the last \nfinancial crisis resolution strategy that it adopted. \nAt another level, it is troubling that the Central Bank of Nigeria has not been \nable to curtail the speculative behavior of private portfolio investors in the \ncountry. This is unfortunate especially given the fact that history has taught us \nthat speculative short term capital flows are incapable of aiding the \neconomic development of developing countries. Foreign capital is only \nuseful to economic development to the extent that it helps fund the \nacquisition of long term capital assets, skilled manpower and technology. \n43 \n \nWhile short term speculative capital can sometimes help shore up the value \nof local currencies in developing countries, to the delight of central banks, \nthis has never been sustainable. The capital flight/ exit that always follow \nusually have far more negative consequences than whatever temporary \ngains the inflows may have had. \nFinally, it has also been widely canvassed that MPC should consider loosening \nits monetary policy stance by lowering the MPR. With inflation rate currently \nabove MPR, I do not see how this will have any meaningful positive impact \non our economy. If MPR is lowered at the present time, most rational \neconomic beings will simply convert their deposits to assets in order to \nmitigate against inflation driven diminution in the value of their deposits. \nIn conclusion, I am of the opinion that the least destructive line of action for \nmonetary policy at the present time is to do nothing. For the avoidance of \ndoubt this stance is not a magic wand and does not address most of our \npresent monetary policy concerns. All it can do is to provide a semblance of \nstability which can enable government to undertake the structural economic \nreforms that are necessary for any meaningful economic progress to be \nmade in our country. The reality is that there is little monetary policy can do in \nan oil rent, import dependent economy that has continued to expand its \nover bloated, inept and corrupt bureaucracy even when it is obvious that its \noil rent income, despite hiccups, is clearly on a downward trajectory. In a \ncountry that is bereft of any meaningful infrastructure that can help facilitate \n44 \n \nindustrial development and economic growth, it is troubling that the \ngovernment has shown little willingness to curtail the widespread practice, at \nboth the state and Federal levels, of borrowing to satisfy recurrent needs. \nSurely such levels of fiscal recklessness were never imagined by those who \nconceptualized monetary policy. \nIt is on the basis of the above constraints that I vote as follows: (i) to retain the \nMPR at 14.00 per cent; (ii) to retain the CRR at22.50 per cent; (iii) to retain the \nLiquidity Ratio at 30.00 per cent; and (iv) to retain the Asymmetric Window at \n+200 and -500 basis points around the MPR. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n45 \n \n7. \nEMEFIELE, I. GODWIN, GOVERNOR OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nAND CHAIRMAN, MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE \nWith wide-ranging improvements in key macroeconomic indices over the \nlast three quarters, the outlook of the Nigerian economy, both in the near- \nand short-term, have begun to brighten. The upturn in real GDP from a nadir \nof -2.3 per cent at the depth of the recession in 2016q3 culminated in a \npositive growth of 0.6 per cent in 2017q2 with a prospect of attaining 1.5 per \ncent by 2017q4. At these positive rates of growth, however, output gap \nremains considerably negative as real GDP stayed below its potential. \nInflation rate decelerated in August 2017 for the seventh consecutive month \nto 16.0 per cent from the peak of 18.7 per cent in January 2017. Relative \nstability and convergence continued in the FX market as the Investors and \nExporters (I&E) window and Bureau de change (BDC) rates hovered around \nN363/US$, narrowing the premium with the interbank rate. \nRegardless of these heartening developments, some macroeconomic \nindices, including the unemployment rate and nominal interest rates, remain \nat undesirable levels. This is essentially due to the structural imbalances and \nassociated rigidities, which characterise the Nigerian economy and resonate \nthe urgent need for diversification. The inevitability of diversification is even \nmore exigent at this time given the planned medium-term phase-out of \nhydrocarbon fuels by major industrialised economies and the weak short-\nterm global demand. \n46 \n \nThough the global economy is expected to strengthen for the rest of 2017, \nyear-to-date outcomes in many regions are tepid. Estimated at 3.5 and 3.6 \nper cent for 2017 and 2018, respectively, global growth was somewhat \nrevised downward by the IMF. Growth projections were, similarly, lowered for \nthe US and UK. However, outlook improved for the euro-area, Japan, and a \nnumber of emerging market economies especially, Brazil and South Africa, \nwhich exited recession in the first half of 2017. While rebound in global \ndemand would likely provide tailwind to the continued recovery of the \nNigerian economy in short-term, the tepid long-run outlook of global \neconomic conditions and the imminent discard of hydrocarbon fuels \nthreaten the long-term path of potential output. \nAfter five consecutive quarters of contraction, Nigeria’s economic recovery \ntook a modestly positive turn, as output expanded by 0.6 per cent in the \n2017q2 from a 0.9 per cent contraction in 2017q1. This followed the general \nimprovement in business and investor sentiment observed since the \nbeginning of the year, the stability in the FX market, savoury developments in \nthe oil sector, and brightening short-term outlook. The growth was driven by \nexpansion in both the oil sector (1.6 per cent) and non-oil sector (0.5 per \ncent). In terms of contributions, the oil sector accounted for nearly 0.2 per \ncent of the overall GDP growth while about 0.4 per cent was from non-oil \nactivities. I note that, while production improved moderately during the \nquarter, the observed economic growth largely reflected falling average \ncosts of input as the FX market stabilises. To safeguard the ongoing recovery, \n47 \n \nit is imperative to ensure that gains from declining costs and relative FX \nstability are complemented by strong rises in production. It is also important \nto strengthen household demand and business investments. Accordingly, \nthe elevated public spending on capital projects and infrastructure as well \nas the recent Executive Order to improve Nigeria’s ease of doing business \nare indeed laudable. As I stated earlier, it is vital to sustain the pace of \ncapital projects into the medium-term so as to reduce infrastructural deficits, \nwith potential favourable effects on output and prices. \nSince the last MPC, inflation rate continued to decelerate; falling from 16.1 \nper cent in July to 16.0 per cent in August 2017. Food inflation, though still \nhigh, moderated around 20.3 per cent, whereas core inflation rose \nmarginally to 12.3 per cent from 12.2 per cent during that period. Analysis \nindicated an uptick in imported food inflation from 14.1 per cent to 14.4 per \ncent reflecting inflation ascent in key overseas economies. The overall \noutcome in headline inflation was essentially driven by the continued \nstability in the FX markets as well as the tight liquidity conditions in money \nand financial markets. I note that, while observed disinflation is pleasing, it \nremains fragile and at a growth-retarding level. It behoves us, therefore, to \nensure that monetary impulses are optimally delayed to avert a reversal of \nthe current trend of disinflation and a derailing of the delicate economic \nrecovery. \n48 \n \nTight liquidity conditions continued in the money and credit markets during \nthe review period as restrictive monetary stance remained. In August 2017, \nbroad money supply M2 contracted by 11.1 per cent annualised as against \na target expansion of 10.3 per cent. Net claims on government indicated an \nannualised contraction of 1.6 per cent, while private sector credits recorded \nan annualised expansion of 0.1 per cent. I note that whereas the marginal \ngrowth in private sector credit is propitious, more needs to be done to \nensure sufficient flow of financing to high impact, employment elastic real \nsector ventures. This is with a view to bolstering domestic productivity, \ncreating jobs and reducing poverty. The CBN will continue to work with \nDeposit Money Banks (DMBs) to ensure that critical sectors are not denied \nvital credits at affordable rates. \nAs \nwe \ncontinue \nto \nwelcome \nthe \nencouraging \nmacroeconomic \ndevelopment especially the stability in the FX market, continued disinflation, \nfavourable oil sector developments, and the exit from recession, I note that \nthe fragile conditions require delicately balanced and correctly timed policy \nactions. The fundamental issues of structural imbalances, supply constraints \nand the need to diversify the economy remain significant for long-term \ngrowth and prosperity. Nonetheless, monetary policy will continue to ensure \nthat short-term outcomes are smoothened for the overall benefit of the \neconomy. A critical anchor variable in the Nigerian economy is the \nexchange rate. Today the relative stability of the rate is reflecting in \nmoderation of consumer price inflation and in declining marginal costs in the \n49 \n \nproductive sectors as average costs of imported raw materials fall. It is \ntherefore sacrosanct to sustain FX market stability. \nPrevailing conditions in the domestic economy provide compelling \narguments for all possible outcomes of MPC decisions; ease, hold or tighten. \nGiven that the impulses from previous policy adjustments are still permeating \nthe system, we need to be prudent with our decisions. I maintain my view \nthat monetary impulses at this time may be impetuous. To safeguard the \nrelative stability in the FX market and maintain balanced inflows to the \neconomy, interest rate parity must not be distorted, especially as recent \nrecovery is still fragile. \nI understand the need to boost output by lowering interesting rate, but \nreiterate that inflation is still at intolerable growth inhibiting level and needs \nto \nbe \nreined \nin decisively. \nAlthough, lowering \nrates \nnow \nseems \ncounterintuitive and counterproductive, raising interest rates is somewhat \ninsensitive to the fragile recovery. I am of the view that the current level of \nreal interest rate is appropriate to balance the objectives of exchange rate \nand price stability, and output stabilisation. As I have noted before, my \npersonal preference is to achieve a low single-digit nominal interest rate in \nthe long-run. Current realities do not, however, support the widely held \nsentiment of lowering monetary policy rate; especially as it is negative in real \nterms. \n50 \n \nIn my consideration, holding monetary policy instruments at their current \nlevels is pragmatic. Policy impulses could generate adverse shocks which \nwould not only destabilise the path of economic recovery, but also re-\nintroduce unwarranted pressures in both the goods and FX markets. To \nensure that the corrective effects of previous policies are not jeopardised by \ndistortive shocks, I vote to: \n1. Retain the MPR at 14.0 percent; \n2. Retain the CRR at 22.5 percent; \n3. Retain the asymmetric corridor at +200/–500 basis points; and \n4. Retain liquidity ratio at 30.0 percent \n \nGODWIN I. EMEFIELE, CON \nGovernor \n \nSeptember 2017", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/Central Bank Of Nigeria Communique No 115 OF THE MPC OF 25th AND 26th September With Personal Statements Of Members.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "1f96361249ea2e7f71a64383fdbc5ede", "text": "1 \n \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA COMMUNIQUÉ NO 117 OF THE MONETARY POLICY \nCOMMITTEE MEETING OF TUESDAY 3RD AND WEDNESDAY 4TH APRIL, 2018 \nBackground \nThe re-constituted Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) held its maiden \nmeeting, the 260th meeting of the Committee, its first in 2018, on 3rd and 4th \nof April, 2018 against the backdrop of strengthening global growth and \nimproving domestic economic conditions. The Committee assessed the \ndevelopments in the global and domestic economic environments during \nthe first quarter of 2018, including the risks to price stability, financial stability, \nand economic growth in the short-to-medium term. Nine members of the \nCommittee attended the meeting. \n \nGlobal Economic Developments \nThe strong headwinds which confronted the global economy in 2017 showed \nsigns of moderation, giving way to prospects for stronger growth in 2018. \nConsequently, global output is projected to grow by 3.9 per cent in 2018 from \n3.7 per cent in 2017 on the heels of rebound in investment as a result of \nimprovements in investor confidence, strengthening commodity prices, rising \n2 \n \naggregate demand and accommodative monetary policy, especially in \nsome advanced economies. With the sustained recovery in oil prices, \naggregate demand is expected to continue to firm up. Growth in the \nadvanced economies is projected at 2.3 per cent in 2018, and 4.9 per cent \nfor emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs). The Monetary \nPolicy Committee noted some downside risks to the outlook for global growth \nto include: continuing normalization of monetary policy in the advanced \neconomies; new U.S. trade policy; uncertainties associated with the BREXIT \nnegotiations; and rising geo-political tensions in the Middle-East and on the \nKorean Peninsula. \nIn the advanced and emerging market economies, inflation is projected at \n1.9 and 4.5 per cent in 2018, respectively. However, the broad indication from \nthe IMF is that over the medium to long term, inflation may rise at a modest \npace as general economic conditions remain subdued. Asset prices and \nlong-term yields in major financial markets are also on the increase, \nconfirming the possibility of a future rise in the price level. \n \nDomestic Output Developments \nData from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) indicate that real Gross \nDomestic Product (GDP) grew by 1.92 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2017, \nup from 1.40 and 0.72 per cent in the third and second quarters, respectively. \nThe economy grew overall by 0.83 per cent in 2017. The main drivers of real \n3 \n \nGDP growth were agriculture (1.08%), industry (0.56%) and trade (0.35%). Non-\noil real GDP grew by 1.45 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2017 compared \nwith a contraction of 0.76 per cent in third quarter of 2017, indicating that the \neconomy is gradually returning to a path of sustainable positive growth. \nThe Committee also noted the continuous positive outlook based on the \nManufacturing, and Non-manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI), \nwhich stood at 56.7 and 57.2 index points, respectively, in March 2018, \nindicating expansion for the twelfth and eleventh consecutive months. The \nCommittee believes that effective implementation of the Economic \nRecovery and Growth Plan (ERGP) by the Federal Government and quick \npassage of the 2018 budget will continue to enhance aggregate demand \nand confidence in the Nigerian economy. \nDevelopments in Money and Prices \nThe Committee noted that money supply (M2) grew marginally by 0.07 per \ncent in February 2018 (annualised to 0.42%), in contrast to the provisional \ngrowth benchmark of 10.29 per cent for 2018. The development in M2 largely \nreflected growth in net domestic credit (NDC) of 4.05 per cent (annualised to \n24.30%), emanating majorly from net credit to government, which grew by \n19.99 per cent (annualised to 119.94%) against the provisional benchmark of \n33.12 per cent. Credit to the private sector also grew by 1.49 per cent \n(annualised to 8.94%) in February 2018, compared with the provisional annual \nbenchmark of 14.88 per cent. Net foreign assets (NFA), contracted by 2.82 \nper cent, annualized to 16.92 per cent, compared with the provisional \n4 \n \nbenchmark of -29.31 per cent. Narrow money (M1), also contracted by 2.77 \nper cent (annualised to 16.62%). The Committee urged the Federal \nGovernment to strongly exercise restraint on domestic borrowing in order to \nlower the cost of credit to the private sector. \nThe Committee noted that the continued low level of lending by banks \nremains a constraint to growth of the real sector of the economy. The \nCommittee advised the Management of the CBN to continue to provide the \nrequired policy impetus to engender improved credit delivery by the deposit \nmoney banks to the economy. \nInflationary pressures in the economy continued to moderate with headline \ninflation (year-on-year) receding for the thirteenth consecutive month to \n14.33 per cent in February 2018 from 18.72 per cent in January 2017. Month-\non-month food inflation fell by 133 basis points to 17.59 per cent in February \n2018, and core inflation also declined marginally by 38 basis points to 11.71 \nper cent during the same period. \nMoney market interest rates reflected liquidity conditions in the banking \nsystem as the average inter-bank call rate increased to averagely 12.42 per \ncent in February 2018 from 9.49 per cent in December 2017. The Open buy \nback (OBB) rate also increased to 13.19 per cent in February 2018 from 8.46 \nper cent in December 2017. The movement in the net liquidity position and \ninterest rates reflected the combined effects of OMO auctions, foreign \nexchange interventions and statutory allocation to state and local \ngovernments. \n5 \n \nThe Committee also noted the continuous improvement in the level of \nexternal reserves, which stood at US$46.699 billion as at March 29, 2018. \nSimilarly, the All-Share Index (ASI) rose by 8.5 per cent from 38,243.19 on \nDecember 29, 2017, to 41,504.51 on March 29, 2018. Market Capitalization \n(MC) improved by 10.2 per cent from N13.61 trillion on December 29, 2017, to \nN14.99 trillion during the same period. The Committee observed that, while \nthis development may be a reflection of improved investor confidence in the \neconomy, it cautioned that the Management of the Bank should carefully \nmonitor the developments and to establish mechanisms for safeguarding the \nstability of the foreign exchange market in the event of a sudden capital \nreversal. The Committee observed the continued rise in oil prices, but \nacknowledged the inherent volatility in commodity prices and urged the \nBank not to relent in building external reserves buffers against any future price \ndownturns and as a means of sustaining investor confidence in the economy. \n \nThe Committee noted the relative stability in the foreign exchange market, \nwith declining premia across all segments of the market. It observed with \nsatisfaction, the sustained high level of activity at the Investors’ and Exporters’ \n(I&E) window of the foreign exchange market. The window continues to \nattract more investors, thus boosting foreign exchange supply. Consequently, \ntotal foreign exchange inflow through the central bank increased by 73.00 \nper cent in February 2018, compared with the previous month. This was \nattributed to the increase in receipt of proceeds from Petroleum Profit Tax \n6 \n \n(PPT), royalties and crude oil & gas. Total outflow also increased in February \n2018 by 15.69 per cent, as a result of higher payments for invisibles, interbank \ntransactions as well as JVC cash call payments. \n \n2.0. Overall Outlook and Risks \nForecasts of key macroeconomic indicators give a positive outlook for the \nNigerian economy in 2018. This is predicated on the quick passage and \neffective implementation of the 2018 budget, improved security, foreign \nexchange market stability as well as favourable crude oil prices. On the \ndownside, the Committee noted the potential impact of the 2019 election-\nrelated spending, against the weak backdrop of tax revenue efforts, \nherdsmen related violence and rising yields in the advanced economies. \nIndications in the US and the UK point to higher interest rates in the short to \nmedium term. \n \n3.0. The Considerations of the Committee \nThe Committee noted with satisfaction the gradual return to macroeconomic \nstability as reflected in the third consecutive quarterly growth in real GDP in \nthe fourth quarter of 2017. It also noted the continued moderation in all \nmeasures of inflation as well as sustained stability in the naira exchange rate \nand urged the Bank to sustain the stability to avoid a mission drift. In \nparticular, the Committee welcomed the narrowing of the exchange rate \n7 \n \npremium between the BDC segment and the Investors’ and Exporters’ (I&E) \nwindow of the foreign exchange market. Overall, the Committee noted that \nthe recovery of the economy was strengthening, in view of the return to \ngrowth of the Services Sector. As the fiscal sector continues to settle its \noutstanding liabilities, it reduces its domestic debt profile, thus increasing the \nliquidity of the banking system. However, the Monetary Policy Committee \nobserved increasing monetization of oil proceeds as evident in the growing \nFAAC distribution, relative to the 2017 level of disbursements. The Committee \nurged the Government to initiate strong stabilization programmes and to \nfreeze the growth in its aggregate expenditure and FAAC distributions in \norder to create savings; needed to stabilize the economy against future oil \nprice related shocks. \nNotwithstanding the general improvement in macroeconomic conditions, \nthe Committee noted the rather slow pace of moderation in food inflation. It \nalso took note of the potential risk of a pass-through from rising global \ninflation to domestic prices. Members, however, expressed confidence that \nthe tight stance of monetary policy would continue to complement other \npolicies of government in addressing some of the structural issues underlying \nthe stickiness of food prices. The Committee noted that at 14 per cent, the \npolicy rate was tight enough to rein-in current inflationary pressures. The \nCommittee, therefore, reaffirmed its commitment to price stability conducive \nto sustainable and inclusive growth. \n8 \n \nThe Committee noted with satisfaction the gradual implementation of the \nEconomic Recovery and Growth Plan, in an effort to stimulate economic \nrecovery. In the same vein, the Committee urged quick passage of the 2018 \nAppropriation Bill by the National Assembly, so as to keep fiscal policy on \ntrack and deliver the urgently needed reliefs in terms of employment and \ngrowth for the citizenry. \nThe Committee noted the relatively strong balance sheets of the deposit \nmoney banks’ and the stable outlook. This is in spite of the concentration of \nnon-performing loans in a few sectors, which the Committee observed was \nsatisfactorily being addressed by adequate mechanisms established by the \nBank to address the phenomenon. The Committee also noted that as \nGovernment pays off its huge contractor debts, a sizeable portion of these \nnon-performing loans will be addressed. The Committee urged the Bank to \nstrengthen its supervisory oversight and early warning systems to promptly \nidentify, monitor compliance with extant prudential regulations, sustain \nmacro-prudential policy and manage emerging vulnerabilities in the banking \nsystem. \nThe Committee reiterated the Bank’s commitment to delivery of low interest \ncredit as evidenced in its bold steps to adopt unconventional monetary \npolicy to aid credit flow to vulnerable and growth enhancing sectors of the \nNigerian economy. The Committee, therefore, enjoined the Bank to continue \nto support and encourage credit delivery at single digit interest rate through \nother mechanisms in the interim, while encouraging the banking system to \n9 \n \nestablish frameworks to increase credit delivery to the employment \ngenerating sectors of the economy. In consideration of available data and \nevolving macroeconomic indicators, the Monetary Policy Committee is \ncommitted to revisiting its decisions in the short to medium term as the \nfundamentals evolve. \n \n4.0. The Committee’s Decisions \nIn reaching its decision, the Committee appraised potential policy options in \nterms of the balance of risks. The Committee also took note of the gains \nmade so far as a result of its earlier decisions; including the stability of the \nforeign exchange market, the moderation in inflation rate as well as the \nrestoration of economic growth. The launching of the Food Security Council \nby the Federal Government to improve food sustainability is a step in the right \ndirection. The Committee was concerned about the fiscal distortions \nassociated with absence of buoyancy between GDP growth and tax \nrevenue, and urged the fiscal authorities to deploy appropriate corrective \nmeasures to address this phenomenon. \nThe Committee was of the view that further tightening would strengthen the \nimpact of monetary policy on inflation with complementary positive effects \non capital flows and exchange rate stability. Nevertheless, it could potentially \ndampen the positive outlook for growth and financial stability. However, the \nCommittee is of the view that loosening would strengthen the outlook for \n10 \n \ngrowth by stimulating domestic aggregate demand through reduced cost of \nborrowing. This may, however, lead to a rise in consumer prices, generating \nexchange rate pressures on the currency in the process. The Committee also \nbelieves that loosening could worsen the current account balance through \nincreased importation. On the argument to hold, the Committee believes \nthat key macroeconomic variables have continued to evolve in a positive \ndirection in line with the current stance of macroeconomic policy and should \nbe allowed more time to fully manifest. \nIn consideration of the foregoing, the Committee decided unanimously by a \nvote of all members present to retain the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) at 14.0 \nper cent alongside all other policy parameters. \nConsequently, the MPC voted unanimously to retain the \n(i) MPR at 14.0 per cent; \n(ii) CRR at 22.5 per cent; \n(iii) Liquidity Ratio at 30.0 per cent; and \n(iv) Asymmetric corridor at +200 and -500 basis points around the MPR. \nThank you for listening. \nGodwin I. Emefiele \nGovernor, Central Bank of Nigeria \n4th April, 2018 \n11 \n \nPERSONAL STATEMENTS BY THE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE MEMBERS \n \n1. \nADAMU, EDWARD LAMTEK \nThe April 2018 Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting held against the \nbackdrop of relatively stable global and domestic economic conditions. The \nworld economy continues to recover, posting a substantially improved \noutlook for economic growth and prices in 2018. It, however, faces a \npotentially strong headwind from trade as China and some European \ncountries brace up to respond to the recent protectionist policies by the \nUnited States. In the domestic economy, recovery remains on course, albeit \nslowly. After some quarters of decline, growth has effectively resumed, but far \nfrom recent years’ average. The momentum for growth continues to build \npartly on account of the stability in the naira exchange rate, slowing \ninflationary pressures and real sector interventions by the Central Bank of \nNigeria. \nNigeria’s stock of external reserves continues to grow on account of reduced \nimports, improved inflows from more favourable oil prices, and increased \nautonomous inflows through the Investors’ and Exporters’ Foreign Exchange \n(I&E) Window. Confidence in the economy is building as the naira exchange \nrate continues to be stable and the premium between the BDC and \ninterbank market segments narrows. The parallel market premium continues \nto shrink as legitimate foreign exchange transactions migrate to the formal \nmarket. It does therefore appear that the bold reforms of the Central Bank \n12 \n \non forex policy and in the foreign exchange market in 2016 and 2017 are \npaying off. It is gratifying that the benefits of these reforms have stretched \nbeyond the stability of the naira exchange rate. Some manufacturing outfits \nhave resorted to using locally available alternatives as raw materials, just as \ninterest in domestic production of certain classes of food like rice and tomato \nproducts is growing. Likewise, capital market indicators have trended upward \npartly in response to positive market sentiments occasioned by the gradual \nimprovement in the macro-economy. \nHowever, over the short-to medium-term, the domestic economy faces a \nnumber of important risks, particularly to price and financial stability. In \narriving at a decision during the April 2018 meeting of the Monetary Policy \nCommittee (MPC), the threats to price and financial stability, which I will \nhighlight shortly, greatly influenced my consideration of the policy options. \nWhilst not neglecting the case for pushing economic growth faster, I am \npersuaded by the logic that there can be no sustainable growth in an \nenvironment of price instability. In effect, the policy choice reduces to one of \neither engendering further price stability or pushing for faster economic \ngrowth. \nTo start with, the outlook for domestic liquidity, based on expected fiscal \nactions and election spending, is worrisome. With an impending Federal \nGovernment budget outlay of over N8.0 trillion and deficit of about N2.0 \ntrillion for 2018, the short-term fiscal outlook appears expansive. The delay in \nthe passage of the budget could result in substantial injections in the second \n13 \n \nhalf of fiscal 2018 in an attempt to meet planned commitments. The \nimmediate effect of this, combined with the repayment of local debt by the \ngovernment and election spending would be a surge in banking system \nliquidity. Monetary policy cannot, at the same time, be expansionary. At \n14.33 per cent in February 2018, inflation is still significantly higher than the \nMonetary Policy Committee’s preferred range of 6 – 9 per cent. \nSecond, the economic recovery we have seen so far has benefitted partly \nfrom improved investment inflows. As a direct consequence, the country’s \nexternal reserves’ position has relatively improved, just as confidence in the \neconomy. Rising yields in advanced economies, following the drift towards \npolicy normalization as global inflation picks up, poses a significant risk to in-\nbound investments. This threat is mitigated by a stable naira exchange rate \nand competitive yields locally. For this purpose, we will need positive interest \nrates, as do most emerging markets and developing economies. This means \nthat inflation needs to moderate further. \nThird, there is still work to be done to fully contain banking system fragilities \nwhich increased in the wake of the stagflation in 2015 through 2016. The NPLs \nratio continues to be in excess of the Bank’s desired level. Among other \nchallenges, \nbanks \nhave \nhad \ndifficulty \nwith \ntheir \nforeign \ncurrency \ndenominated liabilities (loans) as the exchange rate moved against \nborrowers as from 2015. Therefore, from a financial stability standpoint, any \nthreat to the naira exchange rate stability must be viewed seriously and \npromptly addressed to forestall another exchange rate shock. \n14 \n \nIf excess liquidity is allowed to build, the demands for foreign exchange could \nshoot-up in the second half of 2018 and throw the naira exchange rate out of \nequilibrium. Such an adverse scenario must be prevented through proactive \nmonetary policy. This is justified by the reality that exchange rate stability is \ncritical to the current recovery in economic growth and the gradual \ndisinflation. Added to this is that a stable exchange rate should, in the \nminimum, prevent further deterioration of foreign currency denominated \nassets of the banking system and improve the resilience of the industry. \nThese concerns surely call for a forward-looking and cautious approach to \npolicy. I see the need for greater coordination of monetary and fiscal policies \nand \ncontinued \nengagement \nof \ncritical \nstakeholders \nto \naddress \nmisinformation and better anchor expectations. Having considered all, I \nvoted to hold the current stance of monetary policy, which in my view is \nsufficient to sustain the progress the economy has made in recent months on \ninflation, exchange rate stability and economic growth. In addition, I \nreckoned that some of the supportive administrative measures put in place \nsince last year by the Bank need more time to work their way fully through the \neconomy. I am equally persuaded by the commitment of the Federal \nGovernment to the Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP), especially \nin the area of infrastructure development, which continues to be relevant to \nsustaining and deepening growth and development of the country in the \nmedium to long-term. \n15 \n \nOverall, I voted to retain all the policy parameters at their current levels. That \nis: \n \nMPR at 14.0 per cent; \n \nCRR at 22.5 per cent; \n \nLiquidity Ratio at 30.0 per cent; and \n \nAsymmetric corridor at +200 and -500 basis points around the MPR \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n16 \n \n2. \nADELABU, ADEBAYO \nThe improvement in macroeconomic conditions, which commenced in the \nlatter half of 2017, has been reasonably sustained, raising the bar of optimism \nto a good height. Of great deal of interest is that the proactive monetary \npolicy measures put in place to address the various headwinds have \nreceived the endorsement of development partners, notably the IMF, who \nconfirms in the recently concluded Article IV consultation that the economy \ntechnically exited recession at end-December 2017. Although inflation at \n14.33 per cent in February 2018 is still considerably high, it is a pleasant and \nwelcome development that a deceleration has been consistently observed \nin the last 12 months, suggesting that the disinflationary process is well \nanchored. Another key benign outcome of recent policy measures is the \nbourgeoning resilience of the foreign exchange market, buoyed by rising \naccretion to external reserves with the subsequent positive spillover on the \nexchange rate. In other words, the extreme volatilities in the exchange rate, \nwhich characterized the entire 2016 and the early part of 2017, has been \nsufficiently contained. \nThe foregoing positive outcomes are indeed quite remarkable, but the \nmedium term landscape is still strewn with a number of risk factors such that \nvulnerability and setback are still imminent. As indicated in my last statement, \nthe issue at this point in time is not just about sustaining the trend, but a \ncompelling need to improve upon the trend with a view to building robust \nsafeguards around the nascent macroeconomic stability. This seems to be \n17 \n \nthe only pathway through which the improvement in the macroeconomic \nindicators could translate to visible progress in development indicators \nparticularly on employment and poverty level. The task of achieving this \nobjective appears somehow complicated to the monetary authority \nbecause all of the policy choices: tightening; easing; and holding, present a \ngood prospect. In other words, the challenge staring us at the face in this \nmeeting is not a dilemma but more of a trillema in choices. \nOne of the significant challenges is the fragility of recovery and the inherent \npossibility of reversal. For example, GDP recorded a marginal growth of 0.8 \nper cent at end 2017, while about 2.8 per cent is projected for 2018. Apart \nfrom the fact that these rates are considerably lower than the pre-recession \naverage, analysis of the structure reveals that it is not broad based. The \ngrowth was basically driven by recovery in price and volume of crude oil, \nwhile the non-oil sector particularly agriculture and manufacturing are still \nlargely in comatose. A further scrutiny, particularly on the dynamics of oil \nprice, reveals that the current rally in price is driven from both the demand \nand supply sides. On the demand side, the uptick in economic activities in \nkey advanced economies like the USA, Euro zone, and some emerging Asia \ncountries have given significant boost to the price of crude oil with the latest \nprojection indicating that Brent grade may hover in the neighbourhood of \nUS$73/barrel in the latter part of 2018. While it is not envisaged that the \ndemand for crude oil may experience adverse shock in the medium term, \nthe future of the supply side is not that optimistic. \n18 \n \nThe medium path of supply side may be a little bumpy for at least two \nprincipal reasons. First, potential market level of supply has been restrained by \noutput cut deal among OPEC members. OPEC, the largest cartel in the \nindustry, has mounted pressure on its members to cut output since the \nsecond half of 2017, which has been extended to end-2018. The next policy \nmove to contain glut in the market after the expiration of production cut \ndeal is not yet certain. On another note, the market may witness an upsurge \nin the supply of crude oil as most of the shale oilfields in the US resume \nproduction. A critical mass of shale shut down on the backdrop of non-\nviability when the price of oil slumped in 2015-16. Financial analysis within the \nindustry has shown that drilling of shale oil is profitable at a price of \nUS$60/barrel, suggesting that most of the marginal oil fields hitherto shut \ndown may resume production if the current oil price regime persists. In the \nlikelihood of crystallization of this risk therefore, the current hike in the price of \ncrude oil could slow down or even retreat. The policy implication of the \ncurrent crude oil price regime therefore is that this is a most auspicious time to \nrebuild fiscal buffer, having virtually depleted the Excess Crude Oil Account \n(ECA) in the run up to the 2015 economic recession. With the benefit of \nhindsight, this could be a tall order to both the national and sub-national \ngovernments particularly when the forth coming general election is put into \nperspective. However, given that this is a non-negotiable instrument for \neconomic stabilization, necessary engagements with all stakeholders must be \nundertaken to obtain their buy-in with a view to facilitating a hitch free take-\noff on the scheme. \n19 \n \nBesides, given that the bulk of employment is generated in the non-oil sector \nof the economy, it should not be much of a surprise that the ongoing \neconomic recovery may not quickly translate to improvement in key \ndevelopment indicators. From, policy perspectives, this scenario presents a \npicture that supports policy easing, but there is a need to be a little bit \ncircumspect particularly when inflationary variable is put into the equation. \nAgainst this perspective, some form of structural policies that could eliminate \nthe bottlenecks on the supply side could be the least cost route to a \nsustained recovery. In this regard, it is commendable that the Federal \nGovernment has issued some Executive Orders, particularly the order on local \ncontent, which, if fully implemented, would unleash the potentials in the \nmanufacturing sector, most notably MSME-led manufacturing, which could \nhave a significant multiplier effect on employment. \nInflation is receding, but still reasonably above the single digit target of the \nBank. To address this concern, some elements of tightening may be \ncontemplated, but a diagnosis of the structure of price evolution may \nprovide further guidance in terms of appropriate policy response. The \nstructure of inflation reveals that the food component has been consistently \nsticky over the past couple of months, apparently due to rising food deficit. \nThe latest report by the International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC) includes \nNigeria on the list of countries that may continue to experience acute food \nscarcity on account of lingering conflicts in the North-East and ravaging \ndrought, which has been driving pastoralists in search of viable zone. The \n20 \n \npoint here is that food prices may much likely be at risk and constrains a \ndownward push in inflation most especially headline inflation. Obviously, this \nissue appears to be outside the scope of monetary policy, but further \nreinforces the imperative of a well-coordinated structural policies particularly \nthe likelihood of utilizing strategic grain reserves in the short run as \ngovernment continues to address the security challenge in the medium to \nlong term. \nOne other issue that is assuming worrisome dimension is the weakening \ncapacity of the banking sector on the backlash of rising Non Performing \nLoans (NPLs). The NPLs turned northwards in the aftermath of the slump in \nprice of crude oil in 2015 as most of the banks are heavily exposed to the \nupstream segment of the sector. The situation was complicated by the \nrecession, which pushed many businesses particularly small and medium \nscale enterprises out of viable zone. Although most of the soundness \nindicators are still within the prudential requirement, it is a matter of utmost \nconcern that these indicators are almost at the threshold of the requirement. \nThis, invariably, has implication on the capacity of the banks to support the \nfledging recovery. For example, credit to the private sector has been \nexceptionally weak over the last three years on account of constraints \nimposed by rising NPLs, among other factors. Some form of policy easing \nmay enhance the liquidity condition of the banks as well as enhance the \nviability of key sectors such that asset quality could improve. The challenge \nhowever, is that such improvement in liquidity may translate to additional \n21 \n \npressure in the foreign exchange market. With this in mind, I think the \nappropriate response is the need to strengthen macro prudential regulation, \nwhile maintaining the status quo on monetary policy. \nAt the risk of repeating the obvious, but compel by the strategic role of fiscal \nmanagement in driving the ongoing recovery, I want to put in focus the \nadverse effect of the seemly perennial challenge of the delay in the signing \nthe Annual National Budget. It is settled in both theoretical and empirical \nliterature that fiscal multiplier is significantly high in a recessionary phase, \nconsequently, timely release of capital votes cannot be more important at \nany other period of our economic life than now. The 2018 budget is yet to be \npassed by the National Assembly, leading to delay in implementation of \ncapital component. Beside the fact that this challenge could impede the \nrequired expansion in infrastructural base, it also has the tendency to drive \naggregate demand above the equilibrium level, invariably stoking price \nlevel. It is therefore important that all issues impeding the accelerated \npassage of 2018 Appropriation Bill be quickly resolved to enable fiscal policy \nplay its expected role in the ongoing recovery phase. \nConclusively, the balance of risk tends towards maintaining the status quo \nante on monetary policy measures, while advocating for the deepening of \nstructural policy measures, in keeping faith with the tenets of the Economic \nRecovery Programme. I therefore, vote for the retention of all monetary \npolicy measures in place. \n \n22 \n \n \n3. \nADENIKINJU, ADEOLA FESTUS \nMy vote at the April Meeting of the MPC was for a Hold policy option of: \n(a) \nMPR at 14 per cent \n(b) \nCRR at 22.5 per cent \n(c) \nLiquidity ratio at 30 per cent \n(d) \nAsymmetric corridor of -500 and +200 basis points around the MPR. \nSeveral reasons informed my decisions, after the detailed presentations by \nstaff of the Bank and extensive discussions and debates on the state of the \neconomy, potential risks and challenges by the MPC members. \n(1) \nInternational Economic Developments \nOn the optimistic side, there are several positive developments in the \ndomestic economy, fueled mainly by positive developments in the external \nsector, and the monetary policy stance of the CBN that have helped to \nmove the economy from recession into the recent upswing in key \nmacroeconomic indicators. \nThe global economic outlook is largely positive as economic recovery \nremains sustained and broad based. The current stability in the global oil \nmarket has been reinforced by both fundamental and transitory factors. The \nglobal economic recovery continues to drive oil demand in China, India and \nother parts of the world. OPEC projected that global oil demand will increase \nby 1.6 million barrels per day, year on year in 2018. Oil supply quota \n23 \n \nagreement by OPEC and a group of non-OPEC members led by Russia \ncontinues to restrict overproduction. However, the rising share of non-OPEC \nproduction, and the potential of economic pressure on Russia by the West \nmay test the resilience of the current quota agreement in the medium term. \nNigeria is however a beneficiary of the rising oil price and increased domestic \noil production. \nCertain dynamics may pose a threat to the pace of global economic \nrecovery: the threat of possible trade wars between the world’s two largest \neconomies, the cloud of uncertainty cast by the BREXIT talks on the UK \neconomy, rise of trade protectionist tendencies as America shifts from \nmultilateral to bilateral trade negotiations, and the re-awakening of \nnationalist sentiments in Europe. Eventually, if the world moves in the direction \nof trade restriction, this may stymies the pace of global economic growth. \nThe increased volatility in the global stock markets in the first quarter of 2018 is \na signpost of the need to continue to monitor global economic recovery. \nTrend in global stock market remains an important lead indicator of \neconomic cycles. Overall, most stock markets indices are higher in the first \nquarter than where they were in December 2017. \nOther developments in the external market with implications for Nigeria \ninclude the rising inflation rates in the advanced markets and the potential \nfor interest rates spike, which may affect relative risk-adjusted rate of returns \nneeded by portfolio investors, who are dominant drivers of capital markets \ndevelopments and bonds prices issued by developing countries like Nigeria. \n24 \n \nHence, internationally, the optimism of current economic developments must \nbe discounted by the rising uncertain economic environment that may affect \nthe price of oil, the key driver of Nigeria’s recent recovery and fluidity of \nportfolio investment. For a country like Nigeria, where the fortune of the \neconomy is closely tied to a volatile commodity market, our history shows \nthat adequate economic buffer is very important for economic stability. The \nrecent accretion in foreign reserves should not dull our memory of the past \nnor the current mono-structure of the Nigerian economy. \n \n(2) \nDomestic Economic Developments \nSince the last MPC meeting, the Nigerian economy continues to show steady \nrecovery of major economic indicators. Foreign reserves rose by 18.5 per cent \nfrom US$39.35 billion at end-December 2017 to US$46.63 billion by end of \nMarch 2018. Naira exchange rates remain stable in all the foreign exchange \nmarkets, with small appreciation across the various windows. Amount spent \nby the CBN to stabilize the market has declined remarkably as the investors’ \nand exporters’ (I&E) window continues its remarkable improvement. \nInflation rates continues on its downward trend as headline inflation declined \nfrom 15.13 per cent in January 2018 to 14.33 per cent in February 2018, core \ninflation fell to 11.71 per cent in February 2018 from 12.10 per cent in January \n2018 and food inflation also declined from 18.92 per cent in January 2018 to \n17.59 per cent in February 2018. However, while the pace of the decline has \npicked up recently, the rate of decline is still relatively sluggish and sticky. \n25 \n \nSeveral factors such as the increased tension between farmers and \nherdsmen, rising insecurity in several parts of the country, high diesel prices, \nand rise in global inflation rates are contributory factors to high rate of food \ninflation. \nIn the first quarter of 2018, the PMI and investors sentiments’ improved, the \npoor state of domestic infrastructure and security issues continue to affect \nthe supply response capacity of many sectors of the economy. \nIn my view, and comparing Nigeria with economies like South Africa, Kenya, \nand Ghana, where MPR have been lowered within the past 12 months, \ninflation rates are not only lower than Nigeria, real interest rates are in the \npositive territory. However, in Nigeria, the MPR at 14 per cent is below the \ninflation rate of 14.33 per cent, keeping real interest rates for many market \ninstruments in the negative territory. In the long term, negative real interest \nrate is bad for savings and investments which are long time drivers of \neconomic growth. Nigeria savings-GDP, as well as investment-GDP ratio \nremain lower than long term trend and lower than rates in several \ncomparator countries. \n \nConclusion \nNigeria economy rides on the back of a highly volatile commodity - oil. At the \nsame time, with rising international oil price, subsidy on consumption of \nrefined \nproducts \ncontinues \nto \ngrow, \nwith \nimplications \non \nbudget \n26 \n \nimplementation. While the shift to external debt will likely provide a breather \nto the domestic investors who have been crowded out of the credit market, \nthe rise in external debt comes with its own risks to the economy, especially \nfor commercial debts. The share of interest debt payments in 2017 budget \nand 2018 appropriation bill is significant and higher than allocations to some \nhuman capital development sectors. The continued depletion of the excess \ncrude account, the monetization and sharing of oil revenues, and foreign \ndebts without any effective stabilization fund should be of concern to policy \nmakers. Added to this is the potential spike in domestic spending that is a \nregular feature of past electoral cycles in Nigeria. All of these factors, plus the \nrising debt profiles of the government, increases inflationary outlook for the \neconomy. \nHence to put Nigeria on the path of low-inflation induced economic growth, \nthe following steps are important: the fiscal authority must do more to ensure \nthe synchronisation of fiscal and monetary policies in Nigeria, commitment by \nfiscal authority to sustain an effective, functional and well resourced \nstabilization account that will provide needed buffer for the economy, \nincrease in non-oil tax-GDP ratio, horizontal and vertical diversification of the \noil sector, speedy passage of the 2018 budget, payment of contractors’ \ndebts to reduce the NPLs of banks, provision of more credit to the economy \nby the banking sector, reduction in the maximum lending rates by banks and \nthe maintenance of adequate foreign reserves as a hedge against reversal \nin portfolio investments and cyclicality of the global oil market. \n27 \n \n \n4. \nAHMAD, AISHAH \nIt was a privilege to contribute at the maiden Monetary Policy Committee \n(MPC) meeting for 2018 following my confirmation as Deputy Governor at the \nCentral Bank of Nigeria (CBN). The MPC is an important platform for setting \nappropriate monetary policy that ensures fulfilment of the CBN’s core \nmandate; promoting price and monetary stability. MPC members have a \nsacred responsibility, which must be discharged with utmost independence, \ndiligence and care given the very real consequences of their decisions for \nNigerian households, businesses, the financial system, the investment \ncommunity and other stakeholders. \nDecision \nAt the April meeting, I voted to maintain the current monetary policy stance, \nholding rates constant - MPR at 14 per cent; Cash Reserve Ratio at 22.5 per \ncent; Liquidity Ratio at 30 per cent and Asymmetric corridor at +200 and -500 \nbasis points around the MPR. My decision was predicated on some \nimportant international and domestic economic developments, summarised \nbelow, which have implications for financial and macroeconomic stability in \nNigeria. \nStrong global growth, with recovery expected to persist in 2018 \nGlobal output growth was positive and remained resilient through 2017 driven \nby continued monetary easing in advanced economies and gradual \nrecovery in commodity prices. The IMF projects global growth in 2018 at 3.9 \n28 \n \nper cent, up from 3.7 per cent for 2017, reflecting optimism that improved \ninvestor confidence, stronger commodity prices and rebound in trade and \ninvestment will sustain this global economic momentum in the immediate \nterm. \nThese positive growth prospects and likely renewal of the OPEC production \ncap agreement is expected to support increased aggregate demand and \nhigher prices for crude oil. This is good for Nigeria, given the significant impact \nof oil prices on our economic fortunes. Indeed, rising crude oil prices through \n2017 and in Q1 of 2018. Bonny Light prices which rose from US$65.40/b in \nDecember 2017 to US$69.11/b in March 2018 have helped to grow the \nreserves and stabilize the exchange rate. \nA few downside risks to global growth however have mixed implications for \nthe Nigerian economy, so also are the uncertainty over the BREXIT \nnegotiations, tensions over North Korea, US protectionist trade policy and the \nbrewing trade war, growing investments in shale oil production and monetary \npolicy normalization in the advanced economies. \nPositive GDP growth strengthens domestic recovery prospects \nFollowing its exit from recession in Q2 2017, the Nigerian economy grew by \n0.83 per cent in 2017 compared with -1.57 per cent contraction recorded in \n2016, due to improved crude oil production and rising prices, deliberate \nmacro-economic stimulus and a relatively stable naira. This is further \nsupported by the positive outlook for the Nigerian economy with World Bank \n29 \n \nand IMF projections of 2.5 per cent and 2.1 per cent GDP growth in 2018, \nrespectively. \nHowever, it is important to note that GDP per capita continues to decline, \ngiven higher population growth compared with output growth rates. Other \npotential headwinds for output growth include insecurity, farmer/herdsmen \nconflicts, low implementation of the capital budget and delay in the \napproval of the 2018 Appropriation Bill. \nInflationary pressure continued to moderate with headline inflation declining \nto 14.33 per cent in February 2018 from a high of 18.72 per cent in January \n2017. Progressively improved harvest, relative stability in the exchange rate, \nincreased local production and tight monetary policy stance has helped to \nmoderate prices. Although inflation remains above the CBN preferred \nbenchmark of 6-9 per cent, coupled with current negative real rates of return \nover the policy rate, the steady rate of disinflation is a positive indicator for \ngrowth and wider monetary policy options in the near future. \nThe naira exchange rate was relatively stable across the segments of the \nmarket, on account of transparency in the foreign exchange (FX) \nmanagement through the Investors’ and Exporters’ Window, recovery in \ncrude oil prices and stability in domestic crude oil production. Improved \nliquidity and transparency in the FX market provided confidence for foreign \nportfolio investors helping to boost capital flows and accretion to reserves \nfrom a low of US$23billion in October 2016 to over US$46billion as of March \n30 \n \n2018. The continued improvement in the external reserves position gives the \nBank greater flexibility in managing the exchange rate; a fact which has \naided the observed sustenance of stability in the foreign exchange market. \nRisks to capital flows, exchange rate and macro-economic stability \nNotwithstanding the foregoing positive developments, the economy remains \nexposed to potential global economic headwinds, whilst high lending rates \nand low private sector credit growth threatens the fragile recovery in \ndomestic output. \nApproaching monetary policy normalization in advanced economies, as \ninflation rises to long run targets, have potential negative implications for \ncapital inflows as the competition for international investment flows intensifies. \nFor instance, the US has raised rates twice already in the last one year, from \n0.75 - 1.00 per cent in May 2017 to 1.25 - 1.50 per cent in August 2017 and \n1.50 -1.75 per cent in March 2018, with more rate hikes expected in 2018. \nDespite the relatively strong balance sheets of deposit money banks and the \nstable outlook, the high and rising non-performing loans concentrated in a \nfew sectors is worrisome. Whilst macro prudential measures being \nimplemented by the CBN are helping to proactively manage this risk, a \nstronger and resilient economic recovery remains crucial to reversing this \ntrend. \nNigeria’s exposure to volatilities in crude oil prices remains a concern - \nBuilding fiscal buffers and sustained efforts at revenue, economic and export \n31 \n \ndiversification remains paramount in view of volatilities in crude oil prices. This \nunderscores the importance of ongoing efforts of the fiscal authorities \ntowards economic and revenue diversification, such as the recent \ninauguration of the National Food Security Council and the implementation \nof Voluntary Asset and Income Declaration Scheme(VAIDS). \nThe anticipated huge fiscal spending for the proposed 2018 budget and \npreparations ahead of the 2019 elections may also have inflationary effects. \nThis in itself would obviously call for a proactive and cautious monetary policy \nresponse to ensure there is no upward pressure on inflation. Thus, I would \nencourage quick passage of the 2018 Appropriation Bill by the National \nAssembly, to keep fiscal policy on track, boost investment, employment and \neconomic output for the benefit of the citizenry. \nCompeting priorities and limited monetary policy options \nIt is my opinion that monetary policy considerations at this time should \nprioritize reduction in the general price level, exchange rate stability, and \nsustaining the fragile economic growth. We must - while we still can - \nencourage the positive momentum in capital flows and accretion to \nreserves, while accelerating the downward inflation trajectory. \nIn view of the preceding arguments and in the light of economic and \nfinancial data made available to the Committee, I support maintaining the \ncurrent policy stance; holding rates at earlier defined levels. \n \n32 \n \n \n5. ASOGWA, ROBERT CHIKWENDU \nDecision: \nAt this meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee, I vote to hold all \nparameters as they are: \n Retain the MPR at 14.0 percent \n Retain the CRR at 22.5 per cent \n Retain the Asymmetric Corridor at +200/-500 basis points and \n Retain Liquidity Ratio at 30.0 per cent \nIn reaching this decision, I have carefully considered three key influencers (a) \nthe current levels and forecasts of domestic inflation (b) the current levels \nand forecasts of domestic GDP and (c) the official interest rate changes and \nits expectations in some other countries. I have also taken into consideration \nother key macroeconomic pressure points that can either facilitate or \nthreaten expected gains of any policy decision reached at this meeting. \nFirst, are the current domestic inflation and the expectations in the coming \nmonths. It is clear that the inflationary trend has continued to moderate for \nseveral months now with headline inflation decreasing from 15.37 per cent in \nDecember 2017 to 15.13 per cent in January 2018 and further to 14.33 per \ncent in February 2018. While CBN staff estimates show further possible \nmoderation in the coming months of 2018, the anticipated spending towards \nthe 2019 election raises huge expectation of a possible hike in inflation in the \n33 \n \nlatter months of 2018. With inflation still above the CBN target, real interest \nrates still at the negative band, and higher chances of further climb \nassociated with elections spending and other fiscal injections by the \ngovernment in 2018, retaining the MPR at its current level will be key to \ndampening the possible inflationary trend in the future. At the global level \nalso, inflation is expected to moderate on average in 2018 as both the spot \nand future prices of crude oil and other commodities have shown signs of \nimprovement in recent times. For Nigeria therefore, keeping exchange rate \non track will be increasingly difficult if domestic inflation persistently outpaces \ninflation abroad. \nSecond, domestic output at current levels appears to be gradually \nstrengthening following exit from recession. The 2017 fourth quarter GDP \ngrowth was 1.92 per cent, while for the whole year 2017, a growth rate of 0.83 \nper cent was recorded. The IMF estimates a 1.9 per cent growth in 2018, the \nWorld Bank and CBN Staff estimate 2.5 per cent and 2.4 per cent growth, \nrespectively in 2018. These estimates indeed look realistic as both the current \nand forecast of the manufacturing and non-manufacturing Purchasing \nManagers Index (PMI) in the first quarter of 2018 indicates expansion in the \neconomy. These are positive signs even while some gap still exists between \nthe current levels and the estimated levels for 2018 which ordinarily would \nhave necessitated a reduction in the monetary policy rate. Since the \nexpected growth enablers in 2018 are also not predicated on an \nexpansionary monetary policy, suggestions of a rush to MPR cut will certainly \n34 \n \nbe counterproductive at this time. There is however, some evidence of low \ndomestic credits to the private sector, which may partly be attributed to the \nperceived high interest rates, but given the credit market conditions that exist \nin Nigeria, monetary policy expansion may not perfectly yield a seamless \nexpansion in private sector credit. Short term explicit interventionists support \n(credit and non-credit) for such non-oil sectors as industry and services yet to \nrecover from the economic recession will be worthwhile now as long as such \nsupport conforms to the rationale for current monetary policy decisions. \nThird, relates to the official interest rate changes abroad now and as \nexpected in the future. Given that CBN also targets exchange rate, watching \nthe international interest rates keenly is important especially as the rise in \nforeign portfolio investments in the recent past largely contributed to the \nprevailing exchange rate stability. For now, increasing the level of foreign \nportfolio investments or at least avoiding any possible reverse flight of capital \noutside the country will be key for exchange rate management in 2018 \nespecially in the short term. This is moreso as uncertainty in the oil market as \nwell as the potential for more restrictive trade policies in advanced \neconomies and the rising international geopolitical tensions may likely \nintroduce new surprises. CBN Staff data show that most advanced and \nemerging economies who are either potential sources or recipients of \nportfolio investments have either increased policy rates (as in the US) or \nmaintained rates (as in UK, Euro Area, China, Russia, Japan, India, Brazil). \nWhile data also show that Kenya, Ghana and South Africa reduced policy \n35 \n \nrates recently, a MPR reduction in Nigeria now could reverse the flow of \ncapital and possibly in vast amounts which may threaten the recent modest \ngains in exchange rate management. While interest rate induced foreign \ncapital inflow will remain attractive in the short term, the historical risks \nassociated with its volatility makes it a tricky long term solution for developing \nand emerging economies. \nOther key economic pressure points \nWhile developments in the external sector and the capital market show \npositive impetus for macroeconomic strengthening, recent developments in \nbanking industry and the fiscal sector may yet drag down the process of \neconomic recovery thus further limiting the expected maximum impact of \nmonetary policy rules. \nGenerally, key indices of the external sector including inflow of foreign \nexchange and rate stability, external reserves position all look good at the \nmoment which are clear signs of success with recent CBN measures in the \nsector especially the Investors’ and Exporters’ FX Window. CBN Staff data \nshow that apart from the increasing levels of foreign exchange inflow, source \ndiversification has also been very revealing. Between January 2017 and \nFebruary 2017, CBN dominated as the source of foreign exchange inflow to \nthe economy, but the scenario seems to have changed between January \n2018 and February 2018, when other sources of inflow dominated the CBN \nsources. Consequently, external reserves have increased rapidly reaching \nover $45 billion as at end of February 2018. The exchange rates have also \n36 \n \nlooked stable for the greater part of 2017, while the premium between BDC \nrates and interbank rates which appeared too high in the early period of \n2017 has since narrowed considerably. \nParticularly worrisome is the emerging signs of banking sector fragility. Besides \nthe reported increases in non-performing loans, which by CBN staff report \nhad increased to about 16.21 per cent in February 2018 (arguably still at \nmoderate levels for now), the rise in average daily request of deposit money \nbanks from the Standing Lending Facility (SLF) window and the continued \nreliance of many banks on operations in the government debt market to \nremain solvent are all early warning signs of future threats in the banking \nindustry. While the gradual recovery from economic recession may rectify \nsome of the causes of the increases in non-performing loans, the current \npreference of banks for SLF not only sends public signals of interbank fear and \ncaution, but also introduces constant volatility in the interbank rates, and \nwhen unchecked may unnecessarily be expanding the balance sheet of the \nCentral Bank. Increasing arbitrarily the rates on the SLF as a strategy to \ndiscourage banks from utilizing the window may also not be a good policy as \nthis would unjustifiably expand the margin between the rates on SLF and that \nof the SDF. A significant reduction of MPR at this time could even further \nweaken the solvency position of these deposit money banks. \nClosely related to the fragility of the banking system, is the banking sector \ncredit to the private sector, which has recorded an abysmally poor growth in \nrecent times, coupled with the widening gap between lending and deposit \n37 \n \ninterest rates. My earlier expectation was that with the economic recession \nover in 2017 and with current recovery signs, credit to the private sector will \njust naturally pick up in the early parts of 2018, but this has not been so. The \npopular belief now amongst manufacturers and other analysts is that the \ncurrent stance of the MPR is the major limiting factor for the growth of credit \nto the private sector. Unfortunately, this may not practically be so given the \npeculiarities and imperfections of the credit market in Nigeria and indeed \nother parts of Sub-Sahara Africa where evidence has consistently shown that \nlow interest rates, whilst increasing somewhat the demand for credit, does \nnot necessarily lead to increases in the supply of bank credit. While \naddressing these credit market imperfections may be a reliable long-term \nsolution, such short-term measures as the current CBN development financing \nsupport to few sectors can suffice in the interim and simply preparatory for a \nreturn to a longer-term market based solution for private sector financing by \ndeposit money banks. A realistic long-term ambition is to have the bank \ncredit to the private sector grow considerably faster than GDP. \nOn the fiscal sector, the major threat remains the growing public debt in the \nmidst of declining government revenues. With continued decline in oil and \nnon-oil revenue, government has desperately relied on domestic and \nexternal borrowing to finance the increasing budget expenditure targets. \nWith the addition of Green Bond and FGN Sukuk to the expanding FGN Bonds \nand FGN Savings Bond, the stock of domestic debt increased significantly \nbetween June 2017 and December 2017. The same scenario happened with \n38 \n \nexternal debt which had increased significantly partly due to additional \nEurobonds sale. While the government may have commenced a debt \nsubstitution plan of refinancing maturing domestic debt with proceeds of \nEurobonds, this approach (yet invisible in the market) may also be short lived \nas long as domestic revenue consistently falls below planned budget \nexpenditure with a wide margin. The consequences of the burgeoning public \ndebt growth not only for monetary policy but for entire macroeconomic \ngrowth and stability are really well known and have been elaborated \nextensively at previous MPC meetings. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n39 \n \n6. \nBALAMI, DAHIRU HASSAN \nGlobal Level \n \nThe global economy is expected to register positive growth of 3.9 per \ncent slightly higher than 2017 growth rate of 3.7 per cent. A number of \ncountries like Russia, Brazil and South Africa have exited from recession. \nHowever, the global economy is still facing enormous challenges. For \nexample the downside factors such as difficulties with BREXIT negotiations, \nnew US trade policies and likely global trade war, nationalistic sentiment in \nItaly, tensions in the Middle East and North African countries such as Saudi \nArabia and Iran as well as Libya and Sudan. Normalisation of the US \neconomy and the rising of the interest rate from 1.50 to 1.75 per cent and the \nexpectation of higher rates in 2018 and it's consequent implications on the \nemerging and developing economies. In terms of inflation, the highly \nindustrialised nations such as US, Japan, Germany, UK, and France were \ncaught up in low inflation trap, while emerging and developing countries \nsuch as Nigeria, Ghana etc. are caught up in high inflation trap which has \nimplications for growth. \n \nDomestic Level \nAlthough Nigeria has exited from recession due largely to rise in crude \noil exports and price. Early recovery should be the main goal of both \nmonetary and fiscal policy before other considerations. I believe the exit is \nvery fragile as the vital sectors of the economy have not fully recovered. \nTherefore, recovery is expected to be achieved through implementation of \n40 \n \nthe Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP) and the Medium Term \nExpenditure Framework (MTEF). Similarly, the current growth rate (0.83%) is not \nimpressive enough, because Nigeria's population growth rate is about 2.72 \nper cent. The challenges of growth include the following: non-approval of the \n2018 budget by the Nigeria National Assembly (NASS), high interest rate, \nproblem of high inflation rate (14.33 per cent), poor and deterioration of \ninfrastructures such as roads, poor electricity supply and distribution, rising \nlevels of NPLs and non-existence of stabilization programme in place to assist \nsustainability of growth. This requires a sound call on government to build a \nstabilization programme through increasing oil output, food security \nprogramme and see how investment can be channelled to employment \nenhancing sectors of the economy such as the agricultural sector, \nmanufacturing, and other sectors of the economy. \n \nBanking Sector \n \nThe key risk factors in banking industry include the followings: credit \ndefault, credit concentration, solvency and liquidity risks, outstanding \napproval of 2018 budget, which has halted development in the economy for \nmost part of 2018. It should be noted that CBN's mandate includes price \nstability, exchange rate stability, and development functions. In the \neconomy, the CBN has successfully achieved relative stability in the foreign \nexchange market. The exchange rate at the inter-bank segment remained \naround N305.0/US$1 in the period under consideration. \n41 \n \nThe stability in the foreign exchange market has been achieved through \nCBN's intervention policies, creation of various windows such as the Investors’ \nand Exporters’ Window as well as the accretion to reserves from US$39.35 \nbillion at end-December 2017 to US$46.63 billion as at March 28, 2018. The \nmaintaining of policy on 41 commodities has greatly assisted in stabilizing the \nforeign exchange market. This has helped increase the level of investor \nconfidence in the economy, which in turn has increased the level of foreign \ndirect investment (FDI) and foreign portfolio inflows. \n \nFinancial Soundness Indices \nThe financial soundness indicators for 2018 showed that Capital \nAdequacy Ratio (CAR) has improved from 10.23 per cent in December 2017 \nto 11.43 per cent in February 2018 due to capitalisation of 2017 profits. The \nliquidity ratio (LR) has also improved slightly from 45.66 per cent in December \n2017 to 46.40 per cent in February 2018. However, the non-performing loans \n(NPLs), the return on equity (ROE) and return on asset (ROA) have slightly \ndeclined from 14.80 to 16.21 per cent, 19.5 to 11.76 per cent and 2.17 to 1.28 \nper cent, respectively from December 2017 to February 2018. This clearly \nshows that a lot of efforts and strategies need to be put in place to improve \nthe banking sector performance. However, the poor indices have partly \nbeen low due to negative contribution of some outlier banks. The LR is above \nthe prudential requirement of a minimum of 30 per cent for commercial \nbanks and 20 per cent for merchant banks. On the other hand, the CAR for \nbanks with international authorisation is 12.7 per cent, while commercial \n42 \n \nbanks with national authorization is 7.63 per cent. Both fall below the \nprudential requirements of 10 per cent and 15 per cent respectively. It should \nbe noted that outlier banks constitute only a small proportion of the whole \nbanking industry. All necessary efforts are being put in place by the CBN to \nassist in stabilising them. \n \nRequirements for Banking Sector Stability \n- \nExpected improved oil output and prices \n- \nIncreased liquidity in the foreign exchange market which enhances the \nability of the obligor to repay. \n- \nProfitability in the 2017 financial year which is expected to improve the \nindustry capital after audit and capitalization. \n- \nCommercial \nbanks \nshould \nbe \nclosely \nmonitored \nagainst \nthe \nvulnerability and appropriately guided in their operations. \n- \nNPLs can partly be reduced by the three layer of government by \nredeeming their contractor debts. \n \nAchievements \nUnder the current economic policies put in place by the CBN, the \nmacroeconomic environment had flourished. The Purchasing Managers \nIndex (PMI) for manufacturing and non-manufacturing showed a further \nimprovement in economic activities in the first quarter 2018; All Share Index \n(ASI) increased by 13.3 per cent; headline inflation dropped to 14.33 per cent \nin February 2018; there has been increased inflow of FDI and FPI; high \n43 \n \naccretion pushed external reserves to US$46.63 billion as at March 28, 2018; \nand foreign exchange market is relatively stable due to the strategies \nemployed by CBN. \n \nPolicy Choice \nOn the basis of the data available, tightening of MPR is more \nappropriate for increased growth. However, 14 per cent is sufficiently high \nenough to stabilize the economy through encouraging FDI inflows and \nreducing inflation in the economy. Primarily the interest rate which is \nanchored on the MPR has no correlation with lending rate, but partially with \ninter-bank rate. The factors that influence interest rates overtime include the \nfollowing: economic growth, expected inflation, government budget, and \nincreased foreign exchange supply and loadable funds in securing price \nincrease, primarily easing of the interest rate would help to reduce the cost of \nborrowing as well as cost of production and other economic activities. This \nwill help to enhance the business environment, promote sustainability, \ndiscourage vulture investors as well as generate jobs through enhancing \nSmall and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) access to affordable funds. It would \npromote investment to further drive economic recovery. Moreover, it will be \ninflationary and can destabilise the foreign exchange market. For the CRR, \nevidence based on available data showed that the utilisation of the standing \nlending facility (SLF) has been increased by some of the commercial banks. \nHowever, the current rate be retained at 22.5 per cent because loosening \nwould mean more available liquidity to the big banks, which can be used to \n44 \n \nhit the foreign exchange market and possibly destabilising it. Primarily, it is \ndifficult in both theory and empiricism to lower price, interest rate and \nexchange rate simultaneous particularly at the exiting phase of the recession \nand recovery. \nOn the basis of the above analysis, I vote to hold, therefore, to retain the \n(I) MPR at 14.00 per cent; \n(Ii) CRR at 22.50 per cent; \n(Iii) Liquidity ratio at 30.00 per cent, and \n(Iv) Asymmetric corridor at +200 and -500 basis points around the MPR. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n45 \n \n7. \nNNANNA, OKWU JOSEPH \nNigeria’s growth although fragile continues to gather momentum due to \nimproved oil prices, oil production and a substantial increase in foreign \nexchange liquidity. Real GDP grew by 1.92 per cent in Q4 of 2017 up from \n0.72 per cent and 1.4 per cent in Q2 and Q3, respectively. In 2017 growth \nstood at 0.83 per cent relative to a contraction of 1.58 per cent in 2016. Non-\noil real GDP grew by 1.45 per cent in Q4 2017 compared with a contraction \nof 0.76 per cent in third quarter of 2017. In the non-oil sector, the major drivers \nof real GDP growth were Agriculture (4.23%), Construction (4.14%) and Trade \n(2.07%). Manufacturing, and Non-manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ \nIndex (PMI) stood at 56.7 and 57.2 index points, respectively, in March 2018, \nindicating expansion for the twelfth and eleventh consecutive months. \nHowever, structural headwinds remain a drag to growth in the non-oil sectors \nas the manufacturing and construction industries continue to be constrained \nby infrastructure deficits - mainly, erratic power supply and poor \ntransportation networks. \n \nSubsisting disinflation path continues to reflect the lower-than-expected \nliquidity conditions in the money market on account of the tight stance of \nmonetary policy and the weak effect of exchange rate pass-through on \ndomestic prices. Headline inflation (year-on-year) fell for the thirteenth \nconsecutive month to 14.33 per cent in February 2018 from 18.72 and 15.13 \nper cent in January 2017 and 2018, respectively. Food and core inflation \nsimilarly declined to 17.59 and 11.71 per cent from 18.92 and 12.09 per cent, \n46 \n \nrespectively, in January 2018. However, structural factors, including \ndysfunctional transport infrastructure, absence of a vibrant manufacturing \nsector, high cost of energy, insurgency and insecurity in the North East; and \nincreasing cases of herdsmen violence constitute upside risks to inflation. \n \nPsychological factors such as risk aversion remain a constraint to the granting \nof credit to the real sector. Money market interest rates reflected rising NPLs \nand liquidity conditions in the banking system as the average inter-bank call \nrate increased to 12.42 per cent in February 2018 from 9.49 per cent in \nDecember 2017. The Open buy back (OBB) rate also increased to 13.19 per \ncent in February 2018 from 8.46 per cent in December 2017. The movement in \nthe net liquidity position and interest rates reflected the combined effects of \nOpen Market Operations (OMO) auctions, foreign exchange interventions \nand statutory allocation to state and local governments. Crowding out of the \nprivate sector persisted although credit to the private sector rose marginally \nby 1.49 per cent in February 2018, while net credit to government rose by \n19.99 per cent relative to December 2017. The All-Share Index (ASI) rose by \n8.5 per cent from 38,243.19 on December 29, 2017, to 41,504.51 on March 29, \n2018. Market Capitalization (MC) improved by 10.2 per cent from N13.61 \ntrillion on December 29, 2017, to N14.99 trillion during the same period of \n2018. Although, this reflected improved investor optimism on account of \npositive real economy indicators including moderating inflation and \nincreasing PMI, the downside remains is the potential for reversal of portfolio \nflows. I note the weakening banking industry soundness indicators as the non-\n47 \n \nperforming loans (NPLs) remain elevated, but I agree that adequate counter-\ncyclical and corrective measures are well in place to address isolated cases \nof vulnerabilities and systemic spill-overs. Despite these concerns, banking \nassets remain positive, recording an increase of 9.2 per cent in February 2018 \nover the corresponding period of 2017. \n \nGlobal economic activity remains positive in 2018. The IMF and World Bank \nforecast the global economy to expand by 3.9 and 3.0 per cent respectively \nin 2018, higher than 3.7 and 3.0 per cent estimated for 2017. The upward \ngrowth momentum in the US economy remains positive, while much of the \nslack in the in the euro area labour market is being absorbed. China is on \ncourse to managing its slower growth, while Japan is determined to further \nbolster its growth. Despite the efforts by the Organization of the Petroleum \nExporting Countries (OPEC) to keep oil prices on the upward trend by \nextending the existing production-cut deal alongside Russia until the end of \n2018, offsetting effects largely from US shale production are expected. Higher \ncommodity prices arising from strong aggregate demand from developed \nmarkets will spur emerging-market and developing economies with growth \nprojected at 4.9 per cent in 2018. I note however that already 2018 is \ncharacterised by monetary policy normalisation and may portend \nchallenging credit conditions in emerging markets and potential for capital \nreversal. \n \n48 \n \nOn the fiscal front, non-oil revenue buoyancy has remained non-existent, \nwhile fiscal buffers remain weak. However, in a pre-election year, added to \nthe country’s unique fiscal federalism of total sharing of funds from the \nFederation Account on a monthly basis, fiscal surprises maybe inevitable. I \nexpect that current efforts to broaden the tax base and adjustment in the \nVAT rate together with the adoption of the “sin” tax on alcohol and tobacco \nshould improve government revenue. Overall, the need to enhance fiscal \nbuffers cannot be overemphasised. \n \nExternal sector remains viable, supported by improved oil production, crude \noil prices, and effective foreign exchange management. The Nigerian \nAutonomous Foreign Exchange (NAFEX) and the Investors’ and Exporters’ FX \nWindow have continued to engender transparency in the FX market. The \narbitrage premia across all segments of the market have narrowed \nsubstantially. I note with satisfaction the increase in the external reserves \nbuffers. \n \nOverall, staff estimates indicate positive and stable macroeconomic outlook \nfor the economy in 2018. I also note the recent interest rate hikes in some \nclimes and possible impact on portfolio flows in the frontier market. On the \nbalance of risks, it is important to sustain the current disinflationary policies. \nAgainst this backdrop, I vote to retain the current monetary policy stance. \n \n49 \n \n8. \nSANUSI, ALIYU RAFINDADI \n1 \nDecision: \nOn the strengths of the analyses of the available macroeconomic data, \ndevelopments in the global and domestic economic environments as well as \nthe outlook for global output, inflation and monetary policies in the \nadvanced and emerging market economies, keeping the current tight \nmonetary policy stance, in my opinion, is the best policy option for delivering \nprice stability and supporting the current output recovery. I have, therefore, \nvoted to leave the current policy stance, which I consider to be just tight \nenough to keep domestic inflation trending downwards towards the single-\ndigit long-run target, and not too tight for the current upward trend in output \nto continue. \n2 \nBackground and Justification \n2.1 \nGlobal Economic Developments \nGlobal Economic Developments present opportunity for improved exports \nrevenues and capital inflows needed to sustain the current rate of reserves \naccretion for sustained exchange rate and price stability. The global output is \nprojected to grow by 3.9 per cent in 2018, mainly due to expected rise in \ninvestments, strengthening commodity prices, rising aggregate demand as \nwell as sustained recovery of international oil price. As at March 23, 2018, \nBonny Light sold for $70.21 per barrel compared with US$67.02 per barrel as at \nJanuary 2, 2018. The OPEC production cut, which was to end by March 2018, \n50 \n \nhas just been extended to the end of the year. Interest rates in most of the \nadvanced countries remain close to the zero lower bound. However, there is \nan increasing pace of monetary policy normalization, following price \ndevelopments, in the US and UK, which raises financial yields in these \njurisdictions. In the US, for instance, the policy rate was raised five times \nconsecutively between December 2016 and March 2018, and is expected to \nfurther rise by June 2018. There was a moderate hike in the repo rate in the UK \nin November 2017 and the ECB has significantly reduced the amount of its \nmonthly asset purchases of its quantitative easing programme (to € 30billion, \nor by 50%) following positive price movements in some parts of the Euro area. \nAsset prices and long-term yields are expected to rise in major financial \nmarkets. \n \n2.2 \nDomestic Economic Developments \nDomestic Economic Developments and outlook present opportunity for policy \nto sustain the current disinflation process without stifling the fragile output \nrecovery. Domestic output growth is strengthening following sustained \nquarterly rise for the fifth quarter since 2016Q3. Real output grew at the rates \nof 0.72 per cent, 1.4 per cent and 1.92 per cent in the 2nd, 3rd and 4th quarters \nof 2017, respectively. For the year 2017, therefore, output grew at a positive \nrate of 0.83 per cent, mainly driven by the non-oil sector, compared with the \ncontraction of 1.58 per cent experienced in 2016. The upward trend is \nexpected to continue in 2018, on the account of expected improvements in \n51 \n \nthe oil and non-oil sectors (as oil production increases and foreign exchange \nsupply to the growth stimulating manufacturing, light industries and \nagricultural sectors continues to improve). The aggressive implementation of \nthe Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP) is also expected to support \noutput growth. All forecasts suggest that output in 2018 will grow faster than it \ndid in 2018, ranging between 1.9 per cent (IMF’s) to 2.5 per cent (World \nBank’s). \n \nAlthough the rate of growth of credit (Y-o-Y) to the private sector has \nremained positive since December 2017, the increase of 1.75 per cent \nachieved in February 2018 is still fragile. However, when compared with the \n0.54 per cent achieved in January 2018, the improvements in February is \nencouraging. The retail lending rates of the DMBs have remained high and \nthe spread between average lending rate and weighted average deposit \nrates hovered around 25 per cent and has slightly widened during the period. \nHowever, given the empirical evidence of the link between the policy rate \nand retail rates of the DMBs, addressing the structural issues that are \nresponsible for the wide spread are likely to be more effective in raising the \nflow of credit to the private sector. To support the up-trending output \ndevelopment, therefore, the Central Bank should continue to improve the \neffectiveness of its various credit interventions aimed at increasing credit \ndelivery to the growth-inducing sectors at single-digit interest rates. \n \n52 \n \nDomestic headline inflation, which stood at 14.33 per cent (year-on-year) as \nat February 2018, has been declining since December 2016, when it peaked \nat 18.72 per cent. Indeed, the pace of the decline has increased since \nNovember 2018. This downward trend is forecasted to continue, and will hit \nthe lower double-digit mark by the July 2018. Although the trend in Core \nInflation (which excludes the volatile components of the CPI basket) has \nbeen sticky-downward between May 2017 and November 2018, it has \ndeclined faster since December 2017 from 12.4 per cent (Y-o-Y) to 12.09 per \ncent and 11.71 per cent in January and February 2018, respectively. Food \ninflation, which has been on the decline since November 2018, is also \nforecasted to continue to fall over the medium term. Analysis of the impact \ndifferent possible evolutionary paths of the core and food inflation as well as \nprice of PMS show that the decline in headline inflation is still fragile in the \nshort-term. \n \n2.3 \nExternal Sector Developments \nExternal Sector Developments and outlook present opportunity for policy to \nsustain external reserves accumulation for exchange rate stability and lower \ninflationary pressure. The External value of the naira has remained stable. The \ninterbank exchange rate hovered around N305 per US$ between May 2017 \nand February 2018. The BDC rate ranged between N362 and N365 per US$ \nduring the same period. The NAFEX has also stablised at around N360/US$1 \nbetween October 2017 and February 2018. The stability of exchange rate, \n53 \n \nattributable to the various strategies adopted by the Central Bank, has \nsignificantly helped in easing inflationary pressures during the period. The \npositive net foreign exchange inflow has steadily raised external reserves from \nUS$29.8 million in May 2017 to US$46.699 billion as at March 22, 2018. A \nmonetary policy stance that encourages or sustains net positive inflow of \nforeign exchange and improves the external reserves position would, \ntherefore, not only sustain the external value of the naira, but will also be \nconsistent with long-term inflation target. \n \n3 \nImplications for Policy \nMy review of global and domestic economic developments and outlook reveals: \n1. \nThat the headline inflation, which is the overriding objective of \nmonetary policy, is well above the upper boundary of the target band, fixed \nby the MPC in 2012, of between 6 and 9 per cent. It is, however, on a \ndownward trend suggesting that the current policy stance is “tight” enough \nto sustain the current disinflation process, which started in February 2017. This \njustifies keeping the current policy unchanged. \n2. \nThe current stability of the exchange rate, which has significant \nmoderating effect on inflation, was aided by the improved external reserves \nposition, which enabled the Central Bank to implement the various \ninterventions and strategies that stabilized the naira. Keeping this position \nrequires oil prices to remain high and production to rise; and net positive \n54 \n \ncapital flows to be sustained or reversal prevented. Given the rising yields in \nthe US and many advanced and emerging markets, reducing the MPR would \nbe inconsistent with exchange rate stability objective. \n3. \nThe current monetary policy stance not too “tight” for output growth, \ngiven the upward trend in real output, which is also forecasted to rise further. \nThe FGN Bonds, as at February 28, 2018 exhibit a convex shaped yield curve, \ni.e., negatively sloping, therefore signaling that the market expects low future \ninflation. Voting for easing in order to increase the rate of output growth \nwould, therefore, be a classic case of time-inconsistent policy. \n4 \nDownside Risks \nThere are a number of risks that are capable of moderating the positive \noutlook for global output on the basis of which domestic economic outlook is \nhinged. For instance, the rise of protectionism and possible escalation of the \ntrade war that started between the US and China may deliver a significantly \nlower global output growth than expected, hence reducing global demand \nfor, and price of, oil. There are uncertainties generated by BREXIT, and \ncontinued difficulties of the BREXIT negotiations can further weaken \ninvestments in the UK and Euro area. There are indications from IMF that asset \nprices and long-term yields in major financial markets are expected to rise, \nincreasing the risks of capital movements away from emerging markets as \ninvestors adjust portfolio. \n \n \n55 \n \n9. EMEFIELE, GODWIN GOVERNOR OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA AND \nCHAIRMAN, MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE \nThough I voted, at today’s meeting, to retain monetary policy parameters, \nthere are two concerns I had related to two potential shocks to the \ndomestic economy within the short-term. The first of these is the expected \nelectioneering spending within the next twelve months and its knock-on \neffects on systemic liquidity, aggregate demand, the short-term traverses of \ninflation and exchange rates. The second set of concerns for me relate to \nthe latent risks to the domestic economic linked to the rising international \ntensions and the probable ‘trade war’ and ‘cold war’, which need to be \nmitigated. Our in-house analyses of short-term inflation forecasts suggest a \nslow-paced disinflation, barring any shocks. However, as the effects of \nprevious tightening is still evolving and given the continued improvements in \nkey macroeconomic variables, it is imperative to not destabilise the ongoing \nrecovery with impulsive policy shocks. \nA review of global economic outlook indicates an upbeat short-term \nprospect. According to the IMF, global growth is projected to rise to 3.9 per \ncent in 2018 from 3.7 per cent in 2017. Reflecting this upswing, 2017 growth \nestimate for advanced economies was marginally revised upwards from 2.2 \nto 2.3 per cent, while the projection for 2018 was revised from 2.0 per cent to \n2.3 per cent. Output growth in emerging markets and developing countries \nis also projected to pick-up from 4.7 per cent in 2017 to 4.9 per cent in 2018. \nAt 3.3 per cent in 2018, growth projections for sub-Saharan Africa rose by 0.6 \n56 \n \npercentage points vis-à-vis the 2017 estimates. The global growth impetus is \nlargely attributable to improved financial market sentiments and rising \naggregate demand. \nCongruent with the global developments, the short-term outlook for the \ndomestic economy continues to strengthen. Recently released data by the \nNational Bureau of Statistics indicates further consolidation of the cyclical \nrebound as real GDP growth progressed from a contraction of 0.9 per cent \nin 2017q1 to an expansion of 1.9 per cent in 2017q4. This translated to an \nannualised expansion of 0.8 per cent for the entire 2017. Driven mainly by \nnon-oil growth (especially in agriculture, trade, and industry), the short-term \nprospects are brightening with in-house 2018 real growth projections at 2.4 \nper cent. Regardless of this upswing, cautious policy remains sacrosanct as \ncurrent rebound is fragile, while per capita income and unemployment rate \nare outside desirable levels. I therefore, once again, reiterate the imperatives \nof \nwell-coordinated \nmacroeconomic \npolicies \namongst \nthe \nvarious \npolicymaking authorities to ensure balanced and optimal outcomes. \nInflation rate maintained a steady decline as the headline rate fell from 18.7 \nper cent in January 2017 to 15.1 per cent in January 2018 and 14.3 per cent \nin February 2018. This pattern of disinflation is also seen in the core sub-index \nwhich fell from 17.9 per cent in January 2017 to 12.1 and 11.7 per cent in \nJanuary and February 2018, respectively. Though still relatively high, food \ninflation moderated to 17.6 per cent in February 2018 from 17.8 per cent in \n57 \n \nJanuary 2017. I note that whereas the downward trajectory of inflationary \npressure is welcomed, the pace is slow, while the rates remain outside the \npreferred 6–9 per cent band. There is therefore the need to ensure that the \npath of disinflation is not reversed. \nThe moderating inflation pressure directly reflects the tight money and \nfinancial market conditions as well as the stability in the FX market. Hovering \naround NGN360/US$, the exchange rate in the various segments remained \nstable, with steady convergent. External reserves rose progressively from \nabout US$23 billion in October 2016 to over US$39.3 billion at end-December \n2017 and US$46.7 billion as at March 29, 2018. This reflected, among others, \ngrowing investors’ confidence as inflows into the economy rose with a \npositive spill-over on the domestic capital market. Money market conditions, \nhowever, remained tight during the review period as key short-term interest \nrates rose. Relative to its end-December 2017 levels, average inter-bank call \nrate and Open Buy Back (OBB) rates, respectively, rose in February 2018 by \n2.9 and 4.7 percentage points to 12.4 and 13.2 per cent, respectively. \nFurthermore, liquidity conditions showed a 16.6 per cent annualised \ncontraction of narrow money supply (M1) in February 2018, while the \nannualised growth of broad money supply (M2), at 0.4 per cent, was \nconsiderably below the target expansion of 10.3 per cent for 2018. \nAnnualised expansion of net claims on government, at 119.9 per cent in \nFebruary 2018, surpassed the provisional benchmark of 33.1 per cent. Credit \n58 \n \nto private sector, with an annualised growth of 8.9 per cent, however, fell \nshort of the 14.9 per cent programmed target. Given our unrelenting effort to \ndiversify the economy and entrench financial inclusion, I note with concern \nthat the low level of private sector credit may undermine our desired \nobjective. The CBN remains indefatigable in its drive to sufficiently channel \nlow-priced credit to high impact sectors with a view to bolstering domestic \nproductivity, creating jobs and reducing poverty. \nOverall, \nI \nnote \nwith \ndelight \nthe \ncontinued \nimprovement \nin \nkey \nmacroeconomic metrics. The cyclical recovery of real GDP, the steady \npace of disinflation, the sustained stability of the FX market and the \ncontinued accretion to reserves are indeed welcome. Though the short-term \noutlook of the domestic economy is bright, we must remain mindful of the \npotential shocks ahead and effectively mitigate their immanent risks. With \nhigh unemployment rate, I must also underscore that the current recovery is \nyet structurally delicate. \nI re-emphasise the need for cautious policy decisions devoid of impulsive \npolicy shocks, which could destabilise the current recovery trajectory. I am \nmindful that inflation rate, though declining, is outside the programmed \nband and at a growth inhibiting level. The prevailing macroeconomic \nrebound is hugely attributable to the stability in the FX market. Therefore, it is \nimperative that FX market stability is sustained in order to safeguard the \nongoing recovery. To increase the pace of disinflation and advance the \n59 \n \nstability of the FX market, further tightening of monetary conditions may be \napropos. However, given that the current restrictive stance of policy is \nachieving the goals of exchange rate stability and disinflation (albeit at slow \npace), further tightening, which may introduce policy shocks may not be \nnecessary. I am of the view that the current level of real policy interest rate is \nappropriate to balance the objectives of exchange rate stability, price \nstability and output stabilisation. Consequently, I vote to: \n1. Retain the MPR at 14.0 per cent; \n2. Retain the CRR at 22.5 per cent; \n3. Retain the asymmetric corridor at +200/–500 basis points; and \n4. Retain liquidity ratio at 30.0 per cent \n \nGODWIN I. EMEFIELE, CON \nGovernor \n \nApril 2018", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/COMMUNIQUE NO 117 OF THE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE MEETING OF TUESDAY 3RD AND WEDNESDAY 4TH APRIL WITH PERSONAL STATEMENT OF MEMBERS.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "7c30bfe9decb383040a4f341bedd426d", "text": "1\nECONOMIC REPORT FOR THE FIRST HALF OF 2000 \n \nThis Report reviews economic developments during the first half of 2000 and \narticulates the major policy responses of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to those \ndevelopments. The Report is structured into five parts. Part 1 presents a summary of \nthe Report, while Parts 2 and 3 review macroeconomic policy objectives as well as \nsectoral developments and policy appraisal. Part 4 evaluates CBN’s policy responses \nduring the period, while the final Part discusses the prospects of the economy in the \nrest of the year. A statistical appendix is attached to the Report. \n \nI. 0 \n \n \n2\nstood at US $7,272.4 million, which could support about 11 months of imports. \nHowever, the naira exchange rate depreciated slightly during the period due to excess \ndemand arising mainly from the liquidity surfeit in the \nThere were mixed developments in domestic economic conditions. While the \nagricultural sector recorded further improvement, the industrial sector deteriorated. \nInflationary pressures moderated significantly. Provisional estimate indicat\nper cent inflation rate compared with 12.1 per cent attained in the corresponding \nperiod of 1999. The socio economic situation was relatively unfavourable as it was \ncharacterized by labour unrest as well as reports of violent crimes.\n international economic and financial developments influenced the \ndomestic economy during the first half of 2000. The price of crude oil in the \ninternational market rose significantly and was accompanied by increased output. \nHowever, the prices of other primary commodities fell. World output, trade and \ninflation maintained a steady growth.\nA review of CBN policy responses indicated that considerable effort was \ndevoted to liquidity and foreign exchange management, as well as the surveillance of \nAn assessment of economic prospects for the rest of the year indicated that \nimprovement in the industrial sector could come from the increase in aggregate \ndemand, arising from the increase in minimum wage.\n2.0 MACROECONOMIC POLICY OBJE\nThe year 2000 economic policies were designed to sustain the rate of inflation at \nsingle digit, as well as stimulate output and employment growth. The strategies for \nachieving these objectives include further commitment by the Federal Government to\nfiscal prudence, complemented by a tight monetary policy. Specifically, the policy \nthrust anchors on guided privatization of public enterprises, private sector led growth, \nrehabilitation and upgrading of infrastructural facilities and implementation of a\npoverty alleviation programme. Details of policy measures are outlined below.\nThe fiscal measures in Budget 2000 were formulated to improve government \nrevenue, as well as enhance economic growth. Specific measures ou\nBudget included the provisions of generous tax incentives to encourage production, \nwhile provision for low income tax rates was designed to enhance consumers’ \npurchasing power. In order to broaden the tax base and enhance greater efficiency \ntax collection, the administrative capacity of the tax authorities was to be further \nstrengthened. In the area of the Value Added Tax (VAT), the flat rate of 5.0 per cent \non VAT was retained, while the 50 VAT offices established in 1999 would become \nerational. Furthermore, a VAT clearance certificate was to be introduced by \ngovernment and issued to all VAT payers. Other measures included: a \ncomprehensive port reform and streamlining of port charges/levies and a review of \nexisting incentives and set offs as they relate to the oil and gas sector, while the new \nmemorandum of understanding on the scheme was expected to come into effect \nduring the year. There was also a provision for the enforcement of compliance with \ntax assessment by small and medium scale enterprises. In addition, the Federal \nGovernment would embark on the deregulation of the petroleum industry such that the \ncrude oil delivery to Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) for domestic \nconsumption would be at a price equivalent to what it is in the international market, \nthereby eliminating subsidy.\ncollected revenue was projected at 1,686.0 billion for the year, \nrepresenting an increase of 68.9 per cent over the revenue estimates for 1999. Of this \nal receipts from petroleum were projected at \n1,340.0 billion (about 79.5 \nper cent of total receipts) based on a bench mark oil price of US $20.0 per barrel and \nan estimated output level of 2.04 million barrels per day. Non\nrease by 44.7 per cent to \n345.6 billion compared to an increase of \n43.0 per cent in the preceding year. Revenue from customs and excise was projected \nto rise by 31.6 per cent to \n100.0 billion, while revenue from Company Income Tax \nTax (VAT) were expected to increase by 113.1 and 62.5 per \n65.0 billion each. Revenue from independent sources, at \nconstituted 14.5 per cent of the total non oil revenue, compared with the ratio of 5.0 \n \n4\nper cent (N12.0 billion) in 1999. Out of the total collectible revenue, the share of the \nFederal Government was projected at 48.5 per cent, while the State and Local \nGovernments would receive 24.0 and 20.0 per cent, respectively. The balance of 7.5 \nper cent was set aside as special funds. \n \n \nTotal Federal Government planned expenditure was projected to be N653.1 \nbillion for the year, representing an increase of 86.7 per cent over the estimate in \n1999, and about 16.7 per cent of GDP compared with 10.4 per cent in the preceding \nyear. This was to reflect largely the anticipated increase in personnel cost, the \nimplementation of poverty alleviation programme and the substantial allocations for \nthe revamping of infrastructural facilities. Total expenditure comprised of N341.5 \nbillion for recurrent expenditure while capital expenditure was projected at N311.6 \nbillion. Thus, with a projected expenditure of N653.1 billion and retained revenue of \nN556.5 billion, the overall budget deficit was put at N 96.6 billion, representing about \n2.5 per cent of GDP. \n \n2.2 \nMonetary Policy Measures \n \nMonetary and credit policies for the year were primarily designed to maintain \nmacroeconomic stability as basis for sustainable growth. The main thrust of the \npolicies was to sustain inflation at single digit by containing excess liquidity in the \nbanking system. Specifically, the main targets of the monetary policy were to ensure \nthe attainment of a growth rate of 14.6 per cent for broad money supply (M2), while \naggregate bank credit, (credit to government and to the private sector) was targeted to \nexpand by 27.8. \n \n \nOpen Market Operations (OMO) would remain the major instrument of \nmonetary management to be conducted weekly in short term government securities. \nThis was to be complemented by discount window operations, repurchase \nagreements (REPOs), cash and liquidity ratio requirements. The cash reserve \nrequirement (CRR), which is applicable only to commercial banks, remained at 12.0 \nper cent, while the minimum liquidity ratio (LR) applicable to both commercial and \nmerchant banks remained at 40.0 per cent as in 1999. In order to reduce the cost of \nfunds to banks and influence movements in market interest rates, the CRR and the LR \n \n5\nwere reviewed downward to 11.5 and 35.0 per cent, respectively, in April, 2000. \nEarlier in April 2000, the CBN’s Minimum Rediscount Rate (MRR) was reduced by 100 \nbasis points to 17.0 per cent following the ease in economic and market conditions, \noccasioned by the sustained decline in the inflation rate. Interest rates remained \nderegulated in consonance with the prevailing market-based techniques of monetary \nmanagement, while the CBN would continue to influence interest rates through its \nintervention rate on various money market instruments, such as the Minimum \nRediscount Rate (MRR) and the stop rate at the weekly tender for treasury bills. As \nin the recent past, the CBN would place emphasis on creating a more competitive \nfinancial environment and the introduction of complementary monetary instruments. \nIn this regard, the Bank would continue to encourage investment in treasury securities \nby the non-bank public and also initiate policies to strengthen community banks and \nother deposit taking institutions to attract savings and enhance credit delivery to micro-\nenterprises. It was envisaged that these actions would reduce the persistent wide \nspread between savings and maximum lending rates. \n \nIn order to complement current efforts aimed at addressing the problem of \nexcess liquidity in the economy and promote financial savings, the CBN would in \nconjunction with the Federal Government explore the possibility of issuing the National \nSavings Certificate, a medium-to-long term security of 3-5 years maturity, which was \napproved in 1998. The Bank would also work with the Federal Government with a \nview to resuming the floatation of Federal Government development stocks, which \nwas suspended in 1988 to improve the financial environment for monetary policy and \nencourage the government to source its long-term financing needs from the capital \nmarket. \n \nIn pursuance of the objective of deepening the financial sector as well as \nenhancing its efficiency, the CBN would continue to allow merchant banks that meet \nthe necessary conditions to convert to commercial banks, while approval in principle \nwas granted for the introduction of universal banking in Nigeria. Meanwhile the \nminimum paid-up capital requirement for existing banks remained at N500 million as in \n1999, while that for new banks was raised to N1.0 billion with effect from January \n2000. \n \n6\n \nThe capital base of the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund (ACGSF) was \nraised from N100 million to N1.0 billion to enhance its operational effectiveness, while \nrefinancing schemes would be established to cater for the needs of medium and large-\nscale borrowers. In order to promote growth in the real sector in general, banks were \nencouraged to set aside 10 per cent of their profit before tax of the previous year for \nequity investments in small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs). \n \nThe CBN would continue to engage in moral suasion through regular dialogue with \nbanks and other financial institutions, under the aegis of the Bankers’ Committee and \nother channels, in order to enhance efficiency in the banking industry, especially with \nrespect to interest and exchange rate management. \n \n2.3 \nExternal Sector Policy Measures \n \n \nThe external sector policies in the year 2000 were designed to ensure a stable \nnaira exchange rate as well as the attainment of external balance under a deregulated \nexchange rate mechanism. To this end, the Inter-bank Foreign Exchange Market \n(IFEM) would continue to exist and operate freely. However, operators were expected \nto adhere to the relevant laws and regulations governing the operations of the market. \nForeign exchange purchased from the CBN at IFEM was to be used for eligible \ntransactions. Oil and oil service companies were free to sell their foreign exchange to \nany bank of their choice to meet their domestic expenses. In line with the policy of \ndivesting CBN of retail banking, all government parastatals, government companies, \nagencies and companies in which the government had majority shareholding were \ndirected to transfer their foreign currency domiciliary accounts to commercial banks. \nFurthermore, any traveller entering and leaving Nigeria was required to declare any \namount above N10, 000.00 (Ten thousand Naira only) in his/her possession at the \ntime of arrival in, or departure from the country on Forms TM and TE, respectively. In \norder to minimize the delay in foreign exchange transactions, the prescribed minimum \ndocumentation requirements for all visible and invisible trade transactions were \nretained, while all Authorized Dealers should continue to render promptly, accurate \nand coordinated returns on foreign exchange transactions on the prescribed \n \n7\nschedules. Sanctions would be imposed on defaulting authorized dealers and those \nthat rendered inaccurate returns. In the area of external debt, the Federal \nGovernment would intensify efforts at securing debt service and debt stock reduction. \n \n2.4 \nReal Sector Policy Measures \n \nThe 2000 Budget envisaged the achievement of a minimum of 3.0 per cent \ngrowth in real GDP, a single digit inflation rate, reduction in unemployment and \npoverty, improvement in agricultural and industrial production, as well as social \nservices, including the rehabilitation and upgrading of infrastructural facilities. Specific \npolicy measures on agriculture in the budget include, the provision of fiscal incentives \nto institutional lenders and borrowers in support of agricultural enterprises, exemption \nfrom Value Added Tax (VAT) on all agricultural equipment and inputs, encouragement \nof state governments to specialize in the production of a crop in which they have \necological advantage, reactivation of the Agricultural Development Projects (ADP) \nthrough a US $77.986 million loan to be drawn from the on-going World Bank and IMF \nfacility, privatization of fertilizer procurement and other farm inputs supply, as well as \na reassessment of the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme. \n \n \nIndustrial sector policies and programmes included the privatization of \ngovernment investment in public enterprises quoted on the stock exchange as a way \nof enhancing their efficiency, the establishment of regulatory framework for effective \nprivate sector participation in preparation for privatizing public utility companies, the \nestablishment of Niger Delta Development Commission to reduce the perennial \ndisturbance of oil production. Other measures include, emphasis on aerial geo-\nphysical surveys and exploration of solid mineral deposits in order to encourage \nprivate investment in the sector, provision of appropriate protection of domestic \nindustries against stiff competition from imports and dumping by foreign industries. \nSuch protection was designed to allow for survival of local industries in the face of \nglobal onslaught and trade liberalization. \n \n \n \n \n \n8\n3.0 SECTORAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICY APPRAISAL \n3.1 \nFiscal Operations and Developments \n \n(a) Federal Government Finances \n \nThe fiscal operations of the Federal Government during the first half of year 2000 \nresulted in an overall deficit of N59,945.2 million which was 84.2 and 67.4 per cent of \nthe proportionate budget estimate and the outcome in the corresponding period of \n1999, respectively (Figure 1). On a proportionate half year basis, the deficit in the \nreview period was 3.1 per cent of GDP compared with 14.3 per cent in the \ncorresponding period of 1999. Available data showed that total federally-collected \nrevenue amounted to N796,315.0 million, which is by 124.9 per cent higher than the \nlevel in the corresponding period of 1999 but fell short of the proportionate budget \nestimate by 5.5 per cent. The lower revenue, relative to the budget projections, was \nattributable to the low receipts from non-oil sources as a result of the lull in economic \nactivities during the period. Total oil receipts grew by 162.3 per cent over the level in \nthe corresponding period of 1999 and exceeded the budget estimate by 0.7 per cent, \nwhile non-oil revenue recorded an increase of 30.4 per cent when compared with the \ncorresponding half of 1999 although, it fell short of the budget projections by 23.8 per \ncent. The sum of N435,738.9 million or 54.7 per cent of the total federally-collected \nrevenue was credited to the Federation Account as against 36.1 per cent in the first \nhalf of 1999. \n \n \nThe retained revenue of the Federal Government for the period was \nN214,878.7 million indicating an increase of 28.8 per cent over the amount in the \ncorresponding period of 1999, but was 22.8 per cent below the proportionate budget \nprojection. The aggregate expenditure of the Federal Government, at N274,823.9 \nmillion declined by 15.8 and 32.6 per cent below the proportionate budget estimates \n \n9\nfor the first half \nFigure 1: Federal Government Fiscal Operations \nin the First Half of the Year\n(N'Billion)\n-300.0\n-200.0\n-100.0\n0.0\n100.0\n200.0\n300.0\n400.0\n500.0\nBillion Naira\nRet. Rev.\nTot. Exp.\nRecur Bal.\nOverall Bal. \nRet. Rev.\n34.4\n96.4\n127.1\n176.1\n151.6\n166.8\n214.9\nTot. Exp.\n65.2\n107.2\n118.6\n157.0\n199.9\n407.5\n274.8\nRecur Bal.\n-8.7\n35.2\n73.5\n94.1\n54.5\n-24.5\n9.9\nOverall Bal. \n-30.8\n-10.8\n8.6\n19.1\n-48.3\n-240.7\n-59.9\n1994\n1995\n1996\n1997\n1998\n1999\n2000\n \n \nof 2000 and 1999, respectively. The relatively low expenditure resulted largely from \nthe late approval of the year 2000 budget and the low disbursement on capital \nexpenditure, which was 60.0 per cent lower than budgeted for the period. \n \n(b) \nStatutory Allocations to State Governments \nand the Federal Capital Territory \n \nStatutory allocations to State Governments and the Federal Capital Territory \namounted to N108,739.8 million in the first half of year 2000, representing an increase \nof 157.0 per cent over the N42,317.8 million received in the corresponding period of \n1999. The statutory allocations consisted of N95,981.1 million from the Federation \nAccount and N12,758.7 from the Value-Added Tax (VAT) pool account. Receipts from \nthe Federation Account rose by 209.2 per cent over the level in the corresponding \nperiod of 1999 as a result of the upward review of the total amount disbursed to all the \n \n10\nbeneficiaries of the Account and the payment of 13.0 per cent derivation to the mineral \nproducing areas. \n \n(b) Statutory Allocations to Local Government Councils \n \n \nAvailable information showed that total statutory allocations to Local \nGovernment Councils from the Federation and VAT pool accounts increased \nsignificantly by 155.7 per cent to N856.5 million when compared with the \ncorresponding half of 1999. Gross allocation from the Federation Account, at \nN76,795.3 million, indicated an increase of 199.9 per cent over the level in the \ncorresponding period of 1999 and accounted for 89.4 per cent of total allocation for \nthe period under review. \n \n(d) \nPublic Debt \n \nDomestic debt outstanding at the end of June 2000 stood at N794,806.5 million \nindicating a marginal decrease of N190.0 million from the level in end-June, 1999 \n(Figure 2). The Federal Government redeemed a total of N190.0 million development \nstocks, which matured during the review period. Available data on external debt \noutstanding showed that the debt stock at end-June, 2000 stood at US \n \n11\n$27,062.74million, \nwhile \nexternal \ndebt \nservice \npayments \nfor \nthe \nfirst \nFigure 2: Public Debt Outstanding \n0.0\n100.0\n200.0\n300.0\n400.0\n500.0\n600.0\n700.0\n800.0\n900.0\nBillion Naira\n0.0\n5.0\n10.0\n15.0\n20.0\n25.0\n30.0\n35.0\nBillion US Dollars\nInt.(N)\nExt.($)\nInt.(N)\n199.9\n291.6\n409.6\n402.9\n400.7\n411.6\n795.0\n794.9\nExt.($)\n28.7\n29.4\n32.6\n28.1\n27.1\n28.7\n28.3\n27.1\n1993\n1994\n1995\n1996\n1997\n1998\n1999\n2000\n \n \nhalf of the year amounted to US $1,213.5 million compared with US $729.9 million \nin the corresponding period of 1999. Of the total debt service payments, 25.3, 45.7, \n8.2, 5.2 and 15.3 percent accrued to multilateral institutions, the Paris Club of \ncreditors, the promissory notes holders, London Club and other bilateral creditors, \nrespectively. \n \n3.2 \nFinancial Sector Developments \n(a) \nInstitutional Developments \nFollowing the granting of licence by the CBN to Regent Bank Limited to \ncommence commercial banking activities in the country, the number of banks in \noperation at end-June, 2000 increased by 1 to 91 (59 commercial and 32 merchant). \nBranch network also increased by 90 from 2530 (2401 commercial and 129 \nmerchants) in December 1999, to 2,620 (2,483 commercial and 137 merchant) \nfollowing the opening of new branches. A merchant bank converted to commercial \nbank during the period, bringing the number of such conversions to 6. Those granted \napproval-in-principle (AIP) to convert increased from 4 to 7. The number of banks that \n \n12\nmet fully the N500 million minimum paid-up capital requirements as stipulated in the \nPrudential Guidelines remained at 80. Effective January 2000, the minimum paid-up \ncapital requirement for new banks was raised to N1 billion. \n \n \n In order to streamline the functions of development finance institutions (DFIs), \nthe Presidency constituted a Committee comprising the office of Head of Service, the \nMinistries of Finance, Industries and Justice, to work out modalities for the merging of \nthree DFIs namely, NBCI, NIDB, and NERFUND. \n \n \nIn continuation of the distress resolution options, six more banks were \napproved for sale to successful bidders in the review period. These were Nationwide \nMerchant Bank, Eagle Bank (First African Trust Bank) Ltd, New Nigerian Bank Plc, \nAfrican Continental Bank Plc, Orient Bank of Nigeria Plc, and Nigerian Universal Bank. \nNational Bank had earlier been sold and is in the process of commencing banking \nbusiness. The number of distressed banks remained unchanged at 10. \n \n \nA survey of Primary Mortgage Institutions (PMIs) was conducted during the \nperiod to determine their viability as a prelude to their reforms. The Report on the \nrevised guideline for the operation of the PMIs is currently receiving attention of the \nCBN management. Meanwhile, the number of PMIs in operation remained at 195 as \nwas reported in December 1999. \n \n \nThe number of finance companies with AIP stood at 21 while those issued \noperational licence dropped from 280 to 72 at end-June, 2000 following the \ncancellation of 462 AIPs and the revocation of licences of 208 finance companies. \nThe number of community banks also remained at 1,014, the same as at \nend-December, 1999. \n \n \nEfforts to resolve the financial distress continued during the review period. The \njoint CBN/NDIC Technical Committee on problem \n \n \n \n \n13\n \nbanks discovered that some of the funds from prospective investors bidding to \nacquire some distressed banks were from unstable sources and hence unacceptable \nas capital deposit for acquisition of distressed banks. In another development, one of \nthe distressed banks, First African Trust Bank (now Eagles Bank) was handed over to \nthe new owners after meeting the requirements for acquisition. Meanwhile, the Credit \nRisk Management System (CRMS) took off during the review period. Banks have \nstarted rendering their returns on-line instead of the old diskette system. \n \n(b) \nMonetary and Credit Developments \nConsistent with the target expansion rate for fiscal 2000, the growth in broad \nmoney supply (M2) was moderate during the first half of the year. However, narrow \nmoney (M1) accelerated rapidly, particularly in June, owing largely to the sharp \nincrease in foreign assets (net) of the Central Bank. Provisional data indicated that M2 \nrose by 5.4 per cent to N 737,477.0 million within the stipulated target of 14.6 per \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \ncent for fiscal 2000 compared with the 19.5 per cent increase recorded in the \ncorresponding period of 1999 (Figure 3). Narrow money (M1) expanded by 10.3 per \nFigure 4: Banking System's Credit to the Economy \nDuring the First Half Year (Per Cent Growth Rate)\n-100.0\n-80.0\n-60.0\n-40.0\n-20.0\n0.0\n20.0\n40.0\n60.0\nPER CENT\nAC\nCG\nCP\nAC\n24.8\n14.1\n7.4\n-4.2\n7.9\n22.8\n17.2\n-18.2\nCG\n29.3\n-2.0\n-9.5\n-13.9\n-24.9\n51.7\n6.6\n-84.9\nCP\n27.5\n24.1\n48.0\n10.0\n25.2\n17.1\n21.3\n7.7\n1993\n1994\n1995\n1996\n1997\n1998\n1999\n2000\n \n14\ncent to N433,427.0 million, surpassing the 9.8 per cent target for the entire year and \nwas marginally higher than the 9.5 per cent achieved in the comparable period of \n1999. The growth in M2 reflected wholly the substantial increase in M1, as quasi-\nmoney fell during the period. The growth in M1 during the review period reflected the \nsharp rise in foreign assets (net) of the banking system, and the decline in quasi-\nmoney. However, the significant decline in aggregate credit, particularly to the \nFederal Government, as well as the decline in other assets (net), exerted a \nmoderating influence on the growth of M1. \n \nAggregate bank credit to the economy fell significantly during the first half of 2000, \nreflecting entirely the sharp fall in net credit to the Federal Government. Provisional \ndata indicated that, aggregate bank credit fell by 18.2 per cent, compared with the \n27.8 per cent target growth rate envisaged for fiscal 2000 and the 17.2 per cent \nincrease observed in the corresponding period of 1999 (Figure 4). \n \nNet credit to the Federal Government declined sharply by 84.9 per cent in the \nhalf-year, as against the target increase of 37.8 per cent stipulated for fiscal 2000 and \nthe increase of 6.6 per cent recorded in \n \n15\nFigure 5: Share of Governement and Private Sector in \nBanking System's Credit to the Economy \n0.0\n20.0\n40.0\n60.0\n80.0\n100.0\n120.0\nPER CENT \nCG %Tot\nCP % Tot\nCP % Tot\n65.9\n65.1\n52.9\n46.5\n76.0\n79.6\n75.0\n94.8\nCG %Tot\n34.1\n34.9\n47.1\n53.5\n24.0\n20.4\n25.0\n5.2\n1993\n1994\n1995\n1996\n1997\n1998\n1999\n2000\nthe first half of \n1999 (Figure 4). Accounting largely for the decline in net credit to the Government \nwas the sharp fall of 338.2 per cent in CBN net claims, following Government’s fiscal \nprudence, particularly in the first five months of the year, as well as the relatively tight \nmonetary policy adopted during the period. Figure 5 shows that net credit to \ngovernment accounted for 5.2 per cent of the banking systems’ credit to the economy \nduring the period. \n \n \nCredit to the private sector increased by 7.7 per cent, less than 21.9 per cent \nprojected expansion rate for fiscal 2000 and the 21.3 per cent growth recorded in the \nfirst half of 1999. Also, credit to state and local governments fell by 21.0 per cent, as \nagainst the 52.7 per cent increase in the corresponding period of 1999. Credit to \n‘other’ private sector, which constitutes the bulk (91.0 per cent) of private sector credit \nincreased by 7.1 per cent, compared with the increase of 26.0 per cent in the \ncorresponding period a year earlier. \n \n(c) \nInterest Rates \n \n16\n \n \nReported bank deposit and lending rates indicated mixed movements during \nthe first half of 2000. This reflected largely the impact of the liquidity overhang in the \nbanking system, coupled with the reduction in CRR and liquidity ratio. Available data \nindicated that the average rate on commercial banks’ savings deposits rose marginally \nfrom 5.3 per cent in December, 1999 to 5.4 per cent in March, 2000 but fell to 5.1 per \ncent in June. Similarly, the average rates on time deposits of various maturities, \nwhich increased from a range of 8.4-12.7 per cent in December 1999 to 8.7-13.4 per \ncent in March, moved downward to between 8.6-12.5 per cent at the end of June. The \naverage prime lending rates of commercial banks, which stood at 21.3 per cent at \nend-December, 1999 rose marginally by 0.6 percentage point to 21.9 per cent in \nMarch before declining to 20.8 per cent in June. Their maximum lending rate also fell \nfrom 27.2 per cent in December 1999 to 27.1 per cent. Deposit and lending rates of \nmerchant banks fluctuated downward during the half-year. For example 3-months \ntime deposit rate fell from 17.6 per cent in December 1999 to 16.8 per cent in June \n2000. Similarly, the average prime and maximum lending rates fell from 25.8 and 30.0 \nper cent, respectively in December 1999 to 23.2 and 27.7 per cent in June 2000. The \nwide spread between bank deposit and lending rates persisted during the half year of \n2000, as the gap between commercial banks’ savings and maximum lending rates \nstood at 22.0 percentage points in June. Also, the spread between merchant banks’ \n7-day deposit and their maximum lending rates stood at 16.8 percentage points at the \nend of June, 2000. Bank deposits and lending rates were, positive in real terms \nduring the review period as inflation rate moderated to an estimated 1.3 per cent in \nJune. \n \n17\nFigure 6: Selected Commercial Banks' Interest Rates (Per Cent, \nHalf Year)\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\nPer Cent\nMRR\nInter-Bank\nSavings\nPrime\nMax\nMRR\n13.5\n13.5\n13.5\n13.5\n13.5\n20\n17\nInter-Bank\n20.9\n20\n13.2\n6.6\n21.3\n31.8\n4.5\nSavings\n12.2\n12.4\n12.5\n4.8\n5.1\n6.2\n5.1\nPrime\n20.2\n20.3\n20\n17.5\n18\n20.9\n20.8\nMax\n21\n20.8\n20.8\n20\n21.1\n23.4\n27.1\n1994\n1995\n1996\n1997\n1998\n1999\n2000\n \n \n \nFollowing the downward review of CBN’s MRR from 18.0 to 17.0 per cent in April, \n2000, in an effort to narrow the gap between banks’ deposit and lending rates, and the \nsustained moderation in the rate of inflation, treasury bill issue rate declined from 17.0 \nto 16.0 per cent during the review period. \n \n(d) \nFinancial Savings \n \n \n \nAt N340,581.7 million, aggregate financial savings at the end of June 2000 was \n21.6 per cent over the level attained in December 1999. This represents 8.7 per cent \nof GDP compared with 8.6 per cent attained in June 1999. Time and savings deposits \nwith commercial and merchant banks, as in the past years, constituted the bulk of \naggregate institutional savings, accounting for 97.5 per cent of the total compared with \n97.0 and 97.1 per cent in December and June, 1999, respectively. Of the institutional \nsavings, commercial banks, accounted for 81.5 per cent, merchant banks 16.0 per \ncent, while other institutions accounted for the balance. \n \n(e) \nInter-bank Funds Market \n \n \n18\nThe inter-bank funds market witnessed a significant increase in the volume of \ntransactions during the first half of 2000, compared with the corresponding period of \n1999. The increase largely reflected the sustained pressure on the foreign exchange \nmarket, which compelled banks to source funds from the market during the review \nperiod. At N380.1 billion in the first half of the year, the aggregate value of \ntransactions rose by 15.5 and 78.1 per cent over the levels in the preceding half-year \nand the corresponding period of 1999, respectively. The inter-bank call placements, \nwhich constituted the bulk (46.2 per cent) averaged N29.2 billion, compared with \nN24.0 billion in the preceding half-year and the N15.2 billion in the corresponding \nperiod of 1999. Gross rediscounts totalled N134.9 billion in the first half of the year, \ncompared with the N136.9 billion recorded in the corresponding period of 1999 \n \n(f) \nCapital Market Developments \n \n \nThe Nigerian Stock Exchange was active in the first half of 2000. The volume \nand value of equities traded rose by 115.7 and 61.5 per cent from their levels in the \ncorresponding period of 1999 to 2,084 million and N9,100.8 million in the review \nperiod. Also, activities in Federal Government Development Stocks, which had been \ndormant, picked up during the review period as 8.7 million stocks valued at N8.1 \nmillion were traded. Similarly, Edo State Government offered for subscription N500 \nmillion First Edo State 21 per cent Floating Rate Revenue Bond 2002/2006 to finance \nits housing project. Market capitalisation and value price indices thus rose from \nN281.3 billion and 5,978.0 to N361.1 billion and 6,466.7, respectively, in the review \nperiod. This reflected largely investors’ confidence in the market. \n \n(f) \nCentral Banking \n \n \nProvisional data indicated that total assets/liabilities of the Central Bank \nincreased by 2.6 per cent over its end-December, 1999 level to N1,469,021.2 million \nin June, 2000. This represented an increase of 16.6 per cent when compared to its \nlevel in the corresponding period a year earlier, thus reflecting the increase of 18.4 per \ncent in the Bank’s foreign assets holding which was induced by the positive \ndevelopments in the international petroleum market. \n \n19\n \n \nDomestic assets, mainly investments in government securities, fell by 6.9 per \ncent to N829,829.3 million, in sharp contrast to the 37.8 per cent increase in the \ncomparable period of 1999. The fall was induced largely by the sharp decline in the \nBank’s holding of treasury securities following increased participation of the \ncommercial and merchant banks and other investors in the securities market. The \nBank’s other assets, on the other hand, rose by 2.7 per cent to N388,344.8 million \nduring the first half of 2000. \n \n \nTotal deposit liabilities of the Bank rose by 4.8 per cent to N644,546.7 million, \nwhile other liabilities (unclassified items) increased by 2.5 per cent to N607,514.7 \nmillion during the review period. The Bank’s currency liabilities, on the other hand, \ndeclined by 3.6 per cent to N201,025.5 million while its paid-up capital and general \nreserve remained at the end-December 1999 levels of N500.0 million and N15,434.3 \nmillion, respectively. \n \n(h) \nCommercial Banking \n \nTotal assets/liabilities of commercial banks rose by 19.0 per cent to \nN1,272,905.4 million during the first-half of 2000 compared with the increase of \nN287,501.9 million or 41.4 per cent in the corresponding half of 1999. Thus, they \naccounted for 88.6 per cent and 91.2 per cent of total assets and deposit liabilities of \nthe banking system, compared with 84.4 and 90.1 per cent, respectively, in June \n1999. This category of banks also contributed 89.4 per cent of the banking system’s \ncapital and reserves compared with 68.9 and 70.4 per cent in the preceding half-year \nand the corresponding period of 1999, respectively. Their dominance was further \nenhanced by the conversion of six merchant banks to commercial banks. \nFunds available to the banks during the period amounted to N207,946.1 million, \ncompared with N290,406.9 million during the first-half of 1999. The funds were \nsourced through increases in deposit liabilities (42.2 per cent), central government \ndeposits (39.5 per cent) and unclassified liabilities (18.7 per cent), among other \nsources. The funds were utilised to increase banks’ investment in government \nsecurities (15.2 per cent), claims on the private sector (23.6 per cent), acquisition of \n \n20\nforeign assets (5.6 per cent) and unclassified assets (42.6 per cent), among other \nuses. \n \n \nLoans and advances, which over the years constituted the bulk of investment \nportfolio, increased by 13.8 per cent during the period under review, compared with \n15.9 per cent recorded in the corresponding period of 1999. Aggregate liquidity ratio of \ncommercial banks improved from 48.1 and 50.9 per cent, respectively, in June and \nDecember 1999 to 56.2 per cent in June 2000 relative to the new statutory \nrequirement of 5.0 per cent. Loan/deposit ratio of the banks, however, dropped to \n39.9 per cent from 63.4 and 54.1 per cent in June and December, 1999, respectively. \n \n(i) \nMerchant Banking \n \nMerchant banks’ position continued to be relatively weak in terms of assets, \ndeposit liabilities and capital/reserves during the period under review. Assets of the \nbanks constituted 11.4 per cent of the banking system’s total assets in June 2000, \ncompared with 15.6 per cent in June 1999. The banks also accounted for 8.8 per cent \nof total deposit liabilities as against 9.9 per cent in the corresponding period of 1999. \nTheir contribution to the system’s capital and reserves was 10.6 per cent compared \nwith 10.9 and 30.0 per cent, respectively, in December and June 1999. \n \n \nAt N163,585.9 million in June, 2000, merchant banks’ total assets increased by \n31.9 per cent. Total funds available to the banks amounted to N39,895.4 million, \ncompared with N51,238.9 million in June 1999. The funds were sourced mainly from \nincreases in deposit liabilities (55.1 per cent), other liabilities (22.1 per cent) and \ncapital accounts (7.5 per cent), among other sources. The funds were utilised for the \npurposes of increasing other assets (54.6 per cent), claims on the private sector (39.3 \nper cent) and acquisition of foreign assets (4.3 per cent), among other uses. \n \n \nAt N74,722.3 million, merchant banks’ aggregate credit increased by 7.1 per \ncent compared with an increase of 22.9 per cent in the comparable period of 1999. \nLoans and advances granted amounted to N62,546.9 million, representing 83.7 per \ncent of aggregate credit of the banks. The aggregate loan/deposit ratio was 82.6 per \n \n21\ncent in June 2000 compared with 91.2 per cent in December 1999. The average \nliquidity ratio of merchant banks was 59.3 per cent in June 2000, which reflected an \nimprovement over the 55.3 per cent attained in December 1999. \n \n(j) \nDiscount Houses \n \n \nThe number of discount houses operating in Nigeria remained unchanged at 5. \nTheir total assets/liabilities amounted to N22,758.5 million at end-June 2000, \nindicating an increase of 51.2 per cent over the level in December, 1999. The \ninvestible funds generated by the houses, which amounted to N8,566.8 million, were \nsourced from increases in money at call (62.8%), other liabilities (27.9%) and increase \nin capital/reserves (3.5%), among other sources. The funds were utilised to increase \ninvestments in government securities (43.0%), other investments (7.0%) claims on \nbanks (39.5%), among others. \n \n3.3 \nExternal Sector Developments \n \n(a) \nBalance of Payments \n \nProvisional estimates for the first half of the year revealed that the pressure on \nNigeria’s balance of payments abated as the overall position resulted in a modest \nsurplus of N78,323.3 million (US $782.4 million), as against the huge deficit of \nN304,878.4 million (US $3,397.7 million) in the first half of 1999. The favourable \ndevelopment in the external sector was largely as a result of the huge surplus of \nN320,906.6 million (US $3,205.6 million) in the current account which more than offset \nthe deficit of N235,605.9 million (US $2,353.5 million) in the capital account. \nGovernment’s policy of reserves build-up received a boost as the gross reserves grew \nby 33.7 per cent from end-December 1999 level of $5,440.7 million to US $7,272.4 \nmillion. At that level, the external reserves could finance 11.6 months of imports. The \nimprovement in the current account, which started in the second half of 1999, was \nsustained in the review period. The trade account deficit of N5,106.8 million (US \n$57.0 million) recorded in the first half of 1999 swung into surpluses of N412,291.6 \nmillion (US $4,345.4 million) and N80,962.1 million (US $4,804.4 million) in the second \n \n22\nhalf of 1999 and the review period, respectively. The surpluses were traceable to \nincreased inflow from crude oil exports occasioned by the rise in average crude oil \nprices from US $13.5 per barrel in the \n-400.0\n-300.0\n-200.0\n-100.0\n0.0\n100.0\n200.0\n300.0\n400.0\nBillion Naira\nFigure 7: Balance of Payments (Annualized: 1993-96; Ist Half-\nyear: 1997-2000) \nCur. Acct\nCap. Acct\nOverall Bal.\nCur. Acct\n-19.5\n-52.3\n-186.1\n240.2\n-25.7\n-201.3\n-202.0\n320.9\nCap. Acct\n-19.7\n11.3\n-3.3\n-290.2\n30.8\n133.5\n-99.7\n-235.6\nOverall Bal.\n-41.8\n-42.6\n-19.5\n-53.2\n2.7\n-75.2\n-304.9\n78.3\n1993\n1994\n1995\n1996\n1997\n1998\n1999\n2000\nfirst half of \n1999 to US $22.5 and $27.1 in the second half of 1999, and the review period, \nrespectively. In addition to the significant oil export increases, import bills dropped by \n14.6 per cent from the level in the first half of 1999 to N376,434.3 million (US $3,760.3 \nmillion) (Figure 9). Although, non-oil export performance continued to be weak, it \nincreased from N11,244.0 million (US $125.5 million) in the first half of 1999 to \nN14,826.1 million (US $148.1 million). \n \nThe deficit in the services and income account persisted, although the net \nposition in the account improved from N244,689.4 million (US $2,731.1 million) in the \nfirst half of 1999, respectively, to N195,351.6 million (US $1,951.4 million). This \nreflected decreases in expenditures in respect of all the components of invisible \ntransactions, including the Joint Venture Cash (JVC) Calls. However, the surplus in \nunrequited transfers declined from N47,852.0 million (US $534.1 million) in the \ncorresponding half of 1999 to N35,296.1 million (US $352.6 million), an indication of a \nslow down in home remittances by Nigerian residents abroad. The pressure on the \nexternal sector manifested more in the capital account with the deficit enlarging from \n \n23\nN99,735.7 million (US $1,113.2 million) in the first half of 1999 to N263,766.4 million \n(US $2,780.0 million) in the second half of 1999 but declined to N235,605.9 million \n(US $2,353.5 million). Scheduled debt service payments and Nigeria’s short-term \nclaims on foreigners were responsible for the unfavourable performance of the capital \naccount. Consequently, the overall surplus of the balance of payments was \nFigure 8: Exports and Imports (Annualized:1993-97; 1st Half \nyear: 1997-2000) \n-200.0\n0.0\n200.0\n400.0\n600.0\n800.0\n1000.0\n1200.0\nBillion Naira\nExpt.\nImpts.\nTrd. Bal.\nExpt.\n219.4\n206.1\n825.7\n1125.7\n587.6\n391.6\n435.7\n857.4\nImpts.\n147.2\n144.7\n578.4\n449.7\n379.1\n440.9\n440.8\n376.4\nTrd. Bal.\n72.3\n61.3\n247.2\n676.0\n208.5\n-49.3\n-5.1\n481\n1993\n1994\n1995\n1996\n1997\n1998\n1999\n2000\n \nachieved through deferment of some portion of the debt service due, amounting to \nN59,015.4 million (US $589.5 million). \n \n(b) External Assets \n \nNigeria’s total external assets as at the end of the first half of 2000 stood at \nN921,028 million ($9,012.0 million), compared with N625,400.8 million ($6,591.5 \nmillion) at end-June, 1999 and N698,874.3 million ($7,116.9 million) at end-December, \n1999. This represented increases of 47.3 and 31.8 per cent above the level achieved \nat end-June and end-December, 1999 respectively. The Central Bank of Nigeria’s \n(CBN) holdings stood at N743,240.7 million ($7,272.4 million) as against N453,291.0 \nmillion ($4,777.5 million) at end-June, 1999, representing 80.7 per cent of the total \nexternal assets, compared with 72.5 per cent in the corresponding period of 1999. \nThe bulk of the CBN holdings was in foreign bank balances. The combined share of \ncommercial and merchant banks’ net assets increased from N169,503.1 million \n \n24\n($1,786.5 million) at end-June 1999 to N177,764.3 million ($1,739.4 million) at end-\nJune, 2000. \n \n3.4 \nInternational Economic and Monetary Developments \n \n(a) \nInternational Foreign Exchange Market \n \n \nInternational foreign exchange market during the period under review was \ndominated by the US dollar. The dollar was supported at the foreign exchanges by \nthe sustained expansion of the US economy, which triggered large movement of long-\nterm capital from the Euro-zone to the US. Overall, the US dollar appreciated against \nthe pound sterling, Deutsche Mark, French Franc, Dutch Guilder, Swiss France and \nthe Euro by 3.2, 12.1, 11.3, 12.3, 11.5 and 14.1 per cent, respectively. The strength of \nthe dollar was supported by positive economic fundamentals such as the GDP growth \nrate of 7.3 per cent, interest rate of 6.76 per cent and low inflation rate of 3.0 per cent \nin the first quarter of 2000. \n \n(b) \nDevelopments in the International \n Commodity Organizations \n \n \nThe International Coffee Organization (ICO) and Inter-African Coffee \nOrganization (IACO) met in London in May 2000 and discussed the persistent decline \nin coffee prices in the past three years. They decided that the Coffee Retention Plan \nshould come into force by June, 2000 in member countries in order to reduce the total \nworld coffee exports by about 20.0 per cent so as to boost coffee price. The average \ncomposite price of coffee in the international market was US $0.675 per pound in May \n2000, compared with US $0.9128 in the first four months of 1999, representing 26.0 \nper cent decline. The retention committee would decide, whether or not, to release \nretained coffee stocks whenever the price indicator reaches US $0.95 per pound. The \nrelease of stocks would, however, be mandatory when the price indicator rises up to \n110 U.S. cents per pound. \n \n \nThe International Cocoa Council (ICCO) at its sixty-first regular session in \n \n25\nLondon in March 2000 resolved to invite the World Bank and the IMF to assist cocoa \nproducing countries in finding suitable ways of marketing their produce within the \nframework of liberalized trading system. The intention was to moderate the harmful \neffects of exclusive spot market, encourage forward sales and relax the downward \npressure on cocoa prices. The Council would promote stronger cooperation between \nthe Common Fund for Commodities (CFC), the World Bank and the ICCO to assist \nproducing countries in stabilizing the cocoa market in the short-run through increased \nuse of price-risk management instruments. \n \n(c) International Monetary Institutions/Cooperation \n \n(i) \nWorld Bank/IMF \n \n \nThe Spring Meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World \nBank were held in Washington D. C., United States of America in April, 2000. The \nissues discussed included world economic outlook, the strengthening of the IMF’s role \nin the global economy, review of Fund facilities, safeguards and misreporting and \nprivate sector involvement in the resolution of financial crisis. Other issues were \ntransparency and accountability as well as the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) \nInitiative for Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategies. \n \n \nThe meetings endorsed the decision of the IMF Board to streamline its \noperations by eliminating four facilities - the Currency Stabilization Fund, Support for \nCommercial Bank Debt and Debt Service Reduction, the Buffer Stock Financing \nFacility, and the Contingency Element of the Compensatory and Contingency \nFinancing Facility. The Fund also endorsed the requirement that all countries making \nuse of its resources should publish annual central bank financial statements that are \nindependently audited in accordance with internationally accepted standards in order \nto check cases of misreporting and misuse of resources provided to members under \nIMF arrangements. \n \n \nThe Fund noted the need for fairness in the treatment of different cases of \nprivate creditors, and agreed that private sector involvement should proceed on the \n \n26\nbasis that no class of creditors should be considered as inherently privileged. The \nFund reiterated the importance attached to greater transparency in policy making by \nimproving the functioning of national economies as well as the international financial \nsystem. \n \n \nOn the HIPC Initiative and Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), the \nIMF and the World Bank have embarked on the implementation of poverty reduction. \nprogrammes. However, progress in the implementation of the debt reduction has \nbeen slow as only five countries - Bolivia, Mauritania, Mozambique, Tanzania and \nUganda - earlier considered under the Initiatives, have reached their decision points \nunder the new framework. A key requirement for reaching the completion point under \nthe enhanced HIPC Initiative and for drawing from PRGF is the adoption of a fully \ndeveloped Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme (PRSP) that is endorsed by the \nWorld Bank and IMF. \n \n(ii) \nAssociation of African Central Banks \n \n \nThe Assembly of Governors of the Association of African Central Banks \n(AACB) met in Abuja, Nigeria in January, 2000. They agreed that the Central Bank of \nNigeria should continue to act as an Interim Secretariat of the AACB until the issue of \na permanent secretariat was resolved. A working group was mandated to make \nproposals on the cost implications of establishing a permanent secretariat for \nsubmission at its next meeting in Tanzania. The executive body of the Association \nwas reconstituted into a technical committee to draw up an Action Programme for an \nAfrican Monetary Cooperation to be presented for consideration at its next meeting. \nOther issues discussed were the interim report of the liquidated African Centre for \nMonetary Studies (ACMS) and the amended statute of the AACB, and recommended \nthat the final reports of the two issues should be submitted at the next meeting. \n \n(iii) \nECOWAS Single Monetary Zone \n \n \nThe Heads of State of Ghana, The Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra \nLeone expressed commitment to establish a Second Monetary Zone by 1st January \n \n27\n2003 to facilitate attainment of the ECOWAS Single Monetary Zone. This was in line \nwith the decision of the Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS that two or more \ncountries could take initiative to accelerate integration in the region. Consequently, \nthey agreed to take concerted actions to attain the following quantitative primary \nconvergence criteria, which are preconditions for the establishment of a Second \nMonetary Zone: single digit inflation rate by the Year 2000 and 5.0 per cent by 2003; \ngross external reserves to cover at least 3 months of imports by end 2000 and 6 \nmonths by end 2003; central bank financing of budget deficit to be limited to 10.0 per \ncent of previous year’s tax revenue; budget deficit (excluding grants) to GDP ratio of \nnot more than 5.0 per cent by 2000 and 4.0 per cent by 2002. \n \n \nA three-stage action plan covering the period January 2000, to December, \n2003 for the implementation of the convergence criteria was adopted. The first stage \nwould involve the harmonization of macroeconomic policies and concepts, review of \nthe institutional, administrative and legal framework for establishing the second \nmonetary zone, sensitization of public, etc. The second and third stages of the Action \nPlan include: the establishment of macroeconomic data base and studies on \nCompensation and Stabilization Mechanism, Exchange Rate Mechanism and \npreparation of a project document for technical assistance from the IMF and the World \nBank, all of which would lead to the establishment of a Common Central Bank and the \nintroduction of a common currency by December, 2003. This would be merged with \nthe existing CFA franc of the UEMOA group by December 2004 to form a single \ncurrency under the ECOWAS Monetary Cooperation Programme. \n \n \nThe Committee of Governors of ECOWAS Central Banks met in Dakar, \nSenegal in May, 2000 and agreed that the macroeconomic convergence criteria \nadopted by the second sub-regional monetary zone were consistent with those \nprescribed by ECOWAS Heads of State and Government in Lome in December, 1999. \nThe Governors also identified phases of activities which would facilitate the creation of \nECOWAS Single Monetary Zone as follows: harmonisation of economic and financial \nmanagement, revitalization of West African Monetary Agency (WAMA), review of \neligible transactions through the clearing system, review of member countries \n \n28\neconomic adjustment and harmonisation of domestic taxation system and the \nestablishment of a single Central Bank. \n \n3.5 \nReal Sector Developments \n \nThere were mixed developments in the domestic economic conditions during the \nfirst half of 2000. While agricultural sector recorded further improvement, the \nindustrial sector deteriorated slightly. Inflationary pressures moderated, but the socio-\npolitical situation was relatively unfavourable. \n \n(a) \nAgricultural Production \n \n \nThe steady increase in agricultural production observed in the preceding five \nyears, was sustained in the first half of 2000. At 217.7 (1984 = 100), the aggregate \nindex of agricultural production increased by 3.3 per cent, compared with 3.1 and 2.0 \nper \ncent \ngrowth \nrecorded \nin \nFigure 9: Index of Agricultural Production (1984 = \n100; 1st Half Year)\n0\n200\n400\n600\nNumber\nCrops\nLivestock\nFishing\nForestry\nAggregate\nFishing\n62.9\n67.1\n74\n48.6\n45\n46.9\n56.1\n58.8\nLivestock\n161.6\n164.1\n171\n73.2\n73.7\n73.9\n80.5\n83.8\nCrops\n248.7\n249.4\n257.9\n243.8\n250\n254.9\n261.8\n268.7\nAggregate\n211.1\n218.1\n226\n195.7\n200.4\n204.4\n210.7\n217.7\nF\nt\n124 7\n128\n130 8\n122 9\n124 3\n126\n126 6\n130 4\n1993\n1994\n1995\n1996\n1997\n1998\n1999\n2000\nthe first half of \n1999 and 1998, respectively. All the sub-sectors contributed to the observed growth. \nCrop production rose by 2.6 per cent, compared with 2.7 per cent in 1999. The output \nof staples increased by 4.2 per cent higher than the 2.5 per cent recorded in the \npreceding half year. Also, cash crop production rose by 3.0 per cent compared with \n3.7 per cent (Figure 10). The improved agricultural performance during the half year \n \n29\nwas attributed mainly to favourable weather conditions, especially rainfall which was \ntimely, adequate and well distributed throughout the country, except in the case of few \nstates in the north -eastern part of the country that reported late rains. Other factors, \nwhich supported intense farming activities during the period, included low incidence of \npests and diseases, as well as better distribution and availability of farm inputs, \nespecially fertilizers, though at a high cost. \n \n \nThe prices of Nigeria’s major agricultural export commodities at the London \nCommodities Market in the first half of the year continued the downward trend, which \nbegan in the first half of 1998. At 50.5 (1985 = 100), the all commodities price index, \nin dollar terms, declined by 17.7 and 21.6 per cent below the levels in the first half of \n1999 and 1998, respectively. Of the six commodities monitored, palm oil recorded the \nhighest price decline of 15.2 per cent, while cocoa, coffee, cotton, soya bean and \ncopra recorded price losses of 14.3, 11.9, 8.6, 7.6 and 3.2 per cent, respectively. As \nin the preceding year, increased international supply of most of the commodities, \ncoupled with slack in demand, accounted mainly for the general decline in prices. \n \n \nThe domestic retail prices of most selected food items fell during the period. Of \nthe eight commodities monitored, only one registered price increase while the \nremaining seven recorded price declines relative to their respective levels in 1999. \nThe price decreases ranged from 1.8 per cent for beans (brown) to 34.5 per cent for \nmillet, while the price of rice increased by 19.5 per cent. The price increase was \nattributable to rising production and transportation costs due to the poor condition of \nsome rural roads, which made evacuation of farm produce to the urban centres \ndifficult. \n \n(b) \nIndustrial Production \n \n \nThe deterioration in industrial output continued in the first half of 2000. The \nprovisional index of industrial production, at 130.0 (1985 = 100), fell by 0.8 per cent \nfrom the level in the first half of 1999, but indicated a 2.2 per cent increase over the \nlevel in the preceding half year. The fall in output from the level in corresponding \nperiod was accounted for by 1.3 and 5.6 per cent drop in mining output and electricity \n \n30\nconsumption, respectively, as manufacturing production rose marginally by 0.6 per \ncent. The increase recorded over the second half of 1999 reflected improvements in \nmining operations as the manufacturing and electricity sub-sectors suffered some \nset-back. Also, aggregate manufacturing capacity utilization rate, at 33.8 per cent, \nrepresented an increase of 0.6 percentage point over its level in the first half of 1999, \nbut indicated a fall of 2.3 percentage points from the level in the preceding half year \n(Figure 11). \nFigure 10: Index of Industrial Production (1985 = \n100; 1st Half Year)\n0.0\n100.0\n200.0\n300.0\nNumber\nManu\nMining\nElectricity\nAll Sectors\nMining\n124.6\n129.5\n122.2\n128.5\n129.5\n139.2\n128.5\n126.9\nManu\n145.5\n140.0\n136.6\n137.7\n138.2\n133.9\n135.5\n136.3\nAll Sectors\n131.7\n133.3\n127.5\n131.8\n132.6\n137.5\n131.0\n130.0\nElectricity\n142.2\n148.5\n149.2\n150.0\n143.7\n136.9\n137.9\n130.2\n1993\n1994\n1995\n1996\n1997\n1998\n1999\n2000\n \n \n \nThe continued poor performance of the manufacturing sub-sector was \nattributed largely to the uncertainty associated with the late approval and \nimplementation of the year 2000 budget. Other factors included numerous communal \nand religious clashes in some parts of the country, which adversely affected \nmanufacturing activities. Another major constraint was high cost of production \nascribed to high exchange and interest rates, multiple taxes and levies imposed by \nstate and local governments and poor performing economic infrastructure. \n \n \nMining output fell in relation to the corresponding period of 1999, owing to the \ndecline in the production of all the principal minerals, except columbite. Crude oil \nproduction, including condensates, estimated at 311.77 million barrels, fell by 0.5 per \ncent from its level in the first and second halves of 1999, respectively. The average \n \n31\ndaily production was 2.00 million barrels, compared with 2.04 and 2.00 million barrels \nrecorded in the corresponding period of 1999 and the preceding half-year, \nrespectively. Domestic output was sustained in spite of the disruptions of operations, \noccasioned by communal clashes in the oil producing communities. Nigeria’s \nproduction quota (excluding condensates) averaged 2.00 million barrels per day (mbd) \nduring the period. It was raised from 1.97 to 2.033 mbd from April following an \nincrease in total OPEC quota to 24.69 mbd. \n \n \nAggregate crude oil exports, at 311.8.0 million barrels, declined by 0.5 per cent \nbelow the level in the first half of 1999, while a total of 54.8 million barrels were \nsupplied for processing and local consumption, almost the same as in the \ncorresponding period. The first Port Harcourt Refinery was undergoing a Turn-Around \nMaintenance (TAM) during the review period. The other three refineries (Kaduna, \nWarri and Second Port Harcourt) processed 2.29 million tonnes of crude oil, indicating \na decline of 44.6 per cent from the level processed in 1999. The total output of \npetroleum products from the refineries was 2.11 million tonnes, representing a decline \nof 45.2 per cent below the corresponding period’s output. Consequently, the average \ncapacity utilization rate of the refineries dropped from 30.4 to 25.7 per cent. The \nmajor constraints on refinery operations during the period were delayed TAM at the \nsecond Port Harcourt Refinery, and equipment and power plant failures at the Kaduna \nRefinery. The Warri Refinery operated for only two months as a result of the \nexplosion of one of its heaters, which paralyzed its activities. \n \nAt $27.06 per barrel, the average price of Nigeria’s reference crude, the Bonny \nLight (37o API), rose by 93.9 and 23.4 per cent above $13.95 and $21.93 recorded in \nthe corresponding period and the second half of 1999, respectively. The upward \nmovement in price during the review period was attributed largely to increased \ndemand for crude oil by the major consumer nations, especially the United States of \nAmerica and the East Asian countries, as well as disruption in crude oil supply in \nNorway by oil workers strike in April. \n \n \nAt 17,926.9 million cubic metres (MMm\n3), the output of natural gas declined by \n0.8 and 0.9 per cent below the levels in the corresponding and second halves of 1999, \n \n32\nrespectively. Total gas flared at 13,207.7 MMm3 accounted for 73.7 per cent of total \nproduction and indicated a decline of 2.6 percentage points from the proportion flared \nin the first half of 1999. The reduction was attributed to various gas-flaring reduction \nmeasures adopted by oil producing companies. Gas re-injected rose by 26.2 per cent \nto 2005.6 MMm3, while the volume sold to industries increased by 29.0 per cent to \n1428.0 MMm3. Also, gas converted to NGLs increased by 9.6 per cent to 113.4 \nMMm3. In contrast, gas used for pressure lift in oil wells fell by 11.5 per cent to 4405.9 \nMMm3. \n \n \nA total of 4.6 million tonnes of petroleum products were consumed during the \nperiod under review, representing a fall of 0.4 per cent from the level in the first half of \n1999. Except the consumption of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and premium motor \nspirit (PMS), which increased by 25.7 and 4.0 per cent, respectively, the consumption \nof all the other products recorded declines. In addition, the bulk of the consumption \nwas mainly imports as local production was severely constrained. The decline in \nconsumption was attributable mainly to arbitrary increases in prices by dealers, official \nupward adjustment in prices in late May and the social unrest, which disrupted \nproducts distribution. \n \n \nAggregate production of solid minerals at 0.92 million tonnes, declined by 13.2 \nand 10.0 per cent below the levels in the first and second halves of 1999, respectively. \nThe decrease in output was accounted for by all the components except columbite \nproduction, which increased by 3.3 per cent relative to the first half of 1999. The \ndecline in the aggregate output of the solid minerals sub-sector was attributable, \namong others, to shortage of spare parts and mining equipment. \n \n \nElectricity consumption deteriorated further during the first half of 2000. At \n4,005.0 million KWh, projected electricity consumption plummeted by 5.6 and 7.6 per \ncent from the levels in the first and second halves of 1999, respectively. All the three \nmajor electricity-consuming components accounted for the drop. Residential \nconsumption which accounted for 51.2 per cent of total consumption, declined by 5.9 \nper cent to 2,048.6 million KWh. Commercial/street lighting and industrial components \nwhich represented 26.7 and 22.1 per cent of total consumption fell by 6.4 and 4.1 per \n \n33\ncent to 1,069.3 and 887.1 million KWh, respectively. Similarly, compared with \nconsumption levels during the preceding half year, residential, commercial/street \nlighting and industrial consumption fell by 8.4, 7.7 and 5.3 per cent, respectively. The \ngeneral reduction in electricity consumption reflected reduced supply occasioned by \nthe precarious state of electricity infrastructure nation-wide, which resulted in three full \nsystem failures during the period. Other major bottlenecks of the sub-sector included \nvandalization of NEPA facilities, as well as poor maintenance, broken down \ntransformers and cables, owing largely to inadequate funding. \n \n(c) \nTransportation \n \n \nThe performance of various transportation modes in the first half of year 2000 \nwas mixed. Shipping and Railway services improved slightly, while road transportation \nservices declined. The estimated number of ships that berthed and departed the \nNigerian ports was 1,467 and 1,119, respectively, indicating increases of 6.8 and 9.8 \nper cent. The volume of goods evacuated from the hinterland to the seaports by all \nmodes of transportation also rose by 19.2 per cent to 713 million tonnes. The shares \nof road, water, rail and other modes (pipelines, conveyor belt and suction pipes) in \ntotal haulage were 41.6, 7.7, 6.7 and 44.0 per cent, respectively. The improvement in \nrail services during the period was as a result of the re-opening of some routes, \nfollowing the rehabilitation of their tracks. This improvement had led to increased \npassenger revenue and passengers/Km carried. \n \n(d) \nConsumer Prices \n \nThe downward trend in inflationary pressure observed in the second half of \n1999, continued in the first half of 2000. Data from the Federal Office of Statistics \n(FOS) showed that the composite consumer \n \n \n34\nFigure 11: Consumer Price Indices and Inflation \nRate (1985 = 100; 1st Half Year)\n0.0\n1000.0\n2000.0\n3000.0\n4000.0\nNumbers\n1.0\n10.0\n100.0\n1000.0\n10000.0\nPer Cent \nComposite\nFood\nUrban\nRural\nInflation\nComposite\n780.6 1105.1 2094.9 2699.2 2723.4 3204.7 3469.9 3780.2\nFood\n855.6 1115.1 2107.3 2715.4 2687.6 3134.7 3218.1 3515.8\nUrban\n846.5 1232.3 2156.4 2867.7 2935.4 3262.9 3560.7 3575.0\nRural\n767.7 1080.4 2083.0 2666.4 2682.2 3193.4 3452.3 3435.9\n1993\n1994\n1995\n1996\n1997\n1998\n1999\n2000\n \nprice index (CPI) for June 2000 was estimated at 3780.2 (1985 = 100), \nrepresenting an inflation rate of 1.3 per cent, as against 12.1 per cent in June 1999 \n(Figure 12). Analysis of the components of the CPI revealed that the food index \nincreased by 9.3 per cent while some non-food items such as transportation, \nrecreation and other services increased by 1.5, 9.1 and 13.1 percentage points, \nrespectively, when compared to the first half of 1999. In contrast, the index for \nmedical, clothing and footwear however, fell by 1.8 and 0.2 per cent, respectively. \nThe decline in inflation rate was traced largely to favourable harvests of some food \ncrops, and the late release of the 2000 appropriation bill, which led to a general lull in \neconomic activities. \n \n(e) Labour Market \n \n \nAlthough labour statistics were not available from the Federal Office of \nStatistics and the Federal Ministry of Employment, Labour and Productivity, anecdotal \nevidence indicate that the unemployment situation deteriorated. Projections indicated \nthat the national unemployment rate was 5.1 per cent compared with 4.7 per cent \nestimated for the same period of 1999. The rural unemployment rate was projected \nat 4.3 per cent as against 3.9 per cent recorded in the corresponding period of 1999. \nIn contrast, the urban unemployment rate declined by 0.2-percentage point from 6.5 \nper cent estimated for 1999 to 6.3 per cent for year 2000. The unemployment \nstatistics should, however, be interpreted with caution, as evidence abounds that \n \n35\nunemployment was larger than reported, owing to labour lay-offs and staff \nrationalization in many states and the Federal Public Service. Furthermore, private \nsector employment generation capacity was constrained by structural bottlenecks, \nincluding fallen demand for goods and services, frequent power outages and \ninfrastructural inadequacies. \n \n \nIndustrial relations were strained during the period following the wage review \ninitiated by the Federal Government. Many state governments were yet to agree with \nthe labour unions on the new wage structure, hence the numerous strike actions by \nworkers. In addition, an upward review of petroleum product prices led to a \nnationwide strike, which paralyzed the economy for a week. \n \n(f) Social Services \n \nThe delivery of social services was impaired during the review period owing largely \nto the late passage of the 2000 Appropriation Bill. Protests against the increase in \npetroleum product prices by the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) and the industrial \nactions by state government workers for the harmonization of salaries and wages with \nfederal workers were some of the factors that disrupted the provision of social services \nduring the first half of the year. However, some activities of the sub-sector received a \nboost through the launching of specific programmes, such as the Federal \nGovernment’s Poverty Alleviation Programme (PAP) and the Universal Basic \nEducation Scheme. The former has the objective of providing direct jobs for 200,000 \nunemployed persons nationwide, while the latter is aimed at ensuring that all children \nof school age acquire at least primary education free of charge. The problem of social \ninsecurity, with threats to lives and property remained intractable in the first half of the \nyear with reported cases of riots and civil strikes in some parts of the country. Armed \nrobbery and other criminal activities persisted. However, to effectively address the \nsecurity issues the law enforcement agencies were provided additional equipment with \na view to enhancing their operational capabilities. Also, more personnel were \nrecruited to ensure increased surveillance and policing of the country. \n \n \n \n36\n4. \nCBN POLICY RESPONSE AND OPERATIONS \n \nThe CBN policy response and operations during the review period was guided \nby the desire to keep inflation within a single digit level, through the maintenance of \nappropriate monetary and exchange rate regime, as well as improved the overall \nconfidence in the financial system. Although inflationary pressure was at its lowest \nebb, rising stock of liquidity in the system following the substantial monetization of the \nenhanced foreign exchange receipts from crude oil sales and transfer of government’s \ndeposits to deposit money banks was a potential threat to monetary stability. Also, \nthere was an unprecedented surge in foreign exchange demand, which threatened \nexchange rate stability. These problems were the main underlying factors, which \ninformed the policy responses during the period. \n \n(a) \nLiquidity Management \n \n \nOpen Market Operations (OMO) remained the primary instrument of liquidity \nmanagement by the CBN during the first half of 2000. Total bids and sales rose \nsharply, compared with the preceding half-year and the corresponding period of 1999. \nThe levels, which fell in January 2000 compared with the preceding month, increased \nsignificantly in February following largely the liquidity surfeit in the banking system. It, \nhowever, fell in March due to the increased pressure in the IFEM before recovering in \nApril. Reflective of the sudden growth in the level of liquidity in the banking system \nduring the last two weeks of June, aggregate bids peaked at N106.6 billion during the \nmonth, but aggregate sales amounted to only N16.96 billion, following the paucity of \nthe intervention securities in the CBN portfolio. In spite of this development, total bids \nand sales stood at N304.4 billion and N165.4 billion during the first half of 2000, \ncompared with N77.7 billion and N72.1 billion in the preceding half-year and N104.0 \nbillion and N95.5 billion in the comparable period of 1999. \n \nThere was an over-subscription in the primary and secondary markets during \nthe review period. Total issues of treasury bills, amounting to N129,564.6 million, \nwere made to refinance maturing bills in the first half of 2000, compared with \nN71,267.2 million in the corresponding period of 1999. Thus, total treasury bills \n \n37\noutstanding remained unchanged at end-December, 1999 level of N361,758.4 million. \nThe surge in banking system liquidity for most part of the review period, coupled with \nthe attractiveness of the treasury bill rate, accounted for the significant rise in \nsubscription by banks and non-bank public in the primary market, compared with the \nlevel in the first half of 1999. Owing to the observed patronage by these investors, \nCentral \nBank’s \ntake-up \nconstituted \nonly \n27.7 \nper \ncent \nof \nthe \ntotal \nFigure 12: Structure of Treasury Bills Holdings in Nigeria (% of Total) \n1st Half 2000 1st Half 1998 1st Half 1999\nCBN\nCBs\nMBs\nNBPub\n67.6\n11.3\n2\n19.1\n27.7\n46.2\n1.1\n25\n53\n26.2\n0.5\n20.4\nissues, \nwhile \nthe commercial and merchant banks accounted for 46.2 and 1.1 per cent, \nrespectively. The balance of 25.0 per cent went to other investors. Similarly, \nfollowing the large liquidity overhang and low rediscounts at the end of June, Central \nBank holdings of the security fell significantly to an all-time low of N10,400.0 million or \n2.9 per cent of total outstanding in June, 2000, compared with N79,860.5 million or \n22.1 per cent at end-December 1999 and N219,665.4 million or 60.7 per cent in June, \n1999. Commercial and merchant bank’s holdings increased sharply from N186,142.7 \nmillion and N12,723.3 million in December 1999 to N292,692.1 million and N14,576.3 \nmillion, respectively in June, 2000. \n \n \nIn order to reduce the cost of funds to banks and minimize the distortion in the \nfinancial markets, as well as induce down ward movements in the lending rates, the \nCRR and the LR were reduced from 12.0 and 40.0 to 11.5 and 35.0 per cent, \nrespectively, in April 2000. Earlier in April 2000, the CBN’s Minimum Rediscount Rate \n \n38\n(MRR) was lowered by 100 basis points to 17.0 per cent following the ease in \neconomic and market conditions. \n \n(b) \nFinancial Sector Surveillance \n \nThe CBN intensified its efforts geared towards the supervision and surveillance \nof the financial system during the review period. The Bank carried out routine/ \ntarget/maiden examinations of 42 financial institutions made up of 19 commercial \nbanks, 8 merchant banks, one (1) development bank, one (1) primary mortgage \ninstitution, 7 finance companies, 11 community banks and 2 discount houses during \nthe period. In addition, 39 special investigations were carried out based on allegations \nand complaints by clients, which indicted some financial institutions of various \nmalpractices. The report of the investigations showed that most of the examined \ninstitutions were characterized by poor record keeping, poor credit administration and \nineffective recovery procedures, weak assets quality and weak internal control. They \nwere also characterized by infractions of the provisions of BOFI Decree 1999 and \nvarious other circulars issued by the CBN. Appropriate penalties were imposed on \ndefaulters. \n \nThe routine examinations of the foreign exchange operations of 14 banks were \nalso carried out during the period. In addition, 14 special investigations on foreign \nexchange issues were carried out on commercial and merchant banks. The \nexaminations and investigations revealed the usual infractions such as non and/or late \nrepatriation of export proceeds to the CBN, excess charges on customers processing \nforms “M” clause “NOT VALID FOR FOREIGN EXCHANGE”, failure to distribute the \nnaira proceeds of the repatriated interest to eligible LC customers; poor recording \nkeeping and weak internal controls. During the period under review, spot checks on \nforeign exchange utilization were carried out on 6 banks to determine the reasons for \nthe high demand for foreign exchange. The exercise revealed that 3 of the banks \nreleased foreign exchange on the basis of spurious documents, engaged in fraudulent \ntransactions and were appropriately sanctioned along with their customers. \n \n \n39\n \nDuring the period under review, the Money Laundering Surveillance Unit \nconducted routine examinations of 17 commercial banks, 10 merchant banks, one (1) \ncommunity bank, one (1) development bank and one (1) primary mortgage institution \nto ascertain their level of compliance with the provisions of the Money Laundering \nDecree, 1995. Also, the unit carried out investigations on Advance Fee Fraud cases \nreferred to it by the police and Foreign Operations Department of the CBN. As part of \nthe Banks effort to sensitize operators in the financial system on the issues involved in \nmoney laundering, the Bank provided resource persons to assist in the workshops \norganized by two banks. \n \n \nThe Bank carried out follow-up examinations of 20 commercial banks, 24 \nmerchant banks, and 12 other financial institutions. The follow-up visits were aimed at \nverifying their level of compliance with the recommendations contained in the CBN \nexamination reports. The follow-up examinations revealed non or partial compliance \nwith the CBN directives/recommendations, which resulted in the imposition of \nappropriate penalties on the erring financial institutions. In addition, the analysis of the \nReturns of frauds and forgeries sent to the Bank during the period under review \nindicated that 66 fraud cases were perpetrated against the banking system valued at \nN95.56 million. \n \n(c) \nForeign Exchange Management \n \n \nThe Central Bank of Nigeria intervened 121 times at the Inter-bank Foreign \nExchange Market (IFEM) in the first half of the year, compared with 26 AFEM \ninterventions during the same period of 1999. The CBN met in full, all the foreign \nexchange demands by the authorized dealers. A total sum of $3,151.5 million was \nsold to banks as against $2,909.73 million in the corresponding period of 1999. The \nCBN, however, purchased a total sum of $44.1 million from the banks during the first \nhalf of year indicating a net trading position of $3,107.35million. The average IFEM \nrate was N100.51 = $1.00 in the first half of the year, representing a depreciation of \n10.94 per cent, compared with the average AFEM rate of N89.51 = $1.000 during the \ncorresponding period of 1999. Similarly, the bureaux de change and parallel \nsegments of the market witnessed the depreciation of the naira as it exchanged at the \n \n40\nrates of N105.85 and N105.61 to a dollar, signifying depreciations of 8.04 and 8.16 per \ncent, respectively, compared to N97.34 and N96.99 per dollar in the first half of 1999. \nThe increase in forex demand and naira depreciation during the period under review \nwas largely attributable to excess liquidity in the banking system. \n \n(d) \nDebt Conversion Programme \n \n \nTransactions under the Debt Conversion Programme picked-up as 12 \napplications valued at US $206.65 million were received compared with 6 applications \nworth US $101.0 million received in the corresponding period of 1999. The improved \nperformance was attributable to the renewed investors’ confidence in the Nigerian \neconomy, following the restoration of democratic governance. Of the total applications \nprocessed, 7 valued at $116.2 million received approval in principle compared with \nsame number valued at $37.1 million in the first half of 1999. Thus, the cumulative \nnumber and value of approvals granted since the inception of the programme stood at \n368 and $3,245.47 million, respectively. \n \n \nAs a result of improved participation in the programme, debts cancelled during \nthe first half of the year stood at $38.63 million, indicating an increase of 52.1 per cent \nover the level in the corresponding period of 1999. Conversion proceeds amounting \nto N2,675.50 million was disbursed to various beneficiaries during the review period \ncompared to the sum of N1,051.35 million disbursed in the corresponding period of \n1999. A breakdown of the disbursement showed that 76.1, 13.3, 9.3 and 1.2 per cent \naccrued to non-profit organizations as cash gifts and grants, manufacturing sub-\nsector, hotel and tourism and services, respectively. \n \n(e) \nAgricultural Credit Operations \n \n \nThe tempo of activities under the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund \n(ACGSF) increased during the review period. The volume and value of loans \nguaranteed rose by 52.0 and 42.4 per cent to 1,490 and N38.15 million, respectively \nover the level in the corresponding period of 1999. This reflected commercial banks’ \nrenewed interest in the scheme following the increase in the capital base from N100.0 \n \n41\nmillion to N1.0 billion and the response to CBN’s moral suasion on the need to \nenhance agricultural production. The cumulative loans guaranteed from inception of \nthe scheme in April 1978 to date stood at N2.0 billion for the benefit of 270,614 \nfarmers. \n \n \nA breakdown of loans guaranteed during the half year showed that as in the \npast, the food crop sub-sector accounted for the bulk with 1,202 loans (82.7 per cent) \nvalued N24.18 million (75.5 per cent). The livestock sub-sector received 159 loans \n(10.7 per cent) valued N6.59 million (17.3 per cent), while the fisheries sub-sector \nattracted 47 loans (3.2 per cent) valued N0.70 million (17.3 per cent). Farming \nenterprises aggregated as ‘others’ accounted for 76 loans valued N6.41 million. \n \n \nIn terms of size, small scale farmers borrowings between N5,000 and N20,000 \nunder the ACGSF as in the past accounted for the higher volume (1,001 or 67.2 per \ncent) and valued (N13.24 million (or 34.7 per cent) of loans). Medium scale farmers \nborrowings between N20,001 – N50,000 attracted 227 (15.2 per cent) loans valued \nN7.46 million (19.6 per cent) while large scale farmers’ share of total guaranteed loans \nwas 39 loans (2.6 per cent) valued N9.37 million (24.6 per cent). Small scale farmers \nborrowings N5,000 and below received 145 loans (9.7 per cent) which amounted to \nN1.27 million (3.3 per cent). \n \n \nA total of 7,409 loans valued N113.41 million were fully repaid. This \nrepresented a decline of 4.4 per cent in the number but an increase of 45.2 per cent in \nthe value of loans repaid. The small-scale borrowers accounted for the highest \nvolume and value of repayment, 3,567 loans or 48.1 per cent valued N45.19 or 39.9 \nper cent, while the large-scale borrowers accounted for the least number of 21 (0.3 \nper cent) value N13.59 (12.0 per cent). \n \n5. \nECONOMIC OUTLOOK FOR THE REST OF FISCAL 2000 \n \nThe developments in the economy in the first half of the year were mixed but \ngenerally more favourable than in the corresponding period of 1999. A measure of \nmacroeconomic stability was achieved, reflected by fiscal and monetary restraint, \n \n42\nmoderation in inflationary pressures and a modest surplus in the balance of payments. \nIn addition, the growth of key monetary aggregates was within targets. However, the \npressure on the foreign exchange market continued with further depreciation of the \nnaira exchange rate, while infrastructural deficiencies contributed to the less than \nsatisfactory performance of the real sector. On the whole, the projections of major \neconomic aggregates to the end of the year, point to the likelihood of achieving a real \ngrowth rate of 3.0 per cent, single digit inflation and the restoration of both internal and \nexternal balance, as envisaged in the Budget. \n \n \nThe prospects for further reduction in fiscal deficit during the second half of the \nyear would depend largely on the intensification of revenue collection efforts and \nexpenditure restraint. The average oil price will exceed the $20.0 per barrel on which \nthe Budget was predicated, thereby boosting oil revenue. Also, the resolve by the \nGovernment to ensure transparency and accountability in project implementation \nwould help to reduce waste and enhance effective implementation of projects. \n \n \nGiven the high level of excess liquidity in the economy, the maintenance of \nmonetary stability would remain an arduous task. This situation may be aggravated \ngiven the possibility of increased inflow of external resources following improved \nperception of the Nigerian economy by the international community and the continued \nmonetisation of the excess receipts from oil. The recent increases in salaries and \nwages, as well as the modest increase in the prices of petroleum products, would \nthreaten monetary stability in the second half of the year. This underscores the need \nfor fiscal and monetary restraint in the remaining months of the year. The recently \nannounced policy, requesting government ministries and parastatals to transfer their \ncapital vote to the Central Bank of Nigeria would help in assuaging the liquidity \nproblem. \n \n \nThe wide margin between deposit and lending rates observed in the first half \nmay continue unless action is taken to minimise the distortions in the system. Savings \nrates may continue to be low, given the reluctance of banks to finance productive \nactivities with their excess reserves. Low deposit rates may fuel speculation in the \nforeign exchange market and weaken further the confidence in the financial \n \n43\nintermediation process. Therefore, there is need to remove the structural bottlenecks \nthat militate against investments in the real sector to ensure higher returns on \ninvestments in this area. \n \n \nAggregate domestic output performance for the rest of the year will remain \nmoderate. Agricultural output is expected to record further growth if the current \nconducive weather conditions continue and the supply of complementary inputs are \nadequate and timely. Also, it is expected that the current effort to reduce the level of \npest and disease infestation to the barest minimum would be sustained. Output of the \nindustrial sector may improve if the existing structural constraints on manufacturing \nactivities are reduced. These include the deplorable state of economic infrastructure, \nparticularly NEPA’s power generation and distribution facilities and the petroleum \nrefineries. \n \n \nInflationary pressures may increase further during the second half of the year, if \nfiscal and monetary stance becomes expansionary. Also, the poor states of utilities \nand basic infrastructure that have persistently constrained production have the \npotential of fueling inflation. This may however, be dampened if some of the effort of \nrehabilitating them and the increase in agricultural output growth are sustained. Also, \nthe harvesting season is expected to exact a dampening effect on inflation. \n \n \nRelative stability of the naira exchange rate could be attained in the second half \nof 2000 with the successful management of the excess liquidity in the banking system. \nThe resolve to return the capital votes of ministries and parastatals to the CBN may \nhelp in this regard. Also, the price of crude oil, which has remained consistently above \nthe $20.0 budget price, may assist to provide resources for funding the IFEM. \nHowever, negotiations on a Stand-by Agreement with the IMF need to be concluded in \norder to pave the way for the successful external debt reduction and thereby freeing \nmore resources for internal growth and development. \n \n \nFinally, it is desirable that some socio-economic problems that had constrained \nproductive activities in the recent past are urgently addressed. Matters calling for \nurgent attention include decline in the quality of social services and public utilities. \n \n44\nThere is also, the need for concerted efforts to deal with the serious issues of \nmaintaining law and order and the protection of life and property.", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/Quarterly_Economic_Reports/HALF-YR2000.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "af87ee659e9604515a914c14f0cd2455", "text": "Classified as Confidential \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nECONOMIC REPORT \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFourth Quarter \n2023 \n \n \ni \n \nClassified as Confidential \nABOUT THE REPORT \n \nThe Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Economic Report present developments \nin the Nigeria economy, for dissemination to the public. The Report, which \nis published on a monthly and quarterly basis, provides insights on current \ndevelopments in the real, fiscal, financial, and external sectors of the \nNigerian economy, as well as, global development that impact the \ndomestic economy. In addition, it reflects the policy initiatives of the CBN \nin pursuit of its mandate. \n \nThe Report is targeted at a wide range of readers, including economists, \npolicymakers, financial analysts in the government and private sectors, \nand the public. Free download of the Report, including current and past \nissues can be obtained from the CBN website: www.cbn.gov.ng. All \ninquiries concerning the Report should be directed to the Director, \nResearch Department, Central Bank of Nigeria, P.M.B. 187, Garki, Abuja, \nNigeria. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nii \n \nClassified as Confidential \nContent \nABOUT THE REPORT .................................................................................... i \nSUMMARY ................................................................................................. 1 \n1.0 \nGLOBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS ............................ 3 \n1.1 \nGlobal Economic Activity........................................................... 3 \n1.2 \nGlobal Inflation ............................................................................ 6 \n1.3 \nGlobal Financial Markets........................................................... 8 \n1.3.1 Global Financial Conditions ...................................................... 8 \n1.4 \nGlobal Commodity Markets .................................................... 10 \n1.5 \nMonetary Policy Stance........................................................... 13 \n2.0 \nDOMESTIC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS ...................... 15 \n2.1 \nReal Sector Developments ..................................................... 15 \n2.1.1 Sectoral Performance .............................................................. 16 \n2.1.2 Inflation ...................................................................................... 21 \n2.1.3 Energy Sector ........................................................................... 25 \n2.2 \nFiscal Sector Developments ................................................... 27 \n2.2.1 Federation Account Operations ............................................. 27 \n2.2.2 Fiscal Operations of the Federal Government ..................... 30 \n2.3 \nMonetary and Financial Developments ................................ 35 \n2.3.1 Monetary Developments ......................................................... 35 \n2.3.2 Sectoral Credit Utilisation ........................................................ 39 \n2.3.3 Financial Developments .......................................................... 41 \n2.4 \nExternal Sector Developments............................................... 52 \n2.4.1 Current and Capital Account .................................................. 52 \n2.4.2 Financial Account ..................................................................... 58 \n2.4.3 External Debt ............................................................................ 59 \n2.4.4 International Investment Position (IIP) .................................. 59 \n2.4.5. External Reserves ..................................................................... 60 \n2.4.6 Foreign Exchange Flows through the Economy.................. 61 \n2.4.7 \nExchange Rate Movement ................................................. 63 \n3.0 \nGlobal Outlook .......................................................................... 64 \n3.1 \nDomestic Outlook ..................................................................... 65 \n \n \n \n \n \niii \n \nClassified as Confidential \nTables \nTable 1: Global Composite Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) ..... 4 \nTable 2: Indices of Average World Prices of Nigeria’s Major \nAgricultural Export Commodities in US$ for Fourth Quarter 2023, \nJan. 2010=100 ............................................................................... 13 \nTable 3: Central Bank Policy Rates (per cent) ............................... 14 \nTable 4: Federally Collected Revenue and Distribution to the Three \n-Tiers of Government (₦ Billion) ................................................... 29 \nTable 5: FGN Retained Revenue (₦ Billion) ................................... 30 \nTable 6: Fiscal Balance (₦ Billion) ................................................. 31 \nTable 7: Money and Credit Growth over preceding December (per \ncent) .............................................................................................. 38 \nTable 8: Sectoral Credit Allocation ................................................ 40 \nTable 9: Nigeria Exchange (NGX) Limited Sectoral Indices .......... 47 \nTable 10: Listings, De-listings, and Suspensions on the Nigerian \nExchange Limited in Q42023 ......................................................... 49 \nTable 11: EMDEs Currency Rates to the US dollar ........................ 64 \n \nFigures \nFigure 1: Selected Advanced Economies’ PMIs ............................... 5 \nFigure 2: PMI in Selected Emerging Market and Developing \nEconomies ....................................................................................... 6 \nFigure 3: Inflation Rates in Selected Advanced Economies (per \ncent) ................................................................................................ 7 \nFigure 4: Inflation Rates in Selected EMDEs (per cent) ................... 7 \nFigure 5: Key Global Stock ............................................................... 9 \nFigure 6: 10-year Government Bond Yields for Selected Countries\n....................................................................................................... 10 \nFigure 7: Quarterly Crude Oil Prices (US$ per barrel) ................... 11 \nFigure 8: Price Changes in Selected Metals (per cent) for Q42023 \n....................................................................................................... 12 \nFigure 9: Real GDP Growth Rate, Q22021- Q42023, Year-on-Year\n....................................................................................................... 16 \nFigure 10: Sectoral Growth Rate of Real GDP, Q22021- Q42023 . 16 \nFigure 11: Index of Industrial Production (Q42022 – Q42023) ..... 18 \nFigure 12: Index of Mining Production (Q42022 - Q42023) .......... 19 \nFigure 13: Index of Manufacturing Production (Q42022 - Q42023)\n....................................................................................................... 20 \nFigure 14: Top 16 Subsectors with largest Contribution to GDP \nGrowth and their Growth Rates (per cent) in Q42023 .................. 21 \n \n \niv \n \nClassified as Confidential \nFigure 15: Subsectors with Least Contribution to GDP Growth and \ntheir Growth Rates (per cent) in Q42023 ...................................... 21 \nFigure 16: Headline, Food and Core Inflation (Year-on-Year) ....... 22 \nFigure 17: Measures of Underlying Inflation ................................ 22 \nFigure 18: Component Drivers of Core Inflation ........................... 23 \nFigure 19: Contribution of Processed food and farm produce to \nfood Inflation ................................................................................. 24 \nFigure 20: Component Drivers of Food Inflation ........................... 24 \nFigure 21: Index of Electricity Production (Q42023-Q42023) ....... 25 \nFigure 22: Gross Revenue Outturn and Benchmark (₦ Billion) ..... 28 \nFigure 23: Federal Government Expenditure (₦ Billion) ............... 31 \nFigure 24: FGN External and Domestic Debt Composition ........... 33 \nFigure 25: Composition of Domestic Debt Stock by Instrument ... 33 \nFigure 26: Composition of External Debt Stock by Instrument ..... 34 \nFigure 27: Developments in Reserve Money (₦ Billion) and Money \nMultiplier ....................................................................................... 36 \nFigure 28: Growth in Reserve Money (% Growth Over end-\nDecember 2022) ............................................................................ 36 \nFigure 29: Composition of Currency-in-Circulation (₦ Billion) ...... 37 \nFigure 30: Consumer Credit Outstanding ...................................... 40 \nFigure 31: Composition of Consumer Credit (per cent) ................. 41 \nFigure 32: Transactions at the Standing Facility Window ............ 42 \nFigure 33: Primary Market NTBs (₦ Billion) .................................. 42 \nFigure 34: Primary Market Auctions of FGN Bond (₦ Billion) ....... 43 \nFigure 35: Developments in Short-term Interest Rates (per cent) 44 \nFigure 36: Trend in Average Term Deposit and Lending Rates ..... 44 \nFigure 37: Aggregate Market Capitalisation and All-Share Index 46 \nFigure 38: Volume and Value of Traded Securities on the NGX .... 47 \nFigure 39: Current Account Balance (US$ Billion) ......................... 53 \nFigure 40: Import by sector in Per cent ......................................... 54 \nFigure 41: Share of Service Out-Payments in Per cent .................. 55 \nFigure 42: Share of Services Receipts in Per cent .......................... 56 \nFigure 43: Primary Income Balance (US$ Billion) .......................... 57 \nFigure 44: Secondary Income Balance and Remittances Inflow ... 57 \nFigure 45: External Reserves and Months of Import Cover .......... 60 \nFigure 46: Foreign Exchange Transactions through the Economy \n(US$ Billion) ................................................................................... 62 \nFigure 47: Turnover in the I&E Foreign Exchange Market ............ 62 \nFigure 48: EMDEs Currency Values to the US dollar ..................... 63 \n \n \n1 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nSUMMARY \nGlobal economic momentum slowed in the fourth quarter of 2023, on account of the \nlull in the manufacturing and services sectors. The deceleration reflected the 0.43 \npoint decline in the average J.P. Morgan Global Composite Purchasing Managers’ \nIndex (PMI) to 50.47 index points during the quarter. Consumer prices in Advanced \neconomies (AEs) slowed following tighter monetary policy and falling energy costs, \nwith divergent outcomes among Emerging Markets and Developing Economies \n(EMDEs). In EMDEs where inflation moderated, monetary policy rate was largely \nunchanged during the quarter, while those with persistent inflation opted to raise \npolicy rate. The global equities market was bullish, as expectations of interest rate \ncuts in 2024 by the US Federal Reserve steered a decline in bond yields. At the \ninternational crude oil market, increased supply from non-OPEC countries drove \nprices down. Accordingly, the average spot price of Nigeria’s reference crude oil, the \nBonny Light (34.9° API), declined by 3.3 per cent to US$86.97 per barrel during the \nreview quarter. \nRecovery of the domestic economy continued in Q42023, as increased demand \nduring the festive season supported expansion in most sectors, leading to a 3.46 per \ncent growth in real output from 2.54 per cent in the previous quarter. Increased \ncrude oil production to 1.30 mbpd from 1.21 mbpd in the preceding quarter was \nboosted by the renewed efforts to tackle pipeline vandalism and crude oil theft. \nInflationary pressure persisted, with lingering effects of PMS subsidy removal and \nexchange rate passthrough pushing headline inflation to 28.92 per cent in December \n2023. Food inflation increased to 33.93 per cent from 30.64 per cent in the preceding \nquarter, reflecting the festive-season-induced demand and rising costs of \ntransportation and distribution. \nThe fiscal operations of the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) resulted in a 19.1 \nper cent widening of fiscal deficit, on account of an uptick in expenditure. FGN \nretained revenue increased by 7.8 per cent over its level in Q32023 but was 36.4 per \ncent below target. Provisional FGN expenditure rose by 14.9 per cent though it fell \nshort of the target by 7.9 per cent. Public debt, at ₦97,340.71 billion, was 41.5 per \ncent of GDP and within the national threshold of 40.0 per cent at end-December \n2023. \nThe financial sector generally remained robust, as key financial soundness indicators \nwere within regulatory thresholds. Broad money supply (M3) expanded by 50.9 per \ncent to N78,738.41 billion at end-December 2023, reflecting the effects of exchange \nrate reforms on net foreign and domestic assets. Tight monetary policy stance \ncontinued, inducing a rise in domestic interest rates, enhanced investors’ appetite, \nand increased subscriptions for NTBs and FGN bonds. \n \n2 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nExternal sector performance resulted to a current account deficit reflecting the \nnegative balances in the goods, services, and primary income accounts. With lower \ninflow of direct and portfolio investments, there were reductions in net financial \nliabilities in both the financial account and the International Investment Position. The \nstock of external reserves stood at US$33.09 billion, covering 6.6 months of import \nfor goods and services or 9.4 months of goods import. The average exchange rate at \nthe Nigerian Autonomous Foreign Exchange Market (NAFEM) depreciated to \n₦843.14/US$, from ₦764.82/US$ in Q32023. \n \n \n \n3 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \n1.0 \nGLOBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS \nGlobal economic condition, in Q42023, was weighed down by \ndecelerations in both the manufacturing and service sectors. \nInflation continued to decline in most AEs, driven by a combination \nof tighter monetary policy and decreasing energy costs, while \nEMDEs recorded divergent outcomes. Monetary policy rate was \nunchanged in EMDEs with falling inflation but was raised in countries \nwhere inflationary pressure persisted. The global stock market \nshowed optimism during the period, on the prospect of policy rate \ncuts by US Federal Reserve in 2024. Despite the ongoing tensions \nin the Middle East, the spot prices of crude oil were dampened by \nincreased supply from non-OPEC member countries. The average \nspot prices for silver, platinum and palladium also fell due to \nweakened demand. \n1.1 \nGlobal Economic Activity \nGlobal economic activity slowed in the fourth quarter of 2023, \namid weak performance of both the manufacturing and service \nsectors. The global composite Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) \ndecelerated to 50.47 index points in Q42023, from 50.90 index points \nin Q32023, due to the decline in business confidence, driven by \nweaker new order and deteriorating international trade. The pace of \nexpansion of the services sector, at 50.87 index points, was lower \nthan 51.53 index points in the preceding quarter, owing to weaker \nexpansions in business, consumer, and financial services. \nIrrespective of the slight improvement from 48.90 index points to \n49.03 index points, manufacturing PMI continued to weigh on global \neconomic activity. \nEconomic activity in Advanced Economies (AEs) showed a \nmixed outcome. In the UK, economic activity expanded as the PMI \nrose to 50.37 index points from 49.30 index points in the preceding \nquarter, owing to increase in employment levels and improved \nbusiness expectations. The performance of the US economy \nremained unchanged as the PMI stood at 50.80 index points. In \nJapan and Spain, a slower pace of growth was recorded with the \nGlobal \nEconomic \nActivity \n \n4 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nPMI slowing to 50.17 and 50.07 index points from 52.30 and 50.13 \nindex points in the preceding quarter, respectively. This was driven \nby weaker expansion in the service sector and a continued decline \nin manufacturing output. \n \nTable 1: Global Composite Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) \nSource: JP Morgan \n \nIn contrast, economic activity further contracted in France, Canada, \nand Italy to 44.30, 45.40 and 47.90 index points from 45.57, 48.37 \nand 48.77 index points in the preceding quarter, respectively. The \ncontraction was attributed to high interest rates, uncertain business \nclimate and lower consumer demand. \n \nQ22023 \nQ32023 \nQ42023 \nComposite \n53.77 \n50.90 \n50.47 \nEmployment Level \n52.07 \n51.00 \n50.33 \nNew Business Orders \n53.10 \n50.03 \n50.03 \nNew Export Business Orders \n48.80 \n47.93 \n48.27 \nFuture Output \n64.17 \n61.93 \n61.73 \nInput Prices \n57.40 \n57.03 \n56.10 \nOutput Prices \n54.27 \n53.57 \n53.33 \n \n \n \n \nManufacturing \n49.53 \n48.90 \n49.03 \nServices (Business Activity) \n54.97 \n51.53 \n50.87 \nNew Business \n54.67 \n50.73 \n50.60 \nNew Export Business \n52.77 \n50.73 \n49.60 \nFuture Activity \n65.27 \n62.50 \n62.47 \nEmployment \n52.77 \n51.30 \n50.87 \nOutstanding Business \n50.57 \n48.47 \n48.77 \nInput Prices \n60.07 \n59.23 \n59.40 \nPrices Charged \n55.73 \n54.63 \n54.03 \nEconomic \nactivity in \nAdvanced \nEconomies \n \n5 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nFigure 1: Selected Advanced Economies’ PMIs \nSource: Trading Economics/Various countries’ websites \n \nAside Brazil, which recorded an upturn, economic activity in \nmost Emerging Markets and Developing Economies (EMDEs) \nindicated slower momentum, driven by fragile outcomes in \nmanufacturing and service sectors. During the review quarter, \neconomic activity rebounded in Brazil, as improvements in service \nsector, business optimism, and consumer confidence raised PMI to \n50.33 index points from 49.73 index points. PMI, however, slowed in \nIndia (58.1 from 61.3 index points), Russia (53.9 from 54.6 index \npoints), Indonesia (51.8 from 53.2 index points), and China (51.4 \nfrom 51.5 index points). The development was attributed to weaker \nexpansion in both manufacturing and service sectors. \nIn Turkey and South Africa, declines in PMI to 47.67 and 49.30 index \npoints from 49.50 and 49.70 index points, respectively, signified \nfurther contraction in economic activity during the quarter. The \ndevelopment was as a result of deceleration in new orders in Turkey, \nwhile supply challenges and persistent load shedding contributed to \nthe weak performance in South Africa. \n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\n50.0\n60.0\nUNITED\nSTATES\nUNITED\nKINGDOM\nGERMANY\nITALY\nJAPAN\nCANADA\nSPAIN\nFRANCE\nQ22023\nQ32023\nQ42023\n50-point Threshold\nEconomic \nactivity in \nEMDEs \n \n6 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nFigure 2: PMI in Selected Emerging Market and Developing \nEconomies \n \nSource: Trading Economics/Various countries’ websites \nNote: Turkey, Indonesia and Mexico PMIs data were based on manufacturing PMI \n \n1.2 \nGlobal Inflation \nConsumer prices continued to moderate in most AEs following \ntighter monetary policy and softening energy prices. Inflation \ndeclined to 3.4 per cent in the United States from 3.7 per cent in the \nprevious quarter. Within the Euro area, slowdown in both energy and \nfood prices decelerated inflation in France (3.70% from 4.90%), \nGermany (3.70% from 4.50%), Spain (3.10% from 3.50%), and Italy \n(0.59% from 5.34%). The United Kingdom recorded 2.70 percentage \npoints drop in inflation to 4.00 per cent, due to restrictive monetary \npolicy and easing energy and food costs. In Japan, falling food, \nenergy, healthcare, and communication costs led to a decline in \ninflation. \n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\n50.0\n60.0\n70.0\nCHINA\nINDIA\nTURKEY\nSOUTH\nAFRICA\nINDONESIA\nMEXICO\nBRAZIL\nRUSSIA\nQ22023\nQ32023\nQ42023\n50-point Threshold\nGlobal \nInflation \n \n7 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nFigure 3: Inflation Rates in Selected Advanced Economies (per \ncent) \n \nSource: Trading Economics and Staff Computations \nInflation outcome was diverse among EMDEs during the review \nperiod. In China, consumer prices reduced by -0.30 per cent in \nQ42023, due to falls in food and transport costs. Similarly, inflation \nin Brazil eased to 4.62 per cent from 5.19 per cent in Q32023 as \ncosts of healthcare, personal spending, and clothing decelerated \nduring the quarter. Inflation, however, rose in Indonesia (2.61% from \n2.18%), Mexico (4.66% from 4.45%), India (5.69% from 5.02%), \nRussia (7.40% from 6.00%) and Turkey (64.80% from 61.53%), \nlargely, due to hikes in food and transport costs. \nFigure 4: Inflation Rates in Selected EMDEs (per cent) \nSource: Trading Economics and Staff Computations \n \n0.00\n1.00\n2.00\n3.00\n4.00\n5.00\n6.00\n7.00\n8.00\n9.00\nUnited\nStates\nUnited\nKingdom\nJapan\nCanada\nGermany\nFrance\nItaly\nSpain\nQ22023\nQ32023\nQ42023\n-5.00\n5.00\n15.00\n25.00\n35.00\n45.00\n55.00\n65.00\nChina\nIndia\nTurkey\nSouth\nAfrica\nIndonesia\nMexico\nBrazil\nRussia\nQ22023\nQ32023\nQ42023\n \n8 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \n1.3 \nGlobal Financial Markets \n1.3.1 Global Financial Conditions \nThe global stock market was mostly bullish in Q42023, on the \nlikelihood of interest rate cuts by the US Federal Reserve in \n2024. Advanced economies outperformed EMDEs, due to concerns \nover China's real estate sector. Prospects of rate cuts spurred the \nrally in US equities, especially for interest rates sensitive sectors, \nsuch as information technology, and real estate. Considerable \ngrowth was recorded in the US Nasdaq (14.34%), Dow Jones \n(12.34%), and S&P (11.2%). Stock markets in other AEs gained \nmomentum as forward-looking indicators and easing inflationary \npressure suggested an imminent end to the tightening cycle. Hence, \nthe EURO STOXX grew by 8.3 per cent and the Germany’s DAX by \n8.9 per cent, just as France’s CAC 40 and UK’s FTSE 100 recorded \nincreases of 5.7 and 1.6 per cent, respectively. Japan’s Nikkei 225 \nalso increased by 5.0 per cent during the period. Across the regions, \nrobust performance was buoyed by a rise in industrial and financial \nsectors as well as domestically focused stocks. \nThe performance of equities markets in EMDEs was mixed. \nNotwithstanding the anticipated rate cut, returns is expected to \nremain attractive in the US as interest rates stay above the historic \nlevels last recorded during the Global Financial Crisis. This, along \nwith the weakness in the properties sector of the Chinese economy \nmuted risk appetites in EMDEs. Ample policy stimulus in China was \nyet to bolster economic recovery, as the Shenzhen Stock in Mainland \nChina fell by 5.8 per cent during the quarter. Equities in Russia and \nTurkey posted negative returns, falling by 1.1 and 10.4 per cent, \nrespectively. In contrast, the South African JALSH and Brazilian \nBOVESPA grew by 6.2 and 15.1 per cent, respectively. \n \n9 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nFigure 5: Key Global Stocks \n \nSource: Reuters Refinitiv Eikon & Trading Economics \n \nA downward trend was observed in the global bond market \nfollowing prospects of rate cut in the coming year. In the US, the \n10-year government bond yields declined by 0.71 percentage points \ncompared with the level in the preceding quarter, to 3.86 per cent. \nThe decrease was driven by the hint from the Fed that the fund rate \nmay be cut sooner than earlier envisaged, given the deceleration of \ninflation, and slowing economic activities. The decline in the US \npulled yields down in Canada to 3.11 per cent from 4.03 per cent in \nthe previous quarter. Essentially, the 10-year government bonds \nunderperformed in all the selected advanced economies during the \nquarter under review. Bond yields in the Euro area, Italy, Japan and \nthe UK followed a similar trajectory, declining to 2.03, 3.70, 0.62 and \n3.54 per cent, respectively. \nIn most emerging markets and developing economies, bond yields \nalso declined in the quarter under review. The expectation of \nimpending rate cuts was the main driver of the decline across the \ncountries. Consequently, 10-year bond yields in Turkey, Russia, and \nSouth Africa, declined to 23.69, 12.30 and 9.77 per cent, \nrespectively. In Mexico, India, and Indonesia bond yields decreased \nby 9.02, 7.18 and 6.49 per cent, respectively. \n-3.65\n-2.62\n-3.06\n1.02\n-3.58\n-4.01\n-4.71\n-4.79\n-5.10\n1.52\n-1.29\n-4.95\n0.04\n1.71\n-8.32\n12.01\n11.24\n12.48\n14.34\n1.65\n5.72\n5.04\n8.87\n6.23\n8.31\n1.85\n15.12\n12.80\n7.47\n9.74\n-5.79\n-1.09\n-10.00\n-5.00\n0.00\n5.00\n10.00\n15.00\n20.00\nQ32022\nQ42023\n \n10 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nFigure 6: 10-year Government Bond Yields for Selected \nCountries \n \nSource: Reuters Refinitiv Eikon \n \n1.4 Global Commodity Markets \nGlobal crude oil supply rose marginally, as OPEC and non-\nOPEC production increased despite voluntary production cuts \nby Saudi Arabia. Crude oil supply increased by 0.6 per cent to \n102.24 million barrels per day (mbpd), compared with 101.66 mbpd \nin the preceding quarter, driven, largely, by an increase in non-OPEC \ncrude oil supply. \nNon-OPEC crude supply rose by 0.37 mbpd to 74.52 mbpd due, \nmainly, to increased supply from the United States, Canada, China, \nGuyana, and Angola. In addition, OPEC crude oil supply also rose \nslightly by 0.21 mbpd to 27.72 mbpd as larger production from Iran, \nNigeria, Libya, and Venezuela, offset the voluntary cut by Saudi \nArabia. \nGlobal demand rose marginally by 0.1 per cent to 101.61 mbpd, \nrelative to 101.50 mbpd in the preceding quarter. The marginal \nincrease in crude oil demand was due to a slight rise in crude oil \ndemand from Japan and China. \n \n3.82\n2.39\n4.39\n0.40\n3.27\n4.08\n8.67\n7.11\n6.26\n16.34\n10.51\n11.19\n4.57\n2.84\n4.44\n0.77\n4.03\n4.80\n9.92\n7.21\n6.91\n25.52\n10.81\n12.93\n3.86\n2.03\n3.54\n0.62\n3.11\n3.70\n9.02\n7.18\n6.49\n23.69\n9.77\n12.30\n0.00\n5.00\n10.00\n15.00\n20.00\n25.00\nUS\nEuro Area\nUK\nJapan\nCanada\nItaly\nMexico\nIndia\nIndonesia Turkey\nSouth\nAfrica\nRussia\nAdvanced Economies\nEmerging Market and Developing Economies\nQ22023\nQ32023\nQ42023\nWorld Crude \nSupply and \nDemand \n \n11 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nCrude oil spot prices fell due, mainly, to increased supply from \nnon-OPEC members, including the United States and Canada, \ndespite tensions in the Middle East. The average spot price of \nNigeria’s reference crude oil, the Bonny Light (34.9° API), declined \nby 3.3 per cent to US$86.97 per barrel, compared with US$89.90 pb \nin the preceding quarter. The prices of Brent, Forcados, WTI and \nOPEC Reference Basket (ORB), at US$86.67 pb, US$88.13 pb, \nUS$79.58 pb and US$85.42 pb, respectively, all exhibited similar \ntrend as the Bonny Light. The fall reflected the increased supply from \nnon-OPEC members, especially the US and Canada, which \noutweighed the joint effects of the production cuts by Saudi Arabia, \nhigher global demand, and Middle East tensions. \nFigure 7: Quarterly Crude Oil Prices (US$ per barrel) \n \nSource: Refinitiv Eikon (Reuters) \n \nAverage spot prices of silver, platinum and palladium \ndecreased in Q42023, due to weakened demand. The average \nspot prices of platinum and palladium fell by 1.7 and 12.7 per cent to \nUS$911.77 per ounce and US$1,090.38 per ounce, respectively. \nThe decrease was attributed to a glut caused by weakened demand \nfrom the automotive industry, as the Electric Vehicle market \nexpands, leading manufacturers to opt for more economical \n70\n85\n100\n115\n130\nQ12022\nQ22022\nQ32022\nQ42022\nQ12023\nQ22023\nQ32023\nQ42023\nUS$/pb\nBonny Light\nBrent\nForcados\nWTI\nOpec Basket\nCrude Oil \nPrices \nOther Mineral \nCommodities \n \n12 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nalternatives. Similarly, the price of silver declined by 1.4 per cent to \nUS$23.23 per ounce, from US$23.56 per ounce in Q32023. Gold, \nhowever, recorded a price increase to US$1,976.75 per ounce, from \nUS$1,926.31 per ounce in Q32023, fueled by escalating tensions in \nthe Middle East, as investors seek safer havens for assets. \nFigure 8: Price Changes in Selected Metals (per cent) for \nQ42023 \n \nSource: Refinitiv Eikon (Reuters) \n \nThe average price of Nigeria’s major agricultural export \ncommodities declined in Q42023, due to increased supply from \nthe producing regions. The average index of selected agricultural \nproducts fell by 1.3 per cent to 125.5 index points from the 127.2 \nindex points recorded in the previous quarter. The decline was \ninfluenced by glut in the supply of wheat and soybeans, following \nfavourable weather conditions and improved logistics. The prices of \ncocoa, rubber, groundnut, and coffee, however, rose following \nincreased demand from major consumers such as China. \n2.6\n-1.4\n-1.7\n-12.7\n14.1\n9.1\n-6.3\n-43.6\n-50.0\n-40.0\n-30.0\n-20.0\n-10.0\n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\nGold\nSilver\nPlatinum\nPalladium\nPeriod\nWith corresponding quarter\nWith preceding quarter\nAgricultural \nCommodity \nPrices \n \n13 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nTable 2: Indices of Average World Prices of Nigeria’s Major \nAgricultural Export Commodities (US$, Jan. 2010=100) \nCOMMODITY \nQ42022 \nQ32023 \nQ42023 \n% Change \n(1) & (3) \n(2) & (3) \n \n1 \n2 \n3 \n4 \n5 \nAll Commodities \n122.5 \n127.2 \n125.5 \n2.5 \n-1.3 \nCocoa \n68.4 \n98.9 \n109.8 \n60.5 \n11.0 \nCotton \n129.8 \n123.6 \n121.0 \n-6.8 \n-2.1 \nCoffee \n137.2 \n178.9 \n179.6 \n31.0 \n0.4 \nWheat \n206.6 \n161.7 \n147.6 \n-28.6 \n-8.8 \nRubber \n42.9 \n44.0 \n47.9 \n11.9 \n8.9 \nGroundnut \n136.6 \n166.6 \n170.5 \n24.8 \n2.3 \nPalm Oil \n111.3 \n103.1 \n98.6 \n-11.4 \n-4.3 \nSoya Beans \n146.9 \n140.5 \n129.0 \n-12.2 \n-8.2 \nSources: World Bank Pink Sheet \n \n \n \n1.5 \nMonetary Policy Stance \nMost central banks kept policy rate unchanged in Q42023, citing \nmoderating inflationary pressures, while some emerging \neconomies raised rates to curtail inflation. In the United States, \nthe Federal Reserve held the rates within 5.25–5.50 per cent on \naccount of continued disinflation. Similarly, the European Central \nBank retained policy rate at 4.50 per cent during the quarter, and the \nBank of England at 5.25 per cent. In Japan, policy rate was left at \n-0.10 per cent, to reflate its economy. \nMost emerging economies maintained their policy stance, except a \nfew still grappling with elevated inflationary pressures. China held its \nrate at 3.45 per cent as prices fell for the third straight month, \nmarking the longest streak of deflation since October 2009. Similarly, \nIndia maintained its rates at 6.50 per cent as inflation remained within \nits target range. The central banks of Indonesia, Ghana, Mexico, and \nSouth Africa also kept their rates unchanged at 6.0, 30.0, 11.25 and \n8.25 per cent, respectively, to anchor inflation expectations. Russia, \n \n14 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nTurkey and Kenya, however, raised their rates to 16.0, 42.4, and \n12.5 per cent from 13.0, 30.0 and 10.5 per cent, respectively, in \nQ32023 to rein in inflation. Conversely, the Central Bank of Brazil \nlowered its rate to 11.25 per cent in Q42023 from 12.75 per cent in \nQ32023 as inflation maintained a downward trajectory. \nTable 3: Central Bank Policy Rates (per cent) \nCountry \n \nQ12023 \nQ22023 \nQ32023 \nQ42023 \nUnited \nStates \n \n4.75-5.0 \n5.0-5.25 \n5.25-5.50 \n5.25-5.50 \nCanada \n \n4.50 \n4.75 \n5.0 \n5.0 \nEuro Area \n \n3.50 \n4.0 \n4.50 \n4.50 \nUnited \nKingdom \n \n4.25 \n4.50 \n5.25 \n5.25 \nJapan \n \n-0.10 \n-0.10 \n-0.10 \n-0.10 \nBrazil \n \n13.75 \n13.75 \n12.75 \n11.25 \nRussia \n \n7.50 \n7.50 \n13.0 \n16.0 \nIndia \n \n6.50 \n6.50 \n6.50 \n6.50 \nChina \n \n3.65 \n3.55 \n3.45 \n3.45 \nSouth \nAfrica \n \n8.25 \n8.25 \n8.25 \n8.25 \nMexico \n \n11.25 \n11.25 \n11.25 \n11.25 \nIndonesia \n \n5.75 \n5.75 \n6.0 \n6.0 \nTurkey \n \n8.50 \n15 \n30 \n42.5 \nKenya \n \n9.50 \n10.5 \n10.5 \n12.5 \nGhana \n \n29.50 \n29.50 \n30.0 \n30.0 \n Source: Various Central Banks’ websites, Trading Economics. \n \n \n \n15 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \n2.0 DOMESTIC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS \n2.1 \nReal Sector Developments \nThe festive season induced rise in demand, triggered expansions in \nmost sectors in Q42023 and underlaid the performance of the \nNigerian economy. Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by \n3.46 per cent from 2.54 per cent in the preceding quarter. Headline \ninflation rose to 28.92 per cent from 26.72 per cent in Q32023, due, \nmajorly, to the lingering effect of PMS subsidy removal and exchange \nrate passthrough. \nOutput grew by 3.46 per cent in Q42023, driven by oil and non-\noil sectors. With a growth of 12.11 per cent (year-on-year) in \nQ42023, the oil sector recorded an expansion after successive \nquarters of negative outcome. The upturn was a significant departure \nfrom the contractions of 13.38 per cent in Q42022 and 0.85 per cent \nin Q32023. The sector rebounding during the review quarter \nreflected the leap in crude oil production to 1.30 million barrels per \nday (mbpd) compared with 1.21 mbpd in the corresponding quarter. \nBuoyancy of the non-oil sector continued in Q42023 with a growth of \n3.07 per cent in Q42023, vis-à-vis 2.75 per cent in Q32023 and 4.44 \nper cent in Q42022. The growth followed improvements in the \nfinancial institutions, telecommunication, crop production, trade, \nconstruction, manufacturing (food, beverage, and tobacco), and real \nestate subsectors. \nSummary \nDomestic \nOutput \n \n16 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nFigure 9: Real GDP Growth Rate (Year-on-Year) \n \n Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) \n \n2.1.1 Sectoral Performance \nSectoral analysis revealed that the performance of all the sectors, \n(Services, Agriculture, and Industry) improved in Q42023. The services \nsector grew by 3.98 per cent and contributed 2.24 percentage points to the \nreal GDP growth. It also remained the dominant sector, accounting for 56.55 \nper cent of aggregate GDP. \nFigure 10: Sectoral Growth Rate of Real GDP (Q22021–Q42023) \nSource: NBS \n \n-30\n-25\n-20\n-15\n-10\n-5\n0\n5\n10\n15\nQ12022\nQ22022\nQ32022\nQ42022\nQ12023\nQ22023\nQ32023\nQ42023\nPercent (%)\nOil GDP\nNon-oil GDP\nTotal GDP\n3.16\n1.20\n1.34\n2.05\n-0.90\n1.50\n1.30\n2.10\n-6.81\n-2.30\n-8.00\n-0.94\n0.31\n-1.94\n0.46\n3.86\n7.45\n6.70\n7.01\n5.69\n4.35\n4.42\n3.99\n3.98\n-10.0\n-8.0\n-6.0\n-4.0\n-2.0\n0.0\n2.0\n4.0\n6.0\n8.0\n10.0\nQ12022\nQ22022\nQ32022\nQ42022\nQ12023\nQ22023\nQ32023\nQ42023\nPer cent\nAgriculture\nIndustry\nServices\nTotal GDP\n \n17 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nServices sector growth was driven by the significant contributions of \nthe Financial & Insurance (1.18%), Information & Communications \n(1.03%), Trade (0.22%), and Real Estate (0.08%) subsectors. The \nsubsectors grew by 29.78, 6.33, 1.40 and 1.34 per cent, respectively. \nIn the Financial & Insurance subsector, the observed growth was \nattributable to increased demand for services in the capital and \nmoney markets, as well as positive sentiments which drove \ncommercial banks’ stock prices. Also, the continued demand for \nonline financial services heightened investments in fintech by \nfinancial institutions, and propped growth in the subsector. Increased \ninvestment in IT security by banks and fintech solutions contributed \nto growth in the ICT subsector. Rising demand for digital services, \nsuch as data/internet services, and e-commerce, resulting in 5.81 \nper cent growth in internet subscribers between December 2022 and \nDecember 2023, also supported the performance of the subsector. \nExpansion in the Trade subsector was primarily driven by higher \nspending on consumer goods and services during the festive period. \n \nThe agriculture sector grew by 2.10 per cent, compared with 1.30 per \ncent in the preceding quarter, occasioned by continued fiscal support \nand increased credit to the sector. Crop production and forestry \nsubsectors expanded by 2.44 and 1.69 per cent, compared with 1.35 \nand 2.21 per cent in Q32023, respectively. However, livestock and \nfishing subsectors contracted by 2.09 and 0.12 per cent, compared \nwith a growth of 1.18 per cent and a contraction of 2.33 per cent, \nrespectively, in Q32023. \n \nWith a higher growth of 3.86 per cent from 0.46 per cent in Q32023, \nthe industry sector strengthened amid price pressures. The impetus \nwas also reflected in the industrial production index (IPI), which rose \n \n18 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nby 3.70 per cent in Q42023. Growth in the sector was precipitated by \nincreased activities in all its five component subsectors. \nFigure 11: Index of Industrial Production (Q42022 – Q42023) \n \nSource: CBN & NBS \n \nMining & Quarrying grew by 8.04 per cent, from a contraction of 1.96 \nper cent in Q42022, and contributed 0.38 per cent to the overall GDP \ngrowth in Q42023. The growth was also mirrored in the index of \nmining production which increased by 30.60 per cent (y-o-y), \ncompared with a decrease of 1.80 per cent in Q32023. The \nimprovement was propelled by increased crude oil and gas \nproduction, as Nigeria’s average crude oil production rose by 7.4 per \ncent to 1.30 mbpd in Q42023, compared with 1.21 mbpd in the \npreceding quarter. This was due to enhanced security measures in \nthe Niger Delta Region against crude oil theft and vandalism of oil \ninstallations. Nigeria’s production level was, however, 0.44 mbpd \nshort of its 1.74 mbpd OPEC quota. \n \n-15.0\n-10.0\n-5.0\n0.0\n5.0\n10.0\n15.0\n20.0\n80\n85\n90\n95\n100\n105\nQ42022\nQ12023\nQ22023\nQ32023\nQ42023\n% change\nIndex\nIIP [LHS]\nIIP (yoy) [RHS]\nIIP (QoQ) [RHS]\n \n19 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nFigure 12: Index of Mining Production (Q42022 – Q42023) \n \nSource: CBN & NBS \nNote: IMINP- Index of Mining Production \n \nManufacturing subsector grew by 1.38 per cent from 0.48 per cent in \npreceding quarter, contributing 0.12 per cent to GDP growth. This \nwas also reflected in the index of manufacturing production which \nexpanded by 5.00 per cent and 1.40 per cent on a y-o-y and quarter-\non-quarter basis vis-à-vis 5.70 per cent and 0.50 per cent in Q32023, \nrespectively. Likewise, the estimated average manufacturing \ncapacity utilisation increased by 0.30 percentage points to 57.4 per \ncent in Q42023, above the level in the preceding quarter. This \nfollowed the expanded production by firms to meet heightened \ndemand during the year-end festivities. Despite weakened \npurchasing power, occasioned by rising inflation and exchange rate \ndeterioration, consumer demand for food, beverage and tobacco; \ntextile, apparel and footwear; and plastic and rubber products \nincreased. The subsector was however undermined by oil refining \nactivity which contracted by 35.33 per cent in Q42023. \n-30.0\n-20.0\n-10.0\n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\n50.0\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\nQ4 2022\nQ1 2023\nQ2 2023\nQ3 2023\nQ4 2023\n% change\nIndex\nIMINP [LHS]\nIMINP (YOY)[RHS]\nIMINP (QoQ)[RHS]\n \n20 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nFigure 13: Index of Manufacturing Production (Q42022 – \nQ42023) \n \nSource: CBN & NBS \nNote: IMANP- Index of Manufacturing Production \n \nThe Construction subsector grew by 3.70 per cent in Q42023 from \n3.89 per cent in the preceding quarter, contributing 0.13 per cent to \nGDP growth. This performance was buoyed by increased \nconstruction activities during the period, in spite of the higher cost of \nconstruction materials and insecurity issues across the country. \nOverall, of the 22 activity subsectors in the economy, 19 subsectors \ngrew, while 3 subsectors – transportation & storage, livestock, and \nfishing contracted. \n-20.0\n-15.0\n-10.0\n-5.0\n0.0\n5.0\n10.0\n150\n160\n170\n180\n190\n200\n210\nQ42022\nQ12023\nQ22023\nQ32023\nQ42023\n% change\nIndex\nPeriod\nIMANP [LHS]\nIMANP (yoy)[RHS]%\nIMANP (QoQ)[RHS]%\n \n21 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nFigure 14: Top 16 Contributors to GDP Growth in Q42023 (per \ncent) \n \nSource: NBS \nFigure 15: Least Contributors to GDP Growth in Q42023 (per \ncent) \n \nSource: NBS \n \n2.1.2 Inflation \nHeadline inflation continued to rise in Q42023, following the \nincrease in food and non-food components of the CPI. Year-\non-year headline inflation rose to 28.92 per cent from 26.72 per \ncent in Q32023, as the effects of PMS subsidy removal and \nexchange rate depreciation continued to permeate the \neconomy. The acceleration of consumer prices was further \nfuelled by elevated demand during the festive period. \n0.01\n0.01\n0.02\n0.03\n0.03\n0.03\n0.05\n0.06\n0.08\n0.12\n0.13\n0.22\n0.38\n0.59\n1.03\n1.18\n0.00\n0.50\n1.00\n1.50\n(4.13%) Arts, Entertainment & Recreation\n(7.44%) Water supply, sewage, waste Mang.\n(3.73%) Human Health & Social Services\n(3.28%) Accommodation and Food Services\n(6.17%) Electricity,Gas,Steam & Air conditioner\n(1.6%) Education\n(2.18%) Public Administration\n(1.79%) Professional, Scientific & Technical Serv.\n(1.34%) Real Estate\n(1.38%) Manufacturing\n(3.70%) Construction\n(1.40%) Trade\n(8.04%) Mining and Quarrying\n(2.44%) Crop Production\n(6.33%) Information and Communication\n(29.78%) Financial and Insurance\n0.00\n-0.03\n-0.47\n-0.50\n-0.45\n-0.40\n-0.35\n-0.30\n-0.25\n-0.20\n-0.15\n-0.10\n-0.05\n0.00\nFishing (-1.12%)\nLivestock (-2.09%)\nTransportation and Storage (-29.0%)\nHeadline \nInflation \n \n \n22 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nFigure 16: Headline, Food and Core Inflation (Year-on-Year) \nSource: CBN & NBS \n \nAlthough, inflation remained largely broadbased across the \ncomponents of the CPI basket, evidence indicated that it was \ngradually becoming less pervasive. Analysis indicated that in \nQ42023, 70.15 per cent of items of the CPI basket were above the \nhistorical average of 13.10 per cent (1996-2023), compared with \n71.64 per cent in Q32023, and 91.04 per cent in Q42022. \n \nFigure 17: Measures of Underlying Inflation1\nSource: NBS & CBN \n \nAlthough all measures of core inflation remained elevated, the trend \nin trimmed mean and median moderated in the review period. This \n \n1 Core inflation: measure of underlying inflation defined as headline less farm produce less energy prices. \n0.0\n5.0\n10.0\n15.0\n20.0\n25.0\n30.0\n35.0\n40.0\nQ12021 Q22021 Q32021 Q42021 Q12022 Q22022 Q32022 Q42022 Q12023 Q22023 Q32023 Q42023\nPercent (%)\nHeadline\nCore\nFood\n5.00\n10.00\n15.00\n20.00\n25.00\nQ12022\nQ22022\nQ32022\nQ42022\nQ12023\nQ22023\nQ32023\nQ42023\nCore inflation\nTrimmed Median\nTrimmed Mean\nInflation \nPervasiveness \n \nRussia-\nUkraine War \nPMS \nsubsidy \nremoval, \nRate \nunification \n \n23 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nindicated that other measures of underlying inflation grew at a slower \npace compared to the core inflation measure. In addition, it showed \nthat fewer components of the inflation basket accounted for \nunderlying inflationary pressure unlike the core measure. \nFigure 18: Component Drivers of Core Inflation\nSource: NBS \n \nFurther analysis of the drivers of core inflation revealed that \nprocessed food (11.50 pp); housing, water, elect. gas & other PMS \n(3.14 pp); clothing & footwear (2.00 pp); transport (1.74 pp); and \neducation (1.28 pp) accounted for the uptick in core inflation in \nQ42023. 2 \nFood inflation, ascended to 33.93 per cent (y-o-y) from 30.64 per \ncent in the preceding quarter, as the effects of fuel subsidy removal \ncontinued to aggravate transportation and logistics costs. \nFurthermore, increased demand due to the festive season \ncontributed to the uptick in food inflation during the review quarter. \n \n \n \nTrimmed Mean: measure of underlying inflation derived using the average rate of inflation after trimming away a \ncertain percentage of the distribution of price changes outliers at both ends of that distribution. \nTrimmed Median: measure of underlying inflation derived by obtaining median values from inflation of CPI \ncomponents. \n2 ‘PP’ means Percentage point(s) \n-10.00\n0.00\n10.00\n20.00\n30.00\nQ12022\nQ22022\nQ32022\nQ42022\nQ12023\nQ22023\nQ32023\nQ42023\nPer cent\nMeat\nFish & Sea Food\nMilk,Cheese & Eggs\nOil & Fats\nSugar,Jam,Honey,etc\nBREAD UNSLICED 500g\nCABIN BISCUIT: LOCAL MANUFACTURE 800g PACK\nCASSAVA FLOUR,SOLD LOOSE\nCORN FLAKES 350g\nCORN FLOUR 2kg\nCUSTARD 300g\nEKO(AGIDI/KAFA)\nFRITTERS (PUFF-PUFF)\nGARI WHITE,SOLD LOOSE\nGARI YELLOW,SOLD LOOSE\nGUINEA CORN FLOUR,SOLD LOOSE\nMAIZE PASTE-WHITE(OGI/AKAMU)\nPLANTAIN FLOUR\nPOP CORN\nSAUSAGE BEEF (GALA)\nSEMOVITA 2kg\nYAM FLOUR,SOLD LOOSE\nNon-Alcoholic Beverages\nAlcoholic Bev. Tobacco & Kola\nClothing & footwear\nActual and imputed rentals for housing\nMiscellaneous services relating to the dwelling\nFurnishings, Household Equip &HH Maint.\nHealth\nMotor cars\nMotor cycles\nBicycles\nVehicle Spare Parts\nMaintenance and repair of personal transport equipment\nFood \nInflation \n \n24 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nFigure 19: Contribution of Processed food and farm produce \nto food Inflation \nSource: NBS \n \nThe processed food component continued to drive food inflation, due \nto the persisting high energy cost, arising from the PMS subsidy \nremoval, \nwhich \nexacerbated \nthe \ncost \nof \nproduction \nand \ntransportation. \nFigure 20: Component Drivers of Food Inflation \n \nSource: NBS \nFood inflation in Q42023, largely, reflected the quickening in the \nprices of garri (7.73 pp); meat, fish & egg (5.80 pp); yam, potatoes & \n0.00\n5.00\n10.00\n15.00\n20.00\n25.00\n30.00\n35.00\n40.00\nQ12022\nQ22022\nQ32022\nQ42022\nQ12023\nQ22023\nQ32023\nQ42023\nPER CENT\nProcessed food\nFarm produce\nFood Inflation\n0.00\n20.00\n40.00\nQ12022\nQ22022\nQ32022\nQ42022\nQ12023\nQ22023\nQ32023\nQ42023\nPer cent\nMeat, Fish & Egg\nOil & Fats\nSugar,Jam,Honey,etc\nBread, Biscuit & Sausage\nCassava Flour, Sold Loose\nProcessed Corn\nGarri\nFlours\nFruits & Vegatables\nYam, Potatoes & other tubers\nMaize Grain White Sold Loose\nMillet (Jero or Maiwa) Sold Loose\n \n25 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nother tubers (4.16 pp); fruits & vegetables (2.90 pp); rice (2.84 pp); \nand oil & fats (2.19 pp). \n \n2.1.3 Energy Sector \nElectricity generation improved during the review quarter due \nto increased gas supply to thermal stations. The average \nelectricity generation in Q42023, at 4,434.39 MW/h, increased by \n12.5 per cent, above the 3,940.07 MW/h recorded in Q32023. \nLikewise, the average estimated electricity consumption, increased \nby 9.8 per cent to 3,548.32MW/h in Q42023, from 3,231.85 MW/h in \nthe preceding quarter. This was reflected in the index of electricity \nproduction q-o-q and y-o-y, which recorded an increase of 1.5 and \n6.5 per cent, compared with a contraction of 48.9 per cent and a \ngrowth of 5.2 per cent in Q32023, respectively. \n \nFigure 21: Index of Electricity Production (Q42023-Q42023) \nSource: CBN & NBS \n \n-90.0\n-60.0\n-30.0\n0.0\n30.0\n60.0\n90.0\n120.0\n150.0\n180.0\n210.0\n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\n300\n350\n400\n450\nQ42022\nQ12023\nQ22023\nQ32023\nQ42023\nIEP[RHS]\nIEP (YOY)[RHS]%\nIEP (QoQ)[RHS]%\nElectricity \nGeneration \n \n26 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nBox 1: Prices of Selected Domestic Agricultural Commodities (N) \nPrices of most farm produce soared in Q42023, with increases ranging from 2.2 per \ncent for onion bulbs to 32.2 per cent for maize grain. This surge was driven by a \ncombination of factors such as festive season demand, the removal of PMS subsidy, \nsecurity challenges, and the influence of middlemen in the market. \n \n \n \nQ42022 \nQ32023 \n* Q42023 \n% Change \n% Change \n \nUNIT \n1 \n2 \n3 \n(1) & (3) \n(2) & (3) \n \nAgric eggs medium size \n1kg \n835.4 \n1041.3 \n1075.4 \n28.7 \n3.3 \nBeans: brown, sold loose \n\" \n585.7 \n694.5 \n735.3 \n25.5 \n5.9 \nBeans: white black eye, sold loose \n\" \n566.5 \n675.1 \n716.1 \n26.4 \n6.1 \nGari white, sold loose \n\" \n335.5 \n458.5 \n509.5 \n51.9 \n11.1 \nGari yellow, sold loose \n\" \n372.0 \n487.1 \n540.3 \n45.2 \n10.9 \nGroundnut oil: 1 bottle, specify \nbottle \n\" \n1234.0 \n1468.0 \n1550.5 \n25.6 \n5.6 \nIrish potato \n\" \n538.8 \n674.2 \n722.4 \n34.1 \n7.2 \nMaize grain white, sold loose \n\" \n326.4 \n605.8 \n800.8 \n145.3 \n32.2 \nMaize grain yellow, sold loose \n\" \n330.6 \n605.3 \n796.5 \n141.0 \n31.6 \nOnion bulb \n\" \n434.7 \n524.0 \n535.7 \n23.2 \n2.2 \nPalm oil: 1 bottle, specify bottle \n\" \n1032.7 \n1253.5 \n1303.7 \n26.2 \n4.0 \nRice agric, sold loose \n\" \n589.7 \n751.7 \n865.2 \n46.7 \n15.1 \nRice local, sold loose \n\" \n510.0 \n715.1 \n862.5 \n69.1 \n20.6 \nRice, medium grained \n\" \n573.0 \n757.9 \n899.2 \n56.9 \n18.7 \nRice, imported high quality, sold \nloose \n\" \n728.8 \n925.5 \n1065.3 \n46.2 \n15.1 \nSweet potato \n\" \n271.6 \n360.7 \n402.6 \n48.2 \n11.6 \nTomato \n\" \n461.6 \n578.8 \n563.9 \n22.1 \n-2.6 \nVegetable oil: 1 bottle, specify \nbottle \n\" \n1168.6 \n1408.1 \n1459.2 \n24.9 \n3.6 \nWheat flour: prepackaged (Golden \nPenny) \n2kg \n1216.2 \n1478.1 \n1590.2 \n30.8 \n7.6 \nYam tuber \n1kg \n427.9 \n580.5 \n640.6 \n49.7 \n10.4 \nSources: National Bureau of Statistics and CBN Staff projections, \n* and ** denote actual and provisional, respectively. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n27 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \n2.2 \nFiscal Sector Developments \nFederally collected revenue (provisional) in Q42023 was 19.6 per \ncent short of the quarterly target and 6.1 per cent below the level in \nthe preceding quarter due to lower non-oil receipts. Provisional \nFederal Government of Nigeria (FGN) retained revenue rose by 7.8 \nper cent compared with Q32023 but was 36.4 per cent below target. \nProvisional FGN expenditure increased by 14.9 per cent relative to \nthe level in Q32023 but fell short of the target by 7.9 per cent. The \nfiscal operation led to a 19.1 per cent widening of fiscal deficit during \nthe review quarter. Consolidated public debt, at N97,340.71 billion, \nrepresented 41.5 per cent of GDP. \n \n2.2.1 Federation Account Operations \nGross Federation Account earnings dropped in Q42023 relative \nto the preceding quarter, majorly, on account of lower earnings \nfrom non-oil sources. At N4,257.25 billion, provisional federation \naccount receipt fell 6.1 per cent below the level in Q32023 and 19.6 \nper cent short of the budget benchmark. The weaker performance \nfollowed the 52.5 per cent plunge in Companies Income Tax (CIT) \nreceipts. Regarding composition, non-oil revenue remained \ndominant, accounting for 74.2 per cent of total receipts, while oil \nrevenue made up the balance. \nHigher dividends payment by the Nigerian National Petroleum \nCompany Limited (NNPCL), and increased receipts from Petroleum \nProfit Tax (PPT) & Royalties led to a 37.1 per cent rise in oil revenue \nto N1,097.20 billion, relative to Q32023. The performance, however, \nwas below the target by 54.5 per cent. \nNon-oil revenue, at N3,160.06 billion, was 15.3 per cent below the \nlevel in Q32023 but exceeded the target by 9.6 per cent. The drop \nrelative to the preceding quarter highlighted the seasonality variation \nDrivers of \nFederation \nRevenue \n \n28 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nassociated with tax returns, particularly CIT payments, which are \nlargely filed in the second and third quarters of the year. \nFigure 22: Gross Revenue Outturn and Benchmark (₦ Billion) \n \nSource: Office of the Accountant-General of the Federation (OAGF) and Federal Ministry of Finance \n(FMF) \n \n \n \n799.87\n1,097.20\n2,410.89\n3,732.46\n3,160.06\n2,882.76\n4,532.33\n4,257.25\n5,293.66\n0.00\n2,000.00\n4,000.00\n6,000.00\n8,000.00\n10,000.00\n12,000.00\nQ32023\nQ42023\nBudget\nOil\nNon-oil\nGross revenue\n \n29 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nTable 4: Federally Collected Revenue and Distribution to the \nThree-Tiers of Government (₦ Billion) \n \nQ42022 \n \nQ32023 \nQ42023 Budget* \n \nFederation Revenue (Gross) \n3,494.45 \n \n4,532.33 \n4,257.25 \n5,293.66 \n Oil \n1,382.82 \n \n799.87 \n1,097.20 \n2,410.89 \n \nCrude Oil & Gas Exports \n0.00 \n \n3.09 \n19.88 \n122.71 \n \nPPT & Royalties \n1,361.84 \n \n513.05 \n625.56 \n2,060.26 \n \nDomestic Crude Oil/Gas Sales \n0.00 \n \n0.00 \n56.86 \n25.15 \n \nOthers \n20.98 \n \n283.73 \n394.90 \n202.78 \n \n Non-oil \n2,111.63 \n \n3,732.46 \n3,160.06 \n2,882.76 \n \nCorporate Tax \n569.46 \n \n1,843.88 \n876.00 \n523.17 \n \nCustoms & Excise Duties \n434.32 \n \n551.53 \n584.41 \n528.97 \n \nValue-Added Tax (VAT) \n650.83 \n \n937.93 \n1,011.35 \n738.44 \n \n Independent Revenue of Fed. Govt. \n448.24 \n \n312.32 \n561.40 \n792.27 \n \nOthers** \n8.79 \n \n86.80 \n126.90 \n299.92 \n \nTotal Deductions/Transfers*** \n1,287.47 \n \n2,545.26 \n2,198.65 \n2,058.22 \n \nFederally Collected Revenue \nLess Deductions & Transfers \n2,206.99 \n \n1,923.43 \n2,046.15 \n3,235.44 \n \n \n \nplus: \n \n \n \n \n \nAdditional Revenue \n132.08 \n \n872.74 \n853.06 \n34.09 \n \nBalance in Special Account from 2019 \n 0.00 \n \n0.00 \n0.00 \n0.00 \n \nExcess Crude Revenue 0.00 \n \n0.00 \n0.00 \n0.00 \n \nNon-oil Excess Revenue \n119.14 \n \n38.38 \n98.49 \n34.09 \n \nExchange Gain \n12.94 \n \n834.37 \n754.57 \n0.00 \n \nTotal Distributed Balance \n2,339.08 \n \n2,796.17 \n2,899.21 \n3,269.53 \n \nFederal Government \n915.11 \n \n1,058.00 \n1,046.76 \n1291.1 \n \nStatutory \n824.20 \n \n927.94 \n905.50 \n1188.49 \n \nVAT \n90.91 \n \n130.07 \n141.27 \n102.61 \n \nState Government \n729.19 \n \n920.49 \n946.48 \n959.32 \n \nStatutory \n426.16 \n \n486.93 \n475.60 \n617.27 \n \nVAT \n303.03 \n \n433.56 \n470.88 \n342.05 \n \nLocal Government \n539.99 \n \n677.53 \n694.92 \n714.11 \n \nStatutory \n327.87 \n \n374.04 \n365.30 \n474.68 \n \nVAT \n212.12 \n \n303.49 \n329.62 \n239.43 \n \n13% Derivation \n154.79 \n \n140.15 \n211.05 \n305.00 \n \n \nSource: OAGF, FMF and CBN Staff Estimates \nNote: *Budget is based on 2023 appropriation Act, ** Includes Education Tax, Customs Special Levies \n(Federation Account), National Information Technology Development Fund, Customs Special Levies, \nSolid Minerals & Other Mining revenue, and other non-regular earnings; *** Deductions include cost of \nrevenue collections and JVC cash calls; while transfers entail provisions for FGN Independent revenue \nand other non-federation revenue. \n \n \n \n \n30 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \n \nA net balance of N2,899.21 billion was distributed to Federal \n(N1,046.76 billion), State (N946.48 billion), and Local governments \n(N694.92 billion). The balance of N211.05 billion was allocated to the \n13% Derivation Fund for oil-producing states. Net disbursement in \nQ42023 was 3.7 per cent above the level in Q32023 but was 11.3 \nper cent short of the quarterly target. \n \n2.2.2 Fiscal Operations of the Federal Government \nProvisional FGN retained revenue improved, largely, on \naccount of higher receipts from FGN Independent Revenue. At \nN1,756.53 billion, FGN retained revenue was above collections in \nQ32023 by 7.8 per cent, but fell short of the quarterly target of \nN2,761.28 by 36.4 per cent. \nTable 5: FGN Retained Revenue (₦ Billion) \n \n \nQ42022 \nQ32023* \nQ42023* \nBudget* \nFGN Retained \nRevenue \n1,502.52 \n1,628.85 \n1,756.53 \n2,761.28 \nFederation \nAccount \n762.59 \n510.30 \n513.33 \n1,070.84 \nVAT Pool \nAccount \n90.91 \n130.07 \n141.27 \n95.77 \nFGN Independent \nRevenue \n448.24 \n312.32 \n561.40 \n792.27 \nExcess Oil \nRevenue \n0.00 \n0.00 \n0.00 \n0.00 \nExcess non-oil \n55.55 \n5.76 \n37.38 \n0.00 \nExchange Gain \n6.06 \n411.88 \n354.79 \n0.00 \nOthers** \n \n139.17 \n258.52 \n148.36 \n802.40 \nSource: Data from OAGF \nNote: *The figures are provisional \n** Others include revenue from Special Accounts and Special Levies. \n \nProvisional aggregate expenditure of the FGN rose following \nhigher capital outlays. At N5,026.06 billion, expenditure in Q42023 \nwas N652.06 billion (14.9%) above the level in Q32023 and N430.73 \nbillion (7.9%) short of the budgeted spending. In terms of \nFederal \nGovernment \nRetained \nRevenue \nFederal \nGovernment \nExpenditure \n \n31 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \ncomposition, recurrent expenditure, at 67.8 per cent continued to \ndominate FGN spending, compared with 25.8 for capital outlay and \n6.4 per cent for transfers. \nFigure 23: Federal Government Expenditure (₦ Billion) \n \nSource: CBN Staff Estimates and OAGF \nThe fiscal operations of the FGN in Q42023 resulted to a larger \ndeficit. The provisional fiscal deficit of the FGN, at N3,269.53 billion, \nwidened by 19.1 and 21.3 per cent compared to the levels in Q32023 \nand the proportionate target, respectively. The deficit reflected \nsteeper increases in expenditure relative to revenue outturns. \nTable 6: Fiscal Balance (₦ Billion) \n \nQ42022 \nQ32023* \nQ42023* \nBudget \nRetained revenue \n1,502.52 \n1,628.85 \n1,756.53 \n2,761.28 \nAggregate \nexpenditure \n2,808.58 \n4,373.69 \n5,026.06 \n5,456.80 \n Recurrent \n2,435.61 \n3,621.57 \n3,408.29 \n3,721.74 \n Non-debt \n1,217.40 \n1,304.72 \n1,457.01 \n2,082.34 \n Debt Service \n1,151.64 \n2,207.65 \n1,876.98 \n1,639.40 \n Capital \n242.88 \n515.04 \n1,294.47 \n1,493.18 \n Transfers \n130.10 \n237.08 \n323.31 \n241.87 \nPrimary balance \n-154.42 \n-537.19 \n-1,392.55 -1,056.12 \nOverall balance \n-1,306.06 \n-2,744.84 \n-3,269.53 -2,695.52 \nSource: Data from OAGF and CBN Staff Estimates \nNote: *The figures are provisional \n \n -\n 1,000.00\n 2,000.00\n 3,000.00\n 4,000.00\n 5,000.00\n 6,000.00\nQ42022\nQ32023\nQ42023\nBudget\n2,435.61 \n3,621.57 \n3,408.29 \n3,721.74 \n242.88 \n515.04 \n1,294.47 \n1,493.18 \n130.10 \n237.08 \n323.31 \n241.87 \n2,808.58 \n4,373.69 \n5,026.06 \n5,456.80 \nRecurrent Expenditure\nCapital Expenditure\nTransfers\nAggregate Expenditure\nOverall Fiscal \nBalance \n \n32 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nPublic debt stock in the review period was slightly above the \n40.0 per cent national threshold. Total public debt outstanding \nstood at N97,340.71 billion (41.5% of GDP), at end-December 2023, \nand was 10.7 per cent, higher than the levels at end-September \n2023. A breakdown of the consolidated public debt showed that, \ndomestic debt accounted for 60.7 per cent, while external debt \nobligations constituted 39.3 per cent \nOf the consolidated public debt stock, FGN owed N91,477.86 billion \n(94.0% ), while the state governments made up the balance of \nN5,862,85 billion (6.0%). \nA disaggregation of the FGN debt obligations showed that domestic \ndebt was N53,258.01 billion (58.2%), while external debt accounted \nfor N38,219.85 billion (41.8%). Further analysis revealed that FGN \nBonds maintained its dominance, with 83.1 per cent of the total \ndomestic debt stock, followed by Treasury Bills (12.2%), Promissory \nNotes (2.5%), and FGN Sukuk (2.1%), while others (0.1%) \nconstituted the balance. Of the total external debt stock, multilateral, \ncommercial and bilateral loans accounted for 49.8, 36.2, and 14.0 \nper cent, respectively. \n \nDebt service obligations in Q42023 fell marginally by 0.4 per cent to \nN2,848.88 billion, from N2,861.61 billion in Q32023. The decrease \nwas attributed to the lower principal and interest payments on fewer \nmaturing bilateral and commercial loans, relative to the preceding \nthe quarter. A breakdown of the total showed that domestic debt \nservice accounted for N2,000.60 billion (70.2%), while external debt \nservice constituted N848.28 billion (29.8%). \nFederal \nGovernment \nDebt \n \n33 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \n \n \n \nFigure 24: FGN External and Domestic Debt Composition \n(₦ Billion) \n \nSource: Debt Management Office (DMO) \n \nFigure 25: Composition of Domestic Debt Stock by Instrument \n \nSource: Compiled from DMO figures \n \n \n0.00\n20,000.00\n40,000.00\n60,000.00\n80,000.00\n100,000.00\nExternal Debt\nDomestic Debt\nTotal\nFGN Bonds, \n83.1%\nTreasury Bills, \n12.2%\nPromisory \nNotes , 2.5%\nFGN SUKUK, \n2.1%Others , 0.1%\nFGN Bonds\nTreasury Bills\nPromisory Notes\nFGN SUKUK\nOthers\n \n34 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nFigure 26: Composition of External Debt Stock by Instrument \n \nSource: Compiled from DMO figures \n \nNear- to medium-term fiscal outlook is optimistic, on the back of \nprospective rise in oil prices, enhanced crude oil production, \ncontinued implementation of the Petroleum Industry Act (PIA 2022) \nand the imminent tax reforms. The developments would likely \nimprove government revenue and thus widen the fiscal space. \n \n \nMultilateral , \n49.8%\nCommercial , \n36.2%\nBilateral, \n14.0%\nMultilateral\nCommercial\nBilateral\nFiscal \nOutlook \n \n35 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \n2.3 Monetary and Financial Developments \nKey monetary aggregates grew relative to levels in the preceding \nquarter, driven in part by the expansion in private sector credit. \nRising interest rates incentivised investors’ appetite for domestic \nsecurities, leading to increased subscriptions for both the NTBs and \nFGN bonds during the quarter. The financial sector remained robust \nwith financial soundness indicators largely within regulatory \nthresholds. \n \n2.3.1 Monetary Developments \nReserve money grew at end-December 2023, on account of a \nrise in liabilities to other depository corporations (ODCs) and \ncurrency-in-circulation (CIC). Relative to the level at end-\nDecember 2022, reserve money increased by 54.3 per cent to \nN24,735.52 billion at end-December 2023. This growth was \npropelled by the 21.3 per cent and 61.9 per cent rise in CIC and \nliabilities to ODCs, respectively. The elevated demand for banknotes \nand coins during the festive season contributed to the rise in CIC, \nwhile the increase in liabilities to ODCs was attributed to growth in \nreserve requirement debits by the monetary authority. The stock of \nreserve money was 24.1 per cent above the benchmark of \nN19,933.75 billion for 2023. \n \n \nReserve Money \nSummary \n \n36 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nFigure 27: Developments in Reserve Money and Money \nMultiplier \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nFigure 28: Reserve Money Growth Over end-December 2022 \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \nThe volume of eNaira, as a component of CIC rose to N13.98 billion \nat end-December 2023, from N2.55 billion at end-December 2022. \nOn a quarterly basis, the eNaira volume of eNaira grew by 36.3 per \ncent in Q42023 from N10.26 billion in Q32023. The substantial \nexpansion reflected the increasing acceptance of eNaira by the \npublic for transactions. In terms of the composition of total CIC, \neNaira constituted 0.4 per cent, while banknotes and coins, \naccounted for 99.6 per cent. \n 2.80\n 3.00\n 3.20\n 3.40\n 3.60\n 3.80\n 4.00\nDec-22\nMar-23\nJun-23\nSep-23\nDec-23\nN' Billions\nReserve Money\nLiabilities to ODCs\nCurrency-in-Circulation\n2023 Benchmark\nM3 Multiplier (RHS)\n-75\n-50\n-25\n0\n25\n50\n75\nDec-22\nFeb-23\nApr-23\nJun-23\nAug-23\nOct-23\nDec-23\nPer cent\nReserve Money\nCIC\nLiabilities to ODCs\n \n37 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nFigure 29: Composition of Currency-in-Circulation (₦ Billion) \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \nAlthough broad money multiplier decreased to 3.18 from 3.25 at end-\nDecember 2022, it underlaid the expansion of broad money supply \n(M3) in the review period. Relative to the level at end-December \n2022, M3 grew by 50.9 per cent to N78,738.41 billion, and surpassed \nthe 2023 provisional benchmark of 28.2 per cent by 22.67 \npercentage points. \nFrom the asset side, M3 was propped by substantial increases in Net \nforeign assets (NFA) and domestic claims, which, respectively, \nadded 8.02 and 57.61 percentage points to broad money growth. \nThe expansion in NFA reflected the 48.6 per cent upsurge in claims \non nonresidents as the exchange rate revaluation impacted official \nreserve assets. Growth in domestic claims was attributed to the 42.1 \nand 47.3 per cent rise in net claims on central government and \nclaims on other sectors, respectively. \nNet claims on central government mirrored the increased holdings of \ngovernment securities by depository corporations. Expansion in \nclaims on other sectors was driven by increases in claims on other \nfinancial corporations (47.4%), claims on state and local government \n(18.5%), and claims on the private sector (57.8%). \n0\n500\n1,000\n1,500\n2,000\n2,500\n3,000\n3,500\n4,000\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\nDec-22\nMar-23\nJun-23\nSep-23\nDec-23\nN Billion\nN Billion\nNotes & Coins (RHS)\neNaira (LHS)\n \n38 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nTable 7: Money and Credit Growth Over Preceding December \n(per cent) \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nThe growth in M3, from the liability side, was driven by the ample \nincrease in currency outside depository corporations (33.6%), \n \nDec-22 \nJun-23 \nSep-23 \nDec-23 \nContribution \nto M3 growth \n(Dec-23) \n2023 \nBenchmark \nNet \nForeign \nAssets \n-58.91 \n200.11 \n226.25 \n108.87 \n8.02 \n95.57 \nClaims \non \nNon-residents \n11.72 \n50.38 \n81.33 \n109.27 \n48.63 \n \nLiabilities \nto \nNon-residents \n69.47 \n20.69 \n52.60 \n109.36 \n40.61 \n \nNet Domestic \nAssets \n37.76 \n11.58 \n12.54 \n46.27 \n42.86 \n17.85 \nDomestic \nClaims \n35.61 \n31.04 \n23.47 \n45.47 \n57.61 \n49.16 \nNet Claims on \nCentral \nGovernment \n71.18 \n35.70 \n-6.56 \n42.12 \n19.12 \n58.63 \nClaims \non \nCentral \nGovernment \n39.99 \n28.21 \n24.26 \n64.01 \n42.07 \n \nLiabilities \nto \nCentral \nGovernment \n-0.50 \n11.47 \n93.11 \n112.91 \n22.95 \n \nClaims \non \nOther Sectors \n21.51 \n28.44 \n40.24 \n47.33 \n38.49 \n44.09 \nClaims \non \nOther Financial \nCorporations \n18.29 \n25.30 \n36.90 \n47.40 \n8.48 \n \nClaims \non \nState \nand \nLocal \nGovernment \n42.03 \n-7.24 \n8.97 \n18.52 \n1.26 \n \nClaims \non \nPublic \nNonfinancial \nCorporations \n316.63 \n34.03 \n89.04 \n-4.67 \n-0.30 \n \nClaims \non \nPrivate Sector \n10.47 \n33.68 \n39.44 \n57.82 \n29.05 \n \nTotal \nMonetary \nAssets (M3) \n17.42 \n25.46 \n28.28 \n50.88 \n50.88 \n28.21 \nCurrency \nOutside \nDepository \nCorporations \n-12.57 \n-11.88 \n-5.95 \n33.63 \n1.66 \n \nTransferable \nDeposits \n20.24 \n24.42 \n26.01 \n44.62 \n15.54 \n \nNarrow \nMoney (M1) \n14.90 \n19.93 \n22.05 \n43.26 \n17.20 \n29.18 \nOther Deposits \n17.66 \n28.98 \n31.59 \n56.52 \n33.63 \n \nBroad Money \n(M2) \n16.54 \n25.35 \n27.77 \n51.21 \n50.82 \n29.18 \nSecurities \nOther \nthan \nShares \n-18.08 \n-11.57 \n-9.27 \n52.13 \n0.05 \n \nTotal \nMonetary \nLiabilities(M3) \n17.42 \n25.46 \n28.28 \n50.88 \n50.88 \n28.21 \nMoney Supply \n \n39 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \ntransferable deposits (44.6%), other deposits (56.5%), and securities \nother than shares (52.1%). In terms of relative contribution, other \ndeposits was foremost, adding 33.63 percentage points to M3 \ngrowth. Transferable deposits constituted 15.54 per cent, while 1.66 \nper cent was from currency outside depository corporations, and \n0.05 per cent from security other than shares. Heightened end-year \neconomic activity stirred the growth in currency outside depository \ncorporations during Q42023, after three quarters of contraction. \n \n2.3.2 Sectoral Credit Utilisation \nThe value of credit increased by 13.9 per cent to N44,536.13 billion \nin Q42023, from N39,106.01 billion in the preceding quarter. The \nincrease was driven by expansion in loans to the agriculture (23.1%), \nindustry (11.7%), and services (5.4%) sectors. A breakdown \nindicated that services accounted for 52.8 per cent of total credits, \nindustry received 42.2 per cent, while 5.1 per cent went to \nagriculture. \n \n \nSectoral Credit \nUtilisation \n \n \n40 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nTable 8: Sectoral Credit Allocation \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \nConsumer credit outstanding grew by 12.2 per cent to N3,416.42 \nbillion in Q42023 quarter, owing to elevated expenditure during the \nfestive season. A disaggregation of consumer credit showed that \npersonal loans increased by 16.2 per cent to N2,648.89 billion, while \nretail loans increased by 7.4 per cent to N767.54 billion. Personal \nloans remained the major constituent of consumer credit, with a 77.5 \nper cent share, while retail loans accounted for 22.5 per cent. As a \nproportion of total sectoral credit from ODCs, consumer credit fell to \n7.7 per cent, from 7.8 per cent at end-September 2023. \nFigure 30: Consumer Credit Outstanding \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \n6.60%\n7.00%\n7.40%\n7.80%\n0\n1,000,000\n2,000,000\n3,000,000\n4,000,000\nDec-22\nMar-23\nJun-23\nSep-23\nDec-23\nN' Billion\nPersonal loan\nRetail loan\nTotal\n % of total credit by the ODC\nSECTORS \n Allocation (₦ Billion) \nShare in Total (%) \nGrowth \n(%) \nDec-22 \n(1) \nSep-23 \n(2) \nDec-23 \n(3) \nDec-\n22 \n(4) \nSep-\n23 \n(5) \nDec-23\n(6) \n(3) & (2) \n[a] Agriculture \n1,812.47 \n1,832.34 \n2,255.36 \n6.16 \n4.69 \n5.07 \n23.09 \n[b] Industry \n12,074.31 \n16,808.85 \n18,781.93 \n41.01 \n42.98 \n42.17 \n11.74 \n Manufacturing \n5,566.43 \n7,336.66 \n7,732.46 \n18.90 \n18.76 \n17.36 \n1.55 \n[c] Services \n15,559.09 \n20,464.82 \n23,498.84 \n52.84 \n52.33 \n52.76 \n5.40 \nFinance, Insurance & \nCapital Market \n- \n \n3,629.10 \n \n4,327.86 \n8.96 \n \n9.28 \n \n9.72 \n19.25 \nTrade & General \nCommerce \n2,214.41 \n3,207.21 \n3,548.74 \n7.52 \n8.20 \n7.97 \n10.65 \nTOTAL \n29,445.87 \n39,106.01 \n44,536.13 \n100.0 \n100.0 \n100.0 \n6.50 \nConsumer \nCredit \n \n41 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nFigure 31: Composition of Consumer Credit in per cent \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n2.3.3 Financial Developments \n2.3.3.1 \nMoney Market Developments \nBanking system liquidity moderated relative to the level in the \npreceding quarter. Average banking system liquidity declined by \n30.7 per cent to N248.74 billion from N358.91 billion in the preceding \nquarter. Although fiscal injections increased by 3.7 per cent to \nN2,899.22 billion, from N2,796.17 billion in Q32023, and OMO \nmaturities worth N60.00 billion were repaid during the quarter, new \nOMO issues amounted to N575.00 billion, resulting in a net \nwithdrawal of N515.00 billion. \nDespite the moderation in liquidity, activity at the standing lending \nfacility (SLF) declined to N3,660.56 billion, with an average daily \nrequest of N69.07 billion, compared with N5,825.75 billion and N0.10 \nbillion, respectively, in the preceding quarter. Placement at the \nstanding deposit facility (SDF) increased to N7,844.63 billion, with a \ndaily average of N130.74 billion, compared with N2,442.89 billion, \nand daily average of N38.17 billion, respectively, in the preceding \nquarter. \nNotably, applicable rate for the SLF was 19.75 per cent and 15.75 \nper cent for the SDF, vis-à-vis the preceding quarter’s range of \n19.50–19.75 for the SLF and 11.50–15.75 for the SDF, reflecting the \n75.59%\n74.54%\n72.88%\n74.82%\n77.53%\n24.41%\n25.46%\n27.12%\n25.18%\n22.47%\n0%\n20%\n40%\n60%\n80%\n100%\nDec-22\nMar-23\nJun-23\nSep-23\nDec-23\nPersonal loan\nRetail loan\nIndustry Liquidity \nCondition \n \n42 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nasymmetric corridor of +100/-300 around the monetary policy rate of \n18.75 per cent. \nFigure 32: Transactions at the Standing Facility Window \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nPatronage of NTBs and FGN bond increased due to higher \nyields during the period. NTBs worth ₦851.48 billion, ₦7,439.02 \nbillion, and ₦2,650.77 billion were offered, subscribed, and allotted, \nrespectively, in the review quarter, relative to ₦1,407.36 billion, \n₦5,775.89 billion, and ₦1,407.36 billion in the third quarter. Higher \nsubscription for the longer end of bills, at ₦7,124.50 billion or 95.8 \nper cent of total subscription (bid rate of 13.0±3.8 %), could be \nattributed to improved investor confidence. \n \nFigure 33: Primary Market NTBs (₦ Billion) \n \n Source: Central Bank of Nigeria \n0\n2,000\n4,000\n6,000\n8,000\n10,000\nDec-22\nSep-23\nDec-23\nN Billion\nStanding Lending Facility\nStanding Deposit Facility\n0\n1000\n2000\n3000\n4000\n5000\n6000\n7000\n8000\nOffer\nSubsciption\nAllotment\nQ4 2022 (N'B)\n972.99\n2655.07\n852.93\nQ3 2023 (N'B)\n1407.36\n5775.89\n1407.36\nQ4 2023 (N'B)\n851.48\n7439.02\n2650.77\nPrimary Market \n \n43 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \n \nTransactions at the FGN bond, segment exhibited mixed trends. \nTotal amount offered, subscribed, and allotted were N1,080.00 \nbillion, N1,714.82 billion and N1,042.89 billion, compared with \nN1,080.00 billion, N1,548.69 billion and N1,135.99 billion, \nrespectively, in the preceding quarter. The bid and marginal rates \nstood at 17.0 (±3.0) per cent and 16.5 (±1.6) per cent, compared with \n13.5 (±4.5) per cent and 14.4 (±1.9) per cent, respectively, in the \npreceding quarter. \nFigure 34: Primary Market Auctions of FGN Bond (₦ Billion) \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nShort-term interest rates rose consistent with the relatively low \nlevel of liquidity level in the banking system. The average \ninterbank call rate increased by 6.74 percentage points to 14.53 per \ncent from 7.78 per cent in the preceding quarter. From 9.19 per cent \nin the preceding quarter, the open buy back (OBB) rate rose by 4.68 \npercentage points to 13.87 per cent. The Nigeria Interbank Offered \nRate (NIBOR) call rate increased by 4.73 percentage points to 14.21 \nper cent from 9.48 per cent, while the NIBOR-30 rose to 15.00 per \ncent from 10.04 per cent. \n \n \n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1000\n1200\n1400\n1600\n1800\nOffer\nSubsciption\nAllotment\nQ4 2022 (N'B)\n675\n995.39\n641.55\nQ3 2023 (N'B)\n1080\n1548.69\n1135.99\nQ4 2023 (N'B)\n1080\n1714.82\n1042.89\nInterest Rate \nDevelopments \n \n44 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nFigure 35: Developments in Short-term Interest Rates \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nLending rates increased during the review quarter in line with \nthe tight monetary stance. Prime and maximum lending rates \nincreased marginally by 0.16 percentage points and 0.90 percentage \npoints above their levels in the preceding quarter, to 14.25 per cent \nand 28.30 per cent, respectively. Weighted average term deposit \n(WAVTD) rate also rose, marginally, by 0.44 percentage point to 7.17 \nper cent, from 6.73 per cent. Resultantly, the spread between the \nweighted average term deposit and maximum lending rates widened \nto 21.13 percentage points, from 20.67 percentage points in the \npreceding quarter. \nFigure 36: Trend in Average Term Deposit and Lending Rates \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria. \nNote: PLR= Prime lending rate; MXLR= Maximum lending rate; WAVTD= Weighted Average term \ndeposit rate; and SPRD= Spread. \n5\n7.5\n10\n12.5\n15\n17.5\n20\nDec-22\nMar-23\nJun-23\nSep-23\nDec-23\nPer cent \nInterbank call rates\nOBB\nNIBOR\nNIBOR 30\nMPR\n20.0\n20.5\n21.0\n21.5\n22.0\n0.0\n5.0\n10.0\n15.0\n20.0\n25.0\n30.0\n35.0\nDec-22\nMar-23\nJun-23\nSep-23\nDec-23\nPercentage Point\nPer cent\nPLR\nMXLR\nWAVTD\nSPRD(RHS)\n \n45 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \n2.3.3.2 \nCapital Market Developments \nThe Nigerian capital market sustained a bullish trend, as \nequities performance improved. This was underpinned by the \nbetter-than-expected appreciation in the price of banking, and \noil and gas stocks, as well as expectation around the CBN’s \nplanned recapitalisation of banks, which sparked interest in the \nstocks of Systematically Important Banks (SIBs). \nAggregate market capitalisation increased by 18.9 per cent to \nN75,196.53 billion, compared with the N63,222.53 billion at end-\nSeptember 2023. Analysis indicated that Exchange Traded Funds \n(ETF), appreciating by 74.7 per cent, performance, followed by debt \n(27.5%) and equities (12.6%) to close at N23.02 billion, N34,256.00 \nbillion and N40,917.51 billion, respectively. However, the equities \ncomponent, comprising 54.4 per cent of the aggregate market \ncapitalisation, sustained its dominance in terms of contribution, while \ndebt and ETF constituted the balance. \nThe All-Share Index (ASI) improved by 12.6 per cent to 74,773.77 \nindex points, compared with the 66,382.14 index points in the \npreceding quarter. The improvement was on account of price \nappreciation in banking and oil & gas stocks following the \nannouncement of the intended banking sector recapitalisation. The \nmarket performance was also underpinned by the listings on the \nExchange. Renewed investor confidence and improve in Q32023 \ncorporate earnings reports induced strong buying interest in blue \nchip stocks. \n \n \nMarket \nCapitalisation \nNGX All- Share \nIndex \n \n46 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \n \n \n \nFigure 37: Aggregate Market Capitalisation and All-Share \nIndex\nSource: Nigeria Exchange (NGX) Limited \n \nAll the major capital market indices tracked were bullish, except \nNGX-Consumer Goods, NGX- Sovereign Bond and NGX-AseM, \nwhich trended downward, relative to the levels in the preceding \nquarter. \n0.00\n10,000.00\n20,000.00\n30,000.00\n40,000.00\n50,000.00\n60,000.00\n70,000.00\n80,000.00\n0.00\n10,000.00\n20,000.00\n30,000.00\n40,000.00\n50,000.00\n60,000.00\n70,000.00\n80,000.00\nQ4 2022\nQ1 2023\nQ2 2023\nQ3 2023\nQ4 2023\nIndex Points\nN' Billion \nAggregate Market Cap (LHS)\nAll Share Index (RHS)\n \n47 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nTable 9: Nigeria Exchange (NGX) Limited Sectoral Indices \nSectoral Indices \n2023Q2 \n2023Q3 \nChange (%) \nNGX-Growth \n2,771.87 \n6,299.16 \n127.3 \nNGX-Banking \n666.22 \n897.2 \n34.7 \nNGX-Meri Value \n3,938.19 \n5,194.34 \n31.9 \nNGX-Afri Bank Value \n1,648.45 \n2,075.50 \n25.9 \nNGX-CG \n1,863.18 \n2,209.04 \n18.6 \nNGX-Main Board \n2,951.55 \n3,461.22 \n17.3 \nNGX-30 \n2,442.11 \n2,790.28 \n14.3 \nNGX-Oil & Gas \n914.02 \n1,043.06 \n14.1 \nNGX-Pension \n2,848.38 \n3,241.03 \n13.8 \nNGX-Insurance \n283 \n321.66 \n13.7 \nNGX-Afri Div Yield \n6,571.72 \n7,423.65 \n13.0 \nNGX-Pension Board \n1,160.90 \n1,308.54 \n12.7 \nNGX-Lotus II \n4,323.21 \n4,619.73 \n6.9 \nNGX-Premium \n6,775.03 \n7,227.22 \n6.7 \nNGX-Meri Growth \n4,269.37 \n4,547.40 \n6.5 \nNGX-Industrial Goods \n2,662.86 \n2,712.27 \n1.9 \nNGX-Consumer Goods \n1,132.38 \n1,121.29 \n-1.0 \nNGX-Sovereign Bond \n769.82 \n759.75 \n-1.3 \nNGX-AseM \n658.99 \n639.55 \n-2.9 \nSource: Nigerian Exchange (NGX) Limited \nThe value and volume of equities traded on the Exchange were \nN433.03 billion and 26.76 billion shares compared with N632.94 \nbillion and 43.27 billion in Q32023, respectively. The total deals \ntraded was 416,324 deals, relative to 519,699 deals in the preceding \nquarter. \nFigure 38: Volume and Value of Traded Securities on the NGX \nSource: Nigerian Exchange (NGX) \n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n700\nQ4 2022\nQ1 2023\nQ2 2023\nQ3 2023\nQ4 2023\nBillion Unit of Shares\nN' Billion\nValue of Traded Securities (LHS)\nVolume of Traded Securities (RHS)\n \n48 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \n \nIn the review quarter, there were seventeen new listings, eighteen \nsupplementary listings and three delisting on the Exchange, \ncompared with twenty-two new listings, thirteen supplementary \nlistings and one delisting in the preceding quarter. There was also \none suspension in the review quarter. The listings comprised savings \nbonds, ordinary shares, rights issues, futures contracts and \nsubordinated bonds. \n \n \n \n49 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nTable 10: Listings, De-listings, and Suspensions on the \nNigerian Exchange Limited in Q42023 \nCompany/Security \nShares Units/Price \nRemarks \nNew/Supplementary/ \nSuspensions/Delisting \nFGN Bonds 14.70% \nFGN JUNE 2033 \n \nA total of N18,570,000,000.00\n \n10-year bonds of 18,570,000 \nunits at N1,000 per unit. \nSavings bond \nNew \nFGN Bonds 15.45% \nFGN JUNE 2038 \n \nA \ntotal \nof \nN100,643,000,000.00\n 15 -year \nbonds of 100,643,000 units at \nN1,000 per unit. \nSavings bond \nNew \nFGN Bonds 15.70% \nFGN JUNE 2053 \n \nA \ntotal \nof \nN221,562,000,000.00\n 30 -year \nbonds of 221,562,000 units at \nN1,000 per unit. \nSavings bond \nNew \nFGN Bonds 11.07% \nFGN OCT 2025 \n \nN565,149,000 2-year savings \nbond of 565,149 units at N1,000 \nper unit. \nper share. \nSavings bond \nNew \nFGN Bonds 12.07% \nFGN OCT 2026 \n \nN941,598,000.00 \n3-year savings bond of 941,598 \nunits at N1,000 per unit. \nper share. \nSavings bond \nNew \nLagos \nState \nGovernment \nN19,815,000,000.00 \n7-year \nbond of 19,815,000 units at \nN1,000 per unit. \nper share. \nBond Issuance \nNew \n VFD Group Plc \n190,027,365 Ordinary Shares of \n50 Kobo each at N244.88 \nper share. \nOrdinary \nshares \nNew \nChapel Hill Denham \nManagement \nLimited’s \nNigerian \nInfrastructure Debt \nFund \n853,694,759 units of shares of \nN100.00 at N108.39 per share. \nOrdinary \nshares \nNew \nGuinea \nInsurance \nPlc \n1,802,800,000 ordinary shares \nof 50 kobo each at 50 Kobo per \nshare. \n \nRights issue \nSupplementary \n FGN \nBonds \n14.70% FGN \nJUN 2033 \nA total of 22,269,000 units \nSavings bond \nSupplementary \nFGN Bonds 5.45% \nFGN \nJUN 2038 \nA total of 54,864,000 units \nSavings bond \nSupplementary \nFGN Bonds 15.70% \nFGN \nJUN 2053 \nA total of 237,094,000 units \nSavings bond \nSupplementary \nFGN Bonds 14.55% \nFGN APR 2029 \nA total of 20,534,000 units \nSavings bond \nSupplementary \nFGN Bonds 13.53% \nFGN MAR 2025 \nA cumulative of 131,461,000 \nunits \nSavings bond \nSupplementary \nFGN Bonds 12.50% \nFGN APR 2032 \nA cumulative of 213,452,000 \nunits \nSavings bond \nSupplementary \nFGN Bonds 13.00% \nFGN JAN 2042 \nA total of 374,870,000 units \nSavings bond \nSupplementary \nFGN \nBonds \n16.2499% \nFGN \nAPR 2037 \nA total of 627,807,000 units \nSavings bond \nSupplementary \nFGN Bonds 14.55% \nFGN APR 2029 \nA total of 73,699,000 units \nSavings bond \nSupplementary \nCapital Hotels Plc \n \nTotal issued shares \nN/A \nDelisting \nMeCure Ind Plc \n \nA \ntotal \nof \n4,000,000,000 \nOrdinary Shares of 50kobo each \nat N2.96 per share on NGX-\nGrowth Board \nOrdinary \nShares \nNew \n \n50 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nCourteville \nBusiness Solutions \nPlc \n \nTotal issued shares \nN/A \nDelisting \nFGN Bonds 14.55% \nFGN \nAPR 2029 \nAdditional 31,470,000 units \nFGN Bond \nSupplementary \nFGN Bonds 14.70% \nFGN \nJUN 2033 \nAdditional 33,193,000 units \nFGN Bond \nSupplementary \nFGN Bonds 15.45% \nFGN \nJUN 2038 \nAdditional 47,065,000 units \nFGN Bond \nSupplementary \n FGN \nBonds \n15.70% FGN \nJUN 2053 \nAdditional 322,769,000 units \nFGN Bond \nSupplementary \nUnion \nBank \nof \nNigeria Plc \nTotal issued shares \nN/A \nDelisting \nLagos \nState \nGovernment \nA total 115,000,000 units \n \nBond issuance \nNew \n Consolidated \nHallmark Insurance \nTotal issued shares \nN/A \nSuspension \nNGX30M4 \nN2,750.75 per share \nFutures \nContracts \nNew \nPENSIONM4 \nN3,225.50 per share \nFutures \nContracts \nNew \n14.55% FGN \nAPR 2029 \nAdditional 28,614,000 units \nFGN Bond \nSupplementary \n14.70% FGN \nJUN 2033 \nAdditional 9,148,000 unit \nFGN Bond \nSupplementary \n15.45% FGN \nJUN 2038 \nAdditional 24,343,000 units \nFGN Bond \nSupplementary \n15.70% FGN \nJUN 2053 \nAdditional 211,523,000 Units \nFGN Bond \nSupplementary \nWema Bank Plc \n8,572,103,573 ordinary shares \nof 50 kobo each at N4.66 per \nshare \nRights Issue \nNew \nVFD Group Plc \n63,342,455 ordinary shares of \n50 kobo each at N197.33 per \nshare \nRights Issue \nNew \n12.287% \nFGNSB \nDEC 2025 \nTotal of 477,975 units \nSavings Bonds \nNew \n13.287% \nFGNSB \nDEC 2026 \nTotal of 1,195,718 units \nSavings Bonds \nNew \n16% FCMB OCT \n2028 \nTotal of 26,000,000\n Units at \nN1,000 per share \nSubordinated \nBonds \nNew \nSource: Nigerian Exchange Limited (NGX). \nNotes: FGN=Federal Government of Nigeria; Plc=Public Limited Liability Company; N/A=Not \navailable; FCMB=First City Monument Bank. \n \n2.3.2.2 Financial Soundness Indicators \nThe banking industry remained robust in key financial \nsoundness indicators stayed within industry regulatory \nthresholds. The banking system Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) \nincreased marginally by 0.1 percentage point to 13.1 per cent at end-\nDecember 2023, relative to the 13.0 per cent recorded in the \npreceding quarter. The development reflected rise in banks’ total \nqualifying capital, relative to the increase in risk-weighted assets, \n \n51 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \ndue to increased profits and dividends declarations in Q32023 \nresults. The ratio remained above the 10.0 per cent benchmark for \nbanks with national/regional authorisation. \nBanks’ asset quality, measured by the non-performing loans (NPL) \nratio decreased by 0.3 percentage point to 4.1 per cent in the review \nquarter, reflecting improvement in loan recoveries. The ratio \nremained below the prudential benchmark of 5.0 per cent. \nThe industry Liquidity Ratio (LR) declined to 44.0 from 50.7 per cent \nin the preceding quarter. The LR remained above the minimum \nregulatory benchmark of 30.0 per cent, indicating sufficient liquidity \nand continued ability of banks to meet short-term obligations. \n \n \n52 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \n2.4 \nExternal Sector Developments \nReview of external sector performance in Q42023 indicated a deficit \ncurrent account balance vis-à-vis surplus in the preceding quarter. \nThe downturn reflected deficit in the goods, services and primary \nincome accounts. A lower net incurrence of financial liabilities was, \nconcomitantly, recorded in the financial account, due to diminishing \ninflow of direct and portfolio investments. Likewise, the International \nInvestment Position posted a lower net financial liability of US$82.58 \nbillion. The external reserves stood at US$33.09 billion at end-\nDecember, relative to US$32.85 billion at end-September 2023. The \nlevel of external reserves could cover 6.6 months of import for goods \nand services or 9.4 months of import for goods only. The average \nexchange rate of the naira per US dollar at the NFEM depreciated \nby 9.3 per cent to ₦843.14/US$, compared with ₦764.82/US$ in \nQ32023. \n2.4.1 Current and Capital Account \nThe current account recorded to a deficit position from a \nsurplus in the preceding quarter. The current account posted a \ndeficit of US$3.48 billion or 4.3 per cent of GDP in Q42023, \ncompared with a surplus of US$1.55 billion or 1.9 per cent of GDP in \nQ32023. This was due to the deficit in the goods account and the \nhigher deficit in the services and primary income accounts. \n \n \n \n53 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nFigure 39: Current Account Balance \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nEarnings from merchandise export increased on account of \nhigher commodity prices and increased in domestic crude oil \nproduction. Aggregate export earnings increased by 8.9 per cent to \nUS$14.92 billion, from US$13.70 billion in Q32023. A breakdown \nshowed that oil receipts rose to US$13.41 billion, from US$12.64 \nbillion in Q32023, largely, due to increase in domestic production of \ncrude oil to 1.31mbd. Similarly, non-oil export receipts, grew to \nUS$1.51 billion, from US$1.06 billion in the preceding quarter, \nfollowing the increase in electricity, re-exports and other non-oil \nexports. In terms of share, crude oil and gas export constituted 89.9 \nper cent of total export, while non-oil export accounted for the \nremaining 10.1 per cent. \nMerchandise import bills increased, on account of higher \nimportation of non-oil products. Merchandise import rose \nsignificantly by 54.2 per cent to US$17.38 billion, from US$11.27 \nbillion in Q32023. Importation of oil products declined to US$3.73 \nbillion, from US$4.25 billion in Q32023, while non-oil products \nimports, increased significantly by 94.4 per cent to US$13.65 billion, \nrelative to the preceding quarter. Analysis by share showed that non-\noil import remained dominant, accounting for 78.5 per cent of the \n-4.00\n-3.00\n-2.00\n-1.00\n0.00\n1.00\n2.00\n3.00\nQ42022\nQ12023\nQ22023\nQ32023\nQ42023\nUS$ Billion\nExport \nPerformance \nMerchandise \nImport \n \n54 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \ntotal, while petroleum products constituted the balance of 21.5 per \ncent. \nA breakdown of import by sector revealed that raw materials and \nmachinery accounted for the largest share of 62.8 per cent. Other \nsectoral import shares were manufactured products (12.9 %); food \nproducts (10.4%), petroleum products (5.8%), transport (3.9%), \nagricultural products (2.2%), and minerals (2.0%). \n \nFigure 40: Import by Sector in Per cent \n \n Source: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nThe deficit in the services account widened by 5.7 per cent to \nUS$3.53 billion, compared with US$3.34 billion in Q32023, driven, \nlargely, \nby \nhigher \npayments \nfor \nfinancial \nservices, \nand \ntelecommunications, computer & information services. \nFurther analysis revealed that the total payments increased to \nUS$4.66 billion, from US$4.48 billion in the preceding quarter. \nPayments for financial services and telecommunications, computer \n& information services rose by 21.4 and 87.5 per cent, to US$0.17 \nbillion \nand \nUS$0.15 \nbillion, \nrespectively. \nPayments \nfor \ntransportation, travel, insurance and pension services, other \nRaw Materials 62.8\nManufactured \nProducts\n12.9\nFood Products\n10.4\nPetroleum Products\n5.8\nMinerals\n2.0\nTransport\n3.9\nAgricultural Products\n2.2\nServices \n \n55 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nbusiness services, personal, cultural & recreation services and \ngovernment goods & services, however, decreased by 9.9, 4.1, 5.2, \n10.2, 66.7 and 16.7 per cent to US$1.54 billion, US$ 1.16 billion, \nUS$0.15 billion, US$0.88 billion, US$0.05 billion and US$0.10 \nbillion, respectively. \nIn terms of share, transportation was the largest at 33.1 per cent, \nwhile travels recorded 24.8 per cent. Other business services \n(18.9%), \nconstruction \n(8.6%), \nfinancial \nservices \n(3.7%), \ntelecommunications (3.2%), and insurance & pension (3.1%) were \nnotable contributors. Government services, and other categories of \nservices accounted for the balance. \n \nFigure 41: Share of Service Out-Payments in Per cent \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria. \n \nAt US$1.11 billion, receipts from services decreased by 1.8 per cent, \ndriven mainly by transport and travel services. Transport services \ndecreased by 3.5 per cent to US$0.47 billion, while travel services \ndeclined by 7.6 per cent to US$0.12 billion, due to lower personal \ntravel services, compared with the level in the preceding quarter. \nTelecommunication services also decreased by 52.4 per cent to \nUS$0.03 billion, relative to the level in Q32023. Receipts from \nfinancial and government services, however, increased by 8.2 per \n33.1\n24.8\n8.6\n3.1\n3.2\n2.2\n18.9\n3.72.4\nTransportation\nTravels\nConstruction\nInsurance\nCommunications\nGovernment\nOther business\nFinancial\nOthers\n \n56 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \ncent and 2.0 per cent to US$0.33 billion and US$0.12 billion, \nrespectively, compared with US$0.31 billion and US$0.12 billion in \nthe preceding quarter. \nIn terms of share, receipts from transportation services was 42.2 per \ncent; financial services, 29.8 per cent; government goods and \nservices, \n11.1 \nper \ncent; \ntravels, \n10.9 \nper \ncent; \nand \ntelecommunication services, 2.3 per cent. Others accounted for the \nbalance. \nFigure 42: Share of Services Receipts in Per cent \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria. \n \nThe deficit in the primary income account widened, due to \nhigher payments of equity and investment fund shares. Primary \nincome account widened by 13.3 per cent expansion of deficit to \nUS$3.23 billion in Q32023 from US$2.85 billion in Q32023, due to \nhigher equity and investment fund shares. A disaggregation showed \nthat the investment income sub-account recorded a higher deficit \nposition of US$3.71 billion compared with US$3,61 billion in Q32023, \non account of increased payment of direct investment income, \nparticularly income on equity and investment fund shares. \nThe compensation of employees account maintained a surplus \nposition of US$0.05 billion, lower by 19.2 per cent, when compared \nwith the level in the preceding quarter. \n42.2\n10.9\n29.8\n2.3\n11.1\n3.7\nTransportation\nTravels\nFinancial\nCommunications\nGovernment\nOthers\nPrimary Income \n \n57 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nFigure 43: Primary Income Balance (US$ Billion) \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria. \n \nThe secondary income account maintained a surplus position, \ndriven majorly, by workers’ remittances. The secondary income \naccount surplus increased by 8.1 per cent to US$5.84 billion, from \nUS$5.40 billion in Q32023. The development was attributed to \nhigher inflow of private sector transfers, particularly, workers’ \nremittances, which increased by 6.9 per cent to US$4.90 billion from \nUS$4.58 billion in Q32023. Similarly, general government transfers \nincreased by 14.8 per cent to US$0.93 billion from US$0.81 billion in \nthe preceding quarter. \n Figure 44: Secondary Income Balance and Remittances Inflow \n \n Source: Central Bank of Nigeria. \n-3.43\n-2.26\n-2.85\n-1.72\n-1.88\n-2.11\nQ3 2022\nQ4 2022\nQ1 2 0 2 3\nQ2 2023\nQ3 2023\nQ4 2023\n5.46 \n4.95 \n5.49 \n5.58 \n5.30 \n5.74 \n4.80 \n4.95 \n4.85 \n4.95 \n4.58 \n4.90 \n0.77 \n0.49 \n0.73 \n0.71 \n0.81 \n0.93 \n -\n 1.00\n 2.00\n 3.00\n 4.00\n 5.00\n 6.00\n 7.00\nQ3 2022\nQ4 2022\nQ1 2023\nQ2 2023\nQ3 2023\nQ4 2023\nUS$ Billion\nSecondary Income Balance\nRemittances\nGovernment Transfers\nSecondary \nIncome \n \n58 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \n2.4.2 Financial Account \nThe financial account recorded a lower net incurrence of \nfinancial liabilities, driven by decreased in inflow of direct and \nportfolio investments. The financial account recorded a lower net \nincurrence of liabilities of US$7.44 billion (9.3 % of GDP), compared \nwith US$8.13 billion (10.0 % of GDP) in Q32023. \nA higher inflow of US$8.38 billion was recorded in Q42023, \ncompared with US$3.12 billion in the preceding quarter. The \ndevelopment was due to an increase in the inflow of other investment \nloans. Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI) inflow decreased by 5.3 per \ncent to US$2.73 billion, relative to US$2.88 billion in Q32023, due to \ndampened investor confidence from exchange rate volatility. Direct \ninvestment inflow declined by 18.3 per cent to US$0.71 billion, \nfollowing lower investment in equity and investment fund shares, \ncompared to the preceding quarter. Inflow in Other investment \nincreased significantly to US$4.92 billion, against a divestment of \nUS$0.48 billion in Q32023, attributed, largely, to increased \nincurrence of loans. \nA net acquisition of US$0.94 billion in financial assets was recorded, \nan improvement, when compared to disposal of assets totalling \nUS$5.01 billion in Q32023. The development reflected an acquisition \nof other investment valued at US$0.22 billion, against a disposal of \nUS$4.39 billion in the preceding quarter, due majorly to the \nacquisition of foreign currency and deposits by residents. Portfolio \ninvestments recorded a higher net acquisition of US$0.21 billion, \ncompared with US$0.05 billion in Q32023. Direct investments also \nrecorded a higher net acquisition of US$0.19 billion, compared with \nUS$0.04 billion, following reduced divestment in equity and \ninvestment fund shares. \n \nNet Acquisition \nof Asset \nNet Incurrence \nof Liability \nFinancial \nAccount \nDevelopments \n \n59 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \n2.4.3 External Debt \nNigeria’s public sector external debt stock at end-December 2023 \nstood at US$42.50 billion (13.2 per cent of GDP). A breakdown \nshowed that the multilateral loans, from the World Bank, \nInternational Monetary Fund, and African Development Bank \nGroups, amounted to US$21.15 billion, accounting for 49.8 per cent \nof the total. A total of US$15.12 billion or 35.6 per cent of the total \nwas borrowed from commercial sources in the form of Euro Bonds. \nLoans from bilateral sources was US$5.96 billion, or 14.0 per cent of \nthe total, syndicated loan (arranged by African Finance Corporation) \nstood at US$0.27 billion or 0.6 per cent of the total debt stock. \nThe external debt service payment stood at US$0.94 billion at end-\nDecember 2023, relative to US$1.39 billion in the preceding quarter. \nA breakdown showed that interest payment totalled US$0.21 billion, \naccounting for 21.8 per cent of the entire debt service payment. \nPrincipal repayment totalled US$0.72 billion, or 75.9 per cent of the \ntotal, while other payments made up the balance. An analysis of \ninterest payments showed that interest payment on commercial \nborrowings accounted for 78.0 per cent of the total at US$0.16 billion, \nwhile interest on multilateral loans amounted to US$0.04 billion or \n20.0 per cent of the total. Interest payments to bilateral institutions \naccounted for the balance. \n \n2.4.4 International Investment Position (IIP) \nNigeria's International Investment Position posted a lower net \nfinancial liability of US$82.58 billion. The stock of financial assets \nrose to US$104.54 billion at Q42023, compared with US$101.45 \nbillion in the preceding quarter, due, largely, to the 5.3 per cent \nincrease in the stock of ‘other investment assets’ to US$49.21 billion \ncompared with US$46.72 billion in the preceding quarter. The stock \nPublic Sector \nExternal Debt \nInternational \nInvestment \nPosition \n \n60 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nof direct investment assets declined marginally by 0.2 per cent to \nUS$17.66 billion, from US$17.70 billion at Q32023, owing to lower \ninvestments in equity and debt instruments. The stock of portfolio \ninvestment increased by 5.1 per cent to US$4.31 billion, relative to \nthe preceding quarter. \nThe stock of financial liabilities increased by 1.2 per cent to \nUS$187.12 billion, from US$184.84 billion at Q32023. The increase \nwas attributed, mainly, to the growth in the stock of other investment \nliabilities by 4.8 per cent to US$81.91 billion, from its level in Q32023. \nThe stock of direct investment and portfolio investment liabilities \nwere US$73.37 billion and US$31.59 billion, compared with \nUS$75.03 billion and US$31.41 billion in Q32023, respectively. \n \n2.4.5. External Reserves \nThe external reserves remained above the benchmark of 3.0 \nmonths of import cover. The external reserves stood at US$33.22 \nbillion at end-December 2023, relative to US$32.79 billion at end-\nSeptember 2023, and could cover 6.6 months of import for goods \nand services or 9.4 months of import for goods only. \nFigure 45: External Reserves and Months of Import Cover \nExternal \nReserves \n \n61 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nA breakdown of the external reserves showed that the share of CBN \nwas US$28.71 billion; Federal Government, US$4.51 billion, while \nthe Federation accounted for the balance of US$0.67 million. In \nterms of currency composition, the US dollar was US$25.18 billion \n(75.8%); Special Drawing Rights, US$4.39 billion (13.2%); Chinese \nYuan, US$3.27 billion (9.8%); British Pounds, US$0.23 billion \n(0.7%); Euro, US$0.15 billion (0.5%); while other currencies \naccounted for the balance. \n2.4.6 Foreign Exchange Flows through the Economy \nNet foreign exchange inflow to the economy stood at US$9.30 \nbillion in the review period. Foreign exchange inflow into the \neconomy increased by 0.4 per cent to US$16.06 billion from \nUS$15.99 billion in the Q32023. Foreign exchange inflow through \nthe Bank decreased to US$5.01 billion from US$6.37 billion in the \npreceding quarter. However, foreign exchange inflow through \nautonomous sources increased to US$11.05 billion from US$9.62 \nbillion in the preceding quarter. \n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\n10\n28\n30\n32\n34\n36\n38\n40\nq1 2022\nq2 2022\nq3 2022\nq4 2022\nq1 2023\nq2 2023\nq3 2023\nq4 2023\nUS$ Billion\nExternal Reserves - LHS\nMonths of Import (Goods only)\nMonths of Import (Goods and Services)\nForeign \nExchange Flows \n \n62 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nIn contrast, foreign exchange outflow through the economy fell by \n17.1 per cent to US$6.77 billion, relative to US$8.16 billion in the \nQ32023. Outflow through the Bank decreased by 31.2 per cent to \nUS$4.95 billion from US$7.20 billion in the preceding quarter. \nHowever, autonomous outflow rose by 88.4 per cent to US$1.82 \nbillion from US$0.96 billion in the preceding quarter. \nConsequently, net foreign exchange inflow through the economy \nincreased by 18.7 per cent to US$9.30 billion from US$7.83 billion in \npreceding quarter. Net inflow through autonomous sources rose to \nUS$9.23 billion from US$8.65 billion in the preceding quarter, while \nnet inflow of US$0.06 billion was recorded through the Bank, \ncompared to a net outflow of US$0.82 billion in the preceding \nquarter. \nFigure 46: Foreign Exchange Transactions through the \nEconomy (US$ Billion) \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \nThe average turnover at the Nigerian Foreign Exchange Market \n(NFEM) increased by 26.1 per cent to US$0.12 billion, relative to \nUS$0.97 billion in Q32023, reflecting increased trading activities in \nthe market. \nFigure 47: Turnover in the I&E Foreign Exchange Market \nQ4 2022\nQ3 2023\nQ4 2023\nInflow\n14.62\n15.99\n16.06\nOutflow\n8.85\n8.16\n6.77\nNetflow\n5.78\n7.83\n9.30\n -\n 2.00\n 4.00\n 6.00\n 8.00\n 10.00\n 12.00\n 14.00\n 16.00\n 18.00\nInflow\nOutflow\nNetflow\n \n63 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria. \n \n2.4.7 Exchange Rate Movement \nThe average exchange rate of the naira per US dollar at the NFEM \ndepreciated by 9.3 per cent to ₦843.14/US$, compared with \n₦764.82US$ in Q42023. \nThe performance of selected emerging market currencies against \nthe US dollar was mixed during the review period. The Russian ruble \nand Chinese RMB appreciated by 1.6 per cent and 0.6 per cent, \nrespectively, relative to the levels in the preceding quarter. While the \nappreciation of the Russian ruble was due to elevated domestic \ninterest rate and tighter capital controls that of the Chinese RMB was \nattributed to the weakening of US dollar. Conversely, the South \nAfrican rand depreciated by 0.4 per cent due to falling commodities \nexports and global slowdown. \n \nFigure 48: EMEs Currency Values to the US dollar \n11.69 \n(12.66)\n23.22 \n(23.45)\n26.07 \n (30.00)\n (20.00)\n (10.00)\n -\n 10.00\n 20.00\n 30.00\n -\n 20.00\n 40.00\n 60.00\n 80.00\n 100.00\n 120.00\n 140.00\nQ4 2022\nQ1 2023\nQ2 2023\nQ3 2023\nQ4 2023\nPer cent\nUS $Million \n Average Turnover(LHS)\nRate of Turnover(RHS)\nAverage \nExchange Rate \nEmerging Market \nCurrencies \n \n64 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \n \nSources: Central Bank Nigeria & Reuters \n \nTable 11: EMEs Currency Rates to the US dollar \nSources: Central Bank of Nigeria & Reuters \n \n3.0 \nGlobal Outlook \nGlobal economic growth is expected to moderate to 3.0 per \ncent, from 3.5 per cent in 20223. The slowdown is primarily \nattributed to uneven recovery across economies from the aftermath \nof the COVID-19 pandemic, the impact of the Russian-Ukraine war, \nand the consequences of increasing geoeconomic fragmentation, \ncoupled with monetary policy tightening. \n \n3 IMF WEO (October 2023) \n-40.00\n-35.00\n-30.00\n-25.00\n-20.00\n-15.00\n-10.00\n-5.00\n0.00\n5.00\n10.00\nChinese RMB\nNigerian Naira\nSouth African Rand\nRussian Ruble\nDepreciation/Appreciation\nQ4 2022\nQ1 2023\nQ2 2023\nQ3 2023\nQ4 2024\nPeriod \nChinese \nRMB \nNigerian \nNaira \nSouth \nAfrican \nRand \nRussian \nRuble \nQ4 2022 \n7.11 \n445.71 \n17.62 \n63.03 \nQ3 2023 \n7.24 \n764.82 \n18.64 \n94.37 \nQ4 2023 \n7.20 \n843.41 \n18.72 \n92.89 \n \n65 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nAmong Advance Economies (AEs,) growth is projected to slow to \n1.5 per cent, from 2.6 per cent in 2022, reflecting labour shortages, \nweakened manufacturing activities, and restrictive monetary policy. \nFor Emerging Markets and Developing Economies (EMDEs), growth \nis expected to experience a modest decline to 4.0 from 4.1 per cent \nin 2022, with variations across regions. While emerging and \ndeveloping Asia are expected to see a rise in growth in 2023 due to \nincreased demand, economic activities in sub-Saharan Africa are \nprojected to contract due to adverse weather conditions, global \neconomic slowdown, and supply chain constraints. \nGlobal headline inflation is forecasted to decrease from its peak \nof 8.7 per cent in 2022 to 6.9 per cent in 2023. Advanced \nEconomies are anticipated to experience significant disinflation, \nattributed to monetary policy tightening and lower vulnerability to \nshocks stemming from higher commodity prices and exchange rates. \n3.1 \nDomestic Outlook \nNigeria's near-term economic growth outlook remains positive, \ndespite headwinds. The positive outlook is anchored on the \nexpected favourable trajectory of crude oil prices and an \nimprovement in domestic crude oil production. The removal of PMS \nsubsidy is anticipated to expand the fiscal space, providing an \nadditional impetus for growth. Nevertheless, global economic \nuncertainties, domestic security, hawkish monetary policy stance, \nand heightened debt service obligations could constitute downside \nrisks to the growth outlook. \nInflationary pressures remain in 2023 but are expected to \nmoderate in the short-term. Tight monetary policy measures, \ntapering base effect, and the waning impact of the hike in PMS price \nare expected to dampen inflationary pressure in 2024. The impact of \n \n66 | P a g e Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report \nQ42023 \nECONOMIC REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2023 \n \nclimate change on agricultural output and heightening insecurity, \nhowever, remain considerable risks to inflation. \nThe external position of Nigeria is expected to remain \noptimistic, driven by expected upswing in domestic crude oil \nproduction and favourable crude oil prices. The gains from \ncapital flows and remittances, on the back of continued \nimplementation of policy reforms in the sector would support the \npositive outlook for external reserves. Nonetheless, the risk of capital \nreversals could be heightened by a sustained high interest rate \nenvironment in advanced economies and escalating geopolitical \ntension.", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/Quarterly_Economic_Reports/Q4 Economic Report _ 2023.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "a2057dbb14204a57652ccfe6c1347915", "text": "1 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA COMMUNIQUÉ NO. 140 OF THE MONETARY POLICY \nCOMMITTEE MEETING HELD ON MONDAY 24th AND TUESDAY 25th JANUARY, \n2022 \n \nThe Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) held its first meeting for the year 2022 on \nthe 24th and 25th of January 2022 in the light of waning optimism for a robust \nrebound in global recovery in 2021. This resulted from the persistence of the \nCOVID-19 pandemic and emergence of new variants of the virus; persisting \nsupply \nbottlenecks; \nglobal \ninflationary \npressures; \nand \nthe \nimminent \ncommencement of monetary policy normalization by some major central \nbanks. In the domestic economy, output growth recovery was relatively strong \nin 2021. It is however, expected to continue reasonably in 2022, following \nconsiderable improvement in the third quarter of 2021 and a positive outlook \nfor the fourth quarter. This was hinged on the continued support of the monetary \nand fiscal authorities to sustain the current momentum. The Committee \nreviewed the developments in the global and domestic economic and \nfinancial environments in 2021, as well as the outlook and risks for 2022. \nTen (10) members of the Committee attended this meeting. \nGlobal Economic Developments \nThe Committee noted that while the recovery of the global economy in 2021 \nfell \nbelow \nthe \ninitial \nforecast, \nfinal \nestimates showed \nconsiderable \nimprovements over the 2020 outcome, evidence that the global economy was \npulling out of the doldrum associated with the pandemic. Consequently, the \nrecovery is gaining momentum with increasing consumer spending, upswing in \ninvestments and soaring world merchandise trade, above pre-pandemic levels. \nThis reflects the resilience of economic agents in the face of new strains of the \n \n2 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nvirus and rising infection rates. The Committee, however, took cognizance of \nsignificant headwinds confronting the global economy in 2022, largely \nassociated with the persisting threats of new variants of the coronavirus. The \nAdvanced Economies are however, in a strong position to offset the impact of \nthese headwinds with stronger policy support and better access to COVID-19 \nvaccines. Consequently, this group of economies have shown better resilience \ntowards disruptions to the recovery. In the medium term however, the rising \ninflationary pressures and the gradual withdrawal of both monetary and fiscal \nstimuli may dampen the recovery in 2022. \nIn the Emerging Market and Developing Economies (EMDEs), poor access to \nvaccines and limited policy support meant that this group of economies have \nbeen harder hit by the Covid-19 health crisis and its associated \nmacroeconomic downturn. In China, one of the few countries that stayed out \nof recession in 2020, output weakened in the third quarter of 2021 and has \ncontinued to weaken as the Covid infections continue to rage amid power \nsupply shortages and a turbulent property market. Following the containment \nof the infections in India, the economy has commenced a sharp recovery and \nis set to continue on an upward trajectory. Overall, growth in the EMDEs is \nexpected to slow in 2022 due to the low level of vaccination and limited policy \nsupport in several economies in this group. \nOn price development, the MPC observed that inflation, in most Advanced \nEconomies remained high and unlikely to abate in the short to medium term. \nThis is driven by the persistence of supply side disruptions and pent-up demand \nassociated with economic recovery. In the EMDEs, inflation has remained high \ndue to a combination of persisting exchange rate pressures and supply \nbottlenecks associated with the lockdown restrictions. With the US Fed and \ncentral banks of other advanced economies now moving towards monetary \npolicy normalization, the eventual interest rate hike may likely trigger huge \ncapital outflow from the EMDEs which will further aggravate exchange rate \npressures with a pass-through to domestic prices. \n \n3 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nGlobal financial markets data show significant sell-off, as investors continued to \nrebalance their portfolios with the shift from assets such as gold and emerging \nmarket securities to securities of Advanced Economies suggesting market \nresponse to the impending interest rate hike. Thus, global financial conditions \nare expected to tighten as risk averse portfolio investors reassign their portfolios \nfrom perceived riskier emerging market securities, to less risky advanced \neconomy securities with the expectation of improved yields. \nDomestic Economic Developments \nStaff projections showed that the economy is expected to remain on a path of \npositive growth, given the impressive performance in the third quarter of 2021 \nand continuing rebound in economic activities. The Committee noted with \nsatisfaction, the significant improvement in the Manufacturing Purchasing \nManagers’ Index (PMI), which rose to 52.0 index points in December 2021, \ncompared with 50.8 index points in November reflecting the continuing \neconomic recovery. This expansion was driven largely by increasing business \nactivities in the economy, leading to increase in new orders and uptrend in \nemployment and production levels. The Non-Manufacturing PMI, however, \ndeclined marginally to 48.0 index points in December 2021 from 48.6 points in \nNovember, largely reflecting a decline in services. \nThe Committee noted with concern, the slight increase in headline inflation \n(year-on-year) to 15.63 per cent in December 2021 from 15.40 per cent in \nNovember following seven consecutive months of decline. The unexpected \nincrease was attributed to both the food and core components, which rose to \n17.37 and 13.87 per cent in December 2021 from 17.21 and 13.85 per cent in \nNovember, respectively. The Committee, however, expressed confidence in \nthe Bank’s sustained intervention programmes, noting that inflation will continue \nto abate as food supply improves. Members also noted that the seasonal drive \nin price development associated with the December festive period was largely \ncontributory to the marginal increase in price levels, and as such, believe that \nthis episode of increase may be temporary. \n \n4 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nReviewing the developments in monetary aggregates, the Committee noted \nthat broad money supply (M3) rose further to 13.77 per cent in December 2021, \ncompared with 10.10 per cent in November 2021. This upthrust was largely \ndriven by the growth in Net Domestic Assets (NDA) of 15.58 per cent in \nDecember 2021, compared with 9.40 per cent in November 2021. Net Foreign \nAssets (NFA), however decreased to 6.06 per cent in December 2021, \ncompared with 14.98 per cent in November 2021. The sharp growth in Net \nDomestic Assets (NDA) was largely attributed to an increase in claims on the \nFederal government and other sectors. The slowdown in growth of Net Foreign \nAssets (NFA) resulted from a decrease in foreign assets holdings of the banking \nsystem in favour of more domestic investments. \nThe Committee reviewed the performance of the Bank’s intervention \nprogrammes aimed at stimulating productivity in manufacturing/industries, \nagriculture, energy/infrastructure, healthcare and Micro, Small and Medium \nEnterprises (MSMEs). Between November and December 2021, under the \nAnchor Borrowers’ Programme (ABP), the Bank disbursed N75.99 billion to \nsupport the cultivation of over 383,000 hectares of maize, rice and wheat during \nthe 2022 dry season, bringing the cumulative disbursements under the \nProgramme to ₦927.94 billion to over 4.5 million smallholder farmers cultivating \n21 commodities across the country. All excess output aggregated from the \nfinanced farmers will be released to the Nigeria Commodity Exchange (NCX) \nto help moderate the prices of food in the market. The Bank also released N1.76 \nbillion to finance two (2) large-scale agricultural projects under the Commercial \nAgriculture Credit Scheme (CACS). \nIn addition, the Bank disbursed the sum of ₦151.23 billion under the Real Sector \nFacility to 15 additional projects in agriculture, manufacturing, mining, and \nservices. The funds were utilized for both greenfield and brownfield (expansion) \nprojects under the Covid-19 Intervention for the Manufacturing Sector (CIMS) \nand the Real Sector Support Facility from Differentiated Cash Reserve \n \n5 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nRequirement (RSSF-DCRR). Cumulative disbursements under the Real Sector \nFacility currently stood at ₦1.40 trillion disbursed to 331 projects across the \ncountry. As part of its effort to support the resilience of the healthcare sector, \nthe Bank also disbursed ₦498.00 million to two (2) healthcare projects under the \nHealthcare Sector Intervention Facility (HSIF), bringing the cumulative \ndisbursements to ₦108.85 billion for 118 projects, comprising of 31 \npharmaceuticals, 82 hospital and 4 other services. \nTo support households and businesses affected by Covid-19, the Bank disbursed \nN20.29 billion to 40,521 beneficiaries, comprising 35,340 households and 5,181 \nsmall businesses under the Targeted Credit Facility (TCF) within the period. The \ncumulative disbursements under the TCF stood at N369.78 billion to 777,666 \nbeneficiaries, comprising 648,052 households and 129,614 small businesses. To \nfurther promote entrepreneurship development among Nigerian youths, the \nBank disbursed N293 million to 59 beneficiaries under the recently introduced \nTertiary Institutions Entrepreneurship Scheme (TIES). \nUnder the National Mass Metering Programme (NMMP), the sum of ₦47.83 billion \nwas disbursed for the procurement and installation of 858,026 electricity meters \nacross the country under the Scheme’s Phase-0. The Committee also noted the \nimproved collections by DisCos as a result of increased meter installations. The \nBank released ₦274.33 billion to power sector players, as part of its effort to \nsupport the sector under the Nigeria Bulk Electricity Trading Payment Assurance \nFacility (NBET-PAF). This was in addition to the ₦20.58 billion released to \nDistribution Companies (DisCos) under the Nigeria Electricity Market \nStabilisation Facility – Phase 2 (NEMSF-2). To further support the development of \nenabling infrastructure in the gas industry, the Bank released additional ₦3.00 \nbillion for the augmentation of an existing infrastructure, bringing the \ncumulative disbursements under the Intervention Facility for National Gas \nExpansion Programme (IFNGEP) to ₦42.20 billion for six (6) projects. \n Furthermore, under the 100 for 100 Policy on Production and Productivity (PPP), \nwhich was introduced to stimulate the flow of finance and investments to \n \n6 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nenterprises and projects with potential to kick-start a sustainable economic \ngrowth trajectory, accelerate structural transformation, promote diversification, \nand improve productivity, the Bank has received 224 applications, valued at \n₦294.91 billion for real sector projects in agriculture, energy, healthcare, \nmanufacturing and services. The applications are currently being processed \nand the first batch of beneficiaries under the intervention will be announced on \n31st January 2022, with their names published in national dailies. These projects \nhave been carefully selected in line with the approved selection criteria as \ncontained in the guidelinesq \nMoney market rates fluctuated within and above the asymmetric corridor, \nreflecting prevailing liquidity conditions in the banking system. The monthly \nweighted average Open Buyback (OBB) rate increased to 12.75 per cent in \nDecember 2021 from 10.61 per cent in November 2021. The increase in the Open \nBuyback (OBB) rate reflected the tight liquidity conditions in the banking system. \nThe MPC noted the continuing positive performance in the equities market in the \nreview period, with the All-Share Index (ASI) and Market Capitalization (MC) \nincreasing by 1.61 and 1.63 per cent to 42,716.44 and N22.30 trillion on \nDecember 31, 2021, from 42,038.60 and N21.94 trillion on October 29, 2021, \nrespectively. This positive performance reflected improved corporate earnings \nas investors participation increased in the market. \n \nThe MPC also noted the sustained resilience of the banking system, following the \nprogressive improvement in the Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) ratio from 5.10 per \ncent in November 2021 to 4.85 per cent in December 2021- a first in a long time. \nThe Committee also noted that the liquidity ratio remained well above its \nprudential limit at 41.3 per cent, though Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) declined \nmarginally to 14.53 per cent in December 2021 from 14.90 per cent in the \nprevious month. The Committee thus, urged the Bank to sustain its firm regulatory \nsurveillance. \n \n7 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nMembers also noted the continued improvement in the external reserves despite \nongoing foreign exchange market pressures. The reserves stood at US$40.20 \nbillion as at December 2021. \nOutlook \nThe broad outlook for the recovery in both the global and domestic economies \nis clouded with uncertainty such as the resurgence of the COVID-19 pandemic, \ndriven by new and mutating strains of the coronavirus; persisting supply \nbottlenecks; high and rising inflationary pressures; and dwindling monetary and \nfiscal stimuli. \nThe Emerging Markets and Developing Economies are likely to experience a \nsharp downturn as a result of the identified headwinds confronting the outlook. \nThis is hinged on the back of the ongoing two-speed recovery of the global \neconomy, driven by continued disparities in the administration of vaccines \nbetween the Advanced Economies and the Emerging Markets and Developing \nEconomies. While the Advanced Economies will also experience a downturn \nin 2022, this group of economies are expected to take a less severe hit as most \nof them have achieved significant high levels of vaccination. \nStaff forecast project output growth at 3.10 per cent in 2021 with an expected \nbetter \noutcome \nin \n2022, \nconsistent \nwith \nthe \nexpected \nimproved \nmacroeconomic performance. The economic recovery is therefore expected \nto progress gradually with the ongoing support by the monetary and fiscal \nauthorities, progress in COVID-19 vaccinations and continued high crude oil \nprices. \nAfter a moderate increase in December 2021, headline inflation is expected to \ntrend marginally upwards in the short-term before moderating towards the end \nof the first quarter of 2022. This is expected as food harvests progress towards \nthe end of the first quarter of 2022 and improve food supply. In general, with the \nBank sustaining its intervention programmes through the year, food inflation is \nexpected to trend downwards in 2022. \n \n8 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nAvailable forecasts for key macroeconomic variables for the Nigerian \neconomy, indicated expected rebound in output growth for most of 2022, \nsustained by ongoing broad monetary and fiscal stimuli. Accordingly, the \nNigerian economy is forecast to grow in 2022 by 2.86 per cent (CBN), 4.20 per \ncent (FGN) and 2.76 per cent (IMF). \n \nThe Committee’s Considerations \nThe Committee accessed the balance of risks confronting the domestic \neconomy in the near term as they impact output growth and price stability. \nMembers noted the unrelenting effort by the monetary and fiscal authorities in \nmitigating the impact of the virus on the economy. It observed the continued \nmoderate recovery of the domestic economy but requires further concerted \npolicy effort by both the monetary and fiscal authorities to improve the \nmomentum and strengthen the recovery. Members were thus of the view that, \nbuilding on the improved growth in the third quarter and the positive PMIs in the \nfourth quarter of 2021, output growth is expected to strengthen into 2022. \nOn the Pandemic, the MPC reviewed its continued impact on the domestic \neconomy as Members collectively agreed that the downside risks were still \nhindering the recovery. In this light, it commended the efforts of the Presidential \nTask Force on COVID-19 for procuring vaccines and continuing the drive to \nensure that most Nigerians are fully vaccinated. \nOn price development, Members continued to express concerns about the \nimpact of insecurity in farming communities on food inflation. Whereas headline \ninflation had been moderating for several months, the committee believed that \nits recent uptick was associated with increased demand during the festive \nseason and was thus of the view that prices will return to the downward \ntrajectory given the Bank’s ongoing interventions in the agriculture sector. On \nthis note, Members applauded the efforts of the Bank with the recent launch of \nthe rice pyramids, noting that these efforts to increase food supply and stem \nfood inflation were in the right direction. Members, however, reiterated the key \n \n9 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nrole of the Federal Government in providing the necessary security around the \ncountry, and particularly in the farming communities, to ensure that farmers and \ntheir produce remain safe, and food supply is both boosted and uninterrupted. \nThe Committee noted that the ongoing dry season farming would further \nimprove food supply and dampen prices. \nMembers noted the ongoing debate around the removal of fuel subsidy and \nsuggested a robust engagement with relevant groups in the country, and \nafterward follow a stepwise and gradual approach, to ensure its moderate \nimpact on cost of transportation and energy for individual, households and \nfirms. The Committee also noted the need to encourage the take-off of private \nrefineries across the country to provide alternative competitive local supply \nsource and reduce the need for government intervention to manage fuel \nprices for domestic consumption. In addition to this, the Committee called for \nthe speedy conclusion of the government gas-powered vehicle conversion \nscheme and other alternative sources of fuel. \nOn the exchange rate, the Committee applauded the Management’s efforts \nat maintaining stability over the short term with increasing demand as the \neconomy continues to reopen. Members noted the dwindling proceeds from \noil sale, despite rising crude oil prices. They further noted the need to address \nthe persistent reduction in remittance of oil revenue to the Consolidated \nRevenue Fund and urged the NNPC to urgently address this anomaly. The \nimproved foreign exchange supply will thus support the Bank’s demand \nmanagement strategy in the foreign exchange market and consolidate \nmacroeconomic performance, especially those that promote export, reduce \ndependence on import and reduce foreign exchange demand pressure. The \nMPC welcomed the improvement in foreign capital inflow through diaspora \nremittances and urged the Bank to further extend the incentive scope to \nattract more remittances to official channels. \nThe Committee noted the rising government debt profile and the concentration \nof the funding sources and its implications for fiscal sustainability and \n \n10 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nmacroeconomic stability, including its impact on financial system performance \nand growth. The MPC continued to urge the Government on the need to \nharness other sources of revenue to reduce its dependence on oil as a single \nrevenue source. In addition, it reiterated the need for government to seek \nalternative, more viable, and efficient infrastructure financing sources, in order \nto ease its expenditure burden. To this end, Members called on the fiscal \nauthorities to take advantage of InfraCorp, the private sector driven \ninfrastructural \nvehicle \nand \ntransfer \nviable \ninfrastructure \nprojects \nfor \nconsideration by the Corporation as this would ease pressure on Government. \nthat would otherwise have to raise revenue through taxes from an already \nburdened private and household sector. \nThe improved performance of the equities market in the review period, \nsignposted continued investor confidence in the Nigerian economy. This in the \nview of Members was a positive sign that the economy remained on a path to \na more robust medium-term recovery. \nThe banking sector indices, in the consideration of Members, showed no less \nresilience as other macroeconomic indicators reviewed; even as obvious \ndownside risks associated with the Pandemic continued to impact the business \nenvironment. Members thus applauded the Management’s efforts in ensuring \nthe continued downward trend of Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) ratio, signifying \nimproving conditions in the banking system. Nevertheless, Members \nemphasized the need for the Bank to closely monitor developments in the \nsector and swiftly respond to any emerging challenges. \nThe Committee’s Decision \nThe MPC observed with concern the moderate rise in inflation in December \n2021, noting that this was typical of increased aggregate demand associated \nwith the end of year festive activities. Members, however, expressed their \ncontinued commitment to drive down domestic prices by putting in place \n \n11 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nrelevant policy measures to curb the rise in inflationary pressures, while also \nsupporting the fragile growth recovery. \nIn its determination as to whether to hold or loosen or tighten its policy stance, \nthe MPC was mindful that, whereas the US and some Advanced Economies \nhave signaled their intention to commence policy normalisation which may \nresult in capital flow reversal for EMDEs, the major focus at these climes were \ntargeted mainly at reining in the high level of inflation which had been \nunprecedent in the last four decades in those climes. \nFor Nigeria, members were of the view that Nigeria is confronted with, not only \ninflation but also fragile output growth. As a result, MPC believes that its current \nstance of price and monetary stability conducive for growth remain desirable. \nThe MPC is convinced that various measures being implemented were helping, \nnot only in boosting output growth, but also in moderating inflation. The MPC \ntherefore, enjoyed Management to continue to use its development finance \ntools to accelerate output growth, which will also help in boosting \nmanufacturing output that would ultimately aid moderation in prices. It also \nrequested Management to continue its use of administrative measures, \nincluding discretionary tools at its disposal through CRR to control money supply \nin the economy. \nIn its final consideration, the Committee was clear that a loosening option was \nnot desirable because it would trigger liquidity surfeit and fuel inflationary \npressure as available funds may outstrip the economy absorptive capacity or \ndomestic capacity utilization. It also feels loosening could trigger foreign \nexchange demand pressure, as the excess liquidity would be channeled to \neither frivolous importations or speculative holding of foreign exchange as \nalternative investment channels narrow; leading to foreign exchange \ndepreciation and or inflation. \nThe MPC also dropped a tightening option at this meeting in view of the fragile \nstate of the current GDP growth rate and potential external and domestic \n \n12 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nheadwinds confronting the economy. The Committee opined that tightening \ncould truncate the steady improvement in credit performance, including other \nfinancial soundness indicators, and reverse the declining trend in NPLs. \nMoreover, tightening could counteract the CBN’s credit expansion motive as a \nnecessary condition for improved economic growth and employment \ngeneration. \nThe MPC, therefore, concluded that a HOLD stance remains desirable at this \ntime, as this would indicate a conservative but cautious and consistent policy \nchoice given the prevailing economic conditions and outlook, thus \nstrengthening policy credibility and focus. It also feels that a hold would signal \nMPCs realisation of the fragility of the growth recovery and its sensitivity to \nemerging global and domestic uncertainties. Hence the need to sustain the \ncurrent policy trajectory. \nAfter a careful balancing of the benefits and downsides of each policy option, \nthe MPC decided to hold all policy parameters constant; believing that a hold \nstance will enable the continued permeation of current policy measures in \nsupporting the recorded growth recovery and further boost production and \nproductivity, which would ultimately rein-in inflation in the short to medium term. \nThe Committee thus decided by a unanimous vote to retain the Monetary \nPolicy Rate (MPR) at 11.5 per cent. \nIn summary, the MPC voted to retain: \nI. \nThe MPR at 11.5 per cent; \nII. \nThe Asymmetric Corridor of +100/-700 basis points around the MPR; \nIII. \nThe CRR at 27.5 per cent; and \nIV. The Liquidity Ratio at 30 per cent. \nThank you. \n \n13 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nGodwin I. Emefiele \nGovernor, Central Bank of Nigeria \n25th January 2022 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n14 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nPERSONAL STATEMENTS BY THE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE MEMBERS \n1. ADAMU, EDWARD LAMETEK \nThe last two years have seen massive monetary and fiscal stimulus policies in \nresponse to the recessive impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. Consequent upon \nthe global rally in public spending and low interest rates, output is beginning to \nconverge on the level prior to the pandemic in some countries, especially the \nadvanced economies. At the same time, the costs of this policy path have started \nto manifest. Increased inflationary pressures have resulted from the combination of \nhuge fiscal and monetary injections, high energy prices and disruptions in the \nsupply chains of intermediate goods. And so, monetary policy must now aim to \nstrike a balance between stimulating output and reining-in inflation. Against this \nbackground, we can extrapolate that monetary policy making is likely going to be \nquite challenging in 2022, especially for developing countries that are mostly \nposting fragile and sluggish output recoveries due to factors including poor access \nto vaccines and a variety of structural constraints on economic activity including \nweak policy support. \nTo the extent that inflation can be contained without harming growth, there would \nbe little policy dilemma. However, the reality of most emerging markets and \ndeveloping economies (EMDEs) is that output recovery remains quite fragile and \ntherefore vulnerable in the face of aggressive anti-inflation policy stance. Output \nin this cluster, according to the World Bank, could remain substantially below the \npre-pandemic trend for some time. That said, the pressure that these countries face \ngo beyond slow output recovery and elevated inflation pressure. The drift towards \npolicy normalization by central banks in the advanced economies threatens \ncapital flows to these countries, thereby increasing the risk of exchange rate \ninstability. \nThe complexity of the policy problem in the EMDEs vary in some respects by \ncountry. For commodity exporters like Nigeria, the expected moderation in global \ngrowth to about 4.0 per cent in 2022 from 5.9 per cent in 2021 could come with \n \n15 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nsoftening demand for commodities (crude oil in the case of Nigeria) and price \nfluctuations. Up to Q3 2021, for which hard data is available, Oil and gas sector \nremained in contraction. This could worsen in the event of a significant decline in \nthe price of crude oil. I see other important downside risks to domestic output \nrecovery which together with my assessment of the inflation outlook, informed my \ndecision to vote for a ‘hold’ at the January 2022 meeting of the Monetary Policy \nCommittee (MPC). \nIn 2021, real GDP growth rate slowed from about 5.0 per cent in Q2 to about 4.0 \nper cent in Q3. Staff estimates for Q4 show a further decline to about 2.86 per cent. \nAlthough it is projected to inch up to 2.94 per cent in Q1 2022, it could slow again \nto 2.72 per cent in Q2 2022. Obviously, real output growth could remain sluggish in \nthe year. This is further buttressed by the evolution of some of the indicators of \neconomic activity. The non-manufacturing PMI, for instance, remained below 50 \npoints in December 2021. In effect, policy support to key sectors of the economy \ncontinues to be relevant. \nHeadline inflation continues to be a challenge. It rose to 15.63 per cent in \nDecember 2021 from 15.40 per cent recorded in November 2021. The increase \nreflected increases in both core and food inflation in the month. Core inflation rose \nmarginally by 0.02 percentage points to 13.87 per cent, while food inflation grew \nby 0.16 percentage points to 17.37 per cent in December 2021. Until December, \nheadline inflation had steadily declined owing mainly to the sterilization operations \nof the Bank (which kept banking system liquidity close to its optimal level) and \nimproved output of food brought about by the Bank’s interventions in agriculture. \nAs such, the sudden increase in inflation may be attributed to increased demand \non account of year-end festivities. This effect is expected, going by staff \nprojections, to taper-off as from February 2022. Considering this outlook, I saw no \nurgent need to tighten the stance of monetary policy at the January meeting. \nMost fundamentally, the inflationary pressures the economy has experienced in the \nlast two to three years have been driven mainly by non-monetary factors. \nDistribution bottlenecks and supply shortages have been its major undercurrent \n \n16 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nsince 2020, following the coronavirus-induced lockdowns and movement \nrestrictions. The Bank’s response so far has partly focused on alleviating major \nsupply constraints using development finance interventions in the real sector of the \neconomy. This approach has had the desired effect of lifting output and \ndampening consumer price pressures, especially in the foods sub-sector. I am \npersuaded that this strategy continues to be important in addressing much of the \ncurrent price pressures. \nWhile not discounting the risks presented by the drift towards policy normalization \nin the advanced economies, volatile energy prices and rising global inflation, I am \nminded that the timing of any adjustment in policy could be heavily consequential. \nAlthough most central banks are wary of these risks to inflation, only a few have \nresponded with a hike in policy rate. I believe that a cautious approach to \nmonetary policy is ideal at this time in view of the cloudy growth outlook. I should \nemphasize that the routine sterilisation actions of the Bank continue to be sufficient \nto rein-in banking system excess liquidity. \nAgainst the backdrop of pressure on both output and prices, I must admit, \nmonetary policy maneuvers would be difficult, to say the least. In the \ncircumstance, complementary fiscal actions are needed to ease the burden \nof adjustment on monetary policy. Obviously, policy support has been very \ninstrumental to macroeconomic recovery in 2021. More will be needed from \nthe fiscal side in 2022 especially in sectors like agriculture, SMEs and solid \nminerals. In addition, physical infrastructure and security ought to maintain their \npriority position on the fiscal plate in year. On the monetary side, measures \naimed at redirecting credit to these and other sectors of the economy would \ncontinue to be relevant towards addressing growth fragility. Luckily, the \nopportunity for that exists with the substantial improvement in banking system \nresilience. At end-2021, average industry capital adequacy ratio (CAR) stood \nat 14.53 per cent; non-performing loans (NPLs) was 4.85 per cent, indicating a \nremarkable improvement in the quality of risk assets and Liquidity ratio was 41.33 \nper cent. \n \n17 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \nI believe, the option of tightening policy using the policy rate remains on the \ntable as long as inflationary pressures persist. I am however hopeful that the \npolicy headroom for supporting growth will not narrow any further by the next \nmeeting of the MPC in March 2022. Until then, my policy preference remains \ncontinuation of the extant strategy of targeted intervention in critical sectors \nalongside sterilization actions to rein-in excess banking system liquidity. I, \ntherefore, voted to: \n \n1. Retain the MPR at 11.5 per cent. \n2. Retain the Asymmetric Corridor at +100/-700 basis points. \n3. Retain the CRR at 27.5 per cent. \n4. Retain the Liquidity Ratio at 30 per cent. \n \n \n2. ADENIKINJU, ADEOLA FESTUS \nInternational Economic Development \nThe international economic environment presents mixed picture and prospects \nin January 2022. On the upside are the continuous economic recovery from the \nimpact of COVID-19, increasing rate of vaccination especially in the advanced \neconomies, and expansion in global trade. Global economy in 2022 is \nprojected to grow by 4.1%. Growth in Advanced Economies is expected to \nmoderate to 3.8% in 2022, while Emerging and Developing Economies are \nexpected to grow by 4.6% in 2022. However, on the flip side are, rising inflation, \nlow vaccination rate in developing economies, high global debt, rising energy \nprices, and persistent supply problems and logistics constraints. Other downside \nrisks include declining fiscal support and uncertainties around COVID-19 and its \n \n18 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nvariants. Global inflation is expected to remain above its pre-pandemic level in \n2022, due to the base effects of stimulus packages, supply shocks and logistics \nproblems. While, global trade has picked up, especially for goods trade, \nservices trade remain subdued as some restrictions to movement remains in \nplace in certain jurisdictions. Global debt declined slightly to US$296 trillion in \nQ3 2021, after reaching an all-time high in Q2 2021. \nThe global community has resolved to limit global warming and shift energy \ndemand trajectory in favour of green energy. This will impact on energy prices, \nenergy investment and green technology. Again, for many developing \neconomies, the pace of growth in China will impact on commodity prices and \noutbound Chinese foreign direct and portfolio investment. The pace of \nnormalization in the Advanced economies will also impact on capital flows to \ndeveloping economies as well as increase the cost of already high public debt. \nDomestic Economic Development \nStaff of the Bank presented the Economic Developments and Outlook Report, \nand the Banking System Stability Review Report. The Economic Developments \nand Outlook Report showed that the 4.03% growth in real GDP in Q3 2021 was \ndriven by a combination of factors: rise in crude oil prices, credit expansion by \n13.87% due to CBN Interventions and improved credit delivery from banks, \nexpansionary fiscal policy, as well as base effects. Nevertheless, the Economic \nReport also showed that significant headwinds confront the economy. Inflation \ngrew by 15.63% in December 2021, a slight increase from 15.40% in November \n2021. This increase was driven by both food and core inflation. Food inflation \nwas driven largely by demand for food during the festive season. The naira also \ndepreciated by 0.04% to N414.34/US$ in the I&E window. There was mixed \nperformance of Purchasing Managers Indices (PMIs): manufacturing PMI rose \nto 52.0 index points, while non-manufacturing PMI remained below 50.0 index \npoint, at 48.7 index points. \n \n19 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nFederal Government fiscal operations in 2021 resulted in huge budget deficits. \nAs at Q3 2021, FGN fiscal operations already resulted in overall deficit of over \nN7.5 trillion. Broad Money, M3, grew by 13.77%, which is 4.33 percentage points \nabove the provisional level. The growth in broad money was driven by its \ncomponents: Net Foreign Assets (NFA) grew by 6.06%, a -6.73 deviation from \nthe benchmark, while Net Domestic Assets (NDA) rose by 15.58%, 17.44 \npercentage points above provisional level. Growth in NDA was mainly driven \nby Net Claims on Government, which exceeded provisional level by 5.5 \npercentage points. \nInterest rate spread month-on-month widened to 25.3% in December 2021. \nWhile prime lending rates declined to 11.68%. maximum lending rates rose to \n27.58%. Average savings rates declined to 1.25%. The administrative measures \nput in place by the CBN, restrained liquidity surfeit in the system. Tight liquidity \nconditions prevailed in the banking system as average net liquidity balance \nstood at N182.71 billion as at end-December 2021, below the benchmark of \nN313.8 billion – N450.00 billion. \nThe external sector also showed mixed performance. External reserves, FPI and \nFDI inflows declined. On the other hand, trade balance, current account \nbalance and remittances rose between Q2 and Q3 2021. Remittances rose \nmarginally from US$4.92 billion in Q2 2021 to US$4.97 billion in Q3 2021. Petroleum \nproducers accounted for 18.31% of total imports in Q3 2021. \nThe Banking System Stability Review Report showed that the banking system \nremain safe, sound, and resilient. Capital Adequacy ratio though declined \nslightly from 15.1% in December 2020 to 14.53% in December 2021, this is still \nabove the prudential requirement of 10.0%. Non-Performing Loans Ratio fell \nbelow the 5% prudential requirement, for the first time, after a lengthy period. \nLiquidity ratio at 41.33% was also higher than 30% prudential requirement. Both \nReturns on Assets and Returns on Equity fell in December 2021 relative to \nDecember 2020. Operating costs to income rose from 68.2% in December 2020 \nto 73.1% in December 2021. The report also showed growth in total assets, total \n \n20 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \ndeposits as well as total credit to the economy. Gross credit rose from N20.48 \ntrillion in December 2020 to N24.57 trillion in December 2021. The growth in bank \ncredit is largely due to the LDR policy of the CBN. The report also confirmed that \ncredit is increasingly becoming more expensive in the economy. \nMy Concern \nThe pace of economic recovery in Nigeria is still very weak, and unable to \neffectively impact on unemployment and poverty. The elevated level of \ninflation, amid rising budget deficit, insecurity, pressure on exchange rate and \npoor state of infrastructure are important challenges. This is compounded by \nthe fact that 2022 is a pre-election year in Nigeria. The normalization in the \nAdvanced Economies and the reaction by several central banks in emerging \neconomies implies that we cannot be impervious to this development. The US \nFED has already provided a forward guidance on at least three rate hikes in \n2022. This will affect foreign currency exposures of the Federal Government and \nprivate sector institutions, especially commercial banks. It may also lead to \nmore exits of FPIs from local equity market. \nAn important feature of the 2020 Budget is the centralisation of government \nagencies accounts (GOE), and the provisions that government agencies \ncannot spend more than 50% of their earnings. While on paper, this may be a \ngood thing to drive up revenue, one only hopes it will not introduce \nbureaucracy into the functioning of some agencies and affect their flexibility \nto respond to urgent issues and ability to compete in the marketplace. \nWhile world oil prices are trending upwards, Nigeria is unable to benefit \nmaximally from the rising prices in terms of increased contributions of oil to \ngovernment fiscal revenue and foreign exchange reserves, because of the \ndrop in oil production and exports, as well as the negative effects of oil price \nsubsidy. As of January 21, 2022, crude prices for Bonny Light stood at US$89.03 \nper barrel. Crude oil spot prices are expected to exceed US$90 per barrel in Q1 \n \n21 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n2022. By December 2021, oil production stood at 1.52 mbpd, which is \nsignificantly lower than the budget benchmark of 1.86 mbpd. \nAs I had indicated in my earlier Personal Statements, Nigeria needs to diversify \nforeign exchange earnings from crude oil and portfolio capital, because of \ntheir inherent volatility. We must explore diaspora remittances and non-oil \nexports. We must remove the bottlenecks to non-oil exports. Customs and \nrelated agencies should focus on trade facilitation, and not just, maximization \nof revenues. The Bank Staff reports also contained some excellent suggestions \nthat the Bank should explore, including mainstreaming unregistered online \ntransfer channels to Nigeria, removal of bottlenecks inhibiting the seamless \nremittances of funds by Nigerians in diaspora, among others. \nI am also concern by the elevated level of budget deficit in the 2022 budget. \nThe government estimated a budget deficit of N6.39 trillion. However, recent \nexperiences have shown that revenue projections are usually over optimistic, \nwhile actual expenditures exceeded projected expenditures. Hence, there is \nevery probability that we may overshoot the budget deficit just like in the \nprevious years. The normalization policy in advanced economies will likely raise \ncosts of foreign debts. The domestic option also has the potential of crowding \nout private investment, as well as inducing inflation. Government should \nexplore non-debt options to finance capital projects. It should also produce a \ncredible programme to wind down petroleum subsidy. \nCBN intervention programmes remain a vital component of lowering inflation \nand facilitating economic growth, However, it is important to rationalize the \nprogrammes, with a view to strengthening the components of the intervention \nthat promote economic expansion, poverty reduction and employment \ngeneration. \nMy Vote \nThere are still many uncertainties within and outside the domestic economy. \nEconomic growth remains very fragile. While inflation ticked up marginally in \n \n22 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nDecember 2021, it is too soon to tell whether it is a trend or a blip. Hence, the \nnext few months remain very important. We must protect current growth \ntrajectory to reduce socio-economic problems in the country. \nHence, I cast my vote to maintain all monetary parameters at their extant \nvalues: \n1) MPR at 11.5% \n2) CRR at 27.5% \n3) LR at 30% \n4) Asymmetry Corridor around the MPR at +100/-700 basis points. \n \n \n \n \n3. AHMAD, AISHAH N. \nThe headwinds that characterized the global economy following the outbreak \nof COVID-19 have persisted with rising uncertainty. Although output in many \ncountries rebounded in 2021 following a sharp decline in 2020, increased \nvolatility in commodity prices, monetary policy normalization in some \nadvanced economies and impending monetary policy rate hikes by the US \nFederal Reserve (Fed), in particular, remain key considerations for the global \neconomy. \nAs advanced economies raise policy rates, risks of capital flow reversals and \nsecondary effects on currency depreciation and domestic inflation in Emerging \nMarket and Developing Economies (EMDEs)- especially with rising debt levels - \nare impossible to ignore. These combines with the pandemic maintaining grip \nin different parts of the world, prompting uncertain COVID-19 sovereign policy \nenvironment and weakened global growth prospects for 2022. \nThe World Bank in its January 2022 Global Economic Prospects Report, forecasts \nglobal output growth to decelerate to 4.1 and 3.2 per cent in 2022 and 2023, \nrespectively, from 5.5 per cent in 2021 following persisting supply chain \n \n23 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nbottlenecks and the gradual withdrawal of both monetary and fiscal stimuli. \nOverall, global economic prospects are tilted to the downside. \nIn response to these developments, a couple of EMDE central banks have \nraised policy rates. Notably, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC), reduced its \npolicy rate by 10 basis points to 3.70 per cent this month, to spur domestic \ngrowth which has remained muted by prolonged downturn in the real estate \nsector. The PBoC’s decision presents an alternative policy response which \nprioritizes strengthening domestic recovery over a reactive response to global \nmonetary developments. \nNotwithstanding amplified global risks, the domestic economy is expected to \nmaintain its growth trajectory. Notably, the Manufacturing Purchasing \nManagers’ Index, a leading indicator of output performance, rose to 52.0 index \npoints in December 2021, compared with 50.8 index points in the preceding \nmonth, driven largely by increased economic activities, reflected in growth in \nnew orders, employment and production levels. This development, coupled \nwith the relatively strong output growth of 4.03 per cent in the third quarter of \n2021, provides cautious optimism for continued expansion in economic \nactivities in the short-to medium-term. This positive outlook is, however, \npredicated on sustained and coordinated monetary and fiscal policy support \nin view of lingering headwinds. \nAn uptick was reported in headline inflation (year-on-year) to 15.63 per cent in \nDecember 2021 from 15.40 per cent in the preceding month. This follows 8 \nconsecutive months of decline and partly reflects seasonal festive season spike \nin demand. Food and core components rose to 17.37 and 13.87 per cent in \nDecember 2021 from 17.21 and 13.85 per cent in November 2021, respectively. \nThis recent price development appears transient and is expected to abate in \nthe near term as supply-demand imbalances wane amidst efforts to strengthen \nfood supply. Notwithstanding, the Bank’s liquidity management tools will be \nimportant to curb monetary induced inflation, in view of the surge in broad \n \n24 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nmoney (M3) to 13.77 per cent in December 2021 from 10.10 per cent in the \nprevious month. \nThe continued improvement in external reserves is noted, which stood at \nUS$40.20 billion as at December 2021 despite challenges with foreign \nexchange supply. The inherent risk of capital flow volatility and exchange rate \npressures, on the back of monetary policy normalisation in some advanced \neconomies were key considerations for monetary policy. The effect on external \nreserves should be moderate in view of the tepid portfolio inflows recorded in \nthe last few years, despite the relatively high yields. Nonetheless, ongoing \ninitiatives aimed at boosting domestic exports and opening sustainable \nchannels of foreign exchange supply remain imperative and must continue to \nbe pursued. \nThe financial system maintained its resilience into 2022 as data provided by \nBank staff indicated stability in broad soundness indicators and an \nunprecedented improvement in asset quality, even as credit to the private \nsector continued to grow. Capital adequacy as at December 2021 was robust \nat 14.53 per cent, 453 basis points above the regulatory minimum of 10 per cent. \nIndustry liquidity was also strong at 41.33 per cent over the same period and \nsupported by significant cash reserve requirement buffers available to provide \nliquidity backstops should banks require it. \nKey industry aggregates also continued their year-on-year upward trajectory \nwith total assets rising to N59.24trillion in December 2021 from N50.99 trillion in \nDecember 2020, while total deposits rose to N38.42 trillion from N32.21 trillion \nover the same period. Total credit also increased by N4.09 trillion between end-\nDecember 2020 and end-December 2021 with significant growth in credit to \nmanufacturing, General commerce and Oil & Gas sectors. This impressive \nincrease was achieved amidst continued decline in non-performing loans ratio \nfrom 5.10 per cent in November 2021 to 4.94 per cent in December 2021 (6 basis \npoints below the regulatory benchmark) for the first time in over a decade. \n \n25 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nFurthermore, results of stress tests showed resilience of banks’ solvency and \nliquidity ratios in response to potential severe macroeconomic shocks. \nHowever, the Bank must remain vigilant to proactively manage probable \nmacro risks to the financial system such as lingering spillover effects of the \npandemic, winding down of forbearance measures, and myriad risks to \nfinancial stability including exchange rate, operational and cyber security risks. \nPolicy Decision \nThe outlook for global recovery hinges on some key factors – the path of the \npandemic, spillover effects of tightened monetary policy by the Fed, lingering \nsupply chain disruptions, inflation persistence especially in advanced \neconomies and output developments in China to mention a few. These issues \nhave implications for Nigeria’s economic resilience as the economy remains \nconfronted with idiosyncratic challenges such as limited fiscal space in view of \nhigh budget deficits, despite substantial efforts to improve government \nrevenues. This underscores the importance of ongoing CBN interventions in \ncritical output enhancing sectors of the economy and the need for \ncoordinated monetary and fiscal policy efforts at holistically tackling our \nunderlying structural challenges. \nWith inflation far above the guideline benchmark of 6-9 per cent combined with \nfragile output growth, a difficult trade-off becomes apparent, requiring a \nnuanced policy decision-making approach. First, the weak output growth \nrequires much more policy support to strengthen the recovery, especially with \nlingering unemployment. Second, the current pressures on domestic prices are \nadjudged largely supply related, as such, increased production of goods and \nservices and minimizing distribution bottlenecks should help mitigate price \ndevelopments in the short-term. \nOverall, whilst a policy rate hike appears justified in view of the current price \nlevel, it would be prudent to further monitor the recent path of domestic prices \nas well as the effects of policy normalization in practice before a more hawkish \n \n26 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \npolicy decision is taken. Naturally, this view must be balanced with \nconsciousness of not leaving it “too late” to take action. This consideration \nensures that short-term policies do not undermine the long-term prospects of \nthe economy, while the corrective effects of previous policies are allowed to \nfilter-through with minimal distortive policy shocks. \nIn view of the above, I vote to maintain the current monetary policy stance by \nretaining the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) at 11.5 per cent, Cash Reserve Ratio \n(CRR) at 27.5 per cent, Liquidity Ratio (LR) at 30.0 per cent and the asymmetric \ncorridor at +100/-700 basis points around the MPR. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n27 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \n \n \n \n4. ALIYU, AHMED \nINTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS \nThe Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) held its first meeting in 2022 within an \nenvironment of persisting global macroeconomic challenges, exacerbated by \nheadwinds associated with increasing cases of the Omicron variant of the \nCOVID-19 virus. Inflation, in the Advanced Economies, initially thought to be \ntransitory, has maintained an upward trajectory, developing above forecasts. \nWhile supply chain disruptions and rising energy and commodity prices have \nbeen the major drivers of inflation in the Advanced Economies, rising food and \ncommodity prices have been identified as the main drivers of inflation in the \nEmerging Markets and Developing Economies (EMDEs), particularly in Sub-\nSahara Africa, including Nigeria. Against this background, the IMF in its January \n2022 edition of the World Economic Outlook (WEO) downgraded its 2022 global \ngrowth forecast to 4.4 percent from 5.9 percent. \nWhile many Advanced Economies believe that raising benchmark interest rates \nis justified in the current circumstances, the weaker than anticipated global and \ndomestic economic conditions, signaled the need to be cautious in order not \nto disrupt the smooth functioning of financial markets. In light of the rising trend \nof inflation, the US and EU have hinted on plans to commence tightening of \nmonetary policy in 2022, while the UK has already raised its bank rate by 0.15 \npercentage points in December 2021. Conversely, China cut its benchmark \npolicy rate to bolster output growth, considering the 0.9 percentage points \ndecline in growth year-on-year between Q3 - Q4 2021. \n \n28 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nGlobal trade at 9.5 percent in 2021 is projected to slow to 5.8 percent in 2022 \nand to a further 4.7 percent in 2023, due to lower-than-expected level of \nactivities arising from constrained production, supply chain bottlenecks and \nwaning demand. While the strong performance in 2021 was driven by a positive \nshift in merchandise trade, services trade is anticipated to slowly recover in \n2022, particularly in sectors hard hit by the Pandemic. \nCrude oil prices, buoyed by positive market sentiments, sustained an upward \npath in the review period. The OPEC Basket, Bonny Light, UK Brent and West \nTexas Intermediate sold at US$88.55/b, US$89.03/b, US$87.89/b and US$85.14/b, \nrespectively, as at January 21, 2022. For oil exporting EMDEs, the current oil price \ndevelopment is expected to improve growth projections, particularly as \ngeopolitical concerns over tight energy supplies point to further increases in oil \nprices. \nStaff report suggests that global financial conditions are likely to tighten in 2022 \nfollowing the imminent commencement of monetary policy normalization by \nsome Advanced Economies, which could affect portfolio flows to emerging \nmarkets and raise borrowing costs and debt levels. \nTHE DOMESTIC ECONOMY \nThe domestic economy grew strongly in the second and third quarters of 2021 \npointing to a relatively strong recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. Real GDP \ngrew by 4.03 percent year-on-year (y-o-y) in Q3 2021, from 5.01 percent y-o-y \nin Q2 2021. On quarter-on-quarter (q-o-q), Real GDP grew by 11.07 percent in \nQ3 2021 from -0.79 percent in Q2 2021. Staff forecast suggests that the \neconomy will grow by 2.86 percent in Q4 2021 based on sustained increase in \ncrude oil prices and continued improvement in credit expansion, business \nsentiments, and productive activities. \nManufacturing PMI increased above the 50-benchmark point in November and \nDecember 2021 at 50.8 and 52.0 index points, respectively, on account of the \nimprovement in business sentiments, even though the Non-Manufacturing PMI \n \n29 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nremained below the 50-benchmark point in the same periods at 48.6 and 48.7 \npercent, respectively, due to worsening employment outlook. Similarly, the \noutput gap narrowed and is estimated to lessen further by 1.5 percentage \npoints from -3.3 percent in 2021Q3 to -1.8 percent in 2021Q4. \nRecent price developments show an uptick in headline inflation in December \n2021. Headline inflation y-o-y grew by 15.63 percent in December 2021 from \n15.40 percent in November 2021. The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) \nattributed the uptick in inflation to the increase in demand for food items, \nhigher logistics and transportation costs associated with year-end festivities. The \ncore and food components of headline inflation increased by 0.02 and 0.16 \npercentage points, respectively. \nMonetary developments show a month-on-month (m-o-m) increase in Broad \nMoney (M3) by 13.77 percent or 4.13 percentage points above the 2021Q4 \nbenchmark of 9.64 percent. The growth in broad money was largely due to the \n6.18 percentage points increase in Net Domestic Assets. Similarly, Monetary \nBase grew by 2.32 percent m-o-m, led by expansion in currency-in-circulation \n(CIC), Other Reserves and Cash Reserve Requirements (CRR). \nMoney market developments witnessed steady low yields in Government \nsecurities due to huge demand at auctions. Average Open Buy Back (OBB) \nrate, m-o-m, rose to 12.95 percent (+285bps) in December 2021, due to tight \nliquidity conditions in the banking system. Developments in the equities market \nshow that market indicators improved in the review period, due to price \nappreciations in blue-chip stocks and profit-taking activities of investors. \nThe banking sector remained sound, safe and resilient as Financial Soundness \nIndicators (FSIs) were within their regulatory thresholds. Industry Capital \nAdequacy Ratio (CAR) at 14.53 percent at end-December 2021, remained \nabove the 10 percent regulatory minimum. Asset quality measured by Non-\nPerforming Loans (NPLs) improved to 4.94 percent at end-December 2021, \nbelow the regulatory threshold of 5 percent. The improvement in NPLs is \n \n30 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nattributed mainly to sound regulatory oversights of the CBN during the year. \nGross credit rose from N20.48 trillion in December 2020 to N24.57 trillion in \nDecember 2021 on account of increased industry funding base and CBN’s \ndirective on Loan to Deposit Ratio. \nOn the external front, the gross external reserves at US$39.96 billion on January \n20, 2022 could support 7.51 months of import of goods and services and 10.13 \nmonths of import of goods only. The Total Debt to GDP ratio was within \nsustainable levels in accordance with comparable benchmarks. \nCONSIDERATION FOR VOTING \nHighlights of developments in the domestic economy indicate sustained \nprogress in economic recovery. Monetary policy actions since the onset of the \nCOVID-19 pandemic have proved effective in addressing the adverse impacts \nof the Pandemic, with the economy coming out of recession sooner than \nexpected and growth sustained for four consecutive quarters. But despite the \nrecovery, growth remains fragile. While real GDP is projected to grow at 2.86 \npercent in Q4 2022 (below the 33.3 percent rate of unemployment), it indicates \na declining trend from the previous quarters, notwithstanding the associated \nbase effects. Available data shows that inflation moderated for eight \nconsecutive months, before the marginal increase recorded in December \n2021. \nWhile it is evident that efforts made in the last few months yielded positive \nresults, current strategy should focus on what more could be done to take \ngrowth beyond its historic average, engender an all-time low and stable \ninflation and significantly improve the welfare of the people. I cannot under-\nemphasize that price stability remains the principal objective of the Committee. \nThe uptick in inflation in December 2021, is a source of concern, as it suggests \ninflation persistence, even though the inflation report submits that seasonal \neffects played a significant role. In this regard, policy actions should continue \n \n31 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nto focus on price stability conducive to medium to long term growth, rather \nthan dwell on factors that are likely to be temporary. \nMonetary policy tightening is worth contemplating at this meeting, considering \nthe likely liquidity impact of election related spending and the implementation \nof the 2022 budget by the three tiers of government. I however, share in the \nview that the current stance of policy which has aided growth and price \nmoderation for most part of 2021 be sustained through the first quarter of 2022, \nwhile emerging evidence of their implication on Consumer Price Index (CPI) is \nassessed, for subsequent policy intervention. \nReflecting on the rising inflation in Advanced Economies and the imminent \nnormalization, it is unclear to what magnitude these would impact on the \ndomestic economy particularly on capital inflows to warrant monetary policy \naction at this time. What is critical, however, is to strengthen existing institutional \nframework and ongoing efforts at infrastructural development, to encourage \ninflow of capital that would stimulate growth and create employment. \nIn addition, developmental interventions should be reinforced in export-\noriented activities, especially non-oil exports, given that the current crude oil \nexport dependence of the economy, may no longer be feasible in the longer \nterm as emphasis shifts from fossil fuel to clean energy. \nOn fiscal operations, the Government will continue to implement and deploy \ncritical reforms and infrastructure to strengthen its finances, create fiscal space \nand adequately manage the public debt. In this regard, Government remains \ncommitted to the implementation of the Strategic Revenue Growth Initiative \n(SRGI) to improve its revenue and entrench fiscal discipline. \nOn this note, I feel that maintaining the status quo would be apt in the \ncircumstances. I therefore, vote to retain all policy parameters at their extant \nlevels as follows: \n• \nMPR at 11.5 per cent \n \n32 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n• \nThe asymmetric corridor at +100/-700 basis points around the MPR \n• \nLiquidity ratio at 30.0 per cent \n• \nCRR at 27.5 per cent \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n33 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \n5. ASOGWA, ROBERT CHIKWENDU \nPolicy Decision: \nOn the basis of an assessment of the current and evolving macroeconomic \nsituation at both the global and domestic levels, I believe that a continuation \nwith the ongoing accommodative stance is necessary so as to sustain the \ngrowth recovery process. Also, given the risks and uncertainties that remain in \nthe domestic economy, a premature withdrawal of the stimulus programme will \nbe counterproductive. As such, a patient policy approach which will support \ngrowth whilst achieving the medium –term target for inflation is the preferred \ndecision. \nI will therefore vote to: \n• Retain the MPR at 11.5 % \n• Retain the CRR at 27.5% \n• Retain the Asymmetric Corridor at +100/-700 basis points \n• Retain the Liquidity Ratio at 30.0% \nThe key considerations that underlie this decision and which relate to \nassessments of the current global and domestic economic developments are \nexplained below. \nAssessment of the Global Economy: \nAvailable information suggests that the global economy has continued to \nrecover despite the spread of the new coronavirus variant. In many countries, \neconomic activity lost some dynamism but has not contracted significantly. \nLatest forecasts indicate that global GDP growth in 2022 will remain robust but \nwill moderate from 6. 5 percent in 2021 to 3.5 percent in 2022 and 2023, partly \nbecause of the expected lower growth in the USA and China and also as policy \nstimulus is withdrawn in a number of countries. CBN staff report indicates a 2021 \nthird quarter GDP contraction in such large economies as USA, UK, the Euro \n \n34 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nArea, Japan, China, Brazil and Russia. However, there were signs of growth \nrebound in many of these countries by the fourth quarter 2021 although official \nGDP results are not yet out. Preliminary evidence show that global aggregate \ndemand entered the expansion zone in the fourth quarter with exports and \nimports markedly exceeding the third quarter 2021 levels. Also, the composite \nglobal purchasing manager’s index (PMI) improved to a four-month high in \nNovember 2021 with services further dominating manufacturing. \nThe global financial market remains highly volatile partly as a result of \nuncertainties regarding several policy actions in a number of advanced \neconomies. Global equity prices have recently declined since December 2021 \nespecially in developed economies owing to a combination of higher \nexpected interest rates and increased geopolitical tensions. Government bond \nyields have started a somewhat upward swing in recent times in many \ndeveloped countries partly responding to inflation and also reflecting the \ngeneral expectation that policy interest rates will soon be raised while \ncurrencies in a significant number of countries have also appreciated against \nthe dollar. \nGlobal inflation has continued an upward trajectory with many countries now \nposting highest levels in decades due partly to the recovery in global demand \nin the midst of supply chain disruptions. Current energy prices and prices of \nsome agricultural commodities remain at higher levels compared to the same \nperiod last year with slight improvements on a month-on-month basis. As at \nnow, there is considerable uncertainty about the persistence of global \ninflationary pressures with upward revision in current inflation forecasts. For \ninstance, in Canada, the outlook for inflation in 2022 has been revised upwards \nby about three-quarters of a percent. In the UK, the inflation rate in April 2022 is \nalso projected to peak around 2 percentage points higher than had been \nexpected in December 2021. \nAmidst significant increases in current and expected inflation, many central \nbanks are now withdrawing monetary accommodation. However, the \n \n35 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \ndecisions of the respective monetary authorities are not homogenous but \nrather take into account the progress in post-pandemic recovery in the \ndifferent economies. For instance, the US Federal reserve increased the pace \nof reduction in monthly asset purchases, while keeping interest rates close to \nzero. The European Central Bank also announced a slower pace of asset \npurchases under the ‘Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP)’ in \nthe first quarter of 2022 and discontinuation of PEEP by end-March 2022. The \nBank of Japan also signalled the completion of additional purchases of \ncommercial paper and corporate bonds by end-March 2022 and as from April \n2022, it will revert to the quantum of purchases prior to the pandemic. Poland \nbecame the first country to raise rates in 2022 with a hike of 50 basis points on \nJanuary 4, which was the fourth consecutive increase since the hikes \ncommenced in October 2021. Peru, Argentina and Uruguay earlier raised rates \nin October 2021. Russia also effected it 7th rate hike in December 2021, while \nthe Bank of England recently joined the rate-hiking club with a 15 basis point \nincrease in policy rate. The Central Bank of Chile raised interest rates by 150 \nbasis points in early January 2022, but there are several other monetary \nauthorities that have adopted a patient approach to monetary policy as their \neconomies continue to recover, despite inflationary surges. The Reserve Bank \nof India at its December 2021 meeting kept all policy parameters unchanged \nincluding the marginal standing facility. The Bank of Israel kept interest rate \nunchanged at 0.1 percent at its January 3, 2022 monetary committee meeting \nwhile the Bank of Australia also in early January maintained the policy rate \nconstant but decided to cease further purchases under the ‘bond purchase \nprogramme’. \nOverall, the global future outlook is somewhat positive, but the path of recovery \nis still being shaped by the pandemic and its second order effects. Eventhough \nrecent global purchasing managers index increased slightly and continues to \nindicate a relatively high level of economic expansion particularly in the \nservices sector, there are still fears that global supply chain disruptions will persist \nfar into 2022 and may continue to push up prices. While COVID-19 resurgences \n \n36 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nare less likely in 2022, the fears about a new variant always triggers negative \nresponses, like the black Friday plunge in global equity markets on November \n26, 2021. \nCurrent Domestic Economic Assessment. \nThe Nigerian economy had a strong momentum heading into 2022. A wide \nrange of measures and indicators confirmed that the domestic economy \nrebounded strongly in 2021 with the impact of government interventions. \nAccording to CBN staff early forecasts, real GDP is estimated to grow by 2.86 \npercent (year-on-year) in quarter 4 of 2022. This actually looks moderate when \ncompared with the 4.03 percent (year-on-year) growth recorded in the third \nquarter of 2021. However, on a quarter-on-quarter basis, real GDP expanded \nby 11.07 percent in the third quarter of 2021 as compared with -0.79 percent in \nthe second quarter of 2021. This was driven by the strong recovery of the \nservices sector particularly information and communications technology, and \nimproved performance of the manufacturing sector. Such other indicators as \nthe manufacturing and non-manufacturing PMIs as well the Manufacturers \nAssociation of Nigeria (MAN) CEO’s confidence Index for December 2021 point \nto a good overall aggregate growth for 2021. The manufacturing PMI stood at \n52.0 index points in December, which is an improvement on the 50.8 index \npoints recorded in November 2021 and 47.5 points in October 2021. \nWith domestic economic recovery gaining momentum, all constituents of \naggregate demand also entered the expansion zone, with exports and imports \nsignificantly exceeding their pre-COVID 19 levels. In the third quarter of 2021, \nthe domestic current account balance recorded the second consecutive \nsurplus after a prolonged period of over ten quarters consecutive deficits. CBN \nstaff report shows that in the third quarter of 2021, the overall balance of \npayments (BOP) as a percentage of GDP increased significantly to 3.35 \npercent from 0.36 percent of GDP in the second quarter of 2021. GDP growth \nis expected to remain strong in 2022, supported by continued strong \nperformance of the services sector, recovery in agriculture and an \n \n37 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nimprovement in global demand especially if oil prices sustain the ongoing \nfavourable tempo in the months ahead. \nThe Nigerian financial market has been marked by appreciable growth since \nthe previous MPC meeting especially the banking and equities markets. The \nbanking sector remains stable and resilient with strong liquidity and adequacy \nratios. The ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs) to gross loans stood at 4.94 \npercent in December 2021 from 5.3 percent in October 2021. The banking \nindustry asset base increased by 16.17 percent from 50.9 trillion naira at end \n2020 to 59.2 trillion naira at end 2021. Gross credit of the banking industry \nincreased from 20.48 trillion naira at end 2020 to 24.57 trillion naira at end 2021, \nwith manufacturing, general (retail and consumer), government, oil and gas \nrecording the highest increases in gross credit between 2019 and 2021. The \nequity market also improved since the last MPC meeting as the All-Share Index \nincreased by 1.61 percent between October and December 2021, while \nmarket capitalization increased by 1.63 percent during this same period. \nMeanwhile interest rates have remained fairly constant for some long period \neventhough between November and December 2021, maximum lending rates \nrose to 27.58 percent from 27.26 percent, while average savings rate declined \nfrom 1.83 percent to 1.25 percent. \nThere are however three worrisome indicators at the time of this MPC meeting \nincluding, the inflationary rise in December 2021, the surge in M3 and the persistent \ndebt buildup which are key issues of policy concern. First, inflation rate picked up \nin December 2021 after eight consecutive months of moderation. Headline \ninflation (year-on-year) rose to 15.63 percent in December from 15.40 percent in \nNovember 2021, while core inflation also rose marginally from 13.85 percent in \nNovember to 13.87 percent in December 2021. On a month-on-month basis, \nheadline inflation stood at 1.82 percent in December 2021 compared with 1.08 \npercent in November 2021. While much of this temporary increase has been \nattributed to the usual ‘December Demand Pressure’, the lingering security issues \nmay have also played a key role in the rise of the food sub-index. The second \nworrisome issue is the surge in broad money (M3) which moved very significantly \nfrom 4.72 per cent on a month-on-month basis at the end of September to 7.37 \npercent at end-October 2021 and further to 10.22 percent by November 2021. This \n \n38 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nwas above the regulatory maximum benchmark of 9.64 percent for that quarter. \nCBN staff report show that this growth was largely driven by increases in Central \nBanks claims on the Federal government and other sectors (public nonfinancial \ncorporations, private sector, state and local governments). The key concern is \nthat such significant monthly increases in broad money may sooner than later be \nadding to domestic inflationary pressures and this has to be closely watched. The \nthird worrisome issue is the persistent debt build-up caused by the weak revenue \nperformance resulting in an increasing fiscal deficit trend. CBN staff report show \nthat the revenue-expenditure gap even further widened in October 2021 with \npublic debt stock increasing from 32.2 trillion naira in September 2020 to 38 trillion \nnaira in September 2021. Nigeria is however not alone in the debt dilemma as the \nglobal debt levels soared above 400 percent of global GDP early in 2021, but later \ndeclined to about 350 percent of global GDP by the third quarter of 2021. The \nmain challenge is the lack of debt wisdom in Nigeria and with the debt service \nexpenditure estimated at about 35.6 percent of the projected revenue in 2022, \nthe road to long term recovery now seems more uncertain than previously \nanticipated. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n6. OBADAN, MIKE IDIAHI \nINTRODUCTION \n \n39 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nUncertainties and vulnerabilities have continued to define the global economy, \nespecially relating to covid-19 infections and the attendant effects. There is \nuncertainty about the threats of the Omicron and future variants of COVID-19. \nOther notable uncertainties that confront the global economy include: the \nuneven distribution of vaccines; rising infection rate of COVID-19 by mutant \nstrains of the virus; rising inflation; and persisting supply side constraints. These \nhave tended to weigh down global recovery. \nThe recent months have witnessed renewed waves of COVID-19 infections \nacross the world with massive outbreaks of the fast-spreading Omicron variant. \nThe good news is that countries experienced lower death and hospitalization \nrates thereby allowing most governments to refrain from re-imposing \nlockdowns. Rather, they are relying on accelerated vaccination programmes \nsupported by minor restrictions such as wearing of face masks, expanded \ntesting, and limits on large gatherings. A few countries that imposed lock-downs \nare considering lifting them. For example, on the 26th of January, 2022, reports \nindicated that the Dutch authorities had decided to lift the lock-down on public \nplaces and gatherings including restaurants because the impact of the raging \nvariant was lower than earlier feared. Thus, most countries, Nigeria included, \nhave apparently decided to live with the virus. Consequently, economic \nactivities have progressed in defiance to the resurgence of the pandemic \ncompared with the first and second waves. Vaccinations are ongoing but with \nthe Emerging markets and Developing Economies (EMDEs) being less favoured. \nThe EMDEs remain confronted with poor availability and distribution of \nvaccines. Nevertheless, there is less likelihood of a full-scale lockdown as was \nexperienced in 2020. This has favourable implications for global growth \nprospects and resolution of supply chain disruptions in 2022, other things being \nequal. \nIMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS \nThe global economy has sustained its recovery trajectory and the recovery in \neconomic activities is expected to continue through to 2022 although at a \n \n40 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nreduced pace. This is because of persisting supply bottlenecks, rising input costs \nand the continued impact of new and mutating strains of the covid-19 virus. \nBecause of the persistence of the downside risks to output, coupled with the \ndissipation of pent-up demand and the gradual withdrawal of both monetary \nand fiscal stimulus, global growth is forecast by the World Bank to decelerate \nfrom 5.5 per cent in 2021 to 4.1 per cent in 2022 and 3.2 per cent in 2023. The \nexpectation is that the global economy would return to its pre-crisis growth path \nby 2023. But then, slower global economic growth in 2022 has implications for \nthe recovery of poor countries, Nigeria included. \nGlobal trade experienced a strong recovery in 2021. But the recovery in goods \nand services trade is expected to moderate in 2022 and 2023 as base effects \nvanish. After reaching 9.5 per cent in 2021, growth in global trade volume is \nexpected to slow to 5.8 per cent in 2022 and to 4.7 per cent in 2023. Downside \nrisks to the global trade outlook, in the short term, include the rising COVID-19 \ninfections connected to the Omicron variant and the associated supply chain \ndisruptions. Another threat to global trade is persisting inflationary pressure \ndriven by supply bottlenecks and exacerbated by the rapid recovery of global \naggregate demand. The expected moderation of global trade will impact the \nNigerian economy negatively considering its high degree of openness. \nGlobal inflation has remained high, defying the earlier view of transience by \ncentral banks of Advanced Economies (AEs). It has reached historical peaks in \ncountries such as the United States of America and United Kingdom. The \nimplication of this for the Nigerian economy has been felt for some time now in \nthe form of elevated role of imported inflation in the country’s worrisome \nheadline inflation. \nDevelopments in the crude oil market have remained upbeat reflecting high \nprices which are well above the lows of the COVID-19 pandemic levels. As at \n21st January, 2022, oil prices per barrel were as follows: OPEC basket, US$88.55; \nBonny Light, US$89.03; UK Brent, US$87.89. The main drivers of the high prices \nhave been the continued strong demand and persisting OPEC+ supply ceiling. \n \n41 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nHowever, the oil futures market suggests moderation in the price of crude oil to \nlie between US$72.06 and US$73.84 per barrel for December 2022 deliveries. \nOrdinarily, high oil price should be good news to Nigeria. But the country’s \nsubsisting production challenges and the heavy importation of refined \npetroleum products have so far prevented it from realising visible benefits from \nthe high oil price regime in the form of accretion to external reserves, stability \nof the exchange rate and boosting of government revenue. It is imperative \ntherefore for the Government to find lasting solutions to the oil production \nchallenges and continued importation of petroleum products. \nMany countries, especially the AEs, are gradually winding up the stimulus \nprogrammes that supported growth in their economies throughout 2020 and \n2021, especially the monetary stimulus. While fiscal policy has maintained a \nstrong momentum, monetary policy has elicited concerns arising from surging \ninflation and its downside risks to the recovery. Consequently, several \nadvanced economy central banks have given indications to withdraw \nmonetary stimulus and commence a regime of policy rate adjustments, \ninvariably upwards. For example, the US Fed is expected to completely taper \nits US$120.0 billion monthly asset purchase during the first quarter of 2022 and \nannounce its first policy rate hike thereafter. \nThe implication of monetary policy normalisation is that global financial \nconditions will likely tighten and result in a portfolio shift from the EMDEs to the \nAdvanced Economies as investors seek higher and less risky returns. It also \nimplies higher borrowing costs which could hurt economic activity, especially \nfor EMDEs, and possibly trigger a financial crisis through debt defaults. Thus, for \nEMDEs including Nigeria, there is the fear of capital flows reversal which could \nhurt their recoveries. However, the circumstances of each country should \ndetermine its response to the monetary policy normalisation by the Advanced \nEconomies. Sizeable rate hikes may hinder their recovery. \nCONSIDERATIONS FOR OPINION \n \n42 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nIn the past one year, the Nigerian economy has shown notable signs of \nrecovery and resilience. The financial system demonstrated soundness, stability \nand resilience with the non-performing loans ratio falling below the prudential \nbenchmark for the first time in recent history. The market for crude oil, upon \nwhich the economy depends heavily, rebounded strongly with high prices in \nthe US$70s or above. But the net positive impact on domestic revenue and \nforeign exchange has been very minimal because of subsisting production \nchallenges and comatose local refineries. Fiscal performance is worrisome in \nthe area of revenue generation and the attendant narrow fiscal space and \npublic debt accumulation. Besides these are other issues which shape the \ndirection of monetary policy. \nEconomic growth. No doubt, the economy has shown significant signs of growth \nsince the exit from recession in the last quarter of 2020. With dwindling base \neffects, the growth rate in the fourth quarter of 2021 is projected to be about \n2.86 percent. The GDP is forecast by four organisations to lie in the range of 2.4 \nto 3.1 percent on average in 2021. The forecast for 2022 is as follows: World Bank \nGroup, 2.5%; IMF, 2.7%; CBN, 2.72% and FMFBNP, 4.2% which is understandable. \nAlthough they portray positive developments, they do not provide room for \ncomplacency. Besides, negative output gap persists being about -3.3 percent \nin Q3 2021, implying unemployment and underemployment of resources and \nunder-utilisation of capacity in the key real sectors of the economy. \nThus, the growth achieved has not reached a level that provides room for \ncelebration. It is not yet solid nor stable and there are numerous headwinds to \nit including uncertainties in the global economy, the looming normalisation of \nAEs’ monetary policies; foreign exchange market pressures; unpredictable \nglobal oil market and risk of continuing low oil production hindering the country \nfrom leveraging the high crude oil prices; legacy infrastructure deficits and the \npersisting insecurity. The latter is a crucial factor in the persisting output gap as \nit has increasingly impacted food supply, prices and other physical economic \n \n43 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nactivities negatively. Further tightening of monetary policy will be injurious to the \nfragile growth achieved. \nIssue of inflation. For eight consecutive months in 2021, there was good news \nabout inflation decelerating up to November 2021. But the trend was disturbed \nin December with a marginal increase in the headline inflation rate to 15.63 \npercent from the 15.40 percent achieved in November. Food inflation, which is \ndriven by structural and insecurity factors, accounted for a sizable proportion \nof the increase in headline inflation. Indeed, in December, food and non-\nalcoholic beverages contributed over 65.0 percent of the 15.63 percent \nincrease in headline inflation and its weight in the basket of goods for \ncomputing inflation is over 50.0 percent. Also, December was a month of \nelevated economic activities arising from increased spending of savings aimed \nat meeting festivity needs and activities by many economic agents, thus \nelevating demand significantly in relation to supply of goods and services. The \naverage price increase during that period was compounded by market actors \nwho took advantage of glaring market imperfections to hike prices arbitrarily. \nIn his press briefing on the inflation figures for December 2021, the Statistician \nGeneral of the Federation attributed the upward movement of the year-on-\nyear inflation rate last December to increased demand for goods and services \nduring the Christmas festive season. Now that that season is over, the transient \nnature of the hike is manifesting in an observed downward trend of the prices \nof some goods. This suggests the likelihood of a decline in the inflation rate in \nthe month of January 2022. \nIssue of monetary injections and money supply growth. Yes, there have been \nnotable monetary and fiscal injections into the economy to address the \nexigencies of covid-19 and recession. But the injections have not been \ntargeted at just consumption which could easily spike inflation through the \ndemand channel. Rather, a significant proportion of the injections have been \naimed at boosting output and productivity of the real sectors and infrastructure \ndevelopment aimed at enhancing productivity which in the medium/long-\n \n44 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nterm should reduce the prices of goods and services, ceteris paribus. \nConsequently, a large part of the injections may be considered as non-\ninflationary. A consideration of the annualised monthly average growth rates \nof broad money supply (M3) in 2021 shows that it was only in November and \nDecember that the growth rates exceeded the provisional annual benchmark \nof 9.64 percent. There was a spike in money supply growth in those two months \nwhile it was far less in many other months, for example, 1.56% in February and \no.24 in March. \nExtant monetary policy stance. This reflects tight stance with MPR at 11.5 \npercent; CRR at 27.5 percent excluding the administrative tightening measures, \nand Liquidity Ratio of 30 percent. If because of the rather transient marginal \nincrease in inflation last December, some stakeholders are clamouring for a \nhike in MPR, will it address the significant non-monetary factors of inflation? No. \nWill it attract significant portfolio capital inflows? Most likely not. Foreign portfolio \ninflows in the last two years have been marginal. \nThus, further monetary policy tightening at this time may not address the non-\nmonetary factors of the observed uptick in inflation nor attract capital inflows, \nthe latter because of the challenges in the macroeconomic environment and \nwider economy. Rather, the Deposit Corporations will capitalise on an \nincreased MPR to hike lending rates which would hurt much desired investment \nto catalyse growth. \nTherefore, at this point in time, it is not desirable to pander to the calls for further \ntightening by some market participants that exhibit emotional reactions to \nmacroeconomic indicators rather than engaging with them on the basis of \nknowledge and capacity. It will not be in the interest of the desired strong and \nstable economic recovery, price stability as well as poverty reduction to \nabandon policy support at this time. \n Let us watch the growth and inflation trends and allow continuation of extant \nmonetary and development finance measures, which have proved to be \n \n45 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \neffective in supporting growth and inflation control, till the next MPC meeting \nwhen the situation would be reviewed and appropriate decisions/actions \ntaken. \nIn light of the foregoing, I vote to hold all the policy parameters constant, that \nis: \nMonetary Policy Rate: \n \n11.5 percent \nCash Reserve Requirement: \n27.5 percent \nLiquidity Ratio: \n \n30.0 percent \nAsymmetric Corridor: \n+100/-700 percent \nTwo issues of concern \ni. Surging public debt. Public debt has surged to over N38.0 trillion. What \nappears also worrisome now is the composition which shows external debt as \ngrowing more than the target of 40.0 percent of total debt stock in relation to \ndomestic debt of 60.0 percent The latest data show the ratio as 46: 54 percent \nfor external debt and domestic debt, respectively. This trend needs to be \nchecked in view of the foreign exchange implications of external debt \nservicing. \nii. Call to resume sale of foreign exchange to the Bureaux de Change (BDCs). It \nmay be recalled that since July 2021, the CBN has stopped sale of foreign \nexchange to the BDCs as a result of their sharp practices and inability to assist \nthe Bank in its quest to achieve objectives relating to exchange rate stability. \nTheir role was transferred to the deposit money banks along with the associated \nforeign exchange allocations. Now, some people are urging the CBN to resume \nsale of foreign exchange to the BDCs. In the Daily Trust Newspaper of January \n25, 2022, Bode Augusto of Augusto & Co urged the CBN to resume sale of \nforeign exchange to the BDCs, failing which the parallel market rate will be \nbetween N610 and N620 naira in 2022. There is no logic in this. The BDCs are \n \n46 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nnow fully operating in the parallel market. One of the reasons for the suspension \nof forex sales to them was that they were operating like parallel market \noperators. Official foreign exchange sold to them were off-loaded in the \nparallel market. And so, resuming the sale of forex to them will not bring the \nparallel market rate down. Therefore, the calls to resume forex sales to the BDCs \nby the CBN should be ignored. \n \n \n7. OBIORA, KINGSLEY ISITUA \nIn the face of fragile economic recovery, I voted to: \nretain the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) at 11.5 per cent, \nthe Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) at 27.5 per cent, the \nLiquidity Ratio (LR) at 30.0 per cent and the asymmetric \ncorridor of +100/-700 basis points around the MPR. This \nstance should complement the measures already \ntaken by the Bank aimed at sustaining recovery, \nensuring price stability and guaranteeing a stable \nbanking system. \nAfter two years into the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic, the virus \ncontinued to mutate with deleterious effects across the world. The discovery of \nthe Omicron variant in late November 2021 has further dampened the prospect \nof global economic recovery. The number of confirmed cases has increased by \nover 100 million from 257 million to 358 million between November 2021 and \nJanuary 2022 MPC meetings, representing an increase of 39.3 per cent, \ncompared with 13.0 per cent between September and November 2021 MPC \nmeetings. The global deaths toll also increased to 5.6 million from 5.1 million in the \nperiod under review. The recent surge has led to the imposition of some \nrestrictions across the regions, especially in Europe, South East Asia, and Latin \nAmerica. Also, the associated economic losses from the pandemic are expected \nto reach about US$13.8 trillion by the end of 2024 – based on the IMF estimates. \nHowever, despite progress in global vaccination programmes, African countries \ncontinued to lag other regions in vaccination coverage. Only seven (7) out of \nfifty-four (54) countries in Africa met the 40.0 per cent target rate for full \nvaccination set by the World Health Organisation (WHO) by the end of 2021. With \n \n47 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nthis abysmal performance, achieving the target for 70.0 per cent coverage for all \nAfrican countries by June 2022 will be highly unlikely. Therefore, there is an urgent \nneed to overcome the challenge of ensuring equitable distribution of vaccines \nacross the world. \nGiven the dynamics of COVID-19 infections and other related factors, the global \neconomy is projected to moderate in 2022. Although the JPMorgan Global \nComposite Purchasing Managers’ Index expanded for the eighteenth (18th) \nmonth, it has slightly declined to 54.3 points in December from 54.8 points in \nNovember 2021. The decline was in part attributed to weak consumer and \nintermediate goods. Accordingly, in the January World Economic Outlook \n(WEO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projected the global economy \nto moderate to 4.4 per cent in 2022 from 5.9 per cent in 2021. The expected \nmoderation is due to the rapid spread of the Omicron variant, rising energy and \nfood prices, supply chain disruptions with associated inflationary pressures, as \nwell as the downturn in China’s property sector. The growth in Advanced \neconomies, Emerging Market and Developing Economies, and Sub-Saharan \nAfrica is expected to moderate to 3.9, 4.8, and 3.7 per cent in 2022 from 5.0. 6.5 \nand 4.0 in 2021, respectively. Growth in the United States, Euro Area and the \nUnited Kingdom will moderate to 4.0, 3.9, 4.7 from 5.6, 5.2 and 7.2 per cent, \nrespectively. In China, it will also moderate to 4.8 percent from 8.1 per cent in \n2021. Nevertheless, these projections will depend on the dynamics of the \npandemic, the speed of monetary policy tightening by advanced economies, \nsupply chain disruptions and inflationary pressures. \nFollowing the global trends, most analysts expect the domestic economy to \nslightly moderate in 2022. The latest official figures from the National Bureau of \nStatistics (NBS) showed a moderation of real GDP growth to 4.03 per cent in Q3 \n2021 from 5.01 and -3.62 per cent in Q2 2021 and Q3 2020, respectively. The \nmoderate growth was driven by the non-oil sector, which grew by 5.44 per cent, \ncompared with the oil sector that contracted by 10.73 per cent. In terms of \nrelative contribution, Agriculture, Industry and Services contributed 30.0, 20.0, \nand 50.0 per cent, respectively. The overall growth was driven by oil price \n \n48 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nrecovery, proactive interventions by the monetary and fiscal authorities, as well \nas base effects. Accordingly, the IMF projected the domestic economy to \nmoderate to 2.7 per cent in 2022 from 3.0 per cent in 2021. Encouragingly, the \nManufacturing PMI moved into expansionary territory in November 2021. It \nexpanded to 52.0 index points in December 2021 from 50.8 index points in \nNovember 2021, driven by production level, new orders, suppliers’ delivery time, \nand raw materials inventories. Also, the rise in oil price that reached US$89 per \nbarrel during the January 2022 MPC meeting from US$77 per barrel in \nNovember 2021 will significantly bolster domestic economic recovery. \nInflationary pressures which had decelerated for eight (8) months, inched up to \n15.63 per cent in December from 15.40 per cent in November 2021, driven by \nthe increases in food and core inflation. The two components increased to \n17.37 and 13.85 per cent in December from 17.21 and 13.87 per cent in \nNovember 2021, respectively. The factors responsible for the uptick included \nhigher \ndemand \nfor \nfood \nitems \nduring \nthe \nfestive \nseason \nand \nlogistics/transportation costs. Furthermore, the current account balance \nsignificantly improved from a surplus of US$348.88 million (0.36 per cent of GDP) \nin Q2 2020 to a higher surplus of US$3,680.28 billion (3.35 per cent of GDP) in Q3 \n2021, reflecting a decrease in the import of goods and services and net out \npayment of investment income. Gross external reserves, however, decreased \nby 0.69 per cent to US$40.20 billion in December 2021 from US$40.48 billion in \nNovember 2021, occasioned by foreign exchange sales at the Secondary \nMarket Intervention Sales (SMIS) and Investors’ and Exporters’ (I&E) windows \nand direct payments, respectively. \nEfficient supply and demand management policies by the Bank have led to the \ncurrent relative stability of the Foreign Exchange (FX) rate. Apart from measures \naimed at improving the supply-side of forex through the support of non-oil \nexports, the Bank is also working aggressively on the demand-side to eliminate \nthe incidence of over-invoicing and mispricing of export/import of goods and \nservices. That is why I support the current effort of the Bank in introducing the e-\nValuator and e-Invoicing by February 1, 2022. It will replace the hard copy \n \n49 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \ninvoice and will be part of the documentation required for all import and export \ntransactions. The new regulation, which will be operated on a Global Price \nVerification Mechanism will be guided by a benchmark price. The aim is to \neliminate over-invoicing, mispricing of exports and imports, as well as activities \nof money laundering. Reducing these loopholes through this measure will \nenable the Bank to save more foreign exchange earnings that will be \nchannelled to the most productive sectors of the economy. This will boost local \nproduction capacity, promote inclusive growth and sustain a strong naira \nexchange rate. \nThe banking system continued to sustain its soundness, safety and resilience \namid economic recovery. The total asset of the banking industry increased \nfrom N50.99 trillion from end-December 2020 to N59.24 trillion, representing an \nincrease of 16.18 per cent, driven by balances with CBN/banks, OMO bills and \ncredits. Accordingly, the banking system continued to increase the flow of \ncredit to the real economy. The gross banking sector credit increased by N4.88 \ntrillion or 22.0 per cent from N22.68 trillion at the end of December 2020 to \nN27.56 trillion at the end of December 2021. The increased credit was recorded \nin oil and gas, manufacturing, general, government, and general commerce. \nFurthermore, the Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) was below the regulatory \nbenchmark of 5.0 per cent for the first time in several years. It stood at 4.94 per \ncent at end-December 2021, compared with 6.13 per cent at end-December \n2020, attributed to recoveries, restructuring of facilities and write-offs during the \nyear. The average monthly weighted average Open Buy Back (OBB) rates rose \nto 12.75 in December 2021 from 10.61 per cent in November 2021, showing tight \nbanking system liquidity conditions – a reflection of the Bank’s effort at reining \nthe monetary side of inflation and ensuring a stable banking system. \nThe outlook continued to be hobbled by short to medium term imbalances. The \ntransmission of the COVID-19 infections remained a key concern to the \neconomic recovery globally due to its ravaging impacts on socio-economic \nactivities. The domestic economic recovery is still fragile. Despite rising oil prices, \n \n50 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nOil Refining, Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas continued to contract in Q3 \n2021 with attendant consequences on fiscal revenues and external reserves \nposition. Headline inflation continues to trend above the implicit target range \nof 6-9 per cent, driven largely by food inflation, thereby highlighting the need \nfor the Government to address security concerns in the food-producing areas \nof the country. Though inflation inched up in December 2021, after eight \nmonths of deceleration, I believe the uptick is transient and will return in a few \nmonths to a decelerating trend. For example, in an effort to moderate food \ninflation, the Bank between November and December 2021 disbursed N75.99 \nbillion to support the cultivation of over 383,000 hectares of maize, rice and \nwheat during the 2022 dry season, bringing the cumulative disbursements to \n₦927.94 billion to over 4.5 million smallholder farmers under the Anchor \nBorrowers’ Programme (ABP). Furthermore, the economy is still confronted with \nstructural and security challenges and lingering infrastructural deficits. The Bank \nhas continued to support the economy through various interventions in critical \nsectors of the economy including infrastructure. For example, as part of the \nBank’s effort to support infrastructural development, the Bank disbursed \n₦274.33 billion to the sector under the Nigeria Bulk Electricity Trading Payment \nAssurance Facility (NBET-PAF). An additional ₦20.58 billion was also released to \nDistribution Companies (DisCos) under the Nigeria Electricity Market \nStabilisation Facility – Phase 2 (NEMSF-2). However, given the African \ninfrastructure financing needs of US$170 billion a year and a gap of about \nUS$100 billion a year according to the African Development Bank, Nigeria must \nattract private capital to complement the limited fiscal space. This is where \ninitiative like the establishment of InfraCorp becomes necessary because it will \nattract funds across the globe, which will provide the basis for infrastructural \ndevelopment, increased productivity, double-digit growth and sustainable \neconomic development. \n \nAlthough inflation inched up in December 2021, the forecast suggests it will be \ntemporary and will return to its decelerating trend in the coming months. On that \n \n51 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nbasis, and given the fragile growth recovery, I believe the best course of action is \nto hold all parameters. Therefore, I voted to: \n• Retain the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) at 11.5 per cent; \n• Retain the Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) at 27.5 per cent; \n• Retain the Liquidity Ratio (LR) at 30.0 per cent; and \n• Retain the asymmetric corridor of +100/–700 basis points around the MPR. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n8. SANUSI, ALIYU RAFINDADI \n \n52 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n1.0 Decision \nI decided to vote for a hold on all the policy parameters in today’s meeting, \nbeing the first for the year and under the condition of heightened uncertainties \nin both the domestic and global economic environments. On the global scene, \nthe increasing possibility of policy normalization in the major advanced \neconomies raises concerns for possible capital flows reversals with potentially \nadverse consequences on the exchange rate, inflation as well as public debt. \nOn the domestic scene, being a pre-election year, uncertainties regarding the \nevolution of inflation, foreign exchange pressure as well as money market \ndevelopments have also increased. Although the uptick in inflation in \nDecember 2021 appears to put a halt to the eight months of disinflation, it may \nbe a temporary blip in response to the festive period’s increased demand. \nGiven these rising uncertainties, a hold on all the policy parameters appears to \nbe the optimal choice for now. \n2.0 Background and Justification \n2.1 Global Economic Developments \nThe raging global inflation has hastened the planned pace of the well-\nanticipated monetary policy normalisation, including the tapering and rates \nhikes, across Advanced Economies (AEs). Although Nigeria’s exposure to \nforeign portfolio may not be large enough to significantly affect the reserves \nposition, the associated capital flow reversal and rising yields may have \nadverse effect on the domestic capital market, external debt service as well as \nthe FG’s fiscal plans. \nThe two major developments that shaped the medium-term global policy \nenvironment are the rising rate of inflation in the major advanced economies \nand the accompanying policy responses in the form of speeding-up of their \nmonetary policy normalisation plans. While the rising inflation may have no \nimmediate contagion effect on the domestic economy, it nevertheless signals \nthe possibility of future higher import prices, hence, imported inflation. The \n \n53 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nspeedy policy normalisation implies that capital flows to emerging markets may \ndry up and reverse, putting pressure on their foreign reserves, exchange rates \nand, consequently, inflation. Indeed, many Emerging Market and Developing \nEconomies (EMDEs) have started hiking their policy rates, partly, to moderate \nthe adverse effects of this development. \nDuring the last quarter of 2021, the global economy continued to recover in \nresponse to the unprecedented coordinated fiscal and monetary stimulus \nacross Advanced Economies (AEs) and EMDEs. For the year 2021, global GDP \ngrowth is estimated at 5.5%, but is forecasted, by the World Bank, to \nprogressively grow at the relatively lower rates of 4.1% and 3.2% in 2022 and \n2023, respectively, as monetary policy is normalised and the pent-up demand \nwanes out. Output growth in the Advanced Economies is estimated at 5.0% in \n2021, but will decline in 2022 and 2023 to 3.8% and 2.3%, respectively. In the \nEMDEs, however, output growth for 2021 was estimated at 6.3%, but is similarly \nforecasted to grow at the lower rates of 4.6% and 4.4% in 2022 and 2023, \nrespectively. The progressively lower growth rates expected across the globe \nare due to the expected commencement of normalisation of policy, slower \nprogress of vaccination in the EMDEs, persisting supply bottlenecks and the \nuncertainties driven by emergence of new COVID-19 variants. Output in the US \nis forecasted to grow (q-o-q) by 5.5% in Q4 2021 compared with 2.3% in Q3 2021. \nOutput growth in the UK is forecasted to slow down to 0.9% in Q4 2021, \ncompared with 5.5% achieved in Q3 2021. The Euro zone is expected to grow \nby 1.5% (q-o-q) in Q4 2021 compared with 2.2% achieved in Q3 2021. In Japan, \noutput recovery is forecasted to continue in the 4th quarter as output grows by \n1.0% compared with 0.4% achieved in Q3 2021. Although output growth \namongst the EMDEs were forecasted to be mostly positive in Q4 2021, the rates \nhave greatly varied. India and Nigeria are expected to record a somewhat \nhigher q-o-q output growth rates of 12.7% and 5.1%, respectively, in Q4 2021. \nSouth Africa and Brazil are, however, forecasted to grow at 2.0% and 0.2% in \nQ4 2021 compared with the contraction of -1.5% and -0.1% recorded in Q3 \n2021, respectively. \n \n54 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nThe recovery of global trade in 2021 was fast, having grown at the rate of 9.5% \nduring the year. It is, however, expected moderate to 5.8% and 4.7% in 2022 \nand 2023, respectively. Oil prices continued to be driven by rising demand, \nweather-related disruptions and OPEC supply ceilings. As at January 21, 2022, \nthe price of OPEC basket stood at US$ 88.55/b compared with US$71.98 per \nbarrel on September 14, 2021 and US$54.38 per barrel in January 2021. The \nupward trend is expected to continue as the spot price is forecasted to reach \nUS$ 90/b in Q1 2022 and US$100/b on Q3 2022. \nGlobal price developments continue be driven by a combination of demand \nand supply side factors. These include the price of agricultural commodities, \nproduction input, high oil prices and supply bottlenecks. In AEs, inflation is \nforecasted to rise to 2.8% in 2021, but decline to 2.3% in 2022. Inflation in the US, \nEurozone and the UK has been rising fast and well away from their long-term \ntarget of 2%. In the US, inflation rose to 7.0% (y-o-y) in December 2021 from 6.8% \nin November 2021. This is the highest rate recorded since 1982. \nIn the Euro area, inflation rose from 4.9% in November, 2021 to 5.0% in \nDecember, 2021 due to rising prices of food, energy, alcohol and non-energy \nindustrial goods. In the UK, inflation increased from 5.1% in November, 2021 to \n5.4% in December 2021. In the EMDEs, inflation is forecasted to increase to 5.5% \nin 2021 but moderate to 4.7% in 2022. In December, inflation rates in China and \nKenya have declined, but have increased in South Africa, Egypt and Nigeria. \nBetween November and December 2021, inflation increased in Egypt (from \n5.6% to 5.9%), South Africa (from 5.5% to 5.9%) and Nigeria (from 15.4% to \n15.63%). \nGlobal capital flows to the emerging market has continued to decline. In the \nfirst half of 2021, FDI flows to low income economies declined by -9%. Portfolio \nflows also declined by 37.35% in between October and November 2021 in \nresponse to the expected policy normalisation in the AEs. \n2.2 Domestic Economic Developments and their Implications \n \n55 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nAlthough new national accounts data are not yet available, output growth, \nwhich had sustained a positive recovery since the 4th Quarter of 2020 when the \neconomy exited the COVID-induced recession, is expected to remain positive. \nDuring the 3rd Quarter of 2021, output grew by 4.03% (y-o-y), outperforming the \nearlier projected rate of 3.33%. The output growth was driven by the non-oil \nsector, which grew by 5.44% (y-o-y). The non-oil GDP growth was driven by \ngrowth in services and agriculture. The oil output actually contracted by -\n10.73% (y-o-y) in Q3 2021 due to the fall in crude production. Given that the \nCBN’s Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) for both Manufacturing and Non-\nmanufacturing increased in October, November and December 2021, the 4th \nQuarter \noutput \ngrowth \nis \nimpliedly \npositive. \nIndeed, \nbecause \nthe \nManufacturing PMI for the months of November and December crossed the 50 \nindex points threshold, it suggests strong manufacturing activities during the \nperiod, the growth of output in the Q4 2021 can also be expected to be strong. \nStaff forecasts show that output would grow by 2.86% for the Q4 2021 and 3.10% \nfor the year 2021. \nIn December 2021, disinflation that started since April 2021 paused with an \nuptick in the headline inflation, slightly rising (y-o-y) from 15.4% in November \n2021 to 15.63% in December 2021. The increase of 0.23 percentage points was \nattributable to higher demand during the festive season. Although both \ncomponents of inflation increased during the period, the increase in food \ninflation was significantly higher and was the major driver of the increase in \ninflation. For instance, the food price component rose from 17.21% in \nNovember 2021 to 17.37% in December 2021; an increase of 0.16 percentage \npoints compared with the relatively smaller increase of 0.02 percentage points \nincrease in the core component during the period. The rise in core inflation was \nassociated with the higher logistics/transportation costs and other seasonal \neffects. The rise in food inflation was due to the rise in demand for food during \nthe festive season. \n \n56 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nAvailable data shows that the resilience of the banking industry was sustained \nduring the period under review. The Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) of the \nindustry was 14.53% as at December 2021, which is above the regulatory \nminimum of 10%. There was also further improvement in the quality of the \nindustry’s assets as the Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) ratio fell below the \nregulatory maximum of 5% to 4.94% in December 2021. The industry’s total \ncredit to the economy also increased from N20.48 trillion in December 2020 to \nN24.57 trillion in December 2021, representing a 20% increase. In December \n2021, a total of N855.48 billion new credits were granted to six sectors including \nOil & Gas, Manufacturing, General, General Commerce, Agriculture and \nConstruction accounted for 84.96% or N726.79 billion of the new credit. Analysis \nof the interest rate band reveals that 71.83% of customers paid interest rates of \nless than 15% in December 2021. In terms of the total amount lent, 41.43% of the \n3.916 trillion naira was lent at less than 15% interest rates. This shows that interest \nrates are declining as more credit are being granted by the banking system. \n3.0 The Basis for My Policy Choice \nIn choosing between the options to tighten or loosen the current policy stance, \nI voted for hold on all the policy parameters on the conviction that the uptick \nin inflation in December was a temporary blip in response to the rising demand \nduring the festive period. Given that the output recovery is still fragile, and given \nthe strength of the supply-side factors in the inflationary process, tightening may \nhurt output recovery and strengthen the supply constraints and exacerbate the \ninflationary pressures. Although this year is a pre-election year and significant \nliquidity injections as well as exchange rate pressure are expected, it is not yet \ntime to tighten the policy stance through rates hike. The bank should continue \nto use administrative measure to manage liquidity, for now, as we monitor the \nevolution of inflation. A hold, in my opinion, is the optimal choice for now. \n \nConsequently, I voted to: \n \n57 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nRetain the MPR at 11.50 per cent; \nRetain the CRR at 27.5 per cent; \nRetain the asymmetric corridor at +100/–700 basis points; and \nRetain liquidity ratio at 30.0 per cent. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n9. SHONUBI, FOLASHODUN A. \nOur first meeting in 2022 held on the back of a global economy that is \nchallenged by heightened inflation and a recovery momentum that is been \nslowed by protracted supply-chain disruptions. Intermittent rebound, due to \nirregular reopening of economies and uneven vaccination rate, mainly \nbetween advanced and emerging market and developing economies \n \n58 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n(EMDEs) in most of 2021 dampened the full impact of record level stimuli by \nmonetary and fiscal authorities around the world. \nNigeria grappled with the negative spillover from disruptions to global growth \nin 2021 in the form of low demand for major commodity exports, shortfall in \navailability of essentials and imported inflation. However, despite lingering \nsecurity challenges, the economy has witnessed continuous, though fragile \ngrowth. The Bank has remained at the forefront of facilitating growth via its \nintervention programmes and deliberate measures in the banking sector to \nenhance credit flow to the real sector. The monetary policy environment \ntherefore continues to face the herculean task of managing the trade-off \nbetween staying accommodative to further improve growth and aggressively \ntaking steps to curb high inflation, even with the strong pointer from the \nimminent gradual unwinding of accommodative policy in advance \neconomies. \nBrief Review of Global and Domestic Economic Developments \nFor the second year running, a major headwind to the global economic growth \nremains protracted disruptions to economic activities, caused by the \npandemic. Despite the measured improvement in vaccination during 2021, \nfurther disruptive effects of new variants have heightened uncertainties. \nThough the advanced economies recorded some modest rebound, poor \nprogress in vaccination rate and sub-optimal stimuli support limited the strength \nof rebound in the EMDEs. Elevated prices in advanced economies due to \nsupply bottlenecks have also limited growth momentum, just as prices in EMDEs \nrose on account of imported inflation and pressured exchange rate. \nFour consecutive quarters of growth post-recession, notwithstanding the \nmultiple challenges in the socio-political and macroeconomic environment \nunderscores the strength of rebound in the domestic economy. Driven mainly \nby sustained expansion in the non-oil sector, the path to sustained growth is \nunderscored by improvement in other real sector indicators at the end of 2021. \nThe Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) rose further above the \n \n59 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n50.0 index point to 52.0 points, just as the indices of industrial and manufacturing \nproduction, as well as, electricity consumption rose, relative to the levels in the \npreceding period. \nHeadline inflation, on a year-on-year basis, rose to 15.63 per cent in December \n2021, driven by increase in both food and core components, indicating a \nreversal of 8 consecutive months of decline. Food and core inflation rose to \n17.37 and 13.87 per cent, respectively, in December 2021, from 17.21 and 13.85 \nper cent, in November 2021. On a month-on-month basis, headline and food \ninflation also rose, while core inflation fell relative to the levels in preceding \nmonth. \n \nState of the Nigerian banking system at the end of 2021 showed general \nimprovement in the sector’s resilience and robustness, though it was \nchallenged by lower profitability. The industry non-performing loans, at 4.95 per \ncent, was below the regulatory maximum of 5.0 per cent, while liquidity ratio, \nat 41.33 per cent remain well above the regulatory minimum of 30.0 per cent. \nIndustry capital adequacy ratio at 14.53 per cent, was below the 15.10 per cent \nat the beginning of 2021, but above the standard regulatory threshold of 10.0 \nper cent. \n \nGrowth across major monetary aggregates in 2021 were generally above the \nbenchmarks, indicating significant expansion in money supply. Broad money \nsupply (M3) grew by 13.77 per cent, compared with 9.64 per cent benchmark \nfor fiscal 2021, reflecting 10.70 and 18.50 per cent in net claims on government \nand claims on other sectors, respectively, which were above the target growth \nfor fiscal 2021. Overall improvement in All-share index and aggregate market \ncapitalization at the end of 2021 reflected the impact of capital market reform \nto enhance efficiency. Money market rates were generally lower, indicating \nbanking system liquidity condition and impact of policies to stabilize markets. \n \n60 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nState of the external sector at the end of 2021 reflected measured \nimprovement, though the sector remains challenged by sub-optimal liquidity \nand exchange rate pressure. Improvement in the components and overall \nbalance of payments, reflected positive trade balance, reduced imports, as \nwell as higher government transfers and workers remittances. In 2021, the fiscal \nspace struggled with low revenue, even as the Government face pressure for \nincreased expenditure to further ameliorate the effects of pandemic-induced \ndisruptions, finance infrastructure development, address insecurity challenges \nand inspire further expansion of economic activities. \nOverall Considerations and Decision \nDragging pandemic, protracted disruption to supply-chain and impact of \nsupply shortage induced inflation on income is a major headwind to global \ngrowth recovery. Persisting high prices and its likely effect on inflation \nexpectations has heightened likelihood that advanced economies will soon \ncommence a gradual wind down of the loose policy regime. Overall, \nvulnerability of recovery and sustained reopening may compel economies to \nsettle for a trade-off between rate adjustment and direct interventions to \nforestall the big impact of a total discontinuation of the support system. \nSudden inflation uptick in December 2021, against the trend, raises concern. \nAlthough festivity related higher demand may have temporarily caused the \nincrease in core inflation, higher food inflation in a post-harvest period raise \nmore worries about the impact of protracted insecurity on farming activities \nand food supply. Expansion in monetary aggregate above the benchmark \nmay be an indication of monetary angle to inflation, especially at a time of \nnegative output gap. This is however expected to be addressed by liquidly \nmanagement measures of the Bank. \n \nMonetary policy leverages some assumptions, particularly about robustness \nand tidiness of fiscal policy, which enables policy effectiveness. However, tight \nfiscal space, huge deficit size, and its financing options, may be aggravating \n \n61 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \ninflationary pressure. While commending the initiative to redefine operations of \nGovernment Owned Enterprises so as to enhance revenue generation, it is \nhoped that pressure on prices from this area will abate as this progresses and \nGovernment explore other funding alternatives, including the Public Private \nPartnership. \n \nThe Bank has done so much to salvage the domestic economy, deploying \ninterventions at lower interest rates to facilitate growth, and administratively \nmanaging liquidity to curb inflation under a stagflation environment. A thought \nabout the outcomes and what would have been the counterfactual show that \nthere is more to be done to fix the fundamental issues. Against the backdrop of \na regime that prioritized growth, while keeping an eye on monetary and price \nstability, the policy space still faces the task of continuing to manage the trade-\noff between rationalizing interventions to preserve growth, while taming \ninflation. \n \nThe LDR policy has facilitated sustained flow of credit to the real economy, with \nlending rate trending below the level at the beginning of 2021, reflecting effect \nof the credit stimulating measures of the Bank. But current growth is far from \nbeing prosperous. High expectation of businesses from the sentiment survey \nand uptick in PMI reflects the Banks pro-growth policies. The rise in inflation in \nDecember 2021 warrants a watchful eye on monetary variables. In all, the MPC \nwould continue to be mindful of not only what has happened or is happening \nnow but also keep in focus, upcoming happenings that will directly or indirectly \nimpact workings of the economy. \n \n \n I therefore vote to retain: \n• MPR at 11.5 per cent; \n• Asymmetric Corridor of +100/-700 basis points around the MPR; \n• CRR at 27.5 per cent; and \n• Liquidity Ratio at 30 per cent. \n \n62 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n10. EMEFIELE, GODWIN I. \nGOVERNOR OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA AND CHAIRMAN, MONETARY \nPOLICY COMMITTEE \nAs the world adapts to life with Covid-19, recurring mutation of the virus is \ndeterring the pace of global recovery; thus, levitating uncertainty, risks and \nimbalances. Regardless, output recovered above pre-pandemic levels (in \nmajor economies), with global growth projected at 5.9 and 4.9 percent in 2021 \nand 2022, respectively from –3.1 percent in 2020. The surge in global demand \nand consumer spending is, however, outpacing supply and overheating \nmarkets. Labour shortages (due to self-isolations), rising food and energy \nprices, and commodity scarcity (attributable to pandemic-related restrictions) \nare amplifying costs and elevating inflation above target in many economies. \nShort-term outlook indicates that continued output recovery is pulling inflation \n \n63 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nexpectations; warranting monetary tightening in advanced economies. This \ncould spark capital repatriation from Emerging Markets and Developing \nEconomies (EMDEs), heighten financial market vulnerability and complicate \ntheir fragile recovery. \nFor the Nigerian economy, following a strong pick-up of economic activities in \n2021, short-term outlook remains positive, recovery is on course, and output \ncould surpass pre-pandemic levels in 2022. Manufacturing Purchasing \nManagers’ Index (PMI) for December 2021 expanded further to 52.0 points \nfrom 50.8 points in November, although the Non-Manufacturing index \ndeclined by 0.6 point. This reflected sturdy rebound of business activities, \nincreased labour mobilisation, and expanding productive capacity. In-house \nanalysis projects growth at 2.8 percent for 2022 from 3.1 percent estimated for \n2021 and –1.9 percent in 2020. \nConsolidation of the domestic economy is expected to be driven by stronger \nnon-oil activities buoyed by the CBN’s interventions in manufacturing, \nagriculture, infrastructure, healthcare and MSMEs. Cumulatively, these \ninterventions stand at nearly N1trillion to smallholder farmers through the \nAnchor Borrowers Programme (ABP), about N1.4 trillion under the Real Sector \nFacility, over N108 billion for the Healthcare Sector Intervention Facility, and \nalmost N370 billion through the Targeted Credit Facility (TCF) to households \nand businesses. The facilities are helping to resolve the long-standing structural \nconstrains and bolster domestic productivity with favourable effects on market \nprices. \nThough short-term inflation trend remains downward, recent data on domestic \nprices shows an uptick in headline rate from 15.4 percent in November 2021 to \n15.6 percent. This reflects the slim rise in both food and core inflations to 17.4 \nand 13.9 percent, respectively. Analysis implies that the uptick is transient, \nyuletide-pushed, and exacerbated by security challenges along some food-\nproducing belts. Price dynamics are worsened by logistic, distribution, storage \n \n64 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nand middle-men problems, which widened the difference between farm-gate \nand market prices. These are being tackled through our infrastructure initiatives \nand the imminent commodity exchange platform. Near-term outlook suggests \nan episodic and momentary ascent of inflation early in 2022 which is projected \nto start to wane by the first quarter. The slight upside blip in inflationary trend is \nnoted with concern and will be monitored closely. This emerging pressure is, \nhowever, expected to be dampened by the ongoing aggregate supply \nboosting policies of the CBN. \nTrends in the money and financial markets show mixed trajectories of systemic \nliquidity conditions in December 2021. At 12.8 percent, the 2.1 percentage \npoints (m-o-m) rise in OBB rate reflected interbank liquidity constraints, as \ncustomers’ festivity-induced cash-holding preferences enlarged currency-\noutside-banks. Accordingly, money stock expanded further, with annualised \nM3 growth at 13.8 percent vis-a-vis 11.2 percent in November 2021. Net \ndomestic asset quickened 15.6 percent (annualised) from 10.0 percent, \nreflecting the 30.7 percent rise in core private sector credits. \nI note the robust and progressing path of domestic credits, spurred by the LDR \npolicy and our stance on enhanced flows to strategic real sector ventures. I \nreiterate that the CBN will sustain credits to the private sector, even as I remain \nmindful of the risk aversion of banks to supposedly high-risk real sector ventures. \nI note the improvements in banks’ Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) position and \nour continuing efforts at de-risking the target sectors. Robust credits will bolster \ndomestic investment, household demand, and factor productivity, while fast-\ntracking economic diversification, and ensuring strong and inclusive growth. \nIn my consideration, I affirm that the objective of price and monetary stability \nremains sacrosanct to us. I note the continued improvement in short-term \neconomic outlook as the output recovers to pre-pandemic levels following the \nvarious stimulus support by the Federal government and the CBN. I also \nacknowledge the shocks to inflation in the near-term both from domestic and \n \n65 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \nforeign sources. While the recent rise in domestic inflation is deemed transient, \nI note the significant elevation of global inflationary pressures, particularly \namong Advanced Economies, where the rate is manifold of target. The \nelevated inflationary trend that accompanied the worldwide pandemic-\ninduced stimulus support, signals the immediacy of global monetary tightening \nwith dire ramifications for EMDEs. This in addition, to the recent episodic rise in \ndomestic inflation, justifies arguments to tighten, today, in order to tame \nexpectations and, tangentially, mitigate possible capital outflows. \nHowever, I note that though effective anchoring of inflation expectations is \nfundamental, economic recovery remains fragile, while per capita income \nand unemployment rate are outside tolerable levels. Widespread security \nchallenges, infrastructural rigidities, and weak factor productivity diminish \nmedium-term prospects and therefore need to be resolved urgently. I am of \nthe view that a favourable dismantling of these challenges, reinforced by \nsustained application of our various intervention programmes will strengthen \nour domestic fundamentals and further boost short-term outlook. It also \nremains imperative to ensure a full diversification of the economy and create \ninstitutional structures that will insulate the economy from exogenous shocks. \nMy inclination today, given the near-term inflation expectations, is to tighten \nmonetary policy stance. But cautious and well-balanced policy is irrefutable. \nThe dilemma of the trade-off between inflation and output remains extant, \nand a rate hike could derail our modest recovery. I remain mindful of the need \nto pursue a policy of price stability without losing sight of the importance of \neconomic growth. I am of the view that the current levels of policy parameters \nare appropriate and do not require adjusts. I prefer to allow the prevailing \nstance to continue to work through the system, as clearer direction is gleaned \nof potential shocks. To foster price stability and output stabilisation without \nintroducing disruptive policy shocks, I, therefore, vote to: \n1. Retain the MPR at 11.5 percent; \n \n66 \n \n \nClassified as Confidential \n2. Retain the Asymmetric Corridor at +100/–700 basis points; \n3. Retain the CRR at 27.5 percent; and \n4. Retain Liquidity Ratio at 30.0 percent \n \nGODWIN I. EMEFIELE, CON \nGovernor \n \nJanuary 2022", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/Central Bank of Nigeria Communique No. 140 of the 283rd Monetary Policy Committee Meeting of January 24 – 25, 2022, and the Personal Statements of Members.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "d2553ce92034c5839dcb34f6862755cb", "text": "CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2022 \nHalf Year \nEconomic Report \n \n \n \n \ni \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \n \nCentral Bank of Nigeria \n \n \n \n2022 Half Year Economic Report \n \n \n \nii \n \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \n \n \nCentral \nBank \nof \nNigeria \nCorporate Head Office \nPlot 33, Abubakar Tafawa \nBalewa Way Central Business \nDistrict, Cadastral Zone \nP.M.B. 0187 \nGarki, Abuja \nWebsite: www.cbn.gov.ng \n \nContact Centre \nTel: +234 (0) 700 225 5226 \n©2022 Central Bank of Nigeria \nISSN 1597-2976 \n \n \n \niii \n \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \n \nABOUT THE REPORT \n \nThe Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Economic Report presents economic developments \nin Nigeria, intended for dissemination to the public. The Report provides insights on \ncurrent developments in the real, fiscal, financial, and external sectors of the Nigerian \neconomy, as well as on global issues of interest. It also reflects the policy initiatives \nof the CBN in pursuit of its mandate. The Report is targeted at a wide range of readers, \nincluding economists, policymakers, financial analysts in the government and private \nsectors, and the public. Free copies of the Report, both current and past issues, can \nbe obtained from the CBN website: www.cbn.gov.ng. All inquiries concerning the \nreport should be directed to the Director, Research Department, Central Bank of \nNigeria, P.M.B. 187, Garki, Abuja, Nigeria. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \niv \n \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nGOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK \n \n \nMembers of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) as of 30 June 2022 \n1 \nGodwin I. Emefiele, CON \n \nGovernor (Chairman) \n2 \nAishah N. Ahmad \n \nDeputy Governor (Financial System Stability) \n3 \nEdward L. Adamu \n \nDeputy Governor (Corporate Services) \n4 \nFolashodun A. Shonubi \n \nDeputy Governor (Operations) \n5 \nKingsley I. Obiora \n \nDeputy Governor (Economic Policy) \n6 \nMike I. Obadan \n \nMember \n7 \nAdeola F. Adenikinju \n \nMember \n8 \nRobert C. Asogwa \n \nMember \n9 \nAliyu R. Sanusi \n \nMember \n10 \nAhmed Aliyu \n \nMember \n11 \nMomodu Omamegbe \n \nMember \n12 \nMohammed A. Salisu \n \nMember \n \nHassan Mahmud \n \nSecretary \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nMembers of the Committee of Governors \n1 Godwin I. Emefiele, CON \n- Governor (Chairman) \n2 Aishah N. Ahmad \n- Deputy Governor (Financial System Stability) \n3 Edward L. Adamu \n- Deputy Governor (Corporate Services) \n4 Folashodun A. Shonubi \n- Deputy Governor (Operations) \n5 Kingsley I. Obiora \n- Deputy Governor (Economic Policy) \n \nAlice Karau \n- Secretary to the Board \n \n \n \nv \n \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nList of Departmental Directors as of 30 June 2022 \n1 \nSamuel C. Okojere \n- \nBanking Services \n2 \nHaruna B. Mustafa \n- \nBanking Supervision \n3 \nElizabeth O. Fasoranti \n \n- \nBranch Operations \n4 \nMuhammad A. Abba \n- \nCapacity Development \n5 \nRashida J. Monguno \n \n- \nConsumer Protection \n6 \nOsita C. Nwanisobi \n- \nCorporate Communication \n7 \nAlice Karau \n \n- \nCorporate Secretariat \n8 \nAhmed B. Umar \n- \nCurrency Operations \n9 \nPhilip Y. Yusuf \n- \nDevelopment Finance \n10 \nBenjamin A. Fakunle \n- \nFinance \n11 \nAngela A. Sere-Ejembi \n- \nFinancial Markets \n12 \nChibuzo A. Efobi \n- \nFinancial Policy and Regulation \n13 \nJoseph G. Omayuku \n- \nGovernors \n14 \nAmina A. Habib \n- \nHuman Resources \n15 \nRakiya S. Mohammed \n- \nInformation Technology \n16 \nLydia I. Alfa \n- \nInternal Audit \n17 \nSirajuddin K. Salam-Alada \n- \nLegal Services \n18 \nAbdulkadir A. Jibril \n \n- \nMedical Services \n19 \nHassan Mahmud \n- \nMonetary Policy \n20 \nNkiru E. Asiegbu \n- \nOther Financial Institutions Supervision \n21 \nMusa I. Jimoh \n- \nPayments System Management \n22 \nArinze A. Stanley \n- \nProcurement and Support Services \n23 \nMichael A. Adebiyi \n- \nResearch \n24 \nBenjamin C. Nnadi \n- \nReserve Management \n25 \nBlaise Ijebor \n- \nRisk Management \n26 \nOluwakemi O. Osa-Odigie \n- \nSecurity Services \n27 \nMohammed M. Tumala \n- \nStatistics \n28 \nClement O. Buari \n- \nStrategy Management \n29 \nOzoemena S. Nnaji \n- \nTrade and Exchange \n30 \nOlorunsola E. Olowofeso \n- \nWest African Monetary Institute \n31 \nAbubakar A. Kure \n- \nNIRSAL Microfinance Bank \n \n \n \nvi \n \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \n \n \n \nList of Branch Controllers/Currency Officers as at 30 June 2022 \n1 \nChristopher O. Adayi \n- \nAbakaliki \n2 \nWahab Oseni \n- \nAbeokuta \n3 \nOgbu, O. Michael \n- \nAbuja \n4 \nWasiu A. Omotoso \n- \nAdo-Ekiti \n5 \nFatai A. Yusuf \n- \nAkure \n6 \nOkafor G. Ikechukwu \n- \nAsaba \n7 \nBenedicth I.C. Maduagwu. \n- \nAwka \n8 \nHaladu A. Idris \n- \nBauchi \n9 \nRenner D. Jumbo \n- \nBenin \n10 \nMannir D. Abdullahi \n- \nBirnin-Kebbi \n11 \nGlory U. Iniunam \n- \nCalabar \n12 \nGana A. Abdulkadir \n- \nDamaturu \n13 \nSa'adatu A. Ibrahim \n- \nDutse \n14 \nChidozie E. Okonjo \n- \nEnugu \n15 \nShehu A. Goringo \n- \nGombe \n16 \nUmar B. Ibrahim \n- \nGusau \n17 \nOlufolake M. Ogundero \n- \nIbadan \n18 \nNajimu L. Oluwale \n- \nIlorin \n19 \nIdirisa D. Maina \n- \nJalingo \n20 \nEsther T. Catherine \n- \nJos \n21 \nYusuf W. Baba \n- \nKaduna \n22 \nBabangida, Jino \n- \nKano \n23 \nMusa Ahmed. Ladan \n- \nKatsina \n24 \nSamson Isuwa \n- \nLafia \n25 \nBariboloka K. Godfrey \n- \nLagos \n26 \nAhmed I. Sule \n- \nLokoja \n27 \nTijani K. Lawan \n- \nMaiduguri \n28 \nJohn O. Itaha \n- \nMakurdi \n29 \nSaheed M. Ademola \n- \nMinna \n30 \nAjuma D. Madojemu \n- \nOsogbo \n31 \nOruwari Oyoburuoma \n- \nOwerri \n32 \nOkeke Chuks \n- \nPort Harcourt \n33 \nDahiru U. Nakazalle \n- \nSokoto \n34 \nAyotunde O. Oladimeji \n- \nUmuahia \n35 \nItohan M. Ogbomon-Paul \n- \nUyo \n36 \nFrancis E. Asuquo \n- \nYenagoa \n37 \nSanusi S. Nyashi \n- \nYola \n \n \nvii \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCONTENTS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nABOUT THE REPORT \niii \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nGOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK \n \niv \n \n \n \n \n \n \nMembers of the Committee of \nGovernors \n \n \niv \n \n \n \n \n \n \nMembers of the Monetary \nPolicy Committee (MPC) \n \n \niv \n \n \n \n \n \n \nList of Departmental Directors\n \n \n \nv \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nList of Branch \nControllers/Currency Officers \n \nvi \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY \n \nix \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n SERVING THE NIGERIAN PEOPLE \n \n \nDELIVERING ON \nTHE CBN’s \nMANDATE \n \nTHE GLOBAL \nECONOMY \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n• \nThe CBN’s Mandate \nand Strategy \n \n1 \n \n• \nCBN \nStrategic \nPriorities \n \n2 \n• \nOutput Growth \n4 \n \n \n \n \n• \nInflation \n6 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n• \nFinancial \nMarkets \n7 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n• \nCommodity \nPrices \n8 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n• \nCentral Banks’ \nResponse \n11 \n \n \n \n \n• \nFiscal Measures \n11 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nviii \n \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nMACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE \n \nOUTLOOK \n \nADDITIONAL \nINFORMATION \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n• \nMonetary Policy \n13 \n• \nGlobal \nEconomic \noutlook \n \n91 \n• \nRegional \nMeetings \n• \nNon-\nRegional \nMeetings \n94 \n \n95 \n• \nThe Real Economy \n14 \n• \nDomestic \nEconomic \noutlook \n \n91 \n \n \n• \nFiscal Developments \n34 \n \n \n \n \n \n• \nFinancial Developments \n44 \n \n \n \n \n \n• \nPayments System \nManagement \n70 \n \n \n \n• \nExternal Sector \nDevelopment \n76 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nix \n \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \n \nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY \nThe Global Economy \nGlobal economic activity decelerated in the \nfirst half of 2022 due to supply-chain \ndisruptions and heightened inflationary \npressures, occasioned by rising energy and \ncommodity prices due to the Russia-Ukraine \nwar and COVID-19 containment measures. \nThus, the global Composite Purchasing \nManagers’ Index (PMI) fell to 52.30 index \npoints in the first half of 2022, from 54.30 \nindex points recorded in the second half of \n2021, reflecting a slower pace of expansion. \nThe development mirrored the IMF’s revised \ngrowth forecast of 3.2 per cent for 2022, \ndown from the 6.1 per cent growth for 2021. \nThe Real Economy \nDomestic economic recovery continued in the \nfirst half of the year, despite global \nheadwinds. The sustained growth in the \ndomestic economy was realised on the heels \nof the full return to normalcy after the \nremoval of the COVID-19 induced restrictions \nand the sustained implementation of the \nvarious economic stimulus packages by the \nfiscal and monetary authorities. Real GDP \ngrowth rose by 3.32 per cent in the first half \nof 2022, compared with 4.01 per cent and \n2.70 per cent in the preceding half and the \ncorresponding half of 2021, respectively. \n \nInflationary pressures surged in the first half \nof 2022, reversing the decline that started in \nthe first half of 2021. Headline inflation rose \nto 18.60 per cent, from 15.63 per cent and \n17.75 per cent in the preceding half and \ncorresponding half of 2021, respectively. The \nrise in inflation was driven, mainly by increase \nin food and energy (diesel and gas) prices, \npersisting structural bottlenecks and security \nchallenges in some parts of the country. The \nelevated inflationary pressures during the \nperiod, necessitated a tightening of monetary \npolicy by the Bank. \nDomestic crude oil production in the first half \nof 2022 dropped, owing, largely, to the rise in \ncases of crude oil theft and pipeline \nvandalism. At an average daily production of \n1.36 million barrels per day (mbpd) or 246.2 \nmillion barrels in the first half of 2022, crude \noil output during the period declined by 6.8 \nper cent, compared with the corresponding \nhalf of 2021. Crude oil prices surged in the \nreview period due to heightened concerns \nabout the future availability of crude oil in the \nglobal market, following sanctions imposed \non Russian crude supply by the US, and the \nEU’s decision to ban 90.0 per cent of Russian \ncrude oil by the end of 2022. Accordingly, the \naverage spot price of Nigeria’s reference \ncrude oil, the Bonny Light, rose by 71.2 per \ncent to US$110.96 per barrel (pb) from \nUS$64.82 pb in the corresponding half of \n2021. \n \n \n \nx \n \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThe Bank sustained its development finance \ninterventions in critical sectors of the \neconomy to improve access to credit, support \njob creation and sustain economic recovery. \nFiscal Developments \nFederation revenue in the first half of 2022 \ndeclined owing to the high cost of value \nshortfall recovery on premium motor spirit \n(PMS) and low domestic crude oil production, \ndespite the high global crude oil prices, \ncaused \nby \nthe \nRussia-Ukraine \nwar. \nAccordingly, at N5,479.10 billion (or 6.0 per \ncent of GDP), federally collected revenue fell \nby 4.2 per cent and 40.4 per cent relative to \nthe level in the second half of 2021 and the \nbudget benchmark, respectively. \nNotwithstanding the rise in oil prices and the \nuncertainty surrounding global supply, oil \nrevenue in the first half of 2022, at N2,095.34 \nbillion (2.3 per cent of GDP), declined, relative \nto the level in the corresponding period in \n2021 and the projection for 2022, and \nconstituted 38.2 per cent of total revenue. \nThis was attributed to high value shortfall \nrecovery payment and low domestic crude oil \nproduction, occasioned by crude oil theft and \npipeline \nvandalism. \nHowever, \nnon-oil \nrevenue, which accounted for the balance of \n61.8 per cent of total revenue, at N3,383.76 \nbillion (3.7 per cent of GDP), improved, \nrelative to the first half of 2021. The \nperformance was due to the rise in collection \nof company income tax (CIT), customs and \nexcise duties and value added tax (VAT). \nDespite the leap in non-oil receipts, it fell \nbelow the proportionate target by 23.9 per \ncent. \nPublic debt rose during the period following \nnew \nborrowing, \nmainly, \nto \nfinance \ninfrastructure projects and legacy liabilities. \nTotal public debt outstanding, at end-June \n2022, \nstood \nat \nN42,845.88 \nbillion, \nrepresenting 20.8 per cent above the level at \nend-June 2021. The total public debt-to-GDP \nratio of 23.7 per cent, remained below the \nthresholds set by the 2020-2023 MTDS (40.0 \nper cent), WB/IMF (55.0 per cent) and \nECOWAS (70.0 per cent). \nFinancial Developments \nNigeria’s financial sector remained safe and \nsound in the first half of 2022. Financial \nsoundness indicators moderated during the \nperiod, reflecting uncertainties in the global \nand domestic economies. However, they were \nstill within regulatory thresholds. The Banking \nindustry stress test revealed that the solvency \nand liquidity positions remained resilient \nunder “mild” to “moderate” scenarios of \nsustained economic and financial conditions \nbut \nwere \nvulnerable \nunder \n“severe” \nscenarios. The economy witnessed steady \ngrowth, on the back of the continued \naccommodative monetary policy stance of \nthe CBN, which eased credit conditions in the \neconomy. However, the Bank switched to a \nhawkish policy stance to tame heightened \ninflationary and foreign exchange pressures \nthat persisted in the later part of the half-\nyear. Growth in monetary aggregates was \ngenerally above indicative targets for 2022. \n \n \n \nxi \n \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nBroad money supply M3 surged by 10.0 per \ncent to N48,890.24 billion at end-June 2022, \nowing to increase in net domestic assets \n(NDA), compared with 1.6 per cent growth at \nend-June 2021. \nLiquidity conditions in the banking system \nwere influenced by fiscal operations of \ngovernment, Cash Reserve Requirement \n(CRR) operations, transactions in the foreign \nexchange market, maturity and issuance of \nCBN bills and government securities. These \nfactors dictated the movement in money \nmarket rates, which trended downward in the \nreview period. The weighted average monthly \ninter-bank call rate, declined to 9.4 per cent, \ncompared with 10.5 per cent in the second \nhalf of 2021, following improved liquidity in \nthe banking system. \nActivities on the Nigerian equities market \nwere bullish, despite volatile global market \nfundamentals arising from the Russia-\nUkraine war. The NGX All-Share Index and \naggregate \nmarket \ncapitalisation \nrose, \nrelative to their levels at end-December 2021 \nand end-June 2021. The improved market \nperformance was due to bargain hunting, \nfollowing the release of positive first quarter \nof 2022 corporate earnings results. \nThe Bank sustained its efforts at improving \nthe safety, reliability, and efficiency of the \npayments system and attainment of a digital \nfinancial inclusion system through the \ncontinued implementation of the Payments \nSystem Vision 2025 Strategy Plan, during the \nreview period. \n \nExternal Sector Developments \nThe \nexternal \nsector \nexperienced \nan \nunprecedented shock, following the Russia-\nUkraine war, which resulted in supply-chain \ndisruptions with the attendant hike in the \nprices of energy, food and other commodities. \nConsequently, the performance of the \nexternal account weakened in the review \nperiod, with an estimated overall balance of \npayments deficit of 0.3 per cent of GDP, \ncompared with a surplus of 1.7 per cent of \nGDP in the second half of 2021. However, the \ndeficit recorded was an improvement, \ncompared with the deficit of 1.7 per cent of \nGDP in the first half of 2021. A current \naccount surplus of 3.5 per cent of GDP was \nrecorded in the review period, relative to the \ncorresponding period of 2021, driven by \nhigher export earnings from rising crude oil \nprices. The financial account maintained a \nnet borrowing position with a net incurrence \nof financial liabilities of 1.0 per cent of GDP, \ncompared with 1.2 per cent of GDP in the \npreceding period. Increased inflow of other \ninvestment liabilities resulted in a higher net \nliability position in Nigeria's International \nInvestment Position (IIP). \n \nThe external reserves position at the end of \nJune 2022 was US$39.16 billion, compared \nwith US$32.99 billion at end-June 2021. This \n \n \n \nxii \n \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \ncould finance 8.9 months of import (goods \nonly) or 6.7 months of import (goods and \nservices), above the international benchmark \nof 3.0 months. The stock of external debt \nincreased to US$40.06 billion, from US$38.39 \nbillion at end-December 2021 and US$33.47 \nbillion at end-June 2021, following additional \ndisbursements from multilateral and bilateral \nsources, as well as the issuance of Eurobonds. \nThe pressure in the foreign exchange market \npersisted, owing largely to a supply shortage. \nThis led to the depreciation of the naira in the \nreview period. The exchange rate of the naira \nto the US dollar at the I&E window, closed at \nN414.00/US$, at the end of June 2022, \nrelative to N413.00/US$ at the end of \nDecember 2021 and N411.50/US$ at the end \nof June 2021. \n \nOutlook \nThe global economic outlook for the second \nhalf of 2022 remains cautiously optimistic, on \naccount of the tightening financial conditions \nacross various economies to tame rising \nglobal inflation, China's slowdown due to \nresurgence of the COVID-19 pandemic and \nthe negative spillovers of the Russia-Ukraine \nwar. Domestic outlook is positive, as output \ngrowth is expected to maintain its upward \ntrajectory for the rest of the year. The \noptimism is predicated on continued policy \nsupport, positive impact of sustained CBN \nintervention on growth-enhancing sectors, \neffective \nimplementation of the \n2022 \nNational Budget and the Medium-Term \nNational Development Plan (MTNDP), and \nthe increase in crude oil prices. \nThe external sector performance is expected \nto remain viable, as surplus trade balance is \nmaintained in the short-to-medium term. \nWith global crude oil prices remaining stable \nabove US$100pb in the second half of 2022, \naccretion to external reserves is expected to \nimprove. However, the Bank’s continued \nintervention in the foreign exchange market, \nrising import bills, and increased external \ndebt-servicing, would limit accretion to \nreserves. \n \nFiscal sector is expected to remain positive in \nthe second half of the year, predicated on the \neffective implementation of the Finance Act \n2021, under the Strategic Revenue Growth \nInitiatives (SRGIs) of the FGN, with its tax-\nreforms, expected to boost non-oil revenue. \nFurthermore, the imposition of new EU \nsanctions on Russia would continue to rally oil \nprices, \nthereby \nboosting \noil \nearnings. \nHowever, constraints to crude oil production, \nelevated public debt, coupled with lingering \ninsecurity challenges could pose downside \nrisks to the realisation of set goals in the 2022 \nfiscal year. \n \nThe financial sector is expected to remain \nresilient in the second half of the year, \nreflecting CBN’s effort in continuously \nmonitoring the potential risks alongside \nperiodic stress tests, to assess the safety and \n \n \n \nxiii \n \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nhealth of the banking sector. Also, mandatory \nprovisioning would mitigate the risk of \ndeterioration in the quality of restructured \nloans. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n•To be a people-focused Central \nBank promoting confidence in \nthe economy and enabling an \nimproved standard of living. \nVision\nBecome the model central bank 1\n Deliver price stability conducive to \neconomic growth 2\n Achieve safe, stable, and sound financial \nsystem 3\nDeliver credible, reliable, and efficient \npayments system 4\n Promote sustainable finance and inclusive \neconomic growth 5\n• To\nensure\nmonetary,\nprice\nand\nfinancial system stability as a catalyst\nfor inclusive growth and sustainable\neconomic development.\nMission\nMandate\n(CBN Act 2007)\n• Ensure monetary and price stability\n• Issue legal tender currency in Nigeria\n• Maintain external reserves to safeguard \nthe international value of the legal \ntender currency\n• Promote a sound financial system in \nNigeria \n• Act as Banker and provide economic and \nfinancial advice to the Federal \nGovernment\nEstablished by the CBN Act 1958 \n(as amended) \nCommenced operation 1 July 1959 \nTHE CENTRAL \nBANK OF \nNIGEIRIA\n \n \n \n2 \n \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \n \n \nCBN Strategic Priorities (2019 – 2024): 5-Point Agenda \nFoster the Development of a Robust \nPayments System \nConserve the utilization of reserves \nfor critical raw materials and imports \nthat are not produced locally \nImprove consumer spending and \ninvestment by MSMEs through \naffordable and adequate credit \nGrow our External Reserves \nImprove Access to Credit \nPromote inclusive growth and \nprivate sector investment by \nleveraging on monetary tools to \nmaintain a low inflation \nenvironment, while trying to seek \nexchange rate stability \nPreserving macroeconomic and \nfinancial stability \nDrive the cashless initiative across \nthe country to enhance efficiency \nand propel the financial inclusion \ndrive \nDiversify the Economy through \nintervention programmes \nBoost productivity growth in both \nthe agricultural and manufacturing \nsectors through end-to-end value \nchain credit intervention \nprogrammes \n \n \n3 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nSection Two \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nGlobal economic dynamics and the evolution of events shaped \ndomestic economies around the world. \n❖ Global Output Growth \n❖ Global Inflation \n❖ Global Financial Markets \n❖ Central Banks’ Responses \n❖ Fiscal Measures \n \n \n \n4 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \n2.1 GLOBAL OUTPUT GROWTH \nGlobal economic activity in the first half of 2022 \nwas affected by a combination of factors, \nincluding rising energy and commodity prices, \npersisting supply chain disruptions, and the \nCOVID-19 containment measures in China. The \nIMF, in its July 2022 World Economic Outlook \n(WEO), revised the 2022 growth forecast \ndownward to 3.2 per cent from 3.6 per cent \ngrowth forecast in April 2022 report. This was \ndue to deceleration in economic activity, driven \nby supply chain disruptions and inflationary \npressures induced by the Russia-Ukraine war and \nthe COVID-19 containment measures in China. \nThe revision was corroborated by the average J.P. \nMorgan Global Composite Purchasing Manager’s \nIndex (PMI), which fell to 52.30 index points in \nthe first half of 2022, from 54.30 index points in \nthe second half of 2021, reflecting a slower pace \nof economic expansion. In addition, the \nmanufacturing and services PMI indices fell to \n53.30 and 52.80 index points in the first half of \n2022, from 54.40 and 54.80 index points in the \nsecond half of 2021, respectively. \n \nTable 2.1: Growth in Selected Countries \nCountry \nGrowth \n \n2021 \n2022f \n2023f \nGlobal \n6.1 \n3.2 \n2.9 \nAdvanced Economies \n5.2 \n2.5 \n1.4 \nUnited States \n5.7 \n2.3 \n1.0 \nUnited Kingdom \n7.4 \n3.2 \n0.5 \nJapan \n1.7 \n1.7 \n1.7 \nGermany \n2.9 \n1.2 \n0.8 \nItaly \n6.6 \n3.0 \n0.7 \nEmerging Market & Developing \nEconomies \n6.8 \n3.6 \n3.9 \nRussia \n4.7 \n-6.0 \n-3.5 \nChina \n8.1 \n3.3 \n4.6 \nIndia \n8.7 \n7.4 \n6.1 \nSub-Saharan Africa \n4.6 \n3.8 \n4.0 \nSouth Africa \n4.9 \n2.3 \n1.4 \nNigeria \n3.6 \n3.4 \n3.2 \nNote: 2022f and 2023f are forecasts \nSource: IMF World Economic Outlook, July 2022. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n5 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nTable 2.2: Global Composite PMI \n2021H1 \n2021H2 \n2022H1 \nComposite \n55.3 \n54.2 \n52.3 \nManufacturing \n55.0 \n54.4 \n53.3 \nServices (Business Activity) \n55.5 \n54.8 \n52.8 \nSource: IHS Markit, JP Morgan, Staff Compilation \n \nAdvanced Economies \n \n \n \n \nGrowth in advanced economies (AEs) slowed, due \nlargely, to spillover effect of the Russia-Ukraine \nwar and the associated energy price hikes. Output \ngrowth forecast was 2.5 per cent in 2022, below \nthe 5.2 per cent in 2021, reflecting a downturn in \neconomic activities. In the US, output growth was \nexpected to slow to 2.3 per cent in 2022, from 5.7 \nper cent in 2021, attributed to the anticipated \nimpact of a tighter monetary policy. Similarly, the \ngrowth projections for Germany, Italy and the UK \nwere 1.2, 3.0 and 3.2 per cent, respectively, \nbelow the levels in 2021. The slowdown in \neconomic activities was buttressed by the \nmovement in the average JP Morgan Composite \nGlobal Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI). \nIn the United States and the United Kingdom, \nweak demand and supply shortages slowed the \npace of economic activity as depicted by the \ndecline in PMI to 54.43 and 56.67 index points in \nthe first half of 2022, respectively, relative to \ntheir levels in the preceding and corresponding \nhalves of 2021. Similarly, prevailing geopolitical \nuncertainty and rising inflationary pressures \nweighed on economic activity in Germany and \nItaly as PMI fell to 54.23 and 52.18 index points, \nrespectively, from their levels in the preceding \nand corresponding halves of 2021. \n \n \nTable 2.3: Selected Countries' PMIs \nSource: IHS Markit. \nEmerging Markets and Developing Economies \nEmerging Markets and Developing Economies \n(EMDEs) experienced a downturn, driven mainly \nby the lull in economic activities in China, India \nand Russia. Specifically, growth in China and India \nwas estimated at 3.3 and 7.4 per cent, compared \nwith 8.1 and 8.7 per cent in 2021, respectively. \nThis was attributed to COVID-19 containment \nmeasures in China and unfavourable external \nconditions in India. \nThe PMI indicates that the Chinese economy \ncontracted in the first half of 2022, even as the \nIndian economy decelerated recording 46.47 and \n54.48 index points, respectively, in the first half \nof 2022, from 50.15 and 55.04 index points in the \npreceding half. In Russia, growth contracted by \n \n2021H1 \n2021H2 \n2022H1 \nUnited States \n60.3 \n59.93 \n54.43 \nUnited Kingdom \n59.8 \n58.60 \n56.67 \nChina \n51.4 \n50.15 \n46.47 \nIndia \n54.2 \n55.04 \n54.48 \nGermany \n63.3 \n59.92 \n54.23 \nItaly \n60.0 \n61.13 \n52.18 \nJapan \n52.2 \n53.20 \n50.33 \nSouth Africa \n51.0 \n49.23 \n49.47 \n \n \n \n6 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \n6.0 per cent, against an expansion of 4.7 per cent \nin 2021, following the impact of the sanctions \nimposed on the economy. \nIn sub-Saharan Africa, output growth is projected \nto moderate to 3.8 per cent, from 4.6 per cent in \n2021. The forecast reflects the cushioning effects \nof rising fossil fuel and metal prices for some \ncommodity-exporting \ncountries. The \nSouth \nAfrican economy was projected to grow by 2.3 \nper cent, on the back of improved economic \nactivity, particularly towards the end of the \nsecond half of the year, propelled by improved \njob creation and increased demand. \n2.2 GLOBAL INFLATION \nInflationary pressures increased in the first half of \n2022, following the Russia-Ukraine war, which \nexacerbated global supply chain disruptions, thus, \nelevating energy, food, and commodity prices. \nIn AEs, prices generally rose further, owing to the \nupsurge in energy prices. In the United States, \ninflation was 9.10 per cent at the end of June \n2022, compared with 5.4 per cent at the end of -\nDecember 2021 and 4.80 per cent at end-June \n2021. In the United Kingdom, inflation increased \nto 9.40 per cent at end-June 2022, compared \nwith 4.80 per cent and 2.40 per cent at the end-\nDecember 2021 and end-June 2021, respectively. \nIn Japan, consumer price index rose to 2.40 per \ncent at end-June 2022, from 0.80 per cent at end-\nDecember 2021 and 0.50 deflation at end-June \n2021. Inflation in Germany and Italy rose to 7.50 \nper cent and 8.00 per cent, from 5.30 per cent, \nand 3.90 per cent at end-December 2021, \nrespectively, and 2.35 per cent and 1.26 per cent \nat end-June 2021. \nIn EMDEs, inflation increased in the first half of \n2022, compared with the level in the second half \nof 2021, due to increase in food and energy \nprices, and supply disruptions in many sectors. \nSpecifically, inflation in China rose to 2.50 per \ncent at end-June 2022, from 1.50 per cent at end-\nDecember 2021 and 1.10 per cent at end-June \n2021. Inflation in Russia and India increased to \n15.90 and 7.01 per cent at end-June 2022, from \n8.40 and 5.59 per cent in the preceding half, and \n6.50 per cent and 5.58 per cent in the \ncorresponding half of 2021, respectively. \nSimilarly, inflation in sub-Saharan Africa also rose \nduring the first half of 2022, compared with the \nlevel in the second half of 2021, driven majorly, \nby rising food and energy costs. Inflation in South \nAfrica increased to 7.40 per cent at end-June \n2022, from 5.90 per cent at end-December 2021 \nand 5.07 per cent at end-June 2021. \nFigure 2.1: Inflation Rates in Selected Countries (per cent) \n \nSource: Trading Economics Website. \n \n \n5.4\n2.4\n-0.5\n2.4\n1.3\n6.5\n5.6\n5.1\n17.8\n7.0\n4.8\n0.8\n5.3\n3.9\n8.4\n5.6\n5.9\n15.6\n9.1\n9.4\n2.4\n7.5\n8.0\n15.9\n7.0\n7.4\n18.6\n-5.0\n0.0\n5.0\n10.0\n15.0\n20.0\nUnited\nStates\nUnited\nKingdom\nJapan\nGermany\nItaly\nRussia\nIndia\nSouth\nAfrica\nNigeria\nJun-21\nDec-21\nJun-22\n \n \n7 \n \n \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nTable 2.4: Inflation in Selected Countries \nCountry \nJun-21 \nJul-21 \nAug-21 \nSep-21 \nOct-21 \n \nNov-21 \nDec-21 \nJan-22 \nFeb-22 \nMar-22 \nApr-22 \nMay-22 \nJun-22 \nUnited States \n5.4 \n5.4 \n5.3 \n5.4 \n6.2 \n \n6.8 \n7.0 \n7.48 \n7.87 \n8.5 \n8.3 \n8.6 \n9.1 \nUnited Kingdom \n2.4 \n2.1 \n3.0 \n2.9 \n4.1 \n \n5.2 \n4.8 \n5.5 \n6.2 \n7.0 \n9.0 \n9.1 \n9.4 \nJapan \n-0.5 \n-0.3 \n-0.4 \n0.2 \n0.1 \n \n0.6 \n0.8 \n0.5 \n0.9 \n1.2 \n2.5 \n2.5 \n2.4 \nGermany \n2.4 \n3.8 \n3.9 \n4.1 \n4.5 \n \n5.2 \n5.3 \n4.9 \n5.1 \n7.3 \n7.4 \n7.6 \n7.5 \nItaly \n1.3 \n2.0 \n2.0 \n2.5 \n3.0 \n \n3.7 \n3.9 \n4.8 \n5.7 \n6.7 \n6.2 \n6.8 \n8.0 \nRussia \n6.5 \n6.5 \n6.7 \n7.4 \n8.1 \n \n8.4 \n8.4 \n8.7 \n9.2 \n16.7 \n17.8 \n17.1 \n15.5 \nChina \n1.1 \n1.0 \n0.8 \n0.7 \n1.5 \n \n2.3 \n1.5 \n0.9 \n0.9 \n1.5 \n2.1 \n2.1 \n2.5 \nIndia \n5.6 \n5.3 \n4.8 \n4.4 \n4.5 \n \n4.9 \n5.6 \n6.0 \n6.1 \n7.0 \n7.8 \n7.0 \n7.0 \nSouth Africa \n5.1 \n4.7 \n5.1 \n5.1 \n5.1 \n \n5.5 \n5.9 \n5.7 \n5.7 \n5.9 \n5.9 \n6.5 \n7.4 \nNigeria \n17.8 \n17.4 \n17.0 \n16.6 \n16.0 \n \n15.4 \n15.6 \n15.6 \n15.7 \n15.9 \n16.8 \n17.7 \n18.6 \nSource: Trading Economics Website. \n \n2.3 GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS \nGlobal Financial Conditions \nTight global financial conditions in the first half of \n2022 influenced investors’ decision as they \nrebalanced their portfolio across financial \ninstruments. Major equity indices declined, due \nto monetary tightening by most central banks \nand ensuing market reaction to surging inflation \nand rising interest rates in most economies. \nSpecifically, growth in the S&P 500, DAX, Dow \nJones and NASDAQ-100 declined by 20.58 per \ncent, 19.52 per cent, 16.37 per cent and 29.79 \nper cent respectively in the first half of 2022. \nSimilarly, EURO STOCK 50, NIKKIE 225 and \nFTSE100 recorded decreases of 9.65 per cent, \n9.93 per cent and 2.92 per cent, respectively. \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFigure 2.2: Key Global Stock Indices \n \nSource: Reuters and Bloomberg. \nGovernment bonds rallied on the back of hawkish \nmonetary policy stance in response to elevated \ninflation. Following forward guidance by the ECB \nto end asset purchases early in the third quarter \nof 2022, and the likely interest rate hike, yields in \nthe euro area increased by 1.52 percentage \npoints in the first half of 2022. Rate hike by the \nBank of England in the first half of 2022 resulted \nin subsequent increase in the UK 10-year yield by \n1.26 percentage points in the first half of 2022. \nSimilarly, 10-year government bonds yields in the \nUnited States and Canada rose by 1.50 and 1.80 \n-20.58\n-2.92\n-29.79\n-16.37\n-9.65 -9.93 -7.85\n0.00\n-19.52\n21.31\n-40.0\n-30.0\n-20.0\n-10.0\n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\nS&P500\nNasdaq-100\nEURO STOCKS 50\nTOPIX\nDAX\nJun-22\nDec-21\nJun-21\n \n \n \n8 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \npercentage points, respectively, from their level \nin the preceding half. \nIn the EMDEs, yields on 10-year government \nbonds in Brazil and China rose by 1.89 percentage \npoints and 0.05 percentage point in the first half \nof 2022 relative to the preceding half. \n \nFigure 2.3: 10-year Government Bond Yields for Selected \nCountries \n \nSource: Bloomberg. \n \nCurrencies \nof \nselected \nemerging \nmarket \neconomies weakened relative to the US dollar in \nthe review period. The South African rand, \nChinese RMB, and Russian rubles depreciated by \n2.8 per cent, 0.8 per cent, and 6.7 per cent \nagainst the US dollar to 15.40 rand, 6.49 RMB, \nand 78.21 rubles, respectively. The depreciation \nwas due to the twin threats of rising US interest \nrates and a looming global inflation. \n \n \n \n \n \nTable 2.5: EMEs Exchange Rates/US$ \nPeriod \nChinese \nRMB \nNigerian \nnaira \nSouth \nAfrican \nrand \nRussian \nruble \nH1 2020 \n6.91 \n376.43 \n14.29 \n66.64 \nH2 2020 \n6.80 \n387.91 \n16.38 \n74.69 \nH1 2021 \n6.47 \n406.67 \n14.54 \n74.33 \nH2 2021 \n6.43 \n412.16 \n14.97 \n72.98 \nH1 2022 \n6.49 \n416.02 \n15.40 \n78.21 \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \n2.4 GLOBAL COMMODITY PRICES \nWar-related disruptions and policy restrictions \nfrom major producing countries contributed to \nthe upward price movement of monitored \ncommodities in the first half of 2022. The Russia-\nUkraine war brought unprecedented disruptions \nin production and supply chain network for most \ncommodities, especially wheat, edible oils, and \nagricultural inputs such as fertilizers produced by \nthe warring countries. Furthermore, policy \nrestrictions from countries such as India and \nIndonesia banning the export of wheat and palm \noil with the attendant high input cost and high \nmarket demand, added to the pressure on prices. \nThe all-commodities index, at 104.5 index points \n(2010=100), rose by 16.8 per cent and 35.5 per \ncent above the levels in the preceding half and \nthe corresponding period of 2021, respectively. \nThe increase was driven by surge in the prices of \ncotton, wheat, palm oil, soya-bean, coffee and \nrubber by 36.0 per cent, 35.8 per cent, 32.9 per \ncent, 22.3 per cent, 1.8 per cent, and 0.4 per cent, \nrespectively. \nPalm oil and soybean prices rose on account of \npent-up demand, due to the April 28 export ban \nby Indonesia, and increasing investment in \n1.50\n1.80\n1.52\n1.52\n1.26\n1.72\n0.16\n0.05\n1.89\n-0.50\n0.00\n0.50\n1.00\n1.50\n2.00\nUnited\nStates\nCanada\nGermany Euro Area\nUnited\nKingdom\nFrance\nJapan\nChina\nBrazil\nJun-21\nDec-21\nJun-21\n \n \n \n9 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nbiofuel operations in China and Southeast Asia. In \naddition, prices of cotton rose due to supply \nshocks amid droughts in West Texas, low crop \nyield in India, soaring energy prices, and post-\nCOVID-19 pandemic demand pressure. \nThe index of wheat, at 152.6 index points \n(2010=100), rose by 35.6 per cent and 86.8 per \ncent above the levels in the preceding half and \nthe corresponding period of 2021, respectively, \nfuelled majorly by the Russia-Ukraine1 war. \nThe price index of coffee, at 112.1 index points \n(2010=100), rose by 1.8 per cent and 38.6 per \ncent above the levels in the preceding half and \nthe corresponding period of 2021, respectively. \nDry weather conditions in Brazil, supply chain \nchallenges and freight costs, supported the rise, \nwhile the price of Rubber at 36.25 index points, \nrose marginally by 0.4 per cent in the preceding \nhalf, but declined by 23.8 per cent, compared \nwith the corresponding period of 2021. The price \nincrease for rubber during the review period was \nattributed to the seasonal shortage of the \ncommodity amidst increasing world demand. \nSimilarly, the price of soya-bean, at 127.0 index \npoints, was 22.3 per cent and 15.6 per cent \nhigher than its levels in the previous half and the \ncorresponding period of 2021. The development \nwas driven by global supply tightening during the \nfirst quarter of 2022, due to drought in Brazil that \ndelayed harvest, and a slowdown in exports, \ncoupled with the attendant high market demand, \nespecially from China. \n \n \n \n \n1 Russia and Ukraine jointly account for 25.8 per cent and 11.4 per \ncent of global wheat and edible oil exports, respectively. \nFigure 2.4: Index of Major Agricultural Export Commodities \n \nSource: Staff Computation based on data from Index Mundi \n \nFigure 2.5: Trend of Major Export commodities Current vs \npreceding/corresponding halves \n \nSource: Staff Computation based on data from Index Mundi \nConversely, the prices of groundnut and cocoa \ndeclined by 0.9 per cent and 0.5 per cent below \ntheir levels in the preceding half year, but rose by \n0.9 per cent and 2.2 per cent, respectively, above \ntheir levels in the corresponding period of 2021. \nThe decline in the prices of groundnut and cocoa, \nrelative to the preceding half, was driven by \nimproved production, which more than offset \nmarket demand. \n \n \n \n2019 first half\n2020 first half\n2021 first half\n2021 2nd half\n2022 first half\n-40.0\n-20.0\n0.0\n20.0\n40.0\n60.0\n80.0\n100.0\n% change\n% change curent/corresponding\n% change (current/preceding)\n \n \n \n10 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nCrude Oil Prices \nCrude oil prices surged in the first half of 2022 due \nto geopolitical tensions in Europe. Crude oil prices \nsurged due to heightened concerns about the \nfuture availability of crude oil on the global \nmarket. This was on account of the sanctions \nimposed on Russian crude supply by the US and \nthe European Union’s decision to ban 90.0 per \ncent of Russian crude oil by the end of 2022. \nConsequently, the average spot price of Nigeria’s \nreference crude, the Bonny Light, rose by 44.0 \nper cent in the first half of 2022 to US$110.96 per \nbarrel (pb) from US$77.08 pb in the second half \nof 2021. It also rose by 71.2 per cent from \nUS$64.82 pb recorded in the corresponding half \nof 2021. \nSimilarly, prices of the Brent, Forcados, West \nTexas Intermediate (WTI) and OPEC Reference \nBasket rose by 42.5 per cent, 44.7 per cent, 38.8 \nper cent and 39.3 per cent to US$109.94 pb, \nUS$111.60 pb, US$103.07 pb and US$105.47 pb, \nrespectively, relative to the second half of 2021. \nThe prices of all the crude streams rose, \ncompared with the levels in the corresponding \nhalf of 2021. \nFigure 2.6: Bonny Light Average Prices, 2017H1-\n2022H1(US$ per barrel) \nSource: Refinitiv Eikon (Thomson Reuters \nFigure 2.7: Average Monthly Crude Oil Prices, 2021-2022 \n(US$ per barrel) \n \nSource: Refinitiv Eikon (Thomson Reuters) \nGlobal Crude Oil Supply and Demand \nCrude oil supply rose as OPEC+ agreed to increase \nproduction. Total world crude oil supply averaged \n99.02 million barrels per day (mbpd), a 1.6 per \ncent increase above the level in the preceding \nhalf of 2021. The rise was attributed, mainly to \nthe increase in aggregate OPEC supply by 10.68 \nper cent to 33.88 mbpd. Furthermore, the world \ncrude oil supply increased by 5.8 per cent above \nthe level in the corresponding half of 2021. \nAggregate crude oil supply, including natural gas \nliquids (NGLs) and condensates by OPEC, \naveraged 33.88 mbpd in the first half of 2022. \nThis represented an increase of 3.61 per cent and \n10.68 per cent, above the levels in the preceding \nhalf and corresponding half of 2021, respectively. \nOut of this, OPEC crude share increased by 12.22 \nper cent to 28.38 mbpd, while the remaining \nportion of OPEC supply, the Liquefied Natural Gas \n(LNG) and condensates increased to 5.50 mbpd \nin the first half of 2022, compared with 5.44 \nmbpd and 5.33 mbpd, in the preceding half and \ncorresponding half of 2021, respectively. The rise \nin aggregate OPEC supply was driven largely, by \nthe OPEC+ decision to adjust the monthly \naverage crude oil production upwards by 0.4 \nmbpd. \n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\nUS$ per barrel\n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\n140\nJan-21\nFeb-21\nMar-21\nApr-21\nMay-21\nJun-21\nJul-21\nAug-21\nSep-21\nOct-21\nNov-21\nDec-21\nJan-22\nFeb-22\nMar-22\nApr-22\nMay-22\nJun-22\nUS$/bbl\nBONNY LIGHT\nUK BRENT\nFORCADOS\nWTI-M*\nOPEC-Basket\n \n \n \n11 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nWorld crude oil demand averaged 98.85 mbpd, a \n0.55 per cent decrease, compared with 99.40 \nmbpd in the preceding half of 2021, and a 3.77 \nper cent increase, compared with 95.26 mbpd in \nthe first half of 2021. The Organisation for \nEconomic \nCo-operation \nand \nDevelopment \n(OECD) countries' demand was 45.60 mbpd (46.0 \nper cent of the total world demand), while non-\nOECD countries accounted for the balance, at \n53.25 mbpd. \nCompared with the level in the corresponding \nperiod of 2021, the rise in world crude oil \ndemand was driven, largely, by improved \nmobility across the world economies, as \ncountries relaxed COVID-19 restrictions. Also, the \nrise in global crude oil demand was supported by \nincreased fuel and diesel consumption as the \nsummer driving peaks in the US and Europe. In \ncomparison with the preceding period of 2021, \nthe global crude oil demand declined as \nlockdown measures resurfaced in China over the \nnew wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. \n2.5 CENTRAL BANKS’ RESPONSE \nMost central banks tightened their monetary \npolicy stance to tame the persistent inflationary \npressures. In the United States, the Fed raised its \npolicy rate cumulatively by 275 basis points (bps) \nto 1.75 per cent in the first half of 2022. The Bank \nof England and the Bank of Canada also raised \ntheir policy rates by 100 bps and 125 bps, \nrespectively, to 1.25 per cent and 1.75 per cent in \nthe review period. Furthermore, monetary \nauthorities in EMDEs, tightened rates to tame \ninflation, and to retain and/or attract portfolio \ninvestment. The Bank of Mexico increased its \nrepo rate by 225bps cumulatively to 7.75 per cent \nin the review period. Other emerging market \ncentral banks, such as South Africa, Egypt, and \nGhana, also raised policy rates in the first half of \n2022. Conversely, China maintained a dovish \nmonetary stance, bringing the rates to 3.70 per \ncent in the first half of 2022, from 3.80 per cent \nin the second half of 2021. \n Table 2.6: Monetary Policy Rates of Selected Central Banks \nCountry \n2021H1 \n2021H2 \n2022H1 \nUnited States \n0.3 \n1.75 \n4.5 \nUnited Kingdom \n0.1 \n0.25 \n 1.25 \nJapan \n-0.1 \n-0.1 \n-0.1 \nCanada \n0.5 \n0.5 \n1.75 \nEuro Area \n0.0 \n0.0 \n0.0 \nChina \n3.85 \n3.80 \n3.70 \nIndia \n4.0 \n4.0 \n4.9 \nMexico \n4.25 \n5.50 \n7.75 \nTurkey \n19.0 \n14.0 \n14.0 \nEgypt \n8.25 \n8.25 \n11.5 \nGhana \n13.5 \n14.5 \n19.0 \nSouth Africa \n3.50 \n3.75 \n7.00 \nNigeria \n11.5 \n11.5 \n14.00 \nSource: Various Central Bank Websites. \n \n2.6 FISCAL MEASURES \nMany countries limited their fiscal space to \ncushion the impact of the war in Ukraine on their \neconomies. Notably, the EU tightened economic \nsanctions such as the ban on imports from Russia \nof crude oil and refined petroleum products, \nagricultural commodities, and SWIFT. The EU also \ndonated \nan \nemergency \nMacro-Financial \nAssistance (MFA) and the European Peace Facility \n(EPF) support to the Ukrainian economy and \nArmed Forces, respectively. The US government \nissued sanctions on Russian leaders, top \nbusinessmen \nand \nenterprises, \nincluding \nrestricting the Central Bank of Russia from \nwithdrawing its dollar-denominated foreign \nreserves. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n12 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \n \n \nSection Three \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nEnabled by policy support, the domestic economy continued in the \nrecovery path in the first half of 2022. \n❖ Monetary Policy \n❖ Real Economy \n❖ Fiscal Policy \n❖ Financial Sector Developments \n❖ Payments System Management \n❖ External Sector Developments \n \n \n \n13 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \n3.1 MONETARY POLICY \n \n \nMajor Economic \nDevelopment \n \n\nPersistence of COVID-19 \nrisk and weak global \nsupply chains \n\nHeightened currency \nspeculation \n\nElevated global inflation \n\nInsecurity-induced \ninflationary pressure \nPriorities of Monetary Policy \n \n\nEnsure price stability \n\nStrengthen financial \nmarket fundamentals \n\nEncourage credit flow to \nthe real sector \n \n \nImplications \n \n\nPersistence of \nmacroeconomic risk \n\nPressure on the exchange \nrate \n\nDeclining but double-digit \ninflation figure \n\nHeightened investors’ \nsentiment \n \n \n \n \n \nMonetary Policy Environment \nLiquidity Management \nThe Bank continued to ensure an optimal level of banking system liquidity for the \nattainment of its goal using Open Market Operation (OMO), complemented by \nreserves requirement and discount window operation. Though the Bank \nmaintained an accommodative monetary policy stance at the beginning of the \nperiod to sustain the fragile growth recovery, it, however, switched to a tight \npolicy stance in the later part of the period, to rein in inflation. \n \nThe monetary policy rate which remained at 11.50 per cent, for the greater part \nof the first half of the year, was raised to 13.00 per cent in May 2022, to tame \ninflation. Other policy parameters such as asymmetric corridor remain \nunchanged at +100/-700 basis points around the MPR, the CRR at 27.5 per cent, \nand the Liquidity Ratio at 30.0 per cent. The foreign currency trading position of \nAuthorized Dealers at the close of each business day remained at a maximum \nlimit of +0.5 per cent and -10.0 per cent of their shareholders’ fund unimpaired \nby losses. \nExchange Rate Policy \n \n\nSustained intervention in the foreign exchange market and \nretention of the I&E window to attract autonomous inflow of \nforeign exchange to stabilise the domestic currency. \nInstruments of MP \nIn the pursuit of its statutory \nmandate, the Bank during the \nreview period, deployed an \narray \nof \nmonetary \npolicy \ninstruments. \n\nThe CBN Bill remained the \nmajor instrument of \nmonetary policy, \ncomplemented by: \n\nCash Reserve Ratio (CRR) \n\nStanding Facilities \noperations \n\nInterventions in the \nforeign exchange market. \nTrend in Monetary Policy Rate (per cent) \nMonetary Policy Decisions \n \n24 and 25 \nJanuary \n2022 \n \nThe MPR at 11.50 per cent; \nThe Asymmetric Corridor of +100/-700 basis points \naround the MPR; \nThe CRR at 27.5 per cent; and \nThe Liquidity Ratio at 30 per cent. \n \n21 March \n2022 \n \nRetain the MPR at 11.50 per cent; \nRetain the asymmetric corridor of +100/-700 basis \npoints around the MPR; \nRetain the CRR at 27.5 per cent; and \nRetain the Liquidity Ratio at 30 per cent. \n \n23 and 24 \nMay 2022 \nRaise the MPR to 13.00 per cent; \nRetain the asymmetric corridor of +100/-700 basis \npoints around the MPR; \nRetain the CRR at 27.5 per cent; and \nRetain the Liquidity Ratio at 30 per cent. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nMonetary Policy \nobjectives\nPrice stability \nHeadline inflation: 6-9%\n \n \n \n14 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \n3.2 THE REAL ECONOMY \nDomestic Output and Business Activities \nOutput \nPositive output growth was sustained in the first \nhalf of 2022, following the rebound in economic \nactivities, supported by robust fiscal and \nmonetary stimuli. Real Gross Domestic Product \n(GDP) grew by 3.32 per cent, compared with 4.01 \nper cent and 2.70 per cent in the second half and \nthe first half of 2021, respectively. Despite global \nheadwinds, occasioned largely by the Russia-\nUkraine war, growth in the domestic economy \nwas realised on the heels of the return to \nnormalcy since the relaxation of the COVID-19 \nrestrictions and sustained implementation of the \nvarious economic stimulus packages by the fiscal \nand monetary authorities. \nFigure 3.2.1: GDP Growth Rate (per cent) \n \nSource: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) \nOverall, the growth was broad-based across \nsectors, and driven largely by the non-oil sector, \nwhich grew by 5.42 per cent in the first half of \n2022, compared with 5.07 per cent and 3.70 per \ncent in the second half and the first half of 2021, \nrespectively. Continued growth in the sector was \ndriven, largely, by increased investments in ICT \ninfrastructure, thus, spurring increased economic \nactivities. Also, sustained fiscal and monetary \nstimuli to critical sectors of the economy gave \nimpetus to the growth. \nThe Oil sector, however, constrained growth, \ncontracting by 19.71 per cent during the period, \ncompared with the contractions of 9.60 and 7.13 \nper cent in the second and first halves of 2021, \nrespectively. The deteriorating performance of \nthe Sector was attributed to the subsisting \nproduction and technical challenges, which \nmanifested in high crude oil theft, vandalism, and \nforce majeure’ declared by Eni-Shell. \nSectoral Performance \nAgriculture and Services grew, while Industry \ncontracted further in the first half of 2022. \nAgriculture \nSustained policy support, clement weather \nconditions, and reduced farmer-herder clashes \nimproved growth in the agriculture sector. The \nperformance of agriculture improved as it grew \nby 2.15 per cent, compared with the 1.77 per \ncent growth in the first half of 2021. However, \nthe sector’s growth was slower than the 2.38 per \ncent in in the second half of 2021. This \ndevelopment \nwas \nsupported \nby \nthe \ngovernment’s renewed effort in providing \nextension services to farmers, and continued \nimplementation of the National Livestock Breed \nImprovement Programme, which, among others, \nmoderated the farmer-herder clashes. The effort \nof the CBN to provide improved access to credit \nin the sector also aided its performance. \nConsequently, the crop production, livestock, \nforestry, and fishery sub-sectors grew by 2.23 per \ncent, 1.42 per cent, 1.33 per cent and 2.20 per \ncent, respectively. \n \n-25.0\n-20.0\n-15.0\n-10.0\n-5.0\n0.0\n5.0\n10.0\n2018H1 2018H2 2019H1 2019H2 2020H1 2020H2 2021H1 2021H2 2022H1\nTotal GDP\nNon-Oil GDP\noil GDP\n \n \n \n15 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \n Figure 3.2.2: Agriculture Sector Performance (%) \n \nSource: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) \n \nIndustry \nSubsisting technical and production challenges, \nespecially in the crude petroleum and natural gas \nsub-sector, further constrained the performance \nof the sector. Industry contracted by 4.73 per \ncent in the first half of 2022, compared with 0.86 \nper cent and 0.08 per cent contractions in the \npreceding and corresponding halves of 2021, \nrespectively. The Sector constrained overall \ngrowth by 1.1 percentage points during the \nperiod. The poor performance of the sector was \nattributed to the dip in the output of crude \npetroleum and natural gas, owing to continued \nproduction \nand \ntechnical \nchallenges, \ncharacterised by incessant oil theft and aging \ninfrastructure. Also, oil refining dipped on \naccount of non-functional local refineries. \nThe weak performance of the sector was \nreflected in the index of industrial production, \nwhich, at 98.6 index points (2010=100), declined \nby 6.8 per cent, compared with 105.8 index \npoints in the corresponding period of 2021. It, \nhowever, increased by 1.4 per cent, compared \nwith 97.2 index points in the second half of 2021. \n \n Figure 3.2.3: Index of Industrial Production \n \nSource: Computed based on data obtained from NBS and \nManufacturing Association of Nigeria (MAN) \n \nThe \nManufacturing \nsub-sector, \nhowever, \ncontributed the most to growth within the sector \nby 0.4 percentage point and grew by 4.55 per \ncent, compared with 3.26 per cent and 3.44 per \ncent in the preceding and corresponding halves \nof 2021, respectively. The improvement in the \nsubsector was attributed to innovative supply \nchain delivery systems and other cost-cutting \nmeasures. The sub-sector showed resilience in \nthe face of higher energy prices and weaker \npurchasing power of citizens owing to rising \ninflationary pressures. Also, the increased \nperformance was also achieved on the heels of \nrising demand for locally manufactured goods, \nresulting in higher manufacturing capacity \nutilisation, which increased by 0.5 percentage \npoint and 1.2 percentage points to 54.7 per cent, \nfrom 54.2 per cent and 53.5 per cent in the \nsecond half and first half of 2021, respectively. \n \nConstruction sustained its upwards growth \ntrajectory, expanding by 4.48 per cent in the first \nhalf of 2022, compared with a growth of 3.75 per \ncent and 2.40 per cent in the preceding and \ncorresponding halves of 2021, respectively. The \n0.0\n0.5\n1.0\n1.5\n2.0\n2.5\n3.0\n-4.0\n-3.0\n-2.0\n-1.0\n0.0\n1.0\n2.0\n3.0\n4.0\n5.0\nCrop Prod.\nLivestock\nForestry\nFishing\nAgric (RHS)\n179.2\n182.3\n171.9\n179.6\n177.8\n185.5\n185.9\n77.9\n73.9\n77.1\n62.5\n71.7\n57\n57.9\n172.7\n185.8\n171.8\n183.8\n243.3\n203.8\n240.1\n109.2\n107.6\n106.5\n98.9\n105.9\n97.2\n98.6\n2 0 1 9 H 1 2 0 1 9 H 2 2 0 2 0 H 1 2 0 2 0 H 2 2 0 2 1 H 1 2 0 2 1 H 2 2 0 2 2 H 1\nINDEX\nManufacturing\nMining\nElectricity\nIndustry\n \n \n \n16 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nsub-sector contributed 0.2 percentage point to \noverall output. The positive performance of the \nsub-sector was attributed to the continued effort \nof the government to deepen the quality of \ninfrastructure in the country and sustained \ninvestment in the construction of houses. \nIn addition, the water supply, sewage and waste \nmanagement sub-sector grew by 19.41 per cent, \ncompared with 20.19 per cent and 16.92 per cent \nin the preceding and corresponding halves of \n2021, respectively. This resulted to a 0.1 \npercentage point contribution to overall growth. \nThe improved performance of the sub-sector was \ndriven by increased investment in water supply \nprojects, including the N23.50 billion World Bank \nAssisted Upgraded Bauchi Township Water \nSupply Scheme. \nHowever, the Electricity, Gas, Steam & Air \nconditioner subsector contracted by 11.42 per \ncent in the first half of 2022, in contrast to 7.51 \nper cent and 56.58 per cent growth recorded in \nthe previous and corresponding halves of 2021, \nrespectively. The contraction was driven mainly \nby the decline in electricity generation and \nconsumption, as the country witnessed incessant \ngrid collapse following a significant downturn in \npower generation during the first half of 2022. \nReduced gas supply and low water level to hydro \ngeneration stations were responsible for the low \ngeneration. \nThus, the average electricity generation, at \n3,801.9 MW/h, decreased by 9.4 per cent and 5.2 \nper cent, compared with 4,157.9 MW/h and \n3,998.60 MW/h in the second and first halves of \n2021, respectively. Similarly, at 3,333.1 MW/h, \nthe average electricity consumption fell by 10.2 \nper cent, compared with 3,672.1 MW/h in the \ncorresponding period of 2021, but rose by 0.5 per \ncent, compared with 3,317.8 MW/h in the second \nhalf of 2021. Challenges occasioned by theft and \nvandalism of transmission and distribution \nnetworks, as well as planned maintenance, \ncontributed to the low wheeling capacity to end \nusers. \nTable 3.2.1: Industry Sector Performance (Growth \nRates) \n \n2020H1 \n2020H2 \n2021H1 \n2021H2 \n2022H1 \nIndustry \nSector \n-4.97 \n-6.7 \n-0.08 \n-0.86 \n-4.73 \nMining and \nQuarrying \n-1.04 \n-15.54 \n-6.98 \n-8.67 \n-19.27 \nManufacturing \n-4.07 \n-1.51 \n3.44 \n3.26 \n4.55 \nElectricity, \nGas, Steam & \nAir conditioner \n-2.78 \n-2.98 \n56.58 \n7.51 \n-11.42 \nWater supply, \nsewage, waste \nManagement. \n3.16 \n4.68 \n16.92 \n20.19 \n19.41 \nConstruction \n-15.99 \n1.95 \n2.4 \n3.75 \n4.48 \nSource: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) \n \nIndustrial activities \nIndustrial activities in the first half of 2022 rose \nmarginally, compared with the second half of \n2021. \nThis \nwas \nattributed \nto \nincreased \nmanufacturing activities and improved business \nconditions and confidence. The index of industrial \nproduction, at 98.6 index points (2010=100), \nincreased by 1.4 per cent, compared with 97.2 \nindex points in the second half of 2021. The \nsector’s activities, however, declined by 6.9 per \ncent, compared with 105.6 index points in the \ncorresponding period of 2021. \nIndustry sub-sector analysis revealed that the \nindex of mining production at 57.9 index points \n(2010=100), declined by 19.3 per cent, compared \nwith 71.7 index points in the corresponding half \nof 2021. This was due to low crude oil production, \nas investment dipped in the upstream sector, \nwith plans by major oil companies to divest. Also, \ninfrastructural challenges, including oil pipeline \nleakages, fire incidence and poor maintenance of \n \n \n \n17 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \noil production facilities, contributed to the low \nperformance. However, the performance of the \nsub-sector increased tepidly to 57.9 index points, \ncompared with 57.0 index points in the second \nhalf of 2021. \nDespite the rising cost of production, the \nmanufacturing sub-sector recorded an improved \nperformance. This was partly due to the \ncrystallisation of the impact of monetary and \nfiscal stimulus in the real sector. Also, the \nincreased performance was due to rising demand \nfor locally manufactured goods, resulting in an \nupsurge in manufacturing capacity utilisation. \nConsequently, the index of manufacturing \nproduction rose by 0.2 per cent and 4.6 per cent \nto 185.9 index points (2010=100) in the first half \nof 2022, compared with 185.5 index points and \n177.8 index points in the second half and the \ncorresponding period of 2021. Similarly, the \nestimated manufacturing capacity utilisation in \nthe first half of 2022, also increased by 0.5 \npercentage point and 1.2 percentage points to \n54.7 per cent, from 54.2 per cent and 53.5 per \ncent in the second half and first half of 2021, \nrespectively. \n Figure 3.2.4. Index of Industrial Production \n \nSource: Computed based on data obtained from NBS and \nManufacturing Association of Nigeria (MAN) \n \n \n \nIndustrial Financing \nThe provision of credit facilities to support \nindustrial activities was sustained, especially by \nthe Bank of Industry and the Nigeria Export-\nImport Bank. \n• \nThe Bank of Industry \nTotal credit disbursed by the Bank of Industry \n(BOI) to the industrial sector in the first half of \n2022 rose by 28.0 per cent, to N106.90 billion, \nfrom N77.00 billion in the first half of 2021. The \nincrease was attributed to a rise in the number of \napproved applications. From the disbursements, \nlarge enterprises got N84.40 billion (79.0 per \ncent), while small and medium enterprises \nreceived N22.50 billion (21.0 per cent). \nA sectoral analysis of the disbursements showed \nthat food processing was allocated N28.80 billion \n(26.9 per cent), followed by the healthcare & \npetrochemicals sector, N19.90 billion (18.6 per \ncent), creative industry received N14.90 billion \n(13.9 per cent) of the total, oil & gas sector \nN13.00 billion (12.1 per cent), solid minerals \nN12.6 billion (11.8 per cent). Others included; \nagro processing N9.10 billion (8.5 per cent), \nengineering & technology, N7.30 billion (6.8 per \ncent). While financial services received N0.90 \nbillion (0.8 per cent), gender business N0.4 billion \n(0.4 per cent), and renewable energy N0.10 \nbillion (0.1 per cent). \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n179.2\n182.3\n171.9\n179.6\n177.8\n185.5\n185.9\n77.9\n73.9\n77.1\n62.5\n71.7\n57\n57.9\n172.7\n185.8\n171.8\n183.8\n243.3\n203.8\n240.1\n109.2\n107.6\n106.5\n98.9\n105.9\n97.2\n98.6\n2 0 1 9 H 1\n2 0 1 9 H 2\n2 0 2 0 H 1\n2 0 2 0 H 2\n2 0 2 1 H 1\n2 0 2 1 H 2\n2 0 2 2 H 1\nINDEX\nManufacturing\nMining\nElectricity\nIndustry\n \n \n \n18 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nFigure 3.2.5: Summary of BOI Disbursements by \nSector, 2022H1 (per cent) \n \n Source: Bank of Industry \n \n \n• \nThe Nigeria Export-Import Bank \nThe total funding support provided to the non-oil \nexport sector, under the Nigeria Export-Import \nBank (NEXIM) lending facilities in the first half of \n2022 was N31.61 billion for 27 projects, \ncompared with N54.40 billion to 38 projects in \nthe second half of 2021 and N24.06 billion for 23 \nprojects in the corresponding period of 2021. The \ndecrease in funding new projects was attributed \nto increased credit risk perception arising from \nheightened global uncertainties. \nA breakdown of the disbursement by facility \nshows that 51.0, 38.0, and 11.0 per cent were \ndisbursed under Rediscounting & Refinancing \nTrade Finance, and Foreign Input Facilities, \nrespectively. \n \n \n \n \n \nFigure 3.2.6: Summary of NEXIM Disbursement by \nFacility in 2022H1 (per cent) \n \n Source: NEXIM \nA sectoral analysis of the disbursement showed \nthat the agricultural sector received N26.53 \nbillion (84.0 per cent). This was followed by the \nmanufacturing sector with N5.03 billion (15.9 per \ncent) and solid minerals, N0.05 billion (0.1 per \ncent). \nFigure 3.2.7: Summary of NEXIM Disbursement by \nSector in 2022H1 \n \nSource: NEXIM \n \n• \nRenewable Energy \nElectrification to the unserved and underserved \ncommunities improved in the review period. The \nRural Electrification Agency (REA) continued to \nprovide electrification for the rural areas under \nthe Rural Electrification Fund (REF), the Capital \nProject (CP) and the Nigerian Electrification \nProject (NEP). A total number of 159 and 250 off-\nAgro \nProcessing \n(8.5%)\nCreative \nIndustry \n(13.9%)\nEngineering \n& \nTechnology \n(6.8%)\nFinancial \nServices \n(0.8%)\nFood Processing \n(26.9%)\nGender \nBusiness \n(0.4%)\nHealthcare \n& \nPetrochemi\ncals (18.6%)\nOil & Gas \n(12.1%)\nRenewable \nEnergy \n(0.1%)\nSolid \nMinerals \n(11.8%)\nTrade Finance \nFacility\n38%\nRediscounting \n& Refinancing \nFacility\n51%\nForeign Input \nFacility(WC)\n11%\nAgriculture\n84%\nManufacturing \n16%\nSolid Minerals\n0.1%\n \n \n \n19 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \ngrid solar power projects were completed and \nongoing, respectively, while the total installed \nand available capacity of the off-grid solar power \ncompleted and ongoing were 6,998.72 KW and \n27,737.19 KW, respectively. Also, the total \nnumber of connections to the mini-grid and solar \nhome system completed and ongoing were \n746,818 and 507,571, respectively. However, \nchallenges such as insecurity, insufficient funds \nand logistics, amongst others, continued to \nconstrain the agency. \nThe major source of funding for NEP, REF and CP \nare from the World Bank and the African \nDevelopment Bank (AfDB) credit facilities, REA \nand the Federal Government’s annual capital \nbudget, respectively. \n \nTable 3.2.2: Summary of Renewable Energy Projects \nS/N \nProject title \nCompleted \nOngoing \n1 \nTotal number of off-grid \nsolar power project \n159 (total) \n250 \n(total) \n68 (NEP) \n188 (NEP) \n26 (REF) \n62 (REF) \n65 (CP) \n \n2 \nTotal installed and \navailable capacity of the \noff-grid solar power \n(KW) \n6,998.72 (total) \n27,737.19 \n(total) \n4,107 (NEP) \n23,712.19 \n(NEP) \n1,341 (REF) \n4,025 \n(REF) \n1,550.72 (CP) \n \n \n \n5 \nTotal number of \nconnections to the off-\ngrid (mini-grids and \nsolar home system) \n746,818 (total) \n507,571 \n(total) \n721,211 (NEP) \n141,920 \n(NEP) \n24,022 (REF) \n365,651 \n(REF) \n1,585 (CP) \n \nSource: Rural Electrification Agency (REA) \n \nServices \nServices sustained its robust performance, owing \nto an improved business environment and \nincreased leverage of ICT services and access to \ncredit. The Sector grew by 7.07 per cent in the \nfirst half of 2022, compared with 6.84 per cent \nand 4.27 per cent in the second half and first half \n2021, \nrespectively, \nand \ncontributed \n3.9 \npercentage points to the overall GDP growth. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n20 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \n Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) \n \nThe Information and Communications \nTechnology \nThe \nInformation \nand \nCommunications \nTechnology (ICT) sub-sector grew by 9.06 per \ncent, compared with 7.11 per cent and 5.97 per \ncent in the second and first halves of 2021, \nrespectively. The growth was triggered by the \nincrease in the number of active mobile lines, \nwhich crossed the 200 million mark in April 2022 \nto reach 206,081,720 subscriptions at the end of \nfirst half of 2022. \nConsequently, in the first half of 2022, \nteledensity across the country increased to \n108.15 per cent, compared with 102.40 per cent \nand 98.28 per cent in the preceding and \ncorresponding halves of 2021, respectively. The \nbroadband subscription and penetration levels \nalso increased to 84,607,363 and 44.32 per cent, \nrespectively. This development was driven by \nincrease in network coverages and demand, \n \nfollowing increased private sector participation \nand online trading activities in the economy. \n In addition, the Nigerian Communications \nCommission (NCC) issued the International \nGateway and the Internet Service Provider (ISP) \nlicences to Starlink Internet Services Nigeria Ltd \nto operate in Nigeria. \nFig 3.2.8: Active Telephony Subscriptions and \nTeledensity in the first half 2022 \n \nData Source: Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) \n \n \n \n \n \n80\n85\n90\n95\n100\n105\n110\n 150,000,000\n 160,000,000\n 170,000,000\n 180,000,000\n 190,000,000\n 200,000,000\n 210,000,000\nend-June\n19\nend-Dec\n19\nend-June\n20\nend-Dec\n20\nend-June\n21\nend-Dec\n21\nend-June\n22\nTeledensity (%)\nNumber Of Subscriptions\nSubscriptions\nTeledensity\nTable 3.2.3: Services Sector Performance (Growth Rates) \n \n2020H1 \n2020H2 \n2021H1 \n2021H2 \n2022H1 \nGrowth \nContribution in \n2022H1 \nServices Sector \n-2.64 \n-1.83 \n4.27 \n6.84 \n7.07 \n3.87 \nTrade \n-9.64 \n-7.43 \n8.97 \n8.3 \n5.5 \n0.89 \nAccommodation and Food Services \n-16.8 \n-18.56 \n-2.85 \n1.63 \n2.24 \n0.02 \nTransportation and Storage \n-20.47 \n-24.01 \n6.3 \n26.39 \n15.4 \n0.2 \nInformation and Communication \n11.59 \n14.77 \n5.97 \n7.11 \n9.06 \n1.49 \nArts, Entertainment & Recreation \n-3.01 \n-3 \n-0.17 \n4.02 \n1.4 \n0 \nFinancial and Insurance \n19.63 \n-0.72 \n-1.47 \n23.74 \n20.88 \n0.78 \nReal Estate \n-14.11 \n-5.07 \n2.79 \n1.85 \n4.43 \n0.23 \nProfessional, Scientific & Technical Serv. \n-8.08 \n-7.78 \n-1.43 \n1.32 \n1.9 \n0.06 \nAdministrative and Support Services \n-2.15 \n-3.26 \n2.02 \n3.04 \n2.87 \n0 \nPublic Administration \n-2.88 \n2.62 \n-1.34 \n0.53 \n1.97 \n0.04 \nEducation \n-10.83 \n-15.6 \n-3.5 \n1.4 \n1.58 \n0.03 \nHuman Health & Social Services \n1.49 \n2.94 \n4.79 \n5.07 \n4 \n0.03 \nOther Services \n-5.98 \n-5.57 \n-1.54 \n1.28 \n3.1 \n0.11 \n \n \n \n21 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nFinance and Insurance sub-sector \nThe finance and insurance sub-sector expanded \nby 20.88 per cent, compared with 23.74 per cent \ngrowth in the preceding half and a contraction of \n1.47 per cent in the corresponding half of 2021. \nImproved access to consumer credit following \nthe continued implementation of the loan-to-\ndeposit ratio policy and other policy measures by \nthe Bank supported the growth of the financial \ninstitutions' sub-sector during the period. \nThe Transport and Storage sub-sector \nThe Transport and Storage sub-sector grew by \n15.40 per cent, compared with 26.39 per cent \nand 6.30 per cent in the preceding and \ncorresponding halves of 2021, respectively. The \ngrowth was driven by sustained government and \ninstitutional \nsupport \ntowards \nboosting \ninfrastructure in the sector and addressing the \nscarcity of petroleum products. There was also \nnotable increase in passenger and cargo \nmovement across the sub-sector activities of air, \nrail and water transport. \nThe volume of passengers airlifted in both the \ndomestic and international routes increased by \n1.4 per cent to 8.9 million passengers during the \nperiod, compared with the corresponding half of \n2021. However, this was lower than the number \nrecorded in the second half of 2021 by 11.6 per \ncent. Similarly, the volume of domestic-bound \npassengers transported by air increased by 22.7 \nper cent in the first half of 2022, over the 5.9 \nmillion passengers airlifted in the corresponding \nhalf of 2021. It, however, declined by 16.9 per \ncent, when compared with 8.7 million passengers \nin the second half of 2021. The increase in the \nvolume of domestic bound passengers was due \nto the persistent security challenges affecting \nroad transport and rail. The volume of foreign \npassengers also rose, significantly, by 87.6 per \ncent and 21.1 per cent, from 0.90 million and 1.4 \nmillion passengers airlifted in the first and second \nhalves of 2021, respectively. \nAircraft movement rose by 13.0 per cent to \n140,966 flights in the first half of 2022, compared \nwith the corresponding period of 2021, but \ndeclined by 12.5 per cent below the level in \nsecond half of 2021. \nMail movement rose to 40.8 million kg in the first \nhalf of 2022, an increase of 8.4 per cent and 12.0 \nper cent, above the levels in the first and second \nhalves of 2021, respectively. However, cargo \nmovement declined by 49.7 per cent and 30.3 per \ncent to 63.6 million kg, compared with the \ncorresponding half of 2021 and the second half \nof 2021. \nActivities in the marine sector declined compared \nwith the first and second halves of 2021. This was \nobserved in the decrease in the number of \noceangoing vessels that berthed at the nation’s \nports to 1,992 in the first half of 2022, from 2,005 \nvessels in the first half of 2021, and 2,095 in \nsecond half of 2021. This further affected the \nvolume of cargoes discharged and loaded at the \nports, as cargo throughput, which stood at \n39,971,942 metric tons and 39,916,165 metric \ntons in the first and second halves of 2021, \ndecreased to 38,672,392 metric tons in the \nreview period. The decrease in the first half of \n2022 represents a decline of 3.12 per cent and \n3.25 per cent from the corresponding and \nprevious halves of 2021, respectively. The \ndevelopment was occasioned by reduced \ndemand for imported consumer items on \naccount of tighter macroeconomic environment \nand weaker purchasing power. \n \n \n \n22 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nOther sub-sectors included, Trade (5.50 per \ncent), Real Estate (4.43 per cent), Human Health \n& Social services (4.00 per cent), ‘Other Services’ \n(3.10 per cent), Administrative and Support \nServices (2.87 per cent), Accommodation and \nFood \nServices \n(2.24 \nper \ncent), \nPublic \nAdministration (1.97 per cent) and Professional, \nScientific & Technical Services (1.90 per cent), \nalso grew during the review period. \nHealth \nThe Federal Government continued to strengthen \ninstitutions to improve the quality and coverage \nof health care services. Thus, the Federal \nGovernment launched a N62.10 billion Fund to \nsustain the country’s HIV response, address killer \ndiseases and public health emergencies. It also \nunveiled a National Biosecurity Policy and Action \nPlan for 2022-2026 to secure the health sector \nand its immediate environment from biological \nthreats. \nTo deepen access to health insurance coverage \nand increase private sector participation in the \nprovision of health insurance services, the \nNational Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) bill \nwas enacted during the review period. The Act \nestablishes and empowers the NHIA to ensure \nthe provision of mandatory health insurance for \nall Nigerians, in collaboration with state health \ninsurance agencies, and to improve and harness \nprivate sector participation in the provision of \nhealth care services. Also, the new Act stipulates \nthe establishment of a new Vulnerable Group \nFund to provide subsidy for health insurance \ncoverage for vulnerable people. \nFurthermore, the Federal Government officially \nflagged-off the enrolment of Corps Members into \nthe National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS). \nThe health initiative, known as NYSC Group \nIndividual \nFamily \nSocial \nHealth \nInsurance \nProgramme (GIFSHIP), was designed to cover the \nperiods of Pre-Orientation, until the end of \nService of a Corps member, which is three weeks \nafter disengagement from Service. Six Health \nMaintenance \nOrganisations \n(HMOs) \nwere \nselected for each geo-political zones to drive the \nprocess. \nCOVID-19 Update \nThe rate of active cases of COVID-19 infections \ndeclined, following sustained surveillance by \nrelevant health authorities, compliance with \ncontainment \nmeasures, \nand \na \nsustained \nvaccination drive. This followed a significant \ndecline in the newly confirmed cases and \nrecorded deaths. The rate of increase in the \nnumber of confirmed cases moderated in the \nfirst half of 2022 to 6.3 per cent, compared with \n44.6 per cent and 91.3 per cent in the second half \nand corresponding half of 2021, respectively. \nSimilarly, the rate of discharged cases declined to \n16.8 per cent, compared with 30.5 per cent and \n122.8 per cent in the second half and \ncorresponding half of 2021, respectively. In \naddition, the death toll declined by 3.7 per cent \nas against 43.0 per cent in the second half, and \n64.5 per cent in the corresponding period of \n2021. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n23 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nFig 3.2.9: COVID-19: Confirmed, Discharged and \nDeath Cases in the First Half of 2022 \nSource: National Centre for Disease Control (NCDC) \nDuring the review period, Nigeria received a \ndonation of 3.2 million Pfizer COVID-19 vaccines \nfrom the United States; 2 million doses of \nJohnson & Johnson (J&J) vaccines from the \nEuropean Union and another 4.4 million doses of \nJ&J from the government of Spain, and 859,600 \ndoses of AstraZeneca vaccines from the Japanese \nGovernment. \nHousing \nThe Federal Government sustained efforts to \nincrease the delivery of housing to citizens as it \ncommissioned a total of 372 housing units in \nNasarawa, Delta, Kaduna, Kogi and Osun states in \nthe first half of 2022. Out of the 372 housing units \ndelivered in the review period, Nasarawa State \ngot 76 units, while Delta, Kaduna, Kogi and Osun \nstates got 68, 80, 76, and 72 units, respectively. \n \nEducation \nThe government’s commitment to increase \naccess to formal education, especially at the \ntertiary level, was sustained with the licensing of \nnew educational institutions. To increase access \nto tertiary institutions, the Federal Executive \nCouncil \n(FEC) \napproved \nthe \nissuance of \nprovisional licences for the establishment of 12 \nadditional private universities across the country. \nThey included Pen Resource University Gombe \n(Gombe State), Al-Ansar University, Maiduguri \n(Borno State), Margaret Lawrence University \n(Delta State), and Khalifa Ishaku Rabiu University \nKano (Kano State). Also on the list were Sports \nUniversity Idumuje Ugboko (Delta State), Baba \nAhmed University Kano, Saisa University of \nMedical Sciences and Technology (Sokoto State), \nNigerian-British University Hasa (Abia State) and \nPeter University Acina-Onene (Anambra State). \nOthers were Newgate University, Minna (Niger \nState), European University of Nigeria in Duboyi \n(Abuja) and the North-West University Sokoto. In \na related development, the FEC approved the \nestablishment of three new Federal Polytechnics, \nlocated in Umunnoechi in Abia State, Orogun in \nDelta State, and Kabo in Kano State. They would \ncommence academic activities in October 2022. \nThe National Universities Commission (NUC) also \ngranted approval for the establishment of two \nnew universities by the Lagos State Government. \nThe new universities would be developed \nthrough the conversion of selected old higher \nlearning institutions in the State. Consequently, \nthe old polytechnic in Ikorodu became the \nUniversity of Science and Technology, while the \nAdeniran Ogunsanya College of Education, \nIjanikin, and the Michael Otedola College of \nPrimary Education, Epe, were merged to form the \nLagos State University of Education. The creation \nof the two institutions would increase the State’s \ncapacity to cater for the growing population of \nadmission seekers, while increasing access to \nhigher education in the country. \nTo \nprovide each senatorial \ndistrict \nwith \nopportunities to drive e-learning and foster a \n0.0\n100.0\n200.0\n300.0\n400.0\n500.0\n600.0\n700.0\n0.0\n50.0\n100.0\n150.0\n200.0\n250.0\n300.0\nH2 2020\nH1 2021\nH2 2021\nH1 2022\nTotal Confirmed Cases (LHS)\nDischarged Cases (RHS)\nDeath Toll (RHS)\n \n \n \n24 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \ndigital environment, the Federal Government \napproved N964.00 million for the provision of \nsatellite-based education system equipment in \n111 primary schools (three primary schools in \neach of the 36 States of the Federation and the \nFederal Capital Territory). \nFurthermore, the Universal Basic Education \nCommission (UBEC) constructed six ICT schools in \nthe six geopolitical zones at a cost of N21.60 \nbillion. \nThe Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) \ngave 16 Nigerian universities a total of N232.50 \nmillion \ntelecommunications \nresearch \nand \ndevelopment grant to boost the development of \nthe education sector. The researchable areas, \nwhich were technology based included: 5G \nDeployment; Innovative Clean Energy; Advanced \nMethod of Quality of Service (QoS)/Quality of \nExperience Management and Test Mechanism; \nInternet of Things (IoT) Low Power Wide Area \nNetwork (LPWAN) Technology; and Monitoring \nand Localising of Drones. \nSocial Intervention \nThe \nFederal \nGovernment \nsustained \nits \ninterventions aimed at improving the livelihood of \nits citizens during the period. As part of the effort \ntoward poverty eradication and sustenance of \nthe National Social Investment Programmes \n(NSIPs), \nthe \nFederal \nGovernment, \nin \ncollaboration with the CBN, flagged off the \nNEXIT/CBN Agri-Business Small and Medium \nEnterprises Investment Scheme for exited N-\nPower beneficiaries Batches A and B. \nAlso, Google keyed into the Government’s \nentrepreneurship \ndevelopment \ndrive \nby \nannouncing US$1.00 million in support for \nAfrican women, including Nigerian women \nentrepreneurs, to help grow their businesses. \nThe Tech Giant also provided free tools to \nsupport their businesses by launching an \nintensive programme to drive the discovery of \nwomen-owned \nbusinesses \nthrough \nGoogle \nBusiness Profiles. This would help businesses \ncreate a free webpage to make it easier for them \nto be more accessible online. \n• \nEmployment and Job Creation \nThe Federal Government sustained its effort to \nimprove employment by partnering with various \nstakeholders. The Government approved the \nopening of an employment and job creation \nportal called the Nigerian Labour Exchange \n(NILEX) to improve the database and the access \nto employment opportunities in the country. The \nplatform would keep records of job vacancies and \nthe skills of job seekers as well as unemployed \nNigerians in the diaspora. \n \nConsumer Prices \nRising food and energy prices and lingering \nsecurity challenges fuelled headline inflation \nupward in the first half of 2022, thus reversing its \ndownward trend in the second half of 2021. The \nreversal was driven, mainly, by increased prices \nof food and non-food items. In addition, the \neffects of soaring energy prices (such as diesel \nand gas), persisting structural bottlenecks, and \nlingering security challenges contributed to the \nrising inflation. Hence, headline inflation (year-\non-year) rose to 18.60 per cent from 15.63 per \ncent and 17.75 per cent in the second and first \nhalves of 2021, respectively. However, headline \nInflation (Month-on-Month) in the first half of \n \n \n \n25 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \n2022 remains unchanged from its level of 1.82 \nper cent in the second half of 2021. \nFigure 3.2.10: Headline Inflation Rate (per cent) \n2018H1 to 2022H1 \n \nSource: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) \n \nFood Inflation \nFood inflation rose persistently in the first half, \ndriven, mainly, by lingering security challenges, \nrising input costs, and exchange rate pass-\nthrough to domestic prices. Specifically, prices of \nfarm produce continued to rise on the heels of \npersisting security challenges that constrained \nfarming activities, leading to disruptions in the \nsupply of food items. Also, prices of processed \nfood items maintained an upward trajectory due \nto persisting structural challenges that hampered \nfood \nprocessing \nactivities, \nespecially, \nthe \nincreased prices of diesel and other input. \nContinued uptick in food prices was further \nsupported by an increase in the price of imported \nfood, which contributed an average of 4.4 \npercentage points to the increase in food prices. \nThus, food inflation (year-on-year) rose to 20.60 \nper cent, from 17.37 per cent in second half of \n2021, but lower than the 21.83 per cent in the \nfirst half of 2021. On the other hand, the Month-\non-Month food inflation declined to 2.05 per cent \nat end-June 2022, compared with 2.19 per cent \nin the second half of 2021. \nFigure 3.2.11: Food Inflation Rate (per cent)2018H1 \nto 2022H1 \n \nSource: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) \n \nCore Inflation \nCore inflation (all-items less farm produce) \nsustained its rise to 15.75 per cent, compared \nwith 13.87 per cent and 13.09 per cent in the \npreceding and corresponding halves of 2021, \nrespectively. The persistent rise in core inflation \nwas, largely, attributed to the effect of higher \nimport \nprices, \nincrease \nin \nthe \ncost \nof \ntransportation/logistics, and heightened security \nchallenges. \nFigure 3.2.12: Core Inflation Rate 2018H1 to 2022H1 \n \n Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) \n \n0.0\n0.2\n0.4\n0.6\n0.8\n1.0\n1.2\n1.4\n1.6\n1.8\n2.0\n0.0\n2.0\n4.0\n6.0\n8.0\n10.0\n12.0\n14.0\n16.0\n18.0\n20.0\nYear on Year (LHS)\nMonth on Month (RHS)\n0.0\n0.5\n1.0\n1.5\n2.0\n2.5\n0.0\n5.0\n10.0\n15.0\n20.0\n25.0\nYear on Year(LHS)\nMonth on Month (RHS)\n0.0\n0.2\n0.4\n0.6\n0.8\n1.0\n1.2\n1.4\n1.6\n1.8\n0.0\n2.0\n4.0\n6.0\n8.0\n10.0\n12.0\n14.0\n16.0\n18.0\n2018H1\n2018H2\n2019H1\n2019H2\n2020H1\n2020H2\n2021H1\n2021H2\n2022H2\nYear on Year(LHS)\nMonth on Month (RHS)\n \n \n \n26 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nDomestic Commodity Prices \nThe Prices of most domestic agricultural \ncommodities monitored trended upward in the \nfirst half of 2022. Despite improved output, \ndomestic prices of agricultural products were \nhigher than their levels in the second and first \nhalves of 2021. The development was induced by \nstructural factors such as: high transportation \ncosts, driven by an increase in the price of diesel; \nsupply shortages, resulting partly from the \npersisting security challenge; high demand; \nscarcity of foreign exchange for importation; and \nthe Russia-Ukraine war, which further strained \nthe food supply chain, especially imported \ncommodities like wheat and edible oils. \nThe dynamics in agricultural commodity prices, \ncompared to the preceding half indicated \nincrease in onion bulb (21.1 per cent), vegetable \noil (20.1 per cent), groundnut oil (18.7 per cent) \nand palm oil (18.4 per cent). Relative to the \ncorresponding period of 2021, the edible oils \nincreased by 46.1 per cent (groundnut oil), 45.5 \nper cent (palm oil), and 45.4 per cent (vegetable \noil). \nOther commodities also recorded an increase \nranging from 2.1 per cent for garri yellow (sold \nloose) to 16.9 per cent for sweet potato. The \nupward \nprice \nmovement \nexacerbated \ninflationary pressure in the review period. \n \n \n \n \n \nTable 3.2.4. Domestic Agricultural Commodity \nPrices \n \n \n \n1st \nHalf, \n2022 \n2nd \nHalf, \n2021 \n1st \nHalf, \n2022 \n% \nchange \n% \nchange \nFOOD ITEM \n \n \n \nUnit \n1 \n2 \n3 \n(1) \n&(3) \n(2) & \n(3) \nAgric eggs medium size \n\" \n530.33 \n608.00 \n672.55 \n26.82 \n10.6 \nBeans brown,sold loose \n\" \n391.17 \n489.60 \n531.18 \n35.79 \n8.5 \nBeans:white black eye. \nsold loose \n\" \n365.57 \n464.30 \n508.82 \n39.18 \n9.6 \nGari white,sold loose \n\" \n279.98 \n308.00 \n320.02 \n14.30 \n3.9 \nGari yellow,sold loose \n\" \n299.86 \n333.20 \n340.34 \n13.50 \n2.1 \nGroundnut oil: 1 bottle, \nspecify bottle \n\" \n689.66 \n848.70 \n1007.64 \n46.11 \n18.7 \nIrish \npotato \n \n\" \n325.73 \n382.00 \n446.44 \n37.06 \n16.9 \nMaize grain white sold \nloose \n\" \n235.44 \n271.30 \n298.85 \n26.93 \n10.2 \nMaize grain yellow \nsold loose \n\" \n241.37 \n273.10 \n301.03 \n24.71 \n10.2 \nOnion \nbulb \n \n\" \n309.56 \n320.10 \n387.79 \n25.27 \n21.1 \nPalm oil: 1 \nbottle,specify bottle \n\" \n584.82 \n718.60 \n850.56 \n45.44 \n18.4 \nRice agric sold loose \n\" \n445.18 \n467.60 \n503.70 \n13.15 \n7.7 \nRice local sold loose \n\" \n397.51 \n415.40 \n444.56 \n11.84 \n7.0 \nRice Medium Grained \n\" \n443.45 \n464.60 \n490.39 \n10.59 \n5.6 \nRice,imported high \nquality sold loose \n\" \n545.97 \n556.60 \n611.75 \n12.05 \n9.9 \nSweet potato \n\" \n161.40 \n199.40 \n232.37 \n43.97 \n16.5 \nTomato \n \n\" \n290.42 \n367.90 \n417.03 \n43.60 \n13.4 \nVegetable oil:1 \nbottle,specify bottle \n\" \n677.14 \n820.00 \n984.61 \n45.41 \n20.1 \nWheat flour: \nprepacked (golden \npenny 2kg) \n\" \n773.83 \n907.20 \n1053.17 \n36.10 \n16.1 \nYam \ntuber \n \n\" \n255.44 \n315.10 \n354.14 \n38.64 \n12.4 \nSource: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) \n \nAgricultural production \nAgricultural production index, at 149.3 points \n(2010=100), grew by 2.2 per cent and 4.6 per \ncent above the levels in the second and first \nhalves of 2021. Relative to the preceding half, the \ncrop and fishery sub-sectors grew by 2.1 per cent \nand 2.0 per cent, respectively, followed by \nlivestock and forestry sub-sectors at 1.3 per cent, \napiece. The performance of the sub-sectors was \ndriven by sustained policy interventions and \nfavourable weather condition. \n \n \n \n \n27 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nFig 3.2.13: Agriculture Production Index 2019HI \nto 2022HI \n \nSource: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) \n \n Table 3.2.5: Agricultural Production Index \n \nFirst Half 2021, Second Half 2021, First Half 2022 \n \n1 \n2 \n3 \n%(3&1) \n%(3&2) \nAggregate \n142.69 \n146.11 \n149.3 \n4.63 \n2.18 \nCrops \n141.45 \n145.14 \n148.41 \n4.92 \n2.25 \nStaples \n136.15 \n136.7 \n136.9 \n0.55 \n0.14 \nother \ncrops \n147.21 \n150.46 \n153.62 \n4.36 \n2.10 \nLivestock \n145.45 \n145.84 \n147.8 \n1.61 \n1.34 \nFishery \n153.55 \n151.8 \n154.86 \n0.86 \n2.02 \nForestry \n154.22 \n156.83 \n158.92 \n3.04 \n1.33 \nSource: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) \n \nThe Extractive Industry \nCrude Oil \nPolicy and Institutional Support \nTo optimise the nation’s hydrocarbon resources, \nthe Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory \nCommission (NUPRC), awarded Petroleum-\nProspecting Licences (PPLs) to indigenous \noperators for 57 marginal oil fields. This was in \naddition to the 30 marginal oil field licences \nissued earlier. The oil fields were awarded to \nqualified indigenous companies to encourage \ngreater participation in the petroleum industry. \nThe firms were given six years to develop the \nfields and commence full oil production. \nTo bridge the cost of transportation, and \nencourage investment in the transportation of \npetroleum products, the Federal Government \nincreased the freight rate for petroleum product \nmarketers by N10.00 per litre (95.6 per cent) to \nN20.46 per litre. The review was necessitated by \nthe high cost of transporting petroleum products \nnationwide. \nCrude Oil Production \nAt an average daily production of 1.36 million \nbarrels per day (mbpd), Nigeria’s crude oil output \nin the first half of 2022, declined by 6.8 per cent \nbelow the comparative periods in 2021. The \ndecline in domestic crude oil production was due, \nlargely, to rising cases of sabotage, which led to \nTotalEnergies, Shell and Eni declaring force \nmajeures on Forcados, Bonny Light, and Brass \ncrude streams export in February and March \n2022, respectively. \n \nFigure 3.2.14: Average Crude Oil Production (Million \nbarrels per day) \nSource: Refinitiv Eikon (Thomson Reuters) \n \n \n \n137.58\n136.28\n134.46\n143.75\n142.11\n144.26\n150.33\n140.18\n138.88\n135.24\n145.49\n144.17\n149.42\n152.44\n142.69\n141.45\n136.15\n147.21\n145.45\n153.55\n154.22\n146.11\n145.14\n136.70\n150.46\n145.84\n151.80\n156.83\n149.30\n148.41\n136.90\n153.62\n147.80\n154.86\n158.92\nA g g r e g a t e\nC r o p s\nS t a p l e sO t h e r C r o p sL i v e s t o c k\nF i s h e r y\nF o r e s t r y\n First Half 2019\nFirst Half 2020\nFirst Half 2021\nSecond half 2021\nFirst Half 2022\n0\n0.2\n0.4\n0.6\n0.8\n1\n1.2\n1.4\n1.6\n1.8\n2\nMillions of barrels per day\n \n \n \n28 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nRefinery Operations \nThe three Federal Government owned refineries, \nwith a combined refining capacity of 445,000 \nbarrels per day (bpd), remained shut, due to \nrehabilitation. Output from the Walter Smith \nRefinery and Niger Delta Petroleum Resources \nmodular refineries, though operational, was \ninadequate to boost the consolidated capacity \nutilisation rate and meet domestic demand. \nTable 3.2.6. Status of Operation of Refineries in \nNigeria in the First Half 2022 \nS/No \nPlants \nCapacity \n(bpd) \nStatus \n1 \nPort Harcourt Refining \nCompany (PHRC) \n210,000 \nUnder \nrehabilitation \n2 \nKaduna Refining and \nPetrochemical \nCompany (KRPC) \n110,000 \nUnder \nrehabilitation \n3 \n(Warri Refining and \nPetrochemical \nCompany WRPC) \n125,000 \nUnder \nrehabilitation \n4 \nWalter Smith Refinery \n5,000 \nOperational \n5 \nNiger Delta Petroleum \nResources \n1,000 \nOperational \n6 \nDangote Refinery \n650,000 \nUnder \nconstruction \nSource: Fitch Solutions \n \nGas Production and Utilisation \nEstimated gas production in the first half of 2022 \nwas 990,829 million standard cubic feet (mscf), \ncompared with 1,043,196 mscf and 1,032,278 \nmscf in the second and first halves of 2021, \nrepresenting a decrease of 5.02 per cent and 4.02 \nper cent, respectively. \nOf the total gas produced, 94.0 per cent (981,079 \nmscf) was utilised, while the remaining 6.0 per \ncent was lost through gas flaring. Of the utilised \ngas, 5.3 per cent was expended as fuel gas, while \n1.9 per cent, 4.4 per cent, 12.8 per cent, and 39.8 \nper cent were for Natural Gas Liquids/Liquified \nPetroleum Gas, Escravos Gas-to-Liquid (EGTL), \ndomestic use, and Nigeria Liquified Natural Gas, \nrespectively. 29.5 per cent of the total gas \nproduction was re-injected. Estimated value of \ngas exported in the first half of 2022 was \nUS$3,044.65 million, a 12.43 per cent and 2.28 \nper cent increase from the US$2,708.01 million \nand US$2,976.83 million in the corresponding \nperiod of 2021 and preceding half of 2021, \nrespectively. \nFigure 3.2.15: Gas Production, Utilisation and Flared, \n2021 – 2022 (Billion mscf) \nSource: NNPC Monthly Oil Reports \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\nJan-21\nFeb-21\nMar-21\nApr-21\nMay-21\nJun-21\nJul-21\nAug-21\nSep-21\nOct-21\nNov-21\nDec-21\nJan-22\nFeb-22\nMar-22\nApr-22\nMay-22\nJun-22\nBillion scf\nGas Produced\nGas Utilised\nGas Flared\n \n \n \n29 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \n \n \nBox 1: Policy Support and Developments in the Real Sector \n \nSector \nDevelopments \n1 \nCrop \nProduction \n \nSeveral institutional support policies were implemented in the review period to improve agricultural sector output: \n• \nThe Federal Executive Council (FEC) approved the sum of N1.40 billion for the procurement of equipment and agricultural \ninputs for the National Youth Farmers Scheme. \n• \nThe FEC also approved a memo to promote agriculture business in Nigeria through right farm gate pricing and the ban on \nforeigners and their representatives from purchasing agricultural commodities at the farm gates. \n• \nThe Federal Government launched the Energizing Agriculture Programme (EAP), with funding support from the Global Energy \nAlliance for People and Planet (GEAP) to improve access to electricity in rural farming communities. \n• \nThe National Varieties Release Committee (NVRC) in Nigeria approved the commercialisation of 45 new crop varieties, with \ntwo varieties of gingers registered for proper documentation in the nation’s seeds catalogue. \n• \nTomato and onion farmers in Kano State received new high-yielding varieties, Takahe onion seed and Xaman tomato seed, to \nboost their productivity. The new varieties were products of collaborations between Sasakawa Africa Association (SAA), Kano \nState Agro-Pastoral Development Project (KSADP), Alliance for Green Revolution (AGRA) and Bayer Company. \n• \nNigeria and Ghana collaborated on Pod Borer Resistant (PBR) Cowpea to further enhance scientific bilateral collaboration for a \n“New Africa.” \n• \nJulius Berger Nigeria (JBN) Plc established a cashew processing plant in Epe, Lagos State. The plant is highly efficient with no-\nwaste, designed to have less impact on the environment. \n• \nAn ultra-modern 420 metric tons per day capacity rice milling factory was commissioned in Kano State. \n• \nThe St. Gabriel coconut oil refinery, a multi-billion-naira, with a one million daily coconut processing capacity with 3,000 staff, \nwas inaugurated in Akwa Ibom State. \n• \nThe Dangote Fertilizer Plant, which has the capacity to produce three million tons of urea and ammonia annually, built on a \n500 hectares of land in the Lekki Free Trade Zone at a total cost of US$2.5 billion, was commissioned. \n• \nThe Dangote Fertilizer Limited commenced the training of over one million farmers for the next three years on the best \npractices in fertilizer application to boost productivity. \n• \nThe Alliance for Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), a consortium of agriculture support organisations, inaugurated a training \nprogramme for 300,000 smallholder farmers in Kaduna State. The project would support farmers on crop value chain, with \nfocus on maize, soybeans, and tomatoes by strengthening their entrepreneurial skills and market participation. \n• \nThe National Agricultural Land Development Authority (NALDA) trained 200 Young Farmers in Israel and Morocco on crop \nproduction and animal husbandry. \n• \nThe Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (FMARD), in collaboration with the Nigerian Institute for Oil Palm \nResearch (NIFOR), trained oil palm farmers on pest and soil fertility management in Edo State. The Ministry also distributed \n200 oil palm fruit harvesting chisel and 1000 litres of organic path-away fertilizers to the farmers during the training. \n• \nA 10,000-hectare commercial oil palm plantation owned by JB Farms Limited was inaugurated in Ondo State. The project is \nexpected to employ at least 10,000 direct and 30,000 indirect workers throughout its value chain. \n• \nThe Ondo State Government announced the sum of N2.00 billion to support the production of oil palm in the state, and \nallocated 70,000 hectares of land to investors for palm oil and cocoa production. \n• \nThe Oyo State Government launched the Tede Agri Industrial Cluster in Tede community of Oke-Ogun area of the state, located \non 10,000 hectares of arable land, with infrastructure such as a dam and a housing scheme. \n2 \nLivestock \n• \nThe Kano State Agro-Pastoral Development Project (KSADP) announced an investment of N10.93 billion for agro-pastoral \nprojects in the 2022 fiscal year, which consists of 9.0 per cent for crops and the legume value chain interventions for small-\nholder farmers across the state. \n3 \nFisheries \n• \nThe Norwegian Government, through the Norwegian Seafood Council, carried out a capacity training for fishery officers and \nstakeholders in Lagos. \n \n \n \n30 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nBox 1: Policy Support and Developments in the Real Sector Cont… \n \nSector \nDevelopments \n4 \nGas \n• \nThe Board of Directors of the Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas Limited (NLNG) approved the supply of 100.0 per cent of the \ncompany's Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) production (Propane and Butane) to the Nigerian market. \n• \n The Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) limited, Shell, Nigerian Agip Oil Company (NAOC) Limited, Total Energies \nand the Gas Aggregation Company of Nigeria (GACN) signed a Gas Sale and Aggregation Agreement (GSAA) to supply 70 million \nstandard cubic feet (mscf) of gas to Dangote Fertilizer Company. \n• \nThe NNPC Ltd. and energy infrastructure conglomerate, Sahara Group took delivery of two sets of 23,000 Coal Bed Methane \n(CBM) to Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), with plans to add 10 vessels in the next few years to enhance Africa’s transition to \ncleaner fuels. \n• \nA consortium of three companies namely; Falcon Corporation, ND Western Midstream Limited and FHN Gas Limited, were \nselected to build, exclusively own and operate a natural gas distribution infrastructure network within the Lagos Free Trade \nZone (LFTZ). \n5 \nSolid \nMinerals \n• \nThe Federal Government announced the auctioning of the National Integrated Mineral Exploration Project (NIMEP). The \nproceeds would be domiciled in a revolving fund to carry out more exploration activities across the country. \n6 \nIndustry \n• \nThe Bank of Industry and Bayelsa State Government unveiled a N2.00 billion Micro Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) \nmatching development fund to support entrepreneurs. \n• \nThe Bank of Industry and the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) also partnered to improve the \nnation’s industrial energy efficiency. \n• \nThe Federal Government, through the National Automotive Design and Development Council (NADDC) announced floating a \nN200.00 billion vehicle financing scheme. \n• \nThe Central Bank of Nigeria partnered with the African Export-Import Bank, Deutsche Gesellschaft fur international \nZusammenarbeit (GIZ) to roll out a ‘factoring’ programme as an alternative financing instrument for micro, small and medium \nenterprises. \n• \nThe Federal Government signed an Interconnected Mini-grid Acceleration Scheme (IMAS) grant agreement with eight \nindigenous solar mini-grid developers for the development of 23 mini-grids across 11 States of the Federation. \n• \nThe FEC approved ₦5.14 billion contract for the design, supply and installation of 1x60MBA, 132×33 KV transmission sub-\nstation, with associated 4×132 KV line bay extension in Adamawa State. \n \n \n \n31 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nBox 1: Policy Support and Developments in the Real Sector Cont… \n \nSector \nDevelopments \n7 \nTransport \n• \nThe Senate passed a bill to amend the Federal Airports Authority Act. \n• \nThe Federal Executive Council (FEC) approved: \n• \n₦5.40 billion for the construction of an access road from Mpape to Shere-Galuwyi Resettlement Housing \nScheme in Bwari area council of the FCT; \n• \n₦52.80 billion for the completion of three road projects that cuts across Akwa Ibom, Abia, Imo, Kwara and \nCross River states; \n• \n₦115.40 billion for the dualisation of Kano-Kazaure-Kongolam highway in Katsina State under the Tax Credit \nScheme; \n• \nUS$2.81billion for the procurement of rolling stocks and other operational and maintenance equipment for \nthe Ibadan-Kano and Port Harcourt-Maiduguri rail lines; \n• \n₦56.30 billion for the completion of the Abaji-Koton Karfe section of the Abuja-Lokoja highway; \n• \nUpward review of the Afo-Apoto-Oyo Boundary road, Kwara State, from ₦3.06 billion to ₦3.31 billion; \n• \n₦36.10 billion for the rehabilitation of Keffi-Nasarawa-Toto road in Nasarawa State; \n• \n₦169.70 billion for the reconstruction of three roads in Kebbi and Niger States and one in Taraba State under \nthe Tax Credit Scheme; \n• \n₦90.80 billion for road rehabilitation in Taraba State and procurement of control tower radio communication \nsystems for 12 airports - located in Akure, Benin, Calabar, Ibadan, Ilorin, Jos, Minna, Owerri, Sokoto, Yola, \nKaduna and Enugu - and instrument landing systems in Lagos, Abuja, Katsina and Port Harcourt airports \n• \nUS$329.00 million was approved for Consultancy Supervision Services of various railway projects in the country; including \nthe Abuja to Warri rail project, Port Harcourt-Maiduguri railway, and the Kano-Katsina-Jibia-Maradi rail-line \n• \n₦250.00 billion proceeds of the 2021 Sukuk issuance was allotted to fund road infrastructure across the six geopolitical \nzones and the FCT. \n• \nSix Nigerian Airlines - Air Peace, Azman Air, United Nigeria Airline, Arik Air, Aero Contractors and Max Air- signed a deal \nto form an alliance, called Spring Alliance. The objective of the alliance was to curb flight delays among the six partners, \nprovide technical support to each other and reduce flight schedule disruptions by ensuring that passengers are airlifted \nby any of the members, irrespective of which partner airline’s ticket the passengers possess. \n• \nThe proposed Nigeria Air received the Air Transport License (ATL) from the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA), \nauthorising it to provide scheduled and non-scheduled service. The ATL certification precedes the Air Operator's \nCertificate (AOC), which empowers the airline to operate scheduled commercial flights. \n8 \nHealth \n• \nThe Federal Government received 3.2 million doses of the Pfizer COVID-19 vaccines from the U.S Government. \n• \nThe Japanese Government donated 859,600 doses of AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccines to Nigeria, through the COVID-19 \nVaccines Global Assess Facility, COVAX, and 4,400,000 doses of Johnson & Johnson COVID-19 vaccines was donated by \nthe Government of Spain. \n• \nThe President signed the National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) Act into law. The Act empowers the NHIA to ensure \nprovision of mandatory health insurance for all Nigerians in collaboration with state health insurance agencies, and \nstipulates the establishment of a new fund to provide subsidy for health insurance coverage for vulnerable persons in \nthe country. \n• \nFollowing the re-emergence of Monkeypox disease, the NCDC activated a national multisectoral Emergency Operations \nCentre for Monkeypox (MPX-EOC) to strengthen and coordinate ongoing response activities in-country. \n9 \nEnvironment \n• \nThe Federal Government unveiled a National Biosecurity Policy and Action Plan for 2022 - 2026, to secure the health of \nNigerians and their immediate environment from biological threats. The framework includes instruments and activities \nthat analyse and manage risks in food safety, animal life and health, plant life and health. \n \n \n \n32 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nDevelopment Financing \nThe Bank sustained its development finance \ninterventions in the critical sectors of the \neconomy to improve access to credit, ensure price \nstability, and support job creation and economic \nrecovery. A total of 240 projects, including 1 \nstate-based project, and 95,091 individuals and \nbusinesses benefited from 17 intervention \nprogrammes by the Bank, in the review period. \nThe interventions included the disbursement of \nN69.13 billion to 51 projects, under the 100-for-\n100 policy on production and productivity (100 \nfor 100 PPP) to enhance productivity and \nimprove foreign exchange earnings. \nAlso, in complementing efforts at mitigating the \nchallenges in the power sector, a total of N34.37 \nbillion was disbursed to eight discos, under the \nNigeria Electricity Market Stabilization Facility \n(NEMSF - 2). Furthermore, 16,569 electricity \nmeters were distributed nationwide in the first \nhalf of 2022, via the National Mass Metering \nProgramme (NMMP). \nCumulative \nrepayments \nfrom \nthe \nBank’s \nintervention programmes rose by 67.3 per cent \nto N471.82 billion from N282.30 billion in the \npreceding half. The increase reflected an \nincreased drive for loan-recovery and positive \nreturns on the programmes. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n33 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \n \nTable 3.2.7: Some Selected \nDisbursements on Interventions in the H1-2021 and H1-2022 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nH1-2021 \nH2-2021 \nH1-2022 * \n \nDisbursements \nRepayments \nDisbursements \nRepayments \nDisbursements \nRepayments \n \nAmount \n(N Billion) \nBeneficiaries \nAmount \n(N Billion) \nAmount \n(N Billion) \nBeneficiaries \nAmount \n(N Billion) \nAmount \n(N Billion) \nBeneficiaries \nAmount \n(N Billion) \nAgricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme \n(ACGS) \n2.17 \n9,719 loans \nguaranteed \n1.75 \n3.75 \n21,974 Loans \nGuaranteed \n2.01 \n3.21 \n13,194 Loans \nGuaranteed \n2.14 \nCommercial Agricultural Credit \nScheme (CACS) \n16.25 \n11 projects \n20.01 \n13.27 \n12 Projects \n48.14 \n28.30 \n12 Projects \n32.86 \nAnchor Borrowers' Programme \n179.35 \n1,008,457 \nfarmers \n47.49 \n246.67 \n384,617 \nfarmers \n196.48 \n35.52 \n28,875 farmers \n42.99 \nAccelerated Agriculture Development \nScheme (AADS) \n1.50 \n1 State \ngovernment-\nsponsored \nprojects \n0.25 \n0.036 \n1 State \ngovernment-\nsponsored \nprojects \n5.31 \n1.50 \n1 State \ngovernment-\nsponsored \nprojects \n4.37 \nMaize Aggregation Scheme (MAS) \n0.35 \n2 Projects \nN/A \nNil \nNil \nNil \nNil \nNil \nNil \nPaddy Aggregation Scheme (PAS) \n4.17 \n1 Project \nNil \nNil \nNil \n4.67 \n6.20 \n3 Projects \nNil \nPresidential Fertilizer Initiative (PFI) \nNil \nNil \n2.50 \nNil \nNil \n2.75 \nNil \nNil \n3.00 \nNational Food Security Programme \n(NFSP) \nNil \nNil \n8.31 \nNil \nNil \n2.30 \nNil \nNil \n2.03 \nReal Sector Support Facility Using \nDifferentiated Cash Reserve Ratio \n(RSSF-DCRR) \n199.69 \n32 Projects \n1.97 \n476.30 \n39 Projects \n0.08 \n210.29 \n34 Projects \n18.50 \nCOVID-19 Intervention for \nManufacturing Sector (CIMS) \n35.99 \n16 Projects \nN/A \nNil \nNil \nNil \n413.84 \n50 Projects \n12.00 \nNon-oil Export Stimulation Facility \n(NESF) \nNil \nNil \n0.58 \n1.76 \nNil \n3.88 \nNil \nNil \n2.00 \nMicro, Small and Medium Enterprises \nDevelopment Fund (MSMEDF) \n0.05 \n1 \nbeneficiaries \n2.91 \n0.69 \nNil \n2.82 \nNil \nNil \n2.52 \nAgribusiness/Small and Medium \nEnterprises Investment Scheme \n(AGSMEIS) \n9.79 \n1,067 \nbeneficiaries \n0.135 \n22.92 \n154 \nBeneficiaries \n1.16 \n1.60 \n2,720 \nBeneficiaries \n0.008 \nCreative Industry Financing Initiative \n(CIFI) \n0.07 \n21 \nbeneficiaries \n0.013 \n0.26 \n30 \nBeneficiaries \n0.25 \nNil \nNil \n0.28 \nTargeted Credit Facility (TCF) \n144.93 \n323,654 \nbeneficiaries \nN/A \n69.91 \n64,008 \nNil \n24.37 \n50,302 \nBeneficiaries \nNil \nNigeria Youth Investment Fund (NYIF) \n2.81 \n6,763 \nN/A \n0.88 \nNil \n2.62 \nNil \nNil \n0.28 \nHealthcare Sector Intervention Facility \n(HSIF) \n25.16 \n23 Projects \nN/A \n11.06 \n23 Projects \nNil \n17.21 \n11 Projects \nNil \nHealthcare Sector Research & \nDevelopment Intervention (Grant) \nScheme (HSRDIS) \n0.15 \n5 \nbeneficiaries \nN/A \n0.03 \n- \nNil \n0.02 \n- \nNil \nNational Mass Metering Programme \n(NMMP) \n36.04 \n393,702 \nN/A \n11.79 \n346,401 \nN/A \n0.20 \n16,569 \nNil \nNigeria Electricity Market Stabilization \nFacility (NEMSF - 2) \n120.29 \n7 DisCos \n5.91 \n96.72 \n8 DisCos \nN/A \n34.37 \n8 DisCos \nNil \nNigeria Bulk Electricity Trading – \nPayment Assurance Facility (NBET-PAF) \n88.99 \n1 Project \nN/A \n301.36 \n1 Project \nNil \n26.93 \n1 Project \n322.87 \nSolar Connection Facility (SCF) \n7.00 \n100,000 SHS \nN/A \n0.00 \nNil \nNil \n0.00 \nNil \nNil \nIntervention Facility for Nigeria Gas \nExpansion Programme (IFNGEP) \n15.20 \n2 Projects \nN/A \n24.00 \n4 Projects \n- \n26.00 \n4 Projects \nNil \nTertiary Institution Entrepreneurship \nScheme (TIES) \n \n \n \n0.03 \n6 \nBeneficiaries \nNil \n0.26 \n53 \nBeneficiaries \nNil \n100FOR100 Policy on Production and \nProductivity (100FOR100 PPP) \n \n \n \n0.00 \n- \n- \n69.13 \n51 Projects \n1.32 \nYouth Entrepreneurship Development \nProgramme (YEDP) \n \n \n \nNil \nNil \n0.001 \nNil \nNil \n0.12 \nPower and Airline Intervention Facility \n(PAIF) \n0.89 \n- \n33.21 \n0.99 \nNil \n6.56 \nNil \nNil \n15.91 \nTextile Sector Intervention Facility (TSIF) \n0.39 \n1 Project \n- \n0.90 \n3 Projects \n3.27 \nNil \nNil \n8.62 \nPrivate – Accelerated Agricultural \nDevelopment Scheme (P-AADS) \n \n \n \nNil \nNil \nNil \nNil \nNil \nNil \nExport Facilitation Initiative (EFI) \n \n \n \n- \n- \nNil \n36.00 \n5 Projects \nNil \nExport Development Facility (EDF) \n \n \n \n- \n- \nNil \n17.08 \n15 Projects \nNil \n \n \n \n \n34 \n \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \n3.3 FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS \nThe Medium-Term Fiscal Policy Framework \nThe focus of fiscal policy in the first half of 2022 \nwas to address the challenges of low economic \ngrowth, insecurity, inadequate public service \ndelivery, and significant infrastructure deficits. \nThese objectives were anchored on the 2022 \nAppropriation Act (as amended), the Medium-\nTerm Expenditure Framework & Fiscal Strategy \nPapers 2022-2024 (MTEF/FSP 2022-2024), and \nthe Medium-Term Debt Strategy 2020-2023 \n(MTDS 2020-2023). \nIn the first half of 2022, low oil revenue earnings \ncontinued to weigh on federation revenue at both \nthe federal and subnational levels, amid \nincreased government spending. Consequently, \nthe fiscal deficit in the first half of 2022 expanded \nto 6.3 per cent of GDP, while the public debt, at \nthe end of June 2022, stood at 23.7 per cent of \nGDP, below the 40.0 per cent MTDS threshold. \nFederation Account Operations \nFederation Revenue \nRevenue projections in the review period were \nhinged on oil parameters and non-oil reforms, \nenvisaged in the 2022 Appropriation Act. Oil \nprice was benchmarked at US$73.00 per barrel \nand domestic crude oil production at 1.60 million \nbarrels per day (mbpd). The amendment of \nrelevant tax laws through the 2021 Finance Act, \nparticularly, the taxation of digital activities with \nsignificant economic presence, boosted non-oil \nrevenue target. Revenue-enhancing measures, \n \n2 Earnings lodged in the Federation Account by virtue of Section 161 of the \nFederal Republic of Nigeria Constitution 1999 as amended. \nsuch as leveraging technology through e-\ncollections and cost-saving measures such as the \nservice-wide implementation of the Integrated \nPayroll and Personnel Information System (IPPIS) \nwere expected to boost revenue outcomes. \n Key Budget Parameters and Projections \n \nSource: 2022 Appropriation Act, (revised) \n \nRevenue outcomes in the first half of 2022 \ndeclined, relative to the level in the second half of \n2021, due to a high cost of value shortfall \nrecovery for PMS and low domestic crude oil \nproduction. At N5,519.86 billion or 6.0 per cent of \nGDP, provisional gross federally collected \nrevenue2 declined by 3.5 per cent relative to the \nlevel in the second half of 2021. However, it rose \n \n•1.60 mbpd\nDaily oil production\n•US$73.00\nCrude oil price\n•N410.15/US$\nExchange rate\n•4.2 %\nGDP growth\n•13.0 %\nInflaiton rate\nDeficits\nN7.35 Trillion\nExpenditure\nN17.32 Trillion\nRevenue\nN9.97 Trillion\n \n \n \n \n35 \n \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nby 9.6 per cent relative to the first half of 2021 \nand fell short of the 2022 proportionate budget \nby 41.3 per cent. The shortfall was attributed, \nlargely, to the significant payment of value \nshortfall recovery for \npremium motor spirit (PMS), which outweighed \nthe benefit of oil earning, despite the high global \ncrude oil prices. \n \nFigure 3.3.1: Structure of Federation Revenue (per cent) \nSources: Federal Ministry of Finance, Budget and National Planning \n(FMFB&NP) and Office of the Accountant General of the \nFederation (OAGF). \n \nImprovement in revenue outcome, relative to the \nfirst half of 2021, was driven by non-oil revenue, \nwhich accounted for 62.0 per cent of total \nfederation \nearnings, \nwhile \noil \nearnings \nconstituted the balance of 38.0 per cent. This \ncompared with the ratio of 49.5:50.6 (non-oil and \noil) revenue ratio in the 2022 Appropriation Act. \n \nThe \nrobust \nnon-oil \nrevenue \nperformance \nreflected early gains from the government’s \ndiversification effort aided by the Strategic \nRevenue Growth Initiatives (SRGIs) and the \nFinance Act 2021. In contrast, the contribution of \noil continued to be dampened by the high value \nshortfall recovery for PMS and low domestic \ncrude oil production despite rising crude oil \nprices. \n \nTable 3.3.1: Federally Collected Revenue and Distribution \n(N Billion) \nSources: Federal Ministry of Finance, Budget, and National \nPlanning (FMFB&NP) \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1st Half \n2021 \n2nd Half \n2021 \n1st Half \n2022 \nBudget \nFederation Revenue \n(Gross) \n \n5,035.13 \n5,720.28 \n5,519.86 \n9,196.51 \nOil \n \n2,100.40 \n2,257.87 \n2,095.34 \n4,750.21 \nCrude Oil & Gas Exports \n \n18.84 \n15.68 \n0.00 \n 405.42 \nPPT & Royalties \n \n1,403.59 \n1,667.25 \n1,707.64 \n 3,185.47 \nDomestic Crude Oil/Gas Sales \n \n618.75 \n510.71 \n339.12 \n 252.26 \nOthers \n \n59.22 \n64.22 \n48.57 \n 907.05 \nNon-oil \n \n2,934.73 \n3,462.41 \n3,424.52 \n4,646.30 \nCorporate Tax \n \n779.44 \n1,003.66 \n969.91 \n993.89 \nCustoms & Excise Duties \n \n544.59 \n753.36 \n789.36 \n929.29 \nValue-Added Tax (VAT) \n \n1,025.54 \n1,017.42 \n1,181.86 \n1,220.90 \nIndependent Revenue of Fed. \nGovt. \n \n519.78 \n670.30 \n467.84 \n1,308.11 \nOthers* \n \n65.38 \n17.67 \n15.54 \n479.64 \nTotal \nDeductions/Transfers* \n \n \n1,717.99 \n \n1,661.98 \n \n1,915.85 \n 2,298.45 \nFederally Collected Rev \n(Net) \nLess Deductions & \nTransfers** \n \n3,317.14 \n4,058.30 \n3,604.01 \n7,098.06 \nPlus: \n \n \n \n \n \nAdditional Revenue \n \n \n125.30 \n \n \n170.30 \n \n \n303.99 \n \n104.88 \n \nExcess Oil Revenue \n \n0.00 \n0.00 \n0.00 \n0.00 \nExcess Non-Oil Revenue \n \n99.02 \n150.84 \n293.64 \n104.88 \nExchange Gain \n \n26.28 \n19.46 \n10.35 \n0.00 \nTotal Distributed \nBalance \n \n3,442.45 \n4,228.60 \n3,907.99 \n7,202.94 \n Federal Government \n \n \n1,348.73 \n \n \n1,736.14 \n \n \n1,473.96 \n \n \n3,054.53 \n \n State Governments \n \n \n1,088.41 \n \n \n1,282.07 \n \n \n1,255.39 \n \n \n2,073.23 \n \n Local Governments \n \n \n805.28 \n \n \n954.82 \n \n \n925.35 \n \n \n1,554.52 \n \n 13% Derivation \n \n \n200.03 \n \n \n255.58 \n \n \n253.30 \n \n \n520.65 \n \n41.7\n39.5\n38.0\n58.3\n60.5\n62.0\n0.0\n20.0\n40.0\n60.0\n80.0\n100.0\n1st Half 2021\n2nd Half 2021\n1st Half 2022\nOil Revenue\nNon-Oil Revenue\n \n \n \n \n36 \n \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nDrivers of Federally Collected Revenue \n• \nNon-oil Revenue \nA gradual recovery in the domestic economy, \nstirred by improved economic activities and \nhigher independent revenue, led to a favourable \nnon-oil revenue outcome. Non-oil revenue at \nN3,424.52 billion (3.7 per cent of GDP), rose by \n16.7 per cent relative to the first half of 2021. The \nimprovement, relative to the level in the first half \nof 2021, reflected improved performance in non-\noil revenue sources, particularly company income \ntax, customs and excise duties and value-added \ntax. Despite the rise in non-oil receipts, relative to \nthe first half of 2021, they fell below the levels in \nthe second half of 2021 and the proportionate \ntarget by 1.1 per cent and 26.3 per cent, \nrespectively. \n \nFigure 3.3.2: Composition of Non-Oil Revenue (per cent) \nSources: Federal Ministry of Finance, Budget and National Planning \n(FMFB&NP) and Office of the Accountant General of the Federation \n(OAGF). \n \n• \nOil Revenue \nDespite the sustained rise in crude oil prices at the \ninternational market, oil receipt declined, relative \nto 2021 and the target for 2022. At N2,095.34 \nbillion (2.3 per cent of GDP), oil revenue was 0.2 \nper cent and 7.2 per cent, below receipts in the \nfirst and second halves of 2021. It was also below \nthe proportionate budget of N4,750.21 billion by \n55.9 per cent. The low revenue was attributed to \nhigh value shortfall recovery for PMS and low \ndomestic crude oil production occasioned by oil \ntheft and pipeline vandalism. \n \n Figure 3.3.3: Composition of Oil Revenue (per cent) \n \nSource: Federal Ministry of Finance, Budget and National Planning \n(FMFB&NP) and Office of the Accountant General of the \nFederation (OAGF). \n \n \nDeductions \nFrom the gross revenue of N5,519.86 billion in \nthe first half of 2022, statutory deductions from \noil and non-oil revenues, as well as transfers, \namounted to N1,915.85 billion, leaving a net \ndistributable balance of N3,907.99 billion. \nAllocations to the three tiers of government \nGross allocation to the three tiers of government \nrose by 13.5 per cent, due, majorly, to increased \nFederation revenue, relative to the first half of \n2021. However, the disbursement was 7.6 per \ncent and 45.7 per cent short of allocations in the \nsecond half of 2021 and the half year budget, \nrespectively. \nThe \nshortfall \nin \nfederation \nallocation, and low independent revenue \nexacerbated fiscal pressure at the central and \nsubnational levels, in the review period. \n \n \n \n \nPPT & \nRoyalties\n81.5%\nDomestic \nCrude Oil & \nGas Sales\n16.2%\nOthers\n2.3%\nCompany \nIncome Tax\n28.3%\nCustoms & \nExcise Duties\n23.0%\nValue-\nAdded Tax\n34.5%\nFGN \nIndependent \nRevenue\n13.7%\nOther \nTransfers\n0.5%\n \n \n \n \n37 \n \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nFigure 3.3.4: Distribution to the Three Tiers of Government \nand 13% Derivation Fund (N Billion) \n \nSource: Federal Ministry of Finance, Budget and National Planning \n(FMFB&NP) and Office of the Accountant General of the Federation \n(OAGF). \n \nStructure of Tax Revenue \nAnalysis of the structure of federation revenue \nwith a focus on tax performance, indicates \nsustained growth in the contribution of taxes to \nfederation earnings since the first half of 2021. \nTax revenue accounted for 85.2 per cent of total \nfederation revenue in the first half of 2022, \ncompared with 78.0 per cent and 75.8 per cent in \nthe second and first halves of 2021, respectively. \nIncome tax (consisting Petroleum Profit Tax (PPT) \nand Company Income Tax (CIT)) remained the \nmain driver of tax revenue in the period, \naccounting for 57.4 per cent. \nTax revenue-to-GDP at 5.1 per cent, was above \nthe levels in the first and second halves of 2021 \nat 4.8 per cent and 4.6 per cent, respectively. In \ncomparison with an average of 16.6 per cent in \n30 African countries3, Nigeria’s tax revenue-to-\nGDP during the period was below the average. \n \n \n \n \n \n3 Revenue Statistics in Africa OECD 2021. \n \n Figure 3.3.5: Structure of Tax Revenue \n \nNote: PPT includes royalties, thus overstating its contribution. \nSources: Federal Ministry of Finance, Budget and National Planning \n(FMFB&NP) and Office of the Accountant General of the Federation \n(OAGF). \n \n Figure 3.3.6: Composition of Tax Revenue \nSources: Staff computation using data from the Federal Ministry of \nFinance, Budget and National Planning (FMFB&NP) and Office of the \nAccountant General of the Federation (OAGF). \nNote: Income tax consists of CIT and PPT. However, PPT includes \nroyalties, which might overstate PPT contribution. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n0\n500\n1000\n1500\n2000\n2500\n3000\n3500\nFG\nSG\nLG\n13%\nHalf Year\nBenchmark\n2022H1\n2021H2\n2021H1\n2,183.03\n2,670.91\n2,677.55\n4,179.36\n1,025.54\n1,017.42\n1,181.86\n1,220.90\n544.59\n753.36\n789.36\n929.29\n2 0 2 1 H 1\n2 0 2 1 H 2\n2 0 2 2 H 1\nB U D G E T\nBillion Naira\nIncome tax\nVAT\nTrade tax\n58.2%\n27.3%\n14.5%\n2021H1\n60.1%\n22.9%\n17.0%\n2021H2\n57.6%\n25.4%\n17.0%\n2022H1\n66.0%\n19.3%\n14.7%\n2022 Benchmark\n \n \n \n \n38 \n \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nTable 3.3.2: Federation Revenue Structure \n \n2021H1 \n2021H2 \n2022H1 \nBudget \nTotal revenue \n5,035.13 \n5,720.27 \n5,518.85 \n9,682.04 \nNon-Tax \n1,216.59 \n1,260.92 \n854.53 \n3,083.12 \nTax \n3,818.55 \n4,459.36 \n4,664.32 \n6,598.92 \n Tax Revenue Percentage of: \n \n \n \n Federation \n revenue \n75.8 \n78.0 \n84.5 \n68.2 \n GDP \n4.8 \n4.7 \n5.1 \n6.73 \n Income tax \n2,183.03 \n2,670.91 \n2,677.55 \n4,179.36 \n PPT \n1,403.59 \n1,667.25 \n1,707.64 \n3,185.47 \n CIT \n779.44 \n1,003.66 \n969.91 \n993.89 \n Consumption tax \n1,025.54 \n1,017.42 \n1,181.86 \n1,220.90 \n Trade tax \n544.59 \n753.36 \n789.36 \n929.29 \n Other Taxes \n65.38 \n17.67 \n15.54 \n269.37 \nNote: PPT includes royalties, thus overstating its contribution. \nSources: Staff computation using data from the Federal Ministry of \nFinance, Budget and National Planning (FMFB&NP) and Office of the \nAccountant General of the Federation (OAGF). \n \nFiscal Operations of the Federal Government \n \nFGN Retained Revenue \nRetained revenue of the FGN fell, occasioned by \ndeclines in statutory receipts from the Federation \nAccount \nand \nFGN \nindependent \nrevenue. \nProvisional FGN retained revenue, at N2,319.48 \nbillion (2.6 per cent of GDP), declined by 14.5 per \ncent and 48.8 per cent, relative to the levels in \nthe second half of 2021 and the 2022 half year \nbudget, respectively. It however rose above the \nreceipt in the first half of 2021 by 1.4 per cent. \nThe development was due to the low receipts \nfrom the Federation Account, driven by low \ncrude oil production. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Table 3.3.3: FGN Retained Revenue (N Billion) \n \n2021H1 \n2021H2 \n2022H1 \nBudget \nFGN Retained \nRevenue \n2,288.61 \n2,713.87 \n2,319.48 \n4,532.50 \nFederation \nAccount \n1,141.86 \n1,505.48 \n1,185.93 \n2,869.15 \nVAT Pool \nAccount \n143.06 \n142.06 \n165.08 \n169.66 \nFGN \nIndependent \nRevenue \n519.78 \n670.30 \n467.84 \n1,308.11 \nExcess Oil \nRevenue \n0.00 \n0.00 \n0.00 \n0.00 \nExcess Non-Oil \n51.35 \n79.46 \n118.04 \n0.00 \nExchange Gain \n12.19 \n9.13 \n4.90 \n0.00 \nOthers* \n420.38 \n307.43 \n377.68 \n185.59 \n Sources: Federal Ministry of Finance, Budget and National Planning \n(FMFB&NP) and Office of the Accountant General of the Federation \n(OAGF) \nNote*: Includes Transfers from Special Levies Accounts, FGN’s share \nof Signature Bonus, Domestic Recoveries, Stamp Duty, Grants and \nDonor Funding and Share of NLNG Dividend. \n \nFederal Government Expenditure \nProvisional aggregate expenditure of the FGN in \nthe first half of 2022 rose substantially, amid \nrising interest payment obligations. At N8,042.32 \nbillion (8.9 per cent of GDP), provisional \naggregate expenditure of the FGN exceeded the \nlevels in the first and second halves of 2021 by \n38.7 per cent and 27.2 per cent, respectively. The \nincrease reflected new spending priorities to \ngrow the economy, as well as huge interest \npayment obligations. \nRecurrent expenditure, at N5,176.67 billion (5.7 \nper cent of GDP), accounted for 64.4 per cent of \ntotal expenditure, while capital expenditure and \ntransfers recorded 30.4 per cent and 5.2 per cent, \nrespectively. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n39 \n \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \n Table 3.3.4: FGN Expenditure (N Billion) \n \n2021H1 \n2021H2 \n2022H1 \nHalf Year \nBenchmark \nAggregate \nExpenditure \n5,797.54 \n6,323.65 \n8,042.32 \n7,635.99 \nRecurrent \n4,460.36 \n4,641.84 \n5,176.67 \n 5,401.94 \nof which: \n \n \n \n \nPersonnel \nCost \n1,616.94 \n1,429.52 \n1,716.35 \n1,827.88 \nPension and \nGratuities \n178.66 \n177.46 \n191.05 \n288.93 \nOverhead \nCost \n438.45 \n616.93 \n543.05 \n 894.97 \nInterest \nPayments \n2,020.17 \n2,201.49 \n2,597.85 \n1,978.04 \nDomestic \n1,523.02 \n1,752.35 \n2,048.15 \n1,416.43 \nExternal \n497.15 \n449.14 \n549.70 \n561.61 \nSpecial \nFunds \n206.14 \n216.43 \n128.35 \n412.12 \nCapital \nExpenditure \n1,088.92 \n1,433.54 \n2,445.67 \n1,832.25 \nTransfers \n248.26 \n248.27 \n419.98 \n 401.80 \n \nSource: CBN Staff Estimate \n \n \nSource: Staff Estimate \n \nFigure 3.3.7: Composition of Federal Government \nExpenditure (per cent) \n \n Sources: Office of the Accountant General of the Federation \n(OAGF) and Staff estimates \n \nWith regards to the capital budget releases and \nutilisation by MDAs, the Office of the National \nSecurity Adviser (ONSA), Interior, Works & \nHousing, Power, and Aviation ranked highest, \nwhile Education, Transport and Trade & \nInvestment ranked least. On average, 50.3 per \ncent of capital releases was utilised in the first \nhalf of 2022 \n Figure 3.3.8: Expenditure performance (per cent) \n \nSources: Federal Ministry of Finance, Budget and National Planning \n(FMFB&NP) and Office of the Accountant General of the Federation \n(OAGF). \n \n \nFederal Government Fiscal Balance \nThe fiscal operations of the Federal Government \nin the first half of 2022 recorded a deficit of 6.3 \nper cent of GDP, driven largely, by low revenue \noutcome amid rising debt service obligations. \nProvisional overall fiscal deficit at N5,722.84 \nbillion rose by 63.1 per cent, 58.5 per cent and \n84.4 per cent, relative to the levels in the first and \nsecond halves of 2021, and proportionate \nbudget, respectively. This reflected the persistent \nrevenue challenge, amid an upsurge in spending \nobligations. The deficit was financed from both \ndomestic and external sources. \nRecurrent \n66.4%\nCapital\n28.4%\nTransfers\n5.2%\n100.0 \n2.3 \n22.8 \n11.4 \n5.0 \n14.2 \n100.0 \n10.4 \n51.9 \n35.2 \n99.3 \n100.0 \n100.0 \n1.4 \n100.0 \n50.3 \n -\n 10.0\n 20.0\n 30.0\n 40.0\n 50.0\n 60.0\n 70.0\n 80.0\n 90.0\n 100.0\n 110.0\n \nTable 3.3.5: Economic Classification of \nGovernment Expenditure \nFirst Half 2022 \n \nExpenditure \n(=N=billion) \nPercentage share \n \nAdmin. \nEconomic \nservices \nSocial and \ncommunity \nservices \nTransfers \nRecurrent \n5,176.67 \n23.9 \n6.4 \n13.5 \n56.2 \nCapital \n2,445.67 \n38.5 \n41.1 \n15.9 \n4.5 \nTransfers \n419.98 \n- \n- \n- \n- \n \n \n \n \n40 \n \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nTable 3.3.6: Federal Government Fiscal Operations \n(N Billion) \n \n \n2021H1 \n2021H2 \n2022H1 \nHalf Year \nBenchmark \nRetained \nrevenue \n2,288.61 \n2,713.87 \n2,319.48 \n4,532.50 \nAggregate \nexpenditure \n5,797.54 \n6,323.65 \n8,042.32 \n7,635.99 \nPrimary \nbalance \n-1,488.76 \n-1,408.29 \n-3,124.99 \n-1,125.45 \nOverall \nbalance \n-3,508.93 \n-3,609.78 \n-5,722.84 \n-3,103.49 \nGDP \n(Nominal) \n80,122.52 \n95,952.98 \n91,407.93 \n94,115.88* \nDeficit-to-\nGDP (%) \n4.48 \n3.76 \n6.26 \n3.3 \nSource: CBN Staff Estimates from available data \nNote: * 2022 Figures are provisional, ** Estimate based on the \n4.4% GDP growth rate forecast in the 2022 Appropriation Act \n \n \nFigure 3.3.9: Federal Government Fiscal Operations \n(N Billion) \nSources: Federal Ministry of Finance, Budget and National Planning \n(FMFB&NP) and Office of the Accountant General of the Federation \n(OAGF). \nNote: revenue and expenditure figures are provisional \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nPublic Debt Strategy and Sustainability \nTotal Public Debt \nFollowing new borrowings from domestic and \nexternal sources, majorly, for the financing of \ninfrastructural facilities and legacy liabilities, \npublic debt levels were elevated but remained \nbelow the threshold of 40.0 per cent of the GDP in \nthe MTDS4. \nTotal public debt outstanding, constituting \nFederal and State governments’ debt obligation, \nat end-June 2022, stood at N42,845.88 billion or \n23.4 per cent of the GDP and represented an \nincrease of 8.3 per cent and 20.8 per cent above \nthe levels at end-December 2021 and end-June \n2021, respectively. The increase was attributed \nto new borrowings to fund part of the 2022 \nbudget, settle the inherited arrears of the FGN to \nState governments, oil marketing companies, \nexporters, and local contractors. \n \n \nTable 3.3.7: Total Public Debt (N Billion) \nType \n2021H1 \n2021H2 \n2022H1 \nExternal Debt \n13,710.88 \n15,855.23 \n16,615.66 \n Of which: \n \n \nFGN \n11,845.63 \n13,884.76 \n14,723.46 \nStates & FCT \n1,865.24 \n \n 1,970.47 \n1,892.20 \nDomestic Debt \n21,754.13 \n23,700.80 \n26,230.22 \n Of Which: \n \n \nFGN \n17,631.80 \n19,242.56 \n20,948.94 \nStates & FCT \n4,122.32 \n4,458.24 \n5,281.28 \nTotal \n35,465.01 \n 39,556.03 \n 42,845.88 \nSource: Debt Management Office. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n42020-2023 Medium-Term Debt Strategy framework \n (6,000)\n (4,000)\n (2,000)\n -\n 2,000\n 4,000\n 6,000\n 8,000\n 10,000\n2021H1\n2021H2\n2022H1\nBudget\nExpenditure\nRevenue\nFiscal Balance\n \n41 \n \n41 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2021 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThe consolidated debt stock of the Federal \nGovernment \n(including \nState \ngovernments’ \nexternal debt, which forms part of the FGN’s \ncontingent liability), at end-June 2022, was \nN37,564.61 billion or 20.5 per cent of the GDP, \nwhile State governments’ domestic debt stock \naccounted for the balance of N5,281.28 billion or \n2.9 per cent of the GDP. As a ratio of total public \nDebt, FGN debt stock accounted for 87.7 per cent \nand the balance of 12.3 per cent was held by state \ngovernments. \nFederal Government Debt Profile \n• \nDebt Strategy \nFGN borrowing in the review period was guided by \nthe 2020-2023 MTDS, which stipulates the \nborrowing limits, optimal debt portfolio mix, cost-\nrisk and other considerations towards ensuring \ndebt sustainability. \n \nTable 3.3.8: Revised MTDS Targets \nSource: MTDS 2020-2023, Debt Management Office. \n \n• \nFGN Debt Stock and Composition \nA breakdown of the FGN debt showed that \ndomestic debt stood at N20,948.94 billion (55.8 \nper cent), while external debt was N16,615.66 \nbillion (44.2 per cent). FGN Bond issues \nmaintained its dominance, accounting for 72.5 per \ncent of the total domestic debt, followed by \nTreasury Bills (21.5 per cent), FGN Sukuk (2.9 per \n \n5 Composed of Treasury Bonds (0.4%), Green Bonds (0.1%) and FGN \nSavings Bond (0.1%) \ncent), Promissory Notes (2.5 per cent), and others5 \n(0.6 per cent). \nFigure 3.3.10: Composition of FGN Debt Stock (N \nBillion) \nSource: Debt Management Office. \nHoldings of Nigeria’s external debt indicates that \nMultilateral, Commercial and Bilateral loans \naccounted for 47.8 per cent, 39.0 per cent and \n11.7 per cent, respectively, while ‘other’ 6 loans \nconstituted 1.5 per cent. \nFigure 3.3.11: Composition of External Debt Stock by \nHolders\n \nSource: Compiled from Debt Management Office figures. \n \n• \nDebt Service \nThe consolidated debt service payments of the \nFederal Government, at end-June 2022, was \nN1,870.80 billion. The sum of N1,333.41 billion \n6 Promissory Notes \n13,710.88 \n15,855.23 \n16,615.66 \n17,631.80 \n19,242.56 \n20,948.94 \n2021H1\n2021H2\n2022H1\nLocal Currecy Denominated Debt\nForeign Currecy Denominated Debt\nMultilateral\n47.8%\nBilateral\n11.7%\nCommercial\n39.0%\nOthers\n1.5%\nIndicator \nTargets \nTargets \n2016-2019 \n2020-\n2023 \nFiscal Sustainability: Total Public \nDebt as % of the GDP \nMax. 25% \nMax. 40% \nPortfolio Composition: \n \n \nDomestic: External Debt Mix \nMax.60: \nMin.40 \nMax.70: \nMin.30 \nRefinancing Risk: Average Tenor of \nDebt Portfolio \nMin. 10 \nyears \nMin. 10 \nyears \nLong-Term: Short-Term \nMin.75: \nMax.25 \nMin.75: \nMax.25 \nDomestic Debt Mix \n \n \n \n42 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nwas paid to domestic creditors, while external \ncreditors received N537.39 billion. \n \nFigure 3.3.12: Breakdown of Total Debt Service \n(N Billion) \nSource: Debt Management Office \n \nSub-National Government Fiscal Analysis \nState Governments and FCT Finances \nRevenue \nImprovement in non-oil earnings resulted in higher \nstatutory receipts by state governments. At \nN1,508.69 billion, state governments’ gross \nallocation increased by N220.25 billion or 17.1 per \ncent, relative to the level in the first half of 2021. \nThe increase was due, largely, to significant \nimprovement in VAT and Non-oil excess receipts. \nRelative to the level in the second half of 2021, \nhowever, non-oil revenue declined by N28.95 \nbillion or 1.9 per cent. \nOutstanding liabilities of state governments \namounted to N277.25 billion7 and was deducted \nfrom states’ Federation Account receipts, leaving \na net balance of N1,231.44 billion for distribution \nto the state governments. The allocations \nconstituted: Federation Account (Statutory), \n \n7 These arise from state governments’ contractual obligations, \nincluding their contribution to external debt service fund, payments \nN853.78 billion (56.6 per cent); VAT Pool Account, \nN550.27 billion (36.5 per cent); Non-oil Excess \nN101.10 billion (6.7 per cent); and Exchange Gain, \nN3.53 billion (0.2 per cent). \nExpenditure \nFurther analysis shows that total provisional \naggregate expenditure by state governments rose \nby 6.5 per cent to N2,853.31 billion in the first half \nof \n2022, \nfrom \nN2,677.90 \nbillion \nin \nthe \ncorresponding period of 2021. However, relative \nto the level in the second half of 2021, total \nexpenditure fell by 5.0 per cent (N149.11 billion). \nCapital expenditure at N1,202.12 billion fell by \n12.1 per cent (N166.04 billion), relative to the level \nin the preceding period of 2021. At N1,652.10 \nbillion, recurrent expenditure maintained its \ndominance of total expenditure, accounting for \n57.9 per cent in the review period. \nFigure 3.3.13: Composition of State Governments and \nFCT’s Revenue First Half 2022 (per cent) \n \nSource: Sources: Federal Ministry of Finance, Budget and National \nPlanning (FMFB&NP), Office of the Accountant General of the \nFederation (OAGF) and Staff Estimates \n \n \n \n \n \n \nfor fertiliser, State Agricultural Project, National Fadama Project and \nthe National Agricultural Technology Support Programme. \n506.17 \n119.09 \n537.39 \n935.46 \n1,118.98 \n1,333.41 \n1,441.63 \n1,238.07 \n1,870.80 \n0\n500\n1,000\n1,500\n2,000\n2021H1\n2021H2\n2022H1\nExternal\nDomestic\nTotal\nFederation \nAcct \n56.6%\nVAT \n36.5%\nExcess Non-\nOil \n6.7%\nExchange \nGain \n0.2%\n \n \n \n43 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nFigure 3.3.14: Composition of State Governments and \nFCT’s Expenditure, First Half 2022 (per cent) \n \nSource: Federal Ministry of Finance, Budget and National Planning \n(FMFB&NP), Office of the Accountant General of the Federation (OAGF) and \nStaff Estimates \nLocal Government Finances \nThe revenue profile of local governments was \nenhanced by improved collections in the VAT Pool \nAccount. Total allocations to the 774 local \ngovernments from the Federation Account in the \nfirst half of 2022 was N925.35 billion. This was \n14.9 per cent higher than the level in the first half \nof 2021. However, it was 3.1 per cent and 40.5 per \ncent lower than the second half of 2021 and the \nbudget, respectively. Dynamics in the Federation \nAccount \nearnings \ndictated \nthe \nrevenue \nperformance of the subnational unit. \nGross allocation comprised receipts from the \nFederation Account, N463.75 billion (50.1 per \ncent); VAT, N385.19 billion (41.6 per cent); non-oil \nexcess revenue, N74.49 billion (8.1 per cent); and \nexchange gain, N1.92 billion (0.2 per cent). \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Table 3.3.9: Subnational Government Revenue (N \nBillion) \n \n \n2021H1 \n2021H2 \n 2022H1 \nBenchmark \nState \nGovernments \n \n1,088.41 \n1,282.07 \n1,255.39 \n2,073.23 \nLocal \nGovernments \n \n805.28 \n954.82 \n925.35 \n1,554.52 \n13% \nDerivation \n \n200.03 \n255.58 \n253.30 \n520.65 \n \nState \n \nAllocation \n(N’Billion) \n \n% of Total \n \n \n2021H1 \n2021H2 \n 2022H1 \nTop 3 \nLagos \n101.24 \n118.39 \n116.73 \n7.7 \n \nDelta \n93.49 \n117.63 \n115.48 \n7.7 \n \nRivers \n71.74 \n87.64 \n86.68 \n5.7 \nBottom 3 \nEkiti \n23.99 \n28.3 \n27.58 \n1.8 \n \nKwara \n23.79 \n27.83 \n27.38 \n1.8 \n \nNassarawa \n23.7 \n27.81 \n27.3 \n1.8 \n \n \nLocal \n \nAllocation \n(N’Billion) \n \n% of Total \n \n \n2021H1 \n2021H2 \n 2022H1 \n \nTop 3 \nLagos \n61.85 \n65.81 \n75.06 \n8.1 \n \nKano \n44.41 \n53.07 \n51.14 \n5.5 \n \nOyo \n32.5 \n37.94 \n37.67 \n4.1 \nBottom 3 \nEbonyi \n12.69 \n15.11 \n14.37 \n1.6 \n \nGombe \n11.46 \n13.98 \n13.26 \n1.4 \n \nBayelsa \n9.46 \n10.81 \n10.79 \n1.2 \nSource: Staff compilation from Sources: Federal Ministry of Finance, \nBudget and National Planning (FMFB&NP) and Office of the \nAccountant General of the Federation (OAGF). \n \nLocal governments in Lagos, Kano and Oyo states \nreceived the highest allocations in the period at \nN75.06 billion (8.1 per cent), N51.14 billion (5.3 \nper cent), and N37.67 billion (4.1 per cent); while \nEbonyi, Gombe and Bayelsa states ranked least \nreceiving 1.6 per cent, 1.4 per cent and 1.2 per \ncent of the total allocation to the 774 local \ngovernments, respectively. \nCapital Exp\n42.1%\nRecurrent \nExp\n57.9%\n \n \n \n44 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nFigure 3.3.15: Composition of Statutory Allocations to \nLocal Governments, First Half 2022 (per cent) \nSource: Sources: Federal Ministry of Finance, Budget and National \nPlanning (FMFB&NP) and Office of the Accountant General of the \nFederation (OAGF). \n3.4 FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS \n \nMonetary and Credit Developments \nThe \nBank \nmaintained \nan \naccommodative \nmonetary policy stance for most part of the review \nperiod, to support growth. However, the need to \ntame inflationary pressures and encourage foreign \ncapital inflow prompted a switch to a hawkish \npolicy stance in the later part of the review period. \n \nReserve Money \nReserve money grew in the first half of 2022 on \naccount of increased liabilities to other depository \ncorporations. \nRequired \nreserves \nof \nother \ndepository corporations (ODCs) surged by 8.5 per \ncent at end-June 2022, triggered by penal debits \non banks that defaulted on the minimum Loan to \nDeposit Ratio requirement. This propelled a 6.4 \nper cent growth in liabilities to ODCs, in contrast \nto the decline of 2.3 per cent and 6.0 per cent \nrecorded in the preceding half and corresponding \nperiod of 2021, respectively. \n \n \n \nTable 3.4.1: Reserve Money (N Billion) \n \nJun-20 \nDec-20 \nJun-21 \nDec-21 \nJun-22 \n Reserve \nMoney \n13,245.39 \n13,107.92 \n12,333.85 \n13,295.15 \n13,860.27 \nCurrency \nin \nCirculation \n2,300.83 \n \n2,908.46 \n \n2,741.26 \n \n3,325.16 \n \n3,255.56 \n \nNotes and \nCoins \n \n2,300.83 \n \n \n2,908.46 \n \n \n2,741.26 \n \n3,324.21 \n3,254.20 \neNaira \n- \n- \n- \n 0.95 \n 1.36 \nLiabilities \nto ODCs \n10,944.55 \n10,199.46 \n9,592.59 \n9,969.99 \n10,604.70 \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \nConsequently, reserve money grew by 4.3 per \ncent to ₦13,860.27 billion in the first half of 2022, \ncompared with 1.4 per cent in the preceding half \nyear, but was in contrast to the decline of 5.9 per \ncent in the corresponding period of 2021. On the \ncontrary, currency in circulation (CIC), declined by \n2.1 per cent in the first half of 2022, compared \nwith the decline of 5.8 per cent in the \ncorresponding period of 2021, but was in contrast \nto a growth of 14.3 per cent in the preceding half. \nThe decline in CIC was attributed to the \nimplementation of the cashless policy and \nincrease in e-payment, which rose by 237.8 per \ncent in the first half of 2022 compared with the \ncorresponding period of 2021. \nFigure 3.4. 1: Reserve Money (N Billion) \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \n \n \n \n \n -\n 2,000\n 4,000\n 6,000\n 8,000\n 10,000\n 12,000\n 14,000\nJun-20\nDec-20\nJun-21\nDec-21\nJun-22\nCIC\n2,300.83\n2,908.46\n2,741.26\n3,325.16\n3,255.56\nLODCs\n10,944.5 10,199.46 9,592.59\n9,969.99 10,784.29\nRM\n13,245.3 13,107.92 12,333.85 13,295.15 13,860.27\nN' Billion\nVAT\n41.6%\nExchange \nGain\n0.2%\nFederation \nAccount\n50.1%\nNon-Oil \nExcess\n8.1%\n \n \n \n45 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nFigure 3.4.2: Currency-Reserve Deposit Ratio and \nBroad Money Multiplier \n \n Source: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nBroad Money Supply \nBroad money (M3) grew above its benchmark in \nthe first half of 2022, driven by net domestic assets \n(NDA). The growth in loans to the central \ngovernment by depository corporations and the \nrise in claims on private sector resulted in an \nincrease in net claims on central government and \nclaims on other sectors. Net claims on central \ngovernment and claims on other sectors grew by \n31.6 per cent and 12.4 per cent, compared with \nthe growth of 20.4 per cent and 16.8 per cent in \nthe preceding half year, and 0.9 per cent and 9.2 \nper cent in the corresponding period of 2021, \nrespectively. Consequently, NDA grew by 21.9 per \ncent in the first half of 2022, the same level of \ngrowth in the preceding half year, but lower than \n11.9 per cent in the corresponding period of 2021. \nForeign loans and non-residents’ deposits with \ndepository corporations increased in the review \nperiod, leading to a 29.6 per cent surge in liabilities \nto non-residents. Resultantly, net foreign assets \n(NFA) fell by 34.7 per cent, compared with 18.7 \nper cent decline in the corresponding period of \n2021, as against the growth of 4.2 per cent in the \npreceding half year. \nThe growth in NDA outweighed the decline in NFA, \noccasioning an increase in broad money supply \n(M3) by 10.0 per cent (annualised at 20.0 per cent) \nTable 3.4.2: Growth in Money Assets & Liabilities \nto N48,890.24 billion in the review period, \ncompared with the benchmark of 14.9 per cent for \nthe fiscal year. \n \nDrivers of Growth in Monetary Assets \nGrowth in broad money supply was driven, \nmajorly, by the contribution of domestic claims. \nNet domestic assets of the banking system at \nN42,789.31 billion, grew by 21.9 per cent and \ncontributed 17.3 percentage points to the growth \nin broad money supply. Domestic claims grew by \n17.8 per cent to N57,448.24 billion, and \ncontributed 19.6 percentage points to the growth \n0.0\n2.0\n4.0\n6.0\n8.0\nJun.\n20\nDec\n-20\nJun-\n21\nDec\n-21\nJun-\n22\nBroad Money\nMultiplier\n2.70 2.97 3.20 3.34 3.53\nCurrency/Depos\nit Ratio\n6.08 7.06 6.14 7.08 5.89\nPer Cent\n \nJun 20 \nDec 20 \nJun 21 \nDec 21 \nJun 22 \nNFA \n40.64 \n50.95 \n(18.73) \n4.22 \n(34.68) \nDC \n4.74 \n12.71 \n6.85 \n17.83 \n17.82 \nNet claims on \nGovernment \n(11.88) \n13.81 \n0.88 \n20.42 \n31.61 \nClaims on \n \n \n \n \n \nOther Sectors \n11.04 \n12.30 \n9.15 \n16.83 \n12.35 \nOther \nfinancial \ncorporations \n \n21.89 \n \n7.98 \n \n(1.89) \n \n(5.34) \n \n2.91 \nState and \nlocal \ngovernment \n(3.07) \n10.64 \n3.57 \n20.63 \n29.85 \nPublic \nnonfinancial \ncorporations \n(8.66) \n(0.65) \n28.75 \n3.44 \n42.37 \nPrivate sector \n8.46 \n15.16 \n13.87 \n26.84 \n12.64 \nBroad \nmoney \nLiabilities \n2.63 \n11.63 \n1.56 \n14.24 \n10.02 \nCurrency \noutside \ndepository \ncorporations \n \n(7.63) \n \n23.38 \n \n(9.91) \n \n17.74 \n \n(7.46) \nTransferable \ndeposits \n21.88 \n54.69 \n3.25 \n13.30 \n16.61 \nOther \ndeposits \n10.88 \n20.63 \n3.86 \n19.99 \n8.19 \nSecurities \nother than \nshares \n(46.85) \n(81.98) \n(39.82) \n(99.92) \n(1.68) \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \n \n \n \n46 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nin money supply, compared with 18.9 and 7.3 \npercentage points in the preceding half and \ncorresponding period of 2021, respectively. \n \nNet claims on central government grew by 31.6 \nper cent, due to increase in depository \ncorporation’s claims on central government. Thus, \nnet claims on central government contributed 9.8 \npercentage points to the growth in broad money \nsupply in the first half of 2022, compared with 6.0 \npercentage points in the preceding half. \n \nSimilarly, claims on other sectors rose by 12.4 per \ncent to N39,233.61 billion in the review period, \ncompared with the growth of 16.8 per cent and \n9.2 per cent in the preceding half year and the \ncorresponding period of 2021, respectively. This \nwas driven, largely, by the growth of 42.4 per cent, \n29.9 per cent, and 12.8 per cent in claims on public \nnonfinancial corporations, on states and local \ngovernments, and private sector, respectively. \nConsequently, claims on other sectors contributed \n9.8 percentage points to the growth in broad \nmoney supply in the first half of 2022, compared \nwith 12.9 and 7.0 percentage points in the \npreceding half-year and the corresponding period \nof 2021, respectively. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nTable 3.4. 2: Growth in Monetary Assets and Liabilities \nConsumer Credit \nThe value of consumer credit extended by Other \nDepository Corporations (ODCs) declined as a \nresult of the hike in the monetary policy rate. The \nrising trend in consumer credit in most part of the \nfirst half of 2022, was reversed with a rise in the \npolicy rate in May. The rising lending rates resulted \nin \nlower \ndemand \nfor \nconsumer \ncredit. \nConsequently, \nconsumer \ncredit \noutstanding \ndeclined by 6.8 per cent to N1,933.18 billion, from \nN2,073.76 billion in the preceding half of 2021. \nHowever, there was an improvement, compared \nwith N1,840.24 billion in the corresponding period \nof 2021. \n \n \nJun 20 \nDec 20 \nJun 21 \nDec 21 \nJun 22 \nNFA \n40.64 \n50.95 \n(18.73) \n4.22 \n(34.68) \nDC \n4.74 \n12.71 \n6.85 \n17.83 \n17.82 \nNet claims on \nGovernment \n(11.88) \n13.81 \n0.88 \n20.42 \n31.61 \nClaims on \n \n \n \n \n \nOther Sectors \n11.04 \n12.30 \n9.15 \n16.83 \n12.35 \nOther \nfinancial \ncorporations \n \n21.89 \n \n7.98 \n \n(1.89) \n \n(5.34) \n \n2.91 \nState and \nlocal \ngovernment \n(3.07) \n10.64 \n3.57 \n20.63 \n29.85 \nPublic \nnonfinancial \ncorporations \n(8.66) \n(0.65) \n28.75 \n3.44 \n42.37 \nPrivate sector \n8.46 \n15.16 \n13.87 \n26.84 \n12.64 \nBroad \nmoney \nLiabilities \n2.63 \n11.63 \n1.56 \n14.24 \n10.02 \nCurrency \noutside \ndepository \ncorporations \n \n(7.63) \n \n23.38 \n \n(9.91) \n \n17.74 \n \n(7.46) \nTransferable \ndeposits \n21.88 \n54.69 \n3.25 \n13.30 \n16.61 \nOther \ndeposits \n10.88 \n20.63 \n3.86 \n19.99 \n8.19 \nSecurities \nother than \nshares \n(46.85) \n(81.98) \n(39.82) \n(99.92) \n(1.68) \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \n \n \n \n47 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nConsumer credit constituted 4.9 per cent of total \nclaims on other sectors, compared with 5.9 per \ncent and 5.6 per cent in the preceding half and the \ncorresponding period of 2021, respectively. \n \nFigure 3.4.3: Consumer Credit and its Share of Claims \non Other Sectors \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \nCredit Utilisation by Sectors \nUnwavering effort by the Bank to increase \nproductivity and output spurred growth in sectoral \ncredit, particularly in the services and industry \nsectors. Sustained implementation of the LDR \npolicy, \ncoupled \nwith \nthe \nBank’s \ncritical \nintervention drives, engendered considerable \ngrowth in sectoral credit allocation to key sectors \nof the economy. Sectoral credit allocation stood at \n₦26,846.40 billion at end-June 2022, representing \nan increase of 10.1 per cent and 22.6 per cent, \nrelative to the ₦24,378.19 billion and ₦21,895.31 \nbillion at end-December 2021 and end-June 2021, \nrespectively. \nOf the total credit allocated, services sector \nsustained its dominance, as it grew by 12.4 per \ncent and accounted for 54.5 per cent, relative to \n53.3 per cent and 52.4 per cent at end-December \n2021 and end-June 2021, respectively. The share \nof industry sector was also significant at 39.4 per \ncent, albeit lower than the 40.7 per cent and 42.3 \nper cent recorded at end-December 2021 and \nend-June 2021, respectively. The Agriculture \nsector recorded the lowest share of 6.1 per cent, \nthough, higher than the 6.0 per cent and 5.3 per \ncent in the preceding half year and the \ncorresponding period, respectively. \nTable 3.4.3: Sectoral Credit Allocation \n \nJun-21 \nDec-21 \nJun-22 \nAgriculture \n5.3 \n6.0 \n6.1 \nIndustry \n42.3 \n40.7 \n39.4 \n of which \nConstruction \n5.0 \n4.4 \n4.4 \nServices \n52.4 \n53.3 \n54.5 \n of which \nTrade/General \nCommerce \n6.3 \n7.0 \n7.1 \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \nMaturity structure of Banks’ Claims and Liabilities \nShort-term credit accounted for the bulk of banks’ \nloan portfolio. Banks sustained preference for \nshort-term loans, as credit with maximum \nmaturity of one year accounted for 55.7 per cent \nat the end of the first half of 2022, relative to 16.2 \nper cent and 28.1 per cent for bank credit with \nmedium-term and long-term tenors, respectively. \nSimilar trend was observed at the end of the \npreceding and corresponding periods, as short-\nterm bank credit also formed the bulk of banks’ \nloan portfolio, accounting for 56.4 per cent and \n51.3 per cent, respectively. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n0\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n0\n500,000\n1,000,000\n1,500,000\n2,000,000\n2,500,000\nJun. 20\nDec-20\nJun-21\nDec-21\nJun-22\nPer cent\n₦' Billion\nTotal Consumer Credit\nShare of Claims on Other Sectors\n \n \n \n48 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \n \nFigure 3.4.4: Distribution of Bank Loans and Advances \nby Maturity \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \nBanks deposit structure depicted similar trend as \nshort-term deposit of less than one-year maturity \naccounted for 90.0 per cent, relative to 89.9 per \ncent and 89.8 per cent at end-December 2021 and \nthe corresponding period of 2021, respectively. \nThe medium and long-term deposits accounted \nfor 5.0 per cent apiece of the total deposit. The \npreference for short-term deposits over the \nlonger-term \ndeposits \nwas \ndriven \nby \nmacroeconomic uncertainties and inherent risks \nin the economy. \nFigure 3.4.5: Maturity Structure of Bank by Deposits \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \n \n \n \n \nMarket Structure of the Banking Industry \nThe concentration ratio of the banking system in \nterms of assets improved, while the concentration \nratio in terms of deposits remained unchanged. \nThe review of the banking industry indicated that \nsix banks in terms of assets had a concentration \nratio of 61.2 per cent, an improvement compared \nwith 66.2 per cent and 66.4 per cent in the \npreceding half and corresponding period of 2021, \nrespectively. \nIn \nterms \nof \ndeposits, \nthe \nconcentration ratio of six of the largest banks \nremained at 68.8 per cent, the same as in the \ncorresponding period of 2021. The composition of \nthe six banks remains unchanged over time. \nHowever, there was no dominance of a single bank \nfor both deposits and assets. \nFigure 3.4.6: Market Concentration Ratios of Banks \n(Assets and Deposits) December 2019 to June 2022 \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nThe Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of 954.53 \n(on a scale of 100 to 10,000) in deposits and \n933.89 in assets reflects competitiveness in the \nbanking system and allays concerns about the \npossibility of unhealthy dominance in the system. \nNonetheless, the HHI position for both deposits \nand assets show a slight increase relative to the \ncorresponding half year position of 936.66 and \n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\nDec 19\nJun 20\nDec 20\nJun 21\nDec 21\nJun 22\nPer cent (%)\nShort-term\nMedium-term\nLong-term\n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\n50.0\n60.0\n70.0\n80.0\n90.0\n100.0\nDec 19\nJun 20\nDec 20\nJun 21\nDec 21\nJun 22\nPer cent\nShort-term\nMedium-term\nLong-term\n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\n50.0\n60.0\n70.0\n80.0\nDec-19\nJun-20\nDec-20\nJun-21\nDec-21\nJun-22\nCR 6 (Deposits)\nCR 6 (Assets)\nCR (Largest Deposits)\nCR (Largest Assets)\n \n \n \n49 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \n907.93, and preceding half year of 847.43 and \n854.24, respectively. \nFigure 3.4.7: Measures of Competition in Banks: \nHerfindahl-Hirschman Index December 2019 to June \n2022 \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nFinancial Soundness \nNigeria’s financial sector remained resilient, \ndespite \nheightened \nglobal \nand \ndomestic \nuncertainties. At end-June 2022, the industry \nCapital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) fell to 14.1 per cent, \nfrom 14.6 per cent and 15.5 per cent at end-\nDecember 2021 and end-June 2021, respectively. \nThe development was attributed to the increase in \nrisk-weighted assets of banks, which more than \noffset the increase in their total qualifying capital. \nThe ratio, however, remained above the minimum \nregulatory benchmark of 10.0 per cent. \nAnalysis of bank asset quality measured by the \nratio of non-performing loans (NPLs) to gross total \nloans stood at 5.0 per cent at end-June 2022, \nrelative to 4.9 per cent at end-December 2021, \nand 5.7 per cent at end-June 20v21. The NPL ratio \nwas at par with the 5.0 per cent prudential \nrequirement. \nThe Industry Liquidity Ratio (LR) declined by 0.6 \npercentage point to 54.2 per cent, from 54.8 per \ncent at end-December 2021, reflecting a decrease \nin the stock of liquid assets held by banks. \nHowever, it indicated a significant increase of 12.9 \npercentage points, compared with 41.3 per cent \nat end-June 2021, but remained above the \nregulatory benchmark of 30.0 per cent. \n \nDevelopments in Other Financial Institutions \nTo deepen access to financial services and promote \ninclusive growth, the Bank issued licences to new \nOther Financial Institutions (OFIs). The total \nnumber of OFIs at end-June 2022 was 6,697, \nrelative to the 6,682 and 6,620 at end-December \n2021 and end-June 2021, respectively. The \nincrease in the number of OFIs was attributed to \nthe issuance of nine new Microfinance Banks \nlicenses and six Finance Companies (FCs). \nThere were 875 licensed MFBs at end-June 2022, \ncomprising 9 National MFBs, 134 State MFBs, and \n732 Unit MFBs; compared with the 866 and 875 \nMFBs at end-December 2021 and end-June 2021, \nrespectively. The number of FCs in operation also \nincreased to 106 at end-June 2022, compared with \n100 at end-December 2021 and 91 at end-June \n2021. \n \nThe number of operating Primary Mortgage Banks \n(PMBs) remained at 34 at end-June 2022, \ncomprising 12 national PMBs and 22 state PMBs. \nThe number was the same with that of end-\nDecember 2021. \n \n \n \n \n820.0\n840.0\n860.0\n880.0\n900.0\n920.0\n940.0\n960.0\n980.0\nDec-19\nJun-20\nDec-20\nJun-21\nDec-21\nJun-22\nHHI\nHHI (Deposits)\nHHI (Assets)\n \n \n \n50 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nTable 3.4.4: Breakdown of Other Financial Institutions \nS/N \nType \nNo. of \nInstitutions \nat end-June, \n2021 \nNo. of \nInstitutions \nat end-\nDecember, \n2021 \nNo. of \nInstitutions \nat end-June, \n2022 \n1 \nMicrofinance \nBanks: \n875 \n866 \n875 \n Unit \n734 \n723 \n732 \n State \n132 \n134 \n134 \n National \n9 \n9 \n9 \n2 \nBureaux De \nChange \n5,613 \n5,675 \n5,675 \n3 \nFinance \nCompanies \n91 \n100 \n106 \n4 \nDevelopment \nFinance \nInstitutions \n7 \n7 \n7 \n5 \nPrimary \nMortgage Banks \n34 \n34 \n34 \n State \n23 \n23 \n23 \n National \n11 \n11 \n11 \n \nTotal \n6,620 \n6,682 \n6,697 \nSource: CBN \n \nDevelopment Finance Institutions \nThe \ntotal \nassets \nof \ndevelopment \nfinance \ninstitutions (DFIs) increased, due, largely to the rise \nin cash and bank balances. At the end- of June \n2022, the total assets of the seven DFIs was \nN3,334.06 billion, an increase of 9.2 per cent and \n6.9 per cent above the levels at end-December \nand end-June 2021, respectively. The rise resulted \nfrom increased bank balances, placements, \ninvestments and fixed assets. The increased asset \nwas financed through accretion to reserves, \nincreased borrowings and shareholders’ fund. \nFurther analysis of the total assets by institution \nindicated that BOI (Bank of Industry), DBN \n(Development Bank of Nigeria), Federal Mortgage \nBank of Nigeria (FMBN), Nigerian Export-Import \nBank (NEXIM), NMRC, Bank of Agriculture (BOA) \nand The Infrastructural Bank (TIB) accounted for \n59.8 per cent, 14.9 per cent, 14.5 per cent, 6.5 per \ncent, 2.6 per cent, 1.7 per cent and 0.1 per cent, \nrespectively. The BOI, DBN, FMBN, NEXIM, BOA \nand NMRC accounted for 48.8 per cent, 20.1 per \ncent, 19.3 per cent, 8.5 per cent, 1.8 per cent and \n1.6 per cent, of the total net loans and advances, \nrespectively. \n \nTable 3.4.5: Other Financial Institutions Consolidated \nBalance Sheet \nASSETS \nJun-21 \nDec-21 \nJun-22 \nN'000 \nN'000 \nN'000 \nCash & Bank Balances \n71,991,694 \n966,032 \n22,002,218 \nPlacements \n526,751,221 \n428,810,530 \n466,507,297 \nInvestments \n1,002,362,306 \n909,038,807 \n1,121,464,031 \nNet Loans & Advances \n1,385,949,576 \n1,585,391,610 \n1,598,617,094 \nOther Assets \n65,861,932 \n67,871,628 \n60,525,133 \nFixed Assets \n64,825,466 \n62,248,045 \n64,943,907 \nTotal Assets \n3,117,742,195 \n3,054,326,652 \n3,334,059,680 \nFinanced By: \n \n \n \nPaid-up Capital \n238,780,740 \n238,780,740 \n238,780,740 \nReserves \n183,476,959 \n214,459,492 \n232,891,187 \nShareholders' fund \n422,257,699 \n453,240,232 \n471,671,927 \nDeposits \n484,008,966 \n514,848,997 \n558,363,855 \nBorrowings \n1,767,218,636 \n1,582,320,992 \n1,886,720,548 \nDue to Other Banks \n93,513 \n11,415,214 \n2,927,389 \nOther Liabilities \n393,220,299 \n438,596,675 \n371,031,896 \nLong-term Liabilities \n50,943,082 \n53,904,542 \n43,344,065 \nTotal Capital & \nLiabilities \n3,117,742,195 \n3,054,326,652 \n3,334,059,680 \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n51 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nTable 3.4.6: Development Finance Institutions \nConsolidated Balance Sheet \nASSETS \nJun-21 \nDec-21 \nJun-22 \nN'000 \nN'000 \nN'000 \nCash & Bank \nBalances \n303,240,800 \n227,365,705 \n263,824,378 \nPlacements \n816,378,530 \n671,072,047 \n708,544,239 \nInvestments \n1,114,391,867 \n1,015,708,474 \n1,231,449,913 \nNet Loans & \nAdvances \n2,532,381,772 \n2,930,059,195 \n3,023,609,148 \nOther Assets \n248,727,814 \n236,664,533 \n249,145,506 \nFixed Assets \n161,244,028 \n142,791,342 \n170,071,913 \nTotal Assets \n5,176,364,811 \n5,223,661,296 \n5,646,645,097 \nFinanced By: \n \n \n \nPaid-up Capital \n468,505,050 \n466,876,723 \n498,230,745 \nReserves \n182,538,492 \n219,591,851 \n235,691,426 \nShareholders' fund \n651,043,542 \n686,468,574 \n733,922,171 \nDeposits \n1,034,846,107 \n1,106,788,532 \n1,186,557,994 \nBorrowings \n1,988,247,548 \n1,819,868,498 \n2,125,758,380 \nDue to Other Banks \n30,762,607 \n49,566,894 \n157,941,082 \nOther Liabilities \n875,449,945 \n862,519,135 \n920,530,197 \nLong-term Liabilities \n596,015,062 \n698,449,663 \n521,935,273 \nTotal Capital & \nLiabilities \n5,176,364,811 \n5,223,661,296 \n5,646,645,097 \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nThe total assets of OFIs, excluding the BDCs, was \nN5,646.65 billion at the end of June 2022. This was \n9.1 per cent and 8.1 per cent above N5,176.36 \nbillion and N5,223.66 billion, recorded at the end \nof December 2021 and the end of June 2021, \nrespectively. Net loans and advances at N3,023.61 \nbillion was 3.2 per cent and 19.4 per cent above \nthe N2,930.06 billion and N2,532.38 billion at end-\nDecember 2021 and end-June 2021, respectively. \nAt N1,231.45 billion, investments increased by \n21.2 per cent and 10.5 per cent, compared with \nN1,015.71 billion and N1,114.39 billion at end-\nDecember 2021 and end-June 2021, respectively. \nSimilarly, fixed assets at N170.07 billion at end-\nJune 2022, reflected an increase of 19.1 per cent \nand 5.5 per cent above the levels at end-\nDecember 2021 and end-June 2021, respectively. \n \nDeposits at N1,186.56 billion was 7.2 per cent and \n14.7 per cent above the levels at end-December \n2021 and end-June 2021, respectively. Borrowings \namounted to N2,125.76 billion at end-June 2022, \nan increase of 16.8 per cent and 6.9 per cent, \ncompared with the N1,819.87 billion and \nN1,988.25 billion at end-December 2021 and end-\nJune 2021, respectively. Similarly, “due to other \nbanks” increased by 218.6 per cent and 413.4 per \ncent to N157.94 billion at end-June 2022, relative \nto the N49.57 billion and N30.76 billion, at end-\nDecember 2021 and end-June 2021, respectively. \nShareholders’ fund amounted to N733.92 billion, \nan increase of 6.9 per cent and 12.7 per cent \nrelative to N686.47 billion and N651.04 billion at \nend-December \n2021 \nand \nend-June \n2021, \nrespectively. The increase in shareholders’ funds \nwas due to increase in paid-up capital and \naccretion to reserves. \n \nMicrofinance Banks \nAssets of MFBs increased due to rise in net loans \nand advances, fixed assets and investment. Total \nassets of the MFBs rose by 8.3 per cent and 15.1 \nper cent to N1,408.58 billion at end-June 2022, \nfrom N1,301.11 billion and N1,223.89 billion at \nend-December \n2021 \nand \nend-June \n2021, \nrespectively. The increase was, due, largely, to the \nincrease in cash, short-term investments and net \nloans & advances. The asset gap was financed, \nlargely, through increased borrowing, accretion to \nreserves and injection of capital in compliance \nwith the April 2022 recapitalisation deadline. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n52 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nTable 3.4.7: Microfinance Banks Consolidated Balance \nSheet \n Asset \nJun-21 \nDec-21 \nJun-22 \n \nN'000 \nN'000 \nN'000 \nCash \n12,423,556 \n16,698,439 \n32,744,108 \nBalances \nwith Banks \n171,812,729 \n156,482,263 \n151,276,444 \nPlacements \n181,514,459 \n126,448,501 \n127,669,383 \nShort term \nInvestments \n22,552,229 \n21,563,298 \n32,033,882 \nLong Term \nInvestments \n6,084,727 \n6,383,322 \n7,381,753 \nNet Loans \nand \nAdvances \n738,999,456 \n901,660,358 \n955,227,381 \nOther Assets \n62,748,789 \n57,217,332 \n66,799,279 \nFixed Assets \n27,750,852 \n14,652,379 \n35,449,116 \nTotal Assets \n1,223,886,797 \n1,301,105,892 \n1,408,581,346 \nFinanced by \n \n \nPaid-up \nCapital \n93,286,276 \n93,733,391 \n119,260,260 \nReserves \n50,852,705 \n66,125,223 \n54,573,548 \nShareholders' \nFund \n144,138,981 \n159,858,614 \n173,833,808 \nDeposits \n367,965,481 \n411,737,651 \n453,989,534 \nTakings from \nOther Banks \n16,281,708 \n16,584,837 \n133,925,243 \nLong Term \nLoans/On-\nlending \n464,873,270 \n448,434,925 \n390,356,047 \nOther \nLiabilities \n230,627,357 \n264,489,865 \n256,476,714 \nTotal \nliabilities \n1,223,886,797 \n1,301,105,892 \n1,408,581,346 \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nTable 3.4.8: Finance Companies Consolidated Balance \nSheet \nAsset \nJun-21 \nDec-21 \nJun-22 \n \nN'000 \nN'000 \nN'000 \nCash \n2,000,757 \n2,374,221 \n2,233,223 \nBalances with \nBanks \n22,195,104 \n27,320,315 \n27,670,496 \nPlacements \n37,760,193 \n41,886,472 \n37,021,246 \nInvestments \n20,038,776 \n19,756,834 \n12,756,583 \nNet Loans \nand Advances \n142,694,415 \n166,975,827 \n181,798,627 \nOther Assets \n59,558,128 \n58,150,597 \n66,198,625 \nFixed Assets \n49,184,041 \n46,151,221 \n49,792,007 \nTotal Assets \n333,431,414 \n362,615,487 \n377,470,807 \nFinanced by: \n \n \nPaid-up \nCapital \n27,715,587 \n25,653,669 \n29,404,116 \nReserves \n20,009,092 \n15,185,826 \n17,780,420 \nShareholders' \nFunds \n47,724,679 \n40,839,495 \n47,184,536 \nLong Term \nLiabilities \n3,233,191 \n1,852,173 \n1,940,146 \nTotal \nBorrowings \n221,028,912 \n237,547,506 \n239,037,832 \nOther \nLiabilities \n61,444,632 \n82,376,313 \n89,308,293 \nTotal \nLiabilities \n333,431,414 \n362,615,487 \n377,470,807 \n Source: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n53 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nFinance Companies \nTotal assets of FCs increased, due, largely, to rise \nin net loans and advances and other assets. Total \nassets of finance companies increased to N377.47 \nbillion at end-June 2022, an increase of 4.1 per \ncent and 13.2 per cent, compared with N362.62 \nbillion and N333.43 billion at end-December 2021 \nand end-June 2021, respectively. The increase \nrelative to the level at end-December 2021 was \ndue to higher net loans & advances and increase \nin other assets. The increased loans and advances \nwas financed through retention of profit, increase \nin borrowing, other liabilities, as well as, injection \nof additional capital. \n \nPrimary Mortgage Banks \nThe total assets of Primary Mortgage Banks \n(PMBs) increased due, mainly, to rise in net loans \nand \nadvances, \nbalances \nwith \nbanks \nand \nplacements. Total assets of the PMBs, at N526.53 \nbillion, reflected an increase of 4.1 per cent and \n5.0 per cent relative to N505.61 billion and \nN501.30 billion at end-December 2021 and end-\nJune 2021, respectively. The rise in assets was \nfinanced through additional capital injection and \nploughed back profit. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nTable 3.4.9: Primary Mortgage Banks Consolidated \nBalance Sheet \nAsset \nJun-21 \nDec-21 \nJun-22 \n \nN'000 \nN'000 \nN'000 \nCash \n1,090,269 \n1,478,194 \n1,670,226 \nCash Reserve \nRequirement \n1,929,603 \n4,107,915 \n2,590,795 \nBalances with \nBanks \n19,797,088 \n17,938,326 \n23,636,868 \nPlacement with \nbanks \n70,352,657 \n73,926,544 \n77,346,313 \nInvestments/Non-\ncurrent Assets \nHeld for Sale \n43,638,411 \n45,411,458 \n46,623,126 \nShort Term \nInvestments \n11,498,442 \n6,884,809 \n4,388,071 \nInvestment in \nQuoted Shares \n8,216,976 \n6,669,946 \n6,802,467 \nNet Loans and \nAdvances \n264,738,325 \n276,031,400 \n287,966,046 \nOther Assets \n60,558,965 \n53,424,976 \n55,622,469 \nFixed Assets \n19,483,669 \n19,739,697 \n19,886,883 \nTotal Assets \n501,304,405 \n505,613,265 \n526,533,264 \nFinanced by: \n \n \nPaid-up Capital \n108,722,447 \n108,708,923 \n110,785,629 \nReserves \n-71,800,264 \n-76,178,690 \n-69,553,729 \nShareholders' \nFunds \n36,922,183 \n32,530,233 \n41,231,900 \nDeposits \n182,871,660 \n180,201,884 \n174,204,605 \nDue to \nBanks/Others \n14,387,386 \n21,566,843 \n21,088,450 \nLong-term \nLoans/NHF \n76,965,519 \n77,056,282 \n86,295,015 \nOther Liabilities \n190,157,657 \n194,258,023 \n203,713,294 \nTotal Liabilities \n501,304,405 \n505,613,265 \n526,533,264 \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nExamination of Other Financial Institutions \nThe Bank conducted target and Anti-Money \nLaundering and combating the Financing of \nTerrorism (AML/CFT) examinations on 204 OFIs. \nThe target examination was conducted on 114 \nMFBs to ascertain their capital levels in line with \nthe final re-capitalisation deadline of April 2022. \nThe onsite AML/CFT examination of 90 OFIs, \nexcluding Bureaux de Change (BDCs), was to \nascertain the OFIs' compliance with the extant \nMoney Laundering (ML) and Terrorist Financing \nActs and other applicable regulations. Money \n \n \n \n54 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nLaundering and Financing of Terrorism (ML/FT) \nrisks of the OFIs were evaluated in line with the \nGIABA assessment requirements. The outcome of \nthe examination revealed that more than half of \nthe OFIs examined were rated “Above Average”. \nThe \nexamination, \nalso, \nrevealed \nvarious \ninfractions of extant regulations and erring \ninstitutions were sanctioned appropriately. \n \nFinancial Markets \nMoney Market Developments \nLiquidity conditions in the banking system eased, \ninfluencing the downward trend in key money \nmarket rates. The movement in banking system \nliquidity was influenced by injections through the \nfiscal operations of the government, effects of CRR \ndebit, \nsettlement \nof \nforeign \nexchange \ninterventions, maturity and issuance of CBN bills \nand government securities. \n \nMoney Market Rates \nMoney market rates trended southward, following \nimproved liquidity in the banking system. The \naverage net industry liquidity balance rose by 44.3 \nper cent to N200.27 billion from N138.76 billion in \nthe preceding half of 2021. Consequently, the \nweighted average monthly inter-bank call and OBB \nrates declined to 9.4 and 8.1 per cent compared \nwith 10.5 and 12.0 per cent in the second half of \n2021, respectively. Similarly, the weighted \naverage Nigeria Inter-bank Offered Rate (NIBOR \n30-day) fell by 2.1 percentage points to 8.8 per \ncent. \n \n \n \nTable 3.4.10: Money Market Rates, Weighted Average \n(per cent). \n \nMPR \nCall Rate \nOBB Rate \nNIBOR \n30-days \nJan-21 \n11.5 \n4.4 \n2.9 \n0.7 \nFeb-21 \n11.5 \n11.7 \n8.7 \n1.6 \nMar-21 \n11.5 \n10.1 \n12.6 \n3.4 \nApr-21 \n11.5 \n0.0 \n15.9 \n6.5 \nMay-21 \n11.5 \n15.2 \n16.3 \n10.7 \nJun-21 \n11.5 \n16.6 \n16.7 \n12.6 \nAverage \n11.5 \n9.7 \n12.2 \n5.9 \nJul-21 \n11.5 \n12.4 \n11.9 \n12.3 \nAug-21 \n11.5 \n13.5 \n13.0 \n11.9 \nSep-21 \n11.5 \n13.1 \n11.3 \n10.5 \nOct-21 \n11.5 \n13.3 \n12.8 \n11.3 \nNov-21 \n11.5 \n10.5 \n10.1 \n9.5 \nDec-21 \n11.5 \n0.0 \n12.8 \n10.1 \nAverage \n11.5 \n10.5 \n12.0 \n10.9 \nJan-22 \n11.5 \n14.3 \n8.5 \n9.0 \nFeb-22 \n11.5 \n9.3 \n6.1 \n9.4 \nMar-22 \n11.5 \n4.5 \n6.6 \n8.2 \nApr-22 \n11.5 \n8.7 \n7.3 \n8.2 \nMay-22 \n13.0 \n8.4 \n9.4 \n9.5 \nJun-22 \n13.0 \n11.1 \n10.9 \n8.5 \nAverage \n12.0 \n9.4 \n8.1 \n8.8 \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nFigure 3.4.8: Money Market Rates (Per cent) \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nDeposit and Lending Rates \nLending rates leaned towards the tight monetary \npolicy stance of the Bank. The average prime and \nmaximum lending rates inched up to 11.9 per cent \nand 28.0 per cent in the first half of 2022, from \n11.6 per cent and 27.5 per cent in the second half \nof 2021, respectively. Compared with the level in \nthe corresponding half of 2021, the prime lending \n11.5\n9.7\n12.2\n5.9\n11.5\n10.5\n12\n10.9\n12\n9.4\n8.1\n8.8\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\nMPR\nCall Rate\nOBB Rate\nNIBOR 30-day\n2021H1\n2021H2\n2022H1\n \n \n \n55 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nrate fell by 0.6 percentage point, while the \nmaximum lending rate rose by the same \nmagnitude. \n \nAverage term deposit rate fell by 0.4 percentage \npoint to 3.4 per cent, below its level in the second \nhalf of 2021. However, the spread between the \naverage term deposit and maximum lending rates \nbetween the two periods, widened from 23.7 \npercentage points to 24.6 percentage points in the \nreview period. This, however, represented a \ndecline, compared with 25.9 percentage points in \nthe corresponding half of 2021. \n \nFigure 3.4.9: Banks Deposits and Lending Rates \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nOpen Market Operations \nThe Bank continued to use the CBN bills to manage \nliquidity in the banking system, boost tradable \nsecurities and deepen secondary market activities \nin the first half of 2022. The total amount of CBN \nbills issued, amounted to N7,249.61 billion, higher \nthan N6,323.47 billion recorded in the preceding \nhalf of 2021, but lower than N7,456.08 billion in \nthe corresponding half of 2021. Total public \nsubscription and sales stood at N10,856.88 billion \nand N7,227.72 billion, compared with N7,342.20 \nbillion and N6,309.02 billion, respectively, in the \npreceding half year. For the corresponding period \nof 2021, total subscription and sales were \nN11,650.75 \nbillion \nand \nN7,339.03 \nbillion, \nrespectively. \n \nThe high level of activity in OMO in the review \nperiod relative to the level in the preceding period, \nreflected improved investors’ confidence in the \nmoney market amid the hawkish monetary policy \nstance towards the end of the review period. \n \nDiscount Window Operations \nImproved net liquidity in the banking system \nresulted in the reduction of repo transactions in the \nfirst half of 2022. Total request for repurchase \nagreements (repo) transactions fell by 34.7 per \ncent to N4,998.12 billion in the first half of 2022, \ncompared with N7,648.86 billion and N6,410.40 \nbillion in the preceding and corresponding halves \nof 2021, respectively. Applicable interest rate in \nthe review period was 14.0 per cent (±2.5) for the \n4-day to 90-day tenors. Total interest earned on \nrepo transactions declined by 30.8 per cent and \n70.5 per cent to N15.89 billion in the first half of \n2022, compared with N22.96 billion and N53.83 \nbillion earned in the preceding half year and \ncorresponding period of 2021, respectively. \n \nStanding Facilities Window \nTransactions at the SDF window was consistent \nwith the level of liquidity in the banking system. \nActivities at the Standing Deposit Facility (SDF) \nwindow increased due, largely, to improved \nbanking system liquidity. The average daily \namount rose to N18.51 billion for the 122 \ntransaction days in the first half of 2022, \ncompared with N10.11 billion for the 121 \ntransaction days and N15.15 billion for the 120 \ntransaction \ndays \nin \nthe \npreceding \nand \ncorresponding halves of 2021, respectively. \n22.0\n23.0\n24.0\n25.0\n26.0\n27.0\n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\n2021H1\n2021H2\n2022H1\nPercentage Points\nPer cent (%)\nSavings Rate\nAverage Term Deposit Rate\nPrime Lending Rate\nMaximum Lending Rate\nSpread (MXLR-AVTD) (RHS)\n \n \n \n56 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nConsequently, average daily interest payments on \nthe deposits rose by 92.6 per cent to N3.28 million \nin the review period, from N1.70 million and N2.37 \nmillion in the preceding and corresponding halves \nof 2021. \n \nAt the Standing Lending Facility (SLF) window, the \ndaily average of 81 transactions stood at N55.82 \nbillion in the first half of 2022, as against N 34.41 \nbillion in 99 transactions in the second half of 2021 \nand N82.74 billion in 109 transactions in the first \nhalf of 2021. \n \nApplicable rates, for the SLF and SDF, anchored on \nthe MPR, were 12.5 per cent and 4.5 per cent from \nJanuary to 23 May 2022; and 14.0 per cent and 6.0 \nper cent from 24 May to 30 June 2022, \nrespectively. Comparatively, in the preceding and \ncorresponding halves of 2021, the applicable rates \nfor the SLF and SDF were 12.5 per cent and 4.5 per \ncent, respectively. \n \nInter-bank Transactions \nActivities in the inter-bank funds market skewed \ntowards the secured segment, as banks became \nrisk averse to unsecured lending. The total value of \ntransactions at the inter-bank funds market stood \nat N25,408.36 billion. This represented a decline \nof 12.1 per cent and 2.6 per cent, compared with \nthe N28,893.31 billion and N26,076.17 billion in \nthe preceding and the corresponding halves of \n2021, respectively. At the Open-buy-back (OBB) \nsegment, transactions increased significantly, \nattributed, largely, to the risk averse appetite of \nbanks for unsecured lending. Consequently, \ntransactions at the OBB segment stood at \nN25,257.84 billion, which accounted for 99.4 per \ncent, while the inter-bank call constituted the \nbalance of 0.6 per cent (N150.52 billion). \nPrimary Market Activities \nTotal value of the Nigerian Treasury Bills (NTBs) \nissued and allotted in the first half of 2022 \namounted \nto \nN2,415.58 \nbillion \napiece, \nrepresenting a decline of 2.2 per cent, below the \nlevel in the preceding half of 2021. Conversely, it \ngrew by 45.0 per cent, compared with the level in \nthe corresponding half of 2021. Total value of \npublic subscription stood at N4,663.18 billion, \ncompared with N5,116.73 billion and N3,101.23 \nbillion in the preceding and the corresponding \nperiods of 2021, respectively. The decrease in \npublic subscription relative to the level in the \npreceding period of 2021 was due, mainly, to the \ndeclining yield in treasury bills. \n \nTable 3.4.10 Structure of Outstanding holdings of \nNigeria Treasury Bills \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nOf the total NTBs allotted, banks and foreign \ninvestors, took up N1,782.22 billion or 73.8 per \ncent. Mandate and Internal Funds customers, \nincluding CBN Branches, stood at N564.50 billion \nor 23.4 per cent, while merchant banks accounted \nfor the balance of N68.87 billion or 2.8 per cent. \nThe successful bid rate in the market were 2.1 per \ncent (±0.4) for the 91-day; 3.4 per cent (±0.4), for \nthe 182-day and 5.2 per cent (±1.3) for the 364-\nday tenors. Successful bid rates in the preceding \nperiod of 2021 stood at 6.2 per cent (±3.8) for the \n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\nDMBs\nMerchant\nBanks\nParastatals\nCBN\n24.36\n0.47\n52.35\n22.81\n39.38\n0.88\n37.33\n22.41\n50.50\n0.65\n26.91\n21.94\n2021H1\n2021H2\n2022H1\n \n \n \n57 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \n91-day, 7.7 per cent (±4.3) for the 182-day and 8.9 \nper cent (±4.1) for the 364-day tenors. \n \n \nFigure 3.4.11: Nigerian Treasury Bills Outstanding (N \nBillion) \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nThe value of NTBs outstanding at end-June 2022 \nstood at N4,504.80 billion. This represented a \ngrowth of 19.0 per cent and 50.6 per cent above \nN3,786.14 billion and N2,991.87 billion in the \npreceding half year and corresponding period of \n2021, respectively. Of the total, the share of \ncommercial improved to 50.5 per cent, compared \nwith 39.4 per cent and 24.4 per cent in the \npreceding and corresponding halves of 2021, \nrespectively. Mandate customers and Internal \nFunds customers was 26.9 per cent, while \nmerchant banks and CBN, accounted for 0.7 per \ncent and 21.9 per cent, respectively, in the review \nperiod. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nOver-The-Counter Transactions in NTBs \nOver-The-Counter (OTC) transactions in NTBs and \nFGN Bonds declined, attributed to low patronage \nby foreign and institutional investors. Transactions \nin NTBs stood at N22,992.59 billion in the first half \nof 2022, indicating a decline of 24.5 per cent \n(N7,415.98 billion), compared with its level of \nN30,444.57 billion in the first half of 2021. \nSimilarly, transactions in FGN Bonds stood at \nN8,517.85 billion, indicating a decline of 14.2 per \ncent below the level of N13,249.67 billion in the \nfirst half of 2021. \n \nFigure 3.4.12: OTC Transactions in the First Half of \n2022 (N Billion) \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nFederal Government of Nigeria Bonds \nFGN Bonds valued at N1,125.00 billion were \noffered to the public, while subscription, and sale \nstood at N2,852.56 billion and N1,805.45 billion, \nrespectively. The amount offered covered new \nissues and reopening of FGN Bonds. In the \npreceding half of 2021, FGN Bonds issues, \nsubscription and allotments amounted to N850.00 \nbillion, N1,630.92 billion and N1,192.01 billion, \nrespectively. FGN Bonds issues, subscription and \nallotment stood at N900.00 billion, N1,726.40 \nbillion and N1,415.00 billion, respectively, in the \ncorresponding period of 2021. The increase in \nissuance was attributed to a shortfall in revenue \nearnings. \n0\n1,000\n2,000\n3,000\n4,000\n5,000\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\n2,651.51\n2,760.44\n2,991.87\n4,504.80\n2,651.51\n2,720.44\n3,786.14\nFirst Half\nSecond Half\n30,444.57 \n9,931.00 \n22,992.59 \n8,517.85 \n -\n 5,000.00\n 10,000.00\n 15,000.00\n 20,000.00\n 25,000.00\n 30,000.00\n 35,000.00\nNTBs\nFGN Bonds\nFirst Half 2021\nFirst Half 2022\n \n \n \n58 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThe total value of FGN Bonds outstanding at end-\nJune 2022, stood at N15,626.63 billion, compared \nwith N14,395.75 billion and N13,659.66 billion at \nend-December \n2021 \nand \nend-June \n2021, \nrespectively. The structure of holdings showed \nthat 61.0 per cent (N9,531.16 billion) was held by \ncommercial banks, 0.8 per cent (N132.63 billion) \nby merchant banks and the balance of 38.2 per \ncent (N5,926.85 billion) was held by the non-bank \npublic. \n \nFigure 3.4.13: Distribution of FGN Bonds \n (End-June 2022, per cent) \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \n \n Table 3.4.11: Market rates (%) interest spread \nMonth \nSavings \nRate \nAve. \nTerm \nDeposit \nRate \nPrime \nLending \nRate \nMax. \nLending \nRate \nSpread \n(Percentage \npoints) \n \n(1) \n(2) \n(3) \n(4) \n(5) \n \n \n \n \n \n(2) & (4) \nJan-22 \n1.3 \n3.4 \n11.7 \n27.7 \n24.2 \nFeb-22 \n1.3 \n3.4 \n11.8 \n30.7 \n27.3 \nMar-\n22 \n1.3 \n3.3 \n11.8 \n26.6 \n23.3 \nApr-22 \n1.3 \n3.2 \n11.8 \n27.8 \n24.6 \nMay-\n22 \n1.4 \n3.7 \n12.0 \n27.4 \n23.7 \nJun-22 \n1.4 \n3.5 \n12.3 \n27.6 \n24.1 \n2022 \nH1 \n1.3 \n3.4 \n11.9 \n28.0 \n24.6 \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nDevelopments in the Capital Market \nActivities in the Nigerian equities market were \nbullish in the first half of 2022, as the NGX All-\nShare Index and aggregate market capitalisation \nrose, despite volatile global market fundamentals \narising from the Russia-Ukraine war. The bullish \nperformance \nwas \ndue \nto \nbargain-hunting, \noccasioned by the release of positive first quarter \n2022 corporate earnings results. Furthermore, \nthere were 31 new listings in the capital market \nduring the first half of 2022, compared with 30 and \n28 listings in the second and first halves of 2021, \nrespectively. \nThe aggregate volume and value of traded \nsecurities on the Exchange rose by 84.8 per cent \nand 91.8 per cent to 76.02 billion shares and \nN833.41 billion, respectively, in 617,379 deals at \nthe end of June 2022, compared with 41.13 billion \nshares and N434.63 billion in 503,896 deals at \nend-December 2021. Similarly, aggregate volume \nand value of traded securities at the end of the \nfirst half of 2022 rose by 65.3 per cent and 60.5 \nper cent, compared with 45.98 billion shares and \nN519.25 billion in 555,042 deals at the end of the \ncorresponding half of 2021. The equities sub-\nsector maintained its dominance in the capital \nmarket, accounting for 99.9 per cent and 99.7 per \ncent of the aggregate volume and value of \ntransactions, respectively, while the debt and \nExchange Traded Fund (ETF) segments accounted \nfor the balance. \n \nThe sectoral analysis of the equities segment \nindicated that the financial services sector \nmeasured by volume of transactions, remained \nthe most active, accounting for 54.99 billion \nshares or 71.9 per cent, valued at N421.97 billion \n38%\n62%\nNon_Bank Public\nDMBs & Merchant\n \n \n \n59 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nor 39.8 per cent, in 296,774 deals or 48.1 per cent \nat end-June 2022. \nAnalysis of activities in the equities segment \nshowed an increase in participation by domestic \ninvestors, relative to the corresponding and \npreceding periods. The levels of domestic and \nforeign investors’ participation were 85.4 per cent \nand 14.71 per cent, respectively, compared with \n77.7 per cent and 22.3 per cent in the preceding \nhalf. Relative to the levels in the corresponding \nhalf, the domestic and foreign investors’ \nparticipation stood at 76.8 per cent and 23.2 per \ncent, respectively. \n \n \nFigure 3.4.14: Volume and Value of Traded Equities on \nthe NGX \n \nSources: Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)/Nigerian \nExchange Group (NGX) Limited \n \nNGX All-Share Index \nThe NGX All-Share Index improved mainly due to \ninvestors’ positive sentiment amid increased \npreference for blue-chip stocks. The NGX All-Share \nIndex stood at 51,817.59 index points at end-June \n2022, indicating an increase of 21.3 per cent and \n36.7 per cent, relative to the 42,716.44 index \npoints and 37,907.28 index points at end-\nDecember 2021 and end-June 2021, respectively. \nThe development was due to the positive \noutcomes of the year 2021 and the first quarter of \n2022 corporate earnings, which led to increased \ninvestment in blue-chip stocks. \nMarket Capitalisation \nIncreased interest in blue-chip stocks, especially in \nthe telecommunications and financial sectors, \ndrove market capitalisation. The aggregate market \ncapitalisation of the 457 listed securities closed at \nN50.18 trillion, an increase of 16.4 per cent and \n30.8 per cent, relative to the levels at end-\nDecember 2021 and end-June 2021, respectively. \nThe increase was attributed, mainly, to the rise in \nthe value of securities across different asset \nclasses (equities, debt, and ETF), following \nimproved trading in large and medium capitalised \nstocks, occasioned by bargain-hunting and profit- \ntaking by investors. \nSimilarly, at N27.94 trillion, market capitalisation \nof the 176 listed equities rose by 25.3 per cent and \n36.7 per cent at the end of June 2022, compared \nwith the levels at the end of December 2021 and \nend-June 2021, respectively. Listed equities \naccounted for 55.7 per cent of the aggregate \nmarket capitalisation, while the debt and ETF \ncomponents accounted for the balance of 44.3 per \ncent. \n \nThe top ten most capitalised companies on the \nExchange accounted for N22.94 trillion or 82.1 per \ncent of the total equity market capitalisation and \n45.7 per cent of the aggregate market \ncapitalisation. Two banks made the top ten list, \naccounting for N1.29 trillion or 4.6 per cent of the \ntotal equity market capitalisation. \n \nTotal market capitalisation, as a percentage of \nGDP, stood at 54.9 per cent, in the review period \ncompared with 43.8 per cent and 47.9 per cent at \n0.0\n100.0\n200.0\n300.0\n400.0\n500.0\n600.0\n700.0\n800.0\n900.0\n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\n50.0\n60.0\n70.0\n80.0\nFirst half 2021\nSecond Half 2021\nFirst Half 2022\nValue(N' billion)\nVolume (Billion)\nVolume of traded securities (LHS)\nValue of traded securities (RHS)\n \n \n \n60 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nend-December \n2021 \nand \nend-June \n2021, \nrespectively. The Warren Buffet Index measured \nby the ratio of the value of traded stocks to GDP \nwas 0.9 per cent, implying that the stock market is \nslightly undervalued. The ratio remained, the \nsame, compared with the 0.9 per cent at end-\nDecember 2021, but was higher when compared \nto the 0.6 per cent recorded at end-June 2021. \n \n \nFigure 3.4.15: All-Share Index and Aggregate Market \nCapitalisation \n \nSources: Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Nigerian \nExchange (NGX) Limited \n \nPrimary Market Activities \nActivities in the primary segment of the Nigerian \ncapital market improved in the first half of 2022. \nThere were 31 new security issuances worth \nN2,090.20 billion, compared with 31 and 28 \nvalued at N1,343.30 billion and N1,566.70 billion, \nin the preceding and corresponding halves of \n2021, respectively. During the review period, one \nInitial Public Offering (IPO) worth N111.80 billion, \ntwo public offering valued at N9.90 billion, and \nthree equity rights issues, worth N2.50 billion, \nwere approved by the SEC relative to the zero-\nequity issued in the preceding period. This also \ncompares with three private placements worth \nN13.00 billion and two rights issues worth N7.60 \nbillion in the corresponding period of 2021. In the \ngovernment segment of the primary market, 15 \nFGN Bonds worth N1,555.70 billion and 10 \ncorporate bonds valued at N410.40 billion, were \nissued and allotted by the Debt Management \nOffice (DMO). This compares with 18 FGN Bonds \nworth N769.91 billion, 16 corporate bonds valued \nat N257.69 billion, and one subnational bond \nworth N137.33 billion, issued in the preceding \nperiod of 2021, and 18 FGN Bonds worth \nN1,415.00 billion, and five corporate bonds valued \nat N131.10 billion in the corresponding period of \n2021. \n \nFigure 3.4.16: Value of New Issues by Sector 2022 \n \nSource: Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)/Nigerian \nExchange (NGX) Limited \n \nInstitutional Savings \nAggregate financial savings rose by 6.5 per cent \nand 24.2 per cent to N28,615.69 billion, from \nN26,868.76 billion and N23,044.50 billion at end-\nDecember 2021 and end-June 2021, respectively. \nThe ratio of financial savings to GDP rose to 31.3 \nper cent from 28.0 per cent and 28.8 per cent at \nthe end of the second and first halves of 2021. This \nwas driven, largely, by high corporate earnings. \nFurther analysis on financial savings showed that, \nbanks (Commercial, merchant and non-interest \nbanks) remained the dominant depository \ninstitutions in the financial system, accounting for \n0.0\n10.0\n20.0\n30.0\n40.0\n50.0\n60.0\n -\n 10,000\n 20,000\n 30,000\n 40,000\n 50,000\n 60,000\nFirst Half-21\nSecond Half-21\nFirst Half-22\nNaira (billion)\nIndex\nAll-Share Index (LHS)\nAggregate Market Capitalisation (RHS)\nFGN Bonds\n79%\nCorporate \nBonds\n21%\n \n \n \n61 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \n95.3 per cent of total financial savings, compared \nwith 95.2 per cent and 93.7 per cent in the \npreceding and corresponding halves of 2021. \nOther institutions, comprising, primary mortgage \nbanks, \nmicrofinance \nbanks, \nlife \ninsurance \ncompanies, pension fund custodians and the \nNigeria Social Insurance Trust Fund (NSITF), \naccounted for the balance of 4.8 per cent. \n \nFinancial Soundness \nNigeria’s financial sector remained resilient, \ndespite \nheightened \nglobal \nand \ndomestic \nuncertainties. At end-June 2022, the industry \nCapital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) fell to 14.1 per cent, \nfrom 14.6 per cent and 15.5 per cent at end-\nDecember 2021 and end-June 2021, respectively. \nThe development was attributed to the increase in \nbanks’ risk-weighted assets, which more than \noffset the increase in their total qualifying capital. \nThe ratio, however, remained above the minimum \nregulatory benchmark of 10.0 per cent. \nAnalysis of bank asset quality measured by the \nratio of non-performing loans (NPLs) to gross total \nloans stood at 5.0 per cent at end-June 2022, \nrelative to 4.9 per cent at end-December 2021, \nand 5.7 per cent at end-June 2021. The NPL ratio \nwas at par with the 5.0 per cent prudential \nrequirement. \nThe Industry Liquidity Ratio (LR) declined by 0.6 \npercentage point to 54.2 per cent, compared with \n54.8 per cent at end-December 2021, reflecting a \ndecrease in the stock of liquid assets held by \nbanks. However, it indicated a significant increase \nof 12.9 percentage points, compared with 41.3 \nper cent at end-June 2021, but remained above \nthe regulatory benchmark of 30.0 per cent. \n \nDevelopments in Financial System Stability and \nMacroprudential Policy \nAmid high global and domestic uncertainties \ncaused by the Russia-Ukraine war and the \ndownside risks from the resurgence of COVID-19 \nin China, risks and vulnerabilities to financial \nsystem stability were contained using robust \nmacroprudential policies. \n \nSolvency Stress Tests and Liquidity Simulations \nThe banking industry solvency and liquidity \nposition remained resilient under mild-to-\nmoderate scenarios of sustained economic and \nfinancial conditions but could be vulnerable under \nsevere scenarios of sustained economic and \nfinancial stress. \nConsequently, the banking industry’s resilience \nslightly moderated at end-June 2022, compared \nwith the condition at end-December 2021. The \nbaseline CAR, LR and NPLs ratio in the review \nperiod were 14.1 per cent, 54.2 per cent and 5.0 \nper cent, respectively. Return on Asset (ROA) and \nReturn on Equity (ROE) stood at 2.0 per cent and \n17.3 per cent, respectively. The CAR and LR were \nabove the regulatory benchmarks, while NPLs at \n5.0 per cent was within the threshold. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n62 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nTable 3.4.12: Banking Industry Baseline Selected Key \nIndicators for First Half of 2022 \n \nCAR% \nLR% \nNPLs% \nROA% \nROE% \nJun 2022 \n14.1 \n54.2 \n5.0 \n2.0 \n17.3 \nDec 2021 \n14.6 \n54.8 \n4.9 \n2.3 \n27.5 \nJun 2021 \n15.5 \n41.3 \n5.7 \n1.2 \n14.3 \nPercentage \nPoint(s) Change \n-0.5 \n-0.6 \n0.1 \n-0.3 \n-10.2 \nBenchmarks \n10.0 - 15.0 \n30 \n5 \n- \n- \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \n Figure 3.4.17: Banking Industry CAR \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nCredit Risk \nThe impact of general credit risk shock of 15, 20, \n30, 50 and 100 per cent in NPLs could result in a \ndeterioration of banking industry CAR to 13.64 per \ncent, 13.49 per cent, 13.17 per cent, 12.53 per \ncent and 10.88 per cent, respectively from the \nbaseline position of 14.11 per cent. The stress test \nrevealed that the banking industry could \nwithstand a credit risk shock of “up to 100.0 per \ncent increase” in the industry NPLs, as the CAR \nremained \nabove \nthe \nminimum \nregulatory \nrequirement of 10.0 per cent. \n \n \n \n \nTable 3.4.13: Credit Default Shocks on Banking \nIndustry CAR (%) \nSingle Factor Shocks \nEnd-Dec 2021 \nEnd-June 2022 \nBaseline CAR \n14.5 \n14.1 \nPost-Shock CAR \n10% NPLs increase \n14.2 \n13.8 \n15% NPLs increase \n14 \n13.6 \n20% NPLs increase \n13.8 \n13.5 \n30% NPLs increase \n12.7 \n13.2 \n50% NPLs increase \n10.9 \n12.5 \n100% NPLs increase \n6.9 \n10.9 \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nSimilarly, the banking industry’s resilience was \ndemonstrated by the obligor credit concentration \nstress test as CAR remained above the minimum \nregulatory benchmark of 10.0 per cent under all \nthree scenarios. \nTable 3.4.14: Credit Concentration Risk on Banking \nIndustry CAR (%) \n \nDec-21 \nJun-22 \nBaseline CAR \n14.8 \n14.1 \nSingle Factor Credit Concentration Shocks \n \n \nScenario 1 \n14 \n13.6 \nFive largest corporate credit facilities shifted \nfrom pass-through to sub-standard (10%) \nScenario 2 \n13.3 \n12.9 \nFive largest corporate credit facilities shifted \nfrom sub-standard to doubtful (50%) \nScenario 3 \n12.1 \n11.6 \nFive largest corporate credit facilities shifted \nfrom doubtful to lost (100%) \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n15.3\n14.5\n14.9\n14.8\n15.5\n14.6\n14.1\n0.0\n2.0\n4.0\n6.0\n8.0\n10.0\n12.0\n14.0\n16.0\n18.0\n20.0\nJun' 19\nDec' 19\nJun' 20\nDec' 20\nJun' 21\nDec' 21\nJun' 22\nPer cent\n \n \n \n63 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nFigure 3.4.18: Credit Concentration Risk for 2022H1 \n(per cent) \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nSector Credit Concentration Risk \nAnalysis of the banking industry’s total credit by \nsector indicated that: Oil and Gas; Manufacturing; \nGeneral; Government; General Commerce; and \nAgriculture accounted for 22.0 per cent, 16.7 per \ncent, 10.7 per cent, 8.8 per cent, 7.4 per cent, and \n6.2 per cent, respectively, while others constituted \nthe balance. \n \n Figure 3.4.19: Sectoral Concentration of Credit \n Source: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nThe result of the stress test of the sector credit \nconcentration indicated that the banking industry \ncould absorb a shock up to 30.0 per cent in \nexposure to oil and gas as the post-shock CAR \nstood at 13.4 per cent. A shock of 50.0 per cent \nexposure to oil and gas sector, could however, \nlead to vulnerability in the banking industry. \n \nTable 3.4.15: Stress Test on Oil and Gas Exposures \n \nIndustry CAR (%) \nBaseline CAR \n14.1 \n30% Default on total \nexposure to Oil and Gas \n13.4 \n50% Default on total \nexposure to Oil and Gas \n9.7 \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nInterest Rate Risk \nThe stress test on the net position of interest-\nsensitive assets showed that the banks could \nwithstand a shock of “up to 1,000 basis points \ndownward shift in yield curve” as the industry’s \npost-shock CAR of 12.1 per cent remained above \nthe regulatory threshold of 10.0 per cent. \n \nFigure 3.4.20: Net-Position of Interest-Sensitive Assets \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \n \n \n \n14.1\n13.6\n12.9\n11.6\n14.5\n14.0\n13.3\n12.1\n0.0\n2.0\n4.0\n6.0\n8.0\n10.0\n12.0\n14.0\n16.0\nBaseline\nScenario 1 (10%)\nScenario 2: Credit\nfacilities shifted from\nDoubtful to Lost\n(50%)\nScenario 3: Credit\nfacilities shifted from\nDoubtful to Lost\n(100%)\nJun-22\nDec-21\n14.1\n13.1\n12.1\nB a s e l i n e C A R\n5 0 0 b p s \nd o w n w a r d s h i f t i n \ny i e l d c u r v e\n1 0 0 0 b p s \nd o w n w a r d s h i f t i n \ny i e l d c u r v e\nCAR (%)\nOil and Gas\n22%\nManufacturi\nng\n17%\nGovernment\n9%\nGeneral\n11%\nGen Comm\n7%\nAgriculture\n6%\nOthers\n28%\n \n \n \n64 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nTable 3.4.16: Liquidity Stress Test Results (Post-Shock) \nScenario \nBanks with \nJun-21 \nLiquidity Ratios \n(LR) < 30% \nDec-21 \nJun-22 \nLR \n(%) \nShortfall to 30% LR \nthreshold \n (N’ billion) \nTest 1: Implied Cash Flow Test \n \nDay 1 \n9 \n13 \n32.7 \nNil \nDay 2 \n14 \n19 \n28.6 \n432 \nDay 3 \n19 \n21 \n24.3 \n1,623.80 \nDay 4 \n20 \n21 \n19.7 \n2,760.50 \nDay 5 \n21 \n23 \n14.7 \n3,865.60 \nImplied Cash \nFlow Test \n(30 Days) \n22 \n24 \n9.6 \n4,837.00 \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \n Liquidity Stress Test \nIn the first half of 2022, Implied Cash Flow Analysis \n(ICFA) and Maturity Mismatch/Rollover Risk \nmethods were used in liquidity stress tests to \ndetermine the resilience of individual banks and \nthe banking industry to funding and liquidity \nshocks. \nThe outcome of the stress test showed that after \na one-day run scenario, the liquidity ratio for the \nindustry declined from 42.7 per cent baseline \nposition to 32.7 per cent. Similarly, under the 5-\nday and 30-day scenarios, the liquidity ratio for the \nindustry declined to 14.7 per cent and 9.6 per \ncent, indicating a liquidity position shortfall of \nN3.87 trillion and N3.84 trillion, respectively. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFigure 3.4.21: Industry Liquidity Ratios at Periods 1-5 \nand cumulative 30-day Shocks \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nMaturity Mismatch \nThe industry’s baseline assets and liabilities \nmaturity profile at end-June 2022, showed that \nthe shorter end of the market (≤90-day bucket) \nwas adequately funded, showing an excess of \nN1,427.74 billion assets over liabilities. \n \nTable 3.4.17: Maturity Profile of Assets and Liabilities \nat end-June 2022 \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \nThe System-wide Maturity Mismatch Analysis \n(Test 2A) revealed that the banking industry was \nadequately funded, except for above 3-years \nbucket, while the industry had mismatches of \nN5,639.50 billion (Test 2B) and N7,833.49 billion \n(Test 2C). These represented decrease of \nN1,270.00 billion (Test 2B) and N1,300.00 billion \n42.7\n32.7\n28.6\n24.3\n19.7\n14.7\n9.6\n0.0\n5.0\n10.0\n15.0\n20.0\n25.0\n30.0\n35.0\n40.0\n45.0\n50.0\nPre-Shock After Day\n1\nAfter Day\n2\nAfter Day\n3\nAfter Day\n4\nAfter Day\n5\nAfter cum\n30 days\nPer cent\nDec-20\nJun-21\nDec-21\nJun-22\nBucket \nLiabilities \nAssets \nMismatch \nCumulative \nMismatch \nN Billion \n≤30 days \n33,948.91 \n20,530.76 \n13,428.21 \n13,428.21 \n 31-90 \ndays \n4,933.13 \n 3,839,70 \n1,099.74 \n 14.527.95 \n91-180 \ndays \n1,584.54 \n3,904.52 \n-2,296.94 \n12,231.01 \n181-365 \ndays \n1,168.38 \n4,099.75 \n-2,912.36 \n9,318.65 \n1-3 years \n2,200.01 \n5,529.72 \n-3,310.55 \n6,008.11 \n>3 years \n3,185.51 \n10,543.78 \n-7,320.42 \n-1,312.31 \nTotal \n47,020.48 \n48,44.23 \n-1,427.74 \n \n \n \n \n65 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \n(Test 2C), relative to the test carried out at end-\nDecember 2021. \n \nTable 3.4.18: Test Results for System-wide Maturity \nMismatch at end-June 2022 \n \nTest 2A[1] \nTest 2B[2] \nTest 2C[3] \n \nN ‘billion \nNo of banks \nwith \nmismatch \nN ’billion \nNo of \nbanks \nwith \nmismatch \nN ’billion \nNo of banks \nwith \nmismatch \n≤30 days \n18,704.88 \n4 \n11,915,.10 \n4 \n-36.96 \n4 \n31-90 days \n6,380.16 \n5 \n-287.84 \n15 \n-175.46 \n6 \n91-180days \n2,966.75 \n10 \n-2,636.89 \n26 \n-495.59 \n9 \n181-\n365days \n2,355.37 \n14 \n-3,281.88 \n28 \n-484.58 \n10 \n1-3 Years \n1,957.03 \n18 \n-3,989.71 \n29 \n-1,248.85 \n14 \nAbove \n3 \nyears \n-2,071.54 \n29 \n-7,358.27 \n29 \n(5,392.04)) \n23 \nTotal \n30,292.64 \n \n-5,639.50 \n \n-7,833.49 \n \n1[1] Note: Test 2A: Descriptive Maturity Mismatch with no consideration for rollover. \n1[2] Test 2B: Static Rollover risk Analysis with no closing of liquidity gaps in other buckets. \n1[3] Test 2C: Dynamic Rollover risk test with use of liquid assets to close liquidity gaps in other buckets. \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nContagion Risk Analysis \nContagion risk analysis indicated rising exposure \nand \ninterconnectedness \n(via \ninterbank \nplacements and takings). Total exposure rose to \nN597.49 billion at end-June 2022, representing \n49.0 per cent increase from the N352.86 billion \nrecorded at end-December 2021. \nSix banks accounted for N387.30 billion or 64.8 per \ncent of total placements and N432.14 billion or \n72.3 per cent of total takings. The exposures were \nwithin the safety corridor of the interbank market \noperations and did not signal significant threat to \nfinancial system stability, as all placements were \nsecured. \n \n \n \n \n \nFigure 3.4.22: Network Analysis based on Interbank \nExposures \n \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nNode colour representation\nBlue\n= Lenders,\nDeep Blue= Net Placement\nRed\n= Borrowers\nPurple= Net Takings\n \n \n \n66 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nBox 2: Liquidity Stress Test Assumptions \nImplied Cash Flow Analysis \nThe Implied Cash Flow Analysis (ICFA) assessed the ability of the \nbanking system to withstand unanticipated substantial withdrawals of \ndeposits, short-term wholesale and long-term funding over 5 days and \ncumulative 30 days, with specific assumptions on fire sale of assets. \nThe test assumed gradual average outflows of 3.8 per cent, 5.0 per cent \nand 1.5 per cent of total deposits, short-term and long-term funding, \nrespectively, over a 5-day period and a cumulative average outflow of \n22.0 per cent, 11.0 per cent and 1.5 per cent of total deposits, short-\nterm and long-term funding, respectively, on a 30-day balance. It also \nassumed that the assets would remain unencumbered after a fire sale. \n \n \nItem \nNo \n \nAssets \n% Unencumbered \n1. \nCash and cash \nequivalents \n100 \n2. \nCurrent account with \nCBN \n100 \n3. \nGovernment bonds, \ntreasury bills and other \nassets with 0% risk-\nweighting \n66.5 \n4. \nCertificates of deposit \nheld \n66.5 \n5. \nOther short-term \ninvestments \n49 \n6. \nCollateralized placements \nand money at call \n49 \n7. \nCRR \n100 \n \nThe Maturity Mismatch/Rollover Risk \nThis approach assessed funding maturity mismatch and rollover risk \nfor assets and liabilities in the 1-30- and 31-90-day buckets, with \nassumptions of availability of funding from the CBN and intra-group \nas described below: \n• Test 2a: Descriptive Maturity Mismatch assumed that \nthe baseline mismatch remained, but 5.0 per cent of total deposits \nwould be made available from the CBN and the intra-group; \n• Test 2b: Static Rollover Risk assumed that 80.0 and 72.0 \nper cent of the funding in the 1-30- and 31-90-day buckets would \nbe rolled over, with no possibility to close the funding gap from other \nbuckets. However, 5.0 per cent of the total deposits would still be \navailable from the CBN and the intra-group; and \n• Test 2c: Dynamic Rollover Risk made the same \nassumption as in 2b, but with the option of closing the liquidity \ngap from other buckets. \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \n8 The CRMS is a regulatory tool designed to capture credit records \nand mitigate credit risk in the banking system \nCredit Risk Management System \nThe CBN sustained its regulatory oversight to \nensure that banks fully comply with the redesigned \nCredit Risk Management System (CRMS) 8 to \nstrengthen credit administration in Nigeria. The \nCBN CRMS database continued to serve as a \nveritable source of credit information in the \nNigerian banking industry. The number of credit \nfacilities on the CRMS database increased by 10.0 \nper cent and 22.2 per cent to 32,134,238 at end-\nJune 2022 from 29,213,129 and 26,292,020 \nrecorded at end-December 2021 and end-June \n2021, respectively, due to increased credit by \nbanks. The number of credit/facilities reported on \nthe CRMS database comprised 31,206,335 \nindividuals and 927,903 non-individuals. \nThe total number of credit/facilities with \noutstanding balances on the CRMS database \ndeclined by 6.8 per cent and 12.8 per cent to \n4,563,136 at end-June 2022 from 4,898,075 and \n5,233,014 at end-December 2021 and end-June \n2021. This comprised 4,365,111 individuals and \n198,025 non-individuals. \nPrivate Credit Bureaux \nThe number of licensed Private Credit Bureaux \n(PCBs) remained at three, same as that of end-\nDecember 2021 and end-June 2021. At end-June \n2022, the average number of uniquely identified \ncredit records in the database of the three credit \nbureaux stood at an average of 62.17 million, \nindicating an increase of 6.78 million, compared \nwith 55.39 million at end-December 2021. \n \nThe average number of uniquely identified credit \nrecords in the database of the PCBs increased by \n \n \n \n67 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \n30.6 per cent compared with the 47.59 million \nrecorded at end-June 2021. The increase was \nattributed, mainly, to the growth in credit in the \nbanking sector, increased level of coverage of the \ncredit reporting system, and awareness of the role \nof credit bureaux in the management of credit risk \namong stakeholders and the public. This also \nexplained the 6.4 per cent increase in the average \nnumber of subscribers in the database of the \nthree-private credit bureaux at end-June 2022. \n \nTable 3.4.19: Credit Records in the Databases of the \nBureaux at end-June 2022 \nS/N \n \nCRC Credit \nBureau Ltd \nCR Services \nCredit \nBureau Plc \nFirst Central \nCredit \nBureau Ltd \n1 \nNumber of \ncredit \nrecords \n66,732,752 \n64,100,565 \n55,681,214 \n2 \nValue of \nCredit \nFacilities \n(N’Tn) \n \n \n \n36.84 \n27.65 \n33.63 \n3 \nNumber of \nborrowers \n27,892,377 \n17,842,523 \n20,323,840 \n4 \nNumber of \nsubscribers \n1,667 \n691 \n1,394 \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \n \nCompliance \nDevelopments \nand \nConsumer \nProtection \nFinancial Sector Surveillance \nThe Bank maintained its supervisory and surveillance \nactivities in the banking sector, towards promoting a \nsafe, stable, and sound financial system. These \nactivities included the offsite appraisal of banks’ \nperiodic returns, regular onsite assessments (routine \nexaminations and special investigations) and \nissuance of circulars and guidelines. \n \n \n \nFinancial \nCrimes \nSurveillance/Anti-Money \nLaundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism \nand Countering (AML/CFT/CPF) \nBased on the Mutual Evaluation Report (MER) \nconducted in 2019, which was adopted by the \nplenary of the Inter-Governmental Action Group \nAgainst Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) \nin August 2021, which placed Nigeria on the \nEnhanced Follow-Up process, requiring the \ncountry to make progress reports on efforts \ntoward addressing the deficiencies noted in the \nMER. Some significant milestones achieved \nincluded: \n• the commencement of the National Inherent \nRisks Assessment; \n• enactment of three Anti-Money Laundering \nLaws: (1) Anti-Money Laundering (Prevention \nand Prohibition) Act, 2022; (2) Terrorism \nFinancing (Prevention and Prohibition) Act, \n2022; and (3) The Proceeds of Crime (Recovery \nand Management) Act, 2022; and \n• domestication of the national AML/FT laws and \nthe gazette of the latest CBN AML/CFT/CPF \nRegulations. \nIn line with these milestones, the AML/CFT \nsupervisory procedures for conducting risk-based \noff-site and on-site examinations of financial \ninstitutions in Nigeria were reviewed. Supervisory \ncycles were being reviewed to accommodate risk-\nbased targeted examination on the effectiveness \nof risk management practices in mitigating money \nlaundering, terrorist financing and proliferation \nfinancing risks within the banking sector. \nAlso, the Bank collaborated with domestic and \ninternational \nstakeholders, \nnamely; \nthe \nCommunity of African Banking Supervisors (CABS), \nthe College of Supervisors of the West African \nMonetary Zone (CSWAMZ), the Financial Stability \n \n \n \n68 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nBoard (FSB), Regional Consultative Group for sub-\nSaharan Africa (RCG SSA) and the Financial \nStability Institute (FSI). These engagements \nreviewed developments in the banking system \nfocusing on cross-border supervision issues and \njoint examination exercises. \n \nSimilarly, the Bank submitted the updated \nMemorandum of Understanding (MoU) with \nBanque de Etats de l’Afrique Centrale (BEAC) on \nApril 14, 2022, for execution. The MoU was \nupdated \nto \nfurther \nenhance \nsupervisory \ncooperation between the CBN and BEAC. The Bank \nalso forwarded the completed questionnaire on \nthe applicable laws and regulations guiding the \nCBN on information secrecy and data protection \nto the Bank of England (BoE). \n \nConsumer Protection \nThe Bank sustained the implementation of \nmeasures to ensure consumer protection through \neffective customer complaints management. The \nConsumer \nComplaints \nManagement \nSystem \n(CCMS) was modified to enhance efficiency and \nimprove interface with the banking public, \nthrough the public portal. The portal would \nprovide a platform for customers of financial \nservice providers to escalate complaints that were \nneither resolved nor satisfactorily treated by the \nbanks to the CBN. \n \nImproved \noperational \nprocedures \nand \nmanagement of customer complaints have \nlowered the number of complaints. The Bank \nreceived 2,432 complaints, indicating a 2.1 per \ncent decrease, compared with the 2,483 in the \nsecond half of 2021. However, it was 23.3 per cent \nhigher than the 1,973 complaints reviewed in the \nfirst half of 2021. The complaints comprised: \nfraud, 697 (28.7 per cent); electronic/cards, 845 \n(34.8 per cent); excess charges, 115 (4.7 per cent) \nand “Others”, 775 (31.8 per cent). \n \nFigure 3.4.23: Category of Consumer Complaints in the \nFirst Half of 2022 \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nA total of 2,725 complaints were resolved, \nindicating an increase of 18.1 per cent and 29.3 \nper cent, relative to the 2,307 and 2,108 \ncomplaints, resolved in the preceding and \ncorresponding periods of 2021, respectively. \nFigure 3.4.24: Complaints Resolved in the First Half of \n2022 \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \nTotal claims in local and foreign currencies \namounted to N8.13 billion and US$11,283.93 in \nthe first half of 2022, compared with the N15.88 \nbillion and US$50.89 million in the preceding \nperiod \nof 2021 \nand \nN16.57 billion \nand \nUS$96,140.41, respectively, in the corresponding \nperiod of 2021. \n \n \n115\n697\n845\n775\n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n700\n800\n900\nExcess charges\nFraud\nElectronics/Cards\nOthers\nNumber of Complaints\n2108\n2307\n2725\n0\n500\n1000\n1500\n2000\n2500\n3000\n2021H1\n 202H2\n 2022H1\nNumber of Complaints \n \n \n \n69 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nFigure 3.4.25a: Total Consumer Claims in the First Half \nof 2022 (N Billion) \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nFigure 3.4.25b: Total Consumer Claims in 2022H1 \n(US$) \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nThe sums of N3.36 billion and US$31,580.41 were \nrefunded in the first half of 2022, compared with \nN6.04 billion and US$938,767.72 in the second \nhalf of 2021; and N8.43 billion and US$53,782.49 \nin the first half of 2021. \n \n \n \n \nFigure 3.4.26a: Total Refunds to Consumer Complaints \nin the First Half of 2022 (N Billion) \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nFigure 3.4.26b: Total Refunds to Consumer Complaints \nin 2022H1 (US$) \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \n \nMarket Conduct Supervision \nThe \nCBN \ninitiated \nand \nimplemented \nthe \ndevelopment \nof \na \nRisk-Based \nSupervision \nframework for Consumer Protection with the aim \nof identifying and focusing on financial products, \nservices and practices, which posed significant risk \nto consumers. Consequently, the Consumer \nProtection Risk-Based Supervision Framework was \ndeveloped. \n \nN16.57\nBillion\nN15.88\nBillion\nN8.13\nBillion\n2021H1\n 2021H2\n 2022H1\n96.14\n50.89\n11.28\n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\n2021H1\n 2021H2\n 2022H1\nUS$ \nN8.43\nBillion\nN6.04\nBillion\nN3.36\nBillion\n2021H1\n 2021H2\n 2022H1\n53,782.49\n938,767.72\n31,580.41\n0\n100,000\n200,000\n300,000\n400,000\n500,000\n600,000\n700,000\n800,000\n900,000\n1,000,000\n2021H1\n 2021H2\n 2022H1\nUS$\n \n \n \n70 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \n \nFinancial Literacy \nThe Bank, in collaboration with the Shared Agent \nNetwork Expansion Facilities (SANEF), organised a \nFinancial Literacy Awareness Workshop, with 384 \nparticipants in attendance. The workshop was \naimed at raising awareness on the Consumer \nProtection initiatives of the Bank and help \nconsumers \nunderstand \ntheir \nrights \nand \nresponsibilities. \nThe Bank, in collaboration with the Bankers’ \nCommittee and the Junior Achievers of Nigeria \n(JAN), conducted the 2022 Global Money Week \n(GMW) with the theme “Build Your Future, Be \nSmart About Money” between 21st and 25th March \n2022. To commemorate the event, the Bank \nmentored over 500 secondary school students in \nrural areas on the importance of savings, \nbudgeting, and investment, among others. \nThe Bank conducted a 5-day Financial Literacy \nprogramme for 132 participants titled “Training of \nTrainers (ToT) Programme for Faith-based \nOrganisations” in April 2022. \nNigeria Sustainable Banking Principles \nThe CBN continued to monitor the implementation \nof the Nigeria Sustainable Banking Principles \n(NSBPs) at individual banks and industry levels. \nSemi-annual reports received from 26 banks \nrevealed that significant progress was made in the \nimplementation of the NSBPs. Banks that were yet \nto achieve the minimum prescribed requirements \nwere advised to address the gaps. \nThe Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria \nThe cumulative recovery by Asset Management \nCorporation of Nigeria (AMCON) stood at N971.13 \nbillion, comprising cash recoveries of N549.89 \nbillion and asset & shares forfeiture of N421.24 \nbillion. In the first half of 2022, the Corporation \nachieved cash recoveries of N17.08 billion and \nasset forfeiture valued at N633.22 million. \nThe net carrying value of AMCON’s liabilities \nincreased by 3.2 per cent to N5.72 trillion in the \nfirst half of 2022, from N5.54 trillion in the second \nhalf of 2021. However, the liabilities declined by \n1.6 per cent, compared with N5.81 trillion in the \ncorresponding half of 2021. Out of the N5.72 \ntrillion, the combined value of the AMCON Note of \nN3.86 trillion and Loan of N500.00 billion, \nrepresented 76.3 per cent of the total liabilities. \nThe Note was due to mature on 27 December \n2023, while the N500.00 billion loan would be due \nfor redemption on 30 December 2022. The CBN \nhad commenced engagements with AMCON on \nthe maturing obligation. The Corporation’s total \nassets net of impairment stood at N896.49 billion \nat end-June 2022, representing 15.6 per cent of \nthe liabilities. \nContributions to the Banking Sector Resolution \nCost Fund (BSRCF) by the CBN and participating \nbanks for the year 2022 was N354.06 billion. The \nCBN makes an annual contribution of N50.00 \nbillion to the BSRCF, while the contribution of the \nparticipating banks is determined based on 50 \nbasis points of their on-balance sheet assets and \ncontingents. \nAll funds collected in the BSRCF were invested in \nGovernment Securities prior to utilisation of the \nfunds in December of every year by AMCON to \nmake scheduled repayments to the CBN. The \nBSRCF is governed by a Board of Trustees, \nconstituted in line with the AMCON Amendment \nAct 2019, and audited annually by External \nAuditors appointed by the Board of Trustees in line \n \n \n \n71 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nwith Section 60(T) of the AMCON Amendment Act \n2015. \n3.5 PAYMENTS SYSTEM MANAGEMENT \nThe Bank sustained implementation of its policies \nto enhance efficiency of the payments system and \nconsolidate on the gains presented to the \npayments system by the COVID-19 pandemic, \nwhile contributing to the achievement of a digital \nfinancial inclusion system during the review \nperiod. Despite the downturn in global economic \nactivities, the Nigerian payments system remained \nresilient at ensuring payments and settlement \neffectiveness during the review period. The Bank \nalso embarked on the implementation of new \ninitiatives to further deepen and widen the \npayments system landscape. \nPayments System Policies \nThe Bank issued new regulations to promote \nhealthy \ncompetition \nthrough \nincreased \ncapabilities of the payment infrastructure and \ninteroperability. These include revised guidelines \non Quick Response Code Payment and exposure \ndraft on Operational Guidelines for Open Banking \nin Nigeria \n \nPayments System Infrastructure \nThe implementation of the Bank Verification \nNumber (BVN) and other innovative infrastructural \ninitiatives progressed in the first half of 2022 with \nsignificant positive outcomes. The number of \ncustomers enrolled on the BVN platform at 54.1 \nmillion, represented an increase of 5.2 per cent \nand 11.5 per cent over 51.4 million and 48.5 \nmillion \nrecorded \nin \nthe \npreceding \nand \ncorresponding periods, respectively. A total of \n130.6 million bank accounts were linked with BVN, \ncompared with 117.6 million and 109.6 million at \nend-December \n2021 \nand \nend-June \n2021, \nrespectively. There were 212.2 million bank \naccounts in the banking industry at end-June \n2022. \nPayments System Strategy \nConsistent with the PSV2025 Strategy Plan, the \nBank continued the implementation of the \nRegulatory Sandbox, Open Banking Operations \nand QR Code Payment initiatives. Hence, the Bank \nissued a circular on the review of the Industry \nQuick Response (QR) Code presentment options \nfor both merchant-presented and customer-\npresented modes. This was an improvement on \nthe initial guidelines that allowed only merchant-\npresented option. \n \nThe Bank issued the exposure draft on Operational \nGuidelines for Open Banking in Nigeria aimed at \npromoting permissioned data sharing for delivery \nof innovative financial products and services to \nbank customers. The operational guidelines \nprovide clear responsibilities and expectations for \nthe various participants, ensure safeguards for \nfinancial system stability, promote competition \nand enhance access to banking and other financial \nservices as well as stipulate that the Bank \nmaintains an Open Banking Registry (OBR) for \nregulatory oversight. \n \nPayments System Supervision and Regulation \nThe Bank continued to enhance its supervisory and \nregulatory oversight over the payments system \nduring the review period. The number of licensed \nPayments Service Providers (PSPs) rose to 116 \nfrom 100 and 99 at end-December 2021 and end-\nJune 2021, respectively. Further analysis showed \nthat 4 licences were issued for Switching and \nProcessing, 9 for Payments Solution Service \n \n \n \n72 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nProviders (PSSPs), 4 for Payments Terminal Service \nProviders (PTSPs), 4 for Super Agents and 2 \nCheque Printers were accredited in the first half of \n \n \n2022. However, the number of Mobile Money \nOperators (MMOs) remained the same, while the \nnumber of card schemes declined to 7 from 8 \nduring the preceding period. Also, the Bank issued \nlicences to new Payments Service Banks (PSBs), \nnamely: MoMo PSB and SmartCash PSB. \n \nImplementation of Nigeria Cheque Standard and \nNigeria Cheque Printers Accreditation Scheme \nVersion 2.0 \nIn compliance with the stipulations of the Nigeria \nCheque Standard (NCS) and Nigeria Cheque \nPrinters Accreditation Scheme (NICPAS) Version \n2.0, accreditation exercises were conducted and \nlicences for 2 Cheque Printers and 6 Cheque \nPersonalisers were renewed in the review period. \nThe automation of the accreditation process for \nCheque Printers and Personalisers in line with the \nNCS/NICPAS version 2.0, was in progress. \nAutomation would: permit greater operational \nproductivity and effectiveness; reduce turnaround \ntime for processing request/application; and \nrealign the steps to optimize flow of information \nbetween processing officers and applicants. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nTable 3.5.1: Licensed Payments System Participants \n \nThe increase in consumer appetite for payment \nsolutions and the emergence of disruptive \ntechnology in the financial services space resulted \nin the Bank’s development of new and more \nflexible ways of engaging with the industry. The \nBank set up the Regulatory Sandbox Steering and \nTechnical \ncommittees to provide effective \ngovernance for the initiative. \nThe objectives of the Regulatory Sandbox are to: \ni. increase the potential for innovative business \nmodels that advance financial inclusion; \nii. reduce time-to-market for innovative products, \nservices, and business models; \niii. increase competition, widen consumers’ \nchoices and lower costs; \niv. ensure appropriate consumer protection \nsafeguards in innovative products; \nv. ensure adequate provisions in regulations to \ncreate an enabling environment for innovation \nwithout compromising on safety for consumers \nand the overall payment system; and \nvi. provide an avenue for regulatory engagement \nwith FinTech firms in the payment space, while \ncontributing to economic growth. \nLicense -Type \nNumber \nJune \n2021 \nDec. \n2021 \nJune \n2022 \nCard Schemes \n6 \n8 \n7 \nSwitching and Processing \n7 \n9 \n13 \nMobile Money Operators* \n16 \n16 \n 16 \nPayment Solution Service \nProviders \n26 \n30 \n39 \nPayment Terminal Service \nProviders \n16 \n15 \n19 \nSuper Agents \n12 \n16 \n20 \nThird Party Processors** \n5 \nn.a \nn.a \nNon-Bank Acquirers** \n6 \nn.a \nn.a \nAccredited Cheque Printers \n5 \n6 \n2 \nTotal \n99 \n100 \n116 \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n*The data shown is for Non-Bank Licensed Mobile Money Operators. \n** n.a – Not applicable with new licence categorisation \n \n \n \n73 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nTrends in the Payments System \nTotal electronic payment (e-payment) grew in \nvolume and value, indicating increased adoption \nand usage during the first half of 2022. By \nsegment, both the retail and wholesale e-\npayments recorded increases in volume and value. \nFurther analysis showed that volume of total e-\npayments9 increased by 11.2 per cent and 155.8 \nper cent to 10,053.5 million, from 9,037.8 million \nand 3,931.0 million in the second and first halves \nof 2021, respectively. Total e-payments rose by \n20.3 per cent and 237.8 per cent to ₦738.06 \ntrillion, from ₦613.41 trillion and ₦218.49 trillion \nin the second and first halves of 2021. The \nsignificant rise in the usage of electronic payment \nchannels relative to the levels in the first and \nsecond halves of 2021, reflected greater digital \nfinancial inclusion. \n \nRetail Payments System \nThe volume and value of retail e-payments \ntransactions increased in the first half of 2022. The \nnumber of transactions across retail e-payment \nchannels increased to 10,053.3 million during the \nreview period by 11.2 per cent and 155.8 per cent \nfrom 9,037.8 million and 3,930.8 million in the \npreceding and corresponding halves of 2021, \nrespectively. \nThe \ncorresponding \nvalue \nof \ntransactions also rose to ₦701.15 trillion in first \nhalf of 2022, representing 20.7 per cent and 283.6 \nper cent increases over its levels in the preceding \nand corresponding periods of 2021. \n \nA breakdown of the volume of transactions by e-\npayment channels showed that internet/web, \nPoS, mobile app, ATM, USSD and NEFT recorded \n \n9 E-payments transactions includes all electronic platforms used to \nsettle financial transactions for households and businesses, such as \nincreases of 298.3 per cent, 60.0 per cent, 147.1 \nper cent, 89.6 per cent, 11.1 per cent and 7.7 per \ncent to 6,487.2 million, 1,710.3 million, 803.2 \nmillion, 711.7 million, 267.7 million and 39.5 \nmillion in the first half of 2022 from their \nrespective levels in the first half of 2021. In \ncomparison with the preceding half year, \ntransactions on mobile app, internet/web and PoS \nincreased by 76.1 per cent, 14.1 per cent and 6.5 \nper cent, respectively, while transactions on NEFT, \nATM and USSD declined by 69.1 per cent, 14.8 per \ncent and 2.5 per cent, respectively. \n \nIn value terms, transactions on ATM, PoS, \ninternet/web, and mobile app channels grew by \n60.0 per cent, 66.8 per cent, 163.5 per cent and \n153.8 per cent, compared with their respective \nlevels in the first half of 2021. Transactions on \nNEFT and direct debit channels grew in thousand \nfolds, compared with their levels in the first half of \n2021. In comparison with the preceding half of \n2021, ATM, internet/web, PoS, NEFT and mobile \napp channels grew by 5.5 per cent, 16.3 per cent, \n8.7 per cent, 23.7 per cent and 78.0 per cent, \nrespectively. Direct debits fell by 22.8 per cent, \nrelative to its level in the preceding period of 2021, \nwhile USSD channel recorded decline of 7.6 per \ncent and 8.8 per cent, compared with its level in \nthe corresponding and preceding periods of 2021, \nrespectively. \n \nAnalysis of the components of retail e-payments \nsegment showed dominance of internet/web \nATMs, PoS, MMOs, internet (web), USSD, Mobile Apps and Direct \nDebits. \n \n \n \n74 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nchannel10, which accounted for 64.5 per cent of \ntotal volume and 49.7 per cent of total value \nduring the review period. The volume of \ntransactions on PoS, mobile app and ATM \nchannels, accounted for 17.0 per cent, 8.0 per \ncent, and 7.1 per cent, respectively in the first half \nof 2022. In value terms, NEFT transfers accounted \nfor 37.2 per cent of the total value of e-payment \ntransactions in the first half of 2022. \n \n \nFigure 3.5.1: Composition of e-Payments Transactions \nby Volume, First Half 2022 (per cent) \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nFigure 3.5.2: Share of e-Payments Transaction by \nValue First Half 2022 (per cent) \n \n \n10 Internet/web also include NIP, e-Bills Pay and Central Pay \ntransactions. \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nTransactions by cheques in the review period \nincreased both in volume and value. The volume \nof cheque transactions increased by 33.1 per cent \nto 8.4 million in the first half of 2022 from 6.3 \nmillion in the corresponding period of 2021, while \nit declined by 8.2 per cent from 9.2 million in the \npreceding half of 2021. The value of cheque \ntransactions increased by 55.4 per cent to N7.49 \ntrillion in the first half of 2022, from N4.82 trillion \nin the first half of 2021, but fell by 4.9 per cent, \ncompared with the level in the preceding half of \n2021. \nMobile Money Operators (MMOs) recorded a \nboost in their activities, which include cash-in, \ncash-out, fund transfer and bill payments. The \nvolume and value of payments services provided \nby the MMOs via their agents touch points \nincreased by 2.8 per cent and 83.3 per cent, \nrespectively in the first half of 2022. The volume of \ntransactions rose to 445.3 million during the \nreview period from 433.0 million in the \ncorresponding half of 2021. The value also \nincreased to N9.58 trillion in the first half of 2022, \nfrom N5.23 trillion in the first half of 2021. The \ndevelopment was attributed to the increased \nonboarding of agents in the drive for improved \nfinancial inclusion. \nAt end-June 2022, the number of ATMs terminals \nstood at 19,392, compared with 19,355 at end-\nDecember 2021 and 19,156 terminals at end-June \n2021. The number of connected Point-of-Sale \n(PoS) terminals increased to 1,299,738 at end-\nJune 2022, from 915,519 and 638,983 at end-\nDecember 2021 and end-June 2021, respectively. \n \n \n \n75 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nSimilarly, the number of agents at end-June 2022 \nstood at 1,249,845, compared with 1,002,514 at \nend-December 2021 and 776,661 at end-June \n2021. \n \n \nWholesale Payments System \nTransactions in the wholesale payments (Real \nTime Gross Settlement (RTGS)) system witnessed \nan increase in volume and value. The volume of \ninter-bank fund transfers through the CBN RTGS \nSystem increased by 5.7 per cent and 2.8 per cent \nto 149,035, compared with 141,592 and 145,914 \nin the first and second halves of 2021, \nrespectively. Similarly, the value of transactions \nincreased by 3.4 per cent and 14.2 per cent to \nN36.91 trillion, compared with N35.70 trillion and \nN32.33 trillion in the corresponding and preceding \nperiods of 2021, respectively. The marginal \nincrease in volume and value of transactions was \nattributed to the uptick in economic activities. \n \nFigure 3.5.3. Volume of Inter-bank RTGS Transactions \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \n \n \n Figure 3.5.4. Value of Inter-bank RTGS Transactions \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n141,592.0 \n145,914.0 \n149,035.0 \n136,000\n138,000\n140,000\n142,000\n144,000\n146,000\n148,000\n150,000\nFirst Half 2021 Second Half 2021 First Half 2022\n35,695.95 \n32,330.05 \n36,913.90 \n30,000 \n31,000 \n32,000 \n33,000 \n34,000 \n35,000 \n36,000 \n37,000 \n38,000 \nFirst Half 2021\nSecond Half 2021\nFirst Half 2022\nN'billion\n \n \n \n76 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nTable 3.5.2: Volume and Value of Electronic Payments and Other Channels \nPayment \nChannels \nNumber of Terminals \n Volume of Transactions (Million) \n Value of Transaction N' Trillion \nJun-21 \nDec-21 \nJun-22 \nJun-21 \nDec-21 \nJun-22 \nJun-21 \nDec-21 \nJun-22 \nATM \n 29,337 \n 19,355 \n 19,392 \n640.46 \n835.54 \n711.71 \n7.90 \n11.98 \n12.64 \nPOS \n 638,983 \n 915,519 \n 1,299,738 \n1,067.59 \n1,605.68 \n1,710.29 \n9.45 \n14.50 \n15.76 \nInternet (Web) \n - \n - \n \n1,628.66 \n5,686.50 \n6,487.17 \n132.16 \n299.61 \n348.30 \nNEFT \n - \n - \n \n20.84 \n127.74 \n39.52 \n10.57 \n210.99 \n261.03 \nRTGS \n - \n - \n \n0.14 \n0.15 \n0.15 \n35.70 \n32.33 \n36.91 \nUSSD \n - \n - \n \n247.97 \n273.94 \n267.04 \n2.46 \n2.49 \n2.27 \nMobile App \n - \n - \n \n324.97 \n456.09 \n803.16 \n20.25 \n28.88 \n51.41 \nDirect Debits \n - \n - \n \n0.31 \n52.20 \n34.43 \n0.01 \n12.63 \n9.75 \nTotal e-Payment \n \n \n \n3,930.95 \n9,037.83 \n10,053.45 \n218.49 \n613.41 \n738.06 \nCheques \n - \n - \n \n6.3 \n9.2 \n8.4 \n4.82 \n7.87 \n7.49 \nMMOs \n - \n - \n \n433.0 \n907.6 \n445.3 \n5.23 \n9.85 \n9.58 \nSources: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nNOTE: Total e-payment transactions includes ATM, online transfers, NEFT, RTGS, USSD, mobile app, and direct debit transactions \n1/ Figures were revised \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n77 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \n \n3.6 EXTERNAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS \nThe external sector experienced an unprecedented \nshock, following the outbreak of war between \nRussia and Ukraine. In addition to the lingering \neffect of COVID-19 containment measures, the \ndevelopment resulted in further accumulation of \nexternal debt, which undermined the viability of \nthe external sector. Consequently, the external \naccount weakened to a deficit of 0.3 per cent of \nGDP, from an overall balance of payments surplus \nof 1.7 per cent of GDP in the second half of 2021. \nThe deficit, however, was an improvement, relative \nto the 1.7 per cent of GDP in the first half of 2021. \n \nRising international crude oil prices resulted in a \nsignificant improvement in export earnings, which \nculminated in a higher current account surplus of \n3.5 per cent of GDP. The financial account \nmaintained a net borrowing position with a net \nincurrence of financial liabilities of 1.0 per cent of \nGDP, compared with 1.2 per cent in the preceding \nperiod, while the international investment position \n(IIP) posted a higher net liability of US$74.09 billion \nin the review period. \n \nThe external reserves position at end-June 2022 \nwas US$39.16 billion and could finance 8.9 months \nof import (goods only) or 6.7 months of import \n(goods and services), and above the international \nbenchmark of 3.0 months. \n \nThe stock of external debt increased to US$40.06 \nbillion from US$38.39 billion at end-December \n2021, following additional loan disbursements and \nreceipt of Eurobond proceeds. The demand \npressure in the foreign exchange market persisted, \nowing largely to supply shortage, leading to the \ndepreciation of the naira in the review period. \n \n \nCurrent and Capital Account Developments \nHigher export earnings, and increased inflow of \nremittances, contributed \nto \nthe \nsignificant \nimprovement in the current account, as a higher \nsurplus was recorded in the review period. Current \naccount surplus improved significantly to US$7.70 \nbillion (3.5 per cent of GDP), compared with \nUS$1.13 billion in the second half of 2021. This \ncontrasted with the deficit of US$2.98 billion in the \nfirst half of 2021. The improvement was mainly on \naccount of increased export earnings, reflecting \nthe gains of higher commodity prices at the \ninternational market, particularly crude oil and \ngas. \nFigure 3.6.1: Current and Capital Account Balance \n(US$ Billion) \n \n Source: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nTrade \nThe trade surplus in the goods account increased \nsubstantially to US$9.20 billion (4.6 per cent of \nGDP), relative to US$0.34 billion in the second half \nof 2021. This contrasted with a deficit of US$3.58 \nbillion in the first half of 2021. The improvement \nwas majorly on account of higher export receipts, \nfollowing the sustained rise in commodity prices. \n \n \n (10.00)\n (8.00)\n (6.00)\n (4.00)\n (2.00)\n -\n 2.00\n 4.00\n 6.00\n 8.00\nFirst Half\n2020\nSecond\nHalf 2020\nFirst Half\n2021\nSecond\nHalf 2021\nFirst Half\n2022\n(8.09)\n(8.89)\n(2.98)\n1.13 \n7.70 \nUS$ Billion\n \n \n \n78 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nExport Performance \nThe COVID-19 induced supply chain disruptions, \nworsened by the Russia-Ukraine crisis, pushed \ncrude oil and gas prices higher on the international \nmarket, \nthereby, \nboosting \nexport \nreceipts. \nAggregate export earnings grew by 32.2 per cent \nto US$35.50 billion (16.1 per cent of GDP), \ncompared with US$26.85 billion and US$20.01 \nbillion in the second and first halves of 2021, \nrespectively. The improvement was due largely, to \nthe increase in the price of Nigeria’s reference \ncrude, the Bonny Light, to an average of \nUS$110.96 per barrel, from US$77.06 per barrel \nand US$64.82 per barrel in the second and first \nhalves of 2021, respectively. \nCrude oil and gas exports increased by 36.4 per \ncent to US$31.57 billion (14.3 per cent of GDP) in \nthe first half of 2022, compared with US$23.14 \nbillion and US$17.70 billion in the preceding and \ncorresponding halves of 2021, respectively. Crude \noil export receipts increased to US$27.76 billion, \nrelative to US$20.16 billion and US$14.99 billion in \nthe second and first half of 2021, reflecting \nsignificant gains from rising crude oil prices. Gas \nexport receipts followed the same trend, \nincreasing to US$3.81 billion, compared with \nUS$2.98 billion and US$2.71 billion in the \npreceding and corresponding halves of 2021, \nrespectively. In terms of share, crude oil and gas \ncomponent remained dominant, accounting for \n89.0 per cent of total exports, with crude oil \nconstituting 78.3 per cent and gas accounting for \n10.7 per cent. Non-oil exports accounted for the \nbalance. \nNon-oil exports proceeds rose by 6.0 per cent to \nUS$3.93 billion (1.8 per cent of GDP), above \nUS$3.71 billion and US$2.31 billion in the second \nand first halves of 2021, respectively. The increase \nreflected the effect of soaring global commodity \nprices. A breakdown of non-oil export by sector \nrevealed that “other” non-oil category (driven by \nthe export of urea) accounted for the largest share \nof 38.6 per cent of total non-oil export receipts. \nThis was followed by agricultural sector exports, \nwhich \nconstituted \n34.8 \nper \ncent. \nSemi-\nmanufactured, \nmineral \nproducts \nand \nmanufactured products accounted for 12.2 per \ncent, 8.6 per cent and 5.9 per cent of total non-oil \nexport, respectively. The country’s major non-oil \nexport commodities were urea, cocoa beans, \nsesame seeds, cashew nuts, and aluminium, while \nthe major export destinations included Brazil, \nVietnam, China, the Netherlands, Japan, Belgium, \nand Malaysia \nExport to the ECOWAS Sub-Region \nNigeria’s export to the ECOWAS sub-region \nimproved, reflecting the effect of the reopening of \nthe borders and return to normalcy from the \nCOVID-19 pandemic lockdown measures. Nigeria's \nnon-oil export to the ECOWAS sub-region \nincreased significantly to US$254.98 million in the \nfirst half of 2022, from US$189.87 million and \nUS$104.61 million in the second and first halves of \n2021. A breakdown showed that Nigeria’s export \nto Republic of Benin, at US$70.03 million, \nconstituted 27.5 per cent of the total, followed by \nNiger with US$58.23 million (22.8 per cent); \nGhana, US$43.01 million (16.9 per cent); and \nSenegal, US$22.82 million (8.9 per cent). Export to \nTogo was US$22.09 million (8.7 per cent); Côte \nd'Ivoire, US$21.40 million (8.4 per cent); and \nGuinea, US$6.19 million (2.4 per cent). Other \ncountries accounted for the balance of 4.4 per \ncent. The major export commodities to the sub-\nregion were tobacco, instant noodles, detergents, \n \n \n \n79 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nplastics, dairy products, soyabean meal and \ncarbonated soft drinks. \n \n Figure 3.6.2: Export to ECOWAS Sub-Regions (per cent) \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nForeign Exchange Earnings by Top the 100 Non-Oil \nExporters. \nThe Bank’s drive to boost non-oil exports and \nsoaring global commodity prices improved the \nreceipts of the top 100 exporters in the review \nperiod. Receipts from the top 100 non-oil \nexporters rose substantially by 70.9 per cent to \nUS$2.29 billion, from US$1.34 billion in the first \nhalf of 2021. It was also higher than US$1.67 \nbillion in the preceding half of 2021. The value of \nthe top 100 non-oil exports accounted for 58.3 per \ncent of total non-oil export receipts. Analysis \nshows that Indorama Eleme Fertilizer and \nChemical Limited topped the list with US$667.81 \nmillion or 29.2 per cent of the total, from the \nexport of urea, fertilizers, and agronomy services \nto Turkey and China. Dangote Fertilizer Limited \nfollowed with a value of US$206.14 million, \nrepresenting 9.0 per cent of the total, from the \nexport of fertilizer to the United States and Brazil. \nIn third place were Starlink Global and Ideal \nLimited, with earnings of US$102.99 million (4.5 \nper cent) from the export of cocoa beans, cashew \nnuts, and sesame seeds to Turkey and China. \nMetal Recycling Industries Limited was placed \nfourth with an export value of US$84.18 million \n(3.7 per cent), from the export of aluminium alloy \ningots, copper billets and brass ingots to China. \nThis was followed by Segilola Resources Operating \nLimited with a value of US$67.38 million (2.9 per \ncent), from the export of gold to China. \nOutspan Nigeria Limited and British American \nTobacco were sixth and seventh, with export of \nUS$62.00 million (2.7 per cent) and US$61.08 \nmillion (2.6 per cent), respectively. The former \nexported cocoa beans and cashew nuts to \nMalaysia, the US and Vietnam, while the latter \nexported cigarettes to Ghana, Cameroon, and \nCote d'Ivoire. WACOT Limited, Olam Nigeria \nLimited and ETC Agro Company Nigeria Limited \nranked eighth, ninth and tenth, with earnings of \nUS$56.01 million (2.5 per cent), US$44.02 million \n(1.9 per cent), and US$43.60 million (1.8 per cent), \nrespectively. WACOT exported cotton products, \nsesame seeds and ginger to The Netherlands and \nthe United States, Olam exported fermented \ncocoa bean seeds to Australia, Greece and Turkey, \nand ETC Agro exported sesame seeds to Japan. \nNon-Oil Receipts through Banks \nNon-oil export proceeds repatriated through the \nbanking system increased by 19.2 per cent to \nUS$2.28 billion, relative to the level in the \npreceding period. This represented 58.0 per cent \nof total non-oil export receipts in the review \nperiod. A breakdown of the proceeds by sector \nshowed that receipts from the export of \nagricultural products accounted for 42.5 per cent \nof total receipts, followed by manufactured \nBenin\n27.5%\nNiger\n22.8%\nGhana\n16.9%\nSenegal\n8.9%\nTogo\n8.7%\nCôte d’Ivoire\n8.4%\nGuinea\n2.4%\nOthers Ecowas \nCountries\n4.4%\n \n \n \n80 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nproducts with a share of 27.3 per cent of the total. \nProceeds from the sale of industrial products \nconstituted 26.4 per cent; mineral products, 2.6 \nper cent; food products, 1.0 per cent; and \ntransport, 0.2 per cent. \n \n \nFigure 3.6.3: Non-Oil Export Receipts by Banks (per cent) \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nMerchandise Import \nMerchandise import bills declined, owing to \ndemand switch to locally produced goods, coupled \nwith the lingering effect of the supply chain \ndisruption. Aggregate merchandise import was \nUS$26.30 billion (12.0 per cent of GDP), compared \nwith US$26.51 billion and US$23.59 billion in the \nsecond and first halves of 2021, indicating declines \nof 0.4 per cent and 12.8 per cent, respectively. \nAnalysis shows that both the importation of non-\noil products and petroleum products decreased to \nUS$18.84 billion (8.6 per cent of GDP), and \nUS$7.46 billion (3.4 per cent of GDP), relative to \nUS$18.94 billion and US$7.57 billion in the second \nhalf of 2021, respectively. Despite the decline in \nnon-oil import, it accounted for the larger share of \n71.6 per cent of total import, while oil accounted \nfor the balance of 28.4 per cent. \nA breakdown of merchandise imports by broad \neconomic categories indicated that the industrial \nsector accounted for 43.9 per cent, followed by \nfuels and lubricants, which constituted 26.8 per \ncent. Food and beverages was 13.4 per cent, while \ntransport equipment and parts accounted for 8.4 \nper cent. Consumer goods represented 7.0 per \ncent, and others, 0.5 per cent. \nFigure 3.6.4: Export, Import and Trade Balance (US$ Billion) \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nServices \nThe deficit in the services account widened as the \ndemand for services increased, driven majorly by \nhigher cost of transportation and travel services. \nThe deficit in the services account widened by 7.0 \nper cent to US$6.42 billion (2.9 per cent of GDP), \ncompared with US$6.00 billion in both the second \nand first halves of 2021, respectively. \nAn analysis of the services account shows that \npayments for services import increased by 9.3 per \ncent to US$8.62 billion in the review period, \nrelative to US$7.89 billion in the second half of \n2021. A further breakdown reveals that payments \nfor transportation and travels rose by 21.1 per \n53.5 \n35.4 \n26.4 \n2.7 \n3.1 \n1.0 \n16.9 \n25.4 \n27.3 \n0.5 \n1.5 \n0.2 \n24.4 \n33.2 \n42.5 \n2.0 \n1.4 \n2.6 \nF i r s t H a l f 2 0 2 1 S e c o n d H a l f 2 0 2 1 F i r s t H a l f 2 0 2 2\nIndustrial\nFood\nManufactured\nTransport\nAgriculture\nMinerals\n-20\n-10\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\nFirst Half\n2020\nSecond Half\n2020\nFirst Half\n2021\nSecond Half\n2021\nFirst Half\n2022\nImport\nExport\nTrade Balance\n \n \n \n81 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \ncent and 30.2 per cent to US$3.89 billion and \nUS$1.80 billion in the first half of 2022, \nrespectively, from US$3.21 billion and US$1.38 \nbillion in the second half of 2021. Payments for \ntransportation also indicated an increase above \nUS$2.18 billion in the corresponding period, but \nthat for travels was lower than US$3.05 billion in \nthe same period. The increase in payments for \ntransportation was attributed to higher spending \non personal transportation and freight charges, \nwhile that of travels was due to increased payment \nfor health and education related travels, on \naccount of easing of COVID-19 travel restrictions \nin some economies. Similarly, payments for \ntelecommunication and government services \nincreased by 3.8 per cent and 11.4 per cent to \nUS$0.30 billion and US$0.15 billion, respectively, \ncompared with the levels in the preceding period. \nOn the contrary, payment for other business \nservices declined by 10.8 per cent to US$1.87 \nbillion in the first half of 2022, relative to US$2.10 \nbillion in the second half of 2021. This was driven \nby the heels of lower payments for professional \nand management consulting, technical, trade-\nrelated, and other services. Payments for financial \nservices also declined significantly by 41.4 per cent \nto US$0.15 billion, relative to the level in the \npreceding period, as banks managed demand for \nforeign exchange efficiently. Insurance services, \nbeing a joint demand with merchandise import, \nalso declined by 18.2 per cent to US$0.32 billion, \ncompared with the level in the preceding period. \nIn terms of share in total services payments, \ntransportation services accounted for 45.1 per \ncent, followed by other business services with 21.7 \nper cent. Travels was 20.9 per cent; insurance, 3.8 \nper cent; telecommunications and computer \nservices, 3.5 per cent; government services, 1.8 \nper cent; financial services, 1.7 per cent; and \ncharges on intellectual property, 1.5 per cent. \n Figure 3.6.5: Share of Services Out-Payments (per cent) \n \n Source: Central Bank of Nigeria \nAggregate earnings from services export increased \nby 16.1 per cent and 4.4 per cent to US$2.20 \nbillion, compared with US$1.89 billion and \nUS$2.10 \nbillion \nin \nthe \npreceding \nand \ncorresponding halves of 2021, respectively. The \nincrease was driven majorly by earnings from \ntravel services, indicating a gradual return of the \neconomy to pre-pandemic levels. \nA breakdown shows that receipts from travels \nincreased significantly to US$0.50 billion, from \nUS$0.10 billion in the second half of 2021, due to \nhigher inflow from other personal travels. Receipts \nfrom telecommunications services also increased \nby 26.0 per cent to US$0.12 billion, relative to \nUS$0.10 billion in the second half of 2021. \nConversely, receipts in respect of transportation \ndeclined by 5.1 per cent to US$0.95 billion, from \nUS$1.00 billion in the second half of 2021, \nfollowing the decline in receipts from freight \ncharges. Receipts from financial services also \ndeclined by 16.7 per cent to US$0.35 billion, \nrelative to the US$0.41 billion in the preceding half \nof 2021. Furthermore, government services \nTransport\n45.1%\nTravel\n20.9%\nInsurance & \nPensions\n3.8%\nFinancial\n1.7%\nCharges for the \nuse of intellectual \nproperty\n1.5%\nTelecommunicatiions\n3.5%\nOther business\n21.7%\nGovernment \n1.8%\n \n \n \n82 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nreceipts decreased by 3.7 per cent to US$0.22 \nbillion, from US$0.23 billion in the second half of \n2021. \nAs a share of total services receipts, transport \naccounted for 43.4 per cent, while travel services \nconstituted 22.8 per cent. This was followed by \nfinancial services receipts, which accounted for \n15.7 per cent; government services, 10.2 per cent; \nand telecommunications services 5.6 per cent. \nOther categories of services accounted for the \nbalance. \n \nFigure 3.6.6: Share of Services Receipts (per cent) \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nPrimary Income \nThe deficit in the primary income account widened, \nas repatriation of investment income by foreign \ninvestors increased, reflecting uptick in business \nactivities following the removal of COVID-19 \nrestrictions. The deficit in the primary income \naccount, at US$6.56 billion, widened by 43.3 per \ncent and 64.9 per cent, relative to US$4.58 billion \nin the preceding half of 2021 and US$3.98 billion \nin the corresponding period of 2021. \n \nInvestment income, comprising payments of \ndividends and profits, increased by 28.5 per cent \nto US$7.40 billion, compared with US$5.76 billion \nin the preceding half of 2021. A breakdown shows \nthat of dividends payments increased by 29.1 per \ncent to US$6.37 billion, compared with US$4.94 \nbillion in the second half of 2021. Similarly, \nreinvested earnings increased significantly to \nUS$0.69 billion, from US$0.30 billion in the \npreceding half year. The increase reflected \nimprovement in business environment, signaling \ngradual return to pre-pandemic levels. \n \nInterest payments on portfolio investment also \nincreased to US$0.13 billion in the review period, \nrelative to US$0.07 billion in the second half of \n2021. Interest payment on loans increased by 23.2 \nper cent to US$0.87 billion, from US$0.71 billion in \nthe preceding period. Interest earnings on \nexternal reserves investments decreased to \nUS$0.15 billion, from US$0.33 billion. \n \nThe compensation of employees sub-account \nmaintained a surplus position, though lower by 1.1 \nper cent, at US$0.11 billion, compared with the \nlevel in the preceding half of 2021. \n \nSecondary Income \nDespite \nthe \nchallenging \nglobal \neconomic \nenvironment, inflow of remittances improved, \nowing to the effective implementation of \nremittances reform policies by the Bank. The \nsurplus in the secondary income account \nincreased to US$11.48 billion (5.3 per cent of GDP) \nin the review period, compared with US$11.38 \nbillion (4.9 per cent of GDP) in the preceding half \nof 2021. The surplus was also higher by 8.5 per \ncent, \nrelative \nto \nUS$10.6 \nbillion \nin \nthe \ncorresponding period of 2021. \nRemittances by Nigerian migrant workers, which \nconstituted 86.4 per cent of total inflow, rose to \nUS$10.11 billion, from US$10.02 billion and \nTransport\n43.4%\nTravel\n22.8%\nFinancial\n15.7%\nTelecommunic\natiions\n5.6%\nGovernment \n10.2%\nOthers\n2.3%\n \n \n \n83 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nUS$9.22 \nbillion \nin \nthe \npreceding \nand \ncorresponding halves of 2021. This was on the \nback of the continued adoption of official bank \nchannels as a result of the Bank’s policies on \nenhancing remittances inflow, particularly the \n“Naira-4-Dollar” Scheme. General government \ntransfers decreased marginally to US$1.55 billion \nin the first half of 2022, compared with US$1.57 \nbillion in the preceding half of 2021, reflecting \nlower inflow of grants, on account of lingering \neffect of COVID-19 in donor economies. \n Figure 3.6.7: Workers’ Remittances (US$’ Billion) \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \nFinancial Account Developments \nA net borrowing position was recorded in the \nreview period, mainly on account of higher \nincurrence of liabilities, driven majorly by swap \ntransactions. The financial account recorded a \nlower net incurrence of liabilities of US$2.19 \nbillion or 1.0 per cent of GDP, compared with \nUS$2.78 billion in the preceding half of 2021, and \nUS$4.23 billion in the corresponding period of \n2021, respectively. This was due, largely, to swap \ntransactions in the review period. \nNet Incurrence of Liabilities \nTighter global financial conditions, coupled with \nuncertainties surrounding the Russia-Ukraine \nconflict, dampened investors’ sentiments, and \nresulted in a lower inflow of foreign capital in the \nreview \nperiod. Aggregate \nforeign financial \nliabilities declined to US$6.83 billion, compared \nwith US$13.58 billion and US$7.72 billion in the \nsecond and first halves of 2021, respectively. \nA breakdown shows divestment in FDI amounting \nto US$1.91 billion in the first half of 2022, against \nan inflow of US$0.32 billion in the preceding half \nof 2021. Portfolio investment inflow, comprising \nequity and debt securities, reduced to US$3.22 \nbillion, compared with US$4.45 billion in the \npreceding half of 2021, reflecting tighter global \nfinancial conditions and the effect of the rate hike \nin most advanced economies. Similarly, ‘other’ \ninvestment decreased to US$4.52 billion, relative \nto US$8.82 billion in the preceding half of 2021, as \na result of lower incurrence of loans and decline in \nforeign currency placement in deposit taking \ncorporations. Financial derivatives recorded an \ninflow of US$1.00 billion, following swap \ntransactions in the review period. \nFigure 3.6.8: Foreign Capital Inflow (US$ Billion) \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nNet Acquisition of Asset \nAggregate financial assets decreased by 57.0 per \ncent to US$4.64 billion, compared with US$10.80 \nbillion in the preceding half of 2021. The \n9.02 \n7.98 \n9.22 \n10.02 \n10.11 \n -\n 2.00\n 4.00\n 6.00\n 8.00\n 10.00\n 12.00\nFirst Half 2020 Second Half\n2020\nFirst Half 2021 Second Half\n2021\nFirst Half 2022\nF i rs t \nHa l f \n2 0 2 0\nSec on d \nHa l f \n2020\nF i rst \nHa l f \n2021\nSec on d \nHa l f \n2021\nF i rst \nHa l f \n2022\nFDI\nPortfolio Investment\nOther Investment\nFinancial Derivatives\n \n \n \n84 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \ndevelopment was due, largely, to significantly \nlower foreign currency holdings of deposit-taking \ncorporations. It, however, increased compared \nwith US$3.49 billion in the corresponding half of \n2021. \nAn analysis shows a divestment of direct \ninvestment assets by resident investors in the \nreview period to the tune of US$0.25 billion, \nagainst an acquisition of financial assets of \nUS$1.58 billion in the second half of 2021. \nPortfolio investment assets increased to US$0.29 \nbillion, compared with US$0.25 billion in the \npreceding half of 2021. Acquisition of ‘other \ninvestment’ asset decreased to US$4.39 billion, \ncompared with US$4.97 billion in the preceding \nhalf of 2021, reflecting lower foreign currency \nholdings of the deposit taking corporations. \nConsequently, \nreserve \nassets \nwitnessed \na \ndepletion, amounting to US$0.79 billion in the \nreview period, against an accretion of US$4.01 \nbillion in the preceding half of 2021. \nExternal Debt \nNigeria's public external debt surged in the review \nperiod, owing to new borrowings. Public external \ndebt increased to US$40.06 billion at end-June \n2022, compared with US$38.39 billion at end-\nDecember 2021, and US$33.47 billion at end-June \n2021. A breakdown shows that loans from \nmultilateral sources increased to US$19.16 billion, \nconstituting 47.8 per cent of the total, from \nUS$18.66 billion at end-December 2021, owing to \nadditional loans from the World Bank and Africa \nDevelopment Bank groups. Debt from commercial \nsources increased to US$15.62 billion (39.0 per \ncent), compared with US$14.67 billion (38.2 per \ncent), at end-December 2021, reflecting new \nissuance of Eurobonds. Loans from bilateral \nsources also increased to US$4.70 billion (11.7 per \ncent), compared with US$4.47 billion (11.6 per \ncent) at end-December 2021, due to new \ndisbursements by China Exim Bank. Promissory \nnotes declined by 2.1 per cent to US$0.59 billion \nand accounted for the balance. \n \nInternational Investment Position \nIncreased inflow of other investment liabilities \nresulted to a higher net liability position in \nNigeria's International Investment Position. A \nhigher net financial liability of US$74.09 billion was \nrecorded at end-June 2022, compared with \nUS$70.30 billion at end-December 2021 and \nUS$77.54 billion at end-June 2021. \nThe stock of financial liabilities, representing \nforeign investors' claims on the economy, grew to \nUS$182.74 billion at end-June 2022, relative to \nUS$174.55 billion at end-December 2021 and \nUS$168.14 billion at end-June 2021, indicating an \nincrease of 4.7 per cent and 8.5 per cent, \nrespectively. The development reflected an \nincrease in the stock of money market instruments \nheld by foreign investors, bilateral currency swaps, \nand higher loan liabilities of banks and the general \ngovernment. The stock of portfolio investment \nincreased by 12.6 per cent to US$37.02 billion at \nend-June 2022, relative to US$32.87 billion at end-\nDecember 2021. \nFDI liabilities fell by 0.3 per cent to US$87.28 \nbillion at end-June 2022, relative to US$87.53 \nbillion at end-December 2021. The stock of \nfinancial derivatives increased by 60.1 per cent to \nUS$3.21 billion at end-June 2022, from US$2.00 \nbillion at end-December 2021. \nThe stock of financial assets grew by 3.9 per cent \nto US$108.34 billion at end-June 2022, compared \nwith US$104.25 billion at end-December 2021. \n \n \n \n85 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis was due to an increase in the stock of direct \nand portfolio investments abroad and other \ninvestment assets, indicating higher claims by \nNigerian investors on the rest of the world. \nFurther analysis reveals that the stock of FDI assets \ndeclined by 2.1 per cent to US$13.30 billion at \nend-June 2022, relative to US$13.58 billion at end-\nDecember 2021. Other investment assets rose by \n8.6 per cent to US$49.35 billion, compared with \nUS$45.45 billion at end-December 2021. \nThe stock of reserve assets fell by 2.7 per cent to \nUS$39.16 billion at end-June 2022, relative to \nUS$40.23 billion at end-December 2021. Portfolio \ninvestment increased by 11.4 per cent to US$3.32 \nbillion at end-June 2022, relative to its level at end-\nDecember 2021. \nInternational Reserves \nThe external reserves remained above the \ninternational benchmark of three months of \nimport cover. Gross external reserves at end-June \n2022 stood at US$39.16 billion, compared with \nUS$40.23 billion and US$32.99 billion at end-\nDecember 2021 and end-June 2021, respectively. \nThe 2.7 per cent decline, when compared with the \nlevel at end- December 2021, was mainly, due to \nthe Bank’s intervention at the foreign exchange \nmarket and settlement of other obligations \nincluding public sector and external debt service \npayments. \nA breakdown of external reserves by ownership \nshows that, the CBN maintained its dominance, \nwith a share of 96.8 per cent, followed by the \nFederal Government with 3.1 per cent. The \nFederation accounted for the remaining 0.1 per \ncent. In terms of currency composition, the US \ndollar, at US$29.99 billion, constituted 76.6 per \ncent of the total; Special drawing rights, US$5.05 \nbillion (12.9 per cent); Chinese yuan, US$3.65 \nbillion (9.3 per cent); while other currencies \naccounted for the balance of 1.2 per cent. \nAn assessment of external reserves adequacy \nbased on the traditional benchmark showed that, \nthe end-June 2022 level of reserves could finance \n6.7 months of import of goods and services or 8.9 \nmonths of goods only, higher than the 3.0 months \ninternational benchmark. The ratio of external \nreserves to short-term liabilities was 5.8 \npercentage points above the benchmark of 100.0 \nper cent short-term debt cover, based on the \nGreenspan-Guidotti measure of external reserves \nadequacy. In terms of external reserves to money \nsupply (M3), the ratio, at 31.4 per cent, indicated \nthat the level of reserves was inadequate, as it was \nabove the international benchmark of 20.0 per \ncent. \nFigure 3.6.9: External Reserves Stock and Reserve Adequacy \nMeasures \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nExternal Asset Management Programme and \nIncome from Reserves Management \nThe performance of the external reserves \nportfolio was mixed. On the one hand, the \npersistent rise in inflation and subsequent \nincrease in interest rates by the Federal \nReserve Bank and other major central banks \n95\n100\n105\n110\n115\n120\n125\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n35\n40\n45\nFirst Half 2021\nSecond Half 2021\nFirst Half 2022\nReserves\nImport Cover (Goods)\nImport Cover (G&S)\nReserve/M3\nShort-Term Debt Cover\n \n \n \n86 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \naffected the performance of global financial \nassets, leading to decline in prices of fixed \nincome securities, while income received \nfrom fixed term deposits and coupon \npayments increased. Consequently, the \nreturn on the money market and fixed \nincome held-to-maturity portfolios were \npositive. On the other hand, gold and fixed \nincome \nmarked-to-market \nportfolios \ndeclined, recording unrealised losses. \nThe net asset value of the fixed income \nportfolio managed by the external asset \nmanagers decreased to US$7.26 billion at \nend-June 2022, from US$7.45 billion and \nUS$7.46 billion at end-December 2021 and \nend-June 2021, respectively. This was due to \ndecline in prices of bonds (fixed income \nsecurities) as yields increased. Cumulatively, \nthe portfolio recorded an absolute return of \nUS$853 million from inception to end-June \n2022. \nForeign Exchange Flows \nThe economy recorded a lower net foreign \nexchange inflow on account of declining receipts \nfrom the Bank and autonomous sources. Foreign \nexchange flow through the economy recorded net \ninflow of US$16.84 billion in the first half of 2022, \ncompared with US$28.15 billion in the second half \nof 2021. \nAggregate inflow into the economy fell by 23.7 per \ncent and 12.6 per cent to US$38.70 billion in the \nfirst half of 2022, compared with US$50.73 billion \nand US$44.27 billion, in the second and first halves \nof 2021, respectively. The development was \ndriven, largely, by 36.9 per cent and 9.8 per cent \ndecrease in inflow through the CBN and \nautonomous sources. A breakdown shows that \ninflow through the CBN and autonomous sources \naccounted for 42.4 per cent and 57.7 per cent, \nrespectively. \nInflow through autonomous sources decreased by \n9.8 per cent to US$22.30 billion, from US$24.72 \nbillion in the second half of 2021. A disaggregation \nshows that invisible purchases declined by 11.7 \nper cent to US$19.99 billion, from US$22.64 billion \nin the second half of 2021. Of the total invisible \npurchases, \nordinary \ndomiciliary \naccount \ndecreased to US$9.00 billion, from US$10.26 \nbillion in the second half of 2021. Similarly, total \nOver-the-Counter (OTC) purchases, at US$10.86 \nbillion, indicated a 12.3 per cent decline, relative \nto US$12.38 billion in the second half of 2021. \nHowever, non-oil export receipts by banks \nincreased by 12.0 per cent to US$2.28 billion, \ncompared with US$2.03 billion in the second half \nof 2021. \nForeign exchange inflow through the CBN fell by \n36.9 per cent to US$16.40 billion, from US$26.01 \nbillion in the second half of 2021. The \ndevelopment was attributed to 44.8 per cent \ndecline in non-oil receipts to US$12.43 billion, \nfrom US$22.52 billion in the second half of 2021. \nThis was driven, mainly, by the 68.8 per cent, 33.0 \nper cent and 63.3 per cent decreases in proceeds \nfrom Revalued Gold Holding, Treasury Single \nAccount (TSA) & Third-Party receipts, and other \nofficial receipts to US$1.25 billion, US$4.81 billion \nand US$1.29 billion, respectively. Further analysis \nreveals that interbank swaps and foreign exchange \npurchases increased by 32.4 per cent and 33.7 per \ncent to US$3.33 billion and US$1.18 billion, \nrespectively, against the receipts in the preceding \nperiod. \nConversely, crude oil-related receipts rose by 13.8 \nper cent to US$3.97 billion, above the US$3.49 \n \n \n \n87 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nbillion in the second half of 2021, as a result of \nincreased global crude oil prices during the first \nhalf of 2022. \nAggregate foreign exchange outflow from the \neconomy, at US$21.81 billion, declined by 3.2 per \ncent, relative to the level in the second half of \n2021. A breakdown shows that outflow through \nthe autonomous sources rose by 23.6 per cent to \nUS$4.97 billion, compared with the level in the \nsecond half of 2021. \nAggregate foreign exchange outflow from the \neconomy, at US$19.05 billion, declined by 34.6 per \ncent, relative to the level in the first half of 2020. \nA breakdown showed that outflow through \nautonomous sources fell by 21.1 per cent to \nUS$1.41 billion, compared with the level in the \nfirst half of 2020, as a result of higher payment for \ninvisible services. \nOutflow through the CBN decreased by 9.0 per \ncent to US$16.89 billion, owing, largely, to decline \nin interbank utilisation, third-party MDA transfers, \nand public sector/direct payments. Further \ndisaggregation shows that interbank utilisation, \ndecreased by 7.9 per cent to US$9.67 billion or \n57.3 per cent of the Bank’s outflow, compared \nwith the level in the second half of 2021, on \naccount of lower foreign exchange sales at the \nInvestors’ and Exporters’ (I&E), invisible/interbank \nand Secondary Market Intervention Scheme \n(SMIS) windows. Similarly, third-party MDA \ntransfers and public sector/direct payments \ndeclined by 40.1 per cent and 26.2 per cent to \nUS$2.78 billion and US$1.24 billion, respectively. \n \n \n \nFigure 3.6.10: Foreign Exchange Disbursements through the \nCBN (per cent) \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nA net inflow of US$17.33 billion was recorded \nthrough autonomous sources, compared with \nUS$20.70 billion in the second half of 2021. The \nCBN recorded a net outflow of US$0.49 billion, in \ncontrast to a net inflow of US$7.45 billion in the \nsecond half of 2021. \nFigure 3.6.11: Foreign Exchange Flows through the CBN \n(US$ Billion) \n \n Source: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \n \n \n \n \nFunds returned to \nremitter\n0.0%\nInterbank \nutilisation\n57.3%\nDrawings on L/Cs\n4.4%\nExternal Debt \nService\n8.1%\nForex Special \nPayments\n0.8%\nPublic \nSector/Direct \nPayments\n7.3%\nBank and SDR \nCharges\n0.2%\n3rd Party MDA \nTransfers\n16.5%\nNational Priority \nProjects\n0.0%\nOthers\n5.4%\n14.06 \n26.01 \n16.40 \n17.65 \n18.56 \n16.89 \n(3.59)\n7.45 \n(0.49)\n (10.00)\n (5.00)\n -\n 5.00\n 10.00\n 15.00\n 20.00\n 25.00\n 30.00\n1st Half 2021\n2nd Half 2021\n1st Half 2022\nInflow\nOutflow\nNetflow\n \n \n \n88 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nForeign Exchange Management \nPressure in the foreign exchange market \ncontinued, amid persisting supply shortages. \nConsequently, the Bank implemented some \npolicies and programmes to enhance foreign \nexchange inflow and ensure efficient utilisation of \nforeign exchange. \nThe Bank introduced the Race to $200.00 million \n(RT200) programme on 25 February 2022, to raise \nUS$200.00 billion in foreign exchange earnings \nfrom non-oil export over the period of three to five \nyears. The Scheme aims to enhance and diversify \nthe sources of foreign exchange inflow, increase \nthe level of contribution of non-oil exports, ensure \nthe stability and sustainability of foreign exchange \ninflow, and support export-oriented companies to \nexpand export operations and capabilities. The \ncategories include Value-Adding Exports Facility, \nNon-Oil Commodities Expansion Facility, Non-Oil \nFX Rebate Scheme, Dedicated Non-Oil Export \nTerminal, and Bi-annual Non-Oil Export Summit. \nThe Rebate scheme was designed to incentivise \nnon-oil export and encourage repatriation of \nexport proceeds. The Scheme pays N65.00 for \nevery US$1.00 repatriated and sold at the I&E \nwindow to Authorised Dealer Banks (ADBs) for \nother third-party use, and N35.00 for every \nUS$1.00 repatriated and sold in the I&E window \nfor own use on eligible transactions. In addition, \nthe Bank commenced the Bi-annual Non-Oil \nExport Summit in June 2022. \nIn line with efforts to ensure efficient utilization \nand management of foreign exchange, the Bank \ndeployed the Price Verification System (PVS). The \nsystem is designed to operate on a global price \nverification mechanism guided by a benchmark \nprice. The benchmark price is the actual spot \nmarket price obtainable at the time of \nconsummation of invoicing in the markets, where \nthe goods are traded. \nForeign Exchange Sales \nThe Bank sustained its interventions in the foreign \nexchange market to enhance liquidity and ensure \nstability. Total foreign exchange supplied to \nauthorised dealers by the Bank was US$9.67 \nbillion, a decrease of 7.9 per cent, below the level \nin the second half of 2021. \nA breakdown reveals that foreign exchange sales \nat the inter-bank/invisible and Small and Medium \nEnterprises \n(SMEs) \nwindows \ndecreased \nto \nUS$0.94 billion and US$0.72 billion, from US$1.28 \nbillion and US$0.79 billion in the second half of \n2021. Similarly, sales under the SMIS and to the \nI&E window declined by 6.4 per cent and 17.7 per \ncent to US$3.84 billion and US$2.24 billion, \nrespectively, compared with the levels in the \nsecond half of 2021. \nFigure 3.6.12: Supply of Foreign Exchange (US$ Billion) \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nForward and Swap Transactions \nIn the first half of 2022, wholesale forward sales \ndeclined by 1.3 per cent to US$4.84 billion, from \nUS$4.78 billion in the corresponding half of 2021. \nMatured swap transactions increased by 65.8 per \n18.17\n9.98\n11.31\n10.50\n9.67\nH1 2020\nH2 2020\nH1 2021\nH2 2021\nH1 2022\n \n \n \n89 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \ncent to US$1.93 billion, from US$1.16 billion in the \nsecond half of 2021. \n \nExchange Rate Movements \nThe exchange rate of the naira to the US dollar \nremained relatively stable at the Investors’ and \nExporters’ (I&E) window. \nSpot Exchange Rate \nThe average exchange rate of the naira to the US \ndollar at the I&E window depreciated by 1.0 per \ncent and 2.2 per cent to ₦416.02/US$, relative to \nthe ₦411.85/US$ and ₦406.77/US$ in the second \nand first halves of 2021, respectively. \nFigure 3.6.13: Average Exchange Rate Movements (N /US$) \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nThe exchange rate of the naira to the US dollar at \nthe I&E window, closed at N414.00/US$, at end-\nJune 2022, relative to N413.00/US$ at the end-\nDecember 2021 and N411.50/US$ at end-June \n2021. \nCross Rates \nThe average exchange rate of the naira \nappreciated by 3.5 per cent, 5.1 per cent and 8.5 \nper cent against the British pound, euro and \nJapanese yen, respectively, compared with their \nlevels in the second half of 2021. Relative to peer \ncountries, the naira appreciated by 6.4 per cent \nand 2.4 per cent, against the CFA francs and \nWAUA, relative to their respective values in the \nsecond half of 2021. \n \nSectoral Utilisation of Foreign Exchange \nAggregate utilisation of foreign exchange by \nsectors decreased, driven, mainly by contraction in \ninvisibles import. Aggregate sectoral utilisation of \nforeign exchange was US$14.65 billion, indicating \na decrease of 4.6 per cent, compared with the \nlevel in the preceding period of 2021. However, it \nrose by 43.1 per cent relative to the level in the \ncorresponding period of 2021. A disaggregation \nreveals that US$9.04 billion or 61.7per cent of the \nforeign exchange was utilised for visible import, \nindicating an increase of 7.2 per cent and 53.6 per \ncent, compared with the levels in the second half \nand first half of 2021, respectively. \nFurther analysis shows that the amount utilised by \nthe industrial sector, at US$4.41 billion, rose by \n21.4 per cent, over the level in the second half of \n2021. Similarly, utilisation by oil, mineral and \ntransport sectors rose by 30.2 per cent, 237.1 per \ncent, and 31.0 per cent, to US$0.70 billion, \nUS$0.32 billion and US$0.31 billion, respectively, \ncompared with their respective levels in the \npreceding period. \nThe amount utilised for manufactured, food \nproducts and agricultural sectors declined by 8.0 \nper cent, 25.5 per cent and 26.2 per cent, to \nUS$1.92 billion, US$1.25 billion and US$0.12 \nbillion in the first half of 2022, respectively, \nrelative to the levels in the preceding half of 2021. \n \n \n350\n360\n370\n380\n390\n400\n410\n420\nH1 2020\nH2 2020\nH1 2021\nH2 2021\nH1 2022\nI&E\n \n \n \n90 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nFigure 3.6.14: Share of Sectoral Utilisation of Foreign \nExchange (Visible) \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \nInvisible transactions at US$5.62 billion or 38.3 per \ncent of the total, declined by 18.9 per cent, below \nthe level of US$6.92 billion, in the second half of \n2021, but increased by 28.9 per cent, above \nUS$4.36 billion recorded in the first half of 2021. A \nbreakdown shows that the amount utilised for \nfinancial services and other services declined by \n27.7 per cent and 7.8 per cent, to US$3.96 billion \nand US$0.41 billion, respectively, below the levels \nin the second half of 2021. The amount utilised for \neducational, business and transport services, \nincreased by 15.5 per cent, 31.5 per cent and 15.1 \nper cent, to US$0.49 billion, US$0.46 billion and \nUS$0.22 billion, respectively, compared with the \nlevels in the second half of 2022. \nFigure 3.6.15: Share of Sectoral Utilisation of Foreign \nExchange (Invisibles) (Per cent) \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nNominal Effective Exchange Rate (NEER) and Real \nEffective Exchange Rate (REER) Indices \nThe average 13-currency NEER index (November \n2009=100) in the review period was 194.78 index \npoints, indicating a decline of 2.3 per cent and 3.1 \nper cent, relative to the levels in the second and \nfirst half of 2021, respectively. The average REER \nindex (November 2009=100), which measures \nexternal competitiveness, was 65.83 points, \nrepresenting a decline of 7.2 per cent and 11.6 per \ncent, compared with the levels in the second and \nfirst half of 2021, respectively. The indices indicate \ndepreciation against the major trading partners, \nwhich denote increased export competitiveness. \nFigure 3.6.16: Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (NEER) and \nReal Effective Exchange Rate (REER). \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nIndustrial, \n48.83 \nFood Products, \n13.82 \nManufactured \nProducts, \n21.21 \nTransport, \n3.44 \nAgriculture, \n1.35 \nMinerals, 3.58 \nOil, 7.76 \nBusiness \nServices, 8.2\nEducation \nServices, 8.7\nFinancial \nServices, 70.5\nOther' \nServices , 8.7\nTransport \nServices, 4.0\n0.00\n50.00\n100.00\n150.00\n200.00\n250.00\n2020H1\n2020H2\n2021H1\n2021H2\n2022H1\nNEER\nREER\n \n \n \n91 \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2022 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSection Four \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nThe short-to medium-term outlook of the Nigerian economy is \nfragile but improving, drawing on dynamics in the global and \ndomestic economies, market sentiments and forecasts. \n❖ Outlook \n• Global Economy \n• Real Domestic Economy \n• Fiscal Policy \n• Financial Sector, and \n• External Economy \n \n \n \n \n92 \n \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2021 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \n \n \n \n \n93 \n \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2021 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \n4.1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK \nOutput: According to the IMF World Economic \nOutlook (July 2022), global output growth is \nexpected to slow in the second half of 2022, as \nmost economies seek to rein in the rising \ninflationary pressure. Global output, is therefore, \nprojected to grow by 3.2 per cent in 2022, and 2.9 \nper cent in 2023, a moderation from the 6.1 per \ncent growth in 2021. \nIn the advanced economies (AEs), output growth \nis projected to slow to 2.5 per cent in 2022, and \n1.4 per cent in 2023 from 5.2 per cent in 2021. In \nthe United States, output is expected to \nmoderate to 2.3 per cent in 2022 from 5.7 per \ncent in 2021, attributed to the anticipated impact \nof tighter monetary policy. Growth in the euro \narea is projected to slow to 2.6 per cent in 2022 \nfrom 5.4 per cent in 2021 but remain unchanged \nat 1.7 per cent in the UK. \nIn emerging markets and developing economies \n(EMDEs), growth is projected at 3.6 per cent in \n2022, and 3.9 per cent in 2023, a deceleration \nfrom the 6.8 per cent growth recorded in 2021. \nThe expected slowdown is driven by growth \nmoderation in China and India. Specifically, China \nand India are projected to grow by 4.6 per cent \nand 3.3 per cent in 2022, from 7.3 per cent and \n8.1 per cent, respectively, in 2021. In the Middle \nEast and Central Asia, growth in 2022 is projected \nat 4.8 per cent from 5.8 per cent in 2021. \nThe outlook for sub-Saharan Africa is positive, \nwith growth projected at 3.8 per cent in 2022, a \nslight decrease from the 4.6 per cent growth \nrecorded in 2021. The projection for the region \nreflects the cushioning effects of rising fossil fuel \nand metal prices for some commodity-exporting \ncountries. \nConsumer Prices: Global inflation is expected to \nremain elevated in 2022 due to rising food and \nenergy prices and lingering supply chain \ndisruptions. The IMF projections, however, \nsuggest a subdued inflation outlook in the near-\nterm on the back of the central banks’ tightening \npolicy stance. \nIn advanced economies, prices are generally \nprojected to rise in 2022, reflecting the impact of \nthe \nRussia-Ukraine \nwar \non \nenergy \nand \ncommodity prices. In the United States, inflation \nis expected to stand at 7.7 per cent from 7.0 per \ncent at end-December 2021, while in the euro \narea, inflation is projected at 7.3 per cent. In the \nUnited Kingdom and Japan, inflation is projected \nat 10.5 per cent and 1.9 per cent, respectively, \nfrom 4.8 per cent and 0.8 per cent recorded at \nend-December 2021. \nInflation in EMDEs will continue to trend \nnorthward in 2022. In Asia, it will stand at 3.5 per \ncent and particularly, in China, consumer prices \nare expected to grow by 2.1 per cent. \nIn sub-Saharan Africa, inflation is projected at \n12.2 per cent in 2022, occasioned primarily due \nto rising food and energy prices. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n94 \n \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2021 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nDOMESTIC ECONOMIC OUTLOOK \nNigeria’s output growth is expected to maintain a \npositive trajectory for the rest of the year. The \ngrowth prospects are dependent on continued \npolicy support and sustained increase in crude oil \nprices. Specifically, the Nigerian economy is \nestimated to grow in 2022 by 3.52 per cent (CBN), \n4.20 per cent (FGN), and 3.40 per cent (IMF). The \npositive outlook is predicated on the effective \nimplementation of the 2022 Appropriation Act \nand the 2022-2025 Medium-Term National \nDevelopment Plan (MTNDP), and the continued \ninterventions by the CBN in growth-enhancing \nsectors. \nThe uncertainties from the Russia-Ukraine war, \nas well as significant headwinds, such as rising \nenergy prices, the risk of stagflation in the US, \nand the persisting security and infrastructural \nchallenges, could undermine the positive outlook \nin the short-to-medium-term. \nDomestic prices are expected to remain elevated \nthrough the second half of 2022. This is on the \nback of expected build-up in 2023 election-\nrelated spending, spillovers from global supply \nconstraints, and exchange rate pass-through. \nMore \nso, \nthe \npersisting \nsecurity \nand \ninfrastructural challenges could exacerbate \ninflationary pressures. \nHowever, inflation is expected to decelerate in \nthe coming months given the expected good \nharvest season and the sustained interventions \nof the Bank in the real sector of the economy. \nThe outlook of the external sector remains \noptimistic, on account of expected favourable \nterms of trade. The positive outlook is supported \nby the sustenance of crude oil price above \nUS$100.00pb and the gains from the Naira-4-\ndollar and the RT200 programmes of the Bank. \nHowever, the hike in interest rate by central \nbanks across advanced economies increases the \nrisk of capital outflow. Also, the rising external \ndebt-servicing, are likely to weigh on external \nreserves accretion. \n \nFiscal conditions are expected to improve in the \nsecond half of 2022. This is premised on \ncontinued implementation of the Finance Act \n2021, the Strategic Revenue Growth Initiatives \n(SRGIs), and tax reforms, which are expected to \nboost non-oil revenue. Rallying crude oil prices, \narising from Russia-Ukraine crisis, are likely to \nboost oil earnings. However, low domestic crude \noil production, rising public debt and lingering \nsecurity challenges are likely to pose downside \nrisks to fiscal outcomes. \nThe financial sector is expected to remain resilient \nin the second half of 2022. The outlook mirrors \nthe efforts of the CBN in continuously monitoring \nemerging vulnerabilities and risks, including \nperiodic stress tests, and the provision of risk \nmitigants. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n95 \n \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2021 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSection Five \n \n \n \nAn addendum of supporting activities and engagements of the \nBank, in the review period is presented here. \n \n \n \n96 \n \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2021 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n❖ International Meetings \n• Regional \n• Non-Regional \n \n \n \n \n97 \n \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2021 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \n5.1 REGIONAL MEETINGS \n44th Meeting of the Committee of Governors of \nthe Central Banks of the West African Monetary \nZone Member States. \nThe 44th meeting of the Committee of Governors \nof the Central Banks of the Member States of the \nWest African Monetary Zone WAMZ was held \nvirtually on 3 March 2022. The Meeting was held \nto deliberate on the status of the implementation \nof the WAMZ work programme and activities \nunder the ECOWAS single currency programme. \nThe reports of the 50th meeting of the Technical \nCommittee formed the basis of deliberations and \nconsideration. \nThe Meeting considered the following aspects of \nthe report: \n• \nWAMZ Macroeconomic development and \nconvergence report, end-June 2021; \n• \nDiagnostic report on the harmonization of \nstatistics in the WAMZ member states; \n• \nProposed Roadmap for WAMZ countries \nmigration \nto \nInflation \nTargeting \nFramework; \n• \nProgress report on the Capital Markets \nIntegration and Insurance Industry in the \nWAMZ; \n• \nProgress report on the Payments System \nDevelopment in the WAMZ; and \n• \nProposed West African Monetary Institute \n(WAMI) Work Programme and budget for \nFY 2022. \nThe Committee of Governors made the following \nobservations: \n• \nThe need to convene a technical seminar \non the dynamics of NPLs control and \nmanagement in the WAMZ; \n• \nThe need for the establishment of a \nregional harmonized supervisory and \nregulatory framework, considering cross-\ncountry peculiarities, such as shocks, for \nthe resolution of high NPLs within the \nWAMZ; and \n• \nMember Central Banks shared diverse \nexperiences on banking supervision and \nregulatory \npractices, \npolicies, \nand \nmeasures for managing NPLs. \nThe Committee of Governors further endorsed the \nrecommendations submitted by the Technical \nCommittee. \n50th Meeting of the Technical Committee of \nthe West African Monetary Zone \nThe 50th Meeting of the Technical Committee of \nthe WAMZ was held virtually from 28 February to \n2 March 2022. The Meeting deliberated on the \nstatus of implementation of the WAMZ work \nprogramme and activities under the ECOWAS \nsingle currency programme at end-June 2021. The \nbasis for consideration was the technical \ndocuments of the WAMI. \nThe \nMeeting \nmade \npresentations \nand \ndiscussions on the following: \n• \nWAMZ Macroeconomic Development and \nconvergence report, end-June 2022; \n• \nDiagnostic report on the harmonisation of \nstatistics in the WAMZ member states; \n• \nProposed roadmap for WAMZ countries’ \nmigration to Inflation Targeting (IT) \nframework; \n• \nFinancial integration issues (Payments \nsystem, capital market integration, and \ninsurance sector development); and \n• \nAdministrative \nissues \n(WAMI \nwork \nprogramme and budget for FY 2022) \n \n \n \n98 \n \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2021 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThe Technical \nCommittee \ndeliberated \nand \nadopted the reports and made necessary \nrecommendations. \nWEST AFRICAN MONETARY AGENCY \nThe 40th Ordinary Meeting of the Joint Technical \nCommittee (Economic and Monetary Affairs \nCommittee, \nOperations \nand \nAdministrative \nCommittee) of WAMA. \nThe 40th Meeting of the Joint Technical Committee \nof the West African Monetary Agency (WAMA) \nwas held virtually during 24-26 February 2022. The \nMeeting considered and adopted the following \nreports: \n• \nDirector General’s progress reports for \nthe second half of 2021; \n• \nECOWAS Macroeconomic convergence \nreport for the first half of 2021; \n• \nMacroeconomic impact of the COVID-19 \npandemic in ECOWAS; \n• \nThe impact of policy measures adopted to \nmitigate the impact of COVID-19 and its \nimplications for the stabilisation phase of \nthe ECOWAS Monetary union; \n• \nReserve pooling in the proposed ECOWAS \nsingle currency area (Update); \n• \nImplementation \nof \nthe \nECOWAS \npayments and settlement system (EPSS) \nproject (update); \n• \nExchange rate developments in the \nECOWAS as of 31 December 2021; \n• \nTransition to a flexible exchange rate \nregime: Strategic Considerations; \n• \nWAMA work programme for 2022; \n• \nProposed budget for 2022; and \n• \nHarmonisation \nof \nterminal \nbenefits, \nstandardisation of provident fund scheme \nand harmonisation of staff benefits: \nWAMA, WAMI, West African Monetary \nAgency (WAIFEM). \nFourth Ordinary Meeting of the Audit Committee \nof WAMA \nThe 4th Ordinary Meeting of the Audit Committee \nof the WAMA was held virtually on 23 February \n2022 and was presided over by the Central Bank \nof Nigeria. \nThe reports considered at the meeting included: \n• \nReview of the evaluation committee for \nthe appointment of an external auditor \nfor WAMA for the Financial Year ended 31 \nDecember 2021; \n• \nReview of the updated rules and \nregulations of WAMA; and \n• \nInternal audit report for the periods July \nto December 2021. \nThe Committee unanimously considered and \nadopted the reports. \n \n5.2 NON-REGIONAL MEETINGS \nFitch Rating Agency in February 2022 Confirmed \nNigeria's Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer \nDefault Rating (LTFC IDR) at B with a Stable \nOutlook \nThe following were highlights of the review: \n• \nInstitutional weakness is a long-term \ncredit constraint: Fitch acknowledged that \ncompared with her peers, Nigeria had \nbeen able to develop a pension system \nand relatively deep capital market and \nhad experienced peaceful transitions of \npower. However, it assessed fiscal policy \neffectiveness \nas \nweak, \nwhich \nwas \nreflected in the government's inability to \n \n \n \n99 \n \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2021 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nexpand \nthe \nnon-oil \nrevenue \nbase \nsignificantly \nthereby \nexposing \nthe \neconomy to further shocks; \n• \nWeak monetary and macroeconomic \nperformance: Fitch noted that inflation \nhad been relatively volatile; \n• \nExisting financial buffers were almost \nentirely \ndepleted: \nNigeria's \nexisting \nfinancial buffers, the Excess Crude \nAccount (ECA) and the Nigerian Sovereign \nInvestment \nAuthority \n(NSIA), \nwere \nassessed as too small to form a credible \npolicy hedge against protracted oil price \nvolatility or shocks; \n \n• \nDomestic liquidity risk remained under \ncontrol: \nFitch \nacknowledged \nthe \ngovernment’s ability to assess the \ndomestic capital markets to finance its \ndeficits. Government bonds were by far \nthe largest component of the debt \nmarkets (excluding CBN certificates). It \nwas observed that local banks and \npension funds held most government \ndebt, which remained relatively liquid; \nand \n \n• \nExternal liquidity risk remained limited: \nThe rating agency observed that the \nFederal Government’s external debt was \nrelatively small at around 9.0 per cent of \nGDP and around 29.0 per cent of general \ngovernment debt as of 2021. \n \nAfrican Union Summit \nThe 35th African Union (AU) Summit took place in \nFebruary 2022. The 40th Ordinary Session of the \nExecutive Council (Ministerial Session) took place \non 2-3 February and the 35th Ordinary Session of \nthe African Union Assembly (Heads of State and \nGovernment Session) took place from 5-6 \nFebruary 2022. \n \n❖ The African Continental Free Trade \nAgreement (AfCFTA) gained center stage \nat the 35th AU submit. There was an \nagreement on origin rules. \n6th Summit of the European Union and African \nUnion Heads of State and Government \nThe Sixth Summit of European Union (EU) and \nAfrican Union Heads of State and Government was \nheld in Brussels on 17-18 February 2022. The \nSummit issued a “Joint Vision for 2030” that aims \nto consolidate a “renewed partnership” between \nthe two continents to further strengthen the \nsolidarity, security, peace, and sustainable \neconomic development and prosperity for citizens \nand future generations, bringing together the \npeople, regions, and organizations. The Summit \npromised an investment package of €150.00bn for \nAfrica over the next seven years. \nAfrican Development Bank \nThe African Development Bank Group (AfDB) and \nAfrica, in partnership with the African Union \nCommission and the African Union Development \nAgency \n(AUDA-NEPAD), \nare \nexploring \ncollaboration with global partners to create an \nAlliance for Green Infrastructure in Africa. AfDB \nPresident, Dr. Akinwumi A. Adesina made the \nannouncement on 17 February 2022 while \nspeaking at a thematic roundtable on climate \nchange and energy transition at the 6th European \nUnion-African Union Summit in Brussels, Belgium. \nThe European Investment Bank, Bank for \nReconstruction and Development, the French \nDevelopment \nAgency \nand \nThe \nRockefeller \nFoundation have expressed their interest in \njoining the Alliance. It is globally acknowledged \n \n \n \n100 \n \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2021 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nthat climate change continues to devastate \nAfrica’s economies and the livelihoods of its \npeople, \ndespite \nthe \ncontinent’s \nminimal \ncontribution to greenhouse gas emissions. Climate \nchange has taken lives, caused food insecurity, \ndisplaced \npopulations, \ndamaged \ncritical \ninfrastructure, \nand \ndisrupted \neconomies. \nMoreover, increased geopolitical tensions could \nfurther threaten livelihoods and stability. \nThe Alliance for Green Infrastructure in Africa is \nexpected to complement, enhance, and partner \nwith continental and global initiatives to crowd in \nprivate capital to fund green infrastructure \nprojects. The idea is to bridge investment gaps and \nengender financing at scale and with speed. The \nAlliance’s overarching goal will be to leverage the \nprivate \nsector \nto \ntransparently \ndevelop \ntransformative infrastructure that sustainably \nbridges Africa’s infrastructure deficit in a climate-\nresilient manner. \nG-24 Technical Group Meeting Session on \"Central \nBank \nDigital \nCurrencies: \nImplications \non \nDeveloping Countries. \nThe G-24 Technical Group Meeting was held \nvirtually on 10 March 2022. The Meeting \ndiscussed the implications of the Central Bank \nDigital \nCurrencies \n(CBDCs) \non \nDeveloping \nCountries. The meeting discussed the potential of \nthese innovations in enhancing financial access, as \nwell as associated risks to financial stability. One of \nthe presentations focused on the Central Bank of \nNigeria’s perspectives on the benefits and \nchallenges of developing CBDCs. \nCentral Banks across the world have started to \nconsider issuing digital currencies to enhance \nbusinesses and households seeking faster, safer, \neasier, and cheaper means of payments. A 2021 \nsurvey of Central Banks by the Swiss-based Bank \nfor International Settlements (BIS) found 86.0 per \ncent of banks in active research for CBDCs \npotential, 60.0 per cent experimenting with the \ntechnology and 14.0 per cent deploying pilot \nprojects on CBDCs. \nWith the launch of the Central Bank of Nigeria’s \ndigital currency ‘’e-Naira” on 25 October 2021, a \nnew level of engagement and collaboration \namong players in the payments and financial \nservices value chain in Nigeria was stimulated. The \nmeeting further discussed the growing feedback, \nhighlights, and challenges so far since the launch \nof the e-Naira. \n2022 Spring Meetings of the Boards of Governors \nof the International Monetary Fund/The World \nBank Group, 18-24 April 2022. \nThe 2022 Spring Meetings of the Board of \nGovernors of the World Bank Group (WBG) and \nthe International Monetary Fund (IMF) were held \nphysically and virtually from 18-24 April 2022. The \nHonourable Minister of Finance, Budget, and \nNational Planning, Ms. Zainab Ahmed, led the \nNigerian delegation to the meetings. \nThe sidelines meeting of the Inter-Governmental \nGroup of Twenty-Four (G-24) on International \nMonetary Affairs and Developments was held at \nthe same period. The G24 Ministers expressed \nsadness at the tragic deaths and devastation in \nUkraine and strongly supported international \nefforts to provide humanitarian support and \nrestore peace and stability and recognised that \nthe crisis compounds and intensifies risks and \nundermines economic recovery worldwide. \nThe G24 Ministers noted that the pandemic had \nimposed huge costs. Many impediments to the \nglobal recovery remained, with growth prospects \nincreasingly divergent and uncertain. GDP growth \nover the medium-term in many emerging markets \nand developing economies (EMDEs) was projected \nto fall below pre-pandemic levels. Urgent global \n \n \n \n101 \n \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2021 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \naction was needed to prevent hunger and food \ncrises among vulnerable countries and poorer \nhouseholds and avert financial distress in highly \nindebted EMDEs. \nThe G24 Ministers expressed concern about \nincreasing risks to financial stability that may \ndisrupt the economic recovery. In managing the \nexit \nfrom \naccommodative \nmacroeconomic \npolicies, policymakers need to strike a balance \nbetween \ncontaining \nsurging \ninflation \nand \nsupporting economic recovery. Higher than \nexpected increase in interest rates in advanced \neconomies could raise rates globally and trigger \ncapital outflows from developing countries, \nreducing access to financial markets, and further \nincreasing debt vulnerabilities. \nThe \nInternational \nMonetary \nand \nFinancial \nCommittee (IMFC) noted that the recovery of the \nglobal economy continued but has slowed down \nowing to new COVID-19 variants and setback from \nthe Russia-Ukraine war and its ramifications, \nwhich could amplify existing challenges. The \nresulting surge in energy and food prices has \nadded to inflationary pressures, while supply \ndisruptions have further intensified, and financial \nmarkets and capital flows are exhibiting increased \nvolatility. \nAgainst the backdrop of current uncertainties, the \nCommittee pledged to intensify efforts to achieve \nthe goal of a more resilient, sustainable, and \ninclusive global economy, while remaining fully \ncommitted to fostering multilateral cooperation. It \nreiterated its strong commitment to further \naccelerate climate action in line with the Paris \nAgreement, considering country-specific factors, \nand looked forward to strong ambition for the \nConference of Party (COP27), including enhanced \naction on adaptation and resilience. \nThe \nCommittee \nwelcomed \nthe \nManaging \nDirector’s Global Policy Agenda. In the context of \ncurrent \nstress \nin \nthe \nmacroeconomic \ncircumstances and outlook, the Committee looked \nforward to the IMF’s swift and vital real-time and \ngranular support to members through its tailored \ncutting-edge policy advice, timely financial \nsupport, and targeted capacity development in \nclose \nand \neffective \ncollaboration \nwith \ninternational partners. \nThe Committee supported the IMF’s increased \nsurveillance focus on risk analysis and contingent \npolicy advice; and its efforts to continue \nstrengthening \nmultilateral \nsurveillance \nand \nanalytical work on pressing policy issues, including \ninflation and its drivers, policy mixes and \ninternational spillovers, financial, external, and \ncorporate sector vulnerabilities, fiscal adjustment, \nscarring from the pandemic, and inequality. \nInternational Monetary Fund Staff Visit \nThe International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff \nvisited the country from 8-11 June 2022 and had \ndiscussions with key stakeholders including the \nCentral Bank of Nigeria. \nThe IMF delegation from Washington had an \nopening meeting with the Governor and \nconsultations with various departments of the \nBank during this visit. \nThe meetings were for the IMF to gain more \ninsight into recent developments in the Nigerian \neconomy. The CBN responded to questions \nsurrounding; Development Finance, Central Bank \nDigital Currency (e-Naira), Cash flows, and Balance \nof Payments. \n7th Africa-Ireland Economic Forum \nSeventh Africa - Ireland economic forum themed \n‘’Prospering \nPost-Pandemic: \nTowards \na \nSustainable, Greener Future” was held in Dublin \n \n \n \n102 \n \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nHalf Year Economic Report, 2021 \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \nThis document is for CBN internal consumption \non 30 June 2022. Dr. Akinwumi A. Adesina, \nPresident of the African Development Bank Group, \nand Ambassador Mariam Katagum, Minister of \nState, for Industry, Trade and Investment of \nNigeria, \ndelivered \nkeynote \naddress. \nIssues \ndeliberated upon at the event included regional \ntrade, green growth in the agriculture, food and \nenergy \nsectors, \nwomen’s \neconomic \nempowerment, and how technology, innovation, \nand entrepreneurship are being leveraged for \nAfrica’s growth.", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/Quarterly_Economic_Reports/2022 Half Year ECR.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "eb545985b64aba5ec0e8e3e7f58488a1", "text": "1 \n \nPERSONAL STATEMENTS BY \nTHE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE MEMBERS \nMPC MEETING FEBRUARY 26 -27TH 2024 \n \n1. AKU PAULINE ODINKEMELU \nI voted to raise the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) by 300 basis points from 18.75 \npercent to 21.75 percent, the Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) by 750 basis points \nfrom 32.50 percent to 40.00 percent, adjust the asymmetric corridor around \nthe MPR to +100/-700 from +100/-300 basis points, and retain the Liquidity \nRatio (LR) at 30.00 percent. My position is predicated on the persistent \ninflationary pressures, depreciation of the exchange rate due to demand \npressure amid persistent supply shortages, and the need to effectively anchor \nexpectation. In my view, this stance will contain inflationary pressures in the \nshort to medium term. \nMy decision is influenced by the following developments: \n \nGlobal Developments \n \nGlobal output growth is projected to remain stable at 3.1 percent in 2024, \nrelative to the previous year, and may improve to 3.2 percent in 2025, owing \nto the resilience of the United States economy, leading emerging markets, \nand developing economies, as well as the fiscal stimulus in China. However, \nrisks to stable global output growth include conflicts in the Middle East (Israel \nand Gaza), Europe (Russia and Ukraine), with the likelihood of escalation to \nother regions. Additionally, climate change issues such as floods and \ndroughts pose further challenges. \nInflation is moderating in many regions of the globe, signaling early \nindications of a disinflationary process amid tight monetary policy stances. \nGlobal inflation is projected to slow to 5.8 percent by the end of year 2024 \nand decelerate further to 4.4 percent in 2025. On the downside, new \nepisodes of commodity price spikes resulting from geopolitical shocks, \nincluding the Israel-Gaza conflict, continued attacks in the Red Sea, Iran and \nUS tensions, and supply chain disruptions, could prolong tight monetary \nconditions in many regions across the globe. The decision of most central \nbanks to retain the policy rate despite declining inflation in advanced \neconomies is in line with the expectation. \n \nAlthough global inflation is projected to moderate in 2024, inflation remain \nabove the central banks targets, prompting continued tight financial \nconditions in the Advanced Economies. Consequently, Emerging Markets \n \n2 \n \nand Developing Economies may continue to experience capital outflow. The \nrisks may significantly impact the Nigerian domestic economy as tight \nfinancial condition in advanced economies may continue to exert pressure \non the exchange rate through capital outflow. To mitigate the risks, I vote for \ntightening, while emphasising the need for effective coordination between \nthe fiscal and monetary authorities to synchronize policy response and restore \nmacroeconomic stability. \nDomestic Economic Developments \nNigerian economy remains resilient. Real GDP grew by 3.46 percent in the last \nquarter of 2023 (year-on-year), from 2.54 percent in the third quarter of 2023. \nThe non-oil sector which grew by 3.07 percent in real terms in the last quarter \nof 2023, (higher by 0.32 percentage point relative to third quarter of 2023), \nand the oil sector which grew by 12.11 percent (compared with 2.22 percent \ncontraction in the third quarter 2023), are the joint drivers of output growth. \nOutput growth remained fragile as Composite PMI decreased to 48.5 points \nin January 2024 from 49.1 points in December 2023, remaining below the \nexpansion threshold of 50 index points, following low business activities. \nIn spite of output growth, inflationary pressures continued to persist, prices \nremained sticky as headline inflation rose further to 29.90 percent in January \n2024, from 28.92 percent in December 2023 due mainly to the removal of PMS \nsubsidy, the adoption of a market-based exchange rate regime, and \npersistent security challenges. The month-on-month rise of core inflation \n(Headline inflation less farm produce and energy) to 2.24 percent from 1.82 \npercent in the preceding month signals high exchange rate pass through \neffect to domestic prices. This brings to the fore, the importance of \neliminating distortions in the foreign exchange market, promoting transparent \nand efficient foreign exchange market and ultimately engender exchange \nrate stability. The reforms embarked upon by the Bank in the foreign \nexchange market are commendable and should be sustained. The major \nchallenge confronting the economy, however, is expanding the supply-side \nof the foreign exchange market. I understand the constraints of the Bank in \nthis regard, while advocating for stronger coordination with fiscal authority on \naudacious strategies to improve the supply of foreign exchange to the \nmarket. \nOn the monetary sector, growth in money supply (M3) rose by 18.25 percent \nto ₦93.72 trillion at end-January 2024 over preceding December. Broad \nmoney (M2) and narrow money (M1) grew by 17.81 and 3.68 percent, \nrespectively at end-January 2024. The growth in broad money supply was \ndriven by the rise in other deposits, transferable deposits, and securities other \nthan shares. In my view, the growth in M1 could further worsen inflationary \n \n3 \n \npressures in the economy, as it signals rising transactionary motive or excess \nliquidity in the system. The motive for holding excess liquidity is generally \nclassified into precautionary or voluntary motives. Precautionary excess \nliquidity portion is useful as a buffer for insuring bank capital and uncertainty \nsurrounding customers’ withdrawal, and does not have negative effect on \nmonetary policy. However, involuntary motive usually above the desired level \n– a common feature of developing economies banking system – is not \ndesirable during this period of persistent inflationary pressure, and also \ninfluence my decision to vote for monetary policy tightening. In voting for \ntightening, I am mindful of the implications of rate hike on the stability of the \nbanking system and therefore, will vote to raise the Monetary Policy Rate \n(MPR) by 300 basis points from 18.75 percent to 21.75 percent. \nThe Nigerian financial system is resilient as the banking sector remains sound \nand stable. Total assets of the banking industry increased month-on-month by \n24.76 percent between December 2023 and January 2024.The banking \nindustry Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) remained above the minimum \nthreshold of 10–15 percent. Similarly, the Liquidity Ratio (LR) remains above \nthe regulatory threshold of 5 percent and 30 percent, respectively. The \nindustry NPL ratio of 4.15 per at end-January 2024, which is itching towards \nthe industry regulatory threshold of 5 percent should be monitored closely. \nGiven that most banks had CRR above the regulatory threshold of 32.50 \npercent and the industry average of 39.36% at end-January 2024, I vote to \nraise CRR by 750 basis points. I am also aware that tightening of money \nsupply will lead to increased borrowing costs for businesses, with \nconsequences for both the bad debt portfolio of banks and the risks. I am, \nhowever, confident that the Bank’ supervisory tools are robust to address risks \narising from monetary policy tightening. \n \n \n \n4 \n \n \n2. ALOYSIUS UCHE ORDU \nGlobal Economic Developments \nGlobal growth is forecast at 3.1 percent in 2024, unchanged from 2023. \nThough low by historical standards, this stability demonstrates resilience in the \nglobal economy, in view of high interest rates and heightened geopolitical \ntensions. A key driver of global growth is the resilience of the US economy \nwhich \ndefied \nrecession \nforecasts \nand \nattained \nnear-record \nlow \nunemployment, rapid economic growth and fading inflation. \nThe US economic performance will offset the growth forecast for China, the \nworld’s second largest economy, which is facing weak domestic demand \nand dimmer outlook for the real estate sector. Chinese authorities have set \nan ambitious growth target of around 5 percent in 2024, essentially the same \nas last year when the country struggled to emerge from three years of zero-\nCovid policies, and foreign direct investment hit a 30-year low. \nIn Europe, rising geopolitical tensions (Russian-Ukraine war) will continue to \nweigh heavily on growth potential (GDP growth of 1.8 percent in 2024), thus \navoiding a recession. The global purchasing managers index for February \n2024 remains unchanged with marked deterioration in the Eurozone \ncompensated by improving activity in other world regions. \nThe Israeli-Hamas war is further complicating the global geopolitical scene; \nand the Houthi’s attacks on ships in the Red Sea is raising global shipping \ncosts and could result in a spike in oil prices – a downside risk to the global \neconomic outlook. The emerging economies of Asia will contribute \nsignificantly to global growth in view of their export recovery and continued \ninvestments in supply chains. \nOn inflation, with consumer prices trending downwards in advanced \ncountries, the US Federal Reserve, and the European Central Bank (ECB) will \nlikely end policy rate increases and commence lowering rates in the second \nhalf of 2024. \nFor Africa, the confluence of global economic and political headwinds, \nregional challenges, and climate risks will constrain some countries’ ability to \nsettle their international financial obligations. Nevertheless, Africa will be the \nsecond fastest-growing region with 12 of the 20 fastest-growing economies in \n2024 (according to the Economist Intelligence Unit). As in previous years, East \nAfrican countries—Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania, and the \nDRC—will record growth rates in the range of 5% to 6 percent, which is above \nthe 3.2 percent average for sub-Saharan Africa in 2024. \n \n5 \n \nUnlike the situation in advanced countries, inflation remains a challenge and \nmany African central banks will continue to increase interest rates in view of \nhigh inflation, currency depreciations, and heavy debt burdens. In March \n2024, Egypt raised its interest rate by 600 basis point to 27.25 per cent as part \nof a package of measures that included currency devaluation and to ease \nforeign exchange shortages. \nKenya’s Monetary Policy Committee raised its rate to 13 percent, the highest \nin 12 years, as inflation risks remain elevated and to stem pressures on the \nexchange rate. The Bank of Uganda also raised its rate to 10 percent to curb \ninflation and to support the shilling. \nEarlier, an interest rate hike to 12.5 percent, and an increase in the reserve \nratio for local banks to 26 percent, combined to strengthen the Zambian \nkwacha vis-à-vis the US dollar. The currency had previously dropped 21 \npercent against the US dollar during the period October 2023 to February \n2024. And despite political pressure ahead of national elections in May, the \nSouth African Reserve Bank insists that there will be no interest rate cut until \ninflation is brought under control. \nNigeria: Economic Indicators and Outlook \nNigeria currently faces a challenging economic situation. CBN staff \npresentations during the MPC meeting in February highlighted several of \nthese challenges. First, the economy grew by 2.7 percent in 2023 (a decline in \nper capita terms), reflecting low growth across most sectors. The transport \nand logistics sectors were particularly hit more directly on account of the \nelimination of the decades-long fuel subsidy and the adoption of a market-\nbased exchange rate regime. \nSecond, there was a substantial and sustained increase in inflation rates: with \nan increase in headline inflation to 29.9 percent, food inflation to 35.4 \npercent, and core inflation to 23.59 percent in January 2024. Food prices rose \nsharply due to the higher fuel and transportation costs and increased \ninsecurity in food producing areas. \nThird, business activities slowed as reflected in the decrease in the composite \npurchasing managers’ index to 48.5 points in January 2024. The index \nremained broadly below the expansion threshold of 50 index points \nthroughout the preceding 12 months. Unemployment, particularly youth \nunemployment, increased during the period, adding to the burgeoning \npopulation of people living in poverty. \nFourth, there was an exponential growth in broad money supply (M3) by \n18.25 percent to Naira 93.72 trillion in January 2024 which combined with the \ncost push factors indicated to exacerbate the surge in inflation. \n \n6 \n \nFifth, on fiscal policy, Nigeria’s tax-to-GDP ratio has stagnated at around 7 \npercent over time. This ratio is among the lowest in the world and falls far \nshort of the average for sub-Saharan Africa (16.5 percent), Asia-Pacific and \nLatin America and the Caribbean (around 23 percent), and the OECD (over \n33 percent). The ratio emphasizes the potential to raise both tax and non-tax \nrevenues vital to boost investment spending in infrastructure and human \ncapital development. Further, concerted efforts to boost revenues will \nimprove the fiscal space, especially in view of the recent spike in debt-to-\nrevenue ratio to 179 percent at the end of the third quarter of 2023. \nFinally, in the external sector, the balance of payments deficit narrowed due \nto the combined effects of reduced imports (exchange rate depreciation), \nand increased exports of crude oil at favorable prices (US$85 per barrel). \nThe above list is by no means exhaustive but serve to illustrate some of the \nconstraints to better outcomes even though they are outside the immediate \nremit of monetary policy. \nTo address the associated challenges would thus require a whole of \ngovernment approach to map out and to execute a program of economic \ndiversification and structural transformation. A robust revival of Nigeria’s \neconomy is needed simply to prevent the number of poor people from \nincreasing beyond the current 133 million multi-dimensionally poor in 2022 \n(National Bureau of Statistics). Based on the performance of comparable \nlower middle-income countries, even an ambitious growth target of 6 to 7 \npercent throughout the next two and half decades would still leave millions \nof poor people by 2050, when Nigeria will rank as the third most populous \ncountry in the world. More troubling, if growth continues at around the \ncurrent 3 percent a year, the number in absolute poverty would likely double \nby 2050. \nOn monetary policy, there was heightened expectation on the February \nMPC meeting, especially as the current sustained price rise is wreaking havoc \non the living standards of people. It is imperative to break the cycle of \ninflation as a prerequisite for sustained economic growth and to stabilize the \nexchange rate, following the Naira’s sharp depreciation in recent months. \nA substantial hike in interest rate at this time will moderate inflationary \npressures in the short- to medium-term. It will also send a strong signal to \ninvestors (domestic and foreign) about the MPC’s intention to build and \nsustain trust and credibility in monetary policy in line with its core mandate of \nprice stability. \nAccordingly, I vote: \n• to raise the MPR by 450 basis points to 23.25 from 18.75% \n \n7 \n \n• to raise the Cash Reserve Ratio from 32.5 per cent to 45 per cent \n• to adjust the Asymmetric Corridor around the MPR to +100/-700, and \n• to retain the Liquidity Ratio at 30 per cent. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n8 \n \n \n3. BALA M. BELLO \nOpening Statement \nI am honoured to participate in the first Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) \nmeeting for 2024. This meeting provides a unique opportunity to make well-\ninformed policy decisions, given the significant implications for Nigeria's \neconomic stability. \nDecision \nI voted to tighten the monetary policy stance further, by raising the monetary \npolicy rate (MPR) by 400 basis points from 18.75 per cent to 22.75 per cent, \nincreasing the Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) by 1,250 basis points from 32.5 per \ncent to 45.0 per cent, retaining the Liquidity Ratio at 30 per cent, and \nadjusting the asymmetric corridor from +100/-300 basis points to +100/-600 \nbasis points around the MPR. My decision was predicated on some important \ndevelopments \n[summarized \nbelow], \nwhich \nhave \nimplications \nfor \nmacroeconomic stability in Nigeria. \nConsiderations \nThe prolonged upward trajectory of domestic prices requires decisive policy \nactions to curb the trend, given its adverse implications for the value of the \nnaira and the economic well-being of Nigerians. Data from the National \nBureau of Statistics indicates that headline inflation increased year-on-year \n(y-o-y) to 29.90 per cent in January 2024, from 28.92 per cent in December \n2023, driven by lingering effects of the petroleum subsidy removal, continuous \nexchange rate depreciation, surge in money supply, and persistent structural \nchallenges. Food and core inflation have also maintained an upward trend \n(y-o-y). This is clearly a reflection of the need for coordinated monetary and \nfiscal efforts to contain inflation. \nThe depreciation in the naira exchange rate with significant pass-through \neffects further exacerbates the threat to price stability. Thus, keeping the \nexchange rate within desired levels is crucial for price stability. While the \nrecent exchange rate policies implemented by the Central Bank of Nigeria \n(CBN) \nare \ngradually \nshowing \nsome \npositive \nresults, \nimplementing \ncomplementary policy actions by the MPC and the fiscal authority that can \nincrease foreign exchange inflows in the short to medium term, will lead to \neven better outcomes. \n \n \n9 \n \nIn addition, output performance remained positive, at 3.46 per cent in the \nfourth quarter of 2023, up from 2.54 per cent in the previous quarter, a \ndevelopment that gives the MPC latitude to focus on keeping inflation under \ncontrol. Although tightening monetary policy could potentially limit access to \ncredit and negatively impact output, it may be necessary to prevent inflation \nfrom rising any further. If inflation persists, it could eventually erode any gains \nmade in output over time. \n \nBorrowing costs are also expected to rise, possibly constricting loan growth in \nview of the positive correlation between market lending rates and the MPR, \nwith adverse implications for asset quality. Although staff reports presented \nat the meeting showed a resilient financial system with prudential ratios within \nrequired levels and satisfactory stress test results, preserving financial system \nstability as monetary policy contracts remains vital. The CBN’s vigilance and \nproactive measures, such as the proposed recapitalization of commercial \nbanks, are, therefore, germane. \n \nOn the international scene, output recovery is tepid, while inflation, though \nslowly responding to the tightened stance of many central banks, remains \nbroadly above long-run benchmarks. Monetary policy is, thus, expected to \nremain tight over the medium term amidst lingering uncertainty. Nigeria must, \ntherefore, position itself as an attractive investment destination with high \nyields. \n Insummary, there is strong evidence that monetary policy considerations at \nthis meeting should prioritize reducing inflation and maintaining exchange \nrate stability. Further tightening of the monetary policy stance will, in my \nopinion, anchor inflation expectations and help attract the much-needed \nforeign exchange inflows and accretion to reserves while triggering a \ndownward inflation trajectory. The Bank, must however, closely monitor the \nmarkets \nand \nevaluate \nunfolding \noutcomes \nto \nprevent \nunintended \nconsequences \nof \nwell-intentioned \npolicy \nactions. \nThe \nforegoing \nconsiderations reinforce my earlier vote. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n10 \n \n \n4. BAMIDELE A.G. AMOO \nInternational Economic Developments \nGlobally, many countries recorded slow and fragile growth in 2023 with \noffsetting results. Although the USA economy expanded in Q4 2023, the Euro \nArea stagnated while the UK and Japanese economies plunged into \nrecessions. However, we still expect stronger growth in 2024 over 2023 levels in \nmany countries, despite deepening tensions in Israel/Palestine, Israel/Egypt, \nRussia/ Ukraine, USA/Russia, USA/China, China/Taiwan, and many conflicts in \nAfrica. The war in Ukraine/Russia is poised to further cripple the global \neconomy in 2024 as the EU and USA start targeting entities supporting Russia’s \nwar in Ukraine. Climate change and El Niño which are set to peak by mid-\n2024 threaten food and water security in Africa and Middle East, causing \npotentials for flood, drought, and heatwaves. \nThe outlook for the global economy output growth remains unchanged at 3.1 \nper cent in 2024. In developing markets, growth is expected to stabilize at \nabout same levels recorded in 2023 or drop slightly in 2024. Inflation is \nexpected to continue easing in 2024, although at a slower pace in most \ncountries. Red sea disruptions may escalate risks of geopolitical tensions that \nmay drive oil prices. Interest rates are unlikely to be cut until sometime in \nQ2/Q3 2024. However, risks of rate hikes/hold are now emerging linked to \npotential inflationary pressure and output cut from Red Sea trade disruptions. \nWhen these situations occur, expectation of lower global inflation in 2024 and \nprospects of rate cut by central banks, may not happen as the war and its \nnegative impact on Red Sea may incite inflation and cost of living during \n2024. When this happens, the global monetary policy environment may \nremain tighter for a long period. \nEconomic development in Africa was mixed in 2023. There were fragile and \noffsetting growth recorded in major economies amidst regional tensions \nwhich include: debt burden; fiscal stability issues; inflation and tight monetary \npolicy; weak intra-African trade as well as climate change, political and \neconomic stability. \n \nDomestic Economic Developments \nInformation from staff reports indicated that Nigeria’s real GDP grew by 3.46% \nin Q4 2023 (year on year) from 2.54% in Q3 2023 driven by the non-oil sector. \nOn annual basis, real GDP grew by 2.74% in 2023 from 3.1% in 2022. Headline \ninflation rose to 29.9% in January 2024 from 28.92% in December 2023, due to \npersistent supply gap, lingering ripple effects of the PMS subsidy removal. \nCore inflation stood at 23.59% compared with 23.06% in December 2023, due \n \n11 \n \nto fuel subsidy removal and amalgamation of exchange rate regimes, \namong other factors. Consequently, food inflation rose to 35.42% (y-on-y). \nHigh inflation put Nigeria into cost of living crisis which comes on the heels of \nforeign exchange reforms and PMS subsidy removal that pushed petrol price \nup by over 400per cent, straining households and businesses. \nAnother phenomenon was currency depreciation which made naira to hit \nrecord lows against the dollar, reaching N1,700 per dollar, reflecting high \npercentage of loss in value. Other issues were: low capital importation, forex \nbacklogs, and diversion of cargoes to neighboring countries to discharge. \nCBN policy responses were timely and still on-going. They include lifting \nrestrictions on banned items, raising rates on 12-month Treasury Bills, transfer of \nportion of NNPC’s earnings to CBN to stabilize the market and ease pressures \non the naira. The overall economy witnessed contractions as composite PMI \ndecreased to 48.5 points in January 2024 from 49.1 points in December 2023 \nbelow the 50 points threshold. \nExpectedly, monetary aggregates, M3, increased at a rate of 18.25% to \nN93.72 trillion at end-January 2024 compared with the preceding December. \nWhen the growth in money supply is decomposed, data showed that 3.68% \ngrowth in M1 indicate rising transactionary motive by consumers, which could \nfurther worsen inflationary pressures in the economy. \nThe fiscal sector performance was mixed in January 2024. Federal \nGovernment Revenue improved in January 2024 but was below its \nbenchmark of 16.4%. Oil revenue decreased by 14.7% relative to its level in \nDecember 2023 but was 60.5% short of target. Non-oil receipts in January \n2024 exceeded both target and preceding levels by 19.7% and 20.4% \nrespectively. Tax revenue also increased by 7.1% over its level in December \n2023 and revenue distribution to sub-national governments was higher in \nJanuary 2024 by 3,5%. Overall, fiscal deficit in January 2024 was \ncontractionary relative to its benchmark. \nForeign reserves rose to US$34.54 billion by end-february 2024, from US$32.23 \nbillion at end-January 2024. The average NFEM rate as at February 2024 stood \nat N1480.58/USD giving a depreciation of 36.2 per cent, compared with \nN944.08/USD in January 2024 due to demand pressure and persistent supply \nshortages. The overall balance of payments deficit narrowed to US$0.28 \nbillion in Q32023, relative to US$1.34 billion in Q22023, due to decline in \nmerchandise imports. Both the current and financial accounts recorded \nsurplus mostly resulting from favourable export developments and higher \ninvestments in fixed income securities by non-residents. The economy also \nrecorded a higher capital inflow of US$ 2.86 billion relative to US$ 2.23 billion in \nQ22023. However, the inflow of diaspora remittances declined by 7.4 per \n \n12 \n \ncent to US$4.58 billion principally due to lingering global economic \nchallenges in advanced economies. \nMy Concern \nInflation remains my major focus at this meeting. Galloping Inflation, as \nnoticed in the last few months in Nigeria, is presenting an unacceptable \ndimension as it poses a threat to investment and output growth. Inflation is \nlowering real incomes of Nigerians and driving more people to poverty. \nInflation is hurting many Nigerians, whose nominal wages have remained \nstagnant for many years. It is dragging down the values of wages, savings, \nwealth and pensions for retirees. Price stability is a core function of the MPC, \nand hence, the high level of domestic inflation is unacceptable. \nConsequently, it presents a serious policy dilemma for the MPC given the \nimperative to sustain the growth trajectory, limited tools at its disposal, low \nproductive capacity, high import dependency and the constricted fiscal \nenvironment. \nThere is no doubt that there is a monetary component to the rising inflation in \nNigeria. Broad money grew over the months and stood at N 93.72 trillion at \nend-January 2024 and the monetary base is forecasted to increase even \nmore in forthcoming months due to increase in FAAC allocation, and \nassociated spendings of the sub-national governments to reduce the various \noutcry of citizens. Apart from the lag effects expected from the transmission \nmechanisms from policy rates to causal factors of inflation, the underlying \ncauses of the inflation have not abated. \nIn order to reap the benefits of credibility and anchor inflation expectations, \ngood monetary policy should incorporate three main features : primacy of \nprice stability objective, rule-based behaviour implying a systematic response \nto economic developments, and a firm response to inflationary shocks. High \ninflation and its expectations are not unique to Nigeria. All countries of the \nworld are basically addressing same supply factors: energy prices, food \nprices and strong dollar. The measures being taken are same: to tighten \nmonetary policy. In Africa, Ghana, Egypt, South Africa, along with their \ncounterparts in emerging and developing countries have revised upwards \nmonetary policy rates a couple of times since the beginning of the year. \nIt was evident from the MPC discussion that there is an urgent need to \npromote more collaboration with the fiscal authorities now. There is also a \nneed for increased education and enlightenment to promote ethical \nbehaviors \nby \npeople \nand \nleaders \nto \npromote \ntransparency \nand \naccountability across sectors. Government should also ensure that the \nCompressed Natural Gas (CNG) programme designed to provide gas as \nalternative motive fuel for transportation is aggressively implemented. \n \n13 \n \nImprovement in electricity supply will also reduce the amount of fuel on \ndemand in the economy, and thereby moderate energy price input to the \nlocal manufacturers. \nMy Vote \nIn consideration of the extant inflation level, I cast my vote to increase the \nMPR by 400 basis points for high impact on macroeconomy and increase the \nlevels of other monetary parameters. Hence, I vote to: \nA) Raise MPR by 400 basis points: from 18.75 % to 22.75%. \nB) Raise CRR to 45.0% . \nC) Raise LR to 35% . \nD) Adjust asymmetric corridor around the MPR at +100/-300 basis points. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n14 \n \n \n5. EMEM USORO \nGlobal Economic Developments \nThere had been several developments in the global and domestic economic \nenvironments since the last MPC in July 2023. \nOn the global front, in the past two years, economic activities had been \nmixed following the slowdown that was occasioned by necessary monetary \npolicy tightening by major central banks to rein in inflation on one hand, and \na slowdown in the Chinese economy, on the other hand, that stemmed from \nsubdued demand and stress in the real estate sector. According to the US \nCongressional Budget Office, the US economy is expected to slow down in \n2024 from 2.2 percent in 2023 to 1.3 percent, as financial tightening is \nexpected to dampen demand pressure. Geo-political tensions between \nRussia and Ukraine in Eastern Europe, and Israeli and Hamas in the Middle \nEast, which have increased energy prices are also contributing to reduced \ndemand. \nSimilarly, short-term growth prospects for many developing countries, \nespecially in Asia and Latin America, are deteriorating due to tightened \nfinancial conditions, shrinking fiscal space, and sluggish external demand. \nMore so, low-income economies are facing increasing Balance of Payments \npressures and debt sustainability risks. Annual inflation in developing \neconomies is projected to exceed 10 percent in 2024, amid supply-side \ndisruptions, conflicts, and changing climatic factors. Consequently, local \nfood price inflation remains high in most of these countries, disproportionately \naffecting the poorest households. This has largely eroded the economic gains \nrecorded following the COVID-19 recovery. \nGrowth has also remained subdued in the euro area, due to weaker \nconsumer sentiment and lingering effects of energy prices, amid tight \nfinancial conditions. In addition, economies such as Japan and the United \nKingdom have slipped into technical recessions- while Japan witnessed \ndampened private consumption and a decline in capital expenditure, the \nUK experienced a drop in manufacturing, construction, and wholesale \noutput. \nHowever, economic growth is set to rebound in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in \n2024, following a lukewarm performance in the preceding year. Growth in \nSSA is expected to accelerate to 3.8 percent in 2024 and further strengthen \nto 4.1 percent in 2025 as inflationary pressures weaken and financial \nconditions improve. \n \n15 \n \nUncertainties in the global commodity markets, particularly concerning oil \nand other energy prices, have heightened due to recent geopolitical risks in \nthe Middle East. Prices of certain agricultural commodities fell slightly due to \nstrong competition, improved crop conditions, and the arrival of recently \nharvested cereals. This is expected to dampen global food inflation, thus \ntransmitting to lower imported food inflation. \nInflation in advanced economies has eased, albeit remained elevated and \nabove the long-run target, prompting major central banks in these regions to \nsoft-pedal on their aggressive policy stances. \nAccording to the IMF, the outlook for global growth is optimistic, as the global \neconomy is expected to grow by 3.1% in 2024 and then accelerate by 3.2% \nin 20251. This is predicated on departure from restrictive monetary policies, as \nwell as expected economic recovery in China and the euro area. Global \nheadline inflation is expected to fall from an estimated 6.8% in 2023 (annual \naverage) to 5.8% in 2024 and 4.4% in 2025. Notably, downside risks to this \noutlook include heightened geo-political tensions emanating from conflicts, \nprotectionism that could stifle global trade, and electoral outcomes from \nmore than 75 countries. These risks could distort energy and financial markets, \nresulting in dampened growth and inflationary pressures. \nDomestic Economic Developments \nOn the domestic front, economic activity gained momentum since the last \nMPC, reflected by the real GDP growth of 3.46% in Q4 2023, from 2.54% in Q3 \n2023, resulting in an average growth of 2.74% in 2023. This momentum was \ndriven by the non-oil sector, which grew by 3.07% in Q4 2023, compared with \n2.75% recorded in Q3 2023. Similarly, the oil sector grew by 12.11%, compared \nwith 0.85% contraction in Q3 2023. \nDomestic crude oil production has risen from an average of 1.08 mbpd in July \n2023 to 1.34 mbpd in December 2023, and further to 1.48 mbpd in January \n2024, due to improved pipeline infrastructure security and crude oil \nproduction/exportation. This is expected to improve the inflow of oil receipts \nand enhance accretion to external reserves. \nWith respect to price developments, headline inflation rate has risen steadily \nto 29.90% in January 2024, up from 24.08% in July 2023, which is not \nunconnected to the removal of PMS subsidy, the adoption of a market-\nbased exchange rate system, intensified consumer spending, credit \nexpansion, particularly Ways and Means, and the exchange rate pass-\nthrough to domestic prices. Food inflation, the major driver of headline \ninflation, rose steadily from 26.98% in July 2023, to 35.41% in January 2024, \n \n1 IMF World Economic Outlook, January 2024 \n \n16 \n \nunderpinned by high transportation and logistics costs, as well as prevailing \ninsecurity and infrastructural deficits. Core inflation also trended northward, \nfrom 20.47% in July 2023 to 23.59% in January 2024, owing to exchange rate \npass-through and demand pressures. \nNotably, broad money and inflation have moved almost in tandem as broad \nmoney supply (M3) expanded by 18.25% at the end of January 2024. This \ngrowth was ascribed to a rise in other deposits, transferable deposits, and \nsecurities other than shares, by 26.55%, 4.73%, and 99.98%, respectively. From \nthe asset side, Net Domestic Asset (NDA) contributed significantly to broad \nmoney growth while Net Foreign Asset (NFA) subdued growth in broad \nmoney. The steady rise in inflation has resulted in negative real interest rates. \nThe financial system remains resilient as reflected by financial soundness \nindicators which remained within regulatory limits. In addition, recent reports \nfrom international rating agencies such as Fitch, Moody’s, and S&P, have \nupgraded Nigeria’s ratings from stable to positive. \nExternal reserve position stood at US$34.54 billion as of February 21, 2024, from \nUS$33.31 billion at end-July 2023, majorly driven by receipts of crude oil-\nrelated taxes and third-party receipts. The level of reserves could finance 6.9 \nmonths of import for goods and services, and 9.8 months of import for goods \nonly. \nRecent measures put in place by the fiscal and monetary authorities to \nrecalibrate policy objectives, improve credibility, drive market efficiency, \nand promote transparency and accountability have complemented efforts \ntowards achieving price stability. For instance, the removal of fuel subsidy, \nadoption of a market-determined exchange rate, and the introduction of tax \nreforms have fostered market liberalisation and price discovery. Also, the \nchange in the Central Bank’s management team which seeks to re-focus the \nCentral Bank on its core mandates and re-define narratives about the Bank \nhas improved confidence in the Central Bank. \nGoing forward, the growth outlook remains positive, as output is expected to \nmaintain an upward trajectory in Q1 2024 and Q2 2024, respectively. \nInflationary pressures may persist in the near term partly on account of the \nlingering impact of PMS adjustments, import costs, exchange rate pass-\nthrough, and growth in money supply. Furthermore, expectations around the \ncountry’s external position remain optimistic, driven by favourable crude oil \nprices and increased domestic oil production. \nMy Considerations \ni. \nGlobal Economic Recovery and Nigeria's External Account - The \nresilient recovery in global economic activities, particularly in \n \n17 \n \nadvanced economies and some EMDEs2, signals optimism for Nigeria’s \nexternal account given its reliance on demand for oil, globally. \nHowever, broader escalation of conflicts could disrupt energy markets, \ntrade dynamics, and financial markets, leading to dampened growth \nand inflationary pressures. \nii. \nDomestic macroeconomic concerns - The domestic economy is \nexperiencing elevated inflation and exchange rate volatility, which \nhave impacted price levels and real income negatively. Persistent \ninflation has impacted the purchasing power of the general populace \nadversely, thus, heightening uncertainty around future path of general \nprices, and propelling currency substitution. \niii. \nBroad money and banking system liquidity – Monetary and financial \nconditions analysis revealed episodes of liquidity surfeit in the \neconomy. Importantly, the deviation of broad money growth from its \nregulatory benchmark has had inflationary effects on the economy. \niv. \nMoney Market Rates - Furthermore, dynamics of key money market \nrates are indicative of liquidity conditions as average prime and \nmaximum lending rates exhibited downward trends. \nv. \nMonetary Policy Stance and Transmission Channels – the real interest \nrate had remained negative, far below the neutral rate of interest, \nhinting at an accommodative monetary policy stance. \nvi. \nPolicy Coordination Efforts and Strategic Alliances - The impact of the \nrecent policy coordination efforts by the monetary and fiscal \nauthorities, particularly around the strategic alliance with NNPCL, to \nrepatriate all Naira and foreign currency proceeds to accounts \ndomiciled in the CBN, aimed at simultaneously containing liquidity in \nthe banking system and providing FX liquidity is beginning to achieve \nresults. \nMy vote \ni. \nThe domestic economy is faced with a mix of rising inflation, subdued \neconomic growth and exchange rate volatility. Hinged on the resolve \nto focus on its primary mandate of ensuring price stability, the MPC is \npoised to utilise the full range of the instruments available to it to \naddress the liquidity surfeit, as well as attract foreign portfolio \ninvestment that would cater for liquidity conditions in the FX market. \nii. \nResultantly, I vote at this meeting to: \na. Raise the MPR by 400 basis points in a bid to tighten financial \nconditions, and rein in inflation; \n \n2 EMDEs means Emerging Markets and Developing Economies \n \n18 \n \nb. Adjust the asymmetric corridor around the MPR to +100/-700 \nbasis points from +100/-300 basis points to contain cost of liquidity \nmanagement; \nc. Raise the CRR to 40.0% from 32.5% to complement the increase \nin the policy rate and support liquidity management; and \nd. Retain the LR at 30.0%. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n19 \n \n \n6. JAFIYA LYDIA SHEHU \nGlobal growth recovery remained resilient, despite the dampening effect of \nthe withdrawal of fiscal stimulus in many economies, geo-political tensions \nand their disruptive effect on the supply chain, as well as monetary tightening \nby many central banks to control inflation. Consequently, the IMF in its \nJanuary 2024 World Economic Outlook (WEO) forecast global growth at 3.1 \npercent and 3.2 percent in 2024 and 2025, respectively. This is partly on \naccount of the strong growth momentum in the United States and sustained \nrecovery of the Chinese economy. Growth in Advanced Economies is \nprojected to moderate to 1.5 percent in 2024 and rise further to 1.8 percent in \n2025, while in Emerging Market and Developing Economies (EMDEs), it is \nenvisaged to remain at 4.1 percent in 2024 and increase marginally to 4.2 \npercent in 2025. \nOn global price developments, whilst Inflationary pressures continue to abate \nacross many Advanced Economies, particularly in the Euro Area and the \nUnited States, a slow pace of decline which could keep inflation above their \nlong-run target, is foreseen in 2024. Already, the IMF projects global inflation \nto moderate to an annual average of 5.8 percent in 2024, which is above \nmany Advanced Economies long-run targets, signifying the persistence of \ninflationary pressures. This calls for a cautious approach to monetary policy. \nWorld trade is expected to rise to 3.3 percent in 2024, from 0.4 percent in \n2023, and further to 3.8 percent in 2025 (IMF, WEO January 2024). The \nprojected increase reflects a moderate normalisation of trade, following \nsevere weaknesses in the previous year, and alignment of global demand \ntowards services. Downside risks to the outlook, is the ongoing geopolitical \ntensions, particularly in the Red Sea and further rise in protectionist measures. \nIt is noteworthy that foreign investment inflows into EMDEs increased by 23.1 \npercent in January 2024 compared with the position recorded in December \n2023. This suggests positive investors’ appetite for emerging market treasury \nsecurities and stocks. Nonetheless, envisaged tight financial conditions in \nAdvanced Economies in 2024, portend contraction of capital flows to EMDEs. \nTHE DOMESTIC ECONOMY \nReal GDP year-on-year grew by 3.46 percent in Q4 2023 from 2.54 percent in \nQ3 2023. Growth performance hinges on upbeat reforms, higher crude oil \nproduction and prices, increased investments in the oil and ICT sub-sectors, \nand renewed efforts to improve infrastructure. The non-oil sector grew by 3.07 \npercent, in real terms in Q4 2023, higher by 0.32 percentage point relative to \n \n20 \n \nQ3 2023. The oil sector grew by 12.1 percent compared with 2.22 percent \ncontraction in Q3 2023. Downside risk to growth are high inflation and \nexchange rate pressures, which have slowed down business activities, as \ncorroborated by the decline in the Composite Purchasing Managers Index \n(PMI), which decreased to 48.5 points in January 2024 from 49.1 points in \nDecember 2023, below the expansion threshold of 50 index points. Among \ncomparator countries, Kenya’s output expanded by 1.35 percent in Q3 2023 \nand is forecast at 2.7 percent in 2024, South Africa’s economy contracted by \n-0.7 percent and is estimated to grow by 1.0 percent in 2024, while Ghana’s \ngrowth moderated to 2.0 percent and is predicted at 1.2 percent in 2024. \nInflationary pressures persist as Headline inflation year-on-year rose further to \n29.90 percent in January 2024, from 28.92 percent in December 2023, largely \ndue to high transportation costs, increased cost of imported goods arising \nfrom exchange rate pass-through to domestic prices, including, persistent \nsecurity challenges. Disaggregating the headline inflation, shows that food \ninflation year-on-year rose to 35.41 percent from 33.93 percent in December \n2023, while core inflation (headline less farm produce and energy) inched to \n23.59 per cent, compared with 23.06 per cent, in December 2023. \nDomestic crude oil production rose by 6.7 percent in January 2024, to 1.43 \nmbpd, even though it was below the OPEC production quota of 1.578 mbpd \nby 0.148 mbpd. The improvement is attributable to the enhanced security in \nthe oil producing region, and improved governance structure and reforms in \nthe oil industry. As at February 22, 2024, the average price of Bonny Light rose \nby 4.1 per cent to US$85.57 pb, compared with US$82.18 pb in the preceding \nmonth. The price of Bonny Light was US$4.73 pb higher than the 2024 budget \nbenchmark of US$77.96 pb which would accrue to the Federal Government \nas foreign exchange gains. \nBroad money supply (M3) rose by 18.25 percent to ₦93.72 trillion at end-\nJanuary 2024, over preceding December. \nThe external reserves stood at US$34.54 billion as at February 21, 2024, from \nUS$32.23 billion in the previous month. The level of reserves could finance 6.9 \nmonths of import of goods and services, and 9.8 months of import of goods \nonly, based on import statistics for Q3 2023. Banking system Financial \nSoundness Indicators (FSIs) revealed salutary performance in the review \nperiod. \nCONSIDERATION FOR VOTING \nI considered the various contending objectives of monetary policy, which \ninclude price stability, output growth and exchange rate stability, in arriving \nat a policy decision. Indeed, addressing inflation and growth objectives \n \n21 \n \nrequire a delicate balance, considering the tradeoff between them. Though, \nmonetary policy tightening, could be a disincentive to investment, but a low \nand stable price level contributes to macroeconomic stability, including \neconomic growth. Real GDP has remained positive since the country exited \nthe COVID-19 induced recession. Staff forecast suggests further improvement \nin output growth at 3.20 percent and 3.22 percent in Q1 2024 and Q2 2024, \nrespectively, reflecting the short-term impact of the oil, tax and monetary \nreforms. \nI am convinced that in view of the persisting rise in headline inflation, \nmonetary policy tightening is appropriate at this time. The preceding \ndomestic economic analysis shows that inflationary pressure is driven by \nmonetary (high growth in money supply) as well as by structural factors such \nas high energy costs, exchange rate depreciation, infrastructural challenges, \nand insecurity. Hence, dealing with the problem requires policy coordination \nbetween the fiscal and monetary authorities. \nThe rebound in the oil sector and the sustained contribution of non-oil sector \nto real GDP growth is noteworthy. The fiscal authority has made substantial \nprogress in automating tax collections which has boosted non-oil revenues \nand blocked leakages. Government’s efforts at addressing insecurity has \nseen a substantial increase in oil production. Significant efforts are being \nmade to also address security challenges confronting the food producing \nbelts, as well as tackle the high cost of transportation through heavy \ninvestments in the CNG Bus project. Other fiscal measures aimed at \nimproving food crop production, increase supplies and moderate prices, \ninclude efforts at developing dry season farming, build storage facilities and \nfacilitate grain release from the strategic grain reserves. \nNigeria’s inflation is almost above its tolerable threshold and monetary policy \nmay lose its potency over domestic prices and its ability to anchor \nexpectations if an urgent and plausible action is not taken at this time. Also, \nin light of tightened global financial conditions, and capital flows returning to \nEMDEs, a tightened monetary policy stance could encourage foreign \ninvestment inflow, increase accretion to reserves and restore stability in the \nforeign exchange market. A complimentary measure would be to create \nincentives to boost non-oil exports, as well as improve diaspora remittances. \nIn light of the foregoing considerations, I vote at this meeting for a raise in the \nMonetary Policy rate (MPR) to 22.75 percent, an increase in the Cash Reserve \nRatio (CRR) to 45.0 per cent, an adjustment in the asymmetric corridor \naround the MPR to +100/-600 basis points, and the retention of the liquidity \nratio at 30.0 per cent. \n \n \n22 \n \n7. LAMIDO ABUBAKAR YUGUDA \nThe Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting of 26-27 February 2024, the \nfirst since July 2023, took place against a backdrop of slow but resilient \nrecovery in global economic growth, moderately declining global inflation \nand tight monetary policy in most advanced economies. On the domestic \nfront, real output growth increased significantly in the fourth quarter of 2023 \nbuoyed by a pick-up in growth in the oil sector. However, headline inflation \ncontinued to rise, reaching 29.90 percent in January 2024 (with both food \nand core inflation increasing). The rise in inflation was owing to the \ndepreciation of the Naira/US dollar exchange rate following the adoption of \na liberalized exchange rate regime in June 2023, and other domestic \nmonetary and structural factors. \nGlobal Economic Developments \nGlobal economic growth remained subdued at 3.1 percent in 2023 on \naccount of tepid growth in advanced economies owing to the effects of the \ntight monetary policies, and weak growth in the emerging markets and \ndeveloping economies (EMDEs). The International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) \nWorld Economic Outlook (WEO) in January 2024 forecast global economic \ngrowth remaining at 3.1 percent in 2024 and increasing slightly to 3.2 per cent \nin 2025 due to expected resilience in advanced economies and policy \nsupport in China to address weakness in its property sector. \nGlobal inflationary pressures are receding significantly. Inflation was \nestimated at 6.8 percent in 2023 and is expected to decline to 5.8 percent in \n2024 and 4.4 percent in 2025 owing to lower energy and food prices. Inflation \nin advanced economies is expected to trend down from 4.6 percent in 2023 \nto 2.6 in 2024 and 2.0 in 2025, with US inflation moderating to 3.1 per cent in \nJanuary 2024 from 3.4 percent in the preceding month. The level of inflation \nin emerging markets and developing economies is also expected to \nmoderate from 8. 4 percent in 2023 to 8.1 percent in 2024 and 6.0 percent in \n2025. While these levels are still above the inflation targets of most major \ncentral banks, inflation has declined faster than expected and the outlook is \nfor continued moderation given the tight monetary policy stance. \nIn February 2024 crude oil prices rebounded (to above US$82 per barrel for \nthe Opec basket and above US$85 for Nigeria’s Bonny Light crude) after \nthree consecutive months of decline in response to voluntary oil cuts \nannounced by major producers and easing futures selling. In 2024 the crude \noil price is expected to average US$82 per barrel as demand growth \nconcerns in China persist. \n \n23 \n \nMajor global equity markets have shown positive performance since the \nbeginning of the year as inflation pressures subsided pointing to expectations \nabout possible cuts in interest rates by leading central banks, although the \ntiming of such cuts remain uncertain. Foreign exchange markets have \nresponded to this uncertainty as most currencies depreciated against the \nUSD since the beginning of the year. Capital flows into emerging markets \nincreased to US$35.7 billion in January 2024 from US$29 billion in December as \ninvestor sentiments improved. In the medium-term there are prospects that \nflows into emerging markets would improve partly owing to expectations of \nrelaxation of the tight monetary policies in advanced economies. \nDomestic Economic Developments \nOutput growth picked up strongly in Q4 2023 mostly on account of the strong \nperformance of the oil sector (12.11 percent growth in Q4 2023 versus 2.22 \ncontraction in Q3 2023) owing to higher crude oil production. However, year-\non-year GDP growth slowed down from 3.10 percent in 2022 to 2.74 per cent \nin 2023 reflecting slower growth in agriculture and services and a modest \nimprovement in manufacturing. \nStrong inflationary pressures persisted into the new year with the January 2024 \nheadline inflation reaching 29.90 percent compared to 28.92 percent in \nDecember 2023 and 21.82 percent in January 2023. Food and core inflation \nhave also spiked reaching 35.41 percent and 23.59 percent respectively in \nJanuary 2024. The surge intensified in mid-2023 when petroleum subsidies \nwere removed and a market-based exchange rate regime was adopted, \neroding consumer purchasing power and threatening to undermine \nmacroeconomic stability as well as economic growth unless a strong policy \nresponse adopted to rein in inflation and anchor inflation expectations \ndownwards. \nGross Federation Account receipts at NGN 1,474.43 billion in January 2024 \nwere 10.1 percent higher than the collection in December 2023, but missed \nthe budget benchmark by 16.4 percent. Tax collections improved \nsignificantly to 7.1 percent of GDP compared to 6.2 percent of GDP in \nDecember 2023, on account of increases in corporate income tax and \nvalue-added tax (VAT) collections. However, this level is far below the West \nAfrican Monetary Zone (WAMZ) tax-to-GDP benchmark of 20 percent. \nOil revenue declined by 14.7 percent relative to December 2023 and was \n60.5 percent short of the budget target. Over the past few years, the Nigerian \neconomy has suffered persistent underperformance in oil output and oil \nrevenue owing to decreased production attributed to pipeline vandalization, \noil theft, inefficiency and a variety of other factors. \n \n24 \n \nTo address the current macroeconomic difficulties effectively all avoidable \nproduction and revenue losses in the oil sector must be fixed. Since oil \nrevenues accrue in foreign exchange, restoring the lost revenue by improving \nsecurity in the oil fields and along the pipelines - and generally insisting on a \nhigher level of efficiency and transparency in the oil sector - should improve \nboth government revenue and the nation’s foreign exchange reserves. \nFrom the data reviewed it seems this process has started. The oil sector grew \nby 12.11% in Q4 2023 compared with 2.22% contraction in Q3 2023. The \nrecent announcement of the agreement between the Federal Ministry of \nFinance, NNPC Limited and the CBN on the domiciliation of all oil revenues in \nthe CBN is a welcome development and should help improve transparency \nand accountability in the management of oil revenues. Increasing domestic \noil output and a stable oil price at above USD80 per barrel should markedly \nincrease Nigeria’s oil revenue, boosting both the fiscal space and the \nexternal reserves position. \nThe Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) retained revenue in January 2024 \nwas 1.7 percent and 47 percent lower relative to the December 2023 level \nand the budget target, respectively. On the other hand, expenditure was 3.5 \npercent and 15.2 percent below the December 2023 and the target, \nrespectively. This means that relative to the budget target, revenue has been \nmore compressed than expenditure resulting in a fiscal deficit that was 17.4 \npercent higher than the benchmark, and at 6.1 percent of GDP the fiscal \ndeficit was twice the WAMZ benchmark of 3 percent of GDP. \nConsequently, while the removal of petroleum subsidy and the unification of \nthe exchange rate have reduced government expenditure and improved \nrevenues, a stronger fiscal effort is needed to enable the Federal \nGovernment fund its necessary programmes without recourse to borrowing. \nTotal public debt at 39.1 percent of GDP is within the DMO’s ceiling of 40 \npercent of GDP, but the debt-service-to-revenue ratio at 179 percent is more \nthan three times the 50 percent benchmark. This is another reason for \nreducing expenditure, slowing the accumulation of debt and targeting the \ncollection of more revenue to improve fiscal sustainability. \nLoose monetary conditions prevailed in Nigeria for most of 2023. Reserve \nmoney increased by 54.28 percent between December 2022 and December \n2023, while broad money (M3) increased by 50.88 percent over the same \nperiod, well above the provisional benchmark of 28.21 percent. The 50.88 \npercent increase in broad money from NGN 52.2 trillion in December 2022 to \nNGN 78.7 trillion in December 2023 was driven mostly by a 46.27 percent \nincrease in net domestic assets (NDA) which rose by NGN 22.4 trillion. In other \nwords, this represents additional credit created in the economy. While reserve \n \n25 \n \nmoney declined by 2.34 percent in January 2024 relative to December 2023 \ndriven largely by decline in liabilities to Other Depository Corporations \n(ODCs), broad money (M3) increased by 18.25 percent over the one-month \nperiod, thereby adding to the high level of excess liquidity in the system. \nThe banking system remained sound over the review period with capital \nadequacy ratio was above 10 percent and non-performing loans (NPLs) of \n4.15 percent. Liquidity ratio was 42.83 percent in January 2024, significantly \nabove the regulatory minimum liquidity ratio requirement of 30 percent and \n20 percent for commercial and merchant banks, respectively. \nThe capital market equities witnessed a bullish performance as the All-Share \nIndex (ASI) rose by 35.28 percent in January 2024 while market capitalization \nincreased by 35.29 percent over the respective levels in December 2023. \nForeign participation in the capital market is gradually increasing as the \nrecent economic reforms begin to improve foreign investor confidence. \nThe overall balance of payments deficit narrowed. This was on account of a \nhigher current account surplus owing to favourable export developments \nand decline in merchandise imports which moderated the deficit on the \nfinancial account where significant outpayments accrued to non-residents as \ninvestment income (returns on investment - interest and dividend). Personal \nhome remittances from Nigerians in the Diaspora declined. \nThe external reserves stood at US$34.54 billion as of 21 February 2024 an \nincrease of US$2.31 from the level in December 2023. This could finance 6.9 \nmonths of imports of goods and services. \nPolicy Decision \nThe key issues that the MPC must confront at this meeting are the rapidly \nrising inflation and the significant depreciation of the Naira. My preference \nwas for the MPC to signal its resolve to fight inflation by significantly raising the \nmonetary policy rate (MPR) and adopting strong measures to limit excess \nliquidity in the banking system. \nI noted the concerns about the effect of a high MPR on economic growth. \nHowever, the first priority of the MPC is to fight inflation and try to re-anchor \ninflation expectations because unchecked inflation also has a negative \neffect on growth in addition to its other adverse consequences. \nThe data show that the relationship between growth and inflation is \nmultidimensional – at lower levels, inflation energizes growth, while after the \nthreshold it begins to hurt. The computed threshold for Nigeria and other \nEMDEs is in the range 11-16 percent. Thus, at the current 29.9 percent \ninflation, the adverse effect on growth is easy to see, especially considering \n \n26 \n \nthe effects of inflation on consumption. The erosion of purchasing power \nreduces the aggregate level of consumption, which in turn would drag the \ngrowth of the national income. Also, the lower savings rate implies \ninadequate accumulation of capital which is essential for long-term \ninvestments and growth. \nRising inflation and exchange rate depreciation are self-reinforcing, as an \nincrease in inflation exacerbates the depreciation of the exchange rate via \nincreasing interest rate differentials, while the deterioration of the exchange \nrate worsens inflation through the pass-through effect. \nThe Naira has depreciated by over 66 percent as a result of the policy switch \nto a more flexible exchange rate system. This was nurtured and worsened by \nthe excess liquidity in the banking system as indicated by the marked \nincrease in reserve money and broad money over the last one year. \nWith the depreciation of the Naira, another concern is bank asset quality. \nWhile the banking system remained resilient during the review period, with \ncapital adequacy, liquidity and non-performing loan ratios all within normal \nprudential limits. It was therefore very necessary that policy action be taken \nto slow and reverse the implied undervaluation of the Naira. \nIn consideration of the foregoing, I voted as follows: \nTighten the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR): by 300 basis points to 21.75% \nIncrease the Cash Reserve Requirement (CRR): by 1750 basis points to 50% \nRetain the Liquidity Ratio (LR) at 30% \nWiden the asymmetric corridor: to +100/-600 basis points around \nthe MPR. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n27 \n \n8. MUHAMMAD SANI ABDULLAHI \nMy Vote \nIn recognising the current inflationary trend and developments in the foreign \nexchange market, the extant monetary policy stance should be further \ntightened to address inflationary concerns, raise real interest rates towards \npositive trajectory and incentivize capital inflows. I am convinced that a \ndecisive step to raise the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) significantly will align \nour stance with the urgency of the situation and signal our unwavering \ncommitment to tackling inflation. In effect, I voted to: \n1) Raise the MPR by 400 basis points to 22.75 per cent from 18.75 per cent. \n2) Adjust the asymmetric corridor to +100/-400 from +100/-300 basis points \naround the MPR. \n3) Raise the CRR to 45 per cent from 32.5 per cent; and \n4) Retain the Liquidity Ratio at 30 per cent. \nMy Considerations \nAs a member of the Monetary Policy Committee, I am deeply concerned \nabout the prevailing inflationary pressures and our imperative to address \nthem effectively. Having listened to all the technical presentations, surveyed \ncross-country experiences, and held enlightening conversations with other \nMPC members, we cannot afford to allow inflation to persist as a lingering \nissue. The urgency of the current situation demands swift and resolute action \nfrom the MPC. The Committee must convey a clear message that we are not \nonly willing but determined to decisively confront inflation head-on. \n \nWhile the fiscal policy is poised to emphasize social interventions and revenue \ngeneration in the current year, and shifting the focus towards growth in 2025, \nit becomes incumbent upon the monetary policy realm to take a proactive \nstance to dampen the lingering inflationary pressure. Neglecting the \nsignificance of addressing inflation or delaying policy adjustments can lead \nto prolonged economic woes, as evidenced by the experiences of various \ncountries that have had to grapple with soaring inflation before \nimplementing corrective measures. \n \nIn our conversations in the past two days, we analysed the drivers of inflation \nto include the global nature of the phenomenon, the persistence of food, \nrising energy costs, the liquidity risks posed by significant monthly injection \nthrough the Federal Account Allocations Committee (FAAC), the effect of \nexcess liquidity from the CBNs quasi-fiscal development finance interventions, \ncredit to government or Ways and Means advances going as far back as \nquantitative easing during the Covid-19 era, the risks posed by emerging \n \n28 \n \ntechnologies and cryptocurrencies and the foreign exchange pass through \nto inflation. \n \nNotwithstanding, the CBN in response to the drivers above has already taken \nsome deliberate actions particularly the restriction of Ways and Means \nadvances to the statutory provisions, the halt of development finance \ninterventions and various measures to stem banking system liquidity. At this \nMPC meeting, it is critical that we expand on these measures to achieve \nholistic response to achieving price stability. Furthermore, as we navigate this \neconomic landscape, it is crucial to consider the vital role of foreign portfolio \ninvestments (FPIs) in bridging the supply gaps in the foreign exchange market. \nBy concurrently raising interest rates, we can create an environment that \nattracts FPIs, thereby bolstering the stability of our foreign exchange reserves \nand signaling our resolve and commitment to ensure price. \n \nThe strategy of implementing gradual rate hikes, while often perceived as a \ncautious approach, may inadvertently prolong the corrective process and \neconomic uncertainties. Research and historical evidence suggest that, \nsingular substantial rate hikes can yield more effective outcomes in \naddressing inflationary pressures and restoring macroeconomic equilibrium. \n \nIt is also critical that we revisit the efficacy of our monetary policy transmission \nmechanism to enhance our decisions. In adopting a proactive approach to \ncommunication, it is critical that this MPC meeting sees significantly improved \ncommunication through all channels and curated for all stakeholders given \nthe current interest of the nation in the decisions of this Committee. By taking \nthese assertive measures, we aim to instill confidence in the economy, \nreinforce price stability, and create a conducive economic environment for \nsustainable growth prospects. \n \nI acknowledge the bold reforms by both the monetary and fiscal authorities \nas the trajectory suggests that the reforms would successfully anchor inflation \nexpectations and lead the markets towards the attainment of the price \nstability objective of the Bank. I am mindful that my decision will certainly \nhave some trade-offs. I have carefully weighed the empirical evidence of the \nsacrifice ratio for growth which showed possible output loss in the near term. \nNonetheless, I am convinced that the CBN monetary policy must defy gravity \nand give greater value to Nigerians by safeguarding the economic well-\nbeing of our nation and its citizens. It is therefore paramount that we act \ndecisively and collectively in ensuring that monetary policy delivers on its \nmandate as inflation could become more persistent and pervasive and \neventually hurt output growth if not dealt with expeditiously. \n \n \n29 \n \nGlobal and Domestic Developments \nDespite several lingering downside risks and uncertainties, global output \nrecovery remains resilient as key indices show a positive outlook for the global \neconomy. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects global output \nexpansion of 3.1 per cent in 2024 and 3.2 per cent in 2025 due to stronger \nthan expected resilience in advanced, emerging market, and developing \neconomies. Globally, the robust response by monetary and fiscal authorities \nwill continue to support the recovery and create jobs required to push the \nglobal economy to full recovery. The moderation in global inflation is \nprojected to continue in 2024, anchored on lower core inflation because of \nstill-tight monetary policies, a related softening in labour markets, and pass-\nthrough effects from earlier and ongoing declines in relative energy prices. \nGlobal inflation is projected to decline to 5.8 and 4.4 per cent in 2024 and \n2025, respectively. \nNigeria has had to simultaneously confront slow output recovery, persistent \ninflationary and exchange rate pressures. Activities in the domestic economy \nexpanded further for the twelfth (12) consecutive quarter by 3.46 per cent \n(year-on-year) in Q4 2023 compared with 2.54 per cent in Q3 2023 driven \nmajorly by the services sector which recorded a growth of 3.98 per cent and \ncontributed 56.55 per cent to the aggregate GDP. The industry sector grew \nby 3.86 per cent while agriculture sector grew by 2.10 per cent. On an annual \nbasis, GDP grew by 2.74 per cent in 2023 relative to 3.10 per cent in 2022. \nStaff forecast indicate a faster pace of GDP growth of 3.20 per cent in Q1 \n2024. Domestic crude oil production ramped up to 1.43mbp on account of \ndeliberate measures by the FGN to enhance security around oil infrastructure \nin the Niger Delta region. \n \nInflationary pressure continued to persist as headline inflation rose further for \nthe twelfth consecutive month to 29.90 per cent in January 2024, driven \nlargely by food prices. Both food and core components have consistently \nrisen over since the past three (3) months. Staff projection indicates that \ninflationary pressure would remain in the near term. \n \nMoney supply increased in the period under review and was above the \nprovisional benchmark when annualised. Broad money supply (M3) rose \nyear-to-date by 18.25 per cent to ₦93.72 trillion at end-January 2024, from \nN79.25 trillion over the preceding December, driven by an increase in both \nNet Domestic Assets (NDA) and Net Foreign Assets (NFA), indicating the \nexistence of excess liquidity in the system and the need for further tightening. \nBanking system aggregate credit, on a year-to-date basis, also increased by \n23.14 per cent in January 2024. \n \n30 \n \nIn the external sector, the current account posted a higher surplus of US$3.28 \nbillion (4.0 per cent of GDP), in Q3 2023compared to US$0.81 billion (0.8 per \ncent of GDP) in Q2 2023, due largely to a higher trade surplus associated with \nfavourable oil export development, the performance of the external sector \nremained subdued by global economic uncertainties amid tight financial \nconditions. \n \nThe performance of the banking sector remains safe, sound, and resilient, \nlargely due to the proactive monetary policy stance of the Bank and other \ncomplementary regulatory measures. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n31 \n \n9. MURTALA SABO SAGAGI \nContext \nOver the last 10 years, the Nigerian economy remains weak and vulnerable \nto external shocks and volatilities mainly due to domestic structural \nchallenges. The oil price shocks of mid 2015 continued to slow down the \neconomy forcing the country into recession by the second quarter of 2016. \nEven though, the economy exited recession in the second quarter of 2017, \nthe attempts to diversify the economy away from oil, such as the Zero-oil Plan \nand Economic Recovery and Growth Plan 2017-2020 were, at best, \nunsuccessful. Nigeria’s export earnings, local revenues and, predictably, \neconomic growth slumped. With an elevated fiscal constraint, the country \nresorted to massive and unprecedented borrowing. The limited agricultural \nproductivity and value addition coupled with limited progress in tapping into \nhigh value services and the knowledge economy conditioned Nigeria to \nmassive imports and persistent balance of payment challenges. The impact \nof the current global food and energy crisis induced by the Russia-Ukraine \nwar underscores the fragility and vulnerability of the Nigerian economy to \npersistent global commodity price instability. The causes of inflationary \ntendency of the economy is a subject of intense debate. However, the \ncombined effects of years of policy inconsistencies, dearth in dynamic \ngovernance from both the fiscal and monetary sides, deteriorating domestic \nsecurity and falling productivity in key sectors have contributed to the \nworsening of the economy’s fundamentals. \nGlobal and Regional Dimensions \nThe world is gradually adjusting to the shocks emanating from conflicts and \nvolatilities. The policy responses to the shocks varied among the developed \nand developing economies. As many developing economies grapple with \nincreasing costs, United States, European Union and Japan were able to \ncurtail inflation by lowering consumer cost elements in the form of reduced \nenergy, food, housing costs as well as the effective use of social safety nets. \nIn general, inflation is projected to decline in 2024 mainly due to anticipated \nreduction in food and energy prices as global supply chain improves and \nefforts to target inflation are sustained. This explains why most countries retain \nor ease interest rates. It is interesting to note, however, that a number of \ncountries in Africa are also expected to witness noticeable economic \nimprovements. The recent Macroeconomic Performance and Outlook (MEO) \nreleased by the African Development Bank Group included eleven African \ncountries among the world’s 20 fastest-growing economies in 2024. \nUnfortunately, Nigeria did not make the list. This is at a time when the \nexpected growth in Africa of 4.1% exceeds the projected global averages. \n \n32 \n \nDomestic Dynamics \nThe asymmetry between GDP growth rates and welfare in Nigeria has been \nwell established. This is mainly because the gains of the little economic \ngrowth that has occurred do not effectively trickle down suggesting non-\ninclusive/rentier economic landscape. The dominance of oil revenue in \nexport earnings created massive economic dislocation and it will be perilous \nto base the nation’s economic prospect on the temporary relief from \nincreased oil export and its effect on the balance of payment. With the \ncurrent foreign exchange crisis and aggravating inflationary pressures, a fresh \nlook at policy tool kits is imperative. \nToday, inflation is at its record high in Nigeria and, as a norm, the Bank will \ncontemplate an adjustment to the MPR to attain a short-term stability. \nHowever, there is evidence to suggest that previous attempts have been \nlargely unsuccessful. Possible reasons include: \na. A weak link between the banking sector and the real sector. Only few \nsectors have access to formal bank loans. \nb. Only about 5% of nearly 35 million small and medium enterprises, providing \n60-70% of output, have access to formal loans. \nc. Food inflation which is generally structural, not monetary, is a huge \ncontributor to core inflation basket and there is no credible evidence to \nsuggest that the country is moving towards attaining food security in the \nmedium term. \nIt is, therefore, not surpassing that approaches to tame inflation in the short \nrun tend to negatively impact on medium term growth in the last decades. \nThe Figure below shows the relationship between inflation and MPR in Nigeria. \n \nSource: NBS & CBN Data \n \n33 \n \nSince early 2022, the reduced confidence in Naira induced many Nigerians \nto take refuge largely in the US Dollar. Also, the country’s balance sheet, \nmacroeconomic indices, and deteriorating business conditions scared away \nforeign investors living only a handful of speculative portfolio investors. This \ncoupled with massive currency speculation led to the free fall of Naira \nthereby worsening the inflation. \n \nIn view of this, I would be more inclined to ascribe the current price instability \nto (a) domestic policy inadequacies and (b) internal structural rigidities rather \nthan any external factors such as the prolonged Russia-Ukraine conflict and \nother global volatilities. This does not, however, imply that global dynamics \nare inconsequential. \n \nAccordingly, I summarized the recent and systemic policy actions and \ninaction that engender macro-economic instability in Nigeria as follows: \n \nRecent \ni. \nThe closure of Nigeria’s land border with the neighboring countries, \nparticularly, between 2017 and 2023, has disrupted the movement of \nfood and livestock. \nii. \nExcessive abuse of ways and means which compromised previous \nmonetary stance, especially in 2021 to 2022. \niii. \nLarge scale sectoral injection of funds by the CBN without effective \ndue diligence on the sub-sectors and the private sector beneficiaries. \niv. \nThe poorly-conceived Naira redesign policy towards the end of 2022 \nand its spill-over effects up to the second half of 2023. \nv. \nRemoval of fuel subsidy with a limited pathway to cushion its wider \nsocial impact. \nvi. \nExchange rate unification after prolonged foreign exchange market \nmanipulations which resulted in the unprecedented depreciation of \nthe Naira. \nvii. \nClimate change, especially unchecked and persistent flooding and \ndeforestation \n \nSystematic \ni. \nLack of crude oil refining capacity often leading to domestic shortages \nand high cost of energy. This also aggravated Nigeria’s fiscal crisis; \nii. \nNeglect of agricultural transformation, thereby worsening food security \n–low productivity and value addition, and high post-harvest losses in \nthe region of 40-60%, leading to off-season shortages and high food \nprices; \niii. \nMismanagement and corruption in the administration of the subsidy \nregimes; \n \n34 \n \niv. \nMassive debt accumulation and high debt-service to revenue ratio; \nv. \nWeak non-oil export diversification drive; \nvi. \nPoor governance and weak public financial management practices, \nand \nvii. \nPersistent domestic insecurity. \nConsidering these, it is my view that monetary policy consideration (i.e. re-\nadjustments) will have limited impact on inflation rates unless they are \ncomplimented with efforts to address insecurity and food shortages. This is in \naddition to holistic and disciplined roadmap for economic and social \nrejuvenation. \nProspect for 2024 \nFrom 2015 to mid-2023, the CBN had assumed the role of economic \nmanagers in addition to its mandate as regulator and price stabilizer. The \nerratic policies and interventions pursued created deficit of confidence. \nInterestingly, from January, 2024, the determination of the Bank to take \ncorrective measures, implement swift action against currency speculators \nand infractions by banks has been glaring as reflected in the renewed boost \nin the activities of the financial market. With clearer policy statements, \nsolution orientation towards achieving disciplined policy implementation, \nconscious efforts to restore confidence on the Naira, the future policy outlook \nis promising. As noted by the World Bank, inflation is expected to ease in 2024 \nmainly due to alignments and adjustments to the shift in policies. However, \nPwC cautioned that the marginal decline in inflation and 3.1% rise in GDP \nmay not be sufficient to achieve price stability without credible effort to \naligning fiscal and monetary policy required for sustainable growth. \nMy Conclusion \nAt the moment, the main task before us is foreign exchange stability as \nappreciation in the value of Naira could lead to reduced inflation. This, \nhowever, requires massive inflow of foreign exchange. Therefore, targeting \nremittances and investments becomes imperative and urgent. Ironically, \nsignificant Greenfield and Brownfield investments can hardly be attracted to \nNigeria under the present hostile business environment leaving the country at \nthe mercy of speculative portfolio investors with high appetite for hike in \nrates. Therefore, a balancing act is required to attain consistency on the \nBank’s tightening stance needed to enhance investors’ confidence and, at \nthe same time, to be mindful on the increasing cost of doing business which is \nthreatening the country’s ability to produce and repay its financial \nobligations. \n \n \n35 \n \nAccordingly, I voted for tightening to rise rates mildly and reducing excess \nliquidity as follows: \ni. \nMPR: +100 points to 19.75% \nii. \nCRR: From 32.5% to 45% \niii. \nAC: from +100/-300 basis points to +100/-700 \niv. \nLR: Retain 30% \n \nRecommendations \nEvidently, structural factors would continue to limit transmission of monetary \npolicy in Nigeria. To achieve a balanced approach, it may be wise for the \nBank to consider it worthy and strategic to initiate strategic partnerships to \ndevelop effective framework for dealing with the major components of \ninflation in Nigeria, namely food and energy. In specific terms, the Bank may \nwork with various MDAs and private sector in the following areas: \ni. \nInflation: medium term strategy that targets inflation should be \nvalidated and completed in earnest. \nii. \nAgriculture: immediately commence the implementation of Federal \nGovernment’s National Agricultural Technology and Innovation Policy \n(NATIP)-2022-2027 to enhance food security, bring down food prices \nand increase exportable commodities \niii. \nEnergy: the country should work with the private sector and foreign \ninvestors to achieve energy security by 2030. \niv. \nIndustry: there should be a careful selection and development of high \npotential export-oriented industries. \nv. \nSpeculations: maintain strict supervision of all crypto operations and \nbanks. \nvi. \nLending to Real Sector: there should be effective management of \nconcentration risks and re-design instruments for de-risking lending to \ngenuine Micro Small and Medium Enterprises. \nvii. \nLogistics: efficiency in the ports should be prioritized and addressed. \n \n36 \n \nviii. \nPrudence: \nthe \ncountry \nshould \nenhance \ntransparency \nand \naccountability in public finance. \nix. \nWealth and Jobs: youth and women employment and enterprise \ndevelopment should be embedded in any public funded programme \nand project nationwide. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n37 \n \n10. MUSTAPHA AKINKUNMI \nContext \nThe Nigerian economy grew consistently at about 3 percent annually in 2022 \nand 2023. Growth may slow modestly in 2024 as Nigeria sacrifices some \ngrowth to contain inflation. A depreciation of the Naira will help Nigeria \ncompetitiveness and stimulate non-oil exports. These adjustments are not \nwithout pain as rising food prices reduce the purchasing power of low to \nmiddle-income Nigerians. \nThe Fisher equation summarizes Nigeria's dilemma: to keep real interest rates \npositive, the interest rate must be greater than the rate of inflation. \nThe rising cost of food and other necessities are eroding the purchasing \npower of ordinary Nigerians. We must act immediately to bring Inflation \ndown. Timing is critical in applying all monetary tools to be effective in the \nshort to medium term. \nI appreciate increasing the rate is a trade-off for growth. However, the \ninvestment community needs strong commitment and confidence from the \nCBN to bring FDI to Nigeria. An attractive yield is crucial at this moment \nconsidering the growth we are experiencing in the OECD countries. In the \nthought process of managing inflation at the expense of growth, we must \nalso notice the exchange rate pass-through to domestic prices. I align with \nmy colleagues to increase the MPR. \nThe Global Economy \nThe modest upgrade of global GDP growth projections by the IMF (2024) is \nestimated at 3.1 percent in 2024, and 3.2 percent in 2025, due to resilience in \nthe United States and many large emerging markets and developing \neconomies (EMDEs) with fiscal support in China. This anticipated global \neconomic performance is premised on gradual inflation decline and steadily \nrising growth. \nWhile China and the UK have been identified as the biggest rebounders, \nconsumer confidence seems to be trending down across most developed \nand emerging economies. However, the US Consumer Confidence Index \nincreased to 110.7 in December 2023, indicating more optimistic views of \npersonal income prospects, favourable business conditions, and job \nopportunities. Despite robust recovery in Russia’s sales growth as well as in \nChina, Russia’s growth pace is likely to be dragged down due to its monetary \ntightening, thus cooling household demand. Core inflation in advanced \neconomies, fell to 3.9 percent in December 2023 (against 4.0 percent in \nNovember 2023), while Eurozone year-on-year headline inflation decreased \nto 2.8 percent in January 2024 from 2.9 percent in December 2023 due to \n \n38 \n \nwinter. This rise was driven largely by energy prices as all other inflation \ncomponents moderated. The UK headline inflation rose in the midst of \nunexpectedly unchanged core inflation at 5.1 percent. A similar story was \nwitnessed in some emerging economies. India’s headline inflation climbed to \n5.7 percent in December 2023 from 5.6 percent in November 2023, while \nRussia inflation remain unchanged at 7.4 percent in December 2023 and \nJanuary 2024. By contrast, China continued to battle deflation which stood at \n-0.8 percent in January 2024. In the meantime, Brazil’s inflation dropped for \nfive consecutive months to a record 4.5 percent in January 2024 from 5.2 in \nSeptember 2023. \nGlobal commodity prices maintained their post-financial crisis level. Energy \nprices maintained high levels after peaking in 2022, while metal prices \nremained stable after a period of high inflation in 2022. The trend in food \nprices was similar to the 2011 period of inflation. Thus, inflation is expected to \nbe stable between 2 percent and 2.3 percent for both the medium and long \nterm. Interest rates remained stable, especially in developed economies and \nIndia. Brazil set the Selic annual rate at 11.8 percent in January 2024, the \nsame as December 2023 in order to mitigate weather-related disruptions to \nstaple crops such as rice and potatoes, with further reduction expectations. \nThe US real GDP growth surpassed the expectation by recording 3.2 percent \nyear over year in the fourth quarter of 2023. This outpaced economic \nperformance in Europe, pushed down by the Eurozone's third-quarter 2023 \ncontraction (-0.1 percent). The UK real GDP reduced by 0.2 percent over the \nthree months to November 2023,compared with the three months to August. \nChina’s economy recorded a robust growth of 5.2 percent in 2023 to reach \nUS$17.7 trillion, with consumption accounting for over 80 percent. India’s \ngrowth target of 7 percent is anticipated in 2024-25, as Russia’s wartime \neconomy is expected a rebound to witness a growth rate of about 2.7 \npercent to 3 percent in 2024. This economic performance is most likely driven \nby resilient domestic demand, robust government spending, and wage \ngrowth. \n \nDomestic Context \n \nThe challenge of persistently increasing inflation remains a significant concern \nin Nigeria, with the country's headline inflation rising to a near 28-year high of \n29.9 percent in January 2024, up from 28.9 percent in December 2023. Of \nparticular note, food inflation, which comprises a substantial portion of the \ninflation basket, rose to 35.4 percent from 33.9 percent in December 2023. \nThis increase is largely driven by higher prices of essential food items including \nbread, fish, meat, fruits, and eggs. Month-on-month inflation also climbed to \n \n39 \n \n3.2 percent from 2.7 percent in December 2023, primarily due to increased \ntransportation costs and panic buying resulting from uncertain commodity \nprices stemming from exchange rate fluctuations. Additionally, core inflation \nincreased to 2.2 percent from 1.8 percent, largely due to the elevated cost of \nimported goods associated with the high exchange rate. The decline in the \nlabor participation rate has contributed to an increase in the unemployment \nrate, which rose to 5 percent in Q3 2023 from 4.2 percent in Q2 2023. Notably, \nthe informal sector remains the largest employer in Nigeria, accounting for \n92.3 percent of total employment. Despite this, a significant proportion of \nemployed individuals are engaged in self-employment, comprising 87.3 \npercent of the workforce in Q3 2023. \nFurthermore, Nigeria witnessed a decrease in its reserve money to \napproximately N24.2 trillion by the end of January 2024, while broad money \n(M3) supply increased to N93.7 trillion. This exacerbates inflationary pressures \nwithin the country. \nAdditionally, Nigeria's external reserves increased to US$34.54 billion in \nFebruary 2024 from US$32.23 billion in January 2024. The current reserves \ncould finance 6.9 months of imports of goods and services. The reserves-to-\nbroad money ratio of 40.6 percent surpasses the 20.0 percent threshold, \nstrengthening the country's capacity to manage capital flows. \nIn terms of balance of payments, Nigeria reduced its overall deficit to US$0.28 \nbillion in Q3 2023 from US$1.34 billion in Q2 2023, primarily due to a decline in \nmerchandise imports. Furthermore, the current account recorded a higher \nsurplus of US$3.28 billion compared to US$0.81 billion in Q2 2023, driven by \nfavorable export developments. However, net financial liabilities increased to \nUS$3.74 billion from US$1.25 billion in Q2 2023, mainly due to a significant rise in \nportfolio investment inflows. Despite these positive trends, global economic \nchallenges, particularly in developed economies, led to a decline in diaspora \nremittances to US$4.58 billion in Q3 2023, reflecting a decrease of 7.4 \npercent. \n \nDecision \nI am in favour of increasing all parameters. In my view, managing inflation is \nparamount among macro variables. I am deeply committed to this cause. I \npropose increasing the MPR by 400 basis points to tame inflationary pressure. \nAdditionally, I believe it's crucial to enhance our yield to attract FDI. \nMoreover, I believe that banks remain awashed with liquidity and so I \nadvocate for increasing the Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) to 50 percent. \nFurthermore, I suggest making the Asymmetric Corridor more effective by \n \n40 \n \nadjusting the floor to -600 basis points and the ceiling at +100 basis points. \nHowever, I concur with my colleagues in maintaining liquidity at 30 percent. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n41 \n \n11. PHILIP IKEAZOR \n \nIn view of the prevailing challenges occasioned by excess money supply, \nexchange rate depreciation, and the resultant heightened inflation that \nposes a threat to macroeconomic stability, I voted to: \ni. \nRaise the MPR by 300 basis points to 21.75 per cent from 18.75 per cent. \nii. \nAdjust the asymmetric corridor around the MPR to +100/-700 from \n+100/-300 basis points. \niii. \nRaise the Cash Reserve Ratio from 32.50 to 45.00 per cent. \niv. \nRetain Liquidity Ratio at 30.00 per cent. \n \nSummary of key Global and Domestic Developments \nGlobal inflation is expected to decelerate at a faster pace in 2024, on \naccount of tight monetary policies, slack in labour markets, and pass-through \neffects of declining energy prices. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) \nprojects global inflation to decline to 5.8 per cent in 2024 from 6.8 per cent in \n2023. Whereas, emerging and developing economies continue to grapple \nwith still elevated price levels due to peculiar structural and pass-through \nfactors, inflation in the advanced economy have trended downward, albeit \nslowly, as a result of aggressive tightening of the policy environment in 2023. \nThe IMF projects the global economy to grow at a 3.1 per cent in 2024, driven \nlargely by stronger than expected resilience in advanced economies. \nDecelerating inflation and easing of policy interest rates in advanced \neconomies, signaling an end to monetary tightening, could be an impetus to \ngrowth in the advanced economies in 2024. Growth in Emerging Markets \nand Developing Economies is expected to remain at 4.1 per cent in 2024, the \nsame as in 2023. \nDespite the positive outlook, the global economy continues to face \ndownside risks, including geo-economic fragmentation and rising geo-\npolitical tensions like ongoing Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Gaza war and China \nproperty crisis, among others, all of which have constituted a drag on global \ngrowth. This has created uncertainty on the paths for policy rates by major \ncentral banks, especially in the emerging and developing economies. \nIn the domestic economy, real GDP grew by 3.46 per cent in Q4 2023 \ncompared with 2.54 per cent in Q3 2023. Growth in Q4 2023 reflected \nexpansion in Services sector by 3.98 per cent, Agriculture sector by 2.10 per \ncent and the oil sector by 12.11 per cent, on account of higher crude \nproduction. The composite Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) remained \n \n42 \n \nbelow the threshold at 48.5 index points in January 2024, compared with 49.1 \nindex points, showing a decline in economic activity. Industry PMI, however \nrose to 50.4 index point which is above the threshold in January 2024, due to \nexpansion in employment and production levels, Agriculture PMI also \nexpanded in January 2024, after four months of contraction, reflecting \nimprovement in farm yield, new orders, inventory, and general farming \nactivities. \nHeadline inflation (year-on-year) increased further to 29.90 per cent in \nJanuary 2024 from 28.92 per cent in December 2023, driven largely by the \nincrease in both food and core inflation. The current persistent inflationary \npressures reflect the effects of a combination factors including rising food \nand energy prices, exchange rate pass-through, high growth in money \nsupply, underscored by significant growth and level of Currency Outside \nDepository Corporations (CODCs). \nThe performance of the external sector remained subdued by the effects of \nuncertainties in the global economy, amid tight financial conditions thereby \ncontributing to the current exchange rate pressures. The overall balance of \npayments deficit narrowed to US$0.28 billion (0.4 per cent of GDP) in Q3 \n2023, relative to US$I .34 billion in Q2 2023, due to moderation in the \ndrawdown of external reserves to finance the balance of payments \nobligations. \nThe banking system continues to be resilient as the industry financial \nsoundness indicators (FSls) like the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) and non-\nperforming loan (NPL) ratio are still within the regulatory threshold and the \nrecapitalization of banks is imminent, to preserve the stability of the financial \nsystem, which is a key priority on its own, and for effective transmission of \nmonetary policy. \nMy Considerations \nThe economy is currently witnessing accelerating inflation, sluggish output \ngrowth, and a depreciated exchange rate. A tight monetary policy stance \nat this period therefore seems to be the most viable option to moderate \ninflation and mitigate exchange rate passthrough that has eroded \nhouseholds' purchasing power in recent past. The challenges inform a \nhawkish monetary policy, whitst still been mindful of the effect of higher \ninterest rates on loans for borrowers, especially in the real sector of the \neconomy. Undue hikes could, therefore, worsen costs of borrowing, curtail \nlending and hurt economic growth without moderating inflation to a level \n \n43 \n \nsufficient to achieve the desired outcome. \nThe need for a trade-off between inflation and growth constitutes a binding \nconstraint on the policy decision. In the present circumstance, price stability \nmust take priority over economic growth to preserve the primary goal of \nmonetary policy and prevent progression to hyperinflation at which point \nmonetary policy becomes ineffective. Of course, consideration must be \ngiven to what is optimal for growth without sacrificing price stability. \nIn terms of the choice of policy instruments, the current inflation is apparently \nnot credit related but largely fueled by excess liquidity in the system as \nindicated by the significant growth of monetary phenomenon. Deploying \nMPR only without complementary tools might not achieve the desired result \nof moderating inflation. Complementary tools like the Cash Reserve Ratio \n(CRR) and the asymmetric corridor have direct impact on liquidity, thereby \npotent in taming inflation if applied consistently over required periods. \nConsidering our unique circumstance where personal credit constitutes only \n5.21 per cent of the banking industry total lending at end-January 2024, the \nCRR and the asymmetric corridor would be a most potent tools to moderate \nexcess liquidity. \nSignificant increases in rates are required to signal the intention to address \nthe current negative real interest rate that is a disincentive to foreign \ninvestment. Raising the rates wili encourage capital inflow to boost foreign \nexchange supply and strengthen the naira. \nUltimately, as an import-dependent economy the exchange rate channel of \nmonetary policy transmission is now more active than ever and requires close \nattention. Notably, the pressure on exchange rate is gradually dissipating \ndue to various reforms in the foreign exchange market by the Central Bank \nof Nigeria. This includes unification of exchange rate, review of the \noperational guidelines for International Money Transfer Organization (IMTO) \nand Bureau De Change (BDC) reforms. \nThe concerted effort between the monetary and fiscal authorities in driving \nnational economic goals is critical to navigating current economic \nchallenges and delivering significant expected results. Measures such as \nvarious agricultural and CNG initiatives by the fiscal authorities are expected \nto help manage food inflation, moderate energy prices and transportation \ncost, thereby ameliorating the high cost of living. It is crucial that export \noperations and policies are streamlined to boost non-oil exports and improve \nforeign exchange liquidity to support price stability. \n \n44 \n \nIn conclusion, a tight monetary policy stance would be effective in curbing \nexcess liquidity and significantly elevated price levels. Fiscal policies and \nreforms should be formulated to make our economy more productive and \nassist to gradually moderate high public debt. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n45 \n \n12. OLAYEMI CARDOSO \nGovernor of the Central Bank of Nigeria and Chairman, Monetary Policy \nCommittee \nI wish to acknowledge the significance of presiding over the inaugural \nMonetary Policy Committee (MPC) Meeting as the Governor of the Central \nBank of Nigeria (CBN) amidst a backdrop of profound economic challenges: \nescalating \ninflationary \npressures, \nsluggish \neconomic \ngrowth, \nvolatile \nexchange rates of the naira, and a rising cost of living. The anticipation \namong Nigerians for this meeting to deliver viable solutions that will steer the \neconomy towards sustainable growth and position Nigeria as an attractive \ninvestment destination is palpable. \n \nOn a global scale, economic growth remains subdued while inflation, \npersistently exceeding the targets of most central banks, exhibits a gradual \ndecline. Geopolitical conflicts continue to disrupt global supply chains, \ncontributing \nto \nescalating \ndebts \nreaching \nunprecedented \nlevels. \nDomestically, Nigeria witnessed a surge in inflation to 29.9 percent in January \n2024, up from 28.9 percent in December 2023. Despite the resilience of weak \neconomic growth, the depreciation of the naira against major currencies, \ndriven by a persistent shortage of foreign currency liquidity, has led to price \npass-through effects. Notably, the equities market has shown promising \nperformance in 2024. \n \nThe post-COVID-19 fiscal support and subsequent deficit financing have \ncreated a lax financial environment, culminating in surplus liquidity within the \nbanking system. This surplus liquidity has not only directly fueled inflation but \nalso intensified pressure on the foreign exchange market due to heightened \ndemand for foreign currency as an alternative store of value. The fiscal \nauthorities have exhibited commitment to fiscal prudence by reducing the \nfiscal deficit and emphasizing revenue generation in the 2024 Appropriation \nAct. Given staff projections of sustained inflationary pressures in the short \nterm, it is imperative to deploy monetary policy tools to mitigate these \npressures and foster price stability. \n \nMoreover, adopting a tighter monetary stance will steer us towards achieving \npositive real interest rates, a crucial goal to stimulate savings and investment \nwithin the domestic economy. This strategic move also holds the potential to \nattract the capital inflows necessary to enhance liquidity in the foreign \nexchange market and bolster the currency in the immediate term. \n \n \n46 \n \nRecognizing that the current inflationary pressures are multifaceted and not \nsolely monetary in nature, particularly exacerbated by the surge in food \nprices due to various factors, including low productivity, insecurity, and \nelevated energy costs post fuel subsidy removal, underscores the necessity \nfor a comprehensive approach beyond monetary policy. Addressing these \nstructural challenges calls for a holistic response involving non-monetary \nstakeholders to implement appropriate actions. \n \nThe price stability mandate vested in the Central Bank necessitates making \ndifficult decisions to steer the economy towards recovery. After carefully \nweighing the costs against the risks confronting the economy, I firmly \nadvocate for an assertive tightening approach to counter the prevailing \ninflationary pressures. While cognizant of the potential drawbacks of a \ncontractionary monetary policy stance, such as impacting output growth \nand lending rates, constraining credit availability and affordability to small-\nscale businesses and consumers, as well as affecting government borrowing \ncosts and liquidity management, I believe these short-term sacrifices are \ncrucial in our pursuit of achieving price stability and sustained economic \ngrowth. \n \nGiven the imperative to curb inflationary pressures, which could pose social \nchallenges and impede long-term growth prospects, I am persuaded that \nthe MPC must adopt an assertive stance by tightening monetary policy \nmeasures, with a medium-term inflation target of 21.40% by the end of 2024 \nin mind. Therefore, I cast my vote in favor of increasing the Monetary Policy \nRate (MPR) by 425 basis points to 23.0 percent, raising the Cash Reserve \nRatio (CRR) by 1250 basis points to 45.0 percent, and adjusting the \nasymmetric corridor to +100 and -500 basis points around the MPR. \nOLAYEMI CARDOSO \nGovernor \n February 2024", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/Central Bank of Nigeria Communique No. 150 of The Monetary Policy Committee Meeting Held on Monday 26th and Tuesday 27th February 2024 and Personal Statements of Members.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "9473b0b27e29ff61a60c93083df8dc2e", "text": "CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA COMMUNIQUÉ NO. 143 OF THE MONETARY POLICY \nCOMMITTEE MEETING HELD ON MONDAY 18th AND TUESDAY 19th July 2022 \nThe Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) met on the 18th and 19th of July 2022, \nconfronted with heightened macroeconomic uncertainties, broad based \ninflation across countries, and weakening global recovery associated with the \nongoing Russian-Ukraine war, as well as backlash from a wide range of \nsanctions imposed on Russia. The Committee reviewed developments in the \nglobal and domestic economies in the second quarter of 2022 and the outlook \nfor the rest of the year. Majorly, these developments include the unabated rise \nin global inflation, driven by the disruptions to the global supply chain; \ntightening global financial conditions as several advanced economies pursue \nan aggressive regime of monetary policy normalization; declining global trade; \nand growing risks to financial stability, associated with the burgeoning global \nprivate and public debt profile. \n \nEleven (11) members of the Committee attended this meeting. \nGlobal Economic Developments \nThe Committee noted with concern, the downtrend in global recovery, \naggravated by supply chain disruptions as a result of the Russia-Ukraine conflict \nand the spillbacks and spillovers from sanctions imposed on Russia by the US \nand its allies. This has resulted in an unprecedented rise and widespread global \ninflation which is exacerbating downward pressure on the fragile recovery of \nthe global economy. In addition, lingering headwinds associated with the \nCOVID-19 pandemic are constraining the smooth functioning of the global \nsupply chain. The rising risk of tightening global financial conditions, implies that \n \ndeveloping economies now face the risk of constrained access to global \ncapital which would further depress growth in this group of economies. This is \nexpected to result in increased financial vulnerabilities due to the huge volume \nof corporate and public debt accumulated in the wake of the sharp downturn \ndriven by the COVID-19 lockdown. In the light of these developments, the key \nrisk confronting the global economy is that of a recession which may crystalize \nas second quarter growth figures for major advanced and developing \neconomies begin to emerge. Consequently, the International Monetary Fund \n(IMF) in its April 2022 World Economic Outlook (WEO), downgraded its global \noutput growth forecast for 2022 and 2023 to 3.6 per cent apiece from 4.4 and \n3.8 per cent, respectively, with the likelihood of a further downgrade, given the \ncontinued deterioration in output growth. \nInflation in several advanced economies pushed higher and further away from \nthe long-run objectives of their central banks, reflecting the sustained increase \nin the price of food, energy, and other commodities due to the harsh \ncombination of persisting supply chain disruptions and pent-up demand. In the \nEmerging Markets and Developing Economies (EMDEs), inflation is also on the \nrise, compounded by legacy structural challenges as well as heightened \nexchange rate pressures, driven by rising capital flow reversals in addition to the \noutlined shocks from the global economy. \nIn the financial markets, available data suggests that investors are now \nrebalancing their portfolios away from gold and equities to fixed income \nsecurities, to take advantage of rising yields in the advanced economies as \nmajor central banks progress with interest rate hike. Consequently, the \ntightening of global financial conditions is expected to heighten investment \nand debt default risks, leading to the likelihood of a broad economic slowdown. \nDomestic Economic Developments \nAccording to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Real Gross Domestic \nProduct (GDP) grew by 3.11 per cent (year-on-year) in the first quarter of 2022, \ncompared with 3.98 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2021 and 0.51 per cent in \n \nthe corresponding period of 2021. The economy has thus grown for six \nconsecutive quarters, following its exit from recession in 2020. This consistent \npositive performance was driven largely by the continuous growth in the non-\noil sector, specifically, in the services and agriculture subsectors; ongoing policy \nsupport post-COVID lockdown; and the base effect from the corresponding \nperiod. \nStaff projection showed that the economy is expected to remain on a path of \nsustained positive growth observed in the last few quarters. The Committee also \nnoted that both the Manufacturing and Non-Manufacturing Purchasing \nManagers’ Indices (PMIs) increased above the 50-index point benchmark to \n51.1 and 50.3 index points in June 2022, compared with 48.9 and 49.9 index \npoints, respectively, in May 2022. This reflects the continued rebound in \neconomic activities due to improvements in supplier delivery time; raw materials \ninventory; employment levels as well as expansion in some sectors such as \nagriculture, accommodation, electricity, amongst others. \nThe Committee noted with concern the persisting uptick in headline inflation \n(year-on-year) to 18.60 per cent in June 2022 from 17.71 per cent in May 2022, \nan 89-basis point increase in just one month. This continued increase in inflation \nwas driven by increases in both the core and food components to 15.75 and \n20.60 per cent in June 2022. The considerable rise in core inflation resulted \nlargely from the rising cost of production due to high energy prices associated \nwith the persistent disruptions to power supply, hike in electricity tariff, continued \nscarcity of Premium Motor Spirit (PMS), and rising price of Automotive Gas Oil \n(AGO). The increase in the food component was, however, driven by shocks \nto food prices associated with continued insecurity in food producing areas \nand along major access routes across the country; the continued impact of the \nwar in Ukraine on the supply of fertilizer inputs, wheat and other grains; \nexchange rate pressures; and the impact of monetary policy normalization on \ncapital flows away from emerging markets. The Committee, however, \nexpressed confidence in the Bank’s sustained intervention programmes, noting \n \nthat inflation is expected to abate as food supply improves and the fiscal \nauthority sustain its efforts to tame the legacy structural challenges which put \nupward pressure on domestic price levels. Members, therefore, urged the fiscal \nauthority to expand and sustain its support for all the recently deployed stimuli \nto the real sector of the economy. \nThe MPC noted that broad money supply (M3) rose significantly to 11.52 per \ncent in June 2022, compared with 10.86 per cent in May 2022. This was largely \ndriven by the growth in Net Domestic Assets (NDA) of 18.02 per cent in June \n2022, compared with 17.37 per cent in the previous month. The sustained \ngrowth in Net Domestic Assets (NDA) was attributed to the increase in claims on \nthe Federal Government and other sectors (public nonfinancial corporations, \nprivate sector, and state and local governments). \n \nMoney market rates oscillated within the asymmetric corridor, reflecting \nprevailing liquidity conditions in the banking system. Consequently, the monthly \nweighted average Open Buy Back (OBB) and Inter-bank Call rates increased in \nJune 2022 to 10.89 and 11.10 per cent, from 9.39 and 8.38 per cent in May, \nrespectively. The increase in both the Open Buy Back (OBB) and Inter-bank Call \nrates reflected the tight liquidity conditions in the banking system. \nThe Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) and the Liquidity Ratio (LR) both remained \nabove their prudential limits at 14.1 and 42.6 per cent, respectively in June 2022. \nThe Committee, noted the reduction in the Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) ratio to \n4.95 per cent in June 2022, compared with 5.7 per cent in June 2021. The MPC, \nthus, urged the Bank to sustain its tight prudential regime to ensure that the NPLs \nratio is brought well below its prudential benchmark. \nThe MPC noted the very moderate decline in the performance of the equities \nmarket in the review period, as the All-Share Index (ASI) and Market \nCapitalization (MC) moderated to 51,817.59 and N27.94 trillion on June 30, 2022, \nfrom 52,990.78 and N28.56 trillion on May 31, 2022, respectively. The market, \nhowever, remains resilient, reflecting continued confidence in the Nigerian \n \neconomy, as both the monetary and fiscal authorities work assiduously to \nimprove macroeconomic fundamentals in Nigeria. \n \nThe Committee noted the marginal increase of 1.61 per cent in the level of \nexternal reserves to US$39.22 billion at end-June 2022 from US$38.60 billion at \nend-May 2022 due to the increase in inflows from non-oil sources. \nThe Committee reviewed the performance of the Bank’s intervention \nprogrammes \ntargeted \nat \nstimulating \nproductivity \nin \nagriculture, \nmanufacturing/industries, energy/infrastructure, healthcare, exports and micro, \nsmall & medium enterprises (MSMEs). Between May and June 2022, under the \nAnchor Borrowers’ Programme (ABP), the Bank released the sum of N3.62 billion, \nas disbursements to 12 projects for the cultivation of rice, wheat, and maize, \nbringing the cumulative disbursement under the Programme to N1.01 trillion, to \nover 4.21 million smallholder farmers cultivating 21 commodities across the \ncountry. The Bank also disbursed N3.72 billion to finance three (3) large-scale \nagricultural projects under the Commercial Agriculture Credit Scheme (CACS). \nThese disbursements brought the cumulative disbursements under this Scheme \nto N744.32 billion for 678 projects in agro-production and agro-processing. \nAs part of its effort to support the manufacturing sector, the CBN disbursed the \nsum of N113.08 billion to 19 new projects under the Real Sector Facility. The funds \nwere utilized for both greenfield and brownfield projects under the COVID-19 \nIntervention for the Manufacturing Sector (CIMS) and the Real Sector Support \nFacility from Differentiated Cash Reserve Requirement (RSSF-DCRR). Cumulative \ndisbursements under the Real Sector Facility currently stands at N2.183 trillion for \nthe financing of 414 real sector projects across the country. Furthermore, under \nthe 100 for 100 Policy on Production and Productivity, the Bank has released \nN9.98 billion for five (5) projects, bringing the cumulative disbursements under \nthe intervention to N68.13 billion for 48 projects, comprising twenty-six (26) in \nmanufacturing, seventeen (17) in agriculture, three (3) in healthcare and two (2) \nin the services sector. \n \n \nIn the healthcare sector, the Bank disbursed N4.44 billion to three (3) healthcare \nprojects under the Healthcare Sector Intervention Facility (HSIF), bringing the \ncumulative disbursements to N133.42 billion for 129 projects, comprising seventy-\nsix (76) hospitals, thirty-two (32) pharmaceuticals and twenty-one (21) other \nhealthcare services. To further expand the nation’s non-oil export basket under \nthe Export Facilitation Initiative (EFI), the Bank released the sum of N36.00 billion \nfor five (5) projects in domestic production and value addition of cocoa and \nsesame seeds towards improving non-oil foreign currency revenue. \n \nTo improve electricity supply in order to lower the overall cost of production in \nthe real sector, the Bank also intervened in the power sector to facilitate the \ndeployment of enabling infrastructure. Summarily, the sum of N2.53 billion was \ndisbursed to Distribution Companies (DisCos) for their Operational Expenditure \n(OpEx) and Capital Expenditure (CapEx), under the Nigeria Electricity Market \nStabilization Facility – Phase 2 (NEMSF-2). Cumulative disbursement under the \nNEMSF-2 currently stands at N254.46 billion. Under the National Mass Metering \nProgramme (NMMP), the Bank disbursed N47.82 billion for the procurement and \ninstallation of 865,956 meters across the country. \n \nOutlook \n \nThe broad outlook for both the global and domestic economies in the medium-\nterm remain clouded with uncertainties associated with headwinds, such as the \nsubstantial disruptions to the supply chain, the Russian-Ukraine war and the \nlingering impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Others include the rising level of \ncorporate and public debt in the Advanced Economies and Emerging Market \nand Developing Economies; as well as the broad shocks to foreign capital flows \ndriven by the aggressive normalization of monetary policy in some of the \nAdvanced Economies. \nOn the domestic front, available data on key macroeconomic variables \nindicate the likelihood of a subdued output growth for the Nigerian economy in \n \n2022. This is hinged on ongoing and expected shocks from the global economy, \nparticularly from supply blockages of essential exports from both Russia and \nUkraine; the impact of high crude oil prices, given Nigeria’s position as an oil \nexporter and importer of refined petroleum products; and the aggressive \nnormalization by some Advanced Economies. Accordingly, the Nigerian \neconomy is forecast to grow in 2022 by 3.33 per cent (CBN), 4.20 per cent (FGN) \nand 3.40 per cent (IMF). \n \nThe Committee’s Considerations \nThe Committee assessed the impact of emerging external shocks and legacy \nissues on price development and the recovery of output growth in the short to \nmedium term. Members further noted the continued effort by both the \nmonetary and fiscal authorities to dampen price pressures and sustain the \nrecovery of output growth. \nIn the opinion of Members, the major external shocks to the economy remained \nthose associated with the supply constraints arising from the Russia-Ukraine war \nand backlash from sanctions imposed on Russia; residual impact of the COVID-\n19 pandemic; and tightening external financial conditions, following the \naggressive normalization of monetary policy by some advanced economy \ncentral banks. On the domestic scene, Members assessed the impact of the \ncontinued upsurge in money supply resulting from the increased demand for \nmoney, associated with election spending and increase in month-on-month \ninflation between May and June 2022. In addition, the Committee assessed the \ncontinued impact of rising insecurity, the rising cost of Automotive Gas Oil \n(AGO), and the persisting upward pressure on other energy prices on the \ngeneral price level. \nThe MPC noted that the current upsurge in price levels remains a primary \nconcern to monetary policy as Members focused on the optimal policy \napproach required to address this development while protecting the fragile \nrecovery. The Committee clearly identified that inflationary pressure was being \n \ndriven by both demand and supply-side factors, which should be addressed \nusing different policy approaches. In the Committee’s view, the demand-side \nfactors were being broadly addressed by the Bank, using the relevant direct \nand indirect instruments. On the supply side, the Bank has continued to provide \nthe necessary support, through its development finance initiatives in the real \nsector, to ease supply constraints. The Committee called on the Federal \nGovernment to prioritize efforts to curb the menace of insecurity to enable \nfarming and other business activities return to normalcy. The MPC thus called \non the Bank to continue its support to increase food supply in a bid to \naddressing food inflation. Members also noted the upward price pressure, \nparticularly on transportation, resulting from the prolonged scarcity of Premium \nMotor Spirit (PMS) and called on the Federal Government to seek a long-term \nand viable solution to strike a balance between the pricing and supply of PMS \nin Nigeria. \nThe Committee appraised the continued recovery of output growth, noting \nthat despite the obvious external and internal headwinds, the recovery has \nremained resilient with hopes of a stronger medium-term recovery. This is \nhowever, hinged on the continued support by the Bank and the Federal \ngovernment to ensure that recent economic gains are sustained. \nThe MPC welcomed the Bank’s concerted efforts towards ensuring exchange \nrate stability, noting the current difficulties associated with managing the \nstream of external shocks impacting the economy. The Committee applauded \nthe performance of the RT200 and similar initiatives targeted at improving \naccretion to reserves and stabilizing the exchange rate. The MPC noted that \nforeign exchange inflow through the RT200 FX Programme in Q1 and Q2, 2022, \nhad increased substantially to approximately US$600 million as at June 2022. \nMembers also noted the increase in Diaspora remittances as a result of the \nNaira for Dollar incentive and urged the Bank not to relent in its efforts to \nencourage foreign exchange inflow to the economy. \n \nThe Committee noted the Federal Government’s increasing debt profile and \nexpressed concerns over debt sustainability given that global uncertainties \nremain elevated. The MPC thus reiterated its call to the Federal Government \nto urgently diversify its revenue sources through various initiatives, such as, the \ndevelopment of a viable tax framework for the extractive and mineral export \nindustries, to strengthen its fiscal buffers. \nDespite the apparent headwinds confronting the economy, the MPC noted \nthat the banking system remained robust given the continued decline in NPLs \nbelow the prudential threshold and enjoined the Bank to sustain the trend by \nmaintaining its vigorous surveillance to ensure continued resilience of the \nbanking industry. \nThe Committee’s Decision \nThe MPC noted with concern the continued aggressive movement in inflation, \neven after the rate hike at its last meeting, and expressed its unrelenting resolve \nto restore price stability while providing the necessary support to strengthen the \nfragile recovery. \nAs regards the decision as to whether to tighten, loose or hold, Members were \nunanimous and so did not consider both loosening and retaining rates at \nexisting levels at this meeting. This is because on loosening, the MPC felt it could \nworsen the existing liquidity condition in the economy and further dampen \nmoney market rate, necessary to stimulate savings and investment. Members \nalso felt that loosening would trigger the weakening of the exchange rate \nwhich could pass through to domestic prices. \nThe MPC did not also consider retaining the policy rate because a hold stance \nmay suggest that the Bank is not responding sufficiently, to both the global and \ndomestic price development, as inflation numbers continue to trend \naggressively upwards. \nAs regards tightening policy stance, Members were unanimous that given the \naggressive increase in inflation, coupled with the resultant negative \n \nconsequences, particularly on the purchasing power of the poor, as well as \nretarding growth, there is the need to continue to tighten. However, the policy \ndilemma was hinged around the level of tightening needed to rein-in inflation, \nwithout dampening manufacturing output, which could result from the higher \ncost of borrowing. \nAside from narrowing the negative real interest rate gap, Members were also of \nthe view that tightening would signal a strong determination of the Bank to \naggressively address its price stability mandate and portray the MPC’s sensitivity \nto the impact of inflation on vulnerable households and the need to improve \ntheir disposable income. \nMembers also noted that the 150 basis points hike by the Committee in May \n2022, had not permeated enough in the economy to halt the rising trend in \ninflation and noted that the month-on-month percentage point increase in \nheadline inflation rose sharply in June 2022 compared with May 2022. The MPC \nalso noted that other complementary administrative measures deployed by the \nBank to address the growth in money supply did not moderate the inflationary \ntrend. \nAddressing the balance of policy objectives and developments in the global \nand domestic environment, the Committee resolved that the most rational \npolicy option would be to further strengthen its tightening stance in order to \neffectively curtail the unabated rising trend of inflation. Members were \nconscious of the fact that output growth remained fragile, however, not \ncurtailing inflation now could erode the moderate gains achieved in improving \nconsumer purchasing power and thus worsen poverty level for the vulnerable \npopulace. To ensure that output still remains in focus, the MPC advised the \nBank’s Management to continue to use its development finance tools to \nsupport the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. \nThe Committee thus voted unanimously to raise the Monetary Policy Rate \n(MPR). One member voted to increase the MPR by 150 basis points, six members \nby 100 basis points, one member by 75 basis points and three members by 50 \n \nbasis points. Consequently, the Committee resolved to increase the MPR by 100 \nbasis points from 13.0 per cent to 14.0 per cent. \nIn summary, the MPC voted to: \nI. \nIncrease the MPR from 13.0 to 14.0 per cent; \nII. \nRetain the asymmetric corridor at +100/-700 basis points around the MPR; \nIII. \nRetain the CRR at 27.5 per cent; and \nIV. \nRetain the Liquidity Ratio at 30 per cent. \nI thank you for your attention. \nGodwin I. Emefiele \nGovernor, Central Bank of Nigeria \n19th July, 2022", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/Central Bank of Nigeria Communique No. 143 of the Monetary Policy Committee Meeting Held on Tuesday 19th JULY 2022.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "9511e35e3964351e18e573b385fdd700", "text": "1 \n \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA COMMUNIQUÉ NO. 142 OF THE MONETARY POLICY \nCOMMITTEE MEETING HELD ON MONDAY 23rd AND TUESDAY 24th May 2022 \nThe Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) met on the 23rd and 24th of May 2022 \nconfronted with declining global growth and heightened uncertainties \nassociated with adverse price developments across the world. These \ndevelopments partly reflect the aftermath of the ongoing war in Ukraine, the \nbacklash from the numerous sanctions imposed on Russia by major Advanced \nEconomies, as well as persisting supply chain disruptions in major trading routes. \nAt the same time, the Chinese economy remained confronted with the \nlingering impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, total lockdown of major cities, \nsignificant distortions in the property market and modest inflationary pressures. \nConsequently, Advanced Economy and Emerging Market Economy central \nbanks alike, are switching to monetary tightening to curb the sharp rise in \ninflation globally. \n \nEven as global output growth recovery moderates, the domestic economy is \nexpected to remain on the current path of recovery through 2022. This is hinged \non the continued impact of stimulus by both the monetary and fiscal authorities \nto support the economy following the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic. The \nCommittee assessed these developments and the outlook for the rest of the \nyear. \n \nEleven (11) members of the Committee attended this meeting. \n2 \n \nGlobal Economic Developments \nGlobal output growth commenced a broad slowdown in the first quarter of \n2022, as a result of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, after recovering \nconsiderably in 2021. This led to massive supply constraints, with the backlash of \nsanctions against Russia creating huge macro-economic imbalances for \nseveral countries. Consequently, the uncertainties that have arisen are buoyed \nby the resumption of the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic in China, a key \nhub of global manufacturing. This has given rise to upside risks to inflation and \ndownside risks to growth. \n \nIn addition, the huge amount of stimulus deployed by various countries to ease \nthe downsides of the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly in 2021, has predisposed \nthe global economy to huge debt levels, considering the current burgeoning \nglobal private and public debt portfolios. Central banks in both the Advanced \nand Emerging Market Economies have thus commenced monetary policy \ntightening to curb rising prices. This could impact the recovery negatively and \nresult in a rise in debt default as global financial conditions tighten. Furthermore, \nChina has also re-introduced constraining measures to mitigate the spread of \na new wave of the COVID-19 pandemic within its major industrial cities, resulting \nin a slowdown in production. In light of these headwinds, the International \nMonetary Fund (IMF) downgraded its forecast for global output growth for 2022 \nand 2023 to 3.6 per cent apiece from 4.4 and 3.8 per cent, respectively, \nreflecting the severity of setbacks to the global recovery. \nInflation continued to rise unabated across several Advanced Economies and \nis projected to remain high, at least in the medium term, as food and energy \nprices pushed higher to levels not previously recorded in four decades. This is \ndue to tightening supply amidst closure of major trade routes that supply inputs \nfor food and fertilizer, as well as the high price of energy. In the Emerging Market \nand Developing Economies (EMDEs), inflation also remained high due to a \ncombination of persisting high food and energy prices; supply chain disruptions \n3 \n \nassociated with the impact of sanctions against Russia; exchange rate pressure; \ncapital flow reversals; as well as underlying legacy constraints. \nIn the global financial markets, investor confidence is gradually being restored, \nevidenced by portfolio rebalancing with the gradual decline in gold price. The \ndemand for advanced economy equities and bonds has improved with the \ncommencement of interest rate lift-off led by the US Fed and the Bank of \nEngland, resulting in the outflow of capital from emerging market securities. \nGlobal financial conditions are thus, expected to tighten in the near term, as \nrisk-averse investors reassign substantial portions of their portfolios from \nperceived riskier, though more rewarding Emerging Market securities to less risky \nadvanced economy securities. \nIn general, the global economy and financial markets, are confronted with \nsignificant risks in the medium term as the huge build-up of both private and \npublic debt may push several fragile economies into a new era of recession. \nDomestic Economic Developments \nAccording to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Real Gross Domestic \nProduct (GDP) grew by 3.11 per cent in the first quarter of 2022, compared with \n3.98 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2021 and 0.51 per cent in the \ncorresponding period of 2021. This is the sixth consecutive quarter of real output \nexpansion, following the economy’s exit from recession in 2020. This steady \npositive performance, was driven largely by the growth in aggregate \nconsumption, arising from the continued policy support at the onset of the \npandemic and gradual recovery of aggregate demand. \nHeadline inflation (year-on-year) ticked up to 16.82 per cent in April 2022 from \n15.92 per cent in March 2022, 90 basis points increase. This is the third \nconsecutive increase in inflation since the commencement of the year 2022, \nattributable to the rise in both the core and food components to 14.18 and \n18.37 per cent in April 2022 from 13.91 and 17.20 per cent in March 2022, \nrespectively. The rise in headline inflation resulted from rising energy prices \n4 \n \nassociated with the epileptic supply of Premium Motor Spirit (PMS), high cost of \nAutomotive Gas Oil (AGO), mostly used in transportation and production as well \nas a progressive hike in electricity tariffs. The increase in the food component \nwas driven by shocks to food prices associated with persisting security \nchallenges in major food-producing areas and legacy infrastructural problems \nwhich continue to hamper food supply logistics and storage across the country. \nBroad money supply (M3) rose significantly to 6.22 per cent in April 2022, \ncompared with 4.19 per cent in March 2022. This was largely driven by strong \ngrowth in Net Domestic Assets (NDA) of 11.86 per cent in April 2022, compared \nwith 8.82 per cent in the previous month. The growth in NDA was attributed to \nthe increase in claims on the Federal Government and other sectors (public \nnon-financial corporations, private sector, and state and local governments). \n \nMoney market rates oscillated within and outside the Standing Facilities Corridor \n(SFC), reflecting the prevailing liquidity conditions in the banking system. \nConsequently, the monthly weighted average Open Buyback (OBB) and Inter-\nbank Call rates increased to 7.49 and 8.67 per cent in April 2022, from 6.62 and \n4.50 per cent in March 2022, respectively. The increase in rates was an indication \nof the tight liquidity conditions in the banking system during the review period. \nThe performance of the equities market remained strong and positive in the \nreview period, with the All-Share Index (ASI) and Market Capitalization (MC) \nincreasing significantly from 46,965.48 and N25.31 trillion on March 31, 2022, to \n52,979.48 and N28.56 trillion on May 20, 2022, respectively. \n \nIn the Banking System, the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) and the Liquidity Ratio \n(LR) remained above their prudential limits at 14.6 and 43.7 per cent, \nrespectively. The Non-Performing Loan (NPL) ratio stood at 5.3 per cent in April \n2022, compared with its prudential limit of 5.0 per cent, reflecting sustained \nstability in the banking system, though there remains a need to bring this down \nto the prudential limit. \n5 \n \nGross external reserves declined moderately to US$38.36 billion as at May 19th, \n2022 from US$39.28 billion at end-March 2022. This was attributed to the weak \naccretion to the reserves from exports and the high cost of importation of refined \npetroleum products. \nThe Committee reviewed the performance of the Bank’s intervention schemes \ntargeted at stimulating productivity in agriculture; manufacturing/industries; \nenergy/infrastructure; healthcare; exports; and micro, small and medium \nenterprises (MSMEs). \n \nBetween April and May 2022, the Bank released the sum of N57.91 billion under \nthe Anchor Borrowers’ Programme (ABP) to 185,972 new projects for the \ncultivation of rice, wheat, and maize, bringing the cumulative disbursement \nunder the Programme to N1.01 trillion, disbursed to over 4.2 million smallholder \nfarmers cultivating 21 commodities across the country. \n \nThe Bank further disbursed the sum of N1.50 billion, under the Accelerated \nAgriculture Development Scheme (AADS), to one (1) new youth-led project, \npiloted and funded through the Government of Ondo State for the acquisition \nof assets for oil-palm cultivation and the establishment of poultry farms. This \nbrings the total disbursement under the Scheme to N21.23 billion for 10 state-led \nand three (3) private sector-led projects. \n \nIn addition, the Bank released N21.73 billion to finance seven (7) large-scale \nagricultural projects under the Commercial Agriculture Credit Scheme (CACS). \nThe funds were utilized for the establishment of a ranch and milk processing \nfacility; procurement of feed and medication for livestock/dairy production; \nconstruction of a 300 metric-tonne per day oil mill in Gusau, Zamfara State; \nacquisition and installation of an agrochemical factory; as well as purchase and \nstockpiling of homegrown maize for animal feed production. This brings the \ncumulative disbursement under this Scheme to N741.05 billion for 674 projects in \nagro-production and agro-processing. \n6 \n \n \nUnder the Paddy Aggregation Scheme (PAS), N6.20 billion was disbursed by the \nBank to three (3) new projects for the purchase and mopping-up of home-grown \nrice paddy. This brings the total funds disbursed to 42 integrated rice millers under \nthe PAS to N106.39 billion. \n \nTo support the growth of the manufacturing sector, the Bank disbursed the sum \nof N436.85 billion to 34 new projects under the N1.0 trillion Real Sector Support \nFacility (RSSF). This was utilized for both greenfield (new) and brownfield \n(expansion) projects under the COVID-19 Intervention for the Manufacturing \nSector (CIMS) and the Real Sector Support Facility from Differentiated Cash \nReserve Requirement (RSSF-DCRR). Cumulative disbursement under the RSSF for \nthe financing of 402 real sector projects across the country, currently stands at \nN2.10 trillion. \n \nThe Bank disbursed N55.34 billion, under the 100 for 100 Policy on Production and \nProductivity (100 for100 PPP), to 44 projects, comprising 24 in manufacturing, 17 \nin agriculture, 2 in healthcare, and 1 in the services sector. \n \nIn the healthcare sector, the Bank disbursed N17.70 billion to four (4) healthcare \nprojects under the Healthcare Sector Intervention Facility (HSIF), bringing the \ncumulative disbursements to N130.49 billion for 126 projects, comprising 58 \nhospitals, 31 pharmaceuticals and 37 other healthcare services. \n \nThe Bank released the sum of N21.00 billion Under the Export Facilitation Initiative \n(EFI), for three (3) projects in domestic production and value addition of cocoa \nand sesame seed. This intervention is targeted at further expansion of the \neconomy’s non-oil export basket towards improving foreign exchange revenue \nearnings for the country. \n \n7 \n \nTo support micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs), the Bank disbursed \nN1.50 billion to 2,718 new projects through the Agri-Business Small and Medium \nEnterprises Investment Scheme (AgSMEIS) for activities in fish farming, rice \nprocessing, wheat farming, poultry farming, livestock farming, ICT and tailoring \namongst others. This brings the cumulative disbursements under AgSMEIS to \nN136.13 billion. \n \nUnder the Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises Development Fund (MSMEDF), \nthe Bank disbursed N2.79 billion to support youths engaged at various nodes of \nthe agricultural value chain, bringing the total disbursement under this \nintervention to N98.88 billion to 749 MSME projects across the country. \n \nIn energy/infrastructure, the Bank released N15.71 billion to power sector players \nincluding generation companies (GenCos) and gas companies (GasCos), \nunder the Nigeria Bulk Electricity Trading Plc – Payment Assurance Facility (NBET-\nPAF), bringing the cumulative disbursement under the facility to N1.30 trillion. The \nsum of N22.67 billion was also released to Distribution Companies (DisCos) for \ntheir Operational Expenditure (OpEx) and Capital Expenditure (CapEx), under \nthe Nigeria Electricity Market Stabilisation Facility – Phase 2 (NEMSF-2). \nCumulative disbursement under the NEMSF-2 currently stands at N251.93 billion. \n \nAdditionally, under the National Mass Metering Programme (NMMP), the Bank \nhas disbursed N0.19 billion to DisCos for the procurement of electricity meters, \nbringing the cumulative disbursement for the procurement and installation of \n865,956 meters across the country to N47.82 billion. Interventions in \nenergy/infrastructure are designed to improve investment and develop \nenabling infrastructure in the Nigeria Electricity Supply Industry. \n \nOutlook \n \nThe broad outlook for both the global and domestic economies in the medium-\nterm, remains clouded with uncertainties arising from the lingering war between \n8 \n \nRussia and Ukraine, the unfolding impact of the extensive sanctions imposed by \nseveral countries on Russia, and the downside risks from the continued spread \nof the COVID-19 Pandemic. \nGlobal growth is thus confronted with significant headwinds which may derail \nthe current projection further. The persisting rise in inflation, is also set to \nundermine the recovery of output growth, due to the associated build-up of \nuncertainties around the cost of inventory and other production inputs. The rise \nin global debt is also an unfolding dilemma which policy makers must carefully \nevaluate and address to avert a near-term global financial crisis. In summary, \nwhile global aggregate demand remains strong and growing, the numerous \nsupply-side constraints will continue to undermine the recovery effort, at least in \nthe short to medium term. \nIn the domestic economy, data on key macroeconomic variables indicate that \nthe recovery of output growth will continue, probably at a more subdued pace, \nconsidering the unfolding domestic and external shocks to the economy. \nDomestic price development is, however, expected to maintain an upward \npressure in the light of the build-up of increased spending related to the 2023 \ngeneral elections. \n \nConsequently, the Nigerian economy is expected to grow, in line with CBN \nforecast of 3.24 per cent in 2022. However, the FGN forecast is at 4.20 per cent, \nwhile the IMF projects Nigeria’s growth in 2022 to be 3.40 per cent. \n \n \nThe Committee’s Considerations \nAt this meeting, the MPC noted the risks confronting the global economy, as \nthose associated with, not only inflation and prices, but also include risks \nassociated with weakening growth prospects across the world. \nThe Committee observed that whereas post-pandemic policy support has \nremained broadly expansionary, at least, from a fiscal standpoint, the sharp rise \n9 \n \nin inflation across both the Advance & Emerging Markets Economies has \ngenerated growing concern amongst central banks, as the progressive rise in \ninflation, driven by rising aggregate demand and wage growth, is putting \nunsustainable upward pressure on price levels. Consequently, major central \nbanks such as the US Fed, Bank of England, European Central Bank, and Bank \nof Canada have provided strong guidance for a progressive shift away from \nmonetary policy accommodation to drive market interest rate upward, which \nmay ultimately impact capital flow away from Emerging Market Economies. \nOn another hand, MPC noted that the war between Russia and Ukraine has \nresulted in significant disruption of the global supply chain, at a time when the \nglobal economy is still confronted with downside risks to growth associated with \nthe Covid 19 pandemic. In addition to this, global trade has been impacted by \nthe series of restrictions imposed by NATO countries and its allies against trade \nwith Russia. This has increasingly fragmented the global economy, imposing \nhuge strains on the tepid post-pandemic recovery. Only recently, China, the \nUSA, and South Africa are seeing a renewed spike in COVID-19 infections. As a \nresult, the Chinese government recently re-introduced lockdown in major \nindustrial cities, to forestall the spread of the pandemic: further disrupting the \nsupply chain crisis. In the view of the MPC, these two risks pose great challenges \nto rising inflation globally. \nFor the domestic economy, the MPC noted with delight that the GDP grew by \n3.11 percent in Q1, 2022 (y-o-y), highlighting a steady recovery for the 6th \nconsecutive quarter. Quarter on quarter real GDP grew by 9.36 percent, a slight \nmoderation from 11.07 percent in the previous quarter. The MPC however was \nconcerned about the somewhat aggressive rise in inflation by almost 90 basis \npoints in April, 2022. To dampen the expectation of the inflationary pressure, \nMPC decided on the need to take a shift from its historically cautious approach \non interest rate, to a policy rate hike, while still adopting an accommodative \napproach to development finance initiatives that have supported the growth \nof the economy and sustained recovery. The MPC is of the view that rates on \n10 \n \nthe development finance initiatives of the Bank should remain at 5 percent till \nMarch, 2023. \nConsequently, as regards the decision on whether to hold. tighten or loosen, \nMPC feels that loosening in the face of the rising policy rates in Advance \neconomies may result in a sharp rise in capital outflow and faster dry-up of \nforeign credit lines. MPC also feels that loosening could lead to further liquidity \nsurfeit and inflationary pressure. S to whether to hold, MPC feels its stance would \nstrengthen the perception that the CBN has abandoned its primary mandate \nof taming inflation. \nOn the need to tighten, MPC feels that tightening would help moderate the \ninflationary trade-off from the steady growth recovery so far. MPC also feels \nthat tightening would help rein in inflation before it assumes a galloping trend, \nconsidering the progressive increase in headline inflation (m-o-m), particularly \nwith the sharp 90 basis point increase in April, 2022. \nFurthermore, MPC feels that tightening would narrow the negative real interest \nrate margin, improve market sentiment and restore investor confidence. \nEqually, members believe tightening would moderate inflationary pressure \npass-through to exchange rate depreciation and moderate the speed of \ncapital flow reversal, provide incentives for foreign capital inflows and sustain \nremittances. Lastly, tightening could moderate government domestic \nborrowing, as government debt servicing to revenue ratio increased \nsignificantly in recent times, threatening debt sustainability. \nThe Committee’s Decision \nMembers expressed deep concern about the continued uptrend of inflationary \npressure. Despite the gradual improvement in output growth. The Committee \nnoted that the current rise in inflation may be inimical to growth, and thus hinder \nthe full recovery of the economy. While the MPC identified several supply-side \nfactors which may be contributing to inflationary pressure, emerging evidence \nshows that money demand pressure is on the rise and is unlikely to abate until \n11 \n \nthe 2023 general elections are concluded. The dilemma confronting the \nCommittee at this meeting, therefore, is how best to drive down domestic prices \nwhile continuing to support the fragile recovery. \nIn the current circumstance, the Committee was of the view that it was \nconfronted with the choice of either to hold all policy parameters constant to \nallow previous policy measures to continue to support growth or tighten the \nstance of policy to curb money demand growth and upward movement of \ndomestic prices. A loosening option would likely result in an increased liquidity \nsurfeit, rise in inflationary pressure, and further pressure on the exchange rate. \nThe choice of holding, in the view of Members, would not only continue to \nsupport growth, even though moderately, but will also allow the growth of \nmoney demand to continue at the current pace, leading to the uptick in \ninflationary pressure. While growth concerns remain paramount to the \nCommittee, the persistent uptick in domestic price levels is clearly a downside \nrisk to growth, that must be addressed urgently. \nWhile it may seem contradictory to raise rates in the face of fragile growth, this \nis the dilemma that most Central banks around the world are grappling with at \nthe moment. Yet, on balance, it is quite clear and compelling that tackling \ninflation is more urgent in the sequence of policy objectives. In this regard, the \nMPC urged the Bank to redouble its efforts at supporting the priority growth-\nenhancing sectors of the economy while urging the Federal government to do \nmore to provide a safe and secure environment for economic agents to boost \nactivities and growth. \nAfter carefully reviewing the developments of the last two months and the \noutlook for both the domestic and global economies, as well as the benefits \nand downsides of each policy option, the Committee decided to raise the \nMonetary Policy Rate (MPR) to rein in the current rise in inflation as Members \nwere of the view that the continued uptrend would adversely affect growth. \nThe Bank further reaffirmed its commitment to continue to provide support to \n12 \n \npriority sectors as the need arises to support growth until the current upward \npressure in price development abates. \nThe Committee thus decided by unanimous vote to raise the Monetary Policy \nRate (MPR). Six (6) members voted to raise the MPR by 150 basis points, four (4) \nmembers by 100 basis points, and One (1) member by 50 basis points. \nIn summary, the MPC voted to: \nI. \nRaise the MPR to 13.0 per cent; \nII. \nRetain the asymmetric corridor of +100/-700 basis points around the MPR; \nIII. \nRetain the CRR at 27.5 per cent; and \nIV. \nRetain the Liquidity Ratio at 30 per cent. \nThank you. \nGodwin I. Emefiele \nGovernor, Central Bank of Nigeria \n24th May, 2022", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/Central Bank of Nigeria Communique No. 142 of the Monetary Policy Committee Meeting Held on Tuesday 24th May 2022.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "8a97d7c000ca767f621b34738f5961f4", "text": "MENU\nD.1.1\nForeign Trade: Oil and Non-Oil\nD.1.2\nValue of Major Imports Groups by S.I.T.C Sections\nD.1.2.1\nImports by H. S. Section\nD.1.3\nExport Commodity Price Index (Base Period: January\n2007)\nD.1.3.1\nExport Commodity Price Index (Base Period: January\n2018)\nD.1.4\nImport Commodity Price Index (Base Period: January\n2007)\nD.1.4.1\nImport Commodity Price Index (Base Period: January\n2018)\nD.1.5\nCommodity Terms of Trade (Base Period: January 2007)\nD.1.5.1\nCommodity Terms of Trade (Base Period: January 2018)\nD.2.1.1\nBalance of Payments - Analytical Statement (1981 –\n1993)\nD.2.1.2\nBalance of Payments - Analytical Statement (1994 –\n2004)\nD.2.1.3A Balance of Payments Compilation (2005 – 2018) - ₦'\nBillion\nD.2.1.3B Balance of Payments Compilation (2005 – 2019) - US$'\nMillion\nD.2.1.4A Balance of Payments BPM6 Compilation (₦' Billion)\nD.2.1.4B Balance of Payments BPM6 Compilation (US$' Million)\nD.2.2.1A International Investment Position (₦' Billion)\nD.2.2.1B International Investment Position (US$' Million)\nD.2.2.2A International Investment Position BPM6 (₦' Billion)\nD.2.2.2B International Investment Position BPM6 (US$' Million)\nD.3.1\nExternal Reserves\nD.3.2\nExternal Reserves Adequacy - Months of Import Cover\nD.4.1\nMonthly Average Official Exchange Rate of the Naira\nD.4.2\nMonthly Average (AFEM/DAS) Exchange Rates of the\nNaira - Central Rate\nD.4.3\nAverage Naira Official Cross Exchange Rates - Selling\nD.4.4\nAverage AFEM/DAS Naira Cross Exchange Rates - Selling\nD.4.5\nNaira Official Cross Exchange Rates - End Period\nD.4.6\nEnd Period Naira Cross Exchange Rates - Selling\nD.4.7\nMonthly Official Exchange Rate - End Period\nD.4.8\nMonthly Average Exchange Rate Movements at BDC,\nIFEM and I & E Segments of the FOREX Market\nD.4.9\nComputed Relative Purchasing Power Parity (RPPP)\nExchange Rate with Percentage Overvaluation and\nDevaluation\nD.4.10.1 Bilateral Real Exchange Rate (End-Period Exchange Rate)\nD.4.10.2 Bilateral Real Exchange Rate (Average Exchange Rate)\nD.4.11\nNominal Effective Exchange Rate Indices for Nigeria\nD.4.12.1 Nominal Effective Exchange Rate Indices for Nigeria\n(End-Period Exchange Rate)\nD.4.12.2 Nominal Effective Exchange Rate Indices for Nigeria\n(Average Exchange Rate)\nD.4.13.1 Real Effective Exchange Rate Indices for Nigeria (End-\nPeriod Exchange Rate)\nD.4.13.2 Real Effective Exchange Rate Indices for Nigeria\n(Average Exchange Rate)\nD.5.1\nSectoral Utilization of Foreign Exchange for Transactions\nValid for Foreign Exchange\nD.5.2\nSectoral Utilization of Foreign Exchange for Transactions\nValid for Foreign Exchange – Cont’d\nD.5.3\nSupply of Foreign Exchange\nD.6.1\nCash flow\nD.7.1.1\nCapital Importation by Type of Investment\nD.7.1.2\nCapital Importation By Nature of Business\nD.7.1.3\nCapital Importation By Country\nD.7.2\nCo-ordinated Direct Investment Survey\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable D.1.1:\nForeign\nTrade: Oil\nand Non-Oil\n(₦' Billion)\nImports (cif)\nYear\nOil\nNon-Oil\nTotal\n1981\n0.1198\n12.719799999999999 12.8395999\n1982\n0.22550000000000001\n10.545\n10.7705\n1983\n0.1716\n8.7321000000000009 8.90370000\n1984\n0.28239999999999998\n6.8958999999999993 7.17829999\n1985\n5.1799999999999999E-2 7.0108000000000006 7.06260000\n1986\n0.91389999999999993\n5.0697000000000001 5.98359999\n1987\n3.1700999999999997\n14.691600000000001 17.8616999\n1988\n3.8030999999999997\n17.642599999999998 21.4456999\n1989\n4.6716000000000006\n26.188599999999997 30.8601999\n1990\n6.0731000000000002\n39.644800000000004 45.7179\n1991\n7.7721999999999998\n81.715999999999994 89.4881999\n1992\n19.561499999999999\n123.58969999999999 143.151200\n1993\n41.136099999999999\n124.4933\n165.6294\n1994\n42.349599999999995\n120.4392\n162.788799\n1995\n155.82589999999999\n599.30180000000007 755.127700\n1996\n162.17870000000002\n400.4479\n562.626600\n1997\n166.9025\n678.81409999999994 845.716599\n1998\n175.85420000000002\n661.56449999999995 837.418699\n1999\n211.6618\n650.85390000000007 862.515699\n2000\n220.81769\n764.2047\n985.022389\n2001\n237.10682999999997\n1121.0735\n1358.18033\n2002\n361.71\n1150.98533\n1512.69533\n2003\n398.92230999999998\n1681.31296\n2080.23527\n2004\n318.11471999999998\n1668.93055\n1987.04527\n2005\n797.2989399999999\n2003.5573899999999 2800.85633\n2006\n710.68299999999999\n2397.8363199999999 3108.51931\n2007\n768.22683999999992\n3143.72579\n3911.95262\n2008\n1315.5315442462663\n4277.6489059074647 5593.18045\n2009\n1068.7449213806058\n4411.9112015847386 5480.65612\n2010\n1757.1404001490046\n6406.8341702454727 8163.97457\n2011\n3043.596724420433\n7952.2669016427744 10995.8636\n2012\n3064.2559246165702\n6702.3008106272446 9766.55673\n2013\n2429.3761024227433\n7010.0486048142893 9439.42470\n2014 1\n2215.1660295944484\n8323.7484791770476 10538.9145\n2015\n1725.2249234312028\n9350.8434202644348 11076.0683\n2016\n2384.412461649757\n7095.9544041932968 9480.36686\n2017\n2615.4543210921088\n8189.391525450902\n10804.8458\n2018 1\n3686.8923867464391\n9758.33511441058\n13445.2275\n2019 2\n3534.5151869410452\n16914.404376304348 20448.9195\nSources:\nNational\nBureau of\nStatistics\nand Central\nBank of\nNigeria\nNote: Data\ninclude CBN\nestimates\nfor informal\ncross border\ntrade.\n1Revised\n2Provisional\nReturn\nto Menu\nTable\nD.1.2:\nValue of\nMajor\nImports\nGroups\nby\nS.I.T.C.\nSections\n(₦'\nBillion)\nYear\nFood &\nBeverages\nCrude\nLive Animal\n&\nMaterials\nTobacco\nInedible\n1981\n1.8195999999999999\n1.6500000000000001E-2 0.2189000000\n1982\n1.6422999999999999\n1.6399999999999998E-2 0.2072\n1983\n1.7610999999999999\n1.78E-2\n0.2776000000\n1984\n1.3497000000000001\n1.66E-2\n0.3001000000\n1985\n1.1990000000000001\n9.4000000000000004E-3 0.3504999999\n1986\n0.80189999999999995 1.4500000000000001E-2 0.1939000000\n1987\n1.8737999999999999\n3.0699999999999998E-2 0.7995999999\n1988\n1.8915999999999999\n8.5699999999999998E-2 0.5915000000\n1989\n2.1089000000000002\n0.1363\n1.0807\n1990\n3.4744999999999999\n0.22869999999999999\n1.4172\n1991\n3.0456999999999996\n0.2611\n1.5664\n1992\n12.840200000000001\n0.72960000000000003\n3.9396\n1993\n13.952399999999999\n0.49830000000000002\n1.3288\n1994\n13.837\n0.4884\n5.0465\n1995\n88.349899999999991\n3.0205000000000002\n31.715400000\n1996\n75.391999999999996\n2.2505000000000002\n26.4435\n1997\n100.7283\n5.0338000000000003\n38.084600000\n1998\n102.16510000000001\n3.3496999999999999\n37.683900000\n1999\n103.4898\n4.3121\n38.808699999\n2000\n113.6305\n6.7408000000000001\n44.296599999\n2001\n160.20910000000001\n9.5038999999999998\n62.454329999\n2002\n144.29764\n13.670780000000001\n75.763300000\n2003\n201.64829577418502\n18.830149903545841\n105.21155767\n2004\n178.74744145487705\n21.846715458274645\n101.97042067\n2005\n193.25908999999999\n28.008560000000003\n165.25051999\n2006\n214.48767854585719\n31.085198926162377\n183.40265271\n2007\n269.92453685898033\n39.119533486487619\n230.80522120\n2008\n311.38815569605913\n51.898028870813924\n285.43914126\n2009\n446.89565005097546\n28.88074152473482\n77.181110675\n2010\n693.25537031537669\n38.185259143925265\n104.31391286\n2011\n2885.4371485547731\n51.183298903855416\n582.79971426\n2012\n1294.0351823460312\n132.35593698107547\n103.41911628\nSources:\nNational\nBureau\nof\nStatistics\nand\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nReturn to Menu\nTable D.1.2.1 Imports\nby H.S. Section (₦'\nBillion)\nSection\n2013\n2014\n01 - Live animals;\nanimal products\n350.23732949291747\n483.51668918945609\n02 - Vegetable products 414.90044422846728\n650.50088533546955\n03 - Animal or\nvegetable fats and oils\nand their cleavage\nproducts; prepared\nedible\n55.974969803405919\n129.04151045378782\n04 - Prepared\nfoodstuffs; beverages,\nspirits and vinegar;\ntobacco and\nmanufactured\n890.93589730832264\n578.64844919055861\n05 - Mineral products\n1949.912163549433\n1777.2310757935136\n06 - Products of the\nchemical or allied\n675.4277321678353\n833.94583883089047\n07 - Plastics and\narticles thereof; rubber\nand articles thereof\n849.16598851885635\n635.72316737560459\n08 - Raws hides and\nskins, leather, furskins\nand articles thereof;\nsaddlery and\n13.317877996857497\n8.2138089300959649\n09 - Wood and articles\nof wood; wood\ncharcoal; cork and\narticles of cork;\n30.555345105055203\n21.354242714058593\n10 - Pulp of wood or of\nother fibrous cellulosic\nmaterial; waste and\nscrap of paper or\n176.75867732066544\n231.33167926828634\n11 - Textiles and\ntextiles articles\n129.61211132891881\n151.64298480915014\n12 - Footwear,\nheadgear, umbrellas,\nsun umbrellas, walking\nsticks, seat sticks,\nwhips\n35.521142308691523\n37.212565877789835\n13 - Articles of stone,\nplaster,cement,asbestos,\nmica or similar\nmaterials; ceramic\n142.743347366199\n160.10180358779886\n14 - Natural or cultured\npearls, precious or\nsemi-precious stones,\nprecious metals,\n1.6506383312732658\n1.3809393125256479\n15 - Base metals and\narticles of base metal\n746.3011924296294\n968.27672368421815\n16 - Machinery and\nmechanical appliances;\nelectrical equipment;\nparts thereof; sound\n1788.4900051251032\n2441.6272964901113\n17 - Vehicles, aircraft,\nvessels and associated\ntransport equipment\n1030.0314137258638\n1252.6534957040351\n18 - Optical,\nphotographic,\ncinematographic,\nmeasuring, checking,\nprecision, medical\n80.082509038555202\n98.312536722567017\n19 - Arms and\nammunition; parts and\naccessories thereof\n0.23685178606927146 8.28978342847487E-2\n20 - Miscellaneous\nmanufactured articles\n76.884506947798741\n78.018668197631769\n21 - Works of art,\ncollectors pieces and\nantiques\n0.68456335711377547 9.7249469660711296E-2\n9439.4247072370308\n10538.914508771493\nSource: National\nBureau of Statistics\nNotes: 1Provisional\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable\nD.1.3:\nExport\nCommodity\nPrice Index\n(Base\nPeriod:\nJanuary\n2007)\nYear\nMonth Live animals, animal\nproducts\nVegetable products\nPrepared\nbeverage\nvinegar, \n2000\nJan\n66.545077831823704 210.868184989789\n114.1570\nFeb\n103.58945881122656 104.65492992931746 113.6653\nMar\n101.61530209281828 163.6841348286888\n86.40696\nApr\n102.81373826219841 165.61460183013719 87.43238\nMay\n98.544657943170165 200.27698108224203 121.5631\nJun\n98.923509435872603 201.04693893506342 122.0305\nJul\n82.913157603670854 119.13985781881411 97.18022\nAug\n102.55440972409041 159.82015855203196 95.16469\nSep\n99.802541500478611 160.76410070885095 84.86550\nOct\n65.754509097011848 200.8873199692332\n111.4593\nNov\n95.914813190527639 194.93222289070243 111.8604\nDec\n110.33026990793431 142.71100329622615 144.7072\n2001\nJan\n100.13964701688073 112.26302333362524 122.8880\nFeb\n76.672313356028425 114.95413598646768 136.4690\nMar\n103.12237207309983 104.1830389627023\n113.1528\nApr\n100.05431380497025 161.16966100327284 85.07959\nMay\n91.841857540623309 147.74809665916351 80.54389\nJun\n65.293536073797966 403.1408111957648\n112.0100\nJul\n109.67935490247555 131.59771956747176 112.8099\nAug\n96.059045992317891 195.22535405294414 118.4969\nSep\n102.11993797337618 103.17029431021294 112.0528\nOct\n110.45205946829432 142.86853676699977 144.8670\nNov\n83.497441436243506 119.97851824963496 97.86487\nDec\n100.37100933545314 112.52239546186969 123.1719\n2002\nJan\n103.04030259274285 160.57737099678451 95.61557\nFeb\n100.26580254074318 161.51033165058726 85.25943\nMar\n77.019246900625831 115.4742904479449\n137.0865\nApr\n100.50750395305516 161.8996695332323\n85.46496\nMay\n100.4067950312585\n161.73744541546353 85.37932\nJun\n92.165733108776635 148.26912269272222 80.82792\nJul\n65.747923768108791 200.94596983299351 112.7895\nAug\n110.54305906021337 132.6340266978365\n113.6983\nSep\n95.982121831363088 195.06901743308188 118.4020\nOct\n102.08925904147951 103.13929982964709 112.0192\nNov\n100.44142395414907 112.60133480524844 123.2583\nDec\n83.347345337345686 119.76375234112815 97.68912\n2003\nJan\n110.50741835936701 142.94014289007865 144.9396\nFeb\n103.2263892232906\n160.86736725222164 95.78825\nMar\n66.345542366061096 409.63619642910044 113.8147\nApr\n103.51680087418464 104.58152466784401 113.5856\nMay\n105.29091700775642 164.08471459726613 97.70401\nJun\n103.07180487430232 166.03030113191963 87.64547\nJul\n98.881393457749851 200.96134463568887 121.9785\nAug\n97.149951002712399 98.149188424210706 106.5994\nSep\n108.28199093968081 140.0615767666205\n142.0207\nOct\n96.144759121964384 149.83139863590563 89.21689\nNov\n92.652208053544939 149.24618831687067 78.78533\nDec\n97.366175726907926 202.68449667462255 121.0705\n2004\nJan\n35.243735586151224 133.23046096988037 90.15962\nFeb\n110.71618490638063 143.20266554274644 145.2122\nMar\n110.9557709862238\n144.63976152656804 145.6979\nApr\n66.302855190680518 99.40729705582153\n118.0124\nMay\n102.08925904147951 103.13929982964709 112.0192\nJun\n59.926493012472449 183.08208431176254 101.5803\nJul\n78.487782628944188 112.78093287339262 91.99336\nAug\n64.667929822250485 399.27814080533011 110.9368\nSep\n106.55627763051174 129.07041146314032 109.8516\nOct\n96.154934989922978 195.41917808974657 118.6150\nNov\n101.13821214913952 102.17847089636248 110.9756\nDec\n106.30205017912262 127.54549294697406 109.3362\n2005\nJan\n98.413951506837208 100.48298254094124 98.83918\nFeb\n79.166609855166513 116.85270482755385 93.36952\nMar\n88.061035652646368 101.38371206994063 108.5021\nApr\n96.850207023724835 154.06284792160261 90.64702\nMay\n95.19364918471156\n193.46656711443134 111.0194\nJun\n98.779893283877414 100.17954714995733 99.06607\nJul\n97.233072349217281 201.88611001694392 120.8006\nAug\n97.099968971526621 201.08772335926517 120.5308\nSep\n91.867233187715854 151.35290633690713 81.50008\nOct\n91.055302583802856 146.48274772506716 79.85409\nNov\n100.4067950312585\n161.73744541546353 85.37932\nDec\n90.053958775965427 146.16307810423731 79.31429\n2006\nJan\n92.568281580541893 161.24460206778753 84.41146\nFeb\n66.981682416902871 103.47906900998279 119.3886\nMar\n96.671096677077827 202.32865901466465 114.0145\nApr\n108.6274075267909\n130.33555060518907 111.7280\nMay\n99.477447494585519 106.86209193579387 100.9951\nJun\n109.45397950224987 135.29353174937367 113.4036\nJul\n87.602827115918799 98.208437100231507 107.5032\nAug\n102.12249049348794 106.56899357907533 112.6888\nSep\n90.208599312825427 145.12063680872126 79.11155\nOct\n98.585916866956993 102.88582104872032 108.7877\nNov\n97.927150610734088 98.934381931604378 107.4522\nDec\n109.36481084907766 141.46219253428671 143.4409\n2007\nJan\n100\n100\n100\nFeb\n92.535876615237584 148.86458101678943 81.15253\nMar\n110.7313022740793\n132.8598885083006\n113.8919\nApr\n102.26310632222729 103.31493521952029 112.2099\nMay\n83.49764109131003\n119.97971582962148 97.86528\nJun\n103.38146141541371 161.1090307984193\n95.93214\nJul\n100.70892179664845 162.22411776876987 85.63623\nAug\n65.853289030557704 201.1891036246702\n111.6267\nSep\n96.155201193511431 195.42077482777191 112.1408\nOct\n110.71778214544338 143.21224615777845 145.2155\nNov\n100.59231242278327 112.77049054106003 123.4435\nDec\n77.096343243869697 115.58988032827318 137.2237\n2008\nJan\n103.7970529170607\n104.86465924781308 113.8931\nFeb\n100.70892179664845 162.22411776876987 85.63623\nMar\n92.535876615237584 148.86458101678943 81.15253\nApr\n65.853289030557704 406.59688471584946 112.9702\nMay\n110.7313022740793\n132.8598885083006\n113.8919\nJun\n96.155201193511431 195.42077482777191 118.6155\nJul\n102.26310632222729 103.31493521952029 112.2099\nAug\n110.71778214544338 143.21224615777845 145.2155\nSep\n83.49764109131003\n119.97971582962148 97.86528\nOct\n100.59231242278327 112.77049054106003 123.4435\nNov\n103.38146141541371 161.1090307984193\n95.93214\nDec\n100.70892179664845 162.22411776876987 85.63623\n2009\nJan\n77.096343243869697 115.58988032827318 137.2237\nFeb\n100.70892179664845 162.22411776876987 85.63623\nMar\n100.70892179664845 162.22411776876987 85.63623\nApr\n92.535876615237584 148.86458101678943 81.15253\nMay\n65.853289030557704 201.26799863080282 112.9702\nJun\n110.7313022740793\n132.8598885083006\n113.8919\nJul\n96.155201193511431 195.42077482777191 118.6155\nAug\n102.26310632222729 103.31493521952029 112.2099\nSep\n100.59231242278327 112.77049054106003 123.4435\nOct\n83.49764109131003\n119.97971582962148 97.86528\nNov\n110.71778214544338 143.21224615777845 145.2155\nDec\n103.38146141541371 161.1090307984193\n95.93214\n2010\nJan\n66.511821920863269 410.66285356300801 114.0999\nFeb\n103.7970529170607\n104.86465924781308 113.8931\nMar\n105.44909064372196 164.3312114143877\n97.85079\nApr\n103.22664484156466 166.2797207129891\n87.77714\nMay\n99.039857229316766 201.283398072605\n122.1740\nJun\n105.45963555278635 164.34764453552916 97.86057\nJul\n113.53105575378599 299.79200436823834 180.7226\nAug\n106.55616014326067 267.467938309229\n167.6380\nSep\n109.34413962311535 382.20476922441662 167.7461\nOct\n121.4504914913595\n377.21940235895181 168.3092\nNov\n141.55905107769058 345.99248729015318 182.2331\nDec\n134.74383138058744 381.9354338532134\n176.8319\n2011\nJan\n177.57038634153142 174.63799602696702 132.3011\nFeb\n176.27156555112711 192.83063550156689 150.5355\nMar\n209.32145249615991 193.37814027942534 189.4028\nApr\n74.584920694841472 150.33192854523293 113.9568\nMay\n216.41684574504237 188.08693907239268 135.8324\nJun\n450.1035583680528\n250.64816570592828 547.3563\nJul\n120.53158256720128 228.70138800835679 125.1459\nAug\n131.52737351281061 197.82743430111393 146.4193\nSep\n110.48619452918513 105.7410673002545\n183.1979\nOct\n116.92436783594349 151.67297796972727 105.3654\nNov\n132.06936975867865 112.83314612360269 127.5614\nDec\n107.51475169747009 261.88184665928799 173.3675\n2012\nJan\n126.35231573885804 117.33197687252505 105.2282\nFeb\n108.1023484984977\n127.65771797577624 122.6699\nMar\n93.768309370385467 117.21700426510201 95.51438\nApr\n108.10340194100867 130.28210535710281 134.6866\nMay\n110.32719321971705 115.3147483959433\n128.6938\nJun\n106.38168785813035 124.41910913212396 133.5029\nJul\n94.779154315137731 153.987754741587\n129.7864\nAug\n75.16601208912077\n116.22525310541593 124.1675\nSep\n96.887055840494696 222.78730770794979 109.3838\nOct\n106.53591596250658 135.05656457237802 140.4233\nNov\n94.534811067340016 127.58033529656144 137.6309\nDec\n80.200752397830257 114.33992886514388 135.3586\n2013\nJan\n120.68217961123273 241.51559889467384 101.0528\nFeb\n118.27869590060624 179.87112643693155 101.2884\nMar\n113.64995351835904 212.89940197098679 109.1639\nApr\n116.32280610618045 225.7464433368867\n131.3547\nMay\n125.85771205733415 219.70059178103162 145.7263\nJun\n107.63543359401099 174.94915252581904 114.5675\nJul\n107.16244628026031 220.97905237614268 120.8353\nAug\n96.847646084376009 254.47923293843604 129.0126\nSep\n131.01365574551861 292.65684338765345 183.2903\nOct\n94.534811067340016 127.58033529656144 137.6309\nNov\n118.27869590060624 179.87112643693155 101.2884\nDec\n93.768309370385467 117.21700426510201 95.51438\n2014\nJan\n106.54\n135.06\n140.4199\nFeb\n80.2\n114.34\n135.3600\nMar\n75.17\n116.23\n124.17\nApr\n155.72798031320846 120.07906556095229 202.1778\nMay\n93.178075656154675 99.81547273076886\n123.3001\nJun\n179.63252030043799 212.3038882363079\n151.1376\nJul\n109.30054664422858 210.05938471921971 123.8120\nAug\n159.51918177455119 199.70583066140372 147.7050\nSep\n167.19335743687228 189.1264755190706\n143.0592\nOct\n204.66664332134982 310.50572745638431 171.8959\nNov\n196.1036509286954\n308.77638147385477 159.3760\nDec\n162.60421951462919 306.45482060202465 163.3853\n2015\nJan\n404.56334418537449 391.63411260936334 168.2347\nFeb\n362.57400524658158 395.33015813199256 181.2923\nMar\n350.19107940779543 346.9692994866565\n193.3351\nApr\n485.2115314590996\n506.27964322324965 186.1218\nMay\n355.72296628641385 574.89944575745574 185.9336\nJun\n432.44875095513811 574.76682406423038 187.4659\nJul\n514.77412515292963 573.83621131680627 180.9234\nAug\n536.86614387917018 605.14830117586223 191.8044\nSep\n577.9252626914415\n656.26157342052977 196.6126\nOct\n647.29863559322314 807.93527793322369 192.8210\nNov\n662.77984706500956 849.90268922621738 194.0083\nDec\n577.95813886433098 812.14190327576534 194.0083\n2016\nJan\n647.29894729027581 1470.0991586711511 194.0083\nFeb\n662.77984706500956 1426.5659051483324 194.0083\nMar\n577.95813886433098 1324.9781445570522 194.0083\nApr\n704.40293768224558 1560.3577025552161 213.5807\nMay\n852.64742606406082 1790.7132544681992 268.7747\nJun\n1031.3038916784335 2548.1489191339997 311.4679\nJul\n683.11767141790278 1154.2765386023557 375.4259\nAug\n1190.295715015254\n1715.2040620494377 376.2421\nSep\n1186.3149226290766 1712.6025604353292 401.1267\nOct\n954.21840379704224 1047.9982888633424 355.7664\nNov\n1035.98689026391\n1043.2364514682204 323.2363\nDec\n965.02190663845226 1035.0703790394921 354.2688\n2017\nJan\n735.30400956502717 1083.5522312178725 403.0416\nFeb\n500.36130239278788 1003.3679448550245 400.1276\nMar\n595.43427472167934 993.19333091018245 396.8117\nApr\n513.61173983942206 992.23228966786758 391.1252\nMay\n529.867071794033\n1017.4402506074689 401.7077\nJun\n528.59398487670376 1008.6829077096189 388.8643\nJul\n510.73493355411171 1006.3341095527574 372.2343\nAug\n470.22896243184874 977.58234552998829 406.4518\nSep\n551.29047400752631 970.62188480383384 394.0976\nSource:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nand\nNational\nBureau of\nStatistics\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable\nD.1.3.1:\nExport\nCommodity\nPrice Index\n(Base\nPeriod:\nJanuary\n2018)\nYear\nMonth Live animals, animal\nproducts\nVegetable products\nPrepared\nbeverage\nvinegar, \n2017\nJan\n156.1412431228359\n127.38626030734984 121.6804\nFeb\n106.25133924182946 117.95950995707253 120.8006\nMar\n126.44001208151329 116.76334609605804 119.7995\nApr\n109.06505948260813 116.65036266403463 118.0827\nMay\n112.5168667701391\n119.61390035197824 121.2777\nJun\n112.2465277385421\n118.58435592408077 117.4002\nJul\n108.45417187181206 118.30822284549063 112.3795\nAug\n99.852759935177573 114.92806304278011 122.7099\nSep\n117.06610981794209 114.10976648413207 118.9801\nOct\n97.602535570188877 114.54554895123621 108.6777\nNov\n98.992823352352104 114.08084763951715 102.3955\nDec\n96.448328257256108 97.928843652110814 97.65845\n2018\nJan\n99.999999999999986 99.999999999999986 100\nFeb\n110.77444532731715 107.03585547066159 105.8249\nMar\n107.11995290351678 103.96613737420526 112.5402\nApr\n109.46991432996101 120.65771897866846 100.5881\nMay\n111.04954753975426 115.26670215553557 97.06139\nJun\n111.27554432673971 111.14405310984344 105.4609\nJul\n103.95163208300163 117.33866702837321 104.7447\nAug\n102.9947524936905\n117.31478799567802 97.70692\nSep\n105.50842527972647 111.83145679849297 104.8330\nOct\n106.5\n109.38\n102.43\nNov\n105.60599999999999 105.78\n102.32\nDec\n107\n106.23\n102.85\n2019\nJan\n110.7\n108.17\n104.16\nFeb\n102.81\n107.97\n109.13\nMar\n106.64\n109.08\n115.18\nApr\n106.64\n100.3\n115.18\nMay\n99.39\n102.3\n109.13\nJun\n100.16\n102.59\n109.13\nJul\n105.4\n126.33\n109.13\nAug\n106.64\n109.06\n115.18\nSep\n99.24\n102.71\n109.13\nOct\n105\n105.19\n108.16\nNov\n107.71\n105.4\n110.07\nDec\n104.24\n106.49\n108.01\nSource:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nand\nNational\nBureau of\nStatistics\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable\nD.1.4:\nImport\nCommodity\nPrice Index\n(Base\nPeriod:\nJanuary\n2007)\nYear\nMonth Live animals, animal\nproducts\nVegetable products\nAnimal a\nfats and o\nother cle\nproducts\n2000\nJan\n111.92351552708652 85.783985756326302 89.67554\nFeb\n157.45066956867598 96.54636974130149\n134.5314\nMar\n98.696510527706394 97.879688077962442 135.7002\nApr\n57.705198220734587 99.576695296431382 137.3950\nMay\n100.80605802008996 99.971154702434021 137.7456\nJun\n76.842341190168341 97.990573967743771 135.8756\nJul\n94.737399215041123 92.791499190027579 142.1462\nAug\n75.845783725796409 89.302930000866354 138.6398\nSep\n76.2575791580079\n91.37674232524509\n140.8021\nOct\n80.194342218704733 92.914330989182886 142.1267\nNov\n187.81671861400105 90.605825703952647 139.9644\nDec\n138.128640919725\n93.710546391568073 142.9254\n2001\nJan\n132.53537515797265 88.726169220916006 138.2502\nFeb\n105.17052810091539 105.17052810091539 138.7119\nMar\n137.03866527019076 137.03866527019076 137.7379\nApr\n123.56964484228369 105.50406743972941 139.2963\nMay\n126.0229385287963\n103.11069236423621 137.1535\nJun\n77.254890668213633 100.81598836372652 134.8159\nJul\n145.80597832576299 103.76645718775171 138.2325\nAug\n149.54008974325649 103.25713271488961 137.6481\nSep\n152.60553353137317 99.895421815224836 134.5313\nOct\n148.30334814630265 99.309622733376855 134.1417\nNov\n142.14643471512505 98.986621164629028 133.5573\nDec\n171.53057051483344 91.512895795846163 137.9702\n2002\nJan\n130.52767774429043 92.521736644867403 139.1390\nFeb\n127.32667053646331 88.401921490894054 135.2430\nMar\n111.71786367622894 86.996621257692226 134.0742\nApr\n133.99316621706046 90.071217783125391 136.8014\nMay\n124.20762178479485 96.754082054024494 140.6454\nJun\n142.03284006487289 98.308841812163763 142.3986\nJul\n77.900817952470462 92.827493597765695 137.1390\nAug\n141.17858589980099 95.94955157493817\n140.0610\nSep\n138.51715975229826 94.549741053743261 138.8922\nOct\n116.56699770093546 86.637222941093128 131.4897\nNov\n124.73363168041635 88.700935554062028 133.4377\nDec\n118.95374319451341 97.557114359993221 142.5924\n2003\nJan\n178.91604035100232 102.84130716498237 190.7396\nFeb\n174.27544919369038 81.823656359076764 201.9011\nMar\n167.49778112465637 624.58716757989339 209.0418\nApr\n180.73055966823452 78.346794441383508 211.3756\nMay\n178.59607239826624 149.84911060294661 120.8214\nJun\n150.01831603433854 82.588451715561533 127.2951\nJul\n159.1996389427087\n76.726031910808885 115.3721\nAug\n179.86767944980909 62.240674221261052 133.7455\nSep\n161.24669191415765 126.63029538416593 133.2812\nOct\n179.40337552053461 129.41432782862361 150.2498\nNov\n193.92249592330225 82.126125673564459 148.4295\nDec\n178.72950925173572 127.4339988122165\n149.8744\n2004\nJan\n216.59303980216498 218.81775211134129 291.5774\nFeb\n161.39898466283199 124.9921857154546\n348.6106\nMar\n160.93454437750245 201.65272812993311 194.7293\nApr\n137.0388185787223\n193.7934908127211\n58.07029\nMay\n132.42375784618937 298.44067297669585 108.6746\nJun\n119.69345686112172 220.44857858769225 118.8563\nJul\n127.72240612805888 221.49331076116877 160.7284\nAug\n136.48475163563387 124.02629718057187 169.8608\nSep\n127.0952859787066\n266.5126666378697\n210.6464\nOct\n212.15321169470363 141.09302345430987 221.8913\nNov\n249.61003838145487 149.69875187371971 179.0325\nDec\n272.18117863076492 249.89952611010696 939.8954\n2005\nJan\n292.9050767026597\n172.86742925700005 123.4450\nFeb\n186.0061414867983\n103.20744193550043 68.88808\nMar\n104.75362262771306 248.37089817501717 1479.225\nApr\n118.54013532560349 138.79491232659123 616.3037\nMay\n150.17650856750691 228.04120835245902 203.2184\nJun\n95.622082324972666 143.02297968395507 254.9915\nJul\n105.41290774149014 114.75434362929866 145.7603\nAug\n107.43719688514994 125.6826992316014\n778.3004\nSep\n109.39230905094153 91.764802756857051 869.8902\nOct\n107.32802128807863 206.80116103294674 148.3297\nNov\n100.20643100966362 125.00701579935077 651.4517\nDec\n91.593666702838917 154.65747748419463 196.3613\n2006\nJan\n96.648876613407026 141.86117946483665 145.4000\nFeb\n115.86934497438796 89.565633307456253 158.5240\nMar\n97.665210944852333 248.59517290399103 152.6717\nApr\n96.368832119497384 73.976094217208185 147.0659\nMay\n88.944105546472372 120.16578821431666 138.3372\nJun\n73.334494738842807 65.555228423261141 137.8813\nJul\n72.419708912532528 74.791204805892733 230.4286\nAug\n76.087400054328313 71.615463123019097 422.7299\nSep\n80.698873126021994 47.465186311132513 379.6569\nOct\n72.074069158030412 67.54309074659777\n191.1546\nNov\n69.926417422495646 61.513681235723972 177.7892\nDec\n78.710330139569422 97.483964828749961 133.5485\n2007\nJan\n100\n100\n100\nFeb\n102.82936294520022 104.99584889350064 139.9859\nMar\n111.66646365507947 98.207295057710439 144.2890\nApr\n113.22165342159359 110.36317584255421 141.2443\nMay\n104.27059678901176 110.36780580804569 141.7389\nJun\n107.54523054346987 97.502322694400263 141.0870\nJul\n131.55268558707235 102.3955155662933\n143.7622\nAug\n114.22808538661825 102.14046397168993 144.7352\nSep\n122.85533268861533 100.86735349263267 144.2024\nOct\n112.44733241601179 103.34453871295364 144.2272\nNov\n131.97537522224789 109.39626810533382 144.0034\nDec\n140.90762402384044 110.08134344484979 177.2062\n2008\nJan\n120.09602596968632 97.511748818864405 141.0870\nFeb\n135.81941414962412 102.36371387682262 143.7622\nMar\n115.89260857157618 102.10917453018898 144.7352\nApr\n121.03508218186452 100.82647373958582 144.2024\nMay\n115.58978501194714 103.60354467972341 144.2272\nJun\n133.01340200921317 107.29677002306799 144.0034\nJul\n141.83848264833017 110.1754309629508\n177.2062\nAug\n114.81297105580039 105.05412741373036 137.4415\nSep\n114.19820548441086 98.20130919621279\n144.2890\nOct\n115.74733177835637 110.26685130762473 141.2443\nNov\n115.72819895111869 110.25266679385793 141.2443\nDec\n104.27059678901176 110.36780580804569 141.7389\n2009\nJan\n126.11273269731984 100.77853833963376 144.2024\nFeb\n116.52282998714935 103.31821554934405 144.2272\nMar\n132.75493035125197 109.53521218225077 144.0034\nApr\n144.34405938416469 110.18029185686696 177.2062\nMay\n119.63301416746738 97.477778070839619 141.0870\nJun\n139.00388601177696 102.33701689554579 143.7622\nJul\n113.75846237587504 102.06776221031934 144.7352\nAug\n115.48770928908205 100.72764016203142 144.2024\nSep\n107.84732537574233 103.37142319091414 144.2272\nOct\n123.4724478289788\n107.36103079896691 144.0034\nNov\n129.07843163753247 107.41667013480924 177.2062\nDec\n124.89920022707476 107.41667013480924 144.0034\n2010\nJan\n112.44733241601179 107.41667013480924 144.2272\nFeb\n107.54523054346987 103.34453871295364 141.0870\nMar\n140.90762402384044 110.08134344484979 177.2062\nApr\n147.42639922633836 121.0408241911592\n173.0429\nMay\n172.91742261197712 139.48580102998832 187.2044\nJun\n176.5578257762478\n141.0726535526274\n201.6157\nJul\n100.60688699858983 122.09296196123339 130.8587\nAug\n108.80949805870461 94.513589771857283 150.8518\nSep\n124.03103230738655 147.5489864085344\n182.9338\nOct\n119.59618726353855 183.44759679652913 153.8449\nNov\n133.67290664791389 142.27924941557919 228.4614\nDec\n124.03102176190897 210.06578275641652 184.7886\n2011\nJan\n188.75010575538795 326.48783278383507 174.6571\nFeb\n179.74977007380278 221.25201720043228 179.9984\nMar\n224.23525648952437 195.68745324879907 190.1138\nApr\n278.47990991913457 202.54497350006412 214.2387\nMay\n236.57473029764287 244.58407443099287 181.0099\nJun\n209.74919051107838 210.33466110032447 194.3656\nJul\n214.11411165124346 281.10945230574367 273.2656\nAug\n271.8874356677909\n256.84990780755476 391.3952\nSep\n243.59051156199453 245.14053939489284 354.6555\nOct\n293.64527214534814 311.10540547339127 363.7511\nNov\n248.09717131625604 280.80761628970873 337.3176\nDec\n223.60203916947958 302.84424057955312 257.2119\n2012\nJan\n201.18507289078391 118.38313549772889 222.5562\nFeb\n249.66942707063697 215.02956100309333 182.5619\nMar\n225.76692393954241 199.30239300326085 199.3992\nApr\n238.59757468916928 163.92590036033343 174.0507\nMay\n202.85980659815414 319.79477755238543 151.5081\nJun\n219.41532732018862 233.12352636858247 155.9579\nJul\n198.73318574840206 197.80687741864301 158.8339\nAug\n215.74567694449738 179.65631449957783 177.2683\nSep\n210.04793309267166 275.82230903518911 150.8072\nOct\n169.89955909764657 242.54785265096541 156.4636\nNov\n199.32176746321022 232.25416943220853 168.1905\nDec\n163.65154777659725 213.48027938365416 187.4031\n2013\nJan\n120.57942168241239 164.540211619649\n170.4023\nFeb\n149.23449288545584 144.37576804184752 178.6701\nMar\n135.94076410928346 152.62312233420363 198.8420\nApr\n136.11030292734188 95.844934165825777 197.0832\nMay\n155.30342824372414 150.45592523886467 172.5387\nJun\n137.98534547919436 154.6589074210689\n140.5690\nJul\n144.17539764512034 157.44641918436338 157.4056\nAug\n155.40855492336499 216.58600297571064 145.9021\nSep\n136.28743075441955 182.32941921963965 134.5233\nOct\n199.32176746321022 232.25416943220853 168.1905\nNov\n149.23449288545584 144.37576804184752 178.6701\nDec\n225.76692393954241 199.30239300326085 199.3992\n2014\nJan\n169.9\n242.55\n156.46\nFeb\n163.65\n213.48\n187.4\nMar\n215.75\n179.66\n177.27\nApr\n126.50608804908559 166.94422161318241 139.5970\nMay\n118.98434380574318 201.25601386324846 146.3430\nJun\n137.45193960259928 269.91550760475184 154.9468\nJul\n126.17198135822211 151.64674530067464 150.3440\nAug\n128.76418065809037 183.07827509012523 150.5079\nSep\n133.76728729338976 221.19634675270231 150.3978\nOct\n155.87652636030379 193.75154807010537 148.6670\nNov\n152.77644566440532 203.16350871668399 182.5070\nDec\n191.06148615977978 245.27409473361433 198.0952\n2015\nJan\n300.62860874391981 285.21430862148799 109.5454\nFeb\n301.93182480574467 256.95942203412676 113.8903\nMar\n251.65244783187543 211.86831527320365 119.1565\nApr\n222.61075618685794 261.662838739439\n123.6513\nMay\n279.94275593333936 272.33001645751904 118.8359\nJun\n250.74216228345443 267.66840427699293 122.1726\nJul\n225.05072080576639 256.00428752421755 155.3444\nAug\n244.72713949795786 238.97595727581495 164.4746\nSep\n243.02545029803076 255.22837726913463 171.5648\nOct\n195.77866209425764 254.98017906455274 157.4320\nNov\n229.30417411554112 247.23337901476552 165.1099\nDec\n254.13950808119031 274.55857132947244 172.0465\n2016\nJan\n196.42674270876364 315.06613600750813 150.7657\nFeb\n231.88548546627146 308.91170652504019 158.7548\nMar\n255.60984744485972 327.00006158694578 168.7050\nApr\n455.44492233285979 408.42361485487191 169.2852\nMay\n463.19709436068797 429.29058393814847 166.4631\nJun\n519.48094924780537 545.5158075578031\n168.8632\nJul\n432.63694086550089 335.10573386891679 174.9043\nAug\n525.68358901575664 376.67289702195916 181.9690\nSep\n529.64633875148286 407.23261277669275 176.8002\nOct\n373.06063296088161 364.02891406132204 176.4149\nNov\n422.93220537898617 307.92025832209259 181.3106\nDec\n465.11352295578064 515.14993047021289 176.3103\n2017\nJan\n509.83698381906584 530.99511715414758 350.0467\nFeb\n481.57043757849488 544.02248051175638 268.8047\nMar\n520.05267806348729 560.22284138492046 395.2358\nApr\n415.07636343282604 531.05768842063651 341.9450\nMay\n419.686548536727\n422.33826931670581 328.0523\nJun\n425.36799504350978 518.99120654109242 347.6092\nJul\n408.31593284124182 531.18512274606724 456.8786\nAug\n408.12903204050451 437.3091011390369\n580.9801\nSep\n402.87209265950963 478.62693563216379 516.8128\nSource:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nand\nNational\nBureau of\nStatistics\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable\nD.1.4.1:\nImport\nCommodity\nPrice Index\n(Base\nPeriod:\nJanuary\n2018)\nYear\nMonth Live animals, animal\nproducts\nVegetable products\nAnimal a\nfats and o\nother cle\nproducts\n2017\nJan\n123.92163624828227 105.90290748838261 -\nFeb\n116.77626580940078 108.50111529088088 -\nMar\n125.18920947765582 111.73215313549264 -\nApr\n102.41612036022667 105.91538684804588 -\nMay\n103.55363941474266 84.232131745321738 -\nJun\n104.95548196835514 103.50881949381419 -\nJul\n100.74804880966077 105.94080264781681 -\nAug\n100.70193282573572 87.217949441728564 -\nSep\n99.404833342841371 95.458474942974675 -\nOct\n100.50434531974111 96.367049571676205 -\nNov\n98.394168727318885 97.989147896112101 -\nDec\n99.163244026541562 95.904530032449657 -\n2018\nJan\n100.00000000000001 100.00000000000006 99.99999\nFeb\n104.83274560853756 105.08334059078281 105.6546\nMar\n101.8548460025566\n109.96689635604554 104.0983\nApr\n100.2444410944296\n114.05667742950271 98.25886\nMay\n107.52377467817108 113.50720444409212 100.5870\nJun\n103.98022315217821 101.21546473120893 101.0427\nJul\n101.22328547373687 105.66163264540342 101.5460\nAug\n101.69143281315164 103.44968685792537 101.6688\nSep\n103.86878158430068 101.75754978600128 105.3057\nOct\n101.95\n104.72\n102.39\nNov\n105\n103.35\n103.72\nDec\n105\n102.45\n101.33\n2019\nJan\n102.050701556063\n104.11486731606335 101.2516\nFeb\n102.19256432211851 104.14332368250655 101.5737\nMar\n100.08701849784009 104.3198159834467\n100.9295\nApr\n104.2669425279452\n104.43769118338879 100.8847\nMay\n104.72305854099849 105.62686279886573 101.8219\nJun\n104.85778771478294 105.88656156635487 101.8595\nJul\n102.03961022887785 105.33834153581154 102.4242\nAug\n100.7390626054179\n100.02958187801977 105.6910\nSep\n105.25885580967257 107.97339601316298 103.2437\nOct\n106.44996768736468 108.79055848878845 105.7739\nNov\n103.53897994243674 109.81431262154396 103.9485\nDec\n99.557652838365456 103.3752201925948\n103.0515\nSource:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nand\nNational\nBureau of\nStatistics\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable\nD.1.5:\nCommodity\nTerms of\nTrade\n(Base\nPeriod:\nJanuary\n2007)\nYear\nMonth Live animals, animal\nproducts\nVegetable products\nPrepared\nbeverage\nvinegar, \n2000\nJan\n59.455850290656024 478.95674392756831 124.0152\nFeb\n65.79169151519136\n108.39861737913405 121.0109\nMar\n102.95734018305795 167.22993099274311 91.39854\nApr\n178.17066994365763 166.31863644110356 88.44076\nMay\n97.756682364794869 200.33476824226963 110.0122\nJun\n128.73567866842853 205.16967172908224 123.7151\nJul\n87.518929473110362 128.39522893668067 96.27186\nAug\n135.21438461873254 114.83879613255186 100.8168\nSep\n130.87557014324423 175.93546959315913 92.46353\nOct\n81.993950293509727 216.20703483580007 110.5321\nNov\n51.068304194820243 215.14314490949843 115.1440\nDec\n79.875013012003777 152.28915932248481 158.6782\n2001\nJan\n75.556919726164779 126.52752205959179 128.2594\nFeb\n72.902850960735151 109.30261363351197 129.3804\nMar\n75.250566597229877 76.024557563583215 109.3495\nApr\n80.969977645135344 152.76156162921691 80.20671\nMay\n72.877095719869601 143.29076187098681 79.37448\nJun\n84.5170260536824\n399.87785443446035 112.6362\nJul\n75.2228105883474\n126.82105868697342 93.19544\nAug\n64.236316934970731 189.06718491980047 115.1894\nSep\n66.917585234471204 103.27830088254252 110.2570\nOct\n74.477117913300461 143.86172541463424 107.3299\nNov\n58.740440169027316 121.20680233149224 96.31494\nDec\n58.514939368649365 122.95796617877015 117.5170\n2002\nJan\n78.941343608827097 173.55637369101683 88.53581\nFeb\n78.746897345461846 182.7000238532415\n82.35770\nMar\n68.940851862184147 132.73422436246014 126.4822\nApr\n75.009425324153739 179.74628690272218 78.70855\nMay\n80.837869358150783 167.16343329592473 70.82440\nJun\n64.890438765204124 150.81972278344639 73.00184\nJul\n84.399529422429808 216.47247172666329 109.5944\nAug\n78.300160293905591 138.23308657596712 106.3278\nSep\n73.701524940331922 206.31364534589491 112.1933\nOct\n87.579899160995751 119.04732899826919 108.5237\nNov\n80.524733065972896 126.94492352520841 120.2625\nDec\n70.067021935624112 122.76270482867169 86.69283\n2003\nJan\n61.764958660257939 138.99098215541741 86.59782\nFeb\n59.2317447471126\n196.60251620419857 54.67108\nMar\n39.60980373625663\n65.585112485792834 71.59102\nApr\n57.276866216875277 133.48539070872704 77.63840\nMay\n58.954777444914598 109.49995895006639 64.49207\nJun\n68.706147088539254 201.03331359659785 46.55531\nJul\n62.111568917147089 261.92068015363918 83.99449\nAug\n54.011899914359809 157.69300325265999 77.88170\nSep\n67.152999949497584 110.60668881937556 103.9293\nOct\n53.591388034368173 115.77651497314829 68.07536\nNov\n47.777957689957518 181.72802758295884 47.11240\nDec\n54.476832692339727 159.05056622549628 93.39577\n2004\nJan\n16.271868947562986 60.886495581075415 84.00532\nFeb\n68.597819953868068 114.5692946507457\n137.8622\nMar\n68.944657851676666 71.727153343232104 137.4792\nApr\n48.382535604386199 51.295477799038736 114.5296\nMay\n77.092857582290122 34.559397953676665 106.1658\nJun\n50.066640720389699 83.049791241422909 97.11635\nJul\n61.451850938550002 50.918437439856476 90.44218\nAug\n47.381065684825394 321.93022760650081 107.9535\nSep\n83.839677301929243 48.429372266391283 100.3972\nOct\n45.323346378698012 138.50378516626594 109.6808\nNov\n40.518487479489821 68.25606066679596\n103.4199\nDec\n39.055621227700563 51.038709409467586 103.0015\n2005\nJan\n33.59926451761072\n58.127192018083598 99.47641\nFeb\n42.561288150147085 113.22120056088691 92.86542\nMar\n84.064907201929458 40.819481193203053 110.3526\nApr\n81.702460316667242 111.00035681357339 88.09801\nMay\n63.387842807598894 84.838423946346865 108.6125\nJun\n103.30238673131265 70.044371450887837 100.0621\nJul\n92.240195657696191 175.92894842317682 96.28090\nAug\n90.37835292308138\n159.99634364051283 115.0031\nSep\n83.979608790354135 164.93568534979212 76.67168\nOct\n84.838331584816757 70.832652482898823 75.12320\nNov\n100.19995126018964 129.38269454817552 79.89914\nDec\n98.318979922630646 94.507605116716448 73.89623\n2006\nJan\n95.777917782544534 113.66365532563154 73.44177\nFeb\n57.807940859343489 115.53434636560344 104.2785\nMar\n98.982120390508513 81.388812441987852 91.21552\nApr\n103.22574768908007 176.18603953663541 89.07934\nMay\n111.84265318471228 88.928881942008701 67.58844\nJun\n149.25306282130256 206.38099355835223 112.1582\nJul\n120.96545047111998 131.31014182097218 90.13700\nAug\n134.21734797163515 148.8072392913441\n108.2879\nSep\n111.78421187115306 305.74121390246091 47.76900\nOct\n136.78416942270374 152.32619637546392 101.1124\nNov\n140.0431399467499\n160.83313491267435 105.6084\nDec\n138.94594350595608 145.11329405076341 147.2979\n2007\nJan\n100\n100\n100\nFeb\n89.9897402501188\n141.78139667958274 81.58906\nMar\n99.162540524352295 135.28515211647664 112.9589\nApr\n90.321156096739813 93.613593873839733 108.5166\nMay\n80.077839451005389 108.70897989789981 93.84924\nJun\n96.128355384041726 165.23609525014123 88.18924\nJul\n76.554059954930409 158.42892813381278 80.35313\nAug\n57.650698431711945 196.9729682062472\n100.8843\nSep\n78.267014617283976 193.74036103965531 107.1080\nOct\n98.461901911403515 138.57746905771194 148.3137\nNov\n76.220516329947756 103.08440360367439 127.6420\nDec\n54.714103497214325 105.0040603712137\n140.0600\n2008\nJan\n86.428382687084351 107.5405379536442\n104.8877\nFeb\n74.149135767662386 158.47814779754779 81.74341\nMar\n79.846228120826794 145.78962341212252 74.92634\nApr\n54.408430880897875 403.26401354271911 110.4177\nMay\n95.796788844822515 128.23874792992777 118.8115\nJun\n72.289859323236655 182.13108818257803 124.9671\nJul\n72.098279968050122 93.773116489340069 116.6526\nAug\n96.43316528376684\n136.32234133340765 146.7601\nSep\n73.116421345787472 122.17730782987219 98.00890\nOct\n86.906808889043489 102.27052754635262 120.9378\nNov\n89.331262693442596 146.1271055689281\n92.75655\nDec\n96.584200050595044 146.98499855194541 82.12203\n2009\nJan\n61.132878175676986 114.6969208252691\n134.1100\nFeb\n86.428489427998855 157.01405304594405 89.34914\nMar\n75.860777095197889 148.10225363771823 90.21598\nApr\n64.107852453392525 135.10998973407737 84.37061\nMay\n55.046083632377155 206.47577592970592 105.2648\nJun\n79.660580327011658 129.82583676824305 108.7186\nJul\n84.525756752759378 191.46180007855048 109.5155\nAug\n88.548908755518113 102.56860485694585 109.6686\nSep\n93.272885602232179 109.09252002150245 128.7868\nOct\n67.624512641850501 111.75350584541519 103.0806\nNov\n85.775586781494241 133.32404176935043 150.9556\nDec\n82.771916255235894 149.9851285617265\n101.0581\n2010\nJan\n59.149310607738713 382.30830749791545 116.5343\nFeb\n96.514789537882706 101.47092488271845 104.7005\nMar\n74.835617571609063 149.28161873016822 99.87322\nApr\n70.019104708027612 137.37490786611329 70.15602\nMay\n57.275811617641338 144.30386217542724 99.01242\nJun\n59.730932395166455 116.49858452135726 68.73132\nJul\n112.84620679633723 245.54405065824142 119.6005\nAug\n97.92909814341003\n282.99415878167315 44.48184\nSep\n88.158695117627801 259.03584872224474 109.5557\nOct\n101.55047102273826 205.62787899442731 83.45543\nNov\n105.89958326450424 243.17845976229049 65.82961\nDec\n108.637201779441\n181.81706170399474 111.0671\n2011\nJan\n94.076973165596542 53.489894106587855 54.52939\nFeb\n98.064974146421676 87.154294881244653 77.61971\nMar\n93.349036977126204 98.819897274437082 86.17675\nApr\n26.782873032564382 74.221505450089751 56.40992\nMay\n91.479274000549765 76.900730151774326 59.87150\nJun\n214.59132083958127 119.16636297351641 221.1222\nJul\n56.293152112985126 81.356705060068137 44.51859\nAug\n48.375671788496696 77.020636678342314 57.00579\nSep\n45.35734738627783\n43.134875839494654 74.73180\nOct\n39.818236126093126 48.752922739781773 33.86807\nNov\n53.232920415012039 40.181654477346129 45.42663\nDec\n48.083081932888405 86.474105024458979 57.24643\n2012\nJan\n62.80402115491448\n106.73168539388959 80.08749\nFeb\n43.298192240379187 59.367520158746821 93.47205\nMar\n41.533236017998568 58.813646187973355 70.81742\nApr\n45.307837718735975 79.476217651221333 107.5091\nMay\n54.385930396879779 36.058984226862066 99.96039\nJun\n48.484164327722453 53.370464607424381 102.6726\nJul\n47.691659527427369 77.847523175689886 104.3707\nAug\n34.840101156908901 64.693107742499663 78.02509\nSep\n46.126164830076576 80.772040697957763 75.87859\nOct\n62.70523392075259\n55.682440844664583 91.62629\nNov\n47.428242419528395 54.931343367680732 96.14107\nDec\n49.007023451628633 53.559949047873836 92.03396\n2013\nJan\n100.08522012080219 146.78211272327829 89.34251\nFeb\n79.256942288396047 124.58539883562429 87.70171\nMar\n83.602556056691924 139.49354377955544 92.49456\nApr\n85.462160912444403 235.53299431174136 115.0013\nMay\n81.039880111223567 146.02322336739729 77.90610\nJun\n78.004974528429486 113.11935112117962 87.13210\nJul\n74.32783126011185\n140.3519073478484\n85.05319\nAug\n62.318091904357189 117.49569660185981 107.4304\nSep\n96.13040250321842\n160.50994109464582 122.1663\nOct\n47.428242419528395 54.931343367680732 96.14107\nNov\n79.256942288396047 124.58539883562429 87.70171\nDec\n41.533236017998568 58.813646187973355 70.81742\n2014\nJan\n62.71\n55.68\n91.63\nFeb\n49.01\n53.56\n92.03\nMar\n34.840000000000003 64.69\n78.03\nApr\n103.70110687004575 67.139482906967601 127.9225\nMay\n52.972768642957583 41.002489781947617 76.78079\nJun\n110.29934995220898 106.02405805390079 107.7594\nJul\n65.48181391633581\n133.57049177262999 86.73175\nAug\n69.267659810214326 147.90473110403423 86.46581\nSep\n110.49541950090054 162.8096359302362\n98.49034\nOct\n131.30049026642357 160.25974014103548 146.2665\nNov\n128.35987254178193 151.98417443383016 132.9935\nDec\n85.105702244275179 124.94381884677104 129.1314\n2015\nJan\n134.57246995743773 137.31222479763684 132.9641\nFeb\n120.08472623906161 153.84925565387081 138.7491\nMar\n139.15663544101582 163.76648817886738 141.3873\nApr\n217.96410010476598 193.48549670341129 116.5660\nMay\n127.06989509352387 211.10395880548657 115.3998\nJun\n172.467504873102\n214.73091888329145 111.4456\nJul\n228.73693686020835 224.15101593270089 105.0764\nAug\n219.37335801027905 253.22559979430409 111.9661\nSep\n237.80442006494019 257.12719739173497 115.3828\nOct\n330.62777560589376 316.86199331151954 100.9156\nNov\n289.03959102421311 343.76534940917452 102.8762\nDec\n227.41766647304985 295.79914381954904 104.3177\n2016\nJan\n329.53707746913443 466.60018029869076 104.5005\nFeb\n285.82204950529911 461.803769496413\n105.6209\nMar\n226.10949642267144 405.19201682313894 110.5839\nApr\n154.66259544056044 382.04394795087183 85.21510\nMay\n184.07875102085828 417.13313113948993 100.8186\nJun\n198.52583490727315 467.10817245456201 101.1480\nJul\n157.89628829459386 344.45144381023147 123.6321\nAug\n226.42816703558469 455.35637833519127 113.2403\nSep\n223.98246449235089 420.54651486727562 121.7956\nOct\n255.78104991236094 287.8887495971826\n108.3416\nNov\n244.95341737704047 338.80084965925425 106.4979\nDec\n207.48093938567317 200.92604459729074 112.0658\n2017\nJan\n144.22335626910433 204.06067705954402 105.3842\nFeb\n103.90199716344301 184.43501524259926 121.9644\nMar\n114.49499249554668 177.28540458202679 112.7970\nApr\n123.73909600432897 186.8407729146644\n107.5534\nMay\n126.25305091179591 240.90647817768652 116.4079\nJun\n124.26745571740423 194.35452759058529 107.5356\nJul\n125.08327314101936 189.45073317383455 106.4958\nAug\n115.21575911443153 223.54493491759695 110.1547\nSep\n136.8400750640858\n202.79299231704334 109.4937\nSource:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nand\nNational\nBureau of\nStatistics\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable\nD.1.5.1:\nCommodity\nTerms of\nTrade\n(Base\nPeriod:\nJanuary\n2018)\nYear\nMonth Live animals, animal\nproducts\nVegetable products\nPrepared\nbeverage\nvinegar, \n2017\nJan\n125.9999850308628\n120.28589519256015 100.2934\nFeb\n90.987101278996334 108.71732483194722 116.0725\nMar\n100.99912972457959 104.50290522412497 107.3481\nApr\n106.4920825930481\n110.13542615048931 102.3577\nMay\n108.65563721956484 142.00507321081972 110.7845\nJun\n106.94679842677037 114.56449460441146 102.3408\nJul\n107.64890551549058 111.67389701471993 101.3512\nAug\n99.156746184775173 131.77111337565327 104.8333\nSep\n117.76701985323794 119.53864395204236 104.2043\nOct\n97.112751950852953 118.86381233041605 100.2317\nNov\n100.60842490238653 116.42192027270757 96.17805\nDec\n97.26217531915475\n102.1107591257433\n95.55872\n2018\nJan\n99.999999999999972 99.999999999999929 100\nFeb\n105.66778985353189 101.85806319907766 100.1611\nMar\n105.16922572425078 94.543122357103442 108.1094\nApr\n109.20297737691118 105.78750994499711 102.3705\nMay\n103.27906351142913 97.834800957019084 96.49490\nJun\n107.01606608776417 109.80935907867557 104.3725\nJul\n102.69537448473025 111.05134767523184 103.1499\nAug\n101.28164157440243 113.40274829134529 96.10312\nSep\n101.57857218542132 109.89991114534241 99.55115\nOct\n104.46297204512017 104.44996180290298 100.0390\nNov\n100.57714285714286 102.3512336719884\n98.65021\nDec\n101.9047619047619\n103.68960468521229 101.5000\n2019\nJan\n108.47\n103.89\n102.87\nFeb\n100.61\n103.68\n107.44\nMar\n106.54\n104.56\n114.12\nApr\n102.27\n96.04\n114.17\nMay\n94.91\n96.85\n107.18\nJun\n95.52\n96.89\n107.14\nJul\n103.29\n119.93\n106.55\nAug\n105.86\n109.03\n108.98\nSep\n94.28\n95.13\n105.7\nOct\n98.64\n96.69\n102.25\nNov\n104.03\n95.98\n105.89\nDec\n104.7\n103.02\n104.81\nSource:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nand\nNational\nBureau of\nStatistics\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable D.2.1.1:\nBalance of\nPayments -\nAnalytical\nStatement (₦'\nMillion)\n1 9 8 1\nCategory\nOil\nNon-Oil\nTotal*\n(A) CURRENT\nACCOUNT\n10067.200000000001 -14065.600000000002 -3998.4\nMerchandise\n10498.7\n-11202.2\n-703.5\nExports\n(F.O.B.)\n10680.5\n342.8\n11023.3\nImports\n(F.O.B.)\n-181.8\n-11545\n-11726.8\nServices and\nIncome\n-424.7\n-2523.6999999999998 -2948.4\nInvestment\nIncome(Credit)\n-\n431.2\n431.2\nInterest on\nReserves\n-\n-\n-\nOthers\n-\n-\n-\nInvestment\nIncome(Debit)\n-220.9\n-611.5\n-832.4\nInterest on\nLoans\n-\n-\n-\nOthers\n-\n-\n-\nNon-factor\nservices (Net)\n-203.8\n-2343.4\n-2547.19999\nOther Services -\n-\n-\nUnrequited\nTransfers (Net)\n-6.8\n-339.7\n-346.5\n(B) CAPITAL\n149\n780.5\n929.5\nDirect\nInvestment\n141.9\n192.8\n334.7\nPortfolio\nInvestment\n-\n-\n-\nOther Capital\nLong-term\n-\n498.4\n498.4\nOfficial(of\nwhich)\n-\n-480\n-480\nAmortisation\n0\n-\n-\nDisbursement\n-\n-\n-\nOther Official\n-\n-18.399999999999999 -18.3999999\nPrivate (Net)\n-\n-\n-\nOther Capital\nShort-\nterm(Net)\n7.1\n89.3\n96.4\nTotal (A & B)\n10216.200000000001 -13285.100000000002 -3068.9\n(C) NET\nERRORS AND\nOMISSIONS\n0\n0\n48.1\nTOTAL ( A and\nB and C )\n10216.200000000001 -13285.100000000002 -3020.8\n(D)\nEXCEPTIONAL\nFINANCING\n0\n0\n3020.8\n(i) Promissory\nNotes(arrears)\n-\n-\n-\n(ii) Deferred/\nResch. Debt\nService\n-\n-\n-\n(iii) Change in\nReserves**\n-\n-\n3020.8\n(iv) Others\n-\n-\n-\nSource:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nNotes: Time\nReference\nPeriod refers\nto the Balance\nof Payments\nyear: January -\nDecember\n*Total indicate\nthe net\npositions as in\n1970-1993\n**Minus (-)\nsign indicates\nincrease in\nreserves while\nplus (+) sign\nindicates\ndecrease in\nreserves\nExternal\nreserves\nreported were\nconverted into\nraira using the\ncentral\nexchange rate\nas against\nthe table on\nNigeria's\nexternal\nreserves\nposition which\nused the end-\nperiod\nexchange rate\nThe data in\nthis edition of\nthe Statistical\nBulletin\nfeatures the\nlatest revisions\nto the BOP\ntables for the\nvarious years\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable\nD.2.1.2:\nBalance of\nPayments -\nAnalytical\nStatement (₦'\nBillion)\nCategory\n1994\n1995\n1996\n(A)\nCURRENT\nACCOUNT\n-52.304299999999969\n-186.08479999999997 376.024000\nGoods\n61.335900000000024\n247.17770000000007 678.557200\nExport\n(F.O.B)\n206.0592\n825.66960000000006 1128.24660\nOil\n200.71020000000001\n805.56680000000006 1108.18710\nNon-oil\n5.3490000000000002\n20.102799999999998 20.0595\nImports\n-144.72329999999999\n-578.49189999999999 -449.68940\nOil\n-42.349599999999995\n-135.37090000000001 -139.4872\nNon-oil\n-102.3737\n-443.12099999999998 -310.2022\nServices (net) -58.225199999999994\n-282.27590000000004 -285.959\nServices\n(credit)\n-36.030500000000004\n-119.8158\n-188.13420\nServices\n(debit)\n-22.194700000000001\n-162.46010000000001 -97.824799\nIncome (net)\n-66.367399999999989\n-202.5351\n-211.09220\nInvestment\nincome\n(credit)\n1.0680000000000001\n7.0888\n8.02519999\nInterest on\nreserves and\ninvestments\n1.0680000000000001\n7.0888\n8.02519999\nOthers\n0\n0\n0\nInvestment\nincome\n(debit)\n-67.435399999999987\n-209.62389999999999 -219.11740\nInterest due\non loans\n-36.352800000000002\n-106.2709\n-107.4983\nOthers\n-31.082599999999999\n-103.35299999999999 -111.6191\nCurrent\nTransfers\n(net)\n10.952399999999999\n51.548499999999997 194.518\nGeneral\nGovernment\n0\n0\n-4.8751999\nOther sectors 0\n0\n199.393200\n(B) CAPITAL\nAND\nFINANCIAL\nACCOUNT\n11.252800000000002\n-3.2540000000000071 -423.46269\nCapital\nAccount (net)\n30.698799999999999\n34.627400000000002 0\nCapital\nTransfers\n(net)\n30.698799999999999\n34.627400000000002 0\nAcquisation/\nDisposal of\nnon-financial\nassets\n0\n0\n0\nFinancial\nAccount (net)\n-19.445999999999998\n-37.881400000000006 -423.46269\nDirect\nInvestment\n22.229200000000002\n75.940600000000003 111.290899\nPortfolio\nInvestment\n-0.20349999999999999 -5.7850000000000001 -12.055200\nOther\nInvestment\n-41.471699999999998\n-108.03700000000002 -522.69839\nOfficial (of\nwhich)\n-41.471699999999998\n-108.03700000000002 -212.2587\nAmortisation\n(due)\n-51.355699999999999\n-188.20670000000001 -260.66820\nDisbursement 9.8840000000000003\n80.169699999999992 48.4095000\nPrivate (Net)\n0\n0\n-310.43970\n(C) NET\nERROR AND\nOMISSIONS\n-1.5717999999999999\n-5.8775000000000004 -5.7133000\nOVERALL\nBALANCE\n=Total (A &\nB & C)\n-42.623299999999965\n-195.21629999999996 -53.151999\n0\n0\n0\n(D)\nFINANCING\n42.623299999999993\n195.21630000000002 53.1520000\na.\nExceptional\nFinancing\n49.818199999999997\n179.8912\n237.102499\nPromissory\nnotes\n(arrears)\n0\n0\n0\nDeferred debt\nservice\n49.818199999999997\n179.8912\n237.102499\nOthers\n0\n0\n0\nb. Change in\nReserves*\n-7.1948999999999996\n15.325100000000001 -183.95050\nMemorandum\nItems\n1994\n1995\n1996\nCurrent\nAccount\nBalance as %\nof G.D.P\n-5.7\n-8.5\n13.3\nCapital\nAccount\nBalance as %\nof G.D.P\n1.2\n-10.199999999999999 -15\nOverall\nBalance as %\nof G.D.P\n-4.7\n-1.9\n-1.9\nExternal\nReserves -\nStock (US$'\nbillion)\n1.6588000000000001\n1.4410000000000001 4.0747\nNumber of\nMonths of\nImport\nEquivalent\n3\n2.1\n7.6\nExternal Debt\nStock ( US$'\nbillion)\n29.42886\n32.584800000000001 28.06\nDebt Service\nDue as % of\nExports of\nGoods and\nNon Factor\nServices\n40\n33.9\n31.3\nAverage\nExchange\nRate (N/$)\n21.886099999999999\n70.363200000000006 69.8448000\nSource:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nNotes:\n*Minus (-)\nsign indicates\nincrease in\nreserves\nwhile plus\n(+) sign\nindicates\ndecrease in\nreserves\nExternal\nreserves\nreported\nwere\nconverted\ninto raira\nusing the\ncentral\nexchange rate\nas against\nthe table on\nNigeria's\nexternal\nreserves\nposition\nwhich used\nthe end-\nperiod\nexchange rate\nData in this\nedition of the\nStatistical\nBulletin\nfeatures the\nlast revisions\nto the BOP\ntables for the\nvarious years\nReturn to Menu\nTable D.2.1.3A:\nBalance of\nPayments\nCompilation (₦'\nBillion)\nCategory\n2005\n2006\n2\nCURRENT\nACCOUNT\n4891.7444499999992\n4698.0470769410595\n3\nGoods\n3832.9957899999999\n4495.9280454720001\n4\nCredit\n7246.5347999999994\n7324.680627576\n8\nDebit\n-3413.53901\n-2828.7525821039999\n-\nExports fob\n7246.5347999999994\n7324.680627576\n8\nCrude oil & gas\n7140.5789199999999\n7191.0856408320005\n8\nCrude oil\n6743.6405599999998\n6538.465485396001\n7\nGas\n396.93835999999999\n652.620155436\n8\nNon-oil\n105.95588000000001\n133.59498674399998\n1\nElectricity\n0\n0\n0\nOther Non-oil\n0\n0\n0\nImports fob\n-3413.53901\n-2828.7525821039999\n-\nCrude oil & gas\n-724.81681999999989\n-646.72153358399999\n-\nNon-oil\n-1821.4161899999999\n-1835.8000522560001\n-\nTrading Partner\nAdjustment\n-867.30600000000004\n-346.230996264\n-\nServices(net)\n-634.17220999999984\n-1495.5836488809409\n-\nCredit\n235.32062000000002\n295.722930942\n1\nDebit\n-869.4928299999998\n-1791.3065798229406\n-\nTransportation(net) -192.16610999999997\n-189.30674332800007\n-\nCredit\n175.58084000000002\n235.02042512999998\n1\nDebit\n-367.74695000000003\n-424.32716845800007\n-\nOf which:\nPassenger\n-23.122909999999997\n-29.864163941999994\n-\nCredit\n11.115969999999999\n3.2362088759999996\n1\nDebit\n-34.238879999999995\n-33.100372817999997\n-\nOf which: Freight\n-319.58386999999999\n-340.06077768600005\n-\nCredit\n9.4851700000000001\n47.900481732000003\n4\nDebit\n-329.06903999999997\n-387.961259418\n-\nOf which: Other\n150.54067000000001\n180.61819829999999\n3\nCredit\n154.97970000000001\n183.883734522\n4\nDebit\n-4.4390299999999998\n-3.2655362219999997\n-\nTravel\n-24.302959999999999\n-398.15442480599995\n-\nCredit\n7.1526499999999995\n23.696495568\n2\nDebit\n-31.45561\n-421.850920374\n-\nBusiness travel\n-11.62453\n-31.039807986\n-\nCredit\n0\n0\n0\nDebit\n-11.62453\n-31.039807986\n-\nPersonal travel\n-0.27464999999999995\n-367.11461681999998\n-\nCredit\n0\n23.696495568\n2\nDebit\n-0.27464999999999995\n-390.81111238800003\n-\nEducation related\nexpenditure\n-11.084430000000001\n-136.82992051799999\n-\nCredit\n0\n0\n0\nDebit\n-11.084430000000001\n-136.82992051799999\n-\nHealth related\nexpenditure\n0\n-127.92843345599999\n-\nCredit\n0\n0\n0\nDebit\n0\n-127.92843345599999\n-\nOther Personal\nTravels\n-1.3193500000000005\n-102.35626284599999\n-\nCredit\n7.1526499999999995\n23.696495568\n2\nDebit\n-8.4719999999999995\n-126.05275841400001\n-\nInsurance services\n-0.46650999999999998\n-35.251469891999996\n-\nCredit\n7.4900000000000008E-2 8.6706935999999998E-2 0\nDebit\n-0.54140999999999995\n-35.338176827999995\n-\nCommunication\nservices\n-18.22118\n-20.800514508047993\n-\nCredit\n2.6539600000000001\n3.0296423520000002\n3\nDebit\n-20.875139999999998\n-23.830156860047992\n-\nConstruction\nservices\n-5.9739700000000004\n-6.8196239462735999\n-\nCredit\n0\n0\n0\nDebit\n-5.9739700000000004\n-6.8196239462735999\n-\nFinancial services\n-1.9271299999999998\n-2.4035672699999999\n0\nCredit\n1.4369700000000001\n1.5492489300000001\n1\nDebit\n-3.3641000000000001\n-3.9528161999999996\n-\nComputer &\ninformation\nservices\n-19.778790000000001\n-22.578611604436801\n-\nCredit\n0\n0\n0\nDebit\n-19.778790000000001\n-22.578611604436801\n-\nRoyalties and\nlicense fees\n-8.8609799999999996\n-10.842192306000001\n-\nCredit\n0\n0\n0\nDebit\n-8.8609799999999996\n-10.842192306000001\n-\nOther business\nservices\n-378.18155000000002\n-607.80414544200005\n-\nCredit\n1.18598\n1.2113469000000001\n1\nDebit\n-379.36752999999999\n-609.01549234200002\n-\nOperational leasing\nservices\n-3.7780399999999998\n-124.633569888\n-\nCredit\n0\n0\n0\nDebit\n-3.7780399999999998\n-124.633569888\n-\nMisc. business,\nprofessional, and\ntechnical services\n-374.40350999999998\n-483.17057555399998\n-\nCredit\n1.18598\n1.2113469000000001\n1\nDebit\n-375.58949000000001\n-484.38192245400001\n-\nPersonal, cultural\n& recreational\nservices\n-3.857E-2\n-4.4030802182399992E-2 -\nCredit\n0\n0\n0\nDebit\n-3.857E-2\n-4.4030802182399992E-2 -\nGovernment\nServices n.i.e\n15.74554\n-201.578324976\n-\nCredit\n47.235320000000002\n31.129065125999997\n4\nDebit\n-31.48978\n-232.70739010200001\n-\nIncome(net)\n-296.21128000000004\n-591.99925615200004\n-\nCredit\n116.90101999999999\n241.24037268600003\n3\nDebit\n-413.1123\n-833.23962883800004\n-\nCompensation of\nemployees\n13.31709\n16.152992135999998\n2\nCredit\n20.364609999999999\n24.701275944000002\n2\nDebit\n-7.0475200000000005\n-8.5482838080000008\n-\nInvestment income -309.52837\n-608.15224828800001\n-\nCredit\n96.536409999999989\n216.539096742\n2\nDebit\n-406.06477999999998\n-824.69134503000009\n-\nDirect investment\n-341.71724999999998\n-740.20818691800002\n-\nCredit\n5.9130000000000002E-2 1.8820505520000002\n2\nDebit\n-341.77638000000002\n-742.09023747000003\n-\nIncome on equity\n-335.86293000000001\n-733.56363039600001\n-\nCredit\n0\n1.7685664740000002\n2\nDebit\n-335.86293000000001\n-735.33219686999996\n-\nDividends and\ndistributed branch\nprofits\n-104.34873999999999\n-498.41824526999994\n-\nCredit\n0.65704999999999991\n1.0200815999999999\n1\nDebit\n-105.00578999999999\n-499.43832686999997\n-\nReinvested\nearnings and\nundistributed\nbranch profit\n-230.74281999999999\n-235.14538512600001\n-\nCredit\n0.11433\n0.74848487399999997\n0\nDebit\n-230.85714999999999\n-235.89386999999999\n-\nIncome on Direct\nInvestment Loans\n(interest)\n-5.8543199999999995\n-6.6445565220000002\n-\nCredit\n5.9130000000000002E-2 0.113484078\n0\nDebit\n-5.9134500000000001\n-6.7580406000000002\n-\nPortfolio\ninvestment\n-33.903779999999998\n-54.956896199999996\n-\nCredit\n6.1762700000000006\n6.8855507999999999\n6\nDebit\n-40.08005\n-61.842447\n-\nOther investment\n66.092660000000009\n187.01283483\n2\nIncome on debt\n(interest)\n66.092660000000009\n187.01283483\n2\nCredit\n90.301009999999991\n207.77149538999998\n2\nDebit\n-24.208349999999999\n-20.758660559999999\n-\nCurrent\ntransfers(net)\n1907.41615\n2289.7019365019996\n2\nCredit\n1917.2719\n2312.4841839359992\n2\nDebit\n-9.8557500000000005\n-22.782247434000002\n-\nGeneral\ngovernment\n7.7965600000000004\n125.49298863599999\n9\nCredit\n15.769200000000001\n131.623679052\n1\nDebit\n-7.9726400000000002\n-6.1306904159999993\n-\nOther sectors\n1899.6195899999998\n2164.2089478659996\n2\nCredit\n1901.5027\n2180.860504884\n2\nDebit\n-1.8831099999999998\n-16.651557017999998\n-\nWorkers'\nremittances\n1899.6195899999998\n2149.1295916140002\n2\nCredit\n1901.5027\n2153.6472779999999\n2\nDebit\n-1.8831099999999998\n-4.5176863860000003\n-\nOther Transfers\n0\n15.079356251999998\n5\nCredit\n0\n27.213226883999997\n5\nDebit\n0\n-12.133870632000001\n-\nCAPITAL AND\nFINANCIAL\nACCOUNT\n-2496.88015\n-2491.5465777278637\n-\nCapital\naccount(net)\n962.97248000000002\n1357.9836299999999\n0\nCredit\n962.97248000000002\n1357.9836299999999\n0\nDebit\n0\n0\n0\nCapital transfers\n962.97248000000002\n1357.9836299999999\n0\nCredit\n962.97248000000002\n1357.9836299999999\n0\nGeneral\nGovernment\n962.97248000000002\n1357.9836299999999\n0\nDebt Forgiveness\n962.97248000000002\n1357.9836299999999\n0\nOther Sector\n0\n0\n0\nDebit\n0\n0\n0\nAcquisition/\ndisposal of\nnonproduced,\nnonfin assets\n0\n0\n0\nCredit\n0\n0\n0\nDebit\n0\n0\n0\nFinancial\naccount(net)\n-3459.8526299999999\n-3849.5302077278634\n-\nAssets\n-1843.86707\n-2820.7603957802403\n-\nDirect investment\n(Abroad)\n-1.9212100000000001\n-41.119489295999998\n-\nEquity capital\n-1.9212100000000001\n-40.371004421999999\n-\nClaims on direct\ninvestment\nenterprises\n-1.9212100000000001\n-40.371004421999999\n-\nLiabilities to direct\ninvestors\n0\n0\n0\nReinvested\nearnings\n0\n-0.74848487399999997\n-\nOther capital\n0\n0\n0\nClaims on direct\ninvestment\nenterprises\n0\n0\n0\nLiabilities to direct\ninvestors\n0\n0\n0\nPortfolio\ninvestment\n-180.09031999999999\n-194.58581862023999\n-\nEquity securities\n-162.80332999999999\n-175.52431882223999\n-\nDebt securities\n-17.286990000000003\n-19.061499798\n-\nLong-term\n0\n0\n0\nShort-term\n-17.286990000000003\n-19.061499798\n-\nOther investment\n-173.76344\n-797.49724467599992\n-\nTrade credits\n-180.61646999999999\n-598.89118246200007\n-\nLoans -DMBs\n-14.583879999999999\n-16.080311322\n-\nCurrency and\ndeposits\n21.436910000000001\n-182.52575089200002\n-\nMonetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\nGeneral\ngovernment\n0\n15.275721959999998\n-\nBanks\n8.8215499999999984\n-180.97012645199999\n-\nOther sectors\n12.615360000000001\n-16.831346399999997\n-\nOther Assets\n0\n0\n0\nReserve assets*\n-1488.0921000000001\n-1787.5578431880001\n-\nMonetary Gold\n0\n0\n0\nSDRs\n0\n0\n0\nReserve Positions\nin the Fund\n0\n0\n0\nForeign exchange\n-1488.0921000000001\n-1787.5578431880001\n-\nOther Claims\n0\n0\n0\nLiabilities\n-1615.9855600000001\n-1028.7698119476229\n1\nDirect Invesment in\nreporting economy\n654.19315000000006\n624.52073266199989\n7\nEquity capital\n423.33600000000001\n388.62686266200001\n4\nClaims on direct\ninvestors\n0\n0\n0\nLiabilities to direct\ninvestors\n423.33600000000001\n388.62686266200001\n4\nReinvested\nearnings\n230.85714999999999\n235.89386999999999\n2\nOther capital\n0\n0\n4\nClaims on direct\ninvestors\n0\n0\n0\nLiabilities to direct\ninvestors\n0\n0\n4\nPortfolio\nInvestment\n116.03502999999999\n360.29154601800002\n3\nEquity securities\n98.557500000000005\n227.605707\n1\nDebt securities\n17.477529999999998\n132.68583901800002\n1\nLong-term\n17.477529999999998\n129.00206933999999\n1\nShort-term\n0\n3.683769678\n1\nOther investment\nliabilities\n-2386.2137400000001\n-2013.5820906276228\n3\nTrade credits\n0\n0\n0\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\nLong-term\n0\n0\n0\nLoans\n-2391.00495\n-2026.9997926943624\n2\nGeneral\ngovernment\n-1999.9287899999999\n-2094.9925859999998\n-\nLong-term\n-1999.9287899999999\n-2094.9925859999998\n-\nDrawings\n34.692239999999998\n63.882610199999995\n5\nRepayments\n-2034.62103\n-2158.8751962000001\n-\nshort-term\n0\n0\n0\nMonetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\nBanks\n11.43267\n12.653366505637578\n1\nOther sectors\n-402.50882999999999\n55.339426799999998\n1\nLong-term\n-402.50882999999999\n55.339426799999998\n1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\nCurrency &\nDeposits\n4.7912100000000004\n13.417702066739665\n1\nMonetary\nAuthority\n0\n0\n0\nBanks\n4.7912100000000004\n13.417702066739665\n1\nOther Liabilities -\nmonetary authority\nSDR allocation\n0\n0\n0\nNET ERRORS AND\nOMISSIONS\n-2394.8642999999993\n-2206.5004992131962\n-\nMemorandum\nItems:\n2005\n2006\n2\nCurrent Account\nBalance as % of\nGDP\n32.842622896018376\n25.306455505049996\n1\nCapital and\nFinancial Account\nBalance as % of\nGDP\n-16.763772921365604\n-13.420940994291531\n-\nOverall Balance as\n% of GDP\n9.9908831877538695\n9.6288420018971621\n5\nExternal Reserves -\nStock (US$' Billion)\n28.279060000000001\n42.298000000000002\n5\nNumber of Months\nof Imports\nEquivalent\n13.063807131514364\n22.879737763088855\n2\nExternal Debt\nStock (US$' Billion)\n20.476199999999999\n3.5444900000000001\n3\nDebt Service Due\nas % of Exports of\nGoods and Non\nFactor Services\nSource: Central\nBank of Nigeria\nNotes: 1Revised\n*Negative sign\nindicates accretion\nto reserves while\npositive sign\nindicates depletion\nof reserves.\nReturn to Menu\nTable D.2.1.3B:\nBalance of\nPayments\nCompilation (US$'\nMillion)\nCategory\n2005\n2006\n2007\nCURRENT\nACCOUNT\n37225.054790350805\n36844.480496000004\n2788\nGoods\n29168.219998478045\n35259.360000000001\n3807\nCredit\n55144.469979453621\n57443.880000000005\n6660\nDebit\n-25976.249980975572\n-22184.52\n-285\nExports fob\n55144.469979453621\n57443.880000000005\n6660\nCrude oil & gas\n54338.170002282932\n56396.160000000003\n6500\nCrude oil\n51317.560003043909\n51277.98\n5816\nGas\n3020.6099992390227\n5118.18\n6844\nNon-oil\n806.29997717068727\n1047.72\n1597\nElectricity\n0\n0\n0\nOther Non-oil\n0\n0\n0\nImports fob\n-25976.249980975572\n-22184.52\n-285\nCrude oil & gas\n-5515.6899779316636\n-5071.92\n-560\nNon-oil\n-13860.560003043909\n-14397.28\n-184\nTrading Partner\nAdjustment\n-6600\n-2715.32\n-449\nServices(net)\n-4825.9052583517223\n-11729.129504\n-170\nCredit\n1790.7360170458871\n2319.21\n1455\nDebit\n-6616.6412753976092\n-14048.339504\n-185\nTransportation(net) -1462.3400806635721\n-1484.6400000000006\n-418\nCredit\n1336.1299748877561\n1843.1499999999999\n836.\nDebit\n-2798.4700555513282\n-3327.7900000000004\n-502\nOf which:\nPassenger\n-175.96004870253404\n-234.20999999999998\n-958\nCredit\n84.589985541435198\n25.38\n125.\nDebit\n-260.55003424396926\n-259.58999999999997\n-108\nOf which: Freight\n-2431.9600487025341\n-2666.9300000000003\n-347\nCredit\n72.179971082870409\n375.66\n378.\nDebit\n-2504.1400197854045\n-3042.59\n-385\nOf which: Other\n1145.5800167414961\n1416.5\n249.\nCredit\n1179.3600182634505\n1442.11\n333.\nDebit\n-33.78000152195419\n-25.61\n-83.7\nTravel\n-184.9399589072369\n-3122.5299999999997\n-542\nCredit\n54.430028156152495\n185.84\n215.\nDebit\n-239.3699870633894\n-3308.37\n-563\nBusiness travel\n-88.460010653679333\n-243.43\n-558\nCredit\n0\n0\n0\nDebit\n-88.460010653679333\n-243.43\n-558\nPersonal travel\n-2.090023590289932\n-2879.1\n-486\nCredit\n0\n185.84\n215.\nDebit\n-2.090023590289932\n-3064.94\n-507\nEducation related\nexpenditure\n-84.349973365801688\n-1073.0899999999999\n-254\nCredit\n0\n0\n0\nDebit\n-84.349973365801688\n-1073.0899999999999\n-254\nHealth related\nexpenditure\n0\n-1003.28\n-107\nCredit\n0\n0\n0\nDebit\n0\n-1003.28\n-107\nOther Personal\nTravels\n-10.039951297465949\n-802.73\n-124\nCredit\n54.430028156152495\n185.84\n215.\nDebit\n-64.46997945361845\n-988.57\n-145\nInsurance services\n-3.5500342439692565\n-276.45999999999998\n-206\nCredit\n0.56997184384750021 0.68\n4.58\nDebit\n-4.1200060878167566\n-277.14\n-211\nCommunication\nservices\n-138.65900616391448\n-163.12823999999995\n-185\nCredit\n20.196027699566244\n23.76\n27\nDebit\n-158.85503386348071\n-186.88823999999994\n-212\nConstruction\nservices\n-45.460543337645539\n-53.482968\n-60.7\nCredit\n0\n0\n0\nDebit\n-45.460543337645539\n-53.482968\n-60.7\nFinancial services\n-14.665017882961722\n-18.850000000000001\n4.66\nCredit\n10.935012556122061\n12.15\n13.5\nDebit\n-25.600030439083785\n-31\n-8.84\nComputer &\ninformation\nservices\n-150.51206148694925\n-177.07298400000002\n-201\nCredit\n0\n0\n0\nDebit\n-150.51206148694925\n-177.07298400000002\n-201\nRoyalties and\nlicense fees\n-67.430028156152503\n-85.03\n-174\nCredit\n0\n0\n0\nDebit\n-67.430028156152503\n-85.03\n-174\nOther business\nservices\n-2877.8749714633591\n-4766.71\n-414\nCredit\n9.0250361464119937\n9.5\n10\nDebit\n-2886.9000076097709\n-4776.21\n-415\nOperational leasing\nservices\n-28.750019024427367\n-977.44\n-824\nCredit\n0\n0\n0\nDebit\n-28.750019024427367\n-977.44\n-824\nMisc. business,\nprofessional, and\ntechnical services\n-2849.1249524389318\n-3789.27\n-332\nCredit\n9.0250361464119937\n9.5\n10\nDebit\n-2858.1499885853436\n-3798.77\n-333\nPersonal, cultural\n& recreational\nservices\n-0.29350886538315196 -0.34531199999999995 -0.39\nCredit\n0\n0\n0\nDebit\n-0.29350886538315196 -0.34531199999999995 -0.39\nGovernment\nServices n.i.e\n119.81995281942015\n-1580.88\n-246\nCredit\n359.44996575603074\n244.13\n348.\nDebit\n-239.6300129366106\n-1825.01\n-281\nIncome(net)\n-2254.0999923902295\n-4642.76\n-118\nCredit\n889.58998554143511\n1891.93\n2585\nDebit\n-3143.6899779316641\n-6534.6900000000005\n-144\nCompensation of\nemployees\n101.34000456586257\n126.67999999999999\n191.\nCredit\n154.97001750247318\n193.72\n219.\nDebit\n-53.630012936610612\n-67.040000000000006\n-28\nInvestment income -2355.4399969560918\n-4769.4400000000005\n-120\nCredit\n734.61996803896193\n1698.21\n2365\nDebit\n-3090.0599649950536\n-6467.6500000000005\n-144\nDirect investment\n-2600.3900007609773\n-5805.09\n-131\nCredit\n0.44996575603074351 14.760000000000002\n21.9\nDebit\n-2600.8399665170077\n-5819.85\n-131\nIncome on equity\n-2555.8399665170077\n-5752.9800000000005\n-130\nCredit\n0\n13.870000000000001\n20.9\nDebit\n-2555.8399665170077\n-5766.85\n-130\nDividends and\ndistributed branch\nprofits\n-794.07000989270216\n-3908.85\n-109\nCredit\n5\n8\n14\nDebit\n-799.07000989270216\n-3916.85\n-109\nReinvested\nearnings and\nundistributed\nbranch profit\n-1755.9000076097711\n-1844.13\n-210\nCredit\n0.87002511224412149 5.87\n6.96\nDebit\n-1756.770032722015\n-1850\n-211\nIncome on Direct\nInvestment Loans\n(interest)\n-44.550034243969257\n-52.11\n-74\nCredit\n0.44996575603074351 0.89\n1\nDebit\n-45\n-53\n-75\nPortfolio\ninvestment\n-258\n-431\n-536\nCredit\n47.000000000000007\n54\n53.3\nDebit\n-305.00000000000006\n-485\n-589\nOther investment\n502.95000380488551\n1466.65\n1642\nIncome on debt\n(interest)\n502.95000380488551\n1466.65\n1642\nCredit\n687.17000228293125\n1629.45\n2290\nDebit\n-184.2199984780458\n-162.80000000000001\n-648\nCurrent\ntransfers(net)\n15136.840042614716\n17957.009999999998\n1870\nCredit\n15268.09002359029\n18135.679999999997\n1885\nDebit\n-131.24998097557264\n-178.67000000000002\n-151\nGeneral\ngovernment\n59.330035765923448\n984.18\n784.\nCredit\n120.00000000000001\n1032.26\n867.\nDebit\n-60.669964234076559\n-48.08\n-83.6\nOther sectors\n621.84004261471728\n16972.829999999998\n1791\nCredit\n678.09002359028989\n17103.419999999998\n1798\nDebit\n-56.24998097557264\n-130.59\n-67.7\nWorkers'\nremittances\n14455.669964234075\n16854.57\n1791\nCredit\n14470\n16890\n1794\nDebit\n-14.330035765923446\n-35.43\n-26.4\nOther Transfers\n0\n118.25999999999999\n0.44\nCredit\n0\n213.41999999999996\n41.7\nDebit\n0\n-95.16\n-41.2\nCAPITAL AND\nFINANCIAL\nACCOUNT\n-19000.686020850771\n-19539.978587813865\n-133\nCapital\naccount(net)\n7328\n10650\n0\nCredit\n7328\n10650\n0\nDebit\n0\n0\n0\nCapital transfers\n7328\n10650\n0\nCredit\n7328\n10650\n0\nGeneral\nGovernment\n7328\n10650\n0\nDebt Forgiveness\n7328\n10650\n0\nOther Sector\n0\n0\n0\nDebit\n0\n0\n0\nAcquisition/\ndisposal of\nnonproduced,\nnonfin assets\n0\n0\n0\nCredit\n0\n0\n0\nDebit\n0\n0\n0\nFinancial\naccount(net)\n-26328.686020850771\n-30189.978587813865\n-133\nAssets\n-14031.406057377673\n-22121.841200000003\n-251\nDirect investment\n(Abroad)\n-14.619968038962028\n-322.48\n-874\nEquity capital\n-14.619968038962028\n-316.61\n-868\nClaims on direct\ninvestment\nenterprises\n-14.619968038962028\n-316.61\n-868\nLiabilities to direct\ninvestors\n0\n0\n0\nReinvested\nearnings\n0\n-5.87\n-6.96\nOther capital\n0\n0\n0\nClaims on direct\ninvestment\nenterprises\n0\n0\n0\nLiabilities to direct\ninvestors\n0\n0\n0\nPortfolio\ninvestment\n-1370.4460847728483\n-1526.0411999999999\n-185\nEquity securities\n-1238.896050528879\n-1376.5511999999999\n-172\nDebt securities\n-131.55003424396926\n-149.49\n-138\nLong-term\n0\n0\n0\nShort-term\n-131.55003424396926\n-149.49\n-138\nOther investment\n-1322.2999771706873\n-6254.38\n-133\nTrade credits\n-1374.4499657560307\n-4696.8100000000004\n-722\nLoans -DMBs\n-110.9799863024123\n-126.11\n-116\nCurrency and\ndeposits\n163.12997488775588\n-1431.46\n-600\nMonetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\nGeneral\ngovernment\n0\n119.8\n-127\nBanks\n67.129974887755878\n-1419.26\n-291\nOther sectors\n96\n-132\n-181\nOther Assets\n0\n0\n0\nReserve assets*\n-11324.040027395176\n-14018.94\n-903\nMonetary Gold\n0\n0\n0\nSDRs\n0\n0\n0\nReserve Positions\nin the Fund\n0\n0\n0\nForeign exchange\n-11324.040027395176\n-14018.94\n-903\nOther Claims\n0\n0\n0\nLiabilities\n-12297.2799634731\n-8068.1373878138593\n1175\nDirect Invesment in\nreporting economy\n4978.2600258732218\n4897.8099999999995\n6086\nEquity capital\n3221.4899931512064\n3047.81\n3936\nClaims on direct\ninvestors\n0\n0\n0\nLiabilities to direct\ninvestors\n3221.4899931512064\n3047.81\n3936\nReinvested\nearnings\n1756.770032722015\n1850\n2112\nOther capital\n0\n0\n38.0\nClaims on direct\ninvestors\n0\n0\n0\nLiabilities to direct\ninvestors\n0\n0\n38.0\nPortfolio\nInvestment\n883\n2825.59\n2665\nEquity securities\n750\n1785\n1459\nDebt securities\n133\n1040.5900000000001\n1206\nLong-term\n133\n1011.7\n1058\nShort-term\n0\n28.89\n147.\nOther investment\nliabilities\n-18158.539989346322\n-15791.53738781386\n3000\nTrade credits\n0\n0\n0\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\nLong-term\n0\n0\n0\nLoans\n-18195.000000000004\n-15896.765848491825\n2150\nGeneral\ngovernment\n-15219\n-16430\n-513\nLong-term\n-15219\n-16430\n-513\nDrawings\n264\n501\n425\nRepayments\n-15483\n-16931\n-938\nshort-term\n0\n0\n0\nMonetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\nBanks\n87\n99.234151508174079\n1384\nOther sectors\n-3063\n434\n1278\nLong-term\n-3063\n434\n1278\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\nCurrency &\nDeposits\n36.460010653679326\n105.22846067796667\n850\nMonetary\nAuthority\n0\n0\n0\nBanks\n36.460010653679326\n105.22846067796667\n850\nOther Liabilities -\nmonetary authority\nSDR allocation\n0\n0\n0\nNET ERRORS AND\nOMISSIONS\n-18224.368769500034\n-17304.501908186139\n-145\nMemorandum\nItems:\n2005\n2006\n2007\nCurrent Account\nBalance as % of\nGDP\n32.842622896018376\n25.306455505049996\n16.8\nCapital and\nFinancial Account\nBalance as % of\nGDP\n-16.763772921365604\n-13.420940994291531\n-8.06\nOverall Balance as\n% of GDP\n9.9908831877538695\n9.6288420018971621\n5.45\nExternal Reserves -\nStock (US$' Billion)\n28.279060000000001\n42.298000000000002\n51.3\nNumber of Months\nof Imports\nEquivalent\n13.063807131514364\n22.879737763088855\n21.5\nExternal Debt\nStock (US$' Billion)\n20.476199999999999\n3.5444900000000001\n3.62\nDebt Service Due\nas % of Exports of\nGoods and Non\nFactor Services\nEffective Central\nExchange Rate (N/\n$)\n131.41\n127.5102\n124.\nAverage Exchange\nRate (N/$)\n132.15\n128.65\n125.\nEnd-Period\nExchange Rate (N/\n$)\n130.29\n128.27000000000001\n117.\nSource: Central\nBank of Nigeria\nNotes: 1Revised\n2Provisional\n*Negative sign\nindicates accretion\nto reserves while\npositive sign\nindicates depletion\nof reserves\nReturn to Menu\nTable D.2.1.4A\nBalance of Payments\nBPM6 Compilation\n(₦' Billion)\n2014\n20\nCredits\nDebits\nCr\nCurrent Account\n17145.69198002074\n17003.121322844967\n14\n1. Current account\nbalance (+ Surplus;\n- Deficit)\n142.570657175772\n0\n0\n1.A Goods and\nservices\n13302.999486408738\n13595.586479881487\n96\nBalance on goods\nand services (+\nSurplus; - Deficit)\n0\n292.58699347274904\n0\n1.A.a Goods\n12989.820326366947\n9677.7843887048693\n90\nBalance on trade in\ngoods (+ Surplus; -\nDeficit)\n3312.035937662079\n0\n0\n1.A.a.1 General\nmerchandise on a\nBOP basis\n12989.820326366947\n9677.7843887048693\n90\nOf which: 1.A.a.1.1\nRe-exports\n0\nn.a\n0\n1.A.a.2 Net exports\nof goods under\nmerchanting\n0\nn.a\n0\n1.A.a.2.1 Goods\nacquired under\nmerchanting\n0\nn.a\n0\n1.A.a.2.2 Goods sold\nunder merchanting\n0\nn.a\n0\n1.A.a.3\nNonmonetary gold\n0\n0\n0\n1.A.b Services\n313.17916004178966\n3917.8020911766189\n62\nBalance on trade in\nservices (+ Surplus;\n- Deficit)\n0\n3604.6229311348302\n0\n1.A.b.1\nManufacturing\nservices on physical\ninputs owned by\nothers\n0\n9.0472896747441087\n0\n1.A.b.1.1 Goods for\nprocessing in\nreporting economy—\nGoods returned ,\nreceived\n0\n0\n0\n1.A.b.1.2 Goods for\nprocessing abroad—\nGoods sent, Goods\nreturned\n0\n9.0472896747441087\n0\n1.A.b.2 Maintenance\nand repair services\nn.i.e.\n0\n10.508763692639732\n0\n1.A.b.3 Transport\n121.78590830966155\n1374.5459885255787\n35\n1.A.b.3.1 Sea\ntransport\n109.77636671684594\n802.34915263233518\n34\n1.A.b.3.1.1\nPassenger\n0.48884151729769659 1.948572016638825\n0.\nOf which:\n1.A.b.3.1.1.1\nPayable by border,\nseasonal and other\nshort-term workers\n0\n0\n0\n1.A.b.3.1.2 Freight\n51.70950251902844\n784.67832520783645\n84\n1.A.b.3.1.3 Other\n57.578022680519794\n15.722255407859835\n25\n1.A.b.3.2 Air\ntransport\n12.009541592815625\n525.18403674022818\n14\n1.A.b.3.2.1\nPassenger\n9.287988828656232\n521.89080848934702\n10\nOf which:\n1.A.b.3.2.1.1\nPayable by border,\nseasonal and other\nshort-term workers\n0\n0\n0\n1.A.b.3.2.2 Freight\n2.7215527641593926\n1.1842411045432084\n4.\n1.A.b.3.2.3 Other\n0\n2.1089871463379048\n0\n1.A.b.3.3 Other\nmodes of transport\n0\n42.620255454490575\n0\n1.A.b.3.3.1\nPassenger\n0\n9.8041952798437748\n0\nOf which:\n1.A.b.3.3.1.1\nPayable by border,\nseasonal, and other\nshort-term workers\n0\n0\n0\n1.A.b.3.3.2 Freight\n0\n0.82409341139527381\n0\n1.A.b.3.3.3 Other\n0\n31.991966763251526\n0\n1.A.b.3.4 Postal and\ncourier services ( For\nall modes of\ntransport)\n0\n4.3925436985248094\n0\n1.A.b.3.0.1\nPassenger\n0\n0\n0\nOf which:\n1.A.b.3.0.1.1\nPayable by border,\nseasonal, and other\nshort-term workers\n0\n0\n0\n1.A.b.3.0.2 Freight\n0\n0\n0\n1.A.b.3.0.3 Other\n0\n4.3925436985248094\n0\n1.A.b.4 Travel\n85.417911170060151\n913.95592387743193\n79\n1.A.b.4.1 Business\n0\n181.6976369291161\n0\n1.A.b.4.1.1\nAcquisition of goods\nand services by\nborder, seasonal,\nand short term\nworkers\n0\n0\n0\n1.A.b.4.1.2 Other\n0\n181.6976369291161\n0\n1.A.b.4.2 Personal\n85.417911170060151\n732.2582869483158\n79\n1.A.b.4.2.1 Health-\nrelated\n0\n131.36296677473288\n0\n1.A.b.4.2.2\nEducation-related\n0\n352.06358644785126\n0\n1.A.b.4.2.3 Other\n85.417911170060151\n248.83173372573157\n79\nFor both business\nand personal travel\n0\n0\n0\n1.A.b.4.0.1 Goods\n0\n0\n0\n1.A.b.4.0.2 Local\ntransport services\n0\n0\n0\n1.A.b.4.0.3\nAccommodation\nservices\n0\n0\n0\n1.A.b.4.0.4 Food-\nserving services\n0\n0\n0\n1.A.b.4.0.5 Other\nservices\n0\n0\n0\nOf which:\n1.A.b.4.0.5.1 Health\nservices\n0\n0\n0\n1.A.b.4.0.5.2\nEducation services\n0\n0\n0\n1.A.b.5 Construction 0\n11.008881449936863\n0\n1.A.b.5.1\nConstruction abroad\n0\n0\n0\n1.A.b.5.2\nConstruction in the\nreporting economy\n0\n11.008881449936863\n0\n1.A.b.6 Insurance\nand pension services\n3.4841458456832686\n52.695874768636074\n8.\n1.A.b.6.1 Direct\ninsurance\n3.4841458456832686\n52.17546921552406\n8.\n1.A.b.6.2\nReinsurance\n0\n0.51568746106204255\n0\n1.A.b.6.3 Auxiliary\ninsurance services\n0\n4.7180920499729417E-3 0\n1.A.b.6.4 Pension\nand standardized\nguarantee services\n0\n0\n0\n1.A.b.7 Financial\nservices\n2.2243218137571406\n195.21917683135112\n49\n1.A.b.7.1 Explicitly\ncharged and other\nfinancial services\n2.2243218137571406\n195.21917683135112\n49\n1.A.b.7.2 Financial\nintermediation\nservices indirectly\nmeasured (FISIM)\n0\n0\n0\n1.A.b.8 Charges for\nthe use of\nintellectual property\nn.i.e.\n0\n39.764079797171945\n0\n1.A.b.9\nTelecommunications,\ncomputer, and\ninformation services\n8.4359485853516194\n242.92638162688681\n15\n1.A.b.9.1\nTelecommunications\nservices\n8.4359485853516194\n133.03148071077206\n15\n1.A.b.9.2 Computer\nservices\n0\n109.19866779927375\n0\n1.A.b.9.3\nInformation services\n0\n0.69623311684100719\n0\n1.A.b.10 Other\nbusiness services\n15.726463945968408\n758.66204372383822\n17\n1.A.b.10.1 Research\nand development\nservices\n0\n7.8634867499549036E-4 0\n1.A.b.10.2\nProfessional and\nmanagement\nconsulting services\n0\n274.59902446026206\n0\n1.A.b.10.3\nTechnical, trade-\nrelated, and other\nbusiness services\n15.726463945968408\n484.06223291490124\n17\n1.A.b.11 Personal,\ncultural, and\nrecreational services\n0\n47.421700464013043\n0\n1.A.b.11.1\nAudiovisual and\nrelated services\n0\n3.1453946999819614E-3 0\n1.A.b.11.2 Other\npersonal, cultural,\nand recreational\nservices\n0\n47.418555069313058\n0\n1.A.b.12\nGovernment goods\nand services n.i.e.\n76.104460371307567\n262.04598674439046\n95\n1.A.b.0.1 Tourism-\nrelated services in\ntravel and passenger\ntransport\n0\n0\n0\n1.B Primary income\n256.82745350398051\n3270.4416117062701\n18\nBalance on primary\nincome (+ Surplus; -\nDeficit)\n0\n3013.6141582022901\n0\n1.B.1 Compensation\nof employees\n31.466465670725544\n2.7012202380796544\n42\n1.B.2 Investment\nincome\n225.36098783325497\n3267.7403914681904\n14\n1.B.2.1 Direct\ninvestment\n49.807151294825992\n3093.1745609041868\n59\n1.B.2.1.1 Income on\nequity and\ninvestment fund\nshares\n49.342199832954527\n3086.5015954629157\n58\n1.B.2.1.1.1\nDividends and\nwithdrawals from\nincome of quasi-\ncorporation\n44.867325428157692\n2668.2568895089639\n53\n1.B.2.1.1.1.1 Direct\ninvestor in direct\ninvestment\nenterprises\n44.867325428157692\n2668.2568895089639\n53\n1.B.2.1.1.1.2 Direct\ninvestment\nenterprises in direct\ninvestor (reverse\ninvestment)\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.2.1.1.1.3\nBetween fellow\nenterprises\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.2.1.1.1.3.1 if\nultimate controlling\nparent is resident\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.2.1.1.1.3.2 if\nultimate controlling\nparent is nonresident\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.2.1.1.1.3.3 if\nultimate controlling\nparent is unknown\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.2.1.1.2\nReinvested earnings\n4.4748744047968367\n418.24470595395132\n5.\nInvestment income\nattributable to\npolicyholders in\ninsurance, pension\n0\n0\n0\nschemes, and\nstandardized\nguarantees, and to\ninvestment fund\nshareholders\n0\n0\n0\nOf which:\nInvestment income\nattributable to\ninvestment fund\nshareholders\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.2.1.2 Interest\n0.46495146187147041 6.6729654412714225\n0.\n1.B.2.1.2.1 Direct\ninvestor in direct\ninvestment\nenterprises\n0.46495146187147041 6.6729654412714225\n0.\n1.B.2.1.2.2 Direct\ninvestment\nenterprises in direct\ninvestor (reverse\ninvestment)\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.2.1.2.3 Between\nfellow enterprises\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.2.1.2.3.1 if\nultimate controlling\nparent is resident\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.2.1.2.3.2 if\nultimate controlling\nparent is nonresident\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.2.1.2.3.3 if\nultimate controlling\nparent is unknown\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.2.1.2M\nMemorandum:\nInterest before FISIM\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.2.2 Portfolio\ninvestment\n3.8641567063615891\n84.555643131969916\n4.\n1.B.2.2.1 Investment\nincome on equity\nand investment fund\nshares\n0\n45.213969907731062\n0\n1.B.2.2.1.1\nDividends on equity\nexcluding\ninvestment fund\nshares\n0\n45.213969907731062\n0\n1.B.2.2.1.2\nInvestment income\nattributable to\ninvestment fund\nshareholders\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.2.2.1.2.1\nDividends\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.2.2.1.2.2\nReinvested earnings\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.2.2.2 Interest\n3.8641567063615891\n39.341673224238853\n4.\n1.B.2.2.2.1 Short-\nterm\n3.8641567063615891\n22.36932628665296\n4.\n1.B.2.2.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n16.972346937585893\n0\n1.B.2.3 Other\ninvestment\n139.47623718130009\n90.010187432033774\n44\n1.B.2.3.1\nWithdrawals from\nincome of quasi-\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.2.3.2 Interest\n139.47623718130009\n90.010187432033774\n44\n1.B.2.3.2M\nMemorandum:\nInterest before FISIM\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.2.3.3 Investment\nincome attributable\nto policyholders in\ninsurance, pension\nschemes, and\nstandardized\nguarantee schemes\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.2.4 Reserve\nassets\n32.213442650767284\n0\n32\n1.B.2.4.1 Income on\nequity and\ninvestment fund\nshares\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.2.4.2 Interest\n32.213442650767284\n0\n32\n1.B.2.4.2M\nMemorandum:\nInterest before FISIM\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.3 Other primary\nincome\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.3.1 Taxes on\nproduction and on\nimports\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.3.2 Subsidies\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.3.3 Rent\n0\n0\n0\nBalance on goods,\nservices, and\nprimary income\n13559.82693991272\n16866.028091587756\n98\n1.C Secondary\nincome\n3585.8650401080213\n137.09323125721144\n43\nBalance on\nsecondary income\n(+ Surplus; -\nDeficit)\n3448.77180885081\n0\n39\n1.C.1 General\ngovernment\n295.06751093362027\n8.2480112520276982\n32\n1.C.1.1 Current taxes\non income, wealth,\netc.\n0\nn.a\n0\nOf which:1.C.1.1.1\npayable by border,\nseasonal, and other\nshort-term workers\n0\nn.a\n0\n1.C.1.2 Social\ncontributions\n0\nn.a\n0\nOf which:1.C.1.2.1\npayable by border,\nseasonal, and other\nshort-term workers\n0\nn.a\n0\n1.C.1.3 Social\nbenefits\nn.a\n0\nn.\n1.C.1.4 Current\ninternational\ncooperation\n33.927799931355423\n8.2480112520276982\n33\n1.C.1.5\nMiscellaneous\ncurrent transfers of\ngeneral government\n261.13971100226485\n0\n29\nOf which: 1.C.1.5.1\nCurrent transfers to\nNPISHs\n0\n0\n0\n1.C.2 Financial\ncorporations,\nnonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds, and\nNPISHs\n3290.797529174401\n128.84522000518376\n40\n1.C.2.1 Personal\ntransfers (Current\ntransfers between\nresident and\nnonresident\nhousehold)\n3271.0540360488626\n5.8881788783662312\n40\nOf which: 1.C.2.1.1\nWorkers’ remittances\n3271.0540360488626\n5.8881788783662312\n40\n1.C.2.2 Other\ncurrent transfers\n0\n0\n0\n1.C.2.0.1 Current\ntaxes on income,\nwealth, etc.\nn.a\n0\nn.\n1.C.2.0.2 Social\ncontributions\n0\n0\n0\n1.C.2.0.3 Social\nbenefits\n0\n0\n0\n1.C.2.0.4 Net nonlife\ninsurance premiums\n19.743493125538521\n122.95704112681753\n7.\n1.C.2.0.5 Nonlife\ninsurance claims\n0\n0\n0\n1.C.2.0.6 Current\ninternational\ncooperation\n0\n0\n0\n1.C.2.0.7\nMiscellaneous\ncurrent transfers\n0\n0\n0\nOf which:1.C.2.0.7.1\nCurrent transfers to\nNPISHs\n0\n0\n0\n1.C.3 Adjustment for\nchange in pension\nentitlements\n0\n0\n0\n2 Capital account\n0\n0\n0\nCapital account\nbalance (+ Surplus;\n- Deficit)\n0\n0\n0\n2.1 Gross\nacquisitions /\ndisposals of\nnonproduced\nnonfinancial assets\n0\n0\n0\n2.2 Capital transfers\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.1 General\ngovernment\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.1.1 Debt\nforgiveness\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.1.2 Other capital\ntransfers\n0\n0\n0\nOf which:2.2.1.2.1\nCapital taxes\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.2 Financial\ncorporations,\nnonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds, and\nNPISHs\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.2.1 Debt\nforgiveness\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.2.2 Other capital\ntransfers\n0\n0\n0\nOf which: 2.2.2.2.1\nCapital taxes\nn.a\n0\nn.\nOf which: 2.2.2.0.1\nBetween households\n0\n0\n0\nOf which:\n0\n0\n0\nfor each item in\ncapital transfers:\n0\n0\n0\nTransfers to NPISHs\n0\n0\n0\nNet lending (+) /\nnet borrowing (-)\n(Balance from\ncurrent and capital\naccounts)\n142.570657175772\n0\n0\nNet acquisition of\nfinancial assets\nNet incurrence of\nliabilities\nNe\nfin\n3 Financial account\n951.0165182103575\n2883.2691884401333\n15\nNet lending / net\nborrowing (from\nfinancial account)\n(+ net lending; - net\nborrowing)\n0\n1932.2526702297801\n20\n3.1 Direct\ninvestment\n253.87966822550149\n738.19718506943684\n28\n3.1.1 Equity and\ninvestment fund\nshares\n253.87966822550149\n736.14863275051562\n28\n3.1.1.1 Equity other\nthan reinvestment of\nearnings\n249.40479382070464\n317.90392679656418\n27\n3.1.1.1.1 Direct\ninvestor in direct\ninvestment\nenterprises\n249.40479382070464\n317.90392679656418\n27\n3.1.1.1.2 Direct\ninvestment\nenterprises in direct\ninvestor (reverse\ninvestment)\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.1.1.3 Between\nfellow enterprises\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.1.1.3.1 if\nultimate controlling\nparent is resident\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.1.1.3.2 if\nultimate controlling\nparent is nonresident\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.1.1.3.3 if\nultimate controlling\nparent is unknown\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.1.2 Reinvestment\nof earnings\n4.4748744047968367\n418.24470595395132\n5.\nOf which: 3.1.1.0.1\nInvestment fund\nshares/units\n0\n0\n0\nOf which: 3.1.1.0.1.1\nMoney market fund\nshares/units\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.2 Debt\ninstruments\n0\n2.0485523189211263\n0\n3.1.2.1 Direct\ninvestor in direct\ninvestment\nenterprises\n0\n2.0485523189211263\n0\n3.1.2.2 Direct\ninvestment\nenterprises in direct\ninvestor (reverse\ninvestment)\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.2.3 Between\nfellow enterprises\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.2.3.1 if ultimate\ncontrolling parent is\nresident\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.2.3.2 if ultimate\ncontrolling parent is\nnonresident\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.2.3.3 if ultimate\ncontrolling parent is\nunknown\n0\n0\n0\nOf which: 3.1.2.0\nDebt securities\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.2.0.1 Direct\ninvestor in direct\ninvestment\nenterprises\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.2.0.2 Direct\ninvestment\nenterprises in direct\ninvestor (reverse\ninvestment)\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.2.0.3 Between\nfellow enterprises\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.2.0.3.1 if\nultimate controlling\nparent is resident\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.2.0.3.2 if\nultimate controlling\nparent is nonresident\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.2.0.3.3 if\nultimate controlling\nparent is unknown\n0\n0\n0\n3.2 Portfolio\ninvestment\n542.44596950663208\n832.39201629101956\n32\n3.2.1 Equity and\ninvestment fund\nshares\n433.95677560530561\n164.33989469390588\n26\n3.2.1.1 Central bank n.a\n0\nn.\n3.2.1.1.9 Monetary\nauthorities\nn.a\n0\nn.\n3.2.1.2 Deposit-\ntaking corporations,\nexcept the central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n3.2.1.3 General\ngovernment\nn.a\n0\nn.\n3.2.1.4 Other sectors 433.95677560530561\n164.33989469390588\n26\n3.2.1.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n3.2.1.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds, and\nNPISHs\n433.95677560530561\n164.33989469390588\n26\n3.2.1.0.1 Equity\nsecurities other than\ninvestment fund\nshares\n0\n0\n0\n3.2.1.0.1.1 Listed\n0\n0\n0\n3.2.1.0.1.2 Unlisted\n0\n0\n0\n3.2.1.0.2 Investment\nfund shares/units\n0\n0\n0\nOf which: 3.2.1.0.2.1\nReinvestment of\nearnings\n0\n0\n0\nOf which:\n3.2.1.0.2.0.1 Money\nmarket fund shares/\nunits\n0\n0\n0\n3.2.2 Debt securities 108.4891939013264\n668.05212159711368\n65\n3.2.2.1 Central bank 0\n0\n0\n3.2.2.1.1 Short-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.2.2.1.2 Long-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.2.2.1.9 Monetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n3.2.1.1.9.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.2.1.1.9.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.2.2.2 Deposit-\ntaking corporations,\nexcept the central\nbank\n0\n161.20346603391206\n0\n3.2.2.2.1 Short-term\n0\n161.20346603391206\n0\n3.2.2.2.2 Long-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.2.2.3 General\ngovernment\n0\n261.11302980901371\n0\n3.2.2.3.1 Short-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.2.2.3.2 Long-term\n0\n261.11302980901371\n0\n3.2.2.4 Other sectors 108.4891939013264\n245.73562575418796\n65\n3.2.2.4.0.1 Short-\nterm\n108.4891939013264\n0\n65\n3.2.2.4.0.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n245.73562575418796\n0\n3.2.2.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n3.2.2.4.1.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.2.2.4.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.2.2.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds, and\nNPISHs\n108.4891939013264\n245.73562575418796\n65\n3.2.2.4.2.1 Short-\nterm\n108.4891939013264\n0\n65\n3.2.2.4.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n245.73562575418796\n0\n3.3 Financial\nderivatives (other\nthan reserves) and\nemployee stock\noptions\n0\n0\n0\n3.3.1 Central bank\n0\n0\n0\n3.3.1.9 Monetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n3.3.2 Deposit-taking\ncorporations, except\nthe central bank\n0\n0\n0\n3.3.3 General\ngovernment\n0\n0\n0\n3.3.4 Other sectors\n0\n0\n0\n3.3.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n3.3.4.2 Nonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds, and\nNPISHs\n0\n0\n0\n3.3.0.1 Financial\nderivatives\n0\n0\n0\n3.3.0.1.1 Options\n0\n0\n0\n3.3.0.1.2 Forward-\ntype contracts\n0\n0\n0\n3.3.0.2.Employee\nstock options\n0\n0\n0\n3.4 Other investment 1484.0085974660494\n1312.6799870796772\n20\n3.4.1 Other equity\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.2 Currency and\ndeposits\n-418.09064630480657 567.39247822049424\n83\n3.4.2.1 Central bank 0\n0\n0\n3.4.2.1.1 Short-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.2.1.2 Long-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.2.1.9 Monetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.2.1.9.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.2.1.9.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.2.2 Deposit-\ntaking corporations,\nexcept the central\nbank\n-162.06002654420715 567.39247822049424\n-8\n3.4.2.2.0.1 Of which:\nInterbank positions\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.2.2.1 Short-term\n-162.06002654420715 567.39247822049424\n-8\n3.4.2.2.2 Long-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.2.3 General\ngovernment\n-106.72187874715614 0\n-2\n3.4.2.3.1 Short-term\n-106.72187874715614 0\n-2\n3.4.2.3.2 Long-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.2.4 Other sectors -149.3087410134433\n0\n19\n3.4.2.4.0.1 Short-\nterm\n-149.3087410134433\n0\n19\n3.4.2.4.0.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.2.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.2.4.1.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.2.4.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.2.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds, and\nNPISHs\n-149.3087410134433\nn.a\n19\n3.4.2.4.2.1 Short-\nterm\n-149.3087410134433\nn.a\n19\n3.4.2.4.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\nn.a\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.3 Loans\n-139.47822860774693 745.28750885918294\n-1\n3.4.3.1 Central bank 0\n0\n0\n3.4.3.1.1 Credit and\nloans with the IMF\n(other than reserves)\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.3.1.2 Other\nshort-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.3.1.3 Other long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.3.1.9 Monetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.3.1.9.1 Credit\nand loans with the\nIMF (other than\nreserves)\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.3.1.9.2 Other\nshort-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.3.1.9.3 Other\nlong-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.3.2 Deposit-\ntaking corporations,\nexcept the central\nbank\n0\n382.66516654191668\n0\n3.4.3.2.1 Short-term\n0\n382.66516654191668\n0\n3.4.3.2.2 Long-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.3.3 General\ngovernment\n0\n177.45058739418235\n0\n3.4.3.3.1 Credit and\nloans with the IMF\n(other than reserves)\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.3.3.2 Other\nshort-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.3.3.3 Other long-\nterm\n0\n177.45058739418235\n0\n3.4.3.4 Other sectors -139.47822860774693 185.17175492308397\n-1\n3.4.3.4.0.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.3.4.0.2 Long-\nterm\n-139.47822860774693 185.17175492308397\n-1\n3.4.3.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.2.4.1.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.2.4.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.3.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds, and\nNPISHs\n-139.47822860774693 185.17175492308397\n-1\n3.4.3.4.2.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.3.4.2.2 Long-\nterm\n-139.47822860774693 185.17175492308397\n-1\n3.4.4 Insurance,\npension, and\nstandardized\nguarantee schemes\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.4.1 Central bank 0\n0\n0\n3.4.4.1.9 Monetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.4.2 Deposit-\ntaking corporations,\nexcept the central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.4.3 General\ngovernment\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.4.4 Other sectors 0\n0\n0\n3.4.4.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.4.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds, and\nNPISHs\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.4.0.1 Nonlife\ninsurance technical\nreserves\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.4.0.2 Life\ninsurance and\nannuity entitlements\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.4.0.3 Pension\nentitlements\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.4.0.4 Claims of\npension funds on\npension managers\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.4.0.5\nEntitlements to\nnonpension benefits\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.4.0.6 Provisions\nfor calls under\nstandardized\nguarantees\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.5 Trade credit\nand advances\n2041.577472378603\n0\n13\n3.4.5.1 Central bank 0\n0\n0\n3.4.5.1.1 Short-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.5.1.2 Long-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.5.1.9 Monetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.5.1.9.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.5.1.9.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.5.2 General\ngovernment\n1122.8676098082317\n0\n74\n3.4.5.2.1 Short-term\n1122.8676098082317\n0\n74\n3.4.5.2.2 Long-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.5.3 Deposit-\ntaking corporations\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.5.3.1 Short-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.5.3.2 Long-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.5.4 Other sectors 918.70986257037123\n0\n60\n3.4.5.4.0.1 Short-\nterm\n918.70986257037123\n0\n60\n3.4.5.4.0.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.5.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.5.4.1.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.5.4.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.5.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds, and\nNPISHs\n918.70986257037123\n0\n60\n3.4.5.4.2.1 Short-\nterm\n918.70986257037123\n0\n60\n3.4.5.4.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6 Other accounts\nreceivable/payable\n—other\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.1 Central bank 0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.1.1 Short-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.1.2 Long-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.1.9 Monetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.1.9.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.1.9.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.2 Deposit-\ntaking corporations,\nexcept the central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.2.1 Short-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.2.2 Long-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.3 General\ngovernment\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.3.1 Short-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.3.2 Long-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.4 Other sectors 0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.4.0.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.4.0.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.4.1.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.4.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds, and\nNPISHs\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.4.2.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.4.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.7 Special\ndrawing rights\nn.a\n0\nn.\n3.5 Reserve assets\n-1329.3177169878254 n.a\n-1\n3.5.1 Monetary gold 0\nn.a\n0\n3.5.1.1 Gold bullion\n0\nn.a\n0\n3.5.1.2 Unallocated\ngold accounts\n0\nn.a\n0\n3.5.2 Special\ndrawing rights\n0\nn.a\n0\n3.5.3 Reserve\nposition in the IMF\n0\nn.a\n0\n3.5.4 Other reserve\nassets\n-1329.3177169878254 n.a\n-1\n3.5.4.1 Currency and\ndeposits\n-1329.3177169878254 n.a\n-1\n3.5.4.1.1 Claims on\nmonetary authorities\n-1329.3177169878254 n.a\n-1\n3.5.4.1.2 Claims on\nother entities\n0\nn.a\n0\n3.5.4.2 Securities\n0\nn.a\n0\n3.5.4.2.1 Debt\nsecurities\n0\nn.a\n0\n3.5.4.2.1.1 Short-\nterm\n0\nn.a\n0\n3.5.4.2.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\nn.a\n0\n3.5.4.2.2 Equity and\ninvestment fund\nshares\n0\nn.a\n0\n3.5.4.3 Financial\nderivatives\n0\nn.a\n0\n3.5.4.4 Other claims 0\n0\n0\n3 Total assets/\nliabilities\n811.53828960261058\n3628.5566972993161\n13\nOf which: (by\ninstrument):\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.1 Equity and\ninvestment fund\nshares\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.1.1 Equity\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.1.2 Investment\nfund shares\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.2 Debt\ninstruments\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.2.1 Special\ndrawing rights\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.2.2 Currency and\ndeposits\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.2.3 Debt\nsecurities\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.2.4 Loans\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.2.5 Insurance,\npension, and\nstandardized\nguarantee schemes\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.2.6 Other\naccounts receivable/\npayable\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.3 Other financial\nassets and liabilities\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.3.1 Monetary\ngold\n0\nn.a\n0\n3.0.3.2 Financial\nderivatives and ESOs\n0\n0\n0\nCredits\nDebits\nCr\nNet errors and\nomissions\n0\n2074.8233274055501\n32\nMemorandum Items\n2014\n20\nCurrent Account\nBalance as % of GDP\n0.17800834138947405\n-3\nCapital and Financial\nAccount Balance as\n% of GDP\n2.4125244471836291\n-0\nOverall Balance as %\nof GDP\n-1.6597267736864312\n-1\nExternal Reserves -\nStock (US$' Billion)\n34.241540000000001\n28\nNumber of Months\nof Imports\nEquivalent\n6.6711074587332941\n6.\nExternal Debt Stock\n(US$' Billion)\n9.7114499999999992\n10\nEffective Central\nExchange Rate (N/$)\n157.26973499909806\n19\nEnd-Period Exchange\nRate (N/$)\n169.68\n19\nExceptional\nFinancing\n1. Current and/or\ncapital transfers\n0\n0\n1.1 Debt forgiveness 0\n0\n1.2 Other\nintergovernmental\ngrants\n0\n0\n1.3 Grants received\nfrom IMF subsidy\naccounts\n0\n0\n2. Direct investment\n0\n0\n2.1 Equity\ninvestment\nassociated with debt\nreduction\n0\n0\n2.2 Debt instruments 0\n0\n3. Portfolio\ninvestment—\nliabilities\n0\n0\n4. Other investment\n—liabilities\n0\n0\n4.1 Drawings on new\nloans by authorities\nor by other sectors\non behalf of\nauthorities\n0\n0\n4.2 Rescheduling of\nexisting debt\n0\n0\n5.Arrears\n0\n0\n5.1 Accumulation of\narrears\n0\n0\n5.1.1 Principal on\nshort-term debt\n0\n0\n5.1.2 Principal on\nlong-term debt\n0\n0\n5.1.3 Original\ninterest\n0\n0\n5.1.4 Penalty\ninterest\n0\n0\n5.2 Repayment of\narrears\n0\n0\n5.2.1 Principal\n0\n0\n5.2.2 Interest\n0\n0\n5.3 Rescheduling of\narrears\n0\n0\n5.3.1 Principal\n0\n0\n5.3.2 Interest\n0\n0\n5.4 Cancellation of\narrears\n0\n0\n5.4.1 Principal\n0\n0\n5.4.2 Interest\n0\n0\nSource: Central Bank\nof Nigeria\nNotes: 1Revised\nReturn to Menu\nTable D.2.1.4B\nBalance of Payments\nBPM6 Compilation\n(US$' Million)\n2014\n20\nCredits\nDebits\nCr\nCurrent Account\n109020.9249740204\n108114.38909681179\n72\n1. Current account\nbalance (+ Surplus;\n- Deficit)\n906.53587720860378\n0\n0\n1.A Goods and\nservices\n84587.155224017071\n86447.570347590765\n49\nBalance on goods\nand services (+\nSurplus; - Deficit)\n0\n-1860.4151235736936\n0\n1.A.a Goods\n82595.804758248269\n61536.216035210913\n45\nBalance on trade in\ngoods (+ Surplus; -\nDeficit)\n21059.588723037356\n0\n0\n1.A.a.1 General\nmerchandise on a\nBOP basis\n82595.804758248269\n61536.216035210913\n45\nOf which: 1.A.a.1.1\nRe-exports\nn.a\n1.A.a.2 Net exports\nof goods under\nmerchanting\n0\nn.a\n0\n1.A.a.2.1 Goods\nacquired under\nmerchanting\n0\nn.a\n0\n1.A.a.2.2 Goods sold\nunder merchanting\n0\nn.a\n0\n1.A.a.3\nNonmonetary gold\n1.A.b Services\n1991.3504657687999\n24911.354312379855\n31\nBalance on trade in\nservices (+ Surplus;\n- Deficit)\n0\n-22920.003846611056\n0\n1.A.b.1\nManufacturing\nservices on physical\ninputs owned by\nothers\n0\n57.527213832947538\n0\n1.A.b.1.1 Goods for\nprocessing in\nreporting economy—\nGoods returned ,\nreceived\n0\n0\n0\n1.A.b.1.2 Goods for\nprocessing abroad—\nGoods sent, Goods\nreturned\n0\n57.527213832947538\n0\n1.A.b.2 Maintenance\nand repair services\nn.i.e.\n0\n66.819999999999993\n0\n1.A.b.3 Transport\n774.37599999999998\n8740.0540767329567\n18\n1.A.b.3.1 Sea\ntransport\n698.01329999999996\n5101.7390767329562\n17\n1.A.b.3.1.1\nPassenger\n3.1083000000000007\n12.39\n2.\nOf which:\n1.A.b.3.1.1.1\nPayable by border,\nseasonal and other\nshort-term workers\n0\n0\n0\n1.A.b.3.1.2 Freight\n328.79499999999996\n4989.3790767329556\n42\n1.A.b.3.1.3 Other\n366.11\n99.970000000000013\n13\n1.A.b.3.2 Air\ntransport\n76.362700000000004\n3339.3840000000005\n76\n1.A.b.3.2.1\nPassenger\n59.057699999999997\n3318.4440000000004\n53\nOf which:\n1.A.b.3.2.1.1\nPayable by border,\nseasonal and other\nshort-term workers\n0\n0\n0\n1.A.b.3.2.2 Freight\n17.305000000000003\n7.53\n22\n1.A.b.3.2.3 Other\n0\n13.41\n0\n1.A.b.3.3 Other\nmodes of transport\n0\n271.00099999999998\n0\n1.A.b.3.3.1\nPassenger\n0\n62.34\n0\nOf which:\n1.A.b.3.3.1.1\nPayable by border,\nseasonal, and other\nshort-term workers\n0\n0\n0\n1.A.b.3.3.2 Freight\n0\n5.24\n0\n1.A.b.3.3.3 Other\n0\n203.42099999999999\n0\n1.A.b.3.4 Postal and\ncourier services ( For\nall modes of\ntransport)\n0\n27.930000000000007\n0\n1.A.b.3.0.1\nPassenger\n0\n0\n0\nOf which:\n1.A.b.3.0.1.1\nPayable by border,\nseasonal, and other\nshort-term workers\n0\n0\n0\n1.A.b.3.0.2 Freight\n0\n0\n0\n1.A.b.3.0.3 Other\n0\n27.930000000000007\n0\n1.A.b.4 Travel\n543.13000000000011\n5811.3910084650006\n40\n1.A.b.4.1 Business\n0\n1155.324875\n0\n1.A.b.4.1.1\nAcquisition of goods\nand services by\nborder, seasonal,\nand short term\nworkers\n0\n0\n0\n1.A.b.4.1.2 Other\n0\n1155.324875\n0\n1.A.b.4.2 Personal\n543.13000000000011\n4656.0661334650003\n40\n1.A.b.4.2.1 Health-\nrelated\n0\n835.27175000000011\n0\n1.A.b.4.2.2\nEducation-related\n0\n2238.5971875\n0\n1.A.b.4.2.3 Other\n543.13000000000011\n1582.197195965\n40\nFor both business\nand personal travel\n0\n0\n0\n1.A.b.4.0.1 Goods\n0\n0\n0\n1.A.b.4.0.2 Local\ntransport services\n0\n0\n0\n1.A.b.4.0.3\nAccommodation\nservices\n0\n0\n0\n1.A.b.4.0.4 Food-\nserving services\n0\n0\n0\n1.A.b.4.0.5 Other\nservices\n0\n0\n0\nOf which:\n1.A.b.4.0.5.1 Health\nservices\n0\n0\n0\n1.A.b.4.0.5.2\nEducation services\n0\n0\n0\n1.A.b.5 Construction 0\n70\n0\n1.A.b.5.1\nConstruction abroad\n0\n0\n0\n1.A.b.5.2\nConstruction in the\nreporting economy\n0\n70\n0\n1.A.b.6 Insurance\nand pension services\n22.153949999999998\n335.0668503952034\n43\n1.A.b.6.1 Direct\ninsurance\n22.153949999999998\n331.75785039520343\n43\n1.A.b.6.2\nReinsurance\n0\n3.2789999999999999\n0\n1.A.b.6.3 Auxiliary\ninsurance services\n0\n0.03\n0\n1.A.b.6.4 Pension\nand standardized\nguarantee services\n0\n0\n0\n1.A.b.7 Financial\nservices\n14.143355768799999\n1241.30162\n25\n1.A.b.7.1 Explicitly\ncharged and other\nfinancial services\n14.143355768799999\n1241.30162\n25\n1.A.b.7.2 Financial\nintermediation\nservices indirectly\nmeasured (FISIM)\n0\n0\n0\n1.A.b.8 Charges for\nthe use of\nintellectual property\nn.i.e.\n0\n252.83999999999995\n0\n1.A.b.9\nTelecommunications,\ncomputer, and\ninformation services\n53.64\n1544.6479999999999\n77\n1.A.b.9.1\nTelecommunications\nservices\n53.64\n845.88100000000009\n77\n1.A.b.9.2 Computer\nservices\n0\n694.34\n0\n1.A.b.9.3\nInformation services\n0\n4.4270000000000005\n0\n1.A.b.10 Other\nbusiness services\n99.996759999999995\n4823.9544864\n87\n1.A.b.10.1 Research\nand development\nservices\n0\n5.0000000000000001E-3 0\n1.A.b.10.2\nProfessional and\nmanagement\nconsulting services\n0\n1746.0385780000001\n0\n1.A.b.10.3\nTechnical, trade-\nrelated, and other\nbusiness services\n99.996759999999995\n3077.9109084000002\n87\n1.A.b.11 Personal,\ncultural, and\nrecreational services\n0\n301.53100000000001\n0\n1.A.b.11.1\nAudiovisual and\nrelated services\n0\n0.02\n0\n1.A.b.11.2 Other\npersonal, cultural,\nand recreational\nservices\n0\n301.51100000000002\n0\n1.A.b.12\nGovernment goods\nand services n.i.e.\n483.9104000000001\n1666.2200565537503\n48\n1.A.b.0.1 Tourism-\nrelated services in\ntravel and passenger\ntransport\n0\n0\n0\n1.B Primary income\n1633.0380000033281\n20795.111098298894\n93\nBalance on primary\nincome (+ Surplus; -\nDeficit)\n0\n-19162.073098295565\n0\n1.B.1 Compensation\nof employees\n200.07960000000003\n17.175715582500001\n21\n1.B.2 Investment\nincome\n1432.9584000033281\n20777.935382716394\n71\n1.B.2.1 Direct\ninvestment\n316.69889502332813\n19667.958116174901\n30\n1.B.2.1.1 Income on\nequity and\ninvestment fund\nshares\n313.74250000000001\n19625.528048868502\n29\n1.B.2.1.1.1\nDividends and\nwithdrawals from\nincome of quasi-\ncorporation\n285.28899999999999\n16966.118048868502\n27\n1.B.2.1.1.1.1 Direct\ninvestor in direct\ninvestment\nenterprises\n285.28899999999999\n16966.118048868502\n27\n1.B.2.1.1.1.2 Direct\ninvestment\nenterprises in direct\ninvestor (reverse\ninvestment)\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.2.1.1.1.3\nBetween fellow\nenterprises\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.2.1.1.1.3.1 if\nultimate controlling\nparent is resident\n1.B.2.1.1.1.3.2 if\nultimate controlling\nparent is nonresident\n1.B.2.1.1.1.3.3 if\nultimate controlling\nparent is unknown\n1.B.2.1.1.2\nReinvested earnings\n28.453500000000002\n2659.41\n27\nInvestment income\nattributable to\npolicyholders in\ninsurance, pension\nschemes, and\nstandardized\nguarantees, and to\ninvestment fund\nshareholders\nOf which:\nInvestment income\nattributable to\ninvestment fund\nshareholders\n1.B.2.1.2 Interest\n2.9563950233281497\n42.430067306399998\n2.\n1.B.2.1.2.1 Direct\ninvestor in direct\ninvestment\nenterprises\n2.9563950233281497\n42.430067306399998\n2.\n1.B.2.1.2.2 Direct\ninvestment\nenterprises in direct\ninvestor (reverse\ninvestment)\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.2.1.2.3 Between\nfellow enterprises\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.2.1.2.3.1 if\nultimate controlling\nparent is resident\n1.B.2.1.2.3.2 if\nultimate controlling\nparent is nonresident\n1.B.2.1.2.3.3 if\nultimate controlling\nparent is unknown\n1.B.2.1.2M\nMemorandum:\nInterest before FISIM\n1.B.2.2 Portfolio\ninvestment\n24.570249999999998\n537.64726654149217\n23\n1.B.2.2.1 Investment\nincome on equity\nand investment fund\nshares\n0\n287.493139783\n0\n1.B.2.2.1.1\nDividends on equity\nexcluding\ninvestment fund\nshares\n0\n287.493139783\n0\n1.B.2.2.1.2\nInvestment income\nattributable to\ninvestment fund\nshareholders\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.2.2.1.2.1\nDividends\n1.B.2.2.1.2.2\nReinvested earnings\n1.B.2.2.2 Interest\n24.570249999999998\n250.1541267584922\n23\n1.B.2.2.2.1 Short-\nterm\n24.570249999999998\n142.23541666666665\n23\n1.B.2.2.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n107.91871009182555\n0\n1.B.2.3 Other\ninvestment\n886.8599999999999\n572.32999999999993\n22\n1.B.2.3.1\nWithdrawals from\nincome of quasi-\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.2.3.2 Interest\n886.8599999999999\n572.32999999999993\n22\n1.B.2.3.2M\nMemorandum:\nInterest before FISIM\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.2.3.3 Investment\nincome attributable\nto policyholders in\ninsurance, pension\nschemes, and\nstandardized\nguarantee schemes\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.2.4 Reserve\nassets\n204.82925498\n0\n16\n1.B.2.4.1 Income on\nequity and\ninvestment fund\nshares\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.2.4.2 Interest\n204.82925498\n0\n16\n1.B.2.4.2M\nMemorandum:\nInterest before FISIM\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.3 Other primary\nincome\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.3.1 Taxes on\nproduction and on\nimports\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.3.2 Subsidies\n0\n0\n0\n1.B.3.3 Rent\n0\n0\n0\nBalance on goods,\nservices, and\nprimary income\n86220.193224020404\n107242.68144588966\n49\n1.C Secondary\nincome\n22800.731749999999\n871.7076509221414\n22\nBalance on\nsecondary income\n(+ Surplus; -\nDeficit)\n21929.024099077858\n0\n20\n1.C.1 General\ngovernment\n1876.1875\n52.445\n16\n1.C.1.1 Current taxes\non income, wealth,\netc.\n0\nn.a\n0\nOf which:1.C.1.1.1\npayable by border,\nseasonal, and other\nshort-term workers\n0\nn.a\n0\n1.C.1.2 Social\ncontributions\n0\nn.a\n0\nOf which:1.C.1.2.1\npayable by border,\nseasonal, and other\nshort-term workers\n0\nn.a\n0\n1.C.1.3 Social\nbenefits\nn.a\n0\nn.\n1.C.1.4 Current\ninternational\ncooperation\n215.73000000000002\n52.445\n16\n1.C.1.5\nMiscellaneous\ncurrent transfers of\ngeneral government\n1660.4575\n0\n15\nOf which: 1.C.1.5.1\nCurrent transfers to\nNPISHs\n0\n0\n0\n1.C.2 Financial\ncorporations,\nnonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds, and\nNPISHs\n20924.544249999999\n819.26265092214135\n20\n1.C.2.1 Personal\ntransfers (Current\ntransfers between\nresident and\nnonresident\nhousehold)\n20799.0052\n37.44\n20\nOf which: 1.C.2.1.1\nWorkers’ remittances\n20799.0052\n37.44\n20\n1.C.2.2 Other\ncurrent transfers\n0\n0\n0\n1.C.2.0.1 Current\ntaxes on income,\nwealth, etc.\nn.a\n0\nn.\n1.C.2.0.2 Social\ncontributions\n0\n0\n0\n1.C.2.0.3 Social\nbenefits\n0\n0\n0\n1.C.2.0.4 Net nonlife\ninsurance premiums\n125.53904999999999\n781.82265092214141\n36\n1.C.2.0.5 Nonlife\ninsurance claims\n0\n0\n0\n1.C.2.0.6 Current\ninternational\ncooperation\n0\n0\n0\n1.C.2.0.7\nMiscellaneous\ncurrent transfers\n0\n0\n0\nOf which:1.C.2.0.7.1\nCurrent transfers to\nNPISHs\n0\n0\n0\n1.C.3 Adjustment for\nchange in pension\nentitlements\n0\n0\n0\n2 Capital account\n0\n0\n0\nCapital account\nbalance (+ Surplus;\n- Deficit)\n0\n0\n0\n2.1 Gross\nacquisitions /\ndisposals of\nnonproduced\nnonfinancial assets\n2.2 Capital transfers\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.1 General\ngovernment\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.1.1 Debt\nforgiveness\n2.2.1.2 Other capital\ntransfers\nOf which:2.2.1.2.1\nCapital taxes\n2.2.2 Financial\ncorporations,\nnonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds, and\nNPISHs\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.2.1 Debt\nforgiveness\n2.2.2.2 Other capital\ntransfers\nOf which: 2.2.2.2.1\nCapital taxes\nn.a\nn.\nOf which: 2.2.2.0.1\nBetween households\nOf which:\nfor each item in\ncapital transfers:\nTransfers to NPISHs\nNet lending (+) /\nnet borrowing (-)\n(Balance from\ncurrent and capital\naccounts)\n906.53587720860378\n0\n0\nNet acquisition of\nfinancial assets\nNet incurrence of\nliabilities\nNe\nfin\n3 Financial account\n6047.0408894363027\n18333.274284824533\n10\nNet lending / net\nborrowing (from\nfinancial account)\n(+ net lending; - net\nborrowing)\n0\n-12286.23339538823\n53\n3.1 Direct\ninvestment\n1614.2945\n4693.8286318958335\n14\n3.1.1 Equity and\ninvestment fund\nshares\n1614.2945\n4680.8029068958331\n14\n3.1.1.1 Equity other\nthan reinvestment of\nearnings\n1585.8409999999999\n2021.3929068958332\n14\n3.1.1.1.1 Direct\ninvestor in direct\ninvestment\nenterprises\n1585.8409999999999\n2021.3929068958332\n14\n3.1.1.1.2 Direct\ninvestment\nenterprises in direct\ninvestor (reverse\ninvestment)\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.1.1.3 Between\nfellow enterprises\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.1.1.3.1 if\nultimate controlling\nparent is resident\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.1.1.3.2 if\nultimate controlling\nparent is nonresident\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.1.1.3.3 if\nultimate controlling\nparent is unknown\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.1.2 Reinvestment\nof earnings\n28.453500000000002\n2659.41\n27\nOf which: 3.1.1.0.1\nInvestment fund\nshares/units\n0\n0\n0\nOf which: 3.1.1.0.1.1\nMoney market fund\nshares/units\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.2 Debt\ninstruments\n0\n13.025724999999998\n0\n3.1.2.1 Direct\ninvestor in direct\ninvestment\nenterprises\n0\n13.025724999999998\n0\n3.1.2.2 Direct\ninvestment\nenterprises in direct\ninvestor (reverse\ninvestment)\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.2.3 Between\nfellow enterprises\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.2.3.1 if ultimate\ncontrolling parent is\nresident\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.2.3.2 if ultimate\ncontrolling parent is\nnonresident\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.2.3.3 if ultimate\ncontrolling parent is\nunknown\n0\n0\n0\nOf which: 3.1.2.0\nDebt securities\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.2.0.1 Direct\ninvestor in direct\ninvestment\nenterprises\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.2.0.2 Direct\ninvestment\nenterprises in direct\ninvestor (reverse\ninvestment)\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.2.0.3 Between\nfellow enterprises\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.2.0.3.1 if\nultimate controlling\nparent is resident\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.2.0.3.2 if\nultimate controlling\nparent is nonresident\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.2.0.3.3 if\nultimate controlling\nparent is unknown\n0\n0\n0\n3.2 Portfolio\ninvestment\n3449.1440423025001\n5292.7666998090463\n16\n3.2.1 Equity and\ninvestment fund\nshares\n2759.315233842\n1044.9556279525004\n13\n3.2.1.1 Central bank n.a\n0\nn.\n3.2.1.1.9 Monetary\nauthorities\nn.a\n0\nn.\n3.2.1.2 Deposit-\ntaking corporations,\nexcept the central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n3.2.1.3 General\ngovernment\nn.a\n0\nn.\n3.2.1.4 Other sectors 2759.315233842\n1044.9556279525004\n13\n3.2.1.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n3.2.1.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds, and\nNPISHs\n2759.315233842\n1044.9556279525004\n13\n3.2.1.0.1 Equity\nsecurities other than\ninvestment fund\nshares\n0\n0\n0\n3.2.1.0.1.1 Listed\n0\n0\n0\n3.2.1.0.1.2 Unlisted\n0\n0\n0\n3.2.1.0.2 Investment\nfund shares/units\n0\n0\n0\nOf which: 3.2.1.0.2.1\nReinvestment of\nearnings\n0\n0\n0\nOf which:\n3.2.1.0.2.0.1 Money\nmarket fund shares/\nunits\n0\n0\n0\n3.2.2 Debt securities 689.8288084605\n4247.8110718565458\n33\n3.2.2.1 Central bank 0\n0\n0\n3.2.2.1.1 Short-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.2.2.1.2 Long-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.2.2.1.9 Monetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n3.2.1.1.9.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.2.1.1.9.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.2.2.2 Deposit-\ntaking corporations,\nexcept the central\nbank\n0\n1025.0126385399999\n0\n3.2.2.2.1 Short-term\n0\n1025.0126385399999\n0\n3.2.2.2.2 Long-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.2.2.3 General\ngovernment\n0\n1660.2878475665468\n0\n3.2.2.3.1 Short-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.2.2.3.2 Long-term\n0\n1660.2878475665468\n0\n3.2.2.4 Other sectors 689.8288084605\n1562.5105857499998\n33\n3.2.2.4.0.1 Short-\nterm\n689.8288084605\n0\n33\n3.2.2.4.0.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n1562.5105857499998\n0\n3.2.2.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n3.2.2.4.1.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.2.2.4.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.2.2.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds, and\nNPISHs\n689.8288084605\n1562.5105857499998\n33\n3.2.2.4.2.1 Short-\nterm\n689.8288084605\n0\n33\n3.2.2.4.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n1562.5105857499998\n0\n3.3 Financial\nderivatives (other\nthan reserves) and\nemployee stock\noptions\n0\n0\n0\n3.3.1 Central bank\n0\n0\n0\n3.3.1.9 Monetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n3.3.2 Deposit-taking\ncorporations, except\nthe central bank\n0\n0\n0\n3.3.3 General\ngovernment\n0\n0\n0\n3.3.4 Other sectors\n0\n0\n0\n3.3.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n3.3.4.2 Nonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds, and\nNPISHs\n0\n0\n0\n3.3.0.1 Financial\nderivatives\n0\n0\n0\n3.3.0.1.1 Options\n0\n0\n0\n3.3.0.1.2 Forward-\ntype contracts\n0\n0\n0\n3.3.0.2.Employee\nstock options\n0\n0\n0\n3.4 Other investment 9436.0723471337969\n8346.6789531196537\n13\n3.4.1 Other equity\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.2 Currency and\ndeposits\n-2658.4304113388653 3607.7664798236497\n72\n3.4.2.1 Central bank 0\n0\n0\n3.4.2.1.1 Short-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.2.1.2 Long-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.2.1.9 Monetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.2.1.9.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.2.1.9.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.2.2 Deposit-\ntaking corporations,\nexcept the central\nbank\n-1030.4590806688684 3607.7664798236497\n-4\n3.4.2.2.0.1 Of which:\nInterbank positions\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.2.2.1 Short-term\n-1030.4590806688684 3607.7664798236497\n-4\n3.4.2.2.2 Long-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.2.3 General\ngovernment\n-678.59133066999948 0\n-1\n3.4.2.3.1 Short-term\n-678.59133066999948 0\n-1\n3.4.2.3.2 Long-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.2.4 Other sectors -949.37999999999738 0\n13\n3.4.2.4.0.1 Short-\nterm\n-949.37999999999738 0\n13\n3.4.2.4.0.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.2.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.2.4.1.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.2.4.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.2.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds, and\nNPISHs\n-949.37999999999738 n.a\n13\n3.4.2.4.2.1 Short-\nterm\n-949.37999999999738 n.a\n13\n3.4.2.4.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\nn.a\n0\n-886.87266249000061 4738.9124732960045\n-7\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.3 Loans\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.3.1 Central bank 0\n0\n0\n3.4.3.1.1 Credit and\nloans with the IMF\n(other than reserves)\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.3.1.2 Other\nshort-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.3.1.3 Other long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.3.1.9 Monetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.3.1.9.1 Credit\nand loans with the\nIMF (other than\nreserves)\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.3.1.9.2 Other\nshort-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.3.1.9.3 Other\nlong-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.3.2 Deposit-\ntaking corporations,\nexcept the central\nbank\n0\n2433.1774104160045\n0\n3.4.3.2.1 Short-term\n0\n2433.1774104160045\n0\n3.4.3.2.2 Long-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.3.3 General\ngovernment\n0\n1128.3200000000002\n0\n3.4.3.3.1 Credit and\nloans with the IMF\n(other than reserves)\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.3.3.2 Other\nshort-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.3.3.3 Other long-\nterm\n0\n1128.3200000000002\n0\n3.4.3.4 Other sectors -886.87266249000061 1177.4150628799998\n-7\n3.4.3.4.0.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.3.4.0.2 Long-\nterm\n-886.87266249000061 1177.4150628799998\n-7\n3.4.3.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.2.4.1.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.2.4.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.3.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds, and\nNPISHs\n-886.87266249000061 1177.4150628799998\n-7\n3.4.3.4.2.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.3.4.2.2 Long-\nterm\n-886.87266249000061 1177.4150628799998\n-7\n3.4.4 Insurance,\npension, and\nstandardized\nguarantee schemes\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.4.1 Central bank 0\n0\n0\n3.4.4.1.9 Monetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.4.2 Deposit-\ntaking corporations,\nexcept the central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.4.3 General\ngovernment\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.4.4 Other sectors 0\n0\n0\n3.4.4.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.4.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds, and\nNPISHs\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.4.0.1 Nonlife\ninsurance technical\nreserves\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.4.0.2 Life\ninsurance and\nannuity entitlements\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.4.0.3 Pension\nentitlements\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.4.0.4 Claims of\npension funds on\npension managers\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.4.0.5\nEntitlements to\nnonpension benefits\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.4.0.6 Provisions\nfor calls under\nstandardized\nguarantees\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.5 Trade credit\nand advances\n12981.375420962662\n0\n68\n3.4.5.1 Central bank 0\n0\n0\n3.4.5.1.1 Short-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.5.1.2 Long-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.5.1.9 Monetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.5.1.9.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.5.1.9.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.5.2 General\ngovernment\n7139.7564815294645\n0\n37\n3.4.5.2.1 Short-term\n7139.7564815294645\n0\n37\n3.4.5.2.2 Long-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.5.3 Deposit-\ntaking corporations\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.5.3.1 Short-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.5.3.2 Long-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.5.4 Other sectors 5841.6189394331977\n0\n30\n3.4.5.4.0.1 Short-\nterm\n5841.6189394331977\n0\n30\n3.4.5.4.0.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.5.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.5.4.1.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.5.4.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.5.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds, and\nNPISHs\n5841.6189394331977\n0\n30\n3.4.5.4.2.1 Short-\nterm\n5841.6189394331977\n0\n30\n3.4.5.4.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6 Other accounts\nreceivable/payable\n—other\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.1 Central bank 0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.1.1 Short-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.1.2 Long-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.1.9 Monetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.1.9.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.1.9.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.2 Deposit-\ntaking corporations,\nexcept the central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.2.1 Short-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.2.2 Long-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.3 General\ngovernment\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.3.1 Short-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.3.2 Long-term\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.4 Other sectors 0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.4.0.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.4.0.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.4.1.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.4.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds, and\nNPISHs\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.4.2.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.6.4.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.7 Special\ndrawing rights\nn.a\nn.\n3.5 Reserve assets\n-8452.4699999999939 n.a\n-5\n3.5.1 Monetary gold 0\nn.a\n0\n3.5.1.1 Gold bullion\n0\nn.a\n0\n3.5.1.2 Unallocated\ngold accounts\n0\nn.a\n0\n3.5.2 Special\ndrawing rights\n0\nn.a\n0\n3.5.3 Reserve\nposition in the IMF\n0\nn.a\n0\n3.5.4 Other reserve\nassets\n-8452.4699999999939 n.a\n-5\n3.5.4.1 Currency and\ndeposits\n-8452.4699999999939 n.a\n-5\n3.5.4.1.1 Claims on\nmonetary authorities\n-8452.4699999999939 n.a\n-5\n3.5.4.1.2 Claims on\nother entities\n0\nn.a\n0\n3.5.4.2 Securities\n0\nn.a\n0\n3.5.4.2.1 Debt\nsecurities\n0\nn.a\n0\n3.5.4.2.1.1 Short-\nterm\n0\nn.a\n0\n3.5.4.2.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\nn.a\n0\n3.5.4.2.2 Equity and\ninvestment fund\nshares\n0\nn.a\n0\n3.5.4.3 Financial\nderivatives\n0\nn.a\n0\n3.5.4.4 Other claims 0\n0\n3 Total assets/\nliabilities\n5160.1682269463017\n23072.186758120537\n99\nOf which: (by\ninstrument):\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.1 Equity and\ninvestment fund\nshares\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.1.1 Equity\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.1.2 Investment\nfund shares\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.2 Debt\ninstruments\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.2.1 Special\ndrawing rights\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.2.2 Currency and\ndeposits\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.2.3 Debt\nsecurities\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.2.4 Loans\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.2.5 Insurance,\npension, and\nstandardized\nguarantee schemes\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.2.6 Other\naccounts receivable/\npayable\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.3 Other financial\nassets and liabilities\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.3.1 Monetary\ngold\n0\nn.a\n0\n3.0.3.2 Financial\nderivatives and ESOs\n0\n0\n0\nCredits\nDebits\nCr\nNet errors and\nomissions\n0\n-13192.769272596834\n20\nMemorandum Items\n2014\n20\nCurrent Account\nBalance as % of GDP\n0.17800834138947405\n-3\nCapital and Financial\nAccount Balance as\n% of GDP\n2.4125244471836291\n-1\nOverall Balance as %\nof GDP\n-1.6597267736864312\n-1\nExternal Reserves -\nStock (US$' Billion)\n34.241540000000001\n28\nNumber of Months\nof Imports\nEquivalent\n6.6711074587332941\n6.\nExternal Debt Stock\n(US$' Billion)\n9.711450000000001\n10\nEffective Central\nExchange Rate (N/$)\n252.68969999999999\n19\nEnd-Period Exchange\nRate (N/$)\n305\n19\nExceptional\nFinancing\n1. Current and/or\ncapital transfers\n0\n0\n1.1 Debt forgiveness 0\n0\n1.2 Other\nintergovernmental\ngrants\n0\n0\n1.3 Grants received\nfrom IMF subsidy\naccounts\n0\n0\n2. Direct investment\n0\n0\n2.1 Equity\ninvestment\nassociated with debt\nreduction\n0\n0\n2.2 Debt instruments 0\n0\n3. Portfolio\ninvestment—\nliabilities\n0\n0\n4. Other investment\n—liabilities\n0\n0\n4.1 Drawings on new\nloans by authorities\nor by other sectors\non behalf of\nauthorities\n0\n0\n4.2 Rescheduling of\nexisting debt\n0\n0\n5.Arrears\n0\n0\n5.1 Accumulation of\narrears\n0\n0\n5.1.1 Principal on\nshort-term debt\n0\n5.1.2 Principal on\nlong-term debt\n0\n0\n5.1.3 Original\ninterest\n0\n0\n5.1.4 Penalty\ninterest\n0\n0\n5.2 Repayment of\narrears\n0\n0\n5.2.1 Principal\n0\n5.2.2 Interest\n0\n0\n5.3 Rescheduling of\narrears\n0\n0\n5.3.1 Principal\n0\n0\n5.3.2 Interest\n0\n0\n5.4 Cancellation of\narrears\n0\n0\n5.4.1 Principal\n0\n0\n5.4.2 Interest\n0\n0\nSource: Central Bank\nof Nigeria\nNotes: 1Revised\n2Provisional\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable\nD.2.2.1A:\nInternational\nInvestment\nPosition (₦'\nBillion)\nType of\nAsset/\nLiability\n2005\n2006\n2007\nNet\ninternational\ninvestment\nposition of\nNigeria\n-2859.2378615399994\n709.21602053116294\n1036.56\nASSETS\n5396.3313171600003\n7759.720232931164\n8907.35\nDirect\ninvestment\nabroad\n39.347579999999994\n80.102049600000015\n177.712\nEquity\nCapital and\nReinvested\nEarnings\n39.347579999999994\n80.102049600000015\n177.712\nDebt\nInstrument\n0\n0\n0\nPortfolio\ninvestment\nabroad\n367.83134045999998\n557.87367977999997\n732.395\nEquity\nSecurities\n331.79879407499999\n503.22469522499995\n665.805\nMonetary\nAuthority\n0\n0\n0\nGeneral\nGovernment\n0\n0\n0\nBanks\n331.79879407499999\n503.22469522499995\n665.805\nOther Sector 0\n0\n0\nDebt\nSecurities\n36.032546385000003\n54.648984555000013\n66.5901\nBonds and\nNotes\n0\n0\n0\nMonetary\nAuthority\n0\n0\n0\nGeneral\nGovernment\n0\n0\n0\nBanks\n0\n0\n0\nOther Sector 0\n0\n0\nMoney\nMarket\n36.032546385000003\n54.648984555000013\n66.5901\nMonetary\nAuthority\n0\n0\n0\nGeneral\nGovernment\n0\n0\n0\nBanks\n36.032546385000003\n54.648984555000013\n66.5901\nOther Sector 0\n0\n0\nFinancial\nDerivatives\n0\n0\n0\nMonetary\nAuthority\n0\n0\n0\nGeneral\nGovernment\n0\n0\n0\nBanks\n0\n0\n0\nOther Sector 0\n0\n0\nOther Assets 1331.0300333999999\n1696.1659338511631\n1941.47\nTrade Credit 423.0359952\n602.45981870000003\n213.828\nMonetary\nAuthority\n0\n0\n0\nGeneral\nGovernment\n0\n0\n0\nBanks\n0\n0\n0\nOther Sector 423.0359952\n602.45981870000003\n213.828\nLoans\n120.49349489999999\n134.80150839999999\n137.752\nMonetary\nAuthority\n0\n0\n0\nLong-term\n0\n0\n0\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\nGeneral\nGovernment\n0\n0\n0\nLong-term\n0\n0\n0\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\nBanks\n120.49349489999999\n134.80150839999999\n137.752\nLong-term\n0\n0\n0\nShort-term\n120.49349489999999\n134.80150839999999\n137.752\nOther Sector 0\n0\n0\nLong-term\n0\n0\n0\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\nCurrency\nand Deposits\n787.50054329999989\n958.90460675116287\n1589.89\nMonetary\nAuthority\n0\n0\n0\nGeneral\nGovernment\n112.7425428\n95.627850400000028\n238.223\nBanks\n463.23869999999999\n638.1051848511629\n930.748\nOther Sector 211.51930049999999\n225.17157150000003\n420.919\nReserve\nAssets\n3658.1223633\n5425.578569700001\n6055.77\nGold\n0\n0\n0\nSpecial\nDrawing\nRights\n5.3418899999999991E-2 5.3873400000000002E-2 9.43760\nReserve\nPosition in\nthe Fund\n(IMF)\n0\n0\n0\nForeign\nExchange\n3658.0689444\n5425.5246963000009\n6055.67\n2005\n2006\n2007\nLIABILITIES 8255.5691786999996\n7050.5042124000001\n7870.78\nDirect\ninvestment\nin Reporting\nEconomy\n3432.4900499999999\n4007.5152387000007\n4403.76\nEquity\nCapital and\nReinvested\nEarnings\n3260.8655475\n3838.5515812000003\n4243.88\nDebt\nInstrument\n171.62450250000001\n168.96365750000001\n159.882\nPortfolio\ninvestment\nin Reporting\nEconomy\n896.08250399999997\n1244.6281812999998\n1459.13\nEquity\nSecurities\n462.52949999999998\n684.32045000000005\n801.545\nMonetary\nAuthority\n0\n0\n0\nGeneral\nGovernment\n0\n0\n0\nBanks\n0\n0\n0\nOther Sector 462.52949999999998\n684.32045000000005\n801.545\nDebt\nSecurities\n433.55300399999993\n560.3077313\n657.588\nBonds and\nNotes\n399.07826999999997\n522.66176900000005\n605.515\nMonetary\nAuthority\n0\n0\n0\nGeneral\nGovernment\n399.07826999999997\n522.66176900000005\n605.515\nBanks\n0\n0\n0\nOther Sector 0\n0\n0\nMoney\nMarket\n34.474734000000005\n37.645962300000008\n52.0731\nMonetary\nAuthority\n0\n0\n0\nGeneral\nGovernment\n0\n0\n0\nBanks\n34.474734000000005\n37.645962300000008\n52.0731\nOther Sector 0\n0\n0\nFinancial\nDerivatives\n0\n0\n0\nMonetary\nAuthority\n0\n0\n0\nGeneral\nGovernment\n0\n0\n0\nBanks\n0\n0\n0\nOther Sector 0\n0\n0\nOther\nLiabilities\n3926.9966246999998\n1798.3607924000003\n2007.88\nTrade Credit 0\n0\n0\nMonetary\nAuthority\n0\n0\n0\nGeneral\nGovernment\n0\n0\n0\nBanks\n0\n0\n0\nOther Sector 0\n0\n0\nLoans\n3209.2290146999999\n1078.2235103000003\n1245.30\nMonetary\nAuthority\n0\n0\n0\nLong-term\n0\n0\n0\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\nGeneral\nGovernment\n2667.8440979999996\n519.00607400000013\n416.811\nLong-term\n2667.8440979999996\n519.00607400000013\n416.811\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\nBanks\n128.3656167\n139.10368420000003\n291.233\nLong-term\n128.3656167\n139.10368420000003\n291.233\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\nOther Sector 413.01929999999999\n420.11375210000006\n537.258\nLong-term\n413.01929999999999\n420.11375210000006\n537.258\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\nCurrency\nand Deposits\n717.76760999999999\n720.13728209999999\n762.585\nMonetary\nAuthority\n0\n0\n0\nGeneral\nGovernment\n0\n0\n0\nBanks\n717.76760999999999\n720.13728209999999\n762.585\nOther Sector 0\n0\n0\nSDR\nAllocations\n0\n0\n0\nSource:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nNotes:\n1Revised\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable\nD.2.2.1B:\nInternational\nInvestment\nPosition\n(US$'\nMillion)\nType of\nAsset/\nLiability\n2005\n2006\n2007\nNet\ninternational\ninvestment\nposition of\nNigeria\n-21945.182758001378 5529.087241998619\n8786.6672419\nASSETS\n41417.847241998621 60495.207241998622 75505.237241\nDirect\ninvestment\nabroad\n302\n624.48\n1506.42\nEquity\nCapital and\nReinvested\nEarnings\n302\n624.48\n1506.42\nDebt\nInstrument\n0\n0\n0\nPortfolio\ninvestment\nabroad\n2823.174\n4349.2139999999999 6208.3240000\nEquity\nSecurities\n2546.6174999999998 3923.1674999999996 5643.8575000\nMonetary\nAuthority\n0\n0\n0\nGeneral\nGovernment\n0\n0\n0\nBanks\n2546.6174999999998 3923.1674999999996 5643.8575000\nOther Sector 0\n0\n0\nDebt\nSecurities\n276.55650000000003 426.04650000000004 564.4665\nBonds and\nNotes\n0\n0\n0\nMonetary\nAuthority\n0\n0\n0\nGeneral\nGovernment\n0\n0\n0\nBanks\n0\n0\n0\nOther Sector 0\n0\n0\nMoney\nMarket\n276.55650000000003 426.04650000000004 564.4665\nMonetary\nAuthority\n0\n0\n0\nGeneral\nGovernment\n0\n0\n0\nBanks\n276.55650000000003 426.04650000000004 564.4665\nOther Sector 0\n0\n0\nFinancial\nDerivatives\n0\n0\n0\nMonetary\nAuthority\n0\n0\n0\nGeneral\nGovernment\n0\n0\n0\nBanks\n0\n0\n0\nOther Sector 0\n0\n0\nOther Assets 10215.903241998618 13223.40324199862\n16457.343241\nTrade Credit 3246.88\n4696.8100000000004 1812.57\nMonetary\nAuthority\n0\n0\n0\nGeneral\nGovernment\n0\n0\n0\nBanks\n0\n0\n0\nOther Sector 3246.88\n4696.8100000000004 1812.57\nLoans\n924.81\n1050.9199999999998 1167.6899999\nMonetary\nAuthority\n0\n0\n0\nLong-term\n0\n0\n0\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\nGeneral\nGovernment\n0\n0\n0\nLong-term\n0\n0\n0\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\nBanks\n924.81\n1050.9199999999998 1167.6899999\nLong-term\n0\n0\n0\nShort-term\n924.81\n1050.9199999999998 1167.6899999\nOther Sector 0\n0\n0\nLong-term\n0\n0\n0\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\nCurrency\nand Deposits\n6044.2132419986183 7475.6732419986192 13477.083241\nMonetary\nAuthority\n0\n0\n0\nGeneral\nGovernment\n865.32\n745.5200000000001\n2019.3600000\nBanks\n3555.4432419986188 4974.703241998619\n7889.7032419\nOther Sector 1623.45\n1755.45\n3568.02\nReserve\nAssets\n28076.77\n42298.11\n51333.15\nGold\n0\n0\n0\nSpecial\nDrawing\nRights\n0.41\n0.42\n0.8\nReserve\nPosition in\nthe Fund\n(IMF)\n0\n0\n0\nForeign\nExchange\n28076.36\n42297.69\n51332.35\n2005\n2006\n2007\nLIABILITIES 63363.03\n54966.12\n66718.569999\nDirect\ninvestment\nin Reporting\nEconomy\n26345\n31242.81\n37329.54\nEquity\nCapital and\nReinvested\nEarnings\n25027.75\n29925.56\n35974.26\nDebt\nInstrument\n1317.25\n1317.25\n1355.28\nPortfolio\ninvestment\nin Reporting\nEconomy\n6877.6\n9703.1899999999987 12368.689999\nEquity\nSecurities\n3550\n5335\n6794.49\nMonetary\nAuthority\n0\n0\n0\nGeneral\nGovernment\n0\n0\n0\nBanks\n0\n0\n0\nOther Sector 3550\n5335\n6794.49\nDebt\nSecurities\n3327.6\n4368.1899999999996 5574.2\nBonds and\nNotes\n3063\n4074.7\n5132.79\nMonetary\nAuthority\n0\n0\n0\nGeneral\nGovernment\n3063\n4074.7\n5132.79\nBanks\n0\n0\n0\nOther Sector 0\n0\n0\nMoney\nMarket\n264.60000000000002 293.49\n441.40999999\nMonetary\nAuthority\n0\n0\n0\nGeneral\nGovernment\n0\n0\n0\nBanks\n264.60000000000002 293.49\n441.40999999\nOther Sector 0\n0\n0\nFinancial\nDerivatives\n0\n0\n0\nMonetary\nAuthority\n0\n0\n0\nGeneral\nGovernment\n0\n0\n0\nBanks\n0\n0\n0\nOther Sector 0\n0\n0\nOther\nLiabilities\n30140.43\n14020.12\n17020.34\nTrade Credit 0\n0\n0\nMonetary\nAuthority\n0\n0\n0\nGeneral\nGovernment\n0\n0\n0\nBanks\n0\n0\n0\nOther Sector 0\n0\n0\nLoans\n24631.43\n8405.8900000000012 10556.11\nMonetary\nAuthority\n0\n0\n0\nLong-term\n0\n0\n0\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\nGeneral\nGovernment\n20476.2\n4046.2000000000007 3533.2000000\nLong-term\n20476.2\n4046.2000000000007 3533.2000000\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\nBanks\n985.23\n1084.46\n2468.71\nLong-term\n985.23\n1084.46\n2468.71\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\nOther Sector 3170\n3275.23\n4554.2\nLong-term\n3170\n3275.23\n4554.2\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\nCurrency\nand Deposits\n5509\n5614.23\n6464.23\nMonetary\nAuthority\n0\n0\n0\nGeneral\nGovernment\n0\n0\n0\nBanks\n5509\n5614.23\n6464.23\nOther Sector 0\n0\n0\nSDR\nAllocations\n0\n0\n0\nSource:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nNotes:\n1Revised\n2Provisional\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable D.2.2.2A\nInternational\nInvestment\nPosition -\nBPM6 (₦'\nBillion)\n2010\n2011\n2012\nAssets\nAssets\nAssets\nNet\nInternational\nInvestment\nPosition\n1413.6207020201125\n1459.3108071623483\n3088.\n1 Direct\ninvestment\n1881.1822382616733\n1979.5674243488475\n2051.\n1.1 Equity and\ninvestment\nfund shares\n808.62912739681997\n851.80428906602424\n881.7\n1.1.1 Direct\ninvestor in\ndirect\ninvestment\nenterprises\n808.62912739681997\n851.80428906602424\n881.7\n1.1.2 Direct\ninvestment\nenterprises in\ndirect investor\n(reverse\ninvestment)\n0\n0\n0\n1.1.3 Between\nfellow\nenterprises\n0\n0\n0\n1.1.3.1 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nresident\n0\n0\n0\n1.1.3.2 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nnonresident\n0\n0\n0\n1.1.3.3 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nunknown\n0\n0\n0\nOf which:\n1.1.0.1\nInvestment\nfund shares/\nunits\n0\n0\n0\nOf which:\n1.1.0.1.1\nMoney market\nfund shares/\nunits\n0\n0\n0\n1.2 Debt\ninstruments\n1072.5531108648534\n1127.7631352828234\n1169.\n1.2.1 Direct\ninvestor in\ndirect\ninvestment\nenterprises\n437.76270634929318\n462.34043856315338\n477.4\n1.2.2 Direct\ninvestment\nenterprises in\ndirect investor\n(reverse\ninvestment)\n0\n0\n0\n1.2.0.1.3\nBetween fellow\nenterprises\n634.79040451556011\n665.42269671966994\n692.1\n1.2.3.1 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nresident\n0\n0\n0\n1.2.3.2 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nnonresident\n634.79040451556011\n665.42269671966994\n692.1\n1.2.3.3 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nunknown\n0\n0\n0\nOf which:\n1.2.0.1 Debt\nsecurities\n0\n0\n0\n1.2.0.1.1\nDirect investor\nin direct\ninvestment\nenterprises\n0\n0\n0\n1.2.0.1.2\nDirect\ninvestment\nenterprises in\ndirect investor\n(reverse\ninvestment)\n0\n0\n0\n1.2.0.1.3\nBetween fellow\nenterprises\n0\n0\n0\n1.2.0.1.3.1 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nresident\n0\n0\n0\n1.2.0.1.3.2 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nnonresident\n0\n0\n0\n1.2.0.1.3.3 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nunknown\n0\n0\n0\n2 Portfolio\ninvestment\n222.24445434889938\n234.08731998781982\n230.4\n2.1 Equity and\ninvestment\nfund shares\n77.246091557323126\n80.980836111355785\n79.11\n2.1.1 Central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n2.1.1.9\nMonetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n2.1.2 Deposit-\ntaking\ncorporations,\nexcept the\ncentral bank\n3.8623045778661567\n4.0490418055677893\n3.955\n2.1.3 General\ngovernment\n0\n0\n0\n2.1.4 Other\nsectors\n73.383786979456971\n76.931794305787989\n75.16\n2.1.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n2.1.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds,\nand NPISHs\n73.383786979456971\n76.931794305787989\n75.16\n2.1.0.1 Equity\nsecurities other\nthan\ninvestment\nfund shares/\nunits\n73.383786979456971\n76.931794305787989\n75.16\n2.1.0.1.1 Listed 73.383786979456971\n76.931794305787989\n75.16\n2.1.0.1.2\nUnlisted\n0\n0\n0\n2.1.0.2\nInvestment\nfund shares/\nunits\n0\n0\n0\nOf which:\n2.1.0.2.1\nMoney market\nfund shares/\nunits\n0\n0\n0\n2.2 Debt\nsecurities\n144.99836279157628\n153.10648387646404\n151.3\n2.2.1 Central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.1.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.1.9\nMonetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n2.1.1.9.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n2.1.1.9.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.2 Deposit-\ntaking\ncorporations,\nexcept the\ncentral bank\n144.98621753119824\n153.09349229813071\n151.2\n2.2.2.1 Short-\nterm\n0.92007367054823397\n0.97152194045947249\n0.960\n2.2.2.2 Long-\nterm\n144.06614386064999\n152.12197035767124\n150.3\n2.2.3 General\ngovernment\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.3.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.3.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.4 Other\nsectors\n1.214526037805494E-2\n1.299157833334416E-2\n1.254\n2.2.4.0.1\nShort-term\n7.7073079676669937E-5 8.2443761668606668E-5 7.960\n2.2.4.0.2 Long-\nterm\n1.2068187298378268E-2 1.2909134571675553E-2 1.246\n2.2.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.4.1.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.4.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds,\nand NPISHs\n1.214526037805494E-2\n1.299157833334416E-2\n1.254\n2.2.4.2.1\nShort-term\n7.7073079676669937E-5 8.2443761668606668E-5 7.960\n2.2.4.2.2 Long-\nterm\n1.2068187298378268E-2 1.2909134571675553E-2 1.246\n3 Financial\nderivatives\n(other than\nreserves) and\nemployee stock\noptions\n0\n0\n0\n3.1 Central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.9 Monetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n3.2 Deposit-\ntaking\ncorporations,\nexcept the\ncentral bank\n0\n0\n0\n3.3 General\ngovernment\n0\n0\n0\n3.4 Other\nsectors\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds,\nand NPISHs\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.1 Financial\nderivatives\n(other than\nreserves)\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.1.1 Options 0\n0\n0\n3.0.1.2\nForward-type\ncontracts\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.2.Employee\nstock options\n0\n0\n0\n4 Other\ninvestment\n6176.2284367924703\n8359.0246484283343\n10311\n4.1 Other\nequity\n0\n0\n0\n4.2 Currency\nand deposits\n4083.6524169815548\n5813.6020724514028\n8055.\n4.2.1 Central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.1.0.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.1.0.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.1.9\nMonetary\nauthorities\n(where\nrelevant)\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.1.9.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.1.9.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.2 Deposit-\ntaking\ncorporations,\nexcept the\ncentral bank\n1287.0494963351669\n1703.1885285371559\n2005.\n4.2.2.1 Short-\nterm\n1287.0494963351669\n1703.1885285371559\n2005.\n4.2.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.3 General\ngovernment\n381.32269424638753\n629.71546772424711\n485.2\n4.2.3.1 Short-\nterm\n381.32269424638753\n629.71546772424711\n485.2\n4.2.3.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4 Other\nsectors\n2415.2802264000002\n3480.6980761899999\n5565.\n4.2.4.0.1\nShort-term\n2415.2802264000002\n3480.6980761899999\n5565.\n4.2.4.0.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4.1.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds,\nand NPISHs\n2415.2802264000002\n3480.6980761899999\n5565.\n4.2.4.2.1\nShort-term\n2415.2802264000002\n3480.6980761899999\n5565.\n4.2.4.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.3 Loans\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.1 Central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.1.1 Credit\nand loans with\nthe IMF (other\nthan reserves)\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.1.2 Other\nshort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.1.3 Other\nlong-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.1.9\nMonetary\nauthorities\n(where\nrelevant)\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.1.9.1\nCredit and\nloans with the\nIMF (other\nthan reserves)\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.1.9.2 Other\nshort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.1.9.3 Other\nlong-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.2 Deposit-\ntaking\ncorporations,\nexcept the\ncentral bank\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.2.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.3 General\ngovernment\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.3.1 Credit\nand loans with\nthe IMF (other\nthan reserves)\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.3.2 Other\nshort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.3.3 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.4 Other\nsectors\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.4.0.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.4.0.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4.1.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds,\nand NPISHs\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.4.2.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.4.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.4 Insurance,\npension, and\nstandardized\nguarantee\nschemes\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.1 Central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.1.9\nMonetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.2 Deposit-\ntaking\ncorporations,\nexcept the\ncentral bank\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.3 General\ngovernment\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.4 Other\nsectors\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds,\nand NPISHs\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.0.1 Nonlife\ninsurance\ntechnical\nreserves\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.0.2 Life\ninsurance and\nannuity\nentitlements\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.0.3 Pension\nentitlements\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.0.4 Claims\nof pension\nfunds on\npension\nmanagers\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.0.5\nEntitlements to\nnonpension\nbenefits\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.0.6\nProvisions for\ncalls under\nstandardized\nguarantees\n0\n0\n0\n4.5 Trade\ncredit and\nadvances\n2092.576019810916\n2545.422575976932\n2255.\n4.5.1 Central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.1.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.1.9\nMonetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.1.9.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.1.9.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.2 General\ngovernment\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.2.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.3 Deposit-\ntaking\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.3.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.3.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.4 Other\nsectors\n2092.576019810916\n2545.422575976932\n2255.\n4.5.4.0.1\nShort-term\n2092.576019810916\n2545.422575976932\n2255.\n4.5.4.0.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.4.1.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.4.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds,\nand NPISHs\n2092.576019810916\n2545.422575976932\n2255.\n4.5.4.2.1\nShort-term\n2092.576019810916\n2545.422575976932\n2255.\n4.5.4.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6 Other\naccounts\nreceivable/\npayable—other\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.1 Central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.1.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.1.9\nMonetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.1.9.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.1.9.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.2 Deposit-\ntaking\ncorporations,\nexcept the\ncentral bank\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.2.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.3 General\ngovernment\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.3.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.3.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4 Other\nsectors\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4.0.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4.0.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4.1.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds,\nand NPISHs\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4.2.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n5 Reserve\nassets\n4837.3053723615794\n5165.7995988196517\n6839.\n5.1 Monetary\ngold\n0\n0\n0\n5.1.1 Gold\nbullion\n0\n0\n0\n5.1.2\nUnallocated\ngold accounts\n0\n0\n0\n5.2 Special\ndrawing rights\n385.89023134098363\n407.04936523171642\n401.7\n5.3 Reserve\nposition in the\nIMF\n0\n0\n0\n5.4 Other\nreserve assets\n4451.415141020595\n4758.7502335879344\n6437.\n5.4.1 Currency\nand deposits\n4202.0916923641871\n4662.7568876297928\n6337.\n5.4.1.1 Claims\non monetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n5.4.1.2 Claims\non other\nentities\n4202.0916923641871\n4662.7568876297928\n6337.\n5.4.2 Securities 249.32344865640843\n95.993345958142413\n100.4\n5.4.2.1 Debt\nsecurities\n249.32344865640843\n95.993345958142413\n100.4\n5.4.2.1.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n5.4.2.1.2 Long-\nterm\n249.32344865640843\n95.993345958142413\n100.4\n5.4.2.2 Equity\nand investment\nfund shares\n0\n0\n0\nof which:\n5.4.2.0.1\nSecurities\nunder repo for\ncash collateral\n0\n0\n0\n5.4.3 Financial\nderivatives\n0\n0\n0\n5.4.4 Other\nclaims\n0\n0\n0\nTotal assets\n13116.960501764621\n15738.478991584652\n19432\nOf which: (by\ninstrument):\n0\n0\n0\n0.1 Equity and\ninvestment\nfund shares\n0\n0\n0\n0.1.1 Equity\n0\n0\n0\n0.1.2\nInvestment\nfund shares\n0\n0\n0\n0.2 Debt\ninstruments\n0\n0\n0\n0.2.1 Special\ndrawing rights\n0\n0\n0\n0.2.2 Currency\nand deposits\n0\n0\n0\n0.2.3 Debt\nsecurities\n0\n0\n0\n0.2.4 Loans\n0\n0\n0\n0.2.5\nInsurance,\npension, and\nstandardized\nguarantee\nschemes\n0\n0\n0\n0.2.6 Other\naccounts\nreceivable/\npayable\n0\n0\n0\n0.3 Other\nfinancial assets\nand liabilities\n0\n0\n0\n0.3.1 Monetary\ngold\n0\n0\n0\n0.3.2 Financial\nderivatives and\nESOs\n0\n0\n0\n2010\n2011\n2012\nLiabilities\nLiabilities\nLiabil\n1 Direct\ninvestment\n7624.5020966317743\n9385.6259484021011\n10217\n1.1 Equity and\ninvestment\nfund shares\n4464.8684658254215\n5496.1733629223745\n5983.\n1.1.1 Direct\ninvestor in\ndirect\ninvestment\nenterprises\n4464.6685844335188\n5495.9273124977481\n5982.\n1.1.2 Direct\ninvestment\nenterprises in\ndirect investor\n(reverse\ninvestment)\n0\n0\n0\n1.1.3 Between\nfellow\nenterprises\n0.19988139190201329\n0.24605042462602492\n0.267\n1.1.3.1 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nresident\n0\n0\n0\n1.1.3.2 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nnonresident\n0.19988139190201329\n0.24605042462602492\n0.267\n1.1.3.3 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nunknown\n0\n0\n0\nOf which:\n1.1.0.1\nInvestment\nfund shares/\nunits\n0\n0\n0\nOf which:\n1.1.0.1.1\nMoney market\nfund shares/\nunits\n0\n0\n0\n1.2 Debt\ninstruments\n3159.6336308063533\n3889.4525854797271\n4234.\n1.2.1 Direct\ninvestor in\ndirect\ninvestment\nenterprises\n1768.7358243076135\n2177.2822196250022\n2370.\n1.2.2 Direct\ninvestment\nenterprises in\ndirect investor\n(reverse\ninvestment)\n0\n0\n0\n1.2.0.1.3\nBetween fellow\nenterprises\n1390.89780649874\n1712.1703658547247\n1863.\n1.2.3.1 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nresident\n0\n0\n0\n1.2.3.2 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nnonresident\n1390.89780649874\n1712.1703658547247\n1863.\n1.2.3.3 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nunknown\n0\n0\n0\nOf which:\n1.2.0.1 Debt\nsecurities\n0\n0\n0\n1.2.0.1.1\nDirect investor\nin direct\ninvestment\nenterprises\n0\n0\n0\n1.2.0.1.2\nDirect\ninvestment\nenterprises in\ndirect investor\n(reverse\ninvestment)\n0\n0\n0\n1.2.0.1.3\nBetween fellow\nenterprises\n0\n0\n0\n1.2.0.1.3.1 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nresident\n0\n0\n0\n1.2.0.1.3.2 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nnonresident\n0\n0\n0\n1.2.0.1.3.3 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nunknown\n0\n0\n0\n2 Portfolio\ninvestment\n2094.3319246980323\n2249.2491289959503\n3439.\n2.1 Equity and\ninvestment\nfund shares\n489.89336240067792\n526.13065087068139\n804.6\n2.1.1 Central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n2.1.1.9\nMonetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n2.1.2 Deposit-\ntaking\ncorporations,\nexcept the\ncentral bank\n45.26614668582264\n48.614472140450957\n74.34\n2.1.3 General\ngovernment\n0\n0\n0\n2.1.4 Other\nsectors\n444.62721571485531\n477.51617873023037\n730.2\n2.1.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n2.1.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds,\nand NPISHs\n444.62721571485531\n477.51617873023037\n730.2\n2.1.0.1 Equity\nsecurities other\nthan\ninvestment\nfund shares/\nunits\n444.62721571485531\n477.51617873023037\n730.2\n2.1.0.1.1 Listed 444.62721571485531\n477.51617873023037\n730.2\n2.1.0.1.2\nUnlisted\n0\n0\n0\n2.1.0.2\nInvestment\nfund shares/\nunits\n0\n0\n0\nOf which:\n2.1.0.2.1\nMoney market\nfund shares/\nunits\n0\n0\n0\n2.2 Debt\nsecurities\n1604.4385622973546\n1723.1184781252691\n2635.\n2.2.1 Central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.1.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.1.9\nMonetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n2.1.1.9.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n2.1.1.9.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.2 Deposit-\ntaking\ncorporations,\nexcept the\ncentral bank\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.2.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.3 General\ngovernment\n1604.4385622973546\n1723.1184781252691\n2635.\n2.2.3.1 Short-\nterm\n1394.093060576507\n1497.2137726894068\n2289.\n2.2.3.2 Long-\nterm\n210.34550172084727\n225.9047054358625\n345.4\n2.2.4 Other\nsectors\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.4.0.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.4.0.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.4.1.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.4.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds,\nand NPISHs\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.4.2.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.4.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3 Financial\nderivatives\n(other than\nreserves) and\nemployee stock\noptions\n0\n0\n0\n3.1 Central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.9 Monetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n3.2 Deposit-\ntaking\ncorporations,\nexcept the\ncentral bank\n0\n0\n0\n3.3 General\ngovernment\n0\n0\n0\n3.4 Other\nsectors\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds,\nand NPISHs\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.1 Financial\nderivatives\n(other than\nreserves)\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.1.1 Options 0\n0\n0\n3.0.1.2\nForward-type\ncontracts\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.2.Employee\nstock options\n0\n0\n0\n4 Other\ninvestment\n1984.505778414702\n2644.2931070242544\n2686.\n4.1 Other\nequity\n0\n0\n0\n4.2 Currency\nand deposits\n15.674746787006914\n125.33087266642478\n122.0\n4.2.1 Central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.1.0.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.1.0.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.1.9\nMonetary\nauthorities\n(where\nrelevant)\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.1.9.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.1.9.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.2 Deposit-\ntaking\ncorporations,\nexcept the\ncentral bank\n15.674746787006914\n125.33087266642478\n122.0\n4.2.2.1 Short-\nterm\n15.674746787006914\n125.33087266642478\n122.0\n4.2.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.3 General\ngovernment\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.3.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.3.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4 Other\nsectors\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4.0.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4.0.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4.1.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds,\nand NPISHs\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4.2.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.3 Loans\n1968.8310316276948\n2518.9622343578294\n2564.\n4.3.1 Central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.1.1 Credit\nand loans with\nthe IMF (other\nthan reserves)\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.1.2 Other\nshort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.1.3 Other\nlong-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.1.9\nMonetary\nauthorities\n(where\nrelevant)\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.1.9.1\nCredit and\nloans with the\nIMF (other\nthan reserves)\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.1.9.2 Other\nshort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.1.9.3 Other\nlong-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.2 Deposit-\ntaking\ncorporations,\nexcept the\ncentral bank\n145.18607502769453\n262.4578204978294\n235.4\n4.3.2.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.2.2 Long-\nterm\n145.18607502769453\n262.4578204978294\n235.4\n4.3.3 General\ngovernment\n684.89241660000016\n896.83261685999992\n1018.\n4.3.3.1 Credit\nand loans with\nthe IMF (other\nthan reserves)\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.3.2 Other\nshort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.3.3 Long-\nterm\n684.89241660000016\n896.83261685999992\n1018.\n4.3.4 Other\nsectors\n1138.75254\n1359.671797\n1310.\n4.3.4.0.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.4.0.2 Long-\nterm\n1138.75254\n1359.671797\n1310.\n4.3.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4.1.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds,\nand NPISHs\n1138.75254\n1359.671797\n1310.\n4.3.4.2.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.4.2.2 Long-\nterm\n1138.75254\n1359.671797\n1310.\n4.4 Insurance,\npension, and\nstandardized\nguarantee\nschemes\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.1 Central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.1.9\nMonetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.2 Deposit-\ntaking\ncorporations,\nexcept the\ncentral bank\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.3 General\ngovernment\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.4 Other\nsectors\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds,\nand NPISHs\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.0.1 Nonlife\ninsurance\ntechnical\nreserves\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.0.2 Life\ninsurance and\nannuity\nentitlements\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.0.3 Pension\nentitlements\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.0.4 Claims\nof pension\nfunds on\npension\nmanagers\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.0.5\nEntitlements to\nnonpension\nbenefits\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.0.6\nProvisions for\ncalls under\nstandardized\nguarantees\n0\n0\n0\n4.5 Trade\ncredit and\nadvances\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.1 Central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.1.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.1.9\nMonetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.1.9.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.1.9.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.2 General\ngovernment\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.2.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.3 Deposit-\ntaking\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.3.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.3.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.4 Other\nsectors\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.4.0.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.4.0.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.4.1.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.4.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds,\nand NPISHs\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.4.2.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.4.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6 Other\naccounts\nreceivable/\npayable—other\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.1 Central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.1.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.1.9\nMonetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.1.9.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.1.9.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.2 Deposit-\ntaking\ncorporations,\nexcept the\ncentral bank\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.2.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.3 General\ngovernment\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.3.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.3.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4 Other\nsectors\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4.0.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4.0.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4.1.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds,\nand NPISHs\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4.2.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.7 Special\ndrawing rights\n0\n0\n0\nTotal liabilities 11703.33979974451\n14279.168184422304\n16343\nOf which: (by\ninstrument):\n0\n0\n0\n0.1 Equity and\ninvestment\nfund shares\n0\n0\n0\n0.1.1 Equity\n0\n0\n0\n0.1.2\nInvestment\nfund shares\n0\n0\n0\n0.2 Debt\ninstruments\n0\n0\n0\n0.2.1 Special\ndrawing rights\n0\n0\n0\n0.2.2 Currency\nand deposits\n0\n0\n0\n0.2.3 Debt\nsecurities\n0\n0\n0\n0.2.4 Loans\n0\n0\n0\n0.2.5\nInsurance,\npension, and\nstandardized\nguarantee\nschemes\n0\n0\n0\n0.2.6 Other\naccounts\nreceivable/\npayable\n0\n0\n0\n0.3 Other\nfinancial assets\nand liabilities\n0\n0\n0\n0.3.1 Monetary\ngold\n0\n0\n0\n0.3.2 Financial\nderivatives and\nESOs\n0\n0\n0\nSource: Central\nBank of\nNigeria\nNotes:\n1Revised\n2Provisional\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable D.2.2.2B\nInternational\nInvestment\nPosition -\nBPM6 (US$'\nMillion)\n2010\n2011\n2012\nAssets\nAssets\nAssets\nNet\nInternational\nInvestment\nPosition\n9450.5996926067164\n9220.5627652154071\n19793\n1 Direct\ninvestment\n12576.428922728126\n12507.771198979241\n13145\n1.1 Equity and\ninvestment\nfund shares\n5405.9976427117253\n5382.0713671581834\n5650.\n1.1.1 Direct\ninvestor in\ndirect\ninvestment\nenterprises\n5405.9976427117253\n5382.0713671581834\n5650.\n1.1.2 Direct\ninvestment\nenterprises in\ndirect investor\n(reverse\ninvestment)\n0\n0\n0\n1.1.3 Between\nfellow\nenterprises\n0\n0\n0\n1.1.3.1 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nresident\n0\n0\n0\n1.1.3.2 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nnonresident\n0\n0\n0\n1.1.3.3 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nunknown\n0\n0\n0\nOf which:\n1.1.0.1\nInvestment\nfund shares/\nunits\n0\n0\n0\nOf which:\n1.1.0.1.1\nMoney market\nfund shares/\nunits\n0\n0\n0\n1.2 Debt\ninstruments\n7170.4312800164007\n7125.6998318210581\n7494.\n1.2.1 Direct\ninvestor in\ndirect\ninvestment\nenterprises\n2926.6125574895918\n2921.26873298384\n3059.\n1.2.2 Direct\ninvestment\nenterprises in\ndirect investor\n(reverse\ninvestment)\n0\n0\n0\n1.2.0.1.3\nBetween fellow\nenterprises\n4243.8187225268093\n4204.4310988372181\n4435.\n1.2.3.1 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nresident\n0\n0\n0\n1.2.3.2 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nnonresident\n4243.8187225268093\n4204.4310988372181\n4435.\n1.2.3.3 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nunknown\n0\n0\n0\nOf which:\n1.2.0.1 Debt\nsecurities\n0\n0\n0\n1.2.0.1.1\nDirect investor\nin direct\ninvestment\nenterprises\n0\n0\n0\n1.2.0.1.2\nDirect\ninvestment\nenterprises in\ndirect investor\n(reverse\ninvestment)\n0\n0\n0\n1.2.0.1.3\nBetween fellow\nenterprises\n0\n0\n0\n1.2.0.1.3.1 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nresident\n0\n0\n0\n1.2.0.1.3.2 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nnonresident\n0\n0\n0\n1.2.0.1.3.3 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nunknown\n0\n0\n0\n2 Portfolio\ninvestment\n1485.7899074000493\n1479.0658822611147\n1476.\n2.1 Equity and\ninvestment\nfund shares\n516.41991949005967\n511.6722760357863\n506.9\n2.1.1 Central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n2.1.1.9\nMonetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n2.1.2 Deposit-\ntaking\ncorporations,\nexcept the\ncentral bank\n25.820995974502985\n25.583613801789316\n25.34\n2.1.3 General\ngovernment\n0\n0\n0\n2.1.4 Other\nsectors\n490.59892351555663\n486.08866223399696\n481.6\n2.1.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n2.1.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds,\nand NPISHs\n490.59892351555663\n486.08866223399696\n481.6\n2.1.0.1 Equity\nsecurities other\nthan\ninvestment\nfund shares/\nunits\n490.59892351555663\n486.08866223399696\n481.6\n2.1.0.1.1 Listed 490.59892351555663\n486.08866223399696\n481.6\n2.1.0.1.2\nUnlisted\n0\n0\n0\n2.1.0.2\nInvestment\nfund shares/\nunits\n0\n0\n0\nOf which:\n2.1.0.2.1\nMoney market\nfund shares/\nunits\n0\n0\n0\n2.2 Debt\nsecurities\n969.36998790998973\n967.39360622532843\n969.5\n2.2.1 Central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.1.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.1.9\nMonetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n2.1.1.9.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n2.1.1.9.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.2 Deposit-\ntaking\ncorporations,\nexcept the\ncentral bank\n969.28879215936763\n967.31151976173624\n969.4\n2.2.2.1 Short-\nterm\n6.1510474030500992\n6.1384997533249033\n6.152\n2.2.2.2 Long-\nterm\n963.13774475631749\n961.1730200084113\n963.3\n2.2.3 General\ngovernment\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.3.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.3.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.4 Other\nsectors\n8.1195750622108154E-2 8.2086463592183842E-2 8.038\n2.2.4.0.1\nShort-term\n5.1526326832912104E-4 5.2091567837013832E-4 5.101\n2.2.4.0.2 Long-\nterm\n8.0680487353779029E-2 8.1565547913813707E-2 7.987\n2.2.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.4.1.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.4.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds,\nand NPISHs\n8.1195750622108154E-2 8.2086463592183842E-2 8.038\n2.2.4.2.1\nShort-term\n5.1526326832912104E-4 5.2091567837013832E-4 5.101\n2.2.4.2.2 Long-\nterm\n8.0680487353779029E-2 8.1565547913813707E-2 7.987\n3 Financial\nderivatives\n(other than\nreserves) and\nemployee stock\noptions\n0\n0\n0\n3.1 Central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.9 Monetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n3.2 Deposit-\ntaking\ncorporations,\nexcept the\ncentral bank\n0\n0\n0\n3.3 General\ngovernment\n0\n0\n0\n3.4 Other\nsectors\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds,\nand NPISHs\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.1 Financial\nderivatives\n(other than\nreserves)\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.1.1 Options 0\n0\n0\n3.0.1.2\nForward-type\ncontracts\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.2.Employee\nstock options\n0\n0\n0\n4 Other\ninvestment\n41290.469560051279\n52815.966995193783\n66075\n4.1 Other\nequity\n0\n0\n0\n4.2 Currency\nand deposits\n27300.791663200656\n36732.875915076438\n51622\n4.2.1 Central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.1.0.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.1.0.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.1.9\nMonetary\nauthorities\n(where\nrelevant)\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.1.9.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.1.9.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.2 Deposit-\ntaking\ncorporations,\nexcept the\ncentral bank\n8604.4223581706556\n10761.488677596441\n12851\n4.2.2.1 Short-\nterm\n8604.4223581706556\n10761.488677596441\n12851\n4.2.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.3 General\ngovernment\n2549.2893050300004\n3978.8172374800001\n3109.\n4.2.3.1 Short-\nterm\n2549.2893050300004\n3978.8172374800001\n3109.\n4.2.3.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4 Other\nsectors\n16147.08\n21992.57\n35661\n4.2.4.0.1\nShort-term\n16147.08\n21992.57\n35661\n4.2.4.0.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4.1.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds,\nand NPISHs\n16147.08\n21992.57\n35661\n4.2.4.2.1\nShort-term\n16147.08\n21992.57\n35661\n4.2.4.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.3 Loans\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.1 Central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.1.1 Credit\nand loans with\nthe IMF (other\nthan reserves)\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.1.2 Other\nshort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.1.3 Other\nlong-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.1.9\nMonetary\nauthorities\n(where\nrelevant)\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.1.9.1\nCredit and\nloans with the\nIMF (other\nthan reserves)\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.1.9.2 Other\nshort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.1.9.3 Other\nlong-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.2 Deposit-\ntaking\ncorporations,\nexcept the\ncentral bank\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.2.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.3 General\ngovernment\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.3.1 Credit\nand loans with\nthe IMF (other\nthan reserves)\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.3.2 Other\nshort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.3.3 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.4 Other\nsectors\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.4.0.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.4.0.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4.1.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds,\nand NPISHs\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.4.2.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.4.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.4 Insurance,\npension, and\nstandardized\nguarantee\nschemes\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.1 Central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.1.9\nMonetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.2 Deposit-\ntaking\ncorporations,\nexcept the\ncentral bank\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.3 General\ngovernment\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.4 Other\nsectors\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds,\nand NPISHs\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.0.1 Nonlife\ninsurance\ntechnical\nreserves\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.0.2 Life\ninsurance and\nannuity\nentitlements\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.0.3 Pension\nentitlements\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.0.4 Claims\nof pension\nfunds on\npension\nmanagers\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.0.5\nEntitlements to\nnonpension\nbenefits\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.0.6\nProvisions for\ncalls under\nstandardized\nguarantees\n0\n0\n0\n4.5 Trade\ncredit and\nadvances\n13989.677896850621\n16083.091080117345\n14452\n4.5.1 Central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.1.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.1.9\nMonetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.1.9.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.1.9.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.2 General\ngovernment\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.2.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.3 Deposit-\ntaking\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.3.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.3.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.4 Other\nsectors\n13989.677896850621\n16083.091080117345\n14452\n4.5.4.0.1\nShort-term\n13989.677896850621\n16083.091080117345\n14452\n4.5.4.0.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.4.1.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.4.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds,\nand NPISHs\n13989.677896850621\n16083.091080117345\n14452\n4.5.4.2.1\nShort-term\n13989.677896850621\n16083.091080117345\n14452\n4.5.4.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6 Other\naccounts\nreceivable/\npayable—other\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.1 Central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.1.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.1.9\nMonetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.1.9.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.1.9.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.2 Deposit-\ntaking\ncorporations,\nexcept the\ncentral bank\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.2.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.3 General\ngovernment\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.3.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.3.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4 Other\nsectors\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4.0.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4.0.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4.1.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds,\nand NPISHs\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4.2.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n5 Reserve\nassets\n32339.252389100006\n32639.777078099993\n43830\n5.1 Monetary\ngold\n0\n0\n0\n5.1.1 Gold\nbullion\n0\n0\n0\n5.1.2\nUnallocated\ngold accounts\n0\n0\n0\n5.2 Special\ndrawing rights\n2579.8250524200002\n2571.9155934699997\n2574.\n5.3 Reserve\nposition in the\nIMF\n0\n0\n0\n5.4 Other\nreserve assets\n29759.427336680004\n30067.861484629993\n41255\n5.4.1 Currency\nand deposits\n28092.603906700006\n29461.333617429995\n40611\n5.4.1.1 Claims\non monetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n5.4.1.2 Claims\non other\nentities\n28092.603906700006\n29461.333617429995\n40611\n5.4.2 Securities 1666.8234299800001\n606.52786720000006\n643.9\n5.4.2.1 Debt\nsecurities\n1666.8234299800001\n606.52786720000006\n643.9\n5.4.2.1.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n5.4.2.1.2 Long-\nterm\n1666.8234299800001\n606.52786720000006\n643.9\n5.4.2.2 Equity\nand investment\nfund shares\n0\n0\n0\nof which:\n5.4.2.0.1\nSecurities\nunder repo for\ncash collateral\n0\n0\n0\n5.4.3 Financial\nderivatives\n0\n0\n0\n5.4.4 Other\nclaims\n0\n0\n0\nTotal assets\n87691.940779279452\n99442.581154534128\n12452\nOf which: (by\ninstrument):\n0\n0\n0\n0.1 Equity and\ninvestment\nfund shares\n0\n0\n0\n0.1.1 Equity\n0\n0\n0\n0.1.2\nInvestment\nfund shares\n0\n0\n0\n0.2 Debt\ninstruments\n0\n0\n0\n0.2.1 Special\ndrawing rights\n0\n0\n0\n0.2.2 Currency\nand deposits\n0\n0\n0\n0.2.3 Debt\nsecurities\n0\n0\n0\n0.2.4 Loans\n0\n0\n0\n0.2.5\nInsurance,\npension, and\nstandardized\nguarantee\nschemes\n0\n0\n0\n0.2.6 Other\naccounts\nreceivable/\npayable\n0\n0\n0\n0.3 Other\nfinancial assets\nand liabilities\n0\n0\n0\n0.3.1 Monetary\ngold\n0\n0\n0\n0.3.2 Financial\nderivatives and\nESOs\n0\n0\n0\n2010\n2011\n2012\nLiabilities\nLiabilities\nLiabil\n1 Direct\ninvestment\n50972.737642945409\n59302.482187708752\n65473\n1.1 Equity and\ninvestment\nfund shares\n29849.368002576688\n34727.222749672226\n38341\n1.1.1 Direct\ninvestor in\ndirect\ninvestment\nenterprises\n29848.031718368224\n34725.668095672176\n38339\n1.1.2 Direct\ninvestment\nenterprises in\ndirect investor\n(reverse\ninvestment)\n0\n0\n0\n1.1.3 Between\nfellow\nenterprises\n1.3362842084637871\n1.554654000050705\n1.716\n1.1.3.1 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nresident\n0\n0\n0\n1.1.3.2 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nnonresident\n1.3362842084637871\n1.554654000050705\n1.716\n1.1.3.3 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nunknown\n0\n0\n0\nOf which:\n1.1.0.1\nInvestment\nfund shares/\nunits\n0\n0\n0\nOf which:\n1.1.0.1.1\nMoney market\nfund shares/\nunits\n0\n0\n0\n1.2 Debt\ninstruments\n21123.369640368721\n24575.259438036526\n27132\n1.2.1 Direct\ninvestor in\ndirect\ninvestment\nenterprises\n11824.681269605651\n13757.019591102393\n15188\n1.2.2 Direct\ninvestment\nenterprises in\ndirect investor\n(reverse\ninvestment)\n0\n0\n0\n1.2.0.1.3\nBetween fellow\nenterprises\n9298.6883707630695\n10818.239846934133\n11944\n1.2.3.1 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nresident\n0\n0\n0\n1.2.3.2 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nnonresident\n9298.6883707630695\n10818.239846934133\n11944\n1.2.3.3 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nunknown\n0\n0\n0\nOf which:\n1.2.0.1 Debt\nsecurities\n0\n0\n0\n1.2.0.1.1\nDirect investor\nin direct\ninvestment\nenterprises\n0\n0\n0\n1.2.0.1.2\nDirect\ninvestment\nenterprises in\ndirect investor\n(reverse\ninvestment)\n0\n0\n0\n1.2.0.1.3\nBetween fellow\nenterprises\n0\n0\n0\n1.2.0.1.3.1 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nresident\n0\n0\n0\n1.2.0.1.3.2 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nnonresident\n0\n0\n0\n1.2.0.1.3.3 if\nultimate\ncontrolling\nparent is\nunknown\n0\n0\n0\n2 Portfolio\ninvestment\n14001.416798355611\n14211.737942817836\n22043\n2.1 Equity and\ninvestment\nfund shares\n3275.1261024246414\n3324.3231429842062\n5156.\n2.1.1 Central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n2.1.1.9\nMonetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n2.1.2 Deposit-\ntaking\ncorporations,\nexcept the\ncentral bank\n302.62165186403689\n307.16745841174065\n476.4\n2.1.3 General\ngovernment\n0\n0\n0\n2.1.4 Other\nsectors\n2972.5044505606047\n3017.1556845724654\n4679.\n2.1.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n2.1.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds,\nand NPISHs\n2972.5044505606047\n3017.1556845724654\n4679.\n2.1.0.1 Equity\nsecurities other\nthan\ninvestment\nfund shares/\nunits\n2972.5044505606047\n3017.1556845724654\n4679.\n2.1.0.1.1 Listed 2972.5044505606047\n3017.1556845724654\n4679.\n2.1.0.1.2\nUnlisted\n0\n0\n0\n2.1.0.2\nInvestment\nfund shares/\nunits\n0\n0\n0\nOf which:\n2.1.0.2.1\nMoney market\nfund shares/\nunits\n0\n0\n0\n2.2 Debt\nsecurities\n10726.290695930969\n10887.41479983363\n16887\n2.2.1 Central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.1.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.1.9\nMonetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n2.1.1.9.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n2.1.1.9.2 Long-\nterm\n2.2.2 Deposit-\ntaking\ncorporations,\nexcept the\ncentral bank\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.2.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.3 General\ngovernment\n10726.290695930969\n10887.41479983363\n16887\n2.2.3.1 Short-\nterm\n9320.049876831843\n9460.0502485635461\n14673\n2.2.3.2 Long-\nterm\n1406.2408190991259\n1427.3645512700848\n2213.\n2.2.4 Other\nsectors\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.4.0.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.4.0.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.4.1.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.4.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds,\nand NPISHs\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.4.2.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n2.2.4.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n3 Financial\nderivatives\n(other than\nreserves) and\nemployee stock\noptions\n0\n0\n0\n3.1 Central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n3.1.9 Monetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n3.2 Deposit-\ntaking\ncorporations,\nexcept the\ncentral bank\n0\n0\n0\n3.3 General\ngovernment\n0\n0\n0\n3.4 Other\nsectors\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n3.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds,\nand NPISHs\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.1 Financial\nderivatives\n(other than\nreserves)\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.1.1 Options 0\n0\n0\n3.0.1.2\nForward-type\ncontracts\n0\n0\n0\n3.0.2.Employee\nstock options\n0\n0\n0\n4 Other\ninvestment\n13267.186645371719\n16707.798258792132\n17217\n4.1 Other\nequity\n0\n0\n0\n4.2 Currency\nand deposits\n104.79172875389031\n791.89516871125875\n782.3\n4.2.1 Central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.1.0.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.1.0.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.1.9\nMonetary\nauthorities\n(where\nrelevant)\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.1.9.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.1.9.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.2 Deposit-\ntaking\ncorporations,\nexcept the\ncentral bank\n104.79172875389031\n791.89516871125875\n782.3\n4.2.2.1 Short-\nterm\n104.79172875389031\n791.89516871125875\n782.3\n4.2.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.3 General\ngovernment\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.3.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.3.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4 Other\nsectors\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4.0.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4.0.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4.1.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds,\nand NPISHs\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4.2.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.3 Loans\n13162.394916617828\n15915.903090080872\n16434\n4.3.1 Central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.1.1 Credit\nand loans with\nthe IMF (other\nthan reserves)\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.1.2 Other\nshort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.1.3 Other\nlong-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.1.9\nMonetary\nauthorities\n(where\nrelevant)\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.1.9.1\nCredit and\nloans with the\nIMF (other\nthan reserves)\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.1.9.2 Other\nshort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.1.9.3 Other\nlong-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.2 Deposit-\ntaking\ncorporations,\nexcept the\ncentral bank\n970.62491661782656\n1658.3230900808724\n1508.\n4.3.2.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.2.2 Long-\nterm\n970.62491661782656\n1658.3230900808724\n1508.\n4.3.3 General\ngovernment\n4578.7700000000004\n5666.58\n6527.\n4.3.3.1 Credit\nand loans with\nthe IMF (other\nthan reserves)\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.3.2 Other\nshort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.3.3 Long-\nterm\n4578.7700000000004\n5666.58\n6527.\n4.3.4 Other\nsectors\n7613\n8591\n8398.\n4.3.4.0.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.4.0.2 Long-\nterm\n7613\n8591\n8398.\n4.3.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4.1.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.2.4.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds,\nand NPISHs\n7613\n8591\n8398.\n4.3.4.2.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.3.4.2.2 Long-\nterm\n7613\n8591\n8398.\n4.4 Insurance,\npension, and\nstandardized\nguarantee\nschemes\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.1 Central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.1.9\nMonetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.2 Deposit-\ntaking\ncorporations,\nexcept the\ncentral bank\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.3 General\ngovernment\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.4 Other\nsectors\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds,\nand NPISHs\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.0.1 Nonlife\ninsurance\ntechnical\nreserves\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.0.2 Life\ninsurance and\nannuity\nentitlements\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.0.3 Pension\nentitlements\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.0.4 Claims\nof pension\nfunds on\npension\nmanagers\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.0.5\nEntitlements to\nnonpension\nbenefits\n0\n0\n0\n4.4.0.6\nProvisions for\ncalls under\nstandardized\nguarantees\n0\n0\n0\n4.5 Trade\ncredit and\nadvances\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.1 Central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.1.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.1.9\nMonetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.1.9.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.1.9.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.2 General\ngovernment\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.2.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.3 Deposit-\ntaking\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.3.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.3.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.4 Other\nsectors\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.4.0.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.4.0.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.4.1.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.4.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds,\nand NPISHs\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.4.2.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.5.4.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6 Other\naccounts\nreceivable/\npayable—other\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.1 Central\nbank\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.1.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.1.9\nMonetary\nauthorities\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.1.9.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.1.9.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.2 Deposit-\ntaking\ncorporations,\nexcept the\ncentral bank\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.2.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.3 General\ngovernment\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.3.1 Short-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.3.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4 Other\nsectors\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4.0.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4.0.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4.1 Other\nfinancial\ncorporations\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4.1.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4.1.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4.2\nNonfinancial\ncorporations,\nhouseholds,\nand NPISHs\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4.2.1\nShort-term\n0\n0\n0\n4.6.4.2.2 Long-\nterm\n0\n0\n0\n4.7 Special\ndrawing rights\n0\n0\n0\nTotal liabilities 78241.341086672735\n90222.01838931872\n10473\nOf which: (by\ninstrument):\n0\n0\n0\n0.1 Equity and\ninvestment\nfund shares\n0\n0\n0\n0.1.1 Equity\n0\n0\n0\n0.1.2\nInvestment\nfund shares\n0\n0\n0\n0.2 Debt\ninstruments\n0\n0\n0\n0.2.1 Special\ndrawing rights\n0\n0\n0\n0.2.2 Currency\nand deposits\n0\n0\n0\n0.2.3 Debt\nsecurities\n0\n0\n0\n0.2.4 Loans\n0\n0\n0\n0.2.5\nInsurance,\npension, and\nstandardized\nguarantee\nschemes\n0\n0\n0\n0.2.6 Other\naccounts\nreceivable/\npayable\n0\n0\n0\n0.3 Other\nfinancial assets\nand liabilities\n0\n0\n0\n0.3.1 Monetary\ngold\n0\n0\n0\n0.3.2 Financial\nderivatives and\nESOs\n0\n0\n0\nSource: Central\nBank of\nNigeria\nNotes:\n1Revised\n2Provisional\nReturn\nto Menu\nTable\nD.3.1:\nExternal\nReserves\n(US$'\nMillion)\nYear\nJanuary\nFebruary\nMarch\n1981\n5177.8999999999996 5163.6000000000004 5572.1\n1982\n1679.9\n1726.6\n977.4\n1983\n1193.5999999999999 647\n562.200000000000\n1984\n224.4\n210.8\n333.1\n1985\n567.1\n779.4\n804.3\n1986\n1308.9000000000001 1320.3\n1030.8\n1987\n2287.019221\n2558.1\n9449.50514939999\n1988\n7925.6614\n8240.5976934999999 8555.53398700000\n1989\n4310.4602199999999 4769.7824034999994 4540.12131174999\n1990\n3386.7689559999999 3960.7350058112461 3770.02887948993\n1991\n4003.7532310000001 4682.2814850000004 4428.32000700000\n1992\n4109.6457246600003 5517.3574887000004 4109.64572443\n1993\n8365.6910475000004 1016.3623656100001 9505.26121050000\n1994\n7596.1677779000001 8388.8701612000004 9181.57254450000\n1995\n1295.1781232799999 1217.1391484599999 8028.98856059999\n1996\n1002.95246939\n1437.3254842599999 1849.15064486000\n1997\n4480.5192766700002 5352.1762589800001 6180.59157979999\n1998\n7464.7337724199997 8402.3934511900006 8319.59567828999\n1999\n6549.6\n6274.9\n5507.1\n2000\n5789.2\n6494.8\n6682.8\n2001\n9705\n10016.25\n10787.5\n2002\n9668.7800000000007 9768.4699999999993 9546.1\n2003\n7134.42\n7655.06\n8226.16\n2004\n8323.9959999999992 9352.4\n9684.49\n2005\n19592.64\n20554.09\n21807.98\n2006\n31317.94\n34319.11\n36201.54\n2007\n43510.78\n42550.61\n42633.86\n2008\n54215.79\n56908.42\n59756.51\n2009\n50108.65\n48113.06\n47081.9\n2010\n42075.67\n41410.1\n40667.03\n2011\n33131.83\n33246.07\n33221.8000000000\n2012\n34136.57\n33857.370000000003 35197.4400000000\n2013\n45824.443752799998 47295.845573990002 47884.1245184799\n2014\n40667.56\n36923.61\n37399.22\n2015\n32385.71\n29566.99\n29357.21\n2016\n27607.85\n27568.38\n27336.38\n2017\n28592.98\n29975.38\n29996.38\n2018\n41150.28\n45276.58\n46730.54\n2019\n42515.659635199998 42328.960531390003 44793.0834570399\nSource:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable\nD.3.2:\nExternal\nReserves\nAdequacy\n- Months\nof Import\nCover\nYear\n2008\n2009\n2010\nJanuary\n15.738384256382394 19.644548828834367 8.979609852963\nFebruary\n18.984322949226943 20.39503879345634\n10.47961856947\nMarch\n20.834805193454621 18.336926142743646 8.679034179959\nApril\n15.965502773035022 19.401204938999953 11.33212124424\nMay\n15.185164730406214 16.867966066994803 9.925777942641\nJune\n13.66405711972169\n14.708910778312603 9.308188862473\nJuly\n14.055428291992904 13.173435754245466 9.631110958709\nAugust\n17.406673363318596 12.849623814044481 8.554396970654\nSeptember 17.821509011148351 16.705001235145936 6.656658140092\nOctober\n14.972816361145552 14.985504911927269 8.911897187480\nNovember 16.037767351254086 14.588039326673846 7.636644000114\nDecember 19.335483053639024 14.574012506881619 8.400363369666\nAverage\n16.666826204560447 16.352517758188363 9.041285106539\nSource:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable\nD.4.1:\nMonthly\nAverage\nOfficial\nExchange\nRate of the\nNaira (N/\nUS$1.00)\nYear\nJanuary\nFebruary\nMarch\n1981\n0.5323\n0.54690000000000005 0.572200000\n1982\n0.64370000000000005 0.65590000000000004 0.6643\n1983\n0.67359999999999998 0.69169999999999998 0.699899999\n1984\n0.74860000000000004 0.74860000000000004 0.748600000\n1985\n0.82030000000000003 0.84770000000000001 0.874600000\n1986\n0.99960000000000004 0.99960000000000004 1.0016\n1987\n3.6471\n3.7014\n3.9213\n1988\n4.1748000000000003\n4.2610999999999999\n4.316900000\n1989\n7.0388999999999999\n7.3822999999999999\n7.587100000\n1990\n7.8620999999999999\n7.9009\n7.938799999\n1991\n9.2120999999999995\n9.6107999999999993\n9.452099999\n1992\n9.5626999999999995\n10.226100000000001\n17.61070000\n1993\n20.107800000000001\n21.999199999999998\n24.88009999\n1994\n21.886099999999999\n21.886099999999999\n21.88609999\n1995\n21.886099999999999\n21.886099999999999\n21.88609999\n1996\n21.886099999999999\n21.886099999999999\n21.88609999\n1997\n21.886099999999999\n21.886099999999999\n21.88609999\n1998\n21.886099999999999\n21.886099999999999\n21.88609999\n1999\n86\n86\n86.96590000\n2000\n98.78\n99.914299999999997\n100.9319\n2001\n110.50449999999999\n110.705\n110.655\n2002\n113.96250000000001\n114.27589999999999\n116.04\n2003\n127.06950000000001\n127.315\n127.164\n2004\n136.0823\n135.16249999999999\n134.4317000\n2005\n132.86000000000001\n132.85\n132.85\n2006\n130.29\n129.59309999999999\n128.7042999\n2007\n128.27719999999999\n128.2687\n128.1512999\n2008\n117.9768\n118.21\n117.9218\n2009\n145.78030000000001\n147.14439999999999\n147.7226\n2010\n149.7792\n150.22239999999999\n149.8284999\n2011\n151.5455\n151.9391\n152.5073999\n2012\n158.38679999999999\n157.8681\n157.5875000\n2013\n157.30124761904761\n157.29941999999997\n157.3115\n2014\n157.2916285714285\n157.30749999999995\n157.3007666\n2015\n169.68\n179.74\n197.07\n2016\n197\n197\n197\n2017\n305.20238095238096\n305.3125\n306.4021739\n2018\n305.77727272727265\n305.89499999999992\n305.7428571\n2019\n306.84545454545457\n306.76818181818186\n306.9238095\nSource:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nNotes: The\nDutch\nAuction\nSystem\n(DAS)\ncommenced\non July 22,\n2002\nThe\nWholesale\nDutch\nAuction\nSystem\n(WDAS)\ncommenced\non February\n20, 2006\nThe Retail\nDutch\nAuction\nSystem\n(RDAS)\ncommenced\non October\n2, 2013\nThe\nExchange\nRate from\nAugust\n2005,\nincludes 1%\nCommission\nup to 18th\nFebruary,\n2015.\nThe RDAS\nsegment of\nthe Foreign\nExchange\nMarket was\nclosed on\nFebruary\n18, 2015\nwhile the\nInterbank\nExchange\nRate\nbecame the\nreference\nofficial rate.\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable D.4.2:\nMonthly\nAverage\n(Official/\nAFEM1/\nDAS2)\nExchange\nRate of the\nNaira -\nCentral Rate\n(N/US$1.00)\nPeriod\nJanuary\nFebruary\nMarch\n1995\n79.895499999999998 80.458600000000004 81.59\n1996\n84.575000000000003 83.920400000000001 82.087500000\n1997\n79.599999999999994 79.599999999999994 82.742099999\n1998\n76.510300000000001 82.535300000000007 83.58\n1999\n85.57\n85.57\n86.662300000\n2000\n98.490499999999997 99.627399999999994 100.60809999\n2001\n109.99769999999999 110.1925\n110.15560000\n2002\n113.41589999999999 114.2526\n115.5579\n2003\n126.57181818181817 126.98444444444443 130.35203095\n2004\n135.53569999999999 134.65526\n133.9829\n2005\n132.38\n132.35319999999999 132.35249999\n2006\n129.785\n129.10329999999999 128.23560000\n2007\n127.1408\n127.1335\n127.1335\n2008\n116.89176590909084 116.87538571428571 116.83654166\n2009\n142.37125\n145.90588749999998 146.42745238\n2010\n147.822\n148.23736842105262 147.83500000\n2011\n149.54499999999999 149.93469999999999 150.48259999\n2012\n156.31857142857143 155.83000000000004 155.52727272\n2013\n155.24380952380952 155.24200000000002 155.25399999\n2014\n155.2342857142857\n155.25\n155.24333333\n2015\n167.5\n178.15\n196.57999999\n2016\n196.5\n196.5\n196.5\n2017\n304.70238095238096 304.8125\n305.90217391\n2018\n305.27727272727265 305.39499999999992 305.24047619\n2019\n306.34545454545457 306.2700000000001\n306.42380952\nSource:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nNotes:\n1Autonomous\nForeign\nExchange\nMarket\n(AFEM)\ncommenced\nin 1995\n2The Dutch\nAuction\nSystem (DAS)\nwas re-\nintroduced\non 22nd July,\n2002\nThe Initial\nBuying and\nSelling Rates\nwere\nN81.1800 /\nUS $1.00 and\nN82.0000/\nUS $1.00,\nrespectively\nThe\nWholesale\nDutch\nAuction\nSystem\n(WDAS)\ncommenced\non February\n20, 2006\nThe Retail\nDutch\nAuction\nSystem\n(RDAS)\ncommenced\non October 2,\n2013\nThe RDAS\nsegment of\nthe Foreign\nExchange\nMarket was\nclosed on\nFebruary 18,\n2015 while\nthe Interbank\nExchange\nRate became\nthe reference\nofficial rate.\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable\nD.4.3:\nAverage\nNaira\nOfficial\nCross\nExchange\nRates -\nSelling\nYear\nUS\nPound\nDeutsche\nDollar\nSterling\nMark\n1981\n0.61\n1.2495000000000001 0.269911504424\n1982\n0.67290000000000005 1.1734\n0.277302716981\n1983\n0.72409999999999997 1.1215999999999999 0.283598223447\n1984\n0.76490000000000002 1.0765\n0.268768842631\n1985\n0.89380000000000004 1.1999\n0.303603637265\n1986\n2.0206\n2.5554000000000001 1.800999999999\n1987\n4.0179\n6.5929000000000002 2.237400000000\n1988\n4.5366999999999997\n8.0894999999999992 2.580099999999\n1989\n7.3916000000000004\n12.0695\n3.934899999999\n1990\n8.0378000000000007\n16.241900000000001 5.562400000000\n1991\n9.9094999999999995\n17.4955\n5.948400000000\n1992\n17.298400000000001\n27.868400000000001 11.1327\n1993\n22.051100000000002\n33.252200000000002 13.3871\n1994\n21.886099999999999\n33.425175000000003 13.523\n1995\n21.886099999999999\n34.524025000000002 15.089475\n1996\n21.886099999999999\n34.122900000000001 14.5962\n1997\n21.886075000000002\n35.769750000000002 12.65105\n1998\n21.885999999999999\n36.216574999999999 12.45872499999\nSource:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable D.4.4:\nAverage\n(AFEM1/\nDAS2) Naira\nCross\nExchange\nRates -\nSelling\nYear\nUS\nPound\nDeutsche\nDollar\nSterling\nMark\n1995\n81.022800000000004 128.15610000000001 57.069200000\n1996\n81.252799999999993 126.4165\n53.844999999\n1997\n81.6494\n133.7389\n47.192700000\n1998\n83.807199999999995 142.61410000000001 51.2761\n1999 3\n92.342799999999997 156.43450000000001 50.90231\n2000\n100.80159999999999 149.53630000000001\n2001\n112.025185167299\n161.10488241500369\n2002\n120.97933280005019 182.05777000193441\n2003\n129.43227183929301 211.19989348192203\n2004\n133.50007626980823 244.52375294410265\n2005\n131.63914600000001 238.7723115\n2006\n127.38235069067501 234.73625704921281\n2007\n124.61179331515679 249.42309325218821\n2008\n117.69367934479918 218.24685578597405\n2009\n147.3958325833523\n230.64754672353232\n2010\n148.81266523398418 230.09068432223503\n2011\n152.32966997478326 244.26000961870807\n2012\n155.94017965367968 247.05827696836789\n2013\n155.75372515527951 243.67300419506557\n2014\n156.98281673881675 258.57615681816378\n2015\n192.30156881313133 294.12231111181126\n2016\n253.49225191946158 339.57528349975081\n2017\n305.78990082667138 394.11285165671359\n2018\nQ1\n305.80500000000001 425.66980000000001\nQ2\n305.76909999999998 415.7953\nQ3\n306.048\n398.95330000000001\nQ4\n306.70949999999999 394.71089999999998\n2019\nQ1\n306.84642135642133 399.60977824458877\nQ2\n306.95318627450962 394.36370986344537\nQ3\n306.92950138026225 378.37288090027613\nQ4\n306.95371212121216 395.62890816666669\nNotes:\n1Autonomous\nForeign\nExchange\nMarket\n(AFEM)\ncommenced\nin 1995\n2The Dutch\nAuction\nSystem (DAS)\nwas re-\nintroduced\non 22nd July,\n2002\n3The Euro\nbecame the\nofficial\ncurrency for\nGermany,\nFrance and\nThe\nNetherlands\neffective 1st\nJanuary\n1999.\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable\nD.4.5:\nNaira\nOfficial\nCross\nExchange\nRates -\nEnd\nPeriod\nYear\nUS\nPound\nDeutsche\nDollar\nSterling\nMark\n1981\n0.63690000000000002 0.82720000000000005 0.28246407663\n1982\n0.67020000000000002 0.91200000000000003 0.28201136124\n1983\n0.74860000000000004 0.92569999999999997 0.27483662530\n1984\n0.80830000000000002 0.91069999999999995 0.25676620076\n1985\n0.99960000000000004 0.69620000000000004 0.40612684353\n1986\n3.3166000000000002\n4.7411000000000003\n1.64640000000\n1987\n4.1916000000000002\n7.6055000000000001\n2.54380000000\n1988\n5.3529999999999998\n9.8496000000000006\n3.03889999999\n1989\n7.65\n12.4542\n4.56310000000\n1990\n9.0000999999999998\n17.0642\n5.92499999999\n1991\n9.7545000000000002\n16.893999999999998\n5.80419999999\n1992\n19.660900000000002\n30.8185\n12.3653999999\n1993\n22.6309\n33.8596\n13.5901999999\n1994\n21.886099999999999\n34.703899999999997\n14.2109000000\n1995\n21.886099999999999\n34.398299999999999\n15.1326\n1996\n21.886099999999999\n34.334000000000003\n14.5328\n1997\n21.886075000000002\n35.831650000000003\n12.610975\n1998\n21.885999999999999\n36.365524999999998\n12.49315\nSource:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable D.4.6:\nEnd Period\nNaira Cross\nExchange\nRates -\nSelling\nYear\nUS\nPound\nDeutsche\nDollar\nSterling\nMark\n1995\n84.575000000000003 130.14400000000001 58.8307\n1996\n79.599999999999994 131.9821\n51.2856999999\n1997\n74.625\n124.3402\n42.0516999999\n1998\n84.367900000000006 140.20567500000001 48.1759750000\n1999 1\n92.528375000000011 146.50710000000001 49.7391250000\n2000\n109.55\n163.03229999999999\n2001\n113.45\n164.321\n2002\n126.9\n204.55009999999999\n2003\n137\n244.01070000000001\n2004\n132.85\n256.70609999999999\n2005\n129\n222.4863\n2006\n127\n249.38990000000001\n2007\n116.8\n234.0205\n2008\n131.25\n191.20500000000001\n2009\n148.1\n239.93680000000001\n2010\n148.81266523398418 230.09068432223503\n2011\n156.69999999999999 242.3366\n2012\n155.75666666666666 250.98633333333336\n2013\n155.73750000000001 245.51141625\n2014\n168\n262.24799999999999\n2015\n197\n291.93430000000001\n2016\n305\n375.18049999999999\n2017\n306\n413.65079999999995\n2018\nQ1\n305.64999999999998 430.23\nQ2\n305.75\n402.45872500000002\nQ3\n306.35000000000002 399.44976500000007\nQ4\n307\n392.00829999999996\n2019\nQ1\n306.95\n402.35005999999998\nQ2\n306.89999999999998 389.64024000000001\nQ3\n307\n377.85559999999998\nQ4\n307\n405.24\nSource:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nNotes: 1The\nEuro\nbecame the\nofficial\ncurrency for\nGermany,\nFrance and\nNetherland\neffective 1st\nJanuary\n1999.\nThe Inter\nBank\nForeign\nExchange\nMarket\n(IFEM)\nstarted on\nthe 25th\nOctober,\n1999\nPrevious\nrates were\nAutonomous\nForeign\nExchange\nMarket\n(AFEM)\nrates\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable\nD.4.7:\nMonthly\nOfficial\nExchange\nRate -\nEnd\nPeriod\n(N/\nUS$1.00)\nYear\nJanuary\nFebruary\nMarch\n1999\n90\n86\n90\n2000\n98.15\n100.45\n100.57\n2001\n110.8\n110.6\n110.7\n2002\n114.2\n115.7\n116.1\n2003\n127.27\n127.02\n127.22\n2004\n135.30000000000001 135\n133.69999999999\n2005\n132.86000000000001 132.86000000000001 132.86000000000\n2006\n130.29\n129.28\n128.52250000000\n2007\n128.2801\n128.2801\n128.05789999999\n2008\n117.9781\n117.9478\n117.8973\n2009\n145.95509999999999 147.30850000000001 147.15700000000\n2010\n150.31829999999999 150.09610000000001 149.78\n2011\n151.8535\n152.06559999999999 153.0352\n2012\n158.62049999999999 157.459\n157.5701\n2013\n157.29740000000001 157.3075\n157.3075\n2014\n157.3075\n157.3075\n157.29740000000\n2015\n169.68\n199.8\n197\n2016\n197\n197\n197\n2017\n305.25\n305.5\n306.35000000000\n2018\n305.7\n305.89999999999998 305.64999999999\n2019\n306.75\n306.85000000000002 306.95\nSource :\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable\nD.4.8:\nMonthly\nAverage\nExchange\nRate\nMovements\nat BDC,\nIFEM and I\n& E\nSegments\nof the\nFOREX\nMarket (N/\nUS$1.00)\nBureau-de-Change\nMonth\n2004\n2005\n2006\nJanuary\n147.64769999999999 139.80000000000001 144.09\nFebruary\n142.94999999999999 139.93\n145.4737000000\nMarch\n139.9239\n139.72999999999999 148.4565000000\nApril\n138.85230000000001 141.77000000000001 147.8471999999\nMay\n139.6429\n141.21\n142.3261\nJune\n140\n141.85\n136.8181999999\nJuly\n139.8409\n143.94\n130.119\nAugust\n140.3295\n145.82\n130.4565000000\nSeptember 141.0795\n145.80000000000001 130.21\nOctober\n140.53569999999999 144.99\n130.2955\nNovember\n140.69319999999999 143.94\n129.8181999999\nDecember\n138.71430000000001 141.93\n129.3158\nAverage\n140.85082500000001 142.55916666666667 137.102225\nEnd-Period 138.5\n141.5\n129.5\nInter-Bank Rate\nMonth\n2004\n2005\n2006\nJanuary\n137.76\n133.11000000000001 129.9273\nFebruary\n136.44\n133.15\n129.3300000000\nMarch\n134.80000000000001 133.09\n128.6760999999\nApril\n137.22999999999999 133.06\n128.5763\nMay\n134.81\n133.37\n128.5696000000\nJune\n133.54\n134.35\n128.5\nJuly\n134.38999999999999 135.35\n128.4333\nAugust\n133.22999999999999 135.94\n128.4250000000\nSeptember 133.77000000000001 132.55000000000001 128.3881000000\nOctober\n133.76\n131.09\n128.4205\nNovember\n133.15\n130.80000000000001 128.4199999999\nDecember\n133.13999999999999 130.08000000000001 128.3947\nAverage\n134.66833333333332 132.99499999999998 128.6717416666\nEnd-Period 132.66999999999999 130.4\n128.5\nNote: *\nOperations\nof the\nInter-Bank\nForeign\nExchange\nMarket\n(IFEM) was\nstopped\nfrom\ntrading\nmid-\nFebruary\n2009 and\nreopened\nfor trading\nin June\n2009\nI & E\nMonth\n2017\n2018\n2019\nJanuary\n360.53363636363639 363.7640909090\nFebruary\n360.35699999999991 361.9436363636\nMarch\n360.2061904761905\n360.4866666666\nApril\n378.10771428571422 360.26900000000006 360.4420000000\nMay\n381.86333144368865 361.19190476190482 360.7004761904\nJune\n370.46016865079366 361.06052631578956 360.6270588235\nJuly\n364.74761904761908 361.81190476190466 361.2573913043\nAugust\n362.72608695652178 362.39380952380958 362.9955000000\nSeptember 359.98894736842112 364.21900000000005 362.2652380952\nOctober\n360.43238095238092 363.976\n362.3531818181\nNovember\n360.30272727272717 363.91380952380956 362.6625000000\nDecember\n360.67944444444441 364.75684210526316 363.57\nAverage\n365.58254061624643 362.04947368421074 361.9223116809\nEnd-Period 360.33\n364\n364.51\nSource:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable D.4.9:\nComputed\nRelative\nPurchasing\nPower Parity\n(RPPP)\nExchange\nRate with\nPercentage\nOvervaluation\nand\nDevaluation\nPeriod\nExchange Rates\nRPPP\nOvervaluat\nUndervalua\nJan 1981\n0.5323\n0.55981522867432132 5.16912054\nFeb 1981\n0.54690000000000005 0.56819982565174088 3.89464722\nMar 1981\n0.57220000000000004 0.5924172228900727\n3.53324412\nApr 1981\n0.59940000000000004 0.63522617880019994 5.97700680\nMay 1981\n0.59940000000000004 0.6857997304765292\n14.4143694\nJun 1981\n0.59050000000000002 0.68894512360313476 16.6714857\nJul 1981\n0.59919999999999995 0.68601414017037299 14.4883411\nAug 1981\n0.66800000000000004 0.64371834891945146 -3.6349777\nSep 1981\n0.66710000000000003 0.74948698451602636 12.3500201\nOct 1981\n0.66090000000000004 0.7219566591447969\n9.23841112\nNov 1981\n0.64880000000000004 0.71216815857027438 9.76697881\nDec 1981\n0.63560000000000005 0.69238522156148097 8.93411289\nJan 1982\n0.64370000000000005 0.6849665364094274\n6.41083368\nFeb 1982\n0.65590000000000004 0.6729660176991149\n2.60192372\nMar 1982\n0.6643\n0.68148565455427479 2.58703214\nApr 1982\n0.66959999999999997 0.68990073357417947 3.03177024\nMay 1982\n0.66959999999999997 0.67980753062975474 1.52442213\nJun 1982\n0.67559999999999998 0.67832183494447773 0.40287669\nJul 1982\n0.6794\n0.67499227732080413 -0.6487669\nAug 1982\n0.68100000000000005 0.6707004341832854\n-1.5124178\nSep 1982\n0.68430000000000002 0.63621118063687077 -7.0274469\nOct 1982\n0.68979999999999997 0.68348341288771131 -0.9157128\nNov 1982\n0.68920000000000003 0.69482087609990373 0.81556530\nDec 1982\n0.67200000000000004 0.70350685501458587 4.68852009\nJan 1983\n0.67359999999999998 0.69185956681438721 2.71074329\nFeb 1983\n0.69169999999999998 0.70516613700873243 1.94681755\nMar 1983\n0.69989999999999997 0.7320768876634709\n4.59735500\nApr 1983\n0.70479999999999998 0.77055226959709078 9.32920964\nMay 1983\n0.70479999999999998 0.78442878902827817 11.2980688\nJun 1983\n0.72719999999999996 0.80831157748334359 11.1539572\nJul 1983\n0.74470000000000003 0.85869079030574258 15.3069410\nAug 1983\n0.74860000000000004 0.91469827901991985 22.1878545\nSep 1983\n0.74860000000000004 0.94032638352630371 25.6113256\nOct 1983\n0.74860000000000004 0.94264191873837488 25.9206410\nNov 1983\n0.74860000000000004 0.95930744731887352 28.1468671\nDec 1983\n0.74860000000000004 0.97025344677756031 29.6090631\nJan 1984\n0.74860000000000004 1.0008526040602783\n33.6965808\nFeb 1984\n0.74860000000000004 1.0027707096499439\n33.9528065\nMar 1984\n0.74860000000000004 0.98129447573217454 31.0839534\nApr 1984\n0.74860000000000004 0.98203951965570235 31.1834784\nMay 1984\n0.74860000000000004 1.1425164861082686\n52.6204229\nJun 1984\n0.75429999999999997 1.0827565685827498\n43.5445537\nJul 1984\n0.76759999999999995 1.0676089171914493\n39.0840173\nAug 1984\n0.76759999999999995 1.0617097737264813\n38.3154994\nSep 1984\n0.76819999999999999 1.0670866198047531\n38.9073964\nOct 1984\n0.77480000000000004 1.065493688852521\n37.5185452\nNov 1984\n0.79569999999999996 1.0125291223617485\n27.2501096\nDec 1984\n0.80810000000000004 0.99237232969423228 22.8031592\nJan 1985\n0.82030000000000003 0.95327826118316028 16.2109302\nFeb 1985\n0.84770000000000001 0.97117142492102126 14.5654624\nMar 1985\n0.87460000000000004 1.0037586804072309\n14.7677430\nApr 1985\n0.88249999999999995 1.0116609033875852\n14.6357964\nMay 1985\n0.89170000000000005 0.86922472977184706 -2.5204968\nJun 1985\n0.89510000000000001 0.89293680690735122 -0.2416705\nJul 1985\n0.89510000000000001 0.89542924710032723 3.67832756\nAug 1985\n0.89690000000000003 0.86259878497154241 -3.8244191\nSep 1985\n0.91569999999999996 0.84014694819571156 -8.2508520\nOct 1985\n0.92249999999999999 0.843319457833546\n-8.5832566\nNov 1985\n0.9234\n0.87853659917603288 -4.8585012\nDec 1985\n0.95950000000000002 0.89054726892964653 -7.1863190\nJan 1986\n0.99960000000000004 0.93415729364410016 -6.5468893\nFeb 1986\n0.99960000000000004 0.93888257730529889 -6.0741719\nMar 1986\n1.0016\n0.96975318032886648 -3.1795946\nApr 1986\n1.0135000000000001\n0.94567033409270052 -6.6926162\nMay 1986\n1.0341\n0.96213464298602391 -6.9592260\nJun 1986\n1.1249\n1.0322990374839673\n-8.2319283\nJul 1986\n1.2694000000000001\n1.1382726745324661\n-10.329866\nAug 1986\n1.3293999999999999\n1.3502646918316579\n1.56948185\nSep 1986\n4.6406000000000001\n1.4562155420530858\n-68.620102\nOct 1986\n4.1203000000000003\n5.1483508078658424\n24.9508727\nNov 1986\n3.5310999999999999\n4.5243044534795755\n28.1273386\nDec 1986\n3.1827999999999999\n3.9357658502571011\n23.6573410\nJan 1987\n3.6471\n3.5775685071914092\n-1.9064871\nFeb 1987\n3.7014\n4.1602444752522496\n12.3965114\nMar 1987\n3.9213\n4.0978548210942369\n4.50245635\nApr 1987\n3.9054000000000002\n4.3577326895468724\n11.5822371\nMay 1987\n4.1616999999999997\n4.2890592955800262\n3.06027093\nJun 1987\n4.0506000000000002\n4.4223502365423304\n9.17765853\nJul 1987\n3.8081\n4.2555820107916169\n11.7507946\nAug 1987\n4.0808999999999997\n3.9391917859883208\n-3.4724745\nSep 1987\n4.2073\n4.112853355704698\n-2.2448279\nOct 1987\n4.2760999999999996\n4.2929144864538369\n0.39322014\nNov 1987\n4.2889999999999997\n4.4628770178616612\n4.05402233\nDec 1987\n4.1664000000000003\n4.5051311139636567\n8.13006705\nJan 1988\n4.1748000000000003\n4.377771388199629\n4.86182303\nFeb 1988\n4.2610999999999999\n5.2558355567235315\n23.3445719\nMar 1988\n4.3169000000000004\n5.7148966999511499\n32.3842734\nApr 1988\n4.2023000000000001\n5.9457623583759291\n41.4882887\nMay 1988\n4.1102999999999996\n6.2003336728965603\n50.8486892\nJun 1988\n4.1913\n6.297466574969933\n50.2509143\nJul 1988\n4.6086999999999998\n6.5474128566465986\n42.0663713\nAug 1988\n4.5830000000000002\n7.3787867415902877\n61.0034200\nSep 1988\n4.7167000000000003\n7.3850804487070327\n56.5730372\nOct 1988\n4.7747999999999999\n7.5017663532628154\n57.1116351\nNov 1988\n5.1478999999999999\n7.2866463461971334\n41.5459963\nDec 1988\n5.3529999999999998\n7.9504019019251775\n48.5223594\nJan 1989\n7.0388999999999999\n8.2643942248269955\n17.4103087\nFeb 1989\n7.3822999999999999\n10.099000517242255\n36.8001912\nMar 1989\n7.5871000000000004\n10.531847742551175\n38.8125600\nApr 1989\n7.5808\n11.327555167172015\n49.4242714\nMay 1989\n7.5050999999999997\n11.338635728287874\n51.0790759\nJun 1989\n7.3471000000000002\n11.092760738842752\n50.9814857\nJul 1989\n7.1387999999999998\n11.202407232396885\n56.9228334\nAug 1989\n7.2592999999999996\n10.163548837821853\n40.0072849\nSep 1989\n7.3400999999999996\n10.149179643832797\n38.2703184\nOct 1989\n7.3933999999999997\n10.19807727538695\n37.9348780\nNov 1989\n7.5037000000000003\n10.511901288323603\n40.0895729\nDec 1989\n7.6220999999999997\n10.359008693801577\n35.9075411\nJan 1990\n7.8620999999999999\n10.537200322441699\n34.0252645\nFeb 1990\n7.9009\n9.5833474395554497\n21.2943770\nMar 1990\n7.9387999999999996\n9.1938670257510733\n15.8092788\nApr 1990\n7.94\n8.6153056606082892\n8.50510907\nMay 1990\n7.94\n8.1767954440811081\n2.98231037\nJun 1990\n7.9424000000000001\n8.024508417664002\n1.03379857\nJul 1990\n7.9523000000000001\n7.6184007165334808\n-4.1987762\nAug 1990\n7.9622999999999999\n7.8583667219680962\n-1.3053172\nSep 1990\n7.9743000000000004\n7.8793017373175829\n-1.1913053\nOct 1990\n8.0089000000000006\n7.7212607101106405\n-3.5914955\nNov 1990\n8.3246000000000002\n7.73054117813974\n-7.1361845\nDec 1990\n8.7071000000000005\n8.0593340250124932\n-7.4395145\nNote: *In May\n2017, BDC\nand I & E\nrates were\nadopted for\nRPPP\ncompilation\nSource:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable\nD.4.10.1:\nBilateral\nReal\nExchange\nRate (End-\nPeriod\nExchange\nRate)\nChina\nIndia\nUSA\nM1 2008\n20.967232461769125 3.0213377032356985 145.527417291\nM2 2008\n21.472359252611525 3.0080710885532693 145.542883661\nM3 2008\n21.500242888518329 2.981744739556369\n145.637439602\nM4 2008\n21.447903565343751 2.9830313926596834 144.324588913\nM5 2008\n20.957607587357472 2.7981862144092138 142.675780869\nM6 2008\n20.335980928313759 2.6748701191684892 139.031354762\nM7 2008\n19.926141075732797 2.6710568737788321 136.687309102\nM8 2008\n19.406822190165851 2.6710583534788572 134.560670743\nM9 2008\n19.346839005786212 2.5059258635808384 132.873466546\nM10 2008\n19.370356327782382 2.3951556479566465 132.433978135\nM11 2008\n19.141871629781726 2.3791761307331964 129.956222743\nM12 2008\n22.095771817685851 2.6587582296712036 143.613370880\nM1 2009\n24.683985255661089 2.9190379041314038 157.930939711\nM2 2009\n24.840967862790553 2.9012514508659608 159.127039015\nM3 2009\n24.50264849719812\n2.7686554459621466 158.309345690\nM4 2009\n24.478608575334068 2.8598728006274019 158.052056403\nM5 2009\n24.171801728147038 2.931675451586468\n156.479108999\nM6 2009\n23.673572893395029 2.9648635612093504 155.072661645\nM7 2009\n23.191891491278\n3.0537066474186796 154.739431229\nM8 2009\n22.83232205956968\n3.0902361803023002 154.538358294\nM9 2009\n22.009714019721791 3.013568167734177\n150.190330996\nM10 2009\n22.063096787175663 3.185441791400732\n151.433720719\nM11 2009\n21.940022402758625 3.2165839936438405 149.793100000\nM12 2009\n21.843075160491534 3.1575085859413474 146.095509022\nM1 2010\n22.087306398686806 3.2477104575061668 146.033680342\nM2 2010\n22.241205935416133 3.1224180158954722 143.222431878\nM3 2010\n22.948039561404343 3.2033526152421321 144.893129085\nM4 2010\n23.26065179003999\n3.2291843505036151 143.104108817\nM5 2010\n24.004813395222836 3.1770106625599079 143.382447618\nM6 2010\n23.99027764709615\n3.0661994009656559 138.895997127\nM7 2010\n24.691114458701769 3.0892303144389568 137.625900482\nM8 2010\n25.168818784470911 3.0657314985596247 135.983869963\nM9 2010\n26.242170562792452 3.1147869861273905 135.968212311\nM10 2010\n27.357109725903683 3.2284521485257063 134.545567480\nM11 2010\n28.850391624850126 3.2052848079535035 134.706296318\nM12 2010\n29.834769370500602 3.2169083456340255 133.669951319\nM1 2011\n19.823513230339316 3.2382932384559191 133.718006899\nM2 2011\n19.969587706544754 3.157908863107131\n133.299317772\nM3 2011\n19.840890619151317 3.166231243587621\n133.625781424\nM4 2011\n20.259880929619246 3.2744112957740885 136.420889752\nM5 2011\n20.288695847866407 3.2394458273976108 136.509741337\nM6 2011\n19.973668996701225 3.2072152097008733 133.417919899\nM7 2011\n19.877712251737858 3.267241078457781\n131.923762193\nM8 2011\n19.824502652960504 3.1780437008645932 130.489872445\nM9 2011\n20.210610844225396 3.0995079148500584 132.067456291\nM10 2011\n19.646683033709916 2.9140222533373543 127.475593302\nM11 2011\n20.439975178069645 2.9494699610541257 132.395839926\nM12 2011\n20.370854786984125 2.7964960664118204 131.027592824\nM1 2012\n20.094957506111701 2.7962950618538782 127.648987485\nM2 2012\n19.932289012355341 2.9070346544639727 126.982426997\nM3 2012\n19.642535207563231 2.8252352164748182 126.005811825\nM4 2012\n19.591791677954863 2.7892806456354218 125.947990935\nM5 2012\n19.370654002220999 2.646436994812523\n124.892762125\nM6 2012\n19.035115351562563 2.5722903226453004 123.482808019\nM7 2012\n18.965797999654271 2.6374721955580611 122.841114576\nM8 2012\n18.909921010506309 2.6411082129700847 122.673902010\nM9 2012\n18.770431760847689 2.6721233776471345 121.953923941\nM10 2012\n18.656875703533252 2.7520960450691621 120.802948117\nM11 2012\n18.645357759295109 2.6619419513756912 119.584663181\nM12 2012\n18.654521525723549 2.6597241238891498 118.334084719\nM1 2013\n18.760599450598058 2.6802608090483044 117.966559574\nM2 2013\n18.808445864022843 2.7053839189163806 118.051266200\nM3 2013\n18.536272802592922 2.6601176235116082 117.523424422\nM4 2013\n18.549219699165555 2.6619864579271071 116.758052409\nM5 2013\n18.469938445208651 2.6332149679196375 116.176865175\nM6 2013\n18.444056508515747 2.521631349068314\n115.778509893\nM7 2013\n18.359716121996144 2.4883357238897643 115.216468729\nM8 2013\n18.400048411618602 2.3769449814698955 115.069596408\nM9 2013\n18.447214474941518 2.3659750822094407 114.329194200\nM10 2013\n18.385487049357248 2.4541519745857845 113.221036890\nM11 2013\n18.237105407184568 2.4271656911566328 112.135871689\nM12 2013\n18.203872090487145 2.398599299095971\n111.249881729\nM1 2014\n18.326753638262282 2.3589416216160175 110.976394077\nM2 2014\n18.304737376121544 2.3405643659568276 110.839351005\nM3 2014\n17.995719834924451 2.3819077193405676 110.674072775\nM4 2014\n17.768649123847634 2.4118448308920599 110.355823180\nM5 2014\n17.62473203547453\n2.4504675357923853 109.885897118\nM6 2014\n17.492449816744859 2.4330990869666294 109.242221065\nM7 2014\n17.348505419706054 2.4557751242646946 108.499566038\nM8 2014\n17.314970513647818 2.4326367426635844 107.799597934\nM9 2014\n17.337651617552744 2.4167775061589443 107.300505828\nM10 2014\n17.273472731278865 2.3859840400723291 106.499635927\nM11 2014\n18.141302559109132 2.4978562533847737 111.543761037\nM12 2014\n18.449239176182083 2.4664065709361505 112.023319994\nM1 2015\n18.332248580057058 2.4683598433623821 110.561629879\nM2 2015\n21.487504520249448 2.8748428955334893 128.714387097\nM3 2015\n21.022875182292005 2.8279019611685263 127.678254409\nM4 2015\n20.876579139012154 2.8041315757231851 126.950109922\nM5 2015\n20.665665094141037 2.7483986374214289 126.214603233\nM6 2015\n20.46407627602575\n2.7512266967343404 125.459618600\nM7 2015\n20.397670215164197 2.7560677483139715 124.639235034\nM8 2015\n19.773385653824082 2.7053888540397115 123.726182566\nM9 2015\n19.469852493642176 2.6546559080279661 122.760491322\nM10 2015\n19.387874024838975 2.7064111799514974 122.222840348\nM11 2015\n19.215050819680396 2.6559107535271274 121.165086676\nM12 2015\n18.862019500420079 2.6006325522012714 119.560067133\nM1 2016\n18.436408811589597 2.5335866859053309 118.730331070\nM2 2016\n18.387297183942238 2.4440975016163811 116.156649852\nM3 2016\n18.129969532059821 2.4743124098289706 114.171248429\nM4 2016\n17.761015485433042 2.4535020930154268 112.891636665\nM5 2016\n16.955891144382147 2.3875858702806476 110.319278223\nM6 2016\n23.685119466760217 3.3905307307355304 156.330799133\nM7 2016\n25.888525905599952 3.7643980271765241 170.482985590\nM8 2016\n24.984122810464925 3.6461497229343571 165.137060990\nM9 2016\n24.920675468931123 3.6193656571586548 163.778722555\nM10 2016\n24.311635847197905 3.5901754073350562 162.520320215\nM11 2016\n23.744623498214143 3.4708989954699394 161.038808555\nM12 2016\n23.318093432124069 3.4412788327631576 159.356920302\nM1 2017\n23.593713524854081 3.4150995510186157 158.855211948\nM2 2017\n23.260499394453198 3.4300612590803405 157.154054623\nM3 2017\n22.788435374796645 3.4852582425068426 155.028182417\nM4 2017\n27.719817554965335 4.2944884394418503 189.319162883\nM5 2017\n27.568366683284324 4.2205943780275188 186.747058708\nM6 2017\n26.263356885161702 4.0072840018102367 177.188459400\nM7 2017\n26.23898305381811\n4.0825609423003213 175.624566228\nM8 2017\n26.036981121158391 3.992370303887133\n170.567406851\nM9 2017\n25.831509982465548 3.8822061618444064 170.480599543\nM10 2017\n25.767406799002206 3.9179397654598516 169.286385705\nM11 2017\n25.636798436930142 3.9492467800793887 167.893714366\nM12 2017\n25.91160048635248\n3.942038966734966\n166.657413316\nM1 2018\n26.816300533133873 3.9133241736177955 166.084690823\nM2 2018\n26.955736603656163 3.7896642829490736 165.761609095\nM3 2018\n26.494966856031787 3.7611693358683675 164.617100156\nM4 2018\n25.978028979938895 3.6521852469547822 164.044679389\nM5 2018\n25.436024486872338 3.5700561352170523 163.159861352\nM6 2018\n24.303726458384872 3.4743145514601914 161.579300578\nM7 2018\n23.443089569815392 3.5927127238678644 160.258806663\nM8 2018\n23.368065576653724 3.4414917474478313 158.789795661\nM9 2018\n23.239690535364012 3.3484260122484417 158.212349146\nM10 2018\n22.789238423887056 3.2663006738008873 157.164446950\nM11 2018\n22.650433360082385 3.4473599010234799 155.632692679\nM12 2018\n22.795713413585158 3.3941550945812522 153.955420998\nM1 2019\n23.170056886259523 3.3764108313419925 152.711127897\nM2 2019\n23.170538024422591 3.3255183252715268 151.389583897\nM3 2019\n22.773281484592406 3.4153006010879574 150.925707373\nM4 2019\n22.511111016852329 3.3831817257378205 150.284923239\nM5 2019\n21.746574879775931 3.3699673822227436 148.994910504\nM6 2019\n21.610327396508456 3.3986041512071927 147.440407424\nM7 2019\n21.477450638692115 3.4083908024239364 146.589073138\nM8 2019\n20.726312657290382 3.2600225636450992 145.652522367\nM9 2019\n20.673515485313903 3.2894820916049952 143.983410529\nM10 2019\n20.934190976182446 3.2831543495413911 142.956778689\nM11 2019\n20.831224822094633 3.2558053784269476 141.490799965\nM12 2019\n20.876604838316066 3.2473915985653736 140.821511134\nNote: From\nApril 2017,\nthe I & E\nrate was\nadopted for\nBRER\ncompliation.\nSource:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable\nD.4.10.2:\nBilateral\nReal\nExchange\nRate\n(Average\nExchange\nRate)\nChina\nIndia\nUSA\nM1 2008\n20.921362569828315 3.0147279403966198 145.209047811\nM2 2008\n21.390837405885094 2.9966506616063131 144.990316310\nM3 2008\n21.298311046563882 2.9537399765116619 144.269602197\nM4 2008\n21.375662669117993 2.9729839369436144 143.838474379\nM5 2008\n20.951097610512711 2.7973170251476431 142.631462069\nM6 2008\n20.326261474253961 2.6735916818346408 138.964905601\nM7 2008\n19.918374077430581 2.6700157241590974 136.634029840\nM8 2008\n19.400953603639476 2.6702506304569837 134.519979849\nM9 2008\n19.329484868716527 2.5036780451692602 132.754278892\nM10 2008\n19.367773299912788 2.3948362550819882 132.416318126\nM11 2008\n19.157115415207127 2.3810708070285753 130.059714440\nM12 2008\n22.390382108588334 2.694208339400153\n145.528215825\nM1 2009\n24.791359799194129 2.9317356253164335 158.617934230\nM2 2009\n25.145939336804993 2.9368699878064026 161.080634701\nM3 2009\n24.603551648181774 2.7800569097066714 158.961271616\nM4 2009\n24.45713316822205\n2.8573637963883312 157.913395243\nM5 2009\n24.274999963200653 2.944191843031192\n157.147175370\nM6 2009\n23.725083189130146 2.9713146786448084 155.410077492\nM7 2009\n22.982202659301784 3.0260966450031348 153.340359031\nM8 2009\n23.253393789275766 3.1472260515140555 157.388341474\nM9 2009\n22.668970581467192 3.1038335199811722 154.688979235\nM10 2009\n22.002838713372693 3.1767418075130278 151.020129445\nM11 2009\n22.121189717608054 3.2431445811591399 151.03\nM12 2009\n21.875055381643605 3.162131461709802\n146.309405950\nM1 2010\n22.089025560524487 3.2479632425120704 146.045046849\nM2 2010\n22.370700238512349 3.140597576217766\n144.056311527\nM3 2010\n22.993542507331039 3.2097044423969296 145.180433113\nM4 2010\n23.304648263254098 3.2352922069842829 143.374783781\nM5 2010\n24.200056041562519 3.2028508121580304 144.548645748\nM6 2010\n24.197414424460479 3.0926735698775505 140.095252494\nM7 2010\n24.72138487073488\n3.0930175989149022 137.794624852\nM8 2010\n25.154981041084671 3.0640459682957109 135.909106426\nM9 2010\n26.462634722467577 3.1409547489586109 137.110500354\nM10 2010\n27.684515879572363 3.267089823003845\n136.155790460\nM11 2010\n28.910401591621181 3.2119519283627587 134.986490795\nM12 2010\n30.224541798078125 3.258935222383136\n135.416264849\nM1 2011\n19.903993403048567 3.25144017139792\n134.260879808\nM2 2011\n20.073910054755519 3.1744059722551063 133.995681565\nM3 2011\n20.122851690320108 3.2112269028121281 135.524752050\nM4 2011\n20.279662126570649 3.2776083419446267 136.554087400\nM5 2011\n20.425252201993974 3.2612494423219132 137.428542265\nM6 2011\n20.278808719815128 3.2562121546896212 135.456158699\nM7 2011\n19.935972748175345 3.2768171848427223 132.310423584\nM8 2011\n20.005316686343804 3.2070297949866515 131.680035980\nM9 2011\n20.282317313860872 3.1105048496727687 132.536026545\nM10 2011\n20.691144346534777 3.0689381494761268 134.252479014\nM11 2011\n20.563865899464837 2.9673472802790775 133.198317227\nM12 2011\n20.873217542540235 2.8654600585719376 134.258845674\nM1 2012\n20.435678839184586 2.8437078210423565 129.813348030\nM2 2012\n20.075459100270123 2.9279153675016443 127.894519192\nM3 2012\n19.661221595574752 2.8279229266365156 126.125684004\nM4 2012\n19.614590649555907 2.7925265320388966 126.094556635\nM5 2012\n19.512571448862509 2.665825890043338\n125.807778309\nM6 2012\n19.618933627805252 2.6511839922882983 127.270098970\nM7 2012\n19.439538084785003 2.7033526980539953 125.909520139\nM8 2012\n19.103637203321014 2.6681641391975899 123.930592677\nM9 2012\n18.823186311404815 2.6796334162875346 122.296677082\nM10 2012\n18.653625199014982 2.7516165596091438 120.781901157\nM11 2012\n18.676457533738905 2.6663819731408398 119.784126024\nM12 2012\n18.654794239298521 2.6597630068416431 118.335814665\nM1 2013\n18.720358313397874 2.6745116994192011 117.713523496\nM2 2013\n18.833853392246898 2.7090385067953422 118.210736626\nM3 2013\n18.662650455157362 2.6782539243950132 118.324682294\nM4 2013\n18.654460571860788 2.6770895071377292 117.420491020\nM5 2013\n18.554786494321402 2.6453115514348049 116.710563779\nM6 2013\n18.762092859480251 2.5651125882612815 117.774913167\nM7 2013\n18.803474382879084 2.5484793299231545 118.001275392\nM8 2013\n18.848290347248735 2.4348495258246605 117.872796567\nM9 2013\n18.992806168564936 2.4359507608641739 117.710575100\nM10 2013\n18.674312047044126 2.4927052332772788 114.999671616\nM11 2013\n18.412522397441187 2.4505118357826929 113.214471427\nM12 2013\n18.411427510330096 2.4259474523945785 112.518321531\nM1 2014\n18.66723287483919\n2.4027666578614144 113.038142638\nM2 2014\n19.039277399240387 2.4344874946067803 115.287158028\nM3 2014\n18.833467045388307 2.4927916720673333 115.826236545\nM4 2014\n18.322504114425314 2.4870228754793504 113.795652679\nM5 2014\n18.13712313239472\n2.5217082074862724 113.080530389\nM6 2014\n18.1077599981842\n2.5186851916200901 113.084898995\nM7 2014\n17.89588227623786\n2.5332592899232598 111.922924417\nM8 2014\n17.832667186135247 2.5053696385154689 111.022675508\nM9 2014\n17.957335651814876 2.5031582033817639 111.135650968\nM10 2014\n18.07747226297472\n2.4970404605556422 111.456696892\nM11 2014\n18.62572377955939\n2.5645556852933376 114.522277308\nM12 2014\n19.607209456865366 2.6212110852010615 119.054486648\nM1 2015\n19.639534104683946 2.6443803178124341 118.445857375\nM2 2015\n21.105504439889458 2.8237345773906712 126.426131326\nM3 2015\n21.030345239463379 2.8289067994288399 127.723622317\nM4 2015\n20.876579139012154 2.8041315757231851 126.950109922\nM5 2015\n20.665665094141037 2.7483986374214289 126.214603233\nM6 2015\n20.460959128078141 2.7508076218376556 125.440508224\nM7 2015\n20.394563970968996 2.7556480425654968 124.620254440\nM8 2015\n19.773385653824082 2.7053888540397115 123.726182566\nM9 2015\n19.474795335097784 2.6553298496141626 122.791656717\nM10 2015\n19.386889868797105 2.706273798673327\n122.216636143\nM11 2015\n19.214075436390058 2.6557759357223794 121.158936164\nM12 2015\n18.861062037501277 2.6005005403965913 119.553998094\nM1 2016\n18.442755673518537 2.5570934117600981 118.730331070\nM2 2016\n18.397656097968945 2.4576484873992919 116.156649852\nM3 2016\n18.019103539602479 2.4488777562831241 114.171248429\nM4 2016\n17.777093987767536 2.4552763913520597 112.891636665\nM5 2016\n17.101016174195813 2.3981582851259149 110.319278223\nM6 2016\n19.540008947955343 2.7898331882634859 128.025533594\nM7 2016\n24.270393198207262 3.533591169351415\n160.444642381\nM8 2016\n25.401393959655937 3.6928913101670107 167.150006210\nM9 2016\n24.910689150854758 3.614891594765512\n163.767991763\nM10 2016\n24.403376545667829 3.5985093952148079 162.632219452\nM11 2016\n23.940104925175895 3.5191846775046538 161.133847852\nM12 2016\n23.428726963460722 3.446513352996782\n159.471866277\nM1 2017\n23.529424830342109 3.4011054250136978 158.829191439\nM2 2017\n23.232961780654623 3.4106568749623234 157.056315603\nM3 2017\n22.771551662961034 3.4308988557675479 155.053484879\nM4 2017\n27.67651559176187\n4.2647090999605402 188.855649349\nM5 2017\n27.42233129348228\n4.2436761807732903 187.416173392\nM6 2017\n26.450105533926148 4.0697870918937955 179.132372428\nM72017\n25.84275636926537\n4.0240245299409434 174.129179020\nM8 2017\n25.961939807682917 4.0292523665867117 172.016704339\nM9 2017\n26.114947311491683 3.9327940943259443 170.286158646\nM10 2017\n25.781699740801439 3.8951740885282673 169.099839433\nM11 2017\n25.542200389673578 3.919323772629947\n167.732048186\nM12 2017\n25.614366539922884 3.9265128405105165 166.819036016\nM1 2018\n26.300407701679347 3.9222599788068329 166.330882019\nM2 2018\n26.869724884710493 3.8309690682061945 165.691260073\nM3 2018\n26.310621167781232 3.7625510417456587 164.619929302\nM4 2018\n26.130145062994075 3.713342739903823\n163.935015947\nM5 2018\n25.562339666747143 3.5676620027793353 163.260163179\nM6 2018\n24.883899304941796 3.5118792972804278 161.463266103\nM7 2018\n23.794958481952698 3.5823627868095742 159.998741980\nM8 2018\n23.282689173860366 3.507348024706773\n158.681995817\nM9 2018\n23.343099545436349 3.3665891072486174 158.342337859\nM10 2018\n22.932860692572781 3.2862641453495764 157.352937072\nM11 2018\n22.647037461387455 3.3402528988877371 155.553106507\nM12 2018\n22.735198430763219 3.3650286680268011 154.275530737\nM1 2019\n22.939037132652704 3.3976082951371929 153.019928411\nM2 2019\n23.068556929267668 3.3330642906139993 151.789513569\nM3 2019\n22.793243316955426 3.3983700108291033 150.844807489\nM4 2019\n22.58122211554242\n3.401357337955949\n150.206578216\nM5 2019\n21.849385939600399 3.3711762624783996 148.978586153\nM6 2019\n21.495334630149294 3.3720550514264187 147.394246496\nM7 2019\n21.470843563409531 3.4068125861136971 146.417789636\nM8 2019\n20.958946612751699 3.2887003862524793 145.678809089\nM9 2019\n20.714246902041214 3.2598867188386924 143.997417379\nM10 2019\n20.782656971174383 3.2697584888149853 142.835834171\nM11 2019\n20.854529584773484 3.2503935616766984 141.431770275\nM12 2019\n20.723267500539375 3.2427204124790503 140.458359998\nNote: From\nApril 2017,\nthe I & E\nrate was\nadopted for\nBRER\ncompliation.\nSource:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable D\n4.11:\nNominal\nEffective\nExchange\nRate\nIndices\nfor\nNigeria1\nPeriod\nJanuary\nFebruary\nMarch April\n1981\n113.7\n115.6\n110.8 107.9\n1982\n107.8\n108.2\n108.2 108.7\n1983\n111.6\n110.2\n109.8 110\n1984\n113.7\n111.4\n108.7 109.9\n1985\n114.5\n113.8\n110.5 104\n1986\n79.400000000000006 77\n75.3\n74.3\n1987\n16.5\n16.100000000000001 15.4\n15.2\n1988\n13.6\n13.6\n13.3\n13.5\n1989\n9.3000000000000007 8.8000000000000007 8.6\n8.69999999\n1990\n8.1999999999999993 8.1\n8.1\n8.1\n1991\n6.4\n6\n6.5\n7.2\n1992\n6.4\n6\n3.6\n3.4\n1993\n3.2\n3\n2.6\n2.8\n1994\n3.1\n3.1\n3\n3\n1995\n0.7\n0.7\n0.7\n0.7\nSource:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nNotes:\n1Indices\nare\ntrade-\nweighted\nand\nprovided\nat 1985\nbase\nperiod.\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable D\n4.12.1:\nNominal\nEffective\nExchange\nRate\nIndices for\nNigeria1\n(End-Period\nExchange\nRate)\nPeriod\nJanuary\nFebruary\nMarch\n1996\n31.011751549699184 31.245552505709647 30.7094706991\n1997\n28.981104939619012 28.66715540075764\n29.7260481626\n1998\n25.77254706967263\n28.095242599943482 28.1062866183\n1999\n72.126995386603483 68.138156829016424 71.5198139691\n2000\n76.411549024088742 77.926432704555737 77.7629531493\n2001\n82.713113820177099 82.074926322644231 80.5643925882\n2002\n81.496551005036963 82.666666423382011 83.3419305238\n2003\n95.934451973943155 95.653230233461784 96.2669668489\n2004\n108.64488115126018 108.56677444667162 107.671363957\n2005\n109.48962689738831 109.76904115698792 108.808129812\n2006\n105.20074134487862 103.98859931067022 103.742372415\n2007\n106.21892522773322 106.82388064651769 107.299529436\nTable D\n4.12.1:\nNominal\nEffective\nExchange\nRate\nIndices for\nNigeria2\n(End-Period\nExchange\nRate)\nPeriod\nJanuary\nFebruary\nMarch\n2008\n80.891867499592436 80.836618152351107 82.2665712480\n2009\n88.624938150607932 87.782365990220626 87.2058775904\n2010\n98.810874466542003 96.596688816698489 96.7556165758\n2011\n99.396982424354803 100.36232765531318 102.326997008\n2012\n100.42941372630516 101.68266819012054 100.846266999\n2013\n97.937559355744654 98.078686700892078 96.5737877434\n2014\n93.981626680427951 93.923347901193722 94.8461962118\n2015\n93.413563868566456 107.44080170718699 103.690308246\n2016\n97.763236290626494 97.871312790667545 101.577254604\n2017\n153.29259183947147 153.32521170117832 154.536573844\n2018\n196.81720690889378 194.4788729977366\n194.858735064\n2019\n183.83783319742304 181.49320691419027 179.842760132\nSource:\nNational\nBureau of\nStatistics\nNote:\n1Indices\nare trade-\nweighted\nand\nprovided at\nMay 2003\nbase\nperiod.\n2Indices\nare trade-\nweighted\nand\nprovided at\nNovember\n2009 base\nperiod.\nFrom April\n2017, I & E\nrate was\nadopted for\ncompilation\nof indices.\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable D\n4.12.2:\nNominal\nEffective\nExchange\nRate\nIndices for\nNigeria1\n(Average\nExchange\nRate)\nPeriod\nJanuary\nFebruary\nMarch\n2008\n80.05395369773224\n79.873106272910618 80.8301377759\n2009\n88.277618084866361 88.132932361420387 86.8710551055\n2010\n98.012773501048159 96.365090325638121 96.0967206912\n2011\n98.980798728762394 100.0586776829616\n102.930010541\n2012\n101.29385282348375 101.57291893658889 100.113918273\n2013\n96.925739441741086 97.405418776351468 96.4334052254\n2014\n94.942658508686449 96.889572993198982 98.4459362021\n2015\n99.281800543541067 104.82610836503542 103.107167938\n2016\n96.998603140552774 97.926312848835096 99.0632244949\n2017\n150.68735475115554 151.98022826612069 152.958294262\n2018\n192.68207600148369 193.84518193865082 193.307016674\n2019\n181.24303105294752 180.02434586796286 178.771116305\nSource:\nNational\nBureau of\nStatistics\nNote:\n1Indices\nare trade-\nweighted\nand\nprovided at\nNovember\n2009 base\nperiod.\nIn April\n2017, I & E\nrate was\nadopted for\ncompilation\nof indices.\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable D\n4.13.1:\nReal\nEffective\nExchange\nRate\nIndices for\nNigeria1\n(End-Period\nExchange\nRate)\nPeriod\nJanuary\nFebruary\nMarch\n1996\n17.925723912487356 18.323343945967615 18.3340299370\n1997\n18.412320684825303 18.351624106434819 19.7250421845\n1998\n17.273086845118851 18.803354551371449 19.0446812241\n1999\n53.058847952961031 50.343951272433493 53.0740678636\n2000\n53.457762451090993 55.050761743289861 55.1706506195\n2001\n65.954432474578667 66.552801699900016 65.6160578333\n2002\n75.026369721815072 77.128491656166602 77.5131297321\n2003\n94.590228592839253 92.408281943792545 91.4317540742\n2004\n127.89845964401209 127.9857235885563\n122.560207166\n2005\n137.3329614261522\n139.3366926867414\n139.586410294\n2006\n140.9428213216259\n141.20112121851369 144.241530881\n2007\n149.41748589802242 150.75525466563349 152.247374857\nTable D\n4.13.1:\nReal\nEffective\nExchange\nRate\nIndices for\nNigeria2\n(End-Period\nExchange\nRate)\nPeriod\nJanuary\nFebruary\nMarch\n2008\n95.826218763328185 96.171031267262322 97.8576436910\n2009\n95.795919298820337 94.641686913849881 93.5536605552\n2010\n96.801708385512597 93.400325606964216 95.1705324124\n2011\n89.322328872724739 89.663822546152019 90.6361023652\n2012\n83.142248446465302 84.304149492396803 82.7679086688\n2013\n77.255019132493331 77.275206373417035 75.7289356894\n2014\n70.888854654985039 70.75737303834633\n71.1504834981\n2015\n66.466240380771083 76.353096402162578 73.3723322668\n2016\n65.296754653842271 64.18917490534055\n65.4186145068\n2017\n88.753917165686275 87.70817551026731\n87.0269648025\n2018\n101.39580693101776 99.721122433387166 99.1169381008\n2019\n87.095424471040303 85.711006543268766 84.5591534816\nSource:\nNational\nBureau of\nStatistics\nNote:\n1Indices\nare trade-\nweighted\nand\nprovided at\nMay 2003\nbase\nperiod.\n2Indices\nare trade-\nweighted\nand\nprovided at\nNovember\n2009 base\nperiod.\nFrom April\n2017, I & E\nrate was\nadopted for\ncompilation\nof indices.\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable D\n4.13.2:\nReal\nEffective\nExchange\nRate\nIndices for\nNigeria1\n(Average\nExchange\nRate)\nPeriod\nJanuary\nFebruary\nMarch\n2008\n94.833608334569391 95.024744680787208 96.1489788862\n2009\n95.420496244283441 95.019646568631998 93.1944660839\n2010\n96.019835566948615 93.176390659088625 94.5224307894\n2011\n88.948328616152907 89.39254130075706\n91.1702213949\n2012\n83.857889487448759 84.213157412418141 82.1668455427\n2013\n76.456876240949043 76.744745377623488 75.6188538657\n2014\n71.613745764008783 72.991985624468313 73.8508895345\n2015\n70.6416471771429\n74.494957504805058 72.9596961667\n2016\n64.786050782991111 64.225246847698841 63.7995082688\n2017\n87.245527269222777 86.93879099827754\n86.1458110172\n2018\n99.26548031116927\n99.396190564367288 98.3276402768\n2019\n85.866105183161324 85.01733011931384\n84.0552839079\nSource:\nNational\nBureau of\nStatistics\nNote:\n1Indices\nare trade-\nweighted\nand\nprovided at\nNovember\n2009 base\nperiod.\nFrom April\n2017, I & E\nrate was\nadopted for\ncompilation\nof indices.\nReturn to Menu\nTable D.5.1:\nSectoral\nUtilization of\nForeign\nExchange for\nTransactions\nValid for\nForeign\nExchange (US$'\nMillion)\nCategory\n1997\n1998\n1999\n(A) Imports\n4369.659790239999\n4337.5179665900005\n5142\n1. Industrial\nSetor\n2913.1901721199997\n2304.3297587299999\n2786\n(i) Raw\nMaterials\n1486.3318212199999\n1436.6334569400001\n1685\n(ii) Machinery,\nSpare Parts &\nCKD\n1426.8583509\n867.69630179000001\n1101\n2. Agricultural\nSector\n46.585051450000002\n93.345776010000009\n82.38\n3. Finished\nGoods\n1310.8988659400002\n1801.4203808299999\n2082\n(i) Food\n663.55987161999997\n744.32754595000006\n813.1\n(ii) General\nMerchandise\n647.3389943200001\n1057.0928348800001\n1269\n(a) Drug &\nPharmaceuticals\n72.818122689999996\n96.186120410000001\n140.6\n(b) Books &\nEducational\nMaterials\n37.992400450000005\n51.840158280000004\n78.61\n(c) Cement\n57.274550810000001\n117.96176611\n156.4\n(d) Other\nBuilding\nMaterials\n15.758853050000001\n122.31685889000001\n97.04\n(e) Detergents\n4.5806209000000004\n7.5815097800000002\n6.658\n(f) Alcohol\n12.70863772\n13.29995284\n1.339\n(g) Insecticides\n5.5808219599999997\n14.517646859999999\n33.43\n(h) Lubricants\n26.71794517\n32.09428054\n56.55\n(i) Glass\nProducts\n7.1887641599999998\n9.862019720000001\n17.26\n(j) Furniture/\nWood Products\n10.291301220000001\n14.27266857\n6.284\n(k) Others\n396.42697619\n577.15985288000002\n674.9\n4. Transport\n98.936651519999998\n137.99452849000002\n188.9\n(i) Aircraft/\nShipping\nVessels\n4.8867690799999997\n2.2916080600000002\n12.70\n(ii) Motor\nVehicles (Cars)\n60.002594389999999\n79.362106060000002\n85.63\n(iii) Buses/\nTrucks/Lorries\n22.566540329999999\n34.210695530000002\n71.69\n(iv) Rolling\nStocks\n3.76613591\n2.87596637\n1.823\n(iv) Motorcycles\n& Bicycles\n7.7146118099999992\n19.254152469999998\n17.13\n5. Personal\nEffects\n4.9049209999999996E-2 0.42752253000000001\n2.624\n6. Minerals\n7. Oil Sector\nB. Invisibles\n413.35121801999998\n516.01768069000002\n703.9\n(i) Education\n41.664925070000002\n9.5063249899999995\n14.27\n(ii) Personal\nHome\nRemittances\n3.9966872499999999\n4.6383516500000006\n9.619\n(iii) Airline\nRemittances\n19.890736019999999\n37.235348420000001\n75.84\n(iv) Travels\n(PTA)\n127.06360487000001\n167.31811003999999\n274.4\n(v) Travels\n(BTA)\n0\n0\n0\n(vi) Estacode\n0\n0\n0\n(vii) Re-\nInsurance\n3.8178142899999998\n2.3223239200000001\n3.723\n(viii) Contract\nServices Fees\n8.7442046799999993\n6.5214656799999995\n12.33\n(ix) Technical\nServices Fees\n30.620970070000002\n21.382846609999998\n29.78\n(x) Royalty\n8.1631396800000005\n9.1001763800000006\n14.33\n(xi) License\n0.72519328000000005\n0.14719628000000001\n0.214\n(xii) Trade\nMark\n4.562824E-2\n2.5590999999999999E-2 1.85E\n(xiii)\nConsultancy\nFees\n1.02952515\n0.81907114999999997\n2.158\n(xiv)\nManagement\nServices Fees\n3.5434383700000001\n5.6217101700000001\n1.498\n(xv) Aircraft\nLease &\nMaintenance\nFees\n28.89516266\n5.0517261799999993\n11.52\n(xvi) Shipping\nVessels Charter\n& Maintenance\nFees\n12.940442130000001\n5.1780038600000005\n0.655\n(xvii)\nInvestment\nIncome - Profit\n& Dividend\n43.180706610000001\n66.30328634\n57.74\n(xix)\nRepatration of\nCapital\n6.2117387800000001\n0.60305178000000004\n5.981\n(xx) Others\n72.817300870000011\n174.24309624\n189.8\nTotal (A+ B)\n4783.0110082599986\n4853.5356472800004\n5846\nSource: Central\nBank of Nigeria\nReturn to Menu\nTable D.5.2:\nSectoral\nUtilization of\nForeign\nExchange for\nTransactions\nValid for\nForeign\nExchange (US$'\nMillion) -\nContinued\nCategory\n2008\n2009\n2010\nA. Imports\n30148.793156699994\n23761.042949590003\n23824.98\n1. Industrial\nSector\n10552.50589511\n7378.0856080199992\n6174.059\n2. Food\nProducts\n3974.49984249\n3433.8009534900002\n4381.103\n3.\nManufactured\nProducts\n6810.4167786199987\n6027.5092574999999\n5281.140\n4. Transport\nSector\n1672.0554395700003\n1564.0594766900003\n1471.882\n5. Agricultural\nSector\n364.03508297999991\n271.72199598999998\n314.2300\n6. Minerals\n302.14445004999988\n154.74221347000002\n194.8830\n7. Oil Sector\n6473.1356678799993\n4931.1234444299998\n6007.683\nB. Invisibles\n18176.659245709998\n8835.3720996899992\n9545.882\n1. Business\nServices\n1556.89186509\n1487.4279418100002\n1372.527\n2.\nCommunication\nServices\n839.31638873000009\n345.48715919000006\n287.9556\n3. Construction\n& Related\nEngineering\nServices\n37.413173869999994\n42.385296469999986\n133.7660\n4. Distribution\nServices\n66.544015459999997\n44.498547930000001\n62.62379\n5. Educational\nServices\n714.20274028000006\n192.72564453000001\n158.1176\n6.\nEnvironmental\nServices\n0\n0.13324577999999998 0.107677\n7. Financial\nServices\n14287.01599706\n5882.9528022800005\n6625.504\n8. Health\nRelated &\nSocial Services\n7.008385549999999\n4.3274800900000017\n0.940223\n9. Tourism &\nTravel Related\nServices\n29.663844379999997\n10.489074240000001\n52.52111\n10.\nRecreational,\nCultural &\nSporting\nServices\n0.43529717000000001 0.36969889000000006 0.163139\n11. Transport\nServices\n534.18140650999999\n711.99466669000003\n787.1524\n12. Other\nServices not\nIncluded\nElsewhere\n103.98613160999999\n112.58054179\n64.50257\nTotal (A + B)\n48325.452402409996\n32596.415049280004\n33370.86\nSource: Central\nBank of Nigeria\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable\nD.5.3:\nSupply of\nForeign\nExchange\n(US$'\nMillion)\nMonth\n1995\n1996\n1997\nJanuary\n…\n42.34352286\n137.3609173099\nFebruary\n392.26216225000002 169.67071339\n328.7059362599\nMarch\n…\n203.98954578000001 284.98797507\nApril\n267.95936899999998 187.15035019999999 337.7802877599\nMay\n…\n149.71564111000004 311.8428172200\nJune\n379.92598292999998 160.97252869000002 171.8290312199\nJuly\n…\n241.21896784999998 168.7351103099\nAugust\n…\n196.26084788\n231.0045611699\nSeptember 436.54714124999998 149.73016455999999 267.2939309300\nOctober\n…\n188.35027278000001 307.7383243699\nNovember 199.11732096\n110.07773027\n193.3773423499\nDecember …\n47.555328580000001 198.6784182700\nTable\nD.5.3:\nSupply of\nForeign\nExchange\n(US$'\nMillion)\n…\nContinued\nMonth\n2008\n2009\n2010\nJanuary\n1163.3900000000001 1279.8899999999999 1890.92\nFebruary\n707.52\n3191.4\n2117.85\nMarch\n603.16999999999996 3141.31\n2064.21\nApril\n826.1\n2622.52\n2147.12\nMay\n1380.79\n3112.08\n2984.81\nJune\n1460.78\n2103.67\n2941.44\nJuly\n2211.7800000000002 1815.81\n2576.36\nAugust\n2046.23\n3065.5299999999997 2399.36\nSeptember 1380.3\n2460.83\n4207.310000000\nOctober\n4398.1499999999996 1743.05\n2820.79\nNovember 4357.88\n1788.96\n1841.89\nDecember 957.53\n1206.21\n2180.239999999\nSource:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nNotes:\nThe\nsupply\nfigures\ninclude\nforeign\nexchange\nsold to\nBureaux-\nde-Change\nwhich\nstarted\nfrom\nApril,\n2006\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable D.6.1:\nCash Flow\n(US$' Million)\nCATEGORY\n2004\n2005\n2006\nInflow\n35402.19\n51235.969999999994 58715.59\nA. Through\nthe Central\nBank\n24971.74\n35081.42\n36727.160000\n1. Oil\n23527.200000000001 32601.65\n33138.21\n2.Non-oil\n1444.54\n2479.7699999999995 3588.95\nDrawings on\nLoans/Grants\nRDAS/WDAS\n(FOREX)\nPurchases\n221.48\n865.48\nSwaps\nInterest on\nReserves &\nInvestments\nInterest\nRepatriated\nfrom overseas\nRefund on\nWorld Bank/\nIBRD/IMF\nLoans/SDR\nAllocation\nCash Swap\nIRO BDC\nSales\nEurobond\nproceeds -\nfixed income\nsecurities\nReturned\nPayments\n[Wired/Cash]\nUnutilised\nfunds from\nDAS\nRecovered\nFunds\nOther Official\nReceipts\n1444.54\n2258.29\n2723.47\nCBN\nInterbank\nTransactions\nReturn of\nUnutilised\nIMTO Funds\nTSA and\nThird Party\nFunds\nOthers (FGN\nLoans)\nRevenue Gold\nHolding\nB. Through\nAutonomous\nSources\n10430.450000000001 16154.550000000001 21988.43\n1. Non-oil\nexports\n699.85000000000014 701.13\n911.05000000\n2. Capital\nInflow\n(External\nAcct)\n297.70999999999998 397.56\n145.94999999\n3. Invisibles\n9432.8900000000012 15055.86\n20931.43\n(a) Ordinary\nDomiciliary\nAccounts\n(b) Total OTC\nPurchases\nOil\nCompanies\nCapital\nImportations\nHome\nRemittances\nOther OTC\nPurchases\nOutflow\n15847.160000000002 24843.53\n24716.120000\nA. Through\nthe Central\nBank\n15342.240000000002 24309.83\n24321.56\n1. WDAS/\nRDAS\nUtilisation/FX\nIntervention\n9523.9599999999991 10668.490000000002 12605.67\nWDAS/RDAS\nSales\nInter-bank\nFWD\nBDC Sales\nInter-bank\nSales\nSwaps\nInvestor &\nExporter FX\nSales\nSMIS\nWholesale\nForward\nIntervention\nSME\n2. Drawings\non L/C\n140.93\n285.76000000000005 364.24\n3. External\nDebt Service\n1757.1099999999997 8898.4700000000012 6832.01\nPrincipal\n1479.8200000000002 8590.19\n6551.7699999\nInterest\n224.69\n176.88\n143.36000000\nOthers\n52.600000000000009 131.4\n136.88\nProfessional\nfees/\nCommission\n4. Govt and\nInternational\nGrants/\nContributions,\nGrants &\nEquity\nInvests. (AFC\nEquity\nParticipation)\n5. National\nIndpt Priority\nProjects\n(NIPP)\n125.24000000000002 87.16\n84.9\n6. Forex\nSpecial\nPayment\n(Cash Swap/\nFX Advance/\nTo MDAs)\n7. Other\nOfficial\nPayments\n3794.9999999999991 4369.95\n4434.7400000\nInt'l\nOrganisations\n& Embassies\n200.63\n300.3\n210.82999999\nEstacode\n917.8599999999999\n924.79\n1420.3400000\nParastatals\n(Public Sector\nUses)\nJoint Venture\nCompany\n(JVC) Cash\nCalls\n1963.74\n2317.8700000000003 2476.9600000\nMiscellaneous\n(CBN Uses)\n712.77\n826.9899999999999\n326.61\n8. Bank\nCharges\n9. NSIA\nTransfer\n10. Funds\nReturned to\nRemitters\n11. 3RD Party\nMDA Transfer\nB. Through\nAutonomous\nSources\n504.92\n533.70000000000005 394.56\n1. Imports\n460.49000000000012 429.38000000000005 386\n2. Invisibles\n44.429999999999993 104.32\n9.5599999999\nNetflow\nthrough the\nCBN\n9629.4999999999982 10771.590000000002 12405.599999\nNetflow\nthrough\nAutonomous\nSources\n9925.5299999999988 15620.85\n21593.879999\nNetflow\n19555.03\n26392.44\n33999.479999\nSource:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable\nD.7.1.1:\nCapital\nImportation\nBy Type of\nInvestment\n(US$'\nMillion)\n2010\nQ1\nQ2\nQ3\nForeign\nDirect\nInvestment\n- Equity\n66.434117900000004\n197.17330512000001\n294.2808\nForeign\nDirect\nInvestment\n- Other\ncapital\n7.4983440000000003\n15.03695752\n5.013195\nPortfolio\nInvestment\n- Equity\n927.58411701\n580.57652567000002\n631.9490\nPortfolio\nInvestment\n- Bonds\n0\n6.8476839999999997E-2 0\nPortfolio\nInvestment\n- Money\nmarket\ninstruments\n124.6\n239.4032473\n271.0600\nOther\nInvestments\n- Trade\ncredits\n0\n0\n0.154875\nOther\nInvestments\n- Loans\n633.26716313999998\n306.53940639999996\n297.3205\nOther\nInvestments\n- Currency\ndeposits\n0\n0\n0\nOther\nInvestments\n- Other\nclaims\n0.69799999999999995\n0.99986600000000003\n0.453392\nTotal\n1760.08174205\n1339.79778485\n1500.232\nTable\nD.7.1.1:\nCapital\nImportation\nBy Type of\nInvestment\n(US$'\nMillion) . . .\nContinued\n2015\nQ1\nQ2\nQ3\nForeign\nDirect\nInvestment\n- Equity\n413.67962117999997\n218.57170336000001\n715.8571\nForeign\nDirect\nInvestment\n- Other\ncapital\n5.0939999999999999E-2 0.12994002000000002\n1.855491\nPortfolio\nInvestment\n- Equity\n1173.37681524\n1846.0783998000002\n879.9687\nPortfolio\nInvestment\n- Bonds\n705.98135761000003\n100.53703966999998\n20.34220\nPortfolio\nInvestment\n- Money\nmarket\ninstruments\n16.144603920000002\n286.89126346\n108.8193\nOther\nInvestments\n- Trade\ncredits\n0\n0\n0\nOther\nInvestments\n- Loans\n406.17933216\n162.56572145999999\n696.3813\nOther\nInvestments\n- Currency\ndeposits\n0\n0.98999000000000004\n7.112667\nOther\nInvestments\n- Other\nclaims\n31.50825073\n117.84878126\n317.7673\nTotal\n2746.9209208400002\n2733.61283903\n2748.104\nSource:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nReturn to Menu\nTable D.7.1.2: Capital\nImportation By Nature\nof Business (US$'\nMillion)\n2010\nQ1\nQ2\nAGRICULTURE\n0.67\n3.354752\nBANKING\n126.1\n244.88265634999999\nBREWERING\n17.122046999999998\n7.7095140000000004\nCONSTRUCTION\n4.24759741\n3.4106287900000001\nCONSULTANCY\n4.0200000000000001E-3 5.4705749999999997E\nDRILLING\n2.6645809300000001\n2.9999750000000001\nELECTRICAL\n0\n3.3596613999999998\nFINANCING\n43.826546749999999\n91.999334319999988\nFISHING\n4.9844380600000004\n1.2426600000000001\nHOTELS\n0\n0.5\nMARKETING\n12.133334\n0.52693203\nIT SERVICES\n0\n0\nOIL & GAS\n1.8288551000000002\n63.466956140000001\nPRODUCTION/\nMANUFACTURING\n554.37534144999995\n69.662653400000011\nSERVICING\n4.9812770199999994\n23.727125230000002\nSHARES\n931.54455673999996\n587.87603359000002\nTELECOMMUNICATION 52.555470589999999\n224.75634844999999\nTANNING\n0\n0\nTRADING\n2.9747110000000001\n10.151149\nTRANSPORT\n6.8966E-2\n0.1167\nWEAVING\n0\n0\nTOTAL\n1760.08174205\n1339.79778545\nSource: Central Bank of\nNigeria\nReturn to Menu\nTable D.7.1.3:\nCapital\nImportation By\nCountry (US$'\nMillion)\n2010\nQ1\nQ2\nQ3\nAFGHANISTAN\n0\n0\n0\nALBANIA\n0\n0\n0\nANDORRA\n0\n0\n0\nANGUILLA\n0\n0\n0\nANTIGUA AND\nBARBUDA\n0\n0\n0\nARMENIA\n0\n0\n0\nAUSTRALIA\n0\n0.14497499999999999\n0.44\nAUSTRIA\n0\n0\n0\nAZERBAIJAN\n0\n0\n0\nBAHAMAS\n0\n1.0249900000000001\n0\nBAHRAIN\n0\n3\n0\nBANGLADESH\n0\n0\n0\nBARBADOS\n0\n0\n0\nBELGIUM\n33.545295129999992\n15.788272019999999\n9.96\nBELIZE\n0\n0\n0\nBENIN\n0\n0\n0\nBERMUDA\n0\n8.3001299999999993E-3 0\nBHUTAN\n0\n0\n0\nBOTSWANA\n0\n0\n1.99\nBOUVET\nISLAND\n0\n0\n0\nBRAZIL\n0\n0\n0\nBRITISH\nINDIAN OCEAN\nTERRITORY\n0\n0\n0\nBRITISH VIRGIN\nISLANDS\n0.5\n0.805176\n13.0\nBRUNEI\nDARUSSALAM\n0\n0\n0\nBULGARIA\n0\n0\n0\nBURKINA FASO 0\n0\n0\nCAMEROON\n0\n0\n0\nCANADA\n2.999968\n0\n1.19\nCAYMAN\nISLANDS\n1.17\n0\n3.2\nCHINA\n6.5927118\n0.25280903999999998\n2.62\nCONGO\n0\n0\n0\nCOTE D-IVOIRE 0\n0\n0\nCYPRUS\n15.620155489999998\n3.75\n12.1\nCZECH\nREPUBLIC\n0\n0\n0\nDENMARK\n1.95\n0.65\n5.49\nEGYPT\n0.1597624\n0.5627624\n88.4\nFINLAND\n0\n0\n0\nFRANCE\n4.0200000000000001E-3 0.31245023\n55.1\nGABON\n0\n0\n0\nGAMBIA\n0\n0\n0\nGEORGIA\n0\n0\n0\nGERMANY\n0.48958711999999999\n16.295378929999998\n36.1\nGHANA\n1.67987\n1\n1.96\nGIBRALTAR\n0\n3.85E-2\n0\nGREECE\n0.83499999999999996\n0\n0\nGUADELOUPE\n0\n0\n0\nGUINEA\n0\n0\n0\nHONG KONG\n5.1358402000000005\n5.3447245399999996\n12.6\nHUNGARY\n0\n0\n0\nICELAND\n0\n0\n4.99\nINDIA\n2.4980950600000003\n7.1963120599999995\n3.56\nINDONESIA\n0\n0.39034600000000003\n0\nIRELAND\n6.6666000000000003E-2 0\n0\nISLE OF MAN\n0\n0.15495999999999999\n0\nISRAEL\n0.24995800000000001\n3.9965000000000001E-2 0.22\nITALY\n0.62672641000000007\n1.04910777\n3.78\nJAPAN\n3.9471999999999997E-3 10.94935452\n0\nJORDAN\n0\n0\n0\nKENYA\n2.4999549999999999\n0.12\n0\nKIRIBATI\n0\n0\n0\nKOREA,\nREPUBLIC OF\n0\n0\n0\nKUWAIT\n0\n0\n0\nLATVIA\n0\n0\n0\nLEBANON\n10.833030410000001\n11.71223779\n2.45\nLIBERIA\n0\n0\n0\nLIBYA\n0\n0\n0\nLIECHTENSTEIN 0\n0.45\n0\nLUXEMBOURG\n1.7417379799999999\n2.4844643900000003\n100.\nMALAYSIA\n2.8000000000000001E-2 1.2E-2\n1.49\nMALTA\n0\n0\n0\nMARSHALL\nISLANDS\n0\n0\n0\nMAURITANIA\n0\n0\n0\nMAURITIUS\n23.384848000000002\n72.59885328\n28.4\nMEXICO\n0.74172183999999997\n0\n0\nMONACO\n0\n0\n0\nMOROCCO\n0\n0\n0\nMOZAMBIQUE\n0\n0\n0\nNAMIBIA\n0\n0\n0\nNETHERLANDS\n17.13420859\n253.75358476999997\n88.0\nNETHERLANDS\nANTILLES\n0\n0.99997499999999995\n0\nNEW ZEALAND\n0\n0\n0\nNIGER\n0\n0\n0\nNIUE\n0\n0\n0\nNORWAY\n0\n0\n0\nOMAN\n0\n0\n0\nPANAMA\n0.82992999999999995\n0.75726300000000002\n0.59\nPHILIPPINES\n0\n0\n0\nPITCAIRN\n0\n0\n0\nPOLAND\n0\n0\n0\nPORTUGAL\n0\n0\n0.17\nPUERTO RICO\n0\n0\n0\nQATAR\n0\n0\n0\nREPUBLIC OF\nSOUTH AFRICA\n382.68033130000003\n83.843251010000003\n44.4\nROMANIA\n4.9999900000000004\n0\n0\nRUSSIAN\nFEDERATION\n0\n0\n0\nRWANDA\n0\n0\n0\nSAINT KITTS\nAND NEVIS\n0\n0\n0\nSAO TOME &\nPRINCIPE\n0\n0\n0\nSAUDI ARABIA\n11\n0\n0\nSENEGAL\n0\n0\n0\nSEYCHELLES\n0\n0\n0\nSIERRA LEONE\n0\n0\n0\nSINGAPORE\n33.135171999999997\n4.7268600000000003\n0.20\nSLOVAKIA\n0\n0\n0\nSLOVENIA\n0\n0\n0\nSPAIN\n0\n1.576079E-2\n6.42\nSRI LANKA\n0\n0\n0\nSWAZILAND\n0\n0\n0\nSWEDEN\n25\n15\n0\nSWITZERLAND\n17.698346810000004\n16.811750299999996\n18.6\nSYRIAN ARAB\nREPUBLIC\n0\n0\n0\nTAIWAN,\nPROVINCE OF\nCHINA\n5.0000000000000001E-3 0.04\n3.18\nTHAILAND\n0\n7.0000000000000007E-2 7.00\nTOGO\n0\n0\n0\nTOKELAU\n0\n0\n0\nTUNISIA\n0\n0\n0\nTURKEY\n2.8476598599999998\n0\n0\nUGANDA\n0\n0\n0\nUKRAINE\n0\n0\n0\nUNITED ARAB\nEMIRATES\n11.719861460000001\n33.382578000000002\n15.8\nUNITED\nKINGDOM\n714.27739445999998\n554.54440597000007\n731.\nUNITED\nREPUBLIC OF\nTANZANIA\n0\n0\n0\nUNITED STATES 425.39695152999997\n218.71641750999999\n227.\nUNITED STATES\nVIRGIN\nISLANDS\n0\n0\n0\nURUGUAY\n0\n0\n0\nVIETNAM\n0\n0\n0\nZAMBIA\n0\n1\n0\nZIMBABWE\n0\n0\n0\nJAMAICA\n0\n0\n0\nNIGERIA\n0\n0\n0\nTOTAL\n1760.08174205\n1339.79778545\n1500\nSource: Central\nBank of Nigeria\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable D.7.2:\nCo-ordinated\nDirect\nInvestment\nSurvey (₦'\nMillion)\n2011\nCountry\nTotal Inward Direct\nInvestment\nTotal Equity Inward\n(Net)\nTotal Deb\nAfganistan\n0.01\n0\n0.01\nAlgeria\n6.0919999999999996\n0\n6.091999\nAngola\n9.7219999999999995\n0\n9.721999\nAsia\n94.799000000000007\n0\n94.79900\nAustralia\n13.206\n0\n13.206\nBahamas\n2465.2324199999998\n2465.2324199999998 0\nBahrain\n1.8759999999999999\n0\n1.875999\nBelgium\n7237.4827360000008\n6892.9147360000006 344.5679\nBenin\n133.27500000000001\n0\n133.2750\nBermuda\n1906076.3955399999\n1068626.1409400001 837450.2\nBotswana\n0.04\n0\n0.04\nBrazil\n365.46563000000003\n326.77463\n38.69100\nBritish Virgin\nIsland\n657803.52490600001\n20370.908251999997 637432.6\nBurkina Faso\n0\n0\n0\nCameroun\n40.929000000000002\n0\n40.92900\nCanada\n-3302.9632000000001\n-3756.5912000000003 453.6279\nCayman\nIslands\n38115.471740000001\n7416.8677400000006 30698.60\nChina\n2146298.744224932\n2090333.9339249323 55964.81\nCongo\n0.94499999999999995\n0\n0.944999\nCote D'Ivoire\n2045.6410000000001\n1490.0630000000001 555.5779\nCyprus\n69013.69640999999\n9594.1393599999992 59419.55\nDenmark\n4871.9910999999993\n1975.3711000000001 2896.62\nEgypt\n11.608000000000001\n0\n11.60800\nEquitorial\nGuinea\n-35.015010000000004\n-35.015010000000004 0\nEritrea\n8.0120000000000005\n8.0120000000000005 0\nFinland\n538.24400000000003\n68.257999999999996 469.9859\nFrance\n901831.40334100008\n614804.11516100017 287027.2\nFremley\n0\n0\n0\nGabon\n277.11099999999999\n0\n277.1109\nGambia\n22.574999999999999\n22.574999999999999 0\nGermany\n20072.882595499999\n13190.933595500001 6881.949\nGhana\n19111.285188769994\n16693.064828769999 2418.220\nGibraltar\n2332.3220300000003\n687.89702999999997 1644.425\nGreece\n11327.212\n11327.212\n0\nGuerrsey\n473.077\n473.077\n0\nGuinea\n0.02\n0\n0.02\nGuinea Bissau\n7.2999999999999995E-2 0\n7.299999\nGulf\n209.298\n0\n209.298\nHong Kong\n5455.5082000000002\n5397.2341999999999 58.27400\nHungary\n33.17\n33.17\n0\nIndia\n62669.663827770004\n61352.73282777\n1316.931\nIndonesia\n2.411\n0\n2.411\nIreland\n1789.5885499999999\n209.64155\n1579.946\nIsle of Man\n1674.1961999999999\n1674.1961999999999 0\nIsrael\n133047.77053000001\n133047.77053000001 0\nItaly\n758044.75775679993\n234483.45275680002 523561.3\nJapan\n2130.8524397000001\n1889.7664397000003 241.0860\nJordan\n424.46379999999994\n424.46379999999994 0\nKazakhstan\n1632.4829999999999\n0\n1632.482\nKenya\n82353.799714799999\n82346.897714799998 6.902000\nKuwait\n166.572\n166.572\n0\nLebanon\n909317.95234338997\n721431.11546533997 187886.8\nLiberia\n13472.856800000001\n13472.856800000001 0\nLibya\n1132.9059\n761.04489999999998 371.8609\nLuxemburg\n10999.431919999999\n-125.62408000000008 11125.05\nMadeira Island 337.99599999999998\n337.99599999999998 0\nMalaysia\n117\n0\n117\nMauritius\n141812.773082\n140147.21208199998 1665.560\nMexico\n1.45\n0\n1.45\nMonaco\n4452.0825000000004\n4452.0825000000004 0\nNetherlands\n2298386.0685930001\n1200711.4995929999 1097674\nNorway\n4898.1468399999994\n-3252.2796800000001 8150.426\nOthers\n27285.598752000002\n3748.5987519999999 23537\nPakistan\n401.56299999999999\n374.85399999999998 26.709\nPanama\n141472.39276249998\n141472.39276249998 0\nPeachtree\n0.48599999999999999\n0\n0.485999\nPerth\n2.387\n0\n2.387\nPhilipines\n22.099\n0\n22.099\nPortugal\n644.91899999999998\n644.91899999999998 0\nQatar\n13815.906000000001\n0\n13815.90\nIreland\n0\n0\n0\nRomania\n1841.5374999999999\n1070.7465\n770.7910\nRwanda\n0.223\n0\n0.223\nSaudi Arabia\n50029.892899999999\n49881.649899999997 148.2429\nScandinavia\n119.508\n0\n119.508\nSenegal\n0\n0\n0\nSeychelles\n357.62900000000002\n0\n357.6290\nShagar\n35.226999999999997\n0\n35.22699\nSierra Leone\n1988.9097939999999\n1987.964794\n0.944999\nSingapore\n76101.457618600005\n72922.505028600004 3178.952\nSlovakia\n0\n0\n0\nSouth Africa\n283993.875856\n212941.237376\n71052.63\nSouth Korea\n3749.2976014000001\n3707.7806014000003 41.51700\nSpain\n12000\n12000\n0\nSri Lanka\n552.31700000000001\n552.31700000000001 0\nSudan\n11229.98\n-4397.143\n15627.12\nSwaziland\n4002.4867889000002\n4002.4637889000001 2.3E-2\nSweden\n21718.532415199999\n21635.845415199998 82.68699\nSwitzerland\n499903.15182129998\n495168.26146129996 4734.890\nSyria\n13.430122649999999\n13.101122649999999 0.329000\nTanzania\n0\n0\n0\nThailand\n554.46690000000001\n535.7989\n18.66799\nTogo\n68557.527000000002\n42275.711000000003 26281.81\nTrinidad\n0\n0\n0\nTunisia\n0.67400000000000004\n0\n0.674000\nTurkey\n82.522999999999996\n0\n82.52299\nUAE\n46172.09259\n22494.618589999998 23677.47\nUganda\n0.34799999999999998\n0\n0.347999\nUK\n1493260.2001905402\n1266930.2513505402 226329.9\nUSA\n418770.58185952995\n389342.34865952999 29428.23\nVanuatu\n343.60899999999998\n343.60899999999998 0\nVietnam\n0\n0\n0\nYemen\n0\n0\n0\nZambia\n1518.758\n0\n1518.758\nTotal\n13402369.174122285\n9201587.5181102324 4200781\n2012\nCountry\nTotal Inward Direct\nInvestment\nTotal Equity Inward\n(Net)\nTotal Deb\nAfganistan\n1.2999999999999999E-2 0\n1.299999\nAlgeria\n1146.6099999999999\n0\n1146.609\nAngola\n4.88\n0\n4.88\nAsia\n8.2219999999999995\n0\n8.221999\nAustralia\n21.725000000000001\n0\n21.72500\nBahamas\n2517.0803999999998\n2517.0803999999998 0\nBahrain\n0\n0\n0\nBelgium\n8860.7251359999991\n8617.8671360000008 242.858\nBenin\n144.01300000000001\n0\n144.0130\nBermuda\n2015792.0628300002\n1051727.24013\n964064.8\nBotswana\n0.191\n0\n0.191\nBrazil\n370.11263000000002\n326.77463\n43.33800\nBritish Virgin\nIsland\n956715.49614499998\n31672.661549999993 925042.8\nBurkina Faso\n1.881\n0\n1.881\nCameroun\n92.343000000000018\n0\n92.34300\nCanada\n8921.3081999999995\n8613.2111999999997 308.0969\nCayman\nIslands\n41196.224139999998\n7702.7401399999999 33493.48\nChina\n2103060.4809249318\n2047670.441624932\n55390.03\nCongo\n6.44\n0\n6.44\nCote D'Ivoire\n2026.36\n1791.1410000000001 235.2189\nCyprus\n76992.922269999995\n7748.7051600000004 69244.21\nDenmark\n2054.4407000000001\n1421.8356999999999 632.6050\nEgypt\n273.24700000000001\n0\n273.2470\nEquitorial\nGuinea\n10.128\n10.128\n0\nEritrea\n8.0120000000000005\n8.0120000000000005 0\nFinland\n449.596\n74.393000000000001 375.2029\nFrance\n917280.55728099984\n642224.61152100004 275055.9\nFremley\n5.6109999999999998\n0\n5.610999\nGabon\n1315.7159999999999\n0\n1315.715\nGambia\n22.574999999999999\n22.574999999999999 0\nGermany\n25193.110995899999\n18286.327995900003 6906.783\nGhana\n44545.029364769995\n23197.26836477\n21347.76\nGibraltar\n685.98291999999992\n114.14191999999998 571.8410\nGreece\n11327.212\n11327.212\n0\nGuerrsey\n614.80799999999999\n614.80799999999999 0\nGuinea\n0.53800000000000003\n0\n0.538000\nGuinea Bissau\n0\n0\n0\nGulf\n5.7510000000000003\n0\n5.751000\nHong Kong\n7265.7439999999997\n5527.7979999999998 1737.945\nHungary\n33.17\n33.17\n0\nIndia\n93883.343987769986\n90527.254987769993 3356.088\nIndonesia\n31.274999999999999\n0\n31.27499\nIreland\n3136.5766600000002\n-524.52833999999996 3661.105\nIsle of Man\n1585.691\n1585.691\n0\nIsrael\n70899.62904\n70899.558040000004 7.099999\nItaly\n761486.35242679995\n239483.61142680002 522002.7\nJapan\n2168.6550397000001\n1978.8980397\n189.7570\nJordan\n527.97648000000004\n527.97648000000004 0\nKazakhstan\n2114.924\n0\n2114.924\nKenya\n91539.420514800018\n91522.064514800019 17.35600\nKuwait\n193.5384\n193.5384\n0\nLebanon\n2030963.3532233902\n738744.85734533996 1292218\nLiberia\n48462.794470000001\n48462.794470000001 0\nLibya\n1309.2501000000002\n876.19309999999996 433.0570\nLuxemburg\n10317.41568\n-590.94732000000033 10908.36\nMadeira Island 314.59199999999998\n314.59199999999998 0\nMalaysia\n78.728999999999999\n0\n78.72899\nMauritius\n156220.15289199995\n134245.05289199998 21975.09\nMonaco\n3385.0496000000003\n3385.0496000000003 0\nNetherlands\n2450075.5133979996\n1359312.5163980001 1090762\nNorway\n5213.7369900000003\n-3128.3150500000002 8342.052\nOthers\n264951.33750200004\n241414.33750200001 23537\nPakistan\n501.60199999999998\n427.673\n73.92900\nPanama\n150256.4667625\n150201.12221999999 0\nPeachtree\n0\n0\n0\nPerth\n0\n0\n0\nPhilipines\n39.695999999999998\n0\n39.69599\nPortugal\n1259.9504999999999\n1259.9504999999999 0\nQatar\n17094.019\n0\n17094.01\nIreland\n0\n0\n0\nRomania\n2390.328\n1164.366\n1225.962\nRwanda\n1.2170000000000001\n0\n1.217000\nSaudi Arabia\n549430.81499999994\n549260.80000000005 170.0149\nScandinavia\n0\n0\n0\nSenegal\n61.19\n0\n61.19\nSeychelles\n813.48500000000001\n0\n813.4850\nShagar\n53.460999999999999\n0\n53.46099\nSierra Leone\n51533.70033\n51522.711329999998 10.98900\nSingapore\n85245.945528599987\n73249.525498599993 11996.42\nSlovakia\n5.9939999999999998\n0\n5.993999\nSouth Africa\n397964.19278600003\n327221.76878600003 70742.42\nSouth Korea\n3802.1804013999999\n3801.8374013999996 0.343000\nSpain\n24500\n24500\n0\nSri Lanka\n867.31600000000003\n867.31600000000003 0\nSudan\n11272.006599999999\n-4382.2974000000004 15654.30\nSwaziland\n0.36099999999999999\n0\n0.360999\nSweden\n4115.6707888999999\n3927.1977889\n188.4730\nSwitzerland\n590837.51352949999\n586132.94021949999 4704.573\nSyria\n1629.99205665\n1628.2730566499999 1.719000\nTanzania\n2.7330000000000001\n0\n2.733000\nThailand\n1216.1342999999999\n1189.5653\n26.56899\nTogo\n68557.527000000002\n42275.711000000003 26281.81\nTrinidad\n1.089\n0\n1.089\nTunisia\n0.67400000000000004\n0\n0.674000\nTurkey\n29.756\n0\n29.756\nUAE\n62258.523309999997\n22985.772309999997 39272.75\nUganda\n0.86099999999999999\n0\n0.860999\nUK\n1580892.5244175401\n1385947.48199754\n194945.0\nUSA\n641946.15175302979\n609852.59869302984 32093.55\nVanuatu\n326.65499999999997\n326.65499999999997 0\nVietnam\n0\n0\n0\nYemen\n4.8000000000000001E-2 0\n4.800000\nZambia\n0.17699999999999999\n0\n0.176999\nTotal\n16476739.584406182\n10723841.308660632 5752842\n2013\nCountry\nTotal Inward Direct\nInvestment\nTotal Equity Inward\n(Net)\nTotal Deb\nAlgeria\n6.0919999999999996\n0\n6.091999\nAngola\n-167.60838000000001\n0\n-167.608\nAustralia\n-8763.134\n0\n-8763.13\nBahamas\n-4370.8835499999996\n8.0214499999999997 -4378.90\nBarbados\n-32098.999999999996\n0\n-32098.9\nBelgium\n187722.22525999998\n187608.16225999998 114.063\nBenin\n1\n0\n1\nBermuda\n523168.49315540004\n523054.22115539998 114.2720\nBritish Virgin\nIsland\n524828.17968122801\n36638.566681227996 488189.6\nBurundi\n-15\n0\n-15\nCameroon\n-84.531000000000006\n0\n-84.5310\nCanada\n8726.2187589999994\n8219.6797590000006 506.5389\nCayman\nIslands\n41898.844572067799\n6418.8445720677992 35480\nChad\n0.28100000000000003\n0\n0.281000\nChina\n708447.92733675975\n708447.92733675975 0\nCongo\n-33.445999999999998\n0\n-33.4459\nCote D'Ivoire\n525.87194999999997\n1132.0459499999999 -606.173\nCyprus\n6371.5749999999998\n7168.6139999999996 -797.038\nDenmark\n2863.5536175904199\n2782.8496175904202 80.70399\nEgypt\n722.43899999999996\n388.75400000000002 333.685\nEquitorial\nGuinea\n10.128\n10.128\n0\nFinland\n393.87799999999999\n74.393000000000001 319.4850\nFrance\n845398.9385193343\n701457.67851933429 143941.2\nGabon\n-193.209\n0\n-193.209\nGambia\n-1\n0\n-1\nGermany\n32998.150205339996\n32894.50920534\n103.6410\nGhana\n41607.365575600001\n22794.783575599999 18812.58\nGibraltar\n886.46547999999996\n632.94047999999998 253.5250\nGreece\n5501.2628000000004\n5501.2628000000004 0\nGuernsey\n614.80799999999999\n614.80799999999999 0\nGuinea\n-439.88265999999999\n0\n-439.882\nHong Kong\n1050.8081532828999\n1050.8081532828999 0\nIndia\n627044.75289607304\n610584.62189607299 16460.13\nIndonesia\n48.853000000000002\n0\n48.85300\nIsle of Man\n1237.799\n1237.799\n0\nIsrael\n70908.558040000004\n70908.558040000004 0\nItaly\n21077.816167034001\n19164.577667034002 1913.238\nJapan\n5813.506511999999\n5813.506511999999\n0\nJersey\n493.49285520000001\n435.07885519999996 58.41400\nJordan\n719.67899999999997\n340.14800000000002 379.5310\nKenya\n91366.286400000012\n91366.286400000012 0\nLebanon\n516064.84849041956\n512478.47828236956 3586.370\nLiberia\n48315.938719800004\n48319.2597198\n-3.32100\nLiechtenstein\n-185924.9117154268\n2787.0882845732099 -188712\nLuxembourg\n54967.491100600004\n17927.753100600003 37039.73\nMadeira Island 314.59199999999998\n314.59199999999998 0\nMalawi\n-4\n0\n-4\nMalaysia\n12.5\n12.5\n0\nMauritius\n171514.90830540002\n168908.87971040001 2606.028\nMOZAMBIQUE -11.734\n0\n-11.734\nNepal\n14.423\n0\n14.423\nNetherlands\n1927114.3394579079\n1552629.7532631478 374484.5\nNew Zealand\n34.530999999999999\n34.530999999999999 0\nNorway\n150187.46481977002\n11409.21932977\n138778.2\nOthers\n620.93820000000005\n620.93820000000005 0\nPakistan\n427.673\n427.673\n0\nPANAMA\n166194.97098339998\n164980.01198339998 1214.959\nPortugal\n1259.9504999999999\n1259.9504999999999 0\nQatar\n10345.416999999999\n0\n10345.41\nRomania\n1164.366\n1164.366\n0\nSaudi Arabia\n549288.625\n549260.80000000005 27.82499\nSeychelles\n813.48500000000001\n0\n813.4850\nSIERRA\nLEONE\n51510.711329999998\n51510.711329999998 0\nSingapore\n84654.1453912\n61552.954691200001 23101.19\nSouth Africa\n518709.53220709995\n517699.94820709998 1009.584\nSouth Korea\n3789.0747000000001\n3788.5227\n0.552000\nSpain\n3177.6260000000002\n3177.6260000000002 0\nSRI LANKA\n867.31600000000003\n867.31600000000003 0\nSweden\n3927.1977889\n3927.1977889\n0\nSwitzerland\n77107.476999922495\n66640.994999922492 10466.48\nSyria\n2738.877\n2738.877\n0\nThailand\n1189.5653\n1189.5653\n0\nTogo\n166253\n166253\n0\nTurkey\n29.68\n0\n29.68\nUAE\n16913.229950000001\n18481.79895\n-1568.56\nUganda\n-1\n0\n-1\nUK\n1904659.2565627\n1995508.4084927002 -90849.1\nUSA\n652678.36433286499\n638891.46382249997 13786.90\nVanuatu\n111.855744\n111.855744\n0\nZambia\n-4\n0\n-4\nTotal\n10607315.28151447\n9611625.6102862954 995689.6\n2014\nCountry\nTotal Inward Direct\nInvestment\nTotal Equity Inward\n(Net)\nTotal Deb\nAberdeen\n2410.63\n0\n2410.63\nAfganistan\n1.2999999999999999E-2 0\n1.299999\nAngola\n4.88\n0\n4.88\nAustralia\n984.10799999999995\n962.38300000000004 21.72500\nBahamas\n13.478999999999999\n13.478999999999999 0\nBahrain\n56.4\n0\n56.4\nBelgium\n8926.7882199999985\n7956.5509799999991 970.2372\nBenin\n1579.384\n0\n1579.384\nBermuda\n616075.41745999991\n615382.55245999992 692.8650\nBotswana\n0.191\n0\n0.191\nBrazil\n3494.4659999999999\n0\n3494.465\nBritish Virgin\nIsland\n1106921.634695\n184226.122695\n922695.5\nBurkina Faso\n56.432000000000002\n0\n56.43200\nCameroun\n61.697000000000003\n0\n61.69700\nCanada\n8543.9326671999988\n8234.1206672000008 309.8120\nCayman\nIslands\n475534.51007034699\n433616.738070347\n41917.77\nChad\n144.01300000000001\n0\n144.0130\nChile\n5.7839999999999998\n0\n5.783999\nChina\n1677356.7744117298\n1676176.5824117297 1180.192\nCongo\n204.24\n0\n204.24\nCote D'voire\n10442.0328212\n10316.0378212\n125.995\nCyprus\n31064.611565400002\n11972.906455400002 19091.70\nDenmark\n2832.8604218999999\n2442.1854219000002 390.6750\nEgypt\n9934.6972499999993\n9934.2492500000008 0.448000\nEquatorial\nGuenie\n-38.38364\n-42.01164\n3.628000\nEritrea\n0\n0\n0\nFinland\n449.596\n74.393000000000001 375.2029\nFrance\n939852.8899013435\n761272.35290134349 178580.5\nGabon\n56.999000000000002\n0\n56.99900\nGermany\n9884.2911976999894\n1965.1571976999892 7919.134\nGhana\n19756.538809999998\n9948.9748099999979 9807.564\nGibraltar\n6224.5483647999999\n945.42836479999994 5279.12\nGreece\n38.429934807999999\n10.108934808000001 28.32100\nGuinea Bissau\n0.53800000000000003\n0\n0.538000\nHongkong\n2878.2733006720005\n683.10730067200006 2195.166\nHungary\n0\n0\n0\nIndia\n1782440.6081732179\n1741669.9221732179 40770.68\nIndonesia\n58.734000000000002\n0\n58.73400\nireland\n4298.9950230000004\n4264.1990230000001 34.79599\nIsle of Man\n1356.31639\n1356.31639\n0\nIsrael\n70908.558040000004\n70908.558040000004 0\nItaly\n273031.77631575504\n141462.77787575501 131568.9\nJapan\n11126.881638000001\n11126.881638000001 0\nJordan\n19387.165720799996\n19387.165720799996 0\nKenya\n91826.678400000004\n91366.286400000012 460.392\nKingston and\nGrenadines\n179.55648499999998\n179.55648499999998 0\nKorea\n0\n0\n0\nLebanon\n472539.92612791696\n471563.54724986688 976.3788\nLiberia\n48319.2597198\n48319.2597198\n0\nLiechtenstein\n3467.8139073411899\n3467.8139073411899 0\nLuxembourg\n45378.416530600007\n8338.678530600002\n37039.73\nMadagascar\n5.7910000000000004\n0\n5.791000\nMadeira Island 314.59199999999998\n314.59199999999998 0\nMalawi\n16.805\n0\n16.805\nMalaysia\n103.794\n12.5\n91.29399\nMauritius\n311095.5650756603\n309287.47407566028 1808.090\nNetherlands\n3533318.079388517\n2727914.3868285171 805403.6\nNew Zealand\n872.77440000000001\n872.77440000000001 0\nNiger\n6152.8029999999999\n0\n6152.802\nNorway\n100264.47925943999\n33738.419689439987 66526.05\nPakistan\n484.226\n427.673\n56.55299\nPanama\n15061.516667800001\n9636.3326677999994 5425.184\nPhilipines\n34.667999999999999\n0\n34.66799\nPortugal\n1321.8112599999999\n1321.8112599999999 0\nQatar\n1720.9094731999999\n977.43847319999998 743.471\nRomania\n1225.962\n0\n1225.962\nRussia\n86.54\n0\n86.54\nRwanda\n4.8120000000000003\n0\n4.812000\nSaudi Arabia\n549392.65899999999\n549260.80000000005 131.8590\nSenegal\n21.905999999999999\n0\n21.90599\nSeychelles\n813.55200000000002\n0\n813.5520\nSierra Leone\n1852.2993300000001\n1826.4973300000001 25.802\nSingapore\n70489.667000499991\n61840.637000499999 8649.030\nSouth Africa\n439735.84455759998\n431282.87555759994 8452.968\nSouth Korea\n119131.5827\n9135.8036999999986 109995.7\nSpain\n132.136\n132.136\n0\nSudan\n-81.59\n-115.919\n34.32900\nSwaziland\n0.36099999999999999\n0\n0.360999\nSweden\n4094.2407889000001\n3927.1977889\n167.0430\nSwitzerland\n157199.60967552254\n148816.94387552253 8382.665\nSyria\n1.7190000000000001\n0\n1.719000\nTanzania\n89.894000000000005\n0\n89.89400\nThailand\n2381.5605\n2381.3485000000001 0.211999\nTogo\n212188.54725964952\n212188.54725964952 0\nTurkey\n108.053\n0\n108.053\nUganda\n29.254999999999999\n0\n29.25499\nUK\n2101690.3405981362\n1912197.4874961362 189492.8\nUnallocated\n38664.390115000002\n18.220520000000075 38646.16\nUnited Arab\nEmirates\n111352.9893302\n61597.413330200005 49755.57\nUSA\n967862.84676047252\n719797.89816047251 248064.9\nVanuatu\n-500.53608000000003\n-500.53608000000003 0\nYemen\n4.8000000000000001E-2 0\n4.800000\nZambia\n3.831\n0\n3.831\nTotal\n16508813.718984129\n13547793.136089079 2961020\n2015\nCountry\nTotal Inward Direct\nInvestment\nTotal Equity Inward\n(Net)\nTotal Deb\nAlgeria\n4.5250000000000004\n0\n4.525000\nAngola\n176.60470764226227\n0\n176.6047\nArgentina\n1059.0853841999999\n1020.3748842\n38.71050\nAustralia\n1273.8295243937055\n0\n1273.829\nBahamas\n2613.9823334999996\n2613.9823334999996 0\nBahrain\n0\n0\n0\nBelgium\n375383.76851332001\n13503.089513320001 361880.6\nBenin\n385.197\n0\n385.197\nBermuda\n2342874.2677789\n1332095.2452789003 1010779\nBrazil\n86234.613281128914\n86131.268834200004 103.3444\nBritish Virgin\nIslands\n115205.017080522\n96409.488080522002 18795.52\nBulgaria\n7.9930000000000003\n0\n7.993000\nBurkina Faso\n5.0179999999999998\n0\n5.017999\nCameroon\n87.361000000000004\n0\n87.36100\nCanada\n576.73737121375848\n470.32081699999998 106.4165\nCayman\nIslands\n797928.19465717743\n562746.79101579997 235181.4\nChina\n693418.90648137941\n679639.78248137934 13779.12\nColumbia\n0\n0\n0\nCongo\n3.0270000000000001\n0\n3.027000\nCongo DR\n4.5720000000000001\n0\n4.572000\nCosta Rica\n1.6040000000000001\n0\n1.604000\nCote D'Ivoire\n23831.779686999998\n8578.635687\n15253.14\nCyprus\n6747.061781418116\n1379.8533031067\n5367.208\nCzech\nRepublic\n2.3290000000000002\n0\n2.329000\nDenmark\n7601.5444446269894\n1847.44944462699\n5754.095\nEgypt\n7539.8035999999993\n7416.1220000000003 123.6816\nEstonia\n1.2829999999999999\n0\n1.282999\nFinland\n62.834540000000004\n54.495539999999998 8.339000\nFrance\n1771233.4821852264\n1675155.2561399064 96078.22\nGabon\n0.59299999999999997\n0\n0.592999\nGambia\n4.38\n0\n4.38\nGermany\n73223.689705688885\n44588.223375899994 28635.46\nGhana\n5484.5755436408035\n2136.655543640803\n3347.92\nGibraltar\n17021.979719999999\n-109.14528\n17131.12\nGreece\n216.14\n0\n216.14\nGuernsey\n5351.3559999999998\n0\n5351.355\nGuinea\n39.756\n0\n39.756\nHong Kong\n2893.79448195036\n1849.3494819503599 1044.444\nHungary\n24.909299999999998\n22.8873\n2.021999\nIndia\n206249.65752516518\n203177.03677516518 3072.620\nIndonesia\n42.8035\n0\n42.8035\nIreland\n5136.2151662338638\n4232.4080532299995 903.8071\nIsle of Man\n76207.511840000006\n4580.9688399999995 71626.54\nIsrael\n80091.487362799991\n80091.487362799991 0\nItaly\n160618.71673428398\n120126.32973428398 40492.38\nJapan\n35774.460009999995\n6592.6970099999999 29181.76\nJersey\n2976.9353987000009\n2976.9353987000009 0\nJordan\n734.82174588000009\n126.20074588000001 608.6209\nKenya\n16315.243\n0\n16315.24\nKuwait\n782.86568219999992\n782.86568219999992 0\nLebanon\n68807.35552648564\n64151.539510443799 4655.816\nLiberia\n57598.429530999994\n57535.653338399999 62.77619\nLiechtenstein\n18.3045747719543\n18.3045747719543\n0\nLuxembourg\n49943.931618423652\n9494.3876686399981 40449.54\nMalaysia\n270.43038642169711\n12.125\n258.3053\nMali\n10.050000000000001\n0\n10.05000\nMalta\n58.933\n0\n58.933\nMauritius\n77191.438755799987\n7289.8863787999953 69901.55\nMexico\n0\n0\n0\nMonaco\n3611.0887499999999\n3611.0887499999999 0\nMorocco\n322.90499999999997\n0\n322.9049\nNepal\n346.12700000000001\n0\n346.1270\nNetherlands\n4537648.4498658786\n3226238.3617479191 1311410\nNorway\n20119.198641517811\n-28189.173169900001 48308.37\nOthers\n15863.76451626\n118.51951625999999 15745.24\nPakistan\n698.55626000000007\n483.27048999999994 215.2857\nPanama\n2215.8992389999999\n1304.6082390000001 911.2910\nPhilippines\n0.91400000000000003\n0\n0.914000\nPoland\n29.715\n0\n29.715\nPortugal\n1026.6042642999998\n1006.8922643\n19.712\nQatar\n10.714\n0\n10.714\nRomania\n4386.5090292055638\n0\n4386.509\nRussia\n16.940000000000001\n0\n16.94000\nSaint Kitts and\nNevis\n884.31299999999999\n884.31299999999999 0\nSaudi Arabia\n28.527000000000001\n0\n28.52700\nSenegal\n0.91200000000000003\n0\n0.912000\nSeychelles\n884.31299999999999\n884.31299999999999 0\nSierra Leone\n2862.5478210000001\n2020.5920000000001 841.9558\nSingapore\n245605.81379767373\n150288.08979767372 95317.72\nSlovakia\n0\n0\n0\nSouth Africa\n313028.86231147812\n297617.36977347813 15411.49\nSouth Korea\n16803.393230999998\n15654.657330999999 1148.735\nSpain\n2.048\n0\n2.048\nSudan\n280.45100000000002\n0\n280.4510\nSweden\n964.85699999999997\n0\n964.8569\nSwitzerland\n172151.86098880536\n132282.59103460141 39869.26\nSyria\n9.0397746285\n9.0397746285\n0\nTanzania\n6\n0\n6\nThailand\n2770.9040749999999\n2677.4420749999999 93.46200\nTogo\n227762.86380000002\n227703.8438\n59.02\nTunisia\n10.808\n0\n10.808\nTurkey\n32.8795\n0\n32.8795\nUganda\n43.204000000000001\n0\n43.20400\nUnited Arab\nEmirates\n332010.0673853\n29017.825385299995 302992.2\nUnited\nKingdom\n1549325.2785414702\n1406711.7318167933 142613.5\nUSA\n702960.32969431055\n117795.73327367906 585164.5\nZambia\n9.4459999999999997\n0\n9.445999\nTotal\n15332091.292947926\n10666860.061748004 4665231\n2016 1\nCountry\nTotal Inward Direct\nInvestment\nTotal Equity Inward\n(Net)\nTotal Deb\nAlgeria\n0.125\n0\n0.125\nAngola\n2482.4199676422622\n0\n2482.419\nArgentina\n2.4940000000000002\n0\n2.494000\nAustralia\n9782.8366784927057\n9774.5006540989998 8.336024\nAustria\n9.6000000000000002E-2 0\n9.600000\nAzerbaijan\n1671.194\n0\n1671.194\nBahamas\n1168.522062\n1168.522062\n0\nBahrain\n0\n0\n0\nBangladesh\n522.90200000000004\n0\n522.9020\nBelgium\n211221.64103292002\n45616.23927292\n165605.4\nBelize\n1989.4958999999999\n1989.4958999999999 0\nBenin\n1293.4870000000001\n0\n1293.487\nBermuda\n4257800.7201772453\n2343648.048992245\n1914152\nBrazil\n86536.064019128913\n86440.540572200014 95.52344\nBritish Virgin\nIslands\n1644992.5684383484\n896627.57343834825 748364.9\nBulgaria\n0.93300000000000005\n0\n0.933000\nCameroon\n177.22995\n0\n177.2299\nCanada\n1194.9729783137584\n966.25142409999989 228.7215\nCayman\nIslands\n723716.21725517733\n508421.5051138\n215294.7\nChina\n642322.99926337937\n623501.03026337933 18821.96\nCongo\n3.0270000000000001\n0\n3.027000\nCote D'Ivoire\n10767.9232928\n10521.5758128\n246.3474\nCyprus\n9690.9463927400157\n1707.1693144286\n7983.777\nCzech\nRepublic\n4.5860000000000003\n0\n4.586000\nDenmark\n9403.4474740616697\n2625.5864740616698 6777.860\nDR Congo\n18.193000000000001\n0\n18.19300\nEcuador\n1459.8377601999998\n422.35576020000002 1037.482\nEgypt\n19634.881000000001\n7110.2809999999999 12524.6\nFinland\n2309.4485399999999\n54.495539999999998 2254.953\nFrance\n2686532.3739712443\n2634651.1279309243 51881.24\nGabon\n65.224000000000004\n0\n65.22400\nGambia\n14\n0\n14\nGermany\n64195.454863924882\n20447.326638136001 43748.12\nGhana\n20130.85191930323\n2173.0339193032296 17957.81\nGibraltar\n26555.803920000002\n132.24591999999998 26423.55\nGreece\n17569.926849749998\n14526.075849749999 3043.851\nGuernsey\n25043.618999999999\n1560.893\n23482.72\nGuinea\n3.9592399999999999\n0\n3.959239\nHong Kong\n204506.75025175637\n3074.81125175636\n201431.9\nHungary\n505.59429999999998\n22.8873\n482.7069\nIndia\n832639.65342048288\n814516.87229090941 18122.78\nIndonesia\n3144.8409999729033\n270.969999972903\n2873.871\nIran\n8.5690000000000008\n0\n8.569000\nIraq\n8.61\n0\n8.61\nIreland\n6990.5093350038642\n131.46667200000002 6859.042\nIsle of Man\n9954.2681599999996\n-61.368839999999999 10015.63\nIsrael\n80091.487362799991\n80091.487362799991 0\nItaly\n273013.07161565399\n197377.34261565402 75635.72\nJapan\n17031.915399999998\n7401.8283999999994 9630.086\nJersey\n56889.769804199997\n27571.752804200001 29318.01\nJordan\n734.82174359999988\n126.20074359999998 608.6209\nKenya\n25196.212502000002\n355.01050199999997 24841.20\nKuwait\n909.37165306470001\n909.37165306470001 0\nLebanon\n296541.20969441067\n278659.00389836886 17882.20\nLiberia\n59245.0162996\n59229.7662996\n15.25\nLiechtenstein\n18.3045747719543\n18.3045747719543\n0\nLuxembourg\n42668.235129983666\n5652.9411802000004 37015.29\nMadagascar\n4.218\n0\n4.218\nMalaysia\n22531.3076375577\n22161.160851136003 370.1467\nMalta\n237.26499999999999\n0\n237.2649\nMauritania\n11.026999999999999\n0\n11.02699\nMauritius\n252438.02106919998\n7273.0822261999838 245164.9\nMexico\n43.732999999999997\n0\n43.73299\nMonaco\n3696.0697500000001\n3696.0697500000001 0\nMorocco\n2651.4404\n2277.9083999999998 373.5319\nMozambique\n1002.5839999999999\n0\n1002.583\nNepal\n357.74799999999999\n0\n357.7479\nNetherlands\n4063841.2945978376\n2892640.7657248783 1171200\nNorway\n89102.981223336814\n-46592.398268081\n135695.3\nOthers\n35735.151495360005\n22441.054344260003 13294.09\nPakistan\n820.12056599999983\n483.27048999999994 336.8500\nPanama\n47526.604874406992\n28149.980874406996 19376.62\nPoland\n79.606999999999999\n0\n79.60699\nPortugal\n1153.7757111999999\n1000.6907112\n153.0850\nQatar\n11.348100000000001\n0\n11.34810\nRepublic of\nCongo\n3196.2710000000002\n0\n3196.271\nRomania\n4846.9420292055638\n0\n4846.942\nRussia\n30.898\n0\n30.898\nRwanda\n3602.6840000000002\n3602.6840000000002 0\nSaint Kitts and\nNevis\n884.31299999999999\n884.31299999999999 0\nSaudi Arabia\n71.953999999999994\n0\n71.95399\nSenegal\n48.383000000000003\n0\n48.38300\nSeychelles\n884.31299999999999\n884.31299999999999 0\nSierra Leone\n2812.6497580000005\n2511.2378480000002 301.4119\nSingapore\n362796.6838343105\n206876.11752431054 155920.5\nSlovakia\n19.238\n0\n19.238\nSouth Africa\n540081.49843978207\n303458.62606578204 236622.8\nSouth Korea\n62778.161026679991\n-8622.1371783200011 71400.29\nSpain\n100.255\n0\n100.255\nSweden\n865.49300000000005\n0\n865.4930\nSwitzerland\n220042.14121956436\n148332.76416536045 71709.37\nSyria\n444.85060609850007\n435.1136060985001\n9.737000\nTanzania\n2689.8970749999999\n2677.4420749999999 12.455\nThailand\n63.738999999999997\n0\n63.73899\nTogo\n227592.39864\n220726.19219999999 6866.206\nTunisia\n0.47099999999999997\n0\n0.470999\nTurkey\n9.6440000000000001\n0\n9.644000\nUganda\n985.53\n963.8\n21.73\nUnited Arab\nEmirates\n82284.791002890794\n31420.554553890801 50864.23\nUnited\nKingdom\n2802583.1176997023\n1936388.220723826\n866194.8\nUnited States\n2493386.1772513147\n288454.43712368305 2204931\nVenezuela\n18.128\n0\n18.128\nZambia\n13.289\n0\n13.289\nTotal\n23724756.843201425\n14761959.787373224 8962797\n2017 1\nCountry\nTotal Inward Direct\nInvestment\nTotal Equity Inward\n(Net)\nTotal Deb\nAlgeria\n0.125\n0\n0.125\nAngola\n205.03498999999999\n0\n205.0349\nArgentina\n13.869\n0\n13.869\nAustralia\n5018.8571284000009\n4954.5998384000004 64.25728\nAustria\n248.672\n0\n248.672\nBahamas\n125343.0822373\n-15926.713762700001 141269.7\nBahrain\n3.8460000000000001\n0\n3.846000\nBangladash\n568.19000000000005\n0\n568.1900\nBelgium\n360568.56679061998\n49414.178270619996 311154.3\nBenin\n5533.8959999999997\n0\n5533.895\nBermuda\n4972998.1058252407\n2254133.5106402417 2718864\nBrazil\n85736.243160100013\n85715.931160100008 20.31200\nBritish Virgin\nIslands\n2211377.3976652403\n1291883.72321124\n919493.6\nCanada\n400.93441500000006\n392.87341500000002 8.060999\nCameroon\n756.74199999999996\n0\n756.7419\nCayman\nIslands\n1749060.82105924\n1590235.1105592402 158825.7\nChina\n430056.94958449993\n411273.73087049997 18783.21\nCongo\n3229.0250000000001\n0\n3229.025\nCote D'Ivoire\n11642.620067899999\n11156.7500679\n485.87\nCyprus\n96364.655638172597\n1706.8400381725999 94657.81\nCzech\nRepublic\n30.242999999999999\n0\n30.24299\nDemocratic\nRepublic of\nCongo\n0.46800000000000003\n0\n0.468000\nDenmark\n8192.3366986616693\n1295.0336986616701 6897.302\nEcuador\n1759.0776654000001\n583.28766540000004 1175.79\nEgypt\n7170.0150000000003\n7110.2809999999999 59.73400\nFinland\n2275.5970425\n29.572042499999998 2246.025\nFrance\n3304322.1696115006\n2830239.2249855008 474082.9\nGabon\n97.837999999999994\n0\n97.83799\nGermany\n80624.730882236792\n27295.768882236796 53328.96\nGhana\n72191.434800782183\n-10427.948199217812 82619.38\nGibraltar\n11260.062895999999\n1142.7948959999999 10117.26\nGreece\n5014.05013375\n1233.0731337499999 3780.976\nGuernsey\n44255.423000000003\n5332.0559999999996 38923.36\nGuinea\n20.565000000000001\n0\n20.56500\nHong Kong\n14954.8796079358\n1890.3246079358\n13064.55\nHungary\n1090.6189999999999\n0\n1090.618\nIceland\n726\n0\n726\nIndia\n89933.78664953899\n66257.294798820003 23676.49\nIndonesia\n5232.0149998268435\n1731.5619998268439 3500.453\nIsle of Man\n278001.69774699997\n913.81174699999997 277087.8\nIsrael\n726.28599999999994\n0\n726.2859\nIran\n8.5690000000000008\n0\n8.569000\nIraq\n8.61\n0\n8.61\nIreland\n28160.363277\n20091.380044000001 8068.983\nItaly\n-194003.58849419994\n-218637.97449419994 24634.38\nJapan\n24939.222611099998\n20839.4096111\n4099.813\nJersey\n41895.717195545498\n37516.388195545493 4379.328\nJordan\n734.82174359999988\n126.20074359999998 608.6209\nKenya\n24479.776502000001\n355.01050199999997 24124.76\nKorea\n43236.713205\n0\n43236.71\nKuwait\n16756.365251012798\n6151.2612510127992 10605.10\nLebanon\n64179.689127500002\n41282.743107499999 22896.94\nLiberia\n56268.647238199999\n56249.326238200003 19.32100\nLuxembourg\n3986.0342821999998\n3490.5382821999997 495.4959\nMadagascar\n4.218\n0\n4.218\nMalaysia\n22431.706003880001\n21728.295013880004 703.4109\nMalta\n101.497\n0\n101.497\nMali\n31.084\n0\n31.084\nMauritius\n59526.102213343191\n-55427.737829656813 114953.8\nMexico\n76.349000000000004\n0\n76.34900\nMonaco\n3727.76775\n3727.76775\n0\nMorocco\n395.68905000000001\n2.2620500000000003 393.4270\nNetherlands\n6066034.6717962138\n4812543.1379992142 1253491\nNevis\n999.29849999999999\n999.29849999999999 0\nNepal\n357.74799999999999\n0\n357.7479\nNew Zealand\n78.529564799999989\n78.529564799999989 0\nNorway\n233998.14193757999\n116761.12169757999 117237.0\nOthers\n301991.9047957104\n257208.23216561039 44783.67\nPakistan\n256.74400000000003\n0\n256.7440\nPanama\n29861.4879846\n15851.8769846\n14009.61\nPoland\n3043.7089999999998\n0\n3043.708\nPortugal\n4943.3353987\n4793.9263986999995 149.4089\nQatar\n11.348100000000001\n0\n11.34810\nRomania\n53.808999999999997\n0\n53.80899\nRussia\n406.44200000000001\n0\n406.4420\nRwanda\n0.49199999999999999\n0\n0.491999\nSaudi Arabia\n253.71299999999999\n0\n253.7129\nSenegal\n3.02\n0\n3.02\nSerbia\n166.9831312\n166.9831312\n0\nSeychelles\n999.29849999999999\n999.29849999999999 0\nSierra Leone\n3591.1803810000001\n2784.6794709999999 806.5009\nSingapore\n534791.3931015\n185169.21556150002 349622.1\nSingapore\n30108.252157999999\n30108.252157999999 0\nSlovakia\n54.901000000000003\n0\n54.90100\nSouth Africa\n228561.22577108376\n60229.7805700838\n168331.4\nSouth Korea\n118265.87634983071\n55106.573349830702 63159.30\nSpain\n96.26\n0\n96.26\nSwaziland\n0.253\n0\n0.253\nSweden\n-540.3466092000001\n-1371.2956092000002 830.9489\nSwitzerland\n151424.40878791804\n100093.80437391803 51330.60\nSwizerland\n4592.7619999999997\n4592.7619999999997 0\nSyria\n-231.32100026500004\n-241.05800026500003 9.737000\nTanzania\n22.423999999999999\n0\n22.42399\nThailand\n266.80700000000002\n48.5\n218.3069\nTurkey\n14.356999999999999\n0\n14.35699\nTogo\n267273.64419999998\n267269.66619999998 3.978000\nTunisia\n473.38997699999999\n472.91897700000004 0.470999\nUganda\n1063.2370000000001\n963.8\n99.43699\nUnited Arab\nEmirates\n128267.16430703001\n27504.092350030001 100763.0\nUnited\nKingdom\n1946102.284687879\n1244146.921760879\n701955.3\nUnited States\n2967271.5408781171\n189494.56512511699 2777776\nVenezuela\n18.545000000000002\n0\n18.54500\nVietnam\n23.712\n0\n23.712\nVirgin Island\n0\n0\n0\nWestern\nIceland\n1389.77127\n1389.77127\n0\nZambia\n15.77\n0\n15.77\nTotal\n27210330.452221725\n15934226.896531912 1127610\n2018 2\nCountry\nTotal Inward Direct\nInvestment\nTotal Equity Inward\n(Net)\nTotal Deb\nAlgeria\n0.125\n0\n0.125\nAngola\n133.55098999999998\n0\n133.5509\nArgentina\n15.923\n0\n15.923\nAustralia\n5096.9140984000005\n4954.5998384000004 142.3142\nAustria\n637.19000000000005\n0\n637.1900\nBahamas\n48151.6662373\n-16562.091762700002 64713.75\nBahrain\n3.8460000000000001\n0\n3.846000\nBangladesh\n596.46199999999999\n0\n596.4619\nBelgium\n220779.66345302001\n49822.616933019999 170957.0\nBelize\n0\n0\n0\nBenin\n377781.93400000001\n0\n377781.9\nBermuda\n4814840.5331152407\n2064080.1304302409 2750760\nBrazil\n85741.45816010001\n85715.931160100008 25.52700\nBritish Virgin\nIslands\n1526246.6977888115\n971592.30378881143 554654.3\nBurkina Faso\n0\n0\n0\nCameroon\n1154.491\n0\n1154.491\nCanada\n480.42690700000003\n373.64990699999998 106.777\nCayman\nIslands\n1901464.3237992602\n1605485.1372992601 295979.1\nChina\n255813.66664537502\n211914.67853037501 43898.98\nCongo\n0\n0\n0\nCote D'Ivoire\n12060.7058894\n11342.9358894\n717.77\nCroatia\n0.439\n0\n0.439\nCyprus\n95441.641638172601\n1706.8400381725999 93734.80\nCzech\nRepublic\n46.801000000000002\n0\n46.80100\nDenmark\n4655.0236986616701\n1089.1276986616701 3565.896\nDR Congo\n3.948\n0\n3.948\nEcuador\n1759.0776654000001\n583.28766540000004 1175.79\nEgypt\n7169.9880000000003\n7110.2809999999999 59.70700\nFinland\n2275.5970425\n29.572042499999998 2246.025\nFrance\n3350439.5548214\n2895144.1141954004 455295.4\nGabon\n97.837999999999994\n0\n97.83799\nGambia\n0\n0\n0\nGermany\n81291.400902236797\n32937.747662236798 48353.65\nGhana\n74567.804800782193\n-10427.948199217812 84995.75\nGibraltar\n11331.766616000001\n1214.4986159999999 10117.26\nGreece\n5065.9791337500001\n1233.0731337499999 3832.905\nGuernsey\n45538.330999999998\n6151.4219999999996 39386.90\nGuinea\n20.565000000000001\n0\n20.56500\nGuinea Bissau\n2.056\n0\n2.056\nHong Kong\n19104.806979045898\n4817.2189790458997 14287.58\nHungary\n1090.6189999999999\n0\n1090.618\nIceland\n726\n0\n726\nIndia\n97566.831633559006\n72102.044782839992 25464.78\nIndonesia\n5166.7059998268442\n1731.5619998268439 3435.143\nIran\n8.5690000000000008\n0\n8.569000\nIraq\n8.61\n0\n8.61\nIreland\n53852.745618200002\n44083.2123852\n9769.533\nIsle of Man\n199586.91664759998\n774.79364759999999 198812.1\nIsrael\n1273.895\n0\n1273.895\nItaly\n893868.76286100002\n868847.36086100002 25021.40\nJapan\n26553.152891100002\n22453.3398911\n4099.813\nJersey\n50777.915778899995\n40026.757778899999 10751.15\nJordan\n734.82174359999988\n126.20074359999998 608.6209\nKenya\n24488.064502000001\n355.01050199999997 24133.05\nKorea\n43236.713205\n0\n43236.71\nKuwait\n20595.977531012799\n6244.3075310127997 14351.67\nLebanon\n57765.214748628052\n34057.701757500014 23707.51\nLiberia\n56268.262738199999\n56249.326238200003 18.93649\nLiechtenstein\n0\n0\n0\nLuxembourg\n324.75660000000005\n-277.86539999999997 602.6219\nMadagascar\n4.218\n0\n4.218\nMalaysia\n22483.422003880001\n21728.295013880004 755.1269\nMali\n31.084\n0\n31.084\nMalta\n0\n0\n0\nMauritius\n-11949.549149300008\n-135750.0984323\n123800.5\nMexico\n93.835999999999999\n0\n93.83599\nMonaco\n3727.76775\n3727.76775\n0\nMorocco\n395.61642567999996\n2.1894256799999998 393.4270\nMozambique\n0\n0\n0\nNepal\n357.74799999999999\n0\n357.7479\nNetherlands\n4354728.7022720296\n3294975.8659750298 1059752\nNevis\n1115.008\n1115.008\n0\nNew Zealand\n78.529564799999989\n78.529564799999989 0\nNorway\n362781.60893757991\n244861.39669757994 117920.2\nOthers\n232308.54268231441\n187272.67405221442 45035.86\nPakistan\n373.18400000000003\n0\n373.1840\nPanama\n26700.814409599996\n15622.524409599999 11078.29\nPoland\n83.861000000000004\n0\n83.86100\nPortugal\n3841.7053987000004\n3692.2963987000003 149.4089\nQatar\n11.348100000000001\n0\n11.34810\nRepublic of\nCongo\n3230.1210000000001\n0\n3230.121\nRomania\n41.71\n0\n41.71\nRussia\n406.44200000000001\n0\n406.4420\nRwanda\n7.2009999999999996\n0\n7.200999\nSaint Kitts and\nNevis\n0\n0\n0\nSaudi Arabia\n253.71299999999999\n0\n253.7129\nSerbia\n166.9831312\n166.9831312\n0\nSenegal\n1.36\n0\n1.36\nSeychelles\n1115.008\n1115.008\n0\nSierra Leone\n3347.2637369999998\n2253.8888270000002 1093.374\nSingapore\n1410952.3524530001\n220252.03791299998 1190700\nSlovakia\n79.162999999999997\n0\n79.16299\nSouth Africa\n235238.5290080838\n54851.176717083785 180387.3\nSouth Korea\n117909.09346933069\n54075.481469330698 63833.61\nSpain\n95.814999999999998\n0\n95.81499\nSwaziland\n2.3E-2\n0\n2.3E-2\nSudan\n34.027000000000001\n0\n34.02700\nSweden\n-7287.9452997999997\n-8362.2052997999999 1074.26\nSwitzerland\n153793.95860727804\n107613.95419327803 46180.00\nSyria\n58.237000000000002\n48.5\n9.737000\nTanzania\n22.423999999999999\n0\n22.42399\nThailand\n204.34\n0\n204.34\nTogo\n220426.51519999999\n220422.53719999999 3.978000\nTunisia\n468.12371999999999\n467.65271999999999 0.470999\nTurkey\n14.651999999999999\n0\n14.65199\nUganda\n1072.7139999999999\n963.8\n108.914\nUnited Arab\nEmirates\n123332.87884033\n23042.816530330001 100290.0\nUnited\nKingdom\n3596114.4387800517\n2838186.307673052\n757928.1\nUnited States\n2780884.5993329166\n185459.60907991658 2595424\nVenezuela\n18.545000000000002\n0\n18.54500\nVietnam\n0\n0\n0\nZambia\n21.471\n0\n21.471\nTotal\n28122897.937255159\n16414966.876574211 1170793\nSource:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nNotes:\n1Revised\n2Provisional", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/Annual_Reports/2019 Statistical Bulletin External Sector Statistics.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "9f5ce5b89d7e92c758f5bf4057e1762e", "text": "Table E.1.1:\nBusiness\nExpectations\nSurvey Result -\nNational\nYear\n2008\nQuarter\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\n1. Overall\nBusiness\nOutlook on the\nMacroeconomy\nConfidence\nIndex: All\nSectors\nCurrent\nQuarter\nNational\n10.161662817551967\n15\n3.8\nNext Quarter\nNational\n63.741339491916861\n58.8\n39.700000\n2. Business\nOutlook Index\non the\nMacroeconomy\nby Sector:\nCurrent\nQuarter\nIndustrial\nSector\n21.666666666666668\n14.88095238095238\n-6.951871\nConstruction\nSector\n5.1948051948051948\n43.835616438356169 12.903225\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n-12.290502793296088\n16.12903225806452\n6.6666666\nServices Sector\nof which:\n14.673913043478262\n11.627906976744189 -4.878048\nFinancial\nIntermediation\n44.444444444444443\n36.36363636363636\n-21.05263\nHotels and\nRestaurants\n8.5365853658536572\n16.326530612244898 12.280701\nRenting and\nBusiness\nActivities\n33.962264150943398\n-16.12903225806452\n34.375\nCommunity\nand Social\nServices\n78.571428571428569\n-24.137931034482758 25.423728\n3. Business\nOutlook Index\non the\nMacroeconomy\nby Sector: Next\nQuarter\nIndustrial\nSector\n68.067226890756302\n58.805970149253739 37.634408\nConstruction\nSector\n63.636363636363626\n79.452054794520549 65.625\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n77.222222222222229\n57.837837837837839 40.555555\nServices Sector\nof which:\n54.74254742547425\n50\n31.707317\nFinancial\nIntermediation\n55.555555555555557\n72.72727272727272\n36.842105\nHotels and\nRestaurants\n71.951219512195124\n62.62626262626263\n47.368421\nRenting and\nBusiness\nActivities\n88.679245283018872\n51.612903225806448 59.375\nCommunity\nand Social\nServices\n93.333333333333329\n55.172413793103445 29.310344\n4. Business\nConfidence\nIndex on Own\nOperations by\nSector: Current\nQuarter\nIndustrial\nSector\n21.338912133891213\n12.759643916913948 -2.673796\nConstruction\nSector\n66.233766233766218\n20.833333333333332 -12.5\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n29.651162790697676\n3.7634408602150557 9.4444444\nServices Sector -4.6070460704607044\n16.442953020134226 15.862068\n5. Business\nOutlook Index\non Own\nOperations :\nCurrent\nQuarter\nVolume of\nBusiness\nActivity Index\n21.478060046189377\n24.2\n15.1\nVolume of\nTotal Order\nBook Index\n-2.3094688221709028\n22.700000000000003 12.3\nCredit Access\nIndex\n3.002309468822169\n-0.5\n-6.9\nFinancial\nCondition\nIndex\n18.591224018475753\n12.700000000000003 7.9\nAverage\nCapacity\nUtilization\n77.367205542725173\n21.3\n19.399999\n6. Business\nOutlook Index\non Own\nOperations :\nNext Quarter\nVolume of\nBusiness\nActivity Index\n46.189376443418013\n74.8\n57.2\nEmployment\nOutlook Index\n70.55427251732101\n44.6\n39.6\n7. Employment\nOutlook Index\non Own\nOperations by\nSector: Next\nQuarter\nIndustrial\nSector\n51.694915254237287\n40.059347181008903 37.433155\nConstruction\nSector\n39.759036144578317\n56.164383561643838 59.375\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n29.60893854748603\n47.8494623655914\n80.555555\nServices Sector 52.602739726027394\n45.302013422818796 73.103448\n8. Business\nwith\nExpansion\nPlans (in per\ncent): Next\nQuarter\nIndustrial\nSector\n75.630252100840337\n70.029673590504444 61.497326\nConstruction\nSector\n69.736842105263165\n68.493150684931507 59.375\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n43.888888888888886\n67.204301075268816 60.555555\nServices Sector\nof which:\n75.37688442211055\n72.093023255813947 67.479674\nFinancial\nIntermediation\n77.777777777777771\n63.636363636363633 73.684210\nHotels and\nRestaurants\n82.926829268292678\n69.696969696969703 63.157894\nRenting and\nBusiness\nActivities\n64.15094339622641\n70.967741935483872 71.875\nCommunity\nand Social\nServices\n86.666666666666671\n51.724137931034484 72.881355\n9. Business\nConstraints:\nCurrent\nQuarter\nHigh Interest\nRate\n58.140877598152429\n57.150000000000006 55.4\nUnclear\nEconomic\nLaws\n36.085450346420323\n35.15\n35.4\nLack of\nEquipment\n16.281755196304847\n5.0000000000000036 13.6\nInsufficient\nDemand\n9.8729792147805995\n2.5499999999999972 13.9\nAccess to\nCredit\n26.501154734411081\n18.649999999999999 23\nFinancial\nProblems\n42.147806004618936\n41.55\n41.2\nCompetition\n34.237875288683597\n32.699999999999996 38.1\nLabor\nProblems\n-14.318706697459582\n-16.549999999999997 -8.5\nLack of\nMaterials Input\n5.3695150115473407\n-2.8500000000000014 10.199999\nUnfavourable\nPolitical\nClimate\n17.609699769053115\n13.900000000000006 23.7\nUnfavourable\nEconomic\nClimate\n43.360277136258659\n37.450000000000003 42\nInsufficient\nPower Supply\n68.533487297921468\n68.5\n60.8\n10. Business\nExpectation\nIndex on\nSelected\nEconomic\nIndicators:\nCurrent\nQuarter\nN/$ Exchange\nRate\n14.780600461893766\n17.8\n-5.4\nInflation Rate\n24.711316397228636\n22.200000000000003 23\nBorrowing\nRate\n-3.4642032332563559\n-2.8999999999999986 12\n11. Business\nExpectation\nIndex on\nSelected\nEconomic\nIndicators:\nNext Quarter\nN/$ Exchange\nRate\n28.637413394919164\n24.9\n3.5\nInflation Rate\n-3.4642032332563559\n-2.8999999999999986 12\nBorrowing\nRate\n-0.46189376443417984 -1.3999999999999986 -2\n12. Business\nOutlook index\non the\nMacroeconomy\nby Type of\nBusiness:\nCurrent\nQuarter\nImporter\n3.9215686274509807\n14.88095238095238\n7.7319587\nExporter\n42.857142857142861\n43.835616438356169 -14.28571\nBoth Importer\nand Exporter\n6.8493150684931479\n16.12903225806452\n15.068493\nNeither\nImporter nor\nexporter\n11.090225563909776\n7.7181208053691321 -2.319587\n13. Business\nOutlook index\non the\nMacroeconomy\nby Type of\nBusiness: Next\nQuarter\nImporter\n64.052287581699346\n63.190184049079754 35.384615\nExporter\n85.185185185185176\n61.290322580645153 35\nBoth Importer\nand Exporter\n56.164383561643838\n60.139860139860147 39.726027\nNeither\nImporter nor\nexporter\n65.103189493433391\n57.685352622061487 40.826873\n14. Business\nOutlook index\non the\nMacroeconomy\nby Size of\nBusiness:\nCurrent\nQuarter\nSmall (<50)\n5.3601340033500833\n13.572542901716069 6.7460317\nMedium (50\nand <200)\n17.901234567901234\n19.075144508670522 -9.6\nLarge (200 and\nUp)\n23.529411764705884\n19.230769230769234 6.7796610\n15. Business\nOutlook index\non the\nMacroeconomy\nby Size of\nBusiness: Next\nQuarter\nSmall (<50)\n65.66164154103852\n59.126365054602182 40.873015\nMedium (50\nand <200)\n64.596273291925471\n59.064327485380119 40\nLarge (200 and\nUp)\n52.427184466019419\n60.256410256410263 29.310344\n16. Percentage\nDistribution of\nRespondent\nFirms by Type\nof Business\nImporter\n17.66743648960739\n18.303571428571427 28.301886\nExporter\n3.2332563510392611\n3.4598214285714284 3.0478955\nBoth Importer\nand Exporter\n17.5745958429561\n16.183035714285701 10.595065\nNeither\nImporter nor\nexporter\n61.547344110854503\n62.0419642857143\n58.013497\n17. Percentage\nDistribution of\nRespondent\nFirms by\nEmployment\nSize\nSmall (<50)\n69.053117782909936\n71.875\n73.294629\nMedium (50\nand <200)\n18.706697459584294\n19.308035714285715 18.142235\nLarge (200 and\nUp)\n11.893764434180138\n8.7053571428571423 8.5631349\nNo Response\n0.34642032332563133 0.1116071428571388 0\n18.\nDistribution of\nRespondent\nFirms by\nSector\nSample Size\n(N)\n1075\n1075\n1050\nResponse\nRate(%)\n80.558139534883722\n83.348837209302332 81.523809\nAll Sectors\n866\n896\n856\nIndustrial\nSector\n240\n338\n187\nConstruction\nSector\n77\n73\n32\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n180\n186\n180\nServices Sector\nof which:\n369\n299\n290\nFinancial\nIntermediation\n18\n11\n19\nHotels and\nRestaurants\n82\n99\n57\nRenting and\nBusiness\nActivities\n53\n31\n32\nCommunity\nand Social\nServices\n15\n29\n59\nSource: Central\nBank of\nNigeria\nTable E.1.1.1:\nBusiness\nExpectations\nSurvey Result -\nNorth Central\nYear\n2008\nQuarter\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\n1. Overall\nBusiness\nOutlook on the\nMacroeconomy\nConfidence\nIndex: All\nSectors\nCurrent\nQuarter\nNorth Central\n25.280898876404493\n30.199999999999996\n60.3\nNext Quarter\nNorth Central\n67.415730337078656\n66.900000000000006\n79.400000\n2. Business\nOutlook Index\non the\nMacroeconomy\nby Sector:\nCurrent\nQuarter\nIndustrial\nSector\n48.275862068965516\n26.666666666666668\n22.9\nConstruction\nSector\n3.125\n27.27272727272727\n100\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n25\n35.555555555555557\n70.599999\nServices Sector\nof which:\n0\n40\n66.7\nFinancial\nIntermediation\n40\n0\n100\nHotels and\nRestaurants\n25\n38.46153846153846\n58.3\nRenting and\nBusiness\nActivities\n20\n-12.5\n92.9\nCommunity\nand Social\nServices\n14.285714285714281\n0\n80\n3. Business\nOutlook Index\non the\nMacroeconomy\nby Sector: Next\nQuarter\nIndustrial\nSector\n80.701754385964918\n71.621621621621628\n68.599999\nConstruction\nSector\n56.25\n63.636363636363633\n100\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n58.333333333333343\n64.444444444444443\n94.1\nServices Sector\nof which:\n68.181818181818187\n53.333333333333336\n91.7\nFinancial\nIntermediation\n80\n100\n0\nHotels and\nRestaurants\n100\n61.538461538461533\n66.7\nRenting and\nBusiness\nActivities\n50\n62.5\n64.3\nCommunity\nand Social\nServices\n57.142857142857146\n80\n92.9\n4. Business\nConfidence\nIndex on Own\nOperations by\nSector: Current\nQuarter\nIndustrial\nSector\n39.655172413793096\n22.666666666666671\n-2.9\nConstruction\nSector\n-15.625\n18.18181818181818\n66.7\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n2.7777777777777786\n15.555555555555554\n58.8\nServices Sector 30.769230769230766\n26.190476190476193\n61.1\n5. Business\nOutlook Index\non Own\nOperations :\nCurrent\nQuarter\nVolume of\nBusiness\nActivity Index\n33.707865168539321\n40.700000000000003\n47.62\nVolume of\nTotal Order\nBook Index\n43.82022471910112\n38.900000000000006\n55.6\nCredit Access\nIndex\n14.04494382022472\n0.60000000000000142 32.6\nFinancial\nCondition\nIndex\n19.662921348314605\n19.199999999999996\n42.8\nAverage\nCapacity\nUtilization\n32.584269662921351\n33.099999999999994\n56.4\n6. Business\nOutlook Index\non Own\nOperations :\nNext Quarter\nVolume of\nBusiness\nActivity Index\n80.337078651685388\n82.6\n94.4\nEmployment\nOutlook Index\n50\n46.5\n66.599999\n7. Business\nwith\nExpansion\nPlans (in per\ncent): Next\nQuarter\nIndustrial\nSector\n74.137931034482762\n76\n25\nConstruction\nSector\n75\n63.636363636363633\n3\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n80.555555555555557\n71.111111111111114\n32\nServices Sector\nof which:\n77.272727272727266\n86.666666666666671\n12\nFinancial\nIntermediation\n60\n0\n1\nHotels and\nRestaurants\n100\n69.230769230769226\n8\nRenting and\nBusiness\nActivities\n75\n62.5\n10\nCommunity\nand Social\nServices\n85.714285714285708\n40\n15\n8. Business\nConstraints:\nCurrent\nQuarter\nHigh Interest\nRate\n64.044943820224717\n58.05\n59.5\nUnclear\nEconomic\nLaws\n33.988764044943821\n30.299999999999997\n35.700000\nLack of\nEquipment\n25.842696629213489\n6.6500000000000021\n17.5\nInsufficient\nDemand\n12.640449438202246\n3.8000000000000007\n21.4\nAccess to\nCredit\n42.696629213483149\n10.5\n24.6\nFinancial\nProblems\n56.460674157303373\n42.449999999999996\n33.700000\nCompetition\n33.988764044943821\n42.45\n42.1\nLabor\nProblems\n0.28089887640449263 -20.9\n-20.6\nLack of\nMaterials Input\n12.359550561797761\n4.0500000000000043\n12.3\nUnfavourable\nPolitical\nClimate\n13.483146067415731\n7.2500000000000071\n13.5\nUnfavourable\nEconomic\nClimate\n48.31460674157303\n41.25\n35\nInsufficient\nPower Supply\n66.292134831460672\n77.25\n80.599999\n9. Business\nExpectation\nIndex on\nSelected\nEconomic\nIndicators:\nCurrent\nQuarter\nN/$ Exchange\nRate\n5.617977528089888\n25.599999999999998\n33.299999\nInflation Rate\n29.213483146067411\n16.3\n40.5\nBorrowing\nRate\n-6.1797752808988804 3.4999999999999964\n4.8\n10. Business\nExpectation\nIndex on\nSelected\nEconomic\nIndicators:\nNext Quarter\nN/$ Exchange\nRate\n23.033707865168537\n39.6\n11.9\nInflation Rate\n4.4943820224719104\n1.2\n4.8\nBorrowing\nRate\n0.56179775280899236 0\n15.9\n11. Percentage\nDistribution of\nRespondent\nFirms by Type\nof Business\nImporter\n8.9887640449438209\n13.953488372093023\n34.126984\nExporter\n1.6853932584269662\n3.4883720930232558\n0.7936507\nBoth Importer\nand Exporter\n12.921348314606741\n12.209302325581396\n7.9365079\nNeither\nImporter nor\nexporter\n75.842696629213478\n70.348837209302332\n48.412698\n12. Percentage\nDistribution of\nRespondent\nFirms by\nEmployment\nSize\nSmall (<50)\n88.764044943820224\n79.651162790697668\n90.476190\nMedium (50\nand <200)\n7.3033707865168536\n15.697674418604651\n7.1428571\nLarge (200 and\nUp)\n3.9325842696629212\n4.6511627906976747\n2.3809523\nNo Response\n0\n0\n0\n13.\nDistribution of\nRespondent\nFirms by\nSector\nAll Sectors\n178\n173\n126\nIndustrial\nSector\n58\n75\n35\nConstruction\nSector\n32\n11\n3\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n36\n45\n34\nServices Sector\nof which:\n52\n42\n54\nFinancial\nIntermediation\n5\n1\n1\nHotels and\nRestaurants\n8\n13\n12\nRenting and\nBusiness\nActivities\n10\n8\n14\nCommunity\nand Social\nServices\n7\n5\n15\nSource: Central\nBank of\nNigeria\nTable E.1.1.2:\nBusiness\nExpectations\nSurvey Result -\nNorth East\nYear\n2008\nQuarter\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\n1. Overall\nBusiness\nOutlook on the\nMacroeconomy\nConfidence\nIndex: All\nSectors\nCurrent\nQuarter\nNorth East\n0\n8.6999999999999993 11.9565217\nNext Quarter\nNorth East\n60.000000000000007 52.2\n36.9\n2. Business\nOutlook Index\non the\nMacroeconomy\nby Sector:\nCurrent\nQuarter\nIndustrial\nSector\n25.925925925925927 -12.500000000000004 17.2413793\nConstruction\nSector\n50\n33.333333333333329 0\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n0\n50\n-6.25\nServices Sector\nof which:\n-52.631578947368418 -16.666666666666668 26.3157894\nFinancial\nIntermediation\n0\n0\n-50\nHotels and\nRestaurants\n0\n9.0909090909090917 20\nRenting and\nBusiness\nActivities\n16.666666666666668 40\n20\nCommunity\nand Social\nServices\n0\n-20\n16.6666666\n3. Business\nOutlook Index\non the\nMacroeconomy\nby Sector: Next\nQuarter\nIndustrial\nSector\n70.370370370370367 29.166666666666664 31.0344827\nConstruction\nSector\n50\n100\n66.6666666\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n71.428571428571431 75\n31.25\nServices Sector\nof which:\n15.789473684210527 33.333333333333329 42.1052631\nFinancial\nIntermediation\n100\n50\n25\nHotels and\nRestaurants\n0\n63.63636363636364\n60\nRenting and\nBusiness\nActivities\n100\n60\n60\nCommunity\nand Social\nServices\n0\n60\n0\n4. Business\nConfidence\nIndex on Own\nOperations by\nSector: Current\nQuarter\nIndustrial\nSector\n55.55555555555555\n12.5\n17.2413793\nConstruction\nSector\n50\n0\n-33.333333\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n0\n41.666666666666664 -6.25\nServices Sector -15.384615384615383 18.309859154929576 18.1818181\n5. Business\nOutlook Index\non Own\nOperations :\nCurrent\nQuarter\nVolume of\nBusiness\nActivity Index\n21.176470588235297 27.5\n21.8\nVolume of\nTotal Order\nBook Index\n27.058823529411768 23.199999999999996 22.8\nCredit Access\nIndex\n2.352941176470587\n5.8\n3.3\nFinancial\nCondition\nIndex\n15.294117647058822 20.299999999999997 12\nAverage\nCapacity\nUtilization\n24.705882352941178 15.9\n28.3\n6. Business\nOutlook Index\non Own\nOperations :\nNext Quarter\nVolume of\nBusiness\nActivity Index\n69.411764705882348 63.800000000000004 60.9\nEmployment\nOutlook Index\n36.470588235294116 31.900000000000002 34.7999999\n7. Business\nwith\nExpansion\nPlans (in per\ncent): Next\nQuarter\nIndustrial\nSector\n81.481481481481481 69.565217391304344 68.9655172\nConstruction\nSector\n75\n66.666666666666671 100\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n60.714285714285715 75\n75\nServices Sector\nof which:\n68.421052631578945 66.666666666666671 73.6842105\nFinancial\nIntermediation\n100\n50\n75\nHotels and\nRestaurants\n0\n72.727272727272734 90\nRenting and\nBusiness\nActivities\n83.333333333333329 80\n80\nCommunity\nand Social\nServices\n0\n80\n83.3333333\n8. Business\nConstraints:\nCurrent\nQuarter\nHigh Interest\nRate\n56.470588235294116 47.9\n28.8\nUnclear\nEconomic\nLaws\n-50\n40.649999999999991 39.1\nLack of\nEquipment\n33.529411764705891 13\n9.19999999\nInsufficient\nDemand\n21.764705882352942 15.150000000000006 2.7\nAccess to\nCredit\n25.882352941176471 7.3000000000000007 24.5\nFinancial\nProblems\n-37.647058823529406 44.250000000000007 38.6\nCompetition\n-49.999999999999986 27.499999999999996 40.7999999\nLabor\nProblems\n1.1764705882352935 -8.75\n-6\nLack of\nMaterials Input\n30\n11.650000000000006 1.6\nUnfavourable\nPolitical\nClimate\n20.588235294117649 15.949999999999996 19.6000000\nUnfavourable\nEconomic\nClimate\n49.411764705882348 33.349999999999994 29.3\nInsufficient\nPower Supply\n85.882352941176464 79.750000000000014 54.9\n9. Business\nExpectation\nIndex on\nSelected\nEconomic\nIndicators:\nCurrent\nQuarter\nN/$ Exchange\nRate\n1.1764705882352935 -11.6\n-50\nInflation Rate\n50.588235294117652 30.5\n4.3\nBorrowing\nRate\n31.764705882352942 31.9\n4.3\n10. Business\nExpectation\nIndex on\nSelected\nEconomic\nIndicators:\nNext Quarter\nN/$ Exchange\nRate\n18.823529411764703 23.2\n10.9\nInflation Rate\n31.764705882352942 33.4\n32.6\nBorrowing\nRate\n30.588235294117649 18.899999999999999 17.3999999\n11. Percentage\nDistribution of\nRespondent\nFirms by Type\nof Business\nImporter\n11.764705882352942 14.492753623188406 11.9565217\nExporter\n3.5294117647058822 2.9\n10.8695652\nBoth Importer\nand Exporter\n10.588235294117647 13.043478260869565 8.69565217\nNeither\nImporter nor\nexporter\n74.117647058823536 69.563768115942025 68.4782608\n12. Percentage\nDistribution of\nRespondent\nFirms by\nEmployment\nSize\nSmall (<50)\n62.352941176470587 65.217391304347828 68.4782608\nMedium (50\nand <200)\n30.588235294117649 27.536231884057973 25\nLarge (200 and\nUp)\n7.0588235294117645 7.2463768115942031 6.52173913\nNo Response\n0\n0\n0\n13.\nDistribution of\nRespondent\nFirms by\nSector\nAll Sectors\n85\n71\n92\nIndustrial\nSector\n27\n24\n29\nConstruction\nSector\n4\n6\n3\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n28\n12\n16\nServices Sector\nof which:\n19\n29\n44\nFinancial\nIntermediation\n1\n2\n4\nHotels and\nRestaurants\n0\n11\n10\nRenting and\nBusiness\nActivities\n6\n5\n5\nCommunity\nand Social\nServices\n0\n5\n6\nSource: Central\nBank of\nNigeria\nTable E.1.1.3:\nBusiness\nExpectations\nSurvey Result -\nNorth West\nYear\n2008\nQuarter\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\n1. Overall\nBusiness\nOutlook on the\nMacroeconomy\nConfidence\nIndex: All\nSectors\nCurrent\nQuarter\nNorth West\n24.999999999999996 38.6\n-10.9\nNext Quarter\nNorth West\n76.19047619047619\n62.7\n18.8999999\n2. Business\nOutlook Index\non the\nMacroeconomy\nby Sector:\nCurrent\nQuarter\nIndustrial\nSector\n33.333333333333329 36.53846153846154\n4.34782608\nConstruction\nSector\n-66.666666666666671 41.176470588235297 50\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n20\n26.086956521739133 -19.444444\nServices Sector\nof which:\n29.411764705882348 38.461538461538467 -39.130434\nFinancial\nIntermediation\n0\n0\n-100\nHotels and\nRestaurants\n33.333333333333336 52.173913043478265 0\nRenting and\nBusiness\nActivities\n25\n0\n0\nCommunity\nand Social\nServices\n100\n66.666666666666671 33.2999999\n3. Business\nOutlook Index\non the\nMacroeconomy\nby Sector: Next\nQuarter\nIndustrial\nSector\n77.777777777777771 65.384615384615387 21.7391304\nConstruction\nSector\n100\n82.352941176470594 100\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n70\n60.869565217391305 13.8888888\nServices Sector\nof which:\n70.588235294117652 61.53846153846154\n-8.6956521\nFinancial\nIntermediation\n75\n-100\n100\nHotels and\nRestaurants\n91.666666666666671 52.173913043478258 100\nRenting and\nBusiness\nActivities\n62.5\n0\n0\nCommunity\nand Social\nServices\n100\n66.666666666666671 41.6666666\n4. Business\nConfidence\nIndex on Own\nOperations by\nSector: Current\nQuarter\nIndustrial\nSector\n5.5555555555555571 -3.8461538461538467 -4.3478260\nConstruction\nSector\n33.333333333333336 0\n0\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n30\n17.391304347826086 -5.5555555\nServices Sector 16.279069767441861 28.846153846153847 0\n5. Business\nOutlook Index\non Own\nOperations :\nCurrent\nQuarter\nVolume of\nBusiness\nActivity Index\n76.19047619047619\n30.999999999999996 13.9\nVolume of\nTotal Order\nBook Index\n33.333333333333336 31.700000000000003 9.9\nCredit Access\nIndex\n-15.476190476190474 4.1999999999999993 -12.9\nFinancial\nCondition\nIndex\n17.857142857142854 11.8\n-3\nAverage\nCapacity\nUtilization\n35.714285714285708 31\n13.9\n6. Business\nOutlook Index\non Own\nOperations :\nNext Quarter\nVolume of\nBusiness\nActivity Index\n75\n77.3\n47.5\nEmployment\nOutlook Index\n39.285714285714292 49.7\n32.7000000\n7. Business\nwith\nExpansion\nPlans (in per\ncent): Next\nQuarter\nIndustrial\nSector\n64.705882352941174 76.92307692307692\n47.8260869\nConstruction\nSector\n100\n70.588235294117652 100\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n60\n73.913043478260875 47.2222222\nServices Sector\nof which:\n70.588235294117652 73.07692307692308\n69.5652173\nFinancial\nIntermediation\n75\n0\n0\nHotels and\nRestaurants\n75\n60.869565217391305 66.6666666\nRenting and\nBusiness\nActivities\n62.5\n66.666666666666671 0\nCommunity\nand Social\nServices\n0\n0\n83.3333333\n8. Business\nConstraints:\nCurrent\nQuarter\nHigh Interest\nRate\n43.452380952380949 50.05\n53.5\nUnclear\nEconomic\nLaws\n28.571428571428569 29.75\n26.7\nLack of\nEquipment\n25.595238095238098 7.6999999999999993 -2\nInsufficient\nDemand\n0.5952380952380949 -4.8000000000000043 8.5\nAccess to\nCredit\n29.166666666666664 19.350000000000001 9.4\nFinancial\nProblems\n47.023809523809526 39\n39.5\nCompetition\n38.69047619047619\n18.600000000000005 32\nLabor\nProblems\n38.69047619047619\n-7.6500000000000021 -19\nLack of\nMaterials Input\n17.857142857142858 1.0499999999999972 -8.5\nUnfavourable\nPolitical\nClimate\n-14.88095238095238\n13\n21.3\nUnfavourable\nEconomic\nClimate\n38.095238095238088 33.5\n44.1\nInsufficient\nPower Supply\n58.928571428571438 76.2\n67.8\n9. Business\nExpectation\nIndex on\nSelected\nEconomic\nIndicators:\nCurrent\nQuarter\nN/$ Exchange\nRate\n22.619047619047617 -20\n-6.9\nInflation Rate\n41.666666666666671 24.2\n25.7\nBorrowing\nRate\n15.476190476190474 0.7\n-2\n10. Business\nExpectation\nIndex on\nSelected\nEconomic\nIndicators:\nNext Quarter\nN/$ Exchange\nRate\n28.571428571428573 31.7\n12\nInflation Rate\n8.3333333333333357 13.8\n48\nBorrowing\nRate\n7.1428571428571423 1.4\n3\n11. Percentage\nDistribution of\nRespondent\nFirms by Type\nof Business\nImporter\n14.285714285714286 15.9\n36\nExporter\n0\n2.1\n3\nBoth Importer\nand Exporter\n20.238095238095237 12.4\n18\nNeither\nImporter nor\nexporter\n65.476190476190482 69.7\n43\n12. Percentage\nDistribution of\nRespondent\nFirms by\nEmployment\nSize\nSmall (<50)\n61.904761904761905 64.8\n72\nMedium (50\nand <200)\n25\n26.2\n19\nLarge (200 and\nUp)\n11.904761904761905 9\n9\nNo Response\n0\n0\n0\n13.\nDistribution of\nRespondent\nFirms by\nSector\nAll Sectors\n84\n145\n100\nIndustrial\nSector\n18\n52\n23\nConstruction\nSector\n3\n17\n2\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n20\n23\n36\nServices Sector\nof which:\n43\n53\n39\nFinancial\nIntermediation\n4\n26\n1\nHotels and\nRestaurants\n12\n1\n3\nRenting and\nBusiness\nActivities\n8\n23\n0\nCommunity\nand Social\nServices\n2\n3\n12\nSource: Central\nBank of\nNigeria\nTable E.1.1.4:\nBusiness\nExpectations\nSurvey Result -\nSouth East\nYear\n2008\nQuarter\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\n1. Overall\nBusiness\nOutlook on the\nMacroeconomy\nConfidence\nIndex: All\nSectors\nCurrent\nQuarter\nSouth East\n-21.83098591549296\n-8.6999999999999993 -10.3\nNext Quarter\nSouth East\n77.464788732394368 53.6\n19.8\n2. Business\nOutlook Index\non the\nMacroeconomy\nby Sector:\nCurrent\nQuarter\nIndustrial\nSector\n-77.777777777777786 5.1282051282051277\n0\nConstruction\nSector\n-100\n20\n-20\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n-43.75\n0\n-14.814814\nServices Sector\nof which:\n5.2631578947368425 19.047619047619051\n0\nFinancial\nIntermediation\n0\n80\n-20\nHotels and\nRestaurants\n10.714285714285714 33.333333333333329\n-5.2631578\nRenting and\nBusiness\nActivities\n33.333333333333336 -75\n-100\nCommunity\nand Social\nServices\n27.272727272727273 0\n-15.384615\n3. Business\nOutlook Index\non the\nMacroeconomy\nby Sector: Next\nQuarter\nIndustrial\nSector\n86.111111111111114 60\n47.619047\nConstruction\nSector\n83.333333333333329 100\n30\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n37.5\n43.75\n0\nServices Sector\nof which:\n84.21052631578948\n47.61904761904762\n20.833333\nFinancial\nIntermediation\n100\n100\n40\nHotels and\nRestaurants\n71.428571428571431 100\n15.789473\nRenting and\nBusiness\nActivities\n83.333333333333329 100\n0\nCommunity\nand Social\nServices\n90.909090909090907 100\n0\n4. Business\nConfidence\nIndex on Own\nOperations by\nSector: Current\nQuarter\nIndustrial\nSector\n-16.666666666666664 10\n-4.7619047\nConstruction\nSector\n-75\n20\n-20\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n-37.5\n-15.625\n-18.518518\nServices Sector 0\n2.3809523809523796\n11.8\n5. Business\nOutlook Index\non Own\nOperations :\nCurrent\nQuarter\nVolume of\nBusiness\nActivity Index\n-12.676056338028172 -4.6999999999999993 -1.6\nVolume of\nTotal Order\nBook Index\n-5.6338028169014081 -4.6999999999999993 -11.9\nCredit Access\nIndex\n-21.12676056338028\n-22.1\n-28.6\nFinancial\nCondition\nIndex\n-9.8591549295774676 -2.6999999999999993 0\nAverage\nCapacity\nUtilization\n0\n0\n-0.8\n6. Business\nOutlook Index\non Own\nOperations :\nNext Quarter\nVolume of\nBusiness\nActivity Index\n85.91549295774648\n76.5\n50.8\nEmployment\nOutlook Index\n54.929577464788736 50.300000000000004\n19.8\n7. Business\nwith\nExpansion\nPlans (in per\ncent): Next\nQuarter\nIndustrial\nSector\n55.555555555555557 67.5\n66.666666\nConstruction\nSector\n83.333333333333329 80\n40\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n37.5\n46.875\n14.814814\nServices Sector\nof which:\n36.842105263157897 85.714285714285708\n37.5\nFinancial\nIntermediation\n0\n80\n70\nHotels and\nRestaurants\n25\n58.333333333333336\n42.105263\nRenting and\nBusiness\nActivities\n16.666666666666668 75\n50\nCommunity\nand Social\nServices\n0\n0\n23.076923\n8. Business\nConstraints:\nCurrent\nQuarter\nHigh Interest\nRate\n54.929577464788728 66.849999999999994\n61.5\nUnclear\nEconomic\nLaws\n55.281690140845072 49.3\n21.8\nLack of\nEquipment\n31.690140845070424 -17.150000000000002 -13.1\nInsufficient\nDemand\n45.774647887323937 7.7000000000000028\n-23\nAccess to\nCredit\n37.323943661971832 24.8\n18.3\nFinancial\nProblems\n55.985915492957744 43.9\n23.8\nCompetition\n51.760563380281695 9.7999999999999972\n10.7\nLabor\nProblems\n-13.380281690140846 -38.549999999999997 -34.1\nLack of\nMaterials Input\n25\n-26.200000000000003 -20.2\nUnfavourable\nPolitical\nClimate\n39.436619718309863 6.7000000000000028\n19.399999\nUnfavourable\nEconomic\nClimate\n54.577464788732399 36.5\n38.5\nInsufficient\nPower Supply\n82.74647887323944\n73.75\n63.9\n9. Business\nExpectation\nIndex on\nSelected\nEconomic\nIndicators:\nCurrent\nQuarter\nN/$ Exchange\nRate\n39.436619718309856 36.9\n19\nInflation Rate\n-14.084507042253517 -5.3\n15.1\nBorrowing\nRate\n-33.098591549295769 -18.8\n-34.1\n10. Business\nExpectation\nIndex on\nSelected\nEconomic\nIndicators:\nNext Quarter\nN/$ Exchange\nRate\n50\n13.4\n-29.4\nInflation Rate\n-52.112676056338024 -52.4\n-21.4\nBorrowing\nRate\n-51.408450704225352 -26.2\n-32.5\n11. Percentage\nDistribution of\nRespondent\nFirms by Type\nof Business\nImporter\n33.098591549295776 20.80536912751678\n31.746031\nExporter\n2.112676056338028\n0.67114093959731547 0\nBoth Importer\nand Exporter\n3.5211267605633805 11.409395973154362\n4.7619047\nNeither\nImporter nor\nexporter\n61.267605633802816 67.114093959731548\n63.492063\n12. Percentage\nDistribution of\nRespondent\nFirms by\nEmployment\nSize\nSmall (<50)\n71.126760563380287 74.496644295302019\n71.428571\nMedium (50\nand <200)\n20.422535211267604 17.449664429530202\n17.460317\nLarge (200 and\nUp)\n7.746478873239437\n8.053691275167786\n11.111111\nNo Response\n0\n0\n0\n13.\nDistribution of\nRespondent\nFirms by\nSector\nAll Sectors\n142\n122\n126\nIndustrial\nSector\n36\n40\n21\nConstruction\nSector\n6\n5\n10\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n16\n32\n27\nServices Sector\nof which:\n84\n45\n68\nFinancial\nIntermediation\n1\n5\n10\nHotels and\nRestaurants\n28\n12\n19\nRenting and\nBusiness\nActivities\n6\n4\n2\nCommunity\nand Social\nServices\n11\n3\n13\nSource: Central\nBank of\nNigeria\nTable E.1.1.5:\nBusiness\nExpectations\nSurvey Result -\nSouth South\nYear\n2008\nQuarter\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\n1. Overall\nBusiness\nOutlook on the\nMacroeconomy\nConfidence\nIndex: All\nSectors\nCurrent\nQuarter\nSouth South\n34.146341463414629\n10.4\n14.5\nNext Quarter\nSouth South\n85.365853658536594\n61.2\n45.2\n2. Business\nOutlook Index\non the\nMacroeconomy\nby Sector:\nCurrent\nQuarter\nIndustrial\nSector\n4.1666666666666679\n24.137931034482758 -23.07692\nConstruction\nSector\n0\n36.36363636363636\n-23.07692\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n71.428571428571431\n0\n75\nServices Sector\nof which:\n33.333333333333336\n15.384615384615383 23.076923\nFinancial\nIntermediation\n20\n50\n0\nHotels and\nRestaurants\n60\n17.391304347826086 33.333333\nRenting and\nBusiness\nActivities\n85.714285714285708\n-25\n0\nCommunity\nand Social\nServices\n100\n0\n33.299999\n3. Business\nOutlook Index\non the\nMacroeconomy\nby Sector: Next\nQuarter\nIndustrial\nSector\n75\n46.666666666666664 66.666666\nConstruction\nSector\n66.666666666666671\n90.909090909090907 75\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n100\n50\n69.230769\nServices Sector\nof which:\n66.666666666666671\n69.230769230769226 44.444444\nFinancial\nIntermediation\n100\n100\n0\nHotels and\nRestaurants\n100\n58.333333333333336 66\nRenting and\nBusiness\nActivities\n100\n50\n0\nCommunity\nand Social\nServices\n100\n50\n0\n4. Business\nConfidence\nIndex on Own\nOperations by\nSector: Current\nQuarter\nIndustrial\nSector\n33.333333333333329\n36.666666666666664 0\nConstruction\nSector\n-46.666666666666664\n45.454545454545453 -50\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n35.714285714285708\n30\n30.769230\nServices Sector 18.018018018018019\n25.531914893617021 -11.1\n5. Business\nOutlook Index\non Own\nOperations :\nCurrent\nQuarter\nVolume of\nBusiness\nActivity Index\n34.146341463414636\n29.299999999999997 30.6\nVolume of\nTotal Order\nBook Index\n30.487804878048784\n32.799999999999997 24.2\nCredit Access\nIndex\n-9.7560975609756113\n3.5\n-11.3\nFinancial\nCondition\nIndex\n15.853658536585364\n27.6\n0\nAverage\nCapacity\nUtilization\n23.170731707317074\n32.799999999999997 14.5\n6. Business\nOutlook Index\non Own\nOperations :\nNext Quarter\nVolume of\nBusiness\nActivity Index\n89.024390243902445\n81\n54.8\nEmployment\nOutlook Index\n36.585365853658537\n50\n4.8\n7. Business\nwith\nExpansion\nPlans (in per\ncent): Next\nQuarter\nIndustrial\nSector\n75\n76.666666666666671 76.923076\nConstruction\nSector\n93.333333333333329\n90.909090909090907 75\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n35.714285714285715\n90\n53.846153\nServices Sector\nof which:\n66.666666666666671\n84.615384615384613 77.8\nFinancial\nIntermediation\n20\n100\n0\nHotels and\nRestaurants\n50\n91.666666666666671 66.7\nRenting and\nBusiness\nActivities\n100\n87.5\n0\nCommunity\nand Social\nServices\n100\n50\n100\n8. Business\nConstraints:\nCurrent\nQuarter\nHigh Interest\nRate\n69.512195121951237\n53.8\n49.2\nUnclear\nEconomic\nLaws\n26.829268292682926\n36.200000000000003 24.2\nLack of\nEquipment\n10.975609756097558\n27.950000000000006 19.399999\nInsufficient\nDemand\n-0.60975609756097526 -1.7000000000000028 9.6999999\nAccess to\nCredit\n14.024390243902438\n39.65\n27.4\nFinancial\nProblems\n46.951219512195124\n46.050000000000004 -31.5\nCompetition\n55.487804878048784\n41.449999999999996 33.89\nLabor\nProblems\n-6.0975609756097526\n-16.100000000000001 -3.21\nLack of\nMaterials Input\n-0.60975609756097526 3.8499999999999979 23.4\nUnfavourable\nPolitical\nClimate\n12.804878048780484\n9.0500000000000043 20.2\nUnfavourable\nEconomic\nClimate\n20.121951219512191\n38.399999999999991 33.1\nInsufficient\nPower Supply\n17.073170731707314\n79.349999999999994 39.5\n9. Business\nExpectation\nIndex on\nSelected\nEconomic\nIndicators:\nCurrent\nQuarter\nN/$ Exchange\nRate\n-10.975609756097562\n19\n-29\nInflation Rate\n39.024390243902445\n28\n12.9\nBorrowing\nRate\n30.487804878048777\n-2\n4.8\n10. Business\nExpectation\nIndex on\nSelected\nEconomic\nIndicators:\nNext Quarter\nN/$ Exchange\nRate\n23.170731707317071\n20.7\n1.6\nInflation Rate\n10.975609756097562\n6.9\n22.6\nBorrowing\nRate\n21.95121951219512\n-12.1\n-1.6\n11. Percentage\nDistribution of\nRespondent\nFirms by Type\nof Business\nImporter\n15.853658536585366\n20.689655172413794 30.7\nExporter\n9.7560975609756095\n1.7241379310344827 3.2258064\nBoth Importer\nand Exporter\n14.634146341463415\n17.241379310344829 6.6\nNeither\nImporter nor\nexporter\n59.756097560975611\n56.03448275862069\n59.677419\n12. Percentage\nDistribution of\nRespondent\nFirms by\nEmployment\nSize\nSmall (<50)\n70.731707317073173\n85.34482758620689\n59.677419\nMedium (50\nand <200)\n20.73170731707317\n11.206896551724139 30.6\nLarge (200 and\nUp)\n8.536585365853659\n3.4482758620689653 9.6774193\nNo Response\n0\n0\n0\n13.\nDistribution of\nRespondent\nFirms by\nSector\nAll Sectors\n82\n100\n48\nIndustrial\nSector\n24\n30\n13\nConstruction\nSector\n15\n11\n4\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n14\n10\n13\nServices Sector\nof which:\n29\n49\n18\nFinancial\nIntermediation\n5\n2\n0\nHotels and\nRestaurants\n10\n24\n6\nRenting and\nBusiness\nActivities\n7\n8\n0\nCommunity\nand Social\nServices\n4\n2\n3\nSource: Central\nBank of\nNigeria\nTable E.1.1.6:\nBusiness\nExpectations\nSurvey Result -\nSouth West\nYear\n2008\nQuarter\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\n1. Overall\nBusiness\nOutlook on the\nMacroeconomy\nConfidence\nIndex: All\nSectors\nCurrent\nQuarter\nSouth South\n8.474576271186443\n9\n-25.4\nNext Quarter\nSouth South\n46.440677966101688\n55.1\n31.5\n2. Business\nOutlook Index\non the\nMacroeconomy\nby Sector:\nCurrent\nQuarter\nIndustrial\nSector\n13.888888888888889\n5.1282051282051242\n-37.5\nConstruction\nSector\n-7.4074074074074048 56.521739130434781\n-28.57142\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n-4.7619047619047592 0\n-5.769230\nServices Sector\nof which:\n9.1954022988505741\n-8.3333333333333321 -41.17647\nFinancial\nIntermediation\n100\n0\n-100\nHotels and\nRestaurants\n8.3333333333333357\n-37.5\n-40\nRenting and\nBusiness\nActivities\n63.63636363636364\n-50\n0\nCommunity\nand Social\nServices\n12.5\n-54.545454545454547 0\n3. Business\nOutlook Index\non the\nMacroeconomy\nby Sector: Next\nQuarter\nIndustrial\nSector\n32.876712328767127\n56.521739130434781\n18.75\nConstruction\nSector\n48.148148148148145\n69.565217391304358\n71.428571\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n34.920634920634924\n57.142857142857139\n40.384615\nServices Sector\nof which:\n47.126436781609193\n40.425531914893611\n32.352941\nFinancial\nIntermediation\n100\n0\n100\nHotels and\nRestaurants\n83.333333333333329\n56.25\n20\nRenting and\nBusiness\nActivities\n81.818181818181813\n0\n70\nCommunity\nand Social\nServices\n75\n27.272727272727273\n-12.5\n4. Business\nConfidence\nIndex on Own\nOperations by\nSector: Current\nQuarter\nIndustrial\nSector\n-36.986301369863014 8.6206896551724128\n-10.9375\nConstruction\nSector\n3.7037037037037024\n31.818181818181817\n0\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n-6.3492063492063515 -10.9375\n0\nServices Sector -4.5454545454545467 8.6419753086419746\n-5.2\n5. Business\nOutlook Index\non Own\nOperations :\nCurrent\nQuarter\nVolume of\nBusiness\nActivity Index\n23.050847457627121\n22.799999999999997\n-5.5\nVolume of\nTotal Order\nBook Index\n22.033898305084751\n17.900000000000002\n-9.4\nCredit Access\nIndex\n1.3559322033898304\n5.7000000000000028\n-19.89999\nFinancial\nCondition\nIndex\n-12.203389830508474 9\n-5.5\nAverage\nCapacity\nUtilization\n11.186440677966097\n16.700000000000003\n7.2\n6. Business\nOutlook Index\non Own\nOperations :\nNext Quarter\nVolume of\nBusiness\nActivity Index\n71.186440677966104\n67.8\n53\nEmployment\nOutlook Index\n47.118644067796609\n37.900000000000006\n21.5\n7. Business\nwith\nExpansion\nPlans (in per\ncent): Next\nQuarter\nIndustrial\nSector\n80.555555555555557\n62.393162393162392\n51.5625\nConstruction\nSector\n62.962962962962962\n56.521739130434781\n14.285714\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n75.806451612903231\n67.1875\n67.307692\nServices Sector\nof which:\n77.011494252873561\n58.333333333333336\n67.647058\nFinancial\nIntermediation\n100\n0\n100\nHotels and\nRestaurants\n83.333333333333329\n56.25\n80\nRenting and\nBusiness\nActivities\n100\n50\n70\nCommunity\nand Social\nServices\n100\n54.545454545454547\n75\n8. Business\nConstraints:\nCurrent\nQuarter\nHigh Interest\nRate\n61.186440677966104\n59.55\n55\nUnclear\nEconomic\nLaws\n40.16949152542373\n31.650000000000006\n36.5\nLack of\nEquipment\n20.16949152542373\n2.8499999999999979\n17.7\nInsufficient\nDemand\n19.322033898305087\n1.5000000000000036\n23.2\nAccess to\nCredit\n31.694915254237287\n13.900000000000002\n14.9\nFinancial\nProblems\n40.000000000000007\n38.35\n42.3\nCompetition\n33.559322033898312\n45.5\n40.9\nLabor\nProblems\n3.0508474576271141\n-7.9499999999999993 -3.3\nLack of\nMaterials Input\n12.881355932203391\n-2.8500000000000014 19.100000\nUnfavourable\nPolitical\nClimate\n34.067796610169495\n25.15\n24.9\nUnfavourable\nEconomic\nClimate\n49.66101694915254\n38.6\n46.4\nInsufficient\nPower Supply\n74.576271186440678\n46.75\n40.9\n9. Business\nExpectation\nIndex on\nSelected\nEconomic\nIndicators:\nCurrent\nQuarter\nN/$ Exchange\nRate\n17.288135593220339\n9\n-16\nInflation Rate\n24.406779661016945\n31.1\n30.4\nBorrowing\nRate\n-3.7288135593220382 17.899999999999999\n6.1\n10. Business\nExpectation\nIndex on\nSelected\nEconomic\nIndicators:\nNext Quarter\nN/$ Exchange\nRate\n26.101694915254242\n20.5\n9.9\nInflation Rate\n-2.3728813559322077 -0.4\n6.1\nBorrowing\nRate\n-16.949152542372882 10.199999999999999\n-3.9\n11. Percentage\nDistribution of\nRespondent\nFirms by Type\nof Business\nImporter\n18.64406779661017\n20.816326530612244\n32.044198\nExporter\n3.7288135593220337\n7.3469387755102042\n2.7624309\nBoth Importer\nand Exporter\n27.457627118644069\n22.040816326530614\n14.917127\nNeither\nImporter nor\nexporter\n48.813559322033896\n49.795918367346935\n50.276243\n12. Percentage\nDistribution of\nRespondent\nFirms by\nEmployment\nSize\nSmall (<50)\n59.66101694915254\n64.489795918367349\n64.088397\nMedium (50\nand <200)\n18.983050847457626\n20.408163265306122\n24.309392\nLarge (200 and\nUp)\n21.016949152542374\n14.693877551020408\n11.602209\nNo Response\n0.33898305084745761 0.40816326530612912 0\n13.\nDistribution of\nRespondent\nFirms by\nSector\nAll Sectors\n295\n285\n181\nIndustrial\nSector\n73\n117\n64\nConstruction\nSector\n27\n23\n7\nWholesale and\nRetail Trade\n63\n64\n52\nServices Sector\nof which:\n132\n81\n58\nFinancial\nIntermediation\n2\n0\n1\nHotels and\nRestaurants\n24\n16\n5\nRenting and\nBusiness\nActivities\n11\n6\n10\nCommunity\nand Social\nServices\n8\n11\n8\nSource: Central\nBank of\nNigeria\nTable E.2.1:\nConsumer\nExpectations\nSurvey Result -\nNational\nYear\n2009\nQuarter\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\n1. Overall\nConsumer\nOutlook:\nComposite\nIndex\nConfidence\nIndex: All\nSectors\nCurrent\nQuarter\nNational\n-22.999999999999996 -20.266666666666666\n-14.3333\nNext Quarter\nNational\n22.5\n21.516666666666669\n29.28333\nNext 12\nmonths\nNational\n24.216666666666669\n28.416666666666668\n26.96666\n2. Consumer\noutlook indices\non the current\neconomic and\nfamily\ncondition:\nCurrent\nQuarter\nNational\nEconomic\nCondition\n-35.399999999999991 -32.299999999999997\n-24.05\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n-38.686131386861312 -29.968944099378881\n-26.8092\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n-33.018867924528308 -32.518337408312959\n-13.0606\nBetween\nN50,001 and\nN100,000 per\nmonth\n-35.969387755102041 -35.310734463276837\n-32.5443\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n-34.905660377358487 -34.027777777777771\n-46.0227\nFamily\nFinancial\nSituation\n-24.3\n-19.7\n-12.65\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n-30.712979890310788 -93.5\n-15.1315\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n-22.634643377001453 -83\n-13.7203\nBetween N\n50,001 and N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n-18.877551020408159 -12.5\n-7.69230\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n-12.5\n-4.5\n-9.09090\nFamily Income\n-9.2999999999999972 -8.7999999999999972\n-6.3\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n-12.591240875912408 -8.0882352941176485\n-12.8289\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n-8.2728592162554442 -9.6045197740113011\n3.430079\nBetween N\n50,001 and N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n-11.224489795918366 -11.111111111111111\n-14.2011\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n0.94339622641509635 -8.7755102040816304\n-10.2272\n3. Consumer\noutlook indices\non economic\nand family\ncondition: Next\nQuarter\nNational\nEconomic\nCondition\n12\n3.0500000000000043\n11.65\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n15.280898876404493\n-0.79051383399209385 8.541666\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n7.7507598784194514\n0.92592592592592382 13.15789\nBetween\nN50,001 and\nN100,000 per\nmonth\n14.455782312925166\n15.025906735751299\n18.50828\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n14.930555555555554\n-0.48543689320388239 2.5\nFamily\nFinancial\nSituation\n1.1000000000000001\n2\n4.599999\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n-3.6117381489841982 1.5810276679841877\n-3.34728\nBetween N\n20,000 and\nN50,000 per\nmonth\n0.91743119266054762 3.9351851851851833\n11.52882\nBetween\nN50,001 and\nN100,000 per\nmonth\n6.8493150684931514\n-3.6269430051813494\n3.867403\nOver N100,000\nper month\n4.8951048951048897\n4.8543689320388381\n-1.66666\nFamily Income\n54.400000000000006\n59.500000000000007\n71.59999\nUnder N20,000\nper month\n46.741573033707866\n50.197628458498031\n66.66666\nBetween\nN20,000 and\nN50,000 per\nmonth\n57.534246575342458\n61.342592592592595\n74.68671\nBetween\nN50,001 and\nN100,000 per\nmonth\n59.106529209621996\n64.766839378238345\n72.92817\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n55.55555555555555\n65.048543689320383\n69.16666\n4. Consumer\noutlook indices\non economic\nand family\ncondition: Next\n12 Months\nNational\nEconomic\nCondition\n12.649999999999999\n16.5\n16.2\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n7.790368271954673\n9.6685082872928234\n7.909604\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n6.7545304777594701\n15.357142857142858\n14.51187\nBetween N\n50,001 and N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n23.214285714285715\n17.99163179916318\n26.62037\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n19.72477064220184\n25.886524822695037\n14.67065\nFamily\nFinancial\nSituation\n5.6000000000000014\n7.1000000000000014\n8.199999\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n2.8571428571428577\n-2.7624309392265189\n-11.8644\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n3.6243822075782539\n9.5238095238095255\n10.02638\nBetween N\n50,001 and N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n9.418282548476455\n7.9831932773109244\n12.03703\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n9.2165898617511495\n11.347517730496453\n20.35928\nFamily Income\n54.4\n61.649999999999991\n56.5\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n62.162162162162161\n58.011049723756905\n54.51977\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n67.073170731707322\n60.952380952380949\n58.04749\nBetween N\n50,001 and N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n68.367346938775512\n63.807531380753147\n59.25925\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n62.152777777777779\n64.893617021276597\n51.79640\n5. Confidence\nIndex on\nAmount of\nExpenditures:\nNext 12\nmonths\nAverage\n13.995454545454544\n8.8545454545454572\n4.418181\nFood & Other\nhousehold\nneeds\n65.3\n61.649999999999991\n56.5\nEducation\n59.75\n56.6\n51.5\nDebt Payment\n5.5000000000000036\n-5.9499999999999957\n-3.9\nMedical\nExpenses\n24.3\n13.95\n19.7\nSavings\n4.6000000000000014\n4.3500000000000014\n-4.95\nPurchase of\nAppliances\n-1.6000000000000014 -2.8499999999999979\n-10.25\nInvestment\n2.8999999999999915\n2.6499999999999986\n-5.05\nPurchase of\nConsumer\ndurables\n14.249999999999993\n15.349999999999994\n11.45\nPurchase of\nCar/Motor\nVehicle\n-17.850000000000001 -22.550000000000004\n-26.75\nPurchase of\nHouse\n-21.05\n-20.049999999999997\n-28.8\nOthers\n17.849999999999994\n-5.7499999999999929\n-10.85\n6. Buying\nConditions\nIndex: Current\nQuarter\nBuying\nConditions\nIndex\n37.283333333333339\n36.824999999999996\n36.68333\nConsumer\nDurables\n45.35\n45.6\n46.85\nMotor Vehicle\n31.05\n32.699999999999996\n32\nHouse & Lot\n35.450000000000003\n32.174999999999997\n31.2\n7. Buying\nIntention\nIndex: Next 12\nMonths\nBuying\nIntentions\nIndex\n46.366666666666667\n45.6\n43.55000\nConsumer\nDurables\n52.8\n53.55\n54.1\nMotor Vehicle\n38.524999999999999\n41.95\n38.45000\nHouse & Lot\n47.774999999999999\n41.3\n38.1\n8. Indices on\nSelected\nEconomic\nIndicators:\nNext 12\nMonths\nUnemployment\nRate Index\n47\n36.599999999999994\n39.65\nInterest Rate\nIndex for\nBorrowing\nMoney\n22.599999999999998\n13.900000000000002\n-23.5\nExchange Rate\n-28.7\n-23.700000000000003\n23.6\nChange in Price\nIndex\n29.1\n29.800000000000004\n10\n9. Sectors\nContribution to\nprice changes\nover the next\n12 months\nFood\n31.299999999999997\n58.5\n60.9\nClothing &\nFootwaer\n46.300000000000004\n48.7\n54.5\nElectricity\n43.4\n40.700000000000003\n44.5\nWater\n22.4\n25\n30.2\nHouse Rent\n75.3\n73.099999999999994\n66.3\nTransportation\n64.2\n64.099999999999994\n67.2\nCommunication 23.800000000000004\n23.3\n31.3\nEducation\n57.3\n52.5\n48.8\nMedical Care\n44.4\n48.5\n47.7\nPersonal Care\n30.7\n32.9\n28\nHotel &\nRestaurant\n41.9\n48.6\n45.1\nOthers\n8.1999999999999957\n35.9\n29.6\n10. Percentage\nof Respondents\nby Educational\nAttainment\nPrimary School 8.1\n4.9000000000000004\n7.6\nJunior School\n4\n4.5999999999999996\n3.9\nSenior School\n20.6\n17.2\n22.8\nHigher non-\nuniversity\neducation\n32.299999999999997\n36.200000000000003\n31.6\nUniversity\n31.7\n34.700000000000003\n32.4\nNone\n3.1\n2.2999999999999998\n1.5\n11. Total\nSample\nHouseholds\nand Response\nRate\nNumber of\nSample\nHouseholds\n1800\n1085\n1085\nNumber of\nRespondents\n1543\n981\n963\nResponse Rate\n85.722222222222229\n90.414746543778804\n88.75576\nSource: Central\nBank of Nigeria\nTable E.2.1.1:\nConsumer\nExpectations\nSurvey Result -\nNorth Central\nYear\n2009\nQuarter\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\n1. Zonal\nConsumer\nOutlook:\nComposite\nIndex\nConfidence\nIndex:\nCurrent\nQuarter\n-14.333333333333334\n-10.216666666666669 5.399999\nNext Quarter\n22.066666666666666\n31.100000000000005 42.94999\nNext 12\nmonths\n27.75\n32.733333333333334 38.21666\n2. Consumer\noutlook indices\non the current\neconomic and\nfamily\ncondition:\nCurrent\nQuarter\nEconomic\nCondition\n-30.25\n-17.850000000000001 -1.55\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n-24.568965517241388\n-7.0175438596491233 -8.333333\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n-37.037037037037031\n-21.717171717171713 0.602409\nBetween\nN50,001 and\nN100,000 per\nmonth\n-38.333333333333321\n-25.862068965517238 6.25\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n-33.333333333333336\n-18.181818181818183 8.333333\nFamily\nFinancial\nSituation\n-12.350000000000003\n-17.900000000000006 -3.15\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n11.440677966101694\n-24.5\n-13.88888\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n19.196428571428569\n-8\n3.614457\nBetween N\n50,001 and N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n13.793103448275861\n-5\n4.166666\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n20\n2.5\n0\nFamily Income\n-0.40000000000000213 5.1000000000000014 20.9\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n19.166666666666671\n0\n18.05555\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n-16.363636363636367\n13.131313131313135 30.12048\nBetween N\n50,001 and N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n-23.333333333333336\n-20.68965517241379\n12.5\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n13.333333333333332\n27.27272727272727\n-8.333333\n3. Consumer\noutlook indices\non economic\nand family\ncondition: Next\nQuarter\nEconomic\nCondition\n7.4000000000000021\n18.399999999999999 18.85000\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n9.8958333333333321\n20.192307692307693 19.81132\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n4.1322314049586772\n10.294117647058826 13.04347\nBetween\nN50,001 and\nN100,000 per\nmonth\n6.2499999999999964\n40.909090909090907 25.86206\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n15.625\n16.666666666666664 35.29411\nFamily\nFinancial\nSituation\n13.8\n18.800000000000004 33\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n-20.168067226890756\n19.230769230769234 28.84615\nBetween N\n20,000 and\nN50,000 per\nmonth\n-4.5871559633027523\n22.549019607843135 36.95652\nBetween\nN50,001 and\nN100,000 per\nmonth\n-6.4516129032258078\n12.121212121212121 41.37931\nOver N100,000\nper month\n0\n0\n11.76470\nFamily Income\n45\n56.1\n77\nUnder N20,000\nper month\n58.67768595041322\n40.384615384615387 79.24528\nBetween\nN20,000 and\nN50,000 per\nmonth\n29.203539823008843\n70.588235294117638 80.43478\nBetween\nN50,001 and\nN100,000 per\nmonth\n32.258064516129025\n42.424242424242415 68.96551\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n62.5\n33.333333333333329 64.70588\n4. Consumer\noutlook indices\non economic\nand family\ncondition: Next\n12 Months\nEconomic\nCondition\n15.849999999999994\n28.299999999999997 25.1\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n10.563380281690151\n28.350515463917525 21.42857\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n7.1428571428571423\n23.469387755102041 8.695652\nBetween N\n50,001 and N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n28.070175438596493\n45.833333333333336 33.33333\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n40.909090909090907\n28.316326530612244 44.04761\nFamily\nFinancial\nSituation\n9\n14.800000000000004 29.3\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n15.277777777777782\n-7.8947368421052637 3.571428\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n-0.85470085470085166 20.618556701030929 14.49275\nBetween N\n50,001 and N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n8.6206896551724128\n24.489795918367349 43.13725\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n29.411764705882348\n0\n54.76190\nFamily Income\n58.4\n55.1\n60.25\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n57.857142857142861\n57.894736842105267 58.92857\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n63.247863247863243\n52.577319587628871 66.66666\nBetween N\n50,001 and N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n62.280701754385966\n52.04081632653061\n56.86274\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n55.714285714285715\n79.166666666666671 54.76190\n5. Confidence\nIndex on\nAmount of\nExpenditures:\nNext 12\nmonths\nAverage\n0.78181818181818064 6.827272727272728\n22.13636\nFood & Other\nhousehold\nneeds\n58.4\n55.1\n60.25\nEducation\n38.450000000000003\n40.299999999999997 52.6\nDebt Payment\n-4.0999999999999943\n-19.649999999999999 23.05\nMedical\nExpenses\n3.4500000000000064\n6.65\n33.54999\nSavings\n-14.950000000000003\n1.55\n19.85000\nPurchase of\nAppliances\n-17.950000000000003\n4\n17.05\nInvestment\n-12.450000000000003\n-0.7\n27\nPurchase of\nConsumer\ndurables\n4.2999999999999972\n27.6\n0\nPurchase of\nCar/Motor\nVehicle\n-21.800000000000004\n-17.600000000000001 26.25\nPurchase of\nHouse\n-15.5\n-17.3\n-28.1\nOthers\n-9.25\n-4.8499999999999996 12\n6. Buying\nConditions\nIndex: Current\nQuarter\nBuying\nConditions\nIndex\n40.766666666666666\n41.233333333333334 45.30000\nConsumer\nDurables\n49.8\n52.55\n60.45\nMotor Vehicle\n45.924999999999997\n36.450000000000003 35.95000\nHouse & Lot\n26.575000000000003\n34.700000000000003 39.5\n7. Buying\nIntention\nIndex: Next 12\nMonths\nBuying\nIntentions\nIndex\n40.074999999999996\n45.433333333333337 46.55833\nConsumer\nDurables\n54.5\n57.400000000000006 64.65000\nMotor Vehicle\n30.75\n41.475000000000001 36.79999\nHouse & Lot\n34.975000000000001\n37.424999999999997 38.22500\n8. Indices on\nSelected\nEconomic\nIndicators:\nNext 12\nMonths\nUnemployment\nRate Index\n42.2\n16.350000000000001 46.35\nInterest Rate\nIndex for\nBorrowing\nMoney\n16.500000000000004\n2\n1.5\nExchange Rate\n-2.3999999999999986\n0.5\n-0.5\nChange in Price\nIndex\n24.4\n7.7\n-13.6\n9. Sectors\nContribution to\nprice changes\nover the next\n12 months\nFood\n51.199999999999996\n55.6\n67.59999\nClothing &\nFootwaer\n52.6\n52.1\n31.4\nElectricity\n54.599999999999994\n29.1\n22.6\nWater\n13.399999999999999\n27\n27.8\nHouse Rent\n77.599999999999994\n59.7\n54.5\nTransportation\n76.7\n60.2\n84.3\nCommunication 35.400000000000006\n30.6\n17.8\nEducation\n52.199999999999996\n34.700000000000003 38.20000\nMedical Care\n49.8\n32.6\n28.3\nPersonal Care\n26.1\n13.8\n7.3\nHotel &\nRestaurant\n36.799999999999997\n31.1\n41.4\nOthers\n0\n11.8\n27.2\n10. Percentage\nof Respondents\nby Educational\nAttainment\nPrimary School 7.9\n2.6\n4.712041\nJunior School\n1.7\n3.1\n1.570680\nSenior School\n16.8\n9.1999999999999993 27.74869\nHigher non-\nuniversity\neducation\n41.2\n51\n34.03141\nUniversity\n22.3\n31.6\n28.79581\nNone\n8.6\n2.6\n3.141361\n11. Total\nSample\nHouseholds\nand Response\nRate\nNumber of\nSample\nHouseholds\n300\n200\n200\nNumber of\nRespondents\n291\n196\n191\nResponse Rate\n97\n98\n95.5\nSource: Central\nBank of Nigeria\nTable E.2.1.2:\nConsumer\nExpectations\nSurvey Result -\nNorth East\nYear\n2009\nQuarter\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\n1. Zonal\nConsumer\nOutlook:\nComposite\nIndex\nConfidence\nIndex:\nCurrent\nQuarter\n-17.766666666666666 -10.666666666666666 -6.5166666\nNext Quarter\n7.1833333333333327 27.400000000000002 18.983333\nNext 12\nmonths\n21.266666666666669 32\n37.9\n2. Consumer\noutlook indices\non the current\neconomic and\nfamily\ncondition:\nCurrent\nQuarter\nEconomic\nCondition\n-62.55\n-56\n-13.75\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n-74.038461538461547 -48.214285714285715 -20\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n-40\n-66.666666666666657 -4.3478260\nBetween\nN50,001 and\nN100,000 per\nmonth\n0\n-62.5\n-16.666666\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n-100\n-19.766666666666701 -50\nFamily\nFinancial\nSituation\n28.95\n24\n-5.8\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n-11.538461538461538 4\n-10\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n-7.5\n7\n-4.3478260\nBetween N\n50,001 and N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n0\n1\n-8.3333333\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n-50\n-29.766666666666701 25\nFamily Income\n-19.7\n0\n0\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n-17.307692307692307 -14.285714285714285 5\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n-30\n11.111111111111114 17.391304\nBetween N\n50,001 and N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n0\n50\n-50\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n0\n0\n-100\n3. Consumer\noutlook indices\non economic\nand family\ncondition: Next\nQuarter\nEconomic\nCondition\n-7.25\n23\n14.65\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n-7.777777777777775\n2.7272727272727266 11.764705\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n-3.8461538461538467 15\n26.086956\nBetween\nN50,001 and\nN100,000 per\nmonth\n-49.999999999999993 20\n-14.285714\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n25\n-20\n12.5\nFamily\nFinancial\nSituation\n-18.399999999999999 -2\n11.7\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n-15.555555555555557 3.7037037037037024 -5.8823529\nBetween N\n20,000 and\nN50,000 per\nmonth\n-15.384615384615385 -10\n39.130434\nBetween\nN50,001 and\nN100,000 per\nmonth\n-100\n100\n-28.571428\nOver N100,000\nper month\n0\n-2\n0\nFamily Income\n21\n-4\n62.7\nUnder N20,000\nper month\n11.111111111111114 0\n52.941176\nBetween\nN20,000 and\nN50,000 per\nmonth\n30.769230769230774 -25.925925925925924 78.260869\nBetween\nN50,001 and\nN100,000 per\nmonth\n100\n40\n71.428571\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n0\n100\n0\n4. Consumer\noutlook indices\non economic\nand family\ncondition: Next\n12 Months\nEconomic\nCondition\n9.2500000000000071 30\n26.45\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n1.3513513513513473 -1.162790697674418\n36.363636\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n15.517241379310345 18.115942028985508 32.692307\nBetween N\n50,001 and N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n14.285714285714285 14.285714285714288 -21.428571\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n50\n-10\n35.714285\nFamily\nFinancial\nSituation\n3.8999999999999986 10\n21.6\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n5.405405405405407\n-28.571428571428569 -9.0909090\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n6.8965517241379324 19.35483870967742\n42.307692\nBetween N\n50,001 and N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n-14.285714285714285 9.090909090909097\n-14.285714\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n0\n0\n28.571428\nFamily Income\n50.65\n56\n65.650000\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n50.000000000000007 7.1428571428571459 59.090909\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n46.666666666666664 62.903225806451616 63.461538\nBetween N\n50,001 and N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n64.285714285714278 68.181818181818187 78.571428\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n75\n50\n71.428571\n5. Confidence\nIndex on\nAmount of\nExpenditures:\nNext 12\nmonths\nAverage\n17.850000000000001 20.727272727272727 20.522727\nFood & Other\nhousehold\nneeds\n50.65\n56\n65.650000\nEducation\n68.5\n64\n40.299999\nDebt Payment\n2.6499999999999986 12\n6.9\nMedical\nExpenses\n66.55\n56\n49\nSavings\n-49.3\n-53\n6.85\nPurchase of\nAppliances\n34.900000000000006 42\n9.85\nInvestment\n0\n-14\n7.9\nPurchase of\nConsumer\ndurables\n40.800000000000004 52\n20.6\nPurchase of\nCar/Motor\nVehicle\n-32.950000000000003 -17\n2\nPurchase of\nHouse\n7.25\n20\n0\nOthers\n7.2999999999999972 10\n16.7\n6. Buying\nConditions\nIndex: Current\nQuarter\nBuying\nConditions\nIndex\n34.866666666666667 38.5\n50.324999\nConsumer\nDurables\n40.15\n50\n50\nMotor Vehicle\n16.424999999999997 23\n43.6\nHouse & Lot\n48.024999999999999 42.5\n57.375\n7. Buying\nIntention\nIndex: Next 12\nMonths\nBuying\nIntentions\nIndex\n45.283333333333339 45.833333333333336 56.416666\nConsumer\nDurables\n51.95\n55\n59.424999\nMotor Vehicle\n35.200000000000003 32\n57.375\nHouse & Lot\n48.7\n50.5\n52.449999\n8. Indices on\nSelected\nEconomic\nIndicators:\nNext 12\nMonths\nUnemployment\nRate Index\n-12.5\n31\n34.299999\nInterest Rate\nIndex for\nBorrowing\nMoney\n28.9\n-4\n-47.058823\nExchange Rate\n-53.899999999999991 -72\n47.058823\nChange in Price\nIndex\n26.3\n48\n25.5\n9. Sectors\nContribution to\nprice changes\nover the next\n12 months\nFood\n-49.999999999999993 -14\n25.5\nClothing &\nFootwaer\n0\n24\n74.5\nElectricity\n7.8999999999999986 -4\n56.8\nWater\n-5.2000000000000028 -18\n45.1\nHouse Rent\n71\n94\n84.3\nTransportation\n46.099999999999994 72\n80.400000\nCommunication 5.3000000000000007 12\n39.200000\nEducation\n-7.8999999999999986 42\n56.9\nMedical Care\n17.099999999999994 32\n60.8\nPersonal Care\n14.5\n24\n15.7\nHotel &\nRestaurant\n10.5\n32\n56.9\nOthers\n31.6\n38\n31.4\n10. Percentage\nof Respondents\nby Educational\nAttainment\nPrimary School 13.2\n8\n9.8000000\nJunior School\n5.3\n4\n3.9\nSenior School\n22.4\n42\n13.7\nHigher non-\nuniversity\neducation\n38.200000000000003 30\n35.299999\nUniversity\n11.8\n8\n37.299999\nNone\n9.1999999999999993 8\n0\n11. Total\nSample\nHouseholds\nand Response\nRate\nNumber of\nSample\nHouseholds\n100\n75\n75\nNumber of\nRespondents\n76\n50\n51\nResponse Rate\n76\n66.666666666666657 68\nSource: Central\nBank of Nigeria\nTable E.2.1.3:\nConsumer\nExpectations\nSurvey Result -\nNorth West\nYear\n2009\nQuarter\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\n1. Zonal\nConsumer\nOutlook:\nComposite\nIndex\nConfidence\nIndex:\nCurrent\nQuarter\n-12.6\n-21.016666666666666 -6.8666666\nNext Quarter\n13.949999999999998 8\n29.349999\nNext 12\nmonths\n24.916666666666668 31.683333333333334 36.75\n2. Consumer\noutlook indices\non the current\neconomic and\nfamily\ncondition:\nCurrent\nQuarter\nEconomic\nCondition\n-16.3\n-20.400000000000002 -4.5999999\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n27.61904761904762\n-25.000000000000004 -3.9215686\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n17.21311475409836\n-15.714285714285715 2.9411764\nBetween\nN50,001 and\nN100,000 per\nmonth\n25.531914893617021 -22.222222222222221 -21.428571\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n25\n-24.999999999999996 -25\nFamily\nFinancial\nSituation\n-11\n-25.35\n-16.7\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n-8.6538461538461533 -12.5\n-17.647058\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n-10.245901639344265 -22.5\n-22.058823\nBetween N\n50,001 and N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n-20.212765957446805 -4.5\n-7.1428571\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n-4.1666666666666679 1.5\n5\nFamily Income\n-10.5\n-17.3\n0.6999999\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n-30.476190476190474 -10.714285714285712 5.8823529\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n9.0163934426229488 -18.571428571428569 7.3529411\nBetween N\n50,001 and N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n-12.76595744680851\n-22.222222222222218 -19.047619\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n-25\n-50\n-30\n3. Consumer\noutlook indices\non economic\nand family\ncondition: Next\nQuarter\nEconomic\nCondition\n27.849999999999998 11.3\n17.350000\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n24.757281553398062 4.5454545454545467 13.461538\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n34.54545454545454\n14.285714285714281 21.052631\nBetween\nN50,001 and\nN100,000 per\nmonth\n27.173913043478262 15\n25\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n13.461538461538456 30\n3.3333333\nFamily\nFinancial\nSituation\n-3.1000000000000014 -9.3000000000000007 12.7\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n-18.446601941747574 -12.727272727272727 1.9230769\nBetween N\n20,000 and\nN50,000 per\nmonth\n7.2072072072072082 -5.7142857142857117 24.561403\nBetween\nN50,001 and\nN100,000 per\nmonth\n6.5217391304347849 -20\n11.538461\nOver N100,000\nper month\n-3.8461538461538467 20\n6.6666666\nFamily Income\n17.099999999999994 22\n58\nUnder N20,000\nper month\n0\n1.8181818181818201 61.538461\nBetween\nN20,000 and\nN50,000 per\nmonth\n21.818181818181813 37.142857142857153 57.894736\nBetween\nN50,001 and\nN100,000 per\nmonth\n31.81818181818182\n45\n61.538461\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n45.833333333333321 -60\n40\n4. Consumer\noutlook indices\non economic\nand family\ncondition: Next\n12 Months\nEconomic\nCondition\n40.549999999999997 27.049999999999997 25.3\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n39.87341772151899\n22.093023255813954 19.736842\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n51.612903225806448 24.637681159420289 31.25\nBetween N\n50,001 and N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n38.311688311688314 30.357142857142854 20\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n20\n55\n25\nFamily\nFinancial\nSituation\n17.100000000000001 2\n17.3\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n2.5641025641025692 4.6511627906976756 0\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n28.260869565217391 -10.144927536231879 26.5625\nBetween N\n50,001 and N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n19.480519480519479 25\n26.666666\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n17.142857142857142 10\n5.5555555\nFamily Income\n17.099999999999994 66\n67.650000\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n-1.2820512820512775 65.116279069767444 -44.642857\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n15.217391304347821 69.565217391304358 -34.057971\nBetween N\n50,001 and N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n35.526315789473685 60.714285714285715 -16.666666\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n27.272727272727273 60\n-9.5238095\n5. Confidence\nIndex on\nAmount of\nExpenditures:\nNext 12\nmonths\nAverage\n19.309090909090909 17.077272727272724 22.086363\nFood & Other\nhousehold\nneeds\n67.55\n66\n63.35\nEducation\n67.150000000000006 67\n59\nDebt Payment\n30.450000000000003 16.100000000000001 33\nMedical\nExpenses\n50.550000000000004 41.7\n48.65\nSavings\n7.8999999999999986 -0.3\n5.3\nPurchase of\nAppliances\n-3.5000000000000036 18.649999999999999 24\nInvestment\n7.6999999999999957 -6.65\n0\nPurchase of\nConsumer\ndurables\n6.6499999999999986 3.35\n4.3\nPurchase of\nCar/Motor\nVehicle\n-15.450000000000003 -16.399999999999999 9.4\nPurchase of\nHouse\n-13.900000000000002 -4.3\n-8.0500000\nOthers\n7.2999999999999972 2.7\n4\n6. Buying\nConditions\nIndex: Current\nQuarter\nBuying\nConditions\nIndex\n52.158333333333331 38.608333333333341 46.616666\nConsumer\nDurables\n81.150000000000006 41.35\n50.35\nMotor Vehicle\n38.1\n38.325000000000003 44.65\nHouse & Lot\n37.225000000000001 36.15\n44.85\n7. Buying\nIntention\nIndex: Next 12\nMonths\nBuying\nIntentions\nIndex\n49.108333333333327 49.266666666666673 54.274999\nConsumer\nDurables\n58.55\n51\n58.65\nMotor Vehicle\n44.55\n47.35\n54\nHouse & Lot\n44.225000000000001 49.45\n50.174999\n8. Indices on\nSelected\nEconomic\nIndicators:\nNext 12\nMonths\nUnemployment\nRate Index\n41.3\n40\n33.049999\nInterest Rate\nIndex for\nBorrowing\nMoney\n39.199999999999996 34\n-21.3\nExchange Rate\n-33.300000000000004 -29.3\n38.700000\nChange in Price\nIndex\n41.2\n43.3\n32\n9. Sectors\nContribution to\nprice changes\nover the next\n12 months\nFood\n14.399999999999999 26\n37.299999\nClothing &\nFootwaer\n23.4\n36\n52\nElectricity\n28.299999999999997 50\n49.3\nWater\n5.8999999999999986 24.7\n48.7\nHouse Rent\n68.599999999999994 78.7\n66.7\nTransportation\n49.3\n56.7\n69.400000\nCommunication 18.2\n18\n51.4\nEducation\n49.7\n51.3\n58.7\nMedical Care\n52.100000000000009 62.6\n58\nPersonal Care\n40.200000000000003 26.7\n30.7\nHotel &\nRestaurant\n52.1\n46.7\n50\nOthers\n25.5\n22\n37.4\n10. Percentage\nof Respondents\nby Educational\nAttainment\nPrimary School 8.6999999999999993 6\n8.6666666\nJunior School\n3.1\n4\n4\nSenior School\n15.4\n12.7\n13.333333\nHigher non-\nuniversity\neducation\n39.9\n47.3\n44\nUniversity\n29.4\n23.3\n30\nNone\n3.5\n6.7\n0\n11. Total\nSample\nHouseholds\nand Response\nRate\nNumber of\nSample\nHouseholds\n300\n200\n200\nNumber of\nRespondents\n286\n150\n150\nResponse Rate\n95.333333333333343 75\n75\nSource: Central\nBank of Nigeria\nTable E.2.1.4:\nConsumer\nExpectations\nSurvey Result -\nSouth East\nYear\n2009\nQuarter\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\n1. Zonal\nConsumer\nOutlook:\nComposite\nIndex\nConfidence\nIndex:\nCurrent\nQuarter\n-26.599999999999998 -33.133333333333333 -29.8\nNext Quarter\n19.966666666666669 22.166666666666668 19.816666\nNext 12\nmonths\n24.933333333333334 26.400000000000002 15.449999\n2. Consumer\noutlook indices\non the current\neconomic and\nfamily\ncondition:\nCurrent\nQuarter\nEconomic\nCondition\n-36.899999999999991 -39.450000000000003 -36.25\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n-41.77215189873418\n-36.470588235294116 -40\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n-33.333333333333329 -38.15789473684211\n-31.914893\nBetween\nN50,001 and\nN100,000 per\nmonth\n-40.277777777777771 -58.823529411764717 -40\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n-47.72727272727272\n-42.857142857142854 -50\nFamily\nFinancial\nSituation\n-29.400000000000002 -36.25\n-25.75\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n-28.205128205128204 -31.5\n-18.333333\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n-34\n-24.5\n-30.319148\nBetween N\n50,001 and N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n-25\n-6.5\n-23.333333\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n-16.666666666666664 -4.5\n-41.666666\nFamily Income\n-13.5\n-23.699999999999996 -27.4\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n-5.0632911392405049 -16.470588235294116 -33.333333\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n-15.686274509803926 -27.631578947368418 -17.021276\nBetween N\n50,001 and N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n-27.777777777777782 -52.941176470588239 -53.333333\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n4.5454545454545432 0\n0\n3. Consumer\noutlook indices\non economic\nand family\ncondition: Next\nQuarter\nEconomic\nCondition\n-4.1000000000000014 -8.0999999999999979 -5.25\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n-10.576923076923073 -8.7301587301587276 -21.052631\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n-6.0714285714285694 -4.0229885057471293 -1.8018018\nBetween\nN50,001 and\nN100,000 per\nmonth\n4.7297297297297263 -14.58333333333333\n11.666666\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n2.2727272727272698 -22.727272727272727 -31.818181\nFamily\nFinancial\nSituation\n2.3000000000000007 -7.5999999999999979 -13.7\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n8.1632653061224474 -1.5873015873015888 -28.947368\nBetween N\n20,000 and\nN50,000 per\nmonth\n2.9629629629629655 -6.8965517241379288 -3.6036036\nBetween\nN50,001 and\nN100,000 per\nmonth\n-1.3157894736842088 -25\n-30\nOver N100,000\nper month\n4.7619047619047628 -9.0909090909090917 -18.181818\nFamily Income\n61.7\n82.199999999999989 78.400000\nUnder N20,000\nper month\n56\n92.063492063492063 73.684210\nBetween\nN20,000 and\nN50,000 per\nmonth\n63.829787234042556 80.459770114942529 79.279279\nBetween\nN50,001 and\nN100,000 per\nmonth\n69.333333333333329 66.666666666666671 73.333333\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n54.545454545454547 72.727272727272734 100\n4. Consumer\noutlook indices\non economic\nand family\ncondition: Next\n12 Months\nEconomic\nCondition\n5.7999999999999972 10.050000000000001 2.15\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n-25.675675675675677 7.4468085106382986 -26.5625\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n3.3898305084745779 11.235955056179776 6.6037735\nBetween N\n50,001 and N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n22.471910112359552 10\n22.972972\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n3.4090909090909136 10.714285714285712 -20\nFamily\nFinancial\nSituation\n1\n1.6000000000000014 -11.6\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n0\n-4.2553191489361701 -43.75\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n-4.2372881355932179 11.235955056179773 -1.8867924\nBetween N\n50,001 and N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n11.494252873563218 -8.571428571428573\n-10.810810\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n-2.2727272727272734 -14.285714285714285 -13.333333\nFamily Income\n68\n67.55\n55.8\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n56.944444444444443 60.638297872340431 42.1875\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n68.487394957983199 69.101123595505626 52.358490\nBetween N\n50,001 and N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n75.280898876404493 70\n56.756756\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n68.181818181818187 75\n30\n5. Confidence\nIndex on\nAmount of\nExpenditures:\nNext 12\nmonths\nAverage\n6.8636363636363606 6.9954545454545416 13.140909\nFood & Other\nhousehold\nneeds\n68\n67.55\n55.8\nEducation\n63.6\n59\n61.1\nDebt Payment\n-8\n8.0500000000000007 28.95\nMedical\nExpenses\n12.850000000000001 23.75\n33.4\nSavings\n5.4499999999999993 2.7\n9\nPurchase of\nAppliances\n2.9500000000000028 3.45\n14.2\nInvestment\n-7.9999999999999964 -5.9\n12.6\nPurchase of\nConsumer\ndurables\n26.15\n16.7\n0\nPurchase of\nCar/Motor\nVehicle\n-27.75\n-43.25\n28.95\nPurchase of\nHouse\n-51.2\n-47.8\n-46.55\nOthers\n-8.5499999999999972 -7.3\n-52.9\n6. Buying\nConditions\nIndex: Current\nQuarter\nBuying\nConditions\nIndex\n30.966666666666669 25.600000000000005 32.017543\nConsumer\nDurables\n43.25\n38.150000000000006 60\nMotor Vehicle\n28.3\n18.500000000000004 20.526315\nHouse & Lot\n21.35\n20.150000000000002 15.526315\n7. Buying\nIntention\nIndex: Next 12\nMonths\nBuying\nIntentions\nIndex\n37.508333333333333 37.65\n38.245614\nConsumer\nDurables\n50.5\n50.8\n60.263157\nMotor Vehicle\n40.674999999999997 30.95\n26.973684\nHouse & Lot\n21.35\n31.200000000000003 27.5\n8. Indices on\nSelected\nEconomic\nIndicators:\nNext 12\nMonths\nUnemployment\nRate Index\n47.65\n48.400000000000006 38.15\nInterest Rate\nIndex for\nBorrowing\nMoney\n14.600000000000001 28.099999999999998 -15.789473\nExchange Rate\n-10.899999999999999 -35.599999999999994 36.315789\nChange in Price\nIndex\n16.299999999999997 48.1\n22.105263\n9. Sectors\nContribution to\nprice changes\nover the next\n12 months\nFood\n38.699999999999996 88.1\n64.2\nClothing &\nFootwaer\n57.7\n70.8\n68.400000\nElectricity\n54.6\n57.3\n58.9\nWater\n31.6\n41.1\n47.3\nHouse Rent\n79\n76.2\n82.6\nTransportation\n67.099999999999994 81.7\n83.1\nCommunication 19.599999999999998 46.5\n52.1\nEducation\n70.8\n73.5\n61.6\nMedical Care\n43.4\n66.5\n74.2\nPersonal Care\n27.1\n47\n42.6\nHotel &\nRestaurant\n53.599999999999994 63.8\n47.4\nOthers\n36.299999999999997 58.9\n38.4\n10. Percentage\nof Respondents\nby Educational\nAttainment\nPrimary School 7.1\n4.9000000000000004 6.3\nJunior School\n1.4\n9.1999999999999993 3.2\nSenior School\n25.4\n16.2\n22.6\nHigher non-\nuniversity\neducation\n18.3\n31.9\n27.4\nUniversity\n46.4\n37.799999999999997 38.4\nNone\n0\n0\n2.1\n11. Total\nSample\nHouseholds\nand Response\nRate\nNumber of\nSample\nHouseholds\n300\n200\n200\nNumber of\nRespondents\n295\n185\n190\nResponse Rate\n98.333333333333329 92.5\n95\nSource: Central\nBank of Nigeria\nTable E.2.1.5:\nConsumer\nExpectations\nSurvey Result -\nSouth South\nYear\n2009\nQuarter\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\n1. Zonal\nConsumer\nOutlook:\nComposite\nIndex\nConfidence\nIndex:\nCurrent\nQuarter\n-31.75\n-19.733333333333338 -28.55\nNext Quarter\n10.966666666666663\n26.133333333333336 -21.83333\nNext 12\nmonths\n13.850000000000003\n26.600000000000005 11.81666\n2. Consumer\noutlook indices\non the current\neconomic and\nfamily\ncondition:\nCurrent\nQuarter\nEconomic\nCondition\n-37\n-37.050000000000004 -41.25\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n-34.146341463414636\n-36.956521739130437 -59.16666\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n-38.970588235294123\n-37.735849056603769 -13.26530\nBetween\nN50,001 and\nN100,000 per\nmonth\n-53.571428571428569\n-38.571428571428569 -48.4375\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n-22.222222222222221\n-32.35294117647058\n-100\nFamily\nFinancial\nSituation\n-20.45\n-10.250000000000004 -7.7\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n-17.073170731707318\n-9\n-17.5\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n-20.588235294117645\n-5\n-5.102040\nBetween N\n50,001 and N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n-21.428571428571427\n0\n3.125\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n-22.222222222222218\n-1.5\n100\nFamily Income\n-37.799999999999997\n-11.899999999999999 -36.70000\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n-41.463414634146346\n-10.869565217391305 -48.33333\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n-47.058823529411768\n-20.754716981132077 -24.48979\nBetween N\n50,001 and N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n-14.285714285714288\n11.428571428571427 -31.25\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n-11.111111111111107\n-35.294117647058819 -100\n3. Consumer\noutlook indices\non economic\nand family\ncondition: Next\nQuarter\nEconomic\nCondition\n-11.5\n2.2999999999999972 -13.4\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n35\n-2.8571428571428612 -29.54545\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n-11.940298507462689\n-7.5\n-8.196721\nBetween\nN50,001 and\nN100,000 per\nmonth\n-17.307692307692314\n21.052631578947366 -2.777777\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n22.727272727272723\n5.5555555555555571 0\nFamily\nFinancial\nSituation\n-31.900000000000002\n-2\n-30.3\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n-35.483870967741936\n-2.8571428571428559 -48.33333\nBetween N\n20,000 and\nN50,000 per\nmonth\n-40.298507462686572\n-1.6666666666666643 -24.48979\nBetween\nN50,001 and\nN100,000 per\nmonth\n-23.07692307692308\n2.6315789473684212 -31.25\nOver N100,000\nper month\n9.0909090909090864\n-11.111111111111107 -100\nFamily Income\n76.3\n78.100000000000009 -21.8\nUnder N20,000\nper month\n80.645161290322577\n77.142857142857139 49.05660\nBetween\nN20,000 and\nN50,000 per\nmonth\n77.611940298507449\n80\n44.56521\nBetween\nN50,001 and\nN100,000 per\nmonth\n65.384615384615373\n81.578947368421041 48.27586\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n81.818181818181827\n66.666666666666657 -5.882352\n4. Consumer\noutlook indices\non economic\nand family\ncondition: Next\n12 Months\nEconomic\nCondition\n-0.69999999999999574 16.25\n2.049999\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n3.7037037037037024\n8.8235294117647136 0\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n-6.4516129032258007\n9.4827586206896584 0\nBetween N\n50,001 and N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n-7.4074074074074119\n16.666666666666664 6.097560\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n22.222222222222225\n32.258064516129032 16.66666\nFamily\nFinancial\nSituation\n-24.4\n2.6000000000000014 -22.6\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n-25\n-23.529411764705884 -25\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n-32.258064516129025\n3.4482758620689644 -13.79310\nBetween N\n50,001 and N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n-34.615384615384613\n4.4444444444444429 -31.70731\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n16.666666666666671\n12.903225806451616 -33.33333\nFamily Income\n66.650000000000006\n60.95000000000001\n56\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n66.071428571428584\n52.941176470588246 57.5\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n72.950819672131146\n62.931034482758619 55.17241\nBetween N\n50,001 and N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n68.518518518518519\n56.666666666666664 54.87804\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n47.222222222222229\n67.741935483870975 66.66666\n5. Confidence\nIndex on\nAmount of\nExpenditures:\nNext 12\nmonths\nAverage\n1.5409090909090892\n14.560000000000004 -12.9\nFood & Other\nhousehold\nneeds\n66.650000000000006\n14.560000000000006 56\nEducation\n55.8\n60.95000000000001\n47.55\nDebt Payment\n-1.9000000000000057\n62.6\n-23.2\nMedical\nExpenses\n34.799999999999997\n-5.95\n34.54999\nSavings\n34.799999999999997\n22.25\n-18.64999\nPurchase of\nAppliances\n-26.700000000000003\n23.5\n-24.65\nInvestment\n-26.25\n-4.7\n-38.4\nPurchase of\nConsumer\ndurables\n-2.6500000000000057\n30.8\n-7.4\nPurchase of\nCar/Motor\nVehicle\n-46.95\n12.05\n-69.8\nPurchase of\nHouse\n-58.05\n-29.5\n-76.40000\nOthers\n-12.600000000000001\n-26.4\n-21.5\n6. Buying\nConditions\nIndex: Current\nQuarter\nBuying\nConditions\nIndex\n20.19166666666667\n31.058333333333334 15.35\nConsumer\nDurables\n31.1\n44.05\n31.65\nMotor Vehicle\n16.500000000000007\n24.625\n6.674999\nHouse & Lot\n12.975000000000001\n24.5\n7.725000\n7. Buying\nIntention\nIndex: Next 12\nMonths\nBuying\nIntentions\nIndex\n23.774999999999995\n42.208333333333336 21.42500\nConsumer\nDurables\n37.799999999999997\n51.3\n38.70000\nMotor Vehicle\n18.725000000000001\n36.6\n13.22500\nHouse & Lot\n14.799999999999997\n38.725000000000001 12.35000\n8. Indices on\nSelected\nEconomic\nIndicators:\nNext 12\nMonths\nUnemployment\nRate Index\n57.400000000000006\n49.050000000000004 56\nInterest Rate\nIndex for\nBorrowing\nMoney\n33.299999999999997\n7.2999999999999972 -62\nExchange Rate\n-57.1\n-25.1\n12\nChange in Price\nIndex\n45.2\n32.4\n-9.800000\n9. Sectors\nContribution to\nprice changes\nover the next\n12 months\nFood\n60.699999999999996\n65.5\n83.1\nClothing &\nFootwaer\n43.7\n51\n65.5\nElectricity\n28.9\n46.4\n45.1\nWater\n20\n15.9\n-5\nHouse Rent\n69.599999999999994\n88.1\n61.9\nTransportation\n72.599999999999994\n58.9\n41.5\nCommunication 23.7\n10.6\n24.7\nEducation\n60\n47.7\n49.3\nMedical Care\n45.9\n43.1\n54.3\nPersonal Care\n37\n43\n52.1\nHotel &\nRestaurant\n43.7\n72.2\n71.09999\nOthers\n30.400000000000002\n53\n45.1\n10. Percentage\nof Respondents\nby Educational\nAttainment\nPrimary School 8.9\n8.6\n15.5\nJunior School\n3.7\n2\n4.900000\nSenior School\n14.8\n20.5\n31.7\nHigher non-\nuniversity\neducation\n45.9\n29.1\n21.8\nUniversity\n26.7\n38.4\n23.9\nNone\n0\n1.3\n0.7\n11. Total\nSample\nHouseholds\nand Response\nRate\nNumber of\nSample\nHouseholds\n300\n160\n160\nNumber of\nRespondents\n135\n151\n142\nResponse Rate\n45\n94.375\n88.75\nSource: Central\nBank of Nigeria\nTable E.2.1.6:\nConsumer\nExpectations\nSurvey Result -\nSouth West\nYear\n2009\nQuarter\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\n1. Zonal\nConsumer\nOutlook:\nComposite\nIndex\nConfidence\nIndex:\nCurrent\nQuarter\n-20.85\n-16.066666666666666 -15.86666\nNext Quarter\n25.816666666666663\n23.616666666666664 24.86666\nNext 12\nmonths\n22.766666666666666\n31.266666666666666 22.90000\n2. Consumer\noutlook indices\non the current\neconomic and\nfamily\ncondition:\nCurrent\nQuarter\nEconomic\nCondition\n-48.900000000000006\n-37.700000000000003 -37.95000\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n-52.054794520547944\n-34\n-24.39024\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n-54.08163265306122\n-42.473118279569889 -23.38709\nBetween\nN50,001 and\nN100,000 per\nmonth\n-41.538461538461547\n-33.783783783783775 -41.96428\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n-33.695652173913039\n-40.322580645161295 -59.64912\nFamily\nFinancial\nSituation\n-11.649999999999999\n-7.3000000000000007 -11.55\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n-19.387755102040817\n-18.627450980392162 -8.536585\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n-11.855670103092782\n-23.655913978494624 -12.90322\nBetween N\n50,001 and N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n-3.125\n5.405405405405407\n-10.71428\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n3.3333333333333321\n-8.0645161290322562 -13.15789\nFamily Income\n-2\n-3.1999999999999993 1.9\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n-20.547945205479454\n1.9607843137254903 -7\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n9.183673469387756\n-3.2608695652173942 7\nBetween N\n50,001 and N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n4.6153846153846168\n-5.4054054054054035 6\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n4.3478260869565233\n-6.4516129032258043 -2\n3. Consumer\noutlook indices\non economic\nand family\ncondition: Next\nQuarter\nEconomic\nCondition\n-10.450000000000003\n-4.25\n-4.599999\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n-13.392857142857142\n-24.999999999999993 -6.944444\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n-16.208791208791208\n-12.209302325581394 0.909090\nBetween\nN50,001 and\nN100,000 per\nmonth\n-1.0526315789473699\n11.029411764705884 6.603773\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n0\n2.5423728813559343 -15.97222\nFamily\nFinancial\nSituation\n8.3000000000000007\n5.6\n11.1\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n-8.1081081081081052\n13.888888888888891 0\nBetween N\n20,000 and\nN50,000 per\nmonth\n10.439560439560443\n4.6511627906976756 10\nBetween\nN50,001 and\nN100,000 per\nmonth\n27.173913043478265\n-1.4705882352941195 16\nOver N100,000\nper month\n6.0606060606060588\n10.169491525423727 -2\nFamily Income\n79.599999999999994\n69.5\n68.09999\nUnder N20,000\nper month\n81.415929203539818\n60.784313725490193 38.88888\nBetween\nN20,000 and\nN50,000 per\nmonth\n83.97790055248619\n69.892473118279568 61.81818\nBetween\nN50,001 and\nN100,000 per\nmonth\n80.645161290322577\n71.621621621621628 83.01886\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n65.151515151515142\n77.41935483870968\n76.38888\n4. Consumer\noutlook indices\non economic\nand family\ncondition: Next\n12 Months\nEconomic\nCondition\n-1.5500000000000007\n13.899999999999999 -3\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n-11.05263157894737\n-24.137931034482754 5.357142\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n-14.080459770114945\n-19.736842105263154 -15.17857\nBetween N\n50,001 and N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n15.533980582524276\n9.1549295774647916 14\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n15.662650602409634\n19.17808219178082\n-7.926829\nFamily\nFinancial\nSituation\n7.6000000000000014\n10.4\n17.60000\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n0\n13.793103448275861 3\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n10.465116279069768\n11.842105263157894 10\nBetween N\n50,001 and N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n13.861386138613867\n0\n14\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n2.4096385542168619\n17.80821917808219\n11\nFamily Income\n62.249999999999993\n69.5\n54.1\nUnder N\n20,000 per\nmonth\n59.895833333333336\n61.5\n46.42857\nBetween N\n20,000 and N\n50,000 per\nmonth\n64.942528735632195\n71.05263157894737\n61.60714\nBetween N\n50,001 and N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n60.679611650485434\n69.014084507042256 59\nOver N\n100,000 per\nmonth\n63.855421686746993\n76.712328767123282 48.78048\n5. Confidence\nIndex on\nAmount of\nExpenditures:\nNext 12\nmonths\nAverage\n14.268181818181819\n4.0227272727272716 13.12272\nFood & Other\nhousehold\nneeds\n62.249999999999993\n61.5\n54.1\nEducation\n60\n56.399999999999991 62.25\nDebt Payment\n-0.70000000000000284 -22.299999999999997 -7.1\nMedical\nExpenses\n10.200000000000003\n-17.499999999999996 -1.9\nSavings\n20.300000000000004\n10.400000000000006 16.8\nPurchase of\nAppliances\n-0.10000000000000142 -11.450000000000003 -1.45\nInvestment\n9.1000000000000014\n3.3999999999999986 0\nPurchase of\nConsumer\ndurables\n10.149999999999999\n6.6000000000000014 16\nPurchase of\nCar/Motor\nVehicle\n-7.3000000000000007\n-11.799999999999997 4.25\nPurchase of\nHouse\n-12.25\n-15\n-4.599999\nOthers\n5.3000000000000007\n-16\n6\n6. Buying\nConditions\nIndex: Current\nQuarter\nBuying\nConditions\nIndex\n38.816666666666663\n45.141666666666673 45.97500\nConsumer\nDurables\n49\n48.4\n50.95\nMotor Vehicle\n35.549999999999997\n43.75\n43.65\nHouse & Lot\n31.9\n43.274999999999999 43.32500\n7. Buying\nIntention\nIndex: Next 12\nMonths\nBuying\nIntentions\nIndex\n44.608333333333327\n45.225000000000001 58.09999\nConsumer\nDurables\n53.8\n31.950000000000003 58.8\nMotor Vehicle\n41.15\n52.525000000000006 64.22499\nHouse & Lot\n38.875\n51.2\n51.27499\n8. Indices on\nSelected\nEconomic\nIndicators:\nNext 12\nMonths\nUnemployment\nRate Index\n51.95\n33.299999999999997 30.3\nInterest Rate\nIndex for\nBorrowing\nMoney\n16.300000000000004\n8.1\n-23.6\nExchange Rate\n-33.299999999999997\n-19.7\n25.4\nChange in Price\nIndex\n28.199999999999996\n20.100000000000001 14.3\n9. Sectors\nContribution to\nprice changes\nover the next\n12 months\nFood\n66.7\n68.7\n62.5\nClothing &\nFootwaer\n59.8\n40.9\n52.3\nElectricity\n51.5\n37.700000000000003 44.5\nWater\n35\n25.7\n24.1\nHouse Rent\n80.2\n64.7\n60.7\nTransportation\n68.5\n60.3\n50.4\nCommunication 34.799999999999997\n13.7\n13.4\nEducation\n70\n56.7\n38\nMedical Care\n45.2\n45.7\n27.3\nPersonal Care\n40.200000000000003\n36.9\n18.60000\nHotel &\nRestaurant\n42\n41.3\n23.2\nOthers\n28.2\n35.299999999999997 7.9\n10. Percentage\nof Respondents\nby Educational\nAttainment\nPrimary School 7.4\n3.2\n4.599999\nJunior School\n5.7\n4.4000000000000004 6\nSenior School\n24.6\n20.100000000000001 21.3\nHigher non-\nuniversity\neducation\n26.1\n26.5\n30.1\nUniversity\n34.299999999999997\n44.6\n36.6\nNone\n1.3\n0.8\n1.4\n11. Total\nSample\nHouseholds\nand Response\nRate\nNumber of\nSample\nHouseholds\n500\n250\n250\nNumber of\nRespondents\n460\n249\n216\nResponse Rate\n92\n99.6\n86.4\nSource: Central\nBank of Nigeria\nTable E.3.1:\nSummary of\nResults of\nInflation\nAttitudes\nSurvey (Per\ncent)\n2009\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\nQ.1 Which\nof these\noptions best\ndescribes\nhow prices\nhave\nchanged\nover the last\n12 months?\nGone down\n4\n5.0999999999999996 6.5\nNot\nchanged\n6.2\n12.5\n8.80000000000\nUp by 1%\nbut less\nthan 3%\n4.7\n21.5\n29\nUp by 3%\nor above\n74.8\n53.3\n40.7999999999\nNo idea\n10.1\n7.6\n14.8\nMedian (%) 3\n3\n2.88275862068\nQ. 2 How\nmuch\nwould you\nexpect\nprices in the\nshops\ngenerally to\nchange over\nthe next 12\nmonths?\nWould Go\ndown\n15.7\n22.6\n16.5\nNot\nchanged\n8.6999999999999993 10.199999999999999 8\nUp by 1%\nbut less\nthan 3%\n6.9\n20.5\n28.3\nUp by 3%\nor above\n54.8\n34.6\n32.6\nNo idea\n13.6\n12.1\n14.6\nMedian (%) 3\n2.087804878048781\n2.28621908127\nQ. 3 If\nprices\nstarted to\nrise faster\nthan they\ndo now, do\nyou think\nNigeria's\neconomy\nwould…?\nEnd up\nstronger\n8\n9.6999999999999993 7.9\nOr make\nlittle\ndifference\n14\n13\n21.5\nOr weak\n65.099999999999994 65.400000000000006 55.2\nDon't know\n12.5\n11.9\n15.3\nQ. 4 The\nGovernment\nin this years\nbudget\nanticipated\nan inflation\nrate of\n11.2%.\nWhat do\nyou think of\nthis rate?\nToo high\n45.7\n45.8\n45.3\nOr too low\n20.5\n17.7\n21.4\nOr about\nright\n13.9\n16.2\n12.6\nNo idea\n19.2\n20\n20.7\nQ. 5 How\nwould you\nsay interest\non bank\nloans and\nsavings\nhave\nchanged\nover the last\n12 months?\nRisen a lot\n36.200000000000003 34.299999999999997 29.4\nRisen a\nlittle\n24\n25.5\n28.5\nStayed\nabout the\nsame\n10.199999999999999 13.5\n14.3\nFallen a\nlittle\n6\n6.1\n5.4\nFallen a lot\n6.1\n3\n4.59999999999\nNo idea\n17.100000000000001 17.5\n17.7\nTotal saying\n'rise'\n60.2\n59.8\n57.9\nTotal saying\n'fall'\n12.1\n9.1\n10\nNet rise\n48.1\n50.699999999999996 47.9\nQ. 6 How\nwould you\nexpect\ninterest\nrates to\nchange over\nthe next 12\nmonths?\nRise a lot\n15\n13.8\n16\nRise a little\n23.8\n22.2\n23.3\nStay about\nthe same\n15\n16\n17.1000000000\nFall a little\n21.2\n24.8\n18.1000000000\nFall a lot\n10.8\n9.1999999999999993 9.80000000000\nNo idea\n13.8\n13.8\n15.7\nTotal saying\n'rise'\n38.799999999999997 36\n39.2999999999\nTotal saying\n'fall'\n32\n34\n27.9000000000\nNet rise\n6.7999999999999972 2\n11.3999999999\nQ. 7 What\ndo you\nthink would\nbe best for\nthe\nNigerian\neconomy -\nfor interest\nrates to go\nup over the\nnext few\nmonths,\nor to go\ndown, or to\nstay where\nthey are\nnow, or\nwould it\nmake no\ndiffrence\neither way?\nGo up\n13.7\n14.1\n16.3\nGo down\n52.4\n54.5\n51\nMake no\ndifference\n12.7\n17.5\n15.4\nNo idea\n13.1\n13.8\n17.3\nQ. 8 And\nwhich\nwould be\nbest for you\npersonally,\nfor interest\nrates to…\nGo up\n11\n13.9\n12.2\nGo down\n67.599999999999994 75.2\n68.4000000000\nMake no\ndifference\n9.1\n10.4\n17.3\nNo idea\n8.9\n0\n2.1\nQ. 9 How\nstrongly do\nyou agree\nwith the\nfollowing\nstatements?\na) A rise in\ninterest\nrates would\nmake prices\nin the street\nrise more\nslowly in\nthe short\nterm - say a\nmonth or\ntwo\nAgree\nstrongly\n21.3\n23.8\n18.8\nAgree\n32.200000000000003 33.6\n32.5\nNeither\nagree nor\ndisagree\n12.8\n11.7\n15.3\nDisagree\n13.8\n14.1\n14.5\nDisagree\nstrongly\n7.2\n6.2\n5.2\nDon't know\n12.1\n10.5\n13.8\nTotal agree\n53.5\n57.400000000000006 51.3\nTotal\ndisagree\n21\n20.3\n19.7\nNet agree\n32.5\n37.100000000000009 31.5999999999\nb) A rise in\ninterest\nrates would\nmake prices\nin the street\nrise more\nslowly in\nthe medium\nterm - say a\nyear or two\nAgree\nstrongly\n14.8\n17.100000000000001 11.7\nAgree\n32.5\n34.799999999999997 32.9\nNeither\nagree nor\ndisagree\n14.1\n12.3\n16.3999999999\nDisagree\n15.2\n17.8\n15.8\nDisagree\nstrongly\n8.5\n5.3\n8.4\nDon't know\n6.7\n12.4\n14.9\nTotal agree\n47.3\n51.9\n44.5999999999\nTotal\ndisagree\n23.7\n23.1\n24.2000000000\nNet agree\n23.599999999999998 28.799999999999997 20.3999999999\nQ. 10 If a\nchoice had\nto be made,\neither to\nraise\ninterest\nrates to try\nto keep\ninflation\ndown; or\nkeep\ninterest\nrates down\nand allow\nprices in the\nshops to\nrise faster,\nwhich\nwould you\nprefer ?\nInterest\nrates to rise\n48.2\n50.8\n52.7\nPrices to\nrise faster\n14.1\n14.8\n15.9\nNo idea\n36.799999999999997 34.1\n31.3\nQ. 11 Every\nother\nmonth, a\ngroup of\npeople meet\nto set\nNigeria's\nbasic\ninterest rate\nlevel. Do\nyou know\nwhat this\ngroup is?\nMonetary\nPolicy\nCommittee\n55.9\n59.5\n61.2\nThe\nGovernment\n9.4\n7\n7\nFederal\nMinistry of\nFinance\n8.6999999999999993 10.5\n9.5\nNational\nAssembly\n4\n2.4\n3.2\nOthers\n1.2\n1\n2\nDon't know\n20\n19.2\n17\nQ. 12\nWhich of\nthese\ngroups do\nyou think\nsets the\ninterest\nrates?\nGovernment\nministers\n3.1\n2.4\n4.3\nCivil\nservants\n2.8\n1.8\n2.4\nCBN\n76.900000000000006 82.3\n77.5\nOther banks 3.4\n3.5\n4.5\nNo idea\n13.1\n9.8000000000000007 11.2\nQ. 13 In\nfact, the\ndecisions\nare taken by\nthe\nMonetary\nPolicy\nCommittee\nof the\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria.\nWhich of\nthese do\nyou think\nbest\ndescribes\nthe\nMonetary\nPolicy\nCommittee?\nPart of the\nGovernment\n26.3\n22.3\n16.8999999999\nA Body\nwholly\nowned\nappointed\nby the\nGovernment\n27.2\n33.6\n42.4\nAn\nindependent\nbody, partly\nappointed\nby the\nGovernment\n20\n19.8\n21.3\nA\ncompletely\nindependent\nbody partly\nappointed\nby the\nGovernment\n6.8\n6.2\n5.2\nNo idea\n18.3\n17.5\n14.2\nQ. 14\nOverall,\nhow\nsatisfied or\ndissatisfied\nare you\nwith the\nway the\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nis doing its\njob to set\ninterest\nrates in\norder to\ncontrol\ninflation?\nVery\nsatisfied\n20.2\n27.1\n21.4\nFairly\nsatisfied\n44.6\n44.6\n41.6\nNeither\nsatisfied nor\ndissatisfied\n12.4\n12.3\n17.6000000000\nVery\ndissatisfied\n12.8\n8.4\n8.6\nNo idea\n9.1999999999999993 7.1\n8.69999999999\nTotal\nsatisfied\n64.8\n71.7\n63\nTotal\ndissatisfied\n12.8\n8.4\n8.6\nNet satisfied 52\n63.300000000000004 54.4\nSource:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/Annual_Reports/2011 Statistical Bulletin Statistical Expectations Survey.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "96ce0725f76552f5d08799c06437000f", "text": "Central Bank of Nigeria Communiqué No. 74 of the Monetary Policy Committee \nMeeting, January 24-25, 2011 \n \n \nThe Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) met on the 24th and 25th January, 2011 \nto review domestic and international economic and financial developments in \n2010 and the challenges facing the Nigerian economy in the year ahead. \n \nOn the global scene, the Committee noted the divergence in the economic \nperformance of advanced and emerging economies in 2010. Economic \nuncertainties contributed to the weak recovery in advanced economies. As a \nresult, growth was sluggish and concerns about inflation were dominant on \naccount of the rising oil and commodity prices in the international markets and \nfears of fiscal stress in the years ahead. On the other hand, robust economic \ngrowth was recorded in emerging markets based essentially on strong domestic \ndemand which offset weak export demand. Financial market conditions in \nadvanced economies were, however, more stable than in the preceding two \nyears while some emerging economies were confronted with challenges posed \nby large volatile capital inflows . \n \nWith regard to the domestic economy, the Committee noted with satisfaction \nthe impressive economic growth, the continuing recovery of the capital market \nand the progress made towards restoring stability in the banking sector. It, \nhowever, observed that inflation had continued to be relatively high and \nreiterated the need for it to be reined in and for Government to further \nstrengthen and deepen economic and structural reforms. \n \nKey Domestic Macroeconomic and Financial Developments \nDomestic Output \nThe Committee noted the sustained output growth recorded in 2010. Provisional \ndata from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) indicated that real Gross \nDomestic Product (GDP) grew by 8.29 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2010, up \nfrom 7.86 per cent recorded in the third quarter. The overall GDP growth for 2010 \nwas estimated to be 7.85 per cent, compared to the revised growth rate of 6.96 \nper cent recorded in 2009. The non-oil sector remained the major driver of \noverall growth, with agriculture, wholesale and retail trade, and services \ncontributing 2.39, 2.04 and 2.08 per cent, respectively. The outlook for 2011 is \nprojected to be generally favourable in view of the continued improvement in \n \n \n2 \n \nthe international oil market and emphasis on the development of the non-oil \nsector. \n \nDomestic Prices \nThe year-on-year headline inflation, as measured by the percentage change in \nthe all-items consumer price index (CPI, November 2009=100), trended \ndownwards during most periods of 2010. It declined to 11.8 per cent in \nDecember 2010 from 13.6 per cent in September. Similarly, core inflation \ndeclined to 10.9 per cent in December 2010 from 12.8 per cent in September. \nFood inflation also, dropped to 12.7 per cent in December 2010, from 14.6 per \ncent recorded in September. \nThe Committee noted that although inflation has been trending downwards, the \nsingle digit benchmark was not achieved in 2010, despite the relatively good \nharvest, improved supply of petroleum products and lower growth in monetary \naggregates. This, according to the Committee underscores the need to address \nboth supply and demand side factors that determine inflation dynamics in \nNigeria. One of the ways to keep aggregate demand in check is to restrain \ndebt-financed government spending in the medium-term. This calls for a review \nof subsidies and other recurrent expenditure categories that constitute a drain \non the national budget as well as improving the revenue base. However, the \nCommittee commended the government for recognizing the existence of these \nissues in the 2011 budget proposal especially the reduction in the proposed level \nof total spending. Although there has been a strong emphasis on capital \nexpenditure and infrastructure development, the Committee noted that \nrecurrent expenditure remained high at over 70 per cent of the total budget. \nFor this reason, the MPC believes that the risk to price stability posed by fiscal \noperations will need to be constantly monitored if inflation is to be brought \ndown to single digit levels in the short to medium term. However, the Committee \nnoted that the general thrust of fiscal policy pronouncements is in the desired \ndirection. \n \nMonetary, Credit and Financial Market Developments \nProvisional data showed that the growth in broad measure of money supply \n(M2) was generally below the indicative benchmark throughout 2010 when \ncompared with the level at end-December 2009. Specifically, at end-December \n \n \n3 \n \n2010, M2 growth was 6.70 per cent compared with the indicative benchmark of \n29 per cent for 2010. \n \nAvailable data indicated that growth in aggregate credit to the domestic \neconomy (net) was similarly sluggish at 6.13 per cent in December 2010 \ncompared with 59.6 per cent recorded in the corresponding period of 2009. This \ndevelopment is connected to the damaged balance sheets of the DMBs in the \nwake of the global financial and economic crises. However, aggregate credit \nto the Federal, as well as State and local governments grew by 67.83 per cent \nand 19.17 per cent, respectively, in 2010. Credit to the private sector contracted \nby 4.92 per cent in contrast to the indicative benchmark growth of 31.54 per \ncent for 2010. However, this outcome would need to be considered in the \ncontext of the purchase of non-performing loans with face value of over N 2 \ntrillion from the DMBs by the Asset Management Company of Nigeria (AMCON) \nin 2010. These loans were purchased at a discount and paid for by AMCON-\nissued zero-coupon bonds. Adjusting for this factor, growth in credit to the \nprivate sector would appear to be positive, since the loans were transferred to \nthe balance sheet of AMCON. The growth in credit to the three tiers of \ngovernment against the backdrop of the decline in private sector credit is a \nreflection of the fact that government borrowing had to some extent crowded \nout private sector credit. \n \nDevelopments in retail market interest rates indicated that the retail lending \nrates remained relatively high in 2010. The average maximum lending rate \ndeclined from 23.18 per cent in January 2010 to 21.86 per cent in December \n2010. The average prime lending rate also declined consistently from 18.38 per \ncent in January to 15.74 per cent in December 2010. \n \nInter-bank and OBB rates moderated to 8.06 and 6.86 per cent respectively in \nDecember 2010. The weighted average savings rate declined consistently from \n3.33 per cent in January 2010 to 1.51 per cent in December 2010. The \nconsolidated deposit rate initially declined from 6.13 per cent in January to 2.07 \nper cent in September, 2010 but rose marginally to 2.24 per cent in December \n \n \n4 \n \n2010. Thus, the spread between the average maximum lending rate and the \nconsolidated deposit rate widened from 17.05 percentage points in January to \n19.76 percentage points in December 2010. The Committee noted with \nconcern the extremely low returns paid to savers and depositors as this poses a \nmajor dis-intermediation risk and is inconsistent with developmental goals of \nfinancial inclusion. \n \nThe domestic capital market recorded significant recovery in 2010, after the \ndecline associated with the global financial and economic crises in 2008/2009. \nThe All-Share Index (ASI) rose from 20,827.17 points as at end-December 2009 to \n24, 770.52 points as at end-December 2010, representing a growth of 18.93 per \ncent. Market Capitalization (MC) rose from N4.98 trillion as at end-December \n2009 to N7.91 trillion as at end-December 2010, representing a growth of 58.83 \nper cent. For the fourth quarter of 2010, the All-Share Index (ASI) increased by \n7.5 per cent from 23,050.59 to 24,770.52 at end-December 2010 while Market \nCapitalization (MC) increased by 40.1 per cent from N5.65 trillion to N7.91 trillion. \nHowever, the number of deals, volume and value of shares traded declined as \nat December. The increase in ASI and MC was partly due to share price \nrecoveries in the Banking, Food/Beverage, Insurance and Oil & Gas sectors. \nNonetheless, the recovery process needs to be sustained through further \nstrengthening of macroeconomic and structural reforms. The Committee noted \nthe major role being played by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) \nin reforming and improving governance processes in the NSE and encouraged \nthe SEC to continue as this is necessary for restoring confidence in the Nigerian \nfinancial system. \n \nExternal Sector Developments \nThe foreign exchange market remained relatively stable. Between end-2009 \nand end-2010, the Naira/Dollar exchange rate depreciated by N1.08 or 0.72 per \ncent, to N150.66/US$ from N149.58 /US$ at end-2009, as against 15.65 per cent \ndepreciation recorded at the end of 2009. The average premium between the \nCBN transaction rate and the BDC’s as at end-2010, was 1.83 per cent, \ncompared with 8.58 per cent in 2009. \n \n \n \n5 \n \n \nThe Committee reaffirmed its conviction that a stable exchange rate regime is \ncritical to maintaining price stability but noted that in the absence of \ncomplementary policies the regime is only sustainable at the cost of significant \nattrition in foreign reserves. The MPC, therefore, continues to emphasize that the \nsolution to reserve depletion lies in the implementation of appropriate reforms \nwith regard to industrial and trade policies aimed at reducing import-\ndependence, which are beyond the scope of monetary policy. Substantial \nforeign exchange is expended annually on JVC Cash calls and importation of \npetroleum products due to the delay in implementing much needed reforms in \nthe oil sector. This is in addition to the huge amounts spent on petroleum \nsubsidies which are likely to increase with higher oil prices. The country is also \nexpending foreign exchange on import of food items such as rice whereas what \nis needed is the implementation of policies that will lead to food security and \ntotal self sufficiency. The Committee noted that external reserves stood at \nUS$32.32 billion as at end-December 2010. It, however, rose to US$33,26 billion as \nat 20th January 2011. \n \nIn the Committee’s view, implementation of these reforms along with the \nimproved outlook for oil price and output should go a long way in reversing the \nnegative trend in our foreign reserves position. \n \nThe Committee’s Considerations \nThe considerations of the MPC following from the above review suggest that \nwhile the general outlook on growth is highly favourable, it is important to be \nvigilant on prices and financial market developments. The likelihood of \nimproved oil output and rising oil prices in the international market, would \ncontribute to growth and help rebuild external reserves which is vital to sustain \nconsumer and investor confidence in the economy. \n \nThe Committee noted that the risk of inflation is on the upward side as a result of \nthe liquidity injections from the likely increase in government spending in the run \nup to the April 2011 elections, and AMCON purchases, as well as rising global \nenergy and food prices and the expected pass-through to the domestic \neconomy. It noted that the existing subsidy regime on petroleum products is not \nsustainable in view of government’s current finances. In view of these factors, \n \n \n6 \n \nthe Committee noted, that inflation remains a major concern that cannot be \nignored in the short- to medium-term. \n \nThe MPC also noted with serious concern the existing low rates of about 1.0 \npercent paid on savings deposits and its implications for financial intermediation \nand the mobilization of long-term funds which is critical for enhancing \ninvestment in real sector economic activities, and hence, economic growth. \nThe Committee felt that in preparation for the removal of the CBN guarantee of \ninter-bank market, banks need to provide reasonable incentives for the \nmobilization of savings for growth and financial inclusion. The Committee, \nhowever, stated its commitment to continue to monitor developments with a \nview to coming up with appropriate measures to address the issue. \n \nWith regard to external reserves, the Committee observed that the fundamental \nstructural problem of the country as an import-dependent economy was largely \nresponsible for the continuing depletion of the external reserves. The continuing \ndecline in reserves was accounted for by the payment for JVC cash calls, \namounting to US$6,867 million and US$5,657 million in 2009, funding of the \nforeign exchange market to the tune of US$24,835.65 million as against \nUS$25,070 million in 2009 in the case of WDAS. Sales to BDCs amounting to \nUS$5,337 million in 2010 compared with US$4,734 million in 2009, in addition to \nthe payment of subsidies on petroleum product as well as other government \nexternal payment obligations. The Committee stressed that a significant portion \nof the foreign exchange outflow will be stemmed with the Petroleum Industry Bill \nbecause JVC Cash Calls alone accounted for a large proportion of the total net \noutflow in 2010. The Committee observed that if exchange rate had not been \nmanaged in a stable manner, inflation would not have moderated. The policy \nthrust on exchange rate stability is informed by the overwhelming impact of \nexchange rate pass-through on inflation, given the import-dependent nature of \nthe economy. \n \nThe MPC identified the greatest challenge facing the economy as the lack of \nflow of credit to the critical sectors, and the consequent need to unlock the flow \nof credit for critical investments in agriculture, SMEs and manufacturing sectors. \nTo achieve this, government would need to create the right policy and \nregulatory environment, including the sustained fight against corruption, \n \n \n7 \n \nstrengthening of transparency and institutions, as well as implementing critical \nreforms. On its part, the CBN will continue to engage banks and take the lead in \nprogrammes and interventions to channel credit to the real economy. To this \nend, the Committee noted the initiatives being pursued by the Bankers’ \nCommittee and urged speedy implementation. \n \nThe Committee further stated that the economy is affected not only by \nmonetary and fiscal policy measures but also by political risk and concerns \nabout national security which affect investors’ confidence in the economy. In \nthis regard, the Committee stressed the need to pay greater attention to the \nissue of security and how to manage uncertainty in the political environment. \n \nMPC Decisions \nIn the light of the above considerations, the Committee committed to \nmaintaining price stability by pursuing the current policy thrust of monetary \ntightening in view of the perceived inflation risks in the near term. The \nCommittee took the decision to further tighten monetary policy. This was a \ndecision taken by a majority of 11:1. The following measures were approved: \n \n1. Raise the MPR by 25 basis points from 6.25 per cent to 6.50 per cent with \nimmediate effect (a majority vote of 11:1); \n2. Maintain the symmetric corridor of +/- 200 basis points by 7-5; 4 members \nvoted for asymmetric corridor by 50 basis points increase in Standing \nDeposit Facility rate; \n3. Raise the Cash Reserve Requirement (CRR) Ratio by 100 basis points from \n1.00 per cent to 2.00 per cent with effect from February 1, 2011 with a \nmajority vote of 11:1; and \n4. With effect from March 1, 2011, raise the Liquidity Ratio (LR) by 500 basis \npoints from 25.00 per cent to 30.00 per cent with a majority vote of 11:1. \n \n \nSanusi Lamido Sanusi \nGovernor, \nCentral Bank of Nigeria \nAbuja \nJanuary 25, 2011", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/cbn communique no. 74 of the mpc meeting of january 24 - 25,  2011.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "f17155444b007697d85ec04ca2052231", "text": "1 \n \n \n \n \n \nCentral Bank of Nigeria Communique No 108 of the Monetary Policy \nCommittee Meeting of Monday and Tuesday 25th and 26th July 2016 \nThe Monetary Policy Committee met on 25th and 26th July 2016 against the backdrop of \nfragile global and domestic economic and financial conditions. The Committee \nevaluated the global and domestic macroeconomic and financial developments in the \nfirst six months of 2016 and the outlook for the rest of the year. In attendance were 8 \nmembers. \nInternational Economic Developments \nThe Committee noted the continued sluggish growth in global output, being \nunderpinned by weak demand and slowing productivity. In addition to existing risks, \nrising debt levels in the Emerging Market Economies (EMEs), volatile financial markets \nand the vote of the United Kingdom to exit the European Union “BREXIT” have \nlessened the prospects for a more prosperous global economy in 2016. Consequently, \nthe International Monetary Fund (IMF), in July 2016, further downgraded its baseline \nforecast for global growth to 3.1 per cent from 3.2 in April. The Organisation of \nEconomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) forecast for global output in 2016 is \neven less optimistic at 3.0 per cent. Slower global growth prospects is traced to weak \ntrade, sluggish investment, protracted weak aggregate demand and low commodity \n2 \n \nprices; which have translated to output declines in the Emerging Market and Developing \nEconomies (EMDEs). The Brexit vote has created widespread uncertainty and elevated \nvolatility in the global financial markets. \n \nThe United States (US) economy grew by 0.8 per cent in Q1 of 2016, though, much \nlower than the 1.4 per cent growth recorded in the last quarter of 2015. The tapered \ngrowth was attributed to the goods sector which continues to struggle under the weight \nof declining factory activity; the hitherto resilient service sector is now losing steam while \ntrade remains under pressure from a strong dollar and weak domestic demand. \n \nThe Japan economy grew at an annualized rate of 1.7 per cent in Q1 of 2016, a \nreversal of the negative growth recorded in Q4 of 2015. The Bank of Japan (BoJ) at its \n15th-16th July meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee, maintained its monthly asset \npurchase at ¥6.7 trillion (US$63.93 billion), leaving the policy rate also unchanged at \nnegative 0.1 per cent. \n \nThe Euro Area grew by 0.6 per cent in first quarter, 2016, up from 0.3 per cent, \nrecorded in fourth quarter of 2015. Downside risks to the growth outlook have, however, \nrisen following the Brexit vote. The Governing Council of the European Central Bank \n(ECB), at its meeting of July 21st, 2016, retained its key interest rates on the main \nrefinancing operations, the marginal lending facility and the deposit facility at 0.00, 0.25 \nand -0.40 per cent, respectively, with the expectation that they would remain at present \n3 \n \nor lower levels for an extended period of time. The ECB also sustained its monthly asset \npurchases of €80 billion (US$87.91) until March 2017, with possibility of extension. \n \nIn anticipation of and to mitigate the impact of the Brexit vote, the Bank of England \n(BoE) voted to continue its ₤375 billion (US$495 billion) monthly assets purchase \nprogram, financed through the issuance of reserves and possible increase in the \nquantum should the need arise. The Bank also retained its policy rate at 0.5 per cent, \nwith a commitment to stimulate inflationary growth towards its 2.0 per cent long run \npath. The Bank also hinted at a possible further easing of monetary policy in August, \n2016. \n \nMajor EMDEs continued to face declining capital inflows, rising financing costs and \ngeo-political tensions, all of which pose constrain to growth. Depressed commodity \nprices continued to tilt the balance of risk towards the downside, thus, dampening \nprospects for near term economic and financial recovery in the EMDEs. Consequently, \nthe IMF (WEO July 2016 Update) downgraded the 2016 growth forecast for this group \nof countries to 4.1 from 4.3 per cent in the April projection. \n \nIn July, oil and other commodity prices rallied against the backdrop of better-than-\nexpected economic data on China in the second quarter, sustained attacks on oil \nproduction facilities in Nigeria, and continued unrest in Libya. Nonetheless, global \ninflation remained subdued despite widespread easing of monetary policy. In the \nadvanced economies, recent developments such as BREXIT has increased the \n4 \n \nuncertainty surrounding the future of the Euro zone thus further weakening demand and \nsuppressing inflation. Consequently, while the stance of monetary policy in most \nadvanced economies is expected to remain accomodative through fiscal 2016 in the \nEMDEs, it is expected to remain mixed, reflecting diversity and multiplicity of shocks \nconfronting them. \n \nDomestic Economic and Financial Developments \nOutput \nThe Nigerian economy is still saddled with the effects of the shocks of the first quarter of \n2016; which led to a contraction in output arising from energy shortages, high electricity \ntariffs, price hikes, scarcity of foreign exchange and depressed consumer demand, \namong others. Whereas the influence and persistence of some of the factors waned in \nthe second quarter, it is unlikely that the economy rebounded strongly in the quarter as \nsetbacks in the energy sector continued owing mainly to vandalism of oil installations. In \naddition, the implementation of the 2016 budget in the second quarter remained slower \nthan expected in the second quarter. The Committee noted that most of the conditions \nundermining domestic output growth were outside the direct purview of monetary policy. \nIt nonetheless, hopes that the deregulation in the downstream petroleum sector and the \nliberalization of the foreign exchange market would help bring about the much needed \nrelief to the economy. \nData from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) indicate that domestic output in the \nfirst quarter of 2016 contracted by 0.36 per cent, the first negative growth in many \n5 \n \nyears. This represented a decline of 2.47 percentage points in output from the 2.11 per \ncent reported in the fourth quarter of 2015, and 4.32 percentage point lower than the \n3.96 per cent recorded in the corresponding period of 2015. Aggregate output \ncontracted in virtually all sectors of the economy, with the non-oil sector recording a \ndecline of about 0.18 per cent, compared with the 3.14 per cent expansion in the \npreceding quarter. Agriculture and Trade were the only sectors with positive growth at \n0.68 per cent and 0.40 per cent, respectively, Industry, Construction and Services \ncontracted by 0.93, 0.26 and 0.08 percentage point, respectively. \n \nPrices \nThe Committee noted a further rise in year-on-year headline inflation to 16.48 per cent \nin June 2016, from 15.58 per cent in May; 13.72 per cent in April, 12.77 per cent in \nMarch and 11.38 per cent in February 2016. The increase in headline inflation in June \nreflected increases in both food and core components of inflation. Core inflation rose \nsharply for the fourth time in a row to 16.22 per cent in June, from 15.05 per cent in \nMay; 13.35 per cent in April; 12.17 per cent in March; 11.00 per cent in February and \n8.80 per cent in January having stayed at 8.70 per cent for three consecutive months \nthrough December, 2015. Food inflation also rose to 15.30 per cent in June, from 14.86 \nper cent in May; 13.19 per cent in April; 12.74 per cent in March; 11.35 per cent in \nFebruary, 10.64 per cent in January and 10.59 per cent in December, 2015. The rising \ninflationary pressure was largely a reflection of structural factors, including high cost of \nelectricity, high transport cost, high cost of inputs, low industrial activities as well as \nhigher prices of both domestic and imported food products. \n6 \n \nThe MPC expressed strong support for the urgent diversification of the economy away \nfrom oil to manufacturing, agriculture and services; and called on all stakeholders to \nincrease investment in growth stimulating and high employment elasticity sectors of the \neconomy in order to lift the economy out of its current phase. \nMonetary, Credit and Financial Markets Developments \nBroad money supply (M2) grew by 8.26 per cent in June, 2016, a 4.80 percentage \npoints increase from 3.46 per cent in May compared with the 0.54 per cent contraction \nin June 2015. When annualized, M2 grew by 16.52 per cent in June 2016 against the \nprovisional growth benchmark of 10.98 per cent for 2016. Net domestic credit (NDC) \ngrew by 12.52 per cent in the same period and annualized at 25.04 per cent. At this \nrate, the growth rate of NDC exceeded the provisional benchmark of 17.94 per cent for \n2016. There was no change in the level of banking sector net credit to government in \nJune, contrasting the 31.45 per cent growth in May. Credit to the private sector grew by \n14.45 per cent in June 2016, which annualizes to a growth of 28.90 per cent, \noutperforming the benchmark growth of 13.38 per cent for the year. The MPC \nexpressed cautious satisfaction over the improved performance of credit to the private \nsector and urged the Bank to ensure that the tempo is sustained inorder to stimulate \nrecovery of output growth. \nThe MPC noted that the level of money market interest rates largely reflected the \nliquidity situation in the banking system during the review period. Average inter-bank \ncall rate, which stood at 20.0 per cent on 17th June 2016, closed at 50.0 per cent on \nJuly 15, 2016. The increase was attributed in part; to the newly introduced foreign \n7 \n \nexchange framework and the mop up of naira liquidity due to increased sale of foreign \nexchange by the CBN during the period. Generally, the period under review witnessed a \ndecline in volume of activity in the inter-bank market owing to injections by FAAC and \nmaturity of some CBN securities. \nThe MPC also noted the decline in the indices of the equities segment of the capital \nmarket. The All-Share Index (ASI) declined by 6.55 per cent from 29,597.79 on June 30, \n2016, to 27,659.44 on July 22, 2016. Similarly, Market Capitalization (MC) declined by \n6.26 per cent from N10.17 trillion to N9.50 trillion during the same period. Relative to \nend-December 2015, the indices fell by 3.43 per cent and 3.55 per cent, respectively. \nGlobally, however, the equities markets remained generally bearish, in the aftermath of \nthe Brexit vote. \n \nExternal Sector Developments \nThe MPC noted the actions taken by the Bank as part of the implementation of the \nflexible foreign exchange regime decided at its meeting in May which was designed to \nimprove liquidity and stabilize the foreign exchange market. The Bank introduced a \nflexible exchange rate regime in the inter-bank market; introduced a Naira-settled OTC-\nFMDQ-OTC trading platform, adopted two-way quote trading platform at the inter-bank \nforeign exchange market and appointed foreign exchange primary dealers. \nHowever, the average naira exchange rate weakened at the inter-bank segment of the \nforeign exchange market during the review period following the liberalization of the \nmarket. The exchange rate at the interbank market opened at N197.00/US$ and closed \nat N292.90/US$, with a daily average of N244.95/US$ between May 25 and July 19, \n8 \n \n2016. The initial weakness was attributable to the normal market reaction to a new \nregulatory reform. The MPC reaffirmed its commitment to its statutory mandate of \nachieving a stable naira exchange rate. \n \nThe MPC’s Considerations \nThe MPC recognized the weak macroeconomic environment, as reflected particularly in \nincreasing inflationary pressure and contraction in real output growth. In view of this, the \nMPC underscored the imperative of coordinated action, anchored by fiscal policy, to \ninitiate recovery at the earliest time. Members called on the Federal Government to \nfast-track the implementation of the 2016 budget in order to stimulate economic activity \nto bridge the output gap and create employment. In the same vein, the MPC expressed \nconcern over the non-payment of salaries in some states and urged express action in \nthat direction to help stimulate aggregate demand. On its part, and as a complementary \nmeasure, the MPC restated its commitment to measures and deployment of relevant \ninstruments within its purview to complement fiscal policy with a view to restarting \ngrowth. The Committee also enjoined deposit money banks (DMBs) to partner with \nGovernment and the Bank in this direction, by redirecting credit from low employment \ngenerating sectors to those capable of supporting growth, reducing unemployment and \nimproving citizen standards of living. \n \nMembers agreed that the economy was passing through a difficult phase, dealing with \ncritical supply gaps and underscored the imperative of carefully navigating the policy \nspace in order to engender growth and ensure price stability. The MPC therefore, \n9 \n \nsummarized the two policy options it was confronted with as restarting growth or fighting \ninflation. The MPC was particularly concerned that headline inflation spiked significantly \nin June 2016, approaching twice the size of the upper limit of the policy reference band. \nThe Committee noted that inflation had risen significantly, eroding real purchasing \npower of fixed income earners and dragging growth. The MPC was further concerned \nthat while the situation called for obvious tightening of the monetary policy stance, the \nrecession confronting the economy and the prospects of negative growth to year-end \nneeded to be factored into the policy parameters. \nThe arguments in favour of growth were anchored on the premise that the current \ninflationary episode was largely structural. In particular, members noted the prominent \nrole of cost factors arising from reform of the energy sector, leading to higher domestic \nfuel prices and electricity tariffs and prolonged foreign exchange shortages arising from \nfalling oil prices leading to higher inputs costs, domestic fuel shortages, increased \ntransportation costs, security challenges, reform of the foreign exchange market \nreflected in high exchange rate pass-through to domestic prices of imports. \nConsequently, the current episode of inflation, being largely non-monetary but largely \nstructural, tightening at this point would only serve to worsen prospects for growth \nrecovery as the Bank had in June 2016, withdrawn substantial domestic liquidity \nthrough the foreign exchange market upon introduction of the flexible foreign exchange \nmarket regime. Members however, noted the negative effect of inflation on consumption \nand investment decisions and its defining impact on the efficiency of resource allocation \nand investment. \n10 \n \nThe MPC further noted the prolonged non-payment of salaries, a development which \nhas affected aggregate demand and worsened growth prospects. It also noted that at \nthe May MPC meeting, members weighed the risks of the balance of probabilities \nagainst growth and voted to hold, allowing fiscal policy some space to stimulate output \nwith injections, but this has been long in coming. \nThe MPC in putting forward for tightening considered the high inflationary trend which \nhas culminated into negative real interest rates in the economy; noting that this was \ndiscouraging to savings. Members also noted that the negative real interest rates did \nnot support the recent flexible foreign exchange market as foreign investors attitude had \nremained lukewarm, showing unwillingness in bringing in new capital under the \ncircumstance. Members further noted that there existed a substantial amount of \ninternational capital in negative yielding investments globally and Nigeria stood a \nchance of attracting such investments with sound macroeconomic policies. \nConsequently, members were of the view that an upward adjustment in interest rates \nwould strongly signal not only the Bank‟s commitment to price stability but also its desire \nto gradually achieve positive real interest rates. Such a decision, it was argued, gives \nimpetus for improving the liquidity of the foreign exchange market and the urgent need \nto deepen the market to ensure self-sustainability. Members were of the opinion that \nthis would boost manufacturing and industrial output, thereby stimulating growth which \nis desired at this time. \n \nThe Committee’s Decisions \n11 \n \nThe MPC, recognizing that the Bank lacked the instruments required to directly \njumpstart growth, and being mindful not to calibrate its instruments in such a manner as \nto undermine its primary mandate and financial system stability, in assessment of the \nrelevant issues, was of the view that the balance of risks remains tilted against price \nstability. Consequently, five (5) members voted to raise the Monetary Policy Rate while \nthree (3) voted to hold. \n \nIn summary, the MPC voted to: \n(i) Increase the MPR by 200 basis points from 12.00 to 14 per cent; \n(ii) Retain the CRR at 22.50 per cent; \n(iii) \nRetain the Liquidity Ratio at 30.00 per cent; and \n(iv) \nRetain the Asymmetric Window at +200 and -500 basis points around the \nMPR \n \nThank you for listening. \n \nGodwin I. Emefiele \nGovernor, Central Bank of Nigeria \n26th July 2016 \n \n \n \n \n12 \n \nPERSONAL STATEMENTS BY MEMBERS OF THE MONETARY POLICY \nCOMMITTEE \n \n1.0 \nADELABU, ADEBAYO \nThe lingering challenges in both the global and domestic economies have not shown \nsigns of waning, rather new issues seem to be unfolding which, invariably, have \ncomplicated the fragility of the macroeconomic conditions. A number of new issues in \nthe global economy such as the shocking Brexit vote, the rising wave of terrorism \nparticularly in the US and Europe, the wobbling recovery as well as the volatile financial \nmarkets conditions in the Euro zone, and the palpable uncertainty regarding the \nforthcoming general election in the US are part of unanticipated developments that have \nimpacted on domestic macroeconomic conditions. Within the domestic economy, issues \nsuch as the adjustment in the exchange rate, negative shock to oil output arising from \nresurgence of militancy in the Niger Delta areas, prolonged lag effects of adjustment in \nfuel and electricity tariffs are all parts of the major phenomenon that have pushed key \nmacroeconomic indicators out of the comfort zone. Key macroeconomic indicators have \ntherefore not only displayed lackluster performance but the challenge of stagflation is \nnow real, more than ever before. Apart from the twin challenges of output contraction \nand inflation, the pressure in the FX market has not eased even when the exchange \nrate has shown sharp adjustment. Against the perspective of these multi-dimensional \nchallenges therefore, it is exceedingly clear that monetary policy cannot address all of \nthe issues simultaneously thus requiring optimal-mix of policies. \n13 \n \nI have argued severally in my previous statements on the imperative of far reaching \nstructural reforms in our quest to provide a stable macroeconomic environment, and I \nwould like to stress that emerging issues on daily basis continue to reinforce my \nconviction. The main challenges confronting the macroeconomy at this period could be \nbroadly dimensioned along four lines: contraction in output; rising price level; exchange \nrate pressure; and high lending rate. I am of the view that the underlying drivers of all \nthese issues reside largely in the real side of the economy rather than the monetary \nside. With regard to inflation for instance, it is well known that there is a partial \nsuppression in aggregate demand on the backlash of default in wages and salaries by \nmany sub-national governments, thus the likelihood of inflation being driven by excess \ndemand is out of place. Available statistics revealed that the increase in headline \ninflation in the first half of the year was largely driven by imported food inflation which \nincreased by 20.0 percent in June 2016. A most worrisome dimension is that imported \nfood price, unlike other items, did not only show an uptick on year-on-year basis but the \nupward trend was also observed on month-on-month basis, suggesting a low likelihood \nof moderation in the near term. It is equally disturbing to note that the items that \naccounted for the significant uptick in imported food inflation during the period included \nrice, bread, cake, frozen fish, and edible oils. The reason for the upward adjustment in \nthe prices of these items was mainly due to exchange rate pass-through as commodity \nprices are easing in the global market. \n With the adoption of the flexible exchange rate model at the last meeting, it is \nenvisaged that real equilibrium would soon be attained in the FX markets and thereby \nminimize incessant adjustments in domestic price on the heels of swings in the \n14 \n \nexchange rate. In as much as this is a realistic projection, it is however, necessary to \nrecognize that sustainability of the exchange rate, among others, is a function of terms \nof trade of a country‟s export commodities in the international market. The price of crude \noil, the country‟s main export, has been severely hit by negative shock since mid-2014 \nwhile the prospects of improvement in the medium term is highly diminished in light of \nseveral factors like the slow recovery in the global economy and persistence of supply \nglut. Besides, developments in the global financial markets also pose considerable risks \nto the medium path of the domestic currency. With Brexit and the attendant softening of \npound sterling, portfolio investors, particularly in the Euro zone, now place much \npremium on security rather than returns, which has naturally shifted investors‟ sentiment \nto dollar denominated assets. In addition, the evolving monetary policy stance of the US \nFederal Reserves would much likely weigh on the currencies of emerging economies. \nThe singular reason why the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) did not hike its \npolicy rate at the last meeting in June was because inflation was still running below the \ntarget of 2 percent as labor market had sufficiently strengthened. In the view of the \nCommittee, the underlying currents for the softness in consumer price were transitory in \nnature and expected to dissipate soonest. The point here is that it is logical to expect \nthat the FOMC would soon hike interest rate with implication of further strengthening of \nthe US dollar against most currencies particularly currencies of emerging market \neconomies. In the light of all these issues, attempt to strengthening naira by increasing \npolicy rate with a view to attracting capital flow could be a desirable option, but the most \nenduring option to reducing addressing inflation, in my view, is to reduce the pass-\nthrough effect of exchange rate on domestic prices. \n15 \n \nA reliable way forward, therefore, to minimizing the impact of exchange rate pass-\nthrough on domestic prices is to drastically reduce the weight of imported food in the \naverage consumer‟s basket. In essence, my view is that further tightening of monetary \npolicy stance may not achieve the best result over the medium to long term. This \ninforms my concerns on the need to stimulate activities in the real sector particularly in \nagricultural value chain that could enhance domestic production of staples such as rice, \ncorns, meats and dairy products. Large scale farming in these products supported by \ngovernment incentives is one of the right strategic direction. On its part, the Bank should \nrejuvenate its various development financing schemes, most especially the NIRSAL. \nStructural reforms measures that enhances production would not only address the price \nconcern but it would equally address the contraction in output. \nAnother dimension of the current challenge is the contraction in output which emanates \nfrom both non-oil and oil sectors. Apart from the regular issues like infrastructural \nconstraint on the manufacturing sector, the decline in oil-GDP, in particular has price \nand output dimensions. Oil production hovered around 1.5mbd against the production \nquota of 2.2mbd during the first half of the year, resulting in a net production loss of \nabout 32 percent as a result of the resurgence of militancy in the Niger Delta. The point \nhere is that the underlying drivers of the current recession goes beyond monetary \nfactors, as there are significant issues that must be addressed by all stakeholders \nincluding the security agencies in order to produce an enduring solution. \nIn as much as most of the factors fuelling the current downward trend in output is \noutside the scope of monetary policy, issues bothering on appropriate monetary policy \n16 \n \nstance in a period of recession cannot be completely ruled out. One of the essential \nelements of a sound macroeconomic policy, including monetary policy, is the need to be \ncountercyclical with the business cycle. This was amply demonstrated by notable \ncentral banks like the Fed and ECB in the wake of the recent global economic and \nfinancial crisises. While I will subscribe to the fact that the issue of stagflation in our \npeculiar circumstance may not afford the monetary authority the latitude to significantly \nease monetary policy stance, I will equally averse to raising interest rate at this period \nas such is synonymous to procyclical monetary policy with potential effect of \naccelerating recessionary process. Increase in policy rates, on the basis of inflation \nconcerns, poses further upside risk to the stability of the banking system, among others. \nThe NPLs of the banking system have increased considerably in the last one year on \nthe backlash of slowdown of activities in virtually all sectors of the economy. Increase in \npolicy rates will, therefore, have either of these two impacts on the banking system; the \nbanks would most likely transfer the cost to the customers with implication of \nheightening the level of NPLs or the banks could absorb the cost but cut down on the \nlevel of lending. Either of these outcomes, therefore, is not desirable at this point in \ntime. \nIn my opinion therefore, the challenge may look a bit complicated but the most enduring \nsolution lies in working with necessary stakeholders to remove the binding structural \nconstraints in the real sector of the economy. From the monetary side, the most \ndesirable way to support the process of recovery is through easing of monetary policy \nstance, but in the light of concern for inflation as well as rising pressure on the \nexchange rate, I am of the view that the MPR should be reviewed upward . \n17 \n \nConsequently, I vote for an increase of 200 basis point in the MPR to 14 percent while \nCRR remains 22.5 percent and Liquidity ratio at 30%. Asymmetric window at +200/-500 \nbasis point around the MPR is also recommended. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n18 \n \n2.0 \nALADE, SARAH O \nThis is the first MPC meeting since the historic Brexit vote which has added additional \nrisks to global economic growth. The big concern is whether a retreat from financial risk \ndue to Brexit will disturb the existing fault lines in the world economy, notably in China \nand southern Europe, although the Bank of England have put in place some monetary \npolicy intervention measures to cushion these effects. These developments, coupled \nwith domestic economic environment have increased risks to the Nigerian economy. Oil \nprices remain low, even as militant activities in the Niger Delta are affecting output, \nputting undue pressure on the fiscal and external sectors and adversely affecting the \ndomestic economy. Headline inflation remains elevated at 16.48 percent in June up \nfrom 15.58 percent recorded in May, a further drift from the single digit goal of the \nCentral Bank. The growth for the second quarter of 2016 remains subdued even for the \nrest of the year. These developments call for balanced monetary policy measures to \nfight inflation and attract foreign investments to cushion the loss in foreign earnings from \noil. I will therefore support an increase in monetary policy rate. \n \nGlobal economic growth continue to be sluggish: Weak demand and slowing \nproductivity coupled with the vote of the United Kingdom to exit the European Union \n“BREXIT” is undermining global growth for 2016. In addition, the Brexit vote has created \nwidespread uncertainty and elevated volatility in the global financial markets. The \nInternational Monetary Fund‟s (IMF) World Economic Outlook (WEO) for July 2016 \ndowngraded its baseline forecast for global growth to 3.1 percent from 3.2 percent in the \nApril version. In the Emerging Market and Developing economies, weak aggregate \n19 \n \ndemand and low commodity prices have translated to output decline and resulting in \ndifficult economic and business environment. Depressed commodity prices continued \nto pose downside risk to growth in emerging markets, especially on commodity \nexporting countries, thus, dampening prospects for near term economic and financial \nrecovery in those economies. \n \nThe shocks experienced during the first quarter of the year are still affecting \nGross Domestic Product (GDP) growth negatively: Contraction in output which \nstarted in the first quarter due to energy shortages, high electricity tariffs, fuel price \nhikes, scarcity of foreign exchange and depressed consumer demand continued to \ndetermine growth outcomes in the second quarter. In addition, the implementation of the \n2016 budget in the second quarter remained slower than expected affecting the speed \nof economic activities at a time when fiscal policy is needed to complement the efforts of \nmonetary policy to spur growth. First quarter GDP growth stood at -0.36 percent \ncompared to a 2.11 percent expansion in the previous period and way below forecasts \nof 1.7 percent growth. It is the first contraction since the second quarter of 2004 as the \nnon-oil sector contracted, mainly due to a slowdown in the services sectors as a result \nof a weakening naira, while lower oil prices keep dragging the oil sector down. GDP \nAnnual Growth Rate in Nigeria averaged 4.12 percent from 1982 to 2016, reaching an \nall-time high of 19.17 percent in the fourth quarter of 2004 and a record low of -7.81 \npercent in the fourth quarter of 1983. The resuscitation of economic growth will require \nthe cooperation and collaboration of monetary and fiscal policy and delicate balancing \nof both global events and domestic risks in the coming months. In addition, policy \n20 \n \nmeasures targeted as expanding the revenue base such as improving tax \nadministration and broadening the tax base should be pursued vigorously to help lift \ndepressing consumer demand and increase growth. While an increase in tax rate might \nnot ordinarily be the best at this time, the fact that is declining calls for additional \nmeasures to increase government revenues and spending to lift the economy out of the \ncurrent crisis. In addition, efforts should be made in the area of concessional borrowing \nto finance infrastructure development and spur employment which will help increase \naggregate demand. \n \nHeadline inflation elevated even as foreign exchange supply remain limited. \nHeadline inflation further increased to 16.48 percent in June 2016, from 15.58 percent \nrecorded in May. The increase in headline inflation in June reflected increases in both \nfood and core components of inflation. Core inflation rose sharply for the fourth time in a \nrow to 16.22 per cent in June, from 15.05 per cent in May and 13.35 per cent in April. \nFood inflation also rose to 15.30 per cent in June, from 14.86 per cent in May and 13.19 \nper cent in April. The rising inflationary pressure was largely a reflection of structural \nfactors, including high electricity tariff, high transport cost as a result of higher fuel \nprices, high cost of inputs, low industrial activities as well as higher prices of both \ndomestic and imported food products. The persistent upsurge in inflation calls for \nmonetary policy intervention. High inflation causes lenders to demand higher fixed \ninterest rate on borrowing. It also hurts the poor since it erodes their purchasing power. \nHigh inflation is harmful to growth and Central Bank at this time can only support growth \nby keeping inflation low since it cannot increase aggregate demand by lowering interest \n21 \n \nrate. Thus fighting increasing inflation pressure by increasing MPR will also help to \nattract foreign inflows into the country to cushion the lost revenue from both lower oil \nprices and lower output. \n \nThe recently adopted foreign exchange regime is bringing more transparency into \nthe foreign exchange market. After a period of restriction in the foreign exchange \nmarket, a new market driven approach was adopted in June, 2016. This has brought the \nneeded transparency, price discovery and greater participation in the market. In \naddition, the new framework is attracting inflows into the market, increasing supply and \nensuring continuation of economic activities, although more should be done to further \nincrease supply. In addition, the decision to increase the monetary policy rate will \nfurther help encourage foreign inflows to curb capital outflow and provide liquidity to the \ninterbank market. At this time, monetary policy should be focused on restoring \nconfidence in the domestic economy and increasing supply of foreign exchange to \nattract inflows, therefore an increase in MPR is in the right direction. \n \nAgainst this background, I support a rate increase to help bring inflation gradually \nunder control and bring interest rate to a less negative territory. Decreasing rate at this \ntime will make interest rate more negative which is bad for savers and for investment at \na time when the nation needs all the investment it can get to support growth. However, \nincreasing Monetary Policy Rate rapidly to make interest rate positive will ground \neconomic activities. The increase in rate coupled with the new liberalized foreign \n22 \n \nexchange policy will lead to stable currency as foreign inflow increases and inflation \nmoderate. \nI therefore support an increase in Monetary Policy Rate by 200 basis points, to 14 \npercent, the retention of Private Sector Cash Reserve Requirement (CRR) at 22.5 \npercent, retention of the Liquidity Ratio at 30.00 per cent; and retention of the \nAsymmetric Window at +200 and -500 basis points around the MPR to help attract \ncapital inflow and resuscitate the economy. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n23 \n \n3.0 \nBALAMI, DAHIRU HASSAN \nAt the global level, the IMF downgraded its 2016 economic growth projection to 3.1per \ncent from 3.4 per cent due to high level of uncertainty which include some of the \nfollowing vulnerabilities and risks: the British vote to leave the EU; the continuous fall in \ncrude oil and other commodity prices; the divergence of monetary policy between the \nUSA and other major economies of the world; and the slowing down of the Chinese \neconomy, all of which have had impacts on the Nigerian economy. There is the need for \nthe G20 to deliberately enact policies that would stimulate growth at the global level. It \nshould however, be noted that manufacturing and industrial development are the key \ndrivers of growth and economic transformation for any economy at the global level. \nAt the domestic level, the Nigerian economy is currently in recession with the twin \nproblem of negative growth indices and rising inflation. It has been observed that for \ntwo consecutive quarters, the growth rate has declined Q1 at -0.36% and Q2 at -1.8% \nwhile inflation has risen from 15.58 per cent in May to 16.48 per cent in June. The \nnation is also caught up in economic crisis with pressure on its foreign exchange market \nand slow growth in the economy, with the private sector being crowded out. Also, sub-\nnational governments are unable to pay salaries which affects the consumption \nexpenditure. The critical questions then are: How do we stimulate growth of output in \nthe face of high lending rate and inflation? Will an increase in interest rate reduce \ninflation? Will it encourage households to save? Do we control inflation and leave \ngrowth or the other way round? How do we stimulate private investment? Do we shift \nresources to higher productive sectors of the economy? In agriculture for instance, \nshould the government direct social funds to farmers through providing improved \n24 \n \nseedlings, water pumps and fertilisers etc.? In the light of the questions raised above, \ngrowth can be encouraged through diversification of the economy. However, there are a \nlot of constraints due to the reasons earlier discussed in my personal statement of May \n2016. These include lack of adequate infrastructural facilities like energy; poor roads \nnetwork; insecurity; low level of household income; and the lag in the implementation of \nthe 2016 budget which was expected to be expansionary. \nAt the theoretical level, any economy in recession would require both expansionary \nfiscal and monetary policies to move the economy forward. At the Monetary policy level, \nit requires raising the level of money supply and reducing interest rates to attract more \ninvestors. At the fiscal level, the government is expected to raise public expenditure and \nreduce the level of taxes to raise the disposable income of both households and firms. A \nlot has been done on the monetary side, particularly to encourage the banking industry \nto lend to the real sectors of the economy. However, with rising non-performing loans, \nnot much has been achieved in stimulating growth. Hence, the CBN has had to \nintervene several times in various sectors of the economy, like the Anchor Growers \nProgramme, to encourage the growth of the agricultural sector where Nigeria has \ncomparative advantage if properly planned. Similar interventions have been done to the \nsmall and medium scale enterprise sectors of the economy. For growth to take place, \nproactive and creative planning is needed. \nAnother important aspect of monetary policy objective is price stability. Currently, \ninflation rate of 16.5% is much outside the CBN band of 6 - 9%. However, inflation in \nNigeria is partly not a monetary phenomenon, but due to structural reforms in the \n25 \n \neconomy. These include removal of energy subsidies; foreign exchange depreciation; \nrising cost of transportation; poor electricity and infrastructural facilities. The point here \nis that the CBN as a regulatory body, should be seen promoting financial system \nstability, hence the need for taming inflation and sending signals to the fiscal side to \npursue growth vigorously. Impact analysis of earlier monetary policies should be made \navailable to the government to complement the fiscal side. In view of monetary policies \nput in place in May 2016, there is need to allow time for the CRR, liquidity ratio and \nsymmetric corridor to hold while the MPR be varied by 200 point basis to promote the \ninflow of FDI. These would gradually reduce inflation in the economy. For treasury bills, \nthe banks are quoting 18.5%, then why do we have to leave policy rate at 12%? It \nshould be noted that the policy of setting MPR at 12% is ineffective because it is too far \nfrom the current inflation rate of 16.5%. Again, we cannot leave the control of current \nlevel of liquidity to the banks because the DMB‟s are not using it appropriately. On the \nbasis of the above analysis, l vote to: \n(I) \nRetaining the CRR at 22.5%. \n(II) \nRaising MPR by 200 basis points from 12% to 14%. \n(III) \nRetaining the liquidity ratio at 30%. \n(IV) \nRetaining the asymmetric corridor at +200/-500 point basis. \n \n \n \n \n26 \n \n4.0 \nBARAU, SULEIMAN \nBackground \nThe drag on key macroeconomic indicators since the beginning of the year is still very \nmuch at play. It has been complicated by new shocks like the Brexit vote, and rising \nwave of global terrorism and ascendancy of militancy in the domestic environment. A \nkey outcome of the last meeting in May 2016, was the deployment of a flexible \nexchange rate model, which, to a large extent, has reduced the high rate of depletion of \nthe external reserves but it is glaring that the pressure in the FX market is still \nreasonably high given the significant depreciation in the exchange rate even when \nsome slowdown could still be observed on external reserves. \nBesides, other major issues include the acceleration in domestic price level and sliding \noutput, with statistics pointing to the likelihood of the economy being in recession at the \nend of the year. However, this should not be interpreted as a complete bad news \nbecause the underlying cause is pretty clear and monetary policy measures will always \nbe proactive in response. The contraction in output was principally a result of \nunprecedented shocks on both the demand and supply sides. The sharp adjustment in \nthe exchange rate impacted production negatively, while the fall in public revenue \narising from the slump in oil price has equally eroded consumption with many \nsubnational governments unable to pay wages and salaries on regular basis. Structural \nissues including productivity declines from negative spillover in the global environment, \nexchange rate adjustment, increase in electricity tariffs, and supply deficit from conflict \nravaged north eastern part of the country, has accelerated inflation. \n27 \n \nA simultaneous rise in inflation and contraction in output would naturally pose serious \nchallenge to any monetary authority, but I am of the view that restoring confidence in \nthe macroeconomic environment should be critical. The policy rate (MPR) was \nincreased by 100 basis points in March against the background of creeping inflation but \nmy view is that the challenge in the macroeconomic environment demands further \ntightening through upward adjustment in the policy rate. Perhaps, the most compelling \ncase against the status quo ante is the emergence of unanticipated shocks which have \ncaused inflation to overshoot forecast as well as putting additional pressure on external \nreserves. In the light of this, my vote is to increase the Monetary Policy Rate with a \nview to addressing inflation concerns as well as enhancing the competiveness of the \neconomy for foreign capital required to shore up the external reserves. \nPressure Points \nGlobal Environment: \nThere are a number of significant negative developments in the global environment with \npotential spillover to the domestic economy. One of such key developments is the exit \nof Britain (Brexit) from the European Union via the outcome of the referendum in June. \nAlthough events are still unfolding, evidence so far reveals amplification of downside \nrisks in the global financial markets with potential spillover to both the real and financial \nsectors of the domestic economy. Preliminary data shows that the pound sterling has \nshed about 15 percent, while the credit rating of UK has been downgraded from triple to \ndouble “A”s. Pound Sterling denominated assets continued to shed weight on the heel \nof anxiety by investors who are moving out to a more secured haven. Naturally, the \n28 \n \nlikely destination of most of these investments is the US with implication of further \nstrengthening of the dollar against most currencies particularly emerging economies‟ \ncurrencies. This could possibly accentuate the risk of depreciation of the Naira against \nthe US dollar and heighten the pressure in the foreign exchange market. Besides, given \nthat most primary commodities exported by emerging market economies, crude oil \ninclusive, are quoted in US dollar, an appreciating dollar should result in softening of \nprices of these commodities. The implication of such development on the domestic \neconomy particularly on the fiscal sector is fairly obvious. \nAnother challenge of worrisome dimension brought about by Brexit is the increase in the \nlevel of uncertainty in the global output as the IMF has undertaken a third downward \nrevision of 2016 global growth. Global growth in 2016 is now projected at 3.1 per cent \ncompared to 3.4 and 3.2 percent in October 2015 and April 2016, respectively. Although \nthe downward adjustment from the latest revision is restricted mostly to Euro economies \nbut when cognizance is taken that the leading emerging economies like China are still \ncontending with growth challenges under its rebalancing model, then the prospects of \nincrease in exports for most developing economies is highly diminished. \nThe increase in global terrorist activities, especially in the US and Europe have \nprofound macroeconomic implications. These activities divert attention of leaders in \nlarge global economies with likely severe consequence on allocation of resources for \nreal economic activities. Secondly, most of these activities are concentrated in the Euro \nzone and in view of the fact that the zone is yet to fully recover from recession since the \n2008/9 global financial crisis, even after series of quantitative easing by the ECB, the \n29 \n \ncurrent spate of terrorism challenges confronting the zone would only aggravate the \nslide into recession. \nThe last issue in the global environment is the evolving monetary policy stance of \nsystematically important global central banks like the Bank of England (BOE) and the \nUS Federal Reserves (FOMC). Both the BOE and the FOMC kept their rates \nunchanged at their last meeting in June and July, respectively, which, naturally, is a \ngood news to emerging economies. The reason for keeping the rate unchanged was \nsimilar in the two countries but a deeper appreciation of issues should make emerging \neconomies treat the news with caution. In the US, for example, the labor market has \nstrengthened and economic activities were expanding at moderate pace. The only \nreason why the Fund‟s rate was kept unchanged was inflation running below the long \nrun target of 2 percent as a result of transitory factor of earlier decline in energy price. \nAs the effect of transitory factor dissipates, uptick in inflation should be expected with \nthe FOMC responding with rate hike. The implication of such development on the \ndomestic economy is obvious but more importantly, the Naira may slide further against \nthe US dollar. \n \nDomestic Environment \nPressure on Exchange Rate: The adoption of a flexible rate model at the last meeting \nrepresented a giant stride in aligning the exchange rate framework to the realities of the \noperating environment. The model has considerably enabled the exchange rate to \n30 \n \nabsorb much of the pressure in the market but it appears the pressure is yet to abate as \nexternal reserves is still slowing down. It is worrisome that demand pressure in the FX \nmarket continued to increase at a period when the real side of the economy is \ncontracting, suggesting that some speculative forces could still be at play. Among \nothers, the likely drivers of the excess demand is the difference in rate between the \ninterbank and parallel market rates which is still relatively high although some form of \nnarrowing has been achieved. Additional risk to the pressure in the FX market is the \nlingering liquidity surfeit in the banking sector. \nSlowing Output: The GDP contracted by 0.36 percent at the end of first quarter after \npersistent slowdown since the latter half of 2014. The key forces at play are yet to ease. \nThe insurgency in the North East, and the militancy in the Niger Delta have impacted \nnegatively on economic activities of those areas. From, the demand side, though there \nwas bailout programme for some states, a considerable number are still owing on \nwages and salaries thereby reducing consumption and depressing aggregate demand. \nThe softening output portends a lot of adverse consequences. Among others, given the \nrecourse to borrowing to finance budget due to falling fiscal revenue, a softening GDP, \ntherefore, would accentuate the contraction of fiscal space. \nRising Domestic Price: The domestic price level continued its upward trend in June as \nheadline inflation accelerated to 16.48 percent, the highest level since 1994. The \npressure on domestic price level emanated from both core and food components with \nan increase of 15.30 and 16.22 percent, respectively, suggesting that both monetary \nand non-monetary factors are at play. The medium term path is still challenged by \n31 \n \nsignificant upside risks including the lag effect of upward adjustment in energy prices, \nrecent increase in electricity tariff, and rising prices of imported food items on account of \ndepreciation of domestic currency. \nHigh Lending Rates: The challenge to growth is further impeded by the subsisting high \nlending rate regime. The prime lending rate rose to 16.78 percent in June while the \nMaximum lending rate increased to 26.93 percent in the same month. A commissioned \nstudy on the viability of small scale agro-allied business in Nigeria in 2015 revealed an \nInternal Rate of Return (IRR) of between 21 to 43 percent for the various agriculture \nsectors. With the current lending rate, most of the sectors would definitely drop out of \nthe viability zone. Besides, the current monetary policy rate regime has revealed the \ninefficiency of resource allocation inherent in oligopolistic banking structure such as \nours. It is difficult to understand that while the lending rate increased between May and \nJune 2016, there was a reduction in consolidated deposit rate. The consolidated deposit \nrate fell to 3.26 percent in June, culminating to wide spread of 23.67 percent between \nsavings and lending rates. The wide spread in rate would not only inhibit maturity \ntransformation role of banks but the negative real interest rate on savings deposit could \nreduce incentive to save and thereby threaten banking system stability. \nWay Forward \nTo reduce the risk inherent in the macroeconomic environment, the following measures \nmay become necessary. \n32 \n \nAddress the Rising Inflation: The persistent rise in inflation deserves attention. \nAlthough the significant drivers of the current inflationary trend could be ascribed to \nshocks and structural challenges, nevertheless the demand for money needs to be well \nmanaged to avert stagflation. The current policy rate may appear fairly high but in the \nlight of the conventional Taylor‟s rule, the central bank‟s policy rate must be increased \nwhenever inflation exceeds the target rate regardless of whether the source of the \npressure is from decline in productivity or increase in aggregate demand. The current \ninflation rate is 16.4 percent against the bank‟s inflation target of 9 percent, suggesting \nthe need to adjust the policy rate upward. Argument for upward adjustment is further \nreinforced by the fact that the current level of inflation has taken the real policy rate to \nnegative territory, which is an indicator of loose monetary condition. It is equally \nsignificant to mention that the decision to hold the MPR at the last meeting was in the \nhope that it would elicit reversal of the declining growth trend. However, the result was a \nrise in inflation and decline in growth, confirming the thesis that though inflation could be \nbeneficial but it is harmful to growth if it exceeds certain threshold. \nStabilize the Foreign Exchange Market: The perception of economic agents about the \nmedium term path of key economic variables is very crucial to reversing recession and \nrestoring growth on sustainable basis. One of such variables is the exchange rate. It is \nappreciated that the currencies of most emerging economies particularly oil exporting \ncountries, are facing pressure but the effect seems much more on Nigeria. Available \nstatistics reveal that Naira depreciated by about 34 percent in July 2016 on year-on-\nyear basis while the South Africa rand depreciated by about 16 percent during the \nperiod. When examined on month-on-month basis, however, Naira still depreciated by \n33 \n \nabout 6 percent while South Africa rand appreciated by about 4 percent. This shows \nthat the switch to a flexible exchange rate model at the last meeting, though a logical \nstep, has not completely eliminated the pressure in the FX market. The model, could \nonly work on one side of the equilibrium path- the demand side, as the supply side is yet \nto be addressed. At a time when accretion to external reserves through oil proceeds is \nthreatened from both the price and output sides, the only available leeway is capital \naccount. Global capital flow is generally influenced by both push and pull factors. A \nsignificant push factor is already at work in the aftermath of the exit of Britain (Brexit) \nfrom the EU but the domestic economy needs to strengthen the pull factors. As such, it \nmay be in order to put in place measures that can enhance the attraction of some of \nthese capitals into the domestic economy. Thus, beside the need to address inflation \nconcerns, another reason to increase the policy rate is the need to improve the \ncompetitiveness of the domestic economy for foreign capital and thereby shore up the \nexternal reserves. \nSupport the Real Sector: Given the lingering infrastructural challenge coupled with the \nneed to raise the policy rate in order to curtail inflationary pressure, the vulnerable \nsectors of the economy particularly agriculture and manufacturing may be worse hit in \nterms of flow of credit. Credit to the core private sector grew by 12.63 percent at the end \nof the first half, annualized to 25.26 percent, which is below the optimum requirement at \na time of softness in critical sectors. As a result, it may be in order for the Bank to \nintensify its various development finance scheme, like the Nigerian Incentive based Risk \nSharing System for Agriculture Lending (NIRSAL), the CAC, and the Anchor Borrowers \nProgramme. \n34 \n \nStrong Sectorial Policies: Stabilization of the macroeconomic environment is \nimperative in reversing the slide to recession but it is important to appreciate the fact \nthat the relationship between stable macroeconomic environment and growth is not \nsymmetry. Instability in the macroeconomic environment would hurt growth but restoring \nstability does not translate to automatic restoration of growth. This is even more \nimportant for developing economies such as ours with a lot of bottlenecks in the \nproduction process. At this point in time, there is a compelling need for government to \nspend in order to halt the slide to recession while at the same time cautiously guides \nagainst unproductive consumption that could exert further pressure on price level. It is \ntherefore critical for government to prioritize spending to critical sectors that could \npromote non-inflationary growth. It is noteworthy to mention some recent initiatives of \ngovernment, particularly in the transport sector despite the dwindling revenue. The \nproposed launch of Abuja-Kaduna rail line as well as Lagos-East bound line are good \nexamples of such projects. Other critical sectors like the power sector need to come \nwith robust policies that must be faithfully implemented in order to promote spending \nthat could stimulate growth without necessarily increasing the risk to inflation. \nProtection of Oil and Gas Installations: I mentioned this issue in my last statement in \nMay 2016, but it is quite disheartening that the condition has not improved but rather \ndeteriorating with the recent bombing of some key oil installations. We have not \nbenefited from the rally in oil price since April. Instead, our production level had dropped \nto 2.2million to 1.6million per day. We must implore all initiatives to stop this \nhaemorrhage in order to take advantage of the current rally in oil price and by extension \nhalt the declining fiscal revenue. \n35 \n \nDecisions \nIn view of the need to restore stability in the macroeconomic environment and most \nespecially to stem the rising inflation and equally make the domestic economy \ncompetitive for foreign capital, I propose that the MPR be increased by 200 basis points, \nwhile retaining other measures. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n36 \n \n5.0 \nSALAMI, ADEDOYIN \nThe Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting in May 2016 had issues around \nexchange rate management as its overriding challenge. At the end of that session I \nwas clear in my mind that with GDP data for Q1-2016, released in the run-up to that \nmeeting, already showing a contraction and the outlook for both activity growth and \ninflation indicating a worsening in both parameters, our meeting in July would have to \nprovide clarity as to the priority between inflation and growth. \n \nAt the end of deliberations, I voted with a minority of colleagues in favour of the \nproposal to leave policy rates unchanged. \n \nAdditional data published since the meeting in May simply confirmed my feeling that the \nprimary issue at this meeting is for the MPC to indicate its preference for policy attention \nbetween growth and inflation. The most recent revision of the 2016 forecast for Nigeria \npublished by International Monetary Fund (IMF) just ahead of this meeting foresees \noutput of the economy in Nigeria contracting by 1.8 percent this year. The National \nBureau of Statistics (NBS), on the sanguine assumption that Nigeria attains daily \naverage oil production of 1.7mn barrels for 2016, expects GDP to contract by 1.3 \npercent this year. On available information concerning the current state of oil-export \nproduction, this assumption looks optimistic. \n \nIt is perhaps noteworthy that the forecasts from both the IMF and the NBS show a \nmarked worsening of the economic environment. While the IMF‟s January 2016 forecast \n37 \n \nfor Nigeria has swung from 4.2 percent annual growth to contraction of 1.8 percent in \nupdated forecasts published in July, the NBS‟ forecast similarly swings from its January \nforecast of 3.8 percent growth to a conservative estimate of 1.3percent contraction! \nAllowing for the 0.4percent contraction in Q1-2016, the most optimistic forecasts for \ngrowth suggest a minimum average contraction of approximately 1.6percent in each of \nthe remaining 3 quarters of the year. \n \nFor inflation, data published (by the NBS) for June shows Aggregate prices rising at \n16.5 percent when compared with the same month last year. Both Core and Food \ninflation also rose by 10.9 percent and 11.67 percent respectively. These figures \nrepresent a worsening of inflation when compared with the similar data for the previous \nmonth. The trend in inflation is however not fully captured by the year-on-year figures. \nThe month-on-month data however shows a sharp improvement in the rate of \naggregate price increase from 2.8 percent in May 2016 to 1.7percent in June 2016. \nCore inflation and the rate of increase in food prices similarly showed a marked \nreduction – rising slower, at 1.8 percent and 1.4 percent respectively when compared \nwith 2.7percent and 2.6 percent the previous month. \n \nIt is also noteworthy that the rate of change of the month-on-month data has been quite \nvolatile in 2016. In other words, whilst prices doubtless continue to rise, it is not \nconclusive that inflationary conditions are worsening. Indeed, forecasts for inflation \nprovided by Bank Staff show a deceleration in the rate of aggregate price increase to \n15.95percent in August before increasing to 16.83percent, year-end. Forecasts for \n38 \n \nmonth-on-month inflation show a deceleration to October before rising in the final two \nmonths of the year. \n \nIn my judgment, raising the MPR is inappropriate at this time. To begin with, the primary \ncauses of rising prices are not driven from the demand-side – indeed, credit conditions \nare quite tight. Year-to-date has seen credit increase by just 1.3percent. This compares \nwith price rise of almost 12percent between December 2015 and June 2016. It is clear \nthat rising inflation is the result of reform in Energy Costs and the Naira‟s weakness. \n \nWhilst it is tempting to conclude that at the very least the Naira‟s weakness might be \nhalted by raising the MPR, I am not convinced this will happen. The fundamental \nchallenge facing the Naira is the negative shock in Nigeria‟s Terms of Trade caused by \nsharply lower oil prices. This has been worsened by ineffectual policy responses, \nleading to a loss of policy credibility with the resultant inability to provide supply stimuli \nneeded to revive the economy. In my view it is unduly optimistic to expect international \ninvestors to be attracted to Nigeria until policy credibility and consistency is not only \nrestored but also successfully maintained. Indeed, initial implementation of the \nsupposed flexibility in exchange rate determination simply saw movement from a „hard‟ \npeg at N197/US$1 to a “soft” peg in the range N282-284/US$. This, in my view, sent a \nneedlessly negative signal from which we now appear to be belatedly back-tracking. \n \nThe „market‟ rates for Naira are in my view an over-adjustment given the fundamentals \nof the economy. I have seen estimates that suggest a Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) \n39 \n \nrate of N315/US$ at the time of this meeting. In all markets, the Naira has weakened \nbeyond this level and shows no sign of appreciation anytime soon. The difference within \nmarkets is what can only be described as the cost of FOREX Market illiquidity with a \nfurther premium for policy uncertainty. At this point, it may be that the most credible \noption open to the Central Bank for improving FOREX liquidity is to specifically borrow \nUSD for the purpose. \n \nIf, as I contend, upward movement in the Policy rate fails to attract the size of FOREX \nflows immediately required, the case for raising rates also fails. In my view higher \ninterest rates also worsen the financial stability problems already evident in the banking \nsector. Data provided by Bank Staff for June 2016, show Non-Performing Loans (NPL) \namounting to 10.71percent of the Banking Industry Loan Book, which is well above its \nregulator‟s mandate. My hope remains that the data reflects full disclosure of NPLs. \n \nIn charting a path out of the present situation, we could not do worse than to draw on \nlessons from the reaction of Central Banks in other jurisdictions on the prioritization \nbetween inflation and GDP Growth. As we have seen time and again in the period of \nsub-par growth prevailing since the sub-prime induced financial and economic crisis, \nCentral Banks have placed priority on growth, even to the extent of using the \ninstrumentality of unorthodox monetary policy. \n \nThe collapse in government revenue in H1-2016 means that the fiscal side will face \nenormous challenges to deliver any significant stimulus to the economy, through the \n40 \n \n2016 Appropriation Act, as hoped. Indeed the government has already warned that it is \nunlikely to fully implement the budget for this year. Raising rates at this point is unlikely \nto achieve anything other than to worsen the economic and business circumstances of \nNigeria. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n41 \n \n6.0 \nUCHE, CHIBUIKE U \nWith the Nigerian economy now in recession, inflation and bank NPLs in double digit \nterritory, oil prices tottering and no visible sign that our oil dependent economy is being \ndiversified, few will dispute the fact that our country currently has no clear path towards \neconomic recovery. Under the above scenario, as I have argued in the past, it is clear to \nme that there is a limit to what monetary policy alone can achieve. While some MPC \nmembers have argued that we should focus on the main mandate of monetary policy, \nwhich is price stability, I am of the view that such a mandate is not an end in itself. This \nis because the very essence of price stability is to engender economic growth. Since it \nis now prudent to assert that the days of high oil prices are unlikely to return, the only \nreasonable path towards encouraging economic growth in Nigeria is to diversify the \neconomic base of our economy by promoting real sector development. Tightening of \nmoney supply at the present time, will therefore be counterproductive towards achieving \nthe above objective. \nAt another level, I also very much doubt whether tightening at the present time will \nindeed curtail inflation. This is because evidence available to MPC suggests that \nliquidity is not the main causative factor of the current inflationary pressure. Rather such \ninflation has in the main been caused by the reforms in the electricity and petroleum \nsectors which have resulted in higher prices for the above energy products, which \nimpact on the input costs to the real sector of our economy. Another important factor \nthat has contributed to the present inflation is the oil revenue induced scarcity of foreign \nexchange which has resulted in both the explicit and implicit devaluation of the Naira. \n42 \n \nIn the light of the above, I do not see how tightening money supply can help curtail \ninflation at the present time. Rather such a policy move can only further exacerbate the \npresent difficulties being experienced by operators in the real sector of the Nigerian \neconomy. Tightening, which will definitely lead to increases in lending rates, will \nadversely affect our already contracting manufacturing sector and thus drive our \neconomy further down the recession path. This will not be in the interest of our banking \nsystem which, given its current double digit NPL level, is already in a precarious state. \nThroughout the meeting, I also carefully listened to the argument that tightening will help \nthe country achieve higher interest rates which will positively impact on foreign portfolio \ninflows and thus on the value of the Naira. In my humble view, to tighten monetary \npolicy with the main objective of attracting foreign portfolio flows will be a major policy \nerror. This is because history teaches us that unless foreign capital inflows are deployed \nto the real sectors of our economy, their impact on stabilizing the exchange rate of the \nNaira are at best temporary. Given our current precarious economic situation therefore, \nI am convinced that it would be an error to continue to allow unhindered inflow of \nspeculative capital into our economy. \nFor the avoidance of doubt, I am not fundamentally opposed to the inflow of foreign \ncapital. All I am saying is that our country should encourage the inflow of foreign direct \ninvestments as opposed to foreign portfolio flows. Although some MPC members have \nargued that foreign portfolio flows are normally the precursor of foreign direct \ninvestments, history teaches us that this has thus far not been applicable to Nigeria. \nWhile portfolio flows can sometimes help to sustain the value of our currency, this is not \n43 \n \nsustainable in the long run. Without investments in the real sector, which admittedly will \nrequire a clear strategy to diversify our current oil dependent economy, the value of our \ncurrency will continue to slide. Speculators cherish the above dynamics. In fact, some \nwill argue that speculators are already exploiting the above scenario and reaping \nhandsome profits to the detriment of both the value of the Naira and our economy. \nIn conclusion therefore, I believe that monetary policy tightening at the present time will \nbe an error. Although maintaining status quo, when there is no clear path towards \ndiversifying the nation‟s economy and making the country less dependent on foreign \ngoods, may not provide the optimal solution to our complex economic problems, it is by \nfar the lesser of the two evils. At the very least, this position will give the fiscal \nauthorities the necessary space for it to adopt policies that will encourage the \ndiversification of our economy. \nBased on the above arguments, I am inclined to vote that status quo be maintained at \nthe present time. I therefore vote as follows: (i) to retain the MPR at 12.00 per cent; (ii) \nto retain the CRR at 22.50 per cent; (iii) to retain the Liquidity Ratio at 30.00 per cent; \nand (iv) to retain the Asymmetric Window at +200 and -500 basis points around the \nMPR. \n \n \n \n \n \n44 \n \n7.0 \nYAHAYA, SHEHU \n \nThe Domestic Economy \nThe dominant challenge facing the Nigerian economy is the fall in GDP experienced in \nthe first quarter of the year, as well as resurgent inflation. Government revenue is also \nlow, and the 2016 budget has not yet really taken off. Substantial progress has been \nmade in the de-regulation of the foreign exchange market, but there are still \nuncertainties; policies are still evolving and there is quite a bit of fine-tuning. \n \nOutput \nThe factors that have precipitated the historical decline in GDP are extant, and have \ncertainly not played out. Crude petroleum output is still suffering from disruptions, and \nrepairs have not completed on many of the breached pipelines, thereby impacting on \nexports and supply to domestic refineries. The destructions of gas pipelines has \ndisrupted supplies to power plants and therefore reduced electricity output. The \nconstruction sector is reviving and many of the hitherto abandoned projects are coming \nback to life. However, very little of the capital resources of the budget have actually \nbeen disbursed. At any rate, much of the revival effect, including the boost to \nconsumption, will show only in Q3 or Q4 and will not show in the growth figures for Q2 \n2016. It can only be hoped that the various policy measures deployed in the agricultural \nsector can substantially raise crop production and livestock sufficient to make up for \ndeclines in other sectors of the economy and thereby avoid another quarter of negative \ngrowth. \n45 \n \n \nPrices \nWith respect to price levels, the surging trend of prices continue, with headline inflation, \nYOY, at 16.5% in June 2016, up from 15.6% last month. Both core and food prices \ncombined to drive headline inflation forward. The most significant contributors to the \nheadline inflation include processed food, farm produce, non-alcoholic beverages, \nclothing and footwear, utilities and fuel. In the meantime, there has been a sharp \nincrease in diesel prices; the deregulation of PMS also implies that the depreciation of \nthe Naira may trigger an increase in pump prices of PMS, with an additional inflationary \nimpact on transport costs. It is worth noting though that month on month prices, for all \nitems, have declined in June as compared to May 2016. \n \nForex Market \nThe foreign exchange market has been substantially liberalized and the value of the \nNaira is being increasingly determined by the market. Hopefully, this will lead to \nadditional supply of foreign currency from external investors and other sources, and \nsome movement in that direction is already being observed. But there is still a wait and \nsee attitude from many investors who are weighing the still unfolding policies, the \ndirection of the Naira value and other macro-economic variables in the economy, \nincluding foreign reserves and interest rates. However, it is necessary to do some \nintelligent market intervention to ensure that the market pulls in the direction of desired \nobjectives. An increased intervention capacity from the CBN and a more realistic import \n46 \n \nregime and overall fiscal policy are therefore essential for a more effective management \nof the foreign exchange market. \nThe banking system remains overall sound. The difficult macro-economic environment, \nparticularly the negative growth rates, low government revenues, declines in crude oil \nexport earnings, construction and the energy sector, combined with the effects of the \nimplementation of the TSA have placed onerous burdens on the financial sector. \nUnsurprisingly, overall capital adequacy ratio, liquidity ratio have experienced some \ndecline during Q2 2016. But they remain above the prudential thresholds. ROE, ROA \nhave both improved recently, and are performing at least as well as comparators in \nother countries. Profitability is also stable. However, NPLs are rising, given the overall \nslow- down of the economy \n \nThe Global Economy \nWorld output growth rate is forecast to be lower than previous estimates, to equate the \ngrowth rate in 2015, largely due to the UK vote to leave the EU. US growth rates have \nexperienced a decline in Q1 2016, while unemployment rose slightly and prices \nremained stable. Overall, this makes it improbable that policy rates will be raised in that \ncountry in the near term. \nOutput growth rate in China continues its gradual slow down. Growth in the Eurozone is \nstill low, although recovering somewhat, while unemployment remains fairly stable and \nprices remain negative. Effect of Brexit may cast a pall over recovery prospects. There \nis a slight slow down in UK. Most of the major oil producing developing and emerging \neconomies are still undergoing some painful re-adjustments. \n47 \n \nGlobal crude oil output is still characterized by over-supply. OPEC output is also rising. \nOverall, prices are holding up, although there was a bit of a decline in the third week of \nJuly. \nThere are unlikely to be any major challenges from imported inflation to Nigeria, except \nof course higher import prices due to the exchange rate depreciation effect. It also \nappears that there are unlikely to be threats from higher interest rates in the major \ntrading partners of Nigeria in the near term \n \nConclusion and Recommendations \nMany of the issues causing the sharp drop in output are also the same as causing the \ncurrent inflationary pressures- i.e supply gaps for fuel, diesel, gas, infrastructure, as well \nas the effect of exchange rate depreciation on imports and now PMS- it is mainly the \ndecline in consumption (salaries not paid and construction staff laid off, austerity and \nlate take-off of the budget) that is undermining growth, but not fuelling inflation. Overall, \nthe current inflationary pressure is not primarily fuelled by excess liquidity in the system. \nUnder the circumstances, the challenge is for a policy response that addresses \ninflationary pressure as well as contributes to, or at least does not undermine growth. \nThe MPR, which is one of the main instruments available to help respond to inflationary \npressure, will in this case not be much help, since the inflation is not largely a monetary \nphenomenon. Also, it cannot be very effective as an incentive for international portfolio \ninvestors, since there are currently more important macro-environmental factors for \nthem to consider. Raising it is therefore unlikely to have a significant effect on the \nsupply of foreign exchange. Yet raising the MPR may undermine efforts to re-generate \n48 \n \ngrowth if DMBs thereby re-price their loans accordingly. Moreover, it may exacerbate \nthe challenge of rising NPLs in the financial sector and complicate the quest for financial \nstability. \nUnder the circumstances, it may be necessary to tolerate, for a short time, the current \nnegative MPR rate. Raising the CRR will also not help for similar reasons. \nThere is much greater scope to address inflationary pressures and contribute to growth \nthrough the foreign exchange market. As the forex market is being liberalized, it is \nnecessary to ensure that its outcomes are guided to yield the necessary benefits to \nsociety. Efforts therefore need to be stepped up to find ways of augmenting the capacity \nof the CBN to intervene in the market, through additional forex resources. For an \neconomy such as Nigeria, at the current level of development, and given the \nuncertainties regarding oil earnings, the time lag between policy and results in the effort \nto diversify the economy and add local value, the high level of import dependence, it is \nalso necessary to manage the import regime through fiscal and other measures. This \nmust be done to avoid market outcomes that destabilize the foreign exchange market \nand to ensure that the market can stabilize, help check inflationary pressures and help \ndrive growth. \nI therefore vote to hold, with respect to MPR, CRR and liquidity ratios. This does not \nexclude some tinkering with the corridor around the MPR. Much attention should be \npaid to stabilizing the foreign exchange market in order to build on the progress \nachieved so far. \n \n \n49 \n \n8.0 \nEMEFIELE, I. GODWIN, GOVERNOR OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA AND \n CHAIRMAN, MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE \n \nIn the first six months of 2016, the state of the global economy was broadly fragile and \nfragmented amidst lacklustre potential growth, weak demand and diminished \nproductivity in many countries. The tepid global outlook was further complicated by the \nJune 23 decision of the United Kingdom to exit the European Union. This exacerbated \nthe uncertainties that pervaded global economic and financial markets, and lowered the \nmedium-term growth prospects. The IMF, in the July 2016 vintage of the World \nEconomic Outlook, reduced global growth forecast for 2016 and 2017 by 0.1 \npercentage point apiece to 3.1 percent and 3.4 percent. Similarly, 2016 growth \nprospect in advanced economies was downgraded by 0.1 percentage point to 1.8 \npercent while medium-term outlook in emerging market and developing economies \nremained cautious with a 2016 growth rate of 4.1 percent vis-à-vis 4.0 percent in 2015. \nIn Nigeria, macroeconomic performance remained weak in the first half of 2016 due to \nboth economic and non-economic factors. Output growth declined from 2.1 percent in \n2015Q4 to -0.4 percent in 2016Q1. This contraction, the first in many years, was due to \nthe torrents of shockwaves that beleaguered the economy over the past three years. \nAside the debilitating effect of lower oil prices, the economy experienced energy \nshocks (scarcities and price hikes), foreign exchange scarcity, weak domestic demand, \nlate ratification of the 2016 budget, and poor financial markets sentiments. As the \neffects of these shocks lingered into 2016Q2, an immediate rebound in that quarter \nseems unlikely. Available indicators of economic activities signify an insipid second \n50 \n \nquarter performance and the likelihood of a technical recession in 2016H1. I note that \nalthough the non-oil sector is the dominant driver of domestic GDP growth, the \nimperative of the oil sector remains fundamental and deep-seated. The non-oil sector \nrelies heavily on foreign exchange inflows from crude oil, thereby weakening the fabric \nof our economy. This is why a broad-based diversification of the economy remains \nnon-negotiable, incontrovertible and exigent at this time. \nThe prevailing difficulty of the Nigerian economy is worsened by rising inflationary \ntrends. From an inflation rate of 9.6 percent in January 2016, domestic prices have \nassumed an exponential acceleration with year-on-year headline inflation rising \npersistently to 15.6 percent in May 2016 and 16.5 percent in June 2016. These \nincreases reflected the ascent in both food and core components of inflation. Food \ninflation increased steadily from 10.9 percent in January 2016 to 14.9 percent and 15.3 \npercent in May and June, while core inflation rose abruptly over the same period from \n8.8 percent to 15.1 percent and 16.2 percent, respectively. Although, the rising \ninflationary pressure was due essentially to aggregate supply factors, analysis revealed \nthat it was reinforced by monetary factors. The critical supply-side drivers of inflation in \nthe first half of 2016 include high and rising energy costs, high cost of transport, the \nexchange rate pass-through that is reflected in the rising costs of imported food, and \nlow domestic supply as industrial activities remained lacklustre. \nData on monetary and credit conditions indicates rising domestic liquidity as the \nannualised growth of broad money supply (M2) in June 2016, at 16.5 percent, \nexceeded the 2016 growth threshold of 10.9 percent. Net domestic credit expanded at \n51 \n \nan annualised rate of 25.0 percent vis-à-vis the target of 17.9 percent while private \nsector credit, at an annualised rate of 28.9 percent, exceeded its benchmark growth of \n13.4 percent. To ensure that the private sector credit is productive it must be \nchannelled to sectors that can deliver sustainable and inclusive growth rather than to \nventures that will exert unwarranted pressure on the exchange rate and undermine \neconomic recovery. \nIn the foreign exchange market, the CBN on 20 June 2016 further liberalised the \ninterbank segment to eliminate the pressure on foreign reserves, allow market forces, \nand correct immanent distortions in the market. Accordingly, the naira-dollar exchange \nrate weakened from ₦197.00/US$ to ₦292.90/US$ as at 19 July 2016. This fall \nreflected the rush into the market as operators jostled to benefit from the freshly \nreleased hold on the market. \nOverall, I note that the Nigerian economy is in an intricate conundrum as actual and \npotential output fall while inflationary pressures intensify. During the review period, we \nalso noticed a faster than desired growth in M2 and a continuing weakening of the \nnaira. I observe more delicately that the intersecting factor that is worsening both \ngrowth and inflation is supply-sided. Thus, I want to re-echo the urgent need to resolve \nthe underlying structural imbalances of the Nigerian economy, diversify the economy, \nand reduce the dependence on imports for consumption, rather than production. This \nwill not only remove the undue exchange market pressure, it will also ensure that the \neconomy has the armour to withstand adverse shocks like the ones we are currently \nexperiencing. \n52 \n \nThe choice before the Monetary Policy Committee of the CBN at this time is a very \ndifficult one. Given the supply constraint nature of the underlying shocks, we are \nexperiencing both a contracting economy and rising domestic prices. Growth \nconsiderations are germane, as growth will ensure that economic development is \naccelerated, while unemployment and poverty are reduced. But how do we achieve this \ngrowth if the needed investments to drive growth are hindered by the distortionary \neffects of high inflation. It may be more important at this time to contain inflation so that \nillusions in investment decisions are extricated. Economic theory suggests that inflation \nis innately undesirable and costly as it creates money illusion, uncertainties, relative \nprices distortions, market inefficiency, and perverse wealth transfer from creditors to \ndebtors. The ramification of this is that at the current level of inflation no meaningful \ngrowth can occur. Our in-house forecasts indicate that, if we do nothing, inflation and \ngrowth outcomes will deteriorate rapidly. \nI am strongly of the view that, on the balance of judgment and evidence, the MPC \nshould take a stand and act now. If we must remove the distortions to efficient market \noperations we must use the tools at our disposal to fight inflation promptly while not \nlosing sight of output growth. By raising interest rate, the MPC will signal its stance to \ncurb inflation. Tangentially, this hike could moderate exchange market pressures as the \nhigher yields on domestic instruments attract foreign investors. I acknowledge that a \nrate hike may inhibit real sector activities. However, the CBN is perceptive to the health \nof the critical sectors of the economy. Accordingly, the Bank will continue to support \ngrowth by broadening its development finance initiatives. We have seen the success of \n53 \n \nthe anchor borrowers‟ programme in rice: lowering prices and increasing supply. This \nwill be extended to other agricultural products including tomato and palm oil for which \nwe have domestic capacity. We will strategically extend the intervention to \nmanufacturing and industrial sector ventures, while continuing activities with SMEs, \npower, etc. It is my utmost belief that this development finance activities in consonance \nwith an ardent inflation combating will speed-up the rebound of the Nigerian economy. \nBased on the foregoing, I vote to: \n1. Raise the MPR by 200 basis points to 14.0 percent; \n2. Retain the CRR at 22.5 percent; \n3. Retain the asymmetric corridor at +200/–500 basis points; and \n4. Retain Liquidity Ratio at 30 percent", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/Communique No 108 MPC July 2016 with personal statement of members.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "aac352e039507af81e7012e19e70fbbd", "text": "L\nA\nR\nT\nN\nE\nC\n \nL\nA\nR\nT\nN\nE\nC\nK\nN\n \nA\nB\nK\nN\n \nA\nB\nO\nF \nO\nF \nN\nIG\nER\nI\nA\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nii\n \n \n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n1\n Global Economic and Financial Developments ...\n...\n...\n1\nOutput\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n1\nInflation\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n3\nOil prices\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n4\nMonetary Policy Rates ...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n4 \nDomestic Developments\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n5\nOutput\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n5\nInflation\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n7\nInterest Rates\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n7\nFiscal Operations\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n8\nMoney and Credit\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n11\nAggregate Credit to the Economy\n...\n...\n...\n11\nClaims on the Federal Government\n...\n...\n12\nClaims on the Private Sector\n...\n...\n...\n12\nConsumer Credit\n...\n...\n...\n...\n12\nSectoral Classification of Private Sector Credit\n...\n...\n13\nReserve Money ...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n14\nMaturity Structure of Bank Deposits and Credits ...\n...\n14\nMarket Structure of the Banking Industry\n...\n...\n15\nImplementation of the 2010 Banking Model\n...\n...\n...\n16\nNon-Interest (Islamic) Banking ...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n16\nCross-border Collaboration\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n16\nMemoranda of Understanding (MoUs)\n...\n...\n...\n17\nColleges of Supervisors ...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n17\nCross-border Examination\n...\n...\n...\n...\n17\nNigerian Sustainable Banking Principles...\n...\n...\n18 \nOther Financial Institutions (OFIs)\n...\n...\n...\n...\n18\nDevelopment Finance Institutions (DFIs)\n...\n...\n18\nPrimary Mortgage Banks\n...\n...\n...\n...\n19\nPage \nList of Tables \n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\nv\nList of Figures ...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\nvi\nBox\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\nvii\nList of Abbreviations\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\nviii\nFinancial Stability\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\nx\nGovernor’s Statement\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\nxi\nExecutive Summary\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\nxii\n1\nMACROECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM \nSTABILITY\n1.1\n1.1.1\n1.1.2 \n1.1.3\n1.1.4\n1.2\n1.2.1\n1.2.2\n1.2.3\n1.2.4\n2\nDEVELOPMENTS IN THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM ...\n...\n...\n11\n2.1\n2.1.1\n2.1.1.1\n2.1.1.2\n2.1.1.3\n2.1.2\n2.1.3\n2.1.4\n2.1.5\n2.2\n2.3\n2.4\n2.4.1\n2.4.2\n2.4.3\n2.4.4\n2.5\n2.5.1\n2.5.2\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\niii\nGuidelines on Mortgage Brokerage\n...\n...\n20\nMicrofinance Banks\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n20\nFinance Companies\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n20\nFinancial Inclusion\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n21\nFinancial Literacy\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n21\nFinancial Markets\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n22\nThe Money Market\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n22\nThe Foreign Exchange Market\n...\n...\n...\n23\nThe Capital Market\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n24 \nThe Ten-Year Blueprint Committees\n...\n...\n24\nMinimum Capital Requirements for Capital Market \nOperators\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n24\nFinancial Markets Dealers Quotations \nOver-the-Counter Plc\n...\n...\n...\n...\n24\nThe Bond Market\n...\n...\n...\n...\n25\nThe Equities Market\n...\n...\n...\n...\n27\nReal Sector Intervention...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n27\nThe Nigerian Incentive-based Risk Sharing System for \nAgricultural Lending (NIRSAL) Plc.\n...\n...\n...\n27\nThe Commercial Agriculture Credit Scheme\n...\n...\n28\nThe Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme\n...\n...\n28\nThe Small and Medium Enterprises Credit Guarantee \nScheme...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n29\nThe Power and Aviation Intervention Fund\n...\n...\n29\nThe SME Restructuring and Refinancing Fund\n...\n...\n29\nEntrepreneurship Development Centres ...\n...\n...\n29\nThe External Sector\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n29\nThe Insurance Sector\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n31\nAirtel Nigeria Life Insurance\n...\n...\n...\n...\n31\nMTN Nigeria Life Assurance Service\n...\n...\n...\n31\nMacro-Prudential Supervision\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n33\nFinancial Soundness Indicators ...\n...\n...\n...\n33\nAsset and Liquidity-based Indicators\n...\n...\n33\nCapital-based Indicators\n...\n...\n...\n34\nIncome and Expense-based Indicators\n...\n...\n34\nBanking Industry Stress Tests\n...\n...\n...\n...\n35\n Liquidity Stress Test\n...\n...\n...\n...\n35\nContagion Risk Analysis through Inter Bank Exposures 39\nSolvency Stress Test\n...\n...\n...\n...\n39\nSupervision of Banks and Other Financial Institutions\n...\n...\n46\nBanks and Discount Houses\n...\n...\n...\n...\n46\n2.5.2.1 \n2.5.2.2 \n2.5.3\n2.5.4\n2.6\n2.6.1\n2.7\n2.7.1\n2.7.2\n2.7.3\n2.7.3.1 \n2.7.3.2\n2.7.3.3\n2.7.3.4\n2.7.3.5\n2.8\n2.8.1\n2.8.2\n2.8.3\n2.8.4\n2.8.5\n2.8.6\n2.8.7\n2.9\n2.10\n2.10.1\n2.10.2\n3.0\nREGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY ACTIVITIES...\n...\n...\n33\n3.1\n3.1.1\n3.1.1.1 \n3.1.1.2 \n3.1.1.3 \n3.1.2\n3.1.2.1 \n3.1.2.2 \n3.1.2.3\n3.2\n3.2.1\n Mortgage Refinancing\n...\n...\n...\n19\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\niv\nDiscount Houses\n...\n...\n...\n...\n47\nOther Financial Institutions\n...\n...\n...\n...\n47\nMicrofinance Banks\n...\n...\n...\n...\n47\nPrimary Mortgage Banks (PMBs)\n...\n...\n47\nFinance Companies (FCs)\n...\n...\n...\n48\nBureaux de Change\n...\n...\n...\n...\n48\nCompliance with International Standards\n...\n...\n...\n48\nAnti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of \nTerrorism\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n48\nImplementation of Basel II/III\n...\n...\n...\n49\nInternational Financial Reporting Standards\n...\n...\n50\nThe Assets Management Corporation of Nigeria ...\n...\n...\n50\nKey Risks in the Financial System\n...\n...\n...\n...\n50\nCredit Risk\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n50\nLiquidity Risk ...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n51\nMarket Risk\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n51\nOperational Risk\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n51\nReputational Risk\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n52\nCredit Bureaux ...\n...\n..\n...\n...\n...\n...\n52\nCBN’s Credit Risk Management System...\n...\n...\n52\nPrivate Credit Bureaux ...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n52\nThe Financial Services Regulation Coordinating Committee\n...\n52\nConsumer Protection\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n53\nCustomer Complaints\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n53\nThe Payments System Vision 2020\n...\n...\n...\n...\n55\nThe Real-Time Gross Settlement System...\n...\n...\n...\n56\nNIBSS Instant Payment ...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n56\nNIBSS Electronic Fund Transfer...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n57\nCheque Clearing\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n58\nElectronic Cards\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n59\n ATM Transactions\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n61\nMobile Payments\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n62\n Point of Sale Terminal Transactions\n...\n...\n...\n63\n3.2.1.1\n3.2.1.2\n3.2.2\n3.2.2.1\n3.2.2.2\n3.2.2.3\n3.2.2.4\n3.3\n3.3.1\n3.3.2\n3.3.3\n3.4\n3.5\n3.5.1\n3.5.2\n3.5.3\n3.5.4\n3.5.5\n3.6\n3.6.1\n3.6.2\n3.7\n3.8\n3.8.1\n4.0\nTHE PAYMENTS SYSTEM\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n55\n4.1\n4.2\n4.3\n4.4\n4.5\n4.6\n4.6.1\n4.6.2\n4.6.3\n5.0\nOUTLOOK\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n65\nBanks ...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n46\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nv\n Page\nReal GDP Growth of Selected Countries and Regions\n...\n...\n2\nGlobal Inflation (Consumer Prices)\n...\n...\n...\n...\n3\nInflation Rates for Selected Countries\n...\n...\n...\n...\n3\nSummary of Policy Rates Across Selected Countries \n(Jan 2013 – Dec 2013)\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n5\nPercentage Changes in Real GDP by Sector\n...\n...\n...\n6\nConsumer Credit by Sector\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n13\nDistribution of Off-shore Subsidiaries of Nigerian Banks\n...\n17\nMatured FGN Bonds, July - Dec 2013\n...\n...\n...\n...\n25\nNew Sub-national Bonds Issued During the Review Period\n...\n26\nNew Corporate Bonds Issued in the Second Half of 2013\n...\n27\nActivities of NIRSAL, July - Dec 2013\n...\n...\n...\n28\nSelected Financial Soundness Indicators of the Nigerian Banking \nIndustry\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n34\nAssets Un-encumbered ...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n35\nImplied Cash Flow Analysis\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n36\nBaseline CARs and LRs\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n40\nStress Test Results – Credit Risk\n...\n...\n...\n...\n42\nCredit Concentration Risk\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n43\nStress Test Results - Liquidity Risk\n...\n...\n...\n...\n43\nStress Test Results - Interest Rate Risk\n...\n...\n...\n...\n44\nStress Test Result - Exchange Rate Risk\n...\n...\n...\n45\n \nStress Test Result - FX Trading Risk\n...\n...\n...\n...\n45\n \nTable 1.1: \nTable 1.2: \nTable 1.3: \nTable 1.4: \nTable 1.5: \nTable 2.1: \nTable 2.2: \nTable 2.3: \nTable 2.4: \nTable 2.5: \nTable 2.6: \nTable 3.1: \nTable 3.2: \nTable 3.3: \nTable 3.4: \nTable 3.5: \nTable 3.6: \nTable 3.7: \nTable 3.8: \nTable 3.9: \nTable 3.10:\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nvi\n Page\nGross Domestic Product\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n6\nShares of Oil and Non-oil Sectors in Real GDP ...\n...\n...\n6\nShare in Total GDP (%)\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n7\nInflationary Trend (Year-on-Year)\n...\n...\n...\n...\n7\nMoney Market Interest Rates and MPR ...\n...\n...\n...\n8\nLending and Deposit Rates\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n8\nFederal Government Fiscal Operations\n...\n...\n...\n...\n9\nTrend in Monetary Aggregate\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n11\nCredit to the Economy ...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n12\nConsumer Credit\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n13\nSectoral Allocation of Credit\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n14\nDistribution of Bank Loans and Advances by Maturity\n...\n...\n15\nDistribution of Banks' Deposit Structure\n...\n...\n...\n15\nMarket Concentration Ratios of Banks (Assets and Deposits)\n...\n16\nInter-bank Rates Movements\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n22\nWDAS, Inter-bank and BDC Rates, 2013\n...\n...\n...\n23\nYield Curves for Nigeria\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n26\nBreakdown of External Reserves\n...\n...\n...\n...\n30\nBanking Industry NPLs to Total Gross Loans\n...\n...\n...\n33\nBanking Industry Liquidity Indicators\n...\n...\n...\n...\n33\nBanking Industry Capital Adequacy Indicators\n...\n...\n...\n34\nIndustry and Individual Bank Pre-Shock Liquidity Ratio Positions\n37\nIndustry Position after 1-5 day and Cumulative 30- day Shocks\n...\n37\nIndividual Bank Positions after 5-day and Cumulative 30-day Shocks\n38\nRoll-over Risk, Pre- and Post-shock\n...\n...\n...\n...\n38\nTotal Bilateral Exposure\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n39\nBanks in Each Bucket of CAR\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n40\nBanks in Each Bucket of LR\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n40\nBaseline CARs and LRs (%)\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n41\nBaseline ROAs and ROEs (%)\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n41\nCredit Concentration Risk\n...\n...\n...\n...\n...\n42\nTrend of Banking Industry NPLs, 2010 - 2013\n...\n...\n...\n51 \nFigure 1.1: \nFigure 1.2: \nFigure 1.3: \nFigure 1.4: \nFigure 1.5: \nFigure 1.6: \nFigure 1.7: \nFigure 2.1: \nFigure 2.2: \nFigure 2.3: \nFigure 2.4: \nFigure 2.5: \nFigure 2.6: \nFigure 2.7: \nFigure 2.8: \nFigure 2.9: \nFigure 2.10: \nFigure 2. 11: \nFigure 3.1: \nFigure 3.2: \nFigure 3.3: \nFigure 3.4: \nFigure 3.5: \nFigure 3.6: \nFigure 3.7: \nFigure 3.8: \nFigure 3.9: \nFigure 3.10: \nFigure 3.11: \nFigure 3.12: \nFigure 3.13: \nFigure 3.14: \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nvii\nFigure 4.1: \nFigure 4.2: \nFigure 4.3: \nFigure 4.4: \nFigure 4.5: \nFigure 4.6: \nFigure 4.7: \nFigure 4.8: \nFigure 4.9: \nFigure 4.10: \nFigure 4.11: \nFigure 4.12: \nFigure 4.13: \nFigure 4.14: \nBox\nBox 1:\nVolume of NIP Transactions, July to December 2013\n...\n...\n57\nValue (N Billion) of NIP Transactions, July to December 2013\n...\n57\nVolume of NEFT Transactions, July to December 2013\n...\n...\n58\nValue (N Billion) of NEFT Transactions, July to December 2013 ...\n58\nVolume of Cheques Cleared, July to December 2013\n...\n...\n59\nValue (N Billion) of Cheques Cleared, July to December 2013\n...\n59\nVolume of Electronic Card Transactions, July to December 2013 ...\n60\nValue of Electronic Card Transactions, July to Dec 2013 ...\n...\n60\nVolume of ATM Transactions, July - Dec 2013\n...\n...\n...\n61\nValue (N Billion) of ATM Transactions, July - Dec 2013 ...\n...\n61\nVolume of Mobile Payments, July - Dec 2013\n...\n...\n...\n62\nValue (N Billion) of Mobile Payments, July - Dec 2013 ...\n...\n62\nVolume of PoS Transactions, July - Dec 2013\n...\n...\n...\n63\nValue (N Billion) of PoS Transactions, July - Dec 2013\n...\n...\n63\n \nGuidance Note on Regulatory Capital\n...\n...\n...\n...\n67\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nAIPs\nApprovals-in-Principle\nAMCON\nAsset Management Corporation of Nigeria\nAML/CFT\nAnti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of \nTerrorism\nASI\nAll Share Index (Nigerian Stock Exchange Index)\nATMs\nAutomated Teller Machines\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nEBAs\nEligible Bank Assets\nEDC\nEnterprise Development Centre\neFASS\nElectronic Financial Analysis and Surveillance System\nFATF\nFinancial Action Task Force\nFCs\nFinance Houses\nFCT\nFederal Capital Territory\nFGN\nFederal Government of Nigeria\nBCEAO\nBanque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (Central Bank of \nWest African States)\nBDCs\nBureaux de Change\nBOA\nBank of Agriculture\nBOFIA\nBanks and Other Financial Institutions Act 1991 (as amended)\nBOI\nBank of Industry\nBRICS\nBrazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa\nCACS\nCommercial Agricultural Credit Scheme\nCAR\nCapital Adequacy Ratio\n \nCBN\nCentral Bank of Nigeria\n \nCIBN\nChartered Institute of Bankers of Nigeria\n \nCIFTS\nCBN Inter-bank Fund Transfer System\n \nCR6\nConcentration Ratio (of the six largest banks)\n \nCRMS\nCredit Risk Management System\n \nDFIs\nDevelopment Finance Institutions\n \nDMBs\nDelivery versus Payment\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFMBN\nFederal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria\n \nFMF\nFederal Ministry of Finance\n \nFSIs\nFinancial Soundness Indicators\n \nFSRCC\nFinancial Services Regulation Coordinating Committee\nGDP\nGross Domestic Product\nGIZ\nDeutsche Gesellschaft fur InternationaleZusammenarbeit (German \nSociety for International Cooperation)\nHHI\nHerfindahl-Hirschman Index\nICFA\nImplied Cash Flow Analysis\nIFRS\nInternational Financial Reporting Standards\nIFSB\nIslamic Financial Services Board\nIMF\nInternational Monetary Fund\nviii\nDvP\nDeposit Money Banks\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nKYC\nKnow Your Customer\nL/C\nLetter of Credit\nM1\nNarrow Money Supply\nM2\nBroad Money Supply\nMCP\nMicrofinance Certification Programme\nMENA\nMiddle East and North African Countries\nMFBs\nMicrofinance Banks\nML/FT\nMoney Laundering and Financing of Terrorism\nMoUs\nMemoranda of Understanding\nMPR\nMonetary Policy Rate\nNAICOM\nNational Insurance Commission\nNDIC\nNigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation\nNERFUND\nNational Economic Reconstruction Fund\nNEXIM\nNigerian Export-Import Bank\nNFIU\nNigerian Financial Intelligence Unit\n \nNGAAP\nNigerian Generally Accepted Accounting Principles\nNIBSS\nNigeria Inter-bank Settlement System\nNIRSAL\nNigerian Incentive-based Risk Sharing System for Agricultural \nLending \nNMRC\nNigeria Mortgage Re-finance Company Plc \nNPLs\nNon-Performing Loans \nNSE\nNigerian Stock Exchange \nOBB\nOpen Buy Back \nOFIs\nOther Financial Institutions \nPAIF \nPower and Aviation Infrastructure Fund\nPCBs\nPrivate Credit Bureaux \nPENCOM\nNational Pension Commission\nPFAs\nPension Fund Administrators\n \nPFCs\nPension Fund Custodians\n \nPMBs\nPrimary Mortgage Banks\nPoS\nPoint of Sale\nPSV 2020\nPayments System Vision 2020\nRDAS\nRetail Dutch Auction System\nROA\nReturn on Asset\nROE\nReturn on Equity\nRTGS\nReal-Time Gross Settlement System\nSEC\nSecurities and Exchange Commission\nSMEs\nSmall and Medium Enterprises\nSMECGS\nSmall and Medium Enterprises Credit Guarantee Scheme\nWAMZ\nWest African Monetary Zone\nWDAS\nWholesale Dutch Auction System\nWEO\nWorld Economic Outlook\nix\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\n‘Financial stability’ is the resilience of the financial system to unanticipated adverse \nshocks, while enabling the continued smooth functioning of the financial system's \nintermediation process. A stable financial system contributes to broader economic \ngrowth and rising living standards. The financial system performs one of the most \nimportant functions in the welfare of citizens by supporting the ability of households and \nfirms to hold or transfer financial assets with confidence. Thus, the stability of the \nfinancial system and its adequate analysis and reporting are important policy goals of the \nCBN. \nx\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nDuring the second half of 2013, while the global economy sustained its recovery, fiscal \nand monetary authorities focused on measures that would further enhance growth and \ncurb unemployment. In the emerging economies, a decline in commodity prices \ncontributed to the dampening of the significant growth in GDP experienced in recent \nyears. In Nigeria, the efforts to diversify the economy achieved results, as the real GDP \ngrowth was mainly driven by growth in the non-oil sectors of the economy.\nWith respect to monetary policy, rates remained low in most advanced economies. In \nNigeria, the policy thrust was to rein in inflation. Thus, the monetary policy rate was \nretained at 12.0 per cent throughout the review period. Inflationary pressure was, \ntherefore, contained as year-on-year inflation rate was 8.0 per cent at end-December \n2013. Money markets and foreign exchange rates were relatively stable. In the near \nterm, we expect to continue the tight monetary policy stance in order to maintain price \nstability.\nFor the Central Bank of Nigeria, it was critical to ensure that the shocks noted in the \nglobal environment did not threaten the stability of the domestic banking system. \nRegulatory actions were, therefore, focused on ensuring that the banks maintained \nhealthy loan portfolios by creating high quality assets that would ensure sustainable \ngrowth. Meanwhile, the proactive actions taken to resolve the distress situation in the \nsystem have achieved the desired results and contributed to the overall stability of the \nfinancial system. \nFollowing the successes recorded in the pilot scheme of the cash-less policy, its \nimplementation was extended to five additional states and the Federal Capital Territory \nin the second half of 2013. The expected reduction in the cost of cash handling in the \ncountry was already being achieved. The implementation of the policy has also \ncontributed to the achievement of the Bank's financial inclusion targets. We believe that \nthe inclusion of the economically active but poor people into the formal financial system \nwould enhance the ability of the financial system to contribute to economic growth and \ndevelopment. \nWith the Federal Government's continued commitment to implementing measures to \naddress security challenges and tackle the disruption in crude oil production, it is \nexpected that the success achieved in these efforts would enhance both economic \ngrowth and government's revenue base.\nSanusi Lamido Sanusi (CON)\nGovernor, Central Bank of Nigeria\nxi\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nGlobal output was estimated to have grown by 3.0 per cent in 2013, compared with the \n3.1 per cent achieved in 2012. However, in the second half of the year, growth achieved \nwas higher than the 2.9 per cent projected for the half year, driven mainly by growth in \nadvanced economies. In Nigeria, real GDP growth was estimated at 6.7 per cent in 2013, \ncompared to 6.6 per cent in 2012. In advanced economies, inflation decreased in 2013 \nowing to declining commodity prices caused by improved supply and reduced demand \nfrom major consuming nations, such as China. In Nigeria, headline inflation decelerated \nto 8.0 per cent at end-December 2013, from 8.4 per cent at end-June 2013.\nIn 2013, most advanced economies maintained a stable monetary policy stance. Among \nthe BRICS, only Brazil and India reviewed their policy rates upwards.\nThe CBN maintained its policy rate at 12.0 per cent in the review period. However, \nlending rates in the banking industry trended upwards. On the fiscal side, the Federal \nGovernment operated at a deficit of 6.3 per cent of GDP, which was financed through \ndomestic borrowings and privatization proceeds. \nThe CBN examined 21 banks and 14 foreign subsidiaries of Nigerian banks. The results \nshowed that most banks had a stable outlook in their composite risk rating and \nimprovements in their internal audit and financial analysis functions. In addition, the \nstress test conducted, based on their end-December 2013 call reports indicated that the \nbanking industry was stable and resilient.The key challenges in the industry, however, \nremained corporate governance and risk management practices.\nThe Other Financial Institutions sub-sector witnessed several developments, including \nthe establishment of the Nigeria Mortgage Refinancing Company Plc to provide \nliquidity in the mortgage market and promote availability and affordability of housing in \nNigeria.\nThe Bank continued to promote financial inclusion during the review period in line with \nits Financial Inclusion Strategy.The geo-spatial mapping of financial services' access \npoints and the Micro Small and Medium Enterprises Development Fund were launched. \nThe Bank also commenced financial literacy/enlightenment programmes through \npublic workshops, secondary schools' outreach, road shows and engagement of the \nmedia.\nMeanwhile, matured AMCON bonds, as at December 2013 were redeemed in line with \nthe terms of the indenture. \nThe cash-less policy, earlier launched in Lagos, was extended to five additional States \nand the FCT. \nThe Nigerian economy is projected to remain strong, driven largely by increased growth \nxii\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nin agriculture, trade and services, while activities in the oil sector are projected to \nrecover in 2014. Although inflation is projected to decline, the 2015 electioneering \nactivities would pose some threat.\nThis edition of the FSR is divided into five sections. Section one reviews global and \ndomestic economic and financial developments, highlighting key stability issues. \nSection two chronicles developments in the domestic economy, while section three \ncovers regulatory and supervisory activities. Key developments in the payments system \nare highlighted in section four. Finally, section five provides the outlook for financial \nstability.\nxiii\nwas expected to partly offset the drag \nfrom the consumption tax increase in \nearly 2014. \nReal GDP growth of the Euro area \nimproved to negative 0.4 per cent in \n2013, compared with the negative 0.7 per \ncent recorded in 2012, and is projected to \nstrengthen to 1.0 per cent in 2014 in spite \nof the uneven recovery within the area. \nHigh private and public debts and \nfinancial fragmentation were expected to \nhold back domestic demand, while \nexports were projected to further \ncontribute to growth, with the \nimprovement in growth being more \nmodest in economies under stress. \nThe emerging market and developing \neconomies were estimated to grow by 4.7 \nper cent in 2013, compared with the 4.9 \nper cent achieved in 2012. The marginal \ndecline in 2013 was attributed to low \ncommodity prices and weak internal and \nexternal demand. Growth was projected \nto strengthen to 5.1 per cent in Sub-\nSaharan Africa in 2013. Growth in the \nBRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, \nChina, and South Africa) was mixed in \n2013. While Brazil improved from a \ngrowth rate of 1.0 per cent in 2012 to 2.3 \nper cent in 2013, Russia slowed down \nfrom 3.4 per cent in 2012 to 1.5 per cent in \n2\n2013. India grew by 4.4 per cent in 2013, \ncompared with the 3.2 per cent recorded \nin 2012. China grew by 7.7 per cent in \n2013, the same as in 2012, and South \nAfrica recorded a growth of 1.8 per cent \nin 2013, down from the 2.5 per cent \nachieved in 2012.\n1.1\nGlobal Economic and \nFinancial Developments\n1.1.1\nOutput\nGlobal output was estimated to have \ngrown by 3.0 per cent in 2013, compared \n1\nwith the 3.1 per cent achieved in 2012 . \nThe lower growth rate was attributed to \nthe continued fragility and persistent \ndownside risks in some economies. The \ngrowth in the second half of 2013 was \nstronger than the 2.9 per cent projected in \nthe October 2013 World Economic \nOutlook (WEO). The stronger growth \nduring the second half of 2013 was due to \nimproved macroeconomic and financial \nconditions in most economies. Global \noutput in 2013 was driven mainly by \ngrowth in advanced economies as growth \nin emerging markets and developing \neconomies slowed down.\nOutput in advanced economies was \nprojected to improve to 2.2 per cent in \n2014, due to higher inventory demand \naimed at filling the large output gaps. \nThe US economy was estimated to have \ngrown by 1.9 per cent in 2013, due to \nupward surprises to inventories in the \nsecond half of 2013. This was expected to \nimprove to 2.8 per cent in 2014, given the \ncarryover effects of final domestic \ndemand supported by reduction in the \nfiscal drag following the recent \nagreement on the budget. Japan's growth \nwas estimated at 1.7 per cent in 2013, up \nfrom the 1.4 per cent achieved in 2012. It \nwas projected to remain unchanged at 1.7 \nper cent as the temporary fiscal stimulus \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\n1 World Economic Outlook (WEO) January 2014 Update\n2 For India, the IMF WEO Report noted that, “all data and forecast are presented on a fiscal year basis in the July 2013 WEO, whereas data were \npresented on a calendar year basis in the April 2013 WEO.” It added that the difference between the April 2013 WEO and the July 2013 WEO \nUpdate was adjusted to a fiscal year basis. \n1\nOutput growth in Sub-Saharan Africa \nstrengthened from 4.8 per cent in 2012 to \n5.1 per cent in 2013, and was projected to \nrise to 6.1 per cent in 2014. The increase \nin growth in 2013 was supported by \ndomestic demand. In Nigeria, real GDP \ngrew by 6.9 per cent in 2013, higher than \nthe 6.6 per cent achieved in 2012 and is \n3\nprojected to grow by 6.7 per cent in 2014 .\nReal GDP growth in Latin America and \nthe Caribbean slowed down from 3.0 per \ncent in 2012 to 2.6 per cent in 2013. \nGrowth in Mexico declined to 1.2 per \ncent in 2013 from the 3.7 per cent \nrecorded in 2012. In the Middle East and \nNorth Africa (MENA) region, growth \nslumped to 2.4 per cent in 2013, from 4.0 \nper cent in 2012, due mainly to social and \npolitical instability.\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nTable 1.1: Real GDP Growth of Selected Countries and Regions\n2012\n2013\n(Est.)\n2014 \n(Proj.)\n2015\n(Proj.)\nWorld \nOutput\n3.1\n3.0\n3.7\n3.9\nAdvanced \nEconomies\n1.4\n1.3\n2.2\n3.0\nUnited States\n2.8\n1.9\n2.8\n3.0\nEuro Area\n-0.7\n-0.4\n1.0\n1.4\nGermany\n0.9\n0.5\n1.6\n1.4\nFrance\n0.0\n \n0.2\n \n0.9\n1.5\nItaly\n-2.5\n \n-1.8\n \n0.6\n1.1\nSpain\n-1.6\n \n-1.2\n \n0.6\n1.1\nJapan\n1.4\n \n1.7\n \n1.7\n1.0\nUnited \nKingdom\n0.3\n \n1.7\n \n2.4\n2.2\nEmerging \nand \nDeveloping \nEconomies\n4.9\n \n4.7\n \n5.1\n5.4\nSub-Sahara \nAfrica\n4.8\n5.1\n6.1\n5.8\nChina\n7.7\n7.7\n7.5\n7.3\nIndia\n3.2\n4.4\n5.4\n6.4\nBrazil\n1.0\n2.3\n2.3\n2.8\nMexico\n3.7\n1.2\n3.0\n3.5\nMENA\n4.1\n2.4\n3.3\n4.8\nSource: IMF World Economic Outlook, January Update 2014\n3World Bank: Global Economic Prospects January 2014\n2\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\ncapacity constraints, weakening \nexchange rates as well as strong domestic \ndemand pressures in some of the \ncountries, led to a marginal rise in prices \nrelative to 2012.\n1.1.2 Inflation\nA downward trend was observed in the \ninflation figures of advanced economies \nin 2013 due to declining commodity \nprices, amid improved supply and lower \ndemand growth from key emerging \n4\nmarket economies, especially China . In \naddition, weak economic growth in the \nEuro area, alongside a downward \npressure on wages in the periphery, \nworked together to reduce inflation \nwithin the region. However, in emerging \nmarket economies, despite a drop in \ncommodity prices, the presence of \nTable 1.2: Global Inflation (Consumer Prices) \nConsumer prices\n \n2012\n \n2013\n2014\n(proj.)\nAdvanced Economies\n \n2.0\n \n1.4\n1.7\nEmerging and \nDeveloping Economies\n6.0\n6.1\n5.6\nincreased to 0.30, 6.21, 6.78, and 5.76 per \ncent in 2013, from -0.04, 5.41, 5.07, and \n5.65 per cent in 2012, respectively (Table \n1.3). \nOverall, inflationary pressures in \nadvanced economies were contained \naround 1.4 per cent in 2013, down from \n2.0 per cent in 2012; on the other hand, \nemerging and developing countries \nwitnessed a marginal rise in inflation to \n6.1 per cent in 2013, from 6.0 per cent in \n2012 (Table 1.2). \nInflation declined in France, Germany \nand USA to 0.99, 1.60 and 1.48 per cent in \n2013, from 2.23, 2.14 and 2.08 per cent in \n2012, respectively. However, inflation in \nJapan, Brazil, Russia and South Africa \n4http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/pdf/text.pdf\nTable 1.3: Inflation Rates for Selected Countries\nCountry/ Region\n2012\n2013\n2014*\n%\n%\n%\nAfrica\nNigeria \n12.24\n8.00\n8.80\nSouth Africa \n5.65\n5.76\n5.70\nEgypt \n8.60\n6.91\n9.90\nGhana \n9.16\n11.65\n9.90\nNorth America\nUnited States \n2.08\n1.48\n1.60\nCanada \n1.52\n \n1.00*\n1.50\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n3\n1.1.4\nMonetary Policy Rates\nMonetary policy rates remained low in \nmost advanced economies for the greater \npart of 2013. The U.S. Federal Reserve, \nthe Bank of Japan, the Bank of England \nand the Bank of Canada maintained their \nrates at 0.25, 0.10, 0.50, and 1.00 per cent, \nrespectively, while the European Central \nBank maintained its rate between 0.25 \nand 0.75 per cent. The Reserve Bank of \nAustralia reduced its policy rate from \n2.75 per cent at end-July 2013 to 2.50 per \ncent by December 2013.\nIn the BRICS countries, monetary policy \nrates remained unchanged, except in \nBrazil and India where the rates were \nreviewed upward at end-July 2013 to \n10.00 and 6.75 per cent, from 8.50 and \n6.25 per cent, respectively (Table 1.4).\n1.1.3\nOil prices\nAverage crude oil prices declined \nmarginally to US$104.10 in 2013, from \nUS$105.00 in 2012. The decline was \nattributed to increased supply from new \noil discoveries in China and the U.S. as \nwell as the return to the market by Libya \nand Iran. Furthermore, increasing U.S. \nproduction arising from innovations in \nshale oil technology placed her as the \nlargest non-OPEC producer of liquid \nhydrocarbons.\nGlobal demand for crude oil was \nprojected to grow at less than 1.5 per cent \nannually, with the growth coming from \nnon-OECD countries. OECD oil \nconsumption was expected to remain \nsubdued in the light of sluggish economic \ngrowth and sustained general energy \nefficiency.\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nLatin America\nBrazil \n5.41\n6.21\n5.80\nArgentina \n10.03\n10.61\n12.15\nMexico \n4.11\n3.81\n3.70\nColombia \n3.17\n2.02\n2.90\nEurope\nUnited Kingdom \n2.84\n2.57\n2.10\nFrance \n2.23\n0.99\n1.20\nGermany \n2.14\n1.60\n1.50\nRussia \n5.07\n6.78\n5.40\nAsia\nJapan\n-0.04\n0.30*\n2.40\nChina \n2.65\n2.63\n3.10\nIndia \n11.44\n9.01\n8.84\n·Sources: All figures were sourced from Bloomberg except those for India which were from the IMF, World Economic Outlook (WEO) October \n2013 and January 2014 update;\n·(*) Bloomberg estimates\n4\nand the corresponding quarter of 2012, \nrespectively. The growth in the non-oil \nsector was driven by activities in the \ntelecommunications and postal services \n(26.73%), building and construction \n(14.96%), solid minerals (13.61%), \nhotels and restaurants (13.48%), \nwholesale and retail trade (11.33%), real \nestate and business services (11.02%), \nmanufacturing (8.81%), and agriculture \n(4.29%) (Table 1.5).\nThe oil sector recorded a real growth rate \nof 0.30 per cent and contributed 11.73 per \ncent to GDP in the fourth quarter of 2013, \nin contrast to the negative growth of 1.15 \nand 0.53 per cent recorded in the second \nand third quarters of 2013, respectively. \nIts contribution to GDP was, however, \n1.2\nDomestic Developments\n1.2.1\nOutput\nDespite the slowdown in some emerging \nmarket economies, including the BRICS, \nthe Nigerian domestic economy \nremained strong in the second half of \n2013 as growth in output rose by 1.2 \npercentage points above its level of 6.5 \nper cent in the preceding period. The \ndevelopment was attributed to the \nincrease in the contribution of the non-oil \nsector, reinforced by the relative stability \nin monetary and fiscal policies. The non-\noil sector, in the fourth quarter, recorded a \ngrowth of 8.73 per cent, in real terms, and \ncontributed 88.27 per cent to real GDP, \ncompared with the growth of 7.95 and \n8.21 per cent in the third quarter of 2013 \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nTable 1.4: Summary of Policy Rates Across Selected Countries (Jan 2013 – Dec 2013)\n5\nCountry\nJan\nFeb\nMar\nApr\nMay\nJun\nJul\nAug\nSep\nOct\nNov\nDec\nDeveloped Economies\nJapan\n0.10\n0.10\n0.10\n0.10\n0.10\n0.10\n0.10\n0.10\n0.10\n0.10\n0.10\n0.10\nEurope\n0.75\n0.75\n0.75\n0.75\n0.50\n0.75\n0.75\n0.75\n0.75\n0.75\n0.25\n0.25\nUK\n0.50\n0.50\n0.50\n0.50\n0.50\n0.50\n0.50\n0.50\n0.50\n0.50\n0.50\n0.50\nUS\n0.25\n0.25\n0.25\n0.25\n0.25\n0.25\n0.25\n0.25\n0.25\n0.25\n0.25\n0.25\nCanada\n1.00\n1.00\n1.00\n1.00\n1.00\n1.00\n1.00\n1.00\n1.00\n1.00\n1.00\n1.00\nSouth Korea\n2.75\n2.75\n2.75\n2.75\n2.50\n2.50\n2.50\n2.50\n2.50\n2.50\n2.50\n2.50\nNew Zealand\n2.50\n2.50\n2.50\n2.50\n2.50\n2.50\n2.50\n2.50\n2.50\n2.50\n2.50\n2.50\nAustralia\n3.00\n3.00\n3.00\n3.00\n2.75\n2.75\n2.75\n2.50\n2.50\n2.50\n2.50\n2.50\nASEAN\nIndonesia\n5.75\n5.75\n5.75\n5.75\n5.75\n6.00\n6.50\n7.00\n7.25\n7.25\n7.50\n7.50\nMalaysia\n3.00\n3.00\n3.00\n3.00\n3.00\n3.00\n3.00\n3.00\n3.00\n3.00\n3.00\n3.00\nBRICS\nBrazil\n7.25\n7.25\n7.25\n7.50\n8.00\n8.00\n8.50\n9.00\n9.00\n9.50 10.00 10.00\nRussia\n8.25\n8.25\n8.25\n8.25\n8.25\n8.25\n8.25\n8.25\n8.25\n8.25\n8.25\n8.25\nIndia\n6.75\n6.75\n6.50\n6.50\n6.25\n6.25\n6.25\n6.25\n6.50\n6.50\n6.75\n6.75\nHong Kong Base\n0.50\n0.50\n0.50\n0.50\n0.50\n0.50\n0.50\n0.50\n0.50\n0.50\n0.50\n0.50\nSouth Africa\n5.00\n5.00\n5.00\n5.00\n5.00\n5.00\n5.00\n5.00\n5.00\n5.00\n5.00\n5.00\nOther Emerging Economies & South America\nMexico\n4.50\n4.50\n4.00\n4.00\n4.00\n4.00\n4.00\n4.00\n3.75\n3.50\n3.50\n3.50\nChile\n5.00\n5.00\n5.00\n5.00\n5.00\n5.00\n5.00\n5.00\n5.00\n4.75\n4.50\n4.50\nColombia\n4.00\n3.75\n3.25\n3.25\n3.25\n3.25\n3.25\n3.25\n3.25\n3.25\n3.25\n3.25\nAfrica\nEgypt\n9.25\n9.25\n9.75\n9.75\n9.75\n9.75\n9.75\n9.25\n8.75\n8.75\n8.75\n8.25\nGhana\n15.00 15.00 15.00 15.00 16.00 16.00 16.00 16.00\n16.00 16.00 16.00 16.00\nMonthly Policy Rate\nSource: Bloomberg\ngrowth rate of the oil sector was \nattributed to improved production levels. \nlower than the 12.50 per cent recorded in \nthe second quarter of 2013.The rise in the \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nFigure 1.1: Gross Domestic Product\n \n0\n50\n100\n150\nQ4 2012\nQ1 2013\nQ2 2013\nQ3 2013\nQ4 2013\nN billion\nCrop Production\nCrude Petroleum and Nat res.\nBuilding & Const\nwholesale and Retail Trade\nTelecommunications\nReal Estate & Business Serv.\nTable 1.5: Percentage Changes in Real GDP by Sector\nSector\nQ4 12\nQ1 13\nQ2 13\nQ3 13\nQ4 13\nTelecommunication and Postal Services\n32.44\n24.53\n22.12\n24.42\n26.73\nBuilding and Construction\n12.55\n15.66\n14.87\n14.31\n14.96\nSolid Minerals\n13.59\n \n12.00\n11.84\n12.67\n13.61\nHotels and Restaurants\n-3.12\n \n13.61\n13.69\n13.66\n13.48\nWholesale and Retail Trade\n11.19\n \n8.22\n7.44\n9.03\n11.33\nReal Estate and Business Services\n5.58\n9.81\n10.58\n10.15\n11.02\nManufacturing\n7.70\n8.41\n6.81\n8.16\n8.81\nAgriculture\n3.62\n4.14\n4.52\n5.08\n4.29\nCrude Petroleum & Natural Gas\n-0.79\n-0.54\n-1.15\n-0.53\n0.3\nFigure 1.2 : Shares of Oil and Non-oil Sectors in Real GDP\n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\nQ4 2012\nQ1 2013\nQ2 2013\nQ3 2013\nQ4 2013\nOIL GDP/GDP\nNON-OILGDP/GDP\nPer cent \n6\nat end-June 2013, and a decline of 4.0 \npercentage points from the level in \nDecember 2012. Furthermore, core and \nfood inflation declined to 7.9 and 9.3 per \ncent at end-December 2013, from their \nrespective levels of 13.7 and 10.2 per cent \nin December 2012.\n \nRates generally trended upwards with the \nexception of the Inter-bank Call and the \nOpen-Buy-Back (OBB) rates. The \n1.2.3\nInterest Rates\n1.2.2\nInflation\nInflation was generally mild in the \nsecond half of 2013, due largely to price \nmoderation in both food and non-food \ncommodities classification. Year-on-year \nheadline inflation stood at 8.0 per cent in \nDecember 2013, down from 8.4 per cent \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nFigure 1.3: Share in Total GDP (%)\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n35\n40\n45\nQ4 2012\nQ1 2013\nQ2 2013\nQ3 2013\nQ4 2013\nAgriculture\nCrude Petroleum, Nat. Res. and Solid Min.\nManufacturing \nBuilding and Construction\nWholesale and Retail Trade\nTelecommunication\nReal Estate\nOther Services\nPer cent \nFigure 1.4: Inflationary Trend (Year-on-Year)\n0\n5\n10\n15\nSECOND HALF 2012\nFIRST HALF 2013\nSECOND HALF 2013\nPer cent\nHead line (Y-o-Y)\nCore (Y-o-Y)\nFood (Y-o-Y)\nSimilarly, rates for other deposits with \nvarious maturities rose to a range of 1.71 - \n7.92 per cent in the second half of 2013, \nfrom a range of 1.34 - 7.72 per cent in the \nfirst half of 2013.\nHowever, the average Inter-bank Call and \nOpen-Buy-Back (OBB) rates stood at \n11.02 and 11.07 per cent in the second \nhalf of 2013, down from 11.69 and 11.27 \nper cent in the first half of 2013, \nrespectively. The prime and maximum \n \ndevelopment was largely attributed to the \ncontinued monetary tightening stance of \nthe CBN. During the review period, the \nBank maintained its policy rate at 12.00 \nper cent. Consequently, the average term \ndeposit rate rose to 6.64 per cent, from \n6.58 per cent in the first half of 2013. \n7\nsavings, remained a major challenge to \ncapital accumulation and the ability of \nbanks to build a sustainable long-term \nlending rates rose by 0.47 and 0.37 \npercentage points, respectively, to 17.09 \nand 24.93 per cent in the review period. \nThus, the spread between the maximum \nlending and the average term deposit \nrates stood at 18.30 percentage points, a \n0.32 percentage point over the level in the \nfirst half of 2013. With the inflation rate at \n8.0 per cent in December 2013, all \ndeposit rates were negative in real terms, \nwhile lending rates were positive in real \nterms. The negative real rate of return on \ndeposits, which has been a disincentive to \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\n10.40\n10.60\n10.80\n11.00\n11.20\n11.40\n11.60\n11.80\n12.00\n12.20\nSECOND HALF 2012\nFIRST HALF 2013\nSECOND HALF 2013\nPer cent\nCall\nOBB\nMPR\nFigure 1.5: Money Market Interest Rates and MPR\nFigure 1.6: Lending and Deposit Rates\n16.00\n16.50\n17.00\n17.50\n18.00\n18.50\n0.00\n5.00\n10.00\n15.00\n20.00\n25.00\n30.00\nSECOND HALF 2012\nFIRST HALF 2013\nSECOND HALF 2013\npercentage point\nPer cent\nSavings\nPrime\nMaximum\nAvterm Dep.\nSpread (Max-Avtrm) rhs\nsecond half of 2013, against the \nproportionate budget estimate of \nN2,452.68 billion, while expenditure was \nloanable funds base. \nAs part of efforts to improve the savings \nculture, the CBN continued to initiate and \nencourage banks to implement customer-\nfriendly policies. Specifically, the \nrecently revised Guide to Bank Charges \nspecifies the minimum interest rate \npayable on savings accounts at 30 per \ncent of the ruling MPR.\nThe Federal Government's retained \nrevenue stood at N1,817.49 billion in the \n1.2.4\nFiscal Operations\n8\nbudget deficit of N443.53 billion for the \nfirst half of 2013 and N278.55 billion for \nthe corresponding period of 2012. The \ndeficit was financed through domestic \nborrowings and privatization proceeds.\nestimated at N2,561.77 billion, compared \nwith N2,896.22 billion budgeted for the \nsecond half of 2013. Thus, the fiscal \noperations of Government resulted in a \ndeficit of N744.28 billion or 6.3 per cent \nof GDP, as against the proportionate \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nFigure 1.7: Federal Government Fiscal Operations\n-1000\n-500\n0\n500\n1000\n1500\n2000\nH2 2012\nH1 2013\nH2 2013\nN Billion\nRetained Revenue\nTotal Expenditure\nBudget Balance\n9\ncredit, which more than offset the \nrespective 26.0 and 5.9 per cent decline in \nother assets (net) and foreign assets (net) \nof the banking system.\nNarrow money supply (M ) rose by 1.1 \n1\nper cent at end-December 2013, in \n5\n2.1\nMoney and Credit\nGrowth in money supply remained \nsluggish at the end of the second half of \n2013. Relative to the level at end-June \n2013, broad money supply (M ) grew by \n2\n0.5 per cent to N15,668.95 billion at the \nend of the second half of 2013. The \nincrease in money supply relative to the \nposition during the preceding half year \nreflected, largely, the respective 14.4 and \n17.3 per cent rise in net domestic credit \nand other assets (net) which more than \noffset the 7.1 per cent decline in net \nforeign assets of the banking system. \nOver the level at end-December 2012, M \n2\nrose by1.2 per cent, due largely, to the \n18.5 per cent increase in net domestic \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nFigure 2 .1: Trend in Monetary Aggregate\n \n0\n2000\n4000\n6000\n8000\n10000\n12000\n14000\n16000\n18000\nSECOND HALF 2012\nFIRST HALF 2013\nSECOND HALF 2013\nM2\nM1\nCOB\nDD\nNBillion\n5The analysis is based on the revised CBN Monetary Survey.\nat end-June 2013. This reflected the 42.2, \n17.3 and 5.2 per cent growth in claims on \nthe Federal Government, and other assets \n(net) and claims on the private sector, \nrespectively.\ncontrast to the 6.5 per cent decline at the \nend of the first half of 2013.The increase \nrelative to the position in the preceding \nhalf year was attributed, largely, to the \n28.3 per cent rise in currency outside \nbanks (COB). As a ratio of total monetary \nassets, COB stood at 9.2 per cent, \ncompared with the 7.2 per cent recorded \nat the end of the preceding half year. \nNet domestic credit (NDC) to the \neconomy grew by 7.3 per cent to \nN15,040.7 billion at end-December \n2013, compared with N13,149.4 billion \n2.1.1\nAggregate Credit to the \nEconomy\n11\nchange in claims on the private sector to \nthe total monetary assets stood at 5.2 per \ncent, compared with the 3.5 per cent \nrecorded at the end of the first half of \n2013. \nConsumer credit grew by 24.5 per cent to \nN782.6 billion in the review period, \ncompared with the marginal growth of \n0.8 per cent in the first half of 2013. As a \nratio of credit to the core private sector, \nconsumer credit constituted 5.0 per cent, \ncompared with 4.2 per cent at end-June \n2013. \n2.1.1.3\nConsumer Credit\n2.1.1.1\nClaims on the Federal \nGovernment\n2.1.1.2\nClaims on the Private \nSector\nNet claims on the Federal Government \nrose by 42.2 per cent at end-December \n2013, compared with the growth of 3.6 \nper cent at end-June 2013. The \ndevelopment reflected, mainly the \nincrease in the banking system holdings \nof government securities. This increase in \nnet claims on the Federal Government \ntended to “crowd out” private sector \ncredit. However, the Federal Government \nremained a net lender in the system, a \nsituation that mitigated the apparent \n“crowding out” effect.\nCredit to the private sector increased by \n5.2 per cent at end-December 2013, \ncompared with the growth rate of 3.6 per \ncent at end-June 2013. The growth in \nprivate sector credit reflected, largely, the \n4.5 per cent rise in claims on the core \nprivate sector. The contribution of the \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nFigure 2.2: Credit to the Economy\n \n-5000\n0\n5000\n10000\n15000\n20000\nH2 2012\nH1 2013\nH2 2013\nNDC\nCP\nNCG\nN Billion\n12\nwith a share of 24.4 per cent, followed by \nmanufacturing (12.9 per cent) and the \ngeneral sector (11.6 per cent). The share \nof the agricultural sector declined to 3.7 \nper cent, from 4.0 per cent in the first half \nof 2013 (Table 2.1).\n2.1.2\nSectoral Classification of \nPrivate Sector Credit\nTotal bank loans and advances to the \nvarious sectors of the economy grew by \n13.9 per cent to N10,042.71 billion at \nend-December 2013. The oil and gas \nsector recorded the highest growth rate, \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nFigure 2.3: Consumer Credit\n \n0%\n10%\n20%\n30%\n40%\n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n700\n800\n900\nSECOND HALF 2012\nFIRST HALF 2013\nSECOND HALF 2013\nConsumer Credits\nGrowth over end-Dec\nRatio of Credit to Core private sector\nNBillion\npercent\nTable 2.1: Consumer Credit by Sector\n13\nSector\nN'Billion \nPer cent\nN'Billion \nPer cent\nOil and Gas\n2,002.26\n22.72\n2,450.48\n24.40\nManufacturing\n1,196.64\n13.58\n1,295.41\n12.90\nGeneral\n1,017.03\n11.54\n1,164.42\n11.59\nInformation and Communication\n845.86\n9.60\n881.22\n8.77\nGeneral Commerce\n777.45\n8.80\n807.51\n8.04\nGovernments\n684.48\n7.77\n764.91\n7.62\nReal Estate Activities\n414.44\n4.70\n450.10\n4.48\nConstruction\n394.26\n4.47\n431.27\n4.29\nAgriculture, Forestry and Fishing\n352.43\n4.00\n370.63\n3.69\nFinance and Insurance\n247.70\n2.80\n324.21\n3.23\nTransportation and Storage\n235.09\n2.67\n291.44\n2.90\nCapital Market\n192.83\n2.19\n255.79\n2.55\nPower and Energy\n131.11\n1.49\n193.98\n1.93\nProfessional, Scientific and Technical Activities\n125.90\n1.43\n159.13\n1.58\nEducation\n74.16\n0.84\n70.99\n0.71\nAdministrative and Support Service Activities\n54.55\n0.62\n58.67\n0.58\nHuman Health and Social Work Activities\n22.19\n0.25\n32.38\n0.32\nActivities of Extraterritorial Organizations and Bodies\n18.07\n0.21\n14.66\n0.15\nMining and Quarrying\n10.59\n0.12\n11.35\n0.11\nWater Supply Sewerage, Waste Management and Remediation \nActivities\n8.38\n0.10\n8.22\n0.08\nArts, Entertainment and Recreation\n8.05\n0.09\n3.98\n0.04\nPublic Utilities\n0.88\n0.01\n1.96\n0.02\nTotal \n8,814.36\n100.00\n10,042.71\n100.00\nJun. 2013\nDec. 2013\nsecond half of 2013. On the average, \ncredits maturing within one year \naccounted for 52.6 per cent, compared \nwith 57.1 per cent in the first half of 2013. \nThe medium-term (≥1yr and < 3yrs) and \nlong-term (3yrs and above) maturities \nstood at 19.1 and 28.3 per cent in the \nreview period, compared with 19.7 and \n23.2 per cent, respectively, in the first half \nof 2013. \nSimilarly, deposits of below one-year \nmaturity constituted 97.1 per cent of total \ndeposits (out of which 76.7 per cent had \nmaturity of less than 30 days), compared \nwith 96.9 per cent at end-June 2013. The \nmedium and long-term deposits \nconstituted 2.8 and 0.003 per cent in the \nreview period, compared with 3.1 and \n0.05 per cent recorded in the first half of \n2.1.3\nReserve Money\n2.1.4\nMaturity Structure of Bank \nDeposits and Credits\nReserve money (RM) increased at the \nend of the second half of 2013 and was \nhigher than the indicative benchmark for \n2013. It rose by 71.8 per cent to N5,558.9 \nbillion at end-December 2013, in contrast \nto the decline of 12.6 per cent recorded at \nthe end of the first half of 2013. This \ndevelopment reflected the 108.9 and 24.6 \nper cent increases in bank deposit with \nthe Bank and currency-in-circulation, \nrespectively. The corresponding rise in \nthe sources of reserve money, relative to \nthe first half of 2013, was attributed to \nincreases in net domestic credit and other \nassets (net) of the Bank. \nShort-term maturities remained \ndominant in the credit market in the \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nFigure 2.4: Sectoral Allocation of Credit\n0\n500\n1000\n1500\n2000\n2500\n3000\nOil&Gas\nMANUFACTURING\nGENERAL\nINFORMATION & COMMUNICATION\nGENERAL COMMERCE \nGOVERNMENTS\nREAL ESTATE ACTIVITIES\nCONSTRUCTION\nAGRICULTURE, FORESTRY AND FISHING\n \n \nFINANCE AND INSURANCE\n \nTRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE\n \n \nCAPITAL MARKET\n \nPOWER AND ENERGY\n \n \nPROFESSIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND…\n \nEDUCATION\nADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT SERVICE…\n \nHUMAN HEALTH AND SOCIAL WORK…\nACTIVITIES OF EXTRATERRITORIAL…\nMINING AND QUARRYING\nWATER SUPPLY SEWERAGE, WASTE MGT. &… \nARTS, ENTERTAINMENT AND RECREATION\nPUBLIC UTILITIES \nJun. 2013\nDec. 2013\n14\nfor longer loan maturities. Thus, the \nobserved mismatch portends refinancing \nand re-pricing risks for the system.\nThe banking industry was dominated by a \nfew banks as the average market share of \n2.1.5\nMarket Structure of the \nBanking Industry\n2013, respectively. The continued \ndominance of short-term deposits \nconstrained the ability of banks to lend \nlong term loans and especially to the real \nsector which typically has a preference \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nFigure 2.5: Distribution of Bank Loans and Advances by Maturity\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\nSECOND HALF 1012\nFIRST HALF 2013\nSECOND HALF 2013\nPer cent\nShort term\nMedium term\nLong term\nFigure 2.6: Distribution of Banks' Deposit Structure\n-0.5\n0.5\n1.5\n2.5\n3.5\n96.6\n96.7\n96.8\n96.9\n97\n97.1\n97.2\n97.3\n97.4\n97.5\nSECOND HALF 2012\nFIRST HALF 2013\nSECOND HALF 2013\nShort term\nMedium term\nPer cent\nPer cent\nassets and deposits, stood at 13.71 and \n15.14 per cent, respectively, compared \nwith 13.57 and 15.17 per cent at end-June \n2013. However, the banking industry \nremained competitive in both deposits \nand assets as revealed by the respective \nHerfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of \n798.08 and 750.16 for total deposits and \nassets and deposits of the six largest \nbanks (concentration ratio–CR ) stood at \n6\n50.68 and 52.23 per cent, respectively. \nDuring the review period, the market \nshare of the largest bank, in terms of \n15\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nFigure 2.7: Market Concentration Ratios of Banks (Assets and Deposits)\n700.0\n720.0\n740.0\n760.0\n780.0\n800.0\n820.0\n49.5\n50.0\n50.5\n51.0\n51.5\n52.0\n52.5\n53.0\nSECOND HALF 2012\nFIRST HALF 2013\nSECOND HALF 2013\nHHI\nCR\nCR( Assets)\nCR(Deposits)\nHHI (Deposits) rhs\nHHI (Assets)rhs\nduring the review period.\nA new unit was created in the CBN to \nformulate policies on Islamic finance and \nserve as a secretariat for the Financial \nRegulation Advisory Council of Experts \n(FRACE).The roles and responsibilities \nof the Unit include the following:\n·\nDevelop policies on the Non-\nInterest Financial Institutions \n(NIFIs) under the purview of the \nCBN;\n·\nProcess requests for the \nestablishment of NIFIs; \n·\nDevelop guidelines for the \noperations of NIFIs; \n·\nArrange and co-ordinate the \nmeetings of FRACE; \n·\nReceive requests and queries \ndirected to the Council from \nNIFIs and other regulatory \nauthorities; and\n·\nDevelop parameters for non-\ninterest products and instruments \nissued by the NIFIs.\nNigerian banks continued to expand their \noperations outside the country with the \n2.4\nCross-border Collaboration\n 2.2\nImplementation of the 2010 \nBanking Model\n2.3\nNon-Interest (Islamic) \nBanking\nThe deadline for the implementation of \nthe prescribed banking model introduced \nin October 2010 expired on June 30, \n2013. At end-December 2013, most of \nthe banks had complied with the \nRegulation on the Scope of Banking \nActivities and Ancillary Matters by \ndivesting from their non-banking \nactivities.\nAs part of efforts to promote non-interest \nbanking (NIB) in Nigeria, the CBN \nintensified collaboration with \ninternational agencies, such as the \nIslamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) \nand the International Islamic Liquidity \nManagement Corporation (IILM) in the \nreview period.\nAs evidence of growing interest in NIB \nproducts and services in Nigeria, one \nbank was granted approval to operate a \nnon-interest banking window, while an \n16\nassets, compared with 797.36 and 748.55, \nrespectively, in the preceding period. \n(Figure 2.7)\nApproval-in-Principle (AIP) was issued \nto a micro-finance bank (MFB) to \nestablish a state-wide non-interest MFB \nhost regulators. The MoUs facilitated \ninformation sharing, consolidated \nsupervision and joint examinations \nacross jurisdictions. In the review period, \nopening of seven subsidiaries across the \nAfrican continent during the review \nperiod, bringing the total to 64 at end-\nDecember 2013 (Table 2.2). The increase \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nTable 2.2: Distribution of Off-shore Subsidiaries of Nigerian Banks\n \n \ns\nes\n& \nRegion\nSubsidiaries\nRepresentative Office\nBranch\nJan-Jun \n2013\nJul-Dec \n2013\nJan-Jun \n2013\nJul-Dec \n2013\nWest Africa\n32\n35\n-\n-\nThe Rest of Africa \n17\n20\n4\n4\nEurope, N/ America\n& Asia\n9\n9\n5\n5\n58\n64\n9\n \n9\n \nthe CBN also initiated the process of \nsigning an MoU with the Bank of \nMauritius, while collaborative \ndiscussions on the MoUs with the Central \nBank of Sudan and the Banque Central du \nCongo continued.\nDuring the review period, agreements \nwere reached on the establishment of a \nCollege of Supervisors for the banking \nsubsidiaries of Ecobank Transnational \nIncorporated (ETI) led by the Central \nBank of West African States (BCEAO), \nand a College of Supervisors for the \nUnited Bank of Africa, led by the CBN. \nIn order to ascertain the health of foreign \nsubsidiaries of Nigerian banks, the CBN \nexamined 14 of them in the review \nperiod. Of this number, eight (8) were \njointly conducted with host supervisors, \nwhile six (6) were solely carried out by \nthe CBN. Six (6) examination reports \nwere issued during the period, which \nindicated that three (3) of the subsidiaries \n2.4.2\nColleges of Supervisors\n2.4.3\nCross-border Examination\nin foreign subsidiaries was as a result of \nfour acquisitions in West Africa and three \nin East Africa, while one bank divested \nfrom a subsidiary in West Africa.\nThe cross-border expansion of Nigerian \nbanks has continued to be motivated by \nseveral factors which include profit \nmaximization, risk diversification, the \ndemand pull from corporate clients, and \nincreasing business opportunities. \nHowever, the expansion exposes the \nNigerian financial system to regional \ncontagion risk. \nThe major thrust in managing the \ncontagion risk is the timely exchange of \ninformation amongst home and host \nregulatory authorities. This is facilitated \nthrough the execution of MoUs, the \nactivities of the College of Supervisors, \nand cross-border examination.\nAt end-December 2013, 15 MoUs had \nbeen executed between the CBN and the \n2.4.1\nMemoranda of Understanding \n(MoUs)\n17\nsector is divided by institution-type: \nDevelopment Finance Institutions \n(DFIs), Primary Mortgage Banks \n(PMBs), Microfinance Banks (MFBs), \nFinance Companies (FCs), and Bureaux \nde Change (BDCs). In terms of total \nnumber of OFIs in operation, the figure \nrose to 3,858 at end-December 2013, \nrepresenting an increase of 9.95 per cent \nover the 3,509 recorded at end-June \n2013. The number comprised 6 \nDevelopment Finance Institutions \n(DFIs), 82 Primary Mortgage Banks \n(PMBs), 820 Microfinance Banks \n(MFBs), 61 Finance Companies (FCs) \nand 2,889 Bureaux de Change (BDCs). \nThe increase was accounted for by \napprovals to resume operations/licences \ngranted to 456 operators (1 DFI, 4 MFBs \nand 451 BDCs) and the exit of 107 OFIs \n(83 MFBs, 4 FCs and 20 BDCs) during \nthe review period. Total assets of the sub-\nsector similarly increased by 39.00 per \ncent to N1,565.65 billion at end-\nDecember 2013, from N1,126.40 billion \nat end-June 2013. Paid-up capital and net \nloans/advances also increased by 156.10 \nand 43.75 per cent to N532.31 billion and \nN673.95 billion, respectively, at end-\nDecember 2013. Total deposit liabilities \nfollowed the same pattern, increasing by \n10.73 per cent to N457.56 billion at end-\nDecember 2013, from N413.22 billion at \nend-June 2013. \nThe specific developments analyzed \nunder each segment/OFI-type were as \nfollows: \nAt end-December 31, 2013, the number \nof DFIs under the supervisory purview of \nthe CBN was six (6), compared with five \n(5) at end-June 2013. The increase \nresulted from the re-emergence, in \nOctober 2013, of the National Economic \nReconstruction Fund (NERFUND). \n2.5.1\nDevelopment Finance \nInstitutions (DFIs)\nhad a “Moderate” composite risk rating \nwhile three (3) other subsidiaries had a \nrisk rating of “Above Average”. \nThe CBN and the entire banking industry \nhave adopted the Nigerian Sustainable \nBanking Principles. This is to ensure that \nfinancial institutions get committed to \neconomic growth that is environmentally \nresponsible and socially relevant. The \nNigerian Sustainable Banking Principles \nconsist of the following nine overarching \ncommitments:\n·\nManaging environmental and \nsocial risks;\n·\nManaging each bank's own \nenvironmental and social \nfootprints;\n·\nSafeguarding human rights;\n·\nPromoting women's economic \nparticipation and empowerment;\n·\nPromoting financial inclusion;\n·\nEnsuring good governance, \ntransparency and accountability;\n·\nSupporting capacity building in \nthe sector;\n·\nPromoting collaborative \npartnership to accelerate sector \nprogress; and\n·\nReporting to take stock of \nprogress.\nDuring the review period, the Bank \nissued guidelines on sustainable bank \nlending to the power, aviation as well as \nthe oil and gas sectors. A reporting \ntemplate was also developed to \nstandardize reporting by financial \ninstitutions.\nDuring the review period, significant \ndevelopments were recorded in each of \nthe five segments into which the sub-\n2.4.4\nNigerian Sustainable Banking \nPrinciples\n2.5 Other Financial Institutions \n(OFIs)\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\n18\nminimum of N2.5 billion (for state \nlicence) and N5 billion (for national \nlicence), 40 PMBs met the new capital \nrequirement. Further analysis of the \nexisting 82 PMBs indicated that: seven \n(7) emerged as National PMBs; 33 as \nState PMBs; four (4) were subsumed in \nmerger and acquisition arrangements; 13 \napplied for conversion to OFI-types, with \nlower capital requirements; and 25 were \nunable to meet the re-capitalization \ndeadline. \nAnalysis of PMBs' financial information \nshowed that their total assets increased by \n32.77 per cent to N484.01 billion at end-\nDecember 2013, from N364.54 billion at \nend-June 2013. Paid-up capital and \nshareholders' funds also increased by \n117.97 and 88.33 per cent to N150.25 \nbillion and N144.58 billion, respectively, \nat end-December 2013, from N68.93 \nbillion and N76.77 billion respectively at \nend-June 2013. The growth was \nattributed to the effort of PMBs to comply \nwith the new capital requirements under \nthe mortgage/housing finance sector \nreforms. Similarly, loans/advances and \ndeposits increased by 21.05 and 0.12 per \ncent to N157.40 billion and N164.69 \nbillion, respectively, at end-December \n2013, from N130.03 billion and N164.50 \nbillion, respectively, at end-June 2013, \nrespectively.\nThe Nigeria Mortgage Re-finance \nCompany Plc (NMRC) was incorporated \nin the second half of 2013 as a second-\ntier, mono-line institution to promote the \navailability and affordability of housing \nto Nigerians by providing liquidity in the \nmortgage market through financial \ninstitutions. The NMRC is expected to \naddress the mismatch between the short-\nterm tenor of deposit liabilities and the \nlong-term nature of mortgage assets. This \n2.5.2.1 Mortgage Refinancing\nFollowing the appointment of a new \nmanagement team, the process of \nrestructuring and recapitalizing the Fund, \nas well as the recovery of loans, \ncommenced. \nProvisional data showed that the total \nassets of the 6 DFIs increased by 31.26 \nper cent to N586.66 billion at end-\nDecember 2013, from N446.94 billion at \nend-June 2012.The increase in aggregate \nassets was due to the improved financial \nperformance of the Bank of Industry \n(BOI), Bank of Agriculture (BOA), and \nThe Infrastructure Bank (TIB), while the \ndata showed that the financial \nperformance of FMBN and NEXIM \ndeclined marginally during the review \nperiod. The paid-up capital and net \nloans/advances of the institutions \nincreased by 227.44 and 57.86 per cent to \nN230.94 billion and N358.21 billion, \nrespectively, as at December 31, 2013. \nAlso, total deposit liabilities increased by \n56.22 per cent to N171.81 billion at end-\nDecember 2013. A disaggregation of the \ntotal assets showed that BOA, FMBN, \nNEXIM, TIB, BOI and NERFUND \naccounted for 8.85, 24.03, 9.13, 5.22, \n50.49 and 2.28 per cent, respectively, \nwhile their respective shares of the total \nloans and advances were 7.22, 31.59, \n8.55, 3.93, 45.57 and 3.13 per cent.\nIn the area of corporate governance, the \nreview period also witnessed the \nreconstitution of the Boards of Directors \nof BOA and NEXIM. Those of FMBN \nand the privatized TIB were already in \nplace while BOI and NERFUND were \nstill being governed by a Shareholders' \nand Interim Management Committees, \nrespectively. \nAt the expiration of the December 31, \n2013 deadline for operators of PMBs to \nincrease their capital to the prescribed \n2.5.2\nPrimary Mortgage Banks\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\n19\nDecember 2013, from N278.93 billion at \nend-June 2013. The paid-up share capital \nand net loans/advances also decreased by \n2.54 and 8.92 per cent to N67.40 billion \nand N129.03 billion, respectively, at end-\nDecember 2013, from N69.16 billion and \nN141.67 billion, respectively, at end-\nJune 2013. Similarly, aggregate reserves \ndecreased to N5.56 billion at end-\nDecember 2013, compared with N5.76 \nbillion at end-June 2013, reflecting a \ndecline of 3.47 per cent. The decrease \nwas attributed, largely, to the revocation \nof the licenses of 83 MFBs.\nIn 2013, the Microfinance Certification \nProgramme (MCP), which was \nintroduced to bridge the observed skills \ngap in the microfinance industry, \nconcluded its second phase and with it, \nthe withdrawal of the subsidy to it by the \nCBN and the NDIC. The subsidy, \ndesigned to nurture the fledgling \nprogramme, had entailed the payment of \n60 per cent of the total cost of training. \nThe CBN will, however, continue to co-\nordinate the Programme and accredit the \nMicrofinance Training Service Providers \n(MTSPs). During the first four years of \nthe Programme, a total of 9,352 operators \nof microfinance banks were trained in the \n12 runs organized for the two approved \nlevels of training as against the set target \nof 6,000, representing a 156 per cent \nperformance rate. Of the 9,352 trained \nMFB operators, 2,202 have been certified \nby the Chartered Institute of Bankers of \nNigeria and are spread over 632 MFBs. \nThe Programme was also extended to \nnon-executive directors of MFBs and \nother stakeholders, with a total of 1,406 \nnon-executive directors and 223 \nregulators having been trained in 2012 \nand 2013. \n \nThe number of operating finance \ncompanies (FCs) fell to 61 at end-\n2.5.4\nFinance Companies\nwould be achieved by raising long-term \nfunds from the capital market and other \nsources of debt capital to re-finance \neligible mortgages originated by the \nfinancial institutions. To ensure a smooth \ntake-off of the NMRC, the Federal \nGovernment of Nigeria secured a 40-year \nterm loan of US$ 300 million from the \nWorld Bank, on International \nDevelopment Association (IDA) terms. \nOf the total loan, US$250 million was for \nthe NMRC, US$25 million for financing \nmicro-housing”, and US$25 million for a \nmortgage-guarantee programme to \nenable low income borrowers to access \nmortgage loans.\nFollowing the CBN's “No Objection” \napproval in 2012 for the registration of \nmortgage brokers in Nigeria, the \nMortgage Banking Association of \nNigeria (MBAN), in July 2013, released \nthe guidelines for mortgage brokerage \ncompanies/operators in Nigeria. The \nguidelines created a new class of \noperators in the system - Licensed \nProfessional Mortgage Brokers - who are \nauthorized to solicit for borrowers; \nnegotiate, find and place mortgages; as \nwell as provide related advisory services \n- for a fee.\nThe number of licensed microfinance \nbanks (MFBs) fell to 820 at end-\nDecember 2013 from 899 at end-June \n2013. The fall was due to the revocation \nof the licenses of 83 institutions that were \nconfirmed to have either closed shop or \nceased to carry on microfinance business, \nwhile four new MFBs were licensed. Of \nthe existing 820 MFBs four (4) operated \nas National, 69 as State, and 753 as Unit \nMFBs. Available data indicated that the \ntotal assets of MFBs decreased by 2.88 \nper cent to N270.90 billion at end-\n2.5.2.2 Guidelines on Mortgage \nBrokerage\n2.5.3\nMicrofinance Banks\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\n20 \ndedicated to enterprises promoted by \nwomen. The Financial Inclusion \nSecretariat was also established in the \nreview period to co-ordinate the financial \ninclusion programmes in the country.\nFollowing the adoption of the tiered-\nKYC and the need to mitigate the \nassociated risk, CBN's Anti Money \nLaundering/Combating the Financing of \nTerrorism Regulation 77 (1)-(8) was \namended to require financial institutions \nto:\n·\nAllow third parties with acceptable \nmeans of identification, such as \nclergymen, village/clan heads and \nheadmasters, to identify the \nfinancially excluded persons, for \naccount opening purposes;\n·\nFormulate policies on financially \ndisadvantaged customers and \nprescribe the type of documents to \nbe provided by third-party \nidentifiers;\n·\nAdopt a risk-based approach on the \noperation of this category of \ncustomers; and\n·\nEnhance the monitoring of such \naccounts, customers and third party \nidentifiers and render monthly \nreturns to the CBN and the NFIU \non their operations.\nIt is expected that full implementation of \nthese measures will improve access to \nformal financial services.\nT h e B a n k c o m m e n c e d t h e \nimplementation of its Financial Literacy \nAwareness/Enlightenment initiative, in \nline with its financial inclusion strategy, \nthrough public workshops, road shows, a \nsecondary schools programme, and the \n2.6.1\nFinancial Literacy\nDecember 2013, from 65 at end-June \n2013. This was due to the voluntary \nliquidation of two (2) FCs and \ndiscontinuation of finance company \nbusiness by two (2) others, while one (1) \nwas sealed up and is being investigated \nby the Economic and Financial Crimes \nCommission. One (1) new FC was \nlicensed in the period.\nTotal assets of FCs increased to N103.05 \nbillion at end-December 2013, from \nN82.13 billion at end-June 2013, \nreflecting a growth of 25.47 per cent. \nSimilarly, paid-up capital increased by \n3.23 per cent to N14.69 billion at end-\nDecember 2013, from N14.23 billion at \nend-June 2013. Aggregate reserves rose \nto N3.59 billion at end-December 2013, \nfrom N0.07 billion at end-June 2013. Net \nloans/advances and borrowings also \nincreased by 68.58 and 20.64 per cent to \nN46.68 billion and N59.22 billion, \nrespectively, at end-December 2013, \nfrom N27.69 billion and N49.09 billion, \nrespectively, at end-June 2013.\nAs part of efforts to implement the \nnational financial inclusion strategy, the \ngeo-spatial mapping of financial services \naccess points was launched in July \n2013.The mapping exercise was aimed at \nproviding consumer information by \nindicating the geographic distribution of \nfinancial access points across the country, \nincluding banks, other financial \ninstitutions, non-governmental \norganisations, ATMs, and Nigeria Postal \nService offices.\nThe N220 billion Micro Small and \nMedium Enterprises Development Fund \n(MSMEDF) was launched on August 15, \n2013 to provide wholesale funding to \nMFBs/MFIs, as well as enhance access to \nfinancial services by women. Towards \nthis end, 60 per cent of the Fund was \n2.6 Financial Inclusion\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\n21\n2.7 Financial Markets\n2.7.1\nThe Money Market\nThe Bank maintained its tight monetary \npolicy stance in 2013. Money market \nrates were relatively stable during the \nreview period, due to the responsiveness \nof the Bank to developments in the \nmarket through effective liquidity \nmanagement. Rates at the inter-bank \nfunds market moved upward in August \nand September 2013, due to tight \nliquidity in the banking system. The \nmovement followed the implementation \nof the increase in CRR on public sector \ndeposits, as the DMBs had to borrow at a \nhigher cost to rebalance their portfolio \npositions and comply with prudential \nrequirements. Rates, however, \nmoderated to their pre-August levels in \nthe last quarter of the year, as overall \nliquidity in the banking system improved \nand inter-bank funds intermediation \nslowed down.\nThe weighted average monthly OBB and \nInter-bank Call rates closed at 11.16 and \n10.86 per cent, respectively, at end-\nDecember 2013, compared with 11.66 \nengagement of the media.\nThe secondary schools programme was \ndesigned by the Bank to teach school \nchildren the rudiments of banking and the \nneed to imbibe the culture of savings, \nbudgeting and investment.\nIn addition, the Bank developed and \nc i r c u l a t e d \np u b l i c \nenlightenment/educational materials on: \n'How to Lodge Complaints', 'Consumer \nBill of Rights' and '101 Ways to Save \nMoney in Nigeria'.\nDuring the review period, the Financial \nLiteracy Steering Committee (FLSC), \ncomprising all heads of financial sector \nregulatory institutions, representatives of \nthe Federal Ministries of Education, \nF i n a n c e , I n f o r m a t i o n a n d \nCommunication Technology, was \ninaugurated by the CBN Governor. The \nCommittee was established to ensure \nimplementation of the Financial Literacy \nFramework, through policy formulation \nand oversight of the implementation arm \nof the Committee.\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nFigure 2.8: Inter-bank Rates Movements\nJanuary\nFebruary\nMarch\nApril\nMay\nJune\nJuly\nAugust\nSeptember\nOctober\nNovember\nDecember\nInter-bank\n11.84\n11.78\n10.39\n11.25\n12.15\n12.05\n11.08\n14.61\n16.98\n10.65\n11.22\n10.86\nOBB\n11.72\n11.66\n10.29\n11.15\n11.89\n11.66\n10.90\n13.68\n17.82\n11.12\n10.99\n11.16\nSDF\n10.00\n10.00\n10.00\n10.00\n10.00\n10.00\n10.00\n10.00\n10.00\n10.00\n10.00\n10.00\nMPR\n12.00\n12.00\n12.00\n12.00\n12.00\n12.00\n12.00\n12.00\n12.00\n12.00\n12.00\n12.00\nSLF\n14.00\n14.00\n14.00\n14.00\n14.00\n14.00\n14.00\n14.00\n14.00\n14.00\n14.00\n14.00\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n16\n18\n20\nInter bank; OBB, SDF, MPR and SLF Rates(%)\n-\n22\nrestriction on importation of foreign \ncurrency, subject to CBN approval; \npayment of receipts of the proceeds of \ninternational money transfers in naira; \nand an increase in the amount spendable \non naira debit and credit cards to \nUS$150,000 from US$40,000 per \nannum.\nThe WDAS operated in the third quarter \nuntil October 2, 2013 when they were \nreplaced by the RDAS in a bid to check \nthe persistent demand pressures in the \nforeign exchange markets and curb the \nhuge movement of cash without the \nrequired documentation and reporting to \nthe monetary authorities. The re-\nintroduction of the RDAS was aimed at \nmonitoring the utilisation of funds in \norder to curtail round tripping and ensure \nexchange rate stability.\nThe average foreign exchange rate at the \nRDAS and Inter-bank segments \nappreciated by 0.02 and 0.60 per cent to \nN157.2742/$ and N159.0505/$, \nand 12.05 per cent at end-June 2013. \nThe Scripless Securities Settlement \nSystem (S4) was deployed in December \n2013 to provide a straight-through \nprocess for securities trading and \nsettlement. The S4 is geared towards \nfacilitating electronic management of \nsecurities by easing transfer and \nsettlement of OBB transactions, thereby \nboosting activities in the segment. It is \nalso aimed at facilitating delivery versus \npayment (DvP) settlements and reducing \nsettlement risks, thus encouraging \ntrading in Federal Government debt \ninstruments.\nDuring the review period, the CBN \nintroduced a number of policies to \naddress inherent risks to exchange rate \nstability and check money laundering. \nThese included: the re-introduction of the \nRetail Dutch Auction System (RDAS); \nthe pegging of purchases from DMBs to \nUS$250,000 by each BDC per week; \n2.7.2\nThe Foreign Exchange Market\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nFigure 2.9: WDAS, Inter-bank and BDC Rates, 2013\nJan\nFeb\nMar\nApr\nMay\nJun\nJul\nAug\nSep\nOct\nNov\nDec\nW/DAS-SPT (incl. 1% comm.)\n157.30\n157.30\n157.31\n157.31\n157.30\n157.31\n157.32\n157.31\n157.32\n157.42\n157.27\n157.27\nInter-Bank\n156.96\n157.52\n158.38\n158.20\n158.02\n160.01\n161.12\n161.15\n161.96\n159.83\n158.79\n159.05\nBDC\n159.12\n158.70\n159.80\n159.81\n159.57\n160.98\n162.43\n162.28\n163.14\n165.00\n167.19\n171.40\n145\n150\n155\n160\n165\n170\n175\nInter-bank/ OBB Volume (N'B)\n23\nrespectively, while the average rate at the \nBDC segment depreciated by 6.08 per \ncent to close at N171.4000/$ at end-\nDecember 2013.\nTransactions on the Nigerian Stock \nExchange (NSE) were bullish during the \nreview period as both the All Share Index \n(ASI) and Market Capitalization (MC) \ntrended upwards. The development was \nattributed to improved corporate earnings \nby blue chip companies and increased \np o r t f o l i o i n v e s t m e n t . T h e \nimplementation of the Transformation \nAgenda of the Federal Government, such \nas privatization of the power sector and \nthe Subsidy Re-investment and \nEmpowerment Programme (SURE-P) \nbolstered capital investment. Salient \ninstitutional developments were also \ncontributory factors.\nThe Ten-Year Master Plan Committees, \nwhich the Securities and Exchange \nCommission (SEC) set up to articulate \nmodalities for moving the market \nforward, presented their interim reports \nrd\nduring the 3 Annual Capital Market \nCommittee Retreat in November 2013. \nThe Committees are:\nI.\nCapital Market Master Plan \nCommittee;\nii.\nCapital Market Literacy Master \nPlan Committee; and\niii. Non-interest Capital Market \nP r o d u c t s M a s t e r P l a n \nCommittee.\nThe Committees were expected to submit \ntheir final reports by March 2014.\n2.7.3\nThe Capital Market\n2.7.3.1 The Ten-Year Blueprint \nCommittees\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\n2.7.3.2\nM i n i m u m C a p i t a l \nRequirements for Capital Market \nOperators\n2.7.3.3\nFinancial Markets Dealers \nQuotations Over-the-\nCounter Plc\nIn September 2013, the Board of the SEC \napproved a review of the minimum \ncapital requirements for registered \nmarket operators as follows:\nI.\nBrokers/Dealers\nN300 million\nii.\nTrustees\nN300 million\niii.\nBrokers\nN200 million\niv.\nIssuing Houses\nN200 million\nv.\nUnderwriters\nN200 million\nvi.\nRegistrars\nN150 million\nvii. Rating Agency\nN150 million\nviii. Fund/Portfolio \nManager\nN150 million\nix.\nDealer\nN100 million\nx.\nCorporate Investment \nAdviser\n N5 million\nxi.\nIndividual Investment \nAdviser\nN2 million\nThe Financial Markets Dealers \nQuotations Over the Counter (FMDQ-\nOTC) Plc was inaugurated on November \n7, 2013 as a SEC-licensed OTC market \nsecurities exchange and self-regulatory \norganization with a focus on the money \nmarket and government securities. The \nfunctions of the FMDQ-OTC include \nmarket governance, compliance and \ndevelopment, as well as data services to \nensure market integrity, liquidity, \ntransparency and reliability. It has also \nimproved quoting on the Nigeria Inter \nBank Offered Rate; the Nigeria Inter-\nBank Foreign Exchange Fixing; and \nyields on NTBs, FGN bonds, sub-\nnational and corporate bonds. The \nFMDQ-OTC publishes these rates on its \nelectronic platform daily.\n24\n2.7.3.4 The Bond Market\nFGN Bonds\nTotal bonds outstanding at end-\nDecember 2013 stood at N5,038.04 \nbillion, of which FGN, sub-national and \ncorporate bonds constituted N4,222.03 \nbillion (83.80%), N597.50 billion \n(11.86%) and N218.51 billion (4.34%), \nrespectively. This level reflected an \nincrease over end-June 2013 figures of \nN4,745.90 billion, comprising FGN, sub \n-national and corporate bonds valued \nN4,032.90 billion (84.98%), N498.00 \nbillion (10.49%) and N215.00 billion \n(4.53%), respectively.\nDemand for FGN Bonds at the secondary \nmarket increased as evidenced by the \ndecline in yields, compared with the \nposition at end-June 2013.This was \nattributed to the high level of liquidity in \nthe banking system and the establishment \nof the Financial Markets Dealers \nQuotations Over-the-Counter Plc. \n(FMDQ-OTC Plc) platform. The FMDQ-\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nTable 2.3: Matured FGN Bonds, July - Dec 2013\nNEW \nNOMENCLATURE\nINTEREST. \nRATE\nISSUE \nDATE\nISSUE \nAMOUNT (N)\nREDEMPTION \nDATE\nINTEREST PAY \nDATES\n3.75%+NTB RATE \nFGN SEP 2013\n3.75% + NTB \nRATE\n27-10-2003\n599,454,000\n30-09-2013\n31 MAR & 30 \nSEP.\n12.74% FGN OCT \n2013\n12.74%\n27/10/2006\n \n10,000,000,000\n \n27/10/2013\n27 APR & 27 \nOCT\n10.98% FGN NOV \n2013\n10.98%\n24/11/2006\n \n10,000,000,000\n \n24/11/2013\n24 MAY & 24 \nNOV\n11.99% FGN DEC \n2013\n11.99%\n22/12/2006\n10,000,000,000\n22/12/2013\n22 JUN & 22 \nDEC.\n10.50% FGN NOV \n2013\n10.50%\n28/11/2008\n200,000,000,000\n28/11/2013\n28 MAY & 28 \nNOV.\nOTC Plc platform standardized OTC \ntransactions. \nFive (5) bonds matured and were \nredeemed by the Federal Government \nduring the review period. These were the \n3.75%+NTB Rate FGN September 2013, \nthe 12.74% FGN October 2013, the \n10.98% FGN November 2013, the \n11.99% FGN December 2013 and the \n10.50% FGN November 2013 (Table \n2.3).\nWith headline inflation at single digit, \nFGN bonds remained attractive to \ninvestors. The yield curve reflected \ninvestors' expectations of future \nmonetary policy tightening. Therefore, \nthey demanded higher compensation on \nthe long-dated assets. Another reason \nwas that investors were swapping long- \nfor short-term assets, thus pushing down \nlong-term asset prices and raising their \nyield. \n25\nvalued N130.00 billion in the first half of \n2013. Total outstanding bonds held by 14 \nstate governments stood at N597.50 \nbillion.\nSub-National Bonds\nTwo state governments issued bonds \nvalued N99.50 billion, compared with \nthree state governments that issued bonds \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nFigure 2.10: Yield Curves for Nigeria\n9.00%\n10.00%\n11.00%\n12.00%\n13.00%\n14.00%\n15.00%\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n16\n18\n20\nYield\nTime to Maturity \nDec-2013\nDec-2012\nJun-2013\nSource: Financial Markets Dealers Quotations\nTable 2.4: New Sub-national Bonds Issued During the Review Period\nState \nGovernment\nBond Features\nValue \n(N Billion)\nIssue Date\nNiger\n14% Fixed Rate 5-Year Amortiz ing \nBond (Tranche 1)\n \n12.0\nNov-13\nLagos\n13.50% Fixed Rate 7-Year Bullet \nPayment Bond (Tranche 4)\n \n87.5\nNov-13\nTotal\n99.5\nN12.94 billion in the first half of 2013.\nCorporate Bonds\nThree corporate bonds were issued, \nvalued N10.60 billion, compared with \n26\ninvestors invested N203.60 billion in the \nequities market while total sales \namounted to N255.80 billion, compared \nwith N327.66 billion and N254.98 billion \ninvested and sold by foreign investors, \nrespectively, in the first half of 2013. The \ndevelopment reflected a decline in \nforeign portfolio investments in the \nreview period. As a result of risks posed \nto the stability of the market by the \ncontinued decline in foreign portfolio \ninvestment, the Bank will continue to \nmonitor movements in portfolio funds to \nensure system stability. \nDuring the review period, NIRSAL Plc \naccomplished the following: \n·\nIssued four (4) Credit Risk \nGuarantees (CRGs) valued \nN3.051 billion to four (4) \ncounterparties, compared with 22 \nCRGs valued N6.653 billion \nissued in the first half of 2013;\n·\nPaid the sum of N67.52 million to \n18 customers from eleven (11) \n2.8\nReal Sector Intervention\n2.8.1\nThe Nigerian Incentive-based \nRisk Sharing System for \nAgricultural Lending \n(NIRSAL) Plc.\n2.7.3.5\nThe Equities Market\nIn the review period, several initiatives \nwere taken to enhance the performance of \nthe equities market. Specifically, the \nNSE: \n·\nLaunched the electronic issuers \nportal, called X-Issuer, to \nenhance efficiency, compliance \nand integrity in the market; \n·\nPartnered with Standard & \nPoor's, Dow Jones, and Morgan \nStanley Capital International for \nthe generation of key market data;\n·\nMigrated to a new trading \nplatform (X-Gen); and\n·\nEstablished an OTC market \nplatform in un-listed equities by \nthe National Association of \nSecurities Dealers to standardize \noperations and promote liquidity, \nefficiency and reliability in the \nmarket.\nThese initiatives resulted in increased \ntrading activities on the floor of the NSE \nand led to a significant rise in market \nindices, as the ASI and MC attained new \nheights since May 2008. The NSE ASI \nclosed at 39,858.23 at end-December \n2013, from 36,164.31 at end-June 2013.\nDuring the review period, foreign \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nTable 2.5: New Corporate Bonds Issued in the Second Half of 2013 \nCompany\nDescription\nValue \n(Nbillion)\nIssue Date\nLacasera Company \nPlc\n15.75% Fixed Rate 5\n-Year \nAmortising Bond \n \n3.0\nOct-13\nFSDH SPV Plc\n14.25% Fixed Rate 3\n-Year \nAmortising Bond\n \n5.5\nOct-13\nNAHCO\n15.25% Fixed Rate 7\n-Year \nBullet Payment Bond\n2.1\nDec-13\nTotal\n10.6\n27 \nand 62.6 per cent in number and value of \nloans, respectively.\nThe increases in the second half of 2013 \nwere attributed to a number of factors, \namong which are the:\n·\nIntensity of farming activities in \nthe northern part of the country \nthat peaked with the rains in the \nsecond half of the year;\n·\nIncrease in the number of \nparticipating microfinance banks; \nand\n·\nPrompt processing and payment \nof interest drawback claims.\n2.8.2\nThe Commercial Agriculture \nCredit Scheme\nThe Bank continued to finance large \nprojects in the agricultural value chain \nthrough the Commercial Agriculture \nCredit Scheme (CACS) established in \n2009. In the review period, N9.90 billion \nwas disbursed to sixteen (16) projects \nthrough nine (9) banks in the second half \nof 2013, compared with N16.26 billion \ndisbursed to 19 projects in the first half of \n2013. This reflected decreases of 15.79 \nand 39.12 per cent, respectively, in \nnumber and value. Analysis of the value \nof funds disbursed also showed that \nmarketing, storage, production and \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nTable 2.6: Activities of NIRSAL, July - Dec 2013\n28 \ncounterparties as interest \ndrawback; \n·\nGuaranteed N8.891 billion \naccessed by 59 agro-dealers and \npaid N7.781 million as interest \ndrawback to two (2) borrowers \nunder the Growth Enhancement \nScheme of the Federal Ministry of \nA g r i c u l t u r e a n d R u r a l \nDevelopment;\n·\nTrained 15,000 cocoa farmers, in \ncollaboration with GIZ/Farmers \nBusiness School; and\n·\nGuaranteed N164.0 million to \nWest African Cotton Company \nLtd's contract farmers.\nprocessing, accounted for 38.0, 24.0, 24.0 \nand 14.0 per cent, respectively, of the \ntotal funds disbursed. The recoveries \nfrom the projects for January to June \n2013 stood at N6.68 billion, while the \nfigure for July – December stood at N6.92 \nbillion.\nA total of 33,667 loans, valued N5.84 \nbillion granted by five (5) commercial \nand 50 microfinance banks were \nguaranteed in the review period. When \ncompared with 22,610 loans valued \nN3.59 billion guaranteed in the first half \nof 2013, the performance in the second \nhalf of 2013 reflected increases of 48.9 \n2.8.3\nThe Agricultural Credit \nGuarantee Scheme\nS/N\nFocus Area\nNumber of \nProjects\nAmount (N)\n(%)\n1\nPoultry Production\n \n \n2\n \n1,050,683,592\n34.44\n2\nOil Palm Processing\n \n \n1\n \n1,000,000,000\n32.78\n3\nCotton Production\n1\n1,000,000,000\n32.78\nTotal\n4\n3,050,683,592\n100\npower generated increased by 30.85 per \ncent over the level of 647.6MW \ngenerated in 2012. \nThe Fund was established to fast-track \nthe development of the manufacturing \nsector of the Nigerian economy by \nfacilitating access to credit by \nmanufacturers, improve the financial \nposition of DMBs, generate employment \nand increase foreign exchange earnings, \namong others. \nSome of the repayments were ploughed \nback to finance new SMEs, resulting in \nthe disbursement of N28.98 billion to \nfund thirty two (32) projects. \nConsequently, direct employment \ncreated by the benefiting SMEs increased \nby 22.3 per cent, and turnover increased \nby 24.9 per cent during the review period.\nDuring the review period, a total of 2,806 \nparticipants were trained by the new \nentrepreneurship development centres \nlocated in North-East (Maiduguri), \nNorth-Central (Makurdi) and South-\nSouth (Calabar). A total of 1,018 start-up \nbusinesses were thereby created, while \n317 graduates, representing 11.3 per cent \nof the total trained participants accessed \nloans valued N22.4 million to start or \nexpand their businesses. \nThe process of transferring ownership of \nthe first phase EDCs located in Kano \n(North-West), Lagos (South-West) and \nOnitsha (South-East) to the host states \nhad commenced, in line with the policy \nestablishing the Scheme. \nThe level of gross external reserves \ndecreased to US$42.85 billion at end-\n2.8.6\nThe SME Restructuring and \nRefinancing Fund\n2.8.7\nEntrepreneurship \nDevelopment Centres\n2.9\nThe External Sector\n2.8.4\nThe Small and Medium \nEnterprises Credit Guarantee \nScheme\n2.8.5\nThe Power and Aviation \nIntervention Fund\nThe Scheme, established to fast track the \ndevelopment of the Nigerian economy by \nguaranteeing bank credits to small and \nmedium enterprises (SMEs), continued \nto play a critical role in facilitating \nfunding for start-ups. The number of \nfacilities guaranteed increased by 112.5 \nper cent to 17, valued N896.78 million, in \nthe second half of 2013, from 8 facilities \nvalued N279.22 million that were \nguaranteed in the first half of 2013. \nThe Fund, established to stimulate and \nsustain investment in the power and \naviation sectors of the economy through \nthe provision of long-term credits \nsuitable for infrastructure projects, \ncontributed to enhancing the quality of \ncredits in the banking industry. Other \nimpacts of the Fund included:\n·\nImprovement in the liquidity of \nbanks and the balance sheet \npositions of the beneficiaries;\n·\nReduction of the cost of doing \nbusiness;\n·\nResuscitation of some non-\nperforming projects; and\n·\nIncrease in capacity utilization of \nbenefiting projects.\nDuring the review period, N11.628 \nbillion was disbursed to five (5) power \nprojects, compared with N39.61 billion \ndisbursed to the same number of projects \nin the first half of 2013. The power \nprojects financed through the scheme had \na combined generating capacity of \n847.4MW of power, out of which \n440.1MW was utilized by the companies \nto guarantee stable and reliable power for \ntheir manufacturing processes. The \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\n29\nindicated that the CBN, the FGN and the \nFederation holdings were US$36.94 \nbillion, US$2.62 billion and US$3.29 \nbillion, respectively, at end-December \n2013, compared with US$36.68 billion, \nUS$1.30 billion and US$6.98billion, \nrespectively at end-June 2013. Further \nanalysis showed that 83.88 per cent of the \nreserves was held in US Dollars, 5.90 per \ncent in Euro, 2.09 per cent in Renminbi, \n2.08 per cent in Pound Sterling, and 6.02 \nper cent in SDR at end-December 2013. \nTotal foreign exchange inflow during the \nsecond half of 2013 was US$21.32 \nbillion, compared with US$19.75 billion \nrecorded in the first half of 2013, \nDecember 2013, from US$44.96 billion \nat end-June 2013, representing a decline \nof US$2.11 billion or 4.69 per cent. The \ndecrease in reserves, when compared \nwith the level at the end of first half 2013, \nreflected an increase in demand and sale \nto authorized dealers. \nA breakdown of the external reserves \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nFigure 2.11: Breakdown of External Reserves\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n35\n40\n45\n50\nExternal\nReserves\nCBN Portion\nFGN Portion\nFederation\nPortion\nUS$Billion\nJun-13\nDec-13\n2013.\nSimilarly, total outflow rose to US$23.46 \nbillion in the review period, from \nUS$18.86 billion in the first half of 2013, \nreflecting an increase of US$4.60 billion \nor 24.39 per cent. Foreign exchange \nflows in the review period resulted in a \nnet outflow of US$2.14 billion.\nAt end-December 2013, the country's \nexternal reserves could finance about10 \nmonths of imports. This was lower than \nthe 11.96 months at end-June 2013, but \nhigher than the minimum international \nbenchmark of 3 months.\nIn order to manage the decreasing trend in \nreflecting an increase of US$1.57 billion \nor 7.95 per cent. The increase in gross \ninflows in the review period reflected, \nlargely, the increase in other government \nrevenues, reinforced by the rise in non-oil \nexport proceeds and interest on reserves \nand investments. The sum of US$0.24 \nbillion was recorded as unrealized \nexchange rate gain at end-December \n30\nOperational Guidelines was formally \nlaunched in November 2013 at the \nTakaful Stakeholder Engagement \nWorkshop, held in Lagos.\nIn July 2013, FBN Life Assurance, in \npartnership with Airtel Nigeria, \nintroduced a micro insurance scheme, \n'Padi4Life'. The scheme is aimed at \nproviding low-income earners living in \nremote locations a daily insurance cover \nfor permanent disability or death. For a \ndaily premium of N20, the subscriber \nwould be entitled to a N500,000 \ninsurance cover.\nIn October 2013, MTN Nigeria \nintroduced airtime-based insurance \nservice, in collaboration with Mansard \nInsurance Plc. This service would enable \nsubscribers on the platform to have \naccess to affordable life protection plan \ndirectly from their mobile phones. For a \nN15 daily premium, the subscriber would \nreceive a N350,000 insurance cover.\nThe first claim on the MTN Yello Cover \nwas made in December 2013. The \nsettlement came barely two months after \nthe launch of the service.\nOverall, the introduction of the new \nproducts would increase the patronage of \ninsurance by people in the lower segment \nof the market to purchase life insurance at \nlow cost, via the use of mobile phone \ntechnology. \nIt is envisaged that there would be \nincreased consolidation of activities \namong the 50 existing insurance \ncompanies as the pressure of competition \nforces them into mergers. Furthermore, \n2.10.1 Airtel Nigeria Life Insurance\n2.10.2 MTN Nigeria Life Assurance \nService\nreserves, a number of measures were \ntaken, including the following:\n·\nThe increase in CRR for public \nsector deposits in order to reduce \nbanks' capacity to fund \nspeculative activities in the \nforeign exchange market;\n·\nThe re-introduction of RDAS in \nplace of WDAS to reduce \nspeculation; and \n·\nReconciliation of critical inflows \ninto the reserve accounts to \nensure that all receivables are \ntracked.\nIn addition, the Federal Government \ncontinued to encourage the development \nof local industries that would reduce \nover-reliance on imports and thus \nconserve foreign exchange.\nIn order to promote micro-insurance, the \nNational Insurance Commission issued \nguidelines on micro-insurance operations \nin Nigeria in December 2013 and \ninaugurated the Micro-Insurance \nSteering Committee.\nDuring the period under review, four \ninsurance companies merged to form a \nsingle entity. This is expected to enable \nthe consolidated company benefit from \neconomies of scale and thereby engage in \nbig ticket transactions. \nIn pursuance of the National Roadmap \nfor the Adoption of IFRS, 43 of the 50 \noperating insurance companies published \nIFRS-compliant accounts.\nNAICOM facilitated the settlement of 61 \ndisputes on claims between insurance \ncompanies and customers, with the \nsettlement claims valued N2.24 billion \nfor 2013.\nThe Takaful (Shari'a Insurance) \n2.10\nThe Insurance Sector\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\n31\npremium income for insurance \ncompanies and thereby enhance their \nviability.\nthe sustained enforcement of compulsory \ninsurances schemes, particularly Group \nLife and motor, is expected to increase \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\n32\nDecember 2013, from 3.7 per cent at end-\nJune 2013 (Figure 3.1). The \nimprovement in asset quality was \nattributed to stricter adherence to credit \nrisk management policies and standards \nby banks. The ratio of core liquid assets to \ntotal assets increased by 1.2 percentage \npoints to 22.2 per cent at end-December \n2013, from 21.0 per cent at end-June \n2013. Similarly, the ratio of liquid assets \nto short-term liabilities improved by 0.9 \npercentage point to 25.2 per cent at end-\nJune 2013 (Figure 3.2).\n3.1\nMacro-Prudential Supervision\n3.1.1\nFinancial Soundness \nIndicators\n3.1.1.1 Asset and Liquidity-\n based Indicators\nThe quality of assets of the banking \nindustry improved slightly in the second \nhalf of 2013, compared with the first half. \nThe ratio of non-performing loans \n(NPLs) to total loans dropped by 0.5 \npercentage point to 3.2 per cent at end-\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nFigure 3.1: Banking Industry NPLs to Total Gross Loans\n3.5\n3.7\n \n3.2\n2.9\n3\n3.1\n3.2\n3.3\n3.4\n3.5\n3.6\n3.7\n3.8\nEnd-Dec 2012\nEnd-June 2013\nEnd-Dec 2013\nPercentage\n33\nFigure 3.2: Banking Industry Liquidity Indicators\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n35\nEnd-Dec 2012\nEnd-June 2013\nEnd-Dec 2013\nLiquid assets (core) to total assets\nLiquid assets (core) to short-term liabilities\n2013 was 1.4 and 0.9 percentage points \nbelow the levels at end-June 2013 and \nend-December 2012, respectively \n(Figure 3.3).The industry ratio of non-\nperforming loans (net of provisions) to \ncapital remained stable at 7.4 per cent at \nend-December 2013. On the whole, the \n3.1.1.2 Capital-based Indicators\nThe average ratio of regulatory capital to \nrisk weighted assets stood at 17.2 per cent \nat end-December 2013, showing a \ndecrease of 1.7 and 1.1 percentage points, \nrespectively, below the levels at end-June \n2013 and end-December 2012. Similarly, \nthe ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk weighted \nassets of 17.1 per cent at end-December \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\n \nFigure 3.3: Banking Industry Capital Adequacy Indicators\n16\n16.4\n16.8\n17.2\n17.6\n18\n18.4\n18.8\n19.2\nEnd Dec-2012\nEnd-June 2013\nEnd-Dec 2013\nRegulatory capital to risk-weighted assets\nTier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets\n34\nexpenses to gross income rose by 5.9 \npercentage points to 68.9 per cent at end-\nDecember 2013. Conversely, the ratio of \npersonnel expenses to non-interest \nexpenses fell by 3.2 percentage points to \n36.5 per cent, from 39.7 per cent at end-\nJune 2013 (Table 3.1). \nabove scenario reflected a strong capital \nbase for Nigerian banks (Table 3.1).\nThe ratio of interest margin to gross \nincome increased to 64.9 per cent in the \nreview period, from 63.9 per cent at end-\nJune 2013. The ratio of non-interest \n3.1.1.3 Income and Expense-based \n Indicators\nTable 3.1: Selected Financial Soundness Indicators of the Nigerian Banking Industry\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\n(1)\n(2)\n(3)\n(4)\n(5)\n(6)\n(7)\n(8)\n(9)\n(10)\nEnd \nJune\nEnd \nDec\nEnd \nJune\nEnd \nDec\nEnd \nJune\nEnd \nDec\nEnd \nJune\nEnd \nDec\nEnd \nJune\nEnd \nDec\n1. Asset-based Indicators\nNPL to total gross loans\n8.5\n \n27.6\n \n28.8\n \n15.7\n \n10.8\n \n5.3\n \n4.3\n \n3.5\n3.7\n3.2\nLiquid assets (core) to total \nassets\n15.6\n \n16.5\n \n17.2\n \n17.2\n \n22.6\n \n25.7\n \n23.5\n \n24.7\n21.0\n22.2\nLiquid assets (core) to short-\nterm liabilities\n21.5\n \n22.3\n \n19.4\n \n19.8\n \n25.7\n \n31.3\n \n28.1\n \n28.9\n24.3\n25.2\nReturn on Assets (ROA)\n1.7\n \n-8.9\n \n1.0\n \n3.9\n \n0.9\n \n0.1\n \n1.5\n \n1.2\n1.4\n0.8\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\n2. Capital-based Indicators\nRegulatory capital to risk-\nweighted assets\n22.4\n4.1\n1.5\n1.8\n4.2\n17.9\n17.7\n18.3\n18.9\n17.2\nTier 1 capital to risk-weighted \nassets\n21.9\n4.9\n2.4\n2.2\n4.5\n18.1\n17.8\n18.0\n18.5\n17.1\nNPLs net of provision to capital\n \n12.5\n \n106.8\n \n289.8\n \n192.7\n \n74.3\n \n10.1\n \n6.8\n \n6.1\n7.4\n7.4\nReturn on equity (ROE)\n8.9\n \n-222.8\n \n50.2\n \n265.2\n \n29.4\n \n0.5\n \n13.1\n \n11.2\n12.4\n7.7\n3. Income and Expense-\nbased Indicators\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nInterest margin to gross income\n60.1\n57.8\n54.0\n53.7\n50.8\n45.2\n64.6\n64.3\n63.9\n64.9\nNon-interest expenses to gross \nincome\n64.5\n81.2\n80.5\n66.9\n72.9\n75.4\n64.8\n64.9\n63.0\n68.9\nPersonnel expenses to gross \nincome\n46.7\n47.6\n45.5\n42.8\n44.6\n36.1\n43.6\n43.9\n39.7\n36.5\ncumulative 30-day shocks, with specific \nassumptions on fire sale of assets.\nThe test assumed a gradual average \noutflow of 3.8, 5.0 and 1.5 per cent of \ntotal deposits, short-term and long-term \nfunding, respectively, over a 5-day (Test \n1.1) and a cumulative average outflow of \n22.0, 11.0 and 1.5 per cent of total \ndeposits, short-term and long-term \nfunding, respectively, on a 30-day \nbalance (Test 1.2). The test further \nassumed that a percentage of the assets \nwould remain unencumbered on a fire \nsale (Table 3.2). \n3.1.2\nBanking Industry Stress Tests\n3.1.2.1 Liquidity Stress Test\nThe liquidity stress test was conducted at \nend-December 2013 to assess the \nresilience of the banking industry to \nliquidity and funding shocks, using the \nImplied Cash Flow Analysis (ICFA) and \nMaturity Mismatch/Rollover Risk \napproaches.\nThe ICFA test assessed the ability of the \nbanking system to withstand \nunanticipated substantial withdrawal of \ndeposits, as well as short-term wholesale \nand long-term funding over 5-day and \nTable 3.2: Assets Un-encumbered\n35\nItem \nNo\nAssets\n% \nUnencumbered\n1\nCash and cash equivalent\n100\n2\nCurrent account with CBN\n100\n3\nCRR\n30\n4\nGovernment Bonds & Treasury Bills \nand other assets with 0% risk\n-\nweighting exposure \n66.5\n5\n \nOther Short - term investments \n49\n6\n \nCertificates of deposits held\n66.5\ntotal deposits would be available from the \nCBN and intra-group funding; and\niii. Test 2c: Dynamic Rollover Risk: the \nassumption was as in 2b above, but with \nthe option of closing the liquidity gap \nfrom other buckets.\nThe test revealed that, after the 5-day and \ncumulative 30-day shocks were applied, \nthe industry liquidity ratio (LR) declined \nto 12.2 and 10.4 per cent, respectively, \nfrom 50.53 per cent (Table 3.3). Most \nbanks' LRs were also below the 30.0 per \ncent threshold after the two scenarios. \nFurthermore, three (3) banks recorded a \nnegative LR, following a cumulative 30-\nday shock. Two of these banks were \n6\namong the categorised “large banks” .\nAnalysis of Test Results\nThe Maturity Mismatch/Rollover Risk \napproach assessed funding maturity \nmismatch and rollover risk for assets and \nliabilities in the 0-30 and 31-90 day \nbuckets, with the assumption on the \navailability of funding from CBN and \nintra-group sources as described below:\ni. Test 2a: Descriptive Maturity Mismatch \nassumed that the baseline mismatch \nremained, but 5 per cent of total deposits \nwould be made available from the CBN \nand intra-group funding;\nii. Test 2b: Static Rollover Risk assumed \nthat 80.0 and 72.0 percent of the funding \nin the 0-30 and 31-90 day buckets would \nbe rolled over with no possibility to close \nthe funding gap from other buckets. \nHowever, it is assumed that 5 per cent of \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\n6Banks with assets over N1 trillion \n36\nTotal \nNumber of \nBanks tested\nNumber of \nBanks with < \n30% liquidity \nratio\nDec 2013\n23\nDec 2013 (23 \nDMBs)\n \nSept \n2013 (23 \nDMBs)\n \nJune 2013 \n(23 DMBs)\n \nMar 2013 \n(20 DMBs)\n \nSystem \nLR\nLiquidity Shortfall \nto make 30% LR \n(N’billion)\nTest 1.1: \nImplied Cash \nFlow Test ( 5 \nDays)\n \n \n \n \nDay 1\n7\n12\n \n9\n \n4\n \n34.1%\nNIL\nDay 2\n10\n13\n \n11\n \n9\n \n29.4%\n168.78\nDay 3\n14\n17\n \n12\n \n11\n \n24.2%\n716.94\nDay 4\n16\n17\n \n14\n \n14\n \n18.5%\n1,240.33\nDay 5\n17\n17\n16\n15\n12.2%\n1,740.82\nTest 1.2: \nImplied Cash \nFlow Test (30 \nDays)\n17\n18\n18\n17\n10.4%\n1,873.30\nTable 3.3: Implied Cash Flow Analysis\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\n160\nBank 1\nBank 2\nBank 3\nBank 4\nBank 5\nBank 6\nBank 7\nBank 8\nBank 9\nBank 10\nBank 11\nBank 12\nBank 13\nBank 14\nBank 15\nBank 16\nBank 17\nBank 18\nBank 19\nBank 20\nBank 21\nBank 22\nIndustry\nMar-13\nJun-13\nSep-13\nDec-13\n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\n140\nPer cent\nFigure 3.4: Industry and Individual Bank Pre-Shock Liquidity Ratio Positions\n37 \nFigure 3.5: Industry Position after 1-5 day and Cumulative 30- day Shocks\n \n-5\n5\n15\n25\n35\n45\n55\n65\n75\nPre-Shock\nAfter Day 1 After Day 2 After Day 3 After Day 4 After Day 5\nAfter cum\n30 days\nPer cent\n \n \nMar-13\nJun-13\nSep-13\nDec-13\nTests (Test 2c) (Figure 3.7).\nIn general, the banking industry was \nresilient to liquidity stress, although the \ntest results indicated a deterioration in the \nbanks' resilience, compared with the \nposition in the preceding period.\nUnder the maturity mismatch/rollover \ntest, assets in the 0-30 day bucket were \nadequately funded under the three \nscenarios used for the test. However, \nthere was deterioration in the 31-90 day \nbucket under the Static Rollover Analysis \n(Test 2b) and the Dynamic Risk Rollover \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nFigure 3.6: Individual Bank Positions after 5-day and Cumulative 30-day Shocks\n-20.00\n-10.00\n0.00\n10.00\n20.00\n30.00\n40.00\n50.00\n60.00\n70.00\n80.00\n90.00\n100.00\n110.00\n120.00\n130.00\n140.00\n150.00\nPercent\nDay 5\nDay 30\nPre-shock\nN.B: Bank 23 was excluded from figure 3.6 because of its outlier effect\nLess than\n30 days\n(N'billion)\n31-90 days\n(N'billion)\n90 -\n180days\n(N'billion)\n180\n360days\n(N'billion)\n1-3 years\n(N'billion)\nabove 3\nyears\n(N'billion)\nPre-shock\n7,557\n-134.61\n-507.22\n-780.01\n1,789\n3,803\nTest 2a\n9281.38\n1,653.62\n1267.62\n989.81\n-5.7\n-2,026.93\nTest 2b\n6,768.55\n-800.84\n-656.57\n-957.27\n-2,020.21\n-3,790.64\nTest 2c\n56.51\n-87.31\n-45.87\n-137.94\n-267.3\n-1153.69\n-4,000\n-2,000\n0\n2,000\n4,000\n6,000\n8,000\nFigure 3.7: Roll-over Risk, Pre- and Post-shock\n38\nmultiple financial institutions on the \nentire banking system arising from \nexposures across institutions.\nThe analysis revealed that contagion risk \nthrough interbank exposures in the \nbanking sector was minimal, as all the \nplacing banks met the minimum CAR. \nAlso, the industry position was above the \nminimum required CAR.\nA solvency stress test was conducted on \n3.1.2.3 Solvency Stress Test\n3.1.2.2 Contagion Risk Analysis \nthrough Inter Bank Exposures\nThe contagion risk analysis assessed the \neffect of the financial interconnectedness \nof institutions in transmitting shocks to \nindividual banks and the banking system \nas a whole. The test was conducted using \na network analysis tool which evaluates \nsets of bilateral links among different \nfinancial institutions. It assessed the \nimpact of a failure or a weakness of \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nFigure 3.8: Total Bilateral Exposure \n \nBank 10\nBank 4\nBank E\nBank F\nBank D\nDH 2\nBank 4\n0.5 percentage points over the end-June \n2013 positions. Similarly, the pre-shock \nliquidity ratios for the banking industry, \nlarge and medium banks declined by \n18.68, 19.47 and 13.15 percentage points \nto 51.02, 50.75 and 62.30 per cent, \nrespectively compared with the end-June \n2013 positions. However, the pre-shock \nliquidity ratio for small banks increased \nby 5.96 percentage points (Table 3.4).\nthe banking industry as at December 31, \n2013 to assess the stability of the sector \nunder various hypothetically strained \nmacroeconomic conditions.\nThe pre-shock CARs for the entire \nbanking industry, large, medium and \nsmall banks stood at 17.20, 16.24, 18.05 \nand 18.33 per cent, respectively. These \nreflected decreases of 1.49, 2.62, 0.2 and \nBaseline Position\n39\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nTable 3.4: Baseline CARs and Lrs\nRatio\nBanking \nIndustry (%)\n \nLarge \nBanks (%)\n \nMedium \nBanks (%)\n \nSmall \nBanks (%)\nDec-2013 CAR\n17.20\n \n16.05\n \n18.05\n17.83\nJune-2013 CAR\n \n18.69\n \n18.86\n \n18.25\n18.33\nDec-2012 CAR\n18.36\n \n18.06\n \n20.32\n16.93\nDec-2013 Liquidity Ratio (LR)\n \n51.02\n \n50.75\n \n62.30\n74.43\nJune-2013 Liquidity Ratio (LR)\n \n69.7\n \n70.22\n \n75.45\n68.47\nDec-2012 Liquidity Ratio (LR)\n55.56\n50.75\n62.30\n72.38\nFigure 3.9: Banks in Each Bucket of CAR\n21\n1\n \n0\n \n0\n \n1\nBanks with CAR\nabove 15%\nBanks with CAR\nabove 10% but <\n15%\nBanks with CAR\nbelow 10% but>\n5%\nBanks with CAR\nbelow 5% but> 0%\nBanks with CAR <\n0%\nBanks with CAR above 15%\nBanks with CAR above 10% but < 15%\nBanks with CAR below 10% but> 5%\nBanks with CAR below 5% but> 0%\nFigure 3.10: Banks in Each Bucket of LR\n18\n5\n \n>40%\n<40% but >30%\n<30% but >20%\n<20%\n>40%\n<40% but >30%\n<30% but >20%\n<20%\n40\nbanks being the most profitable, while \nROEs stood at 19.83, 22.14, 20.40 and \n17.56 per cent, respectively.\n·\nCredit Risk\nGenerally, the banking industry \nresilience to credit risk sustained an \nupward trend as the average industry \nAnalysis of Test Results\nThe pre-shock ROAs for the entire \nbanking industry, large, medium and \nsmall banks were 2.31, 3.04, 2.42 and \n2.02 per cent, respectively, with large \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nFigure 3.11: Banks in Each Bucket of LR\nFigure 3.12: Baseline ROAs and ROEs (%)\n2.31\n1.8\n19.83\n12.8\n3.04\n2.0\n22.14\n13.1\n2.42\n1.2\n20.4\n11.0\n2.02\n1.5\n17.56\n13.7\nDec-2013 ROA\nJune-2013 ROA\nDec-2013 ROE\nJune-2013 ROE\nBanking Industry\nLarge Banks\nMedium Banks\nSmall Banks\ngeneral credit risks as their average \nCARs fell from 17.64 per cent to 12.21 \nper cent and 17.03 to 11.45 per cent, \nrespectively. However, the average CAR \nfor the small banks deteriorated to 5.56 \nper cent (below the required minimum of \n10.0 per cent), from 18.33 per cent. This \nindicated that about N89.15 billion would \nbe required to raise their CAR to 10.0 per \nCAR stood at 12.42 per cent under a \nshock scenario of 200 per cent rise in \nNPLs. Also, large banks and medium-\nsized banks were less vulnerable to \n41\nDec-2013 CAR\nJune-2013 CAR\nDec-2013 Liquidty Ratio\nJune-2013 Liquidty Ratio\nBanking Industry\nLarge Banks\nMedium Banks\nSmall Banks\n17.2 16.05 18.05 17.83\n18.69 18.86 18.25 18.33\n51.02 50.75\n62.3\n74.43\n69.7 70.22\n75.45\n68.47\nthe CARs of the entire banking industry, \nlarge, medium and small banks declined \nfrom their baseline positions to 9.91, \n7.22, 4.19 and 9.02 per cent, respectively. \nUnder this scenario, only five banks \nwould be able to maintain CARs equal to \nor above 10.0 per cent, while the \nremaining 18 would record less than 10.0 \nper cent CAR.\ncent. Under this scenario, 15 banks \nmaintained CARs above 10.0 per cent, 5 \nbanks had CARs between 5.0 and 10.0 \nper cent and 3 banks had less than 5 per \ncent CARs (Table 3.5).\nThe banking industry and peered banks, \nhowever, showed significant levels of \ncredit concentration as indicated by the \nextent of capital depletion under the \nvarious shock scenarios. On the \nassumption that the credit facilities of the \nfive (5) biggest corporate obligors \ndeteriorated from “doubtful” to “lost”, \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nTable 3.5: Stress Test Results – Credit Risk\nNumber of banks\nScenarios\n≤0%\n \n>0 but ≤5\n \n>5 but ≤10\n>10 but \n≤15\n>15\nTotal\nShock 1av-50% NPLs increase \n1\n \n2\n \n2\n5\n13\n23\nShock 1avi-100% NPLs increase \n2\n1\n2\n10\n8\n23\nShock 1avii-200% NPLs increase \n2\n1\n5\n7\n8\n23\n42\nFigure 3.13: Credit Concentration Risk\n17.12\n9.91\n \n17.64\n7.22\n17.03\n4.19\n18.16\n9.02\nBaseline\nFive biggest corporate obligor credit facilities shifted\nfrom 'Doubtful' to 'Lost' (100%)\nAll banks\nLarge banks\nMedium-sized banks\nSmall banks\nshowed more resilience as their liquidity \nratios were 36.00 and 42.12 per cent, \nfrom 62.30 and 74.43 per cent, \nrespectively. All the peered groups of \nbanks remained above the 30 per cent \nbenchmark. Thus, the banking industry \nand the three groups of peered banks were \nresilient to the liquidity shock at the level \nindicated.\n·\nLiquidity Risk\nLiquidity risk was moderate as the impact \nof a 10 per cent general run on the \nbanking industry resulted in the average \nliquidity ratio falling to 31.24 per cent \n(above the threshold of 30 per cent) from \n51.02 per cent. Large banks followed the \nsame trajectory as their liquidity ratio \ndeteriorated to 30.07 per cent from 50.75 \nper cent. The medium and small banks \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nTable 3.6: Credit Concentration Risk\nCREDIT CONCENTRATION RISK\nAll Banks\nLarge Banks\nMedium\nSmall\nBaseline\n17.20\n16.05\n18.05\n17.83\nSingle Factor Credit \nConcentration Shocks\nSolvency Ratios after Shocks\nAll Banks\nLarge Banks\nMedium\nSmall\n2bi - Five biggest corporate \nobligors credit facilities shifted \nfrom ‘pass-through’to \n‘sub-standard’(10%)\n16.73\n16.89 \n16.22\n17.53\n2bii- Five biggest corporate \nobligor credit facilitie s shifted \nfrom ‘sub-standard’ to \n‘doubtful’ (50%)\n14.03\n11.85\n10.27\n12.56\n2biii - Five biggest corporate \nobligor credit facilities shifted \nfrom ‘doubtful’ to ‘lost’ (100%)\n9.91\n7.22\n4.19\n9.02\nTable 3.7: Stress Test Results - Liquidity Risk\n43\n \nBanking \nIndustry (%)\n \nBanks by Category\nLarge (%)\n \nMedium (%)\nSmall (%)\nBaseline\n \n51.02\n \n50.75\n \n62.30\n74. 43\nShock 6gi ( 10% General Run)\n \n31.24\n \n30.07\n \n36.00\n42.12\nShock 6gii ( 15% General Run)\n \n27.21\n \n22.17\n \n31.77\n41.61\nShock 6giii ( 20% General Run)\n \n21.10\n \n17.13\n \n22.42\n37.35\nShock 6hi (20% Run on 20 largest Deposits)\n \n38.42\n \n36.99\n \n43.45\n48.52\nShock 6hii ( 50% Run on 20 largest \nDeposits)\n \n33.47\n \n34.52\n \n44.97\n47.00\nUnsatisfactory\n \n<30\n \nBorder Line\n≥30 < 35\nSound Position\n≥35<60\nVery Sound Position\n≥60\nand its peered categories were stable as \ntheir positions declined only marginally, \neven after the most severe shocks were \napplied (Table 3.8).\n·\nExchange Rate Risk\nThe banks generally showed modest \nresilience to exchange rate risk as the \nindustry CAR deteriorated only \nmarginally, after a 50 per cent exchange \nrate appreciation shock was induced, \nwith a 15 per cent hedging cover. After \n·\nInterest Rate Risk\nThe results of the test on the net position \nof interest-sensitive instruments in \nrelation to capital impairment, ROA and \nROE, revealed that the banking industry \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nTable 3.8: Stress Test Results - Interest Rate Risk\nScenario\nBanking \nIndustry\n(%)\nBanks by Category\nLarge \n(%)\nMedium\n(%)\nSmall \n(%)\nBaseline CAR\n17.20\n16.05\n18.05\n17.83\nBaseline ROA\n2.31\n3.04\n2.42\n2.02\nBaseline ROE\n19.83\n22.14\n20.4\n17.56\nInterest Rate Volatility (Impact on CAR)\nShock 5biii (500bps downward parallel shift in \nyield curve)\n16.89\n \n15.13\n17.03\n16.54\nShock 5biv (1000bps downward parallel shift in \nyield curve)\n16.41\n \n14.85\n16.55\n15.14\nImpact of Parallel Shift in Yield Curve Shocks on ROA\n \nInterest Rate Volatility\nShock 5biii (500bps downward parallel shift in \nyield curve)\n1.23\n \n2.89\n0.74\n1.58\nShock 5biv (1000bps downward parallel shift in \nyield curve)\n1.07\n1.50\n0.70\n1.24\nImpact of Parallel Shift in Yield Curve Shocks on ROE\nInterest Rate Volatility\nShock 5biii (500bps downward parallel shift in \nyield curve)\n15.42\n19.52\n17.35\n16.12\nShock 5biv (1000bps downward parallel shift in \nyield curve)\n13.45\n17.83\n16.25\n15.17\nexchange rate depreciation was \nsignificant, as the industry, large, \nmedium and small banks CARs \ndeteriorated to 12.23, 11.07, 13.54 and \n14.12 per cent, respectively when 30 per \ncent of the total foreign exchange loan \nexposure was assumed lost. Assuming a \n50 per cent counterparty loss due to \nexchange rate depreciation, the industry, \nlarge, medium and small banks CARs \nwould fall to 7.34, 6.64, 8.12 and 8.47 per \ncent, respectively (Table 3.9).\nthe shock, 4 banks had their CARs below \nthe 10 per cent minimum prudential \nrequirement (Table 3.9). \nHowever, counterparty risk arising from \n44\nand ROE changed marginally after a 100 \nper cent decline in FX trading income \nwas assumed. This was largely due to the \nsmall proportion of FX trading income to \ngross income.\n·\nForeign Exchange Trading \nRisk\nThe results of the test showed that the \nbanking industry was resilient to FX \ntrading risk. The banks' pre-shock ROA \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nTable 3.9: Stress Test Result - Exchange Rate Risk\nExchange Rate Shocks\nBanking \nIndustry\nBanks by Category\nLarge \nMedium\nSmall\nCAR - Pre-shock position\n17.20\n17.64\n17.03\n18.16\nShock 4bi (10% appreciation in \nfavour of the Naira)\n17.14\n17.20\n16.93\n17.12\nShock 4bii (20% appreciation in \nfavour of the Naira)\n15.59\n \n15.53\n \n15.61\n15.90\nShock 4biii (50% appreciation in \nfavour of the Naira)\n14.13\n \n12.24\n \n14.36\n12.91\nShock 4biv (100% appreciation in \nfavour of the Naira)\n3.21\n \n2.22\n \n5.08\n6.20\nCounterparty Risk Due to Exchange Rate Depreciation\n \n20% of the total foreign exchange \nloans exposure are categorised as loss\n14.23\n13.07\n15.34\n15.79\n30% of the total foreign exchange \nloans exposure are categorised as loss\n12.23\n11.07\n13.54\n14.12\n50% of the total foreign exchange \nloans exposure are categorised as\nloss\n7.34\n6.64\n8.12\n8.47\nTable 3.10: Stress Test Result - FX Trading Risk\n45\n \n \nNumber of Banks with ROAs\nand ROEs in the Respective \nBuckets\n≤0%\n>0 ≤5%\n>5 ≤10%\n>10 ≤15%\n>15%\nImpact of FX Trading \nShocks on ROA\nFX Trading Income Volatility\n \nBanks\nShock 7ai (10% decline in FX \ntrading Income)\n0\n \n0\n \n4\n \n3\n16\n23\nShock 7aii (20% decline in FX \ntrading Income)\n1\n \n0\n \n4\n \n3\n15\n23\nShock 7aiii (50% decline in FX \ntrading Income)\n1\n0\n6\n2\n14\n23\nShock 7aiv (100% decline in \nFX trading Income)\n3\n0\n8\n2\n10\n23\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nThe key challenges in the banking \nindustry remained weak corporate \ngovernance and inadequate risk \nmanagement practices, while the rating \nof the control functions generally trended \ntowards 'needs improvement' due to the \nnon-implementation of some previous \nrecommendations. Improvements were, \nhowever, noted in the internal audit and \nfinancial analysis functions of most \nbanks.\nRisk-based examination of some \nspecialized financial institutions, \nincluding the Asset Management \nCorporation of Nigeria (AMCON), the \nthree private credit bureaux, and the non-\ninterest banks (including the non-interest \nbanking windows of conventional banks) \nwas also conducted in the review period. \nAs part of its monitoring activities in the \nforeign exchange market, the CBN \nexamined banks to ascertain their \ncompliance with regulations and extant \nlaws on utilisation of foreign exchange. \nThe major infractions observed included \nfailure to issue certificates of capital \nimportation to beneficiaries on time, \nrendition of inaccurate returns to \nregulators, and non-compliance with \napproved net open position limits. The \nerring banks were appropriately \npenalised.\nOn the whole, the banking industry was \nadjudged as being stable and resilient to \nmost of the shocks, even with severe \nshock scenarios. \nThe Bank conducted risk-based \nexamination jointly with NDIC on 21 \nDMBs in the second half of 2013. The \nexamination covered the assessment of \nrisk assets and tested compliance with \nprudential requirements and the quality \nof the risk management control functions. \nOf the 21 banks examined, two were \nmaiden examinations of the recently \nlicensed merchant banks. \nMost banks' composite risk rating had a \nstable outlook; while one (1) bank had an \nincreasing and two (2) others had a \ndecreasing risk outlook. Four of the \nbanks were examined under the risk-\nbased supervision framework for the first \ntime.\nThe relatively stable risk profile of banks, \ncoupled with the measures taken by the \nCBN and AMCON to support the \nindustry, resulted in the general stability \nexperienced by the banking industry as \nthe industry witnessed signs of recovery \nand profitability.\n3.2\nSupervision of Banks and \nOther Financial Institutions\n3.2.1\nBanks and Discount Houses\n3.2.1.1 Banks\n46 \nImpact of FX Trading Shocks on ROE\n<0%\n<1%\n<2%\n<5%\n>5%\nInitial ROE\nFX Trading Income Volatility\nBanks\nShock 7ai (10% decline in FX trading \nIncome)\n1\n \n2\n18\n2\n0\n23\nShock 7aii (20% decline in FX trading \nIncome)\n1\n2\n17\n3\n0\n23\nShock 7aiii (50% decline in FX trading \nIncome)\n2\n3\n16\n2\n0\n23\nShock 7aiv (100% decline in FX trading \nIncome)\n5\n2\n15\n1\n0\n23\nwith a view to enhancing stability in the \nsub-sector.\nTo give greater attention to the \nsupervision of MFBs and in \nconsideration of their large number, the \nbank engaged 116 consultants to carry \nout post-examination monitoring. The \nfirst round of the post-examination \nmonitoring, involving 580 MFBs, took \nplace in December 2013, the outcome of \nwhich is expected to inform appropriate \nsupervisory action early in 2014.\nThe examinations conducted in the \nsecond half brought the total number of \nMFBs examined in 2013 to 810. The \nCBN will continue to ensure effective \nsupervision of the institutions with a view \nto enhancing stability in the sub-sector. \nThe examinations conducted in the \nsecond half brought the total number of \nMFBs examined in 2013 to 810. The \nCBN will continue to ensure effective \nsupervision of the in institutions with a \nview to enhancing stability in the sub-\nsector.\nOn-site examination of the 82 licensed \nPMBs was undertaken in the period. The \nexamination revealed that the average \nNPL ratio was 42.0 per cent, with 23 \nmeeting the 30 per cent benchmark. The \nexamination further revealed the lack of \nfocus on core mortgage banking business \nby most operators as only 26 PMBs met \nthe minimum mortgage assets to loanable \nfunds ratio of 60 per cent, while 3 met the \nminimum mortgage assets to total assets \nratio of 50 per cent. The examination also \nshowed that a considerable proportion of \nthe sub-sector's investible funds were \nplaced with commercial banks.\n3.2.2.2 Primary Mortgage Banks \n(PMBs)\n3.2.1.2 Discount Houses\n3.2.2\nOther Financial Institutions\n3.2.2.1 Microfinance Banks\nThe license of one discount house was \nrevoked as a result of its failure to meet \nmaturing obligations, severe under-\ncapitalization and inability of the \nshareholders to inject additional capital. \nA liquidator was subsequently appointed.\nIn September 2013, a special \nexamination conducted on another \ndiscount house showed signs of distress. \nThe investigation revealed that the \ncompany's capital had been significantly \neroded, thus requiring a fresh capital \ninjection for it to continue as a going \nconcern. In the overarching interest of \nfinancial system stability, the CBN took \nover the company's management and \nAMCON acquired its shares and injected \nadditional funds to recapitalize it.\nOf the 821 MFBs in existence as at \nDecember 31, 2013, on-site examination \nwas conducted on 797 MFBs in 2013, \nwhile 24 MFBs were not examined. The \n24 MFBs that were not examined \ncomprised 18 newly licensed MFBs that \nhad not operated for up to 6 six months as \nat December 31, 2013 and 6 MFBs \nlocated in volatile parts of the North-east \ngeo-political zone. Analysis of the on-site \nexamination revealed that 526 MFBs or \n66 per cent of the 797 MFBs met the \ncapital adequacy ratio (CAR) of 10 per \ncent. Furthermore, 568 MFBs or 71.27 \nper cent satisfied the minimum liquidity \nratio requirement of 20 per cent. The asset \nquality of the MFBs was, however, \nrelatively poor as the average portfolio-\nat-risk (PAR) ratio for the sub-sector was \n45.70 per cent, much higher than the \nprescribed maximum ratio of five (5) per \ncent. The CBN will continue to ensure \neffective supervision of the institutions \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\n47\n3.3\nCompliance with International \nStandards\n3.3.1\nAnti-Money \nLaundering/Combating the \nFinancing of Terrorism\nIn supporting the global fight against \nterrorism, the CBN regularly circulated \nthe United Nations Consolidated Lists of \nPersons/Entities Involved in Terrorism \nFinancing or Terrorist Activities to \nfinancial institutions under its regulatory \npurview for appropriate action. \nIn order to strengthen domestic \ncollaboration, the CBN inaugurated the \nAML/CFT Stakeholders' Consultative \nForum for key stakeholders in the fight \nagainst money laundering and financing \nof terrorism. This resulted in an increased \nlevel of co-operation through the \nexchange of information, joint \nexaminations, and training programmes. \nNigeria had been placed on the Financial \nAction Task Force (FATF) “grey list” of \ncountries which had failed to make \nsignificant progress in their AML/CFT \nregimes in 2009. To address this problem, \nthe CBN and other stakeholders took \naction based on the reports of the GIABA \nMutual Evaluation and International \nMonetary Fund Technical Assistance \nTeam to improve legislation and \nenforcement of the regulations on \nAML/CFT.\nThe CBN action included the issuance of:\n·\nAML/CFT Regulations in 2013 \n(amended);\n·\nAn AML/CFT Risk-based \nSupervision (RBS) Framework;\n·\nAn AML/CFT Compliance \nFramework applicable to the \nBank's operations;\n·\nA Dud Cheques Policy;\n·\nStandard account opening forms \nfor financial institutions, in \n3.2.2.3 Finance Companies (FCs)\n3.2.2.4 Bureaux de Change\nOn-site examination was conducted on \n55 out of the 61 operating finance \ncompanies during the review period. Six \nof the companies were undergoing \nrestructuring. The examination revealed \nthat 40 per cent of the FCs met the capital \nadequacy ratio (CAR) of 12.5 per cent. \nThe average CAR for the sub- sector was, \nhowever, a negative 442 per cent. \nOverall, 40 per cent of the FCs had \nshareholders' fund unimpaired by losses \nof above N20 million. Thirty nine of the \nFCs were operating with a lower capital \nthan the regulatory minimum of N20 \nmillion. Poor asset quality remained the \nbane of the sub-sector, as the NPL ratio \nstood at 40.7 per cent, well above the \nprescribed maximum of 20 per cent. As \npart of the reform measures adopted by \nthe Bank, the minimum capital was raised \nto N100 million, from N20 million, \nduring the review period while the final \napproval of the operating guidelines for \nthe sub- sector was being awaited.\nSpot checks were carried out on 160 \nbureaux de change (BDCs) during the \nreview period, compared with the checks \non 60 undertaken in the first half of 2013, \nthus bringing the total number of \nreviewed BDCs in 2013 to 220. The \nexercise indicated that certain infractions \npersisted amongst the institutions, \nincluding: non-rendition of returns on the \npurchase and utilization of foreign \nexchange (Forex); failure to keep \naccounting records; and engaging in \nwholesale foreign exchange trading. \nAccordingly, 29 BDCs were suspended \nfrom the CBN Forex window, 58 were \nsubjected to monetary sanctions, while \nthe licenses of 20 BDCs were revoked. \nThis brought the total number of revoked \nBDC licenses in 2013 to 222.\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\n48\n·\nComply with the Pillar 3 \ndisclosure requirements on a bi-\nannual basis. \nThe implementation of Basel II/III in \nNigeria is expected to enhance the safety \nand soundness of financial institutions \nand promote broad stability of the \nfinancial system.\nOne of the identified risks in the \nbanking system is concentration \nrisk. To mitigate this risk and to \np r o v i d e i n c e n t i v e s f o r \ndiversification, the CBN \nreviewed the risk weights for the \ncomputation of capital adequacy \nratio. The review provided that: \n·\nWhere the exposure to a \nparticular sector, as defined by the \nInternational Standard Industrial \nClassification of Economic \nSectors is in excess of 20 per cent \nof the total credit facilities of a \nbank, the risk weight of the entire \nportfolio shall be 150 per cent;\n·\nBonds that meet the eligibility \ncriteria set out in the Guidelines \nfor Granting Liquid Asset Status \nfor State Government Bonds \nwould be risk-weighted at 20 per \ncent, while others would be \nweighted at 100 per cent;\n·\nAny breach of the single obligor \nlimit shall be regarded as \nimpairment of capital;\n·\nLending by a bank to its financial \nholding company would be \nregarded as return of capital and \nshall, accordingly, be deducted \nfrom the capital of the bank in the \ncourse of computing its capital \nadequacy ratio; and\n·\nLending to subsidiaries within the \ngroup shall be risk-weighted at \n100 per cent, provided they are \nfully collateralised. Otherwise, \nReview of Risk Weights on Certain \nIndustry Exposures\ncollaboration with the Committee \nof Chief Compliance Officers of \nBanks in Nigeria; and\n·\nA Safe Custody Items Policy. \nThese measures led to the delisting of \nNigeria from the “grey list” by the \nFinancial Action Task Force on October \n18, 2013.\nFor effective implementation of the Basel \nII/III framework in Nigeria, the Bank \nissued the Guidance Notes on the \nCalculation of Regulatory Capital to the \nbanking industry in the reporting period. \nThe Guidance Notes took cognisance of \nthe peculiarities of Nigeria's local \nenvironment and, therefore, required \nbanks to:\n·\nCommence a parallel run of \ncapital adequacy computation, \nbased on the requirements of the \nnew guidelines alongside Basel I \nrequirements, effective January \n1, 2014 and migrate fully to Basel \nII by June 2014;\n·\nAdopt basic approaches for \ncalculating credit, market and \noperational risks capital \nrequirements for the first two \nyears, in anticipation of the \ndevelopment of an effective \nrating system in Nigeria. This \nwould also afford banks sufficient \ntime to gather the required data \nand acquire necessary experience \nfor the adoption of the more \nadvanced approaches;\n·\nCarry out an Internal Capital \nAdequacy Assessment Process \n(ICAAP) on an annual basis, as at \nDecember 31, and forward copies \nof the assessment report to the \nCBN for review, not later than \nfour (4) months after the year end, \nbeginning from 2014; and \n3.3.2\nImplementation of Basel II/III\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\n49\nwas deployed by the Bank in November \n2013. The new application, which went \nlive in December 2013, is expected to run \nconcurrently with the existing e-FASS \napplication. \nThe Corporation's bonds held by banks \nand other private investors, amounting to \nN734.09 billion, became due and were \nredeemed on 31st December 2013, in line \nwith the terms of the indenture, while \nbonds of N3.51 trillion held by the CBN \nwere restructured into a N3.80 trillion \nNote at 6 per cent, with a 10-year tenor. \nAMCON is due to redeem the third \ntranche of its bonds held by private \ninvestors in the sum of N866.73 billion \nby October 2014. Thereafter, the CBN \nwould be the only bondholder in \nAMCON.\nThe Eligible Bank Assets (EBAs) \nacquired by AMCON stood at N2.37 \ntrillion at end-December 2013, from \nN2.72 trillion at end-June 2013. \nRestructured loans amounted to N374.35 \nbillion as at December 31, 2013 of which \n55.75 per cent were performing, while \n44.25 per cent were non-performing. \nTotal recoveries at end-December 2013 \nwere N164.5 billion, from the N109.40 \nbillion achieved at end-June 2013.\nThe NPL ratio decreased to 3.23 per cent, \ncompared with 3.65 per cent at end-June \n2013, reflecting an improvement in the \nquality of banks' assets. It also remained \nwithin the regulatory threshold of 5 per \n3.4\nThe Assets Management \nCorporation of Nigeria\n3.5\nKey Risks in the Financial \nSystem\n3.5.1\nCredit Risk\nsuch exposures would be taken as \nreduction of capital and be \ndeducted from capital during \ncapital adequacy computation.\nThe above policy measures, approved to \ntake effect from January 1, 2014, would \nensure a stricter prudential assessment of \nthe banks' capital adequacy.\nSequel to the publication of the first \nIFRS-based annual financial statements \nby banks and discount houses in the first \nhalf of 2013, the CBN/NDIC added \ntraction to the implementation by \nconducting an assessment of the \nimpairment methodology and IT support \nfor IFRS reporting of the entities in the \nsecond half of 2013. The impairment \nmethodology assessment reviewed the \nimpairment models of the entities for \nappropriateness, adequacy of the inputs, \nand correctness of the output. \nThe assessment of IT support for IFRS \nreporting indicated that while some \nentities used Excel to convert their \nNGAAP figures to IFRS figures, others \nwere at various stages of implementing \nIT solutions for IFRS reporting.\nDuring the review period, capacity \nbuilding programmes continued, \nespecially in the Other Financial \nInstitutions (OFIs) sub-sector. In \naddition, 19 publicly quoted OFIs issued \ntheir first IFRS financial statements as at \nDecember 31, 2012. Guidelines were \nalso issued on the mode of adoption \nexpected of the other OFIs, with the unit \nMFBs and BDCs categorised under \nSMEGA Levels II and III respectively.\nFollowing the adoption of IFRS in the \nbanking industry, an application, FinA, \n3.3.3\nInternational Financial \nReporting Standards\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\n50\nend-June 2013, indicating a marginal \ndecrease in credit concentration.\nLiquidity risk remained subdued during \nthe review period as all banks exceeded \nthe minimum required ratio of 30 per cent \nand the industry maintained an average of \n50.63 per cent. The downside risk, \nhowever, was the cost of liquidity \nmanagement in order to contain \ninflationary pressure and to protect the \nnaira exchange rate. \nRates were generally stable in the second \n3.5.2\nLiquidity Risk\n3.5.3\nMarket Risk\ncent. Total NPLs, however, increased by \n0.72 per cent to N324.13 billion at end-\nDecember 2013, from N321.80 billion at \nend-June 2013.\nFurthermore, credit concentration \nremained a concern as the top 50 and 100 \nborrowers constituted 31.88 and 40.51 \nper cent, respectively, of gross credit at \nend-December 2013. This compares with \n32.57 and 40.76 per cent, respectively, at \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nFigure 3.14: Trend of Banking Industry NPLs, 2010 - 2013\n40\n35\n30\n25\n20\n15\n10\n5\n0\n34.5\n15.5\n9.4\n8.8\n4.9\n4.44\n4.3\n4.08\n3.47\n3.65 \n3.65 \n3.23\nNov, ‘10 Mar’11 Jun’11\nSep’11 Dec’11 Mar ‘12 Jun ‘12 Sep ‘12 Dec‘12 Mar‘13 Jun ’13 Dec’13\nNPLs %\nNotwithstanding the stable rates, the \ncontinued decline of foreign reserves and \ndecrease in oil receipts due to challenges \nin the oil sector, coupled with possible \nforeign portfolio investment reversals \nfollowing the tapering of the US \nquantitative easing programme, could \nelevate market risk.\nWith enhanced security features in \nelectronic banking software, identity \ntheft and other cyber crimes have been \nameliorated. However, other operational \nrisks, such as fraud and forgeries, \npersisted. \n3.5.4\nOperational Risk\nhalf of 2013 except for the fluctuations \ncaused by the short-run effects of the July \n2013 MPC decision to raise CRR on \npublic sector deposits to 50 per cent from \n12 per cent, and the challenges \nexperienced by some discount houses. \nMeasures taken by the CBN, however, \nhelped in moderating the rates towards \nthe end of the reporting period.\n51\nin the CRMS were processed as against \n86 from January to June 2013.\nPeriodic spot checks on banks' \ncompliance with the CRMS regulation \nhelped to improve the number of \nborrowers registered in the database, \nwhile the decline in CRMS-related \ncomplaints was due to improved \ncompliance with the CRMS Guidelines. \nAlso, a workshop on basic CRMS \nadministration and processes was \nconducted in November 2013 to train \ndesk officers of reporting institutions.\nThe three licensed private credit bureaux \n(PCBs) continued to complement the \nefforts of CBN's CRMS in ensuring that \nfinancial institutions have adequate \ninformation on prospective borrowers \nwhile processing their credit requests. \nThe number of credit records in PCBs \nincreased to 21.89 million, from 21.08 \nmillion at end-June 2013. \nThe progress made by the PCBs \nnotwithstanding, they continued to face \nthe challenges of low public awareness, \nabsence of a unique identifier, inadequate \nskilled human resources, and lack of an \nefficient information sharing \nmechanism. The guidelines for the \noperation and regulation of PCBs were \nrevised, effective November 14, 2013, to \naddress the identified challenges and \nfacilitate sustainable growth of the \neconomy.\nThe Financial Services Regulation \nCoordinating Committee (FSRCC) \ncontinued to provide a forum for \ninteraction and coordination by the \n3.6.2\nPrivate Credit Bureaux\n3.7\nThe Financial Services \nRegulation Coordinating \nCommittee\nReported cases of fraud and forgery \nincreased by 58.07 per cent to 3,917, \ninvolving a total sum of N31.49 billion in \nthe second half of 2013, from 2,478 cases \ninvolving N22.41 billion in the first half \nof 2013. Actual losses, however, declined \nby 45.55 per cent to N2.08 billion in the \nreview period, from N3.82 billion in the \nfirst half of 2013.\nThe activities of the consumer protection \nfunction of the CBN, in mediating \nbetween banks and their customers, \ncontributed in enhancing confidence in \nthe banking system. Furthermore, the \nengagement of the general public through \nsensitization workshops, road shows, and \nconsumer parliaments improved \nconfidence in the system. This was \nevidenced by the substantial decline in \nthe number of complaints by bank \ncustomers to the CBN. \nAlso, the delisting of Nigeria from the \nFinancial Action Task Force (FATF) \n“Grey List” in October 2013 has \nimproved the country's reputation as an \ninvestors' destination.\nThe Credit Risk Management System \n7\n(CRMS) continued to complement the \nprocess of credit risk management in the \nbanking industry. At end-December \n2013, the number of borrowers registered \nby banks in the CRMS database stood at \n202,611, while the total value of \noutstanding credits was N16.49 billion.\nDuring the review period, 75 requests/or \ncomplaints on customers' credit records \n3.5.5\nReputational Risk\n3.6\nCredit Bureaux\n3.6.1\nCBN's Credit Risk \nManagement System\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\n7The CRMS is a depository of credit information on borrowers of N1 million and above for individuals, and N5 million and above for corporate \ncustomers.\n52\ncharged its Financial Sector Soundness \nSub-Committee (FSSSC) with the task of \ndeveloping a financial stability \nmonitor/dashboard and report on the \ndashboard at every meeting of the \nFSRCC.\nThe Bank received a total of 305 \ncustomer petitions against financial \ninstitutions during the second half of \n2013.The figure showed a decrease of \n59.82 per cent, from the 759 petitions \nreceived in the first half of 2013. The total \nrefunds by banks to petitioners arising \nfrom the complaints amounted to N1.48 \nbillion and US$194,000, compared with \nN1.45 billion recorded in the first half of \nthe year.\n3.8\nConsumer Protection\n3.8.1\nCustomer Complaints\nregulatory authorities in the Nigerian \nfinancial system. The framework for the \nenhancement of supervisory tools, \ndeveloped by the Bank, was adopted by \nthe Committee for implementation.\nUnder the framework, the FSRCC would \nbe restructured to have a Support Service \nGroup (SSG) responsible for financial \nresearch and macro-prudential analysis. \nA robust, IT-driven database \ninfrastructure is expected to become an \nimportant component part of the \nrestructuring arrangement. Other aspects \nof the adopted framework include the \nreview of existing legislation and \ncapacity building to transform the \nFSRCC into the Financial System \nStability Committee (FSSC).\nThe FSRCC also identified the need for \nregular reports on vulnerabilities and \nthreats to financial system stability and \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\n53\n4.1\nThe Payments System Vision \n2020\nThe Bank sustained the implementation \nof the Payments System Vision 2020 \n(PSV 2020) and achieved the following \nmilestones during the review period:\n1.\nHosted a 2-day maiden International \nConference on the Payments System, \nwith over one thousand participants \nfrom stakeholders across the globe; \n2.\nRevised and launched the Payments \nSystem Vision 2020 Strategy \ndocument. This would provide the \npolicy direction for the Bank in the \npayments space in the next five years. \nThe overall objective remains \nconsistent with the original PSV 2020 \ndocument, intended to create an \nelectronic payments infrastructure \nthat is nationally utilised and \ninternationally recognized; and\n3.\nAssessed the Nigerian Payments \nSystem Market Infrastructure against \nthe current 24 BIS/IOSCO core \nPrinciples for Financial Market \nInfrastructure (PFMI). \nConsequent upon the revision of the \nstrategy document and benchmarking of \nthe Nigerian PFMI against the 24 \nBIS/IOSCO principles, the CBN shall:\na. Ensure that, henceforth, no \nnational payments system shall \ninvoke the principle of unwind;\nb. Remove its implicit role of \n'Lender of Last Resort' for the \nRTGS payment system by \nDecember 2016 and Deferred \nNet Settlement systems by \nDecember 2019;\nIn pursuance of the Payments System \nVision 2020, the CBN deployed a new \nreal-time gross settlement (RTGS) \nsystem in the review period for the \nsettlement of inter-bank fund transfers, \ncustomers' transfers and net positions \nfrom clearing systems on real-time basis. \nThe new system interfaces with the \nScripless Securities Settlement System \n(S4) to facilitate simultaneous delivery \nversus payment to mitigate settlement \nrisks.\nThe Bank extended its cash-less policy, \nearlier launched in Lagos, to five \nadditional States and the FCT, effective \nOctober 1, 2013. This reduced the cost of \ncash management, increased efficiency \nof the payments system, and enhanced \nfinancial inclusion.\nTen (10) additional Payment Terminal \nService Providers (PTSPs) were licensed \nin the review period to deploy and \nmaintain PoS terminals, bringing the total \nnumber of PTSPs to 16. With the \nadditional PTSPs, a wider coverage on \nthe deployment of PoS terminals across \nthe country would be achieved.\nThe Bank, in collaboration with the \nBankers Committee, commenced the \ndevelopment of a biometric solution to \naddress the challenges posed by the \nabsence of a unique identifier in the \nNigerian banking industry. \nDuring the review period, the Bank \nadopted the use of mobile money and \nissued the Guidelines for the Operation \nand Regulation of Agent Banking in \nNigeria, aimed at promoting financial \ninclusion.\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\n55\nI.\nHealth,\nii. Bill Presentment.\n5. Issued the following guidelines:\ni.\nThe Revised RTGS Rules and \nRegulations, and\nii. The Clearing House sanctions.\nThe volume and value of inter-bank \ntransfers through the Nigeria Inter-bank \nSettlement System (NISS) increased to \n200,918 and N56,610.69 billion at end-\nDecember 2013, from 197,220 and \nN55,005.31 billion at end-June 2013, \nreflecting increases of 1.88 and 2.92 \npercent in volume and value, \nrespectively. \nThe volume of NIBSS instant payment \n(NIP) rose to 11,186,930 at end-\nDecember 2013, from 5,924,602 at end-\nJune 2013, reflecting an increase of 88.82 \nper cent, while the value increased by \n59.53 percent to N6,666.17 billion. The \nsignificant rise in volume and value of \nNIP was attributed to the extension of the \ncash-less policy to 5 additional states and \nthe FCT.\n4.2\nThe Real-Time Gross \nSettlement System\n4.3\nNIBSS Instant Payment\nc.\nS t r e n g t h e n i t s s c h e m e \ngovernance structure to reflect \nthe significantly greater \nresponsibility of scheme \nmanagement, covering all aspects \no f r i s k , b u s i n e s s \nm a n a g e m e n t a n d \noperational resilience;\nd. Ensure that each Scheme \nManagement Board carries out an \nannual self-assessment against \nthe CPSS/IOSCO PFMI. An \nindependent \nreview shall be \nundertaken every four years, with \nthe objective of making the \nresults publicly available by end-\n2017;\ne.\nOpen formal engagement \nchannels with Continuous Linked \nSettlement as a first step towards \nthe naira becoming a settlement \ncurrency;\nf.\nMandate the use of the SWIFT \nSanctions Checking (or its \nequivalent) for international \npayment instructions originating \nfrom all banks in Nigeria; and\n \ng. Work jointly with SEC and other \nkey stakeholders to sponsor a \nformal review of the securities \nmarket in Nigeria, which would \nbe completed under the FSS2020 \nFinancial Markets work stream.\n4. Furthermore, the CBN identified the \nfollowing new areas and initiatives to \ndeepen the adoption of e-payment in \nthe next phase of the PSV2020 \nProject in the following areas:\ni.\nAgriculture,\nii. Smart cities,\niii. Transportation,\niv. Education,\nv.\nHotels & entertainment,\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\n56 \nbillion at end-December 2013, from \n13,918,838 and N6,738.14 billion at end-\nJune 2013, reflecting increases of 15.78 \nper cent and 12.33 per cent in volume and \nvalue, respectively. \n4.4\nNIBSS Electronic Fund \nTransfer\nThe volume and value of NIBSS \nElectronic Funds Transfer (NEFT) \nincreased to 16,115,171 and N7,569.17 \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nFigure 4.1: Volume of NIP Transactions, July to December 2013\n \n -\n 500,000\n 1,000,000\n 1,500,000\n 2,000,000\n 2,500,000\n 3,000,000\nJuly\nAugust\nSeptember\nOctober\nNovember December\nFigure 4.2: Value (N Billion) of NIP Transactions, July to December 2013\n \n -\n 200\n 400\n 600\n 800\n 1,000\n 1,200\n 1,400\n 1,600\nValue N' Billion\n57\n21,096,075 and N11,492.50 billion at \nend-June 2013, thus reflecting decreases \nof 40.23 and 13.09 per cent, respectively.\n4.5\nCheque Clearing\nThe volume and value of cheques cleared \ndecreased to 8,257,330 and N4, 073.15 \nbillion at end-December 2013, from \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nFigure 4.3: Volume of NEFT Transactions, July to December 2013\n \n -\n 500,000\n 1,000,000\n 1,500,000\n 2,000,000\n 2,500,000\n 3,000,000\n 3,500,000\nJuly\nAugust\nSeptember\nOctober\nNovember December\nFigure 4.4: Value (N Billion) of NEFT Transactions, July to December 2013\n \n -\n 200\n 400\n 600\n 800\n 1,000\n 1,200\n 1,400\n 1,600\n 1,800\nJuly\nAugust\nSeptember\nOctober\nNovember\nDecember\n58\nincreased to 176,413,492 at end-\nDecember 2013, from 146,961,511 at \nend-June 2013.\nAutomated teller machines (ATMs) \nremained the dominant channel of \n4.6\nElectronic Cards\nElectronic card (e-card) transactions rose \nto N1,764.11 billion in the second half of \n2013, from N1,416.10 billion in the first \nhalf of 2013, reflecting an increase of \n20.04 per cent, while the volume \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nFigure 4.5: Volume of Cheques Cleared, July to December 2013\nFigure 4.2: V \n \n 1,200,000\n 1,250,000\n 1,300,000\n 1,350,000\n 1,400,000\n 1,450,000\n 1,500,000\n 1,550,000\nFigure 4.6: Value (N Billion) of Cheques Cleared, July to December 2013\n \n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n700\n800\n900\nJuly\nAugust\nSeptember\nOctober\nNovember\nDecember\n59\npatronised and accounted for only 1.02 \nper cent of the total. In value terms, ATMs \naccounted for 87.44 per cent; PoS, 5.88 \nper cent; mobile payments 5.17 per cent; \nwhile the Internet accounted for 1.51 per \ncent.\nelectronic payments. ATMs accounted \nfor 89.92 per cent, followed by mobile \npayments with 5.55 per cent and PoS \nterminals with 3.51 per cent. The Internet \nas a payment channel (e-commerce) is yet \nto be fully embraced by the banking \npublic. Thus, it remained the least \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nFigure 4.7: Volume of Electronic Card Transactions, July to December 2013\n \nATM\nPOS\nWEB\nMOBILE\nFigure 4.8: Value of Electronic Card Transactions, July to Dec 2013\n \n \nATM\nPOS\nWEB\nMOBILE\n60\n136,663,013, reflecting an increase of \n16.07 per cent, while the value increased \nto N1,542.59 billion from N1,286.35 \nbillion at end-June 2013, reflecting an \nincrease of 19.92 per cent. \n4.6.1\n ATM Transactions\nThe number of ATMs rose to 12,755 at \nend-December 2013, from 11,702 at end-\nJune 2013. The volume of ATM \ntransactions increased during the period \nunder review to 158,629,927, from \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nFigure 4.9: Volume of ATM Transactions, July - Dec 2013\n \n 23,000,000\n 24,000,000\n 25,000,000\n 26,000,000\n 27,000,000\n 28,000,000\n 29,000,000\n 30,000,000\nJuly\nAugust\nSeptember\nOctober\nNovember December\nFigure 4.10: Value (N Billion) of ATM Transactions, July - Dec 2013\n \n -\n 50\n 100\n 150\n 200\n 250\n 300\n 350\nJuly\nAugust\nSeptember\nOctober\nNovember\nDecember\n61\nrespective, in the first half of 2013, \nrespectively, reflecting increases of 63.77 \nand 75.96 per cent, respective, in volume \nand value, respectively. \n4.6.2\nMobile Payments\nThe volume and value of mobile \npayments increased during the review \nperiod to 9,797,110 and N91.14 billion, \nfrom 5,982,225 and N51.79 billion, \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nFigure 4.11: Volume of Mobile Payments, July - Dec 2013\n \n -\n 500,000\n 1,000,000\n 1,500,000\n 2,000,000\n 2,500,000\nJuly\nAugust\nSeptember\nOctober\nNovember December\nFigure 4.12: Value (N Billion) of Mobile Payments, July - Dec 2013\n \n -\n 5\n 10\n 15\n 20\n 25\n 30\nJuly\nAugust\nSeptember\nOctober\nNovember\nDecember\n62\nbillion, respectively, in the second half of \n2013, reflecting increases of 93.11 and \n81.37 per cent in volume and value. The \nnumber of PoS terminals rose to 120,191 \nat end-December 2013 from 119,653 at \nend June 2013. \n4.6.3\n Point of Sale Terminal \nTransactions\nThe volume and value of point of sale \n(PoS) transactions increased during the \nreview period to 6,194,467 and N103.79 \nbillion from 3,207,788 and N57.23 \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\n \n -\n 200,000\n 400,000\n 600,000\n 800,000\n 1,000,000\n 1,200,000\n 1,400,000\n 1,600,000\nJuly\nAugust\nSeptember\nOctober\nNovember December\nFigure 4.13: Volume of PoS Transactions, July - Dec 2013\nFigure 4.14: Value (N Billion) of PoS Transactions, July - Dec 2013\n \n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\nJuly\nAugust\nSeptember\nOctober\nNovember\nDecember\n63\n2014. Although responses to the news on \ntapering were relatively subdued in most \neconomies, the combination of portfolio \nshifts and domestic weaknesses could \nresult in sharper capital outflows and \nexchange rate adjustments. \nConsequently, the report recommends \nthat efforts to strengthen the global \nfinancial system and sever the links \nbetween banking and sovereign debt \ndistress in Europe should be embarked \nupon to ensure that improvements in the \nglobal financial outlook translate into \nbetter prospects for the real economy.\nFor the Nigerian economy, real GDP \ngrowth is expected to remain strong at 7.3 \nper cent in 2014, up from the 6.4 per cent \nrecorded in 2013. Similarly, real GDP \ngrowth in the non-oil sector is expected to \nremain strong, driven largely by \nagriculture, trade and services, while \nactivities in the oil sector are projected to \nrecover in 2014. Inflation is projected to \ndecline to 7.0 per cent by end of 2014, \ndown from the 8.0 per cent recorded at \nend December 2013. The forecast is \nbased on the assumption that the Bank \nwould sustain its tight monetary policy \nstance, in view of the forthcoming 2015 \nelections, and that the trend of declining \nfood prices, arising from higher rice and \nwheat production, would persist. The \ndownside risks to developments in the \ndomestic economy include a continued \ndecline in oil revenues due to changes in \nthe international oil market, lack of fiscal \nprudence induced by increasing political \nactivities, unabated security challenges \nin the northern part of the country, likely \ncapital flow reversals as the Federal \nReserve continues implementing its \ntapering programme, and uncertainties \nGrowth in global output is projected to \nstrengthen at 3.7 per cent in 2014, up \nfrom the 3.0 per cent recorded in 2013. \nMost of the growth is expected to come \nfrom the advanced economies, as the drag \nin fiscal consolidation and uncertainties \nsurrounding the impact of the US Federal \nReserve's decision to systematically cut \nback on its quantitative easing \nprogramme on most economies thin out \nand private sector demand gains firmer \nground. Also, it is expected that 2014 \nwould witness an appreciable reduction \nin fiscal tightening, but accommodative \nmonetary conditions in most economies. \nConsequently, output growth in the \nadvanced economies is projected at 2.2 \nper cent or 0.9 per cent higher than the 1.3 \nper cent recorded in 2013. The stronger \nrecovery in advanced economies will see \nemerging markets benefiting from higher \nexternal demand. Output in Emerging \nMarket and Developing Economies is \nprojected to grow at 5.1 per cent in 2014, \ncompared to 4.7 per cent in 2013, and \ngrowth in Sub-Saharan Africa is \nprojected to expand to 6.1 per cent in \n2014 from 5.1 per cent in 2013. \nThe IMF World Economic Outlook \n(January 2014 Update), however, noted \nthat downside risks remained with these \nforecasts. The risks include low inflation \nin advanced economies, especially the \nEuro area. Increases in real debt burdens \nand “premature real interest rate”, given \nthat monetary policy in the Euro area, is \nconstrained in lowering nominal interest \nrate. In the emerging market economies, \nincreased financial market and capital \nflow volatility remains an issue of \nconcern, given the announcement in \nDecember 2013 that the U.S. Federal \nReserve would start its tapering early \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\n65\nassociated benefits in the reduction of \nfraud and credit risk.\nIn the area of regulation, further measures \nare expected to address issues relating to \ncapacity in the banking system to further \nenhance the resilience of the financial \nsystem. These measures include the \ndevelopment of a competency \nframework for the banking industry, the \nissuance of regulations for holding \ncompanies, and the automation of the 'fit \nand proper persons' portal.\nIt is envisaged that the system will remain \nresilient and capable of dealing with \nemerging challenges, despite short-term \nrisks to financial stability.\nabout the pace of recovery in the global \neconomy. \nMoney market rates are expected to \nremain stable in the first half of 2014, \nalbeit at a slightly higher level than was \nrecorded in the second half of 2013. \nExpectations of an increased liquidity \nsurfeit in the system would likely be \ncounter-balanced by tight monetary \npolicy in order to maintain price stability.\nThe biometric solution to address the \nchallenges associated with a unique \nidentifier in the Nigerian banking \nindustry is expected to be deployed in the \nfirst half of 2014. This would enhance the \napplication of the “Know Your \nCustomer” (KYC) principle, with its \nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\n66\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nBox 1: Guidance Note on Regulatory Capital\nREGULATORY CAPITAL\n1.0\nIntroduction\n2.0\nComposition of Regulatory Capital\nThis document lays down new supervisory regulations for assessing the capital \n8\nadequacy levels of banks and banking groups. The regulations have been revised \nfollowing the changes that were introduced in international regulations to take \naccount of developments in risk management methodologies adopted by banks and \nthe new policies and criteria underpinning supervisory activities.\n9\nThe rules governing regulatory capital , the total capital requirement, the internal \ncapital assessment process and risk concentration shall be applied on solo and \nconsolidated bases.\nThe following regulation is applicable to all banks licensed by the CBN.\nThis guideline establishes the procedures for calculating regulatory capital, \nwhich shall be the sum of \nCapital elements:\n10\nTier 1 Capital\n(a)\nPaid-up share capital/common stock\n11\n(b)\nDisclosed reserves\n12\nTier 2 Capital\n(a)\nRevaluation reserves\n(b)\nGeneral provisions/general loan-loss reserves \n(c)\nHybrid (debt/equity) capital instruments\n(d)\nSubordinated debt\nLess any\na)\nFrom Tier 1:\n(i)\nGoodwill and increase in equity capital resulting from a securitization;\n(ii)\nInvestment in own shares (treasury stock);\n(iii)\nLosses carried forward and losses for the current financial year; and\n(iv)\nIntangible assets.\nb)\nThe following items shall be deducted 50% from Tier 1 and 50% \nfrom Tier 2 capital:\n(i)\nInvestments in unconsolidated banking and financial subsidiary \ncompanies;\n(ii)\nInvestments in the capital of other banks and financial institutions; and\n8More specifically, these are contained in International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, A Revised Framework. \nComprehensive Version, published by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision June 2006 (the “New Basel Capital Accord\", or \"Basel II\")\n9Regulatory capital shall not be less than the initial capital required for authorization to engage in banking.\n10Subject to Tier 1 capital prudential filters, if any, as computed by the CBN.\n11These include share premium, retained profit, general reserves, SMEEIS reserves, regulatory risk reserves and statutory/legal reserves. \n12Subject to Tier 2 capital prudential filters, if any, as specified by the CBN.\n67\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\n13The total of Tier 2 capital will be limited to a maximum of 33.3% of the total of Tier 1, while Tier 3 capital, innovative instrument and \nundisclosed reserve are not allowed for inclusion in regulatory capital.\n(iii) \nSignificant minority investments in other financial entities.\nThis includes only permanent shareholders' equity (issued and fully paid ordinary \nshares/common stock and perpetual non-cumulative preference shares) and \ndisclosed reserves (created or increased by appropriations of retained earnings or \nother surpluses). \nIn the case of consolidated accounts, this also includes minority interests in the equity \nof subsidiaries which are not wholly owned. This basic definition of capital excludes \nrevaluation reserves and cumulative preference shares.\nThere is no limit on the inclusion of Tier 1 capital for the purpose of calculating \nregulatory capital. For this purpose, the equity shares with the following \ncharacteristics are included in Tier 1 capital:\n·\nIssued directly by the bank;\n·\nClearly and separately identified in the balance sheet;\n·\nHave no maturity (are perpetual); \n·\nFully paid;\n·\nCannot be refunded beyond the possibility of the liquidation of a bank or a \nreduction of its share capital;\n·\nDo not give to the holder rights to a minimum remuneration nor are there any \nclauses that require the compulsory payment of dividends;\n·\nThe dividends are paid solely out of distributable profits or retained earnings \ndistributable; and\n·\nClassified as equity instruments in accordance with IFRS.\n(a)\nRevaluation Reserve\ni)\nFixed Asset Revaluation Reserve: This relates to revaluation of fixed assets \nin line with market values reflected on the face of the balance sheet.\nPrior approval of the CBN must be obtained by any bank before the recognition of the \nrevaluation surplus on fixed assets in its books, which can only be done taking into \nconsideration the following:\n·\nThe valuation must be made by qualified professionals and the basis of the \nrevaluation as well as the identities of the valuers must be stated;\n·\nThe difference between the market and historic values of the eligible fixed \nassets being revalued shall be discounted by 55%;\n·\nThe revaluation of fixed assets is applicable to own premises only; and\n·\nThe revaluation of fixed assets (own premises only) is permissible within a \n3.0\nQualifying Criteria for the Assessment of Capital Components\n3.1\nTier 1 Capital\n13\n3.2 Tier 2 Capital\n68\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\nminimum period of seven years after the date of the purchase of the asset or \nthe last revaluation.\nii)\nOther revaluation reserves: The inclusion of other revaluation reserves \ncreated by the adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as \npart of the Tier 2 capital shall be subject to the limitations that will be specified by the \nCBN from time to time. \n(b)\nGeneral provisions/General loan-loss reserves\nFor the purpose of the standardized credit risk measurement approach, provisions or \nloan-loss reserves held against future (presently unidentified) losses are freely \navailable to meet losses which subsequently materialize and therefore qualify for \ninclusion in Tier 2 capital. Provisions ascribed to specific or identified deterioration \nof particular assets or known liabilities, whether individual or group (collective), are \nexcluded. Furthermore, general provisions/general loan-loss reserves eligible for \ninclusion in Tier 2 will be limited to a maximum of 1.25 percentage points of credit \nrisk-weighted assets and subject to the approval of the CBN.\n(c)\nHybrid (debt/equity) capital instruments\nThese include financial instruments which combine characteristics of equity and debt \ncapital. Essentially, they should meet the following requirements:\n·\nThey are unsecured, subordinated and fully paid-up;\n·\nThey are not redeemable at the initiative of the holder or without the prior \nconsent of the CBN;\n·\nThey are available to participate in losses without the bank being obliged to \ncease trading (unlike conventional subordinated debt);\n·\nAlthough the capital instrument may carry an obligation to pay interest that \ncannot permanently be reduced or waived (unlike dividends on ordinary \nshareholders' equity), it should allow service obligations to be deferred (as \nwith cumulative preference shares) where the profitability of the bank would \nnot support payment; and\n·\nHybrid capital instruments that are redeemable must have a maturity of at \nleast 10 years. The contract must clearly specify that repayment is subject to \nauthorization by the Central Bank of Nigeria. Cumulative preference shares, \nhaving these characteristics, would be eligible for inclusion in this category. \n·\nThe valuation must be made by qualified professionals and the basis of the \nrevaluation as well as the identities of the valuers must be stated;\n·\nThe difference between the market and historic values of the eligible fixed \nassets being revalued shall be discounted by 55%;\n·\nThe revaluation of fixed assets is applicable to own premises only; and\n·\nThe revaluation of fixed assets (own premises only) is permissible within a \nminimum period of seven years after the date of the purchase of the asset or \nthe last revaluation. \n69\nCBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT\nDECEMBER 2013\n(d)\nSubordinated term debts\nSubordinated debts issued by banks shall form part of the Tier 2 capital, provided that \nthe contracts governing their issue expressly envisage that:\n·\nIn the case of the liquidation of the issuer, the debt shall be repaid only after all \nother creditors not equally subordinated have been satisfied;\n·\nThe debt has an original maturity of at least five years. Where there is no set \nmaturity, repayment shall be subject to at least five years' prior notice;\n·\nEarly repayment of the liabilities may take place only at the initiative of the \nissuer and shall be subject to approval of the CBN;\n·\nThe contracts shall not contain clauses whereby, in cases other than those \nreferred to in points (a) and (c), the debt may become redeemable prior to \nmaturity; and\n·\nDuring the last five years to maturity, a cumulative discount (or amortization) \nfactor of 20% per year will be applied to reflect the diminishing value of these \ninstruments as a continuing source of strength.\nUnlike instruments included in hybrid capital above, these instruments are not \nnormally available to participate in the losses of a bank which continues trading. For \nthis reason, these instruments will be limited to a maximum of 50% of Tier 1 Capital.\nOwing to the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by \nbanks and for the purpose of calculating regulatory capital, the CBN may, from time \nto time, apply prudential filters. \nBanks shall continue to report on regulatory capital in accordance with the CBN's \nextant rules.\n4.0\nPrudential Filters\n5.0\nFrequency of Reporting and Procedures for Calculating Individual \nRegulatory Capital\n70", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/Financial_Stability_Reports/FSR December 2013b.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "c2727494fde19fdc59eac40a9323a7a6", "text": "ECONOMIC REPORT \nSECOND QUARTER 2016 \n \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA\n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage ii\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nThe Central Bank of Nigeria Quarterly Economic Report is designed for the dissemination \nof financial and economic information on the Nigerian economy on current basis. The \nReport analyses developments in the financial, fiscal, real and external sectors of the \neconomy, as well as international economic issues of interest. The Report is directed at \na wide spectrum of readers including economists and financial analysts in government \nand the private sector, as well as general readers. \n \n \n \n \nSubscription to the Quarterly Economic Report is available without charge to institutions, corporations, \nembassies and development agencies. Individuals, on written request, can obtain any particular issue \nwithout a charge. Please direct all inquiries on the publication to the Director of Research, Central Bank \nof Nigeria, P.M.B. 187, Garki, Abuja, Nigeria. \n \nThe Quarterly Reports can also be freely downloaded from the CBN website: www.cbn.gov.ng \n \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage iii\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\nContents \n1.0 \nSummary ................................................................................................................................. 1 \n2.0 \nFinancial Sector Developments ................................................................................................ 3 \n2.1 \nMonetary and Credit Developments......................................................................................... 3 \n2.2 \nCurrency-in-circulation (CIC) and Deposits at the CBN .............................................................. 6 \n2.3 \nMoney Market Developments .................................................................................................. 6 \n2.3.1 \nInterest Rate Developments ............................................................................................. 7 \n2.3.2 \nCommercial Papers (CPs) .................................................................................................. 9 \n2.3.3 \nBankers’ Acceptances (BAs) .............................................................................................. 9 \n2.3.4 \nOpen Market Operations .................................................................................................. 9 \n2.3.5 \nPrimary Market ................................................................................................................ 9 \n2.3.6 \nBonds Market ................................................................................................................. 10 \n2.3.7 \nCBN Standing Facilities ................................................................................................... 10 \n2.4 \nDeposit Money Banks’ Activities ............................................................................................. 11 \n2.5 \nCapital Market Developments ................................................................................................ 12 \n2.5.1 \nSecondary Market .......................................................................................................... 12 \n2.5.2 \nNew Issues Market ......................................................................................................... 13 \n2.5.3 \nMarket Capitalization ..................................................................................................... 13 \n2.5.4 \nNSE All-Share Index ........................................................................................................ 13 \n3.0 \nFiscal Operations ................................................................................................................... 15 \n3.1 \nFederation Account Operations .............................................................................................. 15 \n3.2 \nThe Fiscal Operations of the Three Tiers of Government ........................................................ 18 \n3.2.1 \nThe Federal Government ................................................................................................ 18 \n3.2.2 \nStatutory Allocations to State Governments ................................................................... 20 \n3.2.3 \nStatutory Allocations to Local Government Councils ....................................................... 20 \n4.0 \nDomestic Economic Conditions .............................................................................................. 21 \n4.1 \nAgricultural Sector ................................................................................................................. 21 \n4.2 \nAgricultural Credit Guarrantee Scheme Operations ................................................................ 21 \n4.3 \nIndustrial Production .............................................................................................................. 23 \n4.4 \nPetroleum Sector ................................................................................................................... 25 \n4.5 \nConsumer Prices .................................................................................................................... 26 \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage iv\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\n5.0 \nExternal Sector Developments ............................................................................................... 29 \n5.1 \nForeign Exchange Flows ......................................................................................................... 29 \n5.2 \nNon-Oil Export Earnings by Exporters ..................................................................................... 30 \n5.3 \nSectoral Utilisation of Foreign Exchange ................................................................................. 31 \n5.4 \nForeign Exchange Market Developments................................................................................ 32 \n5.5 \nGross External Reserves ......................................................................................................... 34 \n6.0 \nGlobal Economic Conditions................................................................................................... 35 \n6.1 \nGlobal Output ........................................................................................................................ 35 \n6.2 \nGlobal Inflation ...................................................................................................................... 35 \n6.3 \nGlobal Commodity Demand and Prices ................................................................................... 35 \n6.4 \nInternational Financial Markets .............................................................................................. 36 \n6.5 \nOther International Economic Development and Meetings .................................................... 36 \n \nText Tables \nTable 1: Growth in Monetary and Credit Aggregates ............................................................................................... 6 \nTable 2: Selected Interest Rates (Percent, Averages) ............................................................................................... 9 \nTable 3: Traded Securities on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) .......................................................................... 12 \nTable 4: New and Supplementary Listing on the Nigeria Stock Exchange (NSE) ...................................................... 13 \nTable 5: Market Capitalization and All Share Index (ASI) ........................................................................................ 14 \nTable 6: Gross Federation Account Revenue ......................................................................................................... 15 \nTable 7: Components of Gross Oil Revenue ........................................................................................................... 16 \nTable 8: Components of Gross Non-Oil Revenue ................................................................................................... 17 \nTable 9: Federal Government Fiscal Operations .................................................................................................... 19 \nTable 10: Disbursement of Credit Under the Commercial Agriculture Credit Scheme ............................................. 22 \nTable 11: Index of Industrial Production and Manufacturing Capacity Utilization Rate ........................................... 25 \nTable 12: Average Crude Oil Prices in the International Oil Market ........................................................................ 26 \nTable 13: Consumer Price Index (November 2009 = 100) ...................................................................................... 27 \nTable 14: Headline Inflation Rate .......................................................................................................................... 28 \nTable 15: Foreign Exchange Flows Through the CBN.............................................................................................. 30 \nTable 16: Demand for and Supply of Foreign Exchange ......................................................................................... 32 \nTable 17: Exchange Rate Movements and Exchange Rate Premium ....................................................................... 33 \nTable 18: Gross External Reserves......................................................................................................................... 34 \n \nAppendix Tables \nTable A1: Money and Credit Aggregates .................................................................................................. 41 \nTable A2: Money and Credit Aggregates (Growth Rates) ..................................................................... 42 \nTable A3: Federal Government Fiscal Operations .................................................................................... 43 \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage v\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\nFigures \nFigure 1: Growth Rate of Narrow Money (M1) and Broad Money (M2) .................................................. 4 \nFigure 2: Growth Rate of Aggregate Domestic Credit to the Economy................................................ 5 \nFigure 3: Selected DMBs Interest Rates (Average) ..................................................................................... 8 \nFigure 4: Volume and Value of Traded Securities ..................................................................................... 12 \nFigure 5: Market Capitalization and All-Share Index ................................................................................ 14 \nFigure 6: Components of Gross Federally-Collected Revenue .............................................................. 15 \nFigure 7: Gross Oil Revenue and Its Components..................................................................................... 16 \nFigure 8: Gross Non-Oil Revenue and Its Components ............................................................................ 17 \nFigure 9: Federal Government Retained Revenue .................................................................................. 19 \nFigure 10: Federal Government Expenditure ............................................................................................. 20 \nFigure 11: Capacity Utilization Rate ............................................................................................................. 23 \nFigure 12: Index of Industrial Production (1990=100) ................................................................................ 24 \nFigure 13: Trends in Crude Oil Prices ............................................................................................................ 26 \nFigure 14: Consumer Price Index .................................................................................................................. 27 \nFigure 15: Inflation Rate .................................................................................................................................. 28 \nFigure 16: Foreign Exchange Flows Through the CBN .............................................................................. 29 \nFigure 17: Sectoral Utilisation of Foreign Exchange .................................................................................. 31 \nFigure 18: Demand for and Supply of Foreign Exchange ....................................................................... 32 \nFigure 19: Average Exchange Rate Movements ...................................................................................... 33 \nFigure 20: Exchange Rate Premium ............................................................................................................. 33 \nFigure 21: Gross External Reserves ................................................................................................................ 34 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage vi\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 1\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\n1.0 Summary \nOn quarter-on-quarter basis, growth in the key monetary aggregates \naccelerated in the second quarter of 2016. Over the level at the end \nof the preceding quarter, broad money supply, (M2), grew by 5.9 \nper cent. The development reflected the increase in net foreign \nassets, domestic credit (net) and other assets (net) of the banking \nsystem, respectively. Similarly, narrow money (M1), grew by 0.9 per \ncent over the level at the end of the preceding quarter. \nDevelopments in banks’ deposit and lending rates were mixed \nduring the second quarter of 2016. The spread between the \nweighted average term deposit and maximum lending rates \nwidened to 21.43 percentage points at the end of the second \nquarter of 2016. Similarly, the margin between the average savings \ndeposit and the maximum lending rates widened to 24.10 \npercentage points. At the inter-bank funds segment, the weighted \naverage inter-bank call rate rose by 12.55 percentage points to \n15.56 per cent in the second quarter of 2016, reflecting the liquidity \ncondition in the banking system. \nThe total value of money market assets outstanding at the end of \nthe second quarter of 2016, stood at N10,460.66 billion, showing an \nincrease of 6.7 per cent, compared with the level at the end of the \nfirst quarter of 2016. The development reflected the 8.09 and 2.73 \nper cent increase in FGN bonds and treasury bills, respectively. \nDevelopments on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) were mixed in \nthe review quarter. \nAt N1,159.05 billion, total federally-collected revenue was 51.3 and \n8.6 per cent lower than the quarterly budget estimate and the \npreceding quarter’s receipts, respectively. At N537.19 billion or 46.3 \nper cent of the total, gross oil receipt was lower than both the \nprovisional quarterly budget and the receipts in the preceding \nquarter. The development was attributed to the continued fall in \nreceipts from crude oil/gas exports arising from persistent low price \nof crude oil and incidences of shut-ins and shut-downs at some \nNNPC terminals, owing to pipeline vandalism. Non-oil receipts, at \nN621.86 billion or 53.7 per cent of the total, was above the level in \nthe preceding quarter by 3.2 per cent, but was significantly lower \nthan the proportionate quarterly budget. Federal Government \nretained revenue was N677.88 billion, while total expenditure was \nN1,768.85 billion, resulting in an estimated deficit of N1,090.96 billion \nin the second quarter of 2016, compared with the proportionate \nquarterly budget deficit of N555.49 billion. \nAgrcultural sector activities increased due to well distributed rainfall \nin most parts of the country. Major activity in the South was \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 2\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\nharvesting of maize and yam, while planting and off-season \nharvesting dominated in the North. In the livestock sub-sector, \nfarmers engaged in the breeding of poultry and migration of cattle \nfrom North to South in search of green pastures. The end-period \ninflation rate on year-on-year and 12-month moving average basis \nfor the second quarter of 2016, was 16.5 per cent and 11.4 per cent, \nrespectively. \nWorld crude oil demand and supply were estimated at 93.25 mbd \nand 94.34 mbd, respectively, in the second quarter of 2016. Nigeria’s \ncrude oil production, including condensates and natural gas liquids, \nwas estimated at an average of 1.54 million barrels per day (mbd) or \n141.68 million barrels (mb) for the second quarter of 2016. Crude oil \nexport was estimated at 1.09 mbd or 100.28 million barrels, while \ndeliveries to the refineries for domestic consumption remained at \n0.45 mbd or 41.40 million barrels during the review quarter. The \naverage price of Nigeria’s reference crude, the Bonny Light (370 \nAPI), was US$46.44 per barrel in the review quarter. \nProvisional data showed that foreign exchange inflow and outflow \nthrough the CBN amounted to US$5.89 billion and US$6.09 billion, \nrespectively, resulting in a net outflow of US$0.20 billion. Foreign \nexchange sales by the CBN to the authorized dealers amounted to \nUS$4.31 billion. The average exchange rate of the naira vis-à-vis the \nUS dollar at the inter-bank was N209.13/US$. \nGlobal growth remained modest and uneven. Risks to the global \noutlook remained tilted to the downside, due to ongoing \nadjustments in the global economy, general slowdown in emerging \nmarket economies, China’s rebalancing, lower commodity prices \nand gradual exit by the US from extraordinarily accommodative \nmonetary policy. \nOther major international economic developments and meetings of \nimportance to the domestic economy during the review period \nincluded: The 2016 Spring Meetings of the Board of Governors of the \nWorld Bank Group (WBG), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and \nthe Inter-Governmental Group of Twenty-Four (G-24) on International \nMonetary Affairs and Developments held from April 11 – 18, 2016 in \nWashington D. C., USA. Also, the 2016 continental seminar of the \nAssociation of African Central Banks (AACB) was held from May 9 - \n11 2016 in Cairo, Egypt, on the theme \"Financial stability: New \nChallenges for Central Banks. Finally, the 51st Annual Meetings of the \nAfrican Development Bank (AfDB) and the 42nd Meetings of the \nBoard of Governors of the African Development Fund (ADF) were \nheld from May 23 – 27 2016 in Lusaka, Zambia. \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 3\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\n2.0 Financial Sector Developments \n2.1 Monetary and Credit Developments \nProvisional data indicated that growth in the key monetary \naggregates accelerated at the end of the second quarter of 2016. \nDevelopments in banks’ deposit and lending rates were mixed in the \nreview period. The value of money market assets outstanding \nincreased, due largely, to the rise in FGN Bonds and treasury bills \noutstanding. Developments on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) \nwere mixed. \nProvisional data indicated that growth in the key monetary \naggregates accelerated at the end of the second quarter of \n2016. On quarter-on-quarter basis, broad money supply (M2), \nat N21,684.97 billion, grew by 5.9 per cent, compared with the \ngrowth of 2.2 per cent at the end of the preceding quarter, \nbut in contrast to the decline of 1.7 per cent at the end of the \ncorresponding period of 2015. The development reflected the \n28.0 per cent, 7.3 per cent and 25.7 per cent increase in net \nforeign assets, domestic credit (net) and other assets (net) of \nthe banking system, respectively. Over the level at end-\nDecember 2015, broad money supply (M2) grew by 8.3 per \ncent, compared with the growth of 2.2 per cent at the end of \nthe preceding quarter. The development reflected the 25.7 \nand 12.5 per cent growth in foreign assets (net) and domestic \ncredit (net) of the banking system. \nNarrow money supply (M1), grew by 0.9 per cent to N9,125.9 \nbillion, compared with the growth of 5.5 per cent, at the end \nof the preceding quarter. This, however, indicated a decline \nof 6.2 per cent, relative to the level at the end of the \ncorresponding period of 2015. The development was \nattributed, wholly, to the 1.9 per cent growth in demand \ndeposits of banks. Over the level at end-December 2015, \nnarrow money supply (M1) grew by 6.5 per cent, compared \nwith the growth of 5.5 per cent at the end of the preceding \nquarter. \nQuasi money rose by 9.9 per cent to N12,559.03 billion at the \nend of the second quarter, in contrast to the 0.3 per cent \ndecline \nat \nthe \nend \nof \nthe \npreceding \nquarter. \nThe \ndevelopment was due to the decline in time and savings \ndeposits of banks. Over end-December 2015, quasi money \ngrew by 9.6 per cent, in contrast to the decline of 0.3 per cent \nkey monetary \naggregate grew \nduring Q2 of 2016. \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 4\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\nat the end of the preceding quarter (Fig. 1, Table 1). \nFigure 1: Growth Rate of Narrow Money (M1) and Broad Money (M2)1 \n \nAt N24,318.14 billion, aggregate domestic credit (net) to the \neconomy, on quarter-on-quarter basis, grew by 7.3 per cent, \ncompared with the growth of 4.9 per cent and 3.8 per cent at \nthe end of the preceding quarter and the corresponding \nquarter of 2015, respectively. The development, relative to the \npreceding quarter was attributed to the 13.5 per cent growth \nin claims on the private sector. Over the level at end-\nDecember 2015, net domestic credit rose by 12.5 per cent, \ncompared with the growth of 4.9 per cent at the end of the \npreceding quarter. The development reflected the growth in \nclaims on the private sector. \nBanking system’s credit (net) to the Federal Government fell \nby 23.5 per cent to N2,893.2 billion, in contrast to the growth of \n30.7 and 26.5 per cent at the end of the preceding quarter \nand the corresponding quarter of 2015, respectively. The \ndevelopment was due to the fall in banks’ holding of \ngovernment securities. Relative to the level at end-December \n2015, net claims on Federal Government rose marginally by \n \n1 QM1 and QM2 represent quarter-on-quarter changes, while CM1 and CM2 represent \ncumulative changes (year-to-date). \n \n-15\n-10\n-5\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n-10\n-5\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\nQ1-14\nQ2-14\nQ3-14\nQ4-14\nQ1-15\nQ2-15\nQ3-15\nQ4-15\nQ1-16\nQ2-16\nQuarterly (%)\nCumulative (%)\nQM1 (RHS)\nQM2 (RHS)\nCM1 (LHS)\nCM2 (LHS)\nBanking system’s\ncredit to the Federal \nGovernment fell by \n23.5 per cent at the \nend of the second \nquarter of 2016. \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 5\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\nN0.96 million (0.00003 per cent) at the end of the review \nperiod, compared with the growth of 30.7 per cent and 118.5 \nper cent at the end of the preceding quarter and the \ncorresponding period of 2015, respectively. \nAt N21,424.95 billion, banking system’s credit to the private \nsector, quarter-on-quarter, grew by 13.5 per cent, compared \nwith the growth of 0.9 per cent and 1.3 per cent at end-June \n2016 and the end of the corresponding period of 2015, \nrespectively. The development was due to the growth in \nclaims on the core private sector. Over the level at end-\nDecember 2015, banking system’s credit to the private sector \ngrew by 14.5 per cent, compared with the growth of 0.9 per \ncent and 4.3 per cent recorded at the end of the preceding \nquarter and the corresponding period of 2015, respectively. \nFigure 2: Growth Rate of Aggregate Domestic Credit to the Economy2 \n \nRelative to the level at the end of the preceding quarter, \nforeign assets (net) of the banking system, rose by 2.8 per cent \nto N7,105.7 billion at end-June 2016, in contrast to the decline \nof 1.8 per cent at the end of the preceding quarter. The \ndevelopment was attributed, largely, to the increase in foreign \nasset holdings of the banks, following the adoption of a \nflexible exchange rate regime. Over the level at end-\nDecember 2015, foreign assets (net) rose by 25.7 per cent at \n \n2 QCP, QCG and QAC represent quarter-on-quarter changes in credit to private sector, credit to government (net) and \naggregate credit (net) to the domestic economy, respectively, while CCP, CCG and CAC, represent the cumulative \nchanges (year-to-date). \n-50\n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n-50\n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\nQ2-14\nQ3-14\nQ4-14\nQ1-15\nQ2-15\nQ3-15\nQ4-15\nQ1-16\nQ2-16\nQuarterly (%)\nCumulative (%)\nQCP (RHS)\nQCG (RHS)\nQAC (RHS)\nCCP (LHS)\nCCG (LHS)\nCAC (LHS)\nForeign assets (net) \nof the banking \nsystem grew at the \nend of the review \nquarter. \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 6\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\nend-June 2016, in contrast to the decline of 1.8 and 14.4 per \ncent at the end of the preceding quarter and the \ncorresponding period of 2015, respectively. \nTable 1: Growth in Monetary and Credit Aggregates (Per cent) Over \nPreceding Quarter \nSep-14\nDec-14\nMar-15\nJun-15\nSep-15\nDec-15\nMar-16\nJun-16\nDomestic Credit (Net)\n7.2\n17.3\n7.7\n3.8\n0.5\n0.4\n4.9\n7.3\n Claims on Federal Government (Net)\n19.7\n-27.3\n89.4\n26.5\n11.0\n3.8\n30.7\n-23.5\n Claims on Private Sector\n4.1\n2.6\n2.5\n1.3\n-0.9\n-0.1\n0.9\n13.5\n Claims on Other Private Sector\n4.4\n2.7\n2.6\n1.6\n-1.3\n-0.2\n-0.4\n13.0\nForeign Assets (Net)\n-1.1\n-5.1\n13.9\n-12.3\n-14.6\n11.2\n-1.8\n28.0\nOther Assets (Net)\n-5.4\n5.4\n3.9\n-3.1\n7.8\n8.2\n7.1\n25.7\nBroad Money Supply (M2)\n4.0\n0.1\n1.2\n-1.7\n-0.5\n7.0\n2.2\n5.9\nQuasi-Money\n6.6\n6.2\n1.2\n1.0\n-5.7\n-1.0\n-0.3\n9.9\nNarrow Money Supply (M1)\n0.4\n-8.7\n1.3\n-6.3\n9.3\n19.9\n5.5\n0.9\nMemorandum Items:\nReserve Money (RM)\n3.3\n20.7\n-0.1\n0.7\n-2.7\n0.4\n-0.9\n-6.7\n \n2.2 \nCurrency-in-circulation (CIC) and Deposits at \nthe CBN \nAt N1,684.7 billion, currency-in-circulation declined by 7.0 per \ncent in the review quarter, compared with the decline of 2.5 \nper cent at the end of the preceding quarter. The \ndevelopment was due, largely, to the decline in vault cash. \n \nTotal deposits at the CBN amounted to N10,502.2 billion, \nindicating an increase of 8.1 per cent relative to the level at \nthe end of the preceding quarter. The development reflected \nthe significant increase in Federal Government deposits. Of \nthe total deposits at CBN, the shares of the Federal \nGovernment, Banks and ‘’Others’’ were N5,020.9 (47.8 per \ncent), N3,687.3 billion billion (35.1per cent) and N1,794.0 billion \n(17.1 per cent), respectively. \nReserve money (RM) fell by 6.4 per cent to N5,372.00 billion at \nthe end of the second quarter, reflecting the decline in both \nDMB’s reserves with the CBN and currency in circulation. \n2.3 \nMoney Market Developments \nThe global and domestic economic developments such as \nthe sharp fall in oil prices, slow-down in global growth, \ngeopolitical tensions and the normalization of Monetary Policy \nby the United States’ Federal Reserve necessitated the \nThe financial market \nwas relatively liquid \nduring the review \nperiod . \nReserve money (RM) \nfell at the end of the \nfirst quarter of 2016. \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 7\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\nadoption of a new flexible foreign exchange policy in Nigeria, \ntowards the end of the second quarter of 2016. The \noperationalisation of this policy involved the appointment of \nforeign exchange primary Dealers (FXPD) to deal directly with \nthe Central Bank of Nigeria and the introduction of the over-\nthe-counter (OTC) Naira-settled futures and long-tenured \nforeign exchange forwards of 6 to 12 months. Hitherto, foreign \nexchange was allocated based on the prioritization of the \nmost critical need for foreign exchange as it was becoming \ndifficult to continuously meet demand while speculative \nactivities persisted at the parallel market. \nThe commencement of the new foreign exchange policy on \nJune 20, 2016 influenced the direction of the financial market \nthereafter. At the onset, foreign exchange illiquidity hindered \nthe smooth running of the foreign exchange inter-bank market \nand this led the Bank to float a special foreign exchange \nauction. The settlement of these transactions drained liquidity \nin the money market. Consequently, inter-bank money market \nrates spiked and the trend in standing facilities reversed as \nthere was more patronage at the Standing Lending Facilities \n(SLF) than the Standing Deposit Facility (SDF). \nProvisional data indicated that total value of money market \nassets outstanding at the end of the second quarter of 2016 \nstood at N10,460.66 billion, showing an increase of 6.7 per \ncent, compared with the level in the first quarter of 2016. The \ndevelopment reflected the 8.09 per cent and 2.73 per cent \ngrowth in FGN bonds and treasury bills, respectively. \n2.3.1 \n Interest Rate Developments \nAvailable data indicated mixed developments in banks’ \ndeposit and lending rates in the second quarter of 2016. With \nthe exception of the 7–day and 1 month maturities deposit \nrates, which fell from 2.83 per cent and 6.93 per cent to 2.75 \nper cent, and 6.49 per cent at the end of the second quarter \nof 2016, all other deposit rates of various maturities rose above \nthe levels in the preceding quarter. At 5.41 per cent, the \naverage term deposit rate rose by 0.02 percentage point \nabove the level in the preceding quarter. The average prime \nlending rates fell by 0.13 percentage point to 16.56 per cent, \nwhile maximum lending rates rose by 0.03 percentage point to \n26.85 per cent. Consequently, the spread between the \nThe spread between\nthe weighted – \naverage term \ndeposit and \nmaximum lending \nrates widened at \nthe end of the first \nquarter of 2016. \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 8\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\nweighted average term deposit and maximum lending rates \nwidened by 0.01 percentage point to 21.43 percentage \npoints, at the end of the second quarter of 2016. Similarly, the \nmargin between the average savings deposit and the \nmaximum lending rates widened by 0.12 percentage point to \n24.10 percentage points. With headline inflation at 16.5 per \ncent at end-June 2016, all lending rates were positive in real \nterms, while deposit rates were negative in real terms. \nAt the inter-bank funds segment, the weighted average inter-\nbank call rate, which stood at 3.01 per cent at the end of the \npreceding quarter, rose by 12.55 percentage points to 15.56 \nper cent, in the second quarter of 2016, reflecting the liquidity \ncondition in the banking system. The Nigeria inter-bank offered \nrate (NIBOR) for the 30-day tenor, rose from 8.02 per cent in \nthe preceding quarter to 10.04 per cent in the second quarter \nof 2016. However, the weighted average rate at the Open-\nBuy-Back (OBB) segment, rose by 7.66 percentage points to \n10.58 per cent (Fig. 3, Table 2). \nFigure 3: Selected DMBs Interest Rates (Average) \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n0.0\n2.5\n5.0\n7.5\n10.0\n12.5\n15.0\n17.5\n20.0\n22.5\n25.0\n0.0\n2.5\n5.0\n7.5\n10.0\n12.5\n15.0\n17.5\n20.0\n22.5\n25.0\n27.5\n30.0\nQ2-14\nQ3-14\nQ4-14\nQ1-15\nQ2-15\nQ3-15\nQ4-15\nQ1-16\nQ2-16\nPercent per Annum\nPercent per Annum\nPrime\nInterbank\nMaximum\nAverage Term Deposits (RHS)\nInterbank call \nrate rose in Q1 \n2016. \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 9\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\nTable 2: Selected Interest Rates (Percent, Averages) \nQ2-14\nQ3-14\nQ4-14\nQ1-15\nQ2-15\nQ3-15\nQ4-15\nQ1-16\nQ2-16\nAverage Term Deposits\n8.6\n8.2\n8.6\n8.5\n7.9\n9.2\n6.1\n5.4\n5.4\nPrime Lending\n16.6\n16.5\n16.3\n16.8\n16.4\n17.2\n16.9\n16.7\n16.6\nInterbank\n10.6\n11.1\n16.0\n15.4\n17.3\n20.5\n1.6\n3.0\n15.6\nMaximum Lending\n25.8\n25.6\n25.8\n26.3\n26.6\n27.0\n27.0\n26.8\n26.9\n \n2.3.2 \nCommercial Paper (CP) \nCommercial Paper (CP) outstanding held by banks, rose to \nN0.53 billion in the second quarter of 2016, compared with \nN0.45 billion in the preceding quarter. The development \nreflected increased investment in CPs by the commercial \nbanks, during the review quarter. As a ratio of total assets \noutstanding, CPs constituted 0.01 per cent, same as in the \npreceding quarter. \n2.3.3 \nBankers’ Acceptances (BAs) \nDuring the review period, BAs outstanding rose by 141.75 per \ncent to N29.76 billion, compared with N12.31billion at the end \nof the preceding quarter. The development was attributed to \nthe increase in investment in BAs by the banks, during the \nquarter. Consequently, BAs accounted for 0.28 per cent of \nthe total value of money market assets outstanding, at the \nend of the second quarter of 2016, compared with 0.13 per \ncent, at the end of the preceding quarter. \n \n2.3.4 Open Market Operations \nThe Bank conducted twenty (20) and one (1) special auctions \nwith tenors ranging from 202 to 364 day tenors from April –June \n2016. Total sales was N727.47 billion, while total subscription \nwas N1,616.80 billion. The bid rates ranged from 8.30 per cent \nto 13.50 per cent, while the stop rates ranged from 8.80 per \ncent to 13.50 per cent. The specifics of the special auction \nwere an allotment of N205.94 billion at 13.50 per cent for a \ntenor to maturity of 363 days. Repayment of matured CBN bills \nwas N710.16 billion, bringing the net injection via OMO during \nsecond quarter 2016 to N176.49 billion. \n2.3.5 \nPrimary Market \nNTBs of 91-182-and 364-day tenors, amounting to N1,111.72 \nbillion, N1,868.02 billion and N1,100.72 billion were offered, \nsubscribed to and alloted, respectively, in the second quarter \nInvestment in CP by \nbanks rose in the \nsecond quarter of \n2016. \nDMBs’ holdings of \nBAs increased \nduring Q2 of 2016. \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 10\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\nof 2016. The bid rates ranged from 5.00 per cent to 13.00 per \ncent, 6.01 per cent to 9.99 per cent and 8.00 per cent to 21.95 \nper cent, respectively, while the stop rates were from 6.10 - \n9.99 per cent, 8.69 per cent - 12.30 per cent and 11.05 per \ncent - 14.99 per cent, respectively. In the preceding quarter, a \ntotal of N1,328.56 billion, N3,062.01 billion and N1,328.56 billion, \nwas offered, subscribed to and alloted, respectively, for the \nthree tenors. \n2.3.6 \nBonds Market \nTranches of the 5-, 10- and 20-year FGN Bonds were reopened \nduring the review period. The term to maturity of the bonds \nranged from 3 years and 8 months to 19 years and 11 months. \nTotal amount offered, subscribed to and allotted were N320.0 \nbillion, N538.20 billion and N264.50 billion, respectively. In \naddition, N70.18 billion of the 10-year was allotted on non-\ncompetitive basis during the review period. The marginal rates \nranged from 12.00 per cent to14.20 per cent for the 5-year \nbond, 12.60 per cent to 14.40 per cent for the 10-year bond \nand 13.08 per cent to 14.98 per cent for the 20-year tenor \nbond. No bond matured during the review period, thereby \nresulting in a total withdrawal of N264.50 billion. In the \npreceding quarter, tranches of the 5-year and 10-year bond \nwere re-opened and a new tranche of 20 –year bond offered \nfor sale. The term to maturity of the bonds ranged from 3 years \nand 11 months to 20 years. \nTotal amount offered, subscribed to and allotted were \nN270.00 billion, N645.64 billion and N265.00 billion, respectively. \nIn addition, N10.84 billion of the 5-year bond was allotted on \nnon-competitive basis in January 2016, while N5.00 billion and \nN20.00 billion of the 5-year and 10-year bonds were allotted \non non-competitive basis, respectively. The marginal rates \nranged from 11.33 per cent to 12.24 per cent for the 5-year, \nfrom 12.09 per cent to 12.50 per cent for the 10-year and was \n12.04 per cent for the 20-year maturity bond. There was no \nmaturity in the period. \n2.3.7 \nCBN Standing Facilities \nDevelopments at the CBN standing facilities window in the \nreview quarter indicated higher patronage at the Standing \nDeposit Facility (SDF) window, during the first two months of \nthe review quarter. The trend, however, reversed with the \nSubscription for FGN \nBonds of various \nmaturities were \nreopened during the \nsecond quarter of \n2016. \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 11\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\nsettlement of a large volume of foreign exchange purchased \nat the special auction conducted on June 20, 2016. \nTotal request for Standing Lending Facility (inclusive of Intra-\nday lending facilities converted to overnight repo) during the \nreview period amounted to N4,066.94 billion, with N1.46 billion \nin interest earned, compared with SLF of N560.80 billion and \ninterest earned of N0.28 billion in the preceding quarter. This \namounted to N3, 506.14 billion and N1.18 billion increase in SLF \nand interest earned, respectively, from the levels in the first \nquarter of 2016. \nThe Total deposit at the SDF window during the review period \nwas N6,012.98 billion with a daily average of N100.22 billion, \ncompared with N6, 614.16 billion in the first quarter of 2016. The \ncost incurred on SDF in the review quarter stood at N1.74 \nbillion, compared with N1.08 billion, in the preceding quarter. \n2.4 \nDeposit Money Banks’ Activities \nAvailable data indicated that the total assets and liabilities of \nthe commercial banks stood at N31,231.4 billion at the end of \nthe preceding quarter of 2016, representing an increase of 9.6 \nper cent over the level at the end of the the preceding \nquarter. The funds were sourced, mainly, from time, savings \nand \nforeign \ncurrency \ndeposits, \nforeign \nliabilities \nand \nunclassified liabilities. The funds were used, mainly, to increase \nclaims on private sector, acquire foreign and unclassified \nassets. \nAt N20,406.4 billion, banks’ credit to the domestic economy, \nrose by 11.2 per cent, compared with 0.9 per cent at the end \nof the preceding quarter. The development was attributed to \nthe significant increase in claims on the private sector, during \nthe review quater. \nCentral Bank’s credit to the commercial banks rose by 34.2 \nper cent to N1,041.73 billion, at the end of the review quarter. \nTotal specified liquid assets of the banks stood at N6,536.9 \nbillion, representing 34.9 per cent of their total current \nliabilities. At that level, the liquidity ratio fell by 5.0 percentage \npoints below the level at the end of the preceding quarter but \nwas 4.9 percentage points above the stipulated minimum \nratio of 30.0 per cent. The loans-to-deposit ratio, at 74.9 per \nLiquidity ratio in Q2\nwas \nabove \nthe \nstipulated \nminimum, \nwhile \nthe \n \nLoan-to-\ndeposit ratio was \nbelow \nthe \nprescribed \nmaximum. \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 12\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\ncent, was 7.0 percentage points, above the level at the end \nof the preceding quarter, but 5.1 percentage point below the \nprescribed maximum of 80.0 per cent. \n2.5 \nCapital Market Developments \n2.5.1 \nSecondary Market \nAvailable data indicated that developments on the Nigerian \nStock Exchange (NSE) were generally mixed during the \nsecond quarter of 2016. Total volume of traded securities \ndeclined by 22.6 per cent to 27.0 billion shares, while the value \nincreased by 9.8 per cent to N163.4 billion in 251,646 deals, in \nthe review quarter, compared with 34.9 billion shares worth \nN148.9 billion in 202,644 deals, recorded in the first quarter of \n2016. The Financial Services Industry led the activity chart \n(measured by volume) with 51.8 billion shares, worth N105.5 \nbillion in 154,827 deals, compared with 29.0 billion shares worth \nN88.9 billion in 128,269 deals, in the preceding quarter. The \nbanking sub-sector was the most active (measured by \nvolume) with 17.8 billion shares worth N90.8 billion in 103,416 \ndeals. \nFigure 4: Volume and Value of Traded Securities \n \nTable 3: Traded Securities on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) \nQ2-14\nQ3-14\nQ4-14\nQ1-15\nQ2-15\nQ3-15\nQ4-15\nQ1-16\nQ2-16\nVolume (Billion)\n24.0\n26.8\n28.9\n25.9\n24.7\n23.26\n18.4\n34.9\n27\nValue (N Billion)\n298.19\n441.25\n316.99\n279.1\n277.9\n219.76\n172.6\n148.9\n163.4\n \n \n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\n300\n350\n400\n450\n500\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n35\n40\nQ2-14\nQ3-14\nQ4-14\nQ1-15\nQ2-15\nQ3-15\nQ4-15\nQ1-16\nQ2-16\nValue (N billion)\nVolume (Billion)\nVolume of traded securities (LHS)\nValue of securities (RHS)\n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 13\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\n \n2.5.2 \nNew Issues Market/Supplementary Listings \nThere were three (3) supplementary listings in the review quarter (table \n4) \nTable:4 New and Supplementary Listing on the Nigerian Stock Exchange \nS/N Company\nAdditional Shares (Units)\nReasons\nListing\n1\nTransnational Corporation of Nigeria\n1,936,049,872\nBonus Issue\nsupplementary\n2\nVita Foam Plc\n59,570,053 ordinary shares\nmerger with vono Prod Plc\nsupplementary\n3\nFortis Microfinance Bank Plc\n656,666,668 units\nSpecial Placing\nsupplementary\n \n2.5.3 \nMarket Capitalization \nAggregate market capitalization for all listed securities \n(Equities and Bonds) stood at N17.28 trillion, indicating a rise of \n8.8 per cent, above the level at the end of the first quarter of \n2016. Similarly, market capitalization for the listed equities \nincreased by 16.8 per cent above the level in the preceding \nquarter to close at N10.17 trillion at the end of the review \nquarter. Listed equities accounted for 58.9 per cent of the \naggregate market capitalization, compared with 54.9 per \ncent at the end of the preceding quarter. \n2.5.4 NSE All-Share Index \nThe All-Share Index, which opened at 25,306.722 at the \nbeginning of the period, closed at 29,597.79, representing an \nincrease of 16.9 per cent above the level at the end of \nprevious quarter. In the review quarter, with the exception of \nthe NSE-Oil and Gas index which fell by 8.1 per cent to 324.00 \nat end-June2016, all other sectoral indices rose above the \nlevels in the preceding quarter. The NSE Banking, NSE \nInsurance, NSE Consumer goods, NSE Lotus Islamic, NSE \nIndustrial, NSE AseM, NSE Pension and NSE Premium indices \nrose by 38.7 per cent, 10.3 per cent, 19.6 per cent, 10.5 per \ncent, 9.5 per cent, 0.7 per cent, 27.1 per cent and 23.2 per \ncent to close at 298.81, 140.04, 736.28, 1958.86, 2146.80, \n1213.60, 882.30 and 1862.79, respectively. \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 14\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\nFigure 5: Market Capitalization and All-Share Index \n \n \nTable 5: Market Capitalization and All Share Index (NSE) \nQ2-14\nQ3-14\nQ4-14\nQ1-15\nQ2-15\nQ3-15\nQ4-15\nQ1-16\nQ2-16\nMarket Capitalization (Ntrilion)\n19.10\n18.90\n16.90\n16.30\n17.02\n17.01\n17.00\n15.88\n17.28\nAl-Share Index (Equities)\n42,482.48\n \n41,210.10\n \n34,657.15\n \n31,744.82\n \n33,456.86\n \n31,217.77\n \n26,871.24\n \n27,385.69\n \n29,597.79\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n-\n5,000.00 \n10,000.00 \n15,000.00 \n20,000.00 \n25,000.00 \n30,000.00 \n35,000.00 \n40,000.00 \n45,000.00 \n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\nQ2-14\nQ3-14\nQ4-14\nQ1-15\nQ2-15\nQ3-15\nQ4-15\nQ1-16\nQ2-16\nIndex\nN billion\nMarket Capitalization (LHS)\nAll-Share Index (RHS)\n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 15\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\n3.0 \nFiscal Operations \n3.1 \nFederation Account Operations \nProvisional data indicated that federally-collected revenue \nduring the second quarter of 2016 was N1,159.05 billion. This \nwas 51.3 per cent and 8.6 per cent lower than the quarterly \nbudget estimate and the receipts in the preceding quarter, \nrespectively. The decline in federally-collected revenue \n(gross) relative to the budget estimate was attributed to the \nshortfall in receipts from both oil and non-oil revenue, during \nthe review quarter (Fig. 6, Table 6). \nFigure 6: Components of Gross Federally Collected Revenue \n \nTable 6: Gross Federation Account Revenue (N billion) \nQ2-14\nQ3-14\nQ4-14\nQ1-15\nQ2-15\nQ3-15\nQ4-15\nQ1-16\nQ2-16\nFederally-collected revenue (Gross) \n2613.30\n2783.46\n2210.81\n2055.64\n1397.20\n1911.71\n1547.96\n1268.59\n1159.05\n Oil Revenue\n1795.53\n1723.11\n1466.22\n1210.77\n839.02\n949.45\n830.81\n666.13\n537.19\n Non-Oil Revenue\n817.77\n1060.30\n744.58\n844.87\n558.19\n956.32\n717.16\n602.46\n621.86\n \nAt N537.19 billion or 46.3 per cent of the total revenue, gross oil \nreceipt was lower than the provisional quarterly budget and \nthe receipts in the preceding quarter by 39.2 per cent and \n19.4 per cent, respectively. The decline in oil revenue relative \nto the budget estimate was attributed to the persistent fall in \nreceipts from crude oil/gas export, due to persistent low price \nof crude oil in the international market and the series of shut-\nins and shut-downs at some NNPC terminals owing to pipeline \n0\n500\n1000\n1500\n2000\n2500\n3000\nQ2-14\nQ3-14\nQ4-14\nQ1-15\nQ2-15\nQ3-15\nQ4-15\nQ1-16\nQ2-16\nOil Revenue Gross\nNon-Oil Revenue\nN Billion\nGross federally -\ncollected revenue \nfell by 8.6 per cent \nbelow the level in \nthe first quarter of \n2016. \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 16\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\nvandalism in the Niger Delta region, during the review quarter \n(Fig. 7, Table 7). \n \nFigure 7: Gross Oil Revenue and Its Components \n \nTable 7: Components of Gross Oil Revenue (N billion) \n \n \n \n \n \nAt N621.86 billion or 53.7 per cent of total revenue, gross non-\noil receipts was above the receipts in the preceding quarter \nby 3.2 per cent. It was, however, below the provisional budget \nestimate by 58.4 per cent. The decline in non-oil revenue \nrelative to the provisional budget estimate was due, largely, to \nthe shortfall in receipts from all of its components except \nCustoms Special Levies (Non-Federation Account) during the \nreview quarter (Fig. 8, Table 8). \n-\n200 \n400 \n600 \n800 \n1,000 \n1,200 \n1,400 \n1,600 \n1,800 \n2,000 \nQ2-14\nQ3-14\nQ4-14\nQ1-15\nQ2-15\nQ3-15\nQ4-15\nQ1-16\nQ2-16\nN billion\nOthers\nPPT/Royalties\nCrude oil/Gas Sales\nQ2-14\nQ3-14\nQ4-14\nQ1-15\nQ2-15\nQ3-15\nQ4-15\nQ1-16\nQ2-16\n Oil Revenue\n1795.53\n1723.11\n1466.22\n1210.77\n839.02\n949.45\n830.81\n666.13\n537.19\n Crude oil/Gas Sales\n577.41\n470.99\n331.18\n274.09\n215.40\n196.29\n212.86\n82.43\n112.54\n PPT/Royalties\n838.89\n916.31\n809.89\n573.30\n325.03\n495.39\n388.66\n314.04\n212.78\n Others\n379.23\n335.81\n325.15\n363.38\n298.59\n257.78\n229.28\n269.66\n211.86\n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 17\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\nFigure 8: Gross Non-Oil Revenue and its Components\n \nTable 8: Components of Gross Non-Oil Revenue (N billion) \nQ2-14\nQ3-14\nQ4-14\nQ1-15\nQ2-15\nQ3-15\nQ4-15\nQ1-16\nQ2-16\n Non-Oil Revenue\n817.77\n1060.35\n744.58\n844.87\n558.19\n956.32\n717.15\n602.46\n621.86\n Value-Added Tax (VAT)\n194.15\n193.39\n192.88\n195.66\n203.18\n202.11\n177.78\n196.57\n194.61\n Companies Income Tax & Other Taxes\n404.20\n422.60\n202.38\n174.94\n159.36\n415.67\n279.13\n176.26\n171.71\n Customs & Excise Duties\n136.28\n151.53\n156.80\n138.08\n127.59\n138.83\n141.67\n135.51\n106.54\n Others/1\n83.14\n292.83\n192.52\n336.19\n68.06\n199.70\n118.58\n94.12\n149.00 \n1/ Include FGN Independent Revenue, Education Tax, NITDF & Customs Federation/Non-Federation \nAccount Levies (Port, Sugar, ETLS, Steel, CISS & Cement Levies) \nOf the gross federally-collected revenue, a net sum of N665.67 \nbillion was transferred to the Federation Account for \ndistribution among the three tiers of government and the \n13.0% Derivation Fund. The sums of N100.92 billion, N186.83 \nbillion and N48.09 billion were transferred to the Federal \nGovernment Independent Revenue, VAT Pool Account and \nOthers, repectively. The Federal Government received \nN323.16 billion, while the state and local governments \nreceived N163.91 billion and N126.37 billion, respectively. The \nbalance of N52.23 billion was allocated to the 13.0% \nDerivation Fund for distribution among the oil-producing \nstates. The Federal Government also received N28.02 billion \nfrom the VAT Pool Account, while the state and local \ngovernments received N93.41 billion and N65.39 billion, \nrespectively. \n-\n200 \n400 \n600 \n800 \n1,000 \n1,200 \nQ2-14\nQ3-14\nQ4-14\nQ1-15\nQ2-15\nQ3-15\nQ4-15\nQ1-16\nQ2-16\nN billion\nOthers\nCustoms & Excise Duties\nCompanies Income Tax & Other Taxes\nValue-Added Tax (VAT)\nThe \nsum \nof \nN665.67 \nbillion \nout of the gross \nfederally \ncollected revenue \nwas \ndistributed \namong the three \ntiers \nof \ngovernment and \n13.0% Derivation \nFund \nfor \noil \nproducing states. \n \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 18\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\nThe sum of N7.86 billion was equally distributed as Exchange \nGain among the three tiers of government and the 13% \nDerivation Fund as follows: Federal Government (N3.68 billion), \nState Governments (N1.87 billion), Local Governments (N1.44 \nbillion) and 13% Derivation Fund (N0.88 billion). \nIn addition, the sum of N18.99 billion was received by the \nFederal Government being installmental refund of NNPC’s \nindebtedness to the Federal Government in the first quarter of \n2016. \nThe total statutory and VAT revenue allocation to the three \ntiers of government in the second quarter of 2016 amounted \nto N879.35 billion, compared with the provisional quarterly \nbudget estimate of N1,485.70 billion and N1,074.31 billion \nreceived in the first quarter of 2016. \n3.2 \nThe Fiscal Operations of the Three Tiers of \nGovernment \n \n3.2.1 \nThe Federal Government \n \nFederal Government retained revenue for the second quarter \nof 2016 was estimated at N677.88 billion. This was above the \nreceipts in the preceding quarter by 18.9 per cent, but lower \nthan the quarterly budget estimate by 33.0 per cent. Of the \ntotal revenue, Federation Account accounted for 47.7 per \ncent, while “Other Oil Revenue”, Federal Government \nIndependent Revenue, VAT and, NNPC Refund and \nExchange Gain accounted for 30.0 per cent, 14.9 per cent, \n4.1 per cent and 3.3 per cent, respectively (Fig. 9, Table 9). \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nAt N677.88 billion, the \nestimated \nFederal \ngovernment \nretained \nrevenue \nwas \nhigher \nthan the receipts in the \npreceding quarter by \n18.9 per cent. \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 19\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\n \nFigure:9 Federal Government Retained Revenue \n \n \nTable 9: Federal Government Fiscal Operations (N billion) \n \nQ2-14\nQ3-14\nQ4-14\nQ1-15\nQ2-15\nQ3-15\nQ4-15\nQ1-16\nQ2-16\nRetained Revenue\n936.7\n988.6\n839.8\n1027.0\n538.6\n1044.9\n802.6\n570.5\n677.9\nExpenditure\n949.0\n1252.4\n1164.0\n1156.6\n1024.6\n1176.2\n1538.5\n1119.0\n1768.8\nOverall Balance: Surplus(+)/Deficit(-)\n-12.37\n-263.77\n-324.22\n-129.54\n-485.94\n-131.26\n-735.86\n-548.42\n-1090.96\n \nAt N1,768.85 billion, provisional data indicated that Federal \nGovernment expenditure for the second quarter of 2016 was \nabove the provisional quarterly budget estimate and the level \nat the end of the preceding quarter by 12.8 and 58.1 per \ncent, \nrespectively. \nThe \ndevelopment \nrelative \nto \nthe \nproportionate quarterly budget estimate was attributed, \nmainly, to the rise in both recurrent and capital expenditure. \nA breakdown of the total expenditure showed that the \nrecurrent component accounted for 72.6 per cent, while \ncapital and statutory transfers constituted for 19.8 per cent \nand 7.6 per cent, repectively (Fig. 5). A further breakdown of \nthe \nrecurrent \nexpenditure \nshowed \nthat \nthe \nnon-debt \ncomponent represented 73.4 per cent, while debt service \npayments accounted for the balance of 26.6 per cent. \nThe fiscal operations of the Federal Government, thus, \nresulted in an estimated deficit of N1,090.96 billion, indicating \nFederation\nAccount (47.77%)\nVAT Pool\nAccount (4.1%)\nOthers - including NNPC \nRefund and Exchange Gain \n(33.3%)\nFGN Independent \nRevenue (14.9%)\n Fiscal operations \nof the FG resulted \nin an estimated \ndeficit \nof \nN1,090.96 billion \nin Q2 2016. \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 20\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\nan increase of 96.4 per cent above the provisional quarterly \nbudget deficit of N555.49 billion. \nFigure9: Federal Government Expenditure \n \n \n3.2.2 \nStatutory Allocations to State Governments \n \nTotal \nallocation \nto \nstate \ngovernments \nincluding, \nthe \nFederation Account, 13.0% Derivation Fund and VAT, during \nthe review quarter, amounted to N312.30 billion. This was 40.0 \nand 17.9 per cent, lower than both the provisional budget \nestimate and the level at the end of the preceding quarter, \nrespectively. Further breakdown showed that receipts from \nthe Federation Account was N218.89 billion (70.1 per cent), \nwhile VAT contributed N93.41 billion (29.9 per cent). The share \nof Federation Account was 23.4 per cent lower than the \npreceding quarter’s level. However, receipts from the VAT \nPool Account fell by 1.0 per cent below the level in the \npreceding quarter. \n3.2.3 \nStatutory Allocations to Local Government Councils \n \nProvisional \ndata \nindicated \nthat \nallocations \nto \nlocal \ngovernments from the Federation and VAT Pool Accounts in \nthe second quarter of 2016 stood at N193.20 billion. This was \n44.1and 15.7 per cent below the budget estimate and the \nlevel in the preceding quarter, respectively. Of the total \namount, allocation from the Federation Account was N127.81 \nbillion (66.2 per cent), while VAT Pool Account accounted for \nthe balance of N65.39 billion (33.8 per cent). \n \nRecurrent\nCapital\nTransfers\nCapital\n(19.8%)\nTransfers\n(7.6%)\nRecurrent (72.6%)\n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 21\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\n \n4.0 \nDomestic Economic Conditions \nActivities in the agrcultural sector increased significantly due to well \ndistributed rainfall in most parts of the country. Farmers in the South \nengaged in harvesting of maize and yam, while farmers in the North \nengaged in planting and off-season harvesting. In the livestock sub-\nsector, farmers engaged in the breeding of poultry and migration of \ncattle from the North to the South in search of green pastures. Crude \noil production was estimated at 1.54 million barrels per day (mbd) or \n141.68 million barrels, for the quarter. The end-period inflation rate for \nthe second quarter of 2016, on year-on-year basis, was 16.5 per \ncent, compared with 12.8 per cent at the end of the preceding \nquarter. The inflation rate on a 12-month moving average basis was \n11.4 per cent, compared with 9.8 per cent at the end of the \npreceding quarter. \n4.1 \nAgricultural Sector \nAvailable data indicated that agricultural activities increased \nsignificantly during the second quarter of 2016 due to well \ndistributed rainfall in most parts of the country. Major \nagricultural activities in the southern states were harvesting of \nmaize and yam, while farmers in the Northern States engaged, \nmainly, in planting and off-season harvesting. In the livestock \nsub-sector, farmers engaged in the breeding of poultry and \nmigration of cattle from the North to the South in search of \ngreen pastures. Also, the continued resettlement and re-\nintegration \nof \nhitherto \ndisplaced \npersons \narising \nfrom \ninsurgency has improved the prospects for increased \nagricultural activities in the North-Eastern part of the country. \n4.2 Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme \nA total of N1,993.5 million was guaranteed to 12,405 farmers \nunder the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme (ACGS) in \nthe second quarter of 2016. The amount represented a 21.6 \nper cent increase above the level in the preceding quarter, \nbut indicated a 25.7 per cent decline below the level in the \ncorresponding period of 2015. Sub-sectoral analysis showed \nthat food crops got the largest share of N1,369.5 million (68.5 \nper cent) guaranteed to 9,607 beneficiaries, livestock got \nN350.6 \nmillion \n(17.6 \nper \ncent) \nguaranteed \nto \n1,149 \nbeneficiaries, fisheries had N89.5 million (4.5 per cent) \nguaranteed to 385 beneficiaries, while cash crop received \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 22\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\nN83.9 million (4.2 per cent) guaranteed to 538 beneficiaries. \nThe mixed Crop sub-sector received N68.7 million (3.5 per \ncent) guaranteed to 414 beneficiaries, while ‘Others’ received \na total of N31.1 million (1.6 per cent) guaranteed to 312 \nbeneficiaries. \nAnalysis by state showed that 31 states and the Federal \nCapital Territory benefited from the Scheme in the review \nperiod, with the highest and lowest sums of N518.0 million (26.0 \nper cent) and N0.7 million (0.05 per cent) guaranteed to Edo \nand Taraba states, respectively, \nAt end-June 2016, total amount released by the CBN under \nthe Commercial Agriculture Credit Scheme (CACS) from \ninception to the participating banks, for disbursement, stood \nat N366.4 billion, for 456 projects(Table 10). \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Table 10: Disbursement of Credit Under the Commercial Agriculture Credit Scheme (CACS)\nS/N\nParticipating Banks\nAmt Disbursed (N billion)\nNumber of Projects/State Governments\n1\nAccess Bank Plc\n17.62\n19\n2\nCitibank Plc\n3.00\n2\n3\nDiamond Baqnk Plc\n4.70\n19\n4\nECOBANK\n6.30\n10\n5\nFCMB Plc.\n10.10\n20\n6\nFidelity Bank Plc \n15.90\n13\n7\nFirst Bank of Nigeria Plc \n39.80\n96\n8\nGTBank Plc\n23.70\n20\n9\nHeritage Bank Plc\n4.80\n13\n10\nKeystone Bank \n3.40\n6\n11\nJaiz Bank Plc\n1.00\n1\n12\nSkye Bank Plc\n11.80\n9\n13\nStanbic IBTC Bank \n21.26\n40\n14\nSterling Bank Plc\n24.10\n30\n15\nUnion Bank Nigeria PLC\n21.90\n28\n16\nUnited Bank for Africa (UBA) Plc\n55.80\n40\n17\nUnity Bank Plc \n24.30\n26\n18\nWema Bank\n1.82\n10\n19\nZenith Bank\n75.09\n54\nTOTAL\n366.4\n456\n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 23\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\n \n \n4.3 \nIndustrial Production \nAvailable data indicated a decline in Industrial activities \nduring the second quarter of 2016 relative to the preceding \nquarter. At 110.3 (2010=100), the estimated index of \nindustrial production fell by 0.02 per cent, below the \nlevels in the preceding quarter and the corresponding \nperiod of 2015, respectively. The development was \nattributed to a marginal decline in activities in all \nsubsectors during the period. \nThe index of manufacturing production in the second quarter \nof 2016 at 188.9 (2010=100), showed a marginal decline of 0.01 \nand 0.06 per cent relative to the levels in the preceding \nquarter and the corresponding period of 2015, respectively. \nCapacity utilisation was estimated at 50.7 per cent, indicating \na 2.0 percentage points decline, compared with the level in \nthe preceding quarter. The development was occasioned by \nthe poor power supply due to continued vandalism of gas \npipelines, exchange rate challenges and cash squeeze, all of \nwhich together impacted on business confidence and \nhindered activities in the sector (Fig.11). \nFigure11: Manufacturing Capacity Utilization Rate \n \n44.0\n46.0\n48.0\n50.0\n52.0\n54.0\n56.0\n58.0\n60.0\n62.0\nQ2-14\nQ3-14\nQ4-14\nQ1-15\nQ2-15\nQ3-15\nQ4-15\nQ1-16\nQ2-16\nPercent\nIndustrial activities \nfell in the review \nquarter due to \nreduced activities in \nall sub-sectors. \nIndustrial capacity \nutilization \nwas \nestimated to have \ndeclined \nby \n2.0 \npercentage points \nduring the review \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 24\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\nAt 75.0 (2010=100), the estimated index of mining production \nin the second quarter of 2016, indicated 0.04 per cent and \n0.12 per cent decrease relative to the levels attained in the \npreceding quarter and the corresponding period of 2015, \nrespectively. The development during the review quarter was \ndue to a significant fall in crude oil and gas production. \nAt 3,156 MW/h, estimated average electricity generation in \nthe second quarter of 2016 fell by 0.19 per cent, compared \nwith the level attained in the preceding quarter. The \ndevelopment was attributed to the fall in power generation in \nthe various power plants due to vandalism. \nAverage estimated electricity consumption, at 2,989 MW/h, \nfell by 0.19 per cent, relative to the level attained in the \npreceding quarter. The fall in electricity consumption was \nattributed to a decline in power generation and transmission \nlosses (Fig. 12, Table 11). \nFigure 102: Index of Industrial Production (2010=100) 3\n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\nQ2-14 Q3-14 Q4-14 Q1-15 Q2-15 Q3-15 Q4-15 Q1-16 Q2-16\nIndex\nMining\nAll Sectors\nManufacturing\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n3 Index measurement at (2010=100) from first quarter15 \nAverage electricity \ngeneration and \nconsumption fell \nduring the review \nquarter. \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 25\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nTable 11: Index of Industrial Production and Manufacturing Capacity Utilization Rate \nQ2-14\nQ3-14\nQ4-14\nQ1-15\nQ2-15\nQ3-15\nQ4-15\nQ1-16\nQ2-16\nAll Sectors (1990=100)\n139.00\n139.00\n123.60\n139.45\n110.20\n112.50\n118.80\n111.10\n110.30\n Manufacturing\n108.4\n108.4\n108.98\n191.2\n185.1\n191.8\n185.5\n190.2\n188.9\n Mining\n147.5\n147.5\n147.59\n101.1\n87.4\n83.1\n94.5\n75\n72\nCapacity Utilization (%)\n60.00\n59.88\n60.30\n60.50\n59.5\n54.90\n53.70\n52.70\n50.70 \n4.4 \nPetroleum Sector \nNigeria’s crude oil production, including condensates and \nnatural gas liquids, was estimated at an average of 1.54 \nmillion barrels per day (mbd) or 141.68 million barrels (mb) for \nthe second quarter of 2016. This represented a decline of 0.37 \nmbd or 15.4 per cent, relative to 1.82 mbd or 165.62 million \nbarrels produced in the first quarter of 2016. \nCrude oil export stood at 1.09 mbd or 100.28 mb. This \nrepresented a decline of 20.4 per cent, compared with 1.37 \nmbd or 124.67 mb, recorded in the preceding quarter. Supply \ndisruptions owing to continued attacks on oil installations by \nvandals accounted for the decline in crude oil production. \nDeliveries to the refineries for domestic consumption remained \nat 0.45 mbd or 41.40 million barrels during the review quarter. \nAt an estimated average of US$46.44 per barrel, the price of \nNigeria’s reference crude, the Bonny Light (37º API), rose by \n35.0 per cent, compared with the level in the preceding \nquarter. The average prices of other competing crudes, \nnamely the the UK Brent at US$45.29/b, WTI at US$45.18/b and \nForcados at US$46.05/b exhibited similar trends as the Bonny \nLight. \nThe average price of OPEC basket of eleven selected crude \nstreams, at US$42.38 per barrel, indicated an increase of 40.5 \nper cent, compared with the average of US$30.16/b recorded \nin the preceding quarter. It, however, showed a decline of \n28.5 per cent, compared with the average of US$59.31/b \nrecorded in the corresponding quarter of 2015 (Fig. 13, Table \nCrude oil and \nnatural gas \nproduction \ndecreased in the \nsecond quarter of \n2016. \nCrude oil export \ndecreased in Q2 \n2016. \nAverage crude oil \nprices, including \nNigeria’s Bony \nLight (37o API) rose \nin the international \ncrude oil market in \nQ2 2016. \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 26\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\n12). \nFigure113: Trends in Crude Oil Prices\n \nTable 12: Average Crude Oil Prices in the International Oil Market \nQ2-14\nQ3-14\nQ4-14\nQ1-15\nQ2-15\nQ3-15\nQ4-15\nQ1-16\nQ2-16\nBonny Light\n112.23\n103.04\n77.74\n56.73\n62.22\n51.15\n44.08\n34.39\n46.44\nOPEC Basket\n105.74\n100.86\n7.36\n50.3\n59.31\n48.14\n39.9\n30.16\n42.38\n \n \n4.5 \nConsumer Prices4 \nThe all-items composite Consumer Price Index (CPI), at the \nend of the second quarter of 2016, was 201.7 (November \n2009=100), representing an increase of 6.2 per cent and 16.5 \nper cent, compared with the levels in the preceding quarter \nand the corresponding quarter of 2015, respectively. The \ndevelopment was driven, largely, by the increases in the \nprices of food and non-alcoholic beverages; housing, \nwater, electricity, gas and other fuel; clothing and \nfootwear; transport; education; furnishing, household \nequipment and maintenance; and health. \n \n4 New CPI with November 2009 = 100 as base and new weight based on the 2003/2004 Nigeria \nLiving Standard Survey (NLSS) was released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) ON 18TH \nOctober 2010. \n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\nQ2-14\nQ3-14\nQ4-14\nQ1-15\nQ2-15\nQ3-15\nQ4-15\nQ1-16\nQ2-16\nUS$ per barrel\nBonny Light\nOPEC Basket\nThe general price \nlevel rose in Q2, \ncompared with the \nlevel in the first \nquarterof 2016. \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 27\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\nThe urban all-items CPI at the end of the second quarter of \n2016 was 203.36 (November 2009=100), indicating an increase \nof 7.1and 18.1per cent, above the levels in the preceding \nquarter and the corresponding period of 2015, respectively. \nSimilarly, the rural all-items CPI, at 200.52 (November \n2009=100), represented increase of 5.6 and 15.1 per cent \nabove the levels in the preceding quarter and the \ncorresponding period of 2015, respectively (Fig. 14, Table 13). \nThe composite food index (with a weight of 50.7 per cent) was \n205.39 per cent, representing an increase of 5.4 per cent, \ncompared with the 194.87 per cent at the end of the \npreceding quarter. The development was attributed to the \nincrease in the prices of farm produce (vegetables, yam, \npotatoes, and other tubers, rice, millet, and fruits) and \nprocessed food. \nFigure124: Consumer Price Index \n \nTable 13: Consumer Price Index (November 2009=100) \nQ2-14\nQ3-14\nQ4-14\nQ1-15\nQ2-15\nQ3-15\nQ4-15\nQ1-16\nQ2-16\nComposite\n158.6\n161.3\n164.4\n168.4\n173.2\n176.5\n180.2\n189.9\n201.7\nUrban\n157.6\n162.4\n163.4\n167.4\n172.2\n175.5\n179.2\n190.0\n203.4\nRural\n159.7\n160.3\n165.5\n169.5\n174.2\n177.5\n181.11\n189.9\n200.5\n \n \n \n145\n147.5\n150\n152.5\n155\n157.5\n160\n162.5\n165\n167.5\n170\n172.5\n175\n177.5\n180\n182.5\n185\n187.5\n190\nQ2-14\nQ3-14\nQ4-14\nQ1-15\nQ2-15\nQ3-15\nQ4-15\nQ1-16\nQ2-16\nIndex\nComposite\nUrban\nRural\n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 28\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\nThe inflation rate at the end of the review quarter, on a year-\non-year basis, was 16.5 per cent, compared with 12.8 and 9.2 \nper cent in the preceding quarter and the corresponding \nperiod of 2015, respectively. On a twelve-month moving \naverage basis, the inflation rate was 11.4 per cent, indicating \na 1.6 percentage points increase, above the level recorded \nin the preceding quarter (Fig. 15, Table 14). \nFigure 15: Inflation Rate \n \n \nTable 14: Headline Inflation Rate (%) \nQ2-14\nQ3-14\nQ4-14\nQ1-15\nQ2-15\nQ3-15\nQ4-15\nQ1-16\nQ2-16\n12-Month Moving Average\n8.0\n8.0\n8.0\n8.2\n8.4\n8.7\n9.0\n9.8\n11.4\nYear-on-Year\n8.2\n8.3\n8.0\n8.5\n9.2\n9.4\n9.6\n12.8\n16.5\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n0.0\n2.0\n4.0\n6.0\n8.0\n10.0\n12.0\n14.0\nQ2-14\nQ3-14\nQ4-14\nQ1-15\nQ2-15\nQ3-15\nQ4-15\nQ1-16\nQ2-16\nPercent\n12-Month Average\nYear-on-Year\nThe headline \ninflation (y-o-y) \nstood at 16.5 per \ncent in Q2 2016. \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 29\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\n5.0 \nExternal Sector Developments \nProvisional data showed that foreign exchange inflow and outflow \nthrough the CBN in the second quarter of 2016, rose by 49.3 per cent \nand 35.7 per cent, respectively, above the levels in the preceding \nquarter. Total non-oil export receipts declined by 43.2 per cent, \nrelative to the level in the preceding quarter. The average \nexchange rate at the inter-bank segment was N209.13/US$, \ncompared with N197.00/US$ at the end of the preceding quarter. At \nUS$27.22 billion, the gross external reserves fell by 1.2 per cent, \ncompared with the level at the end of the preceding quarter. \n5.1 \nForeign Exchange Flows \nProvisional data showed that foreign exchange inflow and \nouflow through the CBN in the second quarter of 2016 were \nUS$5.89 billion and US$6.09 billion, respectively. This resulted in \na net outflow of US$0.20 billion, compared with the net outflow \nof US$0.54 billion in the preceding quarter. Relative to the level \nat the end of the preceding quarter, inflow increased by 49.3 \nper cent, but was a decline of 15.6 per cent, compared with \nthe level at the end of the corresponding period of 2015. The \ndevelopment, relative to the preceding quarter was due to \nthe increase in both oil and non-oil receipts. Similarly, outflow \nrose by 35.7 per cent above the level in the preceding \nquarter, but was 25.7 per cent lower than the level at the end \nof the corresponding period of 2015. The development \nrelative to the preceding quarter was driven mainly, by inter-\nbank sales, swaps and 3rd party MDA transfer (Fig.16, Table 15). \nFigure 16: Foreign Exchange Flows Through the CBN \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nForeign exchange \ninflow and outflow \nthrough the CBN rose \nby 49.3 and 35.7 per \ncent, respectively, \nand resulted in a net \noutflow of US$0.20 \nbillion in Q2 of 2016. \n-10,000\n-5,000\n0\n5,000\n10,000\n15,000\n20,000\nQ2-14\nQ3-14\nQ4-14\nQ1-15\nQ2-15\nQ3-15\nQ4-15\nQ1-16\nQ2-16\nUS$ million\nInflow\nOutflow\nNetflow\n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 30\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\n \nTable 15: Foreign Exchange Flows Through the CBN (US$ million) \nQ1-14\nQ2-14\nQ3-14\nQ4-14\nQ1-15\nQ2-15\nQ3-15\nQ1-16\nQ2-16\nInflow\n12,676.51\n \n13,094.23\n \n10,641.86\n \n8,307.23\n \n6,976.02\n \n11,111.00\n \n7,135.41\n \n3,942.89\n \n5,887.88\n \nOutflow\n12,806.25\n \n11,804.98\n \n14,527.35\n \n12,875.77\n \n8,194.56\n \n9,523.32\n \n7,757.49\n \n4,487.05\n \n6,087.87\n \nNetflow\n(129.74)\n \n1,289.25\n \n(3,885.49)\n \n(4,568.54)\n \n(1,218.54)\n \n1,587.68\n \n(622.08)\n \n(544.16)\n \n(199.99)\n \n \n \nProvisonal data on aggregate foreign exchange inflow into \nthe economy indicated that total inflow was US$15.33 billion. \nThis represented an increase of 3.7 per cent above the level \nat the end of the preceding quarter but, showed a decline of \n35.3 per cent relative to the level at the end of the \ncorresponding period of 2015. The development was driven \nby increase in oil and non-oil receipts. Oil sector receipts, \nwhich accounted for 20.5 per cent of the total, stood at \nUS$3.15 billion, compared with US$2.48 billion and US$3.65 \nbillion, recorded in the first quarter of 2016 and the \ncorresponding period of 2015, respectively. \nNon-oil public sector inflow, at US$2.74 billion (17.9 per cent of \nthe total), rose by 87.7 per cent, above the level at the end of \nthe preceding quarter. It, however, indicated a decline of \n17.5 per cent from the level at the end of the corresponding \nperiod of 2015. Autonomous inflow, which accounted for 61.6 \nper cent of the total, fell by 13.0 per cent compared with the \nlevel in the preceding quarter of 2016. \nAt US$6.60 billion, aggregate foreign exchange outflow from \nthe economy rose by 29.4 per cent, above the level in the \npreceding quarter, but showed a decline of 19.5 per cent, \nfrom the level at the end of the corresponding period of 2015. \nThe development, relative to the first quarter was attributed to \nthe increase in outflow through the CBN. Thus, foreign \nexchange flows through the economy resulted in a net inflow \nof US$8.73 billion in the review quarter, compared with US$9.69 \nbillion and US$15.51 billion in the first quarter of 2016 and the \ncorresponding period of 2015, respectively. \n5.2 \nNon-Oil Export Earnings by Exporters \nProvisional data showed that total non-oil export earnings, at \nUS$576.97 million, fell by 43.2 per cent, below the level in the \npreceding \nquarter. \nThe \ndevelopment, \nrelative \nto \nthe \nAutonomous inflow\ninto the economy fell \nby 13.0 per cent in \nQ2 2016 . \nTotal non-oil export \nearnings by \nexporters fell \nduring the second \nquarter of 2016. \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 31\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\npreceding quarter, was attributed, mainly, to the significant \ndecline in receipts from manufactured and food products as \nwell as minerals export. A breakdown by sectors showed that \nproceeds from the export of agricultural, minerals, industrial, \nmanufactured products, food products and transport sectors \nstood at US$196.87 million, US$185.51 million, US$84.34 million, \nUS$79.44 \nmillion, \nUS$30.68 \nmillion \nand \nUS$0.12 \nmillion \nrespectively. \nThe percentage shares of agricultural, minerals, industrial, \nmanufactured products, food products and transport sectors \nin the total non-oil export proceeds were 34.1 per cent, 32.2 \nper cent, 14.6 per cent, 13.8 per cent, 5.3 per cent and 0.02 \nper cent, respectively. \n5.3 \nSectoral Utilisation of Foreign Exchange \n \nThe invisible sector accounted for the bulk (34.1per cent) of \ntotal foreign exchange disbursed in the second quarter of \n2016, followed by the industrial sub-sector (22.5 per cent). The \ncontributions of other sectors in a descending order included: \nminerals and oil sub-sector (23.3 per cent), manufactured \nproducts (11.3 per cent), food products (6.3 per cent), \ntransport sector (1.7 per cent) and agricultural products (0.8 \nper cent) (Fig.17). \nFigure17: Sectoral Utilisation of Foreign Exchange \n \n \n \n \n \n0.8\n1.7\n6.3\n11.3\n23.3\n22.5\n34.1\n0.9\n2.8\n7.3\n13.1\n18.9\n24.1\n32.9\n0.9\n1.8\n6.0\n9.0\n19.7\n22.0\n40.6\n0.0\n5.0\n10.0\n15.0\n20.0\n25.0\n30.0\n35.0\n40.0\n45.0\nPercent of Total\nQ4-15\nQ1-16\nQ2-16\n. \nThe invisible sector\naccounted for the \nbulk of the total \nforeign exchange \ndisbursed during \nQ2 2016. \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 32\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\n5.4 \nForeign Exchange Market Developments5 \nA total of US$4.31 billion was sold by the CBN to authorized \ndealers during the second quarter of 2016. This reflected an \nincrease of 22.7 per cent above the level in the preceding \nquarter, but a decline of 41.5 per cent relative to the level in \nthe corresponding period of 2015. The development, relative \nto the preceding quarter, was attributed to the increased \nintervention by the CBN at the forex market and swap \ntransactions. Of the aggregate, inter-bank and swaps sales \nwere US$3.11 billion and US$1.20 billion, respectively (Fig. 18, \nTable 16). \nFigure 18: Supply of Foreign Exchange \n \n \n \nTable 16: Demand for and Supply of Foreign Exchange (US$ billion) \nQ4-14\nQ1-15\nQ2-15\nQ3-15\nQ4-15\nQ1-16\nQ2-16\nForex Sales at rDAS/Interbank\n10.89\n8.17\n4.68\n4.85\n3.78\n2.75\n3.11\nSupply of Swaps\nnil\n1.00\n1.25\n1.50\n1.20\n0.74\n1.20\nSupply of Forex to BDC\n0.43\n0.86\n0.97\n1.24\n0.87\n0.02\n0.00\nTotal Forex Supply(BDC and rDAS)\n12.74\n10.92\n7.35\n8.04\n7.01\n3.51\n4.31\n \nThe average exchange rate at the inter-bank segment was \nN209.13/US$, compared with N197.00/US$ in the first quarter of \n2016 and indicated a depreciation of 6.2 per cent relative to \nthe rate in the preceding quarter. At the BDC segment, the \n \n5 Market Closed (MC) - wDAS and rDAS window was closed in February 2015 \n \n0.00\n2.00\n4.00\n6.00\n8.00\n10.00\n12.00\n14.00\nQ3-14\nQ4-14\nQ1-15\nQ2-15\nQ3-15\nQ4-15\nQ1-16\nQ2-16\nUS$ billion\nForex Sales at rDAS/Interbank\nSupply of Swaps\nSupply of Forex to BDC\nTotal Forex Supply\nSupply for foreign \nexchange by \nauthorized dealers \nrose during Q2 2016. \nThe average naira \nexchange rate vis-à-\nvis the US dollar was \nN209.13/US$ at the \ninterbank segment in \nQ2 2016. \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 33\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\naverage exchange rate was N351.82/US$ at end-June 2016, \nresulting in a premium of 51.8 per cent relative to the inter-\nbank rate(Fig. 19, Table 17). \nFigure 19: Average Exchange Rate Movements \n \n Table 17: Exchange Rate Movements and Exchange Rate Premium \nAverage Exchange Rate (N/US$)\nQ2-14\nQ3-14\nQ4-14\nQ1-15\nQ2-15\nQ3-15\nQ4-15\nQ1-16\nQ2-16\nrDAS\n157.29\n157.29\n162.33\n169.68 N/A\nN/A\nN/A\nN/A\nN/A\n BDC\n168.08\n168.90\n178.24\n210.69\n216.41\n225.21\n238.69\n313.49\n351.82\n Interbank\n162.29\n162.39\n172.16\n191.11\n196.97\n196.99\n196.99\n197.00\n209.13\nPremium (%)\n rDAS/BDC\n6.9\n7.4\n9.8\n23.5 N/A\nN/A\nN/A\nN/A\nN/A\n rDAS/Interbank\n3.2\n3.2\n6.1\n12.6 N/A\nN/A\nN/A\nN/A\nN/A\n BDC/Interbank\n3.6\n4.0\n3.5\n10.2\n9.9\n14.3\n21.2\n59.1\n68.2\n \n \n \n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\n300\nQ2-14\nQ3-14\nQ4-14\nQ1-15\nQ2-15\nQ3-15\nQ4-15\nQ1-16\nQ2-16\nN/US $\nAverage wDAS/rDAS\nAverage BDC\nAverage Interbank\n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 34\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\nFigure 20: Exchange Rate Premium \n \n \n5.5 \nGross Official External Reserves \nGross external reserves at the end of the second quarter of \n2016 stood at US$26.51 billion, showing a decline of 3.0 per \ncent and 6.5 per cent, compared with the levels in the \npreceding quarter and the corresponding period of 2015, \nrespectively. The development, relative to the preceding \nquarter, was due to increased sales of foreign exchange at \nthe interbank market and notional changes in the value of \nthird currencies. A breakdown of the official external reserves \nshowed that CBN reserves stood at US$19.44 billion (73.3%), \nFederation reserves, US$2.45 billion (9.3%), and the Federal \nGovernment reserves, US$4.61 billion (17.4%), (Fig. 21, Table \n18). \n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\nQ2-14\nQ3-14\nQ4-14\nQ1-15\nQ2-15\nQ3-15\nQ4-15\nQ1-16\nQ2-16\nPer cent\nrDAS/BDC\nrDAS/Interbank\nInterbank/BDC\nGross external\nreserves \ndeclined during \nthe second \nquarter of 2016. \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 35\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\nFigure 21: Gross Official External Reserves \n0\n5,000\n10,000\n15,000\n20,000\n25,000\n30,000\n35,000\n40,000\n45,000\nQ2-14\nQ3-14\nQ4-14\nQ1-15\nQ2-15\nQ3-15\nQ4-15\nQ1-16\nQ2-16\nUS$ million\n \nTable 18: Gross Official External Reserves (US$ million) \nQ2-14\nQ3-14\nQ4-14\nQ1-15\nQ2-15\nQ3-15\nQ4-15\nQ1-16\nQ2-16\nExternal Reserves\n37,330.0\n \n38,278.6\n \n34,241.5\n \n29,357.2\n \n28,335.2\n \n29,880.2\n \n28,284.8\n \n27,336.4\n \n26,505.4\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n6.0 Global Economic Conditions \n6.1 Global Output \nGlobal growth remained modest and uneven. Economic \nactivities continued to expand at a solid pace in advanced \neconomies, \nwhile \ndevelopments \nin \nemerging \nmarket \neconomies remained weak and more diverse. Increased \nuncertainties in Chinese economy and persistent oil price \ndecline led to renewed downward pressures on euro-area \nsovereign bond yields. Risks to the global outlook remained \ntilted to the downside due to ongoing adjustments in the \nglobal economy, general slowdown in emerging market \neconomies, China’s rebalancing, lower commodity prices and \ngradual exit by the US from extraordinarily accommodative \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 36\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\nmonetary conditions. If these key challenges are not \nsuccessfully managed, global growth could be derailed. \n6.2 Global Inflation \nThe sharp decline in oil prices in 2015 continued to have a \nhuge impact on global inflation. Consumer price inflation has \nbeen revised downwards across almost all advanced \neconomies and the IMF projects that inflation will remain \nbelow central bank targets in 2016. In emerging market \neconomies, the downward pressure from lower oil prices was \noffset by varying degrees of the pass-through of nominal \nexchange rate depreciations to domestic prices, especially in \ncountries with strong depreciations, such as Brazil, Colombia, \nRussia, and Kazakhstan. Overall, global inflation is projected to \nremain subdued in the short-term but rise from the second half \nof 2016. \nIn the sub-Saharan Africa region, inflation increased from 11.6 \nper cent in April 2016 to 12.6 per cent in May 2016, based on \npreliminary estimates. Electricity and water scarcity across the \nregion, coupled with depreciating currencies, has kept \ninflationary pressures elevated. \n6.3 Global Commodity Demand and Prices \nWorld crude oil demand was estimated at 93.25 mbd in the \nsecond quarter of 2016, representing a decline of 0.2 per cent \ncompared with the 93.15 mbd recorded in the preceding \nquarter. World crude oil supply in the review quarter was \nestimated at 94.34 mbd, representing a decline of 0.6 per \ncent from the level in the preceding quarter. \nThe price of OPEC Reference Basket (ORB) averaged US$42.38 \nper barrel in the second quarter of 2016, representing an \nincrease of 40.5 per cent, compared with the level in the \npreceding quarter. The development was attributed to the \ndecline in production in Canada, continuous decline in crude \noil rig counts in the US, supply constraints in Nigeria due to \npipeline sabotage and increased global demand. \n6.4 \nInternational Financial Markets \nDevelopments in the international stock markets were mixed \nduring the review period. In Europe, the FTSE 100 and MICEX , \nindices increased by 5.3 and 1.1per cent, respectively, while \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 37\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\nthe CAC 40 and DAX declined by 3.4 and 2.9 per cent, \nrespectively. In Asia, the India’s BSE Sensex index increased by \n6.5 per cent, while Japan’s Nikkei 225 and China’s Shanghai \nStock Exchange-A indices fell by 7.1 and 2.5 per cent, \nrespectively. In North America, the Canadian S&P/TSX \nComposite, United States S&P 500 and Mexican Bolsa indices \nincreased by 4.2, 1.9 and 0.2 per cent, respectively. \nIn Africa, the Nigerian NSE All-Share index increased by 17.0 \nper cent, while the Kenyan Nairobi NSE 20, Egyptian EGX CASE \n30, Ghanaian GSE ASI and South African JSE All-Share indices \nfell by 8.6, 7.7, 6.5 and 0.1 per cent, respectively. \n6.5 Other International Economic Developments \nand Meetings \nOther major international economic developments and \nmeetings of importance to the domestic economy during the \nreview period included: \nThe 2016 Spring Meetings of the Board of Governors of the \nWorld Bank Group (WBG), the International Monetary Fund \n(IMF) and the Inter-Governmental Group of Twenty-Four (G-24) \non International Monetary Affairs and Developments held in \nWashington D. C., USA from April 11 – 18, 2016. The Ministers of \nthe Inter-Governmental Group of 24, the International \nMonetary \nand \nFinance \nCommittee \n(IMFC) \nand \nthe \nDevelopment Committee also held their respective meetings. \nThe central message at the meetings was that the recovery of \nthe global economy remained modest, with greater downside \nrisks and need to manage policy space to achieve higher, \nmore balanced and inclusive growth. The IMFC noted that the \nIMF had a key role to play in supporting a stronger policy \nresponse by the membership especiall with regard to policy \nadvice and surveillance. The G-24 Ministers welcomed the \nentry into force of the 2010 Quota and Governance Reforms \nof the IMF that have made progress in shifting the distribution \nof quota shares to EMDCs, and noted that there was still a \nlong way to go in this respect. The Development Committee \nobserved that fragility and conflict had displaced millions of \npeople, significantly impacting both origin and host countries. \nThe 2016 continental seminar of the Association of African \nCentral Banks (AACB) was held in Cairo, Egypt, from May 9 - \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 38\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\n11 2016 with the theme \"Financial stability: New Challenges for \nCentral Banks. Key recommendations included: \n \nThe need for central banks and other regulatory \nauthorities to strengthen prudential oversights and \nregulations within the financial system in line with \nemerging developments; \n \nMember central banks should harmonise regulatory and \nsupervisory norms as well as accounting standards \nthrough convergence to internationally accepted \nstandards and practices; and \n \nClear specification of the authorities in charge of the \nfinancial stability function. \nFinally, the 51st Annual Meetings of the African Development \nBank (AfDB) and the 42nd Meetings of the Board of Governors \nof the African Development Fund (ADF) were held from May \n23 – 27, 2016 in Lusaka, Zambia, with the theme: “Energy and \nClimate Change”. After deliberatiuons, the Governors \nendorsed the High 5 priorities and expressed satisfaction \nwith the progress made towards operationalizing them. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 39\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 40\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\n \n \n \nAPPENDIX TABLES \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 41\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nTable A1: Money and Credit Aggregates \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 42\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\n \n1/ Quasi money consist of Time, Savings and Foreign Currency Deposit at Deposit Money Banks excluding Taking from Discount \nHouses. \n \n 2/ Demand Deposit consist of State, Local and Parastatals Deposits at CBN, State, Local Government and Private Sector Deposits as well \n as Demand Deposits of non-financial Public Enterprises at Deposit Money Banks. \n \n \n \n \n \nMar-15\nJun-15\nSep-15\nDec-15\nMar-16\nJun-16\nDomestic Credit (Net)\n20757.6\n21409.8\n21519.8\n21612.5\n22664.8\n24318.1\n Claims on Federal Government (Net)\n2178.4\n2512.9\n2787.6\n2893.2\n3782.6\n2893.2\n Central Bank (Net)\n-1371.5\n-769.5\n-1042.2\n-1653.1\n-850.7\n-1465.2\n Banks\n3453.5\n3219.3\n3829.8\n4546.3\n4633.3\n4358.4\n Claims on Private Sector\n18579.2\n18897.3\n18732.2\n18719.3\n18882.2\n21425.0\n Central Bank\n4849.2\n5093.1\n5275.2\n5061.6\n5166.7\n5376.9\n Banks\n13631.1\n13713.0\n13456.9\n13657.7\n13715.6\n16048.1\n Claims on Other Private Sector\n18012.4\n18374.8\n18142.3\n18109.9\n18044.3\n20397.9\n Central Bank\n4825.6\n5042.0\n5082.3\n5036.0\n4996.7\n5050.3\n Banks\n13087.9\n13241.5\n13059.9\n13073.8\n13047.6\n15347.6\n Claims on State and Local Government\n543.2\n471.4\n397.0\n583.8\n668.0\n700.5\n Central Bank\n--\n--\n--\n--\n--\n DMBs \n543.2\n471.4\n397.0\n583.8\n668.0\n700.5\n Claims on Non-financial Public Enterprises\n--\n--\n--\n--\n--\n--\n Central Bank\n--\n--\n--\n--\n--\n--\n DMBs \n--\n--\n--\n--\n--\n--\nForeign Assets (Net)\n5985.6\n5951.5\n5083.1\n5653.3\n5551.7\n7105.7\n Central Bank\n5354.7\n5796.0\n5242.6\n5545.3\n5178.2\n6840.4\n DMBs and Non Interest Banks\n630.9\n155.5\n-159.5\n108.0\n373.5\n265.2\nOther Assets (Net)\n-7600.7\n-8549.8\n-7884.9\n-7235.9\n-7746.1\n-9738.8\nTotal Monetary Assets (M2)\n19142.5\n18811.4\n18718.0\n20029.8\n20470.4\n21685.0\nQuasi-Money 1/\n12269.0\n11569.4\n11569.4\n11458.1\n11429.6\n12559.0\nMoney Supply (M1)\n6542.4\n7148.6\n7148.6\n8571.7\n9040.8\n9125.9\n Currency Outside Banks\n1184.0\n1219.0\n1219.0\n1456.1\n1441.4\n1379.2\n Demand Deposits 2/\n5358.4\n5929.6\n5929.6\n7115.6\n7599.5\n7746.7\nTotal Monetary Liabilities (M2)\n19142.5\n18811.4\n18718.0\n20029.8\n20470.4\n21685.0\nMemorandum Items:\nReserve Money (RM)\n5930.9\n5937.1\n5945.8\n5812.7\n5760.4\n5372.0\n Currency in Circulation (CIC)\n1798.0\n1818.4\n1562.6\n1857.9\n1811.1\n1684.7\n Banks' Deposit with CBN\n4133.0\n4118.7\n4383.4\n3954.8\n3949.4\n3687.3\nN billion\n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 43\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\nTable A2: Money and Credit Aggregates (Growth Rates) \nQ1-15\nQ2-15\nQ3-15\nQ4-15\nQ1-16\nQ2-16\nDomestic Credit (Net)\n7.7\n3.75\n0.51\n0.43\n4.87\n7.29\n Claims on Federal Government (Net)\n89.41\n-26.46\n10.95\n3.79\n30.74\n-23.51\n Claims on Private Sector\n2.51\n1.33\n-0.87\n-0.07\n0.87\n13.47\n Claims on Other Private Sector\n2.6\n1.63\n-1.27\n-0.18\n-0.36\n13.04\n Claims on State and Local Government\n1.28\n-13.22\n-15.79\n47.06\n14.41\n4.87\n Claims on Non-financial Public Enterprises\nForeign Assets (Net)\n-13.9\n-12.3\n-14.6\n11.2\n-1.8\n28.0\nOther Assets (Net)\n2.91\n-3.12\n7.78\n8.23\n7.05\n25.73\nTotal Monetary Assets (M2)\n1.2\n-1.7\n-0.5\n7.0\n2.2\n5.9\nQuasi-Money 1/\n1.17\n1.0\n-5.7\n-1.0\n-0.3\n9.9\nMoney Supply (M1)\n1.29\n-6.32\n9.27\n19.91\n5.47\n0.94\n Currency Outside Banks\n2.35\n-19.5\n2.95\n19.45\n-1.01\n-4.31\n Demand Deposits 2/\n1.02\n-2.98\n-10.66\n20\n6.8\n1.94\nTotal Monetary Liabilities (M2)\n1.2\n-1.7\n-0.5\n7.0\n2.2\n5.9\nMemorandum Items:\nReserve Money (RM)\n0.46\n0.65\n-2.65\n0.42\n-0.9\n-6.74\n Currency in Circulation (CIC)\n1.14\n-14.07\n-14.07\n13.46\n-2.52\n-6.98\n DMBs Demand Deposit with CBN\n22.73\n7.21\n-5.31\n-4.72\n-0.14\n-6.64\nDomestic Credit (Net)\n9.99\n11.08\n11.65\n12.13\n4.87\n12.52\n Claims on Federal Government (Net)\n187.57\n118.5\n142.38\n151.56\n30.74\n0.00003\n Claims on Private Sector\n2.56\n4.3\n3.36\n3.29\n0.87\n14.45\n Claims on Other Private Sector\n2.6\n4.6\n3.31\n3.12\n-0.36\n12.63\n Claims on State and Local Governments\n1.28\n-12.11\n-25.99\n8.85\n14.41\n19.98\n Claims on Non-financial Public Enterprises\nForeign Asset (Net)\n-15.7\n-14.42\n-26.91\n-18.71\n-1.8\n25.69\nOther Asset (Net)\n-7.92\n-16.9\n-7.79\n1.08\n-7.05\n-34.59\nTotal Monetary Assets (M2)\n1.13\n-0.54\n-1.03\n5.90\n2.20\n8.26\nQuasi-Money 1/\n1.17\n2.2\n-3.65\n-4.58\n-0.25\n9.61\nMoney Supply (M1)\n1.08\n-5.3\n3.53\n24.14\n5.47\n6.47\n Currency Outside Banks\n2.35\n-17.6\n-15.2\n1.3\n-1.01\n-5.28\n Demand Deposits 2/\n0.74\n-2\n8.45\n30.15\n6.8\n8.87\nTotal Monetary Liabilities (M2)\n1.13\n-0.54\n-1.03\n5.90\n2.20\n8.26\nMemorandum Items:\nReserve Money (RM)\n0.46\n0.25\n-2.41\n-1.99\n-0.9\n-7.58\n Currency in Circulation (CIC)\n1.14\n-13.11\n-8.93\n3.34\n-9.32\n DMBs Demand Deposit with CBN\n25.74\n6.06\n0.43\n0.43\n-0.14\n-6.76\nPercentage Change Over Preceding Quarter\nPercentage Change Over Preceding December\n \n1/ Quasi money consist of Time, Savings and Foreign Currency Deposit at Deposit Money Banks excluding Taking from Discount Houses. \n2/ Demand Deposit consist of State, Local and Parastatals Deposits at CBN, State, Local Government and Private Sector Deposits as well as Demand Deposits of \nnon-financial Public Enterprises at Deposit Money Banks. \nTable A3: Federal Government Fiscal Operations (N billion) \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 44\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016\nQ2-14\nQ3-14\nQ4-14\nQ1-15\nQ2-15\nQ3-15\nQ4-15\nQ1-16\nQ2-16\nRetained Revenue\n936.65\n988.60\n839.77\n1027.03\n538.61\n1044.91\n802.60\n570.54\n677.88\n Federation Account\n769.48\n765.56\n638.38\n601.39\n430.41\n589.66\n482.84\n412.24\n323.16\n VAT Pool Account\n27.96\n27.85\n27.77\n28.17\n29.26\n29.10\n25.60\n28.31\n28.02\n FGN Independent Revenue\n12.88\n98.88\n62.44\n280.63\n10.31\n23.47\n8.93\n40.31\n100.92\n Excess Crude\n0.00\n0.00\n1.27\n7.16\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n Others/SURE-P\n126.33\n96.31\n109.91\n109.68\n68.63\n402.68\n285.23\n89.68\n225.78\nExpenditure\n949.02\n1252.37\n1163.98\n1156.57\n1024.55\n1176.17\n1538.46\n1118.96\n1768.84\n Recurrent\n816.06\n904.71\n869.66\n1032.77\n814.15\n1013.07\n939.20\n988.37\n1285.08\n Capital\n48.05\n236.82\n193.15\n59.58\n162.29\n72.31\n463.18\n72.36\n350.07\n Transfers\n84.91\n110.84\n101.18\n64.22\n48.11\n90.15\n136.08\n58.23\n133.69\nOverall Balance: Surplus(+)/Deficit(-)\n-12.37\n-263.77\n-324.21\n-129.54\n-485.94\n-131.26\n-735.86\n-548.42\n-1090.96 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nC e n t r a l B a n k o f N i g e r i a\nPage 45\nEconomic Report Second Quarter \n2016", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/Quarterly_Economic_Reports/CBN ECONOMIC REPORT second QUARTER 2016.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "377a4bb337be43d4d985972d63f24959", "text": "1 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCentral Bank of Nigeria Communiqué No. 106 of the Monetary Policy \nCommittee Meeting of Monday and Tuesday, March 21 and 22, 2016 \nThe Monetary Policy Committee met on 21st and 22nd March 2016 \namidst uncertain global economic prospects and continuing \nchallenges in the domestic economy. In attendance were 8 out of \nthe 12 members. The Committee appraised the international and \ndomestic economic and financial environments in the first two \nmonths of 2016 as well as the outlook for the rest of the year. \nInternational Economic Developments \nThe Committee noted with concern the further decline in global \noutput at the end of 2015, which grew at 2.3 per cent, year-on-year \nin Q4, its slowest in three years, representing a 0.3 percentage point \ndecline compared with 2.6 per cent in Q3. This deceleration \nstemmed from the continuous slowdown of growth in the emerging \nmarket economies, worsened by deteriorating conditions in the Euro \narea and China as well as key emerging market economies. Other \nfactors include sustained pressure in global financial markets arising \n \n2 \n \nfrom US monetary policy normalization, depressed global oil market \nand persistently weakened global aggregate demand. \nThe slowdown in growth in the United States to 1.0 per cent in Q4 \nfrom 2.0 per cent in Q3 was attributed to slowdown in private \nconsumption \nexpenditure \n(PCE) \nand \nnon-residential \nfixed \ninvestments. In Japan, output declined by 1.4 percentage points in \nQ4, 2015 in contrast to the 1.3 per cent growth recorded in Q3. The \nBank of Japan’s monthly asset purchase program of ¥6.7 trillion \n($56.71 billion) remains substantially sub-optimal, as the economy \ncontinues to lurch between contraction and expansion, with the \nadoption of a negative interest rate policy in January 2016. \nIn the Euro area, GDP grew by 1.5 per cent in Q4 of 2015, and \nprojected to grow at 1.7 per cent in 2016. The European Central \nBank (ECB), at its meeting on 10th of March, 2016 eased monetary \npolicy by further reducing its refinancing rate to 0.0 per cent and \ndeposit rate to -0.4 per cent. The Bank also expanded its monthly \nasset purchase program from €60 billion ($65.4 billion) to €80 billion \n($87.2 billion) to further stimulate output growth and move inflation \ntowards its long term objective of 2.0 per cent. \nOn the other hand, the Bank of England (BoE) sustained its stock of \nassets purchase, financed through the issuance of reserves at ₤375 \nbillion ($536.25 billion), while retaining its policy rate at 0.5 per cent. \nThe BoE further committed to investing ₤8.4 billion ($12.01 billion) of \n \n3 \n \ncash flows associated with redemption of the January 2016 \ngovernment securities held in the Asset Purchase Facility, with a \ncommitment to bring inflation closer to the 2.0 per cent target, \nreducing unemployment and promoting growth. \nUncertainties and geo-political tensions in the Middle East, including \na negotiated ceasefire agreement in Syria and Iran’s re-entry into \nmainstream international oil market may have further redefined \nconditions in the oil market. The market witnessed some uptick in \nprices following the resolve of the Organization of the Petroleum \nExporting Countries (OPEC) and some non-OPEC members to pursue \na higher anchor price, coupled with smaller-than-anticipated build-\nup in stocks at the Cushing Oklahoma delivery hub for United States \ncrude futures. \nThe Emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs) were \nforecast to grow at 4.3 per cent in 2016, an improvement over the \n4.0 per cent recorded in 2015. However, external and domestic \nchallenges have persisted, stemming from low commodity prices, \ntroubled financial markets, tepid global demand, policy uncertainty \nas well as continuously feeble growth in global trade. In addition, \nweaknesses in major emerging market economies, diminished \ncapital inflows, rising borrowing costs and geopolitical factors have \nbeen identified as possible deterrents to growth in the EMDEs. In the \nenvironment of suppressed inflation, slow growth, weak global \ndemand and volatile financial markets, the stance of monetary \n \n4 \n \npolicy in the advanced economies is expected to remain \naccommodative in 2016, while in the EMDEs, it is expected to be \nunderpinned by currency adjustments and other complementary \npolicies. \nDomestic Economic and Financial Developments \nOutput \nThe Bank had adopted accommodative monetary policy since July \n2015 in the hope of addressing growth concerns in the economy, \neffectively freeing up more funds for DMBs by lowering both CRR \nand MPR, with excess liquidity arising from the lower CRR \nwarehoused at the CBN. DMBs were to access these funds by \nsubmitting verifiable investment proposals in the real sector of the \neconomy. The funds have not impacted the market yet because the \nCBN was still processing some of the proposals submitted by the \nDMBs. In the first episode of easing which resulted in injecting liquidity \ninto the Banking system, DMBs did not grant credit as envisaged. \nMoreover, the delay in passage of the 2016 Budget has further \naccentuated the difficult financial condition of economic agents as \noutput continues to decline due to low investment arising from weak \ndemand. The cautious approach to lending by the banking system \nunderpinned by a strict regulatory regime conditioned by the Basel \nCommittee in the post global financial crisis era has further alienated \n \n5 \n \ninvestors from access to credit as banks prefer to build liquidity \nprofiles in anticipation of government borrowing. \nIn the light of these developments, domestic output growth in 2015 \nremained subdued as reported by the National Bureau of Statistics \n(NBS). Consequently, real GDP grew by 2.11 per cent in the last \nquarter of 2015, more than half a percentage point lower than the \n2.84 per cent recorded in the third quarter and 3.83 percentage \npoints in the corresponding period of 2014. Overall, growth in 2015 \nwas estimated at 2.79 per cent, compared with 6.22 per cent in \n2014. The major impetus for growth continued to come from the non-\noil sector which grew by 3.14 per cent in Q4, 2015 compared with \n3.05 per cent in the preceding quarter. The key drivers of growth in \nthe non-oil sector were Services, Agriculture and Trade; contributing \n1.23, 0.83 and 0.76 percentage points, respectively. \nThe Committee noted that the sluggish growth in output was directly \nattributable to certain fiscal uncertainties, which inadvertently \nhampered movement of labor and goods; fuel scarcity, increased \nenergy tariffs, foreign exchange scarcity as well as slow growth in \ncredit to private sector in preference to high credit growth to the \npublic sector. The Committee noted that many of these factors were \noutside the control of monetary policy and given these limitations, in \nthe absence of complementary fiscal and structural policies, the \nonly option was to continue with the existing measures. The MPC \n \n6 \n \nbelieves that complementary fiscal and structural policies are \nessential for reinvigorating growth. \n \nPrices \nThe Committee noted the increase in year-on-year headline inflation \nto 11.38 per cent in February 2016, from 9.62 per cent in January and \n9.55 per cent in December, 2015. The increase in headline inflation in \nFebruary reflected increases in both food and core components of \ninflation. Core inflation rose sharply for the first time to 11.00 per cent \nfrom 8.80 per cent in January after a lull of three consecutive months \nat 8.70 per cent through December, 2015. Food inflation also inched \nup to 11.35 per cent from 10.64 per cent in January and 10.59 per \ncent in December, 2015. The rising inflationary pressure was traced to \nthe lingering scarcity of refined petroleum products, exchange rate \npass through from imported goods, seasonal factors and increase in \nelectricity tariff. The Committee noted that the factors responsible for \nrising inflation were more structural in nature than monetary, but \nreaffirmed its commitment to monitor the developments closely and \nto work with the relevant authorities to address the underlying drivers \nof the upward price movements. \n \n \n \n7 \n \nMonetary, Credit and Financial Markets Developments \nBroad money supply (M2) grew by 2.29 per cent in February, 2016 in \ncontrast to 1.69 and 0.25 per cent in January 2016 and February \n2015, respectively. When annualized, M2 grew by 13.74 per cent in \nFebruary 2016 against the provisional growth benchmark of 10.98 per \ncent for 2016. Net domestic credit (NDC) grew by 3.71 per cent in \nthe same period, annualized, at 22.26 per cent. At this rate, the \ngrowth rate of NDC was below the provisional benchmark of 17.94 \nper cent for 2016. Credit to the private sector grew by 1.45 per cent \nin February 2016, which annualized to a growth of 8.70 per cent, \nbelow the benchmark growth of 13.28 per cent. The Committee \nnoted with concern, the dismal performance of growth in credit to \nthe private sector, noting that even at that, credit went primarily to \nlow employment elasticity sectors of the economy. This had a \nsignificant negative impact on output growth. \nMoney market interest rates reflected the liquidity situation in the \nbanking system. Average inter-bank call and OBB rates, which stood \nat 0.5 and 2.77 per cent on 25 January 2016, closed at 4.00 and 5.00 \nper cent, respectively, on March 9, 2016. Between January 25th and \nend-February 2015, interbank call and OBB rates averaged 1.43 and \n2.68 per cent, respectively. This was traced to liquidity surfeit in the \nbanking system. The deposit money banks were, however, reluctant \nto grant new credit because of rising non-performing loans (NPLs), \nmainly in the oil sector, amongst other reasons. \n \n8 \n \nThe Committee also noted the slight improvement in the equities \nsegment of the capital market during the review period. The All-\nShare Index (ASI) rose by 8.1 per cent from 23,916.15 on January 29, \n2016 to 25,853.58 on March 14, 2016. Similarly, Market Capitalization \n(MC) rose by 8.02 per cent from N8.23 trillion to N8.89 trillion during \nthe same period. However, relative to end-December 2015, the \nindices declined by 9.73 per cent and 9.74 per cent, respectively. \nExternal Sector Developments \nThe average naira exchange rate remained stable at the inter-bank \nsegment of the foreign exchange market during the review period. \nThe exchange rate at the interbank market opened at N197.00/US$ \nand closed at N197.00/US$, with a daily average of N196.99/US$ \nbetween January 25 and March 14, 2016. The Committee reiterated \nits commitment to maintaining a stable naira exchange rate. The \nMPC took note of the level of activity in the autonomous foreign \nexchange market as well as the rising demand in the interbank \nmarket but observed that the data on demand for foreign \nexchange, was being overshadowed by speculative demand. \nHowever, the Committee charged the Bank to speed up reforms of \nthe foreign exchange market to improve certainty and eliminate \nnoise and opportunities for arbitrage. \n \nThe Committee’s Considerations \n \n9 \n \nThe \nCommittee \nnoted \nthe \nweakening \nmacroeconomic \nenvironment, reflected particularly in foreign exchange shortages, \nslowing GDP growth rate and rising inflation. Overall economic \ngrowth slowed significantly in 2015, particularly in Q4. Apparently, the \nconditions responsible for the slowdown – uncertainty around fiscal \npolicy, adverse external environment, security challenges in some \nparts of the country affecting production and distribution of \nagricultural produce, low electricity supply, fuel shortages, and \nsluggish growth in credit to the private sector – have continued in \nthe first quarter of 2016. \nOn the monetary side, contrary to the notion of liquidity overhang in \nthe financial system, the wider economy appears starved of the \nneeded liquidity to spur growth and employment. Recent \nperformance of the monetary aggregates lends credence to this \nfact. With the exception of credit to government, growth in all the \nmonetary aggregates remained largely below their indicative \nbenchmarks, yet; headline inflation spiked to 11.38 per cent in \nFebruary 2016, substantially breaching the policy reference band of \n6 - 9 per cent. Apart from liquidity, the increase in inflation was driven \nby structural factors such as fuel scarcity, increased electricity tariff, \npersistent insecurity, exchange rate pass through and seasonality of \nagricultural produce. The conflicting signals from slowing growth and \nrising inflation present a difficult policy challenge. Though mindful of \nthe limitations of monetary policy in influencing the drivers of the \n \n10 \n \ncurrent price spiral, the Committee stressed the need to urgently \naddress the key sources of the pressures. In this regard, the \nCommittee reaffirmed its commitment to closely monitor the \ndevelopment while encouraging relevant authorities to address the \nstructural bottlenecks. \nFrom the monetary data, the Committee noted that the excess \nliquidity in the banking system was contributing to the current \npressure in the foreign exchange market with a strong pass-through \nto consumer prices. The Committee further noted that previous \nefforts to reflate the economy in order to spur growth did not elicit \nthe required response from DMBs, hence; the surfeit of liquidity in the \ninterbank market. Obviously, the attendant low rates at that market \nhave not transmitted to the term structure of interest rates. \nConcerned about the need for low interest rates to support growth \nand employment, the Committee urged the CBN to explore \ninnovative ways of ensuring the unhindered flow of credit at low cost \nto key growth sectors even as monetary policy has to, under the \ncircumstance, address the liquidity surfeit in the banking system as \nwell as the pressure on exchange rate and consumer prices. The \nCommittee hopes that fiscal and other structural policies would soon \nbe deployed to strengthen the overall response of macroeconomic \npolicy to the shocks. \nThe Committee was also concerned that with headline inflation at \n11.38 per cent, noting that the policy rate had become negative in \n \n11 \n \nreal terms. This development has the potential of keeping both \nforeign and domestic investments on hold. As part of measures to \naddress the supply constraint in the foreign exchange market, yields \non domestic instruments have to be competitive to attract the much \nneeded foreign inflows. On the administrative side, this will have to \nbe complemented by a comprehensive reform of the foreign \nexchange market which is currently being undertaken. For the \navoidance of doubt, the Bank would continue to allow domiciliary \naccount holders unfettered access to funds in their accounts. \nThe Committee also urged speedy passage of the 2016 Budget in \norder to halt the depressing effect of the uncertainty that engulfs the \nwaiting period, hoping that the implementation of the budget would \ngo a long way in boosting business confidence, and reinvigorating \nthe financial markets. In the circumstance, the Committee urged the \nBank to continue to upscale its surveillance of the financial system \nwith the aim of promptly detecting and managing vulnerabilities to \nensure sustained stability. \nFinally, the Committee remains committed to price stability across \nthe range of consumer prices, exchange rate and interest rate, \nwhich is fundamental to reviving economic growth and employment \ngeneration. In the meantime, the Bank would continue to leverage \nits development finance policy to support critical sectors of the \neconomy. The MPC also stressed the need to sustain, deepen and \n \n12 \n \nspeed up reforms designed to ensure focused coordination of \nmonetary and fiscal policies. \nThe Committee’s Decisions \nThe Committee, in its assessment of relevant internal and external \nindices, came to the conclusion that the balance of risks is tilted \nagainst price stability. The MPC therefore, voted to tighten the \nstance of monetary policy. One member voted to retain the CRR at \n20.00 per cent while another member voted to retain the current \nwidth of the asymmetric corridor. \nIn summary, the MPC voted to: \n(i) Raise MPR by 100 basis points from 11.00 per cent to 12.00 per \ncent; \n(ii) Raise CRR by 250 basis points from 20.00 to 22.50 per cent; \n(iii) Retain Liquidity Ratio at 30.00 per cent; and \n(iv) Narrow the asymmetric corridor from +200 and -700 basis points \nto +200 and -500 basis points \nThank you for listening. \nGodwin I. Emefiele \nGovernor, Central Bank of Nigeria \n22nd March 2016. \n \n13 \n \nPERSONAL STATEMENT BY THE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE \nMEMBERS \n \n1.0 \nADELABU, ADEBAYO \n \nThe challenges in both the domestic and global macroeconomic \nenvironments since the latter half of 2014 appear somehow \nintensified. The global economic landscape is grappling with slow \nrecovery with global growth projected at 3.0 per cent in 2016, a \nsomewhat flat trend relative to 2015. Perhaps, more disturbing is the \nmedium to long term outlooks for key emerging and developing \neconomies where growth prospect is confronted by three significant \nheadwinds. The first one is the lingering slowdown of economic \nactivities in China in which the likelihood of quick bottom out remains \nlow given the complication introduced by the ongoing rebalancing \nmodel. A sharper than expected slowdown in countries like China \nwould not only weigh down on growth prospects of other \ndeveloping and emerging economies but for Nigeria in particular it \nwould aggravate the weakness in external demand for export, \nworsening the current account deficit which reared its ugly head at \nend-December 2014. \nAnother headwind is the persisting lower energy and other primary \ncommodities prices. It is a little bit comforting that a rally was \nobserved in the price of crude oil in the last one week with the price \n \n14 \n \nof Brent inching to about US$41/barrel but I would apply some \ncaution in building projections around this new price. This is because \nthe rally was not driven by fundamentals but by mere speculation of \nlikely cut in production by OPEC members at their next meeting in \nApril. Persistent softness in energy prices would directly impinge on at \nleast two macroeconomic accounts. The first is the current account \ncomponent of the balance of payment with potential implication on \nexternal reserves. The other area is the fiscal account as the odd of \nfiscal revenue under-running its target becomes elevated. The \nimplication is either under-implementation of the budget or \nheightening of fiscal deficit with the attendant worsening of the \nfragile condition of public debt. \nThe last headwind from the global environment is the ongoing \ntightening of the monetary policy stance by the US Federal Reserves \n(Fed). Further tightening of monetary policy by the US Federal \nReserves in the face of monetary stimulus by the European Central \nBank (ECB) would widen the diverging stance of monetary policy \nbetween the two blocs, heightening volatilities in the global financial \nmarkets. Given that the tightening process of the Fed would further \nstrengthen the dollars, the cumulative effect is elevated risk level for \nfinancial markets in developing economies and consequent \nacceleration of capital outflow. \nThe risk elements in the domestic environment are not in any way less \npronounced. Firstly, inflation is above the single digit threshold of the \n \n15 \n \nBank with the pressure emanating from both the core and food \ncomponents. Growth is tepid as overall output growth at 2.79 per \ncent in 2015 was significantly lower than 6.22 per cent recorded in \n2014. Another worrisome dimension on growth is the challenge with \nsome important subsectors of the GDP. The industrial sector, with the \ngreatest employment generating potential, contracted by 0.7 per \ncent in 2015, thus, it is not much of surprise that unemployment rate \ncommenced an upward trend in the third quarter 2015. The \nchallenge of banking system liquidity is yet unabated while the \nseemly perennial pressure in the foreign exchange market appears \nintensified as external reserves recorded a mild negative growth \nbetween end-December 2015 and March 18, 2016. \n In the light of these multidimensional challenges, what is the logical \nway forward for monetary policy? As I have always pointed out, a \ncareful diagnosis of the challenges revealed that monetary factors \ncould have played some roles but the dominant factors are \nstructural in nature. Take the issue of headline inflation for instance, \nthe only monetary factor that could have played some role is \nexchange rate depreciation as other factors like growth in monetary \naggregates, which could fuel aggregate demand, remained \nsuppressed during the period. Analysis of inflation dynamics revealed \nthat food and non-alcoholic beverages which have the highest \nweight in headline inflation (about 51 per cent), increased by 0.37 \npercentage point on year-on year basis in February 2016. Farm \n \n16 \n \nproduce, which is an important component of food inflation, also \nincreased by 39 percentage points during the same period. Given \nthe significant weight of these items on inflation, any enduring effort \nto curtail headline inflation must of necessity tame rising risks in these \nareas. Some prominent factors that drive price level in these sectors \nare seasonality in agricultural produce, higher cost of energy, and \nrecurring fuel scarcity. The point here is that monetary policy \nresponse alone would not be sufficient to address the current \nunderlying rising risk to price level but in view of the fact that some \nforms of monetary factor is at play, I may be cautiously disposed to a \nmodest upward adjustment in the Monetary Policy Rate. With this in \nmind, continuous efforts should be made to fast track fiscal and \nstructural policies that would address the inherent bottlenecks in \nproduction process. \nAnother key issue is the liquidity surfeit which I would not want to \ntreat in isolation. I would, as always, like to consider it within the \ncontext of overall macroeconomic objectives which are output \ngrowth and employment. One of the key disadvantages of excess \nbanking system liquidity is the tendency to filter into inflation through \nthe channel of excessive aggregate demand. Available statistics is \nindicative that this has not happened so far because broad money \nonly grew by 2.29 percent at end February 2016, translating to \nannualized growth rate of 13.74 per cent. The major challenge with \nthe current liquidity surfeit is that it is not translating to improve \n \n17 \n \nprivate sector credit as anticipated when we commenced \nmonetary easing in the second half of 2015. It is equally feared that \nthis might eventually drive pressure in the foreign exchange market, \nthus a need for sterilization. My position is that we should not derail \nfrom the overall goal of monetary policy on account of some \nteething issues that could be handled administratively. As I pointed \nout earlier, growth is not only softening but contraction is taking \nplace in key sectors like industrial sectors. If growth must be \nenhanced, banks must lend, and if banks must lend, liquidity must be \navailable. From this perspective, I am of the view that concerted \nefforts should be put in place by all stakeholders including Bankers \nCommittee on effective and efficient means of utilizing excess \nbanking system liquidity in the real sector of the economy instead of \nsterilizing it through higher CRR. \nIn the light of the foregoing, I would like to propose that the MPR be \nincreased by 100 basis points to 12 percent while the CRR be \nretained at 20 per cent. The asymmetry corridor around the MPR \ncould be adjusted from +2/-7 per cent to +2/-5 per cent. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n18 \n \n2.0 \nALADE, SARAH O. \nHeadline inflation accelerated to 11.38 percent in February \nfrom 9.62 percent recorded in January, the highest since \nDecember 2012. Projected growth for 2016 has been further \ndowngraded from over 4 percent to 2.3 percent according \nto the IMF Article IV report. On the global scene, weak \neconomic activities in China and Euro area and geopolitical \ntension pose great challenge to growth in 2016. The United \nStates is showing strong signs of recovery on the back of \nstronger consumer spending and improved unemployment \nfigures. However, in the emerging market economies, lower \ncommodity prices and sluggish growth in the economies of \ntrading partners are affecting growth. These developments \nsuggest that monetary policy should remain balanced and \ncautious in managing both domestic and global events in \nthe face of inflationary pressure; therefore I will support an \nincrease in Monetary Policy Rate and Cash Reserve \nRequirement to counter adverse external shocks to the \neconomy and contain inflationary pressure. \nHeadline inflation edged up to 11.38 percent in February \nreflecting a combination of limited foreign exchange supply \nand seasonal effect as all categories of prices increased \nduring the period. Headline inflation edged up to 11.38 \npercent in February 2016, from 9.62 percent recorded in \n \n19 \n \nJanuary. Core inflation increased to 11.04 percent from 8.84 \npercent recorded in January, while food inflation rose to \n11.35 percent from 10.64 percent in the previous month. This \nis attributable to the pass-through effect exchange rate, \nhigher transportation cost as a result of inadequate fuel \nsupply and seasonal effect. The current level of inflation is \nabove the indicative target of between 6 to 9 percent set \nby the Central Bank and the single digit rate set for the \nECOWAS monetary zone. The sudden upsurge in inflation will \nneed to be monitored to ensure that inflationary pressure is \ncontained, as staff projection suggests a further increase in \nthe coming months, before moderating towards the end of \nthe year. Therefore, in the short to medium term inflationary \npressure is a major concern and monetary policy must \nrespond appropriately. \n \nGross Domestic Product (GDP) growth is slowing on the back \nof lower international oil price and lower government \nrevenue. The unabated decline in oil price and the negative \nimpact on government revenue poses downside risk for \ndomestic GDP growth in 2016 as growth has been sluggish. \nThis is because revenue measures to mitigate the negative \nimpact of oil price decline will include high borrowing which \nmay \nimpact \non \nsome \ngrowth-enhancing \ncapital \nexpenditures and austerity measures, including increase in \n \n20 \n \ntax rate and broadening of the tax base. These \ndevelopments suggest that both global events and \ndomestic risks pose huge challenge to growth in the coming \nmonths. Policies should be mindful of the impact of the \nfallout of decline in government revenue on growth and \ntherefore, efforts at economic diversification should be \nintensified and judicious use of available resources made a \npriority to minimize waste. \n \nForeign exchange scarcity is affecting economic activities \nand impacting growth. While the Central Bank is making all \nefforts to meet all legitimate foreign exchange demand, \nreduced inflow is making foreign exchange scarce.. It is \nimportant for the Bank to implement policies that will \nencourage inflows and increase supply of foreign exchange \nto meet import demand and reduce Current Account \nDeficit (CAD) which has been widening. The lack of liquidity \nin the interbank market is fueling capital outflow and \ncurrency weaknesses outside the interbank market. These \ndevelopments are having a dampening effect on growth. \nUnder these uncertain conditions, monetary policy should \nbe focused at restoring confidence in the domestic \neconomy, increasing supply of foreign exchange, accretion \nto reserve and making all efforts to bring inflation to the \ntarget level. \n \n21 \n \n \nAgainst this background, I vote for a change in Monetary \nPolicy Rate from 11 percent to 12 percent, increase in \nPrivate Sector Cash Reserve Requirement (CRR) to 22.5 \npercent, to address the increase in inflation rate. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n22 \n \n3.0 \nBALAMI, DAHIRU HASSAN \n \nGrowth: The second MPC meeting for year 2016 is coming at a time \nwhen the global economy is facing a number of headwinds which \nincludes; continued fall in crude oil and other commodity prices, \nweak response to stimulus and deflation in Europe, slow economic \ngrowth in China as well as declining import and export figures. In the \nsame vain, economic growth in Europe is expected to inch up to \n1.7% in 2016. The tepid growth in the global economy would \ncontinue to weaken demand for crude oil which will negatively \naffect Nigeria’s fiscal position, budgetary revenue and ability to \nexecute the 2016 Federal budget and also affect the accretion to \nforeign reserves. Furthermore the normalization of the U.S economy \nand expected hike in US interest rate which also has implications on \nthe Nigerian economy. With Nigeria being an import dependent \neconomy, a hike in the US Fed rate implies further pressure on the \nNaira, while a weaker Naira and stronger dollar will lead to higher \ninflation in Nigeria; and this will also fuel capital outflows as investors \nwould want to take advantage of the U.S interest rate hike. The \ndivergence of monetary policy between the U.S.A and other \ndeveloped and emerging economies will present a problem to the \nNigerian economy e.g. higher interest in the U.S and lower rate in \nEurope. The general implication of the slowdown in growth will mean \nless aid for the rebuilding of the Northeast part of Nigeria that has \n \n23 \n \nbeen \ndevastated \nby \nthe \nBoko \nHaram \ninsurgency. \nThough \nreconstruction has commenced, it is estimated to gulp more than \nN1.3 trillion in order to meet with the socio economic demand of the \npeople of the affected region. Hence, Boko Haram insurgency \nshould be treated as a global phenomenon. Thus requiring synergy \nwithin and between countries. \n At the domestic level the economy is currently heading towards \nstagflation. This is evidenced in declining growth with unemployment \nand inflation itching up. The headwinds affecting the domestic \neconomy \ninclude \nthe \nexternal \nmacroeconomic \nimbalances \nhighlighted earlier. In my earlier statement, I had argued that Nigeria \nshould seriously promote growth rather than attacking inflation \nbecause of its own medium and long-term effects on the economy. \nGrowth could be encouraged through targeted diversification of the \neconomy using sectors like agriculture, solid mineral, education and \nindustrialization. Nigeria has comparative advantage in the sectors. \nThe identified sectors can be used as major growth drivers of the \neconomy. However, it should be noted that development banking \nwill be critical in this pursuit. The issue of the fiscal side is also of \nparamount importance. \nPrices: The global inflation rate is likely to remain subdued as a result \nof weak demand and negative output gaps. The global consumer \nprices estimated for 2016 is expected to be as high as 6.9% for sub-\nSaharan Africa and 1.1% for advanced economies, while emerging \n \n24 \n \nand developing countries will witness 5-6% increase in consumer \nprices. The headline inflation in Nigeria rose from a single digit figure \nof 9.0% and 9.6% in December 2015 and January 2016 respectively \nto double digit figure of 11.4 % in February 2016 while unemployment \nrate stood at about 9.9 % during this period and forecasted to \nincrease further as the implementation of 2016 budget starts. \n The rise in Nigerian inflation has been attributed to several factors \namong which are rising food prices, hike in electricity charges, \ndeclining power generation and insufficient distribution system as \nwell as rising prices of imported commodities given that Nigeria is an \nimport dependent economy. In addition, lack of urgency in the \nmove towards diversification of the economy despite the collapse of \nthe oil prices, and lack of market friendly return to attract private \nsector capital in real sector of the economy. It is also envisaged that \nwhen the budget is finally approved in March the inflationary trend is \nlikely to rise in the short run. What policy option can be put in place \nto tackle the problems of inflation? To my mind the shift from the \nconsumption of foreign to locally made goods should be sustained \nwhile provision of infrastructural facilities that will encourage and \nraise the level of production should be improved. \nExternal Reserve: The external Reserve rose from $27.50 billion to \n$27.78 billion in January and February respectively and later \ndeclined to $27.43 billion on 16th March 27, 2016 which represents a \ndrop of 3.04% relative to the balance of $28.29 billion recorded in \n \n25 \n \nDecember 2015. The decline in revenue was attributed to fall in non-\noil revenue compared to the previous month before March 2016. It is \nmy opinion that with fall in oil price the revenue can be boosted by \nconcentrating and boosting the growth of the non-oil sector through \neffective and efficient diversification of the economy as highlighted \nearlier. It should be noted that external reserve has been drawn to \nsupport the naira, payment for school fees abroad and Basic Travel \nAllowance (BTA). But again on the fiscal side, what are our \nauthorities doing with the educational institutions, health, power, \nand importation of simple equipments in order to add to its demand \nside. \nThe Banking Stability: The stress test conducted on the Nigerian \nDeposit Money Banks (DMBs) in terms of Capital Adequacy Ratio \n(CAR), Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) and Liquidity Ratios (LR) as well \nas the Return On Equity (ROE) and Return On Assets (ROA) revealed \nmixed results, but were generally sound and favorable relative to the \nprudential requirement. As at Feb 2016, the CAR stands at 16.55% \nabove the prudential requirement of 10-15% mark for banks with \nnational and international authorization. Similarly, during the same \nperiod under review the NPLs and Liquidity ratios were above the \nMaximum 5% and Minimum 30% prudential. While both ROE and \nROA marginally declined from 18.09 and 2.28 ratios in February 2016, \nrespectively. However, the banking sector is susceptible to \nvulnerabilities particularly that of NPLs due to their exposure to the oil \n \n26 \n \ncompanies as well as dollar loans. There should be need for \nimprovement of the efficiency and effectiveness in the allocation of \ncredit, foreign exchange and securities, and strengthening of the \ntransmission mechanism of the monetary policy as well as reducing \nthe structural vulnerability of the Nigerian economy. This can be \nachieved by understanding the system very well using appropriate \ndata, policy and strategy to implement the proposed policies. \nExchange Rates: On the exchange rate, the official rate has been \nstable while the parallel market has fluctuated from N300-N315 as at \n23rd March 27, 2015. A lot has been done on the demand side of \nforeign exchange; however, there is need to look at the supply side. \nHere we have to prepare adequately to get the relevant data and \nanalysis. The gap between the official and parallel market is a \nsource of concern because for rational economic agents it \nencourages round tripping which is very devastating to the \neconomy. The level of liquidity, growth, exchange rate and \ninflationary trend suggest that some policy changes be put in place \nto deal with some of the challenges affecting the economy on the \nmonetary side. The current situation requires tightening. \nOn the basis of the analysis made above, I vote in support of \ni. Raising CRR from 20% to 22.5% \nii. Raising the MPR from 11% to 12% \niii. Retaining the Liquidity ratio at 30% \n \n27 \n \niv. To adjust the asymmetric corridor from +2/-700point basis to \n+2/-500 point basis \nIn conclusion, The November MPC Policies and the hold that took \nplace in January did not produce the required result in terms of \neffective control of the level of liquidity in the economy. Monetary \nauthorities have to keep an eye on growth and respond to policies \naffecting it appropriately. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n28 \n \n4.0 \nBARAU, SULEIMAN \nBackground \nMy vote at this meeting is largely informed by the fact that enduring \ngrowth is only feasible within the context of stable macroeconomic \nenvironment, thus the issues of rising inflation and excess liquidity \ndeserve urgent response in order for monetary policy to remain on \ntrack. I also subscribe to a compelling need for robust fiscal and \nstructural policies given that monetary policy alone cannot deal with \nthese and related issues. \nThe risk matrix in both the global and domestic macroeconomic \nenvironments appears relatively elevated since the beginning of the \ncurrent fiscal year. The tepid global growth that characterized fiscal \n2015 is equally being envisaged in 2016 while pockets of financial \nmarket volatility are quite discernible. In line with the trend since mid-\n2014, commodity prices particularly crude oil prices have not been \nfaring well. Although a little bit of rally is currently being observed in \nthe global crude oil prices against the backdrop of likely freeze in \noutput by OPEC members, the sustainability of the observed gains \nshould be treated with guarded optimism given Iran’s position to \npump more oil in their bid to recover lost market share. \nAs expected, the vulnerability of the domestic economy to the \nexternal environment suggests that key domestic macroeconomic \nindicators should show less than satisfactory outcomes. Inflation has \n \n29 \n \nburst the single digit threshold of the Bank while output growth \ncontinues with its lackluster performance since end 2014. Evidence \nof slowdown abound in the financial system particularly in the \ncapital market though the banking system remains resilient despite \nthe issues of rising NPLs, persistent liquidity surfeit, and excessive \ndemand pressure in the foreign exchange market. \nThe critical issues confronting us remain the need to stem the rising \ninflationary trend, curtail liquidity surfeit in the banking system, \nmoderate pressure in the foreign exchange markets and possibly \nprovide some leverage to jump start growth. My candid view is that \nmonetary policy alone cannot deliver satisfactory outcomes on all of \nthese variables, hence the need for fiscal and strong structural \npolicies to complement the actions of monetary authority that we \nhave continued argued for. \nDevelopments/Pressure Points \nGlobal Environment \nLingering Softness in Global Recovery: Recent data and statistics \nreveal that the weakness in global growth which became \npronounced in 2015 is far from being over. The interim global growth \nfor 2016 at 3.0 per cent is suggestive of flat trend relative to 2015, \nwhich was not only below the long run average but equally the \nslowest pace in the last five years. It is a matter of serious concern \nthat the post crisis recovery in the US is becoming susceptible to \n \n30 \n \nsetback on account of strengthening dollar and low investment in \nmining. Perhaps, more worrisome is the diminishing growth prospects \nfor key emerging economies. For instance, the current recession in \nBrazil could be prolonged and more intense than anticipated on \naccount of ongoing political uncertainty while the contraction in \nRussia is being intensified by continuous slide in crude oil price. In \nChina, managing the rebalancing process constitutes a daunting \nchallenge to growth while flood is threatening the growth projection \nfor India. \nThese developments have far reaching implications on the domestic \neconomy. Notably, the recent rally in the price of crude oil \nnotwithstanding, medium term developments in the price of the \ncommodity may remain insufficiently positive to lift the country out of \ntrade imbalance trajectory. Secondly, the country’s ability to \ndiversify the economic base with a view to ameliorating the \ndwindling fortune from crude oil may also suffer severe setback as \nmajor emerging and advanced economies remain weak. Available \nstatistics indicate that the country’s non-oil exports declined by 58 \nper cent at end-December 2015 as global trade remained largely \nsubdued owing to cut-back on imports by countries like China and \nother emerging economies. \nResurgence of Volatility in Global Financial Markets: Unfolding \ndevelopments since the beginning of the year are suggestive of \nrenewed wave of volatility in the global financial markets. Going by \n \n31 \n \nthe last meeting of the Federal Reserve System of the US, the \nfrequency of rate hike this year may be lower than earlier \nanticipated but the ongoing divergence of monetary policy stance \nbetween the euro area and the US would continue to fuel upside risk \nto market volatility. In addition, uncertainties around Renminbi \nexchange rate is a potential spillover of volatility to global financial \nmarkets particularly in emerging and advanced economies. Indeed \navailable data has shown that European banks equity prices have \nfallen by about 20 per cent since the beginning of the year while \nglobal equities shed significant weight in the months of January and \nFebruary with Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) World \nIndex plummeting by almost 10 per cent. \nThese developments could trigger new round of capital outflow in \nthe domestic financial markets, heightening pressure as well as \nrenewed wave of volatility in the naira exchange rate. It could be \nexpected that the overall impact of these risks on the banking \nsystem may not be as severe as in the previous episode of global \nfinancial instability on account of improved macro-prudential buffer \nbut the spillover should be expected to adversely impinge on the \ncurrent \nfaltered \ngrowth \ntrajectory. \nThis \ncould \nbe \nfurther \ncompounded by the intensification of imbalances in the external \nsector due to rising deficit on the current account. \n \n \n32 \n \nDomestic Environment \nA number of issues would continue to pose upside risks in the \ndomestic economy and these include: \nRising Inflationary Pressure: Headline inflation, at 11.38 per cent in \nFebruary 2016, has crossed the single digit threshold of the Bank. The \ninflation dynamic is a little bit complicated given that the pressure is \nfrom both food and core components. An assessment of the upside \nrisks is suggestive that the inflation level may remain elevated over \nthe medium term. Among others, the exchange rate risk is prominent \nas economic agents begin to adjust price level in line with \ndevelopments in the parallel markets even when they source foreign \nexchange from the interbank window. To me, the initial price \nadjustment is not much of an issue as this headwind would \neventually ease but the more knotty issue is the self-reinforcing \nimpetus to inflationary pressure which would inevitably increase \nparticularly if accretion to external reserves does not increase \nsubstantially. \nPersistent Liquidity Surfeit: When the Committee decided to \ncommence monetary easing in July 2016, the intention was to free \nsterilized liquidity and make such available for bank lending. \nAvailable evidence to date prove to the contrary. Private sector \ncredit increased, on annualized basis, by mere 8.70 per cent at end-\nFebruary 2016 against an annual target of 13.28 per cent, while \n \n33 \n \nbetween the last week of January and end-February 2016, the \naverage inter-bank and OBB rates were 1.43 and 1.26 per cent, \nrespectively. Comparing these market rates with the Monetary \nPolicy rate (MPR) of 11 per cent during the period presents a clear \ncase of liquidity surfeit in the banking system while the wider-\neconomy lending is dismal. Besides, this development also shows \nthat MPR, which is supposed to be the signaling rate does not, as \nearlier studies demonstrated, have significant influence on the \nmoney market rates. \nRising Risk in Domestic Financial Markets: The Sovereign Yield spread \nbetween Nigeria 10-year bond and similar US Treasury instrument \nincreased from 8.56 per cent at end-December 2015 to 11.65 per \ncent by end-February 2016, an increase of 309 basis points. Yield \nspread on similar instrument in Ghana increased by mere 127 basis \npoints while for South Africa it decreased by 34 basis points during \nthe period. In other words, while foreign investors’ risk perception for \nNigeria and Ghana has increased, the risk perception for South \nAfrica has decreased but more disturbing is that risk perception for \nGhana is lower than Nigeria. A major reason for this development is \nheightened exchange rate risk and rising inflation in the country. The \nimplication of this is on the cost of financing domestic projects. \nGiven the amount of borrowing required to finance fiscal deficit in \n2016 budget (about N2.2 trillion), the financing may have to be \ncarried out at higher interest rate with possible spillover to other rates \n \n34 \n \nin the economy. This could also constitute additional headwinds to \ngrowth. \nWay Forward \nNeed to Halt Creeping Inflation: Growth issues are very pertinent in \nmacroeconomic policy but sustainable growth is only possible within \nthe context of a stable macroeconomic environment particularly \nlow and stable inflation. Latest empirical work undertaken by staff of \nthe Bank on inflation-growth nexus in Nigeria indicates that inflation \nlevel of 13 per cent and above is inimical to growth. As pointed out \nabove, foreign investors are already responding to the evolving \nmacroeconomic environment through the pricing of long term \nbonds. On this note, I am of the opinion that though we are \npassionate about the need to jump start growth, it is expedient to \nfollow a path that can guarantee durable upward growth trajectory, \nwhich is curtailing inflation to an acceptable threshold. Besides \nmonetary policy actions alone cannot deliver growth. This justifies \nour sustained call for the pre-requisite structural and real sector \nreforms to support monetary policy decisions. In light of this, it \nbecomes compelling to adjust the MPR upward \nStrengthening of Agricultural and Food Policies: Analysis of inflation \nespecially from January 2016 reveals that the rise in core inflation has \nbeen relatively moderate while food inflation particularly farm \nproduce has assumed phenomenal increase. Given the large share \n \n35 \n \nof food in the average household budget, the effect is the new \nelevated general price level. Under these circumstances, the \ncapacity of central bank to fight inflation is limited. It is therefore \nincumbent for the Federal Government particularly, the Ministry of \nAgriculture, to put in place robust policies for intervening in food \nproduction and distribution. \nUrgent Curtailment of Liquidity Surfeit: As pointed out earlier, liquidity \nin the banking system has not led to improvement in private sector \ncredit. Secondly, in the face of low money market rates and apathy \ntowards private sector lending, the inter-bank foreign exchange \nmarket would likely become the ultimate destination of the banking \nsystem excess liquidity that had continued to put pressure on our \nexchange rate and become a fertile ground for market bubbles. \nPerhaps more worrisome is the fact that the disturbing weakness of \nmonetary policy transmission signaled by the excess banking system \nliquidity threaten a loss of one of the vital tools of monetary policy. \nAgainst this perspective, pending the deployment of appropriate \nframework that would enable the banking system to channel excess \nliquidity into the real sector, such liquidity should be sterilized. \nStructural Policies: Price stability is a cardinal mandate of monetary \nauthority but monetary policy alone cannot address all forms of \ninflationary pressures particularly if the causes are structural. The \nstructure of the economy contributed significantly to the current \ninflationary trend. Among others, the nature of production and \n \n36 \n \ndistribution of goods and services played a significant role. For \ninstance, the official price of Petrol Motor Sprit (PMS) is N86/litre but \nmost economic agents obtained the product at a price above the \nofficial rate while the parallel market rate became the basis for \ncosting inputs and pricing outputs. As I have said in my previous \nstatements, structural policies that could fast track the turnaround of \ndomestic refineries as well as build new ones are inevitable. \nRelatedly, higher transportation cost contributed considerably to the \nup-tick in price level in the months of January and February. These \npoints to the fact that the dominant use of road transport in the \nhaulage of goods need to be reviewed and replaced by more \nefficient means like rail and water ways if inflation is to be addressed \nsustainably via the traditional monetary policy tools. \nBesides, the high degree of import constitutes serious issue for \ninflation when there is large variation in exchange rate. An open \neconomy that seeks to control inflation must of necessity take into \nconsideration movement in the exchange rate. Within the domestic \neconomy, \nnominal \nexchange \nrate \nat \nthe \nofficial \nwindow \ndepreciated by about 22 per cent at end-February on year-on-year \nbasis while general price level increased by about 2 percentage \npoints during the period. Anything short of this should be regarded as \nabnormal. The logical way forward is to reduce the level of level of \nimport by stimulating domestic production through appropriate \npolicies. \n \n37 \n \nIt is instructive to stress that significant reduction of pressure in the \nforeign market would be achieved if these structural issues could be \naddressed and this would, invariably, reduce the risk in the financial \nmarkets. \n Decisions \nAgainst the background of the need to address the lingering liquidity \nsurfeit while simultaneously stemming the rising tide of inflation \nparticularly the core component, I voted as follows: \ni. \nMPR be increased by 200 basis points from 11 to 12 per cent \nii. \nCRR be increased by 250 basis points from 20 to 22.5 per cent \niii. \nAsymmetric corridor around MPR be adjusted to +200/-500 \nbasis points \niv. \nLR to remain at 30 per cent. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n38 \n \n5.0 \nGARBA, ABDUL-GANIYU \nMetaphors \nI feel compelled to use three metaphors to illustrate the dilemma \nthat confronts monetary policy and indeed, macroeconomic \nmanagement in Nigeria today so that we could all have the \nconversations that is necessary for policy effectiveness and \nachieving the mandates of the monetary and the fiscal authorities. \nThe first metaphor is the ‘medical diagnostics metaphor’. When a \ndoctor suspects that a patient is anemic, it is sound medical practice \nto send the patient to the laboratory for a full blood count test. \nWhen the result is ready, the doctor carefully and thoroughly \nanalyses it to understand the problem, and if necessary recommend \nadditional tests to determine underlying problem(s) and consult with \nrelevant colleagues/team members before determining the best \nintervention for the patient. To transfuse a patient without screening \nthe blood and without knowing the blood type of the patient is \nmurderous and a serious criminal breach of the ethics of medical \npractice and the laws of any sane nation. No sane persons will use \nthe services of such a doctor unless they were suicidal. Most serious \ncountries will keep such doctors off medical practice for the entirety \nof their lives. Recently, a 46 years old US medical doctor was \nsentenced to 30 years to life in prison by a judge in Los Angeles after \nmurder convictions in connection with prescription drug overdose \n \n39 \n \ndeaths of three of her patients. She was convicted for recklessly and \ncriminally prescribing drugs fueled by greed. The implications of this \nmetaphor for monetary policy is that more than ever before, \nrigorous, critical and mandate focused and evidence based \ndiagnostics is needed first, because so much has changed in the last \ndecade and second, because good and bad policies have long \nlasting effects. Shortness of the policy sight dooms policy analysis, \npolicy choice and actions and policy effectiveness. This is why I keep \nrepeating the point that my vote is for “harnessing and directing all \navailable intellectual and political resources to engage the fiscal \nauthorities to develop a strategic macroeconomic management \nframework for Nigeria” for the medium to the long term. \nThe second metaphor is the ‘tapeworm metaphor’ and it addresses \nthe dangers of quick-fix measures. A hungry person decides to \nswallow live tapeworms with a large dose of hope that his hunger \nwould be satiated. Clearly, to swallow life tapeworms whole \nbecause one wants to satiate hunger pangs is a quick fix to a \nhunger problem, but an unwise solution. For only the tapeworms will \nbenefit from such folly. Indeed, the health of the individual will \nbecome inversely proportional to the health of the tapeworms in the \nindividual. \nThe \ntapeworm \nmetaphor \nimplies \nthat \ntrading-off \nmonetary policy independence for exchange rate stability using \nportfolio flows was bound to profit only portfolio investors. Sooner \nrather than later, their rational behaviours would destabilize the \n \n40 \n \nforeign exchange market and further limit the latitude of the MPC for \neffective monetary policy. It was also very clear from the credible \nevidence from sound research papers on the Nigerian Foreign \nExchange Management that the Retail Dutch Auction System \n(RDAS) is inherently unstable because it inevitably creates arbitrage \nopportunities which rational speculators would inevitably take \nadvantage of. The data on global economic slow-downs particularly \nin China from 2013, forward guidance on US Fed rate hike and the \n‘Bernanke effects’ of May 2013 and historical pattern of movements \nof commodity prices all pointed to headwinds from negative \ncommodity price shocks and reversals of portfolio flows out of \ncommodity exporters and emerging markets. It was also clear that \nnegative commodity price and reverse financial flows tend to have \nthe most destabilizing effects on the financial markets and \nmacroeconomic management of small open commodity exporters. \nIt was also obvious to the discerning that exchange rate instability \nand widening spreads were highly probable in the absence a \nforward looking and creative macroeconomic management \nstrategy. For it was clear that a backward looking strategy will fail to \nensure the allocation of scarce forex resource to those who could \nbest use it to create tangible values and create jobs in Nigeria. \nSimply put the real economy and jobs were at risk not in 2015 or 2016 \nbut as far back as December 2011. To think that the journey to \nstagflation began only recently is to think amiss. \n \n41 \n \n \nThe third metaphor is the ‘recovering addict metaphor’. The \nrecovering drug addict who after being released from rehab seeks \nadvise on how to stay off drugs from the drug dealer who aided him \nto develop dependence on drugs is doomed to suffer a relapse. The \ndealer clearly has a conflict of interest between truth and profit and \na rational drug dealer would rather have a client than a friend. This \nmetaphor applies to Nigeria’s fiscal processes where in terms of its \nconflict between saving excess crude and at the same time \ndoubling its public debt every 14 quarters between 2007 and 2016 \non the advice of institutions that profit from its borrowing. Like the \naddict, Nigeria is urged on; on a borrowing binge on the \ndisingenuous premise that it is under-borrowed in disregard of the \nfiscal and monetary trade-offs and crowding-out effects. \nWhen you put together, the consequences of the three metaphors, \nyou get a strategic conundrum that makes purposeful, effective and \nconsistent monetary and fiscal policy very difficult to achieve. Were \nexperience the best teacher as the cliché say, then we would have \nlearnt from the aftermath of the jumbo loan of 1978 and of the \ncapital account liberalization of 2006. Then we would have \nprepared for the shocks that were inevitable given the scope of \nquantitative easing globally and the risks of nomalisation. \nFailures to learn the rights lessons lead to repeated cycles of errors at \nrising costs. I believe the window of opportunity for changing the \n \n42 \n \nstrategic character of Nigeria’s macroeconomic management is not \nwidening or remaining static. I believe the earlier we have \npurposeful, effective and sustainable harnessing and utilization of all \navailable intellectual and political resources to develop a people-\ncentered strategic macroeconomic management framework for \nNigeria, the better for the Nigerian people. When the United States \nconfronted the global financial crisis in the summer of 2008, the fiscal \nand monetary authorities and the US Senate and Congress worked \ntogether \nwith \nthe \nPresidential \ncandidates \n- \nJohn \nMccain \n(Republican) and Barack Obama (Democratic) - to put together a \ncomprehensive strategy that started to steer the ship of their state \nfrom the precipice even when it required many to commit \nideological volte-faces. I believe that Nigeria has been at such a \npoint for some time. Every delay makes it more difficult and more \ncostly. \nBackground to Decision \nAt the March 2016 MPC I asked and attempted to answer many \nquestions before deciding. The questions included: (i) What are the \nreal problems confronting the economy and what are their \nunderlying and immediate causes? (ii) What can we learnt from the \nrecent domestic and global economic strategies, policies, interests, \nbehaviours, market processes, the outcomes and the paths? (iii) \nWhat are the short to medium term domestic and global outlooks? \n \n43 \n \n(iv) What do we know about the stagnation-inflation process, the \nallocation and pricing relations in the segmented forex and money \nmarkets, the relationships between the spot and futures forex market, \nthe relationships between fiscal and monetary policies in the recent \npasts, the effectiveness and efficiency in the allocation the loanable \nfunds and forex and the short to long term effects of capital account \nliberalization of debt and equity? In addition, how has policy choices \naffected uncertainties, risks, expectations and rational behaviours of \nkey players? How do we separate the short term noises in the \nmarkets and policy space from the trend factors? How strong the \nexchange rate is pass-through and how effective and symmetrical is \nthe transmission mechanism of monetary policy? What is the real \ntrade-off compatible with medium to long term low inflation growth? \nWhat are the likely effects of a high leverage fiscal expansion \nbudget on the feasible options of monetary policy hence, on the \neffectiveness of monetary policy in 2016? (v) What are the domestic \nand global medium term outlooks? (vi) What the relationships \nbetween fiscal, monetary, prudential (macro and micro) and \ndevelopment finance policies? (vi) What are the strategic goals set, \nthe binding constraints, the inherent trade-offs and framework for \nevaluation and choice of the best feasible options as well as the \nevaluation criteria? These are some of the questions that needs clear \nanswers to in the conversations leading to a people-centred \nstrategic macroeconomic management framework for Nigeria. \n \n44 \n \nIn a policy choice context, the framing of options is rather limited \nand costly trade-offs may be the price to pay for strategic and \ncoordination weaknesses. What we know from the Economic Report \nprepared by Bank Staff is that there has been for at least 10 quarters, \na steady build-up of stagnation pressures mainly in industry (peaking \nin the four quarters of 2015) and a build-up of inflation from \nNovember 2014 and with the most significant increase in February \n2016. The build-up is partly explained by the deflationary monetary \npolicies, the Bernanke effects which triggered the exit of portfolio, \nexchange \nrate \ngenerated \nsupply \nshocks \nand, \neventually, \ncommodity price shocks amplified by the economic slowdown in \nChina, Japan and the Eurozone. \nIt is clear from the pattern of stagnation and inflation that exchange \nrate pass-through is a key factor in both. It is also clear from an \nevaluation of the over thirty three exchange and trade related \nadministrative measures between June 2014 and January 2016 that \nthe consistent shifting of demand pressures first from RDAS market to \ninterbank, then from interbank to BDCs and finally from BDCs to the \nparallel market has been a strong factor in (i) the widening of the \nexchange rate spread and the attractiveness of the arbitrage \nopportunities and (ii) the growing importance of the parallel forex \nmarket which ought to have been kept so small that its noise value is \ngreatly minimized as it was when the Wholesale Dutch Auction \nSystem (WDAS) was in operation. It is also, evident from data that the \n \n45 \n \ngrowth of money supply driven by a spike in demand deposits in \nDecember 2015 and February 2016 and the final shift in forex \ndemand to the parallel markets in January 2016, the announced \ncommitment to supply a key player forex contributed significantly to \nthe unprecedented spread between the ‘official interbank’ and the \nparallel rate from January 2016. The data on utilization of forex and \nindeed on allocation of credit do not show that economic activities \nwith the highest output and employment elasticities attract forex or \ncredit under both tightening and easing regimes. The high interest \nrate spreads and rising exchange rate spread signal market mal-\nfunctioning problems that need to be urgently corrected as part of a \ncomprehensive strategy. \nThe MPC communiqué has given forward guidance about its \ncommitment to forex market comprehensive strategy. Therefore, as \nMPC works towards the comprehensive strategy, the main issue for \nme at this MPC is stemming the drift into the global stagflation trap of \nthe 1970s. The 1970s ‘stagflation trap’ made it clear that the \ntraditional demand management strategies were ill-suited to \ncorrecting supply shocks. This is because a short-run trade-off \nbetween unemployment/growth and inflation does not exist. \nStimulus programmes of Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter \nadministrations (before President Carter appointed Volcker as Chair \nof the UD Fed) worsened the stagnation and the inflation and \nhelping the neoclassical counter revolution in macroeconomics. If \n \n46 \n \nwe fail to learn from history, we are condemned to repeating it and \nmuch higher costs. \nThe lessons of history imply that the MPC has to decide which goal it \ncould most effectively achieve in the short term for it is impossible for \nmonetary policy on its ‘sore legs’ to stimulate growth and deflate the \neconomy at the same time. Paul Volcker’s US Fed chose inflation. \nInevitably, the sacrifice ratio was high not only for the US which \nsuffered several episodes of recessions, but more for those who \nnaively walked into the ‘debt trap’. The high costs within the US \ncould partly be attributable to both recognition and action lag \nwhich in turn, could be explained by weight given to political \nexigencies in decision making. The lessons for me are clear, getting \nout of a stagflation trap is neither easy nor low cost. That is why \ngetting into the traps of stagflation, debt and capital account \n(equity and debt) is very dangerous and ought to have been \navoided when they lay in the future. \nIt is clear to me from available evidence that (i) monetary policy has \nmore effective impact on inflation in the short term, (ii) the \nimpending fiscal expansion will be inflationary and crowd-out private \ninvestment given its high leverage structure, (iii) the asymmetrical \nnature of interest rate and the malfunctions in the credit market and \nthe rational behavior of DMBs rendered the easing at the September \nMPC ineffective and counterproductive (the release of the ‘forex \nchasing liquidity’ that MPC had been mopping-up since the huge \n \n47 \n \nquantitative easing of 2009-2014 contributed to exchange rate \npressures), (iv) the consistent shifting of demand towards the parallel \nmarket contributed to the sustained widening of exchange rate \nspreads; (v) inflation has asymmetrical effects on poorer individuals, \nhouseholds small businesses and domestic producers (through \nnegative budget and supply shocks), and (vi) effective fiscal-\nmonetary-prudential-development policy coordination is necessary \nindeed critical to job creating growth and to macroeconomic and \nfinancial system stability. To want is not to have: nothing can be \nproduced out of nothing! \nI am persuaded based on what we know about (i) the recent \ninflationary pressures (it was triggered by exchange rate pass-\nthrough effects of recent forex market shifts and amplified by the \npost-September 2015 liquidity shocks and the lingering fuel crisis), (ii) \nthe structural path of economic stagnation, (iii) the asymmetrical \nnature of interest rate policies and (iv) domestic and global \neconomic and financial outlook, my vote is for a tightening regime. \nClearly, a tightening regime conflicts with the requirements for \nreversing economic stagnation. The easing at the last two MPCs of \n2015 which I did not support, did not achieve lower interest rates or \ngreater access by real sector operators because the allocation \npattern in key markets – money and forex – are biased against real \nsector operators. Without correcting for the factors that predisposes \nthe financial markets to allocate to sectors that have lowest output \n \n48 \n \nand employment elasticities and to wholesale borrowers that have \nhigher default risks, easing is unlikely to generate real investment, \ngrowth and job creation. Yet, a runaway inflation undermines the \nmandate of the MPC. The balance of policy effectiveness is on the \nside of tightening checking the advance of inflation pressures. The \nstatus quo not only is unable lower lending rates and interest rate \nspread, it has undercut inflation through its effects on exchange rate \nand undercut growth through by triggering significant supply shocks \nthrough its exchange rate effects and allocation bias. \nIn the constrained policy space that the MPC is in, tightening is the \nbest option for the short term. It allows MPC to work to fix to the \ntransmission mechanism that has been considerably weakened and \ndistorted by attractiveness of inverted intermediation and the pricing \nand allocation problems of the forex and money markets that have \ntrend effects on growth and employment. Therefore, I am \nconvinced about the urgent need to correct and avoid further \nescalation of inflation expectation and pressures. I am also \nconvinced about the urgency of a forward looking comprehensive \nstrategic framework for evaluating options based on sound \nknowledge about nexuses, constraints, trade-offs, strength of \ntransmission mechanisms, hysteresis and the true cost-benefits of \nalternative choices to help the MPC make wise, effective and \nsustainable decisions. \n \n49 \n \nDecision \nFirst, I strongly support the forward guidance about a comprehensive \nstrategy for foreign exchange management framework. In addition, \nmy vote reiterate my conviction about the urgent need to harness, \ndirect and put to effective use the best available intellectual and \npolitical resources to engage the fiscal authorities to develop a \nforward looking strategic macroeconomic management framework \nfor Nigeria” for the medium to the long term effectiveness of \nmacroeconomic management compatible with the long term \nwellbeing of Nigerians. The great challenge for MPC is to deliver on \nthe promise of a forward looking comprehensive strategy and for the \nfiscal and monetary authorities to deliver on a forward looking \nstrategic macroeconomic management framework for Nigeria. \nSecond, to stem and prevent a runaway inflation and its adverse \neconomic consequences, I vote for: \n1. Increase in CRR by 2.25% to 22.5% \n2. Increase in MPR from 11% to 12% \n3. Asymmetric Corridor of -5 (SDF), +2 (SLF) \n4. Hold liquidity Ratio at 30% \n \n \n \n \n \n50 \n \n6.0 \nUCHE, CHIBUIKE U \n \nA disturbing development that MPC was faced with at this meeting \nwas the issue of rising inflation. With inflation rate now officially above \nMPR, there is very little room for maneuvre. This is because any \ninvestment at the current MPR will yield a negative real return for the \ninvestor. \nThis \nhas \nnegative \nconsequences \nfor \nboth \nthe \ncompetitiveness of our financial instruments and the health of our \nbanking sector in general. Unfortunately, this inflation problem may \nget worse when Government begins to implement its 2016 deficit \nbudget. In my humble opinion, therefore, there is now a strong case \nfor monetary policy tightening. \nIn following the above route however, there is need for extreme care \nespecially given the fact that the resultant higher interest rates is \nlikely to negatively impact on the stability of the Nigerian banking \nsystem. This is especially so because for some time now we have \nbeen witnessing a slow but consistent rise in the nonperforming loan \nportfolio of banks in the country. Tightening monetary policy at this \ntime will therefore further increase the pressure on the NPLs of \nNigerian banks. The fact that the consequences of the last banking \ncrisis in Nigeria continue to rear its head in AMCON’s financial \nstatements remain a major reason for my trepidation in this regard. \nGiven the current level of inflation, I am in total agreement with the \nassertion that the tightening of monetary policy at the present time \n \n51 \n \nmust include an increase in MPR. While I support the need to \nincrease MPR, to the extent that it does not pose a material danger \nto our banking system stability, I consider it prudent to reiterate that I \nam not convinced by the argument that enhancing our country’s \ncompetitiveness in attracting foreign currency investments should \nalso be an incentive for increasing MPR. As I have consistently \nargued in some of my past policy statements, the time has come for \nNigeria to impose some form of restrictions on the inflow of foreign \n‘investments’ into the country. This should be specifically aimed at \ndiscouraging short term portfolio inflows. History has taught us that \nsuch speculative capital inflows only offer temporary relief, mainly in \nthe arena of exchange rates, and generally cause more harm than \ngood. I therefore see no harm for the country to insist that the only \ntypes of foreign capital it will welcome are those that have long term \ninvestment intentions. \nFrom the above, it is clear that the problem of monetary stability in \nNigeria is more complicated than increasing MPR. Despite the \nobvious fiscal policy gains that resulted from the implementation of \nthe TSA, inflation has continued to trend upwards. The main reason \nfor this trend is the nation’s inability to diversify its economy away \nfrom its current overdependence on oil rents. With persistent low oil \nprices, which has thus far shown no credible sign of abating, the \nability of the country to continue to fund the indulgence of its \n \n52 \n \ncitizens in all manner of imported goods which has been \nencouraged over the years by high oil prices is now very doubtful. \nThe result of the above is the current unrelenting pressure that is now \nbeing put on the exchange rate of the Naira. Given the dynamics of \nthe exchange rate mechanism that is currently in place in Nigeria, a \ndistinct and robust parallel market has emerged and the gap \nbetween the exchange rate in this market and that in the official \nmarket has continued to widen. This has created immense \nopportunities for arbitrage. The fact that prices and inflation in \nNigeria currently correlate more with the parallel market exchange \nrate is evidence that such arbitrage opportunities are being \nexploited. \nI am of course aware that the exchange rate mechanism in the \ncountry is currently being reviewed with the view of reducing (or \neliminating) the variance between the official and parallel \nexchange rates for the Naira. It is however important to stress that \nwhatever exchange rate management system that is arrived at will \nbe unsustainable if the Nigerian economy continues to be \ndependent on oil rents. \nOn its part the CBN has been exploiting its developmental role in its \nattempt to promote the diversification of our economy. It has, for \ninstance, recently used exchange rate allocation restrictions as a \ntool to discourage the importation of some 41 items. As I stated in an \n \n53 \n \nearlier policy statement, I am in full support of the CBN’s attempt to \nexploit its developmental function in its bid to aid sustainable \nnational economic development. I however believe that there is \nneed for more studies in this area before continuing on this \ntrajectory. This is particularly important given the fact that the CBN \nhas a long history of exploiting its developmental function. Learning \nfrom the mistakes and/ or successes of the past will in my view lead \nto the formulation of more effective policies in the above direction. \nDespite its developmental role potentials, there is a limit to what the \nCBN can achieve without the support of the fiscal authorities. In my \nview, for instance, the time has come for the Federal Government to \nban the import of all goods that can be manufactured locally. \nAnother way to encourage local industrial development is to impose \nhefty tariffs on luxury goods and goods that have reasonable local \nsubstitutes. Although these measures may appear extreme, the stark \nreality, in the light of the current international oil prices, is that Nigeria \nis no longer in a position to support the import dependent appetite \nof its citizens. \nIt is of course obvious that for any meaningful progress to be made in \nthe direction of promoting local industries, there is an urgent need \nfor the Nigerian Government to also tackle the country’s poor \ninfrastructure, declining educational standards, declining ethical \nstandards, porous borders and rampant corruption that has now \nbeen engrained in our system. \n \n54 \n \nIn summary therefore, I support a tightening of monetary policy at \nthe present time. I therefore vote as follows: (1) to increase MPR by \n100 basis point from 11 percent to 12 percent (2) to retain the \nasymmetric interest rate corridor of + 200/- 700 basis points around \nthe MPR; (3) to increase CRR by 250 basis points from 20 percent to \n22.50 percent; and (4) to retain Liquidity Ratio at 30 percent. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n55 \n \n7.0 \nYAHAYA, SHEHU \nThe Global Economy \nThe possible effects of the changes in global economic and \nfinancial variables, including that of our main trading partners on the \nNigerian economy have remained fairly stable over the last quarter \nof 2015- positive GDP growth rates in US, UK, a bit lower but still high \ngrowth rates in China, high growth rates in India, much lower growth \nin the Euro area, slowed growth in South Africa, negative growth \nrates in Japan Brazil and Russia. Most oil producing countries are still \nfacing difficult challenges. This underlines the importance of \ndeveloping new trading partners. Worth noting is the additional \nstimulus injected into the Eurozone by the ECB to support growth and \nthe prospects for further normalization of interest rates in the US \nduring 2016. \nGeneral price levels as well as food prices and raw materials remain \nlow in US, UK, Europe and much of Asia and are expected to remain \ngenerally low or even in some cases dip, for much of 2016. Crude oil \nprices rose to around $40/barrel in mid-March, but it is not evident \nthat even this modest rise can be sustained, due to persisting supply \nglut and the prospects of resumed expansion in shale oil production \nonce the $40 dollar threshold is crossed. For oil producing countries \nincluding Nigeria, the effects of pressures on the local currency is \nimpacting significantly on local prices. \n \n56 \n \nDomestic Economy \nQ4 GDP dropped to 2.11%, the lowest in the year, with an overall \ngrowth rate of 2.79% in 2015, much lower than forecast. The decline \nin growth rate was mainly driven by a sharp fall in the oil sector \nduring the quarter and a significant drop in manufacturing \nproduction. It is instructive to note that, increased lending to the \nmanufacturing sector and privileged access to foreign exchange at \nthe official rate did not translate into higher output. \nOutput in the power sector stagnated. The non-oil sector grew at a \nslightly faster rate than in Q3 2015. Agriculture also grew, but not fast \nenough. Special attention needs to be paid to this issue if agricultural \nproduction is actually to serve as the bulwark for pulling the non-oil \neconomy forward. One important consequence of the low growth \nrate is that unemployment has risen consistently in each quarter of \n2015, reaching about 7.5 million in Q3 2015, which is a jump of 24% \nover the previous quarter. \nOne of the most significant developments in the domestic economy \nis the big jump in headline inflation to 11.38% in February 2016, year \non year, as compared to 9.62% in the previous month. Most of the \nincrease emanated from core inflation, particularly processed food, \nhousing, water, electricity, gas fuel. The increase in food inflation, \nthough lower than core, was mainly driven by increases in imported \nrice and bread (due to the imported wheat component). Here, the \n \n57 \n \nexchange rate effect is evidently significant. It is important that the \nright and measured response to this price hike be developed. \nFrom the foregoing, it seems clear that the foreign currency market \nand the fixing of the Naira exchange rate is posing some challenges \nthat need to be addressed. In particular, the parallel market rates \nappear to be having a significant effect on price levels, particularly, \nbut not exclusively for imported goods. On the positive side, the pick \nup in prices of crude oil has led to an increase in external reserves to \nUS$28 billion by Mid-March. However, it is not at all apparent that this \nincrease will be sustained- hence measures to adapt to the long \nterm decline in oil prices must continue to be developed and \nimplemented, including a longer term strategy for the foreign \nexchange market to avoid a significant decline in reserves, \nintolerable pressures on the official exchange rate, declines in \ninward foreign currency flows. \nThe banking sector remains robust, with respect to capital, asset and \nincome based measures, as well as a lower level of risk on the Net \nOpen Position, albeit with slight declines in capital adequacy, return \non equity and on assets, as well as an increase in NPLs. Liquidity in \nthe banking system has remained quite high, with a significant \nproportion of it in the form of deposit for forex. It is pertinent to note \nthat injections of liquidity emanating from the loosening of monetary \npolicy has been, to a large extent, used for forex bids, and has not \ntranslated, in any significant way, into lower interest rates or higher \n \n58 \n \nlevels of lending to the productive sectors. Lending concentration \nremains a cause for concern. \nConclusion and Vote \nMost of the evidence is pointing towards persistent oil glut in the \nmedium term and therefore low prices. It is necessary to develop a \nlong term approach to the foreign exchange market, which \nobviously has an important effect on prices, foreign reserves, \nportfolio investment and FDI and therefore growth. This approach \nshould be set, not just as a short term response to declines in forex \nsupply, but as part of wider strategic objectives of growth, job \ncreation and a more egalitarian society. \nThe other important task is to respond to the short term threat of \ninflation. In devising the right response, it matters if the causes of the \ncurrent spike in prices is due to transient factors or due to unfolding \ncumulative effects of pressures in the foreign exchange market, \nincreases in the cost of fuel and power etc. It is also important that \nthe overall objective of supporting expansionary fiscal policy to \nstimulate growth is not lost sight of. At the moment, the real MPR is \nnegative. We consider the cumulative effects of various factors as \nproviding a better explanation of the spike in prices. Approval of the \nbudget later in the month and the surge in fiscal spending may also \ngenerate additional pressure on price levels. Moreover, the banking \nsector is characterized by excess liquidity. Under the circumstances \n \n59 \n \nwe deem it essential to tighten monetary policy and therefore vote \nas follows: \nRaise the MPR by 100 basis points to 12%. \nAsymmetric corridor to be tightened to +2/-5 \nRaise CRR to 22.5% \nLiquidity Ratio remains at 30% \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n60 \n \n8.0 EMEFIELE, I. GODWIN, GOVERNOR OF THE CENTRAL \n BANK OF NIGERIA AND CHAIRMAN, MONETARY \n POLICY COMMITTEE \nGlobal economic performance throughout 2015 was generally \ntepid and uneven as output growth dropped to 2.3 percent in the \nfourth quarter from 2.6 percent in the third quarter. Though medium-\nterm outlook remain modest, growth is projected to gain marginal \ntraction in 2016 with the IMF forecasting a rate of 3.4 percent during \nthe year. The fragile global economic environment reflects \ndepressed demand, rising uncertainties and enormous vulnerabilities \nespecially \namong \nkey \nemerging \nmarkets \nand \ndeveloping \neconomies. Nonetheless, recovery and expansion in advanced \neconomies is envisaged to remain largely robust buoyed by \nrelatively benign conditions and accommodative monetary policy. \nIn the US recovery is expected to be sustained albeit at a cautious \npace, fuelled by cheaper energy and modest private demand. The \neuro area is also likely to continue its rebound largely on the back of \ndynamic private consumption. \n \nAverage growth among emerging markets and developing \neconomies is forecast to increase slightly from 4.0 percent in 2015 to \n4.6 percent in 2016. This is regardless of rising uncertainty related to \ndevelopments in China, softened commodities and energy prices, \nfinancial markets fragilities, and weak global trade. The key \n \n61 \n \ndownside risks to the envisaged fragile recovery in emerging \nmarkets and developing economies include the withering capital \nflows, currency volatility, fiscal vulnerabilities, and heightening \ngeopolitical tensions. On the back of the uneven global outlook, \naccommodative monetary policy is expected to largely remain \namong advanced economies even as emerging markets and \ndeveloping economies generally deal with currency and structural \nissues. \n \nIn Nigeria, recent data by the National Bureau of Statistics shows \nthat domestic output growth decelerated further to 2.1 percent in \nquarter four of 2015 from 2.8 percent in quarter three. At that pace, \nfourth quarter growth is 1.7 percentage points lower than its level in \nthe corresponding period of 2014. Growth for the entire 2015 slowed \nto 2.8 percent from 6.2 percent at the end of 2014 and the average \nof 5.3 percent in the preceding three years. Though growth in the \nnon-oil sector decelerated from 7.2 percent in 2014 to 3.8 percent \nin 2015, it continued to be the driver of overall growth given the \ndeeper contraction of the oil sector from -1.3 percent to -5.5 \npercent over the same period. By respectively contributing 1.23, \n0.83 and 0.76 percentage points to non-oil growth, services, \nagriculture and trade sub-sectors remain the key growth propellers. \nIn line with various forecasts including staff estimates, we expect a \nmoderate pick-up of growth to between 3.5 and 4.0 percent in \n \n62 \n \n2016, especially if global conditions improve. I note that the major \ndomestic impediment to growth is the apathy of the financial sector \nto lend to the real private sector even in the presence of enormous \nsystemic liquidity. \n \nOn domestic prices, the year-on-year headline inflation rose sharply \nfrom 9.6 percent in January 2016 to 11.4 percent in February. \nAccording to the National Bureau of Statistics, this sudden ascent \nwas attributable to the effects of acute fuel scarcity, exchange rate \npass-through (especially to imported foods), and the hike in energy \ntariffs. Consequently, both the food and the core components of \ninflation rose during the month to 11.4 percent and 11.0 percent \nfrom 10.6 percent and 8.8 percent respectively, in the preceding \nmonth. Though the underlying causes of inflation in February were \nessentially structural and supply sided, it is exigent to curb its ascent \nin order to ensure that the projected trend of future inflation reverses \ndownward. \n \nData on domestic monetary, credit and financial conditions \nindicated that, during the review month, broad money supply grew \nby 2.3 percent over preceding December. This implies an \nannualised monetary expansion of 13.7 percent relative to the \nprovisional programmed target of 15.2 percent. Similarly, net \ndomestic credit increased by 3.7 percent which annualises to 22.3 \n \n63 \n \npercent and is 7.0 percentage points below the 29.3 percent \nexpansion provisionally targeted for 2016. The flow of credit to the \nprivate sector was unacceptably far less than anticipated. With a \ngrowth rate of 1.5 percent, the annualised growth at 8.7 percent \nwas significantly below the target rate 13.3 percent. I note once \nagain that sluggish growth of credit to the private coexisted \nperversely with a highly liquid money market. \n \nThe extent of liquidity surfeit in the banking system is reflected in the \nrepeatedly low interest rates in the market. Starting at 0.5 percent \nand 2.8 percent on 25 January 2016, the interbank call and OBB \nrates, respectively, recorded averages of 1.4 percent and 2.7 \npercent between 25 January and end-February 2016. The aberrant \nconcurrence of excess liquidity in the banking sector and poor flow \nof credit to the private sector is expounded by the lethargy at \nlending to the real sector of the economy due in part to a \nheightened default risk. Developments at the domestic capital \nmarket indicated a rare return of bullish episodes at the equity \nsegment. Starting at 23,916.2 points on 29 January 2016, the All-\nShare Index of the Nigerian Stock Exchanged grew by 8.1 percent \nto the 25,853.6 points as at 14 March 2016. Over the same period, \nMarket Capitalisation rose by 8.0 percent from ₦8.2 trillion to ₦8.9 \ntrillion. \n \n \n64 \n \nDuring the review period, the exchange rate of the Naira to the US \ndollar at the interbank market continued to steady around \n₦197.00/US$ with a daily average of ₦196.99/US$ between 25 \nJanuary and 14 March 2016. This reflected the strong commitment \nof the CBN to safeguard the domestic currency, even in the \npresence of immense speculative pressures, using a mix of orthodox \nand alternative policy measures. I note, once again, that fostering a \nsustainable autonomous inflow of foreign exchange is expedient \nand imperative as this can feasibly ease the pressure on our gross \nofficial reserves. In this regard, the Bank is currently working on a \nnumber of initiatives that will boost the supply in the foreign \nexchange market. On official reserves, our data indicate a decline \nof 0.8 percent in 30-day moving average position from US$28.1 \nbillion as at end-January 2016 to US$27.9 billion on 18 March 2016. \n \nOn the whole, I note the multiplicity, complexity and simultaneity of \nchallenges confronting the Nigerian economy at this time. These \ninclude decelerating growth, rising inflation, excess liquidity, low \ncredit to the productive private sector, and a constricted foreign \nexchange supply. Most of these are largely attributable to low \ncrude oil prices and its spill-over effects on structural vulnerabilities \nand a constrained fiscal space. In recent times, the MPC has \nadopted a largely accommodative stance of monetary policy to \nprop flagging growth. The aim was to release liquidity into the \n \n65 \n \nsystem with a view to elevating the flow of credit to the real sector. \nWhile the policies succeeded in raising the level of liquidity in the \nbanking system, it however did not translate immediately to \nincreased credit to the core private sector. Instead, financial \ninstitutions channelled the excess liquidity to the foreign exchange \nmarket and increased downward pressure on the Naira exchange \nrate. Consequently, the goal of bolstering growth was stymied while \nthe heightened pressure on the exchange rate transmitted to rising \ninflation. In addition, the continued delay in ratifying the 2016 fiscal \nbudget further complicated growth outcomes, as the attendant \nuncertainty around fiscal policy delayed investment decisions. \n \nI reiterate that the structural vulnerabilities of the Nigerian economy, \nwhich was once again undraped by the prolonged fall in crude oil \nprices, is underpinned by a problem of weak aggregate supply. \nNigeria needs to learn from the experiences of past episodes of low \noil prices and accept the current episode as an opportunity to \ndiversify the economy once and for all. To this end, the CBN will not \nrelent in its efforts at supporting the broad diversification of the \neconomy and the build-up of our domestic productive capacity. It \nis in this regard that I deem it fitting to be tactful in tackling the \nproblems of slowing growth, rising inflation, liquidity surfeit and poor \nprivate sector credit. Given the apparent trade-offs inherent in \npolicy decisions, we need to make some sacrifices and choose the \n \n66 \n \nleast costly policy options. \n \nI strongly believe that in the medium term, we need to boost \nproductivity and domestic supply capacity to ensure that jobs and \ngoods are in abundant supply. On its part, the CBN will sustain and \nstrengthen its development finance initiatives to ensure that \nconcessionary credits are channelled to strategically selected real \nsector ventures. In the immediate term, however, there is need to \ntame inflation which has maintained an upward trajectory over the \nlast year. It is also imperative to rein in the banking system’s excess \nliquidity which is stoking the pressure on the exchange rate. On the \nbalance of inflation-output trade-off, it is most optimal at this time to \ntighten the noose on inflation and reduce the speculative pressures \non the exchange rate. To mitigate an excessive sacrifice of output \ngrowth, the CBN development finance schemes will be used to \nchannel concessionary credit to the private sector. I am of the view \nthat this option will correct the perverse simultaneity of excess \nliquidity and poor credit and will moderate exchange market \npressure and the attendant pass-through to inflation. \n \nI therefore vote as follows: \n1. 100 basis points increase in MPR from 11.0 percent to 12.0 \npercent; \n \n67 \n \n2. 250 basis points increase in CRR from 20.0 percent to 22.5 \npercent; \n3. Narrow the asymmetric corridor from +200/–700 basis points \naround the mid-point of the MPR to +200/–500 basis points; and \n4. Retain Liquidity Ratio at 30 percent.", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/Central Bank of Nigeria Communique No 106 of the MPC with Personal Statements of Members for the meeting held on March 21 and 22, 2016.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "29839d65830ff8655d067e81d00cb898", "text": "This document is for CBN internal consumption \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \nECONOMIC REPORT \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSecond Quarter \n2025 \n \n \ni \n \nABOUT THE REPORT \n \nThe Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Economic Report present developments \nin the Nigeria economy, for dissemination to the public. The Report, which \nis published on a monthly and quarterly basis, provides insights on current \ndevelopments in the real, fiscal, financial, and external sectors of the \nNigerian economy, as well as global development that impact the domestic \neconomy. In addition, it reflects the policy initiatives of the CBN in pursuit \nof its mandate. \n \nThe Report is targeted at a wide range of readers, including economists, \npolicymakers, financial analysts in the government and private sectors, \nand the public. Free downloads of the Report, including current and past \nissues can be obtained from the CBN website: www.cbn.gov.ng. All \ninquiries concerning the Report should be directed to the Director, \nResearch Department, Central Bank of Nigeria, P.M.B. 187, Garki, Abuja, \nNigeria. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nii \n \nContent \n \nABOUT THE REPORT .....................................................................................i \nSUMMARY ..........................................................................................................1 \n1.0 \nGLOBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS..................................2 \n1.1 \n Global Economic Activity ....................................................................2 \n1.2 Global Inflation ....................................................................................5 \n1.3 \nGlobal Financial Markets......................................................................7 \n1.4 \nGlobal Commodity Markets.................................................................9 \n1.5 \nMonetary Policy Stance...................................................................... 12 \n2.0 \nDOMESTIC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS.......................... 14 \n2.1 Real Sector Developments ................................................................. 14 \n2.1.1 Sectoral Performance......................................................................... 15 \n2.1.2 Inflation ............................................................................................... 21 \n2.1.3 Socio-Economic Developments ....................................................... 23 \n2.2 \nFiscal Sector Developments .............................................................. 23 \n2.2.1 \nFederation Account Operations ....................................................... 23 \n2.3.1 \nMonetary Developments ................................................................... 29 \n2.3.2 \nSectoral Utilisation of Credit ............................................................. 32 \n2.3.3 \nFinancial Developments .................................................................... 33 \n2.4 \nExternal Sector Developments ......................................................... 43 \n2.4.1 Current and Capital Account ............................................................ 43 \n2.4.2 Financial Account............................................................................... 47 \n2.4.3 \nExternal Debt ..................................................................................... 48 \n2.4.4 International Investment Position (IIP)........................................... 48 \n2.4.5 External Reserves ................................................................................ 49 \n2.4.6 Foreign Exchange Flows through the Economy ............................ 49 \n2.4.7 \nExchange Rate Movement ................................................................ 51 \n3.0 \nECONOMIC OUTLOOK............................................................... 52 \n3.1 \nGlobal Outlook .................................................................................. 52 \n3.2 \nDomestic Outlook ............................................................................. 52 \n \n \n \n \n \n \niii \n \nTables \nTable 1: Global Composite Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) ......... 3 \nTable 2: Selected Agricultural Export Commodities Q22025............. 12 \nTable 3: Central Bank Policy Rates (per cent)......................................... 13 \nTable 4: Index of Industrial Production ................................................... 16 \nTable 5: Index of Mining Production ....................................................... 17 \nTable 6: Index of Manufacturing Production ......................................... 17 \nTable 7: Index of Electricity Production .................................................. 19 \nTable 8: Federation Revenue and Distribution (₦ Billion).................. 25 \nTable 9: Money and Credit Growth over preceding December (%) . 31 \nTable 10: Sectoral Credit Allocation.......................................................... 32 \nTable 11: Nigerian Exchange Limited Sectoral Indices....................... 39 \nTable 12: Listings, De-listings, and Suspensions on the Nigerian \nExchange Limited .......................................................................................... 41 \nTable 14: Selected EMEs Currency Rates to the US dollar ................. 51 \n \nFigures \nFigure 1: PMIs in Selected Advanced Economies ................................... 4 \nFigure 2: PMI in Selected Emerging Markets and Developing \nEconomies ......................................................................................................... 5 \nFigure 3: Inflation in Selected Advanced Economies (per cent) .......... 6 \nFigure 4: Inflation in Selected EMDEs (per cent) ................................... 7 \nFigure 5: Growth Rate of Key Global Stocks (per cent) ........................ 8 \nFigure 6: 10-year Government Bond Yields for Selected Countries ... 9 \nFigure 7: Total Global Crude Oil Supply and Demand ...................... 10 \nFigure 8: Quarterly Crude Oil Prices (US$ pb)....................................... 10 \nFigure 9: Price Changes in Selected Metals (per cent) .......................... 11 \nFigure 10: Real GDP Growth Rate (Y-on-Y), Q22022-Q22025 ....... 14 \nFigure 11: Sectoral Growth Rate of Real GDP, Q22022- Q22025 ... 15 \nFigure 12: Selected Top Subsectors with Contribution to GDP \nGrowth and Growth Rates (%) in Q22025 ............................................. 18 \nFigure 13: Subsector with Negative Contribution to GDP Growth \nand Growth Rate (%) in Q22025 ............................................................... 18 \nFigure 14: Nigeria’s Crude Oil Production and OPEC Quota ........... 19 \nFigure 15: Headline, Food and Core Inflation (y-o-y) .......................... 21 \nFigure 16: Inflation Momentum ................................................................. 21 \nFigure 17: Food and Headline Inflation across States in Q22025 ..... 22 \nFigure 18: Federally Collected Revenue (₦ Billion) .............................. 24 \nFigure 19: Contribution to Federation Revenue ................................... 24 \n \n \niv \n \nFigure 20: Top Five Recipients of Federation Allocation in Q22025\n ............................................................................................................................ 26 \nFigure 21: Bottom-Five Recipients of Federation Allocation in \nQ22025 (₦Billion) ......................................................................................... 26 \nFigure 22: FGN External and Domestic Debt Compositions (₦ \nBillion) .............................................................................................................. 27 \nFigure 23: Composition of Domestic Debt Stock by Instrument ..... 28 \nFigure 24: Composition of External Debt Stock ................................... 28 \nFigure 25: Developments in Reserve Money and Money Multiplier . 29 \nFigure 26: Reserve Money Growth Over end-December.................... 30 \nFigure 27: Consumer Credit Outstanding ................................................ 33 \nFigure 28: Average Banking System Liquidity (₦ Trillion) .................. 33 \nFigure 29: Transactions at the Standing Facilities Window ................. 34 \nFigure 30: Open Market Operations (₦ Trillion) .................................. 34 \nFigure 31: Primary Market NTBs (₦ Trillion) ........................................ 35 \nFigure 32: Primary Market Auctions of FGN Bonds (₦ Trillion) ..... 35 \nFigure 33: Developments in Short-term Interest Rates ........................ 36 \nFigure 34: Average Term Deposit and Lending Rates.......................... 37 \nFigure 35: Aggregate Market Capitalisation and All-Share Index ...... 38 \nFigure 36: Quarter-on-Quarter Changes in Sectoral Indices ............... 39 \nFigure 37: Volume and Value of Traded Securities ............................... 40 \nFigure 38: Key Financial Soundness Indicators...................................... 42 \nFigure 39: Current Account Balance (US$ Billion) ................................ 43 \nFigure 40: Classification of Imports .......................................................... 44 \nFigure 41: Share of Service Out-Payments .............................................. 45 \nFigure 42: Share of Services Receipts........................................................ 46 \nFigure 43: Primary Income Balance .......................................................... 46 \nFigure 44: Secondary Income Balance (US$ Billion)............................. 47 \nFigure 45: External Reserves and Months of Import Cover ............... 49 \nFigure 46: Foreign Exchange Transactions through the Economy... 50 \nFigure 47: Turnover in the NFEM ............................................................ 50 \nFigure 48: Selected EMEs Currency Values to the US dollar ............. 51 \n Box Information \nBox 1: Prices of Monitored Domestic Agric. Commodities ....... 20 \n \n \n \n1 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \nSUMMARY \nThe global economy performance was tepid in the second quarter of 2025, \non account of softer demand conditions. The global composite purchasing \nmanagers’ index (PMI) declined to 51.23 from 51.80 index points in the \npreceding quarter, as the pace of economic activity remained uneven for \nadvanced economies (AEs) and emerging market and developing economies \n(EMDEs). Inflation outcomes were also mixed across regions but indicated \nwidespread deceleration in price pressures. \nThe domestic economy growth quickened in Q22025, expanding by 4.23 per \ncent, compared with 3.13 and 3.48 per cent in Q120225 and Q22024, \nrespectively. Headline inflation pressures continued to wane in the second \nquarter, easing to 22.22 per cent in June 2025. On the fiscal front, federation \nrevenue increased by 15.02 per cent, relative to Q12025, signalling \nimprovement in fiscal conditions. Public debt stock (33.10% of GDP) settled \nbelow the IMF-prescribed threshold of 70.00 per cent for Market-Access \nCountries. \nMonetary expansion was moderate during the review quarter, in line with \nthe tight monetary policy stance. The liquidity management operations of \nthe Central Bank of Nigeria resulted in a net withdrawal, with money market \nrates remaining within the policy corridor. The Nigerian capital market \nmaintained its bullish run, as investor confidence and stable \nmacroeconomic environment spurred strong buy orders. Key indicators \nrevealed sustained soundness and resilience of the financial system. \nThe external sector improved in Q22025 despite subsisting geopolitical \ntensions and global trade uncertainties. A lower deficit was recorded in the \noverall balance of payments, buoyed by narrower deficits in the services and \nprimary income accounts, and reduction in other investment liabilities. The \ncountry’s external reserves stood at US$37.81 billion and could finance 8.07 \nmonths of imports for goods and services or 12.25 months for goods only. \nThe average exchange rate at the Nigerian Foreign Exchange Market \n(NFEM) was ₦1,581.06/US$, compared with ₦1,521.56/US$ in Q12025. \n \n \n \n \n2 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \n1.0 \nGLOBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS \nGlobal economic activity expanded in Q22025, albeit at a slower pace, and was \nuneven between advanced economies (AEs) and emerging markets and developing \neconomies (EMDEs). Inflation eased across advanced economies (AEs) and in most \nEMDEs, following a reduction in food and energy prices. Global equity markets \nwere largely bullish, while bond yields remained within a lower range, reflecting \nthe impact of monetary policy easing and lingering trade policy uncertainties. \n1.1 \nGlobal Economic Activity \nThe expansion of economic activity moderated in Q22025, owing to the decline in \nmanufacturing activity and softer demand. The global composite purchasing \nmanagers’ index (PMI) fell to 51.23 from 51.80 in Q12025 but remained within the \nexpansion region. The slower pace of expansion was attributed, largely, to lower \nactivities in the manufacturing and services sectors, as global demand weakened. \nThe manufacturing sector, contracted to 49.87 from 50.33 in the preceding \nquarter, due in part to fragile demand and slower inventory replenishment. \nDecline in new business and export orders slowed the services PMI to 51.53 from \n52.13 in Q12025. \nGlobal Economic \nActivity \n \n3 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \nTable 1: Global Composite Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) \n \nQ22024 \nQ12025 \nQ22025 \nComposite (Output) \n52.90 \n51.80 \n51.23 \nEmployment Level \n51.30 \n50.37 \n50.47 \nNew Business Orders \n52.00 \n51.80 \n50.93 \nNew Export Business Orders \n49.60 \n49.80 \n48.20 \nFuture Output \n62.10 \n61.53 \n59.50 \nInput Prices \n56.30 \n57.07 \n57.13 \nOutput Prices \n52.80 \n52.67 \n53.27 \nManufacturing \n50.90 \n50.33 \n49.87 \nServices (Business Activity) \n53.10 \n52.13 \n51.53 \nNew Business \n52.40 \n52.10 \n51.30 \nNew Export Business \n50.60 \n50.20 \n48.43 \nFuture Activity \n63.10 \n61.53 \n59.63 \nEmployment \n51.50 \n50.87 \n50.80 \nOutstanding Business \n50.00 \n49.27 \n50.13 \nInput Prices \n56.70 \n57.77 \n57.87 \nPrices Charged \n53.00 \n52.90 \n53.50 \n Source: JP Morgan \n \nThe pace of economic activity varied in advanced economies, reflecting distinct \nrecovery patterns in the manufacturing and services sectors. In Italy the PMI \nexpanded to 51.90 in Q22025 from 50.70, buoyed by improved domestic demand, \neasing inflation pressure, and higher manufacturing exports. Similarly, Japan \nsustained its recovery, with the PMI increasing to 50.97 from 50.67 and 49.70 in \nthe preceding and corresponding quarters. The expansion was supported by \ncontinued uptick in new orders and a stable employment environment. \nIn the US, the PMI remained robust at 52.17, but lower than 52.60 in Q12025, \namid weaker domestic demand, higher cost pressures, and emerging policy \nuncertainties. Similarly, the UK recorded a slower expansion at 50.57, compared \nwith 50.87 in Q12025, as domestic and external demand weakened and business \nconfidence faltered. PMI also slowed in Spain to 52.00 from 54.37 in the preceding \nquarter, due to cooling demand in the services sector and lower new orders. \nFrance recorded a PMI of 48.77, compared with 46.90 in the preceding quarter, \nas the slack in new orders, job losses, and fragile business confidence lingered. \n \n \nEconomic Activity in \nAdvanced Economies \n \n4 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \nIn contrast, the PMI in Germany, at 49.77, dropped to a contraction at 49.67, from \nan expansion of 50.73 in Q12025, due to slackening services activity softening \ndemand. Canada recorded further contraction in PMI to 43.73 from 46.10 in the \npreceding quarter, reflecting job losses, lower domestic orders, and high input \ncosts in the manufacturing sector. \nFigure 1: PMIs in Selected Advanced Economies \n \nSource: Trading Economics/Various countries’ websites. \n \nEconomic activity slowed in most EMDEs in Q22025. Purchasing managers’ indexes \n(PMIs in Indonesia and Turkey weakened to 47.00 and 47.07 in Q22025, \nrespectively, from 52.63 and 47.87 in the preceding quarter. The contraction in \nIndonesia reflected lower export demand and manufacturing output, and \nuncertainty in fiscal policy associated with its election cycle. The development in \nTurkey followed elevated inflation pressure and soft domestic demand. The PMI \nalso dropped in Brazil to 49.07 from 50.67 in the preceding quarter, owing to rising \nfinancing costs, weak domestic orders, and inflation concerns. In Russia, the Index \ncontracted to 49.90 from 51.40, following reduced exports, geopolitical tensions, \ncautious consumer spending, and tighter credit conditions. \nSimilarly, economic activity in Mexico further slowed, as indicated by a PMI of \n45.93, compared with 47.73 in Q12025. The downturn was due to weaker demand \nfrom the US, rising logistics costs, and reduced production in the automotive and \nelectronics industries. In China, the PMI declined to 50.67 from 51.47, due to \nreduction in new orders and softer external demand. In contrast, India’s PMI \nincreased to 60.00 from 58.67, supported by robust growth in the services sector, \nstrong domestic demand, and sustained rise in new export orders. Similarly, South \nAfrica’s PMI rebounded to 50.30 from a contraction of 46.23 in Q12025. The \n54.80\n52.30\n50.40\n51.30\n49.70\n47.50\n54.70\n48.80\n52.60\n50.87\n50.73\n50.70\n50.67\n46.67\n54.37\n46.90\n52.17\n50.57\n49.67\n51.90\n50.97\n43.73\n52.00\n48.77\n50\n50\n0.00\n10.00\n20.00\n30.00\n40.00\n50.00\n60.00\nUNITED\nSTATES\nUNITED\nKINGDOM\nGERMANY\nITALY\nJAPAN\nCANADA\nSPAIN\nFRANCE\nQ22024\nQ12025\nQ22025\n50-point Threshold\nEconomic activity in \nEMDEs \n \n5 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \nimprovement was explained to easing supply constraints and modest recovery in \nnew business. \n \nFigure 2: PMI in Selected Emerging Markets and Developing Economies \n \nSource: Trading Economics/Various countries’ websites. \nNote: South Africa, Turkey, Indonesia and Mexico PMIs data were based on manufacturing PMI. \n \n1.2 Global Inflation \nGlobal inflation trend was mixed in Q22025, influenced by volatile energy prices, \nbase effects, and policy shifts. In the UK and the US, inflation rose to 2.70 and 3.60 \nper cent, respectively, from 2.60 and 2.40 per cent in the preceding quarter. Price \npressures in the UK were associated with higher housing, energy and services \ncosts. In the US, they were attributed to rising shelter costs and consumer \nspending. Inflation ticked up in France to 1.00 per cent, from 0.80 per cent in \nQ12025, due to seasonal fluctuations in the cost of transportation and education \nservices. \nGermany and Japan recorded disinflations to 2.00 and 3.30 per cent from 2.20 and \n3.60 per cent, respectively, on account of benign food and energy prices. In \nCanada, inflation declined to 1.90 per cent, from 2.30 per cent, underscoring \nsofter food and gasoline prices, and shelter cost. Disinflation was also recorded in \nItaly to 1.70 per cent from 1.90 per cent, as food and energy prices moderated. \nPrice pressures was, however, unchanged at 2.3 per cent in Spain, reflecting the \ndecline in energy costs, counterbalanced by rising costs of leisure, hospitality, and \ntransportation services. \n52.38\n60.90\n47.90\n49.20\n50.70\n51.10\n54.10\n49.80\n51.47\n58.67\n47.87\n46.23\n52.63\n47.73\n50.67\n51.40\n50.67\n60.00\n47.07\n50.30\n47.00\n45.93\n49.07\n49.90\n50\n50\n50\n0.00\n10.00\n20.00\n30.00\n40.00\n50.00\n60.00\n70.00\nCHINA\nINDIA\nTURKEY\nSOUTH\nAFRICA\nINDONESIA\nMEXICO\nBRAZIL\nRUSSIA\nQ22024\nQ12025\nQ22025\n50-point Threshold\nGlobal Inflation \n \n6 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \nFigure 3: Inflation in Selected Advanced Economies (per cent) \n \nSource: Trading Economics \nPrice pressures were broadly mixed in EMDEs, owing to base effects, food price \ndynamics, currency pressures, and policy adjustments. In India and Turkey, \ninflation moderated to 2.10 and 35.05 per cent, respectively, from 3.34 and 38.10 \nper cent in Q12025. Lower food prices and positive sentiment around agricultural \noutput influenced price dynamics in India, while declining food prices, and tight \nmonetary policy eased price pressures in Turkey. Likewise, inflation decelerated in \nBrazil and Russia to 5.35 and 9.40 per cent, respectively, from 5.48 and 10.30 per \ncent, on account of lower gasoline prices in Brazil and dampened demand in \nRussia. \nHowever, inflation rose in Indonesia and South Africa to 1.87 and 3.00 per cent, \nrespectively, from 1.03 and 2.70 per cent in the preceding quarter. The increase \nin Indonesia was due to expiration of discounted electricity tariff and end-of-\nseason adjustments, while higher services and goods prices, especially in fuel and \nagricultural products, drove up prices in South Africa. Inflation in Mexico rose to \n4.32 per cent from 3.80 per cent, on the back of stronger domestic demand. In \nChina, it remained tepid at 0.10 per cent due to weak demand, moderate food and \nservices prices and low wage pressures. \n \n \n \n3.0\n2.0\n2.2\n2.2\n2.8\n2.7\n0.8\n3.4\n2.4\n2.6\n2.2\n0.8\n3.6\n2.3\n1.9\n2.3\n2.7\n3.6\n2.0\n1.0\n3.3\n1.9\n1.7\n2.3\n0\n0.5\n1\n1.5\n2\n2.5\n3\n3.5\n4\nUNITED\nSTATES\nUNITED\nKINGDOM\nGERMANY FRANCE\nJAPAN\nCANADA\nITALY\nSPAIN\nQ22024\nQ12025\nQ22025\n \n7 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \nFigure 4: Inflation in Selected EMDEs (per cent) \n \n Source: Trading Economics \n \n1.3 \nGlobal Financial Markets \n1.3.1 \nGlobal Financial Conditions \nEquities markets were bullish in many economies, and bond yields remained at the \nlower rangebound, as monetary policy eased and trade policy uncertainties \npersisted. Stocks across the AEs ended the quarter on a bullish note, following a \ntemporary pause in reciprocal tariffs. In the US, the S&P 500, NASDAQ 100, and \nDow Jones rebounded, due to tariff pause, strong corporate earnings, and \nrenewed investor sentiment. The UK FTSE 100 extended its positive run in the UK, \ngaining 2.08 per cent, supported by interest rate cuts, fading recession fears, and \nfavourable performance in major stocks lifted market conditions. The Japanese \nNIKKEI and TOPIX indices also appreciated by 13.67 and 7.30 per cent, \nrespectively, owing to the US-China trade negotiations and easing global recession \nfears. Eurozone stocks also recorded strong gains, as the German DAX, Italy FTSE \nMIB and EURO STOXX 50 appreciated. The bullish stance was led by industrials and \nreal estate sectors, amid consensus by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation \n(NATO) to raise defence spending. The French CAC 40, however, depreciated by \n1.60 per, as tensions in the Middle East weighed investor sentiment. \nIn the EMDEs most equities markets were bullish in Q22025, supported by a \nweaker US dollar. The Mexican MEXBOL and Brazilian BOVESPA extended their \npositive performance, with returns of 9.46 and 6.60 per cent, respectively. Gains \nin the MEXBOL were associated with the pause of the US tariff policy, while \nappreciation of the BOVESPA was attributed to increased foreign capital inflow, as \ninvestors reassessed exposure to the US, following Moody’s downgrade of US \n5.08\n2.51\n5.1\n4.23\n0.27\n4.98\n8.6\n71.6\n3.34\n1.03\n2.7\n5.48\n0.1\n3.8\n10.3\n38.1\n2.1\n1.87\n3\n5.35\n0.1\n4.32\n9.4\n35.05\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\nINDIA\nINDONESIA\nSOUTH\nAFRICA\nBRAZIL\nCHINA\nMEXICO\nRUSSIA\nTURKEY\nQ22024\nQ12025\nQ22025\n \n8 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \nsovereign debt from AAA to Aa1. Similarly, the South African JALSH appreciated by \n8.79 per cent, supported by broad-based growth in corporate income. The Indian \nBSE SENSEX gained 8.00 per cent in the review quarter, driven by positive domestic \neconomic data and robust performance of blue-chip companies. The Russian \nMOEX and Chinese SZI, however, dipped by 5.51 and 0.37 per cent, respectively, \nreflecting dampened investor sentiment in both economies. \nFigure 5: Growth Rate of Key Global Stocks (per cent) \n \nSource: Reuters Refinitiv Eikon & MarketWatch \n \nLong-term bond yields fell in most AEs and EMDEs in the review period, due to \naccommodative monetary policy stance. In the AEs, the 10-year bond yields in the \nUS and the UK declined to 4.23 and 4.49 per cent, respectively, from 4.25 and 4.67 \nper cent in the preceding quarter. The lower yields in the US were underpinned by \ngrowing concerns around fiscal policy and the downgrade of US sovereign debt. \nIn the UK, accommodative monetary policy necessitated portfolio rebalancing, as \nsofter UK labour market data favoured rate cuts and suppressed yields. \nSimilarly, returns on sovereign bonds in the Euro area declined to 2.61 per cent, \nfrom 2.73 per cent, buoyed by easing monetary conditions. Yields also fell to 3.51 \nin Italy and 1.43 per cent in Japan, from 3.86 and 1.49 per cent respectively, as \ntrade policy uncertainties and moderating domestic growth in both economies \nweighed on investors’ sentiment. In Canada, however, yield rose to 3.27 per cent, \nfrom 2.97 per cent, as Bank of Canada held its policy rate. \nAmong EMDEs, Turkey and Russia recorded lower yields of 29.15 and 14.81 per \ncent, respectively, from 31.33 and 15.25 per cent in the preceding quarter. The \ndecline in Turkey reflected the effects of US tariffs and lingering geopolitical \n-4.59\n-1.28\n-0.21\n5.01\n5.55\n11.31\n11.32\n7.20\n-4.53\n8.29\n6.00\n5.40\n-0.93\n0.86\n4.52\n10.57\n4.98\n5.66\n2.08\n-1.60\n4.57\n13.67\n7.88\n1.05\n7.30\n6.60\n9.46\n8.79\n8.00\n-0.37\n-5.51\n-6.00\n-1.00\n4.00\n9.00\n14.00\n19.00\nUS-S&P 500\nUS-Dow Jones\nUS-Nasdaq-100\nUK-FTSE-100\nFance-CAC-40\nItaly-FTSE MIB\nJapan-Nikkei\nGermany-DAX\nEuro Area-Euro stoxx 50\nJapan-Topix\nBrazil-Bovespa\nMexico-MEXBOL\nSouth Africa-JALSH\nIndia-BSE Sansex\nChina-SZI\nRussia-Moscow Exchange\nQ12025\nQ22025\n \n9 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \ntension, while easing monetary stance impacted yields in Russia. Returns on \nsovereign yields in Indonesia and India declined to 6.63 and 6.32 per cent, \nrespectively, from 6.98 and 6.58 per cent in the preceding quarter, due also to \naccommodative monetary policy and tariff uncertainties. In Mexico, yield on \nsovereign bonds fell by 9.19 per cent, from 9.35 per cent, in response to the \nBanxico’s rate-cutting cycle, as investors remained cautious. South Africa also \nrecorded lower yield of 9.95 per cent, from 10.62 per cent in the preceding \nquarter, following policy rate cut, supported by a favourable inflation outlook. \nFigure 6: 10-year Government Bond Yields for Selected Countries \n \nSource: Reuters Refinitiv Eikon & Trading Economics \n \n1.4 \nGlobal Commodity Markets \nWorld crude oil supply slightly exceeded demand in Q22025. Global crude oil \nsupply, including Natural Gas Liquids (NGLs), rose by 1.08 per cent to 104.46 mbpd, \ncompared with 103.34 mbpd in the preceding quarter. The increase was driven by \nhigher production in both OPEC+ and non-OPEC countries. Supply by OPEC+ \ncountries rose by 0.89 per cent to 32.96 mbpd from 32.67 mbpd, attributed to \nincreased supplies from Iraq, Libya, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia and United Arab \nEmirates (UAE). Non-OPEC supply ticked up by 1.15 per cent to 71.50 mbpd, from \n70.69 mbpd, due to higher supplies from the US, Mexico, Brazil and Angola. \nGlobal crude oil demand, including natural gas liquids, increased by 0.99 per cent \nto 103.19 mbpd, from 102.18 mbpd. The growth was driven by the 2.11 per cent \nincrease in non-OECD countries, which increased by to 58.12 mbpd, driven, mainly, \nby uptick in economic activity in China and other Asian countries. In contrast, \ndemand in OECD countries declined by 0.40 per cent to 45.08 mbpd, compared \nwith 45.26 mbpd in the preceding quarter. \n4.34\n2.49\n4.18\n1.05\n3.5\n4.07\n9.83\n7.01\n7.05\n26.52\n9.98\n15.11\n4.25\n2.73\n4.67\n1.49\n2.97\n3.86\n9.35\n6.58\n6.98\n31.33\n10.62\n15.25\n4.23\n2.61\n4.49\n1.43\n3.27\n3.51\n9.19\n6.32\n6.63\n29.15\n9.95\n14.81\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n35\nUSA\nEuro Area\nUK\nJapan\nCanada\nItaly\nMexico\nIndia\nIndonesia\nTurkey\nSouth Africa\nRussia\nAdvanced Economies\nEmerging Markets and Developing Economies\nQ22024\nQ12025\nQ22025\nWorld Crude Supply \nand Demand \n \n10 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \nFigure 7: Total Global Crude Supply and Demand \n \n Source: Energy Information Administration (EIA) \n \nCrude oil spot prices fell in Q22025, driven, mainly, by increased crude oil supply \nand growing stockpiles. The average spot price of Bonny Light (34.9° API) fell by \n10.11 per cent to US$69.68 per barrel (pb) in Q22025, from US$77.52 pb in the \npreceding quarter. The prices of Brent, at US$68.92 pb, Forcados (US$70.90 pb), \nWTI (US$65.18 pb) and OPEC Reference Basket (US$67.41 pb) also dropped. \nFigure 8: Quarterly Crude Oil Prices (US$ pb) \n Source: Refinitiv Eikon (Reuters) \n \n90\n95\n100\n105\nQ1 2021\nQ2 2021\nQ3 2021\nQ4 2021\nQ1 2022\nQ2 2022\nQ3 2022\nQ4 2022\nQ1 2023\nQ2 2023\nQ3 2023\nQ4 2023\nQ1 2024\nQ2 2024\nQ3 2024\nQ4 2024\nQ1 2025\nQ2 2025\nmbpd \nWorld Supply\nWorld Demand\nCrude Oil \nPrices \n60\n70\n80\n90\n100\n110\n120\nQ1 2022\nQ2 2022\nQ3 2022\nQ4 2022\nQ1 2023\nQ2 2023\nQ3 2023\nQ4 2023\nQ1 2024\nQ2 2024\nQ3 2024\nQ4 2024\nQ1 2025\nQ2 2025\nBonny Light\nBrent\nForcados\nWTI\nOpec Basket\n \n11 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \nThe average spot prices of precious metals rose, driven by demand for gold. The \naverage spot prices of gold rose by 14.88 per cent to US$3,287.80 per ounce, silver \n(5.67%) to US$33.71, platinum (11.13%) to US$1,073.77 and palladium (3.31%) to \nUS$989.51 per ounce, from the levels in the preceding quarter. The rise in gold \nprices was attributed, primarily, to increased demand by central banks and weaker \nUS dollar amid US trade policy uncertainties. Increase in the prices of silver and \nplatinum was associated with improved industrial activity, while higher investor \ndemand drove up the price of palladium. \nFigure 9: Price Changes in Selected Metals (per cent) \n Source: Refinitiv Eikon (Reuters) \n \nThe prices of most of the monitored global agricultural commodities trended \ndownward in Q22025, reflecting improved supply conditions and moderating \ndemand. The all-commodity price index of monitored agricultural commodities fell \nby 9.54 per cent to 143.54, from 158.69 in the preceding quarter. Reduction in the \nprices of groundnuts, rubber, palm oil, coffee, cocoa, and wheat, owing to output \nrecovery and improved supply, influenced the direction of the index. Improved \ncrop outlook, easing logistics disruptions, and weaker demand contributed to the \ndecline in prices. Conversely, the prices of soya beans and cotton rose during the \nquarter, driven by robust export demand, lower output in key producing regions, \nand high production costs. \n \n \n \n \n \nOther Mineral \nCommodities \nAgricultural \nCommodity Prices \n23.56\n5.67\n11.14\n-1.83\n46.94\n16.81\n9.78\n1.91\n-10.00\n0.00\n10.00\n20.00\n30.00\n40.00\n50.00\nGold\nSilver\nPlatinum\nPalladium\nWith corresponding quarter\nWith preceding quarter\n \n12 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \n \nTable 2: Selected Agricultural Export Commodities Q22025 \n(in dollars; Jan. 2010=100) \nCommodity \nQ22024 \nQ12025 \nQ22025 \n% Change \n(1) & (3) \n(2) & (3) \n \n1 \n2 \n3 \n4 \n5 \nAll Commodities \n153.15 \n158.68 \n143.54 \n-6.27 \n-9.54 \nCocoa \n235.22 \n271.28 \n241.52 \n2.68 \n-10.97 \nCotton \n105.48 \n100.68 \n101.06 \n-4.19 \n0.38 \nCoffee \n325.65 \n364.88 \n323.46 \n-0.67 \n-11.35 \nWheat \n129.03 \n128.25 \n120.39 \n-6.70 \n-6.13 \nRubber \n65.15 \n64.94 \n55.11 \n-15.41 \n-15.13 \nGroundnut \n128.40 \n117.20 \n98.30 \n-23.44 \n-16.13 \nPalm Oil \n137.83 \n128.59 \n113.83 \n-17.41 \n-11.48 \nSoya Beans \n98.42 \n93.61 \n94.64 \n-3.84 \n1.10 \nSources: World Bank Pink Sheet \nNote: Indices of Average World Prices of Nigeria's Major Agricultural Export Commodities for the \nSecond Quarter of 2025 (in dollars; Jan. 2010=100) \n \n1.5 \nMonetary Policy Stance \nThe stance of monetary policy was broadly accommodative in Q22025, on the back \nof cooling inflation. The US Fed maintained its policy rate within the target 4.25 – \n4.50 per cent band, following rising concerns that the prevailing trade war could \nundermine the 2.00 per cent inflation target. Bank of Canada also maintained rate \nat 2.75 per cent, as inflation continued to moderate. Similarly, The Bank of Japan, \nheld rate at 0.50 per cent, reflecting concerns over domestic growth. On the other \nhand, the European Central Bank (ECB) and Bank of England cut rates to 2.15 and \n4.25 per cent, respectively, from 2.65 and 4.50 per cent in the preceding quarter. \nMonetary policy was also largely dovish in EMDEs, as price pressures continued to \nease. The Bank of Indonesia and the Reserve Bank of India cut rates by 25- and 75-\nbasis-points, respectively, to 5.50 per cent, a-piece. The cuts were due to slowing \ninflation, trade policy uncertainties, and growth priorities. Based on similar \nconsiderations, the Bank of Russia and the Bank of Mexico also lowered rates to \n20.00 and 8.00 per cent, respectively, from 21.00 and 9.00 per cent. The People’s \nBank of China and the South African Reserve Bank also eased with 10- and 50-basis \npoints cuts to 3.00 and 7.25 per cent, respectively, predicated on optimism over \nongoing trade negotiations and domestic growth priority. The Central Bank of the \nRepublic of Turkey and the Central Bank of Brazil, however, raised rates to 46.00 \nand 15.00 per cent, respectively, from 42.50 and 14.25 per cent, in the preceding \nquarter, reflecting efforts to effectively tame inflation in these jurisdictions. \n \n \n13 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \nTable 3: Central Bank Policy Rates (per cent) \nCountry \nQ22024 \nQ32024 \nQ42024 \nQ12025 \nQ22025 \nUS \n5.25-5.50 \n4.75-5.00 \n4.25-4.50 \n4.25-4.50 \n4.25-4.50 \nCanada \n5.00 \n4.25 \n3.25 \n2.75 \n2.75 \nEuro Area \n4.25 \n3.65 \n3.15 \n2.65 \n2.15 \nUK \n5.25 \n5.00 \n4.75 \n4.50 \n4.25 \nJapan \n0.10 \n0.25 \n0.25 \n0.50 \n0.50 \nBrazil \n10.50 \n10.75 \n12.25 \n14.25 \n15.00 \nRussia \n16.00 \n19.00 \n21.00 \n21.00 \n20.00 \nIndia \n6.50 \n6.50 \n6.50 \n6.25 \n5.50 \nChina \n3.45 \n3.35 \n3.10 \n3.10 \n3.00 \nSouth Africa \n8.25 \n8.00 \n7.75 \n7.75 \n7.25 \nMexico \n11.00 \n10.50 \n10.00 \n9.00 \n8.00 \nIndonesia \n6.25 \n6.00 \n5.75 \n5.75 \n5.50 \nTurkey \n50.00 \n50.00 \n45.00 \n42.50 \n46.00 \n Source: Various Central Banks’ websites, Trading Economics. \n \n \n \n14 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \n2.0 \nDOMESTIC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS \nOutput in the domestic economy grew by 4.23 per cent, in real terms, in the second \nquarter of 2025, compared with 3.13 per cent in the preceding quarter. The growth \nwas driven by higher outcomes in both oil and non-oil activities. The industrial \nsector was particularly active, reflecting increased activities in the manufacturing \nand mining subsectors. Inflation pressure continued to moderate in Q22025, \nreflecting the decline in the non-food component of the price basket. \n \n2.1 Real Sector Developments \nGrowth in the domestic economy quickened to 4.23 per cent in Q22025, from 3.13 \nper cent in Q12025, driven by both oil and non-oil economies. The growth was \nsupported by resilient consumer and infrastructural spending and crystallisation of \nreforms in the oil industry. The oil sector expanded by 20.46 per cent, compared \nwith 1.87 per cent in Q12025, and contributed 0.72 percentage point to overall \ngrowth. In the non-oil sector output grew by 3.64 per cent, compared with 3.19 \nper cent in the preceding quarter, contributing 3.51 percentage points to overall \ngrowth. The sector’s stronger performance was driven by activities in the \ninformation & communication and the crop production subsectors. \nFigure 10: Real GDP Growth Rate (Y-on-Y), Q22022-Q22025 \n Source: National Bureau of Statistic \n \n \n \n (10.00)\n -\n 10.00\n 20.00\n 30.00\n 40.00\n 50.00\n 60.00\n% of GDP\nOil GDP\nNon-oil GDP\nTotal GDP\n \n15 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \n2.1.1 Sectoral Performance \nGrowth in the review period was strong in all three economic sectors: services, \nindustry and agriculture. The services sector grew at a slower pace by 3.94 per cent \nin Q22025, compared with 4.33 per cent, though higher than the 3.83 per cent \nrecorded in Q22024. Despite the slowdown, services accounted for 56.53 per cent \nof aggregate GDP and remained the most dominant sector, as it contributed 2.23 \npercentage points to overall growth. Agriculture and industry accounted for 26.16 \nand 0.75 per cent and contributed 17.31 and 1.25 percentage points to growth. \n \nFigure 11: Sectoral Growth Rate of Real GDP, Q22022- Q22025 \n \n Source: National Bureau of Statistics \n \nWithin the services sector, the information and communications subsector (ICT) \nexpanded the most by 6.61 per cent (contributing 0.72 percentage point to output \ngrowth). The expansion was on account of higher investment in the subsector, \nparticularly, the recent investment of US$1 billion in telecom infrastructure by \ntelcos to boost telephony services. The real estate subsector recorded the second \nlargest contribution to the services sector. The subsector grew by 3.79 per cent \nand contributed 0.49 percentage point to overall growth. The performance was \nbuoyed by the adoption of smart home technologies, PropTech, diaspora \ninvestment, and public investment to provide affordable housing and \ninfrastructure development. \nSimilarly, the finance & insurance subsector expanded by 16.13 per cent, \ncompared with 15.03 per cent and 0.29 per cent in the preceding and \ncorresponding periods, respectively. The growth reflected growth, higher interest \nincome, accruals from increased use of digital services and gains from the banking \nsector recapitalisation policy. Uptick in general economic activities during the \nperiod supported the 1.29 per cent growth in the trade subsector growth, with a \ncontribution of 0.24 percentage point to the overall growth in Q22025. \n (10.00)\n (5.00)\n -\n 5.00\n 10.00\n 15.00\nAgriculture\nIndustry\nServices\nTotal GDP\n \n16 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \nThe expansion in the agriculture sector quickened by 2.82 per cent in the quarter \nunder review, compared with growth of 0.07 and 2.60 per cent in the preceding \nand corresponding quarters. Crop production dominated expansion in the sector, \ngrowing by 3.32 per cent, albeit slower than the 3.71 per cent growth recorded in \nQ12025. The moderation underscored weather patterns, disruptions in logistics \ncaused by disproportionate rainfalls, and shift in the planting-harvesting cycle. The \nforestry subsector expanded slower by 1.66 per cent, compared with 1.82 per cent \nin Q12025, while the livestock subsector recovered to a growth of 1.44 per cent, \nrelative to the contraction of 16.89 per cent in the preceding period. The fishing \nalso rebounded to a growth of 2.57 per cent after three consecutive quarters of \ncontraction. The impressive performance of the agriculture sector was attributed \nto increased timber production for construction purposes, festivity-driven demand \n(Easter and Sallah), and availability of feeds. \nWith a robust growth of 7.46 per cent in Q22025, the industry sector contributed \n1.25 percentage points to aggregate growth and exceeded the 3.42 per cent \nexpansion in the preceding quarter. This outcome was corroborated by the \nexpansion in estimated index of industrial production (IIP) which rose by 3.99 per \ncent on year-on-year (y-o-y) basis. \nTable 4: Index of Industrial Production \nPeriod \nIIP \nY-on-Y Change \nQ22024 \n95.71 \n4.15 \nQ32024 \n94.97 \n2.01 \nQ42024 \n93.33 \n1.76 \nQ12025 \n109.56 \n4.17 \nQ22025 \n99.53 \n3.99 \n Source: Central Bank of Nigeria \n Note: IIP refers to index of industrial production \n \nGrowth in the industry sector was attributed to increased public sector investment \nin construction, mining & quarrying and the manufacturing activities. The mining \n& quarrying subsector led growth in the industrial sector, expanding by 20.86 per \ncent, from 2.97 per cent in Q12025, and contributing 0.76 percentage point to total \ngrowth. The robust growth reflected increased crude oil production and the \nincreased private sector participation in the Nigerian oil industry, aided by the \nPetroleum Industry Act 2021. \n \n \n \n \n17 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \n Table 5: Index of Mining Production \nPeriod \nIMP \nY-on-Y Change \nQ22024 \n53.44 \n7.74 \nQ32024 \n53.78 \n3.22 \nQ42024 \n45.51 \n2.22 \nQ12025 \n65.52 \n8.23 \nQ22025 \n57.28 \n7.19 \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \nNote: IMP refers to the index of mining production \n \nThe observed improvement in mining activities was corroborated by the estimated \nindex of mining production (IMP), which increased by 7.19 per cent (y-o-y). \nThe manufacturing subsector continued to expand in the review period, rising by \n1.60 per cent, compared with 1.69 per cent in the preceding quarter. The \nperformance was spurred by the relative exchange rate stability, increasing \nelectricity supply, rising consumer demand, and positive business confidnece. In \ncongruence, the estimated index of manufacturing production rose by 1.77 per \ncent (y-o-y). \nTable 6: Index of Manufacturing Production \nPeriod \nIMANP \nY-on-Y Change \nQ22024 \n175.73 \n1.29 \nQ32024 \n185.16 \n0.90 \nQ42024 \n196.13 \n1.79 \nQ12025 \n211.38 \n1.44 \nQ22025 \n178.84 \n1.77 \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \nNote: IMANP refers to index of manufacturing production \n \nOther subsectors of the industrial sector also expanded, as the construction \nsubsector grew by 5.27 per cent, compared with 6.21 per cent in the preceding \nquarter. The electricity, gas, steam & air conditioner, and the water supply, \nsewage, & waste management subsectors expanded by 11.47 and 10.60 per cent, \nrespectively, compared with 18.65 and 9.43 per cent in Q12025. \nThe estimated average manufacturing capacity utilisation rose by 0.20 percentage \npoint to 62.60 per cent, from 62.40 per cent in the preceding quarter, indicating \nuptick in manufacturing activity. \n \n \nCapacity Utilisation \n \n18 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \n \nFigure 12: Selected Top Subsectors with contribution to GDP Growth and Growth \nRates (%) in Q22025 \nSource: National Bureau of Statistics \n \nFigure 13: Subsector with Negative Contribution to GDP Growth and Growth Rate (%) \nin Q22025 \nSource: National Bureau of Statistic \n \nNigeria’s crude oil production rose in Q22025, following the completion of \nmaintenance at the Trans-Niger Pipeline and enhanced security around oil \ninfrastructure. Nigeria's average crude oil production, excluding condensates, rose \nto 1.48 mbpd from 1.47 mbpd in the preceding quarter, but remained below the \ncountry’s OPEC quota of 1.50 mbpd. Total crude production, including blended \nand unblended condensates, increased by 0.60 per cent to 1.68 mbpd, from 1.67 \nmbpd. The growth was attributed to increased output from Bonny, Forcados, and \nQua Iboe crude streams/terminals that followed the effective maintenance and \nsecurity of major pipelines. \n \n \nCrude Oil Production and \nExport \n0.03\n0.04\n0.04\n0.05\n0.05\n0.05\n0.10\n0.12\n0.13\n0.13\n0.19\n0.24\n0.47\n0.49\n0.60\n0.72\n0.76\n(2.57%) Fishing\n(2.35%) Human Health & Social Services\n (10.60%) Water supply, sewage, waste Mang.\n(3.08%) Administrative and Support Services\n(1.79%) Public Administration\n(2.27%) Professional, Scientific &…\n(1.64%) Livestock\n(22.09%)Transportation and Storage\n(1.60%) Manufacturing\n (11.47%) Electricity,Gas,Steam & Air…\n(5.27%) Construction\n(1.29%) Trade\n(16.13%) Financial and Insurance\n(3.79%) Real Estate\n(3.32%) Crop Production\n(6.61%) Information and Communication\n(20.86%) Mining and Quarrying\n-0.04\nOther Services (-3.00%)\n \n19 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \n Figure 14: Nigeria’s Crude Oil Production and OPEC Quota \n \nSource: Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC)\n \nThe estimated index of electricity production increased by 3.53 per cent (y-o-y), \nto 430.05, compared with the level in the preceding quarter, due to continued \nefforts to improve electricity generation and transmission. The energy sector \ncontinued to benefit from sustained implementation of various power projects, \nincluding the Siemens project. \n \nTable 7: Index of Electricity Production \nPeriod \nIEP \nY-on-Y Change \nQ22024 \n415.40 \n6.79 \nQ32024 \n209.93 \n5.55 \nQ42024 \n257.17 \n-1.64 \nQ12025 \n145.24 \n2.96 \nQ22025 \n430.05 \n3.53 \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \nNote: IEP refers to index of electricity production \nEstimated electricity generation in Q22025 increased by 9.21 per cent to an \naverage of 4,916.33 MW/h from 4,501.68 MW/h. Also, estimated electricity \nconsumption at an average of 4,254.65 MW/h, represented an increased by 11.67 \nper cent, from 3,810.14 MW/h in the preceding period. \n \n \n0.0\n0.5\n1.0\n1.5\n2.0\n2.5\n3.0\n3.5\nQ1 2024\nQ22024\nQ32024\nQ42024\nQ12025\nQ22025\nmbpd\nCrude Oil Production\nOPEC Quota\nCrude Oil plus Condensate\nElectricity Generation/ \nConsumption \nIndex of Electricity \nproduction \n \n20 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nBox 1: Prices of Monitored Domestic Agricultural Commodities \nThe estimated prices of most of the monitored domestic agricultural commodities \ndecreased in Q22025, compared with Q12025 and Q22024. The price changes ranged \nfrom 0.80 per cent for rice (agric.) to 39.34 per cent for beans (white). The development \nwas driven, primarily, by improved supply of some of the staples, following the temporary \nsuspension of retaliatory global tariffs. However, on account of seasonality, 9 of the 20 \nmonitored commodities recorded price increases during the review, ranging from 3.62 \nper cent for agric. eggs to 23.95 per cent for onion bulb. \n \nPrices of Selected Domestic Agricultural Commodities in Second Quarter 2025 \n \nFood Items \n \n2024Q2/a \n2025Q1/b \n2025Q2/b \n% \nChange \n% \nChange \nUnit \n1 \n2 \n3 \n(1) & (3) \n(2) & (3) \nAgric. eggs medium size \n1kg \n1,800.95 \n2,932.80 \n3,038.88 \n68.74 \n3.62 \nBeans: brown, sold loose \n\" \n1,896.63 \n2,062.05 \n1,354.76 \n-28.57 \n-34.30 \nBeans: white-black eye, sold \nloose \n\" \n1,771.73 \n1,863.72 \n1,130.60 \n-36.19 \n-39.34 \nGari white, sold loose \n\" \n1,034.01 \n1,143.52 \n1,077.11 \n4.17 \n-5.81 \nGari yellow, sold loose \n\" \n1,102.70 \n1,268.72 \n1,223.31 \n10.94 \n-3.58 \nGroundnut oil: 1 bottle, specify \nbottle \n\" \n2,382.87 \n3,653.75 \n4,177.96 \n75.33 \n14.35 \nIrish potato \n\" \n1,810.63 \n1,896.94 \n2,023.58 \n11.76 \n6.68 \nMaize grain white, sold loose \n\" \n916.66 \n1,139.59 \n1,120.99 \n22.29 \n-1.63 \nMaize grain yellow, sold loose \n\" \n9,27.07 \n1,154.16 \n1,144.40 \n23.44 \n-0.85 \nOnion bulb \n\" \n1,245.17 \n2,417.43 \n2,996.46 \n140.65 \n23.95 \nPalm oil: 1 bottle, specify bottle \n\" \n1,719.78 \n2,813.47 \n3,185.60 \n85.23 \n13.23 \nRice agric, sold loose \n\" \n1,612.45 \n2,027.20 \n2,010.94 \n24.71 \n-0.80 \nRice local, sold loose \n\" \n1,570.33 \n1,913.25 \n1,863.08 \n18.64 \n-2.62 \nRice, medium grained \n\" \n1,690.05 \n2,068.30 \n2,029.52 \n20.09 \n-1.88 \nRice, imported high quality, \nsold loose \n\" \n1,953.53 \n2,584.03 \n2,685.88 \n37.49 \n3.94 \nSweet potato \n\" \n948.87 \n907.89 \n871.02 \n-8.20 \n-4.06 \nTomato \n\" \n1,635.12 \n1,416.13 \n1,355.98 \n-17.07 \n-4.25 \nVegetable oil: 1 bottle, specify \nbottle \n\" \n2,238.11 \n3,794.40 \n4,489.28 \n100.58 \n18.31 \nWheat flour: prepackaged \n(Golden Penny) \n2kg \n2,910.86 \n3,975.69 \n4,143.48 \n42.35 \n4.22 \nYam tuber \n1kg \n1,491.43 \n2,045.69 \n2,270.76 \n52.25 \n11.00 \nSources: (a) National Bureau of Statistics (b) Staff Estimates \n \n21 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \n \n2.1.2 Inflation \nInflation pressure continued to ease in Q22025, as the rise in non-food prices \nmoderated. Headline inflation (y-o-y) slowed to 22.22 per cent in June, from 24.23 \nper cent in the preceding quarter, due largely to the impact of tight monetary and \nsustained exchange rate stability. \n \nFigure 15: Headline, Food and Core Inflation (y-o-y) \n \nSource: National Bureau of Statistics \n \nThe momentum of inflation continued to increasingly decelerate. In June, inflation \nmomentum declined by 0.76 percentage point, reflecting the impact of sustained \nmonetary tightening, improved food supply conditions, and relative exchange rate \nstability. \n \nFigure 16: Inflation Momentum \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria and National Bureau of Statistics \n \n \n24.23 \n21.79 \n24.43\n22.22 \n21.97 \n22.76\n 20.00\n 21.00\n 22.00\n 23.00\n 24.00\n 25.00\nHeadline\nFood\nCore\nper cent\nQ12025\nQ22025\n-1.30\n1.05\n-0.52\n-0.74\n-0.76\nFEB -25\nM AR -25\nAPR -25\nM AY -25\nJUN-25\nHeadline \nInflation \nInflation \nMomentum \n \n22 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \n \nCore inflation eased to 22.76 per cent from 24.43 per cent, driven mainly by slower \nincreases in the prices of housing, utilities, transport, and household equipment. \nThe moderation reflected the impact of sustained monetary tightening, and \nrelative exchange rate stability. Food inflation, however, rose slightly to 21.97 per \ncent, from 21.79 per cent, due to lingering insecurity in key food-producing \nregions, and elevated input prices. \n \nUrban inflation dropped to 22.72 per cent, from 26.12 per cent in the preceding \nquarter, underlining declining demand pressures, lower logistics costs, and lower \nexchange rate pass-through effects. The moderation was supported by favourable \nbase effects and a gradual dissipation of initial policy shocks. Rural inflation also \ndeclined to 20.85 per cent from 20.89 per cent. The relatively slower pace of \ndecline in rural inflation mirrors the persistence of food-related cost pressures. \n \nInflation varied across states in the federation, with Borno state recording the \nhighest inflation among the states at 47.40 per cent, followed by Ebonyi and \nBayelsa states at 30.62 and 28.64 per cent, respectively. Insecurity and structural \nchallenges continued to drive inflation in these states. Conversely, Zamfara state \nhad the lowest inflation rate at 9.90 per cent, followed by Yobe and Sokoto states \n13.51 and 15.78 per cent, respectively, due primarily to weaker demand. \n \nFigure 17: Food and Headline Inflation across States in Q22025 \n \nSource: National Bureau of Statistics \n \n0.00\n5.00\n10.00\n15.00\n20.00\n25.00\n30.00\n35.00\n40.00\n45.00\n50.00\n Abia\n Abuja\n Adamawa\n Akwa Ibom\n Anambra\n Bauchi\n Bayelsa\n Benue\n Borno\n Cross River\n Delta\n Ebonyi\n Edo\n Ekiti\n Enugu\n Gombe\n Imo\n Jigawa\n Kaduna\n Kano\n Katsina\n Kebbi\n Kogi\n Kwara\n Lagos\n Nassarawa\n Niger\n Ogun\n Ondo\n Osun\n Oyo\n Plateau\n Rivers\n Sokoto\n Taraba\n Yobe\n Zamfara\nper cent\n Food Inflation\n Headline Inflation\nCore & Food \nInflation \nState Level \nInflation \nUrban/Rural \nInflation \n \n23 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \n2.1.3 Socio-Economic Developments \nThe Federal Executive Council (FEC) approved the revised National Urban \nDevelopment Policy (NUDP) to address Nigeria’s rapid urbanisation over the next \ndecade. As a proactive, inclusive, and climate-resilient framework, the policy was \ndesigned to strengthen urban governance, enhance infrastructural development \nand improve the quality of life. \n2.2 \nFiscal Sector Developments \nFederation revenue increased by 15.03 per cent in Q22025, signalling improvement \nin fiscal conditions. The increase was driven largely by higher non-oil receipts, \nwhich contributed 61.03 per cent to gross federation earnings in the review period. \nRevenue to the three tiers of government increased by 2.36 per cent, reflecting high \nstatutory deductions, while the public debt stock (33.10% of GDP) was below the \nnational debt ceiling of 40.00 and the IMF-prescribed threshold of 70.00 per cent \nfor Market-Access Countries. \n2.2.1 Federation Account Operations \nReceipts into the Federation Account increased in Q22025, owing to improved \nearnings from oil and non-oil sources. At ₦8.31 trillion, provisional gross \nFederation Account receipts was 15.02 per cent above earnings in Q12025, driven, \nmajorly, by increased collections from corporate tax and petroleum profit tax \n(PPT). Non-oil revenue remained dominant, accounting for 61.03 per cent of gross \nfederation revenue, while oil revenue constituted the balance. \nNon-oil revenue, at ₦5.07 trillion, rose by 7.50 per cent from the level in the \npreceding quarter. The increase was attributed to higher collections from \ncorporate tax and customs & excise duties, reflecting seasonality in the filing of tax \nreturns by companies1. Oil revenue rose by 29.17 per cent to ₦3.24 trillion, \nrelative to Q12025, as higher crude oil production boosted receipts from \npetroleum profit tax, royalties, and related revenue sources. \n \n \n \n \n1 Corporate tax is composed of company income tax, withholding tax and capital gain tax. \n \nSummary \nFederation Revenue \nHousing & \nInfrastructure \n \n24 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \nFigure 18: Federally Collected Revenue (₦ Billion) \n \n Source: Office of the Accountant General of the Federation and Federal Ministry of Finance \n \nFigure 19: Contribution to Federation Revenue \n \n Source: Staff Estimates Based on data from the OAGF and FMoF \n \nOil \n2,506.39\n3,237.39\nNon-Oil\n4,715.97\n5,069.65\nFederally \nCollected \nRevenue\n7,222.36\n8,307.04\n0.00\n1,000.00\n2,000.00\n3,000.00\n4,000.00\n5,000.00\n6,000.00\n7,000.00\n8,000.00\n9,000.00\nQ42023\nQ12024\nQ22024\nQ32024\nQ42024\nQ12025\nQ22025\n25.77\n30.78\n27.14\n17.88\n24.42\n34.70\n38.97\n74.23\n69.22\n72.86\n82.12\n75.58\n65.30\n61.03\n0%\n10%\n20%\n30%\n40%\n50%\n60%\n70%\n80%\n90%\n100%\nQ42023\nQ12024\nQ22024\nQ32024\nQ42024\nQ12025\nQ22025\nOil Revenue\nNon-Oil Revenue\n \n25 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \n Table 8: Federation Revenue and Distribution (₦ Billion) \n \nQ22024 \nQ12025 \nQ22025 \n*Budget \nFederally Collected Revenue \n6,387.82 \n7,222.36 \n8,307.04 \n19,519.29 \nOil \n1,733.50 \n2,506.39 \n3,237.39 \n11,505.11 \nCrude Oil & Gas Exports \n9.49 \n103.82 \n109.10 \n0.00 \nPPT \n445.34 \n353.95 \n797.52 \n6,101.41 \nRoyalties \n800.86 \n1,459.54 \n1,657.86 \n3,432.55 \nDomestic Crude Oil/Gas Sales \n0.00 \n0.00 \n0.00 \n490.19 \nOthers \n477.82 \n589.08 \n672.91 \n1,480.96 \nNon-oil \n4,654.32 \n4,715.97 \n5,069.65 \n8,014.18 \nCorporate Tax \n895.24 \n1,233.69 \n1,659.81 \n2,332.44 \nCustoms & Excise Duties \n845.87 \n959.56 \n1,000.93 \n1,549.34 \nValue-Added Tax (VAT) \n1,548.28 \n2,075.90 \n2,022.70 \n1,875.40 \nIndependent Revenue of Fed. Govt. \n1,306.21 \n319.25 \n282.10 \n1,315.42 \nOthers** \n58.72 \n127.57 \n104.11 \n941.58 \nTotal Deductions/Transfers \n4,192.91 \n3,325.79 \n3,665.40 \n2,717.94 \nFederally Collected Revenue Less \nDeductions & Transfers*** \n2,194.91 \n3,896.57 \n4,641.64 \n16,801.35 \nplus: \n \n \n \n \nAdditional Revenue \n1,279.78 \n909.86 \n278.23 \n57.21 \nExcess Crude Revenue \n0.00 \n0.00 \n0.00 \n0.00 \nNon-oil Excess Revenue/ EMTL \n47.92 \n478.93 \n91.50 \n57.21 \nExchange Gain \n1,231.86 \n430.93 \n186.73 \n0.00 \nTotal Distributed Balance \n3,474.69 \n4,806.43 \n4,919.87 \n16,858.56 \nFederal Government \n1,102.11 \n1,507.46 \n1,632.01 \n8,204.89 \nStatutory \n885.85 \n1,217.50 \n1,349.48 \n7,944.28 \nVAT \n216.26 \n289.96 \n282.53 \n260.61 \nState Government \n1,190.51 \n1,711.64 \n1,665.03 \n3,263.48 \nStatutory \n469.63 \n745.10 \n723.26 \n2,394.79 \nVAT \n720.88 \n966.54 \n941.77 \n868.69 \n13% Derivation \n317.08 \n346.98 \n409.23 \n1,658.91 \nLocal Government \n864.99 \n1,240.34 \n1,213.60 \n3,731.28 \nStatutory \n360.37 \n563.76 \n554.36 \n3,123.20 \nVAT \n504.62 \n676.58 \n659.24 \n608.08 \nSource: Office of the Accountant General of the Federation. \nNote* Includes Education Tax, Customs Special Levies (Federation Account), National Information Technology \nDevelopment Fund, Customs Special Levies, Solid Minerals & Other Mining revenue, and other non-regular \nearnings. **Deductions include cost of revenue collections and JVC cash calls, while transfers entail provisions for \nFGN Independent revenue and other non-federation revenue. /1 Provisional. \n \nFrom the gross receipts of ₦8,31 trillion, ₦3.67 trillion was deducted as statutory \ndeductions and transfers, while ₦278.23 billion was added from non-oil excess \nand exchange gain revenue accounts. This resulted in a net balance of ₦4.92 \ntrillion which was shared among the three tiers of government. The Federal, state, \nand local governments received ₦1.63 trillion, ₦1.67 trillion and ₦1.21 trillion, \nrespectively, while the balance of ₦409.23 billion was allocated to the 13% \n \n26 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \nderivation fund to oil-producing states. The distribution was 2.36 per cent above \nsharing in the preceding quarter. \n \nFigure 20: Top Five Recipients of Federation Allocation in Q22025 \n(₦ Billion) \n \nSource: Office of the Accountant General of the Federation and Federal Ministry of Finance \nFigure 21: Bottom-Five Recipients of Federation Allocation in Q22025 (₦Billion) \n \nSource: Office of the Accountant General of the Federation and Federal Ministry of Finance \nRevenue allocation to subnational governments revealed that Lagos topped the \nlist with ₦0.27 trillion, followed by Delta (₦0.21 trillion), Rivers (₦0.20 trillion), \nAkwa Ibom (₦0.17 trillion), and Kano (₦0.14 trillion). On the other hand, Ebonyi \n(₦0.05 trillion), Gombe (₦0.05 trillion), Nasarawa (₦0.05 trillion), Ekiti (₦0.06 \ntrillion), and Kwara (₦0,06 trillion) were the bottom recipients. \nAt end-March 2025, public debt stock was below the 70.00 per cent of GDP \nthreshold for Market-Access Countries. Total public debt outstanding stood at \n₦149,389.00 billion (33.10% of GDP), at end-March 2025, indicating 3.26 per cent \nincrease relative to the level at end-December 2024, due to new borrowings. A \nbreakdown of the consolidated public debt showed that domestic debt accounted \nfor 51.46 per cent, while external debt constituted 48.54 per cent. Of the \nconsolidated public debt stock, FGN owed ₦145.52 trillion (97.41%), while state \ngovernments owed the balance. \n270.00 \n205.19 \n202.83 \n166.14 \n138.21 \n Lagos\n Delta\n Rivers\n Akwa-Ibom\n Bayelsa\n53.70 \n53.79 \n53.83 \n56.30 \n59.34 \n Ebonyi\n Gombe\n Nassarawa\n Ekiti\n Kwara\nPublic Debt \n \n27 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \nA disaggregation of the FGN debt showed that domestic debt was N70.63 trillion, \nconstituting 48.54 per cent, while external debt constituted N74.89 trillion \n(51.46%). Further analysis of FGN domestic debt revealed that FGN Bonds \nmaintained dominance, with 79.85 per cent, followed by treasury bills (16.95%), \npromissory notes (1.74%), and FGN Sukuk (1.32%), while ‘others’ constituted the \nbalance2. Of the total external debt stock, multilateral debt accounted for 48.80 \nper cent, commercial (38.08%) and bilateral loans (13.13%). \nDebt service at end-March 2025 rose by 46.63 per cent to N4,.75 trillion, from \nN3.24 trillion at end-December 2024, owing to increased interest payments on \nboth domestic and external borrowings. A breakdown showed that domestic debt \nservice constituted 54.95 per cent, while external debt service accounted for \n45.05 per cent. \nFigure 22: FGN External and Domestic Debt Compositions (₦ Billion) \n \n Source: Debt Management Office \n \n \n \n \n2 Includes treasury bonds (0.00%), green bond (0.02%) and special FGN savings bond (0.07%). \n0\n50,000\n100,000\n150,000\n200,000\nQ42023\nQ12024\nQ22024\nQ32024\nQ42024\nQ12025\nFGN External Debt\nFGN Domestic Debt\n \n28 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \n \nFigure 23: Composition of Domestic Debt Stock by Instrument \n \n Source: Debt Management Office \n \nFigure 24: Composition of External Debt Stock \n Source: Debt Management Office \n \nFGN Bonds\n79.85%\nTreasury Bills\n16.96%\nFGN SUKUK\n1.33%\nPromisory Notes\n1.74%\nOthers\n0.13%\nMultilateral\n48.80%\nBilateral\n13%\nCommercial\n38%\n \n29 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \n2.3 \nMonetary and Financial Developments \nBroad money supply (M3) expanded moderately at end-June 2025, driven largely \nby higher net foreign assets (NFA). Credit to other sectors remained subdued, \nreflecting the impact of tight monetary conditions, as the Bank sustained efforts to \nrein in inflation. Activities increased in the fixed-income market, further tightening \nliquidity conditions in the banking system. Consequently, key money market rates \ntrended upward, but remained within the policy corridor. Overall, the financial \nsector remained stable and resilient, as reflected by key prudential indicators. The \nNigerian capital market continued its bullish run, driven by strong buy-side action, \nbuoyed by investor confidence and relatively stable macroeconomic environment. \n \n2.3.1 Monetary Developments \nReserve money expanded at end-June 2025, compared to its level at end-December \n2024, driven wholly by increased liabilities to ‘other depository corporations’ \n(ODCs). Reserve money grew by 6.08 per cent to ₦34.66 trillion from ₦32.67 \ntrillion at end-December 2024. The expansion was driven by 8.89 per cent growth \nin liabilities to ODCs, underpinned by notable growth in excess reserves (32.35%) \nand required reserves (8.23%). In contrast, currency-in-circulation (CIC) declined \nby 7.97 per cent, in congruence with the Bank’s monetary policy stance. \nFigure 25: Developments in Reserve Money and Money Multiplier \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \n \n \n3.10\n3.60\n4.10\n4.60\n0.00\n5.00\n10.00\n15.00\n20.00\n25.00\n30.00\n35.00\n40.00\nJun-24\nSep-24\nDec-24\nMar-25\nJun-25\n₦ Trillion\nCurrency in Circulation\nLiabilities to ODCs\nReserve Money\nM3 Multiplier (RHS)\nReserve Money \nSummary \n \n30 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \nFigure 26: Reserve Money Growth Over end-December \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \nRelative to the level at end-December 2024, broad money supply (M3) expanded \nby 3.44 per cent to ₦117.25 trillion at end-June 2025, from ₦115.82 trillion (2.17 \nper cent growth) in the preceding quarter. Similarly, M2 grew by 3.44 per cent to \n₦117.24 trillion, while narrow money (M1) increased by 2.71 per cent to ₦39.86 \ntrillion. \nOn the asset side, the modest expansion in M3 was largely attributed to higher net \nforeign assets (NFA), which contributed 8.39 percentage points to overall M3 \ngrowth, and offset the contraction in net domestic assets (NDA). Specifically, NFA \nrose by 29.74 per cent, followed the 7.89 per cent increase in claims on non-\nresidents. In contrast, NDA declined by 6.89 per cent, reflecting the 20.18 and 2.43 \nper cent reduction in net claims on central government and claims on other \nsectors, respectively. Claims on other sectors was weighed by the decline in claims \non the private sector (-2.51%), other financial corporations (-4.48%) and state and \nlocal government (-10.10%) amid tight monetary policy stance. \n \n \n \n \n1.16\n13.75\n32.09\n2.61\n6.08\n (20)\n (10)\n -\n 10\n 20\n 30\n 40\n 50\n 60\nJun-24\nSep-24\nDec-24\nMar-25\nJun-25\nPer cent (%)\nLiabilities to ODCs\nCurrency in Circulation\nReserve Money\n \n31 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \nTable 9: Money and Credit Growth over preceding December (%) \n \nJun-24 \nDec-24 \nMar-25 \nJun-25 \nAnnualised \nJun-25 \n2025 \nTarget \nContribution \nto M3 growth \n(Jun-25) \nNet Foreign Assets \n147.27 \n242.25 \n49.05 \n29.74 \n59.48 \n \n52.90 \n8.39 \nClaims on Non-residents \n41.34 \n78.95 \n4.95 \n7.89 \n15.77 \n- \n6.18 \nLiabilities to Non-residents \n16.81 \n41.14 \n-19.82 \n-4.39 \n-8.77 \n- \n-2.20 \nNet Domestic Assets \n12.10 \n16.42 \n-16.24 \n-6.89 \n-13.79 \n-9.47 \n-4.95 \nDomestic Claims \n1.08 \n9.45 \n-4.37 \n-7.01 \n-14.03 \n15.52 \n-6.51 \nNet Claims on Central \nGovernment \n-28.66 \n-19.10 \n-9.40 \n-20.18 \n-40.37 \n \n8.81 \n-4.83 \nClaims on Central Government \n-7.29 \n-5.90 \n-0.43 \n0.09 \n0.17 \n- \n0.04 \nLiabilities to Central Government \n24.63 \n13.83 \n9.09 \n21.61 \n43.21 \n \n4.87 \nClaims on Other Sectors \n17.03 \n24.76 \n-2.62 \n-2.43 \n-4.86 \n17.86 \n-1.67 \nClaims on Other Financial \nCorporations \n-9.05 \n15.10 \n-12.20 \n-4.48 \n-8.96 \n- \n-0.63 \nClaims on State and Local \nGovernment \n2.24 \n-2.67 \n4.00 \n-10.10 \n-20.20 \n- \n-0.36 \nClaims on Public Non-financial \nCorporations \n12.54 \n18.10 \n17.12 \n15.74 \n31.49 \n- \n0.52 \nClaims on Private Sector \n27.57 \n31.27 \n-1.68 \n-2.51 \n-5.02 \n- \n-1.20 \nTotal Monetary Assets (M3) \n28.02 \n43.03 \n2.17 \n3.44 \n6.87 \n8.12 \n3.44 \nCurrency Outside Depository \nCorporations \n10.39 \n49.25 \n-10.29 \n-12.32 \n-24.64 \n- \n-0.56 \nTransferable Deposits \n23.68 \n26.23 \n5.03 \n4.99 \n9.98 \n- \n1.48 \nNarrow Money (M1) \n22.16 \n28.86 \n3.00 \n2.71 \n5.41 \n8.12 \n0.93 \nOther Deposits \n32.73 \n53.00 \n1.73 \n3.83 \n7.66 \n- \n2.52 \nBroad Money (M2) \n28.02 \n43.77 \n2.17 \n3.44 \n6.89 \n8.12 \n3.44 \nSecurities Other than Shares \n-97.46 \n-95.87 \n19.67 \n-37.85 \n-37.71 \n- \n-0.01 \nTotal Monetary Liabilities \n(M3) \n28.02 \n43.03 \n2.17 \n3.44 \n6.87 \n8.12 \n3.44 \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria. \nNote: The numbers for June 2025 are provisional. \n \nOn the liabilities side, the growth in M3 was primarily driven by increases in other \ndeposits and transferable deposits. Other deposits grew by 3.83 per cent, \ncontributing 2.52 percentage points to M3 growth, while transferable deposits \nrose by 4.99 per cent, adding 1.48 percentage points. Currency outside depository \ncorporations (CODCs) and securities-other-than-shares, however, declined by \n12.32 and 37.85 per cent, respectively. These contractions moderated M3 growth \nby 0.57 percentage point (-0.56 percentage point from CODCs and -0.01 \npercentage point from securities other than shares). The sustained decline in \nCODCs reflected continued moderation in cash-based transactions, indicative of \nthe increasing adoption of electronic and digital payment channels. \nMoney Supply \n \n32 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \n \n2.3.2 Sectoral Utilisation of Credit \nTotal credit by ODCs to the economy declined by 1.62 per cent to ₦58.14 trillion, \nfrom ₦59.10 trillion at end-March 2025, as tight monetary conditions remained \nrestrictive. Despite overall decline in sectoral credit, credit to the services and \nagriculture sectors rose by 5.23 and 0.69 per cent to ₦32.41 trillion and ₦3.19 \ntrillion, respectively. \nFurther analysis indicated that the services sector accounted for the largest share \nof credit at 55.74 per cent, followed by industry (38.77%) and agriculture (5.49%). \nTable 10: Sectoral Credit Allocation \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nConsumer credit outstanding expanded by 6.48 per cent to ₦4.27 trillion in the \nreview period, relative to end-March 2025, due largely to increased loan demand \nduring the Salah festivities. A disaggregation of the consumer credit portfolio \nrevealed that personal loans accounted for 54.10 per cent, while retail loans made \nup the balance. Personal loan outstanding grew by 4.52 per cent to ₦2.31 trillion, \nwhile retail loans expanded by 8.89 per cent to ₦1.96 trillion, relative to levels at \nend-March 2025. \n \n \n \n \n \nSectors \nCredit Allocation (₦ Trillion) \nShare in Total (%) \nJun-24 \nMar-25 \nJun-25 \nJun-24 \nMar-25 Jun-25 \nAgriculture \n2.44 \n3.17 \n3.19 \n 4.38 \n 5.36 \n 5.49 \nIndustry \n24.57 \n25.13 \n22.54 \n 44.10 \n 42.52 \n 38.77 \nManufacturing \n9.26 \n7.72 \n7.09 \n 16.62 \n 13.06 \n 12.19 \nServices \n28.70 \n30.80 \n32.41 \n 51.52 \n 52.12 \n 55.74 \nFinance, Insurance \n& Capital Market \n6.16 \n8.40 \n9.47 \n 11.06 \n 14.21 \n 16.29 \nTrade/General \nCommerce \n3.57 \n3.68 \n3.86 \n 6.41 \n 6.23 \n 6.64 \nTOTAL \n55.71 \n59.10 \n58.14 \n100.0 \n100.0 \n100.0 \nConsumer \nCredit \nSectoral Credit \nUtilisation \n \n \n33 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \nFigure 27: Consumer Credit Outstanding \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \n2.3.3 Financial Developments \n2.3.3.1 Money Market Development \nLiquidity in the banking system reduced in Q22025, owing to robust auctions of \nOMO bills. Daily average liquidity in the banking system declined to ₦0.16 trillion \nfrom ₦0.25 trillion in Q12025. The reduction in system liquidity was driven \nprimarily by net withdrawal in system’s liquidity through Nigerian Treasury Bills \n(NTBs), Open Market Operations (OMO) bills, Federal Government of Nigeria \n(FGN) bonds, and Cash Reserve Requirement (CRR) debits by the Bank. \nFigure 28: Average Banking System Liquidity (₦ Trillion) \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nActivities at the standing lending facility (SLF) window reduced significantly, \ncompared with a reduction at the standing deposit facility (SDF) window. The value \nof transaction at the SLF window fell by 83.92 per cent to ₦7.97 trillion, while \ntransactions at the SDF window rose by 153.93 per cent to ₦48.40 trillion. \n4.73\n4.25\n4.72\n4.01\n4.27\n0.00\n1.00\n2.00\n3.00\n4.00\n5.00\nJun-24\nSep-24\nDec-24\nMar-25\nJun-25\n₦ Trillion\nPersonal Loan\nRetail Loan\nTotal\n0.27\n0.25\n0.16\nQ2 2024\nQ1 2025\nQ2 2025\nIndustry Liquidity \nCondition \n \n34 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \nApplicable rates at the window remained unchanged at 32.50 per cent for the SLF \n(MPR+5%) and 26.50 per cent for the SDF (MPR-1%). Additionally, the interest rate \non converted Intra-day Lending Facility (ILF) transactions to SLF was maintained at \n37.50 per cent (MPR+10%). \nFigure 29: Transactions at the Standing Facilities Window \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nIssuance of Open Market Operations (OMO) bills increased during the review \nperiod. The total amount of CBN bills offered, subscribed, and allotted was ₦5.15 \ntrillion, ₦9.23 trillion, and ₦8.16 trillion (tenors: 104 to 350 days), compared with \n₦2.30 trillion, ₦8.25 trillion, and ₦4.57 trillion, respectively (tenors: 347 to 364 \ndays) in Q12025. The bid rates averaged 23.32 (±2.93) per cent, while the stop \nrates averaged 23.68 (±1.31) per cent. A total of ₦4.26 trillion maturing CBN bills \nwere repaid, resulting in a net liquidity withdrawal of ₦3.90 trillion. \n \nFigure 30: Open Market Operations (₦ Trillion) \n \n Source: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \n26.44\n49.57\n7.97\n6.39\n19.06\n48.4\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\nQ22024\nQ12025\nQ22025\n₦ Trillion\nStanding Lending Facility\nStanding Deposit Facility\nOffer\nSubscription\nAllotment\nRepayment\nQ2 2024\n2.70\n4.94\n4.36\n0.20\nQ1 2025\n2.30\n8.25\n4.57\n1.54\nQ2 2025\n5.15\n9.23\n8.16\n4.26\n0.00\n1.00\n2.00\n3.00\n4.00\n5.00\n6.00\n7.00\n8.00\n9.00\n10.00\n₦ Trillion\nOMO Operations \n \n35 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \nSubscriptions for both NTBs and FGN bonds declined, suggesting moderating \nbanking system liquidity. Total NTBs (91-, 182- and 364-day tenors) offered, \nsubscribed, and allotted amounted to ₦2.86 trillion, ₦7.47 trillion, and ₦2.97 \ntrillion, respectively, compared with ₦5.12 trillion (offered), ₦15.20 trillion \n(subscribed), and ₦5.54 trillion (allotted) in the preceding quarter. The average \nstop rate decreased to 19.78 (±3.15) per cent from 21.81 (±4.81) per cent in \nQ12025. \n \nFigure 31: Primary Market NTBs (₦ Trillion) \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nFGN bonds of 5-, 7-, and 9-year tranches were offered for sale during the review \nperiod. The total amount offered, subscribed and allotted declined to ₦0.75 \ntrillion, ₦1.54 trillion, and ₦0.80 trillion, respectively, compared with ₦1.10 \ntrillion, ₦2.41 trillion, and ₦1.78 trillion recorded in the preceding quarter. The \naverage bid and marginal rates were 18.24 (± 3.24) and 18.87 (±1.72) per cent, \ncompared with 22.00(±7.00) and 20.80(±1.80) per cent, respectively, in the \npreceding quarter. \nFigure 32: Primary Market Auctions of FGN Bonds (₦ Trillion) \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \nQ2 2024\nQ1 2025\nQ2 2025\nOffer\n1.47\n5.12\n2.86\nSubscription\n6.98\n15.2\n7.47\nAllotment\n2.85\n5.54\n2.97\nRepayment\n2.85\n5.54\n2.96\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n16\nQ2 2024\nQ1 2025\nQ2 2025\nOffer\n1.35\n1.1\n0.75\nSubscription\n1.78\n2.41\n1.54\nAllotment\n1.3\n1.78\n0.8\n0\n0.5\n1\n1.5\n2\n2.5\n3\n \n36 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \n \nMoney market rates inched up but remained within the policy corridor. Driven by \nthe relative decrease in banking system liquidity, the average interbank call rate \n(27.55%) and open repo (OPR) rate (27.70%), rose slightly by 0.98 and 0.72 \npercentage point (pp), respectively, relative to the levels in the preceding quarter. \nSimilarly, the Nigeria Interbank Offered Rate (NIBOR) call and NIBOR 30-day rate \nincreased to 27.47 and 27.33 per cent, respectively, from 26.98 and 27.08 per cent \nin Q12025. With the monetary policy rate (MPR) at 27.50 per cent and an \nasymmetric corridor of +500/-100 basis points (bps), money market rates were \nwithin the policy corridor. \nFigure 33: Developments in Short-term Interest Rates \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \nNote: OPR = Open Repo rate which used to be Open Buy Back (OBB) rate \n \nThe average prime and maximum lending rates declined marginally by 0.09 and \n0.34 pp to 18.18 and 29.82 per cent, while the weighted average term deposit \n(WAVTD) rate rose by 0.30 pp to 9.93 per cent. Consequently, the average spread \nbetween the WAVTD rate and maximum lending rate narrowed to 19.89 pps, from \n19.93 pps. \n \n \n 20.00\n 22.00\n 24.00\n 26.00\n 28.00\n 30.00\n 32.00\n 34.00\nQ22024\nQ32024\nQ42024\nQ12025\nQ22025\nPer cent (%)\nInterbank Call\nOBB\nNIBOR Call\nNIBOR-30day\nUpper Corridor\nLower Corridor\nInterest Rate \nDevelopments \n \n37 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \nFigure 34: Average Term Deposit and Lending Rates \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria. \nNote: PLR= Prime lending rate; MXLR= Maximum lending rate; WATD= Weighted Average term \ndeposit rate. \n \n2.3.3.2 Capital Market Developments \nThe Nigerian capital market remained bullish, as relatively stable macroeconomic \nenvironment and a positive outlook for the second half of 2025 supported positive \ninvestor sentiment and persistent buy-side momentum. The Nigerian stock \nexchange sustained its gains in the second quarter of 2025, driven largely by strong \nperformances in the equities and bonds markets. The momentum was indicative \nof robust corporate earnings, sustained investor confidence and increased \nparticipation, underlain by continued exchange rate stability and disinflation. \nConsequently, aggregate market capitalisation rose by 9.99 per cent to N126.73 \ntrillion, from N115.22 trillion. \nActivities in the equities and debt segments increased by 14.61 and 3.72 per cent, \nwith closing values at N75.95 trillion and N50.75 trillion, respectively. Similarly, \nExchange Traded Funds (ETFs) rose by 3.87 per cent to N25.79 billion. Further \ndisaggregation showed that equities market accounted for 59.93 per cent of total \ncapitalisation, while debt and ETFs constituted 40.05 and 0.02 per cent, \nrespectively. \nThe All-Share Index (ASI) grew by 13.55 per cent to 119,978.57, from 105,660.64 \nin the preceding quarter. Broad-based sectoral demand, portfolio shifts from \nother asset classes, improved market liquidity and strategic bargain- and value-\nhunting activities in mid- to large-cap stocks propelled the ASI. The momentum \nwas supported by positive macroeconomic tailwinds and improved corporate \nearnings. \n \n \n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n35\nQ22024\nQ32024\nQ42024\nQ12025\nQ22025\nPercentage point\nPer cent (%)\nPLR\nMLR\nWATD\nSpread(RHS)\nMarket Capitalisation \nNGX All- Share \nIndex \n \n38 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \nFigure 35: Aggregate Market Capitalisation and All-Share Index \n \nSource: Nigerian Exchange (NGX) Limited \n \nSectoral indices in the Nigerian equities market were predominantly bullish in the \nquarter, reflecting widespread positive sentiment, as advancers outpaced \ndecliners. Consequently, the NGXCNSMRGDS led the rally, increasing by 45.16 per \ncent, followed by NGXGROWTH and NGXLOTUSISLM, which recorded gains of \n27.27 and 22.23 per cent, respectively. The NGXOILGAS, however, lost 0.86 per \ncent. \n \n \n0.00\n20.00\n40.00\n60.00\n80.00\n100.00\n120.00\n140.00\n0.00\n20,000.00\n40,000.00\n60,000.00\n80,000.00\n100,000.00\n120,000.00\n140,000.00\nQ12024\nQ22024\nQ32024\nQ42024\nQ12025\nQ22025\nN' Trillion\nIndex points\nAggregate Market Capitalisation (RHS)\nAll-Share Index (LHS)\n \n39 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \nFigure 36: Quarter-on-Quarter Changes in Sectoral Indices \n \nSource: Nigeria Exchange (NGX) Limited \n \nTable 11: Nigerian Exchange Limited Sectoral Indices \nSectoral Indices \nQ1 2025 \nQ2 2025 \nChange (%) \nNGXOILGAS \n2,458.69 \n2,437.47 \n-0.86 \nNGXASEM \n1,587.89 \n1,595.12 \n0.46 \nNGXSOVBND \n626.86 \n653.01 \n4.17 \nNGXINDUSTR \n3,489.87 \n3,638.15 \n4.25 \nNGXCOMMDTY \n1,003.58 \n1,047.21 \n4.35 \nNGXINS \n698.54 \n755.52 \n8.16 \nNGXMERIVAL \n10,274.99 \n11,150.56 \n8.52 \nNGXBNK \n1,159.99 \n1,280.41 \n10.38 \nNGXAFRBVI \n2,646.53 \n2,957.78 \n11.76 \nNGX30 \n3,921.32 \n4,423.04 \n12.79 \nNGXPREMIUM \n10,171.85 \n11,576.85 \n13.81 \nNGXCG \n3,009.51 \n3,436.94 \n14.20 \nNGXPENBRD \n1,890.00 \n2,179.87 \n15.34 \nNGXMAINBOARD \n5,068.04 \n5,888.97 \n16.20 \nNGXAFRHDYI \n16,758.62 \n19,489.91 \n16.30 \nNGXMERIGRW \n6,930.25 \n8,149.49 \n17.59 \nNGXPENSION \n4,785.90 \n5,798.71 \n21.16 \nNGXLOTUSISLM \n7,551.18 \n9,229.65 \n22.23 \nNGXGROWTH \n7,401.79 \n9,420.18 \n27.27 \nNGXCNSMRGDS \n1,815.85 \n2,635.86 \n45.16 \nSource: Nigerian Exchange (NGX) Limited \n \nTrading activities on the Exchange fell in the review quarter, as the value of traded \nsecurities declined by 15.32 per cent to N0.94 trillion from N1.11 trillion in \nQ12025. Similarly, the volume of traded securities decreased by 11.06 per cent to \n-0.86\n0.46\n4.17 4.25 4.35\n8.16 8.52 10.38 11.76 12.79 13.81 14.2 15.34 16.2 16.3 17.59\n21.16 22.23\n27.27\n45.16\n-10\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n \n40 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \n34.57 billion shares from 38.87 billion shares in the previous quarter. Conversely, \nthe total number of deals increased by 19.86 per cent to 982,055 from 819,343 in \nQ12025. \n \nFigure 37: Volume and Value of Traded Securities \n Source: Nigerian Exchange (NGX) Limited \n \nDuring the review quarter, a total of 20 securities were listed on the Exchange, \ncomprising 10 new listings and 10 supplementary offerings. In addition, there \nwere two suspensions, one reinstatement of a previously suspended issuer and \nthree delisting. Overall, the total number of listings was lower than the 21 \nrecorded in the preceding quarter. \n \n \n0.00\n10.00\n20.00\n30.00\n40.00\n50.00\n60.00\n70.00\n0.00\n0.20\n0.40\n0.60\n0.80\n1.00\n1.20\n1.40\nQ12024 Q22024 Q32024 Q42024 Q12025 Q22025\nShares (Billion)\nN' Trillion\nVolume of traded securities\nValue of traded securities\n \n41 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \nTable 12: Listings, De-listings, and Suspensions on the Nigerian Exchange Limited \nSource: Nigerian Exchange (NGX) Limited \nNotes: FGN = Federal Government of Nigeria; Plc = Public Limited Liability Company; N/A = Not \navailable. \n \n \n \n3 Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) Savings Bond \nCompany/Security \nShares Units/Price \nRemarks \n19.89% FGN MAY 2033 \n327,692,592 units \nNew listing \n19.30% FGN APR 2029 \n95,986,501 units \nNew listing \nLegend Internet Plc \n2,000,000,000 units of ordinary shares \nof 50 Kobo each at N5.64 per share \nNew listing \n16.635% FGS3 MAR 2027 \n969,038,000 units \nNew listing \n17.635% FGS MAR 2028 \n3,489,239,000 units \nNew listing \n16.046% FGS APR 2027 \n1,135,475 units \nNew listing \n17.046% FGS APR 2028 \n3,203,072 \n units \nNew listing \n16.173% FGS MAY 2027 \n840,434 units \nNew listing \n17.173% FGS MAY 2028 \n3,466,410 \n units \nNew listing \nTSL SPV Plc \n5,000,000 \n Units \nNew listing \nWema Bank Plc \n14,286,785,417 units of ordinary shares of \n50 Kobo each at N10.45 per share \nSupplementary \nlisting \nFirst HoldCo Plc \n5,982,548,799 units of ordinary shares of \n50 Kobo each at N25.00 per share \nSupplementary \nlisting \nMulti-Trex Integrated Foods \nPlc \n1,719,576,719 units of Ordinary Shares of \n50 Kobo each at ₦1.89 Per Share \nSupplementary \nlisting \n19.30% FGN APR 2029 \n71,127,200 units \nSupplementary \nlisting \n19.89% FGN MAY 2033 \n449,771,362 units \nSupplementary \nlisting \nChapel Hill Denham Nigeria \nInfrastructure Debt Fund \n(NIDF) \n229,316 units \nSupplementary \nlisting \nUnited Bank for Africa \n6,839,884,274 Ordinary Shares of 50 \nKobo each at ₦35.00 per share \nSupplementary \nlisting \nChams Holding Company Plc \n2,348,030,000 units of Ordinary Shares of \n50 Kobo \neach at ₦1.70 Per Share \nSupplementary \nlisting \nStanbic IBTC Holdings Plc \n2,944,772,083 Ordinary Shares of 50 \nKobo Each \nSupplementary \nlisting \nSterling Financial Holdings \nCompany Plc \n6,659,927,623 Ordinary Shares of 50 \nKobo Each \nSupplementary \nlisting \nThomas Wyatt Nigeria Plc \nAll units \nSuspension lifted \nGolden Guinea Breweries Plc \nAll units \nSuspended \nNotore Chemical Industries \nPlc \nAll units \nSuspended \nCapital Oil Plc; \nAll units \nDelisted \nGoldlink Insurance Plc; \nAll units \nDelisted \nMedview Airline Plc \nAll units \nDelisted \n \n42 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \n2.3.3.3 Financial Soundness Indicators \nThe Nigerian banking sector remained resilient and stable as illustrated by key \nfinancial soundness indicators. Liquidity ratio (LR) stood at 55.03 per cent, \nsignificantly above the 30.00 per cent regulatory minimum, reflecting the banking \nsector’s ability to meet maturing obligations and support credit intermediation. \nThe industry’s capital adequacy ratio (CAR) stood at 13.43 per cent and remained \nabove the minimum threshold of 10.00 per cent, underscoring the sector’s robust \nsolvency and capacity to absorb credit and market shocks. The non-performing \nloans (NPLs) ratio edged up by 0.09 percentage point to 5.63 per cent, above the \nprudential limit of 5.00 per cent. Notwithstanding, the overall asset quality was \nbroadly stable, reinforcing the resilience and robustness of the financial system. \nFigure 38: Key Financial Soundness Indicators \n Source: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \n \n15.65\n5.54\n51.18\n13.43\n5.63\n55.03\n10.00\n5.00\n30.00\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\nCAR\nNPL\nLR\nPer cent (%) \nBenchmark\nQ22025\nQ12025\n \n43 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \n \n2.4 \nExternal Sector Developments \nThe performance of the external sector in Q22025 was influenced by the US tariffs \npolicy which heightened global uncertainty and fuelled volatility in commodity \nprices. Despite these headwinds, deficit in the overall balance of payments reduced \nsignificantly, relative to the level in the preceding quarter. In the current account, \nthe surplus balance increased, buoyed by higher trade surplus and remittances \ninflow. The financial account was, however, in a net borrowing position, against a \nnet lending position in the preceding period. At US$37.81 billion, the external \nreserves could cover 8.07 months of imports for goods and services or 12.25 \nmonths for goods only. At the Nigerian Foreign Exchange Market (NFEM), the \naverage exchange rate showed relative stability at ₦1,581.06/US$, compared with \n₦1,521.56/US$ in Q12025. \n \n2.4.1 \nCurrent and Capital Account \nThe current and capital account recorded a higher surplus, as trade surplus and \nremittances inflow improved further. The surplus in the current and capital \naccount rose to US$5.28 billion (8.69% of GDP), compared with US$2.85 billion \n(4.51% of GDP) in the preceding quarter. The development reflected the higher \nearnings from merchandise exports and increased inflow of diaspora remittances. \nFigure 39: Current Account Balance (US$ Billion) \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nEarnings from merchandise exports rose in Q22025, due to higher proceeds from \ngas and refined petroleum products exports. Aggregate export earnings rose by \n7.04 per cent to US$14.90 billion, from US$13.92 billion in Q12025. A breakdown \nshowed that earnings from the export of crude oil, gas and refined petroleum \nproducts rose to US$12.55 billion, from US$11.52 billion, following improved \nexport of gas and refined petroleum products. Non-oil exports, however, declined \nto US$2.34 billion from US$2.40 billion in Q12025, due largely to decline in \nagricultural exports, as global uncertainties weighed on commodity prices. \n3.38\n3.94\n5.78\n3.80\n2.85\n5.28\n0.00\n1.00\n2.00\n3.00\n4.00\n5.00\n6.00\n7.00\nQ12024\nQ22024\nQ32024\nQ42024\nQ12025\nQ22025\nExport \nPerformance \n \n44 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \nCrude oil, gas and refined petroleum products exports continued to dominate \ntotal merchandise export, accounting for 84.23 per cent of total earnings, with \nnon-oil exports making up the balance. \nMerchandise import bills moderated in the review period, due to reduction in oil \nand non-oil imports. Merchandise import bills fell to US$9.26 billion, from \nUS$10.34 billion in Q12025. A disaggregation indicated that import of petroleum \nproducts decreased to US$2.58 billion from US$3.57 billion, as improvement in \ndomestic refining capacity lowered reliance on oil import. Similarly, importation of \nnon-oil products fell to US$6.68 billion from US$6.77 billion, owing largely to lower \nmachinery and raw material imports. By share, non-oil imports constituted 72.14 \nper cent of total import, while oil constituted the balance. \nIn terms of foreign exchange utilisation, industrial sector, mainly raw materials and \nmachinery, accounted for the largest share of merchandise imports, with 43.95 \nper cent. This was followed by the oil sector (27.87%) manufactured products \n(11.11%), food products (10.66%), transport (4.67%), minerals (1.15%), and \nagricultural products (0.59%). \n \nFigure 40: Classification of Imports \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nIn the services account, the deficit balance worsened, following increased out-\npayments for travels. The deficit expanded slightly to US$3.71 billion, from \nUS$3.70 billion in the preceding quarter. Total payments for services increased by \n3.01 per cent to US$4.79 billion, driven by rise in travel demand from US$1.27 \nbillion to US$1.69 billion. Payments for financial services also increased to US$0.12 \nbillion from US$0.08 billion. A similar trend was observed for insurance & pension \nservices and government goods & services where payments rose to US$0.24 \nbillion (5.01%), and US$0.17 billion (3.54%), respectively. \nIndustrial\n43.95%\nFood products\n10.66%\nManufactured \nProducts\n11.11%\nTransport\n4.67%\nAgricultural Sector\n0.59%\nMinerals\n1.15%\nOil Sector\n27.87%\nMerchandise \nImport \nServices \n \n45 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \nPayments for transport services, however, declined by 6.67 per cent to US$1.54 \nbillion, while those for other business and telecommunication services fell by \n18.52 and 43.75 per cent to US$0.88 billion and US$0.09 billion, respectively. \nIn terms of composition, travels had the largest share of 35.28 per cent of services \nout-payments. This was followed by transport (32.15), other business (18.37%), \nand insurance & pension services (5.01). Telecommunications services \ncontributed 1.88 per cent, while financial and government services accounted for \n3.54 and 2.51 per cent, respectively. The other categories of services accounted \nfor the balance. \nFigure 41: Share of Service Out-Payments \n Source: Central Bank of Nigeria. \n \nReceipts from the export of services increased by 13.68 per cent to US$1.08 \nbillion, reflecting increased receipts from financial and transport services. Receipts \nfrom financial services rose to US$0.12 billion from US$0.10 billion, while \ntransport services increased by 5.45 per cent to US$0.58 billion. Earnings from \ntravels and other business services rose by 28.57 and 50 per cent, respectively to \nUS$0.09 billion and US$0.03 billion. However, lower receipts were recorded for \ntelecommunication services and government goods & services, both of which \ndecreased by 50.00 and 7.69 per cent to US$0.02 billion and US$0.12 billion, \nrespectively. \nA disaggregation of services receipt indicated that transport accounted for the \nlargest share, at 53.70 per cent, followed by financial services and government \ngoods & services (11.11% apiece), travels (8.33%), and insurance and pension \nservices (3.70%). Other categories of services accounted for the balance. \n \nTransportation\n32.15%\nTravels\n35.28%\nOther business \nservices\n18.37%\nInsurance and \npension\n5.01%\nFinancial services\n3.54%\nTelecommunication\n1.88%\nGovernment goods \nand services\n2.51%\nOthers\n1.26%\n \n46 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \nFigure 42: Share of Services Receipts \n Source: Central Bank of Nigeria. \n \nThe primary income balance improved in Q22025, on account of lower interest \npayments on portfolio investments liabilities. The deficit in the primary income \naccount narrowed to US$2.16 billion, from US$2.31 billion. Further analysis \nindicated that the deficit in the investment income sub-account narrowed to \nUS$2.24 billion from US$2.37 billion in Q12025, owing to lower interest payments \non portfolio investment liabilities. Surplus in the compensation of employees sub-\naccount inched to US$0.08 billion from US$0.06 billion in the preceding quarter. \nFigure 43: Primary Income Balance \n \n Source: Central Bank of Nigeria. \nA higher surplus was recorded in the secondary income account, driven by \nincreased inflow of diaspora remittances. The surplus in the secondary income \naccount rose by 4.31 per cent to US$5.51 billion, compared with US$5.29 billion \nin the preceding quarter. The development was driven by higher inflow of private \nsector transfers, particularly workers' remittances, which increased by 7.50 per \ncent to US$5.30 billion. The higher inflow of remittances reflected the positive \neffect of the Bank’s reforms aimed at bolstering non-resident transfers. \n \n (3.50)\n (3.00)\n (2.50)\n (2.00)\n (1.50)\n (1.00)\n (0.50)\n -\nQ22024\nQ32024\nQ42024\nQ12025\nQ22025\n(3.11)\n(1.06)\n(1.78)\n(2.31)\n(2.15)\nUS$ Billion\nPrimary Income \nSecondary Income \nTransportation\n53.70%\nTravels\n8.33%\nFinancial services\n11.11%\nTelecommunication\n1.85%\nGovernment goods \nand services\n11.11%\nInsurance and \npension\n3.70%\nOthers\n10.20%\n \n47 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \nFigure 44: Secondary Income Balance (US$ Billion) \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria. \n \n2.4.2 \nFinancial Account \nThe financial account recorded a net borrowing position, on account of higher \ninflow of short-term debt securities. A net incurrence of financial liabilities of \nUS$3.21 billion was recorded, against to a net acquisition of financial assets of \nUS$8.68 billion in Q12025. \nThe economy recorded a net incurrence of financial liabilities of US$5.44 billion, \nin contrast to a net reduction in liabilities of US$9.26 billion in the preceding \nquarter. The development was driven primarily by inflow of portfolio debt \nsecurities. A disaggregation showed that portfolio investment liabilities posted a \nnet inflow of US$5.28 billion, against a net outflow of US$5.03 billion in the \npreceding quarter. Similarly, other investment’ liabilities recorded a net inflow of \nUS$0.07 billion, in contrast to a net outflow of US$4.53 billion, due, largely, to \nplacement of currency and deposit against a withdrawal in the preceding quarter. \nForeign direct investment liabilities, however, fell to US$0.09 billion, from US$0.25 \nbillion, attributed to higher inflow of equity and investment fund shares. \nThe economy recorded a net acquisition of financial assets worth US$2.23 billion, \ncompared to a disposal of US$0.58 billion in the preceding quarter. The \ndevelopment was due to acquisition of foreign direct investment assets in the \nreview period, against a disposal in Q12025. Direct investment assets increased to \nUS$0.99 billion, from a disposal of US$0.55 billion in the preceding quarter. ‘Other \ninvestment’ assets recorded a lower acquisition of US$2.16 billion, compared with \nUS$2.20 billion in the preceding quarter, reflecting the decline in the acquisition \nof loan liabilities. Portfolio investment assets, however, resulted in a disposal \n5.53\n6.01\n6.44\n5.28\n5.51\n4.89 \n5.40 \n5.08 \n4.93 \n5.30 \n0.78 \n0.69 \n1.44 \n0.47 \n0.46 \n0.00\n2.00\n4.00\n6.00\n8.00\n10.00\n12.00\n14.00\nQ22024\nQ32024\nQ42024\nQ12025\nQ22025\nGovernment transfers\nRemittances\nSecondary income balance\nNet Acquisition of \nAssets \nNet Incurrence of \nLiability \nFinancial Account \nDevelopments \n \n48 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \nworth US$0.65 billion, in contrast to an acquisition of US$0.48 billion in Q12025, \nfollowing the disposal of listed equity securities by resident investors. \n2.4.3 \nExternal Debt \nNigeria’s external debt stock at end-June 2025 stood at US$46.98 billion, \nrepresenting 19.32 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) relative to 21.52 per \ncent of GDP in the preceding quarter. Analysis of the composition of the external \ndebt showed that multilateral loans - comprising obligations to institutions such \nas the World Bank Group, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the African \nDevelopment Bank (AfDB) Group - amounted to US$23.19 billion, constituting \n49.36 per cent of the total external debt. Commercial borrowings, (Eurobonds), \naccounted for US$17.32 billion or 36.86 per cent, while bilateral loans from \nsovereign sources amounted to US$6.20 billion, representing 13.21 per cent of the \ntotal. \nTotal external debt service obligations, as at end-March 2025 stood at US$1.39 \nbillion. A breakdown showed that principal repayments was US$0.76 billion or \n54.67 per cent of total debt service obligations, interest payments constituted \n45.32 per cent (US$0.63 billion), while other associated charges accounted for the \nbalance. A further disaggregation of interest payments indicated that commercial \ndebt instruments were the major source of debt service payments, with interest \npayments on Eurobonds amounting to US$0.43 billion (68.25%), followed by \nmultilateral creditor, which stood at US$0.14 billion (22.22%). Interest payments \non bilateral debt obligations accounted for the balance. \n \n2.4.4 \nInternational Investment Position (IIP) \nThe international investment position, at US$61.43 billion, was a higher net \nfinancial liability. The stock of financial assets rose to US$119.00 billion, from \nUS$117.52 billion in the preceding quarter, driven primarily by an increase in other \ninvestment assets. ‘Other investment’ assets increased to US$58.51 billion from \nUS$56.37 billion in the preceding quarter. The stock of direct and portfolio \ninvestment assets decreased by 0.11 and 13.43 per cent to US$18.30 billion and \nUS$4.19 billion, respectively, relative to the levels in the preceding quarter. \nSimilarly, reserve assets fell to US$37.81 billion from US$37.82 billion in Q12025. \nThe stock of financial liabilities increased to US$180.43 billion, from US$176.34 \nbillion due, mainly to a 15.79 per cent increase in portfolio investment liabilities to \nUS$40.62 billion. Other investment liabilities increased to US$70.02 billion from \nUS$68.94 billion in the preceding quarter. Direct investment liabilities, however, \ndecreased to US$69.64 billion from US$72.18 billion in Q12025. \n \n \nExternal Debt \nInternational \nInvestment Position \n \n49 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \n2.4.5 External Reserves \nThe external reserves remained robust, steadily above the 3-month benchmark of \nimport cover. The external reserves stood at US$37.81 billion at end-June 2025, \ncompared with US$37.82 billion at end-March 2025. The reserves could cover 8.07 \nmonths of imports for goods and services or 12.25 months for goods only. \nFigure 45: External Reserves and Months of Import Cover \n Source: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nA breakdown of the external reserves by ownership showed that the shares of the \nCBN and the FGN stood at US$32.95 billion and US$4.86 billion, respectively, while \nthe federation accounted for the balance. In terms of currency composition, the \nUS dollar continued to dominate reserves (US$28.93 billion or 76.51%), followed \nby Special Drawing Rights (US$4.33 billion or 11.46%), Chinese yuan (US$3.38 \nbillion or 8.94%), the euro (US$0.83 billion or 2.20%), and the British pound \n(US$0.33 billion or 0.88%). Other currencies accounted for the balance. \n2.4.6 \nForeign Exchange Flows through the Economy \nThe economy recorded a decrease in net foreign exchange inflow, driven by a fall \nin inflow through autonomous sources. The economy recorded a lower net foreign \nexchange inflow of US$14.57 billion, compared with US$15.20 billion in the \npreceding quarter. Aggregate foreign exchange inflow decreased by 5.40 per cent \nto US$27.41 billion, from US$28.97 billion in Q12025. Foreign exchange outflow, \nat US$12.83 billion, decreased by 6.81 per cent, relative to US$13.77 billion in the \npreceding quarter. \nForeign exchange inflow through the Bank increased by 20.38 per cent to \nUS$10.02 billion, from US$8.32 billion, while autonomous inflow fell by 15.79 per \ncent to US$17.39 billion, from US$20.65 billion in the preceding quarter. \nInternational Reserves \nReserves Structure & \nComposition \n-5\n0\n5\n10\n15\n25\n30\n35\n40\n45\n50\nQ4 2023\nQ1 2024\nQ2 2024\nQ3 2024\nQ4 2024\nQ1 2025\nQ2 2025\nUS$ Billion\nExternal Reserves - LHS\nMonths of Import (Goods) - RHS\nMonths of Import (Goods and Services)- RHS\n \n50 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \nOutflow through the Bank and autonomous sources decreased by 6.99 and 6.93 \nper cent to US$9.82 billion and US$3.01 billion, respectively, from US$10.54 billion \nand US$3.23 billion in the preceding quarter. \nConsequently, the autonomous sources recorded a net inflow of US$14.38 billion, \nfrom US$17.41 billion in the preceding quarter. A net inflow of US$195.65 million \nwas recorded through the Bank, compared with a net outflow of US$2.21 billion \nin Q12025. \nFigure 46: Foreign Exchange Transactions through the Economy \n(US$ Billion) \n \nSource: Central Bank of Nigeria \n \nThe average turnover at the Nigerian Foreign Exchange Market (NFEM) increased \nby 8.75 per cent to US$459.04 million, compared with US$422.09 million in \nQ12025, reflecting increased trading activities in the market, as the foreign \nexchange market reforms continued to boost confidence in the market. \nFigure 47: Turnover in the NFEM \n Source: Central Bank of Nigeria. \n \n \n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n35\nQ12024\nQ22024\nQ32024\nQ42024\nQ12025\nQ22025\nAverage Turnover \n0.78\n-17.01\n75.17\n42.38\n8.75\n-40\n-20\n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\n300\n350\n400\n450\n500\nQ2 2024\nQ3 2024\nQ4 2024\nQ1 2025\nQ2 2025\nPer cent\nUS$ Million\nAverage Turnover (LHS)\nRate of Turnover (RHS)\n \n51 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \n \n2.4.7 \nExchange Rate Movement \nThe average exchange rate of the naira per US dollar at the NFEM was \n₦1,581.06/US$, compared with ₦1,521.56/US$ in Q12025. This represented a \n3.76 per cent depreciation in the value of the naira during the review period. \n \nIn Q22025, the Russian ruble and South African rand appreciated by 16.13 and \n1.10 per cent, respectively. The Chinese renminbi also strengthened by 0.49 per \ncent, relative to the preceding quarter. Appreciation in the ruble was due, mainly, \nto tight capital controls and attractive yields. Improved trade surplus supported \nthe rand's appreciation, while the renminbi benefited from increased exports. \nFigure 48: Selected EMEs Currency Values to the US dollar \n \nSources: Central Bank of Nigeria & Reuters \n \nTable 13: Selected EMEs Currency Rates to the US dollar \nSources: Central Bank of Nigeria & Reuters \n \n \n-15\n-10\n-5\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\nQ22024\nQ32024\nQ42024\nQ12025\nQ22025\nDepreciation/Appreciation\nChinese RMB\nNigerian naira\nSouth African rand\nRussian ruble\nPeriod \nChinese \nRMB/US$ \nNigerian \nnaira/US$ \nSouth \nAfrican \nrand/US$ \nRussian \nruble/US$ \nQ22024 \n7.21 \n1,384.12 \n18.57 \n90.78 \nQ12025 \n7.27 \n 1,521.56 \n18.50 \n94.03 \nQ22025 \n7.23 \n 1,581.06 \n18.29 \n80.97 \nAverage Exchange \nRate \nEmerging Market \nCurrencies \n \n52 | P a g e \nCBN ECONOMIC REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2025 \n \n \n3.0 \nECONOMIC OUTLOOK \n3.1 \nGlobal Outlook \nThe global economy is expected to slow in 2025 due to trade-related distortions. \nGrowth is projected at 3.00 per cent in 2025, compared with 3.30 per cent in 2024, \nreflecting the front-loading of tariffs and weaker US dollar. In AEs growth could \nslow to 1.50 per cent from 1.80 per cent, predicated on tariff-related uncertainties \nand cooling domestic demand in the US, as well as currency appreciation, \noffsetting gains from easing financial conditions in other AEs. Similarly, growth in \nEMDEs is expected to slow to 4.10 per cent in 2025 from 4.30 per cent in 2024, \ndriven by trade-related distortions in China, India, Russia, Brazil and Mexico. \nGlobal price pressures are anticipated to ease further, as demand cools, energy \nprices ease, and supply chains continue to normalise. Thus, inflation is projected \nto fall to 4.20 per cent in 2025, from 5.80 per cent in 2024. \n3.2 \nDomestic Outlook \nThe domestic economy is expected to remain robust and resilient in the medium \nterm. The outlook is predicated on the continued implementation of fiscal and \nstructural reforms in the oil sector and foreign exchange market. The reforms are \nexpected to bolster macroeconomic stability, improve investor confidence, and \nsupport domestic production. Improved security in oil-producing regions is \nexpected to sustain higher crude oil output, while foreign exchange reforms are \nprojected to continue to attract capital, further strengthening Nigeria’s external \nposition. Nevertheless, downside risks to the outlook include heightened security \nconcerns, increased demand pressures in the foreign exchange market, and rising \nproduction costs, which could weigh on overall growth. \nNigeria's inflation is expected to moderate further in Q32025. The decline is \npredicated on the lagged effect of the Bank’s contractionary policy stance, \nsustained FX market stability, base effects, and enhanced security in key \nagricultural regions. However, several factors such as expansionary money supply, \nhigher PMS and electricity prices, import tariffs, and worsening insecurity in food-\nproducing areas could pose risks to the outlook.", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/Quarterly_Economic_Reports/Second Quarter 2025 Economic Report.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "7db0839d62a4d26307e9dbef9a70fe8e", "text": "1 \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA COMMUNIQUÉ NO. 133 OF THE \nMONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE MEETING HELD ON MONDAY 23rd \nAND TUESDAY 24th NOVEMBER 2020 \nThe Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) met on the 23rd and 24th of \nNovember, 2020 amidst the announcement of the discovery of \nseveral high efficacy COVID-19 vaccines, resulting in stronger \noptimism for improvement in global output. However, persisting \nweakness in crude oil prices, soaring global debt and high \nunemployment persist. In the domestic environment, the Nigerian \neconomy slid into recession in the third quarter of 2020, following a \nsecond consecutive quarter of contraction in output. The third \nquarter contraction was, however, milder than the previous \nquarter. The Committee appraised the developments in both the \nglobal and domestic economies, as well as the outlook for the rest \nof the year and the first quarter of 2021. \nTen (10) members of the Committee were in attendance at the \nmeeting. \nGlobal Economic Developments \nAlthough the global economy witnessed a better-than-expected \nrecovery in the second quarter of 2020, it, however, continued to \nbe weighed down by the headwinds largely associated with the \n \n2 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nCOVID-19 pandemic and weak crude oil prices. In the advanced \neconomies, the persistence of weak aggregate demand, slow \nrecovery in supply chain networks and the rebound in COVID-19 \ninfection rates, have cast a new wave of uncertainty over their \nrecovery in the short to medium term. In the Emerging Market and \nDeveloping Economies (EMDEs), China continues to lead the \nrecovery, recording a stronger-than-expected growth in the \nsecond quarter of 2020. In India, on the other hand, growth \ncontinued to be muted as a result of increasing rates of COVID-19 \ninfections and fatality. In general, this group of economies is set to \ncontract less, compared with the advanced economies, led by the \nexpected strong recovery in China. Consequently, the International \nMonetary Fund (IMF) reviewed the forecast for global growth in \n2020 to reflect a slower pace of contraction from -4.9 per cent to -\n4.4 per cent. \nInflation in most Advanced Economies is expected to remain \nsubdued in the medium to long term as aggregate demand \nremains weak across several economies, reflecting the impact of \nthe Pandemic on income. The US economy has, however, \nmaintained a steady pace of job creation, even though infection \nrates and total fatality continue to rise in that country. The threat of \na rebound of the Pandemic in several countries has resulted in \nsecond and third waves of lockdowns in these countries. This is \nexpected to further dampen aggregate demand and slow the \npace of price development. In several Emerging Market and \nDeveloping Economies (EMDES), inflation remained relatively high \n \n3 \n \nClassified as Confidential \ncompared with the Advanced Economies owing to the persistence \nof exchange rate pressures, dwindling capital flows and weak \naccretion to reserves as well as other structural issues. \nIn the financial markets, conditions remain relatively stable, buoyed \nby continued monetary and fiscal stimulus. The huge level of \nmonetary and fiscal injections has, however, increased the \nlikelihood of a global financial crisis post-pandemic, especially \nwhen central banks commence normalization of monetary policy. \nDomestic Economic Developments \nData from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) showed that real \nGross Domestic Product (GDP) contracted by -3.62 per cent in Q3 \n2020, compared with -6.10 and 2.28 per cent in the previous quarter \nand corresponding period of 2019, respectively, thereby pushing \nthe economy into recession. The oil sector contracted further by -\n13.89 per cent in Q3 2020 from -6.63 per cent in the previous quarter, \nwhile the non-oil sector contracted by -2.51 per cent in Q3 2020, \ncompared with -6.05 per cent in the preceding quarter. The \npersisting weak performance was mainly attributed to the lull in \neconomic activities associated with the low price in the oil market \nas well as the lingering effects of the Coronavirus Pandemic. \nThe MPC observed the gradual improvement in the Manufacturing \nand Non-Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Indices (PMIs) \nwhich rose to 50.2 and 47.6 index points, respectively, in November \n2020, compared with 49.4 and 46.8 index points in October 2020. \nThis development signposts an increase in economic activities, \n \n4 \n \nClassified as Confidential \ndriven by growth in new orders, improved supply delivery time, rising \nproduction levels and new export orders. The employment level \nindex component of the manufacturing and non-manufacturing \nPMIs also improved in November 2020 to 47.3 index points and 46.7 \nindex points, respectively, compared with 46.0 index points and \n44.2 index points in October 2020. The Committee, however, noted \nthe likely downside risk to growth of the recent unrest in the country, \nwarning that this may adversely impact economic recovery in the \nnear term. \nThe Committee noted with concern that inflation has been on the \nrise for the fourteenth consecutive month, as headline inflation \n(year-on-year) moved up to 14.23 per cent in October 2020 from \n13.71 per cent in September 2020. This was attributed to the \nincrease in both food and core inflation, which rose to 17.38 and \n11.14 per cent in October 2020 from 16.66 and 10.58 per cent in \nSeptember 2020, respectively. The continued increase in food and \ncore inflation was attributed to the persistence of insecurity across \nthe country as well as lingering structural deficiencies impacting the \nlogistics of moving food items to urban areas such as poor road \nnetworks, unstable power supply and a host of other infrastructural \ndeficiencies. Other factors include the persisting impact of \ncoronavirus-induced supply disruptions, recent hikes in the price of \nenergy products (PMS and electricity) and weak crude oil prices. \nThe Committee, however, noted that the rise in inflation will likely \nabate in the medium term, as domestic production is expected to \nrecover, following the resumption of economic activities post-\n \n5 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nCOVID-19 lockdown. In addition to this, food inflation is expected \nto moderate as harvest season sets in. Monetary and fiscal policies \nare also expected to continue their broad-based stimulus support \ntowards full recovery. This will involve fiscal measures to reduce \nunemployment, provide an enabling environment for private \nsector investment and necessary support to the health sector to \ncushion the impact of the coronavirus pandemic. In addition, the \nCBN is expected to sustain its various intervention measures to boost \nconsumer spending and support the recovery. \nThe Committee noted that growth in broad money supply (M3) \nincreased marginally to 3.53 per cent in October 2020 from 3.20 per \ncent in September 2020, reflecting an increase in Net Foreign Assets \n(NFA). It further noted the moderation in contraction in Net \nDomestic Assets (NDA) to -2.19 per cent from -5.05 per cent in the \nprevious period. Aggregate domestic credit, however, grew by \n7.61 per cent in October 2020 compared with 7.35 per cent in the \nprevious month, as a result of the Bank’s policy on Loan-to-Deposit \nRatio (LDR), supported by the Bank’s interventions in the various \nsectors of the economy. Total gross credit by the banking industry \nstood at N19.54 trillion as at 13th November 2020 compared with \nN19.33 trillion at end-August 2020, an increase of N290.13 billion. \nWhen compared with N15.56 trillion at the commencement of the \nLDR policy in May 2019, total gross credit increased by N3.97 trillion. \nThese loans were granted mainly to manufacturing (N738 billion), \nGeneral Commerce (N874 billion), Agric and Forestry (N301 billion), \nConstruction (N291 billion), ICT (N231 billion), just to mention a few. \n \n6 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nThe Committee noted the reduction in interest rates on loans \ngranted by Deposit Money Banks (DMBs). As at October 2020, 86.23 \nper cent of total loans granted to over one (1) million customers, by \nDeposit Money Banks (DMBs) were at interest rates considerably \nbelow 20 per cent. This was an improvement from 76.43 per cent as \nat July 2019. \nMPC noted the improvement in Financial Soundness Indicators of \nthe DMBs which showed Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) of 15.5 per \ncent, Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) of 5.73 per cent and Liquidity \nRatio (LR) of 35.6 per cent, as at October, 2020. As regards non-\nperforming loans (NPLs), MPC however, noted that the ratio \nremained above the prudential benchmark of 5.0 per cent and \nurged the Bank to sustain its tight prudential regime to bring it below \nthe benchmark. \nThe Committee welcomed the improvement in the financial \nsoundness indicators of Other Financial Institutions (OFIs) as \nindicated by the growth of N582 billion, or 16.94 per cent (year-on-\nyear), in aggregate assets to N4.02 trillion as at end-September \n2020. Similarly, aggregate credit grew by N217 billion, or 12.27 per \ncent (year-on-year), to N1.99 trillion during the same period. The \nCapital Adequacy Ratio for the subsector also exceeded the \nminimum prudential ratio of 10 per cent. \nThe Committee recognized the supportive developmental roles of \nthe CBN towards addressing some of the structural issues in the \neconomy. The MPC specifically expressed optimism on the future \n \n7 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nimpact of the disbursements from Agri-Business/Small and Medium \nEnterprise Investment Scheme (AGSMEIS) (N92.90 billion to 24,702 \nbeneficiaries), Anchor Borrowers Program (ABP) by the sum of \nN164.91 billion to 954,279 beneficiaries and COVID-19 Targeted \nCredit Facility (TCF) to household and SMEs (N149.21 billion to \n316,869 beneficiaries). \nLiquidity conditions in the banking system continued to influence \nmoney market rates in the review period. The Open Buy Back (OBB) \nrate declined progressively as a result of rising liquidity levels in the \nbanking system, while there were no transactions at the \nuncollateralized inter-bank call window. Consequently, the monthly \nweighted average OBB rate declined to 1.88 per cent in October \n2020 from 3.50 per cent in September 2020. \nThe Committee noted the recent impressive performance \nrecorded in the equities market, particularly the increased \npatronage by domestic investors largely driven by low yields in the \nmoney market. The All-Share Index (ASI) increased by 20.55 per \ncent to 30,530.69 on October 30, 2020 from 25,327.13 on September \n30, 2020. Similarly, Market Capitalization, grew by 20.82 per cent to \nN15.96 trillion from N13.21 trillion over the same period. This \nimproved performance was largely attributed to positive third \nquarter corporate earnings as investors moved in to pick-up \nbargain stocks. \nThe Committee observed the moderate decline in the external \nreserves position, which stood at US$35.18 billion as at November \n \n8 \n \nClassified as Confidential \n19, 2020 compared with US$35.95 billion at end-September 2020, as \ncrude oil prices continue to fluctuate with downward pressure. \n \nOutlook \nOverall, the medium-term outlook for the global economy is \nbeginning to show a ray of optimism following the discovery of \nCOVID-19 vaccines. \nIn the domestic economy, available data and forecasts for key \nmacroeconomic variables also suggest optimism in output growth \nin the fourth quarter of 2020, due to the positive outlook for most \neconomic activities. Accordingly, the economy is expected to \nrecover from recession by the end of 2020, while inflation is \nprojected to moderate by the first quarter of 2021. \nThe Committee’s Considerations \nThe Committee’s considerations remained focused around \ntailwinds imparting upward pressure to domestic prices and key \nheadwinds to output growth. \nThe Committee noted that inflation continued to be driven by \nsupply side disruptions arising from the COVID-19 pandemic and \nother legacy factors. Key amongst these are: the security \nchallenges in parts of the country; increase in food prices; and the \nrecent hike in pump price of PMS and electricity tariff. The MPC, \ntherefore, emphasized the need to address structural supply side \nissues putting upward pressure on costs of production and \n \n9 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nunemployment. To address the public health crisis associated with \nthe COVID-19 pandemic, the Committee urged the Federal \nGovernment to make relentless effort to procure a substantial \nquantity of the COVID-19 vaccines to surmount the public health \ncrisis and pave the way for a broader macroeconomic recovery. \nThe Committee noted that the contraction had bottomed out, \nsince it moderated significantly from -6.10 to -3.62 per cent in the \nthird quarter of 2020. This was so because both the monetary and \nfiscal authorities had anticipated the impending recession and had \nput measures in place for its quick reversion. Some of these \nmeasures include the Economic Sustainability Programme by the \nFederal Government and other CBN facilities targeted at \nhouseholds, \nsmall \nand \nmedium \nenterprises \n(SMEs), \nyouth \nempowerment, and reduction of unemployment. It thus, urged the \nFederal Government to maintain its initiatives targeted at reducing \nunemployment, particularly amongst the youths, citing the recent \nEndSARS protests and ensuing agitation by hoodlums as potentially \ndisruptive to output growth in Nigeria. To this end, the MPC \nreiterated its support for the various development finance initiatives \nof the CBN to stimulate production and reduce unemployment. \nMPC further encouraged the Bank to intensify its efforts by \nincreasing funding to more beneficiaries so as to boost consumer \nspending and accelerate recovery from recession. \nOn the Financial Markets, the Committee considered the improved \nperformance in the equities market as a leading indicator of \nmedium-term macroeconomic recovery. It thus urged the Bank to \n \n10 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nmaintain its policies on exchange rate and financial system stability \nto attract more investment into the Nigerian equities market. \nThe MPC noted that credit to key sectors of the economy increased \nand encouraged the continued credit support to employment-\nstimulating sectors to hasten the recovery of output growth and \nimprove employment particularly among the youths. The \nCommittee emphasized the need for the Bank to maintain its \nregulatory surveillance over the banking system to ensure that non-\nperforming loans remain low. \nMPC noted with pleasure, the CBN’s engagement with relevant \nstakeholders, particularly in the private sector, to hasten the \nrecovery of growth. This engagement would involve collaboration \ntowards job creation and provision of credit facilities to stimulate \nbusiness activities for both corporates and individuals, particularly \nthose who lost their goods and business premises to hoodlums, \nduring the recent protest. \nThe Committee’s Decision \nAt this meeting, the Committee focused not only on price stability, \nbut also on the need to speedily take actions to exit the recession. \nIn view of these considerations, the choices before the Committee \nwere focused on whether: to tighten the stance of policy to address \nrising price levels recognizing its primary mandate of price stability; \nto ease to support output recovery; or to hold to allow existing \npolicy initiatives to permeate the economy. \n \n11 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nThe Committee noted that, although the appropriate response to \nrising inflationary pressure would be to tighten the stance of policy \nin order to moderate upward pressure on prices, it nevertheless, felt \nthat doing this would exert downward pressure on the recovery of \noutput growth. The Committee also felt that tightening would \nnegate the Bank’s desire to expand credit to the real sector at \naffordable terms, not only to boost production, but also to increase \nconsumer spending. To the Committee, tightening was therefore \nnot the appropriate response at this time. \nWith the economy, whereas MPC felt that government spending \nand Bank’s expansionary stance would be desirable to support \nrecovery and guide the economy out of recession, it felt loosening \nwould trigger excess liquidity and worsen the inflationary pressure. \nMPC also felt that excess liquidity may impact demand pressure \nand fuel further depreciation of the naira. \nWith respect to a hold position, the Committee was of the view that \nthis will be beneficial as it will allow current policy measures to \npermeate \nthe \neconomy \nwhile \nobserving \nthe \ntrend \nof \ndevelopments. The Committee also felt that the heterodox policies \nof the Bank targeted at various sectors are showing positive results \nthat would further engender growth. \nOn balance, the MPC was of the view that, although all three \noptions offer some benefits to the economy, the hold option was \ndesirable at this meeting. Based on these factors, members, voted \nin line with the most pressing need towards reversing the recession \nand achieving medium term macroeconomic stability. \n \n12 \n \nClassified as Confidential \nIn view of the foregoing, the Committee decided by a unanimous \nvote to retain all parameters. \n \nIn summary, the MPC voted to: \nI. Retain the MPR at 11.5 per cent; \nII. Retain the asymmetric corridor of +100/-700 basis points around \nthe MPR; \nIII. Retain the CRR at 27.5 per cent; and \nIV. Retain the Liquidity Ratio at 30 per cent. \n \nThank you. \nGodwin I. Emefiele \nGovernor, Central Bank of Nigeria \n24th November, 2020", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/Central Bank of Nigeria Communique No 133 of the Monetary Policy Committee of November 23 and 24, 2020.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "8e677b0f3bf88e4b8692e362402c54fe", "text": "1 \n \n \nCentral Bank of Nigeria Communiqué No. 105 of the Monetary Policy \nCommittee Meeting of Monday and Tuesday, January 25 and 26, 2016 \nThe Monetary Policy Committee met on 25th and 26th January, 2016 against the \nbackdrop of weakening global economic prospects as well as increased risks in the \ndomestic economic environment. In attendance at the meeting were 10 out of \nthe 12 members. The Committee reviewed the ensuing international and \ndomestic economic and financial environments in 2015 as well as the outlook for \nthe first half of 2016. \nOn the global front, uncertainties and geopolitical tensions have increased in the \nMiddle East, leading to a major standoff between two major oil producers; Saudi \nArabia and Iran, in the face of improving relations between the United States (US) \nand Iran. In the global oil market, both Iran and the US are emerging as new \nsuppliers while OPEC appears to have shifted from protecting price to defending \nmarket share. These developments underscore the conclusion that the current \nglobal oil prices would remain for a much longer period. Widespread stock market \nweaknesses and worsening macroeconomic conditions in China have further \nexacerbated the already stifling global economic challenges. These uncertainties \nhave blended well with domestic vulnerabilities to affect the monetary policy \nenvironment in Nigeria. \nInternational Economic Developments \nThe Committee noted the considerable divergence in global output recovery in \n2015, as growth picked-up in the most advanced countries compared with \nslowdown in majority of emerging and developing economies. Following the \nslowdown in the emerging market economies, the IMF in its January 2016 World \n \n2 \n \nEconomic Outlook (WEO), revised its global growth estimate from 3.4 to 3.1 per \ncent and 3.4 per cent in 2015 and 2016, respectively. \nIn the United States, growth has remained relatively firm with 2015 third quarter \ngrowth rate revised to 2.1 per cent from an earlier estimate of 1.5 per cent. The \ncountry’s overall growth in 2015 is expected to be the strongest since the post-\ncrisis recovery began in 2010. Likewise, 2016 growth rate has been projected at \n2.6 per cent. The major drivers of this growth remained improvements in \nconsumption spending supported by a robust labor market recovery; low inflation \nstemming from soft global crude oil prices; massive and dynamic investments in \nthe non-oil private sector, improved foreign investment demand due to the \nrecent normalization of monetary policy by the Fed, as well as housing market \nrecovery. \nJapan’s recovery in 2015 remained fragile despite the continuous policy stimulus \nby the Bank of Japan. The Bank’s asset purchase program injects ¥6.7 trillion \n($56.71 billion) monthly into the economy, with the possibility of expansion. \nHowever, this has done little to restart growth which is estimated at 0.8 per cent \nin 2015. Private consumption and investment spending remained modest in 2015, \nworsened by rising skill shortages. Japan’s outlook for 2016 remains dampened by \nthe feeble response of the economy to monetary and fiscal stimuli. \n In the Euro area, weakening fiscal consolidation and improving labor market \nconditions generated 1.5 per cent growth in 2015 with prospects for achieving 1.7 \nper cent in 2016. The European Central Bank (ECB) further eased its monetary \npolicy stance in December 2015, despite the Bank’s continuous monthly asset \npurchase of €60 billion ($64.8 billion), as both inflation and wage growth \nremained subdued. In the same vein, the Bank of England continued its \naccommodative monetary policy through its ₤375 billion ($540 billion) asset \npurchase program, even as it announced a decision to reinvest another ₤6.3 \nbillion ($9.07 billion), being the proceeds of redemption of the December 2015 \ngilt (government securities) held in the Asset Purchase Program. The Bank also \nmaintained its core rate at 0.5 per cent in an attempt to herd inflation towards its \ntarget rate. \n \n3 \n \nGrowth in the emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs) decelerated \nto 4.0 per cent in 2015, the lowest since 2009, as both external and domestic \nchallenges continued; owing to low commodity prices, financial market volatility, \nslowing productivity, policy uncertainty and eroding policy buffers as well as weak \nglobal trade. The slowdown in the majority of EMDEs has also been attributed to \nspillovers from weaknesses in major emerging economies, diminishing capital \ninflows, rising borrowing costs and other geopolitical factors. \nThe stance of monetary policy in the advanced economies is expected to remain \nlargely accommodative in 2016, except for the United States where monetary \npolicy normalization has commenced. Against the background of suppressed \ncommodity prices and slow recovery, global inflation is expected to remain \nmoderate through 2016. \n \nDomestic Economic and Financial Developments \nOutput \nDomestic output growth in 2015 remained moderate. According to the National \nBureau of Statistics (NBS), real GDP grew by 2.84 per cent in the third quarter of \n2015, almost half a percentage point higher than the 2.35 per cent recorded in \nthe second quarter. However, third quarter expansion remained substantially \nbelow the 3.96 and 6.23 per cent in the first quarter of 2015 and corresponding \nperiod of 2014, respectively. The major impetus to growth continued to come \nfrom the non-oil sector which grew by 3.05 per cent compared with the growth of \n3.46 per cent posted in the preceding quarter. The major drivers of expansion in \nthe non-oil sector were Services, Agriculture and Trade; contributing 1.42, 1.03 \nand 0.79 percentage points, respectively. The outlook for the fourth quarter of \n2015, based on staff estimates, suggests further improvements over the third \nquarter growth level. \n \nThe economy is expected to continue on its growth path in the first quarter 2016, \nalbeit less robust than in the corresponding period of 2015. This expectation is \n \n4 \n \npredicated on the current low global oil price trend which is projected to hold low \nover the medium-to long term, and with attendant implications for government \nrevenue and foreign exchange earnings. Other downside risks to growth in 2016 \ninclude: capital flow reversal, high lending rates, sluggish credit to private sector \nand bearish trends in the equities market. \nHowever, the Committee remains optimistic about a gradual recovery in \neconomic activity due to notable improvements in power and supply of refined \npetroleum products, improved policy recalibration aimed at improving the flow of \nfinancing resources to the real sector and suppression of internal insurgencies, \nwhich will boost general agricultural activity. \nPrices \nThe Committee noted the slight uptick in year-on-year headline inflation to 9.6 \nper cent in December, from 9.4 per cent in November and 9.2 per cent in \nOctober, 2015. The increase in headline inflation in November 2015 reflected an \nincrease in the food component, even though the core component remained \nunchanged at 8.70 per cent. Core inflation declined for the third consecutive \nmonth to 8.70 per cent in November and December from 8.74 per cent in October \n2015, while food inflation inched up to 10.32 per cent from 10.13 and 10.2 per \ncent over the same period. Consistent with its primary mandate, the Committee \nwould continue to monitor consumer price developments with a view to \nformulating policies that will keep inflation in check. \nMonetary, Credit and Financial Markets Developments \nBroad money supply (M2) rose by 5.90 per cent in December 2015, over the level \nat end-December 2014, although below the growth benchmark of 15.24 per cent \nfor 2015. Net domestic credit (NDC) grew by 12.13 per cent in the same period, \nbut remained below the provisional benchmark of 29.30 per cent for 2015. \nGrowth in aggregate credit reflected mainly growth in credit to the Federal \nGovernment by 151.56 per cent in December 2015 compared with 145.74 per \ncent in the corresponding period of 2014. The renewed increase in credit to \n \n5 \n \ngovernment may be partly attributable to increased government borrowing to \nimplement the 2015 supplementary budget. \nDuring the period under review, money market interest rates generally reflected \nthe level of liquidity in the banking system. Average inter-bank call and OBB \nrates, which stood at 1.00 and 1.50 per cent on 25 November 2015, closed at 4.75 \nand 4.50 per cent, respectively, on January 21, 2016. Between the November \n2015 and end-December 2015, interbank call and OBB rates averaged 0.81 and \n0.98 per cent, respectively. \nThe Committee noted the bearish movement in the equities segment of the \ncapital market during the review period. The All-Share Index (ASI) decreased by \n13.15 per cent from 27,435.56 on November 30, 2015 to 23,826.50 on January 22, \n2016. Similarly, Market Capitalization (MC) fell by 13.06 per cent from N9.42 \ntrillion to N8.19 trillion during the same period. However, relative to end-\nDecember 2014, the indices declined by 31.25 per cent and 28.66 per cent, \nrespectively. This development reflected capital flow reversals accentuated by \nsoft commodity prices and monetary policy normalization in the United States. \nExternal Sector Developments \nThe Committee noted the ongoing activities in the informal segment of the \nforeign exchange market, which led to the stoppage of dollar sales to BDCs, even \nas the average naira exchange rate remained relatively stable at the inter-bank \nsegment during the review period. The exchange rate at the interbank market \nopened at N197.00/US$ and closed at N197.00, with a daily average of \nN196.99/US$ between November 23 and January 11, 2015. The Committee \nunderscored the necessity of improving the supply of foreign exchange to the \nmarket, especially from autonomous sources. It also reiterated its commitment to \nmaintaining stability in the naira exchange rate. \nCommittee’s Considerations \nThe Committee observed that the last episode of low oil prices in 2005 lasted for \na maximum period of 8 months. However, the current episode of lower oil prices \nis projected to remain over a very long period. Consequently, it is imperative to \nbrace up for a longer period of low government revenues from oil sources, which \n \n6 \n \nwould necessitate hard and uncomfortable choices as the economy transits to \nmore sustainable sources of revenue, consistent with the economic realities and \nstrategic objectives of the country. In the circumstance, certain tradeoffs must be \nenvisaged and duly accommodated. \nIn view of the foregoing, the imperative for consistently sound and coordinated \nmacroeconomic policy has become inevitable. In the medium term within which \nmonetary policy is cast, the need to allow policy to produce the desired outcomes \nbecomes a key consideration in the policy mix. Consequently, the Bank is fine-\ntuning the framework for foreign exchange management with a view to ensuring \na more effective and liquid foreign exchange market, taking into account Nigeria’s \nstrategic development priorities; with the policies being designed within an \nenvironment of regularly ensuring consistency with monetary and fiscal policies. \nThe Committee noted that at its November 2015 meeting, it eased monetary \npolicy with a view to increasing the liquidity of the banking system. This was \naimed at moderating domestic interest rates so as to encourage indigenous \nbusinesses to borrow. While the objective of stabilizing the financial system in the \naftermath of the Treasury Single Account (TSA) withdrawals and J. P. Morgan \ndelisting of Nigeria have been largely achieved, the goal of increasing lending to \nkey sectors of the economy is yet to be achieved as the Bank continues to adopt \nmoral suasion to encourage the DMBs to support targeted lending to the real \nsector including agriculture, solid minerals and SMEs sub-sectors of the Nigerian \neconomy. \nDespite current challenges, the Committee remains guided by evidence \nunderpinned by credible data in its holistic evaluation of the emerging scenario \nand in its assessment of policy choices. Consequently, the Committee believes \nthat given sound and properly coordinated monetary, fiscal, and external sector \npolicies, there is wide room for optimism about the medium to long term \nmacroeconomic prospects for the Nigerian economy, especially, given the clarity \nin the policy direction of the administration, the various interventions in the real \nsector; gradual improvement in the power sector, and the reinvigorated fight \nagainst corruption. The Committee also believes that the effect of the softer \n \n7 \n \nmonetary policy stance adopted at the last MPC, should start crystalizing soon \nthrough expansion of credit to critical sectors of the economy. In addition, the \nunveiling of the Federal budget, oriented towards socio-economic and \ninfrastructural development is expected to provide the necessary impetus for \ngrowth. \nThe Committee acknowledged the continuous liquidity surfeit in the system \nstemming partly from the recent growth-stimulating monetary policy measures, \nas well as the tendency of the banks to invest excess reserves in government \nsecurities, rather than extend credit to the needed sectors of the economy. To \nthis end, the Committee once again urged the deposit money banks to improve \nlending to the real sector, as part of their patriotic obligations to the country and \nenjoined the Management of the Bank to continue to explore ways of \nincentivizing lending to employment- and growth-generating sectors, particularly \nSMEs. \nThe MPC also emphasized the necessity of coordination between monetary and \nfiscal policies as a prerequisite for resolving the nation’s economic problems, \nparticularly, steering the economy away from oil dependency. In particular, the \nCommittee stressed the need for the fiscal authorities to compliment the Bank’s \nlow interest rate policy orientation by properly coordinating its borrowing \nactivities (and rates) with the Bank in order to push the common objective of \nstimulating banking system credit delivery at low interest rates to the key sectors \nof the Nigerian economy. It noted that given the current economic reality of \ndwindling oil revenue and the rather unclear outlook for commodity prices, there \nwould be need for a recalibration of the fiscal strategy to increasingly explore \nopportunities in non-oil tax revenue. \nFinally, the Committee reiterated its unyielding commitment towards achieving a \nstable exchange rate regime to ensure more flexibility for sustainable inclusive \neconomic growth in the medium to long term. \n \n \n \n8 \n \nThe Committee’s Decisions \nThe Committee, in consideration of the headwinds in the domestic economy and \nthe uncertainties in the global environment decided by a unanimous vote to \nretain the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR), Cash Reserve Requirement (CRR), \nLiquidity Ratio (LR) and the asymmetric corridor of +2/-7 around the MPR. \nIn summary, the MPC voted to retain: \n(i) the CRR at 20.0 per cent; \n(ii) MPR at 11.0 per cent; \n(iii) Liquidity Ratio at 30 per cent; \n(iii) The asymmetric corridor at +200 basis points and -700 basis points. \n \nThank you for listening. \n \nGodwin I. Emefiele \nGovernor, Central Bank of Nigeria \n26th January 2016", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/Central Bank of Nigeria Communique No. 105 of the Monetary Policy Committee Meeting of Monday and Tuesday, January 25 and 26, 2016.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "bd3155b5def8d9f8cfb80441d3c69f2f", "text": "CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA\nMONETARY \nMONETARY \nPOLICY REVIEW\nPOLICY REVIEW\nMONETARY \nPOLICY REVIEW\nAUGUST 2019\nAUGUST 2019\nAUGUST 2019\nCentral Bank of Nigeria\n33 Tafawa Balewa Way\nCentral Business District\nP.M.B. 0187, Garki, \nAbuja\nPhone: +234 (0)9 462 36011\nWebsite: www.cbn.gov.ng\nE-mail: info@cbn.gov.ng\nISSN: 2141-6281\n©2017 Central Bank of Nigeria\nMandate\n§Ensure monetary and price stability\n§Issue legal tender currency in Nigeria\n§Maintain external reserves to safeguard the international \nvalue of the legal tender currency\n§Promote a sound financial system in Nigeria\n§Act as banker and provide economic and financial \nadvice to the Federal Government\nVision\n“Be the model Central Bank delivering Price and \nFinancial System Stability and promoting \nSustainable Economic Development\"\nMission Statement\n“To be proactive in providing a stable framework for the economic \ndevelopment of Nigeria through effective, efficient and \ntransparent implementation of monetary and exchange \nrate policy and management of the financial sector\"\nCore Values\n \n· Meritocracy\n· Leadership\n· Learning \n· Customer - Focus\nCentral Bank of Nigeria\niii\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \nCONTENTS\nPage\niv\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \nTable of Contents\nStatement by the Governor \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \nvii\nChapter 1 \nOverview.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n1\nChapter 2 \nOutput in the Domestic Economy \n.. \n.. \n.. \n5\nChapter 3 \nPrice Developments .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n21\nChapter 4 \nMonetary Policy and Liquidity Management.. \n.. \n29\nChapter 5 \nDevelopments in the Financial Markets.. \n.. \n.. \n49\nChapter 6 \nEconomic Outlook.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n63\n \n \nAppendices \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n78\nList of Tables\nTable 3.1: \nInflation Rates, January – June 2019 .. \n.. \n.. \n22\nTable 3.2: \nMajor Components of Headline Inflation (Y-on-Y), \n \n \nJanuary - June 2019.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n23\nTable 3.3: \nMajor Components of Headline Inflation (M-on-M), \n \n \nJanuary - June 2018 \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n23\nTable 3.4: \nMajor Components of Food Inflation (Y-on-Y), \n \n \nJanuary - June 2019.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n24\nTable 3.5: \nMajor Components of Food Inflation (M-on-M), \n \n \nJanuary – June, 2019.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n25\nTable 3.6: \nMajor Components of Core Inflation (Y-on-Y) \n \n \nJanuary – June. 2019 .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n25\nTable 3.7: \nMajor Components of Core Inflation (M-on-M) \n \n \nJanuary – June. 2019 .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n26\nTable 3.8: \nActual and Seasonally Adjusted Headline Inflation \n \n \nJanuary – June 2019 .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n26\nTable 4.1: \nOMO Bills Auction (January – June, 2019) (N'billion) .. \n37\nTable 4.2: \nCBN Standing Lending Facility (January 2018 – June 2019) \n(N'billion) \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n38\nTable 4.3: \nCBN Standing Deposit Facility (January 2018 – June 2019) \n(N'billion) \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n38\nTable 4.4: \nForeign Exchange Supply by the CBN (US$ Million) \n.. \n39\nTable 4.5: \nMonetary Aggregates Outcomes (Growth in % except \n \n \notherwise stated) \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n44\nTable 4.6: \nThe Performance of Monetary Aggregates and their \n \n \nImplications \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n45\nTable 5.1: \nWeighted Average Monthly Money Market Interest Rates \n \n \n(January - June 2019).. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n51\nTable 5.2: \nAverage Monthly Spot Exchange Rates (Jul 2018 – \n \n \nJune 2019) (N/US$) \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n54\nTable 5.3: \nEnd-Month Exchange Rates (Jul 2018 – Jun 2019) (N/US$) \n54\nTable 5.4: \nNominal and Real Effective Exchange Rates Indices \n \n \n(Jan 2018 – May 2019) .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n55\nTable 5.5: \nMonthly Foreign Exchange Flows through the CBN \nv\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \nPage\n \n \n(Jan 2018 – Jun 2019) .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n56\nTable 5.6: \nMonthly Foreign Exchange Flows through the Economy\n \n \n(Jan 2017 – June 2019) (US$ Million) \n.. \n.. \n.. \n57\nTable 5.7: \nNSE All-Share Index (ASI) and Market Capitalization (MC) \n \n \n(June 2018 – June 2019) \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n58\nTable 5.8: \nPolicy Rates of Selected Central Banks December 2018 – \n \n \nJune 2019 \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n64\nTable 5.9: \nSelected International Stock Market Indices as at June 28, \n2019 \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n65\nTable 5.10: \nExchange Rates of Selected Countries (value in currency \n \n \nunits to US$) \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n67\nTable 6.1 \nGlobal Output and Inflation Outlook .. \n.. \n.. \n73\nTable 6.2: \nInflation Forecast \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n76\nList of Figures\nFigure 2.1: \nGross Domestic Product Growth Rate (2017Q1 – 2019Q2) \n6\nFigure 2.2: \nNon-oil Sector Performance (2018 Q1 – 2019 Q2) .. \n.. \n7\nFigure 2.3: \nPerformance of Oil Production 2017Q1-2019Q2 \n.. \n7\nFigure 2.4: \nAgricultural Sector Contribution by Activity (2017Q1-\n \n \n2019Q2) \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n9\nFigure 2.5: \nIndustrial Sector Contribution by Activity (2017Q1-2019Q2) 12\nFigure 2.6: \nServices Sub-Sector Contribution, 2016Q1-2018Q2 \n.. \n15\nFigure 2.7: \nQuarterly Domestic Crude Oil Production (2017Q1-2019Q2) 16\nFigure 2.8: \nMonthly Bonny Light Oil Price, January – June 2019 .. \n16\nFigure 3.1: \nHeadline, Core and Food Inflation Rates (January – \n \n \nJune 2018) \n \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n22\nFigure 3.2: \nMajor Components of Headline Inflation (Y-on-Y), \n \n \nJanuary – June 2019 .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n23\nfigure 3.3: \nMajor Components of Headline Inflation (M-on-M), \n \n \nJanuary – June 2019 .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n23\nFigure 3.4: \nMajor Components of Food Inflation (Y-on-Y), \n \n \nJanuary – June 2019 \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n24\nFigure 3.5: \nMajor Components of Food Inflation (M-on-M), \n \n \nJanuary – June 2019 .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n25\nFigure 3.6: \nMajor Components of Core Inflation (Y-on-Y) \n \n \nJanuary – June 2019 .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n25\nFigure 3.7: \nMajor Components of Core Inflation (M-on-M) January – \n \n \nJune 2019 \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n26\nFigure 3.8: \nActual and Seasonally Adjusted Headline Inflation \n \n \nJanuary – June 2019 .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n26\nFigure 4.1: \nOMO Bills Auction (January – June, 2019) \n.. \n.. \n37\nFigure 4.2: \nStanding Lending Facility (January – June 2019).. \n.. \n38\nFigure 4.3: \nStanding Deposit Facility (January - June, 2019) \n.. \n39\nFigure 4.4: \nTotal FX Supply (including Forward Sales) \n \n \n(Jan - June, 2019).. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n40\nPage\nvi\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \nFigure 4.5: \nMoney Supply (M1), (M2) and (M3) (January – June, 2019) 41\nFigure 4.6: \nGrowth in Money Supply (M1), (M2) and (M3) \n \n \n(January - June, 2019).. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n41\nFigure 4.7: \nNet Domestic Asset (NDA) (January – June, 2019) \n.. \n42\nFigure 4.8: \nNDA, NDC and Other Assets (Net) (January – June, 2019) \n42\nFigure 4.9: \nDomestic Credit to Private Sector (January – June, 2019) \n43\nFigure 5.1: \nWeighted Average Monthly Money Market Interest Rates \n \n \n(Jan.–Jun. 2019) \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n51\nFigure 5.2: \nDaily Interbank Call Rate (January – June 2019) \n.. \n52\nFigure 5.3: \nDaily Open Buy Back Rate (January- June 2019) \n.. \n52\nFigure 5.4: \nDaily Naira/US Dollar Exchange Rate (January – June, 2019) 54\nFigure 5.5: \nNominal and Real Effective Exchange Rates Indices \n \n \n(Jan 2018 – Jun 2019)).. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n55\nFigure 5.6: \nMonthly Foreign Exchange Flows through the CBN \n \n \n(Jan 2018 – Jun 2019) .. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n56\nFigure 5.7 \nMonthly Foreign Exchange Flows through the Economy\n \n \n(Jan 2018 – May 2019) (US$ Million) .. \n.. \n.. \n58\nFigure 5.8: \nNSE All Share Index (ASI) and Market Capitalization (MC) \n \n \n(June 2018– June 2019) \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n59\nFigure 5.9: \nNSE ASI and MC (December 2018 – June 2019) \n.. \n59\nFigure 5.10: \nNSE Market Capitalization by Sector as at End-\n \n \nDecember 2018 \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n60\nFigure 5.11: \nNSE Market Capitalization by Sector as at End-June 2019 \n60\nFigure 5.12: \nWarren Buffett Valuation of Nigerian Equities Market \n60\nFigure 5.13: \n10-Year U.S. Dollar-denominated Bond Yield for Nigeria \n \n \n(June 29, 2018 – June 28, 2019) \n.. \n.. \n.. \n61\nFigure 5.14: \nFGN Bonds Yield Curves: end-June. 2018 vs. end-Oct. 2018 \n \n \nvs. end-June 2019 \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n.. \n61\nFigure 5.15: \nStructure of the Nigerian Capital Market (June, 2019).. \n62 \nFigure 6.1: \nFan Chart of Inflation Forecast \n.. \n.. \n.. \n76\nList of Boxes\nBox 2.1 \nThe African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA): \n \n \nImplications for Trade and Growth in Nigeria .. \n.. \n17\nBox 4.1 \nRecent Developments in Central Bank Independence: \n \n \nImplications for Monetary Policy \n.. \n.. \n.. \n46\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \nSTATEMENT BY THE GOVERNOR\nD\nevelopments in the global and domestic economic and financial \nenvironment remained the key drivers of monetary policy in the first half of \n2019. From the global environment, key challenges to monetary policy \nincluded: persisting financial market vulnerabilities in Emerging Market and \nDeveloping Economies (EMDEs); slowdown in the Chinese economy; tightening \nglobal financial conditions; the growing trade war between the US and China; \nuncertain BREXIT negotiations, and indications of renewed tension on the Korean \nPeninsula. Other indicators of growing uncertainty in the global economy were the \nuncertainty associated with continuing monetary policy normalization in the US, the \nEuropean Central Bank's (ECB) decision to halt its monetary policy normalization \nprogramme, and continued asset purchase by the Bank of Japan (BoJ).\nOn the domestic front, inflationary pressure moderated on the back of healthy \naccretion to external reserves, due to the relatively stable oil prices in the \ninternational market. This helped the Bank sustain its intervention in the foreign \nexchange market which further stabilized the exchange rate. Consequently, \nheadline inflation declined by 0.15 percentage point from 11.37 per cent in January \nto 11.22 per cent in June 2019. \nThe fragile recovery of the domestic economy from recession weakened further \nduring the review period. The development was attributed to the lull in fiscal \nactivities as a result of the 2019 electioneering activities, delay in the constitution of \nthe federal cabinet, the late passage of the 2019 Federal Government budget, as \nwell as lingering security challenges across the country. Consequently, growth in real \nGross Domestic Product (GDP) moderated to 1.94 per cent (year-on-year) in the \nsecond quarter of 2019 from 2.10 per cent in the preceding quarter, and 1.50 per \ncent in the corresponding period of 2018. \nThe foregoing provided the context for the conduct of monetary policy during the \nreview period. Consequently, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) sustained the \nMPR at 14.0 per cent until its March 2019 meeting when it was adjusted downwards \nby 50 basis points to 13.5 per cent, to signal a pro-growth stance and to encourage \nthe flow of credit to the productive sectors of the economy. The asymmetric corridor \nof +200 and -500 basis points around the MPR as well as other policy parameters \nwere, however, retained. \nThe money market remained active in the review period, with market rates largely \nreflecting liquidity conditions in the banking system. The capital market remained \nvii\nbearish, reflecting continuing negative investor sentiments, in response to \nperceived sovereign risk and weakening macroeconomic conditions. \nConsequently, the All-Share Index (ASI) decreased by 4.66 per cent to 29,966.87 at \nend-June 2019 from 31,430.50 at end-December 2018. \nThe outlook for domestic output growth in 2019 remains sluggish but promising. This is \ndue to weaker-than-expected domestic demand amid high unemployment. Other \nheadwinds to the growth outlook include: low credit flows to the private sector, high \nand sticky NPLs ratios, fall in capital and remittance inflows, persisting insecurity in \nthe food producing areas as well as threat to budget implementation as a result of \nthe underperformance of crude oil production and price below the 2019 budget \nbenchmarks. The price outlook indicates continuing moderation into the second \nhalf of 2019. Upside risk to the outlook remain food shortages resulting from insecurity \nin agricultural producing areas of the country, liquidity injection from the \nimplementation of the FGN budget and increased FAAC disbursements.\nThe thrust of monetary policy in the near term will be to support the fragile economic \nrecovery, and manage expectations to ensure that the downside risks to growth \nand upside risks to inflation are well contained.\nGODWIN I. EMEFIELE\nGovernor, Central Bank of Nigeria\nAugust 2019 \nviii\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n1 \nCHAPTER ONE \n1.0 \nOVERVIEW \nuring the first half of 2019, \nmonetary policy was influenced \nby key developments in the \nglobal and domestic economic and \nfinancial environments. On the global \nfront, \nthe \nkey \nchallenges \nwere: \nvulnerabilities in major financial markets \nand \nmounting \nexternal \ndebt \nin \nEmerging \nMarket \nand \nDeveloping \nEconomies (EMDEs); slowdown in the \nChinese economy resulting from trade \nwar with the US; tightening global \nfinancial conditions; US imposition of a \nnew \nround of \nsanctions on Iran; \nuncertain \nBREXIT \nnegotiations, \nand \nindications of renewed tension on the \nKorean \nPeninsula. \nIn \naddition, \nuncertainty surrounding the continuing \nmonetary policy normalization by the \nUS, the European Central Bank’s (ECB) \ndecision to halt its monetary policy \nnormalization \nprogramme, \nand \ncontinued asset purchase by the Bank \nof Japan (BoJ), signalled a broad level \nof uncertainty in the global economy. \nDespite these challenges, oil prices \nremained relatively stable resulting in \nmodest accretion to Nigeria’s external \nreserves. This helped the Bank sustain its \nintervention in the foreign exchange \nmarket \nwhich \nresulted \nin \nstable \nexchange rate. Consequently, headline \ninflation decelerated from 11.37 per \ncent in January to 11.22 per cent in June \n2019. \nThe recovery of the domestic economy \nfrom recession in 2017, weakened \nfurther due to the lull in governance \nactivities leading to the 2019 general \nelections, delay in the constitution of the \nfederal cabinet after the elections, as \nwell as the late passage of the 2019 \nFederal Government budget. Other \nfactors were: the heightened security \nchallenge across the country, and the \ncontinued difficulties in securing market \noutlets for Nigerian oil. Notwithstanding, \noutput growth remained positive due to \nimproved government revenue and \nexpenditure \non \nimplementing \nthe \nEconomic Recovery and Growth Plan \n(ERGP). In addition, the development \nfinance initiatives of the Central Bank of \nNigeria (CBN) also supported growth \nduring the period. Accordingly, growth \nin real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) \nstood at 2.10 per cent (year-on-year) in \nthe first quarter of 2019, compared with \n2.38 and 1.89 per cent in the preceding \nand corresponding quarters of 2018, \nrespectively. \nThe non-oil sector continued to drive \ngrowth, as it grew by 2.47 per cent \ncompared with 0.76 per cent in the \ncorresponding \nquarter, \na \n1.72 \npercentage point increase. Compared \nwith the 2.70 per cent growth in the \npreceding \nquarter \nof \n2018, \nit \nmoderated by 0.23 percentage point. \nOn the other hand, the oil sector \ncontracted by 1.46 per cent in the first \nquarter of 2019 compared with the \ngrowth of 14.02 per cent in the \ncorresponding period of 2018 and a \ncontraction of 1.62 per cent in the \npreceding quarter. In the second \nquarter of 2019, growth in real GDP \nfurther moderated to 1.94 per cent \ncompared with 2.10 per cent in the \npreceding quarter. This was, however, \nD\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n2 \nhigher than the growth of 1.50 per cent \nin the corresponding period of 2018. At \n5.15 per cent, the oil sector was the \nmajor driver of growth during the \nsecond quarter; indicating significant \nrecoveries from the contractions of 1.46 \nand 3.95 per cent in the preceding \nquarter and the corresponding period \nof 2018, respectively. The non-oil sector \ngrowth moderated to 1.64 per cent \nduring the quarter, compared with 2.47 \nand 2.05 per cent in the preceding \nquarter and the corresponding period \nof 2018, respectively. \nThe Nigerian financial markets were \nmoderately calm during the review \nperiod. The key global events that \nshaped developments in the market \nwere: \nthe \nescalating \ntrade \nwar \nbetween the US and China; impact of \nthe new round of sanctions on Iran; \ndifficult BREXIT negotiations; a new \nwave of tensions on the Korean \nPeninsula; and vulnerabilities arising \nfrom growing public and private debt in \nsome Emerging Market and Developing \nEconomies (EMDEs). As a result, financial \nvulnerabilities were elevated in the \nsovereign, corporate and non-bank \nfinancial sectors in several systemically \nimportant countries, with the risk that \nstrains in the financial sector could \nagain be transmitted to firms and \nhouseholds, thereby hurting growth. \nThese forces were calmed by the dovish \nmonetary policy stance of major central \nbanks including the US Fed, the Bank of \nEngland and the European Central \nBank. \nAccordingly, the Central Bank of Nigeria \n(CBN) continued to conduct monetary \npolicy using the various instruments in its \ntoolkit to achieve its objectives of price \nand macroeconomic stability. These \ninstruments were: the Monetary Policy \nRate (MPR), the Cash Reserve Ratio \n(CRR), Liquidity Ratio, Open Market \nOperations \n(OMO) \nand \nDiscount \nWindow Operations, complemented \nwith periodic interventions in the foreign \nexchange market. The MPR remained \nthe key instrument for monetary policy in \nthe review period. It was retained at 14.0 \nper cent until March 2019, when the \nMonetary Policy Committee (MPC) \nadjusted it downwards by 50 basis points \nto 13.5 per cent. This was to signal a pro-\ngrowth stance by way of encouraging \nthe flow of credit to the productive \nsectors of the economy. The asymmetric \ncorridor of +200 and -500 basis points \naround \nthe \nMPR \nwas, \nhowever, \nretained. \nThe primary tool used for liquidity \nmanagement in the first half of 2019 \nremained Open Market Operations \n(OMO). There was a decrease in OMO \nsales by 10.48 per cent to N8,682.01 \nbillion in the first half of 2019 from \nN9,678.76 billion in the preceding half of \n2018. The decrease in OMO sales was to \nencourage deposit money banks to \nlend to the productive sectors of the \neconomy \nin \norder \nto \nstimulate \neconomic growth. \nThe money market remained active in \nthe review period, with market rates \nlargely reflecting liquidity conditions in \nthe banking system. The rates oscillated \noutside the Standing Facilities corridor \nfor most of the review period, and \nreflected the effect of: withdrawals from \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n3 \nthe \nbanking \nsystem \nfor \nmonthly \ndisbursements of statutory Federation \nAccount Allocation Committee (FAAC); \nOMO sales and foreign exchange \ninterventions. The fall in rates from April \nto May 2019 was a reflection of a more \naccommodative \nmonetary \npolicy \nstance by the Bank following the \ndecision of the MPC to lower the MPR in \nMarch 2019. \nThe \nforeign \nexchange \nmarket \nexperienced relative stability during the \nfirst half of 2019 due to the relatively \nstable \noil \nprices \nand \nimproved \naccretion \nto \nexternal \nreserves. \nIn \naddition, the Bank sustained the policy \non repatriation of export proceeds as \nwell as return of unutilized foreign \nexchange sourced from CBN auctions. \nMore fundamentally, the Bank made a \nstrategic shift towards long term stability \nin the foreign exchange market to \ndeepen restriction of access to official \nforeign exchange for imports that can \nbe produced locally. The policy entails \nencouraging the local production of \nsuch items for export by providing \nfinancial assistance in line with the \nrecent Export Facilitation Initiative (EFI) \nof the Bank. The development is \nexpected \nto \ncomplement \nexisting \nmeasures such as the directive to \nInternational Money Transfer Operators \n(IMTOs) to sell foreign exchange to \nBDCs; the adoption of Bank Verification \nNumber (BVN) in BDC transactions; as \nwell \nas \nspecial \nforeign \nexchange \nauctions to the real sector and small \nand medium-scale enterprises. These \nmeasures significantly contributed in \nstabilizing the foreign exchange market. \nActivities at the Nigerian capital market \nin the first half of 2019 remained bearish, \nreflecting continuing negative investor \nsentiment, attributable to rising public \ndebt stock, perceived increase in \nsovereign \nrisk \nand \nweakening \nmacroeconomic conditions. In addition \nto these factors, there was significant \ncapital outflow following continued \nmonetary policy normalization by the US \nFed. \nCoupled \nwith \nthe \nuncertain \npolitical environment as a result of the \n2019 general elections, the market \nexperienced significant sell-offs and \nprofit taking activities. Consequently, \nthe All-Share Index (ASI) decreased by \n4.66 per cent to 29,966.87 at end-June \n2019 from 31,430.50 at end-December \n2018. Similarly, it decreased by 21.71 per \ncent compared with 38,278.55 at end-\nJune 2018. Market capitalization (MC), \nhowever, increased by 12.71 per cent to \nN13.21 trillion at end-June 2019 from \nN11.72 trillion at end-December 2018. \nCompared with N13.87 trillion at end-\nJune 2018, it fell by 4.76 per cent. The \nincrease in market capitalization in the \nreview period was as a result of new \nlistings \nin \nthe \nmarket, \nprominent \namongst which were MTN, Skyway \nAviation Handling Company and the \nmerger between Access Bank and \nDiamond Bank. \nBond market activities in the first half of \n2019 were dominated by Federal \nGovernment of Nigeria (FGN) securities. \nThe \nSub-national \ngovernment \nand \ncorporate \nbonds \nsegments \nalso \nwitnessed some activity, with the latter \nrecording the least share by market \nvolume. \nThe \n10-year \ndollar-\ndenominated bond yield for Nigeria \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n4 \ndecreased by 232 basis points to 3.79 \nper cent at end-June 2019 from 6.11 per \ncent \nat \nend-December \n2018. \nCompared with 4.47 per cent at end-\nJune 2018, it fell by 211 basis points. This \nreflects an improvement in foreign \ninvestors’ perception of long term \nsovereign risk of the country. \nHeadline \ninflation \nmarginally \nmoderated during the review period, \nbut was still above the Bank’s 6-9 per \ncent target. The decline was largely \nattributed to: moderation in food prices, \nand sustained intervention in the foreign \nexchange \nmarket. \nStaff \nestimates \nsuggest that the year-on-year headline \ninflation would moderate to 11.13, \n11.10, 11.18 per cent in July, August and \nSeptember 2019, respectively from 11.22 \nper cent in June 2019 due to a gradual \ndecline in food prices. Inflation would, \nhowever, rise to 11.29, 11.31 and 11.37 \nper cent in October, November and \nDecember, respectively. The upside risks \nto inflation remains food shortages due \nmainly to insecurity in the agricultural \nproducing areas of the country, liquidity \ninjection \nfrom \nthe \ncontinued \nimplementation of the 2018 FGN budget \nand 2019 budget, as well as increased \nFAAC disbursements. \nThe \nanticipated \nrecovery \nof \nthe \ndomestic economy has been weaker \nthan expected despite the relatively \nstable \noil \nprices. \nThus, \nreal \nGDP \nmoderated further to 1.94 per cent in \nthe second quarter of 2019 from the \nmoderation of 2.10 per cent in the first \nquarter. With the slowdown in GDP \ngrowth in Q2 2019, the Central Bank of \nNigeria (CBN) GDP growth projection \nwas also revised downward from 2.72 \nper cent to 2.27 per cent for 2019 due to \nweaker-than-expected \ndomestic \ndemand amid high unemployment, \ndecline in crude oil and gas production \nand \nescalation \nof \ntrade \ntensions, \ninvolving major economies (Euro Area, \nthe United States and China) which is \nlikely to weigh on global aggregate \ndemand. Nevertheless, sustaining stable \nexchange \nrates, \nrobust \nexternal \nreserves, \nfinancial \nsystem \nstability, \nenhanced flow of credit to the real \nsector, sustained calmness in the Niger \nDelta, improved production/export of \noil to build fiscal buffers, expected \nimprovements in tax revenue, effective \nimplementation \nof \nthe \nEconomic \nGrowth Recovery Plan by the Federal \nGovernment and the CBN special \ninterventions in selected sectors of the \neconomy \nis \nexpected \nto \nsupport \ngrowth. \nThe thrust of monetary policy for the rest \nof 2019 will be influenced by the need \nto \nsupport \nthe \nfragile \neconomic \nrecovery, and manage expectations to \nensure that the downside risks to growth \nand upside risks to inflation are well \ncontained. \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n5 \nCHAPTER TWO \n2.0 \nDEVELOPMENTS \nIN \nDOMESTIC \nOUTPUT \nn the first half of 2019, the recovery of \nthe domestic economy, which had \nremained fragile since the exit from \nrecession in 2017, further weakened. The \ndevelopment was attributed to the lull in \ngovernance activities which attended \npreparations towards the 2019 general \nelections, delay in the constitution of the \nfederal cabinet after the elections, as \nwell as the late passage of the 2019 \nFederal budget. Other factors were: the \nheightened security challenge across \nthe \ncountry, \nand \nthe \ncontinued \nweakness in the oil market arising from \nslow global growth and uncertainties in \nsome key oil producing countries in the \nMiddle East. Notwithstanding, growth \nremained positive due to improved \ngovernment revenue and accretion to \nexternal reserves, as oil prices remained \nrelatively \nstable. \nIn \naddition, \nthe \ndevelopment finance initiatives of the \nCentral Bank of Nigeria (CBN) also \nsupported growth during the period. \nAccordingly, \ngrowth \nin \nreal \ngross \ndomestic product (GDP) moderated to \n2.10 per cent (year-on-year) in the first \nquarter of 2019, from 2.38 and 1.89 per \ncent \nin \nthe \npreceding \nand \ncorresponding \nquarters \nof \n2018, \nrespectively. The non-oil sector, which \ngrew by 2.47 per cent continued to be \nthe main driver of growth. Compared \nwith the 2.70 per cent growth in the \npreceding quarter of 2018, growth \nmoderated by 0.23 percentage point. \nThe key drivers of the non-oil growth \nwere Agriculture (3.17%), construction \n(3.18%), services (3.16%) and Trade \n(0.85%). The sector contributed 90.86 \nper cent to total real GDP in Q1, 2019 \ncompared with 90.45 and 92.94 per \ncent \nin \nthe \ncorresponding \nand \npreceding quarters, respectively. \nOn the other hand, the oil sector \ncontracted by 2.40 per cent in the first \nquarter of 2019 compared with the \ngrowth of 14.02 per cent in the \ncorresponding period of 2018 and a \ncontraction of 1.62 per cent in the \npreceding \nquarter. \nThus, \nthe \nmoderation in output growth during the \nquarter was largely accounted for by \nthe contraction in oil sector output. The \ndevelopment was largely attributed to \nthe lack of new investments and capital \ninflow into the sector occasioned by the \ncontinued absence of a clear fiscal \nregime around the oil sector, as well as \nthe reluctance of banks to lend to the \nsector as a result of high non-performing \nloans from previous exposures. Crude oil \nproduction in the first quarter was 1.99 \nmbpd up from 1.98 mbpd in the \ncorresponding quarter of 2018, and \nhigher than 1.91 mbpd in the fourth \nquarter \nof \n2018. \nThe \nOil \nsector’s \ncontribution to total real GDP in the first \nquarter of 2019 also declined to 9.14 per \ncent \nfrom \n9.55 \nper \ncent \nin \nthe \ncorresponding period of 2018. It was, \nhowever, an improvement compared \nwith 7.06 per cent in the preceding \nquarter. \nDuring the second quarter of 2019, \noutput growth further moderated to \n1.94 per cent (year-on-year) from 2.10 \nI\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n6 \nper cent in the preceding quarter. This \nwas, \nhowever, \nan \nimprovement \ncompared with the growth of 1.50 per \ncent in the corresponding period of \n2018. \nThe non-oil sector also moderated to \n1.64 per cent in the second quarter, \ncompared with the growth of 2.47 and \n2.05 per cent in the preceding quarter \nand the corresponding period of 2018, \nrespectively. The key drivers of non-oil \ngrowth \nwere \nServices \n(2.93%), \nAgriculture (1.79%) and Construction \n(0.67%). Trade and Industry, however, \ncontracted by 0.25 and 0.17 per cent, \nrespectively. \nThe \nnon-oil \nsector \ncontributed 91.18 per cent to total real \nGDP in Q2 2019 compared with 91.45 \nand 90.78 per cent in the preceding \nand \ncorresponding \nquarters, \nrespectively. Thus, the moderation in \noutput growth during the quarter was \nlargely accounted for by the slowdown \nin non-oil sector output. \nThe oil sector grew significantly by 5.15 \nper cent in the second quarter of 2019 \ncompared with the contractions of 3.95 \nand 1.46 per cent in the preceding \nquarter and in the corresponding period \nof 2018, respectively. The development \nwas largely attributed to the sustained \npeace in the Niger Delta region which \nresulted in a healthy oil production. \nCrude oil production in the quarter rose \nto 1.98 mbpd from 1.84 mbpd in the \ncorresponding period of 2018, but a \nmarginal decline compared with 1.99 \nmbpd in the preceding quarter of 2019. \nThe Oil sector’s contribution to total real \nGDP in second quarter of 2019 rose \nmarginally to 8.82 per cent from 8.55 per \ncent in the corresponding period of \n2018. It was, however, a decline \ncompared with 9.22 per cent in the first \nquarter of 2019. \nFigure 2.1: \nGross Domestic Product Growth Rate (2017Q1 – \n2019Q2) \n \nSource: National Bureau of Statistics \n \n2.1 DOMESTIC ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES \nIn the first half of 2019, real GDP growth \nwas driven by activities in the non-oil \nsector, which grew by 2.47 per cent. This \nwas a decrease of 0.23 percentage \npoint relative to the preceding quarter \nof 2018, but an increase of 1.71 \npercentage points compared with 0.76 \nper cent in the corresponding quarter of \n2018. Activities in the non-oil sector were \ndriven by transportation (19.5%), solid \nminerals \n(11.03%), \ninformation \nand \ncommunications \n(9.48%), \nutilities \n(6.22%), accommodation and food \nservices (4.15%), construction (3.18%), \nagriculture \n(3.17%), \nmanufacturing \n(0.81%) \nand \nTrade \n(0.85%). \nThese \ncompares with their respective growth \nrates of 14.45, 26.29, 1.58, 8.01, 0.29, -\n1.54, 3.00, 3.39 and -2.57 per cent in the \ncorresponding quarter of 2018. \n-1.50\n-1.00\n-0.50\n0.00\n0.50\n1.00\n1.50\n2.00\n2.50\n3.00\nQ1-2017\nQ2-2017\nQ3-2017\nQ4-2017\nQ1-2018\nQ2-2018\nQ3-2018\nQ4-2018\nQ1-2019\nQ2-2019\nPer cent\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n7 \nThe oil sector, however, contracted by \n2.40 per cent, a further contraction \ncompared with -1.62 per cent in the \npreceding quarter and a growth of \n14.02 per cent in the corresponding \nperiod of 2018. Accordingly, average \ncrude oil production declined to 1.96 \nmbpd in the first quarter of 2019 \ncompared with 1.98 mbpd in the \ncorresponding period of 2018; but was \nan increase, relative to the 1.91 mbpd in \nthe previous quarter. The contraction in \nthe oil sector largely accounted for the \nmoderation \nin \naggregate \noutput \ngrowth during the quarter. \nActivities in both the non-oil and oil \nsectors drove real output growth in the \nsecond quarter, 2019. The non-oil sector \ngrowth moderated to 1.64 per cent in \nthe second quarter of 2019 from 2.47 \nand 2.05 per cent in the preceding \nquarter and the corresponding period \nof 2018, respectively. Activities in the \nnon-oil \nsector \nwere \ndriven \nby \ninformation \nand \ncommunication \n(9.01%), transportation (8.02%), utilities \n(4.73%), \nforestry \n(3.23%), \naccommodation and food services \n(2.92%), other services (2.55%), and \nadministrative and support services \n(2.03%). These compares with their \nrespective growth rates of 11.81, 21.76, \n8.91, 3.96, 2.43, 2.72 and -3.41 per cent \nin the corresponding quarter of 2018. \nThe activities that moderated non-oil \nperformance were: real estate (-3.84%), \npublic administration (-3.39%), solid \nminerals (-2.54%) and finance and \ninsurance (-2.24%). These activities grew \nrespectively by -3.88, -5.21, 2.86 and 1.28 \nin the corresponding period of 2018. \nThe oil sector grew significantly by 5.15 \nper cent in the second quarter of 2019, \ncompared with the contractions of 1.46 \nand 3.95 per cent in the preceding \nquarter and the corresponding period \nof 2018, respectively. \nFigure 2.2: \nNon-oil Sector Performance (2018 Q1 – 2019 Q2) \n \nSource: National Bureau of Statistics \n \nFigure 2.3: \nPerformance of Oil Production 2017Q1-2019Q2 \n \nSource: National Bureau of Statistics \n -\n 5.00\n 10.00\n 15.00\n 20.00\n 25.00\n 30.00\n 35.00\n 40.00\n 45.00\n2018Q1\n2018Q2\n2018Q3\n2018Q4\n2019Q1\n2019Q2\nPer cent\nAgriculture\nIndustry\nConstruction\nTrade\nServices\n (20.00)\n (15.00)\n (10.00)\n (5.00)\n -\n 5.00\n 10.00\n 15.00\n 20.00\n 25.00\nQ1-2017\nQ2-2017\nQ3-2017\nQ4-2017\nQ1-2018\nQ2-2018\nQ3-2018\nQ4-2018\nQ1-2019\nQ2-2019\nPer cent\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n8 \n2.2 Sectoral Analysis \nThis section presents a review of the \nsectoral performance of the economy \nalong with key institutional and policy \nactions which contributed to output \ngrowth in the first half of 2019. \n2.2.1 Agriculture \nIn the first quarter of 2019, real \nagricultural GDP expanded by 0.72 \npercentage point to 3.17 per cent \nabove the 3.00 per cent in the \ncorresponding period of 2018. The \ndevelopment was also an increase of \n0.17 percentage point compared with \n2.46 per cent in the preceding quarter. \nThe growth of the sector was driven \nlargely by fishing which rose remarkably \nby 7.09 per cent in the first quarter of \n2019 from 4.25 and 1.97 per cent in the \ncorresponding and preceding quarters \nof 2018, respectively. The livestock sub-\nsector also recorded a considerable \ngrowth of 0.88 per cent against the \ncontraction of 1.85 per cent in the \ncorresponding quarter of 2018. There \nwas, however, a moderation in crop \nproduction and forestry of 3.27 and 2.19 \nper \ncent \ncompared \nwith \ntheir \nrespective growth rates of 3.45 and 2.94 \nper cent in the corresponding quarter of \n2018. Further analysis showed that the \nlivestock, crop production and forestry \nsub-sectors grew by 2.35, 2.48 and 1.73 \nper cent, respectively, in the preceding \nperiod. \nThe overall contribution of the sector to \nreal GDP in the first quarter of 2019 stood \nat 24.11 per cent, higher than 23.95 per \ncent in the corresponding quarter of \n2018 but lower than 28.13 per cent in the \npreceding quarter. \nDuring \nthe \nsecond \nquarter, \nreal \nagricultural GDP increased by 1.79 per \ncent over the 1.19 per cent in the \ncorresponding quarter of 2018. The \ndevelopment was, however, a decline \nof 1.38 percentage point compared \nwith 3.17 per cent in the preceding \nquarter. The growth of the sector during \nthe quarter was driven largely by forestry \nwhich grew by 3.23 per cent compared \nwith 3.96 and 2.19 per cent in the \ncorresponding period of 2018 and in the \npreceding quarter, respectively. The \ncrop production and fishing sub-sectors \nalso recorded a considerable growths \nof 1.94 and 1.09 per cent in the second \nquarter above their respective growth \nrates of 1.49 and -1.35 per cent in the \ncorresponding quarter of 2018. Their \nperformance \nwas, \nhowever, \na \nmoderation when compared with 3.27 \nand \n7.09 \nper \ncent, \nrespectively, \nrecorded in the first quarter of 2019. On \nthe other hand, livestock sub-sector \ncontracted by 0.01 per cent in the \nsecond quarter of 2019 compared with \n1.95 per cent in the corresponding \nperiod \nof \n2018. \nThe development \ncompares unfavourably with the growth \nof 0.88 per cent in the preceding \nquarter. \nThe \noverall \ncontribution \nof \nthe \nagricultural sector to real GDP in the \nsecond quarter was 25.03 per cent, up \nfrom 24.11 and 24.99 per cent in the \npreceding \nquarter \nand \nthe \ncorresponding \nperiod \nof \n2018, \nrespectively. \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n9 \nFigure 2.4: \nAgricultural Sector Contribution by Activity \n(2017Q1-2019Q2) \n \nSource: National Bureau of Statistics \n2.2.1.2 Agricultural \nPolicies \nand \nInstitutional Support \nThe agricultural sector continued to \nenjoy a number of policies, reforms and \ninstitutional support in the first half of \n2019, as outlined in this section. \n \n \nThe \nAgricultural \nCredit \nGuarantee \nScheme (ACGS) \nIn the review period, 11,981 loans \nvalued at ₦1.68 billion were guaranteed \nunder the ACGS compared with 10,420 \nloans valued at ₦1.75 billion in the \ncorresponding \nhalf \nof \n2018. \nThis \nindicated an increase of 14.98 per cent \nin volume but a decline of 4.14 per cent \nin value, respectively. Also, 8,676 loans \nvalued at ₦1.32 billion were repaid, \ncompared with 17,977 loans valued at \n₦3.05 billion in the corresponding period \nof 2018. Only one (1) default claim \nvalued at ₦47,108.06 was settled in the \nreview period, compared with no claim \nin the corresponding period of 2018. \nN200 Billion Commercial Agriculture \nCredit Scheme (CACS) \nUnder the scheme, ₦4.84 billion was \ndisbursed to 6 projects in the first half of \n2019 compared with ₦39.34 billion \ndisbursed \nto \n16 \nprojects \nin \nthe \ncorresponding half of 2018. Repayments \nduring the review period amounted to \n₦23.91 billion in respect of 139 projects, \ncompared with ₦17.01 billion repaid by \n51 projects in the corresponding period \nof 2018. \nAgri-business/ \nSmall \nand \nMedium \nEnterprises \nInvestment \nScheme \n(AGSMEIS) \nIn the first half of 2019, the sum of ₦1.29 \nbillion was disbursed to 595 projects, \ncompared \nwith \n₦111.81 \nmillion, \ndisbursed \nto \n353 \nprojects \nin \nthe \ncorresponding period of 2018. No \nrepayment \nwas \nmade \nunder \nthe \nscheme in the review period. \nMicro, Small and Medium Enterprises \nDevelopment Fund (MSMEDF) \nIn the first half of 2019, the sum of \n₦625.55 million was disbursed to 1,103 \nprojects, compared with ₦4.77 billion, \ndisbursed to 14,492 projects in the \ncorresponding period of 2018. The \ndevelopment was an increase of 662.59 \nper cent by value and a decrease of \n92.39 per cent by volume. Repayments \nduring the period amounted to ₦3.63 \nbillion. \nAnchor Borrowers’ Programme (ABP) \nIn the first half of 2019, ₦26.67 billion was \ndisbursed to 237,967 smallholder farmers \n -\n 5.00\n 10.00\n 15.00\n 20.00\n 25.00\n 30.00\n 35.00\nPer cent\nCrop Production\nLivestock\nForestry\nFishing\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n10 \ncompared with ₦36.37 billion disbursed \nto 155,732 farmers in the corresponding \nperiod of 2018. This represented 26.67 \nper cent decrease in the amount \ndisbursed but 52.81 per cent increase in \nthe number of farmers financed. The \nenterprises covered were: cassava, \ncotton, maize, rice, soya bean, tomato, \nwheat, and poultry. The amount repaid \nduring the review period was ₦2.89 \nbillion, representing \n84.1 \nper \ncent \nincrease over ₦1.57 billion repaid in the \ncorresponding period of 2018. \nPaddy Aggregation Scheme (PAS) \nUnder the scheme, ₦35.20 billion was \nreleased to 12 projects in the first half of \n2019, compared with ₦4.25 billion \nreleased \nto \n3 \nprojects \nin \nthe \ncorresponding half of 2018. During the \nreview period, ₦1.5 billion was repaid, \ncompared with ₦13.37 billion in the first \nhalf of 2018. \nNon-oil Export Stimulation Facility (NESF) \nIn the first half of 2019, ₦8.0 billion was \ndisbursed to 2 projects, compared with \n₦19.04 billion to 6 projects in the \ncorresponding period of 2018. Over the \nsame period, ₦1.0 billion was repaid \ncompared with ₦5.04 billion in the first \nhalf of 2018. \nFederal Government of Nigeria (FGN) \nSpecial Presidential Fertilizer Initiative \n(PFI) \nIn the review period, there was no \ndisbursement \nunder \nthe \ninitiative, \ncompared with N20.0 billion disbursed in \nthe first half of 2018. \nExport Development Facility (EDF) \nIn the first half of 2019, there were no \ndisbursement or repayment under the \nFacility. \n \nInterest Drawback Programme (IDP) \nThe \nInterest \nDrawback \nscheme \ncomplements the ACGS. The Fund \nprovides a rebate of 40.0 per cent on \nthe market interest rate of ACGS loans \nrepaid when due, thus, reducing the \neffective borrowing cost to farmers and \nencouraging loan repayment. \nIn the review period, 5,760 rebate claims \nvalued at ₦87.64 million were settled, \ncompared with 5,929 valued at ₦89.31 \nmillion in the corresponding period of \n2018. The development reflected a 0.69 \nper cent decrease in volume but 60.23 \nper cent increase in value of claims \nsettled. \n \nAccelerated Agriculture Development \nScheme (AADS) \nAADS was launched as an off-shoot of \nthe ABP with the major objective of \nencouraging youths to engage in \nagricultural activities. The scheme is \njointly \nimplemented \nwith \nstate \ngovernments with a target to engage at \nleast 10,000 youths per state. \nSince inception to the first half of 2019, \nthe Scheme had disbursed N1.37 billion \nto a state government-owned poultry \nproject. \nNational Food Security Programme \n(NFSP) \nUnder the Programme, ₦8.90 billion was \ndisbursed to 2 projects in the first half of \n2019, compared with ₦4.04 billion \nreleased \nto \n3 \nprojects \nin \nthe \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n11 \ncorresponding period of 2018. In the \nreview period, ₦2.60 billion was repaid. \n \n2.2.2 Industry \n \n2.2.2.1 Industrial Production \nThe Industrial sector indices indicated \nthat the sector was on the verge of \nrecession. In the review period, the \nsector contracted by 0.73 per cent \nfollowing a modest recovery of 0.71 per \ncent \nin \nthe \npreceding \nquarter, \ncompared with a growth of 8.41 per \ncent in the corresponding quarter of \n2018, having suffered two consecutive \nquarters of contraction in the year. The \nmain driver of the contraction in the \nsector was the crude petroleum and \nnatural \ngas \nsub-sector \nwhich \ncontracted by 2.40 per cent in the \nreview period from a contraction of 1.62 \nper cent in the preceding quarter, \ncompared with a growth of 14.02 per \ncent in the corresponding period of \n2018. The sub-sector has been in \ncontraction since the second quarter of \n2018. The contraction of the industrial \nsector was, however, moderated by a \ngrowth in the review period of 11.03 and \n0.81 per cent in the solid minerals and \nmanufacturing \nsub-sectors, \nrespectively, compared with 17.68 and \n2.35 per cent in the preceding quarter \nand 26.29 and 3.39 per cent in the \ncorresponding period of 2018. Thus, the \nshare of the industrial sector in overall \nGDP increased to 19.01 per cent from \n16.09 in the preceding quarter, but \nbelow the 19.53 per cent recorded in \nthe corresponding period of 2018. \nThe development in the industrial sector \nis instructive at the policy level. It will be \nrecalled that the 2016 recession was \npreceded by persistent contractions of \nthe industrial sector. There, however, \nappears to be a repeat occurrence of \nthis trend, thus urgent efforts are \nrequired to reverse the trend in order to \navert another recession in the near \nterm. \nIn the second quarter of 2019, however, \nthe \nindustrial \nsector \nrecorded \na \nsignificant growth of 2.36 per cent \nfollowing a revised contraction of 0.26 \nper cent in the preceding quarter. \nWhen compared with the contraction \nof 1.56 per cent in the corresponding \nperiod \nof \n2018, \nthe \nsector \ngrew \nsignificantly by 3.92 percentage points. \nThe driver of the growth in the sector \nwas the crude petroleum and natural \ngas sub-sector which grew by 5.15 per \ncent \nin \nthe \nreview \nperiod \nfrom \ncontractions of 1.46 per cent and 3.95 \nper cent in the preceding quarter and \nthe corresponding period of 2018. The \ngrowth of the industrial sector was, \nhowever, \nmoderated \nby \nthe \ncontractions of 2.54 and 0.13 per cent in \nthe solid minerals and manufacturing \nsub-sectors, \nrespectively, \ncompared \nwith growth of 11.03 and 0.81 per cent \nin the preceding quarter, and 2.86 and \n0.68 per cent in the corresponding \nperiod of 2018. Nevertheless, the share \nof the industrial sector in overall GDP \nrose to 18.07 per cent from 17.99 per \ncent in the corresponding period of \n2018. It was, however, 19.08 per cent in \nthe preceding quarter. \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n12 \nFigure 2.5: \nIndustrial Sector Contribution by Activity (2017Q1-\n2019Q2) \nSource: Statistics Department \n \n2.2.2.2 Industrial Policy and Institutional \nSupport \nThe industrial sector continued to \nbenefit from a number of policies, \nincentives \nand \ninstitutional \nsupport \nduring the review period. These were: \nPower and Airline Intervention Fund \n(PAIF) \nThere was no disbursement in the review \nperiod, however, ₦12.728 billion was \nrepaid compared with the repayment \nof ₦12.35 billion in the corresponding \nperiod of 2018. \nNigeria Electricity Market Stabilization \nFacility (NEMSF) \nIn the review period, there was no \ndisbursement \nunder \nthe \nFacility, \ncompared with a disbursement of \n₦38.53 billion to one (1) distribution \ncompany \n(DisCo), \n17 \ngenerating \ncompanies (GenCos), 6 gas companies \n(GasCos) and 5 service providers, in the \ncorresponding period of 2018. Also, \n₦9.36 billion was repaid in the review \nperiod, compared with ₦4.99 billion in \nthe corresponding period of 2018. \nReal Sector Support Facility (RSSF) \nDuring the review period, ₦40.00 billion \nwas released to 1 project, compared \nwith ₦23.91 billion to 5 projects in the \ncorresponding period of 2018. A total of \n₦2.90 billion was repaid in the period, \ncompared with ₦960.16 million in the \ncorresponding half of 2018. \nUnder the Differentiated Cash Reserves \nRequirement (DCRR) window, ₦75.55 \nbillion was disbursed to 18 projects \nduring the period. No repayment has \nbeen made in the Window due to a \ncurrent moratorium on all existing loans. \nTextile Sector Intervention Facility (TSIF) \nIn the first half of 2019, no disbursements \nwere \nmade \nunder \nthe \nFacility, \ncompared with the sum of ₦19.1 billion \nto 2 projects in the first half of 2018. \nDuring the period, ₦884.38 million was \nrepaid by 6 projects. \n \nNigeria Bulk Electricity Trading Payment \nAssurance Facility (NBET-PAF) \nUnder the Facility, ₦98.12 billion was \ndisbursed in the first half of 2019, \ncompared with ₦248.40 billion in the \ncorresponding period of 2018. \n \nSmall \nand \nMedium \nEnterprises \nRestructuring and Refinancing Facility \n(SMERRF) \nDisbursement was discontinued under \nthe Facility in December 2014 following \nits replacement with the Real Sector \nSupport Facility after it had met its \nobjectives. \nIn \nthe \nreview \nperiod, \n-20.00\n-10.00\n0.00\n10.00\n20.00\n30.00\n40.00\nQ1-2017\nQ2-2017\nQ3-2017\nQ4-2017\nQ1-2018\nQ2-2018\nQ3-2018\nQ4-2018\nQ1-2019\nQ2-2019\nPer cent\nCrude Petroleum & Natural Gas\nSolid Minerals\nManufacturing\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n13 \nrepayments received amounted to \n₦12.60 billion. \nYouth Entrepreneurship Development \nProgramme (YEDP) \nThe YEDP aims to deepen credit \ndelivery \nto \ndiligent \nyouth \nentrepreneurs, including serving and \nex- National Youth Service Corps \n(NYSC) members. \nThere were no disbursements during the \nreview period, however, ₦20.65 million \nwas repaid compared with ₦7.01 \nmillion in the corresponding period of \n2018. \nCreative Industry Financing Initiative \n(CIFI) \nCIFI was introduced during the review \nperiod as a window under the AGSMEIS \nto improve access to long-term, low-\ninterest financing to entrepreneurs and \ninvestors in the Nigerian Creative \nIndustry and Information technology \n(IT) sub-sectors. Activities eligible for \nfinancing include fashion, information \ntechnology, software development, \nmovie \nand \nmusic \nproduction \n& \ndistribution. \n \nCBN-BOI Industrial Facility \nThis is a facility provided by the Central \nBank of Nigeria to the Bank of Industry \n(BOI) to enhance the financing of the \nindustrial sector through investments in \nvalue-added \nprojects. \nThe \nBank \napproved and released the sum of ₦50 \nbillion to the BOI for this purpose. \nIn the first half of the year, there was no \ndisbursement \nunder \nthe \nFacility, \ncompared with ₦50.0 billion disbursed to \n30 projects in the corresponding period \nof 2018. \n \n2.2.3 Construction and Trade \nThere \nhas \nbeen \nsustained \nimprovement in Construction sector \nactivities in recent times. In the first \nquarter of 2019, the sector grew by 3.18 \nper cent, compared with 2.05 per cent \nin the preceding quarter in contrast to \nthe contraction of 1.54 per cent in the \ncorresponding quarter of 2018. The \ndevelopment \nis \nreflected \nin \nthe \nimprovements in capital releases since \n2018. \nConsequently, \nthe \nshare \nof \nConstruction in real GDP improved to \n4.09 per cent from 3.48 and 4.04 per \ncent \nin \nthe \npreceding \nand \ncorresponding quarters of 2018. \nDuring the second quarter, the growth \nof the sector moderated to 0.67 per \ncent compared with 3.18 and 7.66 per \ncent in the preceding quarter and the \ncorresponding \nperiod \nof \n2018, \nrespectively. The share of Construction \nin real GDP declined to 4.45 per cent \ncompared with 4.51 per cent in the \ncorresponding period of 2018. It was, \nhowever an improvement from 4.09 per \ncent in the preceding quarter. \n2.2.4 Construction and Trade \nThe sluggish performance of the Trade \nsector continued in the review period. \nAlthough the sector grew marginally by \n0.85 per cent during the period, it had \ncontracted by 2.57 per cent in the \ncorresponding period of 2018, ending \nthe year with an overall contraction of \n0.63 per cent. In the preceding quarter, \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n14 \nhowever, it grew marginally by 1.02 per \ncent. The share of Trade in real GDP, \nhowever, rose marginally to 16.87 per \ncent in the first quarter of 2019 from \n16.50 per cent in the fourth quarter of \n2018 but was a decline compared with \n17.07 per cent in the corresponding \nperiod of 2018. \nIn the second quarter, the contraction \nof the trade sector moderated to 0.25 \nper cent from 2.14 per cent in the \ncorresponding period of 2018. When \ncompared with the growth of 0.85 per \ncent in the preceding quarter, the \nsector contracted by 1.1 percentage \npoints. The share of Trade in real GDP \ndeclined to 16.10 per cent in the review \nperiod from 16.86 and 16.45 per cent in \nthe \npreceding \nquarter \nand \nthe \ncorresponding \nperiod \nof \n2018, \nrespectively. \nThe continued softness in this sector \ncould further amplify the weakness \nobserved in the industrial sector to lead \nthe overall economy into recession in \nthe \nabsence \nof \nrobust \npolicy \ninterventions. \n2.2.5 Service Sector \nThe Services sector sustained its growth \nfor six consecutive quarters. The sector \ngrew by 3.16 per cent in the first quarter \nof 2019, compared with 3.71 and 0.59 \nper cent in the preceding quarter, and \ncorresponding period of 2018. Growth in \nthe sector was driven by transport \n(19.50%), Information & Communication \n(9.48%), \nArts, \nEntertainment \n& \nRecreation \n(7.12%), \nUtilities \n(6.22%), \nAccommodation \n& \nFood \nServices \n(4.15%), \nProfessional, \nScientific \n& \nTechnical \nServices \n(1.73%) \nand \nAdministrative \n& \nSupport \nServices \n(1.43%). However, the sub-sectors that \ncontracted during the period were: \nPublic Administration (14.21%), Finance \nand Insurance (7.60%), and Human \nHealth & Social Services (0.16%). The \nshare of the services sector in overall \nGDP increased to 38.12 per cent in the \nfirst quarter of 2019 from 37.79 and 37.69 \nper cent in the preceding quarter and \nthe corresponding quarter of 2018, \nrespectively. \nThe growth of the services sector \nmoderated to 2.93 per cent in the \nsecond quarter of 2019 from 4.19 and \n3.16 per cent in the corresponding \nperiod of 2018 and the preceding \nquarter, \nrespectively. \nThe \nsector’s \ngrowth during the quarter was driven by \ninformation & communication (9.01%), \ntransport \n(8.02%), \nutilities \n(4.73%), \naccommodation \n& \nFood \nServices \n(2.92%), other services (2.55%) and \nadministrative \n& \nSupport \nServices \n(2.03%). The sub-sectors that contracted \nduring the period were: real estate \n(3.84%), public administration (3.39%) \nand finance and insurance (2.24%). The \nshare of the services sector in overall \nGDP increased to 38.56 per cent in the \nsecond quarter of 2019 from 38.09 and \n38.19 per cent in the preceding quarter \nand the corresponding period of 2018, \nrespectively. \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n15 \nFigure 2.6: \nServices Sub-Sector Contribution, 2016Q1-2018Q2 \n \nSource: Statistics Department \n \n2.2.6 \nOil Sector \nDuring \nthe \nreview \nperiod, \nthe \nperformance \nof \nthe \noil \nsector \nmoderated despite the relative stability \nin the price of crude oil. The moderation \ncame from two main forces; namely \ndemand-supply dynamics and price \nfactors. Global oil prices had largely \nfluctuated within the range of US$60-70 \nper barrel, while demand-supply factors \nunderpinned \nmarket \ndevelopments. \nThe growing investment and production \nof shale oil in the US, increased supply \nfrom Saudi Arabia in the wake of US \nsanctions against Iran coupled with the \nslowing global economy occasioned by \nUS induced trade tensions against \nChina and its other trading allies had \nsubstantially \nweakened \ndemand, \ncreating a situation of moderate supply \nglut. These developments are in spite of \nthe subsisting production ceiling by \nOPEC and some non-OPEC members. \nThere were also pockets of tension in the \nMiddle East and Venezuela which are \nkey oil producers. On the domestic front, \nproduction weakness has persisted on \naccount of the unclear fiscal regime in \nthe oil industry as well as the reluctance \nof banks to extend new credit to \nfinance exploration and production in \nthe sector, having accumulated huge \nnon-performing loans \nin \nthe past. \nConsequently, \naverage \ncrude \noil \nproduction stood at 1.99 mbpd in the \nfirst quarter of 2019 compared with 1.98 \nmbpd in the corresponding period of \n2018. This also represented an increase \nrelative to the 1.91 mbpd in the previous \nquarter. In the second quarter of 2019, \naverage crude oil production rose to \n1.98 mbpd from 1.84 mbpd in the \ncorresponding period of 2018, but a \nmarginal decline compared with the \n1.99 mbpd in the preceding quarter of \n2019. \nIn the review period, crude oil prices \nfluctuated mainly due to the crisis in the \nMiddle East, Venezuela and the US \nsanctions on Iranian oil as well as the \nsubsisting OPEC production ceiling. As a \nresult, the price of Nigeria’s reference \ncrude, the Bonny Light 370API which was \nat US$62.91 per barrel (pb) in January \n2018, increased to US$69.93pb in March \nand peaked at US73.89pb in April. It, \nhowever, fell to US$70.07pb in June, \n2019. Overall, the average price of \nBonny Light of US$65.77pb in the first half \nof 2019 was US$5.77pb above the \nFederal Government of Nigeria’s 2019 \nbudget benchmark of US$60.0pb. \n-20.00\n-15.00\n-10.00\n-5.00\n0.00\n5.00\n10.00\n15.00\n20.00\n25.00\n30.00\nTransport\nInfo. & Comm\nUtilities\nAccom &\nComm\nFinance &\nInsurance\nReal Estate\nProf, Sci &\nTech Service\nAdmin &\nBusiness\nSupport\nPublic Admin\nEducation\nHealth &\nSocial Service\nArts,\nEntertainment\n& Recreation\nOther Services\nPer cent\nQ1-2017\nQ2-2017\nQ3-2017\nQ4-2017\nQ1-2018\nQ2-2018\nQ3-2018\nQ4-2018\nQ1-2019\nQ2-2019\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n16 \nFigure 2.7: \nQuarterly Domestic Crude Oil Production \n(2017Q1-2019Q2) \n \nSource: Research Department \n \nFigure 2.8: \nMonthly Bonny Light Oil Price, January – June \n2019 \n \nSource: Research Department \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n0.2\n0.7\n1.2\n1.7\n2.2\n2.7\nQ1-2017\nQ2-2017\nQ3-2017\nQ4-2017\nQ1-2018\nQ2-2018\nQ3-2018\nQ4-2018\nQ1-2019\nQ2-2019\nMillion Barrels Per Day\n55\n60\n65\n70\n75\nUS$ Per Barrel\nBonny Light Oil Price\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n17 \nThe African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA): Implications for Trade and \nGrowth in Nigeria \n \nIntroduction: \n \nThe imperatives to respond to the dynamic economic challenges and the increasing \neconomic interrelationship among economies have made regional integration and \nthe associated regional trade agreements inevitable for economic transformation \nand sustainable development within a regional area. According to the World Trade \nOrganization (WTO), global trade, as we know it today, is shaped by regional trade \nagreements, hence, explaining the proliferation of sub-regional agreements, with \nabout 420 of such free and non-free trade agreements in force globally. \n \nRegional integration and trade agreements are particularly inevitable and relevant \nfor Africa, which had hitherto, remained a fragmented bundle of small resource-rich \nbut commodity-dependent economies, having the need to optimize its resource \nendowments and translate them into welfare gains for its teeming population. \nConsequently, the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) was \nconceived, as a strategy to aggregate Africa’s small countries into one large market \nthat can deliver economies of scale, improved competitiveness, foreign direct \ninvestment (FDI) and poverty reduction. \nOn the socio-political front, it is intended to help in addressing problems such as \nrecurring conflicts and political instability as well as increasing the continent’s \nbargaining power in the multilateral front. \n \nThe decision to establish the AfCFTA was taken at the 18th Ordinary Session of the \nAssembly of AU Heads of State and Government, in Addis Ababa, in January 2012. \nThe AU Summit then endorsed the Action Plan for Boosting Intra-African Trade (BIAT). \nNigeria initiated the process for the establishment of AfCFTA in 1991 at the Economic \nand Trade Policy Leadership tagged “Abuja Treaty”. Thereafter, the Agreement \ncame into force on 12th May, 1994. Actual negotiations were launched at the 25th \nOrdinary Session in 2015 in Johannesburg, South Africa. The Agreement requires \ncountries to take out tariffs on 90 percent of goods, with 10 per cent of \"sensitive \nitems\" to be addressed later. The AfCFTA intends to address supposed \"non-tariff \nbarriers\" which impede trade amongst African countries, such as extended delays \nalong the border. \n \nThe AfCFTA was signed in Kigali, Rwanda on 21st March, 2018 by 44 African heads of \nstate, except for Nigeria and South Africa. However, its signing did not yet create \nthe African Continental Free Trade Area. Nigeria, however, abstained from signing \nthe AfCFTA on concerns for the need to protect domestic industries and small \nbusinesses from external pressures and competition that could lead to closures and \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n18 \njob losses, as well as to further engage with stakeholders to consider the \nconsequences of an open market to Nigeria’s manufacturing sector and SMEs. \nHowever, after an extensive nationwide consultation and sensitisation programme \nof domestic stakeholders on the AfCFTA, the Nigerian President appended his \nsignature to the agreement at the 12th Extraordinary Summit of the African Union on \nthe Launch of the Operational Phase of the AfCFTA in Niamey, on 7th July 2019. \n \nImplications for Trade and Growth in Nigeria \nThe potential benefits for Nigeria from AfCFTA are massive; given that AfCFTA would \ncover a consumer base of over 1.2 billion people with a combined GDP of US$2.2 \ntrillion. AfCFTA’s implementation is expected to facilitate industrialization and create \na continental market, unlock manufacturing potential, and create a mammoth \ninternational negotiation block. \nAfCFTA has the prospects to give the country an expanded market access for export \nof goods and services, essentially, linking Nigerian exporters to global value chains \nfor business and enterprise; with potential to bring down hitherto existing barriers to \ntrade against Nigerian exporters and remove the usually discriminatory and hostile \ntreatment Nigerian businesses have had to endure in other African countries; \nAfCFTA is expected to boost regional cooperation and stimulate scale efficiency, \ndynamism and competitiveness of Nigerian goods. It will aid easier movement of \ngoods, services, investment, capital and people. Ultimately, it is expected to offer \nnew ways of coordinating supply chains; it would increase trade volumes which \nshould lead to increased values and lower prices; expand consumer choices; \ncontribute to growth and expand job creation in Nigeria and Africa. It portends a \ngreat opportunity for Nigeria’s businesses to become prominent players in the \nAfrican market due to the expanded market access. \nAfCFTA will eliminate impediments against Nigeria’s products and services, as well as \nreduce hostility against Nigerian citizens (natural and corporate persons) in other \nAfrican nations. It will boost the industry course of action of Nigeria via the bargained \nand agreed “Exclusion and Sensitive category lists” to create room for Nigeria’s \ninfant industries. This is in addition to engendering know-how and quality products \nthrough competition and strengthening of the country’s business environment, \nthereby reaffirming the economy as truly the largest in Africa. \nAfCFTA will encourage and create room for growth in Nigeria’s exports market by \naiding and nudging the economy in the direction of manufacturing and export-\noriented services. This also offers a platform for the integration of Nigerian Small and \nMedium Enterprises (SMEs) into the continental economy. \nHowever, to realize the lofty prospects of AfCFTA for trade and growth in Nigeria, it is \nimportant that the nation properly identify its weaknesses and strengths within the \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n19 \ncontext of AfCFTA provisions and protocols, and recognizing those imbedded \nattributes in the Agreement that can undermine the realization of the potential \nbenefits for the country. \nIt is incumbent on Nigeria to take the advantage provided by AfCFTA to revive the \ncountry’s manufacturing industry through bold and deliberate policy actions to \neliminate impediments, and build infrastructure. This can be achieved by addressing \nthe intractable power issues, corruption and ease of doing business; ensuring security \nof lives and property, and implementing policies that are geared towards \nempowering manufacturers, including SMEs, through access to credit and finance, \namong others. \nEnsuring that the Nigerian economy remains competitive vis-à-vis other African \neconomies should be the guiding principle during the implementation phase. The \ngoal is to reassert Nigeria as an attractive investment destination with the aim of \nconsolidating the country’s number one economic position on the continent. \nMeasures should be implemented to ensure that AfCFTA is not used against Nigeria’s \ninterests by turning the country economic space into a dumping ground for goods \nfrom other countries, thus undermining the capacity of Nigerian manufacturers, \nparticularly, in export oriented goods. It is also important to exploit AfCFTA as a \nveritable political instrument to enhance Nigeria’s economic and trade policy \nleadership, both on the continent and beyond. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n21 \nCHAPTER THREE \n \n3.0 \nDOMESTIC PRICE DEVELOPMENTS \nn the first half of 2019, the inflation \nenvironment became benign with a \ntrend towards moderation in prices, \ndue largely to the relatively tight \nmonetary policy stance of the Bank. \nHeadline and core inflation generally \nmaintained a downward trend, while \nthe \nfood \ncomponent \nfluctuated \nupwards during the review period. \nHeadline inflation, however, remained \nabove the upper band of the Bank’s \ntarget benchmark of 6-9 per cent, \nindicating that latent price pressures \nwere \nyet \nto \nbe \nsubdued. \nPrice \ndevelopments generally reflected the \ninterplay of both supply- and demand-\nrelated factors. \nOn the supply side, the relative stability \nin the naira exchange rate, due to \nsustained supply of foreign exchange in \nthe market from the CBN and other \nautonomous \nsources, \nhad \na \nmoderating effect on domestic price \ndevelopments in the review period. \nThus, the naira strengthened in all \nsegments of the market, reflecting the \nimpact \nof \nrecent \nreforms \nand \ninterventions by the Bank, including the \nintroduction of measures to encourage \ncapital inflow and improve liquidity in \nthe \nforeign \nexchange \nmarket. \nIn \naddition, accretion to external reserves \nimproved on account of sustained \nstability in crude oil prices and inflow of \nproceeds \nfrom \nforeign \nborrowing, \nthereby strengthening the naira. The \nBank also sustained the implementation \nof a number of reforms, including the \nInvestors’ & Exporters’ (I&E) window, the \nuse of Bank Verification Number (BVN) in \nBDC transactions, and resumption of \nsale of foreign exchange to BDCs by the \nBank and International Money Transfer \nOperators (IMTOs). The Bank further \nintensified \nits \nexisting \npolicy \non \nrepatriation of export proceeds as well \nas return of unutilized foreign exchange \nsourced from official foreign exchange \nauctions to the CBN. \nOn \nthe \ndemand-side, \nprice \ndevelopments were also impacted by \ncontinued restriction of access to \nforeign exchange for 42 items and the \nuse of bank verification number (BVN) in \nBDC transactions. In addition, the Bank’s \nuse \nof \nliquidity \nmanagement \ninstruments, especially Open Market \nOperations (OMO) bills also helped to \nmoderate price pressures. With the \nprevailing uncertainties in the market, \nthe Inter-Bank Call and Open Buy Back \n(OBB) rates fluctuated widely for most of \nthe period. The major sources of liquidity \nin \nthe \nreview \nperiod \nwere: \nCBN \ninterventions, the implementation of the \n2018 and 2019 budgets, maturing OMO \nbills, Joint Ventures Cash (JVC) calls and \ndistributions of proceeds of revenue in \nthe Federation Account to the 3 tiers of \ngovernment. \nThe \nsustained \ntight \nmonetary policy stance which earlier \nconstrained \nmoney \nsupply \nwas, \nhowever, slightly relaxed in the review \nperiod. \n3.1 Trends in Inflation \nHeadline, core and food measures of \ninflation fluctuated during the period \nI\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n22 \nunder review. The three measures of \nconsumer price index (CPI) stood at \n289.7, 267.9 and 316.0, in June 2019, \ncompared with276.6, 258.8 and 298.9 in \nJanuary \n2019, \nrespectively. \nFood \ninflation \n(year-on-year) \nincreased \nmarginally by 0.05 percentage point \nfrom 13.51 per cent in January to 13.56 \nper cent in June 2019. Core inflation, \nhowever, \nfell \nsignificantly \nby \n1.07 \npercentage points from 9.91 per cent in \nJanuary to 8.84 per cent in June 2019. \nThe net effect of the development was \nthat headline inflation declined by 0.15 \npercentage point from 11.37 per cent in \nJanuary to 11.22 per cent in June 2019 \n(Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1). Thus, the \nmajor driver of the overall moderation in \nconsumer prices during the period was \ncore \ninflation, \nwith \nsome \nsub-\ncomponents of the food measure also \ncontributing to the moderation (Table \n3.4). \nTable 3.1: \nInflation Rates, January – June 2019 \nSource: Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics data \nbase \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFigure 3.1: \nHeadline, Core and Food Inflation Rates (January \n– June 2018) \n \nSource: Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics data \nbase \n \n3.1.1 Headline Inflation \nMajor \ncomponents \nof \nheadline \ninflation continued to decrease during \nthe first half of the year, thus moderating \ndomestic prices. The main driver of the \nmoderation in headline inflation was \nTransport, which decreased to 0.54 per \ncent in June, 2019 from 0.60 per cent in \nJanuary. This was followed by housing, \nwater, electricity, gas and other fuels, \nwhich fell to 1.21 per cent from 1.27 per \ncent over the same period. Food and \nNon-Alcoholic \nBeverages, \nhowever, \nrose to 7.43 per cent from 7.36 per cent, \nthus dampening the moderation in \nheadline inflation (Table 3.2 and Figure \n3.4). \nThe stability in the foreign exchange \nmarket, due to demand management \nmeasures, further contributed to the \ndecline in inflation during the period. \nForeign exchange supply measures \nsuch as the restriction of 42 items, I&E \nwindow and intervention sales in the \nmarket \nalso \nhelped \nto \nmoderate \npressures. Other contributory factors \nwere the tight monetary policy stance \nCPI\nY-on-Y\n12MMA\nCPI\nY-on-Y\n12MMA\nCPI\nY-on-Y\n12MMA\nJan 2019 276.60\n11.37\n11.80\n258.75\n9.91\n10.34\n298.85\n13.51\n13.93\nFeb 2019 278.62\n11.31\n11.56\n260.44\n9.80\n10.19\n301.30\n13.47\n13.62\nMar 2019 280.81\n11.25\n11.40\n261.82\n9.46\n10.04\n303.94\n13.45\n13.42\nApr 2019 283.46\n11.37\n11.31\n263.65\n9.28\n9.91\n307.40\n13.70\n13.34\nMay 2019 286.61\n11.40\n11.30\n265.62\n9.03\n9.77\n311.73\n13.79\n13.37\nJun 2019 289.69\n11.22\n11.30\n267.88\n8.84\n9.64\n315.97\n13.56\n13.42\nHeadline Inflation\nCore Inflation\nFood Inflation\n0.00\n5.00\n10.00\n15.00\nJan\n2019\nFeb\n2019\nMar\n2019\nApr\n2019\nMay\n2019\nJun\n2019\nHeadline Inflation\nCore Inflation\nFood Inflation\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n23 \nof the Bank and the continued supply of \nforeign exchange to the market. \nTable 3.2 \nMajor Components of Headline Inflation (Y-on-Y), \nJanuary - June 2019 \n \n \nFigure 3.2 \nMajor Components of Headline Inflation (Y-on-Y), \nJanuary – June 2019 \n \nOn a month-on-month basis, headline \ninflation increased to 1.07 per cent in \nJune 2019 from 0.74 per cent in January. \nThe major drivers of the month-on-\nmonth increase were the prices of: food \nand non-alcoholic beverages, which \nrose to 0.76 per cent in June from 0.46 \nper cent in January; and Housing, \nWater, Elect. Gas & Other fuels to 0.11 \nper cent in June, 2019 from 0.08 per cent \nin January (Table 3.3 and Figure 3.5). The \nrising trend of month-on-month inflation \nin contrast to the moderating year-on-\nyear inflation implies a buildup of \ninflationary pressure in the economy, \nthus requiring the proactive tightening \nof monetary policy. \n \n \nTable 3.3 \nMajor Components of Headline Inflation (M-on-\nM), January - June 2018 \n \nFigure 3.3 \nMajor Components of Headline Inflation (M-on-\nM), January – June 2019 \n \n \n3.1.2 Food Inflation \nFood inflation (year-on-year) rose by \n0.05 percentage point to 13.56 per cent \nin June 2019 from 13.51 per cent in \nJanuary. The main driver was farm \nproduce which rose by 0.79 percentage \npoint to 7.79 per cent from 7.00 per \ncent. Processed food, however, fell by \n0.74 percentage point to 5.77 per cent \nin June 2019 from 6.51 per cent in \nJanuary. The increase in farm produce \nwas accounted for by the increase in \nthe prices of rice agric sold loose and \nrice local sold loose by 0.45 and 0.38 \npercentage point to 1.55 and 1.25 per \ncent in June 2019 from 1.10 and 0.88 per \ncent in January, respectively. This was \ndue to the shortage of food supply \noccasioned \nby \npersisting insecurity \nHeadline\nFood & \nNon-\nAlcoholic \nBev.\nAlcoholic \nBev. \nTobacco \n& Kola \nClothing \n& \nfootwear\nHousing,\nWater, \nElect.Gas \n& Other \nFuel\nFurnishings, \nHousehold \nEquip &HH \nMaint.\nHealth\nTransport Education\nJan'19\n11.37\n7.36\n0.09\n0.75\n1.27\n0.43\n0.25\n0.60\n0.34\nFeb'19\n11.31\n7.34\n0.09\n0.75\n1.25\n0.42\n0.24\n0.59\n0.33\nMar '19\n11.25\n7.33\n0.09\n0.74\n1.24\n0.42\n0.24\n0.58\n0.33\nApr '19\n11.37\n7.47\n0.09\n0.74\n1.24\n0.42\n0.24\n0.57\n0.32\nMay '19\n11.40\n7.54\n0.09\n0.74\n1.24\n0.41\n0.24\n0.56\n0.31\nJune '19\n11.22\n7.43\n0.09\n0.73\n1.21\n0.40\n0.23\n0.54\n0.30\n0.00\n2.00\n4.00\n6.00\n8.00\n10.00\n12.00\nJan\n2019\nFeb\n2019\nMar\n2019\nApr\n2019\nMay\n2019\nJun\n2019\nHeadline\nFood & Non-Alcoholic\nBev.\nAlcoholic Bev. Tobacco\n& Kola\nHousing,Water,\nElect.Gas & Other Fuel\nFurnishings, Household\nEquip &HH Maint.\nHealth\nTransport\nEducation\nHeadline\nFood & \nNon-\nAlcoholic \nBev.\nAlcoholic \nBev. \nTobacco \n& Kola \nClothing \n& \nfootwear\nHousing,\nWater, \nElect.Gas \n& Other \nFuel\nFurnishings, \nHousehold \nEquip &HH \nMaint.\nHealth\nTransport Education\nJan'19\n0.74\n0.46\n0.01\n0.05\n0.08\n0.03\n0.02\n0.04\n0.02\nFeb'19\n0.73\n0.45\n0.01\n0.05\n0.09\n0.03\n0.02\n0.04\n0.02\nMar '19\n0.79\n0.49\n0.01\n0.05\n0.11\n0.03\n0.02\n0.04\n0.02\nApr '19\n0.94\n0.63\n0.01\n0.06\n0.11\n0.03\n0.02\n0.04\n0.02\nMay '19\n1.11\n0.78\n0.01\n0.06\n0.12\n0.03\n0.02\n0.04\n0.02\nJune '19\n1.07\n0.76\n0.01\n0.06\n0.11\n0.03\n0.02\n0.04\n0.03\n0.00\n0.20\n0.40\n0.60\n0.80\n1.00\n1.20\n1.40\n1.60\n1.80\n2.00\n0.00\n0.05\n0.10\n0.15\n0.20\n0.25\n0.30\n0.35\nEducation\nTransport\nHealth\nFurnishings,\nHousehold Equip\n&HH Maint.\nHousing,Water,\nElect.Gas & Other\nFuel\nClothing &\nfootwear\nAlcoholic Bev.\nTobacco & Kola\nFood & Non-\nAlcoholic Bev.\nHeadline\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n24 \nacross the country which restrained \nfarming \nactivities \nand \nimpeded \ndistribution channels in the economy. \nThe development was compounded by \npolicy stagnancy in the agricultural \nsector except the CBN interventions in \nthe sector, at all levels of government. \n \nThe decrease in the price of processed \nfood was accounted for by the fall in \nthe prices of fish and sea food; sugar, \njam, honey etc; and garri by 0.06, 0.01 \nand \n0.46 \npercentage \npoint, \nrespectively. \n \nTable 3.4 \nMajor Components of Food Inflation (Y-on-Y), \nJanuary - June 2019 \n \n \nFigure 3.4 \nMajor Components of Food Inflation \n(Y-on-Y), January – June 2019 \n \nConsistent with the year-on-year trend, \nfood inflation on a month-on-month \nbasis rose by 0.53 percentage point to \n1.36 per cent in June 2019 from 0.83 per \ncent in January. This was largely \naccounted for by the increase in the \nprice of farm produce, which rose by \n0.51 percentage point to 0.82 per cent \nin June 2019 from 0.31 per cent in \nJanuary. \nSimilarly, \nthe \nprice \nof \nprocessed \nfood \nrose \nby \n0.03 \npercentage point to 0.54 per cent from \n0.51 per cent over the same period. The \nkey drivers of the increase in farm \nproduce were: Yam, Potatoes & Other \ntubers (0.06 percentage point); and rice \n(0.13 percentage point); while the rise in \nprocessed food was driven by meat \n(0.07 percentage point). \n \nTable 3.5 \nMajor Components of Food Inflation (M-on-M), \nJanuary – June, 2019 \n \n \nFigure 3.5 \nMajor Components of Food Inflation (M-on-M), \nJanuary – June 2019 \n \n3.1.3 Core Inflation \nCore inflation (year-on-year) fell to 8.84 \nper cent in June 2019 from 9.91 per cent \nin January 2019, a decrease of 1.07 \npercentage points. The performance \nFOOD\nProces\nsed \nFood\nMeat\nFish & \nSea Food\nMilk, \nCheese & \nEggs\nOil & \nFats\nSugar, \nJam, \nHoney, \netc.\nFarm \nProduce\nRice \nAgric \nSold \nLoose\nRice \nLocal \nSold \nLoose\nFruits\nVegat\nables\nYam, \nPotatoes \n& other \ntubers\nJan'19\n13.51\n6.51\n1.15\n1.34\n0.24\n0.80\n0.24\n7.00\n1.10\n0.88\n0.49\n1.41\n1.71\nFeb'19\n13.47\n6.29\n1.15\n1.34\n0.24\n0.80\n0.24\n7.18\n1.20\n0.86\n0.49\n1.41\n1.70\nMar '19\n13.45\n6.30\n1.15\n1.34\n0.23\n0.79\n0.24\n7.15\n0.00\n0.00\n0.48\n1.39\n1.71\nApr '19\n13.70\n6.28\n1.24\n1.35\n0.24\n0.84\n0.25\n7.42\n1.28\n0.99\n0.48\n1.38\n1.71\nMay '19\n13.79\n6.18\n1.31\n1.32\n0.24\n0.88\n0.24\n7.61\n1.39\n1.10\n0.46\n1.33\n1.68\nJune '19\n13.56\n5.77\n1.33\n1.28\n0.24\n0.89\n0.23\n7.79\n1.55\n1.25\n0.43\n1.28\n1.63\nChange \nbtw Jan \n& Jun. \n2019\n0.05\n-0.74\n0.18\n-0.06\n0.00\n0.09\n-0.01\n0.79\n0.45\n0.37\n-0.06\n-0.13\n-0.08\nFood\nProces\nsed \nFood\nMeat\nFish & \nSea \nFood\nMilk, \nCheese \n& Eggs\nOil & \nFats\nSugar, \nJam, \nHoney, \netc.\nFarm \nProduce\nFruits\nVegatabl\nes\nYam, \nPotatoes \n& other \ntubers\nJan'19\n0.83\n0.51\n0.07\n0.09\n0.02\n0.05\n0.02\n0.31\n0.03\n0.08\n0.10\nFeb'19\n0.82\n0.23\n0.07\n0.09\n0.02\n0.05\n0.01\n0.59\n0.03\n0.08\n0.10\nMar '19\n0.88\n0.35\n0.08\n0.09\n0.02\n0.05\n0.02\n0.53\n0.03\n0.08\n0.11\nApr '19\n1.14\n0.54\n0.16\n0.10\n0.02\n0.11\n0.02\n0.60\n0.03\n0.09\n0.11\nMay '19\n1.41\n0.70\n0.17\n0.11\n0.02\n0.11\n0.02\n0.71\n0.03\n0.10\n0.17\nJune '19\n1.36\n0.54\n0.14\n0.11\n0.02\n0.09\n0.02\n0.82\n0.03\n0.10\n0.16\nChange \nbtw Jan \n& Jun. \n0.53\n0.03\n0.07\n0.02\n0.00\n0.04\n0.00\n0.51\n0.00\n0.02\n0.06\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n25 \nwas driven by processed food (0.35 \npercentage point), Transportation (0.11 \npercentage point), Housing, water, \nelectricity \n& \nother \nfuels \n(0.09 \npercentage point) and Health (0.09 \npercentage point). The fall in these \nmajor components was due to the \nrelatively tight monetary policy stance, \nstability in the exchange rate, and \ncontinued implementation of foreign \nexchange management measures by \nthe Bank. In addition, the reactivation of \nrail transport services and the relatively \nstable energy and utility prices also \nsupported the moderation. \n \nTable 3.6 \nMajor Components of Core Inflation \n(Y-on-Y) January – June. 2019 \n \n \nFigure 3.6 \nMajor Components of Core Inflation \n(Y-on-Y) January – June 2019 \n \nThe month-on-month core inflation rose \nby 0.04 percentage point to 0.85 per \ncent in June 2019 from 0.81 per cent in \nJanuary. Processed food was the major \ndriver of the increase, as it rose to 0.38 \nper cent in June 2019 from 0.30 per cent \nin January (Table 3.7 and Figure 3.9). The \nrising trend in month-on-month core \ninflation in the face of the declining \nyear-on-year measure, indicated a \nbuild-up of inflationary pressure in the \nnear term from the core components. \n \nTable 3.7 \nMajor Components of Core Inflation \n(M-on-M) January – June. 2019 \n \n \nFigure 3.7 \nMajor Components of Core Inflation (M-on-M) \nJanuary – June 2019 \n \n \n3.1.4 Seasonally-Adjusted Inflation \nThe actual and seasonally-adjusted \nmeasures of headline inflation trended \ndownwards \nin \nthe \nreview \nperiod, \nreversing \nthe \nrising \ninflation \ntrend \nwitnessed during the second half of \n2018 (Table 3.8 and Figure 3.10). Actual \nheadline inflation continued to reflect \nthe general price level in the economy, \ntrending below the seasonally-adjusted \nheadline inflation during the early part \nof the review period, which reversed \nlater \nin \nthe \nperiod. \nThe \noverall \ndownward trend in both actual and \nCore\nProces\nsed \nFood\nNon-\nAlcoho\nlic \nBevera\nges\nAlcoholi\nc Bev. \nTobacco \n & Kola \nClothing \n& \nfootwear\nHousin\ng,Wate\nr, \nElect.G\nas & \nOther \nFuel\nFurnishin\ngs, \nHousehol\nd Equip \n&HH \nMaint.\nHealth\nTranspo\nrt\nCommu\nnication\nRecreatio\nn & \nculture\nEduc\nation\nRest\naura\nnt & \nHotel\ns\nMisc \nGood\ns & \nServi\nces\nJan'19\n9.91\n3.94\n0.14\n0.13\n0.95\n1.94\n0.53\n0.35\n0.90\n0.10\n0.11\n0.57 0.13 0.12\nFeb'19\n9.80\n3.89\n0.14\n0.13\n0.94\n1.95\n0.52\n0.34\n0.89\n0.10\n0.11\n0.56 0.12 0.12\nMar '19\n9.46\n3.75\n0.14\n0.13\n0.92\n1.92\n0.50\n0.32\n0.86\n0.10\n0.10\n0.54 0.09 0.09\nApr '19\n9.28\n3.74\n0.14\n0.13\n0.90\n1.90\n0.48\n0.30\n0.83\n0.09\n0.10\n0.52 0.07 0.07\nMay '19\n9.03\n3.66\n0.13\n0.13\n0.88\n1.88\n0.47\n0.27\n0.81\n0.09\n0.10\n0.49 0.05 0.05\nJune '19\n8.84\n3.59\n0.13\n0.13\n0.87\n1.85\n0.45\n0.26\n0.79\n0.09\n0.10\n0.48 0.04 0.05\nChange \nbtw Jan \n& Jun. \n2019\n-1.07\n-0.35\n-0.01\n0.00\n-0.08\n-0.09\n-0.08\n-0.09\n-0.11\n-0.01\n-0.01\n-0.09 -0.09 -0.07\nCore\nProces\nsed \nFood\nNon-\nAlcoho\nlic \nBevera\nges\nAlcoholi\nc Bev. \nTobacco \n & Kola \nClothing \n& \nfootwear\nHousin\ng,Wate\nr, \nElect.G\nas & \nOther \nFuel\nFurnishin\ngs, \nHousehol\nd Equip \n&HH \nMaint.\nHealth\nTranspo\nrt\nCommu\nnication\nRecreatio\nn & \nculture\nEduc\nation\nRest\naura\nnt & \nHotel\ns\nMisc \nGood\ns & \nServi\nces\nJan'19\n0.81\n0.30\n0.01\n0.01\n0.08\n0.16\n0.05\n0.03\n0.07\n0.01\n0.01\n0.05\n0.01\n0.02\nFeb'19\n0.65\n0.24\n0.01\n0.01\n0.07\n0.15\n0.04\n0.02\n0.06\n0.01\n0.01\n0.04\n0.00\n0.01\nMar '19\n0.53\n0.19\n0.01\n0.01\n0.06\n0.14\n0.03\n0.01\n0.05\n0.01\n0.01\n0.03 -0.01 0.00\nApr '19\n0.70\n0.33\n0.01\n0.01\n0.07\n0.14\n0.03\n0.01\n0.05\n0.01\n0.01\n0.03\n0.00\n0.00\nMay '19\n0.75\n0.35\n0.01\n0.01\n0.07\n0.15\n0.03\n0.02\n0.06\n0.01\n0.01\n0.03\n0.00\n0.00\nJune '19\n0.85\n0.38\n0.01\n0.01\n0.08\n0.16\n0.04\n0.02\n0.07\n0.01\n0.01\n0.05\n0.01\n0.01\nChange \nbtw Jan \n& Jun. \n2019\n0.04\n0.08\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n-0.01\n-0.01\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00 -0.01 -0.01\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n26 \nseasonally-adjusted \nmeasures \nof \ninflation were attributed to the stability \nin \nthe \nforeign \nexchange \nmarket, \nimproved accretion to external reserves \nand the sustained tight monetary policy \nstance of the Bank. \nTable 3.8: \nActual and Seasonally Adjusted Headline \nInflation January – June 2019 \nDate \nInflation \nS.A Inflation \nJan-19 \n11.37 \n11.36 \nFeb-19 \n11.31 \n11.37 \nMar-19 \n11.25 \n11.31 \nApr-19 \n11.37 \n11.31 \nMay-19 \n11.40 \n11.34 \nJun-19 \n11.22 \n11.33 \n \nFigure 3.8 \nActual and Seasonally Adjusted Headline \nInflation January – June 2019 \n \n3.2 \nKey \nFactors \nthat Influenced \nDomestic Prices \nDuring the review period, inflationary \npressure \nwas \ninfluenced \nby \na \ncombination of cost-push, demand-pull \nand moderating factors. The net effect \nof these factors was a moderation in \ndomestic prices. A summary of these \nfactors \ninclude: \na \nrelatively \ntight \nmonetary policy stance, continued \nintervention by the Bank in the real \nsector to improve the supply side, \nmeasures by the Bank to manage the \ndemand \nand \nsupply \nof \nforeign \nexchange to ensure exchange rate \nstability and relatively stable energy and \nutility prices. Others include: the impact \nof festivities and seasonal activities; \npersistent security challenges arising \nfrom \nfarmers-herders \nconflict, \nkidnapping and banditry in some parts \nof the country as well as production and \ndistribution \nchallenges \n \ndue \nto \ninsurgency in the north east region. \n3.2.1 Demand-side Factors \nOn the demand side, the moderation in \nheadline inflation was influenced by \nseveral factors such as; the relatively \ntight monetary policy stance of the \nBank, \ndemand \nside \nmanagement \nmeasures, which supported the stability \nof the exchange rate, as well as \nrelatively stable energy and utility prices \nduring \nthe \nperiod. \nThese \nfactors \noverwhelmed \nthe \neffect \nof \nfiscal \ninjections from FAAC disbursements, \nsustained liquidity surfeit in the banking \nsystem \nand \nexpectation \nof \nprice \npressures \nfrom \nthe \nanticipated \nimplementation of the new minimum \nwage law. \n \n3.2.2. Supply-side Factors \nThe \nsupply-side \nfactors \nthat \nmoderated inflationary pressure during \nthe review period included: relative \nstability in the exchange rate due to the \ncontinued implementation of foreign \nexchange management measures by \nthe \nBank, \nimproved \ntransportation \nactivity resulting from the reactivation of \n11.10\n11.20\n11.30\n11.40\n11.50\nInflation\nS.A Inflation\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n27 \nrail services and the relative stability of \nenergy and utility prices. \n \n3.2.3 Moderating Factors \nAlthough headline inflation moderated \nduring the review period, the decline \nwas wedged by a number of factors, \nthe absence of which would have \nresulted in a deeper moderation. These \nwere: the shortage of food supply \noccasioned by persistent insecurity \nacross the country which affected \nfarming \nactivities \nand \nimpeded \ndistribution channels in the economy, \npolicy stagnancy in the agricultural \nsector at all levels of government, and \nthe impact of festivities and seasonal \nactivities. \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n29 \nCHAPTER FOUR \n4.0 \nMONETARY \nPOLICY \nAND \nLIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT \nhe design and implementation of \nmonetary policy during the first half \nof 2019 continued to be shaped by \ndevelopments \nin \nthe \nglobal \nand \ndomestic \neconomies. \nThe \nkey \ndevelopments were: vulnerabilities in \nthe \nmajor \nfinancial \nmarkets \nand \nmounting external debt in Emerging \nMarket and Developing Economies \n(EMDEs), and slowdown in the Chinese \neconomy; as well as tightening global \nfinancial conditions. Others were: the \nescalating trade tensions between the \nUS, China and other major trading \npartners; imposition of a new round of \nsanctions \non \nIran; \nincreasing \ncomplications \nin \nthe \nBREXIT \nnegotiations, \nand \nindications \nof \nrenewed \ntension \non \nthe \nKorean \nPeninsula. Furthermore, the continuing \nmonetary policy normalization by the \nUS, the European Central Bank’s (ECB) \nabandonment of its monetary policy \nnormalization programme, continued \nasset purchase by the Bank of Japan \n(BoJ), and the lull in policy by the Bank \nof England signified a broad level of \nuncertainty in the global economy. \nOn the domestic front, the challenges \nwere: the liquidity effect of continued \nimplementation of the 2018 budget, \nresurgence \nin \ninflationary \npressure, \nheightened sovereign risk in the build-up \nto the 2019 general elections, and rising \npublic debt and deficits. In the face of \nthese developments, the desire to \nachieve price and financial system \nstability conducive to output growth \nwas \nthe \nmajor \nconsideration \nthat \ninfluenced monetary policy in the \nperiod under review. \n \n4.1 \nDECISIONS \nOF THE \nMONETARY \nPOLICY COMMITTEE (MPC) \nMonetary policy decisions in the first \nhalf of 2019 was shaped by major \ndevelopments \nin \nthe \nglobal \nand \ndomestic \neconomic \nand \nfinancial \nenvironments. \nThese \nincluded: \nthe \nescalation of trade tensions between \nthe US, China and other major trading \npartners; \nvulnerabilities \nin \nmajor \nfinancial \nmarkets \nand \nmounting \nexternal debt in Emerging Market and \nDeveloping Economies (EMDEs); and \nslowdown in the Chinese economy. \nOthers were: imposition of a new round \nof sanctions on Iran; and increasing \ncomplications \nin \nthe \nBREXIT \nnegotiations. In addition, the continuing \nmonetary policy normalization by the \nUS, the European Central Bank’s (ECB) \nabandonment of its monetary policy \nnormalization programme, continued \nasset purchase by the Bank of Japan \n(BoJ), and the lull in policy by the Bank \nof England increased the level of of \nuncertainty in the global economy. \nOn the domestic front, the challenges \nwere: the liquidity effect of continued \nimplementation of the 2018 budget, \nresurgence \nin \ninflationary \npressure, \nheightened sovereign risk in the build-up \nto the 2019 general elections, and rising \npublic debt and deficits. \nThese challenges and the need to \nachieve the objective of price and \nT\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n30 \nfinancial system stability conducive to \nsustainable and inclusive economic \ngrowth, were the key considerations \nthat underpinned the thrust of monetary \npolicy in the first half of 2019. \n4.1.1 January 2019 MPC Meeting \nThe 21st and 22nd January, 2019 MPC \nmeeting reviewed developments in the \nglobal and domestic economic and \nfinancial environments in 2018, as well as \nthe risks and outlook in the short to \nmedium \nterm. \nThe \nkey \nglobal \ndevelopments were: financial market \nvolatilities; trade tensions between the \nUS \nand \nits \nkey \ntrading \npartners; \ncontinuing \nmonetary \npolicy \nnormalization by the US; difficult BREXIT \nnegotiations, \ntermination \nof \nthe \nEuropean Central Bank’s (ECB) asset \npurchase program in December 2018 \nand the slowdown of the Chinese \neconomy. As a result, global growth was \ndowngraded by the IMF to 3.5 per cent \nin 2019, from 3.7 per cent in 2018. \nThe key developments on the domestic \nfront were the continued recovery in \noutput growth after the 2016 recession \nand the resurgence in inflationary \npressure. Real GDP grew by 1.81 per \ncent in Q3, 2018 from 1.50 per cent in \nQ2, 2018, driven by the services and \nagricultural sectors which grew by 1.19 \nand 0.56 per cent, respectively. Growth \nwas, however, dampened by the \npersistence of herdsmen attack on \nfarmers, cattle rustling and flooding in \nsome parts of the country, which \naffected \nagricultural \nand \nlivestock \noutput. The MPC was optimistic about \nQ4 2018 output growth given the \ncontinued \npositive \ntrend \nin \nthe \nManufacturing and Non-Manufacturing \nPurchasing Managers’ Indices (PMIs). \nIn terms of prices, headline inflation \n(year-on-year) inched up to 11.44 per \ncent in December 2018 from 11.28 per \ncent in November 2018. This was driven \nby food inflation, which rose to 13.36 per \ncent in December 2018 from 13.30 per \ncent in November, while core inflation \ndeclined marginally to 9.77 per cent in \nDecember 2018 from 9.79 per cent in \nthe previous month. The uptick in \ninflation \nwas \nattributed \nmainly \nto \nseasonal \nfactors, \nwhich \nimpacted \nprimarily on food. All measures of \nmonth-on-month \ninflation, \nhowever, \nshowed a decline. The headline, food \nand core measures (month-on-month) \ndeclined to 0.74, 0.81and 0.50 per cent \nin December 2018 from 0.84, 0.90 and \n0.68 per cent, respectively, in November \n2018. \nDevelopments in the financial markets \nindicated that the All-Share Index (ASI) \ndecreased (year-on-year) by 17.81 per \ncent to 31,430.50 at end-December \n2018 from 38,243.19 at end-December \n2017. The ASI further declined by 1.35 \nper cent to 31,005.17 as at January 18, \n2019. Similarly, Market Capitalization \n(MC) decreased by 13.87 per cent \n(year-on-year) to N11.72 trillion at end-\nDecember 2018 from N13.61 trillion at \nend-December 2017, declining further \nby 1.37 per cent to N11.56 trillion as at \nJanuary 18, 2019. The development was \nattributed \nto \nthe \nprogressive \nnormalization of monetary policy in \nsome \nadvanced \neconomies \nand \nperceived increase in sovereign risk in \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n31 \nthe build-up to the 2019 general \nelections, resulting in sustained profit \ntaking by some foreign investors. \nIn the foreign exchange market, there \nwas relative stability at both the Bureau-\nde-Change (BDC) segment and the \nInvestors’ and Exporters’ (I&E) window. \nThis stability was further enhanced by \nthe \nBank’s \nexchange \nrate \nmanagement \npolicies, \nthe \nimplementation \nof \nthe \nBilateral \nCurrency Swap Agreement (BCSA) with \nChina and the inflow of proceeds from \nthe US$2.8 billion Euro bond offer. \nNotwithstanding the above challenges \nin the global and domestic economy, \nthe MPC in its considerations noted \nremarkable \nprogress \ntowards \nmacroeconomic \nstability. \nThese \nincluded stability in the exchange rate, \nstable accretion to external reserves, \nmoderation in price development and \nthe low but gradual improvement in \noutput growth in the last six consecutive \nquarters. The MPC commended the \ngovernment’s focused expenditure on \ninvestment in infrastructure and urged \nthe Federal Government to sustain the \npace \ntowards \naddressing \nthe \ninfrastructural deficit in Nigeria. The \nCommittee commended the initiative \nof the Bankers Committee in addressing \nthe phenomenon of low credit to the \nsmall and medium scale enterprises \nthrough a partnership with the Nigeria \nIncentive-Based Risk Sharing System for \nAgricultural \nLending \n(NIRSAL) \nto \nestablish a national Microfinance bank \nto provide low interest rate loans to small \nscale businesses. The MPC also noted \nthat although there was an increase in \nthe year-on-year headline inflation for \nthe second consecutive month, the \nmonth-on-month inflation continued to \nmoderate, indicating that the year-on-\nyear measures will also moderate in the \nnear term. The Committee also noted \nwith satisfaction the gradual reduction \nin Non- Performing Loans of the deposit \nmoney banks (DMBs). The Committee \nbelieves that as Government pays off \ncontractor debts and other obligations, \nthere will be a sizable reduction in the \nNPLs of the banking system. \nIn reaching its decision, the MPC \nobserved the risks confronting the \neconomy such as the global and \ndomestic inflationary pressures, and the \nassociated \nrisk \nof \ncurrency \ndepreciation. As a result, it was of the \nview that a loosening option remained \nremote. On the other hand, weighing its \njudgement on price stability concerns, \nthe MPC was of the view that a \ntightening policy would result in the loss \nof the gains so far achieved, noting that \nthis may also drive DMBs to re-price their \nassets, thus increasing the cost of credit \nand \nelevating \ncredit \nrisk \nin \nthe \neconomy. \nThis, \nit believed, \nwould \nworsen the position of non-performing \nloans of the banks. The Committee \nequally \nfelt \nthat \ntightening \nwould \ndampen \ninvestments \nand \nhamper \nimprovements in output growth, given \nthat the growth performance so far \nremained fragile. \nBased on the foregoing, the MPC \ndecided by a vote of all eleven (11) \nmembers to keep the policy parameters \nunchanged from their current levels. \nThus, the MPC retained the MPR at 14 \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n32 \nper cent; the asymmetric corridor of \n+200/-500 basis points around the MPR; \nthe CRR at 22.5 per cent; and the \nLiquidity Ratio at 30 per cent. \n4.1.2 March 2019 MPC Meeting \nAt the 25th and 26th March 2019 MPC \nmeeting, developments in the global \nand domestic economic and financial \nenvironments in the first quarter of 2019 \nwere reviewed. Global output growth \nwas observed to be softening due to a \nset of legacy headwinds from the \nsecond half of 2018. These included: the \ncontinued trade war between the US \nand China; policy uncertainty amongst \nadvanced economy central banks; \npersisting \nuncertainties \nsurrounding \nBREXIT negotiations; vulnerabilities in \nmajor financial markets and rising public \ndebt in some Emerging Market and \nDeveloping Economies (EMDEs). \nIn the domestic economy, real Gross \nDomestic Product (GDP) grew by 2.38 \nper cent in Q4 2018 from 1.81 and 2.11 \nper cent in the previous quarter and \ncorresponding period of 2017. The major \ndriver of growth was the non-oil sector, \nwhich grew by 2.7 per cent in Q4 2018, \nwhile the oil sector contracted by 1.62 \nper cent. The MPC noted the positive \ndirection of output growth based on the \nManufacturing and Non-Manufacturing \nPurchasing Managers’ Indices (PMIs) \nwhich grew for the 24th and 23rd \nconsecutive months in March 2019. The \nmanufacturing PMI rose by 57.4 index \npoints compared with 57.1 in the \nprevious month. Similarly, the non-\nmanufacturing PMI increased by 58.5 \nindex points compared with 58.4 in \nFebruary 2019. The improvement in the \noutlook was attributed to the continued \nstability in the foreign exchange market, \ninterventions by the Bank in the real \nsector \nand \nthe \neffective \nimplementation \nof \nthe \nEconomic \nRecovery and Growth Plan (ERGP) by \nthe Federal Government. \nOn \nprice \ndevelopments, \nheadline \ninflation (year-on-year) declined further \nto 11.31 per cent in February 2019 from \n11.37 and 11.44 per cent in January 2019 \nand December 2018, respectively. The \ndecrease was driven by food inflation, \nwhich declined to 13.47 per cent in \nFebruary 2019 from 13.51 per cent in \nJanuary 2019, while core inflation also \ndeclined to 9.80 per cent from 9.91 per \ncent in the previous month. On a month-\non-month basis, headline, food and \ncore inflation declined to 0.73, 0.82 and \n0.65 \nper \ncent \nin \nFebruary \n2019, \nrespectively, from 0.74, 0.83 and 0.81 per \ncent in January 2019. In spite of this \ndecline, the upside risks to inflation \nremained the following: the high cost of \nenergy; \ninfrastructure \nconstraints; \ngrowing insecurity in the country; and \nanticipated increase in liquidity from the \nlate \nimplementation \nof \nthe \n2018 \nbudget. These factors were notably \noutside the ambit of monetary policy. \nIn the financial markets, the All-Share \nIndex (ASI) and Market Capitalization \n(MC) \ncontinued \nto \ndecline. \nThe \ndevelopment \nreflected \nsentiments \ntowards portfolio rebalancing from \nequities to fixed income securities, \nindicating the perceived risk at the long \nend of the yield curve. \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n33 \nIn its considerations, the Committee \nnoted that output growth was mostly \nweak in 2018, but, strengthened in the \nlast quarter, with a positive forecast for \n2019. The MPC further noted the \ncontinued moderation in all measures of \ninflation, \nsustained \nstability \nin \nthe \nexchange rate and the robust level of \nexternal reserves. The MPC noted the \nrelative volatility in oil prices and its \nimpact on accretion to reserves which \ncould easily undermine the relative \nstability \nobserved \nin \nthe \nforeign \nexchange market. It observed the \nimproved \nconfidence \nby \nforeign \ninvestors in the Nigerian economy \nreflected in the recent upsurge in \ncapital inflows into the economy. \nDespite these developments, the MPC \nwas conscious of unfavourable trends in \nthe global economy, such as the recent \nslowdown in output growth in some \nadvanced economies and the dovish \nstance of some major central banks, as \nan early warning sign of broader \nmacroeconomic \nvulnerabilities. \nThe \nMPC equally expressed concerns over \nthe growing fiscal deficit, external debt \nand cost of debt servicing. It, however, \nnoted that current developments in the \noil futures market indicate that oil prices \nwill remain considerably above the \nFederal Government’s 2019 budget \nbenchmark with prospects of improved \nfiscal receipts to manage the debt. On \nfinancial system stability, the MPC noted \nthe improvements in key financial \nsoundness indicators and commended \nthe \nFederal \nGovernment \nfor \nthe \nsettlement \nof \ndebts \nowed \nto \noil \nmarketers, which has considerably, \nhelped in reducing the NPL portfolio of \nthe banking industry. In anchoring its \nconsiderations, \nthe \nCommittee \nbelieved \nthat \nhaving achieved a \nrelatively stable exchange rate with \nprice stability, it is imperative that \nmonetary policy should explore the next \nsteps necessary for enhancing growth, \nreducing \nunemployment \nand \ndiversifying the productive base of the \neconomy. \nIn reaching its decision, the Committee \ndeliberated between the options of \nmaintaining the prevailing policy stance \nor easing slightly. The MPC was of the \nview that given the relative stability in \nthe key macroeconomic variables, \nthere was a need to signal a pro-growth \nstance. It was further convinced that this \nnew stance would encourage the flow \nof credit to the real economy, thus \nupholding the Bank’s commitment to \nsupport output growth. The Committee \nwas of the view that easing by a small \nmargin will not hurt capital flow to the \neconomy due to the wide spread \nbetween market rates in the EMDEs and \nthe advanced economies. \nConsequently, the MPC decided by a \nvote of six out of eleven members to \nreduce the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) \nby 50 basis points. Two members voted \nto reduce the MPR by 25 basis points, \nwhile one member voted to reduce it by \n100 \nbasis \npoints. \nTwo \nmembers, \nhowever, voted to hold the MPR at its \ncurrent level. Ten members voted to \nhold all other parameters constant, \nwhile a member voted to reduce the \nCash Reserve Ratio (CRR) by 100 basis \npoints from 22.5 to 21.5 per cent. Thus, \nthe Committee voted to adjust the MPR \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n34 \nby 50 basis points from 14.00 to 13.50 per \ncent; \nand \nretain \nthe \nasymmetric \ncorridor of +200/-500 basis points around \nthe MPR; the CRR at 22.5 per cent; and \nthe Liquidity Ratio at 30 per cent. \n4.1.3 May 2019 MPC Meeting \nThe Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) \nmet on 20th and 21st May, 2019 amidst \nuncertainties in the global and domestic \neconomic, \nfinancial \nand \npolitical \nenvironments. On global developments, \nthe weakening global output growth \ncontinued in the face of familiar \nheadwinds, \nincluding: \nthe \nfurther \nescalation of the trade war between \nthe US and China; imposition of new \nrounds of sanctions on Iran; difficult \nBREXIT negotiations; a new wave of \ntensions on the Korean Peninsula; \nvulnerabilities in major financial markets \nand rising public and private debt in \nsome Emerging Market and Developing \nEconomies (EMDEs). Accordingly, the \nInternational Monetary Fund further \ndowngraded its global output growth \nprojections for 2019 from 3.5 to 3.3 per \ncent. \nOn the domestic front, the recovery of \noutput moderated as real GDP grew by \n2.01 per cent in the first quarter of 2019 \ncompared with 2.38 per cent in the \nprevious quarter. It was, however, a \nmarginal improvement compared with \n1.89 per cent in the corresponding \nquarter of 2018. The performance was \nlargely driven by the non-oil sector, \nwhich grew by 2.47 per cent in the first \nquarter of 2019, while the oil sector \ncontracted by 2.40 per cent. Staff \nprojections indicated that real GDP will \nstrengthen to 2.34 and 2.36 per cent in \nQ2 and Q3 2019, respectively. The \nCommittee \nobserved \nthat \nactual \noutput \nremains \nbelow \npotential, \nimplying that the economy still had \nsufficient headroom for non-inflationary \ngrowth. \nIt \nnoted \nthe \ncontinued \nexpansion of the Manufacturing and \nNon-Manufacturing \nPurchasing \nManagers’ Indices (PMI) for the 25th and \n24th consecutive months in April 2019. \nThe manufacturing PMI grew by 57.7 \nindex points compared with 57.4 index \npoints in the previous month, while the \nnon-manufacturing PMI grew by 58.7 \nindex points compared with 58.5 index \npoints in March 2019. \nOn \nprice \ndevelopments, \nheadline \ninflation (year-on-year) rose slightly to \n11.37 per cent in April 2019 from 11.25 \nper cent in March 2019. The increase in \nheadline inflation was driven mainly by \nfood inflation which rose by 13.70 per \ncent in April 2019 from 13.45 per cent in \nMarch. \nCore \ninflation, \nhowever, \ndeclined marginally to 9.28 per cent in \nApril 2019 from 9.46 per cent in March. \nMonth-on-month, headline, food and \ncore inflation increased to 0.94, 1.14 and \n0.70 per cent in April 2019 from 0.79, 0.88 \nand \n0.53 \nper \ncent \nin \nMarch, \nrespectively. This uptick in inflationary \npressures was attributed to seasonal \nfactors. \nIn the financial markets, activities in the \nequities segment remained bearish in \nspite of the sustained capital inflow into \nthe economy, reflecting the continued \nportfolio rebalancing from the long to \nthe short end of the yield curve in the \nreview period. The All-Share Index \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n35 \ndeclined by 8.14 per cent to 28,871.83 \nindex points on May 17, 2019 from \n31,430.50 \nindex \npoints \nat \nend-\nDecember 2018. Market capitalization, \nhowever, grew by 8.53 per cent to \nN12.72 trillion on May 17, 2019 from \nN11.72 trillion at end-December 2018. \nThe growth in market capitalization \nreflected new listings in the market, \nprominent amongst which were MTN, \nSkyway Aviation Handling Company \nand the merger between Access Bank \nand Diamond Bank. \nThe Committee took note of the \ncontinued slowdown in the global \neconomy \nand \nthe \npersisting \nuncertainties such as the on-going trade \nwars between the US and its major \ntrading partners, financial fragilities in a \nnumber of countries, debt-constrained \nfiscal \noperations \nin \nsome \nEMDEs, \nincluding Nigeria, and the volatility in \nthe \noil \nmarket. \nThe \nCommittee, \ntherefore, \nenjoined \nthe \nFederal \ngovernment to improve its savings \nculture including a more realistic oil \nprice budget benchmark in order to \nbuild fiscal buffers. \nThe MPC noted the moderation in \noutput growth during the first quarter of \n2019, emphasizing that actual output \nremains well below the economy’s long-\nrun \npotential. \nThis \nindicated \nthe \nexistence of spare capacity for non-\ninflationary growth in the economy, an \nopportunity which should be explored \nfor improved credit delivery to the \nprivate sector. The Committee also \nnoted that the uptick in inflationary \npressures in April 2019 was driven largely \nby food shortages during the Easter \nseason \nas \na \nresult \nof \nthe \ncommencement of the planting season \nand the persisting security challenges in \nsome of the food producing regions of \nthe country. These factors, it noted \nremain outside the remit of monetary \npolicy. \nThe MPC, however, welcomed the \nimprovements \nin \nthe \nfinancial \nsoundness indicators (FSIs), noting the \nmoderation in the NPL ratio, although it \nremained \nabove \nthe \nprudential \nbenchmark. \nConsequently, \nthe \nCommittee recommended a proposal \nto \ndevelop \na \ncomprehensive \nadministrative, legal and regulatory \nframework to speed up the recovery of \ndelinquent loans. The proposal will \ninvolve structured engagement with \nrelevant stakeholders and authorities, to \nmitigate \ncredit risk \nand ultimately \nimprove credit delivery in the economy. \nThe Committee called on the Bank to \nprovide a mechanism for limiting DMBs \naccess to government securities in order \nto refocus their lending to the private \nsector. \nFollowing the limited progress towards \nmacroeconomic and financial sector \nstability, the Committee was confronted \nwith the options to tighten, ease or hold \npolicy. It noted that the slight uptick in \ninflation should ideally elicit a tightening \nstance, but this will likely impede the \nability of DMBs to increase credit as \nrequired to support consumer spending, \nmortgages and other priority sectors of \nthe economy. The MPC considered \neasing as this will stimulate output \ngrowth, restart capital market activities \nand \nimprove \ncredit \nto \nthe \nreal \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n36 \neconomy. It, however, felt that given \nthe marginal increase in headline \ninflation in April 2019, there was the \nneed to refrain from easing in order not \nto exacerbate inflationary pressures. On \nthe argument for a hold position, the \nCommittee was of the view that \nmaintaining the monetary policy rate at \nits present level was essential for better \nunderstanding \nthe \nmomentum \nof \noutput \ngrowth \nbefore \nany \nfurther \nadjustments. \nOn \nthe \nbackdrop \nof \nthese \nconsiderations, the MPC decided by a \nvote of 9 out of 11 members to hold all \npolicy parameters constant, while two \nmembers \nvoted \nto \nreduce \nthe \nmonetary policy rate by 25 basis points. \nIn summary, the Committee retained \nthe MPR at 13.50 per cent, asymmetric \ncorridor of +200/-500 basis points around \nthe MPR, CRR at 22.5 per cent and \nLiquidity Ratio at 30 per cent. \n4.2.0 \nInstruments \nof \nLiquidity \nManagement \nDuring the first half of 2019, the Bank \ncontinued to conduct monetary policy \nusing the various instruments in its toolkit \nto achieve the objectives of price and \nmacroeconomic \nstability. \nThese \ninstruments were: the Monetary Policy \nRate (MPR), the Cash Reserve Ratio \n(CRR), Liquidity Ratio, Open Market \nOperations \n(OMO) \nand \nDiscount \nWindow Operations, complemented \nwith periodic interventions in the foreign \nexchange market. \n \n4.2.1 Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) \nThe MPR remained the key instrument \nfor monetary policy management in the \nreview period. It remained at 14.0 per \ncent until the March 2019 MPC meeting \nwhen it was adjusted downwards by 50 \nbasis points to 13.5 per cent. This was to \nsignal a pro-growth stance by way of \nencouraging the flow of credit to the \nproductive sectors of the economy. The \nasymmetric corridor of +200 and -500 \nbasis points around the MPR was \nmaintained. \n4.2.2 Open Market Operations (OMO) \nThe \nprimary \ntool \nfor \nliquidity \nmanagement \nremained \nthe \nOpen \nMarket Operations (OMO) bills in the \nreview period. There was a decrease in \nOMO sales by 10.48 per cent to \nN8,682.01 billion in the first half of 2019 \nfrom N9,678.76 billion in the preceding \nhalf of 2018 (Table 4.1). \nTable 4.1 \nOMO Bills Auction (January – June, 2019) \n(N’billion) \n \nSource: Financial Market Department \n \nDate\n2018\n2019\n% Change\nJan\n2132.61\n2,653.34\n \n24.42\nfeb\n845.28\n1,188.91\n \n40.65\nMar\n1516.38\n2,694.98\n \n77.72\nApr\n2084.46\n693.05\n \n-66.75\nMay\n2033.42\n975.81\n \n-52.01\nJun\n1086.61\n475.92\n \n-56.20\n1st Half\n9,698.76\n \n8,682.01\n \n-10.48\nJul\n1669.13\nAug\n1529.93\nSep\n1651.51\nOct\n1743.64\nNov\n3020.28\nDec\n3095.42\n2nd Half\n12,709.91\n \nCumlative \nFigure\n22,408.67\n \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n37 \n \nFigure 4.1 \nOMO Bills Auction (January – June, 2019) \n \n4.2.3 Reserve Requirements \nThe Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) is an \nimportant instrument of monetary policy \nused to promote the delivery of credit to \nthe economy. The upward adjustment \nof CRR reduces the ability of deposit \nmoney banks to lend as more resources \nare warehoused with the central bank, \nwhile a downward review encourages \nlending by the DMBs. Following the \nglobal financial crisis of 2007/2008, the \nMPC on April 8, 2009, lowered the CRR \nfrom 2.0 to 1.0 per cent to ease financial \nconditions and encourage lending to \nstimulate economic activities. However, \nin March 2016, the CRR was adjusted \nupwards by 250 basis points to 22.5 from \n20.0 per cent to tighten liquidity \nconditions, curtail lending and tame \ninflationary pressures. During the review \nperiod, the Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) \nwas maintained at 22.5 per cent of total \ndeposits in view of the persistence of \nexcess liquidity in the banking system. \nThe \nliquidity \nRatio \n(LR) \nwas \nalso \nmaintained at 30.0 per cent. \n4.2.4 Standing Facilities \nIn the first half of 2019, the Bank \ncontinued to use the standing facilities \n(lending/deposit) window to manage \novernight liquidity in banking system \n(Deposit Money Banks and the Discount \nHouse). The asymmetric corridor was \nkept unchanged at +200/-500 basis \npoints around the MPR. \nThe request for Standing Lending Facility \n(SLF), increased by 160.40 per cent to \nN12,121.76 billion in the first half of 2019 \nfrom N4,655.06 billion in the second half \nof 2018. It also increased by 72.49 per \ncent compared with N7,027.46 billion in \nthe corresponding period of 2018 (Table \n4.2). \nAt the Standing Deposit Facility (SDF) \nwindow, \nthe \nvolume \nof \ndeposits \ndecreased by \n21.32 per cent to \nN8,020.95 billion in the first half of 2019 \nfrom N10,194.71 billion in the second half \nof 2018. Compared with N10,684.38 \nbillion in the corresponding period of \n2018, it decreased by 24.93 per cent \n(Table 4.3). \nTransactions \nat \nthe \ntwo \nwindows \nresulted in a net lending of N4,100.81 \nbillion in the first half of 2019 in contrast \nto the net deposit of N5,539.65 billion \nand N3,656.92 billion in the preceding \nand corresponding half years. The \ndevelopment was due to occasional \nliquidity stress. However, a combination \nof these instruments helped to manage \nliquidity levels in the banking system. \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n38 \nTable 4.2 \nCBN Standing Lending Facility (January 2018 – \nJune 2019) (N’billion) \n \n \nFigure 4.2 \nStanding Lending Facility (January – June 2019) \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nTable 4.3 \nCBN Standing Deposit Facility (January 2018 – \nJune 2019) (N’billion) \n \nSource: Financial Market Department \n \nFigure 4.3 \nStanding Deposit Facility (January - June, 2019) \n \n4.2.5 \n Foreign Exchange Intervention \nIn the first half of 2019, the Bank \ncontinued with the flexible foreign \nexchange \nmanagement \npolicy, \nsupported by proactive strategies such \nas the implementation of the Bilateral \nCurrency Swap Agreement (BCSA) with \nChina. The Bank continued to mandate \nall Authorized Dealers who are agents to \nDate\n2018\n2019\n% Change\nJan\n833.09\n3,239.60\n \n288.87\nFeb\n1020.15\n3,136.42\n \n207.45\nMar\n952.23\n2,143.70\n \n125.12\nApr\n1145.52\n1,990.01\n \n73.72\nMay\n1847.69\n895.78\n \n-51.52\nJun\n1228.78\n716.26\n \n-41.71\n1st Half\n7,027.46\n \n12,121.76\n \n72.49\nJul\n441.1\nAug\n53.04\nSep\n483.4\nOct\n864.8\nNov\n684.7\nDec\n2128.02\n2nd Half\n4,655.06\n \nCumlative \nFigure\n11,682.52\n \nDate\n2018\n2019\n% Change\nJan\n1919.78\n928.86\n \n-51.62\nFeb\n1144.1\n690.42\n \n-39.65\nMar\n1508.75\n1,417.28\n \n-6.06\nApr\n2952.2\n1,056.76\n \n-64.20\nMay\n1527.04\n2,178.21\n \n42.64\nJun\n1632.51\n1,749.43\n \n7.16\n1st Half\n10,684.38\n \n8,020.95\n \n-24.93\nJul\n1643.71\nAug\n2073.1\nSep\n2070.85\nOct\n1345.34\nNov\n2267.19\nDec\n794.52\n2nd Half\n10,194.71\n \nCumlative \nFigure\n20,879.09\n \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n39 \napproved International Money Transfer \nOperator (IMTOs) to sell foreign currency \naccruing \nfrom \ninward \nmoney \nremittances to licensed Bureau De \nChange (BDCs) Operators in Nigeria. As \na result, there was relative stability at \nboth the Bureau-de-Change (BDC) and \nthe Investors’ and Exporters’ (I&E) \nwindow \nof \nthe \nforeign \nexchange \nmarket. \n \nThe total supply of foreign exchange, \nhowever, decreased by 59.93 per cent \nto US$8,370.04 million in the first half of \n2019 from US$20,887.20 million in the \nsecond half of 2018. The development \nrepresented an increase of 11.89 per \ncent compared with US$9,499.92 million \nin the corresponding period of 2018 \n(Table 4.4). The decrease in the supply \nof foreign exchange was largely due to \nforeign reserves depletion occasioned \nby continued flight of capital in the \nreview period. Although, crude oil prices \nincreased moderately toward the end \nof first half of 2019, its impact on reserves \nwas negated by capital flow reversals \nas investors divested from the Nigerian \nstock market due to monetary policy \nnormalization in the United States as well \nas growing sovereign risk in the Nigerian \nmarket due to the general elections in \nthe review period. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nTable 4.4 \nForeign Exchange Supply by the CBN (US$ \nMillion) \nDate \n2018 \n2019 \n% \nChange \n(2018 - \n2019) \n \nTotal FX \nSupply \n(including \nForward \nSales) \nTotal FX \nSupply \n(including \nForward \nSales) \n \nJan \n1,343.12 \n1,473.17 \n74.71% \nFeb \n1,237.26 \n1,922.25 \n41.16% \nMar \n1,300.93 \n1,159.78 \n-0.65% \nApr \n1,422.35 \n1,244.32 \n-25.89% \nMay \n2,039.51 \n1,455.05 \n-3.34% \nJun \n2,156.75 \n1,115.47 \n92.39% \n1st \nHalf \n9,499.92 \n8,370.04 \n-11.89% \nJul \n2,966.31 \n \n145.76% \nAug \n3,733.66 \n \n157.58% \nSep \n3,868.67 \n \n217.02% \nOct \n3,481.15 \n \n164.53% \nNov \n3,617.03 \n \n198.68% \nDec \n3,220.38 \n \n146.45% \n2nd \nHalf \n20,887.20 \n \n170.89% \nSource: Financial Market Department \n \nFigure 4.4 \nTotal FX Supply (including Forward Sales) (Jan - \nJune, 2019) \n \nAdministrative measures were sustained \nby the Bank during the review period to \ncurb speculative activities in the foreign \nexchange market, restore investors’ \n0.00\n500.00\n1,000.00\n1,500.00\n2,000.00\n2,500.00\nJan\nFeb Mar Apr May Jun\nUS$ 'Million\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n40 \nconfidence \nin \nthe \nBanks’ \nforeign \nexchange management strategy, limit \narbitrage \nopportunities \nand \nthe \ndepletion of the external reserves. \n \n4.3.0 \nDevelopments \nin \nMonetary \nAggregates \nDuring \nthe \nreview \nperiod, \nthe \nperformance \nof \nmajor \nmonetary \naggregates was mixed. Broad money \n(M2) performed below its indicative \nbenchmark for 2019, as a result of \nsluggish growth of the Net Foreign Assets \n(NFA), which dampened the impact of \nthe substantial growth of Net Domestic \nAssets (NDA) above its indicative target. \nThe increase in NDA was attributed to \nthe significant increase in credit to \ngovernment occasioned by increased \nfiscal expansion and rising deficit in the \nface of shortfall in government revenue. \nThe under-performance of the NFA was \non account of sluggish crude oil market. \nThe underperformance of monetary \naggregates implies that the economy is \nnot receiving adequate money supply \nto support the envisaged growth target. \nThis may indicate a slowdown in \neconomic activity. \n4.3.1 \nBroad Money (M3, M2) \nBroader measure of money supply \n(M3) \ngrew \nby \n4.97 \nper \ncent \nto \nN35,018.77 billion at end-June 2019 from \nN33,359.25 billion at end-December \n2018. Compared with the end-June \n2018 level of N29,343.83 billion, M3 \nincreased by 19.34 per cent. The \nannualized M3 growth rate of 9.94 per \ncent at end-June 2019 was below the \n2019 indicative growth target of 16.08 \nper cent. \nBroad Money (M2) grew by 3.04 per \ncent to N27,892.33 billion at end-June \n2019 from N27,078.83 billion at end-\nDecember 2018. Compared with the \nend-June 2018 level of N24,814.00 \nbillion, M2 increased by 12.41 per cent. \nThe annualized M2 growth rate of 6.08 \nper cent at end-June 2019 was below \nthe 2019 indicative growth target of \n13.11 per cent. \nThe sluggish growth in the broad and \nbroader monetary aggregates below \ntheir \ntarget \ngrowth \nrates indicate \ninsufficient transactions and economic \nactivities to meet the government’s \nnon-inflationary growth objective. It \nsignified a shortage in the stock of \nmoney to drive economic growth to the \nprojected trajectory. The weak growth \nin the stock of money indicates sluggish \ngrowth in aggregate demand, which \nwould dampen inflationary pressures. \nThe observed trend in these aggregates \nwas manifested in the sustained decline \nin inflation in the first half of 2019. \nFigure 4.5 \nMoney Supply (M1), (M2) and (M3) (January – \nJune, 2019) \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n0.0\n5,000,000.0\n10,000,000.0\n15,000,000.0\n20,000,000.0\n25,000,000.0\n30,000,000.0\n35,000,000.0\n40,000,000.0\nJan-19\nFeb-19\nMar-19\nApr-19\nMay-19\nJun-19\nNaira\nJan-19\nFeb-19\nMar-19\nApr-19\nMay-19\nJun-19\nM3\n33,727,792.4\n32,860,413.0\n33,831,073.8\n34,738,786.5\n34,878,637.5\n35,018,771.1\nM2\n26,771,087.0\n26,546,639.7\n26,834,815.1\n27,579,445.2\n27,806,167.8\n27,892,325.9\nM1\n11,142,014.5\n11,030,117.5\n10,943,876.4\n11,256,202.3\n11,381,974.3\n11,159,122.6\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n41 \nFigure 4.6 \nGrowth in Money Supply (M1), (M2) and (M3) \n(January - June, 2019) \n \n4.3.3 \nNarrow Money (M1) \nNarrow Money (M1) declined by 5.05 \nper cent to N11,159.12 billion at end-\nJune 2019 from N11,751.14 billion at end-\nDecember 2018. It, however, grew by \n4.28 per cent compared with N10,701.11 \nbillion \nat \nend-June \n2018. \nWhen \nannualized, M1 declined by 10.10 per \ncent compared with the 2019 indicative \ngrowth target of 17.20 per cent (Figures \n4.4 and 4.5), indicating that M1 under-\nperformed in the review period. The \nweak performance of M1 is the result of \nthe decline in Currency in circulation \n(13.55 per cent) and private sector \ndeposits at both the CBN (1.42 per cent) \nand commercial banks (4.39 per cent). \nThe primary driver of the observed \ndevelopments in narrow money is a \nsignificant drop in currency in circulation \n(CIC) and deposits in both the CBN and \ncommercial banks. \nThe development in M1 is supportive of \nthe observed trend in M2 & M3, and \nindicates that economic activities are \nslow or slowing down as there are \ninsufficient transactions, business and \neconomic activities to sustain the \ngovernment’s growth objective. The \npersistence of the trend is worrisome as \nit may trigger a fresh round of economic \nrecession. Consequently, efforts must be \nmade to boost real sector economic \nactivities through both monetary and \nfiscal stimulus packages to ensure that \nthe economy is propelled towards the \ntarget growth trajectory. \n4.3.4 Net Foreign Assets (NFA) \nNet Foreign Assets (NFA) increased \nmarginally \nby \n0.40 \nper \ncent \nto \nN18,471.24 billion at end-June 2019 from \nN18,397.82 billion at end-December \n2018. Compared with the end-June \n2018 figure of N18,337.53 billion, NFA \ngrew by 0.73 per cent. The annualized \nNFA growth rate of 0.80 per cent at end-\nJune 2019 was significantly below the \n2019 indicative growth target of 18.32 \nper cent. The under-performance of \nNFA in the review period was attributed \nto the 3.37 per cent decline in net \nforeign assets held by the monetary \nauthorities. \n \nThe poor growth performance of NFA \nvis-à-vis the target growth rate driven by \na decline in the NFA held by Monetary \nAuthorities, is a manifestation of efforts \nby the CBN to stabilize the Naira. The \npersistence of this trend in NFA could put \nsignificant pressure on the international \nvalue of the Naira. Consequently, \ncurrent export diversification efforts \nshould be sustained to help build up \nexternal reserves in order to enhance \nthe growth in NFA. \n \n-8.00\n-6.00\n-4.00\n-2.00\n0.00\n2.00\n4.00\n6.00\nJan-19\nFeb-19\nMar-19\nApr-19\nMay-19\nJun-19\nM3 Growth\nM2 Growth\nM1 Growth\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n42 \n4.3.5 \nNet Domestic Assets (NDA) \nNet Domestic Assets (NDA) increased \nby 10.60 per cent to N16,547.53 billion at \nend-June 2019 from N14,961.43 billion at \nend-December 2018. Compared with \nthe end-June 2018 figure of N11,006,30 \nbillion, NDA also grew by 50.35 per cent. \nThe annualized NDA growth rate of \n21.20 per cent at end-June 2019 was \nsignificantly above the 2019 indicative \ngrowth target of 13.34 per cent. This is \nattributable to the significant increase in \ncredit to government of 55.80 per cent \nin the first half of 2019. The growth in NDA \nwas primarily driven by the growth in \ncredit to government and credit to the \nprivate sector. The over performance of \ngrowth in Credit to government vis-à-vis \nthe \ntarget \nis \na \nmanifestation \nof \nborrowings \nto \nfund \ngovernment \nincluding electioneering and payment \nof outstanding contractor obligations. \nLikewise, the growth in private sector \ncredit was primarily driven by credit to \nstate government (i.e. approximately 93 \nper \ncent). \nIn \nessence \nthe \nover \nperformance in the growth rate of NDA \nvis-à-vis the target growth rate was due \nto credit to the two main tiers of \ngovernment. \nThe developments in domestic credit \nsuggests a crowding out of credit to the \ncore private sector, thus contributing to \na possible slowdown in economic \nactivities. Typically, a precursor to \neconomic recession is a slowdown in \ncredit to businesses, leading to a \ncontraction of business and economic \nactivities. These signs are worrisome and \nconsistent with developments in both \nthe \nbroad \nand \nbroader \nmoney; \nsuggesting the need for real sector \nstimulus. \nFigure 4.7 \nNet Domestic Asset (NDA) (January – June, 2019) \n \n \nFigure 4.8 \nNDA, NDC and Other Assets (Net) (January – \nJune, 2019) \n \n \n4.4.3 \nCredit to the Government (Cg) \nIn the first half of 2019, Credit to \nGovernment (Cg) grew by 55.80 per \ncent to N7,581.49 billion at end-June \n2019 from N4,866.09 billion at end-\nDecember 2018. Compared with end-\nJune 2018, Cg grew by 170.28 per cent \nfrom N2,805.01 billion. The annualized \nCg growth rate of 111.60 per cent at \nend-June 2019 was significantly above \nthe 2019 indicative growth target of \n58.78 per cent. The development was \nattributed to the need to fund the \ngrowing budget deficit in the face of \nrevenue shortfalls. \n 14,500.00\n 15,000.00\n 15,500.00\n 16,000.00\n 16,500.00\n 17,000.00\n 17,500.00\n 18,000.00\nJan-19\nFeb-19\nMar-19\nApr-19\nMay-19\nJun-19\nN'Billion\nJan-19\nFeb-19\nMar-19\nApr-19\nMay-19\nJun-19\nNet Domestic Asset\n15,913.56\n15,837.26\n17,014.27\n17,414.45\n15,778.63\n16,547.53\nNet Domestic Asset (January -June, 2019)\n (20,000.00)\n (15,000.00)\n (10,000.00)\n (5,000.00)\n -\n -\n 10,000.00\n 20,000.00\n 30,000.00\n 40,000.00\nJan-19\nFeb-19\nMar-19\nApr-19\nMay-19\nJun-19\nN'Billion\nJan-19\nFeb-19\nMar-19\nApr-19\nMay-19\nJun-19\nNet Domestic Assets\n15,913.56\n15,837.26\n17,014.27\n17,414.45\n15,778.63\n16,547.53\nNet Domestic Credit\n28,652.34\n30,520.86\n31,736.90\n32,891.84\n32,164.85\n32,332.63\nOther Assets (Net)\n(12,738.79)\n(14,683.61)\n(14,722.62)\n(15,477.39)\n(16,386.22)\n(15,785.10)\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n43 \nCredit \nto \ngovernment \nexpanded \nsignificantly \nabove \nthe \nindicative \nbenchmark; implying that government \nborrowing relative to her deficits had \nincreased beyond projected level. The \nimplication is that more resources are \ncommandeered by the government \nsector to meet growing deficit. This will \nstarve the private sector of credit and \nlead to a general rise in interest rates in \nthe economy. \n4.4.4 \n Credit to the Private Sector (Cp) \nCredit to the private sector (Cp) \nincreased \nby \n9.00 \nper \ncent \nto \nN24,751.13 billion at end-June 2019 from \nN22,708.22 billion at end-December \n2018. Compared with the end-June \n2018 figure of N22,281.87 billion, it rose \nby 11.08 per cent. The annualized Cp \ngrowth rate of 18.00 per cent at end-\nJune 2019 was significantly above the \n2019 indicative growth target of 14.49 \nper cent. In spite of the increase in credit \nto the private sector, this was not \nreflected \nin \nactivities \nin \nthe \nreal \neconomy \nconsidering \nthe \nsluggish \noutput recovery and lingering high level \nof \nunemployment. \nThe \nobserved \nincrease in credit to the private sector \nwas in favour of state governments \n(93.33%), and skewed against the core \nprivate sector (6.67%). This development \njustifies \nthe \nCBN’s \nintervention \nof \ntargeted credit to the real sector of the \neconomy such as SMEs and small scale \nfarmers. This clearly indicates that high \nlending \nto \ngovernment \nhas \nthe \ntendency to crowd out the private \nsector over time. \n \nFigure 4.9 \nDomestic Credit to Private Sector (January – \nJune, 2019) \n \n4.4.5 \n Reserve Money (RM) \nReserve Money (RM) increased by \n13.35 per cent to N8,088.46 billion at \nend-June 2019 from N7,135.73 billion at \nend-December 2018. \nCompared with its end-June 2018 level \nof N6,360.47 billion, RM increased by \n27.17 per cent. The annualized RM \ngrowth rate of 26.70 per cent at end-\nJune 2019 was significantly below the \n2019 indicative growth target of 56.74 \nper cent. \nA summary of the major monetary \naggregates \nand \ntheir \nprovisional \noutcomes as at end-June 2019 is \npresented in Table 4.5. \n \n \n \n \n21,500.00\n22,000.00\n22,500.00\n23,000.00\n23,500.00\n24,000.00\n24,500.00\n25,000.00\n25,500.00\nJan-19\nFeb-19\nMar-19\nApr-19\nMay-19\nJun-19\nN'Billion\nJan-19\nFeb-19\nMar-19\nApr-19\nMay-19\nJun-19\nCredit to Private Sector\n22,946.79\n24,165.58\n23,994.74\n24,887.98\n24,852.93\n24,751.13\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n44 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n45 \nTable 4.6 \n The Performance of Monetary Aggregates and their Implications \nS/N \nMonetary \nAggregates \nPerformance \nImplication \n1 \nOverall \nMonetary \nAggregates \nMixed \nEvidence indicates economic slowdown \nand possible recession, while developments \nin the external sector indicates continued \nreserves depletion and increased pressure \nto depreciate the Naira. If not adequately \nmanaged, the economy could return to a \nstate of stagflation. \n2 \nBroad Money \n(M3, M2) \nWeak \nand \nbelow target \nIt signifies a shortage in the stock of money \nto drive economic growth to the projected \ntrajectory. The weak growth in the stock of \nmoney \nindicates \nsluggish \ngrowth \nin \naggregate demand, which would dampen \ninflationary pressures. \n3 \nNarrow Money \n(M1) \nWeak \nand \nbelow target \nThis indicates that economic activities are \nslow or slowing down as there are \ninsufficient \ntransactions, \nbusiness \nand \neconomic \nactivities \nto \nsustain \nthe \ngovernment’s growth objective. \n4 \nNet \nForeign \nAssets (NFA) \nSignificantly \nbelow target \nThe poor growth performance of NFA vis-à-\nvis the target growth rate was driven by \ndecline in the NFA held by Monetary \nAuthorities, which is a manifestation of \nefforts of the CBN to stabilize the Naira. \nPersistence of the trend in NFA could put \nsignificant pressure to depreciate the naira. \n5 \nNet Domestic \nAssets (NDA) \nAbove target \nDriven by credit to the two tiers of \ngovernment, crowding out credit to the \ncore private sector; depriving businesses \ncrucial funds for business activities including \nexpansion. This trend could be a precursor \nto \neconomic slowdown \nand \npossible \nrecession. \n6 \nCredit to the \nGovt (Cg) \nOverperformed \nMore resources are available to the \ngovernment sector thereby crowding out \nthe private sector \n7 \nCredit to the \nPrivate Sector \n(Cp) \nOverperformed \nThe overperformance of Cp was in favour of \nstate government as against the core \nprivate sector, implying that the real \neconomy is not being funded. This could \nlead to a slowdown in economic activity. \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n46 \n \nBox 4.1 \nRECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR \nMONETARY POLICY \nIntroduction \nThe concept of central bank independence dates back in the history of central \nbanking. Central banking, however, remains a myth to several onlookers, thus \nmaking the concept of central bank independence more of a farce. According to \nMiskin (2000), the role of the central bank in a modern economy is a derivative of \ndevelopments in monetary economics. Mishkin argues that central banks should \nmaintain a strong focus on price stability in order to support the growth mandate of \nthe fiscal authority. In order words, there must be a close alignment between \nmonetary and fiscal policy to mitigate against the time inconsistency of monetary \npolicy. As a monetary authority, a central bank must have the free hand to manage \naggregate demand while supporting the supply side such that prices remain stable \nin both the commodities and the financial markets. According to The Economist \nmagazine (February 10, 1990 p.10), “The only good central bank is the one that can \nsay no to politicians”. \nThere are, however, counter arguments to central bank independence in the \nliterature. It was been noted that central bankers are merely exercising a delegated \nresponsibility, as they are not elected. They are merely exercising the responsibility \ndelegated to them by an elected Government. Following from this argument, \ntherefore, central bank independence does not arise. They may, however, be given \nsome level of autonomy to the extent possible to manage their instruments of price \nstability. This seems to have become the practice world-wide, until recent \ndevelopments which appear to erode this autonomy. \nRecent Developments In Central Bank Independence \nIn recent times, the independence of central banks have come under severe threat \nfrom the activities of elected politicians. This was demonstrated by developments in \nthe United States, India and Turkey. \nIn the United States, the President repeatedly and openly criticized the US Federal \nReserve System’s conduct of monetary policy, insisting that the Fed got it wrong by \nreturning to monetary policy normalization after more than a decade of monetary \naccommodation. According to the US President, the Fed should have continued \nwith monetary accommodation to support the government’s fiscal expansion plans \nto maximize the potentials of the US economy’s recovery from the global slowdown. \nAfter several bouts of criticism, the Fed appears to have made a spectacular policy \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n47 \nU-turn to the surprise of many onlookers. The Fed suddenly came up with forward \nguidance of a likely dovish stance and subsequently returned to an \naccommodative policy stance. \nIn India, the Governor of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) was forced to resign mid-\nway through his three-year term due to purported pressure from the Government to \naccess the Bank’s excess reserves to boost economic growth. The disagreement \nbetween the Government and the RBI was extensive and enduring, leading to the \neventual resignation of the Governor of the Reserve Bank. \nIn Turkey, the Governor of the Central Bank was recently sacked after refusing \nseveral requests from the government to lower the Bank’s policy rate. The Turkish \nGovernment told the press that the reason for the sack was the mounting difference \nin opinion between the government and the Bank’s Governor on the Bank’s \napproach to monetary policy. The sack had become inevitable after the Governor \nof the Bank refused repeated calls from the Government to voluntarily resign, with \nthe Governor of the Bank stating that the Central Bank of Turkey had an \nindependent status which empowered him to remain in office until the expiration of \nhis appointed term. \nIn all three cases, the interference of the Government was unmistakable. The \ninterference of the US government was implicit but very significant as the US Fed, the \nworld’s leading central bank, is clearly expected to be a trail blazer. The case of the \nReserve Bank of India was, however, shrouded with some doubt as all the parties \ninvolved chose to remain silent while the market interpreted the developments as a \ncase of political interference in central bank independence. Several calls, however, \nwent out to the public in the local press, particularly from a former Finance Minister, \nurging the government to refrain from interfering in the central bank’s \nindependence. The case of the Turkish Central Bank was clearly an open abuse of \nthe Bank’s independence as the Governor was formally removed by the \nGovernment after an extended period of differences which was followed by a \nstatement from the government confirming that the Governor was unable to agree \nwith the Cabinet Minister Coordinating the Economy on the best approach to \nmonetary policy. \nImplications for Monetary Policy \nFor a central bank to successfully target inflation, it must be independent in its choice \nof monetary policy. Since the late 1990s, central banks have steadily moved towards \nan institutional structure of policy independence to enable them pursue an \napproach free from political interference (See Debelle & Fischer 1994, Bernanke & \nMishkin 1997). Two broad strands of central bank independence are identified in the \nliterature (Cukierman et al 1992; Amato and Gerlach 2002). These are goal and \ninstrument independence. A central bank may have both goal and instrument \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n48 \nindependence but this is extremely rare. It is more common to have only goal or only \ninstrument independence with the other determined by politicians. Because inflation \nis a monetary phenomenon, the independence of a central bank, particularly in the \nchoice of monetary policy instruments is thus highly strategic to successfully target \ninflation (Angeriz and Arestis 2005; Wessel 2006). The central bank must, therefore, \nalways have the free will to deploy its policy instruments to target inflation and keep \nit within the agreed band or target. With the increasing complexity of financial \nmarkets, central banks will require more instruments and additional objectives to \nenable policy makers cope with a much more complex institution (Bayoumi et al \n2014). As the mandate of central banks broaden, the question of continued \nrelevance of the independent charter arises; should central banks remain \nindependent or should their powers be curtailed by politicians in a bid to refocus the \ninstitution. If the continued interference of politicians persists and as a result, central \nbank independence is eventually lost, what will be the impact on the price stability \nobjective? \nIt is important to confer central banks with some independence in the management \nof their policy instruments because elected politicians have short term horizons, \nwhich is the next election; while central bank decisions in the management of \ninflation takes a longer term perspective. Also, in order to manage the expectations \nof economic agents, central banks have to be credible; and central bank credibility \ncrucially derives from their ability to freely choose their policy instruments. \nConsequently, the recent trend towards limiting the independence of central banks \nmay lead to adverse inflation outcomes as markets may no longer trust the inflation-\nfighting ability of central banks and their instruments.\n \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n49 \n \nCHAPTER FIVE \n5.0 \nDEVELOPMENTS \nIN \nTHE \nFINANCIAL MARKETS \nhe Nigerian financial markets were \nmoderately calm during the review \nperiod, as performance continued \nto reflect developments in the \nglobal and domestic economic and \nfinancial \nenvironments. \nThe \nforces \nunderlying the developments from the \nglobal front were: the escalating trade \nwar between the US and China; impact \nof the new round of sanctions on Iran; \ndifficult BREXIT negotiations; a new \nwave of tensions on the Korean \nPeninsula; and vulnerabilities arising \nfrom growing public and private debt in \nsome Emerging Market and Developing \nEconomies (EMDEs). As a result, financial \nvulnerabilities \nwere \nelevated \nin \nsovereign, corporate and non-bank \nfinancial sectors in several systemically \nimportant countries, with the risk that \nstrains in the financial sector could \nagain be transmitted to firms and \nhouseholds, thereby hurting growth. \nThese forces were calmed by the dovish \nmonetary policy stance of major central \nbanks including the US Fed, the Bank of \nEngland and the European Central \nBank. The stance which is expected to \nremain in place in the near to medium \nterm and help sustain positive market \nsentiments, was in response to the re-\nemergence of signs of weakness in the \nglobal economy. \nIt is noteworthy that in China where \nfinancial vulnerabilities remain high \neven as the authorities continued with \nregulatory measures to address the \ncredit challenge, the recent inclusion in \nthe global bond benchmark index has \nincreased its importance in portfolio \nflows. As a result, China is projected to \nattract additional US$150 billion inflows \nby 2020. Also, the development in the \nhousing market appears to be making \nroom for the possibility of a price \ncorrection to stabilize housing prices. \nConsequently, \nthe \nglobal \nfinancial \nmarkets \nrebounded \nin \nearly \n2019 \ndespite weak earnings outlook and \ntightening credit spreads. \nThus, \namidst \nprevailing \nglobal \nuncertainties, \nthe \nInternational \nMonetary Fund downgraded global \noutput growth from 3.7 per cent in 2018 \nto 3.6 per cent in 2019 with further \ndownward revision to 3.3 per cent. \nAt the domestic scene, the money \nmarket remained active in the review \nperiod, with market rates reflecting \nliquidity \nconditions in \nthe banking \nsystem. The rates oscillated widely \noutside the Standing Facilities corridor, \nreflecting fluctuations in banking system \nliquidity. \nStability \nin \nthe \nforeign \nexchange market was sustained by CBN \nintervention to stabilize the naira. More \nfundamentally, the Bank made a \nstrategic shift towards the long-term \nstability in the foreign exchange market \nwith efforts to deepen the policy on \nrestriction \nof \naccess \nto \nforeign \nexchange for imports that can be \nproduced locally. \nT\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n50 \n \nThe Nigerian capital market in the first \nhalf of 2019 remained bearish, reflecting \ncontinuing negative investor sentiments, \nattributable \nto \nrising \npublic \ndebt, \nperceived increased sovereign risk and \nweakening \nmacroeconomic \nfundamentals. \nThe \nmarket \nthus, \nexperienced significant sell-offs and \nprofit taking activities in the review \nperiod. \n5.1 \n The Money Market \nThe money market remained active in \nthe review period, with market rates \nreflecting liquidity conditions in the \nbanking system. The rates oscillated \noutside the Standing Facilities corridor \nfor most of the review period. The \ndevelopments reflected the effect of: \nwithdrawals from the banking system for \nmonthly \ndisbursements \nof \nstatutory \nFederation \nAccount \nAllocation \nCommittee (FAAC) allocations; OMO \nsales \nand \nforeign \nexchange \ninterventions. The fall in rates from April \nto May 2019 was a reflection of a more \naccommodative \nmonetary \npolicy \nstance by the Bank following the \ndecision of the MPC to lower the rate in \nMarch 2019. The easing stance was \nunderscored by the need to support \nliquidity to increase lending at low \ninterest \nrates, \nstimulate \naggregate \ndemand and revive capital market \nactivities. The major sources of liquidity \nduring \nthis \nperiod \nincluded: \nthe \nextended implementation of the 2018 \nFederal Government budget and 2019 \nbudget, FAAC disbursements, maturing \nCBN \nbills \nand \nother \ngovernment \nsecurities and OMO auctions. Others \nincluded: the interventions of the CBN in \nthe real sector of the economy and \nspending towards the 2019 general \nelections. \n \nTransactions largely took place in the \nOpen Buy Back (OBB) segment of the \nmoney market with the interbank segment \nexperiencing fewer trading days and \nlower volume of transactions. Rates at the \ncollateralized segment of the market \n(Open Buy Back rates) were higher \ncompared \nwith \nrates \nat \nthe \nuncollateralized interbank segment. The \nhigher premium on the collateralised \nsegment \nwas \nperhaps \ndue \nto \ncounterparty risks, oligopolistic nature of \nthe market, and the fact that only a few \nbanks control large volume of the \nhedging instruments. \nThese developments motivated the MPC \nto slightly loosen its monetary policy \nstance from 14.0 per cent to 13.50 per \ncent \nduring \nthe \nperiod, \nwith \nthe \nasymmetric corridor of +200/-500 basis \npoints and the Cash Reserve and Liquidity \nRatios of 22.5 and 30.0 per cent, \nrespectively, remaining unchanged. \n5.1.1 \nShort-term \nInterest \nRate \nDevelopments \nIn the review period, liquidity conditions in \nthe money market, which mirrored the \nbehaviour of short term interest rates, were \ndriven by a number of factors; including: \nstatutory FAAC disbursements, OMO and \nNTB \ntransactions, \nextended \nimplementation of the 2018 FGN budget \nand 2019 budget, continued CBN foreign \nexchange interventions and spending \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n51 \n \nduring the 2019 general elections. OMO \nremained the major instrument of liquidity \nmanagement in \nthe \nreview \nperiod. \nAlthough the interbank segment of the \nmoney market had fewer trading days, \nthe market remained largely active with \nboth \nsegments \nexperiencing \nhigh \nvolatility. As a result, the interbank call rate \noscillated between 5.14 and 16.71 per \ncent, averaging 11.79 per cent, while the \nOBB rate fluctuated over a wider range of \n8.34 and 18.30 per cent, averaging higher \nat 13.56 per cent. Overall, the average \ninterbank call rate was lower than the OBB \nrate in the review period. \nTable 5.1 \nWeighted Average Monthly Money Market \nInterest Rates (January - June 2019) \n \nSource: (Statistics, CBN) \n \nFigure 5.1 \nWeighted Average Monthly Money Market \nInterest Rates (Jan.–Jun. 2019) \n \n \n(i) \nThe Interbank Call Rate \nThe interbank call segment witnessed a \nhigh number of non-trading days in the \nperiod \nunder \nreview. \nThe \nhigh \nfrequency of non-trading days at the \nuncollateralized segment of the market \nwas attributed largely to the persistent \npreference for the collateralized OBB \ninstrument resulting from perceived \ncounterparty \nrisk \nand \naversion \nto \nuncollateralized lending. Consequently, \ninterbank call rates rose from 15.0 per \ncent in January to 16.71 per cent in \nFebruary but subsequently moderated \nto 11.5 and 13.98 per cent in March and \nApril 2019, respectively. The rate fell \nfurther to 5.14 per cent in May, closing \nat 8.38 per cent in June. The interbank \ncall rate fluctuated between 5.14 and \n16.71 per cent, averaging 11.79 per \ncent in the review period, compared \nwith 11.36 per cent in the preceding half \nyear. \nAnalysis of the daily rates showed that \nthe call rate ranged between 4.00 and \n23.00 per cent in January and June \n2019. The observed spikes in rates in the \nreview period were largely accounted \nfor by increased OMO auctions during \nthe period. These spikes were, however, \nmoderated by improved system liquidity \nconditions \narising \nfrom \nFAAC \ndisbursements, \npayment \nof \nOMO \nmaturities, \nand \nforeign \nexchange \npurchases. \n \n \nMONTHS INTERBANK\nOBB\nMPR\nSDF\nSLF\nNIBOR - \n30DAYS\nJan-19\n15.00\n17.50\n14.00\n9.00\n16.00\n15.21\nFeb-19\n16.71\n18.30\n14.00\n9.00\n16.00\n8.59\nMar-19\n11.50\n12.30\n13.50\n8.50\n15.50\n10.68\nApr-19\n13.98\n16.20\n13.50\n8.50\n15.50\n12.08\nMay-19\n5.14\n8.34\n13.50\n8.50\n15.50\n11.62\nJun-19\n8.38\n8.71\n13.50\n8.50\n15.50\n12.10\nAverage\n11.79\n13.56\n13.67\n8.67\n15.67\n11.71\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n52 \n \nFigure 5.2 \nDaily Interbank Call Rate (January – June 2019) \n \n(ii) \nThe Open Buy Back (OBB) Rate \nThe OBB segment of the market was \nmore active in the period under review \ncompared with the interbank call \nsegment. \nThe \npreference \nfor \ncollateralized OBB transactions reflects \nthe perception of risk amongst market \nparticipants \nin \nthe \ninterbank \ncall \nsegment of the market, which is \nuncollateralized. The OBB rate rose from \n17.5 per cent in January to 18.3 per cent \nin February, declining significantly to \n12.3 per cent in March 2019. It further \nrose to 16.2 per cent in April and \nslumped to 8.34 per cent in May, closing \nat 8.71 per cent in June 2019. It \nfluctuated between 8.34 and 18.3 per \ncent, averaging 13.56 per cent in the \nperiod, compared with 11.86 per cent in \nthe preceding half year. The daily rates \noscillated between 4.04 and 44.05 per \ncent from January to June 2019. It \nspiked in February and April, largely as a \nresult of increased OMO operations, \nnaira deposits by commercial banks for \nthe purchase of foreign currency and \nrevenue remittances by the Nigeria \nNational \nPetroleum \nCorporation \n(NNPC), Nigeria Customs Service (NCS), \nFederal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) \nand other government agencies during \nFAAC. The rate, however, closed at 4.04 \nper \ncent \nat \nend-June \nfollowing \nimproved liquidity conditions. \nFigure 5.3 \nDaily Open Buy Back Rate (January- June 2019) \n \n \n(iii) \nThe Nigeria Interbank Offered Rate \n(NIBOR) \nThe Nigerian money market reference \nrate, the NIBOR, showed relative stability \nacross most tenors in the review period. \nThe weighted average 30-day NIBOR, \nfell sharply from 15.21 per cent in \nJanuary to 8.59 per cent in February \n2019. It, however, rose to 12.08 per cent \nin April, and finally closed at 12.1 per \ncent in June 2019. The average NIBOR \nrate for the review period was 11.71 per \ncent, down from 13.37 per cent in the \npreceding half year, suggesting the \nslight easing of liquidity conditions \n(Table 5.1). \n \n5.2 \nForeign Exchange Market \nThe \nforeign \nexchange \nmarket \nexperienced relative stability during the \nfirst half of 2019 due to the relatively \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n53 \n \nstable \noil \nprices \nand \nimproved \naccretion to external reserves to support \nthe CBN’s interventions in the market. In \naddition, the Bank sustained the policy \non repatriation of export proceeds as \nwell as return of unutilized foreign \nexchange sourced from CBN auctions. \nMore fundamentally, the Bank made a \nstrategic shift towards the long term \nstability in the foreign exchange market \nwith efforts to deepen the policy on \nrestriction \nof \naccess \nto \nforeign \nexchange for imports that can be \nproduced locally. The deepening of this \npolicy entails extending it to more items \nas well as encouraging the local \nproduction of such items for export, in \nline with the recent Export Facilitation \nInitiative \n(EFI) \nof \nthe \nBank. \nThe \ndevelopment \nis \nexpected \nto \ncomplement existing measures such as \nthe directive to International Money \nTransfer Operators (IMTOs) to sell foreign \nexchange to BDCs; the adoption of \nBank Verification Number (BVN) in BDC \ntransactions; as well as special foreign \nexchange auctions to the real sector \nand \nsmall \nand \nmedium-scale \nenterprises. These measures significantly \ncontributed in stabilizing the foreign \nexchange market. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFigure 5.4 \nDaily Naira/US Dollar Exchange Rate (January – \nJune, 2019) \n \n5.2.1 \nAverage Exchange Rates \nThe foreign exchange rate at the \ninterbank market depreciated by 0.17 \nper cent to an average of N306.90/US$ \nin the first half of 2019 from N306.38/US$ \nin the second half of 2018. The BDC rate, \nhowever, appreciated by 0.29 per cent \nto N359.76/US$ in the first half of 2019 \nfrom an average of N360.79/US$ in \nsecond half 2018 (Table 5.2). \nTable 5.2 \nAverage Monthly Spot Exchange Rates (Jul 2018 \n– June 2019) (N/US$) \n \n \n \n306.5000\n306.6000\n306.7000\n306.8000\n306.9000\n307.0000\n307.1000\nMonth / Year\nInterbank Rate\nBDC Rate\n2018: Jul\n305.81\n359.36\nAug\n306.06\n359\nSep\n306.27\n359.25\nOct\n306.51\n360.81\nNov\n306.72\n362.88\nDec\n306.92\n363.46\nAverage\n306.38\n360.79\n2019: Jan\n306.85\n360.94\nFeb\n306.77\n359.69\nMar\n306.92\n359.24\nApr\n306.96\n359\nMay\n306.95\n359.75\nJun\n306.95\n359.94\nAverage\n306.9\n359.76\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n54 \n \n5.2.2 \n End-Period (Month) Exchange \nRates \nThere was relative stability in both the \nInterbank and the BDC segments of the \nforeign exchange market. The rate at the \ninterbank segment depreciated by 0.36 \nper cent to N306.89/US$ at end-June 2019 \nfrom N305.78/US$ at end-December 2018. \nAt \nthe \nBDC \nsegment, \nthe \nnaira \nappreciated \nby \n0.66 \nper \ncent \nto \nN359.63/US$ at end-June 2019 compared \nwith N362.00/US$ at end-December 2018. \nIn the review period, the premium \nbetween the two segments narrowed, \nreflecting the continued effectiveness of \nthe foreign exchange policies of the Bank \n(Figure 5.5 and Table 5.3). \n \nTable 5.3 \nEnd-Month Exchange Rates (Jul 2018 – Jun 2019) \n(N/US$) \n \n \n \n5.2.3 \nNominal \nand \nReal \nEffective \nExchange Rates \nThe Nominal Effective Exchange Rate \n(NEER) appreciated by 0.73 per cent to an \naverage of 180.36 in the first half of 2019 \nfrom an average of 181.67 in the second \nhalf of 2018. It, however, appreciated by \n6.17 per cent when compared with 191.48 \nrecorded in the corresponding period of \n2018. On the other hand, the Real \nEffective \nExchange \nRate \n(REER) \nappreciated by 4.80 per cent to an \naverage of 84.42 in the first half of 2019 \nfrom an average of 88.47 in the second \nhalf \nof \n2018. \nThe \naverage \nREER \nappreciated by 14.96 per cent (Table 5.4) \ncompared with 97.05 recorded in the \ncorresponding period of 2018. Both NEER \nand REER appreciated in the review \nperiod, \nimplying \na \nloss \nin \ntrade \ncompetitiveness (Table 5.4 and figure 5.6). \nMonitoring \nNigeria’s \ntrade \ncompetitiveness is important, particularly \ngiven her recent accession to the African \nContinental \nFree \nTrade \nAgreement \n(AfCFTA) because of the potential loss \nNigeria \nwill \nincur \nif \nshe \nlooses \ncompetitiveness. \n \nTable 5.4 \nNominal and Real Effective Exchange Rates \nIndices (Jan 2018 – May 2019) \n \nMonth / Year\nInterbank Rate\nBDC Rate\n2018: Jul\n305.90\n359.00\nAug\n306.15\n359.00\nSep\n306.35\n360.00\nOct\n306.60\n361.75\nNov\n306.80\n367.00\nDec\n307.00\n361.00\nAverage\n305.78\n362.00\n2019: Jan\n306.75\n360.25\nFeb\n306.85\n359.50\nMar\n306.95\n359.00\nApr\n306.95\n359.00\nMay\n306.95\n360.00\nJun\n306.90\n360.00\nAverage\n306.89\n359.63\nNEER\nREER\n2018: Jan\n196.82\n101.42\nFeb\n194.48\n99.75\nMar\n194.86\n99.13\nApr\n191.14\n96.68\nMay\n187.45\n93.96\nJun\n184.14\n91.35\n2018:H1 Average\n191.48\n97.05\n2018: Jul\n184.94\n91.42\nAug\n181.18\n88.82\nSep\n181.32\n88.27\nOct\n179.22\n86.7\nNov\n181.68\n87.14\nDec\n181.98\n86.67\n2018:H2 Average\n181.67\n88.47\n2019:Jan \n183.86\n87.1\nFeb \n181.52\n85.72\nMar \n179.85\n84.56\nApr \n179.08\n83.85\nMay\n177.57\n82.41\nJun\n180.28\n82.85\n2019:H1 Average\n180.36\n84.42\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n55 \n \nFigure: 5.5 \nNominal and Real Effective Exchange Rates \nIndices (Jan 2018 – Jun 2019) \n \n \n5.2.4 Foreign Exchange Flows through \nthe CBN \nForeign exchange inflows through the \nCBN increased by 6.91 per cent to \nUS$30,908.52 million in the first half of \n2019 from US$28,910.42 million in the \npreceding half year. It also increased by \n1.64 \nper \ncent \ncompared \nwith \nUS$30,409.76 \nmillion \nin \nthe \ncorresponding period of 2018. Outflows, \nhowever, declined by 13.60 per cent to \nUS$28,846.75 million in the first half 2019 \nfrom \nUS$33,388.79 \nmillion \nin \nthe \npreceding period. On a year-on-year \nbasis, \nforeign \nexchange \noutflows \nrecorded an increase of 25.74 per cent \ncompared with US$22,942.11 million in \nthe corresponding period of 2018. The \ndevelopment resulted in a positive net \ninflow of US$2,061.77 million in the first \nhalf of 2019, which was lower than \nUS$7,467.65 million in the corresponding \nhalf of 2018, in contrast to the net \noutflow of US$4,478.38 million in the \nsecond half of 2018 (Table 5.5 and \nFigure 5.7). The significant improvement \nin net flows was largely due to lower \ncapital reversals observed during the \nreview period. \nTable 5.5 \nMonthly Foreign Exchange Flows through the CBN \n(Jan 2018 – Jun 2019) \nDates \nInflow \n(CBN) \nTotal \nOutflow \n(CBN) \nNet Flow \n(CBN) \n18-Jan \n4,212.56 \n2,734.38 \n1,478.18 \n18-Feb \n7,303.15 \n3,163.07 \n4,140.08 \n18-Mar \n5,076.48 \n3,754.12 \n1,322.36 \n18-Apr \n4,238.05 \n3,437.72 \n800.33 \n18-May \n4,373.01 \n4,821.91 \n-448.9 \n18-Jun \n5,206.51 \n5,030.91 \n175.6 \n2018 H1 \nTotal \n30,409.76 \n22,942.11 \n7,467.65 \n18-Jul \n4,722.44 \n6,014.85 \n-1,292.41 \n18-Aug \n3,957.38 \n5,102.75 \n-1,145.36 \n18-Sep \n4,239.49 \n6,270.21 \n-2,030.72 \n18-Oct \n2,871.70 \n4,929.03 \n-2,057.33 \n18-Nov \n8,061.53 \n5,216.64 \n2,844.89 \n18-Dec \n5,057.88 \n5,855.31 \n-797.44 \n2018 H2 \nTotal \n28,910.42 \n33,388.79 \n-4,478.37 \n19-Jan \n5,397.41 \n5,690.85 \n-293.44 \n19-Feb \n5,228.38 \n5,362.41 \n-134.03 \n19-Mar \n7,758.24 \n5,248.48 \n2,509.76 \n19-Apr \n3,852.66 \n4,271.03 \n-418.37 \n19-May \n5,075.77 \n4,597.62 \n478.14 \n19-Jun \n3,596.06 \n3,676.36 \n-80.30 \n2019 H1 \nTotal \n30,908.52 \n28,846.75 \n2,061.77 \n \n \n \n \n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\nJan-18\nMar-18\nMay-18\nJul-18\nSep-18\nNov-18\nJan-19\nMar-19\nMay-19\nNEER\nREER\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n56 \n \nFigure 5.6: \nMonthly Foreign Exchange Flows through the CBN \n(Jan 2018 – Jun 2019) \n \n5.2.5 Foreign Exchange Flow through the \nEconomy \nGross foreign exchange inflow to the \neconomy increased by 31.88 per cent \nto US$69,285.75 million in the first half of \n2019 from US$52,536.35 million in the \nsecond half of 2018. This represented a \n3.52 per cent increase compared with \nUS$66,931.28 \nmillion \nin \nthe \ncorresponding period of 2018. On the \nother hand, gross foreign exchange \noutflow decreased by 13.25 per cent to \nUS$30,761.56 million in the first half of \n2019, from US$35,460.03 million in the \nsecond half of 2018. This represented a \n23.40 per cent increase compared with \nUS$24,928.57 \nmillion \nin \nthe \ncorresponding period of 2018. Thus, \nduring \nthe \nperiod, \ntotal \nforeign \nexchange \nflows \nto \nthe \neconomy \nresulted in a net inflow of US$38,524.18 \nmillion, 125.60 per cent higher than \nUS$17,076.32 million in the preceding \nhalf year. The net inflow was, however, \n8.28 per cent lower than US$42,002.71 \nmillion in the corresponding period of \n2018. The increase in net inflow through \nthe economy during the period was due \nto higher inflows from improved foreign \nexchange receipts, owing to relatively \nhigh crude oil prices and increased \ncapital inflows from sustained tight \nmonetary policy stance. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n-4,000.00\n-2,000.00\n0.00\n2,000.00\n4,000.00\n6,000.00\n8,000.00\n10,000.00\nJan-18\nMar-18\nMay-18\nJul-18\nSep-18\nNov-18\nJan-19\nMar-19\nMay-19\nInflow (CBN)\nTotal Outflow (CBN)\nNet Flow (CBN)\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n57 \n \nTable 5.6 \nMonthly Foreign Exchange Flows through the Economy \n(Jan 2017 – June 2019) (US$ Million) \nPERIOD\nInflow \n(CBN)\nInflow \n(Autono\nmous)\nTotal \nInflows\nOutflows \n(CBN)\nOutflows \n(Autono\nmous)\nTotal \nOutflow\nNet Flow\nNet Flow \n(CBN)\nNet Flow \n(Autono\nmous)\nJan-18\n4,212.56\n6,288.40\n10,500.96 2,734.38\n297.61\n3,031.99\n7,468.97\n1,478.18\n5,990.79\nFeb-18\n7,303.15\n3,561.35 10,864.50 3,163.29\n447.64\n3,610.93\n7,253.58\n4,139.86\n3,113.72\nMar-18\n5,076.48\n6,147.23 11,223.71 3,754.12\n331.74\n4,085.86\n7,137.85\n1,322.36\n5,815.49\nApr-18\n4,238.05\n8,721.00\n12,959.05 3,437.72\n222.55\n3,660.27\n9,298.78\n800.33\n8,498.45\nMay-18\n4,373.01\n5,865.39\n10,238.40 4,821.91\n321.53\n5,143.44\n5,094.96\n-448.90\n5,543.86\nJun-18\n5,211.73\n5,932.93\n11,144.66 5,030.91\n365.18\n5,396.09\n5,748.58\n180.82\n5,567.76\n2018 H1 Total 30,414.98 36,516.30 66,931.28 22,942.33 1,986.24 24,928.57 42,002.71 7,472.65 34,530.06\nJul-18\n4,722.44\n3,452.14\n8,174.58\n6,014.85\n232.18\n6,247.03\n1,927.55\n-1,292.41\n3,219.96\nAug-18\n3,957.38\n4,461.65\n8,419.03\n5,102.75\n349.01\n5,451.76\n2,967.27\n-1,145.37\n4,112.64\nSep-18\n4,239.49\n5,204.58\n9,444.07\n6,270.21\n288.14\n6,558.35\n2,885.72\n-2,030.72\n4,916.44\nOct-18\n2,871.70\n4,229.03\n7,100.73\n4,929.03\n312.95\n5,241.98\n1,858.75\n-2,057.33\n3,916.08\nNov-18\n8,061.53\n774.11\n8,835.64\n5,216.64\n228.96\n5,445.60\n3,390.04\n2,844.89\n545.15\nDec-18\n5,057.88\n5,504.42\n10,562.30 5,855.31\n660.00\n6,515.31\n4,046.99\n-797.43\n4,844.42\n2018 H2 Total 28,910.42 23,625.93 52,536.35 33,388.79 2,071.24 35,460.03 17,076.32 -4,478.37 21,554.69\nJan-19\n5,397.41\n6,000.11\n11,397.52 5,690.85\n209.55\n5,900.40\n5,497.12\n-293.44\n5,790.56\nFeb-19\n5,228.38\n5,489.17\n10,717.55 5,362.41\n65.56\n5,427.97\n5,289.58\n-134.03\n5,423.61\nMar-19\n7,758.24\n10,599.47 18,357.71 5,248.48\n615.57\n5,864.05\n12,493.66 2,509.76\n9,983.90\nApr-19\n3,852.66\n5,806.37\n9,659.03\n4,271.03\n402.70\n4,673.73\n4,985.30\n-418.37\n5,403.67\nMay-19\n5,075.77\n5,852.24\n10,928.00 4,597.62\n381.73\n4,979.35\n5,948.65\n478.14\n5,470.51\nJun-19\n3,596.06\n4,629.87\n8,225.93\n3,676.36\n239.70\n3,916.06\n4,309.87\n-80.30\n4,390.17\n2019 H1 Total 30,908.52 38,377.23 69,285.75 28,846.76 1,914.81 30,761.56 38,524.18 2,061.76 36,462.42\n \n \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n58 \n \nFigure 5.7 \nMonthly Foreign Exchange Flows through the \nEconomy \n(Jan 2018 – May 2019) (US$ Million) \n \n5.3 \nCapital Market \nThe Nigerian capital market in the first \nhalf of 2019 remained bearish, reflecting \ncontinuing negative investor sentiment, \nattributable to rising public debt stock, \nperceived \nsovereign \nrisk \nand \nweakening \nmacroeconomic \nfundamentals. In addition to these \nfactors, there was significant capital \noutflow \nfollowing \nthe \ncontinued \nmonetary policy normalization by the US \nFed. \nCoupled \nwith \nthe \nuncertain \npolitical environment following the 2019 \ngeneral elections, the market thus \nexperienced significant sell-offs and \nprofit taking activities. \n \n5.3.1 \nEquities Market \nThe All-Share Index (ASI) decreased by \n4.66 per cent to 29,966.87 at end-June \n2019 from 31,430.50 at end-December \n2018. Similarly, it decreased by 21.71 per \ncent compared with 38,278.55 at end-\nJune 2018. Market capitalization (MC), \nhowever, increased by 12.71 per cent to \nN13.21 trillion at end-June 2019 from \nN11.72 trillion at end-December 2018. \nCompared with N13.87 trillion at end-\nJune 2018, it fell by 4.76 per cent. The \nincrease in market capitalization in the \nreview period was as a result of new \nlistings \nin \nthe \nmarket, \nprominent \namongst which were MTN, Skyway \nAviation Handling Company and the \nmerger between Access Bank and \nDiamond Bank. The new listings will \nincrease the market capitalization of \nequities as well as market depth and \nliquidity. \n \nTable 5.7: \nNSE All-Share Index (ASI) and Market \nCapitalization (MC) (June 2018 – June 2019) \n \nSource: Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) \n \nFigure 5.8: \nNSE All Share Index (ASI) and Market \nCapitalization (MC) (June 2018– June 2019) \n \n Source: Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) \n0.00\n10,000.00\n20,000.00\nJan-18\nMar-18\nMay-18\nJul-18\nSep-18\nNov-18\nJan-19\nMar-19\nMay-19\nTotal Inflows\nTotal Outflow\nNet Flow\nJun-18\n38,278.55\n \n13.87\n \nJul-18\n37,017.78\n \n13.41\n \nAug-18\n34,848.45\n \n12.72\n \nSep-18\n32,766.37\n \n11.96\n \nOct-18\n32,466.27\n \n11.85\n \nNov-18\n30,874.17\n \n11.27\n \nDec-18\n31,430.50\n \n11.72\n \nJan-19\n30,557.20\n \n11.39\n \nFeb-19\n31,718.70\n \n11.83\n \nMar-19\n31,041.42\n \n11.67\n \nApr-19\n29,159.74\n \n10.96\n \nMay-19\n31,069.37\n \n13.68\n \nJun-19\n29,966.87\n \n13.21\n \nMC(Equities)\nN’Trillion)\nDate\nASI\n0.00\n2.00\n4.00\n6.00\n8.00\n10.00\n12.00\n14.00\n16.00\n18.00\n20.00\n20,000\n24,000\n28,000\n32,000\n36,000\n40,000\nJun-18\nJul-18\nAug-18\nSep-18\nOct-18\nNov-18\nDec-18\nJan-19\nFeb-19\nMar-19\nApr-19\nMay-19\nJun-19\n(N' Trillion)\nAll-Share Index\nEquities Market Capitalisation (N' Trillion)\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n59 \n \nFigure 5.9: \nNSE ASI and MC (December 2018 – June 2019) \n \nSource: Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) \n \n5.3.2 Market Turnover \nAggregate stock market turnover in \nthe first half of 2019 increased by 33.74 \nper cent to 46.22 billion shares, valued \nat N538.57 billion in 463,313 deals \ncompared with 34.56 billion shares, \nvalued at N400.50 billion in 400,384 deals \nin the second half of 2018. Market \nturnover, however, decreased by 30.87 \nper cent from 66.86 billion shares, valued \nat N798.63 billion in 646,829 deals in the \ncorresponding half of 2018. The increase \nin market turnover in the review period \nwas largely attributable to the new \nlistings \nof \nMTN, \nSkyway \nAviation \nHandling Company and the merger \nbetween Access Bank and Diamond \nBank, as well as sell-offs by investors in \npreference for short-tenored money \nmarket instruments. \n \n5.3.3 Sectoral Contribution to Equity \nMarket Capitalization \nIn the review period, ‘Other’ sectors \ndominated \noverall \nmarket \ncapitalization. \nThe \ncontribution \nof \n‘Other’ sectors to market capitalization \nincreased to 35.72 per cent at end-June \n2019 from 20.55 per cent in the second \nhalf of 2018. The classification of ‘Other’ \nsectors comprises of sectors with few \nparticipants trading in the Nigerian \nStock Exchange (NSE). The dominance \nof ‘Other’ sectors was mainly due to the \nlisting of MTN Nigeria on Thursday, 16 \nMay, 2019. Sectors that also contributed \nsignificantly to the overall increase in \nmarket capitalization in the review \nperiod included: Building materials; \nBanking; and Food & Beverages, with \nmarket shares of 25.25, 11.66 and 11.03 \nper cent, respectively (Figure 5.11). \n \nFigure 5.10: \nNSE Market Capitalization by Sector as at End-\nDecember 2018 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSource: Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n0.00\n2.00\n4.00\n6.00\n8.00\n10.00\n12.00\n14.00\n16.00\n18.00\n20.00\n20,000\n24,000\n28,000\n32,000\n36,000\nDec-18\nJan-19\nFeb-19\nMar-19\nApr-19\nMay-19\nJun-19\n(N' Trillion)\nAll-Share Index\nEquities Market Capitalisation (N' Trillion)\nFood and Beverages \n13.41%\nindustrial goods\n3.21%\nBanking\n14.16%\nInsurance\n0.99%\nAgriculture\n1.12%\nBreweries\n9.55%\nConglomerates\n0.74%\nOil and Gas\n2.29%\nBuilding Materials\n30.02%\nConstruction\n0.59%\nPersonal Household \nproducts\n2.29%\nServices\n1.08%\nOther Sectors\n20.55%\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n60 \n \nFigure 5.11: \nNSE Market Capitalization by Sector as at End-\nJune 2019 \n \nSource: Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) \n \n5.3.4 The Warren Buffett Valuation \nMetric and Nigeria’s Equities \nMarket \nThe Warren Buffett valuation metric \nshowed that the Nigerian equities \nmarket was moderately undervalued in \nthe review period. The valuation metric \nwas 71.0 per cent in Q1 2019 below the \nthreshold of 75.0 – 115.0 per cent of \nnormal valuation. In the Q2 2019, \nhowever, the valuation metric stood at \n78.0 per cent. Below 75.0 per cent, the \nmarket is undervalued and above 115.0 \nper cent, the market is overvalued. The \nundervaluation in the review period was \nattributed to the following factors: \nincreased sell-off and profit taking \nactivities; \nweakening \ncorporate \nearnings; and capital flight due to the \nuncertain political environment and \ncontinued \nmonetary \npolicy \nnormalisation by the US Fed. The \nundervaluation \nof \nequities \nin \nthe \nreviewed \nperiod \noffers \nattractive \ninvestment opportunities for domestic \nand foreign investors. \n \nFigure 5.12: \nWarren Buffett Valuation of Nigerian Equities \nMarket \n \n \n5.3.5 Bond Market \nBond market activities in the first half of \n2019 were dominated by Federal \nGovernment of Nigeria (FGN) securities. \nThe \nSub-national \ngovernment \nand \ncorporate \nbonds \nsegments \nalso \nwitnessed some activities, with the latter \nrecording the least share by market \nvolume. \n \n5.3.5.1 FGN Eurobond \nThe 10-year dollar-denominated bond \nyield for Nigeria decreased by 232 basis \npoints to 3.79 per cent at end-June 2019 \nfrom 6.11 per cent at end-December \n2018. Compared with 4.47 per cent at \nend-June 2018, it fell by 211 basis points \n(Figure \n5.14). \nThis \nreflects \nan \nimprovement \nin \nforeign \ninvestor \nFood and Beverages \n11.03%\nindustrial goods\n2.85%\nBanking\n11.66%\nInsurance\n0.84%\nAgriculture\n0.99%\nBreweries\n5.90%\nConglomerates\n0.53%\nOil and Gas\n1.71%\nBuilding Materials\n25.25%\nConstruction\n0.53%\nPersonal Household \nproducts\n2.03%\nServices\n0.95%\nOther Sectors\n35.72%\nNSE Market Capitalization by Sector as at June 28, 2019\n0.00\n10.00\n20.00\n30.00\n40.00\n50.00\n60.00\n70.00\n80.00\n90.00\n100.00\nQ1-2014\nQ3-2014\nQ1-2015\nQ3-2015\nQ1-2016\nQ3-2016\nQ1-2017\nQ3-2017\nQ1-2018\nQ3-2018\nQ1-2019\nPer cent\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n61 \n \nperception of the long term sovereign \nrisk. \n \nFigure 5.13: \n10-Year U.S. Dollar-denominated Bond Yield for \nNigeria (June 29, 2018 – June 28, 2019) \n \n \nFGN bond yield fell by 163.53 basis \npoints to 13.24 per cent at end-June \n2019 from 14.88 per cent at end-\nOctober 2018, and by 8.59 basis points \nwhen compared with 13.16 per cent at \nend-June 2018. The long end of the yield \ncurve, as at end-June 2019, showed a \npositive premium over its October 2018 \nposition, suggesting an improvement in \noverall \nmacroeconomic \ncondition \n(Figure 5.14). \n \nFigure 5.14: \nFGN Bonds Yield Curves: end-June. 2018 vs. end-\nOct. 2018 vs. end-June 2019 \n \n5.3.5.2. State/Local Government Bonds \nThe \nsub-national \nbonds \nmarket \ncontinued to record low activity during \nthe review period. The total value of \noutstanding state/local governments \nbonds increased by 9.81 per cent to \nN565.82 billion at end-June 2019 from \nN515.26 billion at end-December 2018. \nCompared with N562.82 billion at end-\nJune 2018, it increased marginally by \n0.53 per cent. \n \n5.3.5.3 Corporate Bonds \nActivity \nin \nthe \ncorporate \nbonds \nsegment improved during the review \nperiod. \nThe \nvalue \nof \noutstanding \ncorporate bonds at end-June 2019 \nincreased by 15.94 per cent to N297.44 \nbillion from \nN256.56 billion in the \npreceding half year. The value also \nincreased by 11.10 per cent compared \nwith N267.72 billion in the corresponding \nperiod. \n \n5.3.5.4 Overall Analysis of the Nigerian \nCapital Market \nThe value of FGN bonds decreased by \n1.30 per cent to N9.26 trillion at end-\nJune 2019 from N9.38 trillion at end-Dec \n2018, remaining unchanged compared \nwith N9.26 trillion at end-June 2018. FGN \nbonds accounted for 39.66 per cent of \naggregate market capitalization at \nend-June \n2019. \nThe \nvalue \nof \nstate/municipal \nbonds, \ncorporate \nbonds and supranational bonds were \nN565.82 billion, N297.44 billion and \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n62 \n \nN12.95 billion, accounting for 2.42, 1.28 \nand 0.05 per cent of aggregate market \ncapitalization, respectively. The equities \nmarket contributed 56.59 per cent of \naggregate market capitalization at \nend-June 2019, while FGN bonds, \nstate/municipal \nbonds, \ncorporate \nbonds \nand \nsupranational \nbonds \naccounted for the balance of 43.41 per \ncent (Figure 5.15). \n \nFigure 5.15: \nStructure of the Nigerian Capital Market (June, \n2019) \n \n5.4 \nGlobal \nFinancial \nMarket \nDevelopments \nIn the first half of 2019, there was \nheightened uncertainty in the global \nfinancial markets as a result of: the \nincreasing complexities around BREXIT \nnegotiations; \nintensified \ntrade \nwar \nbetween the US, China and other key \ntrade partners; and renewed tensions \non \nthe \nKorean \nPeninsula. \nThe \ndevelopment led to a broad slowdown \nin the global economy necessitating a \ndovish monetary policy response from \nmajor central banks across the globe. \nThe US Fed which had continued its \nnormalization programme during the \nperiod gave forward guidance of its \nsuspension \nand \npossible \nreversal \ntowards the end of the first half. In the \nsame vein, the European Central Bank \n(ECB) which had terminated its asset \npurchase programme in the second \nhalf of 2018, indicated reluctance to \nprogress \nwith \nits \nnormalization \nprogramme. Also, the Bank of England \n(BOE) and the Bank of Japan (BoJ) \nsustained \ntheir \nbroadly \naccommodative \nmonetary \npolicy \nstance in the review period. \nThe uncertainties also permeated the \ncommodities market, giving rise to a \nsupply glut in the oil market as demand \ncontracted. \nCoupled \nwith \nthe \ncontinued US-led sanctions against Iran \nand the crisis in Venezuela, OPEC and \nnon-OPEC members extended their \nproduction ceiling for a further 9 months \nto March 2020 to support prices. \nAccordingly, liquidity conditions in the \nglobal economy during the review \nperiod reflected the tacit return to \nmonetary policy accommodation by \nmajor central banks in the advanced \neconomies. \nMost \ncurrencies \nappreciated against the US dollar, \ncoupled \nwith \nimproved \nyields \nin \nemerging market economies and the \nrecovery of commodity prices, the \nperformance of major global stock \nmarkets was largely positive. \n \nEquities\n56.58%\nFGN \nBonds\n39.66%\nState/Mu\nnicipal \nBonds\n2.42%\nCorporate \nBonds\n1.27%\nSupranation…\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n63 \n \n5.4.1 Money Market and Central Bank \nPolicy Rates \nThe tacit return to monetary policy \naccommodation by some major central \nbanks shaped liquidity conditions in the \nglobal economy during the review \nperiod. This was as a result of broadly \nweakening \ngrowth \nconditions \noccasioned by growing uncertainties in \nthe global economy. \nIn the wake of a slowing global \neconomy \nand \nthreats \nto \nthe \nUS \neconomy, the U.S Fed switched from an \naggressive pace of normalization to a \ndovish stance. The Bank of England \ncontinued to hold its policy rate \nconstant to avert a recession as the \nuncertainty around BREXIT threatened \nto dampen growth. The Bank continued \nto warn of the drastic impact of a \ndisorderly \nBREXIT \non \nthe \nmacroeconomy. In the Euro Area, the \ndowngrade of growth forecast by the \nECB was reversed in part as the new \nround of stimulus injected into the \neconomy \nshowed \nsigns \nof \nsome \nrecovery. The German, French and \nItalian economies, however, remained \ndrags on the Zone’s growth prospects in \n2019. The ECB foreclosed the likelihood \nof a rate hike till the end of 2020, as its \nmonetary \npolicy \nremained \nlargely \naccommodative. The Bank of Japan \nalso retained its policy rate in response \nto prevailing uncertainties in the global \neconomy. \nCentral banks in the Emerging Markets \nand Developing Economies (EMDEs) \nmaintained a largely accommodative \nstance during the review period. The \nReserve Bank of India lowered its policy \nrate to 5.75 per cent in June from 6.50 \nper cent in January. The Bank of Russia \nalso lowered its policy rate to 7.50 per \ncent from 7.75 per cent in January. The \nReserve Bank of South Africa retained its \npolicy rate to support the economy’s \nrecovery from recession. The People’s \nBank of China also retained its policy \nrate during the period to address growth \nconcerns. The Central Bank of Brazil held \nits rate constant to support its post-\nrecession recovery. Other central banks \nthat cut their policy rates in the review \nperiod were: the Central Bank of Egypt \nfrom 16.75 to 15.75 per cent; the Bank of \nGhana from 17.0 to 16.0 per cent; and \nthe Central Bank of Nigeria from 14.0 to \n13.5 per cent, to address growth \nconcerns. \n \nTable 5.8: \nPolicy Rates of Selected Central Banks December \n2018 – June 2019 \nSource: www.cbrates.com \n \n \n \n \nCountry\nDec. \n2018\nJan. \n2019\nFeb. \n2019\nMar. \n2019\nApr. \n2019\nMay. \n2019\nJun. \n2019\nEgypt\n16.75\n16.75\n15.75\n15.75\n15.75\n15.75\n15.75\nKenya\n9.00\n9.00\n9.00\n9.00\n9.00\n9.00\n9.00\nS. Africa\n6.75\n6.75\n6.75\n6.75\n6.75\n6.75\n6.75\nGhana\n17.00\n17.00\n16.00\n16.00\n16.00\n16.00\n16.00\nNigeria\n14.00\n14.00\n14.00\n13.50\n13.50\n13.50\n13.50\nBrazil\n6.50\n6.50\n6.50\n6.50\n6.50\n6.50\n6.50\nUSA\n2.25-\n2.50\n2.25-\n2.50\n2.25-\n2.50\n2.25-\n2.50\n2.25-\n2.50\n2.25-\n2.50\n2.25-\n2.50\nJapan\n-0.10\n-0.10\n-0.10\n-0.10\n-0.10\n-0.10\n-0.10\nEuro Area\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nIndia\n6.50\n6.50\n6.25\n6.25\n6.00\n6.00\n5.75\nRussia\n7.75\n7.75\n7.75\n7.75\n7.75\n7.75\n7.50\nChina\n4.35\n4.35\n4.35\n4.35\n4.35\n4.35\n4.35\nUK\n0.75\n0.75\n0.75\n0.75\n0.75\n0.75\n0.75\nIndonesia\n6.00\n6.00\n6.00\n6.00\n6.00\n6.00\n6.00\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n64 \n \n5.4.2 Global Capital Market \nThe performance of major global stock \nmarkets was largely positive in response \nto developments in the review period. \nOn average the US dollar depreciated \nagainst most currencies as the Fed \nswitched from a normalizing mode to a \ndovish stance, resulting in the flow of \ncapital away from the short end of the \nyield curve. In the face of growing \nuncertainties from BREXIT and the US \ntrade \nwars, \na \nnumber \nof \nother \nadvanced economy central banks also \nmaintained a \ndovish \nstance, \nthus \nenabling capital to flow towards stock \nmarkets. \n \nConsequently, in Europe, the Russian \nMICEX, the UK FTSE 100, French CAC 40 \nand \nGerman \nDAX \n30 \nindices \nall \nincreased by 17.27, 10.37, 17.09 and \n17.42 per cent, respectively. \nIn North America, the United States S&P \n500, Canadian S&P/TSX Composite and \nMexican Bolsa indices increased by \n17.35, \n14.38, \nand \n3.65 \nper \ncent, \nrespectively. Also, in South America, the \nBrazilian Bovespa, the Argentine Merval \nand the Columbian indices increased \nby 14.88, 37.98 and 16.82 per cent, \nrespectively. \nIn Asia, the Japanese Nikkei 225, the \nChinese Shanghai SE and the Indian BSE \nSensex index increased by 6.30, 19.48, \nand 9.22 per cent, respectively. \nIn Africa, the South African JSE All-Share \nand Egyptian EGX CASE 30 indices \nincreased by 10.37 and 8.17 per cent, \nrespectively, while the Nigerian NSE All-\nShare Index, Kenyan Nairobi NSE 20, and \nGhanaian \nGSE \nAll \nShare \nindices \ndecreased by 4.66, 7.08, and 4.18 per \ncent, respectively. \n \n \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n65 \n \nTable 5.9 \nSelected International Stock Market Indices as at June 28, 2019 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCountry\nIndex\n29-Jun-18\n31-Dec-18\n28-Jun-19\nJune 29, 2018 - \nJune 28, 2019 % \nChange\n Dec 31, 2018 - \nJune 28, 2019 \n% Change\nAFRICA\nNigeria\nASI\n38,278.55\n31,430.50\n29,966.87\n-21.71\n-4.66\nSouth Africa\nJSE African AS\n57,610.98\n52,736.86\n58,203.84\n1.03\n10.37\nKenya\nNairobi NSE 20 \n3,285.73\n2,833.84\n2,633.32\n-19.86\n-7.08\nEgypt\nEGX CSE 30\n16,348.60\n13,035.77\n14,100.74\n-13.75\n8.17\nGhana\nGSE All Share\n2,878.66\n2,499.33\n2,394.82\n-16.81\n-4.18\nNORTH AMERICA\nUS\nS&P 500\n2,718.37\n2,506.85\n2,941.76\n8.22\n17.35\nCanada\nS&P/TSX Composite\n16,277.73\n14,322.86\n16382.20\n0.64\n14.38\nMexico\nMexico Bolsa (IPC)\n47,663.20\n41,640.27\n43,161.17\n-9.45\n3.65\nSOUTH AMERICA\nBrazil\nBovespa Stock \n72,762.50\n87,887.26\n100,967\n38.76\n14.88\nArgentina\nMerval \n26,037.00\n30,292.55\n41,796.36\n60.53\n37.98\nColombia\nCOLCAP\n1,577.01\n1,325.93\n1,548.98\n-1.78\n16.82\nEUROPE\nUK\nFTSE 100\n7,636.93\n6,728.13\n7,425.63\n-2.77\n10.37\nFrance\nCAC 40\n5,323.53\n4,730.69\n5,538.97\n4.05\n17.09\nGermany\nDAX \n12,306.00\n10,558.96\n12,398.80\n0.75\n17.42\nRussia\nMICEX\n2,295.95\n2,358.50\n2,765.85\n20.47\n17.27\n \nASIA\nJapan\nNIKKEI 225\n22,304.51\n20,014.77\n21,275.92\n-4.61\n6.30\nChina\nShanghai SE A \n2,982.00\n2,611.38\n3,119.99\n4.63\n19.48\nIndia\nBSE Sensex\n35,423.48\n36,068.33\n39,394.64\n11.21\n9.22\nSource: Bloomberg \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n66 \n \n5.4.3 Commodities \nIn the review period, commodity prices \nrecovered from the downward trend \nobserved in the second half of 2018. This \nwas in spite of the continuing trade war \nbetween the US and China, the \nenforcement \nof \nearlier \nimposed \nsanctions on Iranian oil as well as a \nbroad \nslowdown \nin \nthe \nglobal \neconomy. Consequently, the OPEC \nreference basket rose by 27.26 per cent \nto an average of US$65.60pb in June \n2019 from US$51.55pb in December \n2018. In addition, OPEC and non-OPEC \nmember \ncountries \nextended \ntheir \nproduction ceilings to support prices. \nThe non-fuel price index which reflects \nprice development in metals, however, \ndeclined in the review period. The price \nof Aluminium fell by 8.56 per cent to \nUS$1,756.0/mt \nin \nJune \n2019 \nfrom \nUS$1,920.38/mt \nin \nDecember \n2018. \nSimilarly, the price of Zinc also fell by 0.58 \nper cent to US$2,601.0/mt in June 2019 \nfrom US$2,616.29/mt in December 2018. \nThe Food and Agriculture Organization \n(FAO) Food Price Index rose by 6.93 per \ncent to 172.7 points in June 2019 from \n161.5 points in December 2018. The sub-\nindices of meat, dairy, Cereals and \nsugar rose, while vegetable oil fell. The \ndevelopment was due to strong import \ndemand from Asia as supplies from \nOceania contracted. In the US, the \nreduced supply of maize export also \nresulted in a sharp rise in the price of \ncereals, while sugar quotations which \nwere hitherto depressed due to large \nsupplies, improved as the Brazilian real \nappreciated against the US dollar. \n \n5.4.4 Global Foreign Exchange Market \nMost currencies appreciated against \nthe US dollar in the first half of 2019, \nindicating that risk sentiments appeared \nto have regained some momentum \nsupported by advanced economy \ncentral banks signalling the likelihood of \nfurther \nmonetary \npolicy \naccommodation. \nIn \naddition, \nthe \nrelatively \nstrong \ncommodity \nprices, \nparticularly oil, increased the prospect \nof building reserves to support fleeing \ncapital, coupled with improved yields in \nthe emerging market economies. \nAccordingly, in North America, the \nCanadian dollar and the Mexican peso \nboth appreciated by 4.10 and 2.24 per \ncent, respectively. Similarly, in South \nAmerica, \nthe \nBrazilian \nreal \nand \nColombian peso appreciated by 0.64 \nand 1.18 per cent, respectively, while \nthe Argentine peso depreciated by \n11.26 per cent. \nIn \nEurope, \nthe \nRussian \nrubble \nappreciated by 10.26 per cent and the \nBritish pound stabilized against the US \ndollar. The Euro, however, depreciated \nagainst the U.S dollar by 0.89 per cent. \nIn Asia, the Chinese yuan, Indian rupee, \nand Japanese yen all appreciated \nagainst the US dollar by 0.12, 0.10 and \n1.63 per cent, respectively. In Africa, the \nNigerian naira, South African rand, and \nEgyptian pound also appreciated by \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n67 \n \n0.03, \n1.89 \nand \n7.36 \nper \ncent, \nrespectively, while the Kenyan shilling \nand Ghanaian cedi both depreciated \nagainst the U.S. dollar by 0.44 and 10.10 \nper cent, respectively. \n \n \nTable 5.10 \nExchange Rates of Selected Countries (value in currency units to US$) \n \nCurrency\n31-Dec-18\n28-Jun-19\n Dec 18 - Jun 19 \n(% App/Dep)\nAFRICA \nNigeria \nNaira\n307.00\n306.90\n0.03\nSouth Africa \nRand\n14.35\n14.08\n1.89\nKenya \nShilling\n101.85\n102.30\n-0.44\nEgypt \nPound\n17.92\n16.69\n7.36\nGhana\nCedi\n4.92\n5.47\n-10.10\nNORTH \nAMERICA \nCanada \nDollar\n1.36\n1.31\n4.10\nMexico \nPeso\n19.65\n19.22\n2.24\nSOUTH \nAMERICA \nBrazil \nReal\n3.87\n3.85\n0.64\nArgentina \nPeso\n37.66\n42.44\n-11.26\nColombia \nPeso\n3249.75\n3211.86\n1.18\nEUROPE \nUK \nPound\n0.78\n0.78\n0.00\nEuro Area \nEuro\n0.87\n0.88\n-0.89\nRussia \nRuble\n69.72\n63.23\n10.26\nASIA \nJapan \nYen\n109.69\n107.93\n1.63\nChina \nYuan\n6.88\n6.87\n0.12\nIndia\nRupee\n69.77\n69.70\n0.10\nSource: bloomberg \n Exchange Rates of Selected Countries (Value in currency units to US$)\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n69 \n \nCHAPTER SIX \nECONOMIC OUTLOOK \n \n6.1 \nOVERVIEW \n \nlobal growth was projected to \nslow to 3.2 per cent in 2019, \nfrom 3.6 per cent in 2018, as a \nresult of persisting headwinds from 2018. \nThe growth was earlier projected at 3.5 \nper cent but later revised downwards to \n3.2 per cent. This was predicated on: \nweakening \noutput \ngrowth \nin \nthe \nadvanced \nand \nemerging \nmarket \neconomies \nresulting \nfrom \nsubdued \ninvestment and demand for consumer \ndurables; \ncontinuing \ntrade \nwars \nbetween the US and its key trading \npartners; escalating uncertainties about \na no-deal BREXIT; and pockets of geo-\npolitical tensions in the Middle East and \nthe Korean peninsula. The growth \nprojection is associated with further \ndownside risks such as: increasing \nfinancial vulnerabilities as a result of an \nextended era of low interest rate \nregime; diminishing monetary policy \nspace as advanced economy central \nbanks return to policy accommodation; \nrising public and private debt; and \nincreasing debt service burden. \n \nThe tailwinds expected to moderate the \ndownturn are: improved capital flows to \nthe Emerging Markets and Developing \nEconomies \n(EMDEs) \nas \nadvanced \neconomy central banks retreat to a \ndovish \nmonetary \npolicy \nstance; \nstabilising oil prices as OPEC and non-\nOPEC members extend their production \nceiling to March 2020 and country-\nspecific expansionary fiscal policies to \nsmoothen the downturn in aggregate \ndemand. \n \nGrowth in the advanced economies \nwhere aggregate demand remains \ngenerally \nsubdued \nwith \ndeclining \ninflationary pressures is expected to slow \nto 1.9 per cent in 2019 from 2.2 per cent \nin 2018. This downward revision is \npremised on a broad slowdown across \nkey economies in the group, such as the \nUnited States, the Euro area, the United \nKingdom and Canada. In the United \nStates, growth is expected to moderate \nto 2.6 per cent in 2019 from 2.9 per cent \nin 2018. The growth for the US is \nexpected to be driven by unwinding \nfiscal \nstimulus, \nsoftening \ndomestic \ndemand, and weaker imports reflecting \nthe impact of the trade war with its key \ntrading partners. Growth in the Euro \narea is also projected to moderate to \n1.3 per cent in 2019 from 1.9 per cent in \n2018, owing to weak external demand \nin the German auto market, uncertain \nfiscal policy in Italy and a residual \nimpact of the ‘yellow vest’ protests in \nFrance. Growth in the United Kingdom, \nwhere the expectation of a disorderly \nno-deal BREXIT is getting stronger, would \ndip moderately to 1.3 per cent in 2019 \nfrom 1.4 per cent in 2018. The Japanese \neconomy is, however, projected to \ngrow by 0.9 per cent in 2019 up from 0.8 \nper cent in 2018, due to improved net \nexports and sustained fiscal support. \n \nSimilarly, growth in the Emerging Markets \nand Developing Economies (EMDEs) is \nG\nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n70 \n \nexpected to slow to 4.1 per cent in 2019 \nfrom 4.5 per cent in 2018. The decline \nreflects impact of tariffs on trade and \ninvestment particularly in China, weaker \nsentiments in Latin America, especially \nBrazil \nand \nMexico, \nand \ndeep \nhumanitarian and economic crisis in \nVenezuela. \nIn the Middle East and North Africa \n(MENA) region, growth is expected to \nslow to 1.0 per cent in 2019 from 1.6 per \ncent in 2018. The slowdown will largely \nbe accounted for by the crippling \neffect of tighter US sanctions on Iran and \ncivil strife across other economies in the \nregion, including Syria and Yemen. \n \nIn \nsub-Saharan \nAfrica, \ngrowth \nis \nprojected to improve to 3.4 per cent in \n2019 from 3.1 per cent in 2018, as strong \ngrowth \nin \nresource \nrich \ncountries \npartially off-set the weak performance \nof the region’s largest economies. \nGrowth in Nigeria is expected to \nstrengthen to 2.3 per cent in 2019 from \n1.9 per cent in 2018. In Angola, the \neconomy will grow by 0.44 per cent in \n2019 from a contraction of 1.7 per cent \nin 2018. Growth in Angola, Nigeria and \nother oil exporting countries in the \nregion, would be supported by relatively \nhigher oil prices. In South Africa, growth \nis expected to slow to 0.7 per cent in \n2019 from 0.8 per cent in 2018. Growth in \nSouth Africa would remain subdued due \nto unfavourable impact of labour \nmarket crisis, energy supply issues and \nweak agricultural production. \n \n \n6.2 \nOutlook for Global Output \nThe \nslowdown \nin \nglobal \ngrowth \nobserved in 2019 could persist in the \nabsence of robust policy interventions in \nkey economies across the globe. The \nkey downside risks are evidenced by a \ndecline in global trade activities and \nweakening industrial production and \nlingering trade tensions between the \nUnited States and China. Furthermore, in \nthe face of high uncertainty in the \ninternational \npolicy \nenvironment, \neconomic \nsentiments and \nbusiness \nconfidence indicators have weakened. \nAlthough \nimproving \nmonetary \nconditions have provided some degree \nof stabilization in capital flows and \nglobal financial markets, there are still \nconsiderable downside risks from the \nbuild-up of financial fragilities, and \npersistent trade tensions and concerns \nabout the consequences of climate \nchange. There are growing signs in the \npolicy horizon of improving tailwinds as \nreflected in: improved capital flows to \nthe Emerging Markets and Developing \nEconomies (EMDEs), likelihood of a \nfurther extension by OPEC and non-\nOPEC members’ production ceiling \nbeyond March 2020 and coordinated \ncountry-specific \nexpansionary \nfiscal \npolicies \nto \nimprove \naggregate \ndemand. Against this backdrop, global \noutput is expected to improve to 3.5 per \ncent in 2020 from 3.2 per cent in 2019 \n(WEO IMF, July 2019). \nIn the advanced economies, growth is \nprojected to decline to 1.7 per cent in \n2020 from 1.9 per cent in 2019, led by \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n71 \n \ndeclines in the US to 1.9 per cent from \n2.6 per cent and Japan to 0.4 per cent \nfrom 0.9 per cent. The reduction can be \nattributed primarily to the impact of the \ndeclining fiscal stimulus, particularly in \nthe United States. This is however \nexpected \nto \nbe \nmoderated \nby \nimproving labour market outcomes and \nfavourable \nfinancial \nconditions. \nMeanwhile growth in the euro area is \nprojected to improve to 1.6 per cent in \n2020 from 1.3 per cent in 2019. Similarly, \ngrowth in the United Kingdom and \nCanada were expected to improve to \n1.4 and 1.9 per cent in 2020 from 1.3 and \n1.5 per cent in 2019, respectively. \nIn \nthe \nEmerging \nMarkets \nand \nDeveloping \nEconomies, \ngrowth \nis \nprojected to increase to 4.7 per cent in \n2020 from 4.1 per cent in 2019. The \ndevelopment would be led by India \nprojected to grow to 7.2 per cent from \n7.0 per cent, Brazil to 2.4 per cent from \n0.8 per cent, Russia to 1.9 per cent from \n1.2 per cent and Mexico to 1.9 per cent \nfrom 0.9 per cent. Conversely, China is \nforecast to experience a gradual \nslowdown to 6.0 per cent from 6.2 per \ncent in 2019. \nIn India, growth is expected to increase \non account of strong business and \ninvestment confidence, easing financial \nconditions, \nlower \noil \nprices, \naccommodative \nfiscal \npolicy \nand \nrecent structural reforms. Similarly, the \nexpansion in the Brazilian economy is \nexpected \nto \nbe \ndriven \nby \nthe \nimplementation \nof \nthe \nnew \ngovernment’s \nreform \nagenda, \nimproving \nbusiness \nconfidence, \nreduced policy uncertainty, disinflation \nand \nstrengthening \nlabour \nmarket \nconditions. \nGrowth in the Middle East and North \nAfrican region is expected to increase \nto 3.0 per cent in 2020 from 1.0 per cent \nin 2019. This growth is expected to be led \nby Saudi Arabia, which is projected to \ngrow by 3.0 per cent from 1.9 per cent \nin 2019. The outlook for the region would \nhowever, \nbe \nweighed \ndown \nby: \nmacroeconomic \nadjustment \nchallenges in Pakistan; US sanctions on \nIran; and civil tensions and conflicts in \nIraq, Syria, and Yemen. \nIn \nSub-Saharan \nAfrica, \ngrowth \nis \nprojected to improve to 3.6 per cent in \n2020 from 3.4 per cent in 2019. The \ndevelopment is predicated on reduced \npolicy \nuncertainty \nand \nimproved \ninvestment in large economies in the \nregion, together with continued robust \ngrowth \nin \nnon-resource \nintensive \ncountries. Nigeria is projected to grow \nby 2.6 per cent in 2020, from 2.3 per cent \nin \n2019. \nSimilarly, \nSouth \nAfrica \nis \nexpected to grow by 1.1 per cent in \n2020 from 0.7 per cent in 2019. \n \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n72 \n \n6.3 \nDownside \nRisks \nto \nGlobal \nOutlook \nDespite the prospects of global growth \npicking up reasonably well in 2020, on \nbalance, the risks to the outlook remain \ntilted to the downside. The downside \nrisks to the outlook are broadly in the \nareas \nof \ntrade, \nfinancial \nmarket \nconditions, \nmacroeconomic \nimbalances, \ncommodity \nmarket \nconditions and climate change issues. \nGrowing policy uncertainty as a result of \nlingering trade tensions could impose a \nfurther drag on growth. The likely \ncontinued \ndeterioration \nin \ninvestor \nconfidence may also result in portfolio \nrealignment from risky to safer assets as \nfinancial conditions tighten in more \nvulnerable economies. The effects of \nthese factors could be exacerbated by \nthe possibility of a no-deal BREXIT; weak \neconomic data indicating a prolonged \nslowdown \nof \nglobal \ngrowth; \nand \nlingering fiscal uncertainty in emerging \nand developing Europe. In the medium \nterm, the consequences of climate \nchange, including extreme weather \nevents could further weaken growth \nprospects. \n \nIn the Emerging Market and Developing \nEconomies, the downside risks to the \noutlook include the associated effect of \nthe on-going trade war between the US \nand \nChina \nand \nrising \npolicy \nuncertainties \nwhich \ncould \ndepress \ninvestment and trigger financial market \nvolatility. The rising public and corporate \ndebt levels could also introduce a new \nsource of vulnerabilities in this group of \neconomies. In addition, slowdowns in \nmajor \neconomies \ncould \nhave \nsubstantial spill-over effects for EMDEs. \n \nIn \nSub-Sahara \nAfrica, \nthe \noutlook \nharbours several downside risks. There is \nthe possibility of a spill-over of trade-\nrelated deceleration in growth from key \ntrading partners such as, China, the Euro \nArea, and the United States. Being \nprimary commodity exporters, revenues \nare likely to be depressed as oil and \nother \ncommodity \nprices \nface \nconsiderable volatility. \n \nIn the Middle East and North Africa \nRegion, risks also remained tilted to the \ndownside for both oil exporting and \nimporting countries. Geo-political risks \nare elevated in some oil exporters, while \npolitical challenges remain high in oil \nimporting \ncountries. \nThe \ntensions \nbetween the US and Iran would pose \nsubstantial \nrisk \nfor \nthe \nregion’s \neconomies. Several countries in the \nregion are also confronted with fragile \npeace situations and growing tensions \nsuch as Yemen, Syria and Libya. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n73 \n \nTable 6.1 \nGlobal Output and Inflation Outlook \n \n \n \n \n201\n6 \n201\n7 \n201\n8 \n2019\n* \n2020\n* \nA. World \nOutput \n \n \n \n \n \nWorld Output \n3.3 \n3.7 \n3.6 \n3.2 \n3.5 \nAdvanced \nEconomies \n1.7 \n2.3 \n2.2 \n1.9 \n1.7 \nUSA \n1.6 \n2.2 \n2.9 \n2.6 \n1.9 \nEuro Area \n1.9 \n2.4 \n1.9 \n1.3 \n1.6 \nJapan \n1.0 \n1.7 \n0.8 \n0.9 \n0.4 \nUK \n1.8 \n1.7 \n1.4 \n1.3 \n1.4 \nCanada \n1.4 \n3.0 \n1.9 \n1.5 \n1.9 \nOther \nAdvanced \nEconomies \n2.1 \n2.6 \n2.6 \n2.1 \n2.4 \nEmerging & \nDeveloping \nEconomies \n4.4 \n4.7 \n4.5 \n4.1 \n4.7 \nCommonweal\nth of \nIndependent \nStates \n0.4 \n2.1 \n2.7 \n1.9 \n2.4 \nLatin America \nand the \nCaribbean \n-0.6 \n1.3 \n1.0 \n0.6 \n2.3 \nMiddle East \nand North \nAfrica \n5.1 \n2.2 \n1.6 \n1.0 \n3.0 \nSub-Saharan \nAfrica \n1.4 \n2.7 \n3.1 \n3.4 \n3.6 \nB. Commodity \nPrices (US' \nDollars) \n \n \n \n \n \nOil \n-\n15.7 \n23.3 \n29.4 \n-4.1 \n-2.5 \nNon-fuel \n-1.5 \n6.8 \n1.6 \n-0.6 \n0.5 \nC. Consumer \nPrices \n \n \n \n \n \nAdvanced \nEconomies \n0.9 \n1.4 \n2.0 \n1.6 \n2.0 \nEmerging & \nDeveloping \nEconomies \n4.2 \n4.3 \n4.8 \n4.8 \n4.7 \nSource: IMF WEO Update, July 2019 \n*Forecast \n \n \n \n6.4 \nGlobal Inflation Outlook \nAccording \nto \nthe \nIMF’s \nWorld \nEconomic Outlook (WEO) Update for \nApril 2019, global inflation is expected to \nmoderate to 3.58 per cent in 2019 from \n3.64 per cent in 2018, before inching up \nto 3.62 per cent in 2020. The decline in \ninflation in 2019 is expected on the \nbackdrop of several developments, \nprincipal \namongst \nwhich \nis \nthe \nexpectation of continued stability in oil \nprices, following the retention of a \nproduction ceiling by OPEC and non-\nOPEC members. In addition to this, \ncommodity prices have also been on a \ndownward trend. The recent return to \nmonetary accommodation by major \nadvanced economy central banks is, \nhowever, expected to reverse this trend \nin 2020. \nIn \nthe \nadvanced \neconomies, \nthe \nprojection for inflation is an initial decline \nin 2019 to 1.6 per cent from 2.0 per cent \nin 2018 before rising to 2.0 per cent in \n2020. While wage growth has been \nstrong in these group of economies, \ngrowth in aggregate demand has not \nbeen commensurate, thus leading to a \nbroad weakening of core inflation. In \nthe United States, inflation is projected \nto decline sharply to 2.0 per cent in 2019 \nfrom 2.4 per cent in 2018, before \ncommencing an uptick to 2.7 per cent \nin 2020, with core inflation exceeding \nthe long-run objective of 2.0 per cent. \nEuro Area inflation is also expected to \ndecline to 1.3 per cent in 2019 from 1.8 \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n74 \n \nper cent in 2018 before commencing a \nmoderate rise to 1.6 per cent in 2020. \nThe Euro area is thus expected to \ncontinue monetary accommodation \nbeyond 2020 as growth in aggregate \ndemand may remain weak for some \ntime to come. In the United Kingdom, \ninflation is projected to moderate to 1.8 \nper cent in 2019 from 2.5 per cent in \n2018 before moving in an upward \ntrajectory to 2.0 per cent in 2020. In \nJapan, however, consumer prices are \nexpected to rise to 1.1 and 1.5 per cent \nin 2019 and 2020, respectively, from 1.0 \nper cent in 2018 as the Bank of Japan \npersists with monetary accommodation \nto \noffset \nthe \nexpected \nrise \nin \nconsumption tax rate due in October \n2019. \nIn the emerging market and developing \neconomies, inflation is expected to \npeak at 4.8 per cent in 2019 before \nmoderating marginally to 4.7 per cent in \n2020 as commodity prices stabilize. \nSpecifically, the IMF projects that there \ncould \nbe \na \ntemporary \nboost \nto \nconsumer price inflation in Russia, \nprojected to rise to 5.0 per cent in 2019 \nfrom 2.9 per cent in 2018 due to a \nproposed increase in value added \ntaxes. A moderation to 4.5 per cent is, \nhowever, expected in 2020. Inflation in \nChina is estimated to rise to 2.3 and 2.5 \nper cent in 2019 and 2020, respectively, \nfrom 2.1 per cent in 2018. The rise in \ninflation in China will be driven by \nstrengthening aggregate demand as \nthe economic rebalancing produces a \nstrong middle class in China. It is also \nexpected to rise in India to 3.9 and 4.2 \nper cent, respectively in 2019 and 2020 \nfrom 3.5 per cent in 2018 as aggregate \ndemand strengthens with rising food \nprices. In Brazil, inflation is expected to \nfall to 3.6 per cent in 2019 from 3.7 per \ncent in 2018 before rising to 4.1 per cent \nin 2020. The decline in inflation in 2019 \ncomes on the back of a strengthening \ndomestic currency as sugar export \nsupplies dwindle. \nIn Sub-Saharan Africa, headline inflation \nis projected to fall to 8.1 per cent in 2019 \nfrom 8.5 per cent in 2018 and further to \n7.4 per cent in 2020 as oil and other \ncommodity prices recover relative to \n2018. In Nigeria, according to the IMF, \nheadline inflation is expected to decline \nfrom 12.1 per cent in 2018 to 11.7 per \ncent apiece in 2019 and 2020 as the \nexchange rate is expected to remain \nstable in the medium term due to \nstabilizing oil prices. Similarly, inflation in \nAngola is projected to decline to 17.5 \nand 11.1 per cent in 2019 and 2020, \nrespectively, from 19.6 per cent in 2018 \nas the oil market stabilizes. Inflation in \nSouth Africa is however, expected to \nrise to 5.0 and 5.4 per cent in 2019 and \n2020, respectively from 4.6 per cent in \n2018 \ndue \nto \npersisting \nenergy \nchallenges and legacy labour market \nissues. \nIn \nthe \nMENA \nregion, \nincluding \nAfghanistan and Pakistan, headline \ninflation is estimated to decline to 9.7 \nand 9.3 per cent in 2019 and 2020, \nrespectively, owing to sustained stability \nin energy prices. \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n75 \n \n6.5 Outlook for Domestic Output Growth \nThe \nanticipated \nrecovery \nof \nthe \ndomestic economy has been weaker \nthan expected amid increased oil \nsector \ncontraction. \nReal \nGDP \nmoderated further to 1.94 per cent in \nthe second quarter of 2019 from 2.10 per \ncent in the first quarter. The growth was \nled by Services, industry and Agriculture. \nThe oil sector grew significantly by 5.15 \nper cent in Q2 2019, compared with \ncontractions of 1.46 and 3.95 per cent in \nthe \npreceding \nquarter \nand \nthe \ncorresponding period of 2018. \nWith the slowdown in GDP growth in Q2 \n2019, the GDP growth projection by \nBank staff was also revised downward \nfrom 2.72 per cent to 2.27 per cent for \n2019 due to weaker-than-expected \ndomestic \ndemand \namid \nhigh \nunemployment, decline in crude oil and \ngas production and escalation of trade \ntensions, involving major economies \n(Euro Area, the United States and \nChina) which is likely to weigh on global \ndemand. The IMF projects Nigeria’s \ngrowth at 2.3 per cent in 2019. \nNevertheless, \nsustaining \nstable \nexchange \nrates, \nrobust \nexternal \nreserves, \nfinancial \nsystem \nstability, \nenhanced flow of credit to the real \nsector, sustained calmness in the Niger \nDelta, improved production/export of \noil to build fiscal buffers, expected \nimprovements in tax revenue, effective \nimplementation \nof \nthe \nEconomic \nGrowth Recovery Plan by the Federal \nGovernment and the CBN special \ninterventions in selected sectors in \nAgriculture and SME are expected to \nsupport output growth. \nKey headwinds to the growth outlook \nhowever, are low credit to the private \nsector, high and sticky NPLs, fall in \ncapital and remittance inflows, high \nunemployment rate, high level of \ninsecurity in food producing areas and \ncrude oil production below the budget \nbenchmark of 2.3 mbpd. The continued \nintervention by the Bank in the real \nsector is, however, expected to partly \nsubdue these downside risks, while fiscal \npolicy is expected to drive growth in the \nlong term. \n6.6 \nOutlook for Domestic Inflation \nStaff estimates suggest that the year-\non-year \nheadline \ninflation \nwould \nmoderate to 11.13, 11.10, and 11.18 per \ncent in July, August and September \n2019, respectively from 11.22 per cent in \nJune 2019 due to the gradual decline in \nfood prices. Upside risk to inflation \nremain food shortage due mainly to \ninsecurity \nin \nagricultural \nproducing \nareas of the country, high liquidity \ninjection \nfrom \nthe \ncontinued \nimplementation of the 2018 FGN budget \nand 2019 budget, as well as increased \nFAAC disbursements. \nAs the Bank \ncontinues \nto \nmanage \nliquidity \nconditions in the domestic economy, \ninflationary \ndevelopments \nwill \nalso \ncontinue to be monitored to ensure that \nthe risks to inflation and growth are \nminimized. \n \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n76 \n \nTable 6.2: Inflation Forecast \n YEAR-ON-YEAR INFLATION RATE \n12-MMA INFLATION RATE \nStatus \nMonth \nHeadline \ninflation \nFood \ninflation \nCore \ninflation \nStatus \nMonth \nHeadline \ninflation \nFood \ninflation \nCore \ninflation \nActual \nJan-19 \n11.37 \n13.51 \n9.90 \nActual \nJan-19 \n11.80 \n13.93 \n10.34 \nFeb-19 \n11.31 \n13.47 \n9.80 \nFeb-19 \n11.56 \n13.62 \n10.19 \nMar-19 \n11.25 \n13.45 \n9.46 \nMar-19 \n11.40 \n13.42 \n10.04 \nApr-19 \n11.37 \n13.70 \n9.28 \nApr-19 \n11.31 \n13.34 \n9.91 \nMay-19 \n11.40 \n13.79 \n9.03 \nMay-19 \n11.30 \n13.37 \n9.77 \nJun-19 \n11.22 \n13.56 \n8.84 \nJun-19 \n11.30 \n13.42 \n9.64 \nForecast \nJul-19 \n11.13 \n13.47 \n8.82 \nForecast \nJul-19 \n11.29 \n13.45 \n9.54 \nAug-19 \n11.10 \n13.29 \n8.99 \nAug-19 \n11.27 \n13.46 \n9.44 \nSep-19 \n11.18 \n13.41 \n9.24 \nSep-19 \n11.25 \n13.44 \n9.36 \nOct-19 \n11.29 \n13.57 \n9.52 \nOct-19 \n11.23 \n13.43 \n9.28 \nNov-19 \n11.31 \n13.60 \n9.81 \nNov-19 \n11.21 \n13.41 \n9.22 \nDec-19 \n11.37 \n13.69 \n10.49 \nDec-19 \n11.19 \n13.38 \n9.17 \n \nFigure 6.1: Fan Chart of Inflation Forecast \n \nSource: CBN Staff Estimates \n \n10\n11\n12\n95\n80\n60\n50\n70\nActual \nForecast \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n77 \n \n6.7 \nThe Outlook for Monetary Policy \nin 2019 \nThe conduct of Monetary Policy in 2019 \nwill continue to be anchored on the \nMedium-Term \nFramework. \nThis \nwill \nenable the Bank to consistently anchor \nexpectations \nand \nprevent \nmarket \nagents \nfrom \noverly \nengaging \nin \nspeculative activities in response to \ntemporary shocks. In the circumstance, \nthe primary objective of monetary \npolicy remains maintenance of price \nstability. Thus, the Bank will remain \nfocused on policies that engender a \nreduction in inflationary pressures. This \nwill continue to involve effective liquidity \nmanagement \nand \ncreating \nan \nenvironment conducive for inclusive \nand sustainable growth. \nThe Bank will continue to monitor \ndevelopments in the global economy \nwhich \ninfluence \nthe \ndirection \nof \nmonetary policy in the near to medium \nterm. Risks from the global economy \ninclude the effect of the rising trade \ntensions, particularly between the US \nand its key trading partners in Europe, \nCanada and China, rising debt levels in \nsome \nadvanced \neconomies \nand \nEMDEs, \nslower \ngrowth \nin \nChina, \nheightened uncertainty around BREXIT \nnegotiations, \nsecondary \nsanctions \nagainst Iran, increasing fragile financial \nmarkets and overall higher uncertainty \nfor global economic policies. Given \nthese risks, the IMF reviewed downward \nthe forecast for 2019 output growth to \n3.3 per cent from an earlier estimate of \n3.6 per cent. \nOther challenges to monetary policy \ninclude: Increasing capital outflow and \nsustaining exchange rate stability, high \ncost of liquidity management, financial \nmarket volatility and constrained credit \ngrowth. Furthermore, headline, food \nand core inflation are likely to trend \nslightly upwards in the near term, due to \nthe harvest season and the familiar \nstructural factors such as the high cost of \nenergy, \ntransport \nand \nproduction \ninputs. These issues will continue to \ndemand close attention and monitoring \nin monetary policy implementation. \nGrowth headwinds that are expected \nto aid monetary policy implementation \ninclude accretion to reserves following \nthe moderate rise in oil prices, renewed \npeace in the Niger-Delta, improved \nagricultural production and effective \nimplementation \nof \nthe \nEconomic \nGrowth Recovery Plan by the Federal \nGovernment. Furthermore, sustained \nstability in exchange rate supported by \nincreased foreign portfolio inflow is \nexpected to support monetary policy \nimplementation. \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n78 \n \nAppendices \nCENTRAL \nBANK \nOF \nNIGERIA \nCOMMUNIQUÉ \nNo. \n122 \nOF \nTHE \nMONETARY \nPOLICY \nCOMMITTEE \nMEETING OF MONDAY 21ST AND TUESDAY \n22ND JANUARY, 2019 \n1.0 \nBackground \nThe Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) \nheld its first meeting for fiscal 2019 on 21st \nand 22nd January, 2019 amidst concerns \nover the slowdown in global economic \nactivity, arising from on-going trade \ntensions, tightening global financing \nconditions and mounting external debt \nin Emerging Market and Developing \nEconomies (EMDEs). On the domestic \nfront, the resurgence of moderate \ninflationary pressure and possible threats \nto accretion to external reserves due to \nsoftening crude oil prices were noted. \nThe \nCommittee \nreviewed \nthe \ndevelopments \nin \nthe \nglobal \nand \ndomestic \neconomic \nand \nfinancial \nenvironments in 2018, as well as the risks \nand outlook in the short to medium term. \nEleven (11) members of the Committee \nwere in attendance. \nGlobal Economic Developments \nThe Committee noted the divergence in \nperformance of most economies in 2018 \nleading to moderation in global output. \nIn addition, a combination of factors \nincluding: financial market volatilities, \ntrade war between the US and key \nallies, \ncontinuing \nmonetary \npolicy \nnormalization by the US, BREXIT, the \ntermination of the European Central \nBank’s (ECB) asset purchase program in \nDecember 2018 and the slowdown in \nthe \nChinese \neconomy, \nfurther \nheightened uncertainties for the global \neconomy in 2019. Consequently, global \ngrowth has been downgraded by the \nIMF to 3.5 per cent in 2019, from 3.7 per \ncent in 2018. \nThe Committee noted the gradual \nincrease \nin \nglobal \ninflation, \nwith \ninflationary \npressures \nintensifying \nin \nsome \nEmerging \nMarkets \nand \nDeveloping Economics (EMDEs) that \nhad in the recent past faced currency \ndepreciation arising from capital flow \nreversals \narising \nfrom \nprogressive \nmonetary tightening by the Federal \nReserve. It is, however, expected that \nthe recent decline in oil prices may \nreverse the trend, especially for oil \nimporting \neconomies \nand \nthus \nmoderate currency depreciation in \nthese countries. \n \nDomestic Output Developments \nThe Committee noted the continued \nrecovery in output growth in the \ndomestic economy after the 2016 \nrecession as real GDP grew by 1.81 per \ncent in Q3 2018 from 1.50 per cent in Q2 \n2018. The services and agricultural \nsectors continued to drive output \ngrowth, contributing 1.19 and 0.56 per \ncent, \nrespectively. \nHowever, \nthe \npersistence of herdsmen attack on \nfarmers, cattle rustling and flooding in \nsome parts of the country affected \nagricultural and livestock output. Based \non \nthe \nManufacturing \nand \nNon-\nManufacturing Purchasing Managers’ \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n79 \n \nIndices (PMI), output growth for Q4 2018 \nis expected to expand further. The \nexpected performance projected in the \nPMI is attributed to continued stability in \nthe \nforeign \nexchange \nmarket, \nimprovements in the flow of financing \nresources to the real sector through the \nvarious \ninterventions by \nthe \nBank, \neffective \nimplementation \nof \nthe \nEconomic Recovery and Growth Plan \n(ERGP) and the increase in non-oil \nsector GDP. The outlook for growth, \nhowever, remains fragile as the late \nimplementation of the 2018 budget and \nthe residual impact of flooding and \nsecurity \nchallenges, \nconstitute \nheadwinds to growth. The Committee, \ntherefore, believes that the effective \nimplementation of the 2018 capital \nbudget and the ERGP, improvement in \nthe security situation, and continued \nstability in the foreign exchange market \nwill enhance aggregate demand and \noutput growth. \nDevelopments in Money and Prices \nThe Committee noted that the broader \nmeasure of money supply, M3, grew by \n16.58 per cent in 2018, above the \nprovisional benchmark of 13.02 per \ncent. Broad money (M2), also grew by \n12.17 per cent in December 2018 over its \nlevel at end-December 2017, in contrast \nto the provisional benchmark of 10.48 \nper cent for 2018. The increase in M2 \nreflected the growth in Net Foreign \nAssets (NFA) of 18.54 per cent in \nDecember 2018, above its provisional \nbenchmark of 14.50 per cent. Credit to \nthe private sector rose marginally by \n1.96 per cent below its provisional \nbenchmark of 12.39 per cent, while \ncredit to government grew by 33.77 per \ncent in December 2018, above its \nbenchmark rate of 17.38 per cent. \nThe Committee noted the appreciable \ngrowth in credit to the private sector \nwhich had been a constraint to growth \nin the real sector and expressed \noptimism of further improvement in \nlending, through the sustained effort of \nthe Bank to enhance credit delivery to \nsmall and medium scale industries in the \neconomy. The MPC, thus, commended \nthe Management of the Bank for its \nefforts so far in sustaining credit delivery \nto the real sector of the economy. \nThe resurgence in inflationary pressure in \nthe economy was of concern to the \nMPC as headline inflation (year-on-\nyear) inched up to 11.44 per cent in \nDecember 2018 from 11.28 per cent in \nNovember \n2018. \nThe \nincrease \nin \nheadline inflation was driven by food \ninflation, which rose to 13.36 per cent in \nDecember 2018 from 13.30 per cent in \nNovember, \nwhile \nCore \ninflation \ndeclined marginally to 9.77 per cent in \nDecember 2018 from 9.79 per cent in \nthe previous month. The Committee, \nhowever, observed that the uptick in \ninflation was attributed to seasonal \nfactors, which impacted mainly on \nfood. Consequently, all measures of \ninflation, month-on-month, showed a \ndecline. Thus, headline, food and core \ninflation declined to 0.74, 0.81and 0.50 \nper cent in December 2018 from 0.84, \n0.90 and 0.68 per cent, respectively, in \nNovember 2018. \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n80 \n \nThe Committee observed that the near-\nterm risks to inflation remain: the residual \nimpact of flooding on agricultural \noutput, insecurity in parts of the food \nproducing \nbelts \nof \nthe \ncountry, \nexchange rate pass-through to inflation \ndue \nto \nweakening \noil \nprice and \ncampaign-related spending towards \nthe 2019 general elections. Accordingly, \nthe \nMPC \nurged \nthe \nFederal \nGovernment to sustain its current effort \ntowards improving security to ease the \nfood supply chain bottlenecks. \nMoney market interest rates in the \nreview period, generally reflected the \nlevel of liquidity in the banking system as \nthe \naverage \ninter-bank \ncall \nrate \ndeclined significantly to 7.17 per cent in \nNovember 2018 from 14.18 per cent in \nOctober 2018. The Open Buy Back (OBB) \nrate, which stood at 6.57 per cent in \nOctober 2018, increased marginally to \n6.76 per cent in November 2018. On \nDecember \n24 \nand \n31, \n2018, \nthe \ninterbank call and OBB rates, however, \nclosed at 14.00 and 18.94 per cent, \nrespectively. The improvement in net \nliquidity \nposition \nand \ninterest \nrate \nreflected the combined effects of the \nCBN \nquasi-fiscal \noperations, \nOMO \nauctions, maturing CBN Bills and foreign \nexchange interventions as well as \nstatutory allocations to state and local \ngovernments. \nThe Committee observed the decline in \nthe equities market for the most part of \n2018. On a year-on-year basis, the All-\nShare Index (ASI) decreased by 17.81 \nper \ncent \nfrom \n38,243.19 \nat \nend-\nDecember 2017 to 31,430.50 at end-\nDecember 2018. The All-Share Index \n(ASI) further decreased by 1.35 per cent \nto 31,005.17 as at January 18, 2019. \nSimilarly, Market Capitalization (MC) \ndecreased by 13.87 per cent from \nN13.61 trillion at end-December 2017 to \nN11.72 trillion at end-December 2018. It \nfurther declined by 1.37 per cent to \nN11.56 trillion as at January 18, 2019. The \nCommittee \nobserved \nthat \nthese \ndevelopments largely reflected the \nimpact of the progressive monetary \npolicy normalization in some advanced \neconomies and the sustained profit \ntaking activities of foreign investors \narising from perceived political risk in the \nbuild-up to the 2019 general elections. \nThe MPC, however, remained optimistic \nof the gradual reversal of the current \ntrend in the medium term, given the \ncurrent stability in the foreign exchange \nmarket \nand \nthe \nexternal \nreserves \nposition, \nas \nwell \nas \ncontinued \nimprovements in key macroeconomic \nindicators. \n \nThe Committee noted the relative \nstability at both the Bureau-de-Change \n(BDC) and the Investors’ and Exporters’ \n(I&E) window of the foreign exchange \nmarket, \nsupported \nby \nthe \nBank’s \nproactive exchange rate management \npolicies. \nIt \nalso \nobserved \nwith \nsatisfaction, the contribution to stability \nin the market of the implementation of \nthe Bilateral Currency Swap Agreement \n(BCSA) with China and the inflow of the \nUS$2.8 billion Euro bond. The Committee \nalso noted the marginal increase in the \nexternal reserves, from US$42.54 billion \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n81 \n \nat end-December 2018 to US$43.28 \nbillion as at January 21, 2019, noting that \nthese \nimprovements \nwould \nfurther \nstrengthen investor confidence in the \nNigerian economy. \n \nThe Overall Outlook and Risks \nForecasts \nfor \nkey \nmacroeconomic \nindicators in 2019 portend a positive \noutlook for the domestic economy. \nOutput growth is expected to be driven \nby fiscal stimulus from increase in oil and \nnon-oil receipts to support the Federal \nGovernment’s Economic Recovery and \nGrowth Plan. The economy is projected \nto grow by 2.0 per cent by the IMF, 2.2 \nper cent by the World Bank and 2.28 per \ncent by the CBN. Key headwinds to \nthese forecasts, however, are softening \noil prices, persistent security challenges \narising from insurgency in the North East, \nherdsmen attack in some parts of the \ncountry and perceived political risks \nassociated \nwith \nthe \n2019 \ngeneral \nelections. \nThe outlook for inflation in the first half of \n2019 is mixed, with the expectation of an \nincrease in the near-term before a \ngradual decline towards the mid-year. \nInflation is expected to rise marginally \namidst \npalpable \ntailwinds, \nwhich \ninclude \nincreased \nspending \npreparatory \nto \nthe \n2019 \ngeneral \nelections and continued disruptions to \nthe food supply chain in the insurgency \nprone areas and herdsmen attacks in \nfood producing regions of the country. \nThe MPC appraised the possibility of \nexternal shocks in 2019 as the outlook for \nthe global economy remains uncertain \ndue to the effect of on-going trade \ntensions between the US and its key \nallies, slower growth in China, unclear \ndirection of BREXIT negotiations and \ncontinuing \nmonetary \npolicy \nnormalization \nin \nsome \nadvanced \neconomies. The Committee was of the \nview that oil prices may, however, \nremain relatively stable, within the \nUS$50pb bracket in view of recent \nOPEC’s production cutting actions. \nCommittee’s Considerations \nThe Committee noted with satisfaction, \nthe performance of the economy in \n2018, highlighting the achievements in \nkey macroeconomic indicators in the \nface \nof \nglobal \nuncertainties \nand \ndomestic challenges. In particular, it \nnoted the stability in the exchange rate, \nstable accretion to external reserves, \nmoderation in inflation and the low but \ngradual improvement in real GDP \ngrowth in the last six consecutive \nquarters commencing from Q2 2017. \nThe MPC noted that given global \neconomic \nconditions \nand \nthe \nrisk \nconfronting emerging markets and \ndeveloping economies in recent times, \nas well as the limited productive \ncapacity \nof \nthe \neconomy, \nthe \nmanaged \nfloat \nforeign \nexchange \nmanagement regime of the CBN has \ndelivered the most optimal results when \ncompared with other emerging markets \nin recent times. Consequently, capital \nflows into the domestic economy has \ncontinued unabated after an initial lull. \nThe Committee considered the risks to \nthe \nglobal \neconomy, \nnoting \nthe \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n82 \n \ndownward revision in projected global \noutput in 2019, the adverse impact of \nthe trade war between the U.S and its \nmajor trading partners, likelihood of \nlower crude oil prices, impact on capital \nflows of continued monetary policy \nnormalization \nby \nmajor \nadvanced \neconomies, distorted signals on BREXIT \nnegotiations, as well as pockets of other \nsocio-political tensions and perceived \nelection risks on the domestic front. \n \nThe \nCommittee \ncommended \nthe \ngovernment’s focused expenditure on \ninvestment in infrastructure and urged \nthe Federal Government to sustain the \npace \ntowards \naddressing \nthe \ninfrastructural deficit in Nigeria. It noted \nthat the immediate impact of this \napproach on GDP may be slow in \ncoming, but will eventually expand the \neconomy’s productive base, reduce \nunemployment \nand \nincrease \naggregate \ndemand \nin \na \nmore \nsustainable manner and over a long \nperiod of time. \n \nThe Committee acknowledged the \nstrategic role of the private sector in \neconomic \ngrowth \nand \nremained \nconcerned over the slow growth in \ncredit to the private sector through \n2018, while noting the sudden increase \nat end-December 2018. The MPC \ncommended \nthe \ninitiative \nof \nthe \nBankers Committee in addressing the \nphenomenon of low credit to the small \nand medium scale enterprises through \npartnering with the Nigeria Incentive-\nBased \nRisk \nSharing \nSystem \nfor \nAgricultural \nLending \n(NIRSAL) \nto \nestablish a national Microfinance bank \nwith branches in all States and Local \nGovernment areas of the Federation to \nprovide low interest rate lending to small \nscale businesses. A further initiative by \nNIRSAL with the CBN to de-risk lending to \nsmall scale enterprises is also being fine-\ntuned. On external borrowing, the \nCommittee noted the increase in the \ndebt level, it advised for caution, noting \nthat \ndebt \nlevels \ncould \nfast \nbe \napproaching the pre-2005 Paris Club \nexit level. \n \nThe MPC also noted that although there \nwas an increase in the inflation rate for \nthe second consecutive month, month-\non-month \ninflation \ncontinued \nto \nmoderate, indicating that the year-on-\nyear measures will also moderate in the \nnear term. This is supported by the \nstability in the naira exchange rate and \nthus, urged the Bank to sustain this \nstability. To this end, it welcomed the \nnarrowing \nof \nthe \nexchange \nrate \npremium between the BDC segment \nand the Investors’ and Exporters’ (I&E) \nwindow \nof \nthe \nforeign \nexchange \nmarket. \n \nThe \nCommittee \nalso \nnoted \nwith \nsatisfaction the gradual reduction in \nNon- Performing Loans of the deposit \nmoney banks (DMBs) which has further \nstrengthened their balance sheets. The \nCommittee \nbelieves \nthat \nas \nGovernment pays off contractor debt \nand other obligations, there will be a \nsizable reduction in the NPLs of the \nbanking system. \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n83 \n \nThe Committee also noted the attempt \nby Government to broaden the base of \nthe Value Added Tax (VAT) and urged \nthe authorities to expedite action in that \nrespect, arguing that increased tax \ncollection will reduce the pressure on \ngovernment expenditure and create \nfiscal \nbuffers \nto \nimprove \nmacroeconomic management. \n \nThe observed and recent high foreign \ncapital \ninflow \ninto \nthe \nNigerian \neconomy despite the perception of \nelection \nrisk, \nis \nevidence \nof \nthe \nconfidence \nof \nthe \ninternational \ncommunity \nin \nthe \ncountry’s \nmacroeconomic \nmanagement \nand \nprovides a compelling reason for the \nCommittee \nto \nawait \nclarity \non \nmacroeconomic performance after the \ngeneral elections in February and \nMarch 2019. \n \n In the light of the observed risk \nconfronting the economy, including the \nglobal \nand \ndomestic \ninflationary \npressures, which have intensified the risk \nof currency depreciation, the MPC was \nof the view that a loosening option was \nvery remote. Weighing the balance of \nits \njudgement \non \nprice \nstability \nconducive to growth, the MPC felt that \ntightening would result in the loss of the \ngains so far achieved, noting that this \nmay drive the banks to reprice their \nassets; thus increasing the cost of credit \nas well as elevating credit risk in the \neconomy. It will also worsen the position \nof non-performing loans of the banks. \nThe Committee also felt that tightening \nwould \ndampen \ninvestments \nand \nhamper \nimprovements \nin \noutput \ngrowth, given the already fragile growth \nperformance so far achieved. \n \nThe Committee’s Decision \nIn the light of the above, the MPC \ndecided by a vote of all eleven (11) \nmembers to keep the policy parameters \nunchanged from their current levels. \nIn summary, the MPC voted to: \ni. \nRetain the MPR at 14 per cent; \nii. \nRetain the asymmetric corridor of \n+200/-500 basis points around the \nMPR; \niii. \nRetain the CRR at 22.5 per cent; and \nIV. Retain the Liquidity Ratio at 30 per \ncent. \nThank you. \nGodwin I. Emefiele \nGovernor, Central Bank of Nigeria \n22nd January, 2019 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n84 \n \nCENTRAL \nBANK \nOF \nNIGERIA \nCOMMUNIQUÉ \nNO. \n123 \nOF \nTHE \nMONETARY \nPOLICY \nCOMMITTEE \nMEETING \nOF \nMONDAY \n25TH \nAND \nTUESDAY 26TH MARCH, 2019 \n1.0 \nBackground \nThe Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) \nmet on the 25th and 26th March, 2019; \nagainst the backdrop of developments \nin the global and domestic economic \nenvironments in the first quarter of 2019. \nEleven (11) members of the Committee \nwere present. \n \nGlobal Economic Developments \nThe Committee noted with concern the \nweakening \nperformance \nof \nglobal \noutput growth at the end of 2018 and \nobserved that developments in the first \nquarter of 2019 were characterised by \nlegacy headwinds from the second half \nof 2018. These include: the continued \ntrade war between the US and China, \npolicy uncertainty amongst advanced \neconomy \ncentral \nbanks; \npersisting \nuncertainties \nsurrounding \nBREXIT \nnegotiations; vulnerabilities in major \nfinancial markets and rising public debt \nin \nsome \nEmerging \nMarket \nand \nDeveloping \nEconomies \n(EMDEs). \nConsequently, global output growth for \n2019 was downgraded by the IMF from \n3.7 per cent to 3.5 per cent. \n \nPrice \ndevelopments \nacross \nmajor \nadvanced economies, continued to \nmoderate \nin \nthe \nreview \nperiod \nalongside signals of weakening output \ngrowth. In the light of this development, \nthe US Fed, the Bank of England and the \nEuropean Central Bank retreated from \ntheir earlier stance of monetary policy \nnormalisation in favour of a monetary \npolicy accommodation. This led to \nvolatilities in the financial markets of the \nadvanced economies as the balancing \nof portfolios moved capital from the \nequities to the bonds market. \n \nThe \nMPC \nnoted \nthe \nmoderate \nappreciation of the US dollar against the \ncurrencies of most advanced and \nemerging market economies. It further \nnoted the trend of declining long term \nyields in the US, and the likelihood that \ncapital flows may be redirected to \nEMDEs in the medium term. \n \nDomestic Output Developments \nOutput data from the National Bureau \nof Statistics (NBS) indicate that real Gross \nDomestic Product (GDP) grew by 2.38 \nper cent in Q4 2018 from 1.81 and 2.11 \nper cent in the previous quarter and \ncorresponding period of 2017. The major \nimpetus for growth came from the non-\noil sector, which grew by 2.7 per cent in \nQ4 2018, while the oil sector contracted \nby 1.62 per cent. \n \nThe \nCommittee \nwelcomed \nthe \ncontinued positive sentiments in the \nManufacturing and Non-Manufacturing \nPurchasing Managers’ Indices (PMIs) for \nthe 24th and 23rd consecutive months in \nMarch 2019. The manufacturing PMI \nrose by 57.4 index points compared with \n57.1 in the previous month. Similarly, the \nnon-manufacturing PMI increased by \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n85 \n \n58.5 index points compared with 58.4 in \nFebruary 2019. The increase in both \nmeasures of PMI was driven by increases \nin \nproduction, \nemployment, \nraw \nmaterial inventories and new orders. This \nimproved outlook was attributable to \nthe continued stability in the foreign \nexchange market, various interventions \nby the Bank in the real sector and the \neffective \nimplementation \nof \nthe \nEconomic Recovery and Growth Plan \n(ERGP) by the Federal Government. \nFurthermore, on the current measure of \nnational output, the MPC noted the \nneed to rebase the GDP, an exercise \nwhich was last carried out in 2010. \n \nDevelopments in Money and Prices \nThe Committee noted that broad \nmoney supply (M2) contracted by 1.98 \nper cent in February 2019, below its level \nat end-December 2018. Net Foreign \nAssets (NFA) contracted by 7.47 per \ncent in February 2019 relative to its level \nat end-December 2018. In contrast, M3 \ngrew by 4.31 per cent in February 2019 \ncompared \nwith \nits \nlevel \nat \nend-\nDecember 2018. Net Domestic Credit \nalso grew by 10.68 per cent in February \n2019. \nThe \ngrowth \nin \nNDC \nwas \naccounted for by the increase in credit \nto Government which grew by 17.20 per \ncent in February 2019 over its level at \nend-December 2018. Credit to the \nprivate sector also rose by 6.41 per cent \ncompared with its growth benchmark of \n9.41 per cent. Given the positive \ntrajectory, the Committee urged the \nManagement of the CBN, to sustain the \nvarious \ninitiatives \nof \nthe \nBank, \nparticularly the partnership between \nthe Bankers Committee and the Nigeria \nIncentive-Based Risk Sharing System for \nAgricultural Lending (NIRSAL) aimed at \nestablishing a national microfinance \nbank to cater for the MSMEs of the \neconomy. \n \nThe Committee noted the continued \nmoderation in inflation as headline \ninflation (year-on-year) declined further \nto 11.31 per cent in February 2019 from \n11.37 and 11.44 per cent in January 2019 \nand December 2018, respectively. The \ndecrease in headline inflation was \ndriven mainly by food inflation, which \ndeclined to 13.47 per cent in February \n2019 from 13.51 per cent in January \n2019, while core inflation declined \nmarginally to 9.80 per cent from 9.91 per \ncent in the previous month. On a month-\non-month basis, headline, food and \ncore inflation declined to 0.73, 0.82 and \n0.65 \nper \ncent \nin \nFebruary \n2019, \nrespectively, from 0.74, 0.83 and 0.81 per \ncent in January 2019. The Committee \nnoted the upside risks to inflation to \ninclude; \nhigh \ncost \nof \nenergy, \ninfrastructure constraints, insecurity in \nsome \nparts \nof \nthe \ncountry; \nand \nanticipated increase in liquidity from the \nlate \nimplementation \nof \nthe \n2018 \nbudget, and noted that most of these \nfactors were outside the ambit of \nmonetary policy. The MPC, therefore, \nurged the Federal Government to \nsustain its current effort in stimulating \noutput growth by executing the policies \napproved in the ERGP. \n \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n86 \n \nThe net liquidity position reflected the \nimpact of OMO auctions, \nforeign \nexchange \ninterventions, \nstatutory \nallocations \nto \nstates \nand \nlocal \ngovernments, and maturing CBN Bills. \nConsequently, the average Inter-bank \ncall rate increased to 16.45 per cent in \nFebruary 2019 from 15.00 per cent in \nJanuary 2019. The Open Buy Back (OBB) \nrate, however, declined marginally to \n18.79 per cent in February 2019 from \n19.71 per cent in January 2019. The \ninterbank call rates, however, closed at \n8.0 per cent on March 8, 2019, while the \nOBB closed at 14.39 on March 22, 2019. \nThe Committee noted that in spite of the \nrecent upsurge in capital inflow into the \neconomy, the All-Share Index (ASI) and \nMarket Capitalization (MC) continued \nto decline, reflecting global sentiments \nin portfolio rebalancing from equities to \nfixed income securities. This generally \nreflected the perceived risk at the long \nend of the yield curve. \n \nThe Committee noted with satisfaction, \nthe continued stability in the foreign \nexchange market at the Investors’ and \nExporters’ (I&E) window of the market. In \nparticular, \nit \nalso \nobserved \nthe \nmoderate improvement in oil prices and \nstable accretion to external reserves, \nwhich stood at US$45.2 billion as at \nMarch 21, 2019, a 6.73 per cent increase \nfrom US$42.35 billion at end-February \n2019. \n \nThe Overall Outlook and Risks \nThe medium term outlook for the global \neconomy continues to be uncertain \nwith \nindications \nof \nincreasing \nmacroeconomic \nvulnerabilities \nand \ndownward revision of the forecast for \nglobal output growth. \n \nOn the domestic economy, available \ndata on key macroeconomic indicators \nfor output growth in the first quarter of \n2019, and forecasts for the rest of the \nyear, \nsuggests \ncontinued \npositive \noutcomes. Based on recent projections, \nthe economy is expected to grow by 2.0 \nper cent (IMF), 2.2 per cent (World Bank) \nand 2.74 per cent (CBN). The projection \nis hinged on: the enhanced flow of \ncredit to the real sector; sustenance of \na stable exchange rate; moderating \ninflation rate; CBN special interventions \nin growth-enhancing sectors, especially, \nagriculture and non-agricultural SMEs; \nimproved growth in the non-oil sector \nand the effective implementation of the \nERGP by the Federal Government, \namongst \nothers. \nThe \nCommittee \nexpressed \noptimism \nthat \nthe \nestablishment of the NIRSAL National \nMicrofinance Bank and the enactment \nof the Secured Transactions in Movable \nAssets Act 2017 will stimulate lending to \nsmall and medium enterprises. \n \nCommittee’s Considerations \nThe Committee observed the tepid \noutput growth in 2018, but noted with \nsatisfaction that it strengthened in the \nlast quarter of 2018 as well as the \npositive forecast for 2019. It further \nnoted \nwith \ngreat \nsatisfaction, \nthe \ncontinued moderation in all measures of \ninflation, \nsustained \nstability \nin \nthe \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n87 \n \nexchange rate and the robust level of \nexternal reserves. It commended the \nrecent upsurge in capital inflows into the \neconomy, \nnoting \nthis \nto \nbe \na \ndemonstration of sustained confidence \nby the foreign investor community in the \nNigerian economy. The Committee was, \nhowever, \nnot \nunmindful \nof \ndevelopments in the global economy, \nnoting the recent slowdown in growth in \nsome advanced economies and the \ndovish stance of some major central \nbanks as an early warning sign of \nbroader \nmacroeconomic \nvulnerabilities. It, therefore, underscored \nthe need to monitor the trend in capital \nflows and the continued downturn in \nthe equities market, noting that the \nrecent surge in portfolio inflows were \nconcentrated in the money market. \n \nThe Committee noted the relative \nvolatility in oil prices and its impact on \naccretion to reserves which could easily \nundermine the stability observed in the \nforeign exchange market. It, however, \nnoted that current developments in the \noil futures market indicate that oil prices \nwill remain considerably above the \nFederal Government’s 2019 budget \nbenchmark. The Committee, therefore, \nurged the Federal Government to \nstrengthen \nits \ncurrent \nrevenue \nmobilization efforts as well as explore \nadditional sources of revenue in order to \nimprove fiscal buffers. It further urged \nthe Federal Government to sustain its \nimplementation of the ERGP, while \nensuring that growth is all inclusive. It \nreiterated the need to concentrate \neffort on addressing the problem of \nweak power infrastructure, as well as \nsupport domestic manufacturing. The \nCommittee also called on all relevant \ninstitutions of the government to address \nthe menace of smuggling and dumping \nof goods into Nigeria; and encouraged \nthe Bank to continue to explore \navailable scenarios to deal with the \nactivities of economic and policy \nsaboteurs, including those involved in \ndumping and smuggling, in a bid to \naccelerate domestic production of \ngoods in Nigeria. \n \nThe MPC noted the positive moderate \noutlook for growth and the risks in the \nhorizon. The Committee also noted that \nhaving achieved a relatively stable \nexchange rate with price stability, it is \nimperative that monetary policy should \nexplore the next steps necessary for \nenhancing \ngrowth, \nreducing \nunemployment and diversifying the \nbase \nof \nthe \neconomy. \nIt \nfurther \nobserved that per capita income \ngrowth \nis \nvery \nnegligible, \nwhile \naggregate demand remains weak. \nAggregate output also remains below \nthe potential output level, implying \nsufficient headroom for non-inflationary \ngrowth. \nThis \nnew \ndirection \nhas, \ntherefore, become imperative against \nthe backdrop of the aftermath of the \ngeneral national elections and strong \ninflow of foreign direct and portfolio \ninvestments into the economy. \n \nThe Committee urged for the speedy \npassage of the other aspects of the \nPetroleum Industry Bill (PIB) to fast track \nthe development of the value chain in \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n88 \n \nthe sector and create employment. It \nalso welcomes the passage of the \nNational Minimum Wage Bill by the \nNational Assembly and call for its \nspeedy implementation in order to \nboost domestic aggregate demand. \nThe Committee further observed that \nthe performance of the monetary \naggregates \nwere \nbelow \ntheir \nbenchmarks, indicating headroom for \nmonetary growth. The MPC noted the \nencumbrances \nand \nconstraints \nimposed on fiscal policy and the \nassociated vulnerabilities as it has \nconsistently failed to mobilise sufficient \nrevenues to support development as \nenunciated in the ERGP, leaving room \nfor continued debt financing, not \npreviously \nenvisaged. \nAgainst \nthis \nbackdrop, it is imperative for monetary \npolicy to provide the much needed \nleverage to support output growth and \nemployment generation in the country. \n \nOn \na \nmore \ncautious \nnote, \nthe \nCommittee expressed concern and \nsympathises with the fiscal authorities, \nover the growing fiscal deficit, external \ndebt and debt service, and urged the \nneed to closely monitor the public \nprocurement \nprocess \nin \norder \nto \nimprove efficiency in public resource \nmanagement. \n \nOn financial system stability, the MPC \nnoted the improvements in key financial \nsoundness indicators and commended \nthe \nFederal \nGovernment \nfor \nthe \nsettlement \nof \ndebt \nowed \nto \noil \nmarketers, which has considerably, \nhelped in reducing the non-performing \nloans (NPLs) portfolio of the banking \nindustry. The Committee, therefore, \nurged the Government to expedite \naction \nin \nsettling \nall \noutstanding \ncontractor-related arrears so as to \nimprove the NPLs position and stabilise \nthe banking system. In addition, the \nMPC reiterated the Bank’s commitment \nto improve credit delivery, especially to \nsmall and medium scale enterprises, \nwhile acknowledging efforts by the \nCentral Bank of Nigeria in coordinating \nthe de-risking of lending to the private \nsector \nthrough \nthe \ncollaboration \nbetween the Bankers’ Committee and \nNIRSAL. \n \nIn its consideration of the best monetary \npolicy option, the Committee noted the \nneed for all agencies of Government to \nwork hard, not only in consolidating the \ngrowth so far achieved, but also in \nensuring that appropriate policies are \nput in place and implemented to \ncreate jobs on a mass scale and \ndiversify the economy in a proper \ndirection. In doing this, the policy \noptions facing the MPC at this meeting \nis a decision between retention of the \ncurrent stance of monetary policy or a \nslight loosening of the policy rate, \nbacked by the substantial stability of the \nmajor macroeconomic indicators. The \nCommittee felt that given the relative \nstability in the key macroeconomic \nvariables, there is the need to signal a \nnew direction that is pro-growth. \n \nIn its arguments, the Committee was \nconvinced that doing this would further \nuphold the Bank’s commitment to \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n89 \n \npromoting strong growth by way of \nencouraging \ncredit \nflow \nto \nthe \nproductive sectors of the economy. The \nMPC \nfelt \nthat \nsignalling \nthrough \nloosening by a marginal reduction \nwould serve to manage the sentiments \nin the capital markets owing to the \nwider spread in yields in the EMDEs, \nrelative to the advanced economies. \nMoreover, the real interest rate in the \ncountry would still remain positive. \n \nThe Committee’s Decision \nIn light of the above, the MPC decided \nby a vote of six out of eleven members \nto reduce the Monetary Policy Rate \n(MPR) by 50 basis points. Two members \nvoted to reduce the MPR by 25 basis \npoints, while one member voted to \nreduce it by 100 basis points. Two \nmembers, however, voted to hold the \nMPR at its current level. Ten members \nvoted to hold all other parameters \nconstant, while a member voted to \nreduce the Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) by \n100 basis points from 22.5 to 21.5 per \ncent. \nIn summary, the MPC voted to: \nI. Adjust the MPR by 50 basis points from \n14.00 to 13.50 per cent; \nII. Retain the asymmetric corridor of \n+200/-500 basis points around the \nMPR; \nIII. Retain the CRR at 22.5 per cent; and \nIV. Retain the Liquidity Ratio at 30 per \ncent. \nThank you. \nGodwin I. Emefiele \nGovernor, Central Bank of Nigeria \n25th March 2019 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n90 \n \nCENTRAL \nBANK \nOF \nNIGERIA \nCOMMUNIQUÉ \nNO. \n124 \nOF \nTHE \nMONETARY \nPOLICY \nCOMMITTEE \nMEETING \nOF \nMONDAY \n20TH \nAND \nTUESDAY 21ST MAY, 2019 \n1.0 \nBackground \nThe Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) \nmet on the 20th and 21st of May 2019, \namidst uncertainties in the global \nfinancial, \neconomic \nand \npolitical \nenvironments. All Eleven (11) members \nof the Committee were present. \nGlobal Economic Developments \nThe \nCommittee \nreviewed \ndevelopments in the global economy, \nnoting with concern, the declining trend \nin \nglobal \noutput \ngrowth, \nwhich \ncommenced in the second half of 2018. \nAccordingly, the International Monetary \nFund \ndowngraded \nglobal \noutput \ngrowth from 3.7 per cent in 2018 to 3.6 \nper cent in 2019 and further revised it \ndownwards to 3.3 per cent in 2019. The \ndecrease in the global composite \nPurchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) in the \nlast three months provides further fillip to \nthis downgrade. The Committee noted \nthat the weakening global output \ngrowth continued amidst prevailing \nuncertainties from familiar headwinds \nincluding: the further escalation of trade \ntensions between the US and China; \nimposition of new rounds of sanctions on \nIran; breakdown of BREXIT negotiations; \na new wave of tension on the Korean \nPeninsula; \nvulnerabilities \nin \nmajor \nfinancial markets and rising public and \nprivate debt in some Emerging Market \nand Developing Economies (EMDEs). \nDespite these uncertainties, inflation in \nthe advanced economies remained \nmuted and largely below their 2.0 per \ncent long-run targets. As a result, most \ncentral \nbanks \nin \nthe \nadvanced \neconomies, including the US Fed, Bank \nof England and the European Central \nBank, adopted a dovish monetary \npolicy stance, which is expected to \nremain in place in the near to medium \nterm, as signs of weakness in the global \neconomy re-emerged. In the Emerging \nMarket \nDeveloping \nEconomies, \nhowever, developments were mixed, \nwith \ninflation \nrising \nin \nsome, \nbut \nmoderating in others. In response, the \nfinancial \nmarkets \nwitnessed \nthe \nrebalancing of portfolios from equities to \nfixed income securities, and some stock \nmarkets posting losses. In the main, the \nEmerging \nMarket \nDeveloping \nEconomies are expected to continue to \nbenefit \nfrom \nthe \naccommodative \nmonetary \npolicy \nstance \nof \nthe \nadvanced \neconomies \nthrough \nincreased capital inflows. \nDomestic Output Developments \nAvailable output data from the National \nBureau of Statistics (NBS) showed that \nreal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) \ngrew by 2.01 per cent in the first quarter \nof 2019 compared with 2.38 and 1.89 \nper \ncent \nin \nthe \nprevious \nand \ncorresponding \nquarters \nof \n2018, \nrespectively. This was largely driven by \nthe non-oil sector, which grew by 2.47 \nper cent in the first quarter of 2019 while \nthe oil sector contracted by 2.40 per \ncent. Staff projections indicate real GDP \ngrowth of 2.34 and 2.36 per cent in Q2 \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n91 \n \n2019 \nand \nQ3 \n2019, \nrespectively, \nincluding \na \nreduction \nin \nthe \nunemployment rate. The Monetary \nPolicy Committee observed that actual \noutput \nremains \nbelow \npotential, \nimplying that the economy still had \nsufficient headroom for non-inflationary \ngrowth. This is expected to be driven \nlargely by sustained stability in the \nfinancial system; continued special \ninterventions \nin \nAgriculture, \nmanufacturing and SMEs sectors, by the \nBank; sustained effort in improving \ntransport \ninfrastructure \nto \naddress \ndistribution \nchallenges; \ncontinued \nexpansion of business activities as \nindicated by the PMI and increased \nsupply of foreign exchange to growth-\nstimulating sectors of the economy, \namong others. \nThe Committee noted the continued \nexpansion of the Manufacturing and \nNon-Manufacturing \nPurchasing \nManagers’ Indices (PMI) for the 25th and \n24th consecutive months in April 2019 \nand broadly welcomed this positive \ndevelopment in economic activities in \nNigeria. The manufacturing PMI grew by \n57.7 index points compared with 57.4 \nindex points in the previous month. \nSimilarly, the non-manufacturing PMI \ngrew by 58.7 index points compared \nwith 58.5 index points in March 2019. The \ngrowth in both measures of PMI were \nanchored by marginal increases in \nproduction, employment level and new \norders. \n \n \n \nDevelopments in Money and Prices \nThe Committee noted the growth in \nbroad money supply (M3) by 5.42 per \ncent in April 2019 from the level at end-\nDecember 2018, annualized to 16.36 \nper \ncent, \nabove \nthe \nindicative \nbenchmark rate of 14.47 per cent for \n2019. This was largely driven by the \ngrowth of 19.62 per cent in Net \nDomestic Assets (NDA). In contrast, Net \nForeign Assets (NFA) contracted by 5.83 \nper cent in April 2019 relative to the level \nat end-December 2018. In spite of the \nsignificant underperformance of M1 at -\n4.26 per cent annualised to -12.77 per \ncent, M2 grew by 1.85 per cent in April \n2019, annualized to 5.54 per cent, which \nwas significantly below the benchmark \nrate of 12.99 per cent for 2019. This \ndevelopment was largely due to the \ngrowth in time and savings deposits by \n6.53 per cent. The Net Domestic Credit \n(NDC) grew by 19.31 per cent in April \n2019 from the level at end-December \n2018, annualized to 57.92 per cent, \nabove its indicative benchmark of 11.82 \nper cent. The growth in NDC was \nattributed to the significant increase in \ncredit to both government and the \nprivate sector by 64.44 and 9.64 per \ncent, \nrespectively, \nin \nApril \n2019, \ncompared with end-December 2018. \nThe \nCommittee \nnoted \nthe \ndevelopments \nin \nthe \nmonetary \naggregates and enjoined the Bank to \ninitiate \nmoves \ntowards \nimproving \nlending to the private sector and urged \nother intermediary institutions in the \nfinancial \nsector \nto \nsupport \nthese \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n92 \n \ninitiatives by improving their credit \ndelivery to boost output growth. \nThe Committee noted the uptick in \ninflation as headline inflation (year-on-\nyear) rose slightly to 11.37 per cent in \nApril 2019 from 11.25 per cent in March \n2019. The increase in headline inflation \nwas driven mainly by food inflation \nwhich rose by 13.70 per cent in April \n2019 from 13.45 per cent in March 2019. \nCore \ninflation, \nhowever, \ndeclined \nmarginally to 9.28 per cent in April from \n9.46 per cent in March 2019. In April \n2019, month-on-month headline, food \nand core inflation increased to 0.94, 1.14 \nand 0.70 per cent from 0.79, 0.88 and \n0.53 \nper \ncent \nin \nMarch \n2019, \nrespectively. The MPC noted that the \nrecent uptick in inflationary pressure was \nseasonally driven and anticipated. \nLiquidity conditions in the banking \nsystem reflected the net impact of \nOpen \nMarket \nOperations \n(OMO) \nauctions, maturing CBN Bills, statutory \nallocations \nto \nstates \nand \nlocal \ngovernments as well as interventions by \nthe CBN in the foreign exchange \nmarket. Consequently, the monthly \nweighted average Inter-bank call and \nOpen Buy Back (OBB) rates increased to \n13.98 and 16.15 per cent in April 2019 \nfrom 10.80 and 12.17 per cent in March \n2019, respectively. The daily unsecured \ninterbank and the OBB rate, fluctuated \nwithin the standing facilities corridor, \nclosing at 6.57 per cent and 5.55 per \ncent on May 10 and May 16, 2019, \nrespectively, reflecting the reaction of \nthe money market to the 50 basis point \nreduction in the policy rate at the \nmeeting of the MPC in March 2019. \nThe Committee observed the continued \nbearish trend in the equities market in \nspite of the sustained capital inflows into \nthe economy during the period under \nreview. The All-Share Index declined by \n8.14 per cent to 28,871.83 index points \non May 17, 2019 from 31,430.50 index \npoints as at end-December 2018, while \nmarket capitalization grew by 8.53 per \ncent to N12.72 trillion on May 17, 2019 \nfrom N11.72 trillion at end-December \n2018. The recent growth in market \ncapitalization reflected new listings in \nthe market, prominent amongst which \nis: MTN and Skyway Aviation Handling \nCompany Plc and additional listing from \nthe merger between Access Bank and \nDiamond Bank. \nThe \nCommittee \nwelcomed \nthe \ncontinued stability at both the Bureau-\nde-change (BDC) and the Investors’ \nand Exporters’ (I&E) windows of the \nforeign exchange market, expressing \noptimism in the recovery of crude oil \nprices due to the OPEC production \nceiling and other geo-political issues \naffecting oil exports. \nThe \nMPC \nalso noted \nthe \nsteady \naccretion to external reserves, which \nstood at US$45.42 billion as at May 16, \n2019, an increase of 2.20 per cent from \nUS$44.44 billion at end-April 2019. \n The Overall Outlook and Risks \nThe overall medium term outlook for the \nglobal economy remains mixed and \nuncertain with growing indications of \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n93 \n \npersistent \nmacroeconomic \nvulnerabilities, global financial market \nfragilities, accommodative monetary \npolicy, \npolicy \nuncertainties \nand \nweakening global output. \nData \non \nthe \ndomestic \neconomy \nsuggests some fragility in output growth \nduring the second quarter of 2019 with \nimproved outlook for the rest of the \nyear. \nAccordingly, \nrevised \noutput \nprojections indicate that the economy \nwould grow by 2.1 per cent according \nto the International Monetary Fund \n(IMF), 2.2 per cent by the World Bank \nand 2.38 per cent by the CBN in 2019. \nThis outlook is hinged on the following \nkey \nfactors: \nthe \neffective \nimplementation \nof \nthe \nEconomic \nRecovery and Growth Plan (ERGP); \nsupportive monetary policy; enhanced \nflow of credit to the real sector; \nsustained stability of the exchange rate; \nand improved fiscal buffers; amongst \nothers. The Committee, thus, expects \nthat monetary policy would focus on \nimproving access to credit, reducing \nunemployment \nand \nstimulating \neconomic growth. \nCommittee’s Considerations \nThe Committee took into consideration \nthe continued slowdown in the global \neconomy \nand \nthe \npersisting \nuncertainties, including the ongoing \ntrade wars between the US and its major \ntrade partners, financial fragilities in a \nnumber \nof \ncountries, \nthe \ndebt-\nconstrained fiscal operations of most \nEMDEs, including Nigeria, and the \nvolatility \nin \nthe \noil \nmarket. \nThe \nCommittee, therefore, enjoined the \nFederal government to urgently build \nfiscal buffers through a more realistic \nbenchmark oil price for the Federal \nBudget. \n \nThe MPC noted the 2.01 per cent growth \nin real GDP during the first quarter of \n2019 compared with 1.89 per cent in the \ncorresponding \nquarter \nof \n2018. \nAlthough output growth in the first \nquarter was slower than 2.38 per cent \nrecorded in the preceding quarter, it \nemphasized that actual output remains \nwell below the economy’s long-run \npotential, indicating the existence of \nspare \ncapacity \nfor \nnon-inflationary \ngrowth in the economy, an opportunity \nwhich should be explored through \nincreased credit delivery to the private \nsector. Not impressed by the flow of \ncredit from the Deposit Money Banks \n(DMBs) to the private sector, the MPC \ncalled on the CBN management to \nurgently put in place modalities to \npromote Consumer, and Mortgage \nlending in the Nigerian economy, noting \nthat doing this will greatly and positively \nimpact on the flow of credit and \nultimately result in output growth. \n \nThe MPC called for a close monitoring of \nthe uptick in inflationary pressures in April \n2019, driven largely by food shortages \nduring \nthe \nEaster \nseason, \nthe \ncommencement of the planting season \nas well as persisting security challenges \nin some of the food producing regions \nof the country. The Committee, urged \nthe relevant authorities to strengthen \nefforts \nto \naddress \nthe \nsecurity \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n94 \n \nchallenges \nand \nimprove \nfood \nproduction. It encouraged financial \nintermediating institutions to ensure that \nloans to the agricultural sector were \nchannelled effectively to end users. \n \nThe MPC welcomed the improvement in \nfinancial soundness indicators (FSIs), but \nnoted \nthat \nalthough \nthe \nNon-\nPerforming Loan (NPL) ratio moderated, \nit remained above the prudential \nbenchmark. \nConsequently, \nthe \nCommittee \nconsidered \nand \nrecommended to the CBN, a proposal \nto \ndevelop \na \ncomprehensive \nadministrative, legal and regulatory \nframework to speed up the recovery of \ndelinquent loan facilities of the banking \nsystem; \ninvolving \nstructured \nengagement with relevant stakeholders \nand authorities, in order to mitigate \ncredit risk and ultimately open up the \ncredit delivery space in the Nigerian \neconomy. \n \nThe \nCommittee \nextended \nwarm \nfelicitations in an expression of gratitude \nto the President and Commander in \nChief of the Armed Forces of the \nFederal Republic of Nigeria, President \nMuhammadu Buhari, and the Senate of \nthe Federal Republic, respectively, for \nthe \nreappointment \nand \nprompt \nconfirmation of the Governor of the \nCentral Bank of Nigeria, Godwin I. \nEmefiele, for a second 5-year term in \noffice. In particular, the Committee \nnoted that the reappointment was in \nrecognition of the contributions of the \nCBN to maintaining macroeconomic \nstability \nand \nit \nwould \nengender \nconfidence and build policy credibility \nand deliver stability to the Nigerian \nfinancial markets. \n \nIn view of the abundant opportunities \navailable to banks for unfettered access \nto government securities, which tends to \ncrowd out private sector lending, the \nCommittee called on the Bank to \nprovide a mechanism for limiting DMBs \naccess to government securities so as to \nredirect bank’s lending focus to the \nprivate sector, noting that this would \nspur the much needed growth in the \neconomy. It called on the Government \nto use all machinery at its disposal to \nincrease tax revenue to enable the \ngovernment \nfund \nits \nbudget \nadequately. \n \nThe Committee’s Decision \nThe global and domestic developments \nhave conditioned an environment of \nlow optimism in the macroeconomic \nand financial sector space, forcing \ncentral \nbanks \nto \nreturn \nto \naccommodative monetary policy. \nAs \nin \nthe \npast, \nthe \nCommittee \nconsidered the options of whether to be \nmore accommodative, tighten or hold it \nposition. \nThe \nCommittee \nfelt \nthat \nalthough the slight inflation uptick \nshould result in tightening, it nevertheless \nfelt that doing this will limit the ability of \nDMBs to increase credit at this time, \ngiven the need to support or redirect \nthe focus of DMBs to new credit in \nsupport of consumer, mortgage and \nother priority sectors of the economy, \nincluding, \nSMEs, \nagriculture \nand \nCBN Monetary Policy Review \n95 \n \nmanufacturing. It also felt that given the \nfragile state of the economy, increasing \nthe cost of credit would further diminish \ninvestment flow and impact negatively \non output growth. \nAs regards loosening, some members \nfelt that it was desirable to aggressively \nstimulate growth, restart the capital \nmarket activities and increase lending \nat lower rates; which would ultimately \nstimulate \ndomestic \naggregate \ndemand. \nThose against loosening felt that given \nthat there was a marginal increase in \nheadline inflation for April 2019, there is \nneed to restrain from loosening in order \nnot to exacerbate inflationary pressures. \nThey also felt the economy would \nexperience liquidity surfeit and without \ncorresponding increase in real sector \noutput, inflationary pressures could be \nelevated; resulting in likely exchange \nrate pressures. \nAs for members who favoured a hold \nposition, maintaining monetary policy \nrate at its present level was essential for \nbetter understanding of the momentum \nof growth before determining any \npossible modifications. They also felt \nthat retaining the current policy stance \nprovides an avenue for evaluating the \nimpact of \nthe \nBank’s \nintervention \npolicies to support lending to the priority \nsectors of the economy. \nConsequently, \nthe \nMPC \ndecided \nagainst \nthe \nbackdrop \nof \nthese \ndevelopments by a vote of 9 members \nout of 11, to hold all parameters of \nmonetary \npolicy \nconstant. \nTwo \nmembers voted, however, to reduce \nthe monetary policy rate by 25 basis \npoints. \nIn summary, the MPC voted to: \nI. Retain the MPR at 13.50 per cent; \nII. Retain the asymmetric corridor of \n+200/-500 basis points around the MPR; \nIII. Retain the CRR at 22.5 per cent; and \nIV. Retain the Liquidity Ratio at 30 per \ncent. \nThank you. \nGodwin I. Emefiele \nGovernor, Central Bank of Nigeria \n21st May, 2019", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/Monetary_Policy_Review/MPR Aug 2019.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "dc9bd273cb1e8d36f005792bd9c18e89", "text": "CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA \n \nFINANCIAL MARKETS DEPARTMENT \n \n \nHalf Year Activity Report \n \n2019 \n \nii \n \nTABLE OF CONTENTS \nLIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................................. vi \nLIST OF FIGURES .............................................................................................................................. viii \nLIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .............................................................................................................. ix \nFOREWORD ......................................................................................................................................... xiii \nPREFACE............................................................................................................................................... xiv \n1.0 \nOVERVIEW ................................................................................................................................ 1 \n1.1 \nGlobal Economy ................................................................................................................ 1 \n1.2 \nDomestic Economy ............................................................................................................ 5 \n1.3 \nMonetary Policy ................................................................................................................. 6 \n1.4 \nNigerian Financial Markets Operations ......................................................................... 7 \n1.4.1 Money Market ................................................................................................................... 7 \n1.4.2 Foreign Exchange Market ................................................................................................ 7 \n1.4.3 Capital Market Developments ......................................................................................... 8 \n1.4.4 Federal Government Domestic Debt ............................................................................... 8 \n1.4.5 Activities of Internal and Inter-Agency Committees ..................................................... 9 \n1.4.6 Other Developments in the Nigerian Financial Markets ............................................... 9 \n1.4.7 Guidelines and Circulars .................................................................................................. 9 \n \niii \n \n2.0 \nDOMESTIC MONEY MARKET OPERATIONS ........................................................... 11 \n2.1 \nLiquidity Management ................................................................................................... 11 \n2.1.1 Open Market Operations ................................................................................................ 12 \n2.1.2 Discount Window Operations ........................................................................................ 14 \n2.2 \nInter-bank Funds Market ............................................................................................... 16 \n2.3 \nInterest Rates Movement ................................................................................................ 16 \n2.4 \nCentral Bank of Nigeria Promissory Notes ................................................................... 19 \n3.0 \nFOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET OPERATIONS ...................................................... 20 \n3.1 \nDevelopments in the Foreign Exchange Market .......................................................... 20 \n3.2 \nInter-bank Foreign Exchange Market .......................................................................... 20 \n3.3 \nNaira-Settled Over the Counter Foreign Exchange Futures ...................................... 22 \n3.4 \nThe Bilateral Currency Swap Agreement ..................................................................... 22 \n3.5 \nInvestors’ and Exporters’ Window ............................................................................... 23 \n3.6 \nBureau-de-Change .......................................................................................................... 23 \n3.7 \nInterbank Foreign Exchange Rate Movement ............................................................. 24 \n3.8 \nForeign Exchange Rate Premium .................................................................................. 25 \n4.0 \nCAPITAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS ......................................................................... 29 \n4.1 \nNigerian Stock Market .................................................................................................... 29 \n \niv \n \n4.1.1 \nAll Share Index and Market Capitalization .............................................................. 30 \n4.1.2 \nMarket Turnover .......................................................................................................... 30 \n4.1.3 \nNew and Supplementary Listings and Delisting ........................................................ 31 \n4.1.4 \nNew Developments in the Capital Market ................................................................. 32 \n5.0 \n FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DOMESTIC DEBT .......................................................... 33 \n5.1 \n Nigerian Treasury Bills .................................................................................................. 33 \n5.1.1 Structure of Outstanding Nigerian Treasury Bills Holdings ..................................... 35 \n5.2 \n Federal Republic of Nigeria Treasury Bonds .............................................................. 35 \n5.3 \nFederal Government of Nigeria Bonds .......................................................................... 36 \n5.4 \nDomestic Debt Charge .................................................................................................... 36 \n5.5 \nOver-the-Counter Transactions ..................................................................................... 37 \n5.5.1 Over-the-Counter Transactions in Nigerian Treasury Bills ....................................... 37 \n5.5.2 Over-the-Counter Transactions in Federal Government of Nigeria Bonds .............. 37 \n5.6 Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria Bonds ...................................................... 38 \n5.7 \nFederal Government of Nigeria Savings Bonds ........................................................... 38 \n5.8 \nFederal Government of Nigeria Green Bonds .............................................................. 38 \n5.9 \nFederal Government of Nigeria Sukuk ......................................................................... 39 \n5.10 Federal Government of Nigeria Promissory Notes ...................................................... 39 \n \nv \n \n6.0 \nACTIVITIES OF INTERNAL AND INTER-AGENCY COMMITTEES ................. 40 \n6.1 \nLiquidity Assessment Group .......................................................................................... 40 \n6.2 \nThe Non-Interest Financial Institutions Products Development Committee ............ 40 \n6.3 \nFinancial Stability Report Committee ........................................................................... 41 \n6.4 \nFiscal Liquidity Assessment Committee ....................................................................... 41 \n6.5 \nFinancial Services Regulation Coordinating Committee ............................................ 42 \n7.0 \nMAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NIGERIAN FINANCIAL MARKETS ......... 43 \n7.1 \nReview of National Financial Inclusion Strategy ......................................................... 43 \n7.2 \nEnforcement of Clean Note Policy ................................................................................. 44 \n7.3 \nPolicy and Procedure Manual on Money Laundering ................................................. 44 \n7.4 CBN Five-Year Agenda .................................................................................................. 44 \n7.5 \nFiscal Drive for Increased Revenue Generation ........................................................... 44 \n7.6 \nAdoption of USSD Code by Nigerian Insurers Association ........................................ 45 \n7.7 \nDevelopment of Special Economic Zones ...................................................................... 45 \n7.8 \nRecapitalisation of Insurance Firms .............................................................................. 45 \n7.9 \nFinancial Regulation Advisory Council of Experts ...................................................... 46 \nAPPENDIX 1 .......................................................................................................................................... 47 \n \n \nvi \n \nLIST OF TABLES \nTable 2.1 OMO Subscription and Sales……………………………………………………………..52 \nTable 2.2 Repurchase Transactions……………………………………………………………….....53 \nTable 2.3 Standing Lending Facility (SLF)……………………………………………………........54 \nTable 2.4 Standing Deposit Facility (SDF)…………………………………………………….…...55 \nTable 2.5 Rediscounting…………………………………………………………………………….56 \nTable 2.6 Monthly Average Inter-bank Placements……………………………………………......57 \nTable 2.7 Monthly Money Market Rates (Per cent)……..……………………………………........58 \nTable 2.8 Promissory Notes.…………………………………………………………………..…....58 \nTable 3.1 Foreign Exchange Transactions (US$ Million)………………………………………….59 \nTable 3.2 I&E, Inter-bank and BDC Rates………………………………………………………....60 \nTable 4.1 The Nigerian Stock Exchange Monthly Opening and Closing Transactions…………….61 \nTable 4.2 Quarterly Distribution of Transactions on the Nigerian Stock Exchange……………..…62 \nTable 4.3 Sectoral Distribution of Transactions on the Nigerian Stock Exchange, \nJanuary-June 2018 & 2019………………………………………………………....……....63 \nTable 4.4 Foreign Portfolio Participation in Equity Trading……………………………………......64 \nTable 4.5 New Listing, Supplementary Listing and Delisting…………………………….…...……65 \nTable 5.1 FGN Domestic Debt Stock Outstanding (By Instrument Type)………………….……….69 \n \nvii \n \nTable 5.2 Primary Market: Nigerian Treasury Bills Transaction …………….……………….…...70 \nTable 5.3 Marginal Rates and Range of Successful Bids Schedule…………………………..……71 \nTable 5.4 Nigerian Treasury Bills: Class of Holders…………………………………………..…..72 \nTable 5.5 Federal Republic of Nigeria Treasury Bonds: Class of Holders…..………………….…73 \nTable 5.6 FGN Bonds Issued…………………………………………………………………...74-75 \nTable 5.7 Federal Government of Nigeria Bonds………………………………………………76-77 \nTable 5.8 Federal Government of Nigeria Bond Outstanding: Class of Holders ……..……….78-79 \nTable 5.9 Domestic Debt Charges……………………………………………………………....80-81 \nTable 5.10 Over the Counter Transactions………………………………………………..………..82 \nTable 5.11 FGN Savings Bond…………………………………………………………………......83 \nTable 5.12 FGN Savings Bond Profile as at June 30, 2019………………………………………...84 \nTable 5.13 FGN Green Bond Profile as at June 30, 2019…………………………………………..85 \nTable 5.14 FGN Sukuk Profile as at June 30, 2019………………………………………………...85 \nTable 5.15 FGN Promissory Note Profile as at June 30, 2019……………………………..………85 \n \n \n \n \n \nviii \n \nLIST OF FIGURES \nFigure 2.1: Open Market Operations, January – June, 2019 .............................................................. 13 \nFigure 2.2: Open Market Operations, January – June, 2018 .............................................................. 13 \nFigure 2.3: Average Monthly Money Market Rates, January – June, 2019 ...................................... 18 \nFigure 2.4: Average Monthly Money Market Rates, January – June, 2018 ...................................... 18 \nFigure 3.1: Inter-bank Foreign Exchange Sales, January – June, 2018 vs 2019 ................................ 22 \nFigure 3.2: Selected Exchange Rates, January – June, 2019 ............................................................. 24 \nFigure 3.3: Selected Exchange Rates, January – June, 2018 ............................................................. 25 \nFigure 3.4: Exchange Rate Premium between I&E & BDC, January – June, 2018 vs 2019 ............. 26 \nFigure 3.5: Exchange Rate Premium between Inter-Bank & BDC, January – June, 2018 vs 2019 .. 26 \nFigure 5.1: NTB Primary Market Auction, January – June, 2019 .................................................... 34 \nFigure 5.2: NTB Primary Market Auction, January – June, 2018 ..................................................... 35 \n \nBOX INFORMATION \nBox 1: 5-year Policy Thrust of Central Bank of Nigeria……………………………......………….27 \n \n \n \n \nix \n \nLIST OF ABBREVIATIONS \nACE- Advisory Committee of Experts \nAIB- Africa International Bank \nAMCON- Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria \nAML/CFT- Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism \nASI- All Share Index \nBDC- Bureau-de-Change \nBOF- Budget Office of the Federation \nBOI- Bank of Industry \nCBN- Central Bank of Nigeria \nCGRS- Corporate Governance Rating System \nCIFTS- CBN Inter-bank Funds Transfer System \nCoG- Committee of Governors \nCRR- Cash Reserve Ratio \nDCS- Direct Cash Settlement \nDMBs- Deposit Money Banks \nDMO- Debt Management Office \nEMDEs- Emerging Markets and Developing Economies \n \nx \n \nETF- Exchange Traded Funds \nFAAC- Federation Account Allocation Committee \nFGN- Federal Government of Nigeria \nFIRS- Federal Inland Revenue Service \nFMD- Financial Markets Department \nFMF- Federal Ministry of Finance \nFRACE- Financial Regulation Advisory Council of Experts \nFRN- Federal Republic of Nigeria \nFRNTBs- Federal Republic of Nigeria Treasury Bonds \nGDP- Gross Domestic Product \nI&E- Investors' & Exporters' Window \nILF- Intraday Liquidity Facility \nLAG- Liquidity Assessment Group \nLR- Liquidity Ratio \nMC- Market Capitalization \nMPR- Monetary Policy Rate \nMSMEs- Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises \nNAICOM- National Insurance Commission \n \nxi \n \nNCS- Nigeria Customs Service \nNDIC- Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation \nNFIS- National Financial Inclusion Strategy \nNIA- Nigerian Insurers Association \nNIFIs-Non-Interest Financial Institutions \nNIFI-PDC- Non-Interest Financial Institutions Products Development Committee \nNIID- Nigeria Insurance Industry Database \nNIMASA- Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency \nNIRSAL- Nigeria Incentive-Based Risk-Sharing System for Agricultural Lending \nNNPC- Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation \nNPA – Nigerian Ports Authority \nNSE- Nigerian Stock Exchange \nNSIA- Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority \nNTBs- Nigerian Treasury Bills \nOAGF- Office of the Accountant General of the Federation \nOBB – Open-Buy-Back \nOPEC- Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries \nOMO- Open Market Operations \n \nxii \n \nOTC- Over-the-Counter \nPENCOM- Pension Commission \nPMI- Purchasing Managers’ Index \nPSV- Payments System Vision 2020 \nRDAS- Retail Dutch Auction System \nSANEF- Shared Agent Network Expansion Facility \nSDF- Standing Deposit Facility \nSEC- Securities and Exchange Commission \nSLF- Standing Lending Facility \nSMEs- Small and Medium Enterprises \nSRA- Statutory Revenue Allocation \nUSSD- Unstructured Supplementary Service Data \nVAT- Value Added Tax \n \n \n \n \n \n \nxiii \n \nFOREWORD \n \nFinancial markets were influenced largely by global economic and socio-political \ndevelopments in the first half of 2019. In contrast to observed trends in the first half of \n2018, growth in the global economy decelerated owing to the effects of trade tensions \nbetween the two leading economies in the world - the United States of America and \nPeople’s Republic of China, geo-political tensions in the Middle East, uncertainties \nsurrounding the exit of Britain from the European Union, and increased sanctions on \nIran, all of which impacted business confidence, investment decisions and the flow of \ncapital. Thus, global financial markets generally witnessed a decline in yields on risk-\nfree securities, consistent with market outlook on growth. \nIn the domestic market, policy measures by the monetary and fiscal authorities were \naimed to sustain price stability and non-inflationary growth. Thus, the Monetary Policy \nCommittee voted to lower the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR), by 50 basis points from \n14.00 per cent to 13.50 per cent, with the asymmetric corridor of +200/-500 basis points \nretained in March 2019; while the Cash Reserve Requirement (CRR) and Liquidity \nRatio (LR) were retained at 22.50 and 30.00 per cent, respectively. Furthermore, the \nmonetary authority mandated the deposit money banks to ramp up credit to the real \nsector of the economy and achieve a minimum loan to deposit ratio of 60 per cent. \nThis report therefore, presents the major developments in the Nigerian financial \nmarkets in the first half of 2019 and measures taken by the Bank to enhance monetary \npolicy implementation for the achievement of set objectives. \n \n \nOkwu Joseph Nnanna, Ph.D. \nDeputy Governor, Economic Policy \n \n \n \n \n \n \nxiv \n \nPREFACE \nThe 2019 Half-Year Activity Report elucidates the Bank’s monetary policy measures \nimplemented by the Financial Markets Department in the money, fixed income and \nforeign exchange markets to support the communication strategy of the Bank. \nThe Report therefore, has seven chapters. Chapter one provides an overview of the \nglobal economy and the Nigerian financial market operations, while chapter two \ndiscusses the operations in the domestic money market. Following these are chapter \nthree which focuses on developments in the foreign exchange market and chapter four \non the capital market. The Federal Government domestic debt activities are presented \nin chapter five; stakeholder collaborations and related committee activities are detailed \nin chapter six; while major developments in the Nigerian financial markets are \ncontained in chapter seven. The appendix contains the list of guidelines and circulars \nissued in the first half of 2019 for regulatory purposes. \nI hereby express my sincere gratitude to the Management of the Bank for its continued \nsupport and commend the staff of the Department for their service, dedication to duty \nand commitment towards achieving the Bank’s objectives with a high sense of \nprofessionalism. \n \nAngela O. Sere-Ejembi, Ph.D \nDirector, Financial Markets Department \n \n1 \n \n1.0 OVERVIEW \n1.1 Global Economy \nGlobal economic activity remained weak against the backdrop of the trade war between \nthe United States (US) and the People’s Republic of China, and the political tension \nbetween the US and Iran on nuclear disarmament. The heightened tension contributed \nto a decline in business confidence, tight financial conditions, and subdued investment \nacross major economies which further reduced the growth momentum. Consequently, \nglobal economic growth was forecasted to decline to 3.3 per cent in 2019, from an \nearlier projection of 3.5 per cent. In spite of the weak performance observed in the first \nhalf of 2019, global growth has been projected to strengthen in the second half of 2019 \nowing to anticipated policy accommodation by major advanced economies including \nthe Euro area, United Kingdom, Japan, as well as Emerging Markets and Developing \nEconomies (EMDEs)1. \nAmidst geo-political tensions in the Middle East, global crude oil prices (Brent and \nBonny Light) which stood at $60.84 and $63.59 per barrel, respectively, at end-January \n2019, trended upwards to $66.31 and $66.77 per barrel, respectively, at end-June 20192. \nThis reflected the impact of crude oil supply shortages occasioned by US sanctions on \nIran and Venezuela, and production cuts by the Organization of the Petroleum \n \n1 https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2019/03/28/world-economic-outlook-april-2019 \n2 https://oilprice.com/oil-price-charts \n \n2 \n \nExporting Countries (OPEC) and some non-OPEC members to shore up crude oil \nprices. \nIn the review period, advanced economies recorded mixed performances. In the US, \nthe real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate was 3.10 per cent in the first \nquarter of 2019 compared with 2.20 per cent in the corresponding quarter of 2018. The \ngains were driven largely by strong consumer and government spending and \nimprovements in exports. At end-June 2019, the real GDP declined to 2.10 per cent, \ncompared to the 3.50 per cent rate at end-June 2018, owing largely to weak exports. \nThe US inflation for June 2019 stood at 1.60 per cent, a sharp decline from 2.90 per \ncent at end-June 2018, due largely to the fall in energy costs and food prices. \nIn view of the declining output growth in the last two quarters of 2018, the U.S. Federal \nReserve adopted a dovish stance on interest rate policy in January 2019 to shore up the \neconomy. However, financial markets operators viewed the policy stance as a new \nround of easing, prompting investors to take short positions against the US dollar and \nseek higher yields in emerging markets. \nIn the United Kingdom (UK), the real GDP growth rate stood at 0.50 per cent in the \nfirst quarter of 2019, in line with market expectations, compared to 0.10 per cent in the \ncorresponding quarter of 2018. At end-June 2019, the economy contracted 0.20 per \ncent compared to 0.50 per cent expansion recorded at end-June 2018. The development \nwas attributed largely to a decline in construction, services, industrial output and \ntransport and housing prices, amidst uncertainties surrounding the exit of Britain from \nthe European Union (BREXIT). Inflation in the UK was 2.00 per cent in June 2019, a \ndecrease of 0.40 percentage point when compared with the level in June 2018. \n \n3 \n \nEconomic conditions in the BRICS were generally weak. In Brazil, the real GDP \ncontracted by 0.20 per cent in the first quarter of 2019, from a 0.60 per cent growth in \nthe first quarter of 2018. The contraction was attributable to the exit of foreign \ninvestors, uncertainties about pension reforms, as well as contraction in fixed income \ninvestments, agricultural activities and exports. However, in the second quarter of \n2019, the GDP grew by 0.40 per cent compared to 0.20 per cent growth at end-June \n2018, owing to the jump in fixed investment, industrial production and services sector \nby 3.20 per cent, 0.70 per cent and 0.30 per cent, respectively, thereby averting fears \nof another recession after emerging from the last one in 2017. Inflation in Brazil \ndecreased to 3.37 per cent in June 2019 compared with 4.39 per cent recorded in June \n2018, owing mainly to lower prices for food, housing and transport. \nRussia’s real GDP growth rate contracted 0.40 per cent in the first quarter of 2019, \ncompared to 1.70 per cent in the corresponding period of 2018, resulting mainly from \ncontraction in agriculture, forestry and fishing activities. Conversely, inflation stood at \n4.70 per cent in June 2019, compared with 2.30 per cent in June 2018 driven largely \nby price increases in the services sector. \nIn India, the real GDP growth declined to 1.40 per cent in the first quarter of 2019, \nfrom 1.90 per cent in the corresponding quarter of 2018 owing to lower growth in the \nagriculture, trade, transport, communication and services sub-sectors3. The retail \n \n3https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/economic-survey-pegs-india-s-growth-in-fy-20-at-7/story-\nufh89xOB1KNlybS4fLMvbN.html \n \n4 \n \ninflation declined to 3.15 per cent in June 2019, from 4.90 per cent in June 2018. This \nperformance was below the Reserve Bank of India's medium-term target of 4.00 per \ncent by 0.85 percentage point. \nChina’s real GDP growth rate in the first and second quarters of 2019 stood at 1.40 and \n1.60 per cent, respectively, representing a reduction of 0.10 percentage point apiece, \ncompared to 1.50 and 1.70 per cent recorded in the respective quarters of 2018. The \ndevelopment was attributed largely to the impact of the intense trade war with the US \nas well as weakening domestic demand. However, inflation in China increased to a \nyear-long high of 2.70 per cent in June 2019, from 1.90 per cent in June 2018, caused \nmainly by increases in food prices as a result of African swine fever epidemic and bad \nweather. \nSub-Sahara Africa was projected to grow at a slower rate of 2.80 per cent in 2019, from \nan earlier projection of 3.30 per cent by the World Bank4. The downgrade came on the \nheels of fragile oil prices and policy uncertainties by some economies in the region. \nThe South African economy shrank by 3.20 per cent in the first quarter of 2019, while \nthe second quarter performance was yet to be released against the International \nMonetary Fund’s projected growth rate of 0.70 per cent in 2019. The slowdown was \nattributable to weak investment growth, slow pace of structural reforms, declining \nbusiness confidence, uncertainties surrounding the 2019 elections and reduced \nelectricity distribution to major sectors of the economy. In 2018, the first and second \n \n4 https://af.reuters.com/article/zambiaNews/idAFL8N21S265 \n \n5 \n \nquarters contracted by 2.70 and 0.50 per cent, respectively. Inflation in June 2019 was \n4.50 per cent compared to 4.60 per cent in June 2018 owing largely to declining \ntransport costs. \nIn Kenya, the real GDP growth rate declined to 1.66 per cent in the first quarter of 2019 \nfrom 1.80 per cent in the corresponding quarter of 2018, resulting from a slowdown in \nfarming activities due to prolonged dry weather. The second quarter performance was \nyet to be released against the World Bank’s projected growth rate of 5.70 per cent in \n2019, while the second quarter growth 2018 was 1.30 per cent. Inflation rose to 5.70 \nper cent in June 2019, from 4.30 per cent in the corresponding period of 2018 due to \nhigher pump prices. \nIn Ghana, the economy expanded 1.60 per cent in the first quarter of 2019, from 1.30 \nper cent at end-June 2018, driven largely by growth in the services sector. Inflation \ndecreased to 9.10 per cent in June 2019, a 0.90 percentage point drop when compared \nwith the 10.00 per cent recorded in June 2018. The decline was attributed mainly to \nlower food prices. \n1.2 Domestic Economy \nThe Nigerian economy grew marginally as real GDP rose by 2.01 per cent in the first \nquarter of 2019, compared with 1.89 per cent in the corresponding period of 20185. It \nwas, however, lower than the 2.38 per cent recorded in the fourth quarter of 2018. A \n \n5 https://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/ \n \n6 \n \nsignificant share of the growth recorded in the first half of the year was attributed to \nthe expansion in the non-oil sector, which grew by 2.47 per cent. The manufacturing \nand non-manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Indices (PMI) maintained an upward \ntrend due to slight increases in employment level, production activities and new orders. \nFactors such as the volatility in the global oil market, low credit to the private sector, \ninfrastructure deficit and low capacity for revenue generation contributed to the \neconomy's muted growth. \nHeadline inflation, year-on-year, remained above the target range of 6.00 – 9.00 per \ncent, as it stood at 11.22 per cent in June 2019, compared to 11.23 per cent in June \n2018. Structural factors such as high cost of transport, electricity supply and production \ninputs challenges contributed to the high rate of inflation. \n \n 1.3 Monetary Policy \nIn the first quarter of 2019, the Bank maintained its contractionary policy stance in \norder to moderate inflation. However, at the end of the first quarter, the Bank reviewed \nthe Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) downwards by 50 basis points to 13.50 per cent, from \n14.00 per cent, to signal a new direction that is pro-growth, to encourage credit flow to \nthe productive sector and manage sentiments in the financial markets. The asymmetric \ncorridor of +200/-500 basis points around the MPR was maintained, while the Cash \nReserve Requirement (CRR) and Liquidity Ratio were retained at 22.50 and 30.00 per \ncent, respectively. \n \n \n7 \n \n1.4 Nigerian Financial Markets Operations \n1.4.1 Money Market \nDomestic money market rates were largely stable and trended in tandem with the \nbanking system liquidity. The interplay of demand and supply of funds by authorized \ndealers at the inter-bank market revealed the market’s preference for collateralized \ntransactions. In the first quarter of 2019, money market interest rates trended above the \nupper band of the MPR. This signified liquidity squeeze in the market, resulting mainly \nfrom short-term concerns about unavailability of funds and cautious investment \ndecisions by domestic and foreign investors in the build-up to the 2019 general \nelections. However, the rates moderated significantly in the second quarter, in response \nto improved liquidity in the banking system. Fiscal disbursements, maturing OMO \nBills, treasury bills redemption, reduced frequency of OMO auctions and foreign \nexchange interventions also contributed to influence banking system liquidity. \n \n1.4.2 Foreign Exchange Market \nIn the first quarter of 2019, the foreign exchange market was characterized by demand \npressures associated with foreign capital outflows occasioned by uncertainties \nsurrounding the general elections. However, in the second quarter of 2019, there was \na significant reduction in the demand pressures owing to the monetary authority’s \ninterventions in the market to bridge the supply gap. Consequently, the exchange rate \nremained relatively stable in the first half of the year. \n \n \n8 \n \n1.4.3 Capital Market Developments \nEquity market indicators revealed a bearish trend during the first half of 2019. The \nNigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) All Share Index (ASI) declined to 29,966.87 by 3.55 \nper cent at end-June 2019, from 31,070.06 at the beginning of the year, while the \nMarket Capitalization (MC) declined by 13.98 per cent to ₦13.21 trillion, from ₦11.59 \ntrillion at the beginning of 2019. Similarly, the total volume, value and number of deals \ndecreased in the review period, compared with the corresponding period of 2018. The \ndecline in market indices was due to concerns about global economic slowdown and \ncautious approach of investors to the build-up of political activities towards the 2019 \ngeneral elections. In the review period, MTN Nigeria – a leading telecommunications \ncompany in the country, listed 20,354,513,050 shares at the initial price of N90.00 per \nshare on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. \n \n1.4.4 Federal Government Domestic Debt \nThe total domestic debt outstanding at end-June 2019 stood at ₦13,412.80 billion, \nrepresenting an increase of ₦1,261.36 billion or 10.38 per cent, over ₦12,151.44 \nbillion in the corresponding period of 2018. The debt stock during the review period \ncomprised FGN Bonds worth ₦9,691.42 billion or 72.26 per cent, Nigerian Treasury \nBills (NTBs) worth ₦2,651.51 billion or 19.77 per cent and FRN Treasury Bonds of \n₦125.99 billion or 0.94 per cent. Others included FGN Promissory Notes of ₦707.76 \nbillion or 5.28 per cent, FGN Sukuk worth ₦200.00 billion or 1.49 per cent, FGN Green \nBonds worth ₦25.69 billion or 0.19 per cent and FGN Savings Bonds of ₦10.43 billion \nor 0.08 per cent. In spite higher debt stock, the cost of debt servicing declined by 15.00 \n \n9 \n \nper cent to ₦800.73 billion at end-June 2019, compared to ₦941.99 billion in the \ncorresponding period of 2018. This was due to declining yields in the fixed income \nmarket during the review period. \n \n1.4.5 Activities of Internal and Inter-Agency Committees \nThe Financial Markets Department (FMD) engaged in collaborative activities with \ninternal and external stakeholders to further enhance the depth of the financial system. \nSome focus areas during the review period included lending for real sector growth, \nliquidity assessments and risk management, fiscal and monetary policy coordination. \n \n1.4.6 Other Developments in the Nigerian Financial Markets \nMeasures taken by regulatory authorities impacted on the Nigerian financial markets \nand influenced the conduct of transactions. These included policies strategically aimed \nat increasing lending to the real sector, improving the rate of financial inclusion, \ndeepening the financial markets and boosting stability in the foreign exchange market. \n \n1.4.7 Guidelines and Circulars \nThe Bank issued new guidelines and circulars to operators in the financial markets to \nguide their activities. Additionally, some of the existing guidelines and circulars were \nrevised. The Bank also issued exposure drafts of Proposed Guidance Notes on the \nCalculation of Capital Requirements for Operational Risks and the Supervisory Review \n \n10 \n \nProcess for Non-Interest Financial Institutions in Nigeria and Review of Minimum \nCapital Requirement for Microfinance Banks in Nigeria amongst others. The details of \nthe releases can be accessed in the appendix and on the CBN website, www.cbn.gov.ng. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n11 \n \n2.0 \nDOMESTIC MONEY MARKET OPERATIONS \n \n2.1 \nLiquidity Management \nFiscal disbursements including Statutory Revenue Allocation (SRA), Value Added Tax \n(VAT) and government expenditure, amongst others, boosted the level of liquidity in \nthe banking system. In addition, inflows from matured CBN Bills, other monetary \noperations and the redemption of FGN Bonds and Nigerian Treasury Bills (NTBs) \ncomplemented the fiscal injections. \n \nOpen Market Operations (OMO) remained the major tool for liquidity management \nand was complemented by discount window operations, CRR debits and interventions \nin the foreign exchange market. The desire to curtail inflation, promote capital inflows, \nencourage credit flow to the real sector and sustain the economy on the path of growth \nremained paramount to the Bank’s policy objectives. The MPR, which had been set at \n14.00 per cent since July 2016, was adjusted downwards by 50 basis points to 13.50 \nper cent, with an asymmetric corridor of +200/-500 basis points for the Standing \nLending Facility (SLF) and Standing Deposit Facility (SDF), respectively, while, the \nCRR and Liquidity Ratio were unchanged at 22.50 and 30.00 per cent, respectively. \nMaturing CBN Bills and interest payments, periodic fiscal injections and the \nredemption of FGN Bonds and NTBs were contributory factors to the increased \nliquidity in the banking system. In addition, the frequency of OMO auctions was \nsignificantly reduced to moderate the cost of liquidity management. \n \n12 \n \nThe CBN Inter-bank Funds Transfer System (CIFTS) and the Intraday Liquidity \nFacility (ILF) were available to participants in the market to ensure uninterrupted \ntransactions during trading hours and to facilitate real time settlement. \n2.1.1 Open Market Operations \nThe primary instrument for liquidity management was OMO, used to moderate excess \nliquidity, boost tradable securities, and deepen secondary market activities. \n \n2.1.1.1 Open Market Operations Auctions \nCBN Bills offered at the open market amounted to ₦11,894.96 billion, while total \nsubscription and sales amounted to ₦13,097.62 billion and ₦11,870.93 billion in the \nfirst half of 2019, respectively, compared with ₦13,972.84 billion, ₦11,651.25 billion \nand ₦9,743.76 billion offered, subscribed to and sold respectively, in the corresponding \nperiod of 2018 (Table 2.1). \nThe high level of activity arose from the monthly disbursements to the three tiers of \ngovernment by the Federation Account Allocation Committee (FAAC) and maturing \nCBN Bills during the period. Thus, the cost of liquidity management in the review \nperiod rose to ₦1,297.03 billion compared to ₦848.32 billion in the corresponding \nperiod of the previous year. \nIn the review period, the tenors of OMO auction ranged from 27 to 364 days, at stop \nrates ranging from 11.0500 to 15.0000 per cent compared to tenors of 73 to 365 days \nat stop rates of 10.9000 to 14.4000 per cent in the previous year. \n \n13 \n \nFigure 2.1: Open Market Operations, January – June, 2019 \n \n \nFigure 2.2: Open Market Operations, January – June, 2018 \n \n \n \n \n \n0.00\n500.00\n1,000.00\n1,500.00\n2,000.00\n2,500.00\n3,000.00\n3,500.00\n4,000.00\n4,500.00\n5,000.00\nJan-19\nFeb-19\nMar-19\nApr-19\nMay-19\nJun-19\n₦'Billion\nTotal Offered\nTotal Subscribed\nTotal Sold\n0\n500\n1000\n1500\n2000\n2500\n3000\n3500\n4000\nJan-18\nFeb-18\nMar-18\nApr-18\nMay-18\nJun-18\n₦'Billion\nTotal Offered\nTotal Subscribed\nTotal Sold\n \n14 \n \n2.1.2 Discount Window Operations \n2.1.2.1 Repurchase Transactions \nThe total value of repo transactions in the first half of 2019 amounted to ₦611.30 \nbillion, with interest rates ranging from 18.50 to 19.50 per cent from January to March \n25, 2019 and 18.00 to 19.00 per cent from March 26 to June 2019, following the \ndownward review of MPR. The tenors were for 4- to 90-days and the total interest \nearned amounted to ₦19.25 billion. In the first half of 2018, the total value of repo was \n₦240.73 billion, while interest earned was ₦6.53 billion at 18.50 to 19.50 per cent for \nthe same tenors (Table 2.2). The increased level of request in the review period was \ndue to preference for tenored funds instead of overnight facility. \n \n2.1.2.2 CBN Standing Facilities \nCBN standing facilities were available at the discount window for banks to meet up \nwith their liquidity obligations by either borrowing from the standing lending facilities \n(SLF) or depositing excess funds at the standing deposit facilities (SDF) windows at \nthe end of each business day. \nThe trend in 2019 showed more recourse to the SLF in the first half, when compared \nwith the corresponding period of 2018. The remunerable limit for daily deposits per \ninstitution at the SDF remained at ₦7.50 billion. The applicable rates, which were \nanchored to the MPR, for the SLF and SDF, also remained 16.00 and 9.00 per cent, \nfrom January to March 25, 2019, respectively; and 15.50 and 8.50 per cent from March \n26 to June 2019. In the first half of 2018, the applicable rates for SLF and SDF were \n16.00 and 9.00 per cent respectively. \n \n15 \n \n2.1.2.2.1 Standing Lending Facility \nThe average daily volume of SLF was ₦95.63 billion in 121 transaction days, of which \nIntraday Liquidity Facility (ILF) conversion constituted ₦35.50 billion or 37.12 per \ncent of the total request. As a result, the average daily interest income amounted to \nN66.87 million. In the first half of 2018, the average daily volume of SLF was ₦57.36 \nbillion in 123 transaction days, of which ILF conversion constituted ₦45.54 billion or \n79.39 per cent of the total request. Consequently, the average daily interest income was \n₦44.40 million (Table 2.3). The higher patronage at the window in 2019 reflected the \nimpact of the prevailing liquidity conditions in the banking system. \n2.1.2.2.2 Standing Deposit Facility \nPatronage at the SDF window reflected an average daily amount of ₦67.64 billion for \nthe 121 business days in the first half of 2019, \nrepresenting a decrease from ₦88.30 billion for the \n121 transaction days out of 123 business days in the \ncorresponding period of 2018. Similarly, the average \ndaily interest payments on the deposits decreased to \n₦22.48 million in the review period, from ₦30.43 \nmillion in the corresponding period of 2018. The \ndecreased volume of transactions reflected in the \nreview period was due to the tight liquidity \nconditions in the banking system (Table 2.4). \n \n \nPatronage \nat \nthe \nSDF \nwindow was low in 2019 with \na daily average of ₦67.64 \nbillion, compared to ₦88.30 \nbillion in the corresponding \nperiod of 2018. The reduction \nin transactions was due to the \ntight liquidity conditions in \nthe banking system. \n \n16 \n \n2.1.2.3 Rediscounting of Bills \n During the review period, CBN Bills worth ₦54.44 billion with 170 to 352 days to \nmaturity were rediscounted at 13.50 per cent. Interest earned on the transactions totaled \n₦6.59 billion (Table 2.5). There was no transaction in the first half of 2018. \n \n2.2 \nInter-bank Funds Market \nThe total monthly average value of transactions at the inter-bank funds market stood at \n₦1,205.09 billion in the first half of 2019, a significant increase of ₦489.03 billion or \n68.29 per cent over ₦716.06 billion in the corresponding period of 2018. Analysis of \nthe transactions indicated that Open-Buy-Back (OBB) at ₦1,129.61 billion accounted \nfor 93.74 per cent, while the unsecured inter-bank call took up 6.26 per cent or ₦75.48 \nbillion. In the preceding year, OBB accounted for ₦685.61 billion or 95.75 per cent \nwhile the unsecured segment recorded ₦30.45 billion or 4.25 per cent (Table 2.6). The \npreference for OBB transactions in the review period was attributable to risk aversion \nby market participants as there was low appetite for unsecured lending in the market. \n \n2.3 \nInterest Rates Movement \nThe movement in money market rates was influenced by liquidity conditions in the \nbanking system. The contributory factors included the fiscal operations of government; \neffects of CRR maintenance periods; deposits and settlement for foreign exchange \nwholesale and retail intervention; as well as the sale and maturities of CBN Bills. \n \n17 \n \nConsequently, the daily inter-bank call rates ranged from 3.00 to 35.00 per cent, while \nthe daily OBB ranged from 1.50 to 60.00 per cent in the review period. The weighted \nmonthly average rates at the call segment was 12.14 per cent in January 2019, peaked \nat 16.71 per cent in February and thereafter declined to 6.88 per cent in June 2019. \nSimilarly, at the OBB segment, the weighted monthly average rate was 17.54 per cent \nin January, peaked at 18.29 per cent in February and then moderated to 7.67 per cent \nin June 2019 (Table 2.7, Figure 2.3). The peak recorded at the inter-bank call and the \nOBB segments rates in February was attributed to the effect of frequent Open Market \nOperations and naira debits for foreign exchange transactions. \nDuring the first half of 2018, the weighted monthly average rates at the call segment \nwas 14.72 per cent in January, it peaked at 25.43 per cent in May and thereafter \ndeclined to 5.00 per cent in June 2018. Similarly, at the OBB segment, the weighted \nmonthly average rate was 10.04 per cent in January and peaked at 18.40 per cent in \nFebruary, before moderating to 11.13 per cent in June 2018 (Figure 2.4). \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n18 \n \nFigure 2.3: Average Monthly Money Market Rates, January – June, 2019 \n \n \nFigure 2.4: Average Monthly Money Market Rates, January – June, 2018 \n \n5.00\n7.00\n9.00\n11.00\n13.00\n15.00\n17.00\n19.00\n21.00\n23.00\nJan-19\nFeb-19\nMar-19\nApr-19\nMay-19\nJun-19\nPer cent\nInter-bank Call\nOpen Buy Back (OBB)\nMPR\nCall NIBOR\n30-day NIBOR\n2.00\n7.00\n12.00\n17.00\n22.00\n27.00\nJan-18\nFeb-18\nMar-18\nApr-18\nMay-18\nJun-18\nPer cent\nInterbank Call\nOpen Buy Back (OBB)\nMPR\nCall NIBOR\n30-day NIBOR\n \n19 \n \n2.4 \nCentral Bank of Nigeria Promissory Notes \nIn the first half of 2019, one Promissory Note was issued to EcoBank Plc on behalf of \nthe defunct Africa International Bank (AIB) for settlement of liabilities, while none \nwas issued in the corresponding period of 2018 (Table 2.8). \n \n \n20 \n \n3.0 \nFOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET OPERATIONS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n3.1 Developments in the Foreign Exchange Market \nThe first half of 2019 recorded an overall reduction in foreign exchange demand \npressure, as well as moderation in exchange rate volatility compared with the \ncorresponding period in 2018. The foreign exchange demand pressure and capital \noutflows witnessed in early 2019 were attributed to uncertainties around the 2019 \ngeneral elections. \n3.2 Inter-bank Foreign Exchange Market \nIn the review period, the CBN sustained its direct intervention in the inter-bank foreign \nexchange market to manage demand pressure and ensure exchange rate stability. \nConsequently, a total of US$8,287.52 million was sold at the foreign exchange market. \nThis comprised US$2,142.63 million at the Inter-bank spot, US$550.70 million for \nInvisibles, US$810.00 million for SMEs, US$212.11 million at the I&E window and \nUS$4,572.03 million as Forwards sales. On the other hand, the Bank purchased \nUS$9,368.92 million at the inter-bank segment, hence a net purchase of US$1,081.40 \nThe foreign exchange market remained stable in the first half of 2019, traceable to \nthe sustenance of policy measures adopted since June 2016. Some of these \nmeasures included moral suasion, restriction of items from the official foreign \nexchange window, operations at the autonomous Investors’ and Exporters’ (I&E) \nwindow, and increased volume and frequency of foreign exchange sales to BDCs. \n \n21 \n \nmillion by the Bank. At the Forwards segment, the sum of US$4,979.46 million \nmatured, while US$2,552.01 million was outstanding at end-June 2019. \nIn the corresponding period of 2018, US$9,499.91 million was sold at the Inter-bank \nsegment, comprising US$1,546.43 million at the Inter-bank spot, US$768.70 million \nfor Invisibles, US$637.00 million for SMEs, US$1,236.69 million at the I & E window \nand $5,311.09 million as Forwards sales. The Bank purchased US$6,436.47 million at \nthe inter-bank segment, resulting in a net sale of US$3,063.44 million. The sum of \nUS$5,681.77 million matured at the Forwards segment, while US$1,469.04 million \nwas outstanding at end-June 2018 (Table 3.1). \nThe increased sales at the inter-bank spot market in 2019 were attributable to the \nBank’s foreign exchange management strategy of sustaining liquidity and maintaining \nexchange rate stability. Figure 5 displays the monthly sales at the inter-bank foreign \nexchange market in 2019 and 2018, respectively. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n22 \n \nFigure 3.1: Inter-bank Foreign Exchange Sales, January – June, 2018 vs 2019 \n \n3.3 \nNaira-Settled Over the Counter Foreign Exchange Futures \nThe sum of US$8,035.39 million was traded in the futures market in the first half of \n2019. A total of US$3,483.04 million matured while US$9,324.70 million remained \noutstanding at end-June 2019. In the corresponding period of 2018, US$3,965.68 \nmillion was traded at the futures market, US$2,914.86 million matured, while \nUS$4,369.69 million remained outstanding at end-June, 2018. \n3.4 The Bilateral Currency Swap Agreement \nDuring the review period, the Bank continued with the implementation of the Bi-lateral \nCurrency Swap Agreement with the People’s Bank of China through bi-weekly \nRenminbi auctions, which commenced in July, 2018. \n -\n 50.00\n 100.00\n 150.00\n 200.00\n 250.00\n 300.00\n 350.00\n 400.00\n 450.00\nJan\nFeb\nMar\nApr\nMay\nJun\nUS$ Million\nAmount Sold at the Interbank Spot in 2019\nAmount Sold at the Interbank Spot in 2018\n \n23 \n \nIn the review period, 13 auctions were conducted and Renminbi worth CNY512.43 \nmillion were sold from the drawdown of CNY1.00 billion. A total of Renminbi worth \nCNY669.66 million was sold through 12 auctions conducted from July to December \n2018, from the same initial draw down of CNY1.00 billion. \n3.5 Investors’ and Exporters’ Window \nThe daily rate at the I&E window opened at ₦364.41/US$ in January 2019 and closed \nat ₦360.75/US$ at end-June 2019, representing an appreciation of ₦3.66/US$. The \nmonthly average exchange rate opened at ₦363.76/US$ in January and closed at \n₦360.64/US$ in June 2019 (Table 3.2). At the beginning of the year, the rates at the \nI&E window depreciated as a result of uncertainties around the 2019 general elections. \nHowever, it appreciated by ₦3.27/US$ in March, and remained stable through end-\nJune, 2019. \n3.6 Bureau-de-Change \nThe increased sale of foreign exchange by the Bank to the BDCs resumed in the second \nhalf of 2018, and was sustained in the first half of 2019 which increased supply in the \nretail market and helped to converge the rates in the BDC, I&E and Inter-bank \nsegments. Thus, the daily BDC exchange rate, which opened at ₦360.75/US$ in \nJanuary, closed at ₦360.00/US$ at end-June 2019. The exchange rate was relatively \nstable, ranging from ₦359.00/US$ to ₦362.75/US$, between January and June 2019. \nThe monthly average exchange rate opened at ₦360.94/US$ in January and closed at \nN359.94/US$ in June 2019 (See Table 3.2). \n \n24 \n \n 3.7 Interbank Foreign Exchange Rate Movement \nAt the inter-bank segment of the market, the daily exchange rate opened at \n₦306.95/US$ in January and closed at ₦306.90/US$ at end-June 2019. The rate was \nrelatively stable owing to sustained supply of foreign exchange through various \ninterventions by the Bank. The monthly average exchange rate opened at ₦306.85/US$ \nin January and marginally depreciated to close at ₦306.95/US$ in June 2019. \n \nFigure 3.2: Selected Exchange Rates, January – June, 2019 \n \n \n \n \n270.00\n280.00\n290.00\n300.00\n310.00\n320.00\n330.00\n340.00\n350.00\n360.00\n370.00\nJan-19\nFeb-19\nMar-19\nApr-19\nMay-19\nJun-19\nN/US$\nI & E\nInter-Bank\nBDC\n \n25 \n \nFigure 3.3: Selected Exchange Rates, January – June, 2018 \n \n3.8 \n Foreign Exchange Rate Premium \nIn the first half of 2019, the average exchange rate premium between the BDC and \ninter-bank segments moderated from ₦54.10 in January to ₦52.99 in June 2019 (Table \n3.2), representing a decrease in the percentage premium from 14.99 to 14.91 per cent. \nIn the corresponding period of 2018, the average exchange rate premium between the \nBDC and inter-bank segments decreased to ₦54.79 in June from ₦57.43 in January \n2018, representing a decrease in the percentage premium from 15.81 to 15.19 per cent. \nThe development in the first half of 2019 was due to improved liquidity in the foreign \nexchange market. \nIn the first half of 2019, the monthly average exchange rate premium between the I&E \nwindow and BDC contracted towards convergence from -₦2.82 in January to -₦0.70 \n 270.00\n 280.00\n 290.00\n 300.00\n 310.00\n 320.00\n 330.00\n 340.00\n 350.00\n 360.00\n 370.00\nJan-18\nFeb-18\nMar-18\nApr-18\nMay-18\nJun-18\nN/US$\nI & E\nInter-Bank\nBDC\n \n26 \n \nin June 2019, compared to a reduction in the premium from ₦2.67 in January to -₦0.40 \nper cent in June 2018(Table 3.2). The development in the first half of 2019 was due to \nimproved liquidity in the foreign exchange market. \nFigure 3.4: Exchange Rate Premium between I&E & BDC, January – June, 2018 \nvs 2019 \n \nFigure 3.5: Exchange Rate Premium between Inter-Bank & BDC, January – \nJune, 2018 vs 2019 \n \n (4.00)\n (3.00)\n (2.00)\n (1.00)\n -\n 1.00\n 2.00\n 3.00\nJan\nFeb\nMar\nApr\nMay\nJun\nN/US$\nPremium b/w I&E and BDC rates 2018\nPremium b/w I&E and BDC rates 2019\n 49.00\n 50.00\n 51.00\n 52.00\n 53.00\n 54.00\n 55.00\n 56.00\n 57.00\n 58.00\nJan\nFeb\nMar\nApr\nMay\nJun\nN/US$\nPremium b/w Interbank and BDC rates 2018\nPremium b/w Interbank and BDC rates 2019\n \n27 \n \nBox 1: 5-year Policy Thrust of the Central Bank of Nigeria \nThe Governor stated that \nThe vision of the Central Bank of Nigeria over the next five years would be driven by the need to support continued \ngrowth and development of the Nigerian economy through improved wealth and job creation. He also noted that \nalthough the Bank achieved reassuring results from its activities between 2014 and 2019, the task of building a stronger \neconomy was very imperative in view of the fact that GDP growth remained slow and unemployment high. \nThe goal of the Bank would therefore be to target double digit growth and bring down inflation to single digit. \nConsequently, the priorities of the CBN over the next 5-years are as follows; to \n \nPreserve domestic macroeconomic and financial stability; \n \nFoster the development of a robust payments system infrastructure that will increase access to finance for all \nNigerians thereby raising the financial inclusion rate in the country, \n \nWork with the Deposit Money Banks to improve access to credit for not only small holder farmers and MSMEs but \nalso Consumer credit and mortgage facilities for bank customers. Intervention support shall also be extended to \nthe teeming youth population who possess entrepreneurial skills in the creative industry. \n \nGrow our external reserves and \n \nSupport efforts at diversifying the economy through the intervention programs in the agriculture and manufacturing \nsectors. \nThe Governor expressed confidence that when these measures are implemented, they will help to insulate the economy from \npotential shocks in the global economy. He also pledged to work to the best of his abilities to ensure that the objectives are \nfulfilled. \nThe Governor stated further that to achieve the Bank’s vision and fulfill the objectives, he would ensure the following: \nMacroeconomic Stability: There would be key emphasis on supporting improved GDP growth and greater private sector \ninvestment, leverage monetary policy tools in supporting a low inflation environment, while seeking to maintain stability in \nthe exchange rate. The Bank will support measures to increase and diversify Nigeria’s export base to shore up reserves. \nExchange Rate Stability: We will continue to operate a managed float exchange rate regime in order to reduce the impact \nwhich continuous volatility in the exchange rate could have on our economy. \nFinancial System Stability: A resilient and stable financial system is imperative for continued growth of our economy given \nthe intermediation role that financial institutions play in supporting the needs of individuals and businesses. The Bank will \ncontinue to improve on-site and off-site supervision of all financial institutions. The recapitalization of Banks would also be \npursued to position them among top 500 in the world. \n \n28 \n \nRobust Payment System Infrastructure: An efficient payment system is vital to the effectiveness of monetary policy \ninterventions. It also helps in reducing the cost involved in payment for goods and services. Thus, payment services \nmanagement department of the CBN will work with stakeholders to ensure a robust system. \nTargeted Development Finance: Building on the success of the Anchor Borrowers Program and other intervention \nprograms geared towards supporting the growth of the agriculture and manufacturing sectors. The Bank would boost \ngrowth through provision of inputs. \nFinancial Inclusion: Over the next five years, through initiatives and policy measures such as the Shared Agent Network \n(SANEF) and the payment service banks, the Bank would broaden access to financial services to individuals in underserved \nparts of the country. This would ensure that 95 per cent of Nigerians have access to financial services. \nAccess to Credit: Beyond our intervention programs, the Bank is also working to encourage banks and financial institutions \nto lend from their balance sheet in order to support the growth of critical sectors of the economy, such as Agriculture, \nMSMEs and the Real Estate Sector. Greater emphasis on improving consumer spending and business investment by MSMEs \nis critical to sustainable double-digit growth of the Nigerian economy. \nUnique Identification: To enhance the identification of financial service consumers, the CBN will support an aggressive \nenrollment of prospective banking customers in the informal sector onto the BVN system. \nLending to MSMEs: The recently established NIRSAL microfinance bank will also work to improve access to credit for \nMSMEs in rural communities, which will help stimulate improved economic activities. \nConsumer Credit: In order to spur lending to consumers, a framework will be announced by the CBN, under which large \ndepartmental stores, automobile companies, equipment leasing companies, in partnership with financial institutions, and \nthe credit bureaus, will be able to provide credit facilities at reasonable interest rates to consumers. \nMortgage Lending: Adequate safeguards will be put in place to reduce the risk of delinquency in the mortgage backed \nassets that will be sold in the capital markets. \nConclusion \nThe Governor reiterated that although these goals were onerous and tasking, the CBN will remain committed to fulfilling \nits mandated objectives of price and monetary stability. Efforts would be geared towards safeguarding the stability of the \nfinancial system, while supporting the development of a payment system infrastructure that will improve access to credit for \nall eligible Nigerians. Nevertheless, additional emphasis will be placed on supporting greater growth of the economy and \nin reducing unemployment, through targeted interventions in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. \n \n \n \n \n \n29 \n \n4.0 \nCAPITAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n4.1 \nNigerian Stock Market \nThe performance of the market during the review period was bearish as the major \nindicators, the NSE ASI and the MC declined, compared with the first half of the \npreceding year. The bearish trend was occasioned by prolonged investor apathy, \nuncertainty surrounding the February/March general elections, and foreign portfolio \ndivestments. However, the market indices improved slightly in May owing to the \nlisting by a major telecommunications company, MTN Nigeria, on the bourse. \n \n \nThe NSE indicators reflected weaker performance during the first half of 2019 \nwhen compared with the corresponding period of the preceding year. \nContributory factors included weak investor sentiments and bearish activities due \nto concerns over the general elections and the direction of a new government. \nThus, the NSE ASI and MC fell by 21.71 and 4.76 per cent to 29,966.87 and \n₦13.21 trillion at end-June 2019, from 38,278.55 and ₦13.87 trillion, respectively \nat end-June 2018. Among the various sectors on the Main Board of the NSE, the \nfinancial services sector was the most active, accounting for 76.39 per cent of the \nvolume of equities traded, followed by the conglomerates with 6.65 per cent, while \nthe remaining nine sectors accounted for 16.96 per cent. \n \n30 \n \n4.1.1 All Share Index and Market Capitalization \nThe ASI which stood at 31,070.06 at the beginning of the year declined by 3.55 per \ncent to 29,966.87, while the MC which opened at ₦11.59 trillion declined by ₦1.62 \ntrillion or 13.98 per cent to N13.21 trillion at end-June 2019. \nIn the first half of 2018, the ASI opened at 38,264.79 trillion and declined by 17.19 per \ncent to close at 38,278.55 trillion at end-June. However, the MC of equities increased \nby ₦0.25 trillion or 1.80 per cent, from N13.62 trillion at the beginning of January to \n₦13.87 trillion at end-June 2018 (Table 4.1). \nThe turnover of activities in the market in the first half of 2019 was lower than the \ncorresponding period of the preceding year. The volume and value of shares traded in \nthe review period was 46.22 billion and ₦538.57 billion, respectively, compared with \n67.99 billion and ₦816.34 billion, in the corresponding period of 2018. The number of \ndeals decreased to 463,942 in the first half of 2019, from 663,266 in the first half of \n2018. The decline in the volume and value of transactions during the review period \nreflected the bearish trend in the capital market (Table 4.2). \n4.1.2 Market Turnover \nThe financial services sector remained dominant in the first half of 2019, accounting \nfor 76.39 per cent of the volume of equities traded, followed by the conglomerates with \n6.65 per cent, while the remaining sectors accounted for 16.96 per cent. (Table 4.3) \n \n31 \n \nForeign investment inflow amounted to ₦221.61 billion, while outflow was ₦250.18 \nbillion at end-June 2019, reflecting a net \noutflow of ₦28.57 billion. Similarly, \nforeign investment inflows amounted to \n₦380.65 billion, while outflows amounted \nto ₦419.06 billion, reflecting a net outflow \nof ₦38.41 billion in the first half of 2018. \n(Table 4.4) \nThe net outflow during the review period \nwas attributable to the uncertainties \nsurrounding leadership changes expected to \nfollow the general elections. At end-June \n2019, the total foreign portfolio investment in the stock market was 43.38 per cent of \ntotal market transactions, compared with 50.07 per cent in the corresponding period of \n2018. \n4.1.3 New and Supplementary Listings and Delisting \nThe NSE admitted one Eurobond, 11 FGN Bonds and five FGN Savings Bonds on the \nfloor during the review period. In addition, there were 14 supplementary listings on the \nNSE arising from additional issues, mergers and rights issues. Conversely, three \ncompanies were delisted from the Exchange, two of which were done voluntarily by \nGreat Nigeria Insurance Plc and Newrest ASL Nigeria Plc, while Diamond Bank was \ndelisted following its merger with Access Bank. (Table 4.5) \nIn the first half of 2019, the \npercentage \nof \nforeign \nportfolio investments in the \nstock market averaged 43.38 \nper cent of total market \ntransactions, compared with \n50.07 \nper \ncent \nin \ncorresponding \nperiod \nof \n2018. \n \n32 \n \nIn the corresponding period of 2018, one state government bond, three FGN Bonds and \nfour FGN Savings Bonds were admitted on the Exchange. In addition, there were \nfourteen supplementary listings on the NSE arising from bonus issues, additional \nissues, scrip dividend offers, mergers and rights issues. Only Seven-Up Bottling \nCompany was delisted from the Exchange. (Table 4.5) \n4.1.4 New Developments in the Capital Market \nMTN Nigeria became the first telecommunications network provider to be listed on the \nPremium Board of the Nigerian Stock Exchange with 20,354,513,050 ordinary shares \nlisted at ₦90 per share on May 16, 2019. \nAlso in the review period, the Demutualization process of the NSE was in the final \nstages of implementation. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n33 \n \n5.0 \n FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DOMESTIC DEBT \n \n \n5.1 Nigerian Treasury Bills \nThe total NTBs issued and allotted was ₦1,473.84 billion apiece, indicating a decrease \nof ₦179.52 billion or 10.86 per cent below ₦1,653.37 billion apiece in the \ncorresponding period of 2018. The decrease was attributable to fewer NTB issues in \nthe review period. Total public subscriptions stood at ₦4,153.63 billion, compared to \n₦3,223.36 billion in the corresponding period of 2018. The rise in public subscription \nwas traceable to the increased level of liquidity in the system and the favorable appetite \nfor government securities. \nThe Federal Government continued to rely on public financing to support its revenue \nshortfalls. It issued new instruments comprising Federal Government of Nigeria \n(FGN) Bonds and Federal Government Savings Bonds. Consequently, the stock of \nFGN domestic debt outstanding amounted to ₦13,412.80 billion at end-June 2019. \nThis represented an increase of ₦1,261.36 billion or 10.38 per cent over ₦12,151.44 \nbillion at end-June 2018. However, the cost of debt servicing decreased by 15.00 \nper cent to ₦800.73 billion at end-June 2019, from ₦941.99 billion at end-June \n2018. This was due to declining yields in the fixed income market and the issuance \nof Promissory notes which has no implication for debt servicing. \n \n34 \n \nThe holding structure of the instrument indicated that Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) \nand foreign investors took up ₦766.37 billion or 52.00 per cent, mandate and internal \nfunds customers (including CBN Branches) ₦581.08 billion or 39.43 per cent, CBN \ntake-up N73.45 billion or 4.98 per cent and merchant banks ₦52.94 billion or 3.59 per \ncent (Table 5.2; Figures 5.1 and 5.2). The successful bid rates in the market ranged \nfrom 9.60 to 11.00 per cent for 91-day, 11.89 to 13.50 per cent for 182-day and 12.02 \nto 15.00 per cent for 364-day tenors. The range of successful bid rates in the \ncorresponding period of 2018 was higher, between 10.00 to 12.55 per cent for the 91-\nday and 10.30 to 13.93 per cent for the 182-day, but lower for the 364-day tenors at \nrates between 10.70 and 14.30 per cent (Table 5.3). \nFigure 5.1: NTB Primary Market Auction, January – June, 2019 \n \n \n \n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1000\n1200\n1400\nJan-19\nFeb-19\nMar-19\nApr-19\nMay-19\nJun-19\nN'Million\nTotal Issue\nTotal Public Subscription\nTotal Allotment\n \n35 \n \nFigure 5.2: NTB Primary Market Auction, January – June, 2018 \n \n5.1.1 Structure of Outstanding Nigerian Treasury Bills Holdings \nThe outstanding NTB holdings structure indicated that DMBs accounted for 41.69 per \ncent of the total at end-June 2019 compared with 27.59 per cent in the corresponding \nperiod of 2018. Mandate and Internal Account customers (parastatals) accounted for \n45.51 per cent, Merchant banks 0.81 per cent, while the CBN accounted for 11.99 per \ncent (Table 5.4). \n5.2 Federal Republic of Nigeria Treasury Bonds \nIn the first half of 2019, there was no new issue of the Federal Republic of Nigeria \nTreasury Bonds (FRNTBs), as FGN Bonds remained the major source of government \ndeficit financing. Hence, the outstanding stock of the instrument at end-June 2019 \nstood at ₦125.99 billion, compared to ₦150.99 billion at end-June 2018. The decline \nin the amount outstanding was due to the redemption of ₦25.00 billion at the end of \n -\n 100.00\n 200.00\n 300.00\n 400.00\n 500.00\n 600.00\n 700.00\n 800.00\n 900.00\n 1,000.00\nJan-18\nFeb-18\nMar-18\nApr-18\nMay-18\nJun-18\n₦'Million\nTotal Issue\nTotal Public Subscription\nTotal Allotment\n \n36 \n \n2018. A breakdown of the amount outstanding showed that the CBN held ₦41.03 \nbillion, while ₦84.95 billion was held in the Sinking Fund (Table 5.5). In 2018, the \nCBN held ₦50.44 billion, while ₦100.55 billion was held in the Sinking Fund. \n5.3 Federal Government of Nigeria Bonds \nThe total value of FGN Bonds offered to the public was ₦700.00 billion, while public \nsubscription and sale stood at ₦1,160.45 billion and ₦615.39 billion, respectively \n(Table 5.6). The amount offered comprised new issues and re-openings of FGN Bonds. \nIn the same period of 2018, FGN Bonds issues, subscription and allotment amounted \nto ₦500.00 billion, ₦829.42 billion and ₦425.35 billion, respectively. The increase in \nissues, subscriptions and allotment in the first half of 2019 was attributable to \ngovernment’s efforts to rebalance domestic debt structure in favour of longer tenored \ninstruments and cost reduction. \nConsequently, the total value of FGN Bonds outstanding at end-June 2019 stood at \n₦10,171.29 billion, compared with ₦9,407.53 billion at end-June 2018, indicating an \nincrease of ₦763.76 billion or 8.12 per cent (Table 5.7). The FGN Bonds holding \nstructure showed that ₦3,669.98 billion or 36.08 per cent was held by DMBs, ₦170.48 \nbillion or 1.68 per cent by merchant banks, and the balance of ₦6,330.83 billion or \n62.24 per cent held by non-bank public (Table 5.8). \n 5.4 Domestic Debt Charge \nFGN domestic debt service was ₦800.73 billion at end-June 2019, representing a \ndecrease of 15.00 per cent when compared to ₦941.99 billion at end-June 2018. The \ndecrease was attributable to the fall in yields on the securities issued in the markets. A \n \n37 \n \nbreakdown of the cost showed that interest \nexpense on NTBs stood at ₦166.63 billion \nor 20.81 per cent, coupon payments on FGN \nBonds, FGN Savings Bonds and FGN Green \nBonds accounted for ₦609.84 billion or \n76.16 per cent, ₦0.66 billion or 0.08 per cent \nand ₦0.72 billion or 0.09 per cent, \nrespectively. Rental payments on FGN Sukuk was ₦16.02 billion or 2.00 per cent, \nwhile interest paid on FRN Treasury Bonds was ₦6.87 billion or 0.86 per cent(Table \n5.9). \n \n5.5 Over-the-Counter Transactions \n5.5.1 Over-the-Counter Transactions in Nigerian Treasury Bills \nOTC transactions in NTBs during the first half of 2019 amounted to ₦44,794.05 \nbillion, indicating an increase of ₦9,864.81 billion or 28.24 per cent over the level of \n₦34,929.23 billion in the corresponding period of 2018. The increase was attributed to \nimproved patronage from foreign and institutional investors (Table 5.10). \n5.5.2 Over-the-Counter Transactions in Federal Government of Nigeria Bonds \nIn the review period, OTC transactions in FGN Bonds amounted to ₦7,052.72 billion, \nindicating an increase of ₦1,461.14 billion or 26.13 per cent over the level of \nThe cost of domestic debt instruments of \nthe FGN stood at N800.73 billion at \nend-June 2019, representing a decrease \nof 15.00 per cent when compared to \nN941.99 billion at end-June 2018. \n \n38 \n \n₦5,591.59 billion in the corresponding period of 2018. The trend was attributed to \nactive participation of investors, both local and foreign (Table 5.10). \n \n5.6 Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria Bonds \nAsset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) Bonds were fully repaid to the \npublic in December 2014, in a restructuring exercise that led to the conversion of ₦3.8 \ntrillion into 6.00% AMCON Notes for the CBN to hold to maturity in 2023, as the sole \ninvestor. This was to ensure stability in the banking system. \n5.7 \nFederal Government of Nigeria Savings Bonds \nThe total value of ₦2.75 billion FGN Savings Bonds, comprising 2- and 3-year tenors, \nwere issued and allotted during the review period, representing an increase of ₦1.42 \nbillion or 106.77 per cent when compared to ₦1.33 billion in the corresponding period \nof 2018. The increase was attributable to increased awareness and government’s efforts \nto encourage household savings in the economy. The range of coupon rates for the 2-\nyear spanned from 11.276 to 12.125 per cent, and 12.276 to 13.125 per cent for the 3-\nyear tenor. The range of coupon rates for the corresponding period in 2018 was lower \nfrom 9.480 to 12.098 per cent for the 2-year and 10.480 to 13.098 per cent for the 3- \nyear tenor (Table 5.11 and 5.12). \n5.8 \nFederal Government of Nigeria Green Bonds \nA total value of ₦25.69 billion FGN Green Bond was outstanding as at end-June 2019. \nThe 5- and 7-year tenors were issued at coupon rates of 13.4800 and 14.5000 per cent, \n \n39 \n \nin December 2017 and June 2019 respectively. The bond was issued to finance \nsustainable development projects with positive impact on the environment and the \neconomy (Table 5.13). \n5.9 \nFederal Government of Nigeria Sukuk \nThe total FGN Sukuk Bonds outstanding at end-June 2019 stood at ₦200.00 billion. \nThe two issues of the 7-year Sukuk of ₦100.00 billion each attracted rental rates of \n16.47 and 15.74 per cent, respectively, payable semi-annually. The proceeds were \ntargeted at the rehabilitation of roads across the six geopolitical zones (Table 5.14). \n5.10 Federal Government of Nigeria Promissory Notes \nThe total value of ₦707.76 billion FGN Promissory Notes was outstanding as at end-\nJune 2019. The 1-, 2- and 3-year notes were issued to settle part of the inherited local \ncontractors’ debts, outstanding obligations to oil marketing companies and state \ngovernments. (Table 5.15) \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n40 \n \n6.0 \nACTIVITIES OF INTERNAL AND INTER-AGENCY COMMITTEES \n \n6.1 \nLiquidity Assessment Group \nThe membership of the committee comprised the Director, all Heads of Division and \nOffice in the Financial Markets Department. The Liquidity Assessment Group (LAG) \nmet daily to assess the liquidity levels in the banking system and advise Management \non appropriate intervention measures by the Bank. \n6.2 \nThe Non-Interest Financial Institutions Products Development Committee \nThe Non-Interest Financial Institutions Products Development Committee (NIFI-PDC) \ncontinued to meet during the period under review in a bid to achieve its mandate of \ndeveloping non-interest products to stimulate growth and deepen the Nigerian financial \nmarkets. Consequently, it reviewed the implementation processes for non-interest \ninstruments at the CBN window to enhance efficiency and customer service delivery \nand an external proposal for a non-interest product by a non-interest financial \ninstitution. \n \n \nThe Financial Markets Department (FMD) sustained its collaboration with all relevant \ninternal and external stakeholders in its efforts to deepen the Nigerian financial markets, \nstimulate economic growth and promote financial systems stability. \n \n41 \n \n6.3 \nFinancial Stability Report Committee \nThe committee released the 2018 Report on the Nigerian financial system stability and \ncommenced processes to produce the 2019 half-year report. The 2018 Report reviewed \nthe soundness of the financial system, potential risks and efforts at sustaining its safety \nand stability. It also provided an outlook on developments that would impact the \nfinancial system as well as possible actions to mitigate threats. \nThe membership of the committee comprises the Financial Policy and Regulation, \nStatistics, Trade and Exchange, Research, Monetary Policy, Banking Services, Reserve \nManagement, Strategy Management, Risk Management, Banking Supervision, Other \nFinancial Institutions Supervision, Development Finance and Financial Markets \nDepartments. \n6.4 Fiscal Liquidity Assessment Committee \nThe inter-agency committee continued to provide valuable inputs on the examination \nof funds flow in the economy to analyze its effects on interest, exchange rates and \ninflation and proffer measures to keep them at desirable levels for economic growth \nand development. \nThe membership of the Committee comprises the Nigerian National Petroleum \nCorporation (NNPC), Office of the Accountant General of the Federation (OAGF), \nFederal Ministry of Finance (FMF), Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS), Nigeria \nCustoms Service (NCS), Ministry of Mines and Steel Development, Debt Management \nOffice (DMO), Budget Office of the Federation (BOF) and the CBN. \n \n42 \n \n6.5 Financial Services Regulation Coordinating Committee \nThe Financial Services Regulation Coordinating Committee (FSRCC) facilitated \nefforts towards the implementation of the Nigeria Sustainable Finance Principles \n(NSFP), Consolidated Examination of the Financial Holding Companies, the \nimplementation of the Executive Order on the Ease of Doing Business in Nigeria, as \nwell as setting up the Nigerian Financial System Stability Dashboard (FSSD) sub-\ncommittee that x-rays developments in the economy and the direction it is headed in \nthe areas of banking, insurance, pensions, and capital market sectors. \nThe FSRCC held one meeting in the first half of 2019, to aid the implementation of the \nNigeria Sustainable Finance Principles (NSFP). In addition, the Legal and Enforcement \nSub-Committee of the FSRCC setup a Technical Work Group (TWG) to develop a \nframework to curtail activities of Illegal Fund Managers (IFMs) in the country. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n43 \n \n7.0 \nMAJOR \nDEVELOPMENTS \nIN \nTHE \nNIGERIAN \nFINANCIAL \nMARKETS \nPolicy measures by the various regulatory authorities, geared towards the \ndevelopment of the financial system, influenced the conduct of operators and \nimpacted on the financial markets generally. Some of these policies included \nenhancing financial inclusion, increasing fiscal revenue, strengthening insurance \nservice delivery, improving the quality of banknotes in circulation, enforcing rules on \nmoney laundering, imposing stiffer sanctions on Direct Cash Settlement (DCS) and \nE-dividend Mandate defaulters, and unfolding the new CBN five-year agenda. \n \n7.1 \nReview of National Financial Inclusion Strategy \nIn the first half of 2019, the CBN reviewed the National Financial Inclusion Strategy \n(NFIS), which was launched in 2012 to facilitate the achievement of its 2020 target of \nreducing financially excluded adult population from 46.30 per cent as at 2010 to 20.00 \nper cent. The target aims to achieve 70 per cent of adult population in the formal \nfinancial services sector and 10 per cent in the informal sector. \nAs at 2016, 96.4 million adults constituting 58.40 per cent of the target population were \nfinancially included. This comprised 38.30 per cent banked, 10.30 per cent served by \nother formal institutions, and 9.80 per cent served by informal service providers. \n \n \n44 \n \n7.2 \nEnforcement of Clean Note Policy \nTo facilitate the implementation of clean note policy, the Bank imposed a penal fee of \n₦1 million on any deposit money bank’s Branch found culpable of non-compliance \nwith its ‘Banknote Fitness Guidelines and Clean Note Policy’. The penalty is intended \nto motivate DMBs to process and issue fit notes to members of the public. \n7.3 \nPolicy and Procedure Manual on Money Laundering \nDuring the review period, the Bank released its ‘Anti-Money Laundering/Combating \nthe Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) Policy and Procedure Manual’ to strengthen \nits internal processes and ensure its employees comply with AML/CFT laws and \nregulations. \n7.4 CBN Five-Year Agenda \nFollowing his reappointment for a 5-year term, the Governor of CBN, Mr. Godwin \nEmefiele, unfolded a new policy direction for the Bank, targeted at facilitating access \nto financial services for 95 per cent of eligible Nigerians by 2024, collaborating with \nfiscal authorities to achieve double-digit growth, bringing down inflation to single digit \nand accelerating the rate of employment, amongst others as contained in the Box \nInformation on 5-Year Policy Thrust of the CBN. \n7.5 \nFiscal Drive for Increased Revenue Generation \nTo enhance revenue generation, the FIRS set a target to generate ₦8 trillion revenue in \n2019 compared to ₦5.3 trillion generated in 2018. This drive was aimed at improving \n \n45 \n \nfiscal revenue, and increasing revenue-debt service ratio and revenue-GDP ratio, \namongst other parameters. \n7.6 \nAdoption of USSD Code by Nigerian Insurers Association \nThe Nigerian Insurers Association (NIA) introduced an Unstructured Supplementary \nService Data (USSD) Code, *565*11#, to check the proliferation of fake insurance \ncertificates in Nigeria. The service would be accessible through mobile phones, thereby \nenabling direct communication with the Nigeria Insurance Industry Database (NIID) \nsystem to retrieve information on insurance policy status when required, independent \nof internet connectivity. \n7.7 \nDevelopment of Special Economic Zones \nThe Federal Government of Nigeria signed investment agreements with three \ndevelopment finance institutions- African Export–Import Bank (Afreximbank); Bank \nof Industry (BOI) and the Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority (NSIA) for the \ndevelopment of special economic zones in the country. \n7.8 Recapitalisation of Insurance Firms \nIn the review period, the National Insurance Commission (NAICOM) raised the \nminimum paid-up capital of insurance and reinsurance firms. Under the new capital \nregime, implementable between May 20, 2019 and June 30, 2020, life insurance \nunderwriting firms would compulsorily shore up their capital to N8 billion from the \ncurrent minimum paid up share capital of ₦2 billion, representing a 300 percent \nincrease; while insurance firms underwriting general business are required to beef up \n \n46 \n \ntheir capital to ₦10 billion from ₦3 billion. Composite insurance companies \nunderwriting both life and general business; are to raise their capital to ₦18 billion \nfrom ₦5 billion, while reinsurance companies are to raise their minimum paid-up \ncapital to ₦20 billion from ₦10 billion. \n7.9 Financial Regulation Advisory Council of Experts \nDuring the review period, the Financial Regulation Advisory Council of Experts \n(FRACE) undertook several activities that included participation in on-site \nexamination of Non-Interest Financial Institutions (NIFIs) alongside Banking \nSupervision Department (BSD) and Other Financial Institutions Supervision \nDepartment (OFISD), to assess Shari'ah compliance; the formulation of a framework \nfor the involvement of NIFIs in Commercial Agricultural Credit Scheme; the review \nof Guide to Bank Charges applicable to NIFIs; modification of the operational \nprocedures for NIFI participation in the CBN foreign exchange window; and approved \nmembers of the Advisory Committee of Experts (ACE) of newly proposed non-interest \nbanks, as well as some new financial products by Sterling and Jaiz Banks. \nIn addition, the FRACE approved the Uniform Underwriting Standards for Non-\nInterest Housing Finance in Nigeria; developed a template for ACE to use in reporting \nthe disposal of non-permissible income; and conducted Shariah Audit training for \nfinancial service regulators: Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), National \nPension Commission (PENCOM), Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC), \nNational Insurance Commission (NAICOM) and CBN. \n \n \n47 \n \nAPPENDIX 1 \nIndex of Financial Markets Regulatory Circulars and Guidelines January – June 2019 \nS/N \nDATE \nISSUED \nREFERENCE NO. \nTITLE \nDEPT \nREMARK \n1 \nJanuary \n28, 2019 \nPSM/DIR/CIR/G\nEN/01/002 \nExposure \nDraft \nfor \nthe \nRegulations \non \nEnd-to-End \nElectronic Payment of Salaries \nPension and other Remittances, \nSupplies \nand \nRevenue \nCollections \nin \nNigeria, \nRevised,2018 \nPSMD \nRevised \n2 \nJanuary \n31, 2019 \nBKS/DIR/GEN/C\nIR/06/001 \nCircular on the Additional Data \nFiles for Industry Customer \nAccount \nDatabase \n(ICAD) \nSubmission to NIBSS Plc. \nBSD \nNew \n3 \nFebruary \n28, 2019 \nBKS/DIR/CIR/G\nEN/02/041 \nRe: Circular on the Revised \nNigerian \nCheque \nStandard \n(NCS) and Nigerian Cheque \nBSD \nRevised \n \n48 \n \nPrinters Accreditation Scheme \n(NICPAS) \n4 \nMarch 18, \n2019 \nFPR/DIR/GEN/C\nIR/07/024 \nRE: \nReview \nof \nMinimum \nCapital \nRequirement \nfor \nMicrofinance Banks in Nigeria \nFPR \nRevised \n5 \nApril 10, \n2019 \nBSD/DIR/GEN/L\nAB/12/011/8 \nGuidance \nNotes \non \nthe \nCalculation \nof \nCapital \nRequirement for Operational \nRisk for Non-Interest Financial \nInstitutions in Nigeria \nBSD \nNew \n6 \nApril 10, \n2019 \nBSD/DIR/GEN/L\nAB/12/011/7 \nGuidelines on the Management \nof Investment Account Holders \nfor \nNon-Interest \nFinancial \nInstitutions in Nigeria \nBSD \nNew \n7 \nApril 10, \n2019 \nBSD/DIR/GEN/L\nAB/12/011/6 \nGuidance Notes on Supervisory \nReview \nProcess \nfor \nNon-\nInterest Financial Institutions in \nNigeria \nBSD \nNew \n \n49 \n \n8 \nApril 10, \n2019 \nBSD/DIR/GEN/L\nAB/12/011/5 \nGuidance \nNotes \non \nthe \nCalculation \nof \nCapital \nRequirement for Credit Risk for \nNon-Interest \nFinancial \nInstitutions in Nigeria \nBSD \nNew \n9 \nApril 10, \n2019 \nBSD/DIR/GEN/L\nAB/12/011/4 \nGuidelines on the Practice of \nSmoothing the Profit Payout to \nInvestment Account Holders \nfor \nNon-Interest \nFinancial \nInstitutions in Nigeria \nBSD \nNew \n10 \nApril 10, \n2019 \nBSD/DIR/GEN/L\nAB/12/011/3 \nGuidance Notes on Regulatory \nCapital \nfor \nNon-Interest \nFinancial Institutions in Nigeria \nBSD \nNew \n11 \nApril 10, \n2019 \nBSD/DIR/GEN/L\nAB/12/011/2 \nGuidance Notes on Disclosure \nRequirements \nto \nPromote \nTransparency \n& \nMarket \nDiscipline \nfor \nNon-Interest \nFinancial Institutions in Nigeria \nBSD \nNew \n \n50 \n \n12 \nApril 10, \n2019 \nBSD/DIR/GEN/L\nAB/12/011/1 \nGuidance \nNotes \non \nthe \nCalculation \nof \nCapital \nRequirement for Market Risk \nfor \nNon-Interest \nFinancial \nInstitutions in Nigeria \nBSD \nNew \n13 \nApril 10, \n2019 \nBSD/DIR/GEN/L\nAB/12/011 \nIssuance of Final Guidelines on \nIslamic \nFinancial \nServices \nBoard Standards for Nigerian \nNon-Interest \nFinancial \nInstitutions \nBSD \nNew \n14 \nApril 18, \n2019 \nFPR/DIR/GEN/C\nIR/O7/025 \nExposure \nDraft \nof \nthe \nGuidelines for Licensing and \nRegulation \nof \nPrimary \nMortgage Banks in Nigeria \nFPRD \nNew \n15 \nMay 15, \n2019 \nPSM/DIR/GEN/C\nIR/02/003 \nRequest for Information on \nProposed PSV 2030 \nPSMD \nNew \n16 \nJune 10, \n2019 \nBKS/DIR/CIR/G\nEN/02/045 \nImplementation of the Nigeria \nCheque Standard (NCS) and \nNigeria \nCheque \nPrinters \nBSD \nNew \n \n51 \n \nAccreditation \nScheme \n(NICPAS) Version 2.0 \n17 \nJune 13, \n2019 \nFPR/DIR/GEN/C\nIR/07/030 \nCircular to all Banks on the \nCommencement of the Export \nFacilitation Initiative (EFI) \nFPRD \nNew \n18 \nJune 21, \n2019 \nTED/FEM/FPC/\nGEN/01/002 \nNotice of Meeting of Foreign \nExchange Officers of Banks \nTED \nNew \n \n52 \n \n \n \nPeriod\n2018\nJanuary\n3,786.60\n \n2,132.61\n \n2,132.61\n \n12.5500 - 15.0000\n12.6000 - 15.0000\n183.22\n \n163\nFebruary\n1,600.71\n \n919.31\n \n845.28\n \n12.6000 - 14.5000\n12.6000 - 14.4000\n79.72\n \n173\nMarch\n1,935.25\n \n1,599.25\n \n1,561.38\n \n12.5000 - 14.4000\n12.6000 - 14.4000\n156.52\n \n199\nApril\n1,939.09\n \n3,423.08\n \n2,084.46\n \n10.3100 - 14.4000\n10.9000 - 14.4000\n176.59\n \n189\nMay\n2,576.51\n \n2,484.39\n \n2,033.42\n \n10.6000 - 14.4000\n11.0000 - 14.4000\n156.72\n \n201\nJune\n2,134.69\n \n1,092.61\n \n1,086.61\n \n11.0500 - 12.5000\n11.0500 - 12.1500\n95.56\n \n230\nTotal \n13,972.84\n \n11,651.25\n \n9,743.76\n \n848.32\nPeriod\n2019\nJanuary\n4,428.78\n \n3,113.72\n \n3,113.72\n \n11.7500-15.0000\n11.9000-15.0000\n378.45\n \n214.00\n \nFebruary\n2,794.16\n \n3,721.50\n \n3,474.13\n \n11.9000-15.0000\n11.9000-15.0000\n444.11\n \n236.00\n \nMarch \n2,049.31\n \n2,574.90\n \n2,158.57\n \n11.0000-14.4000\n11.0500-14.4000\n145.27\n \n188.00\n \nApril\n699.92\n \n991.41\n \n841.20\n \n11.5000-14.3000\n11.7800-14.3000\n103.71\n \n253.00\n \nMay \n898.74\n \n1,529.97\n \n1,152.69\n \n10.7500-13.0290\n11.4000-13.0290\n125.63\n \n241.00\n \nJune\n1,024.05\n \n1,166.12\n \n1,130.62\n \n11.3300-13.0290\n11.4000-13.0290\n99.86\n \n243.00\n \nTotal \n11,894.96\n \n13,097.62\n \n11,870.93\n \n1,297.03\n \nTable 2.1\nOMO Subscription and Sales\nOffer \n(₦’Billion) \nSubscription \n(₦’Billion)\nSales \n(₦’Billion)\nBid Rate (%)\nStop Rate (%)\nCost of Liquidity \nManagement \n(₦'Billion)\nAverage Tenor \nCost of Liquidity \nManagement \n(₦'Billion)\nAverage Tenor \nOffer \n(₦’Billion) \nSubscription \n(₦’Billion)\nSales \n(₦’Billion)\nBid Rate (%)\nStop Rate (%)\n \n53 \n \n \n2018\nAmount (₦’Billion)\nInterest (₦’Billion)\nTotal (₦’Billion)\nRange of Rate (%)\nRange of Tenor \n(Days)\nJanuary\n29.93\n0.99\n30.92\n18.50-19.00\n30-90\nFebruary\n52.60\n1.43\n54.03\n18.50-19.00\n4-90\nMarch\n23.88\n0.69\n24.57\n18.50-19.50\n28-90\nApril\n16.06\n0.34\n16.4\n18.50-19.50\n28-90\nMay\n49.32\n0.3\n49.62\n18.50-19.50\n4-90\nJune\n68.94\n2.78\n71.72\n18.50-19.50\n30-90\nTotal\n240.73\n6.53\n247.26\n18.50-19.50\n4-90\n2019\nAmount (₦’Billion)\nInterest (₦’Billion)\nTotal (₦’Billion)\nRange of Rate (%)\nRange of Tenor \n(Days)\nJanuary\n116.68\n2.40\n119.08\n18.50-19.50\n4-90\nFebruary\n86.02\n2.53\n88.55\n18.50-19.50\n4-90\nMarch\n90.29\n3.03\n93.32\n18.50-19.50\n4-90\nApril\n96.88\n3.08\n99.96\n18.00-19.00\n7-90\nMay\n126.10\n4.28\n130.38\n18.00-19.00\n7-90\nJune\n95.33\n3.93\n99.26\n18.00-19.00\n28-90\nTotal\n611.3\n19.25\n630.55\n4-90\nTable 2.2\nRepurchase Transactions\n \n54 \n \n \nPeriod \n Direct SLF (₦) \n ILF Conversion (AREPO) (₦) \n Total (₦) \n Interest (₦) \n Transaction Days \n Average SLF (including \nILF) (₦) \n Average ILF (₦) \n Average Interest (₦) \n Total (₦) \n2018\n January \n 205,043,529,300.00 628,047,501,300.53 833,091,030,600.53 613,302,588.66 \n22\n 37,867,774,118.21 28,547,613,695.48 27,877,390.39 37,895,651,508.60 \n February \n 366,992,720,400.00 653,157,556,760.45 1,020,150,277,160.45 727,179,050.57 \n20\n 51,007,513,858.02 32,657,877,838.02 36,358,952.53 51,043,872,810.55 \n March \n 98,010,001,850.00 854,218,036,339.78 952,228,038,189.78 751,811,044.34 \n21\n 45,344,192,294.75 40,677,049,349.51 35,800,525.92 45,379,992,820.67 \n April \n - 1,145,520,519,914.39 1,145,520,519,914.39 949,916,184.33 \n20\n 57,276,025,995.72 57,276,025,995.72 47,495,809.22 57,323,521,804.94 \n May \n 529,664,019,650.00 1,318,030,234,651.62 1,847,694,254,301.62 1,386,963,674.70 \n21\n 87,985,440,681.03 62,763,344,507.22 66,045,889.27 88,051,486,570.30 \n June \n 253,287,207,350.00 975,492,511,171.99 1,228,779,718,521.99 1,003,755,614.61 \n19\n 64,672,616,764.32 51,341,711,114.32 52,829,242.87 64,725,446,007.19 \n Total \n 1,452,997,478,550.00 5,574,466,360,138.76 7,027,463,838,688.76 5,432,928,157.20 \n123\n 344,153,563,712.04 273,263,622,500.27 266,407,810.20 344,419,971,522.25 \n Average \n242,166,246,425.00\n \n929,077,726,689.79\n \n1,171,243,973,114.79\n \n905,488,026.20\n \n57,358,927,285.34\n \n45,543,937,083.38\n \n44,401,301.70\n \n57,403,328,587.04\n \nPeriod \n Direct SLF (₦) \n ILF Conversion (AREPO) (₦) \n Total (₦) \n Interest (₦) \n Transaction Days \n Average SLF (including \nILF) (₦) \n Average ILF (₦) \n Average Interest (₦) \n Total (₦) \n2019\n January \n 2,086,569,262,450.00 1,140,360,062,197.67 3,232,632,239,716.16 2,220,901,995.89 22.00 146,937,829,078.01 52,093,771,693.92 100,950,090.72 147,038,779,168.73 \n February \n 2,351,915,826,750.00 976,887,326,264.73 3,328,803,153,014.73 2,134,858,766.03 20.00 166,440,157,650.74 48,844,366,313.24 106,742,938.30 166,546,900,589.04 \n March \n 1,084,211,127,835.42 871,543,988,723.02 1,955,755,116,558.44 1,403,478,675.69 21.00 93,131,196,026.59 41,502,094,701.10 66,832,317.89 93,198,028,344.48 \n April \n 1,344,496,466,000.00 667,434,106,150.00 2,011,930,572,150.00 1,283,635,022.39 20.00 100,596,528,607.50 33,371,705,307.50 64,181,751.12 100,660,710,358.62 \n May \n 516,473,309,250.00 380,349,776,689.13 896,823,085,939.13 600,424,075.12 21.00 24,593,967,107.14 18,111,894,128.05 28,591,622.62 24,622,558,729.77 \n June \n 391,182,750,200.00 324,145,266,800.00 715,328,017,000.00 576,746,601.80 17.00 42,078,118,647.06 19,067,368,635.29 33,926,270.69 42,112,044,917.75 \nTotal\n 7,774,848,742,485.42 4,360,720,526,824.55 12,141,272,184,378.50 8,220,045,136.91 121.00 573,777,797,117.04 212,991,200,779.10 401,224,991.35 574,179,022,108.39 \nAverage\n1,295,808,123,747.57\n \n726,786,754,470.76\n \n2,023,545,364,063.08\n \n1,370,007,522.82\n \n20.17\n \n95,629,632,852.84\n \n35,498,533,463.18\n \n66,870,831.89\n \n95,696,503,684.73\n \nTable 2.3\nStanding Lending Facility (SLF) \n \n55 \n \n \n \n \nPeriod \n Total SDF \n(₦) \n Interest \n(₦) \n Transaction Days\n Average SDF \n(₦) \n Average Interest \n(₦) \n Total \n(₦) \nJanuary \n1,919,775,000,000.00\n619,361,506.85\n22\n87,262,500,000.00\n28,152,795.77\n \n87,290,652,795.77\n \nFebruary\n1,144,096,000,000.00\n404,963,316.31\n20\n57,204,800,000.00\n18,840,526.03\n \n57,223,640,526.03\n \nMarch\n1,508,748,000,000.00\n673,616,219.18\n20\n75,437,400,000.00\n30,618,919.05\n \n75,468,018,919.05\n \nApril\n2,952,198,000,000.00\n1,033,611,287.67\n20\n147,609,900,000.00\n49,219,585.13\n \n147,659,119,585.13\n \nMay\n1,527,038,000,000.00\n528,131,835.62\n20\n76,351,900,000.00\n26,406,591.78\n \n76,378,306,591.78\n \nJune\n1,632,510,000,000.00\n616,268,219.18\n19\n85,921,578,947.37\n29,346,105.68\n \n85,950,925,053.04\n \nTotal\n10,684,365,000,000.00\n3,875,952,384.81\n121\n529,788,078,947.37\n182,584,523.43\n529,970,663,470.80\nAverage\n1,780,727,500,000.00\n645,992,064.13\n88,298,013,157.89\n30,430,753.90\n88,328,443,911.80\nPeriod \n Total SDF \n(₦) \n Interest \n(₦) \n Transaction Days\n Average SDF \n(₦) \n Average Interest \n(₦) \n Total \n(₦) \n2019\nJanuary \n976,655,000,000.00\n \n305,273,835.62\n \n22\n44,393,409,090.91\n \n13,876,083.44\n \n44,407,285,174.35\n \nFebruary\n704,410,000,000.00\n \n272,502,739.73\n \n20\n35,220,500,000.00\n \n13,625,136.99\n \n35,234,125,136.99\n \nMarch\n1,402,260,000,000.00\n \n481,204,178.08\n \n21\n66,774,285,714.29\n \n22,914,484.67\n \n66,797,200,198.96\n \nApril\n1,056,755,000,000.00\n \n302,370,616.44\n \n20\n52,837,750,000.00\n \n15,118,530.82\n \n52,852,868,530.82\n \nMay\n2,178,207,960,000.00\n \n741,928,429.04\n \n21\n103,724,188,571.43\n \n35,329,925.19\n \n103,759,518,496.62\n \nJune\n1,748,917,000,000.00\n \n578,157,657.53\n \n17\n102,877,470,588.24\n \n34,009,273.97\n \n102,911,479,862.21\n \nTotal\n8,067,204,960,000.00\n \n2,681,437,456.44\n \n121\n405,827,603,964.86\n \n134,873,435.08\n \n405,962,477,399.94\n \nAverage\n1,344,534,160,000.00\n \n446,906,242.74\n \n20.17\n67,637,933,994.14\n \n22,478,905.85\n \n67,660,412,899.99\n \n2018\nTable 2.4\n Standing Deposit Facility (SDF) \n \n56 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nPeriod\nAmount \n(₦’Billion)\nInterest \n(₦’Billion)\nRate \n(%)\nTenor \n(Days)\n2018\nJanuary\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nN/A\nFebruary\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nN/A\nMarch\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nN/A\nApril\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nN/A\nMay\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nN/A\nJune\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nN/A\nTotal\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nN/A\nPeriod\nAmount \n(₦’Billion)\nInterest \n(₦’Billion)\nRate \n(%)\nTenor \n(Days)\n2019\nJanuary\n54.44\n6.59\n13.50 170-352\nFebruary\n0\n0\n0\nN/A\nMarch\n0\n0\n0\nN/A\nApril\n0\n0\n0\nN/A\nMay\n0\n0\n0\nN/A\nJune\n0\n0\n0\nN/A\nTotal\n54.44\n6.59\n13.50 170-352\nTable 2.5 Rediscounting\n \n57 \n \n \n \n \n \nPeriod\nCall\nTenored\nCall + Tenored OBB\nTotal\n2018\nJanuary\n4.87\n0.00\n4.87\n114.19\n119.06\nFebruary\n4.62\n0.00\n4.62\n106.54\n111.16\nMarch\n5.83\n0.00\n5.83\n109.57\n115.40\nApril\n7.39\n0.00\n7.39\n92.07\n99.46\nMay\n4.74\n0.00\n4.74\n153.92\n158.66\nJune\n3.00\n0.00\n3.00\n109.32\n112.32\nTotal\n30.45\n0.00\n30.45\n685.61\n716.06\nPeriod\nCall\nTenored\nCall+Tenored\nOBB\nTotal\n2019\nJanuary\n5.50\n-\n \n5.50\n135.56\n \n141.06\n \nFebruary\n6.82\n-\n \n6.82\n154.81\n \n161.63\n \nMarch\n5.90\n-\n \n5.90\n216.20\n \n222.10\n \nApril\n6.38\n22.37\n \n28.75\n181.61\n \n210.36\n \nMay\n5.90\n-\n \n5.90\n195.13\n \n201.03\n \nJune\n6.42\n16.19\n \n22.61\n246.30\n \n268.91\n \nTotal\n36.92\n38.56\n75.48\n1,129.61\n1,205.09\n \nMonthly Average Inter-Bank Placements (₦'Billion)\nTable 2.6\n \n58 \n \n \n \nItem\nJanuary\nFebruary\nMarch\nApril\nMay\nJune\nInter-Bank Call\nRange of Bid Rate\n7.00-24.10\n4.00-53.75\n5.00-40.00\n1.00-7.00\n3.00-140.00\n5.00-5.00\nWeighted Average Rate\n14.72\n23.54\n16.06\n3.10\n25.43\n5.00\nInter-Bank (Tenored)\nRange of Bid Rate\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nWeighted Average Rate\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\nNIBOR Rates \nCall NIBOR\n11.24\n19.91\n15.97\n3.88\n22.77\n11.65\n30-day NIBOR\n15.00\n15.12\n15.32\n12.91\n13.15\n13.94\nOpen-Buy-Back (OBB)\nRange of Bid Rate\n3.65-18.38\n3.43-47.27\n2.69-39.04\n1.85-5.15\n1.86-131.04\n2.5-42.61\nWeighted Average Rate\n10.04\n18.40\n13.92\n2.88\n18.37\n11.13\nOMO \nRange of Issue Rate\nRange of Tenor (Days)\nNTB Primary Issue Rates (%)\nMPR\n14.00\n14.00\n14.00\n14.00\n14.00\n14.00\nSavings\nTime Deposits\nLending Tenored\nItem\nJanuary\nFebruary\nMarch\nApril\nMay\nJune\nRange of Bid Rate\n6.00-35.00\n15.00-23.00\n7.00-15.00\n4.00-20.00\n3.00-16.00\n4.00-8.20\nWeighted Average Rate\n12.14\n16.71\n10.80\n13.98\n7.31\n6.88\nRange of Bid Rate\n-\n-\n-\n10.00-10.00\n-\n5.00-5.00\nWeighted Average Rate\n-\n-\n-\n10.00\n-\n5.00\nCall NIBOR\n19.09\n18.86\n12.88\n16.27\n8.68\n16.43\n30-day NIBOR\n14.79\n11.92\n10.83\n12.07\n11.51\n22.73\nRange of Bid Rate\n1.50-40.00\n6.00-60.00\n5.00-32.00\n4.00-40.00\n3.00-20.00\n2.00-15.00\nWeighted Average Rate\n17.54\n18.29\n12.07\n15.87\n8.25\n7.67\nRange of Issue Rate\n11.90-15.00\n15.00-11.90\n11.80-13.48\n11.78-13.046\n11.74-13.029\n11.40-13.029\nRange of Tenor (Days)\n50-364\n58-364\n91-364\n86-364\n91-364\n27-364\nNTB Primary Issue Rates (%)\n13.01\n12.93\n11.82\n11.85\n11.58\n11.30\nMPR\n14.00\n14.00\n14.00\n13.50\n13.50\n13.50\nSavings\n4.07\n4.07\n3.97\n3.91\nTime Deposits\nLending Tenored\n16.01\n16.08\n14.92\n18.23\nOMO \nMonthly Money Market Rates (Per cent), 2019\nMonthly Money Market Rates (Per cent), 2018\nTable 2.7\nInter-Bank Call\nInter-Bank (Tenored)\nNIBOR Rates \nOpen-Buy-Back (OBB)\nBeneficiary\nAssumed Bank\nTranche\nIssue Date\nIssue Amount \n(₦) Billion \nApplicable Rate \n(%)\nRedemption Date\nInterest Pay Date\nEffective Date\n2018\nNil\nNil \nNil \nNil \nNil \nNil \nNil \nNil \nNil \n2019\nEcobank\nAIB\n1\n21/01/2019\n0.002\n15\n13/11/2019\n14/05/2019\n14/11/2018\nTable 2.8\nPromissory Notes\n \n59 \n \n \n \n \nPeriod\nNAFEX SALES Invisible Sales\nSME Sales\nAmount Sold at \nthe Inter-bank \nSpot\nAmount Sold at \nFWD\nTotal Sales \nAmount \nPurchased\nNet Sales\nAmount \nMatured at \nFWD\nJanuary\n-\n \n140.50\n \n122.50\n \n154.20\n \n925.92\n \n1,343.12\n \n1,978.65\n \n(635.53)\n \n801.43\n \nFebruary\n-\n \n112.40\n \n98.00\n \n135.50\n \n891.36\n \n1,237.26\n \n1,210.27\n \n26.99\n \n1,022.82\n \nMarch\n-\n \n112.40\n \n98.00\n \n201.60\n \n888.93\n \n1,300.93\n \n1,466.26\n \n(165.33)\n \n825.47\n \nApril\n46.40\n \n140.50\n \n122.50\n \n270.86\n \n842.09\n \n1,422.35\n \n1,045.34\n \n377.01\n \n1,020.56\n \nMay\n646.78\n \n142.50\n \n98.00\n \n393.69\n \n758.54\n \n2,039.51\n \n240.33\n \n1,799.18\n \n1,150.96\n \nJune\n543.51\n \n120.40\n \n98.00\n \n390.58\n \n1,004.25\n \n2,156.74\n \n495.62\n \n1,661.12\n \n860.53\n \nTotal\n1,236.69\n \n768.70\n \n637.00\n \n1,546.43\n \n5,311.09\n \n9,499.91\n \n6,436.47\n \n3,063.44\n \n5,681.77\n \nPeriod\nNAFEX SALES Invisible Sales\nSME Sales\nAmount Sold at \nthe Inter-bank \nSpot\nAmount Sold at \nFWD\nTOTAL \nSALES(US$)\nAmount \nPurchased\nNet Sales\nAmount \nMatured at \nFWD\nJanuary\n201.41\n \n96.50\n \n124.50\n \n376.90\n \n591.37\n \n1,390.69\n \n1,016.90\n \n373.79\n \n1,024.08\n \nFebruary\n10.70\n \n88.80\n \n134.00\n \n320.52\n \n1,368.20\n \n1,922.24\n \n2,063.64\n \n(141.40)\n \n1,010.88\n \nMarch\n-\n \n88.80\n \n134.00\n \n340.25\n \n596.72\n \n1,159.77\n \n3,766.60\n \n(2,606.83)\n \n926.63\n \nApril\n-\n \n107.00\n \n161.50\n \n352.17\n \n623.64\n \n1,244.31\n \n1,354.63\n \n(110.32)\n \n879.43\n \nMay\n-\n \n84.80\n \n128.00\n \n397.92\n \n844.31\n \n1,455.04\n \n716.80\n \n738.24\n \n557.67\n \nJune\n-\n \n84.80\n \n128.00\n \n354.87\n \n547.79\n \n1,115.47\n \n450.35\n \n665.12\n \n580.77\n \nTotal\n212.11\n \n550.70\n \n810.00\n \n2,142.63\n \n4,572.03\n \n8,287.52\n \n9,368.92\n \n(1,081.40)\n \n4,979.46\n \nTable 3.1\nForeign Exchange Transactions (US$ Million)\n2018\n2019\n \n60 \n \n \n \n2018\nI & E window \n(₦/US$)\nInter-Bank \n(₦/US$)\nBDC \n(₦/US$)\nPremium b/w \nInter-Bank and \nBDC (₦/US$)\nPremium b/w \nI&E and BDC \n(₦/US$)\n% Premium \nb/w Interbank \nand BDC\n% Premium \nb/w I&E and \nBDC\nJan-18\n360.53\n \n305.78\n \n363.20\n \n57.43\n \n2.67\n \n15.81\n \n0.74\n \nFeb-18\n360.35\n \n305.90\n \n362.48\n \n56.58\n \n2.13\n \n15.61\n \n0.59\n \nMar-18\n360.25\n \n305.74\n \n362.07\n \n56.33\n \n1.82\n \n15.56\n \n0.50\n \nApr-18\n360.27\n \n305.61\n \n362.25\n \n56.64\n \n1.98\n \n15.64\n \n0.55\n \nMay-18\n361.19\n \n305.83\n \n362.81\n \n56.98\n \n1.62\n \n15.71\n \n0.45\n \nJun-18\n361.06\n \n305.87\n \n360.66\n \n54.79\n \n(0.40)\n \n15.19\n \n(0.11)\n \nAverage\n360.61\n \n305.79\n \n362.24\n \n56.46\n \n1.64\n \n15.59\n \n0.45\n \n2019\nI & E window \n(₦/US$)\nInter-Bank \n(₦/US$)\nBDC \n(₦/US$)\nPremium b/w \nInter-Bank and \nBDC (₦/US$)\nPremium b/w \nI&E and BDC \n(₦/US$)\n% Premium \nb/w Interbank \nand BDC\n% Premium \nb/w I&E and \nBDC\nJan-19\n363.76\n \n306.85\n \n360.94\n \n54.10\n \n(2.82)\n \n14.99\n \n(0.78)\n \nFeb-19\n361.82\n \n306.77\n \n359.69\n \n52.92\n \n(2.13)\n \n14.71\n \n(0.59)\n \nMar-19\n360.49\n \n306.92\n \n359.24\n \n52.31\n \n(1.25)\n \n14.56\n \n(0.35)\n \nApr-19\n360.44\n \n306.96\n \n359.00\n \n52.04\n \n(1.44)\n \n14.50\n \n(0.40)\n \nMay-19\n360.73\n \n306.95\n \n359.75\n \n52.80\n \n(0.98)\n \n14.68\n \n(0.27)\n \nJun-19\n360.64\n \n306.95\n \n359.94\n \n52.99\n \n(0.70)\n \n14.72\n \n(0.19)\n \nAverage\n361.31\n \n306.90\n \n359.76\n \n52.86\n \n(1.55)\n \n14.69\n \n(0.43)\n \nTable 3.2\nI & E, Inter-Bank and BDC Rates\n \n61 \n \n \n \n \n \nPeriod\n2018\nOpen\nClose\nOpen\nClose\nOpen\nClose\nOpen\nClose\nOpen\nClose \nJanuary\n38,264.79\n44,343.65\n13.62\n15.90\n1.78\n7.76\n0.25\n0.65\n3,035\n7,091\nFebruary\n44,460.18\n43,330.54\n15.95\n15.55\n3.44\n10.80\n0.63\n0.57\n7,079\n5,142\nMarch\n42,843.38\n41,504.51\n15.39\n14.99\n4.87\n3.72\n0.37\n0.27\n4,570\n4,368\nApril\n40,855.64\n41,268.01\n14.76\n14.95\n6.27\n4.96\n0.37\n0.45\n4,173\n4,699\nMay\n41,306.02\n38,104.54\n14.96\n13.80\n6.89\n7.20\n0.28\n1.62\n5,327\n5,166\nJune\n36,816.29\n38,278.55\n13.34\n13.87\n7.20\n5.82\n0.52\n0.47\n5,031\n3,355\n2019\nOpen\nClose\nOpen\nClose\nOpen\nClose\nOpen\nClose\nOpen\nClose \nJanuary\n31,070.06\n30,557.20\n11.59\n11.34\n1.56\n3.49\n0.21\n0.35\n2,857\n4,231\nFebruary\n30,636.36\n31,718.70\n11.42\n11.83\n4.42\n5.27\n0.27\n0.41\n3,144\n5,320\nMarch\n31,827.24\n31,041.42\n11.87\n11.67\n3.75\n3.15\n0.34\n0.26\n4,515\n3,457\nApril\n30,527.50\n29,159.74\n11.52\n10.96\n3.68\n8.20\n1.72\n0.29\n3,254\n4,683\nMay\n29,171.73\n31,069.37\n10.96\n13.68\n2.82\n2.73\n0.28\n0.22\n4,837\n3,737\nJune\n30,928.29\n29,966.87\n13.62\n13.21\n2.82\n5.40\n0.25\n0.25\n3,850\n3,184\nThe Nigerian Stock Exchange Monthly Opening and Closing Transactions \nTable 4.1\nAll Share Index\nMarket Capitalisation \n(₦'Trillion)\nValue Traded \n(₦'Billion)\nVolume Traded \n(Billion)\nDeals\n \n62 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nPeriod\nVolume Traded\nValue Traded (₦)\nDeals\nQuarter 1\n43,819,048,886.00\n \n439,487,594,088.95\n \n384,687\n \nQuarter 2\n24,170,726,974.00\n \n376,856,507,705.86\n \n278,579\n \nTotal\n67,989,775,860.00\n \n816,344,101,794.81\n \n663,266\n \nPeriod\nVolume Traded\nValue Traded (₦)\nDeals\nQuarter 1\n20,703,300,811.00\n \n208,774,719,066\n \n241,583\n \nQuarter 2\n25,518,797,280.00\n \n329,796,828,531\n \n222,359\n \nTotal\n46,222,098,091.00\n \n538,571,547,597.33\n \n463,942\n \n2018\n2019\nQuarterly Distribution of Transactions on the Nigerian Stock Exchange\nTable 4.2 \n \n63 \n \n \n \nSector\nVolume\nValue (₦) \nNo. of Deals\nPercentage\nAgriculture\n256,291,420.00\n \n6,627,328,675.99\n \n7,982.00\n \n0.38\nConglomerates\n8,492,773,790.00\n \n22,579,615,907.49\n \n30,156.00\n \n12.70\nConstruction/Real Estate\n100,550,174.00\n \n817,196,984.64\n \n4,407.00\n \n0.15\nConsumer Goods\n3,732,468,867.00\n \n167,680,526,218.81\n \n108,783.00\n \n5.58\nFinancial Services\n48,886,437,655.00\n \n521,017,667,538.10\n \n389,926.00\n \n73.11\nHealthcare\n533,882,253.00\n \n4,462,615,725.75\n \n10,945.00\n \n0.80\nICT\n118,309,188.00\n \n131,736,995.84\n \n1,272.00\n \n0.18\nIndustrial Goods\n747,278,111.00\n \n48,945,279,819.46\n \n27,534.00\n \n1.12\nNatural Resources\n263,448,617.00\n \n86,981,661.70\n \n928.00\n \n0.39\nOil and Gas\n2,318,503,281.00\n \n23,387,448,750.70\n \n46,807.00\n \n3.47\nServices\n1,412,673,433.00\n \n2,894,255,311.89\n \n18,095.00\n \n2.11\nTotal (Equities)\n66,862,616,789.00\n \n798,630,653,590.37\n \n646,835.00\n \n100.00\n \nFederal Government of Nigeria Bonds\n287,702.00\n \n289,363,938.35\n \n416.00\n \nExchange Traded Products (ETPs)\n9,087,047.00\n \n175,394,473.85\n \n308.00\n \nGrand Total\n66,871,991,538.00\n \n799,095,412,002.57\n \n647,559.00\n \nSector\nVolume\nValue (₦) \nNo. of Deals\nPercentage\nAgriculture\n68,212,874.00\n \n1,941,749,060.24\n \n3,715.00\n \n0.19\nConglomerates\n2,351,372,831.00\n \n5,064,428,967.11\n \n20,265.00\n \n6.65\nConstruction/Real Estate\n307,647,923.00\n \n5,107,205,385.31\n \n3,073.00\n \n0.87\nConsumer Goods\n1,565,354,856.00\n \n62,143,740,164.97\n \n58,285.00\n \n4.43\nFinancial Services\n26,992,936,972.00\n \n225,554,703,514.25\n \n244,982.00\n \n76.39\nHealthcare\n272,197,368.00\n \n638,300,290.97\n \n6,057.00\n \n0.77\nICT\n1,628,074,846.00\n \n52,537,997,869.55\n \n7,776.00\n \n4.61\nIndustrial Goods\n523,871,971.00\n \n28,148,890,697.80\n \n23,364.00\n \n1.48\nNatural Resources\n9,600,372.00\n \n8,045,246.03\n \n319.00\n \n0.03\nOil and Gas\n1,198,532,984.00\n \n8,720,873,354.07\n \n27,303.00\n \n3.39\nServices\n419,691,658.00\n \n1,225,237,353.96\n \n8,829.00\n \n1.19\nTotal (Equities)\n35,337,494,655.00\n \n391,091,171,904.26\n \n403,968.00\n \n100.00\nFederal Government of Nigeria Bonds\n980,462.00\n \n994,868,490.70\n \n332.00\n \nExchange Traded Products (ETPs)\n3,182,142.00\n \n36,224,941.64\n \n161.00\n \nGrand Total\n35,341,657,259.00\n \n392,122,265,336.60\n \n404,461.00\n \nTable 4.3\nSectoral Distribution of Transactions on the Nigerian Stock Exchange, January - June 2018 and 2019\nJanuary - June 2018\nJanuary - June 2019\n \n64 \n \n \n \n \n \nMonth\nTotal Transactions \n(₦' Billion)\nTotal Foreign Inflow \n(₦' Billion)\nTotal Foreign \nOutflow (₦' Billion)\nTotal Domestic \nTransaction (₦' Billion)\nForeign \nTransactions \n%\nJanuary\n394.44\n \n91.75\n \n74.64\n \n228.05\n \n42.18\n \nFebruary\n212.05\n \n44.89\n \n38.33\n \n128.83\n \n39.25\n \nMarch\n272.48\n \n69.71\n \n62.50\n \n140.27\n \n48.52\n \nApril\n212.23\n \n64.28\n \n58.25\n \n89.70\n \n57.73\n \nMay\n318.27\n \n62.06\n \n130.89\n \n125.32\n \n60.62\n \nJune\n187.78\n \n47.96\n \n54.45\n \n85.37\n \n54.54\n \nTotal\n1,597.25\n \n380.65\n \n419.06\n \n797.54\n \n50.07\n \nMonth\nTotal Transactions \n(₦' Billion)\nTotal Foreign Inflow \n(₦' Billion)\nTotal Foreign \nOutflow (₦' Billion)\nTotal Domestic \nTransaction (₦' Billion)\nForeign \nTransactions \n%\nJanuary\n122.08\n \n27.81\n \n39.04\n \n55.23\n \n54.76\n \nFebruary\n188.08\n \n43.93\n \n55.01\n \n89.14\n \n52.61\n \nMarch\n110.11\n \n25.89\n \n30.20\n \n54.02\n \n50.94\n \nApril\n148.91\n \n41.78\n \n34.14\n \n72.99\n \n50.98\n \nMay\n221.13\n \n37.90\n \n39.35\n \n143.88\n \n34.93\n \nJune\n297.25\n \n44.30\n \n52.44\n \n200.51\n \n32.54\n \nTotal\n1,087.56\n \n221.61\n \n250.18\n \n615.77\n \n43.38\n \n2018\nTable 4.4\nForeign Portfolio Participation in Equity Trading \n2019\n \n65 \n \n \nCompany \nAmounts/Units Listed\nDate Listed\nLagos State Government\nA total volume of 46.370 million units of 16.75% LAB AUG 2024 and 38.770 million units of \n17.25% LAB AUG 2027\n4th of January\nDebt Management Office of the Federal Government of Nigeria\nA total volume of 196,165 units of 12.738% FGNSB DEC 2020, 50,253 units of 11.738% \nFGNSB DEC 2019\n10th of January\nDebt Management Office of the Federal Government of Nigeria\nA total volume of 73,054, 123,253, 32,821 and 235,017 units of 11.098% FGNSB JAN 2020,\n12.098% FGNSB JAN 2021, 10.277% FGNSB FEB 2020 and 11.277% FGNSB FEB 2021\nrespectively were admitted to trade at the Exchange\n5th of March\nDebt Management Office of the Federal Government of Nigeria\nA total volume of 52,435,102 units of 13.98% FGN FEB 2028 was admitted to trade at the\nExchange\n20th of March\nDebt Management Office of the Federal Government of Nigeria\nA total volume of 8,905,003 units of 13.53% FGN MAR 2025. The 8,905,003 units were offered\nat N1,000 per unit with total amount of N8,905,003,000 realized. \n3rd of May\nDebt Management Office of the Federal Government of Nigeria\nA total volume of 38,289,277 units of 12.75% FGN APR 2023. The 38,289,277 units were\noffered at N1000 per unit with total amount of N38,289,277,000 realized. \n8th of May\nDebt Management Office of the Federal Government of Nigeria\nA total volume of 30,523, 121,300, 64,922, 129,006, 21,440 and 157,186 units of FGS202024,\nFGS202125, FGS202026, FGS202127, FGS202028 and FGS202129, respectively\n12th of June\nDebt Management Office of the Federal Government of Nigeria\nA total volume of 50,754 units of 10.344% FGNSB June 2020 and 317,533 units of 11.344%\nFGNSB June 2021\n28th of June\nDebt Management Office of the Federal Government of Nigeria\nA total of 2,359 units of Federal Government valued at N2.188 million were traded this week in \n24 deals, compared with a total of 6,108 units valued at N3.710 million transacted last week in 13 \ndeals\nJuly 6th 2018\nDebt Management Office of the Federal Government of Nigeria\nA total quantity of 21,034,773, 7,923,500 and 8,790,000 units were added to the following bonds \n13.98% FGN Feb 2028, 13.53% FGN MAR 2025, and 12.75% FGN APR 2023 respectively on \nMonday July 23, 2018.\nJuly 13th 2018\nDebt Management Office of the Federal Government of Nigeria\na total volume of 10,690,000 units of 13.48% FGN DEC 2022 was admitted to trade at the\nExchange today Friday, July 20, 2018. \nJuly 20\nth 2018\nDebt Management Office of the Federal Government of Nigeria\nA total volume of 79,985 units of 10.483% FGNSB JULY 2020 and 263,065 units of 11.738%\nFGNSB DEC 2019 were admitted to trade at the Exchange on the 1st of August, 2018.\nAugust 3rd, 2018\nDebt Management Office of the Federal Government of Nigeria\nA total of 7,787 units of Federal Government Bond valued at N8.005 million were traded this\nweek in 11 deals compared with a total of 16,463 units valued at N18.200 million transacted last\nweek in 27 deals.\nAugust 10th, 2018\nDebt Management Office of the Federal Government of Nigeria\nA total volume of 28,200,000 units of 17.50% N28.2billion fixed rate bond issued by Plateau\nState were admitted to trade at the Exchange on the 9th of August, 2018\nAugust 10th, 2018\nDebt Management Office of the Federal Government of Nigeria\nA total volume of 7,000,000 units of 16.54% N7 Billion Senior Secured Series 1 Bond issued by C\n& I Leasing Plc were admitted to trade at the Exchange on Friday,17th August, 2018.\nAugust 17th, 2018\nDebt Management Office of the Federal Government of Nigeria\nA total volume of 4,355,000 units of 16.00% UPD APR 2023 issued by UACN Property\nDevelopment Company Plc were admitted to trade at the Exchange on Tuesday,14th August,\n2018.\nAugust 17th, 2018\nDebt Management Office of the Federal Government of Nigeria\nFlour Mills of Nigeria Plc’s N10,110,000,000, 3-Year 15.50% Fixed Rate Senior Unsecured Bond\nDue 2021 (Series 1); and N10,000,000,000, 5-Year 16% Fixed Rate Senior Unsecured Bond Due\n2023 (Series 2) issued under the N70,000,000,000 Bond Issuance Program were today, Friday, 7\nDecember 2018 listed on The Exchange.\nDecember 7, 2018\n2018\nTable 4.5 Listings\nNew Listings, Supplementary Listing and Delisting in the First Half of 2018\nNew Listing\n \n66 \n \n \nCompany\nAmounts/Units Listed\nReason\nUnion Bank of Nigeria Plc\nAn additional volume of 12,133,646,995 ordinary shares of Union Bank of Nigeria Plc (“Union \nBank”) were listed on The Daily Official List of The Exchange on the 12th of January, 2018. \nWith this listing, the company’s total issued and fully paid up shares now stands at \n29,120,752,788 ordinary shares\nThese additional shares were as a result of the just \nconcluded Union Bank of Nigeria Plc right issue of 5 \nnew ordinary shares for every 7 ordinary shares held \nas at 21 August 2017 \nNigerian Breweries Plc \nAn additional volume of 67,801,163 ordinary shares of Nigerian Breweries Plc (“NB”) were listed \non The Daily Official List of The Exchange on the 24th of January, 2018. With this listing, the \ncompany’s total issued and fully paid up shares now stands at 7,996,902,051 ordinary shares\nThese additional shares were as a result of the Scrip \nDividend Scheme offered to eligible shareholders of \nNigerian Breweries Plc, who elected to receive new \nordinary shares in lieu of cash dividends with respect \nto the 258 kobo final dividend declared for the year \nended 31 December 2017\nDebt Management Office of the Federal Government of Nigeria An additional volume of 39,374,090 units and 134,648,698 units were added to 14.50% FGN JUL \n2021 and 16.2884% FGN MAR 2027, respectively on the 25th of January 2018\nAdditional Bond Issues\nSeplat Petroleum Development Company Plc \nAn additional volume of 25,000,000 ordinary shares of 50 kobo each of Seplat Petroleum \nDevelopment Company Plc were listed on The Daily Official List of The Exchange on the 1st of \nFebruary, 2018. With this listing, the company’s total issued and fully paid up shares now stands \nat 588,444,561 ordinary shares\n These additional shares were as a result of the \ncompany’s Long Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) for \nthe benefit of it’s employees\nDebt Management Office of the Federal Government of Nigeria An additional volume of 45,122,840 units and 64,877,160 units were added to 14.50% FGN JUL \n2021 and 16.2884% FGN MAR 2027, respectively on the 2nd of Feburary, 2018. \nAdditional Bond Issues\nUAC of Nigeria Plc \nAn additional volume of 960,432,193 units of UAC of Nigeria Plc were added to its outstanding \nshares on Friday 2nd of March, 2018. By this action, the total outstanding shares of the \ncompany now stood at 2,881,296,580. \nResulting from Right Issue\n7-Up Bottling Company Plc \nThe entire share capital of Seven-Up Bottling Company Plc (“SBC”) were delisted from The \nDaily Official List of The Nigerian Stock Exchange on Monday, 12th of March 2018. The \ndelisting of the entire issued share capital of SBC followed its shareholders’ approval of a Scheme \nof Arrangement to restructure and delist from The Exchange\nVETBANK, VETGOODS and VETINDETF \nAdditional volumes 83,704,193, 14,281,216 and 5,526,523 units of VETBANK, VETGOODS and \nVETINDETF were added to their respective outstanding shares on the 9th of March, 2018. By \nthis action, the outstanding volume of these ETPs now stand at 154,408,386, 26,362,432 and \n10,053,046, respectively\nAdditional Shares \nLafarge Africa Plc \nAn additional volume of 3,097,653,023 units of Lafarge Africa Plc were added to its outstanding \nshares on Thursday, 22nd of March, 2018. By this action, the total outstanding shares of the \ncompany now stands at 8,673,428,240\nResulting Right issue \nDebt Management Office of the Federal Government of Nigeria An additional volume of 27,179,600 units was added to 14.50% FGN JUL 2021 on the 20th of \nMarch, 2018 \nAdditional Bond Issues\nMorison Industries Plc \nAn additional volume of 836,983,125 ordinary shares of Morison Industries Plc were listed on \nThe Daily Official List of The Exchange on Monday, 26 March 2018. With this listing of \n836,983,125 ordinary shares of 50 kobo each, the total issued and fully paid up shares of Morison \nhas now increased from 152,178,750 to 989,161,875 ordinary shares of 50 kobo each\n The additional shares listed arose from Morison \nRights Issue of 836,983,125 ordinary shares of 50 \nkobo each at N0.60 per share on the basis of eleven \n(11) new ordinary shares for every two (2) ordinary \nshares held as at Friday, 25 August 2017. \nDebt Management Office of the Federal Government of Nigeria Additional volumes of 10,053,532 units and 45,102,500 units were added to 14.50% FGN JUL \n2021 and 13.98% FGN FEB 2028 bonds respectively on Friday, 20th April, 2018. \nAdditional Bond Issues\nFlour Mills of Nigeria Plc\nAn additional volume of 1,476,142,418 units of Flour Mills of Nigeria Plc was admitted to the \nDaily Official List of The Exchange on the 26th of April, 2018\nThese additional shares arose from the Rights Issue of \n1,476,142,418 ordinary shares of 50 kobo each at \nN27 per share on the basis of 9 new ordinary shares \nfor every 16 ordinary shares held as at 8 December \n2017. With this supplementary listing, the total \nissued and fully paid up shares of the Company now \nstands at 4,100,379,605 ordinary shares. \nDebt Management Office of the Federal Government of Nigeria An additional volume of 63,960,722 and 37,750,001 units were added to 13.98% FGN Feb 2028 \nand 13.53% FGN MAR 2025 respectively on the 22nd of May, 2018\nAdditional Bond Issues\nDebt Management Office of the Federal Government of Nigeria\nAn additional volume of 53,485,990, 23,435,990 and 3,500,000 units were added to the \noutstanding volumes of 13.98% FGN Feb 2028, 13.53% FGN MAR 2025 and 12.75% FGN APR \n2023, respectively on the 27th of June, 2018\nAdditional Bond Issues\nNotore Chemicals & Industries\nA total volume of 1,612,066,200 ordinary shares of 50k each of Notore Chemical & Industries \nPlc at N62.50 per share were admitted on the Daily Official List of the Exchange on the 2 nd of \nAugust, 2018.\nResulting Right issue \nDebt Management Office of the Federal Government of Nigeria\nAdditional volumes of 46,394,252, 11,580,600 and 8,925,500 units were added to the following \nbonds 13.98% FGN Feb 2028, 13.53% FGN MAR 2025, and 12.75% FGN APR 2023 respectively \non Tuesday August 7, 2018.\nAdditional Bond Issues\nDebt Management Office of the Federal Government of Nigeria\nA total quantity of 71,880,802, 7,375,510 and 17,482,004 units were added to the following\nbonds 13.98% FGN FEB 2028, 13.53% FGN MAR 2025, and 12.75% FGN APR 2023\nrespectively on Thursday October 11, 2018.\nDebt Management Office of the Federal Government of Nigeria\nAdditional volumes of 55,290,601, 20,142,251 and 12,650,000 units were added to the following\nbonds 13.98% FGN FEB 2028, 13.53% FGN MAR 2025, and 12.75% FGN APR 2023\nrespectively on Monday, 26 November, 2018.\nDebt Management Office of the Federal Government of Nigeria\nA total quantity of 21,034,773, 48,495,001 and 40,217,000 units were added to the following \nbonds 13.98% FGN Feb 2028, 13.53% FGN MAR 2025, and 12.75% FGN APR 2023 respectively \non Tuesday September 4, 2018.\nCompany \nAmounts/Units Listed\nDate Listed\nStanbic IBTC\nAn additional volume of 64,208,713 units of Stanbic IBTC Holdings Plc resulting from the Scrip \nDividend offered to eligible shareholders who were elected to receive new ordinary shares in lieu of \ncash dividends with respect to the 50 kobo dividend declared for the year ended 31 December \n2017 were added to its outstanding shares on Thursday 9th of August, 2018. By this action, the \nAugust 10, 2018\nDeListing\nNone\nN/A\nPaints and Coatings Manufacturers Nigeria Plc\nThe entire issued share capital of Paints and Coatings Manufacturers Nigeria Plc was delisted from \nthe Daily Official List of The Nigerian Stock Exchange in compliance with the company’s \nrequest for voluntary delisting and the subsequent approval of the Exchange effective 17th of \nAugust 2018.\nAugust 17th, 2018\nSupplementary Listing\n \n67 \n \n \nAmounts/Units Listed\nDate Listed\nFGN Bond\nA total of 17,996 units of Federal Government Bonds valued at N18.426 million were \ntraded this week in 10 deals compared with a total of 7,209 units valued at N6.958 \nmillion transacted last week in 8 deals \n11th January 2019\nDebt Management Office of the Federal Government of \nNigeria\nA total volume of 21,731 units of 12.125% FGS JAN 2021 and 414,519 units of\n13.125% FGS JAN 2022 were admitted to trade at the Exchange on the 25th of\nJanuary, 2019. \n25th January 2019\nFGN Bond\nA total of 4,336 units of Federal Government Bonds valued at N4.308 million were\ntraded this week in 26 deals compared with a total of 3,498 units valued at N3.131\nmillion transacted last week in 20 deals.\n2nd February 2019\nFGN Bond\nA total of 2,668 units of Federal Government Bonds valued at N2.886 million were\ntraded this week in 14 deals compared with a total of 4,336 units valued at N4.308\nmillion transacted last week in 26 deals. \n8th February 2019\nFGN Bond\nA total of 1,460 units of Federal Government Bonds valued at N1.472 million were\ntraded this week in 9 deals compared with a total of 2,668 units valued at N2.886\nmillion transacted last week in 14 deals\n15th February 2019\nFGN Bond\nA total of 5,845 units of Federal Government Bonds valued at N6.158 million were\ntraded this week in 18 deals compared with a total of 1,460 units valued at N1.472\nmillion transacted last week in 9 deals. \n22nd February 2019\nFGN Bond\nA total of 25,740 units of Federal Government Bonds valued at N26,597 million were \ntraded this week in 22 deals compared with a total of 5,845 units valued at N6.158 \nmillion transacted last week in 18 deals.\n1st March 2019\nDebt Management Office of the Federal Government of \nNigeria\nA total volume of 122,245 units of 12.050% FGS FEB 2021and 223,650 units of \n13.050% FGS FEB 2022 were admitted to trade at the Exchange on the 26th of \nFebruary, 2019\n1st March 2019\nFGN Bond\nA total of 15,496 units of Federal Government Bonds valued at N15.750 million were \ntraded this week in 12 deals compared with a total of 25,740 units valued at N26,597 \nmillion transacted last week in 22 deals.\n8th March 2019\nFGN Bond\nA total of 201units of Federal Government Bonds valued at N205,083.12 were traded\nthis week in 2 deals compared with a total of 15,496 units valued at N15.750 million\ntransacted last week in 12 deals.\n15th March 2019\nFGN Bond\nA total of 2,224 units of Federal Government Bonds valued at N2.324 million were\ntraded this week in 18 deals compared with a total of 201 units valued at N205,083.12\ntransacted last week in 2 deals.\n29th March 2019\nFGN Bond\nA total of 3,453 units of Federal Government Bonds valued at N3.565 million were\ntraded this week in 24 deals compared with a total of 2,224 units valued at N2.324\nmillion transacted last week in 18 deals. \n29th March 2019\nFGN Bond\nA total of 18,042 units of Federal Government Bonds valued at N19.685 million were\ntraded this week in 24 deals compared with a total of 3,453 units valued at N3.565\nmillion transacted last week in 24 deals. \n5th April 2019\nFGN Bond\nA total of 787,527 units of Federal Government Bonds valued at N795 million were\ntraded this week in 26 deals compared with a total of 18,042 units valued at N19.685\nmillion transacted last week in 24 deals. \n12-Apr-19\nFGN Bond\nA total of 14,246 units of Federal Government Bonds valued at N14.980 million were\ntraded this week in 17 deals compared with a total of 787,527 units valued at N795\nmillion transacted last week in 26 deals. \n18th April 2019\nFGN Bond\nA total of 14,589 units of Federal Government Bonds valued at N15.164 million were\ntraded this week in 12 deals compared with a total of 41,150 units valued at N43.977\nmillion transacted last week in 11 deals.\n3rd May 2019\nDebt Management Office of the Federal Government of \nNigeria\nA total volume of 126,317 units of 11.276% FGS APR 2021 and 627,796 units of\n12.276% FGS APR 2022 were admitted to trade at the Exchange on the 2nd of May,\n2019.\n3rd May 2019\nDebt Management Office of the Federal Government of \nNigeria\nA total volume of 120,699 units of 11.745% FGS MAY 2021 and 411,956 units of\n12.745% FGS MAY 2022 were admitted to trade at the Exchange on the 3rd June,\n2019.\n3rd June 2019\nFGN Bond\nA total of 23,941 units of Federal Government Bonds valued at N24.584 million were\ntraded this week in 26 deals compared with a total of 1,057 units valued at N1.060\nmillion transacted last week in 7 deals.\n7th June2019\nFGN Bond\nA total of 235 units of Federal Government Bonds valued at N229,216.74 were traded\nthis week in 14 deals compared with a total of 23,941units valued at N24,584 million\ntransacted last week in 26 deals.\n14th June 2019\nFGN Eurobonds \n14th June 2019\nFGN Bond\nA total of 21,682 units of Federal Government Bonds valued at N22.552 million were\ntraded this week in 29 deals compared with a total of 235 units valued at N229,216.74\ntransacted last week in 14 deals.\n21th June 2019\nFGN Bond\nA total volume of 108.806 million units of 11.418% FGS JUN 2021 and 329.275 million\nunits of 12.418% FGS JUN 2022 were admitted to trade at the Exchange on the 27th of\nJune, 2019.\n27th June, 2019\nNew Listing\nNew Listings, Supplementary Listing and Delisting\n2019\nTable 4.5 Listings ctd\n \n68 \n \n \nCompany\nAmounts/Units Listed\nReason\nDebt Management Office of the Federal Government of \nNigeria\nA total volume of 30,020 units of 12.390% FGS NOV 2020, 341,328 units of 13.390% \nFGS NOV 2021, 63,959 units of 12.402% FGS DEC 2020 and 300,007 units of 13.402% \nFGS DEC 2021were admitted to trade at the Exchange on the 8th of January, 2019.\nAdditional Bond Issues\nNigeria Mortgage Refinace Company\nThe Nigeria Mortgage Refinance Company Plc N11,000,000,000 13.80% Series 2 \nBond under the N440,000,000,000 Medium Term Note Program was admitted to trade \nat the Exchange on the 10th of January, 2019.\nAdditional Bond Issues\nNigeria Mortgage Refinace Company\nThe Nigeria Mortgage Refinance Company Plc N11,000,000,000 13.80% Series 2 \nBond under the N440,000,000,000 Medium Term Note Program was admitted to trade \nat the Exchange on the 10th of January, 2019.\nAdditional Bond Issues\nSterling Investment SPV Plc\nSterling Investment SPV Plc N32,899,000,000, 7-Year 16.25% Fixed Rate Unsecured\nBonds Due 2025 (Series II) issued under the N65,000,000,000 Debt Issuance Program\nwere admitted to trade at the Exchange on the 14th of January, 2019.. \nAdditional Bond Issues\nMixta Real Estate Plc\nMixta Real Estate Plc N2,961,000,000 16.50% (Series II), Tranche A Senior Guaranteed\nFixed Rate Bond Due 2023; and N2,320,000,000 17.75% (Series II), Tranche B Senior\nSecured Fixed Rate Bonds Due 2023, issued under the N30,000,000,000 MediumTerm\nNote Programme were admitted to trade at the Exchange on the 16th of January, 2019\nAdditional Bond Issues\nMay & Baker Plc\n745,234,886 additional ordinary shares of May & Baker Plc (May & Baker) were listed\non the Daily Official List of The Nigerian Stock Exchange on Thursday, 24 January\n2019.\nAdditional ordinary shares\nDebt Management Office of the Federal Government of \nNigeria\nA total volume of 27,375,000 , 35,000,000 and 48,930,002 units were added to the \nfollowing bonds:12.75% FGN APR 2023, 14.55% FGN APR 2029 and 14.80% FGN \nAPR 2049 respectively on the 3rd June, 2019.\nAdditional Bond Issues\n Consolidated Hallmark Insurance Plc \nAn additional 1,130,000,000 ordinary shares of Consolidated Hallmark Insurance Plc\n(Consolidated Hallmark) were listed on the Daily Official List of The Nigerian Stock\nExchange today, Tuesday, 5 February 2019.\nAdditional ordinary shares\nDebt Management Office of the Federal Government of \nNigeria\nAdditional volumes of 7,345,001, 32,346,002 and 227,290,952 units were added to the\nfollowing bonds 12.75% FGN APR 2023, 13.53% FGN MAR 2025 and 13.98% FGN\nFEB 2028 respectively on Friday 15th of March, 2019\nAdditional Bond Issues\nLafarge Africa Plc\nAdditional 7,434,367,256 ordinary shares of Lafarge Africa Plc (Lafarge) were listed\non the Daily Official List of The Nigerian Stock Exchange on Tuesday 26th March\n2019. \nAdditional ordinary shares\nDebt Management Office of the Federal Government of \nNigeria\nAdditional volumes of 20,000,000, 62,150,001 and 39,800,000 units were added to the\nfollowing bonds 13.98% FGN FEB 2028, 13.53% FGN MAR 2025 and 12.75% FGN\nAPR 2023 respectively on Thursday 4th of April, 2019. \nAdditional Bond Issues\nMutual Benefits Assurance Plc\n3,172,733,508 ordinary shares of Mutual Benefits Assurance Plc (Mutual Benefits or\nthe Company) were listed on The Daily Official List of The Exchange on Friday, 3\nMay 2019.\nAdditional ordinary shares\nDebt Management Office of the Federal Government of \nNigeria\nA total volume of 27,375,000 , 35,000,000 and 48,930,002 units were added to the\nfollowing bonds:12.75% FGN APR 2023, 14.55% FGN APR 2029 and 14.80% FGN\nAPR 2049 respectively on the 3rd June, 2019.\nAdditional Bond Issues\nEllah Lakes \nThe additional shares listed arose fromthe 1,880,000,000 ordinary shares of 50 Kobo\neach issued to the shareholders of Telluria Limited, as consideration for the\nacquisition of the entire issued shares of Telluria Limited by Ellah Lakes.\nAdditional ordinary shares\n Great Nigeria Insurance Plc (GNI) \nFurther to the NSE market bulletin of 13 December 2018 notifying Dealing Members\nof the approval of the application filed by MBC Securities Limited on behalf of Great\nNigeria Insurance Plc (GNI or the Company) for the voluntary delisting of the entire\nshare capital of GNI, please be informed that the entire issued share capital of GNI\nwere delisted from the Daily Official List of The Nigerian Stock Exchange on Friday,\n25 January 2019. \nVoluntary delisting\nDiamond Bank Plc\nFollowing the Court Sanction of the Scheme of Merger (Scheme) between Access\nBank Plc and Diamond Bank Plc, trading in the shares of Diamond Bank Plc (Diamond \nBank or the Bank) has been placed on full suspension on The Nigerian Stock\nExchange (The Exchange) with effect from today, 20 March 2019. \nMerged with Access Bank Plc\nNewrest ASL Nigeria Plc\nNewrest ASL Nigeria Plc (Newrest or the Company) has through its Stockbroker,\nHelix Securities Limited, submitted an application to The Nigerian Stock Exchange\n(The Exchange) for voluntary delisting of the entire 634,000,000 ordinary shares of\nthe Company fromthe Daily Official List of The Exchange as a result of its inability to\nmeet up with the 20% free float requirement of The Exchange.\nVoluntary delisting\nSupplementary Listing\nDeListing\n \n69 \n \n \nInstrument\nAmount Outstanding \n(₦)\n Proportion \n(%) \n2018\nFGN BONDS \n8,927,657,644,592.00\n \n73.47\nNIG. TREASURY BILLS \n2,953,580,696,000.00\n \n24.31\nFGN SAVINGS BONDS\n8,521,321,000.00\n \n0.07\nFGN SUKUK\n100,000,000,000.00\n \n0.82\nFGN GREEN BOND\n10,690,000,000.00\n \n0.09\nNIG. TREASURY BONDS \n150,988,000,000.00\n \n1.24\nTOTAL \n12,151,437,661,592.00\n \n100\n Restructured states Commercial \nloans into FGN Bonds \n680,420,115,000.00\n \n2019\nFGN BONDS \n9,691,417,043,592.00\n \n72.26\nNIG. TREASURY BILLS \n2,651,514,042,000.00\n \n19.77\nFGN SAVINGS BONDS\n10,431,836,000.00\n \n0.08\nFGN SUKUK\n200,000,000,000.00\n \n1.49\nFGN GREEN BOND\n25,690,000,000.00\n \n0.19\nNIG. TREASURY BONDS \n125,988,000,000.00\n \n0.94\nPROMISSORY NOTES\n707,755,166,029.00\n \n5.28\nTOTAL \n13,412,796,087,621.00\n \n100\n Restructured states Commercial \nloans into FGN Bonds \n680,420,115,000.00\n \nTable 5.1\nFGN Domestic Debt Stock\nOutstanding (By Instrument Type) as at June 2019\n \n70 \n \n \n \n \nDMBs\nMBs\nMandate & \nInternal Customers\nCBN \nBranches\nCBN/MM\nD Take-up\nTotal\n2018\nJanuary\n391.39\n860.00\n378.71\n13.40\n263.42\n16.50\n98.56\n12.91\n0.00\n391.39\nFebruary\n428.88\n585.07\n428.88\n13.11\n252.97\n13.95\n148.92\n13.04\n0.00\n428.88\nMarch\n279.67\n615.83\n559.33\n12.76\n171.54\n7.23\n88.03\n12.87\n0.00\n279.67\nApril\n153.69\n269.43\n307.38\n12.08\n112.45\n0.56\n28.77\n11.92\n0.00\n153.69\nMay\n178.87\n579.00\n357.73\n10.51\n82.81\n1.08\n79.91\n15.07\n0.00\n178.87\nJune\n220.87\n314.03\n247.54\n10.67\n36.88\n1.37\n178.45\n4.17\n0.00\n220.87\nTotal\n1,653.37\n3,223.36\n2,279.58\n920.07\n40.69\n622.63\n69.98\n0.00\n1,653.37\n2019\nJanuary\n554.92\n691.86\n481.47\n13.01\n222.24\n3.70\n229.35\n26.19\n73.45\n554.92\nFebruary\n268.50\n1,165.94\n268.50\n12.93\n93.92\n32.68\n126.80\n15.11\n0.00\n268.50\nMarch\n138.06\n859.05\n138.06\n11.82\n106.32\n1.50\n23.55\n6.69\n0.00\n138.06\nApril\n154.17\n420.67\n154.17\n11.85\n97.56\n1.15\n41.00\n14.46\n0.00\n154.17\nMay\n210.92\n618.08\n210.92\n11.58\n163.52\n6.11\n23.00\n18.29\n0.00\n210.92\nJune\n147.25\n398.03\n147.25\n11.30\n82.80\n7.81\n50.43\n6.21\n0.00\n147.25\nTotal\n1,473.84\n4,153.63\n1,400.39\n766.37\n52.94\n494.13\n86.95\n73.45\n1,473.84\nTable 5.2\nPrimary Market: Nigerian Treasury Bills Transactions (₦'Billion)\nPeriod\nIssues\nSubscription\nRepayment\nAve. \nRates \n%\nAllotment\n \n71 \n \n \nRange of Bids\nStop \nRates\nRange of Bids\nStop \nRates\nRange of Bids\nStop \nRates\n12.2900 – 13.4100\n12.5499\n13.4899 – 17.0000\n13.9250\n13.8800 – 18.6000\n14.3000\n12.0000 – 15.0000\n12.1000\n12.4000 - 15.5000\n13.7500\n12.6000 – 18.0000\n13.7900\n12.0000 – 18.0000\n12.0000\n13.0000 – 14.2000\n13.6500\n12.0000 – 18.5000\n13.7000\n11.8000 – 15.0000\n11.9500\n13.0000 – 14.5000\n13.6500\n13.0000 – 20.0000\n13.7000\n11.8000 – 13.1500 11.8500\n \n13.0000 – 17.2000\n13.4999\n \n13.1000 – 20.0000\n13.5000\n11.5000 – 11.7500 11.7500\n \n12.6000 – 14.2000\n13.0000\n \n12.4900 – 13.9649\n13.1850\n11.9500 – 12.5000 11.9500\n \n12.5000 – 14.4864\n13.0000\n \n12.5000 – 18.5000\n13.1500\n11.5000 – 13.0000\n11.7500\n12.7000-14.1500\n12.7000\n12.0000-18.4000\n13.0422\n10.9000 – 13.0000\n10.9000\n11.5000-13.6000\n12.0000\n11.5000-15.1000\n12.0780\n10.0000 – 11.5000\n10.0000\n10.3000 – 12.5000\n10.9500\n10.7500 – 13.7211\n11.1490\n9.0000 - 12.0000\n10.0000\n10.1000 - 12.5001\n10.5000\n10.0000 - 18.6000\n10.7000\n9.7000 - 12.0000\n10.0000\n10.0000 - 13.2000\n10.3000\n10.0000 - 12.5000\n11.0000\n9.9000 - 10.2000\n10.2000\n10.0000 - 12.5890\n10.5000\n10.4900 - 13.4900\n11.5000\n10.0000 - 10.0000\n10.0000\n10.3000 - 11.0000\n10.3000\n10.5000 - 13.1215\n11.5000\nRange of Bids\nStop \nRates\nRange of Bids\nStop \nRates\nRange of Bids\nStop \nRates\n10.5000 – 11.9000\n10.8990\n12.8000 – 14.2500\n13.1000\n14.4000 – 16.0000\n14.5000\n10.7000 – 13.0000\n11.0000\n12.0000 – 15.0000\n13.1000\n14.0000 – 16.0000\n15.0000\n10.8500 – 12.0000\n11.0000\n12.8500 – 14.5000\n13.5000\n14.3000 – 18.0000\n15.0000\n10.8000 – 12.5000\n10.9700\n12.0000 – 13.5000\n13.4000\n14.8000 – 16.5237\n14.9500\n10.4000 – 13.0000\n10.9000\n12.5000 – 14.5000\n13.0100\n14.0000 – 16.0000\n14.3700\n10.5000 – 13.0000 10.7500\n \n12.0000 – 14.0000\n12.5000\n \n12.2500 – 15.9900\n12.8450\n10.3000 – 14.0000 10.3000\n \n11.5000 – 13.5200\n12.2000\n \n11.5900 – 14.5000\n12.3450\n10.0000 – 13.0000\n10.2900\n11.8000-14.000\n12.6000\n11.7999-15.0000\n12.8500\n9.7000 - 13.5000\n10.1499\n11.8000-14.000\n12.5000\n11.8500-15.000\n12.7400\n9.0000-11.0000\n10.0000\n11.8000-13.4664\n12.4900\n12.1000-14.0237\n12.7700\n9.5000 - 12.5000\n10.0000\n11.8000-13.4664\n12.3000\n12.0000 - 14.4000\n12.4900\n9.5000 – 10.2000\n10.0000\n11.4000 – 12.6664\n11.9500\n11.7900 – 14.0000\n12.2000\n9.6500 - 12.1500\n10.0000\n11.1900 - 12.6664\n11.9499\n11.7800 - 15.0000\n12.3400\n9.6000 - 13.0000\n9.6000\n11.3000 - 12.5000\n11.8900\n11.7500 - 12.6900\n12.0200\nJanuary - June, 2019\n91\n182\n364\nTable 5.3\n Marginal Rates and Range of Successful Bids Schedule\nJanuary - June, 2018\n91\n182\n364\nJanuary\nFebruary\nMarch\nApril\nMay\nJune\nJanuary\nFebruary\nMarch\nApril\nMay\nJune\n \n72 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n₦'Million\n%\n₦'Million\n%\n₦'Million\n%\n₦'Million\n%\n₦'Million\n%\n₦'Million\n%\nBanks\n833,868.51\n23.21\n852,116.06\n23.72\n936,525.27\n28.27\n779,642.65\n24.68\n617,179.89\n20.71\n814,933.46\n27.59\nMerchant Banks\n42,494.00\n1.18\n33,610.07\n0.94\n39,634.15\n1.20\n43,035.96\n1.36\n38,599.14\n1.30\n33,722.38\n1.14\nParastatals\n2,629,821.87\n73.20 2,612,531.94\n72.72 2,222,887.10\n67.10 2,261,846.91\n71.60 2,191,177.61\n73.52 1,954,692.87\n66.18\nCBN\n86,293.26\n2.40\n94,219.57\n2.62\n113,764.09\n3.43\n74,595.29\n2.36\n133,297.26\n4.47\n150,231.99\n5.09\nTotal\n3,592,477.64\n100.00 3,592,477.64\n100.00 3,312,810.61\n100.00 3,159,120.81\n100.00 2,980,253.90\n100.00 2,953,580.70\n100.00\n₦'Million\n%\n₦'Million\n%\n₦'Million\n%\n₦'Million\n%\n₦'Million\n%\n₦'Million\n%\nBanks\n1,096,815.23\n41.37 1,099,461.11\n41.47 1,054,386.91\n39.77 1,163,593.67\n43.88 1,046,820.59\n39.48 1,105,480.35\n41.69\nMerchant Banks\n34,266.97\n1.29\n49,844.96\n1.88\n34,201.68\n1.29\n16,248.66\n0.61\n28,827.17\n1.09\n21,497.32\n0.81\nParastatals\n1,034,455.30\n39.01 1,104,616.39\n41.66 1,203,248.72\n45.38 1,038,893.34\n39.18 1,215,779.46\n45.85 1,206,587.02\n45.51\nCBN\n485,976.55\n18.33\n397,591.60\n14.99\n359,676.72\n13.56\n432,778.38\n16.32\n360,086.83\n13.58\n317,949.37\n11.99\nTotal\n2,651,514.04\n100.00 2,651,514.04\n100.00 2,651,514.04\n100.00 2,651,514.04\n100.00 2,651,514.04\n100.00 2,651,514.04\n100.00\n2019\nCUSTOMER CLASS\nJanuary\nFebruary\nMarch\nApril\nMay\nJune\nTable 5.4\nNigerian Treasury Bills: Class of Holders\n2018\nCUSTOMER CLASS\nJanuary\nFebruary\nMarch\nApril\nMay\nJune\n \n73 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n1\n12.50% T/BOND 2019\n25,000,000,000\n1,517,927,000\n23,482,073,000\n0.00\n2\n12.50% T/BOND 2020\n25,000,000,000\n4,179,027,000\n20,820,973,000\n0.00\n3\n12.50% T/BOND 2021\n25,000,000,000\n8,602,660,000\n16,397,340,000\n0.00\n4\n12.50% T/BOND 2022\n25,000,000,000\n10,369,847,000\n14,630,153,000\n0.00\n5\n12.50% T/BOND 2023\n25,000,000,000\n11,914,548,000\n13,085,452,000\n0.00\n6\n12.50% T/BOND 2024\n25,988,000,000\n13,852,974,000\n12,135,026,000\n0.00\nTotal\n150,988,000,000\n50,436,983,000\n100,551,017,000\n0\n1\n12.50% T/BOND 2020\n25,000,000,000\n4,179,027,000\n20,820,973,000\n0.00\n2\n12.50% T/BOND 2021\n25,000,000,000\n6,299,876,000\n18,700,124,000\n0.00\n3\n12.50% T/BOND 2022\n25,000,000,000\n8,318,093,000\n16,681,907,000\n0.00\n4\n12.50% T/BOND 2023\n25,000,000,000\n10,082,217,000\n14,917,783,000\n0.00\n5\n12.50% T/BOND 2024\n25,988,000,000\n12,155,650,000\n13,832,350,000\n0.00\nTotal\n125,988,000,000\n41,034,863,000\n84,953,137,000\n0\nS/N\nTreasury Bond\nIssue Amount \n(₦)\nCBN Holdings \n(₦)\nFGN Treasury Bond \nS/Fund Holding \n(₦)\nFGN Bond \nS/Fund Holding \n(₦)\n2018\n2019\nTable 5.5\nFederal Republic of Nigeria Treasury Bonds: Class of Holders\nS/N\nTreasury Bond\nIssue Amount \n(₦)\nCBN Holdings \n(₦)\nFGN Treasury Bond \nS/Fund Holding \n(₦)\nFGN Bond \nS/Fund Holding \n(₦)\n \n74 \n \n \n \n \n Tranche\nTenor\nIssue \n(₦'Billion)\nSubscription \n(₦'Billion)\nAllotment \n(₦'Billion)\nJanuary\n14.50% FGN JUL 2021\n5 YEAR\n50.00\n55.75\n45.12\n16.2884% FGN MAR 2027 10 YEAR\n60.00\n94.26\n64.88\nSub-Total\n110.00\n150.01\n110.00\nFebruary\n14.50% FGN JUL 2021\n5 YEAR\n50.00\n38.89\n27.18\n13.98% FGN FEB 2028\n10 YEAR\n50.00\n78.69\n52.44\nSub-Total\n100.00\n117.58\n79.62\nMarch\n14.50% FGN JUL 2021\n5 YEAR\n10.00\n18.85\n10.05\n13.53% FGN MAR 2025\n7 YEAR\n30.00\n25.21\n8.91\n13.98% FGN FEB 2028\n10 YEAR\n30.00\n98.75\n45.10\nSub-Total\n70.00\n142.81\n64.06\nApril\n12.75% FGN APR 2023\n5 YEAR\n30.00\n52.89\n38.29\n13.53% FGN MAR 2025\n7 YEAR\n30.00\n49.40\n12.75\n13.98% FGN FEB 2028\n10 YEAR\n30.00\n160.19\n38.96\nSub-Total\n90.00\n262.48\n90.00\nMay\n12.75% FGN APR 2023\n5 YEAR\n20.00\n8.72\n3.50\n13.53% FGN MAR 2025\n7 YEAR\n20.00\n14.45\n8.45\n13.98% FGN FEB 2028\n10 YEAR\n30.00\n66.65\n38.50\nSub-Total\n70.00\n89.82\n50.45\nJune\n12.75% FGN APR 2023\n5 YEAR\n20.00\n8.29\n3.49\n13.53% FGN MAR 2025\n7 YEAR\n20.00\n10.90\n6.70\n13.98% FGN FEB 2028\n10 YEAR\n20.00\n47.53\n21.03\nSub-Total\n60.00\n66.72\n31.22\nGrand Total\n500.00\n829.42\n425.35\nTable 5.6\nFGN Bonds Issued, 2018\n \n75 \n \n \n Tranche\nTenor\nIssue \n(₦'Billion)\nSubscription \n(₦'Billion)\nAllotment \n(₦'Billion)\nJanuary 30, 2019\n12.75% FGN APR 2023\n5 YEAR\n50.00\n16.57\n5.85\n13.53%FGN MAR 2025\n7 YEAR\n50.00\n31.25\n20.10\n13.98% FGN FEB 2028\n10 YEAR\n50.00\n149.27\n91.04\nSub-Total\n150.00\n197.09\n116.99\nFebruary 20, 2019\n12.75% FGN APR 2023\n5 YEAR\n50.00\n9.52\n1.50\n13.53% FGN MAR 2025\n7 YEAR\n50.00\n28.85\n12.25\n13.98% FGN FEB 2028\n10 YEAR\n50.00\n195.98\n136.25\nSub-Total\n150.00\n234.35\n150.00\nMarch 27, 2019\n12.75% FGN APR 2023\n5 YEAR\n40.00\n21.62\n3.80\n13.53% FGN MAR 2025\n7 YEAR\n40.00\n26.17\n5.55\n13.98% FGN FEB 2028\n10 YEAR\n20.00\n100.68\n20.00\nSub-Total\n100.00\n148.47\n29.35\nApril 24, 2019\n12.75% FGN APR 2023\n5 YEAR\n40.00\n16.61\n6.81\n14.55% FGN APR 2029\n10 YEAR\n40.00\n52.28\n37.43\n14.80% FGN APR 2049\n30 YEAR\n20.00\n80.41\n53.16\nSub-Total\n100.00\n149.30\n97.40\nMay 22, 2019\n12.75% FGN APR 2023\n5 YEAR\n35.00\n45.98\n27.38\n14.55% FGN APR 2029\n7 YEAR\n35.00\n124.22\n35.00\n14.80% FGN APR 2049\n30 YEAR\n30.00\n100.91\n48.93\nSub-Total\n100.00\n271.11\n111.31\nJune 26, 2019\n12.75% FGN APR 2023\n5 YEAR\n30.00\n39.34\n28.99\n14.55% FGN APR 2029\n10 YEAR\n40.00\n60.30\n49.86\n14.80% FGN APR 2049\n30 YEAR\n30.00\n60.49\n31.49\nSub-Total\n100.00\n160.13\n110.34\n₦13.50 billion of the 14.55% FGN APR 2029 was allotted on non-competitive basis in June\nGRAND TOTAL\n700.00\n1,160.45\n \n615.39\nTable 5.6 ctd\nFGN Bonds Issued, 2019\n \n76 \n \n \n \n \nAuction ID\nBond Tranche\nNew Nomenclature\nInterest Rate\nIssue Date\nIssue Amount (₦) Redemption \nDate\nInterest Pay Date\n2018\nFGB.2010-000060\n5TH FGN BOND 2028 SERIES 5\n15.00% FGN NOV 2028\n15.00%\n28/11/2008\n75,000,001,000.00\n \n28/11/2028\n28 MAY & 28 NOV.\nFGB.2009-000053\n6TH FGN BOND 2029 SERIES 3\n12.49% FGN MAY 2029\n12.49%\n22/05/2009\n150,000,000,000.00\n \n22/05/2029\n22 MAY & 22 NOV.\nFGB.2011-000064\n6TH FGN BOND 2019 SERIES 4\n7.00% FGN OCT 2019\n7.00%\n23/10/2009\n233,896,698,000.00\n \n23/10/2019\n23 APR & 23 OCT\nFGB.2009-000055\n6TH FGN BOND 2029 SERIES 5\n8.50% FGN NOV 2029\n8.50%\n20/11/2009\n200,000,000,000.00\n \n20/11/2029\n20 MAY & 20 NOV.\nFGB.2013-000073\n7TH FGN BOND 2030 SERIES 3\n10.00% FGN JUL 2030\n10.00%\n23/07/2010\n591,568,208,000.00\n \n23/07/2030\n23 JAN & 23 JUL\nFGB.2013-000072\n9TH FGN BOND 2022 SERIES 1\n16.39% FGN JAN 2022\n16.39%\n27/01/2012\n605,310,000,000.00\n \n27/01/2022\n27 JAN & 27 JUL\nFGB 2012-000069\n9TH FGN BOND 2019 SERIES 3\n16.00% FGN JUN 2019\n16.00%\n29/06/2012\n351,300,000,000.00\n \n29/06/2019\n29 JUN & 29 DEC\nNGFB0010Y00058/M11TH FGN BOND 2024 SERIES 1 14.20% FGN MAR 2024\n14.20%\n14/03/2014\n719,994,128,000.00\n \n14/03/2024\n14 MAR & 14 SEP\nNGFB0020Y00060/M11TH FGN BOND 2034 SERIES 2 12.1493% FGN JUL 2034\n12.15%\n18/07/2014\n1,075,920,115,000.00\n \n18/07/2034\n18 JAN & 18 JUL\nNGFB0005Y00063/M12TH FGN BOND 2020 SERIES 1 15.54% FGN FEB 2020\n15.54%\n13/02/2015\n606,430,000,000.00\n \n13/02/2020\n13 FEB & 13 AUG\nNGFB0010Y00064/M12TH FGN BOND 2025 SERIES 2 12.00% FGN MAR 2025\n12.00%\n03/03/2015\n263,600,000,000.00\n \n03/03/2025\n3 MAR & 3 SEP\nNGFB0010Y00065/M12TH FGN BOND 2025 SERIES 3 9.00% FGN MAY 2025\n9.00%\n22/05/2015\n190,000,000,000.00\n \n22/05/2025\n22 MAY & 22 NOV.\nNGFB0015Y00066/M12TH FGN BOND 2030 SERIES 4 9.00% FGN AUG 2030\n9.00%\n24/08/2015\n98,522,000,000.00\n \n24/08/2030\n24 FEB & 24 AUG\nNGFB0010Y00067/M13TH FGN BOND 2026 SERIES 1 12.50% FGN JAN 2026\n12.50%\n22/01/2016\n611,915,153,000.00\n \n22/01/2026\n22 JAN & 22 JUL\nNGFB0025Y00071/M13TH FGN BOND 2041 SERIES 2 6.00% FGN FEB 2041\n6.00%\n02/01/2016\n402,639,507,796.00\n \n02/01/2041\n1 FEB & 1 AUG\nNGFB0030Y00072/M13TH FGN BOND 2046 SERIES 3 6.00% FGN FEB 2046\n6.00%\n02/01/2016\n402,639,507,796.00\n \n02/01/2046\n1 FEB & 1 AUG\nNGFB0020Y00068/M13TH FGN BOND 2036 SERIES 4 12.40% FGN MAR 2036\n12.40%\n18/03/2016\n668,100,320,000.00\n \n18/03/2036\n18 MAR & 18 SEP\nNGFB0030Y00070/M13TH FGN BOND 2046 SERIES 5 6.00% FGN APR 2046\n6.00%\n22/04/2016\n224,601,000,000.00\n \n22/04/2046\n22 APR & 22 OCT\nNGFB0005Y00073/M13TH FGN BOND 2021 SERIES 6 14.50% FGN JUL 2021\n14.50%\n15/07/2016\n561,048,876,000.00\n \n15/07/2021\n15 JAN & 15 JUL\nNGFB0010Y17327/M14TH FGN BOND 2027 SERIES 1 16.2884% FGN MAR 2027\n16.29%\n17/03/2017\n608,389,160,000.00\n \n17/03/2027\n17 MAR & 17 SEP\nNGFB0020Y18437/M14TH FGN BOND 2037 SERIES 2 16.2499% FGN APR 2037\n16.25%\n18/04/2017\n402,046,735,000.00\n \n18/04/2037\n18 APR & 18 OCT\nNGFB0010Y23228/M15TH FGN BOND 2028 SERIES 1 13.9800% FGN FEB 2028\n13.98%\n23/02/2018\n214,984,314,000.00\n \n23/02/2028\n23 FEB & 23 AUG\nNGFB0007Y23325/M15TH FGN BOND 2025 SERIES 2 13.5300% FGN MARCH 2025\n13.53%\n23/03/2018\n70,090,994,000.00\n \n23/03/2025\n23 MAR & 23 SEP\nNGFB0005Y27423/M15TH FGN BOND 2023 SERIES 3 12.7500% FGN APR 2023\n12.75%\n27/04/2018\n41,789,277,000.00\n \n27/04/2023\n27 APR & 27 OCT\nNGFB0005Y02023/M15TH FGN BOND 2023 SERIES 4 13.5000% FGN JUN 2023\n13.50%\n29/06/2018\n8,790,000,000.00\n \n29/06/2023\n29 JUN & 29 DEC \nNGFB0007Y02025/M15TH FGN BOND 2025 SERIES 5 13.8000% FGN JUN 2025\n13.80%\n29/06/2018\n7,923,500,000.00\n \n29/06/2025\n29 JUN & 29 DEC\nNGFB0010Y02028/M15TH FGN BOND 2028 SERIES 6 13.8100% FGN JUN 2028\n13.81%\n29/06/2018\n21,034,773,000.00\n \n29/06/2028\n29 JUN & 29 DEC\nTOTAL\n9,407,534,267,592.00\n \nTable 5.7\nFederal Government of Nigeria Bonds\n \n77 \n \n \n \nAuction ID\nBond Tranche\nNew Nomenclature\nInterest Rate\nIssue Date\nIssue Amount (₦)\nRedemption \nDate\nInterest Pay Date\n2019\nFGB.2010-000060\n5TH FGN BOND 2028 SERIES 5\n15.00% FGN NOV 2028\n15.00%\n28/11/2008\n75,000,001,000.00\n \n28/11/2028\n28 MAY & 28 NOV.\nFGB.2009-000053\n6TH FGN BOND 2029 SERIES 3\n12.49% FGN MAY 2029\n12.49%\n22/05/2009\n150,000,000,000.00\n \n22/05/2029\n22 MAY & 22 NOV.\nFGB.2011-000064\n6TH FGN BOND 2019 SERIES 4\n7.00% FGN OCT 2019\n7.00%\n23/10/2009\n233,896,698,000.00\n \n23/10/2019\n23 APR & 23 OCT\nFGB.2009-000055\n6TH FGN BOND 2029 SERIES 5\n8.50% FGN NOV 2029\n8.50%\n20/11/2009\n200,000,000,000.00\n \n20/11/2029\n20 MAY & 20 NOV.\nFGB.2013-000073\n7TH FGN BOND 2030 SERIES 3\n10.00% FGN JUL 2030\n10.00%\n23/07/2010\n591,568,208,000.00\n \n23/07/2030\n23 JAN & 23 JUL\nFGB.2010-000059\n4TH FGN BOND 2014 SERIES 11 9.25% FGN SEP 2014\n9.25%\n28/09/2007\n-\n \n28/09/2014\n28 SEP & 28 MAR.\nFGB.2013-000072\n9TH FGN BOND 2022 SERIES 1\n16.39% FGN JAN 2022\n16.39%\n27/01/2012\n605,310,000,000.00\n \n27/01/2022\n27 JAN & 27 JUL\nNGFB0010Y00058/M11TH FGN BOND 2024 SERIES 1 14.20% FGN MAR 2024\n14.20%\n14/03/2014\n719,994,128,000.00\n \n14/03/2024\n14 MAR & 14 SEP\nNGFB0020Y00060/M11TH FGN BOND 2034 SERIES 2 12.1493% FGN JUL 2034\n12.15%\n18/07/2014\n1,075,920,115,000.00\n \n18/07/2034\n18 JAN & 18 JUL\nNGFB0005Y00063/M12TH FGN BOND 2020 SERIES 1 15.54% FGN FEB 2020\n15.54%\n13/02/2015\n606,430,000,000.00\n \n13/02/2020\n13 FEB & 13 AUG\nNGFB0010Y00064/M12TH FGN BOND 2025 SERIES 2 12.00% FGN MAR 2025\n12.00%\n03/03/2015\n263,600,000,000.00\n \n03/03/2025\n3 MAR & 3 SEP\nNGFB0010Y00065/M12TH FGN BOND 2025 SERIES 3 9.00% FGN MAY 2025\n9.00%\n22/05/2015\n190,000,000,000.00\n \n22/05/2025\n22 MAY & 22 NOV.\nNGFB0015Y00066/M12TH FGN BOND 2030 SERIES 4 9.00% FGN AUG 2030\n9.00%\n24/08/2015\n98,522,000,000.00\n \n24/08/2030\n24 FEB & 24 AUG\nNGFB0010Y00067/M13TH FGN BOND 2026 SERIES 1 12.50% FGN JAN 2026\n12.50%\n22/01/2016\n611,915,153,000.00\n \n22/01/2026\n22 JAN & 22 JUL\nNGFB0025Y00071/M13TH FGN BOND 2041 SERIES 2 6.00% FGN FEB 2041\n6.00%\n02/01/2016\n402,639,507,796.00\n \n02/01/2041\n1 FEB & 1 AUG\nNGFB0030Y00072/M13TH FGN BOND 2046 SERIES 3 6.00% FGN FEB 2046\n6.00%\n02/01/2016\n402,639,507,796.00\n \n02/01/2046\n1 FEB & 1 AUG\nNGFB0020Y00068/M13TH FGN BOND 2036 SERIES 4 12.40% FGN MAR 2036\n12.40%\n18/03/2016\n668,100,320,000.00\n \n18/03/2036\n18 MAR & 18 SEP\nNGFB0030Y00070/M13TH FGN BOND 2046 SERIES 5 6.00% FGN APR 2046\n6.00%\n22/04/2016\n224,601,000,000.00\n \n22/04/2046\n22 APR & 22 OCT\nNGFB0005Y00073/M13TH FGN BOND 2021 SERIES 6 14.50% FGN JUL 2021\n14.50%\n15/07/2016\n561,048,876,000.00\n \n15/07/2021\n15 JAN & 15 JUL\nNGFB0010Y17327/M14TH FGN BOND 2027 SERIES 1 16.2884% FGN MAR 2027\n16.29%\n17/03/2017\n608,389,160,000.00\n \n17/03/2027\n17 MAR & 17 SEP\nNGFB0020Y18437/M14TH FGN BOND 2037 SERIES 2 16.2499% FGN APR 2037\n16.25%\n18/04/2017\n402,046,735,000.00\n \n18/04/2037\n18 APR & 18 OCT\nNGFB0010Y23228/M15TH FGN BOND 2028 SERIES 1 13.9800% FGN FEB 2028\n13.98%\n23/02/2018\n713,692,511,000.00\n \n23/02/2028\n23 FEB & 23 AUG\nNGFB0007Y23325/M15TH FGN BOND 2025 SERIES 2 13.5300% FGN MAR 2025\n13.53%\n23/03/2018\n267,781,859,000.00\n \n23/03/2025\n23 MAR & 23 SEP\nNGFB0005Y27423/M15TH FGN BOND 2023 SERIES 3 12.7500% FGN APR 2023\n12.75%\n27/04/2018\n242,333,283,000.00\n \n27/04/2023\n27 APR & 27 OCT\nNGFB0030Y02049/M16TH FGN BOND 2049 SERIES 1 14.8000% FGN APR 2049\n14.80%\n26/04/2019\n133,576,002,000.00\n \n26/04/2049\n26 APR & 26 OCT\nNGFB0010Y02029/M16TH FGN BOND 2029 SERIES 2 14.5500% FGN APR 2029\n14.55%\n26/04/2019\n122,288,602,000.00\n \n26/04/2029\n26 APR & 26 OCT\nTOTAL\n10,171,293,666,592.00\n \nTable 5.7 ctd\n \n78 \n \n \n \nBond Tranche\nBanks\nMerchant Banks\nBrokers\nPension Fund\nParastatals\nCorporate Bodies\nInsurance \nCompanies\nTrust/Inv./Tax \nFund\nCBN\nIndividuals\nTotal\n5TH FGN BOND 2028 SERIES 5\n28.14\n \n6.26\n \n-\n \n37.46\n \n-\n \n1.31\n \n-\n \n0.56\n \n1.20\n \n0.07\n \n75.00\n \nSUB TOTAL\n28.14\n \n6.26\n \n-\n \n37.46\n \n-\n \n1.31\n \n-\n \n0.56\n \n1.20\n \n0.07\n \n75.00\n \n6TH FGN BOND 2029 SERIES 3\n43.11\n \n29.85\n \n6.20\n \n53.71\n \n-\n \n2.60\n \n-\n \n-\n \n14.53\n \n0.00\n \n150.00\n \n6TH FGN BOND 2019 SERIES 4\n86.05\n \n17.15\n \n24.80\n \n62.85\n \n-\n \n19.27\n \n0.70\n \n11.88\n \n11.17\n \n0.03\n \n233.90\n \n6TH FGN BOND 2029 SERIES 5\n91.09\n \n46.44\n \n2.00\n \n12.60\n \n-\n \n4.75\n \n0.10\n \n8.10\n \n34.85\n \n0.05\n \n200.00\n \nSUB TOTAL\n220.25\n \n93.44\n \n33.00\n \n129.16\n \n-\n \n26.62\n \n0.80\n \n19.98\n \n60.56\n \n0.08\n \n583.90\n \n7TH FGN BOND 2030 SERIES 3\n165.44\n \n8.62\n \n23.16\n \n255.34\n \n-\n \n100.12\n \n8.45\n \n14.46\n \n15.80\n \n0.18\n \n591.57\n \nSUB TOTAL\n165.44\n \n8.62\n \n23.16\n \n255.34\n \n-\n \n100.12\n \n8.45\n \n14.46\n \n15.80\n \n0.18\n \n591.57\n \n9TH FGN BOND 2022 SERIES 1\n186.79\n \n14.01\n \n54.99\n \n99.86\n \n130.61\n \n81.78\n \n12.61\n \n15.93\n \n8.51\n \n0.21\n \n605.31\n \n9TH FGN BOND 2019 SERIES 3\n146.62\n \n7.35\n \n24.89\n \n56.18\n \n38.80\n \n62.96\n \n7.78\n \n1.89\n \n4.20\n \n0.63\n \n351.30\n \nSUB TOTAL\n333.41\n \n21.36\n \n79.89\n \n156.04\n \n169.41\n \n144.74\n \n20.38\n \n17.82\n \n12.71\n \n0.84\n \n956.61\n \n11TH FGN BOND 2024 SERIES 1\n161.55\n \n16.36\n \n119.85\n \n122.81\n \n133.60\n \n108.79\n \n19.13\n \n34.53\n \n-\n \n3.37\n \n719.99\n \n11TH FGN BOND 2034 SERIES 2\n775.15\n \n9.99\n \n73.83\n \n130.72\n \n45.19\n \n15.21\n \n16.68\n \n-\n \n9.16\n \n1,075.92\n \nSUB TOTAL\n936.70\n \n26.35\n \n193.67\n \n253.53\n \n133.60\n \n153.98\n \n34.34\n \n51.21\n \n-\n \n12.53\n \n1,795.91\n \n12TH FGN BOND 2020 SERIES 1\n220.21\n \n10.05\n \n97.38\n \n105.48\n \n119.73\n \n19.56\n \n15.88\n \n1.03\n \n-\n \n17.12\n \n606.43\n \n12TH FGN BOND 2025 SERIES 2\n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n49.81\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n213.79\n \n-\n \n263.60\n \n12TH FGN BOND 2025 SERIES 3\n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n190.00\n \n-\n \n190.00\n \n12TH FGN BOND 2030 SERIES 4\n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n98.52\n \n-\n \n98.52\n \nSUB TOTAL\n220.21\n \n10.05\n \n97.38\n \n105.48\n \n169.54\n \n19.56\n \n15.88\n \n1.03\n \n502.31\n \n17.12\n \n1,158.55\n \n13TH FGN BOND 2026 SERIES 1\n273.53\n \n0.50\n \n107.09\n \n77.41\n \n81.02\n \n9.65\n \n12.27\n \n0.80\n \n-\n \n49.65\n \n611.92\n \n13TH FGN BOND 2041 SERIES 2\n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n402.64\n \n-\n \n402.64\n \n13TH FGN BOND 2046 SERIES 3\n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n402.64\n \n-\n \n402.64\n \n13TH FGN BOND 2036 SERIES 4\n333.52\n \n0.18\n \n132.50\n \n122.69\n \n-\n \n11.55\n \n22.23\n \n1.78\n \n-\n \n43.64\n \n668.10\n \n13TH FGN BOND 2046 SERIES 5\n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n224.60\n \n-\n \n224.60\n \n13TH FGN BOND 2021 SERIES 6\n307.74\n \n-\n \n44.30\n \n157.26\n \n-\n \n7.31\n \n26.82\n \n2.50\n \n-\n \n15.13\n \n561.05\n \nSUB TOTAL\n914.79\n \n0.68\n \n283.89\n \n357.36\n \n81.02\n \n28.51\n \n61.32\n \n5.08\n \n1,029.88\n \n108.42\n \n2,870.94\n \n14TH FGN BOND 2027 SERIES 1\n322.35\n \n-\n \n81.63\n \n40.28\n \n29.79\n \n7.23\n \n87.24\n \n-\n \n-\n \n39.88\n \n608.39\n \n14TH FGN BOND 2037 SERIES 2\n214.81\n \n-\n \n82.60\n \n63.55\n \n0.22\n \n35.12\n \n-\n \n-\n \n5.75\n \n402.05\n \nSUB TOTAL\n537.16\n \n-\n \n164.22\n \n103.83\n \n29.79\n \n7.44\n \n122.36\n \n-\n \n-\n \n45.63\n \n1,010.44\n \n15TH FGN BOND 2028 SERIES 1\n78.51\n \n0.50\n \n26.96\n \n23.82\n \n39.99\n \n25.03\n \n12.05\n \n6.49\n \n-\n \n1.63\n \n214.98\n \n15TH FGN BOND 2025 SERIES 2\n11.40\n \n0.30\n \n6.65\n \n5.75\n \n39.99\n \n1.40\n \n4.50\n \n0.05\n \n-\n \n0.06\n \n70.09\n \n15TH FGN BOND 2023 SERIES 3\n10.09\n \n-\n \n2.00\n \n19.58\n \n-\n \n7.39\n \n2.50\n \n0.24\n \n-\n \n-\n \n41.79\n \n15TH FGN BOND 2023 SERIES 4\n1.50\n \n-\n \n0.50\n \n-\n \n2.30\n \n0.59\n \n0.40\n \n3.50\n \n-\n \n-\n \n8.79\n \n15TH FGN BOND 2025 SERIES 5\n4.00\n \n-\n \n0.20\n \n2.00\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n1.72\n \n-\n \n-\n \n7.92\n \n15TH FGN BOND 2028 SERIES 6\n6.00\n \n-\n \n1.70\n \n1.82\n \n-\n \n1.50\n \n5.00\n \n5.01\n \n-\n \n-\n \n21.03\n \nSUB TOTAL\n111.49\n \n0.80\n \n38.01\n \n52.97\n \n82.27\n \n35.91\n \n24.45\n \n17.02\n \n-\n \n1.69\n \n364.61\n \nGRAND TOTAL\n3,467.59\n \n167.56\n \n913.22\n \n1,451.19\n \n665.64\n \n518.18\n \n287.99\n \n127.15\n \n1,622.46\n \n186.56\n \n9,407.53\n \nTable 5.8\nFederal Government of Nigeria Bond Outstanding: Class of Holders (₦'Billion)\nJanuary - June 2018\n \n79 \n \nBond Tranche\nBanks\nMerchant Banks\nBrokers\nPension Fund\nParastatals\nCorporate Bodies\nInsurance \nCompanies\nTrust/Inv./Tax \nFund\nCBN\nIndividuals\nTotal\n5TH FGN BOND 2028 SERIES 5\n28.14\n \n6.26\n \n-\n \n37.46\n \n-\n \n1.31\n \n-\n \n0.56\n \n1.20\n \n0.07\n \n75.00\n \nSUB TOTAL\n28.14\n \n6.26\n \n-\n \n37.46\n \n-\n \n1.31\n \n-\n \n0.56\n \n1.20\n \n0.07\n \n75.00\n \n6TH FGN BOND 2029 SERIES 3\n43.11\n \n29.85\n \n6.20\n \n53.71\n \n-\n \n2.60\n \n-\n \n-\n \n14.53\n \n0.00\n \n150.00\n \n6TH FGN BOND 2019 SERIES 4\n86.05\n \n17.15\n \n24.80\n \n62.85\n \n-\n \n19.27\n \n0.70\n \n11.88\n \n11.17\n \n0.03\n \n233.90\n \n6TH FGN BOND 2029 SERIES 5\n91.09\n \n46.44\n \n2.00\n \n12.60\n \n-\n \n4.75\n \n0.10\n \n8.10\n \n34.85\n \n0.05\n \n200.00\n \nSUB TOTAL\n220.25\n \n93.44\n \n33.00\n \n129.16\n \n-\n \n26.62\n \n0.80\n \n19.98\n \n60.56\n \n0.08\n \n583.90\n \n7TH FGN BOND 2030 SERIES 3\n165.44\n \n8.62\n \n23.16\n \n255.34\n \n-\n \n100.12\n \n8.45\n \n14.46\n \n15.80\n \n0.18\n \n591.57\n \nSUB TOTAL\n165.44\n \n8.62\n \n23.16\n \n255.34\n \n-\n \n100.12\n \n8.45\n \n14.46\n \n15.80\n \n0.18\n \n591.57\n \n9TH FGN BOND 2022 SERIES 1\n186.79\n \n14.01\n \n54.99\n \n99.86\n \n130.61\n \n81.78\n \n12.61\n \n15.93\n \n8.51\n \n0.21\n \n605.31\n \nSUB TOTAL\n186.79\n \n14.01\n \n54.99\n \n99.86\n \n130.61\n \n81.78\n \n12.61\n \n15.93\n \n8.51\n \n0.21\n \n605.31\n \n11TH FGN BOND 2024 SERIES 1\n161.55\n \n16.36\n \n119.85\n \n122.81\n \n133.60\n \n108.79\n \n19.13\n \n34.53\n \n-\n \n3.37\n \n719.99\n \n11TH FGN BOND 2034 SERIES 2\n775.15\n \n9.99\n \n73.83\n \n130.72\n \n45.19\n \n15.21\n \n16.68\n \n-\n \n9.16\n \n1,075.92\n \nSUB TOTAL\n936.70\n \n26.35\n \n193.67\n \n253.53\n \n133.60\n \n153.98\n \n34.34\n \n51.21\n \n-\n \n12.53\n \n1,795.91\n \n12TH FGN BOND 2020 SERIES 1\n220.21\n \n10.05\n \n97.38\n \n105.48\n \n119.73\n \n19.56\n \n15.88\n \n1.03\n \n-\n \n17.12\n \n606.43\n \n12TH FGN BOND 2025 SERIES 2\n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n49.81\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n213.79\n \n-\n \n263.60\n \n12TH FGN BOND 2025 SERIES 3\n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n190.00\n \n-\n \n190.00\n \n12TH FGN BOND 2030 SERIES 4\n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n98.52\n \n-\n \n98.52\n \nSUB TOTAL\n220.21\n \n10.05\n \n97.38\n \n105.48\n \n169.54\n \n19.56\n \n15.88\n \n1.03\n \n502.31\n \n17.12\n \n1,158.55\n \n13TH FGN BOND 2026 SERIES 1\n273.53\n \n0.50\n \n107.09\n \n77.41\n \n81.02\n \n9.65\n \n12.27\n \n0.80\n \n-\n \n49.65\n \n611.92\n \n13TH FGN BOND 2041 SERIES 2\n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n402.64\n \n-\n \n402.64\n \n13TH FGN BOND 2046 SERIES 3\n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n402.64\n \n-\n \n402.64\n \n13TH FGN BOND 2036 SERIES 4\n333.52\n \n0.18\n \n132.50\n \n122.69\n \n-\n \n11.55\n \n22.23\n \n1.78\n \n-\n \n43.64\n \n668.10\n \n13TH FGN BOND 2046 SERIES 5\n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n-\n \n224.60\n \n-\n \n224.60\n \n13TH FGN BOND 2021 SERIES 6\n307.74\n \n-\n \n44.30\n \n157.26\n \n-\n \n7.31\n \n26.82\n \n2.50\n \n-\n \n15.13\n \n561.05\n \nSUB TOTAL\n914.79\n \n0.68\n \n283.89\n \n357.36\n \n81.02\n \n28.51\n \n61.32\n \n5.08\n \n1,029.88\n \n108.42\n \n2,870.94\n \n14TH FGN BOND 2027 SERIES 1\n322.35\n \n-\n \n81.63\n \n40.28\n \n29.79\n \n7.23\n \n87.24\n \n-\n \n-\n \n39.88\n \n608.39\n \n14TH FGN BOND 2037 SERIES 2\n214.81\n \n-\n \n82.60\n \n63.55\n \n0.22\n \n35.12\n \n-\n \n-\n \n5.75\n \n402.05\n \nSUB TOTAL\n537.16\n \n-\n \n164.22\n \n103.83\n \n29.79\n \n7.44\n \n122.36\n \n-\n \n-\n \n45.63\n \n1,010.44\n \n15TH FGN BOND 2028 SERIES 1\n174.87\n \n4.78\n \n156.02\n \n97.02\n \n39.99\n \n96.78\n \n42.46\n \n18.51\n \n-\n \n2.85\n \n633.26\n \n15TH FGN BOND 2025 SERIES 2\n39.65\n \n0.80\n \n36.80\n \n32.71\n \n130.74\n \n5.72\n \n9.50\n \n5.10\n \n-\n \n0.21\n \n261.23\n \n15TH FGN BOND 2023 SERIES 3\n91.25\n \n4.50\n \n6.47\n \n27.21\n \n72.25\n \n15.39\n \n7.26\n \n0.34\n \n-\n \n-\n \n224.67\n \n15TH FGN BOND 2023 SERIES 4\n3.50\n \n1.40\n \n-\n \n6.89\n \n0.66\n \n1.40\n \n3.87\n \n-\n \n-\n \n17.72\n \n15TH FGN BOND 2025 SERIES 5\n10.05\n \n-\n \n0.65\n \n4.25\n \n-\n \n-\n \n2.83\n \n1.72\n \n-\n \n-\n \n19.50\n \n15TH FGN BOND 2028 SERIES 6\n15.00\n \n-\n \n19.11\n \n6.00\n \n-\n \n7.65\n \n12.45\n \n6.01\n \n-\n \n1.20\n \n67.43\n \n16TH FGN BOND 2049 SERIES 1\n49.12\n \n0.50\n \n34.86\n \n10.15\n \n20.77\n \n2.30\n \n0.15\n \n117.85\n \n16TH FGN BOND 2029 SERIES 2\n77.06\n \n0.50\n \n34.65\n \n4.25\n \n15.60\n \n5.88\n \n0.08\n \n138.02\n \nSUB TOTAL\n460.50\n \n11.08\n \n289.96\n \n181.59\n \n249.86\n \n162.56\n \n84.08\n \n35.55\n \n-\n \n4.49\n \n1,479.67\n \nGRAND TOTAL\n3,669.98\n \n170.48\n \n1,140.28\n \n1,523.63\n \n794.43\n \n581.87\n \n339.84\n \n143.80\n \n1,618.26\n \n188.73\n \n10,171.29\n \nTable 5.8 ctd\nFederal Government of Nigeria Bond Outstanding: Class of Holders (₦'Billion)\nJanuary - June 2019\n \n80 \n \n \nInterest and Sinking Fund Charges\nJanuary\nFebruary\nMarch\nApril\nMay\nJune\nTotal\n NIGERIA TREASURY BILLS:\n {i} 91\n0.72\n0.39\n0.25\n0.67\n0.75\n0.34\n3.13\n {ii} 182\n4.16\n8.63\n6.84\n1.78\n1.43\n0.00\n22.83\n {iii} 364\n57.25\n58.35\n86.83\n48.88\n58.46\n43.77\n353.54\n10.70% FGN MAY 2018\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n15.92\n0.00\n15.92\n15.00% FGN NOV 2028\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n5.58\n0.00\n5.58\n12.49% FGN MAY 2029\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n9.29\n0.00\n9.29\n7.00% FGN OCT 2019\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n8.16\n0.00\n0.00\n8.16\n8.50% FGN NOV 2029\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n8.43\n0.00\n8.43\n10.00% FGN JUL 2030\n29.82\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n29.82\n16.39% FGN JAN 2022\n50.01\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n50.01\n16.00% FGN JUN 2019\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n28.03\n28.03\n14.20% FGN MAR 2024\n0.00\n0.00\n50.70\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n50.70\n12.1493% FGN JUL 2034\n24.22\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n24.22\n15.54% FGN FEB 2020\n0.00\n47.51\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n47.51\n12.00% FGN MAR 2025\n0.00\n0.00\n15.69\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n15.69\n9.00% FGN MAY 2025\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n8.48\n0.00\n8.48\n9.00% FGN AUG 2030\n0.00\n4.47\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n4.47\n12.50% FGN JAN 2026\n38.56\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n38.56\n6.00% FGN FEB 2041\n0.00\n12.18\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n12.18\n6.00% FGN FEB 2046\n0.00\n12.18\n0.00\n6.72\n0.00\n0.00\n18.90\n12.40% FGN MAR 2036\n0.00\n0.00\n41.08\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n41.08\n6.00% FGN APR 2046\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n14.50% FGN JUL 2021\n34.99\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n34.99\n16.2884% FGN MAR 2027\n0.00\n0.00\n49.14\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n49.14\n16.2499% FGN APR 2037\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n32.58\n0.00\n0.00\n32.58\nCOUPON PAID ON ALL SPECIAL FGN BOND\n0.00\n0.33\n0.92\n7.75\n0.00\n0.00\n9.00\nCOUPON PAID ON ALL FGNSB\n0.07\n0.06\n0.11\n0.07\n0.07\n0.12\n0.50\nCOUPON PAID ON ALL FGN GREEN BOND\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.72\n0.72\nCOUPON PAID ON ALL FGN SUKUK\n0.00\n0.00\n8.17\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n8.17\nTREASURY BONDS INTEREST\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n3.13\n3.13\n3.13\n9.38\nS/ FUND ON TREASURY BONDS\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.37\n0.33\n0.29\n0.99\nTOTAL\n239.81\n144.10\n259.72\n110.12\n111.85\n76.39\n941.99\nCUMMULATIVE TOTAL\n239.81\n383.91\n643.63\n753.75\n865.60\n941.99\nTable 5.9\nDomestic Debt Charges, 2018 (₦'Billion)\n \n81 \n \nInterest and Sinking Fund Charges\nJanuary\nFebruary\nMarch\nApril\nMay\nJune\nTotal \n NIGERIA TREASURY BILLS:\n {i} 91\n0.63\n0.75\n0.00\n0.43\n1.52\n0.21\n3.55\n {ii} 182\n6.78\n2.89\n0.75\n2.85\n5.46\n0.00\n18.72\n {iii} 364\n66.73\n26.04\n16.34\n11.62\n7.72\n15.90\n144.36\n10.70% FGN MAY 2018\n0.00\n15.00% FGN NOV 2028\n5.58\n5.58\n12.75% FGN APR 2023\n11.82\n11.82\n12.49% FGN MAY 2029\n9.29\n9.29\n7.00% FGN OCT 2019\n8.16\n8.16\n8.50% FGN NOV 2029\n8.43\n8.43\n10.00% FGN JUL 2030\n29.82\n29.82\n16.39% FGN JAN 2022\n50.01\n50.01\n16.00% FGN JUN 2019\n28.03\n28.03\n14.20% FGN MAR 2024\n50.70\n50.70\n12.1493% FGN JUL 2034\n24.22\n24.22\n15.54% FGN FEB 2020\n47.51\n47.51\n12.00% FGN MAR 2025\n15.69\n15.69\n9.00% FGN MAY 2025\n8.48\n8.48\n9.00% FGN AUG 2030\n4.47\n4.47\n12.50% FGN JAN 2026\n38.56\n38.56\n6.00% FGN FEB 2041\n12.18\n12.18\n6.00% FGN FEB 2046\n12.18\n12.18\n12.40% FGN MAR 2036\n41.08\n41.08\n13.98% FGN FEB 2028\n48.89\n48.89\n14.50% FGN JUL 2021\n41.01\n41.01\n6.00% FGN APR 2046\n6.72\n6.72\n16.2884% FGN MAR 2027\n49.14\n49.14\n13.5300% FGN MARCH 2025\n13.80\n13.80\n16.2499% FGN APR 2037\n32.58\n32.58\nCOUPON PAID ON ALL SPECIAL FGN BOND\n0.42\n1.17\n9.90\n0.00\n11.50\nCOUPON PAID ON ALL FGNSB\n0.10\n0.09\n0.15\n0.11\n0.10\n0.10\n0.66\nCOUPON PAID ON ALL FGN SUKUK\n8.17\n0.00\n0.00\n7.85\n16.02\nCOUPON PAID ON ALL FGN GREEN BOND\n0.00\n0.00\n0.72\n0.72\nTREASURY BONDS INTEREST\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n3.13\n3.13\n6.25\nS/ FUND ON TREASURY BONDS\n0.00\n0.00\n0.33\n0.29\n0.62\nTOTAL\n257.87\n155.42\n196.99\n84.20\n50.03\n56.22\n800.73\nCUMMULATIVE TOTAL\n257.87\n413.29\n610.28\n694.48\n744.51\n800.73\nTable 5.9 ctd\nDomestic Debt Charges, 2019 (₦'Billion)\n \n82 \n \n \n2018\nJanuary\nFebruary\nMarch\nApril\nMay\nJune\nTotal\n(₦'Billion)\n(₦'Billion)\n(₦'Billion)\n(₦'Billion)\n(₦'Billion)\n(₦'Billion)\n(₦'Billion)\nNTBs\n4,593.97\n5,583.06\n5,588.21\n6,849.29\n5,645.50\n6,669.21\n34,929.23\nFGN Bonds\n740.82\n685.60\n1,154.24\n918.02\n911.57\n1,181.34\n5,591.59\n5,334.78\n6,268.66\n6,742.45\n7,767.31\n6,557.07\n7,850.54\n40,520.82\n2019\nJanuary\nFebruary\nMarch\nApril\nMay\nJune\nTotal\n(₦'Billion)\n(₦'Billion)\n(₦'Billion)\n(₦'Billion)\n(₦'Billion)\n(₦'Billion)\n(₦'Billion)\nNTBs\n6,560.17\n8,284.34\n9,941.74\n5,149.38\n7,392.55\n7,465.85\n44,794.05\nFGN Bonds\n701.20\n1,033.19\n1,497.82\n735.56\n1,462.10\n1,622.86\n7,052.72\n7,261.37\n9,317.53\n11,439.56\n5,884.94\n8,854.65\n9,088.72\n51,846.77\nTable 5.10\nOver the Counter Transactions\n \n83 \n \n \nBond Tranches\nIssue Date\nTenor\nAllotment \n(₦'Million)\nCoupon \nRate (%)\nBids \nSuccessful\nMaturity \nDate\nJanuary 8 -12, 2018\n12.098% FGNSB JAN 2020\n17/01/2018 2 YEAR\n0.07\n \n12.0980\n121\n17/01/2020\n13.098% FGNSB JAN 2021\n17/01/2018 3 YEAR\n0.12\n \n13.0980\n178\n17/01/2021\nSub-Total\n0.20\nFebruary 5-9, 2018\n10.277% FGNSB FEB 2020\n14/02/2018 2 YEAR\n0.03\n \n10.2770\n124 14/02/2020\n11.277% FGNSB FEB 2021\n14/02/2018 3 YEAR\n0.20\n \n11.2770\n178 14/02/2021\nSub-Total\n0.24\nMarch 5-9, 2018\n10.746% FGNSB MAR 2020\n14/03/2018 2 YEAR\n0.03\n \n10.7460\n110\n14/03/2020\n11.746% FGNSB MAR 2021\n14/03/2018 3 YEAR\n0.12\n \n11.7460\n164\n14/03/2021\nSub-Total\n0.15\nApril 9-13, 2018\n10.75% FGNSB APR 2020\n18/04/2018 2 YEAR\n0.06\n \n10.7500\n144\n18/04/2020\n11.75% FGNSB APR 2021\n18/04/2018 3 YEAR\n0.13\n \n11.7500\n177\n18/04/2021\nSub-Total\n0.19\nMay 7-11, 2018\n9.48% FGNSB MAY 2020\n16/05/2018 2 YEAR\n0.02\n \n9.4800\n117\n16/5/2020\n10.48% FGNSB MAY 2021\n16/05/2018 3 YEAR\n0.16\n \n10.4800\n203\n16/5/2021\nSub-Total\n0.18\nJune 4 - 8 2018\n10.344% FGNSB JUNE 2020\n13/06/2018 2 YEAR\n0.05\n \n10.3400\n124\n13/06/2020\n11.344% FGNSB JUNE 2021\n13/06/2018 3 YEAR\n0.32\n \n11.3400\n183\n13/06/2021\nSub-Total\n0.37\nGRAND TOTAL\n1.33\n \nBond Tranches\nIssue Date\nTenor\nAllotment \n(₦'Million)\nCoupon \nRate (%)\nBids \nSuccessful\nMaturity \nDate\nJanuary 16, 2019\n12.125% FGNSB JAN 2021\n16/01/2019 2 YEAR\n0.02\n12.1250\n123\n16/01/2021\n13.125% FGNSB JAN 2022\n16/01/2019 3 YEAR\n0.41\n13.1250\n260\n16/01/2022\nSub-Total\n0.44\nFebruary 13, 2019\n12.050% FGNSB FEB 2021\n13/02/2019 2 YEAR\n0.12\n12.0500\n126\n13/02/2021\n13.050% FGNSB FEB 2022\n13/02/2019 3 YEAR\n0.22\n13.0500\n248\n13/02/2022\nSub-Total\n0.35\nMarch 13, 2019\n11.62% FGNSB MAR 2021\n13/03/2019 2 YEAR\n0.06\n11.6200\n142\n13/03/2021\n12.62% FGNSB MAR 2022\n13/03/2019 3 YEAR\n0.18\n12.6200\n244\n13/03/2022\nSub-Total\n0.24\nApril 10, 2019\n11.276% FGNSB APR 2021\n10/04/2019 2 YEAR\n0.13\n11.2760\n197\n04/10/2021\n12.276% FGNSB APR 2022\n10/04/2019 3 YEAR\n0.63\n12.2760\n365\n04/10/2022\nSub-Total\n0.75\nMay 15, 2019\n11.745% FGNSB MAY 2021\n15/05/2019 2 YEAR\n0.12\n11.7450\n172\n15/5/2021\n12.745% FGNSB MAY 2022\n15/05/2019 3 YEAR\n0.41\n12.7450\n343\n15/5/2022\nSub-Total\n0.53\nJune 19, 2019\n11.418% FGNSB JUN 2021\n19/06/2019 2 YEAR\n0.11\n11.4180\n186\n19/06/2019\n12.418% FGNSB JUN 2022\n19/06/2019 3 YEAR\n0.33\n12.4180\n283\n19/06/2022\nSub-Total\n0.44\nGRAND TOTAL\n2.75\n \nFGN Savings Bond \n January - June, 2019\nTable 5.11\nFGN Savings Bond \n January - June, 2018\n \n84 \n \n \nAuction ID\nBond Tranche\nNew Nomenclature\nInterest Rate\nIssue Date\nIssue Amount (₦)\nRedemption Date\nTotal Number of Successful \nSubscription at the Primary \nMarket\nInterest Payment Dates\nNGFB0003Y00078\n1ST FGNSB 2020 SERIES 3\n13.7940% FGNSB APR 2020\n13.7940%\n12-Apr-2017\n868,690,000.00\n \n12-Apr-2020\n957\n12 JAN, 12 APR, 12 JUL, 12 OCT\nNGFB0003Y00080\n1ST FGNSB 2020 SERIES 5\n14.1890% FGNSB MAY 2020\n14.1890%\n17-May-2017\n483,199,000.00\n \n17-May-2020\n652\n17 FEB, 17 MAY, 17 AUG, 17 NOV\nNGFB0003Y00082\n1ST FGNSB 2020 SERIES 7\n14.1890% FGNSB JUN 2020\n14.1890%\n14-Jun-2017\n335,696,000.00\n \n14-Jun-2020\n496\n14 MAR, 14 JUN, 14 SEP & 14 DEC\nNGFB0002Y00083\n1ST FGNSB 2019 SERIES 8\n13.3860% FGNSB JUL 2019\n13.3860%\n12-Jul-2017\n160,770,000.00\n \n12-Jul-2019\n342\n12 JAN, 12 APR, 12 JUL, 12 OCT\nNGFB0003Y00084\n1ST FGNSB 2020 SERIES 9\n14.3860% FGNSB JUL 2020\n14.3860%\n12-Jul-2017\n239,803,000.00\n \n12-Jul-2020\n437\n12 JAN, 12 APR, 12 JUL, 12 OCT\nNGFB0002Y00092\n1ST FGNSB 2019 SERIES 10\n13.5350% FGNSB AUG 2019\n13.5350%\n16-Aug-2017\n215,644,000.00\n \n16-Aug-2019\n328\n16 FEB, 16 MAY, 16 AUG, 16 NOV\nNGFB0003Y00093\n1ST FGNSB 2020 SERIES 11\n14.5350% FGNSB AUG 2020\n14.5350%\n16-Aug-2017\n522,497,000.00\n \n16-Aug-2020\n433\n16 FEB, 16 MAY, 16 AUG, 16 NOV\nNGFB0002Y00095\n1ST FGNSB 2019 SERIES 12\n13.8170% FGNSB SEP 2019\n13.8170%\n20-Sep-2017\n160,044,000.00\n \n20-Sep-2019\n328\n20 MAR, 20 JUN, 20 SEP & 20 DEC\nNGFB0003Y00096\n1ST FGNSB 2020 SERIES 13\n14.8170% FGNSB SEP 2020\n14.8170%\n20-Sep-2017\n252,658,000.00\n \n20-Sep-2020\n433\n20 MAR, 20 JUN, 20 SEP & 20 DEC\nNGFB0002Y00098\n1ST FGNSB 2019 SERIES 14\n12.0590% FGNSB OCT 2019\n12.0590%\n18-Oct-2017\n115,279,000.00\n \n18-Oct-2019\n198\n18 JAN, 18 APR, 18 JUL, 18 OCT\nNGFB0003Y00099\n1ST FGNSB 2020 SERIES 15\n13.0590% FGNSB OCT 2020\n13.0590%\n18-Oct-2017\n273,914,000.00\n \n18-Oct-2020\n260\n18 JAN, 18 APR, 18 JUL, 18 OCT\nNGFB0002Y00108\n1ST FGNSB 2019 SERIES 16\n12.0910% FGNSB NOV 2019\n12.0910%\n15-Nov-2017\n72,424,000.00\n \n15-Nov-2019\n177\n15 FEB, 15 MAY, 15 AUG, 15 NOV\nNGFB0003Y00109\n1ST FGNSB 2020 SERIES 17\n13.0910% FGNSB NOV 2020\n13.0910%\n15-Nov-2017\n183,807,000.00\n \n15-Nov-2020\n244\n15 FEB, 15 MAY, 15 AUG, 15 NOV\nNGFB0002Y00102\n1ST FGNSB 2019 SERIES 18\n11.7380% FGNSB DEC 2019\n11.7380%\n13-Dec-2017\n50,253,000.00\n \n13-Dec-2019\n141\n13 MAR, 13 JUN, 13 SEP & 13 DEC\nNGFB0003Y00103\n1ST FGNSB 2020 SERIES 19\n12.7380% FGNSB DEC 2020\n12.7380%\n13-Dec-2017\n196,165,000.00\n \n13-Dec-2020\n201\n13 MAR, 13 JUN, 13 SEP & 13 DEC\nNGFB0002Y00104\n2ND FGNSB 2020 SERIES 1\n12.0980% FGNSB JAN 2020\n12.0980%\n17-Jan-2018\n73,054,000.00\n \n17-Jan-2020\n121\n17 JAN, 17 APR, 17 JUL, 17 OCT\nNGFB0003Y00105\n2ND FGNSB 2021 SERIES 2\n13.0980% FGNSB JAN 2021\n13.0980%\n17-Jan-2018\n123,253,000.00\n \n17-Jan-2021\n178\n17 JAN, 17 APR, 17 JUL, 17 OCT\nNGFB0002Y00106\n2ND FGNSB 2020 SERIES 3\n10.2770% FGNSB FEB 2020\n10.2770%\n14-Feb-2018\n32,821,000.00\n \n14-Feb-2020\n124\n14 FEB, 14 MAY, 14 AUG, 14 NOV\nNGFB0003Y00115\n2ND FGNSB 2021 SERIES 4\n11.2770% FGNSB FEB 2021\n11.2770%\n14-Feb-2018\n202,196,000.00\n \n14-Feb-2021\n178\n14 FEB, 14 MAY, 14 AUG, 14 NOV\nNGFB0002Y00112\n2ND FGNSB 2020 SERIES 5\n10.7460% FGNSB MAR 2020\n10.7460%\n14-Mar-2018\n30,523,000.00\n \n14-Mar-2020\n110\n14 MAR, 14 JUN, 14 SEP & 14 DEC\nNGFB0003Y00116\n2ND FGNSB 2021 SERIES 6\n11.7460% FGNSB MAR 2021\n11.7460%\n14-Mar-2018\n121,300,000.00\n \n14-Mar-2021\n164\n14 MAR, 14 JUN, 14 SEP & 14 DEC\nNGFB0002Y00119\n2ND FGNSB 2020 SERIES 7\n10.7500% FGNSB APR 2020\n10.7500%\n18-Apr-2018\n64,922,000.00\n \n18-Apr-2020\n144\n18 JAN, 18 APR, 18 JUL & 18 OCT\nNGFB0003Y00120\n2ND FGNSB 2021 SERIES 8\n11.7500% FGNSB APR 2021\n11.7500%\n18-Apr-2018\n129,006,000.00\n \n18-Apr-2021\n177\n18 JAN, 18 APR, 18 JUL & 18 OCT\nNGSV0002Y00004\n2ND FGNSB 2020 SERIES 9\n9.4800% FGNSB MAY 2020\n9.48000%\n16-May-2018\n21,440,000.00\n \n16-May-2020\n117\n 16 FEB, 16 MAY, 16 AUG & 16 NOV\nNGSV0003Y00005\n2ND FGNSB 2021 SERIES 10\n10.4800% FGNSB MAY 2021\n10.4800%\n16-May-2018\n157,186,000.00\n \n16-May-2021\n203\n 16 FEB, 16 MAY, 16 AUG & 16 NOV\nNGSV0002Y00006\n2ND FGNSB 2020 SERIES 11\n10.3440% FGNSB JUN 2020\n10.3440%\n13-Jun-2018\n50,754,000.00\n \n13-Jun-2020\n124\n13 MAR, 13 JUN, 13 SEP & 13 DEC\nNGSV0003Y00007\n2ND FGNSB 2021 SERIES 12\n11.3440% FGNSB JUN 2021\n11.3440%\n13-Jun-2018\n317,533,000.00\n \n13-Jun-2021\n188\n13 MAR, 13 JUN, 13 SEP & 13 DEC\nNGSV0002Y00008\n2ND FGNSB 2020 SERIES 13\n10.4830% FGNSB JUL 2020\n10.4830%\n11-Jul-2018\n79,985,000.00\n \n11-Jul-2020\n113\n11 JAN, 11 APR, 11 JUL, 11 OCT\nNGSV0003Y00009\n2ND FGNSB 2021 SERIES 14\n11.4830% FGNSB JUL 2021\n11.4830%\n11-Jul-2018\n263,065,000.00\n \n11-Jul-2021\n175\n11 JAN, 11 APR, 11 JUL, 11 OCT\nNGSV0002Y00010\n2ND FGNSB 2020 SERIES 15\n10.668% FGNSB AUG 2020\n10.6680%\n15-Aug-2018\n49,327,000.00\n \n15-Aug-2020\n113\n15 FEB, 15 MAY, 15 AUG, 15 NOV\nNGSV0003Y00011\n2ND FGNSB 2021 SERIES 16\n11.668% FGNSB AUG 2021\n11.6680%\n15-Aug-2018\n176,515,000.00\n \n15-Aug-2021\n175\n15 FEB, 15 MAY, 15 AUG, 15 NOV\nNGSV0002Y00012\n2ND FGNSB 2020 SERIES 17\n11.3640% FGNSB SEP 2020\n11.3640%\n12-Sep-2018\n91,562,000.00\n \n12-Sep-2020\n175\n12 MAR, 12 JUNE, 12 SEP, 12 DEC\nNGSV0003Y00013\n2ND FGNSB 2021 SERIES 18\n12.3640% FGNSB SEP 2021\n12.3640%\n12-Sep-2018\n549,399,000.00\n \n12-Sep-2021\n175\n12 MAR, 12 JUNE, 12 SEP, 12 DEC\nNGSV0002Y00015\n2ND FGNSB 2020 SERIES 19\n11.1750% FGNSB OCT 2020\n11.1750%\n10-Oct-2018\n72,211,000.00\n \n10-Oct-2020\n92\n10 JAN, 10 APR, 10 JUL, 10 OCT\nNGSV0003Y00017\n2ND FGNSB 2021 SERIES 20\n12.1750% FGNSB OCT 2021\n12.1750%\n10-Oct-2018\n211,744,000.00\n \n10-Oct-2021\n167\n10 JAN, 10 APR, 10 JUL, 10 OCT\nNGSV0002Y00018\n2ND FGNSB 2020 SERIES 21\n12.390% FGNSB NOV 2020\n12.3900%\n13-Nov-2018\n30,020,000.00\n \n10-Nov-2020\n100\n14 FEB, 14 MAY, 14 AUG, 14 NOV\nNGSV0003Y00019\n2ND FGNSB 2021 SERIES 22\n13.390% FGNSB NOV 2021\n13.3900%\n13-Nov-2018\n341,328,000.00\n \n10-Nov-2021\n242\n14 FEB, 14 MAY, 14 AUG, 14 NOV\nNGSV0002Y00020\n2ND FGNSB 2020 SERIES 23\n12.402% FGNSB DEC 2020\n12.4020%\n12-Dec-2018\n63,959,000.00\n \n12-Dec-2020\n114\n12 MAR, 12 JUNE, 12 SEP, 12 DEC\nNGSV0003Y00021\n2ND FGNSB 2021 SERIES 24 \n13.402% FGNSB DEC 2021\n13.4020%\n12-Dec-2018\n300,007,000.00\n \n12-Dec-2021\n229\n12 MAR, 12 JUNE, 12 SEP, 12 DEC\nNGSV0002Y00026\n3RD FGNSB 2021 SERIES 1\n12.125% FGNSB JAN 2021\n12.1250%\n16-Jan-2019\n21,731,000.00\n \n16-Jan-2021\n123\n16 JAN, 16 APR, 16 JULY, 16 OCT\nNGSV0003Y00027\n3RD FGNSB 2022 SERIES 2\n13.125% FGNSB JAN 2022\n13.1250%\n16-Jan-2019\n414,519,000.00\n \n16-Jan-2022\n260\n16 JAN, 16 APR, 16 JULY, 16 OCT\nNGSV0002Y00028\n3RD FGNSB 2021 SERIES 3\n12.050% FGNSB FEB 2021\n12.0500%\n13-Feb-2019\n122,245,000.00\n \n13-Feb-2021\n126\n13 MAY, 13 AUG, 13 NOV, 13 FEB\nNGSV0003Y00029\n3RD FGNSB 2022 SERIES 4\n13.050% FGNSB FEB 2022\n13.0500%\n13-Feb-2019\n223,650,000.00\n \n13-Feb-2022\n248\n13 MAY, 13 AUG, 13 NOV, 13 FEB\nNGSV0002Y00030\n3RD FGNSB 2021 SERIES 5\n11.620% FGNSB MAR 2021\n11.6200%\n13-Mar-2019\n62,581,000.00\n \n13-Mar-2021\n142\n13 JUNE, 13 SEP, 13 DEC, 13 MAR\nNGSV0003Y00031\n3RD FGNSB 2022 SERIES 6\n12.620% FGNSB MAR 2022\n12.6200%\n13-Mar-2019\n178,308,000.00\n \n13-Mar-2022\n244\n13 JUNE, 13 SEP, 13 DEC, 13 MAR\nNGSV0002Y00032\n3RD FGNSB 2021 SERIES 7\n11.376% FGNSB APR 2021\n11.2760%\n10-Apr-2019\n126,317,000.00\n \n10-Apr-2021\n197\n10 JUL, 10 OCT, 10 JAN, 10 APR\nNGSV0003Y00033\n3RD FGNSB 2022 SERIES 8\n12.276% FGNSB APR 2022\n12.2760%\n10-Apr-2019\n627,796,000.00\n \n10-Apr-2022\n365\n10 JUL, 10 OCT, 10 JAN, 10 APR\nNGSV0002Y00034\n3RD FGNSB 2021 SERIES 9\n11.745% FGNSB MAY 2021\n11.7450%\n15-May-2019\n120,699,000.00\n \n15-May-2021\n172\n15 AUG, 15 NOV, 15 FEB, 15 MAY\nNGSV0003Y00035\n3RD FGNSB 2022 SERIES 10\n12.745% FGNSB MAY 2022\n12.7450%\n15-May-2019\n411,956,000.00\n \n15-May-2022\n343\n15 AUG, 15 NOV, 15 FEB, 15 MAY\nNGSV0002Y00036\n3RD FGNSB 2021 SERIES 11\n11.4180% FGNSB JUNE 2021\n11.4180%\n19-Jun-2019\n108,806,000.00\n \n19-Jun-2021\n19 SEP, 19 DEC, 19 MAR, 19 JUNE\nNGSV0003Y00037\n3RD FGNSB 2022 SERIES 12\n12.4180% FGNSB JUNE 2022\n12.4180%\n19-Jun-2019\n329,275,000.00\n \n19-Jun-2022\n19 SEP, 19 DEC, 19 MAR, 19 JUNE\nTOTAL\n \n10,431,836,000.00\n \n11,545\n \nTABLE 5.12\n FGN Savings Bond Profile as at June 30, 2019\n \n85 \n \n \n \n \nAuction ID\nBond Tranche\nNew Nomenclature\nRental Rate\nIssue Date\nIssue Amount (₦)\nRedemption Date\nCoupon Payment Dates\nNGGB0005Y00001\n1ST FGN GREEN BOND 2022 SERIES 1\n13.4800% FGN GREEN BOND DEC 2022\n13.4800%\n22/12/2017\n10,690,000,000.00\n \n22/12/2022\n22 JUNE & 22 DEC\nNGGB0007Y00008\n2ND FGN GREEN BOND 2026 SERIES 1 14.5000% FGN GREEN BOND JUNE 2026\n14.50%\n13/06/2019\n15,000,000,000.00\n \n6/13/2026\n13 DEC & 13 JUNE\nTOTAL\n \n25,690,000,000.00\n \nTABLE 5.13\n FGN Green Bond Profile as at June 30, 2019\nAuction ID\nBond Tranche\nNew Nomenclature\nRental Rate\nIssue Date\nIssue Amount (₦)\nRedemption Date Rental Payment Dates\nNGFB0007Y00097\n1ST FGN SUKUK 2024 SERIE16.4700% FGN SUKUK SEP 2024\n16.4700%\n26-Sep-17\n100,000,000,000.00\n \n26-Sep-24\n26 MAR & 26 SEP\nNGSK0007Y00022\n2ND FGN SUKUK 2025 SERIE15.7430% FGN SUKUK DEC 2025\n15.7430%\n28-Dec-18\n100,000,000,000.00\n \n28-Dec-25\n28 JUN & 28 DEC\nTOTAL\n \n200,000,000,000.00\n \nTABLE 5.14\n FGN Sukuk Profile as at June 30, 2019\nInstrument No.\nIssue Date\nIssue Amount (₦)\nRedemption Date\nNGPN0001Y00003\n14/12/2018\n181,589,179,344.00\n \n14/12/2019\nNGPN0002Y00004\n28/12/2018\n153,823,453,439.00\n \n28/12/2020\nNGPN0002Y00023\n18/02/2019\n31,440,652,571.00\n \n18/02/2021\nNGPN0003Y00044\n1/4/2019\n277,896,159,025.00\n \n1/4/2022\nNGPN0003Y00045\n24/5/2019\n8,773,818,664.00\n \n24/5/5022\nNGPN0002Y00046\n24/5/2019\n5,849,212,443.00\n \n24/5/2021\nNGPN0002Y00047\n30/4/2019\n44,488,038,738.00\n \n30/4/2021\nNGPN0001Y00048\n24/5/2019\n3,894,651,805.00\n \n24/5/2020\n707,755,166,029.00\n \n \n**NGPN0001Y00003 was reviewed upwards by N4.14bn.\nTABLE 5.15\n FGN Promissory Note Profile as at June 30, 2019\nTOTAL", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/Quarterly_Economic_Reports/Half Year Activity Report 2019.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "692623588c9587a62a24de9b69793f4f", "text": "PRESS RELEASE \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA, COMMUNIQUE NO. 36 \nOF THE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE \nIN JUNE, 2004 \n \n \n \nOn the recommendation of its Monetary Policy Committee, \nthe Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) has decided to recall N74.5 \nbillion of public sector funds lodged with deposit money banks, \nwith effect from July 21, 2004. \n \n2. \nThe policy action, which represents a tightening of monetary \npolicy stance, is designed to stem the continued high demand \npressure in the foreign exchange market, and acceleration of the \ninflation rate. \n \n3. \nAvailable information on price developments in May, 2004 \nindicated that the inflation rate, on twelve-month moving average \nbasis, exceeded the 17.5 per cent recorded in April, 2004. \nMoreover, the daily average demand for foreign exchange \nremained unsustainably high at US$46.03 and US$47.90 million in \nJune and May 2004, respectively, while the level of gross official \nexternal reserves recorded only a modest increase during the \nmonth, despite the substantial rise in net inflow. Overall, the naira \nexchange rate depreciated in the Bureaux de Change (BDC) \nmarket, although the rate appreciated marginally in the Dutch \nAuction System (DAS) segment of the market, due to increased \nsupply of foreign exchange by the CBN. The effect was reflected \nin the further widening of the spread between the DAS and the \nBDC exchange rates. \n \n4. \nIn the month under review, the growth in monetary \naggregates remained broadly within the programme targets, helped \nmainly by the continued fall in bank credit to Federal Government. \n \n2\nThe Committee, nevertheless, emphasized the need for proactive \nmonetary policy actions to ensure the sustenance of this positive \ndevelopment, recognizing the potential risk to macroeconomic \nstability posed by anticipated bunched government spending on \ncapital projects during the second half of this year. In this regard, \nthe phased recall of public sector funds with the deposit money \nbanks will be sustained until the need for re-injection of liquidity \narises. Meanwhile, the Committee will continue to closely monitor \ndevelopments in the economy, with a view to taking appropriate \naction to fine-tune the current policy measures. \n \n \n \nJames K. A. Olekah, \nSecretary, \nMonetary Policy Committee, \nCentral Bank of Nigeria, \nAbuja. \n \n2nd July, 2004", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/mpc-06-04.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "39e4f36ab1a174e3315853155c111850", "text": "CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA COMMUNIQUE NO. 54 OF THE MONETARY \nPOLICY COMMITTEE, FEBRUARY 5th , 2008 \n \n \nThe Monetary Policy Committee of the CBN met on 5th February 2008 \nand decided to leave the MPR unchanged at 9.5 per cent. \n \n \n1. The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) met on 5th February, \n2008. The Committee reviewed the major domestic and \ninternational macroeconomic developments. It also focused \nattention on the implementation of fiscal, monetary and \nexchange rate policies in 2007, as well as the challenges for the \nfirst quarter of 2008. The MPC noted that the domestic \nmacroeconomic environment was stable in 2007 despite tight \nconditions in the global financial markets engendered by major \nadverse financial developments like the US sub-prime market \ncrisis. The Committee observed with satisfaction the sustained \nsingle–digit inflation rate throughout the year and the orderly \nfunctioning of the foreign exchange and domestic financial \nmarkets. \n2. The Committee recognized that the naira appreciation has been \non \naccount \nof \nthe \nsustained \nforeign \nexchange \ninflows \nengendered by the favorable macroeconomic environment and \nthe investment climate as well as high rates of return in domestic \nfinancial markets. It, therefore, restated its commitment to \n \n2\nensuring continued monetary and price stability through the \npursuit of appropriate monetary and exchange rate policies. \n \n Key Macroeconomic Developments \n3. Inflation: \n \nThe \nCommittee \nnoted \nwith \nsatisfaction \nthe \nimprovement in inflation outcomes in 2007 compared with the \nprevious year. From 8.5 percent at end-December 2006, the year-\non-year (headline) inflation closed at 6.6 percent in 2007, \napproximately 2 percentage points lower. The decline in \ninflation in 2007 was attributable to the restrictive stance of \nmonetary policy, complemented by considerable fiscal restraint \nand favorable climatic conditions for food production in some \nparts of the country. Inflation in December 2007, however, was \nin contrast to inflation rates in the months of December 2005 and \nDecember 2006. The Committee, therefore, expressed its \nconcern that given the rise in food prices in December 2007 and \nthe overall global and domestic outlook, it will be necessary to \nensure that inflation in 2008 is within single digit. \n4. Exchange Rate: The MPC noted the steady appreciation in the \nNaira exchange rate, particularly in the second half of 2007. In \nJanuary, 2008 the Naira exchange rate appreciated further and \nthe WDAS rate stood at N116.81/US$1 as at end-January. The \nappreciation of the Naira exchange rate was driven largely by \n \n3\nrising \nprivate \nforeign \nexchange \ninflows. \nThe \nCommittee \nrecognized that inflows could continue as they were in December \nand January. However, it felt that the exchange rate would settle \ndown at a reasonable level once the uncertainties in the global \neconomy are reduced as a result of the monetary and fiscal \nactions being taken by industrialized economies. \n5. External Reserves: The Committee observed that the gross \nofficial reserves as at 31st January, 2008 stood at US$54.22 \nbillion. This level of reserves would support about 28 months of \ncurrent foreign exchange disbursements. \n6. Monetary Aggregates: Over the end- December 2006 level, \nprovisional figures indicate that broad money (M2) grew by \n30.68 per cent in 2007. The growth in M2 was driven by the \nincrease in foreign assets (net) of the banking system as well as \nthe rise in credit to the private sector. While the Committee \nexpressed concern about the rapid growth of M2, it noted with \nrelief that this did not translate to higher inflation during the \nyear, partly on account of improved supply conditions. \n7. Credit: The Committee noted that credit to the private sector \nmaintained an upward trend in the last quarter of 2007. Credit to \nthe private sector grew by 96% which is unprecedented in \n \n4\nNigeria’s history. The MPC, however, noted that credit to \ngovernment remained negative all through the year. \n8. Interest Rates: The MPC observed that the inter-bank call money \nmarket rate increased slightly in December 2007, and January \n2008, following the upward review of the MPR at the 201 \nmeeting of the MPC which held on 4th December, 2007. As a \nresult the yield curve has become steep at the shorter end. The \nCommittee noted that the real interest rate however continue to \nbe positive. \n9. Fiscal Stance: The Committee noted the salutary effects of \nsharing the Paris Club debt refund to the states in dollars. The \nFederal budget for 2008 has projected significant increases in \nexpenditure on account of government focus on infrastructure \ndevelopment, environmental protection and social safety nets. As \nthese expenditures take time to yield results, the initial impact \nwould be on aggregate demand. The private sector’s own \ninvestments in partnership with those of the public sector would \nalso have lagged effects on output. The Committee welcomes the \nrecent decision of the National Economic Council (NEC) to phase \nthe distribution of the proceeds of the Excess Crude Account to \nbe paid in US dollars. \n \n \n \n5\nTHE OUTLOOK: \nIn the light of the above, the outlook for 2008 while being positive has \nmany elements of uncertainty. The Committee, therefore, decided: \n1. To leave the MPR unchanged at 9.5 per cent \n2. To continue the use of Open Market Operations (OMO) for \nliquidity management and appropriate exchange rate policies. \n \n \n \n \n \n \nProfessor Chukwuma C. Soludo; CFR \nGovernor, \nCentral Bank of Nigeria, \nAbuja. \n \nFebruary 5, 2008", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/mpc central bank of nigeria communique no_54.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "708c35d6a9e8d31ff571e0457a022a7c", "text": "1 \n \n \nDate: Tuesday, 25th November 2025 \nRef: CBN/MPC/COM/160/303 \nAttention: News Editors/Gentlemen of the Press \n \nMONETARY POLICY RATE RETAINED AT 27.0 PER CENT \n \nThe Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) \nheld its 303rd meeting on November 24 and 25, 2025. The Committee \nreviewed key developments in the global and domestic economies, \nincluding the risks to the outlook. All the twelve (12) members of the \nCommittee were in attendance. \n \nDecisions of the MPC \nThe Committee decided by a majority vote, to maintain the current \nmonetary policy stance with an adjustment to the corridor as follows: \n1. Retain the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) at 27.0 per cent. \n2. Adjust the Standing Facility corridor around the MPR at +50/-450 basis \npoints. \n3. Retain the Cash Reserve Requirement (CRR) for Deposit Money Banks \nat 45.00 per cent, Merchant Banks at 16.00 per cent, and 75.00 per \ncent for non-TSA public sector deposits. \n4. Keep the Liquidity Ratio unchanged at 30.00 per cent. \nThe Committee’s decision was underpinned by the need to sustain the \nprogress made so far towards achieving low and stable inflation. The MPC \nreaffirmed its commitment to a data-driven assessment of developments and \noutlook to guide future policy decisions. \n \n \n2 \n \nConsiderations \nThe Committee welcomed the continued deceleration in headline inflation \n(year-on-year) in October 2025, for the 7th consecutive month. This favourable \ndevelopment resulted from several factors, including sustained monetary \npolicy tightening, stable exchange rate, increased capital inflows, and \nsurplus current account balance. In addition, the relative stability in the price \nof Premium Motor Spirit (PMS) and improved food supply, supported the \npace of disinflation. However, headline inflation remains high at double digit \nrequiring sustained efforts toward moderating it further. \nThe Committee was, therefore, of the view that the steady deceleration in \ninflation across the three measures (headline, core and food) in October \n2025, suggests that the lagged impact of previous tight policy measures is \nexpected to continue in the near term. Thus, maintaining the current stance \nof policy, amidst lingering global uncertainties, would allow the effect of \nprevious policy rate hikes to sufficiently transmit to the real economy and \nfurther reduce prices. \nMembers noted the robust performance of the external sector, evidenced by \nthe surplus current account balance and steady accretion to reserves, which \nhave contributed to stability in the exchange rate and moderation in \ninflation. The MPC also commended the collaborative effort of both the fiscal \nand monetary authorities, which led to the recent upgrade of Nigeria’s \nsovereign credit rating by major rating agencies, and the delisting of the \ncountry from the FATF grey list. Members acknowledged that these positive \ndevelopments would further boost investor confidence and improve capital \nflows to the economy. \nThe Committee noted with satisfaction, the sustained resilience of the \nbanking system, with most financial soundness indicators remaining within \nregulatory thresholds. Members also acknowledged the substantial progress \nin the ongoing recapitalization programme, with sixteen (16) banks achieving \nfull compliance with the revised capital requirements. The Committee, thus, \nurged the Bank to ensure a successful implementation and conclusion of the \nprogramme. \n \nPrice and Other Domestic Developments \nHeadline inflation (year-on-year) further declined to 16.05 per cent in \nOctober 2025, from 18.02 per cent in September, driven by a moderation in \nboth food and core inflation. Food inflation fell significantly to 13.12 per cent \nin October 2025 from 16.87 per cent in the preceding month, reflecting \nimproved domestic food supply, stable exchange rate and base effect. \n \n3 \n \nSimilarly, core inflation slowed to 18.69 per cent (year-on-year) in October \n2025, from 19.53 per cent in the preceding month, owing largely to a decline \nin the price of furnishing & household maintenance. \nReal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for the second quarter of 2025 sustained \nits positive trajectory, evidenced by the growth rate of 4.23 per cent (year-\non-year), compared with 3.13 per cent in the first quarter of 2025. In addition, \nthe Purchasing Manager’s Index increased significantly to 56.4 points in \nNovember 2025, the highest in the last five years, pointing to a more positive \ngrowth outlook for the third and fourth quarters of 2025. \nGross external reserves increased by 9.19 per cent, reaching a high of \nUS$46.70 billion on November 14, 2025, from US$42.77 billion at end-\nSeptember 2025, sufficient to cover 10.3 months of import for goods and \nservices. \nGlobal Developments \nGlobal output is projected to recover in the near to medium term, \nunderpinned by improved trade negotiations, accommodative monetary \npolicy especially in Advanced Economies and easing geopolitical tension. \nHowever, headwinds to the outlook include the potential for increasing \nprotectionism, geoeconomic fragmentation and likely resurgence of trade \ntensions between the US and its major trading partners. \nGlobal inflation is expected to maintain a steady decline through 2026, on \nthe back of the combined impact of past monetary tightening, gradual \nstabilization of the global supply chain and softening commodity prices. \nInflation is, however, projected to remain above pre-Pandemic levels in the \nnear term. \nOutlook \nThe Committee’s forecast indicates a sustained disinflation in the near term, \nto be largely driven by the lagged impact of previous monetary policy \ntightening measures, supported by the continued stability in the foreign \nexchange market. In addition, the ongoing seasonal harvest cycle is \nexpected to boost local food supply, and further moderate food prices. \nThe MPC reaffirmed its commitment to evidence-based policy approach \ntowards achieving the Bank’s mandate of price and financial system stability. \nThe next meeting of the Committee is scheduled for Monday, 23rd and \nTuesday, 24th February 2026. \nThank you. \n \n4 \n \nOlayemi Cardoso \nGovernor, \nCentral Bank of Nigeria \nNovember 25, 2025. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n5 \n \nPERSONAL STATEMENTS BY \nTHE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE MEMBERS \nMPC MEETING NOVEMBER 24 – 25, 2025 \n \n1. AKU PAULINE ODINKEMELU \nINTRODUCTION \nI vote to reduce the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) by 50 basis points from 27.00 \nper cent to 26.50 per cent, adjust the asymmetric corridor around the MPR to \n+50/-450 basis points, retain the Cash Reserve Ratio for commercial banks at \n45 per cent, merchant banks at 16 per cent, and 75 per cent CRR on non-TSA \npublic sector deposits, and retain Liquidity Ratio at 30.00 per cent. My \ndecision is influenced by the following developments: \nECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CONTEXT \nGLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS \nThe October 2025 WEO projects a slowing global expansion, with growth at \n3.2 per cent in 2025 and 3.1 per cent in 2026. This modest pace reflects a \nworld adjusting to a landscape marked by greater protectionism and \neconomic fragmentation. While global headline inflation is expected to \ndecline further, it will likely remain above target in some countries. \nOverall, growth forecast remains dim, and risks to the outlook are tilted to the \ndownside. Prolonged uncertainty and an escalation of protectionist \nmeasures threaten to further hinder activity. Specific vulnerabilities include \nlarger-than-expected labour supply shocks, particularly acute in ageing \neconomies with skill shortages alongside fiscal strains and financial market \nfragilities. These could interact with higher borrowing costs and increased \nrollover risks for sovereigns. Additional threats to macro-financial stability \ninclude an abrupt repricing of technology stocks and mounting pressure on \nthe independence of key economic institutions, which could undermine \nsound policymaking. \nGrowth trajectories are also diverging across country groups. Advanced \neconomies are projected to moderate to 1.6 per cent in 2025 and remain \nsteady at that rate in 2026. Meanwhile, growth in Emerging Market and \nDeveloping Economies (EMDEs) is expected to ease from 4.3 per cent in 2024 \nto 4.2 per cent in 2025 and 4.0 per cent in 2026. Sub-Saharan Africa’s forecast \nhas been revised downward to 3.9 per cent for 2025, with a rebound to 4.3 \nper cent anticipated in 2026. \nThis highly divergent and fragile outlook underscores the urgent need for \ncoordinated multi-level global action to address primary threats, notably \n \n6 \n \ngeopolitical tensions and trade restrictions. To navigate a global economy in \nflux and restore confidence, policymakers must implement a coherent \nstrategy built on credible, transparent, and sustainable policies. This strategy \nshould \nintegrate \nproactive \ntrade \ndiplomacy \nwith \nmacroeconomic \nadjustments, rebuild fiscal buffers to manage vulnerabilities, preserve central \nbanks’ independence for price and financial stability, and accelerate \nstructural reforms to strengthen long-term growth. \nGlobal headline inflation is expected to continue its downward trajectory but \nfaces mounting headwinds and increasing divergences across regions. The \nIMF's October 2025 forecast projects a decline from 5.8 per cent in 2024 to 4.2 \nper cent in 2025 and 3.7 per cent in 2026, remaining above most advanced-\neconomy central bank targets. This moderating trend is supported by a \nprojected decline in commodity prices and some stabilization in supply \nchains. However, the disinflation process is becoming more fragile and \nuneven, with significant risks now tilting to the upside. \nThis is particularly evident in the diverging outlooks for advanced and \nemerging economies. In advanced economies, inflation is projected to ease \nmodestly from 2.6 per cent in 2024 to 2.5 per cent in 2025 and 2.2 per cent in \n2026. \nNotably, \nthe \nforecast \nfor \nthe \nUnited \nStates \nhas \nbeen \nrevised upward due to emerging signs that tariffs and associated supply-\nchain rewiring are beginning to pass through to consumer prices, threatening \nto slow the pace of disinflation. \nMeanwhile, inflation in EMDEs is expected to decline from 7.9 per cent in 2024 \nto 5.3 per cent in 2025 and 4.7 per cent in 2026. While this represents progress, \nthe level remains elevated and the path is fraught with persistent risks. These \ninclude exchange rate pressures, infrastructure gaps, and climate-related \nshocks. Furthermore, the landscape is now complicated by new, potent \nupside risks: escalating protectionist trade measures, which act as a supply \nshock; potential labor supply shocks from restrictive immigration policies; and \nmounting fiscal vulnerabilities that could interact with financial market \nfragilities. Eroding confidence in the independence of key economic \ninstitutions also presents a material risk to price stability. \nDOMESTIC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND OUTLOOK \nIn line with the rebasing of Nigeria's national accounts to a 2019 base year, \nreal GDP grew by 3.98 percent year-on-year in the third quarter of 2025. \nHowever, 4.23 per cent (year-on-year) was recorded in the second quarter of \n2025 using the previous methodology. The Q3 2025 growth was led by a \nbroad-based acceleration in the Agriculture and Industry sectors, which \nmore than offset a modest slowdown in the dominant Services sector. The \nServices sector continues to account for most of the output, but the recent \n \n7 \n \nperformance highlights a more balanced growth contribution from \nproductive sectors. \nNigeria's recent growth in agriculture and industry is vital for sustained easing \nprices and reducing pressure on interest rates, while also strengthening \neconomic resilience. However, these gains remain at risk due to persistent \ninsecurity, which disrupts production and deters investment. \nHeadline Inflation (year-on-year) eased to 16.05 per cent in October 2025, \nthe lowest in five years and the seventh consecutive monthly slowdown. This \ntrend was driven by a continued drop in food inflation, supported by strong \nharvests, and a fifth straight month of decline in core inflation. \nThe exchange rate remained stable, supported by rising capital inflows and a \npersistent current account surplus. External reserves grew for the third \nconsecutive month, reaching US$43.20 billion in October 2025. This level \nequates to 8.3 months of import cover, significantly strengthening the \neconomy's buffer against external shocks and underscoring sustained \nconfidence among investors and markets. \nRATIONALE FOR DECISION & POLICY IMPLICATIONS \nGlobal developments present a fragile and fragmented economic \nlandscape. The October 2025 WEO projects a slowing global growth at 3.2 \nper cent in 2025 and 3.1 per cent in 2026. While global headline inflation is on \na downward trajectory, it remains above target in many countries, and \nsignificant upside risks persist, notably from escalating protectionist trade \nmeasures, fiscal vulnerabilities, and potential labour supply shocks. In this \ncontext of subdued global growth and heightened uncertainty, domestic \npolicy space is constrained, underscoring the need for credible and \nsustainable policy frameworks. \nAgainst this backdrop, Nigeria’s recent economic performance provides a \ncompelling rationale for a calibrated policy adjustment. Domestically, the \ndisinflation trend is now entrenched and broad-based. Headline inflation has \ndeclined for seven consecutive months to a five-year low of 16.05 per cent in \nOctober 2025, driven by a sustained drop in food prices, supported by strong \nharvests and a steady decline in core inflation. Concurrently, external stability \nhas markedly improved. The naira exchange rate has stabilized, bolstered by \nsignificant capital inflows, a persistent current account surplus, and robust \nexternal reserves of $43.20 billion, providing a formidable 8.3 months of import \ncover. Furthermore, Nigeria's economic momentum is shifting favourably. Q3 \n2025 GDP growth of 3.98 per cent was underpinned by a broad-based \nacceleration in the critical Agriculture and Industry sectors, signalling a move \ntoward more balanced and resilient growth. \n \n8 \n \nA 50bps reduction in the MPR at this juncture is a prudent, forward-looking \nadjustment. It acknowledges the hard-won gains in price stability and \nexternal resilience, providing a measured stimulus to support this nascent \nproductive sector recovery without jeopardizing the credibility of the \ndisinflation process. \nThe decision to retain tight prudential ratios (CRR, LR) is crucial. It ensures that \nsystemic liquidity remains controlled, anchoring inflationary expectations and \npreventing any premature flood of liquidity that could undermine exchange \nrate stability. The asymmetric corridor adjustment (+50/-450 bps) actively \ndiscourages banks from parking excess funds at the Bank's standing deposit \nfacility, incentivizing them instead to channel liquidity toward private sector \nlending to support growth in the critical sectors of the economic such as \nagriculture and industry. \nThis policy-mix modest easing paired with stringent reserve requirements \nstrikes a necessary balance. It signals a cautious pivot toward supporting \ndomestic output and employment, while firmly maintaining the defensive \nbuffers needed to shield the economy from persistent domestic insecurity \nand volatile global financial conditions. The primary implication is a carefully \nmanaged reduction in the cost of credit for the real economy, aimed at \nconsolidating growth in productive sectors without reigniting inflationary and \nexchange rate pressures. \nCONCLUSION \nBased on current developments, I conclude that the improving trends in \ninflation, external reserves, and productive sector growth provide a window \nfor a cautious policy adjustment. A modest 50 bps MPR reduction, combined \nwith a liquidity-steering asymmetric corridor and maintained reserve ratios, \noffers a balanced path forward. This stance supports domestic economic \nmomentum while preserving the defensive buffers necessary to manage \nongoing risks from insecurity, global volatility, and potential inflationary \npressures, thereby safeguarding macroeconomic stability. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n9 \n \n2. ALOYSIUS UCHE ORDU \nIntroduction \nI voted as follows: \n1. Reduce the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) by 50 basis points to 26.50 per \ncent. \n2. Adjust the Standing Facilities corridor around the MPR to +50/-450 basis \npoints. \n3. Maintain the 45 per cent CRR for commercial banks, the 16 per cent for \nmerchant 16 percent, and the 75 per cent for non-TSA public sector \ndeposits. \n4. Keep the Liquidity Ratio unchanged at 30.00 percent. \nEconomic and Financial Developments \n• \nGlobal Developments \nThe November 2025 MPC meeting convened against a backdrop of easing \nglobal uncertainties and the resolution of the U.S. political standoff that \nculminated in the end of a protracted government shutdown. Geopolitical \ntensions have moderated, following the UN’s endorsement of President \nTrump’s 20-point comprehensive plan on November 17 to end the Gaza \nconflict, alongside his diplomatic engagements with Presidents Putin and Xi \nJinping, and Prime Minister Modi, and renewed efforts to advance a 28-point \npeace framework for the Russia–Ukraine war. Additional developments, \nincluding the renegotiation of the US–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA), \nhave reinforced a sense of improving global stability. \nMonetary policy responses have mirrored these shifts. Major central banks \nhave embarked on a cautious easing cycle. Among advanced economies, \nthe U.S. Federal Reserve lowered its policy rate by 25 basis points in October \nto 4 percent, while the Bank of Canada reduced its benchmark rate to 2.75 \npercent. The Bank of England is widely expected to follow suit. Similar trends \nare evident in emerging markets: Kenya cut rates by 25 bps to 9.25 percent, \nSouth Africa by 25 bps to 6.75 percent, and Egypt by 100 bps to 21 percent. \nThese synchronized moves, driven by global disinflationary pressures, \nare anticipated to support output recovery. This outlook aligns with the IMF’s \nupward revision of global growth to 3.2 percent from 3.0 percent, with \nemerging and developing economies projected to expand by 4.2 percent \ncompared to 1.5 percent for advanced economies. Consensus suggests that \nthe disinflationary trend observed in 2025 will persist into 2026. \nThe recent U.S. government shutdown (October 1–November 12), triggered \nby \npartisan \ndisputes \nover \nappropriations \nand \nhealthcare \nsubsidies, \n \n10 \n \nintroduced temporary uncertainty, disrupting data releases and fuelling safe-\nhaven demand for gold, while undermining the dollar. Nevertheless, the \ngrowth impact is expected to dissipate in the near term, with U.S. GDP \nprojected to rebound strongly—between 3 and 4 percent—in Q1 2026, \ndefying earlier consensus forecasts. \nWhile consecutive rate cuts by the Fed are expected to bolster employment \nand growth, the combination of lower rates, fiscal strain, policy ambiguity, \nand China’s gradual divestment of U.S. assets could temper demand for \nTreasuries. Notably, foreign holdings of U.S. Treasuries declined marginally in \nSeptember, from USD 9.262 trillion to USD 9.249 trillion. This shift may create \nopportunities for capital inflows into emerging markets, including Nigeria. \n• \nDomestic Development \nOutput: \nRecent \ndata \nfrom \nthe \nNational \nBureau \nof \nStatistics \n(NBS) indicates that the Nigerian economy sustained its growth momentum in \nQ2 2025, expanding by 4.23 percent—up from 3.48 percent in Q2 2024 and \n3.13 percent in Q1 2025. The performance was broad-based, driven by a \nstrong rebound in the oil sector, which surged by 20.48 percent, alongside \ncontinued resilience in information and communication, crop production, \nreal estate, financial services, insurance, and trade sub-sectors. While this \ntrajectory underscores steady progress, it falls short of the growth \nthreshold required to \nsignificantly \nreduce \npoverty. As indicated in \nmy previous statements, \nachieving \ninclusive \nprosperity in \nNigeria will require real output growth of at least 7 percent per year for over a \ndecade. \nThe near-term outlook remains positive. Growth is projected at 4.62 percent in \nQ3 2025 and 4.27 percent for full-year 2025. This optimism is reinforced by the \ncomposite Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI), which expanded for the 11th \nconsecutive month to 55.4 points in October, from 54.0 points in August—\nsignalling sustained business confidence. Continued implementation of \nstructural reforms in both monetary and fiscal policy spaces will be critical \nto maintaining this trajectory. \nInflation: Consistent with projections at the September MPC meeting, price \npressures have eased for the eighth consecutive month since March 2025. \nHeadline inflation declined to 16.02 percent in October from 18.02 percent in \nSeptember, supported by tight monetary policy, exchange rate stability, \nstructural reforms, and fiscal consolidation measures. Food inflation softened \nmarkedly to 13.12 percent from 16.87 percent, reflecting improved domestic \nsupply and rising food imports amid a stable exchange rate. Staff estimates \nsuggest further moderation to 15.02 percent in November, driven by \n \n11 \n \nsustained currency stability, stable fuel prices, and the lagged impact of \nmonetary tightening. \nMonetary and Financial Developments: The monetary base expanded by \n12.15 percent year-to-date, reaching ₦36.64 trillion at end-October 2025 \nfrom ₦32.67 trillion in December 2024, contributing to moderate broad \nmoney growth with minimal inflationary risk. Liquidity management through \nopen market operations remained effective, anchoring short-term rates \nwithin the policy corridor. Equity market performance was mixed: the All-\nShare Index (ASI) and market capitalization declined month-on-month by \n2.56 percent and 2.36 percent, respectively, amid uncertainties over tax \nreforms and corporate earnings. However, year-on-year gains exceeded 40 \npercent, \nreflecting \nrobust \ninvestor \nparticipation \nand \nimproved \nmacroeconomic sentiment. The ongoing bank recapitalization program is \nprogressing steadily, with several institutions meeting capital requirements \nahead of the March 2026 deadline. Financial soundness indicators confirm \nthat the banking sector remains resilient and stable. \nFiscal \nDevelopments: Fiscal \nuncertainty \npersists \nwith \nthe \nimminent expiration of the 2025 Appropriation Act and the absence of a \nproposed 2026 budget. The extension of capital outlay implementation under \nthe 2024 budget from June to December 2025 raises concerns about \noverlapping fiscal cycles and delayed releases, which could dampen \nbusiness confidence and investment decisions. On the positive side, \nfederation revenue has improved despite weaker global oil prices, supported \nby strong non-oil receipts. VAT collections in Q2 2025 totalled ₦2.06 trillion—a \n32.15 percent increase over Q2 2024—while monthly inflows to the \nFederation Account have averaged over ₦2 trillion since July. Nonetheless, \nrevenue remains below target, underscoring the need for enhanced \nmobilization and fiscal transparency. Persistent delays in fiscal reporting, \nparticularly at subnational levels, continue to obscure policy assessment and \nhinder investment planning. \nPublic debt rose from ₦121.67 trillion in Q1 2024 to ₦152.40 trillion in Q2 2025 \n(33.98 percent of GDP) but remains within the 60 percent debt ceiling. \nInvestor confidence appears intact, as sovereign debt instruments dominate \nfixed-income market activity. However, rising debt service obligations could \nstrain fiscal resources, amplifying pressures on the budget. Strengthening \nrevenue \ngeneration \nand \nimproving \ntransparency \nin \nfiscal \noperations remain pivotal to safeguarding fiscal sustainability. \nExternal Developments: Recent policy actions have continued to strengthen \nNigeria’s external position, sustaining capital inflows and boosting foreign \nreserves to USD 45.60 billion as of November 18, 2025, from USD 42.77 billion at \nend-September. Portfolio investment accounted for 89.61 percent of total \n \n12 \n \ncapital flows, compared to a modest 1.56 percent from foreign direct \ninvestment (FDI). This underscores the need for structural reforms to \ncomplement \nmonetary \npolicy \nin \nattracting \nmore \npermanent \nand \ntransformative foreign capital for domestic development. Remittance inflows \nalso improved significantly, rising to USD 485.65 million from USD 313.72 million \nin September, reflecting the effectiveness of reforms in the remittance \nsubsector. \nFurther supporting the narrative of a stronger external position, the overall \nbalance of payments deficit narrowed sharply to USD 0.27 billion in Q2 2025 \nfrom USD 2.77 billion in Q1, aided by higher reserve assets and improvements \nin the current account balance. The naira sustained its resilience, \nappreciating by 1.89 percent and 2.26 percent at the official and BDC \nsegments in October, with notable convergence between both rates. The \ndiminishing premium signals improved market liquidity and effective price \ndiscovery mechanisms. Autonomous sources continued to dominate foreign \nexchange inflows in October, as the FX market deepened and direct \ninterventions were scaled back. \nRisks and Outlook: Despite easing price pressures globally, uncertainties \npersist, warranting cautious optimism regarding the outlook for global growth. \nThis reinforces the need for vigilance in insulating the domestic economy and \npreserving \nrecent \npolicy \ngains. \nOn \nthe \ndomestic \nfront, \nfiscal \nrisks remain elevated. Delays in presenting the 2026 Appropriation Act could \nunsettle private sector expectations, weaken investor confidence, and \nheighten the risk of extra-budgetary spending. These risks may be \ncompounded by spending pressures associated with the onset of the 2027 \nelection cycle, with implications for liquidity conditions and inflation outlook. \nRenewed insecurity in parts of the country also poses downside risks to the \notherwise optimistic macroeconomic outlook. Policy must therefore prioritize \ntransparency, accountability, and the removal of structural bottlenecks to \nsustain investor confidence. \nRationale for Vote: Based on my assessment of global and domestic \nconditions, Nigeria is well-positioned to continue to attract capital, supporting \nrobust foreign reserves and exchange rate stability. This outlook, however, \nhinges on strict adherence to FX reforms, effective policy coordination, and \navoidance of disruptive surprises. The economy has recorded broad-based \ngrowth, eight consecutive months of disinflation, and a stable, strengthening \nnaira—developments that have significantly altered the macroeconomic \nnarrative. \nNevertheless, I am conscious of the fact that inflation remains a major \nchallenge and the task of fighting inflation is a marathon, not a sprint. We \nmust learn the lessons of other countries which shows that lowering inflation \n \n13 \n \nfrom a high to a sustainable level takes time, often over a period of three to \nfive years. Some countries have celebrated victory over inflation and \nprematurely loosened policy only to reverse course. \nThis is thus not a time for rapid loosening of policy. While welcoming the \nmoderation in price pressures, we should continue to signal our tight policy \nstance \nin \nthe \nperiod \nahead. We \nmust \npersevere, \ncontinue \nto demonstrate policy credibility and consistency; keep our eyes on the prize: \nmacroeconomic stability and stronger growth brought about by defeating \ninflation. \nThe challenge now is to consolidate on the gains made and translate them \ninto jobs, productivity, and inclusive growth. Against this backdrop, I support \na cautious easing stance and an adjustment of the symmetric corridor to \nfoster credit intermediation and investment, thereby accelerating growth. At \nthis critical inflection point, policy adjustments must remain measured, \nbalancing \nthe \nimperative \nof \nsupporting \ngrowth \nwith \nthe \nneed \nto contain inflationary risks. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n14 \n \n3. BALA MOH’D BELLO MoN \nIntroduction \nAt the November 2025 Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting, following \na thorough review of recent global and domestic macroeconomic \ndevelopments and a robust assessment of available data, I voted to \nmaintain the current stance of monetary policy, with an adjustment to the \ncorridor as follows: \n1. Retain the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) at 27.0 per cent. \n2. Adjust the Standing Facility corridor around the MPR at +50/-450 basis \npoints. \n3. Retain the Cash Reserve Requirement (CRR) for Deposit Money Banks \nat 45.00 per cent, Merchant Banks at 16.00 per cent, and 75.00 per \ncent for non-TSA public sector deposits. \n4. Retain the Liquidity Ratio unchanged at 30.00 per cent. \nRationale \nThe November meeting provided an opportunity to evaluate the impact of \nprevious monetary policy decisions on key macroeconomic indicators, \nreassess prevailing risks, and review the short- to medium-term outlook. \nNotably, remarkable gains have been recorded, including a steady decline \nin headline inflation, Nigeria’s delisting from the Financial Action Task Force \n(FATF) grey list, upgraded sovereign credit ratings, stability in the naira \nexchange rate, significant accretion to external reserves, and a positive \noutput growth trajectory. Preserving these gains remains a priority as 2025 \ndraws to a close, considering lingering global and domestic risks. Ultimately, \nmy decision was data-driven and evidence-based. \nI note with delight recent reports by the National Bureau of Statistics showing \nfurther decline in headline inflation year-on-year for the seventh consecutive \nmonth to 16.05 per cent in October 2025, from 18.02 per cent in September. \nFood inflation also trended significantly downwards to 13.12 per cent in \nOctober 2025 from 16.87 per cent in the preceding month, while core \ninflation slowed to 18.69 per cent (year-on-year) in October 2025, from 19.53 \nper cent in the preceding month, owing largely to a decline in the price of \nfurnishing & household maintenance. \nThe remarkable decline in headline inflation rate underscores the importance \nof policy consistency and collaborative efforts of the fiscal authority which \nhelped ramp up food production, thus, bridging the supply-demand gap. \nStability in the exchange rate and favourable base effects also contributed \nto the notable decline. \n \n15 \n \nAt the current inflation level, real yields (MPR less headline inflation) remain \npositive, a development that would bolster investor confidence and \nenhance economic expectations. Continued moderation in domestic prices \nis expected as monetary and fiscal policies remain coordinated, alongside \nstability in the exchange rate. Risk factors such as the traditional end-of-year \nsurge in demand should, however, not be ignored. \nWhile more recent numbers for real Gross Domestic Product (rGDP) are \nawaited, leading indicators such as the Purchasing Manager’s Index (PMI) \nindicate sustained positive economic momentum. The PMI increased \nsignificantly to 56.4 points in November 2025, the highest in the last five years, \npointing to a stronger outlook for the third and fourth quarters of 2025. Recall \nthat the rGDP for the second quarter of 2025 stood at 4.23 per cent (year-on-\nyear), compared with 3.13 per cent in the first quarter of 2025, thus, \nmaintaining its positive trajectory. \nThe strong economic performance is mirrored in the financial system, which \ncontinues to post robust soundness indicators despite the current tight stance \nof monetary policy. Staff reports to the Committee indicate considerable \nprogress in the recapitalization programme, with sixteen (16) banks already in \nfull compliance with the revised capital requirements. The exercise will further \nenhance banks’ capacity to absorb risks and strengthen their role in \nsupporting economic activity. \nGains of previous policy decisions are also reflected in key external sector \nindices. For the first time in several years, gross external reserves increased by \n9.19 per cent, reaching a high of US$46.70 billion on November 14, 2025, from \nUS$42.77 billion at end-September 2025, sufficient to cover 10.3 months of \nimport for goods and services. The transparency in foreign exchange \nmanagement policies and sustained macroeconomic stability are expected \nto further boost investor confidence, improve capital inflows, and generate \npositive pass-through effects to domestic prices. \nAt this point, I must acknowledge the collaborative efforts of the Central Bank \nof Nigeria, fiscal authority and other relevant agencies which led to the \nrecent upgrade of Nigeria’s sovereign ratings and delisting of Nigeria from \nthe Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey list. These developments would \nfurther enhance Nigeria’s competitiveness globally and attract foreign \ncapital with positive macroeconomic outcomes. \nConclusion \nOverall, I recognize that the relative stability enjoyed by the Nigerian \neconomy reflects the combined and individual potency of our past policy \ndecisions. I am also convinced that the current levels of key policy \n \n16 \n \nparameters are suitable; this would prevent the disruption of on-going \ntransmission of previous policies, especially the September 2025 MPC decision \ngiven the well-established policy lag effects. More so, the current level of real \npolicy rate remains appropriate to balance the objectives of exchange rate \nstability, price stability and output stabilization without introducing disruptive \npolicy shocks. \nNotwithstanding persistent global risks, the continued improvement in key \ndomestic fundamentals, particularly output and inflation, as well as external \nsector indicators, supports the conclusion that there is no immediate need to \nalter the current stance of monetary policy. Although inflation remains above \nthe 6–9 per cent benchmark, it is on a downward trajectory, reflecting the \neffectiveness of ongoing efforts to address supply-side pressures. In addition, \nroutine monetary sterilization continues to play a critical role in containing \ndemand-induced inflation. \nTo further strengthen the Bank’s sterilization operations and enhance the \neffectiveness of earlier policy actions, I consider an adjustment to the corridor \naround the MPR necessary. Accordingly, I vote for an adjustment to the \nStanding Facility corridor around the MPR. \n \n \n \n17 \n \n \n4. BANDELE A.G. AMOO \nIn view of the recently observed developments in the domestic and external \neconomies, I hereby vote as follows: \na) Reduce the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) by 50 basis points to 26.5 per \ncent. \nb) Adjust the Standing Facility corridor around the MPR at +50/-450 basis \npoints. \nc) Retain the Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) at 45.0 per cent for Commercial \nBanks and 16.0 per cent for Merchant Banks. \nd) Retain the 75 per cent CRR on non-TSA public sector deposits. \ne) Retain the Liquidity Ratio (LR) at 30.0 per cent. \nMy decision was influenced by the following considerations. \n1. Global Economic Developments \nThe global economic recovery persisted in the medium term, underpinned by \nimproved trade negotiations, accommodative monetary policy especially in \nadvanced economies and easing geopolitical tension. However, headwinds \nto \nthe \noutlook \ninclude \nthe \npotential \nfor \nincreasing \nprotectionism, \ngeoeconomic and trade fragmentation and likely resurgence of trade \ntensions between the US and its major trading partners. Though headline \ninflation in major advanced economies has eased further, core inflation \npersists, compelling central banks to maintain a cautious stance. The U.S \nFederal Reserve's continuous pause, alongside similar postures from the \nEuropean Central Bank (ECB) and Bank of England (BoE), reflects a global \nconsensus. In view of these developments, the global monetary policy and \nfinancial conditions remain slightly accommodative. \n2. Domestic Macroeconomic Developments \nThe domestic economy expanded by 4.58 per cent year-on-year, in Q3 2025, \nmaintaining its positive growth trajectory and marking a modest acceleration \nfrom the 4.23 per cent growth recorded in Q2 2025. Resilient growth across \ntrade, ICT, agriculture, and financial services continues to drive economic \nperformance. \nThis performance underscores the resilience of the non-oil sector, which \ncontinues to serve as the primary engine of economic activity. Notably, \ngrowth was driven by Services (4.92%), Agriculture (2.15%), and a resurgent \nManufacturing sector, which posted a growth of 1.88 per cent, indicating \n \n18 \n \ncurrent gains from the ongoing structural reforms and improved foreign \nexchange availability for raw materials. This development was corroborated \nby the October 2025 composite Purchasing Managers Index (PMI), which rose \nto 55.40 compared with 54.00 in September 2025, indicating sustained \nexpansion in economic activities for the eleventh consecutive month. \nThis growth is occurring alongside a continued disinflation trend. Headline \ninflation (year-on-year) slowed to 16.05 per cent in October from 18.02 per \ncent in the preceding month, on account of sustained increase in the supply \nof food, particularly, grains and tubers as well as decline in transportation \ncosts which helped to drive down prices of many consumer items. This trend is \nsupported by a slowdown in both food inflation and core inflation. While this \ndisinflationary path is a key policy success, the pace remains gradual, and \nthe current level of inflation is still profoundly constraining economic welfare \nand investment planning. \nThe banking system remains stable, sound and resilient. Many financial \nsoundness indicators in respect of our financial system stood within approved \nbenchmark levels. The successful recapitalisation of a substantial number of \nbanks has strengthened the sector further. However, the transmission of \nsystemic liquidity into broad-based productive credit remains suboptimal. \nCredit to the private sector (CPS) is growing marginally, sectoral \nconcentration in oil & gas still subsists, manufacturing, and general \ncommerce credit share remains excessive, crowding out credit to the \nagriculture and SMEs. The external sector shows resilience, with the current \naccount surplus sustained by improved remittance inflows. The relative \nstability of the naira in recent weeks is encouraging but remains fragile. \n3.0 My Concern \nMy main concern this period is that, while the 75 per cent CRR on non-TSA \npublic sector deposits introduced in September 2025 has begun to sterilise \nFAAC-induced liquidity, fiscal injections remain another potent source of \nexcess liquidity. Excessive liquidity, if not well managed can pose a latent \nthreat to exchange rate stability and the disinflation success. The \napproaching 2026 budget cycle and the early shadow of the 2027 electoral \nseason, which may fuel higher government consumption/expenditure, \nunderscore the imperative for monetary policy to maintain a firm, anti-\ninflationary stance to prevent a derailment of our hard-won disinflation gains. \nThat was the reason I chose a modest slack in policy rate to encourage \nfinancial sector operators channel credit to productive sectors to boost \naggregate production during the festive seasons. \n \n \n19 \n \nNigeria \nstands \nat \nan \nimportant \njuncture \ntoday \nas \nfundamental \nmacroeconomic indices continue to improve: policy reforms have begun to \nrestore investor trust, general consumer prices are declining, non-oil export \nbasket and procedure is improving, reserves are recovering, and external \nliquidity conditions are gradually improving. So far, the durability of these \ngains depends on whether the economy can transit away from random \ninflows toward a foundation built on economic productivity, institutional \ncredibility, and export diversification. Achieving this shift will transform \nNigeria’s external reserves from a fragile buffer into a strategic asset capable \nof supporting macroeconomic stability, long-term growth, and sustained \neconomic resilience. \nTo this end, I am of the opinion that a bold, strategic hold for most \nparameters is the most prudent policy action at this meeting. A small ease in \nMPR, strongly reinforced by adjusted rate corridors will strengthen critical \nsectors and help to moderate the risk of high inflation expectations. Also, a \nrate ease could improve the growth momentum and boost the current \npositive sentiment in the capital market. \nTherefore, I voted to reduce the MPR to reaffirm our unwavering commitment \nto inclusive growth and price stability. The adjustment of the standing facility \ncorridor to +50/-450 bps is a critical, complementary operational tool. \nNarrowing the deposit-taking window to -450bps reduce the incentive for \nbanks to place idle liquidity with the CBN, enhancing the effectiveness of our \nintention to increase credit to real sector economy. I support retaining the \nCRR measures introduced in September. The 75 per cent CRR on non-TSA \ndeposits is essential for continued sterilisation of public sector liquidity at its \nsource. Maintaining the 45 per cent CRR for deposit money banks provides \nthem the operational flexibility to manage this new regime and, over time, re-\norient portfolios towards more productive lending. \n4.0 Conclusion \nThe current policy mix supports the structural balance needed for economic \ngrowth. It allows previous policy actions more time to fully transmit through \nthe Nigerian economy; it can further strengthen the moderation of fiscal-\ndriven liquidity, helps sustain a tight monetary environment to further \nentrench the current disinflation trend. \nWe must remain vigilant by continuing to monitor the impact of these liquidity \nmeasures closely and stand ready to make adjustments the when necessary. \nI reiterate the need for strengthened collaboration with the fiscal authorities \nto ensure spending efficiency and to fast-track on-going structural reforms, \nparticularly in power, agriculture, infrastructure and logistics, to address the \n \n20 \n \nsupply-side drivers of inflation. Our communication must also remain clear \nand consistent to firmly anchor inflation expectations. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n21 \n \n \n5. EMEM USORO \nAt the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) held on November 24 - 25, 2025, I \nvoted to: \ni. Retain the MPR at 27% \nii. Adjust the Asymmetric Corridor from +250/-250 basis points to +50/-450 \nbasis points around the MPR. \niii. Retain the CRR for commercial banks deposits at 45%, a 75% CRR on \nnon-TSA public deposit, CRR for merchant banks at 16%; and \niv. Retain the LR at 30.0%. \nThis policy adjustment reflects my recognition of recent progress in \nmacroeconomic stabilization, and the importance of maintaining financial \nsystem resilience amid moderating inflation and improving external \nconditions. \nRecent developments in the global and domestic economy point to a \ncautiously improving macroeconomic environment, although characterised \nby persistent vulnerabilities that require a disciplined and forward-looking \nmonetary policy stance. Externally, there has been a gradual easing in global \ninflation, supported by softening food and energy prices, and improvements \nin supply chain efficiency, supported in part by new technologies, better \nlogistics architecture, and productivity gains from AI adoption. Business \nconfidence \nindicators \nglobally \nhave \nstrengthened, \nwith \nPurchasing \nManagers’ Index (PMI) readings signalling expansion in both manufacturing \nand services, following earlier periods of contraction. \nHowever, volatility persists as geopolitical concerns remain elevated, and \nmajor central banks continue to navigate complex policy trade-offs. \nAlthough major central banks have signalled caution regarding future policy \ndirections, the global monetary environment is still relatively tight, with \nmarkets sensitive to unexpected policy signals and asset-price volatility. \nCommodity markets provide mixed signals, with crude oil prices declining \ndue to weaker demand from China and robust non-OPEC supply, while gold \nprices have strengthened on account of flight-to-safety positions. \nWithin this challenging external environment, domestic indicators suggest \nmomentum is gradually strengthening. High-frequency data show continued \nexpansion in business activity, with industrial output moving from contraction \nto modest growth on the back of improved domestic demand and \n \n22 \n \nenhanced productivity in the oil sector. Inflation continues to moderate, with \nnotable disinflation in the food component due to improved harvest \nconditions, easing logistics bottlenecks, and relative exchange-rate stability. \nInvestor confidence appears stronger, reflected in risk-on sentiments. External \nbuffers have strengthened, with gross reserves reaching about post-\npandemic highs, supporting a more resilient FX market. Broad money supply \ngrew, fuelled by an increase in net foreign assets, and improvements in \nreserve money. These gains indicate visible progress in stabilising the \nmacroeconomic environment. \nNotwithstanding the improvement, several pressure points remain evident. \nInflation expectations are yet to be fully anchored, given that disinflation has \nso far been driven primarily by supply-side conditions rather than monetary \ntransmission. The exchange rate, while currently stable, remains vulnerable to \nseasonal demand pressure, domestic security concerns, and shifts in global \nrisk sentiment. Equally important is concerns around the sensitivity of foreign \nportfolio flows to external narratives, particularly recent geopolitical \ncommentary and security-related statements from advanced economies, \nwhich can influence FX demand and investor confidence. \nIn addition, monetary and financial stability indicators present a mixed \npicture. On one hand, capital adequacy and liquidity ratios improved, \nsupported by recapitalisation activities. On the other hand, asset quality \ndeterioration and rising contagion exposure reflects growing liquidity \npreference among banks and uneven distribution of reserves. Empirical stress-\ntest highlight the susceptibility of the banking system to moderate shocks, \nparticularly given contagion exposure. These trends require carefully \ncalibrated tools that recognise the endogenous nature of money and credit. \nFrom a policy perspective, liquidity conditions have improved following the \nintroduction of the 75% CRR on non-TSA deposits. However, seasonal fiscal \nflows during December and January, along with election-related spending \nand end-of-year liquidity movements, pose risks to current conditions and \ncould amplify the already existing imbalance, thus, placing pressure on both \nmoney-market rates and the exchange rate. \nIn view of these factors, maintaining a restrictive monetary policy stance \nremains appropriate. Retaining the Monetary Policy Rate at 27% reinforces \nanti-inflation signalling and supports the disinflation trajectory without \njeopardising recent gains. Adjusting the corridor is consistent with managing \nupward rate volatility and discouraging passive liquidity parking in the \nstanding deposit window, while promoting interbank activity. This operational \nrefinement aligns with the Committee’s broader aim of controlled \n \n23 \n \nnormalisation, helping maintain monetary discipline without imposing \nadditional contraction on an economy. \nLooking forward, my vote at the next meeting will depend on whether inflation \nexpectations remain anchored given the expected base-effect rebound in the \nfirst quarter of 2026; FX stability is supported by adequate liquidity and external \nbuffers, and whether credit transmission improves as the bankingsystem \nconditions normalise. Thus, continuous monitoring of inflation expectations, FX \nstability, NPL evolution, and interbank liquidity distribution will be essential. \nEnhancing liquidity forecasting, refining CRR operations, and deploying \ntargeted macroprudential interventions, rather than relying solely on interest-\nrate tools, will be critical to supporting financial stability and sustaining recovery. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n24 \n \n6. LYDIA SHEHU JAFIYA \nIntroduction \nAt the 303rd meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), I voted to \nmaintain all policy parameters at their extant levels: \n1. Retain the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) at 27.0 per cent. \n2. Retain the Standing Facilities corridor around the MPR at +250/-250 basis \npoints. \n3. Maintain the Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) for Commercial Banks and \nMerchant Banks at 45.0 and16.0 per cent, respectively. \nRetain the CRR on non-TSA public sector deposits at 60.0 per cent. \n4. Maintain the Liquidity Ratio at 30.0 per cent. \nTHE GLOBAL ECONOMY \nGlobal economic growth is forecast to slow to 3.2 and 3.1 per cent in 2025 \nand 2026, respectively, (World Economic Outlook, October 2025). Though, \nslightly better than the June 2025 WEO projections, growth remains below the \nworld’s expectations. While better financial conditions and reduced \ncontroversies over tariffs provide strong impetus for growth, prolonged policy \nuncertainties, trade fragmentation, and fiscal vulnerabilities remain key risks \nto the global outlook. \nGlobal headline inflation is projected to moderate to 4.2 and 3.7 per cent in \n2025 and 2026, respectively, from 5.7 per cent in 2024 (WEO, October 2025). \nThe outlook is on account of easing demand pressures, lower energy prices, \nmoderating supply chain disruptions and de-escalation of geopolitical crisis. \nInflation outcomes have shown divergences among major advanced \neconomies. Likewise, in Emerging Markets and Developing Economies \n(EMDEs) disinflation is expected to continue with notable variations across \ncountries. \nGlobal trade is forecast to grow by 0.3 percentage points to 2.9 percent in \n2025 and 2026, apiece. This is supported by some clarity around tariff regimes, \nincluding renewed momentum of reforms across the globe and increased \nproduction enabled by artificial intelligence. Downside risks to global trade \ninclude increasing economic fragmentation, financial market fragility, labour \nsupply shocks and lingering geopolitical tensions. \nFinancial conditions eased as major economies cut interest rates in response \nto inflation moderation. Exchange rates of several economies particularly in \nEMDEs improved as the US dollar fluctuated. Global debt rose in the second \nquarter of 2025 largely due to the spillover effects of accommodative fiscal \n \n25 \n \nand monetary policies associated with the Covid-19 pandemic, including \ndebt service costs. Capital flows to EMDEs remained positive as Advanced \nEconomies sustained monetary policy easing. \nTHE DOMESTIC ECONOMY \nReal Gross Domestic Product (year-on-year) maintained an upward \ntrajectory, following the growth rate of 4.23 per cent in the second quarter of \n2025, compared with 3.13 per cent in the first quarter of 2025. Growth \nperformance was supported by the improvement in the Composite \nPurchasing Manager’s Index (PMI) which increased to 56.4 index points in \nNovember 2025, above the 50.0 index points benchmark, signaling a \nsustained growth outlook for the subsequent quarters in 2025. Growth \nperformance remained above the rate of growth of the population. \nHeadline inflation (year-on-year) declined to 16.05 per cent in October 2025, \nfrom 18.02 per cent in September, driven by a moderation in both food and \ncore inflation. Food inflation (year-on-year) fell sharply to 13.12 per cent in \nOctober 2025 from 16.87 per cent in September on account of improved \nfood supply, aided by the harvest season. Similarly, core inflation moderated \nto 18.69 per cent (year-on-year) in October 2025, from 19.53 per cent in the \npreceding month, owing largely to a stable exchange rate and improvement \nin domestic fuel supplies. \nOn the external sector, gross external reserves increased by 9.19 per cent, \nreaching a high of US$46.70 billion on November 14, 2025, from US$42.77 \nbillion at end-September 2025. The reserves are adequate to cover 10.3 \nmonths of import of goods and services. The foreign exchange rate has \nremained stable, supported by improved market liquidity, enhanced policy \ncoordination, and positive market sentiment. \nThe prudential indicators of the banking system are largely within regulatory \nrequirements. The outlook is significantly positive given the success recorded \nwith the banking system recapitalization exercise and the central bank’s \ncommitment to regulatory best practices and effective risk management. \nCONSIDERATIONS FOR VOTING \nThe November 2025 MPC meeting was held against the backdrop of \nsustained improvement in domestic macroeconomic conditions, including \nrapidly moderating price levels, positive economic growth rate, continuous \nstability in the foreign exchange market, and comfortable external reserves \nposition. Other developments include improved sovereign ratings by Fitch \nand Standard & Poor’s, and the removal of Nigeria from the Financial Action \nTask Force (FATF) Grey List, amongst others. \n \n26 \n \nThese achievements reflect the policy trade-offs undertaken by the monetary \nand fiscal authorities, which have improved public and market confidence \nby enhancing policy signaling, reducing uncertainty, and supporting \nconditions for a stable environment for sustainable economic growth. \nIt is noteworthy that, since its February 2024 meeting, the Monetary Policy \nCommittee has pursued a policy mix designed to balance competing \nobjectives, particularly those of disinflation and growth acceleration. The \nrapid deceleration of inflation affirms the central bank’s commitment to its \nprice and monetary stability objective. \nAlthough the recent stabilization in domestic macroeconomic conditions \nsuggests that a reduction in the policy rate may be optimal, the available \npolicy space remains constrained. However, with inflation still elevated at \n16.05 per cent, there is need to tread cautiously as the risk to the outlook is on \nthe upside. \nIndeed, there is a need to remain data-driven and continue to assess the \nbalance of risks and how they could impact the economy in the near to \nmedium term, particularly given the volatile external environment. It is \nnoteworthy that year-end festivities and pre-election activities are risk factors \nthat could impact inflation in the near to medium term. Accordingly, it is \nappropriate to hold policy parameters at their current levels, while continuing \nto monitor emerging risks and adjust as necessary. \nOverall, the fiscal authority remains committed to policy coordination, fiscal \nsustainability and structural reforms that creates room for predictable taxes \nand investment climate to boost economic growth and job creation. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n27 \n \n7. LAMIDO ABUBAKAR YUGUDA \nPolicy Decision and Rationale \nAt the 303rd Monetary Policy Committee meeting held on November 24 and \n25, 2025, I voted to: \na) reduce the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) by 50 basis points to 26.50 \npercent; \nb) adjust the Standing Facility corridor to +50/-450 basis points around the \nMPR; \nc) retain the Cash Reserve Requirement at 45 percent for Deposit Money \nBanks, 16 percent for Merchant Banks, and 75 percent for non-TSA \npublic sector deposits; and \nd) maintain the Liquidity Ratio at 30 percent. \nThe case for modest monetary easing at this juncture rests on compelling \nevidence of significant progress in the disinflation trajectory and improving \nmacroeconomic conditions that warrant a carefully calibrated policy \nadjustment. \nEconomic Performance and Disinflation Progress \nThe most compelling argument for the rate reduction is the substantial \ndisinflation achieved over recent months. Headline inflation declined sharply \nto 16.05 percent in October 2025 from 18.02 percent in September, marking \nthe seventh consecutive month of decline. This represents over 4 percent \nreduction in headline inflation within a four-month window, reflecting the \neffective transmission of previous monetary policy tightening measures \nimplemented at earlier meetings. \nThe disinflation has been broad-based across all inflation measures. Food \ninflation fell significantly to 13.12 percent in October from 16.87 percent in \nSeptember, driven by improved domestic food supply and stable exchange \nrate conditions. Concurrently, core inflation moderated to 18.69 percent from \n19.53 percent, primarily due to declining prices in furnishing and household \nmaintenance categories. \nDomestic Economic Conditions \nReal economic activity demonstrates resilience with real GDP growth of 3.98 \npercent year-on-year in the third quarter of 2025. While this represents a \ndeceleration from the 4.23 percent recorded in Q2 2025, it reflects a marked \nimprovement over the 3.13 percent achieved in Q1 2025 and exceeds the \n3.86 percent posted in Q3 2024. This sustained positive trajectory, despite the \n \n28 \n \nmoderation, underscores the underlying strength of the economy and \nprovides confidence in the growth outlook. \nGrowth has been broad-based across key non-oil sectors, which contributed \n96.56 percent to real GDP. The services sector expanded by 4.15 percent \nand accounted for 53.02 percent of total real GDP, reflecting sustained \nstrength in telecommunications, financial services, and real estate. \nAgriculture grew by 3.79 percent, while the industrial sector expanded by \n3.77 percent. Overall, the non-oil sector grew by 3.91 percent in real terms, \noutperforming both the 3.79 percent recorded in Q3 2024 and the 3.64 \npercent achieved in Q2 2025. \nThe oil sector recorded real growth of 5.84 percent year-on-year in Q3 2025, \nwith crude oil production averaging 1.64 million barrels per day, reflecting \n11.6 percent year-on-year improvement compared to 1.47 million barrels per \nday in Q3 2024. However, oil sector growth decelerated sharply from the \n20.46 percent expansion recorded in Q2 2025, and on a quarter-on-quarter \nbasis, the sector contracted by 5.53 percent, reflecting the volatility \ncharacteristic of the oil industry. \nThe Purchasing Managers' Index reached 56.4 points in November 2025, the \nhighest level in five years, signaling strengthened business activity and \npositive growth prospects for the remainder of 2025. \nBroad money growth strengthened from 3.91 percent (year-to-date) in \nSeptember to 5.01 percent in October 2025, supported largely by gains in net \nforeign assets \nThe external sector has remained robust, with gross external reserves rising by \n4.52 percent to US$44.26 billion as of November 21, 2025, from US$42.35 billion \nat end-September. This level provides adequate cover for approximately 10.3 \nmonths of imports, reinforcing external stability. The stronger reserve position \nreflects a surplus current account balance and sustained capital inflows, \nwhich have supported exchange rate stability and contributed to the \nongoing disinflationary trend. \nGlobal Macroeconomic Environment \nThe global backdrop provides further support for monetary accommodation. \nThe US Federal Reserve has initiated rate cuts in its policy cycle, and a weaker \nUS dollar has emerged as global monetary policy shifts toward greater \naccommodation, particularly in advanced economies. These developments \nare expected to enhance foreign portfolio investment flows to Nigeria, \nparticularly given the relative attractiveness of domestic yields and the \nrecent sovereign credit rating upgrades from S&P and Fitch. The delisting of \n \n29 \n \nNigeria from the FATF grey list further strengthens the investment climate and \ninvestor confidence. \nGlobal inflation continues its steady decline trajectory, supported by past \nmonetary tightening in major economies, gradual supply chain stabilization, \nand softening commodity prices. However, global uncertainty persists \nregarding protectionism, geoeconomic fragmentation, and potential trade \ntensions that could affect global demand. \nAssessment of Previous Policy Actions and Near-term Outlook \nThe MPC's decision at its previous meeting to reduce the Cash Reserve \nRequirement by 500 basis points to 45 percent for Deposit Money Banks \nrepresented a significant injection of liquidity into the financial system. This \nsubstantial easing measure, which was only slightly dampened by the \nintroduction of a 75 percent CRR on non-TSA public sector deposits (which \naffects only about 6 percent of total banking sector deposits), has provided \nconsiderable monetary accommodation. \nHowever, given the steady deceleration in inflation and the lagged effects of \nprevious policy tightening, there is merit in allowing a measured reduction in \nthe MPR. Data indicate that the disinflationary process remains on track, \nsupported by exchange rate stability, improved food supply conditions, and \nthe anticipated seasonal harvest cycle expected to further moderate food \nprices. \nRisk Factors and Considerations \nNevertheless, significant downside risks warrant close monitoring and \npotentially constrain further rate cuts. Exchange rate depreciation pressures \nremain, as persistent foreign exchange demand continues despite steady \nreserve accumulation and capital inflows. The volatility inherent in foreign \nportfolio investment flows, which have become a significant source of capital \ninflows, creates potential fragility in external stability. \nOn the domestic front, several concerns warrant attention. The substantial \nliquidity injection from the CRR reduction may create inflationary pressures if \nnot carefully managed, particularly as the economy enters peak expenditure \nperiods including election-related spending. Real yields on government \nsecurities remain negative, which could distort financial intermediation and \ninvestment decisions. The security situation in certain parts of the country \ncontinues to pose challenges to economic activity and agricultural \nproduction, while oil sector headwinds including the volatility in oil production \nand external demand limit the sector's contribution to growth. \n \n30 \n \nThe implementation of the recent tax and tariff regime, including the 15 \npercent import duty on oil products, presents uncertainty regarding real \nsector adjustment and its ultimate inflationary impact. These structural \nchallenges suggest that underlying inflationary risks persist beneath the \nsurface of current headline disinflation. \nConclusion \nThe modest 50 basis point rate reduction reflects a nuanced assessment of \nNigeria's current economic position. The evidence of significant disinflation, \nresilient economic growth driven by broad-based non-oil sector expansion, \nimproved external stability, and favorable global monetary conditions justifies \na cautious move toward less restrictive policy. However, the decision must be \nweighed against the need to continue monitoring inflation developments, \nparticularly regarding the potential for renewed pressure from fiscal \nspending, currency depreciation, or supply-side shocks. The MPC must remain \nvigilant in balancing the need to support economic growth with the \noverriding objective of achieving low and stable inflation, particularly given \nthe persistent underlying risks that could reverse recent disinflation gains. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n31 \n \n8. MUHAMMAD SANI ABDULLAHI \nMy Vote \nThe November 2025 meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) came \nat a crucial time, as the cumulative effects of earlier policy actions have \nbegun to manifest in measurable improvements in key macroeconomic \nindicators: Headline inflation decelerated further in October, its seventh \nconsecutive month of moderation; external reserves have strengthened \nsignificantly; real output has expanded for three straight quarters; and the \nexchange rates have remained broadly stable for over fourteen months. \nCollectively, \nthese \ndevelopments \nunderscore \ngrowing \ntraction \nin \nmacroeconomic \nfundamentals \nand \njustify \na \ncontained \ndata-driven \napproach to policy calibration. \nIn the last four meetings, I submitted that the overarching objective of \nsafeguarding long-term macroeconomic stability remains paramount. At this \n303rd meeting, however, the MPC is confronted with persistent excess \nliquidity in the banking system, evidenced by substantial placements at the \nstanding deposit facility (SDF) window and compounded by the liquidity \nimpact from maturing OMO bills. \nThis excess liquidity risks diluting the effectiveness of our tight monetary policy \nstance and undermines efforts to control inflation, requiring consideration of \nenhanced OMO operations and improved monitoring of monetary \naggregates like M1 to preserve policy credibility. Accordingly, addressing the \npersistent excess liquidity in the banking system should remain a priority. \nData and their underlying drivers have continued to be the key guiding \nprinciples of my votes at all MPC meetings. Therefore, at this meeting, I will \nalso be guided strictly by data, and the need to consolidate the current \nmomentum to sustain credibility and foster growth-supportive measures that \nwill enhance growth performance for the remainder of 2025 and throughout \n2026, given policy lags. \nIn the current context, my assessment is that additional tightening at this \nstage could undermine the ongoing recovery by suppressing credit, raising \nborrowing costs, and discouraging investment. With the decision at previous \nmeetings still gaining traction, maintaining the current stance allows the \neconomy to consolidate these gains. This decision is consistent with my \nassessment of the current situation and strengthens confidence in the \ndirection, impact, and effectiveness of the ongoing policy measures. \nSpecifically, I voted to: \n1. Retain the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) at 27.00 per cent. \n \n32 \n \n2. Adjust the Standing Facilities corridor around the MPR to +100/-\n450 basis points. \n3. Retain the Cash Reserve Ratio of Deposit Money Banks at 45.0 \nper cent that of Merchant Banks at 16 per cent. \n4. Retain a 75 per cent CRR on non-TSA public sector deposits. \n5. Keep the Liquidity Ratio unchanged at 30.00 per cent. \n \nMy Considerations \nSeveral of the constraints identified earlier in the year have largely abated, as \nreflected in recent macro-financial indicators. Headline inflation has begun \nto decelerate, exchange rate pressures have eased, and real output growth \nas well as consumer and business sentiment remain on a positive trajectory. \nThe period also recorded upgrades in sovereign credit assessments by major \nrating agencies and Nigeria’s removal from the FATF Grey List, further \nstrengthening the macroeconomic risk profile. \nAt 27%, the monetary policy rate (MPR) remains sufficiently elevated and has \ndirectly impacted borrowing costs and yields during the year 2025. Analysis of \nkey macroeconomic indicators suggest that the economy is responding \ngradually to previous tightening measures, and therefore no further action is \nwarranted even currently. Additionally, evidence from price, output, and \nexchange-rate \ndevelopments \nindicates \nthat \nthe \ncurrent \nstance \nis \nappropriately restrictive. We have seen inflation slowing for the seventh \nconsecutive month, an indication that policy transmission is underway. This \ngenerally pushed bond yields down as the real return increases. Albeit a, \nstronger GDP growth could further improve these yields. \nInflation Trends and Dynamics \nData released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) using the 2024 base \nyear, showed the notable progress around inflation dynamics with the \nseventh consecutive month of observed decline in headline inflation. \nHeadline inflation moderated further in October 2025, declining to 16.05% \nfrom 18.02% recorded in September 2025. \nOther key underlying components of headline inflation have shown clear \ndisinflation momentum: for example, food inflation fell sharply to 13.12% from \n16.87%, \nreflecting \neasing \nsupply \npressures \nand \nimproving domestic \nproduction conditions. Core inflation declined to 18.69% from 19.53%, \ndemonstrating that monetary tightening is softening demand-side pressures. \nConsequently, these movements signal that the restrictive policy stance is \n \n33 \n \nalready curbing underlying inflation, and further tightening may risk over-\ncorrecting and harming the recovery. \nBoth core and food inflation decreased in October 2025 to 18.69% and \n13.12% from 19.53 and 16.87%, respectively. The observed continued decline \nin headline inflation is attributable to significant decrease in energy prices \nand deceleration in the Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages sector, which \naccounts for 8.89% year-on-year contribution. The share of imported food in \nthe inflation basket also declined to 9.63% from 12.93% in September on \naccount of stability in the FX market. \nReal output growth accelerated to 4.23% in Q2 2025, up from 3.13% in Q1. This \nsuggest that output conditions are improving and need to be supported by \nour actions at this meeting. The forecast shows possible improvements for the \nthird and fourth quarter of 2025. This improvement shows strengthening \neconomic fundamentals, particularly in non-oil sectors. \nThe data from the foreign exchange market shows that exchange rate \npressures are moderating. The exchange rate has largely stabilized, reflecting \nimproved foreign exchange market liquidity and reduced speculative \nactivity. Developments in the foreign exchange market have also been \nsupported by the increase in gross external reserves to US$46.70 billion as of \n14th November 2025 from US$42.77 billion at end-September 2025. This will \nsupport the current account as it can support over 10 months of import for \ngoods and services. \nThis current trajectory of headline is consistent with the prevailing tight \nmonetary policy stance, thereby reinforcing the policy transmission \nmechanism and providing a complementary response to other fiscal \nmeasures. \n \nMonth-on-month, headline inflation rose to 0.93% in October 2025 from 0.72% \nin September 2025, driven largely by food prices which increased to -0.37% \nfrom -1.57% over the same period. Similarly, core inflation inched up to 1.33% \nin October from 1.32% in September, indicating persistent underlying price \npressures in the non-food segment. \n \nFindings from the Staff Household Expectation Survey (HES) in October 2025 \nindicate an improvement in consumer price expectations, with households \nanticipating a continued deceleration in inflation over the next three to six \nmonths. In tandem with the HES, results from the Business Expectations Survey \n(BES) \nshowed \nthat \nall \nfirms \nexpressed \noptimism \nregarding \nthe \nmacroeconomy. Current policies will continue to support these positive \nbusiness sentiments across key sectors. The October 2025 Purchasing \n \n34 \n \nManagers’ Index (PMI) showed business activities remained in expansion as \nPMI stood at 55.4 index points compared with 54.0 index points in \nSeptember. \nGiven the recent improvements in key macroeconomic indicators and the \nneed to reinforce these gains, policy credibility will remain a central priority. \nAchieving this will require addressing the residual gaps in policy transmission \nand coordination. Accordingly, enhanced and sustained alignment across \nmonetary, fiscal, and structural policy frameworks will be essential to \nconsolidate macroeconomic stability and anchor a durable disinflation \ntrajectory \nOutlook \nReal GDP growth is expected to remain positive and broad-based through \nthe remainder of 2025, underpinned by sustained expansion in the services \nsector, the impact of ongoing fiscal reforms, expected recovery in oil \nproduction and continuing structural shifts in the composition of aggregate \noutput. \nThe inflation outlook indicates a possible spike at the end of the year due to \nDecember 2024 base effect. It is expected to moderate thereafter. However, \nthe outlook for the month-on-month headline inflation suggests further \nmoderation in headline as the effect of the previous MPC decisions continue \nto permeate through the system with significant outcomes. Additionally, \nstability has been sustained in the FX market, and the rebased GDP data \nshowed a positive growth for the second consecutive quarter at 4.32 per \ncent in Q2 2025. \n \nThe fiscal outlook remains broadly stable, underpinned by moderate revenue \nexpansion during the review period. Nonetheless, measures aimed at \nstrengthening revenue mobilization, rebuilding fiscal buffers, and entrenching \na more resilient medium-term fiscal framework for the remainder of 2025 and \nbeyond require sustained consolidation. \nThe near-term outlook for the naira is broadly stable, despite heightened \nglobal risks and its potential impact on key foreign exchange inflow channels. \nThe outlook is supported by favourable crude oil price dynamics and \nsustained stability in the foreign exchange market. \nSupported by adherence to regulatory best practices and a strengthened \nrisk management architecture, the Nigerian banking sector remains resilient. \nAsset quality indicators continue to stabilize, and broader prudential metrics \n \n35 \n \nremain within regulatory tolerance bands, underscoring the system’s overall \nrobustness. \nExpected inflationary dynamics driven by increased seasonal or transitory \ndemand shocks associated with festive-season consumption, persistent \nsupply-side cost pass-through, and statistical base-effect distortions arising \nfrom the recent CPI rebasing could mechanically elevate the measured \nyear-on-year inflation rate, thereby contributing to a likely uptick in Nigeria’s \nheadline inflation for December 2025 relative to underlying trend inflation. \nGiven that inflation indicators are improving, and the exchange rate is \nrelatively stable, the marginal benefits of additional tightening are limited \ncompared with the potential economic costs. Based on the trends in \ninflation, output, and exchange rate stability, the current monetary policy \nstance remains appropriate, and no further action should be taken at this \ntime. Keeping the MPR and other parameters at their current levels will sustain \ndisinflation trends, encourage growth and preserve financial market stability. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n36 \n \n9. MURTALA SABO SAGAGI \nContext \nNigeria's economic performance is slowly but gradually improving, especially \nas it relates meeting inflation and growth projections. Current indicators \nreveal a marked moderation in inflationary pressures, attributable to the \nlagged effects of previously implemented aggressive monetary policy \nmeasures and substantial decline in food prices. These outcomes underscore \nthe \neffectiveness \nof \nearlier \npolicy \ninterventions \nin \nstabilizing \nkey \nmacroeconomic variables which are key to laying a solid foundation for \nsustainable economic development. However, it is imperative to evaluate \nthe forward-looking implications within the context of the approaching \nyuletide season and the 2026 pre-election year— periods historically \nassociated with substantial liquidity expansion. This assessment must carefully \nbalance the imperative for price stability and the urgent need to fast track \ninclusive growth, which is fundamental to elevating living standards and \nreducing the nation's persistent security challenges. Given that the full \ntransmission effects of prior monetary tightening measures are yet to \nmaterialize, a calibrated policy easing could suffice. Such a strategic \nadjustment would catalyse the requisite economic expansion while \nmaintaining macroeconomic stability, and it is this rationale that informs my \npolicy perspective at this critical moment. \nGlobal and Domestic Economic Environment \nGlobal Context \nThe ongoing wave of monetary policy easing across the global landscape \npresents significant opportunities for emerging market economies like Nigeria \nto attract much-needed capital inflows for developmental financing. As \ncentral banks, particularly in advanced economies, transition from restrictive \nto more accommodative monetary stances, global liquidity conditions are \nimproving, creating favorable condition for portfolio and foreign direct \ninvestment flows into developing nations. To fully capitalize on these evolving \ndynamics, Nigeria's domestic policy framework must be strategically aligned \nto enhance the country's attractiveness as an investment destination, \nthereby channeling these potential inflows toward critical infrastructure \ndevelopment and productive sectors of the economy. \nNevertheless, there is a need for careful attention to the shifting geopolitical \nand economic landscape, particularly the evolving balance of power in \ninternational trade relations between the United States and its major trading \npartners, alongside the rising tide of protectionist sentiment gaining traction \nacross various jurisdictions. These developments carry significant implications \nfor global trade flows, supply chain configurations, and cross-border \n \n37 \n \ninvestment \npatterns. \nNotwithstanding \nthese \ncomplexities, \nthe \nearlier \nmonetary tightening measures across economies are expected to sustain \ndisinflation while supporting moderate output recovery—a pattern consistent \nwith Nigeria's recent macroeconomic performance. This convergence of \nglobal monetary easing and gradual economic stabilization provides a \nconducive environment for emerging markets to pursue growth-oriented \npolicies while maintaining prudent macroeconomic management. \nDomestic Environment \nOn the domestic front, Nigeria's economy continues to exhibit encouraging \nmacroeconomic trends, with inflation demonstrating sustained moderation \nwhile economic growth maintains positive momentum. Headline inflation has \ndeclined for the seventh consecutive month, reaching 16.02 percent by the \nend of October 2025, from higher levels in preceding months. This disinflation \nhas been broad-based, with food inflation moderating to 13.12 percent and \ncore inflation declining to 18.69 percent over the same period. These \nfavorable developments are primarily attributable to improved food supply \nconditions, relative exchange rate stability, and increased availability of \nessential household items. Notably, the disinflationary trajectory was \nachieved without compromising economic expansion, as real GDP growth \naccelerated to 4.23 percent in Q2 2025 from 3.13 percent in Q1 2025, \nreflecting strengthening economic momentum across key sectors. \nFurther reinforcing the positive economic outlook, the Purchasing Managers' \nIndex (PMI) increased significantly to 56.4 points in November 2025—the \nhighest reading in five years and well above the 50-point threshold that \ndelineates expansion from contraction. This robust PMI performance signals \ngrowing \nbusiness \nconfidence, \nexpanding \nproduction capacity, \nand \nimproved demand conditions across the private sector, collectively \nunderscoring the economy's progressive trajectory and the effectiveness of \nrecent policy interventions in fostering a conducive environment for \nsustainable economic growth. \nAdditional positive macroeconomic developments include a substantial \nstrengthening of Nigeria's external reserve position, which rose from US$42.77 \nbillion at the end of September 2025 to US$46.70 billion by November 14, \n2025. \nThese developments have significantly bolstered both domestic and \ninternational investor confidence in the Nigerian economy, as evidenced by \nimprovements in capital inflows. Gross capital importation increased from \nUS$5.089 billion in Q4 2024 to US$5.642 billion in Q1 2025, reflecting enhanced \ninvestor sentiment and perceptions of reduced country risk. Furthermore, \nNigeria's removal from international watch lists and the growing recognition \n \n38 \n \nof its improved macroeconomic fundamentals underscore the credibility \ngains achieved through consistent policy implementation. Collectively, these \nindicators demonstrate that structural reforms and improved economic \nmanagement are yielding measurable dividends in terms of external sector \nresilience, market confidence, and the economy's integration into global \nfinancial markets. However, more needs to be done in restoring public and \nprivate sectors trust in governance. Equally, fiscal dominance and excessive \nspending on non-critical projects must be addressed. \nMajor Economic Considerations \nConsidering the foregoing, the indicators collectively suggest that the \nfinancial \necosystem \ncan \nabsorb \na \nless \nrestrictive \nstance \nwithout \ncompromising price or exchange rate stability, thereby facilitating a strategic \nshift toward growth-oriented policies. Specific diagnosis of the developments \nin the economy is as follows: \n1. Domestic Macroeconomic Stability \nThe domestic environment presents evidence of stability and resilience, \nweakening the rationale for continued aggressive tightening: \n• \nSustained Disinflationary Trajectory: Headline inflation has shown \nsustained moderation, declining for the seventh consecutive month to \n16.02 percent. This trend indicates that earlier restrictive measures are \nyielding results and that current price pressures are manageable, providing \nscope for policy adjustment. \n• \nAccelerated Economic Growth Momentum: Real GDP growth \naccelerated significantly by 4.23 percent in Q2 2025 from 3.13 percent in \nQ1 2025. This strengthening economic momentum suggests the economy is \nrobust and capable of absorbing a modest stimulus to sustain or further \nboost output expansion without immediately triggering a significant \ninflationary spiral. \n• \nRobust Business Confidence: The PMI signals growing business \nconfidence and expanding production capacity, indicating that a mild \nloosening would align with and reinforce the positive private sector \ntrajectory. \n2. Enhanced External Sector Resilience \nStrengthened external buffers and market stability will mitigate the risks (such \nas capital flight and currency depreciation) traditionally associated with \nmonetary easing in emerging markets: \n3. Strategic Global Alignment \n \n39 \n \nThe global economic environment provides a strategic opportunity for policy \nalignment. The continuation of the wave of global disinflation supports a \nmoderate worldwide output recovery, creating a conducive environment for \nemerging markets to pursue growth-oriented policies while maintaining \nprudent macroeconomic management. \n4. Limited Near-Term Headwinds: While medium-term challenges persist, the \nimmediate headwinds facing the economy at this meeting are not too \nsignificant. Global conditions remain supportive, domestic supply-side factors \ncontinue to improve, the harvest season should sustain food price \nmoderation, and exchange rate stability appears well-anchored. This \nconfluence of favorable factors creates an appropriate window for policy \nrecalibration. \n5. Real Interest Rate Considerations: Even with headline inflation at 16.05 per \ncent, the current MPR of 27.00 per cent implies a real interest rate exceeding \n10.5 percentage points. This represents an extraordinarily restrictive stance \nthat, while appropriate during the acute phase of inflation, may now be \nunnecessarily constraining economic activity without delivering additional \ndisinflationary benefits, given the lagged nature of monetary transmission. \n \nMy Vote \n• Monetary Policy Rate (MPR): Reduction by 50 basis points to 26.50 per \ncent \nI therefore vote for a 50 basis point reduction in the MPR to spur growth. \n• Standing Facilities Corridor: Adjustment to +50/-450 basis points \n(Asymmetric structure) \n• This decision is appropriate at this time as an asymmetric corridor in this \nmanner can help to tighten liquidity conditions significantly on the \ndeposit side, support exchange rate stability, and disciplined liquidity \nmanagement. \n• Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR): Maintained at 45.0 per cent for Deposit \nMoney Banks, 16.0 per cent for Merchant Banks, and 75.0 per cent for \nnon-TSA public sector deposits. \n• Liquidity Ratio: Maintained at 30.00 per cent \nRecommendations \nWhile \nmonetary \npolicy \nhas \nresponded \nappropriately \nto \nevolving \nmacroeconomic conditions, the pathway to sustainable inclusive growth \nrequires \nrenewed \nfiscal \ndiscipline \nand \ngrowth-enhancing \npolicy \nimplementation to prevent the reversal of the achieved gains. Hence, there is \na need to pay closer attention to the following: \n \n \n40 \n \nI. Renewed Effort on Food Security \nNigeria cannot achieve sustainable development while relying primarily on \nsubsistence agriculture and food imports. This requires substantial public \ninvestment, private sector partnership, and policy consistency over multiple \nyears to transform agricultural productivity and value chains. \nIII. Enhanced Fiscal Discipline \nWith public debt reaching ₦152.39 trillion (Q2 2025) and squeezing fiscal \nspace, improved public financial management, strategic prioritization of \nexpenditures, and revenue mobilization are essential. The gains from \nimproved sovereign credit ratings and FATF delisting must be consolidated \nthrough consistent fiscal prudence and transparent resource management. \nV. Strengthen Policy Coordination \nWithout effective federal-state collaboration and policy consistency across \ngovernmental levels, even an optimal monetary policy will deliver suboptimal \noutcomes. \nEnhanced \ncoordination \nmechanisms \nand \naccountability \nframeworks are needed to ensure policy alignment and implementation \neffectiveness. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n41 \n \n10. MUSTAPHA AKINKUNMI \n1. Introduction \nI reaffirm my strong support for maintaining the current Monetary Policy Rate \n(MPR), Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR), and Liquidity Ratio, while adjusting the \nStanding Facility Corridor to +50/-450 basis points around the MPR. This \nposition is grounded in the sustained decline in inflation following earlier \ntightening measures and the continued convergence and stability in the \nforeign exchange market. \nEconomic activity has also strengthened, with GDP growth in the second \nquarter of 2025 outpacing money-supply expansion by nearly a factor of \nthree clear evidence of real productivity gains. Investor sentiment has \nimproved as well, reflecting supportive incentives and strengthening \nmacroeconomic fundamentals. \nTaken together, these indicators highlight a favourable macroeconomic \nenvironment shaped by effective monetary actions and disciplined \nimplementation. We therefore remain committed to safeguarding stability, \nattracting durable investment, and advancing inclusive and lasting \nimprovements in welfare across Nigeria. \n2. Economic and Financial Context \nNigeria’s \neconomy \ncontinues \nto \nrecord \nsteady \nand \nencouraging \nimprovements, with the positive impact of earlier monetary policy actions \nnow becoming increasingly evident. In the second quarter of 2025, GDP \nexpanded by 4.23 percent, up from 3.13 percent in the first quarter. Such a \nsharp quarter-to-quarter rise is uncommon in many developed and EMDE \neconomies, underscoring the growing strength and resilience of economic \nactivity across the country. \nThe 50-basis-point reduction in the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) implemented \nin September 2025 helped generate significant real productivity gains. In Q2 \n2025, these gains amounted to 2.73 percentage points, reflected in the gap \nbetween GDP growth of 4.23 percent and money-supply growth of 1.5 \npercent. By comparison, Ghana and South Africa both of which eased \nmonetary policy by 350 and 25 basis points, respectively, bringing their policy \nrates to 21.50 percent and 6.75 percent by November 2025 experienced only \nmodest improvements in output. \nNigeria’s robust economic performance, combined with a sustained decline \nin inflation to 16.05 percent in October 2025, has yielded a markedly positive \nreal interest rate of 10.95 percent as of November 2025. This signals stronger \n \n42 \n \nreturns on investment and places Nigeria second in the region, just behind \nGhana’s real interest rate of 13.10 percent. \nImproving domestic fundamentals are also reinforcing global economic \nsentiment through rising business confidence. The Purchasing Managers’ \nIndex (PMI), a key measure of whether business activity is expanding or \ncontracting, climbed to 56.4 points in November 2025, the highest level in five \nyears. With any reading above 50 indicating expansion, this result reflects \nbroad-based momentum across agriculture, services, and industry. \nImportantly, Nigeria’s PMI surpassed the global average of 54 points, \ndemonstrating that the country’s business environment is strengthening at a \nfaster pace than many economies worldwide. \n \n3. Rationale for the Vote \nFollowing the most recent MPC meeting, Nigeria’s economy has continued to \nstrengthen. Several key indicators now point to rising stability and growing \nconfidence among households, businesses, and investors. \nThe economy expanded by 4.23 percent in the second quarter of 2025, up \nfrom 3.13 percent in the first quarter. This acceleration reflects broad-based \nimprovements across multiple sectors, signalling that business activity is \npicking up, employment conditions are stabilising, and households are \ngradually beginning to experience relief from financial pressures. \nA major driver of this progress is the strengthening of the Naira and the \nconsistent decline in inflation. Headline inflation (year-on-year) fell for the \nseventh consecutive month, reaching 16.05 percent in October 2025, down \nfrom 18.02 percent in September. Food inflation also recorded a sharp \ndecline, dropping from 16.87 percent to 13.12 percent over the same period. \nThese improvements are helping to ease the cost of living through more \nstable exchange rates, greater food supply, and lower petroleum prices—all \nof which reduce pressure on household budgets. \nStability in the foreign exchange market has been another notable \nachievement. Nigeria’s transparent, market-driven exchange-rate framework \nhas contributed to a more predictable and balanced FX environment. As of \n28 November 2025, the Naira remained stable at an average of ₦1,445 per \nUS dollar, an appreciation of ₦13.79 compared with its October average. At \na time when many global currencies have weakened against the US dollar, \nthe resilience of the Naira reflects prudent monetary policy actions and \neffective management of external reserves. With Nigeria’s recent credit \n \n43 \n \nrating upgrade and rising investment inflows, the outlook for the Naira \nremains positive. \nNigeria’s external position has also strengthened significantly. The country \nrecorded a US$5.28 billion current account surplus in the second quarter of \n2025, up from US$2.85 billion in the first quarter. Gross external reserves \nreached US$46.70 billion on 14 November 2025, the highest level in a \ndecade, representing a 9.19 percent increase from US$42.77 billion at the \nend of September 2025. These reserves are sufficient to cover 10.3 months of \nimports of goods and services, underscoring Nigeria’s improved financial \nresilience and stronger capacity to withstand external shocks. \n \n4. Policy Implications and Outlook \nTaken together, stronger economic growth, easing inflation, a stable \nexchange rate, a sound banking system, and rising investor confidence, the \noverall outlook for Nigeria’s economy is highly favourable. Current trends \npoint to growth of 4.27 percent in 2025, exceeding the International \nMonetary Fund’s projection of 3.90 percent. Continued exchange-rate \nstability and increasing investment inflows are expected to support further \nappreciation of the Naira and reduce inflation even further to an estimated \n15.18 percent in November 2025. Achieving single-digit inflation remains the \ncentral goal, as it will ease the cost of living for households and reinforce \nlong-term macroeconomic stability. \nNigeria is clearly moving along a stronger trajectory. With sustained policy \ndiscipline and ongoing structural reforms, the country is well positioned to \nachieve even greater economic progress in the months ahead. \n5. Conclusion \nGiven the favourable and supportive macroeconomic environment, we \nhave resolved to maintain all existing monetary policy measures. We expect \nfurther improvements in economic performance in the months ahead, driven \nby seasonal harvests and the increased spending typically associated with \nthe festive period. \nNigeria’s recent progress demonstrates that the economy is firmly on a \npositive path, and sustained macroeconomic stability will be essential to \npreserving this momentum. To consolidate the gains recorded so far and \nensure continued disinflation, we remain committed to proactive policy \nactions that address emerging risks. We are closely tracking price trends and \nfinancial market conditions, particularly factors affecting investor confidence, \n \n44 \n \nto ensure that growth remains inclusive and aligned with long-term \nsustainable development goals. \nAccordingly, I vote to: \n• \nMaintain the Monetary Policy Rate at 27.00 percent \n• \nAdjust the Standing Facility Corridor around the MPR to +50/-450 \nbasis points \n• \nMaintain the Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) at 45 percent for \ncommercial banks and 16 percent for merchant banks \n• \nKeep the Liquidity Ratio at 30.00 percent \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n45 \n \n11. PHILIP IKEAZOR \n \nAll key indicators of macroeconomic stability remain aligned with the \ntrajectory of monetary policy, highlighting the effectiveness of the Bank’s \nrestrictive stance in curbing price pressures and anchoring inflation \nexpectations. \nDespite ongoing efforts, fiscal challenges remain, as several key benchmarks \nset by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN), from crude oil output to \ninflation, have not met expectations. The revenue outlook points to a \nnarrowing fiscal space which underscores the importance of maintaining a \nprudent monetary stance, while strengthening policy coordination to \nconsolidate disinflation and safeguard macroeconomic stability. Against this \nbackdrop, I was mindful of a balanced growth path that aligns with \nlong‑term objectives of monetary policy. \nI therefore voted to: \n \n(1) Retain the MPR at 27.0 per cent. \n \n(2) Adjust the Standing Facility corridor around the MPR to +50/-450 basis \npoints. \n \n(3) Retain the CRR for Commercial Banks at 45.0 per cent. \n \n(4) Retain the CRR of Merchant Banks to 16.0 per cent. \n \n(5) Retain the CRR for non-TSA public sector at 75.0 per cent. \n \n(6) Retain the Liquidity Ratio at 30.0 per cent. \n \n \nDevelopments in the Global and Domestic Economy \nThe International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects that global growth in Q4 2025 \nwill remain modest, broadly in line with Q3 performance. This reflects the \ngradual adjustment of the world economy to a changing macroeconomic \nenvironment, shaped by policy reforms and the easing of elevated tariffs. \nTemporary factors that boosted activity earlier in the year, such as \nfront‑loaded demand, are fading, though growth projections for the final \nquarter have been revised upward relative to Q1-2025. \n \n46 \n \nThe global growth is expected to moderate to 3.1 per cent in 2026, slightly \nbelow the 2025 forecast. Emerging markets and developing economies are \nprojected to expand by 4.0 per cent, offsetting weaker growth of 1.5 per \ncent in advanced economies. Global inflation is expected to continue its \ndownward trajectory but remain above target, with risks tilted upward. \nDownside risks dominate the outlook, including prolonged uncertainty, rising \nprotectionism, labor supply shocks, fiscal vulnerabilities, potential financial \nmarket corrections, and institutional erosion. \nIn this context, central banks must sustain credible, transparent, and \nsustainable \nmonetary \npolicies \nto \nrestore \nconfidence. \nStrengthened \ncoordination with fiscal authorities will be essential to rebuild buffers, support \ntrade diplomacy, and safeguard central bank independence for effective \npolicy signaling. \nDomestically, the economy has demonstrated resilience, with the impact of \ninternational commodity price swings and exchange rate‑driven inflationary \npressures beginning to ease. However, global uncertainty continues to weigh \non export performance, while supply chain disruptions have intensified \nimported inflation and strained fiscal space. \nLooking ahead, the sustained global growth, moderating inflation, progress in \ntariff negotiations, improved financial conditions, and expanded fiscal \nspending are expected to deliver positive spillover effects for Nigeria. A \nsustained decline in global inflation would help reduce imported price \npressures, particularly in food and manufactured goods, thereby supporting \ndomestic price stability. \nMy Considerations \nNigeria’s economy has remained broadly stable, supported by consistent \nmonetary and fiscal reforms. Forecasts from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) \nand the International Monetary Fund (IMF) indicate continued growth as \ninflationary and foreign exchange pressures ease. Real GDP is projected to \nexpand modestly in Q3 2025, rising by 0.40 percentage point relative to Q2. \nThis outlook is contingent on stronger crude oil production, enhanced refining \ncapacity, favorable oil market conditions, and sustained agricultural output \nunderpinned by reforms and improved security. \nAs the year draws to a close, macroeconomic indicators point to notable \nprogress. Declining inflation, a stable exchange rate, and consistent oversight \nof the foreign exchange market reflect the effectiveness of monetary policy. \nInflation expectations have been anchored, market volatility reduced, and \nthe economy placed on a sustainable growth trajectory. Monthly core \n \n47 \n \ninflation stabilized at 1.42 per cent between September and October 2025, \nsignaling the onset of a disinflationary phase. \nNonetheless, inflation dynamics remain mixed across rural and urban areas. In \nrural regions, food and farm produce prices rose by 0.24 percentage point, \nwhile core inflation, imported inflation, and energy costs declined in line with \npolicy objectives. Conversely, urban inflation has intensified, with most key \nmetrics, except passthrough, rising by at least 0.29 percentage point. This \ndivergence underscores the need for coordinated monetary and fiscal \nmeasures to consolidate disinflation and drive inflation toward single digits. \nUrban inflation presents a downside risk to growth, warranting a cautious but \nproactive stance. I weighed the balance between holding rates and \nadopting a more aggressive tightening. A moderate approach was chosen, \nallowing price levels to adjust fully and avoiding reactive response to \ntemporary fluctuations. This stance also provides space for the new \ncontractionary tax policy to crystallize its impact. \nCBN forecasts indicate inflation will continue its downward trajectory, \nreaching 15.02 per cent (year-on-year) by December. However, the \nadoption of December 2024 as the CPI base year introduces potential \ndistortions from seasonal effects and base effects. To mitigate unintended \nsignaling, it was necessary to maintain rates and leverage the policy corridor \nto manage liquidity pressures associated with festive spending. Evidence \nfrom prior experiments supports the adoption of an asymmetric corridor \nbetween lending and deposit facilities, which is more effective in managing \nliquidity than a symmetric corridor. \nThe foreign exchange market exhibited resilience, with NFEM and Bureau de \nChange rates appreciating month-on-month by 2.11 and 1.36 per cent, \nrespectively. Improved market coordination, strengthened confidence, and \nenhanced liquidity conditions underpinned this stability. However, the \nnegative premium of N4.00 per USD between NFEM and BDC rates highlights \ndemand pressures and distortions in signaling, necessitating a cautious \nmonetary stance. To safeguard macroeconomic stability and prevent \ntransmission of these pressures into consumer prices, I opted to hold the \npolicy rates. \nFiscal performance fell short of government targets, with crude oil production \nand inflation outcomes below expectations. Public spending rose by 28.26 \nper cent year-on-year, while the public debt-to-GDP ratio climbed to 38.17 \nper cent, nearing the Debt Management Office (DMO) threshold of 40 per \ncent. Although still within the fiscal framework, narrowing fiscal space pose \nrisks to macroeconomic stability. These developments must be factored into \n \n48 \n \nmonetary policy, particularly given autonomous spending pressures linked to \nsecurity challenges. \nIn conclusion, the consolidation of monetary and fiscal policies has yielded \ntangible benefits, notably in maintaining price stability and output growth. \nHowever, output growth remains below the level required to firmly anchor the \neconomy’s fundamentals. I re-emphasized the need for fiscal authorities to \nbe vigilant and to continue addressing structural impediments which are \nbeyond the scope of monetary policy, prioritizing the mitigation of risks \nassociated with oil market disruptions, security challenges, elevated \ninfrastructure and energy costs, while accounting for global geopolitical \nuncertainties to foster inclusive and resilient growth. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n49 \n \n12. OLAYEMI CARDOSO \nGovernor of the Central Bank of Nigeria and Chairman, Monetary Policy \nCommittee \nThe November meeting, our final for 2025, marks the close of an eventful \nyear. In pursuing our price stability mandate, faced with significant \nheadwinds and financial system shocks, we successfully navigated these \nchallenges and steered the economy towards relative stability. Inflation is \nnow firmly trending downwards on the back of a tight policy stance; the \nexchange rate is significantly less volatile and has shown a degree of market \ndriven appreciation; our foreign reserves position continues to strengthen on \nthe back of market reforms that have resulted in structural shifts in the \nbalance of payments and improved capital flows; and, confidence remains \nhigh across the board, spurring long term investment in critical sectors of the \neconomy. \n \nI must commend the MPC members for staying the course to get us to this \npoint. Our reform story over the past two years is one that we need to \ncollectively communicate more effectively to reinforce confidence, \nmacroeconomic stability, and to signal that we have what it takes to \nmanage any headwinds in the horizon. Our gatherings have provided the \nopportunity to review and analyse information and estimates from staff, ask \nquestions, and educate ourselves on the complex and dynamic variables \nthat impact the trajectory of the economy. Maintaining the credibility of the \nMPC（and to an extent the Central Bank remains central to the delivery of \nour mandate, hence it is important for our decisions to be seen to be \nevidence-based and correct over the medium to long run. \n \nWe must bear in mind that there is a fair amount of time before our next \nmeeting and, given the sheer number of risks and uncertainties that clouds \nour outlook, focus of members must be on developments we see on the \nhorizon over the next few months. We must endeavour to determine what \nneeds to be done to avoid surprises and lean on all the resources available \nto us collectively to articulate how best to execute our decisions in a \ncollaborative manner to deliver the best possible outcomes. \n \nOn the global stage, an increasing number of bilateral trade deals have \nbrought relief from tariff wars rhetoric and resulted in the upward review in \noutput forecasts for both advanced and emerging economies, with growth \nexpected to remain strong going into 2026. Moderating supply chain \ndisruptions and easing geopolitical tensions has led to a lower inflation \noutlook, with prices in advanced economies generally expected to soften, \nexcept for the United States where heightened protectionism and policy \n \n50 \n \nuncertainty could sustain inflationary pressures. Commodity prices are \nforecast to remain soft, with a bearish oil market expected to persist due to \nsubdued demand coming out of large consumption markets in Asia, and \nincreased supply. Across emerging and developing economies（EMDEs), \ninflation is projected to trend lower, reflecting an improved policy \nenvironment but vulnerabilities to exchange rate and commodity price \nvolatility persist. \n \nOn the domestic front, the economy remains firmly on the path of recovery. \nReal GDP growth sustained its momentum with continued improvements in \nthe oil and non-oil sector, and 4.23% outturn in Q2 2025 is expected to remain \nstrong with a full year forecast of 4.27%. Inflation declined to 16.05% in \nOctober, down from 18.02% in the preceding month and 8.43 percentage \npoints below the 24.48% recorded in January 2025. The sustained \ndeceleration is evident across all measures - headline, food, and core, with \nmomentum accelerating in recent months. Contributory factors include the \npass-through of low volatility in the foreign exchange market, continued \ndecline in food prices, and well anchored expectations given the relative \nstrength of the exchange rate. Research estimates indicate that our tight \npolicy stance has accounted for up to 10 percentage points of the decline in \nheadline inflation, providing encouraging counterfactual evidence on the \neffectiveness of monetary policy in the current environment and a reminder \nof the need to consistently take bold actions. \n \nBusiness and household sentiments reflect an increasingly optimistic outlook \nof the macroeconomy and coupled with increased investor confidence, this \nshould \ncontinue \nto \nfoster \nthe \nstability \nof \nthe \neconomy. \nStability \nnotwithstanding, the data before us firmly indicates the persistence of \nheightened risks to the near term economic outlook. For example, Nigeria’s \nrecent designation as a ‘Country of Particular Concern’ by the US \nadministration, though grounded in security considerations, could carry \neconomic spillovers that warrant close monitoring. \n \nThe local political cycle also makes 2026 pivotal in the economic landscape, \nwith empirical studies showing undeniable links between pre-election fiscal \nexpansion and inflationary pressures, exchange rate depreciation, and \nexternal sector vulnerabilities. \n \nChallenges also persist on the fiscal side of the economy and despite the \nongoing best and well intended efforts to reform, it is well acknowledged that \nthese often take time to materialise, more so given the extent of changes \n \n51 \n \nthat needed to be implemented. New challenges also creep in along the \nway, with upcoming elections now playing a critical role in our outlook. \n \nIt is therefore important that monetary policy must remain alert and \nexceptionally proactive in managing the resultant fragility that these risks \npose to the financial system, and constantly evaluate what is required for \npolicy implementation to remain effective. Our triggers and early warning \nsignals will be fine tuned and continuously recalibrated to enhance our \ncapability to take adequate policy actions on issues that might threaten our \nstable course. Our ability to respond early is a key determinant of the \noutcomes we will deliver and the extent to which these are sustainable over \ntime. It must however be noted that the extent to which monetary policy \nalone can deliver sustainable economic gains is limited, and our focus must \nalso be on how we can support the improvement of the fundamentals of the \neconomy across board. \n \nThe extensive deliberations at this meeting present an overwhelming case for \nmaintaining a tight monetary stance. I am, therefore, firmly convinced that \nholding policy rates at current levels best supports our disinflationary progress. \nIn addition to the uncertainties to the outlook earlier mentioned, excess \nliquidity in the system remains a major risk to sustaining price stability, and we \nneed to ensure policy remains tight and well implemented to forestall any \nreversal in the disinflationary trend that has now been established. \n \nIn my view, holding is a clear signal of reinforcing stability and \nacknowledgement that the current policy stance is having the desired \neffect. The effective anchoring of overnight market rates within the standing \nfacilities corridor further demonstrates the improved transmission of our policy \nstance to the wholesale market. This is a welcome development and gives us \nsome room to further adjust the corridor to reflect emergent liquidity \nconditions and the sustained price action witnessed in the benchmark \ngovernment securities market. The proposed asymmetric adjustment of the \ncorridor – widening the floor while keeping the ceiling tight – aims to absorb \npersistent excess liquidity without compromising control over short-term rates. \n \nAccordingly, I support the following policy actions: \n \n1. Maintain the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) at 27.00 per cent. \n2. Adjust the Standing Facilities corridor around the MPR to +50/-450 \nbasis points. \n3. Maintain the CRR for commercial banks at 45 per cent and that of \nmerchant banks at 16 per cent, and retain a 75 per cent CRR on non-\nTSA public sector deposits. \n \n52 \n \n4. Keep the Liquidity Ratio unchanged at 30.00 per cent. \n \nOLAYEMI CARDOSO \nGovernor, Central Bank of Nigeria \nNovember 2025", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/PERSONAL STATEMENTS OF MPC MEMBERS FOR THE NOVEMBER 2025 MEETING AND COMMUNIQUE.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "ba8e0a97f6bc9f7d35e294cca31b9e4b", "text": "CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA\nRemarks by\nPROF. NJUGUNA NDUNG’U\nGOVERNOR\nCCEENNTTRRAALL BBAANNKK OOFF KKEENNYYAA\naatt tthhee\nTHE LAUNCH OF RISK CERTIFICATION PROGRAMME\nCONDUCTED BY KSMS IN COLLABORATION WITH GLOBAL\nASSOCIATION OF RISK PROFESSIONALS (GARP)\nKenya School of Monetary Studies\nFriday, November 8, 2013\n\nDistinguished Guests;\nLadies and Gentlemen:\n1. It gives me great pleasure to be here today to officially\nwelcome you all to the launch of the Risk Certification\nProgramme conducted by the Kenya School of Monetary\nStudies in collaboration with the Global Association of\nRisk Professionals (GARP). On behalf of the Central Bank\nof Kenya (CBK), let me extend a very warm welcome to all\nthe Organizations represented here today.\n2. The School, through its international networks, has\nestablished a collaborative partnership with GARP to offer\na Flagship Risk Management Certification Programme\n(RCP) that seeks to professionalize Risk Management in the\nfinancial sector in Kenya and the region. In this\ncollaborative arrangement, KSMS is leveraging the\nexpertise GARP has developed over the years in delivering\nglobally recognized professional risk education and\ncertification. This collaboration provides an opportunity\nfor KSMS and participants to tap into a wide network of\nfinancial expertise on a global platform. As a sector, we\nsincerely appreciate GARP‟s initiative and mission to\nadvance risk profession through education, training and\n2\n\npromotion of best practice and we are proud to be\nassociated with GARP.\nFurther, colleagues, it is important to note that the RCP we\nare launching here today is a culmination of continuous\nefforts by Kenya School of Monetary Studies towards\ndeveloping relevant and practical solutions for the region.\n3. The launch of the “Risk Certification Programme” by\nGARP and KSMS comes at an opportune moment for the\nFinancial Sector. Many of you would know and agree that\nwe are increasingly progressing in various areas as a sector.\nCompanies face risks every day; they are part of normal\nbusiness life. In a climate where undesirable events and\nmissed opportunities may impact on profits and\nshareholder value, it is crucial to strike the right balance\nbetween risk adversity and conscious risk-taking. To do\nthis, it is essential to understand the complex picture of\nnot only financial but also technological, environmental\nand social risks relevant to organizations we all work for.\n4. Ladies and Gentlemen: The KSMS-GARP's curriculum we\nare launching here today is designed to give candidates a\ndeeper understanding of why and how financial risks\n3\n\nimpact financial assets, institutions and systems, and\nultimately, the global financial infrastructure.\n5. Ladies and Gentlemen: As Kenya and the region at large\nbecome an increasingly attractive destination for\ninvestments, the onus is on you, the financial industry\nplayers and financial institutions to tap into this\ntremendous potential of the Risk Certification program in\ngrowing the much needed technical capacity. The road\nwon‟t be an easy one and the industry must overcome\ncertain challenges which include lack of certified Risk\nManagement professionals, emerging legal and regulatory\nframeworks and most importantly the lack of awareness by\nthe majority of consumers.\n6. GARP's academic partnerships with KSMS will play a\ncritical role in educating the next generation of qualified\nrisk managers. By working with KSMS to combine rigorous\nacademic instruction with practitioner-driven insight and\ncertification, students can be better prepared to succeed in\nthe challenging field of risk management.\nThe KSMS-GARP's Academic Outreach team stands ready\nto:\n4\n\n Develop and enhance undergraduate and graduate-level\nrisk curricula\n Incorporate professional certification into academic\nprograms\n Increase recognition and visibility of approved\nrisk programs\n Provide opportunities to participate as a GARP\nContinuing Professional Education provider\n Promote risk management as a profession and an\nacademic discipline\n7. Ladies and Gentlemen: In accordance with the Basel Core\nPrinciples for Effective Banking Supervision, „Risk\nManagement Processes‟ require that banks and banking\ngroups must have comprehensive risk management\nprocesses (including Board and senior management\noversight) to identify, evaluate, monitor and control or\nmitigate all material risks and to assess their overall\ncapital adequacy in relation to their risk profile. These\nprocesses should be commensurate with the size and\ncomplexity of the institution.\nIt is therefore a requirement that each institution prepare\na comprehensive Risk Management Programme (RMP)\n5\n\ntailored to its needs and circumstances under which it\noperates and establish a Risk Management Function that\nsupervises overall risk management. The function should\nbe independent from those who take or accept risks on\nbehalf of the institution and should report directly to the\nBoard or a Committee of the Board.\nThe risk management function is responsible for ensuring\nthat effective processes are in place for:\ni. Identifying current and emerging risks;\nii. Developing risk assessment and measurement systems;\niii. Establishing policies, practices and other control\nmechanisms to manage risks;\niv. Developing risk tolerance limits for Senior\nManagement and Board approval;\nv. Monitoring positions against approved risk tolerance\nlimits; and\nvi. Reporting results of risk monitoring to Senior\nManagement and the Board.\nIt is for this reason that I strongly recommend this\nprogramme for purposes of Banks institutionalizing strong\nrisk management programs. One sure way of achieving this\nis through education and training of staff to upscale their\nknowledge and risk management skills in response to the\n6\n\never evolving demands. It is my sincere hope that this RCP\nProgramme will create a culture of risk awareness,\nprofessionalize Risk Management and uplift banking\nsystems in the financial sector.\n8. Ladies and Gentlemen: Risk identification and assessment\nare critical ingredients for an effective operational risk\nmanagement system. Effective risk identification considers\nboth internal and external factors. Sound risk assessment\nallows the bank to better understand its risk profile and\ntarget risk management resources and strategies most\neffectively. Further Risk Management professionals\ncontinue to face rising expectations. Senior management,\nboards of directors, investors and internal stakeholders\ndemand more information from Risk Management\ndepartments than ever before. Specifically, boards have\nincreased their scrutiny of risk management, which has\nmotivated Risk Management departments to contemplate\nbest practices around quantifying financial risk and\nmaintaining compliance.\nFinancial institutions that get their staff through this\nprogram will have the reward of employees who have an\nenterprise-wide understanding of risk with enhanced\n7\n\nability to understand customer risk profiling and\nsubsequent appropriate pricing of credit products and\nother financial services offered to specific clients. We\nanticipate that this approach will help lower the cost of\ncredit and offer other financial services, improve access to\nbanking services and ultimately contribute to the overall\nstability of the banking system.\n9. Ladies and Gentlemen: Many of the current approaches to\nmanaging emerging risks do not provide companies with\nthe information they need to act on insights from risk\ndata. This is because many key decision makers receive\ninformation about emerging risks on an inconsistent basis\nthat makes it difficult for them to evaluate changes that\nhave occurred from one period of time to the next or to be\ninformed of emerging external trends in the marketplace.\nGoing forward, I hereby do challenge executives to focus on\ndeveloping the analytical capacity and tools to understand\nthe potential business impact of emerging risks on their\ncorporate performance. At a time of systemic uncertainty\nand volatility, we hope this programme we are launching\nhere today assists your management team in developing the\n8\n\ncritical capability of transforming risk data into business\ninsights for risk-adjusted decision making.\n10. Ladies and Gentlemen, let me take this early\nopportunity to inform you of the Central Bank‟s strategic\nplan to take training and capacity building to the next\nlevel. Currently, the Central Bank of Kenya, in\nconsultation with the KSMS is developing a framework\nthat seeks to provide minimum standards of professional\ntraining and education for banking sector employees. It is\nanticipated that these guidelines will ensure that training\nand capacity building programs address specific knowledge\nand competency requirements in core areas of banking.\nDraft guidelines once ready, will be shared with industry\nstakeholders for appropriate comments before adoption.\n11. With these few remarks, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is\nnow my honour and pleasure to launch the Risk\nCertification Programme.\nI wish all trainees success in your learning process towards\nRisk Management Certification.\nThank You and God bless you all\n9", "source": "CBK", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-04-26", "url": "https://www.centralbank.go.ke//images/docs/Launch_of_Risk_Certification_Programmme_KSMS.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "7910fc8bb88c654b0f8206e823e358b9", "text": "CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA\nRemarks by\nPROF. NJUGUNA NDUNG’U\nGOVERNOR\nCCEENNTTRRAALL BBAANNKK OOFF KKEENNYYAA\nOONN TTHHEE\nOOCCCCAASSIIOONN OOFF TTHHEE OOFFFFIICCIIAALL OOPPEENNIINNGG OOFF TTHHEE SSCCHHOOOOLL OOFF\nEECCOONNOOMMIICCSS BBUUIILLDDIINNGG\nKKeennyyaattttaa UUnniivveerrssiittyy\nJanuary 30, 2014\n1\n\nThe Chairman of Council, Prof. Ratemo Michieka;\nThe Chancellor, Mr. Benson Wairegi;\nThe Vice-Chancellor; Prof. Olive Mugenda;\nDeputy Vice-Chancellors; Prof. John Okumu (Academic), Prof.\nKeren Mburugu (Finance and Development), Prof. P. K Wainaina\n(Administration) and Prof. Fredrick Graveris (Research,\nInnovation and Outreach);\nDean, School of Economics; Prof. Nelson Wawire;\nSenate Members;\nInvited Guests;\nProfessors;\nLecturers;\nStudents;\nMembers of the entire University Community;\nDistinguished Ladies and Gentlemen:\nIt is a pleasure and honour for me to officiate at the opening of\nthis beautiful facility put up to address infrastructural\nchallenges and support economics training at this University. I\ntake this opportunity to thank the University Management for\nbestowing this honour on me and also for being visionary in\naddressing the infrastructural challenges that face many of our\n2\n\nuniversities, especially the public ones. A state of the art facility\nlike this is as important as the discipline being taught and\nsignals that the discipline will provide the best training\ncapabilities.\nLadies and Gentlemen: Vision 2030 growth objective is to propel\nthe country to the middle income country status. It is anchored\non the investment and the capacity that should be developed.\nEconomics is one such important discipline where we need to\ninvest in and develop capacity to improve on public policy.\nIn this regard, may I congratulate Kenyatta University for making\nsignificant contributions towards building this knowledge pool\nand especially in the discipline of Economics, where as a\ncountry we still suffer serious capacity deficits. Putting up such a\nfacility to further train the much needed economists is testimony\nthat the University is addressing key gaps in nation building. In\n2008, Kenyatta University was the second University after\nNairobi to inaugurate a School of Economics in Kenya. There is\nindeed need for more universities to emulate the University of\nNairobi and Kenyatta University to establish more Schools of\nEconomics in Kenya to train more economists and satisfy the\ngrowing capacity requirements in both public and private sectors.\n3\n\nLadies and Gentlemen: Let me enumerate a few recent\ndevelopments that have pushed the demand for economists to a\nnew high level;\n Adoption of the new constitution that has created a devolved\ngovernment to the counties has generated huge demand for\neconomists at the county level to support economic reforms and\ndecision making based on sound evidence.\n In addition new institutions have been defined by the new\nconstitution. We need strong institutions to manage the process\nas strong institutions define the rules of the game and define\nthe appropriate incentives - the basic tenets of strong\ninstitutions. You are familiar with the pitfalls of institutional\nfailure.\n Regional integration fronts at the EAC, COMESA and\ncontinental level provide us with the opportunities that call\nfor building strong human capital base, especially in\neconomic policy analysis to support the new institutional\nstructures being created.\n The discovery of natural resource wealth in our country will\nrequire knowledge of natural resources management for the\ncurrent and future generations. This is important to avoid the\n4\n\nDutch disease outcomes that plagued other resource rich\ncountries or what is now being called a “natural resource\ncurse”.\n Kenya’s locational advantage in the EAC calls for building of\ncritical infrastructure and capacity to provide leadership,\nefficient services to support the landlocked countries and\npolicy direction in the region. A good example of the need for\ncontinuous build-up of human capacity is manifested in the\nrapid expansion of Kenyan banks in the EAC region, current\nat 282 subsidiaries.\n Growing demand for economic research and policy analysis to\ninform policy in various policy development areas; and the\nneed to develop economic and forecasting models for\nassessment, monitoring and evaluation requires a critical mass\nof well skilled economists.\n The world is becoming more integrated through globalization,\nICT development and liberalization of economies and\nfinancial markets. These developments are challenging to the\neconomic policy making process. For instance, CBK is grappling\nwith monetary policy in the face of changing financial\narchitecture, dynamism, innovation and external shocks.\nThese new challenges require dynamic, intellectual capacity to\ngive solid advice. We are glad that KU is undertaking to build\n5\n\nthe necessary capacity. In addition, the unconventional\nmonetary policy in Europe and America give rise to global\nsignals of weaknesses in the global economy to watch and react\nto, at all times.\n There is evidence of good macroeconomic management in the\npast that have ensured Kenya’s economic growth. The growth\noutlook for 2013 and 2014 remains positive. Capacity is\nrequired to keep the economy on a positive growth trajectory in\nthe coming years.\nLadies and gentlemen; let me take this opportunity to\nacknowledge that the CBK is a beneficiary of the capacity built\nfrom this University and has worked closely with the School of\nEconomics to provide 5 internship slots for undergraduate\nstudents. This kind of partnership should be encouraged in order\nto improve quality in the training of economists at all levels.\nThus the need for building capacity is well motivated and\ncannot be over emphasized. The international community IMF,\nACBF, AERC and others have supported institutions of higher\nlearning in Kenya and it is important to work with them to\ncontinue producing highly skilled economists for absorption in\nthe local and EAC market. Having worked with AERC, I know\n6\n\nthe support we provided to the then Department of Economics.\nThe continuous training and capacity building should continue\nto keep up with a dynamic changing world. Thank you for\nundertaking this endeavour to train and fill the existing\ncapacity gaps of economists.\nA word to the students making use of this facility: pursue\nexcellence in economics to ensure the investment pays dividends\nto the country. It is the quality of education that we confer here\nthat is critical and all stakeholders in this training should strive\nto achieve their best.\nIn conclusion, I would like to say that I have no doubt in my\nmind that the facility that we have opened today is going to add\nvalue to the training of economists at Kenyatta University. With\nthese remarks, I now have the pleasure to declare the School of\nEconomics Building officially opened.\nPS: As a token of appreciation and as a scholar, I will provide\nthe following of my latest works.\n1. Kenya Policies for Prosperity – five copies.\n2. Applied Time Series Econometrics – five copies.\n7\n\nThank you\n8", "source": "CBK", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-04-26", "url": "https://www.centralbank.go.ke//images/docs/Official_Opening_of_School_of_Economics_KU.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "ee12f6f69b372da91d711311c9d36c9b", "text": "CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA\nGLOBAL FORUM ON REMITTANCES, INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT\nRemarks by Dr. Patrick Njoroge\nGovernor, Central Bank of Kenya\nJune 14, 2023\nUnited Nations, Gigiri, Nairobi\nAs prepared for delivery\nGood morning! It is an honor for me to join you at this Summit of the Global Forum on\nRemittances, Investment and Development. This event aims to strengthen the existing\ninitiatives aimed at advancing the international agenda on remittances and diaspora\ninvestment. I am pleased to note that during the Summit delegates will explore the new\nopportunities and challenges in the global and Africa’s ecosystems, new digital channels,\nand innovative business models as well as sharing experiences.\nRemittances are inexorably tied to the stories of migrants. Stories full of courage,\nendurance, desperation, successes, failures, guilt, redemption… The best and the worst of\nlife. Consider the desperation and courage of those migrants putting all their lot in a hardly\nseaworthy boat in the Mediterranean Sea and a promise from a human trafficker. Consider\nthe story of an Afghanistan boy in the book “Kite Runner” by Khaled Hosseini. Or the\nstory of Sadio Mané, the celebrated Senegalese professional footballer who left home with\nnothing, but now supports everyone in his region in Senegal. These are the stories of\nmigrants that need to be told.\nLet me turn to the theme of the Summit, by acknowledging the important role of the\ndiaspora in economic development, mainly through remittances. The financial\ncontribution of diaspora remittances is significant. As the President of African\nDevelopment Bank remarked recently, “Africans in diaspora are Africa’s largest\nfinanciers. Remittances from the diaspora to Africa grew from US$37 billion in 2010 to\nUS$96 billion in 2021. Total Official Development Assistance to Africa in 2021 was\nUS$35 billion or 36 percent of remittances from diaspora.” According to data from the\nWorld Bank, remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries increased by 4.9\npercent to reach US$626 billion in 2022, even as global flows are estimated to have\n1\n\nreached US$794 billion in the same year. Further, remittances now represent a prime\nsource of external finance for low- and middle-income countries relative to other types of\nflows, such as foreign direct investment (FDI), official development assistance (ODA),\nand portfolio investment flows. Closer home, Kenya is the third largest recipient of\nremittances in Sub-Saharan Africa, and it received US$4.0 billion in 2022, an increase of\n8.3 percent compared to 2021, which represents over 3 percent of Kenya’s GDP.\nRemittances have had massive impact on the lives and livelihoods of the recipients. Take\nfor example, Esther from Kenya, who worked in Saudi Arabia as a housekeeper for 7\nyears from 2012 to 2019. She was able to achieve 70 percent of her financial goals while\nin Saudi Arabia and at the same time managed to build a 2-bedroom stone house in\nKabete, Kenya, educate her 3 children and take care of her mother’s as well as other\nrelative’s needs. Kenya’s digital landscape enabled her to achieve this by providing a\nplatform for transactions (M-Pesa) and for savings (M-Shwari). Esther is a return migrant\nand believes that she would have achieved 100 percent of her financial goals had she\nstayed longer.\nHowever, the cost of sending remittances remains high especially in certain corridors.\nAccording to the World Bank’s data, the cost of sending US$200 averaged between 5\npercent and 10 percent worldwide, far exceeding the Sustainable Development Goal\n(SDG) target of 3 percent. As a result of the high costs, remittance tickets remain sizeable.\nIn the case of Kenya, the adoption of technology and innovation has reduced costs\nallowing for smaller bite-sized remittance tickets. Kenya’s 2021 Diaspora Remittance\nSurvey revealed that 32 percent of remittances are through mobile money operators, due to\nthe convenience, speed, and lower cost. Still, a lot needs to be done to reduce costs\ntowards the SDG target.\nRemittances are used by recipients largely for daily expenditures, and not for investment\nand growth. The 2021 Diaspora Remittance Survey revealed that the purchase of food and\nhousehold goods, medical and education expenses, rent, and household utilities constituted\n49 percent of remittances. This indicates that the huge reservoir of human and financial\ncapital that represents the diaspora remains largely untapped. The diaspora should be an\nimportant bridge between the host and the home countries. For instance, India success\nstory in the information technology (IT) industry is anchored on the diaspora. India is also\nhome to an increasing number of start-ups that have achieved unicorn status—enterprises\nvalued at more than US$1 billion—that have been founded by Indian diaspora.\n2\n\nThe benefits from the diaspora should go well beyond the remittances. This is an\nappropriate time for deepening the conversations on how the diaspora can contribute to\neconomic growth and progress especially in Africa where significant opportunities exist,\nand significant resources will be required to put our citizens on the path of shared\nprosperity. A UNDP report indicated that by 2050, more than half of Africa’s population\nwill be under 25. Additionally, 25 percent of the world’s labor force will be based in\nAfrica. Between 10-12 million people join the labour force in Africa each year, yet the\ncontinent creates only 3.7 million jobs annually. This quandary can only be resolved\nsuccessfully with significant input from all those that have a connection with the\ncontinent, and crucially, the diaspora.\nNevertheless, further work is needed to improve the business environment and thereby\nattract additional investments. Kenya has implemented several measures to improve the\nbusiness climate, including significant investments in infrastructure, advancing innovative\nuse of technology, among others. These initiatives are key to promoting competitiveness\nin the economy. A recent survey by US News and World Report ranked Kenya at position\n26 globally—an improvement from position 39 in 2021—due to its resilience and\nmomentum. It was also ranked the best country to start and run a successful business\nacross the continent in 2022.\nAs I draw to a close, let me mention a new innovation that will expand the available\ninvestment opportunities for the diaspora. This follows the digital innovations that allow\ntransactions to be conducted anytime anywhere and with small ticket sizes. CBK is\nimplementing a Central Securities Depository (CSD) that will improve efficiency and\ntransparency in the government domestic debt market. The CSD will mitigate\nsegmentation in the interbank market and enhance liquidity distribution by strengthening\nthe operation of the secured overnight market. More importantly, the CSD provides a new\nand easy way to invest in Government securities and will therefore be beneficial to the\nDiaspora. The Kenyans abroad will be able to register CSD accounts online, from\nwherever they are, thereby mitigating the current inconvenience of having to come\nphysically to the Central Bank. They will also be able to invest in Government of Kenya\nsecurities online. Additional investment channels in government securities, including\ndiaspora bonds, are also being considered.\n3\n\nI want to conclude with a poignant text from the little book “Sea Prayer” by Khaled\nHosseini. A father prays over his sleeping son as they wait for dawn and a boat to arrive,\nto start their perilous journey towards the promise of a new life:\nPray God steers the vessel true,\nwhen the shores slip out of eyeshot and we are a flyspeck\nin the heaving waters, pitching and tilting, easily swallowed.\nBecause you,\nyou are precious cargo, Marwan,\nthe most precious there ever was.\nI pray the sea knows this.\nInshallah.\nThis Summit offers an opportunity to chart a new path for engaging the diaspora. How I\npray the sea knows this. I wish you fruitful deliberations and a successful Summit.\nThank You!\n4", "source": "CBK", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-04-26", "url": "https://www.centralbank.go.ke/uploads/speeches/1632586561_Remarks by the Governor - Global Forum on Remittances, Investment and Development.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "230d734b421582467e6ea87c1968a33c", "text": "SPEECH BY HIS EXCELLENCY HON. UHURU KENYATTA,\nC.G.H., PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA AND\nCOMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCES\nDURING THE INAUGURAL AFRO-ASIA FINTECH\nFESTIVAL AT THE KENYA SCHOOL OF MONETARY\nSTUDIES, NAIROBI ON 15TH JULY, 2019\nMr. Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Senior Minister and\nCoordinating Minister for Social Policies, Singapore and\nChairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore;\nDistinguished Guests;\nLadies and Gentlemen,\n1. It is my distinct pleasure to join you for the inaugural\nAfro-Asia Fintech Festival. We thank our co-hosts, the Central\nBank of Kenya (CBK) and the Monetary Authority of\nSingapore (MAS), for convening this Festival.\n2. Nairobi City is delighted to play host to the world’s\nfirst Afro-Asia Fintech convocation.\nDistinguished Delegates,\n3. I am also delighted to welcome Senior Minister\nTharman and his delegation which features representation\nfrom over 20 Singaporean companies, just over a year after\nhis last visit.\n4. Senior Minister, your visit and the growing partnership\nbetween our two monetary regulators as evidenced by the\njoint-hosting of this forum is further testament of the\ndeepening of the relationship between Singapore and Kenya. I\nsalute all Central Bank Governors, Regulators and Captains of\nIndustry present today, drawn from around the globe and I\nwelcome you all to Magical Kenya.\n1\n\n5. The World is in the midst of an unprecedented revolution\nin the Information and Technology arena, one which has\nimpacted every Sector of the Economy and Social Life; bringing\nPeoples and Nations together and making the world a true\nglobal village. Properly harnessed and channelled,\ninnovations in Information and Technology are a sure\npath to greater Freedom, Prosperity and Fraternity for\nall humanity.\n6. In Governance, the use of Technology and new ways to\ngather, store, interpret and disseminate Information has\nprovided new and exciting frontiers in the delivery of Public\nGoods and Services. Financial Technology in particular\npresents an opportunity for deepening of trade and investment\nlinks across the globe; as evidenced by this Forum which seeks\nto strengthen and expand the millennia of economic and social\nlinks between our two great continents by building a digital\nbridge between Africa and Asia.\nDistinguished Delegates,\n7. Join me in applauding the CBK and MAS for their signing\nof a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that will underpin\nco-operation in innovation between our two Central Banks. I\nam pleased to note that the MOU sets the foundation for joint\ninnovation projects on the application of key emerging\ntechnologies such as digital and mobile payments, block\nchain, big data and artificial intelligence. These projects\nwill enhance the digital infrastructure in both countries and\ncatalyse trade and investments between Africa and Asia.\n8. In Kenya, citizens began to trade goods and services with\nmobile phone airtime units. This was what inspired M-PESA, a\nrevolutionary money transfer platform that has radically\n2\n\ntransformed the conduct of business across all sectors of our\neconomy, a transformative solution that has gained global\nacclaim in enhancing financial inclusion.\n9. The M-Pesa money transfer service has in effect become a\nglobal poster child for financial services innovation.\n10. Riding on mobile phone financial services, access to\nfinancial services in Kenya has more than tripled from 26\npercent in 2006 to 82 percent in 2019. More importantly,\nmobile phone financial services have lifted thousands of\nKenyans out of poverty and enhanced their livelihoods. We are\nscoring astounding accomplishments.\n11. Technology-driven financial inclusion is not a success story\nlimited to Kenya alone but rather one which is evidenced in\nevery country in Africa.\n12. All African countries have driven transformation of their\nfinancial inclusion landscapes by leveraging on mobile phone\ntechnology in one way or another. Indeed, Africa has one of\nthe fastest growing mobile phone adoption and penetration\nrates globally. However, with a continental average\npenetration rate of approximately 44 percent against a global\naverage of approximately 66 percent, Africa still has\ntremendous space for growth in Mobile Phone Penetration and\nthe attendant opportunities in delivery of Financial Services\nthrough mobile phones.\n13. In Kenya, other ground breaking innovations include: M-\nKOPA, a service delivery innovation in the power and lighting\nsubsector has enabled many rural households to receive solar\nlighting, thus liberating families from the time-consuming\n3\n\npursuit of firewood and kerosene fuels while also enabling\nchildren to study longer at night.\n14. Similarly, the Government has recognized the vast\nuntapped potential of capital raising through issuance of Bonds\naccessible to ordinary Kenyans for whom traditional investment\nand brokerage platforms are inconvenient or remote. In that\nvein, in 2017 the Government of Kenya in conjunction with\nprivate sector players launched a mobile centric government\nbond dubbed M-Akiba, which enables Kenyans with as little as\nUSD 30 to participate in the Government Securities\nMarket.\n15. M-Akiba provides a savings mechanism for ordinary\nKenyans who can save a dollar a day, and at the end of 30\ndays invest in government securities. For my Government, our\nkey motivation in rolling out this product was to democratise\naccess to financial services and to give a space at the heart of\nthe financial system to every Kenyan no matter their location,\nsocial or economic status. In this, we are scoring\nastounding accomplishments.\n16. Aside from introducing new ways for Kenyans to invest\nand for the Government of Kenya to access debt financing from\ndomestic sources, my Government has also long-sought to\ndevelop ways in which MSMEs can surmount the traditional\nconstraints to access to loans that arise from lack of collateral\nor credit information history. I was therefore pleased when a\nconsortium of Kenyan banks convened by the CBK launched a\nrevolutionary MSME credit financing scheme dubbed ‘Stawi’,\nwhich means ‘Prosper’ in Kiswahili.\n4\n\n17. Stawi, whose pilot was launched in May 2019, targets\nto provide MSMEs with an ‘anytime-anywhere’ product that\nleverages on both traditional and non-traditional sources of\ncredit information, particularly digital payment footprints arising\nfrom mobile money transactions, in order to allow Banks to\nform an accurate credit appraisal of MSMEs for the purposes of\ncredit rating. The use of big data and artificial intelligence that\nthe product is built on in effect de-risks the MSMEs and enables\nthe reduction of credit cost.\n18. While Stawi is still in its inception stages I am delighted to\nreport that Stawi Loans will be offered at single digit interest\nrates, greatly enhancing access to credit by MSMEs, which will\nultimately lead to greater shared prosperity of our citizens.\n19. These and other innovations in FinTech are tremendous\nsuccesses that have been achieved by Kenya in a relatively\nshort period of time. We shall not rest on our laurels but\ninstead we shall explore even greater ways to bring the full\nbenefits of the digital economy to all Kenyans.\n20. It was with this imperative in mind that I launched\nKenya’s Digital Economy Blueprint in Kigali, Rwanda in May\n2019. The vision of the blueprint is “a digitally empowered\ncitizenry, living in a digitally enabled society.”\n21. We aspire for a Kenya where every citizen, enterprise and\norganization has digital access and the capability to participate\nand thrive in the digital economy.\n22. This is the thinking that informed Kenya’s digital economy\nblueprint and its five pillars for a thriving digital economy.\nThe pillars are: Digital Government, Digital Business,\n5\n\nInfrastructure, Innovation-Driven Entrepreneurship\nand Digital Skills and Values.\n23. The blueprint serves as one of Kenya’s contributions in\nchampioning the growth of an African wide digital economy. It\nis our hope and wish that our sister African countries will find\nvalue in Kenya’s blueprint and customize its elements for\nadoption within their own ecosystems.\n24. This will bring forth an African digital economy that\nunderpins the growth and prosperity of all our Citizens.\n25. To maximize our benefits, we must build ecosystems that\nfacilitate digital transactions nationally, regionally and globally.\nI was therefore pleased to be informed that the first concrete\noutput of the MOU between CBK and MAS will be on co-\ndevelopment of foundational infrastructure on identity, data\nand electronic Know-Your Customer procedures (e-KYC).\n26. Identity and e-KYC are critical prerequisites to enhancing\nfinancial inclusion while ensuring financial integrity at both\nnational and cross-border levels.\n27. This initiative between our two Central Banks aligns well\nwith the ongoing drive of my Government to introduce a\n‘‘single source of truth’’ digital identity.\n28. The resultant new Single Unique Identifier will allow all\npersons in Kenya, whether Citizens or Non-Citizens to access\nGovernment Services more expeditiously and efficiently and will\nalso be leveraged by the private sector to provide for faster\nand more secure transactions, particularly in the Financial\nServices Sector.\n6\n\n29. FinTech Festivals such as this provide an opportunity\nfor exchange of ideas and experiences as well as two-way\nlearning.\n30. It is imperative that this Festival provides concrete\ndeliverables that can be adopted as new solutions or\nstrengthening of existing ones. It is also important that\nFinTech provides an enabling space for the participation of the\nYouth, who are the drivers of the New Information Age and the\nNew Economy. I therefore welcome the move by CBK and\nMAS to invite the Youth from our Universities and from the\nstart-up FinTech space to participate in this seminal event.\n31. In particular, I welcome the launch of the Global\nHackathon at this Festival, the first of its kind in the Region.\nI am informed that the hackathon will provide young Fintech\nentrepreneurs with the opportunity to showcase their skills and\ntheir potential solutions to problem statements on sustainable\nfinance. Thereafter, there will be afforded with mentoring\nopportunities so that they may enhance their skills and\nknowledge bases and also develop their solutions.\n32. In closing, I look forward not just to collaborations\nbetween governments at this Festival, but also between the\nvarious private sector entities represented here from Africa,\nAsia and beyond. It is only through such public and private\nsector collaborations and partnerships that we can build truly\nrobust and resilient digital economies that leave no one behind\nand score astounding accomplishments for our citizenry.\n33. Beyond the Festival, I urge all our visitors to take time to\nexperience magical Kenya’s scenic attractions and the warm\nhospitality. The timing of the Festival coincides with the annual\nwildebeest migration in the legendary theatre of the Maasai\n7\n\nMara National Reserve and I urge all of you to find time to\nwitness this phenomenal Wonder of the Nature.\n34. When you go back home and as you travel the world, tell\nall those you will meet about what you witnessed here. Our\nbeauty. Our promise. Our values. Our hope.\n35. Kenya, East Africa and the African Continent are rising.\nAfrica is open for business and we urge you to join hands with\nus in building a better and more prosperous World for All our\nPeople.\n36. It is now my distinct honour to inaugurate the Afro-Asia\nFintech Festival.\nThank You and God Bless You All.\n…….0000000…….0000000…….\n8", "source": "CBK", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-04-26", "url": "https://www.centralbank.go.ke/uploads/speeches/1955080639_speech - inaugural afro-asia fintech festival - 15th July 2019.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "392e5099089020e85c36e55134217280", "text": "CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA\nRemarks by\nPROF. NJUGUNA NDUNG’U\nGOVERNOR\nCCEENNTTRRAALL BBAANNKK OOFF KKEENNYYAA\naatt tthhee\nOPENING OF THE WORKSHOP ON THE HARMONIZATION OF\nMONETARY AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS IN THE EAST AFRICAN\nCOMMUNITY\nNorfolk Hotel\nTuesday, March 29, 2010\n\nMr. B. Rajcoomar, Chief of Financial Institutions Division, IMF;\nMr. Jaroslav Kucera, Senior Economist, IMF;\nMr. Thomas Morrison, EDDI Project Manager, IMF;\nMr. Robert Maate, Senior Statistician EAC Secretariat;\nDistinguished Participants;\nLadies and Gentlemen;\nI welcome you all to Kenya and to this very important workshop on the\ncompilation and harmonization of monetary and financial statistics in the\nEast African Community (EAC). I thank you all for attending this workshop.\nLadies and Gentlemen,\nThis workshop is taking place at a critical stage in the integration process of\nthe EAC and monetary and financial statistics play a critical role. This will\nsupport the institutions to be formed under the regional integration\nprocess. Previous milestones achieved comprise of the establishment of an\nEAC Customs Union and the launch of the Common Market Protocol. These\ndevelopments, ladies and gentlemen, underscore the need for a\nstatistical harmonization framework and related capacity building strategies\nfor the region.\nThe success of the regional integration initiative is anchored on a number of\nconvergence criteria that require information and analysis: In this regard,\nthe computation, concepts, definitions and methods used in compiling the\nindicators that determine the convergence criteria must be understood,\nharmonized and consistent across all Partner States. Furthermore, since the\nEAC regional integration initiative envisages a centralized approach to the\npolicy making process, it has to be anchored on appropriate and adequate\nindicators and centralized statistical information. Thus the harmonization\nof monetary and financial statistics, among other statistics, will be critical\nfor policy formulation and implementation within the EAC region.\nIn fast-tracking the process of statistical harmonization among the Partner\nStates, the EAC Central Bank Governors recently approved the hiring of\n2\n\nshort-term consultants from among Partner States. I am aware that the\nconsultants have begun work and we believe this workshop has come at the\nmost appropriate time so as to complement their efforts.\nLadies and Gentlemen,\nTowards this end, I want to thank the International Monetary Fund (IMF)\nfor the Technical Assistance they continue to provide in the development\nand harmonization of statistics, in the EAC region. About two years ago,\nmost of our countries concluded the second phase of the General Data\nDissemination System (GDDS) project which was aimed at improving the\navailability and quality of data, in developing countries. This was important\nin order to conform to international standards. Some of the major\nachievements of the monetary module of this project include the correct\nclassification of key financial assets and liabilities and sectorization of\ntransactions for the main deposit taking institutions in our financial sectors.\nThe end result was the compilation and filing of standard reports by most of\nthe EAC countries with the IMF Statistics Department.\nAgain I recall that towards the end of last year, the IMF approached most of\nour countries to consider joining the Enhanced Data Dissemination\nInitiative (EDDI). The focus of the EDDI is to consolidate the gains realized\nunder the GDDS while expanding the institutional coverage in statistical\ncompilation to include other deposit taking institutions such as SACCOs\nand microfinance; and other key financial sector institutions such as\npension funds and insurance companies. I am aware that the work plans\nwere prepared during the first EDDI workshop in Kampala and the IMF has\nidentified technical experts for each of our countries. This workshop is\ntherefore part of the greater plan towards the improvement of statistics in\nthe region by the IMF. I wish to sincerely thank the IMF for these\ninitiatives.\nIt is only appropriate at this juncture to recognize, Ladies and\nGentlemen, the critical role that the EAC Secretariat has played in\nproviding an elaborate roadmap on how statistical harmonization can be\n3\n\nachieved within the EAC region. However, for this to succeed, an\nappropriate mechanism, in terms of institutional arrangements and legal\nframeworks, has to be put in place to guard and guide the production of\nharmonized and quality statistics in the EAC Partner States and more\nimportantly, at the regional level. These statistics will inform policy\nformulation and implementation in the integration process.\nAll countries have their own data collection, storage and processing centres.\nIt is a question of how we can pick the important aspects from our own\nareas for use, standardization and centralization.\nLadies and gentlemen,\nIn concluding my remarks, I welcome you once again to Kenya and to this\nworkshop. Though the duration of the workshop is short, please find time to\nvisit some of our beautiful sceneries around town and sample what the City\nof Nairobi has to offer.\nIt is now my pleasure and humble duty to declare this workshop officially\nopen.\nThank you.\n4", "source": "CBK", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-04-26", "url": "https://www.centralbank.go.ke//images/docs/speeches/2011/Governor%27s%20Remarks%20at%20MF%20Workshop%20on%20Harmonization%20of%20Monetary%20and%20Financial%20Statistics%20in%20EAC.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "ec90010fbcc5cce73961e604042d504e", "text": "CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA\nThe Technical University of Kenya (TUK)\n1st International TUK-SBMS International Conference\nRethinking Economic and Business Sustainability in Disruptive Times\nKeynote Address by Dr. Patrick Njoroge\nGovernor, Central Bank of Kenya\nThursday, November 25, 2021\nAs Prepared for Delivery\nGood morning! I am pleased to join you at the inaugural Technical University of Kenya\n(TUK), School of Business and Management Studies International Conference. Let me at\nthe outset express my gratitude for the invite. The theme of the conference—Rethinking\nEconomic and Business Sustainaibility in Disruptive Times—is timely, as we reflect on\nthe challenges and opportunities that the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has brought\nto the fore. Importantly, how will governments and businesses build on the lessons from\nthe pandemic, and thereby enhance their agility to grow and thrive in a dynamic\nenvironment? I note the wide array of papers to be presented over the next two days, that\nwill enrich the outcomes of the conference.\nThe pandemic has upended lives and livelihoods while fundamentally changing\nenonomies and businesses. In Kenya, a robust response from the government and private\nsector has served us well in containing the pandemic and ensuring business continuity.\nThe economy is now on a steady recovery path, while the financial sector has been\nresilient in supporting businesses and households. We must however remain vigilant as\nCOVID is an enemy that attacks with stealth, with devastating consequences. Tellingly,\nwe have seen in recent weeks a resurgence of the virus in Europe and parts of the United\nStates, inspite of their high rates of vaccination against COVID-19.\nComing back to the theme of the conference, what has changed over the last one and a\nhalf years with the pandemic? And how do we rethink economic and business\nsustainability in disruptive times? In venturing to answer these questions, I will first\nhighlight three recent trends in the business landscape.\n\nFirst, is the dominance of Bigtechs. The pandemic has been characterized by accelerated\ndigitization that enabled keeping the lights on for essential services including finance,\neducation and health. Digital payment rails for instance in Kenya, Rwanda, Ghana and\nother African countries were a critical platform for official and personal transfers to the\nvulnerable segments of our population. More broadly, in the wake of COVID-19\ncontainment measures, global technology platforms (Bigtechs) offering information\ntechnology, e-commerce, entertainment and other services have increased their reach and\ninfluence during the pandemic.\nGlobally, Microsoft, Google, Meta (formely Facebook), Amazon and Apple are the face\nof Bigtechs. But beyond the United States, Alibaba and Tencent in China, Mercado Libre\n(online market) in Latin America, ride-hailing services Grub and Gojek in South East\nAsia, and mobile phone financial services firms in Africa are increasingly exhibiting the\ncharacteristics of Bigtechs though on a more regional scale.\nThe global Bigtechs are now estimated at 20 percent of the market capitalization on the\nNew York Stock Exchange. To paint the picture more vividly, Apple took 42 years to\nreach a market capitalization of US$1 trillion and 2 years to hit US$2 trillion.\nShockingly, all of the second trillion in valuation came in just 21 weeks to August 2020!\nThe Bigtechs have far and away displaced the traditional bluechips companies in\nmanufacturing and aviation such as General Electric and Boeing in their dominance.\nSecond, is the proliferation of technology and innovations. From mobile banking to\ncloud computing, artificial intelligence to blockchain technology, internet of things, and\nrobotics. All these developments herald significant opportunities to re-engineer the\noperations of governments and business and transform lives and livelihoods. Indeed, we\nare at the cusp of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, whose transformative powers are\nalready evident in the financial sector, and will transform the way we live, work, and\nrelate to one another. In the words of Professor Klaus Schwab, who popularized this\nlabel: “It is characterized by a fusion of technologies that is blurring the lines between\nthe physical, digital, and biological spheres.”\nSome of these technologies, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) present significant\nopportunities to address some of our most pressing problems on the continent. For\ninstance, despite Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) being the engines of\nour economies, access to credit remains a key challenge. This in part arises from lack of\n2\n\ntraditional collateral such as title deeds used by financial institutions to secure credit\nfacilities. With the proliferation of digital footprints, AI can be used to generate credit\nhistories of MSMEs. These credit histories can then be used to appraise and\nappropriately price credit for MSMEs that would otherwise be excluded from accessing\ncredit.\nThe potential of AI extends to other critical areas including retail, advertising,\nmanufacturing and health. But these new technologies pose challenges including how the\ndata they use is collected and the formulation of the decision-making algorithms that\nunderpins them. Ethical considerations are emerging with the growing use of AI,\nparticularly whether they can perpetrate existing structural biases such as against women\nin access to financial and other services.\nData governance remains a key concern with AI as it extends its reach. For instance, do\nMSMEs understand how their data will be used in the algorithms? Are they made aware\nby the financial institutions and other service providers of how their data will be used?\nAnd is their consent to use the data for AI and other purposes well informed?\nThird, is the growing global wealth inequality. The richest one percent are getting\nwealthier, drawing on the trends of Bigtechs and Technology. I mentioned earlier the so-\ncalled one percenters are drawing their fortunes from the technology and innovation\narena that is the new normal. Before the pandemic, tech entrepreneurs and investors were\nworking towards building companies valued at USD1 billion referred to as Unicorns.\nThe pandemic has seen an acceleration of start up technology companies valued at\nUSD10 billion, the Decathons. In 2021, 30 start-ups have been valued as Decathons\ncompared to 15 in 2020, and just 5 in 2019. Most of these Decathons are in the e-\ncommerce, data analytics, AI and other innovations space.\nOn the other hand, the pandemic has reversed years of steady progress of the global\nvision of shared prosperity by 2030. This is espoused in the implementation of the\nUnited Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). According to World Bank\nestimates, over 100 million people will be pushed into extreme poverty by 2030, by the\npandemic, exacerbated by climate change and armed conflict particularly in the Middle\nEast and Africa. Accordingly, the goal of bringing the global absolute poverty rate to less\nthan 3 percent by 2030, which was already at risk before the crisis, is now harder than\never to reach.\n3\n\nAgainst this backdrop, how do we reimagine the future of our economies and businesses?\nI will sketch three broad ideas.\nFirst, people-centricity must be at the heart of technology and innovations. Any\ntechnology and innovation must answer the question of what need it is solving. We are\nincreasingly attracted by the fanciness of technology and innovation and are blinded to\nthe problem it is solving. Kenya’s mobile money story has become a global posterchild\nof innovation. What is often missed, is the problem of transferring money from urban to\nrural areas, that spawned the digital revolution in Kenya. My clarion call to students who\nare in the audience and are aspiring to be innovators and entrepreneurs is to keep\npeople’s needs at the centre of everything that you do.\nSecond, emerging and developing countries such as Kenya need to be at the global table\non the governance of Bigtechs. Bigtechs are an integral part of our day-to-day lives as we\ncommunicate, transact on e-commerce and conduct other financial transactions. Their\nreach has grown during the pandemic and they continue to scale up their services\nglobally with resultant spill-over effects, particularly in emerging and developing\ncountries. As the United States, the European Union and China design governance\nstructures for the Bigtechs, we must not be left behind.\nI am pleased to note that the United Nations has incubated the Dialogue on Global\nDigital Finance Governance. The Dialogue was established to explore the nexus of\nBigtechs and sustainable development. Its goal is to catalyse governance innovations that\ntake greater account of the SDG impacts of Bigtechs and are more inclusive of the voices\nof developing nations. Kenya co-hosts the Dialogue with Switzerland and will bring on\nboard insights from developing countries.\nThird, is a renewed focus on shared prosperity. The pandemic has wiped out years of\nprogress on the SDGs, particularly on health and education. Youth, women and MSMEs\nhave been disproportionately affected by the adverse impact of the pandemic. MSMEs in\ndeveloping and emerging countries are the backbone of the economy and support the\nlives and livelihoods of a significant swathe of the population. We must therefore get\nthem back on their feet through increased access to credit and other business support\nservices (finance plus). In 2018, before the pandemic, the International Finance\nCorporation estimated a funding gap of USD331 billion for SMEs in Sub-Saharan\n4\n\nAfrica. I expect that with the pandemic, this gap has increased substantially, and banks\nand other financial institutions will play a significant role in meeting this gap. More\ngenerally, let achieving shared prosperity for all our citizens be our guiding compass.\nWill these three ideas be enough to future-proof businesses and our societies in the\ndisruptive times? The simple answer is no, as highly efficient systems and processes are\nworthless without the people that use them. The multiplicative power of technology\nunderscores the importance of well-trained staff, aligned to the objectives of society and\nthe institutions they work for. A single rogue trader or IT employee can bring down a\nhundred-year institution. Each of us has to be the best that we can be, renewing ourselves\nrelentlessly. Quoting Alvin Toffler, “The illiterate of the 21st century will not be those\nwho cannot read and write, but those who cannot learn, unlearn and relearn.” We have\nto be nimble, quick to adapt to the rapidly changing world, and fully aware that with\ngreat powers comes great responsibility.\nIn closing, I wish to draw your attention to the large mural across the street from your\ncampus, of Kenya’s Marathon Champion Eliud Kipchoge with his mantra No Human is\nLimited., He inspires me along with millions of his fans to raise my standards. As he\nsays, “To win is not important. To be successful is not even important. How to plan and\nprepare is crucial. When you plan very well and prepare very well, then success can\ncome on the way.” I hope the mural will remind you how to approach your time at this\nuniversity, and encourage you in your successes and failures as No Human is Limited.\nI look forward to the outcomes of the deliberations over the next two days as we\nreimagine the future of our economies and businesses in disruptive times.\nThank You!\n5", "source": "CBK", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-04-26", "url": "https://www.centralbank.go.ke/uploads/speeches/1448706835_Governors Keynote Address-Technical University of Kenya-November 2021.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "889e6afa13971b4f4b0e5eb43f529f68", "text": "CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA\nEXECUTIVE CERTIFICATE IN AGRICULTURAL FINANCE (ECAF)\nCAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMME\nDr. Patrick Njoroge\nGovernor, Central Bank of Kenya\nHonorable Cabinet Secretary, distinguished guests, Good morning! It is a great\npleasure to speak before this distinguished group today. I would like to express my\nthanks to the organizers and sponsors of this event, the Global Communities Partners\nfor Good and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).\nOn behalf of the Central Bank of Kenya, let me join my colleagues in welcoming you\nto this event whose primary objective is to launch a new and unique capacity building\ninitiative targeting financial sector institutions in Kenya, Tanzania, and Malawi. I am\ninformed that this training programme, aptly called the Executive Certificate in\nAgricultural Finance (ECAF), has been developed in response to the identified\ncapacity gaps obtaining in majority of our lending institutions which has continued to\nconstrain effective delivery of financial services to the agricultural sector.\nAt the outset, let me commend the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA),\nGlobal Communities Partners for Good, Kenya School of Monetary Studies, and\nFinancial Access East Africa (FAEA) for seeking to continue building a critical mass\nof appropriately trained personnel with requisite knowledge and skills to deliver\nlending services to the agricultural sector.\nEstablishing a sustainable and borrower-friendly agricultural financing system with a\ncapacity to infuse growth of various sizes of agribusinesses has continued to be\nelusive. This, in spite of the fact that agriculture remains the single most critical sector\nin the majority of Sub-Saharan communities. A number of both demand and supply\nside factors have been cited as contributing to the worrying scenario. I am happy to\nnote that this programme, seeks to address a critical supply side factor which is under\nthe control of lending institutions – i.e., strengthening the human resource capacity.\nAccording to estimates, demand for food will increase by 70 percent by 2050, and at\nleast $80 billion annually in investments will be needed to meet this demand, most of\nwhich is expected to come from the private sector. Banking sectors especially in\n1\n\ndeveloping countries have continued to lend much smaller share of their loan\nportfolios to agriculture compared to agriculture’s share of GDP. This has constrained\ninvestment in agriculture by both farmers and agribusiness. It also demonstrates that\nthe barrier to lending is not a lack of liquidity in the banking sectors, but rather a lack\nof willingness to expand lending to agriculture.\nIt is noteworthy that various global initiatives that have been undertaken by different\nstakeholders, to reverse the worrying trend in order to enhance access and usage of\nfinancial services for growth in the agricultural sector and these include:\n the World Bank Group’s Community of Practice (CoP) focusing on agricultural\nfinance and insurance;\n AgriFin’s initiative of GFADR, a multi-stakeholder program funded by the Bill &\nMelinda Gates Foundation;\n CGAP’s initiative on small holder finance which explores innovative approaches in\nthe use of information and communication technologies (ICT) and IFC’s work with\nprivate sector banks and agribusinesses.\nI am happy to note that this capacity building programme we are launching today is an\nintervention seeking to further address the nagging human resource capacity\nchallenges characterizing our financial sector institutions in the area of agricultural\nlending.\nIt is a pleasure to note that by the end of the funding phase by the Global Communities\nPartners for Good, KSMS and its partner FAEA will have trained a total of 300\nlending officers consisting of 140 from Kenya, 100 from Tanzania and 60 from\nMalawi. It is anticipated that with an appropriately trained workforce, our lending\ninstitutions should increase their lending activities to this key and critical sector of our\neconomy. We at the Central Bank of Kenya are excited by this unique opportunity to\nbuild the capacity of financial institutions to better serve the agriculture sector, a key\neconomic driver for all three countries, and help stimulate the sector.\nWith these few remarks, I wish to invite the Cabinet Secretary, Mr. Willy Bett to make\na few remarks and launch this training programme.\nThank you.\n2", "source": "CBK", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-04-26", "url": "https://www.centralbank.go.ke//images/docs/speeches/2016/ECAFTrainingProgramme.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "008451d6fde878ac415b85d4d11141bd", "text": "The Conduct of Monetary Policy\nin East Africa In A Changing\nPolicy Environment\nA Memorial Lecture In Honour of Prof Francis Mwega\nBy\nProf. Benno J. Ndulu\n\nOutline\n• Conduct of Monetary Policy in East Africa\n• largely Successful\n• Remarkably similar across countries – regional coherence\n• Recent Striking Changes in the Behaviour of Monetary Aggregates and\nprices in East Africa\n• Sharp slow down of Monetary Growth\n• Sharp Slow Down Of Private Sector Credit Growth;\n• Sharp fall in money market rates - reflected in treasuries\n• What Explains theses Changes?\n• How Have East African Central Banks responded to these changes?\n• What are the key risks to macro stability in the Near and Medium Term?\n\nI. Conduct of Monetary Policy in the EAC\nLargely Successful\nTwo key sets of indicators for measuring such success\n• The first relates to achievement of the core mandates of the central\nbanks - price stability\n• Inflation for domestic prices\n• Exchange rates for price of tradables\n• Secondly, Success is also deduced from ability to ride through major\nshocks to enable the economies continue on a path of sustained growth\nafter brief disruption\n\nInflation trends in selected EAC countries\nSince 2013 Inflation\nHeadlineiInflation\nrates have\nTanzania Kenya Uganda Rwanda\nremained subdued\nBurundi Lower limit Upper limit\nand within EAC\n30\nconvergence band\nsave for Burundi 25\nrecently, mainly due\n20\nto successful\nt\nconduct of n\ne 15\nc\nr\nmonetary policy e\nP\nhelped along by 10\nstability of oil\n5\nprices, and\nimproved food\n0\nsupply 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7\n1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1\n- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nc r n p c r n p c r n p c r n p c r n p c r n p c r n p c\ne a u e e a u e e a u e e a u e e a u e e a u e e a u e e\nD M J S D M J S D M J S D M J S D M J S D M J S D M J S D\n4\n\nNominal exchange rate index – Reasonably Stable save for\nCorrections For Shocks\n- Reasonably stable\nNominal exchange rate index (2010=100)\npath with correction Tanzania Kenya Uganda Rwanda\n170\nfor shocks\n160\n- Real effective\n150\nExchange rates\n140\nStable\nx\ne 130\nd\n- Larger correction n I\n120\nin countries purs-\n110\nuing more\n100\nflexible exch rate\n90\nregime 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 4 1 4 1 4 1 4 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 7 1 7 1 7 1 7 1\n- c - r -n - p - c - r -n - p - c - r -n - p - c - r - n - p - c - r - n - p - c - r -n - p - c - r -n - p - c\ne D a M u J e S e D a M u J e S e D a M u J e S e D a M u J e S e D a M u J e S e D a M u J e S e D a M u J e S e D\n5\n\nReal GDP performance in selected EAC countries\nReal GDP Growth in EAC Countries\nPercent\n2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016\n• Growth in the region was strong and\nBurundi 4.9 3.8 5.1 4.0 4.4 4.9 4.5 -3.9 0.9\nrobust supported by public investment in\nKenya 0.2 3.3 8.4 6.1 4.6 5.7 5.3 5.6 6.0\ninfrastructure, favourable commodity\nRwanda 11.1 6.3 7.3 7.8 8.8 4.7 7.0 6.9 6.0\nprices, subdued global oil prices and\nTanzania 5.6 5.4 6.4 7.9 5.1 7.3 7.0 7.0 7.0\nfavourable weather condition.\nUganda 10.4 6.9 8.2 5.9 3.2 4.7 4.9 5.5 4.8\nSources: African Economic Outlook, 2017 and National Bureau of Statistics • Growth in the region has remained\nresilient to shocks, quickly recovering after\nEAC QUARTERLY GDP GROWTH each shock – with robust macrostability\nPercent\nCountry 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017\nQ1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3\nUganda 3.4 4.6 3.9 4.1 5.8 7.0 1.4 8.4 5.7 5.6 6.2 5.3 4.1 2.9 1.2 2.0 3.9 6.5 7.5\nRwanda 4.5 7.7 2.7 4.1 7.4 5.9 10.5 6.7 8.0 9.3 8.1 10.0 8.9 7.5 5.4 2.4 1.7 4.0 8.0\nKenya 6.1 7.5 6.4 3.5 5.2 6.0 4.6 5.6 5.8 5.6 6.1 5.5 5.3 6.2 5.7 6.1 4.7 5.0 4.4\nTanzania 6.2 5.9 7.3 9.7 7.8 9.8 5.7 4.4 6.5 6.5 6.8 8.2 6.9 8.5 6.6 5.5 5.7 7.8 6.8\nEAC Average 5.1 6.4 5.1 5.3 6.6 7.2 5.5 6.3 6.5 6.8 6.8 7.3 6.3 6.3 4.7 4.0 4.0 5.8 6.7\nSources: National Bureau of Statistics 6\n\nManaging Shocks for Sustained Macrostability\n• Since 2008 the region managed to ride through three major shocks with\nconsequence on macrostablity\n• Global Financial Crisis (2009) – the biggest shock with impacts transmitted through\na spike in exchange rates (heightened by speculative attacks) and through a global\neconomic recession\n• The Euro Crisis (2011/12) again transmitted mainly through spike in exchange rates\nand its impact on lengthening the period of recovery from GFC recession\n• Commodity Price Collapse (2014/15) with its effect transmitted mainly via pressure\non exchange rates\n• Judging from the short duration of stress from each shock – short lived\ninflationary and exchange rate spikes and quick recovery of growth –\nManagement of shocks was quite successful.\n\nRemarkable Similarity Across Countries in the Path of\nMonetary Aggregates and Price Indicators Across the\nRegion\nIt is not by accident – the region is on a path to Monetary Union and\nthe Central banks via MAC have actively coordinated approaches and\naction\n• Harmonization in the approaches to the conduct of monetary policy has\nstrengthened over time.\n• Coordination of responses to common shocks e.g. Global Financial Crisis\n2009\n• Cross border operations of regional and international banks has\nnecessitated coordination in regulation and handling of common challenges.\n• Exchange of information and data has facilitated this coordination\n\nII. Recent Significant Developments in the Path\nof Monetary Aggregates and Prices\n• Sharp slow down of Growth Rates of all Monetary Aggregates\n• A Virtual Collapse of growth of Credit to the Private Sector – mainly\ndriven by a spike in the risk premium as indicated by spikes in Non-\nperforming loans across the region\n• Sharp decline in yields in the market for treasuries a key benchmark\nfor other financial prices\n• But lending Rates stayed strikingly stable or rose widening the gap\nbetween treasuries and lending rates in most countries\n\nEAC money supply Growth Trends\n• Growth of\nAnnual growth of M3\nmoney\nTanzania Kenya Uganda Rwanda\nsupply\n45\ntracks\nInflation\n40\nreasonably\n35\nwell\n30\n• It has now\nbegun to t 25\nn\ne\nc\npick up in r\ne 20\nP\nsome of the\n15\nEAC\ncountries 10\nafter sharp\n5\ndeceleration\n0\nover the last\n0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7\n1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1\ntwo years - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nc r n p c r n p c r n p c r n p c r n p c r n p c r n p c\ne a u e e a u e e a u e e a u e e a u e e a u e e a u e e\nD M J S D M J S D M J S D M J S D M J S D M J S D M J S D\n10\n\nGrowth of Credit to the Private sector has\nslowed down sharply\nAnnual growth of credit to the private sector\nTanzania Kenya Uganda Rwanda\n50\n40\n30\nt\nn\ne 20\nc\nr\ne\nP\n10\n0\n-10\n0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7\n1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1\n- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nc r n p c r n p c r n p c r n p c r n p c r n p c r n p c\ne a u e e a u e e a u e e a u e e a u e e a u e e a u e e\nD M J S D M J S D M J S D M J S D M J S D M J S D M J S D\n\nSharp Rise in NPLS Has Raised Risk Premium\nTanzania NPLs/gross Loans Kenya NPLs/gross Loans Uganda NPLs/gross Loans Rwanda NPLs/gross Loans\n14\n12\n10\n8\nt\nn\ne\nc\nr\ne\nP\n6\n4\n2\n0\n1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7\n1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1\n- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\np c r n p c r n p c r n p c r n p c r n p c r n p c\ne e a u e e a u e e a u e e a u e e a u e e a u e e\nS D M J S D M J S D M J S D M J S D M J S D M J S D\n\nEAC money market interest rates Declined Sharply Reflecting\nFlight to Safety of Government Paper\n91-day T-bill rate 182-day T-bill rate\nTanzania Kenya Uganda Rwanda Tanzania Kenya Uganda Rwanda\n25 30\n25\n20\n20\n15\nt t\nn n\ne e 15\nc c\nr r\ne e\nP P\n10\n10\n5\n5\n0 0\n0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7\n1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1\n- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nc r n p c r n p c r n p c r n p c r n p c r n p c r n p c c r n p c r n p c r n p c r n p c r n p c r n p c r n p c\ne a u e e a u e e a u e e a u e e a u e e a u e e a u e e e a u e e a u e e a u e e a u e e a u e e a u e e a u e e\nD M J S D M J S D M J S D M J S D M J S D M J S D M J S D D M J S D M J S D M J S D M J S D M J S D M J S D M J S D\n• Countries in the EAC which are more open to global market, experience\nrelatively large swings in money market interest rates e.g. Uganda\n13\n\nEAC money market and commercial banks interest rates\nTZ 364-day WAY TZ Central Bank rate KE 364-day WAY KE Central Bank rate\nTZ Overall Time Deposit Rate TZ Overall Lending Rate KE Overall Time Deposit Rate KE Overall Lending Rate\nTZ Interbank rate KE Interbank rate\n35 35\n30 30\n25 25\nt n 20 t n 20\ne e\nc c\nr e 15 r e 15\nP P\n10 10\n5 5\n0 0\n0 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 6 6 6 7 7 7 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 6 6 6 7 7 7\n1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1\n-c -r -g -c -r -g -c -r -g -c -r -g -c -r -g -c -r -g -c -r -g -c -c -r -g -c -r -g -c -r -g -c -r -g -c -r -g -c -r -g -c -r -g -c\ne p u e p u e p u e p u e p u e p u e p u e e p u e p u e p u e p u e p u e p u e p u e\nD A A D A A D A A D A A D A A D A A D A A D D A A D A A D A A D A A D A A D A A D A A D\nUG 364-day WAY UG Central Bank rate RW 364-day WAY RW Central Bank rate\nUG Overall Time Deposit Rate UG Overall Lending Rate RW Overall Time Deposit Rate RW Overall Lending Rate\nUG Interbank rate RW Interbank rate\n30 20\n18\n25\n16\n20 14\nt n t n 12\ne c r e P 15 e c r e P 1 8 0\n10\n6\n5 4\n2\n0 0\n0 1 -c\ne D\n1 1 -r\np A\n1 1 -g\nu A\n1 1 -c\ne D\n2 1 -r\np A\n2 1 -g\nu A\n2 1 -c\ne D\n3 1 -r\np A\n3 1 -g\nu A\n3 1 -c\ne D\n4 1 -r\np A\n4 1 -g\nu A\n4 1 -c\ne D\n5 1 -r\np A\n5 1 -g\nu A\n5 1 -c\ne D\n6 1 -r\np A\n6 1 -g\nu A\n6 1 -c\ne D\n7 1 -r\np A\n7 1 -g\nu A\n7 1 -c\ne D\n0 1 -c\ne D\n1 1 -r\np A\n1 1 -g\nu A\n1 1 -c\ne D\n2 1 -r\np A\n2 1 -g\nu A\n2 1 -c\ne D\n3 1 -r\np A\n3 1 -g\nu A\n3 1 -c\ne D\n4 1 -r\np A\n4 1 -g\nu A\n4 1 -c\ne D\n5 1 -r\np A\n5 1 -g\nu A\n5 1 -c\ne D\n6 1 -r\np A\n6 1 -g\nu A\n6 1 -c\ne D 14\n7 1 -r\np A\n7 1 -g\nu A\n7 1 -c\ne D\n\nBut Lending Rates Have stayed Stubbornly\nHigh\n• Notwithstanding sharp decline in interbank cash market rate and\nTreasuries’ market rates lending rates have stayed stubbornly high.\nIn Tanzania they even rose slightly. In Kenya they moved down but\nnot significantly.\n• To a large extent this is due sharp rise in NPLS raising risk premiums\n• Risk-adjusted rates followed suit or stayed stubbornly above\ndeclining cost of funds or declining market rates\n\nThe Gap between Lending Rates and market\nRates Has Widened\n• Interbank Cash market rates have fallen sharply in line with with\nCentral Bank easy monetary policy – Response from banks has been\nto use this position to lend to Governments or accumulate liquidity\nin the form of excess reserves in the Central Banks\n• With high NPLS banks have\n• slowed down credit to the private sector\n• Lent more to each other driving rates down\n• Increased demand for govt paper, way beyond govt needs (heavy\noversubscriptions driving maket rates down.\n\nIII. Major Changes Impacting the Conduct of\nMonetary Policy\n• More Frequent Supply Side shocks with exogeneous impact on\nInflation\n• Sharp Rise in Transaction Velocity of Circulation with the advent of\nmobile Money\n• Dilution of Fiscal Dominance\n• Changes in the approach to conducting monetary policy – From\nTargeting Quantities to Targeting Prices\n\nTransaction velocity of money in the EA Region\n• The impact of\nTransaction Velocity\nslow growth in\nTanzania Kenya Uganda Rwanda\nmonetary\n40\naggregates was\npartly reduced\n35\nby rising\ntransaction\n30\nvelocity of\nmoney\n25\nassociated with\nongoing financial\n20\ninnovations and\ntechnological\n15\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7\ndividend 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1\n- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nc c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c\ne e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e\nD D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D\n18\n\nThe main Imperatives of Monetary Policy\nImplementation have changed significantly\n• In 2008 when I became Governor of the Bank of Tazania – our main preoccupation was\nmopping up liquidity from the system to reduce Inflationary pressure.\n• Fiscal dominance = Govt busy injecting via spending foreign savings and the Central\nBank mopping up excess liquidity arising from this\n• Currently fiscal Dominance significantly diluted\n• Government greater reliance on domestic revenue means enhanced neutrality in monetary\neffects of govt operations – withdraw liquidity when collecting Revenue and injecting liquidity\nwhen spending it\n• Significant proportion of foreign savings – via grants or loans spent on big projects meant\nleakages via imports of goods and services and fees\n• Loans given in kind – i.e. with no cash transfer for big projects also meant less liquidity\ninjections\n• Central Banks have been pushed to rely more on their own instruments to provide liquidity e.g.\nvia repos, purchase of forex from the market etc – depth and efficacy of financial markets key\nchallenges for effectiveness of transmission mechanisms\n\nFiscal Operations Much less Liquidity Injecting\n• Sharp decline in liquidity injecting financing as donor budget\nsupport sharply decreased, and non-concessional borrowing also\nslowed down with increase in the cost of borrowing\n• Loans given in kind are not-liquidity injecting – many Chinese-\nfunded infrastructure loans are in that form (Rail in Kenya; Gas\npipeline in Tanzania)\n• Dominance of large infrastructure projects in the development\nbudget – where foreign firms dominate in securing contracts=\nmeans large leakages in the multiplier effects\n• As the share of development budget rises these leakages become\nmore pronounced\n\nThose countries that have shifted to price-based conduct\nof monetary Policy Policy Rate tracks Markets better\n• They use policy rates more actively\n• They track short term rates more accurately\n• But not long term rates\n\nEAC Policy rates and short-term money market interest rates\nTZ Central Bank rate TZ Repo rate TZ Interbank rate KE Central Bank rate KE Repo rate KE Interbank rate\n35 35\n30 30\n25 25\ntn 20 tn 20\ne e\nc c\nr r\ne P 15 e P 15\n10 10\n5 5\n0 0\n0 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 6 6 6 7 7 7 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 6 6 6 7 7 7\n1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1\n-c\ne\n-r\np\n-g\nu\n-c\ne\n-r\np\n-g\nu\n-c\ne\n-r\np\n-g\nu\n-c\ne\n-r\np\n-g\nu\n-c\ne\n-r\np\n-g\nu\n-c\ne\n-r\np\n-g\nu\n-c\ne\n-r\np\n-g\nu\n-c\ne\n-c\ne\n-r\np\n-g\nu\n-c\ne\n-r\np\n-g\nu\n-c\ne\n-r\np\n-g\nu\n-c\ne\n-r\np\n-g\nu\n-c\ne\n-r\np\n-g\nu\n-c\ne\n-r\np\n-g\nu\n-c\ne\n-r\np\n-g\nu\n-c\ne\nD A A D A A D A A D A A D A A D A A D A A D D A A D A A D A A D A A D A A D A A D A A D\nUG Central Bank rate UG Repo rate UG Interbank rate RW Central Bank rate RW Repo rate RW Interbank rate\n30 14\n12\n25\n10\n20\ntn\ne c r e P 15\ntn\ne c r e P 6\n8\n10\n4\n5 2\n0 0\n0 1 -c\ne D\n1 1 -r\np A\n1 1 -g\nu A\n1 1 -c\ne D\n2 1 -r\np A\n2 1 -g\nu A\n2 1 -c\ne D\n3 1 -r\np A\n3 1 -g\nu A\n3 1 -c\ne D\n4 1 -r\np A\n4 1 -g\nu A\n4 1 -c\ne D\n5 1 -r\np A\n5 1 -g\nu A\n5 1 -c\ne D\n6 1 -r\np A\n6 1 -g\nu A\n6 1 -c\ne D\n7 1 -r\np A\n7 1 -g\nu A\n7 1 -c\ne D\n0 1 -c\ne D\n1 1 -r\np A\n1 1 -g\nu A\n1 1 -c\ne D\n2 1 -r\np A\n2 1 -g\nu A\n2 1 -c\ne D\n3 1 -r\np A\n3 1 -g\nu A\n3 1 -c\ne D\n4 1 -r\np A\n4 1 -g\nu A\n4 1 -c\ne D\n5 1 -r\np A\n5 1 -g\nu A\n5 1 -c\ne D\n6 1 -r\np A\n6 1 -g\nu A\n6 1 -c\ne D\n22 7 1 -r\np A\n7 1 -g\nu A\n7 1 -c\ne D\n\nIV. Major Macrostability Risks Going Forward\n• Independence of Central Banks to pursue price stability and protect\nthe value of the local currency\n• Tendency to fix interest rates, a key price of monetary policy blunts\nefficacy of monetary policy transmission\n• Debt Sustainability / Debt distress\n• Unsustainable levels of borrowing\n• Risks from Currency mismatch in major borrowing for infrastructure big\npush (borrowing for non-tradable services\n• Risks from Maturity mismatch for major infrastructure investment\n• End of Quantitative Easing in US to be followed by Europe\n\nRising Challenges to Central Bank\nIndependence\n• Notwithstanding the fact that independence/autonomy of central\nbank independence is enshrined in Constitutions and Law there are\nfrequent operational challenges to this independence\n• Interest rate controls and directed credit – most frequent pressure\nin the region – more on this in the next slide\n• Rising capital inadequacy and dependence on fiscal subventions will\nundermine autonomy and separation of fiscal and monetary policy\nmandates\n• Almost a decade of very low returns/yields to central bank foreign\ninvestment due to quantitative easing have eroded capital adequacy of\ncentral banks and exposed them to risk of dependence on subventions\n\nDeliberate Policy Interventions to Promote\nCredit by Lowering Rates Unfruitful\n• Tying lending rates to policy rates is at best tenuous. Objectives of policy rates\nare related to price stability – while capping interest rates targets affordability\nof lending rates\n• It is also likely that those who least can afford high interest rates may be\nskewed out of credit market by higher risk assessment rather than simply\ninterest rates – e.g. those who benefited for unsecured credit – e.g. Mkesho,\nMpawa\n• Interest Controls are not new, they were tried across the region in the past, and\nthe ensuing rationing of credit at set rates disproportionately skewed out those\nwho were targeted most for help driving them to loan sharks\n• Interventions that target reduction of risk premium or requirements for\nexpensive collateral – e.g. credit scoring system based on mobile telephony and\nmobile money usage – would be most effective solutions instead.\n\nDebt Sustainability Challenges – Are we\nborrowing too much?\n• Based on DSA carried out for each of the East African member\ncountries External debt and Total public debt are broadly within the\nacceptable int’l thresholds and EAC limit of PV of debt at 50%\n• None is currently already at risk of distress\n• Nevertheless recent build up has been rapid with higher cost and\nshorter maturities as non-concessional borrowing increased faster\nthan debt stock\n• PV of Kenya’s total public debt ratio to GDP has approached the 50%\nmark (although there are disputes for discount rate for domestic\ndebt) and could breach the threshold for sustainable debt\n\nThe Risks from Currency Mismatch\n• The Greater risk is that from currency mismatch (liquidity risk)\n• Loans for large infrastructure projects (transport, power, water\ncommunications) are contracted in foreign currency and have to be\nrepaid in the same\n• But revenue streams from these investments are in local currency and\nservicing to a large extent depends on growth of export sector.\n• Unless these investments accelerate growth of exports, a country may\nface challenges in externalizing debt service even if there is enough\nrevenue from these investments\n• Hope lies in getting oil and gas exports to start flowing early to boost\nforeign exchange earnings\n\nThe Risks of Maturity Mismatch\n• Some debts start getting repaid even before investment is complete\n• This is particularly the case for debt contracted in the capital\nmarkets – usually medium term in maturity\n• This mismatch in timing leads to a “solvency” risk – no revenue\navailable to service the debt\n• Large and lengthy gestation period projects = such as standard\ngauge railway if funded this way could spell out such risk for the\ncountries concerned\n• This is particularly troublesome if debt has to be rolled over at\nhigher cost.\n\nEnd of Quantitative Easing and Rise in interest\nRates\n• USA is already moving full steam to reversal while Europe is winding\ndown QE. Two major impacts are worrisome vis a vis macrostability\n• Reversal of capital flows back to USA and Europe to take advantage\nof higher returns and reduced risks – likely to engender\n• significant pressures on and volatility of exchange rate and\n• tightening of liquidity particularly if foreign currency denominated deposits\ndecline and subdues liquidity injection via inflows of foreign savings\n• Initial large negative effect on central bank income via revaluation\nlosses as price of its foreign assets decline with rise in interest rate -\nengendering inadequacy of capital and thraeat central bank\nindependence.\n\nConcluding Remarks\n• The conduct of monetary policy in the region has been overall\nsuccessful\n• Part of this success can be attributed to letting Central Banks pursue\nits mandates unencumbered\n• Sustaining this success will partly depend on\n• Protecting the independence of central banks to implement its mandate\n• Improve accountability of central banks for its actions – including more\neffective communication of its activity\n• Stronger capacity and flexibility to manage response to shocks\n• Let us sustain regional coordination and coherence of policy and\naction in response to shocks and in this era of cross-border banking.", "source": "CBK", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-04-26", "url": "https://www.centralbank.go.ke/uploads/speeches/383506888_Prof Mwega's Memorial Lecture - rev.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "159cde40332a8a0714325f607f4c79f8", "text": "CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA\nRemarks\nby\nPROF. NJUGUNA NDUNG’U\nGOVERNOR\nCCEENNTTRRAALL BBAANNKK OOFF KKEENNYYAA\ndduurriinngg tthhee\n22000099 AALLLLIIAANNCCEE FFOORR FFIINNAANNCCIIAALL IINNCCLLUUSSIIOONN ((AAFFII))\nGGLLOOBBAALL PPOOLLIICCYY FFOORRUUMM\nWindsor Golf Hotel and Country Club, Nairobi\nSeptember 14th, 2009\n\nRemarks at during the 2009 Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI) Global Policy Forum – September 14, 2009\nThe Right Honourable Prime Minister of the Republic of Kenya,\nMr. Raila Odinga;\nThe Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance of the\nRepublic of Kenya, Mr. Uhuru Kenyatta;\nPermanent Secretaries here present;\nDr. Alfred Hannig, Executive Director, Alliance for Financial\nInclusion;\nDistinguished Guests;\nLadies and Gentlemen:\nRight Honourable Prime Minister, let me thank you most sincerely for\ngracing this important Forum. Your personal presence demonstrates the\nseriousness with which the Government of Kenya takes the role of the\nfinancial sector in the process of our nation’s economic development. May I\nalso heartily thank the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI) for choosing to\nhost its inaugural Global Policy Forum in Nairobi. This is indeed a very\ngreat honour to our country. I also warmly welcome all the Forum\nparticipants and hope that in the course of the next three days, we shall\nhave fruitful discussions and emerge with smart policies to expand global\nfinancial inclusion. In this respect, I am delighted to be part of the Forum\nand to champion its course.\nMr. Prime Minister, this Forum is jointly hosted by the Alliance for\nFinancial Inclusion (AFI) and the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK). The CBK is\na member of the AFI Steering Committee. The AFI has over 60 member\ncountries that account for the majority, nearly 70 percent, of the world’s\n‘unbanked’ population. AFI’s vision is to expand financial services to at least\nfifty million people across the globe living on less than two dollars a day by\n2012.\nThe AFI currently concentrates on six policy areas, namely, Agent Banking,\nMobile Phone Banking, Diversification of Financial Service Channels and\nProviders, State Bank Reforms, Financial Identity and Consumer\nProtection. AFI’s mandate, however, will be widened as need arises. All\nthese thematic areas, which AFI champions are relevant to our country and\n2\n\nRemarks at during the 2009 Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI) Global Policy Forum – September 14, 2009\nare key to our financial sector if it has to become “a vibrant and\nglobally competitive financial sector’’ as stipulated in Vision 2030. A\nstrong and accessible financial sector is a key ingredient in Kenya’s vision of\nbecoming a middle income country by the year 2030.\nAs a country we are matching on towards all these fronts that AFI espouses.\nThe government in the current fiscal year 2009/10 proposed to introduce\nbranchless banking. This will enable banks to provide their services through\nAgents with wide distribution networks and therefore legalizing Agent\nBanking and reducing costs of financial services. There has been a\nsignificant reduction of the proportion of our population that remains\nunbanked from 38% in 2006 to 33% in 2009 according to the national\nfinancial access surveys conducted by the CBK and Financial Sector\nDeepening (FSD) Kenya. This reduction in the unbanked is greatly\nattributed to the contribution of mobile phones as a channel for money\ntransfer.\nThe recent Financial Access Survey also indicates that the proportion of our\npopulation accessing banking services increased from 19% to 23% between\n2006 and 2009. However, 33% of the population still has no access to any\nform of financial service and 27% access financial services from the informal\nfinancial sector. Despite the progress we have made towards expanding\nfinancial access, the majority of Kenyans still lack access to formal financial\nservices. We are therefore keen to draw on the wealth of experiences that\nare brought to the table by participants in this Forum. We will, over the next\nthree days, share experiences on smart financial inclusion policies that have\nworked elsewhere. We will thereafter adopt these policies to suit our\nrespective countries as we work together to push forward the global\nfinancial access frontiers.\nMr. Prime Minister, this Forum also comes at a time when the global\neconomy is suffering a slow down, with economic activities weakened\n3\n\nRemarks at during the 2009 Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI) Global Policy Forum – September 14, 2009\nconsiderably. Although there are signs of improvement, we are yet to see\nfull recovery. Globally, policy actions taken to mitigate the crisis have been\ngeared towards maintaining effective and well functioning financial systems\nand to reinforce their resilience in order to guard their integrity. We have\nacted accordingly to ensure that our financial system remains sound,\nsecure, stable, accessible and trusted. We are in constant vigilance that this\nremains the case and any action necessary to achieve this will be\nundertaken.\nWith these few remarks, it is now my pleasant duty and honour to welcome\nthe Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance to make a few remarks\nand to welcome you to address this Forum.\nHonourable Deputy Prime Minister and Minster for Finance, You\nHave The Floor.\n4", "source": "CBK", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-04-26", "url": "https://www.centralbank.go.ke//images/docs/speeches/2009/Governor%27s%20Remarks%20during%202009%20AFI%20Global%20Policy%20Forum.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "81b1cc2b1dabb95af42eedc2980f0488", "text": "CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA\nRemarks by\nPPRROOFF.. NNJJUUGGUUNNAA NNDDUUNNGG’’UU\nGGOOVVEERRNNOORR\nCCEENNTTRRAALL BBAANNKK OOFF KKEENNYYAA\naatt tthhee\n33RRDD GGOOVVEERRNNOORRSS CCOONNSSUULLTTAATTIIVVEE FFOORRUUMM OONN CCOOOOPPEERRAATTIIOONN\nBBEETTWWEEEENN BBAANNKK OOFF SSOOUUTTHH SSUUDDAANN AANNDD CCEENNTTRRAALL BBAANNKK OOFF\nKKEENNYYAA\nKenya School of Monetary Studies\nWednesday, December 19, 2012\n\nMr. Kornelio Koriom Mayik, Governor, Bank of South Sudan;\nMembers of the Technical Committee, Bank of South Sudan\nand Central Bank of Kenya;\nThe Central Bank of Kenya is delighted and honoured to host the 3rd Consultative\nForum on cooperation between Bank of South Sudan and Central Bank of Kenya here\nat the Kenya School of Monetary School Studies.\nI take this opportunity to welcome the Governor, Bank of South Sudan, H.E. Kornelio\nKoriom Mayik, and the entire BSS delegation to Nairobi, Kenya and more specifically to\nthe Kenya School of Monetary Studies (KSMS).\nThe genesis of the cooperation between BSS and CBK goes back a few years ago before\nSouth Sudan became a Republic when a number of officials were hosted here at KSMS\nand the first Governor of BSS operated for a while from an office at CBK.\nTo date we have had two other Consultative Forums at Bank of South Sudan in Juba;\nthe 1st one being in July 2012 and the 2nd in October 2012. The purpose of these forums\nis to strengthen the mutual cooperation between the two institutions and to seek\nsolutions to common binding constraints.\nDuring the 1st Consultative Forum, BSS outlined the challenges the Bank was facing,\nincluding;\n The capacity constraints in conventional banking operations;\n Facilitating Government borrowing from the domestic market and putting in place\nthe necessary infrastructure;\n The need to put in place a framework and appropriate instruments for monetary\npolicy implementation;\n The adverse impact of stoppage of oil revenues that led to reduced foreign currency\nrevenues; and,\n The need to establish a functioning Capital Market\nThe CBK on its part identified a number of areas that it could provide support. This,\ncombined with the challenges highlighted by BSS formed the basis for mutual\ncooperation between the two Central Banks.\nDuring the 2nd Consultative Forum which was held in October 2012, we agreed to form\na Technical Committee (TC) to fast-track the implementation of issues discussed during\nthe 1st Consultative Forum.\n2\n\nThe Terms of Reference of the Technical Committee were drawn up and agreed upon.\nAmong the tasks given to this TC include;\n1. To formulate a comprehensive Memorandum of Understanding between BSS and\nCBK;\n2. To map out capacity building requirements for BSS and support to be provided by\nCBK to enhance operations at BSS;\n3. To review and finalize a Balance Sheet for BSS;\n4. To fast-track the opening and operationalization of reciprocal accounts at both BSS\nand CBK to facilitate trade between the two countries and solve the supply\nconstraints of dollars in the market in South Sudan;\n5. To formulate a method of determining the bilateral exchange rate;\n6. To propose instruments to enhance Government borrowing and facilitate the\ndeepening of the financial markets in South Sudan; and\n7. To propose a comprehensive budget for the TC.\nI am informed that the TC held its 1st meeting from 4th to 6th December, 2012 in Juba\nand that you have been holding the 2nd TC meeting in this same venue over the last two\ndays. Governor Kornelio and myself look forward to the TC’s report on the progress\nmade on the tasks identified. In this particular meeting, we need to make tangible\nprogress and produce meaningful results that the market participants and governments\non both sides are waiting for.\nI am pleased to hear that the Memorandum of Understanding has been finalized and\nreviewed by the Legal Counsels of the two Central Banks, who are present here with us\ntoday.\nBefore we give the chance to the TC for the presentation, I want to invite Governor\nKornelio to make a few remarks.\nThank you.\n3", "source": "CBK", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-04-26", "url": "https://www.centralbank.go.ke//images/docs/speeches/2012/Coop-South-Sudan-CBK.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "6ff9fef77ae0a26e44e7db91e50097a4", "text": "CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA\nRemarks by\nPROF. NJUGUNA NDUNG’U\nGOVERNOR\nCCEENNTTRRAALL BBAANNKK OOFF KKEENNYYAA\naatt tthhee\nLLAAUUNNCCHH OOFF TTHHEE SSTTUUDDYY RREEPPOORRTT OONN\nCCOOSSTT OOFF CCOOLLLLAATTEERRAALL IINN KKEENNYYAA\nIntercontinental Hotel, Nairobi\nMarch 24th, 2010\n\nGovernor’s Remarks at the Launch of Study Report on Cost of Collateral in Kenya – March 24, 2010\nHon. Uhuru Kenyatta, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for\nFinance;\nPermanent Secretaries, here present;\nMr. Martin Oduor Otieno, Chairman, Kenya Bankers Association;\nMr. John Wanyela, Chief Executive Officer, Kenya Bankers\nAssociation;\nMr. David Ferrand, Director, Financial Sector Deepening Trust\nKenya;\nDistinguished Guests;\nLadies and Gentlemen:\nIt is with great pleasure that we congregate here this morning to chart the way\nforward on another avenue of enhancing efficiency in our banking system.\nThis is through changes in the collateral technology in use. But before I make\nmy remarks, allow me to thank the Hon. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister\nfor Finance for agreeing to grace this occasion and deliver a keynote address.\nAlso, allow me to thank KBA and FSD for their tireless effort to deepen the\nfinancial sector.\nYesterday, we held our Monetary Policy Committee meeting in Mombasa CBK\nBranch. The first review was a survey on what sustains high interest rates -\nThe response from the market showed two factors; cost of credit and credit\nrisk sustains high interest rates. But what is behind cost of credit and credit\nrisk - perhaps the collateral technology in use. The cost of collateral is being\naddressed today by this study.\nLadies and Gentlemen: Kenyan banks have persistently cited cost of\ncollateral as contributing a significant portion of premium factored in the\ninterest rates they charge. To demystify the assertion, Central Bank of Kenya\n(CBK) and Kenya Bankers Association (KBA) in conjunction with Financial\nSector Deepening Trust (FSD) Kenya commissioned a study to review the\nKenyan collateral process with a view to determining the costs associated with\neach step in the process. The consultants were also required to put forward\nsuccinct recommendations based on their findings. Evidence seems to show\nthat the three steps of collateral process in Kenya; that is: creation,\nperfection and enforcement, entail enormous costs and time.\n2\n\nGovernor’s Remarks at the Launch of Study Report on Cost of Collateral in Kenya – March 24, 2010\nLadies and Gentlemen: The report has brought forward several\nrecommendations. They will be implemented and will result in both cost and\ntime reduction. The implementation of the recommendations touches on\nseveral Government agencies, most of which are represented here today. I\nbelieve your presence in this occasion goes a long way in showing your\nreadiness to play your part in addressing the constraints noted.\nThe study has indicted the collateral process in Kenya; the collateral process is\nflawed and as a result it is characterized with high costs. There are more than\n20 applicable statutes relating to collateral creation and perfection. This\nmakes the process cumbersome, expensive and complex. It is high time the\nstatutes are looked at to not only ensure uniformity but also simplify the\nprocess. Lenders have cited the slow and expensive judicial process as\ncontributing to premiums they factor in their interest rates. A certain and\nreliable judicial process facilitates quick recovery by lenders when secured\nfacilities are defaulted. Good borrowers will thus not be penalized for a\nmistake that is not of their making. In addition, there are many manual and\nuncoordinated registries.\nLadies and Gentlemen: What are the other complementing initiatives to\nthis study: Going forward the following two events will shape the outcome of\nthe recommendations of the report.\n• First, the licensing of credit reference bureaus has introduced a\nsubstitute to physical collateral, which is information capital and\nreputational capital as well as appropriate risk pricing. CRB Africa was\nlaunched early this month. It is expected that the credit information\nsharing mechanism will be fully operational by July this year and as a\nresult we expect to subsequently see a reduction in costs of credit as\nbanks pass the resultant benefits to their customers. Similarly, it is high\ntime that Kenyans henceforth adhere to their credit contract terms in\norder to build favourable credit track records for use as information\ncollateral.\n3\n\nGovernor’s Remarks at the Launch of Study Report on Cost of Collateral in Kenya – March 24, 2010\n• Second, the CBK and KBA have formed a committee to drive forward\nthe recommendations of the study. The formation of the committee\nreflects the importance attached to the study by both KBA and CBK. The\nimplementation of the recommendations will not only be beneficial to\nthe financial sector but the entire economy. This will happen at three\nlevels:\no First, through the supply of required credit in future.\no Second, through lengthening the maturity profile of term loans.\no Third, the appropriate definition of property rights and certainty\nin enforcement of contracts will be strong building blocks of a\ndeepened financial sector.\nIt is therefore important and complementing to explore the widening of the\nmembership of the committee to include the various players represented here\ntoday. A broad based implementation committee will support the quick\nexecution of the cross cutting recommendations contained in the report.\nLadies and Gentlemen: As I conclude let me take this opportunity to thank\nFSD Kenya, our development partner in several projects aimed at inclusive\nfinancial markets in Kenya; Kenya Bankers Association who partnered with us\nin this study; ShoreBank International and Walker Kontos who authored the\nreport being launched today; and all market players who took part in the\nstudy; but more importantly those who came here today to take part in the\nlaunch and I am sure they do believe we can achieve the prescribed results.\nFinally, Ladies and Gentlemen, let me let me take this opportunity to invite\nour chief guest to address this gathering.\nWELCOME DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, HON. UHURU\nKENYATTA.\n4", "source": "CBK", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-04-26", "url": "https://www.centralbank.go.ke//images/docs/speeches/2010/Governor%27s%20Remarks%20at%20Launch%20of%20Study%20Report%20on%20Cost%20of%20Collateral.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "cb02bd216af05e7f61f714b33f2037e9", "text": "CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA\nRemarks by\nPROF. NJUGUNA NDUNG’U\nGOVERNOR\nCENTRAL BANK OF KENYA\nDuring the\nTHE 2ND REGIONAL CREDIT INFORMATION SHARING (CIS)\nCONFERENCE\nHilton Hotel, Nairobi\nSeptember 24, 2013\n\nMr. Jeremy Awori, Chairman, Kenya Bankers Association;\nMr. Habil Olaka, Chief Executive Officer, Kenya Bankers\nAssociation;\nMr. Benjamin Nkungi, Chief Executive Officer, Association of\nMicrofinance Institutions of Kenya;\nChief Executive Officers of various Commercial Banks,\nMicrofinance and Development Finance Institutions here present;\nRepresentatives of various Central Banks from around Africa;\nRepresentatives of IFC, USAID and FSD Kenya;\nRepresentatives of the licensed Credit Bureaus (CRB Africa,\nMetropol CRB and CRIF);\nDistinguished Ladies and Gentlemen;\nIt gives me great pleasure to be here today to officially open this\nlandmark conference that brings together various players in the\ncredit information sharing (CIS) fraternity. This is the second such\nconference, the first having been held in July 2011. We\nappreciate the growing interest that the subject has generated\ninternationally, and more recently in Africa, as attested to by the\npresence in this conference of representatives from various\ncountries. Let me extend a warm welcome to you all to Kenya. I\nsincerely hope that you will enjoy Kenya’s hospitality and tourist\nattractions during your stay in Kenya.\n1\n\nLadies and Gentlemen; We are gathered here today because we\nbelieve that CIS mechanism is vital for unlocking access to\naffordable credit. Indeed the depressing statistics show that in the\nyear 2012, domestic credit stood at 44.9% of GDP in Sub-Saharan\nAfrica compared to 156.5% for the European Union. Besides cost of\ncredit, we do know that asymmetric information provides\ndifficulties and in fact acts as a mechanism for rationing credit.\nInformation capital will minimize these difficulties. Conferences\nsuch as this allow participants to share experiences as well as\nchallenge each other. We are therefore happy to have participation\nby you all.\nLadies and Gentlemen; you will recall that at the first regional\nCredit Reporting Conference, we focused on International\nStandards of Credit Reporting which were eventually released in\nSeptember 2011 by a Task Force coordinated by the World Bank,\nwith support from the Bank for International Settlements. These\nprinciples are designed to ensure that credit reporting systems are\nsafe, efficient and reliable. It is important that at this conference\nwe review the performance of our respective countries in meeting\nthose standards. Further, I am informed that various local and\ninternational experts will be making presentations during this\nConference covering recent developments and emerging issues.\n2\n\nParticipants will be taken through CIS international benchmarks\nand trends by experts from the International Finance Corporation\n(IFC) of the World Bank Group. The conference will also provide\nthe delegates with an opportunity to discuss and share experiences\non fundamental issues on the subject of CIS.\nLadies and Gentlemen; The CIS mechanism in Kenya has evolved\nsignificantly since it was unveiled in July 2010. There has been\nincreased usage of credit reports by banks in credit evaluation,\nwith the cumulative requests amounting to 2,907,395 as at June\n30, 2013. This has greatly contributed to improved risk lending,\nexpedited lending decisions and improved loan repayment\nculture, thus minimising the information asymmetries that\ndominated the lending process in the banking industry. We have\nsucceeded in unlocking funds previously tied up in non-\nperforming loans and thus making them available to new\nborrowers. Apart from banks, credit reports have also been useful\nto other credit providers, for example the Higher Education Loans\nBoard (HELB), IDB Capital and the Agricultural Finance\nCorporation (AFC). Most employers too, utilise credit reports in the\nassessment of the suitability of prospective employees. All these\ninitiatives demonstrate the importance of CIS to the Kenyan\neconomy.\n3\n\nLadies and Gentlemen; Despite these positive developments, the\nmechanism has faced some challenges that need to be addressed\nfor the benefit of all stakeholders. Customers are yet to fully\nbenefit from the CIS mechanism. The cost of credit still remains\nhigh to most borrowers. As it is well known, CIS alleviates the\nproblems of asymmetric information by countering adverse\nselection, moral hazard and information monopoly thus enabling\nlenders to make more informed decisions efficiently. Lenders\nshould therefore be able to extend credit to customers at more\nfavourable rates.\nOther challenges include data quality issues, legal impediments,\ninadequate dispute resolution mechanisms and limited access by\ncustomers in rural areas. We recognise the various initiatives that\nhave been improvised to deal with some of these challenges. It is\nalso anticipated that the coming into effect of the soon to be\ngazetted Credit Reference Bureau Regulations, 2013 will play a\nmajor role in resolving most of the challenges. Towards this end,\nthe Regulations contain provisions for credit reference bureaus\n(CRBs) to engage third party agents with a view to enhancing their\noutreach. The Regulations have also placed greater responsibilities\ntowards customer protection and higher standards for data\ncollection, storage, processing and use.\nLadies and Gentlemen; CIS is also very pertinent from a regional\nperspective. In the East African region; Uganda, Tanzania and\n4\n\nRwanda have licenced private CRBs while Burundi has in place\na government run credit bureau. Many African countries have\nalso implemented regulatory reforms to enhance their credit\nunderwriting standards by embracing CIS. The integration of\nseveral African countries has enabled several indigenous\nfinancial institutions to establish subsidiaries in other countries.\nBecause credit markets in Africa are at different levels of\ndevelopment, information sharing across borders presents an\nopportunity to bridge the gaps in the various markets and assist in\nweeding out cross border serial defaulters. Information asymmetry\nhas the potential of curtailing the entry of financial institutions\ninto African markets thus denying them essential investment\nflows. We should therefore strive to deepen our credit markets\nthrough initiatives such as CIS.\nLadies and Gentlemen; the CIS Regional Conference is being held\nat a time when Kenya is unveiling five key reforms that will\nsignificantly transform the effectiveness of this important beacon\nof financial infrastructure in our economy. The five landmark\ndevelopments are: introduction of positive data sharing, inclusion\nof Deposit Taking MFIs (DTMs) in CIS mechanism, implementing\nan Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanism (ADR), allowing\ncredit bureaus to open agencies and the registration of the\nAssociation of Kenya Credit Providers (AKCP) to spearhead a more\ncomprehensive CIS mechanism going forward.\n5\n\nThe first two reforms were facilitated by the amendments to the\nCentral Bank of Kenya Act, Banking Act and Microfinance Act in\n2012. The Banking Act and the Microfinance Act were amended\nto require all institutions licenced under the two statutes to share\nnegative credit information on their customers through CRBs. The\nCentral Bank of Kenya Act was amended to require banks to share\npositive information on their customers with CRBs. Allowing\nlenders to share positive information, enables good borrowers to\nbuild reputation collateral. Credit bureaus will soon be in a\nposition to provide credit scores using positive data from various\nlenders. With good credit scores, the push for less stringent\ndemands for fixed assets as collateral will begin in earnest while\na positive credit report is an excellent bargaining tool for lower\ninterest rates. It allows us to develop an efficient collateral\ntechnology.\nThe new requirement for participation of licensed DTMs marks\nthe first step towards inclusion of non-bank credit providers in\norder to make the database more comprehensive. Expansion of the\ndatabase to other credit providers will provide a complete picture\nof the customers and enable the providers develop tailored\nproducts to their requirements. The benefit of a comprehensive\ndatabase is the minimization of customer over-indebtedness. A\ncomprehensive database also minimises the tendency of serial\ndefaulters migrating to lenders who do not share information.\n6\n\nThe third and fourth reforms are intended to strengthen consumer\nprotection. The CIS Customer Complaints Office (CISCOF) has been\nestablished as an interim Credit Information Ombudsman to help\nresolve customer complaints regarding accuracy of data. This\nAlternative Dispute Resolution process, which will be discussed in\nthis conference, will speed up dispute resolutions.\nFinally Ladies and Gentlemen, the Association of Kenya Credit\nProviders (AKCP) has been registered with the primary objective of\ndeveloping an efficient CIS mechanism in Kenya. This Association,\nwhich we are launching today, will promote self-regulation\namong licensed and non-licensed credit providers and ensure a\nlevel playing field for credit providers who join the information\nsharing mechanism. This is a major step in complimenting the\nexisting CIS regulatory framework.\nThese measures are expected to radically change the credit market\nin Kenya, to benefit lower risk customers and enhance access to\ncredit by SMEs. Going forward, CIS being a relatively new area in\nthis region, there is need to raise public awareness on its\nimportance and safeguard confidentiality of customer information.\nThe Central Bank of Kenya is committed and will work with all\nrelevant parties to ensure that the CIS mechanism grows to its full\n7\n\npotential. The efficiencies that will accrue to our credit market\nwill contribute significantly to the stability of the financial sector\nand to the goals of our Vision 2030. As a demonstration of this\ncommitment, we have consulted with the Kenya School of\nMonetary Studies and agreed to provide office space for the new\nAssociation so as to give it a sound footing that also guarantees its\nneutrality.\nIt is now my pleasure to declare this two-day Regional CIS\nConference officially open.\nThank you and God bless you all\n8", "source": "CBK", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-04-26", "url": "https://www.centralbank.go.ke//images/docs/2nd_Regional_Conference_on_CIS.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "8dcb547f879de050fbf53f1b7164de8b", "text": "CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA\nMessage by\nPROF. NJUGUNA NDUNG’U\nGOVERNOR\nCCEENNTTRRAALL BBAANNKK OOFF KKEENNYYAA\nand\nTHE CHAMPION OF FINANCIAL EDUCATION IN KENYA\naatt tthhee\nFinancial Education Partnership Champion’s Breakfast Meeting with the\nInsurance Sector\nCrowne Plaza Hotel, Nairobi\nMonday, 20th September 2010\n\nMr. Sammy Makove, Chief Executive Officer, Insurance Regulatory\nAuthority;\nMr. Tom Gichuhi, Chief Executive Officer, Association of Kenya Insurers\n(AKI);\nMs. Bilha Maina, Project Manager, Financial Education, FSD Kenya;\nDistinguished guests;\nLadies and Gentlemen:\nI am honoured to speak at today’s breakfast meeting with the representatives of the\ninsurance sector; this is a rare opportunity to highlight the status of financial\neducation in Kenya as it concerns the insurance industry, an integral part of the\nfinancial sector.\nI am indeed grateful to the FSD Kenya for hosting this gathering and to all\nparticipants for the honour of your presence.\nLadies and Gentlemen: My brief this morning is on financial education and\nconsumer protection in relation to the insurance industry in Kenya. For a contextual\nbackground, allow me to recap the latest statistical highlights on financial inclusion\nin general and specifically insurance services, as reported in the 2009 National\nFinancial Access Survey.\n• As at June 2009, 32.7% of the Kenyan population had no access to any financial\nservices. This was 6% drop from the 38.4% reported in 2006;\n• The survey indicated that in 2009, only 7% of the Kenyan population used\ninsurance products and 91% of the population have never used insurance\nproducts;\n• In absolute terms, out of a population of 38 million, those using insurance\nproducts are approximately 1.3 million only;\n• 48% of the population is ignorant of the meaning of insurance and its usefulness;\n• The highest usage of insurance products was with the government-run National\nHospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) and the National Social Security Fund (NSSF),\nserving 4.2% (777,000) and 2.9% (536,000) of potential financial services\nconsumers, respectively. In strict terms, however, these two are effectively\nstatutory deductions rather than insurance arrangements for risk mitigation\nentered into voluntarily. Their apparent high “use” so to speak, may be attributed\nmore to the need to comply rather than to individual volition to mitigate against\nrisks they face on their day to day activities; and\n• According to the Insurance Regulatory Authority (IRA), the total life insurance\npolicies in force as at the end of 2009 numbered just under 450,000 while all\nother policies, through extrapolation, were estimated at less than one million.\nLadies and Gentlemen: From the foregoing, the general picture emerges: A major\nchallenge facing the Kenyan financial sector in general and the insurance industry in\n2\n\nparticular is the lack of awareness by the target market. The statistics indicate that\ninsurance, as a financial service, is yet to be recognized as an available risk-\nmitigation tool by much of the population. Whereas life’s risks are known from\npractical experience, not many are aware that insurance is available as a viable\nsolution to those risks. In times of financial crises caused by occurrence of\nmisfortunes, many continue to rely on traditional sources of help such as family and\nfriends, sale of physical assets, personal savings and emergency borrowing –\nincluding the dreaded shylocks. We need to parade the insurance products and the\npotential risks they mitigate.\nLadies and Gentlemen: As players in the insurance sector, it is your task to\nsensitize your prospective customers on your products not only as a marketing\nstrategy but as part of your corporate social responsibility. This will of course\ntranslate to more business in future when the prospective customers concretize your\nmessages. In this regard, I encourage you to come up with sustained efforts to\nenlighten the public through provision of credible, relevant and adequate guidance\non the role and usefulness of insurance as a risk management service.\nAs you know, an enlightened customer is empowered, and business is thereby made\neasier and faster when dealing with them. Certainly, the returns will not be reaped\novernight. However, the potential long-term business gains make it merit your\ninvestment.\nLadies and Gentlemen: The insurance sector regulator, IRA, through its\nparticipation in the Domestic Financial Sector Regulators Forum, is part of our\ncollective efforts as regulators of the financial sector to demystify financial services to\nthe public. The Forum has resolved to jointly undertake financial education activities\nto raise awareness on our various roles towards the economic development of our\ncountry. The financial sector is expected to play a critical role in realizing the\ncountry’s aspirations under Vision 2030 of becoming a middle income country by\n2030.\nThe increasing inter-linkages between players in the various sub-sectors in the\nfinancial sector informed the coming together of the regulators to facilitate our\ncollaboration in our various activities which are generally geared towards a sound,\nefficient and stable financial sector. For us to achieve these objectives, our consumers\nmust fully appreciate what we do. The best way to do this is through financial\neducation.\nLadies and Gentlemen: Allow me now to briefly share with you some few aspects\nwhich you need to consider as you rollout your various awareness and sensitization\ncampaigns. These are those aspects that determine the publics’ perception of\ninsurance as an industry, and that affect your collective reputation.\n3\n\n• Emphasize on the usefulness (positive benefits) of insurance to the\ninsured- The real benefits of the product as a value-proposition to the prospects\nshould be emphasized. The prospects need to be convinced of their status as the\nprimary beneficiary in any contract of insurance, in order to be volitionally\ninterested in the product. Financial education should be aimed at eliciting the\nsaid conviction and interest.\n• Cost-effectiveness- Insurers should be mindful of the low-income status\nof most of the uninsured public in Kenya and tailor their offerings accordingly.\nThe micro-insurance initiatives launched recently are a commendable step in this\ndirection.\n• Simplification of product structure and procedures – products\nproposals, and financial education content should be straightforward, and in\nlanguage plain enough for the ordinary customer to follow.\n• Transparency, integrity and credibility – The consumer protection\ndiagnostic study undertaken in 2010 showed significant customer dissatisfaction\nwith the manner in which insurance products were marketed as well as the\ntedious and protracted claims process. For a service based on trust, these\nobservations create a negative perception in prospective customers, and\nundermine their confidence. To avoid this, the industry should be seen to operate\ntransparently and above board. As for any financial service, associations that\nportray the industry in a negative light need to be avoided. Financial education\ninitiatives will need to clearly lay down the standards of integrity and consumer\nprotection which the insuring public should expect of all players in the industry.\nLadies and Gentlemen: I need not belabour the benefits of financial education to\nyour business. However, let me reiterate that the widespread public mistrust of\ninsurance providers and their products could hinder the effective implementation of\na financial education strategy in this sector. Consumer protection is therefore a\nrequisite step to the implementation of the strategy. The ongoing work by the IRA to\nadopt standardised policy wording for the industry should be fast tracked. I also\nsuggest that you consider introducing transparency regulations where there is a\nuniform disclosure regime for pricing and policy conditions particularly conditions\nrelated to claims settlement.\nI would also remind you the benefits of being customer centric. Your products and\nservices will elicit adequate interest if they are tailored towards the needs of the\ncustomers. To effectively do this, you need to be aware of the segments in the market.\nI am informed that there are three key population segments in our market that you\nneed to be aware as you develop your products:\n4\n\n• The underserved or unbanked – who largely need short term insurance products\nto manage emergencies brought on by bereavement, crop failure etc.;\n• The middle income disciplined planners – who are the more served group in\ninsurance but need to develop skills to seek the right advice, negotiate and\nadvocate for their rights; and\n• The elite but sometimes risky banked segment – who require financial planning\ntools for wealth generation, on which to fall back on in old age.\nIn conclusion, Ladies and Gentlemen, for financial institutions in Kenya to secure\ntheir future, they need to remain conscious to the needs and sensitivities of the target\nmarket. The current level of financial exclusion in Kenya indicates that financial\nservices in general, and particularly insurance, have largely not tailored their\nproducts to the needs of the market. In this regard, concerted action is therefore\nneeded from all players in devising sufficient incentives that will raise interest and\nparticipation in insurance by the currently uninsured public. Both actual and\nprospective customers should be adequately sensitized to appreciate how insurance\nmay be beneficial to themselves so as to encourage sustained volitional participation.\nI take this opportunity to urge you as the players in the insurance industry to\ncontinue to actively participate and support the financial education partnership\nspearheaded by FSD Kenya aimed at the development and implementation of a\ncomprehensive national strategy for Kenya.\nWith these few remarks, Ladies and Gentlemen, I thank you all for your\nattention.\n5", "source": "CBK", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-04-26", "url": "https://www.centralbank.go.ke//images/docs/speeches/2010/FSD%20Insurance%20Sector.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "bd2a9da6c44d7725a6505a641d85b558", "text": "CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA\nLAUNCH OF THE FINACCESS HOUSEHOLD SURVEY 2019 REPORT\nIntercontinental Hotel, Nairobi\nKeynote Speech by Dr Patrick Njoroge\nGovernor of the Central Bank of Kenya\n3 April 2019\n1416 words\nGood morning!\nToday is a good day. Not only because, it is one day closer to the rains which will\nbring some relief and transform the brown landscape to a lovely hue of green. Today\nis a good day because it is one of those days when economics comes to life. Often, we\neconomists are in our own little corners, crunching away at some statistics, hoping\nthat our work resonates with our fellow citizens. All too often, that hope does not get\nfulfilled. But sometimes, as it is this morning, our work has direct resonance with the\nvast majority of our people. It serves as a map for how they access financial services,\nand more broadly, the impact of policy on how Kenyans live their lives.\nThis is the fifth time we have done the FinAccess Survey. In every one of them since\nthe first one in 2006, we have learned something new and profound about Kenyans\nand their interaction with finance. This one is no different, and I will highlight some\nof the issues and conclusions that jumped out at me. But before I do that, let me tell\nyou why we carry out the Survey, and why it is some of the most important work that\nwe do.\nGlobally, financial inclusion surveys have become an increasingly important source of\nvaluable data and information that supports evidence-based policy and decision\n1\n\nmaking. These surveys provide data that track progress and dynamics of the financial\ninclusion landscape; and provide data to various stakeholders including policy makers,\nprivate sector players and researchers. I need not remind you, since it is something\nthat we're consistently proud of, that we take the global gold medal in financial\ninclusion. So, for us Kenyans, this is doubly important.\nEven as we continue to appreciate the Survey and what it does to aid policymaking,\ncertain constants remain, well, constant. We continue to strengthen the measurement\nof the financial inclusion landscape in terms of access and usage, while incorporating\nnew dimensions of a Needs-Based Framework that measures the relevance of\nfinancial services and products, financial service providers and payments channels in\nmeeting household financial needs. This Survey also has new information on financial\nhealth and livelihoods, and perceptions on financial literacy and consumer protection.\nIt thus measures aspects of quality and impact dimensions of financial inclusion.\nWe at the Central Bank have consistently said that the dynamism of the Kenyan\neconomy is largely driven by Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises, or MSMEs, and\nthus this Survey contained some related questions. It also contained questions about\nAgricultural Finance modules that provide data for better understanding the usage of\nfinancial products and services within these specific aspects.\nSo what jumped out at me in this Survey?\nFirst, some interesting numbers. Kenya’s financial access has risen to 82.9 percent in\n2018, up from 75.3 percent in 2016, and as low as 26.7 percent in 2006. This is a\nremarkable jump in just over a decade, and this number is despite the age, education,\ngender, residence, and income gaps. What is equally interesting – and bear with me\nfor drilling down into the statistics – is that only 11 percent of Kenya's adult\npopulation is completely excluded from any form of financial services, products or\ninstitutions. This number was as high as 41.3 percent as recently as 2006. The most\ntraditionally marginalised regions of the country also recorded the highest declines of\nexcluded adults. The North Eastern region recorded a decline of 47.2 percentage\n2\n\npoints, the Upper Eastern region a decline of 24.6 percentage points, and the Coast\nregion a decline of 18.6 percentage points. This is something to celebrate.\nHere is another statistic. The number of Kenyans using more than one type of\nfinancial service and product, and this is both formal and informal, increased to 73.7\npercent in 2019, compared to 18.8 percent in 2006.\nDigital finance is also showing strong growth. In just the years between the 2016\nSurvey and this one, the uptake of loans through digital apps grew from 0.6 percent to\n8.3 percent.\nWhat will come as no surprise to any Kenyan in this room is the place of friends and\nfamily. Kenyans still rely a great deal on these groups to tide them over day to day,\nand a third of Kenyan households say that this is the primary way they get by. The\nnumber jumps when they are asked about how they deal with a financial shock, with\njust about half, or 50.1 percent, saying that friends and family are the key. Social\ncapital remains crucial.\nWhat are the flies in the ointment? It's not all good news, and some concerns remain.\nSome questions we are asking ourselves out of the Survey findings include the\nfollowing:\nWhy are Kenyans increasingly tapping the digital apps loans? Do they care about\npricing of these products? What are these loans used for? How are the new emerging\nrisk and consumer protection concerns handled?\nWhat is hindering rapid uptake of Microfinance Institutions (MFIs), Insurance and\nPension services and products?\nWhy do almost a third of Kenyans still use informal sources – a ‘Secret Hiding Place’,\ncredit in form of cash and goods from a shopkeeper, and chamas? Is there a policy gap\nwe need to fill? How do we handle consumer protection concerns?\n3\n\nShould we be concerned that cash is still the dominant mode of transaction at about 90\npercent, despite rapid financial technology and innovations?\nDespite the rapid growth in financial inclusion, why is the financial health of Kenyans\nstill low at just one fifth of the adult population?\nThere are also other challenges. Accessing and using financial services and products\nstill costs more than it should, locking out many. Fraud is becoming an increasing\nconcern, as are unexpected transaction charges. Lack of transparency in pricing of\nfinancial services and products; and unreliable market infrastructure mainly due to\ndowntime for ATMs, Point of Sale (POS) devices and Mobile money and electronic\nfunds transfer ecosystems remain problematic, although we are attempting to address\nthese systematically.\nThese are issues we will ponder on in the coming days, weeks and months. Before I\nlet researchers, the media and the general public loose on this Survey and its findings,\none last thing. The datasets will be released through the KNBS website, and you can\nfind links on the CBK and FSD websites. This year, for the first time, we have created\nand made available a tool that will enable you interrogate these datasets. So, dive in!\nAsk questions of the data, and share the answers the data gives you.\nThe researchers have finished their jobs, and will now get a chance to have more than\nthree hours of sleep a night, which they haven't done for many months. As a matter of\nfact, let me recognise them now – the Director General and staff of the Kenya\nNational Bureau of Statistics (KNBS), who also served a dual role of being the\nResearch House and a funding partner. It is the first time KNBS played the role of a\nResearch House in the FinAccess Surveys, and the Bureau has proved its capability by\ncollecting high quality and comprehensive data. I am also indebted to the Director and\nstaff of the Financial Sector Deepening Trust (FSD) Kenya for financial and analytical\nsupport offered during the entire survey process. Lastly, I thank my colleagues from\nthe Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) for the excellent work in coordinating the survey\nwork including planning, logistics, ensuring security for enumerators, analytical work,\ntechnical support and CBK funding.\n4\n\nWe had some excellent partners along the journey. These included Airtel Kenya\nLimited, Diamond Trust Bank, Kenya Post Office Savings Bank, and NIC Bank\nLimited. Their support, which was both financial and material, enabled successful\ncompletion of the survey. We thank you, and I ask that you join me in applauding\nthem.\nAsanteni nyote.\nAs I finish reflecting on the outcome of the Survey, I remember those that hesitated in\nproferring support. As you have seen this morning, this is crucial work, which not\nonly touches the lives of all Kenyans, but also informs crucial policy decisions. I\nchallenge you – join us. Be part of the team! Lean in! There is still a lot of research to\ndo, even with these Survey findings. We ask you to avail your financial and material\nsupport for this next phase, and also for future surveys.\nLet me now do the traditional Kenyan thing: it gives me great pleasure to officially\nlaunch the 2019 FinAccess Household Survey Report\nThank you.\n5", "source": "CBK", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-04-26", "url": "https://www.centralbank.go.ke/uploads/speeches/1187139058_Governor's Remarks - Launch of FinAccess Report.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "7be3fe28d38b033f70bb6d92fbaea353", "text": "CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA\nAddress by\nPPRROOFF.. NNJJUUGGUUNNAA NNDDUUNNGG’’UU\nGGOOVVEERRNNOORR\nCCEENNTTRRAALL BBAANNKK OOFF KKEENNYYAA\naatt tthhee\nFFIIRRSSTT CCOONNSSUULLTTAATTIIVVEE GGRROOUUPP MMEEEETTIINNGG\nSSEERREENNAA HHOOTTEELL\nMonday, November, 24th, 2008\n\nChair, Governing Council of the FIRST Initiative;\nDistinguished Members of the Council here present;\nManagement and Staff of the FIRST Initiative Program\nManagement Unit;\nDistinguished Guests;\nMeeting Participants;\nLadies and Gentlemen:\nI am pleased to be here this morning at the opening of the FIRST\nInitiative Consultative Group meeting. My thanks go to the Governing\nCouncil and the Program Manager for the kind invitation. Allow me also\nto thank FIRST Initiative for choosing to host both the Governing and\nConsultative Group meetings in Nairobi famed as “the Green City in the\nSun’’. I would also wish to welcome you all to Nairobi and hope that you\nwill extend your stay to enjoy the varied and scenic delights that Kenya\noffers.\nLadies and Gentlemen: This is indeed a ‘’watershed’’ meeting that\ncomes after the completion of the first four year mandate of FIRST\nInitiative. I am informed that FIRST Initiative began its’ operations in\n2002 with a five year mandate that was successfully completed in 2007.\nThe mandate was to provide Technical Assistance to support growth and\npoverty reduction in low and middle income countries by promoting a\nfinancial sector that was stable, deep and diversified. This is indeed a\nnoble objective and it is therefore gratifying to note that FIRST will now\nenter a second phase of operations to run to the end of 2012.\nRole and significance of FIRST in Development\nFIRST mission to deliver flexible, top-quality technical assistance related\nto financial sector is welcomed in the region where the role of the\nfinancial sector is recognized as an engine for development. Most of you\nin this room can remember vividly the days of financial repression when\ngovernment legal restrictions prevented financial intermediaries in the\neconomy from functioning at their full capacity. The regulations\ngenerally included interest rate ceilings, compulsory credit allocation,\nand high reserve requirements. The development philosophy has shifted\naway from direction and control. Governments of developing countries\n2\n\nhave now realized the great potential of the financial sector in fostering\ndevelopment. The formation of FIRST as an institution was to help\ndeveloping countries tap the potential support to the development of the\nfinancial sector.\nThe fact that FIRST initiatives always come in after Financial Sector\nAssessment Program (FSAP) and other assessment have been\nundertaken by the IMF and the World Bank signals to governments of\ndeveloping countries that our partners not only perform a “health check”\nof our financial system but they also offer “health solutions” after a\nprognosis has been identified.\nMany of the projects financed by FIRST initiative have helped countries\ntighten their adherence to international standards and codes for the\nfinancial sector. In doing so, I belief in the assertions that FIRST has\nhelped developing countries achieve part of their development goals of\nbuilding an efficient, inclusive and transparent financial system. The fact\nthat FIRST works closely with the recipient institutions to prioritize\ntechnical assistance activities that are consistent with the recipient\ncountry plans is a great plus. It re-defines development partnership of\ndonors and recipient countries.\nI note with great pleasure FIRST model of doing business. It encourages\nrecipient governments to identify their financial sector problems,\nprioritizes them, and then supports viable solutions. It also pools the\nefforts of several development agencies, leveraging their expertise and\nreducing duplication. Often, FIRST takes on targeted projects and once\ncompleted, FIRST disseminates the results to boost their impact and\ncatalyze long-term support from both development partners and\nrecipient governments.\nIn Kenya the Vision 2030 has identified that the problems of high\ninterest rate spreads and limited access .The focus then is how to reduce\nthese spreads, raise access and deepen the financial sector. The level of\nsolutions require policy reforms that alleviate market, institutional and\npolitical barriers to competition. The Vision 2030 has identified areas in\nwhich policy reforms can have a major impact in reducing such barriers\nand thus increasing the effectiveness and competitiveness of financial\nintermediation.\n3\n\nHere in Kenya, I would like to acknowledge an initiative such as\nFinAccess initiated and partly funded by FIRST which has given us the\nsurvey information which has become an integral part of financial market\nprocesses and analyses. The results have helped us understand some of\nthe issues in the financial sector and have provided us a better\nunderstanding on how to develop the sector. There is an increasing body\nof evidence to support the view that financial sector development\ncontributes to both economic growth and poverty reduction by affording\npeople greater access to finance.\nGoing Forward\nGoing forward, I have noted with satisfaction that FIRST will seek to\nstrengthen the causal links between its technical assistance and the\ncontributions of deep, orderly financial systems to economic growth,\npoverty reduction, and social equity. FIRST will do this by increasing its\nemphasis on achieving market development outcomes, and filling gaps in\ndomestic financial markets. It will also continue to give priority to\nsupporting governments in lower-income countries in developing action\nplans geared toward these outcomes.\nSuch a move is welcomed in the region where there has been a very\nstrong upward trend in diversification of economic activities among rural\nhouseholds over the decade. One robust finding of the rural panel\nanalysis is the importance of access to credit as a correlate of escaping\nfrom poverty. In Kenya for example, most (70 percent of) Kenyans do\nnot have access to any form of credit. For those who do access loans,\nthere is significant disparity in average amounts—with non-poor\nhouseholds borrowing 42 percent above the average amount, and poor\nhouseholds 77 percent below; the advantage for urban households is even\nlarger, whereas female headed are way below average (World Bank\n2008). The question is whether we have adequate financial vehicles for\neach of these diverse house-holds.\nFinancial stability and development are a crucial prerequisite and a\nfacilitator of reforms in other sectors, including private sector\ndevelopment, infrastructure, housing, and social policies. Financial\nsector development is vitally linked to growth and poverty reduction.\n4\n\nWell-functioning financial systems channel funds to productive uses\nessential for a country’s transformation.\nFinancial Services\nIn Kenya, we have identified that a well-functioning financial system is\ncritical to accelerating economic growth. That is, a vibrant and globally\ncompetitive financial sector will drive high levels of savings and finance\nKenya’s investment need.\nAccording to the Financial Access Survey 2007, by FSD Kenya, the\nbanking sector serves only 19 per cent of Kenya’s bankable population\nwith 8 per cent being served by other financial services providers such as\nMFIs and SACCOs. 38 per cent are totally excluded and 35 per cent rely\non informal financial services providers. The evidence is also that access\nto financial services outside the main cities still remains limited. The\nintroduction of MFI’s, the SACCO’s and CRBs will produce the best\nfinancial infrastructure to reach all segments of the economy and\ninformation flow to help them function properly.\nFor Kenya to achieve its aspirations of Vision 2030, the levels of\ninvestment will require a continuous increase in the level of national\nsavings to sustain economic growth. In this regard, financial sector\nreform measures will be implemented and more savings products\ndeveloped to support the requisite national savings.\nTo do so I intend to suggest areas where support of FIRST initiative will\nbe most welcomed in Kenya’s case, but also applies to most countries in\nSSA:\n• Enhance the role of the Government in the financial\nsector to provide a legal, regulatory, and supervisory framework\nthat promotes soundness and competition in the sector. More\nsupport for the review, amendment and drafting of financial sector\nlaws and regulations that govern all the regulators with the\nobjective of strengthening their effectiveness.\n5\n\n• Reduce the existing deficiencies in the clearing and\nsettlement mechanisms in national payment systems. The\nmodernization of the national payment system has included,\namong other things, the introduction of Real Time Gross\nSettlement (RTGS) and the Kenya Electronic Payments and\nSettlement System (KEPSS) to all participants. But now require\nenhancement to ensure overall adoption.\n• Increasing access to credit. The major impediments to growth\nin developing countries especially in SSA is the insufficient access\nto credit for large segments of the population and enterprises,\nespecially micro, small and medium sized ones. Areas which FIRST\ncan support include: improvements in the operation of the\ngovernment registries including: assistance to the Companies\nRegister to enable the Registry clear the backlog in filing and allow\nfor speedy and accurate information sharing of corporate\ninformation and data; improvements in the land registration\nsystem through digitizing land records; establishment of a legal and\nregulatory framework for the operation of a credit reference bureau\nthat would facilitate the much needed information flow among the\ncredit granting institutions.\n• Improve the financial legal environment. The legal system\nin the region currently faces major challenges in supporting\neffective financial intermediation. Furthermore, the drafting,\nimplementation and application of the legislative and regulatory\nreforms, require strong capacity in the judiciary and in the\nlegislative and executive offices charged with legislative drafting\nand law revision.\n• Clear and effective laws backed by a strong and credible\njudiciary are an essential element in creating an environment that\nis conducive to business and financial activity. Enforcement of\ncontracts in the financial sector is a major signaling mechanism\nthat helps the financial sector development and innovation\nintermediation.\n6\n\n• Develop a financial sector that reflect the economic structures of\nthe country and avoid temptations of one size fits all. Most SSA are\ncharacterized by formal and informal finance. The process of\nformalization requires understanding of the economic structures.\nConclusion\nIn conclusion, I realize that the issues for discussion during this meeting\nare vital to the financial sector at this crucial time when the world is\nseeking solutions to the global financial crisis; the Central Bank of Kenya\nand the Ministry of Finance are interested and also party to the issues\nbeing discussed here. The financial sector reform agenda is now even\nmore urgent in the wake of the ongoing global financial crisis. I am\ninformed that you spent a good part of yesterday discussing the crisis and\nI am sure that you came up with useful proposals that you will be\nsharing. It is inevitable that there will be fundamental changes to the\nglobal financial architecture and institutions that govern it. This will pose\na greater challenge to developing countries that are already resource\nconstrained and yet need to quickly embrace these changes. Again,\npartners such as FIRST Initiative will be called upon to quickly deploy\ntechnical assistance to client countries.\nTargeted technical assistance in the financial sector will support\ngovernments’ effort to deepen a market based economy which\ncontributes to a sustainable fiscal position and improved allocation of\nresources. Broad-based financial and legal sector reforms will directly\ncontribute to improving equity and reducing poverty through expanding\naccess to financial services. Poverty is sustained by exclusion in the\nmarket. The poor benefit from financial services by providing a safe\nhaven for their savings. The route to savings together with investment\nopportunities that promise returns is the road to enhance poverty\nreduction. These objectives will be achieved through provision of\ntechnical expertise and building capacity to implement our countries’\nfinancial sector and legal sector reforms whenever required.\nI therefore look forward to the output of today’s discussions that should\nenable FIRST to meet and exceed the monumental expectations from\nclient countries in its’ second phase of operations.\n7\n\nOn that note, it is my honour and pleasure to declare the FIRST\nConsultative Group Meeting officially open and to wish you fruitful\ndeliberations.\nThank you\n8", "source": "CBK", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-04-26", "url": "https://www.centralbank.go.ke//images/docs/speeches/2008/FIRST_Consultative_Meeting.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "ba6f80ae9bdf2e771638a5187b7e6902", "text": "CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA\nPUBLIC LECTURE IN HONOUR OF THE LATE PROF. FRANCIS MWEGA\nChandaria Auditorium, University of Nairobi\nTuesday, February 27, 2018\nIntroductory Remarks by\nDr. Patrick Njoroge, Governor, Central Bank of Kenya\nAs prepared for delivery\nGood afternoon!\nI am very pleased to welcome you all to this public lecture in honour of the late\nProf. Francis Mwega. Let me begin by thanking the Vice Chancellor of the University of\nNairobi, Prof. Peter Mbithi, for accepting to co-host this event with the Central Bank of\nKenya (CBK). Prof. Mwega taught economics at the University of Nairobi from January\n1985, and indeed taught most of the current generation of economists in the country. He\nalso made a significant contribution to the economy through his research work.\nI wish to express my gratitude to Prof. Benno Ndulu, the immediate former Governor of\nthe Bank of Tanzania and long term friend of Prof. Mwega, for accepting our invitation to\ndeliver the Keynote Address. I also want to thank Dr. Louis Kasekende, Deputy Governor\nof the Bank of Uganda, and Prof. Wafula Masai from the School of Economics at the\nUniversity of Nairobi for accepting to provide the initial responses to the Keynote\nAddress.\nThis event has been organized to coincide with the first anniversary of the death of\nProf. Mwega, who served as a member of the CBK’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC),\nfrom May 1, 2011 to the time of his death on February 28, 2017. Prof. Mwega had\npreviously served as a member of the Monetary Policy Advisory Committee (MPAC) of\nthe CBK, the precursor to the MPC, from August 2005 to December 2007. Throughout his\ndistinguished career as a member of the MPC and MPAC, Prof. Mwega exemplified the\nhighest professionalism and distinctive humility. He was an invaluable resource to the\nMPC as was shown by his candid contributions during meetings, and informative research\nwork on monetary policy issues. His publications on monetary policy transmission and\nexchange rate misalignment have enhanced our understanding of how monetary policy\nworks. Despite his remarkable professional and academic achievements, he demonstrated\nhumility, patience and kindness in all his endeavors and was a mentor to many of the CBK\nresearch staff.\n1\n\nIn a tribute for this occasion, Prof. Victor Murinde of SOAS University of London\ncaptures the lasting impression on many: “The late Francis was a personal friend and\nresearch collaborator over so many years – we are all very proud of the indelible positive\nimpact he has had on research, policy and capacity building especially in the area of\nmonetary economics in Kenya. He was the best of the best”.\nLadies and gentlemen, I am happy to note that this public lecture has drawn a large\naudience comprising of CEOs and other representatives of private sector institutions,\npolicy makers and other senior Government officials, the Deputy Governor of Bank of\nSouth Sudan, Mr. Odera Innocent Ochan, Vice Chancellors and other senior staff from our\nuniversities. I also wish to warmly welcome our development partners including the\nWorld Bank and IMF, research institutions including the African Economic Research\nConsortium (AERC) and KIPPRA, the CBK Board of Directors, and current and former\nCBK Governors and MPC/MPAC members. I am equally pleased to welcome students\nfrom various universities, the media, and other participants from the financial sector,\nincluding the CBK staff. I also wish to acknowledge, in a special way, the presence of the\nfamily of the late Prof. Mwega in this event. Thank you all for coming.\nIt is now my honour to introduce the Keynote Speaker Prof. Benno Ndulu, who served as\nthe Governor of the Bank of Tanzania from January 2008 to January 2018. He started his\ncareer at the University of Dar es Salaam in the early 1980s before joining the World Bank\nas a Lead Economist. He is best known for his involvement in setting up and developing\none of the most effective research and training networks in Africa, the AERC. He received\nan honorary doctorate from the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS) in The\nHague in 1997 in recognition of his contributions to Capacity Building and Research on\nAfrica. Following his Ph.D. degree in economics from Northwestern University in\nEvanston, Illinois, U.S.A., he taught economics and published widely on monetary policy\nissues, growth, adjustment, governance and trade. More recently, Prof. Ndulu has co-\nauthored a book titled Tanzania: The Path to Prosperity, published by Oxford University\nPress. The book highlights the challenges of securing economic prosperity in Tanzania in\nthe coming decades. We in the Central Banking fraternity, also recognize Prof. Ndulu for\nhis key role in driving the regional integration initiatives, especially harmonization of\nmonetary, exchange rate and financial sector policies, within the auspices of the East\nAfrican Community.\nLadies and Gentlemen, allow me to invite Prof. Ndulu to deliver the Keynote Address\nentitled “The Conduct of Monetary Policy in a Changing Policy Environment”. The\nkeynote presentation will be uploaded on the CBK and University of Nairobi websites,\nafter this event, for future reference.\nThank You!\n2", "source": "CBK", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-04-26", "url": "https://www.centralbank.go.ke/uploads/speeches/76176263_Governor's Remarks - Public Lecture iho Prof. Francis Mwega.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "7d65b18770ef43aa12641aa9bc2dae31", "text": "CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA\nRemarks by\nPPRROOFF.. NNJJUUGGUUNNAA NNDDUUNNGG’’UU\nGGOOVVEERRNNOORR\nCCEENNTTRRAALL BBAANNKK OOFF KKEENNYYAA\naatt tthhee\nAAFFRRIICCAANN MMIICCRROOFFIINNAANNCCEE PPRRIICCIINNGG TTRRAANNSSPPAARREENNCCYY\nLLEEAADDEERRSSHHIIPP FFOORRUUMM\nHotel Intercontinental, Nairobi\nOctober 6, 2011\n\nMr. Ives Terracol, Regional Director, Agence Française de\nDéveloppment;\nMr. Chuck Waterfield, Chief Executive Officer, MicroFinance\nTransparency;\nDistinguished Guests;\nLadies and Gentlemen:\nIt gives me great pleasure to be with you this morning during this important\nAfrican Microfinance Pricing Transparency Leadership Forum. Before I make\nmy opening remarks, let me take this opportunity to thank the organizers of\nthis conference, MicroFinance Transparency, for inviting me to share some\nthoughts on this pertinent topic. I would also like to extend a warm welcome\nto all the participants who have travelled from other countries to Kenya and to\nsay ‘Karibu Sana’. I hope you will take some time to enjoy our beautiful\ncountry with its rich culture and diverse tourist attractions.\nLadies and Gentlemen, financial inclusion has been recognized now in\ndevelopment debates and action across the globe. This is more so in\ndeveloping and emerging economies, which record the highest poverty levels\nand constitute majority of the world’s unbanked population. The drive to\nenhance financial inclusion is thus critical given that increasing evidence\nshows that it is key in reducing the economic vulnerability of households,\npromoting economic growth, alleviating poverty and sustainably improving\nthe quality of peoples’ lives.\nThe push for financial inclusion is entrenched in Government of Kenya’s\nDevelopment Blueprint, Vision 2030 and lies at the core of the Central Bank of\nKenya’s strategic actions towards implementing this Vision. It is in this regard\nthat the Central Bank, together with market players, has embraced several\ninitiatives and reforms aimed at enhancing the level of financial inclusion.\nThese include licensing of deposit taking microfinance institutions (DTMs)\nand credit reference bureaus (CRBs); introduction of shariah compliant\nbanking products, mobile phone money transfer services and the agency\nbanking model. These measures and new institutions help in completing the\nfinancial infrastructure picture in Kenya that reflects its market structures as\nwell.\n2\n\nLadies and Gentlemen, in effect, we have seen a significant decline of\nbarriers to entry into the financial sector, increased infrastructure distribution\nand innovative instruments targeting the lower segments of the population.\nThese have resulted in tremendous increases in the levels, reach and depth of\naccess to financial services. To highlight a few, bank accounts have grown from\n2.5 million to over 14 million in just over 5 years, while mobile money transfer\nservices have led to over 15 million Kenyans being integrated into the financial\nsystem. The regulated microfinance industry has also grown tremendously\nwith the licensing of six Deposit Taking Microfinance institutions with 57\nbranches, 1.5 million deposit accounts valued at Ksh.9 billion and 0.53 million\nloan accounts with an outstanding loan portfolio of Ksh.15 billion.\nDespite these remarkable developments in the Kenyan financial sector, we are\ncognisant of the fact that there still remains great need within the Kenyan\nmarket for appropriate and more affordable financial services. Given that this\nsituation is not unique to Kenya, but applies to most, if not all, African nations\nrepresented in this Forum, it is imperative that improving access to financial\nservices remains key in our development agenda. We need to solve costs,\nbarriers to entry, physical distance and market concentration problems.\nLadies and Gentlemen, as we undertake to enhance access to financial\nservices as regulators and policy makers, we must ensure that financial\nservices are provided a competitive market environment. Let us learn from\ndevelopments in the microfinance sectors in parts of Bosnia and India, that\nrecently experienced crises. The challenges in these countries were instigated\nby issues such as multiple lending and client over-indebtedness, aggressive\ncompetition, erosion of credit quality standards, a lack of transparency in\npricing, a weak credit information sharing framework and inadequate\nregulation. Beyond these challenges, currently the broader issue of\ntransparent and responsible pricing is becoming a concern for the global\nmicrofinance industry. Price is an incentive.\nTransparent and responsible pricing is essential for stimulating growth,\nefficiency and effectiveness of the financial sector. It is indeed a key ingredient\n3\n\nfor incentivising innovation, enhancing informed decision-making by\nconsumers and fostering the development of healthy, vibrant and competitive\nmarkets. Transparency in pricing is critical because consumers have the right\nto know the exact price of products in the market. Conversely, non-\ntransparent (or opaque) pricing, prevents consumers from making informed\ndecisions about borrowing. This ultimately reduces the ability of financial\ninstitutions to compete effectively, free market forces to operate properly and\nthe financial sector to develop efficiently and sustainably.\nPolicies to entrench relevant consumer protection measures, including\ntransparency and truth-in-lending regulations combined with the promotion\nof competition and efficiency among credit providers, can go a long way\ntoward expanding the reach of sustainable finance, particularly credit, while\nsafeguarding consumer interests. We, as policymakers and regulators,\ntherefore, have to take up the responsibility of stimulating competition in\nfinancial institutions and promoting innovation aimed at improving efficiency\nand lowering prices. We must, however, also endeavour to put in place\nconsumer protection measures to ensure our consumers are not exploited.\nFinancial institutions, on the other hand, should seek to maintain\ntransparency regarding interest rates charged on the borrowers. Further they\nshould adopt new technology to increase productivity and efficiency in their\noperations to reduce these rates.\nIt is imperative that concerted efforts be put into educating financial clients.\nWhen clients are financially informed they are empowered to demand safe,\ncost-efficient and quality financial services at fair prices. This makes it\nnecessary for service providers to competitively innovate products suitable for\ntheir customers’ needs and pockets.\nLadies and Gentlemen: the push to enhance consumer protection is also\nentrenched in Kenya’s Vision 2030 strategy which aims at improving\ntransparency and increasing competition in the financial sector to benefit\ncustomers and the overall economy. The Kenyan constitution also has specific\n4\n\nprovisions on consumer rights. In this regard, the Central Bank has initiated a\nnumber of reforms and initiatives including the amendment of the Banking\nAct and Prudential Guidelines, publication of information on charges and\nlending rates and the conducting of a series of studies and surveys to foster\ncompetition in the banking sector and develop a disclosure regime for\nconsumer interest rates. To complement these efforts, the Bank also actively\nparticipates in financial education campaigns to aid consumers in making\nbetter and informed financial decisions. In particular, the Bank is a pivotal\nmember of a public private partnership whose aim is to champion the\ndevelopment of a national strategy for Financial Education and Consumer\nProtection in Kenya.\nEffective consumer protection and financial literacy, especially with regards to\nprice disclosure, are key in ensuring that lenders behave responsibly and\nethically; and consumers, especially the poor, gain the capacity to use this\ninformation to make informed decisions about financial services in order to\nenhance their economic wellbeing. Ladies and Gentlemen, the practice of\nprice transparency ultimately contributes to the health and vibrancy of our\nfinancial markets, and enhances the extension of access to, and use of,\nappropriate financial products and services.\nAs I conclude, Ladies and Gentlemen, I express my confidence that this\nworkshop will present an invaluable platform for African leaders in the\nmicrofinance industry and financial sector to share their experiences on\npricing transparency in the various jurisdictions represented here. It will also\npresent us with an opportunity to acquaint ourselves with the global best\npractices on the same. We should remember that PRICE is an incentive and\ncan be a disincentive – it has to be appropriate. With these few remarks, I now\ndeclare this workshop officially open and take this opportunity to wish you\nfruitful deliberations.\nThank you\n5", "source": "CBK", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-04-26", "url": "https://www.centralbank.go.ke//images/docs/speeches/2011/AFRICAN%20MICROFINANCE%20PRICING%20TRANSPARENCY%20LEADERSHIP%20FORUM.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "3a7d545bf88518bb3f892ab483330966", "text": "CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA\nAddress on\n“CREDIT INFORMATION SHARING TO ENHANCE FINANCIAL\nSECTOR DEVELOPMENT”\nby\nPROF. NJUGUNA NDUNG’U\nGOVERNOR\nCCEENNTTRRAALL BBAANNKK OOFF KKEENNYYAA\noonn tthhee ooccccaassiioonn ooff\nTTHHEE LLAAUUNNCCHH OOFF TTHHEE BBAANNKKIINNGG CCRREEDDIITT IINNFFOORRMMAATTIIOONN\nSSHHAARRIINNGG IIMMPPLLEEMMEENNTTAATTIIOONN PPRROOJJEECCTT\nHilton Hotel, Nairobi\nAugust 27, 2009\n\nGovernor’s Address during the Launch of the Banking Credit Information Sharing Implementation Project, August 27, 2009\nMr. Martin Oduor-Otieno, Chairman, Kenya Bankers Association;\nMr. John Wanyela, Executive Director, Kenya Bankers Association;\nChief Executives of Commercial Banks here present;\nDistinguished Guests;\nLadies and Gentlemen:\nI am pleased to join you this morning on this important occasion to launch the\nBanking Credit Information Sharing Project. Allow me therefore to extend my\ngratitude to the Kenya Bankers Association for facilitating this project and the\ninvitation. The importance of this function cannot be overemphasised and I am\ndelighted at the excellent turnout of the banking fraternity.\nThe Banking (Credit Reference Bureau) Regulations 2008 were published in July\n2008 and launched at this very venue in September 2008. The Regulations paved\nthe way for the licensing and surveillance of Credit Reference Bureaus (CRB) by\nthe Central Bank of Kenya. These Bureaus will collate credit information from\ninstitutions licensed under the Banking Act. I am pleased to report that since the\nRegulations became operational in February 2009, there has been considerable\ninterest by potential investors. I do believe that interest is for those who cherish\nthe importance of the development of information capital.\nThe Central Bank has so far received three applications for CRB licenses, two\nfrom local investors (Credit Reference Bureau Africa and Metropol) and one from\na South African based regional player - Compuscan. Accordingly the Central\nBank has this week issued a letter of intent to the first applicant, Credit Reference\nBureau Africa. This is an approval in principle to conduct credit reference bureau\nbusiness. The Bureau will commence operations on completion of an independent\nthird party system and security audit and an onsite inspection by CBK. The letter\nof intent was granted after a detailed due diligence of the application to ensure all\nstatutory and prudential requirements were met. The Central Bank wishes to\nreassure Kenyans that it shall rigorously assess all applications to ensure the\nintegrity of the envisaged credit information sharing mechanism.\n2\n\nGovernor’s Address during the Launch of the Banking Credit Information Sharing Implementation Project, August 27, 2009\nLadies and Gentlemen: The launch of this project today by the banking sector\nis therefore very timely. The overarching objective of the project is to co-ordinate\nthe efforts of all players so as to build a sustainable and holistic information\nsharing mechanism. The Central Bank renders its full support to this project and\nwe expect that all banks will also commit to implementing all the agreed\nmilestones.\nCredit information sharing offers Kenya an opportunity to promote access to\naffordable credit to more Kenyans because information lowers the risk premium\nand search costs. There is indeed a clear and direct linkage between access to\ncredit and economic development. Allow me to highlight four key benefits that the\nCentral Bank sees accruing from this initiative.\nFirst, credit information sharing will facilitate the development of information\ncapital. The risk premium associated with information asymmetry and search costs\nwill decline. Second, information capital will change the current collateral\ntechnology. Credit by the banking sector in Kenya has to a large extent been\nunderwritten by physical collateral such as land. Borrowers without access to such\ncollateral have been constrained in accessing credit. Credit information sharing\nwill enable borrowers build a track record that can be used in accessing credit.\nThis will be especially pertinent to those borrowers in the informal and Small and\nMedium Enterprises (SMEs) who have a track record and good performance to\nuse it to access credit. The SME sector is very important to the industrial\ndevelopment of this country and the Vision 2030.\nLadies and Gentlemen: The third benefit is to enhance information symmetry\nand support financial development. The existing state of information asymmetry\nbetween borrowers and banks is a constraint to innovation. Two important\noutcomes in information asymmetry: moral hazard problems from the borrowers\nand adverse selection from the banks. These two problems could punish the\neconomy with low provision of credit. We have also seen that there is adverse\nselection among banks as well.\nFourth, in a segmented market like ours, some segments remain untapped\nbecause banks do not have adequate information to price suitable products. In\npart this has also contributed to the high cost of credit. Borrowers have had to\nbear a “risk premium” because of this lack of information. It is therefore the\n3\n\nGovernor’s Address during the Launch of the Banking Credit Information Sharing Implementation Project, August 27, 2009\nCentral Bank’s expectation that savings arising from the increased credit\ninformation shall translate to lower cost of credit. In turn, more Kenyans will be\nable to access credit from banks.\nThe current level of interest rates is a combination of costs (like information search\ncosts), risk premium and of course banks’ profit margin. High interest rates also\ngive rise to default risks. The risk premium and search costs can be minimized by\ninformation symmetry and reduce Non-Performing Loans. As you will recall the\nKenyan banking sector was saddled with a huge non performing loan portfolio in\nthe 1980s and 1990s. Part of the burden was occasioned by “serial defaulters”\nand inadequate incentives to have a good credit history. The days of “serial\ndefaulters” are definitely numbered with the advent of credit information sharing.\nMore importantly, we expect that there will be incentives for good credit\nbehaviour that will attract competitive pricing of credit facilities. The message to\nKenyans is that now more than ever before, there will certainly be benefits\naccruing from adhering to the contractual terms of loans. I am sure the other\ninstitutions in Kenya will deal with appropriate definition of property rights and\ncontract enforcements to further reduce the risk premium.\nLadies and Gentlemen: In a nutshell, credit information sharing will increase\nvibrancy in the market for the borrowers and lenders. Borrowers will be able to\naccess enhanced facilities as they grow their credit histories and track record.\nConversely credit providers will be able to develop new and competitive products\nthat will tap into previously unserved and underserved market niches with the\npower of available information. This can only impact positively on the banking\nsector and the Kenyan economy as a whole.\nAs I draw to a close, let me recognize that the banking sector credit information\nsharing initiative will serve as a model for other credit providers. We must move\nwith speed to have the mechanism up and running and begin to rope in other\nfinancial and non financial credit providers. This will allow the full benefits of\ncredit information sharing to the whole economy. I therefore urge all banks to\nsupport this initiative which the Central Bank is unreservedly committed to.\nIt is now my distinguished duty to officially launch the Banking Credit Information\nSharing Implementation Project.\nThank You\n4", "source": "CBK", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-04-26", "url": "https://www.centralbank.go.ke//images/docs/speeches/2009/CreditSharing.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "54105c82963ed6ee5ff1ad1aaf9352ce", "text": "CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA\nTribute to Dr. Geoffrey Mwau, EBS\nBy Dr. Patrick Njoroge\nGovernor, Central Bank of Kenya\nFriday, August 19, 2022\nAs Prepared for Delivery\nMadam Joy Mukiri Mwau; Ian, Alan, Ngina, and Kawira;\nMembers of the family, distinguished friends, and fellow mourners.\nIt saddened me deeply when I learnt of the passing away of Geoffrey Mwau. He had\nbeen ill for some time, and we held out hope that he will bounce back and win this battle.\nBut that was not what God ordained. I wish to convey deepest condolences, on my own\nbehalf, and that of Management and the entire staff of CBK.\nI have known Geoffrey since 1980, when I was a first-year student at the University of\nNairobi and he was in his second year. He was brilliant, and we were among a handful of\nstudents that were lucky enough to work during the long holidays as Research Assistants\nfor the professors. This was before the invention of the category interns. We were both\ntall, thin, and lanky. He coined a nickname for me, that stuck all these years, and I also\nused that nickname to address him. We were that close.\nIt is impossible to summarize 42 years in just a few minutes. But I will mention a few\nthings. He was a gifted student. His Master’s Thesis in 1984 on the “Impact of Foreign\nCapital Inflows on the Kenya Economy” should be required reading for Kenya’s policy\nmakers. Subsequently he attended McGill University for a second Master’s degree and\nthen his PhD in 1994. We interacted closely during this time though infrequently as this\nwas before the advent of instant communication.\nHe was a consummate professional and an economist in every respect. We had millions\nof conversations over these years, invariably about economics. Both of us were interested\nin theoretical issues but our conversations were almost always about applied economics.\nWe never really disagreed but we also never really agreed. Each pushed the other, and I\nnever felt that I had lost or won an argument. In fact, I had learnt something from his keen\nobservation and clarity of mind. Every discussion ended with his characteristic\nlaugh—I can hardly imitate his laughter, but it now seems I am adopting his hairstyle.\n\nHe was a true friend, over all these years. In Nairobi, Washington, and back again in\nNairobi. His humor and optimism was infectious, and I wish more of us could learn this\nfrom him.\nBut what really mattered to him was his family. I remember discussing weighty career\ndecisions, which he struck a balance in favor of his family. Yes, he loved his family.\nThe last time he visited me in Washington, in 2014 or early 2015, we had lunch together\nand discussed Kenya’s economic trajectory and other matters. But the highlight of the\nlunch was when he fired up his iPad and showed me videos of his daughters. In one of\nthem they were singing, I believe with their cousin. He was beaming, smiling from ear to\near. This was before Tik Tok.\nKenya has lost a worthy hero, we have lost a friend, and the family has lost a husband and\na father. And you carry the heaviest burden. We pray that Almighty God grants you\nstrength, comfort, and peace.\nMathai, you have completed your race! May the angels lead you into paradise.\nMay choirs of angels welcome you. And may you rest in eternal peace. Amen. Amen.", "source": "CBK", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-04-26", "url": "https://www.centralbank.go.ke/uploads/speeches/731087102_Governor's Tribute to Dr. Geoffrey Mwau, EBS.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "b78bcf7ec65cd8ab9221cf725ef42db0", "text": "CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA\nRemarks By\nPROF. NJUGUNA NDUNG’U\nGOVERNOR\nCCEENNTTRRAALL BBAANNKK OOFF KKEENNYYAA\naatt tthhee\nLLAAUUNNCCHH OOFF SSMMEEPP DDTTMM LLIIMMIITTEEDD\nHotel Intercontinental, Nairobi\n5th April, 2011\nMr. Gabriel Kivuti, Chairman, SMEP DTM Ltd;\n\nGovernor’s Speech at the Launch of SMEP DTM, April 5, 2011\nBoard of Directors, Management and Staff of SMEP DTM Ltd;\nRepresentatives from National Council of Churches of Kenya here present;\nDistinguished Guests;\nLadies and Gentlemen:\nIt gives me great pleasure to be here today to witness the launch of the Small and Micro\nEnterprises Programme Deposit Taking Microfinance Limited (SMEP DTM Ltd). I join\nyou in celebrating this milestone that SMEP DTM Ltd has achieved by being the fourth\ndeposit taking microfinance institution to be licensed by the Central Bank of Kenya\nunder the Microfinance Act. It is important to note that the Central Bank has to date\nlicensed five deposit taking microfinance institutions; approved 26 business names; and\nis processing six applications for licence which are at various stages of review. The\nlaunch today provides us with an opportune moment to review the progress made since\nthe operationalisation of the Microfinance Act in 2008. More specifically, today’s\nlaunch is a great achievement for SMEP DTM Ltd and provides an opportunity for the\ninstitution to provide to its clientele more diverse financial products, including savings.\nLadies and Gentlemen: The SMEP DTM’s commitment to offering financial services\nto the unbanked populace dates back to 1975 when it started as a small project of the\nNational Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) under the name Small Scale Business\nEnterprise (SSBE). The project was aimed at providing the poor in a number of slum\nareas with food and later small business grants. The project was then modified,\ndeveloped and evolved into a microcredit company that was registered as a company\nlimited by guarantee in 1999. Today, the institution boasts of 87,500 clients and an\noutstanding loan balance of approximately Ksh.1.1 billion. The transformation into a\ndeposit-taking microfinance institution will enable SMEP DTM offer savings products\nto its clients in addition to the loan products as well as enlarge its resource base due to\nthe build up of deposits base. This will undoubtedly position SMEP DTM Ltd to\nenhance financial outreach towards becoming a major player in the microfinance sub-\nsector in the years ahead.\n2\n\nGovernor’s Speech at the Launch of SMEP DTM, April 5, 2011\nThe microfinance sub-sector has achieved rapid growth. The sector has opened a\nbranch network of 44 branches which had mobilised 0.8 million deposit accounts\nvalued at Ksh.8.59 billion and advanced loans amounting to Ksh.16.6 billion as at 28th\nFebruary 2011. The licensing of SMEP DTM is therefore another milestone towards the\ndevelopment of an all inclusive financial system in Kenya as envisaged by Kenya’s\neconomic blue print Vision 2030.\nLadies and Gentlemen: Over the past few years, the Central Bank of Kenya in\naddition to licensing and regulating Deposit Taking Microfinance Institutions has\nembraced policy reforms to build an adequate financial infrastructure to support the\ndevelopment and deepening of the financial sector. Innovative models such as agent\nbanking and credit information sharing aimed at scaling up financial inclusion are some\nrecent examples. These initiatives are guided by CBK’s resolve as a regulator to advise,\nform partnerships, develop and regulate the market with an aim of enhancing access\nand reducing the cost of doing business in financial services.\nI am happy to note that according to the FinAccess Report of 2009, access to financial\nservices improved with access to MFIs service doubling from 1.7% in 2006 to 3.4% in\n2009, the picture has changed drastically by now. These improvements, however small,\nare an indication that financial sector transformations and reforms being undertaken\nbased on the three pillars of stability, efficiency and access are translating into\nincreased financial inclusion and consequently spreading financial services to the poor.\nFinancial inclusion actors globally, like CBK, believe that poverty can be reduced\nsustainably and consistently with access to finance. Access to finance allows the poor to\ndevelop a savings base and enlarge their asset base that supports them to ride over\nshocks and escape poverty.\nLadies and Gentlemen: The licensing of SMEP DTM progresses the financial\ninclusion initiatives. The Central Bank is focused on addressing entry barriers for\nunbanked and under-banked Kenyans to access financial services. It is our belief that\nwe will scale up financial inclusion through reducing barriers to entry and lowering\ntransaction costs through these initiatives. In turn, these initiatives continue to support\na rolling out of financial services and products as well as increasing the delivery\nchannels. It is expected that Microfinance Institutions will address any entry barriers by\n3\n\nGovernor’s Speech at the Launch of SMEP DTM, April 5, 2011\nfocusing on areas that have not been well served by mainstream financial institutions by\noffering demand-driven, affordable and convenient products.\nLadies and Gentlemen: I am happy to assure the microfinance industry that the\nCentral Bank will continue to initiate key reforms and structural changes that are\nnecessary in the sector’s legal, regulatory and supervisory frameworks. As you are\naware, key among these legislative changes was the specific amendment to the\nMicrofinance Act in January 2011 that introduced agency definition. The amendment\nanchored agency business in the law and, the Central Bank is in the process of designing\nguidelines to facilitate the contracting of agents to provide financial services on behalf\nof deposit taking microfinance institutions. The move will undoubtedly allow\nmicrofinance institutions to leverage on additional cost effective distribution channels\nto offer financial services. This initiative is informed by the need to leapfrog access to\nfinancial services to Kenya’s bankable who remain totally outside the orbit of these\nservices at affordable cost.\nLadies and Gentlemen: Another remarkable initiative in the pipeline is in the area of\ncredit information sharing (CIS) for Microfinance Institutions. As you are aware, the\nCIS mechanism is already in place for commercial banks. The Central Bank is currently\nworking on modalities of incorporating the Deposit Taking Microfinance Institutions\ninto the CIS mechanism. Indeed, it is the Government’s intention to create a framework\nwhereby all financial institutions such as banks, Deposit-Taking Microfinance\nInstitutions, SACCO’s and other licensed credit providers will have access to and\nexchange credit information across the board. It is hoped that the merging of credit\ninformation from these various players will provide for a stronger credit market that\nwill improve the pool of credible borrowers, decrease defaults, reduce credit costs and\nultimately result in a stable financial sector.\nBefore I conclude, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to once again congratulate\nSMEP DTM for its achievement as a Deposit Taking Microfinance Institution. On its\npart, the Central Bank would like to assure SMEP and the industry and all the\nstakeholders of its continued support in the development of the Microfinance Industry\nand look forward to working collaboratively with the market to increase access to\nfinancial services in the country. The Central Bank is out to create strong financial\n4\n\nGovernor’s Speech at the Launch of SMEP DTM, April 5, 2011\ninstitutions. Indeed, the New Constitution has provided us the wonderful space to\ncreate strong institutions. Strong institutions both from the regulator and the regulated\nwill support the market, define appropriate incentives (and for a regulator, define\nappropriate penalties as well) to encourage prudent behavior in the market. That is the\nway we can develop and deepen the financial market.\nWith those few remarks, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is now my pleasure to declare\nSMEP DTM Limited officially launched.\nThank you.\n5", "source": "CBK", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-04-26", "url": "https://www.centralbank.go.ke//images/docs/speeches/2011/Governor%27s%20Remarks%20at%20Launch%20of%20SMEP%20DTM%20Ltd.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "63aafd308b3e5e3c4bbede8a7cba320b", "text": "CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA\nRemarks by\nPROF. NJUGUNA NDUNG’U\nGOVERNOR\nCCEENNTTRRAALL BBAANNKK OOFF KKEENNYYAA\naatt tthhee\nNATIONAL DIGITAL REGISTRY SERVICE\nFINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR CONSULTATION\nSerena Hotel\nThursday, October 23, 2014\n\nMs. Mwende Gatabaki, Director General, Kenya Citizens and Foreign\nNationals Management Service;\nMr. Joshua Oigara, Chairman, Kenya Bankers Association;\nMr. Habil Olaka, Chief Executive Officer, Kenya Bankers Association;\nDistinguished Ladies and Gentlemen;\nI am delighted to be here today at this important consultative meeting on the\nNational Digital Registry Service to the financial services sector. I am grateful for\nthe invitation and at the outset let me register the Central Bank of Kenya’s support\nfor this important initiative.\nLadies and Gentlemen: The national digital registry has three core objectives:-\n Strengtheneing national security, reducing crime and improving safety.\n Driving efficiency, effectiveness and accountability in service delivery.\n Providing citizen centric services that are easy to access, available and\naffordable.\nMore fundamentally, the register will capture details of people, land , assets and\nestablishments. These are important objectives but of fundamental improtance to\nthe financial sector is the provision of a digital identity for individuals and\ncorporate entities. Identity is a prequisite for the stable, efficient, safe and inclusive\nfinancial sector that is envisaged pursuant to Vision 2030. It is the process of\nidentification and a host of menu services that can be included that makes an\nassurance of safety and accessibility of financial services.\nWithout identity, individuals and corporate entities cannot access the financial\nsector. In Kenya, the use of the identification card has mitigated this challenge.\nHowever evolution in the financial sector and growth in fraud has possed serious\nchallenges in the form of fraud perperated through identity theft. We need such a\nregistry service as the repository insitution for any verification and cross-checking.\nLadies and Gentlemen: Most businnesses in Kenya thrive in the informal\nmarket and lack the formal identity that is required to in particular access credit.\nThese are mainly the small and medium size enterprises that drive Kenya’s\neconomic growth. These businesses lack the formal identity or track record that is\nrequired to access credit. For these businesses to grow to the next level, it is\nimperative that they aquire a formal identity and a documented track record. Only\nthen, will they be able to access credit and grow their business. But how do we\nmake it easier for them to register formally? I leave this to this Registry Service.\n2\n\nThe Central Bank has in this regard been supportive of the Integrated Population\nRegistry Service (IPRS). The IPRS has been a useful tool for financial institutions\nto validate the identity of their customers. We have asked all banks to utilise the\nIPRS in their Know Your Customer checks and mitigate fraud risk. The National\nDigital Registry will build on the IPRS and provide an even more powerful tool for\nthe Financial Sector and especially for SMEs.\nThe Central Bank therefore stands ready to support this important initiative and\nwork with the financial sector to utilise it. Through the register, financial\ninstitutions will be able to meet the statutory legal and regulatory requirements for\nAnti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combatting the Financing of Terrorism (CFT)\nand the common frauds in banks that we see every day. AML/CFT has become an\nissue of global concern and mitigating measures are important to ensure the\nintegrity of Kenya’s financial sector.\nLadies and Gentlemen: Of importance also is the ease of access to credit. A\ncentral repository of personal and corporate information will facilitate banks in\ntheir credit risk appraisal. This should not only ease access to credit but also\nreduce the cost of credit given the lower search costs. Finally the register will also\nreduce the risk of fraud particularly identity theft and reduce the operational cost\nof fraud to the financial sector. These are but a few of the benefits of the national\ndigital registry that I can enumerate and also stress that personal and corporate\ninformation and identification in the National Digital Registry Service is a major\nmilestone in completing the financial infrastructure requirements in our country. I\nam sure that this will be a useful consultation forum and you can count on the\nCentral Banks’ support and together we develop a stable and vibrant financial\nsector.\nThank You.\n3", "source": "CBK", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-04-26", "url": "https://www.centralbank.go.ke//images/docs/speeches/2014/NationalDigitalRegistryServicesOct2014.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "5f229f0f9ecdd0ff22b6b556d6f16d5a", "text": "CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA\nRemarks by\nPROF. NJUGUNA NDUNG’U\nGOVERNOR\nCCEENNTTRRAALL BBAANNKK OOFF KKEENNYYAA\naatt tthhee\nREGIONAL COURSE ON THE METHODOLOGY OF COLLECTION,\nCOMPILATION AND ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL\nREMITTANCES STATISTICS\n\nHilton Hotel, Nairobi\nMonday, November 17, 2014\n2\n\nDr. Sehliselo Mpofu, Director, Macroeconomic Management\nProgramme – MEFMI;\nDistinguished Facilitators and MEFMI Staff;\nDelegates;\nLadies and Gentlemen:\nIt is a privilege for me to join you on this important occasion of\nthe official opening of this regional course on “Methodology for\nCollection, Compilation and Analysis of International\nRemittances Statistics”.\nAllow me from the onset, to extend a cordial welcome to you all\non behalf of the Government of Kenya. We are indeed honoured\nand happy to host this important activity here in Nairobi,\nKenya.\nI would like also to extend a very special welcome to the\ndelegation from MEFMI. We are honoured to host one of your\ncapacity building events this year. As always this has attracted a\nhigh level of interest and attendance, an indication of the\nperceived need to bridge the existing capacity gaps in the\ncompilation of remittances statistics.\nLet me also thank the distinguished resource persons, Dr.\nEmmanuel Kumah, who was formally of the IMF Statistics\nDepartment, and Mr. Moris Mpofu from the Reserve Bank of\n3\n\nZimbabwe for accepting to bring their expertise to this course. I\nam confident that their vast knowledge will enable them to share\nexperiences in this critical policy area and contribute immensely\nto the enhancement of skills in the MEFMI region.\nAs you are all aware, international remittances have grown to\nbecome significantly important in providing foreign exchange\nand financing. They, particularly, support millions of poor\nrecipients. We cannot therefore afford to ignore the quality of\ndata for such an important contributor to economic growth and\ndevelopment.\nUntil recently, unlike other countries with significant numbers\nin the diaspora, we in Africa have paid little attention to the\nrole of remittances in our development thinking. This must now\nchange. There is increasing awareness of the importance of these\nremittances due to the fact that, unlike other financial flows,\nremittances mostly go directly to households, either for\ninvestment or consumption smoothing. Therefore, they have\nimportant poverty alleviation benefits. The critical questions are\ntherefore how much of this money is coming into our economies\nand through what channels?\n4\n\nIn Kenya, for instance, estimates of remittances captured only\nfrom formal channels that include commercial banks and other\nauthorized international remittances service providers, have\naveraged USD118.2 million per month so far in 2014, from\nUSD107.5 million per month in 2013. This places remittances as\nan important source of foreign exchange. Indeed they have grown\nexponentially in recent years to surpass some of the major\ntraditional sources.\nIn Sub-Saharan Africa, remittances have become one of the\nimportant enablers of economic growth and of poverty reduction.\nAs such, remittances contributed up to 3% of GDP over the last\nfive years and to more than 20% of international flows. For\nexample, in Nigeria, remittances account for more than a quarter\nof GDP, while in Lesotho they account for more than 20 percent\nof GDP. There are indications that international remittances to\nAfrica exceed USD30 billion annually, affect 25 million\nrecipient households, and have the potential to stimulate\neconomic growth and reduce poverty.\nInternational remittance flows often exceed Foreign Direct\nInvestment in Africa and account for more than twice as much as\nthe world’s total Official Development Aid.\n5\n\nIn this regard, there is no doubt that the capture of timely,\nreliable, accurate and comprehensive statistics is pivotal to the\nregion’s macroeconomic policy management and deliberate policy\nmust be designed to attract more inflows from our compatriots\nabroad. It is therefore important to increase transparency and\nmake it easier and more cost effective for remitters to use\nlegitimate channels, particularly in our region.\nWhile a majority of developed economies are largely compliant\nwith the acceptable best practices, many developing countries,\nincluding MEFMI member countries still have work to do, mainly\ndue to inadequate technical capacity among some data compilers.\nWithout an adequate pool of skilled personnel, our efforts to\nbridge the capacity gaps in data compilation in the region will\nbe futile. The importance of regular capacity building activities,\ninteractions and sharing of experiences amongst ourselves, and\nbenchmarking to international best practice therefore, cannot be\noveremphasized.\nI am happy to note that this course will make an important\ncontribution to improving our understanding on how to collect,\ncompile and analyse international remittances statistics in line\nwith the 6th Edition of IMF’s Balance of Payments Manual (BPM\n6) and the IMF International Remittances Guide. This is indeed,\n6\n\nin line with IMF’s and MEFMI’s mandate of imparting hands-on\nskills.\nI therefore, expect the course to bring together information on key\nstatistical activities currently undertaken by the statistical\norganizations in our respective countries and to identify what\nmore can be done to further improve the quality and timely\navailability of statistics in this area.\nMay I urge you all to make the most out of this rare opportunity\nso that when you return to your respective institutions, you can\ntake the lead in ensuring that our region benefits fully from this\ninvaluable initiative. This, however, can only be realized\nthrough individual commitment, free exchange of ideas, sharing\nof experiences and a good sense of open-mindedness among all\nparticipants.\nIt is also my hope that strong networking links will emerge out of\nthis course to foster a long-run exchange of ideas and experiences\namong professionals in the region. Once we have the correct\nclassification of data, then we can open another chapter of how\nto use it in policy making. This will also inform us on how to\ntarget the diaspora to channel investments in specific areas –\nlike Diaspora Bonds\n7\n\nAs I conclude, I appeal to you to take some time out of your\ndensely packed schedule to enjoy the hospitality of Nairobi.\nFreely explore the boundless beauty of our country, sample local\ncuisine and explore the attractive tourism products on offer.\nIt is now my singular honour to declare this course officially\nopen, and I wish you fruitful discussions and a memorable stay\nin Nairobi.\nI thank you all for your attention\n8", "source": "CBK", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-04-26", "url": "https://www.centralbank.go.ke//images/docs/speeches/2014/MEFMICourseMethodologyRemittancesStatistics.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "0a97d9a03048a24a4a8f5bb09e61504d", "text": "CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA\nREMARKS\nBY\nPROF. NJUGUNA NDUNG’U\nGOVERNOR\nCENTRAL BANK OF KENYA\nAT\nA ONE DAY INTERACTIVE FORUM ON\n‘GROWING AGRICULTURE THROUGH FINANCE’\nKenya School of Monetary Studies\n17th March 2010\nDeputy Prime Minister & Minister for Finance, Hon. Uhuru\nKenyatta;\n\nMinister for Agriculture, Hon. William Ruto;\nUS Government Representative – Deputy Chief of Mission, Mr. Lee\nA Brudvig;\nCEOs of Commercial Banks Present;\nResource Persons;\nDistinguished Participants;\nLadies and Gentlemen:\nIt gives me great pleasure to be with you this morning, and to welcome you all\nas we deliberate and exchange views on this crucial matter of growing\nAgriculture through Finance.\nThe Agricultural sector is the livelihood of many in Kenya. The sector\ncontributes directly about 24% of GDP, 65% of the country’s export\nearnings and employs about 80% of Kenya’s labour force, directly and\nindirectly. But more important, food security is the most critical and cuts\nacross all other developmental objectives. The policy paradigm that supports\nthis sector is indeed the cornerstone of our development blueprint.\nIt is tempting to say that financing Agriculture will rely on the financial sector\nin totality. The subject is broader than this and this is what we want to\ngenerate via dialogue this morning.\nBut what is not in doubt in financing Agriculture is the presence of long-term\nfunds as well as appropriate avenues to develop crop insurance.\nSmall-holder farmers have done well in increasing quality production and\nadoption of high yielding varieties, but have done poorly where they are not\nsupported by cooperatives to market and create buffers for them. That is, they\nhave been failed by lack of supporting agricultural infrastructure.\nA policy to support Agricultural infrastructure should focus on:\n• Financing production – crop insurance/crop finance\n• Financing processing\n2\n\n• Investing in storage\n• Investing in distribution and marketing networks\n• Complemented with an appropriate credit policy\nIn this way, the farmer can participate in the market fully. This is what will\nensure food security and stability of domestic prices – food is now accounting\nfor 36% of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) basket – an important tool to fight\nnational inflation. To that extent, increased agricultural productivity,\nparticularly in food helps reduce food inflationary pressure that also feeds to\nthe national inflation. In addition, GDP growth in this country is determined\nby growth in this sector.\nFrom the Central Bank side, our support in this initiative is important. The\nCentral Bank of Kenya through its capacity building arm – the Kenya School\nof Monetary Studies (KSMS) intends to develop a certified agricultural\nfinance program in collaboration with COMPETE – USAID. This program\nwill be suitable for agricultural officers as well as credit officers. This is\nimportant in developing the critical mass of human capital that fully\nunderstands agribusiness, such as agribusiness cycles, risk management\npractices, farm cash-flows and finance and insurance. This will support\nfarmers and also develop a strong drive to lift the policy paradigm in this area.\nBut the wider scope of monetary policy support is not in doubt.\nFinally, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to conclude\nmy brief remarks by wishing all of you fruitful deliberations this morning.\nThank you very much for your kind attention.\n3", "source": "CBK", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-04-26", "url": "https://www.centralbank.go.ke//images/docs/speeches/2010/Governors%20Remarks%20at%20Agriculture%20Forum.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "8e8e5110fc9aca7cb6f3728df15aa6a0", "text": "CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA\nBarbados Chamber of Commerce and Industry Digital Conference\nKenya’s Digital Transformation\nKeynote Address by Dr. Patrick Njoroge\nGovernor, Central Bank of Kenya\nWednesday, April 6, 2022\nAs Prepared for Delivery\nGood morning! I am delighted to participate in the Barbados Chamber of Commerce\nand Industry (BCCI) Digital Conference. I am grateful for the invitation to this\nconference with its bold theme—Adapt and Change: We Must. It is also a great honour\nto have the opportunity to address a second BCCI event. As you may recall, I was\nprivileged to address a BCCI event in September 2019, when I led a Kenyan delegation\nto Barbados that paved the way for Prime Minister Mia Motley’s visit to Kenya three\nmonths later.\nI wish to note that the Prime Minister’s visit to Kenya in December 2019 and President\nUhuru Kenyatta’s visit to Barbados in October 2021, cemented Kenya’s already strong\nconnection to Barbados and indeed the Caribbean people, which has been built over the\nyears. I also wish to express my gratitude to my brother Governor Cleviston Haynes of\nthe Central Bank of Barbados for the warm hospitality he extended us at that occasion.\nOver the last two decades, the world has changed drastically. Kenya has changed,\nBarbados has changed. Globalization on the back of the internet revolution in the 1990s\nbrought markets closer together and opened up distant markets to disparate producers\nfrom across the globe. However, over the last two decades the internet revolution shifted\nto mobile phones with their near ubiquity, and quite literally placed the power of\nglobalization at the fingertips of citizens everywhere. In 2000 mobile phone\npenetration—measured as mobile phone subscription as a percentage of population—was\nat 39, 10 and 0.4 percent in the United States, Barbados and Kenya, respectively. By\n2020 the mobile phone penetration in all three countries was over 100 percent, with\nKenya recording the highest at 114 percent. It is therefore fitting that the focus of my\naddress today is Kenya’s digital transformation and how we can deepen our\nrelationships in addressing the challenges facing our citizenry.\n\nHowever, I need to acknowledge that not all developments over the last 20 years are to\nbe seen approvingly—I am sure some Barbadians will look back with nostalgia to when\nthe Concorde made regular flights to Barbados, one of only four destinations in the\nworld.\nKenya has had remarkable success in its digital transformation as you have seen in the\nintroductory video clip. Significantly, digital financial services have underpinned\nKenya’s threefold increase in financial access to 83.7 percent of all adults in 2021, from\n26.7 percent in 2006. The seed for this transformation was planted in 2007, with the roll\nout of mobile phone money transfer services. This was in response to a send money home\nneed by Kenyans in urban areas to rural areas. From this basic financial platform that\nwas powered by mobile phones, an elaborate financial services ecosystem has evolved\ntoday, extending beyond money transfer to among others credit, savings, insurance,\ncapital markets and pension products.\nHow did the incumbent banks respond to these developments? First, with some\nsuspicion, but soon after they saw the possibility of cooperating with the telcos and\nbegun working with them to develop new products and appropriate services.\nConsequently, the importance of bank-branch channels has reduced while digital\nchannels (mobile phone and internet) have increased in dominance. Mobile phone and\ninternet transactions account for 77.1 percent and 2.3 percent respectively, of the number\nof bank transactions, and 14.6 percent and 21.9 percent respectively, of the value of bank\ntransactions. With a mobile phone penetration of 132 percent, a large swathe of Kenya’s\npopulace now partakes of anytime anywhere financial services.\nAdvances in technology and innovations have accelerated the pace and raised the\npotential for digitalization. The COVID-19 pandemic also served to catalyse\ndigitalization not just in financial services but also in other spheres including health,\neducation and entertainment. But much more needs to be done to fully benefit from the\ndigital economy. Digitalization is the next frontier for placing citizens at the heart of any\nnation’s development and more importantly raising their standards of living. In his\nremarks at this Conference yesterday, Minister Davidson Ishmael highlighted that people\nexpect the delivery of services to not only be effective but also fast, and that there is a\nhuge transformation potential of rebuilding and delivering public services digitally.\n2\n\nIt is with this in mind, that Kenya’s Digital Economy Blueprint was launched in May\n2019. The vision of the blueprint is a digitally empowered citizenry, living in a\ndigitally enabled society. We aspire for a Kenya where every citizen, enterprise and\norganization have digital access and the capability to participate and thrive in the digital\neconomy. To maximize our benefits, we must build ecosystems that facilitate digital\ntransactions nationally, regionally and globally. This is the thinking that informed\nKenya’s Digital Economy Blueprint that outlines five pillars as the foundation for a\nthriving digital economy. The pillars are: Digital Government, Digital Business,\nInfrastructure, Innovation-Driven Entrepreneurship, and Digital Skills and Values.\nAgainst this backdrop, how do we build on the digitalization momentum and put our\ncitizens back on the path to shared prosperity following the ravages of COVID-19\npandemic? Kenya’s digital transformation has taken over 15 years, but how can\nBarbados and indeed the Caribbean region leapfrog in a much shorter period? What do\nwe learn from Kenya’s incremental change that would help accelerate Barbados’ digital\ntransformation? I will highlight three broad themes from our journey that could hasten\nthe pace for Barbados.\nFirst, we must put people at the centre of the financial system. For both the public\nand private sector, the key question must be what are the needs of the people particularly\nin the context of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and how will digitalization\nwork for them? How do we get citizens to participate for instance in financing the health,\neducation and other social services that are critical for their lives and livelihoods? We\nmust be clear on what the vision for our citizens is, and then all else will fall in place. I\nacknowledge that I have benefited immensely from Prime Minister Mia Motley’s clarity\nof vision on these and related matters.\nIn order to align all stakeholders in Kenya, the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) recently\nlaunched the National Payments Strategy, 2022-2025. The Strategy seeks to realise a\nvision of “a secure, fast, efficient and collaborative payments system that supports\nfinancial inclusion and innovations that benefit Kenyans.” The vision will be anchored\non core principles of trust, security, usefulness, choice and innovation. The Strategy was\ndeveloped through a consultative process, identifying what the problems are and setting\nout a roadmap for public and private actors to develop appropriate solutions. I certainly\nencourage you to look at this Strategy, as there are some elements that are readily\napplicable to Barbados.\n3\n\nSecond, is the courage to act. In 2007, when mobile phone transfer services started in\nKenya, we did not have a comprehensive National Payment System (NPS) legislative\nframework. While a few years earlier, in 2003, the central bank’s mandate had been\nexpanded to incorporate the oversight of efficient and effective payments systems, the\nimplementing legislation had yet to be crafted. Our easy choice in 2007, would have\nbeen to ask the innovators of mobile money transfer services to wait until we had the\nNPS Act and Regulations in place. Kenya and Barbados given their common heritage\nhave a fairly similar legislative process that can take years to conclude.\nIn the circumstances, we took the narrower route laced with risks to allow the innovation\nto proceed in a controlled environment, a test-and-learn approach. This was way before\nsandboxes came into vogue. We focused on the business model, the risks and what the\nmitigants were. But more importantly, we were motivated by the problem we had with\nlow financial inclusion levels and inefficient money transfer systems.\nDoes Barbados have the courage to act? Are you waiting for all the pieces to fall in\nplace? As you ponder on this question, I was struck by a comment made last week by the\nBarbados High Commissioner to Kenya, H.E. William McDonald: “Barbados may have\na population of 300,000, but its ambition is for 60 million.” And the words of the\nNational Anthem are a faithful reminder of what is possible:\nWe have no doubts or fears\nUpward and onward we shall go\nInspired, exulting, free\nAnd greater will our nation grow\nIn strength and unity.\nThird, co-operation and collaboration are key to creating a thriving financial\necosystem. Synergies between regulators, policy makers, financial institutions and other\nactors are critical to financial services transformation. Traditional adversarial relations\nbetween regulators and the regulated, and a race-to-the-bottom by competing financial\ninstitutions have no place in this new world. Crucially, do banks see emerging payment\nservice providers and fintechs as fierce competitors out to eat their lunch? In the world\nof anytime anywhere financial services, standalone models will not work, and it is the\nwell-coordinated ecosystems that will deliver for our citizens.\n4\n\nThere is certainly no room for zero-sum games and we must aim for win-win outcomes.\nThis is why the symbiotic relationship between Kenya and Barbados to grow our\nrespective financial sectors is particularly welcome. Together, we will go far for the\nbenefit of our citizens. In the words of a proverb, “If you want to go fast, go alone. If you\nwant to go far, go together.”\nIncidentally, last week I welcomed to our offices in Nairobi, a delegation from Barbados\nthat was accompanied by the Barbados High Commissioner to Kenya. The delegation\nwas aptly accompanied by representatives from Kenya’s largest Payment Service\nProvider and two young Kenyan fintechs who were part of the Kenyan delegation to\nBarbados last year. The Kenyan fintechs are looking to work with you in Barbados to\nresolve problems in the credit unions and insurance spaces. I am delighted that these\nconversations are taking place and will certainly bear fruit.\nUltimately what matters for our citizens is not who is providing the solution, but are their\nproblems being resolved. Let me allow, a Kenyan business lady to speak to this in the\nfollowing video clip.\nI will finish with a story I have been retelling the last few years. At a regional conference\na few years ago, I struck a friendship with an older participant from another country. At\none point he told me a story about how he had travelled somewhere and had seen an old\nman planting coconuts trees. They talked and he remarked to the old farmer, “I really\ndon’t think you will eat the fruit from the coconut trees that you are planting.” To which\nthe man replied, “Yes, I know. I am planting these coconut trees for another generation,\nand I eat fruit from this coconut tree that I did not plant.” My new friend turned to me\nand said: “Society is at its best when people plant coconuts that they do not expect to eat\nfrom.”\nDear friends, we must face the future with hope and courage. Your Kenyan brothers and\nsisters stand ready to journey with you on the road towards a digital society. We have a\nlot in common and a lot to share for the benefit of our citizens. And yes, let’s plant\ncoconuts.\nWe write our names on history's page\nWith expectations great\nStrict guardians of our heritage\nFirm craftsmen of our fate.\nI wish you fruitful deliberations and look forward to the outcomes of this important\nconference.\nThank You!\n5", "source": "CBK", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-04-26", "url": "https://www.centralbank.go.ke/uploads/speeches/800377460_Governor's Keynote Address -Barbados Chamber of Commerce and Industry-April 2022.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "fc5d50364ecdf77dcf4441079b1b465c", "text": "CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA\nRemarks by\nPROF. NJUGUNA NDUNG’U\nGOVERNOR\nCCEENNTTRRAALL BBAANNKK OOFF KKEENNYYAA\naatt tthhee\nMARKET LEADERS FORUM DINNER\nCrowne Plaza Hotel\nWednesday, August 6, 2013\n\nMembers of the Market Leaders Forum,\nOfficials from the Treasury,\nColleagues at the Central Bank of Kenya,\nLadies and Gentlemen,\nLet me take the opportunity to welcome you all to this event which has been\norganized to take stock of our achievements for the year, review challenges\nencountered and develop the plans for the future. At the outset I wish to commend\nthe market leaders for the effort and success in taking this market to a higher level. As\nyou may be aware, Kenya’s bond market is now regarded among the top and fastest\ngrowing in Africa and this could not have been without the strong partnerships that we\nhave continuously cultivated. We are however still a long way to achieve liquidity,\nmarket efficiency and stability.\nThe 2012-13 financial year was a great success with respect to raising the borrowing\nrequirement for the Government. The Market Leaders Forum together with market\nstakeholders contributed significantly to the success of the bond market in terms of the\nfollowing:\n1. Successful financing of the FY 2012-13 Borrowing Plan: Treasury’s target for the\nyear was successfully achieved reflecting a sterling performance especially given\nthat this was the highest in the history of domestic borrowing at Kes. 165bn.\n2. Benchmark Bonds Program Implementation: Successful implementation of this\nprogram during the year was critical for addressing bond market fragmentation\nand increasing liquidity in the market. All 17 bonds valued at Kes 209.8bn issued\nin the year were benchmark tenors, out of which 5, worth Kes 5.4bn were issued\nthrough reopen auctions. Overall, 16 benchmark bonds have been reopened\nsince 2009 when the strategy was first employed, bringing into the market more\nthan Kes. 183 billion and providing critical financing for the country’s fiscal gaps.\n2\n\n3. Longer Maturity Profile of Domestic Debt: Average maturity profile of\ngovernment bonds in the debt portfolio rose to 7.3 years by end June 2013\ncompared to 6.2 years at the beginning of the year. These are encouraging\noutcomes given that in 2001, the average maturity of all government securities\nwas about 8 months. This is indeed a reflection of the continued success in\nreducing rollover risk associated with short term debt which is essential for a well-\nfunctioning secondary market for bonds.\n4. Global recognition for Kenya: Infrastructure Bond program and the plan by the\ngovernment to issue a Euro bond in the current financial year also signifies that\nthe domestic market has matured over time and gained confidence from both\nlocal and foreign investors. This is evidenced by the stable country’s credit rating\nand an attractive environment for investors.\n5. Automation of primary market processes: In an effort to enhance efficiency and\nsafety of its operations, the Central Bank launched the T-24 system in all its\noperations in April 2012. I would like to thank the stakeholders for being patient\nwhile the bank was experiencing challenges leading to the implementation of the\nnew system. Going forward the bank is working towards providing internet\nbanking which will allow for services such as: online bidding faster dissemination\nof auction results and statements for government securities.\n6. Competitiveness at auctions: The use of an auction-based method in the\nissuance of government securities over the years has promoted price discovery\nand competitive prices at the primary market which is a key ingredient for the\nsecondary market.\n7. Kenya Government Bond Index: In October 2012, the Nairobi Securities\nExchange (NSE) launched the FTSE NSE Kenya Shilling Government Bond\nIndex as a benchmark tool for measuring market performance. This was a great\nstep in market development because the market now has the benefit of further\nopening up to the rest of the world and increasing Kenya’s financial sector\ncompetitiveness.\n3\n\nLadies and Gentlemen, as you all know our success has not been without\nchallenges along the way. Just to mention a few, the slow pace of reforms particularly\nin the secondary market has promoted market illiquidity and hampered faster growth.\nBut above all, economic vibrancy has been constrained by shocks in both the\ndomestic and international environment beyond our control and this has at times\naffected the momentum of our market development.\nI wish to emphasize that a well-developed and proper functioning financial market is\ncritical to economies all over the world as it enhances effectiveness of monetary\npolicy, cushions the economy against external vulnerabilities while mobilizing long\nterm financing for public and private sector development. Therefore, the development\nof a robust financial market is not only a priority of the Central Bank of Kenya but for\nevery stakeholder in this market to embrace.\nTowards this objective I urge all the stakeholders to continue to build a competitive\nbond market that supports the country’s development agenda under Vision 2030. In\ncognizance with today’s theme of ‘Taking Kenya’s bond market to the next level’, we\nas stakeholders have set for ourselves a number of initiatives which are ongoing or for\nthe future. These include:\n1. Further support to the benchmark bonds program through strategies for building\nliquidity such as bond reopening, and initiating approaches to smoothen the debt\nmaturity structure such as bond exchanges through switches and conversions.\n2. Promoting financial literacy to ensure market confidence and increased numbers\nof investors, so as to enhance further market deepening.\n3. Fast-tracking financial markets reforms particularly at the secondary market\nincluding diversification of existing products, improving the legal and operational\nframework and expanding the trading platform to incorporate Over the Counter\ntrading. But we also need to review and develop mechanisms to reduce insider\nactivities and fraud so as to mitigate these risks and increase the integrity of our\nfinancial markets.\n4\n\n4. At the primary market level, enhancement of products that will include; the\nissuance of project specific infrastructure bonds with bond service costs matched\nwith income streams from the projects as well as more products to promote\nnational savings and attract small investors and the Kenyan diaspora.\nAs I conclude, I wish to thank the Market Leaders Forum for its invaluable\ncontribution towards market development and at the same time call upon all the\nstakeholders to take up the challenge of enhancing market efficiency and\ntransparency.\nWith these remarks, ladies and gentlemen, I invite all of you to relax and enjoy the\nrest of the evening.\nThank you for your attention.\n5", "source": "CBK", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-04-26", "url": "https://www.centralbank.go.ke//images/docs/speeches/2013/Market%20Leaders%20Forum%20Dinner%20Aug%202013.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "6ebcf54762226474d3fc9cbf7d5df0b3", "text": "CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA\nKEYNOTE ADDRESS\nby\nPROF. NJUGUNA NDUNG’U\nGOVERNOR\nCENTRAL BANK OF KENYA\ndduurriinngg tthhee\nLLAAUUNNCCHH OOFF MMEETTRROOPPOOLL CCOONNSSUUMMEERR AANNDD SSMMEE BBUURREEAAUU SSCCOORREESS\nIInntteerrccoonnttiinneennttaall HHootteell,, NNaaiirroobbii\nTThhuurrssddaayy 2244tthh JJuullyy,, 22001144\n\nMr. Peter Kebati, Chairman, Board of Directors, Metropol Credit\nReference Bureau;\nMr. Sam Omukoko, Managing Director, Metropol Credit Reference\nBureau;\nBoard Members;\nRepresentatives of Commercial Banks, Microfinance Banks and\nother Financial Institutions;\nDistinguished Ladies and Gentlemen:\nIt is a great honour for me to join you this morning to witness the\nroll-out of another innovative financial product, Metropol’s\nConsumer and SME Bureau Scores. At the outset, I wish to express\nmy gratitude to the Directors and Management of Metropol Credit\nReference Bureau (CRB) for inviting me to this auspicious\noccasion.\nLadies and Gentlemen: The roll-out of full file banking sector\ncredit information sharing effective February 2014 is already\nyielding positive results. We are gathered here today for the\ninauguration of Consumer and SME Bureau Scores, which has\nbeen made possible by the expanded credit information sharing\n(CIS) mechanism. I take this opportunity to congratulate Metropol\nCRB for quickly seizing the opportunity to develop a customer’s\nscoring mechanism, that will contribute to the growth of the\ncredit market in Kenya. Introduction of credit scoring by\n2\n\nMetropol CRB will not only enrich the value of its credit reports\nto the lenders but will greatly improve the lenders credit risk\nmanagement.\nLadies and Gentlemen: When the CIS mechanism was launched\nin 2010, the viability of the licensed CRBs hinged primarily on\nthe volume of credit reports accessed by the lenders. However,\nwith the introduction of full file credit information sharing,\nCRBs are now well positioned to introduce value add products\nsuch as credit scoring that will not only propel their success but\nwill contribute to the development of the financial sector;\nespecially the dynamic and changing profile of collateral\ntechnology and pricing credit in our financial market.\nAs you are aware, a high level Committee was established under\nthe leadership of the Cabinet Secretary to the National Treasury\nin January 2014 to explore ways of increasing private sector\ncredit and mortgage finance in Kenya. The formation of the\nCommittee that comprised of representatives from the National\nTreasury, Central Bank of Kenya, Kenya Bankers Association and\nother private sector representatives and market players, was\ninformed by the Government’s desire pursuant to Vision 2030 to\ntransform the country to a middle income status by 2030.\nCountries that have attained a middle income status, such as\n3\n\nMalaysia and South Africa, have reported private sector credit to\nGDP ratios of more than 100%. Kenya’s current ratio of private\nsector credit to GDP of about 40% is way below those of middle\nincome and comparable countries. In addition, Kenya has only\nabout 20,000 mortgage accounts concerted efforts to improve the\nsituation were thus deemed necessary.\nLadies and Gentlemen: The Committee finalized its task in April\n2014. The various recommendations made by the Committee are\nalready being implemented. As we gather here, the banking sector\nis at the deep end of rolling out a transparent pricing\nmechanism, whereby all banks are required to price their loans\nbased on a common reference rate, the Kenya Banks’ Reference\nRate (KBRR). This was the first of the recommendations by the\nCommittee. To supplement the KBRR, the banking industry has\nalso rolled out the use of the all-inclusive Annual Percentage\nRate (APR) in loan pricing. This is loan pricing that includes\nthe interest rate on the loan and other fees and charges such as\nappraisal , legal and valuation fees.\nKBRR is computed as an average of the Central Bank Rate (CBR)\nand a two-month moving average of the 91-day Treasury bill\nrate, and announced by MPC. The CBR reflects the monetary\npolicy direction consistent with inflation profile, while the 91-\nday Treasury bill rate reflects the return on short term risk free\nassets. Prior to this every bank had its own base rate, whose\ncomposition was not known to the borrowers. This now opens a\n4\n\ntransparency window for borrowers who can compare and\nnegotiate lending rates across banks.\nBanks are now required to explain to their customers and the\nCentral Bank the composition of the premium (k) they charge\nabove KBRR. The Central Bank will periodically publish on its\nwebsite details of the premium (k) obtained through returns from\nthe banks. The CBK has already developed a template for this\ninformation capturing process. This will in turn promote\ntransparency and competition in the pricing of credit. Borrowers\nare now empowered to compare interest rates offered by banks as\nthey shop for the cheapest credit facilities. This is the surest way\nof increasing credit in the market to the productive and\nprofitable sectors.\nThe contribution by Metropol’s credit scoring is to help customers\nknow their risk profile and how their loans will be priced but\nalso empower them with tools to negotiate for better rates.\nLadies and Gentlemen: Apart from the introduction of KBRR, the\nCommittee made other recommendations that require the\nGovernment and other players including the Central Bank to\nimplement certain policy and institutional reforms to promote\nprivate sector credit and mortgage finance in Kenya. These\nreforms will have an overarching objective of reducing the cost of\ndoing business. These recommendations include:\n5\n\n Promotion of sharing of infrastructure by banks.\n Fast tracking of the on-going modernization of the Lands and\nCompanies Registries to facilitate quicker collateral process.\n Establishment of a legal framework for creation of an\nelectronic moveable assets register.\n Enhanced financial services consumer protection and\neducation.\n Ensure that Government borrowing does not crowd out private\nsector as well as adopting alternative sources of funding such as\nsovereign bonds. (This has been done with success).\n Fast tracking capital markets reforms to make capital markets\nmore efficient and attractive alternative sources of long term\nfunding.\n Facilitate lines of credit for large housing development projects\ntargeted at lower income buyers for owner occupation.\nThese recommendations are at different levels of implementation.\nLadies and Gentlemen: Integrity and sanctity of information\nshared under the credit information sharing mechanism and\nbuilding information capital are critical in promoting\nconfidence in the mechanism. Once individuals and\nparticipating entities are assured of sanctity of the mechanism,\napplication will increase and more innovative ideas will be\nshared to enrich the mechanism. This is the reason\n6\n\nwhy consumer protection measures under the CIS mechanism\nwere strengthened under the revised Credit Reference Bureau\nRegulations, 2013 that became operational in February 2014. In\nthe same vein, I urge Metropol CRB and other CRBs to ensure that\ntheir value add products are introduced within the same\nprecincts of consumer protection. Any blot on consumer\nconfidence may ruin a noble cause that has taken several years\nto establish.\nLadies and Gentlemen: As I conclude, it is worth noting that we\nare yet to reach the optimal level in credit information sharing.\nThere are still several credit providers who currently are only\nable to contribute data but cannot access credit reports directly.\nWe need to bring all financial sector and non-financial sector\ncredit providers into the ambit of the CIS mechanism. The\nCentral Bank will continue to support market development and\nmarket players in the development of an all-encompassing CIS\nmechanism. This will undoubtedly increase the supply of credit\nto the private sector to support Kenya’s growth and development\nas envisaged under Vision 2030; but more importantly,\nincreasing supply must go hand in hand with declining and\nappropriate pricing of this credit. But above all this credit must\nbe destined to productive sectors of the economy to make a\ndifference to an all-inclusive growth.\n7\n\nWith these few remarks, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is now my\ndistinguished honour to declare the Metropol CRB Consumer and\nSME Bureau Scores officially launched.\nThank You\n8", "source": "CBK", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-04-26", "url": "https://www.centralbank.go.ke//images/docs/speeches/2014/launch_of_metropol_consumer_and_sme_bureau_scores.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "08247e1d1016f99c28eca5d4bee3aa35", "text": "CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA\nRemarks by\nPPRROOFF.. NNJJUUGGUUNNAA NNDDUUNNGG’’UU\nGGOOVVEERRNNOORR\nCCEENNTTRRAALL BBAANNKK OOFF KKEENNYYAA\naatt tthhee LLaauunncchh ooff tthhee\nRREEGGIIOONNAALL CCEERRTTIIFFIICCAATTEE IINN AAGGRRIICCUULLTTUURRAALL FFIINNAANNCCEE\nAANNDD TTHHEE EEAASSTT AAFFRRIICCAANN AAGGRRIICCUULLTTUURRAALL FFIINNAANNCCEE\nNNEETTWWOORRKK\nKenya School of Monetary Studies, Nairobi\nSeptember 7, 2011\n\nGovernor’s Remarks at Launch of CAF and EAAFN, KSMS – September 7, 2011\nThe Hon. Minister for Agriculture, Dr. Sally Kosgei;\nThe Secretary General, East Africa Community, Amb. Dr. Richard\nSezibera;\nPermanent Secretary, Dr. Romano Kiome\nUSAID East Africa Regional Director, Lawrence Meserve;\nChief Executive Officers of Commercial Banks;\nEsteemed Members of AFRACA;\nDistinguished Participants;\nLadies and Gentlemen:\nGood Morning:\nHon. Minister, About a year and a half ago, on 17th March 2010, we\ngathered here to discuss innovative ways to increase financial flows to the\nagricultural sector. The delegates in that meeting identified limited human\ncapacity in agricultural lending as an impediment to financing the sector.\nThe Kenya School of Monetary Studies was tasked to address this human\nresource gap amongst lending institutions.\nLadies and gentlemen: I am pleased to inform you that after extensive\nconsultations with key stakeholders, the School with the support of USAID-\nCompetitiveness and Trade Expansion Project (COMPETE), developed a\nModular Certificate Training Program whose launch we are all here to\nwitness.\nI wish to commend the team that steered the process of initiating this\nimportant program. In order to further develop this sector, this committee\nhas been transformed into the East African Agricultural Finance Network\n(EAAFN) with a view to nurture, deepen and consolidate the sector’s\ncapacity building agenda.\nHon. Minister, I also recognize the presence, at this forum, of the\ninaugural class of the Regional Certificate Program in Agricultural Finance.\nI hope the course is has met your expectations.\n2\n\nGovernor’s Remarks at Launch of CAF and EAAFN, KSMS – September 7, 2011\nHon. Minister, Ladies and gentlemen: The rapid growth of\nmicrofinance suggests that there may be a large market for rural and\nagricultural loans. It is therefore important to better understand the\ndemand for and use of agricultural credit to develop effective products,\ninstitutions and policies. That is why the CAF program mainly targets staff\nworking in the credit and product development units in regional\ncommercial banks, agricultural SACCOs and Micro-finance Institutions.\nHon. Minister, Ladies and Gentlemen, let me conclude by again\nexpressing the Central Bank of Kenya’s appreciation of various institutions\nthat have enabled the development of this capacity building programme as\nwell as the 22 financial institutions that are represented by the pioneer CAF\nparticipants.\nWhile acknowledging that the challenges facing agriculture are huge given\nthe growing population, declining land sizes, climate change that has\nimposed severe costs on the sector, all of which compound the problem of\nfinancing agriculture, the challenges are not insurmountable, if we work\ntogether.\nLadies and Gentlemen, it is now my pleasure and privilege to welcome\nThe Hon. Minister for Agriculture, Dr. Sally Kosgei to give the key\nnote address and officially launch the East African Agricultural\nFinance Network (EAAFN) and inaugurate the Regional Certificate\nProgram in Agricultural Finance.\nThank you.\n3", "source": "CBK", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-04-26", "url": "https://www.centralbank.go.ke//images/docs/speeches/2011/CAFS%20and%20EAAFN%20Launch%20at%20KSMS%20Sept%207.pdf"}
{"doc_id": "270f68dfbb79e3885101e776d5f25c39", "text": "Market research conducted by BrandsEye shows what South Africans expect from Starbucks when it enters the local market next month – and how much they’d be willing to pay.\nTaste Holdings announced on Thursday that South Africa’s first Starbucks coffee chain will be opening at the end of April in Rosebank, Gauteng.\nA second branch will open around the same time at the Mall of Africa in Midrand.\nThe global brand’s entry into the market has South African coffee consumers divided, with the excitement of such a big brand operating in the country being quelled by concerns over quality and price.\nBrandEye tracked and analysed consumer sentiments towards Starbucks and other local coffee brands on social media, to gauge what South Africans expect.\nThe group found that Starbucks’ entry into South Africa increased conversation not only about the US brand, but local brands as well.\nAnd while a lot of consumers – especially consumers of artisanal brands of coffee – are less excited, and unwilling to pay premium fees for Starbucks, many rejoice the brand’s equity, and wouldn’t mind “splurging” out for its novelty blends.\nWho loves and hates Starbucks\nAccording to the report, overall sentiment towards Starbucks in the country is more positive than it is negative. The only place where this isn’t true is Cape Town, where 33% of consumers expressed negative sentiment towards the brand, versus 26% who were positive.\nDurban is the most positive towards Starbucks (43% positive vs 17% negative), while Gauteng is in the middle – but also more positive (33% vs 18% negative).\nBrandEye suggests that Durban would be the next most logical city for Stabucks to head to, after Joburg, as Cape Town would prove to be a resistant market.\nPrice and quality\nOne of the most talked-about aspects of Starbucks’ launch in the country is price. BrandEye’s analysis found that South African consumers were largely unwilling to spend more than R25 for a cup of coffee.\nLocal brands offer high-quality products for up to R28 per cup – while Starbucks is expected to enter at a R30-R50 price point. When prices were discussed, sentiment toward Starbucks was negative.\nAnother subject that drew criticism from consumers was a question of quality, where South African coffee fans saw local brands – especially artisanal brands – as being of higher quality and more affordable.\nHowever, Starbucks’ novelty blended beverages prompted high levels of excitement from South Africans, the group said.\nWhile pricing is one of the most-discussed issues, it’s only the 5th most important factor, according to South African consumers.\nTopping the list is quality, followed by the in-store experience, product mix and brand status.\n“Despite initial concerns as to what Starbucks would charge per cup, price only ranked fifth in the above scale, but (it was) also linked to quality,” BrandEye said.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/115442/how-much-money-south-africans-are-willing-to-pay-for-starbucks-coffee/"}
{"doc_id": "7b213593e0d0f8b3b172c421102b5726", "text": "One of the reasons why the decision to call riot police into parliament to disperse the EFF a fortnight ago seemed alarming to many is because we have abundant recent evidence in this country of just how badly things can escalate when public order policing gets involved. When SAPS top brass presented their plans for “enhancing public order policing capacity” in Parliament on Wednesday, it was revealing that most of the focus seemed to be on suppressing protests. By REBECCA DAVIS.\n“The Republic is currently experiencing an upsurge in violent incidents which is requiring urgent additional interventions from SAPS,” Lieutenant General Elias Mawela began his presentation to parliament’s police committee on Wednesday. “It is anticipated that this upsurge against state authority will not decline in the foreseeable future.”\nStrong words, and they seemed to set the tone for what was to follow. As context for the proposed expansion of the country’s public order policing, SAPS presented their data on the escalation in the number of violent protests over the past decade. Between 2007 and 2008, there were 812 violent protests countrywide. During the 2013-2014 period, this figure had grown to 1907 violent protests.\n“We really handle a lot of protests,” national police commissioner Riah Phiyega told the committee, saying that there was a “significant, noticeable increase” in protests of a violent nature. The preferred police term is “community protests”, she said, because not all protests are service-related.\nWhile the number of protests has been steadily growing, the number of public order police (POP) units has been dropping. In 1995, there were 31 POP units with 11,000 members. Currently their members number just 4,721. Malewa attributed this drop rather vaguely as being due to “transformation and changes happening” within SAPS, but also to a shift in police focus after apartheid from crowd management to crime combating and prevention.\nBut now that this “upsurge against state authority” is on the rise, SAPS wants money to beef it all up again. Phiyega is asking Treasury for R3.3-billion over four years, to be used to almost double POP personnel numbers and upgrade and expand their existing physical resources.\nThese resources currently include: 561 armoured vehicles; 10 water cannons; and 973 soft-top vehicles. POP members get given a 9mm sidearm (handgun) with 9mm ammunition and a 12-gauge shotgun with “blue double ball and white reduced rounds”.\nWhen members of the public pick up cartridges after a protest, Malewa broke off to explain, mostly it is a “blue type of cartridge” – the blue double ball. A member of the committee asked later whether the blue and white ammunition could be lethal.\n“We say it is less lethal,” Malewa replied. “It can be deadly if incorrectly used. If correctly used, it is less lethal; it cannot cause fatalities.”\nPOP members are also equipped with tear gas launchers, R5 rifles and 5.56mm rounds and R1 rifles and 7.62 mm rounds.\nThe bulk of the money they are asking for (over R2-billion) will go towards personnel costs, with the remainder for equipment and accommodation. R20 million is earmarked for “pyrotechnics”, which is the term for “non-lethal means to control crowds”. Malewa said there is an “urgent need” for nine water cannons to be allocated to each province – a major increase on the 10 that currently service the whole country.\nBut the police aren’t just relying on bodies and hardware to control protests. There is also a major emphasis placed on information gathering. “The provision of forewarning intelligence is of critical importance,” Malewa said. POP units will have both “information gatherers” and “information officers”. He was, again, vague as to their duties: information gatherers “go out, they do what is necessary” and intelligence officers “do what they are doing to collect what they are collecting”.\nPhiyega later elaborated that intelligence gatherers are “out there in the community collecting information”, and information officers collate the information.\nThe information they gather about potential unrest or protests is sent to crime intelligence, which alert unit commanders via cellphones and email. They need more information gatherers, Malewa said, to have more “ground coverage”. Phiyega said there was a definite need for new intelligence products because “If there’s going to be a blockage of roads in the community tomorrow, somebody knows”.\nFunds have also been allocated for long-range recording devices to record conversations.\nThey also need recording equipment for another purpose: to gather evidence of public violence for use in court cases. R770,000 has been allocated for new video cameras to add to their existing stock. The latest water cannons are apparently also capable of recording footage. “We must be able to account for each and every protest that we manage,” Phiyega said.\nOne interesting lacuna in the discussion, given SAPS’ recent history, was the mis-use or over-use of force against protestors. ANC MP Jerome Maake, a committee member, eventually voiced the two ugly words – “police brutality” – in a rambling comment, but it became apparent that his point was the opposite: that the public is always outraged by cases when police attack citizens, but when citizens attack police there is no commensurate offence.\n“We cannot afford to be at loggerheads with the people we are supposed to serve and protect,” said Phiyega. “Mutual respect is crucial.”\nAfter the briefing, the Democratic Alliance complained that the Western Cape wasn’t getting enough POP resources compared to the rest of the country, with shadow police minister Diane Kohler-Barnard suggesting in a statement that “the only possible explanation we can think of is that this allocation has been politicised”.\nBut civil society representatives had different worries. Koketso Moeti, the national co-ordinator of the Local Government Action group – an alliance of South African organisations – described the tone of the briefing as “very concerning”.\n“The approach that was referred to in the meeting is one of suppression, force and clamping-down, instead of one that sees the POP’s presence at gatherings as a means of ensuring the safety of protesters,” Moeti told the Daily Maverick.\nMoeti pointed out that SAPS’ own data shows that the vast majority of protests in South Africa over the past financial year have been peaceful; 1,907 violent protests may seem like a lot, but there were over 11,000 other protests classified as peaceful.\nThe emphasis on weaponry and equipment was also significant, Moeti suggested. “[During the meeting] there was no mention of other means of how they maintain public order rather than by forceful means, which is very problematic.” She added that SAPS’ public order policing strategy also appears to ignore the possibility that the presence of riot police can itself be an agitation.\nIt’s clear that the message from the top is that government is resigned to ever more violent protests. While one approach, encouraged by the likes of Moeti, would see government investing in strategies to address community grievances before they erupt into protest, SAPS is bracing itself for a more hardline tack: spying on communities for evidence of imminent protest action, and bolstering its arsenal to shut these protests down when unrest threatens.\nOne is reminded, here, of the sometimes-maligned Dinokeng Scenarios, which brought together leaders from a wide range of South African sectors in 2008 to consider possible scenarios of the country’s future by 2020. The ‘Walk Apart’ scenario foresaw a situation where “citizens eventually lose patience and erupt into protest and unrest. The government, driven by its inability to meet citizens’ demands and expectations, responds brutally, and a spiral of resistance and repression is unleashed”.\nBut one point, at least, should make us all sleep more soundly at night. A committee member asked: Do you ever deploy ill-equipped or ill-trained POP members to protests?\n“No,” Phiyega replied firmly. DM\nRead more:\n-\nPolice want R3.3bn for public order policing, on News24\nPhoto: A man gestures to the police (not in picture) during violent service delivery protests in Bekkersdal, west of Johannesburg October 25, 2013. REUTERS/Siphiwe Sibeko.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2014-09-03-public-order-policing-saps-demands-more-muscle/"}
{"doc_id": "dffbb83ec43325ea1150972fe48611f0", "text": "Advertisement\nThird Ghana Students Most Beautiful launches in Accra\n20 beautiful ladies have been selected from various universities in Ghana for the third edition of Ghana Students Most Beautiful pageant aimed at helping young female students achieve their dreams.\nSpeaking at the launch which took place at New Bortianor in Accra recently, Nana Kwesi Ohene, General Manager for Crossmark Marketing, organisers of the pageant noted that pageant aims among others to train the contestants to take up leadership roles.\n“There are very intelligent girls who want to take up leadership roles and this pageant has been built to make that happen. This life is not all about social media and the fake lifestyles people flaunt out there.\n“There are young ladies who are yearning to make a difference in their generation and this pageant is a means to help these young and vibrant female students become leaders in the society”, he told Graphic Showbiz.\nThe grand finale will come off in April at the National Theatre, Accra and the first three winners will get a full funded trip outside the country and sponsorship from the organisation to support their individual projects.\nOn his part, Richard Jones Gyasi, Country Manager for BDSwiss, an online forex tradinbg company said his out came on board as a sponsor because his company’s goals and objectives align with that of Ghana Students Most Beautiful.\n“We believe in supporting a worthy cause and we think Ghana Students Most Beautiful is one of them. We will support the event and provide what is within our means to make it successful,” he stated.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.graphic.com.gh/entertainment/showbiz-news/third-ghana-students-most-beautiful-launches-in-accra.html"}
{"doc_id": "61904f4fc81331196f5d5ca6e1912da5", "text": "The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) has released the Nigerian Domestic and Foreign Debt report for the second quarter of 2018. The report which analyses Nigeria’s total debt stock as at the end of June 2018 shows that Nigeria’s total debt stock (36 States and Federal Government debt) stood at $73.21 billion (N22.38 trillion) in Q2 2018, compared to $74.28 billion (N22.71 trillion) in the first quarter of the year.\nAccording to the NBS report, Nigeria’s commercial and industrial capital, Lagos State, retained its position as the most externally indebted state in the country with $1.45 billion, as at the period ending June 2018.\nExternal Debt\nThe NBS report also shows that Nigeria’s total external debt stock stood at $22.08 billion (N6.75 trillion) in the period under review. This shows a quarter on quarter debt growth of 0.05% from $22.07 billion in the period ending March 2018. The total external debt earlier stood at $18.91 billion as at December 2017.\nOut of Nigeria’s total foreign debt of $22.08 billion as at the end of June 2018, Federal Government accounts for $17.83 billion, which is 80.76% of the total foreign debt stock. The 36 states and the FCT account for the remaining 19.24% of the nation’s total foreign debt portfolio, with a joint debt of $4.25 billion.\nDomestic Debts\nMeanwhile, the report equally indicates that Nigeria’s total domestic debts as at June 2018 were N15.63 trillion ($51.12 billion). This shows a quarter on quarter growth of 24.24% from N12.58 trillion in Q1 2018.\nThe 36 states and FCT accounted for N3.47 trillion ($11.37 billion), while the Federal Government was responsible for N12.12 trillion ($39.75 billion).\nDebt Portfolio of States\nThe breakdown of the total debt portfolio of states show that although, Lagos State still tops other states, its external debt reduced from $1.47 billion at the end of the last quarter of 2017 to $1.45 billion in June 2018. The report indicates that Edo State is next to Lagos with an external debt stock of $279 million as at the end of the period ending June 2018 while Kaduna was third with $232.97 million.\nOther high externally indebted states as at Q2 2018 include Cross River ($193.7 million), Bauchi ($134.9 million), Enugu ($127.9 million), and Anambra ($107.4 million). The document also listed other top external debtors to be Oyo ($106.34 million), Ogun ($105.3 million), and Osun ($101.5 million).\nMeanwhile, the NBS report also shows that Taraba State has the lowest foreign debt portfolio in Nigeria, as at the period ending June 2018 with $22.1 million, followed by Borno State with $22.1 million. Other low externally indebted states at the end of the period under review are Yobe ($28.4 million), Plateau ($29.6 million), and Kogi with a foreign debt stock of $32.37 million.\nExternal Debt Sources\nNigeria’s foreign debts are sourced from 4 quarters:\nOut of Nigeria’s total external debt of $22.08 billion, as the end of the second quarter of 2018, only 40% are commercial loans which comprise of the $8.8 billion Eurobonds and Diaspora Bonds incurred solely incurred by the Federal Government.\nThe second is the Bilateral (China EXIM Bank, JICA, India, KFW) which stood at $2.12 billion and also solely incurred by the Federal Government.\nBilateral (AFD) loan contributed $274.98 million as at June 2018.\nMultilateral debt of $10.89 billion was jointly incurred by the Federal Government and all the 36 states.\nDomestic Debt sources\nFederal Government’s domestic debt stock as at the end of Q2 2018 consists of the following instruments:\nFGN Bonds of N8.93 trillion made up 73.47% of the domestic debt stock, while Treasury Bills of 2.95 trillion made up 24.31%.\nGreen Bonds amounted to N10.69 billion out of the total domestic debt, while FGN Sukuk was N100 billion.\nA total amount of N150 billion was sourced from Nigerian Treasury Bonds, while N8.52 billion was borrowed from FGN Savings Bond.\nDownload Nairametrics App for breaking news and market intelligence.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://nairametrics.com/2018/09/21/nigerias-domestic-and-foreign-debt-profile-q2-2018/"}
{"doc_id": "3f76cffb82117d40594033b3fa43a76e", "text": "Fola Fagbule, Senior VP and Head Advisory at Africa Finance Corporation said legitimate export trade and investment is a viable way out of Nigeria’s economic burdens and would move Nigeria away from crude oil dependence.\nHe disclosed this while speaking at a webinar organised by Nairametrics titled, “Economic Outlook: Projecting Nigeria’s Recovery”.\nFagbule said 42% of Nigeria’s GDP is trade, telecoms, I.T, Service economy and others, and boosting the sectors is a way to improve Nigeria’s economy as the country battles a GDP decline due to the global COVID-19 pandemic.\nHe added that Nigeria is below her peers in Africa in investment as a percentage of GDP. “Gabon’s investment as a percentage of GDP is 30%, Nigeria is less than 14%,” he said, citing the performance of Africa Finance Corporation’s investments in Gabon.\nHe said that if Nigeria doubles its investment as a percentage of GDP, it could reach $60 billion annually, adding that the investment focus should be on drivers of trade.\n“ Gabon’s success was about facilitating export trade,” he said, adding that Nigeria can mirror same objectives, which would boost infrastructure investments to achieve success in export trade.\nCiting the present capital expenditure of the Nigerian government which is not sufficient to combat Nigeria’s economic burdens, he said export trade is a legitimate way to boost FDI and FX liquidity as infrastructure is a major focus on making export trade work.\nOn ways of attracting foreign investments to boost trade in the country, he said, “the best way to attract foreign financing to Nigeria is to tie it to projects.\n“Viable projects that are well structured can also catalyze private investors to fund private projects. We need to change direction to financing specific projects.”\nFagbule said that such specific financing for projects include Nigeria’s Electricity infrastructure upgrade project with SIEMENS, which Nairametrics reported last month as a $2 billion power deal, under the Presidential Power Initiative (PPI), with 85% of funding from a consortium of banks, and guaranteed by the German government through credit insurance firm, Euler Hermes.\nFor further inquiries about this article contact:\nEmail: william.ukpe@nairametrics.com or outreach@nairametrics.com.\nTwitter: @_sirwilliam_ @nairametrics.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://nairametrics.com/2020/09/06/trade-and-investments-a-way-out-of-nigerias-economic-troubles-fola-fagbule/"}
{"doc_id": "01f67c705c66d027f10a1be850f7a655", "text": "The Rice Processors Association of Nigeria (RIPAN) has urged the federal government to enter a pact on rice trade with India to import two million metric tonnes (mmt) of husked brown rice for millers to stabilise prices of the grain in the country, the association said.\nThe call comes as millers scramble for paddy amid a worsening shortage in Africa’s biggest economy that has sent prices to their highest level in decades.\nThe rice body said the move is necessary as it would help stabilise prices of a 50kg bag of local parboiled rice at N40,000, ensure survival of mills and a million jobs in the industry.\n“We request Mr. President to appeal to the Prime Minister of India to sell about 2 million MT of husked brown rice to Nigeria and approval to waive the 20 percent export duty that India recently introduced,” the association said in a statement.\n“The husked brown rice will be given to RIPAN for processing and to keep their milling working,” it stated.\nIt also called on the government to grant an immediate permit for the importation of brown rice and make the announcement before the new wet season commence, noting that it will help stop speculative hoarding and bring down paddy prices to acceptable levels.\nAccording to RIPAN, the country has over 100 rice mills with an installed capacity to process over 6 million MT of Paddy and it is expected to increase to 7.5 million Mt in 2023 as more projects come on board.\nThe association added that to keep rice mills functional, a 2.7 million MT of paddy is required, noting that the current area under paddy cultivation is 1.6 billion hectares.\nIt stated that Nigeria’s paddy prices currently at N400,000 is the most expensive globally as millers scramble for available paddies.\nRead also: Rice crisis in the Philippines sounds a global inflation alarm in Nigeria, others\nThe association noted that if the scarcity of paddy is not quickly addressed smuggling through the porous land borders will rise and it will renew pressure on the naira, eroding the country’s past gains in rice production.\n“The shortage has consequences for the government and governance primarily with food security, inadequacy and food inflation,” it said, noting that food inflation and inadequacy could lead to civil unrest.\nIndia – the world’s largest rice exporter recently placed a partial ban on export to control domestic prices and inflation. This has cut global supply by over a fifth and sent prices at the international market to a 15-year high, according to the Food and Agricultural Organisation.\nPresident Bola Tinubu yesterday departed Delhi, Indian capital, where he attend official visits, the G20 Leaders’ Summit and business related meetings for United Arab Emirates (UAE).", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businessday.ng/agriculture/article/ripan-urges-fg-to-enter-pact-with-india-to-import-2mmt-of-rice/?utm_source=auto-read-also&utm_medium=web"}
{"doc_id": "491e2402c6d3f3702dc477f04685cb7e", "text": "‘Government is frustrating local shipbuilding, capabilities’\nIni Ekong Charles Udonwa is the Executive Chairman of Norfin Offshore Shipyard Limited and Executive Chairman of Norfin Offshore Group, promoters of a new shipyard located at Oruk Anam, Akwa Ibom State. In this interview with AYOYINKA JEGEDE, he reveals how shipbuilding and maintenance can help reduce insecurity, unemployment and other vices in the country.\nWhat’s the importance of shipbuilding to the nation’s economy?\nNigerians, the government and companies import averagely $5.6 billion dollars worth of vessels into the country yearly to operate in oil and gas industries, and also into fishery industry. Most of these are in purchases of Floating Production, Storage and Offloading ships (FPSO), security vessels, jack up rigs, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) vessels and other related offshore support vessels. For instance, Egina FPSO delivered to Nigeria in January in 2018 costs up to $8 billion.\nIn shipbuilding, 40 per cent capital cost goes into human labour, which means Nigeria is contributing about $1.8 billion worth of human capital cost yearly to foreign shipyards, needless to say about the loss in technology transfer and real engineering experience and expansion for our teeming youths. Nigeria also loses about $6.2 billion estimated earnings yearly from shipbuilding, ship repairs and spare parts manufacturing activities and other losses of about $4.6 billion in regional trade due to lack of domestic vessels access for goods transportation.\nIt can be said that the world’s economy “rides on the sea” as borne out by the fact that approximately 80 per cent of international trade is moved by sea. However, as said by Okonjo-Iweala, “Nigeria’s share in world trade last year was 0.33 per cent, which showed a small fraction of what Nigeria could do. Our share in Africa’s trade is 19 per cent, which is below our share of Africa’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This means we can turn it around.” We can only turn things around with a focused logistics and seaborne transportation plan and policies.\nNigeria’s shipbuilding industry is of strategic importance to the economy and plays an important role in employment generation, development of manufacturing and related industries, foreign exchange savings, provide for national security and most important, create access for regional and international trade.\nThe last three decades have seen the rise of Asian economies, led by Japan, followed by South Korea and now China. These three countries have cornered 86 per cent of world shipbuilding from a mere 8 per cent in 1975. In contrast, Nigeria has no policy or future growth plans in shipbuilding.\nFrom all these foreign built ships imported to Nigeria yearly, we are at the same time losing tremendous foreign exchange and currencies. It defeats the right senses to see the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) proposing unwitting policies to attract foreign currencies from Nigerians in diaspora while we are wasting away the foreign currencies in the buying of ships overseas.\nGovernment should look into ship building industry as the main aid to diversification and as an alternative source of revenue to the national economy. We require ships for support to oil and gas industry, we require ships for regional trade, we require ships for human transportation, we require fishing trawlers, etc. We will always require ships to exist as a nation, and then it is imperative that we should embark on building these ships in Nigeria.\nHow will shipbuilding help in reducing unemployment as well as encourage diversification from oil to Agriculture?\nNigerian government has to look into shipbuilding as a major part of the economic recovery and expansion plan and centralize our next growth pattern in diversifying to prominent shipbuilding activities. It must be the number one target for us to expand in agricultural produce trade regionally. The Federal Government is investing heavily in the agriculture, but how do we get our products to the regional market? Our farmers are tired of seeing rotten unconsumed products wasting away because of lack of access to regional trade routes.\nWe are selling our children’s future by not building ships in Nigeria. As I had mentioned earlier, Nigeria is contributing yearly about $1.8 billion worth of human capital cost to foreign shipyards. Do the mathematics and calculate how many of our youths would be employed with the amount of money lost yearly. When you look at Nigerian youths and compare them to the youths in Western Europe, Singapore or Japan or South Korea or China: at 22, they gain employment as soon as he/she finishes university. But in Nigeria, our youths remain unemployed and are sacrificed to crime. A sizeable shipyard like ours can easily employ up to 5000 youths if supported. That means, 5000 youths taken away from crime and cultism.\nIt can be noted that USA have up to 500 shipbuilding and repair yards, Europe do have up to 200 shipbuilding and repair yards, China do have up to 80 shipbuilding yards, South Korea up to 30 shipbuilding yards, Singapore with up to 30 shipbuilding and repair yards. Nigeria needs up to at least 50 sizeable shipbuilding yards that can employ up to 100,000 youths.\nAt this moment, the Federal Government is strategizing and aiming to diversify our economy to LNG, LPG and agriculture, but the government is not strategizing on how to champion and move these products to the regional markets and to every overseas markets with ships built in Nigeria, thus a great component of this earnings and labour is lost to overseas shipyards.\nWithout Nigerian government supporting ships building in the country, the nation will continue to struggle with the same challenges of past 50 years.\nWhat are the challenges you have encountered in the quest to build local shipyard?\nOur major challenge is with the Federal and State Governments of Nigeria. There is no support at all by the executive arm of government, neither the legislatures nor the Judiciary.\nFor example, six years ago, Nigeria was included in the next 11 economies poised for growth and at higher par to Vietnam. Just recently in 2020, the Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA), bought several ASD Tugs and pilot boats from a Vietnamese shipyard, despite the cry from our youths for employment opportunities, despite the increase in banditry, cultism and militancy. The government is causing and creating an environment where Nigerian shipbuilding capabilities is denied. A good Nigerian shipyard such as ours would have built those vessels at a cheaper cost to NPA, and the cost of transportation of those vessels to Nigeria would have been eliminated altogether.\nIf we were provided opportunity and contracts to build two of the Azimuth Stern Drive (ASD) tugs as NPA did for the Vietnamese shipyard, we would have employed at least 200 Nigerian youths and given them a chance to realise their dreams.\nWhen we continue to import ships into this country, we employ labour overseas while our own youths are going into insecurity. The importance of the Nigerian shipbuilding capabilities for Nigeria’s long-term economic growth, strategic interests and security concerns clearly indicates that the growth of Nigeria shipbuilding, in both, the commercial and naval sectors is a pressing strategic imperative.\nRecently, the governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria stated that Nigeria needs to be given a chance to reset and diversify its economy. Nigeria has been given a fair chance to reset and diversify its economy, but the government, by the very act of building ships in Vietnam versus building in Nigeria should be seen as insincere about her plans to diversify.\nNigeria needs a more ambitious and proactive approach to enhancing local content and local jobs in the shipbuilding supply chain. Our executive and legislative policies should be amended to require targeted levels of both commercial and Naval shipbuilding production in Nigeria for the adaptation, maintenance, transportation, and services for the African market.\nTaxes for imported vessels to Nigeria must be raised to 300 per cent of the new building cost price to deter importation and vessels below 3500 tons must not be allowed to be imported into Nigeria at all. For instance, comparing the gains in importation in tariff and taxes received by the Nigeria Customs Service against the earnings by the overseas shipyard and the labour loss to Nigeria, it is really a sad story for Nigerian youths.\nWe are aware that the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) has taken off. We now have a single market of over 2 billion people with over $3 trillion in expected GDP and 52 per cent projected increase in intra African trade by 2022. There’s no better time than now to develop massive domestic shipbuilding capabilities in Nigeria. Our people have the talents, we believe government will muster political will to change our narratives, we at Norfin Offshore Shipyard Ltd are set to deploy our experience to unleash the incredible potential of our people. While our focus today may be oil and gas and agriculture, we now have a great opportunity to harvest prosperity through the new initiative in shipbuilding. Admittedly, we cannot achieve a future beyond oil unless we properly harness our present oil and gas proceeds to other sustainable economies and industries similar to what UAE has achieved. This is exactly the reason Norfin Offshore Shipyard Ltd is embarking on this monumental project because we believe in our country and we believe in our dear Akwa Ibom State. From this blessed country, we will dominate African market with our skills, talent and resourcefulness.\nGet the latest news delivered straight to your inbox every day of the week. Stay informed with the Guardian’s leading coverage of Nigerian and world news, business, technology and sports.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://guardian.ng/features/travel/government-is-frustrating-local-shipbuilding-capabilities/"}
{"doc_id": "ed35f2dd36026854dcf9e66d2d2fe6f7", "text": "CFI back on ZSE after 4-year hiatus\nNelson Gahadza – Senior Business Reporter\nTHE Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) has lifted suspension in the trading of CFI Holdings’ securities after the company regularised its corporate governance shortcomings as required under the listing requirements.\nThe agro-industrial concern was suspended from trading on January 2, 2018 for failure to comply with the free float requirements and some corporate governance related matters under the ZSE Listing Requirements.\n“The ZSE is satisfied that CFI has regularised its corporate governance shortcomings as required under the listing requirements. Trading in the securities of CFI will commence on Monday, 11 October 2021,” Mr Justin Bgoni, the ZSE chief executive said in a statement.\nHe said whilst the issue of the free float remains unresolved, the ZSE has given CFI a moratorium of five (5) years to address the free float requirements and the local bourse will be reviewing progress on regularisation of this requirement on an annual basis.\n“During the subsistence of its suspension, CFI demonstrated commitment to its listing on the ZSE by ensuring timely compliance with its continuing listing obligations and reporting cycles,” Mr Bgoni said.\nIn addition to free float requirements, CFI was requested to address issues relating to the appointment of substantive board chair, chief executive and finance director; and the appointment of independent non-executive directors who are not affiliated or have any association with any of the company’s shareholders.\nMessina Investments, currently the largest shareholder in CFI, is an international investment holding Company owned by business tycoon Nicholas van Hoogstraten and incorporated in the British Virgin Islands.\nAccording to the trading update for the quarter to June 30, 2021, CFI Holdings’ sales volumes in the key revenue drivers improved by 169 percent over the previous period largely as a result of an increase in aggregate demand following the relatively good 2020/2021 rainy season, which boosted both summer crops and tobacco.\n“Also contributing to the growth during the period, though modest, was the resurgence in construction activities,” the Group’s secretary Mr Panganai Hare, said.\nHe noted that the Group also benefited from growing demand for Agrifoods’ stock-feeds after it exited judicial management in prior year as well as opening of additional retail stores during the period.\nMr Hare said Farm & City reopened its Chipangayi branch in May 2021 and added another branch in Masvingo at the beginning of June 2021.\nAt Glenara Estates, both maize and table potatoes harvested increased by 42 percent and 85 percent respectively.\nVictoria Foods’ legacy foreign and local creditor debts were fully repaid during the period and Mr Hare said having resolved the legacy debt issues, Victoria Foods is expected to exit judicial management once the courts sanction the same.\nLooking ahead, the company expects an improved business outturn overall for the 2021 financial year, due to the implementation of the more flexible lockdown measures compared to prior year.\n“The management of consistent raw material supplies for Agrifoods and Victoria Foods will remain an on-going priority as the Group seeks to play its part in underpinning food security in the country,” he said.\nMr Hare said priority will also be given to the development of low cost housing delivery in Harare South in support of Government’s Vision 2030 housing plans.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.herald.co.zw/cfi-back-on-zse-after-4-year-hiatus/"}
{"doc_id": "ab39075221c541e2f3684eb329cc16f0", "text": "Mariska Redelinghuys, Legal Specialist: Advice, PSG Wealth\nI am interested in setting up a trust for my family. How do I go about doing so, and should this form part of the family’s financial plan or my personal financial plan?\nThis is a great question, and it’s important to know that, if used correctly, a trust is a structure which can help with the transfer of wealth across generations in a cost-effective way.\nA trust is not a one-size-fits-all solution. Before setting up a trust, get advice from a professional who can help you identify your family’s financial goals and set up a viable plan to reach them. When creating a trust, start with drafting a trust deed - an agreement between the founder of the trust (you) and the trustees for the benefit of income and capital beneficiaries of the trust. This includes key information regarding the number of trustees and how decisions will be made regarding the assets in the trust. Make sure the trust deed is drafted by a professional to ensure the purpose of the trust is served. Then, it’s the responsibility of the Master of the High Court (‘the Master') to register the trust deed and approve the appointment of the trustees.\nThe most important step is to select the right trustees.\nTrustees have a fiduciary duty which entails managing the trust’s assets with care and doing so with the best interests of the beneficiaries. You need to make sure that the nominated person(s) can carry out their duty. It is advised to get the assistance of a professional such as a trust to company who can take up the appointment as corporate trustee as they contain a wealth of experience in trust administration and regulatory requirements.\nI would recommend speaking to a financial advisor to assist you with a thorough estate plan to avoid rushing into a decision that could influence you and your family’s long-term financial well-being.\nJac De Wet, Wealth Manager at PSG Wealth, Somerset West\nMy daughter just turned 21 and I’d like to gift her an investments vehicle with a sizeable amount that can grow over the long term. I have put money aside for this reason, but I need guidance as to which option is best suited as a safe place to start her financial journey.\nBefore the question can be adequately answered, a few considerations need to be taken into account, so we will assume the following:\nSince it is a gift, and you refer to a sizeable amount, donations tax might be applicable and payable by you, the donor. The donation tax rate is 20% for donations above R100 000 and below R30 million. Donations below R100 000 per year are not taxed. Keep that in mind.\nThe investment you are referring to is a discretionary investment, from where she will be able to make future withdrawals and make additional investments, as and when needed.\nShe is a South African citizen and taxpayer, with a marginal income tax rate below 30%.\nShe is investing for long-term capital growth, and she won't have income or capital requirements from the investment in the foreseeable future.\nShe doesn't have any existing investments.\nAssuming the above applies, a sensible approach would be to consider investing the maximum allowable amount of R36 000 p.a. into a tax-free savings investment. The underlying funds of the tax-free investment should have a growth focus (e.g. local and/or offshore equity funds).\nThe remainder of the amount available for investment can be invested into a discretionary investment with a reputable investment firm, and/or into a managed share portfolio, depending on the investment amount. Again, the underlying funds may have an asset allocation that is biased towards growth assets (i.e. local and offshore equity).\nAs always it is advised that you seek the guidance of a qualified adviser who can assist and guide you to make an informed, and sensible, decision.\nPierre De Bruyn, Wealth Manager at PSG Wealth, Northcliff\nI am a 35-year-old woman and I have recently started a side hustle. My business is starting to gain some traction and I’m seeing a relatively consistent income every month. Are there any ways I can invest some of this income to ensure I have funds for a rainy day?\nI assume that you are trading as a sole proprietor and as such the investments can be held in your own name.\nSmall businesses can experience cash flow needs without warning and therefore any investment should be accessible in the short term. Once you have built an emergency fund to deal with short-term requirements you can start moving some of your investments to the longer-term where you can achieve higher returns but will also experience higher volatility.\nI would suggest a spread of investments ranging from cash in the bank to low-risk income funds, higher risk bond funds and even low-equity multi-asset funds further out on the risk /return timeline.\nThe ideal structure of these investments will depend on the amount of access and time you can afford to wait for the money to become accessible when a need arises.\nMoney that falls outside the framework of being required by your business can be invested into long-term unit trusts where the ideal term is at least 5 years.\nThe costs associated with this investment strategy are usually all levied monthly and there are generally no penalties when one needs access to the cash.\nI would suggest that you look for a good financial adviser to assist with this. There are many other issues that small business owners experience as their businesses grow, and it is ideal to understand these issues before your business gets too big.\nKaren Rimmer, Head: Distribution at PSG Insure\nPeople are shocked when they find out that I don’t have car insurance but I’m a very responsible driver who always obeys the rules of the road. Do I really need it?\nOne of the most common myths relating to vehicle insurance is that only bad drivers need it. In fact, many South Africans like yourself opt not to take out cover on their vehicles for this reason, fuelled by the belief that responsible driving practices will suffice in mitigating all possible risks on the road.\nUnfortunately, no matter how responsibly you drive, accidents do happen, and vehicle insurance provides a safety net for when things go wrong. Vehicle insurance can safeguard you against the high cost of a write-off or expensive damage after an accident if the responsible party does not have insurance. Cover extends to both the actions of the insured driver as well as other drivers on the road. With a few different options available, an insurance adviser can be a great help in finding the right fit for your unique situation and budget.\nPERSONAL FINANCE", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/personal-finance/financial-planning/your-investment-questions-answered-cd728155-e5e1-4423-8094-71fbead17b0f"}
{"doc_id": "45a5b51883df0398120dded847607eb0", "text": "In theory, the Ponzi-style business model is outlawed worldwide, including in Kenya. Yet, despite its prohibition, a regulatory void in our legal framework exists. As victims of these schemes grapple with the fallout, it becomes clear that the key to eradicating Ponzi schemes lies in a three-pronged approach: education, regulation, and enforcement.\nPonzi schemes and pyramid schemes, while distinct in their mechanics, share a common thread – exploiting participants for financial gain. Pyramid schemes focus on recruiting members, offering bonuses for new recruits, while Ponzi schemes demand investment, promising extraordinary and quick returns from subsequent investors. Both operate on the precarious precipice of legal ambiguity in Kenya due to the lack of specific regulations, leaving a breeding ground for financial predators.\nConsumer protection is paramount, and a specific regulatory framework is urgently needed. Kenyan regulators should enact clear and stringent rules that leave no room for exploitation by unscrupulous entities.\nRead: Dangerous investments to avoid like the plague\nThis involves a meticulous examination of existing legislation and, where necessary, the creation of new laws tailored to combat Ponzi schemes. A unified approach by regulators, law enforcement, and legal entities is crucial to closing the regulatory gaps that currently enable these fraudulent activities.\nRegulators must proactively educate the public about the risks associated with Ponzi schemes and increase public awareness about the tell-tale signs of fraudulent investment schemes. The Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) and, the Directorate of Criminal Investigation (DCI) play a pivotal role in disseminating information and have acknowledged the dangers posed by these schemes.\nDespite the efforts made to curb fraudulent investment schemes, a more proactive stance is required.\nThe absence of a specific law targeting Ponzi schemes hampers the swift prosecution of fraudsters. In the long term, regulators should advocate for legislative reforms that strengthen penalties for financial fraud and Ponzi schemes.\nBy imposing hefty fines, extended prison sentences, and other punitive measures, regulators can create a deterrent effect, dissuading potential fraudsters from engaging in such criminal activities. Publicising successful prosecutions and the restitution of funds to victims will amplify the message that financial crimes will not go unpunished.\nVictims of Ponzi schemes, who are left grappling with the financial ruin, deserve justice. Regulators must prioritise the implementation of robust regulations that not only prevent Ponzi schemes but also provide swift legal remedies for victims.\nPrevention lies at the heart of this battle. Education, regulation, and enforcement must work in tandem to protect citizens from falling victim to these schemes. Regulators, through the CBK and other enforcement agencies, should intensify their educational efforts, utilising various channels such as public announcements, media coverage, and direct community engagement.\nIn a stark reminder of the pervasive threat posed by Ponzi schemes, recent global events have exposed the vulnerabilities even in seemingly sophisticated financial ecosystems. Sam Bankman-Fried, once hailed as a pioneer in the cryptocurrency industry, faced a meteoric rise and subsequent downfall that culminated in his conviction for fraud and money laundering on November 3, 2023.\nThis underscores the need for vigilant regulatory oversight across all sectors to safeguard investors from unscrupulous schemes.\nCloser to home, the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) in Kenya detailed a chilling case in September 2023. NMK Capital Investment Limited, a Kenyan registered investment firm, orchestrated a well-choreographed scheme that duped over 5,000 investors.\nUnder the guise of a six-month investment contract with a minimum investment of Sh50,000, participants were promised a monthly interest of 15 percent or a similar percentage of compounded interest redeemable at the end of the contract period.\nThis case serves as a stark reminder of the urgent need for comprehensive regulations targeting Ponzi schemes. The absence of specific laws allows these fraudulent activities to persist, causing untold financial and emotional distress to unsuspecting victims.\nRegulators must act swiftly to close these regulatory gaps, ensuring that perpetrators of such schemes face the full force of the law.\nThe battle against Ponzi schemes requires a holistic approach. Education, regulation, and enforcement are the pillars upon which we must build our defence against financial predators.\nThe recent revelations, both globally and in Kenya, underscore the urgency for regulators to fortify their efforts.\nLet us strive for a future where every Kenyan can invest with confidence, knowing that the regulatory framework is robust, and justice prevails.\nRead: Firm loses Sh10m to government in pyramid scheme war\nThe time for comprehensive and decisive action is now before more lives are ruined, and the credibility of our financial systems is compromised.\nThe writer is a certified governance, risk and compliance specialist", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/data-hub/act-holistically-to-tame-ponzi-schemes-menace--4446126"}
{"doc_id": "2446f87ee0978fd0811354d5218c5e16", "text": "Safaricom is set to buy M-Pesa Holding Company Limited — the firm that holds hundreds of billions of shillings powering its mobile money service — from London-based Vodafone Group Plc.\nThe Nairobi Securities Exchange-listed company will pay the British multinational –which was previously its top shareholder— a token amount of $1 in the deal to receive regulatory approvals in the next few weeks.\nThe transaction, disclosed by Vodafone, has the potential to boost Safaricom’s cash flows besides earning the company interest income through investment of part of the M-Pesa war chest in short-term securities.\n“On 17 April 2023, the group entered into an agreement to sell M-Pesa Holding Company Limited (‘MPHCL’) to Safaricom Plc, an associate entity of the group, for USD 1 [Sh137 at current exchange rates],” Vodafone said on Tuesday when announcing its results for the year ended March.\n“No material gain or loss is expected to arise on disposal. Completion of this transaction is subject to various approvals which are expected to be obtained before or during July 2023.”\nM-Pesa Holding keeps customer funds in trust for the benefit of M-Pesa customers in Kenya.\nIt acts as the independent trustee for M-Pesa customers, independently administering the trust and holding all funds in the mobile money service.\nM-Pesa Holding is also a cash cow on its own, holding and investing hundreds of billions of shillings on a short-term basis amid rapid growth in customer deposits as well as transaction volumes and values.\nVodafone says M-Pesa Holding had short-term investments of €1.247 billion [Sh186.2 billion at current exchange rates] as of March 31, 2023.\nIt also held M-Pesa customer funds amounting to €1.226 billion [Sh183.1 billion] on the same date.\nRead: Ethiopia grants Safaricom M-Pesa licence\n“Balances included in the group’s consolidated financial statements for M-Pesa Holding at 31 March 2023 include short-term investments of €1,247 million and €1,226 million due to M-Pesa customers, recorded within Other investments and Other creditors, respectively,” Vodafone said.\nThe multinational added that any profit generated by M-Pesa Holding is currently donated for use for public charitable purposes only after defraying direct costs.\nIt remains to be seen whether the same policy on the use of profits will be retained under Safaricom’s control.\nThe Kenyan telco has been doing a lot of business with M-Pesa Holding as part of its mobile money service which has evolved from a person-to-person cash transfer platform to offer payments and credit among others.\nThe company sold services worth Sh96.8 billion to M-Pesa Holding in the year ended March 2022, according to its latest available annual report. This was an increase from Sh73.3 billion the year before.\nM-Pesa Holding owed Safaricom Sh1.16 billion in the review period, down from receivables worth Sh2.29 billion at the close of the prior year.\nThe transfer of M-Pesa Holding to Safaricom marks the telco’s increased control of the major aspects of the mobile money service which was pioneered in Kenya but whose intellectual property was previously held by Vodafone.\nSafaricom and South Africa’s Vodacom Group Limited in March 2020 teamed up to acquire the M-Pesa brand from Vodafone at a cost of Sh2.1 billion.\nThe companies now hold the mobile money brand in their joint venture firm M-Pesa Africa which is registered in Kenya and which they own on a 50/50 basis.\nThe move saved Safaricom significant licence fees it was paying to the UK firm to use the brand.\nVodafone is the majority shareholder of Vodacom with a 65.1 percent stake and also holds a five percent indirect equity in Safaricom.\nThe transfer of M-Pesa Holding to Safaricom comes as Vodafone’s new chief executive Margherita Della Valle swore to simplify the business and improve its performance.\n“Today I am announcing my plans for Vodafone. Our performance has not been good enough. To consistently deliver, Vodafone must change. My priorities are customers, simplicity and growth,” she said.\n“We will simplify our organisation, cutting out complexity to regain our competitiveness. We will reallocate resources to deliver the quality service our customers expect and drive further growth from the unique position of Vodafone Business.”\nRead: M-Pesa launches interest-free loans for buying goods\nThe multinational said the transfer of its 55 percent stake in Vodafone Egypt to Vodacom in December last year was among the simplification of the management of its African assets.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/companies/safaricom-buys-m-pesa-cash-firm-from-vodafone--4237244"}
{"doc_id": "9bd8ea73a7926bac72499d8ef1385ba9", "text": "Kazakhstan\n27 Jan\nTobi Amusan has added the African indoor record to her rich collections of track and field records after the 26-year-old broke Glory Alozie's 7.82 best at the opening leg of the 2024 World Athletics Indoor Tour Gold in Astana, Kazakhstan, on Saturday. The reigning world 100m hurdles record holder at 12.12 first showed flashes of…\n27 Mar 2023\nKazakhstan's ruling party secured nearly two-thirds of seats in the Central Asian country's parliament, according to final election results published Monday.\nLatest\n5 mins ago\nThe German government slashed its growth forecast for 2024 on Wednesday, warning that Europe's largest economy was in \"difficult waters\" as it faced a series of headwinds.\n23 mins ago\nThe National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) says the average price of a litre of kerosene dropped from N1,362.27 in December 2023 to N1,329.53 in January 2024.\n39 mins ago\nA former governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, CBN, Godwin Emefiele, has threatened legal action against the senate president, Godswill Akpabio, for alleged defamation of character.\n1 hour ago\nA governorship aspirant on the platform of the Labour Party (LP), Martins Okoukoni on Wednesday said he has withdrawn from the Edo governorship race and would not be participating in the LP primaries scheduled for Friday, February 23rd. Okoukoni made this known in a letter of withdrawal he signed and addressed to Barrister Julius Abure,…\n1 hour ago\nNigeria Customs Service says it is determined to intensify efforts to curtail the menace of illegal exportation of Nigeria’s grains to other African countries, to ensure adequate food security for citizens.\n1 hour ago\nAdult film star Kagney Linn Karter, aged 36, has tragically passed away by suicide in her residence as reported by a GoFundMe page created by friends on behalf of Kagney's mother to fund her funeral. Kagney’s friends Rachel and Megan revealed that despite Kagney’s numerous accomplishments and talents, she had been dealing with mental health…\n1 hour ago\nThe Department of State Services (DSS) has revealed that there are plans by certain elements to use the planned protest by the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) to cause crisis in the country. Last Friday, the NLC announced that it would hold a two-day nationwide protest over the hardship being experienced by Nigerians. NLC President, Joe…\n1 hour ago\nThe House of Representatives has resolved to investigate the privatisation and concession of federal government silos across the country.\n1 hour ago\nThe Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) has declared Leno Adesanya, promoter of Sunrise Power and Transmission Limited, wanted in connection with an alleged \"conspiracy and corrupt offer to public officers\" related to the $6 billion Mambilla hydropower contract.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://guardian.ng/tag/kazakhstan/"}
{"doc_id": "d43c859c17756014a601e0b04cb02895", "text": "AA+ Movers is a top-rated moving company that provides both home and office moving services in Accra. Our team of highly trained professionals is committed to delivering exceptional service to our clients, ensuring that their move is seaml…\nWe offer a unique mix of freight brokerage and factoring solutions to shippers and truckers in Ghana. Our solutions include providing trucks from our extensive network of committed transporters to haul your goods at competitive spot rates.…\nWe transport raw materials to various destination s across the country. We have 20,25,27 tonage trucks,semi trailers, Lowbed trucks,articulators,Payloaders and excavators for renting.\nMFG is also a Transportation company.\nMCLOVE FAMILY GROUP LIMITED is an indigenous conglomerate acting as the parent company to over ten subsidiaries which was founded in 2019 with a vision to promote excellence and high-quality services …\nHills Oil Marketing Company Limited is a wholly owned Ghanaian Oil Marketing Company (OMC) operating in Ghana. The company was established in June 2010 as an Oil Marketing Company and is licensed by the National Petroleum Authority.\nWe …\niTransport is a privately owned limited liability company responsible for commercial transport and vehicle rentals. We provide an integrated transport solution, our core business includes; passenger shuttle and vehicle rental services, hau…\nHippo Group of Companies is a wholly Ghanaian owned holding company, formed in 2008 with Hippo Limited, the parent company, originally established in 1983. The Hippo Group comprises of Hippo Limited, Rainbow 2000 Limited, Hippo Transport L…\nGeneral transport, heavy haulage, port logistics, custom clearance, stevedoring, warehousing, express parcel, air and maritime freight, freight forwarding and others.\nCSN LLOYD deals in automobile imports from the USA.We are also experts in logistics and haulage. thinking of relocating to your new office or home?, just rely on CSN LLOYD LTD to package and deliver all your appliances, machinery, equipmen…\nWe transport solids goods including rice, cement and containers from the customers point of carriage to his/her desired destination.\nWe also deal in transportation of home logistics.\nPotential investors are also invited to come in an…\nBuvensa Company Limited is a reputable Logistics firm that has been operating since 2009. We provide safe, efficient and timely Transport Services to several transport and shipping companies.\nWe also do Project / Contract Haulage, Heavy a…\nImportation and Exportation of General Merchants and transportation thus tourism services, Car rentals including passenger buses, van, Saloon cars, 4x4 cars, Coach hire, trucks as well as Cargo collection and delivery services.\nRoad transport haulage firm base in Tema.I have few trucks and are looking for trucking jobs to do.I would grateful if you could arrange some opportunities me .You are bless.\nP K Asamoah\nIntroduction Import & Export of Food ,Cosmetics and Transportation. Haulage & Frieght : We do Transportation of Good across the country . We are one of the Major Transporters of Kasapreko Company Ltd We do Haul Lime Stone from Koforidua…\nSpecializes in office removals and relocation, customs clearing import and export.\nwith the aim of reducing cost and providind quick and efficient service.we offer the following services\nWarehousing and ex-warehousing, consolidation,\nt…\nBest vines limited(Bvl)is a petroleum product transport company.we transport nationwide and beyond,we also manage fuel tanker trucks,tipper trucks and flat bodies(trailers)for companies/owners looking for contracts for their vehicles\nMMS specializes in the transportation of heavy-duty construction equipment such as excavators, dozer, cranes etc. We acknowledge the importance of having a trustworthy and reliable service, which meets your valuable needs thus; we arrange …\nWe are a haulage company in Ghana which handles specialized transportation of goods and cargo.Our activities include project support services, equipment rental and transportation services to mining companies,construction companies and othe…\nBlue Zone Ventures is a multipurpose company whose main activities include transportation, haulage, logistics and the supply of world class lubricants to various industries in Ghana.\nwe offer the following services: customs clearance, freight forwarding, general transport, warehousing&distribution, investment services,e-currency(liberty reserve&alertpay), brokerage and commodities trading.\nFreight forwarding, Hauling of fcl containers( 20ft & 40ft), transport of Heavy Duty Equipment and all other Cargo to various destinations in Ghana and West African countries.\nIntroduction\nImport & Export of Food ,Cosmetics and Transportation.\nHaulage & Frieght : We do Transportation of Good accros the country .\nWe are one of the Major Transporters of Kasapreko Company Ltd\nWe do Haul Lime Stone from Kofori…\nWe specialize in warehouses (non bonded) for storing company logistics, food, drugs etc.\nWe also have standby trucks to move logistics or materials of any kind to any part of Ghana.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businessghana.com/site/directory/haulage-company"}
{"doc_id": "240d9c999f5dd37acea700c6914269b7", "text": "Victor Lindelof\n11 Nov\nVictor Lindelof was Manchester United's unlikely hero as they moved into the Premier League's top six with a 1-0 win over Luton on Saturday. The Swedish defender scored his first goal for nearly three years by smashing in from close range after Luton failed to clear a corner.\nLatest\n2 mins ago\n• Says leaders solve problems, make life better, not give excuses • Reduces work hours for civil servants, promises free services in govt hospitals As part of efforts to cushion the effect of the biting economy on citizens, Lagos State Governor, BabajideSanwo-Olu, yesterday, unveiled palliatives across sectors of the economy, including a 25 per cent…\n4 mins ago\nThe Yoruba Nation activist, Sunday Adeyemo, popularly known as Sunday Igboho, has returned to Nigeria two years after his sojourn in Benin Republic while on exile.\n19 mins ago\nThe Minister of Marine and Blue Economy, Gboyega Oyetola, yesterday, said the $800 million needed for rehabilitation of the country’s ports was almost ready.\n20 mins ago\nNigeria's economy grew 3.46 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2023, sustaining the third consecutive expansion since President Bola Tinubu assumed office as president.\n26 mins ago\nCrypto enthusiasts exchanged a total value of N1.9 billion via USDT-naira pair on Binance 24 hours after the government’s clampdown on leading digital currency exchange.\n30 mins ago\nInfraCredit, an infrastructure credit guarantee institution, has announced the credit enhancement of ACOB Lighting Technology Limited, a renewable energy company's debt issue.\n39 mins ago\nThe Nigeria equities market halted its gaining streak to close on a downward note, yesterday, as the index dipped by 0.2 per cent amid losses in 28 stocks.\n40 mins ago\nA new application developed by Nigerian a United Kingdom-based technology expert is looking at solving financial and social engagement challenges.\n47 mins ago\nCardinalStone has been recognised by Euromoney as a market leader in Nigeria’s investment banking, in its latest ranking exercise.\nCardinalStone has been recognised by Euromoney as a market leader in Nigeria’s investment banking, in its latest ranking exercise.\n53 mins ago\nThe African Development Bank has committed $80 million in loan financing for this state-led pioneering special economic zone project, designed to foster linkages between educators, researchers, innovators, entrepreneurs, and industries, all within one location.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://guardian.ng/tag/victor-lindelof/"}
{"doc_id": "901f9d5128e5ce0bdc43eff410ace7d7", "text": "With Jacob Zuma out of action due to ill health, it has been Cyril Ramaphosa who has been filling his shoes at official functions – and looking as if those shoes were fitting him pretty nicely. Deputy Presidents are often relegated to the status of mere figureheads, as Kgalema Motlanthe discovered, but there are already indications that Ramaphosa will not be lying low. It was the deputy president, not the president, who was the honoured guest at an annual post-SONA breakfast briefing in Cape Town. And it was Ramaphosa who was singled out by Julius Malema for special criticism at the post-SONA Parliamentary debate. By REBECCA DAVIS.\nPresident Jacob Zuma is just fine, thank you. In fact, he is better than fine. He is “fully rested”. While giving the State of the Nation Address on Tuesday night he was “in his element, focused, strong”. That’s what Cyril Ramaphosa had to say about the President’s health at The New Age’s breakfast briefing on Wednesday.\nThe problem with making these assertions about just how healthy the president is, is that it prompts an obvious question: in that case, why isn’t he addressing The New Age’s breakfast briefing, rather than Ramaphosa?\nRamaphosa didn’t deal with that. But he’s been dealing with a lot else lately. He delivered the eulogy at the funeral of Epainette Mbeki on Saturday. He officiated at the national Youth Day celebrations in Kimberley on Monday. And he chaired the three-day Cabinet lekgotla in Pretoria from Tuesday.\nAt the breakfast briefing Ramaphosa appeared relaxed and controlled. His job, to some degree, seemed to be to act as a sweeper, clearing up ambiguities from the previous evening’s address, reinforcing its commitments and at some points covering aspects unattended to by Zuma – like the downgrade of South Africa’s credit rating. “We are not sitting on our laurels or hiding our heads in the sand like ostriches,” Ramaphosa assured his audience, pointing out that it was a time when many other countries were facing economic challenges.\nAmong the barriers to economic growth currently, Ramaphosa said, were energy constraints and a skills shortage. Zuma spent over twenty minutes of his Tuesday-night address on the energy issue: a clear indication of the priority it has been given. Ramaphosa was hammering home the same memo, reiterating that the government was aiming for a “sustainable energy mix”, involving coal, solar, wind, hydro and nuclear energy. Coal-fired power stations Kusile and Medupi would be brought online in the shortest possible time.\nWith regards to the issue of skills shortages, Ramaphosa said the government wanted to see the private sector coming to the party more, opening up opportunities like internships for the youth (though it’s estimated that the private sector creates as much as 70% of South African jobs already). The private sector must invest more, he urged, and overcome the “trust issue” holding back high-level, long-term economic investment.\nRating agencies had complimented the government on the “wonderful plan” it had in the National Development Plan (NDP), Ramaphosa said, but their concern was that they wanted more evidence of its implementation. Ramaphosa said that the next five years would be the key to the NDP’s coming to fruition. There is certainly a lot hanging on the NDP, which Ramaphosa essentially described as holding the key to shaping most aspects of South African life for the better.\nRamaphosa is a less strained public speaker than his boss. He spoke largely without reference to his notes, throwing in at least one seemingly ad-libbed anecdote – a reference to a young woman who spoke at Epainette Mbeki’s funeral. When anchor Peter Ndoro pointed out that Ramaphosa’s had been a lengthy absence from active high-level politics, Ramaphosa said he’d been “learning on the job”. But he displayed due deference to Zuma: “Before I do anything I get good advice from him,” Ramaphosa said.\nDespite this cap-doffing, there was no denying the presidential shadow cast by Ramaphosa. Asked outright by Ndoro if he was being groomed to be president, he countered with a quip: that he was indeed preparing to be president – of his golf club.\nAt a post-SONA analysis session hosted by the Open Society in Cape Town later the same day, the Daily Maverick’s Ranjeni Munusamy suggested that Ramaphosa would be under the spotlight more and more in the months to come.\n“People are realising that Zuma’s moment is passing,” she said. “[Tuesday] night was his seventh state of the nation address. People will look increasingly to Ramaphosa.”\nIt’s not a prospect that thrills everyone. “I don’t think there should be much excitement about Ramaphosa,” said political analyst Ebrahim Fakir at the same event, suggesting that Ramaphosa might be “fit” for office but possibly not “proper”. In making this assertion he drew on Ramaphosa’s business background: his stewardship of the failed New Africa Investments Limited (NAIL), and his directorship of Lonmin at the time of the Marikana Massacre.\nRehad Desai’s Marikana documentary Miners Shot Down provides a reminder of how seamlessly Ramaphosa has made the transition from one side of the miners’ bargaining table to the other. Footage of Ramaphosa speaking as general secretary of the National Union of Mineworkers in the 80s shows him saying: “There is no such thing as a liberal bourgeois. They are all the same. They use fascist methods to destroy workers’ lives.”\nAsked about the platinum strike on Wednesday, Ramaphosa said that the country had hit “the deep end”, and “the only way is up”. But he expressed confidence that unrest between labour and business could be resolved. “We are a nation of consensus-builders,” he said.\nWhen Ramaphosa took his seat in Parliament on Wednesday afternoon for the post-SONA debate, he would have been prepared for a “robust” session. But perhaps he’d forgotten just how bruising the exchanges could be. Julius Malema took little time to bring the spectre of Marikana into the National Assembly and lay its responsibility at the feet of the ANC, if not Ramaphosa explicitly.\nBut Malema also singled Ramaphosa out for special criticism. Beginning his debut speech by acknowledging that the ANC had taught him everything he knew politically, Malema used Ramaphosa as a way of illustrating how far the ruling party has strayed from its authentic self.\nThe EFF is “opposing the ANC of Marthinus van Schalkwyk and Cyril Ramaphosa,” Malema said. In lumping Ramaphosa together with former NP leader Van Schalkwyk, his intention was clearly to suggest that both figures represented the debased, opportunistic character of the latter-day party. Ramaphosa didn’t react visibly in any way; he may be recently returned to Parliament, but this ain’t his first rodeo.\nIt was perhaps telling that Malema should seek Ramaphosa out for censure in his maiden speech. After all, one can hardly imagine any Parliamentarians bothering to give Kgalema Motlanthe a good rev; partly, admittedly, because Motlanthe was a generally less controversial figure, but also because Motlanthe was seen to pose little threat. In Ramaphosa, we have something different; not the “always the bridesmaid, never the bride” character of deputy president stereotypes.\nAs things stand, Ramaphosa is a deputy president looking over the shoulder of a man more than ten years his senior, apparently in poor health, who has presided over a scandal-drenched administration and may not see out another full presidential term. As Ramaphosa’s light burns brighter, he can be sure of many more Parliamentary attacks. DM\nRead more:\n-\nRamaphosa: We are not sitting on our laurels, on IOL\nPhoto: SA Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa speaks about last night’s State of the Nation Address by President Jacob Zuma at a business breakfast in Cape Town, Wednesday, 18 June 2014. Picture: GCIS/SAPA", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2014-06-19-cyril-ramaphosa-the-man-who-would-be-king/"}
{"doc_id": "dcdd0db41f442c6a6092ddfc6b96bac9", "text": "On Friday, judgment will be delivered in the Pretoria High Court on whether the decision to drop corruption charges against President Jacob Zuma in 2009 was unlawful. The judgment, whichever way it falls, is likely to set off another chain of events that will drag the presidency and the country through more complex legal action and more muck. The Office of the President, through its incumbent, could be edging closer to being put on trial. As he has done with all his scandals, Zuma is likely to pretend this has nothing to do with him and continue to go through the motions of running the country as a hollowed out leader. By RANJENI MUNUSAMY.\nOn Wednesday, there was yet another unsuccessful attempt to stage mass demonstrations against the president in the country’s main cities. The “Zuma Must Go” campaign, initiated by religious and civil society leaders after the Constitutional Court ruled that the president had violated the Constitution, did not live up to the initial hype of a mass uprising against South Africa’s elected leader. The protest leaders say this is just the start of a mass action campaign to ensure that Zuma leaves office, but clearly South Africa is not heading the way of its BRICS sister Brazil’s mass rebellion against the president, Dilma Rousseff.\nWhile the small protests were taking place in Johannesburg and Cape Town on Wednesday, Zuma was leading the official Freedom Day celebration in Giyani, Limpopo, at an event attended by thousands of people. Although this was a state event, the attendance was seen as affirmation of Zuma’s leadership. Arts and Culture Minister Nathi Mthethwa boldly declared that Zuma would complete his term in 2019 despite calls for him to step down.\n“No one is going to remove President Zuma from office… President Zuma and his government have been elected and are expected to go out and renew the mandate of 2019 and it is going to be so,” Mthethwa said.\nZuma also referred to the matter in his speech, but appeared to be giving advice to someone else. “What is important is that we should humble ourselves. If you were elected at one point and people no longer want you, humble yourself,” Zuma told the crowd, according to News24. “Accept it so that change will come if people believe we need change now.”\nIt could not have escaped Zuma that the calls to step down or “do the right thing” are directed at him so he has not explained why he is not taking his own advice. It was important however to follow proper procedures to remove a leader and to ensure that democratic institutions are respected, Zuma said without a hint of irony, even invoking the Constitution he was found to have violated. “Our citizens’ faith in our Constitution [and] democracy has never been stronger. We have deepening our understanding of democracy with time,” Zuma said.\nThen on Thursday, Zuma bestowed national orders on people who had done exceptional service to the country and humanity. He did so as “Grand Patron of National Orders”. This should be a moment of pride for the nation, when citizens and foreign nationals who played an outstanding role in society are recognised through the bestowal of the country’s highest honours.\nAlthough there were many worthy and notable recipients, including Winnie Madikizela-Mandela, struggle stalwarts and the President of Chile Michelle Bachelet Jeria, the event was a low-key affair. The lack of public interest could not be a reflection on the recipients but perhaps the charade entailed in a person who brought dishonour on the country bestowing the awards as the “Grand Patron”.\nAgain Zuma seemed not to see the irony in uttering the following words: “By the power vested in me in terms of Section 84 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, I now confer the Order of Mendi, the Order of Ikhamanga, the Order of the Baobab, the Order of Luthuli, the Order of Mapungubwe and the Order of the Companions of OR Tambo to the distinguished persons indicated.”\nBut what is Zuma supposed to do under the circumstances? He has ignored the chorus of calls for him to act in the interests of the country and step down, and the ANC has shut down discussion on the matter. He therefore has to perform his duties, as the Constitution requires him to do. According to his schedule of public engagements announced by the presidency, Zuma will address the national Workers’ Day celebrations in Mamelodi, Pretoria, attend the Presidency budget vote debate in Parliament on Wednesday and Thursday, and undertake a state visit to Qatar later in May. He is also scheduled to answer questions in the National Assembly on 17 May.\nZuma’s appearances in Parliament have been full of commotion since he begun fobbing off accountability on the Nkandla matter two years ago. They now require high-level security operations and almost always result in shouting matches between the presiding officers and opposition MPs. After the Constitutional Court hearing, Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) leader Julius Malema declared that his party no longer recognised Zuma as president and would “physically remove him” should he try to address Parliament. It therefore remains unclear how the EFF will handle Zuma’s upcoming appearances in the National Assembly.\nIt is not a desirable situation for a legitimately and democratically elected president to be threatened with violence and to constantly face condemnation. It is also not desirable for a president to be distrusted as he is accused of acting in the interests of his friends and family rather than that of the country. It is perhaps inappropriate to view Zuma’s state visits with suspicion following allegations that he had transported money out of the country on behalf of the Gupta family and after military co-operation between South Africa and Saudi Arabia was confirmed only after images of the president touring a weapons factory emerged.\nBut the country also does not know what next to expect of our president. Who could have believed that he was capable of sabotaging our economy until he offhandedly did so in December when he fired Nhlanhla Nene as finance minister? And how is it possible that even now Zuma does not appreciate how devastating his actions were and continues to blame the fall of the currency and financial losses on the markets?\nWith Zuma’s immunity to criticism and self-reflection, and his lack of awareness of his ruinous conduct, there is always the danger that he can act irresponsibly again. And there are always questions that will hang over him.\nWhy is he suddenly so interested in visiting the Gulf? What and who is transported on his jet? Where does it stop? When will he make his next Cabinet reshuffle? Who will be removed and why? Who will be appointed and why? What is the president negotiating on our behalf? With whom? Who has Zuma’s ear? How much does his Cabinet know?\nOn Thursday, South Africa started its 23rd year of freedom yet our young nation seems fatigued and weather-beaten. Instead of lauding our progress and achievements, the national dialogue remains centred on the travails of one person.\nOn Friday he will be in the news again when judgment is delivered in the spy tapes case. Zuma’s relationship with his financiers will again generate debate and his compromised reputation will continue to tarnish the Office of the President.\nIf Zuma faces the prospect of a corruption trial again, the nation goes on trial with him as he is our elected leader. If he again evades accountability for his actions, we remain burdened with a leader we cannot dare to trust for the next three years.\nUnpresidential, undaunted, impervious – Jacob Zuma remains our Number One liability, threat and shame. DM\nPhoto: South African President Jacob Zuma arrives at a plenary session of the Africa-South America Summit in Margarita Island September 27, 2009. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi urged African and South American leaders on Saturday to strive for a new world order countering Western economic dominance. REUTERS/Jorge Silva", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-04-29-untrusted-and-unpresidential-how-low-can-the-zuma-presidency-go/"}
{"doc_id": "bf2c72dfcc79fd68501c6181a3bf77ff", "text": "Anti-corruption campaigner, Vitus Azeem has called for the inclusion of armed forces personnel and lower-ranking public officers in the Attorney General’s proposed Conduct of Public Officers Bill, 2018.\nAccording to him, the continuous exclusion of these officers while targeting the topmost officials with the law does not holistically solve the problem of corruption in the country, especially in the remits of asset declaration.\n“We were fighting that anybody, any public officer that has custody of or in control of public resources or public property should have been included even if you are a junior officer not to the level of director. So if you are a storekeeper, if you control the fuel station at the presidency, you should be subject to this asset declaration law,” Mr Azeem said Wednesday.\nHe added that “there are politician special assistants and all that, who are being paid higher than directors in the civil service and have control over what their ministers do. So they should also be included in the bill.”\nThe Attorney General, Gloria Akuffo had earlier urged parliament to pass the Conduct of Public Officers Bill, 2018.\nAccording to her, the bill would be a major boost to hold public office holders accountable for their actions while in office.\nShe stated that though there are laws that hold public officers accountable to citizens, there is no law in the 1992 constitution that directly deals with the corruption of a public officer, and thus such a gap must be addressed accordingly.\nHowever, speaking on the issue on JoyNews’ PM Express, Vitus Azeem said it was rather unfortunate that the law targeted only a small fraction of public office holders, leaving the majority unchecked.\nHe also bemoaned the exemption of the military from the proposed bill saying there is no tangible reason why they should be exempted from the bill as they are also public offices.\n“Finally the asset declaration bill was passed when the military was handing over to the civilian regime. And so the armed forces were exempted. It is an old provision; I don’t know why it has been carried forward to this bill. After 25 years of going into democracy the armed forces is the only institution left out of this asset declaration, I don’t understand,” he said.\nThe Deputy Attorney General, Joseph Dindiok Kpemka who was also on the show replied to the concerns of the anti-corruption campaigner saying as the bill is yet to be passed and debated upon, Mr. Azeem should file his concerns to the Parliamentary committee for it be added to the bill.\nLatest Stories\n-\nThe Roll Call of Biblical Financial Evangelists\n-\nMahama accuses Bawumia of dubbing NDC’s policy promises\n-\nMahama echoes vision for resilient governance and economic recovery at NDC LAB Policy Dialogue\n-\nGSE’s Abena Amoah not on Bawumia’s economy committee\n-\nNDC’s Policy Dialogue marks milestone in pre-election strategy – Mahama\n-\nEOCO to launch lifestyle audits targeting celebrities and individuals with suspected unexplained wealth\n-\nUpper West Akim MP cuts sod for the construction of Mepom to Esaaso Road\n-\nEngineers urged to embrace preview of their works\n-\nParis 2024Q: Zambia edges Ghana 1-0 for crucial first-leg advantage\n-\nDr. Christian Sewordor Mensah: The Role of Sector Skill Bodies in using ESG and CSR Principles in shaping Sustainable Education and Training\n-\nTyler Perry halts $800 film studio build over AI fears\n-\nAkufo-Addo appoints Ofori-Atta as Senior Presidential Advisor\n-\nMIIF aims to position Ghana as electric vehicle hub in Africa\n-\nAvatar: The Last Airbender receives mixed reviews from critics\n-\nMahama slams Police’s decision to dissociate itself from DCOP Waabu’s comments on election security", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.myjoyonline.com/armed-forces-public-officers-must-also-declare-assets-anti-corruption-campaigner/"}
{"doc_id": "be166daa9898efdc7fa017c9d61fd264", "text": "Advertisement\nAgric Minister, will Farmers Day 2022 give hope to the youth?\nAttention Dr Owusu Afriyie Akoto, Minister of Food and Agriculture! Attention the committee responsible for selecting the Best Farmers and deciding the prizes: will Farmers Day 2022 be the same old story?\nOr will there be evidence of strong commitment to attracting the youth to take up farming to replace old or ageing farmers?\nThis year’s Farmers Day, Friday, December 2, is scheduled to take place in Koforidua, under the theme ‘Accelerating Agricultural Development Through Value Addition’.\nClearly value addition is needed to boost agricultural earnings, but evidently also required is an adequate, youthful workforce. The calls for the youth to go into agriculture usually increase around this time of the year.\nBut what happens on National Farmers Day? Is any proof provided of an encouraging response to the calls, by way of meaningful prizes for young farmers in the Farmers Day rewards scheme, as bait?\nTo date, the practice has been for all the recognition and the top, coveted Best Farmer prizes to go to the big-time farmers, mostly well established, already wealthy commercial farmers. The youth, who have done well enough to be rewarded, are recognised only by meagre, unappealing prizes.\nIncidentally, an old video clip I came across recently, features a Zambian woman, raising similar concerns at a conference in Rwanda in 2018. The Zambian, who identified herself as Tamara Kaunda, a medical doctor but a strong advocate for youth in agriculture, was making a contribution at the conference themed ‘YOUTH EMPLOYMENT IN AGRICULTURE’.\n“Make agriculture sexy!” was her passionate suggestion towards achieving the aim of the theme. To attract the youth, even adverts about agricultural events should be promoted in an alluring, “sexy” way, she said, to much applause.\nDr Kaunda continued: “We can talk and talk, but let’s create the enabling environment for the African youth. We need to look at agriculture as the oxygen of the economy in Africa.”\nHer stirring words have prompted me to deliver again my now almost annual petition to the Agricultural Ministry to find approaches to entice the youth into agriculture! And, to me, an ideal way would be to give significant rewards to deserving young farmers to sustain their interest, and also persuade their peers to take up farming.\nOf course here in Ghana, successive governments have long recognised that agriculture should be viewed as “the oxygen of the economy”, as indicated by the institution in 1988 of the first Friday of December as National Farmers Day, and in recognition of the contribution of agriculture to the economy.\nRecently, a video on social media that generated much discussion, showed cocoa beans spread out to dry on a newly constructed town road! The fury of the Ashanti Regional Minister, Mr Simon Osei-Mensah, who reportedly chanced upon that bewildering sight at Ntobroso, in the Altima Mponua District, was understandable.\n(Mr Osei-Mensah was on an inspection tour of roads being constructed under the Ghana Government - Sinohydro Corporation of China agreement.)\nAmid the controversy, countless arguments for and against the Minister’s reaction and the offender’s rudeness to the Minister, what I was wondering was: could it be that there are now no more cocoa drying stands in that community, hence the resort to the bizarre decision to use a town road, newly constructed at that, as a cocoa beans drying space?\nAnd if there are no more cocoa drying stands there, then maybe that indicates the status of cocoa farming in that area now. Sadly, yet another community conquered by the galamsey (illegal mining) fever?\nThe following are excerpts from a previous article on this subject:\n⃰ ⃰ ⃰\nEXCERPTS FROM A 2018 COLUMN:\nWhen this year’s Farmers Day observance was launched recently, the one question that it prompted in my mind was: will the 2018 National Farmers Day unveil an innovative and refreshing approach, or it will be the same old story?\nWill the Farmers Day prizes reflect the country’s recognition of the urgent need to offer incentives to entice the youth into farming?\nOr it will be yet again smiles and laughter for the big-time farmers and sighs of frustration and disappointment from the smallholders desperately trying in vain to catch the eye of the Government?\nThe lament of farmers, agricultural experts and observers of the sector has long been that Ghana has a serious problem of aged farmers and thus ways should be found to attract the youth into farming, notably cocoa farming, as it is the backbone of the economy.\nDecades ago, in my hometown in Brong-Ahafo, despite being a very urbanised district capital, there was evidence everywhere that people were into cocoa farming in a big way.\nOutside many of the houses, there were platforms for drying cocoa beans, on traditional specially woven bamboo mats. During cocoa harvesting time, there would be the unmistakable, pungent smell of fermenting cocoa beans.\nBut these days the story is very, very different. The cocoa drying mats have long disappeared from the neighbourhoods, including the one behind my family house.\nNot surprisingly, unlike the past, parents if they are farmers are not encouraging their children to follow in their footsteps.\nEvery schoolchild in Ghana is taught the importance of cocoa to the national economy. So why is it that apparently fewer and fewer young people go into cocoa farming? Have successive governments shown enough concern, about this situation?\nSo how does the Ministry of Agriculture, or the Government, hope to attract the young to go into cocoa farming when no young farmer will hear their name being mentioned as recipients of the big prizes on Farmers Day – a house, tractor, car or dummy cheque with numerous zeros? (August 17, 2018, ‘Farmers Day 2018: will it be the same old story?’)\n* * *\nI believe that currently, in our context, making agriculture “sexy”, creating an enabling environment for the young and other new entrants, would be by making sure that on Farmers Day, some of the main prizes go to deserving young farmers, too.\nTherefore, Dr Akoto, I sincerely hope that Farmers Day 2022 will tell a different, historic story, one of hope for the youth.\n(", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.graphic.com.gh/features/native-daughter/agric-minister-will-farmers-day-2022-give-hope-to-the-youth.html"}
{"doc_id": "37753268acce652654269b4a89d5a2d5", "text": "5 Feb\nThere is an erroneous belief in many quarters that corruption is the biggest problem militating against Nigeria’s progress. Although such insinuation may appear as the gospel truth, it is better to put issues in a proper perspective in order to correct such misconception.\n4 Feb\nThe Nigerian Transparency Council (NTC), a watchdog organisation, has ignited fresh controversy surrounding the acquisition of OVH Energy Marketing by the Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited (NNPCL) and its retail group. In a petition submitted to the House of Representatives Committee on Downstream Petroleum, led by Hon. Ikenga Imo Ugochinyere, who represents Ideato Federal Constituency,…\n31 Jan\nNigeria has ranked 145th among 180 countries and scored 25 out of 100 points on the 2023 Corruption Perception Index (CPI).\n30 Jan\nSouth Africa's corruption perception index has dropped to its lowest in 12 years and was below the global average, global corruption watchdog Transparency International said on Tuesday.\n30 Jan\nAhiazu Patriotic Forum, a non-governmental organisation with a focus on patriotism, equity, and building public trust, has decried the many cases of misappropriation and corruption leveled against many political leaders across the local government area. This development is coming on the heels of multiple allegations of corruption involving cases of diversion of palliatives donated to…\n22 Jan\nFirst national Chairman of the All Progressives Congress (APC), Chief Bisi Akande, appears to have forgotten that corruption has crippled the country.\n19 Jan\nAlleged resistance to change by those benefiting from corruption has been identified as the major factor impeding the move for local council autonomy in Nigeria.\n15 Jan\nWith recent reports of illegal organ harvesting in the country, many Nigerians are concerned about the ugly development and are exploring measures to prevent such activities in Nigerian hospitals, both private and public.\n15 Jan\nDetails of corruption allegations emerging from government ministries, departments and agencies are shocking to Nigerians, who are consequently swooning against the fact that the Presidency of Bola Ahmed Tinubu is still very young,\n13 Jan\nProfessor Olajumoke Morenikeji is a scholar in the fields of parasitology, ecology and environmental biology in the Department of Zoology, University of Ibadan (UI). The Teen’s Pastor is Chair, Olusegun Obasanjo Presidential Library Wildlife Park and Chair, Pangolin Conservation Guild Nigeria (PCGN).\n12 Jan\nNiger State Internal Revenue Service (NGSIRS) has intensified its crackdown, resulting in the arrest of several individuals involved in the unlawful production and sale of counterfeit motor vehicle stickers and emblems. The latest arrests are the Paiko Local Government Area revenue officer and its director, who were apprehended for their roles in this illegal operation.…\n4 Jan\nCorruption clearly represents one of the most serious political, economic and societal problems.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://guardian.ng/tag/corruption/page/2/"}
{"doc_id": "7f39058f3fb1c01a7cb25a5d33d0ca10", "text": "For most governments, the rate of economic growth that can reasonably be expected in the coming years is a key question. And, at least for the advanced economies, it has become a particularly puzzling one.\nIf the past is a good predictor of the future, the outlook is bleak. Since 2008, economic growth has consistently disappointed expectations. Of the countries most affected by the financial crisis, only a few – the United States, Germany, and Sweden – have rediscovered the path to sustained growth. Yet, even for them, GDP in 2013 was far below the level projected prior to the crisis.\nThe consensus view among economists and policymakers is that the financial crisis and the euro crisis have damaged both demand and supply, but that a gradual healing process has begun.\nOn the demand side, according to this view, the hangover from pre-crisis private indebtedness and crisis-generated public indebtedness still weighs on domestic demand. This is likely to persist for several more years, though the burden will diminish steadily. Gradually, consumers will start spending and investing again (as is becoming the case in the US), and fiscal policy will become neutral again (as is already the case in Germany).\nOn the supply side, the crisis has lowered potential output growth, because, in Europe at least, firms have invested less, impeding the adoption of new technologies. Moreover, in some cases – for example, the United Kingdom – wage decreases and flexible layoff rules have encouraged firms to substitute labor for capital, reducing output per employee. Clogged capital markets and resistance to social hardship have also delayed the replacement of incumbent firms by more efficient new entrants. The aggregate result has been lower-than-anticipated productivity: in the UK, more person-hours were needed to produce a unit of output in 2013 than in 2007. Here, too, the supply-side effect of the crisis is likely to persist until firms invest in new equipment, innovation accelerates, and the churning process in labor markets resumes.\nBut the view that advanced economies are gradually healing is challenged from both sides. Starting with demand, Larry Summers, the Harvard economist and senior US official under Presidents Bill Clinton and Barack Obama, recently proposed that advanced economies have found themselves in the grip of secular stagnation.\nSummers’s view is that pre-crisis indebtedness was not an exogenous anomaly; it was the consequence of insufficient global demand. The global distribution of income had shifted away from the advanced countries’ middle class toward the rich and the emerging economies, resulting in excess worldwide savings. The only way to avoid stagnation was to push the middle class deeper into debt, helped by low interest rates and lenient lending rules.\nIn other words, the savings glut (as former US Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke called it) predated the crisis and could continue to affect global demand, unless the emerging countries’ middle class provides the global economy with a new consumer of last resort. This is likely to happen eventually; but, despite efforts by the US and the International Monetary Fund in the context of the G-20, this rebalancing process has not yet been completed.\nThe challenge on the supply side stems from a new dispute among economists and technology experts about the pace of technological progress. For Robert Gordon of Northwestern University, information and communication technologies have already delivered most of the productivity boost that can be expected from them; there is no major innovation wave in sight that could offset the slowdown in potential growth. Laggards can look forward to reaping catch-up dividends; but countries at the technology frontier should accept that very slow annual per capita growth – little more than 1% – is the new normal.\nBy contrast, the MIT scholars Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee argue that the Second Machine Age is yet to come. They claim that ever-increasing computing power, worldwide connectivity, and the almost unlimited potential for generating new innovations through recombining existing processes will trigger major transformations in both production and consumption, in the same way that the steam engine transformed the world in the nineteenth century. Growth should accelerate as a consequence, at least if properly measured.\nCombining the challenges cited by Gordon and Summers to the view that advanced economies are gradually healing leads to some depressing conclusions. If Gordon is right about slow productivity growth, the debt overhang inherited from the crisis and public-finance woes will persist for much longer than anticipated. If, in addition, Summers is right that demand is bound to remain deficient, the combination of financial troubles and persistent mass unemployment is likely to push governments toward radical solutions – debt default, inflation, or financial protectionism.\nIf, on the contrary, Brynjolfsson and McAfee are right, growth will be much more robust, and debt issues will be forgotten sooner than expected. The challenge, instead, will be to cope with the labor-reducing and income-inequality effects of emerging technologies.\nThat will be especially true if these transformations take place against the background drawn by Summers of persistent mass unemployment. The risk is that social problems become intractable, as technological advances come to be regarded as benefiting the rich while creating additional hardship for the masses. In such a scenario, governments will have to look for innovative responses.\nScenarios like these may seem far-fetched. But, while certainly discomfiting, they are hardly irrelevant.\nJean Pisani-Ferry teaches at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, and currently serves as Commissioner-General for Policy Planning in Paris.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businessday.ng/analysis/article/the-new-growth-conundrum/"}
{"doc_id": "871b7c2d1b7b3b4a94909c9de50162f1", "text": "What you need to know:\nThree categories of dangerous cases are on the rise in Kenya.\nFirst are dangerous drugs cases, which have increased from 5565 cases in 2017 to 8,021 in 2018.\nThe second are economic crimes which increased from 3,503 in 2016 to 4,100 in 2018.\nThird are cases categorized as “corruption” while shot from 92 in 2016 to 119 in 2018.\nIn the wake of the arms fraud on February 13, 2020, Kenya risks sliding into Mafia capitalism. Despite enchantments of the “Africa rising”, the continent is newest frontier of a new global capitalism: Mafia capitalism as a new, totally unregulated and unscrupulous form of capitalism, mired in dirty money.\nAs an operational concept, mafia capitalism came into vogue after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the eastern bloc amid a growing number of companies and gangs involved in drug-dealing and trafficking young women to work as sex slaves, weapons, immigrants and counterfeit goods, corruption and cyber crime syndicates in Western democracies.\nArms deals in Africa’s emerging markets heralds the age of Mafia capitalism. It all started in South Africa, with the “Arms Deal”, a military procurement in 1998-1999 that involved a US$4.8 billion purchase of weaponry tainted with repeated, and seemingly substantive, allegations of corruption.\nIn Nigeria, an arms procurement deal between December 2014 and May 2015 resulted in the embezzlement of $2 billion. And in February 13, 2020, Kenyans were struck mute by the news of $400 million (Sh 40 billion) fake arms scandal involving former Sports Cabinet Secretary, Rashid Echesa, and which has tragically sucked in Deputy President William Ruto whose Office on the second floor of Harambee House Annex in Nairobi is the crime scene where the fake contract for the supply of military equipment was signed.\nFor long, East Africa’s most robust economy has been a source and transit area for global Mafia capitalism. In the year 2018/19 the Ethics and anti-corruption Commission (EACC) received and processed a total of 9,303 complaints and 571 reports on ethical breaches. In the same vein, the State of the Judiciary and the Administration of Justice Annual Report, 2018 – 2019 reveals a country stalked by home-grown mafia barons operating with total impunity.\nThree categories of dangerous cases are on the rise in Kenya. First are dangerous drugs cases, which have increased from 5565 cases in 2017 to 8,021 in 2018. The second are economic crimes which increased from 3,503 in 2016 to 4,100 in 2018.\nThird are cases categorized as “corruption” while shot from 92 in 2016 to 119 in 2018. A total of 58 cases were filed in the Milimani Anticorruption Court in 2018/19 financial year, with 44 cases resolved by the end of 2019.\nThree cases of corruption stand out and signify the threat of mafia capitalism. On March 2019, President Uhuru Kenyatta sacked Echesa reportedly due to possible links with a criminal enterprise behind the $320 million fake currency seizure in Ruiru, Kiambu county on February 28, 2019.\nIn July 2019, 27 Kenyan officials, including the Finance Minister Henry Rotich and the treasury Principal Secretary Kamau Thugge, were arrested and charged with corruption involving $2.22 billion relating to the inflating of the cost of constructing the Arror and Kimwarer water dams in Elgeyo Marakwet County.\nAnd on January 20, 2020, former CS Mwangi Kiunjuri was grilled by the anti-graft agency in an ongoing investigation into an alleged illegal payment of Sh1.8 billion for maize supply in 2019.\nClosely linked to the three categories of drugs, economic crimes and corruption cases are spiraling deadly fraud cases. In May 2019, police arrested six suspects over the gold scam in Nairobi, which turned out to be part of a complex fraud scheme where a Saudi royal was conned of Sh400 million gold million.\nOn February 13, 2020, Echesa was arrested in regard to the Sh39 billion guns scandal case where reportedly duped the US and Poland-based Eco Advanced Technologies that he would help them secure an arms tender at the Ministry of Defence, a deal in which he pocketed Sh11.5 million as consultancy fees.\nMafia capitalism is also capturing local spaces. The high-profile corruption cases of Nairobi and Kiambu counties shows that Kenya is descending into lawlessness with a Mafia-like local governance.\nThe venal capitalism is riding on electronic communications, which enables criminals to shift large sums of cash rapidly around the world and thus keeping it hidden and unregulated.\nKenya’s local mafia capitalists are joining forces with more seasoned and entrenched counterparts in Western capitalism. Tellingly, the Arror and Kimwarer water dams case involved Italians from the CMC di Ravena—the firm that was contracted—signifying linkages with global mafia capitalism.\nThe success of the mafia capitalists and their henchmen rests on their ruthless capacity to punish and silence those either attempting to expose their deals or knowing too much. In Mexico, close to 33,000 people went missing and across the country in 2017: silent victims of the drug war. Kenya’s Mafia capitalists are neither taking chances nor prisoners. They are resorting to brutal violence to cover their footprints.\nThe involvement of the political class at the highest level has given credence to the fear of state capture. Kenya’s mafia capitalists are being defended by those holding the levers of power, and even colluding with elements in state security forces. Their political henchmen are politicizing and ethnicising relentless efforts by security forces to rein in corruption and cronyism.\nFailure by the country’s courts to bring to to justice and convict Mafia capitalists and their cronies undermining the rule of law and encouraging others to employ the same means to keep their dirty operations going. Why should one remain a law-abiding citizen, faithfully working eight to five and paying tax bill?\nThe few pockets of the rule of law holding the country together are at dire risk of virtually collapsed in the Mafia capitalists capture the helm of state power.\nBut, like patient hunters, Kenya’s robber barons and oligarchs are unbowed, and waiting the country out. Ahead of the 2022 elections, they are hell-bent on deploying their wealth to capture and take control state power, and deal brutally with their challengers.\nPeter Kagwanja is the President and Chief Executive of Africa Policy Institute and former Government Adviser.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://nation.africa/oped/opinion/Arms-scam-heralds-Kenya-s-slide-to-mafia-capitalism/440808-5465396-6hesjp/index.html"}
{"doc_id": "13a0bcb2590a88e26580f70c9b64af02", "text": "A gift to the world from African journalists\nThe African journalists finalised their definition of press freedom on 3 May 1991. The United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) funded and supported the seminar. The United Nations agreed to adopt the Windhoek declaration in 1993 and to declare 3 May World Press Freedom Day.\nThe Declaration speaks of an independent press free from economic and political control, an end to monopolies of any kind and the proliferation of voices reflecting “the widest possible range of opinion within the community”.\nTheir work will come under the spotlight when UNESCO convened the World Press Freedom Day conference in Namibia on 3 May 2021 under the theme “Information as a Public Good.”\n( https://en.unesco.org/commemorations/worldpressfreedomday )\nWho were the journalists and media professionals who gathered in Windhoek 30 years ago?\nThe Journalist with the assistance of researcher Melissa Chetty has crosschecked a list of those journalists who participated in the drafting of the historic document.\nThe final list of participants is published on these pages. Added to the participant list are South Africa’s Rafiq Rohan and Malawi’s Al Osman, both not on previous lists. The Namibian’s Gwen Lister has forwarded a further four names but by the time we went to print, we were unable to confirm that they were present. They were Fred M’membe of Zambia, Catherine Gicheru of Kenya, Fernando Lima of Mozambique, and Mario Paiva of Angola.\nSenior UNESCO expert on Freedom of Expression and Media Development, Dr Guy Berger confirmed that UNESCO was committed to paying tribute to the African journalists who crafted the original declaration. He said that UNESCO has kept occasional contact with a number of them over the years including those who have gone on to other professions.\n“We are very pleased that the original co-chair Gwen Lister, is active as one of the co-champions of the Windhoek Declaration today. It is with sadness we heard some years ago that her co-chair of the original event, Pius Njawe, passed away in an automobile accident.”\nHe further explained that this year’s conference would allow those who follow the events to be able to celebrate the history behind the Declaration.\n“On this basis, those involved this year will be party to examining how the original Declaration resonates in today’s conditions. Together they can help shape what current and future generations of journalists and policy-makers, across the whole world, can do to build further upon the legacy of those who met in Windhoek in 1991.”\nWorld press freedom rankings\nIt is perhaps apt that this world gathering convenes in Namibia since this country has for a number of years ranked highest of all African countries on the Freedom Index.\nLast week, on 20 April 2021, the world’s biggest media freedom NGO, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) published its annual Freedom Index that ranks 180 countries according to the levels of freedom available to journalists.\nThe Index is not an indicator of the quality of journalism in each country. It is a snapshot of media freedom based on the evaluation of pluralism, independence of the media, quality of legislative framework and safety of journalists in each country. Self-censorship and the quality of the infrastructure that supports the production of news and information are also considered.\nThis year, like last year, six African countries were ranked higher than the United States of America. Following Namibia ranked 24 was Cabo Verde (27), Ghana (30), South Africa (32), Burkina Faso (37) and Botswana (38). The USA ranked 44. Four African countries also ranked higher than the UK (33).\nThe 2021 Index data reflect a dramatic deterioration in people’s access to information and an increase in obstacles to news coverage. The coronavirus pandemic has been used as grounds to block journalists’ access to information sources and reporting in the field, said the report. The data shows that journalists are finding it increasingly hard to investigate and report sensitive stories, especially in Asia, the Middle East and Europe.\nThe data further shows that African journalists were hit hard by the coronavirus crisis in 2020, suffering three times as many attacks and arrests from 15 March to 15 May as during the same period the year before. Other violations in the past year on the continent include arbitrary censorship, especially on the Internet (by means of ad hoc Internet cuts in some countries), arrests of journalists on the grounds of combatting cybercrime, fake news or terrorism, and acts of violence against media personnel that usually go completely unpunished.\nElections and protests were often accompanied by abuses against journalists, said the report. The financial weakness of many media outlets made them susceptible to political and financial influence undermining their independence, it said.\nAgainst this backdrop of challenges, the profession will have to seriously assess how far it still has to go to uphold the tenor and tone of the Windhoek Declaration so carefully crafted by these men and women who met 30 years ago. They deserve to be recognised and have their stories fully told in time to come.\n*The media fraternity is invited to study the list and contact The Journalist ([email protected]) should anyone have been excluded. Research has shown that a number of those on the list have passed on. This does not mean that an effort must not be made to compile a record of everyone who attended for future generations. If you attended the UNESCO conference: Seminar on Promoting an Independent and Pluralistic African Press at the Safari Hotel in Windhoek in 1991, or know of someone who attended that hasn’t been mentioned in the list, please contact us. — Zubeida Jaffer\nFor the full conference programme please visit the UNESCO website: https://en.unesco.org/commemorations/worldpressfreedomday/2021/programme\nBelow is a list of journalists who attended the seminar on promoting an Independent and Pluralistic African Press, Windhoek in 1991 where the Declaration of Windhoek was produced and signed.\nAlgeria: Omar Belhouchet, Mayouf Zoubir Souissi\nAngola: Joaquim Pinto Andrade\nBenin: Isma l Yves Soumanou, Thomas Megnassan\nBotswana: Methaetsile Leepile\nBurkina Faso: Luc Adolphe Tiao\nBurundi: Albert Mbonerane\nCameroon: Pius N. Njawe, Paddy Mbawa\nChad: Saleh Kebzabo\nCôte d’Ivoire: Issiaka Tao, Paul Arnaud\nDemocratic Republic of Congo: Léon Moukanda Lunyama\nDjibouti: Ismail Tani\nFrance: Sennen Andriamirado, Michel Duteil, Philippe Maeght\nGambia: Sanna Manneh\nGhana: Ajoa Yeboah-Afari, Paul Ansah, John Nyankumah\nGuinea: Sankarela Diallo\nGuinea-Bissau: Francisco Barreto De Carvalho\nKenya: Mohamed Amin, George Odiko, Stephen Musalia Mwenesi\nLesotho: Mike Pitso\nLiberia: Kenneth Yakpawolo Best\nMadagascar: Rahaga Ramaholimihaso\nMalawi: Janet Zeenat Karim, Al Osman\nMauritius: Gérard Cateaux\nNamibia: Gwen Lister\nNiger: Ibrahim Cheick Diop\nNigeria: Sam Amuka, Lewis Obi, Kaye Whiteman\nSenegal: Abdoulaye Bamba Diallo\nSierra Leone: Paul Kamara\nSouth Africa, Rory Wilson, Anton Harber, Rafiq Rohan\nSudan: Bona Malwal\nSwaziland: Sabelo Gabriel Nxumalo\nTanzania: Fili Karashani\nTogo: Komi Agah, Vincent Traoré\nTunisia: Ismail Boulahia, Salah Fourti, Mohamed Ben Salah\nUganda: Alfred Okware, Aloysius Bbosa, James Namakajo\nUnited Kingdom: Shamlal Puri, Alan Rake\nUnited States of America: Dennis Schick\nZambia: Francis Kasoma, Goodwin Mwangilwa\nZimbabwe: Geoffrey Takawira Chada, Onesimo Makani-Kabweza, Hugh Lewin, Andrew Moyse, Geoffrey Nyarota, Govin Reddy\nSol T Plaatje: Pariah In the Land of His Birth\nSolomon Tshekiso Plaatje was a journalist extraordinaire. He was by all accounts the pioneer of pioneers. We take him as “exemplar and standard”, said former Education Minister Professor Kader Asmal in the foreword to Native Life in South Africa, the 1916 Plaatje classic republished in 2007.\n“It reminds us that this country needs more Sol Plaatjes, more crusading journalists who use language like a rapier, not a sledgehammer, who know their stuff and argue their case on the basis of justice, reason and the facts,” said Asmal.\nPlaatje, a largely self-taught man, could speak seven languages fluently. He translated William Shakespeare’s works into Setswana and collected African folklore and proverbs. He was a pioneer of journalism in our indigenous languages but wrote extensively in English as well. He defended tirelessly the rights of African people.\nOn the Warpath With A Pen\nPlaatje was born in the Boshof District of the Orange Free State in 1876. His parents – Johannes and Martha Plaatje – were Christians who worked for the missionaries. When he was born, they named him Thekiso, a Tswana name meaning that which you do for advantage or gain. His parents were signalling that he needed to seek advantage for himself and his people and so he did.\nIn his lifetime, Plaatje moved seamlessly from interviewing homeless people by the roadside to a meeting with the British Prime Minister. He gave talks and showed films at local schools and community centres. He once shared a podium with Marcus Garvey, the famous Jamaican ideologue who propagated the unification and empowerment of all Africans, even those in the diaspora.\nAs editor of the black-owned newspapers, Koranta ea Becoana (1901–1908) and Tsala ea Batho (1910–1915), Plaatje highlighted issues of great concern to Africans such as racism, injustice and exploitation.\nWhen the Land Act of 1913 was passed, he used his pen to go on the warpath. He travelled around the country on a bicycle to research the effects of the new legislation. His work was published in 1916 as the famous classic, Native Life in South Africa. He meticulously reported on conditions around the country, leaving us with first-hand accounts of the early years of dispossession.\nThe opening words of the first chapter of this book, have become immortalised:\n“Awaking on Friday morning, June 20, 1913, the South African native found himself, not actually a slave, but a pariah in the land of his birth.”\nLater he wrote:\n“For to crown all our calamities, South Africa has by law ceased to be the home of any of her native children whose skins are dyed with a hue that does not conform to the regulation hue. “\nPlaatje’s pen raised his national profile. He became the first Secretary-General and founding member of the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) in 1912.\nRise of Protest Journalism\nReading the digitised editions of Koranta gives you a powerful glimpse into the world of Sol T Plaatje. At first glance, the masthead of Koranta ea Becoana seems like information for a tasteless self-help book. Beneath the name it states: The Amelioration of the Native – Labour, Sobriety, Thrift and Education.\nBut as you scroll down, you encounter the richness and contradictions. On the first pages colonial merchants vied with each other. Some sold bicycles, some medicine – like Hoffe’s remedy. If we can believe the advert, this remedy cured and prevented fever and was never known to fail. In true merchant bravura, some colonials offered their “selling skills”.\nA story about the influential Barolong people who were seeking compensation from Imperial Britain in 1903, went to the heart of the issues of the day. Colonel Baden-Powell enlisted the Rolong to fight alongside the British in the Anglo-Boer War. Baden-Powell promised that compensation would follow, but this did not happen. To this day, the Rolong haven’t been compensated or even acknowledged.\nKoranta, like other newspapers of that time, was modest in size and moderate in tone, with low circulation rates among a population with limited literacy. Yet they confronted a social system that discriminated against all.\nOriginally established by the editor of the Mafikeng Mail, G.H. Whales, Koranta began as a one-page newsletter supplement in Tswana with an initial circulation of 500. Silas Molema, of the prominent Barolong people, bought the paper from Whales to make way for Plaatje as Editor.\nWhen Plaatje became Editor he increased it to two pages, appointed newsagents and solicited advertisements. By the end of 1902, Koranta was an eight-page title with a circulation of 2 000 nationwide. By the following year Molema and Plaatje set up a printing plant and built an office in Mafikeng. But his success with the paper was more than just operational. Koranta and subsequently Tsala ea Becoana were politically influential.\nIn several issues of the paper, he began his editorials with a Biblical quotation. This one comes from the Old Testament’s Song of Solomon.\n“I am black, but comely, O ye daughters of Jerusalem, as the tents of Kedar. Look not upon me because I am black, because the sun hath looked upon me”.\nThis, like many of Plaatje’s writings indicated his strong Africanist commitment. By quoting Solomon – seemingly tongue in cheek – he hinted at the importance of a strong African identity in a world where racial discrimination was rife.\nKoranta was critical of the British administration in the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies. Here, Africans continued to suffer at the hands of violent police and a judicial system that did not protect their human rights. Plaatje expanded the newspaper’s protest agenda gradually. He campaigned for the better treatment of Africans employed in urban areas and contended that the African franchise and civil rights of the Cape Colony should be extended to the rest of the country.\nThe Gods Must Be Cruel\nPlaatje was a complex man. Although prefacing his editorials with Biblical quotes, at times he railed against what he saw as the Divine order of things:\n“The gods are cruel, and one of their cruelest acts of omission was that of giving us no hint that in very much less than a quarter of a century all those hundreds of heads of cattle, and sheep and horses belonging to the family would vanish like a morning mist.\n“They might have warned us that Englishmen would agree with Dutchmen to make it unlawful for black men to keep cows of their own. The gods could have prepared us gradually for shock.” – excerpt from Sol Plaatje’s Native Life in South Africa.\nIn later years, he withdrew from political organization and wrote the famous South African novel, Mhudi: An Epic of South African Life a Hundred Years Ago. His pen was his weapon in the fight for restoring the dignity to the African people. He continued this battle until his death in 1932.\nHe certainly lived up to his middle name Thekiso – adding advantage or gain. We continue to reap benefit from his contributions to journalism and the African literary landscape. — Zubeida Jaffer and Sibusiso Tshabalala\nFirst published in thejournalist.org.za on 5 July, 2014\nNnamdi Azikiwe: African philosopher, scholar and eminent journalist\nLike most African journalists who were propelled into the media space by the liberation struggles against colonisers, Dr Benjamin Nnamdi Azikiwe, also known as “Zik” was no exception. Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, were all activists before they became journalists and subsequently presidents of their countries. They were all leaders in the Pan-African Movement.\nAzikiwe was born on November 16 1904 to Igbo parents in Zungeru, Northern Nigeria – the present-day Niger State. He is revered as the towering African pragmatic and progressive philosopher, scholar and eminent journalist of the 20th century. He was a scholar who wrote many works of educational philosophy. He attended various mission schools in Onitsha, Calabar and Lagos.\nLife influences\nAzikiwe briefly lived with a relative while attending school in Onitsha while holding down a job as a student teacher supporting his mother financially.\nHe would later join his father in Calabar in 1920, where he attended the Waddell Training College. It is here that he was introduced to the teachings of African-American civil activist Marcus Garvey. Garveyism, would become his philosophical compass towards nationalistic politics.\nWhen he transferred to the Methodist Boys High School in Lagos his opportunities and access to influential scholars opened up. He was fortunate to attend a lecture by James Aggrey, an educator who believed that Africans should receive a college education abroad and return home to effect change on the continent.\nAggrey gave the young Azikiwe a list of schools that were accepting black students in America. Zik arrived in the United States in 1925, where he earned multiple qualifications, including Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees from Lincoln University in Pennsylvania and a second Master’s degree from the University in Pennsylvania.\nAt Columbia University, his doctoral research focused on Liberia in world politics. During his time in America, he was a columnist for the Baltimore Afro-American, Philadelphia Tribune and the Associated Negro Press. By the time he returned in Nigeria in 1934, Azikiwe’s ideals were traceable to the African-American press, Garveyism and pan-Africanism. He was a man on a mission once he realised how media can influence people’s psyche.\nActivism and newspaper days\nHe applied for a position with the foreign services for Liberia but was rejected because he was not a native of the country, so he continued with his vision of a united Africa and returned to Lagos in Nigeria in 1934.\nHe accepted a job offer from Ghanaian businessman Alfred Ocansey to become founding editor of the African Morning Post, a new daily newspaper on the Gold Coast, now known as Ghana. The publication quickly became an important organ of nationalist propaganda pushing the Pan-Africanist philosophy.\nHe would mentor Kwame Nkrumah, who would later become the first president of Ghana, before returning to Lagos, Nigeria in 1937. There he founded the media outfit the Zik Group, under which he established and edited the West African Pilot, which was referred to as “a fire-eating and aggressive nationalist paper of the highest order”.\nUnder the Zik Group, he revolutionised the West African newspaper industry, demonstrating that English-language journalism could be successful, and expanded his controlling interest to more than 12 daily, African-run newspapers. The West African Pilot grew exponentially from an initial run of 6 000 copies daily, to printing more 20 000 copies at its peak in 1950. There was also the Southern Nigeria Defender in Warri (now known as Ibadan), the Eastern Guardian (founded in 1940 and published in Port Harcourt), and the Nigerian Spokesman in Onitsha.\nIn 1944, the group acquired Duse Mohamed’s Daily Comet. By 1950, the five leading African-run newspapers in the Eastern Region (including the Nigerian Daily Times) were outsold by the West African Pilot.\nAzikiwe’s newspaper venture was a business and political tool. He even began writing a column – Inside Stuff – in the African Morning Post, in which he occasionally attempted to raise political consciousness. His collection of newspapers played a crucial role in stimulating Nigerian nationalism.\nBy the 1960s, after Nigeria’s independence, the national West African Pilot was particularly influential in the east. Azikiwe took particular aim at political groups which advocated exclusion. He was criticised by a Yoruba faction for using his newspaper to suppress opposition to his views.\nTo support his business ventures and to express his economic nationalism, Azikiwe founded the African Continental Bank in 1944 and also ran the Penny Restaurant.\nPolitical life\nHe also became directly involved in politics, first with the Nigerian Youth Movement in 1944 and later when he led a 1945 general strike. On July 8 1945, the Nigerian government banned his newspapers, the West African Pilot and the Daily Comet for allegedly misrepresenting information about a general strike.\nHe founded the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, a group which became increasingly identified with the Igbo people of southern Nigeria. And in 1948, with the backing of the National Council, Azikiwe was elected to the Nigerian Legislative Council, later serving as premier of the Eastern region from 1954 to 1959.\nZik would become the country’s first president when Nigeria became a Republic, governing from 1963 to 1966. Prior to becoming president he had been governor-general of Nigeria from 1960 to 1963. He was overthrown in a military coup on January 15 1966. He became a spokesperson for Biafra and advised its leader, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, during the Biafran War between 1967 and 1970.\nAfter the war, he became the chancellor of the University of Lagos from 1972 to 1976. He would join the Nigerian People’s Party two years later, making unsuccessful bids for the presidency again in 1979 and 1983. He left politics involuntarily after the December 31 1983 military coup. Azikiwe died on May 11 1996 at the University of Nigeria Teaching Hospital in Enugu after a long illness.\nHe is buried in Onitsha. — Phindile Xaba\nFirst published in thejournalist.org.za on 26 November, 2019.\nHilary Teague (1802-1853): Father of Liberia’s independence\nHilary Teague is being celebrated in contemporary times as the Father of Liberia’s independence and the foremost pioneer of the Liberian media. His legacy has also become an interest in scholarly works and literature, aptly so.\nAccording to Dr Patrick Burrowes, a renowned Liberian historian, Teague’s legacy may have been tampered with simply because his last name is sometimes spelt differently, as “Teage”. But he contends that attempts to hide his unwavering commitment to the liberation of black people could not stay buried eternally.\nBurrowes in an interview with the Liberian Observer said: “Teague was the father of Liberia’s independence. Just as Ghanaians uphold Kwame Nkrumah and the Americans look up to George Washington, Liberians need to honour the man who laid our foundation.”\nApart from writing numerous papers on his legacy, Burrowes staged a play chronicling Teague’s historical contributions to commemorate Liberia’s independence in July 2018.\nEarly childhood\nIt’s no wonder that Teague was so invested in Liberia’s independence as he was born to former slaves Colin and Frances Teague in 1805, in Virginia in the United States. His father, Colin and a friend Lott Cary had been ministers at the Providence Baptist Church they had established on a piece of land they purchased in Richmond. They emigrated with their families to a colony that was yet to be named by the American Colonisation Society (ACS), in West Africa as missionaries. Teague was only 14 then and for several years the family primarily lived in Sierra Leone, where Hilary and his sibling Colinette received elementary education for three years.\nWhen they eventually moved to settle in Liberia, they then discovered that the history of the colony had been of no less than a huge dispute and discord between the settlers, a group the Teagues fell into and the ACS. Several rebellions had reportedly occurred regularly with no results. Teague, who was in his late teens when he set foot on the colony, is described by Burrowes as an inspirational person young people can learn from as he had minimal education but did not let that deter his determination.\nHe went on to become a successful businessman with some or full equity in different ventures. He even owned several ships, followed in his father’s footsteps and became a minister of three churches over time. Teague is said to have been bothered by the state of the lives of African people in their land, and had to do something to fight for independence.\nMedia and Writing\nAccording to Marie Tyler-McGraw, Teague was widely viewed as a very bright man, but somewhat angry, an emotion that showed through his writing during his editorship at the Liberia Herald (1835-1849), which he also owned.\nTeague unapologetically used this platform to champion the cause for Liberia’s independence, invoking black nationalism and religious heritage. Tyler-McGraw suggests that his writings demonstrate that his anger was fuelled by the exclusion of blacks from citizenship and opportunities viewed through his own experience in Virginia.\nIn one editorial he wrote: “New Virginia [a new settlement] is looking up. We trust we love all mankind … but somehow, we do love Virginia and Virginians. How strange that we should love a place that despises us and casts us out. Well, let New Virginia copy all in the old that is good and reject the bad.”\nHis editorials covered wide topics ranging from native plant and animal life, daily life and practices among indigenous groups, agriculture, and women’s fashions in Monrovia. His greatest interest was Liberian history and politics and he realised early on that Liberia must be independent. In a private letter, he assessed the relations between Liberia, the ACS, and the United States government accurately:\n“You are probably aware of the nature of our relations with the people of the United States. With them as a nation we have nothing to do. From the first the Government disowned us, and up to this hour disclaims all political connection. With a few American citizens confederated under the title of the American Colonisation Society (ACS), we hold a temporary and conditional relation”.\nPolitics of liberation\nIn 1835, Teague became the secretary for the Liberian colony and progressed to occupy the position of a clerk of the convention which presented the settlers’ views of the ACS regarding constitutional reforms in 1839.\nHe was later an instrumental figure at the Constitutional Convention of 1847 – representing Montserrado County – in both debating and ratifying Liberia’s constitution, and wrote the country’s Declaration of Independence. In 1853, although Teague was the country’s first Secretary of State after Liberia declared independence, he served as attorney general as well. All his life he fought for secular political freedom far from his religious affiliation.\nWhile Teague is said to have been a failure in all aspects of life in some quarters, Burrowes noted that Liberia should be weary of suppression of accurate African history by those who may desire to impose their distorted opinions.\n“My greatest wish is that this play will unify Liberians and teach us to love and respect ourselves. A key to success in life is to know yourself but sadly, many of today’s Liberians look down on our ancestors because we don’t know our history,” Burrowes said.\nTeague died in May 1853 aged 51. — Thapelo Mokoatsi\nFirst published in thejournalist.org.za on 26 February, 2019.\nPioneers: Swazi Queen Labotsibeni\nQueen Labotsibeni Mdluli was born in 1858 at eLuhlekweni northern Swaziland (now known as Eswatini) during the reign of King Mswati II who was in power for 25 years between 1840 and 1865. As fate would have it, she would rule the young Swaziland kingdom for 50 years.\nLabotsibeni’s ascension to the throne was rather unusual. Firstly, Swati traditional laws did not allow a woman in her situation to rule; she had four children at that time. Secondly, her Mdluli clan was not next in line to rule Swaziland. But she defied the odds.\nThe daughter of Matsanjana Mdluli, whose brother was Chief Mvelase Mdluli, she was entrusted with bringing peace and stability in the wake of the political and social confusion the country faced. She was chosen because of “her outstanding intelligence, ability and character and experience”. This was groundbreaking for someone with no “formal education, her wisdom, her perception, her wit, and determination…”, states Thoko Ginindza, in her article titled Labotsibeni/Gwamile Mdluli: The Power Behind the Swazi Throne, 1875-1925.\nThis lioness, whose second name Gwamile means the indomitable one, first took the reigns as the Queen Mother for nine years between 1890 and 1899 and later served her people as the Queen Regent for more than two decades, between 1899 and 1921. It was during this time that she became involved in the affairs of the South African Native National Congress (SANNC), later renamed the African National Congress. She founded and financed its communications organ, Abantu-Batho newspaper in 1912.\nHer role in Abantu-Batho newspaper\nGrant Christison, notes in his PhD thesis African Jerusalem: The Vision of Robert Grendon that Mweli-Skota, that the Swazi Queen-Regent Labotsibeni “was the founder of the Abantu-Batho …[it] was formed in 1912 on [her] … instruction, and under the direction of Dr. P ka I. Seme …”\nIn March 1914, in Tsala ea Batho, Sol Plaatje observed that Abantu-Batho was privileged to have a black financier because it had six sub-editors, unlike other black-owned newspapers. Abantu-Batho came to be known as a publication that would raise the voice of the silenced African population in South Africa, a republic in which the oppressive regime was institutionalising landlessness, poverty in African people and oppression. Those were the pressing issues that gave the Queen-Regent many sleepless nights. Following Pixley ka Seme’s persuasive voice, Labotsibeni invested £3 000, a huge amount of money at the time.\n“She remained in 1912 one of the wealthiest black women in South Africa,” notes Christison.\nShe offered the much-needed financial muscle to support SANNC activities. She was also a very astute entrepreneur who treated this exercise as a business decision to partner with Seme and company, thus making her a shareholder and Seme a managing director of Abantu-Batho – a limited liability company. As an oralate stateswoman she understood the power of the printed word and ensured that Abantu-Batho staff members reported on bread and butter issues happening in Swaziland and other parts of southern Africa for the world to learn about beyond continental boundaries.\nDuring the First World War, Queen Labotsibeni purchased an aircraft worth £1 000 for Britain in support of its war efforts. She insisted that the aircraft should carry her name in order to reflect and acknowledge the role played by women in the First World War.\nThe April 25 1918 issue of Abantu-Batho sang her praises in commending “Ndhlovukazi and the people of Swaziland for the loyalty and devotion to the British Crown”, according to Sarah Mkhonza’s book Queen Labotsibeni and Abantu-Batho.\nWhen she passed on in 1925 there was a heavy rain that led to flood in some parts of South Africa and Swaziland. She was a rainmaker reputed to have said: “When I want water, I make the rain myself.” — Thapelo Mokoatsi\nFirst published in thejournalist.org.za on 21 February, 2017.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://mg.co.za/africa/2021-05-04-world-press-freedom-day/"}
{"doc_id": "4e6090643870c5e109790fb3eb39c9b7", "text": "10-year old Ekukanju* and his six younger siblings have been out of school for the past ten months. Their father, a journalist, was forced to go into hiding for his anti-corruption reporting and can no longer work to pay for their schooling and care. ‘We are staying with our mother and uncle here in Douala’, Ekukanju says sadly. ‘But uncle has a large family of his own so even feeding is difficult. I am thin like this because of under-feeding.’ Community members who have started to help the family don’t blame Ekukanju’s father for the hardship, however; they know he had good reasons to go underground.\nTelling the truth about the Biya regime is a very dangerous activity in Cameroon. Only two months before this conversation took place, on March 9th 2022, web editor and corruption whistleblower Paul Chouta was abducted from a Yaoundé bar where he had been watching football. He was brutally assaulted and left for dead. ‘I had gone outside during half-time when three unidentified men in civilian clothes in a green pick-up truck accosted me and threw me in their vehicle’, he said in an interview. ‘I shouted for help, but the attackers managed to push me inside and used my shirt to blindfold me’.\nChouta was driven to what he would later recognise as an area on the outskirts of the city, near the airport. There he was taken out of the truck and told to kneel. He recalls being beaten with stones, bricks, a baton and a whip, before finally falling unconscious. ‘They told me that I’m stubborn and that I never learn a lesson,’ Chouta says. It is not his first time being detained- he has been arrested in the past and assaulted by unidentified forces, as well as receiving several warnings to ‘stop writing rubbish’. ‘They said this time they will kill me, as I wanted to show that I was a hero.’ After waking up injured, naked and alone, Chouta walked in great pain for about two miles, before being found and helped by strangers.\nA mayor and a timber company\nA few months later Jean Francois Channon, the publisher of Le Messager, Cameroon’s leading privately-owned French-language daily, found himself under fire while being driven home from work. His driver managed to ‘skilfully manoeuvre’ and escape two individuals who shot at the car they were in. Channon says he believes that the attack was connected to his paper's coverage of a case of embezzlement involving the former mayor of a Yaoundé district’s dealings with a timber company.\nYet another reporter, who asked to remain anonymous, says he almost lost an eye in November 2021 while working on an investigation into a powerful and well-connected individual. ‘Men came to my house, broke in and assaulted me. I knew who they were but they said they would return to finish me off if I dared to mention their names. I had to move my kids across the border to a neighbouring country after that’, he said.\nEvidence of torture\nThese journalists all survived, but some have not been so lucky. Chillen Music Television reporter Samuel Ajiekah Abuwe, nicknamed Wazizi, regularly talked about state corruption and human rights violations. He died on 17 August 2019 at a military hospital in Yaounde after going missing ten days prior. According to his lawyer, Christopher Ndong, Wazizi’s body bore evidence of torture. He had been denied bail under the Anti-Terrorism Law of 2014, which allows for indefinite detention without charge for offences including ‘acclaiming terrorism in the media’. Terrorism is defined by the law as anything that ‘creates a crisis situation’ or ‘insurrection’ and has widely been used by the security forces as an excuse to detain peaceful protesters and activists. Data collected by the ZAM team shows a steady increase in state human rights violations of citizens in recent years, mostly carried out under the auspices of this law. That data can be accessed here.\nAmong the hundreds of documented cases, at least eighteen journalists have been detained or forced into exile after the law’s passing in 2014. They include Radio France Internationale’s Ahmed Abba, who reported on refugees and conflict areas in the country and was arrested in 2015, and documentary producer Achomba Hans Achomba, whose turn came in 2017 when he was targeted for filming anti-government protests in southwest Cameroon. The charges against them included ‘complicity in hostility against the fatherland, secession, propagation of false news, insurrection, incitement to civil war, and complicity in acts of terrorism’, and both were tortured. Achomba was eventually freed after months of international pressure, while Abba spent two years in detention. They both now live in exile in Nigeria.\nArmed struggle\nIronically the regime’s longstanding repression of any and all peaceful protests, including restricting their coverage in media, is what led to the insurgent situation in the South- and NorthWestern areas in the first place. In 2016 this largely-Anglophone region was gripped by popular protests denouncing the reigning Yaoundé-based Francophone elite’s perceived discrimination against English speakers. However, it was the central regime’s harsh military response which caused it to turn into a fully-fledged armed struggle a year later.\nThe crackdown on both protest and journalism has meant that Cameroonian media has less and less room to manoeuvre as it attempts to cover security forces’ human rights violations. The fear is especially tangible in Anglophone areas, where state operatives can order any individual to hand over their mobile phone and use whatever they find on the device to underpin a terrorism charge. This practice is also gaining ground in Francophone areas, too, with reporters being arrested in the context of general anti-government protests.\nThe main victim of this repression is the truth, but in Cameroon, there is an extra twist. With truthful reporting made all but impossible, many in the ruling elite have seized the opportunity and launched publications to pump out false news praising their proprietors and smearing opponents. Despite shrinking press freedom the number of registered broadcasters and publishers has doubled in just the past three years, from three hundred to six hundred. L’Anecdote and Vision4 TV are both owned by Amougou Belinga, a prominent tycoon whose proximity to power may be related to the state’s decisions to accord him favours including a large bank loan without collateral and a US$4 million treasury grant. Other regime-friendly publications, including Quotidien Réalités Plus, Essingan, Le Quotidien and La Grande Tribune, share L’Anecdote's habit of remaining dormant until a sponsor is accused of theft or corruption, then abruptly returning to the newsstands to smear accusers.\nSmear campaigns and prison sentences\nNsom Kini, the Guardian Post’s Yaounde bureau chief, notes that ‘those newspapers come out like dogs, to attack the adversaries of their masters, especially during elections’. Denis Nkwebo, President of the National Syndicate of Cameroonian Journalists says he feels ‘disgusted and disheartened’ by watching ‘media houses and newspapers fight each other over stories concerning embezzlers and thieves,’ adding that ‘instead of tackling the thieves, the media outlets owned by the thieves are vigorously fighting against any media house or newspaper exposing their sponsors.’ He blamed the fake news attacks and smear campaigns for contributing to a general climate of fear. ‘Even those who in the past were outspoken about thievery in public institutions are today silent, very silent indeed. Some who started excellent investigations ended the stories halfway and never cared to tell their readers why.’\nThose who still try to keep the Cameroonian public informed about state mismanagement and corruption scandals find the machinery of the state directed against them even if they are civil servants. State-owned broadcaster CRTV’s general manager Amadou Vamoulke (72) was sentenced to twelve years imprisonment for embezzlement on 20 December 2022, despite the prosecution’s charges and evidence being widely dismissed as fabricated and a ‘sham’**. Prior to his arrest six years ago, Vamoulke himself had blown the whistle on the theft of public funds within the corporation. He had also attempted to reform and professionalise the organisation’s hiring policies. At present 80% of the station’s senior positions are reported to be occupied by members of President Biya’s immediate clan, leaving taxpayers to wonder whether the best people are being hired for the job. Even in Cameroon’s crowded media environment, however, few papers remain free to ask such questions.\nSilence also surrounds the case of Health Ministry official Dr Albert Ze, who was transferred to Bamenda, in western Cameroon, after he worked on several audits that uncovered the theft of health project budgets by powerful individuals in the state. In a rare interview, Ze told ZAM that his recent transfer follows years of harassment, including death threats as well as offers of bribes. ‘When I refused to take money, I was physically attacked. My house was burgled twice, with laptops, hard disks, and tablets stolen both times. Several batons were also left behind in my house as a message that they could be used against me.’\nBut after Ze’s attention was caught by irregularities around a COVID-19 Solidarity Fund that had amassed donations from corporate bodies and individuals in Cameroon between 2020 and 2021, things took a sudden turn for the worse. After word got out that he was ‘sticking his nose into business that did not concern him’, as ZAM’s sources put it, he was informed that he was to be transferred to the Regional Delegation of Public Health in Bamenda. As a Francophone and a member of President Biya’s Beti clan, this posting to the heart of an Anglophone anti-Biya region, where rebels are known to attack those perceived to have ties to the governing elite, this transfer posed a considerable risk to his physical safety. While reluctant to comment in detail, in a recent interview he says that ‘this situation has brought about a regression in my activities’, adding that he has had to ‘separate from his family, leaving them in a safer area’ and that he now lives alone.\nAlbert Ze’s colleague, Dr Nancy Saiboh, who had been set to participate in the same audit, also received a similarly abrupt transfer notice sending her to a rural area. Dr Saiboh told ZAM that she has since received threats by ‘unknowns on Facebook’ and that she ‘always looks over her shoulder wherever she goes’ nowadays. ZAM’s investigations suggested that eight other whistleblowers of state mismanagement and corruption were also targeted for harassment, threats, arrest and sometimes torture. However, when the investigations team made efforts to interview those eight individuals, none agreed to talk to us. Instead several expressed anger at being identified.\n‘The IMF is complicit’.\nBesides journalists and whistleblowers, hundreds of ordinary citizens have also been arrested, detained, tortured and jailed under anti-terrorism laws. These include members of the anti-corruption NGO Stand Up 4 Cameroon, whose president Kah Walla also serves as president of the opposition Cameroon Peoples Party (CPP). When asked about the attrition rate she doesn’t mince her words about those responsible. ‘They feel we are trying to remove the gombo (okra stew) from their mouths’, she says.\nWalla, who has been detained herself, is known as the ‘Iron Lady’ in Cameroon’s progressive circles. She says she is disappointed at the lack of support from the international community. ‘We at Stand Up 4 Cameroon called on the International Monetary Fund to demand accountability for a loan of US$335 million given to Cameroon for the fight against COVID-19. The IMF did not; instead, they gave more money to the Cameroon government. This is complicity.’\nThe IMF’s US$335 million has been the object of an investigation by the Audit Bench of the Cameroon Supreme Court, which reported that it had recommended ten individuals for prosecution for embezzlement. However, the names of the ten have not been made public and the report has not been presented to parliament.\nEven officials at CONAC, the anti-corruption commission, would not talk to us on the record. Like their colleagues at ANIF, the Agence Nationale d’Investigation Financière, they recognise that the office exists mainly because of donor pressure rather than any political will. ‘These ‘tigers’, (a common nickname in Cameroon for corrupt politicians), ‘are fighting back ferociously against us and all those exposing them’, said a CONAC official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.\nCONAC’s most recent report, which covers 2020, estimates that in that single year the ‘tigers’, which include ministers, directors of state corporations and government subsidiaries, highly-placed government officials, and senior military and police functionaries, together presided over the theft of approximately US$2 billion of state funds, equivalent to 20% of the country’s 2022 budget. Their reports fall on deaf ears, however; in 2018 alone CONAC transferred 94 dossiers of embezzlement and theft to various courts in the country for prosecution, but to date, none have reached trial.\n*Name changed'\n**Despite calls for Vamoulke’s release being made by several international organisations, including Reporters Without Borders, the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Cameroon has not responded. In a statement after the verdict, Reporters without Borders slammed the case as a ‘monstrous frame up’.\nCredit: Zammagazine.com\nLatest Stories\n-\nVeteran Nigerian actor, Mr Ibu reported dead\n-\nOne Way Tour: Josh Blakk, Blakknoters deliver captivating performance in Nigeria\n-\nGACL apologises for power outage at KIA\n-\nWater Technology Certificate introduced at St Paul’s School in Kukurantumi\n-\nShowing of JoyNews’ ‘Sick Hospitals’ documentary causes stir in Parliament\n-\nGaza receives first airdrop of US humanitarian aid\n-\nAkatsi: Man in police custody found dead\n-\nVanuatu parliament welcomes Vanuatu Trade Commissioner to Ghana Prof. Hugh Keku Aryee in historic visit\n-\nGhana has become a ‘no-action, talk only’ country – Theo Acheampong\n-\nMan convicted over water meter theft\n-\nAnti-LGBTQ Bill: Parliament did not go against the constitution – Sam George\n-\nAnti-LGBTQ+ bill: All arguments remain personal opinions until SC makes pronouncement – Joseph Kpemka\n-\nAnti-LGBTQ Bill: Provisions in the bill do not impose a cap, gag the media – Sam George\n-\nNo regrets over move to Swansea in 2015 – Andre Ayew\n-\nAnti-LGBTQ+ bill: Ghana has done the right thing by passing the bill – Bokpin", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.myjoyonline.com/cameroon-the-truth-is-a-dangerous-business/"}
{"doc_id": "70594e73c4bb15e9c2403b3c0cb22c8e", "text": "Attacq, the JSE listed property company developing Waterfall City on Tuesday (10 September) published its financial results for the year ended June 2019, noting that seven buildings have been completed in Midrand, with a further nine buildings under construction.\nThe real estate investment trust (Reit) reported a full year dividend per share of 81.5 cents, up 10.1% from 2018, while exceeding guidance, it said.\n“In a challenging economic environment, the South African portfolio performed well,” the group said, supported by pleasing trading growth from the Mall of Africa and revenue earned from the seven newly completed buildings in Waterfall. This resulted in distributable earnings increasing by 17.1% to R664.1 million, it said.\nThe group’s South African portfolio contributed R415.4 million to this, with investment in MAS Real Estate adding R189.1 million and its rest of Africa operations adding R86.2 million.\nDragging on distributable earnings was a cost of R26.6 million attributable to ongoing developments at Waterfall City, for the holding of development rights and other associated costs.\nAttacq reported a loss of R603 million for the period (2018: profit of R2.7 billion), driven largely by the impairment of loans to Atterbury Africa and Gruppo Investments in Nigeria, as well as negative movements on the fair value adjustments on completed properties, and the Waterfall development rights, the group said.\nOperating profit declined to R761.3 million (2018: R1.3 billion), while the group ended the year cash positive, with a balance of R673 million, down from the R1.2 billion at the end of the 2018 financial year. This was mainly due to an R805 million payment in dividends during the year, it said.\nWaterfall City\nWaterfall City is one of the biggest investments in the Attacq portfolio, and includes the likes of PwC tower and Mall of Africa, and an additional nine buildings under construction.\nThe total asset value of developments at Waterfall, including the value of the Attacq Sanlam joint venture (Waterfall Junction), remained largely unchanged at R2.3 billion (2018: R2.3 billion), Attacq said.\n“Whilst these assets do not contribute positively to distributable earnings, it is a platform for future economic benefits via the development of new properties,” the group said.\nThe buildings completed in Waterfall increased the total South African portfolio primary gross lettable area (PGLA) to 750 825m2 (2018: 722 731m2). The seven buildings added 42 615m2 of PGLA to Waterfall, of which 27 701m2 represents Attacq’s effective share.\nWaterfall has 948,786 square metres of developable bulk remaining, it said.\nThe developments that are still under construction (and their expected completion dates) include:\n- Deloitte’s head office (Q3 FY20)\n- The Ingress – for PSG Wealth (Q1 FY20)\n- The Ingress – building 2 (Q2 FY20)\n- Waterfall Corporate Campus (Q2 FY20)\n- Waterfall Point (Q2 FY20)\n- Waterfall Courtyard Hotel (Q1 FY21)\nDevelopments that are still in the pipeline include:\n- Waterfall Corporate Campus – building 4\n- The Waterfall Logistics Hub (Q4 FY20)\n- The Ellipse – phase 1 (Q4 FY21)\nDeloitte’s head office\nThe Ingress\nWaterfall Corporate Campus\nWaterfall Point\nWaterfall Courtyard Hotel\nThe Waterfall Logistics Hub\nThe Ellipse – phase 1", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/339887/attacq-points-to-waterfall-city-growth/"}
{"doc_id": "bfd5ff17e23b29a3ef96bb558ba51049", "text": "British Airways has announced it is replacing its chief executive Alex Cruz as the airline navigates \"the worst crisis\" facing its industry.\nMr Cruz, who has been with BA since 2016, will be immediately replaced by Aer Lingus boss Sean Doyle.\nMr Cruz will stay on as non-executive chairman for a transition period before Mr Doyle also takes on the role.\nBA has been embroiled in a bitter dispute with unions over redundancies and pay cuts.\nIt is cutting 13,000 staff and has been criticised by staff and MPs who claim the airline has been following a \"fire and rehire\" policy, which left some employees facing pay cuts of up to 50%.\nLuis Gallego, chief executive of IAG, which owns BA, said: \"We're navigating the worst crisis faced in our industry and I'm confident these internal promotions will ensure IAG is well placed to emerge in a strong position.\"\nThe shake-up is one of the first major movesby Mr Gallego who took over as IAG's chief executive last month, replacing long-standing boss Willie Walsh.\n\"This is a sign that the new chief executive of IAG, Luis Gallego, is flexing his muscles and trying to demonstrate he'll make the changes necessary to lead a sustained recovery for the airline group,\" said Susannah Streeter, senior investment and markets analyst at Hargreaves Lansdown.\nNew data from Heathrow showed the challenges being faced by the travel industry from the coronavirus pandemic. Just 1.2 million passengers travelled through the airport in September, down 82% compared with the same month last year.\nHe's done the dirty work - now a fresh pair of hands is needed.\nAlex Cruz's most recent task at BA was to push through thousands of job cuts as well as changes to pay and conditions, which will see many remaining staff earning a lot less in future.\nThose cuts may have been necessary due to the Covid crisis, but the way BA went about it - effectively threatening to fire employees who refused to sign new contracts - provoked deep resentment and bitterness among the workforce.\nAnd he was hardly popular to begin with. He arrived at BA with a brief to cut costs and boost profitability, to enable the carrier to compete with low-cost operators. He succeeded, but at a cost.\nCustomer satisfaction fell sharply, leading to accusations that the BA brand was being sacrificed for short-term shareholder value. There were strikes over what was described as \"poverty pay\" by cabin crew. And repeated IT failures proved deeply embarrassing for the company.\nNow the man who appointed him, former IAG chief executive Willie Walsh, has retired. The new IAG boss, Luis Gallego, appears keen to make his mark and rebuild bridges with staff.\nMr Cruz was very much part of the old regime. It should come as no surprise that he now has to step aside.\n'Toughest challenge'\nMr Doyle is returning to BA after just two years in charge at Aer Lingus, which is also owned by IAG. Prior to that, he had worked at BA since 1998.\nBut Ms Streeter said: \"Sean Doyle will have his work cut out to make immediate progress given that British Airways is facing the toughest challenge in its history as demand for international travel has plummeted and quarantine restrictions continue to constrain bookings.\"\nMr Cruz's tenure as BA's boss has been eventful. In September last year, the airline's pilots staged their first ever strike which led to 2,325 flights being cancelled and cost BA €137m (£124m).\nIt has also suffered a number of costly IT problems, including an incident in 2017 that left 75,000 flyers stranded and cost the airline £80m.\nLast year, the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) announced it intended to fine BA a record £183m after a breach of its security system, exposing hundreds of thousands of customer details. The ICO and BA are still in discussions regarding the fine.\nIAG declined to comment on whether Mr Cruz would receive any compensation when he leaves BA once the transition period is completed. It also declined to say how long the transition period would last.\nLatest Stories\n-\nThe Roll Call of Biblical Financial Evangelists\n-\nMahama accuses Bawumia of dubbing NDC’s policy promises\n-\nMahama echoes vision for resilient governance and economic recovery at NDC LAB Policy Dialogue\n-\nGSE’s Abena Amoah not on Bawumia’s economy committee\n-\nNDC’s Policy Dialogue marks milestone in pre-election strategy – Mahama\n-\nEOCO to launch lifestyle audits targeting celebrities and individuals with suspected unexplained wealth\n-\nUpper West Akim MP cuts sod for the construction of Mepom to Esaaso Road\n-\nEngineers urged to embrace preview of their works\n-\nParis 2024Q: Zambia edges Ghana 1-0 for crucial first-leg advantage\n-\nDr. Christian Sewordor Mensah: The Role of Sector Skill Bodies in using ESG and CSR Principles in shaping Sustainable Education and Training\n-\nTyler Perry halts $800 film studio build over AI fears\n-\nAkufo-Addo appoints Ofori-Atta as Senior Presidential Advisor\n-\nMIIF aims to position Ghana as electric vehicle hub in Africa\n-\nAvatar: The Last Airbender receives mixed reviews from critics\n-\nMahama slams Police’s decision to dissociate itself from DCOP Waabu’s comments on election security", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.myjoyonline.com/british-airways-boss-replaced-amid-industrys-worst-crisis/"}
{"doc_id": "3b6989be7ab9e61f77ed1ddd888e84ad", "text": "By some strange coincidence, the world celebrates toilets and men on November 19 every year. This year, residents of Tudor Ward presented Mombasa County Assembly Members with feaces ceremonially wrapped in a beautiful box and an open letter. Their demand was simple and in line with the theme this year. The Mombasa County Government must not leave any behind, behind.\nDespite progress globally, struggling to find a clean, safe and available toilet is still a familiar experience for many of us. Four out of seven people on the planet don’t have a safe way of managing the 350 million tonnes of human waste they produce annually. A total of 670 million people regularly relieve themselves in open spaces.\nFifty-six years after independence, more than 61 per cent of Nairobians live in a one room unit and only 4 per cent live in homes with more than four rooms. Only 62 per cent of Nairobians use a flushing toilet, 32 per cent use pit latrines and 6 per cent use open spaces or other means. Six hundred kilometres away, Muoroto community members decided to do something this year about the lack of toilet access.\nMuoroto is an informal settlement in Tudor water-front. Ten thousand human beings live, trade and work here. They have one public toilet, no waste management sewage system or access to public drinking water. They buy 20 litre jerry cans for between Sh50 and Sh100. Like any other informal settlement in the country, being poor is not only undignified, it is also expensive.\nSocial housing\nMuoroto is already within the sights of the Mombasa County government and national government. Under social housing and slum upgrading programmes, it has been indicated that they may be relocated to new houses after the upgrading of Mombasa’s ten old council estates. The draft Beach Management County Bill may bring its own risks. It remains to be seen whether these initiatives will not further displace and impoverish this community and others. In the meantime, the good men and women of the Mombasa County Assembly could prioritise water and sanitation for the Muoroto in the County Integrated Development Plan and Budget.\nExperts tell us toilets save lives, protect our dignity and create opportunities for others. There is also a feminist lens to this. On average, women empty their bladder more regularly and take at least 30 seconds longer than men. They also use toilets to change sanitary pads and care for children. Modern female toilets usually have two to three more supplies than male toilets. Yet men usually enjoy more facilities than women and trans-gender and inter-sex persons have none. A men’s toilet with a cubicle and five urinals is usually allocated the same space as three cubicles in the women’s toilet. Yes my brothers, this is the reason women’s queues are usually longer and women take longer.\nToilets are not just an issue of equity, they are also a matter of rights and dignity. For decades, slum neglect and then demolition has been a well-established cruel technique of political and social control. Governments have failed to provide meaningful levels of water and sanitation to people living in slums and informal settlements. Treating some human beings differently from others without an objective, reasonable and humane argument is discriminatory and irresponsible. If essential services cannot be supplied to areas that are unsuitable for people to live, then the government should provide a minimum level of sanitation as they develop resettlement plans to new locations where they can.\nFailure to do this will open the door for more creative and direct actions by residents in the same situation as Muoroto. Where could this end? Processions of parents dropping off their children at county headquarters to be schooled, relatives dropping off their sick or dead who need treatment or burials they cannot afford and citizens relieving themselves on the county governor’s official car. Another creative idea could be to hang signs on all public toilets on World Toilet Day that say, “Closed today in solidarity with 670 million people.” Let us not get there.\nSanitary and right to water and health standards, framed by our Constitution, the Public Health Act and building codes, should be rigorously enforced, accelerated and invested in. Within five kilometres of most residents and State Officers reading this article there is an informal urban settlement or a rural village that is denied the most basic of services, a safe and clean toilet. Think about this the next time you visit a toilet.\n- Irungu Houghton is Amnesty International Executive Director. [email protected]", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001350471/access-to-toilets-is-a-matter-of-equity-rights-and-dignity"}
{"doc_id": "5cd225604bcbdf7614107b6a2af77947", "text": "Zimbabwe’ internet penetration rate – a measure of the percentage of the population that connects to the internet – has been registered at 50.1%.\nAccording to recent figures shared by the telecoms regulator, POTRAZ, at the end of the third quarter of 2016 (September 2016), 6,732,470 connections were recorded from all internet providers in the country, representing an internet penetration rate of 50.1%.\nThis was the same internet penetration rate recorded for the second quarter of 2016, signifying a slowdown in the growth of internet use among Zimbabweans.\nThe number usually records an increase as a growing segment of a previously offline population has been increasingly turning for the first time to internet-based services that include email, instant messaging, social media and e-commerce.\nSince 2009 when Zimbabwe adopted a multi-currency regime (“dollarisation”) there has been a consistent increase in internet use. Internet penetration in 2009 stood at 5.1%, by the third quarter of 2013 it had grown to 39.8%. At the end of the third quarter of 2015, this number came to 46.6%.\nThis rise was supported by a period of economic growth and stabilisation, investments in broadband technology from internet providers which expanded internet access, as well as the suspension of duties on mobile devices which led to a rise in mobile phone use.\nState intervention to promote growth?\nEarlier this year the Minister of ICT Supa Mandiwanzira highlighted that the government is targeting broadband access for 80% of the population by 2020.\nWith an economic funk that’s set to persist for an uncertain period, a slow response to calls for more affordable data pricing which would make broadband less of a luxury and issues like the burden of import duties on devices, this figure might be out of reach.\nThat is unless the government takes deliberate actions to promote internet access either through a firmer stance on broadband pricing, encouraging smartphone access through policies like device rebates and expanding public access to broadband facilities in areas where this hasn’t been prioritised.\nThis sort of approach would accelerate broadband use and introduce a greater part of the offline population to the opportunity of the internet.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.techzim.co.zw/2016/12/zimbabwes-internet-penetration-rate-stalls-50-1-will-government-intervene/"}
{"doc_id": "5ea975a019e42f61c6aa2660581c1c34", "text": "CBZ nine months profit\nTapiwanashe Mangwiro\nFinancial services group CBZ Holdings reported a profit after tax of $636,6 billion for the 9 months to September 30, 2023, representing a 696 percent inflation-adjusted increase from the 2022 comparative period.\nThe performance drove significant improvement in the group’s profitability indicators, with return on assets rising to 21 percent from 8 percent, and return on equity rising to 80 percent from 22 percent.\nThe group’s total revenues climbed 137 percent to $1,5 trillion, although the cost-to-income ratio declined to 27 percent from 32 percent. Total assets increased by 113 percent to $6,7 trillion and total equity increased by 171 percent to $1,4 trillion.\nTotal loans and advances grew by 57 percent to $1,7 trillion while total deposits increased by 113 percent to $4,8 trillion.\nLooking ahead, the group highlighted the downside risks of further interest rate hikes abroad raising external borrowing costs, and the normal to below normal rainfall being forecasted for the upcoming agricultural season.\nAnalyst Namatai Maeresera said the relatively stable currency environment in the third quarter saw a moderate recovery in the group’s balance sheet, with total assets and deposits closing marginally higher, although still below their values at the end of the first quarter.\n“On the sharp growth in the group’s revenues and profits, technical gains arising from the group’s real assets and USD balances are likely major contributing factors. Otherwise, the high interest rate environment and the sharp local currency depreciation experienced earlier in the year are expected to translate to subdued income interest growth, in real terms.\n“Similarly, the squeeze on local currency liquidity and increased use of cash are likely to slow down income from fees and transactions. Beyond that, the possibility of a weak agricultural season presents a real threat for the group, given the increasingly significant contribution of the Agro-Yield unit to the group’s income,” he said.\nOn a positive note, the group’s asset management unit has been appointed the Fund Manager in the upcoming Revitus REIT – an ambitious project that aims to raise funds from investors to reinvigorate a number of CBD properties held under the property portfolio of the National Railways of Zimbabwe. Under a multi-phased development/rehabilitation programme, the REIT is projected to generate more than US$6 million per year in rentals at completion.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.herald.co.zw/cbz-nine-months-profit/"}
{"doc_id": "89de691b642a28efacee8cf479f19f4f", "text": "Damilola Oyedele in Abuja\nThe House of Representatives Committee on Public Petitions on Wednesday opened investigations against a firm co-owned by the gubernatorial candidate of the All Progressives Congress (APC) in Edo state, Mr. Godwin Obaseki, for alleged criminal appropriation of $16 million.\nThe firm, KCA-DEUTAG (Nigeria), has as Directors, Obaseki Godwin of Government House, Edo state, Ostermeier Hans Joachim, with address listed as KM 16, Aba expressway, Port Harcourt, and Vadakkara Manoj Raghavan of Villa No.52, Meadows, Dubai.\nThe investigation was prompted by a petition, “Complaint of criminal appropriation of the sum of $16 million ( N5.570, 950, 000) only, against the estate of late Chief Humphrey Idisi of blessed memory.”\nThe petition was submitted on May 24, 2016 by Hon. Lovett Ederin Idisi.\nObaseki owns 36 million shares in the firm, while the late Idisi owned 18 million shares, according to documents of the Corporate Affairs Commission.\nThe petition noted that on July 30, 2002, KCA-DEUTAG Nigeria Limited entered into a drilling/work over contractual agreement with the late Idisi for which the consideration accruing to him was percentaged-commission on all day rates earned by each of six rigs owned by Idisi.\nThe contract was renewed by the parties with improvements on the entitlements of the late Idisi putting his commission on the rigs at 3.5 percent on day rate earnings, it read.\nThe petition added that since Idisi died in 2009, KCA-DEUTAG has failed to transmit his entitlements under the existing agreement to the administrators of his estate.\nThe letter to the House by the solicitor to the estate of the late Idisi, FSS Ojealaro & Co, said KCA-DEUTAG’s default on payment of the entitlements, amounts to criminal misappropriation, and attempt to circumvent the Local Content Act Provisions.\nIt added that the position occupied by the late Idisi on the board of the company is yet to be filled, in accordance with the existing agreement.\nObaseki’s counsel, Mr. Olukayode Dada at the hearing however urged the committee to adjourn as a case has been instituted to determine if the House can investigate a matter which is a contractual agreement between KCA-DEUTAG and the late Idisi.\nHis claim was backed by the committee chairman, Hon. Nkem Abonta who disclosed that an Abuja High Court has asked the committee to appear on July 28, 2016 to determine if the House can investigate the matter.\nHon. Lovett Idisi however argued for the doctrine of separation of powers, and that an arm of government cannot stop another from its constitutional roles.\nHe urged Abonta to continue the hearing as he, Abonta, was yet to be personally served with the notice of court process.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.thisdaylive.com:443/index.php/2016/06/22/house-cttee-probes-edo-gubernatorial-candidates-firm-for-16m-fraud"}
{"doc_id": "a1008d0917f6244562558d6fb018c12c", "text": "Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Vodafone Ghana, Patricia Obo-Nai has won Africa’s Most Respected CEO in the Telecommunications category at the Africa Most Respected CEO Awards, held in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE).\nThe awards celebrated CEOs and senior public officers from Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Benin, Ethiopia, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa and Tanzania in various categories such as agro-processing, automobile franchise sales, ICT, tourism, leisure and recreation, private security services, health, insurance, telecommunications, media, pharmaceuticals, aviation, among others.\nSpeaking at the awards ceremony, Surrender Singh Kandhari, the chairman of Al Dobowi Group, and African Chamber for Trade United Arab Emirates said: ‘’The awards are aimed at bringing together business captains, public sector officials and investors in Africa who deserve recognition for accomplishments in their respective areas of endeavour in the COVID-challenged emerging African corporate ecosystem.’’\nPatricia’s contribution to the telecommunications industry is unquestionable. In addition to championing various innovations in the industry, she is celebrated for her outstanding leadership during the heights of the pandemic. Under her leadership, Vodafone Ghana introduced remarkable initiatives as part of a comprehensive relief package for Ghanaians.\nShe is a fierce advocate for technology and continues to emphasize the need for Africa to leverage technological advancement to drive sustainable development and secure its participation in the digital economy.\nPatricia reinforced this in her recent OpEd titled 'Connecting Africa is the Seminal Challenge of our Time’, she said: ‘’To expedite Africa’s economic recovery post-pandemic, the continent must accelerate digitalisation and expand regional cooperation.\"\nShe also called on governments, industry players and businesses to join Vodafone as it embarks on this campaign.\nPatricia is also known for her strong passion for gender issues and interventions that offers economic opportunities to women. Whilst speaking during the United Nations General Assembly last year, she made a call for an urgent solution to end maternal mortality across sub-Saharan Africa, describing it as unacceptable in this age.\nShe also joined other female giants last year at the G7 Partnership on Women’s Digital Financial Inclusion in Africa’s event to deliberate on Catalyzing Digital Financial Services for Women Across Africa.\nThe Mobile Magazine describes her as the ‘First lady of Mobile’. She has also won several awards including the CEO of the Year at the Ghana Information Technology and Telecommunications Awards (GITTA) as well as the Women Leadership Excellence Awards at the CEO’s Summit and Awards.\nThe Africa’s Most Respected CEOs Awards was held under the theme: ‘The Role of the African Corporate Pace-setters in Maximizing the Opportunities Offered by the AfCFTA.’ The awardees are first selected by public voting for nominees in each category.\nThe awards event was organized by The Business Executive Ltd., an events and media company based in Accra, Ghana.\nLatest Stories\n-\nThe Roll Call of Biblical Financial Evangelists\n-\nMahama accuses Bawumia of dubbing NDC’s policy promises\n-\nMahama echoes vision for resilient governance and economic recovery at NDC LAB Policy Dialogue\n-\nGSE’s Abena Amoah not on Bawumia’s economy committee\n-\nNDC’s Policy Dialogue marks milestone in pre-election strategy – Mahama\n-\nEOCO to launch lifestyle audits targeting celebrities and individuals with suspected unexplained wealth\n-\nUpper West Akim MP cuts sod for the construction of Mepom to Esaaso Road\n-\nEngineers urged to embrace preview of their works\n-\nParis 2024Q: Zambia edges Ghana 1-0 for crucial first-leg advantage\n-\nDr. Christian Sewordor Mensah: The Role of Sector Skill Bodies in using ESG and CSR Principles in shaping Sustainable Education and Training\n-\nTyler Perry halts $800 film studio build over AI fears\n-\nAkufo-Addo appoints Ofori-Atta as Senior Presidential Advisor\n-\nMIIF aims to position Ghana as electric vehicle hub in Africa\n-\nAvatar: The Last Airbender receives mixed reviews from critics\n-\nMahama slams Police’s decision to dissociate itself from DCOP Waabu’s comments on election security", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.myjoyonline.com/ceo-of-vodafone-wins-africas-most-respected-ceo-in-telecommunications/"}
{"doc_id": "8b8a0012a3f1c1ac89923cb917c447d2", "text": "Mid-month data from the Central Energy Fund points to some relief for diesel drivers in April – but petrol is still lined up for a hike.\nAccording to the daily snapshot for 14 March 2023, petrol prices are currently on course for a hike of 25 cents per litre, while diesel prices could come down by around 20 cents.\nThese are the expected changes:\n- Petrol 93: increase of 25 cents a litre;\n- Petrol 95: increase of 26 cents a litre;\n- Diesel 0.05%: decrease 20 cents a litre;\n- Diesel 0.005%: decrease of 22 cents a litre;\n- Illuminating paraffin: decrease of 68 cents a litre.\nThe Department of Energy has stressed that the daily snapshots are not predictive and do not cover other potential changes like slate levy adjustments or retail margin changes, which are determined by the department at the end of the month, taking all variables into account.\nThe DoE makes adjustments based on a review of the entire period. Furthermore, the outlook can change significantly before month-end. Ultimately, the expected price changes are contingent on current market conditions persisting through the end of the month.\nLocal fuel price fluctuations are impacted by two main factors – the international price of petroleum products, driven mainly by oil prices, and the rand/dollar exchange rate used to purchase these products.\nIn the first two weeks of March, South Africa’s rand was hammered by a slew of negative economic data, which was exacerbated by risk-off sentiment globally. This has contributed to a significant under-recovery (increase) in fuel prices of around 40 cents per litre.\nHowever, oil prices have also eased significantly, providing at least some balance – especially for diesel.\nRand exchange\nThe rand has had a rough March so far.\nSouth Africa as a whole has been hit with the perfect storm of bad news in the past few weeks, with the ongoing energy crisis, poor GDP data, declining business confidence and a current account deficit in negative territory all emerging against the backdrop of material risk-off sentiment in global financial markets.\nAs a result, the rand weakened to R18.74 against the dollar at one point, before recovering at the start of this week to around R18.20. The unit is currently trading slightly stronger at R18.16 on Wednesday (15 March).\nThe currency has been hit from both ends: weak GDP data for Q4 2022 signalled that the South African economy has likely entered a technical recession, with the damage from load shedding taking its toll. Load shedding has run a red line straight through the economy, beating down business confidence and generally impacting all facets of life in the country.\nAdding to local woes, however, is a global aversion to risk – which pushes investors out of emerging markets like South Africa – due to the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank in the United States, which added to worries that the already tighter lending environment, on the upwards US interest rate cycle, would cause other banks to pull back on lending.\nAs much as problems hit the rand at home, it is inextricably tied to the state of the global economy and the US, in particular. This means that the current environment does not spell good news for the local unit in the weeks ahead.\nOil prices\nWhile the rand has taken a beating, global oil prices seem to provide some relief.\nOil prices have been range-bound between $80 and $90 per barrel for most of the year, bandied back and forth by switching narratives over global supply and demand.\nOn the one hand, demand forecasts have been higher thanks to China getting rid of its zero-Covid policy and opening back up for business. This has generally pushed oil prices up slightly, countering a narrative of a looming global recession and reigning productivity.\nHigher prices have also been supported by supply issues as a result of sanctions against Russia over its war in Ukraine – with a price cap attached to Russian oil – and OPEC+ nations cutting production to support prices.\nOn the other hand, projections have been that China’s post-Covid production boom would be much slower than anticipated, and sanctions against Russia have had little impact on supply, pushing prices down.\nAccording to Bloomberg’s analysis of the market, prices are still fluctuating between these narratives, and general volatility is expected.\n“Oil has endured a bumpy year, whipsawed by aggressive monetary tightening from the Fed and optimism around China’s demand recovery. Further gains may be constrained in the near term, with OPEC forecasting a modest surplus in the second quarter, a typical period of soft demand prior to the summer,” it said. “The price cap imposed on Russian crude is working.”\nFor now, oil prices are favouring lower fuel prices back home. After trading around $83 a barrel in the first weeks of March, prices have now dropped below $80 a barrel and sit closer to $78 a barrel.\nThis is how the expected price changes could reflect at the pumps:", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businesstech.co.za/news/energy/672761/here-is-the-expected-petrol-price-for-april-4/"}
{"doc_id": "3b0ce31232eec19f9821561c8f91a73f", "text": "In its continued intervention in the foreign exchange market, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) injected a cumulative sum of $2.04 billion to further sustain the improved liquidity and relative stability in the market.\nAccording to the latest CBN’s monthly economic report covering the month of May 2019, Nigeria’s apex bank sold the whopping sum of $2.04 billion to authorised dealers in May, compared to $2.43 billion supplied in the previous month. This indicates a decline of 16.1%.\nKey Numbers: A breakdown of the Central Bank’s intervention in the foreign exchange (FX) market in the month of May 2019 reveals that Interbank sales fell by 10% to $0.09 billion, to the level in the preceding month.\nCurrency sales to the Bureau De Change (BDC) rose by 6.3% and estimated at US$1.05 billion.\nSwaps transactions remained unchanged from the previous month and it was estimated at $0.01 billion.\nThe average exchange rate of the naira to the US-dollar, at the inter-bank segment, was N306.95/US$, representing an appreciation of 0.003%\nThe average exchange rate at the BDC segment, at N360.00/US$, depreciated by 0.3% relative to the level at the end of the preceding month.\nAt the “Investors” and “Exporters” (I&E) window, the average exchange rate of the naira vis-à-vis the US dollar, was ₦360.74/US$ indicating that naira appreciated by 0.01%.\nNumbers Explained: The lower sales of FX in the month of May was as a result of less demand for FX at the inter-bank segment, a 6.3% decline. The reason for the decline may be as a result of low demand for forex at the interbank level, possibly due to the delays, policy, and other bureaucratic issues.\nUnlike the interbank segment, demand for FX surged at the BDC segment. This means that the Central Bank had to increase its supply of forex to ease pressure on the Nigerian Naira. This reflected in the depreciation of the exchange rate on this segment, signifying a surge in the demand for FX for the month under review.\nOn the other hand, the fragility of Nigeria’s exchange rate system was further established as the Central Bank increased the supply of forex to the all-important I&E window where foreign investors trade. Accordingly, the naira exchange rate appreciated by 0.01% in the I&E segment in the month, indicating strong stability in the segments likely occasioned by an oversupply of FX by the Central Bank.\nMeanwhile, Reserves Depleted by $48 million: While the CBN is bent on continuing its intervention in the FX market, burning through the reserves means the apex bank is sacrificing FX savings for naira stability.\nAnalysis of data obtained from the Central Bank of Nigeria shows that in the last month, despite an increase in forex receipts, external reserves depleted by US$48.3 million. This shows that the Central Bank’s intervention is gradually eating up Nigeria’s external reserves. Here are highlights of Nigeria’s reserves in May 2019\nThe gross external reserves stood at US$44.85 billion, at end May 2019, indicating an increase of 0.9% above the US$44.47 billion recorded at end-April 2019\nA breakdown of the external reserves by ownership showed that the share of Federation reserves was US$0.004 billion (0.01%)\nFederal Government reserves were estimated at US$7.37 billion (16.4%)\nCentral Bank’s reserves stood at US$37.47 billion (83.6%) of the total\nThe increase was mainly due to rising receipts from foreign exchange purchases, receipts from oil-related taxes, receipts from joint venture companies (JVC cash call funding) and receipts from third parties\nThe external reserves position could cover 6.5 months of import cover for goods and services, and 10.4 months for goods only, using the import figure for the first quarter, 2019.\nThe Upshots: Despite the recent report that the Central Bank is heading towards floating the naira in order to allow market dynamics dictate the price of the naira exchange rate, the apex bank’s Governor, Mr Gowin Emefiele, the bank is committed to continuing its intervention policy in the FX market to stabilise the naira.\nWhile the intervention will keep the naira stable, for now, analysts are of the opinion that it is only a matter of time before the CBN will float the naira in the face of rising tension in the middle east, and on-going trade war capable of crashing oil prices which is Nigeria’s main source of FOREX earnings.\nWhy use the term ‘blow’ when the currency was simply being exchanged for Naira? The term gives the impression that $2 Billion evaporated into thin air when in fact it still exists in the treasury as Naira.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://nairametrics.com/2019/06/28/cbn-blows-2-04-billion-to-defend-the-naira-in-may-as-reserves-deplete/"}
{"doc_id": "36a74001b1761f5988f3dba80ebd6f5a", "text": "Bamburi Cement is in line for an additional payout on top of the $84 million (Sh12.86 billion) consideration from its sale of a 70 percent stake in Uganda’s Hima Cement based on the financial performance of the subsidiary post the close of the transaction.\nThe Nairobi Securities Exchange-listed cement maker told its shareholders in a circular that the top-up payment—known as an Earn-Out Amount—will be triggered if Hima’s earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortisation (Ebitda) for the 2023 financial year equal or exceed Sh3.13 billion.\nRead: Bamburi Cement profit plunges 87pc to Sh181 million\nThe details of how to calculate the Ebitda, as well as the size of the Earn Out Amount, are set out in the share purchase agreement, which is yet to be made public by the firm.\nBamburi and its sister company Cementia Holding AG are selling their entire ownership in Hima to a consortium of Sarrai Group and Rwimi Holdings for $120 million (Sh18.4 billion). From the proceeds, Bamburi is entitled to a 70 percent share, while Cementia will bank 30 percent.\n“In addition to the consideration, the purchasers shall pay to Himcem and Cementia the Earn Out Amount, if the consolidated Ebitda of Huma (based on its audited financial statements for the year 2023) is equal to or exceeds Ush77.96 billion (Sh3.13 billion),” said Bamburi in the circular.\n“The purchasers shall pay out the Earn Out Amount shortly upon Himcem and Cementia providing the purchasers with their calculation of the Ebitda.”\nCompanies involved in asset sales normally utilise the Earn Out option if there is a gap between the price the seller is demanding and what the buyer is willing to pay. The option thus bridges the differing expectations between the parties.\nThe Bamburi consideration will also be affected by other adjustments related to Hima’s debt, cash holdings and working capital levels.\nThe consideration amount will be netted off Hima’s debt at the time of completion and added to any cash held by the subsidiary at the time.\nBamburi will also get to keep Hima’s working capital which is in excess of Ush48 billion (Sh1.93 billion), but if the Ugandan firm’s working capital is below this amount, the difference will be deducted from the consideration.\nRead: Bamburi hit with Sh1.2bn Uganda, Kenya tax claims\nBamburi has signalled to shareholders that it expects to pay a special dividend from the proceeds of the sale, meaning that any extra consideration under the special terms could directly boost the return to its shareholders.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/companies/bamburi-eyes-extra-payout-from-sale-of-uganda-unit--4452770"}
{"doc_id": "ef0d8ed64ec40da2636990ba3c2d9ff6", "text": "Confidence in South Africa’s other services sector has plummeted in the first quarter of the year, the latest data from the Bureau for Economic Research (BER) shows, as companies drop services in favour of higher spending on load shedding solutions.\nAfter continuously increasing since reaching a nadir during the level 5 lockdown in the second quarter of 2020, confidence in the other services sector plummeted in the first quarter of the year, showing a 23-point drop on the index from 68 to 45.\nThis is the largest ever recorded in the survey’s 18-year existence the BER said.\nThe other services sector comprises hotels, restaurants, transport, real estate and business services. They are denoted as “other” services to distinguish them from the retail, wholesale and motor trade sectors, which are also part of the services sector but included in the RMB/BER business confidence index (BCI).\nThe other services sector is not included in the BCI due to its lagging business cycle characteristics, i.e., it recovers/deteriorates later than the BCI sectors, the BER said.\nAlthough the other services sector contributes a considerable 22% to GDP and employment, the BER does not include it in the BCI to safeguard its advanced signalling properties.\nThe fall in the overall index stemmed from the transport and business services sub-sectors.\nConfidence in the transport sub-sector collapsed to 14 and in the crucial3 business service sub-sector fell from 64 to 47.\nIn contrast, confidence in the hospitality sub-sector increased from 73 to 75, a far cry from zero at the time of the hard lockdown in 2020\nIn the case of the last remaining sub-sector, real estate, confidence declined from 47 to 43.\nThe main driver behind the huge drop in confidence in these sectors is the persistent load shedding which has devastated businesses and economic operations over the period.\nThis was felt particularly hard in the business services sector – such as renting of machinery and equipment, computer services, legal services, accounting, consulting engineering, advertising, building and plant cleaning, debt collection and exhibitions – as fewer businesses made use of these services and instead increased spending on load shedding mitigation measures.\nIn the first quarter, the only bright spot was hotels and restaurants, which recorded even faster activity growth than during the fourth quarter of 2022.\nPart of the exceptionally strong year-on-year growth could be attributed to a base effect, the BER said.\nIn the first quarter of 2022, not all Covid-19 restrictions were lifted and the international travel bans knocked foreign tourist numbers. In contrast, the current summer holiday season saw international visitors return.\nAnother explanation for the strong growth is a partial resumption in business travel, more local trips, increased eating out and, in the final instance, the normal pre-Covid summer seasonal factors, the BER said.\nThe rate of increase in selling prices in the hotels and restaurants sector skyrocketed as accommodation rates increased and restaurants had to adjust their menu prices sharply upwards to compensate for higher food prices and load-shedding costs.\nThings look bleak in all other sectors, however.\nRoad freight transport and other supporting services – such as travel agencies, cargo handling and freight forwarding – had to contend with higher fuel costs, fierce competition and delays at ports over the period.\nReal estate confidence declined further from 47 to 43. Given that the long-term average is 45, confidence could be regarded as neither high nor low in the first quarter, the BER noted.\nRespondents commented that the continued improvement in property management – such as renting – partly compensated for the weaker sales of properties.\n“After continuously recovering in 2021 and 2022, the fortunes of the other services sector reversed abruptly in the first quarter of 2023. While hospitality kept on improving, the situation in transport, real estate and business services took a turn for the worse, primarily due to extensive load-shedding and surging costs,” the BER said.\n“Whereas the other services sector supported GDP growth for the most part in recent quarters, it seems destined to join the more energy-intensive sectors of the economy in detracting from growth in the first quarter of 2023.”", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/674379/these-businesses-in-south-africa-are-taking-a-beating-and-you-already-know-why/"}
{"doc_id": "f04ac2b4102eec3217b2e10e8b7efa0e", "text": "Beitbridge elects new mayor\nThupeyo Muleya\nBeitbridge Bureau\nBEITBRIDGE’S Ward 1 councillor, Mr Peter Pirato Mafuta, has been elected as the town’s mayor.\nCllr Mafuta of CCC was elected unopposed on Monday, and immediately declared that he would continue with the town’s transformation thrust set by the Second Republic.\nCllr Mafuta will be deputised by Ward 6 Councillor Mr John Manatsa.\nHe replaces Mr Munyaradzi Chitsunge who was Ward 2 councillor after the 2018, while Mr Manatsa replaces Cllr Agness Tore from Ward 6.\nBeitbridge Town has six elected councillors and two others from the women’s quota system.\nIn his acceptance speech, Cllr Mafuta said he has an open door policy, and accepts all ideas from all people that will help transform the town into a medium city.\n“Let me thank my fellow councillors for the nomination and subsequent election to the post of mayor of Beitbridge,” said Cllr Mafuta.\n“I am advised the 2023 municipal budget speech ran with the theme: ‘Accelerating Economic Transformation’. The theme is premised on the National Development Strategy 1 anchored on moving the nation towards a prosperous and empowered upper middle-income society by 2030.\n“Our 2023 budget was responding to the various issues raised by stakeholders through the 2022 consultative process.” Cllr Mafuta said key issues to be tackled include the need to permanently deal with sewer blockages, provision of potable water in Tshithaudze, Madinginye and Khwalu suburbs, as well as infrastructural development to match the border upgrade spearheaded by the Government.\nHe added that upgrading the sewer system, tarring of roads, completion of stands servicing, completion of the main rank, and public lighting, were some of the immediate concerns.\nIn the first six months in office, Cllr Mafuta said they intend to start the construction of a new clinic, complete a toilet block at Alfred Beit Primary School for the school to open next January.\nThe completion of the Dulivhadzimu Bus Terminus, which is long overdue, would be attended to, he said.\n“We are also going to improve public lighting and I am advised that we have entered into an agreement with Econet to use some of their base stations to install public lights,” said Cllr Mafuta.\n“In addition, it is critical for us to start offering stands on the new central business district, which will make our town look new and modern.\n“Our town has faced challenges of water shortages, roads in need of resealing/ reconstruction, the need to control vending, control illegal occupation of council land, low payments by rate payers and the slow pace of stand servicing.”\nTo ensure the local authority remains viable, Cllr Mafuta said there was a need to increase revenue generation, particularly through payments in foreign currency.\nHe said the development will see workers getting a rise in the foreign currency component of their salaries.\nThe new mayor also said he would focus on council’s vision of becoming a ‘smart city’, which provides “excellent sustainable services to the community by 2030”.\n“Service delivery is currently subdued due to financial constraints as witnessed by the low budget expenditure. Residents and stakeholders have bemoaned deteriorating service delivery,” he said.\nBeitbridge Municipality had budgeted to redevelop or renew the oldest part of Dulivhadzimu Township, which is located north of Dulivhadzimu Stadium, including the stadium itself, and west of Makhado Road, extending westwards to include the old bus terminus and the Wamlala stream.\nThe area has buildings that are not only decaying, but also do not satisfy the minimum requirements for habitable buildings.\nMr Chitsunge challenged the new leaders to be involved in community programmes and ensure they move along with national vision. He said election time was over and expects the new leadership to hit the ground running.\nBeitbridge District Development Coordinator, Mrs Sikhangezile Mafu-Moyo, said they were looking forward to seeing accelerated infrastructure development in the town.\n“The Government has set the tone for development in our town and we expect to see the local authority complementing these efforts,” she said.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.herald.co.zw/beitbridge-elects-new-mayor/"}
{"doc_id": "e64802bfeded17444a832a0cdbeff4ea", "text": "Business\nDizengoff began operations in Nigeria in 1958. We represent the sole importer and distributor for the world Number one tractors and implements such as ploughs, harrows etc. We import them and provide technical support, warranty support, ongoing repairs.\nGreenhouses\nWe are into a relatively new area in Nigeria which is greenhouses with drip irrigation solutions. Greenhouse technologies are a combination of the protective environment and all the technologies of irrigation and chemicals. Today, Kenya is the world’s largest supplier of cut flowers and roses. It is a $1billion export income earner for Kenya but 30 to 35 years ago, it was not so. Our sister company in Kenya has installed over 80 percent of all the greenhouses in Kenya. About 350,000 people are involved in that industry. It is a major part of the agric sector in Kenya.\nWe looked to use that technology and its application for West Africa. So, about four to five years ago, we started to see the combination of factors which suggest that bringing that technology to Nigeria would be helpful for production of market garden vegetables, precisely tomatoes, since all Nigerians eat tomatoes everyday in one form or another.\nTomatoes\nAt least 2.5 million tons of tomatoes are consumed every year in Nigeria. But only 1.3million to 1.4million tons are grown yearly through the old traditional open fields methods. Half of what is grown is even wasted before getting to the market because of the poor infrastructure- the logistics challenge of getting farm to fork.\nImport\nThere is a big gap so Nigeria imports fresh tomato pastes, tin tomatoes and even fresh tomatoes. More than half of what the country consumes is imported, which is crazy. So, we have started to adapt this greenhouse technology for Nigeria to grow tomatoes.\nOpen fields versus greenhouses\nBy growing tomatoes in open fields Nigeria, like other Sub-Saharan African countries will deliver yields of no more than seven tons per hectare. Last year, we had 294 greenhouses installed; on average they deliver 264 tons per hectare. With the greenhouses, our growers produce tomatoes all year round, anywhere in Nigeria. Whether in Calabar to Lagos, to Katsina, we have got our greenhouses all over Nigeria.\nManaged greenhouses\nThe reason they are so successful is not just the technology, or the physical component we put together, it is also the know-how and the supervision of that know-how every single day. It is applying the technology in the right way every single day. So, we supply managed greenhouses. We install them in the growers’ farms, we bring in our own supervisors and we pay them salaries.\nWhat we are trying to do is not just to fill the import supply gap, we need to manage the technology so well that the farmer can have a better income to make it attractive for them to move from the subsistence kind of farming common in Africa to a business. It is crazy for Nigeria to use proceeds from crude oil to import food, in a nation where if you put a stick in the ground in any part of the country, it would grow. There are different types of soils in different parts of the country but they are all very fertile.\nOur managed greenhouse is a turn-key business. We have it structured in a way that it can deliver full returns within the first year of the business. We also help them on the supply chain for example, a lot of our growers are supplying Shoprite and there is still need for more supplies. There is also demand from the hospitality industry -hotels, restaurants etc. Airline companies are also buying cherry tomatoes from our growers so what we are trying to do is to help Nigerian growers have a sustainable agribusiness at attractive levels of returns and profitability.\nChallenges\nThe major challenges are to ensure that the application of the technology is applied every single day. Plants are like little children. If mothers do not nurture – feed, clean, shelter their children every single day, they may fall sick and die. So also, if you do not nurture the plant in the right way, feed it properly, water it properly, nurture it, handle it properly, protect it from pests and diseases or whatever, the plant would die. That is the reason we have got our supervisors within our installations. There is no Christmas day off or Sunday off in taking care of plants just like little children.\nAnother challenge is that Nigeria like all countries within 10 degrees of the equator has bacteria wilt virus in the soil which attacks and damages plants. There is no acceptable chemical treatment because this will damage the environment within the soil, so we have to pre-treat the soil by heating it and then we separate and put the soil in bags to grow the plants.\nContinuous harvests\nWe use plants that keep growing and growing. There are basically two types of plants the determinate with very limited lifespan and the indeterminate which will live as long as you allow them to live. Indeterminate seed varieties will give up to 26 clusters of tomatoes if they are nurtured in the right way. They will give bigger tomatoes and deliver harvests of tomatoes on a consistent basis. Those plants economically will survive eight to nine months but the normal type of bush tomatoes that subsistent farmers grow in open fields will last four months, give one harvest of crop and die.\nSo we are giving the grower something that will constantly yield, using certain types of varieties bred for tropical environment of which one is 500g to 600g in weight.\nGrowers\nThere are also two types of growers – Those growing for the fresh tomatoes market and those growing for processing. In Nigeria, we are seeing the beginning of canning plants because a lot of women like to use canned pastes as additives to their soups and stews.\nSo we talk to our growers and ask what market segment they will be focusing on – fresh tomatoes or processed tomatoes. We provide everything- seeds, all chemicals, all equipment, insurance, supervision, meetings, everything. What they need to bring is the land and the investment funds.\nWe choose our growers carefully. When people come and say they want to buy green houses from us. I talk with them and if I find out they are the get rich quick kind of person, I will not sell to them because they will have failure and the concept and the confidence that this can work may be damaged. My staff get stunned that even with money on the table, I say to some people you are not the right kind of person to be a grower.\nSustainability\nWhat we all want is sustainability. Nigeria is the 13th larger consumer of tomatoes in the world and I want Nigeria to grow their own tomatoes. I do not want them to fail at it. That was what we did when we started growing flowers in Kenya. We told a lot of people they do not have the commitment, the staying power.\nIf Nigeria can meet its own indigenous need of tomatoes, it can then start looking to meet other countries’’ needs.\nLocation\nThe closer one brings the cultivation of the crop to where the market or consumption is, the less volatile will be the price of tomatoes. In other words, most of the consumption in the urban centres is mostly in the south – Lagos, Calabar, Port Harcourt, Enugu. When too much of the indigenous tomato supply is coming from Plateau, Katsina or Kano state, it will result in very expensive costs from site of growing to where the market is.\nMy greenhouses work anywhere in Nigeria because production is not dependent on climate since it is in a climate controlled environment. Another big challenge is the humidity. Most fruits like a relative drop in temperature – humidity at night. Nigeria does not get that dramatic drop in relative humidity at night especially in the south. Fruits and vegetables like cold nights, when there is no sharp drop in relative humidity, the pollen is too sticky to release but we have a unique technology which actually creates pollination regardless of the relative humidity. It is like artificial insemination.\nWe introduce pollen to the plant so the plant will move to the pollination stage. That is the reason we put supervisors in our greenhouses to apply that technology very carefully and they can as well do it to during the day.\nDistance/time\nDistance and time creates damage to the crop. If tomatoes grown by our growers are put side by side with imported tomatoes from South Africa on a supermarket shelf, Nigerians would buy the Nigerian tomatoes because they are younger. The Imported South African tomatoes are seven to 10 days older, and would not sell besides the fresh Nigerian tomatoes. The seed varieties used for Nigerian tomatoes within the Nigerian environment are right for Nigeria but the South African ones are softer probably because they have travelled for days\nBrain-fed agriculture\nWhen a plant gets too much water, it drowns and the roots do not get developed. It does not become strong enough to pass water through the plant. But our modern technologies deliver the right amount of water at the right time and right place.\nEvery time a child is sick, if you keep giving him medicine, he would become weak. If you want to nurture your child to fight infection, you have make him strong, that is exactly what you have to do with a plant. You have to feed the plant and water the plant in a very controlled way that it would become strong and the water has to be clean. The greenhouses stop too much rain. Bacterial wilt virus is actually in the water table in Nigeria, not just the soil, so we also pre-treat the water.\nClients\nOur target clients are primarily the private sector. We have some of our greenhouses in government locations but the yields are much lower than the private sector growers due to diversion and distraction.\nPolicies\nThere have been many schemes to improve agriculture in Nigeria. I think the Agricultural Transformation Agenda (ATA), making agriculture a business is a move in the right direction. The new government can adapt it. It is essential to get government out of the day-to-day running of agribusiness. The population is growing so much. There is the need to feed the people and there is also the social aspect- so many people are unemployed. The oil industry and service industry cannot provide enough jobs. What we need to do is to get young people to see that there is a middle class prosperity available to them in agribusiness with the right tools, equipment and financing. That is what they did in Kenya.\nMD’s background\nI first came to Nigeria in 1978 to help set up GSK. I left in 1982, came back in 1986 to set Smithkline and Beecham. I left and came back in 1997.\nOLUYINKA ALAWODE", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businessday.ng/agriculture/article/greenhouse-technology-yields-264-tons-tomatoes-per-hectare/"}
{"doc_id": "de6501b0511b2bcca5ee457ceee4597e", "text": "Corporate boardrooms: Where are the women?\nKwamboka Oyaro Correspondent\nWhen a woman rises to the top rung of the traditionally all-male corporate ladder in Africa, it’s front-page news because women’s progress in business leadership on the continent continues to be achingly slow.\nAccording to a groundbreaking 2015 study by the African Development Bank (AfDB) titled Where Are the Women? Inclusive Boardrooms in Africa’s Top-Listed Companies, in the 307 top African companies, women accounted for only 14 percent of total board membership.\nThat translates to one woman out of every seven board members. And one-third of the boards have no women at all, adds the report. Countries with the highest percentage of women board members are Kenya (19.8 percent), Ghana (17,7 percent), South Africa (17,4 percent), Botswana (16,9 percent) and Zambia (16,9 percent).\nCompanies that have seated more than a small handful of women include the Kenya-based East African Breweries Limited (EABL) with a board that’s 45,5 percent women, followed by South Africa’s Impala Platinum Holdings Limited at 38,5 percent and Woolworths Holdings Limited at 30,8 percent.\nOn the downside, the country with the lowest percentage of women on boards is Côte d’Ivoire (5,1 percent), followed by Morocco (5,9 percent), Tunisia (7,9 percent) and Egypt (8,2 percent). Uganda hangs around the continent’s average of 12,7 percent, according to the report. Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, AfDB’s special envoy on gender, makes an economic and developmental case for more women on company boards.\n“Women serving on company boards sharpen the continent’s competitive edge and make inclusive growth a reality.”\nWomen Matter Africa, a report by McKinsey & Company, a US-based global management consulting firm, further highlights the financial benefits for companies having women on their boards. “The earnings before interest and taxes margin of those with at least a quarter share of women on their boards was on average 20 percent higher than the industry average.”\nBut women are underrepresented on all rungs of the corporate ladder — in non-management as well as middle and senior management positions, notes the McKinsey & Company report, which states that only 5 percent of professional women make it to top management in companies in Africa.\nAnd even those women who join management may not necessarily wield influence because they usually occupy “staff roles rather than line roles from which promotion to CEOs usually come.”\nThe AfDB report concurs with McKinsey & Company’s finding that most women in corporate organisations are frozen at the periphery. The method used to appoint board members doesn’t favour women, maintains Ms Fraser-Moleketi. “Board appointments are made through old-boy networks, locking women out,” she says, and the process of choosing a nominee is not always transparent.\nExpected to combine work with family duties, women are further limited by patriarchal beliefs that channel them into low-wage careers such as teaching and nursing. The belief among many Africans that a woman’s career should complement—not interfere with—her family responsibilities is a traditional notion of a woman’s role that fails to acknowledge the benefits of gender diversity to society.\nWomen are “victims of ongoing socio-cultural prejudice,” says Viviane Zunon-Kipre, chair of the board of Société nouvelle d’edition et de presse based in Côte d’Ivoire.\nAfrican women can take some small solace in the fact that the continent ranks first in female membership of boards among emerging regions. Africa’s 14.4 percent is far higher than Asia-Pacific’s 9.8 percent, Latin America’s 5.6 percent and the Middle East’s 1 percent.\nAlso, more African women are becoming board members in blue-chip companies, non-governmental organisations and financial institutions, and government enterprises are appointing women to their top management, says Mr Wangethi Mwangi, a non-executive board member and former longtime editorial director of the Nation Media Group (NMG). The media company operates in Kenya, Rwanda Tanzania and Uganda.\nAlthough the NMG has only two women among its 13 board members, Mr Mwangi explains that “women head the digital, procurement, human resources, operation and marketing departments, while in editorial we have a female managing editor.” In departments such as procurement, advertising and marketing, women “perform very well,” he says.\nEABL is the gold standard for women’s board membership in Africa. But just a decade ago women constituted only 16 percent of its board, Mr. Eric Kiniti, the company’s corporate relations director, points out.\nThe company’s policy is to take gender into account during the hiring process. “Before hiring at the senior management level, we ask that there must be a female candidate in all our short lists. And if there isn’t, we ask why,” he says.\nEach member of EABL executive is individually responsible for tackling gender biases that might exist within the business. “As signatories to the UN Global Compact and the UN Women’s Empowerment Principles, we have a set of codes internally to secure diversity in our workplace,” maintains Mr Kiniti.\nOne of the UN Women’s Empowerment Principles requests companies to “establish high-level corporate leadership for gender equality.” Companies promoting women to top management positions are therefore in sync with the 2030 global goals. Sustainable Development Goal 10, Reduced Inequalities, specifies that “everyone will have equal opportunities and nobody will be left behind.”\nTo increase diversity in companies, including on boards, McKinsey & Company recommends four administrative goals: the first is that companies “make gender diversity a top board and CEO priority.”\nThe second is to “anchor gender diversity strategies in a compelling case,” which means communicating relevant policies to employees. The third is to “confront limiting attitudes toward women in the workplace,” which means focusing on changing perceptions of women’s traditional responsibilities. The fourth is to “implement a fact-based gender diversity strategy,” which involves using metrics and data to understand women’s contributions within a company.\nThe AfDB agrees with these recommendations, adding that companies should publish gender-aggregated data in their annual reports and that corporate governance codes should impose quotas for women’s representation on boards.\n“To kick-start the process of increasing the numbers of women on boards, quotas have been shown to be very effective in many European countries, notably Norway, Finland and more recently France,” says Ms Fraser-Moleketi.\nNorway adopted a gender quota policy in 2003, requiring firms operating in the country to increase the percentage of women on their boards to at least 40 percent, from an average at the time of 7 percent. The government warned it would deregister companies not complying with the regulation. — African Renewal.\nAt 40.1 percent currently, Norway has the world’s highest percentage of women on company boards. The global average is 15 percent. Unlike in Norway, African countries adopting policies that support women’s leadership in companies are not necessarily enforcing those policies. The Kenyan constitution requires that of the elective or appointive bodies of a company, no more than two-thirds of the members be of the same gender.\nUnfortunately, the law is silent on penalties for noncompliance. South African laws generally promote gender equity in state-owned institutions, but women constitute about 33 percent in those institutions.\nMorocco’s 2011 constitution guarantees gender equality in all appointments, yet only a negligible 0.1 percent of those in management positions in private companies are women. In 2016, the Global Gender Gap Report published by the World Economic Forum ranked Morocco 139 out of 145 countries in narrowing the gender gap. A 2015 study by the International Labour Organization found no female CEO in any large company in Morocco.\nIrina Bokova, director general of UNESCO, observes, “A sustainable society and a thriving democracy depend on all of its citizens being included and involved in public debate and decision making at every level.”\nMany African companies claim to be equal-opportunity employers. They must now match their words with actions. – African Renewal", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.herald.co.zw/corporate-boardrooms-where-are-the-women/"}
{"doc_id": "bf43062a7d9a2919324c58343eb4fd83", "text": "US private equity group TPG-backed Evercare health care fund, which took over the management of over Kenyan hospitals and clinics previously managed by scandal-hit Dubai-based fund Abraaj, plans to expand its presence in its five key markets including Kenya.\nThe firm's chief executive Massimiliano Colella said it would add more clinics and diagnostic centres citing huge demand for the health care services.\nHe did not divulge the number of new clinics to be added in Kenya and the specific timelines for the expansion.\nThe aim is to boost coverage to six million patients by 2025, from four million in Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, Mr Colella told Reuters in an interview.\n“There is still an opportunity to further expand care and increase the reach in the five countries we operate in,” Colella was quoted saying by Reuters.\n“We are discussing with TPG on how to expand and we are looking at different options.”\nThe expansion plans offer relief to the near half dozen hospitals run by the US healthcare fund in Kenya and their workers and marks a sudden change of fortune two years after the Kenyan hospitals stared an uncertain future following the collapse of Abraaj.\nAbraaj’s health fund Kenyan portfolio was made up of 18 clinics and 10 hospitals that provide over 700 patient beds.\nThe fund had invested in Nairobi Women’s Hospital, Avenue Hospital, Metropolitan Hospital, and Ladnan Hospital among others all of which are now under ownership and management of Evercare.\nEvercare expansion plans mirror several other private Kenyan firms which are expanding health care services in the country in a race to plug gaps in the relatively poor public health infrastructure that is plagued by an acute shortage of doctors, a lack of essential drugs and medical equipment.\nTPG Growth, the group’s mid-market buyout arm, took over the existing assets of Abraaj’s Growth Markets Health Fund in Kenya, renaming it The Evercare Health Fund.\nIt currently owns 30 hospitals, 16 clinics and 82 diagnostic centres around the world.\nMr Colella was quoted saying Evercare has taken a number of steps to improve governance such as changing leadership, investing in finance and information technology, and creating compliance and audit committees at hospitals.\nTPG signed a deal in 2019, to take over and manage Abraaj’s $1 billion (about Sh101 billion) healthcare fund offering relief for the Kenyan medical outlets where the fund had pumped in billions of shillings.\nAbraaj, once the Middle East and North Africa’s biggest buyout funds, collapsed following a row with investors over the use of money in the healthcare fund.\nAbraaj had a row with investors including the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and the IFC over the use of money in the Sh101 billion healthcare fund.\nThis led to months of financial turmoil at the Dubai-based firm which filed for provisional liquidation in 2018.\nThe arrest of Abraaj executives on fraud charges had heightened uncertainty among Kenyan firms where it pumped billions before collapse.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/companies/nairobi-women-s-metropolitan-new-owner-expand-hospitals-3549140"}
{"doc_id": "1c0fb06bf0eb59334fd524a986e919a6", "text": "Cape Town - The move to lockdown Level 4 has, to an extent, eased difficulties for small businesses but the sector continues to face incredible hardship, says the Cape Chamber of Commerce and Industry.\nChamber president Geoff Jacobs said Level 5 had a hugely negative impact on the private sector by confining business owners, managers, administrators and workers to their homes. After five weeks of lockdown, it was obvious that the small business sector had taken the biggest hit.\nJacobs said the owners of many enterprises had continued to pay their workers - sometimes even forgoing their own pay - but could no longer do so, having fallen between regulatory cracks by not being deemed formal enough to qualify for aid, or through simply being unable to wait any longer for their applications to be processed.\n“Other enterprises are left in limbo, unable to get clarity on whether they and their workers can or cannot get back to work. In their case, the fault often lies with the sloppy, hurried drafting of the new permissions,” Jacobs said, which he added was the result of confusion in the official decision-making process.\nHe said the Western Cape had twice been the victim of regulations, either by design or by accident. “Sensible lobbying reversed the first ban on wine exports - much to the relief of the Treasury, one suspects.”\nJacobs said the province had again been a victim, though it “shared the pain” with other provinces through the Level 4 ban on the resumption of private construction projects, while “public works projects” were allowed to continue.\n“It simply does not make sense that public civil engineering and construction projects are permitted during Level 4 but not private-sector developments or building projects,” he said.\nJacobs said if that restriction did not stem from an ideological dislike\nof the small business owner, and if it was not the result of successful anti-competitive lobbying, it made even less sense.\nBudget Justice Coalition chairperson Zukiswa Kota said it was especially problematic that informal traders were still not on the streets to offer more affordable alternatives, and the major retailers were positioning themselves to exploit the financial distress experienced by existing spaza shops by opening their own spaza outlets in townships.\nNational Small Business Chamber founder and chief executive Mike Anderson said a disturbing challenge facing small businesses was their inability to access relief funding. He said a recent survey revealed that of the 53% of small businesses that applied for relief funding, only 6% were successful.\n“Reasons cited for this range from poor or no response, unnecessary qualifying criteria and lengthy, tedious processes. At least 94% of small businesses said they were either in cash-flow crisis or would be within the next 30 days. The government urgently needs to remove red tape, speed up relief-funding processes and make this funding available to all small businesses through the nation.”\nAnderson said the chamber's plea to the government was to communicate more effectively, eliminate confusion and clarify how and when small businesses could resume operations.\n@SISONKE_MD", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/western-cape/despite-move-to-lockdown-level-4-small-businesses-still-face-hardship-47657134"}
{"doc_id": "7abcfeb400a77fe08cccba8070feae6d", "text": "Piet Jan Thibaudier, a small holder farmer in Lemmer, Netherlands handed out his farm’s financial statements for the last three years, during a visit last month, capturing pretty much everything from income, to expenses, and amount of money available in bank and privately.\nThaudier is a dairy farmer, who owns 180 cows, with a ranch occupying 100 hectares of land. 45 ha is owned by him, 25 ha is on long lease, while the remaining 30 ha is on short lease.\nSkipping through all these details, and providing something more ‘wholesome’, he was asked how much his revenue was for last year, and the calculation was around 500,000 Euros (from milk), out of which profit came down to about 200,000 Euros (approximately N82 million). He still had other income such as sales of a pasture reading (technology) said to have been ‘invented’ by him.\nThe notable thing about Thaudier like other smallholder farmers in the Netherlands is that; their books are well kept. The average small holder farmer can produce records to show series of line items capturing specific expenses and incomes, and further breaking this down to estimate for instance, expense per cattle, likewise income.\nThis, from observations, goes beyond cattle to every other form of agricultural activity that has seen the small country, taking giant strides to feed the rest of the world. Smallholder farmers have developed a habit of proper record keeping, which makes it easier for them to get financial support especially from banks.\nThe reverse is however the case in a place like Nigeria, where the average farmer has next to nothing to show when records of his business (which the farm ought to be), is requested. When farm records are available, a bank is able to see at a glance, how well (or badly) run a business is, and its potentials for revenue to be able to service any loan being sought, if granted.\nWith Nigeria still having a huge gap to fill in food production, many agribusinesses are desirous of expansions, but more often than not, do not have good records to present to the bank. These records are however important, in determining if the business has been performing as required.\nRead also: Canada partners Ogun on investment in agriculture, infrastructure, others\nThe management process itself would benefit from availability of proper records, as owners are able to plan and manage the farm efficiently. It will show where things may have been going wrong, leakages, ineffective expenses, and invariably making it possible to make decisions on what can be done to get things right. It will also act as a guideline in managing the farm budget.\nThe farm records form a crucial part of business data, and the lack of it, is a problem in Nigeria. A BusinessDay article on inadequate funding in agriculture, noted that, (operational) data is often overlooked and the lack of it appears to have been accepted as the norm. However, data is important for investors in decision making, whereas in Nigeria, many businesses, particularly in the agric sector, are unable to meet the due diligence requirements to be found attractive by Private Equity investors, added to this, poor governance structures by many agribusinesses.\nBank loans are often unattainable for many agribusinesses, as rates hovering around 25 percent make it nearly impossible for them to service it.\nIn an exclusive interview with Wiebe Draijer, chairman of the Executive Board, Rabo Bank, he was asked how low interest rates are, to perhaps, compare what Nigeria could learn from this. In his response, he said, “Interest rate is calculated based on practices the farm employs, what the securities are against it, and whether or not he adopts sustainable practices. So, we can give discounts for farmers that are really sustainable, and get a better rate if there are certain securities behind the loan.”\nThe question then is; how can farmers who fail to keep records, demonstrate they have been upholding sustainable practices, much less being in a position to secure guarantees that make it easier for the bank to provide them with finance. The challenge remains the same even when attempting to explore opportunities in the private equity space.\nKazim Yusuf, CEO, Kord capital, an investment advisory firm in Lagos, previously told BusinessDay that “Private equity operates in a terrain where there is structure and process. And that is partly why private equity hasn’t grown in Nigeria and other unstructured markets in Africa.”\n“Private equity functions where there is enough data to work on because private equity operators typically require data in order to deploy resources to invest in or manage businesses. They will look at credit ratings, audited accounts, corporate governance structure, among other criteria and all these will influence the investment decision,” Yusuf said.\nMezuo Nwuneli, managing partner, Sahel Capital Agribusiness Managers Ltd, also said, “If a company is interested in raising private equity capital, it is paramount for it to ensure it actively works to strengthen its corporate governance. A robust governance structure could even enable it to secure better valuation pricing during investment negotiations.”\nKeeping adequate records is a good way to start ensuring corporate governance, subsequent to which it becomes easier for an agribusiness to seek funding from either commercial lenders, or perhaps even private equity capital.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businessday.ng/agriculture/article/keeping-farm-records-makes-access-finance-easier/"}
{"doc_id": "36456fe9af581fe8162b3b80c513ba82", "text": "Johannesburg - An estimated 41.5 percent of the total mortgage bonds on residential properties registered at the deeds office in the second quarter had a loan-to-purchase (LTP) value of 100 percent to 109 percent of the transaction value of these homes, according to FNB.\nHousehold and property sector strategist at FNB Home Loans, John Loos, said yesterday that this was slightly lower than the 43.1 percent multi-year high reached in the final quarter of last year but not sufficiently lower to be able to draw conclusions on a possible declining trend. He said this latest estimate of the percentage of bonds falling into the 100 percent to 109 percent LTP price band was well below the peak of 65 percent reached in the second quarter of 2007.\nBut Loos stressed that these latest estimates were also well above the post boom low of 25.4 percent reached in the third quarter of 2009. He said in the first quarter of this year they identified from deeds office data 9 951 bonded transactions by individuals in the 100 percent to 109 percent LTP value price range.\nMortgage\nLoos said this was more than double the 4 117 low reached in the third quarter of 2009 but much lower than the 33 825 high reached in the third quarter of 2006.\nHe said houses with an average price of R358 934 were most dependent on 100 percent to 109 percent mortgage bond loans and accounted for 49.5 percent of the total mortgage bond loans to individuals in the second quarter.\nHouses in the category with an average price of R658 922 had the second-highest percentage of loans in the 100 percent to 109 percent LTP price band at 42.2 percent, he said.\nLoos said the lowest dependence on 100 percent and above mortgage bond loans was in the most affluent segment of the housing market where the average transaction value was R2.442 million, with 22.1 percent of mortgage bonds for these homes falling into the top LTP price band.\nLoos said housing market mortgage lending institutions and mortgage borrowers had for a long time been known for their “pro-cyclical” behaviour.\nThis had resulted in increased lending or borrowing when interest rates were low and both lending institutions and borrowers becoming more conservative when interest rates rose.\nCompetitive\nBut Loos said there had been a more delayed LTP value response in the past two interest rate hiking cycles to the onset of interest rate hiking.\nThis could be attributable to an increasingly competitive banking and mortgage lending environment, which may push lenders to be more competitive on lending for longer into a deteriorating cycle.\nHe said that a potential reason for the lack of any noticeable downward response in the average LTP value in the past two-and-a-half years of interest rate hiking in South Africa since January 2014 was that lenders might feel that the lending criteria were still sufficiently cautious after a very significant post boom pull-back in 2008.\nBut Loos said greater confidence in the Reserve Bank not to shock the market as it did in the late 1990s was believed to be key to the seemingly more delayed response by mortgage lenders to rising interest rates over the past two cycles.\n“So when the bank starts its rate hiking these days, one senses that we all still have considerable time on our side and the magnitude and speed of hiking won’t necessarily be severe,” he said.\nBUSINESS REPORT", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/drop-in-bonds-in-loan-to-purchase-price-band-2057836"}
{"doc_id": "ffb2c179e69f565ea6c67246a5236066", "text": "They say you can’t succeed without vision and you can’t realise your vision without goals. The Zimbabwean govt has a vision and it has goals. The dream is for Zimbabwe to be an upper middle income economy by 2030. The vision is thus aptly named ‘Vision 2030.’\nOf course, the govt knows that to say ‘upper middle income economy’ doesn’t mean much to most. After all, the World Bank says countries with a gross national income per capita between $4046 and $12535 are all upper middle income economies. That’s quite the broad range.\nSo the Zim govt clarified that the gross national income per capita should be at least US$5000 by 2030. That is the main goal. So we are targeting the lower end of the upper middle income range. It’s a noble goal. Let’s talk about that.\nThe gross national income (GNI)\nSome may not be as familiar with GNI as they are with it’s cousin, GDP. If you know what GDP represents it’s then easy to understand what GNI is.\nYou’ll remember that GDP represents the total value of all goods and services produced in a country in a given period of time. To get the GNI:\ni. The income earned by Zimbabweans living in Zimbabwe but earning income from abroad is added. Income earned by people like remote worker Gwinyai Nyatsoka who is CTO of a US firm whilst resident in Zim does not appear in GDP but is added in to make GNI. We then subtract income earned in Zimbabwe by foreigners.\nii. The rentals, dividends, interest and other property income received by resident Zimbabweans from abroad are added. Whilst the same earned in Zimbabwe by foreigners is subtracted.\niii. We then subtract subsidies on production or imports. The thinking being that a subsidy is payment by a govt to promote production or reduce the producer’s losses. It is really not income they earned, hence the subtraction.\nSubsidies\nThe interesting bit is the subsidy situation in Zimbabwe. We all know about the command agriculture programme through which over US$3 billion was distributed from 2017 onwards. The programme was a huge flop and failed to revive agriculture as was planned. Yet, through the years, the command agric subsidies accounted for around 5.5% of the GDP. Subtracting these subsidies from GDP makes the GNI more useful.\nIn 2021, subsidies were responsible for about 1.3% of all expenditure up to September. We expect that to rise to 2.5% by the close of the year. In the 2022 budget, we expect 4.9% to go to subsidies. Removing all these transport (ZUPCO), agric subsidies, etc will leave us with a more representative figure of real economic output.\nGNI per capita\nSimple, here we divide the GNI by the population to get each person’s share of the nation’s gross income.\nNow that it’s clear what GNI is, it’s up to you to determine how useful it is as an indicator. Of course, it does not show who is earning the income and so we could have a few companies responsible for almost all of that GDP which determines the GNI.\nWhat is our current GNI per capita?\nIn 2020 our GNI per capita was US$1090. That means we are a lower middle income economy according to the World Bank. However, we are at the very low end of that range because:\n- Low income economy – less than $1045\n- Lower middle income economy – $1046 – $4045\n- Upper middle income economy – $4046 – $12535\nWhat this means is that the value of the stuff produced, and income from abroad earned by the average Zimbabwean in a year is $1090. That means what a Zimbo produces/earns from abroad per month is around $87. This is low, guys. The World Bank may call this middle income but let’s be honest, it’s way too low.\nHow have we done in the past?\nZimbabwe reached the lowest point, our rock bottom, back in 2008 when it was $330. We dollarised in 2009 and the GNI per capita grew every single year to a record high of $1410 in 2018. We held our elections that year, the second republic was born and the GNI/capita has been falling every year since. A 23% drop since the elections. If the trend holds, we will be a low income economy for 2021.\nThis means the second republic has its work cut out for it. The GDP, which is the main component in GNI has been falling since 2018 and so it is no surprise the GNI/capita has been falling too. The GDP is set to grow in 2021 by 5-7%, even by World Bank and IMF predictions and so this year could be the turnaround year we wanted. However, projections also predict 2022 will see a smaller percentage increase. Which will be smaller still in 2023.\nThe latest IMF World Economic Outlook report of October 2021 projects ….In 2021, Sub-Saharan Africa is expected to grow on average by 3.7%, lower than the global growth rate of 5.9%, ..in 2022 …3.8%\nFrom the 2022 National Budget\nWhile this is growth, around 5% in 2021 and 3.8% in 2022, we are still aways from even just reversing the 23% decline from 2018-2020. Even if we work with our govt’s projected 7.8% and 5.5% in 2021 and 2022 respectively, it’s still not enough to reverse the 23% slide. Let alone to grow the economy by 359% by 2030. Yes, we need to grow by 3.5 times in just 8 years.\nNow as we enter the election cycle we know we will lose ground a little bit as politics take precedence over everything else. So 2022-2023 will likely be disappointing. Whoever wins in 2023 will have a tall order, Vision 2030 will be hard to bring to pass.\nAre we making progress?\nYou decide. We have shrunk by 23% since the 2018 elections but expect to grow in 2021. The 5% growth in 2021 is somewhat disappointing in context.\nWe cannot ignore the negative impact the pandemic has had in the last 2 years. We also predict we will still it’s effects in next few years at least, especially as new variants keep stalling progress.\nHowever, our GNI/capita fell by 15% from 2018 to 2019, before the pandemic. So we had our problems before the 2020 madness. During the pandemic in 2020, we fell by 9%, meaning a smaller percentage drop than in 2019 when there was no pandemic.\n2021 will mark progress towards the upper middle income status. However, I think it’s akin to progressing by a metre in a day as you plan to go around the world in 80 days. It is progress but it’s probably too slow to reach the goal by the stated time.\nSo, I think we can reasonably call Vision 2030 a pipedream. 8 years is too little to attain that lofty goal. However, I hope we do grow at a good rate. Upper middle income status or not, we should see annual growth till 2030.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.techzim.co.zw/2021/12/in-8-years-zimbabwe-economy-gni-should-be-over-us5000-are-we-making-progress/"}
{"doc_id": "5394552a586b90fdb970a0227b34ac3e", "text": "In February, consumers of banking services may begin to experience the “magic” and security offered by biometrics in banking and financial transactions. “Imagine a world very soon where you do not need to come out with your cheque book or ATM card, all you need to do is just walk to an ATM machine or bank and all you need is your finger to take money’’ That would be the “magic” of biometrics, spearheaded by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) in collaboration with Bankers Committee.\nBiometrics are the new E-verification tools for online and mobile banking which offer unique customer identification system that gives unchangeable identification that helps in “KYC” (know your customer). It uses your unique physical characteristics such as your iris, your finger print, your voice, your face or even your veins to make sure you are you.\nThe contract for the project was signed in 2013 between CBN and Dermalog for $50 million (N8 Billion). Dermalog is one of the world leading biometric identification companies and the largest biometrics manufacturer in Germany.\nBiometrics was necessitated by identity fraud plaguing banks and other financial institutions.\nAccording to Steve Cook ‘’one of the biggest fraud scams plaguing banks is when fraudsters pose as someone to obtain a password reset. This is fairly common practice which banks have to deal with daily, and in a lot of cases the fraudsters manage to convince banks to accept they are the real person on the other end of the line’’.\nIdentity theft has been noted to increase at an alarming proportion. The US Federal Trade Commission reported there is a new victim of ID theft every three seconds, while in UK, CIFAS (the UK Fraud Prevention Service) reported that two out of every three cases reported were cases of ID theft. In Nigeria, the Financial Institutions Training Centre (FITC) reported that between 2000-Q1 2013, banks lost N159 billion to electronic fraud. Biometrics has become the more important as more transactions have gone mobile. It is estimated that mobile payment for goods and services are set to reach over $720 billion in 2017, thus the need for effective and authentic customer verification as current methods are said not to be working efficiently enough.\nBiometrics offers fraudsters a bad deal as it will reduce bank frauds to the barest minimum and they will not be able to steal any of your unique physical characteristics listed above. Experts believe that a combination of face and voice of the account holder guarantee 99.9 per cent accuracy against theft.\nThe technology can be integrated with banks, ATM machines, into USB keys that can be hooked into computers at retail location to be used with credit cards and ATM cards, and anywhere you may make a financial transaction. It could act on its own or in conjunction with your PIN to securely identify you as the owner of the card and the person who has access to the money being exchanged.\nFraud in the banking system are often understated because, financial institutions routinely under represent fraud loses for fear of negative publicity. In1998 and 1999 the banking industry lost N3.196 billion and N7.404 billion respectively. In 2002, almost $10 million was lost through employee fraud, which represents a 40 percent increase over the previous year’s figure. In 2003 bank fraud increased by 40 percent. The Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) believed that most of the thefts were the result of forgeries or illegal withdrawals from customers’ accounts.\nIn a research report titled “Bank Frauds in Nigeria: Underlying Causes, Effects and Possible Remedies’’, Eseoghene Jospeh Idolo of the University of Benin, Nigeria noted that “Nowhere are frauds more serious and more pronounced than in the banking sector of the economy. They are the biggest single causes of bank failure and distress in the Nigerian banking system.\nThe report identified institutional causes of bank fraud as 1.Volume of work, whereby the amount of work done by officials could be so heavy (role overload) that frauds could easily pass undetected. 2. Banking experience of staff, whereby fraud occur with higher frequency among staff with little experience. 3. Poor management. 4. Nature of services whereby documents of value and liquid assets are exposed to undisciplined staff. 5. Poor security arrangement, whereby security arrangement for valuable documents are weak, poor and vulnerable, thus making it easy for fraudsters to have their way undetected.\nThe environmental /societal causes include, high level of poverty and unemployment, where 80 percent of the Nigerian youths especially university undergraduates are unemployed irrespective of the fact that Nigerian is one of the richest countries in the sub- Sahara Africa, and the world in both human and natural resources; societal value where wealth determines the reputation associated to a person, the personality profile of the dramatis personae of individuals with inordinate ambition without qualms.\nTypes of bank fraud identified in the report include cheque kiting, account-opening fraud, money transfer fraud and money laundering fraud. Others are loans fraud, over stating interest charges, counterfeited securities, clearing frauds, manipulation of dormant accounts and forging of banks rubber stamps Others are substitution of names in credit vouchers, letter of credit fraud, unauthorized printing of bank stationeries and computer fraud.\nComputer fraud takes the form of computing the programme and even breaking into the system via a remote sensor by a computer programmer or specialist. Hacking your bank account could not be easier. In 2013, three undergraduates were reported to have hacked into the system of Union Bank and affected transfers worth billions of naira before the bubble burst.\nCybercrime poses a big challenge to CBN’s cashless policy which became operational in 2013, and gaining country wide acceptance even in the face of infrastructure deficit. As at the end of August 2013, value of mobile money transfer was N10.14 billion through the use of mobile phones, banking tools for transfer and payments across the country.\nThe Minister of Communication Technology Mrs. Omobola Johnson had said last year that government was addressing the issue of cybercrime through the approval of Cybercrime bill by the Federal Executive Council in order to enhance the system.\nWhile the bill is still in the works, the biometrics project which is “revolutionary” and “transformational”, according to CBN governor, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, promises a safe key to secure banking.\nBy: Arize Nwobu", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businessday.ng/analysis/article/cbn-and-magic-of-biometrics/"}
{"doc_id": "d93184f5766a1591d72670115b3db9d9", "text": "Labour minister Mildred Oliphant has indicated that she will ‘engage’ with the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) after the institution found that the country’s affirmative action and employment equity policies were unconstitutional.\nSpeaking at the opening of the annual Nedlac conference on Friday (14 September), Oliphant noted that the SAHRC had made various recommendations on what needs to be changed to bring the legislation in line with the Constitution.\n“The Commission gives government six months to report back on steps taken to give effect to its recommendations,” she said.\n“It follows therefore that the Nedlac social partners need to study this report and advise on its stance vis-à-vis the recommendations of the Commission.\n“It might even be useful to seek an audience with the Commission in order to understand the basis for its report, findings and the recommendations.\n“This is important given that all our labour laws have to pass constitutional scrutiny before they can be signed into law,” she said.\nUnconstitutional\nThe Equality Report 2017/2018 is an annual report produced by the SAHRC as per legislative requirements.\nIn the latest report, the SAHRC specifically took issue with the Employment Equity Act’s definition of ‘designated groups’ and South Africa’s system of data disaggregation – which it said are not in compliance with constitutional or international law obligations.\nGovernment’s failure to measure the impact of various affirmative action measures on the basis of need and disaggregated data, especially the extent to which such measures advance indigenous peoples and people with disabilities is also a failure of international legal conventions it said.\nIn a statement released at the end of August, the SAHRC outlined its findings as follows:\n- The definition of designated groups as contained in the Employment Equity Act, and the current system of disaggregation of data could give rise to new imbalances in the labour market.\n- Affirmative action measures must be targeted at groups and individuals who are subject to unfair discrimination, to eventually achieve substantive equality and a society based on non-racialism and non-sexism.\n- Decisions based on insufficiently disaggregated data fail to target persons or categories of persons who have been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, as required by the three-pronged test for affirmative action.\n- Without first taking the characteristics of groups into account, varying degrees of disadvantage and the possible intersectionality of multiple forms of discrimination (based on race, ethnicity, gender or social origin) faced by members of vaguely categorised groups, cannot be identified.\n- As such, the SAHRC’s finds that the (EEA) be amended to target more nuanced groups on the basis of need and should take into account social and economic indicators.\n- Once the objective of affirmative action, namely substantive equality, is achieved, temporary special measures should cease. However, given the persistence of gross inequality in South Africa – and despite policies aimed at radical socio-economic transformation – much remains to be done before this goal is reached. Currently, special measures in the employment equity context raise several concerns in respect of the requirement for affirmative action to promote equality.\n- It is therefore clear that affirmative action and reasonable accommodation are designed to both provide initial economic opportunities to disadvantaged groups by prioritising their appointment but continue to apply once people from such groups have entered the workforce.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/271779/government-given-six-months-to-fix-unconstitutional-employment-equity-laws/"}
{"doc_id": "b526093e043c4682557f2b45e799efac", "text": "e-cigarettes\n4 Jun 2023\nOn World No Tobacco Day, we examine e-cigarettes, which are capturing a growing share of the market. Professionals in the sector insist that e-cigarettes facilitate the process of quitting smoking, even going so far as to claim that it's beneficial for public health overall. However, it's important to note that vaping can become an addiction in its own right.\nLatest\n1 day ago\nAides to the late Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny say Moscow has set an ultimatum for his mother to agree to a secret funeral. Russian authorities have threatened to bury him in the penal colony where he died. Vladimir Ashurkov, Executive Director of the Anti-Corruption Foundation, and close friend of Alexei Navalny talked to DW about the circumstances of Navalny’s life and death.\n1 day ago\nRussian President Vladimir Putin needs to ensure his country remains in a permanent state of war. That's the premise of a new book, published by a French political scientist as the world has been marking the second anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.\n1 day ago\nRussian President Vladimir Putin has claimed that Western weapons deliveries to Ukraine have ended up in the hands of Hamas and other terror groups in the Middle East. Russian television has been quick to exploit the Israel-Hamas conflict for propaganda purposes.\n1 day ago\nWhy \"Gone with the Wind\" made movie history, \"Asphalt Cowboy\" exorcised prudery from Hollywood and Bong Joon-ho's \"Parasite\" catapulted the Oscars into the 21st century. Arts Unveiled journeys through nine decades of the Academy Awards.\n1 day ago\nProtesters in Argentina have demanded that President Javier Milei scrap the reforms, arguing that they will only benefit the wealthy. The reform bill contains hundreds of articles including privatization and cutting state subsidies.\n1 day ago\nSince February 24, 2022, Russia's full-scale invasion has had a huge impact on Ukraine, but also the European Union. To tackle inflation and other economic consequences, the EU has taken measures to try to shield its inhabitants from the cost-of-living crisis. We take a closer look.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://tv.guardian.ng/tag/e-cigarettes/"}
{"doc_id": "d4b34aec1c5b4388b25faa0b337d7a79", "text": "Stanbic Bank is facing a Sh9.6 billion ($80 million) compensation claim after it froze and reversed funds in an account held by passenger and cargo carrier Air Afrik.\nThe High Court has allowed the carrier to amend its compensation claim from the initial $14.4 million (Sh1.74 billion) for losses suffered after the South Sudan government terminated a $20 million (Sh2.41 billion) plane leasing contract due to cash hitch.\nAir Afrik sued Stanbic in 2018 over an alleged breach of banking regulations after crediting $7.2 million into its accounts before freezing and reversing the money without a valid court order or a directive from the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK).\nStanbic said that it froze the money and reversed the transactions after realising that the credit note from the South Sudan government did not have funds and the bank could not use its own funds.\nHigh Court judge David Majanja said the bank would not suffer any prejudice if the carrier were allowed to amend the compensation claim.\nStanbic and the South Sudan government are pursuing an out-of-court settlement in a suit that exposes the Nairobi bourse-listed lender to a multi-billion shilling compensation.\n“While I agree with the 1st defendant that there has been a delay in seeking the amendment given the information was in the plaintiff’s possession, I think the proposed amendment, in substance, does not change the cause of action but expands the scope of damages pleaded,” judge Majanja ruled.\nThe bank opposed the upward review of the compensation, saying it was brought in bad faith with the intention of muddling up the issues before court. Stanbic said the amendment introduces a new dimension to the case and is at risk of delaying the conclusion of the suit.\nAir Afrik, which has offices in Kenya and South Sudan, claims that Stanbic, which also has operations in the two countries, breached banking regulations by failing to act diligently before crediting funds, freezing its accounts and reversing the funds without a valid court order or a directive from the CBK.\nAir Afrik says when the $7.2 million went into its account, the transaction was complete in law and that the bank could not lawfully reverse the funds without a proper signing mandate or a court order.\nThe payment was the deposit for a plane-leasing contract that Air Afrik had signed with the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs of South Sudan in September 2014. The contract was to lease several aircraft for a year -- from October 1, 2014, to August 30, 2015.\nUnder the agreement, South Sudan was required to pay Air Afrik a deposit of 35 percent ($7.2 million) of the value of total contract sum estimated at $20.64 million.\nAir Afrik claims that upon the money being credited in its account, it withdrew $1.1 million without any hindrance and the bank debited its accounts.\nHowever, according to the lender, efforts to push the Bank of South Sudan to release the $7.2 million did not bear fruit as the central bank did not respond to their letters.\nThe lender says it notified Air Afrik that the amount had been credited to its account in error and therefore reversed it.\nAccording to Air Afrik, the failure to get access to the funds weakened its capacity to service the plane-leasing contract. The contract was terminated, causing the carrier losses and damages.\nBesides the loss of the South Sudan contract, the company says it failed to execute other contracts of similar nature.\nStanbic said it subjected its officers to disciplinary procedures and tried to arbitrate on condition that the company does not press charges.\nThe parties are meanwhile pursuing an out-of-court settlement and Bank of South Sudan has appointed Kuol Maguith Kuol Arop to represent it in the negotiations in a July 19 letter to Stanbic.\nStanbic had in December asked for a settlement but Air Afrik turned down the offer in pursuit of the court case.\nIn the letter dated December 8, 2021, Stanbic offered to negotiate “to avoid the detraction, costs and waste of management time associated that will be incurred in the litigation”.\nThe bank then offered to pay $250,000 to the airline and also withdraw a cross-appeal it had filed against Air Afrik and the Bank of South Sudan.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/companies/stanbic-bank-risks-sh9-6bn-pay-for-failed-juba-plane-deal-3892022"}
{"doc_id": "60573b0594286dd693f6cdc412206f3c", "text": "The DP's allegations and an investigation by Parliament over some Sh55 billion used without parliamentary approval ahead of last August's election have resulted in an all-familiar public clash between current and former government officials.\nOn Wednesday, former Treasury Cabinet Secretary Ukur Yatani responded to claims by Controller of Budget Margaret Nyakang'o that he had pressured her to approve billions of shillings worth of payments that seemed irregular.\n\"Now that the Controller of Budget works under a new administration, has she weaponised her office to get back at those seen as a stumbling block to her?\" Yatani posed in a press statement.\nAnd he would rope in Gachagua, who he said had requested Sh1.59 billion to facilitate his office and that of his spouse, stating that Nyakang'o's remarks were \"politically choreographed\".\n\"...and designed to hurt public servants due to change of regime, which, unfortunately, will have long-term unhealthy effects of precipitating fear and inactions in future,\" Yatani added.\nHis response prompted other officials such as Defence Cabinet Secretary Aden Duale to wade into the matter.\n\"You were used and abused by the Handshake brothers to loot and now you bear economic and criminal culpability individually,\" Duale tweeted in the wake of Yatani's bombshell. The exchange between Yatani and Nyakang'o sparked questions on how governments should operate in transition, even as they both acknowledged things must stay running and government will keep spending on its programmes.\n\"Governments are perpetual entities and respect and full protection of public servants while undertaking lawful discharge of their mandates remains the hallmark of a decent society,\" Yatani said.\nSince he assumed the office of DP, Gachagua has constantly accused Uhuru of overseeing alleged running down of the economy and pursuing selfish goals at the expense of the nation.\nLike other current officials, he has blamed the current economic hardship on the former regime, with observers seeing his moves as aimed at asserting dominance in Mt Kenya politics.\nRarely has Uhuru fought back, only responding in January by asking the government to end endless politicking. \"They are talking too much because they are idle,\" the former President said in January as he commiserated with the family of the late Education Cabinet Secretary George Magoha.\nUhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto take a walk moments after a Cabinet meeting at State House, Nairobi on August 14, 2018. [PCS]\nVihiga Senator Godfrey Osotsi on Friday termed Ruto vindictive. \"He is acting contrary to his pledge not to weaponise State institutions to fight political wars. He should learn from former President Kibaki who did not revenge against Daniel Moi,\" he said.\nBut for Ruto allies, the issue is not whether or not Uhuru is being targeted but holding the former government to account.\n\"Ukur Yatani, his masters and accomplices must account for every dubious deal during his tenure at the National Treasury,\" Duale had tweeted on Thursday. Molo MP Kimani Kuria does not believe the president is settling scores. \"Kenya is governed by the rule of law,\" said Kuria, who chairs the National Assembly Finance committee.\nStay informed. Subscribe to our newsletter\nHis committee is set to investigate one of the expenditures Nyakang'o said Yatani had pressured her to approve - the Sh6 billion disbursement to Telkom Kenya to buy out Helios Investment Partners.\n\"The inquiry on Telkom is to also give the adversely mentioned officials a public opportunity, within the laws of the land, to shed light on the matter,\" Kuria added of investigations that are likely to rope in Yatani.\nBad blood\nThe bad blood between Ruto and Uhuru has existed since Uhuru and Raila's handshake in 2018, which eventually led the former president into endorsing Raila for president.\nSo nasty has the fight been that the two have had bitter public spats over the years. No previous president has consistently attacked their predecessor's legacy. When he took over as president, Moi vowed to emulate founding father Jomo Kenyatta. On his part, Kibaki promised his presidency would depart from the bad policies that had destroyed Kenya's economy in his inauguration speech. But he never publicly criticised Moi thereafter.\nUhuru followed the same unwritten tradition. In his exit speech a day before he quit as president, Uhuru praised his predecessors for laying a foundation upon which he would build.\n\"The work of building a nation is a continuous endeavour passed from one generation to another, as one Administration hands over to the next, in an unbroken chain that seeks to progressively build a more united, equitable, and prosperous Kenya,\" the former President said.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001468658/blame-game-as-ghosts-of-uhuru-ruto-wars-haunt-kenya-kwanza"}
{"doc_id": "aa6fb6cd76bb6319a5b91cec0d944e2e", "text": "CAPE TOWN - Only an integrated public and private sector approach can provide the best healthcare response to the challenge of the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic, the major representative organisations of South Africa's medical profession, together with the Progressive Health Forum (PHF), said on Sunday.\nThe pandemic posed an existential danger that necessitated mobilisation of all the country’s healthcare resources and health workers, guided by professional ethics and a commitment to comfort and care for an increasingly anxious populace facing an unprecedented and devastating plague, the organisations said in a joint statement.\nIn March this year, the PHF entered into discussion on strategies required to reduce the looming disaster with the South African Medical Association (Sama), SA Private Practitioners Forum (SAPPF), SA Medical and Dental Practitioners (SAMDP), the Radiological Society of SA (RSSA), and the Independent Practitioner Associations Foundation (IPAF).\nDr Aslam Dasoo of the PHF said although private medical practitioners had expressed their willingness to demonstrate solidarity in a time of national disaster, it had elicited little traction with government. “When it became clear that the private healthcare system, which in several respects exceeds the capacity of the public system, was not being meaningfully engaged by the authorities despite the obvious necessity, PHF initiated a process to forge collaboration among clinicians in both sectors to address the pandemic.”\nThe willingness of private specialists and GPs to join in this effort was, however, offset by dwindling patient numbers due to their fear of contracting the virus and limitations on hospital admissions and surgical procedures. “This significant decline in income puts the continuing viability of practices in serious doubt. The stark reality that otherwise viable practices will close is of great concern, as it would imperil the Covid-19 response,” Dasoo said.\nSAPPF CEO Dr Chris Archer said the private sector was both ready and willing to participate in the required response. “However, the financial pressure on private practices is real and, unlike their public sector counterparts who are salaried, private medical practices face significantly reduced income and require funds to honour staff and overhead commitments.”\nSAMPD chairman Dr Nkateko Munisi said family and general practitioners, the bedrock of many communities, faced devastating consequences without intervention.\nSama Gauteng chairman Dr Mark Human said, “Private practices have seen a 60 percent average decline in patient numbers during the hard lockdown while some specialists like ophthalmologists, ENTs, and dentists effectively shut down due to the high risk of infection in these specialties. Although since the introduction of level 3, patient numbers have increased, they are still 40-50 percent lower than normal, which is putting tremendous strain on practices’ ability to survive in the short and medium-term.”\nPHF initiated a process to resolve this material problem and a proposal was developed which in large measure eliminated this risk and enabled an unfettered engagement of over 15,000 medical and other health professionals in the national response.\n“The proposal envisages private medical scheme funding for practices on a capitation basis that would guarantee sufficient income for practices for the next 18-24 months while capping the risk to medical schemes,” Wits School of Governance and PHF member Professor Alex van den Heever said.\nKey tenets of the proposal included:\n- Money to be advanced by medical schemes to private practitioners on a non-repayment basis based on 2019 earnings. This would involve a guaranteed payment to medical practices of up to 70 percent of historical claims (using 2019 as a base year), and 30 percent based on activities that exceeded the 70 percent. The guaranteed payment would be offset against actual activities as they normalised over time.\n- The global cap would be based on both medical savings account and risk benefit claims. In this way medical, dental, and allied practices could also be supported with this framework.\n- Claims activities over the periods 2020 and 2021 would be capped at historical 2019 levels (the global cap), meaning that the risk for medical schemes of a surge in claims either due to Covid-19 patients or deferred treatment would also be capped at 2019 figures. In this way the reserves of medical schemes were also protected.\n- The risk of a decline/increase in numbers of medical scheme members would be balanced by a pro-rated adjustment to the global cap.\n- The only practices that could be negatively affected by participating in such an arrangement would be those that had generated incomes during the pandemic in excess of 100 percent of their 2019 income.\n- Discussions had also been held with the banking sector to address short-term needs to access bridging loans until such time as this framework could be implemented.\n\"A platform will have been established that will enable productive engagements on the future of the health system and agreements into 2022,\" Van den Heever said.\n\"The framework, as proposed, is non-binding on either doctors or medical schemes. Ultimately it will be up to the various associations, the medical practices themselves, and medical schemes to finalise implementation. This framework therefore outlines a feasible point of departure for any final agreements reached between schemes and medical practices,” he said.\nDasoo said the framework reduced uncertainty for medical practitioners and medical schemes over periods of greatest risk. Discussions with major health funders on the proposals had been generally positive and, barring any regulatory impediments, would be supported.\n“While we are confident that the proposal falls within the confines of the Medical Schemes Act, we have consulted the Council for Medical Schemes to fully address any potential regulatory concerns. In addition, we have consulted National Treasury in the context of the economic implications of the financial distress of medical practitioners and possible knock-on effects in the wider economy. The issues raised by all parties have been incorporated into the proposed framework,\" Dasoo said.\nWith the adoption of the proposal, private practices would retain a degree of resilience that would enable them to support government in addressing the pandemic. “It is vital that we eliminate any impediments to the mobilisation of the country’s health resources in a coherent national response to face down the most devastating global health emergency of 100 years,” he said.\nSouth African Medical Research Council (SAMRC) president Professor Glenda Gray said, “We must be relentless in our pursuit of a response to the pandemic that includes everyone. For health professionals, health workers, and health activists everywhere, Covid-19 represents the greatest challenge of a generation. We must not be found wanting in the ethical expression of the cause to which we as health workers have dedicated our lives.”", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africas-medical-professionals-mobilise-to-meet-the-threat-of-covid-19-50056536"}
{"doc_id": "79eebdb37bbceb2693322a9c03e5f164", "text": "David Webster knew of three mobile Renamo bases.\nArms supplied by local businessmen and members of the South African security forces are being used by Renamo to step up the insurgency that has devastated the southern provinces of Mozambique. The L-shaped frontier between the two countries – from Phafuri in the north to Kosi Bay in the south – is being crossed so that armed insurgents, weapons and supplies can be pumped in to the rebel movement.\nA months-long Weekly Mail investigation – based on interviews with national servicemen, priests, businessmen, social workers, medical doctors, refugees and a Renamo deserter – has revealed that intermittent staging points along the 500km long border have been used to support Renamo bands. The scale of the evidence suggests there may still exist a clandestine military unit – that deploys secret funds and recruits private businessmen along the lines of the Civil Cooperation Bureau – aimed to destabilise Mozambique, probably without the knowledge of the cabinet.\nThe Weekly Mail has the names of two Portuguese men, a farmer and cafe owner from the Komatipoort area, who informants say dragoon Mozambican refugees into Renamo, train them to use weapons and ferry them across the border so that they can undertake operations in Mozambique. The names have been passed on to the Department of Foreign Affairs so that the claims can be investigated. The farmer allegedly supplies Renamo bands with clothing, food produced on his farm and other provisions by making regular clandestine trips across the border. He is a former Mozambican who lost a large farm after Frelimo took power in 1974. His son is a South African Police reservist in Komatipoort.\nThe Weekly Mail has also collected evidence that the electrified fence, which runs for 66km from Komatipoort to the South African border, is often crossed by Renamo operatives before and after missions. The Renamo deserter told the Weekly Mail he came into South Af¬rica with another rebel, through a gate in the electrified fence some 20km south of Komatipoort, early last year after insurgents had attacked the town of Ressano Garcia to loot shops. More than two years ago, residents of Alberts Nek, a village in KaNg¬wane near this gate, reported to the ”homeland” administration that Renamo members had been seen in the area.\nLast month an officer in the Mozambican army said he had evidence that a massacre at Moveni, 12km from the South African border, in which a train was blown up and more than 60 people killed, was carried out. by a large group of armed men who had crossed the border from South African soil in the Alberts Nek area The Weekly Mail was told that black members of the South African Defence Force stationed along the fence often cross the border for ”discussions” with members of Renamo. Rebels frequently come to the fence with large amounts of South African currency, as much as R2 000, so that the soldiers can buy goods for them from shops in KaNgwane. It would appear the money is booty taken in attacks on migrant workers who travel on the train and by road from South Africa to Mozambique.\nOther points along the border where there is evidence that support for Renamo has been channelled from South Africa include:\n- Phalaborwa: Some 18 months ago army helicopters ferried, under cover of night, Renamo rebels, wounded in a major Mozambican – army offensive to a – hospital near Phalaborwa for treatment. Members of an SADF reconnaissance regiment were also treated. The Weekly Mail has established there is a township, known as Skye¬ tog to people who live in Phalaborwa’s black township of Namakgale, which houses Portuguese and Shona-speaking black soldiers. A church worker in Namakgale says the inhabitants of Skietog seldom mix with the township residents but are sometimes visited by local women. The Weekly Mail has established that the township is a recce base and its entrance is guarded by SADF soldiers. In 1986 the people of Namakgale were involved in a skirmish with men from Skietog. A number of local people were killed when hand grenades were thrown into a township she¬ been.\n- Kosi Bay: It is suspected that hu¬man rights activist David Webster was assassinated because members of the CCB believed he had uncovered evidence of a Renamo support network in the Kosi Bay area of northern Natal where he worked as an anthropologist. The Weekly Mail knows Webster had been told by an agricultural officer working for kwaZulu that he had seen three mobile Renamo bases in the area more than two years ago. We are informed that there is still an insurgents’ base located at Lake Sibaya, south of Kosi Bay. A medical doctor working in the area told the Weekly Mail more than a year ago that he had established the presence of a Renamo camp in the middle of the Ndumu Game Reserve, which straddles the border with Mozambique. This was confirmed by sources in the Mozambican security forces who said the indications were that this was a mobile base. It is known that a decision was taken in the Department of Military Intelligence, some time after the Nkomati Accord with Mozambique, to make all Renamo units in South Africa highly mobile so that they could avoid detection.\n- Phafuri: There is evidence that a Renamo band operates from the far-northern reaches of the Kruger National Park to sabotage the pylons from the Cahorra Bassa hydroelectric scheme which cross into South Africa. Zimbabwe conservation officials say rebels are poaching elephant and rhino in the Gona Re Zou game reserve, just north of Phafuri, and believe the poachers may come in from the Kruger Park. The Weekly Mail has cross-checked evidence from its sources to verify the accuracy of the information. The picture that emerges is one in which private businessmen and farmers are used to carry out theologistics to support Renamo with extensive back-up from elements in the military. It is likely that such an army unit would run along much the same lines as the CCB and that the South African government may not be aware of its existence. The Southern Africa Quaker Peace Initiative, which undertook an extensive investigation inside Mozambique last year, has just released a port which says: ”There is overwhelming evidence that certain elements in South Africa (especially in the defence force – and a number of generals have been named) continue to recruit Mozambicans to support MNR and give mate¬rial and logistical support to the bandits.”\nThis article originally appeared in the Weekly Mail.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://mg.co.za/article/1990-03-16-00-renamos-secret-sa-bases/"}
{"doc_id": "a1384f30514c8950bd9d4941283c1720", "text": "NAIROBI: A cyber-attack on the University of Nairobi's social media sites has been contained.\nThe attacker demanded a ransom of Sh700,000 with threats of worse consequences if the institution did not yield to his demands.\nIn a statement, Communications Authority of Kenya Director General Francis Wangusi said the authority's National Cyber-security Centre had taken over the case.\n\"We are making efforts to ensure full restoration of any affected systems and resumption of normal operations,\" he said.\nOn July 11 at 4pm, the university's blog site was defaced by hackers who were demanding a Sh700,000 ransom.\nOne of UoN's twitter accounts was used to share blog sites, usernames and passwords, which led to the accounts being suspended.\nAccording to a post on UoN's twitter account, the hacker had given the institution 24 hours to yield to the stipulated demands or face even worse consequences.\n\"...Today is check out or a really bad day for your systems, or whichever you guys will prefer,\" it read.\nIt added: \"You just have about 24 hours before it is out of everybody's hands. Pay ten bitcoins to the below address.\"\nAccording to foreign exchange, one bitcoin is worth about Sh70,000.\nLocally, bitcoins are not a legal currency as the Central Bank of Kenya outlawed their use in a notice dated December 25, 2015.\n\"Virtual currencies are majorly traded in unregulated platforms globally. Consumers may therefore lose their money without having any legal redress in the event these exchanges collapse or close business,\" the notice partly read.\nBy virtue of being illegal and mostly transacted digitally, the bitcoins cannot be easily traced which makes them a good avenue for cyber hackers to terrorise individuals or institutions.\nStay informed. Subscribe to our newsletter", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000208977/uon-s-cyber-attack-contained-says-ca"}
{"doc_id": "95ec1ccc1cda99f1e8e7fd68b791a37d", "text": "Her smile is infectious and her personality is loveable. Evelyn Mahlaba, fondly called Evy by friends and close associates, is South African Tourism’s new regional director for Africa. She is very passionate about the development of the continent’s tourism market. And she says “tourism is a crucial driver of the second economy, it is one of the pillars that can help address poverty.”\nShe says while most people perceive the African traveller as different from the European, American or British traveller, and they assume they have specific travel requirements, however, a research conducted by SAT shows they are not different. According to her, all visitors to South Africa want the same things: a destination that offers good value, great services and enchanting stories.\n“An African traveller who visits South Africa – whether for business or for pleasure – wants the same things from their trip as everyone else and spends their money on the same things too,” she explains.\nShe says part of her day-to-day responsibilities will be working with the African travel market and gaining insight into which travellers are more likely to come to South Africa, and what will inspire and move them to do so.\n‘Using insights from our strategic research unit, I’ll define strategies to help grow our footprint into the continent and will engage with the trade in enabling them to sell our country in a manner that is preferred by consumers,’ she says.\n‘I’m aiming to firmly establish our first standalone office in Nigeria, and I’ll be travelling to Lagos often to ensure that the team there is on a par with the rest of the South African Tourism family and has all the necessary tools it needs to sell South Africa.’\nAddition she explains that Africa is the next frontier for tourism regardless of what the world thinks. “We can’t underestimate the potential of the African travel market. The World Bank has indicated an expectation of rapid growth in Africa from now till 2030. My aim is to capitalise on that market share and drive development on the continent that sees travel become a currency among Africans,” she says.\nWith continental travel patterns that indicate movement all year round, and a local trade with the potential to deliver, Mahlaba’s vision of an intercontinental travel economy isn’t far off.\nThe national tourism budget has injected additional funds into marketing South Africa as a prime destination in Africa – the Tourism Department is serious about continental development.\n“Our African core markets currently include Nigeria, Angola, Kenya and the DRC, with Tanzania, Uganda and Ghana as secondary markets,” she says.\nShe also says she has resolved to working with the trade partners by organizing workshops for product and trade to help deliver an effective African sales model are in the pipeline. Some of the dates for the provisional workshop include: Tanzania: 1 to 4 October at the Tanzania Expo, Kenya: 8 to 10 October at the Magical Kenya Exhibition, Angola: 9 to 12 October at the BITUR Okavango Tourism Trade Fair and Nigeria: 26 to 28 October, 2014. According to her, SAT will be exhibiting at these events\n“We rely on the trade to present the face of our country and fulfil the promise we make to markets. We want to assure them that we are engaging with our stakeholders to manage the current barriers to promoting tourism, which include issues around visas and airlifts and the recent Ebola outbreak,’ she adds.\nMahlaba who is inspired by making a positive contribution to the betterment of her people and country says her message is one of hope. “‘My wish is for the industry to recognise the potential that travellers from Africa represent, in all forms. We currently have a few individuals who operate in the market – my aim is to grow the pool. I believe that developing the trade on the continent will help us mitigate economic risks, such as those being encountered in the Western world.”\nWhile speaking on her favourite restaurant, she says: “living in Jozi one is spoiled for choice with restaurants, however I enjoy cooking for friends and entertaining at home. And her ultimate travel destination is the jewel of the Eastern Free State – Clarens, situated in the foothills of the Maluti Mountains.” This is where I get in touch with my roots as a Mosotho from Jozi,” she says.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businessday.ng/art-and-travel/article/evelyn-mahlaba-south-african-tourisms-face-of-africa/"}
{"doc_id": "1a72bbc31e59e0f969e931873fa5e8c7", "text": "Fred Razak, chief trading strategist at CMTrading, has been trading on the financial markets for well over 20 years. Here he shares insight for budding traders on what it means to be a well-informed trader.\n“Trading has changed considerably over recent decades. Many of us have seen classic movies like 1987’s Wall Street and, more recently, The Wolf of Wall Street, depicting the world of trading as a glamourous, high-flying profession in the cutthroat stockbroking industry. The truth in our current reality, however, is that anyone can get into financial trading if they have an internet connection and the knowledge to make it work.\n“That is not to say that everyone who tries it will make millions overnight, though. Even though trading is more accessible than ever, it requires knowledge and skill. And in my experience, these are the top 10 must-haves for anyone considering entering the online trading arena.\nEducation\n“Trading is like riding a bicycle. You need to start with training wheels before you can hit the bicycle lane and keep up with more experienced cyclists. Similarly, before you spend a cent on trading, find a broker that is willing and able to help you learn the necessary trading techniques before you take to the road.\n“An informed trader is one that has accumulated enough knowledge about the financial markets and has developed the confidence to trade over time, knowing the risk parameters and understanding trading methodologies – and their limitations.”\nInformed strategy\n“Strategy is a direct product of education. A structured strategy informs the volume you trade – whether you trade big or small, hedge your bets or diversify. A trading strategy takes all the market’s influencing factors into account so you know when to push the gas and when to slow down. And it is informed by an overall goal.”\nA reliable trading platform\n“Sadly, there are a lot of scams out there. Avoid them by doing solid research. Start by checking if the broker you have chosen is registered with a regulator. In South Africa, South Africa’s Financial Sector Conduct Authority (FSCA) or the United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) are ones to look out for.”\nCopy the experts\n“Trading can be an art. But there can also be an element of plagiarism involved. Copycat trading entails following and copying other traders with successful track records. And this method has proved to be successful for many beginners.”\nManage your risk\n“Risk should always be taken very seriously. There is a disclaimer at the bottom of our website that states, ‘Trading in CFDs carries a high level of risk; thus may not be appropriate for all investors.’\n“There is a very valid reason for this. Any professional broker will caution you not to overextend yourself when you invest in trading. That said, however, driving a car is also risky. But it becomes less dangerous when you wear a seatbelt. Exercise the same control with the investment you put into trading. Don’t spend money you can’t afford to lose. That is the equivalent of a seatbelt in trading.”\nThink long-term\n“There is no such thing as ‘easy money’, unless you are a trust fund baby or win the lottery. And there is nothing wrong with starting on small trades until you find your feet. Err on the side of caution with your big-picture goal in mind. Trading is a learning experience and taking it slow – at least at first – is a great way to start.”\nPay attention to the news\n“Every financial market is affected by environmental factors. Times of great volatility, for example – like our current context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – can be both very risky for investors and potentially very lucrative.\n“Paying attention to the news, trading signals, the rand dollar exchange rate and socio-economic factors influencing the global economy can help you manage your risk and invest strategically.”\nChoose your weapon\n“The term ‘weapon’ is, of course, used metaphorically here. There are so many online trading techniques and so many different things to trade. Forex trading, CFD trading, stock trading and Bitcoin trading are all options. They are also all potentially lucrative.\n“Choose one that resonates with you and ensure that the proper risk parameters are in place. Ask your broker to help you make the right decision.”\nPlan ahead\n“Any financial professional will tell you that savings are critical. No matter how successful you have been as a trader, rainy days do happen. Emergencies arise and life throws us curveballs.\n“If you win a trade, consider putting some of the money you’ve made away – in a high-interest account, diversified investment portfolio or a sound policy – rather than throwing it all straight back into the pot. It’s never a bad idea to consult a reliable investment broker on what your options are.”\nStick to what you know\n“There are many ways to trade. You can do it on your desktop or mobile device. And there are several apps and platforms to choose from when you start your trading journey. It may all seem a bit overwhelming at first glance. But personal aptitude and preferences differ from person-to-person. You will find the right fit. But getting advice from an experienced broker is always the best place to begin.”", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businesstech.co.za/news/business-opinion/564560/10-ways-to-become-an-online-trader/"}
{"doc_id": "e7e442e4d62b81e9838d0fe006e2557a", "text": "BRICS nations have agreed to look into ways to deepen trade and investment among themselves as they continue to consolidate their dominance in emerging economic markets.\nBusi Mabuza, the chairperson of the five BRICS Business Council chapters, yesterday vowed to increase their contribution to the global economy from the current 23% to a significant figure through a number of initiatives.\nMabuza said intra-BRICS trade had grown an average annual rate of 7% over the past 10 years.\n“However, for me, the even more important success of the BRICS formation has been that we have now created a model for the world that moves us away from an extractive approach, in terms of economic engagement, towards a collaborative approach where we can all benefit,” Mabuza said.\n“The next wave of global growth will, in my mind, come from this continent. And it is very important that we are sitting here today, inviting our partners because we see that they accept and understand the multilateral approach where there is mutual respect, where we’re all working towards a win-win outcome.”\nChairperson of the Brazil chapter José Serrador Neto concurred that the BRICS Business Council had done extensive work to identify intra-BRICS sector networks, including promoting trade missions, and showcasing investment projects.\nSerrador Neto said they had adopted a trade and investment promotion statement, which was a plan of action for the next 10 years and included balance of trade through bilateral agreements to expiration of value-chains opportunities.\nHe mentioned the $38 billion (R721.4bn) investment in electricity transmission and generation made by China State Grid Corporation in Brazil in 2018 to use ultra-high voltage transmission technology to connect remote areas.\n“I think that renewable energy is probably one of the most strategic sectors for Brazil since it is highly relevant for the global economy.\nIn Brazil’s energy metrics, roughly 48% participation of renewables as opposed to the world average of less than 15%,” he said.\n“So this global scene directs investment to regions that can offer abundant renewable energy sources at competitive prices, which is the case for Brazil.”\nHowever, South Africa last year recorded a trade deficit of $14.9bn with its BRICS partners, which was four times larger than the deficit recorded in 2010 when it joined BRICS.\nEverest Wealth said South Africa can use the BRICS Summit to try to strengthen economic cooperation between the grouping, but must at the same time guard against doing so at the expense of other trade relations and partners.\nEverest’s head of product development, Thys van Zyl, said although South Africa’s 13-year long membership of BRICS had resulted in new trade opportunities and access to new markets for the country, most of its biggest trading partners were still in the West.\n“South Africa must therefore be very careful not to alienate its biggest trading partners in the West as these relationships are essential for the country’s economic well-being,” Van Zyl said.\n“South Africa has a trade deficit with all the other BRICS members while the country’s biggest export destinations are dominated by non-BRICS countries.”\nChair of the Russia’s chapter, Sergei Katyrin said they hoped that BRICS countries reached 30% of global gross domestic product (GDP), become dominant and “create a different picture on the global scene” when they reached 50% of GDP.\n“We have opportunities, not only to work with other countries with which BRICS is working, but we have a huge potential within BRICS,” Katyrin said.\n“For example, agriculture is the most important sector in BRICS and our countries. We buy $315bn of agricultural products outside our countries, but only 23% of this $315bn we buy from each other within the BRICS countries.”\nChair of China’s chapter, Shaogang Zhang, said now was the right time to think about how to redirect the Council’s direction of future collaboration after the Covid-19 pandemic.\n“The first issue is better policy coordination as emerging economies and representatives of the developing world so that they can make their voices wider and louder, and so we can always generate this synergy,” Shaogang said.\n“Something like to keep our markets open, to support trade and investment liberalisation, and to support the multilateral trading system embodied by the Worl Trade Organisation, to fight against protectionism. Those are very important policy elements,” Shaogang said.\nChairperson of the India’s chapter, Onkar Kanwar, said BRICS countries needed to invest in the digital infrastructure to enable seamless trade among them, especially among small businesses, and had recently opened bank accounts for more than 19 000 people in rural villages.\n“In India today, you can go to any small taxi or a two-wheeler rickshaw, everything is on digital.\n“You can make any kind of payment on the digital platform, go to any shop,” Kanwar said.\n“During the Covid-19 time, I think India took a really big stride and today we have more digitally connected than anything else because broadband has been provided in the villages.\n“I think we can leverage that, because I think this is the need of all our BRICS countries because they also have a lot of rural areas, so they need to see how they can be connected.”", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/brics-countries-seek-to-deepen-trade-and-investment-ties-16f5701b-8544-4a6e-b612-f565fcec0c0b"}
{"doc_id": "f990539bc15681a8136d84923247b3d3", "text": "This week, the National Treasury published its finalised financial inclusion policy framework for South Africa, titled “An Inclusive Financial Sector for All”, outlining the government’s roadmap towards a financial sector whose services and products are geared towards the population as a whole.\nThe first draft of the paper was published for public comment in October 2020. After comments had been taken into consideration, the revised policy framework was endorsed and approved by the Cabinet in August this year.\nIn an accompanying statement, the Treasury acknowledged that much progress had already been made: “While much remains to be done to achieve the financial inclusion objectives, the headline figures on financial inclusion in South Africa over the last decade reflect positively on South Africa’s progress, with more than 81% of the country’s adult population having bank accounts. However, given low economic growth and rising unemployment, many households are still restricted to using basic financial services.”\nAccording to the paper, available on the Treasury’s website, ongoing challenges include:\n• Low savings rates in the traditional formal sector.\n• Low take-up of savings and insurance products, with the exception of funeral, credit, and legal cover.\n• Inadequate or sub-optimal use of bank accounts.\n• Underdeveloped payment options.\n• The high costs of remittances and other financial products.\n• The limited access small, micro and medium enterprises (SMMEs) have to financial services.\nGovernment policy will rest on three pillars:\n1. To deepen financial inclusion for individuals.\n2. To improve access to and the use of financial products and services by SMMEs.\n3. To improve the enabling foundations, resulting in a more diversified provider and distribution base.\nBanking, savings and credit\nElaborating on the first of these pillars, the Treasury noted that while most South Africans had a bank account, in many cases this was not being used optimally.\n“For instance, 23% of bank account holders withdraw all their money as soon as it is deposited, illustrating that many people, especially those in the low-income group, make sub-optimal use of bank accounts. This is a concerning trend, since the store-of-value aspect of transaction accounts is removed along with the ability to transact electronically. Users falling into this category, if they have no other products from financial services providers, cannot be considered to be financially included,” the paper said.\nThe Treasury acknowledged that cash remained the prevalent means of exchange in the substantial informal sector. Barriers preventing a more cash-light society include:\n• The lack of a convenient service network that would allow the digitisation of routine payments, such as purchases at spaza shops and payments for groceries.\n• The lack of knowledge of the benefits of transaction accounts.\n• The high costs associated with ATM withdrawals (which incentivises a single withdrawal).\n• Payment innovations favouring middle- and high-income clients (for example, smartphone apps).\nOn the subject of savings, the Treasury noted that although informal savings were widespread in South Africa (in the form of stokvels), the level of formal savings at regulated institutions “continues to be very low”.\nThe root causes could include the use of traditional distribution models by financial services providers, high eligibility requirements, unaffordability, and the unavailability of appropriately designed products and services that meet client needs, the policy paper said.\nAnother concern highlighted in the paper was the misuse of credit, particularly in the low-income sector.\n“Retail credit advanced to low-income customers, although high, is primarily for consumption, rather than productive purposes or wealth accumulation, such as buying a house or starting a business. Credit bureau data indicates that most retail credit for low-income earners is unsecured loans, credit cards, and retail accounts. More concerning is that 47% of low-income earners have at least one line of credit that is three months or more in arrears, in comparison with only 20% of higher earners.”\nInsurance\n“The low-level use of formal insurance products by the low-income market is concerning, as it reflects the reality that the most vulnerable people in society are not adequately protected against day-to-day financial risks. In times of a sudden (adverse) event, these households struggle to recuperate, thus perpetuating their unfavourable living conditions,” the paper said.\nThe Treasury said the low uptake of asset insurance and life and disability insurance could be due, among other things, to:\n• The lack of affordable and suitable products in the market.\n• The distribution model, which historically was aimed at servicing the middle and upper market segments.\n• Inadequate financial education on insurance.\n• Poor business conduct, including inappropriate sales practices.\nRemittances\nThe policy paper also recognises the benefits of streamlining the remittance system, whereby working people in the cities send money to relatives in other parts of the country or across our borders.\n“Globally, remittances are an important and stable source of income for low-income households, particularly in developing countries. In some countries, the value of remittances is often on par with, or even exceeds, foreign direct investment and overseas development assistance,” the paper said.\nIt notes that many of the current remittance flows, especially cross-border remittances, go through the informal sector, with associated high costs and a lack of protection.\n“Government and the private sector will need to develop this market with a view to achieving greater formalisation and efficiency. Key actions include expanding low-cost, accessible cross-border remittance options by enabling greater competition and increasing interoperability,” the paper said.\nPERSONAL FINANCE", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/personal-finance/financial-planning/treasury-finalises-its-financial-inclusion-policy-505b2567-822c-425d-a909-bdb8be26e777"}
{"doc_id": "d0329f35070433cf31fab0670339ad3a", "text": "Ugo Aliogo\nThe Lagos State Commissioner of Police, CP Zubairu Muazu has lauded Opay’s motorbike hailing service, ORide, on the safety and security measures put in place by the company in the state.\nAccording to a statement made available to THISDAY recently, the CP disclosed this recently in Lagos during a courtesy visit to the company’s head office in Alausa, Ikeja.\nMuazu in the statement expressed delight with the company about the ORide which was launched in May, adding that the company’s operation model has helped reduce criminal activities in the state.\nThe statement explained that ORide ensures that riders (motorbikers) are not only trained to international standards (and by third-party verified trainers), but also undergo verification processes before they join the programme, “some other processes include providing two guarantors and a riders license.”\n“I know for the riders, you are engaging them in training, you have do’s and don’ts for them. They aren’t like the regular bikers you see on the road and it’s well regulated. First and foremost you are sure of who you are journeying with and the person is well trained”, the CP noted.\nThe Commissioner, who commended the company for creating employment opportunities for the unemployed youths in the past four months since it was launched, assured OPay of the support of the Nigerian Police Force (NPF).\nThe Country Manager of OPay, Iniabasi Akpan urged the Commissioner to ensure that the Police provide support for the riders who have faced harassment from louts in the state.\nThe statement said ORide is an on-demand motorbike ride-hailing service created with the vision to solve the transportation challenge of getting people and goods to their destination, in a timely and safe fashion.\nThe statement added: “ORide is a service featured in the OPay app. Since its launch in May 2019, the service has expanded to 11 other cities in the South-West, South-East and North. The Opera Group is the developers of the world’s leading browser Opera-Mini with over 350 million monthly active users worldwide. Opera Group has several local brands comprising OPay (a Central Bank of Nigeria CBN licensed Mobile Money Operator), Opera News, OBus, and OFood.”", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2019/10/09/lagos-cp-lauds-motorbike-hailing-service-oride-on-safety"}
{"doc_id": "adcddf917193c9ca8262dc13caf30947", "text": "President Jacob Zuma made the both surprising and utterly unsurprising move on Saturday of releasing his response to the Heher Commission’s report on the Feasibility of Fee-Free Higher Education and Training. Despite the commission’s finding that there was at present no capacity for the state to provide free tertiary education to all students in the country, the President announced that government would subsidise tertiary education (how?) to some 90% of the country’s students. Spoiler alert: this has been met with incredulity and described by many – euphemistically – as a foolhardy idea. Not least because many of our tertiary students, once studying, are still floundering. By MARELISE VAN DER MERWE.\nFee-free education is one thing. But the announcement by President Jacob Zuma at the 54th National ANC Conference has raised some critical questions. Why announce it now? Why ignore the recommendations of the Heher Commission? Why ignore prior research? Why promise the plan would be fiscally sustainable when there is no real economic plan? And most crucially, why increase access without balancing access with better educational outcomes? The latter raises the question of who really stands to gain.\nThe President has, in one move, accomplished quite a feat: simultaneously gob-smacking supporters, detractors and fence-sitters. One could almost read the sub-text as a visibly uncomfortable Finance Minister Malusi Gigaba attempted to explain to media what “fiscally sustainable” meant, while emphasising that no details would be available until the Budget speech in 2018.\nThe chief bugbears, in short: The announcement has largely over-ridden the Heher Commission, which issued an over 700-page report suggesting various alternatives to providing free education to all students in need, including government-guaranteed bank loans. Other critics condemned the move as an attempt to hijack the conference, suggesting Zuma released the report strategically to ensure his preferred candidate would have a convenient election campaign angle. DA Shadow Minister of Higher Education and Training Professor Belinda Bozzolli called it “appalling” and “cheap politicking”. The EFF pointedly noted it as a victory for the Fees Must Fall movement, while raising an eyebrow at its lack of detail.\nBut regardless of the motive, the most important question is the outcome. Emeritus Professor on Education Ian Scott told Daily Maverick the announcement was “reckless” and the promised increase of university subsidies to 1% of GDP should leave citizens “very, very sceptical”.\nIn the absence of a detailed plan from the President, there was also a concern that the funds for student financial aid would be sourced from “soft targets”.\nAsked whether he believed the provision of sponsored tuition and an increased subsidy would improve educational outcomes, Scott was doubtful. South Africa’s higher education throughput is notoriously poor overall, and is significantly lower among NFSAS students. A 2016 study on university through-put at six institutions found that just 36.9% of students had completed their degrees within four years. Additionally, universities are packed to over capacity.\nOr to phrase it differently, has the President offered a short-term reprieve but ultimately thrown students under the bus?\nScott told Daily Maverick it was inadequate to simply remove financial barriers to access without considering improving educational outcomes at the other end. “Clearly financial access is extremely important,” he said. “Without that, there is no starting point. But to assume that financial access automatically leads to student success in higher education – which after all is the object of the exercise – is entirely pointless.”\nTo promise free education without allocating realistic budgetary plans in consultation with tertiary institutions – with more successful outcomes in mind – was “entirely irresponsible”, Scott added. At the moment, he said, many students emerge “with debt and not much else” because there are inadequate teaching and support structures at tertiary institutions. Scott does not think dealing with access-related problems only would have a major impact on current through-put figures.\nCertainly many students have argued financial stress impacts on their studies. So doesn’t the promised subsidy increase, and the promise to construct and refurbish student housing, go some distance towards solving this?\nIn a word, no, says Scott. He argues there is “no evidence” that financial access to higher education alone will have a significant impact on the problem. He views the educational system as a pipeline, which means equal access to higher education institutions – when early childhood development, primary and secondary education provide an inadequate foundation for so many students – amounts to a band-aid on a broken leg.\nThat’s not to say it shouldn’t be done, but the entire pipeline must be fixed, and budget can’t be given to one at the expense of the other. Further, it also means if students have been educationally disadvantaged at primary or secondary level, they must be supported additionally at tertiary level to give them a fair chance.\nFailure to do so, he said, could “have the perverse consequence of further advantaging well off people and shutting the door on those who have talent but are not getting the resources lower down”.\n“In order to deal with the very difficult question of educational inequality and diversity, universities, in their day-to-day operations, must be resourced in a way that gives them a fair chance at dealing with these considerable problems,” he told Daily Maverick. “At first sight the agreement to increase subsidies looks absolutely right. If that could be achieved it could be a real step forward.”\nBut universities are progressively more under-funded, and already have more students than they can cope with. The subsidy, too, appears intended to cover the shortfall left by absent fee increases. Add to this the shortfall caused by major decreases in grants from the National Research Foundation (NRF) and the larger number of students likely to apply, and that 1 percent starts to look smaller. Universities are unlikely to have much left over for what they should be doing to improve outcomes, argues Scott. This being offering students who need it more psychosocial, material and academic support.\nThe latter is critical to reduce inequality in higher education, he says. “If (universities) don’t do something radical in terms of our mainstream teaching and learning processes, we can only expect similarly high rates of failure and non-completion. That is counter-productive.\n“But my worry about that 1% is that I don’t think it is coming free.”\nWhether the decision was entirely the President’s call or not is a further question. The Sunday Independent reported that the fees announcement – which would cost R12.4bn for 2018 alone – was in fact an ANC decision, not a Zuma decision. ANC national spokesperson Zizi Kodwa told the publication this from conference sidelines at the weekend, although it was also reported that the inter-ministerial committee had to talk an “obsessed” Zuma out of free education for all students.\nActually, Kodwa isn’t wrong. The party has had a long-standing goal to provide free education, and both the National Development Plan and the White Paper on Higher Education and Training set some ambitious goals on increasing uptake of students in tertiary educations – specifically, aiming for 1.6-million enrolments by 2030. Free education for students from poor families was also set as a target.\nMeanwhile, a 2014 report by Universities South Africa on the funding models from 2015-2019 outlines in considerable detail the challenges facing higher education. The report argues that although from 1994-2013 there was an increase in state funding from R11-billion to R26-billion, this was nonetheless an “alarming (decline) in student per capita terms” – both in terms of budget and percentage of GDP. The report argued that since income for tertiary education institutions typically came from three streams – the state, fees and grants – this placed significantly more pressure on the latter two streams, which was unsustainable.\nAs is, universities and TVET colleges face separate challenges. TVET colleges have historically been critically underfunded, while for some of South Africa’s universities, dwindling resources have impacted research output or international rankings.\nEarlier reports have one thing in common with both Zuma’s announcement and the Heher Commission: acknowledging that it is imperative to provide access to universities for economically disadvantaged students. Where Zuma’s announcement stands out is that it stumbles on sustainability. The President simply stated that the fee-free plan would be “fiscally sustainable”, when he had not yet cleared the details with the Minister of Finance or the Minister of Higher Education and Training.\nWhich leaves universities, students and the public hanging. Higher Education Minister Hlengiwe Mkhize has since said government is “considering a graduate tax.” National Treasury issued a terse statement simply saying it “note[d]” the announcement and was “in the process of reviewing the details, as well as possible financing options”. Tellingly, it described Zuma’s announcement as a “proposal” which would be “considered by the Ministers’ Committee on the Budget and the Presidential Fiscal Committee”.\nBut there’s no getting away from the possibility that Zuma’s trump card places both his successor and his colleagues in an unenviable position: either having to retract, make unwelcome amendments, or make the existing plan work. And should it go ahead, it is not guaranteed that greater access will add up to better educational outcomes. But by that time Zuma will be long gone.\nUniversities South Africa (Usaf) expressed its concern at the weekend, saying “key role players” were not consulted before the presidency released its statement. Wits’ Adam Habib said the university was consulted about no fee increase for families below the R600,000 threshold but that the free education for poor and working-class students was not discussed. “We need to clarify how the financing of free education would work,” he said on Saturday. “(There is an) urgent need for government to clarify with university stakeholders.”\nHe further said quality in universities would “decline” if free education in universities were “not done properly”. “We would have done to higher education what exists at basic,” he said.\nStellenbosch University senior researcher in education, Dr Nic Spaull, called the announcement “irresponsible”.\nThe EFF, for its part, suggested via spokesperson Dr Mbuyiseni Ndlozi, a “war on tax evasion”. It recommended a pension fund education levy of 2.5%; an additional 1% on the 1% skills levy to bring it to 2%; increasing government contribution to 2% of GDP; and a 4.9% Corporate Income Tax earmarked for higher education.\nThe DA’s Bozzoli was worried that the entire proposal was “uncosted”. “This limited offer of ‘free education for the poor’ has not been financially feasible. It will inevitably entail an increase in the NSFAS budget by at least 100% – from the current R11-billion to about R22-billion. In fact, the number of students in this bracket is entirely unknown and this proposal probably entails an even higher number. It could bring the cost of NSFAS up to R30-billion,” she said.\nShe added: “We fear that this statement will cause more harm than good. It makes unsustainable and uncosted offers to students, raises expectations and fails to indicate that the huge bureaucracy needed to implement it is in place. We remain concerned that the start of the academic year of 2018 will entail turmoil and protest, and frustration on the part of students and the institutions that they attend.\n“If the President wants to get serious about funding higher education, he needs to stop making politically expedient statements that he delays for his own benefit.” DM\nRead our article on the Heher Commission report here\nPhoto: A view of the burned and damaged entrance to the Cape Peninsula University of Technology’s (CPUT) Bellville campus after it was torched overnight during student protests, South Africa, 12 October 2016. The student fees issue intensified across the country with most campuses closed. EPA/NIC BOTHMA", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-12-18-analysis-what-cost-the-presidents-free-tertiary-education-plan/"}
{"doc_id": "da424d6bd54a72f9e37bd596dded59bd", "text": "Amidst a record year of load shedding and Eskom’s poor financial performance, Finance Minister Enoch Godongwana has tabled a new Bill to help counter the dire state of Eskom’s finances.\nSouth Africa has experienced more power cuts in the year to September than the whole of 2022, with the Outlier saying that the country has experienced over 6,074 hours of load shedding this year alone.\nAlthough the medium-term outlook for load shedding has improved due to Eskom’s improved performance and the use of alternative power systems by households and businesses, the embattled utility still faces a massive revenue.\nIn the 2023 financial year, Eskom recorded its biggest-ever loss of R24 billion as losses due to criminality skyrocketed, and wealthier customers transitioned to alternative power sources.\nAmidst the utility’s dire financial performance, Godongwana said that the R254 billion would be given to Eskom as debt relief during the 2023 budget.\nThis was done to ease pressure on the company’s balance sheet and free it to invest in transmission and distribution infrastructure.\nIn addition, over R330 billion of Eskom’s debt was already government-guaranteed, and taking over this debt would reduce fiscal risk and enhance long-term fiscal sustainability.\nThis debt was given strict conditions to ensure that public funds were used appropriately. A key condition is that the loan would not be converted to equity if Eskom violated the conditions.\nIn the Medium-Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS), Godongwana tabled the Eskom Debt Relief Amendment Bill, which improves the enforceability of the conditions as part of the debt relief agreement.\n“It provides for the payment of interest by Eskom on amounts advanced as part of the debt relief loan; The Amendment also provides for the reduction of the amount of debt relief available to Eskom in the event that the entity does not comply with the National Treasury conditions,” Godongwana said.\n“These principles and strict conditionalities, greatly enhanced by the Amendment, are a key part of how we will deal with Eskom and all other state-owned entities to avoid a repeat of the mistakes of previous bailouts.”", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businesstech.co.za/news/budget-speech/728683/godongwana-lays-down-the-law-for-eskom/"}
{"doc_id": "e937fef988e65875ddda2f78f9241421", "text": "Businessman Benson Ndeta is set to take controlling stake of Savannah Cement after he gained regulatory approval for a deal that would increase his interest in the company by 29.4 per cent.\nIn a press release, the Competition Authority of Kenya said it had unconditionally okayed Mr Ndeta’s acquisition of Savannah Cement.\nThe agency declined to reveal details about the transaction.\nSavannah Cement currently has two shareholders — Seruji with a 60 per cent stake and Savannah Heights with a 40 per cent stake. Mr Ndeta owns 51 per cent of Seruji and 35 per cent of Savannah Heights.\nSources familiar with matter told the Business Daily that following the transaction, Mr Ndeta will own 100 per cent of Seruji. Given his present holdings in Savannah Heights, this raises his effective stake in Savannah Cement to 74 per cent from 44.6 per cent.\nMr Ndeta said the changes in shareholding would have no impact on the company’s operations.\n“The restructuring at the shareholder level will not see any changes at the management of the company nor its strategy,” he told the Business Daily in a telephone interview.\nThis latest transaction follows a 2015 deal in which Seruji bought out Chinese firms Wan Ho International and Acme Wanji who had collectively owned 60 per cent of Savannah.\nStandard Investment Bank (SIB) estimates that Savannah Cement had a 15 per cent market share in Kenya last year, the fourth largest after market leader Bamburi (32.6 per cent market share), Mombasa Cement (15.8 per cent) and East African Portland Cement (15.1 per cent).\nREAD: Cement production, use fall in first half\nSavannah last year said it was planning to increase its annual production capacity to 2.4 million tonnes by mid-2018.\nThe SIB notes that expansion in capacity at a time when activity in the construction sector is depressed means that production is outpacing consumption, making it difficult to increase prices.\nData from the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics show that cement consumption fell by 62,000 metric tonnes in the first five months of 2017.\nALSO READ: Slow construction activity hits ARM Cement's half-year earnings", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/companies/ndeta-gets-savannah-cement-control-stake-2167742"}
{"doc_id": "f7fdd5b42633bac6e192162f0b70d624", "text": "Advertisement\nBeyonce pays thousands to fly toilet seats around the world so she never has to sit on a used one\nBeyonce has her own loo seats flown out to each destination of her world tour. The superstar’s team has to ensure that she never sits on one that has previously used by anybody else.\nAnd our exclusive photographs from backstage show one container — part of her huge luggage haul ferried around to every concert — labelled “Beyoncé . . . toilet seats”.\nA source said: “Beyoncé is such an elite performer she can literally request anything.\nHer team makes great effort to ensure she has her own comforts and a personal toilet seat happens to be one.\n“Her tour roadies have seen everything so it’s not a great deal for them, but it does raise a smile from people who happen to catch a glimpse of the branded container.”\nBeyoncé, 41, also uses a customised golf buggy, which is covered in black sheets to hide her identity when she is transported around backstage.\nAnd she has a VIP zone for her and her entourage featuring a huge dining area — but tour crew are not allowed within 50 metres of it and do not get any leftover grub.\nQueen Bey has form for diva demands.\nIn 2013, she demanded all tour crew wore 100 per cent cotton clothing.\nShe also wanted her water chilled to -6C exactly and £700 titanium straws to drink it — plus hand-carved ice balls to cool her throat.\nHer Renaissance tour is now back in the US after eight gigs here, including at the Tottenham Hotspur Stadium — which rival fans have claimed looks like a giant toilet seat.\nMore articles on Beyonce: Beyoncé blamed for inflation rise in Sweden", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.graphic.com.gh/entertainment/showbiz-news/beyonce-pays-thousands-to-fly-toilet-seats-around-the-world-so-she-never-has-to-sit-on-a-used-one.html"}
{"doc_id": "5745f2746a946c6d0999c9c4f4a8beb4", "text": "House price growth plateaued in November, while by region Cape Town was the best-performing metro and Johannesburg was at the bottom of the pack, according to the FNB Residential Property Barometer released yesterday.\nThe FNB House Price Index growth averaged 0.5% year on year in November, virtually unchanged from the previous month’s print.\nSiphamandla Mkhwanazi, FNB senior economist, said: “Our market strength indices show both demand and supply in negative territory.”\nHe said while it was expected that interest rates had reached their peak, with a measured cutting cycle coming into view in the latter half of next year, in line with diminished affordability, buying activity continued to decline across the spectrum, with volumes languishing slightly below pre-pandemic levels.\nMkhwanazi said there were signs of widespread downscaling in the market, supporting volumes in lower-priced brackets.\n“At the same time, younger buyers have become more despondent, reflecting the disproportionate impact of subdued economic activity and high interest rates on younger individuals,” Mkhwanazi said.\nHe added FNB projections of slightly lower interest rates and moderately better growth outcomes should help stabilise mortgage volumes and property price growth next year.\nBy price, preliminary data showed that price growth was slowing across all their selected price brackets, except for the R1.25–R1.5 million, which likely reflected the buying down effect.\nLooking at regions, affluent individuals were selling inland property, and buying in the coastal regions, particularly in the Western Cape.\nMkhwanazi said they expected the weak house price growth trajectory to continue for a little while until inflation and borrowing costs ease more meaningfully from the second half of 2024.\n“Year-to-date (January to November), house price appreciation averaged 1.6%, consistent with our prediction of 1.5% on average for 2023. While price growth should bottom in 4Q23, recovery will likely be moderate as interest rates gradually decline, and demand in the interest-rate sensitive segments slowly returns.”\nFeedback from estate agents continued to illustrate weakening buying activity, though short-term expectations were now showing signs of optimism.\nIn the year-to-date (January to September), new mortgage volumes had declined by 27% according to the latest available Deeds registrar data. The decline was more pronounced in higher-priced segments, with the more affordable segments of the market supported by the downscaling trend.\nVolumes in the bottom 20% bucket, with an average purchase price of about R500 000, were 24.7% lower compared to the same period last year. In contrast, volumes in the top 20% (average R2.9m) were down 27.8%.\nThe FNB Property Barometer found that furthermore, younger buyers, including first-time buyers, had been more despondent. The share of mortgage volumes attributed to individuals aged below 35 had declined from the most recent peak of 47.3% in third quarter 2020 to 39.7% in third quarter 2023.\nMkhwanazi said this reflected the disproportionate impact of subdued economic activity and high interest rates on younger individuals, while stronger balance sheets often insulated older individuals.\n“Overall, these trends align with our expectations and reflect higher debt-servicing costs, reduced affordability, and tighter lending standards.\n“Our projections of slightly lower interest rates and moderately better growth outcomes should help stabilise mortgage volumes next year. We expect volumes to decline by around 30% this year, and partially recover by 5% in 2024,” he said.\nBUSINESS REPORT", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/house-price-growth-plateaued-in-november-fnb-residential-property-barometer-fd523ae7-b9fc-4fcf-a51f-ce87f3639139"}
{"doc_id": "7fa8700033b7c8403c7cfadd3cdc4a1e", "text": "Ejiofor Alike with agency reports\nCrude oil prices climbed for a fifth session in a row to hit $58 yesterday, rallying from last December 2018’s 18-month low, thanks to the production cuts by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and more stable equity markets.\nOil has gained nearly 12 per cent since last Monday, its biggest week-on-week rally since early December 2016.\nWhile the global benchmark, Brent crude oil was up $1 at $58.06 per barrel, having touched a session high of $58.90, the United States crude was up 88 cents at $48.84 a barrel.\nThe oil prices are drawing support from an agreed supply cut by OPEC, as well as some non-member countries such as Russia and Oman.\nOPEC oil supply fell in December 2018 by 460,000 barrels per day (bpd) to 32.68 million bpd, a Reuters survey found last week, led by cuts from top exporter Saudi Arabia.\nBefore the current swing in oil prices, President Donald Trump had taken the credit for driving down oil prices, saying the drop amounted to a tax cut for Americans.\n“People see that gasoline (petrol) is way down and the reason it’s way down is because I called up some of the OPEC people,” Trump had reportedly told reporters.\n“I made calls, I said you better let that oil, that gasoline flow, and they did,” he added\nHowever, despite Trump’s intervention, oil has gained nearly 12 per cent since last Monday, its biggest week-on-week rally since early December 2016.\nOPEC, led by Saudi Arabia, alongside other producers led by Russia, agreed last year to rein in supplies starting from January after oil tumbled from above $86 on worries about surging output.\nBefore OPEC and other producers took a decision to lower output, Trump had made it clear that he did not want oil prices to rise.\nMany analysts had thought Saudi Arabia was coming under US pressure to resist calls from other OPEC members for lower crude output.\nTrump had praised Saudi Arabia for helping to lower oil prices as pressure intensified to impose tougher sanctions on the Middle East ally, following the murder of Saudi journalist, Jamal Khashoggi.\nTrump had in a tweet thanked Riyadh for the drop and called for prices to go even lower, likening it to “a big tax cut” that could boost the United States and global economies. The aim of the OPEC cuts is to rein in a surge in global supply, driven mostly by the United States, where daily oil production grew by nearly a fifth to over 11 million bpd in 2018.\nRecord high crude oil production has also pushed up United States inventories, which rose by nearly 17 per cent in 2018 to their highest in well over a year, according to weekly data by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) on Friday.\nAccording to agency reports, more upbeat equity markets also offered support. Shares have risen on expectations that trade talks this week between the United States and China will ease a trade dispute.\nDisruptions to trade undermine prospects for economic growth and oil demand.\nGoldman Sachs said in a note it had downgraded its average Brent crude oil forecast for 2019 to $62.50 a barrel from $70 due to “the strongest macro headwinds since 2015”.\nSociete Generale cut its 2019 oil price forecast for Brent by $9 to $64 a barrel and reduced its forecast for U.S. light crude by $9 to $57 a barrel.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2019/01/08/opec-cuts-stable-equity-markets-push-oil-price-to-58"}
{"doc_id": "5a2c4e58511c7c670ac94468abbe87f0", "text": "EDITORIAL COMMENT: Unity vital for economic prosperity\nA strong message which came out of President Mugabe’s speech marking Zimbabwe’s 37 years of Independence yesterday was the importance of unity. It is something that has eluded many nations, sadly, something which Zimbabweans often take for granted.\nThe Unity Accord signed by President Mugabe and the late Vice President Joshua Nkomo in December 1987 has allowed the people of Zimbabwe to chart an independent path to self-rule which other nations in Africa have failed to do.\nThe biggest by-product of that peace and unity is that Zimbabwe has managed to forge ahead and reclaim its land from alien settlers. That is the biggest prize of that liberation.\nAs the President pointed out yesterday, the land is now under our full control “and is for us to work on, build on, and profit from”. Without peace and unity that would not be possible. But we have had a political leadership which has been committed to peace by way of policy.\nThe land reform programme launched in 2000 is the anchor of Zimbabwe’s indigenisation and black economic empowerment policies.\nOne of the reasons Africans have not benefited from the end of colonial rule is that independence has been no more than a token achievement.\nPolitical freedom has not been accompanied by economic independence, something which should start with control over natural resources and being able to exploit these for the benefit of the majority.\nColonial propaganda has taught that blacks only need jobs. It is the white race and its multinational corporations who should own and control natural resources and make all major decisions about the national economy. Government, so the propaganda goes, should only create an enabling environment to allow capitalists to reap maximum profits from the country’s raw materials.\nZimbabwe under Zanu-PF has in the past 17 years since 2000 been challenging this myth, which has led to sanctions being imposed on the country by the West. The message has been very simple: African resources belong to Africa. We can only derive maximum benefit from that over which we have control.\nThat is why there has been so much hostility and opposition to the whole indigenisation thrust. It empowers blacks to decide how their resources are used, and to control them. It allows black people to benefit first hand from their resources as producers. Tobacco farmers can testify to that.\nThere is no white magic involved in producing tobacco and earning the country foreign currency. There is no inherent logic in why whites should be farmers while blacks provide cheap labour.\nIt is therefore no exaggeration to state that Zimbabwe is one of the few nations in Africa to give practical expression to the whole notion of political independence. It doesn’t end with a national flag. Independence without control over the economy is a charade.\nIt was therefore heartening that Zimbabwe yesterday celebrated 37 years of independence with the economy largely in the hands of black people. The war is far from over. There are still a million challenges ahead. Our people are still learning while they are subjected to a barrage of propaganda from those who took nearly a century to master the art of farming, with limitless support from their racist government and equally racist financial institutions.\nThat is why we believe Government still has a major role in helping our struggling farmers to grow. They still must learn skills to run businesses, from being mere farm labourers. They also require resources.\nThat is not to say all people who got land deserve it. There are many who have betrayed the nation and should be kicked out of the farms. We need an audit of who is doing what before Government can consider issuing title deeds to farmers. Those who want land for speculative purposes are doing the nation a disservice.\nBut those are minor negatives. Zanu-PF can look at its achievement since 1980 with pride. It has achieved a lot in the face of adversity, including Zimbabweans sponsored by outside forces to oppose and undermine all Government policies which seek to empower the black majority.\nLet’s maintain the peace and unity as we forge ahead. With these two, victory against imperialist machinations is certain.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.herald.co.zw/editorial-comment-unity-vital-for-economic-prosperity/"}
{"doc_id": "7684a53d428f24dc5bba10a395f4ee8e", "text": "Eight tier-1 banks including Equity, KCB and Stanbic have increased their loan-loss provisions by 45.8 percent to Sh62.5 billion in the third quarter of this year in anticipation of massive defaults due to a tough operating environment.\nIn the third quarter of 2022, the eight large lenders put aside Sh42.9 billion as insurance cash against potential defaults, or what is known as loan-loss provision.\nThe Sh62.5 billion loan loss provision is close to what these lenders set aside in a similar 2020, a pandemic period when most borrowers were offered debt repayment holidays, analysis of financial statement shows.\nRead: Loan loss provisions hold I&M profit at Sh2.5 billion\nThe data shows that three of the eight banks have set aside a record stockpile of insurance cash in the review period.\nThe loan-loss provision for Equity Bank, I&M and Stanbic has surpassed what they had set aside in a similar period during the Covid-19 pandemic year.\nIn the review period, the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE)-listed Equity Bank was forced to increase its provisions by 96.6 percent to Sh19 billion from Sh9.66 billion in September last year, thus reducing its profitability.\nStanbic, also listed on the NSE, increased its provisions by 56.6 percent to Sh4.48 billion in September from Sh2.86 billion in a similar period last year.\nI&M Bank has increased its provisions by a third to Sh4.4 billion in September from Sh3.4 billion in similar period last year.\nLoan-loss provisions for the other five banks — Co-operative Bank, NCBA, Absa, Standard Chartered and KCB — in were not as high as in the pandemic period. NCBA and Co-op Bank recorded a drop in loan-loss provisions.\nWhere principal or interest is due and goes unpaid for 90 days, the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) requires banks to set aside funds just in case borrowers default.\nNon-performing loans (NPLs) or loans that have not been serviced for more than three months have been rising, pointing to a tough operating environment, which has been aggravated by the devaluation of the shilling, high-interest rates and sky-high inflation.\n“At the household level, we are still struggling with inflation and price of commodities, particularly food and energy, and this has caused a significant strain on consumers,” said James Mwangi, the CEO of Equity Bank in an investor briefing.\nCBK data shows that the ratio of NPLs to gross loans increased to 15 percent in August from 14.2 percent in August last year.\nNPLs surged to a record Sh611.4 billion for eight months up to August from Sh505 billion in similar period last year, explaining the increase in loan provisions.\nDeepak Dave, the founder of Riverside Capital, noted that in an era of high income from interest rates, “banks have more operational margin to devote to padding their losses.”\n“Secondly, tough times ahead arising from a rapidly weakened operating environment,” added Deepak.\nBusinesses are grappling with high-interest rates, a weaker shilling and sky-high inflation.\nHigh-interest rates stemming from the tightening of the supply of money by the CBK to bring down the high consumer prices have also contributed to increased defaults.\nThe new tax measures implemented by the administration of President William have also reduced the disposable income for most households and businesses, making it hard to service loans.\n“This is a sign of tough times to come. It is a very tough business environment. The disposable income is reducing and the borrowers are finding it harder and harder to sell their products and services,” said Kunal Ajmera, the chief operating officer at Grant Thornton Kenya, an audit firm.\nRead: Bad loan woes return to haunt Tier-one lenders\nIn 2020, most banks put up one of the largest cash buffers against potential defaults by borrowers negatively affected by the Covid-19 pandemic.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/companies/top-banks-set-aside-sh62bn-anticipate-record-defaults--4447168"}
{"doc_id": "b5485100b02f9f5c9449b44a3dbc1e4a", "text": "There is need for discreet and painstaking investigations of public officials\nRecently, in Brazil, something happened that ought to invigorate our country’s half-hearted efforts to root out corruption. Former President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, commonly known as Lula, was sentenced to nine and half years in prison following conviction in corruption charges involving the state-run oil giant, Petrobras. The amount involved was a “measly†$190,000. But the judge froze the bank accounts of the ex-president and barred him from using three apartments, a piece of land and two cars, assets linked with the sleaze until the final ruling in the case. Much earlier, in 2016, Israel demonstrated that it operates a government of laws by sending to jail, 70-year-old Ehud Olmert, former prime minister, after a bribery charge was upheld by the country’s Supreme Court.\nHowever, in Nigeria, even though corruption is rife among top government officials and corporate leaders, there are hardly consequences. Most of the overpaid politicians and public officials have continued to fleece the very people they are supposed to protect and yet walk the streets free. There are thousands of cases bordering on graft that dot the entire landscape and more are committed daily. Yet these are issues that do not only impact negatively on citizens but also on national economic development.\nPerhaps no scandal better illustrates the impunity with which Nigerian public officials act than that of Halliburton. Some top officials of the federal government and their cronies in the private sector reportedly collected $182 million in bribes in exchange for $6 billion in engineering and construction work for an international consortium of companies to build the Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas plant. While the foreign companies and many of their top executives in Europe and America have long been indicted and convicted, Nigeria is yet to take any action against those involved in the scandal. Successive governments till date have shirked their responsibility to hold to account individuals and groups who undermined the system and abused public trust.\nMeanwhile, a combination of weak and compromised institutions – cutting across the executive, the legislature and the judiciary – have allowed the culture of corruption to thrive, a culture which has badly damaged the country’s reputation. Even South Africa’s apex court was bold enough to rule last year that the sitting President, Jacob Zuma, had contravened the constitution by failing to refund some money he spent on “security upgrades” at his personal home in Nkandla, KwaZulu-Natal. If for nothing else, Zuma publicly apologised to his nation.\nHere in Nigeria, looters walk the streets with arrogance, and nobody raises an eyebrow. Last week, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) presented a report titled “Impact of Corruption on Nigeria’s Economy†to Acting President Yemi Osinbajo. According to Mr. Uyi Akpata, who led the PwC team, “the results of the study show that corruption in Nigeria could cost up to 37% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2030 if it’s not dealt with immediately. This cost is equated to around $1,000 per person in 2014 and nearly $2,000 per person by 2030. The boost in average income that we estimate, given the current per capita income, can significantly improve the lives of many in Nigeriaâ€.\nHowever, there are some grounds to hope that things may change. But that depends on the readiness of the anti-corruption agencies to learn from their more professional counterparts abroad and indeed catch up with the rest of the civilised world. Last week, the United States filed an assets forfeiture case against the former Petroleum Resources Minister, Diezani Alison-Madueke. The investigations were discreet and from the information on display, very painstaking and thorough. We demand more and better scrutiny of our public officials. That is the only way the unscrupulous ones among them can be held to account.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2017/07/26/holding-leaders-to-account"}
{"doc_id": "01279321fe5e307e5b2a78aac463a585", "text": "Recently, a friend from the Kumasi Local Government of Nigeria asked me about the situation of things in the mainstream Nigeria. I did not want to de-market my beloved country and as such I simply told him that we live in interesting times. When he prodded further, I told him that the times are just interesting, and nothing more than that. I know you are wondering why I referred to Kumasi (which is in Ghana) as a LGA in Nigeria.\nWell, the Central Bank of Nigeria has declared that Ghana is a part of Nigeria because while it approves PTA or BTA to anybody travelling overseas, it excludes people travelling to Ghana and the likes. I hope nobody will drag me to Code of Conduct Tribunal or lay an 8-day siege on my humble abode because of this.\nBut sincerely speaking, these are interesting times in Nigeria. It is an era when we employ experts in criminal history to exhume genuine or fake infractions by significant others and use it as a foundation for trial by media so as to destabilize the person and up the ante in the WAR against corruption. Some of us are spared because we don’t have enough ‘weight’ to rattle the 4+4 movement.\nThere are also other parts of these interesting times including reviving cases that have been concluded, or remembering ones that have been conveniently forgotten or playing ping-pong with police deployments\nI don’t know where Deji Adeyanju, a certified activist and convener of Concerned Nigerians, is now but the last I heard of him was on 21/12/18 when a judge in Kano held that he lacked jurisdiction to handle the matter and then ordered that he should be in detention till February 2019 for appropriate arraignment. That was when his lawyers were preparing for his bail application and that was probably because Adeyanju was too dangerous to be roaming the streets of a safe Nigeria.\nBut the case for which the police arrested and charged him on 13/12/18 was one on which he had been discharged and acquitted by the Kano State High Court following a lengthy trial that lasted between 2005 and 2009. Meanwhile an Abuja High court had also ordered his immediate release. Both the order for his detention and release where made the same day but my interest is that the matter in question was settled 10 years ago!\nDoyin Okupe, the medical doctor who threw his stethoscope into the South-Western version of the Sambisa Forest (so that it can’t be traced) and embraced politics Nigeriana is currently the media adviser to the Director General of Atiku Presidential Campaign Organization. Okupe received some strange visitors on 8/12/18 and paid them a return visit on 10/12/18 were he was served 59 count charges and detained, all in connection with an offence for which he was investigated and cleared by EFCC in 2016 and this is in connection with his role as a media adviser to President Jonathan. We all know when Jonathan left Office! By the way why do these prosecutors or persecutors file 100 count charges; why not make it one or two concrete and winnable cases? Lets I forget, when the over-officious DSS harassed Dr Okupe at the airport sometimes ago, it was the EFCC that wrote a testimonial to DSS , assuring that there was nothing incriminating against him and he has been cleared of all allegations. He was officially arraigned on 14/1/19\nDino Melaye, different things to different people, requires little introduction. He has been in the headlines more because of what the police authorities had done with or to him, and probably for dropping some chart-busting singles than his senatorial responsibilities at Abuja. He is still a serving senator, who holds a gold medal for surviving an orchestrated recall attempt, is campaigning for another term in office and is a key advocate of the Atiku Obi politico-economic herbal cleanser. The police has just succeeded in rattling him out of his hole after laying an unprecedented 8 day stage on his house. In the aftermath, he has moved from the police detention to DSS hospital to here and to there. The problem? He was alleged to have shot a police man in July 2018. Of course, he first raised an alarm that the police shot at him but that is not the issue here. Where have our policemen been since 6 months ago when it happened and why are they behaving as if arresting Dino is a national emergency and a key hindrance to 2019 elections?\nIn another twist, the Governor of Kano State, whose corruption video has been rested through legal gymnastics has just dragged his former boss and benefactor, Senator Musa Kwankwaso of the kwakwansiya fame, to EFCC for alleged corruption. In addition to the pot calling kettle black, my main concern in this case is that Kwankwanso left office almost 4 years ago. So why is Ganduje just finding out that he stole government money and where was he as the number two man when the stealing was going on? Well Gov El-Rufai, whom I never knew was an accidental lawyer has just reminded us on Channels TV(14/1/19) that there is no statute of limitations on crimes and as such, we may have more of such cases in Kaduna or elsewhere.\nBefore going into the star show of this pre-election season, I wonder what can be more interesting than the fact that Bayelsa state has had 9 police commissioners in the past 3 months! I mean NINE! In effect, a police officer would report, hold a valedictory meeting with his predecessor and while he is studying the handover notes, he would be redeployed. The 9th CP is Mr Aminu Saleh and the governor believed that this turnover was because his state is so comfortable and serene that people are scrambling to work there but hoped that he ‘won’t have cause in the next couple of days, weeks or months to receive another Commissioner of Police’\nNow, in what has been described as unprecedented and premeditated, the federal government, which undertook ill-advised midnight operation against some judges earlier on and which had unsuccessfully arraigned the head of the Nigerian legislature, has just arraigned the head of the Nigerian Judiciary, Justice Onoghen before the Code of Conduct Tribunal, over something that was done or not done between 2005 and 2016, and is among other things asking the CJN to vacate office. The learned gentlemen have been throwing big words and phrases about since then but one has referred to it as prosecutorial misadventure while another has called it idiotic! But I am interested in other wonderful aspects of this case. The petition was written on 7/1/19 by Dennis Aghanya, Buhari’s aide between 2009 and 2011, the pioneer national publicity secretary of the Congress for Progressive Change and also a founding member of The Buhari Organisation. The petition got to the CCB on 9/1/19, was served on the CJN on 11/1/19 and he was arraigned on 14/1/19! Excellent; I never knew we still have such effective and efficient institutions in Nigeria; I will recommend them for national honours! And at the head of the star-studded cast of this drama of the absurd is Danladi Umar, Chairman of CCT, who is still on his duty post despite the case of corruption ( CR:109/18) hanging on his neck, and who last year, struck out a similar case against Justice Ngwuta because “ any allegation of official misconduct will first have to be referred to the National Judicial Council to the exclusion of any other body, court or Tribunal’’\nThe charge was signed by two senior lawyers at the CCB, Musa Ibrahim Usman and Fatima Danjuma Ali and announced by the spokesperson of the Code of Conduct Tribunal, Ibrahim Alhassan and prosecuted by Aliyu Umar, SAN. I did not smell any rat! And on top of that, a presidency source swore that the President was shocked at the development because he had no knowledge of the CCT-CJN show of shame. The source attributed it to 5th colmunists, who also organized the invasion of the NASS by DSS\nIf these are not evidence of interesting times, then tell me what is!\nOther matters\n159 Nigerian police officers assigned to African Union Mission in Somalia have just been honoured with certificates and medals for exemplary performance. The colourful ceremony was presided over by Major General Fiza Dludle, head of mission (Guardian, 13/1/19,p5) So, what is wrong with the Nigerian Police Force in Nigeria? Is it in us or in our stars? Any force messing up the performance of Nigerian Police Force in Nigeria…Holy Ghost Fire!\nIk Muo, PhD. Department of Business Administration, OOU, Ago-Iwoye. 08033026625, [email protected], [email protected]", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businessday.ng/analysis/article/these-interesting-times/"}
{"doc_id": "50d44c9acf7e007097e1185802ae8f51", "text": "Many South Africans take on debt over the holiday season as they overspend on presents, parties, clothing, and travel.\nThe desire to create memorable experiences for loved ones can encourage people to overlook budgetary constraints.\nHaving accrued various forms of credit card and store card debt, without fully grasping the implications of high interest rates and strict repayment terms, many people find themselves starting the new year in a precarious financial position.\n“Understanding and managing debt is crucial for long-term financial wellbeing, as it can significantly impact your ability to save, invest, and achieve financial goals,” says Shafeeka Anthony, marketing manager of JustMoney.co.za, a platform that helps South Africans make good money choices.\n“January is traditionally when people take stock of their financial situation and decide on fresh beginnings, so this is an ideal time to learn more about debt and take control of your money matters.”\nAnthony says that a critical aspect of managing debt, and unlocking the key to financial peace of mind, is understanding the difference between good and bad debt.\nGood debt: An investment in the future\nGood debt means borrowing money to invest in assets that have the potential to increase in value over time, or to generate an income, says Anthony. Some examples of good debt include:\nStudent loans:\nInvesting in education can increase your earning potential and long-term career opportunities.\nMortgages:\nBuying a home can be a wise investment as you’re paying off your own property, which generally appreciates over time.\nHome improvement loans:\nUsing a personal loan, or home equity loan (home loan refinancing), to renovate your property can increase its value markedly.\nBusiness loans:\nBorrowing to start or expand a business can increase personal wealth and profitability.\nVehicle loans:\nFinancing a reliable, value-for-money car can be a strategic move if transport is necessary for your work and increases your ability to generate an income.\nBad debt: A burden on financial health\nBad debt is incurred for purchases that do not contribute to wealth-building, or do not provide long-term value, says Anthony. Examples of bad debt that can quickly lead to financial strain include:\nCredit card debt:\nAccumulating credit card debt for non-essential purchases, and not paying it off in full at month-end.\nLifestyle loans:\nTaking out loans for items with no lasting value, such as tech gadgets, fashionable clothing, and extravagant holidays.\nFinancing a rapidly depreciating vehicle: Financing a car that depreciates rapidly in value, and requires expensive repairs and parts, may be a poor financial decision.\nDebt and credit scores\nUnderstanding your credit score is a crucial factor in managing debt. This is a tool that lenders use to decide whether you’re a low-risk or high-risk borrower.\nLending institutions such as banks check your score and accompanying report in detail before providing any kind of loan or credit. Your credit score also determines the interest rate you are charged.\nManaging and repaying good debt has a positive impact on your credit score. On the other hand, accumulating bad debt, and failing to make timely payments, impacts your score negatively. Poor financial behaviour makes it challenging to access favourable financing options in the future.\n“Given the tough economic climate, few of us can pay for a car or home in cash,” says Anthony.\n“Using credit is unavoidable; being able to obtain a loan or bond can make all the difference to your lifestyle. If you can obtain a loan at a favourable interest rate, this adds up to a saving of thousands of rands over the payback period.”\nDebt reduction strategies\nIf you’re struggling with debt, it’s advisable to seek help sooner rather than later, advises Anthony.\nDebt counselling, for example, is a possible solution if you are overindebted and struggling to keep up with debt repayments.\nUnder this option, a debt counsellor acts on your behalf and negotiates lower interest rates.\nThe process results in a single monthly instalment over an extended payment term.\n“Taking the time to educate yourself about debt is a key aspect of managing your hard-earned money,” concludes Anthony. “Understanding the difference between good and bad debt empowers you to make informed financial decisions, avoid pitfalls, and build a secure future.”\nBUSINESS REPORT", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/debt-decisions-in-2024-the-difference-between-good-and-bad-debt-18e1ba63-9e16-4227-ae2c-d2341b55293e"}
{"doc_id": "92adf6117a430886d8d79e7b53cb2529", "text": "By Viren Sookhun\nEnterprises in the manufacturing and logistics sectors need to ramp up to meet increased demand and compressed timelines.\nThey need flexibility with an additional staff component and the ability to scale as necessary, as demand tends to taper off after the first quarter of the year. However, these sectors are also growing industries in South Africa, which means that future demand should increase, and this could provide economic relief and much-needed employment in the country.\nTo capitalise on this opportunity, it is critical to prioritise skills development and the development of a talent pipeline to fill the growing number of available positions.\nPartnering with the right recruitment partner that offers this holistic service is key.\nGrowth sectors\nManufacturing has long been a cornerstone of the South African economy and contributes significantly toward the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). According to the South African Reserve Bank, in 2019 the sector contributed 12% to the GDP, 12% to formal sector employment and 42% of the rand value of exports. While it has been declining for a few years, recent statistics show that manufacturing is once again growing thanks to significant focus from various parties.\nThe latest from Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) shows that the country’s GDP grew at 0.6% in Q2 2023, compared to 0.4% in Q1, and that manufacturing was one of the main drivers of this upward momentum. Investment in South Africa’s automotive sector as well as increased production of metals, metal products, machinery, and equipment, among others, have helped to uplift the sector, which is positive news for both the economy and employment prospects. With alternative energy solutions, component manufacturing and other areas poised to take off in the country, this represents an important opportunity.\nLeveraging the opportunity to address social challenges\nTo meet increased demand, whether this is over peak periods or with a more long-term view, it is important to align job opportunities and create the flexibility and agility needed. A recruitment partner that specialises in a full, people-centric solution from Temporary Employment Services (TES) to relevant training and upskilling, is an invaluable ally. If we can work toward creating a talent pipeline, focused specifically on getting younger people on the first rung of the career ladder, we will be able to cater for demand while addressing a major social challenge in South Africa – that of rampant youth unemployment.\nWhile the Stats SA Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) – Q2:2023 showed a decrease in unemployment across the board and a decrease in youth unemployment by 1.1%, the youth are still vulnerable, and the youth unemployment rate remains high at 45.3%. The same survey showed that the manufacturing sector experienced job losses over the period – at odds with the fact that this is an important growth sector. The right recruitment partner can help to address these issues to align employable people with appropriate skills development to meet the needs of sectors that are providing more employment in the future.\nSustainability is essential\nWithin the manufacturing sector there is an opportunity for hiring young unemployed individuals to help give the youth a foot in the door. Giving them experience in the industry with on-the-job training can help create a talent pipeline that fuels the predicted future growth across manufacturing and subsequently in transport and logistics. Well-structured skilling programmes and appropriate certifications help create the necessary pipeline of talent and help build pools of employable individuals with a career path toward future growth.\nThis is not just about catering for increased demand over peak seasons, it is about creating sustainability and continuity, addressing challenges as a society, specifically around unemployed youth, and about growing the economy. The right talent partner can help to achieve all of this to position manufacturing to take advantage of future growth.\nViren Sookhun is MD at Oxyon People Solutions.\nBUSINESS REPORT", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/creating-a-talent-pipeline-is-key-to-ramping-up-manufacturing-and-logistics-beyond-the-festive-season-d2126280-e9e5-454b-a7a7-faca0f74f6ff"}
{"doc_id": "6ece7c8fa897828c9473f77c15c927ad", "text": "JOHANNESBURG, Aug 29 (Reuters) - Walmart Inc has launched a 6.4 billion rand ($377.6 million) offer for the remaining 47 percent of South African retailer Massmart it does not already own, valuing it at a premium of over 50 percent.\nShares in Massmart surged 46 percent after the company announced the news on Monday, as its Chairman Kuseni Dlamini said the offer seems \"fair and reasonable.\"\nThe world's biggest retailer had acquired a 51 percent stake in Massmart in 2010 for $2.3 billion, an investment that was seen as an outlay to use South Africa as a base to grab a share of the so-called 'Africa growth story.'\nBut it has struggled since then in the face of very competitive and highly profitable local retailers such as Shoprite and Woolworths, curtailing the company's aims to expand further into Africa and shaving off almost three-quarters of its market value in the last decade.\nWalmart has offered 62 rand for each outstanding Massmart share, a premium of 53 percent to Friday's closing share price, Massmart said, adding if approved, it would de-list the company.\nThe deal would help Walmart put \"further intervention operationally and significant additional financial investment,\" Massmart's Chairman Dlamini told reporters.\n'GO THE WHOLE HOG'\nMassmart, which sells a lot of discretionary items such as apparel, home supplies and seasonal goods, has faced a number of challenges over recent years, forcing Walmart to dole out financial relief and convert loans into equity.\nMassmart's management launched a turnaround plan in 2019 involving selling off non-core assets, but it was not enough and financial support by Walmart deepened during the pandemic when it injected 4 billion rand into the company.\nThe COVID-19 crisis was followed by civil unrest last year, flooding of its stores earlier in the year and most recently inflation.\n\"The potential offer, if finalised, will provide Massmart with needed access to ongoing financial and operational support,\" Massmart said in a statement.\nAnalysts and bankers said having invested billions into the company, it is tricky for Walmart to back out now, especially as rivals have shown the South African retail market is highly rewarding.\nIts peers have been posting gross profit margins - a key measure of profitability of retail companies - of up to 36%, nearly double that of Massmart.\n\"Considering the support that they (Walmart) have to give Massmart in this process, they probably thought well... why shouldn't we get the benefit of it and let's just go the whole hog and take the rest of the shares out,\" Sasfin Wealth senior equity analyst Alec Abraham said.\nThe amount that Walmart has been investing into Massmart is a fraction of the profits the parent company makes annually, so it can keep on investing until it manages to turn it around, a banker who has advised Massmart in the past said.\nHe did not wish to be named as he is not involved in the deal.\nMassmart's losses widened in the 26 weeks ended June 26 to 903.5 million rand, from a loss of 358.5 million rand a year earlier.\n($1 = 16.9507 rand)", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/companies/walmart-makes-offer-rest-of-s-african-retailer-massmart-3930222"}
{"doc_id": "368655be9c6929880e0f56c5cce70867", "text": "WEEKLY REPORT\nRenewed investors’ confidence in equities boosted the value of trading by 79.7 per cent to N39.087 billion last week up from N21.740 billion the previous week. The amount was invested in 2.170 billion shares in 24,657 deals, compared with 2.018 billion shares exchanged in 25,496 deals the previous week.\nThe renewed demand for stocks also made the market to close the week on a positive note with the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) All-Share Index rising by 0.72 per cent to be at 42,876.23. Similarly, market capitalisation rose by 0.82 per cent to close at N15.403 trillion. The growth is an improvement on the decline of 0.16 per cent recorded the previous week.\n All other indices finished higher during the week with the exception of the NSE ASeM, NSE Banking and NSE Pension Indices that depreciated by 1.14 per cent , 0.59 per cent  and 0.09 per cent in that order.\nCommenting on the week-on-week performance, analysts at FSDH Merchant Bank said the market recorded a marginal increase to close positive.\n“Activity level was positive in volume and value terms while market breath closed negative. Bargain hunting is likely to be sustained in coming sessions as market outlook remains positive in the immediate term,†they said.\nDaily Performance\nThe market began the week with high hopes as it recorded a growth.  The NSE Index rose marginally by 0.02 per cent to close at 42,579.48, lifted by the appreciation recorded in the share prices of GTBank, Zenith Bank, UAC of Nigeria Plc, PZ Cussons, and FCMB Group Plc among others.\nCommenting on the market, analysts  said it   traded sideways in today’s session but recorded a marginal gain.\n“The market sentiments to the corporate earnings of Total Nigeria, African Prudential and United Capital released today were negative as the stocks experienced sell pressure and closed on offer. Market activity will likely increase in coming sessions with anticipation of corporate earnings of banks,†they said.\nIn terms of sectoral performance on the first day of the week, three   indices advanced while two declined. The NSE Consumer Goods Index led gainers, up 0.8 per cent, trailed by   the NSE  Insurance Index rose by 0.5 per cent.  The NSE Banking Index appreciated by 0.3 per cent.\n On the flipside, the NSE Oil & Gas Index shed 2.5 per cent, while the NSE Industrial Goods Index  went down by 0.2 per cent.\nThe market fell on Tuesday due to sell pressure amidst weakening investors’ sentiment. Consequently, the NSE ASI depreciated by 0.66 per cent to close at 42,299.56. The depreciation recorded in the share prices of International Breweries, Zenith Bank, Dangote Cement, Seplat, and Lafarge Africa were mainly responsible for the decline recorded in the index.\n “Market performance across sectors was mostly bearish. The 2017 earnings release is expected to improve market activity and investors’ sentiment in coming sessions,†operators said.\nDespite the bearish trend, there was increased activity in the market as volume traded inched 14 per cent higher to 438.7 million units while value traded advanced 60.8 per cent to N8.8 billion.\nThe market rebounded on Wednesday as the NSE ASI jumped by 2.44 per cent  to close at 43,330.54. The appreciation recorded in the share prices of Unilever, Nigerian Breweries, Dangote Cement, Stanbic IBTC, and Lafarge Africa were mainly responsible for the gain recorded in the index.\n“Market activity and investor sentiments strengthened today. The positive performance of the market was mainly driven by bargain hunting presented by the temporary decline in the prices of some stocks. This trend is likely to be sustained in coming sessions as investors continue to hunt for bargains in perceived undervalued stocks,†according to the analysts.\nThe NSE Industrial Goods Index led the gainers chart with 4.1 per cent, trailed by the NSE  Consumer Goods Index  that rose by  2.4 per cent. The  NSE Banking  Index and  NSE Oil & Gas Index   also trended northwards, up 0.8 per cent and 0.2 per cent  respectively.\nBut the bullish trend could not be sustained on Thursday as the NSE ASI fell by 1.1 per cent to close at 42,843.38. Profit taking in Dangote Cement Plc (-1.8 per cent), Nigerian Breweries (-3.6 per cent) and GTBank (-2.0 per cent) weighed heavily on the performance. As a result, investors lost N174.8 billion in value as market capitalisation fell to N15.4 trillion. Similarly, activity level declined as volume and value traded fell 35 per cent  and 54.9 per cent  to 371.2 million  units and N4.9 billion respectively.\nPerformance was mixed across sectors as three indices declined while two advanced. The NSE Oil & Gas Index led gainers, rising 1.0 per cent. The NSE  Insurance Index trailed, rising by  up 0.1 per cent. On the negative side,  the NSE Industrial Goods Index declined 2.2 per cent  as investors took profit in Dangote Cement ANGCEM (-1.8 per cent) and Lafarge Africa Plc (-3.5 per cent). The  NSE Banking  Index fell 1.1 per cent while the NSE  Consumer Goods  Index depreciated by 0.7 per cent.\nThe market closed the last day on a positive note, appreciating by 0.08 per cent, bringing the week-on-week gain to 0.72 per cent.Â\nMarket Turnover\nA further analysis of the activity chart showed that the Financial Services Industry led with 1.534 billion shares valued at N17.670 billion traded in 15,208 deals, thus contributing 70.69 per cent and 45.21 per cent to the total equity turnover volume and value respectively.  It was followed by the Industrial Goods Industry, which recorded 200.405 million shares worth N6.436 billion in 1,097 deals. The third place was occupied by Conglomerates Industry with a turnover of 188.097 million shares worth N489.453 million in 998 deals.\nTrading in the top three equities namely – FCMB Group Plc, Transnational Corporation of Nigeria Plc and Cement Company of Northern Nigeria Plc, accounted for 617.511 million shares worth N4.086 billion in 2,090 deals.\n Also traded during the week were a total of 50,547 units of Exchange Traded Products (ETPs) valued at N4.593 million executed in 12 deals, compared with a total of 111,794 units valued at N1.806 million that was transacted  in 10 deals two weeks ago..\nA total of 6,574 units of Federal Government Bonds valued at N6.332 million were traded last week in 31 deals, compared with a total of 9,963 units valued at N10.057 million transacted the previous week in 21 deals\nPrice Gainers and Losers\nMeanwhile, 38 equities appreciated in price during the week under review, higher than 23 of the previous week, while 45 equities depreciated in price, lower than 54 equities of the previous week.\nJapual Oil & Maritime Services Plc led the price gainers with 50 per cent, trailed by Unity Bank Plc with 18.7 per cent. N.E.M Insurance Plc chalked up 18.4 per cent, just as Cement Company of Northern Nigeria Plc gained 17.8 per cent. Consolidated Hallmark Insurance Plc and NASCON Allied Industries Plc garnered 16 per cent and 25.8 per cent respectively.\nOther top price gainers included: First Aluminium Nigeria Plc (15.3 per cent);  Cutix Plc (11.3 per cent); Conoil Plc (9.8 per cent) and Continental Reinsurance Plc (9.2 per cent).\nConversely, Sovereign Trust Insurance Plc led the price losers with 20.8 per cent, trailed by UNIC Diversified Holdings Plc that shed 18.5 per cent. Multiverse Mining and Exploration Plc went down by 17.6 per cent, just as FTN Cocoa Processors Plc and African Alliance Insurance Plc lost 15.9 per cent and 14.2 per cent  in that order.\nOther top price gainers were:  DN Tyre & Rubber Plc (13.6 per cent); Diamond Bank Plc (12.1 per cent); Royal Exchange Plc (11.4 per cent); Courtville Business Solutions Plc (9.3 per cent) and Standard Alliance Insurance Plc (8.3 per cent).", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.thisdaylive.com:443/index.php/2018/03/05/investors-invest-n39bn-in-equities-on-positive-sentiments"}
{"doc_id": "f95c4e9a5a1ade593b21f5b7a651dc27", "text": "Political change is now inevitable; the first task for any new leaders will be solving Zimbabwe’s economic crisis. By Derek Matyszak for ISS TODAY.\nFirst published by ISS Today\nWhen President Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party swept to victory in 2013, the resigned riposte of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change – Tsvangirai (MDC-T) party was: “Let’s see you govern!”\nIt was aware that ZANU-PF would struggle to manage an already precarious economy that would be investor-shy under its stewardship. “You can rig elections,” the MDC-T said, “but you cannot rig the economy”.\nZANU-PF has, however, been making a very good go of doing precisely that.\nThe official position is one of optimism, based on a bumper harvest from the last season and rising international commodity prices, which have seen the value of exports rising from US$2.8-billion to over $4-billion. Protectionist bans on select imports caused the trade deficit to drop by a billion to $2.3-billion. The stock market is enjoying an unprecedented bull run, soaring through what was previously seen as a ceiling of six-billion. At a casual glance, Zimbabwe is looking pretty good.\nUnfortunately, in the inverted world of Zimbabwe, bull runs on the bourse are a portent of doom rather than boom; an indicator of a desperate need for assets to guard against anticipated hyperinflation. Hyperinflation? Did Zimbabwe not dollarise precisely to cure that evil after its own currency was printed out of existence? It did, but the Mugabe administration has found another way to create money out of nothing to fund the trade and successive budget deficits.\nThe post-2013 period has been marked by company closures, and manufacturing firms that have remained open have an average capacity utilisation of only 45% and falling. There has been a slew of worker retrenchments. Zimbabwe’s toxic “indigenisation” policies have also kept foreign direct investment at bay.\nAll this means sharply reduced government tax revenue, but no austerity measures. Just last month the government announced the purchase of 226 twin cabs for the country’s traditional chiefs who, with elections next year, will help secure the rural vote for ZANU-PF.\nThe resultant budget deficit is funded through the issuance of Treasury Bills, with $4.4-billion issued in the past three years and current stock at over $2.5-billion, amounting to 64% of the tiny $3.9-billion national budget. Banks have soaked up most of the bills and are hugely exposed to a default on their maturation, which would also strip the veneer of strength from their asset registers.\nHowever, the government has assured the nervy business community that a default won’t happen. Default is avoided by the simple expedient of government directives to the Reserve Bank to enter electronic credits into the books of those holding maturing bills. The book entries are not backed by anything more than an IOU from the government to the Reserve Bank. In this way, billions of dollars of “cyber money” have been created.\nTwo invariable laws of economics have now kicked in. One is that when money supply is expanded without material backing, the value of the monetary unit depreciates proportionately; and the second is that bad money drives out good – Gresham’s law.\nIn accordance with Gresham’s law, the number of real US dollar notes in the banking system has dropped to unworkable levels. No one wants to put real dollars into the system and have them exchanged by the government for cyber money. Dollars are kept offshore wherever possible, dollar receipts are reduced through imaginative price transfer arrangements by exporters, and dollar notes are smuggled out of the country or jealously hoarded in pillows and under mattresses. When depositors arrive to draw cash from their banks, they are told that only cyber money is available and all commercial transactions must be done through electronic transfers. A few customers who queue for hours may get $20 – issued as a bag of coins.\nThe first attempt to deal with the cash shortage was to print ersatz dollars called “bond notes”, officially on a par with the dollars they seek to replenish. However, “bad” cyber money has likewise driven these (better) notes out of the banking system.\nThe cash shortages have resulted in a thriving black market, with exchanges between three basic tiers of value – US dollar notes, bond notes and cyber money. On 22 September, social media reports that thousands of freshly minted bond notes had appeared on the black market, went viral. The notes appeared to have emanated from the formal banking sector. Interventions by the formal banking sector in the black market to commandeer hard currency was a distinctive feature of the hyper-inflationary period of 2008.\nThe public had every reason to believe those days had returned and responded with panic-buying of imported products. Petrol stations ran dry. The black market value of cyber money and bond notes crashed, now discounted at 65% and 40% against real dollars respectively. Real US dollars are needed to import fuel and electricity, components for locally manufactured goods and 70% of products on supermarket shelves.\nTo secure this hard cash, the government captures dollar receipts from exporters. The exporters’ captured real dollars are distributed to importers by the Reserve Bank according to a “priority list”. But there is not enough to go around, or if it does come around, it’s too late. Zimbabwean firms dependent on imports either halt operations while waiting for their hard currency allocation or approach the black market. The 65% premium on the real dollars sourced in this way is then passed on to the consumer in price hikes.\nThe government is frantically trying to maintain the façade that the three modes of exchange remain on a par with each other. In reality, all salaries paid in cyber money have been drastically reduced in value, and decline further with every dollar of cyber money the government creates. If the trend continues, eventually the government will have to acknowledge the depreciated purchasing power of civil servants’ wages, which already gobble over 90% of government revenue, and award increases.\nThe increased wage bill will have to be financed by the creation of more cyber money, further driving the inflationary cycle, and accelerating an economic death spiral where civil servants’ wages will ultimately buy little more than a can of locally produced baked beans – if the manufacturer is still operating.\nIn 2008, the problem was solved through dollarisation. No one seems to know what the solution is this time around. DM\nDerek Matyszak is a Senior Research Consultant, Peace and Security Research programme, ISS Pretoria\nPhoto: Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe (C) inspects goods on display at an exhibition stand at the 2017 edition of the Zimbabwe International Trade Fair in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, 28 April 2017. Photo: EPA/AARON UFUMELI", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-11-15-iss-today-can-new-leaders-fix-zimbabwes-potemkin-economy/"}
{"doc_id": "2d3efe90d372f7d8f25e684a8de8ef91", "text": "Unfortunately for shale gas exploration companies like Shell, a scientific study indicates that the Karoo shale deposits are “over-mature” (cooked to the point where most gas has disappeared). Commenting on the latest study, Treasure the Karoo Action Group (TKAG) chief executive Jonathan Deal says he is not in the least bit surprised by these results. By TONY CARNIE.\nNew evidence that the shale gas potential of the Karoo is grossly inflated is part of an emerging worldwide pattern – where “game-changing” economic opportunities from the gas fracking industry are deliberately manipulated or overstated.\nThis is the opinion of veteran anti-fracking campaigner Jonathan Deal, reacting to a scientific study published on Thursday morning in the latest issue of the SA Journal of Science.\nProf Michiel de Kock, the study’s lead author and head of geology at the University of Johannesburg, said the United States Department of Energy published a report in 2011, estimating the Karoo basin’s recoverable reserves to be 485 tcf (trillion cubic feet), suggesting South Africa had the fourth largest shale gas reserves in the world.\nThis estimate was later revised down to around 390 tcf – but a new study by de Kock and a team of researchers from several other universities suggests both these estimates are “grossly inflated” and that the actual reserves are more likely to be around 13 tcf.\nA map of the Karoo Basin showing three borehole drilling sites (starred) which revealed very low traces of natural gas.\nThat is more than 37 times lower than the initial US Energy Department estimate, that was used to trumpet the supposedly massive economic and job-creation benefits from fracking the Karoo.\nDe Kock bases the latest low estimates on the first direct measurement and analysis of natural gas content, taken from three deep borehole sites in the north-western Cape, eastern Cape and Free State.\nHe concluded that despite the relatively small sample of direct tests (taken from depths of up to 2,500m) the Karoo deposits have been overcooked – much like an overdone braai steak.\nShale gas is a by-product of ancient animal or plant debris laid down underground millions of years ago. They need a certain amount of heat to produce hydrocarbons such as oil, gas or coal – and in the case of gas, the shale steak has to be cooked to “medium”.\nPhoto: Drill core samples collected from beneath the Karoo which showed very low gas levels. Photo: Alec Birch\nUnfortunately, for shale gas exploration companies like Shell, De Kock believes the Karoo shale deposits are “over-mature” (cooked to the point where most gas has disappeared). Commenting on the latest study, Treasure the Karoo Action Group (TKAG) chief executive Jonathan Deal says he is not in the least bit surprised by these results.\nHe notes that Marcellus shale gas reserves in the United States were originally estimated at around 500 tcf whereas more recent estimates indicated that these reserves were in the region of just 50 tcf.\nShale oil reserves in Monterey, California, were similarly grossly overestimated to be around 13.7 billion barrels – but later slashed by 96% in more recent estimates.\n“Government policy can be built on overstated reserves. This use of sensational hype and manipulation of the figures helps people to get things in place, but no one bothers to hold the oil and gas industry to account when the estimates are slashed later,” he said.\n“What the motives might be is difficult to follow, but I think it would be obvious to anyone who follows the oil and gas industry closely. They enjoy investors speculating in their shares, based on access to supposedly huge reserves of hydrocarbons.”\nDeal recalled that when shale gas reserves in the Karoo were initially estimated at around 485 tcf, Investec economist Brian Kantor calculated that this translated into nearly 400 years of petroleum-based energy for South Africa.“Shell then released a report by Econometrix which said that even if the reserves were 10% or 20% of this estimate it could still translate into nearly 700,000 jobs and add R200-billion to the country’s GDP.”\nYet the CSIR reported in a study last year that Karoo shale gas quantities were uncertain and that there could be “no economically extractable gas”. Even if 30 tcf were found, this would translate into less than 2,600 direct jobs (with only 15%-35% of these jobs available to Karoo residents).\n“The over-stating of the so-called economic benefits of shale gas is completely irresponsible,” said Deal, pointing to the risk of a boom and bust scenario.\n“In the United States, even the very best fracking wells are only lasting three to four years before drying up, whereas many others run dry within 12-18 months or less.”\nDeal says abundant supplies of offshore shale gas from Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania and even the East Coast of America can be imported more cheaply than by developing Karoo gas – without having to incur any risk to South Africa’s scarce underground water supplies, tourism, agricultural sector or the environment, especially when renewable energy is getting cheaper and cheaper all the time.\n“I can speak from experience on this because I have been off the grid for 10 years at my home in the Karoo.”\nOn whether the latest very low estimates signal the end of shale gas exploration in South Africa, Deal says: “No. I don’t think so. There are still vested interests that have built up this momentum of expectation around massively-overstated economic benefits. I think that if it left up to the Zuma administration they will push as hard as they can, and go ahead regardless. I personally believe that promises were made to corporate interests some years ago.\n“The fight will now have to move to the trenches in the Karoo and KwaZulu-Natal to oppose all EIA applications for shale gas exploration”, he says, noting that a legal challenge against South Africa’s new fracking regulations had been lodged in the Pretoria High Court by TKAG and Afriforum and the matter is set down for hearing on February 20- 21.\nMarcus Pawson of Afriforum says De Kock’s study was an encouraging step for South Africans who believed in building a sustainable industry that can be regulated sufficiently through evidence-based scientific studies.\n“Three critical aspects are being revealed; first that government has drafted fracking regulations that were published before scientific studies were completed; second that the wrong ministry published these regulations; and third that there are not enough gas reserves to make the industry economical without polluting the water reserves.\n“I think we as a country must focus now on renewable energy and strategies that not only ensure our energy needs are met in the future, but to also reach our millennial goals in reducing our carbon footprint.\n“Nevertheless, anti-fracking groups must be wary of the soothing sounds or movements that create the impression that the eagerness of international companies to start fracking in South Africa is waning.\n“In fact, now is the time to step up efforts to finally stop fracking and exploration in our water-sensitive and drought-plagued country. The research on hydraulic fracturing has already shown that in the South African perspective, the negatives outweigh the positives.”\nLast year, the country’s top science advisory body (the Academy of Science of South Africa) published a 214 page report warning the government that uncontrolled hydraulic fracturing (fracking) could have “devastating effects” on the country’s scarce water resources and could activate dormant geological faults that could induce significant earthquakes.\nShell, however, appears undaunted by the test results just in from the Karoo. “Shell remains committed to the long-term prospect of a shale gas development in South Africa,” spokesperson Dineo Pooe said last night.\n“We have noted the findings of the research conducted around the shale gas potential of South Africa’s main Karoo basin. However, confirmation of a commercially-viable gas resource across the Karoo basin can only be established through exploration drilling in specific target zones\n“Should a clear and supportive legislative and regulatory framework as well as competitive commercial terms be put in place, the Karoo project could compete favourably within Shell’s global tight/shale gas and oil portfolio.” DM\nThe full research article is available at www.sajs.co.za\nPhoto: One of the drilling sites near Ceres, south of the Tankwa Karoo National Park. Photo: Geoserve Exploration Drilling", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-09-28-fracking-flop-karoo-gas-estimates-overcooked-in-more-ways-than-one/"}
{"doc_id": "d986045d4d6eb66cc71df1e1dd520afb", "text": "Inflation\n4 days ago\nAlthough Nigeria pumps crude oil, its refineries are so dysfunctional they have been closed down, so it imports almost all its refined fuel. Rising domestic consumption thus weighs on the current account.\n26 Feb\nAs shoppers await price cuts, retailers like Home Depot say their prices have stabilized and some national consumer brands have paused price increases or announced more modest ones. Yet some industry watchers predict deflation for food at home later this year.\n6 Feb\nWorld Gold Council forecasts purchases of the commodity this year are unlikely to meet 2023 levels, where they hit an all-time high and also the second highest year in history of central banks buying gold. But is gold still a safe hedge against inflation in Nigeria?\n19 Jan\nFood price increases have seen the consumer inflation rate in Africa's largest economy hit its highest level since 1996.\n6 Jan\nThe cost of living in Germany increased by nearly 6% year-on-year last year, according to provisional figures. While inflation has eased since the start of the year, food and energy price rises remain high.\n20 Dec\nDays ago, Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics reported that headline inflation reached 26.7% in September 2023 up from 25.8% in August of the same year, with food inflation hitting 30.64% in September. The Guardian Nigeria stepped out to know how the inflation is affecting the lives of Nigerians and their businesses.\n4 Dec\nHousehold Consumption accounted for the largest share of real Gross Domestic Product at market prices in the first and second quarter of this year according to data from the National Bureau of Statistics. Femi Oladehin, Partner at Àrgentil Capital Partners joins CNBC Africa to unpack the numbers and drivers of inflation in Nigeria.\n4 Nov\nConsumer price inflation in the eurozone has slowed to its lowest level since July 2021. But the sluggish performance of the German economy contributed to the eurozone's economy shrinking by 0.1%.\n1 Oct\nInflation in the eurozone fell to an almost two-year low. The news increases pressure on monetary policymakers to halt their recent string of painful interest rate hikes in the common currency area.\n20 Sep\nAt the same time the global economy was forecast to do slightly better in 2023. But the effects of tight monetary policy are expected to be felt for a while yet.\n3 Sep 2023\nOn 17 August 2023, popular protests over the high inflation rate and deteriorating economic situation in Syria erupted in the Druze majority city of Al-Suwayda, with hundreds of participants. These grew, and by 20 August, thousands of protesters chanted slogans demanding the downfall of Assad regime.\n26 Aug 2023\nThe health and cost-of-living crises has disproportionately affected the poor and women in developing Asia, hurting their chances of long-term improvement.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://tv.guardian.ng/tag/inflation/"}
{"doc_id": "48ed95cb7a7f05c282be597317b6e67b", "text": "The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has announced that the Nigerian economy would witness a deeper contraction of 5.4% and not the 3.4% it projected in April 2020. But the global lender expects Nigeria’s economy to rebound by 2.6% in 2021.\nIMF says the forecast is influenced by the larger than expected storms to global value chains due to the coronavirus, affecting global demand for goods and services.\nThe IMF expects poorer nations dealing with the disease to have longer economic recoveries as lockdowns continue in the worst-hit to global GDP since the Great Depression.\nGita Gopinath, IMF Chief Economist said: “our projection for sub-Saharan Africa overall is a negative 3.2 % in 2020 with a recovery in 2021 of 3.4%.”\nSouth Africa’s economy is expected to decline by 8% in 2020 and a 3.5% rebound forecasted for 2021.\nIMF says the higher than expected GDP decline is a sign that poorer economies are being hit harder because, “for many countries that are staring out at lower per capita income levels when you have a growth hit of 3 percentage points, the distress that it causes in peoples lives is in a bigger magnitude than a similar decline for an advanced economy so these are very difficult times.”\n“With the relentless spread of the pandemic, prospects of long-lasting negative consequences for livelihoods, job security and inequality have grown more daunting,” IMF said in its revised World Economic Outlook.\nThe rebound of equity markets globally “appears disconnected from shifts in underlying economic prospects”. The fund expects reduced consumption due to larger than expected disruptions to domestic appetite for goods and services due to social distancing measures for COVID-19.\nChief Economist, Gita Gopinath said last month that the global outlooks are worse than previously expected and the fund may downgrade its April forecasts based on data its computing.\nFiscal Monetary Policies seem to have eased in first world nations and emerging economies.\nGlobally, Central Banks have announced stimulus plans up to $11 trillion, which is $3 trillion higher than April estimates. These plans are expected to soften the effects on the declining economic activity and limited the rising borrowing costs, also emerging markets portfolios have seen a recovery from earlier withdrawals.\nThe fund says the reduced global GDP could “tip some economies into debt crises and slow activity further”.\nThe US GDP is set to take an 8% hit in 2020, compared to 5.9% earlier predicted, 2021 growth forecast is pegged at 4.5%. The Euro Area is expected to shrink by 10.2% in 2020 and grow 6% in 2021.\nEmerging Markets are expected to shrink by 3% while advanced economies by 8%, compared to 6.1% previously predicted.\nChina will see a little growth as it’s expected to grow by just 1%. Brazil is expected to shrink 9.1%, Mexico by 10.5% and India by 4.5%.\nIMF warns that the reductions in GDP due to COVID-19 will widen inequality, with over 90% of emerging market economies expected to have per capita income declines.\nGlobal trade for goods and services will also shrink by 11.9% this year.\nThe group expects 2 possible scenarios, first a possible second virus outbreak next year which will disrupt economic activity to about half the value expected for this year, emerging economies are expected to feel the heat more and global outlook will be 4.9% lower than 2021 forecasts.\nThe other scenario predicts a faster than expected economic rebound with global forecasts 3% higher than 2021 expectations.\nDownload Nairametrics App for breaking news and market intelligence.\nFor further inquiries about this article contact:\nEmail: william.ukpe@nairametrics.com or outreach@nairametrics.com.\nTwitter: @_sirwilliam_ @nairametrics.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://nairametrics.com/2020/06/25/imf-expects-nigerias-gdp-to-shrink-by-5-4-in-2020/"}
{"doc_id": "af68b05fd2b815fe2d274c23c11a0a7e", "text": "What you need to know:\n- Only 1.1 per cent of the top 60 per cent of income earners in Kenya have an outstanding loan to purchase a home, while only 0.6 per cent of the bottom 40 per cent of income earners have a mortgage.\nAbout two months ago, Central Bank of Kenya governor Prof Njuguna Ndung’u sent shock waves through the property sector when he announced that the bank would conduct a survey to ascertain the source of the money behind the boom in the country’s real estate sector.\nHis concern was that the high level of activity in the sector was at variance with the low level of home purchase borrowing, which currently stands at only about 17,000 mortgage accounts.\n“There is something wrong somewhere that needs to be investigated. Where is the money coming from? We need to engage a consultant,” he said during the opening of trading on Housing Finance Sh3 billion housing bond on the Nairobi Securities Exchange.\nSo where is the money being used to build the many new pricey homes in Nairobi and other major urban centres really coming from? Some have suggested that piracy or some other “blood” money is the one financing Kenya’s real estate sector.\nNo one knows for certain, for now. But even if that were to be true, it would just be half the story.\nAccording to a new survey, very few Kenyans have an outstanding home purchase loan.\nTitled, 2012 Yearbook: Housing Finance in Africa, the survey conducted annually by South Africa-based Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa, says that most Kenyans own homes through construction loans, rather than through mortgages.\n“Loans for home construction are more prevalent,” it says. Here are the numbers: 3.4 per cent of the top 60 per cent of income earners have construction loans, and 3.8 per cent of the bottom 40 per cent of income earners also have one.\nOn the other hand, the report says, only 1.1 per cent of the top 60 per cent of income earners in Kenya have an outstanding loan to purchase a home, while only 0.6 per cent of the bottom 40 per cent of income earners have a mortgage.\nThe report, which describes Kenya as one of the most developed economies in East Africa with a vibrant housing finance sector and a booming property market, says this trend is surprising, especially given the country’s high level of financial inclusion: 37.9 per cent of rural and 76 per cent of urban Kenyans over 15 years of age have an account with a formal financial institution.\nIt notes that credit is fairly common in Kenya: 66.3 per cent of adults over 25 years of age report that they had a loan in the past year to 2011.\nMost of these loans were from family or friends. Only 12.6 per cent of adults had a loan from a financial institution and only 7.6 per cent had a loan from a private lender.\nAccording to the report, Kenya has a dynamic mortgage industry, which is growing rapidly and become increasingly competitive, with 33 financial institutions currently offering mortgage finance.\nAs at December 31, 2011, the total mortgage book was Sh91.2 billion and comprised 16,135 mortgage loans.\nThis is up 48.5 per cent from the May 2010 figure of Sh61.4 billion and 15,049 mortgage loans.\nDuring that period, the average loan size rose from Sh4.1 million to Sh5.7 million.\nQuoting the Central Bank of Kenya, the report says it is believed that the rise is likely to be due to an increase in property prices.\nAnother thing: Non-performing loans sat at 3.9 per cent of total outstanding mortgages, or Sh3.6 billion, and comprised 764 accounts.\nBetween May 2010 and December 2011, there was also another observable trend: There was a shift towards variable rate mortgages, which make up 90 per cent of all mortgages issued in 2011.\nThe shift is seen to be a likely consequence of the volatility of the interest rate in the period, and contributed to a slowing growth in Kenya’s residential mortgage market.\nDespite all these developments, however, the bad news is that mortgage lending is still accessible to only a tiny minority – mortgage lending as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP) was 2.6 per cent in 2010, growing at 14 per cent annually.\nWhat is wrong? According to the new report, which reviews housing finance markets in over 30 African countries annually, affordability ranks very high.\nIt says that only about 11 per cent of Kenyans earn enough to support a mortgage. This means that most middle-income earners cannot afford an average mortgage necessary to buy an entry-level house.\n(The Kenya National Bureau of Statistics defines middle income households as those whose monthly incomes fall between Sh23,671 ($260) and Sh112,717 ($1,330).\nThe Central Bank of Kenya recently stated that the average mortgage in the country is worth Sh6.6 million, thus demanding a monthly repayment of about Sh90,000 for 20 years. Only a handful of Kenyans can afford that.\n“High levels of inflation and interest rates in 2011 and 2012 affected house prices severely, especially for those with variable interest rates. Borrowers who had taken out loans at the edge of their affordability found they were unable to manage the increased monthly costs,” says the report.\nIt continues: “A highly speculative property market and high demand for housing has driven Kenya’s residential property price inflation up steadily over the last 12 years, especially, more recently in the rental market.”\nIt says property prices have gone up by 3.7 times since 2001, a 2.7 per cent rise in the last quarter and a 1.9 per cent rise in the past year.\nThe average price of a stand-alone house is Sh32.6 million, up from Sh8.8 million in December 2000.\nTownhouses have also gone up, by 2.9 times since 2001. The average price for a townhouse is Sh19.1 million, up from Sh6.5 million in December 2000.\nApartment sale prices have increased by 2.2 times since 2001, and the average price is Sh11.7 million at present.\nRentals have also risen rapidly – 10 times the rate of the last two years, as landlords have sought to manage rising costs and deal with increasing demand.\nAll these have made mortgage to be out of reach for most Kenyans who have instead chosen to go for home construction loans.\nAnd aiding this is Kenya’s strong microfinance sector. The report notes that currently, Kenya has 34 microfinance institutions (MFIs).\nBy 2011, these financial institutions had clocked 1.1 million active borrowers and a gross loan portfolio of Sh144.5 billion ($1.7 billion).\nKenya also has an emerging housing microfinance sector. “A number of pioneering Saccos and non-governmental organisations are using this lending methodology to provide housing finance for the poor,” it says, citing Jamii Bora Bank and the National Cooperative Housing Union (Nachu).\nRooftops Canada is involved together with Homeless International, the Cooperative Housing Federation of Norway, the Swedish Cooperative Centre and other partners, in a programme with Nachu to provide technical and financial support to scale up Nachu’s housing microfinance and housing support services.\nA crucial component of this work, it notes, involves identifying appropriate and sustainable finance for Nachu to be able to extend housing credit to its members.\nThe promised Central Bank of Kenya audit report on sources of real estate funding may not be out yet, but we certainly now know why mortgage uptake is low – and where aspiring home owners turn to when they need money to put up a dream house.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://nation.africa/Features/DN2/What-is-financing-Kenyas-construction-boom/957860-1661210-1v23rx/index.html"}
{"doc_id": "1ac73295187a8aa45974da6a5b99fb46", "text": "Emma Okonji\nMaking good on the strategic partnership with Orange Telecoms and its West African Affiliates, Sonatel and Orange Cote d’Ivoire, which was signed in September 2018, MainOne has confirmed the scheduled landing of the MainOne submarine cable systems in Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire in September and October 2019 respectively.\nWith the cable landing stations (CLS) in both countries fully built and ready for installation of equipment in both Dakar and Abidjan, the company is poised to undertake the physical connection of the branching units on its 7000-kilometer-long omnibus fiber pair to the shore and terminal equipment.\nThe MainOne submarine cable is being installed by the Orange Marine specialized vessel, Pierre de Fermat vessel, which has arrived in Dakar, having picked up the fiber and ancillary equipment, including repeaters from Brest, France earlier in the month. It will proceed to Abidjan to conclude the laying and final splice in the month of October, with ready for service and commercial launch of the system scheduled for November 2019.\nConsistent with its strong preference for deploying top of the range technology to deliver best-in-class services in the West Africa region, MainOne, as part of the landing project, shall deploy on the cable WSS ROADM Spectrum Sharing technology, the first of its kind to be deployed for commercial purpose in the world. This new technology will optimise the utilisation of the MainOne subsea cable, by enabling multiple operators share optical spectrum on the omnibus fibre optic pair to obtain closer to 10 terabits per second of capacity. This will be most beneficial for countries directly connected to the MainOne subsea network, and the region in general, by delivering higher volume of connectivity to achieve lower connectivity pricing that will spur the development of new digital services and promote sustainable socio-economic growth across the region.\nSpeaking on the development, the Chief Executive Officer of MainOne, Funke Opeke, restated the company’s mission to deliver world class communication and connectivity services, as the bedrock for the partnership with Orange that broadens the connectivity range in the region.\nOpeke said: “MainOne is committed to leading the digital transformation across West Africa, driving economic growth and development by enabling and empowering the ecosystem through affordable and ubiquitous connectivity. We are determined ultimately to improve the digital services of the region and today marks the realisation of that journey for Senegal with the landing of the Submarine cable which will drive substantial impact on both GDP and employment.”\nThe CEO of Orange Middle East and Africa, Alioune Ndiaye, explained that “Africa is experiencing a rapid technological evolution with mobile broadband connectivity enabling a tech ecosystem. Orange, as part of its multi-service strategy, is an important partner in the continent’s digital transformation as demonstrated by our continuous investment. Through the partnership with MainOne, we expect to see improved high speed and affordable broadband services in Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire that will reinforce connectivity and guarantee reliable access to global broadband networks.”\nMainOne’s submarine cable in 2010, became the first private subsea cable to deliver open-access, broadband capacity to West Africa, heralding the advent of high speed fibre-optic broadband in the region. The MainOne system traverses the coast of West Africa with fully operational landing stations from Seixal in Portugal through Accra in Ghana to Lagos in Nigeria, and additional branching units in Morocco, with plans to connect Canary Islands", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2019/09/05/mainone-cable-system-set-to-connect-senegal-cote-d-ivoire"}
{"doc_id": "2f29e9052eca831d614f353d0092783a", "text": "Advertisement\nGhana to increase earnings from handicrafts\nAS part of its export development strategy, Ghana will continue to harness existing and potential opportunities to grow its export base in the non-traditional export sector (NTEs).\nOne of such opportunities to be leveraged is the hosting of the secretariat of the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AFCTA), and also winning the bid to host the World Trade Promotion Organisation conference (WTPO), in 2020.\nThe Director, Marketing and Promotion at the Ghana Export Promotion Authority (GEPA), Mrs Agnes Gifty Adjei-Sam, in an interview with the Daily Graphic, said GEPA, under the auspices of the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MoTI), would continue to implement the new National Export Development Strategy (NEDS) to grow the sector.\nShe spoke to the Daily Graphic during the International Handicraft Week (SIAB 2019) in Grand Bassam in Cote d’Ivoire. The theme for Ghana's participation was: \"Celebrating Ghanaian Culture and Business Opportunities.\"\nSpecifically, she said a key focus would be the handicraft sector which had not seen much growth, so the AfCTA and the WTPO were platforms that offered goodwill to products from Ghana.\nShe urged Ghanaian exporters to take advantage of the budding environment to market their products to contribute to economic development.\nHandicrafts\nThe NTE sector in Ghana consists of three main sub-sectors, namely: agriculture, processed/semi-processed, and industrial art & craft sub-sectors.\nAmong the three, handicrafts records the least earnings currently, and, therefore, GEPA said it had put in a strategy to grow the sector and mentioned Ghana’s participation at the third SIAB as one of the strategies.\n“We have come here with over 20 exhibitors to market their products and to introduce them to foreign buyers.\nWe believe our participation here will also help to develop our products and ensure that we access other international markets such as the New York big show and Birmingham creative craft show.\nWe hope this will help increase our craft earnings in Ghana,” Mrs Adjei-Sam said.\nProducts classified under the handicraft category include: basket-ware, ceramic products, traditional musical instruments, hides and skins, batik/tie and dye, nativity sets, beads and beaded items, pottery, leatherwork and paintings.\nThe Chief Executive Officer of Matamiss Pottery, one of the Ghanaian companies that exhibited at the fair, Nana Kwame Addo, said the fair had been an awesome platform for them to market their products.\n“We have practically sold out. We have actually received orders and they are asking us to come for more,” he said.\nNTE sector performance\nNTE earnings in 2017 amounted to US$ 2.557 billion, representing 3.81 per cent increase over the 2016 performance of US$ 2.463 billion.\nThe biggest earner in the NTE portfolio is the processed/semi-processed sub-sector. It contributed US$ 2.105 billion (82.35 per cent) to the whole NTE basket.\nThis was followed by the agricultural sub-sector and then the industrial art and craft sub-sector.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.graphic.com.gh/business/business-news/ghana-news-ghana-to-increase-earnings-from-handicrafts.html"}
{"doc_id": "52cc0cfe730eaf3e65b41e258c676fc8", "text": "It’s extremely rare for a documentary to make it on to South Africa’s mainstream cinema circuit. So if you’re a fan of documentaries, it’s worth diarising the 14th annual ‘Encounters’, South Africa’s international documentary festival. REBECCA DAVIS takes a look at what’s on offer.\nEncounters kicks off this weekend in Cape Town and Johannesburg, and the schedule is full enough to ensure a busy fortnight if you intend to catch everything going. Now in its 14th year, the documentary festival is bringing 29 international films and 22 South African films to screens in the two cities. The 51 chosen documentaries were whittled down from 487 entries, in a selection process programming head Andreas Spath describes as extremely onerous.\n“We put out calls for submission, but we also actively go out and seek films. We keep an eye out on international festivals and generally on the industry press, and also solicit entries from certain filmmakers.”\nSpath explains that what they look for is partly thematic, partly aesthetic and partly subjective.\n“We look at where the film came from, and its subject matter, because we want to end up with a broad range of themes,” he says. “But we’re also looking for quality filmmaking, what it looks like, from a stylistic perspective: is it beautiful? Having said that, it also just comes down to a gut feel.” Ultimately, Spath says, the most important consideration is: will people watch it? He’s confident that, looking at the programme, “most people should find something they’ll find interesting”.\nSpath says the point of Encounters is to attempt to expose a wider audience to documentaries. “You can see watching a feature film as being like reading a novel. Documentary films are like reading non-fiction, and we want to foster audiences for that, to make them see how cool documentaries can be.”\nIn recent years the genre of documentary film-making has grown steadily internationally, with the likes of Michael Moore producing big-hitting personality-driven doccies that have drawn huge audiences. In South Africa, challenges remain. It largely comes down to money, Spath says. “You’ll find a lot of commercial ad makers have a sideline in documentaries, because they have all the equipment and so on.” He cites as an example commercial director Bryan Little, whose documentary about Cape Town street-dance, The African Cypher, is showing at the festival. “I think that kind of crossover is healthy, given that there are such limited resources.”\nSpath has his favourites on this year’s Encounters programme, but in general, he says, “I’d go see them all again. In fact, I feel a bit sad, because I’ve seen them all on the small screen, and I haven’t had the chance to see any of them on a proper cinema screen.”\nThe programme is indeed as varied as Spath claims, though at first glance it may seem intimidatingly stacked with big issue pieces – you can choose between films about rape, rhinos, gay rights or female circumcision, to name a few, and that litany may inadvertently serve to confirm the fears of some that that’s what documentary festivals are all about. Viewers who feel that they get more than enough of that on the evening news shouldn’t be deterred, however – there are lighter options available too.\nProbably the best of these is The Great Contemporary Art Bubble, which is UK art writer Ben Lewis’s investigation into the hugely inflated prices of the contemporary art world. Setting out to explore the question of why the prices of art are rising faster than any comparable commodity, Lewis shines a light on a tightly-knit, closed-ranks group of art collectors, gallery owners and auctioneers who are essentially colluding to inflate the prices associated with Andy Warhol, Jeff Koons, Damien Hirst and others.\nLewis, an agreeable character who has a Louis Theroux-like idiot savant approach to interviewing, speaks to a host of individuals from the art world to back up his thesis that contemporary art is bought and sold as a form of market speculation much as you would undertake with currency. One of the most memorable moments of the film comes when Lewis goes to visit a Hong Kong art collector called Greg Liu, who purchased one of Chinese flavour-of-the-moment Zang Xiaogang’s Bloodlines paintings for a record $6 million. When Lewis asks to see the painting, Liu leads him into a basement warehouse where the artwork is still in its cardboard packaging from its purchase. He hasn’t looked at it since he bought it.\nNeither are the artists themselves blameless. Interviewing German artist Anselm Reyle, who has his assistants produce “stripe paintings” – literally abstract compositions consisting of different coloured, juxtaposed stripes – which sell for around half a million dollars, Lewis asks him whether he has anything against his works of art becoming a form of currency. Reyle looks bemused by the question. “No, I knew that would happen if I was lucky,” he says.\nIf there is a weakness to Lewis’s film, it is that it is now three years old, which raises the question of why it hasn’t been brought to Encounters before. But there is every indication that the observations made in The Great Contemporary Art Bubble are still valid in 2012, particularly given the recent controversies over Damien Hirst’s ‘spot’ paintings. The film is really worth seeing, for entertainment value as much as information, and it would be interesting to know whether the dodgy art-world practices documented by Lewis are as prevalent locally as he suggests they are internationally.\nIn terms of the lighter side of Encounters, you can also take your chances with You Laugh But It’s True, a film about South African comedian Trevor Noah’s attempts to make it big on the comedy circuit. This one, however, is strictly one for diehard Trevor Noah groupies. Having said that, there are some interesting insights into the trials and tribulations of the SA comedy scene – particularly the strain of corporate gigging – and there are also intriguing hints that Noah is not particularly beloved by some of his fellow local comics. (Dinosaur comedian Mel Miller comes off particularly mean-spiritedly, rasping about how young middle-class black comics “mustn’t come bitching about Apartheid”).\nNoah has charm in abundance, but over the course of 90 minutes the mixed-race schtick he leans on so heavily for comic mileage runs thin, and he’s doesn’t come across as old or interesting enough as a character yet to sustain a full-length film about his life at this time. The documentary, in fact, has the feel of a reality TV-show episode stretched two-thirds longer than is warranted. Despite its local subject matter, You Laugh But It’s True is actually an international production, and it’s clear it’s angled at US audiences in the way Noah is shown interpreting the South African context for the camera. This is no doubt helpful for the Yanks, but it grates for a local viewer, and Noah’s version of SA history contains some inaccuracies.\nIf Noah himself has a night free over the next fortnight, he could consider taking himself off to see Clifford Bestall’s excellent documentary about Hillbrow, the Johannesburg suburb which Noah makes some dubious assertions about on camera. In Between Heaven & Hell Bestall examines what he calls “the most feared neighbourhood in South Africa” by exploring the lives of five of its residents. As much as it is a portrait of Hillbrow, however, it’s also a meditation on urban loneliness and the precariousness of the immigrant position in South Africa.\nThree of the people Bestall follows are connected to a boxing club run by former amateur champion George The Brick: female boxers Busi, from Zimbabwe, Congolese Mimie, and South African Les, a nightclub impresario trying to organise a boxing night. Busi and Mimie both see boxing as their ticket to fame and fortune, but also as their means of surviving Hillbrow – the idea that you have to be strong, smart and aggressive to make it in Hillbrow is a running theme throughout the doccie.\nBut the fifth character is an intriguing exception to this rule: Bernice, a Jewish woman in her 80s living with only a small dog for company, who has been in Hillbrow her whole life and is simply too old to move. Bernice gets her hair cut at a local Hillbrow hairdresser, and says that on the two occasions when she’s been mugged on the street, people have instantly come to her assistance. When the lifts in Bernice’s apartment block aren’t working, she walks up 19 floors to reach her flat – a journey which takes her two hours because she stops on every landing in between to do her “yoga breathing”.\nBetween Heaven & Hell succeeds because its portraits of these individuals are so intimate and moving, but it also offers up some fascinating truths about Hillbrow – such as the fact that the heightened police presence in the suburb in recent years, and its general renewal, poses a huge threat to the safety of immigrants from the African diaspora who previously depended on its chaos. While the film avoids demonising Hillbrow, it still presents a suburb which seems more hell than heaven.\nTwo of the finest films about South Africa in the festival are, disappointingly, not made by South Africans, although One Day After Peace is a joint South African-Israeli production, directed by Erez and Miri Laufer. The film tells of the quest by South African-born Israeli, Robi Damelin, to come to terms with the death of her son, an Israeli soldier killed by a Palestinian sniper. Damelin travels back to South Africa to learn about truth and reconciliation from a country which presents itself as expert on that subject, at least on the surface.\nThis even-handed exploration of what loss and forgiveness really mean touches on virtually every victim-perpetrator permutation you could think of within the Apartheid context. Taking TRC testimony as its backdrop, we hear from APLA military director Letlapa Mphahlele, who ordered the 1993 bombing of Heidelberg Tavern, and the mother of one of the bombing’s victims, Lyndi Fourie. There’s an interview with white MK fighter Shirley Gunn, who was falsely accused of the bombing of Khotso House in the late 80s, and says she got no solace from the TRC process. Most extraordinary of all, however, is the footage of former Apartheid Law & Order Minister Adriaan Vlok interacting with the families of his victims in South Africa. There’s one particular scene where a woman in Soweto unexpectedly recognises Vlok, which will haunt you long after the screening.\nDamelin doesn’t get a clear answer as to what forgiveness entails, although Ginn Fourie (mother of Heidelberg victim Lyndi) has an interesting definition: “A principled decision to give up your justified right to revenge”. The film feels long, and it doesn’t make for easy viewing, but its integrity lies in its refusal to settle for pat answers.\nA Common Purpose, by Australian director Mitzi Goldman, is a more straightforward narrative account of the story of the ‘Upington 25’: the 25 Upington residents arrested in 1985 for the murder and burning of a black policeman. The idea that 25 people could be arrested for a single crime may seem ludicrous, but was perfectly possible under South Africa’s common purpose doctrine. This held that even if you weren’t causally connected to a crime, you could be found guilty by being actively associated with the crowd. In this case, it looked likely that all 25 individuals would be sentenced to death for the murder.\nGoldman’s documentary tells the story of the ensuing court-case from the perspective of young solicitor Andrea Durbach, who took on the Upington 25 case in collaboration with high-profile barrister Anton Lubowski. The film’s strength lies in weaving together Durbach’s remembrances with testimony from the defendants, both historical and current, and footage from the TRC. Even if you know the outcome of the case, the documentary expertly sustains dramatic tension throughout. It should be compulsory viewing for anyone seeking to get a handle on the absurdity of the Apartheid legal system, or the ways in which Apartheid served to wound psychically both white and black individuals.\nThere’s another court case-based film at Encounters which is my pick of the festival. Paradise Lost 3: Purgatory was nominated for an Oscar, and it’s hard to see how it lost out. The documentary is the final instalment of a trilogy, but all three movies stand alone. They tell the tale of the West Memphis Three, the Arkansas teenagers convicted for the murder and mutilation of three young boys in 1993, largely on the basis that one of them looked a bit like a Goth.\nThe film traces the radical mis-handling of the case at every step – it’s a truly chilling glimpse into how the US judicial system can be perverted to meet particular agendas, and how the witch-hunt spirit of Salem in 1692 lives on in parts of America today. Joe Berlinger and Bruce Sinofsky’s documentary is utterly compelling. In a testament to the potential effect of documentary film-making, the trilogy of films eventually came to have an impact on the trial’s process. When you watch the documentary, it’s easy to see how this might have come about. Don’t miss this one.\nParadise Lost 3: Purgatory comes with a lot of international heft behind it, but when you’re making your pick of the Encounters programme, note that the most hotly-hyped films are not always the finest. For example, Tiffany Shlain’s Connected arrives garlanded with festival awards and carrying the cachet of its director’s reputation: Shlain invented the ‘Webbys’, the website equivalent of the Oscars. Yet the film, an “autoblogography about love, death and technology” (that “autoblogography” ought to be a warning) is a little underwhelming: a set of feel-good soundbytes about “interconnectedness” strung together with nifty graphics. Very TED. It’s likeable, but there are far more interesting and substantial offerings out there.\nAs it is with every festival, not everything on screen for Encounters will enchant you. To use a Quality Street metaphor, for every five Hazelnut Noisettes, there’s likely to be one Peanut Cracknell. And, of course, one person’s Hazelnut Noisette is another person’s Peanut Cracknell. But considering how rarely South African audiences get to see good documentaries on the big screen, the whole thing’s a bit of a treat. DM\nRead more:\n- Encounters programme\nMain photo: African Cypher", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-06-07-encounters-2012-brain-candy-but-a-mixed-bag/"}
{"doc_id": "d572d94443b546294df6b239c0e7529b", "text": "The CEO and co-founder of Nigerian payments company Flutterwave, Olugbenga Agboola, flew into Kenya this week amid efforts to unfreeze his Sh6.6 billion and lift a Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) embargo on the firm.\nIn a space of just one year, the start-up has seen its Kenya operations — which was the second-largest market after Nigeria— brought to a halt, with the High Court freezing Sh6.6 billion on money laundering fears and the CBK ordering banks to cut links with the firm.\nMr Agboola landed in Nairobi to meet the firm's local team and seek an audience with the CBK, which in December asked his firm to make a fresh licence operation.\nThe CBK had in July ordered local banks to stop dealing with Flutterwave, arguing it was not licensed as its accounts got frozen under the country's anti-money laundering laws.\nMr Agboola's visit coincided with a verdict by the High Court that on Thursday dismissed an application from over 2,000 Nigerians who sought a share of the frozen Sh6.6 billion.\nThe Nigerians said in a petition that they were swindled of billions of shillings through a sports betting platform that used Flutterwave to process the payments.\nThe dismissal of the suit marked another victory for Flutterwave after Kenya’s Assets Recovery Agency (ARA) in December withdrew from the case in which it secured orders freezing the billions in 29 accounts at GTB, Equity and Ecobank denominated in Kenya shillings, US dollars, euros and Sterling pounds.\nThe dismissal of the suit and ARA’s withdrawal have brought Flutterwave closer to accessing the Sh6.5 billion and shaking off the money laundering tag.\n\"CBK invited us in December to reapply for a money remittance and payments service provider licenses,\" Mr Agboola said in an interview with the Business Daily in Nairobi.\n“Kenya is the bedrock of mobile money. We have seen the gap and have raised capital to invest here. Without Nairobi, building a global mobile money payments system is not possible,\" he added from Flutterwave’s Kenya base in Nairobi’s Riverside Drive.\nFlutterwave has described the Kenya trip by the 37-year-old as a \"normal course of doing business\" that the techie takes quarterly.\nWhile in Kenya, the mostly reserved Mr Agboola, or GB as he is fondly known in the tech space, came in tow with Riva Levison, a top US lobbyist and PR guru.\nSolving challenges\nMs Levison prides herself as a political strategist, solving challenges for clients across governments in Africa — from political risk to election strategy, handling briefs for former presidents like Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (Liberia) and Joyce Banda (Malawi).\nIn recent months, Mr Agboola’s reputation has stretched beyond his leadership at Flutterwave thanks to a personal investments spree in other African startups.\nHis Nairobi trip came days after revelations that the firm had Sh184.9 billion in 62 bank accounts spread across five banks in four years without the knowledge and licence from the CBK.\nIt was one of the three Nigerian fintechs that were at the centre of a complex money laundering probe in Kenya.\nThe three, including RemX and Kandon Technologies, were investigated by ARA on fears of card fraud and money laundering.\nFlutterwave termed claims of financial impropriety in Kenya \"entirely false\".\nThe firm said its operations were regularly audited and it continuously engaged regulatory agencies to stay compliant.\n“Innovation in most cases is normally ahead of regulations and compliance is a journey that takes time. What we are doing now is bring in qualified global experts to strengthen our processes,” Mr Agboola said.\nThe Lagos-based company, founded in 2016, is now the biggest payments start-up on the continent. It has processed over 400 million transactions worth more than $25 billion in 35 African countries.\nARA in December changed tune on Flutterwave, saying investigations revealed that the money was not linked to money laundering—which was behind the CBK’s blockade of the licence.\nDespite the intention of ARA to withdraw from the suit, several applications have been filed before the court either seeking a share of the frozen cash or continued freeze of the billions.\nYesterday the court struck out one of the applications.\nJustice Esther Maina rejected the application by Mr Morris Ebitimi Joseph on behalf of 2,468 Nigerian investors, saying there is no reason to grant the application, after ARA signalled its intention to withdraw the case against Flutterwave.\n“I have carefully considered the application and my finding is that it has no merit. The ARA has intimated its intention to withdraw the petition,” the judge said.\nThe Nigerians claimed that they invested the money through a sports betting platform that was used by Flutterwave to process the payments.\nThe judge said the apprehension by the Nigerians that they would lose their money cannot stand in view of the decision by ARA to withdraw the case.\n“The court sees no reason to grant the application sought,” she said.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/technology/flutterwave-ceo-in-nairobi-for-seized-billions-cbk-permit-4118200?ref=benjamindada.com"}
{"doc_id": "856e672d6d7fb1405f004e19725a24e0", "text": "MacArthur Foundation\n9 Nov\nThe Behavioural Change Cohort of MacArthur Foundation has said that it will hold this year’s edition of its behavioural change conference and exhibition, with the theme: “Fostering a Corruption-Free Nigeria,” on November 15, 2023, at D-Serene Exclusive Hotel in Abuja.\n14 Jun 2023\nThe Ford Foundation, MacArthur Foundation and LEAP Africa have initiated a project to equip Nigerian youths with leadership skills. The project also involved educational opportunities tailored to support and strengthen youth leadership and the ecosystem in Nigeria to complement government efforts at empowering the youth The Executive Director, of Leap Africa, Kehinde Ayeni, while speaking…\n3 Apr 2023\nNigeria's impressive array of transparency and accountability measures has not wrought the desired effect on governance and development because of gaps in legislation, capacity, values and resourcing, a new report by Agora Policy, an Abuja-based think tank, has revealed.\nLatest\n55 mins ago\nPope Francis launched a fresh critique Friday of gender ideology, saying it was \"the worst danger\" which \"erases differences\".\n1 hour ago\nPep Guardiola says he is expecting the \"best\" from Manchester United, even though Manchester City will start Sunday's derby as red-hot favourites to extend their dominance over their rivals.\n1 hour ago\nEurozone inflation continued to ease in February, data showed Friday, but economists warned it was unlikely to push the European Central Bank to cut interest rates next month.\n2 hours ago\nThe Nigerian Army, in conjunction with hybrid force and elements of Civilian Joint Task Force, have successfully overran Boko Haram/Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) terrorists’ stronghold in Lake Chad Region\n2 hours ago\nThe Police Command in Kano State has arrested 132 suspects for alleged kidnapping, armed robbery and illicit drug dealing in two months in different parts of the state.\n2 hours ago\nSuper Eagles manager, Jose Peseiro has confirmed that he has left his position with the Nigerian men's senior national team. Peseiro whose contract as the Super Eagles coach expired on Thursday, February 29, 2024, confirmed his departure on Friday through a post on his X handle. \"Yesterday, we concluded our contract with the Nigerian Football…\n2 hours ago\nA report released, yesterday, by Shortlist and the Global Energy Alliance for People and Planet (GEAPP) has indicated that women have remained severely under-represented across levels of management in clean energy companies in Nigeria and Sub-Saharan Africa.\n3 hours ago\nOne Francis Marvellous, 21, a 300 level student of Imo State University, IMSU Owerri, narrowly escaped being lynched by an irate mob, especially students of the Federal University of Technology, Owerri, FUTO, on Thursday night.\n3 hours ago\nDr Olu Agunloye, former Minister of Power and Steel under ex-President Olusegun Obasanjo, has filed a N1 billion suit against the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) over allegations that it published his name on its website’s wanted list.\n3 hours ago\nThe President of the African Development Bank (AfDB), Mr Akinwumi Adesina, has identified youth unemployment and poverty as the factors driving insecurity and migration on the continent.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://guardian.ng/tag/macarthur-foundation/"}
{"doc_id": "560052df275ab64d1dea7ff6bf5d71eb", "text": "Iran’s central bank has proposed slashing four zeros from the rial, following the plunging of the currency’s value in the wake of an economic crisis fuelled by U.S. sanctions.\n“A bill to remove four zeros from the national currency was presented to the government by the central bank yesterday and I hope this matter can be concluded as soon as possible,” Iranian News Agency (IRNA) quoted central bank governor Abdolnaser Hemmati as saying.\nProposals to remove four zeros from the currency have been floated since 2008, but the idea has gained strength as the rial lost more than 60 percent of its value in 2018 despite a recent recovery engineered by the central bank in defiance of U.S. sanctions.\nThe currency was trading at about 110,000 rials per U.S. dollar on the unofficial market on Sunday, according to foreign exchange websites.\nThe currency was trading at about 110,000 rials per U.S. dollar on the unofficial market on Sunday, according to foreign exchange websites.\nPresident Donald Trump re-imposed U.S. sanctions on Iran last year after pulling out of world powers’ 2015 nuclear deal with Tehran.\nWashington has vowed “maximum pressure” on Iran’s economy to force it to accept tougher limits on its nuclear and missile programs. Iran has ruled this out.\nRial weakness disrupted Iran’s foreign trade last year and helped boost annual inflation fourfold to nearly 40 percent in November. The weak currency and galloping inflation have been a complaint of sporadic street protests since late 2017.\nAfter approval by the government, the proposed currency plan would have to be passed by parliament and approved by the clerical body that vets legislation before it takes effect.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2019/01/09/iran-mulls-currency-redenomination"}
{"doc_id": "c15a5f815dfa77ed5efd38eee0c6a0ae", "text": "South Africa’s manufacturing sector showed minimal growth in December, with it set only to have a diminutive impact on the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) figure for Q4.\nStatsSA’s data showed that South African manufacturing production increased 0.7% year-on-year in December 2023 – the slowest increase in three months primarily attributed to a struggling energy sector.\n“While load shedding eased somewhat in December, the electricity supply predicament remains a significant challenge for the energy-intensive manufacturing sector and the economy as a whole,” said economist Lara Hodes from Investec.\nAdditionally, quarter-on-quarter seasonally adjusted basis (the measure used to calculate GDP), manufacturing output largely fell flat at 0.1%.\n“Accordingly, it will make a negligible contribution to the quarter’s overall GDP reading,” said Hodes.\nManufacturing production in South Africa was up by a marginal 0.7% year-on-year in December 2023, which was notably below expectations of a 2.7% year-on-year lift.\nThe largest contributions were made by:\n- Petroleum, chemical products, rubber and plastic products (5.3% and contributing 1.1 percentage points);\n- Wood and wood products, paper, publishing and printing (2,7% and contributing 0,3 of a percentage point); and\n- Food and beverages (0,9% and contributing 0,3 of a percentage point).\nAdditionally, seasonally adjusted manufacturing production decreased by 1.7% in December compared with the previous month.\nManufacturing sales\nSeasonally adjusted manufacturing sales increased by 1.3% in December 2023 compared with November 2023.\nThis follows month-on-month changes of +1.7% in November 2023 and -0.6% in October 2023.\nNumbers show that 5 of the 10 categories included in the manufacturing basket increased annually in December. Petroleum, chemical products, and rubber and plastic categories collectively comprise 24.86% of the manufacturing basket, contributing 1.1% points to the overall growth of 5.3% y/y.\nThe largest volume of sales were in the food and beverages division, followed by basic iron and steel products, and then petroleum/chemical products.\nYearly manufacturing statistics\nTotal manufacturing production increased by 0,4% compared with 2022. This is a marginally better performance than the 0.3% annual decline seen in 2022.\nIn 2023, the largest positive contributors to this were:\n- Basic iron and steel, non-ferrous metal products, metal products and machinery (1.7% and contributing 0.3 of a percentage point);\n- Motor vehicles, parts and accessories and other transport equipment (2.2% and contributing 0.2 of a percentage point);\n- Wood and wood products, paper, publishing and printing (1.4% and contributing 0.2 of a percentage point).\nThe “still subdued global manufacturing environment continues to undermine export potential,” said Hodes.\n“Advance indications provided by the seasonally adjusted (SA) headline Purchasing Managers’ index (PMI) for January reveal that the manufacturing sector remained depressed at the start of 2024, with both the business activity and new sales orders indices declining markedly during the month.”\nRead: Businesses in South Africa hoping for the best in 2024", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/750102/more-disappointment-for-south-africas-economy/"}
{"doc_id": "d20b09dd2e04e001c1f41a80152c46a6", "text": "Big South African clothing and apparel retailers should shoulder the blame for “deplorable and terrible working conditions” in the country’s textiles industry, the Southern African Textile and Workers’ Union (Sactwu) said yesterday.\nSouth African textiles workers in peri-urban and rural areas were struggling with poor working conditions such as long working hours, poor pay and strict toilet visiting times, global union IndustriALL said in a new report, Deplorable Working Conditions at Textile and Garment Factories in South Africa.\nThe report follows a visit to textile manufacturers in Mandeni, KwaZulu-Natal, in December by labour inspectors from the Department of Employment and Labour.\nThe inspectors, notes the report, discovered that workers in the factories were working “12 long working hours with only 30 minutes lunch breaks” while occupational health and safety violations are common.\n“Workers face restrictions when going to the toilets and having lunch in areas with unsanitary conditions. Some chemicals used in the factories were unlabelled and handled without personal protective equipment and in some instances placed in front of fire equipment,” adds the report.\nFurther to this, the textiles factories in the area paid wages that were below the minimum wages for the garment and textile industries. Some employers were paying R10 per hour instead of the industry minimum R25.42 per hour as agreed upon in the National Bargaining Council for the Clothing Manufacturing Industry, made up of unions and employers.\nSactwu national industrial policy officer, Etienne Vlok, told Business Report in an interview yesterday that the “deplorable” working conditions of the textile industry were affecting workers and their families.\nHe said the terrible conditions were most prevalent in rural and peri urban areas that were difficult to control as operators were frequently on the move.\nVlok said large South African retailers were making the situation difficult by not insisting on responsible workplace practices from the manufacturers that supply them with textiles.\n“The big concern is that SA shops and retailers are often the ones who gain the most from these practices. The companies manufacturers sell on the garments to retailers who then make money based on the exploitation of clothing workers by employers,” said Vlok.\nThere is global pressure for companies and retailers to move towards sustainable procurement.\nIn South Africa, clothing and apparel retail companies are also faced with headwinds such as power-outages and slowing down consumer purchasing power amid a cost of living financial squeeze.\nJSE-listed Truworths said yesterday in a trading update that credit selling was slowing down owing to the poor credit health of South Africans.\n“Globally there is a move towards more sustainable practices. The Masterplan (for the industry) agrees that we will pursue high road of compliant wages and these retailers are going against all of that by buying garment from these manufacturers,” added Vlot.\nRomatex, one of the largest household textile manufactures in South Africa, which supplies textiles for the retail and hospitality sectors, said local clothing retailers were already hoping to source 60% of all textile products from within the country during the next five years.\nThis would create around 121 000 new jobs in the textile industry by 2030, although there are many challenges to attaining this, including the poor working conditions and remuneration at some factories.\nPaule France Ndessomin, IndustriALL’s regional secretary for Sub-Saharan Africa, said South African textile factory owners “must respect and allow workers to enjoy their rights” at work in the textile and garment factories.\n“Trade unions have fought hard for the enactment of the national labour laws and for the ratification of international labour conventions on workers’ rights and collective bargaining and these gains must be protected through compliance,” added Ndessomin.\nSome employers in the South African textiles industry said the industry was facing immense pressure from imports of cheaper textile products. World Bank data shows that in 2021, the top partner countries from which South Africa Imported textiles and clothing included China, Eswatini, Lesotho, India and Mauritius.\nAjit Valjee of JMV Textiles said by phone: “Obviously, imports are a big problem for our company. The report (on deplorable working conditions) is not a true reflection of our company.”\nImported pre-owned clothing was also another big problem for South Africa.\nAccording to OECD, South Africa imported $10.5 million (R197m) in used clothing in 2021, becoming the 76th largest importer of pre-owned apparel in the world.\nUsed clothing merchandise was the “623rd most imported product in SA” with imports originating mainly from Netherlands, Italy, Pakistan, Germany and United Arab Emirates.\nBUSINESS REPORT", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/clothing-retailers-must-shoulder-blame-for-deplorable-working-conditions-6713bbb6-2c7e-473e-a333-39d47866d663"}
{"doc_id": "97eb9d7e3693fd3abbbe964bc3baa332", "text": "A question in the minds of observers is whether South Sudan leader Salva Kiir Mayardit will be an astute vision bearer for the East African Community.\nKiir, whose country joined the bloc in 2016 became its chairman last month after Burundi’s Évariste Ndayishimiye called it a day.\nThere are fears that he lacks the moral authority to rally the region toward peace and common aspirations. At home, it’s alleged he embodies repression and has betrayed his people’s hopes.\nAlso, Kiir is settling in for the new role when opinion is divided over the brittle peace process in South Sudan. In August last year, the president and other parties to the 2018 treaty extended it for two years from February this year following a missed deadline. The outcome could be dicey.\nNo matter how things pan out in South Sudan, failure will not be an option for the new EAC torchbearer who dons a giant Texan cowboy and loves threatening journalists that press freedom doesn’t mean you ‘work against’ your country.\nHere’s my two cents for Mr Kiir. He must remedy all EAC’s past failures and pave the way for creative energies that will build good governance, innovation and economic consciousness. He must become politically moderate and seek a swift departure from the ‘all mouth but no action’ trend.\nKiir will need to look beyond selfish interests to inspire confidence. He must shed off the tag of dictator – real or imagined – and wear the mien of a diplomat who overlooks boundaries, converts them to stepping stones and builds bridges that will make the region formidable.\nHe should embrace the words of Sir Kristian Goldman who, in the ‘The Seven Deadly Sins’, said that the world needs peacemakers than warmongers…and war is unworthy since the dignity of humanity will be trampled underfoot. Yes, the new chairman could take us to Canaan or bury our dreams in a dark abyss.\n- Ministry of Health seeks EACC's support to strengthen, implement UHC\n- How new technique can spur learners' curiosity\n- Agony for woman detained over Sh2m bill after son's lungs collapsed\n- Medical milestone as KU Hospital undertakes first CyberKnife treatment\nFailure at home, if any, should not blur the future. Let Mr Kiir work with Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania and now Somalia (the new kid in the bloc) to rethink what, where, and how we undertake production in view of a globalised economy. Empowering micro producers is a good starting point.\nAddressing petty border fights, ending climate-driven hunger and addressing unwarranted sibling wars will equally be too important to ignore. We’ve seen countries auction and burn poultry and animals from across the border. In the Covid period, truck drivers suffered in neighbouring countries. Many were harangued before the courts for lacking test certificates.\nSimilarly, there have been barbs over consumer products like sugar, milk and eggs. A territorial conflict in Lake Victoria has split pet neighbours of Kenya and Uganda, with fishermen, mostly Kenyan, harassed, beaten up and made to pay illegal taxes.\nKiir and his technocrats must end obstacles to integration. Author Joyce Meyer says patience is not simply the ability to wait – it is how we behave while waiting for an outcome. Usually, when the wait time slogs, things tumble.\nIt is a new chance for the EAC leadership to move beyond meetings in Arusha to widen space for synergies on human rights, jobs, climate change, justice, migration, education, equity and other fundamental rights. The region is raring to go and Article 5 of the EAC treaty should ring a bell.\nIntra-EAC trade has surged to $11 billion. Let growth in formal and informal trade, low tariffs, elimination of barriers, free movement of goods and people, intermodal connectivity and one-stop border posts impact lives. There’s no justification for EAC if it least benefits ‘hustler’ citizens.\nWill Kiir finally make EAC a single market and an economic powerhouse? Will we have a vibrant trading bloc with diverse benefits such as employment rights, peace and stability? How about the region’s ability to provide development assistance? He has the answers.\nThe writer is a communications practitioner. X: @markoloo", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/health/opinion/article/2001486973/kiirs-term-a-new-chance-to-make-eac-work"}
{"doc_id": "79cd123e8003ba69c20a0f8afd07618e", "text": "Horticulture business in the Lake Region is set to get a boost as the national carrier, Kenya Airways plans to increase cargo flights at the Kisumu International Airport.\nKenya Airways also plans to triple cargo flights to the Netherlands and United Kingdom.\n“We are likely to have more frequencies of shipment being lifted from Kisumu,” said Kenya Airways Cargo officer Joseph Omwanda.\nALSO READ: Kenya Airways, SAA now plan to launch regional airline 2023\nSome of the fresh produce in the Lake Region include avocados, fish, chilies, mangoes, pineapple, peanuts, bananas and traditional green vegetables.\nThe news come as the region plans to resume the export of chili from Kisumu. The shipment of the produce had taken a break due to low supply.\nFresh Produce Consortium of Kenya CEO Okisegere Ojepat noted that shipment of chili and other fresh produce are set to resume on June 15.\n\"In the next three weeks, we anticipate the produce to start increasing. The chili production can sustain three flights on a weekly basis,\" said Mr Ojepat.\nALSO READ: African airlines projected to acquire Sh16trn planes\nMr Omwanda said the production of chilli is likely to increase.\nSome of the consignments being shipped to the United Arabs Emirates and Netherlands include avocado, bananas, and pineapple.\nAccording to the Kenya Bureau of statistics, earnings from horticulture exports hit a historic high last year at Sh158 billion to remain the leading foreign exchange earner.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/shipping-logistics/kq-eyes-more-cargo-flight-for-kisumu-route-3841422"}
{"doc_id": "49fdc7d87047fed29366acc4f3643f64", "text": "Kenya's government is close to approving a restructuring plan for Kenya Airways (KQ) to replace one introduced by the previous administration and backed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the airline's CEO told Reuters.\nThe airline, one of Africa’s three biggest, fell into insolvency in 2018 after an expansion drive left it with hundreds of millions of dollars of debt.\nThe administration of former President Uhuru Kenyatta introduced a plan in 2021 under which the government agreed to provide loans and eventually take over $800 million of the airline’s debt.\nKenyatta’s successor William Ruto, who took office last September, has said he will cut borrowing and called into question the government’s participation in Kenya Airways.\nA new restructuring plan is with the government, CEO Allan Kilavuka told Reuters.\nRead: Kenya Airways revives COO post, picks George Kamal\n“The government is currently at the tail end of approving this strategy,” he said, in written responses to Reuters’ questions.\nAlso responding to written questions, Treasury Cabinet Secretary Njuguna Ndung’u said the government wanted to turn around KQ so it can secure a strategic investor but did not provide details of the new plan.\nThe IMF approved the previous scheme as part of a $2.34 billion lending programme it agreed in April 2021 with the government, which holds a 48.9 percent stake in the airline.\nMr Kilavuka said the plan would include some of the same elements as the previous one, including eliminating loss-making routes, but did not say how the two would differ.\nRead: US issues Kenya a default notice for Sh57bn KQ debt\nA senior KQ source, who asked not to be named, said it was not yet known if the new plan would maintain the government’s commitment to taking over the $800 million in debt.\n“It is a big if,” the source said.\nRead: Treasury to end KQ bailouts by December\nThe IMF’s representative in Kenya did not respond to requests for comment.\nKenya Airways will present its 2022 results to investors on Monday.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/companies/state-close-to-approve-kenya-airways-restructure-plan-4171660"}
{"doc_id": "5f066823b5d7c882de4a5846d13ca2ce", "text": "BACK PAGE BY ISSA AREMU, FEMI FALANA & KAYODE KOMOLAFE\nWe are obviously certain that the late Fela Anikulapo Kuti (just like the late Gani Fawehinmi!) if alive today would have rejected any proposed state award given to him. More so that the Nigerian state has progressively degenerated over the years from the bad (he painfully lived) to the worse (he foresaw) in most important critical success and nation-building factors.\nCertainly not with the perennial crisis of governance since independence manifesting in serial revelations of Authority Stealing and shortages of “water, light and food†Fela bemoaned with his legendary saxophone. As a matter of fact, Fela once banned his music being played on federal radio stations (what many artists would see as a badge of honour) in protests against the non-payment of copyrights fees, sheer brutality and oppression of the “military sergeant majors†in the military regimes who ruled (sorry ruined!) the Federal Republic! Very few could be so singularly audacious in damning a perceived oppressive and exploitative state.\nOur comradely demand is not just an “honour†for Fela; he never asked for “honour†which he definitely honourably loathed while alive. On the contrary, the demand to genuinely honour Fela is to test our collective claim to good governance, anti-corruption which the Abami Eda gallantly fought against through his artistic patriotism and Pan Africanism. “Blessed are the dead, for they will never be suspected, so declared BM Themba, the great South African poet.\nThe iconic musician courageously decried corruption and bad governance at a time it was not fashionable to do so. For sure, Fela would never be suspected of any indifference and silence at times that mattered. That in itself was a rare honour. The burden is on those of us living who still lay claim to good governance to walk the great songs of the legend. And one bold step would be to honour a like mind. Our call here is an acid test for those who still believe in the Nigerian project. Fela posthumously truly puts to test our sincerity to build a new Nigeria just as he did while alive.\nIt is timely and commendable that the Lagos State Governor Akinwunmi Ambode unveiled a statue in memory of the iconic musician as part of the weeklong activities marking his 79th posthumous birthday and the 20th anniversary of his death in Lagos at the weekend. Abuja could as well take a cue from Lagos.\nPresident Muhammed Buhari parades three themes: anti-corruption, national security and economic recovery. Nobody had foreseen the current national mess like the Anikulapo- Kuti (The One Who Carries Death in his Quiver!) did. And nobody would be taken seriously who refuses to recognise the great contributions of the legendary Fela to good governance and anti-corruption. He was a workingman who truly lived on his sweat in spite of fashionable sleaze combined with official military terror in Nigeria of the 70s, 80s and 90s. Fela symbolised dignity of labour in a country in which a few members elite thrived on corruption, “authority stealing†and captured Nigerian state’s resources. Fela sang for change, change and change ad infinitum.\nNigeria’s search for a desired change remains thematically elusive until Fela’s works are officially recognised. He was truly a global actor in the great traditions of similar artists like South Africa’s Mariam Makeba, Bob Marley, Huge Masakela and Senegal’s Yusuf Ndour among great other artists long recognised by their respective countries. In fact, the reputations of those artists are treated as national moral assets by their nations.\nFela acted locally (downtown Ikeja!) but his thoughts and messages are global in that they resonate in Cape Town, Cairo, New York and London etc.! Even today, 20 years after his death, Fela inspired hope for a strong united Nigeria and economic recovery. In 1974, at the time, it was not fashionable to patronise Africa and even more fashionable to ape Europe and America, Fela’s Buy Africa album rightly warned that prosperity would elude Africa without patronage of its products and ideas by Africans themselves. It was time for government to walk the patriotic songs of Fela through targeted budgetary spending to buy goods that must be produced at home in order to create sustainable jobs for the millions of youths.\nWe commend Vice President Yemi Osinbajo for signing the Executive Bills compelling the federal ministries and departments to buy made in Nigeria. Over 30 years after Fela created that song Nigeria and indeed Africa had uncritically enlisted in the World Trade Organization (WTO), a club of trading nations, without products to sell but with multiple dumped products to buy. The result today is that Nigeria has become a huge market for dumped products from Europe and China leading to factory closures, unemployment and poverty true to Fela’s foresight and danceable warnings.\nBut Fela in the 70s sang against the background of a productive Nigeria with manufacturing contributing as much as 35 per cent of the industrial manufacturing! Currently it’s business unusual in a cargo/container/smuggler consumptive economy fuelled by oil receipts with manufacturing contributing less than 4% to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Will Nigeria (and indeed Africa!) remake and reproduce again, such that we can “buy Nigeria†and “buy Africa†as Fela had prophetically envisioned?\nFela’s Tears, Sorrow and Blood in the late 70s was a danceable lyric which aptly summed up his tragic first-hand “treatment†in the hands of the military tormentors. In retrospect, we could see that singular track as a powerful reminder of the legacy (regular trademark!) of military dictatorship in particular and dictatorships in general including the civilian prototypes. It is far from being over. Just as Fela sang in that historic ode to dictatorship, his people (Nigerians!) are still in “fear to fight for justice, freedom and liberty†such that we were under the heels of majority thieving governors. Sorrow, tears and blood remain regular trademarks from the trails of armed and unarmed robberies to the official and street kidnappers. Follow-Follow is a classical warning against dependency and neo-colonialism. Fela urged that we open “sense, open eye and open brain†as we are susceptible to received wisdom. He observed that in the books of received wisdoms lie “termites, cockroaches and rats†as distinct from the promised sweet outcomes of the salesmen and women of received ideas.\nToday, three decades after Fela’s prophetic warning, Nigeria is spell -bound with received ideas from the books of Bretton Woods Institutions namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The theme of the 2006 UNDP Report was Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and Global Water Crisis. The Report, we recall, showed that water and access to water by majority of people is indispensable to any serious effort at meeting the moribund Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which Nigeria never met, anyway.\nYet that was what Fela had pointed out in his evergreen Water No Get Enemy album. The sad commentary is that in spite of the indispensability of water to life, it has “enemies†in Nigeria which include all of us who unacceptably rely on boreholes; truck-pushing water vendors and rain fall to drink water. Precisely because Nigeria cannot make clean water available for its citizens or make its citizens “enemies†of water contrary to Fela’s universally acclaimed insight that water “no get enemy,†is precisely why we must honour Fela for reminding us of the common sense increasingly becoming uncommon here.\nIn sum, Fela’s brilliant and prodigious works constitute a definitive narrative of the Nigerian condition. His art and politics were anti-poverty and pro-development. His essence was the advancement of human progress. In the making and unmaking of Nigeria, Fela’s name would, on a positive note, remain prominent in the category of makers of Nigeria. Some of the names in the Nigeria’s roll of honour have actually contributed to the unmaking of Nigeria; as a negation the nation would, therefore, be inspiring millions of other makers of Nigeria by honouring the memory of a historical figure such as Fela.\n• Aremu is a member of the National Institute; Falana is Senior Advocate of Nigeria and Komolafe is the Deputy Managing Director of THISDAY Newspapers Group", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2017/10/18/fela-time-for-posthumous-national-award?amp=1"}
{"doc_id": "7f2745e214d211d24f8b41475e736120", "text": "Bayer releases maize seed hybrid varieties\nElita Chikwati Senior Agriculture Reporter\nBayer, a crop protection products provider, has launched maize seed hybrid varieties tailor-made for different agronomic regions in Zimbabwe.\nThe DEKALB maize varieties: DKC 80-33, DK 777, DKC 90 -89 and DKC 80-53 are expected to give yields of between eight and 12 tonnes per hectare.\nBayer territory manager, Mr Farai Munyanyi said they had introduced the hybrid varieties to support farmers to sustainably meet food security needs and stable yield performance.\n“The maize seed varieties focus on yield stability, drought tolerance, disease resistance and good grain quality.\n“Our farmers face many challenges accessing quality and reliable maize seed hybrids they need to produce high yielding harvests that can support their families and communities.\n“We believe it is from high quality seeds that farmers can easily enhance their productivity and profitability, it is from high quality seeds that we generate jobs and income,” said Mr Munyanyi.\nHe said the DEKALB varieties could offer farmers climate smart options that can help make big leaps in fighting climate change, providing food and nutrition security and improving livelihoods.Lands, Agriculture, Fisheries, Water and Rural Development Deputy Minister, Vangelis Haritatos said the coming in of new seed houses witnessed in the past was true testimony of the impact of the new dispensation’s “Zimbabwe is open for business mantra”.\n“This has contributed to Zimbabwe being one of the countries with the highest maize seed hybridisation in the region.\n“Maize seed plays a critical role in the sustainable development of agricultural industry; more so in the livelihood of our smallholder farmers. The increase of players and improvement in organisations structure of the maize seed industry has certainly improved performance in terms of accessibility of quality seed by our farmers throughout the country,” he said.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.herald.co.zw/bayer-releases-maize-seed-hybrid-varieties/"}
{"doc_id": "cbf3628d4e03baab10e2a4fa2e0c251d", "text": "Nigeria could not net about N523 billion worth of revenue from the volume of gas hydrocarbon companies flared between 2015 and 2016, thus indicating how wasteful she has been with the prized resource she ironically needs to grow her economy, writes Chineme Okafor\nNatural gas is now often regarded as the new oil, but Nigeria appears quite ignorant of this and still burns a lot of it away in her oil fields.\nRecently, the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) disclosed that the country lost N523 billion to gas flaring between 2015 and 2016, to simply indicate that the frequently burning oil fields in the Niger Delta are economic incomes burning off into the atmosphere.\nDPR’s disclosure of such financial loses also included the forfeiture of 3,500 megawatts (MW) of electricity to the unwholesome practice, yet the country struggles to maintain a daily electricity generation capacity of 4,000MW.\nIt came just when the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) stated that the percentage of gas flared in the country has been cut down to 10, dropping 26 per cent points from 36 in the last 10 years.\nNNPC’s Chief Operating Officer, Upstream, Mallam Bello Rabiu, who disclosed this, noted that, as at 2006, Nigeria was flaring 2.5 billion standard cubic feet (bscf) of gas, and consuming just about 300 million standard cubic feet (mscf) gas per day.\nNotwithstanding, the DPR stated that, in 2015, Nigeria lost $850 million (N306 billion) to gas flaring, while the NNPC in a separate report indicated that monetary losses to the practice in 2016 was N217 billion.\nThe NNPC also explained that oil and gas firms operating in Nigeria’s oil fields flared a total of 244.84bscf gas in 2016 alone. These losses were in addition to reports that oil majors in the country had failed to pay about $14.298 billion to the country as penalty for flaring gas between April 2008 and October 2016, a period of eight years.\nThe country, according to the DPR, also lost about $400 million worth of carbon credit to the practice within these periods.\nLong Years of Failed Attempts\nNigeria enacted the first regulatory framework to cut down gas flaring in the Associated Gas Reinjection Act of 1979. As part of its provisions, the Act required every oil and gas producing company in Nigeria to submit to the minister for petroleum detailed programmes in relation to the re-injection of produced associated gas or programmes for the use of produced associated gas.\nIt also provided for the deadline for gas flaring in Nigeria as stipulated by the government to be 31 December 1974, this has, however, been extended a number of times between 1974 through a couple of amendments, which now make the final deadline of 2020 quite uncertain.\nIn that regard, Nigeria has continued to burn off gas from her oil fields and losing economic benefits associated with gas.\nThe law also provided for application for permits to be granted by the minister for as long as the applicant paid the amount prescribed by the minister, without providing for strict measures to ensure its effectiveness. Also, penalties for gas flaring have been quite low, thus ensuring that flares are done with less concern to the penalties.\nThe current Petroleum Industry Governance Bill (PIGB) which metamorphosed from the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), and has been on the floors of the National Assembly for years now, is also expected to address the issue of gas flaring.\nThe bill reportedly has in it, provisions for gas flaring measurement, that is, a specified number of days for which a permit would be issued to an applicant as well as the requirement for a gas flaring plan to be submitted by all oil and gas operating companies.\nEconomic Strength\nIn 2015, energy experts projected that the economic strength in gas was fast heading towards exceeding that of oil, and on the back of Qatar’s achievements with it, advised the federal government to give serious attention to it.\nSimilarly, frontend economic evaluations of the gas industry by these experts, referenced the country’s takes from the Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) Limited, which as a joint venture gas company between the country and oil firms, has paid a lot of value to the country from gas that could have been flared.\nBefore now, the government had in a bid to boost the country’s gas sector has set up the ‘Gas Master Plan’ which is a strategic framework towards achieving a wholly competitive market-driven domestic gas sector.\nThe plan also sought to drive investment towards provision of gas grid infrastructure, with the intention to make gas available all the time to industries across major industrial hubs in the country. Its overall goal was to drive Nigeria’s economic growth through gas, and not necessarily oil.\nIt also sought to have the country’s electricity generation grow with improved gas supplies to gas power generation plants, which make up about 80 per cent of Nigeria’s power generation capacity. This was also planned to encourage further investments in power generation being that gas, which is primarily a cheap fuel source would be made available at all times to the generation plants.\nBeyond the benefits to electricity generation for the country, experts have also said the country’s gas resources can be deployed to the transport sector as Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) for both heavy-duty and lightweight haulage of people and goods across the country, sent to homes and other commercial centres as Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) to replace other sources of heating and cooking fuels, as well as used in fertiliser blending plants to improve the country’s food production from its farms.\nWay to Go\nFollowing from the repeated call for a priority attention to gas, the government has said it was shifting its focus on oil to gas, and would, in this light, enact new policy for a standalone gas industry.\nThe Minister of State for Petroleum Resources, Dr. Ibe Kachikwu, stated at a function in November 2016, that new terms that will provide business clarity around Production Sharing Contract (PSC) for gas will be initiated by the government to make exploration and production of gas separate from oil.\nKachikwu also said the government had developed a draft national gas policy, which will include new and improved penalties to discourage flaring and wastage of gas. He said gas had a big place in the government’s ‘7BigWins’ policy direction for the country’s oil and gas sector.\nHe, however, explained that the government would prioritise gas as a stand-alone business, separate from oil, in the new policy, and that the new PSC gas terms were designed to ensure robust gas production and supply growth over a long-term period for the country.\nAccording to him, government will also clear the bottlenecks in gas production and utilisation as reported in the old Petroleum Act, and discourage Greenfield investments without clear-cut plans for gas.\n“Government has developed a draft national gas policy which will be released to stakeholders for consultation.\n“The draft gas policy promotes a competitive business environment for both current and new investors, it articulates our vision for the sector and sets policy goals, strategies and implementation plans for our medium to long term targets for gas,†Kachikwu said then at a function in Abuja.\nHe added that, “In order to ensure robustness in gas supply over a long-term, the following initiatives will be pursued – gas terms for PSCs will be produced before the end of 2016, exploration and development of new gas supply sources from inland and offshore basins will be actively encouraged, a national gas flare commercialisation plan will commence in the first quarter 2017.â€\nThe minister explained that government planned to make Nigeria an attractive gas based industrial nation, with specific attention on meeting local gas demands and then developing a significant presence in the international market.\n“Emphasis is tilting towards local application. The priority of the government is the utilisation of natural gas for domestic needs with the power sector as key priority end user.Â\n“Demands from the industrial, commercial and transportation sectors will also be focused on,†Kachikwu noted.\nHe, however, stated that the gas growth plan would be led by the private sector while the government would set the environment and support investors with appropriate infrastructure to bring their projects to fruition.\n“Our policy challenge is therefore to develop a policy, the institutions and legal and regulatory frameworks that is attractive to private sector.\n“Over the years, we have really focused on oil and neglected gas, but having seen the recession today, it is clear to us that if we develop a two window of economic earnings, a lot of emphasis will move to gas,†the minister added.\nProviding more details into the draft policy, Kachikwu stated that there would be a lot of institutional reforms in the sector.\nHe said it would address issues that are critical to government and investors such as gas flaring, pricing, wholesale gas market development and basis for licensing activities throughout the gas value chain.\n“A simplified licensing regime will be introduced for different activities including but not limited to constructing and operating gas processing plants, liquefaction plants, gas storage facilities, transportation network operation and distribution networks and retail trading of gas.\n“There will be a liberalised entry into the midstream. In order to move the market towards wholesale competition, producers will be encouraged to focus their investments and activities more on the upstream while entering into the midstream will be liberalised and incentivised to allow private sector players to invest in process, transport and storage of gas,†he said.\nAccording to him: “The new fiscal policy we are working on will make gas a stand-alone separate from oil and not consolidated on oil taxation.\n“Our intention is to retain the current pricing framework for a limited period. It will end when sufficient gas volumes are built up to a level that will underpin a competitive gas market. Under such condition, wholesale gas price will be market led.â€\nHe said on the planned increase of gas flaring penalty: “We will be increasing the gas flaring penalties to an appropriate level sufficient to de-incentivise the practice of gas flaring. Our focus really will not be on penalisation, we will seek quite frankly to simply stop it and not you throwing money at us.â€", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2017/05/21/ending-nigerias-wasteful-habit-of-gas-flaring"}
{"doc_id": "8cbde6c2c74e08ad9f57e89185b25d84", "text": "Nigerian Society of Engineers\n22 Jan\nPresident of the Senate, Godswill Akpabio, has called on the Nigerian Society of Engineers (NSE) to address the country’s inadequate infrastructure and advancement in technology.\n14 Dec\nThe Nigerian Society of Engineers (NSE) has charged the three tiers of government to establish technology hubs to facilitate knowledge transfer, create manufacturing clusters and encourage cooperation between academia and industry to boost production in the country.\n28 Nov\nThe Nigerian Society of Engineers (NSE) has urged the Federal Government to involve indigenous engineers in the revival roadmap of the Ajaokuta Steel Complex.\n25 Nov\nThe Federal Government has reiterated commitment to delivering outstanding quality, value for money, innovation, responsiveness, fast deliveries and technical expertise in road infrastructure development in Nigeria.\n1 Nov\nThe Nigerian Society of Engineers (NSE) has sought review of the Electricity Regulation Act, 2023, stating that the technical aspect of the electricity supply industry was not properly articulated in the new law.\n14 Sep\n…Commends Ondo Governor for creating enabling environment for engineers The Nigerian Society of Engineers (NSE), Akure Branch has called on the government at all levels to make more investments in energy sufficiency across the country for economic growth. The Chairman, FNSE, Akure Branch, Engr. Bolawole Stephen disclosed this at the Branch’s 2023 edition of Engineering…\n29 Aug 2023\nUsing 30 per cent inflation as a rationale for increasing electricity tariffs by electricity distribution companies (DisCo) is flawed and not supported by logic, the Nigerian Society of Engineers (NSE) has said.\n24 Apr 2023\nTo enhance safety and productivity, experts have urged housing professionals to improve the use of modern technology in solving major challenges confronting the industry.\n6 Mar 2023\nNigerian Society of Engineers (NSE) has urged Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to geo-tag ballot boxes to prevent snatching and stuffing in future elections.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://guardian.ng/tag/nigerian-society-of-engineers/"}
{"doc_id": "a531702205a08f3c2e528d7c87a94d8f", "text": "Ratings agency Fitch has warned that South Africa needs to ramp up its structural reforms to address weak economic growth outlook in the medium-term.\nThe agency on Friday said the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) would remain below 1% again this year as a result of the ongoing energy crisis, logistical constraints and high levels of income inequality.\nFitch’s primary ratings analyst, Thomas Garreau, said they were forecasting that real GDP growth would accelerate to 0.9% in 2024, and 1.3% in 2025, from an estimated 0.5% in 2023.\nIf the economy grows by 0.5% in 2023, as forecast by Fitch, it would be below all other estimates as the SA Reserve Bank and the National Treasury both forecast 0.8% growth.\nGarreau said the economy remained severely troubled by the impact of electricity capacity constraints, a struggling logistics sector and a high level of inequality.\nHowever, he said the opening of Transnet's infrastructure to third-party freight operators last year would help improve the performance of the logistics sector.\n“Further incremental progress on the 35 priority reforms identified by the government under Operation Vulindlela, launched in 2020, was recorded in the second half of 2023, mainly in the energy and logistics sectors,” Garreau said.\n“Although the reforms will contribute to a modest increase in real GDP growth in the near to medium term, they are limited in ambition and we do not think they will significantly enhance South Africa's low growth potential, which we estimate at 1.2%.”\nOperation Vulindlela is a joint initiative of the Presidency and National Treasury to accelerate the implementation of structural reforms and support economic recovery.\nIt aims to modernise and transform network industries such as electricity, water, transport and digital communications, including prioritising reforms to the visa regime in a bid to attract skills and promote growth in tourism.\nHowever, Fitch noted the slow improvements with power generation capacity, saying load shedding would reduce in intensity in 2024 and 2025, compared with 2023, but would not disappear.\nGarreau said the return to the grid of three units at Kusile power station, and the synchronisation of unit 5 late last year, added a total 3 200MW to generation capacity.\n“Further capacity is expected to come from private-sector investments, with a pipeline of confirmed projects representing 12GW of new capacity,” he said.\n“The legal separation of Eskom into three divisions, intended to further catalyse investment in generation and transmission, is moving slowly, and we do not expect full separation before 2025.”\nThe unbundling of Eskom into three units – generation, transmission and distribution – is aimed at creating a competitive and open electricity market.\nThe ratings agency left South Africa's credit rating unchanged at “BB-” with a stable outlook.\nThis means South Africa’s sovereign bonds still remain below investment level by all three major ratings agencies: Fitch, S&P Global and Moody’s.\nFitch forecast a widening of the consolidated fiscal deficit to 4.7% of GDP in the 2023 financial year, up from 3.7% in the 2022 financial year.\nIt said this would be driven by an erosion of revenue collection hampered by low real GDP growth; low corporate profitability; upward expenditure pressure, stemming from the public-service agreement that was signed after the budget was released; and, interest payments.\nThe general government debt, according to Fitch, will reach 83.2% of GDP in the 2025 financial year, from an estimated 76% in the 2023 financial year, due to a primary surplus below its debt-stabilising level, weak growth and large stock-flow adjustments.\nIn response to Fitch, the National Treasury said the government would focus on raising GDP growth by improving the provision of electricity, logistics and enhancing the delivery of infrastructure over the medium term.\n“Fiscal policy continues to support this approach by stabilising debt and debt-service costs,” Treasury said.\n“Government reiterates that fiscal consolidation will be implemented through spending reductions, efficiency measures across government and moderate tax revenue measures.”\nBUSINESS REPORT", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/fitch-warns-on-sa-growth-restraints-power-crisis-logistics-inequality-3aa24854-b0f9-41ec-af70-5b9be8949a06"}
{"doc_id": "78602256d6f886e1e0a417893c20e0e0", "text": "Retail group Woolworths says that its new pricing strategy has been well-received by customers, helping to boost sales in the last six weeks of 2020, as South Africa continued to feel the impact of the Covid-19 crisis.\nIn a trading statement on Monday (25 January), the group reported increased sales for the 26 weeks ended 27 December 2020, up 5.3% compared to the corresponding period in 2019.\nThis was driven largely in the Woolworths Food segment in the final weeks of the year, which saw sales increase 12.0%, and deliver further market share gains.\nFood sales over the 26-week period grew by 10.9% and by 9.4% in comparable stores, with net space growth of 0.4%.\nWoolworths said that its price investment strategy – where it committed to investing R1 billion into the business to keep prices of select items stable, remains a priority for the business.\nPrice movement was 7.1%, impacted by mix, while underlying product inflation averaged 4.8% over the period.\nIt also noted the success of its digital strategy, which saw online food sales grow by 158.5%, contributing 2.2% to sales, overall. This segment was boosted by the expansion of the click and collect offering, and successful trial of an on-demand delivery service, it said.\nThe same successes were not felt in other segments, however.\nWoolworths Fashion, Beauty and Home continued to take strain, seeing sales decline 11.2% over the period, with comparable store sales 11.0% lower on a 2.4% price movement.\nWhile online sales more than doubled, this was not enough to counteract the effects of reduced foot traffic, a drop in Black Friday participation and lower need for formal wear.\nThe Woolworths Financial Services segment reflected year-on-year contraction of 2.2%. The annualised impairment rate for the six months ended December 2020 was 4.1%, compared to 3.3% for the prior period.\n“Trading conditions across the group continued to be impacted by Covid-19, with significantly reduced store footfall, particularly in larger shopping centres and CBD locations,” Woolworths said.\n“Considered actions to stimulate trade, strengthen online capabilities, manage inventory levels and execute property sales, have resulted in positive cash flows and a continued reduction in net debt levels in both South Africa and Australia.”\nThe group advised that its earnings per share and headline earnings per share would be significantly higher for the year – although this is largely due to property sales and renegotiated leases in Australia.\nTaking these into account, earnings are anticipated to be between 70% and 80% higher than in the previous period. Excluding profits from the property sale, headline earnings are expected to be between 50% and 60% higher.\nExcluding both the property sale profits and lease negotiations, diluted headline earnings are expected to be between 17% and 22% higher, it said.\nShares in the group advanced in early trade on Monday. Woolworths is expected to publish its results for the 26 week period on 25 February 2021.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/463098/woolworths-new-pricing-strategy-paying-off/"}
{"doc_id": "1a07de151fc5975cdc9dd667e86ebf01", "text": "The January global food price index fell further by one percent, the lowest value in nearly three years, according to the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) latest food price index report.\nThe FAO’s global food price index report released Friday showed that January’s global food price index, which averaged 118.0 points, declined by one percent from December 118.5 points, making it the lowest value since February 2021.\nThe global food price index, which tracks changes in the international prices of a set of globally traded food commodities, is led by the decrease in prices of cereals and meat, which more than offset an increase in sugar prices.\n“The FAO meat price index declined for the seventh consecutive month by 1.4 percent from December, as abundant supplies from leading exporting countries drove down international prices of poultry, bovine and pig meats,” the report stated.\n“By contrast, international ovine meat prices increased on high global import demand and lower supplies of animals for slaughter in Oceania,” the report said.\nThe meat price index averaged 109.8 points, fell 1.5 points from December 111.3 points, and dipped further on a year-on-year basis, from 131.6 to 118.0 points, in January 2023 and January 2024, respectively.\nOn a year-on-year basis, the January food price index was down 118.0 points from 131.6 points in January 2023.\nThis decline in the food price index report further eases concern over global food price inflation.\nThe agency’s sugar price index showed the most increase with 135.3 points from 116.8 points in January 2023. It also increased 0.8 percent from the previous month, hinged on concerns over the likely impact of below-average rains in Brazil on sugarcane crops to be harvested from April, coupled with unfavourable production prospects in Thailand and India.\nThe sugar price index, however, had declined 16.6 percent in December last year from November.\nCereal prices declined 2.2 percent from the previous month and fell 18.6 percent from their previous year’s value.\nWheat and maize fell sharply on a month-on-month basis driven by strong competition among experts and the arrival of recently harvested supplies in southern hemisphere countries.\nThe decline in maize reflects improved crop conditions and the start of the harvest season in Argentina and larger supplies in the U.S.\nFor the year as a whole, cereal prices were 15.4 percent below their 2022 average, reflecting well-supplied markets, although the FAO’s All Rice Price Index, which is a part of the FAO Cereal Price Index, increased by a further 2.1 percent, largely reflecting a rise in prices of higher quality India’s rice due to strong pace of Thai and Pakistani shipments and additional purchases by Indonesia.\nThe vegetable oil price index dipped by 17.8 percent below its 2023 corresponding month and averaged 118.9 points, virtually unchanged from December’s value.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businessday.ng/agriculture/article/january-global-food-price-hits-3-year-low/"}
{"doc_id": "7e69812b7df1926cdeb6441e2271e62a", "text": "MUFULIRA, ZAMBIA- JULY 6: Workers move batches of copper sheets, which are stored in a warehouse and wait to be loaded on trucks on July 6, 2016 in Mufulira, Zambia. The copper is trucked to ports such as Dar es Salaam, Tanzania & Durban, South Africa. Glencore, an Anglo-Swiss multinational commodity trading and mining company. owns about 73 % of Mopani mines, which produces copper and some cobalt. The mine employs about 15,000 people. Many people in the area are dependent of the mines and its subcontractors for work. (Per-Anders Pettersson/Getty Images)\nOn 13 November, Zambia became the first African nation in the Covid era to default on its external debt payments. The default was triggered by the inability of the government to arrive at an agreement with holders of $3-billion of its external bonds (so-called Eurobonds). The government was requesting a six-month extension in interest payments that were due a month ago, a request that was turned down by its bondholders.\nAfter having much of its external debt written off in the mid 2000s as part of the Heavily Indebted Poor Country initiative, Zambia began to unsustainably accumulate new debt in 2012. The new debt cycle was facilitated by the country getting a sovereign debt rating in 2011. The rating was bestowed by the international ratings agency Fitch, which, at the time, considered the country to have a “stable” outlook in so far as the risk of default was concerned.\nWith Fitch’s blessing secured, dollars began to flow into Zambia, heralding the era of the international financialisation of the country. In September 2012, Zambia issued its first Eurobond worth $750-million to much fanfare on Wall Street. This bond issuance was so oversubscribed that two additional bonds totalling $2.25-billion were issued in 2014 and 2015, bringing the total bond outstanding to $3-billion.\nZambia has, over the past two years or so, featured prominently in international debates concerning its level of indebtedness. What is inexcusable is the government’s reckless accumulation of external debt, which has increased by more than 1 000% since 2011. Most Zambians agree that there is little to show for all this debt except for an economy that is teetering on the brink.\nWhat is also inexcusable is just how reckless, ideological and dishonest much of the international debate has been. It has proceeded as if its ultimate goal was to force the country into a situation of debt distress.\nFor starters, the subject of the actual level of debt that Zambia owes has been hotly debated in the Western press. In 2018, the London-based Africa Confidential, which anonymously publishes whistleblower-type reports on the African continent, ran a series of articles claiming that Zambia was hiding the true amount of its external debt and that the actual number had reached 100% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP).\nGiven the size of the country’s GDP in 2018, Africa Confidential was suggesting that the Zambian government owed a total of $27-billion, an implausibly large number that has since been shown to be false. Africa Confidential is, however, yet to issue a retraction for its reckless coverage from 2018, coverage which has coloured how Zambia’s debt situation is viewed locally and abroad.\nSecond, many in the Western press and governments, as well as international multilateral agencies, blame China for Zambia’s debt problems. The Financial Times ran an editorial in October effectively blaming China. The Economist has also pushed this line and so has the United States government and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF has, behind the scenes, made the restructuring of Chinese debt a precondition for balance of payments support to the country.\nTo be sure, Zambia has borrowed substantial sums from China. According to the ministry of finance, the country owes about $3-billion to China (although there is some debate about the exact amount). But the lion’s share of Zambia’s external debt stock is owed to Western and Western allied institutions. Data from the World Bank shows that of the $11-billion the government owed external creditors at the end of last year, most of it (about 70%) was owed to entities allied to or headquartered in the West. These include the World Bank, the IMF, commercial banks and hedge funds. Only China and (reluctantly) the World Bank and IMF have given Zambia some debt relief this year. Western commercial banks and hedge funds, which together hold about $5-billion (or 50%) of Zambia’s external debt, have not batted an eye. It is worth remembering that Zambia’s debt problems started with the issuance of Eurobonds in 2012 that were swept up by Western banks and hedge funds.\nAnother angle to the China story concerns misleading reports about Zambia pledging vital national assets as collateral in exchange for Chinese debt. Africa Confidential published a report in 2018 claiming that the national electricity utility, Zesco, was about to be taken over by China because it had been pledged as collateral. This story, too, has since been refuted by the Chinese and Zambian governments but not without the story growing its own legs and the false list of pledged national assets extending to include the national broadcaster and the national airport. China wants to win friends across the African continent, but grabbing sovereign assets is not the way to do it. Beijing knows better than to do that.\nZambia’s current debt situation is concerning and is largely a result of the careless stewardship of the nation’s finances by the government. But that is not the only lesson to draw from this situation. The country is being used as fodder in a geopolitical battle raging between the West and China. The West, worried about its waning influence on the African continent, is carefully spinning a narrative, with Zambia as ground zero, that doing business with China is fatal. The truth is much more complex than this narrative. And caught in the middle of it all are the lives of Zambians who have now become the proverbial grass in the big ideological tussle of our times.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://mg.co.za/africa/2020-11-18-china-blamed-for-zambias-debt-but-the-wests-banks-and-agencies-enabled-it/"}
{"doc_id": "d114dc01dad1aeea1c5ea675bd2fa929", "text": "Advertisement\n‘Gold4oil’ key in stabilising fuel prices — BoG\nTHE Bank of Ghana (BoG) has lauded the Gold for Oil (G4Oil) programme for helping to stabilise fuel prices since its introduction.\nThe Head of Financial Markets at the central bank, Steven Opata, said the government’s policy had resulted in increased competition among traders of refined petroleum products, leading to reductions in prices at the pumps between December last year and March, this year.\nHe attributed the drop in diesel prices from about GH¢24 per litre in December 2022 to a little above GH¢13 per litre as at the end of March to the programme under which about four cargoes have so far been delivered.\nLaunched in January, the G4Oil programme uses locally procured gold to purchase fuel in a bid to prevent the foreign exchange pressure that the use of cash brings on the cedi.\nIt relies heavily on the central bank’s domestic gold purchase programme that was launched in July last year to help shore up the BoG’s reserves.\nFuel prices\nThe BoG’s Head of Financial Markets said in an interaction with the media in Accra that the G4Oil programme played a significant role in getting ex-pump prices of petrol, diesel and Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), among others things to reduce by 50 per cent this year.\nHe said the halving of the prices came at a time when crude oil prices had fallen by an average of 30 per cent.\nAs of March 17, about four cargos have since come in under the programme that took off this year, he said.\nBeneficiaries\nSpeaking to selected journalists on issues arising from the bank’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting in the first quarter, Mr Opata said the lower prices had benefited consumers and businesses, including helping to put inflation on a downward trend.\nConsequently, the BoG’s head of financial markets appealed to the public to support the programme which hinges on using locally produced gold to buy refined petroleum products abroad for the local market.\nHe said by purchasing the petroleum products with gold, the country was also avoiding the pressure that the use of foreign currencies always brought on the cedi.\nThis, he said, also provided some respite for the local currency.\nThe cedi lost about 22.1 per cent of its value to the US dollar as of March 20, according to the BoG data.\nMethods\nAnnounced late last year by the Vice-President, Dr Mohamudu Bawumia, the G4O programme allows the country to pay for petroleum products using either locally sourced gold or proceeds of that gold sold to a broker.\nIt took off in January with Dr Bawumia describing it as revolutionary and a potential big saver for the economy.\nIn February when consignments under the policy were put into the market, the Vice-President said the programme had led to price drops at the pumps, while estimates showed that the country could save about $4.8 billion from its implementation annually.\nUpdate\nGiving an update, Mr Opata explained that BoG’s gold purchase as a reserves programme was key to the success of the government’s G4Oil programme.\nHe said since it was launched, the central bank had successfully purchased about 166,000 ounces of gold valued at about US$314 million.\n“Now, as you know, we are using the domestic purchase programme to secure fuel. As of the March 17 this year, about four cargoes had come in and like I told you, these have created a lot of competition such that the international oil trading companies who, before, had a captive market and taking advantage of their monopolistic power, are now competing,” the BoG’s head of financial markets said.\n“If you look at the data, ex–pump prices have dropped from about almost GH¢24 per litre in December 2022 to around GH¢13 per litre right now.\n“So, we are looking at almost a 50 per cent drop in fuel prices,” he said.\nInflation\nMr Opata expressed the optimism that the drop in fuel prices would impact on other prices for inflation to drop further.\nInflation, which measures the general price levels of goods and services, has resumed a downward trend after peaking at 54.1 per cent in December last year.\nIt dropped to 53.6 per cent in February before easing to 52.8 per cent.\nThe central bank said it expected further falls in the coming months after hiking its policy rate to 28.5 per cent in March.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.graphic.com.gh/business/business-news/gold4oil-key-in-stabilising-fuel-prices-bog.html"}
{"doc_id": "29c8261de03be0e58e177a619333efca", "text": "Jonas Makwakwa – in charge of SARS’ key revenue generating units – seemingly struggles to manage his own finances. We know this because Scorpio has seen the financial statements of Makwakwa’s primary bank account for the years 2014 to 2016. His expenses often outweighed his income – in three months Makwakwa spent about three times more than the salary he gets from SARS, our analysis of his financials show. Reporting a series of suspicious deposits into this account in 2017, the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) found that Makwakwa had grown a dependency on possibly illegal payments to maintain his lifestyle. In Part Three, Scorpio reveals that the FIC had good reason to be worried. By PAULI VAN WYK for SCORPIO.\nJonas Makwakwa is a big spender – an excessive habit the 48-year-old struggles to satisfy solely with his income from SARS. Between 2014 and 2016 his monthly salary (after tax) fluctuated between R105,000 and R144,000, the bank statements of his primary FNB account show.\nBut in April, May and November 2015, Makwakwa’s expenses were at least three times higher than his monthly income from SARS. During another eight months in the analysed three-year period, Makwakwa’s expenses were about twice as much as his monthly income from SARS.\nBetween July 2014 and August 2016 (26 consecutive months) Makwakwa managed to spend more than what he earned from Sars. His overdraft facility was not enough to absorb Makwakwa’s splurging on luxuries. Makwakwa seems to have depended on a series of “suspicious” and unexplained payments to fund his excessive spending.\nIn an attempt to give Makwakwa the benefit of the doubt, one might reason then that he earned a legitimate income elsewhere. But his bank statements show that the only other income (that was not flagged by the FIC for being suspicious) rarely exceeded R10,000 per month.\nThe only other sources of income Scorpio could find were two bonuses paid by SARS in July 2014 and July 2015 – respectively R245,574.06 and R453,018.67. But even with the benefit of these bonuses, the maths does not make sense.\nThese are the spending habits of SARS’ Chief Officer: Business and Individual Tax – a portfolio that includes SARS’ biggest revenue generating units. After over a year on suspension on the back of these mysterious payments, Makwakwa is back in the job thanks to a tailored disciplinary hearing where he answered only to a fraction of the allegations against him. Now that he’s holding the reins once more, Makwakwa’s main task will be to shrink the R50-billion projected revenue shortfall before the financial year ends in February 2018.\nWhy is Scorpio disclosing elements of Makwakwa’s bank statements?\nBank statements are a private matter and Daily Maverick respects Makwakwa’s right to privacy. When we received his bank statements from our source, we carefully considered whether the facts before us merit the infringement of Makwakwa’s privacy.\nWe consulted two sets of lawyers, probed our source’s motives, reviewed the publicly available facts as well as what we knew about the curious case of Makwakwa’s mysterious fortune.\nUltimately it was Moyane’s disastrous reporting stints to Parliament’s standing committee on finance on 28 November and 4 December that convinced us to go ahead and publish some details from Makwakwa’s statements. Members of Parliament criticised Moyane on both occasions for not being frank, but rather combative and defensive.\n“You have not served yourself well, and you have not served SARS well,” committee chair Yunus Carrim reportedly told Moyane in November after he deflected and attacked a series of questions from MPs across party lines.\n“There is a strong perception that [Makwakwa] is being protected and you are feeding directly into that perception.”\nCarrim also wrote to Moyane in October:\n“Given the role SARS plays, it not only has to be, but be seen to be above reproach, and perceptions of irregularities by its senior officials have to be effectively addressed.”\nMakwakwa oversees mega taxpayers. He needs to be above reproach.\nOur source acquired Makwakwa’s bank statements lawfully. The source rationally and truly believes that if the truth learned from the bank statements is not published, justice will not be done. There is a strong and reasonable belief that an escalation of the matter through “appropriate” channels will only result in the source being victimised and the matter dying in Moyane’s office vault.\nIn Part 1 of the Makwakwa Dossier, Scorpio revealed that Makwakwa did not answer to the majority of allegations highlighted in the FIC report. Makwakwa has not been cleared of money laundering allegations, nor is it clear whether he paid tax on his mysterious income and if the income is regular. Yet Moyane allowed him back in SARS.\nWhile analysing the bank statements it becomes clear, even to a layman, that Makwakwa’s excessive spending cannot be funded by his income alone. This possibly makes Makwakwa vulnerable to abuse, manipulation and even extortion. We asked him on two occasions for an explanation. Our queries were met with a lawyer’s letter attempting to kill the story (more on this later).\nScorpio deliberately leaves out highly personal details of Makwakwa’s life that would make for great click bait and probably scandalous reading. Scorpio’s only focus is to investigate the source and nature of Makwakwa’s reportedly suspicious funds and how this makes him vulnerable, considering his senior position in a crucial state department.\nWhile Scorpio is not accusing Makwakwa of criminality, we believe it our duty to inform the public of the facts and allow them to make up their own minds.\nSwipe the plastic\nGood food, fancy clothes and even fancier hotels are a priority for Makwakwa.\nIn April 2015 Makwakwa spent over R16,000 on accommodation at the Fairmont Zimbali Resort Hotel in KwaZulu-Natal. He spent another R19,000 on the same hotel in January 2016 and three months later R24,000 at the Pezula Resort Hotel in Knysna. This does not include the substantive amounts he spent on food, clothes and entertainment during these breakaways. Makwakwa’s financial statements also include some spending in Europe and the United States. Scorpio established that at least one trip to Rotterdam in the Netherlands was in the course of his official duties. It seems as if SARS reimbursed some of these expenses.\nThe people in his life are similarly important to Makwakwa and some have benefited handsomely from his apparent good fortunes. Makwakwa has repeatedly gifted money to at least 60 people between 2014 and 2016. The list includes family members, his wife Moli Makwakwa and girlfriend Kelly-Ann Elskie (who are both employed by SARS), his children, friends and some SARS colleagues. Elskie received at least R85,000 during this period, while Moli received about R51,000. The payments are typically small amounts paid several times per month between 2014 and 2016.\nMakwakwa also co-owns at least three properties, publicly available documents show. The bond payments towards these homes contribute to the about R100,000 in expenditure on loans, insurance and other monthly payments. This does not include payments to his children’s school and tuition fees, their transport, and other payments of a personal nature Scorpio will not disclose.\nAs already mentioned, SARS paid Makwakwa between R105,000 and R144,000 per month between 2014 and 2016.\nSimply put: Makwakwa’s one plus one doesn’t equal two. Makwakwa seems to have grown a dependency on mysterious payments to fund his lifestyle – an assertion made by the FIC in their May 2016 report (more about this later). Scorpio’s analysis now bolsters this finding.\nWhen approached for comment last week, Makwakwa’s lawyer, Norwood-based attorney, conveyancer and notary public Liezel David, at first attempted to dissuade Scorpio from publishing this story by threatening legal action.\nAccording to David, the financials of the second most powerful official in SARS – accused of money laundering and corruption by the highly respected FIC – might be interesting to the public, but they are not in the public interest.\nRead David’s entire four-page letter on behalf of Makwakwa:\nNeither David nor Makwakwa answered Scorpio’s two sets of questions posed to Makwakwa last week. Neither attempted to contact Scorpio again, despite understanding that the publication of a story was imminent.\nAccording to David, Makwakwa further declined “to engage with [Scorpio] on any matter that has been the subject of due process… including the illegal disclosure of information such as [Makwakwa’s] personal bank statements”.\nMakwakwa did not give consent for the publishing of his financial statements.\nWhen one minus three equals four\nMakwakwa’s magic touch with numbers was however interesting to the FIC. It is unclear when Makwakwa’s financial behaviour set off alarm bells at the FIC, but in May 2016 the centre gave SARS boss Tom Moyane a damning report detailing how hundreds of thousands of rand in mysterious payments unexplainably found its way into Makwakwa’s account. Between 2010 and 2015 the payments into his account increased yearly from R1.35-million to R3.4-million, an increase of approximately 152%, the FIC found. During this period, Makwakwa’s expenses also grew, “creating a dependency on suspicious cash deposits and payments to maintain his current standard of living”, FIC investigators said. The centre ordered that it be investigated, because the payments might be “proceeds of crime”, point to “money laundering” and are “of concern as they originate from unknown sources and undetermined legal purpose”.\nThe “suspicious” payments into Makwakwa’s account included cash he and others paid into ATMs, three internet payments made by a company Makwakwa was once a director of as well as a forex payment from an unknown jurisdiction.\nMoyane kept a lid on the FIC report until an amaBhungane exposé forced Moyane to suspend Makwakwa in September 2016.\nThe series of financial statements Scorpio has seen offers a wider view of Makwakwa’s financials than the period ultimately considered by the FIC for their report. An analysis of Makwakwa’s financial statements highlights therefore two additional and important trends.\nTiming is of the essence?\nThe first is how a linear analysis of the mysterious payments create a hyperbolic curve. This means the suspicious payments at first entered his account slowly and in small figures, reached a crescendo in value and frequency in the middle of 2015 – coinciding with the resignation of former deputy SARS commissioner Ivan Pillay – and then tapered off to stop abruptly about a year later.\nPayments into Makwakwa’s account stopped around May 2016 – the same time that the FIC gave Moyane its report, which he possibly illegally disclosed to Makwakwa. Simply put: Moyane seemingly tipped off Makwakwa that the FIC was looking over his shoulder. Disclosing FIC reports to unauthorised persons, including the subject of the investigation, is a criminal contravention of the Financial Intelligence Act and could land Moyane in jail or with a hefty fine. This contravention has not been explained by Moyane.\nWhy the cash payments started in January 2014 is unexplained. In these early months the cash amounts were still low in value, and increased slowly to reach R14,900 in August 2014. But in September 2014, the pattern breaks and 11 cash payments totalling R83,800 were deposited from ATMs at OR Tambo International Airport, Bloemfontein and Mall at Reds in Centurion.\nA forex payment of R147,850.65 landed in Makwakwa’s account in the same month. This marked the beginning of Makwakwa’s good fortune. It is – coincidentally or not – also around this time that the Sunday Times’ stories about former SARS executive and head of investigations Johann van Loggerenberg turned weird. In October 2014 the Sunday Times wrote the first story alleging that a “rogue unit” in SARS spied on President Jacob Zuma and ran a brothel – claims the newspaper had to retract later and label as untrue. September 2014 further marks the month Moyane got appointed as SARS Commissioner.\nThe Makwakwa life\nThe erratic spending pattern Makwakwa fell into from September 2014 is the second trend highlighted by Scorpio’s analysis.\nTo understand Makwakwa’s unpredictable spending and why this might be a problem, we need to take a step back and start with the beginning of the financial picture before us.\nBetween January and June 2014, Makwakwa consistently dipped low into his overdraft. In July 2014 he is awarded a R245,574.06 bonus on top of his R135,389.01 monthly salary from SARS. The bonus temporarily lifts him out of the doldrums and he closes the month of July with R40,924.13 in the green. This means Makwakwa spent over R300,000 in July 2014 – behaviour probably induced by the increase in expendable income. In the previous months (January to June 2014) Makwakwa spent between R130,000 and R200,000 per month. In these six months his salary from SARS never exceeded R106,000 and no other substantial income has been recorded.\nBetween August 2014 and June 2015 Makwakwa barely managed – even with the help of several suspicious payments – to keep his bank balance in the positive. In April 2015 he received no ATM deposits, and by 9 April Makwakwa had again lived into more than R23,000 of his overdraft limit. On this day, though, Biz Fire Worx, a company he was once a director of, sends the first (R150,000) of three big payments to Makwakwa.\n(Side note: The FIC was particularly disturbed by the payments from Biz Fire Worx because it was traced right back to the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, making a loop through 12 other bank accounts, described by the investigators as a possible money laundering scheme.)\nA day later, on 10 April, another R200,000 from Biz Fire Worx arrives in his account. The two payments – flagged as suspicious by the FIC – lift Makwakwa right back to about R308,000 in the bank.\nIn the following seven days Makwakwa spent large sums of it. By the end of April 2015, Makwakwa had R145,333.41 left in his account after spending about R350,000. This is one of three months when Makwakwa spent more than three times his salary. SARS paid Makwakwa a salary of R110,802.49 (after tax) in April 2015.\nOn 8 May 2015, Biz Fire Worx’ last payment of R130,000 registers in Makwakwa’s account. Five days later, Makwakwa pays R200,000 cash from his bank account to “Mercedes Benz”. This correlates with the FIC report’s findings, which described the payment as a “Mercedes Benz C220 Bluetec”, bought for his girlfriend Elskie.\nThe same theme of sudden and excessive spending on luxury items, holidays and food whenever mysterious deposits are paid into Makwakwa’s account repeats itself right through the three years of financial statements Scorpio has had sight of. But when the goose that laid the golden eggs was slain, Makwakwa’s good fortune also seems to have dried up. By the end of August 2016, SARS’ second most powerful official, with the responsibility to lift South Africa out of its revenue doldrums, was R114,671.43 in the red. Again. DM\nPhoto: SARS No2 (again) Jonas Makwakwa.\n- Scorpio is the Daily Maverick’s new investigative unit. If you’d like to support its work, click here.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-12-08-scorpio-the-makwakwa-dossier-part-3-why-sars-no-2s-erratic-spending-pattern-raised-red-flags-with-financial-intelligence/"}
{"doc_id": "2e4daa9f9531a21f3b81d14b5490331a", "text": "Kenya Airways (KQ) net loss has nearly tripled to Sh36.2 billion, the worst ever in the history of the airline, on account of Covid-19 disruptions that led to a sharp decline in passenger numbers.\nThe loss, for the financial year ended December 2020, is 2.8 times more than the Sh12.98 billion net loss it had posted a year earlier, and now deals a major blow to the recovery efforts of the national carrier.\nKQ chairman Michael Joseph says the outlook still looks bleak and the airline will be seeking a right-sized network to match the prevailing demand.\n“The Covid-19 global outbreak in 2020 was beyond anyone’s prediction and its impact on the industry is expected to continue affecting air travel demand for the next two to three years,” said Mr Joseph.\nKQ’s loss, also the worst ever results in corporate Kenya, came on the back of strict Covid-19 control measures across the globe that crushed demand for air travel.\nThe airline says that passenger revenue dropped by 67.5 per cent to Sh33.7 billion as passenger numbers reduced by 65.7 per cent to 1.8 million.\n“Approximately 70 per cent of the total passengers carried in 2020 were flown during the first three months of the year, demonstrating the drop in demand as the global crisis deepened during the year,” said Mr Joseph.\nTotal income dipped by 58.9 per cent to Sh52.8 billion underlining the impact of a sharp fall in passenger numbers as countries restricted movement to contain the spread of Covid-19.\nThe latest loss means that KQ has now gone for the eighth straight year without profits, extending its accumulated losses to Sh128.76 billion.\nThe airline last made a profit in 2012 when it closed with net earnings at Sh1.66 billion.\nThe huge accumulated losses have seen KQ’s negative equity position worsen from Sh17.89 billion a year earlier to Sh64.2 billion, meaning that it is technically insolvent.\nKenya reported its first Covid-19 case mid-March last year, prompting the state to ground both domestic and international flights for months.\nKQ reacted to the Covid-19 hardships through layoffs and massive salary cuts to reduce the pressure on the bottom-line.\nHowever, the muted demand in passenger business and increased costs due to tighter health and safety measures kept recovery out of reach for the airline.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/companies/kenya-airways-reports-worst-ever-loss-of-sh36-billion-3332624"}
{"doc_id": "b7469e4155142c0e7d7976fa0ff00d8f", "text": "S\nouth Africa is generally a divided, unhappy and increasingly corrupt country with its growth potential hampered by contradictory and ever-changing government policy.\nIt needs fast economic growth to reduce high unemployment and poverty but that has not been forthcoming for two reasons. The first is that expenditure to redress the apartheid legacy has reduced the resources available for investments in the knowledge economy through investments in research and development, infrastructure and tertiary education.\nThe second reason is that many of the government’s honourable and justifiable goals have been accompanied by large amounts of wastage, policy experimentation and cronyism.\nThis is the conclusion we reached in a recent paper that updates three scenarios we set out last year ahead of South Africa’s national elections in May 2014.\nThe three scenarios\nThe original three scenarios were for South Africa through to 2030. This is the same horizon as the government’s National Development Plan. These were:\n• Bafana Bafana – named after the country’s bumbling national soccer team. We concluded that this is South Africa’s current pathway, fumbling along with no clear leadership or direction.\n• A Nation Divided. In this scenario the ruling African National Congress (ANC) adopts populist policies to shore up support. Eventually both the economy and the ANC pay a heavy price.\n• In Mandela Magic, the government implements the NDP. This could either come about through a revitalisation of the ANC or the growth of competitive multiparty democracy.\nThree factors contributed to a deterioration of our growth forecasts since our first paper was published. The first is the severity of the electricity constraint on South Africa’s growth prospects. This became more pronounced at the end of 2014.\nThe second factor was the weaker than expected global economic recovery, particularly in Europe – an important trading partner. And lastly, continued domestic policy flip-flops have compounded poor leadership and a lack of vision.\nUntil 2022-23, when the electricity supply problems are expected to be resolved, South Africa will grow at a rate well below that forecast in the original Bafana Bafana scenario. A number of characteristics of the low-road scenario Nation Divided are also evident. This reflects the lack of a clear policy direction, poor leadership and little commitment to the actual implementation of the National Development Plan, which became government policy in 2012.\nMost ominous is the possibility South Africa could have its international credit rating reduced from investment grade to junk status. This would have a debilitating impact on growth prospects, raising the cost of debt and reducing investor confidence.\nWe point to a concern that policy proposals do not appear to be subject to sufficient cost-benefit analysis, and that there is an absence of policy coherence in government. Two recent examples that illustrate this are:\n• Decisions about the affordability and requirement for the proposed nuclear energy-build program; and\n• The barriers raised to tourism and skilled foreigners through visas and immigration requirements.\nOur updated forecasts, now to 2035, are for lower economic growth. We paint a generally less optimistic picture of the country’s prospects than we did 18 months ago.\nWe conclude that competition for resources within the ruling ANC fuels factional politics. Graft and corruption flourish as government expands its role in the economy in an effort to increase employment. Key state-owned companies are in disarray. Increasingly, chief executives – many without the necessary experience or qualifications – fall foul of the law, or another faction of the ANC.\nAfter an expensive golden handshake, a new executive is parachuted in with similar lack of experience but good political connections. The net effect is often the sustaining of a nebulous patronage network facilitated by efforts to grow black industrialists overnight.\nIn sharp contrast to the thorough and detailed impact reports on a variety of areas regularly issued by the presidency, little time is spent looking ahead. As a result, short-term political considerations lie at the heart of decision-making and the country’s growth is slow.\nOutlook for growth\nUnder the original Bafana Bafana scenario we had forecast an average growth of 4.1% to 2035. This was reasonable given the positive fundamentals of South Africa. In time, the investment made in education, health and poverty alleviation since 1994 accentuate South Africa’s substantial growth potential.\nWe have since revised this forecast down by 0.6 percentage points to 3.5%. Although this may seem a small difference, the power of compound interest means it is not. The downward revision means that the economy will be 10% smaller (equivalent to a difference of US$106 billion) than it would have been were the economy to grow an average 4.1% to 2035.\nIFs version 7.09 – The forecast assumes that the electricity shortage will affect multifactor productivity and includes updated data from the 2014 mid-year population estimates released by Statistics South Africa.\nThe lack of a dependable electricity supply will have a severe dampening effect on the South African economy for up to a decade. This means that the country is unlikely to escape from its middle-income trap in the near term.\nThe level of human, social and capital investment still needed after the end of apartheid will continue to limit investments in the knowledge base and other sources of improved productivity. However, in the long run, these investments made in social and human capital will have a positive impact on growth. This is a key reason for the relatively robust growth rates forecast to 2035 under all scenarios.\nYet, even under these rates of growth, South Africa is likely to grow more slowly than its potential, below the average rate forecast for upper middle-income countries and slower than the average for the rest of the Africa.\nThis would not be a new phenomenon. South Africa has grown more slowly than other upper middle-income countries for several decades, giving rise to high unemployment and poverty.\nJakkie Cilliers", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businessday.ng/analysis/article/why-south-africas-economy-is-likely-to-grow-more-slowly-than-its-potential/"}
{"doc_id": "86d0b14c2648f2f6d77b0deee028c384", "text": "Unlike other West African countries, Nigeria’s economic growth is projected to remain slow in 2024, according to the African Development...\nNigeria has asked its telecommunications firms to restrict access to the websites of cryptocurrency firms such as Binance, OctaFX, Coinbase...\nInflationary pressure, naira devaluation and salary reviews are expected to increase operating expenses of Nigerian deposit money banks, according to...\nPeter Obi, the candidate of the Labour Party in the last general elections, asked the federal government to stop the...\nA powerful software developed by the Commonwealth Secretariat is being deployed in Nigeria to transform how the country manages its...\nNigerian Breweries Plc, the country’s largest brewer, reported an after-tax loss of N106.3 billion in 2023, its first loss in...", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businessday.ng/amp/category/business-economy/"}
{"doc_id": "edd083926c074f0c25a9ca26f161c6bc", "text": "Sony will launch a new PSP in October with a high-resolution screen and a built-in microphone that enables it to be used as a telephone.\nSony will launch a new PlayStation Portable (PSP) in October with a high-resolution screen and a built-in microphone that enables it to be used as a telephone, the company said on Thursday.\nThe PSP-3000, which will be available in Japan, Asia, North America and Europe, has the same basic design of the current PSP Slim and Lite, and comes in three colours — black, white and silver.\nIt can be used to make telephone calls through the Skype service, which Sony added to PSPs already on the market earlier this year in an effort to broaden its appeal amid fierce competition with rival Nintendo.\nThe new PSP comes with a price tag of $199,99 in North America and €199 in Europe. The price for Asia has not yet been announced.\nSony aims to sell 15-million PSPs worldwide in the current fiscal year to March 2009.\n“Demand for the consoles is still strong, especially in the United States,” Sony Computer Entertainment spokesperson Yoko Sakaki said.\nSkype, which was bought by eBay in October of 2004, uses a peer-to-peer network to enable users to make free internet telephone calls to one another through their computers, or low-cost calls to standard telephones.\nSony also announced it will launch the Wireless Keypad, which can slot into Sixaxis and Dualshock 3 controllers for the PlayStation 3, in North America in late November, followed by Japan, Europe and Asia by the end of this year.\nUsers can use the keypad instead of the onscreen keyboard for text chat.\nSony is also launching a new version of the PlayStation 3 console with a 160-gigabyte hard drive in November in North America for $499,99, and in Europe from November 1 with a price tag of €499. — AFP", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://mg.co.za/article/2008-08-21-sony-to-launch-new-highresolution-psp/"}
{"doc_id": "60dd8aa3e854f334bdf8b5593908a23b", "text": "Recently, the GSM Association released a case study report they did on EcoCash this year. The case study focuses on EcoCash’s rapid uptake since launch in September 2011 with a look at how the company has managed to register 2.3 million Zimbabweans in under two years. It also looks at the strategy going forward as EcoCash evolves from just a money transfer service to a payments solution.\nThe report, titled “Big ambition meets effective execution: How EcoCash is altering Zimbabwe’s financial landscape“, also provides some new statistics not released before on what Econet spent to drive EcoCash usage, the new company’s (Econet Services that is) organisation structure, staffing & execution strategy, and other things.\nThe subscriber and usage numbers are an update from the last released by the company in May when it published its annual results. The number of subscribers for example, you will notice has increased by 200,000 from the 2.1 million announced then.\nHere are some main points from the report:\nSubscribers & the money\n- Econet has registered 31% percentage of Zimbabwe’s adults since launch. The number of registered subscribers outnumbers all of Zimbabwe’s bank accounts combined.\n- Over 1 million of these accounts are active and push US$200 million of volume over the EcoCash platform every month.\n- Remember those EcoCash people in the streets that would register you and have your airtime credited with a dollar? According to the report, they accounted for approximately 75% of EcoCash subscribers. As brand ambassadors, they were expected to bring in 25–30 subscribers per day.\n- Over 2 million dollars in airtime was spent as registration bonuses to new subscriber\n- Econet now has 4,000 EcoCash agents, and a subscriber:agent ratio of 250–600 active subscribers per agent.\n- Of the 5 integrated banks, EcoCash registers approximately 200 customers per bank each month. These bank customers transfer an average $145 a month between their bank accounts and EcoCash wallets.\n- EcoCash is now doing $200 million in monthly EcoCash transactions. When annualised this volume represents an amount equivalent to 22% of Zimbabwe’s GDP.\nThe strategy\n- EcoCash is paying out 80% of revenues in the form of agent commissions to build a strong and committed agent network.\n- Despite the large user numbers, senior management does not expect EcoCash to break even until three years after launch.\n- The domestic P2P business was purposefully designed with thin margins. EcoCash plans to recoup its investment from what it sees as a larger and more profitable ecosystem built around banks and retailers. The P2P transfers are therefore just a first step towards a much bigger goal: becoming the dominant payment system in Zimbabwe for the banked and unbanked alike.\n- Econet now looks to change the perception that EcoCash is just a P2P money transfer service and convince the market to see EcoCash as the main financial tool in their daily lives. Hence “Live life the EcoCash way”\nThe report has some very interesting information on the challenges Econet faces in its effort to make mobile phones the instinctive ‘cash’ that people reach for to make payments. Merchants, for example may question why they should pay a fee to accept a payment when they currently don’t with real cash. Econet’s task is therefore to show that it’s actually cheaper to pay a fee than to handle cash. Another challenge is that subscribers are not keeping money in their wallets which means that they have to deliberately load their wallets in order to have enough balance for retail payments. Living life the EcoCash way therefore means having money ready in the wallet to use for anything a person needs to buy.\nIn mentioning challenges and possible solutions, the are some things the report missed. The first is how EcoCash has been viewed as “too expensive” and how this has actually worked against its adoption. The typical response we get when we casually ask people why they didn’t use EcoCash to move money or make a payment, the response is almost always that EcoCash is too expensive. Even though Econet has moved to correct this by lowering fees, that tag is yet to go away.\nThe second challenge not mentioned is that EcoCash has had a less than friendly relationship on some occasions with some major banks in the country. This is noteworthy because the report says Econet recognizes that full interoperability with Zimbabwe’s banks is crucial to its success as there is significant money flow between banked and unbanked families.\nYou can download the full report here.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.techzim.co.zw/2013/07/the-ecocash-mobile-payments-strategy-and-numbers-a-case-study-by-gsma/"}
{"doc_id": "b0a4e57d3d3971fca3221680fce91c15", "text": "Developing and managing the mineral wealth of Zimbabwe for tomorrow\nAfrican countries, mineral exploration and production constitute significant parts of their economies and remain keys to economic growth.\nThe continent is richly endowed with mineral reserves and ranks first or second in quantity of world reserves of bauxite, cobalt, industrial diamond, phosphate rock, platinum-group metals (PGM), vermiculite, and zirconium. Gold mining is Africa’s main mining resource.\nHowever, in spite of this rich mineralisation African countries are still wallowing in poverty. The primary problem has been the racist and colonial natural resource laws in Africa which empower the investor at the expense of the citizenry who are the bona fide owners of the resource.\nBased on this flawed framework most of the mining deals and activities on the continent have been opaque and detrimental to Africans. Corruption by both public sector and private sector players has compounded the malaise. Secondly, mining in Africa has been largely extractive without beneficiation or value addition.\nThis has led to African countries exporting cheaply priced raw commodities, while importing expensive refined products. The lack of meaningful benefits to African people from their natural resources is a key part of what is currently being described as leakage of resources from the continent.\nAfrican leaders and industrialists need to make a lot more noise about the leakage of money from the continent. Plugging the leaks is one of the major ways of keeping Africa’s growth steady. If this is addressed we will have enough resources on the continent. We will have sufficient investable capital from the continent. This will smash the current unsustainable overdependence on foreign aid and foreign direct investment.\nIntra Africa investment and investment outflows from the continent into the rest of the world will become practical propositions.\nAfrican governments and societies must harness the opportunities created by natural resources effectively. They must ensure the huge opportunities for economic development and prosperity provided by resource discoveries and commodity booms will never again be missed. Some of the poorest countries in Arica have large amounts of natural resources and these can provide a pathway out of poverty.\nYet in the past, these opportunities have often been missed, and resource abundant countries have consequently remained poor. Natural resources have the potential to be transformative if they are properly harnessed for development.\nHowever, the decision chain from the discovery of natural assets through to their conversion into a productive economy is long and complex. This is why the process has so often been unsuccessful on the African Continent. Africa is too rich to be poor.\nIt is within this continental context that we assess Zimbabwe’s mineral strength and how it can be leveraged to improve the quality of our people’s lives. The recent work of Paul Jordan and ZEPARU has been instructive in identifying the key policy issues with respect to the mining sector in Zimbabwe, in particular around geological and mineralization issues.\nTheir research findings must inform and lay foundation to discussions in the Chamber of Mines. Zimbabwe has a rich and diverse minerals resource base that should be an important contributor to sustainable growth and development. The sector has rebounded dramatically from the hyperinflation economic crisis and with dollarisation the value of mineral production has increased six-fold to about $3 billion in 2011.\nHowever, if this increased mining activity is to ultimately result in more than just holes-in-the-ground, the crucial mineral linkages need to be realized while the resources are still extant.\nZimbabwe has an extensive mineral value proposition. These mineral assets are mainly found in the following geological formations and bodies: The Greenstone Belts: Gold and silver, as well as considerable resources of iron ore, nickel, copper, cobalt and podiform chromite, also chrysotile asbestos (Mashaba Igneous Complex), limestone, pyrite and antimony; The Great Dyke: PGMs5 & Au with associated copper, nickel and cobalt. Also, chromium (chromite seams), as well as minor asbestos and magnesite; The Magondi Super group: Copper and silver (Dewera Group); The Karoo Basins: Considerable bituminous coal, coking coal, anthracite and coal-bed methane (CBM) resources; The Carbonatite Igneous Complexes:, phosphate (Dorowa, Showa); Kimberlite pipes: diamonds (Murowa, River Ranch); Pegmatites: Lithium minerals, columbite-tantalite, cassiterite, et al; Recent alluvial & placer deposits: Gold and diamonds (from Umkondo conglomerates).\nPaul Jordan and his colleagues have emphasized that in order to optimise the economic linkages the current “colonial” minerals governance regime of “free mining” needs to be fundamentally overhauled to both encourage the discovery of new mineral deposits and to maximise the developmental impact of known mineral assets through public tender against developmental outcomes.\nIn this regard a Mineral Cadastre Information Management System (MCIMS) being developed by the Ministry needs to be operationalised quickly. The current historically high mineral prices fuelled by strong Asian appetite are likely to continue for the next couple of decades, so long as the major Chinese and Indian economies continue to display robust growth. Zimbabwe needs to take advantage of this window of opportunity to use its finite mineral resources endowment to catalyse wider national economic growth and development through the maximisation of the key economic linkages.\nZimbabwe’s mining sector has continued to be the lead in economic performance, contributing an estimated 16 percent to GDP in 2012, up from 13 percent in 2011. The sector also continued to lead in export earnings, rising to USD2 billion in 2012, from USD1.8 billion in 2011.\nThe major drivers of this growth in export earnings were diamonds, platinum and gold. Overall, mineral production maintained its upward trend, meeting most Medium Term Plan (MTP) projections for 2012. This year, 2013, looks no different, assuming the current momentum is maintained.\nMilitating against higher growth rates, however, is the unavailability of medium to long term credit facilities for working capital and recapitalization requirements as well as perennial power shortages.\nThese enablers, if they remain unresolved, will continue to be major impediments to potential growth targets. Being number six in the world in terms diamond resource (potential control of about 25 percent of world diamonds), having 90 percent of world platinum between us and SA, and having extensive Gold deposits, Zimbabwe has massive natural resource potential. In fact, in terms of what is called the natural resource per capita we are number one in the world. So, why are we poor? Why are we hungry?\nThis 74th AGM of the Chamber is fortuitous as it occurs while we are currently fashioning a new mining policy framework leading to new Mines and Minerals Act. This policy seeks to ensure the sustainable development of the mining industry and its contribution to the economy.\nThe current Mines and Minerals Act is clearly now an archaic piece of legislation which is in dire need of upgrading to bring it up to date with modern trends in the global mining industry and the country’s current and future aspirations. More specifically and accurately the current Act is a colonial law that empowers the investor at the expense of national interest.\nThe Government is working on having this Act repealed in its entirety and have it replaced by a totally new Mines and Minerals Act that caters for the dynamic modern day needs of the sector, while resolving historical institutional injustices.\nMining in itself is clearly not sustainable, as it depletes finite national assets. However, mineral extraction can indirectly become sustainable in so far as it catalyses sustainable economic activity in other, sustainable, sectors, through maximising the economic linkages while the resource is still in existence.\nStrategies to develop these complex and diverse linkages are therefore key elements of the new mining policy. Mining proceeds must be used to develop secondary industries linked to the minerals, and other industries not linked to mining at all. Schools, hospitals, roads and community housing must also be spear headed by mining activities. This way, when the mineral resource is exhausted the Zimbabwean economy and its communities can continue to flourish.\nIn redesigning the mining policy and laws in Zimbabwe we seek to achieve sustainable exploration, extraction, utilization, management, marketing and beneficiation of minerals.\nThe objective is to understand the status quo, and then fashion a framework for developing and managing the mineral wealth of Zimbabwe for posterity. The foundational objective is to ensure sustainable, shared and inclusive economic development of the country. A key reform of the mining laws is that the right to mine should be linked to payment for the value of the un-mined asset.\nAs the State we must know the value of each mineral claim. This requires comprehensive knowledge of our geology and mineralization. Quantification and valuation of the un-mined asset should be done before engaging investors. New technologies such aero-magnetics, big data, and cloud computing must be deployed. The state must invest massive resources in exploration\nThe difference between working capital and equity capital must be understood and factored in all mining deals. The value of the un-mined asset is the country’s contribution to equity and the investor must acknowledge and match this. The investor’s contribution to equity must not be confused with working capital they deploy. Working capital must be separate and in addition to contribution to equity capital.\nThe situation where the value of the un-mined asset is not reflected on the balance sheets of corporates is not acceptable. Unmined assets have value and can be leveraged. How can mining claims have no value, and yet corporates list them on foreign stock exchanges and raise billions? In some cases the investor goes on to sell the claims (they got for free) to other investors for tonnes of cash. Moreover, when claims (green fields) are handed back to government serious cash is demanded.\nHow is this possible if claims have no value or their value is said be difficult to determine? Discovery of a mineral resource should not mean ownership. In fact once a country has established its geology and mineralisation, the claims can be auctioned.\nThe management of natural assets can be improved within a given political system by both domestic and international actions. In setting the tax and royalty rates, the government faces an internal agency problem. The government must delegate the negotiation to a small group of its members and resource extraction companies have a strong incentive to bribe these individuals.\nTo protect itself the government needs to adopt a process that is transparent. Secret negotiations are ideally suited to corruption. The agency problem is compounded by an information problem.\n(To be continued)\nThe writer Professor Arthur G.O. Mutambara is Deputy Prime Minister of Zimbabwe.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.herald.co.zw/developing-and-managing-the-mineral-wealth-of-zimbabwe-for-tomorrow/"}
{"doc_id": "9a4fce0fb734b6a25153bc5d72f6fe9a", "text": "Gaia Fund Managers on Tuesday announced the launch of South Africa’s first specialist real estate investment trust (REIT) investing in on-site private electricity generation for commercial and industrial clients.\nIn a first round of fund-raising, Gaia Renewables REIT said it aimed to attract R500 million from institutional investors, high-net-worth individuals and family offices.\nIn terms of the structure, Gaia Renewables REIT will issue batches of preference shares, aimed to be listed on the Cape Town Stock Exchange. The REIT would fund the on-site solar power projects. The first batch of preference shares – which will be listed after the current fund-raising round – targets a listing in June.\n“The fund will allow investors to benefit directly from solving South Africa’s 10 000MW electricity deficit,” a statement from Gaia Fund Managers said.\n“Factories, mines and other businesses need electricity to operate,” said Renier de Wit, the managing director of Gaia Fund Managers.\n“Currently, electricity supply is unreliable, and it does not look like it will improve; it is only going to get worse. We have seen the impact of rolling blackouts on South Africa’s GDP (gross domestic product) in the fourth quarter of 2022: it shrank by 1.3%.”\nIt said the cost of installing solar power and energy storage solutions could be prohibitive to many businesses. This conundrum presented a unique opportunity to provide businesses with a renewable energy power solution owned by a third party, with predictable cash outflows over the medium term.\n“They will have certainty of supply and maintenance of the solar system while assured they can, well ahead of time, budget their electricity expenses,” said De Wit.\nGaia Renewables REIT was partnering with Blue Energy Africa, an on-site developer of clean energy solutions for commercial and industrial clients.\nGaia said it had raised and deployed more than R3.5 billion over 12 renewable energy transactions since 2012, showcasing its ability and track record of swiftly deploying investors’ capital to earn good, consistent and inflation-beating returns.\nWhereas large utility-scale renewable energy projects could take up to two years to construct and, thereafter, only offer a return to investors, Gaia said on-site solar power solutions were built within a few months, with investors likely to receive their first distributions within 12 months.\n“This is an attractive proposition to investors as the lead time to receive inflation-beating returns is far shorter than with large utility-scale power projects,” said De Wit.\n“The on-site solar power projects give investors a predictable period of cash flows as electricity off-takers (commercial and industrial clients) sign multiyear power purchase agreements with the developer. In terms of these 10- to 20-year agreements, the off-take price of electricity typically increases by a fraction of the inflation rate,” Gaia said.\nDe Wit said: “It’s a defensive asset with a stable and predictable cash flow profile. It is an attractive proposition for those investors with a long-term investment horizon who seek capital preservation.”\nBUSINESS REPORT", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/companies/gaia-launches-first-specialist-reit-investing-in-on-site-solar-power-solutions-for-businesses-2040daaf-dfcb-4802-8478-299288917818"}
{"doc_id": "f5f8b608991bd8805c8881405d1935f0", "text": "If you’re financially savvy, you’re not only investing for the long term, but you’re also making the most of the government’s tax breaks while doing so. As you no doubt know, you can claim a deduction on contributions to retirement funds of up to 27.5 percent (capped at R350 000 a year) of your income. And you can save on tax on interest income, dividends tax and capital gains tax (CGT) by investing in a tax-free savings account.\nBut there’s another type of investment that allows you to reduce your tax bill – and, in this case, the deduction you can claim is the full amount you invest, regardless of how much it is. Section 12J investments, as they are known, are becoming popular among high-net-worth investors who want to pay less tax and earn a reasonable return.\nSection 12J was introduced into the Income Tax Act in July 2009 to provide individuals, companies and trusts with a tax incentive to invest in venture capital companies (VCCs), which fund small and medium-sized enterprises that are believed to have long-term growth potential in economic sectors that are often hard-pressed for financing. The aim was to encourage investors to participate in the capitalisation of these businesses, which will stimulate economic growth and create jobs.\nSection 12J flew under the radar of most investors until 2014, when amendments made the tax deduction permanent if the investor holds the shares issued by a VCC for at least five years.\nRealistically, most people cannot make use of this tax break, because VCCs require a minimum investment of at least R100 000 – more often R500 000. Therefore, the likely investor is someone in the top marginal tax bracket of 45 percent (a taxable income of R1.5 million or more a year) who wants to reduce his or her taxable income after making full use of his or her retirement fund and tax-free savings account deductions.\nInvestors must also be in a position to tie up their money for at least five years. If they sell their shares before then, they have to pay back the deduction.\nAlthough the tax deduction makes for a compelling investment case, you should never invest in a product because of the tax benefits alone. “The tax benefit should be the bonus, not the main reason for investing,” says Wouter Fourie, the managing director of Ascor Independent Wealth Managers and the 2015/16 Financial Planner of the Year.\nMalcolm Segal, the non-executive chairperson of Grovest, a VCC, agrees: “The underlying investments must work; section 12J should not just be about the tax sweetener.”\nA closer look at the tax break\nYou benefit from the full tax deduction upfront in the tax year in which you make the investment. However, the tax break applies to your upfront investment only. You will pay dividend withholding tax if any dividends are paid out to you and you will be liable for CGT on the capital gains realised when you sell your shares in a VCC.\nNote that, because you receive a 100-percent deduction when you buy the VCC shares, the base cost of your shares will be nil. The base cost of an asset provides investors with a “tax shield” that reduces the amount of the capital gain that is subject to tax, but this shield does not apply with a section 12J investment. If you’re on the top marginal rate of 45 percent, you will pay CGT at an effective rate of 18 percent on your capital gain if you sell your shares after five years. This is something you need to bear in mind when assessing the targeted return on offer.\nThe upfront tax deduction has some qualifications:\nYou cannot claim the tax deduction if you are a “connected person” when, or immediately after, you buy shares in the VCC. In the case of a natural person, this means you cannot own more than 20 percent of the shares in a VCC. Note that VCC shares bought by your relatives, within the third degree of consanguinity, are taken into account when determining whether or not you are a “connected person”, as are shares bought by someone related to your spouse, within the third degree of consanguinity.\nIf you take out a loan to buy shares in a VCC, the deduction is limited to the amount you actually transfer to the VCC, not the total loan amount. For example, if a bank lends you R1m to buy shares in a VCC, but you invest only R500 000, the deduction is limited to R500 000. Furthermore, if you use gearing, the legislation requires that you are genuinely at risk for the investment. This means you cannot use only your VCC shares as security for the loan, but must put up some form of personal surety. You will also not be regarded as at risk if the loan does not have to be repaid within five years.\nAs the legislation currently stands, the tax concession will end on June 30, 2021. In other words, you will be entitled to the upfront tax relief as long as you invest in a section 12J VCC before or on that date.\nVenture capital companies\nSection 12J has spawned a flourishing VCC sector. Segal estimates that there were more than 100 section 12J VCCs registered in February this year, compared with 70 at the end of September 2017. However, many of the registered companies are dormant.\nSegal says VCCs had assets under management of about R3.8 billion in February this year, which is a big jump from the R1.8bn in February last year.\nThe gamut of VCCs ranges from small operations – basically “investment clubs” – to large asset management companies. Some of the big players are Westbrooke Alternative Asset Management, which manages about half of all section 12J investments in South Africa, Anuva Investments, Fairtree Capital and Grovest.\nA section 12J-compliant VCC brings together investors and companies that qualify to be capitalised in terms of section 12J (see below). The VCC will issue shares and provide investors with share certificates and a tax certificate, which entitles them to claim a tax deduction on the expenditure incurred to acquire these shares. The VCC will, in turn, invest in qualifying companies, which will issue shares to the VCC.\nVCCs are subject to strict regulation, to protect investors. They must have a Category Two licence with the Financial Services Board (FSB) and be registered with the South African Revenue Service (Sars). This means they are recognised by the FSB as being competent to make discretionary investment decisions. VCCs are required to keep records of all their investors and the entities in which they invest, and they must submit these records to Sars twice a year.\nAlthough it is not mandatory, it is advisable that you deal only with VCCs that belong to the South African Venture Capital and Private Equity Association.\nThe legislation prescribes how VCCs must invest, namely:\n- Three years from the date on which a VCC first issues shares, at least 80 percent of the VCC’s expenditure must be used to acquire shares in qualifying companies whose book value immediately after the investment is less than R50m, or R500m in the case of junior mining companies;\n- A VCC cannot invest more than 20 percent of the funds it raises from investors in a single company;\n- A VCC cannot acquire more than 69.9 percent of the shares in a qualifying company; and\n- A VCC’s investment into qualifying companies must be of a pure equity nature.\nFourie says you should be able to answer the following questions before you commit your money:\n- Have you done a thorough due diligence on the VCC’s management? Look at their qualifications and track record.\n- Does the VCC have compliance systems in place? Find out whether the company is subject to an external audit, and who its legal and tax advisers are. Does the company have a third-party compliance officer?\n- Does the investment team have experience and a proven track record in the area of private equity or unlisted investments?\n- What type of businesses does the VCC invest in?\n- How does the VCC select qualifying companies, and what due diligence does it undertake to assess the risk associated with these companies?\n- Does the VCC have a convincing and properly articulated investment philosophy?\n- Does the VCC have a disciplined, methodical and repeatable investment process?\n- What are the VCC’s risk-management policies, and are they adequate?\n- How are the asset managers remunerated – is it fair and aligned with the investors’ objectives?\n- Do the asset managers have “skin in the game” – do they believe enough in what they are selling that they are willing to invest their own money?\nQualifying companies\nVCCs use the money raised from investors to finance small and medium-sized businesses that have long-term growth potential. Businesses must meet certain criteria to qualify for section 12J financing:\nThe business must be a company.\nIt must be resident in South Africa.\nIt cannot be a controlled company in relation to a group of companies.\nThe company’s tax affairs must be in order with Sars. (Note that no special tax rules apply to qualifying companies.)\nIn any tax year, the total investment income derived by the company cannot exceed 20 percent of its gross income.\nThe company must be unlisted, except if it is a junior miner, which can be listed on Alt-X.\nA qualifying company cannot be engaged in any of the following activities:\n- Trade carried on in respect of immovable property, except the hospitality sector (including bed-and-breakfast establishments);\n- Financial services, such as banking, long and short-term insurance, money lending and hire-purchase funding;\n- Advisory services, including legal services, stock-broking, management consulting services, and tax advisory services, or auditing or accounting services;\n- Gambling and casinos;\n- The manufacturing, buying or selling of liquor, tobacco, firearms or ammunition; and\n- Trade that is carried on mainly outside South Africa.\nExcluding the activities listed above, qualifying companies operate in all sectors of the economy. VCCs tend to favour companies that, by capitalising on socio-economic and technological trends in South Africa, have the potential to generate significant returns in future. Therefore, it is common to find section 12J VCCs investing in companies seeking to take advantage of the “green economy”, digital technology, student accommodation, franchising and tourism.\nReturns\nYou receive an immediate “return” of 45 percent (in the case of an individual on the top marginal rate, or a trust) or 28 percent (in the case of a company) on the money you invest, but this is thanks to the built-in tax deduction. What you really want to know is the return you could earn on your net investment, bearing in mind that you could tie up your money for five years in another asset class, probably with lower risk than a section 12J investment.\nWhen a VCC quotes returns, you must clarify whether these are net of fees and tax, and include or exclude the tax deduction.\nFourie says that, when evaluating the returns on offer, the adage that applies to any other investment holds true: if it sounds too good to be true, it probably is.\nAs a guideline, he says, your starting point should be a return of inflation plus five percent after costs, excluding the benefit of the tax deduction. “This would be a very realistic target and achievable if you invested in a listed company. Higher returns will compensate you for the extra risk associated with investing in a VCC, and can be evaluated only by understanding the business in which you are investing.”\nThree examples of the returns on offer:\n- Anuva, which has been operating since 2015. Its internal rate of return (IRR), excluding the tax break and net of costs, was 26 percent at the end of February 2017. In other words, R1m invested in February 2015 would have grown to R1.594m in February last year. In terms of dividends, in 2016 the yield (net of costs) was 26 percent; in 2017, eight percent; and in the year to February 2018, eight percent.\n- METTA Capital launched its Moderate Risk Fund earlier this year. This fund of funds consists of eight section 12J investments. The fund targets a net IRR of 16 percent, while the average dividend yield (net of costs) is five to eight percent a year.\n- Westbrooke, which launched its first section 12J fund in 2016, targets an IRR of 16 to 18 percent after fees and taxes. The dividend yield depends on the underlying investment. Westbrooke ARIA, a portfolio of asset-backed rental businesses, targets an average annual yield of six percent based on the gross investment. Its STAC investment strategy, a portfolio of student accommodation operators, targets an annual average yield of five to six percent.\nNote: A VCC’s IRR is the compounded rate of return on the investments, based on the investor’s risk capital and paid dividends.\nFees\nFees associated with a section 12J investment can include:\nA once-off upfront, or capital-raising, fee. Anuva, for example, charges an upfront fee of two percent and METTA charges 1.6 percent. Westbrooke does not charge an upfront fee.\nAn annual fee. Anuva charges two percent; METTA charges 1.86 percent, plus a platform fee of 0.5 percent a year; Westbrooke charges two percent.\nA performance fee. Anuva charges 20 percent of the dividends declared; METTA charges an average of 20 percent of the dividends declared; Westbrooke charges 20 percent of any amount returned to the investor above the net capital invested (that is, gross investment less the tax deduction) plus a performance hurdle (which is the 12-month JIBAR for the ARIA portfolio and the Consumer Price Index for the STAC strategy).\nAn exit fee. None of the abovementioned companies charges this fee.\nWhat happens after five years?\nWhat happens if you want to sell your shares once the five years are up? Qualifying companies are often illiquid, private equity-style investments, and, unlike with listed equity investments, there is no ready-made secondary market for VCC shares. Note, too, that buyers of second-hand VCC shares do not qualify for the tax break.\nYou need to establish whether the VCC has an exit mechanism or a strategy to create liquidity at the end of the five-year period. The VCC’s investment offer should include a commitment to realise the underlying investments after five years and return your original capital within a certain period.\nThe realisation strategies could include:\n- Listing the qualifying company on the Alt-X;\n- In the case of a property portfolio, converting it to real estate investment trust and listing it;\n- Disposing of the qualifying company; and/or\n- Disposing of the qualifying company’s assets.\nMitigating the risks\nFourie says potential investors should be knowledgeable enough to understand the potential rewards and risk of a VCC’s underlying investments. Venture capital, by definition, is capital invested in projects in which there is a substantial element of risk.\nHe says you should seek input from an independent financial adviser who can advise you on whether a particular section 12J investment is suitable for your investment portfolio.\nWestbrooke says there can be significant differences in the nature of the underlying investments of the various VCCs, as well as the strategies that their investment managers employ. “You should therefore invest in a section 12J company that has a clearly defined investment risk strategy and approach that supports your risk appetite relative to the investment return profile.”\nInvestors seeking a lower-risk profile should invest in VCCs whose investment strategies are focused on capital preservation. “These strategies can, for example, include asset-backed investments and investments with predicable revenue streams,” Westbrooke says.\nSome investors may find five years a long time to wait for a return of capital. “You could opt for an investment in a VCC that aims to provide an annual or semi-annual dividend throughout the investment period. Investors should assess the VCC’s investment thesis to ensure the underlying investments generate predictable ongoing cash returns. This is to ensure that the target dividend strategy is supported,” Westbrooke says.\nFourie says Sars or the FSB can withdraw a VCC’s section 12J status if it does not comply with all the legislated requirements. If this happens, you may have to pay back the tax recoupment.\n“The last thing you want is to find out that the section 12J company in which you have invested loses its section 12J status due to regulatory non-compliance,” says Westbrooke. It says you can mitigate this risk by asking the VCC whether it has applied for and obtained a positive Sars ruling for its investment strategies, what tax opinions it has obtained, who its tax advisers are, and the system it has implemented to monitor the tax-related compliance risk.\nThe future\nIn the Budget Review published in February, National Treasury noted that there has been significant growth in section 12J investments over the past two years. It said the legislation would be amended to encourage further uptake of these investments. Although the exact nature of the amendments is not yet known, Treasury’s comments have been taken as a positive sign that the section 12J regime will be extended beyond June 2021.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/personal-finance/investments/section-12j-the-investment-with-a-100-tax-break-18478029"}
{"doc_id": "c3ca932de02f8bb2462abeabbea4f2e6", "text": "Agusto & Co has assigned an “A+†rating to Zenith General Insurance Company Limited.\nThat was the first time the pan-African rating agency would be rating the insurer.\nAccording to a statement by Agusto & Co. yesterday, the rating assigned to Zenith General Insurance Company Limited was reflective of an insurer with good financial condition and strong capacity to meet its obligations as and when they fall due.\n“Zenith General Insurance Company Limited’s financial condition is underpinned by good profitability jointly supported by its core insurance business and strong investment income. “This is in addition to good capitalisation, moderate exposure to risk and a good liquidity profile. Furthermore, an experienced management team drives the processes adopted by the Insurer in its 48th year of operations.\n“The rating is however constrained by claims and operating expenses impacting operating cash flow, as well as overall adverse macroeconomic headwinds which continue to impact business activity in Nigeria, even as the country recovers from recession,†it stated.\nThe Nigerian insurance industry has grappled with rising claims typical of difficult economic periods.\nThis was alongside moderated premium generation as a result of subdued business activity.\nAs analysed in Agusto. & Co.’s 2018 insurance industry report released recently, profitability for insurers is a delicate balancing act between premium generation, astute pricing that is commensurate to risk carried, and strong investment management abilities yielding maximum returns whilst safeguarding policy holders and shareholders’ funds.\nThe industry’s growth potential also lies in the ability to innovatively harness retail opportunities (with life, health, motor, general accident and property/belongings insurance products).\nProfitability indicators, underwriting profit margin and return on average equity for the industry as a whole, hovered around 16.8 per cent and 9.9 per cent respectively, for the 2017 financial year.\nWith 14 life insurers, 28 general insurers, 13 composite insurers, two dedicated takaful insurers, and two re-insurers operating in the Nigerian market, the ability to demonstrate sound financial condition is instrumental to acquiring and retaining business, as well as attracting investments.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2018/07/19/agusto-co-assigns-zenith-insurance-a-rating"}
{"doc_id": "17827822d01ede364e89f1f269ff56fe", "text": "When President Mwai Kibaki assented to the Public Private Partnership (PPP) Act in January 2013, Kenyans expected to see a thriving pipeline of privately financed public projects within no time.\nEight years down the road, many would-be projects remain a mirage, although to its credit the government has finally lined up a couple of mega projects in the roads sector.\nConstruction has started on the 27-kilometre, Sh60 billion Nairobi Expressway, which will run from Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA) to the James Gichuru junction on Waiyaki Way.\nIn October this year, work will also begin on the 175-kilometre, Sh180 billion Rironi-Nakuru-Mau Summit highway, which is being expanded to cater for increased traffic along the busy corridor.\nThe Kenya Rural Roads Authority (KeRRA) has also used the PPP model, under the road annuity programme, to construct the 91-kilometre Ngong-Kiserian-Isinya to Mashuru-Isara road.\nDuring the public participation hearings for the 2021 budget, a proposal was raised to consider using the PPP model for the construction of stadia, which remain a key promise of the Jubilee government that it is now racing to fulfil less than two years to the end of President Uhuru Kenyatta’s term.\nThe Treasury said in the 2021 Budget Policy Statement released last month that its PPP unit would consider this proposal.\nThese ongoing and planned projects, according to experts, are however only a fraction of what could have been achieved in PPP project financing if Kenya had put more emphasis on this line of financing.\nThe country has had some shortcomings—regulatory, policy and capacity issues— that have prevented it from exploiting the huge pile of capital looking to finance public projects in Africa, according to Johnson Mwawasi, the chief executive officer of Kenyan project finance advisory firm Lean Africa Consultants Limited.\nFor instance, the regulations allowing private companies to collect toll levies on Kenyan roads were only passed last year, meaning that any company which would have wished to do a PPP road prior to that would have faced a regulatory hurdle when recouping its funds.\n“Kenya has wasted a lot of time. The World Bank and other organisations have spent a lot of money to build capacity and improve the regulatory framework around PPPs since we started this in 2009 and introduced some policies…fast forward 11 years we only have two projects and another that might start later this year,” said Mr Mwawasi.\nHe also highlighted the lack of clear dissemination of information to the public, who are eventually going to foot the bill for the PPP projects either through regular direct payments such as road tolls, or in their taxes through the exchequer.\n“There is information asymmetry. Our regulatory framework does not provide for a very robust disclosure framework, so a lot of information about the projects is not availed to the public,” he said.\n“For example, we got to know the rates they are going to charge on the Nairobi Expressway just the other day. What if they finish the project and then find that the public cannot afford to pay the rates being charged? That brings problems to the whole project.”\nThe lack of competence in handling PPP deals is also a drawback to the speedy implementation of potential projects, according to Mr David Wright, a director at British firm PPP Solutions, which offers advisory services for such projects across the world.\n“Looking from the outside, competence is a challenge, either from the procuring authority and also in the local participants, whether they be contracting companies, engineering companies, law firms or advisory firms, because they haven’t done such projects before.\nThere is a lot of money sitting in development banks to support PPP projects in sub-Saharan Africa, but hardly any projects because of lack of competence in putting together the right kind of project and selecting the right proposal,” said Mr Wright\nThe solution, he added, is for the government to look at PPP as an opportunity rather than a problem, and approach it as a genuine alternative avenue for funding public projects.\nEconomists and commentators have also differed on whether the current model of sourcing the PPP projects is giving Kenyans value for money.\nThe two big projects in the roads sector have each had a different approach to sourcing private sector partners.\nIn the case of the Nairobi Expressway, the project was a result of privately initiated proposal where only one firm was in the running, while the Nairobi-Nakuru highway had several consortiums that were competing to win the tender.\nAlthough competitive bidding might have led to better cost discovery for the project, the speed at which the Expressway is being constructed—it will be completed by the end of the year—suggests that the approach used for the project may be the right one, considering Kenya’s track record with public projects.\nOn the other hand, the losing consortium in the Nairobi-Nakuru road wasted no time lodging a complaint with the Public Private Partnership Petition Committee, continuing a trend where losers in project bidding drag their grievances through time consuming litigation.\n“It is hard to conclude that we got a raw deal with the Expressway because we needed a solution to the traffic problem on this road. If we went the solicited way, I don’t think we would have made any progress so far, so maybe this was the only way for us to get it done,” said Mr Mwawasi.\n“We could have done it better though, and ensure the rates charged are reasonable to encourage use and pass the message to the public so that in future projects we have more and more buy in from the public and private sector.”\nHe added that Kenya’s credit profile also meant that it would have been difficult to convince financiers to jump at the project.\nTo a great extent, Kenya’s renewed faith in the PPP model has been driven by the harsh realities of the country’s public finances.\nIn the last seven years, the government has borrowed heavily to invest in infrastructure, driving up public debt more than four times from Sh1.77 trillion in February 2013 to Sh7.28 trillion in December 2020.\nThis sharp growth in public debt, which is now up to 65 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), has limited the financing options for further infrastructure investment.\nKenya is already turning away from external commercial loans due to cost concerns, while huge domestic maturities have also meant that a large share of domestic borrowing is going towards repayment or rolling over of old debt.\nThe Covid-19 pandemic has made things worse, hurting tax revenue performance due to job losses and business closures.\nThis hit on the exchequer has widened the fiscal deficit, which the Treasury now expects will stand at nine percent of GDP by end of the current fiscal year, nearly double the projection of 4.9 percent that was contained in the 2020 budget statement.\nWith limited options therefore, the government has had to get creative, paving the way for the entry of PPP financed projects.\nOverall, the Treasury is betting on the PPP model to finance up to 80 projects valued Sh1.1 trillion, cutting across diverse sectors of the economy with the bulk in transport and infrastructure, energy, health and education.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/data-hub/treasury-bets-ties-to-deliver-sh1trn-projects-3286852"}
{"doc_id": "b8ce7424cfaaa1f83a474b846c2e8048", "text": "Brainworks withdraws $20m Telecel offer . . . as Zhuwao calls for the unbundling of Empowerment Corporation\nHappiness Zengeni and Conrad Mwanawashe—\nBrainworks Capital Management has withdrawn the offer that it had made to Empowerment Corporation to purchase its 40 percent shareholding in Telecel Zimbabwe due to protracted shareholder wrangles which have not provided a clear decision on the transaction. Brainworks had sought to acquire the\nThe transaction was affected by an urgent court application with respect to the sale of the Telecel shares, dispute in terms of the valuation of the company and the authority of certain shareholders representatives, chief among them business persons Mr James Makamba and Mrs Jane Mutasa.\nThe EC shareholder disputes originate from the various reorganisations the company went through during the formative years dating back to 1998.\nThe withdrawal also comes at a time the mobile telecoms company is facing imminent closure over its failure to pay for an operating licence as stated under the Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe Act. In addition Telecel Zimbabwe is practically bankrupt with no ability to meet its short term and long term liabilities.\nIn a letter dated March 19, 2015 to EC’s company secretary, which The Herald Business is in possession of, Brainworks said it had become subject of court processes and a sustained public onslaught on its business.\nAs a result of the disputes, EC had to date not responded to the offer with various parties making conflicting statements both in private and the media. This is in spite of a resolution once reported by this paper that shareholders had given their unconditional approval to the sale of shares to Brainworks.\nIt has, however, emerged that after the February 27 resolution, which agreed to the transaction, two of the main EC shareholders Mr Makamba representing Kestrel Corporation and Mrs Mutasa who stands for the Indigenous Business Women’s Organisation had held a secret meeting at the Saxon Hotel in Sandton South Africa. Lawyer Gerald Mlotshwa and EC company secretary Carlton Chikosi also attended the meeting.\nThe meeting resolved that it would dispose of the shareholding as at least two of the shareholders of the company having a majority in value of the company’s issued and paid up shares shall agree. The two agreed that they would now accept bids for the stake which should be submitted within seven days from March 10.\nHowever, Brainworks in the letter said it was surprised that it was now being invited to a bidding process when the process had initially been guided by the offer which had been submitted to EC, the terms of which had not been fulfilled.\nPursuant to that EC managing director Mr Patrick Zhuwao called for the unbundling of the investment vehicle as the best way of resolving the shareholder disputes.\n“In light of the criminal act and in the process of exercising my fiduciary responsibility of protecting the Empowerment Corporation and its shareholders, I’m left with no option but to recommend that the beneficial shareholders of Telecel Zimbabwe hold their interest directly without having to go through Mr (James) Makamba and Mrs (Jane) Mutasa who have persistently and consistently failed to distinguish their individual persona from their fiduciary persona as directors who are legally required to uphold the interest of the company and all shareholders.\n“This is primarily why Telecel Zimbabwe is found to be in a negative equity position as compared to Econet’s net asset value of $700 million.\n“The case of EC reflects a classic case of the failure of corporate governance such that the continued existence of EC as an entity is prejudicial and detrimental to the interests of the shareholders who include ware veterans, farmers, small scale miners and indigenous businesswomen.\nIt is unfortunate that Mr Makamba and Mrs Mutasa are so personally conflicted in the pursuit of their private interests that the failed to protect and safeguard the interests of shareholders,” said Mr Zhuwao.\nIf the EC is unbundled the shareholding structure will see Kestrel Corporation holing 8,57 percent, Independent Engineering group 5,71 percent, Affirmative Action Group 5,14 percent, Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association 5,14 percent, National Miners Association 5,14 percent, Indigenous Business Women’s Organisation 5,14 percent and Zimbabwe Farmers Union 5,14 percent.\nMr Zhuwao said pressure groups empowered by Government should have access to the opportunity given to them directly without having to access it through Mr Makamba and Mrs Mutasa.\nZFU represents more 1,5 million farmers.\n“The pressure groups will have direct benefit of 25,7 percent which is enough to represent a significant say in the operations of any company,” said Mr Zhuwao.\nWhen contacted for comment Brainworks CEO George Manyere said the discontinuance of negotiations with EC does not otherwise affect the company’s view of the opportunity in the telecoms sector.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.herald.co.zw/brainworks-withdraws-20m-telecel-offer-as-zhuwao-calls-for-the-unbundling-of-empowerment-corporation/"}
{"doc_id": "8c9fd71495848f7762c0cdb8147459a4", "text": "Ratings agency Standard & Poor’s has warned that any deviation from the South African fiscal policy under new finance minister David van Rooyen could lead to a credit downgrade.\nLast week, ratings agencies downgraded South Africa’s credit status to one notch above “junk” with little hope that the country will pick itself out of an economic slump.\nOn Friday (4 November) ratings firm Fitch downgraded SA’s credit rating by one notch to BBB-, the lowest investment grade. This was due to a slowing economy and rising debt, it said.\nThe group revised its growth prospects for the country down from 2.1% to 1.4%, and the projection for next year has been changed from 2.3% to 1.7%.\nFitch’s downgrade brought it in line with other ratings agency Standard & Poor’s which has the country at BBB-. Moody’s has the country one notch higher at Baa2 (a BBB equivalent).\nWhile Fitch has assigned South Africa’s position as “stable” – S&P changed its outlook to “negative”, anticipating even slower growth in the country than before.\nThis puts South Africa at very real risk of becoming a junk country, which has substantial implications for investment.\nProfessional investors, such as hedge funds, pension funds and asset managers are prevented (by policy) from investing in junk countries.\nFormer Reserve Bank Governor, Tito Mboweni last week warned that “a dark cloud, mist or fog is gathering upon us as a country”.\nHe said that the country needs an “immediate defence mechanism” to avoid falling into a junk rating. “We cannot afford to become junk status,” he said.\n“Junk status as we know translates automatically to cost of borrowing, re-ordering of corporates on the investor’s horizon within his or her rules or within certain indices like the MSCI. The immediate defense mechanism is based on three pillars: a credible fiscal stance (we dare not deviate from the Budget stance we adopted in October, please!); re-enforce central bank independence (I know this is intangible, but let’s do it!); and finally, respect for all other independent institutions (the judiciary and chapter nine institutions).”\nSouth Africa’s credit rating levels peaked between 2008 and 2011.\nThe ratings firms have laid South Africa’s economic turmoil squarely at government’s feet.\nAnalysts and economists have warned that, unless President Jacob Zuma’s administration changes tack, the country is in serious risk of being junked in the next round of ratings.\nLooking at South Africa’s credit rating history, it’s clear to see that the country has suffered ratings cuts consistently during Jacob Zuma’s tenure.\nZuma took over the presidency during a global economic crisis which took a number of years to overcome.\nSince global recovery, however, the presidency has not managed to overcome economic challenges such as widespread unemployment and corruption and labour unrest.\nAlarmingly, former finance minister, Nhlanhla Nene was pushing back against unchecked spending by government, and was forcing politicians to tighten their belts- a move which analysts say cost him his job.\nZuma announced on Wednesday evening (9 December) that Nene had been removed from the finance portfolio to be replaced by the unknown David van Rooyen.\nEconomists have stated that the move will likely see the economy fully under Zuma’s control, with expectations that spending will continue unchecked – including the fast-tracking of a R1 trillion nuclear build deal.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/106461/what-junk-status-means-for-south-africa/"}
{"doc_id": "80011fd1d76ceb02db559a8e60103d44", "text": "“Empirical data affirms that Nigerians are willing to fulfill their tax obligations when they see meaningful returns on their tax contributions.”\n– Taiwo Oyedele (Chairman, Presidential Committee on Tax Reforms)\nOne of the bold steps taken by President Ahmed Tinubu-led administration so far was the inauguration of the presidential committee on fiscal policy and tax reforms back in August, 2023. It is worthy of note that the president approved the establishment of the committee in July of this year and appointed Taiwo Oyedele, a tax and Fiscal Policy Partner and Africa Tax Leader at PriceWaterhouseCoopers, as the Chairman.\nRead also: Oyedele-led tax reforms embrace Afonomics proposal as fourteenth point\nThe committee comprises experts from both the private and public sectors and is responsible for various aspects of tax law reforms, fiscal policy design and coordination, harmonisation of taxes, and revenue administration. According to the Special Adviser to the President on Revenue, Adelabu Adedeji, the president recognises the importance of a sound fiscal policy environment. And indeed, how an effective taxation system could act as catalyst for the functioning of the government and the economy.\nThe committee will go beyond advising the government on necessary reforms to also drive the implementation of such recommendations. It also has a mandate to achieve an 18 percent tax-to-GDP (tax to gross domestic product) ratio within three years. The current dire economic situation however, brings forth some burning questions, needing urgent answers.\nFor more public enlightenment we need to know what taxation is all about, the percentage of the income thereof, the disbursement pattern, the beneficiaries, and of course, the hurdles between its collection and the implementation and how to scale over them.\nIn its distilled essence, taxation as a tool of fiscal policy is a compulsory levy imposed by the government on the income of taxpayers in a given geographical area. The noble aim of course, is to ensure the welfare for the greatest number of the citizenry through a fair distribution of financial resources. That plays out of course, in an ideal situation.\nAs reflected in my previous thought on the critical issue back in 2017 titled: “Taxation and the People’s Parliament”, given Nigeria’s peculiar scenario, the challenges are characterized by multiple taxation, lack of credible data, and information asymmetry. Access to information remains weak for the average investor, as well as the general public. Relevant data meant for stock analysis is often published with a lag. Sometimes, managers give the wrong information with regards to their actual income.\nAnother frictional factor to taxation here is that many of the rich hardly pay taxes commensurate with their huge incomes. In fact, it has been proven time and again that some of the favoured political apologists and sponsors of some political parties are given questionable tax waivers. There is over dependence on oil revenue at the expense of agriculture and industrialisation. With all these anomalies, is there value for money for taxation for the ordinary Nigerians? The answer is in the negative.\nRead also: FG eyes new tax reforms, ‘conservative’ oil benchmark\nThere still exists the untoward practice of some dubious and unpatriotic accountants preparing different account statements for banks and the Federal Inland Revenue Service, FIRS. The oil benchmark cannot be agreed upon. Banks are not funding the manufacturing sector. Fake products are all over the place. Unlike the European Union, EU countries which came together to harmonise tax policies there is no stable economic model to apply holistically in Nigeria.\nIn response and in the face of these daunting odds the Accounting Education and Research Services, ACCERS came together as concerned professionals some years ago with relevant stakeholders in the financial sector as the People’s Parliament to fashion the best way forward out of the nation’s economic wood. These included capital market operators, bankers and accountants. Others were members of ICAN, CITAN, ANAN, legal practitioners, industrialists, small scale entrepreneurs and academicians.\nAccording to Otunba Abdul Lateef Owoyemi, the past President of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria,(ICAN) enlightened Nigerians must ensure that our tax and other fiscal policies are in sync with international best practices. This has become expedient with the ongoing ‘fiscal cliff’ of the euro-zone countries and the looming policy crisis facing the U.S.\nNigeria, like many other countries across the globe is left with three possible policy options, for economic survival. The first is to drastically cut down on public expenditure, which the federal and state governments are not willing to do. If not, how do we explain the current painful yet, preventable situation that has each lawmaker smiling home with an SUV vehicle worth N160 million when some 133 million Nigerians are multi-dimensionally poor and 71 million of them daily agonise in extreme poverty?\nSimilarly, how do we explain to the ordinary citizen that Mister President who has called on them to make sacrifices to stabilize the wobbling economy has since obtained approval from the Federal Executive Council (FEC) for the renovation of the president’s official residence with N4 billion at Dodan Barracks,Lagos? Yet, there is an additional N4 billion approved for the construction of office complex? Not left out of the spending spree and jamboree at the executive level is the approval of N1.5bn for vehicles for the First Lady’s office.\nComing at a time that food inflation has galloped to 29.34%, as the highest in 18 years, and also when unemployment of graduates has escalated to the level of a time-bomb the fear that the taxes would be judiciously applied is real!\nThe second approach on impactful taxation is to allow those who have the ability to pay higher taxes to do so, as former President Barack Obama’s administration championed in the U.S. The third is to combine the two to meet the needs of the society.\nThough several research findings have raised alarm over the over reliance on petro-dollars not much has changed. The persisting problems that have bedeviled the energy sector for eons, as well as even ineffective road construction and repairs are reflective of the gross failure of the economic policies. More has been said than done on economic diversification.\nNigeria must develop its tax system in such a manner that there is a great collaboration amongst the federal, states and local governments and for the last two to have a fairer sharing formula for tax collected. Tax revenues should henceforth be separated from all other revenues and should be shared in accordance with contributions from the states.\nRead also: Experts task FG on tax reforms to rejig Nigeria’s economy\nTo further strengthen the implementation of tax policies in Nigeria the full computerisation of the entire economy and transactions has become imperative. This would reduce corruption. Stable infrastructure should be put in place along with effective monitoring of governance. We should do away with poor corporate governance.\nWhat is of significance to the average citizen is the implementation of the recommendations made vis-à-vis accountability, fiscal responsibility, thoroughness in terms of prioritizing the crying needs. They want the assurance that the poor would not be taxed to satisfy the tastes of the rich and mighty. They would therefore, be happy, if at the end of the day it guarantees adequate and nutritious food on their table in a safe and secure environment.\nAbove all, government should sustain public enlightenment on the need for the citizens to pay their tax as at when due. There should be accountability on the part of government. And Nigerians should also begin to ask pertinent questions on how their various taxes are utilised.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businessday.ng/backpage/article/factors-that-strengthen-tax-reforms/"}
{"doc_id": "e2774d51d4953940c6927cabe87a1eec", "text": "NAIROBI, KENYA: National Treasury Cabinet Secretary will on Thursday unveil the spending plans for the financial year that begins on July 1.\nHe will also indicate how his ministry plans to fund the Sh3.02 trillion budget, likely through a raft of new taxes and new loans estimated at Sh608 billion.\nAccording to a budget statement on the ministry’s website, Education sector will get the lion share (Sh473.4 billion) compared to other sectors; the General Economic and Commerce Affairs sector has been allocated Sh23.9 billion\nBelow is how the money is distributed per sector.\nEducation sector-Sh473.4 billion\nEnergy, Infrastructure and Information, Communication and Technology-Sh406.8 billion\nPublic Administration and International Relations - Sh270.9 billion\nGovernance, Justice, Law, and Order - Sh204.8 billion\nNational Security - Sh153.6 billion\nHealth- Sh93.0 billion\nEnvironment Protection, Water and Natural Resources- Sh82.3 billion\nAgriculture, rural and urban development sector-Sh59.1b\nSocial Protection, Culture, and Recreation Sector- Sh 54.8 billion\nGeneral Economic and Commerce Affairs-Sh23.9 billion\nThe government projects budget on education to hit Sh Sh504 million by the time President Uhuru Kenyatta leaves the office.\nStay informed. Subscribe to our newsletter\nIn the 2019/2020 budget estimates, the education sector has been allocated Sh473 billion probably the highest among other sectors in this year’s budget.\nThe Sector has prioritised several programmes for implementation including the recruitment of additional teachers to support 100 percent transition policy of the Government and continued support to Free Primary Education and Free Day Secondary Education through increased capitation.\nOther prioritise include continued support to Special Needs Education (SNE) through increased capitation to SNE learners and the provision of examination fees for all students in KCPE and KCSE.\nThe Sector will also complete the ongoing construction and equipment of technical training institutes (TTIs) and support university education in public and private universities in order to equip the youth with relevant skills required to drive the industrialisation agenda.\nThe agriculture rural and urban development sector on the other side has been allocated Sh59.1 billion.\nThe Sector plays a key role in the development agenda of the country through enhancing food and nutrition security; employment and wealth creation.\nIt has also prioritized the implementation of “The Big Four” Plan initiatives.\nThe Big Four Agenda items are Food security, manufacturing (mainly focusing on job creation in this area), affordable universal health care and affordable housing.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001329433/how-sectors-will-share-kenya-s-sh3-02-trillion-budget"}
{"doc_id": "7bc9c2f7bc9dde124a249c30dfd67fbb", "text": "Startups are being urged to come up with strategies to attract capital funding from investors to expand their business.\nMuthuri Kinyamu, programme coordinator for Hong Kong-based venture capital firm Nest, says the ongoing interest by global companies in Nairobi provides a good opportunity for businesses to position themselves to receive funding.\n“Nairobi is the launch pad for a lot of global companies who want to expand into the region. We have so many investor’s funders and big corporates who have set up shop and who can provide much needed capital,” he said.\nNest opened its Africa offices in Nairobi in July looking for startups across the continent that are ready for additional funding for expansion.\nIt is particularly searching for businesses that offer services to the mass or the lower end of the market. The company recently invested close to Sh13 million in startup Ongair.\nMr Kinyamu says startups should focus on the scalability of their business rather than just having a local perspective.\n“From the onset, entrepreneurs need to take a pan African and a global view of what they are trying to build. We see so many Nigerian and South African startups looking to expand into Nairobi but very few Kenyan firms think of how their business can be scaled to other parts,” he said.\nAccording to a report released last week, Kenyan technology startups were among those able to raise capital funding throughout the continent amounting to about $186 million (Sh18.6 billion).\nThe report by Disrupt Africa showed that Kenyan businesses are among the third most funded in the region, preceded by Nigeria and South Africa.\nDisrupt Africa is a one-stop portal for the continent’s tech startups providing news, information and commentary pertaining to the continent’s tech startups and investment ecosystem.\nThe Disrupt Africa African Tech Startups Funding Report 2015, showed that Kenyan technology based businesses accounted for 14.4 per cent of the $185,785,500 raised by 125 startups on the continent.\nKenyan tech startups were able to raise $47,365,000, with Mkopa, BRCK, Kopo Kopo Angaza and Asoko insight listed as among the top listed startups to be funded.\nSouth Africa received 36 per cent of the total funding ($54,568,000) while Nigeria received 24 per cent ($49,404,000) though the report shows that Kenya and Nigeria had larger average funding per startup.\nStartups that dealt with the solar sector accounted for 32.9 per cent of all the funds raised, with the financial technology sector coming in second to receive 29.6 per cent of the funds.\nTech startups in Tanzania Egypt and Ghana also attracted a lot of attention from investors.\nAnother report released at the end of last year by Burbidge Capital showed that the country had attracted over Sh102 billion ($1 billion) in private equity (PE), impact investment and venture fund deals in the first eight months of 2015.\nFinanciers were buying into or lending to energy, financial, healthcare and real estate companies.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/enterprise/startups-urged-to-position-themselves-for-funding-from-investors-2106656"}
{"doc_id": "ccf01c9e1bbcc8367326823f2d1f80ce", "text": "If it is true that we live in a “global village,” bound to one another through commercial, financial, and social ties, then it is also true that informal economic activity in one part of the world has a negative impact elsewhere. That means that formalizing every economy should be viewed as a global public good. The G-20 and other international entities should take the lead in ensuring the coordination and cooperation needed to provide it.\nThe biggest losers of the informal economy are ordinary citizens, because informality inhibits long-term economic growth and productivity gains; creates unfair competition; hinders the growth of small and medium-size enterprises (the main sources of employment); and leaves millions of workers without basic rights, such as health insurance and pensions. It also leads to significant tax-revenue losses, reducing both the quality and quantity of public services. Income inequality and social injustice invariably increase as well.\nReducing the scope of the formal economy may seem to be a national task; and governments should indeed act. They should reduce the tax burden, simplify tax systems, and reduce regulatory compliance costs, while strengthening enforcement. Likewise, they should eliminate barriers to competition, simplify business registration processes, increase the transparency of public procurement, and improve access to credit.\nBut combating the informal economy requires international cooperation as well. According to the European Commission, “non-cooperative” and “non-transparent” jurisdictions – also known as tax havens – cost the European Union’s member states more than $1 trillion in revenue every year. Controlling and decreasing the risks that these jurisdictions pose can happen only at the global level.\nHere the OECD and G-20 can play an important role. The OECD already provides vital support in promoting international cooperation on taxation. Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital regulates the content and practice of bilateral exchanges of tax information, which are crucial to fighting tax avoidance and evasion and combating harmful tax competition.\nSimilarly, the OECD Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes is leading an extensive peer-review process of legal frameworks and implementation of standards. The OECD recently issued an Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) that identifies specific measures to combat double non-taxation and to establish comprehensive and transparent standards of fair taxation.\nThe focus of G-20 summits on global tax evasion in recent years is also encouraging. When the G-20 leaders convened in Los Cabos, Mexico, in June 2012, they reiterated their commitment to strengthen transparency and comprehensive exchange of tax information. They also reiterated the need to prevent BEPS.\nMoreover, the G-20 has launched efforts to encourage all jurisdictions to sign the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, developed jointly by the Council of Europe and the OECD.\nBut more must be done to combat the informal economy. I can easily imagine bilateral agreements – and then a multilateral arrangement – that establishes a unique global tax ID for all taxpayers.\nIn Turkey, a comprehensive plan to reduce the scope of the informal economy involves 14 major public institutions, including the Ministry of Finance. Proactive tax-collection mechanisms to improve voluntary tax compliance have been put in place. For example, a system developed for landlords has helped to double the number of taxpayers reporting rental income. Turkey has also improved regulatory enforcement, created a more effective Tax Audit Board, and invested in human capital and technology.\nMacroeconomic reforms have also helped to curtail Turkey’s shadow economy. In 2006, the corporate-tax rate was lowered from 33% to 20%, and rates for personal-income tax were also reduced, with the highest rate falling from 49.5% to 35%, and the lowest rate to 15%, from 22%. Moreover, in 2008, the income-tax burden on minimum-wage earners was set at a low of 0%, depending on marital status and number of children. Further, the rate for value-added tax on health, education, clothing, and tourism was cut from 18% to 8%, while the VAT on major food items is now 1%.\nLast but not least, Turkey’s authorities have implemented major reforms aimed at improving the business environment. These include a new commercial code and debt legislation. A new income-tax law is currently under parliamentary consideration, and a law on tax procedures will be submitted soon.\nTurkish policymakers have also focused on international cooperation and coordination in creating a level playing field globally. Turkey now has double-taxation agreements with 82 countries and information-exchange agreements with five countries.\nAs a result of these efforts, informal employment in Turkey has declined by 14.5 percentage points since 2002, to 37.6% in April 2013. Likewise, the informal economy as a share of GDP declined by six percentage points during this period, to 26.5% in 2013.\nBut these ratios remain too high. The authorities’ medium-term objective is to reduce the informal economy’s GDP share by five more percentage points and to reduce informal employment in non-agricultural sectors by five percentage points as well.\nDetermined efforts such as these are indispensable to dispelling the shadows in which informal economic activity exists. But national policymakers cannot hold the light alone.\nBy: Mehmet Simsek", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businessday.ng/analysis/article/economic-shadows-and-light-2/"}
{"doc_id": "361887d22a1c64555bba87c978473d8a", "text": "The Institute of Risk Management South Africa (IRMSA) says that expected stage 8 load shedding in mid-winter in South Africa presents a grave threat to multiple sectors in the economy – and the knock-on effects could be disastrous.\nThe body warned organisations across all sectors to start taking action now to mitigate the fallout and to take the threat seriously – stressing that the load shedding situation is no longer ‘business as usual’.\n“There are significant risks posed by the potential implementation of stage 8 mid-winter load shedding, announced by Eskom. This development, we believe, presents a grave threat to the country’s fragile economy and social fabric and calls for immediate action from risk managers across all sectors,” it said.\nIn its latest state of the system update ahead of the winter months (June to August), Eskom warned that there was a high risk of stage 8 load shedding being implemented as the utility battles to address a 6,500MW shortfall between supply and demand in the coming months.\nWhile the group hopes to limit load shedding to between stages 3 and 5, it requires significant cooperation from the public at large to decrease demand. It will also have to limit its unplanned outages to below 15,000MW – something it has not been able to achieve this year consistently.\nWithout public cooperation – and if outages hit 18,000MW or more, as has been the case even outside winter demand – then stage 8 load shedding is likely, Eskom said.\nIRMSA said that stage 8 load shedding represents a severe disruption to businesses, critical infrastructure, and security and exacerbates the livelihood risk.\nStage 8 load shedding would see the country thrust into darkness for 16 hours in every 32 hour cycle, effectively putting power out for half the day, every day. The cost to the economy will also ramp up significantly.\n“The sustained power cuts at such an intensity will have far-reaching consequences on existing risk response strategies which will most likely fall short of providing alternative energy long enough to run ‘business-as-usual’,” IRMSA said.\n“This will lead to significant financial losses, decreased productivity, and potential damage to essential equipment and machinery and communication.”\nThe risk experts warned that the next big impact will be on potable water supply and availability, which has already been hammered by current levels of load shedding.\nThe implications of Stage 8 load shedding are particularly pronounced for industries heavily reliant on uninterrupted power supply, such as manufacturing, mining, and telecommunications, the group said.\n“South Africa’s economy, already grappling with numerous challenges, including the effects of the global pandemic, economic inequalities and extreme unemployment, cannot afford the added strain of stage 8 load shedding,” it said.\nThe potential direct consequences include:\n- Even higher unemployment;\n- Higher cost of living;\n- Decreased investor confidence;\n- Reduced foreign direct investment;\n- Decline in international competitiveness;\n- Small, and medium-sized enterprises risk business closures;\n- Increased socioeconomic hardships.\n“Considering these risks, it is imperative for risk managers to take immediate and initiative-taking steps to refresh their business impact assessments, review the effectiveness of existing risk response strategies and business continuity plans, as well as building rudimentary scenario outcomes of the potential impact of stage 8 load shedding,” IRMSA said.\nThe group said that businesses need to get ahead of stage 8 load shedding by doing all they can to reduce their reliance on the national grid, communicating with suppliers and other stakeholders on their readiness for outages and keeping lines of communication open with clients, employees, suppliers and all other sectors of their operations about the crisis.\nEarlier this week, business leaders warned that stage 8 load shedding is all but guaranteed and said that operation costs will rise significantly as a result.\nFor companies running diesel-powered generators during outages, consumption is likely to spike, creating logistics and storage challenges, as well as extensive costs.\nAlready the cost of dealing with load shedding is a major driver of inflation and is doing serious damage to the profitability of companies. This will require extensive contingency planning by businesses across the country.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/691175/risk-experts-sound-the-alarm-over-stage-8-load-shedding-in-south-africa/"}
{"doc_id": "8298197584066c0ab6c096bf86d7945f", "text": "Makinde\n13 Jul 2023\nA former Governor of Oyo State and Otun Olubadan of Ibadanland, Senator Rashidi Ladoja, has taken the state governor, Seyi Makinde; the Olubadan of Ibadanland, Oba Lekan Balogun, Alli Okunmade II, and 10 members of the Olubadan-in-Council, who were recently elevated to Obas, to court over chieftaincy review.\n15 Mar 2023\nAhead of Saturday’s elections, the fate of incumbent governors in Oyo, Lagos and Ogun states, that is, Seyi Makinde, Babajide Sanwo-Olu and Dapo Abiodun of Ogun APC, remain uncertain.\nLatest\nNOW\nOperatives of Kaduna Zonal Command of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) have arrested 36 suspected Internet fraudsters in the state.\n3 mins ago\nWomen’s Rights and Health Project (WRAHP) has sensitised members of under-served communities of their rights, with a view to curbing violations and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV).\n12 mins ago\nIbrahim Mustapha scored two goals, yesterday, as Kano Pillars walloped Sunshine Stars of Akure 5-1 at the Sani Abacha Stadium to move up to the third position in the Nigerian Premier Football League (NPFL) table.\n15 mins ago\nGen. Adedayo Adesokan, on Saturday, won the 2024 Ikeja Golf Club’s Veterans Cup, held at the club’s course in Lagos. 120 golfers, including 90 veterans aged 65 and above, and 30 guest players, participated in the competition sponsored by ADL Solutions.\n23 mins ago\nCompeting policy issues are begging for attention and government is fast losing gravity. Yet the polity is reeling under by an amalgam of economic reforms the Bola Tinubu government has unleashed all at once; citizens are getting disoriented.\n39 mins ago\nNigeria would need to achieve accelerated growth and a firmer currency to regain and maintain a spot among the top three biggest economies in Africa.\n48 mins ago\nAmid investigation by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) into alleged N100 billion fraud in the Federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Poverty Alleviation and another reported N17 billion malfeasance in the National Social Investment Programme Agency (NSIPA), the suspended conditional cash transfer programme is resuming.\n55 mins ago\n• Falana seeks protection for protesters, says NLC’s action not contempt of court • Shun protest, Nigeria going through ‘surgical’ solution, Afenifere begs Nigerians Ahead of the planned nationwide protest by the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) tomorrow, 65 Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) have joined the Trade Union Congress of Nigeria (TUC) to pull out from the two-day…\n1 hour ago\nRegarded as one of the clear features of federalism, the multilevel policing system has been in place across countries of the world where sub-national bodies exist. It is variously termed State Police, Regional Police or Provincial Police.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://guardian.ng/tag/makinde/"}
{"doc_id": "2d29314ae14896d39918ee9baf37270d", "text": "Farmers in Africa’s most populous country are starting to ditch the use of fertilisers for their soil nutrients as prices of NPK – a fertiliser blend mostly used by them — jumped 250 percent, owing to the Russia-Ukraine war.\nSmallholder farmers who spoke with BusinessDay say they are mixing poultry waste, ash, cow dung, and food waste with fertilisers to use on their farms.\n“Our production costs keep rising owing to the surge in input prices such as fertiliser. A 50kg bag of NKP I bought for N12,000 in January now sells for N28,000,” Musa Idris, a farmer in Nasarawa State who cultivates maize, rice, and other crops, said in response to questions.\n“I couldn’t afford to buy the quantity of fertiliser I need. So, I now mix food waste I collect from the market with fertiliser to use on my farm,” he said. “This has reduced the number of the bags of fertiliser I would have bought and also my production cost.”\nBusinessDay interviewed a dozen of farmers across the country and found that a 50kg bag of NPK 15:15:15 now goes for an average of N28,000 as against N8,000 a year ago, indicating a 250 percent increase. On a year-to-date basis, it has risen by 100 percent.\nWhile a 50kg bag of NPK 20:10:10, which is produced under the Nigeria-Morocco fertiliser deal, is sold for an average of N14,500.\nAbiodun Olorundenro, operations manager of Aquashot Limited, a firm that grows grains in the South-West region, also confirms that he now mixes poultry waste with fertilisers for his soil nutrients.\n“The continuous surge in fertiliser prices is forcing lots of farmers to reduce their production area as most of us cannot afford to buy the quantity of fertiliser we would need,” he said.\nAccording to him, the problem with using organic manure now is that the result is not as quick as that of fertilisers as it requires more time to mix properly with the soil.\n“You don’t get the immediate impact on the crop when you augment organic manure in place of fertiliser. It takes time before you start seeing the results unlike fertiliser with his immediate,” he added.\nOlorundenro attributed the situation to the ongoing Russian-Ukraine war and the foreign exchange volatility in Nigeria.\nSince the war broke out, Nigeria has seen a shortfall in the supply of potash – a key ingredient in the production of NPK — as the war trapped four inbound vessels containing over 70,000 metric tonnes of potash.\nRead also: Nigerian farmers warn as fertiliser, diesel price hikes bite\nThe situation is not just a Nigerian problem, but a global phenomenon. Global fertiliser prices are also surging as the region is a major exporter of potash, ammonia, urea, and other soil nutrients, according to a note from the International Food Policy Research Institute.\nWhile Nigeria imports the raw materials for the production of NPK, it is rich in urea – another blend of fertiliser.\nHowever, the prices of urea blends are also surging. A 50kg bag of different urea brands (Indorama, Notore, and Dangote) is sold for between N19,000 and N22,000 as against N8,500 and N9,000 last year.\n“Farmers can’t afford to buy fertiliser since the subsidies were removed last year and the war in Ukraine has compounded the issue. No farmer can buy a bag of fertiliser for N28,000 and expect to break even.” Ibrahim Kabiru, a farmer in Katsina, said.\n“It is a welcome development that farmers are now embracing organic manure,” he said.\nHe said the situation was one of the factors fuelling the increase in food prices, saying the rising cost of fertilisers would also further reduce the country’s fertiliser application, which was already one of the lowest globally.\nNigeria’s food inflation hit 18.37 percent in April, from 17.2 percent recorded in May, according to the National Bureau of Statistics.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businessday.ng/agriculture/article/farmers-opt-for-manure-on-250-fertiliser-price-spike/"}
{"doc_id": "f4606e94cc6c4354dee22251b4f84112", "text": "The Hawks are again circling Pravin Gordhan as well as four SARS officials, former Deputy Commissioner Ivan Pillay, Group Executive Johann van Loggerenberg, Pete Richer, former SARS head of strategic planning, and initial head of the investigative unit, Andries van Rensburg, who have all been ordered to report to the Hawks in Pretoria on Thursday for warning statements. The threats of criminal action relate to allegations of an alleged “rogue unit” located in SARS. Pravin Gordhan has been in the Hawks cross-hairs since accidentally landing back in the hot seat as Minister of Finance in December. By MARIANNE THAMM.\nUpdate/Correction:\nAndre van Rensburg, original head of the unit, presented himself to the Hawks in Worcester. Former spokesperson Adrian Lackay has not been served with any letters or notices. The four former SARS officials who have been asked to present themselves to the Hawks on Thursday at 10am are Gordhan, Pillay, van Loggerenberg and Pete Richer, former SARS head of strategic planning.\nThe convoluted SARS “rogue unit” saga appears to be heading for a dramatic climax as the Hawks are poised to finally make a much anticipated move on Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan this week. This in spite of Gordhan’s answering of 27 questions personally delivered by the Hawks head Lieutenant-General Mthandazo Ntlemeza in February with regard to the so-called “rogue unit” in SARS.\nGordhan has for some time, since his reinstatement as Minister of Finance in December after President Jacob Zuma’s disastrous firing of Nhlanhla Nene, been viewed as an obstacle thwarting the interests of individuals linked to Zuma including SAA’s Dudu Myeni, current SARS Commissioner Tom Moyane as well as the Gupta family’s interest in the country’s nuclear deal, among countless others.\nIn May Gordhan released a public statement saying that earlier reports of his arrest had been distressing for him and his family and urged South Africans to “protect the integrity of the treasury”.\n“I cannot believe that I’m being investigated and could possibly be charged for something I am innocent of. Throughout my 45 years of activism, I have worked for the advancement of the ANC, our Constitution and our democratic government,” he said.\nDaily Maverick has been reliably informed that Gordhan, Pillay, Van Loggerenberg, Lackay, as well as the original 2007 head of the unit, Andries “Skollie” van Rensburg, have all been asked to report to the Hawks at 10am on Thursday. Pillay, Van Loggernberg, Lackay and Van Rensburg were sent letters informing them of the charges they will face. Gordhan was informed that he would, along with the other, be receiving a “warning statement” given to an accused person before they are charged with an offence and to warn them of their rights in terms of the Constitution.\nDaily Maverick also learned that Pillay, Van Loggerenberg, Lackay and Van Rensburg have been informed by the Hawks that each of them face possible charges in relation as to how the unit was formed. Pillay will also be questioned in relation to his pension payout and Van Loggerenberg in relation to a charity he ran. In addition to it, Pillay will also face questions about the alleged “project Sunday Evenings” and Van Rensburg’s (former head of the unit) involvement in allegedly bugging the offices of the National Prosecuting Authority in 2007 at the behest of the then Directorate of Special Operations, or the Scorpions, who were investigating police commissioner Jackie Selebi.\nHawks spokesperson, Brigadier Hangwani Mulaudzi, told Daily Maverick that he did not have a “mandate to discuss any case or any confidential information attached to any case that is still under investigation. Any matters related to this enquiry is mere speculation and we will also not comment on it.”\nWhen approached for comment on the matter, Van Loggerenberg, Pillay and Lackay declined.\nEarlier this year the Hawks sent the 27 questions to Gordhan who was SARS Commissioner when a request for a unit with special investigative capacity was signed off in 2007. This was done with the knowledge of then Finance Minster Trevor Manuel and in agreement with the NIA (National Intelligence Agency), who was to partner the unit in an attempt to curb the illicit economy.\nGordhan replied to the questions stating that, according to legal advice, the establishment of the unit had been lawful, that the finding by the Sikhakhane Panel (one of four investigations into the unit) that the establishment of the Unit contravened the National Strategic Intelligence Act was “wrong and based on a superficial and clearly mistaken reading of the aforementioned Act” and that the unit had been “an essential part of SARS’ enforcement strategy as it is with most tax and customs administrations globally.”\nAll of this also had been in line with then President Thabo Mbeki’s announcement in his 2007 SONA that government would “start the process of further modernising the systems of the South African Revenue Service, especially in respect of border control, and improve the work of inter-departmental co-ordinating structures in this regard, intensify intelligence work with regard to organised crime, building on the successes that have been achieved in the last few months in dealing with cash-in-transit heists, drug trafficking and the poaching of game and abalone”.\nUnder Gordhan, SARS was turned into one of the most efficient government departments. The National Research Group, as it was later to be named, was responsible for raking in millions in unpaid taxes and for investigating the criminal underworld, including abalone smuggling, rhino poaching, the importation of grey goods as well as drug and tobacco trafficking.\nSome of the unit’s successes included a R40 million fine paid by former Hyundai SA boss Billy Rautenbach who had evaded local authorities for ten years, nailing of underworld drug lord Glen Agliotti, as well as investigations into billionaire Dave King’s tax affairs. The unit’s apparent crime/mistake was that it also began sniffing around individuals and companies who had alleged dealings with President Jacob Zuma and his family.\nThe “rogue unit” narrative was first advanced by a former NIA (National Intelligence Agency) operative Dr Mandisa Mokwena, a SARS group executive who headed the Segmentation and Research Division and who was later charged with 40 counts of fraud, racketeering and money laundering. It was also forwarded by State Security Agency double operative Pretoria attorney, Belinda Walter.\nSince then at least four “investigations” have been conducted including the controversial KPMG report, which cost taxpayers R23 million and which has still not been released.\nSome of the allegations included that the unit, headed by Johann van Loggerenberg, had gone “rogue”, had spied on politicians including Jacob Zuma, had set up a brothel and had used a slush fund.\nWalter was a double agent for the SSA and British American Tobacco (BAT) while she worked as an attorney for BAT competitors Carnilinx. She also chaired the Fair-Trade Independent Tobacco Association (FITA). After a relationship between Walters and Van Loggerenberg turned sour, in 2014 Walter lodged a complaint with the HAWKS and SARS.\nAll of this loops back to 2013 when Pillay, shortly after being appointed as acting Commissioner of SARS, announced that the revenue service was requesting the NPA to prosecute 15 local tobacco manufacturers and importers for tax evasion and illicit trade in an attempt to collect around R12 billion in unpaid taxes.\nOn 14 November SARS wrote a letter to the Tobacco Institute of Southern Africa (TISA), and the Fair Trade Independent Tobacco Association (FITA) as representatives of the majority of the stakeholders in the tobacco industry in South Africa. The bodies were advised that SARS had implemented programmes to monitor and increase compliance particularly with regard to the tobacco industry identified as “as one such high risk area for reasons which include the on-going trade in illicit cigarettes.”\nTax and Customs Enforcement Investigations (TCEI), a new division that fell under Gene Revele, was mandated to investigate serious non-compliance issues and gathered information on the tobacco industry.\nAbout 18-months later, Pillay and several other top officials, all found themselves jobless.\nThis after the Sunday Times, under then editor Phylicia Oppelt, was instrumental in publishing reports on the “rogue unit” and which subsequently directly led to new Commissioner Tom Moyane culling SARS top leadership.\nThe Sunday Times, under its new editor Bongani Siqoko, later apologised for the newspaper’s role in the “rogue unit” saga. He admitted that a 9 November 2014 report that the unit had run a brothel was not true and that this had merely been an allegation by a disgruntled former member of the unit.\n“In another article in the same edition, we reported incorrectly that Johann van Loggerenberg had written a ‘confession’ letter to SARS commissioner Tom Moyane admitting that he had indeed run a ‘rogue unit’. The document contains no such confession. It was, in fact, a denial. More errors were repeated in other reports, such as ‘the infiltration of politicians as bodyguards’, ‘breaking into homes and conducting house infiltrations’, ‘running front companies’ with secret funds of over R500-million, and ‘spying on taxpayers and top cops’,” wrote Siqoko.\nEarlier this month, an anonymous Twitter account @EspionageSA leaked the largest data dump ever pertaining to British American Tobacco’s alleged role in tax evasion, bribery, corruption and industrial espionage in South Africa. Hundreds of affidavits by whistle blowers, photographs, lawyers letters and sound clips were leaked by the account holder and linked to a Google docs folder (owned by ‘Black Widow’) and suggesting serious criminality on the part of British American Tobacco. BAT responded to the leaks with a standard, unsigned statement that it did not condone illegal behaviour.\nThe Hawks, in the meantime, have responded that they are not investigating these leaks and the serious allegations that BAT might have destabilised a state institution and been involved in bribery and industrial espionage. Brigadier Mulaudzi told Daily Maverick “we only comment on official complaints and the BAT is one of those that was leaked to the public and no formal docket has been opened.”\nThis suggests that, incredibly, until a private citizen or someone else lodges a complaint with regard to the massive and serious leak the Hawks are going to ignore it and go after South African former SARS officials instead.\nThe response by the Hawks is curious and inconsistent as in March 2015, Minster of State Security, David Mahlobo, announced that government “noted with great concern the allegations of espionage against the Head of the Office of the Public Protector [Thuli Madonsela] and certain political leaders in our country A search conducted on these allegations made, led government to the following website: africainteligenceleaks.wordpress.com, including other social media platforms.”\nIt appears that law enforcement agencies, when it comes to probing allegations that Madonsela was a “CIA agent” are prepared to investigate an Internet leak while this strangely does not apply to British American Tobacco. DM\nPhoto: Finance minister Pravin Gordhan, the Hawks head Lieutenant-General Mthandazo Ntlemeza. (SAPA)", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-08-23-breaking-sars-wars-endgame-hawks-order-pravin-gordhan-and-others-to-present-themselves/"}
{"doc_id": "d4c0326ff972380567c7094e4ac8040d", "text": "I guess the desire to move from one network to another has never been more relevant than it is now. The local telecoms space is becoming more and more competitive, and as the economy continues to do us no favours, we are appreciating the value of every dollar we spend.\nWe often wish we could just drop any mobile network that frustrates us at any point, something that POTRAZ, the industry regulator hasn’t gotten around to fixing. In other markets though, the approach is a bit more aggressive.\nKenyan authorities recently gave a nod to Equity Bank’s plans to deploy a Taisys developed ultra slim SIM, which gives users the capacity to make and receive calls from an additional network on the same phone without discarding the old SIM card.\nThe slim SIM is made in the same shape as the normal SIM, but only slimmer, allowing it to sit on the back of the old SIM. It can come preloaded with mobile wallets and other capabilities that would add a post manufacturing capability to your mobile phone, such as NFC. It removes the need to purchase a dual SIM or additional phone. Bye bye, Duos!\nNaturally, the biggest mobile phone operators fronted by Safaricom challenged this disruption to their secured monopoly citing security concerns, albeit unsuccessfully.\nThe technology was possibly born out of a similar challenge we reported on earlier between banks and MNOs where MNOs will not allow banks the full autonomous use of their networks to provide, in most cases, competing products and services.\nIt also answers one key flaw that is prevalent in telecoms today; that is, the absence of mobile number portability or the Universal SIM (an operator independent SIM). The dream by POTRAZ to implement number portability by 2014 as it had promised seems to be just that, a pipe dream. This is a disservice in its own respect as it disallows users the right and flexibility of migrating from one operator to another according to the richness of the service, a key element of a consumer driven market.\nSubscribers are most times held hostage to a particular network because the network has one extremely good service (EcoCash comes to mind here), but may be expensive on other services such a voice calls or data bundles.\nUsers cannot easily migrate to the next network because of the high switching costs, the need to stay connected by having a consistent number and the move to network may not offer nearly as good a service as the flagship, and you are just moving for a better data package.\nCase in point is the recent increase in bundle prices from Econet. Many users have contemplated moving to another network, but both Telecel’s and NetOne’s mobile wallets do not match EcoCash’s modicum especially in agency network.\nWhile we are there, a queer development last week saw the launch of the EcoCash Data App that would enable one to actually remove the Econet SIM and use NetOne or Telecel data packages while continuing to use EcoCash and the Econet line for WhatsApp. The slim SIM comes as another channel for doing this.\nFor operators and banks; Econet in particular given that they are already working on NFC payments, the slim SIM resolves one missing key that could have slowed down development of payments via NFC.\nNFC payments would not be deployed in Zimbabwe successfully via services like Google Wallet or Apple pay or any of the smartphone dependent wallets due to the continued antagonistic popularity of feature phones in Zimbabwe, most southern African countries and other developing markets.\nOffering NFC Payments via enabling technology such as NFC tags on feature phones was previously not easily achievable because of the inability to implement a Secure Element to encrypt communication terminating at the phone. This slim SIM, however, contains this capability with an embedded microchip.\nWhile the slim technology sounds like it’s half a decade away, Telecel, NetOne or banks could do well to bring it to Zimbabwe tomorrow.\nimage courtesy of openecosource.org", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.techzim.co.zw/2015/06/kenya-oks-slim-sim-will-telecoms-monopoly-disruptor-get-zim/"}
{"doc_id": "dd3e866ea0845182c48149171ffdaa26", "text": "The global ratings agency Fitch this week lowered its assessment of the creditworthiness of the U.S. government, announcing that it had downgraded U.S. Treasury securities from the agency's top AAA rating to a slightly lower AA+ designation.\nIn the long term, the change could have potentially serious consequences for the United States and the broader global economy. This is because debt issued by the U.S. Treasury is a global benchmark for interest rates and has long been considered one of the safest — if not the safest — interest-bearing investment in the world.\nFitch justified its change by pointing to longtime dysfunction in Washington. For years, the government has lurched from debt crisis to debt crisis, with congressional standoffs, including one earlier this year, repeatedly bringing the country to the brink of default, only for lawmakers to pull back at the last moment.\n\"The rating downgrade of the United States reflects the expected fiscal deterioration over the next three years, a high and growing general government debt burden, and the erosion of governance relative to 'AA' and 'AAA' rated peers over the last two decades that has manifested in repeated debt limit standoffs and last-minute resolution,\" Fitch said in an announcement of the change.\nDistant echo\nThe business of rating countries' creditworthiness is dominated by three global companies: Fitch Ratings, S&P Global Ratings and Moody's. All three issue thousands of assessments of the risk of lending to countries and businesses every year.\nFitch's decision to cut the U.S. rating is a distant echo of one made by S&P 11 years ago, in the wake of an earlier debt limit standoff. S&P also lowered the rating of the U.S. to AA+, citing concerns very much like those expressed by Fitch this week.\nUntil Tuesday, S&P had appeared to be the outlier, with the other two major ratings firms maintaining the country's AAA rating. Now it is Moody's that appears to be out of step with its competitors.\nBiden administration reacts\nThe administration of President Joe Biden seemed somewhat blindsided by the Fitch announcement Tuesday. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen called the decision flawed during a public appearance the same day.\n\"Fitch's decision is puzzling in light of the economic strength we see in the United States,\" Yellen said. \"I strongly disagree with Fitch's decision, and I believe it is entirely unwarranted.\"\nYellen referred to various economic indicators, including rising gross domestic product, extremely low unemployment and rapidly cooling inflation, as signs of the resilience and stability of the U.S. economy.\n\"At the end of the day, Fitch's decision does not change what all of us already know — that Treasury securities remain the world's preeminent safe and liquid asset, and that the American economy is fundamentally strong,\" Yellen said.\nStay informed. Subscribe to our newsletter\n'Wake-up call'\nDespite the administration's assurances, some experts say U.S. policymakers should take the Fitch downgrade seriously, both because of the underlying problems the agency identifies and the negative impact a lower credit rating could have on the economy.\nAccording to the Congressional Budget office, the federal government's outstanding debt is now roughly equal to the nation's GDP, a ratio not seen since the end of World War II, and it is on track to continue rising. In recent years, neither of the two main political parties in the U.S. has taken serious steps to deal with the country's ballooning debt, even when each has enjoyed undivided control of Congress and the executive branch.\n\"This is a useful wakeup call to tell the political class that they need to get serious about the budget deficit issue,\" Desmond Lachman, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, told VOA.\nLachman pointed out that some of the largest purchasers of U.S. Treasury debt are foreign governments, and that continual budgetary dysfunction in Washington could cause them to rethink the wisdom of investing large amounts of money in a government that seems not just unable, but unwilling, to balance its books.\n\"We're already very indebted abroad,\" said Lachman. \"The Chinese central bank is holding something like $3 trillion of Treasuries. They're not going to finance us indefinitely, you know.\"\nGlobal impact\nAndrew Lautz, a senior policy analyst with the Bipartisan Policy Center, told VOA that it was too soon to say how much of an impact the ratings' downgrade would have on the rates at which the U.S. is able to borrow in the future. However, he said, any increase would be felt far beyond the U.S. Treasury.\n\"U.S. government debt, in the form of Treasury securities, underpins not just the U.S. economy but the global economy,\" he said. \"It's still considered the safe-haven asset of the world … and the world's reserve currency.\"\nInterest rates on consumer credit cards, home mortgages and business loans are based, either directly or indirectly, on the rates charged on Treasury debts.\n\"So, when Treasury's borrowing costs go up, and when that increase is sustained over the long term, that has a cascading effect on consumer and business credit,\" Lautz said.\nRegardless of whether the ratings' change drives borrowing costs up, Lautz said, the Fitch downgrade sends a message that needs to be heard.\n\"It should be a powerful signal to policymakers that we need to get our fiscal house in order,\" he said. \"We need to improve our budget process and we need to take steps to ensure that debt limit brinkmanship or government shutdowns can't happen again in the future.\"", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/america/article/2001478793/us-debt-rating-downgrade-may-drive-up-interest-rates"}
{"doc_id": "76c4d3bfee5badefbb04ce85e4c8c6c5", "text": "Poor quality of university education in the East African Community (EAC) is eating away the region’s skills base, adding a fresh layer of challenge to the bloc’s quest for faster growth and realising dream of integration.\nEducationists are warning that mushrooming universities and their uncontrolled expansion in Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi was diluting content.\nThis, coupled with relatively low government funding, risked denying the region the needed skills to boost economic growth.\n“The region has ended up with so many universities where most of them have nothing to write home about,” said Prof Mondo Kagonyera, the chancellor of Makerere University.\n“The downside is that the institutions are churning out half-baked graduates who can hardly meet the desired industry skills,” said Prof Kagonyera at a regional conference in Nairobi on Thursday.\nThe concerns look set to scuttle the integration process which gained impetus in July with the launch of the EAC Common Market Protocol, allowing free movement of goods and labour.\nUniversities are expected to ride on the wave of increased demand for professional services in the 127-million-people economy and a combined GDP of $73 billion, by producing skilled graduates\nA recent survey by the World Bank and Kenya’s Export Promotion Council found that demand for professional services such as banking, insurance, legal, accounting, architectural, ICT and engineering has been rising with the progression of the integration project, offering universities a chance to boost their enrolment and course offering.\n“As it is, there exist a great disconnect with the skills needed in the market and what is coming from universities in the region, ” said David Muturi, the executive director at the Kenya Institute of Management which has organised the three-day conference.\n“This is a link that we must get right to grow the economies,” said Mr Muturi.\nThe ongoing reconstruction of East Africa’s infrastructure and the rising number of foreign investors eyeing the mergers and acquisitions market has created fresh opportunities in project finance, venture capitalism, business formation and due diligence investigation that require professional support—raising demand for highly skilled professional.\nPushing these projects through demands a wide range of professionals, while other demand in other key professions such as teaching, medicine, ICT is expected to edge up as the economies expand.\nBut efforts at boosting EAC’s human capital base are at risk.\nA lucrative examinations brokerage market involving the sale of term papers, project and thesis writing has emerged around campuses across the region, educationists warned saying this was offering ready-made answers to students with the money to pay.\n“Due to overflowing classes and high morale among the teaching force, lecturers can hardly detect the cheating which is becoming a big problem in most of these countries,” said Prof Kagonyera.\nKenyan universities, for example, have been admitting students for courses they have not registered with the regulator, the Commission for Higher Education (CHE), exposing graduates to the risk of rejection in the labour market.\nThe high lecturer to student ratio has only come to worsen issues.\nThe University Academic Staff Union (Uasu) data indicates that there were 9,000 lecturers in both public and private universities, up from 7,000 four years ago.\nDuring the same period, student enrolment grew from 91,541 to 130,000 — a 42 per cent jump, shows the Economic Survey 2010.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/industry/poor-quality-of-varsity-education-slows-eac-growth-1972372"}
{"doc_id": "e2803a97d1b8a14e4e49f11432b69b76", "text": "‘Add value to indigenous fruits’\nMichael Tome–Business Reporter\nRAW milk processor, Dairibord, says local companies should integrate the many indigenous fruits in the production of various foods and beverages they make for the domestic and export markets to cut the import bill.\nThis comes as the company successfully launched its baobab fruit drink under the cascade brand in June this year.\nDairibord said the commercialisation of indigenous fruits was gaining momentum in Zimbabwe. Just last year the Government, through the National Biotechnology Authority, set up a mapfura/marula fruit factory at Rutenga growth point in Masvingo.\nBy last month villagers in the area are reported to have pocketed at least US$5 million from selling the fruit to the factory.\nMapfura/marula is used to produce juices, alcoholic beverages, edible oils, and stock feeds, which are currently being sold locally with plans to export already underway.\nAccording to Dairibord, the baobab fruit was declared a superfood in the developed world in 2015 and some local companies were already exporting hundreds of tonnes of baobab pulp to America and Europe and it had happened for a while.\nIn 2020, the global market for baobab powder was estimated at US$6 billion and is projected to reach a revised value of US$8,5 billion by 2027.\nSpeaking at a recent Marketers Association of Zimbabwe event, Dairibord head of branding, corporate affairs, research and development, Ruvarashe Matambo indicated that dairy manufacturers import ingredients and flavoring worth US$10 million in a year.\nShe said the commercialisation of baobab was one such initiative that could help in curbing the importation of aforementioned raw materials.\n“I can tell you that as dairy processors in a year we spend a lot of money on importation of raw materials mainly around ingredients and flavours, so we thought that it was good if we craft an idea that would speak to import substitution.\n“We have become the biggest commercial customer of the baobab fruit pulp locally, this goes on to show how much we have not exploited most of our natural or indigenous resources,” she said.\nCascade brand is found in orange, tropical punch and mango flavours which the company spends foreign currency on importing but baobab come from natural baobab pulp sourced locally.\nMatambo added that there was an opportunity for manufacturers to partner with local tertiary institutions to come up with locally grown solutions that help in saving the much-needed foreign currency that the country so desperately needs.\nAlso known by its scientific name “Adansonia digitata” baobab fruit is rich in ascorbic acid, vitamin C, calcium, potassium, magnesium, and antioxidants.\nThe kernels of the fruit are a good source of energy, protein, fat, calcium, potassium and magnesium.\nThe fruit is readily available in the arid areas of Zimbabwe and Dairibord makes most of its procurement from Chirundu, Chipinge and Birchenough.\nCommercialisation of indigenous fruits has the potential to create employment,eradicate poverty as it improves income streams for the rural folk especially women and the youth who are economically marginalized.\nHigher and Tertiary Education Innovation, Science and Technology Minister Professor Amon Murwira is on record saying tertiary education should be instrumental in import substitution through innovation, especially in a brain-laden country like Zimbabwe.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.herald.co.zw/add-value-to-indigenous-fruits/"}
{"doc_id": "12740839f762de38dfd577c5bff4aee4", "text": "Even by the standards of this volatile year, Monday’s wild ride throughout financial markets stands out, Bloomberg reports.\nIt said that cryptocurrencies plummeted so violently that a popular lending platform froze withdrawals to prevent a very modern kind of bank run.\nBitcoin plunged to the lowest in about 18 months after the freezing of withdrawals by the Celsius lending platform added to concern that systemic risk in the crypto ecosystem will accelerate the digital-asset market meltdown.\nThe world’s largest digital token tumbled as much as 17% to $22,603 – its lowest since December 2020. Other cryptocurrencies also declined as a broader sell-off continued.\nBloomberg said that the total market value, which topped $3 trillion in November, dropped below $1 trillion during New York trading hours on Monday, citing CoinGecko.\n“The fundamentals to support stabilization and recovery just aren’t there,” said Steven McClurg, co-founder and CIO at crypto fund manager Valkyrie Investments. “Things can and likely will get worse before they get better.”\nBinance, the largest crypto trading platform, temporarily suspended withdrawals of the Bitcoin network because of a transaction processing issue. Withdrawals were later resumed.\nThe selloff comes as traders are boosting bets for a more aggressive pace of Federal Reserve tightening after data Friday showed US inflation jumped to a fresh 40-year high in May.\nCryptocurrencies, which have struggled amid the Fed’s policy in recent months, have been hit particularly hard. The collapse of the Terra/Luna ecosystem last month, and lender Celsius pausing withdrawals Monday morning Asia time, have further eroded confidence in the space.\n“If you do get long, perhaps think about doing so with either a long call spread or short put spread to limit risk” on Bitcoin futures, said Rick Bensignor, president of Bensignor Investment Strategies and a former strategist at Morgan Stanley. “If this dives, there’s no reliable support nearby.”\nMike Novogratz, the founder and chief executive officer of Galaxy Digital Holdings, said that cryptocurrencies are closer to a “bottom” than the US equity market. Bitcoin is down around 67%, while Ether has slumped 74%, respectively, since hitting record highs in early November.\n“Ethereum should hold around $1,000 and it’s $1,200 right now. Bitcoin is around $20,000, $21,000 and it is $23,000, so you are much closer to the bottom in crypto than you are where I think, stocks, are going to have another 15% to 20% decline,” Novogratz said at the Morgan Stanley Financials Conference.\nLet’s go phishing\nGlobal cybersecurity and digital privacy company, Kaspersky, meanwhile, said it has detected nearly 200,000 phishing attacks targeting crypto.\nKaspersky experts took a close look at the phishing pages aimed at potential crypto investors as well as the malicious files that are distributed under the names of the 20 most popular cryptocurrency wallets.\nSince the beginning of 2022, Kaspersky said its products detected and prevented almost 200,000 attempts to steal users’ digital currencies and credentials to their wallets via phishing. The number of such attempts almost reached 50,000 in April, which is half of the indicators for the first quarter of 2022.\nCrypto wallets are the primary target for scamming and malicious activity, it said.\nWith the boom in digital currencies observed over the past five years, Kaspersky experts have seen various cybercriminal tactics used to steal cryptocurrency – from luring victims with gifts sent by crypto exchanges to distributing Trojanized DeFi wallets.\nCrypto wallets are the primary target for scammers because they are the initial place of storage for cryptocurrency and deal with large amounts of virtual money.\nIn 2022, Kaspersky said its products have recorded 193,125 phishing attempts aimed at potential crypto investors or users interested in cryptocurrency mining. Throughout the first quarter of this year, Kaspersky experts discovered about 107,000 attempts. Then in April alone, there were nearly 50,000 attempts.\n“Fraudsters mimic the original crypto wallets’ websites and lure victims to enter a personal seed-phrase, a secret phrase of 12 or 24 words that ensures the security of the wallet, along with a password and private key. Once the user shares their secret phrase, they’re redirected to the real website, however, their account and all of their savings are now in the scammer’s hands.”\nKaspersky said that crypto wallets have become the target of numerous malicious and scamming activities, including not only phishing pages disguised as the most popular wallets but also malware distributed in their names.\n“Scammers will stop at nothing to steal cryptocurrency. With the growing value of digital currencies, fraudsters have been intensifying their scamming activities toward potential investors. Phishing crypto scams deserve special attention – because they’re based on social engineering, these attacks do not require any advanced technical skills to be launched and work well for the fraudsters,” said Alexey Marchenko, head of Content Filtering Methods Research at Kaspersky.\n“They are often successful due to a user’s inattention and lack of awareness. Hence, users need to be wary of basic scamming indicators: offers that are too generous, proposals from unknown senders as well as requests for money with the promise of future profit.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businesstech.co.za/news/banking/596860/crypto-has-another-problem-scammers-will-stop-at-nothing-to-steal-digital-currency/"}
{"doc_id": "509fe5d52536ae200dc908ba58dc08c4", "text": "The civil war may have ended – officially, at least – but South Sudan’s problems are far from over. With foreign currency running out, and oil production yet to return to prewar levels, the country risks sleepwalking into an economic crisis. By IAN SCHECHTMAN.\nTwo months after the formation of the Transitional Government of National Unity intended to end the civil war in South Sudan, the poor economic situation threatens to plunge the country into another catastrophic crisis. Inflation has surged since the unpegging of the South Sudanese Pound to the US$ in December, which led to a more than tenfold increase in the official exchange rate, yet this was not sufficient to prevent a depletion of foreign reserves, as evidenced by statements by the Central Bank deputy governor on June 23 that the country only had five weeks’ worth of hard currency.\nEstimates suggest oil is responsible for 90-98% of the country’s budget, and the fall in global prices decimated the government’s finances. While prices have rebounded to approximately $50 per barrel after a slump to $30 in February, an agreement following independence commits Juba to pay over $25 per barrel to Sudan in transport fees, strangling profit when other costs are added.\nTalks continue and relations between the sides have improved in recent months, yet a renegotiated agreement that would increase South Sudan’s profitability remains to be reached. The budgetary problem is further compounded by the interruption of production in oil-rich Unity State during the civil war, which reduced the nation’s total output from over 300,000 barrels a day to approximately 165,000. Aware of the necessity of restoring exports to higher levels, the oil minister announced, also on June 23, that work had commenced to resume oil production in Unity State within five months.\nFinancial difficulties have made the government unable, or unwilling, to pay salaries to public servants, and several sectors are threatening or have embarked on strikes, with immediate impacts on the population’s daily lives and to a slightly lesser extent on foreign companies and expats in South Sudan. While this high level of dysfunctionality in the country is not new, the converging of strikes incentivises other sectors to actively seek redress for their grievances. Combined with disbelief that the government will be able to solve the crisis and perceptions that high-ranking officials continue to live in luxury, conditions are ripe for large-scale societal mobilisation.\nIn parallel, also arising from a shortage of hard currency and significantly affecting day-to-day life, there are repeated fuel shortages which, besides strengthening the black market, affect the generation of electricity and lead to power outages. The latter problem, in addition to obvious disruptions, has affected the functioning of Juba Teaching Hospital, the main medical facility in the country, where citizens were being required to bring fuel to power generators in order for surgeries to be performed.\nThe Juba International Airport has also been affected. Since finding new energy sources is a mid- to long-term project, fuel and electricity shortages will thus persist for at least as long as the foreign currency scarcity exists.\nIt is thus essential that the country increase exports, with oil remaining practically the only possibility. Yet the gap between the estimated three to four weeks in currency reserves and the at least four months until production in Unity State resumes constitute a major threat to stability, both financial and societal.\nThere are already claims that the government is printing money (which the government denies) in order to pay salary arrears, and this “solution” will probably be further exploited should Juba run out of foreign currency. This practice will floor the value of the South Sudanese Pound and affect already extreme inflation levels, estimated to be the highest in the world, which would further skyrocket once reserves are depleted. Immediately, the import of fuel, food and other goods would be affected and social tensions inflamed.\nThis economic breakdown also means that those perceived as having access to hard currency will become an even more valuable target for criminal elements. This could translate into an increase in the looting of compounds and convoys of international agencies and NGOs throughout the country. In addition, it could also lead to an increase in robberies against expats and potentially to a surge in kidnappings for ransom, which have not been a common phenomenon thus far in the country. Last, this increased criminality will also reflect in more deadly attacks against vehicles travelling along the commercially crucial roads coming from Uganda.\nIt is imperative, then, that the government promptly find a solution, temporary or more long term, to its accounts deficit. As donors and international institutions are conditioning assistance on political progress, increased stability and economic reforms, including better supervision of government spending, the government of South Sudan will probably turn to its longstanding partner, China. With Beijing having considerable leverage due to Juba’s scarcity of alternatives, South Sudan may be pushed to accept stern conditions for this assistance. DM\nIan Schechtman (@ian_geopol) is an intelligence manager at Max Security Solutions, a geopolitical risk consulting firm based in the Middle East.\nPhoto: Children at Kapuri School, South Sudan, by United Nations via Flickr", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-07-07-south-sudan-economic-woes-threaten-new-crisis/"}
{"doc_id": "d94807cfd39c2f34c51612dffc8fac27", "text": "Amina Mohamed gives Helb defaulters 100pc waiver\nThe Education ministry has given Higher Education Loans Board (Helb) defaulters 100 per cent waiver on penalties until June 30, 2018.\nEducation Cabinet Secretary Amina Mohamed announced the waiver on Thursday when she attended the Helb-Employers Forum.\nInitially, Helb loan defaulters had been granted 80 per cent waiver and the latest move is aimed at boosting repayments.\nHowever, Ms Mohamed said the amnesty only covers those who will pay their debts in lump sum.\nMs Mohamed asked all university students to acquire smart cards from the lending corporation in order to access loans.\nThe CS asked all Helb beneficiaries to repay their outstanding loans to enable the board finance other students.\nShe asked employers to submit deductions to Helb, saying it is not a favour but a legal requirement.\nDEFAULTERS\nHelb Chief Executive Officer Charles Ringera said 17, 000 defaulters cannot be traced.\nLast year, Helb had 85,000 loan defaulters owing Sh9.6 billion.\nA total of 169,909 graduates had fully repaid their loans worth Sh13.2 billion by September 2017, while some 136,783 beneficiaries were servicing loans worth Sh20.7 billion.\nIn 2017, Helb said it had received a surge in notifications from employers indicating retrenchment of their workers resulting in a dip in repayments.\nNAME CHANGE\nDuring the forum, Ms Mohamed announced that Helb is set for a name change.\nThe board will be renamed Tertiary Education Funding Corporation in bid to boost service delivery.\nMs Mohamed urged Helb officials to improve service delivery, saying students and vice chancellors had raised concerns over delay in funds disbursement.\nLast year, the Treasury accused Higher Education ministry officials of failing to develop long-term plans for disbursement of student loans, causing funding shortfalls that hurt learners from poor backgrounds.\nMost of the students in public universities come from poor backgrounds and require financial assistance.\nMeanwhile, the number of students enrolled in universities has grown 56 per cent over the past four years.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://nairobinews.nation.africa/amina-mohamed-gives-helb-defaulters-100pc-waiver/"}
{"doc_id": "4dc75421e3a01ea241e15af19619e6c9", "text": "The independence arch towers high above the makeshift market created to house vendors at the third annual Taste of Ghana festival. The initiative, portraiture of Ghanaian culture through the lenses of food, music, fashion, photography and cinema; creates opportunities for small and medium-scale businesses to audition for customers.\nI had gone to the grounds earlier than expected. Most vendors were still unpacking their items ahead of the arrival of visitors. The huge speakers mounted directly in front of the ARCH, which was a venue for a previous concert and fashion show, were booming with highlife tunes. I soaked it in with a big smile on my face…the tunes were classic; from Amakye Dede, Rex Gyamfi through Daddy Lumba, Kojo Antwi, Ben Brako and more!\nI cast my sight towards the back of the ARCH, into the ocean, where some fishermen had anchored their canoes in search of fish. To the east of the ARCH is the Osu Castle, one time the seat of government, where President John Kufour became the last occupant, before heading to the Jubilee House.\nA British-born Ghanaian woman, in her mid-30s, in the company of friends, fixed her gaze on the castle. Her eyes, stashed behind thick Gucci branded sunglasses while wearing big round earrings engaged the others in a conversation. Dressed in a t-shirt embossed with the image of ganja smoking Bob Marley, she pointed to the castle.\nIn her thick London accent, she asked one of the male friends with a round face and Gye Nyame arm tattoo, about the history behind the Osu Castle and its historical relationship to Ghana. “I am not too sure about which Europeans lived here but Rawlings spent his entire presidency there,” he said. I doubt the lady was impressed by that answer-maybe she wanted more than the answer she got as she shrugged and moved on.\nStill, in the company of her friends, she walked to one of the vendors who had displayed colourful African wear made from batik tie and dye. She foraged through the clothes with her long painted nails. In that same distinct accent, she ran a hard bargain until the vendor caved in. She picked three pieces including a skirt which she wrapped around her waist and posed for a picture by one of her friends. A few yards away, a Khebab seller was busy fanning the flame. As the scent reached her nose, she went closer with friends to grab a charred sausage each. Beaming with smiles, they thinned away into the milling crowd.\nIt was my first time at the event, and I took the opportunity to run through the various vending spots, and see what I was in a position to buy. I had made a commitment not to engage in impulse buying. But the smell of 'konkonte' and groundnut soup with ‘dry fish’ and some nicely sliced okra, resting comfortably on the meal, nearly made me break that vow. The only thing I ended up taking was a chilled palm wine and a coffee book of Ghanaian waterfalls.\nI had my two young children with me and they had a good time. I put them in a Mummy Truck ‘Arrow Glass’ which had been displayed as part of the event, and they both took turns sitting behind the wheel and pretending to be driving it. As a teenager in the early 1990s, I used to get free rides in a Mummy Truck to school, or even the market. The last time I saw one on the road was in Prampram.\nIt had brought a group of football fans from Nungua to back their team in a local football match. I was enchanted by the sight of it. I took photos with my phone and later used the images to accompany an article I wrote about Ghana through the lenses of inscriptions. Despite not being able to attend the nightly events at this festival, like the concerts and fashion shows, I enjoyed the time with family and friends.\nIn its THIRD YEAR, my hope is that the organisers will start thinking about the possibility of replicating it across the regions, to encourage both foreign and domestic tourists to see other interesting places in Ghana. Until next year, I’ll be riding that Mummy Truck in my dreams to far-off regions with sweet Tastes of Ghana on my palate.\nLatest Stories\n-\nThe Roll Call of Biblical Financial Evangelists\n-\nMahama accuses Bawumia of dubbing NDC’s policy promises\n-\nMahama echoes vision for resilient governance and economic recovery at NDC LAB Policy Dialogue\n-\nGSE’s Abena Amoah not on Bawumia’s economy committee\n-\nNDC’s Policy Dialogue marks milestone in pre-election strategy – Mahama\n-\nEOCO to launch lifestyle audits targeting celebrities and individuals with suspected unexplained wealth\n-\nUpper West Akim MP cuts sod for the construction of Mepom to Esaaso Road\n-\nEngineers urged to embrace preview of their works\n-\nParis 2024Q: Zambia edges Ghana 1-0 for crucial first-leg advantage\n-\nDr. Christian Sewordor Mensah: The Role of Sector Skill Bodies in using ESG and CSR Principles in shaping Sustainable Education and Training\n-\nTyler Perry halts $800 film studio build over AI fears\n-\nAkufo-Addo appoints Ofori-Atta as Senior Presidential Advisor\n-\nMIIF aims to position Ghana as electric vehicle hub in Africa\n-\nAvatar: The Last Airbender receives mixed reviews from critics\n-\nMahama slams Police’s decision to dissociate itself from DCOP Waabu’s comments on election security", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.myjoyonline.com/anny-osabutey-beyond-accra-taste-of-ghana-must-be-replicated-in-other-regions/"}
{"doc_id": "40d5b1d95ee2d5f88f412cf18d4daa50", "text": "As part of moves to enhance security in the banking sector and reduce cases of fraud, Clari5, a leading global financial fraud management company has over the last two years partnered with CWG Ghana Limited to prevent crimes in the sector.\nThe partnership is coming at a time the Bank of Ghana (BoG) recently announced that GH¢61 million was lost to banking sector fraud in 2021 as compared to a loss of GH¢25 million in 2020—representing a 144percent increase in year-on-year terms.\nSpeaking to Joy Business on new strategies that will help nip the situation in the bud, the Chief Executive Officer of Clari5, Rivi Varghese said his company has developed new technologies that help stop fraud in the financial sector in real time.\nEmphasizing on the need to adopt real-time technologies to stop fraud, Mr. Varghese disclosed that banks across the world are threatened every day as they are exposed to over $4 trillion fraud problems globally.\n“Clari5 is now processing over 10 billion transactions and managing over 700 million accounts across marquee banks worldwide. With over 200 million accounts at a single site, Clari5 has the world’s largest implementation of a fraud management solution. We believe that the partnership will bring real-time intelligence to stop fraud in Ghana,” Mr. Varghese stressed.\nHe explained that Clari5 does not design products and dump it on banks but rather design tailor-made product depending on the focus and aspiration of the bank and its customers.\n“Every human being has a soul, and banks capture customers’ soul. In fighting banking fraud, some banks take a silo approach or what I call piecemeal approach. You can prevent some basic frauds using a silo approach but when it comes to complex fraud, you need an integrated approach”.\nMr. Varghese maintained that it is important for banks in the financial sector to think outside the box, particularly in the case of Ghana where there is currently a payment revolution through fintechs.\nHe stated that even though fintechs play crucial roles in money transfer and payment, their activities are underwritten by banks which makes it imperative for banks to put in stringent measures to detect fraud that may be triggered from the platform of a fintech.\n“Even though the central banks license fintechs, the responsibility of checking for fraud is largely on the banks. This is because the money is with the banks and not the fintech. The payment revolution in Ghana means that fraud activities may go up.”, he said.\nOn her part, the Managing Director of CWG Ghana Limited, Harriet Attram Yartey, said the partnership will provide a uniform platform that will not only monitor fraud patterns but also detect and stop them in real time to boost confidence in the banking system.\nShe maintained that this is important to keep Ghana’s financial ratings at a globally accepted level to help banks interconnect and partner with global financial giants. “This solution is designed to act like the body’s central nervous system and helps you to prevent financial fraud. I think the most important thing in this discussion is to prevent and not to wait for the fraud to happen before we react,” she said.\nShe stated that the platform will sit with banks but managed by Ghanaians to help transfer knowledge to indigenous IT experts to create jobs.\nLatest Stories\n-\nWe’re not a ‘deaf village’ – Adamorobe residents dismiss misconceptions about their town\n-\nHearts to play RTU in Accra following NSA approval\n-\nMore than 1.8 million Ghanaians were unemployed in the third quarter of 2023\n-\nAfrican Games 2023: Azamati confirms participation\n-\nToni Kroos announces decision to come out of international retirement\n-\nThe African Medical Centre of Excellence (AMCE) Wraps up Successful African Health Forum 2024 in Abuja\n-\nUNEP report reveals increase in CO2 emissions from heavy-duty vehicles\n-\nKyei-Mensah-Bonsu’s return to Parliament after resigning as Majority Leader\n-\nThe Multimedia Group commiserates with Oman FM and Kwabena Kwakye’s family\n-\nUnited by Music: Theme for 2024 Guinness Ghana DJ Awards unveiled\n-\nMore Females getting employed than male counterparts – GSS\n-\nUN report exposes alarming rise in heavy-duty vehicle emissions, trucks driving 80% surge since 2000\n-\nDSL drops new single ‘No Gree’ and visualiser\n-\nYEA recruits 282 people living with disabilities\n-\nAkofa Edjeani, Andrew Adote, others star in ‘Detor’", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.myjoyonline.com/banking-sector-fraud-clari5-partners-cwg-ghana-to-provide-real-time-anti-fraud-solutions/"}
{"doc_id": "8a1468ead8a01227b709411afc034df0", "text": "economic instability\n9 Feb\nWith high inflation, massive foreign debt and widespread poverty, Pakistan's economy has been in crisis for years, presenting major challenges for its next government. We take a closer look. Also, China battles deflation and a stock market meltdown. Plus, Disney looks to boost revenues with a sports streaming platform, video games and Taylor Swift.\nLatest\n2 hours ago\nThe Olympic athletes' village is being inaugurated in Paris's Seine-Saint-Denis department. Finally, we look at February 29, a day with a surprising history and unusual customs!\n2 hours ago\nBerlin hopes the bid to halt US troop withdrawals will buy time for talks with Washington — or lead to the plans being scrapped altogether. President Donald Trump's plans would see 12,000 troops pulled from Germany.\n2 hours ago\nSeveral people are killed in Chad in an attack on the national security agency’s office. The government blames an opposition party.\n4 hours ago\nFilmmaker Nausheen Khan's Land of My Dreams recounts the 2019 Shaheen Bagh protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA). Khan captures the resilience and powerful patriotism of the women at the forefront of the movement, while exploring her own Muslim identity.1\n4 hours ago\nAs Cuba's week-long Habano festival kicks off, partly state-owned cigar manufacturer Habanos SA announced a 31 percent boost in revenue over the course of 2023.\n5 hours ago\nDutch gang leader Ridouan Taghi, once part of a cocaine \"super cartel,\" has been handed life in prison for a string of murders. The violence may be over for now, but organized crime still looms large in the Netherlands.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://tv.guardian.ng/tag/economic-instability/"}
{"doc_id": "d4de7f1906725d35775ba0101409f7ea", "text": "By MARK KAPCHANGA\nKenya is in the spot of bother with revelations that the country could be hosting innumerable firms with billions’ worth of questionable deals.\nWhile Kenya has recently been cashing in on international flows that have highlighted Nairobi’s growing profile as Africa’s financial hub, experts say powerful corporations are using the region as a shelter for their illicit businesses.\nFindings in Africa Progress Report 2013: Equity in Extractives note that the country’s capital is gradually growing into a tax haven, which allows companies to transfer profits between jurisdictions and reduce their tax bills.\nAccording to the report, Kenya could be accommodating an assortment of instruments ranging from international banking and insurance to the structured investment vehicles that were at the core of the 2008/2009 global financial crisis. But in a rejoinder to the growing fears, the Chief Executive Officer of the Kenya Bankers Association Habil Olaka says the country is yet to create a tax environment that would attract more foreign investments.\n“If Nairobi is to compete effectively with Mauritius for international inflows, then it should be made a low tax jurisdiction,” said Mr Olaka.\nThe report reveals an intricate system in which firms use their Kenyan operations to evade taxes through hiding their income, shifting their taxable income as well as receiving and depositing income in accounts in Nairobi without declaring it in the home country.\nshadowy owners\nIn a calculated move to evade tax authorities, these firms make payments to these ‘subsidiaries’ for non-existent services or purchases, whose price is exaggerated in what is known as aggressive transfer pricing, to shift taxable income to the tax haven — finding that KRA was not willing to comment on.\nIn the US, for example, around 732 companies trading on the stock exchanges are incorporated in the Cayman Islands, a British Overseas Territory in the western Caribbean Sea known for its attractive taxes and secrecy.\nIt is this secrecy that has made Nairobi eye-catching. Nearly all firms listed at the Nairobi Securities Exchange have shadowy owners in what is what is also referred to as nominee shareholders. According to the report, this environment that does not call for full disclosure concerning main owners, shareholders, directors and company accounts has seen tax cheat prime their sights on Kenya. Situated strategically between Europe, Africa and to some degree, the Middle East, Kenya provides overseas businesses with a relatively efficient ports infrastructure.\nThe country’s fairly developed infrastructure puts it at a better position than other established and developing offshore centres such as Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius, Djibouti, Morocco, Liberia and Tunisia.\n“The first case in Africa was when Ghana government and Barclays Bank tried to create a tax haven but failed. Botswana tried it later but the harsh anti-money laundering legislations nipped the vice in its bud. Now, we are seeing an emerging trend in Kenya,” said Alvin Mosioma, the Director of Tax Justice Network-Africa. He said the model being adopted in the country is similar to that of the United Arab Emirates, where the term ‘international financial centre’ is tactically used for tax haven.\nIt is not a coincidence that these nations are being fronted as tax havens. The move is linked to the discovery of natural resources. Ghana, for example, was spotted due to its vast natural resources as well as abundant oil in the neighbouring Nigeria.\nIt seems Kenya’s case in no different. The discovery of oil in Turkana and Northern Uganda and gas in Mozambique and Tanzania are likely to aid the flows undetected.\nStay informed. Subscribe to our newsletter\nBut it seems it will not be all gloomy. University of Nairobi lecturer XN Iraki says creation of a tax haven in Kenya would not only improve the country’s infrastructure but also create jobs and lift Nairobi’s image as a business hub.\n“The only danger is that it can be abused if proper regulations are not in place,” said Dr Iraki.\nFredrick Omondi, Partner at Deloitte & Touche, says tax havens could promote tax evasion and money laundering, thereby inviting unnecessary attention and potential sanctions on the country. Omondi, however, says information sharing across different tax regimes and proper regulations could minimise misuse of tax havens. “The Government should streamline the economy across the board instead of creating special zones that will create a gap in the market resulting to a further weakening of the economy,” said Mr Mosioma.\nAccording to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), such countries attract huge financial flows, which often end up exceeding the size of host economies. Unfortunately, these tax havens are often used as conduits for tax avoidance that end up increasing poverty in developing countries.\n“Host countries see such activities as a source of growth and a legitimate area for economic diversification. For critics, these regions are a stark reflection of tax evasion and money laundering triggered by the lack of transparency and regulation that comes with unfettered globalisation,” said María González, an economist at the IMF.\nillicit capital flows\nA recent investigation led by former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan showed that through tax havens, Africa loses about $38 billion (Sh3.2 trillion) a year. This is about 40 per cent of the total amount of international development aid to the continent. Annan’s Africa Progress Report said the continent is essentially losing capital as well as funding development elsewhere, a move that has made it depend on foreign aid.\nThe report revealed mining deals involving two FTSE100 multinationals, which had denied the Democratic Republic of Congo an estimated $1.36 billion, about 200 per cent of the country’s education and health budgets combined. “Africa loses twice as much in illicit financial outflows as it receives in international aid,” said Annan. “It is unconscionable that some companies, often supported by dishonest officials, are using unethical tax avoidance, transfer pricing and anonymous company ownership to maximise their profits, while millions of Africans go without adequate nutrition, health and education.”\nThe gravity of the matter has seen Europe expend a lot of effort in fighting the illicit capital flows, especially due to the role they played in exacerbating the global financial crisis. This explains why the issue top on the agenda of the G8 summit that started in June 17 in Northern Ireland.\nWhile discounting the fears that Kenya may be becoming a tax haven, EU Head of Delegation in Nairobi, Lodewijk Briet said the increasing tax appetite in Europe could, however, be forcing more tax cheats to hibernate to countries considered less stringent. “The appetite of the tax authorities in Europe has grown exponentially and increasing information sharing between tax authorities is making Africa a more attractive destination for hiding funds,” Briet said.\nLike a cancer, the vice is insidious and often hard to check against. Mosioma says the complexity of the subject means it cannot be addressed at the national level but through international legislation and automatic exchange of tax information. Today, it is only through a bilateral agreement that such information can be shared. Worse is the fact that the threshold put to pursue such an avenue is strenuous, time consuming and very expensive.\nThis means by the time a country is done with an investigation, the funds would already have been moved to a new jurisdiction. But UK Prime Minister David Cameron has pledged that G8 will seek to maintain the momentum generated by the G20 on information exchange and the strengthening of international tax standards.\nHe said the Summit will look to go further on tax havens by improving the quality and quantity of tax information exchange. “We will work with developing countries to help them improve their ability to collect the tax that is due to them too,” said Mr Cameron. According to Mr Mosioma, the illicit capital flows could also be checked through a mechanism of registry of companies where beneficial owners of the questionable entities can be traced.\n“More importantly, the International Financial Reporting Standards should be reformed so as to compel firms to report their operations on a country by country basis instead of just consolidating their results,” he said. The US and France have already adopted a similar plan.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000086721/nairobi-s-tax-shelter-status-booming-as-firms-flee-tough-laws"}
{"doc_id": "75dba69a07c3cab0f543243e99be7aec", "text": "Trade and industry minister Ebrahim Patel says that South Africa continues to face problems with the implementation of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policies, despite their importance to the country’s growth plans.\nIn an address to the annual Black Business Council this week, Patel said that this includes the use of fronting arrangements and gaming of the empowerment rules by firms to either evade the BEE requirements or artificially inflate the true extent of transformation.\n“Where data and claims by firms are not adequately quality-controlled, or the rules are imprecisely formulated to enable the system to be ‘played’ different to the spirit of transformation, they result in legitimate public scepticism on the real impact of BEE,” he said.\nThe funding mechanisms, particularly the use of certain vendor funding structures, in many cases limits the real benefit in BEE transactions, he said.\n“Many of these deals have been structured using what one can only call ‘heroic’ assumptions about asset price growth.”\nPatel said that many of these deals are now ‘underwater’ – meaning the beneficiaries have not been able to realise the value they were promised, leaving the established firms with the BEE scorecard benefits without providing apparent beneficiaries with any real gain.\nThe minister said that these and other issues require review and that a panel will be established to consider the challenges and identify measures to ensure that the policy benefits a wide number of South Africans.\n“(There is) deep concern among communities and workers that the benefits of BEE are in many cases too narrowly captured by a few individuals, that workers and their collective vehicles are left out of gains in such instances.\n“Where worker-ownership schemes are in place, they in many cases do not provide for one of the key elements of ownership, namely the right to nominate and appoint board members,” he said.\nChanges made to Competition Act\nPatel said that changes have also been made to South Africa’s Competition Act, with transformation placed at the centre of competition policy.\nThis includes:\n- Measures to address price discrimination against smaller businesses and firms owned by black South Africans;\n- New curbs on abuse of power by dominant firm;\n- New powers to the regulators to deal with economic concentration that results in exclusion of black South Africans in the economy.\nThese competition rules were in play this week when the Competition Commission blocked the acquisition of Burger King SA by private equity fund, ECP Africa, on the grounds that the deal would result in black ownership of the company dropping from 68% to 0%.\nThe commission prohibited the acquisition purely on BEE grounds, having otherwise found that the deal was unlikely to result in a substantial prevention or lessening of competition in any relevant markets.\nPatel said that the recent actions against exclusive lease agreements in shopping malls and the opening up of car repair and panel beating markets to township players, also illustrate what is needed\n“Strengthening the economy in a society with significant legacy challenges and deep levels of inequality, requires extraordinary measures.\n“Growth requires deeper inclusion so that our base of enterprise is widened. If we are to develop the national consensus on growth that we urgently need, and the sense that we are in this together, it needs to be based on communities, the unemployed, workers, black entrepreneurs, women, young people and the rural poor seeing a path to jobs and prosperity,” Patel said.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/495821/government-doubles-down-on-enforcing-bee-rules-in-south-africa/"}
{"doc_id": "631b626e843b6a469e51470fff75280b", "text": "By Kimberly Mutandiro\nJohn first heard of cryptocurrency three years ago, when the teenager came across slick YouTube videos and Facebook posts of other South Africans claiming to have become wealthy overnight with bitcoin.\nInspired, the then 14-year-old downloaded a trading app, lied about his age in order to set up an account, and began buying and selling crypto with his savings.\nHe soon made small profits, but as the crypto market slumped this year, John lied again – to his parents, who did not know about his trading activities – to get money to cover his losses.\n\"I will pay it back when I get rich,\" said John, who lives in Langaville Township, a low-income neighbourhood east of Johannesburg. He asked that his last name be withheld.\nJohn, who likes to wear designer T-shirts and jeans, said dozens of teenagers in his township also trade cryptocurrencies, hoping to emulate the influencers and self-styled crypto experts they follow on YouTube and Instagram.\n\"I now coach other boys in the community,\" John told the Thomson Reuters Foundation in a park where he often hangs out with his friends, who also trade in crypto.\n\"All you need is a cellphone, a bank account and a few bucks, and I will show you how to make the big money,\" he said, adding that he has about 20 clients who pay him a fee of R300 to R400 for showing them how to set up accounts and trade.\nSouth Africa ranks eighth worldwide in terms of crypto ownership among the public – 7.1% of its population owned digital currency in 2021, more than in Britain or Brazil – according to the UN trade agency (UNCTAD). Ownership is also high in Kenya and Nigeria among African nations.\nA more recent survey, published this month by financial information firm finder.com, put crypto ownership in South Africa at 10%, with those aged 18 to 34 making up 43% of holders.\nWhile there is no such data on South Africans below the age of 18, more youngsters are getting involved in the hopes of quick riches, even as authorities and financial experts warn about the dangers of fraud, massive losses and mental anguish.\nYoung South Africans are choosing to trade in crypto instead of getting a college education and finding a job without understanding the risks, said Asheer J Ram, a senior lecturer at the University of Witwatersrand.\n\"There is an allure of making money through crypto trading that can be very persuasive… but with the risks involved and a lack of understanding of these risks, it can be very detrimental,\" said Ram, who researches cryptocurrency.\nFraudulent schemes\nCryptocurrencies were designed to be free of central financial authorities such as governments and central banks.They allow for \"peer-to-peer\" transfers between users online without any intermediaries.\nWhile offering users in crisis zones and unstable economies an alternative, their relative anonymity also provides a haven for criminals, extremist groups and sanctioned governments. A sharp downturn in value recently has hurt many users.\nThe South African Reserve Bank, SA’s central bank, last month said it would allow ownership and trading of cryptocurrencies, as well as its use for remittances. But it remains lightly regulated.\nFraud is a major concern: founders of a cryptocurrency exchange in the country, Africrypt, disappeared in 2021 after telling clients their accounts had been hacked. The loss of about around R65 billion is among the biggest crypto losses worldwide.\nAnd in June this year, a US regulator filed civil charges against a South African man and his company for soliciting bitcoin from thousands of people as part of a fraudulent scheme worth more than $1.7bn in bitcoin.\nSouth African police have warned the public about fraudulent crypto schemes, said Thandi Mbamo, a spokesperson for the crime investigation unit.\n\"We are investigating the cases,\" she said, without giving more details.\nYoungsters such as John are particularly susceptible, according to Ram.\n\"They may not fully understand the technological complexities and lack of regulation in the space, and issues around hacking of accounts and theft,\" Ram said.\n\"They get caught up in making money quickly. But they can get taken advantage of and lose all their money,\" he said, while also warning of potential negative impacts on mental health.\nStressed out\nUnknown to his parents, who do odd jobs for a living, John has been skipping school, surfing YouTube for trading tips, and trying to lure more clients with his flashy clothes and a picture of a pile of banknotes on his WhatsApp profile.\nWhen he does attend school, he says he is unable to concentrate, distracted by alerts on his trading app, and tired from staying up late watching YouTube and TikTok.\nOnce a straight-A student, John's grades have dropped. Buthe remains hopeful of success.\n\"In the township, life is not that easy. I want to grow my crypto business and make enough profit to start other businesses,\" he said. \"I think trading is my future.\"\nFor John and other poor young South Africans, well-paid jobs appear out of reach given persistently high unemployment levels.\nTiamo, 15, said he was stressed by the volatility, and from having to lie to his mother about what he does with his money.\nTiamo, who asked that his surname be withheld, has been into crypto since receiving a spam WhatsApp message in March saying: \"Do you know you can make up to R85 000 within two days?\"\nHe responded, and started chatting to a 19-year-old, who helped him set up a crypto trading account and gave him tips.\nIn the first week, Tiamo lost R1 000 of his savings. He told his mother that he had been robbed, and has since told her more lies and skipped school to trade and try to make up his losses.\n\"I will get it right one day,\" said Tiamo, who lives with his single mother and two siblings in KwaThema Township in Johannesburg.\n\"My mother is battling to put food on the table. I can't stop now.\"\nREUTERS", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/personal-finance/my-money/sa-teens-skip-school-to-chase-after-risky-crypto-dreams-63860358-89e3-567a-a4d2-899d8ad84f33"}
{"doc_id": "d463db8f46b8ac580400f9b5ed44aef3", "text": "Nedbank has unveiled its online personal financial management tool, My Financial Life, which aims to help South Africans manage their finances and encourage a more proactive savings culture.\nIn May, Treasury put South Africa’s gross national saving rate at 16%, while a survey conducted by Old Mutual found that economic uncertainty is causing South Africans to postpone making key financial decisions, including saving.\nAccording to Nedbank, its new tool provides a consolidated view of a user’s entire financial position online and will be available to new and existing clients by the end of August, the bank said.\nMy Financial Life enables clients to link accounts from various banks and non-banking financial services providers in a “highly secure environment”, which is enabled through a security mechanism called Approve-IT.\nThe bank said there is a plan to bolt on apps as the bank continues to construct its “digital highway”. On Monday (23 July), Nedbank shared its app journey with a select audience, although it stopped short of officially announcing its App Suite open to the public.\nThe group announced the launch of its digital banking app in-house in June (although it started in March), giving staff beta access to the App Suite ahead of the planned public release.\nAt launch, My Financial Life will provide users with six core functions to customize their dashboard in line with their individual financial interests and requirements including a net worth calculation too; a spend analysis function; a budgeting tool; a saving for a goal feature; alerts; and a calendar view, which helps clients to track debit orders against payments that need to be paid.\nThe core functionality will be available to new and existing clients at no cost. The bank says that future additional value added functionality may be priced separately, as these become available.\n“This is just the beginning, said Ingrid Johnson managing executive of retail and business banking. “We will be consistently adding functionality based on clients’ needs and asking our clients to innovate with us.”\nRelated articles", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businesstech.co.za/news/banking/18774/nedbank-unveils-my-financial-life/"}
{"doc_id": "1a3b8769405bc3e76c520457046c0033", "text": "East African Breweries Limited (EABL) #ticker:EABL says it will increase the prices of its alcoholic products including beers and spirits if the Treasury implements a proposal to raise excise taxes on the products.\nEABL managing director Jane Karuku says a tax increase will be a shock to the business, given that the sector is still reeling from the economic aftershocks of the Covid 19 pandemic.\n\"I think the tax changes will be a disaster. Ten percent is too much. It will make beer and spirits very expensive. It will affect the whole ecosystem from farmers, bar owners and distributors. It will not be good for anybody,\" Ms Karuku said on Tuesday.\nShe declined to specify the planned increase but said the brewer will have no choice but to pass on the additional burden of tax to consumers if the tax proposals are adopted.\nMs Karuku told the press that with inflation rising amid higher costs of production, a tax rise would make brands expensive and increase the cost of doing business.\nIn the Finance Bill 2022, Treasury Cabinet Secretary Ukur Yatani has proposed to raise the consumption tax on beer by Sh12.15 per litre to Sh134, wine by Sh20.80 to Sh229, while spirits like whisky, gin, rum and vodka will attract Sh47.60 additional tax to Sh335.30 per litre.\n\"What do we do?\" She posed to questions from the Business Daily.\n\"There are so many things that are going wrong from an inflation perspective: Oil prices are going to affect us, the Ukraine Russia crisis, and now we are hit with excise just when we are trying to survive Covid,\" she added.\nTreasury Cabinet Secretary Ukur Yatani has proposed to heavily beer products by raising the excise duty.\nIf Treasury proposals become law, a litre of beer will attract an excise duty of Sh134 from the current Sh121.8.\nThe same quantity of spirits such as whiskey, gin and rum will be slapped with a higher sin tax of Sh335.30 up from Sh287.7.\nWine will attract Sh229 compared to the current rate of Sh208.2.\nMr Yatani said the higher excise, which is separate from the annual adjustment for inflation, is among new tax measures meant to help the government generate an additional Sh50.4 billion in the 2022/2023 fiscal year.\nKenyans are currently grappling with the elevated cost of living due to higher prices of many essential goods such as cooking oil, flour, milk and cooking gas.\nThis has forced many households, especially in the low-income segment, to reduce their shopping basket in an environment where firms have frozen salaries as they recover from Covid-19 economic hardships.\nEABL more than doubled its net profit to Sh8.7 billion in the half-year ended December, helped by increased sales on the reopening of bars and pubs.\nThe company had made a net profit of Sh3.7 billion a year earlier.\nThe performance saw the brewer return to paying dividends, declaring an interim payout of Sh3.7 per share or an aggregate of Sh2.96 billion.\nEABL suspended dividends after the economic crisis and closure of bars eroded its earnings in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic. The company last paid an interim dividend of Sh3 per share for the half-year ended December 2019.\nThe brewer had been hit in the wake of Covid-19 restrictions, including the night curfew and reduced drinking hours in pubs.\nEABL profit growth was helped by higher net sales which increased 23.4 percent to Sh54.8 billion from Sh44.4 billion.\n“Across the region, we have seen an easing of Covid-19 restrictions contributing to a more favourable trading environment, as consumers return to pubs and bars,” the brewer said in a statement. “The broader economic rebound across East Africa continues to strengthen consumer demand across all our product categories, supporting our overall performance.”\nIn Kenya, EABL’s biggest market, restrictions on bars and pubs’ operating hours were removed in October last year.\nThe move helped increase net sales in the local market by 27 percent, the company said. Net sales in Uganda and Tanzania on the other hand rose 18 percent and 15 percent respectively.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/companies/eabl-to-raise-beer-price-if-tax-passed-3795448"}
{"doc_id": "19468eeb09922696a05f2af32a1b26d9", "text": "Woolworths has seen a big boost in profit and earnings after dropping the Australian department store chain David Jones.\nIn a trading statement for the 52 weeks ended 25 June 2023, Woolworths said that its Earnings per share (EPS), Headline EPS (HEPS) and adjusted diluted HEPS (adHEPS) were expected to be 20% higher than the reported prior year.\nThe current financial year only had a 9-month contribution from David Jones, whilst the prior year had a full 12 months.\nHowever, the group said its earnings are now expected to be far higher than the prior 20% predictions.\nBelow are the Total group expectations for the 52 weeks ended 25 June 2023:\nDavid Jones sale\nWoolworths completed the sale of David Jones to Anchorage Partners in March 2023, which took about R17 billion of liabilities off Wooloworth’s books.\nWoolworths acquired David Jones in 2014 for roughly A$2.2 billion (about R22 billion at the time).\n“The history here has been a painful one. The transaction allows us to overnight improve our return on capital by several percentage points,” Woolworths Chief Executive Officer Roy Bagattini said.\nWoolworths initially tried to replicate its success in the South African food business with David Jones, but it simply didn’t work, with Bagattini noting that the retailers are fundamentally different.\nWhereas Woolworths sells mainly its own-branded goods, David Jones looks to offer other brands.\nWoolworths does still own the flagship store in Melbourne, which is being leased to David Jones on a long-term basis on market-related terms.\nWoolworths said it is returning to its core clothing range while refocusing on its five local brands and other Australian business Country Road.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/712696/good-times-for-woolworths/"}
{"doc_id": "ada2779a066597d05c9d479dd30b8013", "text": "An Accra Circuit Court has for the sixth time and in seven months turned down a bail application by six persons standing trial over a bullion van attack in Accra.\nThe court presided over by Mrs Patricia Amponsah declined the bail application, awaiting the advice of the Attorney General.\nThe trial judge therefore adjourned the matter to September 20.\nPolice Inspector Isaac Babayi who held the brief of Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) Sylvester Asare, told the Court that his instructions were that he was to seek adjournment to enable the substantive prosecutor to appear at the next adjourned date to inform the court on the extent of investigations carried out in the case.\nWhen the matter was called on Thursday, Defence counsels took turns to pray for bail for their clients.\nLawyers for the accused persons held that it looks as if prosecution was not interested in the case as prosecution seem to bring out excuses all the time.\n“However, since the accused persons were in detention, we will repeat our application for bail,” the lawyers argued.\nAccording to defence counsels, their clients had been in custody for the past seven months and the court had also turned down their bail application on five occasions.\nThe accused persons are: General Constables Yaro Afisu Ibrahim, Albert Ofosu aka “Cypher,” Richard Boadu aka “Osor,” Rabiu Jambedu, Nelson Tetteh and Badu Zakari, all Police recruits as well as Baba Zakari, aka Rasta, a civilian mechanic.\nThey are facing charges of conspiracy to rob and robbery. The accused persons have denied the various charges. Prosecution has also sent a duplication to the Office of the Attorney General for advice\nProsecution’s case was that General Constables Yaro, Fosu, Boadu, Rabiu and Tettey are recruit mates and friend whiles Zakaria is a motor mechanic.\nIn the year 2021, the Ghana Police Services recorded a series of bullion vans and street robberies within the Greater Accra Region and as such surveillance was mounted.\nProsecution held that on February 22, 2022, and upon a tip off that those armed men attacked a bullion van with registration number GN 424-14 at North Kaneshie, investigation led to the arrest of one Constable Reindolph Gyimah Ansah alias Pablo and Lance Corporal Stephen Nyame both deceased.\nIt said further investigations led to the arrest of the accused persons.\nProsecution said the Constables, including the deceased officers, after their basic training were posted to the National SWAT Unit, Police headquarters, while Tettey was posted to the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), Wa.\nThe Court heard that Yaro, Fosu, Rabiu and Tettey when posted to their respective Units, underwent various tactical and specialised weapon training to equip them for the function of their Units which included escort and protection of Bullion Vans.\nFurther investigations revealed that in February 2022, accused persons including their deceased colleagues and those at large, agreed, attacked, and attempted robbing Mon-Tran Ghana’s Bullion Van with registration number GN 424-14.\nProsecution held that accused persons shot the bullet proof van with AK47 Rifles and used Royal motorbikes allegedly belonging to Tettey and same used by accused persons’ accomplices now at large.\nIt said Boadu’s duty was to monitor the van and feed the gang with information.\nLatest Stories\n-\nMinisterial reshuffle: Akufo-Addo names caretaker ministers\n-\nUK-Ghana Science, Technology & Innovation Strategy: Ghanaian delegation arrives in London to explore opportunities for implementation\n-\nFGR to recapitalize Bogoso Prestea Mine as part of planned restructuring\n-\n”Some people are bringing Hearts of Oak to a lower level; I won’t accept it” – Coach Aboubakar Ouattara\n-\nUniversity of Ghana revises plagiarism policy to include AI\n-\nPrivate tertiary institutions must charter before August 31 – GTEC warns\n-\nKenneth Mitchell: ‘Star Trek’ and ‘Marvel’ actor dead at 49\n-\nBawumia lauds Ahmadiyya Muslim Mission for contributions to Ghana’s development\n-\nIf I can do it, you can too – Adekunle Gold to sickle cell survivors\n-\nReview BoG’s Inflation Targeting framework – US-based economist\n-\nBright Simons’ full argument against Agyapa Deal\n-\n2024 Elections: More pink-slime websites to outnumber legitimate news sites – Research\n-\nParis 2024Q: ‘We showed we are able to play amazing football’ – Nora Hauptle on performance against Zambia\n-\nBlame government for increasing unemployment and not universities – Gatsi\n-\nUkraine war: Indians ‘duped’ by agents into fighting for Russia", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.myjoyonline.com/bullion-van-robbery-case-court-declines-bail-awaits-ags-advice/"}
{"doc_id": "7048cf45ae4a71ba3b0f834b845dd349", "text": "London-listed Airtel Africa Plc has ceded a 25.77 percent stake in its local mobile money business as part of a continent-wide deal that has seen it raise $550 million (Sh64.2 billion) from four institutional investors.\nThe multinational’s interest in Airtel Money Kenya Limited dropped to 74.23 percent in the year ended March from 100 percent a year earlier.\nIt also disclosed a similar reduction in ownership in Airtel Mobile Commerce (Kenya) Limited in the review period.\nSimilar changes in ownership of the mobile money businesses were also witnessed in markets such as Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zambia.\nAirtel Africa has disclosed the share sale of the subsidiaries in its latest annual report as a prospect of a cashless Africa triggers a scramble for control of its payments platforms.\nALSO READ: Airtel seeks to delay listing of Uganda unit\nThe record-breaking deal values Airtel Money at Sh250 billion, indicates that the rival M-Pesa platform, available in Kenya and five other African markets such as Tanzania and Mozambique, could be valued even higher.\nAirtel had earlier announced it was selling a minority stake in its mobile money business in Africa to raise cash, with the part of the funds used to reduce the group’s debt.\n\"We received a minority investment of $550 million (Sh64.2 billion) from four investors in Airtel Mobile Commerce B.V.,\" the multinational says in the report.\n\"The Rise Fund invested $200 million, Mastercard $100 million, Qatar Holding LLC (QIA) $200 million and $50 million from Chimera Investment LLC.\"\nIn the agreements, the mobile money businesses were to be folded into the holding company Airtel Mobile Commerce B.V. which is registered in the Netherlands.\nThe multinational’s interest in Airtel Money Kenya Limited could drop further after the government passed a policy requiring the telco to sell at least a 30 percent stake in the business to local investors.\n\"Airtel Money Kenya Limited, which holds a Content Service Provider Licence from the Communications Authority of Kenya, with effect from November 2020, has three years from the date of the licence to comply with the requirement to have 30 percent local shareholding,\" the multinational said.\n\"Under the amended ICT policy, a licensee may apply to the Ministry for ICT for an extension to comply with the requirement, or obtain an exemption.\"\nA similar rule also applies to Airtel Networks Kenya Limited, which provides cellular services and is currently fully owned by the multinational. The minority stakes sold in Airtel Money across the African markets signal the huge value of mobile financial service platforms.\nM-Pesa’s reach recently spread to more than 200 countries after a deal with global payments firm Visa. M-Pesa is offered by Kenya’s Safaricom and by subsidiaries of South Africa’s Vodacom Group.\nAirtel Money generated $553 million (Sh64.6 billion) revenues in the African markets in the year ended March users of the platform stood at 26.2 million.\nALSO READ: Airtel Kenya pays Sh581m for 10-year telecoms licence\nOver the same period, M-Pesa had 47.1 million customers and revenues of Sh145.6 billion in Kenya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Mozambique, and Tanzania.\nBoth Airtel, Safaricom, and South Africa’s Vodacom see mobile money as presenting growth and diversification opportunities and have invested billions of shillings to develop new offshoots of their platforms’ core offerings of cash transfers and payments.\nAirtel Money has struggled in the Kenyan market where it had less than 800,000 active customers in December against M-Pesa’s 26.2 million.\nThe service is, however, more successful in other African markets.\n\"Total transaction value increased to $64.4 billion (Sh7.5 trillion), up by 37 percent in the year ended March in constant currency. Transaction value per customer per month was $223 (Sh26,079), an increase of 13.9 percent in constant currency,\" Airtel Africa said.\n\"This was driven by both customer base growth and increased adoption of Airtel Money services, mainly in person-to-person, cash-in and cash-out transactions. Annualised transaction value now stands at $64.3 billion (Sh7.5 trillion) in the fourth quarter of 2022 in constant currency.\"\nThe prospect for growth has created a flurry of activity. African banks are scrambling to launch basic mobile accounts while investors are scouring for deal making.\nM-Pesa meanwhile processes more than 52 million transactions daily with a cumulative value of $324.6 billion (Sh37.9 trillion) in the year ended March. The platform serves 550,000 merchants through 510,000 agents in the DRC, Kenya, Lesotho, Mozambique and Tanzania.\n\"Alongside M-Pesa, which is expected to further establish itself as Africa’s largest fintech provider through the implementation of an enhanced product road map, VodaPay will be instrumental in our quest in connecting the next 100 million African customers so that no one is left behind,\" Vodacom said.\nAirtel Africa says the low uptake of traditional banking services continues to be the main driver of demand for mobile money services.\nThe platform currently offers mobile wallet deposits and withdrawals, merchant and commercial payments, benefits transfers, loans and savings, virtual credit cards, and international money transfers.\nALSO READ: Airtel Kenya pays Sh1.1bn for licence\nThe multinational has sought to expand the subscriber base and use of its mobile money platform through partnerships with multiple financial service firms.\nIt has, for instance, signed agreements with cash remittance companies MoneyGram, Mukuru and WorldRemit.\nThe telecom operator also plans to introduce new banking and remittance services in partnership with London-based lender Standard Chartered Plc, which has subsidiaries operating in 16 African markets.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/companies/airtel-sells-mobile-cash-unit-stake-for-sh64-2bn-3843940"}
{"doc_id": "1d7985f06ce03efefcc0d0a04756d25f", "text": "For over a century women and men with dreams of other peoples’ equality and dignity in their hearts were prepared to sacrifice their own life possibilities in the belief that a better society was possible. In the end, their dreams were unstoppable and on 27 April 1994 they took 35 million expectant people over the finishing line to freedom. Tragically, however, the baton has been dropped and besmirched by those to whom they handed it. And yet, the future can still be made better for all South Africans. By MARK HEYWOOD.\nA long, long time ago King Lear roamed the moorland in a dizzied state of madness, braving a heavy storm, defeated by his daughters and their armies. Perhaps shaken by the lightning, he suddenly found a common humanity with the poor of his former realm.\nIn words that have rung through the ages he cried out:\nPoor naked wretches, whereso’er you are,\nThat bide the pelting of this pitiless storm,\nHow shall your houseless heads and unfed sides,\nYour looped and windowed raggedness, defend you\nFrom seasons such as these?\nThen, in agony at realisation of the inequality and indignity he has been complicit in, Lear lamented:\nOh, I have ta’en\nToo little care of this!\nShakespeare’s tragedy, King Lear, was published in 1606. At that time the world’s population was estimated to number about 550 million people. Shakespearean England was still full of kings, queens, lords and serfs. It was a time before the industrial revolution, before colonialism, before neo-colonialism, before neo-liberalism, before neo. It was before electricity, the steam engine, the car, the airplane, the Internet and e-mail.\nA barren world – relatively.\nFast forward the tape by 400 years. Sadly, the heart of the human condition that a repentant King Lear cried out against remains unchanged. In the words Thomas Piketty uses to introduce his book, “The distribution of wealth is one of today’s most widely discussed and controversial issues.”\nBut today, instead of infecting a few million people a profound, painful, undignified, humanity-diminishing inequality cloaks several billion ‘poor naked wretches’ across our planet.\nInequality is an awful indictment of the selfishness of centuries of rulers. It is testimony that, while we have built glorious civilisations, the elites have been unwilling to share wealth mainly accumulated from the labour of the wretched.\nSouth Africa 2015 has become a microcosm and exemplar of this inequality. Here ‘unfed sides’ and ‘looped and windowed raggedness’ face us on every street corner.\nPoverty, inequality and state failure to meet basic needs is smog that envelops three quarters of our people, blighting their lives – and ours. Two events in the last few weeks made me realise how far we have sunk.\nTwo tales of the price of inequality\nOn 25 and 26 March the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) held public hearings on the state of emergency medical services in the Eastern Cape.\nWe may all have a medical emergency sometime. And when if it happens ambulances, trained emergency personnel and basic equipment such as oxygen are essential. They are part of the constitutional right of “everyone to have access to health care services”, a right that also states, “no one may be refused emergency medical treatment”.\nThis is a significant legal obligation on the state and should be a great reassurance to a free people. But what happens if there are no emergency medical services to provide the treatment to which people are constitutionally entitled?\nThis is the case across large swathes of the Eastern Cape (and many other parts of our realm); the resulting complaint to the SAHRC was the reason for holding the hearings.\nThus it was that in a dimmed cavernous hall in East London over 200 people gathered to tell their sad tales. There was always a danger that hearings like these become another pro forma talk-about-suffering fest. But this was different because rather than their intermediaries the real people were here.\n“I am grateful to hear the government provides these things called ambulances. We have never seen one,” said one woman.\nAnother: “For seven years, my child was sick. Every month, I had to take the child to hospital and had to hire a car. The clinics we have are beyond rivers and very far away. I struggled forever always having to pay R800. When (we) arrived at hospital, the nurses would ask: ‘Don’t you have money from the government to attend to this person? Why did you come late? Why didn’t you come early?’ You will just break down and cry when they say such things. My child, who was seven years old, died last year.”\n‘Sometimes the nurse will use her own car (to take a patient to hospital) because the nurse cannot endure to see someone in pain. We used to think that the phone was never answered because we are uneducated and live in villages but when even the sister cannot get an answer…’ said another.”\nWith words like these, after a few hours, the hearing assumed something of the cathartic feel of the truth and reconciliation commission. Victim after victim spoke out of the horrors they had experienced. Unfortunately nobody from the responsible government departments seemed willing to make a full disclosure to the victims about why their precious – hard won – rights to life, dignity, health care services meant so little.\nInvisible MECs of the Eastern Cape Health Department, Treasury and Public Works listen sympathetically to community members.\nAfter the conclusion of day two, I realised something obvious. South Africa is not a failed state. Neither is it a society deprived of resources to such an extent that it cannot function and cannot provide essential services. South Africa can provide quality health services that are as good as anywhere in the world.\nIt simply doesn’t (and won’t) do so for most of our people, that is the poor and those who can’t pay.\nLet the poor die.\nA day later, I was in Bloemfontein for the criminal trial of 117 community health workers charged with ‘attending an illegal gathering’ way back in July 2014 – that is, an all night prayer vigil outside the office of the provincial health department to try and get their jobs back.\nThe night before all 117 slept in a school hall and, in another vigil that went on until early hours of the morning, the ragged and tired faces of mostly women health workers told stories of how they have survived since they and 3,000 others lost their jobs to an impersonal Free State health department memorandum in June 2014.\nIf you added up these workers years of service, you would find that they have thousands of years work experience. At the height of the Aids and TB epidemics they provided health services in a province that is desperately short of health care. But they have been cast out because of a budget constrained by… corruption.\nWhen it comes to budget cuts women from far-flung rural towns and villages are the softest cut and easiest saving. Some have been re-employed. But most remain out of work because they are not fully literate or because they are older and expendable.\nOn the day of the trial itself despite being at the court by 8.30am, as instructed by the law, the group were left to bake in the streets until an unconcerned senior prosecutor had dealt with his other business.\nHours later all 117 were jammed into a court smaller than an RDP house, only to be told to come back again in July for a criminal trial of last at least four days. That will be their fifth self-funded trip to the courts. Does the NPA not have better things to do?\nPhoto: Community health workers on trial, packed into court in a way that Magistrate Barry described as “undignified and humane, like sardines.”\nExperiences like those described above are being repeated daily across the country. With the squeeze on quality journalism they are mostly untold. Felt only by those who feel them.\nEnd of the heroic tradition\nThese stories make it abundantly clear that in South Africa we live on the tail end of a heroic tradition.\nFor over a century women and men with dreams of other peoples’ equality and dignity in their hearts were prepared to sacrifice their own life possibilities (love, living, literature, children, mountains…) in the belief that a better society was possible.\nIn the end, their dreams were unstoppable and on 27 April 1994 they took 35 million expectant people over the finishing line to freedom.\nTragically, however, the baton has been dropped and besmirched by those they handed it to. Many – if not most – have become obsessively preoccupied with their own lives and power. “I did not struggle to be poor” is the unspoken mantra of the new political elite. But neither did the left-behind poor.\nSo what is to be done?\nIn recent months, particularly in its antics and anemic explanations around the State of the Nation speech, we have seen how easily the African National Congress leadership now confuses its electoral authority, which remains secure, with its moral authority, which it has entirely lost.\nMoral authority was what Nelson Mandela had, what Chris Hani had, what Ruth First had. Moral authority allowed Mandela to stop the outbreak of civil war with nothing but words after the murder of Hani.\nMoral authority is what was missing at Marikana, Malumulele and a thousand other sites of wanton violence. Its absence can’t stop murderous xenophobia.\nIn the moral vacuum government leaders still talk patronisingly of “our people”. But a situation where “our people” vote for the best of all evils, on a slender hope that a portion of the China-Gupta-Motsepe-who-knows-who-funded promises might be true, or that they might benefit from the trickle down of conspicuous corruption is a dangerous situation. It makes for a volatile, violent, drunken and increasingly desperate society.\nA United Front against inequality and for social justice\nWe live in a sea of troubles. So, how do we end them?\nInequalities and injustice lie behind the ferment in our politics. Up to now they have fuelled endless chatter and the equally endless inaction. However, the expulsion of Zwelinzima Vavi and the looming split in Cosatu marks the end of the Alliance’s ability to police a post-Apartheid political consensus.\nIn the last two years there have been several mainly well-intentioned but thwarted attempts to create new forces for change, including the Economic Freedom Fighters. But the plans now afoot to launch a United Front (UF) seem to suggest a space may open up for a new politics. Amongst the many, many people who are disaffected – and maybe even frightened – by the ANC’s decline are many people watching closely, fingers crossed, to see what emerges from this radical splinter. It espouses equality and dignity – but does it really mean to chase change?\nFor many sympathetic observers the big question is what politics – or more importantly what vision and programme of action – will the UF adopt?\nSome argue that the UF is the prelude to a socialist workers’ party. My fear is that attempting to achieve social justice through the launch of a workers’ party will fail – and it will delay change. There will be sound, fury – lots of self-satisfying radical socialist rhetoric that allows a cleaning of souls – but little action that brings change and betterment.\nWhat we really need to do now is to build on what we have, citizens’ power to hold every level of government, every government department and the private sector accountable. We need to educate, empower and organise people around the rights they won in 1994 to demand that the government they elected in 2014 deliver the rights entrenched in the Constitution in 1996.\nAt this stage the United Front is still embryonic and its path unclear. But if it advanced a radical constitutionalism it could have the potential to unify millions. There is no need to hark back to the Freedom Charter. Our supreme law is a radical one. It gives the people great power. It mandates a government that is democratic, based on human rights, equality and the achievement of social justice.\nSocial justice, words that are indelibly inked into the Preamble of the Constitution = substantive equality.\nIf the United Front is to capture the popular imagination and inspire action it needs to plot a path to reverse inequality. It is vital that it transcends old ideology. Unregulated capitalism – the Pandora’s box that Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher opened to benefit the one per cent and infect the rest with a plague – are certainly responsible for a great many evils. But it does not follow that tomorrow’s struggle should be for an impossible socialism.\nWe have power – if we use it. Campaigns by relatively small numbers of people, such as the struggle for ARV medicines led by the Treatment Action Campaign which has saved over two million lives, have shown that inequality can be narrowed, the abuse of private power can be defeated – and it can be done within the framework of the existing state and economy.\nCall me a “reformist” if you will but politicians can be forced to do what the people demand. We may not get socialism this way, but we can create quality jobs, quality schools, quality health systems, an economy that starts to grow again and accountable government.\nTherefore, those who truly believe in equality and dignity – be they Christian, Muslim, socialist, atheist, intellectual, environmental, musical – would do well to pick up and try to win mass support for the struggles that make the most sense to the most people and represent immediate needs: for decent basic education, quality health services and sufficient food.\nOur aim should be for a broad non-racial front that unites the unemployed, workers, women, the middle classes and even tries to win over the more far-sighted parts of business. Were that to be our vision a South Africa that provides emergency medical services to the poor, employs community health workers and provides quality schooling to poor children may become possible sooner than we think. For, as good King Lear said:\nAllow not nature more than nature needs\nMan’s life’s as cheap as beast’s. Thou art a lady.\nIf only to go warm were gorgeous\nWhy, nature needs not what thou gorgeous wears’t\nWhich scarcely keeps thee warm. But, for true need.\nAre you up to it comrades? DM\nMain photo: Cyclists competes during the 111 kilometer stage four of the Absa Cape Epic mountain bike team stage race in Worcester, South Africa, 19 March 2015. EPA/NIC BOTHMA", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-04-16-op-ed-the-future-can-be-better-for-all/"}
{"doc_id": "6bf3444df8ad292fda3e87577cc49241", "text": "Afreximbank announces first half 2023 results delivers strong 1H financials performance\nAfrican Export-Import Bank (“Afreximbank” or the “Group”) (www.Afreximbank.com) has released the consolidated financial statements of the Bank and its subsidiaries, for the half year ended 30 June 2023. The results demonstrate a strong and resilient performance, which was ahead of expectations.\nAfreximbank Group’s total balance sheet assets grew by 8% from US$27.9 billion as of 31 December 2022 (FY-2022) to approximately US$30.1 billion as of 30 June 2023. The growth was driven by the increase in loans and advances to customers, which grew by 13% to close the period at US$26 billion. The liquidity position remained strong at US$3 billion, representing 11% of total assets and achieving a Liquidity Coverage ratio of 310% .\nDue to increased volume of interest-earning assets, particularly loans and advances and higher interest rates, total interest income recorded a strong growth of 107.1% to reach $1.1 billion for the half-year (H1-2023) period compared to $540.8 million for the same period in 2022.\nNet interest income amounted to $663.6 million, up 76% from the prior year, mainly due to continuous effective management of interest expenses. Net Interest Margin as a result increased to 4.77%, compared to 3.47% last year.\nThe Group’s shareholders’ funds rose by 7.63% to US$5.6 billion as of 30 June 2023 compared to FY-2022. The growth was largely attributable to the $261 million fresh equity contributions from existing and new shareholders who have supported the ongoing General Capital Increase exercise which aims to raise US$2.6 billion paid-in equity by 2026. In addition, the growth in shareholders’ funds was also underpinned by $125.5 million internally generated net earnings after taking into account the approved dividend and other appropriations which amounted to US$209 million.\nMr. Denys Denya, Afreximbank’s Executive Vice President, Finance, Administration and Banking Services, commented:\n“During the period in which the Bank celebrated its 30th Anniversary, we have delivered a strong set of results, driven largely by a focused execution of our mandate as a countercyclical lender which generated increased volume of interest-earning assets, particularly loans and advances and benefited from a rising interest rate environment. The Bank continued to make progress on its strategy implementation, carefully balancing the need to be profitable and sustainable, while maintaining sufficient liquidity, capital, and a quality portfolio of assets. “\nHe further highlighted that despite the continued challenges caused by the Ukraine crisis, ongoing geo-political tensions and persistently high inflation, the half-year period saw some headwinds receding, including relatively lower energy and food prices, reduced supply bottlenecks and the re-opening of China, Africa’s biggest trading partner.\nMr. Denya pointed out that Global Credit Rating (GCR) and Japanese Credit Rating (JCR) respectively affirmed Afreximbank’s international scale long and short-term issuer ratings of A/A2 and A-, with a “Stable” Outlook, while Moody’s maintained the Bank’s credit rating at Baa1. In addition, African Banker recently bestowed on Afreximbank, the 2023 African Bank of the Year and the DFI of the Year awards in recognition of the Bank’s contributions to the continent’s Trade and Development. Significant progress was made during the first half of the year with the Bank’s subsidiary FEDA generating profit after only two years of operation and AfrexInsure generated premium income on assets valued at over $2 billion.\n“We began the second half of 2023 well and are confident that Afreximbank’s strong financial position will provide a solid base for the Group to continue assisting its clients and African countries in expanding trade and investments, meet trade finance obligations, boost production especially of food and export value added products, as well as alleviate supply chain constraints and enable the continent to adapt sustainably to the challenging effects of climate change.”\nHighlights of the results for the Group are shown below:\nDistributed by APO Group on behalf of Afreximbank.\nFollow us on:\nTwitter: https://apo-opa.info/41qI9VY\nFacebook: https://apo-opa.info/3MGRNQi\nLinkedIn: https://apo-opa.info/3KBxMYQ\nInstagram: https://apo-opa.info/3UA1jH1\nAbout Afreximbank:\nAfrican Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) is a Pan-African multilateral financial institution mandated to finance and promote intra-and extra-African trade. For 30 years, the Bank has been deploying innovative structures to deliver financing solutions that support the transformation of the structure of Africa’s trade, accelerating industrialization and intra-regional trade, thereby boosting economic expansion in Africa. A stalwart supporter of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), Afreximbank has launched a Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS) that was adopted by the African Union (AU) as the payment and settlement platform to underpin the implementation of the AfCFTA. Working with the AfCFTA Secretariat and the AU, the Bank is setting up a US$10 billion Adjustment Fund to support countries to effectively participate in the AfCFTA. At the end of 2022, Afreximbank’s total assets and guarantees stood at over US$31 billion, and its shareholder funds amounted to US$5.2 billion. The Bank disbursed more than US$86 billion between 2016 and 2022. Afreximbank has investment grade ratings assigned by GCR (international scale) (A), Moody’s (Baa1), Japan Credit Rating Agency (JCR) (A-) and Fitch (BBB). Afreximbank has evolved into a group entity comprising the Bank, its impact fund subsidiary called the Fund for Export Development Africa (FEDA), and its insurance management subsidiary, AfrexInsure, (together, “the Group”).\nFor more information, visit: www.Afreximbank.com", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://guardian.ng/apo-press-releases/afreximbank-announces-first-half-2023-results-delivers-strong-1h-financials-performance/"}
{"doc_id": "897b94c3692b45569cc75fd53da9a917", "text": "Are we in a crisis? the intricate web of socio-economic challenges we are facing today leaves us no room to answer the question any other way but in the affirmative. As such it is safe to say that our defining challenge is the ability to create an economic momentum that can sustainably help us put a material dent on poverty.\nEconomic growth is the key through which a society unlocks opportunities, raises living standards and avails mass prosperity. It is more than abstract economic indices. For the fortunes of the citizens rise and falls on economic growth.\nWhile it may be convenient to look back and point fingers, we must realise that buck-passing will certainly not offer solutions to the people of Kenya.\nWhen public policy does not encourage the productive capacity of citizens then you know you are staring at a polity that is headed into an abyss.\nThat is why besides the president’s pet projects of avoiding default while raising production, he may also want to focus more seriously on regional integration.\nWith a population of 238.7 million people the East African community provides a market so big that if we are to get our acts right then a healthy competition which includes but not limited to removal of non-tariff barriers will not only see emergence of thriving industries but also help us deal with the problem of sovereign debt.\n- Ministry of Health seeks EACC's support to strengthen, implement UHC\n- How new technique can spur learners' curiosity\n- Agony for woman detained over Sh2m bill after son's lungs collapsed\n- Medical milestone as KU Hospital undertakes first CyberKnife treatment\nThis is how. Part of the reasons why we are now drowning under the heavy weight of the sovereign debt is that our currency has weakened significantly against the dollar; The currency in which the debt was borrowed. As at June 2024, we will spend 50 per cent more on debt repayment on account of shilling depreciation alone.\nIf you compare Kenya’s debt situation and its advanced peers like Japan which the previous administration liked to compare it with whenever the debt to GDP ratio debate popped up, you realize that the comparison is of two very disparate scenarios. Japan has a huge export portfolio that earns it immense revenue in foreign exchange thus strengthening the Yen against other currencies. Japan, just like America also pays its debt in its own currency. If push came to shove, they can print themselves out of debt.\nThe combined EAC economy under a common currency would literally awaken the sleeping economic giant that it is. Secondly, that currency would stand up to other foreign currencies like the dollar and the pound. The East African Community common currency can then now become the means through which we pay our debts and not the shillings.\nFree flow of capital within the community would also incentivize competition as consumers would be looking for high-quality goods at affordable prices. The resultant economic growth would provide the foothold with which to fight some of the seemingly intractable challenges facing the region such as radicalisation, triple planetary crisis and, the mounting disease burden.\nA genuinely unified EAC on the economic front would then have the fiscal muscles to undertake major infrastructural projects without draining close to 20 per cent of the GDP of one particular country in one infrastructural project without the buy-in of neighbouring countries thus rendering the project a white elephant as we did with SGR.\nMay the uncertainties of these present times remind us, as the citizens of the East Africa region that we are better together. We have dragged our feet for too long on the issue of the common currency as well as on the common market.\nThe writer is Convenor; Inter Parties Youth Forum [email protected]", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/health/opinion/article/2001486171/eac-integration-a-silver-lining-for-kenya-will-boost-economy"}
{"doc_id": "ce5543ab8d35d96363d3645d29faea4c", "text": "Food processor Unga Group cut 117 jobs in the year ended June, with most of the retrenchment occurring in the sales and distribution units.\nThe company’s workforce dropped to 283 in the review period compared to 400 the year before, according to disclosures in its latest annual report.\nIts sales team shrank the most to 39 from 126 while the staffing in the production department declined to 103 from 134.\nThe staffing in management and administration however rose by one to 141. The job cuts came as the company reported losses from normal operations, pointing to reduced margins.\nREAD: Unga starts recovery of payments to Seaboard\nUnga said it is feeling the heat of increased competition, noting that the marginal sales growth registered in the review period came from raw material price inflation.\n“This has been a difficult year for the board. Our animal nutrition business has continued to struggle in the face of increased competition, raw material supply bottlenecks, and compressed demand due to the high cost of living which has forced farmers to seek alternative animal feeds,” Unga said in the report.\n“We have had to make extremely difficult decisions as a board, with more concerted efforts focused on fire fighting in order to keep our business running in the face of all of the aforementioned headwinds.”\nUnga’s managing director Joseph Choge said the packaged food business has become more competitive with the entry of new players in the past few years.\nThis has sparked a price war, with most firms betting on lower prices to gain market share in an economy where rising inflation has hurt consumers’ purchasing power.\n“The competitive landscape has continued to intensify, with over 50 new millers joining the fray over the last two years alone,” Mr Choge said.\nHe added that the company continues to be affected by cheap poultry imports from the region and fish from Asia, shrinking the market for its animal nutrition products.\nALSO READ: Unga gets nod to form two animal feed joint ventures\nUnga says it will continue to differentiate itself as a supplier of quality products, leveraging its decades-old brands.\nThe company’s sales rose 1.2 per cent to Sh18 billion in the year ended December. Higher costs saw the company report an operating loss of Sh502 million, reversing an operating profit of Sh616.2 million a year earlier.\nUnga however saw its net profit grow to Sh311.3 million from Sh293.4 million, benefitting from a one-time gain of Sh802.5 million from the sale of its Ennsvalley bakery business.\nUnga is the latest to disclose job cuts, joining the companies that have trimmed their workforce in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic.\nThe layoffs have been witnessed in various sectors including manufacturing and services as companies grapple with sluggish sales and falling margins.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/companies/unga-group-cuts-117-jobs-amid-sluggish-sales--4037620"}
{"doc_id": "830e1fda35f1538ec0cb8b53a58e2c82", "text": "Econet Wireless Zimbabwe has announced that if you buy airtime in USD you will get bonus minutes, data and SMSes.\nThe promotion is running at select Econet Shops nationwide meaning you have to go to an outlet in order to pay in USD. And here is what you’ll get if you buy airtime in USD:\nWhy didn’t Econet do this 10 months ago?\nIf you remember in the middle of last year we were graced by Statutory Instrument 185 of 2020 which allowed anyone offering goods and services in Zimbabwe the go-ahead to price them in local currency and USD. The telecoms regulator, POTRAZ, shortly after gave Telecel, NetOne and Econet the green light to price in USD.\nNow, this is important because the one thing that has been a highlight of the mobile network operator space for some time is foreign exchange losses. MNOs need to pay for certain services and equipment in foreign currency, and doing so while products and services are priced in local currency is difficult.\nThe depreciating ZWL$ has meant that when converting to forex MNOs lose out. This promotion by Econet, which by no means solve this problem but could be a step towards it, I think should have come a lot earlier. Without a reason to spend USD on airtime, Zimbabweans were going to continue to use local currency, however, with as much as a gig of data for buying airtime in USD, I can see some people at the very least being tempted.\nTo check out Econet rates and tariffs in USD click the link here", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.techzim.co.zw/2021/05/econet-now-giving-free-data-call-time-smses-if-you-buy-usd-airtime/"}
{"doc_id": "b9c2c98000238384bcf21666eba4e8bf", "text": "Poverty\n31 Dec\nPoverty is set to be one of the key issues dominating the 2024 European elections. The EU is home to 95 million people who live below the poverty line – that is, who live on less than 60 percent of the median income for their country. In all, that's one in five Europeans who live at risk of social exclusion.\n2 Sep\nClimate shocks are already disproportionately affecting war-torn countries, a report from the IMF has shown. Many also bear the least responsibility for climate change.\n26 Aug 2023\nThe health and cost-of-living crises has disproportionately affected the poor and women in developing Asia, hurting their chances of long-term improvement.\n12 Jul 2023\nNigeria’s population is growing at an exponential rate. Harnessing the potential of the young is possible if the right measures are taken, experts say. Otherwise, the country's problems could grow more intractable.\n25 Jun 2023\nThis week, Paris is aiming to send a message to world leaders that the major issues facing the planet such as extreme poverty and climate change have to be tackled now. The \"Power Our Planet\" concert on June 22 in front of the Eiffel Tower is being organised by the NGO Global Citizen, an organisation that has already raised over $40 billion worldwide to fight poverty.\n22 Jun 2023\nFrench President Macron says no country should have to choose \"between reducing poverty and protecting the planet,\" at a Paris summit to seek ways to tackle debt, poverty and funding green initiatives.\n31 Mar 2023\nLebanon has been drowning in a series of crises since 2019. The economic, banking and political systems are in tailspin and the national currency has lost 98 percent of its value.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://tv.guardian.ng/tag/poverty/"}
{"doc_id": "d8db5057ee0e9c7f5c872445cc17355f", "text": "Advertisement\nGhana RE profit declines by 5% — Pays GH¢5m dividend to government\nPROFIT of Ghana Reinsurance PLC declined by five per cent in 2022 on account of high claims ratio and impairment losses as a result of the Domestic Debt Exchange Programme (DDEP).\nThe company’s profit after tax fell from GH₵51.73m in 2021 to GH¢49.50m in the year under review.\nThese developments impacted negatively on the Return on Equity (ROE) resulting in a decrease from 16 per cent in 2021 to 14 per cent in 2022.\nIn spite of the financial losses, the company declared a dividend of GH₵5m to be paid to the sole shareholder, Government of Ghana.\nThis is against the dividend of GH¢12m declared in 2021.\nThe Board Chairman of the company, George Otoo, announced this on Friday at the group’s 20th annual general meeting (AGM) in Accra.\nHe said an amount of GH¢248.3m was incurred as net claims for 2022, representing a 77 per cent increase over the GH¢140.2m recorded in 2021.\nThis deteriorated claims percentage rose from 43 per cent to 58 per cent in 2022.\nThe increase, he said, was attributable to the Oil Marketing Companies (OMC) bond claims and the depreciation of the cedi in the second half of 2022.\nMr Otoo said shareholder’s equity grew by 20 per cent from GH¢ 435.75 m in 2021 to GH¢521.72m in 2022.\nPremium income\nThe Board Chairman said gross premium income recorded for the year under review was GH¢550.23m compared to the 2021 figure of GH¢385.92m representing an increase of 42 per cent.\n“General business contributed about 95 per cent of the Group gross premium which represents GH¢520.69m in absolute terms.\nThis represents a growth of about 45 per cent of the 2021 figure.\nThe largest contributor to this key achievement is the gross premium from Fire Business which contributed about 63 per cent to the premium generated from General Business and 59 per cent to the total premium recorded by the group,” he said.\nHe said Life business portfolio contributed five per cent to the group’s total gross premium, adding that “the gross premium increased from GH¢26.58m in 2021 to GH¢29.54m in 2022, this represents a growth of 11 per cent.”\nImpairment loss\nMr Otoo explained that the group in compliance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) recognised an impairment loss of GH₵60.60m in 2022 as a result of DDEP.\n“The provision covered its holdings in GOG bonds, treasury bills and Euro bonds, the GHS60.60m provided for under International Accounting Standards (IAS 39) impacted negatively on the profit for the year,” he said.\nHe said the company’s Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) for 2022 was 315 per cent far above the minimum regulatory figure of 150 per cent.\nHe added that the board and management of the company have put in place measures to mitigate the negative impact that it will have on the group’s liquidity, profitability and solvency position going forward.\nOutlook\nThe Board Chairman explained that 2022 marked the year two of the three-year strategic plans of the company have seen tremendous progress in the four pillars of the strategic plan.\nHe gave an assurance that the company would be able to meet most of the targets set in the strategic plan, notwithstanding the challenges of the economic environment which was not envisaged when the strategic plan was drawn.\nReacting to the dividend declared, the Acting Head of Public Entities and Assets Unit, Public Investments and Assets Division (PIAD) at the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP), Kwame Okyere-Mensuo, expressed appreciation to the group for the dividend despite the economic adversity.\n“We appreciate the dividend because some companies did not declare a dividend due to recapitalisation and global economic crisis. However, we expect an increase and we hope to recover from our economic challenges,” he said.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.graphic.com.gh/business/business-news/ghana-re-profit-declines-by-5-pays-gh-5m-dividend-to-government.html"}
{"doc_id": "854fa29c6db63c33f3bc3124391ff796", "text": "NetOne, the second largest mobile telecommunications company in Zimbabwe, launched OneFusion, an integrated prepaid package, in June 2016.\nOneFusion bundles offer some of the best value for money on the market. The comprehensive plans offer users on-net and local and international off-net voice minutes as well as SMSs. Users also get data, some of which is in the form of WhatsApp, Facebook and Twitter bundles.\nIn November 2017, NetOne launched a $3 OneFusion package to supplant the $5 package as the cheapest OneFusion package on offer. For subscribers getting 60 minutes On-Net, 10 minutes Off-Net, 250mb Data, 10 SMSs, 250mb WhatsaApp and 250mb Facebook all valid for 7 days for only $3, that’s as good as it can get.\nWhy was OneFusion launched?\nWhat about for NetOne themselves? Has this popular prepaid package achieved what it was meant to achieve. The OneFusion packages were designed to increase NetOne’s subscribers, revenues and profits and if that has not happened we can’t really say they are a success.\nWith promotions like OneFusion, the thinking is that such affordable packages will attract new customers and more customers will lead to more revenue and ultimately increased profits. Seeing as there are close to 14 million active mobile subscriptions compared to a population of around 16 million, new customers will mostly have to be those moving from another telco. That makes it a bit more difficult.\nThe other problem is that generally these promotions which offer services at a discount decrease the average revenue per user. That means for the company to see an increase in profits there has to be a proportionately bigger increase in subscribers, something which is difficult as we noted.\nYou may have noted that the number of active mobile subscriptions is almost equal to the number of people in the country. If you consider that around 40% of the population is under 14 years of age, you quickly realise that most adults must have multiple lines, with the different mobile operators.\nThe competition between the mobile operators led to this state of affairs. The bargain-hunting Zimbabweans simply pick and choose which line to recharge depending on which telco has the better promotion at any point in time. This means promotions like OneFusion may not yield the intended results if the gained subscribers revert back when the promotion ends.\nNetOne’s number of subscribers since introduction of OneFusion\nAs mentioned, OneFusion was introduced in early June 2016, that is the last month of Q2 2016. We will look at number of subscribers from beginning of 2016 to third quarter 2017. POTRAZ is yet to release the quarterly report for Q4 2017.\nQ1 2016 – 4,360,298; Q2 2016 – 4,512,359; Q3 2016 – 4,619,498; Q4 2016 – 4,712,410\nQ1 2017 – 4,801,762; Q2 2017 – 4,845,458; Q3 2017 – 4,868,897\nAny meaningful impact that can be attributed to OneFusion has to be from Q3 2016 going forward. The number of active subscribers stood at 4,512,359 at the beginning of Q3 2016 (end of Q2) and this rose to 4,868,897 at the end of Q3 2017. That’s a 7.9% increase or 356,538 in absolute terms.\nIn that time the OneFusion-less Econet grew by 422,339 subscribers or 6.3%. Econet has repeatedly refused to be dragged down into a price fight. As such they have never really had a promotion offering bargains as good as OneFusion or Telecel’s MegaBoost. For Econet, quality of service and the accompanying ecosystem which includes the subscriber-pulling-and-retaining EcoCash are some of the differentiators.\nOffering discounted products is not the only strategy for growing subscribers and it might objectively be said that it’s not the best either. However, had NetOne not introduced OneFusion, would they have seen that growth in a period where Telecel only grew by 4,552 subscribers? Probably not. So we can say with some confidence that OneFusion is responsible for a large part of the 356,538 increase NetOne experienced.\nNetOne’s revenue and Average Revenue Per User (ARPU) since introduction of OneFusion\nAs you know, NetOne is a parastatal and is not listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange and so is not obliged to publish annual financial statements. NetOne only sporadically releases some financial information which is not sufficient to monitor trends. Luckily for us POTRAZ releases revenue market-share figures that we can manipulate.\nLet’s look at NetOne’s market-share of mobile revenues from Q1 2016 TO Q3 2017\nQ1 2016 – $28.5m (17%); Q2 2016 – $29.9m (18.5%); Q3 2016 – $29.8m (15.3%); Q4 2016 – $26.8m (This Q4 figure was found by using the annual revenue figure of $115m as given by NetOne themselves)\nQ1 2017 – $24.3m (13.5%); Q2 2017 – $26m (14%); Q3 2017 – $27.2m (12.1%)\nOneFusion was introduced end of Q2 2016 or beginning of Q3 when NetOne’s share of mobile revenues was 18.5% and since then it has fallen to 12.1%. So if OneFusion has helped increase revenues, it has not been by a comparatively higher margin than the competitors’ growths.\nIn absolute terms revenue has decreased to $27.2m in Q3 2017 from $29.9m in Q2 2016.\nNetOne announced that for the financial year ended 2016, of which OneFusion was available for 7 months of the 12, revenues increased by $1m but losses of $2.7m were realised. Revenues for 2015 had been $114m and in 2016 that increased to $115m. The revenue for Q4 2017 will have to be at least $37.5m if NetOne is to avoid posting a decrease in revenues going from 2016 to 2017.\nAverage Revenue Per User for Netone (using number of active subscribers and not total subscribers)\nQ1 2016 – $6.54; Q2 2016 – $6.63; Q3 2016 -$6.45; Q4 2016 – $5.69\nQ1 2017 – $5.06; Q2 2017 – $5.37; Q3 2017 – $5.59\nThe introduction of the OneFusion package had the effect of reducing the ARPU in the short term as was expected. Compared to where the company was before OneFusion’s introduction, it would appear the prepaid packages have not had the required effect. However, for both revenue and ARPU there was better performance in Q2 and Q3 2017.\nHas OneFusion been a success?\nAt its launch back in 2016, the NetOne CEO said the company expected OneFusion to lift them to the top of mobile telecoms in only 2 years. The 2 years are up in June this year and NetOne are nowhere near the summit.\nIn summary, since OneFusion’s introduction (Q2 2016), NetOne’s active subscriber base grew by 356,538. Revenue per quarter has decreased from $29.9m in Q2 2016 to $27.2m in Q3 2017 and average revenue per user has decreased from $6.63 to $5.59.\nAs we noted above, these discounted packages may not necessarily be the best strategy for growing a company’s profits. OneFusion may be the best promotion on the market but most of NetOne’s customers have Econet lines because EcoCash has become an essential product.\nWhat do you think about OneFusion and its meagre contribution to Netone’s bottom-line? Do you think it will pay off in the long term? Let us know in the comments below.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.techzim.co.zw/2018/01/onefusion-failure-netone/"}
{"doc_id": "4d734ad9f81ed1d6660df6671e53996c", "text": "City lawyer Joy Masinde has been appointed to chair the board of Kenya Power following a push by the Treasury to have a new head at the State-owned electricity distributor.\nMs Masinde was elected as a director on Friday and then voted to head the board, replacing Viviane Yeda who had been at the helm since July 2020.\nShe was part of the appeals tribunal of President William Ruto’s coalition ahead of the August polls and is one of the six new directors on the board of Kenya Power.\n“The board of directors of Kenya Power and Lighting Company Plc has appointed Joy Brenda Masinde as the chairman,” read a statement from Kenya Power.\nREAD: Kenya Power seeks firm to headhunt new executives\nTreasury Cabinet secretary had last month directed the company’s board to the table before the annual general meeting an ordinary resolution for the removal of Ms Yeda.\nThe push to oust Ms Yeda came amid concerns by the workers’ union of Kenya Power that had described her as an “impediment” to the transformation and stability of the company that is listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange.\nMs Yeda was appointed chairperson of the board in November 2020, replacing Mahmoud Maalim as the previous administration sought to restore the fortunes of Kenya Power.\nThe Kenya Electrical Trades and Allied Workers Union had demanded the removal of Ms Yeda from the board arguing that she had been behind the company’s shortage of critical materials such as poles, meters and transformers through delayed approval of the firm’s procurement plan.\nMs Masinde leads, Duncan Ojwang, Albert Mugo, Logan Christi and Veska Kangogo as the other new directors along with Treasury Cabinet secretary and Energy and Petroleum PS.\nThe new directors were elected on Friday during the firm’s annual general meeting, joining the Treasury Cabinet secretary and Energy and Petroleum PS who automatically become directors due to their government positions.\nALSO READ: Kenya Power says its home internet here within a year\nKenya Power doubled its net profit for the year ended June to Sh3.5 billion but did not declare dividends—the fifth year it has frozen shareholder payouts.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/companies/city-based-lawyer-picked-to-head-kenya-power-board--4060600"}
{"doc_id": "8e406d033cb8a0fb1af82774590bef40", "text": "Nigeria’s agricultural performance in 2024 depends on the federal government’s commitment to addressing fundamental issues that have continued to impact farmers’ productivity and the sector’s contribution to economic growth.\nAs a result, BusinessDay spoke with experts who shed light on focal points that the government can leverage to cultivate a thriving agricultural environment.\nAccording to these experts, Nigeria’s agriculture will grow if a concerted effort is made to stem insecurity, encourage year-round production, spur private sector leadership and involvement, and provide subsidies on all inputs among others.\nAddress worsening insecurity\n“Government needs to tackle headlong the insecurity issues in all agrarian communities,” said Abiodun Olorundero, managing partner at Prasino Farms.\nThe country’s insecurity intensified in 2023, forcing many farmers to abandon their farmlands.\nAccording to the European Journal of Social Sciences Studies, the farmers-herdsmen conflict remains the major issue in Nigeria, assuming dangerous dimensions with unimaginable consequences for food security.\nWith an outlook that already predicts a ‘considerable decline’ in the production of grains in Nigeria in 2024, the “West Africa Regional Supply and Market Outlook” also projects that in the event of worsening conflict and insecurity in the year, further limits in terms of market functioning and access, and disruptions into other supply corridors is expected.\n“In Nigeria, sluggish economic conditions and anticipated production decreases will keep prices above average in 2024,” the report said.\nEncourage all year production\nAnalysts have said that irrigation facilities are about all that is needed for all-year-round farming in the country.\nThe country has seen its food production decline yearly, causing shortages and price surges that have further strained finances.\nThe Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) forecasts that by the year 2050, global water requirements for agriculture will increase by 50 percent.\nTo be able to feed Nigeria’s ever-growing population and improve its foreign earnings in agriculture, the government needs to both encourage and provide the enabling environment for its farmers to adopt irrigation systems as a leeway to boost resilience and sustainable crop production.\n“To restore Nigeria’s glory and dignity, we need to roll up our sleeves and embark on sustainable innovation and serious knowledge-driven agricultural production,” Ibrahim Kabir, national president of the All Farmers Association of Nigeria, said.\nPromote private sector-led agriculture\nAccording to the FAO, Africa’s food market is estimated to grow to $1 trillion by 2030 and it needs the catalytic intervention of the private sector to bring it to fruition.\nTo achieve and surpass this growth, the international agency says all actors in the agribusiness space must play their part, with the private sector being an indispensable actor.\n“The government should encourage the private sector to drive Nigeria’s agriculture by strictly providing the enabling environment for sustainable agribusiness,” Kabir said.\nSubsidies inputs for farmers\nThe Association’s president has said that Nigeria’s agriculture will grow if the government can work around providing subsidies on all inputs, especially fertilisers, in the short term.\nDrive mechanisation\nKabir projects that full mechanisation of agric processes, deployment of STI (science, technology, and innovation), knowledge-based agricultural production, as well as fully embracing agribusiness and agricultural biotechnology will help to scale productivity in the medium and long term.\n“If we deepen knowledge-based agribusiness, 2024 may well be Nigeria’s year of agricultural prosperity, sustainable food security, and relative peace.”\nNigeria enjoyed relative prosperity upon the discovery of oil but the country squandered proceeds from it “by embarking on poorly thought-out grandiose projects, grand scale corruption, and inefficient management,” AFAN president said.\n“The incidence of gradual descent into fragility in any nation results from inefficiencies in the entire food system and institutional malfunctions.\nSo, “to start with we should aim at adequately feeding our huge population of over 200,000,000 and still counting, as a short-term milestone.\n“This is not very easy for several reasons, though, but definitely doable with focus and determination.”", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businessday.ng/agriculture/article/how-fg-can-drive-agric-growth-in-2024/"}
{"doc_id": "af0827792a8c320ddde912fd719d9028", "text": "Kenya Airways is fighting to save a Sh310 million deposit it made with US plane maker Boeing Corporation for aircraft purchases after the expiry of the preservation period rendered the deposit non-refundable.\nThe airline disclosed in its annual report for the year ending December 2022 that it risks losing the millions of shillings given deposits made for plane purchases are not refundable if a carrier fails to buy the planes.\nThe loss-making carrier has made a Sh310 million provision -- an amount set aside from a company’s profits to cover an expected liability -- for failing to purchase the undisclosed planes.\nThe deposit rose from Sh280 million in 2021, although the airline did not disclose whether this was due to additional cash being put in or due to exchange rate movements.\nThe national carrier had plans to order new planes worth billions of shillings to boost its fleet of Boeing and Embraer planes and grow its business in the face of stiff competition from rivals such as Ethiopian Airlines.\nBut years of loss-making and a balance sheet with negative equity have made it difficult for Kenya Airways to proceed with plane purchases. The cash-strapped airline is pursuing the option of extending the preservation period for the plane orders to save the deposit.\n“The deposits paid towards acquisition of aircraft represent amounts paid to Boeing Corporation for the option to purchase aircraft in the future,” said KQ in the report.\n“A provision of Sh310 million was made in the year as a result of expiry of a purchase option the company had in place with Boeing Corporation. The company is, however, in talks with Boeing to further extend the validity of the options.”\nShould the US firm refuse to extend the validity of the option, KQ would be forced to write off the Sh310 million provision, further hitting its bottom line.\nBy the end of last year, the airline was carrying on its books some Sh3.7 billion in deposits for leased aircraft. KQ reported that during the year, it also received a refund of Sh3.24 billion after terminating a lease for a Boeing 777-300 plane.\nIt has also disclosed plans to terminate the lease for its other two Boeing 777-300 aircraft that are currently subleased to Turkish Airlines, in a move set to save the carrier between $25 million (Sh3.3 billion) and $30 million (Sh4 billion).\nRead: Plane lease end to save KQ Sh4bn\nThe savings will be recognised after deducting the termination penalties due to the company that leased the planes to KQ. KQ has in the past few years not made additional aircraft purchases after running into financial headwinds and has instead leased out planes and terminated some leases in an effort to contain costs.\nA decade ago, the airline was regularly acquiring new planes from Boeing as part of its Project Mawingu, which intended to cement KQ’s strategy that hinges on connecting African travellers to the outside world through its Nairobi hub.\nThe plan, which called for the airline to cover about 115 destinations by 2021, required the carrier to buy additional aircraft that would raise its fleet number to more than 100.\nThe plan, however, stalled after the airline fell into losses and eventually negative equity, forcing it to rely on regular government bailouts to keep afloat.\nExternal shocks such as the Ebola outbreak in West Africa between 2014 and 2016, which saw flights to key destinations such as Sierra Leone put on hold, denied the airline of millions of dollars’ worth of revenue.\nLocally, a spate of terror attacks in that period also reduced tourist arrivals into the country, hitting the airline’s bottom line. In 2022, the airline recorded a 10th straight year in the red, doubling its net loss from Sh15.87 billion in 2021 to Sh38.26 billion.\nSplashThe rise in net loss was majorly due to a Sh18 billion finance cost that was passed through the income statement after the government took over the servicing of $525 million (Sh70 billion) dollar-denominated debt after the airline defaulted on payment.\nThe company was forced to pass through its profit and loss account the resulting exchange losses once the government converted the loan from dollars to shillings.\nThe debt is now being carried as a shareholder loan from the government on KQ’s books. Due to the one-off nature of the financing cost, KQ said it was optimistic of returning to profitability by 2024 — something it has not done since 2012 when it closed with net earnings at Sh1.66 billion.\nThe airline saw its total revenue increase by 66 percent to Sh117 billion as passenger numbers rose by 68 percent to 3.7 million and cargo business uplift increased by 3.5 percent to 65,955 tonnes.\nTotal operating costs rose 59 percent to Sh122.4 billion, with direct operating costs increasing by 94 percent on increased operations and huge global fuel price increases throughout the year.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/companies/kenya-airways-risks-losing-millions-boeing-for-planes-deposit-4197306"}
{"doc_id": "aa1e374b00cf52ef5dcd25ba749fa189", "text": "A bus has hit the scene of an earlier road accident in Turkey, killing 16 people and injuring 21.\nThe incident happened near the southern city of Gaziantep on Saturday morning.\nThe dead include firefighters, rescuers and a team of journalists who had been sent to a site where a vehicle had left the road.\nThe bus struck the group, skidded and overturned 200m (220 yards) away. Reinforcement teams were then sent to take the injured to nearby hospitals.\nThe governor of Gaziantep region said on twitter that \"three firefighters, two emergency workers and two journalists\" were among those who died on the road between Gaziantep and nearby Nizip.\nTurkish journalists' union confirmed the deaths of two of its members. Images on social media showed a number of people lying on the road.\nPhotos on Turkey's DHA news agency showed the back of an ambulance ripped out and metal debris strewn around it.\nJustice Minister Bekir Bozdag has announced an investigation into the crash, BBC Turkish reported.\nA number of Turkish politicians posted their condolences online.\nLatest Stories\n-\nEdna Obiri: Unraveling the threads of unseasonable warmth: A climate wake-up call\n-\nAnti-LGBTQ+ Bill: Akufo-Addo won’t assent – Security Analyst\n-\nNollywood grieves as Kate Henshaw mourns loss of mother\n-\nInflation to inch up to 23.9% in February 2024 – Report\n-\nI was shocked – Former Oti Regional Minister speaks after reshuffle\n-\nDon’t assent to Anti-LGBTQ+ Bill – Finance Ministry tells Akufo-Addo\n-\nTributes pour in for Nollywood star Mr Ibu\n-\nGhana at 67: Centre seems to be shattering, breaking hearts and minds\n-\nCanon to spotlight sustainability champions at Global Good Awards 2024\n-\nGulf Cooperation Council countries reaffirm unwavering support for Morocco’s sovereignty over Sahara\n-\nBaba Rahman scores for PAOK in Greece Super League win against Lamia\n-\nEnimil Ashon: $6m wasted reviewing 1992 Constitution!\n-\nWe don’t have a position on the passage of Anti-LGBTQ+ Bill – Peace Council\n-\nAgric Minister understudies NPA’s operations\n-\nOpoku Prempeh is Bawumia’s top choice for running mate position – Dr Asah-Asante", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.myjoyonline.com/bus-ploughs-into-crash-scene-kills-16-rescuers/"}
{"doc_id": "166572eaf959dd763e9d1487efc9efe6", "text": "The government of Bahamas has taken a giant step towards establishing business connections between the Caribbean nation and Ghana, where most of its citizens are believed to have been taken from as slaves four centuries ago.\nAn Africa- Carribbean Trade Mission has therefore been established in Accra to facilitate the connection between Ghana and the country which is known largely for its huge tourism industry.\nAt a short ceremony to open the centre in the Accra suburb of Ashaley Botwe, High Commissioner Designate of the Commonwealth of Bahamas to Ghana, Andrew Wilson said this marked the dawn of.\nA new era for Africans taken into captivity through the slave trade to come back 'home', re-establish contacts with their motherland and bring their talents in support of the growth and development of Ghana and Africa.\n“Ghana has opened its heart to the Diaspora. In fact, it has become the gateway to Africa. The Year of Return, has demonstrated the desire within the Diaspora to re-connect with Africa. I believe that through trade, enterprise, and investment we can build durable partnerships that can increase growth and revenue for Ghanaian businesses, while also providing economic opportunities for Africa’s vast global Diaspora,” he said.\nThe move to establish the trade center is in furtherance of Bahamas establishing its High Commission in Ghana with Mr Wilson having been appointed to lead it.\nThe center would be seeking to build strategic partnerships between Ghanaian and Bahamian businesses and entrepreneurs, developing the comparative advantages of each party to plug the needs of people in the diaspora and those in Ghana. it would be partnering with businesses in the area of textiles, fashion and tourism which is one of the biggest experts in the Caribbean nation.\nThe economy of Bahamas is almost entirely dependent on tourism and financial services to generate foreign exchange earnings. Tourism alone provides an estimated 60% of the gross domestic product (GDP) and employs about half the Bahamian workforce.\nThe country, officially known as the Commonwealth of The Bahamas, is a country within the Lucayan Archipelago of the West Indies in the Atlantic. It takes up 97% of the Lucayan Archipelago's land area and is home to 88% of the archipelago's population.\nThe people who populate the island country have a unique connection to Ghana and especially the Ahanta people of Ghana’s western region. Majority of the first slave ships that went from West Africa to the country were taken from the Ahanta area specifically from Princess Town- a small community in the Ahanta West Municipality. A good number of the slaves are believed to have been taken through the Fort Groß Friedrichsburg.\nThis group of slaves who went on to settle and populate Bahamas included Jan Kwa, an Ahanta chief who is known to have stood fiercely against the slave trade.\nJan Kwa is the person who started the Junkanoo festival- a celebration popular in the Caribbean and parts of America that are believed to have been mimicking the Kundum festival of the Ahanta and Nzema people.\n“The opening of the Afri-Bahamas trade office. I today represent the descendent of one of the many stolen children of Africans who have returned home. Today, we take a small step of forging a lasting trade relationship between ghana and the wider african continent to the Bahamas and the wider African diaspora especially in the Caribbean region,\" says Dr Michael Pateman, an Archaeologist who has been doing a lot of studies on historical relations between Ghana and the Caribbean.\nThe building of the center also follows visits to Ghana by the First Lady of Bahamas to re-establish diplomatic ties earlier this year.\nAngelique F McKay works with the organisation of the Junkanoo festival around the world and has also recently been enstooled as Queen Mother Asafokyereba of Pokesu and the Ahanta people of Western Ghana.\nShe said the establishment of this center would open new doors for collaboration between people who are into the curation and development of the arts in Ghana and in the Caribbean for mutual benefit.\n“The most important thing I have learnt is that all the ingredients for enterprise growth and development are already here. There is no need to re-invent a wheel. We just need to put that wheels on the wagon, the wagon on the road and move “forward, upward onward together,” said High Commissioner-designate, Wilson\nLatest Stories\n-\nBurkina Faso: At least 15 dead in Catholic church attack\n-\nMorgan Heritage lead singer Peter Anthony Morgan dead\n-\nMahama chastises government for slow pace of development in new regions\n-\nPlayback: The Probe discussed Ghana’s unemployment crisis\n-\nICGC’s 40-year journey: Pastor Mensa Otabil’s testament to faith and inspiration\n-\nWorks & Housing Ministry appoints Manasseh Atta Boahene as spokesperson\n-\nMan sets himself on fire outside Israeli embassy in Washington DC\n-\nGPL 2023/24: Hearts of Oak beat RTU; Olympics triumph over Bofoakwa Tano\n-\nKMJ named as Board Member for Ohio African Community Excellence Awards USA\n-\nJurgen Klopp calls Carabao Cup win ‘absolutely insane’\n-\nVan Dijk scores winner against Chelsea to help Liverpool win Carabao Cup\n-\nStruggling gospel singer Edward Boateng receives massive support from Prophet Bernard El Bernard\n-\nGalaxy International School holds 18th Inter-cultural Festival; urging all to embrace diversity\n-\nHassan || Golf Trophy: Argentina’s Ricardo Gonzalez bags $320,000 for winning competition\n-\nSammi Awuku woos European Lotteries in illegal gambling fight", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.myjoyonline.com/africa-caribbean-trade-mission-opens-in-accra/"}
{"doc_id": "c396578e1f4083e047af56a37cdb968e", "text": "The day before new South African Post Office Group CEO Mark Barnes, only four months in the job, flew to Cape Town on Friday to motivate for a R2.7-billion bailout to members of the Portfolio Committee on Telecommunications and Postal Services, he received a Christmas card in the mail. The committee heard that in a decade, about R4-billion had been lost by the Post Office to wasteful expenditure, corruption and mismanagement. And if the Post Office didn’t get the money soon, it would collapse, said Barnes, ending a 500-year history since the first batch of letters were placed in a Milkwood tree in Mossel Bay. By MARIANNE THAMM.\nIf you had to create a sound cloud of the words or expressions that dominated Barnes and a team of South African Post Office executives’ presentation to the Portfolio Committee on Friday it would read thus: “Borrowed Time”, “Sinking Ship”, “No Plan B”, “Rock and a Hard Place”, “Game Over” and “Give Us Money Now!”\nFrom the tone of his presentation, Barnes, a major shareholder in the Purple Group and who was appointed in January to head the ailing SOE, sounded like an optimistic Edward John Smith, captain of the Titanic, shortly before he spotted the iceberg. This time, if the Post Office sinks, there will be no band playing, just the tragic loss of 21,670 jobs.\nIf it goes down, it will take with it numerous creditors, private firms to which the Post Office owes millions for services rendered. It owes just Avis alone R50-million. Barnes also told the committee of the owners of one family business who had contracted their trucks to SAPO but had not been paid and, as a result, had been forced to sell some of their trucks and take their children out of school.\n“Unless we can pay our creditors in weeks, there will nothing to talk about,” Barnes told the committee on Friday.\nHe also said if SAPO did not manage to raise R2.7-billion – in two sets of R1.35-billion tranches, “we can’t leave the harbour. It will sink.”\nBetween 2012 and 2015 alone the South African Post Office engaged in an expensive game of musical chairs having had three CEOs, four CFOs, three COOs and three chairpersons of the Board. Since about 2006 this one-time behemoth has been reduced to a husk with about R3-billion to R4-billion “thrown away” due to corruption and gross mismanagement, and so far, no one has been held accountable.\nHowever, Barnes hinted that future court action would be instituted as part of the recommendations of a SIU report, which has not been made public, and that will result in civil claims for negligence from former SAPO officials.\nDuring his presentation to the committee of Friday Barnes said that efforts by SAPO to raise funds through the banks had proved fruitless as “the good old days of a government guarantee are over” and that instead SAPO had to make a case for the massive loans in order to prove that it could service the debt.\n“If banks are not prepared to lend against a government guarantee, we should not do business with them,” Barnes suggested before withdrawing the remark when DA Deputy Shadow Minister of Telecommunications and Postal Services, Cameron Mackenzie, pointed out it was “offensive”.\n“The problem is not tight financial controls. The problem is with your business,” said Mackenzie.\n“I agree my comment was offensive, banks are sacrosanct,” said Barnes, himself a former investment banker at Standard Corporate and Merchant Bank (SCMB) and former head of private equity giant Brait.\nBarnes said that the state needed to become involved in unsecured lending and, talking up his pitch, added that the Post Office needed be be viewed “not as an expense but as an investment” and that postal services in other parts of the world including Germany and Australia had proved they could be profitable and a success.\n“We would not be here arguing about the past if we did not think about the future,” Barnes said.\nSAPO owned properties that had been undervalued at R83-million but the real market value of these was R196-million. These properties should be seen as part of the value of the SOE. A case in point was the sale of the old Kalk Bay post office in Cape Town for only R1-million while its value was much higher. The same applied to property located at Heritage Square in Cape Town.\nAt present SAPO was haemorrhaging about R125-million a month despite a cash injection of R650-million promised by Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan in his budget speech. This hardly dented its liability of R800-million as of March this year.\nAnd while Treasury had agreed to extend the term of Sapo’s existing R2.7-billion guarantee and it had managed to get loan commitments of R1.8-billion from banks (which was used to top up salaries), it needed an additional R900-million if it wanted to get out of its hole.\nThe entire R2.7-billion was required as it was not possible, said Barnes, “to get only partly out of a hole. And when you can’t fix a hole it gets bigger.”\nBarnes, who is known as a man, according to journalist Marc Ashton, who could sell a vision “based on the strength of his vision, personality and conviction that what they are doing will ultimately produce results”, was finding the committee a little less easy to convince.\nBarnes told the committee that Sapo expected to make a loss of R1.2-billion in the 2015-16 financial year, adding to last year’s R1.5-billion loss. A loss of R1.1-billion is forecast for 2016-17 financial year and a net profit in the following year, 2018. However, the SOE was three months behind its planned strategy to turn around its fortunes.\n“You have to start looking at us differently. The post office brand used to be powerful. And if it means we have to change our logo and to rebrand ourselves, then we must think of doing that,” said Barnes.\nMackenzie too remarked that he had received his Christmas card sent by Speaker Baleka Mbete only two weeks ago and that he personally would not be renewing his post box in Craighall after being forced to receive his bills electronically.\n“I am never going back to a paper-based bill again,” said MacKenzie.\nThe only upside of the decline of the post office, Barnes said, was the fact that people were no longer receiving traffic fines through the mail. SAPO had, however, recently done a deal with Johannesburg traffic to do so once again.\nWhile SAPO’s competitors could make decisions in three to six minutes, SAPO took three to six months to do so. This organisational culture needed to change as well as SAPO’s operating model. Ways of doing this would be to offer services to Home Affairs, as the banks had now offered to do, as well as distributing social grants. SAPO had an enormous footprint in the country and was, at present, the only player left standing while banks had opted to move to e-commerce. This infrastructure could be put to diverse use.\n“But we must keep the money in the fiscus,” said Barnes.\nThe longer-term vision of SAPO was the delivery of postal, logistic and financial services.\nSA Post Bank, which had deposits worth R7.3-billion, was isolated from risk, he reassured the committee.\nThe ANC’s Juli Kilian asked Barnes what the “tipping point” had been for SAPO; “was it corruption, was it neglect, was it the strike?” she asked, referring to the crippling 2014 strike from which SAPO has never recovered.\nBarnes replied that it had been a series of events that began over a decade ago including the spending of R2.7-billion in labour broker costs between 2001 and 2014 and wastage and fraud “that resulted in about R3/4-billion being thrown away.” He admitted that SAPO had never recovered or “bounced back” from the protracted strike.\nA report by Public Protector, Thuli Madonsela, titled “Postponed Delivery”, also found that a suspected 10-year head office leasing deal which saw SAPO move from its Pretoria offices to expensive new premises at Eco Park in Centurion, had contributed to SAPO’s financial meltdown.\nMadonsela found that SAPO had been ripped off by about R70-million as it had been charged 30 percent above the market-related rental and had paid an additional R22-million it should not have paid for a vacant building. Barnes said SAPO was attempting to recuperate the R22-million – “we are issuing a summons this week” – but that it would currently be “too expensive” for SAPO to move out of the building.\nAsked what he would do should he not receive the amount he was asking for, Barnes replied “we will keep fighting until we do” and added, “The Post Office cannot be allowed to fail.”\nBarnes brought with him an unusual candour and energy so often lacking in those who lead SOEs and who have come with a rather large begging cap in hand. Whether his vision will be shared by those who hold the country’s purse strings still remains to be seen. In the meantime, the cheque, and everything else, is still in the mail. DM", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-04-17-when-the-postman-doesnt-ring-at-all-can-mark-barnes-save-sa-post-office-from-the-iceberg/"}
{"doc_id": "eb747bdc55d6c5f42efdb7eff6aa0a08", "text": "The Employment Equity (EE) reporting period is under way and all designated employers needed to submit their annual 2023 EE reports by January 15, the Department of Employment and Labour said yesterday.\nThe deadline for employers to submit 2023 reports is 15 January 2024 at midnight. The EE reporting season for both manual and online opened on September 1, 2023.\nFor manual reporting, the closing date was October 2, 2023.\nThe department said that the 2023 EE reporting process was based on the current EE Act, and not the controversial EE Amendment Act, 2022.\nThe starting date of the EE Act Amendments was still pending (it had initially been touted for the end of September 2023) as the effective date was still awaiting the President’s signature, the department said.\nOne of the chief critics of the EE Amendment Act, the DA, has threatened to challenge the matter in court as it believes the regulatory changes proposed will worsen racial relations in South Africa.\nParliament, comprising both the National Council of Provinces and the National Assembly, approved the Employment Equity Amendment Bill on May 17, 2022. Subsequently, the Employment Equity Amendment Act was officially published in the Government Gazette in April 2023.\nKey objectives of the EE Amendment, 2022 include reducing the regulatory burden on small businesses (those who employ 1-49 employees) – not to be regarded as designated employers.\nAn objective was also to empower the minister to regulate sector-specific EE numerical targets to ensure the equitable representation of suitably qualified people from designated groups.\nThe submission of annual equity reports is prescribed in the Employment Equity Act of 1998.\nAccording to the 23rd Commission for Employment Equity (CEE) Report, during the 2022 employment equity reporting cycle, 27 532 employment equity reports were submitted by designated employers, which included 7 215 960 employees.\nThis represented an increase of 1.9 % of reports received against the previous year.\nBUSINESS REPORT", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/deadline-approaches-employers-urged-to-submit-2023-employment-equity-reports-by-midnight-january-15-8ac4fada-4f9d-4a1e-98d1-a212ad9e361e"}
{"doc_id": "580cf05a716d2b5cad10a15026809b30", "text": "Oklahoma\n1 Dec\nA 59-year-old man was executed in the US state of Oklahoma on Thursday for a double murder that he claimed was committed in self-defence. Phillip Hancock was put to death by lethal injection at the Oklahoma State Penitentiary in McAlester, a spokeswoman for the Oklahoma Department of Corrections said. The Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board…\nLatest\n4 mins ago\nSenegal's President Macky Sall has proposed a general amnesty bill for political protesters arrested since 2021, as he holds talks to end fresh turmoil over delayed elections.\n6 mins ago\nNo street protest was held on Tuesday in Enugu State by the members of the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) and other affiliated unions over the high cost of living, inflation, insecurity, and hardship in the country. The workers had planned to march on the streets of Enugu State in line with the directives from the…\n19 mins ago\nItalian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni's hard-right government on Tuesday suffered its first electoral setback since taking office, as the centre-left opposition gained a narrow victory in a regional vote in Sardinia.\n25 mins ago\nNigerian singer Adekunle Gold has publicly revealed his battle with sickle cell anemia and offered words of encouragement to others living with the condition. Adekunle Gold, known for his soulful music, surprised fans by dedicating his song \"5 Star\" to individuals battling sickle cell disease. Before launching into the performance, he addressed the audience, sharing:…\n31 mins ago\nThe New Bayern Munich sporting director Max Eberl said Tuesday that his previous attempt to sign Xabi Alonso for Borussia Moenchengladbach does not necessarily mean the German champions will target the Spaniard.\n42 mins ago\nBauchi State Police Command has arrested one Ahmed Mohammed, a resident of Borno State who allegedly stole a car in a bid to pay for an accommodation for his estranged wife after re-marrying her. A Police statement on Tuesday by the public relations officer, Ahmed Wakil, said that the Command got credible information on 24th…\n47 mins ago\nThe Bauchi State government has said that the sum of N396,963,000 has been approved to settle the payment of external examinations for 14,170 students in public schools. Speaking with the journalists in her office, the Commissioner of Education, Dr. Jamila Dahiru said that the payment is an annual exercise to ease the burden on the…\n50 mins ago\nNigerian fuji singer Pasuma has revealed his upcoming marriage plans at the age of 55, after fathering 10 children. Pasuma revealed his intentions during an exclusive interview with Nollywood actress Iyabo Ojo, following the one-year remembrance of his late mother, Alhaja Adijat Kuburat, who passed away in April last year. Asked about his marriage plans,…\n52 mins ago\nThe international friendly game between world champions Argentina and Nigeria's Super Eagles billed for March 26 in Los Angeles, USA, has been called off. According to BBC sports journalist, Oluwashina Okeleji, the game was called off due to the short time to process visas for the Nigerian delegation. Okeleji said the US promoters for the…\n52 mins ago\nThe Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) has announced the sale of foreign exchange to eligible Bureau De Change (BDC) operators. CBN's Director of Trade and Exchange Department, Dr. Hassan Mahmud, in a statement said the bank has observed \"continued price distortions at the retail end of the market, which is feeding into the parallel market…", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://guardian.ng/tag/oklahoma/"}
{"doc_id": "cfc1d84cd58ba0c6992310416f35ea21", "text": "AccessKenya has hired stockbroker Kestrel Capital to advise on valuation of the company and help in assessing whether the acquisition price of Sh14 per share offered by South African firm Dimension Data is a good deal.\nThe telecommunications firm director for strategy and special projects, David Somen, told shareholders at an annual general meeting on Monday the report by Kestrel is expected to be ready in the next one month and will be sent to shareholders.\nDimension Data’s offer price values AccessKenya at about Sh3 billion, and is 40 per cent above the firm’s initial public offering (IPO) price of 2007.\nA shareholder who bought the stock at Sh36 in secondary trading at the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) complained on Monday that the offer by Dimension Data would occasion him loss.\n“The board did not set the price, the board will only make a decision after we have received a report from the financial advisors we have appointed, we will communicate to you within the next four weeks individually,” said AccessKenya chairman Daniel Ndonye.\nDaniel Muchiri, who bought his share at Sh36, said he wanted AccessKenya’s management to negotiate the price upwards.\n“I don’t agree that the Sh14 offered is the best price since I bought the share at Sh36 and selling them at the offer price will be big loss for me,” said Mr Muchiri.\nScores of shareholders who bought their shares above the Dimension Data offer price supported Mr Muchiri and urged the board to reject it.\nDimension Data has expressed interest to acquire 100 per cent of AccessKenya at Sh14 per share.\n(Read: Firm puts in Sh3bn takeover bid for AccessKenya)\n“I urge the board to look for another formula of arriving at a better price for example getting an average of the highest and the lowest level the share has ever traded since the firm was listed, this would bring the price to Sh20 or there about,” Mr Muchiri added.\nAccessKenya will pay its shareholders a dividend of 0.30 per share held in August.\nDimension Data has meanwhile applied to the Ministry of Information for exemption of the 20 per cent local ownership rule, which requires all technology firms to have at least a fifth of their shares owned by Kenyans.\nInformation permanent secretary Bitange Ndemo on Monday said the ministry has received the application but it has not yet been approved.\n“Dimension Data has applied for an exemption of the 20 per cent rule. We have not approved it since the Cabinet secretary needs some time to go through it,” said Dr Ndemo.\nDimension Data has, however, signed an agreement with one of the founder-brothers of the firm, Jonathan Somen, that in the event that the government does not grant the exemption, Somen will own a 20 per cent stake of the company post the take-over.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/AccessKenya-picks-Kestrel-to-advise-on-buyout-price/-/539552/1864382/-/13munkw/-/index.html"}
{"doc_id": "a01bc8ac36d632975fc770f343649f50", "text": "The Economist’s Big Mac Index for 2016 shows how weak the rand has become – and how the currency theoretically remains one of the most ‘undervalued’ in the world.\nSouth Africa’s currency hit a new low against the US dollar late on Sunday night, as Asian markets opened, hitting as low as R17.99 to the US dollar before pulling back to R17.25, and settling around R16.72 in trade on Monday (11 January).\nThe Big Mac Index is based on the theory of purchasing-power parity (PPP) – the notion that, in the long run, exchange rates should move towards the rate that would equalise the prices of an identical basket of goods and services (in this case, a Big Mac burger) in any two countries.\nThe Bic Mac is selected for comparison as the popular fast-food meal is widely available across the world, and remains fairly consistent in pricing – however, it is by no means an exact science.\nAccording to The Economist, which publishes its “burgernomics” indicator each year, in terms of purchasing power parity, the rand should be trading at closer to R5.68 to the dollar.\nIn 2016, a Bic Mac in the USA sells for $4.93 – while the South African Big Mac (at R28.00) sells for an equivalent $1.77 (at R15.81/$ – used at the time of the study).\nTo reach pricing parity, the rand would have to be R5.68 to the dollar.\nThis “implied” exchange rate is a far stretch from the R15.81 used at the time of the study.\nThe difference, in theory at least, means that the rand is undervalued by 64%\nAt R16.72 to the dollar, the currency is undervalued by 66% in PPP terms – the lowest point in South Africa’s history on the index.\nThe table below shows the rand’s value from 2000 to 2016 relative to the US dollar in PPP terms using Bic Mac prices.\nThis graph shows how the value of the rand has changed versus the US dollar since 2000, and how it has significantly diverged in its purchasing power value over that time.\nThe Bic Mac index is widely used to gauge the health of an economy. Its figures align closely with those of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.\nA currency is considered undervalued when its value in foreign exchange is less than it “should be” based on economic conditions.\nCurrency value isn’t determined objectively, and may be undervalued due to a lack of demand, even if a country’s economy is strong. South Africa’s economy is not strong, however, described globally as one of the most fragile in the world.\nAccording to The Economist, a fairer measure of a currency’s fair value would be to look at the relationship between prices and GDP per person, where South Africa has a GDP per capita of $13,046 (PPP dollars, World Bank, 2014) versus the USA’s $54,629.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/108555/how-far-the-rand-has-fallen-from-2000-to-2016/"}
{"doc_id": "6ff88bfc0a8a324674eca79b298e759e", "text": "Welcome to Nairametrics‘ summary of the daily performance of major economic indicators and highlights from trading sessions and key statistics such as Treasury Bills and Bond. This is brought to you by Zedcrest.\nThis report is dated September 6, 2019.\n***US FED Chair plays down recession risks, reinforces expectations for 25bps rate cut***\nBonds: The FGN Bond market closed the week with sustained demand pressures across the curve. Yields compressed further by c.7bps on the average across the FGN Bond Benchmark curve, most notably at the short- to mid-end maturities.\nWe expect to see sustained demand at the mid-end of the curve, as clients’ preference for duration seems to peak at the 10-year benchmark.\nTreasury Bills: Improved demand interests flowed in the Treasury Bills secondary market in today’s session as, contrary to market expectations, there was no OMO auction floated by the CBN. Yields in the NTBills Benchmark Curve compressed by c.9bps, especially at the long-end, supported by buoyant system liquidity.\nWe expect the market to trade cautiously next week, as participants consider the possibility of further rate hikes at PMA and OMO auctions expected later in the week.\nMoney Market: Rates in the money market dropped by an average of c.110 bps supported by buoyant system liquidity. The OBB and OVN rates ended the week at 3.21% and 3.86% respectively, as system liquidity remained well in positive territory at c.N692bn.\nDespite funding pressures from Wholesale and Retail FX funding next week, we expect rates to remain stable at low levels in light of high system liquidity levels and expected OMO maturities of at least c.N348bn.\nFX Market: At the interbank, the Naira/USD spot and SMIS rates remained stable at N306.90/$ and N358.04/$. The Naira appreciated at the I&E window by 11k to close at N362.08/$. At the parallel market, the cash and transfer rates remained stable at N357.70/$ and N362.50/$ respectively.\nEurobonds: The NIGERIA Sovereigns continued their losing streak, weakening further by c.3bps across the curve. Volatility in global oil prices from escalating trade sentiments saw the markets close the week softer.\nThe NIGERIA corps traded on a muted note, with slightly improved bids witnessed across the tracked tickers. We witnessed some buy interest on the FIDABN 22s and ETINL 24s.\nDisclaimer: Whilst proper and reasonable care has been taken in the preparation and accuracy of the facts and figures presented in this report, no responsibility or liability is accepted by Zedcrest Capital or its employees for any error, omission or opinion expressed herein. This report is not an investment advice or a research recommendation and should not be regarded as such. The information provided herein is by no means intended to provide a sufficient basis on which to make an investment decision.\nDownload Nairametrics App for breaking news and market intelligence.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://nairametrics.com/2019/09/07/t-bills-trade-bullish-to-close-the-week-as-cbn-stalls-on-omo-auction/"}
{"doc_id": "90e6404483f3db6de13662c3c3a94f0f", "text": "Advancement of technology has been identified as a major stumbling block against the war on emerging and trans-national organised crime in Kenya and the region.\nProsecutors at the ongoing International Association of Prosecutors conference in Mombasa said technological advancement has provided criminals with an avenue to hide when and after committing economic crimes.\nDirector of Public Prosecutions Noordin Haji while opening the conference said cryptocurrencies have increased the risk of criminal activities due to the anonymity that it provides to its users.\n“We are experiencing a complex and rapidly evolving crime landscape as criminal organisations are no longer restricted by territories or borders. Indeed, with the development of technological tools such as blockchain and cryptocurrencies, perpetrators are able to carry out transnational organised crimes with minimal risks of detection,” said Mr Haji.\nThese crimes, he said, undermine state authority and sovereignty, threaten national security and the rule of law and fuel corruption.\nHe said that the conference presented a chance to fully examine some of the most pressing emerging and transnational crimes such as environmental crimes, money laundering, terrorism, corruption and cyber-crimes that affect respective countries.\n“It is thus essential for law enforcement agencies and prosecution services to embrace this new reality in order to effectively combat these complex and serious crimes,” he said.\nThe DPP said that money laundering plays a significant role in concealing the place of origin of criminally obtained funds so that they appear legitimate, thus exacerbating corruption, economic and related crimes.\nProsecutors from Africa and Europe have gathered in Mombasa to exchange knowledge on how to combat emerging crimes and the transnational organised crime that has become a global concern.\nUnder the theme Effective Mechanisms for Responding to Emerging Crimes and Trans-national Organised Crimes in Africa, the two-day conference will also provide the prosecutors with an opportunity to meet with criminal justice experts to share best practices in strengthening prosecutorial services to achieve excellence “in a progressively complex criminal justice environment”.\n“In this regard, I hope we can examine potential avenues for the harmonisation of legislation, policies, and frameworks towards enhanced regional and international cooperation in the detection, investigation, and prosecution of emerging and transnational crimes,” said Mr Haji.\nTanzanian’s DPP Sylvester Mwakitalu said criminal syndicates have exploited the operational gaps and incoherent working relationships among countries to continue with their illegal activities.\nMr Mwakitalu however said the desire to achieve common interest in combating transnational organised crime pushed the regional countries to form the East African Association of Prosecutors (EIP).\n“The main objective of the EIP is to enhance cooperation in the handling of cross border crimes, provision of mutual legal assistance in criminal matters including the arrest and repatriation of criminals,” he said.\nThe corporation, he noted, has assisted in collection of evidence and sharing the same with member countries to help in prosecuting the criminals involved. These, he said included trafficking in persons, smuggling of immigrants, and illegal drug trafficking\nHe noted that EIP has also helped in bringing the countries together in pursuit of peace and security and assisting one another in ending impunity of all kinds.\nIll-gotten wealth\n“We are also aiming at exchanging information on a national mechanism for combating criminal activities. We have been instrumental in helping one another to ensure that criminals do not benefit from their ill-gotten wealth by tracing and recovering their assets,” he said.\nMauritius DPP, Satyajit Boollel said lack of cooperation, limited resources and lack of transparency has hampered the war against trans-national organised crime.\n“The real culprits hide behind a series of layers of the security system making them difficult to reach. The lack of transparency also makes it hard to find the real beneficiaries of these criminal acts,” he said.\nMr Boollel also asked the prosecutors to invest in expertise to help them unmask the massive scam that happens behind the technological advancement tools such as crypto currencies and also to crack the whip on cybercrime syndicate.\nNational Treasury Cabinet Secretary Ukur Yatan who gave the keynote address noted that there is need for transformation in the prosecution’s department to effectively combat the emerging crime and transnational organised crime.\n“These criminal acts are evolving and that is why we need to be ahead of the game. This conference has come at the right time because sharing experience and lessons from our various jurisdictions will give us a better and common strategy to stay ahead of the game.\nMr Yatani said most countries have paid a heavy price due to the trans-national organised crime that has affected both the political and economic sectors.\nHe said terrorism distorts resources and denies the public opportunity to get better services hence there is a need to combat the vice through waging war on trans-national organised crime that funds terrorism.\n“Trans-national criminal networks pose a direct threat to the economy and undermine our legal system and the rule of law to a greater extent,” he said\nThe CS said that while globalization has enhanced the regional and international interconnectivity and independence, the same has also enhanced the prevalence of cross border criminal enterprises and activities that has in turn undermined economies.\n“Unless we develop strategies to tackle the merging and trans-national crime, we are likely to see this figure rise at the expense of social and economic development,” he said.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/technology/how-new-tech-is-making-fight-on-organised-crimes-intricate-3819800"}
{"doc_id": "1f3e472becadefe7eee0d595c783af5a", "text": "The tech industry is constantly changing, and one recurring theme is the waves of layoffs. This has led to a critical analysis of the impact of layoffs not only within tech but also across industries. Everyone's question is this: Are tech layoffs contagious, causing shockwaves to extend well beyond other industries?\nGiven the current situation, there has been a noticeable increase in tech layoffs recently, which has drawn attention. In the first four weeks of this year, tech giants like Meta, Amazon, Microsoft, Google, and TikTok have collectively said goodbye to about 25,000 workers. This is unexpected considering that consumer trust was rising, inflation had dropped from the previous year, and workforces at tech companies had mostly recovered to pre-pandemic levels.\nExecutives, wielding the justification of a pandemic-induced hiring binge, high inflation, and weak consumer demand, had initiated mass layoffs in the recent past.\nRead: Start-up closures leave trail of job losses in 2022\nHowever, the rationale behind these decisions is now being questioned as the industry appears to have weathered those challenges. The question looms large: Why, in a seemingly recovered landscape, are tech companies still laying people off?\nThe effects of major workforce adjustments made by tech giants are felt widely because of the interconnectedness of industries in the modern economy. Certainly, to address the question of whether layoffs can spread from one industry to another, the answer is affirmative – it has already occurred.\nLayoffs show a spreading trend within industries as well as between different sectors. Although it may not seem reasonable, there is a common belief at the foundation of the trend, which is, \"If everyone else is downsizing, why aren't we?\"\nWe can also see that many retailers are preemptively laying off staff, even as final demand remains uncertain. Layoffs like these can have a knock-on effect on supply chain dependencies, consumer spending patterns, and the general mood in the labour market.\nWhile company executives believe that these actions are essential to their long-term survival and flexibility in the face of changing market conditions, other sectors may have reason for concern. The effects are felt throughout the complex network of related industries and are not just confined to the tech sector.\nIt's critical to consider whether the tech industry's layoff of thousands of workers in the first few weeks of 2024 is a sign of more significant economic difficulties or a calculated move by these companies to prepare themselves for a new wave of innovation.\nFrequently regarded as an indicator of the overall state of the economy, the tech sector presents a warning sign that shouldn't be ignored. Every sector of the economy might have to prepare for changes in consumer behaviour, supply chain dynamics, and general market trust.\nViewing this landscape through the perspective of Human Resources (HR) becomes crucial as the ripple effects of tech layoffs spread throughout industries. HR professionals have the responsibility for managing the immediate effects of these workforce adjustments on employees as well as strategically positioning their organizations for the future.\nSo, the question is: How can HR be a key player in preventing layoffs from potentially spreading? First of all, it becomes imperative to promote an environment that is resilient and adaptive. HR needs to spearhead programmes that enable staff members to welcome ongoing education and adjust to change with assurance as industries prepare for possible changes.\nRead: Factories warn of layoffs, closures on climbing costs\nAdditionally, HR departments should closely monitor industry trends, not only within the tech sector but across the broader job market. Understanding the dynamics of workforce adjustments in tech allows HR professionals to anticipate challenges and proactively plan for the evolving needs of their own organisations.\nCommunication turns into a key component of the HR plan. A sense of stability can be fostered during uncertain times and employee concerns can be reduced by HR leaders communicating in a transparent and compassionate manner.\nOffering opportunities for reskilling and upskilling programmes can give workers the skills they need to stay adaptable in a changing labour market.\nTo sum up, the fallout from tech layoffs demands an HR approach that extends beyond short-term crisis management. It demands initiatives to build resilience, strategic insight, and a dedication to developing a workforce capable of navigating change's impact.\nHR emerges as the guiding force, directing organisations toward stability, growth, and a workforce prepared for the future as industries brace for possible contagion effects.\nThe writer is the General Manager of Workforce Africa, an HR solutions provider.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/data-hub/puzzle-of-tech-industry-layoffs-amid-recovery--4514006"}
{"doc_id": "db3914bfc5f50fa91abc2570d8ef22af", "text": "Brainworks in $35m capital raise\nHappiness Zengeni Business Editor\nLocal investment holding firm Brainworks Capital Management has successfully raised $35 million following the closure of a capital raise last week.\nThe proceeds will be used to strengthen various company investments, which include Dawn Properties and African Sun, and to pursue investment into the telecoms sector in spite of the withdrawal of the offer to purchase a stake in Telecel Zimbabwe.\nThe rights offer was underwritten by major foreign shareholders Red Rock Capital and Blue Air Capital. The offer opened on March 2 and closed on March 23.\nALSO SEE\nAccording to the company’s circular on the capitalisation exercise, Brainworks will seek to obtain control of African Sun by making an additional purchase of shares and effectively hold more than 51 percent of the issued share capital.\nThe acquisition will cost approximately $3,5 million.\nAbout $7,4 million will be used to buy out minorities in Lengrah Investments, the special purpose vehicle holding shares in African Sun and Dawn Properties including Stewart Cranswick.\nThe purchase of the shares will be completed on May 31, 2015. Lengrah Investments holds about 43 percent in Dawn and a similar stake in African Sun.\nBrainworks is required by Zimbabwe Stock Exchange rules to make an offer to minorities in the companies as they have exceeded the mandatory 35 percent shareholding.\nThey will also use the proceeds to have a rights offer in African Sun in order to clean up its balance sheet.\nBrainworks was also recently granted a licence to operate a life assurance company, which needs to be capitalised with equity of $1 million.\n“The other $1 million will be injected by a technical partner who has been secured, to meet the regulatory requirements of $2 million capital.”\nChief executive Mr George Manyere told The Herald Business that even though they had withdrawn the offer to purchase the 40 percent stake in Telecel Zimbabwe, the company was still looking at entering the lucrative sector.\n“We believe the telecoms sector provides an opportunity for long-term growth and strong cash flows.\n“In spite of Brainworks withdrawing its offer to acquire the shareholding in Telecel, we are still looking at entering into the telecoms sector either on the mobile, fibre or infrastructure side. There is value in the telecoms space.”\nThe investment holding company last week withdrew its offer to acquire Empowerment Corporation’s stake in Telecel after protracted shareholder wrangles had stalled the transaction.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.herald.co.zw/brainworks-in-35m-capital-raise/"}
{"doc_id": "cff3eb62988c1f4a17a5306d13023026", "text": "FG urges domestication, implementation of revised gender policy in states\nFederal Government, has charged all state governments to domesticate the revised National Gender Policy 2021-2026 for the equity and welfare of vulnerable groups.\nPermanent Secretary, federal ministry of Women Affairs, Dr. Monilola Udoh, gave the charge at a Dissemination and Sensitisation Workshop on the 20212026 revised National Gender Policy, (NGP), yesterday in Abuja.\nShe said “The overall goal of the 2021 National Gender Policy is to build a just society in which women, girls, and other vulnerable groups will enjoy the same opportunities, rights, and obligations in all spheres of life, devoid of discrimination; where their needs and concerns are mainstreamed equitably into all sectors of National development.\n“The strategic objectives of the revised National Gender Policy are to; bridge gender and social inclusion gaps and achieve parity in all spheres of life, protect women’s human rights and mitigate sexual and gender-based violence through appropriate buffers and related services.\nDr Udoh adds that the NGP will also”Explore and fully harness women’s human capital assets, as a growth driver for national development through women’s economic empowerment, advance women’s participation and representation in leadership and governance, support women and girls’ education, lifelong health, survival and sustainable development.”\nShe urged all state’s gender officers represented to ensure the domestication and full implementation of the policy in their various states for overall impact and national development.\nUnited Nations Women and ECOWAS Country Representative to Nigeria, Beatrice Eyong, said, the NGP is a very important national document that sets the tone for how to engage on issues of gender equality and women’s empowerment.\n“UN Women has always been at the forefront of the development of the strategy, we feel very honoured to continue to be part of this,” she said.\nRepresented by the National Programme officer, UN Women, Patience Ekeoba, she urged all development partners to continue to support the process of review, dissemination and implementation of the policy.\nExecutive Director, Center for Gender, Women and Children in Sustainable Development and Lead of the 2006 Gender Policy Professor Olabisi Aina, explained that the word gender and equity go hand in hand as they all encapsulate the welfare of everyone.\nAccording to her “Unless we get all the processes right, we will not make it in terms of development and this is the reason why the gender policy must be domesticated across all the states in the federation.”\nGet the latest news delivered straight to your inbox every day of the week. Stay informed with the Guardian’s leading coverage of Nigerian and world news, business, technology and sports.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://guardian.ng/news/fg-urges-domestication-implementation-of-revised-gender-policy-in-states/"}
{"doc_id": "d2d7da09208d82e6caa72841b679771f", "text": "Output at the Kilimapesa gold mines in Narok, operated by UK’s Goldplat, increased 69.98 per cent in the year ended June 30, 2017, but the mining firm reported a higher net loss of about Sh153.8 million (£1.1 million) for the year compared to a loss of Sh99 million (£711,000) the previous year.\nKilimapesa produced 3,408 ounces of gold in the period, up from 2,005 ounces a year earlier, after expanding its processing plant.\nThe firm in February commissioned a new plant with a view to raising production. It pumped in $2 million (about Sh206.6 million) last year for expansion of its processing capacity at Kilimapesa.\n“An increase in unrealised foreign exchange losses of £177,000 (about Sh24.7 million) on inter-company payables contributed to the increased loss,” said the firm in a statement. It added the benefits of increased production capacity were only realised during the second half of the financial year, with the firm making operational profits during the last two months of the financial year, the first time in the 10 years since acquisition.\nIn the year ended June 30, 2017, revenue increased to £3,150,000 (about Sh440 million) compared to £156,000 (about Sh21 million) a year earlier.\n“This has been made possible primarily due to the substantial completion during the year of an additional processing plant, but also as a result of continued cost cutting and process efficiency improvements across the operation,” it said. Out of the 3,408 ounces of gold produced 3,215 ounces were sold compared to 1,999 ounces sold in the period a year earlier.\nREAD: Goldplat in Sh200m Kilimapesa loan deal\nALSO READ: Kenya’s gold loses its lustre as earnings slide\n“Significantly, 1,254 ounces of gold was produced during the last quarter of the year and an annualised production rate of roughly 5,800 ounces of gold was achieved in the last two months of the year — a rate which is sustainable with current infrastructure,” it said.\nThe firm said a tax probe by the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) had been “substantially finalised.” “Of the original preliminary assessment of £1,288,540, (Sh180.1 million) £55,000 (about Sh7.6 million) has been paid and £51,000 (about Sh7.1 million) still remains under dispute,” said finance director, Werner Klingenberg.\nIt is demanding a balance of £812,000 (about Sh113 million) in Value Added Tax refunds from KRA.\n“Despite clear provisions in the Kenyan legislation regarding the recoverability of VAT, and two audits and continuous consultation with the Kenya Revenue Authorities the balance due remain outstanding,” he said.\nThe firm is eyeing conversion into a mining licence next year for the neighbouring Teng Teng area where it has been conducting exploration.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/companies/narok-gold-miner-reports-sh153-8m-loss-despite-rise-in-output-2170186"}
{"doc_id": "9f309ed681a51a52f7c056fd576782cb", "text": "Me thinks that the most formidable competition for M-Pesa is going to come from the new money transfer platform launched by the Kenya Banker’s Association recently under the name PesaLink.\nThe unfortunate thing is that PesaLink is a camel built by a committee. All over the world, innovation tends to spring from small nimble players who come to the market with innovative ideas to disrupt the established giants.\nI do not think that PesaLink is much of an innovation because most of what it offers is already in place. For instance, transferring money from one bank account to another has been with us for many years. Loading money into your mobile phone from your bank account is possible. Depositing money from M-Pesa into your bank account is also possible.\nAnd withdrawing money with a mobile phone from an ATM has been possible for several years.\nThus, what the bankers have come up with amid the pomp and noise is no more than a platform that makes it easier for customers to access bank accounts through all these existing channels.\nPesaLink is more or less an omni- channel that gives customers greater convenience and choice in accessing funds from their bank accounts and in moving their money around. It is not a big product innovation that the bankers make it to be.\nStill, we must all recognise that banks are coming into the battle with M-Pesa with formidable strengths. First, banks have a monopoly over operating bank accounts. As at 31 December 2015, banks had 36 million accounts.\nIndeed, bank accounts now almost equal the number of mobile communications mobile phone subscriptions.\nWith M-Pesa, you are restricted to moving money by transactions and daily limits. The banks have enhanced the value of mobile-to- bank trasnsactions to Sh1 million.\nFinally, banks are the only Central Bank of Kenya approved settlement members.\nHow I wish that banks had used these formidable strengths they have to come up with a truly game-changing product innovation in the payments space.\nM-Pesa’s greatest strength is its simplicity: the fact that you grandmother can use the platform without much training.\nIndeed, M-Pesa works on any telephone, scaling from the Mulika Mwizi all the way to the most sophisticated of smartphones.\nWhat the banks are offering will require you to acquire a smartphone. There are many more M-Pesa agents than bank branches. Indeed, the number of bank branches are a parltry 1,500 compared to M-Pesa agents who exceed 130,000.\nAs a matter of fact, commercial bank agents are primarily M-Pesa agents who have just added banking agency as a side hustle.\nMARKET DOMINANCE\nToday, M-Pesa is systemic and part of the nation’s critical financial markets infrastructure. Finally, my views on the raging debate about the proposal to hive off M-Pesa from Safaricom by creating a separate company. In my view, regulation on market dominance should focus on consumer protection. In formulating competition policy for Kenya, and as we continue groping in the dark for the appropriate legal framework for dealing with market dominance, an important distinction will have to be made between promoting competition in the interest of consumers per se and protecting the interests of Safaricom’s weak and insolvent competitors.\nAnd I still maintain that Analysys Mason, the consultants who did the dominant market study, displayed a shallow understanding of our national payments system.\nTelcos don’t have a central clearing counterparty, are not licensed as CBK settlement members- and don’t have a single float. Two of the flagship recommendations by the consultants, namely, wallet- to- wallet interoperability and agent- to- agent interoperability require a single trust account.\nWhile the law can be changed, global standards including guidelines by the Bank of International Settlements and also the Financial Action Task Force, mandate that central banks should be the central settlement counterparties in any nation mainly because of their responsibility of maintaining safe and sound financial system.\nSuggesting that Telco can create a settlement institution of their own within 12 months as implied by the consultants is further evidence that they did not weigh the implications of some of their proposals.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/analysis/Battle-royale-looms-between-banks-MPesa/539548-3825616-jojjw9z/index.html"}
{"doc_id": "0b64569cd127caa47f97e87b23247ac1", "text": "Eighty20 and Tritech Media have published a new report looking at the impact of various rewards programmes in South Africa, including which one have the most active users.\nThe report is based on a consumer survey, which was completed by a total of 1,413 respondents, gauging rewards members’ perceptions of, engagement with and behaviours influenced by the various programmes.\nIt covered 26 of the biggest loyalty programmes out of a possible 100+ in South Africa, including the big names like eBucks, UCount, Smart Shopper, Vitality and others.\nThe report found that the average consumer is subscribed to about 9 different rewards programmes, covering various sectors, from retail/grocery programmes to banking rewards. While South African consumers were highly subscribed, they weren’t necessarily very active.\nIn determining the most successful programmes, the analysts looked at three major factors:\n- How many respondents indicated they were registered for the rewards programme;\n- How many respondents were active on the rewards programme; and\n- How the programmes changed their spending habits.\nThe graphs below outline activity on the major programmes covered, as well as a closer look at how the retail/grocery and banking sectors compare in terms of registered vs active users.\nIn the retail banking sector, while FNB’s eBucks shows activity levels not that much higher than Investec’s rewards programme, it has a very high level of subscription, compared to its competitors.\nMeanwhile, the grocery/health sector has a much higher subscription rate overall, but also produces a clear winner in Pick n Pay’s Smart Shopper scheme.\nAccording to the survey respondents, the schemes that members say give them the most value are Clicks ClubCard, Pick n Pay Smart Shopper and Dis-Chem Benefits. With the retail banking sector, the loyalty programmes that members say have an influence on their shopping behavior are Standard Bank UCount, FNB eBucks and Absa Rewards.\nChanging behaviour\nAccording to Eighty20, the self-assessment data – like behaviour changes – will always come with caveats, but still provides insight into how partnerships between brands and rewards schemes can push consumers to change their shopping habits.\n“The top performing retail programmes all have strong partnerships with other programmes which are clearly helping to drive behaviour change,” the group said.\n“For example, Dis-Chem Benefits is a reward partner on the Discovery Vitality, Momentum Multiply and FNB eBucks programmes. Similarly, Pick n Pay Smart Shopper has partnerships with Absa Rewards, Discovery Vitality and Momentum Multiply.\n“Fuel retail partnerships are also likely to be a strong factor for behaviour change, particularly for banking programmes and a few retailers. Discovery Insure and Standard Bank UCount pioneered the aggressive marketing of exclusive fuel retail partnerships in 2011 and 2013 respectively.\n“Since then a number of banks, retailers and airlines have emulated this approach including Clicks ClubCard and Shell, SAA Voyager and Total, Absa Rewards and Sasol, Dis-Chem Benefits and Total, Avios and BP, and Edcon Thank U and Engen.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businesstech.co.za/news/finance/255699/the-most-popular-rewards-programmes-in-south-africa/"}
{"doc_id": "def9393eeaa652fc6156c54e5d32f780", "text": "GUEST COLUMNIST BY SAM AMADI\nThe famous French political philosopher, Alexis Tocqueville, in his classic: Democracy in America, wisely observes that in the United States no sooner does a political controversy arise than it transforms into a legal dispute.\nIn that disputatious society, the law court is an extension of the public square. Now that the US model of constitutional democracy has traveled across the world and reached Nigeria, we are in the Tocquevillian world where the hooded sages will be asked to determine the most important question of political Nigeria: who should govern?\nIt is official. Vice President Atiku Abubakar has filed a petition at the Presidential Election Tribunal, seeking to nullify the Independent National Electoral Commission’s (INEC) declaration of President Buhari as elected for another four years tenure.\nAs the elections wind up across the country, so many aggrieved politicians are heading to election tribunals to seek relief from a grossly flawed electoral process. Of course, we are used to flawed elections where the incompetence and corruption of the electoral management body result in the overburdening of the judicial system.\nBut the 2019 elections are really flawed, even by Nigerian standard.\nWe have witnessed the court sending away elected governors two or three years into their tenure. We have witnessed tribunals sacking legislators who have almost finished the four-years tenure and requesting them to refund humongous salaries and allowances collected for unlawful duties.\nIn 2015 there was little litigation on the elections. For the first time there was no case against the winner of the presidential election. The sitting president magnanimously accepted his defeat in an election that many of his party leaders believed was rigged in favour of the opposition. The nation heaved a sign of relief. As if taking a cue, many politicians who lost legislative and governorship elections refused to challenge their defeat in the tribunals. Perhaps, the far lower number of cases filed against the results of 2015 elections reflects an upgrade in its credibility or a domino effect of President Jonathan’s extraordinary sportsmanship. With the poor quality of the elections in 2019 and the fact that the defeated presidential candidate has rushed to the tribunal, we will expect a rich harvest of litigation at the various election tribunals.\nNow, the role of the courts in election matters call into question the legitimacy and desirability of judicial review of elections. Elections are part of political discourse and actions by citizens to decide who exercises political authority in the commonwealth. So, elections are political. The conventional conception of the judicial action is that it is both principled and apolitical. By ‘principled’ it means that its decision draws consistently from general value propositions that have universal validity. By ‘apolitical’ it is meant that the court stays away from contestation as to who gets power and exercises it. The court deals with corrective justice while the legislature and executive deal with distributive justice. The convention is that the merit of the court is that it shields itself from partisan contest to regain the neutrality and independence to settle disputes between the contestants. A partisan court loses the credibility and legitimacy to settle disputes between politically misaligned individuals and entities in the society.\nSo, some have advanced the logic that the judiciary should not insert itself too deep in the political battlefield through electoral disputes because such disputes are, to use the Lon Fuller’s word, polycentric, and defies effective resolution through the typical analytical resources of the adjudication.\nTherefore, from the foregoing perspective, electoral disputes are inherently non-justiciable. But this assertion is false or exaggerated in many ways. First, conventional conception of adjudication as merely determination of private rights amongst private parties with bipolar interests and where reliefs flows interdependently from harm has been superceded as the courts responds to the exigence of social justice and stability.\nThe idea of public interest litigation has shifted the role of judges from merely declaring the rights of contestants to ‘legislating’ rules that should guide social interaction and distributive justice in society. This has shaped the court as a political institution, albeit one that acts impartially and on principles and reasoned elaborations.\nIn matter of election, the court ought to embrace its responsibility as a non-partisan political institution. Political scholar, Robert Dahl, in his classic article, The Supreme Court as a National Policymaker, developed the idea of the court as a political institution. According to Dahl, “To consider the Supreme Court of the United States strictly as a legal institution is to underestimate its significance in the American political system, an institution, that is to say, for arriving at decisions on controversial questions of national policy”. The court is an ‘unusual’ political institution. It is unusual because it is non-partisan and arrives at decisions in a principled manner without resort to violence and illogic. This is what makes the court legitimate and credible as a political institution to intervene in terms of national crisis.\nThe last election may bring Nigeria to such a crisis. The reports of daylight brigandage and open manipulations of state institutions by politicians who have access and resources to do so beggars belief. Desperate politicians brushed aside the rules of the game and corrupt and incompetent electoral managers aided and abetted heinous violations. This might probably be our worst election since 1999 as candidates forced returning officers to declare them victors at the threat of loss of life. These candidates cynically challenged the other candidates to go to court, imagining that the arm of the court is too short to retrieve these stolen mandates in electoral matters. Should the court play dead-brain? Should the court restrict itself to the passive mode of private law litigation or should it step up to the role of an undertaker of democratic stability built on the sanctity of the electoral process in a country where political desperation and institutional manipulation threaten to tip the country over the cliff?\nWe need to understand what is at stake in the 2019 elections to understand the need for judicial activism. Scholars and political philosophers have tried to distinguish between a mere regime of elections and a democratic polity. It is true that democracy goes beyond periodic elections as has become fashionable in many of the world’s pseudo democracies. But there can be no democratic polity without free and fair elections. Where elections are abrogated or cynically reduced to competitive oligarchy then democracy has died.\nIn his masterpiece, War, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places, Oxford Scholar, Paul Collier argues that bad electoral system acts as a gravitational force to attract criminal elements who alone can optimize the criminal environment it offers. By a natural selection, ethical and competent persons will shun the electoral process because they are not competitive in exploiting the criminality and violence of the electoral system. So, the fastest way to kill a nascent democracy is to institutionalize bad electoral system.\nThis means that if we don’t fix the flaws in the electoral process the only direction our elections will go is from bad to worse because the criminal environment of election will breed sophisticated criminals who will push it to higher levels of criminality in order to out-compete other criminals.\nIn the meantime, there will be no basis for any significant and sustainable commitment to good governance because you can always win without good performance in office if the electoral system remains violent and criminal. Check out the profile of those elected to govern in executive or legislative offices. Since 1999 they grow from fair to bad to worse.\nFor those who think that after the fiasco of the 2019 election we will work hard to reform the electoral system there is bad news. There is little chance of exiting this reinforcing cycle of doom. We have seen that since 1999 politicians have refused to execute comprehensive reform of the electoral system. The reason is obvious. Politics is a career. To advance your career in politics you must win and win. Manipulable electoral system favours mostly incumbents- president, governors and legislators. So, collectively they won’t want to change the game much because it could enable a successful challenge next time and end their career progress. So, things would probably get worse in 2023.\nWe can’t look to civil society to rescue us from the tragedy of flawed electoral system. Civil society is either too weak or compromised to effect transformation bottom-up. In 2023, things will get worse. You would need a contingent of Nigerian army or a well-armed private militia to win election. You would need to invade the Central Bank of Nigeria and pull through 10 bullion vans to be able to unseat an incumbent. What will be the result? The triumph of warlords and the end of the prospect of democracy and development in Nigeria. The North will remain the poorest part of the world. Most Nigerian children will be illiterates and hungry militants bombing themselves and every other thing in sight. IPOB youths will be chanting down Nigeria in the streets of the southeast while being killed by Nigerian soldiers. Niger Delta youths will still be destroying gas pipelines and increase poverty and instability. Instability will aggravate poverty and poverty will escalate violence. This could be Nigeria after 2023 election if we don’t fix the electoral system.\nThe state of affairs today is that the two branches of government have been captured by virulent and desperately wicked special interests. They are not allowing the people make their choice. The legitimacy and legality of the legislative and executive exercise of power in a democracy rest on the fact that the people actually chose their leaders. That is the core ideal of the constitution which the judiciary is mandated to protect. The ‘governance’ theory of judicial function argues that whenever the prospect of democratic change of leadership is made impossible through the capture of the electoral process, the judiciary should ‘politically’ intervene through public law adjudication to free the polity from the ‘procedural freeze’ and restore electoral process to its democratic character.\nThat is, the judiciary should step up and assert its right to govern whenever the two ‘partisan’ political branches conspire to derail democracy and make the threat of instability clear and present.\nIt is the judiciary that can save us from the crisis of violent and roguish elections in Nigeria. The court has the institutional integrity and political independence to stop the politicians from nullifying the voice and the will of the people. But what could stand against the judiciary from sorting out Nigerian electoral mess is a passive and retrogressive jurisprudence that fashions the court as only competent to redress private wrongs and not public wrongs.\nThe courts and election tribunals in Nigeria need a new jurisprudence in 2019 that starts with the ac\nceptance of the view of the judiciary as an ‘unusual political institution”, one that its invested with legal authority and popular faith to intervene in political conflicts whenever it seems that the other branches of government have been captured by special interests that frustrate the people from expressing their political preferences.\nIt is true that judges are no ‘Platonic Guardians’, as Judge Learned Hand of the US Supreme Court once said. But they are constitutionally authorized to police the political landscape and review the decisions of presidents, legislators and regulators. If these act in line with the constitution and the expression of the people through a credible electoral system, the judiciary defers to them. If they don’t so act, the judiciary reverses them. This has been the wisdom of constitutional adjudication since Marbury v. Madison. The Nigerian Supreme Court has endorsed this view in several cases.\nLegal scholar Professor Itsa Sagay, in his magisterial A Legacy for Posterity- The Work of the Supreme Court 1980-1988, chronicled the work of the Supreme Court in this regard and concluded that the Nigerian Supreme Court has rightly pioneered rule of law, human rights and social justice even in the most difficult tyrannical regimes.\nToday’s judiciary has its work cut out for it. It has to reverse the capture of the electoral system by reversing every electoral result that is procured by fraud, violence or manipulation by the electoral management board. The tribunals and the Supreme Court should consider themselves as exercising ‘the right to govern’ as and unusual political institution’. Just like the Nigerian Supreme Court in the 1980s and the Warren Supreme Court in the United States, the Nigerian judiciary must redirect governance towards justice and respect for the right of the people.\nIn deciding the many electoral cases before it, the judiciary should note that it is not just making decisions between contestants; it is reshaping the normative environment for democratic accountability in Nigeria beyond 2019. It is determining whether we move toward ‘Somalia’ or towards Botswana.\nAlready, by the destruction of the integrity of the electoral system we are on the road to Somalia. The judiciary can pull us back if it rediscovers courage and nullify every violation of the sanctity of democratic elections.\n• Dr. Sam Amadi teaches law at Baze University, Abuja. He is a law and governance professional", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2019/03/20/2019-election-and-judicial-activism"}
{"doc_id": "6e9365253ecc45bfff4fa492aee51a7e", "text": "Standard Bank Group’s shareholders will no doubt be satisfied that guidance for its financial year to December 31 is expected to remain intact.\nThe biggest bank in Africa by assets said in a trading update for the 10 months to October 31, 2023 yesterday that banking revenue growth was expected to be “robust”, underpinned by strong momentum across the franchise.\nThe share price inched up 0.47% to R198.50 yesterday afternoon, a price 0.3% higher than on the same day a year previously and 63% higher than three years ago.\nBanking cost growth was expected to remain elevated, but strong positive jaws (income growth versus cost growth) was expected, the bank said.\nCredit impairment charge growth was expected to moderate in the six months to December 31, and the credit loss ratio for the full year was expected to remain within the targeted range, albeit above the midpoint.\nReturn on equity was expected to remain in the 2025 target range of 17% to 20%, in line with previous forecasts.\nFor the 10 months to October 31, banking revenue growth slowed but was above 20% period-on-period, driven by strong net interest income and non-interest revenue growth.\nHigher average interest rates supported the net interest margin, but the net interest margin expansion had slowed recently as interest rate increases in the second half of 2022 were now embedded in the base.\n“Lower demand, reduced affordability, and competitive pricing (particularly in mortgages in South Africa), resulted in lower disbursements to retail and business clients and a slowdown in growth in the related loan portfolios,” the group said.\nCorporate origination remained strong, driven by energy-related opportunities.\nNon-interest revenue growth was in the low-to-mid teens, supported by client acquisition, higher transaction volumes, annual price increases, and volatility that supported trading revenues.\nCredit impairment charges growth slowed, but remained elevated due to balance sheet growth, client strain linked to the interest rate increases, sovereign risk migrations in Africa Regions, and provisions linked to specific corporates in South Africa.\nAfrica Regions performed “very well and delivered strong earnings growth” in reported and constant currency. Its contribution to group headline earnings for the 10 months was 44%.\nAt the half year stage, Standard had forecast that banking revenue growth was expected to be stronger than previously guided, but moderate relative to the strong first-half growth when compared with the first half of last year.\nIt forecast that banking cost growth was likely to remain elevated due to inflationary pressures, higher performance-related incentives, continued investment in its franchise and to ensure client propositions remained competitive. Banking revenue, however, was expected to remain ahead of cost growth.\nBUSINESS REPORT", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/companies/standard-bank-to-remain-within-its-guidance-despite-higher-costs-8335b7a8-b63b-4f81-bd64-7f508d13d25f"}
{"doc_id": "6c06fb3bba6886329392a484e6d97170", "text": "President Bola Tinubu’s plan to boost food production and stabilise prices is being threatened as the rising spate of banditry, terrorism, and kidnapping across the country has worsened farmers’ plights.\nIn the past three days, several kidnapping cases have been reported in six states and Abuja, the nation’s capital. The deadly operations of terrorists and bandits across five of the six geopolitical zones have left no fewer than six persons dead, 60 kidnapped, and goods worth millions of naira destroyed.\nExperts say the scourge of kidnapping, which has destroyed social and economic activities in some parts of the northern region, is shrinking farming communities as farmers are forced to flee tense states for safety, a development that has pushed up food prices and exacerbated the cost of living crisis in the country.\nThey described it as a huge threat to the food stabilisation plan of the federal government, saying it is hampering the country’s ability to diversify through agriculture and generate substantial foreign exchange despite its vast agricultural potential.\n“We cannot stabilise food prices and feed ourselves with the high rate of insecurity across the country,” Jude Obi, president of the Association of Organic Agriculture Practitioners of Nigeria, said.\n“The government must address the issue of insecurity if it is serious about food security and diversifying the economy through agriculture,” Obi, who is also the general secretary of the Soil Science Society of Nigeria, said.\nEdobong Akpabio, a former head of agribusiness at Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry, said the country has lost 60 percent of its food production in key producing states owing to rising insecurity.\n“A lot of farmers do not cultivate in places where they usually grow crops because of the high rate of insecurity,” she said. “Insecurity must become a thing of the past before Nigeria can curtail the recent surge in food prices.”\nThe situation has also continued to deter new agricultural investments in key crop-growing states while putting existing agribusinesses in constant peril.\nData from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) shows the capital imported into agriculture has maintained a consistent decline since 2019, hitting its lowest in nine years in the third quarter of 2023.\nForeign investment into the sector declined 95 percent to $4.64 million in the third quarter of 2023 from $95.10 million in the same period of 2015.\n“Insecurity issues are affecting the production and distribution of agro products. Investors are not getting rewards for their investments as they ought to and this is owing to the worsening insecurity,” Abiodun Olorundero, operation manager at Aquashoots Limited, said.\nAbiodun said the situation has prevented some investors from making new investments in the sector, adding that some agripreneurs are now providing private security to protect their farmlands and investment, thus leading to increased production costs.\nIbrahim Kabiru, national president of the All Farmers Association of Nigeria, said farmers across the country should be able to carry out their farming activities without any form of fear and having to pay bandits before harvesting their crops.\nAccording to him, tackling the worsening rate of insecurity across the country is crucial in preventing a food crisis, curtailing the continuous surge in food prices and ensuring the country feeds itself.\nFood inflation has shown no signs of easing despite the federal government’s unveiling of a price stabilisation plan last year. It quickened to 33.93 percent in December from 23.75 percent a year earlier, according to NBS data.\nThe country’s headline inflation accelerated to 28.92 percent in December, its highest in more than 18 years.\nA 2023 Save the Children International report stated that armed groups have killed more than 128 farmers and kidnapped 37 others across Nigeria between January and June 2023.\n“All these challenges are a clear threat to our food production and that’s why we are grappling with insufficiency and the attainment of food security has become a mirage,” Kabiru said.\nHe, however, stressed the need for governments at all levels to address the issues of insecurity while promoting mechanised farming, technology, and innovation as well as deploying climate-smart agriculture.\nAmnesty International Nigeria said on Monday that “the current epidemic of kidnapping highlights the utter failure of the Nigerian authorities to effectively protect lives”.\nIt said Tinubu must take all lawful measures to end “the cycle of violence and fear people in Nigeria are living under today, by effectively investigating waves of kidnapping and killings and bringing those suspected of responsibility to justice”.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businessday.ng/agriculture/article/kidnap-plague-threatens-tinubus-food-security-plan/"}
{"doc_id": "5a269e1283adb0c7c81bc0897aeea751", "text": "(John McCann)\nFour months ago, in early December, my cousin’s husband, Bashi Malama*, took off and disappeared into thin air without notice.\nTwo months later, word came that he had been spotted alive and well at a house in a nearby township; this is to say, in plain language, that he was staying with another woman.\nWe broke the news to the wife, Bana Malama*, who responded with just one word: “bakabwela” (he will come back), and continued eating, unbothered.\nWe repeated the information, taking turns, just in case she hadn’t heard us correctly: “Bana Malama, your husband, Bashi Malama, to whom you are married, who we thought was in danger, is living with another woman, sharing the same bed at a place not so far from here.”\nThe second response was even shorter: “So?”\nIn collective anger and bewilderment, we stopped talking to her for a couple of days. When that didn’t yield the result we wanted, we conjured up stories which we loudly shared of husband A who ended up marrying a second wife, husband B who never returned home, husband C who brought home STIs. That wife D beat up the other woman, and wife E left her philandering man and landed herself a prince in shining armour. None of these stories permeated Bana Malama.\nLast week, Bashi Malama returned unannounced and as silently as he had left. Bana Malama neither welcomed or unwelcomed him; the two just slipped back into pre-disappearance norms.\nLived experience has turned Bana Malama into a social scientist. Over the years, she has observed social phenomena, examined patterns, analysed trends and looked at outcomes before arriving at her scientific conclusion: “Bakabwela” — he will come back.\nBana Malama believes in three things. The first one is that all men, without exception, are polygamous. The second is that all women, without exception, cannot stop the first thing. The third is that each woman must either take it or leave it — nothing in between. She has chosen to take it.\nI have in the past written fervently about polygamy. The premise for my argument was and still firmly remains that polygamy is natural, and that monogamy is a social construct, a learned behaviour. Monogamy, the sexual commitment to only one partner at a time, “till death do us part” is not achievable for most men, except for a few (God bless them). The reasons abound, and I will not belabour them here.\nMy views have drawn sharp and often contrasting responses from men and women. The latter accuse me of promoting promiscuity, with some offering to pray for me because the “the devil is using you”. The former have largely been agreeable, others even sharing detailed experiences, mostly about wanting but struggling to stay monogamous.\nI stand by my argument: all men are polygamous. Those who are not, are due to resolve and self-control, while the rest are a matter of time and opportunity.\nA study by Conley et al. (2012) in the Journal of Sexual Medicine, 9, 1559-1565 observed that those who consider themselves monogamous are not always sexually faithful, are unlikely to use condoms during their outside sexual encounter, and are unlikely to inform their partners, in keeping with their self-image of being monogamous.\nThe study concluded that “unprotected monogamy” is riskier than “condom protected promiscuity”. Therefore, as a strategy for preventing sexually transmitted infections, condom use is a much safer option than monogamy, which has a high rate of failure.\nAm I suggesting that there are no men out there in Zambia, the rest of Africa and the world who are not monogamous? No. I want to believe that they are there, and if they are, they know themselves.\nOne of my girlfriends has sworn never to date an “African man” again, because “they cheat on you and mess you up big time; I am now doing Europeans only,” she declared, buying into the myth all too common among some African women that Caucasian men, unlike black men, are predisposed to monogamy. No use trying to convince her that the European stock of men are not exactly cleansed of polygamous urges, contrary to Western popular culture, which portrays them as a faithful-loving-feminised-domesticated lot.\nRepeatedly, I have been asked whether I would marry into or be in a polygamous relationship; a contemptuous question pretending to be philosophical, if you ask me.\nI must perhaps reflect on the advice of Bana Malama, too wise for her age, in particular, her second premise, that no woman, without exception, can stop a man, other than himself, from dreaming of, fantasising about, wanting to and having sex with more than one woman. But it is her third premise, her advice to women, which I find most arbitrary, profound, brutal, wise and conclusive: take it or leave it.\nIt is what it is, folks! When you know, you know.\nIn my painstaking conclusion, a monogamous man is an indulgence, a wish list, a construct, a lottery win, the privilege of a select few women and less of an inalienable right of every woman.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://mg.co.za/africa/2022-04-06-monogamy-is-a-social-construct/"}
{"doc_id": "ce26f79f9a9cf6ff8a42d6e6624c05ac", "text": "Davidson Iriekpen with agency report\nThe Zamfara State House of Assembly yesterday became the first state to abolish the law that allows the payment of pension and other allowances for former governors and their deputies.\nThe spokesperson of the state’s assembly, Mustapha Jafaru, in a statement made available to journalists said the ‘abolished’ law also affects ex-speakers of the state House of Assembly and their deputies.\nThe development is coming days after a former governor, Abdul’aziz Yari, in a leaked letter to the state government, requested his N10 million ‘monthly upkeep’, which he said had not been paid for some months.\nThe media aide to Governor Bello Matawalle, Yusuf Idris, yesterday confirmed that Yari had written the request.\nHe said two days later he (Yari) also sent another letter of reminder demanding the payment.\nHowever, the state House of Assembly yesterday abolished the law authorising the payment of pensions to these categories of former officials.\nPresenting the bill before the assembly, the House Leader, Faruk Dosara, (PDP Maradun), urged his collogues to consider the ‘complete repeal’ of the law, “which provides the jamboree payment for the former political leaders of the state at the detriment of the retired civil servants who have not been paid their entitlements over the years.”\nAccording to the lawmaker, these categories of past leaders “are collecting over N700 million annually,” which he said the present economy cannot accommodate.\nSeconding the motion, Tukur Birnin-Tudu, PDP member representing Bakura Local Government Area said the abolition of the law is necessary.\nAfter deliberations, the Speaker, Nasiru Magarya, pushed the process; the bill passed both first and second readings.\nLater, the assembly went for a committee of the whole after which the bill went for a third reading. The bill will now be sent to the governor for his assent, the spokesman said.\n“With this development, all past political leaders in Zamfara will longer enjoy any entitlements unless those prescribed by the National Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission (NRMAFC),” Jafaru quoted the speaker as saying in the statement.\nYari, it would be recalled had appealed to his successor, Bello Matawalle, to pay his outstanding allowance and pension.\nIn a letter dated October 17 and addressed to the governor, Yari said he was entitled to N10 million monthly as upkeep allowance, but that he has only been paid twice since he left office.\nIn the letter obtained by THISDAY, Yari said the law which provides for the entitlement of former governors, deputies, speakers and deputy speakers was amended in March\nand that it should not be truncated.\nThe law, which first enacted in Lagos in 2007, has seen practically all former governors except Governor of Anambra State, Mr. Peter Obi, who turned down the idea, committed their states to write laws which entitle them humongous pension and entitlements for life.\nThe law also provides for befitting mansions for the former governors in the state capital or in the nation’s capital, Abuja.\nDeputy governors are entitled to an accommodation allowance equal to 300 per cent of his annual basic salary.\nIn most of the states, after office, a former governor and his spouse would be entitled to free medical services anywhere at a sum ranging from N100 million to N200 million per annum while the deputy governor will pocket N50 million for same purpose.\nBoth would also be entitled to their current salary for life, which is in excess of N25 million each per annum.\nIn addition they are also entitled to furniture allowances and brand new cars every four years at the taxpayers’ expense.\nTheir cooks, chauffeurs and security men are also well provided for.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2019/11/27/zamfara-assembly-repeals-law-authorising-pension-for-ex-governors"}
{"doc_id": "3df19978b6d5f3e1e9b37fb56fd9a26e", "text": "José Eduardo dos Santos, aka JES, was once celebrated as the country’s peace architect who stabilised the country from years of civil war.\nBut by the time his death was announced on Friday, July 8, at 11.10am Spanish time, most of his fans or supporters had abandoned him. He was 79.\nWhere he was once venerated as a statesman, it had been replaced with clouds of scandal and controversy that followed him shortly after he left office in 2017.\nDos Santos had been sick and admitted in a hospital in Barcelona for several weeks and even the Angolan government had confirmed it, but claimed he was in stable condition.\nOn Friday, President Joao Lourenco’s office said the country was in “great pain” after the death of a leader he described as “a statesman of great historical dimension”.\nLourenco spoke of dos Santos as a man who “governed for many years with humanity and always had the destiny of Angolans at heart in many difficult situations”.\nThe statement did not confirm what killed him but the former leader had been in and out of hospital for respiratory problems as well as cancer complications. He died at the Teknon Centre in Barcelona.\nHis death may have been expected, just not far away from the land he dominated and ruled like his personal corporation.\nAfter serving 37 years in power, dos Santos stepped down in 2017 after handing power to João Lourenco, his longtime ally. His successor, though, would show his true colours by digging into Santos’ closet, investigating corruption. The cloud gathering around dos Santos’ misdeeds in the past forced him to leave the country on April 16, 2019, officially for medical treatment in Spain.\nYears in power\nHe stayed in Spain for the remainder of his years, only returning to Angola occasionally. His years in power are what many Angolans remember most. When he left in 2017, the country’s key sectors like education and health were in tatters, in spite of Angola being only second to Nigeria in oil production in Africa. Some think that legacy is the reason even he himself had to seek medical attention abroad.\nDos Santos was born on August 28, 1942, in Luanda´s Sambizanga municipality, although some opposition figures as well as rights group members say he was born in Sao Tome and Principe, another former Portuguese colony, only coming to Angola in early childhood.\nHe made his own history by becoming president at the age of 37. He left after 37 years in power.\nHe ruled Angola for 38 years — from September 21, 1979 to September 26, 2017 — being also commander-in-chief of the Angolan armed forces as the constitution states.\nHe attended primary and secondary school at Luanda´s Liceu Salvador Correia and joined the ruling People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in 1958 before beginning his political activity as a member of clandestine groups that fought against colonialism.\nIn 1962, JES joined the MPLA's armed wing, and in 1963 was selected as the first party’s representative in Congo Brazzaville. In November of the same year, he travelled to the former Soviet Union to study oil and gas at the Baku Institute, in today’s Azerbaijan. He graduated in 1969. While there, he also studied military telecommunications.\nHis love for Russia went beyond education. His daughter Isabel was born of a Soviet woman he met while on a study tour. It is Isabel who remained powerful through his reign, and one who has been the public face of a scandal that followed dos Santos in retirement. The Angolan government froze assets in her name as it chased after the wealth reportedly accumulated while her father ruled the land.\nBefore dos Santos rose to the presidency, however, he had been the head of telecommunications for his MPLA and its military wing, between 1970 and 1974, in Cabinda province, the Angolan enclave surrounded by the DR Congo. But he started rising quickly. In September 1974, he was picked up as a member for the MPLA’s Central Committee and Political Bureau\nIn June 1975, he started coordinating his party’s department of foreign affairs and health.\nAs Angola became independent on November 11, 1975, he was appointed the country’s minister of foreign affairs by President António Agostinho Neto. He replaced Neto, who died on September 10, 1979.\nHe was elected President of Angola and leader of MPLA, which also meant he was commander-in-chief from September 20 1979.\nCross-border crisis\nFrom 1986 to 1992, dos Santos played a leading role in solving the cross-border crisis between Angola and South Africa, which led to the repatriation of the Cuban army from Angola, the independence of Namibia, and the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola.\nHe married Ana Paula dos Santos in 1991, with whom he had not been seen in public since 2019.\nThe marriage took place after he divorced the Russian Tatiana Kukanova, with whom he had a relationship between 1966 and 1979. She was the mother of Isabel.\nJES and Ana Paula dos Santos have three sons: Eduane Danilo, Joseana dos Santos and Eduardo Breno.\nIt is not clear how many sons he has, but reportedly from other relationships he has five other sons.\nIn September 2010, JES denied a claim by a Congolese woman that he was her father.\nThe episode happened when Ms Ngutuila Josefa Matias arrived in Luanda and tried to arrange a meeting with JES, stating publicly that she was his daughter.\nJES explained then that he had moved to the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1961 during Angola’s fight for independence from Portugal but denied having a love affair with a Congolese woman during that time.\nHe lived three years in the DRC. “I never had any girlfriend or lover. At that time all I thought about was completing my studies,” dos Santos said in 2010.\nAngola had tried multiparty elections from 1992 but it is only after dos Santos left that it, sort of, improved. Back then, dos Santos and opposition leader Jonas Savimbi of Unita competed for second round. Dos Santos won and the US was among the first Western allies to recognise the winner.\nBut Unita (Union for the Total Independence of Angola) did not acknowledge the poll results and returned to war. It lasted until 2002.\nJES is nicknamed by many Angolans as the 'peace architect' because of his ability to negotiate with his opponent to end the war.\nDr Savimbi, JES´s main opponent, was killed in battle against government forces in the Lucusse region on February 22, 2002, aged 67.\nThe Unita leader's death paved the way for a peace deal that ended one of Africa's longest and bloodiest civil conflicts, which erupted after independence from Portugal in 1975.\nThe war left at least half a million people dead and some four million civilians displaced in the oil-rich nation.\nBut dos Santos remained in office, without constitutional legitimacy, until 2008 when the country held the second polls since independence and his ruling MPLA won with a large majority. However, two years before that, he performed an historic feat worthy of note.\nOn August 1, 2006 under his leadership the government inked an MoU for peace and reconciliation with a rebel group, the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Flec).\nFlec had been fighting for the independence of Cabinda province for four decades. The Cabinda region produces up to 70 per cent of Angola's oil revenues that makes up half of the country’s GDP.\nWon the polls\nAgain, on August 31, 2012, JES and his ruling MPLA won the polls.\nHe agreed to quit five years later. In 2017, President João Lourenço took over from JES following the August 23 general election, marking the end of a 37-year reign.\nSoon after, President Lourenço started implementing his anti-corruption agenda that has seen several associates of his predecessor implicated in wrongdoing.\nA number of JES’ kin and allies were dismissed from key government institutions as a result of the campaign.\nLeaked documents\nIn fact, dos Santos’ close allies including family members were largely accused of embezzling from state institutions.\nFor instance, leaked documents showed in 2020 how Isabel dos Santos got access to lucrative land, oil, diamond and telecoms deals when her father, dos Santos was president.\nNew York-based International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), which published the ‘Luanda Leaks’, fingered Isabel for looting her own country and using firms around the world to clean her money.\nLast year, the US Department of the Treasury designated two close allies of JES as corrupt individuals on a list of 15 other individuals across Central America, Europe and Africa.\nAccording to the US agency, Leopoldino Fragoso do Nascimento and Manuel Helder Vieira Dias Junior, government officials under JES’ regime, stole billions of dollars from the Angolan government through embezzlement.\nAfter he left office, dos Santos retreated to a quiet life, rarely making public appearances.\nHe had lived through his rule rejecting interview requests from the international media, leading some to speculate he was also generally shy.\nAfter his retirement, Isabel spent considerable time in the media fighting fires against her family.\nAt the time of his death, though, former first lady Ana Paula dos Santos was among family members who were by his bed.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://nation.africa/africa/news/angola-s-longest-ruler-dos-santos-dies-at-79-3873332"}
{"doc_id": "402dc1f7142f734ea86d3bf1a8e28fdb", "text": "Google search\n20 Jan\nA new study confirms something we've all known for a while: Google searches are getting worse. Finally: a TikToker's video sheds an international spotlight on a Korean winter fashion accessory: the nose scarf!\nLatest\n13 mins ago\n45-year-old Nigerian standup comedy star Basketmouth made a stop in Berlin on his European tour to thrill the crowd with his socio-political commentary on a range of topics — including his country's ongoing currency crisis.\n25 mins ago\nMedia reports on Tuesday said that tech giant Apple was pulling the plug on its \"special projects group\", which was developing the brand's own electric vehicle.\n26 mins ago\nThe decision by West Africa's regional bloc ECOWAS to reverse key sanctions on military-ruled Niger has been welcomed by analysts inside and outside the country. But how will it affect ordinary Nigeriens?\n2 hours ago\nFind these stories and much more when you grab a copy of The Guardian on Saturday.\n1 day ago\nElection will see candidates compete for a seat in the 290-member parliament. New members of Iran's Assembly of Experts will also be elected.\n1 day ago\nThe US, Japan and South Korea have concluded their trilateral summit at Camp David with a security pact and a pledge to step up economic cooperation. The meeting took place against the backdrop of North Korea's missile program and China's maritime claims in the South China Sea.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://tv.guardian.ng/tag/google-search/"}
{"doc_id": "cbc78115c84b68853b30761ec7c60693", "text": "The global unemployment rate will increase slightly in 2024, the United Nations said on Wednesday as it raised concerns about stagnant productivity, worsening inequalities and inflation biting into disposable income.\nThe UN's labour agency said the economic recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic has slowed down, with ongoing geopolitical tensions and persistent inflation triggering aggressive moves by central banks.\nThat said, global growth in 2023 was modestly higher than anticipated, and labour markets showed surprising resilience, the International Labour Organization (ILO) said.\nHowever, real wages declined in most of the G20 countries as wage increases failed to keep pace with inflation, said the ILO.\nThe 2022 global unemployment rate stood at 5.3 percent and made a modest improvement last year to 5.1 percent.\nHowever, in 2024 an extra two million workers are expected to be looking for jobs, raising the global unemployment rate to 5.2%.\nDisposable incomes have declined in the majority of G20 nations and, generally, the erosion of living standards resulting from inflation is \"unlikely to be compensated quickly\", the ILO said.\nWidening inequalities and stagnant productivity were causes for concern, the ILO said in its World Employment and Social Outlook Trends report for 2024.\nThe study assesses the latest labour market trends, including unemployment, job creation, labour force participation and hours worked -- then links those to their social outcomes.\nThe report found that some of the data, notably on growth and unemployment, were \"encouraging\", ILO chief Gilbert Houngbo said.\nBut a \"deeper analysis reveals that labour market imbalances are growing and that, in the context of multiple and interacting global crises, this is eroding progress towards greater social justice\", Houngbo added.\nThe report found that only China, Russia and Mexico \"enjoyed positive real wage growth in 2023\".\nReal wages fell in other G20 countries, with Brazil (6.9 percent), Italy (5%) and Indonesia (3.5%) experiencing the sharpest declines.\n\"Falling living standards and weak productivity combined with persistent inflation create the conditions for greater inequality and undermine efforts to achieve social justice,\" said Houngbo.\n\"And without greater social justice we will never have a sustainable recovery.\"\nAFP", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/global-unemployment-set-to-worsen-in-2024-un-05f41a27-efb0-4c14-b216-d1432539ed7f"}
{"doc_id": "d594ae17282e68df72b562a70cab35d9", "text": "China puts people first on new journey of ‘building great country’\nThe annual gathering of more than 2,900 deputies to the National People’s Congress (NPC), China’s national legislature, in Beijing for the country’s development and reform priorities, among other things, has drawn to a close.\nAt the closing meeting of the first session of the 14th NPC on Monday morning, Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged to perform his duty scrupulously, do his utmost, and prove worthy of the trust of all NPC deputies and the Chinese people of all ethnic groups.\nIn a speech broadcast live, Xi, who was on Friday elected Chinese president by a unanimous vote, said the people’s trust is the biggest motivation that drives him to march on and is a great responsibility he shoulders.\n“From this day forward to the mid-21st century, the central task of the entire Communist Party of China (CPC) and all Chinese people will be to build China into a great modern socialist country in all respects and to advance the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation on all fronts,” he said.\nHigh-quality development\nHigh-quality development, which entails innovative, coordinated, green and open development and development for everyone, was one of the buzzwords during the country’s all-important political event.\nWhile attending a deliberation with his fellow NPC deputies from the delegation of Jiangsu Province during the session, Xi stressed the importance of pursuing high-quality development, calling it the “first and foremost” task in China’s modernization endeavor.\nAs one of the engines driving China’s economic growth, Jiangsu has become a front-runner in the country’s modernization bid. In 2022, the province’s GDP reached 12.28 trillion yuan ($1.77 trillion), a 2.8-percent increase over the previous year, and its economic output accounted for 10.2 percent of the country’s total.\nThe Chinese leader also highlighted the role of the private sector in pursuing such development when he attended a joint group meeting of national political advisors last week, underscoring that private enterprises and entrepreneurs “belong to our own family” and urging them to take the initiative.\nChina’s economy as a whole has grown by leaps and bounds, with a greener and more efficient economy enabled by a shifted focus to high-quality development. For instance, the country’s energy consumption per 10,000 yuan of gross domestic product in 2022 decreased by 0.1 percent from 2021, while CO2 emissions per 10,000 yuan of GDP fell 0.8 percent year on year, according to the National Bureau of Statistics.\nIn Monday’s speech, Xi reiterated that efforts should be made to effectively upgrade and appropriately expand China’s economy, and continuously increase the country’s economic strength, scientific and technological capabilities and composite national strength.\nPeople-centered philosophy\nChina’s ultimate goal of promoting high-quality development is to deliver happiness and well-being to its people, as the country’s leadership has made clear on many occasions.\nIn building a modern socialist country in all respects, the most challenging and arduous tasks are believed to remain in the rural areas, highlighting the need for further efforts to advance rural revitalization across the board.\nChina should foster rural industries with local features to create more channels for increasing rural incomes and consolidate and expand the achievements in poverty alleviation to prevent large-scale relapse into poverty, according to the government work report, a resolution on which was passed by NPC deputies on Monday.\nIn 2022, the growth of rural residents’ incomes outpaced that of urban residents for the 13th consecutive year, and the income ratio between urban and rural residents dropped from 2.88 in 2012 to 2.45 in 2022, further narrowing the urban-rural income gap.\nAddressing the closing meeting of the first session of the 14th NPC, Xi said a people-centered philosophy of development must be implemented so that the gains of modernization will benefit all people fairly.\nIn promoting prosperity for all, more notable and substantive progress will be made, he said.\n“I will faithfully fulfill my responsibilities bestowed by the Constitution, with the nation’s needs as my mission and the people’s interests my yardstick,” vowed the Chinese president. – CGTN", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.herald.co.zw/china-puts-people-first-on-new-journey-of-building-great-country/"}
{"doc_id": "459f5c27ac176924507ec1b1f8a3581a", "text": "Listed property fund ILAM Fahari I-REIT posted a 16 per cent fall in profit for the year ended December 2020 attributed to the revaluation of property on a year that also saw interruption from the Covid-19 pandemic.\nNet profit fell by Sh148 million compared to Sh175.2 million recorded the previous year.\n“The real estate market was hard hit by the COVID-19 pandemic with most tenants, especially in the retail sector facing the biggest challenges. The year 2020 was particularly challenging for ILAM Fahari I-REIT, due to the financial difficulties experienced by the anchor tenant at Greenspan Mall,” he said.\n“The resultant closure affected business for the other tenants as a result of reduced foot traffic. We expect that 2021 will be a better year after the replacement of the anchor tenant at the mall,” he added explaining the losses caused by struggling retailer Tuskys which was the anchor tenant.\nThe ILAM Fahari I-REIT (formerly Stanlib Fahari I-REIT) is the first and only listed real estate investment trust in East Africa. It was taken over last year by ICEA LION Asset Management from Stanlib.\nThis was the first full year result of the REIT since ICEA took over in May last year.\nThe distributable earnings fell 7 per cent to Sh134.4 million compared to Sh144 million the previous year owing to an increase in property expenses emanating from the provision of bad debts.\nThis saw property expenses grow by 14 per cent.\nRental income declined slightly by one per cent due to rental rebates offered to tenants at Greenspan Mall Limited and Bay Holdings Limited.\n“This was, however, offset by the lease escalations at Starling Park Properties LLP as well as Greenspan Mall Limited hence the minimal impact of the rebates on the portfolio performance,” noted Kihanda.\n“The financial difficulties experienced by the anchor tenant at Greenspan Mall Limited as well as COVID- 19 pandemic hampered rental collections hence the significant increase in bad debts,” he added.\nKihanda noted they discounted management fees to support the REIT and also said that leases were being renewed at reasonable rats with the portfolio vacancy standing at 13.2 per cent.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001407245/property-fund-ilam-fahari-i-reit-records-16-pc-fall-in-profits"}
{"doc_id": "a34317fdcee6cf72e9dc61759b21e8b2", "text": "Also today: China calms waters on Google; US budget deficit to stay well above unwieldy trillion-dollar mark; North Korea plays war games against South.\nUS Congress to hear why AIG bailout terms stayed secret\nUS\nA congressional hearing is set to officially learn that New York’s Federal Reserve helped American International Group keep its bank counterparts confidential after it received the lion’s share (some $180 billion) of the US emergency corporate bailout. But the NY Fed says it wasn’t party to pressuring the ailing insurance giant for secrecy over the matter. It says it agreed to confidentiality to preserve the value of taxpayer assets when it made controversial decisions in late 2008 to allow AIG to make some $62 billion in payments to the nation’s big banks to settle debt obligations. The banks had also received billions in taxpayer money from the country’s $700 billion economic rescue package, leaving the public aggrieved that their cash was not properly accounted for. Timothy Geithner, a former NY Fed president, is now the US treasury secretary. He was deeply involved in AIG’s bailout, and the paying of bonuses while the company was toppling. So he’s answering for that. Photo: Reuters.\nRead more: Reuters, Guardian, CNBC, Suite 101\nChina calms waters on Google\nChina\nChina’s ugly spat with Google over hacking and censorship has forced it to step back and allay fears over curbs on Google’s phone technology. The tensions between the Chinese and the world’s largest search engine have now spilled over into broader economic relations, with US business wanting Washington to face up to what it calls “alarming” measures against foreign technology firms in China. Google threatened to exit the world’s largest Internet market of some 350 million users, along with its burgeoning and allied cellphone potential, after it essentially accused Chinese authorities of being complicit in hacking into its accounts and those of about 30 other large foreign companies. This has further ratcheted up ill feeling caused by China’ refusal to strengthen its yuan currency and US arms sales to its bitter rival Taiwan. China’s officials now say that Google can pursue its Android mobile phone platform in that market, saying there’ll be no restrictions if it sticks to the rules of China’s telecoms environment.\nRead more: The Telegraph, BBC, AP, Wired\nUS budget deficit to stay well above unwieldy trillion-dollar mark\nUS\nThe US Congress expects the nation’s budget deficit to hit $1.35 trillion this year, which is marginally better than the record $1.4 trillion in 2009. This amounts to just shy of 10% of gross domestic product, and is the biggest deficit since the end of the World War II. At least the Yanks were manufacturing and blowing things up for democracy 65 years ago. Now they’re just blowing themselves up for entirely different reasons, not least that they buy most of China’s manufactured goods. That’s led to seriously lopsided market economics with the Chinese using the profits to buy US debt and not returning the favour by buying voluminous amounts of US exports. President Barack Obama will focus on domestic issues in his State of the Union address today, but many of the country’s woes are driven by its unequal economic relationship with China.\nRead more: Daily Finance, Economic Policy Institute, BBC, Bloomberg\nNorth Korea plays war games against southern neighbour\nNorth Korea\nNorth Korea sent more artillery in the direction of its estranged neighbour in the south, after an initial exchange of fire along a disputed naval border with South Korea raised regional security tensions. The North says the earlier act was just a routine military drill, and that it’s going to send more shells into waters inside its territory. The South Koreans won’t confirm whether the exchange happened or not, and no casualties have been reported (an event that would change the picture entirely). Its uniquely Stalinist neighbour usually fires short-range missiles into the sea towards Japan and subsequent tension is par for the course. This helps North Korea sound like a barking dog and reminds the world that it’s still there. Otherwise everybody would forget.\nRead more: Yonhap News Agency, Reuters, Agence France-Presse, The New York Times\nNikkei struggles to see silver linings\nJapan\nFears of a double-dip recession are alive and well, especially as China’s booming drive out of recession is far from being sustainably assured. To this end, Japan’s Nikkei stock average has fallen 0.7% to a five-week low, with its exporters hampered by a stronger yen. The Japanese are closely watching for a US Federal Reserve policy announcement and will be scrutinising the substance of President Barack Obama’s State of the Union address. Most of all they’re keeping an eye on China’s efforts to rein in a credit spree, which has heated its red-hot property market to near-boiling point. Japan is also about to enter earnings season for its large multinationals and, although hopes are high for better revenues and profits, it’s export-led economy is still in the doldrums from the strong yen, deflation at home and somewhat negative sentiment towards the country’s brand new government, whose economic credentials are as yet untested.\nRead more: Xinhua, Time, Reuters\nUN sets stage for declawing the Taliban\nAfghanistan\nThe UN has taken five former Afghan Taliban officials off its sanctions list after US and Afghani officials made noises about striking up relations with the enemy. Ever since the Taliban refused to hand over Osama bin Laden to the Americans when the World Trade Centre towers went down in 2001, they’ve been linked to al-Qaeda, which prompted the US to invade Afghanistan. The UN has now lifted a ban on international travel by the former Taliban officials and has unfrozen their assets. They include a former Taliban foreign minister, who was around at the time the group was shelling priceless Buddhist statues, claiming there was no god other than Allah. That stopped when the Americans invaded and effectively assumed governance of the country, but it’s been bloody from there on in.\nRead more: BBC, Daily Times, The Telegrap\nUS does covert operations in Yemen\nYemen\nThere’s substance to President Barack Obama’s claim that under his watch, the US has been much more effective in combating al-Qaeda than George W Bush ever was. Reports say Obama approved secret joint US military and intelligence operations with Yemeni counterparts even before a Nigerian-born underpants bomber tried to take out a jet over Detroit. The secret liaison led to the deaths of six regional al-Qaeda leaders, after the president okayed a strike against a compound where a US citizen, Anwar al-Aulaqi, was said to be parlaying with al-Qaeda bosses in the region. He wasn’t killed, but is now on a US hit-list. The US says it only plans and provides weaponry for the raids in Yemen and shares ultra-secret intelligence analysis. Yemen is trying to limit the fallout at home from this covert cooperation with the “Great Satan”, saying the forces of McDonald’s are not going to be landing on the beaches anytime soon.\nRead more: The Washington Post, Reuters, The New York Times, Al Jazeera", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2010-01-27-27-january-us-congress-to-hear-why-aig-bailout-terms-stayed-secret/"}
{"doc_id": "7b998fb24d2e2391ee14eef74a5dc9e6", "text": "Britam Holdings' net profit for the half year ended June quadrupled to Sh1.64 billion on increased insurance revenue and growth in interest and dividend income.\nThe company, which restated its previous year's net earnings from Sh667.5 million to Sh377.9 million to reflect the switch to a new accounting standard, saw its insurance revenue rise 34 percent to Sh16.6 billion.\nThe Sh1.64 billion half-year net earnings is nearly the same as the Sh1.69 billion that the Nairobi Securities Exchange-listed firm posted in the full year ending December 2022.\nThe life business’s revenue grew 32 percent to Sh5.23 billion while the general insurance business in Kenya saw a 41 percent growth in revenue to Sh6.95 billion.\nGeneral insurance revenue from businesses outside Kenya grew by 27 percent to Sh4.42 billion.\nBritam CEO Tom Gitogo said the rise in insurance revenue was driven by new business in Kenya and the region, especially in the corporate segment.\n“We have focused on areas that were previously underserved, including the youth and people at the bottom of the pyramid. Using technology, we have been able to tap into this space and also drive organic growth in areas we already serve,” said Mr Gitogo.\nThe firm also benefited from the reduced fair value losses from equities and government securities from Sh2.3 billion to Sh1.8 billion.\nInsurance service expenses were flat at Sh11.84 billion compared with Sh11.4 billion the previous comparable period, helping the net insurance service revenue to rise to Sh1.92 billion from Sh113 million.\nInterest and dividend income grew by 26.8 percent to Sh6.8 billion while income from investment property improved by 80 percent to Sh284 million to reflect increased rent collections as occupancy of its properties rose.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/companies/britam-profit-quadruples-to-sh1-6bn-on-revenue-jump--4354280"}
{"doc_id": "479df84ea617b89f7475edc971db9281", "text": "South African consumers are clutching at financial straws following the announcement of yet another increase in interest rate by the South African Reserve Bank (SARB).\nLee Hancox, Head of Channel and Segment Marketing at Sanlam and a Certified Financial Planner said: “Absorbing a further 75 basis points, even for those who don’t have a large amount of debt, has a significant impact on your disposable income.”\n“It’s a big jump. Those of us who might have had a bit of breathing room in our budget a year ago, may not have that anymore.”\nHere’s how people can manage the rise in interest rates:\nRevisit your financial goals\nWrite down your financial goal and decide which goals you are going to prioritise.\nBudget\nWhen drawing up your budget remember to include your day-to-day expenses. While you are busy with your budget, write up a list of your monthly groceries so you can calculate how much you need to set aside.\nYou should also review your budget to cut down on unnecessary expenses.\nEmergency fund\nHancox said that an emergency fund can be used for unforeseen expenses that you cannot budget for, like when your car breaks down.\nPeople need to have at least three months’ salary saved up in an emergency fund, according to Katlego Gaborone, a financial planner at Momentum.\nTake care of your bills\nIt may seem obvious but paying your bills on time every month is important. If you pay late you may pay a penalty or interest will accumulate on your overdue amounts.\nSpeak to a financial adviser\nHancox said: “Financial advisers are there to help you on your journey to financial confidence, to help you articulate your goals, and put plans in place to achieve them.”\nYou should speak to your financial adviser if you are tempted to save money by cancelling or decreasing your retirement savings or life cover contributions.\nThis is a big decision that you need to discuss with your financial adviser to make sure that you have considered all of your options.\nIOL Business", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/personal-finance/my-money/5-tips-to-help-cash-strapped-consumers-manage-the-rise-in-interest-rates-5ed6447a-7038-4283-9769-153d218e2059"}
{"doc_id": "7948872a887aa88c626178541d4e4bde", "text": "Reps\n27 Jan\nFor Vice Chancellors of public universities in Nigeria, one of the major hurdles they grapple with is having to shuttle between their institutions and the nation’s capital on a weekly or biweekly basis to answer questions from politicians in the National Assembly.\n7 Dec\nThe House of Representatives Committee on Customs and Excuse, has said the South West region produces the majority of revenue coming from the Nigeria Customs Service (NCS).\n29 Nov\nHouse of Representatives’ Public Accounts Committee (PAC) has queried the Federal Ministry of Water Resources for reportedly sinking a unit of borehole in the range of N25 million.\n9 Nov\nThe House of Representatives Committee on Federal Capital Territory (FCT) has urged the Minister, Nyesom Wike, to prioritise security of life and property in the nation's capital.\n5 May 2023\nDespite outrage at Wednesday’s Senate approval of President Muhammadu Buhari’s request to restructure the N23.7 trillion loan from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) extended to the Federal Government under its Ways and Means (W&M) provision, the House of Representatives, yesterday, assented to the president’s controversial CBN overdrafts.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://guardian.ng/tag/reps/"}
{"doc_id": "b05838387df9a130f36e3525b6889839", "text": "There’s a deal, and it seems Greece won’t be leaving the Euro zone, at least any time soon.\nIn the end, Europe’s wealthy powers decided to grant Greece a new lifeline in exchange for new budget-cutting and tax-hiking measures, and Greece is slated to avoid a sudden banking collapse that would likely have forced it out of the 15-year-old currency pact.\nThe agreement in Brussels on Monday likely avoids not only an economy-crushing event but also a major reversal for 60 years of increasing European unity. But the story is far from over, with Greece in line for years of economic adjustment (read: pain), and many new doubts about the long-term potential of the Euro zone and its capacity to turn the continent into the United States of Europe\nHere are the basics of what’s happening, how we got here, and what it means for Greece, Europe and the rest of the global economy.\n1. What’s the situation right now?\nAfter a marathon negotiating session, Europe’s leaders came to an agreement on a deal to continue financial assistance to Greece in exchange for significant concessions. It’s a complicated, and still somewhat tenuous, accord.\nWhat Greece must do\nBy Wednesday, Greece’s ruling party, Syriza, must pass a host of policy changes as a show of good faith. Those include cuts to public pensions and sales tax increases demanded by Europe to increase Greek budget surpluses.\nWhat Europe will do\nIn coming days, Europe will advance a loan of 10 billion euros to help Greece make a 3.5 billion euro payment due to the International Monetary Fund on July 20 and keep its banking system alive. Germany will vote on the agreement as soon as Friday.\nThis is not part of the formal agreement, but it’s widely assumed that the European Central Bank, which has been funding Greek banks with emergency loans, will continue that help in light of the deal.\nAfter Greece passes initial reforms, Greece will receive up to 77 billion more euros over three years. About a third of that will be used to strengthen its banking system, which has been shut down for two weeks amid rapidly declining deposits.\nEurope will also commit to review Greece’s total debt burden, potentially giving the country more time to pay it back. But Greece will not get the reduction in face value of the debt that it has asked for.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://nairametrics.com/2015/07/13/after-saving-greece-what-happens-next/"}
{"doc_id": "05ae8f14342efb0ab98e6f8e049d94a0", "text": "Advertisement\nGhana deindustrialising economy - AGI President\nThe President of the Association of Ghana Industries (AGI), Dr Yaw Adu Gyamfi, has bemoaned the dwindling fortunes of the manufacturing subsector in recent years, warning that the country risks losing its industrial base should the situation remain the same.\nRather than inspiring entrepreneurs to build new factories and sustain existing ones to employ people and grow the economy, Dr Gyamfi said Ghana had, in the recent past, lost a chunk of its “once vibrant” areas of manufacturing to various challenges.\nAddressing captains of industry and government officials at AGI’s Ghana Industry Awards on December 8, the president pointed to the phasing out of businesses in the textiles, alumina, vehicle assembly, glass manufacturing and those in the processing of agricultural products such as meat, sugar, tomatoes and citrus as evidence of a country which had its manufacturing base deteriorating rather than progressing.\n“Industry continues to shrink and we risk losing our industrial base,” he said at the event which was graced by President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo.\n“On the occasion of our 60th anniversary, therefore, we are taking stock of developments in the industry over the past 60 years and I am sorry to say the picture of manufacturing has not been encouraging.\n“We are actually deindustrialising,” Dr Gyamfi, who is also the Chief Executive Officer of Danadams Pharmaceutical Industry Limited, said at the event.\nAGI, an advocacy body with over 400 members, has since its inception in 1958, become the voice of manufacturers and related businesses in the country.\nHow to reverse\nOn how to reverse the situation, the AGI said the country needed “a clear national strategy” on industrialisation.\n“That is why we appreciate government initiatives such as the one district, one factory (1D1F), the stimulus package, and the other initiatives of the Ministry of Trade and Industry.\n“We need to incorporate these initiatives into a comprehensive strategic plan in the form of an industrial policy that will drive the industrialisation agenda,” he said.\nWith the 2019 Budget Statement and Economic Policy keen on industry, the AGI president said: “we are anxious to see the impact on our industrialisation agenda.”\n“Our prospects for job creation will improve if local industry experiences sustainable growth to alleviate the unemployment situation.\n“Indeed, many of our school leavers spend longer times looking for jobs than the time they spent pursuing courses at their tertiary institutions.\nThis trend must change,” he said, pointing to a sustained revitalisation of manufacturing as a key relief.\nWoes of manufacturing\nFor over a decade, manufacturing businesses have been at the mercy of cheap imports, pricey loans and erratic power supply which has led to a contraction and the collapse of some firms, loss of jobs and a consistent decline in the subsector's contribution to national output.\nData computed and sourced from the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) showed that from a share of 10.2 per cent in 2006, the contribution of the value addition arm of industry to gross domestic product (GDP) weakened consistently to a record low of 5.8 per cent in 2012 before wobbling further to 4.6 per cent in 2016.\nAt 4.5 per cent in 2017, the subsector's share of GDP is now the lowest in 11 years and an anti-climax of an industrial revolution story that was virtually truncated in the late 1960, right after the overthrow of Dr Kwame Nkrumah.\nDr Gyamfi said while Ghana’s manufacturing subsector accounted for 4.5 per cent of GDP, the average was 22 per cent in middle income countries.\n“Indeed, Ghana’s manufacturing value addition share to GDP has fallen since 1985, an indication of deindustrialisation,” he said.\nIn July this year, an Economist and Senior Research Fellow with the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), Dr Said Boakye, told the GRAPHIC BUSINESS that the current state of manufacturing explained why the country was unable to achieve sustained development, also called prosperity in economics.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.graphic.com.gh/business/business-news/hananew-ghana-deindustrialising-economy-agi-president.html"}
{"doc_id": "574aebce80617f1d8264568bc97612df", "text": "THE RECENT sovereign rating downgrade makes South Africa the third Brics nation to have received a junk credit assessment from Standard and Poor’s (S&P) Global Ratings. However, before making any impulsive investment decisions, it is important to note that Brazil and Russia - the other two countries to have experienced downgrades of this nature - were the top emerging-market performers last year.\nA downgrade can present investors, particularly those who invest in emerging markets, with attractive buying opportunities.\nWhen a country is downgraded, both its stock market and its currency tend to sell off significantly.\nTypically, the selling is largely indiscriminate and, as such, is likely to include some high-quality shares, which results in some very attractive investment opportunities.\nBoth S&P and Moody’s downgraded Brazil to sub-investment grade in 2015 at the height of political unrest over a massive corruption scandal that ultimately resulted in the impeachment of then president Dilma Rousseff.\nThis downgrade led to major capital outflows and worsened Brazil’s growth outlook, reducing its gross domestic product to -3.5percent last year. Despite this, Brazil was the best-performing emerging market last year, returning 66percent in dollar terms.\nSlight sell-off\nAlthough there has been a slight sell-off of South African bonds and equities following the downgrades - along with an initial weakening of the rand - the extent of this has been far less than what occurred in Brazil.\nAt this point, South Africa is not displaying the effects typically associated with a downgrade; in fact, the rand has moved back to its long-term average. However, this could change, depending on Moody’s looming rating decision.\nConcerning the seemingly unaffected currency, the rand’s strength of late is a function of dollar weakness. The rand’s recovery has very little to do with South Africa, but is related to the weakening of the dollar against all emerging-market currencies.\nWhat this all means from an investment point of view is that there are not massive buying opportunities in South Africa.\nDiversification\nSouth Africa is currently not a screaming buy, which raises the question of how best to diversify away from South Africa.\nTypically, global equity funds would be an obvious choice. However, a large weighting of these funds is in the US market, which, on a risk-adjusted basis, does not offer investors attractive growth prospects.\nAs such, a better option for clients looking to diversify away from South Africa are global emerging-market funds.\nOn a risk-adjusted basis, emerging markets are trading at a far lower price-earning (PE) multiple than US and global equities, which means that global emerging-market funds come at a lower price, with the opportunity for greater returns.\nThis is largely because the demographics in emerging markets are characterised by a booming middle class and growing consumer sector, driving profit growth going forward.\nSuperior returns\nIn light of this, while market sentiment around South Africa remains uncertain for the time being, there is undoubtedly potential for superior returns to be made in other emerging markets.\nBased on GDP growth, increasing consumption, attractive demographics and the starting valuation, emerging markets appear to offer great potential on a three- to five-year basis.\nThe Old Mutual Global Emerging Market Fund’s ability to pick the right emerging-market stocks from a bottom-up perspective adds additional value. This has resulted in the fund being ranked in the top 10 globally over the past four years.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/companies/downgraded-countries-top-emerging-market-performers-last-year-9180283"}
{"doc_id": "3daa689345af9da93a68ce4fac38978d", "text": "Gregory Mthembu-Salter\nFrench President Jacques Chirac looked particularly pleased with himself when he announced progress towards a ceasefire in the Congo at the Paris Franco-African summit last week, but in reality the chances are slim.\nThe Democratic Republic of Congo’s President, Laurent Desire Kabila, resumed his fighting talk immediately after the Paris discussions. Rebels in the east of the country said since they had not been invited to Paris the talks did not concern them, and in Kigali senior Rwandan government officials made it plain that their troops intended to ensure Kabila’s downfall.\nEmmanuel Gasana, representative for Rwandan Vice-President, Minister of Defence and widely acknowledged de facto leader of the country Paul Kagame, said: “We do not care who is president in Congo. Kabila has assembled genocidal forces and says he will bring war to Rwanda. We are clear that Kabila is a genocidaire and we want him to fall. Our forces are in Congo to ensure Rwandan security, and with Kabila our security is not assured.”\nThe Rwandan government does not seem particularly perturbed by the threat posed to its plans in Congo by Zimbabwe’s intervention. It noted the distinct lack of territorial gain from Zimbabwe’s bombing campaign in the east and is following with satisfaction the mounting opposition to the war in Zimbabwe.\nAngola’s involvement is far more troubling to Kigali, where officials privately admit having miscalculated Luanda’s response to Rwanda’s invasion of Congo in August.\nHowever, having prevented the fall of Kinshasa in the early stages of the war, Angola now seems more interested in keeping central Congo’s diamonds out of Unita’s hands than in joining Zimbabwe’s assault. Angolan and Rwandan troops have yet to clash in the eastern Kivu region.\nBut Rwanda has a problem with its donors, on whom the still impoverished country is relying to bridge the yawning gap between its meagre export earnings and hefty import requirements.\nBoth the British and United States governments, Rwanda’s two main international backers, were angered by Rwanda’s three month-long denial of its presence in Congo, only broken in early November by Kagame at a press conference with President Nelson Mandela.\nRwandan officials concede the damage done to their government’s credibility by its stubborn denial, but insist that it was necessary in order to force the world’s recognition of significant internal as well as external opposition to Kabila’s rule.\nHowever plausible they considered the justification for the incursion and its cover-up, donors regard Rwanda’s presence in Congo as illegal under international law. Nonetheless, the donors appear to have agreed to withhold public condemnation for now in order to give forthcoming talks in Lusaka in early December a chance of success.\nBut should Rwanda fail to sign a ceasefire in Lusaka, or sign one and fail to honour it, it is likely to find that aid disbursals will slow considerably.\nAlready, aid inflows are erratic. During his presentation of the 1999 budget to the national assembly on November 10, Rwandan Minister of Finance Donat Kaberuka stressed: “Rwandans must realise that international generosity is over. Aid levels … are now falling. The little that remains has become unpredictable and comes with too many conditions attached.”\nThese conditions stem mainly from the fact that donors do not want to pay for Rwanda’s war in Congo, though Rwanda’s army has cultivated its own sources of income to such an extent that an International Monetary Fund (IMF) team visiting recently was unable to find any evidence of increased military expenditure by the state since the war began in August.\nKaberuka is fairly confident that the World Bank will deliver the funding it promised, but is concerned about the European Union, which has to answer to an inquisitive Parliament.\nApart from the general problems that less aid will mean for Rwanda, Kaberuka reckons it will fail to meet targets it previously agreed to with the IMF on the levels of its foreign exchange reserves.\nMeeting these targets is a key condition for continued funding from the IMF for Rwanda under the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, on which the country is particularly reliant.\nAn IMF team is coming to assess Rwanda’s performance in January. Kaberuka hopes that Rwanda’s impressive economic statistics for 1998 – gross domestic product growth of 9% (2% higher than predicted) and an expected inflation rate of only 5% – and its privatisation programme will encourage the IMF to be lenient.\nHowever, the IMF blew most of its money earlier this year bailing out Indonesia and the United States Congress has refused to give it much more to play with.\nThe other option for Rwanda is to pull its troops out of Congo, which would lead to increased donor funding, a satisfied IMF and the continued flow of financial support under the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, which would keep the government’s much-needed anti-poverty strategy on track.\nBut that means handing Kabila victory and leaving genocidal Rwandan militia at large in eastern Congo. For the security- obsessed Rwandan government that option is no option.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://mg.co.za/article/1998-12-04-why-rwanda-has-to-fight-on/"}
{"doc_id": "d1788bd9437006e37b574bcfced58f59", "text": "British telecommunications firm Vodafone, which is Safaricom’s largest shareholder, has launched Mpesa transfer services between Tanzania and Kenya, opening a new frontier for the mobile money service.\nVodafone has announced that 20 million Safaricom and seven million Vodacom Tanzania Mpesa customers can now make seamless transactions between each other.\n“With a substantial unbanked population transacting mainly in cash, the Tanzania-Kenya corridor represents a significant opportunity for M-Pesa to give people and companies an accessible, low-cost alternative to traditional international remittances,” said Michael Joseph, the Vodafone Director of Mobile Money.\nThe announcement comes just two months after the Central Bank of Kenya awarded Safaricom a cash remittance operating licence, enabling the telecoms giant to transfer money out of the country.\nSafaricom has been offering one sided international cash transfer services under a licence that only allowed it to move money into Kenya through partners such as Western Union and MoneyGram.\nThe new licence now enables Safaricom to take the battle for outward remittances to the doorstep of commercial banks and forex bureaus that have traditionally acted as agents for global money transfer providers.\n“This is a new chapter in the continuing growth story of Mpesa,” said Safaricom’s chief executive Bob Collymore.\n“Enabling transactions between Kenya and Tanzania will make it more convenient for individuals to transact across borders and unleash the transformative power of a first of its kind cross-border payment system.”\nAccording to the World Bank, formal remittance between Tanzania and Kenya stood at $133 million, money which Vodafone is now seeking a slice of through the new deal.\nVodafone is estimated to have pocketed Sh1.7 billion of the Sh15.6 billion revenue that Safaricom generated from M-Pesa in the six months to September when the firm’s net profits rose 30 per cent to Sh14.7 billion.\nThe firm has been earning royalties of between 10 per cent and 25 per cent from M-Pesa’s annual revenues since February 23, 2007.\nVodafone says that the new partnership between Safaricom and Vodacom Tanzania presents a significant opportunity for even further growth as large populations in the two countries are still unbanked.\n“The cost of transferring money internationally through traditional channels like banks or money transfer operators can be up to 31 per cent of the transaction, depending on the service provider,” Vodafone said in a statement.\n“By comparison, using M-Pesa to transfer Sh4,550 across the Tanzania-Kenya border would cost around 1 per cent of the transaction plus a foreign exchange fee.”\nM-Pesa now represents approximately 22 per cent of Vodacom Tanzania’s service revenues.\nFollowing the success of Mpesa in Kenya, the service has since been launched in nine other countries. They are: Tanzania, South Africa, Lesotho, DRC, Egypt, Mozambique, India, Romania and Fiji.\nVodafone says that the Tanzania-Kenya deal will now be replicated in other partner countries.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/technology/mpesa-payments-between-kenya-tanzania-launched-2081776"}
{"doc_id": "5a6eeeb48d8e10c32a522208eb625a73", "text": "A tax relief is an incentive aimed at promoting various initiatives for example investments and savings. Some tax reliefs accrue automatically whereas some are tied to certain conditions, for example contributions to specified schemes, savings or application for exemption. A tax relief means you either pay less tax on account of money spent on specific things or get a credit against the tax payable.\nThe Income Tax Act incentivises taxpayers through other reliefs and tax deductions tied to either saving for specific courses or investments. These reliefs and deductions, if utilised can ease the tax burden significantly. The main difference between a relief and a deduction is that a relief reduces the tax liability while a deduction reduces the income subject to tax.\nGains accruing from employment, including allowances paid, are subject to tax with the exception of tax free benefits provided for under Section 5 of the Income Tax Act. Some of the benefits include meals up to a maximum of Sh48,000 per annum and medical services provided by an employer.\nThe current personal relief for individual taxpayers is Sh1, 162 per month or Sh13, 944 per annum. The relief is applied to reduce an individual’s tax liability. The effect of this relief is to exempt from tax, people earning income of up to a maximum of Sh11,135 per month. This amount hardly covers the current legal minimum wage for most grades of labour and is due for a long overdue review.\nThe first deduction aimed at encouraging savings is the Home Ownership Savings Plan (HOSP) introduced on January 1, 1999. It was intended to encourage individuals to save to acquire or develop a home.\nA taxpayer is entitled to a tax free saving of Sh4,000 per month or Sh48,000 per annum on payments to a registered HOSP. This relief is granted for ten years of mandatory contributions to the HOSP before one is allowed to utilize the money for investment.\nWhereas this is a great move to encourage savings and investments, the deduction is out of touch with the reality of current home prices most of which start of at Sh3 million. While a saving of Sh480,000 over a ten-year period would have afforded a reasonable home in 1999, it is hardly adequate to purchase a 50 X 100 plot in most urban centres in Kenya today. There is an urgent need for the government to review this incentive to encourage a saving culture and home ownership.\nThen there is the mortgage relief which is a tax deduction on interest incurred on mortgages. The mortgage interest deduction was first introduced in Kenya in 1996 at Sh56,000 per annum. This rate was revised in 2001 to Sh100,000 and lastly in 2006 to Sh150,000.\nAt the current average mortgage interest rates of 16 per cent, the deduction can hardly support a mortgage of Sh1 million. As a result, it is hardly adequate as an incentive for taxpayers to take up a mortgage. No wonder mortgage uptake in Kenya is low. This incentive should be reviewed as well in line with changes in property price index and interest rates.\nIndividuals are entitled to a pension contribution deduction of up to Sh20,000 per month or Sh240,000 per annum for contributions to a registered scheme. The relief has remained constant over a period of time. One of the budget proposals submitted through the Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Kenya is to increase the tax free limit for pension contributions to Sh360,000 per annum to encourage savings and increase the pension available on retirement.\nThe insurance relief on education policy for children, life of self or spouse, allows one a tax free deduction equivalent to the lower of 15 per cent of the premiums paid or Sh60,000 per annum. This is also very low and although meant to encourage the uptake of insurance savings, it has not been successful partly due to the low tax savings.\nIntroduction of reliefs and deductions was a noble idea. However, But with the rising cost of borrowing, inflation and property prices, the thresholds must be reviewed to ensure they remain attractive. This is the challenge for the government as it seeks to increase tax revenues.\nThe author is a manager, Tax and Regulatory Services, with KPMG Kenya ([email protected]). The views and opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent views of KPMG.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000204417/state-must-review-tax-reliefs-deductions-to-ease-burden-on-kenyans"}
{"doc_id": "b52e7dd9129eb89aaf1e29d65a6369a1", "text": "guards\n26 Jul 2023\nPresidential guards were holding Niger President Mohamed Bazoum inside his palace in the capital Niamey on Wednesday , security sources said, but the presidency said the guards had started an \"anti-republican\" movement \"in vain\" and that Bazoum was well.\n26 Jul 2023\nNiger President Mohamed Bazoum has been removed from power, according to a group of soldiers who appeared on the West African nation's national television late on Wednesday, hours after the president was held in the presidential palace.\nLatest\n1 hour ago\nAs tensions escalate in the Gaza Strip, many displaced Palestinians are now gripped with fear about Israeli forces launching a relentless assault on the city of Rafah.\n1 hour ago\nIn an interview with FRANCE 24, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said he expected that \"regardless of the outcome of the US elections\", Washington \"will continue to be a committed NATO ally\".\n2 hours ago\nDoctors in the U.S. are struggling to contend with burnout, staffing shortages and overwhelming administrative workloads, according to a new survey. Despite these challenges, 83% of doctors in the survey said they believe AI could eventually help. More than 1,000 doctors were surveyed between Oct. 23 and Nov. 8 in the study, commissioned by Athenahealth.\n2 hours ago\nOn January 6, the US aviation regulator FAA ordered the temporary grounding of certain Boeing 737-9 MAX aircraft operated by US airlines or in US territory, affecting 171 planes.\n3 hours ago\nRussian investigators have said they are carrying out a 14-day forensic \"investigation\" of the opposition leader's body. Navalny's family has so far been refused access to his remains.\n3 hours ago\nIsrael's GDP fell by 19.4 percent in the last quarter of 2023, according to preliminary figures published by the country's Central Bureau of Statistics on Monday. It's the biggest contraction the economy has seen since the early days of the Covid pandemic, and can be attributed to the impact of the war on Gaza following the October 7 Hamas attacks.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://tv.guardian.ng/tag/guards/"}
{"doc_id": "71323f35bafa461f4e7c9f707c8c93f3", "text": "In 1932, USA President Franklin Roosevelt, fresh from winning his first term, was faced with the same crisis President William Ruto is currently facing economically. The USA's turmoil was so severe, it was called the Great Depression.\nIn all soberness, Kenya, much of Africa and a large portion of the world are staring at a similar crisis. Kenya's inflation at 9 per cent has caused a lot of apprehension, with prices rising steadily. This then speaks of the general direction the solution will come from. The answers cannot come from using the same model the world has been using for a century now.\nPresident Roosevelt knew about this through his economic advisors, especially John Maynard Keynes who offered a contrary model known as Keynesianism. His method was extremely effective that it not only rescued USA from the grips of a depression, but within five years, America was back to its superpower status. How do you come from a depression, back to superpower status, to funding the second world war, all within 10 year?\nThe answer lies in what Keynes discovered; the Modern Monetary Theory (MMT). It states that a Sovereign nation can never be broke. This is so because governments are not currency users, they are currency issuers and the rules or status for an issuer differs foundationally from those of currency users. A nation's government is the exclusive source of its currency, meaning that the Kenya shilling has no other source other than the Kenya government. How then can a nation run broke of a commodity whose supply is limitless and it is the sole supplier of that commodity?\nPresident Roosevelt used MMT by ordering for the creation of national infrastructure projects, large labour intensive public works programmes and a wide series of arts and creative projects, which created high demand. To fund it, he didn't rely on taxes that had diminished with the depression, he instead printed the money. Yes, he printed and spent it on these projects that spurred mass employment and mass supply of goods and services. This initiated massive supply to fulfill the large government orchestrated demand.\nThis immediately spurred growth, cash flow and confidence and the economy's upward trajectory began. Bridges, schools, libraries, hospitals, roads and airports were built. Music, art, plays and songs were commissioned. Teachers, nurses, doctors, researchers, engineers, drivers, technicians and people from numerous other jobs categories were employed. Poverty was almost quashed and personal dignity was restored.\nDeficit funding helps government avoid the catch-22 situation of either burdening citizens with new taxes or borrowing. It's not about printing and funding as much as one can. No, there are limits and real dangers to over-creating, but the limit is and can never be financial since governments are currency issuers. The real limit is inflation.\nThat said, inflation isn't an automatic occurrence of deficit spending. Due to the economic downturn since 2020, Kenya has enormous slack and this tool can be used to employ hundreds of thousands of unemployed and have them work in production such as agriculture, dam creation, manufacturing, it can be used to increase the SME financing through the Hustler Fund to figures such as Sh35,000 per entrepreneur, and it can be used to decrease the cost of fuel by Deficit Funding the Sh62. Fuel prices can be reduced by the same amount and yet government will have maintained its revenue, which will most certainly reduce inflation by 2 to 3 per cent. What is critical will be a Pre Disbursement Inflation Analysis that will determine areas of funding, amounts to fund etc. With this the inflation question is answered pre spending.\nThe other category this tool can be useful at is international barter trade. We can't print local currency for international use, but in concert with a foreign central bank, we can both utilise this tool to pay the local import/export trader. Take Kenya and Pakistan for example. Pakistan purchases 50 per cent of Kenya's tea and Kenya imports thousands of tonnes of Pakistan rice. Pakistan is currently in a severe crisis and only has three weeks of import cover available in USD dollars. As much as Pakistan has accepted to cluster our tea as an essential commodity, which means we are in the list of those prioritised to be paid in those scarce dollars, that victory is short-lived. They are in a recession facing great dollar shortage pressures and may soon also default on the essential commodity list.\nAccording to online sources, the average export value of Kenya's tea to Pakistan over the last five years is $500 minion or Sh65 billion per annum. The Kenya Central Bank can, through Deficit Funding, pay KTDA the Kenyan shilling equivalent of proven tea being exported to Pakistan.\nThis will guarantee payments to the Kenya traders and farmers and stabilise the tea sub sector and halt a seemingly inevitable national crisis. This won't result in inflation since it's a replacement of monies that would have circulated into the Kenyan economy should Pakistan not have had its crisis. Economic solutions abound if we opt to remove the current economic lens and put on a new lens.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001475107/kenya-must-change-tack-to-get-out-of-current-economic-crisis"}
{"doc_id": "9c96652b5614ef08a17bf239ccf6da04", "text": "Unknown to many Kenyans, Parliament’s passing of Finance Bill, 2016 that granted amnesty to Kenyan residents who have offshore incomes and assets in foreign banks had a very global agenda.\nThe foreign income that is subject to amnesty is for the year ended December 31, 2016 and offers a waiver of penalties on any Kenyan who reports his or her foreign sourced income for that period.\nKenya is not the first country to offer such an amnesty. Other countries have been doing it with a great degree of success. Citizens with off-shore bank accounts are declaring their foreign wealth. High-profile leaks like Panama Papers have contributed to increased voluntary disclosures.\nNew global coordinated automatic tax information exchange regulations have created a hostile environment for tax evaders. Government revenue agencies like the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) are taking advantage of such regulations to encourage high net worth citizens with offshore assets to come forth and report.\nThe truth of the matter is that the era of bank secrecy is gradually ending. As the world moves toward adoption of global and coordinated banking regulations, information exchange on income for tax purposes has taken centre stage.\nImproving transparency\nThere have been numerous efforts by regulators in multiple jurisdictions to exchange tax-related information. This is aimed at improving transparency in global income reporting and to reduce tax evasion as well as aggressive tax avoidance.\nThis in effect is geared toward increased tax collection as the undisclosed foreign income and assets will be reported to the taxman.\nIt is worth noting that automatic tax information exchange initiatives have been evolving. The two main tax regimes that are already having great impact on financial institutions globally are US legislation Foreign Account and Taxation Compliant (FATCA) and the Common Reporting Standards (CRS).\nMost of the financial institutions in the Eastern Africa region, especially banks, are already FATCA compliant partly due to pressure from US banks.\nFATCA was introduced by the US tax authority to fight tax evasion by requiring foreign financial institutions to report incomes of US citizens to the US Department of Treasury.\nThe US banks have been strict and unwilling to do business with local banks that are non-compliant. This is partly due to huge fines that the US regulators are slapping non-compliant banks with.\nCRS are new global rules that are aimed at allowing automatic exchange of financial information between countries that are signatories. They were developed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in partnership with the G20 club of big economies.\nCRS have been dubbed as Global-FATCA or ‘GATCA’ (Global Accounts Taxation Compliance Act) because of their wider scope compared to FATCA.\nWhile FATCA requires foreign financial institutions to only report Americans’ foreign assets to the US tax authority, GATCA requires financial institutions to report all assets owned by all foreigners from participating countries to the local tax authorities.\nIn this region, the participating tax authorities will include the KRA, the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA), the Tanzania Revenue Authority and the Rwanda Tax Authority.\nCountries that have adopted and implemented these standards will start exchanging tax information in 2017. Kenya became the 94th country to commit itself to these global standards by signing Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters.\nTo be fully compliant and start receiving financial information of Kenyans with assets outside the country, Kenya will be required to draft the necessary legislation and guidance notes.\nFinancial institutions in the region will be greatly impacted once their respective tax authorities become fully compliant with CRS and start exchanging the tax information.\nThey will be required to provide the local tax authorities with financial information of non-residents. The tax authorities will in turn hand over that information to foreign tax authorities that are signatories to CRS.\nIn return, local tax authorities will receive similar tax information relating to their citizens with bank accounts and assets held overseas. This tax information will be provided by foreign tax collection agencies.\nThis will promote transparency and self-reporting of global income to the local tax authorities by citizens with offshore bank accounts and other assets.\nIt will make sense for taxpayers to voluntary disclose this information to home tax authorities before it is handed over by other countries that are signatories to CRS.\nMost of the offshore tax-neutral jurisdictions are already signatories to CRS. For instance, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, and the British Virgin Islands were early adopters.\nThis has motivated other countries to become signatories since they will have access to financial information of their citizens who have wealth in those jurisdictions.\nCurrently, it is problematic trying to obtain financial information from such jurisdictions due to the strict secrecy legislation.\nUnlike FATCA that requires banks to report any income that is above $50,000 per annum, CRS reporting is more striker because it requires all the incomes regardless of the amount to be reported.\nCRS also has a broader definition of the reporting entities. Entities that will be required to report under CRS include banks, insurance companies, saccos, fund managers and brokers.\nFATCA had few exceptions of the reporting financial institutions. For instance, insurance companies that do not make annuity payments were excluded from FATCA. Under CRS, all insurance companies will become reporting entities.\nOnce CRS rules comes into force, Kenyan financial institutions will face heightened reporting pressure. They will be required to gather more data from all their customers to correctly determine their tax residence status. This will increase cost of compliance.\nTo avoid intricate FATCA reporting burden, some banks had started closing bank accounts owned by American citizens.\nSome stopped opening any new bank accounts for Americans. These banks must go back to the drawing board and change their strategy to start accepting all clients regardless of nationality.\nThis is because, in the long run they will be required to report all the customers who are dual citizens or non-residents to revenue authorities once CRS comes to force.\nSuccessful implementation of CRS by the financial institutions will largely depend on the quality of data gathered during the client onboarding process.\nFinancial institutions will be required to enhance their onboarding processes to ensure they gather as much relevant clients’ data at this stage as possible.\nForward-looking financial institutions have already appreciated the mounting data and reporting demands on customers’ due diligence when implementing regulatory anti-money laundering programmes. They are proactive.\nClient data\nAs such, they have been preparing for the regulations that are in the pipeline by putting in place the necessary technological infrastructure and systems to support implementation. These companies are also acquiring the precise client data.\nThese companies will find it easier to implement CRS since they will use the clients’ data that was gathered during the KYC (Know Your Customer) process to determine the tax residence status of their clients.\nThe Eastern African governments have a big role in supporting financial institutions in their efforts to becoming compliant with these global tax regulations. The governments will need to fast track the signing of Model 1 Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) with the US government.\nThis will ensure the regional banks have a single point to report under both CRS and FATCA. Currently, banks are reporting directly to US government since regional governments are still under Model 2 IGA.\nIf the governments sign Model 1 IGA, the banks will be reporting directly to the local revenue authorities for FATCA purposes.\nThis will make it easier for banks since they will be reporting both for FATCA and CRS purposes at the same time to the same institution — the revenue authority.\nMr Kiragu is a financial services a compliance professional based in Canada. He also conducts training programmes at Strathmore University Business School in summer.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/analysis/Crackdown-on-tax-evasion-signals-end-of-bank-secrecy-era/539548-3522360-dqc0qkz/index.html"}
{"doc_id": "cb784dae2d7b96934b0a6d20044a2e26", "text": "Nigeria spent N331.76 billion importing wheat, N157.34 billion importing sugar, and N50.78 billion importing fish; totalling N539.88 billion for the three food items in the third quarter of 2023, BusinessDay’s analysis shows.\nAccording to the Q3 2023 foreign trade report released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), 83.87 percent of the country’s agric import value (N643.68 billion) was dedicated to the importation of durum wheat, cane sugar, mackerel and other fish.\n“The major agriculture goods imported in Q3, 2023 included ‘Durum wheat (not in seeds)’ from Poland with N90.46 billion and Canada with N73.03 billion.\n“This was followed by ‘Mackerel (Scomber scombrus, Scomber australasicus, Scomber japonicus) meat, frozen.’ from Faroe Islands valued at N16.35 billion,” the NBS said.\nWheat\nA total of N331.76 billion was used to import durum wheat into the country in the third quarter of 2023, making it the country’s highest imported food item.\nWheat is the third most imported item in the country after petrol and gas oil, accounting for 3.9 percent of the total value of goods imported into the country.\nDurum wheat is a variety of spring wheat that is typically ground into semolina and used to make pasta. It is also finely ground and used to prepare couscous, bulgur, noodles, and bread.\nAccording to the Central Bank of Nigeria, wheat is the third most widely consumed grain in the country after maize and rice.\nSugar\nCane sugar meant for refining accounted for 1.86 percent of the total value of goods imported into the country. The total quantity of cane sugar imported was valued at N157.34 billion.\nFish\nData from the NBS shows that Nigeria’s fish import (Mackerel and other fish) in the third quarter of 2023 was valued at N50.78 billion, accounting for 0.6 percent of total imports.\nNigeria imports fish varieties including mackerel (locally called titus or alaran), herrings (locally called shawa), horse mackerel (locally called kote), blue whiting (locally called panla), Argentina silus (locally called ojuyobo), and the popular croaker fish.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businessday.ng/agriculture/article/nigeria-spent-n539-88bn-on-wheat-sugar-fish-imports-in-q3/"}
{"doc_id": "b038e2d4ef2290827c07c42b6750f8e1", "text": "Christopher Isiguzo in Enugu and Paul Obi in Abuja\nThe Biafra Zionists Federation, (BZF) tuesday gave a 48-hour ultimatun to the military high command to discontinue its operation Python Dance II by withdrawing troops from the South-east zone.\nThe BZF, which is one of the pro-Biafra groups with Mr. Benjamin Onwuka as its leader, insisted that the launch of operation Python Dance II in the South-east by the Nigerian Army was aimed at intimidating the people of the area.\nThe group alleged that lives were lost during the alleged invasion of the home of Nnamdi Kanu last Sunday in Umuahia.\nIn a statement he issued to journalists in Enugu, self-acclaimed Biafra President, Onwuka said the federal government and the Army hierarchy would pay dearly for the lives lost in the said attack.\n“For sending armed soldiers to Biafra, it is political suicide for them and they will pay dearly for it.\n“Army has nothing to do with Biafra and this intimidation will not work. Biafra is alive; Biafra has since been recognized by the US. So, it can no longer be crushed. Our back-up is the US. So, Buhari is wasting his time, because the army will not stop Biafra’s independence.\n“Sending troops to come to intimidate us is not going to work. Any loss of life by any Biafran, whoever it is, is a great pain and regrettable, but they will pay very dearly.\n“I am warning them; I’m giving them 48 hours that all troops in the South-east, the South-south and the Middle Belt, must be withdrawn immediately. They are going to pay a heavy price.\n“My heart goes out to all the Biafrans kiilled and their families. These soldiers are nothing but terrorists.\n“In the North, the Boko Haram and the Hausa-Fulani herdsmen are killing people in thousands; in the Middle-Belt civilians are being killed by rampaging herdsmen, how many troops have they sent there? But down here, they sent them to kill unarmed agitators.\n“So, it is a terrorist attack and they will definitely face war crimes when the time comes.\n“However, no Biafran should yield to this intimidation; they should go on and fly Biafran and Israeli flag wherever they are,†he said.\nHe equally lambasted son of late Biafra leader, Chief Odumegwu Ojukwu, Emeka Ojukwu Jnr. for saying that his father indeed met with President Muhammadu Buhari in 2003 where they foreclosed Biafra.\nWhile describing Ojukwu Jnr. as a liar, the Zionists said “it is very disappointing for Emeka Ojukwu Jnr. to join Buhari in saying that his father dumped Biafra when he was alive.\n“We have said it before that Buhari lied; we are saying it now that Emeka Ojukwu Jnr. is a chronic liar and a saboteur. Why is he supporting Buhari who is sending troops to be killing his own people if not for selfish interest, for stomach infrastructure?\n“Also, in 2013, I visited him in Abuja on his invitation and we discussed Biafra for almost four hours. In that meeting, he even asked me why I did not include his name in the Biafra government we formed then? It is now strange that the same person is saying this now. We also wonder why Ojukwu should visit Buhari in 2003 to discuss Nigeria’s sovereignty when Olusegun Obasanjo, the then President was the one holding Nigeria’s constitution. In what capacity did Buhari receive Ojukwu to discuss Nigeria’s soverignty? The fallacies are so glaring,†he insisted.\nAlso, Southern Nigerians living in the United Kingdom have condemned the deployment of Nigerian soldiers in South-east region of the country, describing the deployment as unconstitutional.\nThe group which is a coalition of various South-east, South-west, and South-south groups and professionals in the United Kingdom lampooned the federal government, urging it to refrain from the ‘reprehensive act’ because the country is not at war.\nThe group in a statement signed by Felix Adejumo, Tochukwu Ezeoke and Charles Omoregie, on behalf of Yoruba, Ibo an South-south groups respectively, after an emergency meeting in London, UK, noted that it was a waste of tax payers’ money for the Nigeria army to be engaging in the duties of the Nigerian police and other security agencies.\nThey stated that “the conditions that allows for the deployment of soldiers in any part of the country as provided for in Section 217 (2)(c) of Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution has not arisen.\nâ€Therefore the Nigerian Army has no business getting involved in the traditional duties of the Nigeria Police.\nIn the same vein, also, a group under the aegis of South East-South South Network, SESSNet yesterday condemned in strong terms the invasion of the leader of Independent People of Biafra (IPOB), Nnamdi Kanu’s home in Umuahia, Abia State, by the army, saying the invasion was a threat to the unity of the country.\nThe group warned the Nigerian army not to take the patience of South-east and South-south Nigeria for weakness, adding that any attempt by the military to repeat what happened in Zaria, Kaduna State, in the region will immediately lead to breakdown of law and order in the entire country.\nThey stated that “the SESSNet vehemently condemns the military invasion of Kanu’s home.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2017/09/13/leave-south-east-within-48-hours-biafra-zionist-federation-orders-military"}
{"doc_id": "d10d130d166a2747ca138b964c19b575", "text": "In the month since Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa was elected leader of the ANC (by only 179 votes), the most important question has been around the solidity of his mandate. For the ANC, and South Africa, everything else flows from that: whether Jacob Zuma can remain as president, whether corruption will truly end, what deputy ANC leader David Mabuza and ANC Secretary-General Ace Magashule can, and will, actually do; all these crucial, tectonic plate level issues get resolved once the answer to the underlying question is known. It appears that the answer is becoming well known. By STEPHEN GROOTES.\nSo balanced, it seemed, was the national executive committee (NEC) when it was elected in December that it rendered any predictions almost impossible. Now, after a weekend in which the first Zuma supporters rolled over on the question of whether he should stay, the ANC’s national working committee was elected, and finally dramatic strides were taken at Eskom and in the Free State, we need doubt no more. Ramaphosa is firmly in charge. And you might not need more than the fingers on both hands to count the rest of Zuma’s days as president.\nThere is a certain gravity associated with political power. It is hard to get even a little bit of it, but once you have it, it makes it just that much easier to get the next bit. It can, of course, slip away, but if you win an election legitimately, real power can actually come rather easily. Most people have no other option but to follow your lead; couple that with the fact that Zuma’s misgovernance and the theft he sanctioned have created a series of crises from which it could take years to recover, along with impending 2019 elections, and people in the ANC may have no choice but to swallow the inevitable.\nAnd so it came to pass that the question of whether Zuma should stay or go was brought up. By all accounts, there was almost no opposition. So obvious is the answer to that question that it should come as no surprise. Now it is in the hands of the national leaders, the Top Six. The real issue here is how it will be done, or more accurately, the price of the deal with Zuma. It seems that the big card Zuma still has to play is a peaceful transition. But there still seems to be no legal deal on the horizon that would see him avoid prosecution. Obviously it’s hard to have sympathy with him on this, but it does mean he may have not much choice but to play hardball. Speculation about whether he will deliver the State of the Nation Address abounds, but it does seem now that power is literally leaving him moment by moment.\nIn the end, this is going to come down to a negotiation between himself and Ramaphosa, which is already well on its way. At some point they will finalise that deal, hands will not necessarily be shaken, but Zuma will step down, and many will pop the champagne corks.\nAnd then came the elections to the national working committee, the 20-person body that manages the ANC between NEC meetings.\nWorking out how people will behave in political bodies is contested terrain; you examine their histories, who they have backed in the past, and your personal knowledge of them. But people can also change as the facts on the ground shift. The NEC that was elected with Zuma in Mangaung in 2012 was strongly behind him. By the end of its term, it came very close to voting Zuma out of the Union Buildings. Which means any analysis has to be updated regularly. However, by going through the new NWC it seem obvious that it will be firmly in the hands of Ramaphosa.\nSome people are obvious supporters of Zuma, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma will presumably back him when and where she can. So, we know, will Water Affairs Minister Nomvula Mokonyane, fresh from picking up the rand. Environmental Affairs Minister Edna Molewa has spent some of her recent time defending Zuma, so she might find it difficult to change now. Arts and Culture Minister Nathi Mthethwa has defended Zuma vociferously many times, all the way through the attacks on him from Julius Malema to Nkandla, and presided over the non-removal of Richard Mdluli from the police all those years ago, as well as the Marikana Massacre.\nDakota Legoete is someone almost unknown to those who consume their politics from the urban bubble; he is the provincial secretary of the ANC in North West. In 2017 he was instrumental in ensuring that events where Ramaphosa spoke while campaigning in that province were not “official ANC events”. Ramaphosa got around that by speaking at events hosted by the SACP and Cosatu, but surely he didn’t forget the snub. It seems likely that Legoete would follow the lead of Mabuza in many situations.\nTony Yengeni is back on the ANC’s NWC, providing more proof that a criminal conviction and a reputation for drunken driving, breaking parole conditions and driving Maseratis while claiming to speak to the poor is no barrier to a high political office in the party. It is breathtaking that he is back there. Yengeni can be the brazen proof that the ANC is simply not serious about corruption. The only positive is that at least Carl Niehaus didn’t make it onto the NEC.\nAnd then, finally, in the Zuma camp, there is the Social Development Minister, Bathabile Dlamini. A woman who almost broke South Africa in 2017. A politician who thinks it’s okay to spend government money on a two-hour puff interview with her, and is so obviously in the pay of Cash Paymaster Services that nothing more need be said here.\nThere is quite a lot that should be said about some of these people. First, several are incredibly loathed or the objects of fun in popular culture. Dlamini and Mokonyane are not seen as leaders, but at best as a bad joke, at worst as dangerous criminals that could potentially ruin South Africa. This may distress them and their families, but they have brought it upon themselves. They are also both vulnerable to the situations within their ministries, and could find themselves thoroughly delegitimised if, say, social grants are not paid, or taps run dry in Cape Town or the entire Eastern Cape. This weakens them and helps Ramaphosa. Others, such as Yengeni, simply have no moral authority, and still others, like Mthethwa, could find themselves even more high and dry when Zuma goes.\nAnd, of course, the case of Dlamini Zuma is in itself fascinating. Often, when people lose a close contest, they exit the stage. Not her. It will be interesting to see if she still has political fight left in her, especially if someone other than Jacob Zuma delivers the State of the Nation Address.\nTurning our attention to the other side of the NWC is to see a group of people who now appear more powerful.\nHuman Settlements Minister Lindiwe Sisulu and Science and Technology Minister Naledi Pandor are both strong and tough, and will try hard to stop corruption. Presidency Minister Jeff Radebe has always sat on the fence, but is likely to simply go with the flow and follow Ramaphosa, while Basic Education Minister Angie Motshekga (who had supported Zuma for many years) bucked the rest of the ANC Women’s League to proclaim her support for Ramaphosa during the leadership race. Derek Hanekom, the man who lost a Cabinet post because of his opposition to Zuma both publicly and in the NEC, is obviously with them, while Thoko Didiza was named as a possible deputy secretary-general on Ramaphosa’s ideal slate. Ronald Lamola has done a wonderful several year-long pivot from Malema’s deputy leader in the ANC Youth League to strong and forceful Ramaphosa campaigner. Senzo Mchunu was obviously Ramaphosa’s first pick for secretary-general, while Zizi Kodwa said publicly, as voting started, that he was backing Ramaphosa. Deputy International Relations Minister Nomaindia Mfeketo appeared keen for Zuma to leave office last year, while Gauteng Finance MEC Barbara Creecy is one of those who will always fight corruption where she can. National Council of Provinces Chair Thandi Modise also appears to be on the Ramaphosa side, having been named by branches in the Eastern Cape as someone they would like on his slate.\nIn case your maths isn’t quite working right now, that means 12 people on our list are presumably for Ramaphosa and seven are for Zuma.\nYou’re right. That doesn’t quite add up to 20.\nThe person missing is Tina Joemat-Pettersson. And this is a curious case. She was first the Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Minister and then Energy Minister under Zuma. Certainly the corruption claims against her are strong, ranging from the amount of money spent flying her family around to a farm sold in the Northern Cape to claims around the nuclear deal and, particularly, the sale of South African strategic oil reserves. At one point even ANC MPs threatened to “clean up her department” if she failed to do so (this was long before that kind of thing became fashionable). But she was then fired by Zuma amid suggestions that it was because she was not driving the nuclear deal quickly enough.\nWhich means her behaviour could be difficult to predict.\nIt is also important to remember here that the real analysis to conduct is not to ask whether people were for or against Zuma or Ramaphosa in 2017, but whether they are for or against corruption. In this case, it is probably safe to say that support for Zuma can be viewed as a proxy for a vote for corruption. This applies to members of the Top Six too, in that while Ramaphosa and ANC national chair Gwede Mantashe are against corruption, Secretary-General Ace Magashule and Deputy Secretary-General Jessie Duarte may be vulnerable to claims they will protect corruption. That leaves deputy leader David Mabuza and Treasurer Paul Mashatile. They seem to be working together, but Mabuza could certainly be seen as supporting corruption. Which makes predictions all the more difficult.\nAt the same time, however, it should not be forgotten that the law enforcement agencies could soon be acting with more vigour. Writing in City Press on Sunday, the always informed and insightful Professor Mcebisi Ndletyana suggested that a “nasty showdown is looming” between Ramaphosa and his supporters on the one side, and Mabuza and Magashule on the other.\nNever forget that it was Magashule who ensured Mosebenzi Zwane was appointed Mineral Resources Minister and engineered the looting of the Free State provincial treasury for the Guptas. Anyone who helps Atul Gupta get R10-million that was set aside for the poor surely has a special place reserved in hell. This Sunday’s headline about the Estina dairy project in the Free State could well be the end of both Zwane and Magashule. And while Duarte could be acting secretary-general for a period, delegates at a special conference or national general council would surely elect someone like Senzo Mchunu to that post. It goes without saying that all of this would change the balance of power more than significantly.\nIf all of this over the weekend were not enough evidence of how the gravity of power can move quite quickly, Ramaphosa has also had the power to enforce his will in a matter of state for the first time since becoming ANC leader. He has now forced the appointment of a new board at Eskom, and ensured that Jabu Mabuza, the man who helped save Telkom, can now do the same at Eskom. Of course, Ramaphosa had the opportunity of the crisis that was presenting itself, after banks were going to refuse to lend Eskom more money.\nBut it is also incredible that people like Zuma and Public Enterprises Minister Lynne Brown allowed it to get to this stage. It is surely impossible for Brown now to claim to have no knowledge of the massive corruption that has festered at Eskom for years. Despite all of that, Ramaphosa’s instruction that not only a specific board be appointed, but that corrupt people like current acting CEO Matshela Koko and suspended Chief Financial Officer Anoj Singh be removed, is a demonstration of that power. It is almost unheard of for a politician to order the removal of a particular person, as that power is usually only confined to the board.\nThen there is the specific choice of Phakamani Hadebe, the person who turned around the Land Bank, and is seen as a big troubleshooter within the Treasury. Bluntly, we’re lucky to have such people to turn to at these moments. One wonders how long it will be before he asks former Eskom CEO Brian Dames to return to Megawatt Park – Dames was fired after he rebuffed attempts by the Guptas to order him around.\nRamaphosa’s supporters will now be able to claim that he has ended a crisis that threatened the whole of the economy, because a default by Eskom could easily have ended in a downgrade by ratings agencies. And that he should now be given more power to do what needs to be done.\nIt was this week last year that Ramaphosa announced his campaign to unseat Zuma. It was in Davos, that small town to which he is headed this week. There he said, “I am sleeping in the president’s bed… because the president is not here”. Now, finally, he is actually acting, almost already it seems, as the president. The Eskom crisis is now likely to be resolved; Ramaphosa seems to have the upper hand in the ANC. It’s now just a matter of waiting for Zuma himself to go. DM\nPhoto: Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa flanked by Minister in the Presidency Jeff Radebe and Finance Minister Malusi Gigaba, interacting with business leaders. Ramaphosa hosted the Team South Africa breakfast planning session ahead of South Africa’s participation in the World Economic Forum (WEF) Annual Meeting in Davos next week, 23-26 January. [Photo: GCIS]", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-01-22-analysis-sa-holds-its-breath-as-ramaphosa-solidifies-his-grip-on-anc-power/"}
{"doc_id": "6eafd4a9324bdc8303cf514a990d8482", "text": "Private universities have started increasing tuition fees for government-sponsored students that they host, setting them up for a clash with the Ministry of Education.\nThe institutions including the Catholic University of Eastern Africa (CUEA) and Daystar University have increased fees by up to Sh20,000 per semester for the new students who will join in September.\nSources in the admissions and finance departments of CUEA and Daystar University who are, however, not authorised to speak to the Press have confirmed the fee increment on Friday.\nThe move looks set to trigger a clash with the ministry that declared the increments illegal due to lack of consultations.\nDaystar University increased fees for the government-sponsored students by an average of Sh17,000 for those reporting in September while learners joining CUEA will pay up to Sh20,000 more based on a degree course.\nStudents who elect to join private universities receive a government sponsorship of at least Sh70,000 annually depending on the course they are pursuing.\nThe shift was expected to be a big win for private universities and colleges that had for years complained that the admission agency denied them the opportunity to get top students to their institutions.\n“They are not supposed to increase the fees, it is against the agreement signed years ago when placement of government-sponsored students in private universities started,” Education Principal Secretary Simon Nabukwesi said in a response to Business Daily.\n“Let affected students write to us then we pick it up because this (increment) is an illegality.”\nThe government has set fees paid by government-sponsored students at Sh16,000, which is equivalent to the charges in public universities.\nSince 2016 when the system was introduced, the private universities have enrolled 47,548 students.\nStudents joining CUEA to pursue an undergraduate course in Law will pay Sh46,000 per semester up from Sh24,500 while those joining to take Education and Business will pay Sh39,500 up from 24,500.\nUnder the arrangement, the government pays more than half per unit cost while the students, parents and universities foot the remaining costs.\nThe placement of government-sponsored students in private universities is to address congestion in public institutions of higher learning.\nThe admissions department of CUEA could not explain the reasons behind the increment, only saying it was a decision made by the authorities while Daystar attributed the rise to the high cost of living.\nThe increments look set to pile more pressure on households that are grappling with squeezed budgets due to the increased cost of living amid struggles to recover from the economic meltdown of the coronavirus pandemic.\nKenya’s inflation hit a 58-month high in June at 7.9 percent on soaring food and fuel prices, breaching the government’s upper limit ceiling of 7.5 percent for the first time in nearly five years.\nBesides the costs, the institutions say the delays in receiving the government’s share of the fees has put pressure on their operations.\nVice-chancellors/chief executives of public universities have been pushing the State to allow them to increase tuition fees to ease the cash flow hitches.\nThe institutions have targeted new students for the fee increments to ease opposition from continuing learners. But the Ministry of Education has several times turned down requests by universities to increase tuition fees in the wake of funding shortfalls from the Treasury and the increased cost of living.\nSome of the universities have had to sell assets like buildings, close some of their satellite campuses and scrap some courses in a bid to cut operational costs.\nThe cash-flow hitches have left the institutions struggling to honour obligations such as payroll taxes, retirement benefits, insurance premiums for employees and payment for contractors and suppliers.\nThey have outstanding remittances to the Kenya Revenue Authority, the National Health Insurance Fund, the National Social Security Fund, pension schemes, insurance companies and saccos.\nCUEA and Daystar University are the latest universities to raise tuition fees after the University of Nairobi (UoN) in a bid to ease the financial woes.\nUoN more than doubled fees for undergraduate students who joined in September last year despite the recent public pressure on the institution to reverse the decision.\nThe institution also increased fees for postgraduate students, prompting court cases to reverse the decisions.\nNew undergraduate students who joined UoN to pursue medical courses in September last year have been paying Sh59,000 from Sh26,500, making the increment the highest for new students at the university.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/private-varsities-raise-fees-for-state-sponsored-students-3890666"}
{"doc_id": "11fe87b94aa1102ed0309fc13d78b503", "text": "Foreign exchange reserves in Nigeria increased from $47,492,639,432 at the end of April 2018 to stand at $47,622,706,934 on May 30, 2018. It has been increasing gradually since crude oil price began rising in the second quarter of 2017.\nNigeria’s external reserves averaged $11.067 billion from 1960 until 2018, reaching an all-time high of $62.081 billion in September 2008 and an all-time low of $63.22 million in June 1968. However, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) targets a reserve base of $50 billion before the end of 2018.\n[wpdatachart id=186]\nDo you think CBN can meet the $50b target this year?\nDownload Nairametrics App for breaking news and market intelligence.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://nairametrics.com/2018/06/04/cbn-targets-50-billion-foreign-exchange-reserves-before-the-end-of-2018/"}
{"doc_id": "0a24fcb4ded9702e0810d31d549fc9a0", "text": "Payfast has recorded a record-high Black Friday payment, with one South African spending R627,000 in a single transaction.\nHowever, according to the payment platform, the average basket size decreased from R1,689 per basket to R1,364.\nRetailers for general merchandise of convenience food stores, family clothing stores and discount stores were on top, with South Africans topping up on essentials and treats after a tough financial year. This was slightly ahead of men’s and women’s clothing.\n“Experienced Black Friday enthusiasts now approach the day with a meticulously crafted strategy, pre-selecting desired products and leveraging price reductions weeks before the retail event kicks off,” Payfast Managing Director Brendon Williamson said.\n“With access to platforms that monitor item products over time, shoppers can gain valuable insights into price fluctuations throughout the year and gauge whether their wish-listed products really are at a good price. It’s no longer just about shopping – it’s a strategic approach.”\nPayfast added that there was an uptake in QR code payments, with the volume of payments made using Zapper increasing by 63% compared to 2022, whilst Scan to Pay payments also increased by 44%. Payfast said that this highlights the trend towards quicker and more convenient payments.\n“As the cost-of-living climbs, and inflation remains high, the choices around when and where to spend money have gained greater significance – particularly when considering significant purchases like appliances or electronics,” said Williamson.\nAlthough many retailers, such as Superbalist, are running Black Friday-related deals over all of November, e-commerce spiked on the day due to retailers saving their best prices of the month for last.\nPayfast said that there was a peak in transactions between 9 am and 10 am, whilst some shoppers waited till midnight to get their products.\n“Black Friday has shifted predominantly towards online shopping, with numerous retailers offering exclusive online discounts. This transition offers consumers a more deliberate and curated shopping experience,” said Williamson.\n“Yet, as Black Friday becomes more commonplace, we might see merchants extending their sales period through to the festive season. This aims to attract a broader range of buyers and manage the surplus stock from Black Friday.”", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businesstech.co.za/news/black-friday/734051/someone-spent-r627000-on-a-single-black-friday-purchase-in-south-africa/"}
{"doc_id": "f81daa121a140bcaa92b5caf2d4cce1f", "text": "South Africa’s central bank chooses to call digital currencies such as Bitcoin “cyber-tokens” because they don’t meet the requirements to be classified as money.\n“We don’t use the term ‘cryptocurrency’ because it doesn’t meet the requirements of money in the economic sense of the stable means of exchange, a unit of measure and a stable unit of value,” Reserve Bank Deputy Governor Francois Groepe told reporters in Pretoria on Thursday. “We prefer to use the word ‘cyber-token’.”\nDigital currencies such as Bitcoin and Ethereum are becoming increasingly popular, with regulators in some countries struggling to move fast enough to manage them.\nThe Reserve Bank has established a FinTech unit to review its position on private cryptocurrencies and to help draw up an appropriate policy framework and regulatory regime.\n“We want to ensure or establish whether there is still compliance with the relevant financial surveillance or exchange-control regulations,” Groepe said.\nSouth Africa’s Reserve Bank isn’t the first to voice reservations about digital currencies. In January, Nigerian Governor Godwin Emefiele said investing in Bitcoin is a “gamble”.\nBank for International Settlements General Manager Agustin Carstens said in an interview with the German newspaper Boersen-Zeitung this week he prefers to call these currencies “cryptoassets”.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businesstech.co.za/news/banking/247135/sarb-says-cryptocurrencies-are-tokens-and-not-money/"}
{"doc_id": "9daa22edae9507b64f01dd4362cf0082", "text": "Founder, Air Peace, Allen Onyema has denied the allegation of $20 million bank fraud and money laundering levied against him by the United States Attorney in Atlanta, Georgia.\nOnyema, who spoke through Alegeh & Co, his counsel, insisted that the allegations are unfounded and strange to him as he has maintained a track record built on honesty and integrity and will take all necessary steps to clear his good name and hard-earned reputation.\nIn a statement issued by the council and obtained by Nairametrics, Onyema and his Chief of Administration and Finance, Ejiroghene Eghagha, who was also charged with bank fraud and committing aggravated identity theft in connection with the scheme, were cleared that they never engaged in such activities.\nThe truth according to Onyema:“None of the allegations involves any third party funds but relates to his funds utilized in the Airline business. There is no allegation that any Bank [in the United States, Nigeria or elsewhere], Company or individual suffered any financial or any loss whatsoever. He looks forward to an opportunity to rebut these allegations in Court.\n“All the money transfer for the purchase of aircraft passed through the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). I can confirm to you that all allegations are false and are in no way in line with my character as a person and as a businessman whose only aim has been to build Nigeria and improve well-being.\n“These are indictments that only contain charges. Our client is innocent of all charges and the US government will find NO dirt on him because he has never conducted business with any illegalities. Every Kobo transferred to the US for aircraft purchase went through the Central Bank of Nigeria LC regime and all were used for the same purpose. The American companies that received the funds are still in business. He never took a penny from any US bank or Nigerian bank. He is willing to defend his innocence in the US courts.”\nBackstory:Nairametrics had reported that the United States’ Attorney’s Office, Georgia, Atlanta charged the Founder and Chairman, Air Peace Nigeria, Allen Onyema, with bank fraud and money laundering for moving more than $20 million from Nigeria through United States bank accounts in a scheme involving false documents based on the purchase of airplanes.\nChief of Administration and Finance of the airline, Ejiroghene Eghagha, was also charged with bank fraud and committing aggravated identity theft in connection with the scheme.\nDetails: The Air Peace boss allegedly leveraged his status as a prominent business leader and airline executive while using falsified documents to commit fraud.\nU.S. Attorney Byung J. “BJay” Pak, said, “We will diligently protect the integrity our banking system from being corrupted by criminals, even when they disguise themselves in a cloak of international business.”\nCommenting on the development, Special Agent in Charge of the DEA Atlanta Field Division, Robert J. Murphy, said, “Allen Onyema’s status as a wealthy businessman turned out to be a fraud. He corrupted the U.S. banking system, but his trail of deceit and trickery came to a skidding halt. DEA would like to thank the many law enforcement partners and the subsequent prosecution by the U.S. Attorney’s Office who aided in making this investigation a success.”\nDownload Nairametrics App for breaking news and market intelligence.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://nairametrics.com/2019/11/23/air-peace-founder-onyema-denies-alleged-20-million-bank-fraud/"}
{"doc_id": "f19a7288abf89650d9ca599968d23b12", "text": "Short-seller Viceroy says that it has submitted names and evidence of Capitec’s questionable loan practices to South Africa’s finance committee – including the questions it says the bank refuses to answer.\nThe group’s latest move follows at least two prior reports on Capitec in as many months, in which it accuses it of being a loan shark and trying to hide the risks of its loan book from investors through clever accounting.\nViceroy – which makes money by shorting a company’s stock and then releasing damning reports on those groups – first published a report in late January claiming that Capitec was ‘cleaning’ its loan customers by immediately granting loans to clients who had taken out other loans to repay their previous Capitec loans, without a ‘cool down’ period.\nThis, the research group said, made Capitec’s loan books look healthier than they are in reality, while effectively ‘hiding’ the risks of default from its client base. It also accused Capitec of manipulating debt orders so that Capitec loans were paid off first, exacerbating strained financial positions of customers.\nIt declared Capitec “uninvestable”, and called for the bank to be put under curatorship and a formal investigation to be launched.\nFor its part, Capitec has consistently denied Viceroy’s claims, saying that the firm did not understand how its business operated. It provided detailed responses to the allegations, and invited Viceroy to meet with the bank’s management to get a better idea of what was going on.\nThe bank was also backed by ratings agencies, the South African Reserve Bank and the National Credit Regulator.\nHowever, Viceroy maintains that the authorities got it wrong.\nThe short-seller now claims that its engagements with Capitec have proven fruitless, saying that Capitec has failed to answer any of its questions, and has instead chosen to be evasive and tangential with the data it did provide.\nThe group said it was a perfect example of why it did not want to engage with Capitec management in the first place – because they simply do not answer questions.\n“Viceroy has been criticised for not engaging with management prior to publication of our reports. Capitec’s response is a prime example of why we choose not to.\n“We maintain our recommendation that Capitec should be subject to an external, independent regulatory investigation, which we believe will result in Capitec being placed in curatorship to protect its consumers,” the group said.\nViceroy said it sent Capitec eight very specific questions, and received eight vague answers – all of which can be read in Viceroy’s latest document.\n“As the bank has failed to answer our questions, we reassert our opinion that Capitec Bank is fundamentally uninvestable and await the findings of a formal investigation,” the group said.\n“We look forward to presenting to parliament on Capitec, including debt counsellor data. Analysts would be wise to deep dive before dismissing our research.”\nCapitec is currently in a closed period ahead of its annual results, and has not yet responded to Viceroy’s latest volley. The group previously warned shareholders that Viceroy’s attack on its business would continue for some time.\nOn Wednesday, the group’s share price traded 1.4% down, to R854.92 – still off from the highs seen before the first Viceroy report.\nDespite the controversy, the bank said that it expects earnings per share for the year ending February 2018 to be between R38.02 and R39.01 per share, an increase of between 16% and 19% compared to the R32.78 per share in 2017.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businesstech.co.za/news/banking/230019/viceroy-launches-fresh-attack-on-capitec/"}
{"doc_id": "2f0879bf25a93702ccc9debd162f832e", "text": "Consult residents first, President tells councils\nZvamaida Murwira in GWERU\nLOCAL authorities should continuously consult residents on issues that affect them as opposed to only engaging them during budget formulation when they need money, President Mnangagwa has said.\nThe local authorities, he said, must have clear development plans of enhancing service delivery and consider engaging tertiary institutions such as universities where they can leverage on the innovation hubs in their quest to address some of their challenges.\nThe Head of State and Government made the remarks in his acceptance speech after he was conferred with the Freedom of the City by Gweru City Council in honour of his vast and iconic contribution to the city, the Midlands Province and the nation at large.\nFreedom of the City is the highest civic honour council can bestow on a prominent person for meritorious service, either of a national or local character.\nThe President challenged local authorities to ride on the Government’s engagement and re-engagement policy to establish partnerships and twinning arrangements that will leapfrog governance systems and attract investment towards the growth of provincial Gross Domestic Product (GDP).\n“Capital goes where it feels safe, hence I challenge you to improve your ease of doing business environment in line with the national barometer and global best practices.\n“As you do so, always keep the residents continuously engaged and dialogue open, as opposed to restricting interactions with them during the budget formulation process. The GDP of your province must grow from one year to another. Residents must be consulted from January to December. As we entrench democracy, participatory governance and private sector led development in our country, our people’s voice must be heard, and their views taken on board.”\nGovernment, said President Mnangagwa, has taken a deliberate policy to assist local authorities to address some of their challenges.\n“In view of the evident shortcomings within local authorities to collect and prudently utilise resources of rate payers, my Government is in the process of availing financial resources for the improvement of water and sewer reticulation systems; rehabilitation and development of roads; ICTs; refuse removal and public lighting, among others. The welfare of the people of our great country remains paramount,” he said.\nPresident Mnangagwa said it was encouraging that Devolution Funds availed under the Devolution and Decentralisation Programme had resulted in people centred projects.\n“Let us not tire and continue on this positive course so that all citizens across the country within both rural and urban local authorities, have access to reliable services. Going forward, I have tasked the Ministers responsible for Local Government; Finance; the Public Service Commission and representatives from my Office, to continuously review our Inter-Governmental Fiscal Transfer model. Notwithstanding this, local authorities must be proactive and scale up efforts to collect revenue and prioritise implementation of programmes and projects. The resident and rate payer of Gweru deserves better and should see value for the rates, fees and charges that they pay,” said President Mnangagwa.\nHe implored local authorities to partner local universities and leverage on their capabilities for the good of residents.\n“The City of Gweru is home to the Midlands State University, Mkoba Teacher’s College and Gweru Polytechnic College, among other strategic national institutions. I urge you to leverage on the capabilities and competencies of these organisations as you implement the Smart City Concept and modernise the City.\n“Information Communication Technologies and other contemporary strategies must be effectively deployed to accelerate the modernisation of the City. The talented young girls and boys at the innovation hubs and industrial parks should be tasked to come up with solutions which enhance service delivery,” said President Mnangagwa.\nHe said Gweru City Council, known as the City of Progress, should translate that mantra to reality through delivery of quality water and sewer reticulation infrastructure, roads, ICTs, waste management and refuse collection, public lighting as well as other critical services that ought to be scaled up.\n“While I recognise the fact that not all challenges can be resolved in one day, all local authorities must, however, have clear development plans to enhance service delivery and foster incremental development. Sound corporate governance systems, integrity, honesty and orderliness are essential traits for those holding public office in our local authorities and indeed across the political spectrum,” said President Mnangagwa.\n“Furthermore, planning regulations and by-laws should be transformative in line with the changing socio- economic trends and demographics. As our society and cities expand, develop and modernise, it is incumbent upon our local authorities to provide adequate designated industrial zones, factory shells, market areas and stalls for emerging businesses and residents. I also call upon the private sector to embark on various corporate social responsibility programmes for the benefit of their customers and the communities in which they operate in. The National Clean-up and Beautification Programmes should be taken seriously and see the ambience of Gweru improving.”\nHe said Gweru had historical importance as it was the city where liberation movement, Zanu, held its inaugural congress at Mtapa Hall in May 1964.\nGweru Mayor, Councillor Hamutendi Kombayi, led the process of conferment at a colourful ceremony held at Gweru Civic Centre.\nPresident Mnangagwa commended Gweru city fathers for their political maturity and rising above partisan politics.\n“Given that Gweru City Council is made up of councillors from different political parties, backgrounds and persuasions, this honour is apolitical. It is also a demonstration that our democracy is maturing and some political leaders across the political party divide are able to act objectively for the broader national good. This is what it should be. We are all Zimbabweans and this is our home. Congratulations Gweru through this act, you further attest to the fact that there is much more that unites us no matter our party preferences,” said President Mnangagwa.\n“This is the spirit that should permeate throughout our country even as we gear up for the upcoming harmonised elections. Let us remain united, preaching peace, love and harmony among our people.”\nThe last conferment was in 1992 when the late founding President Cde Robert Mugabe was bestowed with the status by Gweru City Council.\nEarlier on President Mnangagwa unveiled a remembrance plaque along ED Mnangagwa Street at the boogie clock.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.herald.co.zw/consult-residents-first-president-tells-councils/"}
{"doc_id": "9ace3b74fe571bc22899ceb32869455e", "text": "1. The Centre for Affordable Housing in South Africa states that there are 6 738 520 residential properties on South Africa’s deeds registry, valued at approximately R6.26 trillion. This compares to the total market capitalisation of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange of approximately R7 trillion. (Eight years ago, it was double this amount).\nAccording to a recent household survey, there are 62 000 000 residents in the country with an average household size of 3.4 people, thus, there are an estimated 18m households in South Africa.\nIt must therefore be assumed that the remainder of the population is housed in 11 000 000 homes, which is not on the national Deeds register. According to the 2021 General Household Survey, 11.7%, or approximately 2 million, live in informal dwellings.\nThat leaves us with at least 9 000 000 homes that are not on the register. The value of the houses at a moderate estimated average value of R250 000 per unit equates to a total value of almost R3 trillion, and it brings the total value of residential property in South Africa to R10 trillion.\nThis is not a healthy situation because there are so many properties not of the deed’s registry, not only for the owner nor for the municipal authority that delivers a service but cannot bill, not even at a nominal amount.\nIt is something that is not sustainable as is evident in the state of our municipalities. How is it possible in this day and age where we know how to digitise information that the Deeds Office and the municipalities, including Eskom and the Water boards, do not share a common database?\n2. The rental market. An estimated 19% of all people live in rental dwellings.\nInflation is not the friend of people who need to rent their homes. If salary increases do not compensate, they find themselves short, not even to speak of those who have no jobs. The table below illustrates the position over the last six years.\nAccording to the TPN Renal Monitor for Quarter 3 2023, “There has been a shift in the percentage of tenants categorised by the various rental value bands.\nMost tenants are paying between R3 000 and R7 000 per month, with 50.3% of all tenants in the third quarter of 2023 falling into this category, down from 50.8% in the previous quarter.\nThe average number of tenants in this value band during 2021 was 54.5%, and in 2020, 55.4%. This is the result of unabating rental escalations following the general inflation trend.\n3. The types of Residential Properties, and ownership detail by race.\nIn a study posted in 1017 by Superlinear, they concluded the following:\n* Black South Africans are more likely to own their property than any other race group, while white South Africans are least likely to own theirs outright.\n* White South Africans are most likely to still owe the bank for their houses, while very few black South Africans appear to have a bond; perhaps pointing to alternative arrangements that do not rely on financing their homes, likely due to both cultural reasons and a historical lack of access to formal financing.\n* Indians and Asians are the most likely to rent their property.\n4. Resale value.\nTransactions are good indicators of a property market’s activity and health. While there were 6.7 million properties in 2021 in South Africa, only 270 156 transactions (new and resale) were recorded; most of which were in the conventional, high-end, and mid-luxury markets.\nThe least transactions were in the entry market segment which is telling of an underserved market.\nValue is very dependent on marketability as aided by liquidity within a market.\nThe time to sell a house is a good indication of reliable estimates of value. If it takes on average longer than three months to sell a house valuations become more unreliable.\nThe collateral value that a bank can place on a house depends on the activity of sales in a particular area.\nThe development of a secondary sales market in houses is a precondition for rural areas to participate in the utilisation of the equity in a house to obtain a loan against a mortgage bond.\nThe national average yields for full title properties improved from 7.25% in the second quarter to 7.31% in the third quarter.\nSectional title property yields improved marginally from 10.47% in the second quarter to 10.49% in the third quarter. This is not an unacceptable yield for a developer provided he can deliver a sought-after product at the right rental.\n5. In a book titled: “Securing Land Tenure in Urban and Rural South Africa” (ed. Hornby, Kingwill, Royston and Cousins, UKZN Press 2017), the authors estimate that in 2011, around 60% of South Africans held land or dwellings outside the formal system.\nThe authors further point out that: “5 million people lived in RDP houses with inaccurate or outdated titles, in most cases due to transfers outside of the formal system.\n“Another 5 million lived in RDP houses where no titles had yet been issued due to systemic inefficiencies. Along with 1.9 million people in backyard shacks, 2 million on farms belonging to others, and 17 million in communal areas. This means that in that year, around 30 million people, nearly 60% of all South Africans, lived on land or in dwellings held outside of the cadastral system.”\nThe Centre for Affordable Housing in Africa suggests that, “beyond the delivery of subsidised housing, a key opportunity exists in the residential resale market, where resale market prices are often for values lower than what is available in the new build market.\n“Leveraging the potential of the resale market depends on resolving the title deeds backlog and addressing the incidence of informal transactions, both of, which undermine healthy market functioning and constrain transaction values.\n“Intentional and targeted transaction support and title deed restoration efforts are needed. This would also increase municipal revenue.”\nWhat the residential property market needs is some air to breathe, it is just a jump to the left and a drop in interest rates of three percentage points during 2024.\nIt is an election year, Mr President, have a friendly chat with Lesetja Kganyago and bring us some relief.\nWe won the World Rugby Cup, we won the first leg of the Rugby evens once again in Dubai, and our ladies are looking good on the soccer field, and the cricket field.\n* Kruger is an independent analyst.\nPERSONAL FINANCE", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/personal-finance/financial-planning/run-on-numbers-state-of-residential-property-2023-fa45579d-3af9-4715-bb36-83b56dcb34f4"}
{"doc_id": "21220fd72696d142f51cb0a42704016a", "text": "Chief Executive Officer of the Association of Ghana Industries, Seth Twum Akwaboah, says the outcome of the Bank of Ghana’s measures to control Ghana’s rising inflation has not been particularly positive for businesses in the country.\nAccording to him, although these policy measures may have worked in previous years, they are currently failing to produce the same desired effect.\n“It looks like our fundamentals are so weak that even though Bank of Ghana is introducing these measures, we’re not seeing the positive effects that we expect,” he said.\nHe added that “I mean if you look at the past three or so policy rate review of the monetary policy committee meetings, they’re always reviewing and revising the policy rate upwards. So one would have expected that by now, inflation would have come down drastically, but it’s not happening. So it means that there is something more to it than merely increasing the policy rate.”\nHis comment comes on the back of the Bank of Ghana increasing the policy rate by 300 basis points to 22%, after an Emergency Monetary Policy Committee meeting on August 17th, 2022.\nThe move is part of measures to address the risks to the inflation outlook.\nSpeaking on JoyNews’ PM Express Business Edition, he noted that the failure of the BoG’s measures to stabilize the economy is indicative of the fact that more needs to be done to solve the current crisis.\n“So some of the measures that the Bank of Ghana is planning to introduce include discussions with the mining sector, and to ensure that the export proceeds are repatriated home, and then being able to buy the dollars that they get is all measures that we need to see.\n“For now, it’s very difficult to predict the situation. No one can tell which particular measure will be the game changer; a combination of things must happen. So we need to monitor the situation and see but I think what we’re finding ourselves in now is quite a challenging one,” he said.\nLatest Stories\n-\nWhy Afua Asantewaa’s Guinness World Records attempt was disqualified\n-\nBawumia eulogises former Chairperson of the Church of Pentecost\n-\nEmbrace the spirit of curiosity and creativity – Ag. UniMAC VC charges freshers at 2nd matriculation\n-\nNDC commemorates 58th overthrow of Osagyefo Dr Kwame Nkrumah\n-\nTraditional games: Ampe, skipping rope, hot scotch once busy pastimes for young girls now waning\n-\nECOWAS lifts sanctions imposed on Niger\n-\nHow I was sex trafficked by my husband for 13 years\n-\nCAF Champions League: Medeama exit competition\n-\nI used to visit pastors for spiritual handkerchiefs – Fameye\n-\nYoung artists are not humble enough to learn – Nana Poku Ashis\n-\nInternational Organization for Migration, others appeal for $112m for migrants\n-\nNCA shuts down 4 radio stations in Bawku\n-\nNigeria’s Iwobi and Bassey score as Fulham hand Manchester United first defeat in 2024\n-\nJordan Ayew excels in Crystal Palace win over Burnley with goal and assist\n-\nI had an affair with a colleague but I did not tell her I was married", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.myjoyonline.com/bogs-economy-stabilization-measures-have-not-been-positive-for-businesses-association-of-ghana-industries-ceo/"}
{"doc_id": "b4d1d8fc5715dc85376a09c3b286a6a2", "text": "• Subscribers lost N12bn\n• Emefiele, others seek effective enforcement of Cybercrime Act\nNdubuisi Francis in Abuja\nNo fewer than 23 Nigerian banks received inflows amounting to N28.7 billion executed in 460,000 transactions through the Mavrodi Mondial Moneybox (MMM) Ponzi scheme within six months, the 2016 annual report of the Nigeria Electronic Fraud Forum (NeFF) has revealed.\nThe amount, which was moved between June and December 2016, is 61 per cent higher than the budget of the Federal Ministry of Education and almost six times over the budget of the Nigerian Defence Headquarters (DHQ) in the 2017 budget, the report erroneously stated.\nA quick fact-check by THISDAY of the 2017 budget, as passed by the National Assembly, showed that N139.3 billion was allocated to the Ministry of Defence for its capital spending programme for the year, while N330.54 billion was allocated for recurrent expenditure.\nIn the case of the budget of the education ministry, the National Assembly passed a provision of N398.70 billion for recurrent spending and N56.72 billion for capital expenditure for the year.\nThe report disclosed that by the time the scheme “crashed†on December 13, 2016, over N11.9 billion had been lost by gullible subscribers.\nThe NeFF report, which was unveiled in Abuja Tuesday at a stakeholders workshop on cybercrime, organised by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), disclosed that since the MMM scheme had a 30-day cycle before return-on-investment (RoI) was realised, everyone who put money into it after November 12, 2016 did not get their money out.\n“No fewer than 23 banks received inflows amounting to N28.7 billion executed in 460,000 transactions through the MMM Ponzi scheme. The amount put into the scheme between November 13th and December 15th, 2016 (through interbank transactions) totals over NGN11.9bn. This amount was largely not recovered.\n“To put this amount into perspective, the 2017 budget for Defence Headquarters is N4.7 billion. This implies that the amount transferred by Nigerians under the MMM Ponzi scheme would have funded the Nigerian Defence HQ almost six times over.\n“Majority of the transfers made by customers of banks that participated in the MMM Ponzi scheme were made through the account-to-account transfer platform.\n“This was followed by the mobile channel, and lastly, through the web channels of other transfer platforms in the industry,†the report said.\nIt added that 34 financial institutions paid out money for investments into the MMM Nigeria Ponzi scheme, adding that the customers included those of commercial banks, mobile payment operators as well as mortgage banks.\n“By the side are the amounts, in terms of volume and value for each financial institution that money was paid out from. Fewer banks received inflows of MMM transactions than the number of banks from which outflows occurred,†the NeFF report stressed.\nIt also stated that MMM followed the usual pattern of Ponzi schemes, pointing out that “they continue to build momentum and crash when the maximum amounts are already invested in the schemeâ€.\nThe NeFF report added that the peak of the MMM investment was in November 2016, when over N13 billion was transferred among the participants, pointing out that the CBN had in the middle of 2016 warned about the dangers of the scheme.\nIn a related development, the volume of fraud reported in 2016 indicated an 82 per cent increase in reported cases, with an estimated N2.19 billion losses.\nThe NeFF 2016 annual report titled, “A Changing Payments Ecosystem: The Security,†said the financial industry recorded an 82 per cent rise when compared to 2015 and over 1,200 per cent rise when juxtaposed with the situation in 2014.\nAccording to the report, despite the 82 per cent increase in reported fraud cases, the industry was able to reduce fraud by 2.7 per cent when compared to the 2015 figure.\n“Comparing the attempted fraud against the actual losses, the industry was able to salvage 49.7 per cent of the total amount attempted by these fraudsters within the year.\n“These figures informed us that there are more attempts on a yearly basis with different innovation tricks or modus operandi to take advantage of the system,†the NeFF report said.\nThe report also noted that 2016 witnessed a significant transaction increase across all payment channels in both volume and value in spite of the economic recession.\n“In contrast with 2015, there was a 71.43 per cent spike in the volume of transactions processed through the NCS (Nigeria Central Switch),†it said.\nIn his address at the unveiling of the NeFF 2016 annual report, CBN’s Director, Banking and Payments System and NeFF Chairman, Mr. Dipo Fatokun, stated that the Nigeria Interbank Settlement System (NIBSS) report of the Nigeria fraud landscape for 2016 indicated that fraud cases grew by 82 per cent over the 2015 figures, attributing the trend to the increased usage of new payment platforms.\nMeanwhile, the CBN Governor, Mr. Godwin Emefiele, has called on stakeholders to ensure that the Cybercrime Act is effectively enforced, to serve as a deterrent and constant reminder to those who may wish to engage in illicit activities targeting the financial technology infrastructure.\n“It is now about two years into the commencement of the Act, and so it is not too early to conduct a holistic review of its implementation, hence the theme of this workshop: ‘Tackling Enforcement Challenges under the Cybercrime Act’,†Emefiele said.\nHe noted that as the regulator of the financial sector, the CBN is constantly confronted with issues raised by operators who occupy the unenviable position of first line of defence against cyber attacks on the systems, networks and infrastructure through which financial services are carried out in the country.\n“While the issue about cyber security is not wholly legal in nature, and while considerable efforts have been made by the CBN and banking operators, especially through the Bankers’ Committee and other bodies, leading to reduced incidents of fraud on the one hand, and very high consumer confidence in our payment system on the other, we are nevertheless desirous that the Cybercrime Act is effectively enforced, to serve as a deterrent and constant reminder to those who may wish to engage in illicit activities targeting our financial technology infrastructures,†he said.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2017/05/31/23-banks-got-n28-7bn-inflows-from-dubious-mmm-transactions"}
{"doc_id": "a0be40ac188eca65c08401bda05f9f44", "text": "inflation pressures\nLatest\n1 hour ago\nAfter more than a century of conflict and the mass exodus of its Armenian population in September 2023, the self-styled republic of Nagorno-Karabakh has officially ceased to exist and is now fully under the rule of Azerbaijan.\n1 hour ago\nPolish farmers took to the streets of Warsaw demanding a ban on food imports from Ukraine. Under pressure, Poland's prime minister is considering a broader ban on Ukrainian food imports.\n2 hours ago\nCan airstrikes by the USA and its allies be effective in halting Houthi attacks on cargo ships in the Red Sea? Or will the conflict escalate across the entire region?\n2 hours ago\nThe Verdi trade union has called on its members working as ground personnel for Lufthansa to strike for three days, starting on Wednesday. The short-notice action is the latest of several similar strikes.\n5 hours ago\nThe documentary, directed by Mati Diop, was awarded the Golden Bear. The top prize at this year's Berlin International Film Festival was given to “Dahomey,” a documentary by the French Senegalese filmmaker Mati Diop about 26 looted artworks that were returned to Benin from France in 2021.\n5 hours ago\nThis means that membership is open to anyone in the locality willing to invest and that the members control the project democratically. The co-op must also have the community's interests — and not just the investors — at heart.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://tv.guardian.ng/tag/inflation-pressures/"}
{"doc_id": "8d1a3be92b583c78d13455d9a39e6d95", "text": "As President William Ruto assembles a new government to run his crucial first term, one of the key ministries to watch will be the ICT given the potential it has to create jobs for the youth.\nThe past decade has seen Kenya make significant strides in ICT infrastructure, services and trade, with the country cementing its status as one of the leading tech hubs in the region.\nAccording to data from the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS), value addition in the ICT sector stood at Sh294 billion last year, a 30 percent increase from Sh223 billion in 2017.\nLast year the KNBS recalculated the country's economy with the new figures putting Kenya's ICT sector output to Sh252 billion as of 2019, up from Sh116 billion. The rise in value was attributed to the factoring in of sub-sectors previously not measured including mobile money, which has seen a meteoric rise in recent years.\nSince 2017, the country's total bandwidth capacity has more than tripled from 3.1million Mbps to 10.8 million Mbps with at least six undersea cables landing in the country.\nThis extra capacity has spurred uptake with the country's utilised bandwidth capacity growing even more rapidly from 916,287 Mbps per year in 2017 to 4.8 million Mbps as of last year.\nOther strides made in the sector include establishment of the Office of the Data Protection Commissioner, ODPC and reforms in the mobile money sector led by the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) to cut the cost of transactions and deepen financial inclusion.\nIn April this year, outgoing ICT Cabinet Secretary Joseph Mucheru unveiled an updated digital masterplan set to guide the State's digital policies over the next five years.\nThe Kenya National Digital Master plan 2022-32 plans to spend Sh585 billion in the country's ICT sector over the next 10 years with Sh17.3 billion required in the current financial year alone for the digitisation of government records and building new IT infrastructure.\nAccording to the plan, Sh5 billion will be spent on the digitisation of five billion government records, and Sh800 million will go to digital skill gaps survey across 10 sectors.\nOut of this, much of the expenditure (Sh405 billion) in the 10-year plan will go towards building of fibre optic infrastructure, new data centres and community networks.\nSome of the policy fixes in President William Ruto's Kenya Kwanza Alliance are in line with what the previous administration had anticipated as the next phase of growth for the sector.\nThe Kenya Kwanza manifesto acknowledges that the sector has fallen short on some of the promises that had been made in previous years.\nThese include the promise of setting up business process outsourcing (BPO) industries that would become a leading employer for the sector. The manifesto also cites the Konza Technopolis and automation of public processes in sectors such as health and agriculture as examples of other state projects that still lag behind.\nAs part of its commitment, the incoming administration has promised to build 100,000 kilometres of national fibre broadband throughout the country within five years as well as the digitisation and automation of all government critical processes with 80 percent of government services going online.\nPresident Ruto has also promised to establish an Africa Regional Hub to promote the development of software for export; a reduction in the cost of calls and data and the establishment of a Presidential Advisory Council on Science and Technology.\nThis will then inform how the government coordinates the ongoing and planned ICT deployment projects for maximum benefit and enhance the sector’s supportive role to other State agencies, ministries and departments.\nJust recently, the National Treasury officially inaugurated the Nairobi International Financial Center, NIFC. NIFC is expected to facilitate Nairobi’s elevation to one of the region’s leading destinations for foreign direct investment and is one of the State organs that requires expert resources and personnel in close partnership with the ICT sector.\nYes, the ingredients are there, but these are all ambitious undertakings that will require strategic funding and partnerships with the private sector as well as local and international development agencies to realise.\nIn addition to this, there is a need to address the high cost of digital services that has been occasioned by several rounds of increases in excise and VAT. The government has in recent years turned to the ICT sector as a new cash cow in a bid to widen the tax net and boost public coffers.\nWhile this is understandable in an environment where the tax revenue as a percentage of GDP has been dwindling, the government should ensure the goose that lays the golden eggs is not chocked.\nThe blueprint has already been drawn and the incoming administration need not reinvent the wheel but only build upon past successes and strive for international best practices.\nKenya is the first country in East Africa to enact the Data Protection Act and the country’s mobile money sector by far outpaces regional peers.\nThe country, however, still lags in the global scene in indicators such as broadband connectivity, adoption of artificial intelligence, machine learning and blockchain far below developed economies.\nIncoming ICT Cabinet Secretary assumes a role that is a central pillar to the day-to-day workings of the government and vital for stimulating economic growth across the other sectors.\nIt is our hope that whoever it is, will have the foresight backed with political goodwill to take the country’s ICT sector to the next level.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/data-hub/this-is-what-is-in-the-in-tray-for-incoming-ict-secretary-3953176"}
{"doc_id": "0b2298ec20826a65c6a18aa4f90dcccd", "text": "Civil Servant\nLatest\n49 mins ago\nTerrorism in 2023 has remained a global threat as a record of 8,352 deaths representing 22 per cent increase from the previous year remains the highest, since 2017.\n1 hour ago\n• NEMA denies attack on Abuja facility • Police arrest 15 suspected warehouse vandals in FCT • Shettima: Protest against hardship in a responsible manner The reality of Nigeria’s grim food insecurity exacerbated by rising food cost became apparent yesterday when hoodlums in Abuja went on a looting spree, carting away food items from public and private facilities.…\n1 hour ago\nFoundation member of All Progressives Congress(APC), Osita Okechukwu,has saidthe 36 state governors should be held responsible for the setback recorded in restructuring the country.\n1 hour ago\nHouse of Representatives Committee on Public Accounts has asked private airlines to explain how they expended N4 billion they collected from the Federal Government as COVID-19 intervention funds or refund the money to the government treasury.\n1 hour ago\nNigeria Union of Journalists has conferred its Internal Security Meritorious Award on the Chairman of Tantita Security Services, Government Ekpemupolo, alias Tompolo.\n1 hour ago\nNo fewer than 600 African and Australian governments, private sector executives, investors, multilateral stakeholders, business leaders, innovators and manufacturers are expected to gather in Melbourne, Australia from May 12 to 14, 2024 for this year’s Australia-Africa Business Summit.\n1 hour ago\nWith the increase in value for personal development, motivational experts have said self-awareness and mindset are crucial to achieving individual growth.\n1 hour ago\nNigeria Navy Dockyard Limited and its Benin Republic counterpart weekend at Yaoundé signed an agreement that would empower the Naval Dockyard to carry out repair works on six of its non-functional platforms.\n2 hours ago\nNational Institute of Credit Administration (NICA) has promised to boost awareness on consumer credit services, urging the Federal Government to enforce appropriate laws that will instill decency, discipline and honesty in Nigeria’s credit system", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://guardian.ng/tag/civil-servant/"}
{"doc_id": "2adb086a5e7a7e711f6cecbf181356ea", "text": "The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) governor, Dr Mangudya, sat down for an interview with Trevor Ncube. We got another look into the man’s mind. He called for respect when we do disagree as Zimbabweans so let’s respectfully consider what he has to say about the economy.\nThe Zimbabwean local currency\nThe history of Zimbabwe and its currencies is a complicated one. It is no wonder then that there is confusion in the market about the current local currency. The doc reminded us that:\n- The currency of the land is the Zimbabwe dollar, denoted ZWL or ZW$. It is not the RTGS$, although it was launched as such, which led to the confusion.\n- The bond note was not a currency and was phased out. The notes we have today are the Zimdollar.\n- We don’t have Nostro accounts, what we have are FCAs, foreign currency accounts. The accounts that banks in different countries hold with each other remain the only ‘Nostro’ accounts. Yes, even the Finance ministry does refer to FCAs as Nostros but we have not adopted and redefined Nostro for the Zim economy.\nThe bond notes\nWe have had the discussion on why the RBZ governor maintains that bond notes were a success. If we act like economists trying to teach a concept and use the ‘all things being equal’ qualifier, and squint, it does appear that under some kinds of light, the bond note was a success. Read more on that here.\nIn this interview, he affirmed the same and went further to say that the bond notes did not even lose value the whole time they were in circulation. On this one, no amount of squinting will make us see it as the good dokotela does. Bond notes lost value and that is a fact.\nMangudya says the bond note traded at 1:1 with the USD until its phasing out in 2019. To be fair, that is accurate. However, that was the govt’s pegged rate which was very different from the market rate. On the parallel market, the bond note was worth far less than the USD. A little like it is today with the Zimdollar which has a higher value according to the RBZ and its auction rate than on the actual market the average Zimbabwean has access to.\nThe forex auction\nMangudya says he is happy with the performance of the forex auction. He says it has achieved its goals and more. How could he possibly think that?\nPrice discovery\nHe feels the auction rate allowed us to value the Zimdollar. He therefore believes that is the accurate valuation of the Zimdollar. For the rest of us, the parallel market already did this before the auction rate came along. And it’s more accurate too.\nHe pointed out that Zim banks do not trade with each other for various reasons. The main one being that they don’t trust each other because of compliance issues. The Zim banks also don’t trade with foreign banks because of several geopolitical reasons. Therefore there really was no interbank market in Zimbabwe.\nWhat he is getting at here is that the interbank market, in normal circumstances, is the main market for the trading of forex in an economy. Banks trade on behalf of clients and also for their own benefit. This interbank market therefore is the one where we discover the real price of currencies. So, when Mangudya says there was no interbank market in Zimbabwe, he is convinced that there was no accurate price discovery before the forex auction came.\nRedistribution of foreign currency\nThe RBZ forces exporters to liquidate 40% of their export receipts at the interbank rate and this forex is what companies bid for on the forex auction. The forex auction is also funded by our trusty friends, Afreximbank and from the forex that is freely traded in the banking system.\nHow much are people freely trading with banks when it’s at a rate lower than the parallel market? Not much. So, the main source of funds on the auction is the 40% liquidation of all export receipts. The most exports are from mining.\nOther companies that are not exporting but need forex for their inputs, especially those in manufacturing can then bid for that money and fund their operations. Without the auction, these companies would have to visit the parallel market.\nThe only problem is that Zim is dominated by informal traders and small businesses that don’t qualify to participate on the auction floor. These businesses still need forex and they get it on the parallel market. Also, those that do participate in the auction are not getting all their forex needs and are turning to the parallel market to supplement the auction proceeds.\nThis means the auction is not accurate as a price discovery mechanism. Neither is it successful as a forex redistribution tool. The lifeblood of the Zim economy does not participate in it.\nAccessibility to forex\nWhat I found funny is that Mangudya believes the average Zimbo can just walk into a bank and trade their Zimdollars for USD at the auction rate and be on their way. He thinks that’s where we are getting the forex to pay school fees, rentals etc. In reality banks only buy from us at the low interbank rate, they don’t sell USD to us at that rate. There never is any forex to trade to us.\nEven small and medium sized businesses are not getting all their forex from the auction. Their demand for forex is much higher than the supply on the auction floor. Mangudya claims though that this demand is excessive because of non-economic factors discussed later.\nThe parallel market\nDr Mangudya thinks in terms of the whole economy and so his eyes are on the large players in Zimbabwe. As he should, as governor of the RBZ. However, I fear this makes him a little blind to the realities for the average person.\nHe was asked about the gap between the official exchange rate and the parallel market exchange rate. From his response, he does not believe that the RBZ is responsible for the gap. He blames short-termism on our part as Zimbos, for wanting to get rid of Zimdollars at all costs.\nPeople have got this heart, that obsession, that requirement to always hold foreign currency. They think it’s a more stable currency, which it is also.\nDr John Panonetsa Mangudya\nApparently, you guys are too focused on limiting your losses from the drop in value of the Zimdollar. You should not be too narrowly minded as to protect yourself against inflation by exchanging the Zimdollar for a more stable currency.\nYou should think about the long term impact this has on the Zimbabwean economy. Do you not see that we need our own currency so that we can manage the economy effectively through monetary policies. Do you want to go back to the deflation era when we exclusively used foreign currency? Huh?\nMangudya says the demand on the parallel market is driven by non-economic factors. He stresses that this demand is not for importing but rather to store value in a more stable currency or to take advantage of arbitrage opportunities. We all agree with this and wonder why he thinks this revelation would be a surprise to us.\nYou would be surprised that the demand factor for foreign currency is a store of value demand as opposed to the import demand for foreign currency.\nDr John Panonetsa Mangudya\nIn closing\nHe does acknowledge that Zimbos have been through hyperinflation and deflation, roller coaster-rides and stability, and so find it hard to trust the RBZ and its banks. Hence, the difficulty in maintaining the value of the Zimdollar as people just don’t trust it. The RBZ is trying to steady the ship though and you can read more about that here.\nThere is more, arguably juicier, stuff from this Dr Mangudya interview and that will follow. It is always a bit of entertainment to hear from the RBZ governor because he always seems to see things just a little bit differently from us, the lay people.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.techzim.co.zw/2021/12/short-termism-by-zimbabweans-reason-for-depreciating-zimdollar-says-rbz/"}
{"doc_id": "03debf01670dd8996bd1167e001c2307", "text": "Taiwan votes for a new president, and parliament, on Saturday in an election that will be closely watched around the world.\nThe winner will lead the democracy of 23 million people as it manages bellicose threats from China, which claims the island as its own.\nHere are some key facts about self-ruled Taiwan, which has its own currency, flag, military and government but is not recognised as an independent state by the United Nations nor most nations.\n- China claim -\nThe rift between China and Taiwan dates back to China's civil war, which erupted in 1927 between communist and nationalist forces.\nDefeated by Mao Zedong's communists, the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) of Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan and claimed rulership of all of China -- just as the mainland claimed Taiwan.\nTaiwan's official name remains the Republic of China, while the mainland is the People's Republic of China.\nAfter decades of authoritarian government, Taiwan transformed into a vibrant democracy in the 1990s, and a distinct Taiwanese identity has emerged.\nThe current ruling party, led by President Tsai Ing-wen, regards Taiwan as a de facto sovereign nation, not a part of China.\nBut Beijing insists the island will one day be absorbed by the mainland, and in a New Year's Eve speech, President Xi Jinping said China would \"surely be reunified\".\n- International limbo -\nThe UN switched recognition from Taiwan to Beijing in 1971, with other countries and international groups soon following suit.\nWashington switched to the People's Republic of China in 1979, and today fewer than 15 states, mostly small nations in Latin America and the Caribbean, grant Taiwan full diplomatic recognition.\nBeijing has kept Taiwan out of international bodies such as the World Health Organization and leans heavily on governments to stop any moves towards recognition.\nAfter Lithuania allowed Taipei to open a de facto embassy in Vilnius in 2021 using the name Taiwan, China slapped trade restrictions on the Baltic state that were partially lifted last year.\nBut Taiwan enjoys many of the trappings of a full diplomatic relationship with the United States in practice, and Washington is bound by an act of Congress to supply the island with weapons to defend itself.\nChina is sensitive to any move even implying official recognition of Taiwan, and a visit by then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi in August 2022 outraged Bejing.\nIn response, China launched its largest-ever military exercises around Taiwan, sending warships, missiles and fighter jets around the island.\n- Semiconductor superpower -\nTaiwan's ambiguous diplomatic status has not stopped it from becoming one of the world's leading tech manufacturing hubs, powering an economy that is one of the biggest in Asia -- albeit dwarfed by China's.\nThe island is home to industry giants such as Foxconn, the world's biggest contract electronics manufacturer, which assembles products for major brands including Apple and Huawei.\nAnd the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) controls more than half of the world's output of microchips -- the lifeblood of the global economy powering everything from smartphones and cars to missiles.\n- Asian pioneer -\nTaiwan has been a regional leader in gender and LGBTQ equality.\nIn the last election in 2020, more than 40 percent of lawmakers voted in were women -- the highest proportion in Asia.\nThe democracy became the first place in Asia to legalise gay marriage 2019, holding its first same-sex weddings within days.\n© Agence France-Presse", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/news/world/four-things-to-know-as-taiwan-goes-to-the-polls-5bc9f533-50d0-4304-99ee-689517a6578b"}
{"doc_id": "15b2a97982474bd5f54eb6fd222991b6", "text": "Address by His Excellency\non the Commemoration of Heroes Day National Heroes Acre, 8th August 2011.\nHonourable Vice President, Mai Joice Mujuru and General Solomon Mujuru,\nHonourable Vice President, Comrade John Landa Nkomo,\nHonourable Prime Minister, Mr Morgan Tsvangirai,\nHonourable Deputy Prime Minister, Professor Arthur Mutambara and Amai Mutambara,\nHonourable Deputy Prime Minister, Ms Thokozani Khupe,\nHonourable President of the Senate, Mai Edna Madzongwe,\nThe Chief Justice, Honourable Godfrey Chidyausiku,\nHonourable Ministers,\nService Chiefs,\nWar Veterans, Detainees, Restrictees and Collaborators,\nMembers of Parliament,\nHis Worship the Mayor of Harare Mr Muchadeyi Masunda,\nMembers of the Diplomatic Corps,\nFamilies of Heroes of Zimbabwe’s Liberation Struggle,\nInvited Guests,\nLadies and Gentleman,\nComrades and Friends\nEvery year, on this day, which falls in August, our nation gathers in one accord, at this sacred National Shrine and others across the country, to remember and pay tribute to the heroes of the liberation struggle who won for is the freedom and independence we celebrate in April.\nToday, as we remember the immense sacrifices of our heroes we also celebrate their courage and bravery in confronting the Settler colonial enemy.\nWe celebrate with mixture of both pride and nostalgia, our dear departed and living heroes whose enduring courage blood and suffering enabled us to reclaim our cherished land, our national heritage, freedom, sovereignty and independence.\nWhilst we salute these gallant sons and daughters of the soil, our experience with the enemy has taught us the fundamental lesson of unity in defending our national heritage and vigilance in guarding our freedom and cultural values.\nAs we gather here today, let no man or woman, dream that they can dismantle these formidable foundations forged on the anvil of the armed liberation struggle, and for which our people perished during the liberation struggle waged twice by our heroes, the first in 1896-1897 and the second in 1967-1980.\nToday, however, the main struggle is a socio-economic one of improving the standards of living of our people as Government continues to direct its efforts towards continued economic recovery. As part of these efforts, Government having successfully implemented the Short Term Emergency Recovery Policy (STERP) has now adopted the Macro-Economic Policy and Budget Framework (2010-2012) in order to hasten the turnaround of the economy.\nThe recent launch by Government of the Medium Term Plan (MTP) (2011-2015), should ensure not only the consolidation of the macro-economic stability so far achieved, but also the sustenance of our development thrust.\nToday, due to the hard work of all Zimbabweans and development partners, we enjoy a very low inflation rate. Our economic growth rate is also higher than the regional average. These economic indicators bode well for rapid economic growth and employment creation, as confidence in the economy continues to grow on the back of increasing investment.\nHowever, it is fundamentally important to recognise that stability and rapid economic progress of a country cannot be achieved unless there is peace in the country. The promotion of a culture of sustainable peace in the country is of utmost importance to our nation.\nThe Organ for National Healing Reconciliation and Integration thus remains a critical institution for ensuring a framework for lasting peace and sustainable development. We are happy that significant progress is being realised towards creating a more tolerant and more peace loving society.\nIt is the responsibility of all political parties, civil society, religious groups and churches, local authorities, the corporate sector, workers organisations and all other institutions, to work hard for peace and the social cohesion of the nation as a whole.\nEven as we prepare for the coming National Elections, our political environment should remain peaceful stable and people friendly.\nLet us closely guard ourselves against the divisive antics of neo-colonialism, which is persistently rearing its ugly head in our midst and employing devilish tactics to sow seeds of discontent and disharmony amongst our people so that they turn against each other.\nThis is not only a deliberate ploy to format political instability and derail our development, but it is also is a well orchestrated move designed to undermine the basics and pillars of our nation by destroying the very foundation of the liberation struggle we are celebrating today.\nThe impact of the illegal economic sanctions imposed by some Western countries, assisted by their proxies, to advance their regime change agenda continues negatively to undermine our economy in its various sectors.\nWe call upon those who have imposed these illegal punitive sanctions to remove them forthwith. We reiterate that we cannot continue to receive the battering of sanctions without hitting back. Let them heed this warning!\nThe on-going Constitution making process, which is in its final stage, should give full meaning to our freedom by consolidating conditions necessary for development under a peaceful environment.\nIn particular, it should empower Zimbabweans to unequivocally assert their sovereign right over the ownership, control and use of their God-given resources for the benefit of all our citizenry.\nGovernment’s continuing focus on the productive sectors of agriculture, mining, manufacturing and tourism is intended to grow the economy by intensifying value addition activities that will improve the competitiveness of the country with its trading partners.\nThe infrastructure sector also offers many investment opportunities in power, water, roads, rail, Information Communication Technologies (ICT’s) and telecommunications, and the social sectors of health and education which, despite resources constraints, will continue to receive due attention of Government.\nGiven the broad range of investment opportunities, domestic and foreign investors are not only invited to invest in sectors of their choice but also do so through the medium of Public Private Partnerships and joint ventures.\nThe empowerment agenda remains central to Government’s priorities. In this regard, resettled farmers, and in particular A1 and communal farmers, are the targeted benefices of Government subsidies input programmes to enable them to timeously prepare for the cropping season so as to increase productivity.\nThe subsidised inputs programme will be extended to A2 commercial farmers depending on the availability of resources at Government’s disposal.\nGovernment will continue to look for resources to support farmers with critical inputs, including those for purposes of irrigation development, modernisation and mechanisation of agriculture.\nThe right of sovereign ownership of our resources must find expression in various projects and programmes under the Indeginisation and Economic Empowerment Act, prioritising at the same time the promotion of small to medium scale enterprises as drivers of economic growth.\nGovernment will also ensure that the operation of Indeginisation and Economic Empowerment Act will be to the mutual benefit of both indigenous entrepreneurs and other investors.\nThe low remuneration levels of workers, who include civil servants and who are struggling to meet their daily needs, are a major concern.\nGovernment is therefore continuously looking for ways of reviewing salaries and conditions of service so that they become attractive, and are in line with the improving economy. Measures are also being taken to review pensions to protect pensioners.\nAs Government pursues various initiatives to cushion vulnerable groups in our society, the National Heroes Dependents Assistance Fund will continue to be reviewed in order to provide a decent life to the surviving spouses and minor children of deceased heroes. Although the provision of social services has improved tremendously as evidenced by the enhanced level of social services delivery particularly in health, education and social amenities, Government however, recognises the challenges still faced by ordinary citizens in accessing these basic services.\nAppropriate intervening will continue to be taken where necessary. These include the Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM) in education and free anti-retroviral treatment to mitigate the scourge of the HIV and Aids pandemic.\nZimbabwe’s historic struggle for self-determination would be incompetent without mentioning the support rendered by various countries.\nAs we take time to pay homage to our heroes, let is also recognise the critical part played by our neighbouring countries in SADC and beyond.\nInternationally, a number of countries have stood firm behind Zimbabwe at the time of our greatest need, among which were our well-weather friends, China, Russia and Cuba, who have always stood firmly in defence of Zimbabwe’s sovereign rights.\nFinally, allow me to pay tribute to our defence, police, prison, and security services for their unflinching, relentless and dedicated service in guaranteeing and maintaining peace, stability and the security of our free sovereign Zimbabwe.\nThis is the role that history has given to them and we ate grateful that they have performed that role in an honourable way.\nComrades and Friends, before we depart from this sacred Shrine, let us re-dedicate ourselves to work harder, in our various spheres of life, to engender tolerance and peace among our people and every day to remember there is a oneness that binds us as Zimbabweans.\nThis is a pledge of unity in diversity and peace forever.\nI thank you.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.herald.co.zw/address-by-his-excellency/"}
{"doc_id": "68bf7481aa1d6c9af3542905b1307bc7", "text": "Kericho County has cleared pending bills worth over Sh500 million giving small businesses much-needed working capital that was locked up to local contractors and suppliers.\nGovernor Erick Mutai said he inherited pending bills worth Sh600 million, and within one year he has managed to settle over Sh515 million after an internal pending bills task force verified them.\n“We established an internal pending bills task force which approved payments totaling over Sh515m. We have paid all genuine pending bills as approved by the committee,” he said during his State of the County address at the Kericho County Assembly.\nDr Mutai reiterated his administration’s dedication to fulfilling promises outlined in the County Integrated Development Programme (CIDP), promising to work every day to ensure effective services are delivered.\n“I wish to reaffirm that the state of our county is strong. We have kept our promise and utilised county resources for the greater good. I remain bullish about our state of the county, working every day to ensure services are delivered,” he said during his 45-minute address.\nCombat unemployment\nIn the education sector, the governor said his administration had addressed the issue of Early Childhood Development Education (ECDE) teachers by hiring 1,136 teachers on permanent and pensionable terms.\n“There are ongoing efforts to employ 65 more to meet current shortfalls,” said the governor.\nIn a bid to combat youth unemployment, Mutai said his administration initiated a crucial intervention, offering 300 internships to skilled youth across the county.\n“Diploma and Degree holders will serve for one year, receiving a monthly stipend and the much-needed hands-on training to launch their careers. We aim to roll out the same number every year,” said Mutai.\nHe termed the elevation of Kericho County Referral Hospital as a level V facility as a milestone in the sector.\nWith 169 dispensaries operational, surpassing MOH guidelines, Mutai proposed the conversion of some of the facilities to health centres for enhanced service delivery.\n“We also launched Primary Care Networks and the training of 167 community units is almost reaching the target of 203,” the governor said.\nHe detailed the water department’s success in increasing access to quality drinking water to rural households through new schemes and rehabilitation efforts.\nIn agriculture, Mutai said his administration subsidised Artificial Insemination services, distributing over 10,000 doses of semen to farmers.\n“Additionally, 30 Agricultural Extension Officers were employed to ensure farmers stay informed about best farming practices,” he said.\nIn infrastructure development, the governor announced a total expenditure of Sh514,777,680 in the 2022/23 fiscal year.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/health/rift-valley/article/2001486471/governor-mutai-outlines-growth-plans-as-he-pays-over-sh500m-bills"}
{"doc_id": "de07cc8683225e87450651c634fde18a", "text": "The Bank of Ghana (BoG) is forecasting a peak in inflation later this year before trending back towards the medium-term horizon.\nAccording to the Central Bank, this is due to the risk to the inflation outlook as result of increased commodity prices, particularly crude oil.\n“The rest are heightened supply chain disruptions, and the over 20% increase in utility tariffs set to kick in from 1st September, 2022”.\nThe warning was contained in an address by the First Deputy Governor of the BoG, Dr. Maxwell Opoku Afari read on his behalf by Dr. Philip Abradu Otoo, Director of Research at a Financial Literacy Workshop for Journalists in the Northern Zone of Ghana.\nThe two-day training workshop was organised for selected Business and Financial Reporters in Tamale, Northern Region.\nIt was under the theme: “Sustaining the Recovery: The Role of the Journalist in Building Confidence”.\nImplications\nIt is not clear for now what the forecast by the Central Bank will mean for the current rate of inflation pegged at 31.7% in July 2022.\nSome observers have said it could show that the trend will go up further in the month of September and October 2022.\nBy this, some have observed whether if the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of Ghana will hike the policy rate again to deal with the fresh challenge.\nThe Bank of Ghana recently justified the increase in the policy rate to 22% because of threats to the inflation rate outlook.\nFinancing government\nThe First Deputy Governor noted that the Central Bank’s overdraft to government has helped close the financing gap as reflected in the Mid-Year Budget review.\nThis challenge, the Dr. Opoku-Afari, said is as a result of the access to the international capital market and given the constrained domestic financing.\n“It is expected that the ongoing policy discussions with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) will help address the underlying macroeconomic challenges, restore fiscal and debt sustainability, and re-anchor sustainable balance of payments”.\nBanking sector development\nThe First Deputy Governor was quick to add that the remarkable resilience of the banking sector over the last two=year period could be attributed to the comprehensive financial sector reforms that took place before the Covid-19 pandemic struck in 2020.\n“The sector has since remained liquid, profitable, and well-capitalised”, he noted.\nDr. Opoku-Afari added that the industry’s measure of solvency, the Capital Adequacy Ratio, has remained well above the revised regulatory 13% prudential limit\nTraining for Journalists\nDr. Opoku-Afari highlighted the role of the media “during periods of heightened uncertainty when all kinds of news including fake news are rife on social media, even at times within mainstream media”.\n“The spread of such misinformation has the potential to jolt financial markets and create panic among the general public with dire implications for financial stability”, he added.\nThe training workshop was aimed at equipping journalists with a better understanding of issues including monetary policy formulation, inflation targeting, forex trading and the foreign exchange market, balance of payments and the BoG’s eCedi.\nThe training workshop is part of efforts by the Central Bank to build a strong pool of financial and business journalists who will help the public to appreciate and understand its programmes and policies.\nThe participants at the workshop were drawn from the Northern, Upper East, Upper West and East Regions.\nThe Central Bank in June 2022, organized a workshop for journalists in the southern zone\nLatest Stories\n-\nRex Omar suggests tenure of Ghana’s presidency be made six years\n-\nAfrican Games 2023: Athletes guaranteed safety – Sports Minister Assures\n-\nBorteyman Complex to be converted into University of Sports for Development after African Games\n-\nTontokrom clash: Asanko Gold intimidating us with ‘machomen’ – Chief claims\n-\nThe formation of Ghana National Gas Company\n-\nAfrica Games: Golden Arms target gold medals, receive boost from NHIS, HD+, KOFATA and others\n-\nGlobal Sports Icon, Ed Moses to grace launch of interactive exhibit celebrating Africa’s sporting heroes\n-\nRwanda: The African Development Fund commits $12 million to the rapid operationalization of the African Pharmaceutical Technology Foundation (APTF)\n-\nFirst Africa Agriculture Investment Summit comes off on March 16 in London\n-\nAfrican Games infrastructure cost $195 million – Sports Minister\n-\nBonwire Kente weavers call for establishment of local thread factory for sustainability\n-\nWe have never been serious about addressing unemployment – Prof. Baah Boateng\n-\nChanging Mindsets: World Hearing Day 2024 advocates for Inclusive Ear and Hearing Care\n-\nAcademic City host top companies for Career Fair\n-\nWhy African producers are pondering ‘what comes next’ as streamers shift course", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.myjoyonline.com/bog-warns-inflation-may-peak-later-in-2022-due-to-threat-to-outlook/"}
{"doc_id": "a10976a47faf033a4f445128d40d4c4b", "text": "Agric Ministry bids for $55 trillion in 2024 budget\nThe Ministry of Lands, Agriculture, Fisheries, Water and Rural Development on Tuesday said it required at least $55 trillion from the 2024 budget to enable it to fully deliver on its mandate and programmes next year.\nIn the 2023 budget, the Ministry was allocated $362 billion, which was later revised to $1.6trillion.\nPresenting the Ministry’s expectations from the 2024 budget before the parliamentary portfolio committee on Lands and Agriculture, chief finance officer, Peter Mudzamiri said the Ministry was big, and had several programmes under implementation, hence the need for a commensurate budget.\n“The expenditure to date only reflects what has been paid, at present the government is on cash accounting; some might have been consumed but not yet paid. $1,6 trillion has been paid. Our projection is as of the end of this year we could spend $2,1 trillion cumulative from January to December,” he said.\n“We invited the parastatals to prepare the ideal budget which they think will effectively help them to deliver their mandate. Each parastatal submitted a bid figure, the total bid from the Ministry comes to $55 trillion, obviously it is segregated into various programmes and sub programmes,” he said.\nHe, however, said the Ministry had been given a ceiling of $2.9 trillion for the 2024 budget by Treasury.\n“The 2024 expenditure target, as you know Treasury has adopted a system of giving actual amounts, they give you a figure that you have to work around with, so what we got from Treasury is $2,9 trillion and we distributed it among the nine programmes,” Mudzamiri said.\nPermanent Secretary for the Ministry, Professor Obert Jiri pleaded with the committee to push for the allocation of more funds from the national budget.\n“Our budget is never enough and our programmes are too many. Most of the people think we can be treated like any other ministry, but we are five ministries in one. Our resources are never enough. We got a resource envelope of $2.8 trillion which is not adequate. We require your support so that the envelope is increased,” he said. — New Ziana", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.herald.co.zw/agric-ministry-bids-for-55-trillion-in-2024-budget/"}
{"doc_id": "1be5b03fccc32e81aa37cca01aec3c35", "text": "Premier Group, with brands including Blue Ribbon, Snowflake flour and Iwisa Mageu under its belt, lifted normalised headline earnings per share 22.7% to 552 cents in the year to March 31 and it plans to declare a maiden dividend at the end of its 2024 financial year.\nThe food manufacturer started trading on the JSE only six days prior to the financial year-end, after 18 years off the bourse, which is why no dividends were declared for the 2023 financial year.\nDespite the good results, the share price was 4.53% lower at R52.51 yesterday afternoon.\nDirectors said the performance was “robust” considering the dynamic market conditions, characterised by “substantial pressure on our consumers”.\n“Exceptionally high commodity prices, unprecedented levels of load shedding and social instability defined the operating landscape. The consumer continued to endure rising food inflation and high levels of unemployment impacting disposable income,” they said.\nThe group had responded by focusing on training and upskilling of its staff, internal cost saving initiatives and realising material operational efficiencies across both manufacturing and the group’s logistics and merchandising channels.\nTraining and upskilling had been a major advantage in assisting the group to navigate the challenging environment, they said.\n“The group has invested in efficiency and capacity to produce basic foods at affordable prices. The new mega-bakery in Pretoria reached full production levels within budget, delivering cost savings and improved bread quality,” the directors said.\nGroup revenue increased by 23.4% to R17.9 billion. Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, amortisation and impairment losses (adjusted Ebitda) increased by 16.2% to R1.7bn. Net profit was up 185.2% to R795 million.\nThe group concluded the acquisition of a bakery in the Western Cape. Synergies were extracted from the integration of the Mister Sweet acquisition, while changes to Premier’s sales and merchandising structures were bedded down.\nThe revenue increase was driven by increases in revenue in both the Millbake and Groceries and International categories, of 25.4% and 14.5%, respectively.\nThe higher normalised headline earnings per share was a result of growth in operating profit, and the after-tax effect of net finance costs being reduced as a result of the shareholder funding exchanged for equity during the year.\nDuring the year, the Brait shareholder loan of R1.5bn was ceded for equity and the redeemable preference shares of R1.8bn were converted to equity.\nThe group refinanced its long-term debt and increased its drawn debt by R1.04bn with lower interest rates, increased flexibility and a bullet repayment profile. Some R934m of the proceeds were distributed to shareholders on November 4, 2022.\nA voluntary capital repayment on borrowings of R294m was made through the year.\nThe Millbake division was focused on efficiencies and being the lowest cost producer. The mega-bakery in Pretoria was commissioned during the year and several Millbake facilities had been upgraded.\nThe Groceries and International division delivered “an encouraging performance supported by good growth in Sugar Confectionery and Home and Personal Care”.\nThe business division in Mozambique, CIM, had a tough year with the Mozambican economy experiencing challenges.\n“Premier is proud of the strong performance. Improving distribution, product availability and forward share management will remain a strategic priority to increase market penetration, as well as a focus on innovation and product renovation to strengthen product margins and brand equity,” directors said.\nThe intention was to continue to leverage its infrastructure and capabilities through investment in assets, people, brands and production capability, as well as business integration and optimisation in pursuit of being the lowest cost producer, the group said.\nRaw material cost inflation had softened in recent months, but operational cost inflation was anticipated to prevail given the rise in interest rates and the local inflationary impact of the weakened exchange rate.\nLoad shedding also continued to impose multiple challenges, but the group’s future performance was not expected to be materially impacted.\nBUSINESS REPORT", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/companies/premier-group-reports-robust-annual-earnings-with-plans-for-maiden-dividend-next-year-a53db402-3341-44af-957f-c54c1059cdf7"}
{"doc_id": "c24c04a9f820538a909948fddc491810", "text": "Goddy Egene\nCapital market stakeholders have hailed the final approval given by members of the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) to demutualise the exchange to become a profit-making and limited liability company, saying it will benefit the market and the economy.\nMembers of the NSE, who are mostly stockbroking firms, had on Tuesday assented to proposal of the council to demutualise the exchange and appointed a board of directors that will steer the affairs of the organisation.\nSome market stakeholders told THISDAY that the demutualisation of the exchange will improve its corporate governance structure, service delivery and lead to better market regulation, while creating more liquidity for the market operators.\nA former Council Member of the NSE and Managing Director/CEO of APT Securities and Funds Limited, Mallam Garba Kurfi, said the demutualisation would lead to greater investor participation in the governance of the exchange and unlock capital for stockbrokers who may decide to trade their shares for liquidity.\n“The demutualisation of the NSE would make the exchange to function better like its peers such as the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) and Nairobi Securities Exchanges that have already undergone the process. It will bring global best practice. In all, it is a good thing and all of us are going to be happy at the end of the day because it is going to unlock more capital for the market. For instance, if I place shares as collateral, I can trade and make money. We are pleased this is coming after so much delay,” he said.\nAnother stockbroker, Mr. Samuel Ayo Oguntayo, said as a profit-making company, the exchange would be restructured to become more agile and improve on its innovativeness and capitalise on new income opportunities in order to create value for shareholders.\n“Apart from the fact that members who would be allotted their shares can trade these shares on over-the-counter (OTC) and make money, the benefits of the demutualisation will trickle down to ordinary Nigerians and every other participant in the market. Given the fact that the exchange will be restructured, there will be room for recruitment of new hands to man the new areas to be created.\n“When it is a non-profit-making organisation, there was little motivation to make more money. But now that it is going to be a profit-making organisation, it has to make sure more money is made so as to end up with profit to share among the shareholders. The corporate governance principle governing other corporations will come into play and this means transparency. Besides, there will be more products and services in the market and this could be other streams of income for operators,” Oguntayo said.\nAn investor and shareholder activist, Mr. Boniface Okezie of Progressive Shareholders Association of Nigeria, said the demutualisation would bring benefits to all stakeholders in the market.\n“It is going to be a healthy competition in the capital market because the platform will become a listed entity at some point. And so as everyone among its staff will put in their best to make sure people who invested reap their fruits of their investment because they will now compete with those other companies also listed in on the platform. Even foreign companies who want to do business here will take us serious going forward,” he stated.\nOkezie noted that the exchange will also become more business-oriented and as a private-driven organisation, interference from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for instance, would reduce.\n“That is the beauty of demutualisation of exchange all over the world. Take a look at the New York Exchange that is one of the best in the world today. Part of the money they will make from those trading on its floors, will be paid as dividend to some of those people and investors using the facilities. And that is a very good one and I believe the NSE will get to that level one day,” he added.\nThe Chief Executive Officer of the NSE, Mr. Oscar Onyema, had said the demutualisation was particularly important to the Nigerian capital market and the wider economy, noting that the exchange to serve the capital market ecosystem and economy more effectively than it has done in the past.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2020/03/05/stakeholders-hail-nse-on-demutualisation-list-benefits?ref=exchangeinvest.com"}
{"doc_id": "e7949c0cfb2d0bf5a22eaa99f401f990", "text": "The Chief Operating Officer (COO) of the Afrexim Bank, West Africa, Eric Intong has underscored the need for African countries to introduce a common currency on the continent as against the use of the dollar.\nThis, he argues will help check exchange rate depreciation on the continent.\nSpeaking at the University of Professional Studies, Accra (UPSA) Law School, Africa Trade Round Table 5, Mr. Intong warned that the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) will face serious challenges if a common currency is not introduced to facilitate trade.\nHe stressed that the inability of African countries to develop a common currency to trade with, adds more cost to moving goods on the continent.\n“Today if I am sitting in Nigeria, and if I want to buy something from Ghana, why should I be paying in dollars? It doesn’t make sense,” he said.\nHe disclosed that trade assessments undertaken in the West Africa show that pressure on local currencies in the sub-region could drop if common currency is used for trading even among West African nations\n“If we stop paying for African trade in dollars that is going to reduce the pressure on our currencies. We have made that estimate and it is at $5 billion annually. This will even be more, once we start operating the data from the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS)”, he said.\nMr. Intong maintained that African countries have the opportunity to learn from best practices across the world.\nOn his part, the Dean of UPSA Law School, Prof. Ernest Kofi Abotsi called for more financing to make the implementation of the AfCFTA a success.\nAccording to him, trade among African countries will still be low if measures are not put in place to finance movements of goods and people on the continent.\nHe argued that it is important to get organizations such as the Afrexim Bank and the African Development Bank to advance funding to businesses on the continent through government to make the AfCFTA effective.\n“West Africa has seen grandiose projects that went nowhere. And part of the reason they went nowhere is because policies go nowhere in the absence of financing” he said.\n“The AfCFTA, frankly is going nowhere in the absence of trade finance. If you don’t have trade financing, there’s no trade, period!”.\nCiting Europe as an example, Prof. Abotsi said with effective infrastructural project, African countries can be easily linked to ease the movement of people and goods.\n“The reason why people move easily in Europe is because of trade, the political integration of Europe is to allow similar businesses in Europe to interact”.\n“In Europe, people wake up in the morning, they are moving flowers from Holland to England. They don’t have to worry so much about so many border bureaucracy issues. It all has to do with similar trades. Now you can’t indulge in trade in the absence of proper financing”.\nLatest Stories\n-\nWater Technology Certificate introduced at St Paul’s School in Kukurantumi\n-\nShowing of JoyNews’ ‘Sick Hospitals’ documentary causes stir in Parliament\n-\nGaza receives first airdrop of US humanitarian aid\n-\nAkatsi: Man in police custody found dead\n-\nVanuatu parliament welcomes Vanuatu Trade Commissioner to Ghana Prof. Hugh Keku Aryee in historic visit\n-\nGhana has become a ‘no-action, talk only’ country – Theo Acheampong\n-\nMan convicted over water meter theft\n-\nAnti-LGBTQ Bill: Parliament did not go against the constitution – Sam George\n-\nAnti-LGBTQ+ bill: All arguments remain personal opinions until SC makes pronouncement – Joseph Kpemka\n-\nAnti-LGBTQ Bill: Provisions in the bill do not impose a cap, gag the media – Sam George\n-\nNo regrets over move to Swansea in 2015 – Andre Ayew\n-\nAnti-LGBTQ+ bill: Ghana has done the right thing by passing the bill – Bokpin\n-\nAnti-LGBTQ+ bill is flawed and unconstitutional – Prof Audrey Gadzekpo\n-\n15 resolutions, 2 decisions and a ministerial declaration agreed at UNEA-6\n-\nChief Imam is pleased with the passage of the anti-LGBTQ+ bill", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.myjoyonline.com/africa-must-adopt-single-trade-currency-and-stop-using-u-s-dollars-afrexim-bank-coo/"}
{"doc_id": "90a869656d782c777179653100fb5b09", "text": "In this Midterm Election, the Republicans have a rich panoply of candidates supported by Donald Trump, and I have a feeling there will be a lot of energy expended to get those people out.\nFor the turnout, in most instances, the party that won the previous election tends to be less enthused while the party that lost is motivated by that alone to come out. Elections are emotional affairs, and people are plain tuckered out by the following midterms. Complacency often creeps in, and people tend to stay home. The notion that \"our people are in office\", after all, is what kills the momentum to come out en masse to cast their votes.\nI have observed that Democrats is lacking concrete and convincing messages in areas of inflation, crime, illegal immigration and to some extent, foreign policy. These are areas Democrats are challenged and President Joe Biden has to lead an aggressive charge on it. If these issues are to really take centre stage in this early ongoing midterms election, then it will favour Republicans.\nHowever, Democrats can focus on areas such as abortion, MAGA/QAnon, Voter ID and related issues of capitol takeover and causing threats to the security of the country or the 6 January inquiry, which has painted a very unflattering picture of Donald Trump and the repeated attempts of senior Republicans to excuse his behaviour. People are emotional far more than they are rational, and Democrats are past masters of strategic emotional communication.\nOne important factor that must not be left out in Democrats' attempt to get supporters out to vote is to drum up support for the Supreme Court overturning Roe v. Wade. This should fire up their base to come out in their numbers to vent through casting their votes.\nThe November 8 Midterms Elections is purely a battle for control of both Congress and the House. You will recall that Democrats majority in Congress is a razor-thin edge, which is very slippery for them. The Senate is a 50-50 split with the Vice President being a tie-breaker as she has a vote thereby giving Democrats an edge over the Republicans. Same way House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's control of the House is.\nKeep in mind that on November 8, 2022, there will be elections for all 435 House seats and around 34 Senate Seats. That is about 470 individual elections, each with its unique slate of candidates.\nLatest Stories\n-\nChampions League: Porto score 94th-minute winner against Arsenal\n-\nBaba Rahman regains consciousness after collapsing in Greek Cup game\n-\nGhana forward Joseph Paintsil completes LA Galaxy move, signs four-year deal with MLS side\n-\n‘My comments were taken out of context’ – Gifty Oware-Mensah on Black Queens bonus row\n-\nSouth Africa budget boosts welfare grants ahead of May election\n-\nBiden cancels $1.2bn in student loans for more than 150,000 people\n-\nIsraeli report says Hamas sexual violence ‘systematic and intentional’\n-\nUkraine war: Dozens of Russian troops ‘die in air strike’\n-\nNPP names Asamoah Gyan on Dr. Bawumia’s manifesto committee\n-\nBawumia is a better choice than ‘tried entity’ Mahama – Nana Akomea\n-\nStrategic collaborations broke me into the commercial scene – D-Black\n-\nExpedite investigations into killing of ‘Jirapa Dubai’ CEO – Youth group demands\n-\nAtta Akyea disagrees with Speaker; says caucuses in parliament can appoint leaders\n-\nBawumia names Osei Kyei-Mensah-Bonsu as Manifesto Committee Chair\n-\nKyei-Mensah-Bonsu steps down as Majority Leader; Afenyo-Markin in the saddle", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.myjoyonline.com/abdul-razak-lukman-us-midterm-elections-odds-of-the-two-titans/"}
{"doc_id": "f830077a30ff058ba002f58c595f39e0", "text": "Yemi Cardoso, governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), declared last Wednesday that the naira was undervalued.\nTwo weeks ago, Bismarck Rewane, managing director/chief executive officer of Financial Derivatives Company Limited, said the naira was undervalued by 26.56 percent at the official market.\nIn October 2023,Taiwo Oyedele, chairman of the Presidential Committee on Fiscal Policy and Tax Reforms, said the government would see a “fair price” for the dollar at “N650 to N750”.\nIn August, during his ministerial screening, Wale Edun, who is now the finance minister and coordinating minister of economy, said naira’s fair value was 700/$1.\nIn June, the Bank of America said: “We now see a USDNGN fair value of 680 per USD (previously 580). However, USDNGN is likely to trade above this level, with year-end 700, and a return to 650-680 in early 2024.”\nWhat does fair value mean?\nIn today’s financial landscape, the concept of fair value has emerged as a pivotal factor in determining the estimated price at which assets are exchanged between willing buyers and sellers. Financial experts and analysts underscore the significance of fair value, considering it a cornerstone in fostering transparent and equitable transactions.\nFair value is defined as the estimated price at which an asset can be bought or sold, provided both parties are willing and informed, and are entering into the transaction without any compulsion. This principle is designed to ensure that assets are accurately valued, promoting a fair and balanced marketplace.\nFinancial professionals highlight the role of fair value in mitigating information asymmetry between buyers and sellers, enabling both parties to make informed decisions based on the true worth of an asset. This approach fosters trust and confidence in the marketplace, as it reflects a genuine representation of an asset’s value.\nWhat is naira’s fair value?\nRazia Khan, managing director/chief economist, Africa and Middle East Global Research at Standard Chartered Bank, pointed out that before the foreign exchange reform in June, Nigeria’s parallel market served as an unrestricted FX market, characterised by sellers having the liberty to set their own prices.\nShe said the fair value of the naira would have been lower than the USD-NGN rate observed in the parallel market at that time.\nSince the reform, Nigeria has faced persistent high inflation, although there are signs of moderation in the month-on-month changes. The parallel market rate has experienced a rapid surge, raising concerns that it may continue to influence the pricing of numerous imported goods, excluding fuel.\nDespite the current highs in the FX market, approximately around N1,300)$, Khan argued that any reasonable assessment of fair value for the currency would suggest a lower USD-NGN rate than both the official market rate and the prevailing parallel market rate. According to her, the CBN governor’s assertion that fair value for USD-NGN is lower aligns with the perspective that the USD is overvalued while the NGN is undervalued.\nLooking forward, Khan anticipates a potential appreciation in the naira, projecting a return to at least around N1,000. However, she emphasised that this positive shift would only materialise with a concerted effort towards economy-wide monetary tightening. Such measures are seen as essential to restore positive real rates and counter the challenges posed by inflation in the country. As Nigeria navigates its economic landscape, the call for further reforms and strategic monetary policies remains at the forefront of discussions.\n“We think the fair value for the naira is around 860,” said Charlie Robertson, head of macro-strategy, FIM Partners, UK.\nHow is it estimated?\nFIM Partners measures the average exchange rate vs the last 25 years – stripping out inflation. “And on average, in today’s money, the naira has averaged about 860/$. Because of inflation, that may rise to N1,000 by the end of 2024 – but today it suggests people getting N1,200\\$ at the Bureau De Change are getting a good deal,” Robertson said.\nWhat is the current naira-dollar exchange rate?\nThe naira has persistently depreciated at the official market, which is the Nigerian Autonomous Foreign Exchange Market (NAFEM), and the parallel market, popularly called black market. As of Thursday, naira continued its slide, marking a 2.08 percent loss against the dollar. The closing rate stood at N900.96, down from the N882.24 recorded on Wednesday at the NAFEM. Naira fell to a record low of N1,416 per dollar at the black market following strong demand by end users.\nWhy is the naira falling?\nThe root of the issue lies in the declining inflow of dollars to Nigeria over the past few years. This downward trend is attributed to a combination of factors, including reduced foreign investment and a decrease in crude oil exports, which historically contribute to over 90 percent of the country’s export income.\nNigeria’s heavy reliance on crude oil exports has left its foreign exchange reserves vulnerable to fluctuations in global oil prices. As these exports decline, the country faces a substantial reduction in its dollar inflows, exacerbating the challenges of meeting the growing demand for foreign currency.\nIn a challenging economic landscape, the CBN finds itself contending with a mounting backlog of forex demand on the official market. The consequence is an increasing number of individuals and businesses resorting to the black market to fulfill their dollar requirements.\nThe official market, intended to be the primary avenue for foreign exchange transactions, has been hampered by the accumulation of unresolved FX demands. This has created a situation where entities are compelled to seek alternative avenues, such as the black market, to access dollars promptly.\nThe impact is felt acutely by businesses and individuals, as the backlog of forex demand on the official market persists. Without a swift resolution, the gap between demand and supply on the official market is pushing more entities toward the black market, where the availability of dollars may be uncertain, and transactions often occur at less favorable rates.\nAnalysts suggest that addressing the root causes, such as attracting more foreign investment and diversifying the economy, are essential for Nigeria to stabilize its foreign exchange market. Until then, the CBN grapples with the complex task of balancing forex demand and supply, while businesses and individuals navigate the challenges posed by the evolving economic landscape.\nAre there any plans by the CBN to stabilise the naira?\nCardoso conveyed an optimistic outlook regarding the stabilisation of the foreign exchange market. This positive sentiment is anchored in the ongoing collaborative efforts to attract more dollars into the system and augment the reserves, which currently stand at approximately $33.34 billion as of Monday.\nHe highlighted the fruitful collaboration with the Ministry of Finance and the Nigeria National Petroleum Company Limited to implement measures ensuring that all FX inflows are directed back to the central bank. This strategic and coordinated effort is expected to significantly bolster the bank’s FX flows and contribute to the accumulation of reserves.\nThe focus on redirecting all FX inflows to the Central Bank is a pivotal aspect of this initiative. By streamlining the process and ensuring that all foreign exchange returns to the central authority, the partners aim to create a more efficient and robust FX market. This concerted effort is anticipated to have a positive impact on market stability and enhance the overall resilience of the country’s foreign exchange reserves.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businessday.ng/analysis/article/explainer-what-is-nairas-fair-value/"}
{"doc_id": "14e45bfb16a1d3a945019ef695c42822", "text": "This week, delegates from across the world are meeting at the University of Johannesburg to discuss financial transparency and human rights. It sounds boring, but tackling illicit financial flows from Sub-Saharan Africa is gaining attention. If nothing is done the majority of people will likely remain poor while a tiny percentage benefits, and benefits big. By GREG NICOLSON.\nStories on the illicit financial outflows from Africa often focus on the numbers, simply because they are astounding. A Global Financial Integrity report conservatively estimates that between 2003 and 2012 $529 billion left Sub-Saharan Africa through illicit flows, growing an average 13.2 percent each year. These figures aren’t as high as in other parts of the world, but they’re the worst when compared to growth, with illicit financial outflows in Sub-Sahara Africa averaging 5.5 percent of GDP. If $529 billion seems hard to grasp, it’s almost twice what Sub-Saharan Africa received in foreign direct investment and one-and-a-half times what it got in official development assistance in the same period. So for every $1 of foreign investment and aid, 84 cents leaves illegally.\nThe system’s like a sieve, but instead of flour it’s billions of dollars falling through the cracks.\nNow, unless you follow global financial systems like the BeyHive follows Beyonce, the details seem exceptionally boring. But the lost billions are tied to expanding basic human rights and turning the continent’s successful economic growth into things like jobs, service delivery, education and health. A leader of the World Bank has called illicit financial outflows a global priority, the White House has recognised the problem, the United Nations has a team on it and so does the African Union. On Monday, Global Financial Integrity president Raymond Baker said, “This is the ugliest chapter in global economic affairs since slavery.” It’s a big deal.\nThabo Mbeki has been focusing on the issue in recent years and a statement on his foundation’s website traces the origins of illicit financial flows from Africa back to the 1960s, when elites in newly-independent governments were uncertain about stability and sought to stash money away in Western institutions. At the same time large corporations were globalising and looking to minimise corporate taxes.\nEssentially, the practice is the illegal transfer of money from one country to another, when funds are illegally earned, transferred or used. Think of tax havens and shell companies, a politician transferring dirty money offshore, criminal organisations laundering their cash through trade, terrorists doing wire transfers, or traffickers carrying suitcases of cash across borders. Most importantly, think of multinational companies. According to Global Financial Integrity, corruption accounts for about five percent of illicit flows, criminal activity like drug trafficking and smuggling 30 to 35 percent, and transactions from multinational companies 60 to 65 percent.\nAddressing the African Union this year, Mbeki, chair of the high level panel on illicit financial flows, agreed “that large corporations are by far the biggest culprits responsible for illicit outflows, especially given their ability to retain the best available professional legal, accountancy, banking and other expertise”. They do it mostly through misinvoicing, or lying about the commercial value of a transaction on invoices submitted to customs. It’s often easy, because trading partners write their own invoices. Companies can evade taxes, claim certain tax incentives, and shift money into tax havens and secret accounts.\nIt’s estimated that at least $122 billion was illegally transferred out of South Africa between 2003 and 2012, recording the tenth highest illicit outflows in the world (Nigeria was ninth, once again a step ahead). Ceasing illicit transactions does not mean the money would be available directly to spend on services, but to put it into perspective, the $29 billion estimated to have illegally left the country in 2012 exceeds the total 2015 education budget. It’s something like 1,300 Nkandla upgrades.\nOn Monday, Yale University’s Professor Thomas Pogge brought the issue back to human rights and development. Curbing illicit financial flows would significantly boost tax collections in developing countries. Currently, these countries struggle to collect taxes from much of the population and those who can afford to pay, wealthy citizens and international companies operating in the area, are doing all they can to avoid paying, leaving governments with fewer resources to improve the lives of citizens. “Clearly, massive reductions in existing human rights deficits could be achieved by allowing poor countries to collect reasonable taxes from multinational corporations and from their own most affluent nationals, assuming the resulting revenues were appropriately spent,” said Pogge.\nThere are a number of recommendations. Countries should try to confirm who owns anonymous companies and enforce laws against money-laundering. Multinational corporations should be required to report their finances and details of subsidiaries in all countries where they operate. Resource extraction contracts should be made public. States should boost customs enforcement and heavily scrutinise transactions involving tax havens. Citizens, both of developing countries and those in states with powerful financial centres that enable tax dodging, should demand greater transparency.\nWhile there’s hope – the issue is at least now on the global agenda – there are many challenges. “Why is this such a hard problem to resolve? Is it a question of getting governments to do the right thing? Is it a question of getting corporations to do the decent thing? What is it?” asked Siphosami Malunga from Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa. The challenge, he said, is that political and business elites have a common interest. “They are not two separate entities. They are one working in tandem to make money,” he said. “This is a problem of elite capture and in order to address it we are going to have to disentangle those relationships.”\nHe has a point. During the Marikana Commission, suspicions were raised that platinum company Lonmin had a questionable transfer pricing agreement going through Bermuda (the company denied the allegations and certain transfer pricing practices are legal in SA). Months after the allegations surfaced, former Lonmin non-executive director and current Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa said tax dodging was stealing from South Africans. But Lonmin only stopped paying “sales commissions” to the Bermuda company in 2012. Why? The commission heard that Lonmin’s BEE partner, controlled by Ramaphosa’s Shanduka Group, didn’t want to break the Bermuda ties. DM", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-05-19-tackling-africas-illicit-finance-flight/"}
{"doc_id": "3ddbcdd1901544cc73bb0366eea951da", "text": "Cape Town - As Sekunjalo and Iqbal Survé await the Competition Tribunal and the Equality Court to rule on their application for an interdict against Nedbank in their battle with the banks, former deputy director-general at the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (Daff), Siphokazi Ndudane, and former Fedusa secretary-general Dennis George, along with others, have joined what has been dubbed as the “David and Goliath” fight.\nThis as Johannesburg law firm Gardee Godrich Attorneys this week filed 288 pages of court papers at the Western Cape Equality Court, looking into the systematic racial profiling used by the banking sector after the banks’ willy-nilly closure of bank accounts.\nThe application is on behalf of clients who want to intervene as complainants in a class action in the proceedings instituted by the Sekunjalo Group of Companies’ (Sekunjalo) executive chairman Dr Iqbal Survé and others at the court.\nAttorney Godrich Gardee, who has been involved in a number of public litigations previously, said his clients would have eventually brought their own case independently against the banks, but that the Sekunjalo matter had acted as a trigger and spurred them on.\nHe said the class action was about arbitrary termination of banking relationships by banks against any client of their choice.\nFor his part, George, in his affidavit, said he was previously banked by Absa but in August 2020 the bank sent him a letter terminating their relationship. In that letter the bank claimed his profile did not fit with its internal policy or risk profile.\nGeorge said the banks have overlooked the fact that the concept of “bank-client relationship” in common law is now mediated by statutory and regulatory framework.\nHe points out that these are: the Constitution, the Financial Sector Conduct Authority, the Conduct Standard 3 of 2020, the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, and the global standards set by the Financial Action Task Force, which is an international body that promotes policies and standards for combating money laundering, terrorist financing, and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.\n“I am also advised that there is no statutory law, regulation or global standard, which requires that banks unilaterally terminate the bank accounts of customers, subject to the exceptions referred to above,” said George.\nHe said the reason why the banks do not cite any statutory law, regulation or global standard for the termination of the applicant’s banking services is because there are none. “Hence they rely on the purported ‘common law of contract’ and ‘reputational and business risk’.”\nIn her affidavit, Ndudane said that after resigning as DDG in 2019, she registered a company and applied to open a business account at FNB, where she already operated a personal account. In May 2021, she received letters from the bank terminating both her personal and business accounts, leaving her with no means to make a living.\nIn the court papers, Gardee’s clients said that pending the inclusion of the intervening parties as complainants in the case, they also intended to make an application declaring that the termination of their bank facilities was “arbitrary and unlawful.”\nThey also said that banks should be prohibited from enforcing discriminatory policies such as unbanking customers on the basis of purported reputational risk, and want the practice to be declared unfair discrimination in terms of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (Pepuda).\nIn papers filed with the Equality Court in the Western Cape, Sekunjalo Group chairman, Dr Iqbal Survé, is asking the court to declare that the banks’ conduct constitutes unfair discrimination and that their decisions to close the group and its related entities’ bank accounts should be overturned.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/western-cape/former-fedusa-chief-and-former-ddg-join-iqbal-surve-in-banks-battle-7cb40b4d-04f1-467d-b00d-ab153cfcd6e6"}
{"doc_id": "4ef508df4e61415e20c33577192a4fd5", "text": "Pope Francis warned in November that “ideologies which defend the absolute autonomy of the marketplace” are driving rapid growth in inequality. Is he right?\nIn one sense, Francis was clearly wrong: in many cases, inequality between countries is decreasing. The average Chinese household, for example, is now catching up with the average American household (though still with a long way to go).\nBut such examples do not negate the importance of rising inequality within countries. Both China and the United States are dramatically unequal societies – and are becoming more so.\nIn the US, the statistics are striking at both ends of the income distribution. The bottom quarter of US households have received almost no increase in real (inflation-adjusted) income for the last 25 years. They are no longer sharing the fruits of their country’s growth. The top 1% of Americans, however, have seen their real incomes almost triple during this period, with their share of national income reaching 20%, a figure not seen since the 1920’s.\nIn many emerging countries, rapid economic growth has raised living standards to at least some degree for almost everyone, but the share of the rich and ultra-rich is increasing dramatically. Once these countries approach the average income levels of developed economies, and their growth slows to typical rich-country rates, their future may look like America today.\nGlobalization explains some of the bottom-quarter income stagnation in the US and other developed economies. Competition from lower-paid Chinese workers has driven down US wages. But technological change may be a more fundamental factor – and one with consequences for all countries.\nTechnological change is the essence of economic growth. We get richer because we figure out how to maintain or increase output with fewer employees, and because innovation creates new products and services. Successful new technologies always cause job losses in some sectors, which are offset by new jobs elsewhere. Tractors destroyed millions of agricultural jobs, for example, but tractor, truck, and car manufacturers created millions of new ones.\nBut new technologies come in subtly different forms, with inherently different economic consequences. Today’s new technologies may have far more troubling distributional effects than those of the electromechanical age.\nImagine that 30 years ago, someone had discovered a set of magic words enabling us to speak to any friend anywhere in the world – “abracadabra John” and you were talking to John, wherever he was. Provided she secured intellectual-property rights, the inventor would have become the richest person in the world; and her lawyers and those who provided her with luxury goods and services would have become pretty rich, too. But, beyond that, no new jobs would have been created.\nInformation and communication technology is not costless magic; but it is closer to it than were the innovations of the electromechanical age. The cost of computing hardware collapses over time in line with Moore’s law of relentlessly increasing processing power. And once software has been developed, the marginal cost of copying it is effectively zero.\nThe consumer benefits of this technology are large relative to its price: the cost of each year’s latest computer, tablet, or smartphone is trivial compared to the cost of a new car in 1950. But the number of jobs created is trivial, too.\nIn 1979, General Motors employed 850,000 workers. Today, Microsoft employs only 100,000 people worldwide, Google employs 50,000, and Facebook employs just 5,000. These are mere drops in the ocean of the global labor market, replacing very few of the jobs that information technology has automated away.\nBut increased unemployment is not inevitable. There is no limit to the number of service jobs that we can create in retail, restaurants and catering, hotels, and an enormous variety of personal services. Walmart, for example, employs two million people, and the US Bureau of Labor Statistics forecasts that more than one million additional jobs will be created in America’s leisure and hospitality sector in the next decade.\nBut the wages that the market will set for these jobs may result in yet greater inequality. And there is no reason to believe that politicians’ all-purpose answer to the problem – “increase workforce skills” – will offset this tendency. However many people learn superior IT skills, Facebook will never need more than a few thousand employees. And access to high-paid jobs is likely to be determined not by absolute skill level, but by relative skill in a winner-take-all world.\nAt least, however, IT products and services are very cheap, so even the relatively poor can afford them. That might make very unequal societies more stable than many fear. In his recent book Average is Over, the economist Tyler Cowen makes the deliberately provocative argument that while new technology will produce extreme inequality, the relative losers, satiated by computer games and Internet entertainment, and provided with the basics of a minimally acceptable life, will be too docile to revolt.\nCowen may be right; the poor may not rebel. But extreme inequality should still concern us. Beyond a certain point, unequal outcomes inevitably fuel greater inequality of opportunity; and extreme inequality of either outcomes or opportunity can undermine the idea that we should all be equal as citizens, if not in material standard of living.\nSo Pope Francis was right: despite capitalism’s undoubted success as a system for generating economic growth, we cannot rely on market forces alone to generate desirable social outcomes. All new technologies create opportunities, but free markets will distribute the fruits of some new technologies in dramatically unequal ways. Offsetting such outcomes will be a greater challenge today than it has been in the past.\nBy: Adair Turner", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businessday.ng/analysis/article/inequality-by-the-click/"}
{"doc_id": "32ed33e4fed2f763cea0d60e8249f658", "text": "Professor Dumisa looks at the economies of seven countries, which include four African countries and three major countries who are also members of BRICS.\nBy Professor Bonke Dumisa\nSouth Africa is widely regarded as the economic powerhouse of the African continent. There are academic debates about whether South Africa is the largest economy in Africa, with some arguing that Nigeria and Egypt overtook the country a long time ago.\nOfficially, the Nigerian and the Egyptian economies are ranked ahead of South Africa; with Nigeria ranked the 31st largest economy in the world, followed by the Egyptian economy as the 33rd largest economy and the South African economy ranked the 36th largest economy, albeit that South Africa having a marginally higher GDP than Egypt.\nThe academic debates on this are mainly based on the allegations that Nigeria simply changed their statistical reporting format – a paper entry – which instantly pushed up their GDP figures.\nLet me look at the economies of seven countries, which include four African countries and three major countries who are also members of BRICS.\nSouth Africa has averaged a 0.61% economic growth rate from 1993 to 2023, reaching an all-time high quarterly economic growth rate of 13.7% in the third quarter of 2020, and a record low of -17.0% in the second quarter of 2020. The country has one of the highest unemployment rates in the world, and with its official unemployment at 32.9% and the expanded unemployment rate at around 42%. Its GDP is at $400 billion. It is ranked the 36th largest economy in the world.\nIndia has averaged about 6-7% GDP economic rate between 2006 and 2023, with a high of 8.7% in 2022 and a low of -6.6% in 2021. In 2015, India was recognised as the Most Rapidly Growing economy in the world. Its unemployment rate stands at 5.98% while its GDP stands at $3.7 trillion. India is ranked the fifth largest economy in the world.\nChina averaged a 1.64% GDP economic growth rate from 2010 to 2023, with a high of 11.8% in the second quarter of 2020, and the lowest economic growth rate of -10.3% in the first quarter of 2020. It is important to mention that the lowest point in 2020 was during the first phase of the Covid-19 pandemic.\nChina had to shut down its entire economy at the time when the whole world branded the the epicentre of or the primary source of the Covid-19 virus. Its 11.8% quarterly growth rate in the second quarter of 2020 was equally directly linked to the beginning of the easing of the Covid-19 pandemic restrictions when the country started easing their borders.\nChina had a 8.97% average economic growth rate between 1989 and 2023. Its unemployment rate stands at 5.2% in the urban areas, although its youth unemployment is significant at about 20.8%. China has a GDP of $17.73 trillion and is ranked the second largest economy in the world.\nBrazil has averaged a 2.45% economic growth rate between 1991 to 2023. Their unemployment rate is at 14.4%. Their GDP is at $2.08 trillion. They are ranked the 10th largest economy in the world.\nNigeria has averaged about 2.66% from 2011 to 2023. Its unemployment rate stands at 9.79%. The GDP is at $504bn. Nigeria is globally ranked the 31st largest economy in the world.\nEgypt has averaged an 4.18% GDP economic growth rate between 1992 and 2021. Its unemployment rate stands at 10.26%. The country’s GDP is at $387bn. Egypt is ranked the 33rd largest economy in the world, higher than South Africa despite it having a lower GDP than South Africa. This is an academic debate for another platform.\nRwanda has averaged an 7.2% economic growth rate in the past 10 years. Its unemployment rate stands at a mere 1.6%. The country’s GDP stands at $9.5bn. Rwanda is ranked the 146th largest economy in the world. It is interesting how many people easily compare the achievements of this 146th-ranked country with those of the 36th-ranked South Africa.\nCOMPARISONS OF THE SA ECONOMY WITH THOSE OF THE OTHER SIX COUNTRIES\nThe most conspicuous statistical figure which distinguishes South Africa from the other six African countries is that South Africa has the highest unemployment rate compared to them. This may be the root of most of South Africa’s economic problems.\nMost economic studies show that South Africa is one of the most unequal societies in the world, which can be traced back to the apartheid past. Most studies on the gini-coeffient show that the previously advantaged race(s) is still the mostly economically advantaged and that the black African population is still the worst economically disadvantaged. This is at the core of the country’s economic challenges.\nThe significantly high unemployment rate in South Africa means that many people who could be contributing in the economic growth of the country, are instead waiting for government hand-outs. This means the government is forced to focus more fiscal allocations to social service delivery targets instead of focusing on increasing expenditures on what will accelerate the economic growth of the country.\nThe need to increase social welfare expenditures has played a major role in pushing up corruption levels in South Africa. Most housing projects which were meant to alleviate homelessness, have instead enriched only a very few politically-connected individuals, and a lot money not accounted for houses allegedly built according to government expenditures thought such houses were never built. This is just one of those glaring examples of how the very high unemployment rates have been exploited to the detriment of real economic growth.\nThe porous borders of South Africa have resulted in many people who actively participate in its economy although not necessarily playing their part in paying their dues to the South African government. Therefore, the money which circulates within such businesses does not find its way into the economic growth of the country.\nEskom’s load shedding – which has at its core corruption involving staff members and Eskom’s service providers, lawlessness and widespread criminality, including the involvement of police in some of that criminality – has all contributed significantly in destroying economic growth levels in the country and there is no political will to deal decisively with these barriers to economic growth.\n*Prof. Bonke Dumisa is an independent economic analyst", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/opinion/economic-stagnation-hastens-poverty-inequality-571279b1-e835-45f4-81c4-29795553a240"}
{"doc_id": "191dd1f3c5f86acf5b21812d023cc8ba", "text": "South Africa’s biggest retailer, Shoprite, has recorded a strong financial performance despite spending over R1.3 billion on diesel to curb load shedding.\nIn its financial results for the 52 weeks that ended 2 July 2023, the group grew sales by 16.9% to R215 billion, which its supermarkets in South Africa have underpinned.\nCheckers and Checkers Hyper also saw 18.0% sales growth, whilst Checkers Sixty60 increased sales by 81.5%. The on-demand grocery delivery app also expanded its services from 300 stores in 2022 to 466 stores in 2023.\nThe low prices and affordability at Shoprite and Usave also resulted in sales growth of 15.6%.\nOverall, the group’s trading profit also increased by 5.7%, which resulted in a trading margin of 5.5% (restated 2022: 6.1%).\n“This was notably impacted by the R1.3 billion (2022: R226 million) diesel expense required to operate generators across our Supermarkets RSA store base during the year due to higher stages of load shedding,” the group said.\nAveraged out, the group has gone from spending R620,000 a day on diesel in 2022 to R3.56 million a day – a 470% increase.\nDue to the effect on liquidity caused by load shedding, the group did not repurchase any shares under its share buy-back programme, which has resulted in the group buying back R1.5 billion worth of shares since the 2021 financial year.\nReturning to positive news, the group opened 382 stores (340 net), which expanded its footprint to 3,326 stores – 94 of these new stores were acquired from Massmart.\nAmidst the improved financial position, the group upped its dividend by 10.5% to 415 cents per share.\n- Group sales of merchandise increased by 16.9% to R215.0 billion\n- Supermarkets RSA sales of merchandise increased by 17.8% to R173.6 billion\n- Diluted headline earnings per share (DHEPS) increased by 9.7% to 1 159.4 cents (restated 2022: 1 056.9 cents)\n- Adjusted headline earnings per share (adjusted HEPS) increased by 3.8% to 1 161.2 cents (restated 2022: 1 118.6 cents)\n- Full-year dividend per share (DPS) increased by 10.5% to 663 cents (2022: 600 cents). This is a result of the interim DPS increasing by 6.4% to 248 cents (2022: 233 cents) and final DPS increasing by 13.1% to 415 cents (2022: 367 cents)\n- The Group created 8,131 new jobs, including 4,480 jobs retained from the Massmart acquisition\nOutlook\nIn the first six weeks of FY24, the group’s sales growth in its South African supermarkets segment has reached double-digits, which is partly due to a reduction in selling price inflation.\n“In terms of costs, the group’s increased diesel expense as a result of the step change in load-shedding from last year is in our cost base from September 2023,” it said.\n“The Group continues to trade uninterrupted at current higher stages of load-shedding as a result of the Group’s solar PV installations and considerable diesel generator infrastructure in place across our South African supermarket operations,” it said,\n“It is clear that our customers’ disposable incomes are under enormous pressure, and there is an increasing need for us to sustain the lowest prices and best value across our various supermarket formats.”", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/716182/south-africas-biggest-retailer-is-spending-r3-5-million-a-day-to-beat-load-shedding/"}
{"doc_id": "fbe2325f5cdc034918d07ab91283e658", "text": "Benefits of credit scoring to banks\nFarayi Dyirakumunda\nLending to individuals and businesses continues to be a risky endeavour.\nMore so in a market where credit providers and financial intermediaries such as banks have limited exposure to advanced credit management tools and\nIn addition, prospective credit clients such as Small to Medium Enterprises and the informal sector have been driving economic activity yet the SMEs and informally employed individuals hardly maintain proper financial records.\nThis makes it even more complicated when trying to assess their credit worthiness. Credit granting has therefore proved to be time consuming, with the information asymmetries and processing requirements increasing the costs even towards good quality borrowers.\nLoans granted have ended up representing subjective biases rather than a systematic evaluation of risk.\nNotwithstanding the challenges, the market is starting to embrace the use of credit scoring and analytics.\nThere is a growing realisation, particularly among early adapters with dynamic management, that the process of credit scoring and the use of credit bureau scores, serves to enhance the credit analysis process and effectively evaluate risks associated with different categories of borrowers.\nThe process uses statistically validated criteria that are objective and independent. As a result, credit risk is better managed and efficiency is enhanced.\nThe credit granting process becomes streamlined with processing taking a matter of minutes where it could have taken up to weeks or even months in certain instances. Ultimately a reduction in loan processing costs to the lender contributes to a lower cost of credit to the benefit of consumers and businesses.\nThis article seeks to unravel the subject of credit scores, particularly credit bureau scores as they relate to individual borrowers.\nA credit score is simply a numerical expression based on a statistical analysis of a person’s credit files, to represent the credit worthiness of that person.\nThe actual score is a number within a range typically between 100-1 000 with 100 being the poorest score and 1 000 representing an individual with the highest possible credit rating.\nIn other words, the higher your credit score the better for you as it translates to higher credit worthiness.\nThis gives rise to the distinction between prime and sub-prime credit. It therefore is important for the market to understand what goes into the credit bureau score and individuals can be mindful of the multiple factors that will have a bearing on their credit score.\nThis is an important starting point towards encouraging a culture of responsible borrowing and credit activity.\nWith the emergence of more advanced credit risk management tools by our credit reference bureau, the local market has moved towards the use of a bureau score by credit providers and financial intermediaries.\nInstitutions will soon incorporate bureau scores in their credit granting criteria and loan pricing and this is done in a variety of ways.\nA credit provider will apply variable interest rates and differing loan charges corresponding with predetermined bureau score categories.\nThis enables good quality borrowers with higher scores to benefit from less onerous requirements, lower or even no down-payment requirements as well as favourable rates. The cut-off scores will be determined based on the company’s risk appetite and profitability per account, as illustrated in the accompanying table.\nThe table illustrates the potential profit and loss from customers within each score band.\nEach customer who is granted a loan will make purchases resulting in a profit to the business.\nGenerally, customers with higher scores will make larger purchases, and result in higher profits.\nThe main factors that go into determining an individual’s credit bureau score are summarised into five categories listed below in order its importance. Each ingredient carries a different weight depending on its relevance:\nPayment history;\nAmounts owed;\nLength of credit history;\nNew credit;\nTypes of credit.\nPayment history is the most important determinant of credit scores. It includes an individual’s performance in account payments, the existence of default judgments or bankruptcy, overdue payments, amount past due, and the time since any adverse occurrences.\nAmounts owed include those on accounts individually and totalled together as a whole. This looks at the level of indebtedness of an individual.\nIt can be reasoned that past some point, more debt will lower the score by raising questions about the repayment ability of a borrower.\nConversely, not having debt means that the subject cannot demonstrate a good payment history.\nThe length of credit history looks at the time a consumer has had active accounts and long running accounts generally indicate stability in credit relationships, whereas new ones might indicate financial distress especially if there are many of them.\nFactors that are excluded from determining a credit bureau score include your race, religion or national origin.\nConsumers can typically keep their credit scores high by maintaining a long history of always paying their bills on time and not having too much debt.\nXDS Credit Bureau provides credit risk management solutions and specialised credit management analytics.\nThe company collects and processes credit data to generate the scores that are used by credit providers. In addition, the bureau data is one of the main external sources that banks can use for calculating and validating their internal risk management outputs.\nOver time, larger financial institutions will use scores as inputs into their internal models while smaller institutions will prefer to directly use credit bureau generic models.\nBanks will have periodic cycles of model validation that includes monitoring of model performance and stability; review of model relationships; and testing of model outputs. Therefore, banks can use XDS bureau models for benchmarking and demonstrating the quality of their own models.\nXDS combines strong business practices, information technology skills and experience that enables us to provide consumer, business and personal solutions that significantly contribute to sound and informed credit decisions for our clients.\nFarayi Dyirakumunda is a director at XDS Zimbabwe, a credit reference bureau and risk management company. He can be contacted on [email protected] / www.xds.co.zw", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.herald.co.zw/benefits-of-credit-scoring-to-banks/"}
{"doc_id": "4f6ccda84cfcf062b0eb3e4db5b1072b", "text": "Beta Glass Plc’s reported revenue for Q2 2020 dipped year on year (YoY) by 41.6% from N7.32 billion to N4.27 billion. Compared with the previous quarter (Q1 2020), the company’s revenue dipped by 39.6%.\nA cursory analysis of the company’s results indicates the company posted a loss after tax for the first time, according to the results on NSE from 2012, in eight (8) years, as companies continue to battle the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic disruption on businesses.\nRevenues from the sales of glassware and bottles dipped in the period under review, from N7.32 billion recorded in the corresponding period of 2019 to N4.27 billion in Q2 2020. Also, Revenue from local sales plunged by 38.15% (YoY) from N6.71 billion to N4.15 billion while revenue from other countries dipped by 80.6% from N604.01 million to N117.05 million.\nThe Earnings Per Share (EPS) of the company declined by 107.02% in Q2 2020 from N2.85 in Q1 2020 to a negative value of N0.20. Compared with the same period last year, EPS declined by 109.2% from N2.18. The decline in distributable profit by 107.09% from N1.09 billion recorded in the second quarter of 2019 relative to a loss of N101.18 million Q2 2020contributed to the decline of the EPS.\nBeta Glass Plc’s shares were listed on the floor of the NSE on July 2nd, 1986. The shares currently trade at N55.40 per unit. The highest price for a unit of share in 52 weeks was N70 and the lowest N53.80. A total of 22,102 units was sold in the last seven days trades. Shares outstanding is 499,972,000 units and its market capitalisation is N27.69 billion.\nGreif Nigeria Plc operates in the same sub-sector as Beta Glass Plc, Packaging/Containers. Greif Nigeria Plc’s share price is N9.1. Its last seven days trades dates back to January 27th, 2020, with total volume sold to date 703 units. Shares outstanding is 42,640,000 units and its market capitalisation is N388.02 million.\nBeta Glass PLC is one of the oldest glass manufacturing and distribution companies in Nigeria, listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) in 1986 and incorporated in 1987.Beta Glass Plc is a subsidiary of Frigoglass Industries Nigeria Limited (the parent company), which holds 61.9% of the ordinary shares of the Company. The ultimate controlling party is Frigoglass S.A.I.C, Athens.\nBeta Glass Plc provides superior packaging solutions to a variety of customers operating in the soft drinks, beer, spirit, cosmetics and pharmaceutical market segments through a wide range of glass containers.COVID-19 pandemic disruption on the operations of Beta Glass Plc as well as its customers affected results negatively. In this instance, the company’s top customers are brewers and soft drink makers that have been hit hardest by the Covid-19 lockdown. Lower demand from customers ensured drop in sales. Inventories increased by 26.73% from N6.54 billion as at December 2019 to N8.31 billion in the year under review and by 21.85% compared to the previous quarter.\nMost of the brewery companies recorded drop in revenue in Q2 2020. A case in point is Nigerian Breweries Plc, the pioneer brewing company in Nigeria, that recorded a 17.49% drop in revenue from N83.20 billion in Q1 2020 to N68.65 billion. It also fell by 21.01% compared to 86.91 billion recorded in the corresponding quarter of 2019.\nWhile the company hopes to bounce back in the near future, the sector faces an uncertain future with the planned phasing out of the production of certain high concentration alcohol. The Director-General of the National Agency for Food Drugs Administration and Control (NAFDAC) indicated that plans are underway to phase out the production of alcohol in sachets, small volume glass and Poly-Ethylene Terephthalate (PET) bottles. This may likely impact the sector positively or negatively.\nDownload Nairametrics App for breaking news and market intelligence.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://nairametrics.com/2020/09/24/covid-19-pandemic-causes-beta-glass-performance-drop-in-q2-2020/"}
{"doc_id": "0404f3965e02c12163be18a6d9d1de95", "text": "Belgium has described as a “good basis” Morocco's autonomy plan, presented in 2007, for a solution accepted by the parties\" regarding the resolution of the Sahara issue.\nThis statement came in a joint declaration issued after talks between Nasser Bourita, Foreign Affairs Minister, African Cooperation and Moroccan Expatriates, and Hadja Lahbib, Belgium's Foreign Minister, European Affairs and Foreign Trade and Federal Cultural Institutions.\n\"Belgium considers the autonomy plan, presented in 2007, as a serious and credible Moroccan effort and as a good basis for a solution accepted by the parties,\" says the joint declaration.\nIn this context, the Belgian Minister reiterated Belgium's long-standing support for the UN-led process for a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution.\nAccording to the Joint Statement, the two ministers agreed on the exclusivity of the UN in the political process and reaffirmed their support for UN Security Council Resolution 2602, which noted the role and responsibility of all parties in the search for a realistic, pragmatic, sustainable and compromise-based political solution.\nMorocco and Belgium also welcomed the appointment of the Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary-General, Staffan de Mistura, and reaffirm their active support of his efforts to advance the political process on the basis of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, the Joint Statement said.\nWith this position, Belgium joins the list of European countries that clearly support the autonomy plan such as Spain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Hungary, Romania, Portugal and Serbia.\nLatest Stories\n-\nKenneth Mitchell: ‘Star Trek’ and ‘Marvel’ actor dead at 49\n-\nBawumia lauds Ahmadiyya Muslim Mission for contributions to Ghana’s development\n-\nIf I can do it, you can too – Adekunle Gold to sickle cell survivors\n-\nReview BoG’s Inflation Targeting framework – US-based economist\n-\nBright Simons’ full argument against Agyapa Deal\n-\n2024 Elections: More pink-slime websites to outnumber legitimate news sites – Research\n-\nParis 2024Q: ‘We showed we are able to play amazing football’ – Nora Hauptle on performance against Zambia\n-\nBlame government for increasing unemployment and not universities – Gatsi\n-\nUkraine war: Indians ‘duped’ by agents into fighting for Russia\n-\nPublish sanctions imposed on Sentuo Oil Refinery – IES and COPEC to NPA\n-\nAkufo-Addo to deliver SONA tomorrow\n-\nI’ve no plans of becoming Bawumia’s running mate – Kennedy Agyapong\n-\nE Vibes to host US-based DJ and musician Ratchet Rome\n-\nPrices of foodstuff to remain high until June 2024 – GAWU\n-\nFranklin Cudjoe accuses NPP of sacrificing Osei Kyei-Mensah-Bonsu for political expediency", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.myjoyonline.com/belgium-calls-moroccos-autonomy-plan-good-basis-for-resolving-sahara-issue/"}
{"doc_id": "aa193e92a8254bc1b48d5c9fd1d2bc49", "text": "The worries of January may spill into the next month as it has been widely expected that the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) will make no changes to the current interest rate in the country.\nOn Thursday, the SARB governor, Lesetja Kganyago, will announce the Monetary Policy Committee’s (MPC) decision on changes to the repurchase rate (repo rate) in the country.\nCurrently, the repo rate is at 8.25%, with the prime lending rate at 11.75%.\nFrank Blackmore, Lead economist at KPMG told Business Report that while inflation had seen a reduction, we could only see a reduction in interest rates later in the year.\nBlackmore said, “Although inflation has seen a reduction from the highs of July in 2022 to the current level of 5.5% in November of last year (2023), we do expect that trend to continue further through 2024. The reality is, there is still a lot of inflation or cost pressure within the economy.”\n“We know for instance, the latest values for food for are around 9%, but are expected to come down over the course of the year - and of course things like electricity remain high at 15.2%, putting pressure on household and utilities. We also know that fuel is a volatile measure and in fact caused an increase in inflation from the lows that we experienced in July of 2023 of 4.7% to the current levels of 5.5% and further changes because of political geopolitical events, or whatever it is will be felt in our inflation,” Blackmore further said.\n“Therefore, the expectation for the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting is to maintain current levels of interest rates well into the year before we see any decreases in those rates. An additional factor in this regard will also be when international trading partners, such as the US and Europe, start decreasing their rates - because for us to prematurely start reducing our interest rates, there would basically be a knock-on-effect on the exchange rate as well as inflation further down the line. As such, the expectation is for no interest rate reductions perhaps in the first half of this year although this will be data dependent and dependent on what international shocks could influence inflation directly,” Blackmore further said.\nNedbank Group’s economic unit has also predicted that rates will remain unchanged.\nIn a statement on Friday, the unit said, “We believe the MPC will leave interest rates unchanged at next week's meeting. Although headline inflation remains above the SARB's preferred target of 4.5%, it not only eased somewhat in November, but the upward pressure was mostly confined to food inflation, resulting from temporary supply shocks and the usual seasonal effects. Underlying price pressures measured by core inflation was 4.5%, holding relatively steady at the SARB's target for the third consecutive month. More importantly, we still expect a gradual disinflationary trend in 2024, with headline inflation sticky above 5% for much of the year, before dipping more convincingly towards 4.5% from September onwards. The downward force is likely to come from fading global price pressures and weaker domestic demand, but the risk to our forecast remains tilted to the upside.”\nBUSINESS REPORT", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/interest-rates-widely-predicted-to-remain-unchanged-by-sa-reserve-bank-later-this-week-49a2ca07-719e-4976-a3a7-1f558d3fe7e3"}
{"doc_id": "1afcaaeeeeb676314af2a826c3193f11", "text": "The ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID) has officially released the 2022 edition of the West Africa Development Outlook (WADO).\nWADO takes stock of socioeconomic developments of the previous year and presents a macroeconomic outlook for the year 2022.\nIt discusses the socio-economic challenges of the times and postulates policy interventions that could help ease these challenges.\nThe 2022 WADO, which is on the theme: “Navigating Global Shocks through Structural Transformation and Trade”, also discusses how the ECOWAS sub-region can mitigate the recent price escalation by increasing local production capacities, improving intra-regional trade and embarking on a deliberate structural transformation agenda.\nAn official statement copied the GNA said the document also discussed the causes of the recent price hikes as being structural and the need for cautious monetary policy interventions.\nDr. George Agyekum Donkor, the President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of EBID, emphasised the importance of the review of key economic indicators as a way of highlighting the impact of recent global events on ECOWAS economies and postulating mitigating actions for policy makers’ consideration.\nHe stated that the WADO also highlighted the opportunities and threats in the sub-region to guide the investment decisions of existing and would-be investors.\nThe Director of Research and Strategic Planning of the Bank, Mr. MacDonald Saye Goanue, spoke about the challenging macroeconomic environment the Community was facing as a result of which growth prospects had been downgraded.\nThe elevated food and energy prices pose a great risk to fiscal consolidation and debt sustainability, while threatening to increase current account deficits and exerting pressure on local currencies.\nThere is the need for fiscal and monetary policy synchronicity to successfully navigate these challenges.\nEBID is a leading regional investment and development bank, owned by the fifteen (15) ECOWAS Member States, namely, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.\nBased in Lomé, Togolese Republic, the Bank is committed to financing developmental projects and programmes covering diverse initiatives from infrastructure and basic amenities, rural development and environment, industry, and social services sectors, through its private and public sector windows.\nEBID intervenes through long, medium, and short-term loans, equity participation, lines of credit, refinancing, financial engineering operations and related services.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businessghana.com/site/news/Business/268163/2022-West-Africa-Development-Outlook-proposes-increased-sub-regional-trade-structural-transformation"}
{"doc_id": "1d4b6fece3ae480e71cc1b91c2f5af83", "text": "For two decades, Kisumu County registered a massive economic downturn characterised by rising poverty and crime levels owing to the collapse of its mainstay industries.\nFrom the fall of once vibrant fish and sugar processors to the closure of the giant Kisumu Cotton Mills (Kicomi) and the region’s economy suffered a devastating blow, leaving thousands of households highly disadvantaged.\nToday, however, there is renewed hope of restoring Kisumu’s economic and social pride amid rising investment in key growth sectors as manufacturing, real estate and agriculture.\nOn the 41-kilometre highway stretch between Kisumu and Awasi on the border with Kericho County alone, about 10 new processing plants have been set up including a steel smelting mill, plastic and mattress factories, three road and house construction material processing plants and a timber treatment facility.\nThe Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) -listed Crown Paints also recently set up its Sh400 million plant in the outskirts of Kisumu town in Kisian area, west of the lakeside town towards Maseno, adding to a raft of new investments including hotels and shopping malls.\nIn the last five years 12 new hotels have come up in Kisumu, including the now popular Pinecone, Clarice, Acacia Premier, Scottish Tartan, Desert Rose and Sovereign.\nNew as well as established supermarket chains, including Uchumi, Naivas, Tumaini and Maisha Mart have also taken space in the shopping malls that have sprouted across Kisumu such as Tuff Foam and Lake Basin.\n“We have been working hard to woo investors and some of whom have factories. The good business environment and our proximity to access other East African states through roads, air and water also gives us an upper hand,” Governor Jack Ranguma says.\nGogni Construction Company that acquired a 26-acre parcel of land around Awasi area for extraction of rocks for use in its projects, says the venture has since morphed into a massive quarry business with ever-growing order books.\n“We initially started the business to produce our own construction materials, but other companies and individuals requested that we supply them.\nWe now produce up to 300 tonnes of ballast alone in a day,” the firm’s manager Micky Cheniati said. The company also makes and supplies blocks, culverts and construction poles.\nEnhance efficiency\n“This place is conducive and that is why companies are setting up here. In the next five to 10 years, this place would be exceptionally an industrial belt,” Mr Cheniati added.\nCrown Paints CEO Rakesh Rao, while opening their Kisumu branch, said it was part of their strategic move to tap into the region’s robust construction industry excited by the high development growth in particularly the real estate sector.\nThe new plant, with a production capacity of 1.3 million litres of paint per month, will serve not only the larger Western Kenya but also the East African countries, Tanzania in particular.\n“This region produces more than 40 per cent of the company’s sales and establishing a new plant in Kisumu, which is very central regionally, will enhance efficiency and also improve our sales and market share,” Mr Rakesh said.\nThere is also renewed activity towards the revival of the region’s cotton industry including the ongoing search for investors by the county government and the Industralisation ministry to reopen the infamous Kisumu Cotton Mills (Kicomi).\nBefore its closure in 1999, Kicomi was key to region’s economy, supporting thousands of farmers and traders in the cotton supply chain.\nIts collapse alongside most ginneries in western Kenya affected nearly 10,000 farmers in Kisumu, Homabay, Migori, Siaya and Busia counties who are now forced to transport lint to processors in Makueni, hundreds of kilometres away.\n“Cotton is now gaining momentum, but we are farming far from the market. It is illogical to travel across eight counties to have cotton separated from seeds. We have requested the county government to set up at least one for the region,” Mr Michael Onyura, a cotton farmer in Nyakach, said.\nBeatrice Obara, a farmer who co-ordinates the collection of the produce, said supplying a company in Makueni was uneconomical.\n“For every three kilos of raw product, only a kilo of lint is extracted and retained in Makueni while we bring back the other two as seeds for replanting. The to-and-fro journeys reduce our profitability by a large percentage,” Mrs Obara said.\nThe farmers transported about 500,000 kilos of cotton balls to Makueni in 2015 alone from 300,000 kilos in 2014.\nAnother giant cotton mill in the region, Rift Valley Textiles (Rivatex) had also collapsed and was only recently revived following a takeover by Moi University in 2007 for an estimated Sh205 million.\nA raft of planned road and maritime infrastructure upgrades around the lakeside town are further expected to bolster the latest resurgence of economic activity.\nTrade around the town has over the years been affected by a number of factors, including a derelict railway infrastructure and impenetrable and stubborn water hyacinth as well as boundary disputes that have turned Lake Victoria into a liability.\nThis situation could change with the planned construction of a new sea port in Kisumu and extend a branch of the standard gauge railway (SGR) line being built from Mombasa.\nThe piers in Homa Bay, Mbita and Luanda K’Otieno are projected to register enhanced activity when the planed port becomes operational.\nBefore the collapse of the lake transport, Homa Bay was the main shipping point for goods to Tanzania.\nVessels from Kisumu docked in Homa Bay and offloaded cargo which was then transported via trucks to the Tanzanian border two hours away.\nMbita and Lunda K’otieno today host regular ferry services by private firms and the construction of a new port facility is expected to boost trade in merchandise.\nA regional body, the Lake Victoria Basin Commission (LVBC) — which implements projects on behalf of the riparian states — has already kicked-off initiatives to boost transport and trade through the lake.\nThe Kisumu-based agency is undertaking two mega projects to improve lake transport industry and safety of its users.\nAmong the plans is to have a weather forecast centre and to upgrade the piers to enable 24-hour operations in accordance with the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) regulations.\nThe commission in 2015 received a $450 million (Sh47.4 billion) allocation by the World Bank to desilt the piers to fit larger vessels and install electronic maps to inform ship stewards of route safety before planning their journeys.\nNavigation routes\n“We will also devise new navigation routes not only from Kisumu to Mwanza and Arusha, but also to landlocked countries which can be connected by railway systems,” said the outgoing LVBC executive secretary Dr Canisius Kanangire, adding that the survey and mapping of the lake are already under way.\n“We also have another project to link the central corridors, including Dar-es-Salaam to Mwanza, the Northern Corridor from Mombasa via railway to Kisumu and Entebbe in Uganda, via the lake, and other states as well.”\nThe town is also looking up to improved air transport following upgrades on the Kisumu International Airport.\nOnly recently the Kenya Airports Authority (KAA) commenced a Sh600 million expansion of the airport runway to 60 metres from the current 40 metres, to handle bigger cargo planes that carry loads of up to 100 tonnes.\n“In order for runway to carry bigger aircraft of 40 tonnes and above, it is being upgraded from code C to code D. This will also enable us to accommodate more international aircraft with wider shoulders and wings stands,” Joseph Okumu, the airport manager, said.\nSugar factories\n“Other than being a transit point, Kisumu Airport is turning into a business entity meant to benefit local industries especially the agro-based,” said Mr Okumu.\nThe expansion has also created a gap for new aircraft operators and other businesses like hotels and restaurants, storage rooms, cargo warehouses, transit shades, retail outlets and business centres.\nThe region’s limping sugar factories, which at their peak employed thousands of workers, are also expected to boost the town’s economic fortunes when the ongoing privatisation plans are concluded.\nThe government plans to sell a 51 per cent stake in the five sugar companies to strategic investors and reserve another 24 per cent for farmers and employees.\nThe government will then sell a remaining 25 per cent stake in the Sony, Chemelil, Nzoia, Muhoroni and Miwani milling companies in an initial public offering once the factories are profitable.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/companies/factories-malls-hotels-give-kisumu-county-new-buzz-as-investment-zone-2116582"}
{"doc_id": "4689e3ccdb7d0b8b64c928c3087249d7", "text": "Aids activists have been sounding the alarm that the withdrawal of health funding from middle income countries (MICS) will result in a failure to meet global goals to end the epidemic. This concern is one of many that have surfaced in the “post-aid” era, which refers to the dwindling number of countries classified as poor by the World Bank. By JULIA GREENBERG.\nFrom the donors’ perspective, one idea behind decreased funding is that middle-income countries (those with a per capita income between $1,045 and $12,736) should be able to pay for the wellbeing of their own populations and address inequality. This is, of course, the dream. But the reality is that the world has a long way to go before equality, and, in the meantime, countries with more wealth do not necessarily have wealthier, healthier people. Already, 70 percent of the world’s poor people live in middle-income countries; by 2020, 70 percent of people living with HIV will as well.\nSome public health advocates worry that donors shifted priorities without regard for whether former “recipient” countries were ready to transition away from external funding or — importantly — to do so in a way that protects the human rights of socially excluded groups who have historically been neglected by their governments and benefited from external aid.\nIn the context of HIV/Aids, the groups that are most at risk in the funding shift are those who have been the most marginalised in any society: people who use drugs; sex workers; and gay, lesbian, and transgender people, many of whom represent the majority of HIV cases in middle-income countries. These fears are already playing out. In Romania, where people who use drugs face barriers to access to services, and in Trinidad, where homosexuality is illegal, we have seen increasing HIV prevalence following donor withdrawal.\nQuestions about how to fill the funding gap left by the withdrawal of foreign assistance for health are gaining prominence among donors, civil society actors, and the private sector. This period of uncertainty provides fertile ground for private sector actors, including through the use of so-called public-private partnerships, which combine government and private resources to deliver social good and sometimes profits. While this seems like an attractive option for countries looking to diversify funding sources, it remains to be seen whether such models are more effective than aid or government funds alone.\nThe private sector has always played a prominent role in development, even before the “post-aid” era. An important question for middle-income democracies, though, is how to hold an increasingly diverse array of actors accountable for health-related decision-making. What if a health-related investment negotiated in a private board room proves ineffective? What if this decision is not based on the best available evidence? How can advocates, health service providers, and affected populations participate effectively in a process that is, by definition, partially private?\nThese questions couldn’t be timelier. This week, 18,000 government and industry representatives, scientists, and health activists gather for the 21st International AIDS Conference in Durban, South Africa to discuss the current state of the global Aids response. The conference is the largest on any global health or development issue in the world, and, as funding for the HIV response shrinks, the future of global health financing is on the agenda.\nCertain kinds of public-private partnerships and other models of “blended” financing will undoubtedly be put forward as innovative approaches to fill funding gaps. These proposals may be based, in part, on unexamined assumptions that a private sector approach is inherently leaner, more efficient, and more effective than public funding mechanisms. But the value of public private partnerships does not lend itself to generalizations. We need more evidence to determine whether and under what circumstances these approaches lead to better health outcomes. Most importantly, we must think hard about how principles of good governance – transparency, accountability, and participation – can inform decision-making in these emerging models. The ultimate test should be whether they advance or hinder progress towards the human right to health.\nOne example demonstrates why a deeper and more honest discussion is necessary. In 2009, the government of Lesotho signed an 18-year contract with a private South African hospital to replace the main hospital in Lesotho’s capital, a deal promoted by the World Bank’s investment arm.\nThe Queen ‘Mamohato Memorial Hospital’ opened in 2011. According to a 2014 report by OXFAM, the hospital takes up 51 percent of Lesotho’s health budget, costing $67 million per year to operate — three times what the old hospital cost. Lesotho’s government plans to build a new public hospital to care for patients because the cost of treating them at Queen Mamohato Memorial is too high. And yet, in another way the partnership has been an enormous success. It is expected to generate a 25 percent rate of return on equity for the project’s shareholders and a total projected income nearly eight times higher than the original investment.\nDiscussions at the Aids Conference would benefit from some healthy reflection on whether public-private partnerships and other modes of blended finance are indeed the “magic bullets” in the next wave of health financing that some purport them to be. And here they can draw lessons from the legacy of early Aids activists.\nFrom the beginning of the Aids epidemic, people with HIV — denied affordable medicines by their governments and pharmaceutical companies alike — immediately understood that they had to take control of the decision-making process. They created seats at the table for advocates in health decision making bodies from the Global Fund to the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/ Aids to National Aids Councils to local clinics. From those seats, they advocated not just for affordable medicines, but for anti-discrimination measures and repeal of laws that criminalised HIV risk behaviors such as sex work, sex between men, and injection drug use.\nThis experience shows that health policies should be set by those most affected, not negotiated between governments and their investment partners. It is that foundation that we stand to lose if conversations about public health decisions are moved out of public spaces, if donors rather than recipients of aid regain control of the agenda.\nIn 2016 and onward, we need to open up the debate about donor withdrawal from middle-income countries, exploring roles for governments, donors, civil society, and the private sector that would advance human rights and preserve and build on the gains of the global HIV response. It would be a breakthrough for the Aids movement to come up with minimum human rights standards for innovative financing approaches and public private partnerships in health. Let us start this discussion in Durban. DM\nJulia Greenberg directs the Global Health Financing Initiative at the Open Society Foundations.\nPhoto: A South African child holds Antiretroviral (ARV) drugs prior to the daily routine of medicine taking at the HOKISA childrens home in Masiphumelele, Cape Town, South Africa 19 July 2016. EPA/NIC BOTHMA", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-07-20-op-ed-decisions-in-the-dark-global-health-financing-in-the-post-aid-era/"}
{"doc_id": "95a00b419b8595b47c68f6c9417dd2b3", "text": "Sub-Saharan Africa is leading all other regions on illicit financial flows. If the continent is to improve the lives of its citizens, then stemming these illegal flows and improving domestic resource mobilisation is crucial. By LOGAN WORT.\nEarlier in August, the African Tax Administration Forum brought together 16 African Ministries of Finance and tax administrators, as well as legislators, academics and civil society, among others, in a high level dialogue to discuss ways of improving domestic revenue mobilisation on the continent.\nThis was the first such occasion of an event that is likely to become an annual feature. The Tax Policy Dialogue in Kampala, Uganda, sought to forge a crucial network that will ensure coordinated tax policy and tax administration decisions and actions in the ever-changing global tax environment.\nOver 60 delegates spent two days devising a framework under which both tax policy and tax administrators could lay strategies to stem the steady drainage of Africa’s resources and seal any gaps that affect efficient domestic revenue mobilisation.\nIf Africa is to improve the lives of its citizens and meet the global Sustainable Development Goals, then stemming illicit financial flows and improving domestic resource mobilisation in Africa is crucial to our development agenda.\nIn 2017, Global Financial Integrity (GFI) estimated that Sub-Saharan Africa is leading all other regions on illicit outflows. This is estimated at between 7.5 and 11.6% of total trade on average over the period 2005 – 2014. Illicit inflows were estimated at between 6.3 and 13.1% of total trade. Much of this relates to tax avoidance and tax evasion. The tax loss in these areas is astronomical and calls for concerted efforts from policy makers and administrators, to stem these.\nThe Zain case in Uganda is an example of this and demonstrates firstly the amount of tax that can be at stake. In this case it was reported that the URA considered the Dutch company Zain International BV to be liable for capital gains tax of $85m. This is reported to represent about 5% of total government revenue (and nearly 50% of public spending on health).\nThe Uganda Court of Appeal ruled that the URA does have the jurisdiction to tax Zain International BV. However, the taxpayer considers the tax treaty between Uganda and the Netherlands protects the Netherlands exclusive right to tax such a transaction.\nOur understanding is the Zain dispute is still unresolved but it demonstrates how differences between domestic legislation and the wording of the applicable tax treaty can cause difficulties for countries.\nAfrican countries face significant challenges in countering such tax losses in particular: deficiencies in their tax laws; limited engagement between the ministries that negotiate treaties and incentives with financial implications, and RAs that enforce these; and capacity constraints in their tax administrations, to mention but a few.\nThese deficiencies and capacity constraints create opportunities for tax avoidance and evasion. To address these issues, countries need to reform their tax policy to both rectify the current loopholes in the law and ensure that the capacity constraints of the tax administration are adequately addressed to cope with the changes required.\nThis dialogue therefore is timely, and needs to remain active to steadily eliminate these avoidable losses, even as Africa strives to finance its own development in the face of the blatant donor fatigue. In addition, African countries are giving away their tax revenues through granting wasteful tax incentives.\nUnder pressure to offer internationally competitive tax environments, African countries often grant generous tax incentives that undermine their domestic resource mobilisation efforts with little demonstrable benefit in terms of increased investment.\nInvestment surveys confirm that tax incentives usually do not top the list of investment factors in developing countries. In 2010, the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation conducted a business survey of 7,000 companies in 19 Sub-Saharan African countries. The results suggest that tax incentives packages ranked 11th out of 12 in importance; and this importance fell over time.\nThere is, therefore, a need for tax policy and its implementation by the tax administration to provide a balanced approach that both addresses tax evasion and tax avoidance strategies and attracts foreign direct investment. ATAF is well placed to facilitate this dialogue as it acts as a platform to improve the performance of tax administration in Africa.\nThe Forum seeks to improve the capacity of African tax administrations to achieve their revenue objectives and advance the role of taxation in African governance and state building.\nThrough ATAF’s technical assistance work it is already helping its members address deficiencies in their domestic tax legislation by providing advice on revisions needed to the legislation. Based on that advice, nine members have or are in process of enacting new rules to address abusive transfer pricing. The new rules have already assisted members to raise over $110-million of additional taxes.\nTo contribute to more effective decision-making and informed policy development in domestic resource mobilisation, it was appropriate to launch the second African Tax Outlook (ATO). This is a much sought after publication on tax issues in Africa stemming from extensive consultations and tax statistics collected and analysed by 21 African countries.\nATO was developed to provide reliable information on taxation that will serve as an African and global benchmark in formulating tax policies and tax administration reforms across Africa.\nSome interesting and important insights from the African Tax Outlook include: Between 2011 and 2015, in nearly all participating countries tax was buoyant as revenue growth outstripped nominal GDP growth; during the same period the average ratio of tax revenue to GDP in the 21 countries was 18% well below the OECD average of 25.1%; and VAT was the biggest source of revenue in most ATO countries during period, accounting for over 90% of consumption tax revenue.\nThe ATO Project continues to expand its coverage in Africa with 26 countries participating in the ongoing preparation of the third edition. The ATO is well on its way to becoming the go-to publication developed by African tax administration to shape the thought leadership on tax administration reform, tax policy formulation as well as implementation on the continent. DM\nLogan Wort is the Executive Secretary of African Tax Administration\nPhoto: An Egyptian currency vendor counts US dollar notes in Cairo, November 2016. Photo: Khaled Elfiqi/(EPA)", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-09-06-op-ed-african-countries-must-collaborate-to-fix-tax-challenges/"}
{"doc_id": "88fc3a9c9abbb47ba8f9be4b30c01ece", "text": "rural areas\n28 Jan\nThere have been nationwide protests against the far-right Alternative for Germany party (AfD). DW's Peter Hille went to a small town where AfD representatives and their opponents faced off.\nLatest\n1 day ago\nAs tensions escalate in the Gaza Strip, many displaced Palestinians are now gripped with fear about Israeli forces launching a relentless assault on the city of Rafah.\n1 day ago\nIn an interview with FRANCE 24, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said he expected that \"regardless of the outcome of the US elections\", Washington \"will continue to be a committed NATO ally\".\n1 day ago\nDoctors in the U.S. are struggling to contend with burnout, staffing shortages and overwhelming administrative workloads, according to a new survey. Despite these challenges, 83% of doctors in the survey said they believe AI could eventually help. More than 1,000 doctors were surveyed between Oct. 23 and Nov. 8 in the study, commissioned by Athenahealth.\n1 day ago\nOn January 6, the US aviation regulator FAA ordered the temporary grounding of certain Boeing 737-9 MAX aircraft operated by US airlines or in US territory, affecting 171 planes.\n1 day ago\nRussian investigators have said they are carrying out a 14-day forensic \"investigation\" of the opposition leader's body. Navalny's family has so far been refused access to his remains.\n1 day ago\nIsrael's GDP fell by 19.4 percent in the last quarter of 2023, according to preliminary figures published by the country's Central Bureau of Statistics on Monday. It's the biggest contraction the economy has seen since the early days of the Covid pandemic, and can be attributed to the impact of the war on Gaza following the October 7 Hamas attacks.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://tv.guardian.ng/tag/rural-areas/"}
{"doc_id": "2ddb01ec0e30ec1a27d384d0c018384f", "text": "Johannesburg - The residential property market appeared to be drifting away from equilibrium between supply and demand, according to FNB.\nJohn Loos, a household and property sector strategist, said the average time a house remained on the market before being sold had deteriorated to an average of 14 weeks in the third quarter from an average of 11 weeks and one day in the first quarter.\nLoos said FNB’s house price index for last month showed further slowing in year-on-year growth compared with August and had now shown slowing growth for five consecutive months.\n“The slowing rate of house price growth is the lagged response to over two years of gradual interest rate hiking since early 2014 as well as a broad multiyear stagnation in the South African economy to near zero growth by the first half of 2016,” he said.\nFNB’s house price index for last month rose by 3.4 percent year on year, which was a further slowing on the revised 4.8 percent growth rate recorded in August this year. The average price of homes transacted last month was R1 056 774.\nLoos said the onset of some mild deflation was evident when examining house price growth on a month-on-month basis. This suggested that there might once again have been renewed economic weakness along with housing market weakening in third quarter after a mildly better second quarter.\nThe housing market could often be a good leading indicator of economic conditions.\nUp until May this year, month-on-month seasonal house price growth accelerated after a dip early this year.\nLoos said this was accompanied by a significant uptick in the Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) after a similar dip early in the year, which was also accompanied by a return to mildly positive growth in gross domestic product in the second quarter after a contraction in the first quarter.\nBut Loos said more recently both the FNB house price index and the Manufacturing PMI had pointed to possible renewed economic weakness in the third quarter.\nFrom a level in June this year of 53.7 on a 100-point scale, the PMI had dropped significantly to 46.3 by August while month-on-month seasonally adjusted house price growth had gone from plus 0.5 percent in May to minus 0.4 percent decline last month. “Therefore, if the housing market is anything to go by, it points to a possible re-emergence of economic weakness in the third quarter of 2016 after a slightly better second quarter,” he said.\nIn real terms after adjusting for consumer price index (CPI) inflation, the rate of house price growth was negative at minus 1.1 percent year on year in August this year after revised negative growth of minus 0.3 percent in July. Loos said the turn to real house price deflation pointed to a deteriorating market balance between supply and demand.\nOther FNB indicators had also pointed to a weakening market balance, including the FNB estate agent survey average time of homes on the market.\nLoos said FNB expected average house price growth to hover in low single digits in the near term, which would translate into a decline after CPI, with probably little support from a very weak economy.\nBUSINESS REPORT", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/fnb-house-price-index-declines-further-2076226"}
{"doc_id": "d474e8a195899fda1edbbd6fc21b0bd8", "text": "In an ideal world, loyal employees who work in your home or help you to run a small business would be rewarded with subsidised benefits similar to those that higher-earning salaried employees enjoy. But there are challenges to providing these benefits, not least of which is the ability of employers and employees to afford them. A lack of suitable products and the fact that these employees typically earn below the tax threshold and therefore do not benefit from tax deductions for retirement savings, for example, are also hurdles. Personal Finance has the following advice on how to provide domestic and micro-business employees with benefits. If you have more ideas, share them with us on Facebook (www.facebook.com/persfinza) or Twitter @persfinza\nHelp them to get out of debt\nAn overindebted employee is a demotivated and unproductive employee. It stands to reason: if you can’t enjoy the fruits of your labour, because all or most of your pay is going to service your debts, you won’t feel inspired to do your job.\nIn research by PricewaterhouseCoopers last year, nearly half of the employees surveyed described their financial situation as stressful, and almost one in five said their personal finances were a distraction at work. About 40 percent of employees said they spent more than three hours a week or more at work dealing with their personal financial issues.\nDebt-stressed employees are also more prone to taking time off work and succumbing to illness, including psychological problems.\n“Debt-related stress can lead to a nervous breakdown, and in recent years, there has been an increase in the number of patients suffering from this specific type of stress,” debt counsellor Philip Nortje says.\nNortje, who has worked as a volunteer at the Neuro Clinic in George since 2012, says debt-stressed patients tend to feel overwhelmed by their debts.\n“They see their money problems as an insurmountable mountain. I try to help them gain perspective. We look at their finances holistically. Sometimes, they are victims of reckless lending, and debt counselling can work for them. And sometimes they just need someone to help them problem-solve: to break down the problem so they can take baby steps in the right direction.”\nNortje says one of the aims of the National Credit Act (NCA) is to promote access to credit, which is to be welcomed. However, there hasn’t been a concurrent effort to make consumers financially literate or to educate them about the responsible use of credit.\nHe says many over-indebted consumers have a mindset that is rooted in scarcity, and because their parents couldn’t give them what they needed or wanted, they set out to satisfy their own and/or their children’s needs and “greeds” – at any cost.\n“Debt is not the problem, financial illiteracy is,” Nortje says. If you can help an employee to acquire this essential life skill, you will be serving him or her well.\nSo, what can you do to help your employee to become financially literate and debt-free. Personal Finance suggests the following:\n1. Offer your employee a “hand up, not a hand out”. As an employer with the best intentions, you have to resist the paternalistic response, which is to step in and “take charge”. Offering an employee the option to take a course in financial literacy is a more helpful response.\nNot-for-profit organisations, such as Learn to Earn (LtE), offer a life-skills course that includes Old Mutual’s On the Money financial skills programme. Although this course is typically offered to unemployed people, Aleks Jablonska, the head of resource and partnership development at LtE, says the organisation also customises courses, and these are priced according to the course content/duration, the number of participants, and so on. Other modules in the course include self esteem, goal-setting, communication, writing a CV and job preparation, work ethics, conflict resolution, domestic violence and HIV/Aids.\nFor more information,go to www.learntoearn.org.za or email [email protected]\nIf you’re certain that all your employee needs is a financial literacy course, Old Mutual’s On the Money course is available free in all 11 official languages, as downloadable booklets. Old Mutual also offers free one-day workshops to employers seeking to serve their staff in this way. The material has been vetted by the Financial Services Board and does not promote any products.\nFor more information, go to www.omonthemoney.co.za or email [email protected]\n2. Help your employee to check his or her credit report. In terms of the National Credit Act (NCA), every consumer is entitled to a free credit report every year from each of the four major credit bureaus (Compuscan, Experian, TransUnion and XDS). This means you can check your credit report for free four times a year.\nChecking your credit report is a cinch if you have access to the internet. You enter your personal details on the bureau’s website and then verify your identity, which may or may not entail uploading a copy of the first page of your identity book and proof of address. Last, you verify an existing account and then wait for your report to be emailed to you.\nEveryone should check their credit reports to ensure that the information supplied by credit providers to the bureaus is accurate. A credit report will show the debts of registered credit providers only. So if your employee has obtained credit from a loan shark, or “mashonisa”, this will not be reflected on his or her credit report.\nA credit report is a good indicator of a person’s exposure to credit, and also shows how well or badly the consumer is managing debt. The key message to any consumer is: if you manage credit well, you enjoy more favourable interest rates when you borrow. The flip side is also true: poor management of credit means you’ll pay more or the maximum interest that you can be charged.\n3. Look for reckless credit. Credit is deemed reckless if the consumer couldn’t afford the credit when it was granted, or if the credit provider failed to carry out a proper affordability assessment.\nWhen taking on a new client, debt counsellors should check for reckless lending. If a debt counsellor finds that a consumer has been granted credit recklessly, he or she must take your case to court or the National Consumer Tribunal (NCT). The debt counsellor must also report the lender to the National Credit Regulator (NCR). A magistrate or the tribunal can set aside the credit agreement if it is found to be reckless.\nIf you suggest to your employee that he or she considers debt counselling, make sure you inform him or her that it is not free and it will mean that he or she won’t be eligible for more credit (except a debt consolidation loan) until he or she is debt-free, which can take years.\nCurbing reckless lending will have a positive impact on employers, Shelley van der Westhuizen, the head of financial wellness and client engagement at MMI, says.\nVan der Westhuizen’s comments follow an announcement by the Department of Trade and Industry that it plans to empower the NCR to impose fines on credit providers that engage in reckless lending. Currently, only the NCT is empowered to fine reckless lenders, and it has a substantial backlog of unheard cases.\n4. Discourage the use of microloans and mashonisas. Microloans are small unsecured loans with very high interest rates. The NCA defines a microloan as a loan of up to R8 000 and payable over six months.\nUntil May, you could be charged interest of up to five percent a month on these loans, which are often treated like a revolving credit facility , resulting in consumers paying interest of 60 percent a year. The maximum rate that can be charged on these loans has been reduced to five percent a month for the first loan and three percent a month for subsequent loans taken in the same calendar year. However, this relief applies to each credit provider, not to the individual consumer, which means that a consumer could still end up paying interest of 60 percent a year if he or she has microloans with more than one provider.\nIf your employee has no option but to use a microloan, strongly discourage him or her from getting one from a mashonisa, because they typically charge extortionate rates and insist on keeping the consumer’s identity book or bank cards as a form of collateral.\n5. Beware of debt consolidation. Be very wary of encouraging an employee with multiple debts to go the way of debt consolidation. And be even more wary of offering a debt consolidation loan out of your pocket, Nortje advises.\nIt might seem a great idea – one loan to settle all loans; one service fee rather than several; and a more favourable interest rate – but these loans are for disciplined consumers only. Not only is there a risk of the consumer not using the consolidation loan for the intended purpose, there’s also the risk that he or she might fall for offers of more credit before paying off the consolidation loan.\nHelp them to find a low-cost bank account\nYou can really help your domestic or micro-enterprise employees by insisting that they be paid via a bank account and offering to help them find a low-cost account that suits their needs.\nEach of the traditional “big-four” banks has a low-fee account. The most appropriate one will depend on the number and type of transactions your employee typically performs each month. Does he or she need debit orders, to buy airtime, and how many withdrawals does he or she make a month?\n* Although Capitec’s Global One account requires a minimum balance of R25 and has a monthly subscription fee of R5.25, you can earn interest on the balance in your account. You can choose from four savings options. On the flexible option, account-holders earn interest from 5.35 percent a year on daily balances.\nCash withdrawals at tillpoints at Pick n Pay, Shoprite, Checkers and Boxer cost R1.30, while withdrawals from Capitec ATMs cost R5.50. It is free to deposit your salary into your account.\nThere is no monthly fee for cellphone banking or using the app, and there is no fee for buying airtime, data bundles and electricity, except if you use another bank’s ATM. Payments to other accounts cost up to R4.\n* The First National Bank (FNB) Easy Account costs R4.95 a month for pay-as-you-use and R49 a month for the bundled option.\nOn the former, you pay R3.50 for payments and scheduled payments and external debit orders, and prepaid airtime purchases cost R0.50 per R5. Electronic transfers are free, while payments and scheduled payments are R3.50.\nFor the bundle, you get 10 free electronic transactions, four free FNB ATM withdrawals, and free deposits at an FNB ATM up to R4 000 a month. External debit orders cost R7.50. Sending an eWallet voucher via your cellphone to anyone in South Africa to draw out at an ATM costs R9.95, while it costs R20 or more to send cash to Zimbabwe or Mozambique.\nYou can earn monthly coupons on your FNB banking app for discounts on products from Checkers and Shoprite.\nThere is a free linked savings account that earns interest. You have the option to “bank your change”, which means that FNB rounds up your card purchase value and transfers the difference between your purchase amount and that amount into your linked savings account.\n* The Absa Transact account costs R4.95 a month. It does not require a minimum balance, and offers free internet banking, cellphone banking and telephone banking.\nCheque deposits at an Absa ATM are free, while cash deposits start at R3; cash withdrawals from an Absa or Barclays ATM are R4.55 and are R1.15 at tillpoints.\nAccount payments at Absa ATMs are R3 and R1.50 by internet and cellphone banking. They cost R14.50 if a consultant helps you to bank by telephone.\nFund transfers are free from an Absa ATM and through internet, cellphone and telephone banking. External debit orders cost R3, while CashSend from an Absa ATM, cellphone or internet banking costs R7.99.\n* Standard Bank’s AccessAccount is a pay-as-you-transact offering for R4.99 a month. Its AccessAccount Plus has a monthly fee of R59, but it also offers a R2 000 death benefit paid to your beneficiaries.\nCash deposits at a Standard ATM for an AccessAccount are R4.50, while withdrawals cost R6.80 or more. Withdrawals are free at tillpoints. External debit orders cost R9.50. Internet, cellphone and telephone banking are free, as are depositing your wages, payments by debit or stop order and electronic account payments.\nIn addition, it costs R9.95 to send an InstantMoney voucher via your cellphone to anyone in South Africa, and there are no charges for cashing out these vouchers. The money can be collected at Standard Bank ATMs and other access points, including certain Spar, Cambridge and Rhino Cash and Carry stores.\n* Nedbank has two low-fee accounts. The Pay As You Use account is suitable if you perform only a few transactions each month and costs R5 a month. Its KeYona Bundle is a better option if you do more transactions. It costs R50 a month for eight free transactions. It also has a R2 000 funeral benefit for the cardholder. Internet, cellphone and app banking are free.\nBoth accounts require a minimum balance of R50.\nWith KeYona, after the first eight transactions, electronic deposits are free, and cellphone top-ups at Nedbank ATMs and online are free. They cost R6 at other banks’ ATMs. External debit orders cost R9; inter-account transfers start at R4. Withdrawals cost a minimum of R4.32 at Nedbank ATMs. They cost R3 from tillpoints and R5 if you use the card to pay for something at a shop.\nPay As You Use deposits at a Nedbank ATM cost R15 and withdrawals at an ATM cost R6.\nOn both accounts, sending Send-iMali vouchers via your cellphone to someone to draw at an ATM costs R10.50.\nHelp them to set up a long-term savings plan\nEmployees in the formal sector are typically offered a retirement fund, but this may not be the best savings vehicle for your employee.\nRetirement-savings products are suitable when you earn more than the tax threshold (R75 000 a year for a person below the age of 65), because you can benefit from the tax deductions. Members of retirement annuity funds cannot access their savings until the age of 55.\nSimilarly, a tax-free savings account makes sense only if the interest earned on the savings will exceed the interest exemption (R23 800 a year for people under the age of 65).\nAnne Cabot-Alletzhauser, the head of the Alexander Forbes Research Institute, says you should discuss with your employee what will have the greatest impact on their lives: saving for an emergency or to buy an asset, such as a house, or saving for retirement.\nSaving for a house may meet an immediate need and also provide some capital at retirement if your employee can sell the house and, for example, return to a former rural home.\nCabot-Alletzhauser says when saving for an emergency, you and your employee should agree on what constitutes an emergency, or he or she may be tempted to access the money for any reason.\nBank savings accounts are appropriate to save for short-term needs; most money market unit trust funds require higher minimum investment amounts, although Gryphon’s fund accepts R200 a month, according to ProfileData.\nFor medium- to long-term savings, some equity and multi-asset unit trust funds accept low investment amounts. The Absa Balanced Fund, for example, accepts R200 a month. Its annual average return over the 10 years to the end of March was 10.26 percent, according to ProfileData. The FNB Momentum Growth Fund accepts as little as R40 a month. Its annual average return over the 10 years to the end of March was 10.48 percent.\nYour employee needs to understand that such investments are for the long term, and there may be times when they show a loss.\nCraig Torr, an independent financial adviser at Crue Consulting in Cape Town, gives free talks to domestic employees during Financial Planning week, an initiative of the Financial Planning Institute. Torr says he explains growth on investments and how this compounds using a cattle analogy. Cattle give birth to calves that grow up to give birth to their own calves. He explains market downturns by likening them to a sickly calf that can die.\nStokvels may be a suitable savings option, because the monthly obligation to the group must be fulfilled, Riaan Appelgrein, the senior manager for customer financial solutions at Standard Bank, says. It is hard to justify a withdrawal from a stokvel when the members are your friends.\nBut if you are going to assist an employee to save in a stokvel, look for one that has the hallmarks of a good stokvel, as outlined by the National Stokvel Association of South Africa.\nA stokvel should have a constitution, a leadership structure and a bank account. The better ones invest on the JSE or in unit trust funds launched by asset managers for stokvels’ needs.\nLife assurers offer products with a savings component that splits the savings between short- and long-term goals. However, the life company pays tax on the growth within the policy, which makes these policies expensive for employees who earn below the tax threshold. They are often bundled with disability and funeral cover, and the costs can be difficult to establish.\nHelp them to save for their children’s education\nLarge employers can make bursaries available to their employees, but you, too, can assist a loyal employee by contributing to education savings and making him or her aware of schemes such as the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS). The unit trust-based Fundisa Fund pays a bonus into the accounts of those who are saving for the tertiary education of a South African citizen or permanent resident from a household earning R180 000 or less a year.\nLast year, Fundisa distributed a bonus payment of R5.4 million to boost the savings of more than 26 000 beneficiaries from lower-income families by 25 percent.\nThe fund was set up in 2007 as a public-private initiative by the Association for Savings & Investment SA, the Department of Education and the NSFAS.\nThe minimum investment in the fund is R40. Top-up payments can be made as and when money is available, or you can commit to a monthly investment of R40 or more. Monthly payments can be stopped or started without any penalties.\nFundisa is administered by Stanlib. The fund invests in bonds, fixed deposits and other interest-earning securities that are managed by selected asset managers.\nFunds can be withdrawn at any time if the beneficiary needs the money. However, the annual bonuses are based on the amounts still invested the fund.\nAn annual fee of no more than 1.25 percent (excluding VAT) applies, which is taken from the return earned on the money invested.\nFundisa is available from Standard Bank, Nedgroup Investments and Absa. More information is available from www.fundisa.org.za\nRegister yourself and your employees with the UIF\nIf you have staff who work 24 or more hours a month, you have to register with the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF). And as soon as you have an employee who earns a taxable income, you also have to register with the South African Revenue Service (SARS).\nIt is your responsibility to fill in and submit the forms to register yourself and your staff with the UIF. There are a number of ways to do this, but first you need to obtain the forms and have the necessary documentation. The forms are available on the Department of Labour’s website: www.labour.gov.za > Documents and look under “Forms”. Have your and your workers’ identity numbers and addresses ready.\nYou must fill in:\n* Form UI-8D – application for registration as an employer of workers in a private household;\n* Form UI-19D – information of employee (domestic worker) to register/declare domestic workers with the UIF; and\n* Form UI.19-UIF – information of employee. You have to complete and submit this form before the seventh day of each month.\nYou must complete the forms for both yourself and your staff. The form for the registration of workers asks for an employer reference number. If you don’t have a reference number yet, leave this part open. The UIF will create a reference number and send it to you.\nYou can fill in the forms online, through Ufiling, or email them to [email protected]. You can fax the forms to 086 713 3000. You can also register via telephone. Phone the UIF on 012 337 1680.\nYou can also use snail mail and send the completed forms to The UIF, Pretoria, 0052.\nIf none of these options appeals to you, and you want to speak to a person, you need to register at a Labour Centre. Make sure you take your and your employees’ identity books and addresses with you.\nEmployers must pay UIF contributions to the UIF or SARS before the seventh of every month. Check the Labour Department website for a list of bank accounts into which you can pay the contributions: Labour Department www.labour.gov.za > Legislation > Basic guides and look for “UIF”.\nThe UIF sends employers the payment advice form every month, although you can also find it on the website. You need to complete this form when you pay, and send it to the fund.\nWorkers can check whether their employer has registered them with the UIF by contacting their nearest Labour Centre. Have your identity number at hand. Alternatively, you can telephone the UIF call centre on 012 337 1680 or 0800 843 843/0800 UIF UIF.\nSubsidise their basic private medical cover\nPrivate healthcare is expensive, but using public healthcare facilities typically means your employee will have to take a day off to see a doctor. The cheapest medical scheme options cost more than R500 a month for a single member.\nInsurance companies offer primary healthcare plans, together with, for example, accident insurance or a hospital cash plan. These packages cost between R400 and R500 a month.\nAbout three years ago, CareCross Health and Occupational Care South Africa launched DomestiCare, which offers unlimited access to general practitioners, acute medicines, basic X-rays and pathology services to domestic workers and small business employees. The product now falls under Momentum and costs R238 a month. For R265 a month, you can include basic optometry and dentistry benefits. Chronic medicines must be obtained from state hospitals.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/companies/how-to-do-your-employees-some-good-2030359"}
{"doc_id": "862ef50b584c2b00e6634edb29e17edd", "text": "The tribe of Nigerian mechanics is under the threat of extinction. Because the mecho group appears not so articulate and unable to project itself, the society seems not to realize this progressive extinction. For any close observer, this genre of artisans and the mecho business they superintendent over, in their present profile and with their current business model, are fast ageing, getting dislocated, disillusioned and are disappearing.\nThe frustration of the good old mechanic is with both self and the society. It is time we all woke up to this reality. The present culture, structure and reward system of the Nigerian mecho workshop is simply outdated and is at loggerhead with modern trend and requirements. The business requires re-orientation, restructuring and massive investment. The situation is calling for the intervention of the smart investor who should see how much return could be generated through investment and revaluation of this highly undervalued and under priced business sector.\nThe other time I was at the mechanic village, all four apprentices of my good old mechanic had abandoned the calling and left the old man to keep plying his trade alone, while the young Turks had gone after other pursuits. The man remarked that these days, apprentices have fallen for the allure of commercial motor cycling, better known as okada business. The lamentation, according to the old man, is not just because of what had befallen this one time thriving trade he had known all his life, but that these fleeing youths were regrettably droning into uncertainties, because the okada business they are drifting into could be so volatile and unpredictable. It is an attraction which in itself had turned, for many youths, the beginning of more frustrations. The veteran mechanic however refused to blame the fleeing youths, remarking that if he also knew what else to do, why would he continue in a career that has brought him poverty, non recognition and more frustration than satisfaction.\nIt is lamentable that hard times have befallen this critical sector in the Nigerian automobile industry, in spite of its laudable contribution to the economy over the ages. Many of us would recollect that the Nigerian mechanic has been the principal reason why many Nigerians are able to ride a car of any worth and why many cars are still cruising on the road, well beyond their stipulated life-time. Besides, the mechanic village has been at the back of the Tokunbo phenomenon, which has been the fall back for the so called middle class, many of whom would have had no experience of owning or driving a car of their own, following the massive devaluation of the Naira in the 80s, which took the price of new cars and other items of living, out of the reach of the average individual.\nMany of the so called elites would have been left at the mercy of the incredible public transport system or resorted to the foot-wagon option. The Nigerian mechanic is equally at the heart of a thriving spare parts industry, which is providing employment for millions of Nigerians and contributing so significantly to the wealth of the nation. It is noteworthy that the Nigerian spare parts market is one of the biggest in the world.\nThe mechanic has demonstrated so much resilience and contribution over the ages, but he has so little to show for it in terms of quality of life, sustainability of existence and job satisfaction. This artisan performs all manner of tasks to keep the Nigerian automobile industry going. The tasks include, but are not limited to, general servicing, cleaning, parts-replacement, greasing, oiling, dismemberment, coupling, wielding, drilling, forging, fabricating, building, etc to keep vehicle owners smiling. The Nigerian mechanic village overhauls engines and body structures, replaces engines, converts right hand drive to the left hand, adapts cars from the temperate regions to the Nigerian tropical environment, and fabricates body structures of cars and haulages, among other feats.\nYet, this industry is largely ignored from mainstream attention. The practitioners are ageing and the tradition of apprenticeship, which has sustained it overtime, is dying. Majority of the mechanics are illiterate or semi-literate. Their work environment is sub-standard – dirty, smeared and black with grease, while the business setting has become archaic, dysfunctional and disoriented with the technological age. The business model is virtually sole ownership, micro, traditional and subsistent. The tools are scanty, old and behind time. Most tasks are still done manually. Common and basic work aids, like overall, boots, engine lifters, visor for the wielder/panel, etc, are missing in most cases. Members are exposed to work hazards, nature and an unfriendly environment. There is no form of insurance back-up.\nThe reward system is uninspiring, either. There are no standard charges for services across board. Where there is some claim to standard charges, members do not comply or enforce it. A lot of mechanics simply asks the motorist to pay anything he wanted for services rendered. Where the mechanic charges, the fees are subjected to hard haggling which does not have a minimum limit. The motorist who did not hesitate to pay premium price for spare parts would suddenly turn broke when it comes to paying for the mechanic service. At the end of the day, the poor mecho receives only a token for his service, which may have taken hours to deliver.\nInvariably, he lives from hand to mouth – no savings, no sufficient fund to send children to good schools or live in habitable accommodation, much less drive a decent automobile. More often than not, even the workshop he is using is at the mercy of the landlord, who accommodated the mechanic village on his land in the first instance, as a form of effecting physical possession over the land, to help preserve his title to the property. This arrangement would naturally last only until when the landlord chooses to develop or dispose of the land. The Nigerian mechanic is thus essentially an itinerant artisan. The situation is worsened by poor sales these days.\nThis scenario, coupled with age and misalignment with modern trend is what is threatening the existence of this vital support system. It is time therefore for a sound framework for the automobile industry and the creation of an enabling environment which will give life and direction to this critical industry.\nNon-investors may see the situation as hopeless. Smart investors and financiers will however see vast potentials and opportunities in this down stream business, worth putting their money on, to bring about depth and modernization while being reassured of return on their investment, given good management. For a long time the Nigerian business environment has been largely individualistic and typified by tradition and illiteracy/semi-literacy. It is time for graduates and experienced businessmen, with creativity and valve, seeking investment destination to discover the fortune in this business line.\nCertainly, the industry needs more of new ideas and fresh breath, like the recent lady mechanic phenomenon. The mechanics themselves need to wake up from their slumber and challenge themselves with training and re-training, re-tooling and re-organization of themselves and their work-practice to form a critical mass that would articulate their views, present their case and facilitate access to funding from banks and other financial bodies, to save their means of livelihood.\nThe industry is calling for a discovery by smart investors. There are vast investment opportunities across the value chain of the mechanic business. Overall, we all have responsibility to keep the concept of the Nigerian mechanic alive and thriving, because we all depend on it one way or the other.\nMike Bamigbola", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businessday.ng/analysis/article/the-nigerian-mechanic-business-as-investment-destination/"}
{"doc_id": "9b964190424c32dcffe718c2e19e905d", "text": "The third prosecution witness in En Huang's trial at an Accra High Court has denied testifying to save himself from further investigations and the charge of engaging in illegal mining.\nNana Sarfo Prempeh, a Director of Volta Resources Limited, a company tasked to undertake exploration in some concessions in the Ashanti Region, said: \"I reject that accusation. I am here to give evidence to ensure that justice is done to the perpetrator (En Huang) who illegally mined from the year 2015 to 2017.\"\nNana Prempeh accused En Huang of causing \"wholesale damage\" to the livelihood of farmers whose farm produce were destroyed and the fact that she also caused damage to the water bodies in the Ashanti region thereby denying residents clean drinking water.\nThe third prosecution witness was answering questions under cross-examination administered by Miracle Attachey, counsel for Aisha Huang, the alleged galamasey queen, standing trial among others for engaging in illegal at Bepotenten in the Ashanti Region in the year 2017 and re-entering Ghana though prohibited.\nEn Huang aka Aisha Huang has pleaded not guilty to the various charges and the Court presided over by Mrs Justice\nLydia Osei Marfo has remanded her into lawful custody.\nDefence Counsel (DC): Is it because investigations were against Volta Resource that you are eager to give evidence in respect of a case which does not have any co-relation to your company?\nWitness: It is wrong. I am sitting here today and giving evidence against En Huang because she was specifically engaged in illegal mining in Volta Resources Concessions.\nDC: Have you ever met En Huang?\nitness: Yes. I know En Huang to be engaged in illegal activities. En Huang makes appearances to claim seized machines on each occasion that Volta Resources had an encountered her.\nDC: Have you met En Huang in person before?\nWitness: I met her in October 2015 when four of her excavators were seized on the concessions of Volta Resources by Law Enforcement Authorities and same were deposited at the 4th Infantry Battalion in Kumasi.\nDC: I put it to you that En Huang does not own any excavator or mining equipment as alleged by you?\nLatest Stories\n-\nThe Roll Call of Biblical Financial Evangelists\n-\nMahama accuses Bawumia of dubbing NDC’s policy promises\n-\nMahama echoes vision for resilient governance and economic recovery at NDC LAB Policy Dialogue\n-\nGSE’s Abena Amoah not on Bawumia’s economy committee\n-\nNDC’s Policy Dialogue marks milestone in pre-election strategy – Mahama\n-\nEOCO to launch lifestyle audits targeting celebrities and individuals with suspected unexplained wealth\n-\nUpper West Akim MP cuts sod for the construction of Mepom to Esaaso Road\n-\nEngineers urged to embrace preview of their works\n-\nParis 2024Q: Zambia edges Ghana 1-0 for crucial first-leg advantage\n-\nDr. Christian Sewordor Mensah: The Role of Sector Skill Bodies in using ESG and CSR Principles in shaping Sustainable Education and Training\n-\nTyler Perry halts $800 film studio build over AI fears\n-\nAkufo-Addo appoints Ofori-Atta as Senior Presidential Advisor\n-\nMIIF aims to position Ghana as electric vehicle hub in Africa\n-\nAvatar: The Last Airbender receives mixed reviews from critics\n-\nMahama slams Police’s decision to dissociate itself from DCOP Waabu’s comments on election security", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.myjoyonline.com/aisha-huangs-trial-witness-denies-testifying-to-save-himself-from-investigations-2/"}
{"doc_id": "468dfd1bedb232502627931e6d33f5e7", "text": "South African Finance Minister Enoch Godongwana’s budget benefited from rising precious mineral prices and increased tax collection.\nBut these positive tailwinds aren’t expected to continue as the country battles frequent power outages, deteriorating rail and port infrastructure and unpredictable fuel prices.\nTo shore up the economy, Godongwana is giving consumers and companies tax relief to encourage them to generate renewable energy, which should ease the load on embattled state-owned power provider Eskom.\nAt the same time, he’s discouraging the use of dirty energy with increased carbon taxes and appears intent on reining in the state’s runaway wage bill.\nHere’s a list of the winners and losers in Wednesday’s national budget announcement:\nWinners\nEskom and its Investors\nThe government has finally provided clarity on its plans to assist Eskom, which should assure bond holders they will be paid in full.\nThe utility will get R254 billion in debt relief over the next three years, support that will alleviate its persistently weak financial position and free up funds for maintenance, which in turn could lead to fewer and less severe power outages.\nOther Embattled State Companies\nThe Land Bank, which has been in default for almost three years, has secured a R5 billion support package, while South African Airways will get R1 billion and the South African Post Office R2.4 billion.\nConsumers Who Can Afford Solar Installations\nGodongwana penciled in R4 billion of tax relief for households that install new solar panels. Rebates equivalent to 25% of the cost of the panels installed at a private residence are on offer.\nThe concession can be used to offset an individual’s personal income tax liability up to a maximum of R15,000.\nCompanies investing in green energy have been allocated R5 billion in an expanded drive to encourage generation. Businesses will be able to claim a 125% deduction in the first year for all renewable energy projects brought into use between March 1 and the end of February 2025.\nWelfare Grant Recipients\nOld-age pensions and other welfare payments will be increased by 5%, in line with the inflation rate.\nThe National Treasury, together with other departments, is reviewing options to provide protection for the working-age population that could replace or complement the Covid-19 grant.\nAny permanent increase in expenditure, such as a new welfare grant, would need to be matched by permanent revenue increases or spending reductions elsewhere.\nFood Manufacturers\nTo combat food price inflation, which rose to an almost 14-year high in January, food manufacturers will be eligible to receive refunds of levies imposed on diesel for a period of two years, starting on April 1.\nLosers\nMost South Africans\nGodongwana revised downward expectations for economic growth, household consumption, exports and imports. He also warned that the state’s debt-servicing costs will rise and power shortages are likely to persist for some time to come.\nAlthough employment growth in the first three quarters of last year expanded 4.6% compared with the previous period, the number of people with jobs now is on par with levels recorded in the first half of 2016 and the pace of job creation is expected to slow in 2023.\nSouth Africa’s unemployment rate of 32.9% is the third-highest in a group of 82 nations and the euro zone, as tracked by Bloomberg.\nPublic Sector Workers\nThe budget provides for the state’s wage bill to increase by an average of 3.3% annually over the next three fiscal years. That’s below the National Treasury’s 5% average consumer price inflation forecast.\nDrinkers & Smokers\nAs ever, consumers and manufacturers of alcohol and nicotine-based products will be taxed more heavily. A can of beer will cost 10 cents more, while a pack of 20 cigarettes will rise 98 cents.\nCarbon Emitters\nCarbon fuel levies will increase by 1 cent to 10 cents a liter for gasoline and to 11 cents a liter for diesel from April 5.\nOil & Gas Companies\nTo ensure South Africa is adequately compensated for the loss of its finite resources, Godongwana plans that minimum royalty rates on extracted fuels will be increased to 2% from 0.5%, with the maximum remaining at 5%.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businesstech.co.za/news/budget-speech/667325/the-biggest-winners-and-losers-in-the-2023-budget/"}
{"doc_id": "06b1aa03abeec12685b7a71f20d45e65", "text": "Deji Elumoye in Abuja\nOne year after its inauguration, the Senate Committee on Constitution Review yesterday began a two-day retreat with the revelation that the Supreme Court was canvassing for the increase in the retirement age of the apex court justices from 70 to 75 years.\nThe Deputy President of the Senate who also doubles as the Chairman of the committee, Senator Ovie Omo-Agege, who made the disclosure while delivering a keynote address at the retreat to analyse the submitted memo also stated that over 280 memoranda for the review of the constitution were received from the public late last year.\nHe explained that among the memoranda submitted was one from the Supreme Court canvassing for the shift in the retirement age of Supreme Court justices from 70 to 75.\nAccording to him, there was also another memo calling for increase in the retirement age of judges of the states, including the FCT and the federal high courts from 65 to 70 years.\nThe ranking Senator said the apex court proposal and that of the High Court judges will be treated by the committee and brought before the Senate for consideration as two bills by March, 2021.\nHis words: “To put you under further pressure we have also decided to extricate one or two issues dealing with the judiciary, most importantly, the one dealing with the retirement age for judges of the states, including the FCT and the federal high courts to bring in parity with the 70 years retirement age of the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court.\n“There is also the issue of the clamour by the Supreme Court to also move from 70 to 75 years. I am sure you are all aware that it is up to our colleagues in both chambers and of course, the State Houses of Assembly to decide whether or not we should move ahead with both.\n“But I want to put you under pressure that these two bills must be ready for consideration by March. Both Houses – the Senate and the House of Representatives – would be prepared to take those two isolated issues while every other matter under consideration will come up on the floor of the Senate and the House of Representatives in June this year.”\nThe committee Chairman stressed that the sole purpose of the retreat was to review and analyse the 2014 National Conference Report, the Report of the APC Ad-hoc Committee on True Federalism and the over 280 memoranda “we have received from the public and translate them into bills proposals for the Senate committee.\nAccording to him, these memoranda and positions express concern, as well as seek solutions, to the many problems that currently confront us as a country and they come from diverse interests that make up the nation.\nHe went further: “They cover a range of areas that include, inter-alia, the devolution of power to the federating units by way of moving some items from the exclusive, to the concurrent list.\nOf equal importance are issues of Local Government fiscal autonomy, the unfettered autonomy of the judiciary in line with their traditional role of the administration of justice. Others are issues of derivation, streamlining of criteria for qualification for participation in elective offices at all levels, such that more people are encouraged to participate.\n“There is also issue of affirmative action and gender equality, plus youth inclusiveness in the governance process. We are also concerned with measures that will help fight perennial poverty and help address the ever-growing concern on national security as well as the security and safety of Nigerians wherever they reside in the country. Some of these areas need to be addressed directly in the Constitution”.\nOmo-Agege specifically told the committee members to take keen interest in the hackneyed terminology of “marginalization” which he said is arguably one of the ugliest words in the Nigerian lexicon.\nAccording to him, “practically every ethnic nationality, religious, social and other group, complains of marginalisation. To take care of this, we should continue to identify, emphasise, explore and exploit those things that unite us as one nation. At the same time, we should continue to isolate and avoid those things that tend to divide us”.\nHe expressed his commitment towards coming up with a workable constitution for the use of all Nigerians saying the overall objective was to have a workable, most representative Constitution that should be as straight-forward as possible.\nHe added: “This way, more people will take interest in politics because the Constitution would have met their desires and aspirations. The fact that it is straight-forward enough would mean that less and less of its provisions and sections would require judicial interpretation. This will reduce the challenge of Constitution-interpretation-related work pressure on the judiciary. Such reduced pressure, you will agree with me, will be salutary to the independence of the judiciary.”", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2021/01/30/constitution-review-supreme-court-wants-retirement-age-of-justices-at-75"}
{"doc_id": "1604bad4708f9afe85dc6dbb5a04b08f", "text": "Police have arrested three men with arms at Kukuabila near Nasia in the West Mamprusi Municipality of the North East Region.\nThe suspects, including two Nigerians and a Ghanaian, were together arrested with a loaded Ak 47 riffle, a foreign-made pistol, and ammunition concealed in the vehicle that they were travelling in.\nThe suspects are currently in custody in Tamale after a Circuit Court in the Northern Regional capital, granted a remand application for further investigation.\nRegional Crime Officer, Superintendent Baba Ananga, said the Police are yet to establish the real motive of the suspects but added that based on preliminary investigation, they are looking to arrest accomplices.\nHe, however, wouldn't confirm or deny whether the suspects were on a mission to target a prominent politician in the North East Region.\nMeanwhile, some regional aspirants of the NPP in the region are calling on the Police to thoroughly investigate the incident.\nLatest Stories\n-\nGhanaians stranded in Ivory Coast not linked to us – QNET\n-\n92% of women businesses in Ghana have never exported before – Survey\n-\nWhen the time comes, it has come – Rudeboy shares video of Mr Ibu in the last moments\n-\nEC sets 3-day deadline for 2024 election results declaration\n-\nI bet Bawumia will choose Opoku Prempeh as his running mate – Ben Ephson\n-\nFinance Ministry fears losing $3.8bn in World Bank financing if Anti-LGBTQ+ bill becomes law\n-\nRainstorm destroys VIP stands of Sunyani Coronation Park\n-\nGovernment borrowed GH¢24bn via T-bills in February 2024\n-\nEdna Obiri: Unraveling the threads of unseasonable warmth: A climate wake-up call\n-\nAnti-LGBTQ+ Bill: Akufo-Addo won’t assent – Security Analyst\n-\nNollywood grieves as Kate Henshaw mourns loss of mother\n-\nInflation to inch up to 23.9% in February 2024 – Report\n-\nI was shocked – Former Oti Regional Minister speaks after reshuffle\n-\nDon’t assent to Anti-LGBTQ+ Bill – Finance Ministry tells Akufo-Addo\n-\nTributes pour in for Nollywood star Mr Ibu", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.myjoyonline.com/3-arrested-at-kukuabila-in-north-east-region-for-illegal-possession-of-weapons/"}
{"doc_id": "87fd11fd5770f7d23f040bef8fe88fd8", "text": "Times are tough, and all sectors are feeling it. Globally, stocks have plunged, wiping billions of dollars from investors, many of whom are fresh in the game following the uptake of retail fractional investment platforms.\nThe unregulated crypto space that offers alternatives through trading, decentralised finance and other blockchain-powered products has faced the same turbulence. Spectacular busts have happened with the most recent one, the UST stable coin, and LUNA.\nOn a more relatable front, the cost of energy continues to rise. The latest review by the Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority posted a painful jump in retail prices, affecting logistics and mobility, with a straight line to food prices and production costs.\nAffected too is the availability and cost of labour – which already saw an upward change with the minimum wage increased by 12 percent effective May 1, 2022. A memo from the Federation of the Public Transport Sector informed a 20 percent rise in fares starting this week.\nCompanies are actively downsizing. Despite many other sectors looking resilient, it is not possible to mop up all the culled talent. Several venture capital and private equity firms have sent cautionary notes to portfolio companies asking that they ‘mind the runway’ as the funding landscape is not immune and will see a lot more discretion applied.\nOptimising for hard times is a challenge every business must review seasonally. Analysed right, and with clarity of mind, it should lead to refactoring of many things that may evade scrutiny in bullish times where false positives on market perception and performance abound.\nIn markets, opportunities are not equal. While expansion into new territories sounds like a great strategy, it may be wiser to hunker down and focus on regions where fundamentals are healthiest with an easier path to defensible ROI. Do not shy away from rolling back where it makes sense.\nIn times of plenty or general ease, businesses tend to hire for specialist roles. Staff counts grow, as does the wage bill. The inelasticity of this obligation means that human resourcing conversations need to happen more intently. Lean and mean should be the game plan. Smaller, cross-competent well-compensated teams can deliver better cost-revenue-profit ratios.\nIn technology, businesses should leverage burstable architecture that allows for cost savings while maintaining uptime, service level agreements, compliance, and other requirements, matching capacity with demand, and actively identifying resource wastage through audits to reduce operating expenditure.\nNjihia is the head of business and partnerships at Sure Corporation | www.mbuguanjihia.com | @mbuguanjihia", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/technology/optimising-help-in-cutting-losses-in-tough-times-3856500"}
{"doc_id": "a962867497f053b742d6b39c9c71830b", "text": "Chinese firms invest US$2,3bn in 3 years\nFarirai Machivenyika-Senior Reporter\nChina has invested over US$2 billion in the past three years to become the largest foreign investor in Zimbabwe, with Chinese companies creating up to 100 000 jobs, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Minister, Ambassador Frederick Shava said yesterday.\nHe said this at a symposium to assess the impact of Chinese investments in Zimbabwe that attracted senior Government officials and representatives of Chinese businesses.\nAmbassador Shava said Zimbabwe had witnessed huge growth in investments by the Chinese government and its private sector ever since President Xi Jinping’s State visit of 2015.\n“Our progressive investment laws have generated a conducive environment in support of investment inflows,” he said.\n“During the period 2019 to June 2022, Zimbabwe received US$3,028 billion foreign direct investment inflows. I am pleased to note that investments from China alone during the period amounted to US$2,306 billion, representing 76,15 percent of total investment.”\nZimbabwe and China enjoy excellent relations whose status was elevated to a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” in April 2018 during President Mnangagwa’s State visit.\nChinese business enterprises have contributed significantly to Zimbabwe’s overall economic growth and increase in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) through employment creation, infrastructure development and modernisation of the agriculture sector.\nSome of the projects supported by the Chinese government include Kariba South Hydropower Expansion Project that was commissioned in March 2018 which increased the installed capacity to 300MW, the expansion of Hwange Power Station where Units 7 and 8 are being added, each with 300MW capacity.\nOther key projects include the upgrading of the Victoria Falls International Airport and Harare City Council Sewer and Water Reticulation Project.\nThe other major Chinese project is the US$1 billion Manhize Steel Plant operated by Dinson Iron and Steel Company, a subsidiary of global steel giant Tsingshan Holdings.\nPresident Mnangagwa officially launched the project nearly a fortnight ago.\nThe integrated project covers mining, processing and beneficiation, and is hosted by Midlands, Mashonaland East and West provinces, and is expected to create 14 000 direct and indirect jobs.\nIt is set to initially produce 600 000 tonnes of steel per annum and the output will rise progressively, transforming Zimbabwe into one of the world’s top steel producers.\nIn addition, said Ambassador Shava, the newly constructed Parliament Building in Mount Hampden “speaks volumes about the positive national impact of an investment of such magnitude by the Chinese government”.\n“It is also pleasing to note that Zimbabwe is cooperating with China in the planning, construction and management of the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and the restructuring of Zimbabwe’s State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs).\n“The Chinese government, through the International Cooperation Centre (ICC) of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), extended training to the Zimbabwe Government officials on the operationalisation and management of these Special Economic Zones,” said Ambassador Shava.\nChina’s Ambassador to Zimbabwe, Mr Guo Shaochun, said Chinese investments in Zimbabwe begun to grow at the turn of the millennium following the imposition of unilateral and illegal sanctions by the West, which resulted in Western investors collectively withdrawing their capital from Harare.\n“When the West chose to abandon and humiliate Zimbabwe, China and Chinese enterprises chose to embrace Zimbabwe,” he said.\n“China’s investment in Zimbabwe has made up for the shortage of funds and technology and other tough challenges faced by Zimbabwe’s economy. In this process, Chinese enterprises have also gained opportunities for development.\n“Our cooperation is highly complementary and mutually beneficial, which will deliver more tangible benefits to our peoples and support Zimbabwe to take an independent development path suitable to its national reality with more capabilities and confidence. No force, no smears can hold back the irreversible strides of the China-Zimbabwe cooperation.”\nZanu PF national spokesperson and former Ambassador to China, Cde Christopher Mutsvangwa, also attended the conference and commended China-Zimbabwe relations.\nThe Chinese, he said, had supported the growth of the tobacco industry through contract farming while Zimbabwe also adopted their model of promoting small-scale miners which has resulted in an increase in their contribution to the industry especially in gold mining.\n“Without their support the tobacco sector could have collapsed so the Chinese saved that industry,” he said.\nIndustry and Commerce Minister, Dr Sekai Nzenza, said there was scope for increasing Chinese investments in value addition especially in agro-processing.\n“There is massive potential in value addition and I challenge the Chinese to enter that area,” she said.\nInformation, Publicity and Broadcasting Services Deputy Minister Kindness Paradza said Chinese investments were creating employment.\n“Business initiatives by the Chinese create employment opportunities for the vast majority of Zimbabweans. For instance, the giant Manhize Steel Plant being constructed by Chinese investors in Mvuma, is already employing hundreds of locals and is set to engage thousands of Zimbabwean employees upon its completion,” he said.\nMs Shanel Liu, a representative of the Chamber of Chinese Enterprises in Zimbabwe said they would continue to engage in businesses that mutually benefit the two countries.\nShe added that they will continue to implore their members to comply with the country’s laws.\n“Our companies employ over 100 000 people and we will continue looking for opportunities that are mutually beneficial,” she said.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.herald.co.zw/chinese-firms-invest-us23bn-in-3-years/"}
{"doc_id": "8279baf977f4a11c8dac8a6b8e08c6b7", "text": "We're pretty used to hearing outlandish valuations on internet companies that, if they were people, would be barely out of nappies.\nWe’re pretty used to hearing outlandish valuations on internet companies that, if they were people, would be barely out of nappies. It happened during the first dotcom boom, and it’s happening again now. But news that Facebook is now “officially” worth $50-billion made even the most seasoned cynics choke on their lattes.\nHow can a seven-year-old company be worth that much? Simple — Goldman Sachs (the investment bank) and Russian technology giant, Digital Sky Technologies (DST), are investing $500-million in the company in exchange for 1% of its shares. So it follows that 100% of its shares must be worth $50-billion.\nOr does it? Despite all these superheated shares fizzing around Facebook is still a private company. All of these trades are in what the investment trade coyly calls “secondary markets”. This means that, unlike a publicly listed company, Facebook is not obliged to report its earnings to the market.\nGoldman is planning to sell another $1,5-billion worth of the shares to its own clients in the next two weeks, and so it has been talking the stock up. Reuters reports that a potential investor “believes Facebook has $2-billion in revenues, though the person does not know if the fast-growing company is cash flow positive or profitable”.\nEven if all of that revenue were profit, Facebook stock would be worth 25 times its yearly earnings — a measure known as the “price/earnings” or PE ratio. It’s far more likely that their real earnings (after costs) are around $500 million, which would make their PE 100. Given that a PE of 20 is considered high, 100 should give investors pause, since it implies that it would take 100 years (at current earning rates) for the company to ‘pay back” the investment in its shares. And that’s assuming Facebook is, in fact, making $2-billion per year and $500-million in profit — again it’s under no obligation to tell anyone the real numbers.\nAnother way to look at this valuation is in terms of Facebook’s bread and butter — its user numbers. At the moment it has just shy of 600-million active users around the globe (that’s twice the population of the United States). This deal means that investors are effectively paying about $83 per user.\nThat seems like a lot until you consider that each time an advert is clicked in Facebook it earns them around 60 US cents. So it would take 133 clicks from each user to earn that back. I know what you’re thinking: I’ve probably only clicked on a dozen ads in my entire time on Facebook. But advertising is only one of their revenue streams.\nGames like Farmville and Mafia Wars earn Facebook hundreds of millions of dollars per year. Some players literally spend a hundred dollars a month on their virtual farms and crime empires. All Facebook needs is a couple of million of those users — less than 1% of total players — and its 10% of the way there.\nAnd then there’s future growth. In September 2009 Facebook had “only” 300-million users — now it has nearly 600-million. Facebook executives don’t even blink at the idea of a billion active users — they expect it. If we assume they have a billion users by the end of 2012, then Goldman and co have really paid $50 per user — or 83 advertising clicks over the entire history of each user.\nEven so, without seeing their earnings in black and white Facebook remains a gamble. Sometimes, like Google with its PE of 25 (that was once as high as 50), the gamble pays off handsomely. And sometimes like Webvan, an ill fated casualty of the dotcom bust, the gamble goes spectacularly wrong.\nBut given how much scorn was heaped on Facebook by market analysts when it refused a $1-billion offer from Yahoo! in 2006, you can forgive its shareholders for not taking our opinions as gospel.\nIt makes you wonder about three-year-old Twitter, recently valued at $3,7-billion. The analysts are saying all the same things about the micro-blogging giant as they were about Facebook back in 2006: no business model, unsustainable growth and opaque earnings reports.\nPerhaps the most unlikely winner out of this deal is homegrown media giant Naspers. They own 28,7% of the Mail.ru Group (previously DST Limited) who in turn own 2,38% of Facebook. That means Naspers effectively owns around 0,83% of Facebook — worth about R2,9-billion at today’s exchange rate.\nInterestingly DST Global, a separate entity in which Naspers has no significant holdings, already owns 10% of Facebook. This new tranche takes their investment to about 10,5%.\nOf course that number is trivial by comparison with Naspers’ 35% stake in China’s Tencent — a social media company currently valued at $42-billion on the Hong Kong stockmarket. Tencent’s main brand, QQ, passed the half a billion users mark years ago and is still growing. Suddenly $50-billion doesn’t seem that ridiculous anymore.\nA previous version of this article had two factual inaccuracies. Firstly, it implied that revenue equated to earnings, and therefore gave an incorrect definition of the PE ratio. Secondly it stated that Naspers now owns 3% of Facebook when in fact, due to ownership structures at DST, it only owns 0,83%. We regret these errors.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://mg.co.za/article/2011-01-05-is-facebook-really-worth-50-billion/"}
{"doc_id": "acdfae1d20f6f0982b3bcb29759e1fdb", "text": "Goddy Egene\nThe Nigerian equities market witnessed further decline yesterday as investors appeared to be ignoring the 2018 financial results of companies. The market had shed 1.2 per cent in the first quarter of 2019 majorly due to political risks. Stakeholders have been hoping that the reduced political tension after the general elections and release of corporate results including declaration of dividends would lead to recovery. However, the market remained bearish and has shed 2.6 per cent in the first two days of the second quarter.\nThe Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) All-Share Index (ASI) went down by 0.99 per cent yesterday to close at 30,226.70 as 28 stocks declined. The market capitalisation shed N169 billion to be at N11.4 trillion. The decline was propelled by losses suffered by Nigerian Breweries Plc, Nestle Nigeria Plc and Unilever Nigeria Plc. The three firms have released their results and declared dividends. Nestle Nigeria , for instance, delighted investors with improved bottom-line and higher dividend.\nThe company reported a revenue of N266.27 billion, showing an increase of 9.0 per cent compared with N244.1 billion posted in 2017. Net finance cost dipped by 89.9 per cent from N8.869 billion to N889 million last year. As a result, profit before tax (PBT) improved by 27.5 per cent from N46.83 billion in 2017 to N59.75 billion, while profit after tax (PAT) grew from N33.72 billion to N43 billion in 2018.\nThe board directors recommended a final dividend of N38.50 per share and having paid an interim dividend of N20 per share before now, the total dividend for the 2018 would be N58.50 per share. This shows an increase of 37 per cent compared with N42.50 paid in 2017.\nBut the stock fell 3.5 per cent to close at N1, 400 per share yesterday. However, Beta Glass Plc and Forte Oil Plc led the price gainers’ table with 9.9 per cent apiece, trailed by Vitafoam Nigeria Plc with 9.6 per cent.\nOando Plc, which announced a growth of 46 per cent on Monday, was also among the price losers, going down by 7.8 per cent.\nThe integrated energy firm recorded a turnover of N679 billion, indicating a growth of 37 per cent from N497.4 billion in 2017. Profit after tax rose by 46 per cent from N19.8 billion to N28.8 billion in 2018.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2019/04/03/equities-market-declines-further-as-investors-ignore-companies-results"}
{"doc_id": "4002fe64baadf3dc789ac7cca78003c2", "text": "Nigerian banks\n1 day ago\nExcept the banks are made to start transiting the dollars in their kitty by way of quick turnover, the mess of the speculation they are involved in will continue.\n2 days ago\nA Yoruba adage says isale oro legbin which rendition in English is best captured by a philosophical statement credited to Mario Puzo that “behind every big fortune, there is a crime”. It is easy and gratifying to envy those who, in the Nigerian street lingo, “have made it big.”\n25 Jan\nIn a widely published article of 20 November, 2023, under the title: \"Mr President and the forex concerns: An invitation to dare,,\" I raised particular issues of significance to the value of the Naira, our national currency, and outlined possible pragmatic measures that can be adopted by His Excellency, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, to bolster…\n12 Oct\nThe rise in electronic fraud could be amongst one of the contributing factors – is your account also at risk?\n16 Jul 2023\nNigerian banks have been urged to strengthen its internal control and sensitise customers on how to protect themselves from fraud following the revelation that fraud cases in the banking sector was N2.59b in the first quarter 2023.\n13 Jun 2023\nThe top five Nigerian banks by market capitalisation posted combined gross earnings of N4.5 trillion for their 2022 full-year operations.The five banks, which are FBN Holdings, United Bank for Africa (UBA), GTCO, Access Holdings and Zenith Bank achieved gross earnings of N4.5 trillion, a 20 per cent growth compared to N3.6 trillion posted in 2021.\n15 Apr 2023\nAt no time in history has the global social and economic dynamics been so challenged like now. It is coming at a time of Nigeria’s transition from one government to another. The good thing is that the president-elect, Bola Ahmed Tinubu, is a man of excellence, who has been roundly acknowledged as a recruiter-in-chief. He…", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://guardian.ng/tag/nigerian-banks/"}
{"doc_id": "464c252af9a6ced5d959d77e3c29352c", "text": "Trustco, the Namibia-based investment group that last week announced a planned R950 million cash-for-shares injection, had an 18.1% average net asset value growth since listing, but faces litigation and other uncertainties in the new financial year.\nWriting in the company’s latest annual report, chairman and advocate Raymond Heathcote said the JSE had issued a directive for Trustco to restate its annual financial statements that had resulted in a legal dispute.\n“During the previous reporting period, Trustco complied under protest with the JSE’s directive, although this matter remains under appeal and Trustco was granted leave to appeal against the judgment, delivered by the High Court of South Africa, by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Bloemfontein,” the chairman said.\nHe said there was also legal action with the Namibian Revenue Agency (Namra) and a constitutional challenge by the company against it.\n“Trustco took legal action, filing an urgent review application and constitutional challenge against Namra following Namra’s directive to freeze both Trustco’s and its investees’ bank accounts. Subsequently, Namra retracted the issued notices to freeze the accounts.”\nThe chairman said the constitutional challenge related to Namra’s authority to unilaterally “sweep” funds from an entity’s bank account without due legal process, “instructing the transfer of funds without notice until the last cent… .”\nIn a property related issue, Trustco and Helios were in dispute over a facility agreement. Helios demanded payment of an outstanding amount and Trustco counter claimed for mala fide misrepresentation.\nMeanwhile, Trustco Bank Namibia was in the process of seeking a commercial resolution to the suspension of Trustco Bank’s banking licence by the Namibia government – commercial banking represents 0.1% of the invested portfolio of Trustco.\n“Trustco initiated a review application against Bank of Namibia (BoN) and the government of the Republic of Namibia, specifically challenging certain legislation granting BoN unchecked authority to issue directives without due process.\nIn response, BoN countered with a liquidation application against Trustco Bank and sought suspension of Trustco Bank’s banking license. BoN amended the Banking Institutions Act in 2023, rectifying various of the issues raised by Trustco in its review application launched against BoN. While Trustco is actively pursuing a commercial resolution,“ the chairman said.\n“Upholding the highest standards of corporate governance stands as a fundamental pillar of Trustco’s success,” he said in the report\nTrustco also held a 19.5% interest in diamond mining in the Sierra Leone-based Meya mining licence area in pursuit of “extraordinary returns”.\nThis “early stage investment” venture where Trustco had an interest was being brought into “commercial production”, Trustco said in its annual report.\n“Ongoing exploration and resource development across the license area over the next 10 to 15 years are expected to yield significant growth potential,” the company’s directors said in the report.\nOn Trustco’s insurance operations, a key income earner for the company, the annual report said the deceleration of organic growth “poses challenges to cash flow sustainability”.\nThe mitigating strategy for this was to introduce new products to cultivate a fresh client base and additional revenue streams, and to implement a 10% premium increase, the first increase after a five=year period.\nTrustco’s property interests, which include four significant property developments, comprising residential estates with room for commercial expansion and industrial parks, experienced challenges last year due to lower-than-expected property sales volumes, attributed to several factors, including the rapid rise in interest rates, insufficient funding for prospective homeowners and overall economic conditions in Namibia.\nBUSINESS REPORT", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/companies/trustco-faces-significant-legal-other-challenges-in-year-ahead-04e822ac-24dc-4f89-ba3e-ebef12ae6a4b"}
{"doc_id": "9420cb5002fbf84998f67ce05ec90896", "text": "Coffee could be a key driver for horticulture growth\nSifelani Tsiko\nAgric, Environment & Innovation Editor\nGovernment recently approved the Horticulture Recovery and Growth Plan to promote the intensive growing of fruits, vegetables and other horticultural products to spearhead the country’s agricultural recovery through competitive exports and increased productivity. In this report, Sifelani Tsiko (ST), our Agric, Environment & Innovations Editor speaks to Caleb Mahoya (CM) head of the Coffee Research Institute about the tremendous potential of coffee in the development of the horticulture sector.\nST: What is the role of Coffee Research Institute in reviving coffee farming and production which has been declining over the years in Zimbabwe?\nCM: The Coffee Research Institute is playing a pivotal role in reviving coffee production in Zimbabwe through, first of all, the development and dissemination of sustainable production technologies to boost productivity and secondly, through the production of seedlings for the farmers. This year alone, we produced over 80 000 coffee seedlings for distribution to the farmers at a small fee. Thirdly, we acquire, evaluate and recommend for production best performing coffee varieties from all over the world. Between 2016 and 2020 Coffee Research Institute managed to bring into the country 31 of the world’s best performing coffee varieties through a collaborative research project with World Coffee Research based in Texas in the US. The varieties are currently being evaluated in the field at the Coffee Research Institute here in Chipinge, for performance under local conditions before recommending for production by the farmers. We also train farmers on sustainable farming practices and recruit new farmers into coffee production through publicity activities such as shows, field days, demonstration plots and information materials.\nST: What is the current coffee production output in Zimbabwe? Before the slump, what was the production level over the past 10 years?\nCM: Coffee production is important to the Zimbabwean economy. At its peak in the late 1980s, the coffee sector employed over 20 000 people and contributed an estimated 2.1 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and earned about US$54 million in foreign currency. At its peak, the country produced about 14 664 metric tonnes (MT) of the best quality coffee (Coffee arabica) alongside Brazil, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Uganda, Mexico and Kenya. During the early 1990s, coffee production in Zimbabwe was ranked fourth after Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and Tanzania. Production was mostly concentrated in the eastern districts (Chimanimani, Chipinge, Mutare, Mutasa) but coffee was also produced in Karoi, Makonde, Goromonzi, Guruve and Bikita districts. Coffee production declined to its lowest of 206 metric tonnes in 2010 due to a number of reasons, including the fact that some farmers abandoned coffee in preference for other crops such as macadamia nuts, bananas and avocado that they considered more lucrative with low production costs.\nIn part, this decline in coffee production is also attributed to volatility in world coffee prices, lack of appropriate financial support to the farmers, natural disasters such as cyclones, droughts, increasing incidences of diseases and pests due to climate change, change of the production and support structures, and the policies that mainly supported cereal production in the country.\nThrough public and private partnerships, coffee production has been on an upward trajectory up to the current production of around 354 metric tonnes since 2010. International markets include USA, Canada, Germany, UK, South Africa, Japan, Netherlands and others.\nFrom 2010 to 2020 production has been slowly picking up from 206 metric tonnes in 2010 to the current approximately 354 metric tonnes through support from development partners such as FAO, World Vision and DFID.\nST: Can you tell us briefly about coffee production in Africa and the emerging global trends.\nCM: Globally and on the African continent, coffee production has gone down due to low world market prices, competition from other land use activities such as real estate and other lucrative crops, natural disasters such as frost, droughts, heat stress and outbreaks of pests and diseases, aged plantations, poor soil fertility and climate change.\nCurrently, world Arabica coffee production stands at 95.99 million bags representing a five percent decrease from last season. In Africa, Arabica coffee production decreased by 24 percent whilst Robusta coffee decreased by 16 percent compared to last season.\nST: Zimbabwe still remains an agro-based economy. What do you think is the role of the smallholder coffee producers in the country? What are some of the constraints do you think need to be addressed to improve productivity?\nCM: Given the fact that most of the farmers doing coffee in Zimbabwe are now smallholder farmers and that Zimbabwe exports more than 90 percent of its coffee produce, if well supported financially and technically smallholder coffee producers can earn the country the much needed foreign currency and improve their food and nutrition security.\nGiven that Zimbabwe has a milling capacity of 50 000 metric tonnes boosting smallholder coffee production will help create jobs for farm workers and supporting industries. Some of the constraints that need to be addressed to improve production include availing medium to long term financing for the farmers, availing production and processing equipment and materials such as knapsack sprayers, fertilizers and chemicals, hand pulpers and well-funded vibrant research.\nST: Does the Coffee Research Institute have adequate funding to help it develop drought-resistance varieties, build value addition techniques and ways of attracting the youth into coffee farming? How much does the institute need to play its mandate effectively?\nCM: The development of the coffee sector requires well-resourced research. This is what helped Zimbabwe reach its peak in 1989. Currently, there is very little funding for research in this very lucrative crop that can easily help the country earn the much needed foreign currency given that it’s a crop that has very high returns on a small manageable piece of land even on steep slopes where very few other crops can thrive.\nThere is need for adequate research funding accompanied by medium to long term financing for the farmers. Historically, the Coffee Research Institute did not have a coffee breeding programme, but is currently exploring other modern methods of producing elite planting materials such as tissue culture techniques and venturing into molecular characterisation of coffee varieties as a starting point into coffee breeding. To carry out its mandate effectively, Coffee Research requires adequate funding.\nST: Global coffee brand Nespresso partnered with TechnoServe, an international non-profit organisation, to help revitalise the sector and support and encourage coffee farmers in the country’s Eastern Highlands. What role have you played in this partnership? How many farmers have been supported so far?\nCM: As part of the efforts to revitalise the coffee industry in Zimbabwe, Nespresso through Technoserve are working with farmers to improve productivity and quality of coffee. We have agreed to partner with Technoserve in training the farmers and evaluating technologies. We are in the process of acquiring coffee seed to produce coffee seedlings for distribution to the farmers at a small fee.\nTraining efforts and most of the field work that had been scheduled for this season have been affected by COVID-19 lockdown. Currently, the Coffee Research Institute is testing Technoserve seed samples for viability and diseases before the seed is distributed to the farmers for planting.\nST: The Eastern Highlands of Zimbabwe is quite suitable for growing arabica coffee due to good rainfall levels, rich soils and cool temperatures. What varieties have you developed that could help adapt to natural challenges such as drought, occasional cyclones and outbreaks of pests?\nCM: Coffee Research Institute is currently evaluating the performance of 31 of the best performing coffee varieties in the world under local conditions and against natural challenges such as drought, cyclones and outbreaks of insect pests and diseases. The 31 best performing varieties in the world were acquired through a collaborative project with the World Coffee Research of the US.\nST: Post-harvest losses are still a major problem in this coffee growing region of Zimbabwe. What is the Coffee Research Institute and the private sector partners – Nespresso doing to help farmers reduce post – harvest losses?\nCM: To reduce post-harvest losses the Coffee Research Institute and Nespresso through Technoserve are helping farmers through training on sustainable processing, packaging, storage and transporting practices.\nST: Finding reliable buyers for coffee is still a major problem for smallholder farmers. Nespresso is now a major buyer and supporter of Zimbabwe coffee. To what extent is its presence going to offer a market and promote the growth of the country’s coffee sector?\nCM: The coming of Nespresso has come as a very big boost for the revitalisation of the coffee sector in Zimbabwe. By offering very good prices and training farmers on sustainable farming practices the intervention has seen a renewed interest to grow new or expand existing coffee plantations by both new smallholder and large – scale farmers. Demand for planting material has sky-rocketed.\nST: What are your hopes for coffee farming in Zimbabwe? How do you see smallholder coffee growers playing a role in the attainment of the country’s Vision 2030?\nCM: Given the current impetus, coffee farming has a bright future in Zimbabwe if it is continuously well supported. Government input and equipment support schemes can go a long way in helping revitalize the lucrative smallholder coffee sector. With over 90 percent of the coffee produced in Zimbabwe being exported and the good prices and support being offered by Nespresso and Coffee Research Institute the smallholder farmers are set to play a very big role in the attainment of vision 2030 by earning the country the much needed foreign currency and improving their livelihoods and that of their communities as the forex they earn circulates.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.herald.co.zw/coffee-could-be-a-key-driver-for-horticulture-growth/"}
{"doc_id": "c5981e55bb175021d2fbcb8bc682f6ed", "text": "Cash sent home by Kenyans working in African countries became the fastest-growing source of the nation’s diaspora dollar inflows last year at a time when overall remittances grew by the slowest pace in four years, largely hurt by elevated inflationary pressures on earnings in the US and Britain.\nCash wired home by Kenyans in other countries on the continent climbed by nearly half to $305.21 million (about Sh48.83 billion under prevailing conversion rates) in 2023 compared with the year before, official data shows, helping boost dollar flows whose supply has been problematic.\nThe 48.55 percent, or $99.75 million (Sh15.96 billion), jump over $205.46 million (Sh32.87 billion) was largely boosted by a surge in remittances from emerging sources such as Uganda and small sources on the continent classified as “others”, according to the Central Bank of Kenya’s data.\nThe pace of growth of remittances from Africa placed the continent as one of the biggest drivers of the money sent home by Kenyans abroad.\nThis came in a period when diaspora remittance, the largest source of foreign exchange ahead of tea exports and tourist receipts, grew 4.02 percent, the slowest pace since 2019.\nTotal diaspora remittances amounted to $4.19 billion (Sh670.4 billion) in 2023 compared with $4.03 billion (Sh644.8) the year before, according to the Central Bank of Kenya data.\nThe softening growth in the remittances is largely on account of flattening or reduced flows from Kenyans in America, who account for nearly 60 percent of the total inflows.\nThe US, despite controlling 55.86 percent of the total remittances, posted a marginal 0.26 percent rise to $2.34 billion (Sh374.4 billion). The US, the world’s largest economy, has been battling high pressure on prices of goods and services in the last three years, which pushed up the cost of rent, medical care as well as prices of cars and car insurance.\nRead: Diaspora inflows grow slowest in 13 years\nThe inflation has squeezed earnings by workers, reducing the disposable income that Kenyans in that country tap to help families and dependents back in Kenya.\n“The US seems to have a fairly strong economy at the moment. The job market is fairly strong and so we expect continued growth of the remittances from the US,” CBK governor Kamau Thugge said on Wednesday.\nDr Thugge projects the inflows to grow at a slightly higher pace of 5.0 percent, largely supported by the US and Saudi Arabia.\nSaudi Arabia, which is President William Ruto’s priority destination in his search for job opportunities abroad, last year overtook the UK to become the second largest source of remittances into Kenya.\nKenyans in the Middle East’s economic powerhouse — who largely work as unskilled domestic labourers as well as skilled workers in sectors such as healthcare, ICT, and construction — wired home $369.80 million (Sh59.17 billion) last year. That represented a 22.34 percent jump year-on-year, but the growth was significantly slower than 63.38 percent in 2022.\nThe remittances from the UK were largely flat, growing 0.32 percent to $334.19 million (Sh53.47 billion), the data shows.\nGermany, which Dr Ruto has a top hunting ground for jobs abroad for the growing unemployed skilled and semi-skilled Kenyan youth, bucked the trend in the developed Western economies to post a 35. 71 percent climb to $175.81 million (Sh28.13 billion).\nThe CBK data shows the share of Africa has nearly doubled in three years from 4.25 percent in 2021 to 8.21 percent last year.\nUganda was the standout performer in Africa, with remittances more than doubling to $57.34 million (Sh9.17 billion) in the 12 months compared with $27.71 million (Sh4.43 billion) a year earlier.\n“We want you to be able to send money back home for investments. The second thing is to help us open pathways to enhance our trade in goods and services,” Diaspora Affairs Principal Secretary Roselyn Njogu told the annual Diaspora Homecoming Convention in Nairobi last December.\n“We look at diaspora as a two-way valve: you allow our goods and services to go out because you are already out there and you bring in tourists and investments.”\nShem Ochuodho, the global chairman of Kenya Diaspora Alliance, has maintained that incentives such as tax rebates – usually given to foreign investors – could see the bulk of cash go into direct investments back home.\n“ There’s no reason Kenyan diaspora cannot match the kind of investments we have seen in some countries like the Philippines if they are given incentives,” Dr Ochuodho said in an interview last year.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/data-hub/africa-fastest-growing-source-kenya-diaspora-dollar-inflows--4518590"}
{"doc_id": "17480d2e3ce1148cd73c38f6be508040", "text": "Africa Day: The dream lives on\nSifelani Tsiko Sydnication Writer\nAfrica today celebrates the 54th anniversary of the founding of the continental body — the African Union — at a time when Africa is building up the momentum to press for industrialisation to rapidly transform its desire to turn its vast economic potential into reality. There is no doubt that the continent’s thrust to\nWith bold leadership and state support, consistent monitoring and evaluation, inclusivity and prioritisation of major sectors, it is possible that Africa can be firmly put on the tough and winding road to structural transformation.\nThe era of begging bowls is ending and Africa increasingly needs to finance its development programmes to ensure sustainability of projects and, more importantly, for its own survival.\nThe continent has posted enviable economic growth rates in the past few years despite a slowdown in its 2016 economic growth rate which stood at 2,2 percent down from a 3,2 percent in 2015 owing largely to low commodity prices, weak global recovery and adverse weather conditions that badly affected the continent’s agricultural sector.\nDespite, the slowing growth, Africa still remains a major global destination for investment.\nThe latest African Economic Outlook report shows that the continent’s foreign direct investment stood at US$56,5 billion in 2016 and is projected to hit US$57 billion in 2017.\nFor the continent, the priority is keeping up this momentum and meeting the challenges that lie ahead.\nAfrica Day provides an opportunity to celebrate that African solidarity, African identity and a common humanity and destiny which is shared by the continent’s more than one billion people.\nAfter nearly five-and-half decades of the existence of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU, now AU), it is a time for reflection for this continent that is so strategically important to world economics.\nDespite all the harsh criticism, Africa is in a considerably better shape than popular perceptions may suggest.\nBrutal wars and famine have declined, though not to the scale Africans may want to see.\nIt is a fact that people still struggle to make ends meet, just as they do in Europe, the US, Brazil, China and India.\nThey don’t always have enough to eat, they may lack education, they may not have the best of infrastructure, they despair about corruption, lack of jobs, poor service and social injustices and some even want to emigrate.\nIn the process, the dominant Western media continue to capture these problems to paint a different picture about the continent.\nPowerful countries, too, continue to subdue and hurl everything they can find at this collective African spirit that seeks to bind, integrate and ensure Africans have control of their destiny and resources.\nDespite this assault, the African spirit still lives on, unbowed by the divisive and dominant policies of powerful countries, which aim to exploit for next to nothing Africa’s economic resources.\nIn the terms — AFRICA DAY, Zimpapers Syndication unearths some of the major highlights of events and processes driving change on this continent, home to more than one billion people.\nA – for Africa\nThe origin of Africa’s name is an area of major contestation by etymologists. One school of thought suggests that “Afri” was the name of a people, maybe the Berbers of North Africa, given by the Romans while others say the addition of the Latin word aprica, meaning “sunny”, or the Greek word aphrike, meaning “without cold” would ultimately lead to the use of the term Africa.\nSome historians or Egyptologists say the name Africa is of African origins from the Egyptian word “Afru-ika” or ‘Motherland”.\nOther scholars suggest that the name Africa came into Western use through the Romans, who used the name Africa terra — “land of the Afri” referring to the northern part of the continent, as the province of Africa with its capital Carthage, in modern-day Tunisia. The Roman suffix “-ca” denotes “country or land”. There are so many theories around the origins of the name and most historians say the actual etymology of Africa is uncertain. No one knows the exact origins but it has come to be acceptable on the continent and globally.\nF – Founding fathers\nFounding fathers who gathered together on May 25 1963 in Addis Ababa to establish the OAU (now AU) had to come up with a united, independent and strong Africa.\nThey dedicated their lives and worked tirelessly to liberate Africa from the shackles of colonialism.\nThe OAU was established, first and foremost, with the express objective of working towards the greater unity of the African continent while at the same time ensuring that the remaining colonies on the African continent are assisted to achieve their freedom and independence.\nThe memory of the founding fathers should not got to waste.\nThe legacy of the likes of Dr Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Modibo Keita of Mali, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Sekou Touré of Guinea, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Ben Bella of Algeria, Emperor Haile Selasse of Ethiopia, William Tubman of Liberia, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa of Nigeria, Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya and many others who were part of the major driving forces for a common and shared vision for Africa must live on and never be downplayed.\nTheir vision inspired the pan-African movement and also influenced the transformation of the continental body in the years that followed.\nThese founding fathers must continue to be part of our collective memory as the continent continues to celebrate their work and soldier on in achieving their dreams.\nR – is for Resources\nAfrica has a large quantity of natural resources including oil, diamonds, gold, platinum, iron, cobalt, uranium, copper, bauxite, silver, petroleum and a whole range of plant genetic resources. Much of its natural resources are undiscovered and have not been harnessed. Africa is the prime target of most industrial nations who want to exploit its resources.\nDespite the abundance of natural resources, the bulk of resources exploited from Africa is causing most of the value and money from the natural resources to go to the West rather than the African.\nAfrica could be losing more than US$15 billion from its biodiversity as medicines, cosmetics, agricultural products and indigenous knowledge surrounding these are being patented illegally by multinational companies without any of the benefits accruing to local communities in countries of origin.\nThe scourge of illicit financial flows (IFF) from the continent is milking the continent dry. Proceeds from Africa’s resources that could easily turn the continent into one of the most developed and industrialised continents in the world are being squirrelled away in billions depriving the majority of the poor of vital infrastructure, uninterrupted power supplies, jobs and a peaceful and stable socio-economic environment. Economists estimate that Africa is losing up to US$70 billion a year through illicit financial flows — the illegal movement of money out of Africa countries, mostly by transnational corporations.\nThe Global Financial Integrity calls IFFs “the ugliest chapter in international affairs since slavery”, and says as a percentage of GDP, IFFs in Africa are the highest in the world, with multinational corporations a lead contributor, undermining the effect of foreign direct investment and aid.\nFor Africa’s struggling masses, the questions are: “What are we as Africans doing to help stop IFFs, to stop transnational corporations from cheating African nations out of revenue due to them? What is the role of multilateral finance institutions in all this? It is estimated that Africa has lost more than US$1,8 trillion to IFFs between 1970 and 2008 through tax evasion, mispricing of goods and services by multi-national companies.\nIf nothing is done to halt IFFs, Africa’s resources that are intended to develop the continent will be used to improve the quality of life for people in industrialised countries.\nI – for Inter-Africa trade\nAfrican countries are losing out on billions of dollars in potential trade earnings every year because of high trade barriers with neighbouring countries‚ and that it was easier for Africa to trade with the rest of the world than with itself. Africa has a great potential to increase intra-continental trade and create more economic opportunities.\nSub-regional and regional economic groupings are no doubt a great step towards a realisation of the African dream for intra-continental trade and the creation of the African Economic Community.\nOver-reliance on Western markets still remains high and Africa is the loser in this scenario in which rich powerful nations peg the prices for their commodities.\nIntra-Africa trade has the potential to transform the continent and this has been shared by all African leaders and technocrats at various African trade and investment indabas. According to the Africa Economic Outlook Report 2016, intra-regional trade accounted for only 16 percent of Africa’s total trade in 2014, mainly driven by manufactured goods which accounted for 60 percent of total regional trade. The report, notes that the commercial potential of the continent has not yet reached its peak, calls for increased trading within the continent saying intra-African trade would greatly boost growth and development. Economic experts all agree that intra-regional trade is key to boosting economies and in the fight to attain all Sustainable Development Goals. Despite the challenges, regional economic groupings in Africa, are making steady efforts to boost inter -Africa trade.\nC is for Common vision\nGreater regional coordination and a common vision are required for the development of a vibrant Africa in all its key production and processing sectors. Africa needs a strong resolve to reverse the trends of poor performance in all key sectors including accountability, transparency and governance of its projects. Experts all agree that promoting successful innovative partnership platforms, investments in public-private partnerships, smallholder farmer initiatives and the agro-processing sector remains key.\nThe adoption by African leaders in 2015 of Agenda 2063 as the continent’s new long-term vision for the next 50 years was a milestone in the history of Africa. What now remains is the task of fast-tracking the implementation and monitoring of major continental development programmes and frameworks, including Agenda 2063 and the SDGs for the benefit of the continent’s people.\nA is for Aids and health-related matters\nAfter more than 30 years of battling the HIV and Aids, Africa has registered some success in slowing the rate of HIV/AIDS infections to appreciable levels. The progress in tackling the pandemic on the continent has been evident particularly on prevention, treatment and care. According to the latest report by UNAIDS, Global AIDS Update 2016, new HIV infections declined by 14 percent between 2010 and 2015 in Eastern and Southern Africa, the world’s most affected region, and by 8 percent in West and Central Africa. Despite economic constraints, sub-Saharan Africa set up the world’s biggest HIV treatment programmes, providing antiretroviral (ARV) treatment to more than 12 million people, compared with 11 000 in the year 2000.\nHealth analysts say by 2015, for instance, about 10 million people living with HIV in East and Southern Africa and 1,8 million in West and Central Africa were on ARVs, according to the report. To achieve these results, the countries used several health approaches: affordable prices were negotiated for ARV medicines, service delivery systems were simplified and decentralised, and strong supply chains for ARV medicines and other HIV-related commodities were established. More and more countries are integrating prevention and treatment at the community level, meaning home-based caregivers are now becoming responsible for delivering treatments and managing patients. Addressing rising cases of non-communicable diseases such as cancer, diabetes and the constant threat of Ebola remains a major challenge for Africa. The recent outbreak of Ebola in the DRC is threatening the entire Southern African region and closer collaboration among states remains important.\nD is for Delivery\nMotivational speakers are well known for saying: “If you promised the moon, deliver it along with a handful of stars.” So many promises have been made in Africa in large and small blueprints and yet delivery still remains elusive. Delivering on promises is what the majority of the poor are waiting for. If our leaders follow through on a commitment, small or large, they build trust. And if they go above and beyond they even make an even stronger impression. When everything is said and done, Agenda 2063 has to deliver in terms of improved quality of life for people on the continent.\nA is for Aid\nMore aid is not the answer. Development aid is no substitute for sound economic policy choices. What Africa needs is trade and support to strengthen its industrialisation drive. After a decade of aid fatigue and dwindling development assistance, African countries are realising that domestic mobilisation of resources and financing their own development programmes is vital for sustainable development. Our accumulated knowledge of what works and what does not is now key in fighting issues of poverty and human hardships in Africa. The history of aid in Africa has been documented and shown to be inefficient and at times has proved more of a hindrance to development than a help. A case in point is development aid to Africa that has amounted to more than US$1 trillion since 1950. The pumping of this aid has also apparently increased the dependency syndrome in the period. Corruption has also frittered the resources while conditions have made the donor-receiver relations more complex and problematic. Aid has failed to deliver higher economic growth for Africa and new innovative strategies such as industrialisation plans, private and public sector reform and domestic mobilisation of resources are more crucial than ever now. Promoting entrepreneurship could also spur development.\nY is for Youth in Africa\nAfrican governments need to pay more attention to Africa’s youth which needs more empowerment programmes and more job creation initiatives to help transform the continent and defuse a ticking “time bomb”. With 200 million people aged between 15 and 24 (the youth bracket), Africa has the youngest population in the world. The current trend indicates that this figure will double by 2045, according to the 2012 African Economic Outlook report prepared by experts from the African Development Bank (AfDB) and other UN agencies. The story of Africa’s worrisome youth unemployment is shown by the dark side of drug abuse, crime, violence, sex and deaths by many attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea into Europe in search of jobs. The youth account for 60 percent of all African unemployed, according to the World Bank. About 10-12 million young people join the labour market each year in Africa and to defuse the youth unemployment time bomb, African governments need to mobilise resources, including from the private sector for youth development. Countries need to implement youth empowerment action plans to both unemployment and under-employment. The African youth are crying for the creation of safe, decent and competitive employment opportunities for themselves.\n“We must unite now or perish,” Kwame Nkrumah, said in 1963. – Zimpapers Syndication", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.herald.co.zw/africa-day-the-dream-lives-on/"}
{"doc_id": "a1eb9e6abace2eebb6b06ed7b0d44e7e", "text": "Nothing leads to more delays and inefficiencies than a government department/parastatal trying to go it alone. It is therefore refreshing to see more and more public private partnerships in Zimbabwe.\nWe saw the Justice Service commission partner a globally known company to help establish a tech-first approach. Now, the government has partnered with another global player, this time to help collect taxes on its behalf.\nThe Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) is responsible for collecting taxes and other revenues for the govt. But believe it or not, even with over a thousand employees, they are still understaffed. In a mostly informal economy, Zimra would have to employ half the population to keep track of every business venture in the country. Hence why we ended up getting the 2% tax.\nNow, the 2% tax was not the last of our finance minister’s revenue generating innovations. He also introduced taxes on companies that provide digital advertising, content, cloud computing, e-commerce, gambling, betting, gaming and cryptocurrency services to Zimbabweans. Seeing as the global economy is ever going digital, this move made all the sense in the world.\nGlobal effort to tax these companies\nThe pandemic saw digital service providers thrive as traditional industries struggled, and even other African countries prioritised taxing these companies. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is working on a framework that should guide countries on how to go about it.\nMost African countries have relied on indirect taxes like Value Added Tax but are yet to figure out direct taxes. For Zimbabwe, as led by Mthuli, we remain one of a few African countries with direct digital services taxes.\n5% ON gross income from satellite broadcasting services in respect of the provision or delivery of television or radio programs, and on e-commerce operators providing or delivering goods or services to persons resident in Zimbabwe FOR revenue in excess of USD 500,000 in any year of assessment\nOf course, these companies, which include Google, Facebook and Netflix, will just tack on the tax fee to the final price. We saw how the Netflix subscriptions shot up to include Value Added Tax. So, we’re looking at price increases for Zimbabweans but there’s nothing new there, the prices we pay even for local goods are affected in the same way.\nNew revenue streams are good for the govt but mean extra work for Zimra. Dealing with players like Facebook is not something Zimra has had to do extensively in the past. So, in order to efficiently collect taxes from such foreign players, Zimra had a few options:\nGo it alone and train current employees\nIt was 2019 when Mthuli Ncube first introduced digital services tax. So, the fact that Zimra only engaged a partner at the end of 2021 means they tried going it alone for a little bit. It didn’t work out as they hoped apparently and I assume the low amounts, for the time being, made it harder to justify this route.\nMaybe if the OECD had finalised its project on taxation in the digital economy and governments across the world had the same guidance would we have been able to go it alone.\nHire new employees with required skills\nAgain, the cost of taking on new employees for a tax regime for which practical implementation is still not nailed down does not seem like the best course of action to take.\nEngaging a knowledgeable partner\nThis became the only option for the time being,\nIT is hereby notified, in terms of section 46 of the Zimbabwe Investment and Development Act [Chapter 14:38], that on the 17th of October, 2021, the Republic of Zimbabwe entered into a public-private partnership agreement with Daedalus World Limited of Tortola, British Virgin Islands, in terms of which Daedalus World Limited will assist the Republic of Zimbabwe by providing a revenue collection service through taxing qualifying companies that provide digital advertising, content, cloud computing, e-commerce, gambling, betting, gaming and cryptocurrency services to persons and organisations within the territory of the Republic of Zimbabwe.\nGeneral Notice 71A of 2022- Public Private Partnerships\nLike it is for the Justice Service Commission partner, we once again looked beyond the borders of Zimbabwe. Maybe a suitable local candidate could not be found or maybe we never even looked. In either case, it still doesn’t make for good news. It means we are either ignoring the skills in our own country, choosing to shell out scarce forex unnecessarily. Or that we are not teaching these skills locally, which would actually be worse.\nSo who are Daedalus World?\nLocated in one of the most popular tax havens, this company appears to offer the exact services we were looking for. Daedalus says they help countries collect revenue in the digital economy. Daedalus says they understand,\nmodern taxation and advanced digital technology, and can provide the end-to-end solution from policy and legislation guidance, through cloud software and secure infrastructure to revenue recovery operations and support.\nDaedalus\nThat’s all well and good, however it is hard to track down who else has engaged Daedalus in the past. They appear to have been engaged as company secretaries for Greta Energy which appears to have since ceased trading.\nThe Daedalus website does not shed light on the matter, with the only post on the site being about the Zimbabwean appointment. In fact, the website appears to have been created less than a month ago. Oh, and there is no contact information whatsoever on the website; no email, no phone numbers, no online chat.\nSo, it is fair to say that Daedalus comes with a harder to verify track record. Quite unlike the Justice Service Commision partner. In the end though, I just hope the partnership leads to success.\nMy fear for small countries like Zimbabwe\nAs mentioned, the tax landscape is still a jumbled mess for digital services providers. Each country is implementing vastly different tax regimes. So, like Deloitte noted,\n…the nature and scope of the activities that may be regarded as being subject to a digital tax will vary between countries and may even include companies that would not necessarily consider themselves carrying out digital services or e-commerce activities. Thus, it will be imperative that companies operating in multiple jurisdictions across Africa keep abreast of the developments around digital taxes….\nDeloitte\nI hope these service providers are not put off by the extra legal and compliance work in the short term. These companies have experience in compliance with laws in different countries but new and different tax regimes will most certainly result in more work hours hence even new hires. This extra cost might be deemed ‘not worth it’ in the short term, especially in small countries like Zimbabwe. Instead, the companies could wait for the OECD’s guidelines.\nThat is not to mention the effect this would have on the adoption and growth of such services. Taxes lead to price increases and with every dollar increase, many potential users fall off.\nThe loss of income would be miniscule to these companies but for the local businesses/content creators reliant on these foreign companies it would be huge. I hope it doesn’t come to that.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.techzim.co.zw/2022/02/zim-partners-foreigner-to-collect-taxes-from-facebook-etc-who-is-this-partner/?amp=1"}
{"doc_id": "9e5e502d51425b65de5f83a4b6b1e875", "text": "Despite the stringent policy measures implemented by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), commercial banks in the country have witnessed a remarkable 44 percent year-on-year surge in their total credit to the private sector, reaching a substantial N59.7 trillion as of November 2023.\nData sourced from the CBN indicates that the private sector credit extension (PSCE) experienced a robust 43 percent increase over the eleven-month period leading up to November 2023.\nThe data encompasses lending activities across the entire banking system, encompassing entities beyond deposit money banks (DMBs), a new report by FBNQuest noted.\nDeposit money banks contribute to 69 percent of the overall figure, with additional lending from the CBN, state-owned development banks such as the Bank of Industry, and smaller credit extensions by other institutions including micro-finance banks and non-interest banks.\nIn response to rising inflationary pressures, the CBN has implemented a series of restrictive measures, as outlined in a report by FBNQuest.\nThese measures include the reintroduction of Open Market Operation (OMO) auctions, Cash Reserve Requirement (CRR) debits, lifting the N2.0 billion cap on Standing Deposit Facility for Deposit Money Banks (DMBs), and modifying the asymmetric corridor of the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) to (+100/-300bps) from the previous (+100/-700bps).\nTo effectively curb inflation, the CBN has consistently pursued liquidity tightening through OMO sales. In the fourth quarter of 2023, the Central Bank conducted three OMO auctions, followed by another in January 2024. During the most recent auction, the CBN set a one-year tenor with a stop rate of 17.5 percent, attracting a substantial oversubscription of N350 billion.\nOn January 11, 2024, the CBN conducted its first OMO sales of the year, amounting to N357.2 billion. These measures reflect the central bank’s commitment to employing strategic financial tools to maintain economic stability amidst inflation challenges.\nAs stakeholders analyze the implications of this significant uptick, it remains to be seen how the central bank will respond to this unexpected surge in private sector credit.\nMuda Yusuf, director of the Centre for Promotion of Private Enterprise (CPPE), expressed deep concern over the excessive spread between deposit and lending rates within the Nigerian banking system. According to Yusuf, this glaring discrepancy, exceeding 20 percent, is a troubling sign of serious efficiency issues in the country’s banking sector, making it one of the highest spreads globally.\nYusuf highlighted that the average spread for sub-Saharan countries is 10 percent, significantly lower than Nigeria’s current rate, and the global average stands at approximately 6.6 percent. The elevated spread in Nigeria is viewed as detrimental to investment growth and serves as a disincentive to savings.\nThe director emphasized the urgent need for the banking industry to address these inefficiencies, as such a substantial spread has far-reaching implications on the overall economic landscape. Investors and savers alike may be discouraged, impacting the country’s economic growth potential.\nThis revelation brings to the forefront the critical issue of addressing inefficiencies within the Nigerian banking system to foster a more conducive environment for investment and savings, ultimately contributing to sustainable economic development, he added.\n“The spread between deposit and lending rates in the Nigerian banking system is too high. It is an indication of serious efficiency issues in the banking system, Yusuf said.\nIn its latest move to combat rising inflation, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) convened in July 2023, marking the eighth consecutive increase in the benchmark interest rate to 18.75 percent.\nAs speculation mounts over the possibility of a new meeting this month, Nigeria’s Central Bank has yet to confirm the details.\nAnalysts at FSDH anticipate future interest rate adjustments to tackle inflation while maintaining a delicate balance to support economic growth and alleviate high borrowing costs. FSDH estimates the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) to stabilize at 19 percent in the first half of 2024, with potential downward adjustments in the latter half contingent on a decline in the inflation rate.\n“While interest rate hikes and the issuance of monetary instruments to mop up liquidity are inevitable, we do not envisage excessive rate increases, as the apex bank will also consider the need to boost economic growth and curtail high borrowing costs for both businesses and the government.\nThe MPR is expected at 19 percent in the first half (H1) of 2024 and will be adjusted downwards as the inflation rate declines in H2,” the analysts said.\n“Although the CBN is yet to release the MPC meeting calendar for the year, we anticipate that the committee will raise the MPR by around 25-50bps at its next meeting,” analysts at FBNQuest said.\nBanks net credit to the government has maintained a steady decline since the securitisation of the ways and means.\nIn three months alone, net credit to the government dropped by 76.68 percent to N5.16 trillion in November compared to N22.13 trillion recorded in September 2023, according to the CBN.\nThe sharp deceleration in credit extension to the government according to the FBNQuest report is unsurprising, considering the new CBN Governor’s plan to stop the financing of the government’s fiscal deficits through the Ways and Means advances and instead return to its core mandate of ensuring monetary and price level stability.\n“We view this as a positive development because the rise in productivity credit extension to the government has been one of the drivers of inflationary pressures in the country,” analysts at FBNQuest said.\n“With the headline reading for December 2023 surging by 72bps to 28.92 percent y/y and the continuous expansion of money supply, we believe that the Monetary Policy Committee will continue to raise interest rates to sustain its efforts in combating inflationary pressures,” the analysts said.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businessday.ng/banking/article/banks-loan-portfolio-surges-by-44-despite-cbns-tightening-measures/"}
{"doc_id": "9015c973cef57a9202bd42b69a2e6d1e", "text": "There’s a widespread belief that the Zimbabwean government along with other African states will be announcing Apollo Fintech as their partner in launching digital currencies.\nRumours are the coin will be gold-backed and the CEO of Apollo Fintech recently confirmed they are working with a country on a gold-backed coin:\nWe have gotten a large number of questions pertaining to rumors circulating that Apollo will be used in a strategy/survival MMO that is the distribution method for a gold backed coin. I want to set the record straight. It is true, and the details are coming soon.\nStephen McCullah – CEO of Appollo Fintech\nApollo claims to be the fastest blockchain in the world – which has been one of the biggest constraints of the technology since it’s inception and has limited how much cryptos can scale in the past.\nApollo’s Steve McCullah also previously suggested that they were working with the Zimbabwean government “on more than one solution” on Xangle – a platform that aggregates crypto-related announcements:\nThe fintech also posted a blog post on the 24th of February stating that African payments were a priority in their strategy:\n…that is a major priority. We have been in conference with a number of central banks to design a product that would be superior to what is available now. It will not only be for Africa, but it is a focus.\nInterestingly, Apollo Fintech also currently offers a Government Bank Platform which they claim “gives a central bank the ability to conduct instant payments to and from any bank in the network using the local currency as well as foreign currency if needed.” This seems like something that could also interest our government and help them evade the effect of sanctions IF other banks were to ever join this platform.\nExpectations from those close to Apollo suggest that the gold-backed solution for Zim will be launching in about a month, and we have gotten in touch with Apollo Fintech for more information.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.techzim.co.zw/2020/03/government-to-partner-with-fintech-to-issue-gold-backed-cryptocurrency/?amp=1"}
{"doc_id": "410248efd966a670cde8a9f65183009c", "text": "The upsurge in COVID-19 cases around the world has kept global investors flocking the world’s safe-haven currency at an exponential rate, the high demand for the greenback is coming on the high geopolitical uncertainty prevailing in today’s financial market.\nAlso, it’s important to note at the currency market, the U.S dollar remains king. According to the International Standards Organization, 90% of currency trading done globally involves the U.S. dollar, most crypto assets, virtually the most liquid commodities are priced in the U.S dollar not forgetting about 40% of the world’s debt is dominated in the greenback.\nSo Nairametrics felt it paramount to ask a hedge fund manager, entrepreneurs, and financial experts, about what sectors or assets they would invest in if they had, say, $10,000.\nTheir responses were revealing and diverse as they were varied—ranging from; buying global equities, local stocks, real estate holdings to investing in digital assets.\nGavin Smith, veteran trader, and managing partner at Panxora Crypto Hedge Funds.\nI would scale into BTC $2,000 now, $2,000 when it comes off to $10,000, then add $2,000 at $9,000 and another $2,000 at the $8,000 level. If BTC then breaks above $13,000 I would buy any of the above orders that had not been filled of the remaining $2,000. I would put $500 into each of these four DeFi protocols: LINK, COMP, KNC, and OMG.”\nDeFi is an exceptionally volatile market and these would need active management, but they represent an opportunity with exceptional upside potential. This is a market our analysts are building a profile in, to advance our DeFi hedge fund later in the year.\nDebo Adejana – Founder, MD/CEO – Realty Point Limited.\nI follow the investment wisdom that says, ‘invest in what you know and understand’. I know and understand real estate probably more than any other investment asset class.\nSo, the decision as per what I will invest in with $10,000 which should be upwards of N4m is simply; Real Estate. I will either do rental income property as part of a properly organized shared-ownership structure or speculate on land depending on how much time I have with the money. The reasons are very basic, real estate investments have been known to survive and surpass any and every challenge.”\nDarlington-Morsi Onyemaka, Co-founder Quba Exchange Forbes Accelerator Cohort ’20.\nOne of the main pointers to a good investment portfolio is diversified across multiple asset classes which should be according to the investor’s risk appetite. Looking at my long-term investment strategy, real estate fits in perfectly for Ten-thousand dollar investment. My portfolio is already jam-packed with high-risk assets and Real Estate will do a great job at hedging the risk factors without minimizing profitability in any significant way.”\nIf I have a spare $10,000 right now for investment, first, I’ll invest 55% of the funds into new crypto startups being run by professionals and backed by companies like Coinlist; LID Protocol, and Binance. Second, I’ll invest 20% of the funds into Lead Token as there is still potential for massive growth in the coming months/years. Third, looking at the situation of Nigeria, and not knowing where the current protest (uprising) on #EndSARS is headed, I’ll reserve the rest 25% in USDC/USDT to hold against a potential Naira crash. I’m confident that there is every possibility that the Dollar will become scarce again in the coming weeks/months due to the ongoing protest, thereby returning instant gains for immediate spending on basic needs.”\nDapo-Thomas Opeoluwa Global Markets analyst and an Energy Trader.\n“There are so many ways to invest $10,000. The real question depends on the investor. His risk appetite, his investment horizon, when does he or she want to liquidate? The answers to these now limit the options of investments. So for safe and long-term investments, I always advise investing in index funds, Eurobonds or the Nigeria International Debt fund. This is with the caveat that says ‘low risk equals low returns’. Also, I usually would say, invest in investments that beat inflation so you won’t suffer negative real turns.”\nVictoria Njimanze Investment Analyst at a Nigerian Investment Bank\nWell, off my head I’ll go with Bonds, cryptocurrency, Stocks, and then alternatives. I would definitely make my findings first, but I’ll make a larger portion go into Bonds say 40%, 30% in cryptocurrency, 20% in stocks, and 10% in alternatives like commodity market so as to have a diversified portfolio.”\nAkinsola Esan, a credit risk analyst at Nigeria’s Tier 1 Bank.\nBasically, the goal is to earn substantial returns on investments – dividends, capital appreciation, and secondly, beat inflation in naira which is currently about 12.85%. With $10,000, I’ll spread my investments across foreign equities such as purchasing and holding stocks of companies like Apple, Facebook, Google, Fastly, Nio, Amazon, to list but a few, and also buy some top-performing dollar-denominated Mutual funds such as Vantage dollar funds and some other ones recommended by Nairametrics. Lastly, I will look in the area of cryptocurrencies by investing as much in bitcoin, Ethereum, and other recognized Cryptos. There are some dividend-paying stocks listed on the Nigerian stock exchange as well, I will consider holding a number of them.\nDue to the present fickle nature of global financial markets, most financial experts interviewed above are unsurprisingly keen on mostly U.S dollar-dominated financial assets, thus reflecting the greenback’s dominance in demand amid the COVID-19 infection exploding at an alarming rate.\nDownload Nairametrics App for breaking news and market intelligence.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://nairametrics.com/2020/10/19/where-to-invest-10000-right-now/"}
{"doc_id": "73634d6a3f00274563d75fea37f5c53a", "text": "Eskom has applied to energy regulator Nersa to hike tariffs by 32% on 1 April next year.\nIn its most recent price determination application to the National Energy Regulator of South Africa (Nersa), Eskom said the tariff hikes would cover emerging costs.\nThe power utility said that depreciation due to an incorrect asset valuation by the energy regulator, increases in diesel and fuel oil prices, and the cost implications of independent power producers all contribute to its 32.02% application.\nThe last increase granted to the national power utility was 9.61% for the year 2022. However, Eskom applied for a 20.5% increase.\nNersa has been trying to shift its methodologies in how it determines what Eskom can include in its tariff applications, but these have not been finalised. The regulator has been met with legal challenges from Eskom over the methodologies.\nEskom, meanwhile, is looking to completely overhaul its tariff structure to be more reflective of costs and keep pace with the changing energy landscape. Until these matters are settled, however, both Nersa and Eskom are using the old systems.\nEskom said that in this application, the total revenue as applied for in June 2021 of R335 billion for 2024 and R365 billion for 2025 – remains the same.\nThe Supreme Court of Appeal ruled that R59 billion of incorrectly deducted equity from the utility can be added back to it through the allowable revenue decisions for each year.\nFrom 1 April, R15 billion will be granted on top of the standard allowable revenue until 2026, then a final R14 billion in 2027.\n“The proposal is to allow these recovered amounts to be targeted towards the return on assets for the transmission and distribution network businesses.”\n“It also allows for the further migration towards cost reflectivity for the Eskom network businesses. Focus can then be shifted to the generation business in subsequent years,” said the utility.\nDiesel\nOne of the primary drivers of the new price application is the assumption that global factors such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict will continue to make diesel more expensive.\nSpeaking to the media on Monday (12 September), Eskom chief operating officer Jan Oberholzer said that R7.7 billion had been spent on diesel in the year’s first six months.\n“Are we proud of it? No. Do we have money to spend on this? No.”\nThis is way above the budget, Oberholzer said – it is the entire budget set for the year, six months in. “So we will overspend on diesel this year,” he said.\nThe power utility’s CEO, Andre de Ruyter, said that the overspending has been due to Eskom having to rely on more diesel than expected to try and avoid load shedding but also due to high global prices.\nEskom said that they submitted proposals to Nersa to restructure tariffs to allow for the allowable revenue allocations to reflect the costs better (unbundled, fixed and variable) included.\n“This ensures that customers are more aligned to the actual costs they impose on the system.”", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businesstech.co.za/news/energy/625978/eskom-wants-a-massive-32-electricity-price-hike-in-south-africa/"}
{"doc_id": "664f92db9ba067f672be57d2140640d6", "text": "2024 Budget balances relief for workers, bolstering revenues\nMartin Kadzere-Senior Business Reporter\nThe cocktail of tax measures introduced by Finance, Economic Development and Investment Promotion Minister Professor Mthuli Ncube yesterday in the 2024 Budget strikes a balance between providing relief to workers by raising the thresholds of tax-free income, bonuses and taxes on smallholder deliveries, while bolstering Government revenues to finance the economic development and infrastructure of Zimbabwe.\nThe tax measures are part of a comprehensive strategy aimed at easing the financial burden on taxpayers and using fiscal policy to tame speculation, bring the tuckshops and much of the informal sector into the main economy while simultaneously boosting the Government’s capacity to generate more revenue to support essential socio-economic programmes.\nUnveiling the 2024 National Budget that largely reflects the Government’s commitment to fostering a more equitable society, consolidating stability and driving economic growth, Minister Ncube proposed to raise the monthly tax-free threshold from $500 000 to $750 000, resulting in an annual tax-free threshold of $9 million and adjusting other tax bands so that the highest tax rate of 40 percent applies only to annual income exceeding $270 million.\nRegarding the local currency bonus tax-free threshold, he proposed to increase it from $500 000 to $7,5 million, meaning that almost everyone in formal employment will get their entire bonus tax free.\nThe proposed new tax thresholds would be effective from January 1, next year while the bonus tax-free threshold would take effect from November 1, 2023.\nThe widening of the bonus tax bands will provide much-needed relief to many employees, particularly low-income earners allowing them to retain a larger portion of their hard-earned money and boost their spending power, overcoming the “band creep” of the fairly low monthly inflation seen since mid-year when the last major adjustment was made.\nOn revenue enhancing measures, Minister Ncube proposed taxation of the micro and small enterprises and licencing of traders to restore the supply chain from the manufacturer to wholesaler and retailer. Under the new measures, only licenced and tax-compliant operators would procure goods from manufacturers and wholesalers. This provides a major incentive for the informal sector to regularise, but without the tax authorities having to spend any money on enforcement.\nTo ensure fair competition and enhance revenue collection, Minister Ncube proposed only traders registered for VAT purposes and in possession of valid tax clearance certificates will be eligible to procure goods from manufacturers. This would level the playing field and ensure all businesses contribute to the fiscus, the minister said.\nPresident Mnangagwa and his two Vice Presidents Constantino Chiwenga and Kembo Mohadi follow proceedings during the 2024 National Budget presentation at the New Parliament Building in Mt Hampden yesterday. — Picture: Innocent Makawa.\nThe measure would also end the growing practice of the US dollar underground cash economy, with tuckshops in the lead, being the preferred customers of manufacturers. They can still buy direct, but now need to be licenced, collecting and paying VAT, just like the formal sector.\nFurthermore, he wants to include more by lowering the VAT registration threshold to US$25 000 or local currency equivalent, effective January 1. This adjustment aims to bring more businesses into the formal tax system and broaden the base of VAT payers.\nEnterprises that meet the revised threshold will be required to register for VAT and comply with all applicable regulations. Failure to do so will result in the imposition of penalties.\nGiven the recent developments where mining rights are disposed of privately outside the country “at astronomic prices”, revenue generated on sale would be shared equally with the State. Even local mining rights sales will only be valid if all capital gains and other taxes are paid. The move should dampen the extreme speculation in mining rights, without affecting the real miners who produce the minerals.\nTo enable the Government to track the movement of mining rights for tax purposes, a register of mining rights with a record of applications, grants, variations, dealings, assignments, transfers, suspensions and cancellations will be kept at Zimra.\nAny lithium processing that does not result in the production of lithium carbonate will not be considered beneficiation and will be subject to an export tax. Lithium cannot be processed to the extremely reactive metal, and lithium carbonate is the product that is traded globally and which is what is delivered to battery factories.\nTo ensure compliance, all lithium producers will be required to submit their beneficiation plans by March 31, next year. No new licences will be granted to prospective lithium mining firms without prior approval of their beneficiation plans.\nMinister Ncube also proposed to introduce a 1 percent levy on the gross proceeds of lithium, black granite, cut or uncut dimensional stones and quarry stones. This levy will be directly channelled towards community development initiatives and ensure the benefits of mining activities are shared equitably among those most impacted.\nThe Finance Minister proposed to enact the international rules on the Domestic Minimum Top-up Tax (DMTT) rules to prevent ceding taxing rights to foreign jurisdictions on top-up tax arising from tax incentives that are provided to those investments. The DMTT is part of the Global Rules, which aim to ensure that global profits of large multinational enterprises are taxed at a minimum corporate income tax rate of 15 percent.\nGranting of tax incentives results in an effective tax rate of less than 15 percent for some multinationals, but now their Zimbabwe subsidiaries will have to pay the difference for local operations.\nUnder the Global Tax Rules, where a tax incentive results in an effective rate of less than 15 percent, the tax jurisdiction where the multinational is headquartered collects the difference between the effective tax under the tax incentive and the minimum effective rate of 15 percent , the top-up tax.\nThe DMTT allows the country where the low tax profits arise to collect that tax on operations within its jurisdiction, rather than ceding taxing rights to the headquarters jurisdiction. The calculation of the DMTT will be based on the effective tax rate charged on the jurisdictional profits, not the jurisdictions’ statutory corporate income tax.\nTo secure the necessary funding for road infrastructure development, the strategic reserve levy would be raised by 3UScents a litre for diesel and 5UScents a litre for petrol, from January 1. The extra money is added to the pool for road infrastructure.\nMinister Ncube proposed an increase of toll fees on premium roads, including the Harare-Beitbridge, Plumtree-Mutare, and other designated routes with effect from January 1, 2024. The revenue generated from these increased fees will be directly deposited into the Consolidated Revenue Fund, ensuring its allocation towards road infrastructure.\nTo discourage consumption of high sugar content beverages, he proposed to introduce a levy of 2USc a gramme of sugar contained in beverages from January 1, with the money assigned to cancer health services. This has become common around the world.\nMinister Ncube proposed the introduction of a Wealth Tax levied at a rate of 1 percent of market values of residential properties with a minimum value of US$100 000. Those over 70 will not pay this on their principal residence. Another tax again aimed at the rich imposes a series of duty surcharges on vehicles valued at more than US$120 000 on import.\nOn the excise duty, he wants better enforcement. “The growth of illicit trade, in particular, cigarettes, has increased contraband cigarettes produced in legally registered factories under registered brands, thereby decelerating the growth of revenue to the fiscus.\n“A digital platform that provides real-time, traceable and authentic data on locally manufactured goods would be beneficial to the fiscus. Government, will, thus, explore the implementation of a digital platform on locally produced goods, in particular, cigarettes.”\nThe 2024 National Budget, themed, “Consolidating Economic Transformation,” builds on socio-economic achievements that have been made over the past five years and seeks to place the country on a solid foundation for further development and growth.\n“Going into 2024, the budget seeks to consolidate and entrench the stability to facilitate economic transformation and preserve disposable incomes,” said Minister Ncube.\n“Fiscal restraint and tight monetary policy, together with a healthy current account position, provides the necessary conditions for currency and price stability.”\nIn line with the projected economic growth of 3,5 percent next year, total revenue collections in 2024 are estimated at $53,9 trillion or 18,3 percent of the GDP.\nAlmost all, $51,2 trillion would be tax revenue. Expenditures are projected at $58,2 trillion. This means a portion of the capital budget, although a lot is still funded from taxes, will come from borrowing, with the rest of the borrowing needed to pay off matured loans.\nThe proposed expenditures for next year take into account safeguarding the purchasing power of incomes of civil servants, ensuring the continuous provision of essential social services to vulnerable groups, maintaining and rehabilitating Government infrastructure, prioritising support for ongoing public infrastructure projects, preventing the accumulation of arrears as well as increasing funding for capital projects through public-private partnerships, Minister Ncube said.\nCivil servants will see their Covid-19 allowances consolidated into their pensionable salaries.\nThe 2024 budget is estimated to face a financing gap of $9,2 trillion, which includes the $4,3 trillion budget deficit or 1,5 percent of the GDP and $4,9 trillion needed to repay maturing loans and Government securities. The Government aims to bridge this gap through a combination of domestic and external borrowing.\nMinister Ncube said the Government was looking to maintain a month-on-month inflation rate below 3 percent throughout next year, a move that aims to stabilise prices.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.herald.co.zw/2024-budget-balances-relief-for-workers-bolstering-revenues/"}
{"doc_id": "2f117579ff48241f746c07d5a125467f", "text": "Going into the Investment Conference this week, South Africa needs to put its best foot forward; however, it has done little to make itself look attractive to foreign and domestic investors, says Busi Mavuso, the CEO of Business Leadership South Africa (BLSA).\nThe fifth and final South African Investment Conference (SAIC) will be held in Johannesburg on 13 April and forms part of the government’s plans to attract R1.2 trillion in investment over five years.\nSAIC brings delegates from around the world to South Africa, and last year’s event raised R367 billion in investment commitments – putting the country closer to its five-year goal. Since the first conference in 2018, South Africa has attracted R1.14 trillion in investment commitments.\nTo ensure that investment into the country keeps flowing, constant care needs to be taken regarding the ‘brand’ of South Africa shown to investors.\nMavuo said that if the government wants to ensure that trillions of dollars are invested in the country, government communications should draw focus to the progress in ending load shedding, commitment to the national energy plan and renewables, not exempting Eskom from disclosure requirements, the importance of coal, and clearing up confusion over the national state of disaster.\nAccording to the CEO, last week’s debacles involving the recall of the national state of disaster as well as Eskom’s exemption from reporting certain financials, made the runup to the conference very weak.\n“There were several blunders in how government communicates to the market,” said Mavuso.\nOne of the most notable blunders was around the exemption given to Eskom, allowing it to skip reporting irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditure in its annual financial statements.\nOn 5 April, finance minister Enoch Godongwana withdrew the exemption. Treasury initially said that the exemption was instated primarily to protect the embattled power utility’s credit rating and audit opinion – this, however, was met with mass public outcries over it being abused for further corruption at the company.\nMavuso said: “The way it (the exemption) was communicated to the market (created the impression) that the exemption was to enable withholding of information from rating agencies (and this) was a serious blunder. It damages the government’s reputation as an honest counterpart to investors.”\nDespite the exemption being withdrawn, Godongwana has made it clear that it is only a temporary withdrawal, and that the exemption will be reinstated at some point. Thus the anxiety around the move persists.\nA further blunder was made by the electricity minister Kgosientso Ramokgopa who told journalists last week that South Africa’s ageing coal power fleet needs to become a priority again – diverting attention away from the overall transition of South Africa’s energy sector to more renewable power supplies.\n“While it is completely right that the stations should be managed to improve performance, the minister was widely quoted saying that their lives should be extended through greater government investment while more should be invested in coal mines to produce more coal,” Mavuso said.\n“This would not be about running the stations better, but about breaking with the plan set out by the National Electricity Crisis Committee (NECOM) based on the existing decommissioning schedule for Eskom plants.”\nMavuso said that while the minister himself may not have intended to imply a swing away from renewable, his comments risk being interpreted poorly by foreign investors who are planning to pour billions into the country’s transition away from coal.\nRamping up renewables should be the focal point of the minster of electricity if investment is to flood into the country, Mavuso said.\n“One of the PR opportunities was that Nersa released data showing 1.2GW of new electricity production was registered in March, bringing the total for the quarter to 2.4GW. That is half the nameplate capacity of Medupi, registered in a single quarter…That is quite some achievement, yet there was no press release and no comment on it from the minister,” said Mavuso.\nShe said that if ever there was an opportunity to tell a credible story of progress toward resolving load shedding, the minister should have outlined this.\nSouth Africa’s bad PR continued with the sudden withdrawal of the state of disaster on the energy crisis. The state of disaster was already under intense scrutiny from businesses, politicians and citizens for ultimately being meaningless. The sudden termination essentially cemented this view.\n“The unavoidable impression is that government did not have good grounds for announcing a state of disaster and that it was completely unnecessary in dealing with the electricity crisis,” Mavuso said.\nGoing into the Investment Conference this week, Mavuso said that government needs to signal to the world that it is committed to the transition to renewables.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businesstech.co.za/news/business-opinion/679183/south-africa-keeps-scoring-own-goals-and-investors-are-taking-note/"}
{"doc_id": "c6ec752fe5b3b2f1be6e523e9d7bb352", "text": "Merafe Resources’ attributable ferrochrome production from the Glencore Merafe Chrome Venture was 75kt in the fourth quarter to December 31, 2023, from 97kt in the same period in 2022, Merafe said on Friday.\nThis resulted in a decrease of about 22% in production for the year to that date, compared to the prior comparative period.\nThe reduction in production was due to planned pull back resulting from market conditions. Only the Lion smelter operated over the three-month high electricity demand winter season, a period of elevated power prices, Merafe said in a quarterly report on Friday.\nFor the year ended December 31, attributable ferrochrome production fell to 300kt from 384kt the year before.\nMerafe’s share price slipped 2.2% to R1.29 on the JSE on Friday afternoon, but the price was nevertheless much higher than the 43 cents that it traded at three years ago on the same day. It closed the day 1.52% higher at R1.34.\nBUSINESS REPORT", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/companies/merafes-annual-ferrochrome-production-falls-22-last-year-182d2047-778a-42fb-bfdf-7b8adea70ff1"}
{"doc_id": "14f19e490126d9a37e26806c6d6c930c", "text": "By Chineme Okafor in Abuja\nNigeria has in the last 10 years dropped from being the second highest gas flaring nation in the world to now occupy the seventh position, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) disclosed yesterday.\nAccording to the NNPC in a statement from its Group General Manager, Public Affairs, Mr. Ndu Ughamadu, the country between 2006 and 2016, succeeded in reducing gas flare from her oil and gas fields by 26 percent within the 10-year period.\nIt explained that from 36 per cent flare rate it recorded between the periods, the country now flares only 10 per cent of gas from her fields in the Niger Delta.\nThe NNPC’s report was also corroborated by the World Bank’s Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership (GGFR), which indicated that as at the close of 2015, Russia, Iraq, Iran, the United States, Venezuela and Algeria were the six other countries ahead of Nigeria in global gas flaring.\nNotwithstanding, the NNPC said in the statement that the rate of reduction was part of efforts to preserve the country’s environment, and monitise her gas resources.\nThe statement was provided to THISDAY in Abuja, and it noted that in explaining the gas flare reduction trend, NNPC’s Chief Operating Officer, Upstream, Mallam Bello Rabiu, noted that as at 2006 Nigeria was flaring 2.5 billion standard cubic feet (bcf) of gas, while consuming only 300 million (mscf) of gas per day.\nRabiu however stated that a raft of technological innovation had helped the industry to record a drastic flare down.\nHe added that the drastic reduction was achieved through aggressive gas commercialisation which is anchored on the country’s gas master plan.\nHe said: “The gas master plan was geared towards addressing four key critical issues of gas availability, infrastructure, commercialisation framework and gas affordability.”\nRabiu further explained that though the implementation of the plan was driven by NNPC, it was however sponsored by all the oil and gas companies operating in the country, adding that this has helped in addressing some of the issues that were confronting the gas sector.\nHe stated that in order to ensure gas affordability, the plan stipulates a lower price for gas to the power sector which is the most important economic segment of the country, while other sectors get gas at commercial rates.\nThis measure, according to him, was to ensure that gas producers get value for the gas they produce for sale.\nOn other actions by the government to end gas flaring in the country, Rabiu said government had also designed a national gas policy which would among other things end gas flaring by 2020.\nHe explained that the policy had been circulated to all operators to guide them on the direction of the government with regard to how it wants the nation’s abundant gas resources deployed.\nHe said the policy document was being studied by all stakeholders in order to put them on the same page with the government.\nRabiu also informed that the government provided a guarantee of payment to gas suppliers through the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and the World Bank three weeks ago as part of incentives to get the oil and gas companies to commercialise more of their gas.\nHe said this a very important measure the NNPC had been working on since 2008.\nOn appropriate gas pricing, he stated that a Gas Aggregation Company of Nigeria had been established by all the gas producing companies in Nigeria to work towards achieving parity between domestic and export gas price.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2017/04/03/nnpc-nigeria-drops-to-seventh-highest-gas-flaring-country"}
{"doc_id": "4dd1513f6ec970f7b1925ee3417e448f", "text": "Sirius Real Estate, the UK and Germany branded business and industrial park operator with listings on the JSE and London Stock Exchange, is acquiring two more properties in Germany for €40 million (R928.1m).\nThe acquisition of two business parks had been notarised, one in Köln and the other in Göppingen. The acquisitions were made using proceeds of November's £147m capital raise, Sirius said in a statement Monday.\nThe acquisitions followed the three acquisitions in North London, UK at the end of last year for £33.5m.\nThe two business parks in Germany added just under 55 000 square metres of primarily light industrial and production space to the group's 1.9 million square metre German portfolio.\nThe Köln business park comprises 19 114 square metres of light industrial space. It was notarised at a price of €20m and currently generated rental income of €1.67m and annualised net operating income of €1.56m. Occupancy was just over 89%.\nIn Göppingen in southern Germany, Sirius was acquiring a multi-tenanted business park with a lettable area of 35 160 square metres of mainly light industrial and production space. It was notarised at €19.8m and generated total rental income of €1.78m and an annualised net operating income of €1.47m.\nBoth business parks were situated in “highly desirable micro-locations within well-established light industrial zones,” and benefited from good transport networks and connectivity, Sirius’ CEO, Andrew Coombs, said in a statement.\n\"These acquisitions provide the company with strong day one cash flow from a stable, diversified tenant base and align well with our strategy of curating a range of flexible out-of-town light industrial products that we expect to appeal to the local market,“ he said.\nHe said Sirius was in advanced discussions with over €70m of additional opportunities across Germany and the UK.\nBUSINESS REPORT", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/companies/sirius-acquires-two-new-industrial-estates-in-germany-5cb36c6f-dcdf-4559-bae3-22ebc1008667"}
{"doc_id": "97a1423371a8cf0dec432989f994357b", "text": "There are numerous driving and refuelling habits motorists can use to help them reduce fuel consumption and save money.\nIn recent months, South Africans have been paying more than ever for petrol and diesel.\nThe outlook for the near future remains bleak.\nIf you plan to hit the road in December to travel to family or your favourite holiday destination, your fuel expenditure could come as a bit of a shock.\nBelow are 10 tips for cutting your fuel consumption and saving fuel costs.\n1. Reduce unnecessary weight\nThe heavier your vehicle, the harder your engine has to work to keep it moving. Don’t travel with unnecessary weight in your boot.\n2. Use the heater without the air conditioning\nVehicles with regular internal combustion engines can heat your car without requiring the air conditioning to be turned on. Without the aircon’s compressor running, you will use less fuel. Turn the A/C off when you only need heat.\n3. Open windows versus aircon\nIf it’s a scorching day and you need to keep cool, open your windows when driving at low speeds and keep the air conditioning turned off.\nHowever, when driving at 80km/h or faster, open windows can introduce significant drag, and your air conditioner will likely end up consuming less fuel.\n4. Check tyre pressure\nUnder-inflated tyres occupy a larger piece of the road, increasing resistance and fuel consumption.\nThe US National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has found that under-inflation by 10% could increase fuel consumption by 2%.\nTyre pressure can change naturally over time due to various factors, including temperature.\nFor optimal consumption, regularly pump up your tyres to the recommended pressure of your manufacturer, which is typically shown on the inside of your door or in the manual.\nWith low-rolling-resistance tyres, you can pump the pressure 0.3-0.5 bars above the recommendation.\n5. Keep your revs low\nIf you have a manual gearbox, then shifting gears efficiently can factor heavily into your fuel usage. In addition to putting more strain on your engine, high revving increases fuel consumption.\nTry and maintain 1,500-2000rpm while cruising and keep it below 3,000 when accelerating, when possible.\n6. Plan your trips\nIf you have to visit multiple destinations on a single day, pool them together and work out the shortest route between your stops to minimise travel distance.\nAdd your stops on Google Maps and then re-arrange them to find the shortest route.\n7. Use the right oil\nUsing high-quality oil with low viscosity will help reduce engine friction and improve fuel economy.\nTotal Energies claim that 5W-30 and 0W-30 oils reduce fuel consumption by around 3%, compared to 10W-40 and 5W-40 oils.\nMobil provides a guide that shows the recommended oil for your particular vehicle, or you can find it in your car’s maintenance manual.\n8. Service your car regularly\nServicing your car according to the correct schedule will help ensure that your oil and air filters are changed as required, tyre pressure is correct, and worn spark plugs are replaced, among other fuel-efficient optimisations.\nWorn spark plugs can be a big trouble-maker, increasing fuel consumption by up to 30%.\n9. Don’t idle too long\nIf your car has been standing in the heat for a long time, rather open the windows and start driving than wait for it to cool down while stationary with the aircon turned on.\nIf you are stuck in terrible traffic and are stationary for more than 30 seconds, switch your engine off to reduce fuel consumption when it is safe to do so.\n10. Avoid sharp stops and quick acceleration\nBraking sharply and accelerating quickly will increase fuel consumption by forcing you or your car to switch gears at a faster rate.\nEPA testing has shown that heavy braking and quick acceleration can reduce fuel economy by as much as 33% while driving on a highway.\nRather than rush to stop at a red light or stop street, drive consistently, brake slowly, and accelerate gradually.\nThe myth: Fuel up when it’s cooler\nSome people claim that filling your car when it is cooler will mean you get more bang for your buck as fuel expands with heat.\nThe claim suggests that fuel will evaporate in hotter temperatures and that the fuel you put in your tank in a cooler environment will be denser.\nThe truth is that fuel stations store petrol and diesel in well-insulated tanks, preventing most of the loss through evaporation.\nEven while the fuel is being poured into your tank, the losses would be nearly inconsequential.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businesstech.co.za/news/broadband/534148/how-to-save-money-on-petrol-in-south-africa/"}
{"doc_id": "c9575d4a5bb264d10e7b6677b5a809e9", "text": "Some of us are old enough to remember when SIM cards were out of the reach of many people. I’ve heard stories of people selling their cattle to buy SIM cards and that is not an exaggeration, we really did buy cards for over $300 at one point.\nSome of us are still bitter about that because we understand that it was a lack of competition that led to that. We had just 3 mobile network operators (MNOs) and as demand rose they realised we had no other vendor to look to. So they charged whatever they wanted and we paid, we murmured, but we paid.\n“Those greedy bastards,” we were taught to think as kids. However, looking back, it was a little more complicated than that, kind of like the whole #DataMustFall debate today. There was a greed element to it, of course, but there were also some legit reasons.\nZimbabwe had started on its journey to total mayhem in the hyperinflation era and foreign currency was scarce, kind of like today. So, as the cost of producing and importing SIM cards remained stable in foreign currency, mobile network operators had to hike prices.\nOf course, what they charged was excessive for what they were making up for, in my opinion. However, they did struggle to acquire foreign currency needed to import the cards, leading to limited availability. With high demand and low supply, they took full advantage.\nThe storm passed\nAnyway, today the SIM card is no longer a status symbol. Sometimes prices can rise to $5 when supply chains are disrupted but for the most part you can get one for $1.\nAt one point, the $1 SIM card came with $1 airtime and so it was actually free. The MNOs had realised they stood to make more from repeat business than from the sale of SIM cards.\nOne hopes the same will happen to data prices soon. It’s just a matter of time until we are paying $15 for unlimited mobile data plans. At least I prophecy so.\nThe SIM card and your personal information\nWhen SIM card prices fell, purchasing one was easier than purchasing tomatoes from the table by the corner in your neighbourhood.\nOf course, you had to give out some of your personal information, you know; name, address, height, blood type and mother’s maiden name but for $1 a pop, we were not complaining.\nHowever, the mobile network operators were not really collecting that information. You could approach a dude by the MNOs store’s door, get a SIM and ask him to submit the information on your behalf.\nAs a result, some of these application forms got to the MNO with mistakes and some had fake names altogether. How could they not? – the vendor in the street couldn’t care less what you wrote down, as long as you paid cash.\nRecently, the regulator has been on the MNOs’ case to make sure they collect the information, including copies of national IDs and proofs of residence. Some people report getting lines without providing some of that but that shouldn’t be the case.\nThe SIM card and the government\nWhy does the government want this information collected? Well, let’s turn to Afghanistan to paint the picture. Let me land.\nWhen the Taliban returned to power in 2021, some Afghanis understandably fled the country, many to neighbouring Pakistan. Kind of like Zimbabweans flocking to South Africa.\nNow, Pakistan has had about enough of these refugees and is kicking then back from whence they came. Kind of like how the South Africans feel about Zimbabweans.\nYou can imagine the fear these Afghani refugees have when they are forced to trek back to their Taliban run country. However, they have been surprised to find care packages waiting for them as they reenter the country.\nTheir government prepared food, tents, and free SIM cards for them. Curious, isn’t it? Food, shelter and a SIM card. A family can get up to 4 free SIM cards and even women and girls, who are kind of like second class citizens there can get those SIM cards.\nThe Taliban stripped away their rights to even drive but feels they should get SIM cards which will expose them to the internet. What gives?\nThis could be a sign of even the Taliban understanding that the digital revolution cannot be stopped and that economies stand to prosper when the population has access to affordable and reliable communication.\nNah, it’s not that.\nThe SIM card and control\nWhen a government has access to information about SIM cards, it gains significant control over its citizens and their communication activities. I think it’s safe to assume the Taliban has access to the MNOs’ systems.\nHere are some of the things access to SIM data grants governments:\nSurveillance and Monitoring:\n- Tracking location and movement: Through base station (tower) data, the movement of individuals can be tracked in real-time. At any given time we can see where you are, roughly, by looking at where your SIM card is connecting from.\n- Interception of communications: By accessing call logs, text messages, and even internet traffic, governments can intercept and monitor communication. Which would be useful when some youths plan an uprising.\n- Identifying individuals: SIM card registration data, including names, addresses, and identification numbers, can be used to identify individuals both online and offline, facilitating surveillance and targeted interventions.\nNo wonder governments love promoting the use of mobile phones. Who can find fault in them promoting communication, information access, and individual empowerment? – as they would put it.\nMakes you look at the Zimbabwean government’s celebration of our mobile penetration rate (97.5%) in a different way, doesn’t it?\nIt doesn’t even end there. Again, the level of control varies depending on the specific policies and regulations in place. However, the following is also possible all from the humble SIM card.\nCensorship and propaganda\nGovernments can utilise targeted marketing and advertising through SIM card data to influence public opinion. It’s becoming a staple in Zimbabwe, where every election cycle we are bombarded with SMSs from the ruling party. We have talked about this countless times.\nThey can also engage in social control by analyzing communication patterns to build detailed profiles of individuals. They can use those profiles when making decisions on services, employment, and travel. You might find that your town or neighbourhood is skipped when free T-shirts are disbursed. Pane maT-Shirts atichakupai and I never got one.\nGovernments can also disrupt communication networks, including mobile phone services and internet access, during protests or periods of unrest, silencing dissent and hindering the flow of information.\nLast year, one opposition party tried to build an independent communication system that the government could not control. All to make sure they could send information from all corners of the country without inopportune network slowdowns disrupting their work.\nI don’t think the parallel vote tabulation system worked as intended in the end but it was only conceived because of the threat of the government disrupting communication networks.\nThe humble SIM card\nWe may not look twice at the humble SIM card but it is a valuable little thing. For the MNOs it presents a customer they can extract value from for years to come and for the government it’s worth much more than money.\nYou cannot fight this, you have give out your personal details to play. Now you can do so knowing just what you’re giving up and weigh that against the access the SIM card gives you.\nOr maybe when you got your SIM card, the MNOs and the government were still lax about the whole personal information collection thing. In which case, don’t lose that card.\nAnyways, these are just the ramblings of a tin-foil-hat-wearing fella, so don’t take it too seriously. After all, some countries have policies and laws to ensure the government does not abuse its access to SIM card data.\nI’m sure Zimbabwe is one of those countries, notwithstanding the unsolicited Zanu PF messages that are sent to the general population every election cycle.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.techzim.co.zw/2024/01/when-govt-gives-free-sim-cards-know-potential-for-tracking-and-surveillance-is-huge/"}
{"doc_id": "fc9c581038c4f66db51b14cae81349cc", "text": "International tourism continued its recovery in January 2022, with a much better performance compared to the weak start to 2021. However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine adds pressure to existing economic uncertainties, coupled with many Covid-related travel restrictions still in place. Overall confidence could be affected and hamper the recovery of tourism.\nBased on the latest available data, global international tourist arrivals more than doubled (+130 percent) in January 2022 compared to 2021 – the 18 million more visitors recorded worldwide in the first month of this year equals the total increase for the whole of 2021.\nWhile these figures confirm the positive trend already underway last year, the pace of recovery in January was impacted by the emergences of the Omicron variant and the re-introduction of travel restrictions in several destinations. Following the 71 percent decline of 2021, international arrivals in January 2022 remained 67 percent below pre-pandemic levels.\nEurope and Americas perform strongest\nAll regions enjoyed a significant rebound in January 2022, though from low levels recorded at the start of 2021. Europe (+199 percent) and the Americas (+97 percent) continued to post the strongest results, with international arrivals still around half pre-pandemic levels (-53 percent and -52 percent, respectively).\nThe Middle East (+89 percent) and Africa (+51 percent) also saw growth in January 2022 over 2021, but these regions saw a drop of 63 percent and 69 percent respectively compared to 2019. While Asia and the Pacific recorded a 44 percent year-on-year increase, several destinations remained closed to non-essential travel resulting in the largest decrease in international arrivals over 2019 (-93 percent).\nBy subregions, the best results were recorded by Western Europe, registering four times more arrivals in January 2022 than in 2021, but 58 percent less than in 2019. Additionally, the Caribbean (-38 percent) and Southern and Mediterranean Europe (-41 percent) have shown the fastest rates of recovery towards 2019 levels. Indeed, several islands in the Caribbean and Asia and the Pacific, together with some small European and Central American destinations recorded the best results compared to 2019: Seychelles (-27 percent), Bulgaria and Curaçao (both -20 percent), El Salvador (-19 percent), Serbia and Maldives (both -13 percent), Dominican Republic (-11 percent), Albania (-7 percent) and Andorra (-3 percent). Bosnia and Herzegovina (+2 percent) even exceeded pre-pandemic levels. Among major destinations Turkey and Mexico saw declines of 16 percent and 24 percent respectively as compared to 2019.\nProspects for recovery\nAfter the unprecedented drop of 2020 and 2021, international tourism is expected to continue its gradual recovery in 2022. As of March 24, 12 destinations had no COVID-19 related restrictions in place and an increasing number of destinations were easing or lifting travel restrictions, which contributes to unleashing pent-up demand.\nThe war in Ukraine poses new challenges to the global economic environment and risks hampering the return of confidence in global travel. The US and the Asian source markets, which have started to open up, could be particularly impacted especially regarding travel to Europe, as these markets are historically more risk averse.\nRead also: Travellers Awards unveils top tourism promoters in Nigeria in 2021\nThe shutdown of Ukrainian and Russian airspace, as well as the ban on Russian carriers by many European countries is affecting intra-European travel. It is also causing detours in long-haul flights between Europe and East Asia, which translates into longer flights and higher costs. Russia and Ukraine accounted for a combined 3 percent of global spending on international tourism in 2020 and at least US$ 14 billion in global tourism receipts could be lost if the conflict is prolonged. The importance of both markets is significant for neighbouring countries, but also for European sun and sea destinations. The Russian market also gained significant weight during the pandemic for long haul destinations such as Maldives, Seychelles or Sri Lanka. As destinations Russia and Ukraine accounted for 4 percent of all international arrivals in Europe, they accounted for only 1 percent of Europe’s international tourism receipts in 2020.\nEconomic uncertainty and pressures\nEven though it is too early to assess the impact, air travel searches and bookings across various channels showed a slowdown the week after the invasion but started to rebound in early March.\nIt is certain that the offensive will add further pressure to already challenging economic conditions, undermining consumer confidence and raising investment uncertainty. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) estimates global economic growth could be more than 1 percent lower this year than previously projected, while inflation, already high at the start of the year, could be at least a further 2.5 percent higher. The recent spike in oil prices (Brent reached its highest levels in 10 years), and rising inflation are making accommodation and transport services more expensive, adding extra pressure on businesses, consumer purchasing power and savings, UNWTO notes.\nThis forecast is in line with the analysis on the potential consequences of the conflict on global economic recovery and growth by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which has also downgraded its projection for world economic growth in 2022 from 3.6 percent to 2.6 percent and warned that developing countries will be most vulnerable to the slowdown.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businessday.ng/arts-and-life/article/tourism-enjoys-strong-start-to-2022-while-facing-new-uncertainties-unwto/"}
{"doc_id": "0da120f224d8248542ef6acee9c1acf1", "text": "US regulators on Tuesday joined a growing chorus of officials saying they may need new powers to regulate cryptocurrencies which pose risks the investing public does not recognize.\nBitcoin and other digital currencies have seen demand soar in recent weeks along with their value, accompanied by a rise in questionable investment scams that has prompted increased attention by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the main agencies overseeing US financial markets.\nSEC Chairman Jay Clayton said virtual currencies often are traded on electronic platforms that call themselves “exchanges” but have a “deceiving” appearance.\n“I’m not satisfied when I see people thinking that trading cryptocurrencies have the same protections as stock markets,” Clayton told a Senate Banking Committee hearing.\nHe offered to work with Congress other regulators to study whether more federal oversight of cryptocurrency trading platforms is needed.\nIn addition, he warned that regulators have no means to respond if a digital currency is stolen or if a platform is hacked.\nCFTC Chairman J. Christopher Giancarlo described this absence of authority as a “gap.”\nDigital currencies have moved from the fringes of global finance used for money laundering, drug dealing and other illicit schemes, closer to mainstream following the launch late last year of bitcoin futures trading on two major exchanges.\nBitcoin’s market capitalization, while far below its peak, stood at $118.4 billion Tuesday, according to coinmarketcap.com. The market value of digital currencies as a whole has declined some $500 billion from peaks following restrictions by some governments and private companies.\nAgustin Carstens, general manager of the Bank for International Settlements, said bitcoin and others fail the “basic textbook definitions” of currencies — which are backed by governments and their central banks.\nInstead it “has become a combination of a bubble, a Ponzi scheme and an environmental disaster,” he said at a lecture in Germany on Tuesday. “There is a strong case for policy intervention.”\nCarstens, the former longtime governor of the Bank of Mexico, warned that, “If authorities do not act pre-emptively, cryptocurrencies could become more interconnected with the main financial system and become a threat to financial stability.”\nIn fact, the SEC and CFTC have cracked down several times in recent weeks on companies that have defrauded investors.\nIn one case, a virtual currency that called itself “My Big Coin” and allegedly misappropriated over $6 million from customers on a currency it falsely said was backed by gold and traded on currency exchanges.\n“We’ve brought three actions in the last week and there are more to come,” Giancarlo said. “We are working the beat hard.” DM", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-02-06-us-policymakers-ponder-tougher-rules-for-cryptocurrencies/"}
{"doc_id": "ddedfe58cfb8e4b02b580e618a4ecdc8", "text": "Guinness Nigeria Plc, a subsidiary of Diageo Plc, has announced its audited results for the period ended 30 June, 2020 revealing a decline in loss after tax at N12.57bn resulting from the significant impact of COVID-19 lockdowns and ongoing economic challenges.\nThe audited results which were released to the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) at the financial year-end indicated that revenue decreased 21% to N104.376bn versus the prior period of 2019.\nProfit was impacted by a number of one-off accounting adjustments totaling N17.2b, as well as volume declines due to the prevailing economic and COVID-19 impacted conditions. This led to a net loss after tax of N12.6b.\nExcluding the accounting adjustments, the underlying performance remains strong despite the impacted top line performance.\nHighlights\n• Revenue decreased 21%\n• Operating profit declined 243%\n• Cost of sales declined 22%\n• Net finance charges at N4.24billion\nSpeaking on the announcement, Mr. Baker Magunda, Managing Director/CEO, Guinness Nigeria Plc said: “The last quarter performance of fiscal 2020 was significantly impacted by restrictions due to COVID-19, exacerbating the already challenging economic environment. Closures of on-trade premises (bars, lounges, clubs and dine-in restaurants) which represent the major part of the consumption occasion for our products; and bans on celebratory occasions impacted sales.\n“Demand was also impacted by reduced consumer income, unemployment concerns due to the shutdown of a large number of businesses, and increases of VAT and excise throughout the year.\n“Distribution was further impacted by the ban of inter-state, and in some cases intra-state travel. Although Management worked diligently with regulatory authorities to minimise the impact, this hampered our distributors ability to restock and have our brands available for purchase.”\nThe company however revealed that its reaction to the challenges presented by the COVID-19 lockdown in Q4 was centered around reducing risk to the business by focusing on cash delivery, reducing distributor inventories, and fast-tracking the ongoing distribution transformation project for efficient sales operations. This focus ensured a reduction of trade receivables by 88% over same period last year.\n“We also focused on cost management by reacting to the drop in demand by reducing operations for a month. Agile actions taken in the period impacted by COVID-19 complemented the work already undertaken throughout the year to reduce Cost of Sales by year end,” Magunda said.\nThe Chairman of the Board of Guinness Nigeria Plc, Babatunde Savage assured that “the Board will continue to support the Management in its efforts to sustain global best practices aimed at consistently delivering business growth for stakeholders.\n“We remain confident that the strategy is comprehensive and robust, and that we are making the right investments in the company to ensure our long-term competitiveness.”\nDownload Nairametrics App for breaking news and market intelligence.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://nairametrics.com/2020/08/28/covid-19-lockdown-significantly-impact-guinness-nigeria-profits/"}
{"doc_id": "5ff3a93206965368b914968ed0c659d2", "text": "The aviation industry’s sustainability commercially, financially, economically, socially and environmentally, remained under threat, according to Aaron Munetsi, the CEO of the Airlines Association of Southern Africa (Aasa).\nGiving the Aviation Industry Roadmap at Aasa’s 52nd annual general assembly near Kleinmond in the Western Cape on Friday, Munetsi said that for years, Aasa had been ready and pleading with governments in southern Africa to engage so that they could work together meaningfully.\n“Given what is at stake, now is the time for our governments to lower their drawbridges so that we can enhance our relationships for us to work together to reimagine policies and frameworks. Instead of prescribing impediments and obstacles, these policies must be fit for purpose, enabling, and frictionless so that they promote efficiencies and drive growth and development,” Munetsi said.\nThe Aasa CEO said this renewal must also help to mend and strengthen the social fabric and restore trust, which was torn when the industry and some of its members were targeted and severely damaged by the malfeasances witnessed across both public and private business sectors.\nSuch selfish and corrupt practices must never be allowed to surface in these businesses and societies, he said.\nAccording to Aasa, these malpractices have caused lasting damage to the industry and its slow pace in recovering to 2019 traffic levels was as much a combination of factors, which included the cynical destructive impact of corruption.\n“Indeed, it is equally about rising costs and the lingering impact of the Covid-19 induced travel restrictions.”\nMunetsi said while the pandemic was now behind them, the aviation industry was, however, still suffering with its own long-Covid symptoms. This was as most airlines and service providers took on additional debt to stay afloat.\n“Most, if not all of them shed jobs temporarily or permanently in order to manage costs. This resulted in institutional knowledge, advanced skills and expertise being lost through retrenchments, retirements and relocation. At the same time, demand for skills development, job creation, transformation and environmental compliance are undiminished. These all require significant investment at a time when rising interest rates are pushing up the cost of borrowing and finance while fuels and other inflationary pressures are tightly squeezing margins,” he said.\nOver the past two years Aasa and its affiliate continental and international airline associations have consistently called on governments to provide financial relief to the air transport and tourism sectors.\n“As industry, we have not been asking for bailouts or for governments to take short-term equity holdings in airlines. What we have, and continue to call for, is relief through any of the array of instruments and mechanisms that rest in governments’ hands.”\nAasa said given the latest downward revised gross domestic product outlook for the region and the vital and significant role aviation, travel and tourism played in the economic mix, they were again calling on governments to offer them what they called “effective financial relief for our airlines”.\nThe association said as was seen throughout the pandemic, governments often made the right noises, but failed to follow through with suitable actions or the appropriate support.\n“We need our policymakers to step up and treat travel and tourism with the importance they deserve.”\nMeanwhile, last week aviation analyst Des Latham told local television station eNCA that the collapse of the rand, combined with the drop-off of domestic airlines South African Airways (SAA) and Comair and increased demand for air travel, would push ticket prices much higher than usual during the upcoming peak travel period.\nLatham advised travellers should rather book well in advance and plan ahead to avoid paying nearly double the normal amount for ticket prices.\nBUSINESS REPORT", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/companies/aviation-sectors-sustainability-remains-under-threat-aasa-32b01eb6-d54b-4358-9556-a6a21f84a58f"}
{"doc_id": "cb536c2d39ac1d2c37653e5928cae4f7", "text": "Nigeria's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) recorded a growth of 2.74% for the full year 2023, according to the latest report by the National Bureau of Statistics.\nBabajide Sanwo-Olu has allayed the fears of residents of the state who complain about the state’s high debt stating that Lagos has the capacity for a debt burden of N20 trillion.\nThe Federal Government has banned the exportation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) also known as cooking gas in order to increase the volume of supply and crash the prices across the country.\nAbike Dabiri-Erewa announced the commission's eagerness to collaborate with Raphael Igbokwe in identifying and nurturing young talent.\nIn a bid to continually foster Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion (ED&I), Unilever Nigeria, the longest-serving manufacturing company in the country, has reaffirmed its commitment to employees’ wellbeing through a range of progressive policies aimed at supporting the diverse needs of its workforce.\nBusiness News | Stock Market | Money Market | Cryptos | Financial Literacy | SME |", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://nairametrics.com/"}
{"doc_id": "b903d27cdc863bd2facdf0c119cee070", "text": "8 Things Raila should know about Korean unification\nCord leader Raila Odinga has called for the unification of South and North Korea because “it will will give them a stronger voice and presence” in international politics.\n“By championing unification of the Koreas and building a global coalition in this direction, Korea will be making active contributions to… international peace and stability,” Raila told the gathering at the Global Forum in Seoul on the role of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) in sustainable development.\nAs Raila goes about fronting for the unification of the two Koreas, here are a few facts he needs to know about the two Asian countries:\n1. War – The two countries are still at war. The war arose from the division of Korea at the end of World War II and from the global tensions of the Cold War that developed immediately afterwards.\nAfter the Korean war ended in 1953, both the South and North signed the armistice agreement leading to the creation of the Korean Demilitarized Zone to separate North and South Korea and the return of prisoners. However, hostilities between the two nations have continued to date.\n2. Economy – North Korea is a small, impoverished and isolated country while on the other side wealthy South Korea has a thriving economy backed by the United States. South Korea’s GDP is estimated at $ 1.7 trillion, while that of the North stands at $ 40 billion.\n3. Allies – South Korea’s closest ally is the United States while North Korea has the backing of China and Russia.\n4. Population – North Korea has an estimated population of 25 million people (2013) while South Korea’s population stands at 50 million people.\n5. Military might – North Koreans males who are fit serve in the military between the ages of 16 to 49 for a combined military force of 5 million soldiers at any given time compared to South Korea’s 11 million.\n6. Military expenditure – North Korea spends roughly 23% of its GDP in military while South only spends 3%.\n7. Area – North Korea is almost twice the size of South Korea.\n8. Democracy – While South Korea have a democratically elected president, North Korean presidency is inherited. The North has been ruled by one family since the end of the war, while in the South a president serves only one term of five years", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://nairobinews.nation.africa/8-things-raila-should-know-about-korean-unification/"}
{"doc_id": "34af4b35640a891a750f1b82d95bb7f9", "text": "Telecommunications firm Airtel Networks Kenya has split its mobile money business into a separately run entity known as Airtel Money Kenya Limited following the entry of minority shareholders into the venture.\nThe new entity took over the operations of the firm’s money services effective Thursday.\n“We wish to inform … the general public that to better serve our customers, we have separated and transferred the Airtel Money Business from Airtel Networks Kenya Limited to Airtel Money Kenya Limited,” the company said in a notice.\n“Following this business separation, Airtel Money Kenya Limited will take over and continue the provision of the Airtel Money Services, in collaboration with the licensed telecommunications network of Airtel Networks Kenya Limited.”\nThe company added that the two businesses will continue to share customer data and that continued use of the mobile money service will be deemed as proof of a customer’s acceptance of that fact.\nThe spinoff comes after London-listed Airtel Africa Plc sold a 25.77 percent stake in its local mobile money business as part of a continental deal that has seen it raise $550 million (Sh65.2 billion) from four institutional investors.\nThe multinational’s interest in Airtel Money Kenya Limited dropped to 74.23 percent in the year ended March from 100 percent a year earlier.\nSimilar changes in ownership of the mobile money businesses were also witnessed in markets such as Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zambia.\nAirtel Money Kenya will now be run and regulated by the Central Bank of Kenya as a standalone business but clients’ user experience is not expected to change.\nSafaricom has also faced calls to separate its mobile money business. Legislative efforts to this end have, however, not succeeded. The company has said that it would prefer not to spin off the business, saying the service benefits from the existing synergies with other offerings including voice, SMS, and data.\nMobile money services in the country were rooted in the use of handheld devices and connection to telecoms infrastructure through a SIM card.\nBut new technologies including apps allow the rollout of such services without the need for the traditional telecoms infrastructure.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/companies/airtel-kenya-splits-mobile-money-after-selling-minority-stake-3887654"}
{"doc_id": "b6ef432919c08367cf7e278c13b9af79", "text": "President William Ruto has detailed how his administration’s bottom-up plan is progressively transforming the country’s economy as he announced the government will in December repay $300 million (Sh45 billion) out of the $2 billion Eurobond debt that is due next year.\nThe President, in his second State of the Nation address, painted a picture of the gains his administration has made in one year even as he acknowledged the difficulties the government is facing in the wave of unprecedented macroeconomic challenges.\nHe said he took control of the country when its economy was facing external shocks, fiscal distress courtesy of the debt burden and structural imbalance.\nThe challenges were exacerbated by geopolitical conflicts, high-interest rates, prolonged drought and suppressed production in agriculture.\nDr Ruto said his administration has been able to “normalise” relationships with development partners, among them the International Monetary Fund (IMF), African Development Bank (AfDB) and World Bank.\nEven as he gave himself a pat on the back, he noted that the economic situation the country was in when he took the reins was avoidable, saying the country was living large and way beyond its means.\n“Time has come to retire the false comforts and illusional benefits of wasted expenditure and counter-productive subsidies on consumption by which we dug ourselves deeper into the hole of avoidable debt,” he said.\n- Community health workers boost counties universal healthcare bid\n- Inside UON's digital health facility\n- Cabinet okays NHIF scrapping if four bills get MPs nod\n- Ruto reaffirms State's support for health sector under devolution\nHe said due to his strategy to subsidise production and not consumption, the price of a two-kilogramme packet of maize flour has dropped to Sh145 from Sh250 last year.\nFertiliser subsidy\nThis has been facilitated by his administration’s fertiliser subsidy programme that distributed 5.5 million bags at a cost of Sh2,500 instead of Sh6,500.\nThese interventions have also seen increased farming of maize by 200 acres with expected additional production of 18 million bags.\n“As a result, the famous gorogoro of maize is now retailing at between Sh60 and Sh75,” he said.\nPresident Ruto said the country needs a new direction, which may not be easy, to drive the economy out of debt. However, he said this was ethical, responsible, prudent and a necessary move to make.\n“We have had to take hard decisions and painful choices,” he said, adding that public borrowing had suppressed the growth of private sector.\nHe said the government’s efforts to stabilise the situation have yielded such progress that next month, the country will settle the first batch of the Sh300 billion ($2 billion) Eurobond debt.\nPay debt\n“I can now confirm with confidence that we will and shall pay the debt that has been a source of concern to citizens, market and partners,” said the president.\nHe said the country has ironed out relations with development partners locally and abroad and they are also supporting the country’s efforts to get out of debt distress.\n“They( development partners) are now working with us to implement the Bottom-up Economic Transformation Agenda,” he added.\nThe president said the government plans to put up more than 700,000 housing units in the coming years, with about 50,000 already under construction and at different stages of completion while work on another 40,000 is set to start in the coming weeks.\n“The construction of 46,792 units across the country is underway. Another 40,000 are ready to commence in a few weeks.\n“More than 50,000 Kenyans are working, people who were previously unemployed are engaged directly and indirectly. The numbers will significantly increase as the projects move into the next phase and as we roll out many more units,” he said\nHe noted that the affordable housing project was aimed at addressing the major challenges that Kenyans, mostly in urban areas, face that range from poor health and insecurity.\nThe President also told MPs that the government is constructing 400 markets across the country that are equipped with water, electricity and other amenities that will provide traders with dignified working places\nThe President also said the National Cereals and Produce Board would take receipt of a first batch of mobile dryers for use by maize farmers.\nHe added that the government is streamlining the coffee sector and farmers will soon have greater say in taking the produce to market, including enhanced participation at the auction.\nThe president also said his government is restructuring the public sugar millers in a process that will result in the leasing of the five public-owned sugar milers to private sector players. This would boost competitiveness, raising farmers incomes and enhancing productivity\nThe government has waived Sh117 billion non-performing debt owed to the government by sugar millers.\nIt has also set aside Sh1.7 to pay cane farmers who had not been paid by the State-run millers for the cane they have delivered. The President said the Treasury would release the money to the farmers in the coming weeks.\n“In the next couple of weeks we shall be disbursing that money so that farmers in the sugar growing areas can go home for Christmas with that money,” he said.\nAmong the things that the government implemented early this year was to increase contributions to the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) after a court ruling on the constitutionality of contributions that had dragged on in court for years.\nNSSF contribution\nFollowing the ruling, NSSF increased monthly rates from employees to Sh1,080 from Sh300, matched by the employer. This was greeted with uproar by both employees and employers, noting that this would reduce the disposable income as well as increase the cost of labour.\nRuto, however, noted that this had significantly increased the country’s savings and now gave the government the opportunity to borrow locally for infrastructure development as opposed to sourcing for funds from foreign institutions.\n“As a result of our initial intervention, the savings situation has changed for the better. Contributions to NSSF has grown from Sh1.4 billion in January to Sh6.5 billion this month.\n“The implication of this growth in our national savings is that it will significantly consolidate our nation;s ability to invest in development using domestic resources as opposed to us going to borrow other people’s money when they borrow ,” he said.\n[Graham Kajilwa and Macharia Kamau]", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/health/politics/article/2001485046/president-says-bottom-up-economic-model-bearing-fruit"}
{"doc_id": "7e0512eff11137a05b18db3d3b68b8da", "text": "Banks attract $15.8b foreign capital flow in five years\nFrom 2017 till the end of last year, Nigeria’s banking sector received a total of $15.83 billion in foreign capital, a telling reflection of the sector’s attraction to the international market.\nThe figure represents 23 per cent of the total capital importation into the country in the five-year period. The analysis is, however, based on sectoral disintegration, implying that the amount cuts across both portfolio and direct investments.\nFrom data obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the country pooled $69.39 billion in both foreign portfolio and foreign direct investments (FDIs) in the period.\nBesides shares, banking was the most favoured sector by foreign investors, having secured almost one-fourth of the country’s foreign capital inflow.\nForeign portfolio investment (FPI) is often considered as hot or fair-weathered money. Hence, it is considered a sustainable source of funding growth. Both FPI and FDI, however, are critical injections in determining the health of a country’s balance of payment position.\nWithin the five year period leading to December 2021, about $26.21 billion came into the country via shares category. In 2017 and 2018, the sector’s share of the total capital importation averaged 61.5 per cent.\nThe overwhelming weighted average decelerated to 22 per cent in 2019 and further down to 19 per cent in 2019. Last year, it was 16 per cent. Since 2020, more foreign investment flows into banking than shares or any other sector.\nIt was 32 to 22 per cent in favour of banks in 2019 and 39 to 19 in that order in 2020. Last year, the banking sector maintained dominance at 22 per cent as against equities 16 per cent.\nFrom an estimated $3.11 billion in foreign capital inflows recorded in the first two quarters of the year (H1), banking accounted for N1.47 billion or 47 per cent, while only N301 million, amounting to 10 per cent went to equities.\nIn the last quarter (Q2), production and telecommunications also competed strongly with 15.24 and 10 per cent respective shares of the capital importation value. General financing held 12.85 per cent, while trading attracted 3.68 per cent, leaving all-important agriculture with 3.74 per cent of the chunk.\nOf Q2 performance, NBS said: “The total value of capital importation into Nigeria stood at $1.535 billion from $875.62 million in the corresponding quarter of 2021, showing an increase of 75.34 per cent. When compared to the preceding quarter, capital importation decreased by 2.4 per cent from $1.573 billion. The largest amount of capital importation was received through portfolio investment, which accounted for 49.33 per cent ($757.32 million).\n“This was followed by other investments with 41.09 per cent ($630.87 million) and FDI accounted for 9.58 per cent ($147.16 million) of total capital imported in Q2 2022. Disaggregated by sectors, capital importation into banking had the highest inflow of $646.36 million amounting to 42.1 of total capital imported in Q2 of 2022.”\nGet the latest news delivered straight to your inbox every day of the week. Stay informed with the Guardian’s leading coverage of Nigerian and world news, business, technology and sports.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://guardian.ng/business-services/banks-attract-15-8b-foreign-capital-flow-in-five-years/"}
{"doc_id": "a3e2c712fdaa2b11f6a3866de74ca149", "text": "Petroleum products firm Ken Petrogas Limited plans to build a Sh1 billion Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) and natural gas terminal and a jetty in Shimoni in Kwale County as it moves to diversify its revenue streams.\nThe firm has revealed in an environmental and social impact assessment study report that the facility will have a capacity to handle 10,000 tonnes of LPG and 140,000 cubic metres of Liquid Natural Gas (LNG).\nThe facility, which will be built on land measuring 6.52 acres will also have a floating jetty and a marshalling yard that can accommodate up to 65 trucks.\nRead: Treasury revives LPG subsidy scheme as prices rise\n“The total estimated cost for the project is approximately Sh1.13 billion,” said Ken Petrogas in the report submitted to the National Environment Management Authority (Nema) in March for approval.\nThe firm’s entry into the gas handling business is expected to further lower the cost of gas in the country through the advantage of bulk purchases.\nPreviously, oil marketers imported cooking gas individually in relatively small quantities due to inadequate gas discharge facilities.\nThis led to cooking gas shortages and expensive LPG due to high import premiums and demurrage, which are penalties marketers pay shipping companies when tankers fail to offload in the stipulated period.\nKenya last month offered a Tanzanian billionaire Rostam Aziz a licence to set up a cooking gas plant and storage facilities in Mombasa, under his Taifa Gas brand.\nRead: Kenya's plan to call the shots in LPG logistics\nTaifa Gas will build the 30,000-tonne facility at the Special Economic Zone in Dongo Kundu, near the port of Mombasa. It was earlier estimated to cost $130 million (Sh16.25 billion).\nThe firm is Tanzania’s largest LPG supply company and has been feeding the Kenyan retail market via road.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/companies/oil-firm-to-set-up-sh1bn-lpg-terminal-in-kwale-county--4161764"}
{"doc_id": "0d065c16a716b2229f3dd495709ccae7", "text": "Advertisement\nInvest now so you don’t come begging in future – Rudeboy tells celebs\nPaul Okoye, popularly known as Rudeboy from the iconic Psquare duo, has sounded a clarion call to his fellow celebrities in the entertainment industry, to wisely invest their earnings while they are still in the spotlight.\nRudeboy emphasised that such situations were tarnishing the prestige of the entertainment industry, and it was high time for celebrities to take their finances seriously.\nHis advice comes in the wake of several industry veterans grappling with financial challenges and underscores the need for proactive financial planning among celebrities.\nThe Reason With Me hitmaker shared in an Instagram post : \"Seriously, a lot is going on in the industry, including depression and all. But, abeg, if e reach your turn to shine, abeg, try to invest. E no easy at all. Avoid story that touches. Me sef don taya to the hear stories. E come be like na loose guard industry,\" Paul wrote on his Instagram story.\nRelated stories:Nollywood comic icon, Mr Ibu’s appeal for medical support: The story so far", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.graphic.com.gh/entertainment/showbiz-news/invest-now-so-you-dont-come-begging-in-future-rudeboy-tells-celebs.html"}
{"doc_id": "ce904f069067c61e629a4470d425bae6", "text": "The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has raised its 2024 global growth forecast amid greater-than-expected resilience in the US and several large emerging market and developing economies, as well as fiscal support in China.\nIn its World Economic Outlook released today, the IMF said global growth would rise to 3.1% in 2024, up from 2.9% previously forecast in October 2023.\nThe forecast for 2024 is about 0.2 percentage point higher compared with that in October 2023, reflecting upgrades for China, the United States, and large emerging market and developing economies.\nHowever, the IMF kept the forecast for 2025 unchanged at 3.2%.\nIMF chief economist Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas said the global economy had begun the final descent toward a soft landing, with inflation declining steadily and growth holding up.\nGourinchas, however, warned that the pace of expansion remained slow, and turbulence may lie ahead.\n“The global economy continues to display remarkable resilience, with inflation declining steadily and growth holding up. The chance of a soft landing has increased, but the pace of expansion remains slow and risks remain,” Gourinchas said.\n“On the demand side, global activity was supported by stronger private and government spending, despite tight monetary conditions. On the supply side, increased labour force participation, mended supply chains, and cheaper energy and commodity prices helped despite renewed geopolitical uncertainties.\n“Important divergences remain. We expect slower growth in the United States where tight monetary policy is still working through the economy and in China where weaker consumption and investment continue to weigh on activity.\n“In the Euro area, activity is expected to rebound slightly after a challenging 2023 when high energy prices and tight monetary policy restricted demand.”\nNevertheless, Gourinchas said the projection for global growth in 2024 and 2025 was below the historical annual average of 3.8%, reflecting restrictive monetary policies and withdrawal of fiscal support, as well as low underlying productivity growth.\nGourinchas said advanced economies were expected to see growth decline slightly in 2024 before rising in 2025, with a recovery in the euro area from low growth in 2023 and a moderation of growth in the United States.\nHe said emerging market and developing economies were expected to experience stable growth through 2024 and 2025, with regional differences.\nIn sub-Saharan Africa, Gourinchas said growth was projected to rise from an estimated 3.3% in 2023 to 3.8% in 2024 and 4.1% in 2025.\n“In sub-Saharan Africa, growth is projected to rise, as the negative effects of earlier weather shocks subside and supply issues gradually improve. Inflation continues to ease when earlier weather shocks subside and supply issues gradually improve,” he said.\nMeanwhile, global inflation is expected to fall to 5.8% in 2024 and 4.4% in 2025, compared to 6.8% in 2023, with advanced economies seeing faster disinflation.\nBUSINESS REPORT", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/imf-raises-its-2024-global-growth-forecast-0eccf2ff-9eb9-4e21-9a50-1634e0e410f5"}
{"doc_id": "29b2f8898b210bba22b04cf97b257b5a", "text": "Despite the last-minute shopping frenzy, holiday retail sales were sluggish as the United States consumer spent less than expected while internet shopping slowed down. Many shoppers waited until the last moment to buy gifts for Christmas, as only 18% of Americans had finished their holiday shopping in mid-December.\nDespite the last-minute shopping frenzy, holiday retail sales were sluggish as the United States consumer spent less than expected while internet shopping slowed down.\nMany shoppers waited until the last moment to buy gifts for Christmas, as only 18% of Americans had finished their holiday shopping in mid-December, according to the International Council of Shopping Centres (ICSC).\nWeekly chain store sales rose 2,8% in the week ending December 22, according to ICSC and UBS Securities.\nBut sales rose a disappointing 3,6% between the late November US holiday of Thanksgiving and Christmas, according to MasterCard Advisors. Clothing sales went up 1,4% while electronics went up 2,7%. And internet sales slowed down to 22,4%.\n”Excluding just the gas purchases, holiday sales rose a lacklustre 2,4%,” said Barry Ritholtz, chief analyst at Ritholz Research.\n”If we back out restaurants [and their price increases], then I ballpark sales at approximately 2% — or a bit below the core rate of inflation,” he said.\n”In other words, real sales may have reflected an actual loss over last year. This was despite the longer holiday shopping season,” noting that stores enjoyed a shopping season this year as Thanksgiving fell on November 22 compared to the 30th in 2006.\nOnline shopping rose again this year but less than in previous holiday seasons.\nAccording to another research firm, comScore, internet sales were up 19% between November 1 and December 21, the lowest in five years.\nCounting the last minute-shopping, web purchases rose 20% between November 1 and December 24, barely more than the 21% of the first 10 months of 2007.\nLast year, internet sales jumped 25% during the holiday season.\nBut some major internet retailers were happy with their numbers as Amazon.com boasted its ”strongest-ever” holiday season thanks to electronics such as GPS systems and Nintendo’s Wii videogame console, which sold every 17 seconds on the website.\nBut US retail giant Target said on Monday its sales would drop in December, while the National Retail Federation expects a 4% rise for November to December — the lowest since 2002.\nIn this environment, the retail industry saw its share prices lose 10% on Wall Street since later November.\nRetailers have offered bargains since November to lure consumers into their stores, a tactic that boosts private discount websites such as Editor’s Closet, which has 10 000 members.\nCreated this year by three French entrepreneurs with a $35 000 investment, the private site has attracted luxury brands looking to dispose of their unsold merchandise.\n”American consumers look for bargains, and we attract all those who don’t have access to private store sales,” said Editor’s Closet chief executive Michael Meyerson, adding that the company hopes to have 500 000 members in one year. – Sapa-AFP", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://mg.co.za/article/2007-12-27-us-holiday-sales-disappoint-even-in-online-world/"}
{"doc_id": "135a0f74428b3bc1bf95ac091f8e19f3", "text": "Plans are afoot to extract more value and better integrate fishing into the Mauritanian economy. Doing so will require a break from the past – including making considerable investment in infrastructure, implanting a new set of policies, and ensuring a new way of doing things. The sector is a key test for a country which could, if it walks its own talk, become a regional exemplar. By GREG MILLS.\nNoauakchott’s fish market at the Plage des Pecheurs (Place of the Fishermen) is a place of great energy. Teams of men, some in oilskins, most barefoot, heave colourfully decorated pirogues up the beach. Others pack outboard engines and hand-knotted nets. Boys and girls sell drinks and food, and donkey carts lug bags and boxes of fish. The concrete tables in the roofed marketplace are piled with fish, the floor littered with discarded heads and entrails, while traders seal cooler boxes for the refrigerated trucks parked outside.\nHundreds of these traditional, open fishing boats line the shore. The seas off Mauritania’s 754km coastline contain some of the world’s richest fishing grounds, generating a quarter of the country’s exports. But the industry is under pressure. As much as 1.2-million tonnes is caught in Mauritanian waters annually, though fishermen complain that they have to go as far as 30kms offshore to make their catch.\nPhotos: Plage des Pecheurs (Greg Mills)\nIn July 2015 the European Union renewed a 20-year agreement with Mauritania allowing EU vessels to trawl up to 281,500 tonnes annually in return for commercial payment and an aid package to support local fishing and environmental controls. Commercial trawlers can net up to 250 tonnes of fish daily; a pirogue might do five tonnes a year. Chinese, Russian and South Korean trawlers, like the Europeans, are drawn to the area by increasing consumer demand and declining stocks back home. It is estimated that more than a third of fish caught off West Africa is illegal, unreported or unregulated, losing $1.3-billion in annual income.\nPlans are afoot to extract more value and better integrate fishing into the Mauritanian economy. Doing so will require a break from the past – including making considerable investment in infrastructure, implanting a new set of policies, and ensuring a new way of doing things.\nThe sector is a key test for a country which could, if it walks its own talk, become a regional exemplar.\nNouakchott – the “place of winds” – was created afresh as the capital on independence from France in 1960, when just 10,000 frequented what was little more than a fishing village. Now home to perhaps 1.5-million people, or a third of Mauritania’s population, it is pockmarked with grey concrete residences under construction. There are no physical city limits to the urban spread across the apparently endless expanse. “If you have a thing about sand,” observes one diplomat, “you should not be here.”\nPhoto: Nouakchott. (Greg Mills)\nSprawl and poverty place different but extreme strains on infrastructure.\nThe road to the mine at Akjoujt strikes out 250km northeast from the capital Nouakchott towards the border with the Western Sahara. Its tough territory, more Mars, it seems, than Mauritania.\nPhoto: The road to the mine at Akjoujt. (Greg Mills)\nA short stretch at the start is built to link the new international airport with the capital, the four lanes lit by solar-powered lamps. On the city limits the route is a dodgem of donkey carts, petrol tankers, trucks, camels, and suicidal Mauritanians, lined with a scruffy salad of plastic rubbish, old tyres, desert shrubs, vehicle detritus, the occasional mosque and the ubiquitous khaima – tents around which goats scuffle and out of which occasionally a shepherd appears in a colourful boubou, veiled in an equally bright chehce headdress. Red sand from rolling dunes spills into the road at various points, whipping across it at others in a ghostly tarmac mist, adding to the challenge.\nAnd then, quickly, there is virtually nothing. Just a black strip, a string through the endless sand, punctuated by an occasional khaima, solar powered cellphone towers, grazing camels and busy goats, sedentary police roadblocks, and an odd roadside water bladder. One of the 10 most sparsely populated countries in the world, Mauritania’s human density is 3.5 people per km2 across its million or so square kilometres, putting it alongside Botswana (3.48), Iceland (3.24), Namibia (2.56) and neighbouring Western Sahara (2.25). The per capita cost of delivering infrastructure over this vast territory is high.\nPhoto: The copper-gold mine at Akjoukt. Temperatures peak at over 60 Celsius in summer in the pit. (Greg Mills)\nOnce on the margins of the world – confused even by couriers with tropical Mauritius on the other side of the continent – Mauritania has benefited from the global mining boom, given its large stores of iron ore and copper. Annual foreign direct investment leapt from $100-million in 2006 to $1.5-billion in 2012, 90% of which was in mining. It enjoyed five years of annual growth of 5.4% from 2010.\nYet it remains one of the poorest countries in the world, with a per capita GDP of $1,300, ranking 156th among the 188 countries on the United Nations Human Development Index. Although its population is growing slowly by regional standards, 60% is under the age of 25, while literacy is just 52%. Its infrastructure is fragile – with just one-fifth of the population having access to electricity, and with a chronic national water shortage. Mauritania imports as much as 90% of its domestic food requirements.\nMacro-economic troubles have surfaced as the commodity super-cycle has cooled. With a 10% drop in mining production in 2015, GDP growth fell to 3%, from 6.4% the previous year. And government debt rose to over 90% of GDP, forcing the devaluation of the Ouguiya.\nA troubled political history has not helped, with a dozen coups or attempts since independence, the first in 1978 ending the rule of independence leader Moktar Dadda. A military junta ruled until 1992, when the first multi-party elections were held. Another bloodless coup in August 2005 oversaw a transition to democracy. Although Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdellahi was inaugurated in April 2007 as the country’s first free and fairly elected president, his term ended abruptly in August 2008 with a putsch led by General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz. The general was subsequently elected president in July 2009 and re-elected to a second, and apparently final term in 2014 with 82% of the vote, both events however being boycotted by various opposition movements.\nAlthough there have been significant reforms in media freedom, for example, Mauritania’s political system remains classified “not free” by Freedom House. The differences appear deeper than democracy. There remain ethnic and racial tensions among three major groups: the Arabic-speaking descendants of slaves (Haratines), around 40% of the population, Arabic-speaking so-called “White Moors” (Bidhan), some 30%, and the remainder from those Afro-Mauritanians originating from the Senegal River valley to the south. With Bidhan Mauritanians occupying most elite positions, in government and business, there is a tense public debate about slavery and its effects.\nDespite such differences, and adverse conditions, there is a strong sense of national attachment and resourcefulness. “We still think like nomads,” explains a veteran local politician, “to our cost. We dump rubbish where we choose, and have no permanence. It reflects in the way in which we drive.” Mauritania is one of the few countries where you will routinely be overtaken while waiting at a red traffic light, a place where old Peugeots and battered Mercedes taxis come to die. “But being nomads,” he smiles, “also means we can survive the toughest conditions.”\nStill Mauritania’s image outside remains tainted. This is compounded by challenges in doing business. It is ranked 168 out of 189 countries in the World Bank’s 2016 Ease of Doing Business indicators, for example. Investors say they are hampered by erratic tax practices and an inefficient and corrupt legal system.\nNone of this, however, is lost on government. By the admission of the Prime Minister’s Chief of Staff, Mohamed Djibril, dealing with corruption and ensuring inclusive government are items two and three on the government’s top-three priorities, the first being to “develop the private sector without which it is impossible to create jobs”.\nThere are deeper challenges. Ahmed Mahmoud Dahan, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs and, later, Islamic Affairs, and now the head of the Institute for Strategic Studies in Nouakchott, says the state was “established by the colonial authorities principally for extraction. After independence, it was replaced by a state to serve the executive. As a result,” he notes, “power is all important as the state is virtually the sole source of jobs.” Predictably, in the government, until now “there has been little incentive for change”.\nThis view is echoed by the Prime Minister, Yahya Ould Hademine.\nWith a background in the state iron-ore mining company SNIM, he, too, has clear ideas of what needs to be done. Appointed in August 2014, the Canadian educated technocrat identifies “the first constraint in that Mauritania was not a state before independence. We have had to construct institutions and educate our people to enter modernity. Now, after 50 years, we have reached the level of countries like Senegal, at least, which has been doing this for hundreds of years.” This situation was made more difficult by “a big 20-year drought in the 1970s, which seriously affected our livestock-based society, and increased the rate of urbanization. But then we had to provide new infrastructure in the cities – potable water, roads, services, policing – as well as attempt to deliver,” he notes, “over a large territory.”\nTo these constraints he says have to be added “increasing investment, improving the legal system and justice.” And this has been complicated by the rise of “violent extremism”.\nNow the government “has identified three fields for growth and jobs: fishing, agriculture and livestock. We aim to add more value to fishing. Whereas Morocco has just half of our production, it has 500,000 workers. Senegal produces one-quarter of what we do, but has 400,000. We have just 36,000. The Free Zone initiative in the [northern port of] Nouadh’bou aims to change this, as will be the development in smaller ports along the coast.” The government plans to spend as much as $1-billion on the fishing sector alone.\nIt’s slightly more complicated, however, given that the local fishing industry is dominated by Senegalese. Many menial jobs go to foreigners, mostly from West Africa.\n“In agriculture,” says the Prime Minister, “the plan is to prepare the land to the south along the Senegal River, where we have hundreds of thousands of hectares available. Already we produce 80% of our rice requirement from this area.”\nA focus on these areas would build on the success of the mining sector, he says. Mauritania is the second largest iron ore producer in Africa, and aspires to be in the top five global exporters of iron ore by 2025 with an annual production of 40-million tonnes. There are also investors operating copper and gold mines, including Mauritanian Copper Mines, at Akjoujt. With an injection of finance and technology by owners First Quantum, the mine, originally started by Anglo American in the 1960s, produces around 40,000 tonnes of copper and 60,000 ounces of gold annually.\nWhat about the to-and-fro steps regarding democracy?\n“You have to understand that Mauritania is not exactly like all African countries,” says Prime Minister Hademine. “Our population has a long cultural history and in the Middle Ages they conquered Spain and Morocco, so convincing them of new rules of governance is not that is as other African populations who learnt how to read with the coming of the colonial power. Our path is thus one of small steps.”\nThese steps include the debate around inclusive government, which some see as a proxy, however, for extending the president’s rule to a third term. With a proactive leadership role in the African Union and the Arab League, the government is surprisingly defensive about its international engagement. Even though it has made a long-term regional commitment to fighting violent extremism, France is routinely fingered as the culprit when things go awry, as is Israel since Nouakchott cut ties with Jerusalem in 2009. And there is suspicion towards foreign workers and investors in taking jobs away from Mauritanians, hence the imposition of schedules to work expats out of positions that locals might fill, sometimes a balancing act between local empowerment and appeasement on the one hand and continued competitiveness on the other.\nYet, ironically, Mauritania’s greatest strength is in its relationship with the international community as a stand-out country in the Sahel, given its relative security. This asset is highlighted by the projected increase in the region’s population from 135-million to 330-million by 2050 and an estimated 670-million in 2100.\nTogether with water scarcity, populist temptations including Islam, and fictions of local statehood across an area of more than six million km2, the Sahel scene is otherwise set for chronic failure. Throw in climate change and soil degradation (already estimated by the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation as affecting over 80% of the Sahel) and a predominantly young population one should expect migration, both south and north, on a grand scale.\nUntil now the role of the international community has been to manage the tactical extremes, and trying to bolster state and especially military capacity in places where there are fundamental issues of control of society and territory at stake. This approach is likely only to stave off rather than solve these problems especially where it’s not always clear who the government and the good guys are.\nThere is a wider role for those Sahel states that might answer these questions. As Ambassador Dahan observes, “The world speaks about North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. But there is a big bit of the continent between the two, stretching from Mauritania in the west to Sudan in the east. It’s sparsely populated and big.\n“Does this region, the Sahel, divide these two worlds,” he asks, “or does it link them?”\nThe road from Nouakchott to Akjoujt was rebuilt in 2012 by Mauritanian Copper Mines at a cost of $25-million. It was in the company’s self-interest to do so, moving an average of six 30 tonne fuel tankers and fifteen 50-tonne copper concentrate trucks daily down the route. MCM has a wider role still, pumping water 120kms away from an aquifer at Benn’chahab. In the heat of summer, with temperatures at over 50 Celsius, the mine gets less than 75% of the water which originally entered the pipe, the rest being diverted to the local town and various populations and camels en route. In the town of Akjoujt, 360 houses are owned by the mine, which has additionally set up training programmes for youth, women, farmers, and school children.\nThis adds a premium, of expectation as much as expense, to the mine’s activities, already burdened by distance and the cost of services. The cost of transport, for example, to the port at Nouakchott is $16 per tonne, plus $10 in handling charges and $35 in shipping to China. To this has to be added processing costs, and explains why plans to extract iron ore from the discarded copper-gold concentrate at MCM had to be put on hold when iron prices slipped below $60 per tonne.\nPhoto: The author with the Prime Minister Hademine and Ambassador Dahane.\nReducing inequalities and tackling wealth redistribution, notes the World Bank, “are key challenges that Mauritania can overcome, provided that it continues its commitment to good governance, particularly in the mining sector and in the supervision of state enterprises”. Indeed, the partnership epitomised by the mine at Akjoujt answers some of the development questions posed by Mauritania – and the Sahel. To do more, and ensure both its own stability and provide an example to its region, the government in Nouakchott will have to stay true to its rhetoric to encourage the private sector. DM\nDr Mills heads the Johannesburg-based Brenthurst Foundation, and has been researching in Mauritania for a new book, ‘Making Africa Work’.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-10-19-reform-in-the-sahel-mars-mauritius-or-mauritania/"}
{"doc_id": "bca8f4415e2d78557fe8c71657761140", "text": "Mid-month data from the Central Energy Fund shows that motorists could see another significant petrol price cut in October 2022 – but it’s bad news for diesel.\nThe data, which serves as a snapshot of market conditions as of 14 September 2022, shows that the petrol price could drop by as much as R1.31 per litre next month. However, diesel is showing an under-recovery – thus potential increase – of 66 cents per litre.\nThe mid-month snapshot is as follows:\n- Petrol 95: over-recovery/decrease of 131 cents per litre;\n- Petrol 93: over-recovery/decrease of 122 cents per litre;\n- Diesel 0.05%: under-recovery/increase of 59 cents per litre;\n- Diesel 0.005%: under-recovery/increase of 66 cents per litre;\n- Illuminating Paraffin: over-recovery/decrease of 1 cent per litre.\nThe Department of Energy has stressed that the daily snapshots are not predictive and do not cover other potential changes like slate levy adjustments or retail margin changes, which are determined by the department at the end of the month, taking all variables into account.\nThe DoE makes adjustments based on a review of the entire period. Furthermore, the outlook can change significantly before month-end.\nThe expected price changes are contingent on current market conditions persisting through to the end of the month. Notably, even if these changes come into effect, fuel prices are still much higher than they were in February before the impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine was felt in global markets.\nLocal fuel price fluctuations are impacted by two main factors – the international price of petroleum products, driven mainly by oil prices, and the rand/dollar exchange rate used in the purchase of these products.\nFor the first two weeks of September, oil prices have remained $100 a barrel, contributing to a significant over-recovery in local prices. However, a weaker rand has cut into the recovery over the same period.\nExchange rate\nThe rand has trended significantly weaker in the first two weeks of September, largely at the mercy of global markets.\nSpecifically, the rand has taken its lead from the US and European markets, which are experiencing high levels of inflation, and central banks in the regions pushing interest rates higher to cope.\nThe US Fed recently announced higher-than-expected inflation in the states, all but cementing a 75 basis point hike in rates at the end of September. The European Cental Bank, meanwhile, also hiked rates by 75bps.\n“US CPI for August came out at 8.3% YoY vs market estimates of 8.1% but still down from July’s 8.5%. What really spooked the market was the rise of 0.1% in the MoM figure, which was expected to actually fall due to the sharp drop in gasoline prices,” said TreasuryOne, in a note.\n“Markets are now fully pricing in a 75 bps rate by the Fed at next week’s FOMC, with the Fed also now to be extra hawkish on monetary policy.”\nThese international moves – dealing with the fallout of two years of Covid-19 and the ongoing war in Ukraine – have created a risk-off environment to the detriment of emerging market economies, including South Africa.\nEconomists anticipate rand weakness and volatility to persist over the next few months, with a wide range projection for year-end. If market conditions persist – the most likely scenario – the rand could end the year in the R17.00 to the dollar range.\nOil prices\nOil prices have helped ease the pressure on international petroleum product prices.\nHowever, the price has fluctuated in recent sessions, Bloomberg reports, as traders grapple with concerns about global demand and assess comments from the US on refilling strategic reserves.\nThe price is also sensitive to events in China, which is pursuing a zero-Covid strategy, heavily disrupting industry activity. The International Energy Agency warned this week that the country is on course for its biggest annual drop in oil demand in over three decades.\n“Oil is on course for the first quarterly loss in more than two years as central banks, including the Federal Reserve, tighten monetary policy to tame inflation, hurting the outlook for energy consumption,” Bloomberg said.\n“The retreat has erased all the gains seen in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with prices earlier this month hitting the lowest level since January.”\nWhile the lower oil price is great news for motorists, the drop hasn’t had an equal effect on petrol and diesel. While petrol prices have benefitted, global demand for diesel has tightened as the Northern Hemisphere starts to shift away from gas heating, increasing demand for middle distillates like diesel.\nAs demand for diesel increases, so too does the price.\nThis is a major red flag as diesel is used mainly by farmers, haulage vehicles and emergency power generators, and any diesel price hike directly impacts transportation and the costs of manufacturing goods.\nThis is how the expected price changes could reflect at the pumps:", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businesstech.co.za/news/energy/625658/here-is-the-expected-petrol-and-diesel-price-for-october/"}
{"doc_id": "2a675238f012a946d75665640b8f054d", "text": "Ripple, one of the fastest-growing Fintech startups worth billions of dollars, and owners of XRP, the fourth most valuable crypto by market value, recently disclosed that it was branching out into the lending business.\nThe report spoke on the barriers associated with many businesses accessing credit and why it felt it necessary to solve such pressing needs by highlighting the following:\nLimited access to working capital is one of the biggest barriers to growth for many companies.\nUnlike incumbents who have large balance sheets that allow them to scale their businesses quickly, many Fintechs and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) lack the capital and resources to compete.\nFaced with stalled growth, customers turn to create bespoke credit arrangements – with each partner, in each destination market. Each arrangement requires additional overhead and management, making it a slow, burdensome, and ultimately inefficient process.\nRipple’s Line of Credit solves this problem for its customers by providing upfront access to capital for every market through one simple credit arrangement – simplifying access to financial solutions that accelerate business performance and scale.\nHint: Ripple has about 6.2 billion XRP, worth over $1.5 billion at prevailing market prices. Its accounts reserve is responsible for 6% of XRP’s total supply when considering both the 45 billion in circulation and 48.6 billion held in escrow accounts. The Ripple periodically sells XRP into the crypto-verse.\nThe report further gave operational details on how Ripple will enforce such program and the edge it holds:\nThose using ODL on RippleNet can purchase XRP from Ripple on credit—customers are charged one fee on the amount borrowed, with no hidden fees, and can receive approvals faster than through traditional means.\nRippleNet customers simply take advantage of one simple XRP-based arrangement everywhere that ODL is available, regardless of sending destination or fiat currency, and costs a lot less than most other available credit options.\nDownload Nairametrics App for breaking news and market intelligence.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://nairametrics.com/2020/10/09/ripple-ventures-into-lending/"}
{"doc_id": "c6039de0030e7bb248783048fe25e82a", "text": "The Middle East is a region where predictions go to die. And the region’s recent turbulence has made forecasting the course of events there even more treacherous. But, as became increasingly clear in 2013, the main source of the Middle East’s crises is not a “clash of civilizations,” but a clash within Islam, centered on the Sunni-Shia divide.\nThe civilian death toll from this struggle is staggering. The combined figure for Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Syria is now approaching many hundreds of thousands – perhaps ten times the total death toll of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since 1948 – while millions more are leading squalid lives as refugees.\nWith the Arab Spring now frozen over, the regional outlook for 2014 appears gloomy. Some opportunities are still on the table, and more will surely emerge during the coming year. But seizing them will demand global leadership, strategic clarity, nuance, and decisiveness – almost all of which were absent in 2013.\nIndeed, there is a spreading perception among world leaders and publics, adversaries and allies alike, that the longtime incumbent global leader, the United States, has been significantly weakened. Consider President Barack Obama’s failure to defend his “red line” after Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime used chemical weapons this past summer; Egypt’s return to military rule; Iran’s post-election protests in 2009; or the instability in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.\nAs a result of American uncertainty, the radical axis of Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah feels emboldened, and will certainly try to leverage its achievements in the year ahead. Assad ended up using the shock caused by his chemical-weapons attack as a bargaining chip in a disarmament deal – still to be executed and verified – that bought him a valuable pause in the efforts to topple him, if not salvation.\nAssad will seek in 2014 to delay the actual implementation of the chemical-weapons deal, in order to gain time to split and weaken his opponents further. He could then muddle through until the US mid-term elections in November, when attacking him would be politically impossible. There is a good chance that he will get away with it.\nHezbollah will support Assad to the end, because his continuing hold on power is critical to its own survival. The Syrian rebels, weakened by infighting, have also been victims of the growing rift between the US and its closest Arab allies. Short of a successful attack on Assad himself, the chances of a rebel triumph on the ground are slim.\nRenewed peace negotiations in Geneva next year can succeed only if Assad comes to the table substantially weaker, which probably will not happen. Israel will continue to act proactively to prevent the transfer of heavy missiles or advanced air-defense systems from Syria to Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, which of course carries the risk of a military showdown. But such pre-emptive measures could also promote Lebanon’s survival by preventing Hezbollah from gaining absolute dominance over the country.\nThough Assad may survive for now, Syria, like Iraq and Libya, faces creeping disintegration into more ethnically homogenous sub-entities, either completely separate or very loosely tied together, similar to post-Tito Yugoslavia, where communal rage filled the political void left by the dictator’s iron fist.\nParadoxically, disintegration in the Arab world is taking place just when Iran is emerging from its decades-long diplomatic deep freeze. Following the six-month interim agreement on its nuclear program reached in Geneva in November, Iran’s military nuclear program may be stopped temporarily. But Iran got relief from crippling international sanctions at a low price; and, because the two-phase structure of the interim agreement delays verification of its success or failure, the true test for Iran – and the world – is still to come.\nThe immediate risk is that Iran still possesses the capability to enrich uranium, as well as a substantial amount of low-enriched uranium. The decision about how to proceed is Iran’s, and its rulers will most likely simply wait for an opportunity to charge ahead toward nuclear capability when the US is unable, for whatever reasons, to respond. This might take 6-12 months, with some risks from the Iranians’ point of view; but once they have enough weapon-grade material, nothing could be done to stop Iran from becoming a military nuclear power.\nBoth Pakistan and North Korea took that path. And, following America’s Syrian zigzag, the Iranians are convinced that, for the time being, a physical attack (at least by the US) is not on the table.\nThe consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran could be devastating for regional order and global stability. Saudi Arabia might have nuclear weapons within weeks, with Turkey and Egypt feeling compelled to follow. The international non-proliferation regime would collapse. Hegemonic Iran would intimidate its Gulf neighbors, sponsor terrorist activities abroad, and feel immune from international intervention.\nOf course, if negotiations on a permanent agreement collapse, Israel and probably even the US might feel compelled to contemplate further action. But, for now, Iran’s leaders clearly believe that they have bought themselves time. Moreover, in six months, Iran might propose another slightly modified interim agreement with a further loosening of sanctions, leveraging once again the paralysis imposed by election-year dynamics on American decision-making. Such a strategy could drag the permanent phase of the agreement far beyond 2014.\nIranians are chess players; they know what a gambit is. They have not given up on winning the game. The only solution – for which there is still time – is to find a way to tell the Iranians unequivocally: “We respect your needs. We will not embarrass you in public. But you should understand that we mean business. You will have to dismantle the military nuclear program in the coming few months, or face the consequences.”\nSuch a message has never reached Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Without hearing and believing it, there is no way that he will yield.\nBy: Ehud Barak", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businessday.ng/analysis/article/middle-east-security-in-2014/"}
{"doc_id": "5703e3032e4cb3b9d8b4c94464acc4f4", "text": "The rand had a punishing week last week, dropping to a new record low against the dollar – with many economists and analysts expecting a rougher time for the currency ahead.\nWhile harsh market conditions have kept the local unit on the back foot for much of the year, last week saw foreign investors take a much tougher position against South Africa – and the government’s foreign policy is to blame.\nAccording to economists at Nedbank, the rand has been carrying South Africa’s risk premium for much of the year but was dragged to a new record position against the dollar on Thursday at R19.92/$ due to the “deeply negative sentiment” towards the country.\nThis was caused by South Africa’s “anti-Western rhetoric”, the group said, and Pretoria’s ever-closer ties to Russia.\n“This past week, the focus was on the government’s decision to extend diplomatic immunity to all BRICS visiting heads of state and their representatives to avoid acting on the ICC arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin,” it said.\nHowever, International Relations Minister Naledi Pandor’s comments at a meeting with her BRICS counterparts in Cape Town on Thursday and Friday did South Africa no favours.\n“Minister Pandor criticised developed nations for failing to reform and transform global institutions. She went even further, downplaying the global impact of the war on Ukraine by referring to the war as a ‘regional conflict’ which should not be allowed to replace global poverty eradication as the world’s ‘greatest challenge’,” Nedbank said.\nEven though Russia’s brutal war on Ukraine directly caused the surge in global oil and food prices over the past year, Pandor directed the blame for the cost-of-living crisis in developing countries towards advanced countries.\nShe said that “…the attention and resources of our Western partners have been diverted, and the agendas of our multilateral organisations no longer respond to the needs and demands of the Global South.”\nNedbank said that this is a statement “overwhelmingly countered by the facts”.\nEspecially given the consistent support offered to South Africa’s development by the US, the EU and Japan, including NGO grants, other charitable initiatives, favourable just transition funding, and the non-reciprocal preferential trade deals of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act and the European Partnership Agreement, the bank said.\nThe South African government has come across as two-faced in its recent foreign policy, seeking to mend fences with Western nations like the US – especially in light of recent allegations that South Africa loaded arms onto a Russian vessel – while also delivering acrimonious statements against them.\nPretoria has been highly critical of the United States and NATO, often blaming them for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine while referring to Russia – the aggressor in the war – as a “friend”. Despite its claims of neutrality, the government has been happy to host Russia for war games on the anniversary of the war, as well as allowing sanctioned vessels to land or dock in the country.\nAt a base level, as persistent rand weakness indicates, markets are not convinced South Africa is as neutral as it claims to be.\n“All these developments undermined confidence in the domestic economy, raising the country’s risk premium even further,” Nedbank said.\nAnd the fallout can be even greater than it first appears.\nLast week, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) added two new risk factors to its financial stability review: the impact of potential secondary sanctions due to South Africa’s foreign policy, and greater risk of capital outflows.\nNedbank said that the potential economic and trade costs of damaging relations with the US would be significant – and it could also extend to other US allies.\n“If there is a complete breakdown of SA-US relations, the EU will likely follow the US. This would greatly cost the country, with most of the impact expected to come through the financial markets and global trade, with very negative impacts on economic growth and job creation.\n“South Africa has strong trade links with both the US and EU. The EU, as a bloc, is our largest trading partner, while the US is our 3rd largest trading partner among individual countries after China and Germany.”\nIn a worst-case scenario, where the USA and EU withdraw from their respective trade deals, R443 billion worth of exports will be placed on the line, Nedbank said.\nIn addition, South Africa relies on foreign funding to cover shortfalls in its current account and budget balance.\n“It is also worth noting that the bulk of the government’s debt is financed by the West and Asian investors from countries aligned with the US. If our ties with the US and the EU were to be severed, the ripple effects would extend far and wide, threatening financial stability,” it said.\nIn light of this, Nedbank said it is worrying that the South African government appears to be taking every measure to act against its own interests through its approach to foreign policy.\n“Government’s perceived support of Russia has compromised SA’s neutral stance on the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. It has already hurt the economy, and any further escalation could permanently fracture or break relations with our largest trading partners, with potentially severe consequences,” the bank said.\nThe rand has recovered from its weakest point, trading at around R19.45 to the dollar on Monday. However, the recovery has little to do with a change in risk premia associated with South Africa, and is rather tied to a softer dollar as markets anticipate a hold on rates by the US Fed.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businesstech.co.za/news/business-opinion/693821/why-south-africa-is-being-punished/"}
{"doc_id": "4765b1f077c298dd1c9ea91b83517266", "text": "Ahead of expectation of high international traffic in 2014, airlines are falling heads over heels as they advance plans to meet the challenges the year will pose.\nEtihad Airways, the national airline of the United Arab Emirates, has announced plans to introduce three more destinations to its core international network in 2014.\nThe eight new routes will increase Etihad Airways’ worldwide network to 102 destinations next year.\nAccording to James Hogan, president and chief executive officer of Etihad Airways, “This is part of a measured and strategic growth plan, which will reinforce the future of the national carrier of the UAE and the vital role it plays in the emergence of Abu Dhabi as a global aviation hub.\n“Together with our code-share and equity alliance partners, we have created a virtual network of more than 375 destinations. But more importantly, it strengthens our customer proposition by offering more choice and better connections across our hub in Abu Dhabi.”\nEtihad Airways’ equity alliance airlines presently include airberlin, Aer Lingus, Air Serbia, Air Seychelles,Darwin Airline (subject to regulatory approval), Jet Airways and Virgin Australia.\nThe 2014 network plan also makes provision for increases in frequency and connectivity on existing routes, with more than 20 percent growth expected in weekly departures.\nTo support the next phase of its global network expansion, Etihad Airways will receive 20 aircraft deliveries next year, including the much-awaited arrival of its first 787-9 Dreamliners and Airbus A380s.\nAccording to Tim Clark, president, Emirates Airline, “Our customers love the A380 – from the quieter cabins and spacious layout on the main deck, to the on-board lounge and shower spas in our premium cabins.\n“It is a beautiful aircraft which we have packed full of the best in-flight comforts and products. From an operator standpoint, the A380 is still one of the most fuel efficient aircraft per seat. It offers us some flexibility in range and also helps us to meet demand at slot-constrained airports.\n“Continuous improvements are being made to the A380, by the manufacturer as well as by Emirates in terms of our on-board product. For instance our latest A380s have been fitted with even bigger high definition LCD TV screens to enhance the in-flight entertainment experience.\n“We’ve also introduced new touch-screen tablets that allow passengers to control all their seat functions and movie selections with just one swipe. Small details, but all these add up to provide a great flying experience,” he added.\nIn 2013, Emirates received 13 A380 aircraft and it expects to receive another 13 in 2014. The airline still has 96 more A380s worth USD 43 billion on order, of which 71 are expected to be delivered over the next five years, before the end of 2018.\nFrom its Dubai hub and dedicated A380 terminal, Emirates’ A380s crisscross the globe flying to 24 destinations spanning Los Angeles to Auckland. Illustrating the range of the A380, Emirates’ currently operates the world’s longest non-stop A380 service (13,414 kilometres), with its daily A380 flight between Dubai and Los Angeles, launched earlier this month.\nEmirates’ current A380 destinations are: Amsterdam, Auckland, Bangkok, Beijing, Dubai, Hong Kong, Jeddah, Kuala Lumpur, London Heathrow, Los Angeles, Manchester, Mauritius, Melbourne, Moscow, Munich, New York JFK, Paris among others.\nBy: Sade Williams", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businessday.ng/art-and-travel/article/intl-airlines-strengthen-networks-increase-fees-ahead-2014/"}
{"doc_id": "3892a97580b843e296ac6a7e6633b3bc", "text": "The Safaricom-led consortium in Ethiopia will pay $150 million (Sh18.9 billion) as licence fees to roll out M-Pesa in the populous nation if the proposed regulations by the Horn of Africa country are passed.\nThe amount referred to as an investment protection fee is contained in the proposed rules that will guide the licensing and launching of mobile money operations such as M-Pesa.\n“A foreign national applicant shall present evidence for the payment of $150 million or equivalent in another foreign currency for investment protection fee,” reads the draft published by the National Bank of Ethiopia, the country’s banking sector regulator.\nAn investment protection fee is the amount paid by foreigners to invest in businesses exclusively reserved for domestic investors or the government.\nThe amount will be in addition to 50 million birrs (Sh117.81 million) that Safaricom will have to pay in cash as paid-up capital and the amount deposited in a bank account with restricted access.\nThe National Bank of Ethiopia is on Tuesday expected to hold a consultative meeting with officials from Safaricom Ethiopia, Ethiopia Telecommunication Authority and those from banks, microfinance banks and payment system operators to discuss the draft.\nMobile money in Ethiopia is set to lift the profile of M-Pesa, which has been raising its stake in Safaricom’s revenue mix since its launch in 2007.\nRead: Ethiopia approves roll out of M-Pesa\nM-Pesa accounted for Sh107.69 billion, 39.9 percent, of the telco’s Sh269.86 billion total mobile service revenue for the year ended March 2022.\nEthiopia is home to more than 112 million people, making it the second-largest country in Africa by population, and M-Pesa is expected to thrive given the large population that is unbanked.\nA Safaricom-led consortium —which also includes Vodacom and Vodafone — was in May granted a telecom licence in Ethiopia following a Sh107 billion ($850 million) bid but has been unsure of what it would take to get an M-Pesa licence.\nThe draft directive on licensing and authorisation of payment instrument issuers now makes it clear that Safaricom will have to pay additional money to get a mobile money licence.\nIf the proposal is passed in its current form, Safaricom will be required to launch M-Pesa within six months of getting the licence.\nSafaricom chief finance officer Dilip Pal said last November Safaricom was already preparing for the launch as soon as it acquires the licence.\n“I think that’s the work that we are currently doing to make sure that our ability to launch in time, we can do it pretty fast, that we are not waiting sequentially to create those capabilities,” said Mr Pal.\nSafaricom has already tapped a Sh50.44 billion ($400 million) bridge loan to fund early costs of launching in Ethiopia launch and hopes to break even in the fourth year of operation.\nCEO at Safaricom Peter Ndegwa said last November the bridge loan was taken in Safaricom Kenya books but the telco is keen to bring external debt into the books of the Ethiopian unit.\nAmong other requirements will be a central bank approval of key product executives, a five-year business plan, a geographical rollout schedule and policies around the security of the digital wallet products.\nM-Pesa license will help Safaricom take mobile money service competition at the doorsteps of State-owned Ethio Telecom, which launched a new mobile financial service called Telebirr in May 2021, attracting millions of users within weeks.\nThe National Bank of Ethiopia is proposing an aggregate daily transaction limit of 20,000 birrs (Sh46,900) and 300,000 birrs (Sh703,600) for accounts classified as level one and level two respectively. No clarity has been given on how the classification will be made.\nEthiopia’s banking regulator is keen to support mobile money for other uses such as tax collection and salary payment and will be granted limit waivers in such cases.\n“The National Bank may, upon a written request from a payment instrument issuer, grant exceptional authorization for the payment instrument issuer to exceed the aggregate daily transaction limit for internal inward remittances, salary payments and tax payment services,” says the bank.\nRead: Ethiopia changes law for M-Pesa expansio\nThe Ethiopian market had largely been closed to external investors but started relaxing the stance in 2019 through an economic reform agenda, with the support of the International Finance Corporation.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/companies/ethiopia-eyes-sh19bn-fee-for-m-pesa-entry--4131096"}
{"doc_id": "f93361448f3497dfddf3fc48555ba75a", "text": "$8,6m set aside for rural electrification\nEmmah Chinyamutangira Manicaland Correspondent\nThe Rural Electrification Fund (REF) has set aside $8,6 million for energy development projects in the country which are aimed at increasing access to electricity in rural areas.\nThe fund has earmarked 335 energy projects countrywide which will increase access to electricity in rural areas from 27,7 percent to 60 percent.\nThe projects are set to benefit schools, clinics, Government extension offices and chief’s homesteads.\nREF chief executive engineer Joshua Mashamba said 189 projects had already been completed this year and they were working on an additional 335 projects which would be completed early next year.\nThe institutions that have benefited were electrified through grid extension this year at a cost of $6,2 million.\n“We are working on three programmes, namely electricity grid extension, solar micro grids and institutional biogas digesters leading to 335 institutions estimated at $8,3 million and 13 institutional biogas digester plants estimated at $220 000,” said Mr Mashamba.\n“As at 30 September 2018, we have electrified over 9 160 rural institutions countrywide. Of these, over 1 700 are in Manicaland Province alone.”\nMr Mashamba revealed that over 420 solar micro grid systems were installed at remote rural schools and clinics countrywide with 40 of those in Manicaland.\nSix biogas digesters were also constructed at some rural institutions in Manicaland.\n“REF has prioritised electrification of rural public institutions by way of 100 percent capital subsidy and attention should now also shift to include rural households in prioritisation,” said Mr Mashamba. New mechanisms are now required to finish off rural public institutions while accelerating electrification of households so that the 60 percent target is met by 2030.”\nMr Mashamba said nine biogas digester projects were commissioned during the period under review. Cumulatively, REF has commissioned 66 biogas digesters countrywide.\nHe said the current year’s performance had been negatively impacted by erratic supply of various materials, mainly transformers, conductor wires.\n“The main reason supplier’s site for lack of performance is shortage of foreign currency,” said Mr Mashamba. Most of the project materials are now imported and with the biting shortage of foreign currency, REF has to find innovative ways of procuring the materials.”\nMr Mashamba indicated that since its inception, REF had remained consistent with the mandate to facilitate rapid equitable provision of energy to rural areas.\n“It is, therefore, incumbent upon us to raise the level of awareness within our sector and without on the practicality of meeting rural population energy needs with other means besides the grid,” he said.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.herald.co.zw/86m-set-aside-for-rural-electrification/"}
{"doc_id": "4085b2e93516c1dc98e7f9578b1f4213", "text": "If Cabinet reshuffles represent the political balance of forces at the time at which they are conducted, Monday night’s announcement was the final proof, if more were needed, that the ANC is still locked in a series of massive struggles, and with big actors. It is now clear that President Cyril Ramaphosa needs David Mabuza if he is to survive, and that he still lacks the power to fire even Bathabile Dlamini from the Cabinet. But at the same time, it is also clear that he does have the authority to right one of the biggest wrongs of our times, the firing of Nhlanhla Nene as Finance Minister. While there are many reasons to feel these are the worst of times, there are also signs of the best of times. By STEPHEN GROOTES.\nFirst, the panic, the worst.\nDavid Mabuza is now going to be your Deputy President. A man accused of corruption; Of theft; Of murder. In some ways, this places us in a much worse position than we were when Jacob Zuma was Thabo Mbeki’s deputy. No one has ever accused Zuma of murder, he didn’t come to the office with a reputation of being a thug, which Mabuza most certainly possesses. Mabuza being just a heartbeat away from the Presidency is the best campaigning tool the opposition parties could wish for.\n(Especially when Ramaphosa himself didn’t look his best on Monday night.)\nThere is so much that is just wrong here. Mabuza has the entirely opposite image to Ramaphosa. Where Ramaphosa promises reform, Mabuza brings scandal, when Ramaphosa promises change, Mabuza brings more of the same, when Ramaphosa gives the image of a new confident polyglot South Africa moving forward, Mabuza brings a small-town provincial image.\nBut, the internal politics of the ANC being what they are, it is now clear that Mabuza decided he could not back Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma at Nasrec, and so Ramaphosa came through in the end. However, it should not be forgotten that under the Constitution, the Deputy President has the rights and duties assigned by the President. Apart from that, they have the same role as any other Cabinet Minister. This means that formally, he can only do what Ramaphosa allows him to do (apart from when Ramaphosa is out of the country, and Mabuza becomes, yes, acting president, with the power to invade Lesotho, should it be necessary).\nIn the past, there has usually been a situation where the incumbent president’s biggest rival has been his deputy; think Mbeki and Zuma, Zuma and Ramaphosa. Which is how Zuma ended up as Chair of the Moral Regeneration Movement and Ramaphosa in charge of the E-tolls task team.\nThis means that Ramaphosa can still place significant boundaries around Mabuza. And Mabuza appears to lack the national support he would need to prevent that from happening. A cat may be able to survive under many circumstances, but that doesn’t mean it gets to run the circus.\nMabuza may find that frustrating.\nThere is reason for panic too that for some reason Bathabile Dlamini cannot be fired from the Cabinet. She is now being shuffled off as Minister for Women in the Presidency. Considering most people probably can’t name the previous person in that post, it is certainly a demotion. And confirmation that the position has no real political power, it was simply used to create an opportunity for patronage.\nHowever, the person who she has swapped with (in case you hadn’t worked it out yet) is Susan Shabangu. Shabangu has been what you could call an almost silent minister. And now she is in charge of fixing the social grants payment system mess. It is a mystery why one of the biggest problems of all is now in the lap of someone who has shown little experience of fixing this, or any, kind of problem in the past. It could well be a job for a Mondli Gungubele or even a Pravin Gordhan. It suggests, perhaps, that the story around Cash Paymaster Services is much more political, and possibly involves a wider group of people than we had previously thought.\nThe appointment of Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma to the position of Presidency Minister for Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation is curious. When Collins Chabane was still alive, it was a ministry that appeared to have some real power. But since then, no one really cares. It is interesting both that Ramaphosa has given the person who lost at Nasrec a Cabinet position, and that it is such a junior one. Dlamini Zuma has been Minister of Health, Home Affairs and International Relations, all offices with very real power. This is a huge come-down. It is a sign of how badly things have gone for her, and may push her to re-assess some of her life choices.\nThankfully, now that the shock of Mabuza as Deputy President may be wearing off, the sense of panic is ebbing. And is slowly being replaced by some calm.\nThe first reason for this is that so many of the really really evil bad incompetent awful ministers have gone. Lynne Brown, Mosebenzi Zwane, Des van Rooyen, Bongani Bongo, David Mahlobo, all politically kaput, and hopefully will be booed in the streets, if they dare venture out without their blue light brigades.\nBut the choice of Dipuo Letsatsi-Duba as the new Minister of State Security is curious. She is the kind of person many people, even professional politics watchers, will not have heard of. Her life story will probably burst onto the national stage over the next few days. She is from Limpopo, a former MK, and Parliament’s website says her previous position was in the Limpopo legislature. During the Zuma years we became accustomed to people unknown in the urban political arena being appointed to important jobs suddenly. Often, this was a sign that they were completely beholden to Zuma, and would do his bidding. It may be that Letsatsi-Duba is a similar case. Or that she is the result of a compromise over the real political hot potato of who controls those who can tap cellphones. And it is also entirely possible that the urban commentariat (including this writer) are just ignorant of her past, and that she is the best person for the job. It would be tempting to say that time will tell, but bluntly, this position is so important to our politics that actually one cannot just hope for the best, one must demand to know more.\nRight, to a phrase you don’t read very often in this online daily: And now, for the good news!\nAnd there is plenty of it. It is surely a fantastic feeling to see Nene back in the halls of the National Treasury. It was his unjust, unexplained, and unwarranted removal back in 2015 that started the internal ANC revolution that led to Ramaphosa becoming president. If ever a person had borne their unjust treatment with a quiet dignity, it is Nhlanhla Nene. And now, in such a symbolic moment, he is going back to the Finance Ministry. The move just makes sense, and completes the circle. When you trust the person who is in charge of the nation’s money, it is simply easier to sleep at night. Now you can.\nBut, as you do, spare a thought for Mcebisi Jonas. The man who turned down the R600-million bribe offered by the Guptas to become the Finance Minister. It was that decision that set the stage for the overstepping by the Guptas and Zuma to remove Nene, and attempt to replace him with Van Rooyen. Jonas was not on the list of ministers and deputy ministers announced by Ramaphosa on Monday night. If it was an oversight, he deserves better. Much better. If he was approached and has other things he wants to do in his life, this nation owes it to him to not just wish him well, but see that he achieves all that he wants to do. In so many ways, it was he, and Pravin Gordhan, and Derek Hanekom and so many others who saved the ANC, and possibly the country, from the abyss.\nTalking of Hanekom, he’s back at Tourism, after playing such a key role in moving opposition to Zuma within the ANC.\nAlso back in Cabinet is Blade Nzimande, at Transport. When Nzimande first became Higher Education Minister, it seemed like a perfect fit, it played to his strengths and interests. But obviously that has become difficult. He may not enjoy Transport that much, but he is likely to do all that he can to perform well and competently. Even though it may not actually suit the longer-term aims of the SACP to have him still in Cabinet.\nWhile there may be many who are relieved to see Malusi Gigaba leave the position of Finance Minister, he may well sit back in his chair at Home Affairs with a relaxed sigh. It’s not clear that he enjoyed the position of Finance Minister, the context around him was incredibly difficult, and would have challenged anyone. But the fact that he oversaw the appointment of so many Gupta-aligned people to the boards of parastatals as Public Enterprises Minister, and yet is still in Cabinet, could mean many things. Perhaps he is still too important to fire from Cabinet, or maybe he has done some deal that could evolve in a court somewhere. Either way, visa officers in airlines around the world will not rejoice upon his return.\nThere are two other appointments that are really reason for celebration. The first is that of Pravin Gordhan to Public Enterprises. Gordhan is one of the finest political operators of his generation, and he knows where the bodies are buried and he won’t take crap from anybody. Imagine being on the board of the parastatals just now. He was surely the prime moving force behind the new Eskom board. Envision, just for a moment, if all of the boards of the parastatals looked like Eskom’s and SAA’s. And imagine how quickly things could get moving once he establishes himself (which should take him until about lunchtime on Tuesday).\nAnd then, the removal of that liar Mosebenzi Zwane from the position of Mineral Resources Minister, and his replacement, by, of all people, Gwede Mantashe. Frankly, there is probably nobody better placed to get our mining industry on its feet again. Mantashe knows everybody in the mining industry from his time as secretary-general of the National Union of Mineworkers. He is still beloved by that union. And, after what they’ve been through, he is likely to receive a great reception from the Chamber of Mines. He will tear up Zwane’s Mining Charter that has caused so much trouble, and sit down and negotiate a new one. He will be tough during that negotiation, but the Chamber will know that he will stick to it once it’s done. And then he will go on an international road show with the Chamber and tell the Americans why they must come and put billions of dollars into our land.\nBut the best part of it is that he has the political heft to make big promises, and then deliver on them. It is an inspired appointment.\nThere is much to celebrate in Monday night’s announcement. It is the final proof that the Zuma Empire is gone, blown to bits, with the Guptas in hiding. But it is also the final proof that the ANC is not a settled organisation, and that there could well be more political surprises in store. DM\nPhoto: South Africa’s deputy president, David Mabuza. (Greg Nicolson photo)\nThe list of the new appointments:\n- Communications: Nomvula Mokonyane\n- Energy: Jeff Radebe\n- Higher Education and Training: Naledi Pandor\n- Home Affairs: Malusi Gigaba\n- Human Settlements: Nomaindia Mfeketo\n- International Relations and Co-operation: Lindiwe Sisulu\n- Mineral Resources: Gwede Mantashe\n- Police: Bheki Cele\n- Public Enterprises: Pravin Gordhan\n- Public Service and Administration: Ayanda Dlodlo\n- Public Works: Thulas Nxesi\n- Rural Development and Land Reform: Maite Nkoana-Mashabane\n- Science and Technology: Nkhensani Kubayi-Ngubane\n- Social Development: Susan Shabangu\n- Sport and Recreation: Tokozile Xasa\n- State Security: Dipuo Letsatsi-Duba\n- The Presidency: Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation: Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma\n- The Presidency: Women: Bathabile Dlamini\n- Tourism: Derek Hanekom\n- Transport: Blade Nzimande\n- Water and Sanitation: Gugile Nkwinti\nThe new Deputy Ministers:\n- Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries: S’fiso Buthelezi\n- Communications: Pinky Kekana\n- Finance: Mondli Gungubele\n- Public Service and Administration: Chana Pilane-Majeke\n- Small Business Development: Cassel Mathale\nThe positions of Deputy Minister of Public Enterprises and Deputy Minister in the Presidency for Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation will remain vacant.\nPending the completion of their swearing-in as Members of the National Assembly, the following will be further appointed:\n- David Mabuza as the Deputy President of the Republic\n- Zweli Mkhize as Minister of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs\n- Nhlanhla Nene as Minister of Finance\n- Reginah Mhaule as Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-02-27-cabinet-reshuffle-the-worst-of-times-the-best-of-times/"}
{"doc_id": "c8200a821d11da15342ccc1719e8b67d", "text": "Advertisement\nGovt asks investors for $2.5 billion to clear energy sector debts\nThe government is on a roadshow to raise $2.5 billion through a bond issue to clear arrears owed banks by state-owned electricity and petroleum utility companies.\nA deputy Minister of Information, Mr Kojo Oppong Nkrumah, said in a message to the Daily Graphic that the transaction advisor, Temple Investment, had done a lot of work in the background to whet investors’ appetite for the country’s energy bond.\nThe Ghanaian delegation, led by Senior Minister Mr Yaw Osafo-Maafo, the Finance Minister, Mr Ken Ofori-Atta and other senior government officials, including the spokesperson for the team, Mr Oppong Nkrumah, was in New York to sell the energy sector bond to investors, after they had attended the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank annual meetings in Washington DC in the United States of America (USA).\n“The process began with the selection of the transaction advisor who has been doing all the work behind the scenes,” Mr Oppong Nkrumah said in a text in response to enquiries by the Daily Graphic.\n“Yes, the total bond is the cedi equivalent of about $2.5 billion.\nThis is aimed at resolving the various issues in the energy sector, which have led to intermittent power supply and high tariffs, as well as provide liquidity to the banking sector,” he stated.\nRising non-performing loans\nThe stock of non-performing loans at banks was GH¢8 billion as of June 30, according to Bank of Ghana data.\nThe three major power utilities, Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG), Volta River Authority (VRA) and Ghana Grid Company (GRIDCo), had GH¢ 7.7 billion in payable loans at the end of 2015, according to the IMF.\nThe government plans to boost the ability of the banks’ to lend and strengthen the financial industry as part of an agreement under an IMF extended-credit facility programme with the country.\nMr Ofori-Atta was quoted by an international newswire, Bloomberg, as saying that the sale was the first tranche of a plan to sell as much as GH¢10 billion cedis in bonds through a special-purpose vehicle and backed by a tax on the sale of petroleum products.\nHe said the debt would carry a maturity of no longer than 10 years.\n“We will do the first tranche, size up the market and then come back. You don’t necessarily need to do all the 10 billion cedis right now,” he told Bloomberg.\nThe government has already appointed Fidelity Bank and Standard Chartered Bank as lead managers for the issuance of the Energy Sector Levy Act (ESLA) bond. The banks are expected to raise GH¢10 billion.\nThere are, however, concerns that the lack of a sovereign guarantee for the bond may hamper its success.\nQuest for assurance\nInvestors will have to seek more assurances from the government that successive governments will continue to allocate energy sector levies to the special purpose vehicle.\nBut the IMF has said Ghana remains at a high risk of debt distress as the country plans to clear arrears owed by energy utilities through the sale of a GH¢10 billion cedi ($2.5 billion) local-currency bond.\nGhana has struggled to tame its national finances with help from a $918 million IMF programme set to end next year.\nMatching expenditure to revenue\nThere are worries that the government has not been able to match its expenditure with revenue and has resorted to borrowing and adding to the public debt.\nProvisional fiscal data for the first seven months of the year show that total revenue and grants amounted to GH¢20.8 billion, which is 10.3 per cent of GDP, compared with a target of GH¢24.0 billion or 11.3 per cent of GDP.\nAgain, the total expenditures and arrears clearance stood at GH¢28.8 billion, which is 14.3 per cent of GDP against a target of GH¢32.3 billion, which is also 16.0 per cent of GDP.\nThe revenue performance has been undermined by low import levels, slower pace of implementing specific tax measures, revision to tax assessments, and a sluggish non-oil real sector.\nThe country’s debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to decrease to 66.1 per cent by the end of 2018 according to a projection captured in the fiscal monitor report released by the IMF.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.graphic.com.gh/business/business-news/govt-asks-investors-for-2-5-billion-to-clear-energy-sector-debts.html"}
{"doc_id": "883fa6f3303ab3808bda8425c1f122c8", "text": "Access to capital can be a critical driver for the growth and sustainability of virtually any business and one of the ways a company can access capital is by issuing shares. Money paid by investors or financiers to purchase units of ownership in a company, when aggregated, is the company’s share capital and a company seeking to acquire more funds to do business may increase its share capital, thus allowing current and new shareholders or investors to increase or acquire ownership respectively.\nWhilst investors in a public company can trade their shares on the stock exchange, a private company’s shares cannot be publicly traded; a shareholder in a private company may only transfer shares to another private individual, where there are no restrictions on such transfer. But did you know that a company can also buy its own shares and subsequently deal with those shares for value? Share repurchase can drive a business’ overall profitability and create value for its shareholders. The commercial and regulatory implications of this practice will be examined in more detail below.\nA company repurchasing its shares (either by acquiring new shares or buying them back from existing shareholders) is basically a company reinvesting in itself. This practice is generally restricted, based on a fundamental principle of company law that a company must maintain and not reduce its capital. A company should ordinarily not finance the purchase of its own shares, either by using capital contributed by its shareholders, or by taking loans secured by its capital.\nTo cite an analogy, a grocery trader who uses his business capital to purchase the same groceries stocked up for trading, will not be growing that capital, but rather ‘recycling’ it. This principle extends to restrict a company giving assistance to a third party to purchase its shares, paying any dividends out of capital or enabling a subsidiary to purchase the shares of its holding company.\nWhen a public company repurchases its shares, the repurchased shares are cancelled and this reduces the company’s share capital. For a private company repurchasing its shares, these are kept as treasury shares (shares in the reserve). When shares are repurchased in a private company, it gives the impression that new funds have been injected into the company through share capital enhancement, but in the real sense the capital to run the company’s business has been reduced. Ensuring that such share repurchase does not create a misleading appearance of capital growth is what the regulators guard against.\nSHARE REPURCHASES UNDER NIGERIAN COMPANY LAW\nUnder the now defunct Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 1990, a company was not permitted to acquire or buy back its shares either from the open market or from existing shareholders. This was meant to serve the dual purpose of avoiding the reduction of the company’s capital and preventing incidents of fraud perpetrated by directors and shareholders repurchasing shares of their company to give an overinflated image of the company’s performance.\nIn more advanced markets like the US and the UK, share buybacks are well recognized but are typically understood in the context of public companies whose shares are traded on the stock exchange. This perhaps explains the reason Nigeria’s Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in accordance with international best practice, had from time permitted a public company to buy back its shares from the open market upon the fulfilment of certain conditions.\nRead also: Buhari launches NNPC Limited, says new status will deliver value to 200 million shareholders\nWith the coming into law of the CAMA 2020, private companies are now generally allowed to repurchase their shares and the company can enter its name in the register of members. As long as the company fully paid for the shares and the purchase is not from the capital of the company but its distributable profits , it can subsequently deal with those shares for value.\nAlthough the Securities and Exchange Commission Rules and Regulations 2013 (the SEC Rules) principally regulate share repurchases by public companies, most pre- and post-conditions for share repurchases set out by CAMA 2020 also seem to mirror the SEC Rules. The Rules provide that public companies may repurchase their shares either from the open market (where the price is determined by the current market value of shares) or self-tender (where the price is determined by the Board and the price must not be fixed above 5% over the average market price of the shares). It is also worthy of note that shares repurchased by public companies pursuant to the SEC Rules cannot be kept as treasury shares but must be cancelled in accordance with the procedure for cancellation of shares set out in CAMA.\nCOMMERCIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR PRIVATE COMPANIES\nPrivate company share repurchases are not done on a stock market, but in ‘off-market’ purchases and there are several commercial considerations which could trigger a company to repurchase its own shares:\n1. TO FACILITATE THE BUY–OUT AND EXIT OF A DIRECTOR/SHAREHOLDER\nWhere a director/shareholder wants out from a company and would only resign further to a compensation, the company can offer to purchase his shares at a market or fair price, especially where the other shareholders are not interested in buying the shares. The company can re-allot the shares sometime in the future to another shareholder.\n2. REGULATORY COMPLIANCE\nCertain industries have regulatory prescriptions as to minimum share capital requirements for companies operating in that industry. Companies may elect to increase their share capital in compliance with that prescribed minimum. The CAMA prescribes in Section 128(1) (a) that a company increasing its share capital must pay up at least 25% of said share capital to give effect to the increase. A private company may use treasury shares to map out the financing of the share increase.\n3. SHARE ACQUISITION FOR THE PURPOSE OF AN EMPLOYEE SHARE COMPENSATION SCHEME\nA company can consider holding a percentage of its shares to set up an employee compensation plan. Typically, under such a plan, employees would become entitled to the shares as a benefit after spending a certain period of time at the company. The company would hold shares in reserve for those of its employees who have not yet become eligible to access the benefit.\nCOMMERCIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR SHARE BUYBACK FOR PUBLICLY TRADED COMPANIES\nBetween 2021 and 2022, Dangote Cement Plc embarked on a share buyback program, purchasing its shares in the open market, and as a result of the buyback, the company’s shares went up by 10% the day it announced its repurchase plan.\nWhile admittedly the Dangote brand may be considered a unicorn in Nigerian business and there may be other market variables which may have contributed to the increase in the value of the company’s shares, this example demonstrates the intrinsic value of a share buyback and the benefits shareholders of a company may derive from investing in its own shares. Here are a few other reasons a publicly-traded company may want to repurchase its shares from the open market:\na) INCREASE EARNING PER SHARE\nA publicly traded company could buy its own shares in a bid to reduce the number of shares available for trading; thereby raising demand, and by extension, the price of its shares in the market. A reduced number of shares in issue increases the Earning Per Share (EPS) of each share, and the greater the EPS of each share, the greater its attractiveness to investors.\nb) ALTERNATIVE TO PAYING DIVIDENDS AND TAX PLANNING MECHANISM\nA public company can also repurchase its shares from the open market for the purpose of returning surplus cash to shareholders as an alternative to paying dividends. A share buyback financed from the distributable profits of the company gives the company the opportunity to buy the shares from its shareholders for value.\nThis purchase is another means of distributing profit to the shareholders and such distribution will not be subject to withholding tax (distribution of the profit as dividends will be subject to withholding tax). The proceeds from the disposal of the shares by the shareholders will only be subject to Capital Gains Tax where the proceeds from the disposal is more than 100 Million Naira (N100, 000,000) in a consecutive 12-month period.\nc) ANTI-TAKEOVER MECHANISM\nShare repurchase can also be applied strategically as an anti–takeover mechanism. A company can choose to buyback its own shares to prevent a shareholder from acquiring a majority stake through a mandatory take-over process. By reducing the liquidity and number of shares available in the market, the value of the outstanding shares will be enhanced and the company’s exposure to such mandatory take–over is reduced.\nCONCLUSION\nThere is no doubt that a company and its shareholders can benefit from a repurchase or buyback of the company’s shares but the mechanism of repurchase or buyback must not offend the fundamental principle that capital must be maintained. The repurchase must therefore not reduce the share capital of the company, the company must not give a misrepresentation as to the capital standing and credit worthiness of the company and such repurchase must be financed from the distributable profit of the company.\nThe statutory leeway afforded for companies to purchase their shares offers greater flexibility to structure commercial transactions, can drive an increase in the price of shares traded on the stock market, thereby increasing shareholder value and it is also a viable tax planning tool.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businessday.ng/backpage/article/shareholder-value-enhanced-by-share-buypack/"}
{"doc_id": "aa29b47d001fdab7d848127c037f86e9", "text": "Shoprite Holdings inflation-beating 13.9% increase in merchandise sales to about R121.1 billion in the six month to December 31 brought to 58 weeks the number of uninterrupted monthly market share gains in South Africa, the group said yesterday.\nApproximate sales from continuing operations were 13.2% higher in the first quarter of 2023, compared with the same period a year before, and 14.6% up in the second quarter, which is traditionally stronger as it falls over the Christmas trading period.\nThe share price was trading 2.47% higher at R270.03 yesterday afternoon, but the share price has increased steadily by more than 48% over three years.\nBy segment, Supermarkets RSA sales of R97.5bn was up 14.6%, 13.3% in the first quarter and 15.8% in the second quarter.\nSupermarkets Non-RSA sales of about R10.6bn increased by 6.2% in the first half, 9.7% in the first quarter and 3.3% in the second quarter.\nFurniture segment sales of R4bn had increased only 1.7% in the six months, 0.5% in the first quarter and 2.5% in the second quarter.\nOther operating segment sales of about R9bn was up 23.1% in the first half, 22.2% in the first quarter and 23.9% in the second quarter. This segment comprises the OK Franchise, Transpharm, Medirite Pharmacies, Red Star Wholesale Catering Services and Computicket.\nThe group’s core business Supermarkets RSA made up 80.5% of group sales and its sales were up 6.3% on a like-for-like basis. In the first half to January 1, 2023, its sales had increased by 17.5% on the prior period.\nShoprite directors said a sustained high level of execution and continued customer momentum, together with record Black Friday and festive season trade, had extended the period of uninterrupted market share gains achieved by the core South African supermarket brands to 58 months.\n“Our commitment and investment into price leadership in support of our customers resulted in our Shoprite and Checkers Xtra Savings rewards programme customers saving R8.4bn over the period,” they said.\nInternal selling price inflation measured 7.7% for the period.\nCheckers and Checkers Hyper reported sales growth of 13.7% with Checkers Sixty60 online sales increasing by 63.1%.\nShoprite and Usave sales grew by 13.1%. LiquorShop sales increased by 25.2%.\nAs was the case during the second half of the 2023 financial year, the period's growth was positively impacted by the inclusion of 94 stores acquired from Massmart Holdings.\nMassmart’s stores were integrated into group operations as follows: Shoprite (51 stores), Usave (one store) and Shoprite LiquorShop (42 stores).\nAdjusting for this, Supermarkets RSA segment sales increased by 11.2%.\nSupermarkets RSA, inclusive of the stores acquired from Massmart, added a net 285 stores during the past 12 months, to total 2 237 stores.\nIn constant currency, Supermarkets Non-RSA increased sales 20%. The segment's store base increased by nine stores over the past 12 months to 258 stores in nine countries.\nThe furniture segment, made up of OK Furniture and House & Home, contributed 3.3% to group sales. The segment's store base remained unchanged with 432 stores.\nThe Other Operating Segments reported sales growth of 23.1% - the segment made up 7.4% of group sales.\nThe group's sales to its OK Franchise operation increased 25%. The OK Franchise store base increased by 70 stores net over the 12 months to end the period with 605 stores.\nDuring the corresponding period last year, non-recurring income of R244m was received from a loss of profit insurance claim.\nLoad-shedding related power outages resulted in a R500m diesel expense to operate generators. Finance charges increased as a result of the increases in the South African repo rate.\nBUSINESS REPORT", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/companies/shoprite-continued-to-grow-market-share-over-the-festive-period-d50efcb3-2ea8-48e2-911e-6592b2c9a1fa"}
{"doc_id": "5add8c0a28972f97d105397966ec4aa9", "text": "By GEOFFREY MOSOKU\nKenya: Anglo-Leasing architect Anura Pereira is not yet done with Kenya even after getting paid 1.4 billion shillings by Treasury.\nA day after revealing that Treasury had paid Pereira’s agents the amount, Permanent Secretary Kamau,Thugge dropped another bombshell hitherto unknown to Kenyans, of a new demand by the Sri Lankan, this time totaling to 3.05 billion shillings.\nThugge said the Sh3.05 billion is Pereira’s free demand in the latest Anglo leasing deals for the services allegedly made to the National Security Intelligence Service, now the NIS.\nThis is in addition to the Sh1.4 billion paid to his two other Anglo Leasing companies: Universal Satspace and First Mercantile Securities Corporation in line with a judgement issued in a London Court.\nThugge shocked the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) when he revealed that fresh demands had been made against the Flagstaff NCTC project entered in 2004 at a cost of US$41,800,000 for the NSIS.\n“Pereira has already filed another claim with Treasury seeking the Sh3.05 billion payment for Flagstaff project though there is uncertainty on how much was done,” said Thugge.\nThe PS told the Ababu Namwamba-led PAC that Pereira has already written to Treasury demanding the payment but failed to clarify when the new demand was made.\nThis prompted committee chairman Namwamba to order Thugge to furnish the team with letters to that effect. But the latest revelation drew the suspicion of the committee, which questioned the manner in which contracts associated with Pereira’s companies were being favoured.\nBig conspiracy\n“The demand is not less than Sh3.05 billion entered in 2004. The figure could be more because of the interest rates accrued and similar tactics that were employed to frustrate the supposed floating of the sovereign bond,” warned Namwamba.\nSuna East MP Junet Mohamed also demanded explanations from Treasury on a pattern he said was worrying, in which firms associated with Pereira were being given preferential treatment.\n“Doesn’t it look like it is a conspiracy to pay Pereira the claims? Already four of his recent claims under the Anglo Leasing deals have been paid. The one in the pipeline is not even captured in the PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) report that conducted an evaluation of the other related security projects,” Mr Mohamed said.\nThe latest demands now add another complication to Kenya’s planned sovereign bond, which seeks over Sh130 billion to bridge the 2014/15 budgetary estimates deficit.\nThis means that Treasury may cave in to the new demands and pay the amount, a situation that will exert more pressure on the Jubilee government, which is already battling criticisms over the payments.\nStay informed. Subscribe to our newsletter\nDeputy Solicitor General Muthoni Kimani told MPs that the project was not among the ones that were evaluated by PWC based on the nature of its security status.\nThugge, however, indicated that Treasury would be ready to work with the House to find ways of having the project audited before payments were made because of the high levels of uncertainty over how much was done.\nThis emerged as the committee was also told that the Government is demanding over Sh3.83 billion from Anglo Leasing businessman Deepak Kamani as a refund over the partly completed contracts.\nTreasury’s quest to recover the money is, however, shrouded in mystery after claims that the courts had quashed the demands after the businessman sued to counter the move.\nBut a Treasury official, a Mr Kairu, told the committee that it was part of the PWC audit report.\nMs Kimani said the figure that the Government was seeking as a refund was still valid because it had not been affected by the court’s verdict.\nShe though failed to produce evidence of any mutual agreement on the refund by the government to Kamani.\n“The figure is valid and is based on the five projects that were partially performed. Already the letters of termination have been sent to him for compliance,” Muthoni said.\nNamwamba faulted the manner in which the process to terminated.\n“You do not just wake up one day and terminate; there must be a process. You may not be sufficiently advised on their levels of completion,” said Namwamba.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000122079/shock-as-"}
{"doc_id": "29cc1a10f580d4098c7175be6f0f73e8", "text": "Nigeria’s imports of Malaysian Palm Oil surged in 2023 by 34 percent, despite the devaluation of the naira and increased local production of the crop, according to data from the Malaysian Palm Oil Council (MPOC).\nThe country imported 304,043 metric tons (MT) of palm oil from Malaysia in 2023, from 227,035 MT in 2022, indicating a 77,008 MT increase.\nIn 2021, the country imported 309,911 MT of palm oil from Malaysia.\nAnd though the exchange rate fell to a fresh low of N1,460 per dollar at the parallel market on Tuesday morning with traders expecting further weakness in the coming days as dollar shortages worsen, Nigeria still imports palm oil in large quantities from Malaysia, Indonesia, and its other neighbouring West African countries.\nRead also: Nigeria’s palm oil imports from Malaysia surges 353% in 4months as demand rises\n“In Nigeria, the palm oil market size is huge and growing. Local producers are not able to satisfy the requirements of the food industry and households,” the MPOC said on its website.\n“The major factors that drive palm oil usage in Nigeria are the level of customer demand provided by the growing Nigerian population and the international price of crude palm oil,” it added.\nAccording to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), palm oil production in Nigeria grew by 9 percent from 2020/21 to 1.4 million metric tonnes in 2022.\nHowever, local production still fell short of demand, with Nigeria consuming two million metric tonnes in 2021, leaving a deficit of 600,000 metric tonnes. This indicates that while local production has increased, it has not kept pace with the country’s growing demand for palm oil.\nIn the face of years of stagnant output growth and growing local demand, Nigeria’s production deficit has widened considerably, and on average, over the last five years, around 25 percent of yearly domestic palm oil consumed in the country was imported.\n“A decline in the international price of crude palm oil always leads to increased imports of palm oil, as well as smuggling from neighbouring West African countries,” MPOC said in one of its reports.\n“Despite paying an import duty of 35 percent, Nigeria importers are not discouraged from importing more palm oil from Malaysia and Indonesia as the demand is always there and imported palm oil is still cheaper than locally produced palm oil,” it added.\nAccording to the Plantation Owners Forum of Nigeria (POFON), 80 percent of palm oil planted areas are either wild trees or managed by smallholders and medium-sized plantations with an estimated oil yield of fewer than 0.5 tonnes per hectare.\nTwenty percent of the planted areas are managed by commercial estates with an estimated oil yield of 1 to 2.3 tonnes per hectare. This gap in production and demand had led to Nigeria being a net importer of palm oil to satisfy local demand.\n“For the record, the highest volume of MPO ever imported by Nigeria was 384,000 MT registered in 2011,” the South East Asian Council said.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businessday.ng/agriculture/article/nigerias-palm-oil-imports-from-malaysia-surge-34-in-2023/"}
{"doc_id": "9eb735d91ce0392adb00b08c8da92f0d", "text": "By Chineme Okafor in Abuja\nThe Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) yesterday said it would hold deeper discussions on the implementation of the 10-year capital market master plan as well as other initiatives for Nigeria’s capital market with stakeholders at its forthcoming Capital Market Committee (CMC).\nA statement from the SEC in Abuja explained that the CMC meeting scheduled to hold in Lagos would be expanded to accommodate a diverse group of relevant stakeholders in Nigeria’s capital market.\nAccording to it, the 10-year master plan for the Nigerian capital market is expected to refocus the market and help double its size over time as well as grow the economy.\nIt noted that since it unveiled the masterplan in November 2014, it has vigorously implemented some initiatives in it with the aim of attracting more investors to the market.\n“The SEC is set to host the first CMC meeting for 2018. The meeting is scheduled to hold at the Federal Palace Hotel and top on the agenda would be the capital market master plan implementation and other capital market initiatives,†said the statement.\nSEC equally explained that some of the initiatives in the masterplan which it has implemented include direct cash settlement; dematerialisation; and e-dividend registration, which it added have promoted transparency; protect and enhance investors’ confidence in the capital market.\n“The SEC therefore enjoins all shareholders to take advantage of the initiatives introduced in the capital market aimed primarily at strengthening the market and accelerating economic development.\n“This is in consonance with the present administration’s economic strategy focused on deepening the capital market as a vehicle for encouraging a private sector-led economy with enhanced productivity,†it explained.\nOn the stakeholders expected at the CEC meeting, SEC stated: “Those who have been invited to attend the expanded session are CEOs of all registered capital market firms, i.e. broker dealer capital market solicitors; custodians; fund managers; issuing houses; rating agencies; registrars; reporting accountants; trustees; and consultants.\n“Others are Chief Executive Officers of the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE); National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD); the Financial Markets Dealers Quotations (FMDQ); Africa Exchange Holdings (AFEX); Nigeria Commodity Exchange (NCX); Central Securities Clearing System (CSCS); Chartered Institute of Stockbrokers (CIS); as well as representatives of relevant financial services’ agencies; among others.â€", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2018/04/16/sec-considers-10-year-capital-market-plan-at-expanded-cttee-meeting"}
{"doc_id": "06fce61373bb270f1c6b8f44b3cdd471", "text": "The Board of Directors of Chemical and Allied Products Plc (CAP Plc), and Portland Paints and Products Plc (Portland Paints), have decided to merge their respective businesses in accordance with applicable laws to drive growth and expansion within the Nigerian and African markets.\nThis is according to a press release signed by Bolarin Okunowo, the Managing Director of Portland Paints, made available on NSE, Monday, 26th October 2020.\nThe completion of the proposed merger is subject to approvals being obtained from the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), The Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE), the Federal High Court, as well as shareholders of CAP and Portland Paints.\nShould the proposed merger go ahead, CAP Plc will emerge as the resultant entity.\nThe proposed merger will be executed by way of a Scheme of Merger (the “Scheme”) in accordance with Section 711 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 2020, and other applicable laws, rules, and regulations.\nThe Scheme will involve the transfer of all Portland Paints Plc’s assets, liabilities and business undertakings including real property and intellectual property rights to CAP Plc.\nIn consideration for the transfer, CAP Plc is offering shareholders of Portland Paints a choice to receive N2.90 cash for every Portland Paints share held OR 1 new ordinary share of CAP Plc, credited as fully paid up for every 8 Portland Paints shares held.\nThe proposed consideration represents a 45% premium to the last traded share price of Portland Paints Plc on October 16, 2020, being the last business day prior to the date on which CAP Plc sent its merger proposal to the Board of Portland Paints and a 41% premium on the trading price as at close of trading on October 23, 2020.\nCommenting on the proposed merger, David Wright, Managing Director of CAP, said, “The decision to pursue the proposed merger, is driven by the Board’s strategic plan to aggressively grow within the Nigerian and African markets.\n“We believe that the Proposed Merger presents a unique opportunity that will benefit all stakeholders, from shareholders to customers, as well as the broader economy. I am excited by the prospect of an enlarged company with a broader decorative paint portfolio covering the premium, mid-market and affordable segments and the inclusion of marine and protective coatings, all of which will benefit our customers and shareholders.”\nThe Managing Director of Portland Paints, Bolarin Okunowo, submitted that “In recent months, the Board and Management of Portland Paints have evaluated various strategic options with a view to positioning our company to capture emerging growth opportunities.\n“CAP Plc’s business is complementary to ours, and both companies will be better able to serve our respective customers by coming together. I believe the combination of Portland Paints and CAP will yield significant benefits for all of our stakeholders.”\nMutual shareholder\nPortland Paints and Products Nigeria Plc – with 85.98% of the company’s issued share capital owned by UAC Nigeria Plc, manufactures and sells decorative, industrial, and marine/protective coatings for the construction of oil & gas industries in Nigeria. Portland Paints is the Nigerian representative of Hempel. It is listed on the NSE.\nChemical and Allied Products Plc (CAP) – a subsidiary of UAC Nigeria Plc – which holds 51.49% of the company’s shares, manufactures and sells premium and standard paints and coatings, and is the sole technological licensee of Akzo Nobel Coatings International B.V. in Nigeria. It is listed on the NSE.\nDownload Nairametrics App for breaking news and market intelligence.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://nairametrics.com/2020/10/27/cap-plc-set-to-merge-with-portland-paints-and-products-plc/"}
{"doc_id": "4ae7fd518009142c1ff61b7ddc4272af", "text": "The state is acquiring hi-tech tools to boost service delivery but this will also increase social control\nStefaans Brmmer\nMinister of Home Affairs Mangosuthu Buthelezi on Monday called himself a “libertarian” who believes in vigilance “to ensure that once acquired, liberties and freedoms are not placed in jeopardy by subsequent actions of government”. That said, he unveiled Hanis, an information-age tool of social control potentially much more powerful than apartheid’s dompas.\nHanis, short for Home Affairs National Identification System, is a R1-billion computer system designed to store and match all South Africans’ identity details, photographs and fingerprints. When an intended complement is rolled out over the next few years computer-chip “smart card” IDs to replace ID books the personal information held by the state may include your medical, employment and welfare details, and even some of your movements and spending habits.\nSouth Africans have accepted Hanis without so much as a squeak over the potential invasion of their privacy. This comes at a time when debate is raging in the United States and Britain over “back-door” attempts to introduce national identification schemes post-September 11. The technology used by Hanis and the envisaged smart ID have been available for some time, but governments have been reticent to implement it on the scale that is intended locally.\nThe basic Hanis that sparked into action on Monday is an imposing bank of computer hardware and operator stations running software that can identify fingerprints in an instant. It is housed at government’s New Cooperation Building in Pretoria a National Key Point where the strictest security applies.\nWhen Buthelezi unveiled the system he was sensitive to charges that the state had aspirations to Big Brotherhood. But he said social delivery, not control, was his aim: “Many countries [are] suspicious of the degree of social control which the state may acquire through a population register and the universal fingerprinting of its population. However, we have now changed the emphasis of the purposes for which this important tool of administration has been developed, shifting from social control to improved governance.”\nButhelezi emphasised the system’s utility in fighting crime, especially that based on identity fraud. He promised easier access to government services such as pension and welfare payments, and private sector applications.\nButhelezi’s reassurances, however, jar against language his department uses to justify the system. The home affairs website speaks, apartheid-style, of “social diversity in the make-up of communities [whose] levels of civilisation and literacy determine the extent to which the subjects can be governable Nonetheless, the Depart- ment of Home Affairs has to track them all down.”\nNational identification and population control in South Africa stem from the early 1950s when the apartheid government introduced a population register enforcing racial classification, and pass laws forcing blacks to carry the hated dompas. Race classification was dropped with the demise of apartheid, but the register grew in scope and its attendant information includes birth, marriage and other “life-event” details, photographs and fingerprints. The register forms the basis for the ID book.\nWhat does Hanis change? It will fulfil a home affairs dream from the mid-1980s to put all this information much of it still stored on paper on to a single, searchable computer database. The fingerprint recognition software gives the department and its clients a particularly powerful tool to instantly verify the identity of anyone whose details are stored on Hanis.\nAs of this month new ID applications will go directly on to Hanis, while existing records are to be transferred over time. Department of Home Affairs Director General Billy Masethla this week estimated it would take 18 months to capture the civic details of all South Africans on Hanis.\nThe Cabinet approved Hanis in 1996, and a tender was awarded three years later to Marpless Consortium, led by a joint venture between the Marubeni trading house of Japan and information technology company Plessey South Africa, and including multinational tech giants NEC and Unysis.\nThe original Hanis tender included the computer system now inaugurated, plus then-envisaged bar-code ID cards, at a total cost that the treasury pegged at just over R1-billion. But the department and the Cabinet later had second thoughts about the bar-code ID and removed it from the Marpless contract, with a R70-million reduction in the contract price. A much grander scheme was thought up: to issue a separate tender for a smart card ID to complement Hanis.\nButhelezi told Parliament in 2000 that the smart card would cost an estimated R2,5-billion extra to implement, but Masethla this week said current estimates were “nowhere near R2-billion at all”. Masethla said he was waiting for final Cabinet approval to issue the tender, and that the first card would come off the production line 18 months later.\nA departmental “request for information”, a document circulated to potential tenderers in mid-2000, specifies some of the information the smart card’s computer chip should be able to store. These include standard ID information with photograph and fingerprint minutiae, but also:\nUnemployment insurance number and payments;\nHealth information including blood type, allergies, last 10 medical treatments and prescriptions;\nHousing subsidy application and subsidy details, erf number, spouse and dependant details;\nWelfare details including pension number and transactions, payment point and amount receivable; and\nDrivers’ licence codes and vehicles registered to owner.\nAdded would be an e-purse, so that the card can be used much as a debit card. The card would be available to government departments and private institutions such as banks to verify identity before services can be accessed your fingerprints would be scanned at terminals and electronically compared to information stored on the card or, online, to that on the Hanis database.\nMore applications would include building access and immigration functions: Buthelezi said he envisaged foreigners would be issued temporary cards on arrival implying that illegal immigrants can be denied a whole range of services.\nThe end result is a vastly improved state capacity to grant or to withhold services from individuals. And the state will access much more personal information than before. Hanis will theoretically be able to log where you have done what kinds of transactions, when your card is swiped and communicates with the central computer.\nWhether this information will be open to abuse by actors as diverse as direct marketers and intelligence agents will depend largely on two factors: whether suitable technological, bureaucratic and legal barriers are put in place to prevent wrongful access; and whether the state retains its democratic character to keep respecting these barriers. Of some concern should be that the basic Hanis, with its powerful fingerprint recognition capabilities, has already been inaugurated without any legal amendments.\nVinodh Jaichand, the national director of Lawyers for Human Rights, this week said: “Who is going to use this information? The public needs to know in advance. There needs to be a debate about this The potential is there for abuse.”\nSimilar debate has been raging in the US and Britain after September 11. Neither country issues a national ID. But the US has mooted standardising state drivers’ licences, while in Britain a government service “entitlement card” has been proposed. Both initiatives are being fiercely debated, with opponents like the powerful American Civil Liberties Union slamming “backdoor” attempts at national identification.\nProfessor Shadrack Gutto of the Centre for Applied Legal Studies at Wits University said of the South African system: “You can see that it has potential good, and also lurking danger; that when you have a government that is not up to scratch, it can be abusive.”\nButhelezi said on Monday that he had asked former presidential law adviser Fink Haysom to advise on privacy safeguards.\nMasethla denied any knowledge of this, but said safeguards would come in the form of compartmentalisation of data the police, for example, would not be able to get someone’s medical information without cooperation from the Department of Health.\nThere would need to be rules to determine under what conditions information could be shared, and he suggested that the appropriate time for debate on that would be when legislation is designed to govern the issuing of the cards.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://mg.co.za/article/2002-02-22-from-dompas-to-smart-card/"}
{"doc_id": "f24778c4cb61b7b40a2bcac091c89304", "text": "Cape Town is attracting large numbers of high-net-wealth individuals from other South African cities while it has also become a popular destination for wealthy individuals from elsewhere across Africa, Europe, Russia and the UK, the BRICS Wealth Report showed yesterday.\nThis was expected to drive growth in South Africa’s wealth by about 60% over the next 10 years. The report calculates South Africa’s gross gross domestic product (GDP) per capital at $11 200, a contrast to the World Economic Forum’s $13 243 (R250 469) calculation for 2023 behind the UAE, Saudi Arabia, China and Russia.\nCape Town is expected to play a key role in bumping up South Africa’s share of wealthy individuals. The Mother City was currently “benefiting from the ongoing ‘semigration’ of large numbers of HNWIs (high-net-worth individuals) from other parts of South Africa”, especially Johannesburg and Pretoria.\nAndrew Amoils, the head of wealth research at New World Wealth, said: “It is also an increasingly popular retirement destination for migrating HNWIs from Africa, Europe, Russia, and the UK. Cape Town is projected to reach over 13 500 millionaire residents by 2033.”\nCurrently, there are about 7 400 HNWIs resident across Cape Town’s opulent suburbs that include Bantry Bay, Bishopscourt, Camps Bay and Clifton, among others. This was feeding into a booming private and wealth banking industry in South Africa.\n“South Africa’s wealth management market is well positioned for success. It is a potential hub for other African wealth management markets, having one of the biggest stock exchanges in the world and a well-developed wealth management, fund management, and banking system,” noted the Africa Wealth Report 2023.\nAlthough Cape Town was attracting wealthy individuals from elsewhere, many South African entrepreneurs, businesspeople, and wealthy families were embracing investment migration to other countries as a strategy “to improve their travel freedom and economic mobility, secure location optionality” and to mitigate risks.\nHenley & Partners, which published the BRICS Wealth Report 2024, said it had seen “a significant increase in interest in residence and citizenship by investment”.\nAmanda Smit, the managing partner for Henley & Partners in South Africa, said: “Enquiries rose by a staggering 43% in 2023 compared to the previous year, putting South Africans in the top 10 nationalities globally in terms of applications for and enquiries about investment migration programs, where it ranked seventh and eighth, respectively.”\nData from the advisory company showed Portugal as the “most popular programme” among South African investors. In the past year, South Africans had mostly applied for the Portugal Golden Residence Permit Programme, the St Kitts and Nevis Citizenship by Investment Programme, and the Dominica Citizenship by Investment Programme.\nReasons for domicile diversification given include “increased mobility” and secure additional options. The majority of South Africans applying for investment migration programmes were, however, not looking to emigrate but rather “to increase their mobility and to secure a plan B for their families” that will give access to world-class education and work opportunities and to diversify” their domiciles.\n“Having a geographically differentiated portfolio of residences and citizenships not only protects our wealth, but also significantly enhances our prosperity, enabling us to leave a greater legacy for future generations,” explained Smit.\nAlthough there has been widespread concern about governance shortfalls in both public and private spheres in South Africa, the country’s “effective legal system, entrepreneurial activity and telecommunications investment” had been deemed as an attractive incentive. South Africa was also a big destination for venture financing capital alongside Nigeria, Egypt and Kenya.\nJose Caballero, a senior economist at the IMD World Competitiveness Centre in Switzerland, said: “South Africa’s competitiveness strengths are underlined by its effective legal environment, open and positive attitudes, and the dynamism of its economy.”\nSouth Africa’s small and medium enterprises sector also played a key role, with the new business density increasing from 6.58 registered new business per 1 000 people in 2014 to 12.5 in 2020. Similarly, the total early-stage entrepreneurial activity in the country rose from 6.97% of the population involved in entrepreneurial activities in 2014 to 17.49% in 2021.\nAnother competitiveness strength is the country’s attraction of direct investment flows which had increased from 36.47% of GDP in 2014 to 41.3% in 2021.\nBUSINESS REPORT", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/cape-town-to-drive-sas-wealth-by-60-over-next-10-years-999e1721-af21-4097-884d-57387d7ec0b5"}
{"doc_id": "462eace40202bf5ca353cef608094e82", "text": "JOHANNESBURG – The Competition Commission in South Africa said it has noted an agreement between Standard Chartered Bank and the New York State Department of Financial Services where Standard Chartered pleaded guilty to currency manipulation.\nThe Competition Commission said in a statement: \"The Competition Commission has noted a consent agreement, which subsequently became a court order, between Standard Chartered Bank and New York State Department of Financial Services. In the consent order, Standard Chartered pleaded guilty to currency manipulation which included the South Africa Rand (ZAR) between 2007 and 2013. This is captured on pages 9 and 10 of the court order.\"\nThe Commission said it would consider the impact of the order on the ongoing forex litigation with the banks in South Africa.\nThe statement continued: \"In February 2017 the Commission referred to the Tribunal for prosecution a collusion case against Bank of America Merrill Lynch International Limited, BNP Paribas, JP Morgan Chase & Co, JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A, Investec Ltd, Standard New York Securities Inc., HSBC Bank Plc, Standard Chartered Bank, Credit Suisse Group, Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd, Commerzbank AG, Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited, Nomura International Plc., Macquarie Bank Limited, ABSA Bank Limited (ABSA), Barclays Capital Inc, Barclays Bank plc (Respondents).\n\"The Commission investigated a case of price-fixing and market allocation in the trading of foreign currency pairs involving the South African Rand since April 2015. The Commission found that from at least 2007, the respondents had a general agreement to collude on prices for bids, offers and bid-offer spreads for the spot trades in relation to currency trading involving US Dollar / Rand currency pair.\n\"Further, the Commission found that the respondents manipulated the price of bids and offers through agreements to refrain from trading and creating fictitious bids and offers at particular times. Citibank N.A. pleaded guilty and reached a settlement agreement with the Commission and agreed to pay an administrative penalty of R69 500 860. Citibank N.A. undertook to cooperate with the Commission and avail witnesses to assist the prosecution of the other banks.\"\nThe commission said that since February 2017, it has been engaged in protracted litigation with the rest of the banks, including Standard Chartered Bank, on pre-trial issues such as jurisdiction of the South African authorities and disclosure of the Commission’s evidence.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/companies/standard-chartered-pleads-guilty-to-manipulating-the-rand-19142556"}
{"doc_id": "9a97cc408aaa316fb09b984286198e74", "text": "Four lenders selected by the Central Bank of Kenya to give low-cost mobile loans to small businesses under a programme dubbed ‘Stawi’ have abandoned the deal.\nThe Business Daily can reveal the platform has not issued a single loan for over a year after KCB Bank #ticker:KCB , Co-operative Bank #ticker:COOP , Diamond Trust Bank pulled out, leaving only NCBA #ticker:NCBA on the programme.\nThe lenders have cited difficulties recovering the loans for their decision, with the small and medium enterprises (SMEs) defaulting on the unsecured mobile-based loans. KCB Bank CEO Joshua Oigara said the bank was issuing similar loans under the State-backed credit guarantee scheme.\n“Why Stawi wasn’t moving as fast is that the agreement we had is that we needed a credit guarantee scheme to support the customers because they were borrowing without security, they were first-time borrowers with no credit history,” Mr Oigara said.\n“The credit guarantee scheme did not exist. When it came in each bank applied separately. For us, we are not lending on Stawi, we are lending on a credit guarantee scheme. It’s the same product, different name.”\nWhile Stawi is still operational under NCBA with support staff and a website, the platform is not issuing new loans.\nAn operator who is not authorised to speak to the media confirmed they had not issued loans for over a year and have no clear timelines when they will resume lending.\nThe operator said they had initially issued loans to about 500 borrowers but had no idea what the rate of repayment was.\nThe CBK and NCBA did not respond to our inquiries.\nThe mobile loans for small businesses was launched by the central bank and the five lenders mid-2019 with fanfare.\nCBK Governor Patrick Njoroge led executives of Commercial Bank of Africa (CBA) and NIC Group, which merged to form NCBA, Cooperative Bank of Kenya, Diamond Trust Bank Kenya, and KCB Bank in roadshows through Gikomba in Nairobi, Kondele in Kisumu and Kongowea in Mombasa pitching the product to retailers in those markets.\nIt was touted as a game-changer, offering quick and annual mobile loans for only nine percent interest rate.\nThe product was to target businesses with a turnover of between Sh50,000 and sh250,000, with prospective borrowers assessed on past records and available assets.\nThe product would give customers access to loans of between Sh30,000 to 250,000 payable within one to 12 months. Since no collateral was offered the banks found the product extremely risky as most of the businesses defaulted.\nNCBA has not disclosed how much money was lent out. But if the 500 borrowers received an average of Sh100,000 each they would have taken away Sh50 million from banks without collateral or a means of recovering the loans.\n“What Stawi was looking for was a collective scoring model for customers and then looking at their risk profiles collectively, and then extend it to the SMEs. But in reality, Stawi was looking for a credit guarantee scheme, and we did not have it when Stawi was launched,” Mr Oigara said.\n“My view is that information has now been passed on to be used for lending by banks through the credit guarantee scheme. So we no longer need to do Stawi now.”\nA banker who did not want to be named said Stawi was a CBK project though it cost banks.\nHe said the CBK was under pressure from the government to make credit affordable to SMEs but rather than be candid on what was making credit expensive it chose to push banks to support Stawi through cash injections.\n“Loans were issued but there was no repayment,” the source said.\nMobile-based lending has unlocked cash into individual pockets. However, the money is usually short-term, high interest and in small proportions, making it unsuitable for investment in businesses.\nDespite this, Kenyans still mobilised digital loans for business. According to FinAccess Digital Credit Tracker Survey 2017, most digital loans go to business at 37 percent while up to 35 percent are used to cover day-to-day needs.\nTwenty-one percent goes towards education, 15 percent to buying airtime and seven percent to medical emergencies.\nStawi was meant to replicate the success of individual mobile loans at a business level, leveraging credit scoring based on data from M-Pesa and M-Shwari transactions and credit reference bureaus to enable banks to make instant lending decisions on MSMEs.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/industry/banks-abandon-cbk-s-sme-mobile-loans-deal-3751964"}
{"doc_id": "569f7fa4ea3b8b1f104c7b29841246f6", "text": "A former Deputy Finance Minister has accused the Akufo-Addo government of hiding essential documents related to the Agyapa Minerals Royalty deal from the public.\nCassiel Ato Forson told Samson Lardy Anyenini on NewsFile that the prospectus that highlights the viability of the Agyapa Minerals Limited deal has been withheld from Parliament.\nThe Ajumako-Enyan-Esiam Constituency MP stated that although Parliament particularly the Minority has requested for the document several times, Finance Minister Ken Ofori Atta on all occasions declined to present the document.\nThis, for the Ranking Member on Parliament’s Finance Committee shows that “there is something that this government definitely wants to hide.”\n“We needed to find out from the Minister of Finance what the prospectus is because investors as we know are not ‘Santa Claus’ they are in there for a business.\n\"So we need to know the amount the investors are going to make? We need to know the terms in the prospectus but till date we do not know what the prospectus contains. We [NDC Minority] were told that some prospectus is in place but they [government] cannot share with Members of Parliament,\" he said.\nHe then quizzed, “Which sort of arrangement is this? You are going to list but here is the case, we [MPs] do not have the prospectus then how do you expect us to perform the oversight on the deal.”\nThe Agyapa Royalties deal\nParliament on August 14, approved the controversial Agyapa Mineral Royalty Limited agreement with the government of Ghana despite a walkout by the Minority.\nTwo years ago, the house passed the Minerals Income Investment Fund Act 2018 which establishes the Fund to manage the equity interests of Ghana in mining companies, and receive royalties on behalf of government.\nThe purpose of the fund is to manage and invest these royalties and revenue from equities for higher returns for the benefit of the country.\nThe law allows the fund to establish Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) to use for the appropriate investments.\nLast month, government introduced an amendment to the act to ensure that the SPVs have unfettered independence.\nLatest Stories\n-\nThree police officers killed J.B Danquah Adu, not Daniel Asiedu- Counsel tells court\n-\n“I’m the king of kings; Sarkodie and others look up to me – Kwaw Kese brags\n-\nPlan Ghana International empowers youth-led groups to spearhead change as equal partners\n-\nGovernment to introduce Fintech Innovation Fund – Bawumia\n-\nNorth Tongu reshapes roads as DCE targets massive infrastructure overhaul to boost economic activities\n-\nRoll out SORMAS to all health facilities for improved disease outbreak control – Dr. Franklin Asiedu-Bekoe\n-\nTrafficked girls rescued from abuse plead for support to pursue education and skills training\n-\nUseless Column: Is Black Queens to replace Black Stars at de next AFCON?\n-\nBurkina Faso mosque attack: Dozens killed during prayers\n-\nHungary’s parliament clears path for Sweden’s Nato membership\n-\nTrump appeals fraud case as $112,000-a-day interest accrues\n-\nNew York Medical school eliminates tuition after $1bn gift\n-\nEmpowering youth in agriculture: Jobberman Ghana launches ‘The Happy Program’ initiative to connect employers with agricultural talent\n-\nKen Ofori-Atta is technically the senior Finance Minister – Isaac Adongo\n-\nAkosua Manu, Asamoah Gyan to co-chair Bawumia’s youth and sports subcommittee", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.myjoyonline.com/agyapa-deal-government-is-definitely-hiding-something-ato-forson/"}
{"doc_id": "f01bccc6d8b9a831d87a3ea241d0a3b5", "text": "APO Group becomes Official Public Relations Partner of Rugby Africa, the governing body of rugby in Africa\nWorld Rugby's African association, Rugby Africa (www.RugbyAfrique.com), the governing body of rugby in Africa, and APO Group (www.APO-opa.com), the leading Pan-African communications consultancy and press release distribution service, today announced a new multi-year agreement making APO Group the Official Public Relations Partner of Rugby Africa.\nThe two organizations have worked together since 2017 and have a common goal to help African rugby break through on the international stage. The sport is on a huge growth trajectory across the continent, with 37 African nations now full or associate members of World Rugby, and APO Group is using its unparalleled media network and international reach to bring the best of African rugby to new audiences both in Africa and all over the world.\nThe new partnership agreement will see APO Group become the Official Public Relations Partner of Rugby Africa as it works to develop Rugby Africa’s domestic and international visibility and reputation.\nAPO Group is well placed to help boost exposure to African rugby, thanks to its long-standing involvement in global sporting projects. Alongside its commitment to African rugby, APO Group is also the Pan-African Public Relations agency of FIFA, the NBA, and the Basketball Africa League, as well as being the Strategic Partner of the Olympic Movement in Africa (ANOCA). It is also the Official Partner of many other prominent sporting organizations including iconic French football club Olympique de Marseille (OM) and the International Sports Press Association (AIPS).\nIn May 2023, APO Group demonstrated its strong Public Relations credentials in the field of Pan-African sport by winning a prestigious SABRE Award (https://apo-opa.info/3p9svRs) for its media campaign for the Basketball Africa League (BAL) Season 2.\nThe partnership comes as Rugby Africa welcomes a new President (https://apo-opa.info/3LQ64Kf). Ghanaian businessman Herbert Mensah is a well-known figure in international sports administration, and he has been a driving force for the development and growth of rugby in Africa.\nMr Mensah is passionate about realizing the vast potential for rugby in Africa despite recent challenges caused by issues of governance and under-funding – a feeling shared by APO Group Founder and Chairman Nicolas Pompigne-Mognard.\n“The APO Group team has provided invaluable support to Rugby Africa for many years, and has given us a voice on the international stage. I am delighted that our important relationship will continue to grow because now, more than ever, it is vital that our message is heard. It’s time for a mindset change across the continent and around the world. Africa must look inward and put pressure on the World. Africa mustn’t be forgotten. It is our time,” said Herbert Mensah, President of Rugby Africa.\n“APO Group is completely aligned with Rugby Africa’s new President on the need for more better and stronger governance, funding and exposure for the game in Africa,” said Nicolas Pompigne-Mognard (www.Pompigne-Mognard.com), Founder and Chairman of APO Group. “Rugby Africa couldn't have chosen a better President to defend its interests on the global stage. Herbert is a natural born leader and a proud African, and I look forward to joining him as we strive to help rugby in Africa realize its true potential.”\nDistributed by APO Group on behalf of APO Group.\nMedia contact:\nmarie@apo-opa.com\nAbout Rugby Africa:\nCreated in 1986, Rugby Africa (www.RugbyAfrique.com), previously the African Confederation of Rugby (Confédération Africaine de Rugby – CAR), is one of the six regional associations composing World Rugby (www.WorldRugby.org), the international organization responsible for the governing of Rugby Union and Rugby Sevens. Rugby Africa unites all African countries which play rugby union, rugby sevens, and women’s rugby. Rugby Africa organizes the qualifying competition for the Rugby World Cup, and Africa Sevens, a qualifying competition for the Olympic Games. Rugby Africa has 39 members unions.\nAbout APO Group:\nFounded in 2007, APO Group (www.APO-opa.com) is the leading Pan-African communications consultancy and press release distribution service. We assist private and public organizations in sharpening their reputation and increasing their brand equity in target countries across Africa. Our role as a trusted partner is to leverage the power of media and build bespoke strategies that enable organisations to produce a real, measurable impact in Africa and beyond. The trust and recognition granted to APO Group by global and multinational companies, governments, and NGOs inspires us to continuously enhance our value proposition within Africa to better cater to our clients’ needs. Among our prestigious clients: Facebook, Dangote Group, Nestle, GE, FIFA, Canon, Coca-Cola, DHL, Marriott Group, Ecobank, Siemens, Standard Chartered, Orange, Jack Ma Foundation, African Development Bank, World Health Organization, Islamic Development Bank, Liquid Telecom, Rotary International, Kaspersky, Greenpeace…\nHeadquarters: Lausanne, Switzerland | Offices in Senegal, Dubai and Hong Kong\nFor further information, please visit our website: https://www.APO-opa.com\nGet the latest news delivered straight to your inbox every day of the week. Stay informed with the Guardian’s leading coverage of Nigerian and world news, business, technology and sports.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://guardian.ng/apo-press-releases/apo-group-becomes-official-public-relations-partner-of-rugby-africa-the-governing-body-of-rugby-in-africa/"}
{"doc_id": "d38e49872bcf886b4b59ced7695207cf", "text": "Poverty and inequality still blight much of the developing world, especially Africa, and breed other social ills, including crime and social instability. But considerable progress has been made in addressing both problems, and with more investment, they can be eradicated in our lifetime.\nThe United Nations Millennium Development Goals, established in 2000, aim at halving global poverty by 2015, a target that was achieved in many countries five years ahead of schedule. Many people are now optimistic that poverty can be reduced even faster in coming years.\nMuch of the progress made thus far can be attributed to sound macroeconomic policy, stronger social-welfare programs, and above-average economic growth. China has made the most progress in absolute terms, having lifted some 680 million people out of poverty from 1981 to 2010, with the share of its population living in extreme poverty (less than $1.25 per day) plummeting from around 84% to 10% over that period.\nIn Africa, too, strong economic growth, macroeconomic reform, fiscal prudence, and improved governance have helped to reduce poverty. Governments have become more democratic, and economies have become more open. Longstanding violent conflicts – in Mozambique, Angola, Rwanda, and elsewhere – have ended. Once a sorry tale of corruption and hunger, Africa’s development narrative has become overwhelmingly positive.\nForeign investors now view the continent as their next frontier. The US investment bank Goldman Sachs, for example, points out that Africa’s potential includes much more than natural resources. The continent is now ascending “the consumption, urbanization, and perhaps industrialization curves that the BRICs [Brazil, Russia, India, and China] have climbed.” Indeed, household consumption in some parts of Africa has overtaken that of the BRICs.\nBut, amid Africa’s new growth and dynamism, too many of its people – what the economist Paul Collier calls the “Bottom Billion” – continue to suffer from poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, and curable diseases. Africa scores poorly in the United Nations Development Program’s latest Human Development Index – only Mauritius, at 80, and Seychelles, at 46, rank in the top 100 countries.\nIn other words, while some people are making the most of the new opportunities, the gap between them and those left behind has widened. The construction cranes and skyscrapers in Nairobi, Lagos, and Luanda are juxtaposed with the grim reality of poverty and helplessness in these cities’ hinterlands and beyond.\nA high degree of inequality within countries correlates with greater poverty, unemployment, and crime. Excluding Africa’s neediest from essential services erodes social cohesion and undermines what are still fragile democratic systems. So efforts to boost economic growth must be accompanied by concerted action to reduce inequality.\nThere are no quick fixes, but action can, and should, be taken. First, civil-society organizations should form an essential part of any anti-poverty program. Although non-governmental groups are only as effective as African leaders allow them to be, they can hold local politicians to account, even in the face of severe resistance, thereby establishing a stronger foundation for the implementation of anti-poverty initiatives.\nSecond, policymakers need to focus on “inclusive” growth, job creation, and social protection as buffers against poverty, inequality, and economic volatility. In recent years, we have seen that even developed countries are vulnerable to the destabilizing effects of high youth unemployment (an experience that should foster a sense of common cause with less-developed countries).\nThird, public-private partnerships can help to ease bottlenecks that constrain trade. Governments can and should work with multinational companies to improve business conditions, especially in such areas as agriculture, energy, and transport, which have the greatest knock-on effects for other economic sectors.\nFinally, if poverty and extreme inequality are to be eradicated, Africans must not allow themselves to become entirely dependent on rich-world investors and expertise in the quest to modernize their economies. Local firms, with government help, must be ready to innovate, develop products for their domestic consumers, and find homegrown ways to raise living standards.\nFor all the value that they bring to a host country, Western companies and governments should recognize that sustainable development will come through the application of local investment, ingenuity, and labor. Africans should not try to do everything alone, but ultimately they must be the masters of their economic destiny.\nBy: Mzukisi Qobo", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businessday.ng/analysis/article/africas-poverty-amid-plenty-2/"}
{"doc_id": "492d144a8a0343587b39df83bd2b2e96", "text": "Finance Minister Malusi Gigaba on Wednesday determinedly put a positive spin on his maiden Medium-Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS), even as his only option to balance the books was to hike government borrowing. Despite the tough decisions ahead, he said in his prepared speech to the House, government would “continue to optimise, squeeze and innovate to improve the quality and efficiency of our spending”. Heavy on words of confidence and short on detail, there was no shift in policy or new direction to get South Africa out of its economic quagmire. Gigaba's turn at the podium in the National Assembly was delayed by the EFF, describing him as a \"Gupta stooge\" and questioning his right to address the House. By MARIANNE MERTEN.\nThe cupboards are bare. And so government is selling “a portion” of its almost 40% stake in Telkom to come up with the billions of rand needed to keep the national airliner SAA and South African Post Office operating.\nThere were no further details provided on the Telkom sale by Finance Minister Malusi Gigaba on Wednesday. This option had been on the table since August when a leaked Cabinet memorandum, seen by Daily Maverick, touted the sale of Telkom shares to raise the R10-billion required for SAA alone over the next couple of years. Politically embarrassed by the leak – the asset sale was raised by DA MP Alf Lees in the House – government has for weeks danced around this possibility.\nWednesday’s MTBPS finally resolved that point, but questions on detail remained. However, the traditional pre-MTBPS media briefing provided hints the sale of Telkom shares may not be the only sell-off to raise much-needed revenue. A list of assets that could be leveraged would be finalised by March 2018, said Gigaba, adding Cabinet had agreed also to bringing in strategic equity partners, effectively private sector capital and skills, and not only to SAA.\nBut aside from such hints, and statements that much hard work was needed before the Budget in February 2018, Gigaba’s Medium-Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS) held very little new: it was about maintaining the expenditure ceiling and “hard choices” in deciding which government programmes should be postponed or shut down, while touting efficiency.\nFaced with the biggest tax collection shortfall since 2009 – R50.8-billion – and a slew of negative numbers from unemployment at its highest in 14 years, increasing levels of poverty affecting millions of South Africans and economic growth that had to be cut down to 0.7% for 2017 , the finance minister could not but be candid. “It is not in the public interest, nor is it in the interest of government, to sugar-coat the state of our economy and the challenges we are facing.”\nInto this mix come the State-owned Entities (SOEs), many central to State Capture as revealed in #GuptaLeaks, which haemorrhage tens of billions of rand from the national purse through often mutually reinforcing financial and governance mismanagement.\nNot only SAA – it already received a R5.2-billion bailout between June and September from the tax paid into the National Revenue Fund – but also other SOEs like the South African Post Office, Denel, South African National Roads Agency Limited (Sanral), Transnet, the Passenger Rail Authority of South Africa (Prasa) have negatively impacted on the fiscus. Talk of governance reform and improvements to mitigate financial mismanagement, announced as part of the finance minister’s 14-Point Plan in July, have yet to emerge into consistent perceptible concrete action. At the pre-MTBPS media briefing Gigaba remained adamant there would be changes in the SOE regimen. “We should not be providing government guarantees for operational inefficiencies… Government is not a nanny. We need to be firm. No SOE must feel they have a special relationship with government.”\nAlthough Gigaba on Wednesday touted the changes at the SAA board and the appointment of a permanent CEO for the first time in years as part of the confidence measures to put South Africa’s economy forward, he was a little less upbeat about Eskom. “It is Eskom’s governance issues, which are of major concern to government. The failures of governance, leadership and financial management (at) Eskom are of grave concern. As government is guarantor over a significant portion of Eskom’s debt, it has become a significant risk to the entire economy.”\nGigaba walked the political tightrope on Wednesday. There were the nods to calls for radical economic transformation, particularly vocal in certain circles of the governing ANC as it is headed to its December national elective conference. And then there was the nod to inclusive growth, one in keeping with not only the constitutional Bill of Rights, but also the National Development Plan (NDP), the country’s blueprint to reduce poverty, unemployment and inequality by 2030.\n“Out starting point therefore is that economic growth and transformation are mutually-reinforcing principles. We cannot allow a repeat of the past where periods of relatively high economic growth were characterised by an uneven accrual of economic benefits,” Gigaba said. “There should be no doubt that an economy that grows should ensure that all our people live productive, prosperous and dignified lives. The economic exclusion of a vast section of the population undermines the realisation of the constitutional vision of a more equal society.”\nThe point, however, is that regardless of years of black economy empowerment and employment equity policies, local procurement directives, and other key redress policies, the fundamental structural distortions of the South African economy have remained largely intact.\nAnd so the MTBPS appeared largely silent on how to tackle fundamental change to benefit all South Africans beyond a small elite of the politically-connected. But, Gigaba told journalists, the statement had received approval in Cabinet just a few hours before his delivery. “There were six comments, all very supportive, short of singing praises,” he said. “It is a collective statement.”\nPolitically-speaking, such support is important for Gigaba as the MTBPS really holds out no silver lining. But it also works the other way for the finance minister who appears to be the first to find the Presidency making inroads into what was previously firmly protected, and defended, National Treasury terrain. Budgeting previously unfolded through a ministerial and a technical team.\nA presidential fiscal committee had its say, although Gigaba maintained this structure was there only for “assistance” in the difficult decision taken and yet to be taken. This structure is described as “a team of Cabinet ministers reporting directly to the President” in the MTBPS documentation. In addition, the presidency in the form of its minister Jeff Radebe, has been playing an increasing role through what is called the Mandate Paper – a process to set government priorities and get departments to cut their cloth accordingly.\nBut on Wednesday Gigaba was the public face to deliver dire news, as the MTBPS appeared to be a kicking for touch moment –possibly with the ANC December national elective conference in mind.\nGigaba told journalists before his statement in the House that as much as government is putting in place measures right now to ensure fiscal stability, a “new path” altogether was actually needed.\n“We are really not in a position that is ideal. We need to chart a new path,” Gigaba said. But that did not emerge in Wednesday’s MTBPS. DM\nFile Photo: South African Finance Minister Malusi Gigaba Photo: EPA", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-10-25-medium-term-budget-gigaba-puts-a-positive-spin-on-dire-reality-as-he-fails-to-chart-new-path/"}
{"doc_id": "b51eb0f642817bfdde4957623d22ee96", "text": "Simba Cement, part of the businessman Narendra Raval’s empire, has inked long-term contracts that will see it export up to Sh27.7 billion worth of clinker to the neighbouring countries annually.\nThe move comes ahead of the opening of the firm's West Pokot plant in August. The company has targeted regional markets of Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi given the proximity of the new plant to these countries.\nMr Raval told the Business Daily that the signing of the long supply deal has started with the neighbouring countries with the supply of 6,000 tonnes of clinker a day.\nRead: State shields cement firms with clinker tax\nThe West Pokot plant, said Mr Raval, will export 80 percent of the total production to the regional market.\n“Currently we are exporting 20 percent of our production to these countries but we are now signing long-term contracts that will see us supply clinker worth $200 million dollars (Sh27.7 billion) a year,” he said.\nHe said these countries are already making orders because the West Pokot plant is closer to them and it will make the cost of the commodity cheaper as compared to other markets where they are acquiring it currently.\nThe new plant will pump into the country an additional 2.5 million tonnes of clinker, a key raw material in the manufacture of cement.\nThe commissioning of the plant will make Mr Raval the largest producer of clinker in East Africa with the production of 7.5 million tonnes from his three factories.\nThe businessman has other cement operations through National Cement Company Limited.\nThe West Pokot plant will be the second largest in Kenya after his Emali plant, which currently produces 3.5 million tonnes of clinker annually.\nMr Raval said the additional capacity in Kenya has the potential to cut the cost of cement from the current Sh650 for a 50-kilo bag to Sh500.\nThe plant, said Mr Raval, would also contribute to job creation with at least 2,000 people to be employed directly at the facility.\nIn the 2023/2024 budget to be read next month, Treasury has proposed a 10 percent tax on imported clinker, resulting in an outcry from small players who have opposed the move through the Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM).\nKAM issued a statement calling on the government to reconsider the proposal, saying it poses serious negative economic and social ramifications including a possible loss of more than 100,000 jobs.\nThe billionaire, who also has an interest in steel, has been pushing for an increase in duty levied on imported clinker to protect the local industry.\nAlso read: Competition regulator fights tycoon in cement price war\nHe has been pushing for enhanced import duty on clinker, the main ingredient for the manufacture of cement, as the steel magnate eyes some Sh8.3 billion that factories without grinders pay to import the crucial raw material. Import levy on clinker stands at 25 percent currently.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/companies/simba-cement-bags-sh28bn-contracts-to-export-clinker--4253618"}
{"doc_id": "6365a91e21d148e88cf7f6d6aa6fe3e6", "text": "In the town of Bapong in North West, a web of deceit, corruption and violent intimidation has enriched three men at the expense of 40,000 (mostly unemployed) members of the community. In late September the violence reached new levels, with the town descending for a few days into a state of all-out urban conflict. Why did the local police, the traditional council and the provincial government appear to either look away or actively take sides? Given that Bapong is on Marikana land, what part did mining company Lonmin play? Most urgently, what was the role and mandate of those seemingly untouchable ‘three men’? An investigative feature by KEVIN BLOOM.\nI. Human rights catch a fright\nConsider a few facts about the land that Kgomotso Morare calls home. It is regarded politically and legally as “tribal land”, but the 1926 title deed does not formally recognise the claim of the people to its fruits. It is situated atop some of the world’s richest platinum and chrome reserves, but since 1938 the people have been excluded from almost all negotiations over mining royalties. It is subject to a land claim by the descendants of the original nineteenth century purchasers, but in 2008 a cabal of pretenders affiliated to the so-called “chief” blocked the application.\nThrow in the fact that the current mine operators, according to evidence led at the Farlam Commission, refuse to acknowledge a) the realities of endemic local unemployment, b) the social costs of their own migrant labour workforce, or c) the fallout from their own environmental waste-laying, and you begin to understand why this land is the site of the largest state-sanctioned massacre of human beings in recent South African history.\nThat said, the violence at the Marikana koppie on 16 August 2012, although it took place within a few kilometres of his home, is not what Kgomotso Morare is here today to talk about. For Morare and his activist colleagues Tshepang Mantu, Abbey Mafate and Lesego Kgobane, the real violence began in 2014, when three men claiming to represent the community swapped the 12 percent annual royalties off the platinum mines for R100 million in cash and R540 million in equity in Lonmin PLC. The transaction was concluded without the consultation required under living customary law, the Mineral Petroleum Resources Development Act or the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act. In other words, the terms of the deal were kept secret from just about every member of the 40,000-strong Bapo Ba Mogale community.\n“As I’m sitting here today, it’s my daughter’s birthday,” Morare yells into the mike. “I cannot be at home because of the fear!”\nThe venue is Forum 3 of the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) in Braamfontein, Johannesburg, and Morare has just woken everybody up. So far, on this Wednesday morning of 28 September 2016, the submissions to the hearings into the “socio-economic conditions of mining communities” have been colourless, soporific, mostly devoid of emotion. But when Morare begins to describe how he was recently “chopped by pangas,” that all changes. He names Lehlohonolo Nthontho, the CEO of Bapo Ba Mogale Investments—one of the three men responsible for the abovementioned R640 million deal with Lonmin—as the individual who ordered the assault. He talks about the R220 million invested by Nthontho in a bus company, and wonders aloud how it will benefit the community. “When we ask such questions,” says Morare, “that’s when we get attacked.”\nThe SAHRC, in their response, appear genuinely shaken. They name four “systemic issues” that Morare’s submission raises, the first to do with the community’s non-inclusion and the second to do with the mine’s non-concern. The third issue, however, is what seems to really scare them. “It could be the first time we’re facing it here,” they say, “the question of the creation of local kingpins.”\nIf the HRC commissioners had been familiar with the founding affidavit in the case brought by members of the Bapo Ba Mogale community against, among others, the national government, Lonmin and Nthontho, they would have known how this kingpin had begun to recruit his henchmen. Lodged with the Pretoria High Court in June 2015, the affidavit alleged that in July 2014, shortly before the deal with Lonmin was signed, Nthontho paid R800 per head to 1,200 unemployed locals to distribute notices on the transaction. Problem was, according to the court papers, that members of the community “were asked to sign the notice titled ‘Bapo Ba Mogale community consultation process form’ before receiving the form titled ‘Lonmin transaction—Benefits to the Bapo Ba Mogale Traditional Community’.”\nMeaning, the residents had to give their consent to the deal before they could get any information about the deal.\nPhoto: Lonmin mining infrastructure towers over the Marikana landscape. (Photo: Sobantu Mzwakali)\nIn the following months, as dissatisfaction with the deal and its opaqueness grew, the core of the original 1,200 coalesced into a group known as “The Ambassadors”. On a visit to Bapong in October 2016, the Daily Maverick would learn from members of the community that if these men couldn’t take their payment in cash, they would sometimes take it in liquor. Their job description was clear—to act as Nthontho’s bodyguards, and to silence his most vocal critics.\nAnd so to the HRC’s fourth systemic issue, the issue that sums it all up:\n“What is the role of SAPS? Are they supporting this local kingpin? Is the mine supporting him as well? If this country is not going to go up in flames, we need to establish the rule of law.”\nII. Casualties of battle\nThere is a risk inherent in the use of violence as a deterrent, a risk that can—and often does—escalate a few isolated incidents into the realm of all-out war. The risk is this: if the resolve of the victims isn’t crushed, they may become more determined.\nDid Kgomotso Morare, Tshepang Mantu, Abbey Mafate and Lesego Kgobane know that on Saturday 24 September they would be protagonists in this timeless drama? They couldn’t have been oblivious. In the sworn statement Morare gave to SAPS, after declaring that he was an adult male residing in the town of Bapong in North West, he declared that on Wednesday 21 September “it was publicly announced on MadibengFM radio that Lehlohonolo Nthontho’s file at Home Affairs was not complete and that his birth certificate could not be traced.” The third item of the statement revealed that Morare called in to MadibengFM, and complained on air that Nthontho, as the CEO of Bapo Ba Mogale Investments, couldn’t be accountable to the community if he wasn’t a South African citizen. Morare then suggested that the community hold a meeting to discuss Nthontho’s leadership.\nAs Morare and his colleagues would’ve been all too aware, in July 2016 a crowd of around 150 people, including members of The Ambassadors and the Bapo Ba Mogale traditional council, forced MadibengFM to cancel a planned interview with critics of Nthontho. The crowd stormed the offices of the community radio station; chanting, slamming doors, demanding to speak to the manager. According to a report in GroundUp, “police were called to the scene and facilitated an agreement between the radio station and the traditional council that the station should stop reporting on Bapo issues.”\nLesego Kgobane’s response to the silencing was both on-the-record and uncowed. “That’s rubbish, I am pissed off,” he told GroundUp. “We are supposed to be telling the community what is happening.”\nMeanwhile, the threats from The Ambassadors were beginning to rise in rate and fury—Nick Motloung, the presenter of the cancelled show, had been told he was on a hit list; Morare, Mantu, Mafate and Kgobane would all hear similar things. And so on Thursday 22 September, when Morare and Mantu and about a dozen other community members showed up at the door of the royal palace occupied by Rangwane Emius Mogale, they knew the stakes. Mogale, the acting regent of the Bapo Ba Mogale, was the second signatory to the Lonmin deal; his son Vladimir was the third. Initially Mogale agreed to facilitate a meeting between the concerned community members and the traditional council, but after he spoke to his son on the phone he changed his mind. Morare and the community members left the palace to discuss their options. They decided to hold their own meeting that coming Saturday, at the Nkukime sportsground in Bapong.\nMorare’s sworn police statement reveals that by 10am on Saturday 24 September, when about 60 community members had gathered, Mantu took the floor. As he was addressing the gathering, “a group of around 200 to 300 people” arrived at the sportsground, and began to demolish the church tent. Led by Hilton “Dibaba” Mokubung and “three large muscular men,” the group then walked across to the community meeting to ask Mantu what he wanted from Nthontho.\n“Then three men grabbed Mr Mantu and started beating him,” Morare declared in his statement. “I heard Mr Mokubung mention my name and he seemed to be looking for me. I was scared that they were going to try to hurt me too, so I left the sports field and went into a house nearby.”\nFor the rest of the day and intermittently over the days that followed, Bapong was in a state of low-level urban conflict. Late on Saturday, after their car was pelted with bottles and stones, Kgobane and his young son had to abandon the vehicle and flee to the sanctuary of a nearby house. This happened after Kgobane had been followed by a bakkie owned by the Bapo traditional council.\n“I don’t think I am going to see the morning,” Kgobane said, when he called researchers at UCT’s Land & Accountability Research Centre (LARC) for help.\nDuring the nights of Saturday, Sunday and Monday, a black car would repeatedly park itself across the gate of the home of Abbey Mafate—just before the requested police patrols would arrive, the car would leave. As for Morare, after visiting Mantu in the local clinic on Saturday afternoon, he went back to the area of the sportsground on a tip-off that SAPS wanted to meet.\n“The policemen that arrived on the scene were from Mooinooi police station,” Morare’s sworn statement would note. “One of the policemen was Captain Mathloko. He was aware of a previous case I had opened, CAS 4/8 2016, in which I had been threatened and intimidated by Mr Mokubung and his associates, but neither he nor his colleagues had ever investigated this case. This had caused me to lose confidence in the Mooinooi police station.”\nWas this lack of confidence founded? That depends on what you make of the following items in Morare’s statement:\nAfter the police left, we had a brief meeting amongst ourselves. Then I decided to go home. My mother’s cousin, Mr Mafate, offered to drive me home.\nMr Mafate and I drove towards my grandmother’s house. However, a white Toyota doublecab FCC819 NW was parked horizontally across the road to block anyone from proceeding. I saw Mr Mokubung in the car. We we were forced to stop driving.\nThen Mr Mokubung, Neo “Motrambi” Ngele and about five large muscular men walked towards our car. They opened the doors to the car and took out the car keys. They then proceeded to drag us out of the car and start beating us.\nOne of the men asked me “What was the meeting about?” and “Why do you want to remove Lehlohonolo Nthontho?” I did not answer him. At that point, Mr Mokubung approached me from behind and hit me on the back of my head with a large knife in the shape of a panga. This caused a large wound on the back of my head which started bleeding profusely. I then fell down. Mr Mokubung and others kicked me while I was lying on the ground.\nThen Mr Mokunbung attacked me again with the knife and caused two more large head wounds. I began to feel dizzy because I was losing blood and was in a lot of pain, but I managed to run away.\nPhotos: Kgomotso Morare’s panga injuries.\nIn fear for his life, after he was discharged from hospital, Morare fled to Johannesburg. According to Brendan Boyle of LARC, Morare, Mantu and others were called repeatedly by a police officer named Montoedi on Tuesday 27 September. The officer told them to report to the Mooinooi police station in the Bapo Ba Mogale area—if they did not, the officer allegedly said, charges against the people who attacked them on Saturday would be dropped. When they refused, Boyle said, Montoedi threatened to arrest them.\nBoyle also told the Daily Maverick this:\n“About an hour after the last conversation [on Tuesday 27 September], police began to arrest people who had attended Saturday’s meeting on charges of holding an illegal gathering. By 10pm on Tuesday, at least three people had been arrested. Community members were told they might also face charges of intimidation relating to their visit on Thursday [22 September] to the home of Rangwane Emius Mogale.”\nSo the gathering of “200 to 300” of Nthontho’s people was legal, but the gathering of 60 community activists was not? If the police weren’t going to offer protection to the Bapo Ba Mogale, they would have to get it somewhere else.\nIII. The PP comes to town\n“Madame Madonsela, you managed bra’ Zuma, what is so difficult about Bapo?”\nIt is the afternoon of 8 October 2016, and Morare is back in Bapong. Although he had told the Daily Maverick on 28 September that he would be risking his life if he returned, he has decided that the risk is worth it—for today is the day that the outgoing public protector has promised her final report.\nPhoto: Public Protector Thuli Madonsela addresses the Bapo Ba Mogale on her sixth last day in office; on her left sits Rangwane Emius Mogale. (Photo: Sobantu Mzwakali)\nThe last time Thuli Madonsela was in town was on 29 July 2016, when she read out the findings of her preliminary report. In the same hall that the community is gathered today, she informed the Bapo Ba Mogale of the results of her investigation into the alleged looting of their collective resources, with a focus on the funds held in so-called account “D ”.\nMadonsela had been asked to investigate\na) the flow of money into the account from 1994 to date,\nb) what the money had been spent on,\nc) the identities of the individuals that had authorised the payments,\nd) the identities of the beneficiaries, and\ne) the question of royalties—specifically, whether all of the funds due to the community from Lonmin and other mining houses had been paid.\nIn summary, Madonsela explained in July, the community had R721,000 to its name when the auditor general audited the account in 1994. Over the next two decades, the total funds in the account amounted to more than R617 million, comprised of R392 million in deposits and R224 million in interest earned. By 2014, the balance in the account had dropped to just over R495,000. After the deal was done with the “newly established investment wing,” about R40 million in royalties had come in—but most of that money had since been spent.\n“What this means is that, basically, all of the money earned has been spent,” Madonsela said, adding that the investigation team was aware of the identity of some of the officials that had been authorising expenditure, and that those still in office would be brought to book.\nThe community had expected these individuals to be named today, but it hasn’t happened. The only real information Madonsela has added is that another R40 million in royalties has come into the account. “But you have borrowed from the Public Investement Corporation over R100 million,” she’s said, “which means at the moment that you are in debt.”\nAt this, today’s crowd has let out wolf whistles and jeers. A similar response has greeted the repetition of the old information that the largest expense has been on the royal palace—the budget had been R20 million, and the latest forensic report indicated an expenditure of R80 million. The reason for the delay in issuing the final report, Madonsela has explained, is that since July an independent forensic investigator has been appointed “to check each and every cent of the R800 million that has gone missing.” Also, she’s said, a quantity surveyor has been employed “to account for every brick that has been laid.”\nIn closing, the public protector has vowed that the final report would be ready by the end of the year. “In the meantime, we are asking you to stop accusing each other of any theft or wrongdoing.”\nPhoto: Kgomotso Morare addressed Public Protector Thuli Madonsela. (Photo: Sobantu Mzwakali)\nBut question time has punched a giant hole in Madonsela’s request. Morare, who has appeared in the hall to everyone’s surprise, is going at it hammer and tongs. He mentions Nthontho, makes the comparison to Zuma, reminds the hall that he has been “chopped” by a panga, directly asks the public protector why she hasn’t delivered on her promise. He says he has come back to Bapong “because this is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.” The words may be vintage Mandela, but the stance and voice are modern Malema—it’s uncanny in this moment how much the 36-year-old resembles the commander-in-chief of the EFF.\nWatch: Kgomotso Morare addresses Public Protector Thuki Madonsela (Video: Sobantu Mzwakali)\nAnd then he does another thing worthy of his doppelganger in the red beret—he taunts the “hooligans” on the left of the stage, who he knows to be members of The Ambassadors, the same people who want him dead.\nAs it had done at the Human Rights Commission ten days before, Morare’s submission elicits a revealing response from the meeting’s host:\n“I do understand your frustration,” Madonsela says from her chair, “you are a divided community. But it took us forever to get the documents from the premier’s office. I don’t know, maybe we should have done a ‘search and seizure’. But we have been reluctant to do a ‘search and seizure’ on government.”\nIV. The size of the fix\nSo much for Premier Supra Mahumapelo and the provincial administration of North West. In an annexure to the founding affidavit in the case brought by community members against the government, Lonmin and Nthontho in 2015, attorney Hugh Eiser—who’s been fighting for the Bapo’s rights for more than a decade—laid out exactly how Mahumapelo and his predecessor had contravened the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act.\nAs it turned out, not only had the “D account” never been properly audited, but in March 2014 the North West’s MEC for local government and traditional affairs had given Rangwane Emius Mogale the power to authorise all necessary and routine payments out of the account, although not the power to make additional payments or to act as regent or acting chief. Also, according to Eiser, the North West government had done everything they could to prevent the creation of a legitimate traditional council for the Bapo Ba Mogale.\nWhich is where Abbey Mafate returns to the fray. In late September 2016, a judge of the North West High Court ordered that Mafate and Tshepo Maakane, another vocal critic of the 2014 Lonmin deal, be allowed back onto the same traditional council to which they’d been elected in January 2014. The two had been suspended in the months leading up to the deal, a decision the judge deemed “irrational and procedurally unfair.” While Mafate and Maakane had been granted access to the council meeting that took place on the day of Madonsela’s second visit to Bapong on 8 October 2016, less than two weeks later they would be served with letters placing them on “special leave” pending unspecified disciplinary charges.\nBut that wasn’t the half of it. At the council meeting of 19 October 2016, when Mafate and Maakane arrived to take up their seats, they saw at the table across from them none other than Hilton “Didaba” Mokubung—the same man who’d applied a series of panga blows to the head of Kgomotso Morare. Mokubung had been arrested after being named in Morare’s sworn affidavit, but now, it seemed, he was out. Although not a member of the traditional council, he was allowed to speak on its behalf.\n“Do not make us angry,” Mokubung allegedly said, when Maakane objected that the council had no power to order the special leave.\nIn terms of official channels, then, the fix looked as good as in—neither the traditional council, the local police or the government of North West appeared all that interested in the truth of the missing R800 million. As of this writing, the hopes of the Bapo Ba Mogale remain pinned on the Pretoria High Court, where the case is yet to be heard, and the final report of the public protector, which may or may not be forthcoming in December (the wild card is the will of Madonsela’s replacement, Busisiwe Mkhwebane).\nAnd where has Lonmin been in all of this? Absent, mostly. Which is unsurprising when you consider that their deal with Lehlohonolo Nthontho, Rangwane Emius Mogale and Vladimir Mogale includes a lease that grants them almost unfettered access to the Bapo’s ancestral land at a nominal one-off rental of R100. Not that the company has ever been a paragon of corporate social responsibility—the Marikana massacre aside, this is the same company that once mined a secret shaft for three years beneath Bapo Ba Mogale land until, according to Eiser, “its denials could no longer withstand scrutiny.”\nFor Morare, one of the few locals to ever work for the mine—he was dismissed earlier this year, for reasons he believes were linked to his activism—it’s a battle for another day.\n“Let us deal with Lonmin at a later stage,” he told the Daily Maverick. “Let us clean our own room first, and then deal with Lonmin.”\nAs far as Morare is concerned, his panga wounds are proof that the “cleaning” is imminent. He looks back on the attack as an indication of Nthontho’s desperation, a sign of the beginning of the end. DM\nMain photo: Lehlohonolo Nthontho, the CEO of Bapo Ba Mogale Investments (Photo: Sobantu Mzwakali)", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-10-26-whats-mine-is-mine-how-the-bapo-ba-mogale-got-robbed-of-r800-million/"}
{"doc_id": "5cff5d2e41a99208bc004a79270b83f6", "text": "2019 was a dark year for Zimbabwe and I mean that in the most literal sense. We had a power crises for over half the year and its impact on small and big business alike was pretty brutal.\nFor many small businesses the power crisis of last year resulted in closure and larger businesses had to increase the price of their service since delivering the service was much more expensive.\nWe saw this trend being most evident in the telco industry where the power crisis increased Telecoms companies reliance on generators and thus every month we would see tariffs change to reflect the cost of running on fuel along with the inflation present at the time.\nEconet has published its full-year results for the year ending 29 February 2020 and in the report, the company explains the impact of relying on generators on their business;\nDuring the year under review, our service quality and network availability were significantly impacted by power disruptions. Our network, during the peak of load shedding required over 3 million litres of diesel to operate optimally.\nEconet further explained that this was extremely cost-inefficient as 1kW of diesel power is 3 times more expensive than 1kW of solar power. The report notes that Econet had to limit the number of base stations that could be operated in this manner and that this had an effect on mobile money services.\nOur operational costs increased as we had to constantly service the generators and also run an extensive fleet of fuel refilling tankers to ensure that network availability remained at an acceptable standard.\nGoing forward Econet is working on becoming more reliant on solar energy which they say will reduce their reliance of local power and along with the need for foreign currency;\nOur strategy to implement a clean energy network, driven by solar power is critical as we are cognizant of the power deficit that the country may continue to experience into the foreseeable future. Addressing this challenge will greatly reduce the demand for operational foreign currency, which is a critical national resource\nUltimately whilst revenue increased by 31% from ZW$5.2 billion to ZW$6.8 billion, the company’s profitability took a 4% hit as the EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) dropped to ZW$2.7 billion from ZW$2.8 billion.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.techzim.co.zw/2020/10/econet-reveals-they-used-3-million-litres-of-fuel-during-the-power-crisis-of-2019/"}
{"doc_id": "dc57d018357c6f1c28e29f1d7b878017", "text": "THE Commissioner-General of the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (Zimra), Regina Chinamasa, will headline the annual tax indaba hosted by The Financial Gazette.\nThe high-profile event, scheduled for February 29 at Meikles Hotel in Harare, brings together industry captains, tax professionals, and government officials for a critical dialogue on pressing fiscal issues.\nThis year’s forum, jointly supported by Zimra, the Zimbabwe Institute of Tax Accountants and the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Zimbabwe, promises an in-depth exploration of the evolving tax landscape.\nA key focus will be the government’s efforts to integrate the informal sector into the tax net, a contentious policy generating significant debate. Beyond this specific issue, the Indaba will delve into broader challenges related to tax compliance and the overall impact of the tax environment on investment and business operations.\nThe interactive format fosters direct engagement with Zimra, ensuring key concerns from various sectors reach the relevant authorities. The tax indaba serves as a crucial platform for shaping Zimbabwe’s fiscal landscape. By bringing together key stakeholders for open discussion, the event contributes to a more efficient and equitable tax system for the nation.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://dailynews.co.zw/chinamasa-to-headline-tax-indaba/"}
{"doc_id": "0831058dd86ac8471ee85282b8651a50", "text": "Centum Real Estate (Centum Re) will develop a green housing project where units will start from lows of Sh1.9 million as the firm seeks to deepen its footprint in the homeownership market.\nThe units which will include studio apartments going for Sh1.9 million and three-bedroom units that will cost Sh10 million, will be built within the Mzizi project at the Two Rivers complex.\nThe entrance of more investors in the affordable housing space has brought the price of units down steadily, placing them closer to the reach of the majority of the middle class who have traditionally been priced out of the home market.\nRead: Centum RE posts Sh174m profit on valuation gain\nOther developers with low-priced units include Edermann Property Limited which is currently selling three-bedroom apartments at Sh2.95 million each.\nThe average mortgage size in Kenya meanwhile stands at about Sh9 million with a wide range stretching to more than Sh30 million. For a house priced at Sh9 million, the monthly repayment will be in excess of Sh100,000 per month even assuming a favourable interest rate of 13 percent and a repayment period of 15 years.\nCentum’s project, to be funded through a Sh3 billion ($20 million) loan from the International Finance Corporation, will see the construction of a total of 2,000 units, helping Centum Re further increase its share in the country’s homeownership market.\n“The facility allows Centum Re to take a long-term view and develop housing communities of scale in the region,” Centum Re’s Managing Director, Kenneth Mbae said.\n“The 2,000 homes are expected to be constructed in phases. The first phase of 300 homes is already significantly advanced.”\nThe studios combine bedroom, kitchen and living area in one space, making them ideal for young Kenyans who have just entered employment.\nCentum Re says that the IFC loan is repayable within seven years and comes weeks after the firm finished repaying a Sh3 billion bond that it issued to finance housing projects.\nThe first phase of the development is set to be completed by July next year.\nDisclosures by its parent company show that Centum Re posted a profit of Sh518.8 million in the half-year ended September, reversing a loss of Sh267.9 million the year before.\nThe firm’s developments are mixed-use comprising residential units and commercial buildings including offices.\nRead: Centum Re raises Sh3.8bn from land sale\nOfficial data shows that a paltry 21.3 percent of the population in Kenyan urban areas live in their own homes with the rest renting, pointing to the huge opportunity for Centum Re and its competitors.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/companies/centum-re-to-sell-affordable-houses-from-sh1-9m--4459830"}
{"doc_id": "fa2df5ab93917e2550e390f5d982bca7", "text": "Brainworks confident about economy\nProperty Reporter\nOne of the country’s top players in property and tourism sectors, Brainworks Capital, believes the firm is poised to benefit from various infrastructure projects that are taking place in the country as President Mnangagwa’s Government prioritises economic development and growth.\nBrainworks Capital, which is listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, owns hospitality concern African Sun, and hotel property owner Dawn Properties.\n“Various infrastructure projects across the country, including the Robert Gabriel Mugabe International Airport upgrade, Beitbridge to Chirundu road rehabilitation and Beitbridge border post development present opportunities which the group is set to benefit from,” said Brainworks.\nThe company, through its subsidiary, is already seeing the benefits of President Mnangagwa’s policies with its results for the half year ended June 30, 2018, showing a 28 percent growth in revenue to $31 million relative to $24 million achieved during the 2017 comparable period.\nChief executive officer Brett Childs attributed the strong performance to growth across all the group’s three main operating segments, with major growth being recorded by the hospitality segment.\n“In line with the prior year, the hospitality segment remains the major contributor to group total revenue, with contribution of 87 percent ($27million) in line with same period in the prior year,” said Mr Childs.\nThe hospitality business segment’s revenue increased by 29 percent to close at $27million compared to $21million recorded over the same period in 2017.\n“Both domestic and foreign revenue registered growth, achieving 26 percent and 32 percent respectively,” he said.\nMr Childs noted that the group had witnessed an exceptional increase in both local and foreign arrivals during what would have traditionally been a quiet period.\nThe first half of the year also coincided with the election period which saw observers from across the globe flocking to the country and filling up hotels.\nRevenue for the group was thus boosted by a 10 percentage points increase in occupancy rate to 55 percent during the period under review to 45 percent reported prior year comparative.\nImproved hotel occupancy resulted in the average daily rate (ADR) improving to $97 from $89 reported during the comparative period. As a result, revenue per available room (RevPAR) firmed by 33 percent to $53 from $40 achieved last year.\nWith interest on investing in Zimbabwe also increasing, the sector and Brainworks in particular also benefited immensely and the trend is expected to continue into the future.\n“The second half of the year presents the group’s peak trading season. The group expects conferencing and international market business to bolster performance, particularly in our Victoria Falls properties, where inward foreign arrivals have been on the increase,” said Mr Childs in a statement accompanying the groups results released Friday last week.\n“We anticipate that the New Victoria Falls Airport will continue to be a conduit for increased foreign arrivals into the destination,” he said.\nThe group recorded profit after tax of $7,3 million during the period under review, compared to losses of $5,2 million and $8 million for the interim period ended June 30, 2017, and year ended December 31, 2017, respectively.\nEarnings per share of the Company is expected to be 7,41 US cents per\nThe out-turn for Brainworks is to be expected given the performance of two of its local operations that reported significant improved results.\nOne of the entities, hospitality group, African Sun Limited reported earnings growth for the half year to June 30, 2018 as operating profit surged 672 percent to $3,8 million on good business during election period.\nAfsun’s strong performance also translated to an equally good set of results for its landlord Dawn Properties.\nThe property concern, posted a profit after tax of $942 177, about 9 percent up from $90 442 recorded in the same period last year.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.herald.co.zw/brainworks-confident-about-economy/"}
{"doc_id": "599b89883a51a362b902857ec982ca52", "text": "Crypto exchange FTX and its sister company Alameda Research, which have filed for bankruptcy in a United States court, invested billions in at least three Kenyan start-ups in what could throw the young firms into financial wild waters.\nRegulatory filings and court papers show that Sam Bankman-Fried’s collapsed $32 billion crypto empire through investment arm Alameda Research, pumped billions of shillings into local digital finance start-up Mara and remittance company Chipper Cash.\nMara received Sh2.8 billion ($23 million) in May backed by FTX-affiliated Alameda Research and Coinbase Ventures for expansion and to create a platform for its users to buy and sell crypto tokens using the Kenya shilling and other currencies in the region.\nMara is a crypto brokerage firm that allows users to buy, sell and send digital assets using local currencies.\nFor its part, Chipper Cash raised Sh18.3 billion ($150 million) at Sh244.9 billion valuation last year from the collapsed crypto firm and other investors for expansion in Africa.\nChipper Cash is a money remittance and payments platform founded in 2018 to offer instant cross-border mobile money transfers in Africa.\nThe peer-to-peer payment services platform operates across nine countries, including Kenya, Ghana, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Nigeria and South Africa.\nIn the first bankruptcy case filed by Bankman-Fried on November 11, BitPesa Kenya was listed among the over 100 subsidiaries spread across continents. FTX later clarified that some of the firms initially listed as part of the suit including BitPesa are not part of its sprawling crypto empire.\nBitPesa is a blockchain payments platform founded in 2013 that was at one point linked to the former ICT Cabinet Secretary, Joe Mucheru. Mr Mucheru offloaded his minority stake in 2018 citing a conflict of interest.\nBitPesa is owned by AZA Finance and its relationship with FTC Africa was a partnership with FTX Africa to expand web3 in Africa which failed to take off.\nALSO READ: Mucheru finally sells stake in Bitcoin dealing firm Bitpesa\nThe collapse of the exchange has further plunged the volatile digital currency market into crisis, coming on the back of a recent meltdown with many investors yet to recover as Bitcoin struggles to maintain the key level of Sh2.4 million ($20,000).\nThe ripple effects have already seen other crypto firms like BlockFi file for bankruptcy following the implosion.\nMore than four million Kenyans who hold digital assets for speculation and hedge on local currency could be pushed deeper into losses as the full impact of the latest crisis in the industry unravels.\nFTX has been one of the most popular digital tokens trading platforms in Africa and Kenya being one of the leading markets in the region could signal losses running into billions.\nALSO READ: 4m Kenyans suffer crypto crash losses\n“That’s where [Africa] the most underserved globally are and where there’s a whole lot of lowest-hanging fruit in terms of being able to make people’s lives better,” Bankman-Fried told the news website Vox in 2021.\nExperts and insolvency professionals have said that the company collapsed under the weight of mismanagement and financial impropriety in what the new FTX chief executive, John Ray III, said was the biggest case of corporate failure he has seen in 40 years.\nFilings in the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware indicate that the company owes over $3 billion to one million creditors.\nIn a damning filing of the company’s fall, Mr Ray III has said that the FTX group companies lacked appropriate corporate governance. The new management is now seeking to restructure or sell the crypto empire.\n“Based on our review over the past week, we are pleased to learn that many regulated or licensed subsidiaries of FTX, within and outside of the United States, have solvent balance sheets, responsible management and valuable franchises,” Mr Ray III said in a statement\n“I respectfully ask all of our employees, vendors, customers, regulators and government stakeholders to be patient with us as we put in place the arrangements that corporate governance failures at FTX prevented us from putting in place prior to filing our chapter 11 cases.”\nA team of lawyers are currently working to track assets in the complex web of companies to repay creditors who are said to be over one million.\nLawyers of the collapsed firm said in the first hearing last week that the company was run by an inner circle of Bankman-Fried operating from the Caribbean Island of Bahamas with no regard to corporate governance rules.\nThey said the 30-year-old ran the exchange as a “personal fiefdom”, using customer funds to buy homes for executives and holiday homes in the Bahamas.\nIt emerged last week that the disgraced crypto king and his parents used company funds to purchase at least 19 properties worth about Sh14.8 billion ($121 million) in the Caribbean Island over the last two years.\nMr Ray III, who is leading the efforts to restructure or sell the company, has accused his predecessor Bankman-Fried of frustrating and undermining the case by working with Bahamian regulators to shift some assets overseas.\nThe crypto market, known for its wild price swings, has shed more than half of its value since November last year as investors pulled out money from riskier assets amid worries over soaring inflation and rising interest rates.\nSince the implosion of FTX, some crypto players are taking to decentralised exchanges known as “DEXs” where investors trade peer-to-peer on the blockchain.\nOverall daily trading volumes on DEXs leapt to their highest level since May on November 10, as FTX imploded, according to data from market tracker DeFi Llama, but have since pared gains.\nEditor's note: The previous version of this story reported that BitPesa, which is owned by AZA Finance, is part of the ongoing FTX bankruptcy case filed on November 11. Subsequent court filings and hearings indicate that BitPesa is not part of the suit. Its engagement with the collapsed crypto giant was a commercial partnership with FTX Africa to expand web3 in Africa which did not take off.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/technology/-collapsed-us-crypto-firm-ftx-put-billions-in-3-kenyan-firms--4037700"}
{"doc_id": "7d2836d91bfc707ad12b899aa2829ae9", "text": "Alexi Coutsoudis, Wealth Adviser at PSG Wealth, Umhlanga Ridge\nI am planning on selling my home and renting an apartment to live in, instead. Do you have any advice for me on how best to use the money from the sale of my home to increase my income without making any harsh decisions?\nWhen selling your home and aiming to generate income from the proceeds, it’s vital to consider potential tax implications. If you expect capital gains tax liabilities, it's wise to set aside funds in a high-yield money market account for payment during your next tax filing. Notably, if the property was your primary residence at the time of sale, the initial R2 500 000 in capital growth is tax-exempt.\nTo make sound use of the sale proceeds, it’s recommended you consult a certified financial planner. They will craft a personalised plan to guide your investment decisions in line with your financial goals. Recognise that there’s no one-size-fits-all approach; the right plan hinges on your goals and needs. To get started, establish the income you require monthly or annually and the duration over which it should be sustained. Assess the risk level needed to meet your expected returns, factoring in annual inflation adjustments, and ensure you’re comfortable with this risk level (your risk tolerance).\nDrawing higher than the recommended income withdrawal could prematurely erode your capital, so be cautious. Your financial planner will suggest the most efficient products based on your circumstances. The strategic asset allocation of the investments should match your risk tolerance and long-term goals, balancing income provision and capital appreciation.\nRegularly review your investment strategy and asset allocation to ensure they align with your objectives and support your cash flow’s sustainability. By implementing your financial plan and reviewing it annually, you will navigate the complexities of post-home sale financial planning and realise your financial goals.\nMagdeleen Cornelissen, Wealth Adviser at PSG Wealth, Menlyn\nI would like to know how I can minimise my tax liability while maximising my investment returns? How do I go about identifying tax-efficient investment strategies that align with my financial goals. Do you have any tips on how to structure my portfolio to minimise taxes and maximise returns?\nThere are several methods that investors can use to optimise their portfolio growth, while reducing their tax liability.\nTax-free investments have become popular over the past few years. Knowing that your investment returns are exempt from income tax, dividends tax and capital gains tax, gives you the opportunity to structure your investment without being concerned about the impact that tax will have on your investment. This can lead to optimised portfolio growth.\nInvestors may contribute R36 000 per tax year in a tax-free investment, with a lifetime limit of R500 000. Contributions in excess of the limits will be taxed at 40%. Do not underestimate the positive cumulative impact of the contributions on your portfolio.\nInvestors also have access to investment products that will provide them with an income tax benefit based on the contributions that are made to the products. This includes retirement annuities, provident funds and pension funds. Contributions to the products are tax-deductible, within certain limits. The maximum tax deduction you may make in a tax year is limited to 27.5% of the higher of your taxable income or remuneration from your employer, subject to an annual limit of R350 000. The products also come with the added benefit of tax-free growth.\nEndowments also hold tax benefits for investors with a marginal tax rate higher than 30%. This product is taxable in the hands of the investment life company and taxable at a rate of 30%. On maturity, you will receive the benefit as an after-tax amount.\nThere are other ways to help reduce taxes and improve after-tax returns in investments. Asset allocation can be an effective tool as different asset classes may be taxed differently. It is, however, important to remember that tax should not be the only consideration when choosing an investment product. Your investment plan must first be in line with your personal financial goals.\nYour financial adviser will also be able to assist in the construction of a tax-effective portfolio.\nRobyn Laubscher, Advice and Product Specialist, PSG Wealth\nWe recently welcomed our first-born and as a young family, we want to take the rights steps to save for our child’s education as soon as possible. What can we do to develop a comprehensive education savings plan that will take into account our child’s age, future tuition costs and our current financial situation?\nCongratulations, what an exciting time! There are a few aspects to consider:\nSavings:\nFrom a savings perspective, one thing to bear in mind is that the sooner you start saving, the better! I would consider starting with tax-free savings account. A tax-free savings account has many benefits:\n– You would be able to open the contract in your minor child’s name.\n– There is no tax within the structure.\n– There are a range of underlying investment options available, although certain restrictions do apply. For example, investments charging performance fees are not allowed.\n– There are no limits on the growth within the portfolio, so the sooner you start, the better. There are however limits to the contribution amount, currently, the limit is R36 000 per tax year and R500 000 per lifetime (a penalty tax of 40% is charged on contributions above the prescribed limits). Bear in mind that if you open the contract in your child’s name, all contributions will count towards their own annual and lifetime limits.\nOther considerations:\n– Your will must be updated to include your nominated guardian for your child, should both parents pass away. It is important to discuss your wishes with your nominated guardian.\n– Provision should be made in your will for the benefit of your child. It is important to create a structure that will provide for your child’s needs, should you pass away. A testamentary trust is often a good option to consider.\n– There are also education benefits that you can add to your life cover that would pay for your child’s education should you pass away.\nI would also suggest you engage with a financial adviser to discuss all the options available to ensure your goals are achieved.\nJacqui Mayne, Adviser at PSG Insure - Approved\nI have just sold my house and I’ll be moving shortly. What I wanted to know is whether my goods will be covered while moving. I have home insurance that covers the building and contents – is this enough or am I required to take up additional cover?\nMost household contents insurance policies offer limited cover for your goods while moving to a new home, but it is important to check with your adviser exactly what cover exists for the goods while in transit and what terms and conditions apply. If you understand these and the possible exclusions on your policy properly, you can decide if you need to take out additional household goods in transit cover.\nIt will be an insurance requirement that all reasonable steps are taken to limit losses and safeguard the items during the move. Most insurers will give cover only if the packing and removal is conducted by a recognised professional removal company, so it’s best to check before you pack the goods yourself.\nMost professional removal companies also offer insurance for your goods in transit for an additional cost. This will allow you to compare and make an informed decision on whether to buy insurance through the mover, to buy additional cover though your insurer or go with the over on your household contents policy.\nWhichever option you choose, moving is a good time to reassess that your contents are adequately insured. Make sure the household contents sum insured represents the full replacement value of all your household contents, so that you are correctly covered should anything go wrong.\nPERSONAL FINANCE", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/personal-finance/financial-planning/your-investment-tax-and-insurance-questions-answered-8d74c44e-9c6a-4162-a798-5d3f7e544d30"}
{"doc_id": "904a74cc12a43b2e60e662cef7e5f9cd", "text": "Stadio, the JSE-listed investment holdings company with investments in three private higher education institutions, has set its sights on creating an alternative to the University of South Africa, the largest university system in the country, with in excess of 400,000 students.\nLarger universities including the likes of Stellenbosch University, UCT, Wits, and North-West University range between 30,000 and 70,000 students.\nStadio started as a subsidiary of Curro Holdings, but was unbundled in 2017, and listed separately on the Johannesburg exchange.\nIn 2013, Curro acquired Embury, a registered private higher education institution, which offers accredited teacher education qualifications. This was Curro’s first acquisition in the post-school education environment.\nIt has since acquired further prestigious registered higher education institutions, namely AFDA, Milpark Education, LISOF, Prestige Academy and Southern Business School, as well as the business of CA Connect. AFDA and Milpark Education operate independently, and the other institutions were consolidated with Stadio to form one Stadio Higher Education institution.\nIn a note on Wednesday (22 June), Stadio chief executive officer, Chris Vorster said the group is set to enter a growth phase with its eye firmly on widening access to quality education. It currently boasts 9 schools, over 50 accredited programmes and both on and off-campus options.\nStadio, with its current three investments in Stadio Higher Education, Milpark Education, and AFDA, has, from 2016 to 2020, focused on establishing and positioning the business.\nVorster said that in 2022, the group is still focused on the consolidation phase of the business and is positioning to implement its growth strategy, aiming for sustainable growth in profit of more than 20% in the long-term, with minimal capital requirements, whilst investigating the possibility of new markets, and further refining its systems and processes to enable continued innovation and efficiencies.\nAddressing shareholders in a virtual AGM, Vorster, said that the foundation for this growth phase has been laid and is visible in the first semester with student numbers up by 11% to 38,414 at the end of May 2022 in comparison to 30 June 2021, with distance learning numbers increasing by 15%.\nThese figures exclude students enrolled in short-learning programmes, Stadio said.\n“Of particular significance, is that new students increased by 16% relative to June 2021 with contact learning students growing by 2% to 2,355 and distance learning by 19% to 11,137 students.\n“This is a good illustration of our strategy for growth, by taking new programmes to new sites. In general, new student growth provides Stadio with a good pipeline of roll-over students for the next few years,” Vorster said.\nStadio is on track to achieve its target of 56,000 students by 2026, with an 8% annual growth rate required to achieve this. “The ultimate goal is to provide top-class education to 100,000 plus students over time with a minimum of 80% distance learning students and a maximum of 20% contact learning students,” Vorster said.\n“Stadio is well-positioned to achieve these goals with its overall strategy underpinned further by its purpose of widening access to education, taking cognizance of the world of work and student centredness,” he said.\nThe group’s latest campus in Centurion opened its first phase in 2022 at a build cost of R200 million.\nFees vary greatly, depending on the course, type of learning, location, advancement, and year of study.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businesstech.co.za/news/business-opinion/599104/the-private-company-taking-on-south-africas-biggest-universities/"}
{"doc_id": "18bd62f624798c8023a47fd7029294eb", "text": "Emmanuel Addeh in Yenagoa\nThere was relief in the Niger Delta region on Wednesday following the failure of the new Niger Delta group, Joint Niger Delta Liberation Force, to unleash six missiles on the country’s critical assets, including military hardware in the region.\nMany respondents told THISDAY that though the group was little known, the threats could not be dismissed with a wave of the hand since several other groups like that had kept their vows in the past.\nAside from threatening to bomb the Presidential Villa, the Department of State Services, Central Bank of Nigeria, the Police Headquarters and the Defence Headquarters, the group had also vowed to attack all the assets of the Joint Task Force in the region.\n‘’Note: we are going to destroy the ones (warships and fighter jets) they have deployed to Escravos, Forcados in Delta State; Bonga oil field, Agbami offshore and Brass in Bayelsa.\n‘’Also, Bony in Rivers; Qua Iboe Terminal in Akwa Ibom State, and\nOpuekeba in Ondo state if they (military) fail to remove them before time. Our crack team has taken inventory of their equipment’’, the group had threatened.\nBut THISDAY learnt that while there was no serious public security response to the vow to bomb the facilities, residents in the area took several precautions, including staying indoors.\n‘’There was serious apprehension in the region concerning the threats. In fact, some teachers asked some students not to come to school tuesday.\n‘’In my area, Harbour Road, Yenagoa, many children did not go to school. You needed to check the Free Readers Association, the people that read free news, saying that the equipment the boys possessed, Nigeria didn’t have them.\n‘’But it was basically out of ignorance. Do you know what a missile is? Do you know what it takes to launch a missile?’’, Mr Christopher Abarowei, a resident of the state, said.\nFurther details later", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2016/06/08/relief-as-niger-delta-militants-fail-to-launch-missiles"}
{"doc_id": "d0d3c13dfe20eba6508e5f5d7e5a7450", "text": "Following Facebook’s announcement of Libra, there was a brief honeymoon phase where crypto and tech enthusiasts celebrated the coming of this digital currency which would leverage Facebook’s digital footprint of 2.45+ billion users.\nFast forward 7 months and that enthusiasm has died down. A number of Libra association members have stepped down with Vodafone being the latest.\nFor Vodafone, the excuse for dropping out is to focus more on their mobile money platform M-PESA:\nVodafone Group has decided to withdraw from the Libra Association. We have said from the outset that Vodafone’s desire is to make a genuine contribution to extending financial inclusion. We remain fully committed to that goal and feel that we can make the most contribution by focusing our efforts on M-Pesa. We will continue to monitor the development of the Libra Association and do not rule out the possibility of future co-operation.\nVodafone statement\nVodafone’s statement is pretty similar to the one made by Paypal which sounds more like an excuse than a valid reason for leaving the association. The reason why most of the Libra Association partners have decided to abandon Facebook in its quest to create a digital currency has been because of the threat of regulation.\nIt’s hard to see any other reason for Vodafone ditching Libra outside of the regulatory threat. It’s hard to believe that Vodafone suddenly had a change of heart and decided that they could “make the most contribution by focusing on M-Pesa”.\nAll this after joining an association that would require them to pay US$10 million that goes to building the digital currency. I have doubts organisations wouldn’t have weighed the pros and cons of joining an organisation that you will have to fund beforehand and Vodafone realising that they are better served focusing on M-Pessa now is either an excuse or calls questions on decision-makers who were willing to allocate resources (time and money) before understanding what benefits they got from this.\nTo be fair the association has been around for over 7 months and Vodafone might have had some experiences that make them question their willingness to be involved in building the world’s largest digital currency.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.techzim.co.zw/2020/01/vodafone-withdraws-from-fbs-libra-association-to-focus-on-m-pesa/?amp=1"}
{"doc_id": "5c9443ea8cd2f051f7b9e8a52b5ac27b", "text": "AY\n15 Apr 2023\nT4T has been following the back and forth exchanges between two top Nigerian comedians, Ayo Makun(AY) and Bright Okpocha aka Basket Mouth. It was AY who drew first blood when he revealed that the refusal of Basket Mouth to pay him '30k for a show he stood in for him', over 15 years ago, created the deep void in their friendship.\n10 Apr 2023\nBasketmouth has once again dissociated himself from being friends with fellow comedian Ayo Makun, popularly known as AY.\nLatest\n8 mins ago\nA multinational health and wellness company, QNET, has commenced training for business representatives and marketers in the Sub-Saharan Africa on new business models that will enhance their marketing skills.\n15 mins ago\nA rights group, Nigerian Unemployed Youth Vanguard has blamed the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Mr Olayemi Cardoso for the hyperinflation and it's attendant consequences on the wellbeing of the citizenry.\n17 mins ago\nThe President of African Export-Import Bank (Afrexim Bank), Prof. Benedict Oramah, has said with enabling environment in trade institutions Nigeria would lead Africa in trade value chain.\n21 mins ago\nActors Guild of Nigeria (AGN), has renewed its partnered with ruzu herbal products company to ensure universal healthcare coverage among the members and Nigeria at large.\n1 day ago\nMark Dodson, the voice actor known for bringing iconic characters to life in \"Star Wars\" and \"Gremlins,\" has passed away at the age of 64. Dodson's most recognizable roles included the cackling court jester Salacious Crumb in \"Star Wars: Return of the Jedi\" (1983) and the mischievous Mogwai in \"Gremlins\" (1984). His talent extended beyond…\n1 day ago\nTo enhance Nigeria’s oil production capabilities, the country has been urged to adopt Brazil’s model of public-private partnerships (PPPs) and policy reforms that triggered investments in deep water oil reserves.\n1 day ago\nNigeria's richest man Aliko Dangote has named the \"biggest\" road network in his refinery complex after the former CEO of Access Bank Herbet Wigwe. Wigwe died in a helicopter crash in the United States along with his wife and son in February. \"I have actually decided to name our major refinery and petrochemical road—out of…\n1 day ago\nThe Senior Staff Association of Nigerian Universities (SSANU) and the Non-academic Staff Union of Education and Associated Institutions (NASU) have given the Federal Government a seven-day ultimatum to meet their demands or they will embark on strike.\n1 day ago\nThe Minister of Agriculture and Food Security, Senator Abubakar Kyari, has revealed that the Federal Government will release more foodstuffs into the Nigerian markets very soon.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://guardian.ng/tag/ay/"}
{"doc_id": "c83940b2930ec150c4a135543007b7bc", "text": "Again, DSS dismisses claims of wrongdoing on Emefiele’s re-arrest, detention\nDepartment of State Services (DSS) has maintained it did not disobey court orders with its re-arrest and detention of former Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Governor, Godwin Emefiele, even as it insisted the apex bank boss financed terrorism and laundered money, besides other crimes against the Nigerian State.\nThe agency also condemned criticism of its handling of the matter.\n“Whether on Emefiele, Bawa or Kanu, the agency has obeyed judicial orders and handled cases procedurally, and in accordance with the rule of law. Critics are encouraged to be a bit more discerning and up their research capabilities. Doing so will reveal that the agency obeys orders. The Court of Appeal judgment on Kanu is recommended for detailed study,” DSS said in a statement, yesterday, by its spokesman, Peter Afunanya.\nIt noted: “Maybe, we can decipher the difference between discharged and acquitted and what the use of either or both mean in the final order of a judge. The DSS is an ardent respecter of the law. Anyone may argue this but it is true. It is in this regard that it has applied for either a stay or notice of appeal on some of the matters. One who does not obey the laws will not resort to legal procedures like the DSS has done.”\nThe statement reads in part: “The agency applied for an ex parte order at the FCT High Court, presided by Justice Edward Okpe (and not Justice Mu’azu as erroneously and massively reported in the media) to detain Emefiele for 14 days. Against the established rules regarding ex parte applications, a lawyer suddenly appeared in the court for Emefiele.\n“While the judge did not out rightly reject the DSS’ request, he struck out the motion upon its withdrawal by the agency’s counsel. But this is not without his guidance. Earlier, the judge had drawn the attention of the counsels to Section 293 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA), which also recognises the Magistrate Court as a competent court that can first be approached for an order for custody of a suspect under investigation.\nIn other words, the agency, having taken the hint of the court, took the right steps. What transpired at the court was, thereafter, variously misrepresented by some mischief makers.\n“Part of the disinformation is to the effect that the court ‘struck out the application and said it was an abuse of judicial process.’ That was not what the court said. What Justice Okpe said was ‘the applicant, having withdrawn the application, same is hereby struck out.’ That was all. The court records are there. But purveyors of fake news distorted the message to suit their intent; just to make the agency look bad – a sort of giving the dog a bad name in order to hang it.”\nGet the latest news delivered straight to your inbox every day of the week. Stay informed with the Guardian’s leading coverage of Nigerian and world news, business, technology and sports.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://guardian.ng/news/nigeria/national/again-dss-dismisses-claims-of-wrongdoing-on-emefieles-re-arrest-detention/"}
{"doc_id": "b3a177981df1b01fe5f5e2f9f908fc7f", "text": "intercepted\n2 Oct\nThe Senegalese navy has stepped up its efforts to board and rescue illegal immigrants in recent weeks. More than 600 people were intercepted in just three days.\n11 Jul 2023\nFollowing the receipt of credible intelligence, a Private Security Contractor engaged by NNPC Ltd., Messrs. Tantita Security Services, intercepted a suspicious Vessel with a Cargo of Crude oil on board on July 7, 2023.\nLatest\n1 day ago\nAs tensions escalate in the Gaza Strip, many displaced Palestinians are now gripped with fear about Israeli forces launching a relentless assault on the city of Rafah.\n1 day ago\nIn an interview with FRANCE 24, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said he expected that \"regardless of the outcome of the US elections\", Washington \"will continue to be a committed NATO ally\".\n1 day ago\nDoctors in the U.S. are struggling to contend with burnout, staffing shortages and overwhelming administrative workloads, according to a new survey. Despite these challenges, 83% of doctors in the survey said they believe AI could eventually help. More than 1,000 doctors were surveyed between Oct. 23 and Nov. 8 in the study, commissioned by Athenahealth.\n1 day ago\nOn January 6, the US aviation regulator FAA ordered the temporary grounding of certain Boeing 737-9 MAX aircraft operated by US airlines or in US territory, affecting 171 planes.\n1 day ago\nRussian investigators have said they are carrying out a 14-day forensic \"investigation\" of the opposition leader's body. Navalny's family has so far been refused access to his remains.\n1 day ago\nIsrael's GDP fell by 19.4 percent in the last quarter of 2023, according to preliminary figures published by the country's Central Bureau of Statistics on Monday. It's the biggest contraction the economy has seen since the early days of the Covid pandemic, and can be attributed to the impact of the war on Gaza following the October 7 Hamas attacks.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://tv.guardian.ng/tag/intercepted/"}
{"doc_id": "7e99a61b7d61ef6e4e7eb7b456834f4b", "text": "Utter the name ‘RBZ’ in front of most adult Zimbabweans and you’ll hear a ‘tsk tsk’ in return. For all the good that the Zimbabwean central bank has ever done, its failures are just so large as to eclipse it all.\nMy friend, consider this – some teenagers have gone through multiple hyperinflation periods in their lifetime in this country. I do not think trust in the institution could be any lower.\nThe same applies to the government as a whole. Zimbabwe is not a bastion of excellence and for all the sanctions talk we can have, the government will have to take a significant piece of the blame pie. My whole life we have talked about a bloated civil servant wage bill and yet civil servants are underpaid. It’s ridiculous.\nThen come the state-owned enterprises. While there are some like Telone that are not complete failures, they would probably do much better without government interventions. Let’s not even talk about Air Zimbabwe and ZESA, we all know how successful they have been.\nThe above is depressing but let’s take comfort in knowing we are not alone on this boat. So many countries out there are unhappy with their governments, central banks and state-owned enterprises.\nSome dude in Argentina thought to himself, what if I got into power and did something about it? What if I got rid of the central bank and privatised parastatals?\nThe crazy Argentine experiment\nJavier Milei, Argentina’s soon-to-be president, is shaking things up with some wild ideas. One of his craziest plans is to say adios to the Central Bank of Argentina (BCRA).\nMilei thinks the BCRA is like a toothless lion – not doing its job to control inflation and keep the economy steady. You could be forgiven for thinking he’s talking about the RBZ here.\nMilei wants to try a new game plan: ditch the central bank and bring in a currency board that ties the Argentine peso to the US dollar. This move would stop the central bank from setting interest rates and printing money.\nFor context: as revealed by the Mid-Term Monetary Policy Statement, the bank policy rate (commonly just called interest rate on the streets) is 150% in Zimbabwe whilst it’s 133% in Argentina. The USA sits between 5.25 and 5.5%.\nAnnual inflation in Zimbabwe as measured by the RBZ is 103% whilst Argentina’s is somehow worse at 138%. You know how the Americans have been complaining about high inflation, well, it’s 3.2%.\nCan we say the RBZ and Argentina’s central bank are doing a great job in controlling inflation? Milei says, ‘Why should the central bank still exist when it has shown that it is incompetent?’\nThis is a crazy idea and many economists, even those highly critical of the RBZ would not suggest that we do away with a central bank altogether. However, I guess they will be tuning in to see what happens in Argentina if Milei follows through with his campaign promises of doing away with the central bank.\nThere’s more. Milei has some other interesting ideas up his sleeve:\n- Austerity for Prosperity: Milei wants to trim the fat from government spending by 50% over the next four years. He thinks the government is too big and slow, and these cuts will slim down the budget deficit and help the economy recover.\n- MaObama: Milei is talking about going all-in with the US dollar and ditching the local currency. Dude, this guy just keeps sounding Zimbabwean. We have flirted with this idea in Zimbabwe for years but the govt is adamant it would make things worse. Milei thinks this would stop the risk of money losing its value and make investors cheer.\n- Govt can’t run no business: Milei also wants to put the ‘For Sale’ sign on some government-owned companies, like the national energy giant YPF. This is eerie, how many people have called for ZESA to be privatised in Zimbabwe? He figures selling them off will make things more efficient and get investors excited.\nWhat’s the Big Picture?\nWe can look at Argentina as our very own lab rat. We can grab our popcorn and see how it all plays out and then factor in the differences in our economies and assess whether we could pull it off here.\nOne thing we kind of have experience with is the fixed exchange rate that Milei is proposing. That doesn’t work out if our experience is anything to go by but who knows, it might work out over there. Milei thinks the perks of a free-market approach to monetary policy would outweigh the risks.\nMilei’s other proposed policy changes, such as drastic cuts to government spending and full dollarisation, could also have a significant impact on the economy. These changes could lead to job losses and social unrest in the short term, but Milei’s supporters believe that they would be necessary to put the economy on a sustainable path to growth in the long term.\nSay what you want about Mthuli Ncube but at some point, he successfully managed to drastically cut government spending in the ‘austerity for posterity’ days. Unfortunately, we felt the austerity bit but are still waiting for the prosperity bit. So, good luck to Milei on that one. On paper, it should work but maybe Zimbabwe is just cursed.\nWe abolished a local currency at some point and many Zimbos swear we had it good during that period. Yes, there was deflation and the economy was not growing but after experiencing hyperinflation, the masses did not mind.\nThe debate rages on in Zimbabwe on whether we should fully dollarise or get rid of the US dollar. Let’s see what happens in Argentina and maybe it can help us make a good decision.\nIt’s good that we get to do this because we got to see how making Bitcoin legal tender turned out in El Salvador – not great. Showed we need not even consider the crazy idea.\nKeep your eyes on the Argentine show. Milei’s plans are still just sketches on paper. Whether he can turn them into action and what it means for Argentina’s economy is a story yet to unfold.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.techzim.co.zw/2023/11/argentina-to-shut-dwon-central-bank-imagine-closing-rbz-could-that-work/"}
{"doc_id": "f03e61355b229004df291245d6299ece", "text": "Mubarak Bala\n16 Aug 2023\nNobel Laureate, Prof. Wole Soyinka, has officially reacted to Mubarak Bala’s open letter to President Bola Tinubu.\n16 Aug 2023\nRecently, Ouida Books, Ikeja, hosted a gathering of humanists, which aimed at creating awareness on the need to release incarerated Mubarak Bala, who has been in prison owing to what is considered 'blasphemous posts' on Facebook.\n11 Jul 2023\nNigerian humanists welcome the British All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) Freedom of Religion or Belief (FoRB) report “Nigeria Unfolding Genocide? Three Years On”. All Party Groups, informal groups of members of both Houses, publish reports on issues of particular interest.\nLatest\n36 mins ago\nThe Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) on Friday revoked the license of 4,173 bureaux de change (BDC) operators. CBN's spokesperson Hakama Sidi Ali announced this in a statement. Sidi Ali said the affected institutions listed on the CBN website failed to comply with regulations, including the \"payment of all necessary fees, including license renewal, within…\n1 hour ago\nBinance, a cryptocurrency giant, has refuted the Nigerian government's claims that they are negotiating to pay a $10 billion fine. A Binance official stated it had no discussions regarding a $10 billion fine with the Nigerian government but hopes to resume services \"very soon.\" “We recently discussed ways to resolve issues with Nigeria, but we…\n1 hour ago\nChelsea has sent an invitation to Hafiz Umar Ibrahim to train with them with the possibility of signing the Nigerian youngster. Germany-based Nigerian sports journalist, Lolade Adewuyi confirmed Chelsea's invitation to Ibrahim on Friday through a post on X. \"English Premier League (EPL) giants, Chelsea have invited Hafiz Umar Ibrahim to train with them with…\n1 hour ago\nNollywood actor, sisi Quadri is dead, aged 44, according to his colleagues in the film industry. Actor Femi Adebayo, in an Instagram post, acknowledged the sad news by posting on his page; “It's a sad day when good people get taken away from us, by the cold hands of death!! My prayers and condolences remain…\n3 hours ago\nPep Guardiola says he is expecting the \"best\" from Manchester United, even though Manchester City will start Sunday's derby as red-hot favourites to extend their dominance over their rivals.\n3 hours ago\nEurozone inflation continued to ease in February, data showed Friday, but economists warned it was unlikely to push the European Central Bank to cut interest rates next month.\n3 hours ago\nThe Nigerian Army, in conjunction with hybrid force and elements of Civilian Joint Task Force, have successfully overran Boko Haram/Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) terrorists’ stronghold in Lake Chad Region\n4 hours ago\nThe Police Command in Kano State has arrested 132 suspects for alleged kidnapping, armed robbery and illicit drug dealing in two months in different parts of the state.\n4 hours ago\nSuper Eagles manager, Jose Peseiro has confirmed that he has left his position with the Nigerian men's senior national team. Peseiro whose contract as the Super Eagles coach expired on Thursday, February 29, 2024, confirmed his departure on Friday through a post on his X handle. \"Yesterday, we concluded our contract with the Nigerian Football…", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://guardian.ng/tag/mubarak-bala/"}
{"doc_id": "726644378e493e4a0a7188c1bb61091a", "text": "Diversification of Nigeria’s economy is believed to be the only viable way to survive the current environment of global economic uncertainty with the volatility of oil prices.\nIt certainly presents an opportunity for the most competitive and strategic option for Nigeria in light of her current developmental challenges. It can only diversify the economy through digital economy, manufacturing and agriculture. Manufacturing actually creates a lot of jobs, creates middle class and also transforms the society. These are areas we need to really focus on.\nNigeria has a readily available market because of its huge population but there is need for government to remove factors that have continued to constrain the manufacturing sector.\nIn addition, the drop in crude oil prices has lowered the expected open market price of imported petrol below the official pump price of N145 per litre. The outbreak of the deadly coronavirus and its spread across the world has forced the international oil market to a near standstill, leaving crude oil price to crash from around $60 per barrel to about $29.\nThe drastic fall in the price reduced the expected pump price of petrol to N64.32.\nDespite the development, the ex-depot price stood at N125.63 per litre, while government’s approved retail price hovers between N135.00 and N145.00 under a subsidy scheme. The PPPRA disclosed that the country currently has about 2,217,972,763 litres of PMS in stock, expected to last for 39 days in the face of the growing concern as businesses close down across the world over the coronavirus pandemic, there are indications that the Federal Government could save the N450 billion that was budgeted for subsidy in 2020.\nThe bad\nFollowing the fall in the world demand for crude oil and crude oil prices, the OPEC+ meeting and negotiations to cut oil production fell through and spurred a race for market share between Russia and Saudi Arabia.\nThe refusal of Russia to cut oil production spurred Saudi Arabia to boost production to about 12.3 million barrels per day starting from April 1. Russia, in retaliation, increased its output by 500,000 barrels per day. This disagreement pushed oil prices down by the most, since 1991.\nThe tit for tat jostle caused a fall in Brent crude by more than 20% on March 9 and led to the biggest one-day calamity of the US Stock Market.\nFor China, the incidence of coronavirus slashed their oil demand by more than 20% last month, leading to excess crude oil in the global market begging for prospective buyers, and then, a crash in the oil price.\nNigeria could see its economy collapse, while all offshore production would be loss-making if oil prices remain suppressed into the teens over the long term. The nation’s foreign exchange reserves declined from $45 billion recorded in June 2019 to $36.2 billion in March 2020. As oil price continues to decline, so does the nation’s reserves. Nigeria’s main source of funds is crude oil.\nHigh importation, capital flight, and weak capital importation are some of the challenges hurting Nigeria’s liquidity.\nInflation rate rose to 12.13% in January, eroding consumer spending, retail sales and household income despite a high unemployment rate of 23.1% or 20.9 million unemployed people.\nWith the foreign reserves fast declining, credit agencies downgrading the nation’s credit rating and global growth projected to slow down in 2020, the nation would struggle to sell its Eurobond scheduled for September as it did in 2018 when it sold $2.86 billion at a period when crude oil was averaging $70 per barrel.\nDownload Nairametrics App for breaking news and market intelligence.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://nairametrics.com/2020/03/24/the-good-bad-and-ugly-of-low-oil-prices-for-nigeria/"}
{"doc_id": "8d4358d4aa1ff6beb6ee79c4383329dc", "text": "Finance Minister Ken Ofori-Atta says government through the Development Bank Ghana (DBG) will invest ¢50 million in the agricultural sector in 2023.\nHe said this is part of a broader plan to bounce the Ghanaian economy back and set it back to its pre-COVID-19 levels.\n“Mr Speaker, Government through the Development Bank Ghana (DBG) has established a GH¢500 million special credit programme: the DBG Emergency Economic Programme (DEEP) to support businesses in the agribusiness value chain over the next five years.\n\"The priority sectors are poultry, rice and cereals, pharmaceutical manufacturing, tourism, textiles and garments for investments to help build economic resilience,” he said.\nHe disclosed this when he addressed Parliament on Thursday, November 24, 2022, during his presentation of the 2023 Budget Statement and Economic Policy.\nAccording to the 2020 Population and Housing Census, more than three million Ghanaians of 15 years and above are involved in the agricultural sector, cultivating staple crops, tree crops and forest trees or engaged in aquaculture and traditional fishing.\nThe contribution of the agricultural sector to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has increased from an average of 2.8 per cent over the four-year period ending 2016 to a four-year average of 5.8 per cent in 2020.\nLast year, the sector contributed 8.4 per cent to the value of goods and services produced within the country.\nThis the Minister explained that the sector is the backbone of the Ghanaian economy hence, it is only prudent government channel enough resources towards it.\nHe said the government over the years has chalked so many successes within the sector notably through the introduction of flagship programmes such as the Planting for Food and Jobs (PFJ) and the Rearing for Food and Jobs (RFJ) and will continue to roll out more interventions in the sector to boost food production and create jobs for the youth who want to venture into agriculture.\nHe called on farmers to take advantage of the intervention to make decent incomes from farming and improve their standard of living.\nLatest Stories\n-\nHearts to play RTU in Accra following NSA approval\n-\nAfrican Games 2023: Azamati confirms participation\n-\nToni Kroos announces decision to come out of international retirement\n-\nThe African Medical Centre of Excellence (AMCE) Wraps up Successful African Health Forum 2024 in Abuja\n-\nUNEP report reveals increase in CO2 emissions from heavy-duty vehicles\n-\nKyei-Mensah-Bonsu’s return to Parliament after resigning as Majority Leader\n-\nThe Multimedia Group commiserates with Oman FM and Kwabena Kwakye’s family\n-\nUnited by Music: Theme for 2024 Guinness Ghana DJ Awards unveiled\n-\nMore Females getting employed than male counterparts – GSS\n-\nUN report exposes alarming rise in heavy-duty vehicle emissions, trucks driving 80% surge since 2000\n-\nDSL drops new single ‘No Gree’ and visualiser\n-\nYEA recruits 282 people living with disabilities\n-\nAkofa Edjeani, Andrew Adote, others star in ‘Detor’\n-\nKing Mohammed VI hosts Spanish PM amid efforts to further bilateral ties\n-\nDemocratic Republic of the Congo: African Development Bank grants $7 million trade finance guarantee facility to Access Bank DR Congo to support SMEs and local businesses", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.myjoyonline.com/2023-budget-government-to-invest-%C2%A250m-to-augment-agricultural-value-chains-finance-minister/"}
{"doc_id": "cbcdc96e3cbca62b52c551043d06c8f1", "text": "The Bank of Ghana will soon close down some Non- Bank Financial Institutions facing severe liquidity challenges.\nAccording to the Central Bank, the liquidity challenges has made it difficult for these institutions to meet financial obligations to their clients and depositors.\nAll attempts by the regulator to keep these institutions in business have proved futile.\nSpeaking at the Monetary Policy Committee press briefing, Governor of the Bank of Ghana, Dr. Ernest Addison, said there are still some legacy institutions in the non-banking sector that are not able to meet depositor payments.\n“You know that we have some legacy institutions in the non-bank sector that are in a sense not able to meet depositor payments and these are legacy problems.\n“We have not been able to raise the necessary resources which would allow those institutions to be resolved and the depositors' funds returned to them. It’s an issue that we’re looking closely at under this IMF programme”.\nThe Governor who did not mention the names of the institutions pointed out that some resources would be set aside to take care of the legacy problem.\n“The plan is to set aside some resources from the budget hopefully, and once those resources are identified, we will take care of that legacy problem in the non-bank financial institution sector”.\nBetween 2017 and 2019, the Central Bank undertook a banking reform where several financial players in the Tier 1, 2 and 3 spaces were shut down.\nThe licenses of 420 financial institutions were revoked in an exercise dubbed the Banking Sector Cleanup.\nLatest Stories\n-\nPresident must sign anti-LGBTQ+ bill quickly — Opuni Frimpong\n-\nSenegal protesters demand fresh election within a month\n-\nBurkina Faso says 170 dead in village ‘executions’\n-\nPakistan: Shehbaz Sharif wins second term as prime minister\n-\nGunfire near Haiti airport disrupts flights for second day\n-\nAkufo-Addo, wife, bid farewell to Gertrude Quashigah\n-\nMinistry of Education reacts to JoyNews’ upcoming documentary ‘Empty Plates’\n-\nSocial media users mourn Mr Ibu\n-\nUniversity of Ghana Stadium: Bawumia eulogises Kufuor for facility\n-\nMr Ibu suffered a cardiac arrest – Actors Guild of Nigeria\n-\n2024 Elections: Martin Amidu reacts to NDC’s running mate choice\n-\nHundreds of prisoners escape Port-au-Prince prison as violence escalates in Haitian capital\n-\nFIFA hails International Football Association Board (IFAB) decision on permanent concussion substitutes\n-\nBinance: Nigeria orders cryptocurrency firm to pay $10bn\n-\n3 dead following clash between Tontokrom residents and Asanko Mines security", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.myjoyonline.com/bog-to-close-down-some-distressed-nbfis/"}
{"doc_id": "f5fa4b98b2d9eeb3134ab859002ebe30", "text": "The African Development Bank’s flagship initiative, Fashionomics Africa, has launched the pilot phase of a digital marketplace to help Africa’s fashion designers, textile and accessories professionals connect with global markets.\nThe launch took place recently, at the Global Gender Summit, a gathering of more than 1,500 representatives from multilateral development banks, finance institutions, governments and private sector leaders in Kigali, Rwanda.\nThe Fashionomics Africa digital marketplace website and mobile app, sponsored by the Fund for African Private Sector Assistance, is the latest innovation from Fashionomics Africa, a platform enabling African entrepreneurs from the textile, apparel and accessories industries to create and grow their businesses, with a focus on opportunities for women and young people.\n“It is the first-ever B2B [Business-to-Business] and B2C [Business-to-Consumer] platform that has ever been created for, micro, small and medium-sized enterprises that are working along this value chain,” the Bank’s Vice-President for Agriculture, Human and Social Development, Dr. Jennifer Blanke, said at the launch.\n“It is all really for connecting business to business, businesses to consumers and ensuring we are putting into place all we need to really transform the clothing and fashion industries in Africa,” she added.\nThe Fashionomics Africa digital marketplace and mobile app provides relevant market information, like market prices for textiles and clothing or listings of trade conferences, to increase transparency in the sector.\nThe aim is to connect suppliers, buyers, manufacturers and distributors to consumers and investors – to increase access and grow markets. To facilitate trade within Africa and worldwide, the digital marketplace and app operate through secure e-commerce and online payment systems.\n“The Fashionomics Africa digital marketplace will be a game-changer for Africa’s fashion entrepreneurs, to be able to reach regional and international markets and increase their revenues,” said Mahlet Teklemariam, Founder of Hub of Africa, an Ethiopia-based fashion platform that promotes African brands.\nGCR Upgrades Afreximbank Rating\n• Global Credit Rating (GCR) has announced an upgrade of the African Export-Import Bank’s (Afreximbank) long-term international scale rating from BBB+ to A-.\n• GCR also affirmed the Bank’s short-term rating at A2 and the outlook as stable.\nIn the announcement released in Johannesburg, South Africa, the rating agency said in granting the upgrade, it acknowledged Afreximbank’s tenacity and resilience in managing risks in its operating environment, which was generally perceived to be high risk.\n“The ratings on Afreximbank balances its significant exposure to high risk operating environments, fairly strong and diverse membership base, demonstrated preferential creditor treatment, strong status within the region and good track record of fulfilling mandate, beyond adequate current levels of capitalisation, strong risk position, stable funding and good liquidity position,” stated GCR.\nAccording to agency, the new rating also captures the Bank’s key strength in structured trade finance which demonstrates its ability to de-risk its lending portfolio through high quality collateral comprising cash, insurance from highly-rated insurers, sovereign backed securities, assignment of receivables (which transfers repayment risk to OECD countries), amongst others.\n“This upgrade confirms stakeholders’ deep confidence in Afreximbank’s compelling credit story, which is punctuated by hard work and an innovation culture,” said Afreximbank President Prof. Benedict Oramah, in reaction to the announcement. “Afreximbank is committed to continuing to develop and implement innovative risk management approaches in the management of its lending book and capital.”\nOramah described the upgrade as a major milestone in the Bank’s history and said that, coming half way into the implementation of the Bank’s current strategic plan, it supported the fulfilment of one of the overarching pillars of that plan, which was financial soundness, by positioning it to leverage competitive financial resources into the Africa.\n—–", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2019/12/11/afdb-launches-initiative-for-fashion-creators"}
{"doc_id": "d6df21c1910b991cb75a5f02d9c8e732", "text": "South African businesses need to prepare for the planned amendments to the Employment Equity Act (EEA) which promise a number of significant changes to the country’s employment equity laws.\nAnnounced by Labour minister Thulas Nxesi in July 2019, the amendment bill will regulate the setting of sector-specific employment targets to address the gross under-representation of blacks, women and persons with disabilities.\nIt will also ensure that an employment equity certificate of compliance becomes a precondition for access to state contracts.\nJohn Botha, chief operating officer of Global Business Solutions, said that individual businesses need to be aware of how their specific sectors will be impacted.\n“For example, the proposed construction Industry sectoral targets will have to be achieved by 2025 by organisations in this sector,” he said.\n“This means that they will have to review their employment policies and procedures, conduct better workforce planning based on anticipated workforce movement and capacitate their employment equity committees and line managers to ensure adherence to re-aligned employment equity plans.\n“In addition to these sectoral targets, the Employment Equity Plans also have to address the analysis, interpretation and remediation of income differentials across occupational levels and in terms of the vertical inequality or Gini Index of an organisation,” he said.\nBotha said that these amendments – which should be implemented by the end Q2 of 2020 at the latest – are a response to slow levels of transformation evidenced in the statistics gathered from more than 27,000 reporting employers.\nA draft version of the bill published at the end of 2018 indicated that the changes being were made to speed up transformation.\nThe bill states that while the public sector has seen significant changes, the private sector continues to lag behind.\n“It has been 20 years since the inception of the Employment Equity Act, however the pace of transformation has been slow,” the bill states.\n“Relative to the demographics of the Economically Active Population (EAP) as released by StatsSA, marginal progress in relation to the equitable representation of the designated groups, in particular Africans, coloureds and persons with disabilities have been made in the middle-to-upper occupational levels, which is repeatedly visible in the statistics contained in all the Commission for Employment Equity (CEE) annual reports.”", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/370656/south-africas-big-employment-equity-shake-up-is-coming/"}
{"doc_id": "018d5e5734f042221649afc80606d22c", "text": "The G-20’s upcoming meeting in Brisbane, Australia, comes at a time when a precarious global economy requires big decisions to be made. But it is far from clear who will provide the decisive voice needed to set a bold agenda – and then shepherd its implementation.\nEconomic data reveal that the global economy is shakier than at any time in the past two years. Capitalism is struggling to generate adequate demand. Wealth and income have become increasingly concentrated, while middle-class incomes in the developed world have stagnated. Tax avoidance by multinational companies is draining developing-country incomes, limiting their ability to invest in education and infrastructure. And much more action is needed to address the largest and most urgent structural weakness of all – climate change.\nMany leading economists and policymakers are forecasting continued economic gloom. Stephen Roach has suggested that in the post-crisis global economy “relapse is the rule”; economist Brad DeLong, speaking of the “consequences of our lesser depression,” argues that the pretense of a eurozone recovery has collapsed; and European Central Bank President Mario Draghi has acknowledged the need not only for structural reform, but also fiscal expansion to boost aggregate demand.\nAt the heart of their concerns is the lack of sustained demand needed to drive growth. While structural reforms – particularly on the supply side – are required in developed and developing countries, they are not sufficient to address what former US Treasury Secretary Larry Summers has called “secular stagnation” – that is, the difficulty of sustaining sufficient demand to permit normal levels of output.\nThe G-20’s central task, therefore, must be to establish a framework for strong and sustainable growth. Member states need to introduce reforms aimed at achieving a 2% annual growth target, as agreed earlier this year by finance ministers.\nOne structural reform that could drive global growth is substantial infrastructure investment in developing and developed countries alike. Unfortunately, no G-20 leader has seriously articulated this need, let alone lobbied for a solution. Apart from a World Bank presentation for a possible pilot infrastructure program, there is little to suggest how the 2% target could be met over the medium term.\nG-20 governments, especially those with strong balance sheets, should be calling for large-scale public and private infrastructure investment to expand the productive capacity of member economies. In the area of tax avoidance, discussion needs to broaden beyond developed economies; as the International Monetary Fund recently pointed out, developing economies’ budgets are disproportionately affected by multinational companies’ savvy accounting strategies.\nUnfortunately, judging by the initiatives already on the Brisbane agenda, the summit looks set to take a business-as-usual approach. If the G-20 fails to put policy meat on its rhetorical bones, it will risk looking weak and irrelevant. Its very credibility is on the line. Indeed, some in the developed world would prefer a smaller, more exclusive body – a G-14 or even a new G-7. Such a move would hurt the developing world, especially the Asia-Pacific region, including Australia.\nOne reason why some want a tighter group is that the G-20 struggles to achieve consensus. But this misses the point: It is harder to reach agreement precisely because all of the key leaders (representing around two-thirds of the world’s population and 80% of global GDP), whose support is needed for any truly global decision, are in the room.\nThe Brisbane Summit therefore needs to rediscover the activism that it displayed in 2008 and 2009, during the height of the financial crisis. It must be led by the United States and other advanced economies, and backed up by major emerging economies.\nAustralia, as host, also has a role to play. The country is respected by developed and developing countries alike, often bridging the interests of both, and is widely viewed as an honest broker.\nUnfortunately, the current government has had little to say about the big structural problems that underlie the world’s economic malaise. The modest initiatives on the table reflect the government’s anti-public-sector rhetoric. Worse, as developed and developing countries are starting to take climate change seriously, Australia is moving in the opposite direction.\nThe Brisbane summit will be a crucial test for Australia, the G-20, and the possibility of truly global policy coordination.\nWayne Swan", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businessday.ng/analysis/article/the-g-20-to-the-rescue/"}
{"doc_id": "8a07bc7068ee733b023d1934e59ed689", "text": "by Rob Woollard Conor McGregor vowed to destroy Floyd Mayweather here Wednesday as the two fighters faced off ahead of their money-spinning boxing duel that could become the richest fight in history.\nIn stark contrast to their lurid, trash-talking global press tour last month, a subdued McGregor and a stern-looking Mayweather spoke respectfully as they looked ahead to Saturday’s 12-round boxing contest at the T-Mobile Arena.\nMayweather, who bombarded McGregor with expletives and homophobic slurs during last month’s frenzied publicity blitz, did not swear once during Wednesday’s news conference.\nMcGregor, the massive underdog for this weekend’s bout, restricted himself to verbally abusing a heckler in the audience who predicted he would be knocked out.\nMcGregor faces his first ever professional boxing contest against Mayweather, the undefeated former welterweight king who has come out of a two-year retirement to take on the Irish mixed martial arts star.\nHowever McGregor, the 29-year-old from Dublin, insisted he was ready to stun the world of combat sports by upsetting Mayweather, who would improve his record to a perfect 50-0 with a win.\n“Been to a lot of these crazy press conferences,” said McGregor, a two-time UFC world champion. “This is a lot more subdued. More business-like, the way I like it.\n“We are prepared for 12 three-minute rounds of non-stop pace. We are prepared, I will put pressure on him and break this old man. Trust me on that.\n“I don’t see him lasting two rounds. I feel I have the decision to end it inside one.\n“Keep your hands up, keep your hands down, I don’t care, I’m going to break through whatever’s in front of me.”\n– ‘I’ll die a fighter’ -Mayweather, 40, looked relaxed throughout, even taking time to quietly admonish members of his entourage shouting at McGregor.\nAnd rather than the abuse of last month, Mayweather praised McGregor as a “helluva fighter, a stand-up guy and a tough competitor.”\n“It’s not going to be an easy fight,” Mayweather said. “It’s going to be blood sweat and tears. “He’s the best at what he do, I’m the best at what I do. It comes down to the two competitors going out there and displaying our skills.”\nBut Mayweather’s words came with a warning for McGregor.\n“After 21 years I’ve been hit with everything and I’m still right here,” Mayweather said.\n“And if you give it, you must be able to take it.\n“Anything and everything in boxing that can be done, I’ve done it. I was born a fighter, I will die a fighter. He’s going to bring his best. But it’s not going to be easy, Conor.”\nMcGregor is hoping his punching power can catch Mayweather out on Saturday. But the American veteran warned he had faced plenty of hard hitters before.\n“Manny Pacquiao got bombs, Canelo (Alvarez) got bombs, Shane Mosley got bombs. But remember this — I got a great chin. And the same way you give it, you’ve got to be able to take it.”\nThe showdown between Mayweather and McGregor was confirmed in June after a protracted guessing game about whether the two fighters from different sports would meet.\nSaturday’s bout could become the most lucrative fight in history according to Showtime Sports television executive Stephen Espinoza.\nMayweather could add another $200 million to his career earnings depending on pay-per-view sales while McGregor, who only four years ago was a struggling former plumber’s apprentice living on welfare, could collect $100 million.\nThis will be the most widely distributed pay per view in history,” Espinoza said.\n“That’s not hyperbole that’s fact. We are well on the way to a record-setting event.” DM", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-08-24-amabhungane-and-scorpio-guptaleaks-tegeta-buyer-hid-gupta-assets-before/?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=First%20Thing%2024%20August%20Exclusive%20Books&utm_content=First%20Thing%2024%20August%20Exclusive%20Books+CID_4dcd332ac086690f025dd195188f8a06&utm_source=TouchBasePro&utm_term=D-Day%20looms%20for%20McGregor%20Mayweather%20fight"}
{"doc_id": "be1d2a51b908770b817ae91e150c6b88", "text": "Speaker of Parliament, Alban Bagbin has ruled that the House will not consider any requests from the Finance Ministry until Ken Ofori-Atta appears before the House to account for Covid-19 expenditure and answer other questions from MPs.\nMr. Alban Bagbin, speaking on the floor of the House on Thursday, said the Minister must appear before the House or suffer rejection of requests from Finance Ministry.\nHe contended that Order 63 of Parliament’s standing orders bars a Minister from taking more than three weeks to respond to questions from the House.\n“I will go further to say that until the answer is provided, until he goes through the accountability process, we will not take that motion…Today, he has another request before us that will also be affected.\n“Until he comes to respond to the question, and to submit the statement giving explanation as to how that money has been applied, we will not entertain any business from that Ministry. Mark my words,” Bagbin said.\nThe Finance Minister was billed to appear before the House on Thursday to account for the government’s expenditure on Covid-19.\nDespite earlier assurances from the leadership of the Majority group in Parliament, Ken Ofori-Atta on Thursday did not show up to render accounts on the Covid-19 funds.\nRegardless of Ken Ofori-Atta’s failure to appear before the House, the Ministry is requesting the approval of a loan sum of 1 billion dollars in total.\nThe amount comprise 750 million dollars from the Afreximbank to finance capital and growth-related expenditures in the 2022 budget and a syndicated loan of 250 million dollars from a consortium of banks.\nBut Mr. Bagbin said the House will not accept the Finance Ministry’s request.\nPer the Business Statement for the week, and Wednesday’s provisional Order Paper, Mr. Ofori-Atta was expected to answer 16 questions, which include accounts on Covid-19 funds.\nBut the said questions were not tabled as part of the day’s business.\nThe Minority MPs are not happy about the development as they have accused him of a continuous disrespect for the House.\nRanking Member on the Health Committee of Parliament, Kwabena Mintah Akandoh, stressed that the attitude of the Finance Minister points to the fact that the government does not care much about probity and transparency.\nHe explained that “if he [Ken Ofori-Atta] really cares and this man has any conscience, he would not have the guts to go and sit on national television and be defending the building of the National Cathedral, while countless number of NABCo people have not been paid, and while the National Health Insurance Authority’s Fund has not been paid.”\nHe also noted that his side will not give up on demanding accountability from the Finance Minister with regard to government’s expenditure on Covid-19.\n“We are talking in excess of GH¢25 million. We need a bi-partisan probe into the entire expenditure and the receipt of Covid money. For me, the questions on the Order Paper are not enough.”\nLatest Stories\n-\n9 awkward but completely normal things that happen during sex\n-\nSexy gift ideas for her any time of the year\n-\n4 fun & simple ways to upgrade your date night\n-\nOnion Sellers Association allays fears of price hikes\n-\nBanking sector clean-up served as a shock absorber during Covid-19, economic crisis – John Awuah\n-\nNorth Tongu Assembly members fail to elect PM after 4th attempt; DCE fumes\n-\nDigital industry players must shape digital landscape in Africa – Minister\n-\nAssociation of Sports Betting Operators presents learning materials to 939 pupils in flood-affected communities\n-\nMan, 30, dies in alleged attempt to steal ECG cables\n-\nAklakpanu bridge will be reconstructed to boost economic growth – North Tongu DCE assures\n-\nAwutu Senya West Assembly members reject President’s nominee\n-\nConsider the use of local rice for school feeding – Rice farmers\n-\nKyei-Mensa-Bonsu to address resignation issues today\n-\nCyber-attack hits Malawi’s immigration service\n-\nKenya scraps entry fee for South Africans and several other foreign nationals", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.myjoyonline.com/bagbin-tells-ofori-atta-to-account-for-covid-19-funds-or-suffer-rejection-of-requests-from-finance-ministry/"}
{"doc_id": "ac21bcc710b7ffc854f6c0b7c2c0932a", "text": "Shares in Purple Group, the owner of the EasyEquities trading platform, slid after it said yesterday that it expected its earnings to fall to a loss amid a significant downturn in the economy and escalating interest rates.\nIt said it was taking longer than expected to take its products live in new markets.\nPurple’s share price slid 4.76%to R0.60 in afternoon trade and the share is down 41.12% in the past three years.\nIn a trading statement for the year ended August 31, 2023, it said it expected a headline loss per share of between 1.94 cents and 2.15c, compared to headline earnings per share of 1.12 c reported in the previous period.\nIt also forecast a basic loss per share of between 1.80c and 1.99c, compared to basic earnings per share of 3.64c reported in the previous period.\n“In accordance with IFRS reporting standards, the prior period earnings and headline earnings per share have been restated to reflect the impact of the rights offer concluded by the Company during the period. The reported weighted average number of ordinary shares has been restated from 1 181 004 638 shares to 1 209 937 728 shares,” it said.\nThe basic earnings for the previous period had been restated from 3.71c to 3.64c and the headline earnings per share from 1.14c to 1.12c.\nPurple said the past year had been marked by economic fluctuations, including a significant downturn in the economy and escalating interest rates.\n“It’s in these times that true innovation emerges. We faced unavoidable declines in activity based revenue, primarily driven by muted market volatility and the impact of inflation and higher interest rates. These challenges have emphasised the importance of retaining strategic agility and building an increasingly diversified business, which we continue to do,” it said.\nPurple said it was focusing on strategic investments and expansion.\n“New markets, particularly in Southeast Asia with EasyEquities Philippines Inc. and our partnership with GCash, is more than just growth – it’s about creating new worlds of possibilities. Our investments are deliberate and lay the groundwork for the future.\n“While taking our products live is proving to be much more difficult and taking longer than planned, our time in the market has been well spent. We are building strong regulatory relationships, strengthening our ties and opportunities with GCash and building a community through educational engagement with hundreds of thousands of Filipinos every single day,” it said.\nLooking at product diversification and innovation, the group said its product portfolio was expanding and was often driven by customer demand.\n“With new introductions like EasyCredit, EasyProtect, and EasyBonds, we're defining what’s possible in our industry and our Clients’ lives,” it said.\nA cornerstone of its strategy was its investment in technology.\n“The technological infrastructure we have built enhances our operational efficiency, security and customer experience and positions us well for rapid scaling as market conditions improve. Significant investment has gone into scaling and securing our platform while making it ever easier to partner and integrate into. We continue to retain significant advantage not just in South Africa, but globally too. ”\nBUSINESS REPORT", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/companies/shares-in-purple-fall-after-it-flags-annuals-to-drop-amid-a-moribund-economy-and-high-rates-61e1928a-43f8-496a-b6ad-1a359f20bd84"}
{"doc_id": "1316d90728a9f72b4b58a78c74ed3b52", "text": "South Africa’s most prestigious university is in danger of losing its undergraduate law degree. In a move described as \"unprecedented\", the Council for Higher Education has served the University of Cape Town with notice of the withdrawal of accreditation for its LLB programme unless certain conditions focusing on transformation are met. Without this accreditation, universities are not permitted to offer the degree in question. By REBECCA DAVIS.\nWhen it comes to teaching law, the University of Cape Town is ranked in the top 100 universities internationally. Yet in a shock move, the Council of Higher Education (CHE) this week informed UCT’s law faculty that it is in danger of losing accreditation for its LLB programme.\nIn an email distributed to law faculty staff this week, seen by Daily Maverick, it is explained that the CHE’s Higher Education Quality Committee has downgraded UCT’s LLB programme status to “notice of withdrawal of accreditation”.\nThe CHE’s website explains that “only programmes accredited by the (Higher Education Quality Committee) can be offered by a higher education institution, whether public or private”. It states that accreditation is only given to academic programmes which meet “minimum standards of quality”. For UCT to have its LLB accreditation withdrawn would mean that the university would no longer be able to offer an undergraduate Bachelor of Laws.\n“Obviously the action of the CHE is alarming,” the email to staff states, explaining that the faculty is “seeking guidance on this unprecedented step”. The email concludes: “This is a serious matter and needs our urgent attention.”\nThe Higher Education Quality Committee’s report on UCT’s LLB focuses on the programme’s curriculum design, transformation and graduate rates. Its wording is damning.\n“There is no indication of proper and sound planning, no clear targets and timelines provided to convince the Higher Education Quality Committee of the urgency and commitment to address the stipulated conditions,” it charges.\nAmong the criticisms it levels is that “there is little evidence of formal tracking and monitoring of student performance with a view to improvement”. It states that the faculty “must report on plans to enhance throughput and graduation rates (including race and gender equity)”.\nUCT’s law school has received criticism since the student protests began two years ago for its slow pace of transformation. In an op-ed written by former UCT law students in 2015, the faculty came under fire for graduating relatively small numbers of black South African students.\n“Recent statistics showed that between 2006 and 2013, the percentage of black South African graduates (students who would have been categorised as apartheid-era ‘black’) ranged from 4% to 14%,” the authors wrote. “In a country where the legal profession is still radically untransformed, the fact that UCT is producing so few black lawyers only serves to compound that larger social problem.”\nThe Higher Education Quality Committee report also found problems with the LLB curriculum design, suggesting that the programme failed to demonstrate evidence of “the diverse purpose of the qualification… for educating a well-rounded law graduate”.\nIt suggests that the law school’s “Improvement Plan” – supposed to address these issues over the last six months – is “insubstantial” and “very little has been achieved”. A further criticism is that it has been drawn up with a “lack of consultation with key stakeholder groups, especially students”.\nUCT now has six months to address the Higher Education Quality Committee’s concerns to the body’s satisfaction. If it fails to do so, the committee warns that the LLB’s status will be further downgraded – from its current “notice of withdrawal of accreditation” to “confirmation of withdrawal of accreditation”.\nDaily Maverick’s attempts to reach the CEO of the Council on Higher Education, Professor Narend Baijnath, were unsuccessful on Wednesday.\nIn response to a request for comment, UCT provided a statement on behalf of Law Dean Penelope Andrews saying that the faculty was “surprised and concerned” by the outcome of the report, which it termed “alarmist”.\n“As a global top 100 law school and as the top law school in South Africa, we note that our graduates are in high demand from law firms across the country, and the findings are at odds with the performance of our graduates,” Andrews stated. “This long-standing reputation stands in stark contrast with this first ever accreditation process of law degrees by the CHE.”\nNonetheless, the dean expressed her confidence that the LLB programme would be able to retain its accreditation.\nShe said that the law school would be submitting a revised “Improvement Plan” in the next few weeks which it was hoped would address the report’s main concerns – particularly “the critical need for transformation across the industry”.\nAndrews says that these are issues that the faculty is “already deeply immersed in and almost takes for granted”, and suggested that their previous report-back to the Higher Education Quality Committee “did not necessarily capture those activities, discussions and reflections”.\nProfessor Andrews herself came in for criticism from students during the protests for seemingly supporting the use of private security on UCT campus to try to ensure the continuation of academic activity.\nIn a 2016 op-ed by black law students, Andrews was accused of siding with white students against black protesters.\n“[Andrews’] consistent appeals to white upper class students for support on her reactionary positions are a testament to her insecurities in leadership and demonstrate a betrayal of the collective struggle that made it possible for a black woman to be dean in a racist institution like UCT after so many years,” the writers charged.\nAndrews’ statement on Wednesday concluded with a desire for “further engagement” with the CHE to “continue improving upon our excellent LLB programme”.\nDespite this, the decision to place UCT’s LLB on notice is likely to reignite debate about the tension between institutional autonomy and government control when it comes to South Africa’s universities. If nothing else, it is a humiliating smackdown for a law school which has produced the likes of Cissie Gool, Dullah Omar, and a clutch of high-profile South African judges. DM\nPhoto: UCT Law School (Wikimedia Commons)\n*note: This story has been updated to reflect a correction to UCT’s ranking on the Top International University Ranking.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-11-16-ucts-law-programme-under-existential-threat/"}
{"doc_id": "f5bca2a3cf7499dcf36e291bad3b12fc", "text": "Ndubuisi Francis in Abuja\nThe African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) has declared a $57.53 million dividend for shareholders as it grew its revenues by 25 per cent to reach $645 million in its 2017 financial year.\nThe $57.53 million represented a 51 per cent increase over the $37.96 million declared in the previous year.\nThe President and Chairman, Board of Directors of Afreximbank, Dr. Benedict Oramah, who presented the 2017 financial report at the annual meetings in Abuja at the weekend, said its revenue grew by 25 per cent to reach $645 million, driven by healthy interest income on average assets of about $14 billion, of which about 70 per cent was loans and advances.\nAccording to Oramah, net income rose by 34 per cent to reach a new record of $220 million.\nHe noted that the bank’s liquidity was very strong, with cash and due from banks reaching $3.2 billion, up 153 per cent from $1.3 billion in 2016, while liquidity cover ratio was 185 per cent, above the target of 105 per cent.\n“Mindful that intra-African trade cannot flourish without a strong industrial base, we are pressing ahead with our effort to support the development of industrial parks and export processing zones across Africa,†stated the President.\n“Projects amounting to about $1.5 billion were already financed or underdevelopment in Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Gabon, Togo, Chad and Burkina Faso. We are also supporting the investment promotion efforts of Egypt’s Suez Canal Economic Zone,” Oramah said.\nHe announced that the bank had recently entered into partnerships or understandings with numerous third parties to support and finance economic and trade development and trade diversification across Africa.\nThey include those with the African Guarantee Fund, Attijariwafa Bank, China Eximbank, the Export Development Bank of Egypt, the Export Credit Insurance Corporation of South Africa, the Finance Center for South-South Cooperation, Kings College Hospital London, and Indonesia Eximbank.\nOthers are the International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation, the Islamic Corporation for the Development of the Private Sector, the Made-in-Africa Initiative and the Russian Export Centre.\nIn his keynote address at the closing ceremony, President Muhammadu Buhari pointed out that the bank, through its dynamism and tenacious leadership, had proved that Africans could come together to build something meaningful.\nThose attributes, Buhari said, had enabled the Bank to achieve the success which it had enjoyed since its establishment 25 years ago..\nThe annual meetings began on July 11 with keynote addresses, presentations and panel discussions on topical trade and trade finance issues, including the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCTFA).\nOver 100 speakers, including heads of state, ministers, central bank governors, directors-general of international trade organisations, business leaders, African and global trade development experts, and academics, spoke during the four- days of the meetings.\nThe meeting also saw the election of , Nigeria’s Minister of Finance, Kemi Adeosun as the new Chairperson of the General Meeting of Afreximbank Shareholders.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2018/07/17/afreximbank-declares-57-53m-dividend"}
{"doc_id": "6be54f5ddec435ec8510b226430a0113", "text": "The government will need to intervene in the coming weeks to soften the impact of a record-high petrol price increase in South Africa, say economists.\nSpeaking to the Sunday Times, Agri SA economist chief economist Kulani Siweya called on the government to suspend fuel levies to relieve pressure on food prices.\n“With global wheat prices and agricultural input costs skyrocketing, the government must take urgent action and suspend the fuel levies to provide relief for farmers, especially the nation’s small-scale farmers, and contain food prices.\n“Failure to act can only worsen the pricing pressure on consumers, compromising food security, especially for the most vulnerable in society,” he said.\nThis was echoed by Investec chief economist Annabel who said that state intervention will likely be needed to soften the blow of record-high petrol prices next month.\nA R2.44/litre petrol price hike is building for April, with the price of diesel expected to increase by R3.35/litre, she said in a research note this week.\nVolatility\nRussia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine has led to significant volatility in the market, making it difficult to gauge exactly how much South Africa’s petrol price will increase at month-end, the Bureau for Economic Research (BER) said in a research note on Monday (14 March).\n“Early in the week, oil prices surged even higher towards $140/bbl after reports emerged that the US and European allies were discussing a ban on oil imports from Russia. In the end, while the US announced an immediate ban, the UK said it would phase out Russian oil imports by the end of this year.”\nOn Wednesday, the oil price subsequently declined sharply by more than 10% after the United Arab Emirates (UAE) said it would encourage fellow OPEC members to raise oil output.\nThe petrol price blow could also be softened by a stronger rand.\n“The local currency continues to be supported by the view that the sharp war-induced rise in some of South Africa’s key export commodities, including coal, palladium and gold, will shield the current account against the impact of the higher oil price.\n“In fact, given the magnitude of the relative commodity price increases and the weights of these commodities in South Africa’s import and export basket, the current account may even benefit.”\nThis is different to other emerging markets like Turkey and India who, like South Africa, are net oil importers and will see their import bills skyrocket, but do not receive a benefit from\nhigher export commodity prices, it said.\n“From this perspective, the rand could remain well supported in the near term.”", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businesstech.co.za/news/energy/567656/south-africa-faces-record-high-petrol-price-hike-in-april-government-asked-to-intervene/?ref=franc.app"}
{"doc_id": "ced38e075c2a3255094723b0956db514", "text": "The South African Reserve Bank (Sarb) Governor Lesetja Kganyago has appointed Dr David Fowkes to serve as a member of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) while the Presidency looks for former deputy governor Kuben Naidoo’s replacement.\nNaidoo tendered his resignation from the Sarb to President Cyril Ramaphosa in October 2023, just less than 18 months before the end of his second five-year contract.\nNaidoo was one of three deputy governors of the Sarb and a member of the crucial five-member MPC, which oversees the interest rates in the country.\nSince Naidoo left the Sarb, a replacement has to be found in order to balance the MPC’s voting split and avoid a stalemate when it comes to interest rates decisions.\nKganyago reiterated that his hands were tied on the replacement of Naidoo as that appointment can only be made by the President.\n“We are not the appointing authority. The President is the appointing authority. The terms of reference of the MPC say that we can include up to four staff members of the Reserve Bank in the MPC,” he said.\n“It always makes sense to have an odd number so that the Governor does not have to exercise two votes, and the Governor can exercise one vote like everybody else. The maximum number [of Sarb staff members to the MPC] is thus eight, and we can go to seven.\n“At the moment we are five. When the President makes an appointment of a deputy governor we will go to six, and we will continue to search like we have been doing for another person to take it to seven. But six is definitely better than five.”\nFowkes’ appointment to the MPC became effective from 12 January 2024 after he was appointed as an adviser to the governors on 1 December 2023.\nHe has served the Sarb in various positions since joining the organisation in 2013.\nPrior to his appointment as adviser, he worked in the Financial Markets Department where he led the reform of the Monetary Policy Implementation Framework, which became operational in 2022.\nBetween 2013 and 2021, Fowkes worked in the Economic Research Department where he edited the Bank’s flagship publication on monetary policy, the biannual Monetary Policy Review, as well as provided analyses on domestic economic developments for MPC meetings.\nIn addition to his role as an MPC member, in his capacity as adviser, Fowkes will offer analytical support to the governors on significant economic and financial developments and their implications for the bank and its policies, among a range of other tasks.\nFowkes has a Master’s degree from the University of the Witwatersrand, and a Doctorate from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in the United States, as a Fulbright Scholar.\nBUSINESS REPORT", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/dr-david-fowkes-appointed-to-serve-as-member-of-sa-reserve-banks-mpc-0c2be9e7-5c7e-4b1f-8849-0e4a7c3565a4"}
{"doc_id": "c387f3e88cdd520e480fcb0fb98ec8c9", "text": "Credo, an independent boutique wealth manager based in London, United Kingdom, and Anchor Capital, a provider of investment solutions in South Africa, has announced that they have agreed to a strategic merger.\nIn a statement, Anchor said the combined entity will have assets under management and advice of R230 billion (US$12bn), making it one of the biggest in the country. Credo was founded over 25 years ago and Anchor 12 years ago.\nAccording to Anchor, both firms offer wealth management services to the high-net-worth retail and financial intermediary market segments. By partnering, Credo and Anchor will be able to leverage each other’s strengths and offer a seamless global proposition.\n\"The combined business will provide UK investors with access to a broader range of investment solutions, and both domestic and global investment solutions to South African investors, as well as offering a world-class investment platform with access to virtually any security, fund or currency in the world.\n\"The partnership will see both companies unite under a common shareholding structure, allowing the co-operation of senior management whilst preserving each firm’s day-to-day operational independence. There will be no change to the way either firm manages its respective investment solutions. Anchor’s investment team will continue to provide a Growth-based set of funds and portfolios, while Credo’s will independently continue with its Value-orientated investment strategies,\" it said.\nCredo chairman Roy Ettlinger said: “As the founding shareholder of Credo, I am extremely excited that this transaction will enable Credo, together with Anchor, to transition to the next phase of developing a larger, more sophisticated wealth management business, and thus enable the business to provide a wider range of solutions to all clients segments. I look forward to continuing the journey with my new partners.”\nAnchor chairman Mike Teke said: “This is an exciting step for Anchor and partnering with a high-quality UK business like Credo is a big moment for the combined businesses. Scale is becoming increasingly important in our industry and both businesses will be enhanced by the partnership.”\nAnchor CEO Peter Armitage said: “Adding Credo’s international capabilities – a world-class platform and global investment reach – builds on Anchor’s strong South African network to create an even larger, independent, global wealth management business. We will be able to look after both domestic and global investment across numerous different asset classes.”\nCredo CEO Charles van der Merwe said: “Our core proposition has always been to offer outstanding financial solutions to our clients, and by partnering with Anchor, we are able to provide our clients with access to a broader range of investment solutions, and additional scale on our wealth platform that is key to operating in multiple jurisdictions.”\nThe merger is subject to regulatory approval in the United Kingdom and South Africa.\nPERSONAL FINANCE", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/personal-finance/investments/credo-and-anchor-to-partner-creating-a-r230-bn-wealth-and-asset-manager-f06e757a-cf49-4047-b02b-e25f07647575"}
{"doc_id": "15f170c41e7d0fad344c608ffc75648d", "text": "Councils directed to improve delivery\nWallace Ruzvidzo\nHerald Reporter\nAll local authorities have been directed to come up with implementation matrices detailing the actions they will undertake to ensure quality and unfettered service delivery for the benefit of ratepayers.\nThe directive was given yesterday by Local Government and Public Works Minister, Winston Chitando, at the launch of the operationalisation of the local government blueprint and unpacking the gender responsive toolkit to council chairpersons and mayors.\nMinister Chitando directed local authorities to prioritise service delivery as the country journeys towards the attainment of Vision 2030 of an upper middle income society.\n“In this vein, all local authorities will now localise and operationalise the dictates of the blueprint and ensure prompt response to the ‘call to action without compromising service delivery’,” said Minister Chitando.\n“Each local authority must now come up with an implementation matrix spelling out a clear roadmap that shows actions to be taken to deliver quality and unfettered services to the people. This an instruction that all local authorities should implement and provide traceable evidence of progress in a dash board format.”\nApart from crafting roadmaps, local authorities were also challenged to set targets and deliver on them, to inspire investor confidence, which would in turn see accelerated development in their communities.\nMinister Chitando said service provision and delivery have gone down the drain in most local authorities, especially in urban areas led by the opposition.\n“As such, I am directing that every local authority must come up with service delivery targets that aim at creating safe habitats which promote investor confidence and in turn develop the councils and communities across the country,” he said.\n“The attainment of Vision 2030 is indeed an achievable dream if local authorities work towards operationalisation of this blueprint. People must see, live and observe an upper-middle income society not only from the income per capita point of view, but also from the services they receive from Government and local authorities similarly.\n“We need to provide world class services that will boost confidence of ratepayers in our local authorities.”\nCouncils were also challenged to champion gender equality through gender responsive budgeting.\nThe inclusion of women and youths, said Minister Chitando, must remain a critical pillar in implementing the ‘call to action without compromising service delivery’ blueprint.\n“It is common knowledge that gender-responsive budget works for everyone (women and men, girls and boys) by ensuring gender-equitable distribution of resources and by contributing to equal opportunities for all.\n“As we also launch this gender responsive budgeting toolkit, it is essential to observe that the same is vital both for gender and fiscal justice. The toolkit aims to assist managing local authorities to apply gender budgeting tools in their processes.\n“Government and all local authorities have a duty to promote gender equality by implementing the legal and political commitments in the national Constitution,” he said.\nGovernment has made strides in promoting women participation in decision making in local governance through the 30 percent women’s quota councillors.\nThe iwomen’s quota has seen an increase in the number of councillors by 587 women across all councils.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.herald.co.zw/councils-directed-to-improve-delivery/"}
{"doc_id": "2f2ec86fdd843e5cf9aa9f5171f12e52", "text": "Importation, often misconstrued as detrimental, is akin to fire: an essential force requiring control for positive outcomes. Much like fire fuels cooking, carefully managed importation can propel production and become indispensable.\nCountries around the world depend on imports and exports by air, sea and road routes in order to transport goods through their borders and into other countries. Healthy trade keeps economies booming (World Top Export- WTE).\nIronically, the top two most importer of goods globally are also the most exporter of goods, likewise the first and second largest economy in the world. While the United States is the world’s largest economy, China is the second-largest economy in the World.\nHowever, a report by World Top Export in 2022, shows that China leads the list of the world’s largest exporter. Interestingly, of the top 10 leading exporting countries, 4 are from Asia, 5 from Europe and 1 from North America. (WTE, 2022)\nData from World Top Export (WTE) reveals the ranking; China-$3.59 trillion, United States-$2.06 trillion, Germany-$1.65 trillion, Netherland-$965 billion, Japan-$746 billion, South-Korea-$683 billion, Italy-$656 billion, Belgium-$632 billion, France-$617 billion, and Hong-Kong-$609 billion.\nThus, China’s major exported goods are electrical and other machinery, including computers and telecommunications equipment, apparel, Furniture, Textiles and major imported goods are electronics, including integrated circuits, Oil and mineral fuels, Optical and medical equipment, and other computer components.\nThus, China sells a lot of technology and diverse goods globally, making it powerful. People work a lot in making things like clothes and furniture. China also buys technology from other countries. Using energy and getting medical tools from outside shows China needs to think about its economy and relationships with other nations. Further implies that China importation is for production of goods that will be exported rather than basic consumption. BusinessDay report.\nIronically, the top two most importer of goods globally are also the most exporter of goods, likewise the first and second largest economy in the world.\nIn stark contrast, the United States is the world’s largest importer of goods, followed by China. Overall, out of the world’s 10 largest importers, 4 countries are in Europe, 4 are in Asia and 1 from North America and 1 from Central America-WTE, 2022.\nData from WTE further reveals the ranking; United states-$3.37 trillion, China-$2.71 trillion, Japan-$897 billion, United Kingdom-$823 billion, South-Korea $731 billion, Hong-Kong- $667 billion, Canada-$581 billion, Singapore-$475 billion, Turkey-$363 billion, and Vietnam-$359 billion.\nUnited State major exported goods are capital goods (transistors, aircraft, motor vehicle parts, computers, telecommunications equipment), organic chemicals, automobiles, medicines and major imported goods are industrial supplies, automobiles, clothing, medicines, furniture, toys, computers, telecommunications equipment, motor vehicle parts, office machines, electric power machinery.\nThe United States sends out a lot of important things like transistors, aeroplanes, computers, and medicines, making it strong. It also sells chemicals and cars. The U.S. buys things too, like supplies for industries, clothes, medicines, and machines. This shows how the U.S. works with other countries for various needs. This further implies United States importation is driving production majorly (BusinessDay report).\nAccording to Visual capitalist report, Africa is the world’s second-largest continent, and much of the value of Africa’s exports are concentrated in natural resources like petroleum, gold, diamonds, natural gas, and coal. Agricultural commodities like tea, coffee, and cotton also find large markets overseas.\nWorld Top Export shows the 5 biggest African exporting nations are South Africa, Algeria, Nigeria, Angola and Egypt. Collectively, that powerful cohort of African shippers generated over half (53.4%) of the continent’s overall exports by value. That percentage reflects a dilution in concentration compared to the 55.7% portion one year earlier in 2022.\nData from WTE reveals the 5 biggest African rankings in values; South-Africa-$123.6 billion, Algeria-$66.7, Nigeria-$63.3, Angola-$51.2 billion, and Egypt-$48.1 billion. Unfortunately, none of the top five biggest African exporting nations above are among the 5 fastest-gaining nations in Africa according to data from WTE.\nThe top gaining nations includes; Gambia- 595.5 percent, Congo- 370.3 percent, Central African Republic-103.1 percent, Equatorial Guinea-93.7 percent, Comoros-78.2 percent.\nHere’s a chart for comparative analyses:\nChart: BusinessDay\nThis raises a concern among experts and professionals that, what could have happened to the likes of Africa’s largest economy, when world largest and second economies are thriving despite their import level?\nNigeria, the Africa largest economy in 2022, goods valued at a total of $53.61 billion U.S. dollars were imported into Nigeria, as shown in Statista data. However, data from WTE reveals that Nigeria is the third exporter of goods in Africa with a value of $63.3 billion.\nThe variance of the import values and export values shows a net export (trade surplus) of $9.69 billion, a positive impact on the national income of the country. BusinessDay analysis\nIn the same vein, Nigeria Bureau of Statistics (NBS) says Nigeria recorded a N3.5 trillion net export (trade surplus), between first quarter and third quarter of 2023. In 2023, Nigeria’s total export totaled N23.3 trillion and imports totaled N19.7 trillion which gives a net export (trade surplus) of N3.5 trillion.\nThe trade surplus of N3.5 trillion is a positive economic sign, indicating Nigeria’s resilience. It opens possibilities for increased investments and the potential to build reserves, showcasing the country’s ability to maintain a favourable economic balance.\nFlow chart of Nigeria export and import from 2012-2022\nChart: BusinessDay source: World Top Export (WTE) & Statista-imports\nOver the analysed period (2012-2022), the table shows fluctuating trade dynamics. Export values surpassed imports in most years, indicating a trade surplus. The substantial drop in both imports and exports in 2016 suggests economic challenges (such as exchange rate fluctuation from N199 to N305 is among the factors responsible, NBS). Despite variations, a general upward trend in trade is evident, reflecting economic growth and global market dynamics.\nDespite the positive economic indicator of trade, unlike other countries, Nigeria is still besieged by a 27-year high inflation rate of 28.92 percent, which has plunged about 71 million Nigerians into extreme poverty, food insecurity, depreciation of the naira’s value, and a high cost of living.\nAccording to a commentator, Nigeria’s challenge does not lie in imports but in the inability to boost exports without exchanging natural resources for money. The government needs to diversify the economy and employ a more sustainable approach for economic growth, emphasising value addition and export promotion.\nAn economist said until Nigeria’s importation promotes production rather than consumption, that is when the benefit of importation experience by advanced countries such as the United States and China will be enjoyed in Nigeria. According to him, imports are not bad, once it will aid production.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businessday.ng/backpage/article/indeed-imports-are-not-bad/"}
{"doc_id": "48c25cf8182653090540b8ee06ec4ae0", "text": "Despite the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, Fidelity Bank Ghana recorded a remarkable profit before tax of GHC 382 million in 2020, representing a 19% increase from the GHC 322 million recorded in 2019. The Bank also grew its operating income by 8% over the prior year to GHC 978 million. (see Fig 1 below).\nOperating expenses were well managed, growing at a relatively lower rate of 6% to GHS 498 million in line with the Bank’s efficiency drive, anchored on digitization, expenditure reprioritization and the adoption during the year of cost containment measures aimed at mitigating the impact of COVID-19 on the Bank’s business. The overall growth in revenues outpaced the increase in operating expenses, resulting in the Bank’s cost-to-income ratio declining further to 51% (see Fig. 2 above). The cost to income ratio measures a bank’s operating expenses as a percentage of its operating income. The low cost of operations as compared to the impressive increase in revenue shows the Bank’s efficiency and profitability in spite of the negative effects of COVID-19.\nSeveral key balance sheet items posted strong performance with deposits increasing by 25% to GHC 6.51 billion and investment securities growing by 15% to GHC 4.93 billion, exceeding the industry average in both cases. The Bank’s gross loans and advances declined by 2% year-on-year to GHC2.4 billion, reflecting the impact of settlements during the year.\nThe Bank remains well capitalized closing the year with total equity of GHC1.0 billion and a capital adequacy ratio of 21.43% which is well above the regulatory minimum of 13% (reduced to 11.5% during the year by the Bank of Ghana as a policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic). The capital adequacy ratio is a measurement of a bank’s available capital expressed as a percentage of its risk-weighted credit exposures. Fidelity Bank’s capital remains adequate for its current risk profile and planned growth of its business.\nFidelity Bank’s market leading platforms and channels continue to attract customers, resulting in significant growth in digital and electronic transaction volumes during the year. In 2020 Fidelity Bank’s credit rating was affirmed by the Global Credit Rating Agency at A and A1 in the long- and short-term categories respectively, with a stable outlook. This reflects the bank’s strong capital base, liquidity position and financial performance over the review period.\nSpeaking on the Bank’s 2020 financial performance, Julian Opuni, Managing Director of Fidelity Bank Ghana, stated, “2020 was a challenging year for everyone. We are fortunate that our financial performance in 2020 revealed that we continue to make strong progress across all areas of our business. Moreover, we understand that our success is a function of the unwavering support that we receive from our loyal customers and we are grateful to them for their continued business.”\nWith respect to Q1 2021 financial performance, Fidelity Bank recently published its unaudited financial results for the quarter ended March 31, 2021, declaring a profit before tax of GHC 104.5 million, 16% in excess of the equivalent figure for the same period last year. Profit after tax recorded a growth of 30% over Q1 2020 to GHC 89.5 million.\nDriven by this strong profitability, the Bank’s capital adequacy ratio rose to 21.73% in Q1 2021 (Q1 2020: 20.07%). Fidelity’s capital adequacy ratio is significantly above the regulatory minimum threshold of 13%. The Bank’s capital position remains robust and adequate for planned expansion and growth.\nThe Bank closed the quarter with a total deposit base of GHC 6.9 billion, growing by 13% over the position recorded in Q1 2020. Although the Bank’s balance sheet declined by 8% against the position recorded in Q1 2020, it maintained its average loans and advances book at GHC 2.3 billion while increasing its investment in government securities by 38%. Consequently, despite a much lower interest rate environment, net interest income rose to GHC 197.4 million, a 7% growth over Q1 2020 while non-interest income increased by 29% to GHC 68.4 million.\nBy all accounts, Fidelity Bank has performed well and demonstrated its resilience in the face of the ongoing challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic. It is expected that the bank will continue to cement its leadership position in the Ghanaian banking sector if it continues along this trajectory.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businessghana.com/site/news/Business/237267/Fidelity-Bank-Ghana-Sustains-its-Profitability-and-Growth-amidst-the-COVID-19-Pandemic"}
{"doc_id": "05df97fa1743ac8828ca9e41a17c8826", "text": "President Cyril Ramaphosa’s cabinet has approved a draft One-Stop Border Policy (OSBP) for public consultation.\nIn a post-cabinet briefing on Friday (4 December), government said that the creation of the OSBP seeks to ‘harmonise the movement of people and goods between South Africa’s land ports of entry and its neighbouring countries’.\nThe proposals in the policy further seek to address congestion which results in delays, particularly by cross-border travellers and traders.\n“This policy gives effect to the One-Stop Border Framework that was adopted by Cabinet in 2018. At a continental level, the policy contributes to the Presidential Infrastructure Champion Initiative, which advances interconnectivity amongst African countries to address infrastructure deficit and boost intra-Africa trade,” the cabinet said.\nThe draft policy will be gazetted for public comment during the first quarter of 2021.\nThe new border policy comes in preparation for the new African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) which will come into effect from 1 January 2021.\nThe AfCFTA aims to build an integrated market in Africa that will see a pool of over a billion people with a combined GDP of approximately US$3.3 trillion.\nThe United Nations Economic Commission for Africa estimates that the AfCFTA will increase intra-Africa trade from the current 10%-16% to approximately 52% by the year 2022.\nRamaphosa has said that through the trade area, the continent’s leaders are determined to build strong and inclusive economies through industrialisation and the beneficiation of the minerals and commodities.\n“The AfCFTA is a significant development that will change trade patterns and has the potential to transform African economies,” he said in November.\n“It will encourage economic diversification, beneficiation of our minerals and resources and value-addition to seize the opportunities arising from an increasingly open African continental market.\n“We expect that in the new year, 2021, preferential trade in Africa will begin with significant product coverage and will be further expanded over the coming years,” he said.\nRamaphosa said that even prior to the agreement on the AfCFTA, South Africa had already begun implementing an investment-led trade strategy.\nHe said that the country has sought to use its outward foreign direct investment in the rest of the continent to encourage balanced growth and localisation.\nBetween 2014 and 2018, South African firms invested over $10 billion – around R160 billion – in different parts of the continent. This has made South Africa the fifth-largest source of foreign direct investment on the continent in value behind the US, France, UK and China.\n“Government has been working to prepare South Africa-based firms for their participation in the AfCFTA,” he said.\n“We want to ensure that our firms, entrepreneurs, small enterprises and workers benefit from the trading opportunities that will arise as the AfCFTA commences to operate.”", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/454774/south-africa-to-make-changes-to-its-borders-as-it-prepares-for-multi-trillion-rand-trade-deal/"}
{"doc_id": "1a6e1e88306a720d92805a697b90a258", "text": "Advertisement\nBoG maintains policy rate at 30% [VIDEO]\nThe Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of Ghana (BoG) has maintained the policy rate at 30 per cent.\nDespite the broad improvement in economic conditions supported by a decline in inflation and stable currency, the committee decided to maintain a tight monetary policy stance to re enforce the current disinflation path.\nThe committee was of the view that the current inflation rate of 35.2 per cent was still high which required a tight monetary stance.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.graphic.com.gh/business/business-news/bog-maintains-policy-rate-at-30-video.html"}
{"doc_id": "22b27634894eaf755a0cdbfd3bf399b9", "text": "Advertisement\nLicensing Imports\nThe whole thing has been hurriedly and shoddily done. When you have such a huge dependence on imported products, you can only replace them in stages.\nThere are some very basic things that we don’t have the competence to do now. But we can plan our next steps.\nRice Imports\nGhana cannot produce enough rice, which is why we import it. We must increase our production capacity and then gradually put restrictions on imports.\nWanting to save scarce foreign exchange and strengthen one’s currency by reducing imports is not altogether a bad thing.\nImplementing it the way they want to, through an import licensing regime, is the problem. And it smacks of self-interest, given all we know about many government appointees. They will give themselves all the contracts.\nRestricting the import of Offals is something we can live with. But the same cannot be said for sugar.\nJust imagine the amount of porridge on Ghanaian breakfast tables. It is in such high demand that if you restrict it, the price will go through the roof.\nThere are some products that we can, with relatively short notice, put import restrictions on; such as onions.\nWith a six-month harvest period, this is something you can confidently start to restrict in six months without upsetting the equilibrium of things. But even here, you have to put in place what it takes to do it.\nHave we sorted out our land ownership system? Where are land banks for use in the commercial kind of agriculture that will enable us to produce the amounts needed to make certain imports unnecessary and take measures to restrict their import? Onions are a low-hanging fruit.\nThere are many other low-hanging fruits. In my opinion, the list is poorly thorough. They’ve just looked at the items with high import bills and come up with it.\nWe know we need to cut imports. But we need to replace imports with those that our pocketbooks will allow us to do. What can we produce in six months? What can we produce in 12? There are challenges with local production that we must fix.\nOur interest rates alone will make our products uncompetitive. Why must imported items be cheaper than the same items produced here? Well, in the case of poultry, we don’t produce enough poultry feed, so we import it, which translates into more expensive poultry.\nAs a country, are we saying we can’t produce enough poultry feed? So let’s focus on what we can do and schedule it in stages so that we can do away with many unnecessary imports with scarce foreign exchange.\nLet’s think through it properly\nRestricting imports can be done but it must be done in stages. After all, what is being proposed doesn’t really prevent imports. You’ve just introduced permits, killing price competitiveness in the process and creating business monopolies. Actually, you know what?\nIf we were to eat our stuff more, we wouldn’t be having this debate about the food component of our imports; and we would be eating healthier, fresher products.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.graphic.com.gh/business/business-news/licensing-imports.html"}
{"doc_id": "6e2f522fb83e438a1da643622bfc2a9c", "text": "GCR Ratings (“GCR”) has affirmed Ecobank Ghana PLC’s national scale long and short-term issuer credit ratings of A+(GH) and A1(GH) respectively, with a Stable Outlook.\nRated Entity Rating class Rating scale Rating Outlook Ecobank Ghana PLC Long Term issuer National A+(GH) Stable Outlook\nShort Term issuer National A1(GH)\nRating Rationale\nThe ratings on Ecobank Ghana PLC (“Ecobank Ghana”) reflect a strong business profile supported by leading market shares, stable funding sources and good levels of liquidity. The ratings also factor in improving capitalisation and improving asset quality risk.\nThe bank’s competitive position is strong, with a cost of funds of less than 2%, benefiting from being part of the broader Ecobank Transnational Incorporated’s (“ETI”) group, which owns 68.93% of the bank’s shares. ETI is a pan-African conglomerate with banking operations spanning over 33 countries. Ecobank Ghana’s approximate market share for deposits in FY21 stood at 13.2% (FY20: 13.1%), while the gross advances market share stood at 11.0% (FY20: 10.4%), supporting its solid domestic footprint. The bank’s revenue is stable, supported by a healthy internal capital generation of 29% in FY21(FY20:35%). Total operating revenue grew from GHC985m in June 2021, to GHC1,186m in June 2022. The growth was mainly driven by net interest income and general banking fees. The cost-to-income ratio stood at 46% in June 2022,\nin comparison to 39.6% in June 2021.\nEcobank Ghana is adequately capitalised, with a GCR capital ratio of 20.6% at 31 December 2021 (FY20:18.6%), while also reporting a CAR above the D-SIB minimum regulatory requirement of 15%. However, the bank’s CAR ratio dipped to 16% at June 2022, largely due to the single large dividend paid once a year, albeit it only will reflect in the third quarter of 2022. The GCR capital ratio is expected to be around 20% by the end of the year.\nAlthough the bank’s asset quality has come under pressure due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the NPL ratio improved from 8% at June 2021 to 5% at June 2022. However, 20% of the NPLs have been restructured as certain sectors were hit hard by the pandemic, namely construction, real estate, and hospitality sectors. The bank’s gross loan and advances increased from GHC5.3billion in FY20 to GHC6.2billion in FY21 with loan loss reserves of GHC531.3million. We expect the cost of risk to remain below 10% within the short to medium-term. Concomitantly, the bank’s credit losses have registered at moderate levels of below 5% historically, and we expect them to remain the same in the next 12-18 months. Foreign currency (FCY) loans accounted for 31.9% of gross loans and advances in FY22 (FY20: 34.6%), with most of the facilities extended to the manufacturing sector, constituting 19.2% of the bank’s loan book. We also note the rising risk of the Ghanaian sovereign. In the unanticipated event of a sovereign default and haircut of local currency government debt, there could be significant capital erosion across the banking sector. Positively, sovereign debt accounts for 12.3% of total assets for Ecobank Ghana.\nFunding sources are relatively stable, supported by the bank’s strong retail footprint. The GCR long term funding ratio and stable funding ratios were 112% (FY21: 108%) and 88% (FY21: 84%) at 30 June 2022 respectively. A large portion of the funding consists of customer deposits as the core deposit ratio stood at 91% at 31 December 2021. The bank’s liquidity is adequate as the bank has a high liquid asset coverage of wholesale funding of 541.2% at June 2022. The GCR liquid assets over deposits stood at 73% in June 2022.\nThe standalone ratings are effectively capped by the credit profile of the group, as reflected in the negative adjustment to the standalone risk score.\nOutlook Statement\nThe outlook is stable due to decent liquidity and its adequate capitalisation. Despite the turbulent operating environment, it is expected that the entity will remain resilient even if the asset quality deteriorates.\nRating Triggers\nWe could revise the ratings upwards if Ecobank Ghana raises and maintains a higher GCR capital ratio (above 23%) over the outlook horizon, presuming the group creditworthiness also improves. We could lower the ratings if: 1) credit losses are at levels above 5% in the outlook horizon, including unexpected sovereign debt haircuts; 2) asset quality deteriorates below industry averages; 3) the company records internal capital generation at levels lower or in line with risk weighted asset growth; 4) ETI’s financial profile deteriorates; or 5) liquidity ratio falls within 100bps of the regulatory minimum.\nAnalytical Contacts\nPrimary analyst Dimakatso Mothibedi Associate Analyst: Financial Institutions\nJohannesburg, ZA Dimakatsom@GCRratings.com +27 11 784 1771\nSecondary analyst Matthew Pirnie Group Head of Ratings\nJohannesburg, ZA MatthewP@GCRratings.com +27 11 784 1771\nCommittee chair Vinay Nagar Sector Head: Financial Institutions\nJohannesburg, ZA Vinay@GCRratings.com +27 11 784 1771\nRelated Criteria and Research\nCriteria for the GCR Ratings Framework, January 2022\nCriteria for Rating Financial Institutions, May 2019\nGCR Ratings Scale, Symbols & Definitions, May 2022\nGCR Country Risk Scores, August 2022\nGCR Financial Institutions Sector Risk Score, June 2022\nRatings History\nEcobank Ghana PLC\nRating class Review Rating scale Rating Outlook Date\nLong- and short-term issuer Initial National AA-(GH)/A1+(GH) Stable Outlook December 2013\nLast National A+(GH)/A1(GH) Positive Outlook June 2021\nRisk Score Summary\nRating Components & Factors Risk scores\nOperating environment 6.50\nCountry risk score 3.50\nSector risk score 3.00\nBusiness profile 2.0\nCompetitive position 2.0\nManagement and governance 0.00\nFinancial profile 0.75\nCapital and Leverage (0.25)\nRisk 0.00\nFunding and Liquidity 1.00\nComparative profile (1.25)\nGroup support (1.25)\nGovernment support 0.00\nPeer analysis 0.00\nTotal Score 8.00\nGlossary\nCovenant A provision that is indicative of performance. Covenants are either positive or negative. Positive covenants are activities that the borrower commits to, typically in its normal course of business. Negative covenants are certain limits and restrictions on the borrowers’ activities.\nDebt An obligation to repay a sum of money. More specifically, it is funds passed from a creditor to a debtor in exchange for interest and a commitment to repay the principal in full on a specified date or over a specified period.\nRating Horizon The rating outlook period.\nRating Watch See GCR Rating Scales, Symbols and Definitions.\nRefinancing The issue of new debt to replace maturing debt. New debt may be provided by existing or new lenders, with a new set of terms in place.\nRepayment Payment made to honour obligations regarding a credit agreement in the following credited order: 3.) Satisfy the due or unpaid interest charges; 4.) Satisfy the due or unpaid fees or charges; and 5.) To reduce the amount of the principal debt. Rights Issue One of the ways that a company can raise additional funds is to issue new shares. These must be first offered to current shareholders and a rights issue allows a shareholder to buy shares in proportion to the number already held. Short Term Current; ordinarily less than one year.\nWorking Capital Working capital usually refers to the resources that a company uses to finance day-to-day operations. Changes in working capital are assessed to explain movements in debt and cash balances.\nInterest Cover Interest cover is a measure of a company’s interest payments relative to its profits. It is calculated by dividing a company’s EBITDA by its interest payments for a given period. Issuer Ratings See GCR Rating Scales, Symbols and Definitions.\nLeverage In corporate analysis, leverage (or gearing) refers to the extent to which a company is funded by debt.\nLiquidity The speed at which assets can be converted to cash. It can also refer to the ability of a company to service its debt obligations due to the presence of liquid assets such as cash and its equivalents. Market liquidity refers to the ease with which a security can be bought or sold quickly and in large volumes without substantially affecting the market price. Maturity The length of time between the issue of a bond or other security and the date on which it becomes payable in full.\nSALIENT POINTS OF ACCORDED RATING\nGCR affirms that a.) no part of the rating process was influenced by any other business activities of the credit rating agency; b.) the ratings were based solely on the merits of the rated entity, security or financial instrument being rated; and c.) such ratings were an independent evaluation of the risks and merits of the rated entity, security or financial instrument.\nThe credit rating has been disclosed to the rated entity. The rating was solicited by, or on behalf of, the rated entity, and therefore, GCR has been compensated for the provision of the rating. The rated entity participated in the rating process via virtual management meetings, and other written correspondence.\nThe information received from Ecobank Ghana Limited and other reliable third parties to accord the credit ratings included:\n• The audited financial results to 31 December 2021\n• Unaudited interim results to 30 June 2022\n• Four years of comparative audited numbers\n• Other related documents\nCREDIT RATINGS ISSUED BY GCR ARE GCR’S CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE RELATIVE FUTURE CREDIT RISK OF ENTITIES, CREDIT COMMITMENTS, OR DEBT OR DEBT-LIKE SECURITIES, AND MATERIALS, PRODUCTS, SERVICES AND INFORMATION PUBLISHED BY GCR (COLLECTIVELY, PUBLICATIONS) MAY INCLUDE SUCH CURRENT OPINIONS. GCR DEFINES CREDIT RISK AS THE RISK THAT AN ENTITY MAY NOT MEET ITS CONTRACTUAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS AS THEY COME DUE. SEE APPLICABLE GCR RATING SCALES, SYMBOLS AND DEFINITIONS PUBLICATION FOR INFORMATION ON THE TYPES OF CONTRACTUAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS ADDRESSED BY GCR’S CREDIT RATINGS. CREDIT RATINGS DO NOT ADDRESS ANY OTHER RISK, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO: FRAUD, LIQUIDITY RISK, MARKET VALUE RISK, OR PRICE VOLATILITY. CREDIT RATINGS, NON- CREDIT ASSESSMENTS (“ASSESSMENTS”) AND OTHER OPINIONS INCLUDED IN GCR’S PUBLICATIONS ARE NOT STATEMENTS OF CURRENT OR HISTORICAL FACT. GCR’S CREDIT RATINGS, ASSESSMENTS, OTHER OPINIONS AND PUBLICATIONS DO NOT CONSTITUTE OR PROVIDE INVESTMENT OR FINANCIAL ADVICE, AND GCR’S CREDIT RATINGS, ASSESSMENTS, OTHER OPINIONS AND PUBLICATIONS ARE NOT AND DO NOT PROVIDE RECOMMENDATIONS TO PURCHASE, SELL OR HOLD PARTICULAR SECURITIES. GCR’S CREDIT RATINGS, ASSESSMENTS, OTHER OPINIONS AND PUBLICATIONS DO NOT COMMENT ON THE SUITABILITY OF AN INVESTMENT FOR ANY PARTICULAR INVESTOR. GCR ISSUES ITS CREDIT RATINGS, ASSESSMENTS AND OTHER OPINIONS AND PUBLISHES ITS PUBLICATIONS WITH THE EXPECTATION AND UNDERSTANDING THAT EACH INVESTOR WILL, WITH DUE CARE, MAKE ITS OWN STUDY AND EVALUATION OF EACH SECURITY THAT IS UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR PURCHASE, HOLDING OR SALE. GCR’S CREDIT RATINGS, ASSESSMENTS, OTHER OPINIONS, AND PUBLICATIONS ARE NOT INTENDED FOR USE BY RETAIL INVESTORS AND IT WOULD BE RECKLESS AND INAPPROPRIATE FOR RETAIL INVESTORS TO USE GCR’S CREDIT RATINGS, ASSESSMENTS, OTHER OPINIONS OR PUBLICATIONS WHEN MAKING AN INVESTMENT DECISION. IF IN DOUBT YOU SHOULD CONTACT YOUR FINANCIAL OR OTHER PROFESSIONAL ADVISER.\nALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS PROTECTED BY LAW, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO, COPYRIGHT LAW, AND NONE OF SUCH INFORMATION MAY BE COPIED OR OTHERWISE REPRODUCED, REPACKAGED, FURTHER TRANSMITTED, TRANSFERRED, DISSEMINATED, REDISTRIBUTED OR RESOLD, OR STORED FOR SUBSEQUENT USE FOR ANY SUCH PURPOSE, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN ANY FORM OR MANNER OR BY ANY MEANS WHATSOEVER, BY ANY PERSON WITHOUT GCR’S PRIOR WRITTEN CONSENT.\nGCR’S CREDIT RATINGS, ASSESSMENTS, OTHER OPINIONS AND PUBLICATIONS ARE NOT INTENDED FOR USE BY ANY PERSON AS A BENCHMARK AS THAT TERM IS DEFINED FOR REGULATORY PURPOSES AND MUST NOT BE USED IN ANY WAY THAT COULD RESULT IN THEM BEING CONSIDERED A BENCHMARK.\nAll information contained herein is obtained by GCR from sources believed by it to be accurate and reliable. Because of the possibility of human or mechanical error as well as other factors, however, all information contained herein is provided “AS IS” without warranty of any kind. GCR adopts all necessary measures so that the information it uses in assigning a credit rating is of sufficient quality and from sources\nGCR considers to be reliable including, when appropriate, independent third-party sources. However, GCR is not an auditor and cannot in every instance independently verify or validate information received in the rating process or in preparing its Publications.\nTo the extent permitted by law, GCR, its affiliates and its and their directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, licensors and suppliers disclaim liability to any person or entity for any indirect, special, consequential, or incidental losses or damages whatsoever arising from or in connection with the information contained herein or the use of or inability to use any such information, even if GCR or any of its\ndirectors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, licensors or suppliers is advised in advance of the possibility of such losses.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "http://businessghana.com/site/news/Business/271813/GCR-affirms-Ecobank-Ghana-PLC-s-long-and-short-term-national-scale-issuer-ratings-of-A-GH-A1"}
{"doc_id": "d496cfa6be9faddda5146c87bb4ad2a6", "text": "The release of the white paper about Facebook’s digital currency resulted in extensive media coverage, ensuring information about it was widely accessible. In this post, we’ll be covering the 7 important things you need to know about Facebook’s “revolutionary” currency, Libra.\nIt Is a Stable coin\nA stable coin is a type of cryptocurrency that is tethered to other stores of value like gold, securities, fiat money or other cryptocurrencies in order to reduce volatility. When launched, Libra will be a stable coin because its value will be based on a group of existing currencies including the Euro, British Pound Sterling, Japanese Yen, and the US Dollar. It will also be pegged to a security token called Libra Investment Token.\nFrom Permission to a Permissionless Network\nOn a permission-based network, Libra would be in charge of authorising those who can have access to the Libra blockchain. On the permissionless network, anyone who meets certain technical requirements can have access to the blockchain. Libra is taking this route to monitor the blockchain closely in its first few months before opening it to the public.\nThe Libra token is built on the Libra blockchain. Unlike the Bitcoin and Ethereum blockchain, a new programming language has been drafted for this blockchain. The name of the programming language is Move.\nUnlike what most people assume, Libra is not run by Facebook. Instead, it will be run by an independent body known as the Libra Association. Even though this body is an offshoot of Facebook, the white paper states that it works independently of it. Many people believe that this is a move by Facebook to remove this new finance project from the privacy controversy that Facebook is known for.\nAnother fascinating thing is the white paper is not signed by Mark Zuckerberg or Facebook’s Head of Blockchain Engineering, Evan Cheng. According to the White paper Facebook would only Facebook is only a partner.\nIt Will Operate Smart Contract\nA smart contract operates pretty much like a normal contract except that it is a set of codes on the blockchain which automatically means that it is decentralized. The Ethereum blockchain was the first blockchain to enable smart contract functionality.\nBacked by Star-Studded Companies\nIts Founding Members as they are called, are companies that are in partnership with the Libra team on this project. Founding members participate in the responsibilities of governance, implementation and strategy.\nSome of its founding members are Booking Holdings, Facebook’s Calibra, Amazon, eBay, Paypal, Mastercard, Uber, Visa, Vodafone, Coinbase, Women’s World Banking and a group of others.\nThere Have Been Mixed Reactions\nReactions to the release of the Libra white paper haven’t been entirely positive. For a start, it has been hit by a host of regulatory hurdles in Europe. As there’s concern about the challenges it would pose for already established financial institutions like banks.\nThen there’s also the privacy issue. Facebook has a bag of privacy issues attached to its name which raises red flags in some quarters.\nThis article is in partnership with Quidax. Quidax is a European based cryptocurrency exchange with a focus on Africa. We provide a seamless platform for users to send, receive, buy and sell cryptocurrencies using their local currencies.\nDownload Nairametrics App for breaking news and market intelligence.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://nairametrics.com/2019/07/09/7-key-takeaways-from-facebooks-cryptocurrency-libra/"}
{"doc_id": "8400c9e40b2347b4c3d11717cafe8e5a", "text": "The Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), Ms Vera Songwe, said the African Continental Free Trade Area (AFCFTA) is a powerful tool to accelerate regional and economic integration in Africa.\nThe statement was made during a virtual panel by the African Union marking the Africa Integration for the Continental Free Trade Agreement.\nShe urged that Continental Free Trade Agreement would be Africa’s Marshall plan. Adding that nobody could have predicted the deep effects of the economic crisis on the continent.\n“We need to talk about Africa and the AfCFTA. Our Marshall Plan is the AfCFTA. The AfCFTA is our plan, so let us take it and run with it.\n“The Marshall Plan for Europe was about 160 per cent of their GDP traded to bring back growth after the war,” she said.\nShe added that implementation of the AFCFTA, would help the continent have control of its economic future. She added that the UN Economic Commission for Africa forecasts African GDP would decline by 3.2% to -2.8% in 2020 due to the effects of the pandemic.\nShe stressed the need for a continental financial system integration to implement a mutual system of financial stability for sub-Saharan monetary cooperation, while also urging that Africa builds on progress made from implementing The Afreximbank Exchange Facility.\n“We need to ensure that as we build the AfCFTA and trade integration, we begin to build stronger, much more robust monetary and fiscal systems that can ensure that as a continent we actually can work with each other in a more effective way,” Songwe said.\nShe also urged that the pandemic has given Africa an opportunity to review its poor healthcare infrastructure, citing countries like South Africa, Ethiopia and Morocco developing new healthcare systems.\nSongwe was joined on the panel by Mr Mukhisa Kituyi, Secretary-General of UNCTAD and Mr Benedict Okey Oramah, the President of the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank), Mr Wamkele Mene, first Secretary-General of the AfCFTA; Mr Chileshe Mpundu Kapwepwe, Secretary-General COMESA; and Paolo Gomes of AfroChampions.\nThe panelist jointly agreed that the economic crisis due to COVID-19 was an opportunity for Africa to learn lessons on the needs for Industrial developments by producing its own pharmaceutical industry.\nDownload Nairametrics App for breaking news and market intelligence.\nFor further inquiries about this article contact:\nEmail: william.ukpe@nairametrics.com or outreach@nairametrics.com.\nTwitter: @_sirwilliam_ @nairametrics.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://nairametrics.com/2020/07/08/afcfta-is-a-powerful-tool-for-africas-economic-integration-eca/"}
{"doc_id": "dc79a19abdef0f082c00b6e9abf68201", "text": "Some Visual Arts students in the Ashanti region are appealing to the Ghana Education Service (GES) to include Elective Mathematics in the current subject to put them in an advantageous position.\nWith the introduction of the pre-engineering programme as an opportunity to express their creative skills, the students say elective mathematics will help further broaden their knowledge.\nThe students say the pre-engineering programme offers them a unique opportunity to correct the erroneous impression that Visual Arts is meant for the academically weak.\nIvy Amoafo, a student at Konongo Odumase SHS, says most visual arts students are brilliant to study elective mathematics.\n\"It will even widen up their minds because most of the visual arts students are brilliant in other subjects.\"\nIvy says it is possible to find a visual arts student good in core mathematics and his brilliance can be extended to elective mathematics.\n\"So, if you give him that chance to exceed like he will be amazing in the place of engineering.\" She said.\nAnother student from Anglican Senior High School, Serwah Tutu agrees with Ivy. They are creative and the engineering program will do them a lot good.\nThe students regard themselves as change-makers.\nVisual Arts teacher at Konongo Odumase Senior High school, Agadas Adu Bosompem is also on the same page with students.\n\"It will erase that perception that visuals arts students or any other student is dull.\"\nThe headmaster of Anglican Senior High school also suggests adding technical drawing to give targeted students the opportunity to learn how to design before they enter the university.\n\"Secondary education setup and subject combination is so broad and well situation for everybody to benefits.\"\nHe says the introduction of the pre-engineering programme is a good policy.\n\"We really need this bunch of visual arts students come into the picture of engineering.\"\nHe says their creative arts and ability to bring new ideas to play will ensure the future of Ghana's engineering is bright.\nLatest Stories\n-\nToday’s front pages: Friday, February 23, 2024\n-\nKPMG to submit its audit report of GRA/SML contract today\n-\nIt’s incorrect to say we’re playing soft with Sentuo Oil Refinery – NPA replies IES, COPEC\n-\n9 awkward but completely normal things that happen during sex\n-\nSexy gift ideas for her any time of the year\n-\n4 fun & simple ways to upgrade your date night\n-\nOnion Sellers Association allays fears of price hikes\n-\nBanking sector clean-up served as a shock absorber during Covid-19, economic crisis – John Awuah\n-\nNorth Tongu Assembly members fail to elect PM after 4th attempt; DCE fumes\n-\nDigital industry players must shape digital landscape in Africa – Minister\n-\nAssociation of Sports Betting Operators presents learning materials to 939 pupils in flood-affected communities\n-\nMan, 30, dies in alleged attempt to steal ECG cables\n-\nAklakpanu bridge will be reconstructed to boost economic growth – North Tongu DCE assures\n-\nAwutu Senya West Assembly members reject President’s nominee\n-\nConsider the use of local rice for school feeding – Rice farmers", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.myjoyonline.com/add-elective-math-to-our-course-visual-arts-students-appeal-to-ges/"}
{"doc_id": "80884f352d0d5d9ed832052145f5adc1", "text": "The Bank of Ghana has increased the policy rate by 300 basis points to 22%, after an Emergency Monetary Policy Committee meeting today, August 17th, 2022.\nThe move is part of measures to address the risks to the inflation outlook.\nHowever, cost of borrowing is expected to go up significantly, and consequently increase cost of living and doing business.\nAdditional measures\nThe MPC also took additional measures including raising the primary reserve requirement of banks from 12% to 15% to be implemented in a phased manner.\nTherefore, the reserve requirement will go up to 13% from September 1st, 2022 and subsequently to 14% by October 1st, 2022 and then 15% by November 1st, 2022.\nStrengthening cedi\nTo boost the supply of foreign exchange to the economy, the Bank of Ghana, said it is working collaboratively with the mining firms, international oil companies, and their bankers to purchase all foreign exchange arising from the voluntary repatriation of export proceeds from mining, and oil and gas companies.\nThis it believes will strengthen the central bank’s foreign exchange auctions, and consequently the cedi.\nIn July 2022, the MPC of the Bank of Ghana kept the policy rate at 19%, citing risks to inflation but balance to growth.\nLatest Stories\n-\nBayer Leverkusen set new unbeaten record with win over Mainz\n-\nAbena Osei-Asare appointed as Minister of State at the Finance Ministry\n-\nEnergy Minister gets SMRP International Leadership Award in Trinidad and Tobago\n-\nNPP’s decision to remove Kyei-Mensah-Bonsu was ill-considered – Dr Arthur Kennedy\n-\nThere was nothing criminal about Agyapa deal – Richard Ahaigbah\n-\nHassan II Golf Trophy: Yang tops leaderboard ahead of final round with minimum $300,000 at stake\n-\nAgyapa deal inimical to the interest of Ghanaians – Sammy Gyamfi\n-\nI am not a member of Bawumia’s Manifesto Committee – Okyeame Kwame\n-\nThe man Osei Kyei-Mensah-Bonsu: An architect of Ghana’s political landscape\n-\nGovernment must tell us that it has stopped pursuing Agyapa – Bright Simons\n-\nKelvin Kiptum funeral: Thousands mourn Kenya’s marathon star destined for greatness\n-\n15 dead, dozens more injured in China flat fire\n-\nPiers Morgan and Oprah Winfrey ‘deepfaked’ for US influencer’s ads\n-\nGWR sing-a-thon attempt: ‘I will announce my next line of action in a few days’ – Afua Asantewaa\n-\nPlayback: Newsfile discusses Agyapa deal, Majority Leadership drama, Tap & Go", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.myjoyonline.com/bog-increases-policy-rate-to-22-cost-of-borrowing-to-shoot-up-significantly/"}
{"doc_id": "8d321ca902c71ba477d7ea57d9264531", "text": "SOUTH Africa’s auto industry is supportive of anti-dumping duties imposed on shipments of vehicle windscreens, saying imported automotive glass should be controlled to control safety standards.\nIn a general notice published at the end of last week, the International Trade Administration Commission said Minister of Trade, Industrious and Competition Ebrahim Patel had “approved” its recommendation for the imposition of anti-dumping duties on imported vehicle windscreens.\n“The five-year period that the anti-dumping duties may stay in place before the duties lapse, if a sunset review is not initiated, will be counted from the publication date of the notice in the Government Gazette by Sars,” the commission said in General Notice 2277 of 2024.\nPatel had now “requested the Minister of Finance (Enoch Godogwana) to amend Schedule No. 2 to the Act in order to give effect” to the new anti-dumping duties.\nThe National Automobile Dealers’ Association (Nada) told Business Report on Friday that it supported the anti-dumping duties on windscreens imported from China into South Africa and the SACU region as a measure of controlling safety, security and quality standards in the industry.\n“NADA supports the imposition of anti-dumping duties on windscreens from China into the SACU region,” Gary McCraw, national chairperson for Nasa, said.\nMcCraw said, “Safety is paramount when it comes to a vehicle’s windscreen” and explained that Nada’s emphasis was on windscreens and other components’ “compliance with both local regulations and original equipment manufacturer (OEM) standards.\n“Meeting these standards is essential for ensuring the glass's safety, particularly in the event of an accident. Nowadays, many windscreens incorporate sensors and other attachments, further underlining their role in modern vehicle safety,” he said.\nFranchised dealers, he added, had in-depth knowledge of products and adherence to standards, hence they were better positioned as “reliable sources for ensuring the safety” of critical components in the manufacture or assembly of vehicles.\nSars last year imposed temporary anti-dumping duties on Chinese imported windscreens for a period of six months ending August 9. The industry has lobbied for longer-term duties to ensure safety and also promote fairness to local players.\nThe International Trade Administration Commission in making its decision considered comments from interested parties after it issued “essential facts letters that it was considering making a final determination” that the windscreens originating and imported from China were constituting product dumping into the SACU auto industry.\nThe commission had determined that the imported vehicle windscreens were “causing material injury” to the SACU industry. Most of the imported windscreens were being used as in the SACU region, especially South Africa as “replacement glass” in the aftermarket.\nOn initiation of the investigation in July 2022, the commission sent questionnaires to known producers and exporters of windscreens in China, while the Chinese diplomatic representative was also directed to forward the questionnaire to unknown producers.\nSouth Africa’s auto industry last year registered an increase in vehicle sales despite facing challenges, although sales in December, at 40 329 units, marked the fifth consecutive month of year-on-year decline.\nAnnual vehicle sales for South Africa for 2023, however, increased to 532 098 compared to 529 556 a year earlier, data from the National Association of Automobile Manufacturers of South Africa (Naamsa) showed earlier this month.\nSouth African vehicle exports were, however, a bright spot for the industry, hitting a record of 396 290 units, and rising 12.7% compared to 2022. Naamsa said increased load shedding and the logistical challenges at ports and the railway network, as well as higher interest rates, had left “a mark on the industry’s performance” in 2023.\n“The automotive sector's productivity relies heavily on infrastructure investment, sustainable energy supply and the revitalisation of South Africa's ports, rail and roads. Alongside faster economic growth and moderate inflation, lower interest rates would go a long way to support the new vehicle market in 2024,” said Naamsa.\nBUSINESS REPORT", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/auto-industry-supportive-of-anti-dumping-duties-on-imported-chinese-windscreens-b71d642e-b9a0-41e9-8bfb-d620a4cb60b1"}
{"doc_id": "8c122e5ecb4ec98620ca35d4f334e5ea", "text": "When Equity Group released its half-year financial results last week, many eyes were drawn to a line on its income statement that showed the lender’s total comprehensive income stood at a negative Sh13.88 billion, yet profit after tax had gone up by 36 percent to Sh24.4 billion.\nThis was all down to a downward revision in the value of bonds on the bank’s books, essentially an erosion in the paper value of these holdings that comprise both local Treasury bonds and international issuances denominated in hard currencies.\nIt is largely similar to the periodic erosion of paper wealth at the equities market at the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE), depending on daily share price movements.\nAnd just like the paper wealth movement at the stock market, such losses or gains in valuations would only be realised upon sale of a security, hence those holding the papers to maturity need not include such deficits on profit and loss line.\nEquity, at the end of June, held investment securities worth Sh365 billion, out of which Sh236.8 billion were in form of Kenya government Treasury bonds and bills.\n“Essentially what we are saying is that the yield at the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) and the Eurobonds has gone up significantly. This is because of the appreciation of the US dollar against all other currencies, where for instance it has now hit parity with the Euro,” said Equity Group chief executive officer James Mwangi.\n“But we hold that portfolio to maturity so it will never actualise (as a loss), and yet it's a very high earning portfolio.”\nA look at the books of all the nine tier one lenders for the six months to June shows similar adjustments in the fair value of their investment securities, with these lenders collectively taking a paper hit worth Sh58.9 billion on their bonds holdings.\nIn June 2021, this downward revaluation stood at just Sh312 million, reflecting the stable yields in the bonds market at the time. The paper erosion in value is a direct result of the rising yields on bonds both locally and in the international market. Whenever yields on bonds rise in the market, the price of these papers falls.\nIn the past one year, the yield curve for government securities has risen significantly, indicative of rising risk perception on lending to the State.\nThe rates on short-term Treasury bills are now averaging between 8.5 percent and 10 percent, while bonds rates have risen to the range of 11.5 percent to 13.9 percent from 9.5 percent to 13 percent a year earlier.\nYields (or indicative rates) in the secondary market are a pointer of the interest rate that investors would demand to lend to the government at that particular time.\nThey are an indicator of the risk rating that investors apply on new lending to the government, hence guiding the pricing of new bond offers being floated.\nAt the same time, the price one would command when selling their bonds drops when yields go up, due to factors of demand and supply.\nThe prospects of offloading bonds in hand and reinvesting the proceeds in higher earning papers (due to elevated yields) means that many would be looking to sell, and there would be few buyers since they can get better returns by participating on primary sales of new bonds.\nSellers are therefore forced to offer a discount on the selling price their bonds in the secondary market in order to secure buyers, hence the drop in valuation of these existing papers.\nFor banks, these price drops translate into billions of shillings worth of devaluation of bond holdings, given their position as the biggest lenders to the government in the domestic market.\nAt the end of June, the nine tier-one lenders—who control 75 percent of the banking industry by market share—held Sh1.36 trillion worth of government securities, up from Sh1.25 trillion a year earlier.\nCrucially though, the dip in bond valuations does not reflect in their profitability under the current accounting standards being applied by the banking sector (IFRS 9), unless they sell their holdings and book a loss. At the same time, their capital is also shielded from harm from a regulatory point of view.\n“The good thing is that, the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) recognise it so it doesn't affect our capital ratios…it's not written off against our regulatory capital.\nThe international accounting standards also recognise it so it doesn’t go through the profit and loss, it goes to fair value and is offset against capital for accounting purposes but not for regulatory purposes, so it doesn't affect the bank,” said Mr Mwangi.\nThere is a downside, however, for the government as it looks to borrow even more money from the domestic market to fill its budget hole in the current fiscal year.\nAs a result of the rising yields hurting the market valuation of their bonds, banks have been exercising caution when taking on new bonds, contributing to the recent underperformance in bond issuances floated by the Treasury.\nFor instance, the August Treasury bond sale that targeted Sh50 billion fell Sh11.5 billion below target as demands for higher rates forced the CBK to leave bids on the table.\nTwo other papers floated in July also returned below par volumes for the government. The first, a tap sale of an infrastructure bond first sold in June, raised Sh6.4 billion out of a target of Sh20 billion.\nThe second consisted two reopened 15-year papers that the State floated in mid-July seeking Sh40 billion, which raised Sh9.3 billion.\nIn the current fiscal year, the government is seeking to borrow Sh845 billion to finance the budget deficit, out of which a net of Sh565 billion is expected to come from the domestic market and the rest from external lenders.\nInternationally, the government has been unable to issue a new Eurobond this year because of elevated rate demands by investors, with yields in the secondary market in London and Irish stock markets where Kenya has listed its existing portfolio of Eurobonds going to as high as 22 percent in June.\n“It is a consideration because there is a lot of uncertainty, and not so much because of the Kenyan market per se but the global macros. We are seeing that Europe is in recession for instance, and these are factors that could influence trade among other things,” said Absa Bank Kenya chief executive Jeremy Awori.\n“Banks have made their own assessments as to whether they want to hold on to government instruments, and especially those that they are trading. Things will however settle after the elections.”\nGlobal shocks have largely been to blame for the uncertainty in the market which has pushed rate demands higher. The Russia-Ukraine war which began in February has been the biggest factor after disrupting global supply of key commodities such as food grain and oil, which Ukraine and Russia are significant source markets.\nAs a result, global inflation has gone up significantly this year, compounded by drought in Europe, Africa and Asia that has caused the prices of food items to shoot up as countries conserve limited supplies for their domestic use.\nThe US, UK and EU have also been raising their interest rates in response to their inflation hitting multi-decade highs, with the effect of drawing capital from emerging and frontier economies such as Kenya.\nThis has also strengthened the dollar, and made local markets less attractive to investors as other currencies such as the Kenya shilling suffer steep depreciation.\nLocally, inflation has also gone up sharply this year, rising to a 62-month high of 8.3 percent in July due to higher cost of imported goods, fuel and raw materials.\nIn its May monetary policy committee meeting, the CBK raised its base rate by 0.5 percentage points to 7.5 percent, signalling the higher yield demands in the domestic debt space as banks adjusted to the tightening of the market.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/data-hub/why-lenders-aren-t-worried-as-sh59bn-wiped-off-bonds-3930468"}
{"doc_id": "04cd40ab310a2cb651a04decfde79535", "text": "The Ashanti Regional Police Commander, Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCOP), Afful Boakye Yiadom, is leading a special “bush operation” to arrest four suspects who allegedly shot and killed a gold buyer.\nThe attack occurred on Monday, January 24, 2022, when the gold dealer now deceased, was transporting gold from Attabrakoso towards Huu, in the Western Region.\nA news brief from the Police said the suspects made away with about 324 grams of gold.\nIt said they also took away unspecified amounts of money together with some mobile phones and fled into a nearby bush.\nThe brief appealed to gold buyers to be on the lookout for the gang.\n“Any suspicious gold dealer(s) should be reported to the Police for a possible quick arrest,” it said.\nThe brief called on the public to aid investigation with any information concerning the robbery.\nLatest Stories\n-\n9 awkward but completely normal things that happen during sex\n-\nSexy gift ideas for her any time of the year\n-\n4 fun & simple ways to upgrade your date night\n-\nOnion Sellers Association allays fears of price hikes\n-\nBanking sector clean-up served as a shock absorber during Covid-19, economic crisis – John Awuah\n-\nNorth Tongu Assembly members fail to elect PM after 4th attempt; DCE fumes\n-\nDigital industry players must shape digital landscape in Africa – Minister\n-\nAssociation of Sports Betting Operators presents learning materials to 939 pupils in flood-affected communities\n-\nMan, 30, dies in alleged attempt to steal ECG cables\n-\nAklakpanu bridge will be reconstructed to boost economic growth – North Tongu DCE assures\n-\nAwutu Senya West Assembly members reject President’s nominee\n-\nConsider the use of local rice for school feeding – Rice farmers\n-\nKyei-Mensa-Bonsu to address resignation issues today\n-\nCyber-attack hits Malawi’s immigration service\n-\nKenya scraps entry fee for South Africans and several other foreign nationals", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.myjoyonline.com/ashanti-police-in-search-of-murderers-of-gold-dealer/"}
{"doc_id": "02f1a478f3beddc9516932666f6e9f68", "text": "#Budget2016 / Johannesburg - Economists and financial analysts have reacted to Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan’s budget speech...\n* In addressing the persistent budget deficits, as expected, a combination of increased taxes and cost containment has been proposed, with forecasts of a reduction in the budget deficit to 2.4 percent in 2019.\nWith respect to increased revenue, the implications are that this will largely be achieved by way of increased taxation on higher-income earners, higher fuel levies, new emissions, tyre, sugar and other taxes, and an increased tax rate on some smaller tax contributors, generating about R15 billion a year.\nGovernment revenues will, however, continue to remain vulnerable to a further deterioration in economic conditions.\nThrough various proposed initiatives aimed at bolstering investor confidence and reducing corruption, the minister is of the view that economic growth will recover in 2017 and 2018, with job creation following suit. This will be one of South Africa’s greatest challenges.\nRating agencies will digest the minister’s comments and stringently assess the realism and ability to rapidly institute the new initiatives proposed by the minister and their impact regarding key sovereign rating parameters.\nIn due course, they will communicate their findings, and it remains to be seen whether they are of the same view as the minister, in that sufficient measures have been taken to avert a sovereign downgrade for now. – Marc Joffe, the Global Credit Ratings chief executive\n* The Budget shows lower-than-previously projected deficit figures and a stabilisation of debt over the medium-term period out to 2018/19. As a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) the fiscal deficit falls by 2018/19 to a sound 2.4 percent of the GDP from the 3 percent medium-term budget policy statement.\nWhile debt as a percentage of GDP rises to 46.2 percent it remains unchanged in rand terms and the widening ratio is due to lower GDP projections. This will probably initially placate the rating agencies, as projected net debt ratios decline thereafter, with the main budget primary balance reaching 1.2 percent in 2018/19.\nThe deficit and debt developments (as a percentage of GDP) are positive, with South Africa avoiding fiscal slippage for a change. Projected non-interest expenditure flattens out below 30 percent of GDP, and interest payments at about 3.5 percent of GDP. Social services will account for 56 percent of consolidated expenditure, debt servicing costs 10.1 percent with economic affairs and agriculture to receive 16.3 percent of expenditure. – Annabel Bishop, Investec economist\n* The big take-away from the Budget was the faster pace of fiscal consolidation that is planned – not so much in the current fiscal year, where there is a very slight widening of the budget deficit, but in the years that follow. This is no easy achievement, given the halving of expected real GDP growth this year.\nEncouragingly, the fiscal consolidation will be achieved through a combination of spending cuts and tax measures. Spending on the public sector wage bill will be reduced, largely through planned reductions in the headcount.\nThe tax measures that are proposed for the 2017 financial year are small – largely, tweaks to capital gains tax, an increase in the fuel levy by 30c/litre, and other modest measures, such as an introduction of a sugar tax. Looking at expectations for the medium term though, there is still a commitment to do more – and these are already incorporated into forecasts.\nA rise in the rate of VAT or the top rate of income tax cannot be ruled out over the medium term – the former in particular will probably drive even greater revenue increases than those tabled today.\nFrom our perspective, the really encouraging news is the achievement of a primary fiscal surplus – for the first time since the global financial crisis. On a consolidated budget basis, this is expected from 2017 financial year, with the primary surplus as a percentage of GDP rising over the medium term.\nHow robust are these forecasts though? Debt servicing costs are an increasing concern, with 12c out of every rand of revenue collected now needed for debt service. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) still pose a risk to public finances, and deeper reassurances on reforms will likely be needed to mitigate this threat. – Razia Khan, Standard Chartered Bank chief economist for Africa\n* The focus of the Budget was on tax relief to lower- and middle-income earners, and while higher-income earners will experience less tax savings, they also have some relief on marginal taxes to look forward to.\nWhile a percent increase in the capital gains tax inclusion rate was announced, it translates to a less than 3 percent increase in actual personal income tax. – Rakesh Seethal, the head of employment taxes and tax risk, Barclays Africa\n* The sugar tax will in principle support human health. This will lead to a decline in sugar usage, resulting in lower domestic sugar prices, which will have a negative impact on the sugar industry. – Ernst Janovsky, Absa senior agricultural economist\n* The Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of Southern Africa (Seifsa) welcomes announced efforts to reduce government expenditure, but remains concerned about the lack of concrete plans to address slow economic growth.\nThe Budget indicated that the primary balance (current expenditure vs income) will be positive from this budget period onwards.\nThese are welcome but high targets to meet. If achieved, this Budget may indicate a turning point. Notwithstanding the government’s concrete plans to cut its expenditure significantly, Gordhan’s speech lacked solid measures to improve domestic demand.\nMuch has been achieved by this Budget, although uncertainties abound. Much more needs to be done to change course on complimentary policies that are inhibiting growth and investment. World economic recovery will happen, but whether South Africa will be part of such a recovery rests a great deal on its own efforts. – Seifsa chief economist Henk Langenhoven\n* The announcement that the general fuel levy will be raised by 30c/litre to R2.85/l for petrol and R2.70/l for diesel, effective April 6 is going to have a major impact on not just motorists, but on the economy as a whole. While budget increases were reasonably equitable, the immediate future for consumers looked dismal.\nConsumers with heavy debt loads were going to feel the increase in the fuel price the worst. – Neil Roets, Debt Rescue chief executive\nBUSINESS REPORT\nBe sure to follow #Budget2016 developments on Business Report as we bring you news, reviews, analysis and opinion regarding Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan's speech on February 24 and 25.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/companies/economists-weigh-in-on-gordhans-plans-1989437"}
{"doc_id": "ca5ec161e48f2cb696ee4fa0da24ce33", "text": "LASG to enhance conducive environment, EoDB for businesses\nThe Lagos State Commissioner for Commerce, Cooperatives, Trade and Investment (MCCTI), Folashade Ambrose-Medebem, has said that the state government, through the Ministry, is doubling efforts to support businesses by fostering a conducive environment and enhancing the ease of doing business in the state, in order to navigate the economic challenges being experienced presently.\nSpeaking at the celebration of “Lagos State Day” and closing ceremony of the 2023 Lagos International Trade Fair (LITF) held at the Tafawa Balewa Square (TBS), Lagos, yesterday, she said the ministry is actively sustaining engagement with the Organised Private Sector (OPS) and other stakeholders to actualise these goals.\nApplauding the organisers of this Trade Fair, the Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI), for successfully hosting an intense business exposition, she added that the theme for this year, “Navigating Economic Challenges: Forging a Path to Prosperity,” is very timely and pertinent, considering what small businesses are experiencing now.\n“We live in an age of unprecedented challenges, compounded by global economic shocks. It is a time that tasks our will power and demands that we all put on our thinking caps to survive. Businesses must adapt to economic variables for survival and prosperity, while building an internal mechanism to face economic challenges. At the crux of this, is the unrelenting commitment to combine factors of production to create marketable value that can be converted to wealth,” she stated.\nShe revealed that Lagos currently contributes 25 per cent to Nigeria’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) while Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) account for eighty per cent of the state’s total employment, underscoring their pivotal role in job creation and economic development.\nSpeaking, LCCI President, Dr. Michael Olawale-Cole, urged all levels of government to support businesses and encourage ease of doing business by focusing on infrastructure, insecurity and the implementation of appropriate policies to address the primary causes of sub-optimality in monetary policy performance.\n“We need to do these in order to fully harness the huge enterprising resources of domestic and foreign investors for the diversification of our economy and the welfare of our people. The OPS shall stand solidly behind the state in its quest to actualise its recently launched development plan,” he said.\nGet the latest news delivered straight to your inbox every day of the week. Stay informed with the Guardian’s leading coverage of Nigerian and world news, business, technology and sports.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://guardian.ng/business-services/lasg-to-enhance-conducive-environment-eodb-for-businesses/"}
{"doc_id": "3e7e32415c98044ff90e86f7d64e6a1c", "text": "The current employment situation in our country is ensuring that people are constantly on the lookout for any employment. At times this desperation to secure any form of employment gives thieves the opportunity to hoodwink, bamboozle, lead astray and flat out deceive innocent people trying to sustain themselves and their families.\nOne such scam is taking place in Cowdray Park, Bulawayo as an organisation operating under the name Sound Prosperity is offering people cleaning jobs in one of the schools in the Cowdray Park area. Job seekers are required to sign a form with terms and conditions before being allowed to work. This form outlines that anyone looking for a job is required to pay a non-refundable $5 dollars that will be used to open a SPURT account. The form also outlines that workers will be paid 10SPURT/hour and will be allowed to work a maximum of 2hrs per day.\nOnce hired workers are required to clean schools. We are not yet sure which school was being cleaned but we will update the article once we have all the information.\nSpurt is ‘apparently’ a digital currency. I say apparently because when I searched for the currency on Google it did not appear in the ‘News’ tab or even the first 10 search pages, which was the first red flag. In this age of digital currencies, how does a digital currency fail to appear in search results?\nThe second red flag appeared when I found SPURT’s website which coincidentally has the same logo as Sound Prosperity. If you are still on the fence and you think this may be genuine go take a look at the SPURT website. The site states “One SPURT is equivalent of one U.S Dollar.” “equivalent of,“??? Really? I wouldn’t invest a dime in this kind of an organisation.\nApparently, the people who were employed in this cleanup campaign gathered at the school demanding to get their money back. We reached out to Sihlengeni Primary, and Luveve High School and they both did not know of any such development in the area. The last of the three schools in Crowdray Park, Crowdray Secondary Park could not be reached at the time of writing.\nWe will update the story once we have all the information.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.techzim.co.zw/2018/02/beware-scammers-offering-jobs-exchange-non-existent-digital-currency/"}
{"doc_id": "19b22f5521c1ef26d6bc659ec555a114", "text": "Obinna Chima\nWith two weeks to the September 30 deadline given by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) for commercial banks to maintain a minimum Loan-to-Deposit Ratio (LDR) of 60 per cent, the financial institutions have launched an aggressive deposit drive to meet the target, findings by THISDAY have shown.\nThe total industry LDR stood at 57.64 per cent as at July 2019, which is just less than three per cent below the target, according to the latest CBN monthly economic report.\nTHISDAY, however, gathered that while some banks have exceeded the 60 per cent target, some are slightly below it.\nIn their moves to achieve the target, some banks’ recently released half-year results showed that most of them recorded improved customer deposits. For instance, while GTBank’s customer deposits increased by 6.3 per cent to N2.418 trillion, from N2.274 trillion as of December 2018; Access Bank’s customer deposits increased significantly by 63 per cent to N4.18 trillion in June 2019, from N2.57 trillion in December 2018 and the United Bank for Africa (UBA) Plc recorded 4.8 per cent growth in customer deposits, to N3.510 trillion as at June 2019, from the N3.349 trillion it was a year ago.\nAn analyst at Ecobank Nigeria, Kunle Ezun, told THISDAY that since the policy was announced, banks have been aggressive in shoring up their Current and Savings Accounts (CASA).\nEzun said CASAs are the life wire of the banks.\n“In some banks today, they have even announced that staff that can bring in enough deposits from CASA would be rewarded. So the idea is to grow your deposits so that you can have more funds to be deployed as loans.\n“So, the banks are aggressively growing their deposits to meet the deadline. What the CBN is saying is that the banks should have a minimum LDR of 60 per cent, which for me is a lovely idea that is geared towards driving economic growth.\n“By my calculation, if the banks that are below 60 per cent LDR decide to grant loan, over N1 trillion would be channelled into the system; you can imagine what would happen if we have over N1 trillion in the system.\n“That is why we can see a lot of the big banks doing advertisements around their consumer lending products.\n“They all need cheap loans to do all of that. I believe that to leapfrog economic growth, banks need to lend to SMEs and provide loans for consumer lending. That is how we can grow the economy and that is why I support the CBN policy,” he added.\nA Director and Group Head, Investment Banking at Coronation Merchant Bank Limited, Mr. Abiodun Sanusi, said the overall impact of the LDR policy was that banks would be willing to give out more loans.\n“So, overall there is a huge positive gain in this 60 per cent loan-to-deposit ratio, which means more loans would be given at longer maturity tenor,” he added.\nThe Managing Director/Chief Executive Officer, Guaranty Trust Bank Plc, Mr. Segun Agbaje, in a recent interview on Arise Television, the broadcasting arm of THISDAY Newspaper, said with the industry LDR already at 57 per cent, banks only have to struggle to achieve three per cent to get to the prescribed limit.\n“Growing three per cent by the end of September, for most banks, they would get really close while some would go over it. So, I think the CBN is being measured in its approach.\n“If we had gone from 57 to 80 in three months, then we would have had a lot of chaos. To boost real sector, you have to lend.\n“There is no way you can boost the real sector without lending. So, this is just to give the banks comfort to be able to grow their loan books and not worry too much about the non-performing loans that happened as a result of that growth,” Agbaje added.\nThe CBN had said the new LDR would be subject to quarterly review.\n“To encourage SMEs, retail, mortgage and consumer lending, these sectors shall be assigned a weight of 150 per cent in computing the LDR for this purpose. The CBN shall provide a framework for classification of enterprises/businesses that fall under these categories.\n“Failure to meet the above minimum LDR by the specified date shall result in a levy of additional Cash Reserve Requirement equal to 50 per cent of the lending shortfall of the target LDR,” the regulator had added.\nAs part of the measures to encourage lending to the real sector, the CBN had also stated that it would no longer remunerate daily bank deposit in excess of N2 billion placed at its Standing Deposit Facility (SDF), just as it would restrict banks’ investment in treasury bills.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2019/09/17/banks-intensify-drive-to-meet-60-loan-to-deposit-target"}
{"doc_id": "09139978e85b1495de98b253f35dc585", "text": "Economic recovery is expected to take front and centre stage during finance minister Enoch Godongwana’s maiden National Budget Speech in February.\nAlthough fiscal consolidation and other prudent budgetary measures are crucial, the country can’t ignore the link between the rule of law and economic reform, says business leader and chancellor of the University of the Free State, Professor Bonang Mohale.\nSpeaking in PSG’s Think Big webinar on Tuesday (25 January), Mohale said that South Africa’s current socio-economic realities, coupled with the findings of the Zondo Commission’s report on state capture, are telling characteristics of a ‘failed state’ – one that can only be pulled back from the precipice by decisive action and single-minded focus.\n“When we take a step back to examine the evidence and what the Zondo Commission’s findings mean for broader society, we see that inequality is widening, racism is at an all-time high, black graduates are roaming the street unemployed, our public education and hospital sectors are in states of disrepair and the general climate in the country is one of lawlessness,” said Mohale, who also holds several notable board positions including chairmanship of the Bidvest Group.\n“Before we consider whether South Africa is ‘recoverable,’ we need to come to recognise the magnitude of the problem and acknowledge that as a country, we find ourselves at an all-important turning point,” he said.\nMohale stressed the link between socioeconomic reform and the forthcoming reactions of the independent judiciary, given the evidence at hand.\nUltimately, he argues that we should not underestimate the centrality of justice to economic recovery. The responsibility to set a precedent of swift, decisive action now rests on the shoulders of the independent judiciary, he said.\nBusiness is the epicentre of creating future markets\nMohale is a strong advocate for the need to adopt a national charter against corruption, as well as an independent public procurement anti-corruption agency that will include a council, a litigation unit, an inspectorate, a tribunal and a special court of appeal.\nThis is aligned with Justice Raymond Zondo’s recent recommendations put forward in the report on state capture.\n“When the loop has been closed on state capture and the guilty have been brought to book, a prime opportunity will emerge for businesses to take the reins and realise its role in promoting job creation so that the self-respect and self-worth of so many struggling South Africans can be restored,” Mohale said.\n“The business sector is not an isolated entity, it is in fact at the epicentre of creating the markets of the future. Our real market should be the 1.3 billion people in Africa who stand to benefit from instruments such as the African Continental Free Trade Agreement. Until the broader African community reaps these rewards, South Africa will never stand true to the precepts laid out in the Constitution.”\nVaccine policy an example of missed opportunity for public/private partnership\nBusiness, however, requires regulatory and policy certainty.\nHere, the vaccine rollout serves as a good example of a missed opportunity on behalf of the government to allow the private sector to bring its economic strength and authority to the table, Mohale said.\nIn his opinion, had the vaccines, for example, been placed in the hands of Roger Baxter, Chief Executive Officer at Minerals Council South Africa, thousands of workers would have received access to vaccines and the 90-day target could have been reached.\nAs a result of the state not taking a cooperative stance on the rollout, 400,000 miners are now struggling with a lack of access to Covid-19 vaccines, Mohale said.\n“These are the kinds of issues that are at the centre of socioeconomic reform. They are the issues that will need to be addressed quickly and decisively if South Africa is to curb the mass exodus of skilled workers and talent from the country in search of better prospects.\n“People are the business, not brick-and-mortar establishments or products and services. Our challenge therefore as a country, is not only an economic one but one concerning human resources and social justice,” he said.\n“When fisherwomen cannot go out to sea, they repair their nets. We need to ask ourselves, ‘what are we doing now to repair our nets? How can we place ourselves in a strategic position so that when recovery is on the horizon, we are in a position to be competitive?”", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businesstech.co.za/news/business-opinion/553340/south-africa-is-showing-the-signs-of-a-failed-state-business-leader/"}
{"doc_id": "de7f54ab1f4966d25907669fa3080b5f", "text": "Eritrea's President Isaias Afwerki (right) laughs with Ethiopia's Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed during the inauguration ceremony marking the reopening of the Eritrean embassy in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 2018. (Reuters/Tiksa Negeri)\nA year ago Eritreans could hardly contain their joy as Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed touched down in Asmara. The city had seen nothing like it in a generation that knew war rather than peace. Men and women lined the streets and waved Ethiopian flags as Abiy arrived to seal a peace deal.\nPROMOTEDThere Is An Easier Way To Earn An IncomeBecome an online trader with only a R3000 deposit and start earning by trading Bitcoin,forex, stocks and commodities online. Take free trading course.Vici Marketing | marketingvici.com\nLess than a week later Eritrea’s president Isaias Afwerki made a reciprocal visit, landing in Addis Ababa to an equally rapturous welcome. In September a formal treaty was signed between the two leaders in the Saudi capital, Jeddah, witnessed by King Salman and the UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, who described it as an “historic event.”\nThe treaty covered a number of things. It ended the state of war between Eritrea and Ethiopia; declaring a new era of peace, friendship and comprehensive cooperation.\nAs part of this deal, there were two important provisions. One called for “the establishment of joint special economic zones. The other was a pledge to establish a high-level joint committee, as well as sub-committees where needed to guide and oversee the implementation of this agreement.\nBut there has been little apparent progress on either front. Economic co-operation was probably one of the key drivers of this reconciliation. These included plans to develop a massive potash mine that would straddle the border. But little has been heard of the project in recent months.\nMuch the same can be said of the joint committees that were given the job of sorting out the many issues bedevilling relations between the two countries.\nWhat’s become clear is that the warmth of a year ago has largely gone. With little progress on implementing and institutionalising the relations between the two countries an air of uncertainty and suspicion is creeping back.\nDisputed border\nOne of the sticking points between the two countries is the disputed border. The border was formally designated by the Boundary Commission established after the 1998–2000 border war. The conflict had many causes: rivalry between the liberation movements that had been operating in both countries and economic competition. But it was competing claims to the insignificant border town of Badme that was the spark that ignited the war.\nThe two countries signed what became known as the Algiers Peace Agreement in 2000. The agreement made clear that the boundary commission could only make decisions based strictly on legal and historical grounds. This barred it from being able to allow for what might be considered just and fair — what’s known as ex aequo et bono.\nAs a result, the border the Boundary Commission came up with resulted in settlements being dissected and villagers separated from their farmlands. And it left some people on both sides of the border concerned at being transferred from one state to the other.\nChanges could only be made by both countries agreeing to any adjustments. This was one of the questions that the joint commissions agreed to in Jeddah was meant to resolve. Others included the terms of trade between Eritrea and Ethiopia, for example exchange rates and economic relations which were seen as important contributing factors in the 1988 – 2000 border war.\nDistractions\nRather than working to consolidate the peace, the leaders of both countries have drifted elsewhere. Ethiopia has been caught up in increasingly complex and bloody ethnic conflicts that have driven more than a million people from their homes. Coming to grips with this is taking much of Abiy’s time and attention.\nHe has also been working on behalf of the African Union to help resolve the political crisis in Sudan. Eritrea’s Isaias has also been to Sudan, but with a rather different remit. Welcomed warmly by by the deputy chairman of the Transitional Military Council, General Mohamed Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti”, Isaias issued a statement that showed his agenda was quite different, as shown by his recent statement:\nThe Government of Eritrea requests the AU to refrain from internationalising and exacerbating the situation in Sudan.\nHis approach isn’t difficult to understand. Isaias enjoys strong relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE both of which have been embroiled in a war in Yemen. Eritrea has allowed its ports and airfields to be used by both countries to prosecute this war. At the same time the Sudanese military provide troops to fight in Yemen and have been open in their support for the Saudi and UAE in their war aims.\nSaudi Arabia was therefore alarmed at the challenge posed to the Sudanese government by the popular uprising in Khartoum and other Sudanese towns and cities.\nBorder remains tense\nEven though the glow of last year’s events has faced, Eritrea has nevertheless reaped many gains from the rapprochement with Ethiopia. One consequence is that it signalled the end of its international isolation. Limited United Nations sanctions were lifted and the country now holds a seat on the UN Human Rights Council, a body that frequently criticised its lack of adherence to international human rights norms.\nEritrea has also taken the chair of the Khartoum Process. This is a critical position, since it is the key forum in which African states negotiate with the European Union.\nBut the situation along the Ethiopia-Eritrea border remains tense. The Ethiopian government attempted to move its heavy artillery away from the border, but this was blocked by local residents of Tigray, fearful that there might be renewed conflict with Eritrea.\nTheir concerns are hardly surprising. Isaias has made vituperative statements about his immediate neighbours, describing the Trigrayan ruling party — the TPLF — as “vultures”, and accusing them of following a “toxic and malignant” agenda.\nIt is difficult to know how relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara will develop. The fear is that Isaias has gone back to his unpredictable ways, making any predictions difficult.\nMartin Plaut, Senior Research Fellow, Horn of Africa and Southern Africa, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School of Advanced Study\nThis article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://mg.co.za/africa/2019-07-08-00-how-the-glow-of-the-historic-accord-between-ethiopia-and-eritrea-has-faded/"}
{"doc_id": "24b093ae9314e8f6eee2c5f1352490f1", "text": "discharged\n2 Apr 2023\nAfter widespread concern over the pontiff's health, the Vatican said he will attend the Easter mass. Francis was hospitalized just weeks after his tenth anniversary as the head of the Catholic Church.\nLatest\n15 mins ago\n45-year-old Nigerian standup comedy star Basketmouth made a stop in Berlin on his European tour to thrill the crowd with his socio-political commentary on a range of topics — including his country's ongoing currency crisis.\n27 mins ago\nMedia reports on Tuesday said that tech giant Apple was pulling the plug on its \"special projects group\", which was developing the brand's own electric vehicle.\n28 mins ago\nThe decision by West Africa's regional bloc ECOWAS to reverse key sanctions on military-ruled Niger has been welcomed by analysts inside and outside the country. But how will it affect ordinary Nigeriens?\n2 hours ago\nFind these stories and much more when you grab a copy of The Guardian on Saturday.\n1 day ago\nElection will see candidates compete for a seat in the 290-member parliament. New members of Iran's Assembly of Experts will also be elected.\n1 day ago\nThe US, Japan and South Korea have concluded their trilateral summit at Camp David with a security pact and a pledge to step up economic cooperation. The meeting took place against the backdrop of North Korea's missile program and China's maritime claims in the South China Sea.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://tv.guardian.ng/tag/discharged/"}
{"doc_id": "6acb970d4fd6e3b8d0f4786c11ee26aa", "text": "The African Development Bank said on Tuesday that it is committed to helping de-risk and remove business barriers that would help increase private investors’ contributions to climate finance on the African continent.\nThe development bank said that this move is in response to the increased danger of global warming on the continent, which contributes less than 3 percent but is the most vulnerable to climate risks.\nIn a statement made available on its website, the bank said, “To build resilience against climate change, the countries have outlined tangible ambitions for green growth, including plans to increase climate investment.”\nRead also: AfDB bans S.A.R.L for 13 Months for fraudulent practices\nIt noticed that unlike other continents where there was increased climate investment, the continent still lags behind because of so many factors, and it agreed that it was going to work assiduously to change that picture.\nIt stated that one of its flagship programmes that was helping to deal with this challenge was its 2018 Africa Disaster Risks Financing Programme, designed to promote the deployment of disaster response mechanisms.\nIt said, “Amid dwindling climate finance flows to Africa, the African Development Bank has committed to helping to de-risk and remove business barriers to increase private investors’ contribution to climate finance on the continent.\n“Over the past decade, the Bank has developed expertise and knowledge of financing climate-related projects. For example, the Bank launched its Africa Disaster Risks Financing Programme in 2018 in collaboration with the African Risk Capacity Group (ARC) to promote the deployment of disaster response mechanisms. Its total climate commitments increased to 45 percent in 2022, up from only 9 percent in 2016. By this, the Bank has exceeded its target of having 40 percent of its funding reserved for climate-related projects.”\nAs a way to broaden knowledge sharing and encourage private sector participation, the AfDB said its Annual Meetings from May 22 to 26 in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, will focus on tackling climate change on the continent.\nThe bank said, “During its upcoming Annual Meetings from 22 to 26 May in Sharm el-Sheikh, the Bank will host a session to explore how to mobilise more private sector financing to tackle climate change in Africa, including domestic natural capital. This flagship event will bring together entrepreneurs, pension and private equity fund managers, financiers, and government representatives to discuss different instruments and how to deploy them on a large scale on the continent.\n“The delegates will consider green financing tools such as green bonds, sustainable bonds, social bonds, sustainability loans, and debt-nature or debt-climate swaps. Participants will discuss national and international levers to overcome obstacles to implementing such instruments.\n“With lessons from best practises in Africa and internationally, the African Development Bank hopes to foster the development of innovative financial instruments to support investment in climate and green growth while ensuring a fairer distribution of resources across Africa.”", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businessday.ng/africa/article/global-warming-afdb-to-help-private-investors-increase-contribution-to-climate-finance/"}
{"doc_id": "8b9346d8c3695706121c6f01d5f35eab", "text": "The Kenyan president’s newly formed Jubilee Party wants taxpayers to foot the sizable bill for the party’s primaries ahead of the 2017 vote. Opposition parties aren’t happy. By NJERI KIMANI.\nIt will cost Kenyan taxpayers 4.35-billion Kenyan shillings (R590-million) to fund President Uhuru Kenyatta’s Jubilee Party primary ahead of the 2017 general election, if a proposal by the party secretariat goes through.\nNational Assembly Leader of Majority Adan Duale disclosed that the two-month-old party (launched to much fanfare in September, and at great expense), had instructed its secretariat to start consultations immediately to see if the government will pay for the process.\nUnder a new Kenyan law, parties can choose to have their primaries overseen by the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC). Jubilee are going one step further by now requesting that the IEBC also cover the costs of its involvement. Usually, parties fund primaries themselves.\nDuale, in seeking the payment for the nomination, said they had already opened negotiations and were directly engaging the national treasury. “Democracy is very expensive and, world over, the treasury is mandated to caters for the cost of nominations,” he added.\nDuale claims that involving the IEBC was the best means of ensuring that the nomination process is free and fair. “Many individual parties have limited manpower to handle primaries and to curb nomination flaws. It’s a major headache for the political parties and the Electoral Board is the perfect solution to this menace,” he added.\nDuale pointed out that the law was silent about who should pay when a political party requests IEBC to oversee its nominations, but pointed out that parties were mandated to ask the IEBC to oversee the nominations.\n“It’s up to the commission to present their budget to the treasury and we as the National Assembly are ready to approve it if brought as a supplementary budget,” Duale added.\nThe Jubilee Party position contradicts President Kenyatta’s claim, made during the launch of the party, that the cash to conduct the nominations would be sourced from within the party, or from private funding.\nThe launch came only a few days after the president had assented to the Election Law (Amendment) Act that stipulates that the IEBC can be requested to conduct and supervise party nominations for the presidential, parliamentary and county elections.\nThe amendment does not, however, indicate who should pay for the nominations. This is a significant omission: previous legislation had specified that political parties must bear all expenses when requesting the IEBC to supervise primaries.\nThe main opposition coalition, led by Orange Democratic Movement’s Raila Odinga, said that it did not intend to involve the IEBC in its nomination process, as it was simply too expensive. “We are still exploring ways to ensure that the nominations are carried out in a free and fair manner but engaging IEBC is quite a costly affair,” he added.\nOther opposition figures criticised the Jubilee Party for its appeal for government funding, saying that it reflects a deeper financial insecurity. “They started from a very high note but are now financially stranded and seeking for ways of getting into people’s pockets,” said Mombasa County senator Hassan Omar, of the Wiper Democratic Movement, in a statement to newsrooms.\nODM Finance Director Joshua Kawino calculated the cost of holding the primaries at ward level as approximately 3-million Kenyan shillings (R400,000) per ward. Kenya has a total of 1,450 wards, which means the entire primary process costs in the region of 4.35-billion Kenyan shillings (R590-million) per party.\nOn the basis of these calculations, if the IEBC were to fund the primaries of all five major political parties, it would set the taxpayer back a whopping 21-billion Kenyan shillings (R2.8-billion).\nAnother concern is that the IEBC’s limited infrastructure and personnel simple could not cope with the extra demands, especially in advance of the general election. “How will we expect the general election to be flawless yet they will be already overburdened with the mandate to ensure that the nominations run smoothly? I feel that this will create unnecessary budget constraints to the election body,” said Makueni Senator Mutula Kilonzo Jr (Wiper). DM\nPhoto: Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta (C) arrives at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, Netherlands, 08 October 2014. EPA/BART MAAT.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-12-01-kenya-taxpayers-tapped-to-fund-ruling-party-primaries/"}
{"doc_id": "6dff80da5ddf05ef0eeb5a6834ef063d", "text": "Allied Bank rot exposed\nHerald Reporter\nThe court application filed by the Zimbabwe Amalgamated Housing Association (Zaha) demanding its $1,4 million from the liquidated Allied Bank has exposed the rot at the institution.\nThis came as creditors from various sectors are not happy with the slow pace with which the liquidation process of the financial institution is proceeding.\nZaha director Dr Killer Zivhu, in his High Court application, wanted the liquidating agent Dr Cyril Madondo to be either relieved of his duties or forced by the court to reveal the assets of the bank.\nIn his response to Dr Zivhu, Dr Madondo said he was being wrongly cited as the liquidator of the bank, when in actual fact he was the liquidating agent.\nHe referred Dr Zivhu to the Deposit Protection Corporation, which he said was the actual liquidator of the bank.\nDr Madondo urged the court to dismiss the case based on wrong citation.\nBut the court fight has exposed the extent to which the Allied Bank shareholders and management sank the depositors’ funds.\nIn fact, the bank has been inundated with claims worth millions of dollars from various institutions, municipalities, parastatals, churches, schools and members of the public.\nIt has emerged that big firms have apparently lost their funds to the bank and these include OK Zimbabwe Limited, CBZ Bank Limited, Zimbabwe Manpower Development Fund, National Social Security Authority, First Mutual Health and TelOne.\nOthers are Hwange Colliery Company, Econet Wireless, Zimbabwe Family Planning Council, Zimbabwe National Roads Administration and the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe.\nThe Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Youth, Indeginisation and Economic Empowerment were cited in the court papers as also having their funds locked in the bank.\nDr Madondo said in his response to Dr Zivhu’s court application that at least $31 388 855 needed to be recovered from the bank to ensure its successful liquidation.\nHe said what needed to be recovered included: “value of assets amounting to US$16 790 000 to be recovered from Trebo and Khays (Private) Limited. However, the matter is before the High Court under case No. HC8287 /15.\n“Value of term deposits and demand deposits amounting to US$22 242 408, which cannot be accounted for by the directors of the bank.\n“Value of loan book with an exposure to be recovered from the former directors of the bank amounting to US$1 860 659, 17.”\nThe other funds that need to be recovered are US$1 139 886,50 RTGS, which is held at the US Department of Treasury – Office of Foreign Asset Control and US$150 000 value of 15 vehicles in possession of the former executive management of the bank.\n“With respect, the recovery of the remaining assets as stated above is subject to court proceedings,” said Dr Madondo.\n“Therefore, the final Liquidation and Distribution Account being sought by the Applicant (Dr Zivhu) will only be prepared after the conclusion of the matters pending in the court. Nothing less will suffice.”\nAllied Bank, whose majority shares are owned by a vehicle linked to Economic Planning and Investment Promotion Minister Obert Mpofu, had its licence cancelled by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe in January 2015 after it was found to be in an unsafe financial position.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.herald.co.zw/allied-bank-rot-exposed/"}
{"doc_id": "ebab8930bb971908e552d6d21ec00ea9", "text": "Tesla is set to start deliveries of its long-delayed Cybertruck electric pickup on Thursday, after CEO Elon Musk tempered investor expectations citing problems in ramping production of what he called a “radical” product.\nCybertruck, Tesla's first new model in nearly four years, is critical to its reputation as a maker of innovative vehicles. At a time when the company is battling softening electric vehicle (EV) demand and rising competition, Cybertruck is also key for generating sales, though not to the extent of the company’s high-volume Models 3 and Y.\n“We dug our own grave with Cybertruck,” Musk said last month, warning that it would take a year to 18 months to make the vehicle a significant cash flow contributor.\nPricing for the vehicle is expected to be revealed at an event scheduled to begin at 3pm ET (2000 GMT). After saying in 2019 that the truck would be priced at $40 000 (R753 192), Musk has not offered an updated price despite rising raw material costs.\nBefore the launch, Musk captured media attention on a different subject, giving a profanity-laced interview to “The New York Times” on Wednesday.\nHe cursed advertisers who had left his social media platform X, formerly known as Twitter, because of anti-semitic comment. He also said customers who didn’t like him should judge his products by their quality, including Tesla EVs.\nThe billionaire has said Tesla would probably reach a production rate of roughly 250 000 Cybertrucks a year in 2025. Tesla has faced “enormous challenges in reaching volume production” with the Cybertruck because of its new technology and design, Musk said.\nCybertruck’s new body material and unconventional, futuristic styling add complexity and costs to production, and threatens to alienate traditional pickup truck buyers who focus on utility, experts say.\nDuring its 2019 reveal, Musk took a sledgehammer to demonstrate the truck’s unbreakable “armour glass” window, only to shatter it.\nA few years ago, Musk had floated the idea that if people did not like the futuristic Cybertruck design, Tesla could “build a normal-looking truck”. On recent calls and interviews, he has emphasised the model’s innovation.\n“The larger problem for the Cybertruck is the Cybertruck wasn’t really designed for pickup truck users,” Eric Noble, the president of automotive consulting firm, The CARLAB, said.\n“It will have a much narrower appeal than a Ram or an F series,” he said of the popular Dodge and Ford pickups.\nCybertruck, which is two years behind schedule, enters a hot and highly profitable pickup truck market to compete with the likes of Ford's F150 Lightning, Rivian Automotive’s R1T and General Motors’ Hummer EV.\nRivian’s R1T has a starting price of $73 000, while Ford’s F-150 Lightning starts at about $50 000.\nSeth Goldstein, an equity strategist at Morningstar, said he expected the Cybertruck to be priced between $50 000 to the low-$70 000 range.\nCybertruck has drawn more than a million reservation holders who have put down $100 as deposits.\n“Tesla’s products have largely appealed to more affluent early adopter types. And this is going to be no different,” said Paul Waatti, an analyst at consultatncy AutoPacific.\n“It’s going to have a smaller audience than the SUVs will have, but I think it’s gonna do surprisingly well.”\nREUTERS", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/companies/tesla-to-deliver-cybertrucks-after-musk-tempers-expectations-f3a6fbc3-6124-4eff-87fd-cd1510070f8d"}
{"doc_id": "15d27b9aa071c2bc6edcb674f2785df8", "text": "South Africans are notorious for being bad savers, says Sebastien Alexanderson, founder and debt counsellor at National Debt Advisors.\nSo, when there are increases in fuel and food prices as well as rising inflation, it’s important that you begin with the money basics of implementing budgeting and saving.\n“When you budget you know exactly where all your money goes, where you can make adjustments to save even small amounts, and also how to effectively save and leave enough money for unexpected expenses and emergencies,” Alexanderson says.\nHe says it’s important to remember to track expenses each month, and make changes where needed in order to stick to your spending thresholds going forward.\nHere is a look at three budgeting methods:\nThe 50/30/20 budgeting rule\nWith this budgeting method, you need to allocate:\n- 50% of your net income to needs like rent, groceries, and utilities.\n- 30% to wants such as hobbies, vacations and dining out.\n- 20% to financial goals (that is, savings and debt payments).\nThe 80/20 rule\nAnother budgeting method is the 80/20 rule, which separates your budget into two separate groups. One group is for needs, wants and debts together, while the other group is for savings.\nYou allocate 80% of your income to needs, wants and debts, while 20% is strictly allocated for savings.\nThe 70/20/10 rule:\nLike the 50/30/20 budgeting rule, this rule also separates money into three groups. Finance is grouped into the following categories:\n- 70% of your income goes to living expenses.\n- 20% to debt payments.\n- 10% to savings.\nWhile many people are new to the practice of budgeting and saving, considering the savings culture in South Africa, it is important that you choose the budget rule appropriate for you.\nIOL Business", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.iol.co.za/personal-finance/my-money/try-these-3-no-brainer-budget-methods-to-make-ends-meet-and-save-f08c33bd-2289-45d5-938c-9383350b19b3"}
{"doc_id": "e173d244f32cd8e3dbcc137a69e11fa3", "text": "Delta State government has proposed N1.6 billion for agricultural sector in the 2014 fiscal year.\nGovernor Emmanuel Uduaghan made the disclosure at the presentation of the 2014 budget proposal of N391.51 billion to the Delta State House of Assembly in Asaba, the state capital, for approval and consideration.\nUduaghan said the amount was out of the N79.434.244.353 billion proposed for the economic sector under the capital expenditure estimates, saying the sum of N1 billion was proposed for the procurement of modern tractor equipment for farmers, while N600 million was earmarked for Agricultural Youth Development Programme.\nThe governor said the decision was geared towards sustaining the state’s drive on ‘Delta beyond oil,’ as well as reduction of unemployment by encouraging youths to embrace farming activities.\nAccording to him, we shall continue to focus on agriculture as a strategy towards sustaining our drive on ‘Delta beyond oil.’ We are encouraging our youths to embrace farming activities from which unemployment, hunger and malnutrition will be reduced.\n“We are implementing a well articulated agricultural and poverty alleviation programmes for Delta State in collaboration with the private sector. The sum of N1 billion and N600 million are proposed for the procurement of modern tractor equipment for farmers and agricultural youth development programme, respectively, in the 2014 fiscal year,” he said.\nHe also disclosed that as part of efforts to taking youths off the streets, N2 billion had been proposed for the training of unemployed youths across the state, noting that the effort was part of promoting and sustaining peace and security in the state.\nBy: IDRIS UMAR MOMOH", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://businessday.ng/agriculture/article/delta-to-spend-n1-6bn-on-agricultural-sector-in-2014/"}
{"doc_id": "02d6c0b840e19e0e1282f1f8c8013e8c", "text": "President Mnangagwa recently addressed a ZANU-PF Committee in Gweru and in that address he spoke on the long-running feud between EcoCash and the state.\nThe President had some interesting things to say about the mobile money operator which has been accused by the financial regulator and state officials of being behind runaway inflation.\nWe realised that Ecocash was behind all this so we studied this thing and got to their server and found everything, every corruption and takatora tsvimbo ndokurova, it was painful to others but we said we only allow limited mobile money and it must reflect in the account.\nPresident ED said that there was $8.4 billion circulating outside of the banking system which they only discovered after investigating:\nWe were all confused as to what was happening until we set up a committee and we discovered there was up to $8,4 billion circulating outside the banking system, which money in financial terms, is phantom money, which is some sort of ghost money whose source no one knows.\nNothing new here\nThe President’s comments just recall what the regulator (RBZ) has said about EcoCash and mobile money operators before. RBZ claimed that mobile money operators were actually creating money which isn’t backed by balances in their trust accounts.\nBecause of the weak KYC of mobile money platforms, the regulator suggests that many account holders were using “ficticious and unverified” identification particulars. This in turn makes it extremely difficult to find out who is behind money laundering.\nThe result of this has been new regulation that has limited the use of mobile money. Revised monthly and daily limits were introduced and a limit has been placed on the number of mobile money accounts one can have.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.techzim.co.zw/2020/09/president-ed-state-had-to-act-against-ecocash-because-8-4-billion-was-circulating-outside-the-banking-system/"}
{"doc_id": "4f107ccc45b61bb11cc090d47cc5bf43", "text": "AMCON’s bid to return Arik Air to founder fails twice over N240.3b debt\nFresh facts have emerged in the conflict of interest between the shareholders of Arik Air and the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON), with the latter showing evidence of failed attempts to return the airline to its founder.\nAMCON and Arik Air (in-receivership), which had been accused of barring the major shareholders from access to the airline’s headquarters, showed efforts at an amicable resolution of the difference, but for the yet unresolved payment plan for debt over N240.3 billion, as of May 2022.\nRecall that AMCON, the special debt recovery vehicle of the Federal Government, took over Arik Air in February 2017 as part of measures to “save” the airline from “imminent collapse”. AMCON had cited gross mismanagement by the owners of Arik, and debt above N300 billion.\nIn a recent twist to the development, the Chairman of Arik Air, Johnson Arumemi-Ikide, lately attempted to reclaim the airline’s headquarters following a Federal High Court ruling that faulted AMCON on transparency, transfer of Arik’s asset to float a new airline, and barring of Arumemi-Ikide and co. from the Arik Air facilities.\nThe Guardian yesterday learnt that the major shareholders of Arik Air, led by Arumemi-Ikide, had on at least two occasions – in 2018 and 2022 – called for amicable settlement of the debt, which were welcome by AMCON and Arik Air (in-receivership).\nIn a 2018 memo to AMCON, the shareholders had hinted at a ready investor willing to settle Arik’s outstanding. The Management of AMCON agreed (subject to regulatory approvals) to settle the then indebtedness of Arik Air with the payment of the sum of N65 billion to AMCON in full, and the final settlement of AMCON’s debt of N135.3 billion.\nAlso, payment of the sum of N26 billion to AMCON concerning Zenith Bank Plc’s exposure was taken over in full and final settlement of all debts owed to Zenith Bank Plc. Payment of a sum equivalent to 65 per cent of the debt owed to Access Bank Plc (N7.6 billion) and EcoBank Plc (N5.2 billion), respectively. Furthermore, the condition that the company will bear the cost and expenses incurred post receivership.\nIt was agreed that, “Upon payment of the debts to AMCON and the banks, the receivership will be terminated and Arik Air Limited returned to its shareholders/owners alongside all documents and securities held by AMCON and the banks”.\nAccording to AMCON, “in response to repeated requests for a proof of funds, (the shareholder) introduced SJ Global as a potential investor. Unfortunately, their purported letter of funds in Citi Bank, Hong Kong, turned out to be spurious and fake. After this, the shareholder of Arik through various emails intimated AMCON about some expected funds from U.S.”\nThough AMCON continued to trust and proceeded to issue the offer for settlement, “the shareholders of Arik were unable to perform until the offer expired.”\nAgain, following a December 2019 letter, the major shareholders of Arik approached AMCON for a meeting to negotiate a discount on the expired offer to pay N65 billion. The Receiver Manager invited them to a meeting with the Management team of AMCON. No further reply was received, though later blamed on the ill health of the Arik founder.\nIn a May 18, 2022 letter to AMCON, settlement proposals were again made by Arik Air shareholders. This includes the proposal to pay N18.2 billion as full and final payment for both AMCON and Zenith Bank exposure – 80 per cent discount on the sum of N91 billion (being the total of the N65 billion and the N26 billion in our April 11, 2018 offer).\nAlso, five per cent as a down payment in cash or asset or a combination of both and a balance payment over a 10-year tenure with a two-year moratorium. Balance at zero interest throughout the tenure and a further five per cent discount, if the balance is paid two years earlier.\nThe shareholders further, “request on AMCON to assist to remove Arik from CBN debtors list and assist to obtain funds for capital injection to rebuild the airline at BOI interest rate.\n“AMCON to assist to get concessions from CBN for Arik Air to get access to foreign exchange directly from CBN to repair, refurbish grounded and presently unserviceable aircraft and purchase spares to restock for efficient operations of the Airline.\n“AMCON to assist the Airline in discussions with various debtors when and if necessary. Once an agreement is reached, this will be presented to the court as a consent judgment and all cases in courts should be withdrawn by both parties.”\nAMCON, however, declined to accede to the proposal “as it does not meet settlement expectations.”\nUpon receivership in 2017, AMCON disclosed that “Arik did not have adequate cash available even for a week’s operations. Out of the 30 aircraft on the records of the company, only eight aircraft were on the ground and immediately available for operations.\n“The company was heavily indebted to Lufthansa Technic; its long-standing Maintenance Repair Organisation (MRO) and they had withdrawn their services and left Nigeria. They were replaced with Ethiopian Airlines (MRO). These were also being owed at the commencement of the Receivership.\n“SAMCO Aircraft Maintenance Limited (SAMCO), a Dutch company responsible for maintaining the CRJs and the Q400s, was owed over EURO2.4 million representing nearly six months of obligations.\n“Outstanding salaries owed to indigenous and expatriate staff. The work environment was toxic, with many disgruntled staff due to unpaid salaries. Salaries of the expatriate staff and crew were unpaid. Some since July 2016. Some Nigerian Pilots had not been paid since October 2016. In addition, salaries for other local staff had been outstanding since December 2016.\n“Health insurance for the employees had expired and was not renewed. Staff and company pension contributions were unremitted for years.\n“Recency training for many pilots necessary to certify pilots for the flight was suspended due to lack of funds. This involves simulator training, available abroad. All training schools were owed and had refused further credits. Thus, pilots were grounded, and many flights could not be properly crewed.\n“Hotels housing crew and expatriate staff were not paid. In some cases, rents on the apartments of foreign crew/engineers were outstanding. The company was stranded. Arik was cancelling flights due to its inability to be fuelled on credit or to pay fuellers upfront as there were outstanding payments owed to aviation fuel suppliers.\n“Outstanding insurance premium on the aircraft; etc. The insurance policy for the airplane fleet was due to lapse on Friday, 10 February 2017, and the Company was already owing N418.89 million as arrears of unpaid premiums. Lack of maintenance reserves. There was no Arik maintained reserve to overhaul planes.\n“Leases on two A330 planes from subsidiaries of Standard Charter were outstanding for over six months. Mercator, the company with the rights and responsibilities for the management of the Passenger Service System and sale of tickets, was owed $2.5 million. They subsequently cut the company off from using the platform.\n“Curiously, even the internet subscription offered by Globacom was suspended due to overdue payments. A good number of the aircraft were at different locations and in various states of disuse. Some of the aircraft had been robbed of vital parts.”\nGet the latest news delivered straight to your inbox every day of the week. Stay informed with the Guardian’s leading coverage of Nigerian and world news, business, technology and sports.", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://guardian.ng/business-services/amcons-bid-to-return-arik-air-to-founder-fails-twice-over-n240-3b-debt/"}
{"doc_id": "7acdc663525e60931296490bae6ba87c", "text": "The Ghana Meteorological Agency (GMet) says its weather monitoring station has observed two rainstorms heading for the country on Friday, June 10.\nAreas within the coastal and northern sectors will be hit by heavy rainfall accompanied by strong winds and thundery conditions.\nThe Greater Accra, Western and Volta Regions will be hit by the storm approaching from the Eastern Gulf.\nThis is according to the forecast released at 6:00 am on Friday morning.\nAccra, Axim, Aflao, Ho and Saltpond are also expected to experience the storm.\nThe forecast also project that another storm, observed over northern Ghana is expected to produce thunderstorms and rain.\nIn this regard, areas to be affected include; Kintampo, Tumu, Bole, Bawku, Yendi and Tamale.\nThe Ghana Meteorological Agency (GMet) classified its warning as orange.\nAn orange weather warning is second on the classification list of the level of risk to life and property. The Agency therefore warns persons living in the affected areas to be prepared for harsh conditions, should the storm occur.\nCommunities captured in the coastal regions are expected to experience the extreme weather conditions between 7:00 and 10:00 GMT whilst the storm for the northern sector is expected to hit between 10:00 and 13:00 GMT.\nLatest Stories\n-\nThe Roll Call of Biblical Financial Evangelists\n-\nMahama accuses Bawumia of dubbing NDC’s policy promises\n-\nMahama echoes vision for resilient governance and economic recovery at NDC LAB Policy Dialogue\n-\nGSE’s Abena Amoah not on Bawumia’s economy committee\n-\nNDC’s Policy Dialogue marks milestone in pre-election strategy – Mahama\n-\nEOCO to launch lifestyle audits targeting celebrities and individuals with suspected unexplained wealth\n-\nUpper West Akim MP cuts sod for the construction of Mepom to Esaaso Road\n-\nEngineers urged to embrace preview of their works\n-\nParis 2024Q: Zambia edges Ghana 1-0 for crucial first-leg advantage\n-\nDr. Christian Sewordor Mensah: The Role of Sector Skill Bodies in using ESG and CSR Principles in shaping Sustainable Education and Training\n-\nTyler Perry halts $800 film studio build over AI fears\n-\nAkufo-Addo appoints Ofori-Atta as Senior Presidential Advisor\n-\nMIIF aims to position Ghana as electric vehicle hub in Africa\n-\nAvatar: The Last Airbender receives mixed reviews from critics\n-\nMahama slams Police’s decision to dissociate itself from DCOP Waabu’s comments on election security", "source": "cc", "stratum": "cc", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.myjoyonline.com/2-rainstorms-to-hit-greater-accra-volta-western-and-northern-regions-today/"}
{"doc_id": "22b4f51bc4a858691924213cae7a5f9a", "text": "6-K 1 a0298n.htm TOTAL VOTING RIGHTS a0298n FORM 6-K SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 Report of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a - 16 or 15d - 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 For the\nmonth of December HSBC Holdings plc 42nd\nFloor, 8 Canada Square, London E14 5HQ, England (Indicate\nby check mark whether the registrant files or will file annual\nreports under cover of Form 20-F or\nForm 40-F). Form\n20-F X               \n        Form 40-F HSBC HOLDINGS PLC 29 December 2025 Voting Rights and Capital The following notification is made in accordance with the UK\nFinancial Conduct Authority Disclosure Guidance and Transparency\nRule 5.6.1. On 29 December 2025, the issued share capital of HSBC Holdings plc\nwas 17,175,239,862 ordinary shares of US$0.50. No shares are held\nin treasury. Therefore, the total number of voting rights in HSBC Holdings plc\nis 17,175,239,862. This figure for the total number of voting\nrights may be used by shareholders as the denominator for the\ncalculations by which they will determine if they are required to\nnotify their interest in, or a change to their interest in, HSBC\nHoldings plc under the Financial Conduct Authority's Disclosure\nGuidance and Transparency Rules and/or under Part XV of the Hong\nKong Securities and Futures Ordinance. Any such notification should be\nsent to investorrelations@hsbc.com and\nshareholderquestions@hsbc.com. Lee Davis Group Governance shareholderquestions@hsbc.com +44 (0)20 7991 8888 SIGNATURE Pursuant\nto the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the\nregistrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf\nby the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized. HSBC\nHoldings plc By: Name:\nAileen Taylor Title:\nGroup Company Secretary and Chief Governance Officer Date:\n29 December 2025", "source": "edgar", "stratum": "edgar", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1089113/000165495425014331/a0298n.htm"}
{"doc_id": "564b1c50961bd355170e2bc3f5aef3fa", "text": "6-K 1 a0811y.htm DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE AT NSM a0811y FORM 6-K SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 Report of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a - 16 or 15d - 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 For the\nmonth of February HSBC Holdings plc 42nd\nFloor, 8 Canada Square, London E14 5HQ, England (Indicate\nby check mark whether the registrant files or will file annual\nreports under cover of Form 20-F or Form 40-F). Form\n20-F X Form 40-F HSBC Holdings plc 2024 Annual Report on Form 20-F The HSBC Holdings plc (the\n\"Company\") Annual\nReport on Form 20-F for the year ended 31 December 2024 has been\nfiled with the US Securities and Exchange Commission and is now\navailable on the Company's website at: www.hsbc.com/investors/results-and-announcements/annual-report A copy of this document has also been submitted\nto the National Storage Mechanism and will shortly be available for\ninspection at: https://data.fca.org.uk/#/nsm/nationalstoragemechanism SIGNATURE Pursuant\nto the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the\nregistrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf\nby the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized. HSBC\nHoldings plc By: Name:\nAileen Taylor Title:\nGroup Company Secretary and Chief Governance Officer Date:\n21 February 2025", "source": "edgar", "stratum": "edgar", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1089113/000165495425001759/a0811y.htm"}
{"doc_id": "3694b25dd367244113a4a2ad4c30b09e", "text": "6-K 1 a9652l.htm TRANSACTION IN OWN SHARES a9652l FORM 6-K SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 Report of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a - 16 or 15d - 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 For the\nmonth of November HSBC Holdings plc 42nd\nFloor, 8 Canada Square, London E14 5HQ, England (Indicate\nby check mark whether the registrant files or will file annual\nreports under cover of Form 20-F or Form 40-F). Form\n20-F X Form 40-F HSBC HOLDINGS\nPLC 12 November 2024 Transaction in own shares HSBC Holdings plc (\" HSBC \" or the \" Company \") announces that it has purchased for\ncancellation the following number of its ordinary shares of US$0.50\nfrom Morgan Stanley & Co. International plc\n(\" Morgan\nStanley \") as part of its\nbuy-back announced on 30\nOctober 2024. UK Venues Date of purchase: 12 November 2024 Number of ordinary shares of US$0.50 each purchased: 5,089,877 Highest price paid per share: £6.9620 Lowest price paid per share: £6.8880 Volume weighted average price paid per share: £6.9263 All repurchases on the London Stock Exchange, Aquis Exchange, Cboe\nEurope Limited (through the BXE and CXE order books) and/or\nTurquoise (\" UK Venues \") are implemented as \"on Exchange\" transactions\n(as such term is defined in the rules of the London Stock Exchange)\nand as \"market purchases\" for the purposes of the Companies Act\n2006. Hong Kong Stock Exchange Date of purchase: 12 November 2024 Number of ordinary shares of US$0.50 each purchased: 4,514,000 Highest price paid per share: HK$70.3000 Lowest price paid per share: HK$69.4500 Volume weighted average price paid per share: HK$69.6769 All repurchases on The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited\n(\" Hong Kong\nStock Exchange \") are \"off\nmarket\" for the purposes of the Companies Act 2006 but are\ntransactions which occur \"on Exchange\" for the purposes of the\nRules Governing the Listing of Securities on The Stock Exchange of\nHong Kong Limited and which constitute an \"on-market share\nbuy-back\" for the purposes of the Codes on Takeovers and Mergers\nand Share Buy-backs. Since the commencement of the buy-back announced on 30\nOctober 2024, the Company has repurchased\n71,232,278 ordinary shares for a total consideration of\napproximately US$653.4m. Following the cancellation of the shares repurchased on the UK\nVenues, the Company's issued ordinary share capital will consist of\n18,104,398,274 ordinary shares with voting rights. There are\nno ordinary shares held in treasury. Cancellation of\nthe shares repurchased on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange takes\nlonger than those repurchased on the UK Venues and a further\nannouncement of total voting rights will be made once those shares\nhave been cancelled. The above figure of 18,104,398,274 may be used by shareholders\nas the denominator for the calculations by which they will\ndetermine if they are required to notify their interest in, or\na change to their interest in, the Company under the Financial\nConduct Authority's Disclosure Guidance and Transparency\nRules. In accordance with Article 5(1)(b) of the Market Abuse Regulation\n(EU) No 596/2014 (as it forms part of domestic law of the United\nKingdom by virtue of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, as\namended), a full breakdown of the individual trades made by Morgan\nStanley on behalf of the Company is available via the link\nbelow. http://www.rns-pdf.londonstockexchange.com/rns/9646L_1-2024-11-12.pdf This announcement will also be available on HSBC's website\nat www.hsbc.com/sea Enquiries to: Lee Davis Corporate Governance & Secretariat shareholderquestions@hsbc.com +44 (0)20 7991 8888 SIGNATURE Pursuant\nto the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the\nregistrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf\nby the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized. HSBC\nHoldings plc By: Name:\nAileen Taylor Title:\nGroup Company Secretary and Chief Governance Officer Date:\n12 November 2024", "source": "edgar", "stratum": "edgar", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1089113/000165495424014131/a9652l.htm"}
{"doc_id": "05a45db37bbfe91aafdc6bf8b261ad06", "text": "6-K 1 a5754c.htm CHANGE OF GROUP COMPANY SECRETARY a5754c FORM 6-K SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 Report of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a - 16 or 15d - 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 For the\nmonth of October HSBC Holdings plc 42nd\nFloor, 8 Canada Square, London E14 5HQ, England (Indicate\nby check mark whether the registrant files or will file annual\nreports under cover of Form 20-F or\nForm 40-F). Form\n20-F X Form 40-F Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited and The Stock Exchange of\nHong Kong Limited take no responsibility for the contents of this\ndocument, make no representation as to its accuracy or completeness\nand expressly disclaim any liability whatsoever for any loss\nhowsoever arising from or in reliance upon the whole or any part of\nthe contents of this document. 8 October 2025 (Hong Kong Stock Code: 5) HSBC HOLDINGS PLC CHANGE OF GROUP COMPANY SECRETARY HSBC Holdings plc (the 'Company') has today announced the\nappointment of Angela McEntee as Group Company Secretary with\neffect from 1 January 2026.  Aileen Taylor remains in her role\nas Group Chief People and Governance Officer, with Angela assuming\nthe Group Company Secretary role. Angela, a qualified solicitor, joined the Company in 2020 and has\nsignificant legal, regulatory, risk and corporate governance\nexperience having held senior roles in the Governance functions at\nboth the Company and previously at NatWest Group plc. For and on behalf of HSBC Holdings plc Brendan Nelson Group Chairman The Board of Directors of HSBC Holdings plc as at the date of this\nannouncement comprises: Brendan Robert Nelson*, Georges Bahjat Elhedery, Geraldine Joyce\nBuckingham † ,\nRachel Duan † ,\nDame Carolyn Julie Fairbairn † ,\nJames Anthony Forese † ,\nAnn Frances Godbehere † ,\nSteven Craig Guggenheimer † ,\nManveen (Pam) Kaur, Dr José Antonio Meade\nKuribreña † ,\nKalpana Jaisingh Morparia † ,\nEileen K Murray † ,\nand Swee Lian Teo † *  Independent non-executive Chair † Independent\nnon-executive Director HSBC Holdings plc Registered Office and Group Head Office: 8\nCanada Square, London E14 5HQ, United Kingdom Web: www.hsbc.com Incorporated in England and Wales with limited liability.\nRegistration number 617987. SIGNATURE Pursuant\nto the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the\nregistrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf\nby the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized. HSBC\nHoldings plc By: Name:\nAileen Taylor Title:\nGroup Company Secretary and Chief Governance Officer Date:\n08 October 2025", "source": "edgar", "stratum": "edgar", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1089113/000165495425011568/a5754c.htm"}
{"doc_id": "c1e88246b24b21a014356ee966540982", "text": "6-K 1 a5473l.htm PRIVATISATION OF HANG SENG BANK - SCHEME DOCUMENT a5473l FORM 6-K SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 Report of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a - 16 or 15d - 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 For the\nmonth of December HSBC Holdings plc 42nd\nFloor, 8 Canada Square, London E14 5HQ, England (Indicate\nby check mark whether the registrant files or will file annual\nreports under cover of Form 20-F or\nForm 40-F). Form\n20-F X Form 40-F Hong\nKong Exchanges and Clearing Limited and\nThe Stock Exchange of Hong\nKong Limited take no responsibility for the contents of\nthis announcement, make no representation as to its accuracy or\ncompleteness and expressly disclaim any liability whatsoever for\nany loss howsoever arising from or in reliance upon the whole or\nany part of the contents of this announcement. This announcement is for information purposes only and does not\nconstitute, or form part of, any invitation or offer to acquire,\npurchase or subscribe for any securities of HSBC Holdings, HSBC\nAsia Pacific or Hang Seng Bank, nor is it an invitation or offer to\nor a solicitation of any offer to acquire, purchase or subscribe\nfor securities of HSBC Holdings, HSBC Asia Pacific or Hang Seng\nBank, or the solicitation of any vote or approval in any\njurisdiction, nor shall there be any sale, issuance or transfer of\nsecurities of HSBC Holdings, HSBC Asia Pacific or Hang Seng Bank in\nany jurisdiction in contravention of applicable law. This\nannouncement is not for release, publication or distribution, in\nwhole or in part, in or into or from any other jurisdiction where\nto do so would constitute a violation of the relevant laws or\nregulations of such jurisdiction. HSBC Holdings plc (Hong\nKong Stock Code: 5) Hang Seng Bank Limited (Stock Codes: 11 (HKD Counter) and 80011 (RMB Counter)) The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT (1) PROPOSAL\nFOR THE PRIVATISATION OF HANG SENG BANK LIMITED BY THE HONGKONG AND\nSHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION LIMITED BY WAY OF A SCHEME OF ARRANGEMENT UNDER SECTION 673 OF THE COMPANIES ORDINANCE AND (2) PROPOSED\nWITHDRAWAL OF LISTING OF HANG SENG BANK SHARES DESPATCH OF THE\nSCHEME DOCUMENT Joint Financial Advisers to HSBC Holdings and HSBC Asia\nPacific (in alphabetical order) Financial Adviser to Hang Seng Bank BofA Securities           Goldman\nSachs Morgan Stanley Financial Adviser to HSBC Asia Pacific Independent Financial Adviser to the Hang Seng\nBank IBC The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited Somerley Capital Limited Reference is made to (i) the\njoint announcement dated 9 October 2025 jointly\nissued by HSBC Holdings plc (\" HSBC\nHoldings \"), The Hongkong and\nShanghai Banking Corporation Limited (\" HSBC Asia\nPacific \") and Hang Seng Bank\nLimited (\" Hang Seng\nBank \") pursuant to Rule 3.5 of\nthe Hong Kong Code on Takeovers and Mergers (the\n\" Takeovers\nCode \") regarding, among others,\nthe proposal (the \" Proposal \") for the privatisation of Hang Seng Bank by HSBC\nAsia Pacific by way of a scheme of arrangement under section 673 of\nthe Companies Ordinance (the \" Scheme \"); (ii) the announcement dated 30 October 2025\njointly issued by HSBC Holdings, HSBC Asia Pacific and Hang Seng\nBank in relation to the update on\nthe timeline for despatch of the Scheme\nDocument; (iii) the announcement dated 27 November\n2025 jointly issued by HSBC Holdings, HSBC Asia Pacific and Hang\nSeng Bank providing a monthly update on the status and progress in\nconnection with the Proposal and the Scheme; and (iv) the composite\nscheme document dated 15 December 2025 jointly issued by HSBC\nHoldings, HSBC Asia Pacific and Hang Seng Bank in relation to the\nProposal and the Scheme (the \" Scheme\nDocument \"). Unless otherwise\ndefined herein, capitalised terms used in this announcement shall\nhave the same meanings as those defined in the\nScheme Document. DESPATCH OF THE SCHEME DOCUMENT The Scheme Document together with\nthe notices of the Hang Seng Bank\nCourt Meeting and the Hang Seng Bank General Meeting to\nbe held on Thursday, 8 January 2026 and the relevant forms of proxy\nwill be despatched to the Hang Seng Bank Shareholders on Monday, 15\nDecember 2025. The\nScheme Document contains, among other things, further details of\nthe Proposal and the Scheme, the expected timetable, the\nexplanatory statement of the Scheme as required under\nthe Companies Ordinance, financial information of\nthe Hang Seng Bank Group, general information regarding\nHSBC Holdings, HSBC Asia Pacific and Hang Seng Bank, the letters\nfrom the Hang Seng Bank Board, the Hang Seng Bank IBC and the Hang\nSeng Bank IFA, a notice of the Hang Seng Bank Court Meeting and a\nnotice of the Hang Seng Bank\nGeneral Meeting. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HANG SENG BANK IBC AND THE HANG SENG BANK\nIFA The\nHang Seng Bank IBC, comprising Cordelia Chung, Clement Kwok King\nMan, Patricia Lam Sze Wan, Lin Huey Ru and Wang Xiao Bin, has been\nestablished by the Hang Seng Bank Board to make a recommendation to\nthe Code Disinterested Shareholders in respect of the Proposal and\nthe Scheme, as required by the Takeovers Code. Hang\nSeng Bank has, with the approval of the Hang Seng Bank IBC,\nappointed Somerley as the Hang Seng Bank IFA to advise the Hang\nSeng Bank IBC in connection with the Proposal and the\nScheme. The\nHang Seng Bank IFA has advised the Hang Seng Bank IBC that it\nconsiders the Proposal and the Scheme are fair and reasonable so\nfar as the Code Disinterested Shareholders are concerned and\naccordingly advises the Hang Seng Bank IBC to recommend, and the\nHang Seng Bank IFA itself recommends, the Code Disinterested\nShareholders to vote in favour of the relevant resolutions to be\nproposed at the Hang Seng Bank Court Meeting and the Hang Seng Bank\nGeneral Meeting to approve and implement the Proposal and the\nScheme. The\nHang Seng Bank IBC, having considered the terms of the Proposal and\nthe Scheme and having taken into account the advice of\nthe Hang Seng Bank IFA, and in particular the principal factors,\nreasons and recommendation set out in its letter, concurs with the\nHang Seng Bank IFA's advice that the Proposal and the Scheme are\nfair and reasonable so far as the Code Disinterested Shareholders\nare concerned. Accordingly,\nthe Hang Seng Bank IBC recommends the Code Disinterested\nShareholders to vote in favour of the relevant resolutions to be\nproposed at the Hang Seng Bank Court Meeting and the Hang Seng Bank\nGeneral Meeting to approve and implement the Proposal and the\nScheme. The\nHang Seng Bank IBC concurs with the Hang Seng Bank IFA's view that\nin addition to Scheme Shareholders who support the Scheme, there\nmay be Scheme Shareholders who do not wish to give up their\nshareholdings and that if all the Conditions, including necessary\nshareholder approval levels and the sanction of the Scheme by the\nHigh Court, are satisfied or\n(if applicable) waived on\nor before the Conditions Long Stop Date,\nthe Scheme will become binding and effective on Hang Seng\nBank and all Scheme Shareholders, irrespective\nof whether or not\nsuch Scheme Shareholders attended or voted at\nthe Hang Seng Bank Court Meeting and/or the\nHang Seng Bank General Meeting. The Hang Seng\nBank IBC also concurs with the Hang Seng Bank IFA's view\nthat such shareholder approval levels are demanding and will\nreflect a strong majority view of Scheme Shareholders if achieved\n(noting that the approximately 1,188 million Hang Seng Bank Shares\nheld beneficially by HSBC Asia Pacific (along with certain other\nminor holdings) will not be voted at the Hang Seng Bank Court\nMeeting). Code\nDisinterested Shareholders should consider carefully the terms of\nthe Proposal and the Scheme and are recommended to read (i) the\nletter from the Hang Seng Bank Board, (ii) the letter from the Hang\nSeng Bank IFA, (iii) the letter from the Hang Seng Bank IBC and\n(iv) the explanatory statement, each contained in the Scheme\nDocument before deciding how to vote at the Hang Seng Bank Court\nMeeting and the Hang Seng Bank General Meeting. Code Disinterested\nShareholders are recommended to consult their own professional\nadvisers if they are in any doubt. HANG SENG BANK COURT MEETING AND HANG\nSENG BANK GENERAL MEETING In\naccordance with the directions of the High Court, the Hang Seng\nBank Court Meeting will be held at 10:30 a.m. on Thursday, 8\nJanuary 2026 in the form of a hybrid meeting at Grand Ballroom,\n16/F, Hopewell Hotel, 15 Kennedy Road, Wan Chai, Hong Kong and via\nthe Court Meeting Online Platform, using any smart phone, tablet\ndevice or computer. The Hang Seng Bank General Meeting will be held\nat the same place and via the General Meeting Online Platform, and\non the same date at 11:00 a.m. (or immediately after the conclusion\nor adjournment of the Hang Seng Bank Court Meeting). The\nHigh Court has directed that the Hang Seng Bank Court Meeting be\nconvened for the purpose of considering and,\nif thought fit, approving, with or without\nmodification, the Scheme. Immediately after\nthe Hang Seng Bank Court Meeting has been concluded or adjourned,\nthe Hang Seng Bank General Meeting will be held for the Hang Seng\nBank Shareholders to consider and, if thought fit, pass a special\nresolution to approve and give effect to the Proposal and the\nScheme, including the approval of the reduction of the share\ncapital of Hang Seng Bank by cancelling and extinguishing the\nScheme Shares and the allotment and issue to HSBC Asia Pacific (or\nits nominee) of such number of new Hang Seng Bank Shares as is\nequal to the number of the Scheme Shares cancelled and\nextinguished. Notices\nof the Hang Seng Bank Court Meeting and the Hang Seng Bank General\nMeeting are contained in the Scheme Document, and are available on\nthe websites of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and Hang Seng\nBank. Hang\nSeng Bank, HSBC Asia Pacific and HSBC Holdings will make a joint\nannouncement in relation to the results of the Hang Seng Bank Court\nMeeting and the Hang Seng Bank General Meeting no later than 7:00\np.m. on Thursday, 8 January 2026. CLOSURE OF REGISTER OF MEMBERS Hang Seng Bank Court Meeting and Hang Seng Bank\nGeneral Meeting For\nthe purpose of determining the entitlements of the Scheme\nShareholders to attend and vote at the Hang Seng Bank Court Meeting\nand the entitlements of the Hang\nSeng Bank Shareholders to attend and vote at the\nHang Seng Bank General Meeting, the register of members\nof Hang Seng Bank will be closed from Monday, 5 January 2026 to\nThursday, 8 January 2026 (both days inclusive) (or such other dates\nas may be notified by Hang Seng Bank by way of announcement(s)),\nand during such period, no transfer of Hang Seng Bank Shares will\nbe effected. In\norder to qualify to vote at the Hang Seng Bank Court Meeting or the\nHang Seng Bank General\nMeeting, all transfers of share ownership\naccompanied by the relevant share certificates must be lodged with the Share Registrar at Shops\n1712-1716, 17th Floor, Hopewell Centre, 183 Queen's Road\nEast, Wan Chai, Hong Kong before 4:30 p.m. on Friday, 2 January\n2026. Registration and payment of the\nScheme Consideration Assuming\nthat the Scheme Record Date falls on Friday, 23 January 2026, it is\nproposed that the register of members of Hang Seng Bank will be\nclosed from Tuesday, 20 January 2026 (or such other date as Hang\nSeng Bank Shareholders may be notified by an announcement) onwards\nin order to determine entitlements to the Scheme Consideration\nunder the Scheme. In\norder to qualify for entitlements to the Scheme Consideration under\nthe Scheme, Scheme Shareholders should ensure that the transfers of\nHang Seng Bank Shares to them are lodged with the Share Registrar\nat Shops 1712-1716, 17th Floor, Hopewell Centre, 183 Queen's Road\nEast, Wan Chai, Hong Kong for registration in their names or in the\nnames of their nominees no later than 4:30 p.m. (Hong Kong time) on\nMonday, 19 January 2026. CONDITIONS OF THE PROPOSAL The Proposal will be implemented, and\nthe Scheme will become binding and effective on\nHang Seng Bank and all the Scheme Shareholders,\nsubject to\nthe satisfaction or (if applicable) waiver of\nthe Conditions on or before the Conditions Long Stop Date as\ndescribed in the section headed \" 5. Conditions\nof the Proposal \" in the\nExplanatory Statement set out on pages 96 to 100 of the Scheme\nDocument. All\nof the Conditions will have to be satisfied or (if applicable)\nwaived, on or before the Conditions Long Stop Date, otherwise the\nScheme will not become binding and effective and will lapse subject\nto the requirements of the Takeovers Code. If\nall the Conditions are satisfied or (if applicable) waived on or\nbefore the Conditions Long Stop Date, the Scheme will become\nbinding and effective on Hang Seng Bank and all of the Scheme\nShareholders on the Scheme Effective Date, which is expected to be\non Monday, 26 January 2026, irrespective of whether or not such\nScheme Shareholders attended or voted at the Hang Seng Bank Court\nMeeting and/or the Hang Seng Bank General Meeting, and the listing\nof the Hang Seng Bank Shares on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange is\nexpected to be withdrawn at 4:00 p.m. on Tuesday, 27 January 2026\npursuant to Rule 6.15(2) of the Hong Kong Listing\nRules. If\nall the resolutions are passed at the Hang Seng Bank Court Meeting\nand the Hang Seng Bank General Meeting, further\nannouncement(s) will be\nmade regarding the Proposal in relation\nto, among other things, the results of the hearing of the petition\nfor the sanction of the Scheme by the High Court, the Scheme\nEffective Date and the date of the withdrawal of the listing of\nHang Seng Bank Shares from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, in\naccordance with the requirements of the Takeovers Code and the Hong\nKong Listing Rules. EXPECTED TIMETABLE The\ntimetable set out below is indicative only and is subject to\nchange. Any changes to the timetable will be jointly announced by\nHSBC Holdings, HSBC Asia Pacific and Hang Seng Bank. Unless\notherwise specified, all times and dates refer to Hong Kong local\ntimes and dates. Hong Kong time and date Date\nof despatch of the Scheme\nDocument...............................................................................................\nMonday, 15 December 2025 Latest\ntime for lodging transfers of Hang Seng Bank Shares in\norder to qualify for entitlement to attend and vote at the Hang\nSeng Bank Court Meeting and the Hang Seng Bank General Meeting (Note 1)................................................................. 4:30 p.m. on Friday, 2\nJanuary 2026 Register\nof members of Hang Seng Bank closed for determining entitlement\nto attend and vote at the Hang\nSeng Bank Court Meeting and the Hang Seng Bank General Meeting (Note 2).................................................................. Monday, 5 January 2026 to Thursday,\n8 January 2026 (both\ndays inclusive) Latest\ntime for lodging forms of proxy in respect of: ● Hang\nSeng Bank Court Meeting (Note 3)................................................. 10:30 a.m.\non Tuesday, 6\nJanuary 2026 ● Hang\nSeng Bank General Meeting (Note 3).............................................. 11:00 a.m.\non Tuesday, 6\nJanuary 2026 Meeting Record Time (Note 4) 4:30 p.m. on Tuesday, 6\nJanuary 2026 Hang Seng Bank Court\nMeeting (Notes\n3\nand 5).................................................... 10:30 a.m.\non Thursday, 8\nJanuary 2026 Hang Seng Bank General\nMeeting (Notes\n3\nand 5).................................................. 11:00\na.m. on Thursday, 8 January 2026 (or\nimmediately after the conclusion or adjournment of the Hang\nSeng Bank Court Meeting) Announcement\nof the results of the Hang Seng Bank Court\nMeeting and the Hang Seng Bank General Meeting posted\non the website of the Hong Kong\nStock Exchange............................................. \nno later than 7:00 p.m. on Thursday,\n8 January 2026 Expected\nlatest time for trading of Hang Seng Bank Shares on\nthe Hong Kong\nStock Exchange............................................................................ \n4:10 p.m. on Wednesday, 14\nJanuary 2026 Latest\ntime for lodging transfers of Hang Seng Bank Shares in order to\nqualify for entitlements to the Scheme Consideration\nunder\nthe Scheme............................................................................... \n4:30 p.m. on Monday, 19\nJanuary 2026 Register\nof members of Hang Seng Bank closed for determining entitlements to\nthe Scheme Consideration under the Scheme (Note 6)................................................................................ From Tuesday, 20\nJanuary 2026 onwards High\nCourt hearing of the petition for the sanction\nof the Scheme (Note 7)............................................................................... 10:00 a.m.\non Friday, 23\nJanuary 2026 Announcement\nof (1) the results of the High Court hearing for the\npetition for\nthe sanction of the Scheme, (2) the expected\nScheme Effective Date and (3) the expected date of the withdrawal\nof the listing of Hang Seng Bank Shares on the Hong Kong Stock\nExchange posted on the website of\nthe Hong Kong\nStock Exchange........................................................................ \nno later than 7:00 p.m. on Friday,\n23 January 2026 Scheme\nRecord Date................................................................................................................... \nFriday, 23 January 2026 Scheme Effective\nDate (Notes 7\nand 10)......................................................... Monday, 26\nJanuary 2026 Announcement\nof (1) the Scheme Effective Date and (2) the\nwithdrawal of the listing of Hang Seng Bank Shares on\nthe Hong\nKong Stock Exchange posted on the website of\nthe Hong Kong\nStock Exchange............................................................................. \nMonday, 26 January 2026 The\nwithdrawal of the listing of Hang Seng Bank Shares\non the Hong Kong Stock Exchange becomes\neffective (Note 7).............................. 4:00 p.m. on Tuesday, 27\nJanuary 2026 Latest\ntime for (1) despatch of cheques for the payment of\nthe Scheme\nConsideration to Scheme Shareholders (other than HKSCC\nNominees) and (2) payment of the Scheme Consideration\nto HKSCC Nominees by electronic bank\ntransfer (Notes 8, 9\nand 10) ........................................................... On\nor before Wednesday, 4\nFebruary 2026 Notes: 1. If\nyou are a Hang Seng Bank ADS Holder and wish to attend and/or vote\nat the Hang Seng Bank Court Meeting and/or the Hang Seng Bank\nGeneral Meeting (whether in person, via the Online Platform(s) or\nby proxy), you must elect to become a Scheme Shareholder and/or\nHang Seng Bank Shareholder by surrendering some or all of your Hang\nSeng Bank ADSs to the Depositary and withdrawing the Hang Seng Bank\nShares represented by such Hang Seng Bank ADSs in accordance with\nthe terms and conditions of the Hang Seng Bank ADS Deposit\nAgreement in order to become a Scheme Shareholder and/or Hang Seng\nBank Shareholder prior to 4:30 p.m. (Hong Kong time) on Friday, 2\nJanuary 2026 and to remain as a Scheme Shareholder and/or Hang Seng\nBank Shareholder at the Meeting Record\nTime. 2. The register of members of\nHang Seng Bank will be closed\nduring such period for\nthe purpose of determining entitlements of the\nScheme Shareholders to attend and vote at the Hang Seng Bank Court\nMeeting and of the Hang Seng Bank Shareholders to attend and vote\nat the Hang Seng Bank General Meeting. For the avoidance of doubt,\nthis period of closure is not for determining entitlements to the\nScheme Consideration under the Scheme. 3. The pink form\nof proxy in respect of the Hang Seng Bank Court Meeting and\nthe white form\nof proxy in respect of the Hang Seng Bank General Meeting should be\ncompleted and signed in accordance with the instructions\nrespectively printed thereon and should be lodged at the Share\nRegistrar at 17M Floor, Hopewell Centre, 183 Queen's Road East, Wan\nChai, Hong Kong by the times and dates stated above.\nThe pink form\nof proxy for use at the Hang Seng Bank Court Meeting and\nthe white form\nof proxy for use at the Hang Seng Bank General Meeting must be\nlodged no later than the times and date stated above in order for\nthem to be valid. Completion and return of a form of proxy for the\nHang Seng Bank Court Meeting and/or the Hang Seng Bank General\nMeeting will not preclude a Scheme Shareholder and/or a Hang Seng\nBank Shareholder from attending and voting (whether in person or\nvia the Online Platform(s)) at the relevant meeting or at any\nadjourned meeting thereof if such Scheme Shareholder and/or Hang\nSeng Bank Shareholder shall subsequently so wish, and in such\nevent, any proxy appointment made by that Scheme Shareholder and/or\nHang Seng Bank Shareholder will be deemed to be\nrevoked. 4. A specific time, being 4:30 p.m. on 6 January 2026, has been set as\nthe Meeting Record Time in order to determine more precisely the\nentitlement of holders of the Code Disinterested Shares and of the\nOrdinance Disinterested Shares to attend and vote at the Hang Seng\nBank Court Meeting. 5. If\nTyphoon Signal No. 8 or above is or is expected to be hoisted or a\nBlack Rainstorm Warning Signal or \"Extreme Conditions\" after super\ntyphoons or other adverse weather conditions announced by the\nHKSAR Government is or is expected to be in\nforce at any time between 7:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. on\nThursday, 8 January 2026, the Hang Seng Bank Court Meeting and the\nHang Seng Bank General Meeting will be adjourned and the Hang Seng\nBank Shareholders will be informed of the date, time and venue of\nthe adjourned meetings by a supplementary notice to be posted on\nHang Seng Bank's website ( www.hangseng.com) and\nthe website of HKEX ( www.hkexnews.hk). The\nHang Seng Bank Court Meeting and the Hang Seng Bank\nGeneral Meeting will be held as scheduled when\na Typhoon Signal No. 3 or below is hoisted or an Amber or\nRed Rainstorm Warning Signal is in force. Hang Seng\nBank Shareholders should carefully consider the risk of physical\nattendance at the Hang Seng Bank Court Meeting and the Hang Seng\nBank General Meeting under bad weather conditions having regard to\ntheir personal circumstances and if they should choose to do so,\nthey are advised to exercise due care\nand caution. 6. The register of members of\nHang Seng Bank will be closed\nduring such period for\nthe purpose of determining the Scheme Shareholders\nwho are qualified for the entitlements to the Scheme Consideration\nunder the Scheme. 7. The\nHigh Court hearing will be held at the High Court at the High Court\nBuilding, 38 Queensway, Hong Kong. Subject to the Conditions having\nbeen satisfied or (if applicable) waived on or before the\nConditions Long Stop Date, the Scheme shall become binding and\neffective as soon as an office copy of the order of the High Court\nsanctioning the Scheme (with or without modification) and\nconfirming the reduction of the share capital of Hang Seng Bank\nprovided for by the Scheme together with a minute and a return that\ncomply with subsections (2) and (3) of section 230 of the Companies\nOrdinance shall have been delivered and registered by the Registrar\nof Companies in Hong Kong. If the Proposal becomes unconditional\nand the Scheme becomes binding and effective, it is expected that\nthe listing of the Hang Seng Bank Shares on the Hong Kong Stock\nExchange will be withdrawn at 4:00 p.m. on Tuesday, 27 January\n2026. 8. Cheques\nfor the payment of the Scheme Consideration to the Scheme\nShareholders (other than HKSCC Nominees), and payment of the Scheme\nConsideration to HKSCC Nominees by electronic bank transfer, will\nbe despatched or made as soon as possible but in any event no later\nthan the seventh (7th) business day (as defined in the Takeovers\nCode) after the Scheme Effective Date, and (if payment is made by\nway of cheques) such cheques will be despatched by ordinary post in\npostage pre-paid envelopes addressed to the Scheme Shareholders\n(other than HKSCC Nominees) at their respective addresses as\nappearing in the register of members of Hang Seng Bank as at the\nScheme Record Date or, in the case of joint holders, at the address\nappearing in the register of members of Hang Seng Bank as at the\nScheme Record Date of the joint holder whose name then stands first\nin the register of members of Hang Seng Bank in respect of the\nrelevant joint holding. All such cheques shall be posted at the\nrisk of the addressees and none of HSBC Holdings, HSBC Asia\nPacific, Hang Seng Bank, BofA Securities, Goldman Sachs, HSBC Asia\nPacific FA, Morgan Stanley, the Depositary (or any of its\ndesignees), the Hang Seng Bank IFA and the Share Registrar and\ntheir respective directors, employees, officers, agents, advisers,\nassociates and affiliates and any other persons involved in the\nProposal shall be responsible for any loss or delay in the despatch\nof the same. Your attention is also drawn to the section headed\n\"15. Registration and payment\" in the Explanatory Statement set out\non pages 110 to 112 of the Scheme Document. 9. In\nthe case of Hang Seng Bank ADSs, the Depositary will receive an\namount in Hong Kong dollars equal to the amount payable in respect\nof all the Scheme Shares represented by the Hang Seng Bank ADSs no\nlater than the seventh (7th) business day (as defined in the\nTakeovers Code) after the Scheme Effective Date. Upon receipt, the\nDepositary will convert such funds into US dollars and thereafter\npay to the Hang Seng Bank ADS Holders as a payment in US dollars in\nproportion to the number of Hang Seng Bank ADSs held by such Hang\nSeng Bank ADS Holders, in accordance with the Hang Seng Bank ADS\nDeposit Agreement. 10. If\nany severe weather condition is in force in Hong Kong: (a) at any\ntime before 12:00 p.m. but no longer in force at or after 12:00\np.m. on the Scheme Effective Date or the latest date to despatch\ncheques for the payment of the Scheme Consideration under the\nScheme, the Scheme Effective Date or the latest date to despatch\ncheques (as the case may be) will remain on the same day; or (b) at\nany time at or after 12:00 p.m. on the Scheme Effective Date or the latest date to despatch\ncheques for the payment of the Scheme Consideration under the\nScheme, the Scheme Effective Date or the latest date to despatch\ncheques (as the case may be) will be rescheduled to the following\nbusiness day which does not have any of those warnings in force at\n12:00 p.m. and/or thereafter (or another business day thereafter\nthat does not have any severe weather condition at 12:00 p.m. or\nthereafter). For the purpose of this note, \"severe weather\" refers\nto the scenario where a tropical cyclone warning signal number 8 or\nabove is hoisted, a black rainstorm warning and/or the \"Extreme\nConditions\" warning as announced by the Hong Kong Government is/are\nin force in Hong Kong. Further announcement(s) will be made if\nthere is any change to the expected timetable as a result of any\nsevere weather. WARNING: Shareholders of and/or potential investors in HSBC\nHoldings and Hang Seng\nBank should be aware that the Proposal will\nonly be implemented if all the Conditions\nare satisfied or (if applicable) waived on or before the Conditions\nLong Stop Date. Shareholders of\nand/or potential investors in\nHSBC Holdings and Hang Seng Bank should\ntherefore exercise caution when dealing in the securities of HSBC\nHoldings and Hang Seng Bank respectively. Persons who are in doubt\nas to the action they should take should consult their licensed\nsecurities dealer or registered institution in securities, bank\nmanager, solicitor, professional accountant or other professional\nadviser. For\nand on\nbehalf of                                            \nFor and on behalf of HSBC\nHoldings plc                                             \nHang Seng Bank Limited Brendan Nelson                                                   \nEdward Cheng Wai Sun Group Chairman                                                     Chairman For\nand on behalf of The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited Dr. Peter Wong Tung Shun Non-executive Chairman The board of\ndirectors of HSBC Holdings plc as at the date of this announcement\ncomprises: Brendan Robert Nelson*, Georges Bahjat Elhedery,\nGeraldine Joyce Buckingham † ,\nRachel Duan † ,\nDame Carolyn Julie Fairbairn † ,\nJames Anthony Forese † ,\nAnn Frances Godbehere † ,\nSteven Craig Guggenheimer † ,\nManveen (Pam) Kaur, Dr José Antonio Meade\nKuribreña † ,\nKalpana Jaisingh Morparia † ,\nEileen K Murray † and\nSwee Lian Teo † . *        Independent non-executive Chair † Independent non-executive Director The board of\ndirectors of HSBC Asia Pacific as at the date of this announcement\ncomprises: Dr. Peter Wong Tung Shun # ,\nDavid Gordon Eldon*, David Liao Yi Chien, Surendranath Ravi Rosha,\nPaul Jeremy Brough*, Judy Chau Lai Kun*, Edward Cheng Wai Sun*,\nSonia Cheng Chi Man*, Choi Yiu Kwan*, Andrea Lisa Della Mattea*,\nManveen (Pam) Kaur # ,\nRajnish Kumar*, Beau Kuok Khoon Chen*, Fred Lam Tin Fuk* and\nAnnabelle Long Yu*. # Non-executive Directors *        Independent Non-executive Directors The Hang Seng Bank\nBoard as at the date of this announcement comprises: Edward Cheng\nWai Sun* (Chairman), Luanne Lim Hui Hung (Chief Executive),\nCordelia Chung*, Kathleen Gan Chieh Huey # ,\nClement Kwok King Man*, Patricia Lam Sze Wan*, David Liao Yi\nChien # ,\nLin Huey Ru*, Saw Say Pin (Chief Financial Officer), Wang Xiao Bin*\nand Catherine Zhou Rong # . # Non-executive Directors *        Independent Non-executive Directors The\nScheme Document can be viewed through the link below: http://www.rns-pdf.londonstockexchange.com/rns/5472L_1-2025-12-14.pdf Hong\nKong, 15 December 2025 HSBC Holdings plc Registered Office and Group Head Office: 8 Canada Square, London\nE14 5HQ, United Kingdom Web: www.hsbc.com Incorporated in England and Wales with limited liability. Registration number 617987 Hang Seng Bank Limited 恒生銀行有限公司 Registered Office and Head Office: 83 Des Voeux Road Central, Hong Kong Incorporated in Hong Kong with\nlimited liability The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited 香港上海 滙豐銀行有限公 司 Registered Office and Group Head Office: 1 Queen's Road Central,\nHong Kong Incorporated in Hong Kong with limited liability SIGNATURE Pursuant\nto the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the\nregistrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf\nby the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized. HSBC\nHoldings plc By: Name:\nAileen Taylor Title:\nGroup Company Secretary and Chief Governance Officer Date:\n15 December 2025", "source": "edgar", "stratum": "edgar", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1089113/000165495425013937/a5473l.htm"}
{"doc_id": "4156224cc6913e5eacf948191e8052af", "text": "6-K 1 a8412a.htm AMENDED AND RESTATED NOTICE OF REDEMPTION a8412a FORM 6-K SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 Report of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a - 16 or 15d - 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 For the\nmonth of April HSBC Holdings plc 8\nCanada Square, London E14 5HQ, England (Indicate\nby check mark whether the registrant files or will file annual\nreports under cover of Form 20-F or\nForm 40-F). Form\n20-F X Form 40-F AMENDED AND RESTATED NOTICE OF REDEMPTION Dated 16 April 2026 US$2,000,000,000 1.589% Fixed Rate/Floating Rate Senior Unsecured\nNotes due 2027 (CUSIP No. 404280CM9; ISIN: US404280CM98)* (the\n'Securities') * No representation is made as to the correctness of such numbers\neither as printed on the Securities or as contained in this Amended\nand Restated Notice of Redemption, and reliance may be placed only\non the other identification numbers printed on the Securities, and\nthe Par Redemption (as defined below) shall not be affected by any\ndefect in or omission of such numbers. The Issuer hereby amends the notice of\nredemption dated 16 April 2026 (the ' Original\nNotice' ). The Original Notice\nprovided that the Issuer will pay interest and principal on the\nSecurities on Monday, 25 May 2026; however, such date is not a\nBusiness Day. Accordingly, in accordance with the terms of the\nIndenture, payment of the interest and principal on the Securities\nwill instead be made on the next succeeding Business Day, being\nTuesday, 26 May 2026. This Amended and Restated Notice of\nRedemption reflects such amendment. All other terms of the Original\nNotice remain unchanged. To:      The Holders of the\nSecurities The New York Stock Exchange NOTE: THIS NOTICE CONTAINS IMPORTANT INFORMATION THAT IS OF\nINTEREST TO THE REGISTERED HOLDERS AND BENEFICIAL OWNERS OF THE\nSECURITIES. IF APPLICABLE, ALL DEPOSITORIES, CUSTODIANS, AND OTHER\nINTERMEDIARIES RECEIVING THIS NOTICE ARE REQUESTED TO EXPEDITE\nRE-TRANSMITTAL TO THE REGISTERED HOLDERS AND BENEFICIAL OWNERS OF\nTHE SECURITIES IN A TIMELY MANNER. The Securities have been issued pursuant to an indenture dated as\nof 26 August 2009 (as amended or supplemented from time to time,\nthe ' Base\nIndenture '),\nbetween HSBC\nHoldings plc, as issuer (the ' Issuer '), The Bank of New York Mellon, London Branch, as\ntrustee (the ' Trustee '), and HSBC Bank USA, National Association, as\npaying agent and registrar (' HSBC Bank\nUSA '), as supplemented and\namended by a nineteenth supplemental indenture dated as of 24\nNovember 2020 (the ' Nineteenth Supplemental\nIndenture ' and, together with\nthe Base Indenture, the ' Indenture ') among the Issuer, the Trustee and HSBC Bank USA\nas paying agent, registrar and calculation\nagent. Capitalised\nterms used and not defined herein have the meanings ascribed to\nthem in the Indenture. The Issuer\nhas elected to\nredeem the Securities\nin whole in accordance\nwith the terms of the Indenture and the Securities (the\n' Par\nRedemption '). Pursuant to Section 11.04 of the Base Indenture and Sections 2.01,\n2.02, 3.01, 3.02, 4.01 and 4.02 of the Nineteenth Supplemental\nIndenture, the Issuer hereby provides notice of the following\ninformation relating to the Par Redemption: ● The\nredemption date for the Securities shall be 24 May 2026\n(the ' Redemption Date ' ). ● The\nredemption price for the Securities shall be US$1,000 per US$1,000\nprincipal amount of the Securities (the ' Redemption\nPrice '). ● Additionally,\nin accordance with the terms of the Indenture, as the Redemption\nDate is an Interest Payment Date all accrued but unpaid interest\nfrom (and including) 24 November 2025 to (but excluding) the\nRedemption Date will be payable to the holders of record of the\nSecurities as of 9 May 2026, the Regular Record Date (the\n' Interest Payment '). ● Subject\nto any conditions and/or the limited circumstances contained in the\nNineteenth Supplemental Indenture, on the Redemption Date the\nRedemption Price and the Interest Payment shall become due and\npayable upon each such Security to be redeemed and interest thereon\nshall cease to accrue on and after such date. ● Pursuant\nto the terms of the Indenture, as the Redemption Date is not a\nBusiness Day, the Issuer will pay interest and principal on the\nSecurities on the next succeeding Business Day, Tuesday, 26 May\n2026. In accordance with the terms of the Indenture, interest on\nthe payment of the Redemption Price and the Interest Payment shall\nnot accrue during the period from and after the\nscheduled Redemption Date. ● Securities\nshould be surrendered at the registered office of HSBC Bank USA at\n66 Hudson Boulevard East, 545W9, New York, NY 10001, Attention:\nIssuer Services. Questions relating to this Amended and Restated Notice of\nRedemption should be addressed to HSBC Bank USA via e-mail at\nCTLANYDealManagement@us.hsbc.com, at its registered office or via\ntelephone at +1 201 217 8417. IMPORTANT TAX INFORMATION EXISTING US FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAW MAY REQUIRE BACKUP WITHHOLDING\nOF 24% OF ANY PAYMENTS TO HOLDERS PRESENTING THEIR SECURITIES FOR\nPAYMENTS WHO HAVE FAILED TO FURNISH A TAXPAYER IDENTIFICATION\nNUMBER CERTIFIED TO BE CORRECT UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY ON A\nCOMPLETE AND VALID INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE ('IRS') FORM W-9 OR\nAPPLICABLE FORM W-8 TO THE APPLICABLE PAYER OR WITHHOLDING AGENT.\nHOLDERS MAY ALSO BE SUBJECT TO PENALTIES FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE\nSUCH NUMBER. ends/more Investor enquiries to: Greg\nCase                   \n+44 (0) 20 7992\n3825                 investorrelations@hsbc.com Media enquiries to: Press Office\n               \n+44 (0) 20 7991 8096 pressoffice@hsbc.com Note to editors: HSBC Holdings plc HSBC Holdings plc, the parent company of HSBC, is headquartered in\nLondon. HSBC serves customers worldwide from offices in 56\ncountries and territories. With assets of US$3,233bn at\n31 December 2025, HSBC is one of the world's largest\nbanking and financial services organisations. ends/all SIGNATURE Pursuant\nto the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the\nregistrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf\nby the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized. HSBC\nHoldings plc By: Name:\nAngela McEntee Title:\nGroup Company Secretary Date:\n17 April 2026 &#xD;", "source": "edgar", "stratum": "edgar", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1089113/000165495426003633/a8412a.htm"}
{"doc_id": "9682e5eac76b9b5e9d08039eb7cbaae0", "text": "6-K 1 a3675w.htm THIRD INTERIM DIVIDEND FOR 2023 - EXCHANGE RATE a3675w FORM 6-K SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 Report of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a - 16 or 15d - 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 For the\nmonth of December HSBC Holdings plc 42nd\nFloor, 8 Canada Square, London E14 5HQ, England (Indicate\nby check mark whether the registrant files or will file annual\nreports under cover of Form 20-F or Form 40-F). Form\n20-F X Form 40-F 11 December 2023 HSBC HOLDINGS PLC THIRD INTERIM DIVIDEND FOR 2023 On 30 October 2023, the Directors of HSBC Holdings plc approved a\nthird interim dividend in\nrespect of the financial year ending 31 December\n2023 of US$0.10 per\nordinary share. The dividend is payable on 21 December 2023 to\nholders of record on 10 November 2023 on the Principal Register in\nthe United Kingdom, the Hong Kong Overseas Branch Register or the\nBermuda Overseas Branch Register. The dividend is payable in cash\nin United States dollars, sterling or Hong Kong dollars, or a\ncombination of these currencies. Dividends payable in cash in Hong Kong dollars or sterling were\nconverted from United States dollars at the forward exchange\nrates quoted by HSBC Bank plc in London at or about 11.00 am\non 11 December 2023 (US$1=HK$7.802778 and\n£1=US$1.257404). Accordingly, the cash dividend payable on 21\nDecember 2023 will be: US$0.10\nper share; approximately\nHK$0.780278 per share; or approximately £0.079529 per\nshare. For holders of American Depositary Shares ('ADSs'), each of which\nrepresents five ordinary shares, the cash dividend payable will be\nUS$0.50 per ADS. It will be paid on 21\nDecember 2023. For and on behalf of HSBC Holdings plc Aileen Taylor Group Company Secretary and Chief Governance Officer SIGNATURE Pursuant\nto the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the\nregistrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf\nby the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized. HSBC\nHoldings plc By: Name:\nAileen Taylor Title:\nGroup Company Secretary and Chief Governance Officer Date: \n11 December 2023", "source": "edgar", "stratum": "edgar", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1089113/000165495423015315/a3675w.htm"}
{"doc_id": "a7fa585a004aaa88fcbd12845543c3da", "text": "6-K 1 a3718j.htm TRANSACTION IN OWN SHARES a3718j FORM 6-K SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 Report of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a - 16 or 15d - 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 For the\nmonth of October HSBC Holdings plc 42nd\nFloor, 8 Canada Square, London E14 5HQ, England (Indicate\nby check mark whether the registrant files or will file annual\nreports under cover of Form 20-F or Form 40-F). Form\n20-F X Form 40-F HSBC HOLDINGS PLC 23 October 2024 Transaction in own shares HSBC Holdings plc (\" HSBC \" or the \" Company \") announces that it has purchased for\ncancellation the following number of its ordinary shares of US$0.50\nfrom Merrill Lynch International (\" Merrill\nLynch \") as part of its\nbuy-back announced on 1 August 2024. UK Venues Date of purchase: 23 October 2024 Number of ordinary shares of US$0.50 each purchased: 1,110,000 Highest price paid per share: £6.8640 Lowest price paid per share: £6.7660 Volume weighted average price paid per share: £6.8043 All repurchases on the London Stock Exchange, Cboe Europe Limited\n(through the BXE and CXE order books) and/or Turquoise\n(\" UK\nVenues \") are implemented as \"on\nExchange\" transactions (as such term is defined in the rules of the\nLondon Stock Exchange) and as \"market purchases\" for the purposes\nof the Companies Act 2006. Hong Kong Stock Exchange Date of purchase: 23 October 2024 Number of ordinary shares of US$0.50 each purchased: 989,200 Highest price paid per share: HK$69.0500 Lowest price paid per share: HK$68.5000 Volume weighted average price paid per share: HK$68.8528 All repurchases on The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited\n(\" Hong Kong\nStock Exchange \") are \"off\nmarket\" for the purposes of the Companies Act 2006 but are\ntransactions which occur \"on Exchange\" for the purposes of the\nRules Governing the Listing of Securities on The Stock Exchange of\nHong Kong Limited and which constitute an \"on-market share\nbuy-back\" for the purposes of the Codes on Takeovers and Mergers\nand Share Buy-backs. Since the commencement of the buy-back announced on 1 August 2024,\nthe Company has repurchased 341,654,319 ordinary shares for a total\nconsideration of approximately US$2,966.4m. Following the cancellation of the shares repurchased on the UK\nVenues, the Company's issued ordinary share capital will consist of\n18,166,545,802 ordinary shares with voting rights. There are no\nordinary shares held in treasury. Cancellation of the shares\nrepurchased on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange takes longer than those\nrepurchased on the UK Venues and a further announcement of total\nvoting rights will be made once those shares have been\ncancelled. The above figure of 18,166,545,802 may be used by shareholders as\nthe denominator for the calculations by which they will determine\nif they are required to notify their interest in, or a change to\ntheir interest in, the Company under the Financial Conduct\nAuthority's Disclosure Guidance and Transparency\nRules. In accordance with Article 5(1)(b) of the Market Abuse Regulation\n(EU) No 596/2014 (as it forms part of domestic law of the United\nKingdom by virtue of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018), a\nfull breakdown of the individual trades made by Merrill Lynch on\nbehalf of the Company is available via the link below. http://www.rns-pdf.londonstockexchange.com/rns/3710J_1-2024-10-23.pdf This announcement will also be available on HSBC's website\nat www.hsbc.com/sea Enquiries to: Lee Davis Corporate Governance & Secretariat shareholderquestions@hsbc.com +44 (0)20 7991 8888 SIGNATURE Pursuant\nto the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the\nregistrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf\nby the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized. HSBC\nHoldings plc By: Name:\nAileen Taylor Title:\nGroup Company Secretary and Chief Governance Officer Date:\n23 October 2024", "source": "edgar", "stratum": "edgar", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1089113/000165495424013254/a3718j.htm"}
{"doc_id": "2e5ec0839c46426805515cfe01883b15", "text": "6-K 1 a4332o.htm PRICING TERMS FOR TENDER OFFERS FOR NOTES a4332o FORM 6-K SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 Report of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a - 16 or 15d - 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 For the\nmonth of May HSBC Holdings plc 42nd\nFloor, 8 Canada Square, London E14 5HQ, England (Indicate\nby check mark whether the registrant files or will file annual\nreports under cover of Form 20-F or Form 40-F). Form\n20-F X Form 40-F 14 May 2024 HSBC HOLDINGS PLC ANNOUNCES PRICING\nTERMS OF ITS TENDER OFFERS FOR FOUR SERIES OF NOTES On May 8, 2024, HSBC Holdings plc (the ' Company ,' ' we ' or ' us ') launched four separate offers to purchase for\ncash any and all of the outstanding series of notes listed in the\ntable below. We refer to the outstanding notes listed in the table\nbelow collectively as the ' Notes ' and separately as a ' series ' of Notes. We refer to each offer to purchase a\nseries of Notes as an ' Offer ', and collectively as the ' Offers .' The Offers are made upon the terms and are subject to the\nconditions set forth in the Offer to Purchase dated May 8, 2024\nrelating to the Notes (the ' Offer to\nPurchase ') and\nthe related notice of guaranteed delivery (together with the Offer\nto Purchase, the ' Offer\nDocuments '),\nincluding the Maximum Tender Amount Condition and the New Issue\nCondition (each as defined below). The\nOffer Documents are available at the following\nlink: https://www.gbsc-usa.com/hsbc/ . The Company today announces that on the terms and subject to the\nconditions in the Offer to Purchase, set forth in the table below\nis the ' Consideration '\nfor each series of Notes, as calculated at 11:00 a.m. (New York\nCity time) on the date hereof (the ' Price Determination\nDate ') in accordance with the\nOffer to Purchase. References to '$' are to U.S.\ndollars. Acceptance Priority\nLevel (1) Title of Notes CUSIP Maturity Date First Optional Redemption\nDate (2) Principal Amount Outstanding Reference Security Reference Yield Fixed Spread Consideration (3) 1 3.900% Senior Unsecured Notes due 2026 (the ' May 2026\nNotes ') 404280BB4 May 25, 2026 N/A $2,500,000,000 UST4.875% due April 30, 2026 (ISIN US91282CKK61) 4.832% +20 basis points (' bps ') $978.48 2 4.300% Senior Unsecured Notes due 2026(the ' March 2026\nNotes ') 404280AW9 March 8, 2026 N/A $3,000,000,000 +20 bps $987.43 3 1.589% Fixed Rate/Floating Rate Senior Unsecured Notes due\n2027 (the ' May\n2027 Notes ') 404280CM9 May 24, 2027 May 24, 2026 $2,000,000,000 +45 bps $930.13 4 2.251% Fixed Rate/Floating Rate Senior Unsecured Notes due\n2027 (the ' November 2027\nNotes ') 404280CX5 November 22, 2027 November 22, 2026 $2,500,000,000 +45 bps $929.51 (1) We will accept Notes in the order of their respective\nAcceptance Priority Level specified in the table above, subject to\nthe satisfaction of the Maximum Tender Amount Condition and the New\nIssue Condition (each as defined below). It is possible that the Maximum\nTender Amount Condition might not be met with respect to any series\nof Notes with an Acceptance Priority Level greater than 1, and such\nseries of Notes will not be accepted for purchase, even if one or\nmore series of Notes with a lower Acceptance Priority Level is\naccepted for purchase. If any series of Notes is accepted for\npurchase under the Offers, all Notes of that series that are\nvalidly tendered and not validly withdrawn will be accepted for\npurchase. As a result, no series of Notes accepted for purchase\nwill be prorated. (2) For each series of Notes in respect of which a First Optional\nRedemption Date is indicated, the calculation of the applicable\nConsideration (as defined below) has been performed assuming\nrepayment of the principal on such First Optional Redemption Date\nfor such series of Notes, excluding scheduled interest payments\nafter such date. (3) Per $1,000 principal amount. Each Offer will expire at 5:00 p.m. (New York City time) today,\nunless extended or earlier terminated by the Company in its sole\ndiscretion (such date and time with respect to an Offer, as the\nsame may be extended, the ' Expiration\nTime '). Notes tendered for\npurchase may be validly withdrawn at any time at or prior to 5:00\np.m. (New York City time) today (such date and time with respect to\nan Offer, as the same may be extended, the ' Withdrawal\nDate '), but not thereafter,\nunless extended or earlier terminated with respect to an Offer by\nthe Company in its sole discretion. We expect the settlement date\nto occur on May 17, 2024, unless extended or earlier terminated in\nrespect of an Offer by the Company in its sole discretion (such\ndate and time with respect to an Offer, as the same may be\nextended, the ' Settlement\nDate '). Each Offer is independent of the other Offers, and we may\nterminate, modify or waive the conditions of any Offer without\nterminating, modifying or waiving the conditions of any other\nOffer. Upon the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in the Offer\nDocuments, holders who (i) validly tender Notes at or prior to the\nExpiration Time or (ii) validly tender Notes at or prior to 5:00\np.m. (New York City time) on May 16, 2024 (such date and time with\nrespect to an Offer, as the same may be extended, the\n' Guaranteed\nDelivery Date ') pursuant to the\nGuaranteed Delivery Procedures (as defined in the Offer to\nPurchase), and whose Notes (i) have not been validly withdrawn at\nor prior to the Withdrawal Date and (ii) are accepted for purchase\nby us, will receive the Consideration specified in the table above\nfor each $1,000 principal amount of such Notes, which will be\npayable in cash on the Settlement Date as described below (the\n' Consideration '). The Consideration applicable to each series of Notes validly\ntendered and accepted by us pursuant to the Offers has been\ndetermined in accordance with the formula set forth in the Offer to\nPurchase and with standard market practice, using the applicable\n' Offer\nYield ', which is equal to the\nsum of: a)   the applicable ' Reference\nYield ' specified in the table\nabove that corresponds to the bid-side yield of the Reference\nSecurity specified in the table above for such series of Notes on\nthe Bloomberg Reference Page PX1, plus b)  \nthe Fixed Spread specified in the table above for such series of\nNotes. Accordingly, the Consideration payable by us for each $1,000\nprincipal amount of each series of Notes accepted by us is equal\nto: (i)  \nthe present value on the Settlement Date of $1,000 principal amount\nof such Notes due on, in the case of the May 2026 Notes and the\nMarch 2026 Notes, the maturity date (as specified in the table\nabove) of such Notes and in the case of the May 2027 Notes and the\nNovember 2027 Notes, the First Optional Redemption Date (as\nspecified in the table above) of such Notes, and all scheduled\ninterest payments on such $1,000 principal amount of such Notes to\nbe made from (but excluding) the Settlement Date up to and\nincluding such maturity date or First Optional Redemption Date, as\nthe case may be, discounted to the Settlement Date at a discount\nrate equal to the applicable Offer Yield, minus (ii)  \nthe Accrued Interest per $1,000 principal amount of such\nNotes; such total amount being rounded to the nearest cent per $1,000\nprincipal amount of such Notes, and the above calculation has been\nmade in accordance with standard market practice as described by\nthe formula set forth in the Offer to Purchase. In addition to the Consideration, holders whose Notes of a given\nseries are accepted for purchase will also be paid a cash amount\nequal to accrued and unpaid interest on such Notes from, and\nincluding, the last interest payment date for such Notes to, but\nnot including, the Settlement Date, rounded to the nearest cent\n(such amount in respect of a series of Notes, ' Accrued\nInterest '). Accrued Interest\nwill be payable on the Settlement Date. For the avoidance of doubt,\ninterest will cease to accrue on the Settlement Date for all Notes\naccepted in the Offers. Under no circumstances will any interest be\npayable to holders because of any delay on the part of Global\nBondholder Services Corporation, as depositary, The Depository\nTrust Company (' DTC ') or any other party in the transmission of funds\nto holders. The Offers are subject to the terms and conditions described in the\nOffer Documents. In particular, the Company's obligation to\ncomplete an Offer with respect to a particular series of Notes is\nconditioned on satisfaction of the ' Maximum Tender Amount\nCondition ', meaning that the\nsum of (a) the Consideration (excluding Accrued Interest) for\nall validly tendered and not validly withdrawn Notes of such\nseries plus (b) the aggregate Consideration (excluding\nAccrued Interest) for all validly tendered and not validly\nwithdrawn Notes of each series having a higher Acceptance Priority\nLevel (as specified in the above table, with 1 being the highest\nAcceptance Priority Level and 4 being the lowest Acceptance\nPriority Level), other than Excluded Notes (as defined below), does\nnot exceed $5,000,000,000 (the ' Maximum Tender\nAmount '). Our obligation to\ncomplete the Offers is also conditioned on the successful\ncompletion, on terms and conditions satisfactory to us in our sole\ndiscretion, of the Proposed Issuance (as defined in the Offer to\nPurchase) (the ' New Issue\nCondition '). Notwithstanding any other provision in the Offer to Purchase to the\ncontrary, if the Maximum Tender Amount Condition is not satisfied\nfor a particular series of Notes, at any time at or prior to the\nExpiration Time, then (1) we will not be obligated to accept for\npurchase such series of Notes and will terminate the Offer with\nrespect to such series of Notes (such series of Notes,\n' Excluded\nNotes '), and (2) if there is\nany series of Notes having a lower Acceptance Priority Level for\nwhich the Maximum Tender Amount Condition is satisfied, meaning the\nMaximum Tender Amount is equal to or greater than the sum\nof: a)  \nthe Consideration necessary to purchase all validly tendered and\nnot validly withdrawn Notes of such series (excluding Accrued\nInterest), plus b)  \nthe aggregate Consideration necessary to purchase all validly\ntendered and not validly withdrawn Notes of all series having a\nhigher Acceptance Priority Level than such series of Notes, other\nthan the Excluded Notes (in each case, excluding Accrued\nInterest), then all Notes of such series having a lower Acceptance Priority\nLevel will be accepted for purchase, and the Maximum Tender Amount\nCondition will be applied at each subsequent Acceptance Priority\nLevel until there is no series of Notes with a lower Acceptance\nPriority Level to be considered for purchase for which the Maximum\nTender Amount Condition is met. It is possible that any series of Notes with an Acceptance Priority\nLevel greater than 1 will fail to meet the Maximum Tender Amount\nCondition and therefore will not be accepted for purchase even if\none or more series with a lower Acceptance Priority Level is\naccepted for purchase. If any series of Notes is accepted for\npurchase under the Offers, all Notes of that series that are\nvalidly tendered and not validly withdrawn will be accepted for\npurchase. As a result, no series of Notes accepted for purchase\nwill be prorated. The Company reserves the right to amend or waive any of the\nconditions of the Offers, in whole or in part, at any time or from\ntime to time, in its sole discretion, subject to applicable law. If\nany of the conditions are not satisfied at the Expiration Time with\nrespect to an Offer, the Company may, in its sole discretion and\nwithout giving any notice, subject to applicable law, (a) terminate\nsuch Offer, (b) extend such Offer, on the same or amended terms,\nand thereby delay acceptance of any validly tendered Notes, or (c)\ncontinue to accept tenders. Holders of Notes are advised to read carefully the Offer to\nPurchase, including the 'Risk Factors' section, for full details of\nand information on the procedures for participating in the\nOffers. The Company has retained HSBC Bank plc as Dealer Manager for the\nOffers (the ' Dealer\nManager '). Questions and\nrequests for assistance related to the Offers may be directed to\nthe Dealer Manager at UK: +44 (0)20 7992 6237, US: +1 (212)\n525-5552 (Collect) or +1 (888) HSBC-4LM (Toll Free), or by email at\nliability.management@hsbcib.com. Global Bondholder Services Corporation is acting as the information\nagent (the ' Information\nAgent ').\nQuestions or requests for assistance related to the Offers or for\nadditional copies of the Offer\nDocuments may\nbe directed to the Information Agent at +1 (855) 654-2014 (toll\nfree) or +1 (212) 430-3774 (banks and brokers). You may also\ncontact your broker, dealer, custodian bank, trust company or other\nnominee for assistance concerning the Offers. If the Company terminates an Offer, all Notes tendered pursuant to\nsuch Offer will be returned promptly to the tendering holders\nthereof. Holders of Notes are advised to check with any bank, securities\nbroker or other intermediary through which they hold Notes as to\nwhen such intermediary would need to receive instructions from a\nbeneficial owner in order for that beneficial owner to be able to\nparticipate in, or withdraw their instruction to participate in, an\nOffer before the deadlines specified herein and in the Offer to\nPurchase. The deadlines set by any such intermediary and DTC for\nthe submission and withdrawal of tender instructions will also be\nearlier than the relevant deadlines specified herein and in the\nOffer to Purchase. This announcement is for informational purposes only and does not\nconstitute an offer to purchase or sell, or a solicitation of an\noffer to purchase or sell, any security. No offer, solicitation, or\nsale will be made in any jurisdiction in which such an offer,\nsolicitation, or sale would be unlawful. The Offers are only being\nmade pursuant to the Offer to Purchase. Holders of the Notes are\nurged to carefully read the Offer to Purchase before making any\ndecision with respect to the Offers. United Kingdom. This communication and any other\ndocuments or materials relating to the Offers is not being made and\nsuch documents and/or materials have not been approved by an\nauthorized person for the purposes of section 21 of the Financial\nServices and Markets Act 2000 (the ' FSMA ').\nAccordingly, this communication and such documents and/or materials\nare not being distributed to the general public in the United\nKingdom. The communication of such documents and/or materials is\nexempt from the restriction on financial promotions under section\n21 of the FSMA on the basis that it is only directed at and may be\ncommunicated to (1) those persons who are existing members or\ncreditors of HSBC Holdings or other persons within Article 43 of\nthe Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion)\nOrder 2005, and (2) to any other persons to whom these documents\nand/or materials may lawfully be communicated. Belgium . Neither this\ncommunication nor any other documents or materials relating to the\nOffers have been or will be notified to, and neither this\ncommunication nor any other documents or materials relating to the\nOffers have been or will be approved by, the Belgian Financial\nServices and Markets Authority (' Autorité\ndes services et marches financiers / Autoriteit financiële\ndiensten en markten '). The\nOffers may therefore not be made in Belgium by way of a public\ntakeover bid ( openbaar overnamebod/offer\npublique d'acquisition ), as\ndefined in Article 3 of the Belgian law of 1 April 2007 on public\ntakeover bids, as amended (the ' Belgian Takeover\nLaw '), save in those\ncircumstances where a private placement exemption is\navailable. The Offers are conducted exclusively under applicable private\nplacement exemptions. The Offers may therefore not be advertised\nand the Offers will not be extended, and neither this communication\nnor any other documents or materials relating to the Offers have\nbeen or will be distributed or made available, directly or\nindirectly, to any person in Belgium other than (i) to 'qualified\ninvestors' within the meaning of Article 2(e) of Regulation (EU)\n2017/1129 and (ii) in any circumstances set out in Article 6,\n§4 of the Belgian Takeover Law. This communication has been\nissued only for the personal use of the above qualified investors\nand exclusively for the purpose of the Offers. Accordingly, the\ninformation contained in this communication may not be used for any\nother purpose or disclosed to any other person in\nBelgium. Italy. None of the Offers, this\ncommunication or any other document or materials relating to the\nOffers have been or will be submitted to the clearance procedures\nof the Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa\n(' CONSOB ')\npursuant to Italian laws and regulations. The Offers are being\ncarried out in the Republic of Italy as exempted offers pursuant to\narticle 101-bis, paragraph 3-bis of the Legislative Decree No. 58\nof 24 February 1998, as amended (the ' Financial\nServices Act ')\nand article 35-bis, paragraph 4 of CONSOB Regulation No. 11971 of\n14 May 1999, as amended. Holders or beneficial owners of the Notes\nthat are located in the Republic of Italy can tender the Notes for\npurchase in the Offers through authorized persons (such as\ninvestment firms, banks or financial intermediaries permitted to\nconduct such activities in the Republic of Italy in accordance with\nthe Financial Services Act, CONSOB Regulation No. 20307 of 15\nFebruary 2018, as amended from time to time, and Legislative Decree\nNo. 385 of 1 September 1993, as amended) and in compliance with\napplicable laws and regulations or with requirements imposed by\nCONSOB or any other Italian authority. Each intermediary must comply with the applicable laws and\nregulations concerning information duties vis-à-vis its\nclients in connection with the Notes and/or the\nOffers. Hong Kong. The contents of this\ncommunication have not been reviewed by any regulatory authority in\nHong Kong. Holders of Notes should exercise caution in relation to\nthe Offers. If a holder of the Notes is in any doubt about any of\nthe contents of this communication, such holder should obtain\nindependent professional advice. The Offers have not been made and\nwill not be made in Hong Kong, by means of any document, other than\n(i) to 'professional investors' as defined in the Securities and\nFutures Ordinance (Cap. 571) of the laws of Hong Kong (the\n' SFO ')\nand any rules made under that ordinance, or (ii) in other\ncircumstances which do not result in the document being a\n'prospectus' as defined in the Companies (Winding Up and\nMiscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap. 32) of the laws of Hong\nKong or which do not constitute an offer to the public within the\nmeaning of that ordinance. Further, no person has issued or had in its possession for the\npurposes of issue, or will issue or have in its possession for the\npurposes of issue (in each case whether in Hong Kong or elsewhere),\nany advertisement, invitation or document relating to the Offers,\nwhich is directed at, or the contents of which are likely to be\naccessed or read by, the public in Hong Kong (except if permitted\nto do so under the securities laws of Hong Kong) other than with\nrespect to the Offers and/or the Notes which are or are intended to\nbe made only to persons outside Hong Kong or only to 'professional\ninvestors' as defined in the SFO and any rules made thereunder.\nThis communication and the information contained herein may not be\nused other than by the person to whom it is addressed and may not\nbe reproduced in any form or transferred to any person in Hong\nKong. The Offers are not intended to be made to the public in Hong\nKong and it is not the intention of HSBC Holdings that the Offers\nbe made to the public in Hong Kong. Canada. Any\noffer or solicitation in Canada must be made through a dealer that\nis appropriately registered under the laws of the applicable\nprovince or territory of Canada, or pursuant to an exemption from\nthat requirement. Where the Dealer Manager or any affiliate thereof\nis a registered dealer or able to rely on an exemption from the\nrequirement to be registered in such jurisdiction, the Offers shall\nbe deemed to be made by such Dealer Manager, or such affiliate, on\nbehalf of the relevant Dealer Manager in that\njurisdiction. France. This\ncommunication and any other offering material relating to the\nOffers may not be distributed in the Republic of France except to\nqualified investors as defined in Article 2(e) of Regulation (EU)\n2017/1129. Cautionary Statement Regarding Forward-Looking\nStatements In this communication the Company has made forward-looking\nstatements. All statements other than statements of historical fact\nare, or may be deemed to be, forward-looking statements.\nForward-looking statements may be identified by the use of terms\nsuch as 'believes,' 'expects,' 'estimate,' 'may,' 'intends,'\n'plan,' 'will,' 'should,' 'potential,' 'seek,' 'reasonably\npossible' or 'anticipates' or the negative thereof or similar\nexpressions, or by discussions of strategy. We have based the\nforward-looking statements on current expectations and projections\nabout future events. These forward-looking statements are subject\nto risks, uncertainties and assumptions about us, as described\nunder 'Risk Factors' in the Offer to Purchase. We undertake no\nobligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking\nstatements, whether as a result of new information, future events\nor otherwise. In light of these risks, uncertainties and\nassumptions, the forward-looking events discussed herein might not\noccur. You are cautioned not to place undue reliance on any\nforward-looking statements, which speak only as of their\ndates. Investor enquiries to: Greg\nCase                           \n+44 (0) 20 7992\n3825 investorrelations@hsbc.com Media enquiries to: Press\nOffice                         \n+44 (0) 20 7991\n8096 pressoffice@hsbc.com Note to editors: HSBC Holdings plc HSBC Holdings plc, the parent company of the HSBC Group, is\nheadquartered in London. HSBC serves customers worldwide from\noffices in 62 countries and territories. With assets of US$3,001bn\nat 31 March 2024, HSBC is one of the world's largest banking and\nfinancial services organisations. ends/all SIGNATURE Pursuant\nto the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the\nregistrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf\nby the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized. HSBC\nHoldings plc By: Name:\nAileen Taylor Title:\nGroup Company Secretary and Chief Governance Officer Date:\n14 May 2024", "source": "edgar", "stratum": "edgar", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1089113/000165495424006208/a4332o.htm"}
{"doc_id": "6d9c583a5c161715745101ace58afea2", "text": "6-K 1 hsbcholdings4492m.htm TOTAL VOTING RIGHTS hsbcholdings4492m FORM 6-K SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 Report of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a - 16 or 15d - 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 For the\nmonth of April HSBC Holdings plc 42nd\nFloor, 8 Canada Square, London E14 5HQ, England (Indicate\nby check mark whether the registrant files or will file annual\nreports under cover of Form 20-F or Form 40-F). Form\n20-F X Form 40-F HSBC HOLDINGS PLC 29 April 2024 Voting Rights and Capital The following notification is made in accordance with the UK\nFinancial Conduct Authority Disclosure Guidance and Transparency\nRule 5.6.1. On 29 April 2024, 47,631,200 ordinary shares which were awaiting\ncancellation having been previously repurchased under the buy-back\non the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, were cancelled. Following\ncancellation of those shares, HSBC Holdings plc has 18,829,384,795\nordinary shares of US$0.50 in issue. No shares are held in\ntreasury. Therefore, the total number of voting rights in HSBC Holdings plc\nis 18,829,384,795. This figure for\nthe total number of voting rights may be used by shareholders as\nthe denominator for the calculations by which they will determine\nif they are required to notify their interest in, or a change to\ntheir interest in, HSBC Holdings plc under the Financial Conduct\nAuthority's Disclosure Guidance and Transparency Rules and/or under\nPart XV of the Hong Kong Securities and Futures\nOrdinance. Any such notification should be\nsent to investorrelations@hsbc.com and\nshareholderquestions@hsbc.com. Lee Davis Corporate Governance & Secretariat shareholderquestions@hsbc.com SIGNATURE Pursuant\nto the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the\nregistrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf\nby the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized. HSBC\nHoldings plc By: Name:\nAileen Taylor Title:\nGroup Company Secretary and Chief Governance Officer Date:\n29 April 2024", "source": "edgar", "stratum": "edgar", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1089113/000165495424005173/hsbcholdings4492m.htm"}
{"doc_id": "6449453b5d8ddd141af978fb429f6e09", "text": "6-K 1 a4083a.htm OVERSEAS REGULATORY ANNOUNCEMENT - GRANT OF AWARDS a4083a FORM 6-K SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 Report of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a - 16 or 15d - 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 For the\nmonth of April HSBC Holdings plc 8\nCanada Square, London E14 5HQ, England (Indicate\nby check mark whether the registrant files or will file annual\nreports under cover of Form 20-F or\nForm 40-F). Form\n20-F X Form 40-F The\nfollowing is the text of an announcement released to The Stock\nExchange of Hong Kong Limited on 14 April 2026 pursuant\nto rules 17.06A, 17.06B and 17.06C of the Rules Governing the\nListing of Securities on The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong\nLimited: Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited and The Stock Exchange of\nHong Kong Limited take no responsibility for the contents of this\ndocument, make no representation as to its accuracy or completeness\nand expressly disclaim any liability whatsoever for any loss\nhowsoever arising from or in reliance upon the whole or any part of\nthe contents of this document. 14 April 2026 (Hong Kong Stock Code: 5) HSBC HOLDINGS PLC GRANT OF CONDITIONAL AWARDS This\nannouncement is made pursuant to Rules 17.06A, 17.06B and 17.06C of\nthe Rules Governing the Listing of Securities on The Stock Exchange\nof Hong Kong Limited. On 13 April 2026, HSBC Holdings plc (the\n\" Company \") granted conditional awards\n(\" Awards \")\nto employees to subscribe for a total of 307,754.79576 ordinary\nshares of US$0.50 each of the Company under the HSBC International\nEmployee Share Purchase Plan (the \" Plan \"). The\nfollowing are the details of the grants: Grant\ndate 13\nApril 2026 Category\nof grantee Employees Number\nof shares under Awards 160,942.19905 LSE\nlisted shares 146,812.59671 HKSE\nlisted shares Closing\nmarket price of the ordinary shares on the London Stock Exchange\nand the Hong Kong Stock Exchange on the date of grant GBP 13.324 HKD 138.80 Purchase\nprice of Awards granted GBP\n0 Vesting\nperiod of the Awards 2\nyears 6 months Performance\nTargets and Clawback Grants\nof Awards under the Plan do not have performance conditions or\nclawback provisions due to the all-employee nature of the\nPlan Arrangements\nfor the Company or a subsidiary to provide financial assistance to\nthe grantees None Number\nof shares available for future grant under the plan\nmandate The\nPlan is subject to a limit on the number of Shares committed to be\nissued under all Plan Awards: 10%\nof the ordinary share capital of the Company in issue immediately\nbefore that day, when added to the number of Shares which have been\nissued, or committed to be issued, to satisfy Awards under the\nPlan, or options or awards under any other employee share plan\noperated by the Company granted in the previous 10 years. The\nnumber of Shares available to issue under this limit\nis 1,108,840,359. For\nand on behalf of HSBC Holdings plc Angela\nMcEntee Group\nCompany Secretary The\nBoard of Directors of HSBC Holdings plc as at the date of this\nannouncement comprises: Brendan Robert Nelson*, Georges Bahjat Elhedery, Geraldine\nJoyce Buckingham † ,\nWei Sun Christianson † ,\nRachel Duan † ,\nDame Carolyn Julie Fairbairn † ,\nJames Anthony Forese † ,\nAnn Frances Godbehere † ,\nSteven Craig Guggenheimer † ,\nManveen (Pam) Kaur, Dr José Antonio Meade\nKuribreña † ,\nKalpana Jaisingh Morparia † ,\nEileen K Murray † and\nSwee Lian Teo † . *  Independent\nnon-executive Chairman † Independent\nnon-executive Director HSBC Holdings plc Registered Office and Group Head Office: 8 Canada Square, London E14 5HQ,\nUnited Kingdom Web: www.hsbc.com Incorporated in England and Wales with limited liability.\nRegistration number 617987 SIGNATURE Pursuant\nto the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the\nregistrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf\nby the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized. HSBC\nHoldings plc By: Name:\nAngela McEntee Title:\nGroup Company Secretary Date:\n14 April 2026", "source": "edgar", "stratum": "edgar", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1089113/000165495426003472/a4083a.htm"}
{"doc_id": "64bff88d7d720df57a6c732498ae2d7c", "text": "6-K 1 a2564j.htm MONTHLY UPDATE ON PRIVATISATION OF HANG SENG BANK a2564j FORM 6-K SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 Report of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a - 16 or 15d - 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 For the\nmonth of November HSBC Holdings plc 42nd\nFloor, 8 Canada Square, London E14 5HQ, England (Indicate\nby check mark whether the registrant files or will file annual\nreports under cover of Form 20-F or\nForm 40-F). Form\n20-F X Form 40-F Hong Kong\nExchanges and Clearing Limited and The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong\nLimited take no responsibility for the contents of this\nannouncement, make no representation as to its accuracy or\ncompleteness and expressly disclaim any liability whatsoever for\nany loss howsoever arising from or in reliance upon the whole or\nany part of the contents of this announcement. This announcement is for information purposes only and does not\nconstitute, or form part of, any invitation or offer to acquire,\npurchase or subscribe for any securities of HSBC Holdings, HSBC\nAsia Pacific or Hang Seng Bank, nor is it an invitation or offer to\nor a solicitation of any offer to acquire, purchase or subscribe\nfor securities of HSBC Holdings, HSBC Asia Pacific or Hang Seng\nBank, or the solicitation of any vote or approval in any\njurisdiction, nor shall there be any sale, issuance or transfer of\nsecurities of HSBC Holdings, HSBC Asia Pacific or Hang Seng Bank in\nany jurisdiction in contravention of applicable law. This\nannouncement is not for release, publication or distribution, in\nwhole or in part, in or into or from any other jurisdiction where\nto do so would constitute a violation of the relevant laws or\nregulations of such jurisdiction. HSBC\nHoldings plc (Hong\nKong Stock Code: 5) Hang Seng Bank Limited (Stock Codes: 11 (HKD counter) and 80011 (RMB\ncounter)) The\nHongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation\nLimited JOINT\nANNOUNCEMENT MONTHLY UPDATE ON (1) PROPOSAL FOR THE PRIVATISATION OF HANG SENG BANK\nLIMITED BY THE HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION\nLIMITED BY WAY OF A SCHEME OF ARRANGEMENT UNDER SECTION 673 OF THE COMPANIES ORDINANCE AND (2)\nPROPOSED WITHDRAWAL OF LISTING OF HANG SENG BANK\nSHARES Joint Financial Advisers to HSBC Holdings and HSBC Asia\nPacific (in alphabetical order) BofA\nSecurities          \nGoldman Sachs Financial Adviser to Hang Seng Bank Morgan Stanley Financial Adviser to HSBC Asia Pacific The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited Reference is made to (i) the joint announcement\ndated 9 October 2025 jointly issued by HSBC Holdings plc\n(\" HSBC\nHoldings \"), The\nHongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited\n(\" HSBC Asia\nPacific \") and Hang Seng Bank\nLimited (\" Hang Seng\nBank \") pursuant to Rule 3.5 of\nthe Hong Kong Code on Takeovers and Mergers (the\n\" Takeovers\nCode \") regarding, among others,\nthe proposal for the privatisation of Hang Seng Bank\nby HSBC Asia Pacific by way of a scheme of arrangement under\nsection 673 of the Companies Ordinance (the \" Rule 3.5 Announcement \"); (ii) the announcement\ndated 22 October 2025 issued by Hang Seng Bank in relation to the\nappointment of the Hang Seng Bank IFA; and (iii) the announcement\ndated 30 October 2025 jointly issued by HSBC Holdings, HSBC Asia\nPacific and Hang Seng Bank in relation to the update on the\ntimeline for despatch of the Scheme Document (the\n\" October\nAnnouncement \"). Unless\notherwise defined herein, capitalised terms used in this\nannouncement shall have the same meanings as those defined in the\nRule 3.5 Announcement. HSBC Holdings, HSBC Asia Pacific and\nHang Seng Bank would like to update the shareholders of and\npotential investors in Hang Seng Bank that, further to the October\nAnnouncement, HSBC Holdings, HSBC Asia Pacific and Hang Seng Bank are in the\ncourse of preparing and finalising the information to be included\nin the Scheme Document and preparing for a hearing at the High\nCourt to seek its directions for convening the Hang Seng\nBank Court Meeting to\nconsider, and if thought fit, approve the Scheme. The Scheme\nDocument will be despatched on or before 17 December 2025. A\ndetailed timetable for the Proposal will be set out in the Scheme\nDocument and in the announcement to be jointly issued by HSBC\nHoldings, HSBC Asia Pacific and Hang Seng Bank upon despatch of the\nScheme Document. Further announcement(s) will be made\non the status and progress of the Proposal and the Scheme and the\ndespatch of the Scheme Document as and when appropriate in\naccordance with the Takeovers Code, the Hong Kong Listing Rules and\napplicable laws and regulations. WARNING: Shareholders of and/or\npotential investors in HSBC Holdings and Hang Seng Bank should be\naware that the Proposal will only be implemented if all the\nConditions are satisfied or (if applicable) waived on or before the\nConditions Long Stop Date. Shareholders of and/or potential\ninvestors in HSBC Holdings and Hang Seng Bank should therefore\nexercise caution when dealing in the securities of HSBC Holdings\nand Hang Seng Bank respectively. Persons who are in doubt as to the\naction they should take should consult their licensed securities\ndealer, registered institution in securities, bank manager,\nsolicitor and/or other professional adviser. For and on behalf of HSBC Holdings plc Brendan Nelson Group Chairman For and on behalf of Hang Seng Bank Limited Edward Cheng Wai Sun Chairman For and on behalf of The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited Dr. Peter Wong Tung Shun Non-executive Chairman The board of directors of HSBC Holdings plc as at the date of this\nannouncement comprises: Brendan\nRobert Nelson*, Georges Bahjat Elhedery, Geraldine Joyce\nBuckingham † ,\nRachel Duan † ,\nDame Carolyn Julie Fairbairn † ,\nJames Anthony Forese † ,\nAnn Frances Godbehere † ,\nSteven Craig Guggenheimer † ,\nManveen (Pam) Kaur, Dr José Antonio Meade\nKuribreña † ,\nKalpana Jaisingh Morparia † ,\nEileen K Murray † and\nSwee Lian Teo † . * Independent non-executive Chair † Independent\nnon-executive Director The board of directors of HSBC Asia Pacific as at the date of this\nannouncement comprises: Dr.\nPeter Wong Tung Shun # ,\nDavid Gordon Eldon*, David Liao Yi Chien, Surendranath Ravi Rosha,\nPaul Jeremy Brough*, Judy Chau Lai Kun*, Edward Cheng Wai Sun*,\nSonia Cheng Chi Man*, Choi Yiu Kwan*, Andrea Lisa Della Mattea*,\nManveen (Pam) Kaur # ,\nRajnish Kumar*, Beau Kuok Khoon Chen*, Fred Lam Tin Fuk* and\nAnnabelle Long Yu*. # Non-executive\nDirectors * Independent Non-executive Directors The Hang Seng Bank Board as at the date of this announcement\ncomprises: Edward Cheng Wai Sun* (Chairman), Luanne\nLim Hui Hung (Chief\nExecutive), Cordelia Chung*, Kathleen Gan Chieh\nHuey # ,\nClement Kwok King Man*, Patricia Lam Sze Wan*, David Liao Yi\nChien # ,\nLin Huey Ru*, Saw Say Pin (Chief Financial Officer), Wang Xiao Bin*\nand Catherine Zhou Rong # . # Non-executive\nDirectors * Independent Non-executive Directors Hong Kong, 27 November\n2025 HSBC Holdings plc Registered Office and Group Head Office: 8 Canada Square, London E14 5HQ, United Kingdom Web: www.hsbc.com Incorporated in England and Wales with limited liability.\nRegistration number 617987 Hang Seng Bank Limited 恒生銀行有限公司 Registered Office and Head Office: 83 Des Voeux Road Central, Hong\nKong Incorporated in Hong Kong with limited liability The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited 香港上海滙豐銀行有限公司 Registered Office and Group Head Office: 1 Queen's Road Central, Hong Kong Incorporated in Hong Kong with limited liability SIGNATURE Pursuant\nto the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the\nregistrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf\nby the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized. HSBC\nHoldings plc By: Name:\nAileen Taylor Title:\nGroup Company Secretary and Chief Governance Officer Date:\n27 November 2025", "source": "edgar", "stratum": "edgar", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1089113/000165495425013475/a2564j.htm"}
{"doc_id": "2e5f83b8ab7300d41d05f6c197afe5cf", "text": "6-K 1 a2323w.htm OVERSEAS REGULATORY ANNOUNCEMENT - GRANT OF AWARDS a2323w FORM 6-K SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 Report of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a - 16 or 15d - 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 For the\nmonth of March HSBC Holdings plc 8\nCanada Square, London E14 5HQ, England (Indicate\nby check mark whether the registrant files or will file annual\nreports under cover of Form 20-F or\nForm 40-F). Form\n20-F X Form 40-F The\nfollowing is the text of an announcement released to The Stock\nExchange of Hong Kong Limited on 11 March 2026 pursuant\nto rules 17.06A, 17.06B and 17.06C of the Rules Governing the\nListing of Securities on The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong\nLimited: Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited and The Stock Exchange of\nHong Kong Limited take no responsibility for the contents of this\ndocument, make no representation as to its accuracy or completeness\nand expressly disclaim any liability whatsoever for any loss\nhowsoever arising from or in reliance upon the whole or any part of\nthe contents of this document. 11\nMarch 2026 (Hong\nKong Stock Code: 5) HSBC HOLDINGS PLC GRANT OF CONDITIONAL AWARDS This\nannouncement is made pursuant to Rules 17.06A, 17.06B and 17.06C of\nthe Rules Governing the Listing of Securities on The Stock Exchange\nof Hong Kong Limited. On 9 March 2026, HSBC Holdings plc (the\n\" Company \") granted conditional awards\n(\" Awards \")\nto directors, employees and former employees to subscribe for a\ntotal of 35,019,686 ordinary shares of US$0.50 each of the Company\n(\" Shares \") under the HSBC Share Plan 2011 (the\n\" Plan \"). The\nfollowing are the details of the grants: Grants to\nDirectors : Name\nof grantee Georges\nElhedery Relationship\nbetween the grantee and the Company Director\nof the Company Number\nof shares under Awards 842,628 Closing\nmarket price of the ordinary shares on the London Stock Exchange on\nthe date of grant GBP\n12.51 Purchase\nprice of Awards granted GBP\n0 Vesting\nperiod of the Awards As\ndisclosed in the Directors Remuneration Report in the Annual Report\nand Accounts 2025, two awards have been granted to Georges\nElhedery: 50%\nof the 2025 annual incentive award is delivered in immediately\nvested shares subject to a retention period of 12\nmonths. The\n2026-2028 Long Term Incentive (\"LTI\") award will, subject to the\nperformance outcome, vest in five equal instalments starting from\nthe third anniversary of the grant date. Upon each vesting, a\n12-month retention period applies. The\nCompany views it as appropriate for the annual incentive award to\nvest immediately and not to be subject to a vesting period for two\nreasons: 1)  \nThe annual incentive is a non-deferred portion of the Directors\nremuneration, which must be partly delivered in shares to comply\nwith UK regulation. 2)  \nThe annual incentive share award is subject to a retention period\nof 12 months, during which time the Directors cannot sell the\nshares. Performance\nTargets and Clawback The\nimmediately vested shares are not subject to forward looking\nperformance conditions as they form part of the annual incentive\nfor which performance is measured over the preceding performance\nyear. The\nLTI award is subject to the following performance conditions as\ndetailed in the Directors Remuneration Report in the Annual Report\nand Accounts 2025: Measure Weighting Average\nReturn on Tangible Equity (\"RoTE\") with Common Equity Tier 1\n(\"CET1\") underpin 42.5% Environment 15% Relative Total\nShareholder Return (\"TSR\") 42.5% Clawback\napplies to the Plan Awards in line with the Company's regulatory\nobligations as set out in the Company's internal clawback\npolicy. Arrangements\nfor the Company or a subsidiary to provide financial assistance to\nthe grantees None Name\nof grantee Manveen\n(Pam) Kaur Relationship\nbetween the grantee and the Company Director\nof the Company Number\nof shares under Awards 491,419 Closing\nmarket price of the ordinary shares on the London Stock Exchange on\nthe date of grant GBP\n12.51 Purchase\nprice of Awards granted GBP\n0 Vesting\nperiod of the Awards As\ndisclosed in the Directors Remuneration Report in the Annual Report\nand Accounts 2025, two awards have been granted to Manveen (Pam)\nKaur: 50%\nof the 2025 annual incentive award is delivered in immediately\nvested shares subject to a retention period of 12\nmonths. The\n2026-2028 LTI award will, subject to the performance outcome, vest\nin five equal instalments starting from the third anniversary of\nthe grant date. Upon each vesting, a 12-month retention period\napplies. The\nCompany views it as appropriate for the annual incentive award to\nvest immediately and not to be subject to a vesting period for two\nreasons: 1)  \nThe annual incentive is a non-deferred portion of the Directors\nremuneration, which must be partly delivered in shares to comply\nwith UK regulation. 2)  \nThe annual incentive share award is subject to a retention period\nof 12 months, during which time the Directors cannot sell the\nshares. Performance\nTargets and Clawback The\nimmediately vested shares are not subject to forward looking\nperformance conditions as they form part of the annual incentive\nfor which performance is measured over the preceding performance\nyear. The\nLTI award is subject to the following performance conditions as\ndetailed in the Directors Remuneration Report in the Annual Report\nand Accounts 2025: Measure Weighting Average\nRoTE with CET1 underpin 42.5% Environment 15% Relative\nTSR 42.5% Clawback\napplies to the Plan Awards in line with the Company's regulatory\nobligations as set out in the Company's internal clawback\npolicy. Arrangements\nfor the Company or a subsidiary to provide financial assistance to\nthe grantees None Grants to other\ngrantees : Category\nof grantee Employees\nand former employees Number\nof shares under Awards 33,685,639 Closing\nmarket price of the ordinary shares on the London Stock Exchange on\nthe date of grant GBP\n12.51 Purchase\nprice of Awards granted GBP\n0 Vesting\nperiod of the Awards Under\nthe HSBC Group-wide deferral policy, vesting occurs over a three\nyear period with 33% vesting on the first and second anniversaries\nof grant and 34% on the third anniversary. Group\nand local Material Risk Takers may be subject to longer vesting\nperiods of up to five years, as required under the relevant\nremuneration regulations. Awards may be subject to a 12-month\nretention period following vesting. Immediately\nvested share awards may be subject to a 12-month retention period\nfollowing vesting. The\nCompany views it as appropriate for the immediately vested share\nawards to vest immediately and not to be subject to a vesting\nperiod for two reasons: 1)  \nThe immediately vested share award is a non-deferred portion of the\nMaterial Risk Takers remuneration, which must be partly delivered\nin shares to comply with UK regulation; each employee will also be\ngranted a deferred share award for which the vesting schedule is\nnoted above. 2)  \nThe immediately vested share award is subject to a retention period\nof 12-months, during which time the shares cannot be\nsold. The\nvesting period for retention awards will align to the completion of\nthe relevant project for which the Award was granted. Performance\nTargets and Clawback The\nGroup Operating Committee additionally participate in the 2026-2028\nLTI.  The LTI award is subject to the following performance\nconditions as detailed in the Directors Remuneration Report in the\nAnnual Report and Accounts 2025: Measure Weighting Average\nRoTE with CET1 underpin 42.5% Environment 15% Relative\nTSR 42.5% Certain\nother awards are subject to the completion of a strategically\nimportant project. No\nperformance targets apply to any other Plan Awards on the basis\nthat the Awards are a form of deferred bonus to meet regulatory\nrequirements in the UK. Performance targets instead attach to the\ninitial award of the Variable Pay. Clawback\napplies to the Plan Awards in line with the Company's regulatory\nobligations as set out in the Company's internal clawback\npolicy. Arrangements\nfor the Company or a subsidiary to provide financial assistance to\nthe grantees None Number\nof shares available for future grant under the plan\nmandate The\nPlan is subject to two limits on the number of Shares committed to\nbe issued under all Plan Awards: 1.  \n10% of the ordinary share capital of the Company in issue\nimmediately before that day, less the number of Shares which have\nbeen issued, or may be issued, to satisfy Awards under the Plan, or\noptions or awards under any other employee share plan operated by\nthe Company granted in the previous 10 years. The number of Shares\navailable to issue under this limit is 1,062,671,787. 2.  \n5% of the ordinary share capital of the Company in issue\nimmediately before that day, less the number of Shares which have\nbeen issued, or may be issued, to satisfy Awards under the Plan.\nThe number of Shares available to issue under this limit is\n311,358,956. For\nand on behalf of HSBC Holdings plc Angela\nMcEntee Group\nCompany Secretary The Board of Directors of HSBC Holdings plc as at\nthe date of this announcement comprises: Brendan Robert Nelson*,\nGeorges Bahjat Elhedery, Geraldine Joyce\nBuckingham † , Wei Sun Christianson †, Rachel\nDuan † , Dame Carolyn Julie Fairbairn † , James Anthony Forese † , Ann Frances Godbehere † , Steven Craig Guggenheimer † , Manveen (Pam) Kaur, Dr José Antonio Meade\nKuribreña † , Kalpana Jaisingh Morparia † , Eileen K Murray † and Swee Lian Teo † . *  Independent\nnon-executive Chairman † Independent\nnon-executive Director HSBC Holdings plc Registered Office and Group Head Office: 8 Canada Square, London E14 5HQ,\nUnited Kingdom Web: www.hsbc.com Incorporated in England and Wales with limited liability.\nRegistration number 617987 SIGNATURE Pursuant\nto the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the\nregistrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf\nby the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized. HSBC\nHoldings plc By: Name:\nAngela McEntee Title:\nGroup Company Secretary Date:\n11 March 2026", "source": "edgar", "stratum": "edgar", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1089113/000165495426002124/a2323w.htm"}
{"doc_id": "d4e3117a3a4d6a526b73bb6e4282f879", "text": "6-K 1 a7172n.htm DIRECTOR/PDMR SHAREHOLDING a7172n FORM 6-K SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 Report of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a - 16 or 15d - 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 For the\nmonth of September HSBC Holdings plc 42nd\nFloor, 8 Canada Square, London E14 5HQ, England (Indicate\nby check mark whether the registrant files or will file annual\nreports under cover of Form 20-F or Form 40-F). Form\n20-F X Form 40-F HSBC HOLDINGS PLC 26 September 2023 Notification of Transactions by Persons Discharging Managerial\nResponsibilities On 25 September 2023, 1.44425 ordinary shares of US$0.50 each (the\n\"Shares\") in HSBC Holdings plc were added to Surendra Rosha's\nvested share plan interests through the automatic reinvestment of\nthe second interim dividend for 2023 at HKD61.2035 per\nShare. The following disclosures are made in accordance with the UK\nversion of the EU Market Abuse Regulation 596/2014. 1 - Details of the person discharging managerial responsibilities /\nperson closely associated Name of natural person Surendra Rosha 2 - Reason for the notification Position/status Co-Chief Executive, Asia-Pacific - The Hongkong and Shanghai\nBanking Corporation Limited Initial notification/amendment Initial Notification 3 - Details of the issuer, emission allowance market participant,\nauction platform, auctioneer or auction monitor Full name of the entity HSBC Holdings plc Legal Entity Identifier code MLU0ZO3ML4LN2LL2TL39 4 - Details of the transaction(s) Transaction(s) summary table Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2023-09-25 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 Hong Kong Stock Exchange HKD - Hong Kong Dollar Nature of Transaction: Price Volume Total Acquisition as part of the HKD61.20 1.44425 HKD88.39 reinvestment of the second interim dividend for 2023 Aggregated HKD61.204 1.44425 HKD88.39 For any\nqueries related to this notification, please\ncontact: Lee Davis Corporate Governance & Secretariat +44 207\n991 3048 SIGNATURE Pursuant\nto the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the\nregistrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf\nby the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized. HSBC\nHoldings plc By: Name:\nAileen Taylor Title:\nGroup Company Secretary and Chief Governance Officer Date:\n26 September 2023", "source": "edgar", "stratum": "edgar", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1089113/000165495423012250/a7172n.htm"}
{"doc_id": "cd334d4930ed6a0cd79a0e098623b1ad", "text": "6-K 1 a3312z.htm STATEMENT ON RESOLVABILITY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK a3312z FORM 6-K SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 Report of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a - 16 or 15d - 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 For the\nmonth of August HSBC Holdings plc 42nd\nFloor, 8 Canada Square, London E14 5HQ, England (Indicate\nby check mark whether the registrant files or will file annual\nreports under cover of Form 20-F or Form 40-F). Form\n20-F X Form 40-F 6 August 2024 HSBC HOLDINGS PLC STATEMENT ON RESOLVABILITY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK HSBC Holdings plc (HSBC) today released its 2024 public disclosure\ndocument regarding its preparedness for resolution, as required\nunder the Bank of England's Resolvability Assessment Framework\n(RAF). This disclosure provides an update as to how the Group continues to\nmaintain and develop the capabilities required under the\nRAF. Please click on the following link to view HSBC's public\ndisclosure: http://www.rns-pdf.londonstockexchange.com/rns/3310Z_1-2024-8-6.pdf . HSBC's public disclosure can also be found at https://www.hsbc.com/investors/results-and-announcements/all-reporting . The Bank of England's 2024 resolvability assessment of major UK\nbanks can be found at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/news . ends/more Investor enquiries to: Neil Sankoff\n                \n+44 (0) 20 7991 5072      \ninvestorrelations@hsbc.com Greg\nCase                     \n+44 (0) 20 7992 3825      \ngreg.case@hsbc.com Media enquiries to: HSBC press office         +44\n(0) 20 79918096       \npressoffice@hsbc.com Note to editors: HSBC Holdings plc HSBC Holdings plc, the parent company of the HSBC Group, is\nheadquartered in London. HSBC serves customers worldwide from\noffices in 60 countries and territories. With assets of US$2,975bn\nat 30 June 2024, HSBC is one of the world's largest banking and\nfinancial services organisations. ends/all SIGNATURE Pursuant\nto the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the\nregistrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf\nby the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized. HSBC\nHoldings plc By: Name:\nAileen Taylor Title:\nGroup Company Secretary and Chief Governance Officer Date: 06 August 2024", "source": "edgar", "stratum": "edgar", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1089113/000165495424009980/a3312z.htm"}
{"doc_id": "f535480f0634cc99be671da01df85e97", "text": "6-K 1 a9169n.htm TRANSACTION IN OWN SHARES a9169n FORM 6-K SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 Report of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a - 16 or 15d - 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 For the\nmonth of November HSBC Holdings plc 42nd\nFloor, 8 Canada Square, London E14 5HQ, England (Indicate\nby check mark whether the registrant files or will file annual\nreports under cover of Form 20-F or Form 40-F). Form\n20-F X Form 40-F HSBC HOLDINGS PLC 27 November 2024 Transaction in own shares HSBC Holdings plc (\" HSBC \" or the \" Company \") announces that it has purchased for\ncancellation the following number of its ordinary shares of US$0.50\nfrom Morgan Stanley & Co. International plc\n(\" Morgan\nStanley \") as part of its\nbuy-back announced on 30\nOctober 2024. UK Venues Date of purchase: 27 November 2024 Number of ordinary shares of US$0.50 each purchased: 5,338,713 Highest price paid per share: £7.3430 Lowest price paid per share: £7.2490 Volume weighted average price paid per share: £7.3030 All repurchases on the London Stock Exchange, Aquis Exchange, Cboe\nEurope Limited (through the BXE and CXE order books) and/or\nTurquoise (\" UK Venues \") are implemented as \"on Exchange\" transactions\n(as such term is defined in the rules of the London Stock Exchange)\nand as \"market purchases\" for the purposes of the Companies Act\n2006. Hong Kong Stock Exchange Date of purchase: 27 November 2024 Number of ordinary shares of US$0.50 each purchased: 1,778,800 Highest price paid per share: HK$72.1000 Lowest price paid per share: HK$71.5000 Volume weighted average price paid per share: HK$71.6525 All repurchases on The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited\n(\" Hong Kong\nStock Exchange \") are \"off\nmarket\" for the purposes of the Companies Act 2006 but are\ntransactions which occur \"on Exchange\" for the purposes of the\nRules Governing the Listing of Securities on The Stock Exchange of\nHong Kong Limited and which constitute an \"on-market share\nbuy-back\" for the purposes of the Codes on Takeovers and Mergers\nand Share Buy-backs. Since the commencement of the buy-back announced on 30 October\n2024, the Company has repurchased 145,444,502 ordinary shares for a total consideration of\napproximately US$1,327.1m. On 27 November 2024, 28,222,400 of the ordinary shares of US$0.50\neach which were awaiting cancellation having been repurchased on\nthe Hong Kong Stock Exchange previously were cancelled. Following\ncancellation of those shares and following the cancellation of\nshares repurchased on the UK Venues, the Company's issued ordinary\nshare capital will consist of 18,009,286,450 ordinary shares with\nvoting rights. There are no ordinary shares held in treasury.\nCancellation of the shares repurchased today on the Hong Kong Stock\nExchange takes longer than those repurchased on the UK Venues and a\nfurther announcement of total voting rights will be made once those\nshares have been cancelled. The above figure of 18,009,286,450 may be used by shareholders as\nthe denominator for the calculations by which they will\ndetermine if they are required to notify their interest in, or\na change to their interest in, the Company under the Financial\nConduct Authority's Disclosure Guidance and Transparency\nRules. In accordance with Article 5(1)(b) of the Market Abuse Regulation\n(EU) No 596/2014 (as it forms part of domestic law of the United\nKingdom by virtue of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, as\namended), a full breakdown of the individual trades made by Morgan\nStanley on behalf of the Company is available via the link\nbelow. http://www.rns-pdf.londonstockexchange.com/rns/9165N_1-2024-11-27.pdf This announcement will also be available on HSBC's website\nat www.hsbc.com/sea Enquiries to: Lee Davis Corporate Governance & Secretariat shareholderquestions@hsbc.com +44 (0)20 7991 8888 SIGNATURE Pursuant\nto the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the\nregistrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf\nby the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized. HSBC\nHoldings plc By: Name:\nAileen Taylor Title:\nGroup Company Secretary and Chief Governance Officer Date:\n27 November 2024", "source": "edgar", "stratum": "edgar", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1089113/000165495424014946/a9169n.htm"}
{"doc_id": "69a633a0c6df663d28817cefedd6a108", "text": "6-K 1 a5201u.htm TRANSACTION IN OWN SHARES a5201u FORM 6-K SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 Report of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a - 16 or 15d - 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 For the\nmonth of November HSBC Holdings plc 42nd\nFloor, 8 Canada Square, London E14 5HQ, England (Indicate\nby check mark whether the registrant files or will file annual\nreports under cover of Form 20-F or Form 40-F). Form\n20-F X Form 40-F HSBC HOLDINGS PLC 23 November 2023 Transaction in own shares HSBC Holdings plc (\" HSBC \" or the \" Company \") announces that it has purchased for\ncancellation the following number of its ordinary shares of US$0.50\nfrom Morgan Stanley & Co. International plc\n(\" Morgan\nStanley \") as part of its\nbuy-back announced on 31 October 2023. UK Venues Date of purchase: 23 November 2023 Number of ordinary shares of US$0.50 each purchased: 3,510,964 Highest price paid per share: £6.1540 Lowest price paid per share: £6.0840 Volume weighted average price paid per share: £6.1203 All repurchases on the London Stock Exchange, Aquis Exchange, Cboe\nEurope Limited (through the BXE and CXE order books) and/or\nTurquoise (\" UK Venues \") are implemented as \"on Exchange\" transactions\n(as such term is defined in the rules of the London Stock Exchange)\nand as \"market purchases\" for the purposes of the Companies Act\n2006. Hong Kong Stock Exchange Date of purchase: 23 November 2023 Number of ordinary shares of US$0.50 each purchased: 2,997,600 Highest price paid per share: HK$59.9500 Lowest price paid per share: HK$58.9500 Volume weighted average price paid per share: HK$59.4772 All repurchases on The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited\n(\" Hong Kong\nStock Exchange \") are \"off\nmarket\" for the purposes of the Companies Act 2006 but are\ntransactions which occur \"on Exchange\" for the purposes of the\nRules Governing the Listing of Securities on The Stock Exchange of\nHong Kong Limited and which constitute an \"on-market share\nbuy-back\" for the purposes of the Codes on Takeovers and Mergers\nand Share Buy-backs. Since the commencement of the buy-back announced on 31 October\n2023, the Company has repurchased 99,966,340 ordinary shares for a\ntotal consideration of approximately US$750.5m. Following the cancellation of the shares repurchased on the UK\nVenues, the Company's issued ordinary share capital will consist of\n19,387,690,789 ordinary shares with voting rights. There are no\nordinary shares held in treasury. Cancellation of the shares\nrepurchased on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange takes longer than those\nrepurchased on the UK Venues and a further announcement of total\nvoting rights will be made once those shares have been\ncancelled. The above figure of 19,387,690,789 may be used by shareholders as\nthe denominator for the calculations by which they will determine\nif they are required to notify their interest in, or a change to\ntheir interest in, the Company under the Financial Conduct\nAuthority's Disclosure Guidance and Transparency\nRules. In accordance with Article 5(1)(b) of the Market Abuse Regulation\n(EU) No 596/2014 (as it forms part of domestic law of the United\nKingdom by virtue of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018), a\nfull breakdown of the individual trades made by Morgan Stanley on\nbehalf of the Company is available via the link below. http://www.rns-pdf.londonstockexchange.com/rns/5189U_1-2023-11-23.pdf This announcement will also be available on HSBC's website\nat www.hsbc.com/sea Enquiries to: Lee Davis Corporate Governance & Secretariat +44 (0) 207 991 3048 SIGNATURE Pursuant\nto the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the\nregistrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf\nby the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized. HSBC\nHoldings plc By: Name:\nAileen Taylor Title:\nGroup Company Secretary and Chief Governance Officer Date:\n23 November 2023", "source": "edgar", "stratum": "edgar", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1089113/000165495423014736/a5201u.htm"}
{"doc_id": "782a181d2e4e77c929873f1aa347b32b", "text": "6-K 1 a4904x.htm DIRECTOR/PDMR SHAREHOLDING a4904x FORM 6-K SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 Report of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a - 16 or 15d - 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 For the\nmonth of December HSBC Holdings plc 42nd\nFloor, 8 Canada Square, London E14 5HQ, England (Indicate\nby check mark whether the registrant files or will file annual\nreports under cover of Form 20-F or Form 40-F). Form\n20-F X Form 40-F HSBC HOLDINGS PLC 20 December 2023 Notification of a Transaction by a Person Discharging Managerial\nResponsibilities (\"PDMR\") On 19 December 2023, Swee Lian Teo acquired 15,200 US$0.50 ordinary\nshares in HSBC Holdings plc. The shares were acquired at a price of\nHKD 60.1592105 per share. The following disclosure is made in accordance with Article 19 of\nthe EU Market Abuse Regulation 596/2014. 1 - Details of the person discharging managerial responsibilities /\nperson closely associated Name of natural person Swee Lian Teo 2 - Reason for the notification Position/status Non-executive Director Initial notification/amendment Initial Notification 3 - Details of the issuer, emission allowance market participant,\nauction platform, auctioneer or auction monitor Full name of the entity HSBC Holdings plc Legal Entity Identifier code MLU0ZO3ML4LN2LL2TL39 4 - Details of the transaction(s) Transaction(s) summary table Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2023-12-19 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 Hong Kong Stock Exchange HKD - Hong Kong Dollar Nature of Transaction: Acquisition Price Volume Total HKD60.16 15,200 HKD914,420.00 Aggregated HKD60.159 15,200 HKD914,420.00 For any\nqueries related to this notification, please\ncontact: Lee Davis Shareholder Services 020 7991 3048 SIGNATURE Pursuant\nto the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the\nregistrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf\nby the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized. HSBC\nHoldings plc By: Name:\nAileen Taylor Title:\nGroup Company Secretary and Chief Governance Officer Date:\n20 December 2023", "source": "edgar", "stratum": "edgar", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1089113/000165495423015798/a4904x.htm"}
{"doc_id": "4c6931816dd18cd5dce24ba2b15a1f5b", "text": "6-K 1 a3595l.htm OVERSEAS REGULATORY ANNOUNCEMENT - GRANT OF AWARDS a3595l FO RM\n6-K SECURITIES AND\nEXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C.\n20549 Report of Foreign\nPrivate Issuer Pursuant to Rule\n13a - 16 or 15d\n- 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 For the\nmonth of November HSBC Holdings plc 42nd\nFloor, 8 Canada Square, London E14 5HQ, England (Indicate\nby check mark whether the registrant files or will file annual\nreports under cover of Form 20-F or Form 40-F). Form\n20-F X Form 40-F The\nfollowing is the text of an announcement released to the Stock\nExchange of Hong Kong Limited on 7 November 2024 pursuant to rules\n17.06A, 17.06B and 17.06C of the Rules Governing the Listing of\nSecurities on The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited: Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited and The Stock Exchange of\nHong Kong Limited take no responsibility for the contents of this\ndocument, make no representation as to its accuracy or completeness\nand expressly disclaim any liability whatsoever for any loss\nhowsoever arising from or in reliance upon the whole or any part of\nthe contents of this document. 7\nNovember 2024 (Hong\nKong Stock Code: 5) HSBC\nHOLDINGS PLC GRANT\nOF CONDITIONAL AWARDS This\nannouncement is made pursuant to Rules 17.06A, 17.06B and 17.06C of\nthe Rules Governing the Listing of Securities on The Stock Exchange\nof Hong Kong Limited. On 5\nNovember 2024, HSBC Holdings plc (the \" Company \") granted conditional awards\n(\" Awards \") to directors,\nemployees and former employees to subscribe for a total of\n1,114,351 ordinary shares of US$0.50 each of the Company\n(\" Shares \") under the HSBC\nShare Plan 2011 (the \" Plan \"). The\nfollowing are the details of the grants: Grants to Directors : Name of\ngrantee Georges\nElhedery Relationship\nbetween the grantee and the Company Director of the\nCompany Number\nof shares under Awards 41,720 Individual tax\nliabilities in respect of the vesting of the Awards were satisfied\nin cash. The number of Shares is therefore net of tax. Closing\nmarket price of the ordinary shares on the London Stock Exchange on\nthe date of grant GBP\n7.224 Purchase price of\nAwards granted GBP\n0 Vesting\nperiod of the Awards Fixed\nPay Allowance awards (\"FPA Awards\") are delivered in immediately\nvested shares subject to a retention period and released on a\npro-rata basis over 5 years, starting from March 2025. The\nCompany views it as appropriate for the FPA Awards to vest\nimmediately and not to be subject to a vesting period for two\nreasons: (1)  that FPA\nAwards form part of fixed pay rather than variable pay and vesting\nconditions would not normally apply to fixed pay; and (2)  the FPA\nAwards are subject to a retention period, during which time the\nDirectors cannot sell the shares, which has the same effect as a\nvesting period. Performance Targets\nand Clawback The FPA\nAwards are not subject to performance conditions as they form part\nof the director's Fixed Pay. The FPA\nAwards are not subject to clawback as they form part of the\ndirector's Fixed Pay. Arrangements for\nthe Company or a subsidiary to provide financial assistance to the\ngrantees None Grants to other grantees : Category of\ngrantee Employees Number\nof shares under Awards 1,072,631 Closing\nmarket price of the ordinary shares on the London Stock Exchange on\nthe date of grant GBP\n7.224 Purchase price of\nAwards granted GBP\n0 Vesting\nperiod of the Awards Group\nand local Material Risk Takers may be subject to vesting periods of\nup to seven years, as required under the relevant remuneration\nregulations. Awards may be subject to a six- or 12-month retention\nperiod following vesting. Immediately vested\nshare awards may be subject to a six- or 12-month retention period\nfollowing vesting. The\nCompany views it as appropriate for the immediately vested share\nawards to vest immediately and not to be subject to a vesting\nperiod for two reasons: 1)   The\nimmediately vested share award is a non-deferred portion of the\nMaterial Risk Takers remuneration, which must be partly delivered\nin shares to comply with UK regulation; each employee will also be\ngranted a deferred share award for which the vesting schedule is\nnoted above. 2)   The\nimmediately vested share award is subject to a retention period of\nsix- or 12-months, during which time the shares cannot be\nsold. FPA\nAwards are delivered in immediately vested shares subject to a\nretention period and released on a pro-rata basis over 5 years,\nstarting from March 2025. The\nCompany views it as appropriate for the FPA Awards to vest\nimmediately and not to be subject to a vesting period for two\nreasons: (1)  that FPA\nAwards form part of fixed pay rather than variable pay and vesting\nconditions would not normally apply to fixed pay; and (2)  the FPA\nAwards are subject to a retention period, during which time the\nshares cannot be sold, which has the same effect as a vesting\nperiod. The\nvesting period for certain other awards will align to the\ncompletion of the relevant project for which the Award was\ngranted. The\nvesting period for buy-out awards for new hires generally mirror\nthose of the forfeited awards from the previous employer. Where the\nforfeited award was subject to a post vesting retention period, a\nretention period will be applied to the buy-out award. Performance Targets\nand Clawback Certain\nawards are subject to the completion of a strategically important\nproject. The FPA\nAwards are not subject to performance conditions as they form part\nof Fixed Pay. No\nperformance targets apply to any other Plan Awards on the basis\nthat the Awards are a form of deferred bonus to meet regulatory\nrequirements in the UK. Performance targets instead attach to the\ninitial award of the Variable Pay. Buy-out\nawards are subject to clawback where the forfeited award of the\nrelevant employee's former employer was subject to clawback. Where\nthe employee's forfeited award was not subject to clawback, no\nclawback terms are applied to the replacement HSBC\naward. The FPA\nAwards are not subject to clawback as they form part of Fixed\nPay. Clawback applies to\nall other Plan Awards in line with the Company's regulatory\nobligations as set out in the Company's internal clawback\npolicy. Arrangements for\nthe Company or a subsidiary to provide financial assistance to the\ngrantees None Number\nof shares available for future grant under the plan\nmandate The\nPlan is subject to two limits on the number of Shares committed to\nbe issued under all Plan Awards: 1.   10%\nof the ordinary share capital of the Company in issue immediately\nbefore that day, less the number of Shares which have been issued,\nor may be issued, to satisfy Awards under the Plan, or options or\nawards under any other employee share plan operated by the Company\ngranted in the previous 10 years. The number of Shares available to\nissue under this limit is 946,894,438. 2.   5%\nof the ordinary share capital of the Company in issue immediately\nbefore that day, less the number of Shares which have been issued,\nor may be issued, to satisfy Awards under the Plan. The number of\nShares available to issue under this limit is\n249,460,082. For and\non behalf of HSBC Holdings plc Aileen Taylor Company\nSecretary The\nBoard of Directors of HSBC Holdings plc as at the date of this\nannouncement comprises: Sir\nMark Edward Tucker*, Georges Bahjat Elhedery, Geraldine Joyce\nBuckingham † , Rachel\nDuan † , Dame Carolyn\nJulie Fairbairn † , James Anthony\nForese † , Ann Frances\nGodbehere † , Steven Craig\nGuggenheimer † , Dr José\nAntonio Meade Kuribreña † , Kalpana\nJaisingh Morparia † , Eileen K\nMurray † , Brendan\nRobert Nelson † and Swee\nLian Teo † . *  Non-executive\nGroup Chairman † Independent\nnon-executive Director HSBC\nHoldings plc Registered Office and Group Head Office: 8 Canada Square, London E14 5HQ, United Kingdom\nWeb: www.hsbc.com Incorporated in England with limited liability. Registered in\nEngland: number 617987 SIGNATURE Pursuant\nto the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the\nregistrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf\nby the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized. HSBC\nHoldings plc By: Name:\nAileen Taylor Title:\nGroup Company Secretary and Chief Governance Officer Date:\n07 November 2024", "source": "edgar", "stratum": "edgar", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1089113/000165495424013860/a3595l.htm"}
{"doc_id": "c9b0d98de8df37e21602fc23924173a8", "text": "6-K 1 a8973a.htm TRANSACTION IN OWN SHARES a8973a FORM 6-K SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 Report of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a - 16 or 15d - 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 For the\nmonth of September HSBC Holdings plc 42nd\nFloor, 8 Canada Square, London E14 5HQ, England (Indicate\nby check mark whether the registrant files or will file annual\nreports under cover of Form 20-F or\nForm 40-F). Form\n20-F X Form 40-F HSBC HOLDINGS\nPLC 25 September 2025 Transaction in own shares HSBC Holdings plc (\" HSBC \" or the \" Company \") announces that it has purchased for\ncancellation the following number of its ordinary shares of US$0.50\nfrom Merrill Lynch International (\" Merrill\nLynch\" ) as part of its\nbuy-back announced on 31 July 2025. UK Venues Date of\npurchase: 25\nSeptember 2025 Number\nof ordinary shares of US$0.50 each purchased: 2,841,743 Highest\nprice paid per share: £10.2880 Lowest\nprice paid per share: £10.1940 Volume\nweighted average price paid per share: £10.2456 All repurchases on the London Stock Exchange, Aquis Exchange, Cboe\nEurope Limited (through the BXE and CXE order books) and/or\nTurquoise (\" UK Venues \") are implemented as \"on Exchange\" transactions\n(as such term is defined in the rules of the London Stock Exchange)\nand as \"market purchases\" for the purposes of the Companies Act\n2006. Hong Kong Stock Exchange Date of\npurchase: 25\nSeptember 2025 Number\nof ordinary shares of US$0.50 each purchased: 1,490,000 Highest\nprice paid per share: HK$107.6000 Lowest\nprice paid per share: HK$106.4000 Volume\nweighted average price paid per share: HK$106.9666 All repurchases on The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited\n(\" Hong Kong\nStock Exchange \") are \"off\nmarket\" for the purposes of the Companies Act 2006 but are\ntransactions which occur \"on Exchange\" for the purposes of the\nRules Governing the Listing of Securities on The Stock Exchange of\nHong Kong Limited and which constitute an \"on-market share\nbuy-back\" for the purposes of the Codes on Takeovers and Mergers\nand Share Buy-backs. Since the commencement of the buy-back announced on 31 July 2025,\nthe Company has repurchased 149,881,233 ordinary shares for a total\nconsideration of approximately US$1,952.7m. Following the cancellation of the shares repurchased on the UK\nVenues, the Company's issued ordinary share capital will consist of\n17,274,711,555 ordinary shares with voting rights. There are no\nordinary shares held in treasury. Cancellation of the shares\nrepurchased on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange takes longer than those\nrepurchased on the UK Venues and a further announcement of total\nvoting rights will be made once those shares have been\ncancelled. The above figure of 17,274,711,555 may be used by shareholders as\nthe denominator for the calculations by which they will determine\nif they are required to notify their interest in, or a change to\ntheir interest in, the Company under the Financial Conduct\nAuthority's Disclosure Guidance and Transparency\nRules. In accordance with Article 5(1)(b) of the Market Abuse Regulation\n(EU) No 596/2014 (as it forms part of domestic law of the United\nKingdom by virtue of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, as\namended), a full breakdown of the individual trades made by Merrill\nLynch on behalf of the Company is available via the link\nbelow. http://www.rns-pdf.londonstockexchange.com/rns/8965A_1-2025-9-25.pdf This announcement will also be available on HSBC's website\nat www.hsbc.com/sea Enquiries to: Lee Davis Group Governance shareholderquestions@hsbc.com +44 (0)20 7991 8888 SIGNATURE Pursuant\nto the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the\nregistrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf\nby the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized. HSBC\nHoldings plc By: Name:\nAileen Taylor Title:\nGroup Company Secretary and Chief Governance Officer Date:\n25 September 2025", "source": "edgar", "stratum": "edgar", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1089113/000165495425011101/a8973a.htm"}
{"doc_id": "f4045cec379ca071c48e6836e0db4e23", "text": "6-K 1 hsbcholdings-9397g.htm DIRECTOR/PDMR SHAREHOLDING hsbcholdings-9397g FORM 6-K SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 Report of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a - 16 or 15d - 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 For the\nmonth of March HSBC Holdings plc 42nd\nFloor, 8 Canada Square, London E14 5HQ, England (Indicate\nby check mark whether the registrant files or will file annual\nreports under cover of Form 20-F or Form 40-F). Form\n20-F X Form 40-F HSBC HOLDINGS PLC 14 March 2024 Notification of Transactions by Persons Discharging Managerial\nResponsibilities (\"PDMRs\") 1.   Annual Incentive awards (Performance Year\n2017) Deferred awards (the \"Awards\") of US$0.50 ordinary shares (the\n\"Shares\") in HSBC Holdings plc (the \"Company\") were granted in 2018\nas a part of variable pay for the performance year ended 31\nDecember 2017. On 12 March 2024, tranches of the Awards granted in 2018 vested and\nthe following transactions took place in London: Directors Name Total number of Shares vested Number of Shares sold at £5.899177 per\nShare 1 Noel Quinn 21,504 10,107 Other PDMRs Name Total number of Shares vested Number of Shares sold at £5.899177 per\nShare 1 Colin Bell 14,943 7,024 Pam Kaur 15,631 7,347 Ian Stuart 13,488 6,340 1 Represents\nshares sold to cover withholding tax . The PDMRs are required to retain a number of Shares equivalent in\nvalue to those that vested under the Awards (net of tax\nliabilities) for twelve months from the original vesting\ndate. 2.   Long Term Incentive awards (2021 to 2023 performance\nperiod) Long Term Incentive awards (the \"LTI Awards\") of US$0.50 ordinary\nshares (the \"Shares\") in HSBC Holdings plc (the \"Company\") were\ngranted in 2021, with a three-year forward-looking performance\nperiod commencing on 1 January 2021 and ending on 31 December 2023.\nThe performance outcome of 75% was determined based on an\nassessment by the Group Remuneration Committee of performance\nagainst financial and non-financial measures, as detailed in the\nDirectors' Remuneration Report in the Annual Report and Accounts\n2023. Shares will vest in five equal annual instalments, each with\na one-year retention period, commencing from March\n2024. On 12 March 2024, tranches of the LTI Awards granted in 2021 vested\nand the following transactions took place in London: Directors Name LTI Award lapsed Total number of Shares vested Number of Shares sold at £5.899177 per\nShare 1 Noel Quinn 279,639 167,782 78,858 1 Represents\nshares sold to cover withholding tax . 3.   Annual Incentive awards (Performance Year\n2020) Awards of Shares in the Company were granted in 2021 as a part of\nvariable pay for the performance year ended 31 December\n2020. On 12 March 2024, tranches of the Awards granted in 2021 vested and\nthe following transactions took place in London: Directors Name Total number of Shares vested Number of Shares sold at £5.899177 per\nShare 1 Georges Elhedery 61,104 28,719 Other PDMRs Name Total number of Shares vested Number of Shares sold at\n£5.899177 per Share 1 Colin Bell 23,391 10,993 Gregory Guyett 61,104 28,719 John Hinshaw 49,453 23,243 Pam Kaur 42,388 19,922 David Liao 18,753 2,813 Nuno Matos 22,607 4,395 Stephen Moss 19,168 265 Barry O'Byrne 27,714 5,321 Michael Roberts 46,879 23,932 Surendra Rosha 24,106 3,616 Ian Stuart 20,447 9,610 1 Represents\nshares sold to cover withholding tax . The PDMRs are required to retain a number of Shares equivalent in\nvalue to those that vested under the Awards (net of tax\nliabilities) for twelve months from the original vesting date, with\nthe exception of David Liao who is subject to a six-month retention\nperiod. 4.   Annual Incentive awards (Performance Year\n2021) Awards of Shares in the Company were granted in 2022 as a part of\nvariable pay for the performance year ended 31 December\n2021. On 13 March 2024, the first tranche of the Awards granted in 2022\nvested and the following transactions took place in\nLondon: Name Total number of Shares vested Number of Shares sold at £5.91874 per\nShare 1 David Liao 27,591 4,139 Stephen Moss 2 17,241 - Michael Roberts 43,415 22,164 Surendra Rosha 27,591 4,139 1 Represents\nshares sold to cover withholding tax . 2 Awards\nvesting in the local jurisdiction of employment are not subject to\nIncome Tax and Social Security liabilities . The PDMRs are required to retain a number of Shares equivalent in\nvalue to those that vested under the Awards (net of tax\nliabilities) for twelve months from the original vesting\ndate. For the purpose of the below disclosures, the value of the Awards\nwhich vested on\n12 and 13 March 2024 has been calculated using the closing Share\nprice on the London Stock Exchange on 8 March 2024 of\n£5.7990. The following disclosures are made in accordance with the UK\nversion of the EU Market Abuse Regulation 596/2014. 1 - Details of the person discharging managerial responsibilities /\nperson closely associated Name of natural person Noel Quinn 2 - Reason for the notification Position/status Group Chief Executive Initial notification/amendment Initial Notification 3 - Details of the issuer, emission allowance market participant,\nauction platform, auctioneer or auction monitor Full name of the entity HSBC Holdings plc Legal Entity Identifier code MLU0ZO3ML4LN2LL2TL39 4 - Details of the transaction(s) Transaction(s) summary table Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2024-03-12 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Acquisition under the HSBC Share Plan 2011 Price Volume Total £5.80 189,286 £1,097,669.51 Aggregated £5.799 189,286 £1,097,669.51 Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2024-03-12 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Disposal Price Volume Total £5.90 88,965 £524,820.28 Aggregated £5.899 88,965 £524,820.28 Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2024-03-12 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Lapse of 2021 Long Term Incentive awards Price Volume Total £0.00 279,639 £0 Aggregated £0.00 279,639 £0 1 - Details of the person discharging managerial responsibilities /\nperson closely associated Name of natural person Georges Elhedery 2 - Reason for the notification Position/status Group Chief Financial Officer Initial notification/amendment Initial Notification 3 - Details of the issuer, emission allowance market participant,\nauction platform, auctioneer or auction monitor Full name of the entity HSBC Holdings plc Legal Entity Identifier code MLU0ZO3ML4LN2LL2TL39 4 - Details of the transaction(s) Transaction(s) summary table Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2024-03-12 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Acquisition under the HSBC Share Plan 2011 Price Volume Total £5.80 61,104 £354,342.10 Aggregated £5.799 61,104 £354,342.10 Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2024-03-12 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Disposal Price Volume Total £5.90 28,719 £169,418.46 Aggregated £5.899 28,719 £169,418.46 1 - Details of the person discharging managerial responsibilities /\nperson closely associated Name of natural person Colin Bell 2 - Reason for the notification Position/status Chief Executive, HSBC Bank plc and HSBC Europe Initial notification/amendment Initial Notification 3 - Details of the issuer, emission allowance market participant,\nauction platform, auctioneer or auction monitor Full name of the entity HSBC Holdings plc Legal Entity Identifier code MLU0ZO3ML4LN2LL2TL39 4 - Details of the transaction(s) Transaction(s) summary table Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2024-03-12 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Acquisition under the HSBC Share Plan 2011 Price Volume Total £5.80 38,334 £222,298.87 Aggregated £5.799 38,334 £222,298.87 Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2024-03-12 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Disposal Price Volume Total £5.90 18,017 £106,285.47 Aggregated £5.899 18,017 £106,285.47 1 - Details of the person discharging managerial responsibilities /\nperson closely associated Name of natural person Greg Guyett 2 - Reason for the notification Position/status Chief Executive, Global Banking and Markets Initial notification/amendment Initial Notification 3 - Details of the issuer, emission allowance market participant,\nauction platform, auctioneer or auction monitor Full name of the entity HSBC Holdings plc Legal Entity Identifier code MLU0ZO3ML4LN2LL2TL39 4 - Details of the transaction(s) Transaction(s) summary table Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2024-03-12 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Acquisition under the HSBC Share Plan 2011 Price Volume Total £5.80 61,104 £354,342.10 Aggregated £5.799 61,104 £354,342.10 Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2024-03-12 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Disposal Price Volume Total £5.90 28,719 £169,418.46 Aggregated £5.899 28,719 £169,418.46 1 - Details of the person discharging managerial responsibilities /\nperson closely associated Name of natural person John Hinshaw 2 - Reason for the notification Position/status Group Chief Operating Officer Initial notification/amendment Initial Notification 3 - Details of the issuer, emission allowance market participant,\nauction platform, auctioneer or auction monitor Full name of the entity HSBC Holdings plc Legal Entity Identifier code MLU0ZO3ML4LN2LL2TL39 4 - Details of the transaction(s) Transaction(s) summary table Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2024-03-12 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Acquisition under the HSBC Share Plan 2011 Price Volume Total £5.80 49,453 £286,777.95 Aggregated £5.799 49,453 £286,777.95 Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2024-03-12 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Disposal Price Volume Total £5.90 23,243 £137,114.57 Aggregated £5.899 23,243 £137,114.57 1 - Details of the person discharging managerial responsibilities /\nperson closely associated Name of natural person Pam Kaur 2 - Reason for the notification Position/status Group Chief Risk and Compliance Officer Initial notification/amendment Initial Notification 3 - Details of the issuer, emission allowance market participant,\nauction platform, auctioneer or auction monitor Full name of the entity HSBC Holdings plc Legal Entity Identifier code MLU0ZO3ML4LN2LL2TL39 4 - Details of the transaction(s) Transaction(s) summary table Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2024-03-12 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Acquisition under the HSBC Share Plan 2011 Price Volume Total £5.80 58,019 £336,452.18 Aggregated £5.799 58,019 £336,452.18 Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2024-03-12 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Disposal Price Volume Total £5.90 27,269 £160,864.66 Aggregated £5.899 27,269 £160,864.66 1 - Details of the person discharging managerial responsibilities /\nperson closely associated Name of natural person David Liao 2 - Reason for the notification Position/status Co-Chief Executive, Asia-Pacific - The Hongkong and Shanghai\nBanking Corporation Limited Initial notification/amendment Initial Notification 3 - Details of the issuer, emission allowance market participant,\nauction platform, auctioneer or auction monitor Full name of the entity HSBC Holdings plc Legal Entity Identifier code MLU0ZO3ML4LN2LL2TL39 4 - Details of the transaction(s) Transaction(s) summary table Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2024-03-12 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Acquisitions under the HSBC Share Plan 2011 Price Volume Total £5.80 18,753 £108,748.65 Aggregated £5.799 18,753 £108,748.65 Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2024-03-12 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Disposal Price Volume Total £5.90 2,813 £16,594.38 Aggregated £5.899 2,813 £16,594.38 Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2024-03-13 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Acquisitions under the HSBC Share Plan 2011 Price Volume Total £5.80 27,591 £160,000.21 Aggregated £5.799 27,591 £160,000.21 Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2024-03-13 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Disposal Price Volume Total £5.92 4,139 £24,497.66 Aggregated £5.919 4,139 £24,497.66 1 - Details of the person discharging managerial responsibilities /\nperson closely associated Name of natural person Nuno Matos 2 - Reason for the notification Position/status Chief Executive, Wealth and Personal Banking Initial notification/amendment Initial Notification 3 - Details of the issuer, emission allowance market participant,\nauction platform, auctioneer or auction monitor Full name of the entity HSBC Holdings plc Legal Entity Identifier code MLU0ZO3ML4LN2LL2TL39 4 - Details of the transaction(s) Transaction(s) summary table Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2024-03-12 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Acquisition under the HSBC Share Plan 2011 Price Volume Total £5.80 22,607 £131,097.99 Aggregated £5.799 22,607 £131,097.99 Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2024-03-12 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Disposal Price Volume Total £5.90 4,395 £25,926.88 Aggregated £5.899 4,395 £25,926.88 1 - Details of the person discharging managerial responsibilities /\nperson closely associated Name of natural person Stephen Moss 2 - Reason for the notification Position/status Regional Chief Executive, Middle East, North Africa and\nTürkiye Initial notification/amendment Initial Notification 3 - Details of the issuer, emission allowance market participant,\nauction platform, auctioneer or auction monitor Full name of the entity HSBC Holdings plc Legal Entity Identifier code MLU0ZO3ML4LN2LL2TL39 4 - Details of the transaction(s) Transaction(s) summary table Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2024-03-12 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Acquisition under the HSBC Share Plan 2011 Price Volume Total £5.80 19,168 £111,155.23 Aggregated £5.799 19,168 £111,155.23 Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2024-03-12 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Disposal Price Volume Total £5.90 265 £1,563.28 Aggregated £5.899 265 £1,563.28 Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2024-03-13 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Acquisition under the HSBC Share Plan 2011 Price Volume Total £5.80 17,241 £99,980.56 Aggregated £5.799 17,241 £99,980.56 1 - Details of the person discharging managerial responsibilities /\nperson closely associated Name of natural person Barry O'Byrne 2 - Reason for the notification Position/status Chief Executive, Global Commercial Banking Initial notification/amendment Initial Notification 3 - Details of the issuer, emission allowance market participant,\nauction platform, auctioneer or auction monitor Full name of the entity HSBC Holdings plc Legal Entity Identifier code MLU0ZO3ML4LN2LL2TL39 4 - Details of the transaction(s) Transaction(s) summary table Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2024-03-12 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Acquisition under the HSBC Share Plan 2011 Price Volume Total £5.80 27,714 £160,713.49 Aggregated £5.799 27,714 £160,713.49 Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2024-03-12 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Disposal Price Volume Total £5.90 5,321 £31,389.52 Aggregated £5.899 5,321 £31,389.52 1 - Details of the person discharging managerial responsibilities /\nperson closely associated Name of natural person Michael Roberts 2 - Reason for the notification Position/status Chief Executive, HSBC USA and Americas Initial notification/amendment Initial Notification 3 - Details of the issuer, emission allowance market participant,\nauction platform, auctioneer or auction monitor Full name of the entity HSBC Holdings plc Legal Entity Identifier code MLU0ZO3ML4LN2LL2TL39 4 - Details of the transaction(s) Transaction(s) summary table Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2024-03-12 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Acquisition under the HSBC Share Plan 2011 Price Volume Total £5.80 46,879 £271,851.32 Aggregated £5.799 46,879 £271,851.32 Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2024-03-12 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Disposal Price Volume Total £5.90 23,932 £141,179.10 Aggregated £5.899 23,932 £141,179.10 Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2024-03-13 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Acquisition under the HSBC Share Plan 2011 Price Volume Total £5.80 43,415 £251,763.58 Aggregated £5.799 43,415 £251,763.58 Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2024-03-13 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Disposal Price Volume Total £5.92 22,164 £131,182.95 Aggregated £5.919 22,164 £131,182.95 1 - Details of the person discharging managerial responsibilities /\nperson closely associated Name of natural person Surendra Rosha 2 - Reason for the notification Position/status Co-Chief Executive, Asia-Pacific - The Hongkong and Shanghai\nBanking Corporation Limited Initial notification/amendment Initial Notification 3 - Details of the issuer, emission allowance market participant,\nauction platform, auctioneer or auction monitor Full name of the entity HSBC Holdings plc Legal Entity Identifier code MLU0ZO3ML4LN2LL2TL39 4 - Details of the transaction(s) Transaction(s) summary table Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2024-03-12 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Acquisition under the HSBC Share Plan 2011 Price Volume Total £5.80 24,106 £139,790.69 Aggregated £5.799 24,106 £139,790.69 Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2024-03-12 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Disposal Price Volume Total £5.90 3,616 £21,331.42 Aggregated £5.899 3,616 £21,331.42 Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2024-03-13 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Acquisition under the HSBC Share Plan 2011 Price Volume Total £5.80 27,591 £160,000.21 Aggregated £5.799 27,591 £160,000.21 Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2024-03-13 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Disposal Price Volume Total £5.92 4,139 £24,497.66 Aggregated £5.919 4,139 £24,497.66 1 - Details of the person discharging managerial responsibilities /\nperson closely associated Name of natural person Ian Stuart 2 - Reason for the notification Position/status Chief Executive, HSBC UK Bank plc Initial notification/amendment Initial Notification 3 - Details of the issuer, emission allowance market participant,\nauction platform, auctioneer or auction monitor Full name of the entity HSBC Holdings plc Legal Entity Identifier code MLU0ZO3ML4LN2LL2TL39 4 - Details of the transaction(s) Transaction(s) summary table Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2024-03-12 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Acquisition under the HSBC Share Plan 2011 Price Volume Total £5.80 33,935 £196,789.06 Aggregated £5.799 33,935 £196,789.06 Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2024-03-12 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Disposal Price Volume Total £5.90 15,950 £94,091.87 Aggregated £5.899 15,950 £94,091.87 For any\nqueries related to this notification, please\ncontact: Lee Davis Corporate Governance & Secretariat shareholderquestions@hsbc.com SIGNATURE Pursuant\nto the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the\nregistrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf\nby the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized. HSBC\nHoldings plc By: Name:\nAileen Taylor Title:\nGroup Company Secretary and Chief Governance Officer Date:\n14 March 2024", "source": "edgar", "stratum": "edgar", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1089113/000165495424003136/hsbcholdings-9397g.htm"}
{"doc_id": "a4b1a1e47e6a780f1e6162828506758e", "text": "6-K 1 a4835i.htm NOTICE OF REDEMPTION a4835i FORM 6-K SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 Report of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a - 16 or 15d - 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 For the\nmonth of October HSBC Holdings plc 42nd\nFloor, 8 Canada Square, London E14 5HQ, England (Indicate\nby check mark whether the registrant files or will file annual\nreports under cover of Form 20-F or Form 40-F). Form\n20-F X Form 40-F NOTICE OF REDEMPTION Dated 16 October 2024 US$1,250,000,000 4.180% Fixed Rate/Floating Rate Senior Unsecured\nNotes due 2025 (CUSIP No. 404280DE6; ISIN: US404280DE63)* (the\n'Securities') * No representation is made as to the correctness of such numbers\neither as printed on the Securities or as contained in this Notice\nof Redemption, and reliance may be placed only on the other\nidentification numbers printed on the Securities, and the Optional\nRedemption (as defined below) shall not be affected by any defect\nin or omission of such numbers. To:      The Holders of the\nSecurities The New York Stock Exchange NOTE: THIS NOTICE CONTAINS IMPORTANT INFORMATION THAT IS OF\nINTEREST TO THE REGISTERED HOLDERS AND BENEFICIAL OWNERS OF THE\nSECURITIES. IF APPLICABLE, ALL DEPOSITORIES, CUSTODIANS, AND OTHER\nINTERMEDIARIES RECEIVING THIS NOTICE ARE REQUESTED TO EXPEDITE\nRE-TRANSMITTAL TO THE REGISTERED HOLDERS AND BENEFICIAL OWNERS OF\nTHE SECURITIES IN A TIMELY MANNER. The Securities have been issued pursuant to an indenture dated 26\nAugust 2009 (as amended or supplemented from time to time, the\n' Base\nIndenture '),\nbetween HSBC\nHoldings plc, as issuer (the ' Issuer '),\nThe Bank of New York Mellon, London Branch, as trustee (the\n' Trustee '),\nand HSBC Bank USA, National Association, as paying agent and\nregistrar (' HSBC Bank\nUSA '), as\nsupplemented and amended by a twenty-fifth supplemental indenture\ndated 9 June 2022 (the ' Twenty-fifth\nSupplemental Indenture ' and, together with the Base\nIndenture, the ' Indenture ')\namong the Issuer, the Trustee and HSBC Bank USA as paying agent,\nregistrar and calculation agent. Capitalised\nterms used and not defined herein have the meanings ascribed to\nthem in the Indenture. The Issuer\nhas elected to\nredeem the Securities\nin whole in accordance\nwith the terms of the Indenture and the Securities (the\n' Optional\nRedemption '). Pursuant to Section 11.04 of the Base Indenture and Sections 2.01,\n2.02 , 3.01, 3.02, 4.01, and 4.02 of the Twenty-fifth\nSupplemental Indenture, the Issuer hereby provides notice of the\nfollowing information relating to the Optional\nRedemption: ● The redemption date for the\nSecurities shall be 9 December 2024 (the ' Redemption Date ' ). ● The redemption price for the Securities shall be\nUS$1,000 per US$1,000 principal amount of the Securities (the\n' Redemption\nPrice '). ● Additionally, in accordance with\nthe terms of the Indenture, as the Redemption Date is an Interest\nPayment Date, all accrued but unpaid interest from (and including)\n9 June 2024 to (but excluding) the Redemption Date will be payable\nto the holders of record of the Securities as of 24 November 2024,\nthe Regular Record Date (the ' Interest\nPayment '). ● Subject\nto any conditions and/or the limited circumstances contained in the\nTwenty-fifth Supplemental Indenture, on the Redemption Date the\nRedemption Price and the Interest Payment shall become due and\npayable upon each such Security to be redeemed and interest thereon\nshall cease to accrue on and after such date. ● Securities\nshould be surrendered at the registered office of HSBC Bank USA at\n66 Hudson Boulevard East, 545W9, New York, NY 10001, Attention:\nIssuer Services. Questions relating to this Notice of Redemption should be addressed\nto HSBC Bank USA via e-mail at CTLANYDealManagement@us.hsbc.com, at\nits registered office or via telephone at +1 201 217\n8417. IMPORTANT TAX INFORMATION EXISTING U.S. FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAW MAY REQUIRE BACKUP WITHHOLDING\nOF 24% OF ANY PAYMENTS TO HOLDERS PRESENTING THEIR SECURITIES FOR\nPAYMENTS WHO HAVE FAILED TO FURNISH A TAXPAYER IDENTIFICATION\nNUMBER, CERTIFIED TO BE CORRECT UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY ON A\nCOMPLETE AND VALID INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE ('IRS') FORM W-9 OR\nAPPLICABLE FORM W-8 TO THE APPLICABLE PAYER OR WITHHOLDING AGENT.\nHOLDERS MAY ALSO BE SUBJECT TO PENALTIES FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE\nSUCH NUMBER. Investor enquiries to: Greg\nCase                   \n+44 (0) 20 7992\n3825                 investorrelations@hsbc.com Media enquiries to: Press Office\n               \n+44 (0) 20 7991 8096 pressoffice@hsbc.com Note to editors: HSBC Holdings plc HSBC Holdings plc, the parent company of HSBC, is headquartered in\nLondon. HSBC serves customers worldwide from offices in 60\ncountries and territories. With assets of US$2,975bn at 30 June\n2024, HSBC is one of the world's largest banking and financial\nservices organisations. ends/all SIGNATURE Pursuant\nto the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the\nregistrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf\nby the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized. HSBC\nHoldings plc By: Name:\nAileen Taylor Title:\nGroup Company Secretary and Chief Governance Officer Date:\n16 October 2024", "source": "edgar", "stratum": "edgar", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1089113/000165495424013024/a4835i.htm"}
{"doc_id": "bd733792d45895d8099fc5326b7b7a97", "text": "6-K 1 a0221o.htm DIRECTOR/PDMR SHAREHOLDING a0221o FORM 6-K SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 Report of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a - 16 or 15d - 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 For the\nmonth of June HSBC Holdings plc 42nd\nFloor, 8 Canada Square, London E14 5HQ, England (Indicate\nby check mark whether the registrant files or will file annual\nreports under cover of Form 20-F or Form 40-F). Form\n20-F X Form 40-F HSBC HOLDINGS PLC 23 June 2025 Notification of Transactions by Persons Discharging Managerial\nResponsibilities (\"PDMRs\") The following transactions of US$0.50 ordinary shares (the\n\"Shares\") in HSBC Holdings plc (the \"Company\"), relates to the\nadditional Shares being added to PDMRs' vested share plan interests\nthrough the automatic reinvestment of the first interim dividend\nfor 2025, which took place on 20 June 2025. The price per Share was\n£8.74251. Other PDMRs Name Shares acquired David\nLiao 6,143 Barry\nO'Byrne 15 Ian\nStuart 13 The\nfollowing disclosures are made in accordance with the UK version of\nthe EU Market Abuse Regulation 596/2014. 1 - Details of the person discharging managerial responsibilities /\nperson closely associated Name of natural person David\nLiao 2 - Reason for the notification Position/status Co-Chief\nExecutive, Asia and Middle East Initial notification/amendment Initial\nNotification 3\n- Details of the issuer, emission allowance market participant,\nauction platform, auctioneer or auction monitor Full name of the entity HSBC Holdings plc Legal Entity Identifier code MLU0ZO3ML4LN2LL2TL39 4 - Details of the transaction(s) Transaction(s) summary table Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2025-06-20 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Acquisition as part of the reinvestment of the first interim\ndividend for 2025 Price Volume Total £8.74 6,143 £53,705.24 Aggregated £8.743 6,143 £53,705.24 1 - Details of the person discharging managerial responsibilities /\nperson closely associated Name of natural person Barry\nO'Byrne 2 - Reason for the notification Position/status Chief\nExecutive, International Wealth and Premier Banking Initial notification/amendment Initial\nNotification 3\n- Details of the issuer, emission allowance market participant,\nauction platform, auctioneer or auction monitor Full name of the entity HSBC Holdings plc Legal Entity Identifier code MLU0ZO3ML4LN2LL2TL39 4 - Details of the transaction(s) Transaction(s) summary table Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2025-06-20 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Acquisition as part of the reinvestment of the first interim\ndividend for 2025 Price Volume Total £8.74 15 £131.14 Aggregated £8.743 15 £131.14 1 - Details of the person discharging managerial responsibilities /\nperson closely associated Name of natural person Ian\nStuart 2 - Reason for the notification Position/status Chief\nExecutive, HSBC UK Bank plc Initial notification/amendment Initial\nNotification 3\n- Details of the issuer, emission allowance market participant,\nauction platform, auctioneer or auction monitor Full name of the entity HSBC Holdings plc Legal Entity Identifier code MLU0ZO3ML4LN2LL2TL39 4 - Details of the transaction(s) Transaction(s) summary table Date of Transaction Financial Instrument Identification Code Place of Transaction Currency 2025-06-20 Ordinary shares of US$0.50 each GB0005405286 London Stock Exchange, Main Market (XLON) GBP - British Pound Nature of Transaction: Acquisition as part of the reinvestment of the first interim\ndividend for 2025 Price Volume Total £8.74 13 £113.65 Aggregated £8.743 13 £113.65 For any queries related to this\nnotification, please contact: Lee\nDavis Corporate\nGovernance & Secretariat shareholderquestions@hsbc.com SIGNATURE Pursuant\nto the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the\nregistrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf\nby the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized. HSBC\nHoldings plc By: Name:\nAileen Taylor Title:\nGroup Company Secretary and Chief Governance Officer Date:\n23 June 2025", "source": "edgar", "stratum": "edgar", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1089113/000165495425007289/a0221o.htm"}
{"doc_id": "f1efd2863aa4f43afed58f8f21870e71", "text": "INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\nREGIONAL\nECONOMIC\nOUTLOOK\nSUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nLight on the Horizon?\n2023\nOC T\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\nREGIONAL\nECONOMIC\nOUTLOOK\nSUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nLight on the Horizon?\n2023\nOCT\nCopyright ©2023 International Monetary Fund\nCataloging-in-Publication Data\nIMF Library\nNames: International Monetary Fund, publisher.\nTitle: Regional economic outlook. Sub-Saharan Africa : light on the horizon?\nOther titles: Sub-Saharan Africa : light on the horizon? | Light on the horizon? | World economic and financial\nsurveys. | Regional economic outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa.\nDescription: Washington, DC : International Monetary Fund, 2023. | World economic and financial surveys. |\nOct. 2023. | Includes bibliographical references.\nIdentifiers: ISBN 9798400253508 (English Paper)\n9798400253560 (ePub)\n9798400253546 (Web PDF)\nSubjects: LCSH: Africa, Sub-Saharan—Economic conditions. | Economic forecasting—Africa, Sub-Saharan. |\nEconomic development—Africa, Sub-Saharan. | Africa, Sub-Saharan—Economic policy.\nClassification: LCC HC800.R44 2023\nThe Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa is published twice a year, in the spring and fall, to review\ndevelopments in sub-Saharan Africa. Both projections and policy considerations are those of the IMF staff\nand do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF Management.\nPublication orders may be placed online or through the mail:\nInternational Monetary Fund, Publication Services\nP.O. Box 92780, Washington, DC 20090, U.S.A.\nT. +(1) 202.623.7430\nF. +(1) 202.623.7201\npublications@IMF.org\nIMFbookstore.org\nelibrary.IMF.org\nFind all published Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa\nhttps://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/SSA\nLIGHT ON THE HORIZON? iii\nContents\nAcknowledgments ....................................................................................................... v\nCountry Groupings. ..................................................................................................... vi\nAssumptions and Conventions. ........................................................................................ vii\nExecutive Summary ...................................................................................................... 1\nLight on the Horizon? .................................................................................................... 2\nRecent developments and outlook: a distant glimpse of sunshine ................................................ 3\nLooking to the horizon: four priority policies ........................................................................ 9\nReferences .............................................................................................................. 15\nStatistical Appendix. ................................................................................................... 18\nOCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\niv REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nFIGURES\nFigure 1. Sub-Saharan Africa: GDP Growth, 2021–24 .................................................................. 3\nFigure 2. Sub-Saharan Africa: Contributions to Change in GDP Growth. ............................................. 3\nFigure 3. Sub-Saharan Africa: GDP Growth 2005–28. .................................................................. 4\nFigure 4. Sub-Saharan Africa: Real Per Capita GDP, 2019–24 .......................................................... 4\nFigure 5. Global Inflation during the Crisis. ............................................................................. 5\nFigure 6. Sub-Saharan Africa: Food Inflation, 2002–23 ................................................................. 6\nFigure 7. Sub-Saharan Africa: Government Deficit, (excluding grants), 2015–24 ..................................... 6\nFigure 8. Sub-Saharan Africa: Public Debt, 2000–24 ................................................................... 6\nFigure 9. Sub-Saharan Africa: time to Double Per Capita Income ..................................................... 7\nFigure 10. Sub-Saharan Africa: Coups per Year 1960–2023 ........................................................... 7\nFigure 11. Sub-Saharan Africa: Policy Rates versus Expected Inflation .............................................. 10\nFigure 12. Sub-Saharan Africa: Reserve Cover, 2022. ................................................................ 10\nFigure 13. Nigerian Naira Versus US Dollar, 2020–23 ................................................................ 11\nFigure 14. Sub-Saharan Africa: Fiscal Adjustment Needed to Stabilize Debt Below 70 Percent of GDP, 2023 . .. 12\nTABLES\nSub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Groupings ................................................................ vi\nSub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Regional Groupings ..................................................... vi\nSub-Saharan Africa: Country Abbreviations ........................................................................... vii\nSTATISTICAL APPENDIX TABLES\nSA1. Real GDP Growth and Consumer Prices, Average .............................................................. 18\nSA2. Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants and Government Debt .............................................. 19\nSA3. Broad Money and External Current Account, Including Grants. ............................................... 20\nSA4. External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based and Reserves. ..................................................... 21\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023\nLIGHT ON THE HORIZON? v\nAcknowledgments\nThe October 2023 issue of the Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa was prepared by a\nteam led by Saad Quayyum and under the supervision of Andrew Tiffin, Luc Eyraud, and Catherine Pattillo.\nThe team included Hany Abdel-Latif, Wenjie Chen, Michele Fornino, Cleary Haines, Irena Jankulov Suljagic,\nThibault Lemaire, Hamza Mighri, Francine Nyankiye, Alvaro Piris, Henry Rawlings, Arthur Sode.\nCharlotte Vazquez was responsible for document production, with assistance from Yao Nourdine Ouattara.\nThe editing and production were overseen by Cheryl Toksoz of the Communications Department.\nOCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\nvi REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nCountry Groupings\nSub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Groupings\nOil Exporters Other Resource- Non-Resource- Middle-Income Low-Income Countries in Fragile\nIntensive Intensive Countries Countries and Conflict-Affected\nCountries Countries Situations1\nAngola Botswana Benin Angola Burkina Faso Burkina Faso\nCameroon Burkina Faso Burundi Benin Burundi Burundi\nChad Central Cabo Verde Botswana Central Cameroon\nCongo, Republic of African Republic Comoros Cabo Verde African Republic Central African Republic\nEquatorial Guinea Congo, Democratic Côte d’Ivoire Cameroon Chad Chad\nGabon Republic of the Eswatini Comoros Congo, Comoros\nNigeria Eritrea Ethiopia Congo, Republic of Democratic Congo, Democratic\nSouth Sudan Ghana Gambia, The Côte d’Ivoire Republic of the Republic of the\nGuinea Guinea-Bissau Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Congo, Republic of\nLiberia Kenya Eswatini Ethiopia Eritrea\nMali Lesotho Gabon Gambia, The Ethiopia\nNamibia Madagascar Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau\nNiger Malawi Kenya Guinea-Bissau Mali\nSierra Leone Mauritius Lesotho Liberia Mozambique\nSouth Africa Mozambique Mauritius Madagascar Niger\nTanzania Rwanda Namibia Malawi Nigeria\nZambia São Tomé Nigeria Mali São Tomé and Príncipe\nZimbabwe and Príncipe São Tomé Mozambique South Sudan\nSenegal and Príncipe Niger Zimbabwe\nSeychelles Senegal Rwanda\nTogo Seychelles Sierra Leone\nUganda South Africa South Sudan\nZambia Tanzania\nTogo\nUganda\nZimbabwe\n1 Fragile and conflict-affected situations as classified by the World Bank, Classification of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations, FY2024\nSub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Regional Groupings\nThe West Economic Common East African Southern African Southern Economic\nAfrican and Monetary Market for Community Development African Community of\nEconomic and Community of Eastern and Community Customs West African\nMonetary Union Central African Southern Africa Union States\n(WAEMU) States (SADC)\n(CEMAC) (COMESA) (*EAC-5) (SACU) (ECOWAS)\nBenin Cameroon Burundi *Burundi Angola Botswana Benin\nBurkina Faso Central Comoros *Kenya Botswana Eswatini Burkina Faso\nCôte d’Ivoire African Republic Congo, *Rwanda Comoros Lesotho Cabo Verde\nGuinea-Bissau Chad Democratic South Sudan Congo, Namibia Côte d’Ivoire\nMali Congo, Republic of Republic of the *Tanzania Democratic South Africa Gambia, The\nNiger Equatorial Guinea Eritrea *Uganda Republic of the Ghana\nSenegal Gabon Eswatini Eswatini Guinea\nTogo Ethiopia Lesotho Guinea-Bissau\nKenya Madagascar Liberia\nMadagascar Malawi Mali\nMalawi Mauritius Niger\nMauritius Mozambique Nigeria\nRwanda Namibia Senegal\nSeychelles Seychelles Sierra Leone\nUganda South Africa Togo\nZambia Tanzania\nZimbabwe Zambia\nZimbabwe\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023\nLIGHT ON THE HORIZON? vii\nAssumptions and Conventions\nThe following conventions are used in this publication:\nIn tables, ellipsis points (. . .) indicate “not available,” and 0 or 0.0 indicates “zero” or “negligible.” Minor\ndiscrepancies between sums of constituent figures and totals are due to rounding.\nAn en dash (–) between years or months (for example, 2011–12 or January–June) indicates the years or\nmonths covered, including the beginning and ending years or months; a slash or virgule (/) between\nyears or months (for example, 2011/12) indicates a fiscal or financial year, as does the abbreviation FY\n(for example, FY 2012).\n“Billion” means a thousand million; “trillion” means a thousand billion.\n“Basis points (bps)” refer to hundredths of 1 percentage point (for example, 25 basis points are equivalent to\n¼ of 1 percentage point).\nAs used in this publication, the term “country” does not in all cases refer to a territorial entity that is a state as\nunderstood by international law and practice. As used here, the term also covers some territorial entities that\nare not states but for which statistical data are maintained on a separate and independent basis.\nThe boundaries, colors, denominations, and any other information shown on the maps do not imply, on the\npart of the International Monetary Fund, any judgment on the legal status of any territory or any endorsement\nor acceptance of such boundaries.\nSub-Saharan Africa: Country Abbreviations\nAGO Angola CPV Cabo Verde LSO Lesotho SLE Sierra Leone\nBDI Burundi ERI Eritrea MDG Madagascar SSD South Sudan\nBEN Benin ETH Ethiopia MLI Mali STP São Tomé and Príncipe\nBFA Burkina Faso GAB Gabon MOZ Mozambique SWZ Eswatini\nBWA Botswana GHA Ghana MUS Mauritius SYC Seychelles\nCAF Central African Republic GIN Guinea MWI Malawi TCD Chad\nCIV Côte d’Ivoire GMB Gambia, The NAM Namibia TGO Togo\nCMR Cameroon GNB Guinea-Bissau NER Niger TZA Tanzania\nCOD Congo, Democratic Republic of the GNQ Equatorial Guinea NGA Nigeria UGA Uganda\nCOG Congo, Republic of KEN Kenya RWA Rwanda ZAF South Africa\nCOM Comoros LBR Liberia SEN Senegal ZMB Zambia\nZWE Zimbabwe\nOCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\nLIGHT ON THE HORIZON? 1\nExecutive Summary\n2023 has been a difficult year for activity in sub-Saharan African economies. The inflationary shock following\nRussia’s war in Ukraine has prompted higher interest rates worldwide, which has meant slowing international\ndemand, elevated spreads, and ongoing exchange rate pressures. As a result, growth in 2023 is expected to fall\nfor the second year in a row to 3.3 percent from 4.0 percent last year.\nThe region is expected to rebound next year, with growth increasing to 4.0 percent in 2024, picking up in four-\nfifths of the sub-Saharan Africa’s countries, and with strong performances in non-resource intensive countries.\nMacroeconomic imbalances are also improving—inflation is falling for most of the region, and public finances are\ngradually being put on a more sustainable footing.\nBut the rebound is not guaranteed. A slowdown in reform efforts, a rise in political instability within the region, or\nexternal downside risks (including from China slowing down) could undermine growth. Moreover, four clouds are\non the horizon which require determined policy action in the face of difficult tradeoffs:\nƒ First, inflation is still too high. It is in double digits in 14 countries. And it remains above target in most countries\nwith explicit targets.\nƒ Second, the region continues to face significant exchange rate pressures.\nƒ Third, debt vulnerabilities are elevated. The funding squeeze is not over, as borrowing rates are still high,\nand rolling over debt is a challenge. And half of the low-income countries in the region are at high risk or in\ndebt distress.\nƒ Finally, while the recovery is underway, economic divergences within the region are widening—in particular,\nper capita incomes in resource intensive economies remain subdued.\nAgainst this background the policy priorities are as follows:\nƒ Addressing inflation: For countries where inflation is high but falling, a “pause” may be warranted, with rates\nheld at existing elevated levels until inflation is firmly on the path to target. In countries with still rising inflation,\nfurther monetary tightening may be required until there are clear signs that inflation is cooling.\nƒ Managing exchange rate pressures: For pegged countries, monetary policy needs to be aligned with the anchor\ncountry to preserve external stability and prevent further losses of reserves. In countries with floating exchange\nrates, currencies should be allowed to adjust as much as possible, since efforts to resist fundamentals-based\nmovements come at a significant cost. The adjustment should be accompanied by other policy measures—\ntighter monetary policy to keep inflation in check, targeted support for the poor, structural reforms to strengthen\nthe export sector, and fiscal consolidation where the fiscal deficit is adding to exchange rate pressures.\nƒ Managing debt obligations while creating space for development spending: For much of the region, fiscal\npolicy must adapt to a tighter financing envelope and elevated debt vulnerabilities. This involves better mobi-\nlizing domestic revenue, a strategic approach to spending, borrowing prudently, and anchoring fiscal policy\nthrough a credible medium-term framework. In the few countries where debt is unsustainable, debt restruc-\nturing may also be needed. With large development needs and limited fiscal space, most countries need\ngreater financial support from donors.\nƒ Improving living standards and potential growth, particularly in resource intensive countries: Boosting income\nper capita will require wide-ranging structural reforms, including investment in education, better natural\nresource management, improved business climate and digitalization, and a commitment to trade integration.\nRegional Economic Outlook Notes. In parallel, a series of analytical notes explore topics of current interest.\n“At a Crossroads: Sub-Saharan Africa’s Economic Relations with China” explores the Africa-China relationship\nand the implications of a slowdown in China. “Debt Dilemmas in Sub-Saharan Africa: Some Principles and Trade-\nOffs in Debt Restructuring” discusses debt developments and how to approach sovereign debt restructuring.\n“The Long Squeeze: Funding Development in an Age of Austerity” discusses trends in development finance and\ntheir policy implications.\nOCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n2 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nLight on the Horizon?\nStill emerging from the COVID-19 pandemic, countries have been hit by a sluggish global economy,\nworldwide inflation, high borrowing costs, and a cost-of-living crisis. As a result, growth in 2023 is expected\nto fall for the second year in a row to 3.3 percent from 4.0 percent last year. But a long-awaited rebound\nis on the horizon. Inflation is falling, public finances are stabilizing, and growth is poised to increase to 4.0\npercent next year. Still, even though the outlook is less ominous, it is too early to celebrate. In many cases,\ninflation is still too high, borrowing costs are still elevated, exchange-rate pressures persist, and political\ninstability is an ongoing concern. To ensure that the coming rebound is more than just a transitory glimpse\nof sunshine, it is important for authorities to guard against a premature relaxation of stabilization policies,\nwhile also focusing on reforms to both claw back lost ground from the four-year crisis and also to create new\nspace to address the region’s pressing development needs.\nLight on the Horizon?\n2023 has been a difficult year\nSlowing international activity, higher global interest rates, elevated\nspreads, and renewed exchange rate pressures have all combined to\ncreate an acute funding squeeze.\nA long-awaited growth rebound next year\n2023: 2024:\nfell for the set to\nsecond year recover\n3.3% 4 %\nThe recovery is not guaranteed: four policy priorities\nPersistent Exchange-rate Fiscal Divergent\ninflation pressures sustainability recoveries\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023\nLIGHT ON THE HORIZON? 3\nRecent developments and outlook: a distant glimpse of sunshine\nEmerging from a difficult year in 2023, activity in the region is expected to\nrebound next year…\nFIGURE 1\n2023 has been another challenging year. The inflationary\nFigure 1. Sub-Saharan Africa: GDP Growth,\nshock following Russia’s war in Ukraine prompted higher 2021–24\ninterest rates worldwide, with a significant impact this year. (Percent)\nFor sub-Saharan Africa, this has meant slowing international\n4.8\ndemand, higher global interest rates, elevated spreads, and Projections\nongoing exchange rate pressures that have all combined to\ncreate an acute funding squeeze—yet another shock for a 4.4\nregion still emerging from the COVID-19 pandemic. As a\nresult, growth in 2023 is expected to fall for the second year\nin a row to 3.3 percent from 4.0 percent last year. 4.0\nBut growth in sub-Saharan Africa is set to rebound to\n4.0 percent in 2024. (Figure 1.) Model estimates suggest 3.6\nthe region’s recovery may already have started. GDP data\nfor most countries are still only available for Q1 2023. But\n2021 22 23 24\nhigh frequency indicators show that aggregate activity for\nSource: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.\nthe region improved in the second quarter.1 Important\nfor the region, disruptive power shortages in South Africa\npicked up significantly in 2022 and have weighed on that country’s growth in 2023—but even here outturns for\nthe first half of the year have been better than anticipated, owing to the lower-than-projected impact of power\nshortages and the ongoing strength of the services sector. Looking ahead, the relative size of South Africa\n(19½ percent of regional GDP) means that average regional growth in 2024 will largely reflect South Africa’s\ncoming recovery (Figure 2), which in turn will be driven by that country’s efforts to address pressing issues in the\npower sector. But the region’s recovery extends beyond South Africa. Indeed, in stark contrast to 2023, growth will\nimprove in around four-fifths of the region’s economies.\nfigure 2 figure 2 Figure 2. Sub-Saharan Africa: Contributions to Change in GDP Growth\n(Percent contributions, from 4.0 to 3.3) (Percent contributions, from 3.3 to 4.0)\n2022 to 20220322 to 2023 2023 to 20220423 to 2024\nBurkina FaBsourkina Faso South AfricSaouth Africa\nMozambiquMeozambique Angola Angola\nEquatorial EGquuinaetoarial Guinea Senegal Senegal\nUganda Uganda Ghana Ghana\nCongo, De Cmo. nRgeop, .Dem. Rep. Niger Niger\nNiger Niger Nigeria Nigeria\nGhana Ghana Tanzania Tanzania\nAngola Angola Uganda Uganda\nNigeria Nigeria Burkina FaBsourkina Faso\nSouth AfricSaouth Africa Congo, DeCmo. nRgeop, .Dem. Rep.\nOthers Others Others Others\n3.5 3.35.7 3.73.9 3.9 3.4 3.43.6 3.63.8 3.84.0 4.0\nSource: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.\n1 Barhoumi and others 2022.\nOCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n4 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\n…with faster growth in the region’s more diversified economies\nStill, there is significant heterogeneity across the region—in particular, the divergence between resource-intensive\nand non-resource-intensive countries is expected to persist. Both groups of economies will recover next year,\nbut at different paces. Subdued commodity prices will continue to weigh on exports for most resource-intensive\neconomies, but overall growth will improve nonetheless from 2.6 percent in 2023 to 3.2 percent in 2024, buoyed\nmainly by private consumption and in some cases, a number of new (or repaired) hydrocarbon projects coming\non stream (Niger, Senegal), and mining projects starting production (Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia,\nMali, Sierra Leone). Growth in non-resource intensive countries, on the other hand, will be supported by both\nconsumption and investment and is expected to improve from 5.3 percent to an impressive 5.9 percent (Figure 3).\nThis two-speed recovery is a long-standing pattern, becoming particularly pronounced following the commod-\nity-price shock of 2015 (see “Recovery Amid Elevated Uncertainty,” Chapter 1 in Regional Economic Outlook:\nSub-Saharan Africa, April 2019). Since that episode, the divergence between these two types of economies has\nbecome more entrenched. Neither group of countries is expected to completely recover lost ground from the\ncrisis, but non-resource countries have nonetheless proven more resilient, supported by their more diversified\neconomies. For resource-intensive economies, on the other hand, a less diversified structure along with greater\nexposure to external shocks has weighed on investor confidence and activity—weakening prospects in the short\nterm and undermining potential growth in the long run (Figure 4).\nExternal conditions are improving\nAlthough the global environment remains difficult, some improvements have been observed since the April 2023,\nRegional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa:\nƒ First, after three long years the World Health Organization has declared that the pandemic is over.\nƒ Second, consumption has proven unexpectedly resilient across numerous large economies, so that (still\ndownbeat) projections for global growth in 2023 have been revised upwards since April.\nƒ Third, global inflation is slowly falling (Figure 5). Policy-rate hikes in many large economies are now on pause\nand international financial conditions are easing—which has helped reduce sovereign spreads for sub-Saharan\nAfrican countries, taking some pressure off the funding squeeze.2\nFigure 3\nFigure 4. Sub-Saharan Africa: Real Per Capita GDP,\nFigure 3. Sub-Saharan Africa: GDP Growth 2005–28\n2019–24\n(Percent, dashed line = weighted average)\n(Index 2019 = 100, dashed line = pre-crisis projections)\n7.5\nProjections\n120 Non-resource-intensive\ncountries\n5.0 Non-resource-intensive\ncountries\n110\n2.5\nResource-intensive\nResource-intensive\ncountries\ncountries\n0.0\n100\n–2.5\n2005 10 15 20 25 2019 20 21 22 23 24\nSource: IMF, World Economic Outlook database. Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.\nNote: See country groupings on page vi. Note: See country groupings on page vi.\n2 Spreads on Eurobonds have come down by 150 bps between March and end-September 2023.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023\nLIGHT ON THE HORIZON? 5\nƒ Finally, global supply chains have normalized, and food and energy prices have fallen. International food\nprices have dropped by over 20 percent over the past 18 months. With food being close to 40 percent of\nsub-Saharan Africa’s consumption basket, this is good news for a region grappling with an acute cost-of-living\ncrisis and an already-troubling incidence of poverty—about a third of the population in sub-Saharan Africa is\nestimated to live under $2.15 a day.\nMacroeconomic imbalances are declining\nInflation is coming down in sub-Saharan Africa. Having peaked in March 2023 at almost 10 percent (y/y), median\ninflation in sub-Saharan Africa has dropped by 3 percentage points, bringing the latest estimate to 7 percent as\nof July, 2023.\nAs with growth, there is significant heterogeneity across countries. Countries with flexible exchange rates\non average have higher inflation rates than those with more fixed arrangements, and nearly one-third of the\nregion still had double-digit inflation as of July, 2023. Nonetheless, using latest available data, over 40 percent\nof countries have had inflation fall consistently for at least two months. And most other countries are expected\nto peak soon, with only five countries (Angola, Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea, Niger, Seychelles) projecting\ninflation to increase over the course of 2024. Some countries with elevated inflation are relatively large economies\n(Ghana, Ethiopia, Nigeria) so the weighted average rate for the region is also elevated. But looking at the median\ncountry, the impact of the crisis on sub-Saharan Africa, as well as the region’s projected disinflation path, is broadly\nin line with trends elsewhere (Figure 5).\nFigure 5\nFigure 5. Global Inflation during the Crisis\n(Percentage point difference to end of 2019 pre-pandemic level)\nWeighted Average Median\nAEs AEs\nNon-SSA EMs Non-SSA EMs\n5.0 Non-SSA LICs 5.0 Non-SSA LICs\nSSA SSA\n2.5 2.5\n0.0 0.0\n2019 20 21 22 23 24 2019 20 21 22 23 24\nSource: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.\nNote: AEs = Advanced economies; Non-SSA EMs = Non-sub-Saharan African emerging markets; Non-SSA LICs = Non-sub-Saharan African\nLow-income countries; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa.\nOf critical importance to the region’s food security, domestic food price inflation has also fallen, driven largely\nby a general drop in global food prices. Typically, as international food prices fall, domestic food inflation follows\nwith a lag of 6-to-12 months and with an almost complete pass-through for imported staples. Although median\nfood price inflation is still too high at over 10 percent, this is down from a peak of almost 16 percent in October\n2022 (Figure 6). The recent trend is a welcome development for the region, as sub-Saharan Africa is the most food\ninsecure region in the world. Projections for 2023 suggest that 142 million people are acutely insecure, up by\n10 million from last year and representing 12 percent the population.\nTurning to the region’s fiscal situation, public finances are gradually being put on a more sustainable footing.\nIn 2020 the median fiscal deficit (excluding grants) expanded sharply to 8.2 percent of GDP, owing to the impact\nof the pandemic on revenues and the need to protect the most vulnerable (Figure 7). Consequently, median\nOCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n6 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nFigure 6\npublic debt also increased sharply, from around Figure 6. Sub-Saharan Africa: Food Inflation,\n51½ percent in 2019 to almost 59 percent in 2020 2002–23\n(Figure 8). But few countries entered the crisis with the (Percent, year over year, median, as of July 2023)\nfiscal space to sustain such an effort, and most authori- 2007–08 Russian\nties have since started to consolidate. The median deficit Global invasion\nfood price of Ukraine\n(excluding grants) narrowed to 6.1 percent of GDP in\n15 crisis\n2022 and is expected to moderate further to 5.3 percent\nin 2023. As a result, debt levels have largely stabilized\nat around 60 percent starting from 2021 and are 10\nprojected to ease gently starting 2024—halting an almost\ndecade-long upward trend. The fiscal adjustment so far\nreflects an almost equal mix of spending restraint and 5\nincreased revenues (as a percent of GDP).\nBeyond general consolidation, some countries (Angola,\nDec. 2002 Dec. 07 Dec. 12 Dec. 17 Dec. 22\nThe Gambia, Nigeria, Zambia) have started to implement\nSources: Haver Analytics; country authorities; and IMF staff\nsignificant energy subsidy reforms to create space for\ncalculations.\ndevelopment spending. In Nigeria, for example, in June\n2023 the authorities removed fuel subsidies that cost about $10 billion last year—four times the amount spent\non health. Most of these subsidies were poorly targeted and tended to benefit affluent segments of the popula-\ntion. Moreover, a significant amount of fuel was being smuggled out of the country, rewarding the rent-seeking\nbehavior of a small number of individuals and effectively subsidizing consumers (or distributors) in neighboring\nstates. Similarly, Angola has announced plans for a phased removal of energy subsidies worth almost $4 billion.\nStill, some storm clouds remain…\nThe recovery next year is most welcome but is not guaranteed:\nƒ First, the funding squeeze is not over. Debt levels have stabilized regionwide, but are still elevated in many\ncases—over half the region’s low-income countries are either at high risk of debt distress or already in distress.\nAnd with a trend shift toward market financing, which is more costly than loans from official creditors, debt\nservice obligations have ballooned. Further, although sovereign spreads have eased from their peak earlier\nin the year, borrowing costs remain elevated. For non-distressed countries, the average yield on outstanding\nFigure 8\nEurobonds is over 12 percent, compared to 7 percent prior to the pandemic. Although global interest rates\nFigure 7\nFigure 7. Sub-Saharan Africa: Government Deficit, Figure 8. Sub-Saharan Africa: Public Debt,\n(excluding grants), 2015–24 2000–24\n(Percent of GDP, median, dashed line = pre-crisis level) (Percent of GDP)\nProjections 120 25th and 75th Projections\n8 quartiles\n90\n7\n6 60\nMedian\n5\n30\n2016 18 20 22 24 2000 06 12 18 24\nSource: IMF, World Economic Outlook database. Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023\nLIGHT ON THE HORIZON? 7\nshould eventually fall in line with declining inflation, longer-term global rates are not expected to return to\npre-crisis levels anytime soon. At current yields, no Eurobond has been issued since April 2022 and some\ncountries may struggle to roll over near-term liabilities—indeed, aggregate upcoming Eurobond repayments\nof around $6 billion in both 2024 and 2025 are of particular concern.\nƒ Second, inflation is still too high. Although inflation is trending down for more than 40 percent of the region,\nrates are still above pre-pandemic levels. For countries where expectations are not well anchored, the longer\nelevated inflation persists the greater the prospect of spiraling second-round effects—ultimately requiring\nmonetary authorities to tighten even more aggressively, and potentially adding an extra hurdle for fiscal author-\nities who may face added public wage demands.\nƒ Third, exchange-rate pressures continue. As a further consequence of the funding squeeze, rising global\ninterest rates and softening commodity prices have placed pressure on most sub-Saharan African currencies,\ncomplicating the choices facing policymakers—especially in the fight against inflation. For those with flexible\narrangements, and particularly those with competitiveness concerns or low reserves, efforts to resist currency\nmovements may ultimately undermine growth and make the funding squeeze even worse (see below).\nƒ Fourth, longer-term prosperity remains fragile, especially for less diversified economies. Sub-Saharan Africa\nis endowed with enviable natural resources and a rapidly growing population. But incomes for many of the\nregion’s inhabitants have stagnated—indeed, income per capita growth has long been significantly softer within\nresource-dependent economies, which host nearly two-thirds of the population. In more diversified countries,\nincome per capita is now growing at a respectable 3½ percent, suggesting that living standards can double in\nas little as 20 years. But for less-diversified resource-intensive countries, continued low output growth and rapid\ndemographic change suggest that this doubling may take generations, if ever. (Figure 9). So, a fundamental\nchallenge for policy makers in these countries is to improve resource management and accelerate the process\nof diversification, helping reduce the divergence in living standards across the region.\nƒ Fifth, recent examples of political instability have underscored the implications of persistent fragility. Forty\npercent of sub-Saharan Africa is classified as either fragile or in conflict affected areas. And there have been\n11 coups or attempted coups in the region since 2020; representing a marked increase over the relative\ntranquility of the previous 20 years (Figure 10). The economic and humanitarian costs of political instability\nare not new but rising geo-economic fragmentation is adding to political and social tensions in some fragile\ncountries, including in the Sahel. In addition, fragile and conflict affected states are particularly exposed to\nFigure 10\nexogenous events, such as climate shocks. Evidence suggests that, following extreme weather events, cumula-\ntive output losses can reach about 4 percent in fragile states compared to around 1 percent in other countries\nFigure 9\nFigure 9. Sub-Saharan Africa: time to Double Figure 10. Sub-Saharan Africa: Coups per Year\nPer Capita Income 1960–2023\n(Years, one block represents one country) (Average number of episodes per year)\n4 Unsuccessful\nNon-resource intensive countries Successful\nOil exporters\n3\nOther resources\n2\n1\n0\n1960– 1970– 1980– 1990– 2000– 2010– 2020–\n20 30 40 >50 69 79 89 99 09 19 23\nSources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and IMF staff\nSources: Jonathan Powell, University of Central Florida; and\ncalculations.\nClayton Thyne, University of Kentucky.\nNote: See country groupings on page vi.\nOCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n8 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\n(Jaramillo and others 2023). These losses, in turn, limit countries’ ability to protect themselves against future\nshocks, with consequences spilling over to other groups of countries, often over multiple generations.\n…and the road ahead will be turbulent, with easing global risks but rising\nlocal risks\nGlobally, risks have eased since the April 2023 Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa. Certainly, coming\nout of a four-year crisis, and with limited fiscal and reserve buffers, the ability of most countries in sub-Saharan\nAfrica to absorb further shocks is still limited. But external risks are now much more balanced. Activity in major\neconomies has been more resilient than expected and inflation is falling, often surprising on the downside. Further,\nswift action taken to contain banking-sector turbulence has reduced the immediate risks of financial stress. So\noverall, the risk of a global hard landing has receded. Nevertheless, the global environment is still challenging\nand key downside risks remain:\nƒ Importantly for sub-Saharan Africa, growth in China—the region’s largest trading partner—is already slowing and\nmay be lower than expected. This could not only impact sub-Saharan Africa’s exports but might also shrink\ninward foreign direct investment and lending from the world’s second largest economy (see analytical note\n“At a Crossroads: Sub-Saharan Africa’s Economic Relations with China”). A downside scenario with a deep-\ner-than-expected contraction in China’s real-estate market and weaker consumer confidence would slow\nglobal activity and also tighten financial conditions for emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs)\nborrowers, leading to a –1¼ percent cumulative drop in sub-Saharan African output over 2024–26.\nƒ Financial markets may tighten unexpectedly, inhibiting borrowing in international markets for sub-Saharan\nAfrican economies. This remains a concern as market expectations of policy rates in advanced economies still\ndiffer from announced intentions, raising the prospect of a sudden repricing of risks. Persistent price pressures,\nor significantly higher global energy prices, may also necessitate tighter-than-expected monetary policy in\nadvanced economies, resulting in higher international borrowing rates.\nƒ Rising geopolitical tensions can weigh on global trade and growth and might also add to commodity-price\nvolatility. Food prices, for example, are already exposed to adverse weather patterns from El-Niño but might be\nrocked even more violently if the war in Ukraine were to escalate. More generally, trade restrictions are rising.\nAlmost 3,000 restrictions were imposed globally just last year—nearly 3 times the number imposed in 2019.\nAnd looking ahead, the region is highly exposed if large economies prioritize national interest over the global\ncommon good, particularly when it comes to issues such as: technology transfers to low-income countries, trade\nrestrictions, and climate change. Moreover, countries in sub-Saharan Africa may be forced to choose between\ncompeting political blocs, undermining their efforts at trade integration and diversification, and so constraining\npotential growth (see analytical note “Geoeconomic Fragmentation: Sub-Saharan Africa Caught Between the\nFault Lines” in Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa—The Big Funding Squeeze, April, 2023).\nStill, the global economy is also subject to a range of upside risks. These include: further downside surprises on\ncore inflation; stronger consumer demand, including from policy support in China; and a better-than-expected\ninvestment response to current policy incentives. In addition, recent breakthroughs in artificial intelligence and\ngreen technologies could also usher in a new period of strong productivity growth, boosting investment and\npotential output. A global upside scenario with faster disinflation, higher commodity prices, and a strong recovery\nin investment in advanced economies could lift cumulative output in resource-intensive sub-Saharan Africa by\nalmost ½ percent of GDP over 2024–26.\nWhile global risks have eased, region-specific risks have increased across sub-Saharan Africa:\nƒ In particular, the risk of conflict has increased significantly, owing to mounting geopolitical tensions, weak\ninstitutions, and a cost-of-living crisis that has left many behind. The military takeover in Niger has raised the\npossibility of a regional military conflict in the Sahel, while in Ethiopia, social tensions and the prospect of\nfurther violence remain despite a peace deal. The security situation also remains challenging in a number of\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023\nLIGHT ON THE HORIZON? 9\nother countries including Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mozambique, and Nigeria. Finally, there is risk that the\nworsening conflict in Sudan can add to economic and humanitarian strains in neighboring countries.\nƒ In the face of rising social tension, there is also risk that reform momentum may slow, undercutting the region’s\nnewly improved prospects for macroeconomic stability and growth.\nLooking to the horizon: four priority policies\nAuthorities in sub-Saharan Africa face some of the most daunting policy challenges in the world: maintaining\nmacroeconomic stability amid limited resources, urgent development and humanitarian needs (including food\ninsecurity), frequent shocks, and political instability and fragility. Currently, with the pandemic officially over (for\nnow), inflation coming down, and growth looking to pick up, the outlook is finally starting to look less ominous.\nBut it is too early to celebrate. To ensure that the coming rebound is more than just a transitory glimpse of sunshine,\nit is important for authorities to maintain momentum—guarding against a premature relaxation of stabilization\npolicies, while also focusing on reforms to both claw back lost ground from the four-year crisis and also to create\nnew space to address the region’s development needs. In this context, policy makers will need to focus on four\ninter-related priorities: addressing inflation, allowing for greater exchange rate flexibility, managing high debt\nobligations while creating space for development spending, and boosting the prospects for broad-based growth\nto ensure prosperity for all.\nHow to address still-elevated inflation?\nAs noted above, headline inflation is falling in many sub-Saharan African countries. This has been helped by a\ndrop in external food and oil prices compared to 2022, but available data suggests core inflation is also trending\ndownward, in part resulting from a delicate process of monetary tightening over the past 2 years. Since end-2021,\nthe median country has increased policy rates by 350 bps—broadly in line with a median emerging-market hike\nof 400 bps. Amplifying this effort, many countries have also taken extra steps to mop up excess liquidity, bringing\neffective interbank rates closer to the main policy rate (Angola, Tanzania, CEMAC, WAEMU), and introduced limits\non credit growth (Ethiopia). A further part of the story, however, reflects less-orthodox measures put in place to\naddress abrupt swings in the cost of living. These include administered prices and subsidies which helped limit\ninflation in Botswana, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Malawi, Rwanda and Togo.\nBut inflation is still too high. Inflation at end 2023 is projected to stay in double digits in 14 countries, including\nsome of the region’s larger economies, such as Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria. And among countries with an explicit\ninflation target range, inflation remains above target in two-thirds of cases. In addition, many countries will likely\nface an extra inflationary impulse as fuel subsidies and other emergency measures are unwound (Angola, Nigeria,\nSenegal, Tanzania), or in response to persistent volatility in global oil prices. So, policy will continue to reflect a\ndelicate balance—including an assessment on when it is finally appropriate to start easing the monetary stance.\nGauging the appropriate stance is difficult. Although policy rates have increased in almost all countries, they may\nnot have always kept pace with anticipated inflation, and so may not have increased the real cost of borrowing\n(Figure 11). For example, with only modest increases in the policy rate in Nigeria, the monetary stance remains\nloose, owing in large part to the financing of the fiscal deficit by the central bank, but also the impact on inflation\nof depreciation and the relaxation of fuel subsidies.\nFinally, a key consideration is the need to preserve the credibility of the region’s monetary authorities. Regionwide,\nthe ability of the authorities to contain inflation amid global shocks owes much to improvements in their policy\nframeworks over the last two decades. Advances in central bank independence, inflation targeting frameworks,\nexchange rate flexibility, and macroprudential regulation have all played critical roles. That credibility is now being\ntested. Care must be taken to safeguard and strengthen this effort, as a more credible policy framework anchors\nexpectations against future shocks, reducing the tightening needed to keep inflation under control.\nOCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\nLast year, the direction of policy across sub-Saharan Africa was Figure 11. Sub-Saharan Africa: Policy Rates\nrelatively unambiguous for most countries—with rapidly rising versus Expected Inflation\ninflation, policy rates needed to be tighter. Looking ahead, (1-year ahead)\nas inflation continues to ease, decisions are likely to be more\n10\nTighter stance\ncomplicated and changes in the monetary policy stance will\nlikely be less synchronous:\nƒ Currently, in select economies with still elevated and 5\nGHA\npersistent inflation, further monetary tightening remains KEN\nappropriate until there are clear signs that inflation is ZMB NGA\nMOZ\ncooling and on track to meet the authorities’ inflation target. 0 NAM\nUGA MUS\nThis is critical to safeguard credibility and keep long-term TZA\nAGO\ninflation expectations anchored.\nLooser stance\nƒ For countries with high but falling inflation, a “pause” may -5\n-5 0 5 10\nbe warranted, with rates held at existing elevated levels\nChange in expected inflation since Dec. 2022 (percent)\n(‘higher for longer’) until inflation is firmly on the path to\ntarget. Loosening prematurely could risk a sharp resurgence\nin inflation once activity rebounds. And amid ongoing\nuncertainty—including, in some cases, the prospect of an\nimpulse from the easing of emergency measures—policy makers should err on the side of caution.\nMore generally, monetary policy needs to remain data-dependent going forward and coordinated with other\npolicies. For countries where inflation has closed on target and expectations are well anchored, authorities\nmight consider gradually easing to a more neutral policy stance. For example, Uganda in August 2023 cut policy\nrates amid its relatively benign inflation outlook. In any event, a strong commitment to price stability will still be\nessential and policy makers should be watchful of inflationary pressures re-emerging. Similarly, policies should be\naccompanied by clear forward-looking communications, outlining country circumstances and international devel-\nopments, as well as the motivation for the current policy stance. Strengthening central bank communication can\nhelp anchor inflation expectations and enhance monetary policy credibility.\nAre exchange rates sufficiently flexible?\nFigure 12\nAs noted above, the ongoing funding squeeze means that most sub-Saharan African countries continue to face\nexchange rate pressures. And since few countries have comfortable reserve buffers, this requires a delicate policy\nresponse (Figure 12).\nFigure 12. Sub-Saharan Africa: Reserve\nFor pegged countries, stability requires authorities to adjust Cover, 2022\nthe policy mix to sustain the peg—this will entail matching the (Months of imports)\nmonetary policy stance of the anchor country but may also\ndemand added (and coordinated) fiscal consolidation to rein\nin external imbalances.\n9 Comfortable\nFor countries with more flexible arrangements, this added\nCEMAC\nflexibility is no guarantee of a less-difficult policy challenge. WAEMU\n6\nRecently, for example, policy makers in most non-pegged\nregimes have allowed exchange rates to weaken. But\nAdequate\nevidence suggests that many have refrained from allowing 3\nthe exchange rate to adjust in full—in some cases this can\nLow\nbe seen in large spreads between rates in the official and\n0\nparallel market (Burundi, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Malawi), and\nin a few, a further deterioration in reserves. The temptation to Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.\n)tnecrep(\n2202\n.ceD\necnis\netar\nycilop\nni\negnahC\n10 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nFigure 11\nSources: Haver Analytics; IMF, World Economic Outlook\ndatabase; and IMF staff calculations.\nNote: See countries abbreviation on page vii.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023\nLIGHT ON THE HORIZON? 11\nresist exchange rate pressures is understandable. Policy makers legitimately worry that depreciation can lead\nto inflation, adding to cost-of-living pressures and fueling social unrest. But efforts to resist fundamentals-based\nmovements also come at a significant cost. The exchange rate is an essential signal through which economies\nadjust to external shocks. Resisting this adjustment does not make the shock go away, but may instead add to the\nburden of adjustment down the road.\nIn countries with limited reserves, for example, resisting depreciation often entails distortive foreign exchange\nrationing or price controls. Rationing can starve businesses of much needed imports and disrupt production\n(Ethiopia, Malawi, São Tomé and Príncipe). Similarly, rationing can discourage capital inflows, owing to investor\nconcerns about their ability to repatriate their returns. Even without rationing, an artificially elevated exchange\nrate may still deter foreign investors, who may hold off until an anticipated adjustment takes place. So rather\nthan avoiding the costs of adjustment, efforts to resist depreciation may instead undermine growth and actually\nmake the funding squeeze worse. Moreover, inflationary pressures can still arise even in the face of resistance, as\nprices often reflect currency movements in the parallel informal market rather than the official market (Ethiopia).\nTherefore, for all these reasons, it seems best to let the exchange rate adjust amid strong fundamentals-based\nexchange rate pressures, particularly in countries with low reserves (see analytical note “Managing Exchange Rate\nPressures in Sub-Saharan Africa—Adapting to New Realities” in Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa—\nFigure 13\nThe Big Funding Squeeze, April, 2023).\nAdjustment, however, needs coordinated policy Figure 13. Nigerian Naira Versus US Dollar,\nsupport. This may include tighter monetary policy to 2020–23\nkeep inflation in check and ensure expectations remain (Index, Feb. 29, 2020 = 100; dashed line = parallel rate)\nanchored. Fiscal consolidation may also be warranted\n100\nif a lax fiscal position is driving the exchange rate\npressure (for example through monetary financing of\nthe deficit). Nigeria is a case in point. The unification of\n75\nthe Naira has been a bold and necessary move but is\nnot sufficient in itself. Follow-up support from monetary\nand fiscal policy is needed to avoid the reemergence\n50\nof an inflation-depreciation spiral (Figure 13). Beyond\nstabilization policies, targeted social support should\nbe put in place to protect the most vulnerable. And\n25\nto speed the realignment of economic activity toward\nmore competitive sectors, structural reforms that Jun. 2020 Jun. 21 Jun. 22 Jun. 23\nremove obstacles for the tradeable sector can maximize Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P.\nbenefits of exchange rate depreciation. Note: Final data point as of end-September, 2023.\nHow to manage high debt obligations while still creating space for development\nspending?\nAs outlined above, debt levels are high and the funding squeeze is far from over. Moreover, with countries\nrelying increasingly on market financing, interest payments have ballooned, crowding out space for develop-\nment spending—the median ratio of interest to revenue is around 10½ percent in sub-Saharan Africa, over three\ntimes that of advanced economies. With rising needs and fewer options, fiscal policy must center around ways to\nadapt in the face of a tighter funding envelope (Figure 14).\nMobilizing revenue. Amid high external borrowing costs, authorities will ultimately need to rely more on domestic\nresources. In this context, sub-Saharan Africa has some of the lowest revenue-to-GDP ratios in the world. While\nmedian revenues (excluding grants) have increased by about 1 percent of GDP between 2019 and 2023 they\nare nonetheless projected to remain steady next year at only 17.0 percent of GDP, significantly below 40 percent\nin advanced markets and 27 percent in other EMDEs. This suggest stronger efforts will be needed to increase\nOCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n12 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nFigure 14. Sub-Saharan Africa: Fiscal Adjustment\nNeeded to Stabilize Debt Below 70% of GDP, 2023.\nrevenues, including by expanding the tax base through Fi(gpeurrcee n1t4 o.f SGuDbP-,S naoh.a orfa cno uAnftrriiceas): Fiscal Adjustment\nreduced (distortive) tax expenditures and improved Needed to Stabilize Debt Below 70 Percent of\ntax design.3 The region has often relied on value GDP, 2023\nadded taxes (VAT), but as activity shifts to the formal (Percent of GDP, number of countries)\nsector, consideration should also be given to more\nprogressive sources, such as income and property\ntaxes in addition to VAT (see Gaspar and Selassie\n2017). More broadly, a critical precondition for tax\npolicy reform is effective tax administration, an area\nwhere the increased use of digitalization promises to\nsignificantly improve efficiency in collection.\nSpending smart. With limited revenues and large\ndevelopment needs, countries need to make the\n-5 0 5 10\nmost of the resources they have. Investment projects\nSources: Country authorities; and IMF staff calculations.\nshould be selected carefully to ensure high economic No S t o e u : r S c e e v : e N n a t t y i o p n e a r l c a e u n t t h t o h r r i e ti s e h s o , l a d n r d e I p M re F s e st n a t f s f t c o a p lc o u n la e ti - o th n i s rd\nNote: 70-percent threshold represents top one-third of countries. For\nand social returns, while efficiency of spending needs ofc coouunntrtireies s.b Feolor wco uthnitsri etsh breeslhoowl dth, isa tdhjuresstmhoelndt, asdtajubsitlimzeesn t debt at\nstaebndili-z2e0s2 d1e bletv aetl .t hFeo ern dth oosf e2 0a2b2o lveev,e l.a Fdojur stthmoesen ta bborivneg,s debt to 70\nto be improved. For many countries, phasing out adpjeursctemnet nt obvreinrg s tdhee bt ftoor e7c0a pste rcheonrti zoof nth.e forecast horizon.\nfuel subsidies and ensuring that these subsidies do\nnot re-emerge will be a vital part of the effort to keep expenditures in check. For countries where sustainability\nrequires a large adjustment effort, difficult choices will need to be made and some spending rationalization may\nbe inevitable. However, these should protect growth enhancing expenditures (such as on education, health,\ncritical infrastructure) as well as social assistance to the vulnerable (see Amaglobeli 2022).\nBorrowing prudently. Effective debt management can help strike the balance between funding the government’s\nneeds and ensuring that debt remains sustainable. When countries need to borrow, they should rely more\non concessional financing where possible or choose official creditors with lower interest rates. Extending the\nmaturity of loans and ensuring repayments are not bunched together can help reduce refinancing risks, while\nstrengthening debt management frameworks can be key in expanding the range of viable options. In a difficult\nfunding environment, for example, debt management efforts need to be agile and proactive—if international costs\nremain prohibitive for countries looking to rollover Eurobonds, an efficient debt management office may help\nsecure alternate funding channels, for example through syndicated loans or from domestic capital markets (see\nIMF 2021).\nMedium-term credibility. Having a strong medium-term fiscal framework can improve lender confidence and\nlower risk premia. Most countries in sub-Saharan Africa have de jure frameworks but the ability of these to steer\npolicy has often been limited, with frequent breaches of fiscal rules. There is scope to greatly improve the design\nand effectiveness of these frameworks by: ensuring that the deficit path is anchored by a viable debt target;\nstrengthening key budget processes (including expenditure controls and fiscal risk management tools); and\nbetter communicating with the public to overcome resistance to difficult reforms—underscoring the long-term\nbenefits of reform and the (often mounting) costs of doing nothing (David and others 2023).\nFor most countries in sub-Saharan Africa, many of the efforts listed above are already underway and should be\nsufficient to maintain fiscal sustainability. But for some, implementing the measures in full may still not be enough.\nSuch cases are atypical and are prompted by widely different country circumstances. But where debt is not\nsustainable, it is in everyone’s interest to ensure that this debt is resolved swiftly. In this regard, some authorities\nhave engaged with creditors to restructure their debt through the G-20 Common Framework for Debt Treatment\n3 In 2022, the median tax revenue-to-GDP ratio was 13 percent. A ratio of 15 percent is typically associated with accelerated growth\nand development (Gaspar et al., 2016) and 27 countries in sub-Saharan Africa were below this threshold in 2022.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023\nLIGHT ON THE HORIZON? 13\n(Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Zambia). These recent cases will provide valuable experience and a clearer roadmap\nof what creditors and debtors can expect from each other going forward in undertaking debt restructuring (see\nanalytical note “Debt Dilemmas in Sub-Saharan Africa: Some Principles and Trade-Offs in Debt Restructuring”).\nHow to reduce divergence in income per capita and improve living standards\nmore fairly?\nSluggish income per capita growth, particularly among resource-intensive countries, can undermine the region’s\nnear-term recovery and is a major long-term obstacle for shared prosperity. Structural reforms can help to ensure\nbroad-based and durable improvements in living standards, reducing divergence in sub-Saharan Africa and\nreducing inequality more generally.\nInvest in people not just natural resources. Sub-Saharan Africa is significantly behind many other regions in terms\nof human capital accumulation—enrollment rates in the region’s secondary schools (54 percent) fall far below\nthe rates seen in EMDEs in other regions (89 percent). Greater focus on education and training can help boost\nproductivity for the millions of workers now entering the workforce, ensuring they are better able to participate in\nthe global economy. Investing in girls’ education, in particular, can have multifaceted returns—adding to produc-\ntivity gains, boosting savings, improving health outcomes, and ensuring that the opportunities and benefits of\neconomic growth are passed on to future generations. As a priority, therefore, authorities should both widen\nthe access and improve the quality of education. For example, abolishing school fees (recently implemented in\nZambia) and providing school lunches and stipends can help attract and retain students, while hiring and training\nnew teachers is critical to ensure that quality standards do not slip as the school population grows.\nImprove natural resource management. Sub-Saharan Africa has abundant natural resources. Some, such as oil,\nmay become less important as the world transitions to cleaner energy, while others (for example, lithium) may\nbecome more important. In either case, the key challenge is to ensure that the region’s natural wealth translates\ninto improved living standards for all. This not only requires good governance and transparency, it also demands\nsound fiscal management. As above, credible medium-term fiscal frameworks are essential for macroeconomic\nstability. But they are particularly important for many resource-intensive countries, where frameworks need to be\nresilient against volatile commodity prices—avoiding boom-bust cycles in public investment that can undermine\nlong-term growth, and also ensuring public wages do not greatly exceed private-sector wages, which can\nundermine competitiveness.\nAccelerate diversification and private sector participation. Expanding beyond the resource sector requires an\nenvironment where business and innovation can thrive. As a first step, continued macroeconomic stability and\ncredible policies can support investor confidence. In addition, removing red tape, reducing regulatory barriers,\nand ensuring adequate access to key public services (transport, electricity, water, and sanitation) are all essential\nto ensure that investment projects in new sectors remain viable. Digitalization and widening internet access can\nalso create new and larger markets and help unlock the region’s underlying dynamism and creativity. Evidence\nsuggests that many development projects may simply not take place without the addition of public incentives\n(Eyraud, Pattillo and Selassie 2021), particularly for resource-intensive countries seeking to expand activity further\nup the value chain. But the associated fiscal risks must be managed carefully, and policies should be aimed at\naddressing specific market failures—ultimately business investment should be self-sustaining rather than reliant on\ncontinued public support (see Cherif and others 2022).\nFoster trade integration. Growth and diversification requires access to new opportunities and markets. The African\nContinental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is the world’s largest free trade area by population covering 1.3 billion\npeople with a combined GDP of $3 trillion. AfCFTA is aimed at lowering tariffs and non-tariff measures, and if\nimplemented with additional reforms—such as improving transport, customs and border processing, and access\nto trade financing—it has the potential to boost income levels and support the expansion of cross-border value\nchains. Median merchandise trade among African countries, and between Africa and the rest of the world, could\nOCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n14 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nincrease by as much as 53 percent and 15 percent, respectively. This in turn could raise the real per capita income\nof the median African country by more than 10 percent (ElGanainy and others 2023). Signatories have agreed\nto eliminate tariffs on 90 percent of non-sensitive products by end-2025, and 7 percent of tariff lines on sensitive\ngoods by 2030. The challenge now is implementation. Priority should be given to ensuring that these deadlines\nare met.\nA helping hand from the international community is needed\nWith large development needs and limited fiscal space, most countries need greater donor support. The four-year\ncrisis, and the ongoing funding squeeze, has highlighted the need for both concessional official development\nassistance (ODA) and increased countercyclical flows to offset the procyclical nature of private capital flows\n(see analytical note “The Long Squeeze: Funding Development in an Age of Austerity”).\nBut ODA to sub-Saharan Africa has been trending downward. For official donors, if increased aid to the region is\nnot feasible in the short run, then one option is to ensure more progressivity in the flows that remain, ensuring that\nscarce resources are channeled to sub-Saharan Africa’s poorest and more fragile countries.\nOn countercyclical flows, the IMF is an essential component of the region’s global safety net, particularly for\ncountries with limited reserve buffers. Demand for assistance has increased dramatically since the start of the\npandemic, with the IMF providing policy guidance and financing of $55 billion, much at highly concessional\nterms. Twenty-six countries have IMF financing arrangements, with about $4 billion disbursed so far in 2023. Five\ncountries (Kenya, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal and Seychelles) have had arrangements approved under the newly\nlaunched Resilience and Sustainability Facility since December 2022, helping them better prepare for climate-\nrelated shocks. And Burkina Faso, Guinea, Malawi and South Sudan have received $358 million from the new\nFood Shock Window, supporting their ability to weather the global food crisis. But the IMF’s ability to continue\nlending at high levels will depend upon the availability of concessional resources. This is a challenge that the IMF\nis working to address, including via pledges from the IMF’s members for both loan and subsidy resources for the\nPoverty Reduction and Growth Trust.\nIn a difficult and more costly funding environment, sub-Saharan African countries may have to rely more on their\nown efforts. But funding and reforms need to go together. Without reform, external development funding is less\neffective. But without funding, reform is more difficult. Emerging from a long crisis, and with some signs of light on\nthe horizon, now is the time for the region and the international community to come together—the more we help\nthe region make progress now, the more resilient the global economy will be for all.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023\nLIGHT ON THE HORIZON? 15\nReferences\nAmaglobeli, David, Emine Hanedar, Gee Hee Hong, and Céline Thévenot. 2022. “Fiscal Policy for Mitigating\nthe Social Impact of High Energy and Food Prices.” IMF Note 2022/001, International Monetary Fund,\nWashington, DC.\nBarhoumi, Karim, Seung Mo Choi, Tara Iyer, Jiakun Li, Franck Ouattara, Andrew J Tiffin and Jiaxiong Yao. 2022.\n“Overcoming Data Sparsity: A Machine Learning Approach to Track the Real-Time Impact of COVID-19 in\nSub-Saharan Africa.” IMF Working Paper 2022/88, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.\nDavid, Antonio, Luc Eyraud, Fabio Comelli, Peter Kovacs, Jimena Montoya, and Arthur Sode. 2023. “Navigating\nFiscal Challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa.” IMF Departmental Paper, International Monetary Fund, Volume\n2023, Issue 6. Washington, DC.\nElGanainy, Asmaa, Shushanik Hakobyan, Fei Liu, and Hans Weisfeld. 2023. “Trade Integration in Africa\nUnleashing the Continent’s Potential in a Changing World.” IMF Departmental Paper 2023/003, International\nMonetary Fund, Washington, DC.\nGaspar, Vitor, Laura Jamarillo, and Philippe Wingender. 2016. “Tax Capacity and Growth: Is there a Tipping\nPoint?” IMF Working Paper 16/234, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.\nGaspar, Vitor, and Abebe Aemro Selassie. 2017. “Taxes, Debt and Development: A One-Percent Rule to Raise\nRevenues in Africa.” IMFblog (blog), December 5, 2017 https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2017/12/05/\ntaxes-debt-and-development-a-one-percent-rule-to-raise-revenues-in-africa.\nEyraud, Luc, Catherine Pattillo and Abebe Selassie. 2021. “How to Attract Private Finance to Africa’s\nDevelopment.” IMFblog (blog), June 14, 2021. https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2021/06/14/\nblog-how-to-attract-private-finance-to-africa-s-development.\nInternational Monetary Fund (IMF). 2019. “Two-Track Recovery Amid Elevated Uncertainty.” Chapter 1 in\nRegional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa, Washington, DC, April.\nInternational Monetary Fund (IMF). 2021. “Guidance Note for Developing Government Local Currency Bonds\nMarket.” Washington, DC.\nInternational Monetary Fund (IMF). 2022. “Industrial Policy for Growth and Diversification: A Conceptual\nFramework.” IMF Departmental Paper 2022/017, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.\nInternational Monetary Fund (IMF). 2023. “The Big Funding Squeeze.” in Regional Economic Outlook:\nSub-Saharan Africa, Washington, DC, April.\nInternational Monetary Fund (IMF). 2023. “Geoeconomic Fragmentation: Sub-Saharan Africa Caught between\nthe Fault Lines.” Analytical Note in Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa, Washington, DC, April.\nInternational Monetary Fund (IMF). 2023. “Managing Exchange Rate Pressures in Sub-Saharan Africa—Adapting\nto New Realities.” Analytical Note in Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa, Washington, DC, April.\nInternational Monetary Fund (IMF). 2023. “The Long Squeeze: Funding Development in an Age of Austerity.”\nAnalytical Note in Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa, Washington, DC. October.\nInternational Monetary Fund (IMF). 2023. “At a Crossroads: Sub-Saharan Africa’s Economic Relations with China.”\nAnalytical Note in Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa, Washington, DC. October.\nInternational Monetary Fund (IMF). 2023. “Debt Dilemmas in Sub-Saharan Africa: Some Principles and Tradeoffs\nin Debt Restructuring.” Analytical Note in Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa, Washington, DC.\nOctober.\nJaramillo, Laura, Aliona Cebotari, Yoro Diallo, Rhea Gupta, Yugo Koshima, Chandana Kularatne, Daniel Jeong\nDae Lee, Sidra Rehman, Kalin Tintchev, and Fang Yang. 2023. “Climate Challenges in Fragile and Conflict-\nAffected States.” IMF Staff Climate Note 2023/001, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.\nOCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n16 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nStatistical Appendix\nUnless otherwise noted, data and projections presented in this Regional Economic Outlook are IMF\nstaff estimates as of September 30, 2023, consistent with the projections underlying the October 2023,\nIMF, World Economic Outlook.\nThe data and projections cover 45 sub-Saharan African countries in the IMF’s African Department.\nData definitions follow established international statistical methodologies to the extent possible.\nHowever, in some cases, data limitations limit comparability across countries.\nCountry Groupings\nƒ Countries are aggregated into three (nonoverlapping) groups: oil exporters, other resource-intensive\ncountries, and non-resource-intensive countries (see table on page vi for the country groupings).\nƒ The oil exporters are countries where net oil exports make up 30 percent or more of total exports.\nƒ The other resource-intensive countries are those where nonrenewable natural resources represent\n25 percent or more of total exports.\nƒ The non-resource-intensive countries refer to those that are not classified as either oil exporters or other\nresource-intensive countries.\nƒ Countries are also aggregated into four (overlapping) groups: oil exporters, middle-income, low-income,\nand countries in fragile and conflict-affected situations. (see table on page vi for the country groupings).\nƒ The membership of these groups reflects the most recent data on per capita gross national income\n(averaged over three years) and the World Bank, Classification of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations.\nƒ The middle-income countries had per capita gross national income in the years 2020–22 of more than\n$1,135.00 (World Bank, using the Atlas method).\nƒ The low-income countries had average per capita gross national income in the years 2020–22 equal to or\nlower than $1,135.00 (World Bank, Atlas method).\nƒ The countries in fragile and conflict-affected situations are classified based on the World Bank, Classification\nof Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations, FY2024.\nƒ The membership of sub-Saharan African countries in the major regional cooperation bodies is shown\non page vi: CFA franc zone, comprising the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and\nCEMAC; the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the East Africa Community\n(EAC-5); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Southern African Development\nCommunity (SADC); and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). EAC-5 aggregates include data for\nRwanda and Burundi, which joined the group only in 2007.\nMethods of Aggregation\nƒ In Tables SA1 and SA3, country group composites for real GDP growth and broad money are calculated\nas the arithmetic average of data for individual countries, weighted by GDP valued at purchasing power\nparity as a share of total group GDP. The source of purchasing power parity weights is the World Economic\nOutlook (WEO) database.\nƒ In Table SA1, country group composites for consumer prices are calculated as the geometric average of\ndata for individual countries, weighted by GDP valued at purchasing power parity as a share of total group\nGDP. The source of purchasing power parity weights is the WEO database.\nƒ In Tables SA2–SA4, country group composites, except for broad money, are calculated as the arithmetic\naverage of data for individual countries, weighted by GDP in US dollars at market exchange rates as a\nshare of total group GDP.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023\nLIGHT ON THE HORIZON? 17\nList of Sources and Footnotes for Statistical Appendix Tables SA1-SA4\nTables SA1.,SA3.\nSources: IMF, Common Surveillance database; and October 2023, IMF, World Economic Outlook database.\n1 Data and projections for 2020–28 are excluded from the database due to constraints in data reporting.\n2 In 2019 Zimbabwe authorities introduced the real-time gross settlement (RTGS) dollar, later renamed the\nZimbabwe dollar, and are in the process of redenominating their national accounts statistics. Current data are\nsubject to revision. The Zimbabwe dollar previously ceased circulating in 2009, and between 2009–19, Zimbabwe\noperated under a multicurrency regime with the US dollar as the unit of account.\nNote: “...” denotes data not available.\nTable SA2.\nSources: IMF, Common Surveillance database; and October 2023, IMF, World Economic Outlook database.\n1 Data and projections for 2020–28 are excluded from the database due to constraints in data reporting.\n2 For Zambia, government debt projections for 2022–24 are omitted due to ongoing debt restructuring.\n3 In 2019 Zimbabwe authorities introduced the real-time gross settlement (RTGS) dollar, later renamed the\nZimbabwe dollar, and are in the process of redenominating their national accounts statistics. Current data are\nsubject to revision. The Zimbabwe dollar previously ceased circulating in 2009, and between 2009–19, Zimbabwe\noperated under a multicurrency regime with the US dollar as the unit of account.\nNote: “...” denotes data not available.\nTable SA4.\nSources: IMF, Common Surveillance database; and October 2023, IMF, World Economic Outlook database.\n1 As a member of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), see WAEMU aggregate for\nreserves data.\n2 As a member of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), see CEMAC aggregate for\nreserves data.\n3 Data and projections for 2020–28 are excluded from the database due to constraints in data reporting.\n4 Official Reserves include foreign assets held by Ghana Petroleum and Stabilization Fund and exclude\nencumbered assets.\n5 For Zambia, government debt projections for 2022–24 are omitted due to ongoing debt restructuring.\n6 In 2019 Zimbabwe authorities introduced the real-time gross settlement (RTGS) dollar, later renamed the\nZimbabwe dollar, and are in the process of redenominating their national accounts statistics. Current data are\nsubject to revision. The Zimbabwe dollar previously ceased circulating in 2009, and between 2009–19, Zimbabwe\noperated under a multicurrency regime with the US dollar as the unit of account.\nOCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n18 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nTable SA1. Real GDP Growth and Consumer Prices\nReal GDP Consumer Prices, Annual Average\n(Annual percent change) (Annual percent change)\n2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024\nAngola 2.0 –5.6 1.2 3.0 1.3 3.3 16.3 22.3 25.8 21.4 13.1 22.3\nBenin 5.1 3.8 7.2 6.3 5.5 6.3 1.2 3.0 1.7 1.4 5.0 2.5\nBotswana 4.1 –8.7 11.9 5.8 3.8 4.1 4.6 1.9 6.7 12.2 5.9 4.7\nBurkina Faso 5.7 1.9 6.9 1.5 4.4 6.4 1.0 1.9 3.9 14.1 1.4 3.0\nBurundi 1.9 0.3 3.1 1.8 3.3 6.0 7.1 7.3 8.3 18.9 20.1 16.1\nCabo Verde 3.0 –19.6 6.4 17.0 4.4 4.5 1.1 0.6 1.9 7.9 5.2 2.0\nCameroon 4.4 0.5 3.6 3.8 4.0 4.2 1.9 2.5 2.3 6.3 7.2 4.8\nCentral African Republic –0.7 1.0 1.0 0.5 1.0 2.5 4.9 0.9 4.3 5.8 6.5 3.2\nChad 2.4 –2.1 –1.2 3.4 4.0 3.7 1.9 4.5 –0.8 5.8 7.0 3.5\nComoros 3.1 –0.2 2.1 2.6 3.0 3.5 1.8 0.8 –0.0 12.4 11.1 1.2\nCongo, Democratic Republic of the 5.9 1.7 6.2 8.9 6.7 4.7 10.2 11.4 9.0 9.3 19.1 10.6\nCongo, Republic of 0.3 –6.3 1.1 1.7 4.0 4.4 2.3 1.4 2.0 3.0 3.5 3.2\nCôte d'Ivoire 6.5 1.7 7.0 6.7 6.2 6.6 1.5 2.4 4.2 5.2 4.3 2.3\nEquatorial Guinea –2.7 –4.8 –0.4 3.2 –6.2 –5.5 2.5 4.8 –0.1 4.9 2.4 4.0\nEritrea1 4.6 … … … … … 2.6 … … … … …\nEswatini 2.5 –1.6 7.9 3.6 3.1 3.3 5.9 3.9 3.7 4.8 5.5 5.0\nEthiopia 9.5 6.1 6.3 6.4 6.1 6.2 14.4 20.4 26.8 33.9 29.1 20.7\nGabon 3.7 –1.8 1.5 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.3 1.7 1.1 4.3 3.8 2.5\nThe Gambia 2.5 0.6 5.3 4.9 5.6 6.2 6.3 5.9 7.4 11.5 17.0 12.3\nGhana 6.5 0.5 5.1 3.1 1.2 2.7 11.8 9.9 10.0 31.9 42.2 23.2\nGuinea 6.2 4.7 5.0 4.3 5.9 5.6 11.4 10.6 12.6 10.5 8.3 7.9\nGuinea-Bissau 3.9 1.5 6.4 4.2 4.5 5.0 1.3 1.5 3.3 7.9 7.0 3.0\nKenya 4.7 –0.3 7.6 4.8 5.0 5.3 7.4 5.3 6.1 7.6 7.7 6.6\nLesotho 1.5 –3.9 1.8 2.1 2.1 2.3 5.1 5.0 6.0 8.2 6.9 5.6\nLiberia 2.8 –3.0 5.0 4.8 4.6 5.3 12.5 17.0 7.8 7.6 10.6 8.0\nMadagascar 3.2 –7.1 5.7 4.0 4.0 4.8 7.0 4.2 5.8 8.2 10.5 8.8\nMalawi 4.1 0.9 4.6 0.8 1.7 3.3 17.2 8.6 9.3 20.8 27.7 19.8\nMali 4.3 –1.2 3.1 3.7 4.5 4.8 1.1 0.5 3.8 9.7 5.0 2.8\nMauritius 3.7 –14.6 3.4 8.7 5.1 3.8 3.0 2.5 4.0 10.8 7.8 6.5\nMozambique 5.5 –1.2 2.4 4.2 7.0 5.0 7.0 3.1 5.7 9.8 7.4 6.5\nNamibia 2.8 –8.1 3.5 4.6 2.8 2.7 5.2 2.2 3.6 6.1 6.0 4.9\nNiger 5.9 3.5 1.4 11.9 4.1 11.1 0.7 2.9 3.8 4.2 4.6 6.6\nNigeria 3.0 –1.8 3.6 3.3 2.9 3.1 11.6 13.2 17.0 18.8 25.1 23.0\nRwanda 7.1 –3.4 10.9 8.2 6.2 7.0 3.9 7.7 0.8 13.9 14.5 6.0\nSão Tomé & Príncipe 3.6 2.6 1.9 0.1 0.5 2.4 8.1 9.8 8.1 18.0 20.8 11.9\nSenegal 5.0 1.3 6.5 4.0 4.1 8.8 1.0 2.5 2.2 9.7 6.1 3.3\nSeychelles 6.8 –8.5 2.5 8.9 4.2 3.9 3.0 1.2 9.8 2.6 -0.8 2.0\nSierra Leone 5.0 –2.0 4.1 4.0 2.7 4.7 10.0 13.4 11.9 27.2 42.9 29.8\nSouth Africa 1.6 –6.0 4.7 1.9 0.9 1.8 5.3 3.3 4.6 6.9 5.8 4.8\nSouth Sudan –5.3 –6.5 5.3 0.5 3.5 4.2 98.6 24.0 30.2 –3.2 16.3 13.6\nTanzania 6.7 4.8 4.9 4.7 5.2 6.1 7.3 3.3 3.7 4.4 4.0 4.0\nTogo 5.4 2.0 6.0 5.8 5.4 5.3 1.4 1.8 4.5 7.6 5.0 2.8\nUganda 5.3 –1.2 5.7 6.4 4.6 5.7 6.8 2.8 2.2 7.2 5.8 4.7\nZambia 4.3 –2.8 4.6 4.7 3.6 4.3 9.0 15.7 22.0 11.0 10.6 9.6\nZimbabwe2 4.6 –7.8 8.4 6.2 4.1 3.6 30.2 557.2 98.5 193.4 314.5 222.4\nSub-Saharan Africa 3.8 –1.6 4.7 4.0 3.3 4.0 8.3 10.1 11.0 14.5 15.8 13.1\nMedian 4.3 –1.2 4.8 4.1 4.1 4.5 4.5 3.6 4.6 8.2 7.1 5.3\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa 5.0 –0.0 5.2 5.0 4.3 5.0 8.0 11.1 10.7 15.2 15.1 11.8\nOil-exporting countries 2.7 –2.3 3.1 3.2 2.6 3.1 11.2 13.0 15.9 17.1 20.5 20.0\nExcluding Nigeria 2.1 –3.6 1.6 3.2 2.0 3.1 10.2 12.3 13.2 12.8 9.4 12.7\nOil-importing countries 4.4 –1.2 5.6 4.4 3.7 4.5 6.7 8.6 8.5 13.1 13.3 9.7\nExcluding South Africa 5.8 0.8 6.0 5.4 4.8 5.4 7.5 10.9 10.2 15.7 16.3 11.6\nMiddle-income countries 3.1 –2.8 4.5 3.4 2.6 3.3 8.2 8.5 10.5 13.1 14.6 12.8\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa 4.2 –1.7 5.1 4.4 3.4 4.4 7.4 7.9 9.1 12.5 11.9 9.8\nLow-income countries 6.0 1.9 5.4 5.6 5.3 5.7 8.8 14.8 12.5 18.2 18.8 13.9\nExcluding low-income countries in fragile and\nconflict-affected situations 5.6 1.0 5.6 5.0 4.8 5.7 7.8 4.9 4.8 8.3 8.7 6.7\nCountries in fragile and conflict-affected\nsituations 4.1 –0.2 4.2 4.3 3.9 4.1 10.3 15.6 16.4 20.3 24.2 20.2\nCFA franc zone 4.4 0.6 4.6 4.8 4.3 5.7 1.6 2.4 2.8 6.5 4.9 3.3\nCEMAC 2.5 –1.5 1.9 3.3 2.7 2.9 2.2 2.7 1.5 5.4 5.7 4.0\nWAEMU 5.7 1.7 6.0 5.6 5.2 7.0 1.2 2.2 3.5 7.0 4.5 3.0\nCOMESA (SSA members) 5.9 0.5 6.4 5.9 5.2 5.3 9.4 17.1 14.6 19.5 20.8 15.4\nEAC-5 5.5 0.9 6.6 5.2 5.0 5.7 7.1 4.4 4.4 7.1 6.8 5.6\nECOWAS 4.0 –0.6 4.4 3.9 3.3 4.1 9.3 10.2 12.7 17.0 20.9 17.2\nSACU 1.7 –6.1 5.0 2.2 1.2 2.0 5.2 3.2 4.6 7.1 5.9 4.8\nSADC 2.8 –4.2 4.6 3.4 2.5 3.2 7.7 10.7 9.6 11.6 11.5 10.5\nSee sources on page 16.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023\nLIGHT ON THE HORIZON? 19\nTable SA2. Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants and Government Debt\nOverall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants Government Debt\n(Percent of GDP) (Percent of GDP)\n2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024\nAngola –0.5 –1.9 3.8 0.7 -1.9 1.0 59.8 138.9 86.8 66.7 84.9 77.1\nBenin –2.4 –4.7 –5.7 –5.6 -4.3 -3.7 30.1 46.1 50.3 54.2 53.0 52.4\nBotswana –0.9 –10.9 –2.4 0.0 -1.9 -1.1 17.6 18.7 18.7 18.0 18.7 18.1\nBurkina Faso –3.3 –5.1 –7.4 –10.7 -6.6 -5.6 31.0 43.3 55.4 58.3 61.2 61.2\nBurundi –5.1 –6.3 –5.2 –12.1 -5.0 -2.8 45.1 66.0 66.6 68.4 72.7 65.8\nCabo Verde –5.0 –9.1 –7.5 –4.1 -4.5 -3.2 102.1 144.6 147.6 127.3 113.1 109.7\nCameroon –3.5 –3.2 –3.0 –1.1 -0.8 -0.6 27.6 44.9 46.8 45.5 41.9 39.6\nCentral African Republic –1.3 –3.4 –6.0 –5.3 -3.5 -2.8 47.4 43.4 47.6 51.8 50.1 49.6\nChad –0.9 1.6 –2.0 5.1 8.3 0.8 40.8 55.9 57.4 48.8 43.2 38.7\nComoros 0.5 –0.5 –2.8 –3.9 -4.9 -4.5 18.0 24.0 25.5 27.9 33.3 36.9\nCongo, Democratic Republic of the –0.1 –3.3 –2.0 –0.8 -2.0 -2.0 18.0 16.5 15.9 14.5 13.3 11.1\nCongo, Republic of –2.1 –1.1 1.6 8.9 4.1 5.0 59.7 102.5 97.8 92.5 97.8 91.0\nCôte d'Ivoire –2.4 –5.4 –4.9 –6.8 -5.2 -4.1 32.4 46.3 50.9 56.8 56.8 57.0\nEquatorial Guinea –5.0 –1.8 2.6 13.6 3.8 0.4 25.2 49.4 42.1 34.6 38.3 33.7\nEritrea1 –2.3 … … … … … 235.6 … … … … …\nEswatini –4.5 –4.5 –4.5 –4.5 -0.3 -2.3 22.5 41.2 40.8 42.0 42.4 41.9\nEthiopia –2.3 –2.8 –2.8 –4.2 -2.7 -2.0 49.5 53.9 53.8 46.4 37.9 31.2\nGabon 0.5 –2.2 –1.9 1.9 -0.4 -1.1 44.5 78.3 65.8 57.7 64.9 64.5\nThe Gambia –4.3 –2.2 –4.6 –4.8 -2.7 -2.5 70.2 85.9 83.1 82.8 72.3 65.5\nGhana –6.6 –17.4 –12.0 –11.2 -4.6 -4.1 49.6 72.3 79.2 92.4 84.9 81.5\nGuinea 0.6 –3.1 –1.8 –0.7 -2.3 -2.4 40.2 47.8 41.5 33.1 31.6 31.5\nGuinea-Bissau –2.9 –9.6 –5.9 –5.9 -3.5 -3.2 55.0 77.7 78.8 80.3 73.9 71.4\nKenya –6.2 –8.1 –7.2 –5.8 -4.7 -4.1 46.7 68.0 68.2 68.4 70.2 68.3\nLesotho –3.1 –0.0 –5.1 –7.7 1.0 -0.4 43.5 53.6 55.7 59.9 61.3 60.4\nLiberia –3.9 –4.0 –2.5 –5.3 -2.8 -3.3 28.7 58.7 53.3 53.9 52.3 52.7\nMadagascar –2.1 –3.9 –2.6 –6.4 -3.9 -3.4 38.1 52.2 52.0 55.1 54.0 53.5\nMalawi –3.8 –8.2 –8.6 –9.3 -6.8 -8.0 35.5 54.8 61.5 75.2 78.6 77.4\nMali –2.7 –5.4 –4.8 –4.8 -4.8 -4.4 31.5 46.9 50.4 51.7 51.8 52.6\nMauritius –3.3 –10.4 –4.0 –3.2 -5.0 -5.7 62.2 94.6 88.4 83.1 79.7 78.9\nMozambique –4.2 –5.4 –3.6 –5.0 -2.8 -2.2 78.9 120.0 104.9 95.5 89.7 92.4\nNamibia –6.1 –8.1 –8.7 –6.5 -4.2 -4.0 38.2 64.3 70.4 69.8 67.6 66.8\nNiger –3.7 –4.8 –5.9 –6.8 -4.9 -4.1 27.8 45.0 51.3 50.3 48.7 46.3\nNigeria –3.1 –5.6 –6.0 –5.6 -5.4 -4.5 21.9 34.5 36.5 39.6 38.8 41.3\nRwanda –2.6 –9.5 –7.0 –5.8 -5.0 -7.3 33.0 65.6 66.7 61.1 63.3 72.1\nSão Tomé & Príncipe –5.2 2.9 –1.5 –2.2 0.2 0.1 94.6 86.7 76.7 77.7 58.5 54.4\nSenegal –3.9 –6.4 –6.3 –6.6 -5.0 -3.9 47.2 69.2 73.3 76.6 81.0 72.1\nSeychelles 1.5 –14.9 –5.4 –1.2 -1.1 -1.3 65.0 77.6 70.7 61.5 60.8 59.0\nSierra Leone –5.1 –5.8 –7.3 –10.6 -5.4 -2.9 51.5 76.3 79.3 95.8 88.9 82.6\nSouth Africa –4.0 –9.6 –5.5 –4.7 -6.4 -6.5 44.9 68.9 68.8 71.1 73.7 75.8\nSouth Sudan –5.7 –5.6 –9.4 5.1 8.4 4.3 53.0 49.9 52.5 37.8 60.4 50.9\nTanzania –2.7 –2.5 –3.4 –3.7 -3.3 -2.6 36.3 39.8 42.1 42.3 42.6 41.8\nTogo –3.8 –7.0 –4.7 –8.3 -6.6 -4.7 48.3 61.8 64.6 66.3 67.2 67.6\nUganda –3.0 –7.5 –7.5 –5.8 -4.2 -2.7 27.8 46.4 50.6 48.4 48.3 47.7\nZambia2 –6.3 –13.8 –8.1 –7.7 -6.0 -4.6 50.9 140.2 110.8 98.5 … …\nZimbabwe3 –3.4 0.8 –2.2 –2.0 -4.1 -3.2 51.7 84.4 59.8 98.4 95.4 56.9\nSub-Saharan Africa –3.3 –6.5 –5.0 –4.4 -4.2 -3.7 37.7 57.1 56.6 57.1 57.7 55.8\nMedian –3.1 –5.2 –4.9 –4.9 -4.0 -3.0 41.3 57.3 58.6 59.1 60.8 57.0\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa –3.1 –5.8 –4.4 –3.9 -3.2 -2.6 42.7 63.4 60.3 59.4 58.8 54.0\nOil-exporting countries –2.6 –4.7 –4.1 –3.1 -3.5 -2.7 30.3 48.8 46.2 46.3 48.9 48.6\nExcluding Nigeria –1.7 –2.1 0.5 2.0 0.1 0.8 48.6 89.5 69.4 59.8 68.1 62.2\nOil-importing countries –3.8 –7.5 –5.5 –5.2 -4.6 -4.1 42.8 61.5 61.8 63.0 61.5 58.8\nExcluding South Africa –3.6 –6.5 –5.5 –5.4 -3.9 -3.3 41.4 58.2 58.3 59.3 56.8 52.4\nMiddle-income countries –3.5 –7.4 –5.4 –4.6 -4.7 -4.2 37.2 59.0 58.6 59.5 62.0 61.9\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa –3.4 –7.6 –4.8 –3.8 -3.3 -2.5 45.0 74.1 68.4 67.3 69.7 66.0\nLow-income countries –2.6 –3.8 –3.9 –4.0 -3.1 -2.7 39.7 51.6 50.9 50.4 47.6 42.8\nExcluding low-income countries in fragile and\nconflict-affected situations –2.7 –4.9 –4.9 –5.0 -3.9 -3.3 35.5 48.2 50.1 49.6 49.3 48.7\nCountries in fragile and conflict-affected\nsituations –2.8 –4.5 –4.7 –4.3 -3.7 -3.1 29.0 42.9 43.6 45.0 43.5 41.3\nCFA franc zone –2.7 –4.3 –4.1 –3.2 -2.9 -2.7 35.2 53.7 56.3 57.1 57.8 55.8\nCEMAC –2.5 –2.0 –1.5 3.1 1.4 0.3 36.6 59.6 57.5 53.5 53.5 50.5\nWAEMU –3.0 –5.5 –5.5 –6.9 -5.2 -4.3 34.7 50.4 55.6 59.3 60.1 58.6\nCOMESA (SSA members) –3.5 –5.6 –4.8 –4.6 -3.6 -3.1 42.4 60.8 57.9 57.5 54.2 47.6\nEAC-5 –4.3 –6.4 –6.1 –5.3 -4.2 -3.5 39.1 55.6 57.2 56.4 56.9 55.9\nECOWAS –3.3 –6.7 –6.5 –6.3 -5.1 -4.3 27.7 43.2 46.8 49.9 50.4 51.0\nSACU –4.0 –9.5 –5.5 –4.6 -6.0 -6.1 43.5 66.3 66.4 68.3 70.4 72.2\nSADC –3.2 –7.1 –4.0 –3.5 -4.6 -4.2 45.1 70.3 64.1 64.2 66.7 64.4\nSee sources on page 16.\nOCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n20 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nTable SA3. Broad Money and External Current Account, Including Grants\nBroad Money External Current Account, Including Grants\n(Percent of GDP) (Percent of GDP)\n2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024\nAngola 34.6 38.4 24.4 20.0 20.0 19.6 3.0 1.5 11.2 9.6 3.1 3.7\nBenin 28.1 30.5 32.7 33.4 33.4 33.4 –4.9 –1.7 –4.2 –5.6 –6.0 –5.7\nBotswana 44.7 52.5 45.4 41.9 42.9 42.7 2.0 –10.3 –1.3 3.0 0.8 1.5\nBurkina Faso 32.3 43.6 49.0 46.0 47.9 48.4 –5.1 4.1 0.4 –6.2 –5.1 –5.2\nBurundi 27.0 46.3 50.6 56.0 54.7 53.6 –14.1 –10.3 –12.4 –15.6 –18.7 –20.7\nCabo Verde 85.5 114.3 110.7 93.3 92.8 92.2 –6.3 –15.0 –11.8 –3.6 –5.8 –5.0\nCameroon 21.7 26.6 29.1 29.6 30.1 30.3 –3.3 –3.7 –4.0 –1.8 –2.6 –2.4\nCentral African Republic 24.0 30.3 33.3 31.9 30.6 29.7 –7.1 –8.2 –11.1 –12.7 –8.8 –7.8\nChad 14.6 20.8 23.3 25.5 23.9 27.0 –7.6 –7.4 –3.4 6.2 0.2 –3.3\nComoros 25.1 31.2 36.7 36.7 37.8 38.7 –3.1 –1.9 –0.5 –2.4 –5.6 –5.8\nCongo, Democratic Republic of the 11.5 20.2 21.9 19.5 21.4 21.8 –4.4 –2.2 –1.0 –5.2 –6.0 –5.3\nCongo, Republic of 26.6 32.7 30.8 27.5 30.5 32.3 –3.0 12.3 14.2 19.4 4.0 2.1\nCôte d'Ivoire 10.9 13.5 15.2 14.5 13.3 13.1 –0.3 –3.1 –4.0 –6.5 –4.7 –3.8\nEquatorial Guinea 13.2 17.5 14.7 16.4 19.9 24.8 –8.4 –0.8 5.4 9.6 –2.6 –3.0\nEritrea1 207.6 … … … … … 14.9 … … … … …\nEswatini 26.8 32.3 30.3 30.3 30.4 30.4 6.0 7.1 2.7 –0.7 6.3 3.2\nEthiopia 29.2 30.8 31.1 27.9 25.3 22.6 –7.1 –4.6 –3.2 –4.3 –2.4 –2.0\nGabon 23.7 27.9 23.1 22.8 26.5 27.6 2.4 –6.9 –4.5 1.6 –0.8 –2.1\nThe Gambia 38.6 56.0 59.2 54.6 52.0 50.6 –7.6 –3.0 –0.1 –5.9 –5.0 –5.2\nGhana 24.1 30.8 29.4 29.5 27.8 26.9 –5.6 –2.5 –2.7 –2.1 –2.5 –2.8\nGuinea 24.2 27.8 26.2 28.1 28.4 29.0 –16.3 –16.2 –2.1 –8.2 –8.9 –8.8\nGuinea-Bissau 38.5 45.6 50.6 46.6 44.6 44.0 –2.4 –2.6 –0.8 –9.6 –7.1 –4.5\nKenya 36.8 37.2 35.2 33.9 32.6 31.9 –6.9 –4.7 –5.2 –5.1 –4.9 –4.9\nLesotho 34.2 40.3 37.3 40.3 38.4 37.4 –6.1 –1.0 –4.4 –7.9 –3.1 –4.7\nLiberia 20.2 25.5 24.6 25.0 25.0 25.2 –20.1 –16.4 –17.9 –19.6 –22.9 –23.1\nMadagascar 23.4 28.7 28.6 29.2 30.9 31.7 –2.7 –5.4 –4.9 –5.4 –3.9 –4.8\nMalawi 17.2 17.5 20.1 23.6 23.6 23.6 –10.2 –13.8 –13.3 –3.4 –5.9 –8.5\nMali 27.1 36.1 39.1 40.2 40.2 40.2 –5.2 –2.2 –7.5 –6.9 –6.5 –5.7\nMauritius 104.3 156.8 160.1 141.5 129.6 131.3 –5.8 –8.8 –13.0 –11.5 –6.2 –4.1\nMozambique 33.5 43.3 42.8 40.9 37.5 36.3 –31.3 –27.6 –22.4 –32.9 –16.0 –39.3\nNamibia 58.3 71.5 70.6 63.0 63.3 63.7 –8.1 2.6 –9.9 –12.7 –7.1 –6.4\nNiger 17.5 19.2 20.1 19.4 19.4 19.4 –12.6 –13.2 –14.1 –15.6 –12.5 –3.9\nNigeria 24.3 25.2 25.2 25.8 27.0 28.3 1.2 –3.7 –0.7 0.2 0.7 0.6\nRwanda 22.4 29.0 29.9 29.2 26.8 27.3 –10.5 –12.1 –11.2 –9.8 –12.7 –11.3\nSão Tomé & Príncipe 41.1 32.5 29.5 28.1 26.3 26.3 –17.4 –11.2 –12.1 –13.3 –14.9 –10.0\nSenegal 34.6 45.3 47.9 51.9 56.4 59.9 –7.2 –10.1 –11.2 –19.9 –14.6 –7.9\nSeychelles 64.4 101.9 92.7 86.3 88.9 88.2 –15.3 –12.3 –10.1 –7.1 –6.9 –8.5\nSierra Leone 22.2 29.5 32.4 36.2 30.2 27.7 –23.0 –7.9 –8.6 –8.8 –6.8 –7.0\nSouth Africa 66.4 74.0 70.1 71.1 71.5 72.3 –3.5 1.9 3.7 –0.5 –2.5 –2.8\nSouth Sudan 20.7 18.4 14.9 8.8 12.8 12.0 4.5 –19.2 –9.5 9.8 2.3 2.0\nTanzania 22.1 20.9 21.3 21.8 22.4 22.4 –7.0 –1.9 –3.4 –5.4 –5.1 –4.2\nTogo 37.2 46.6 48.0 50.4 50.4 51.0 –4.9 –0.3 –0.9 –3.2 –3.1 –2.7\nUganda 17.4 22.5 21.8 20.1 20.5 20.4 –5.6 –9.4 –8.3 –8.2 –7.1 –8.2\nZambia 21.0 31.3 24.3 26.6 26.8 26.3 0.3 10.6 9.7 3.6 3.8 7.1\nZimbabwe2 24.1 14.8 14.9 19.0 15.8 15.1 –7.9 2.5 1.0 1.0 0.9 –0.7\nSub-Saharan Africa 35.3 38.6 37.1 36.6 36.6 36.7 –2.8 –2.7 –1.0 –1.9 –2.7 –2.8\nMedian 26.4 31.0 30.6 29.6 30.3 30.0 –5.6 –4.2 –4.1 –5.4 –5.1 –4.7\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa 28.0 32.6 31.3 30.1 29.6 29.3 –4.5 –4.0 –3.0 –3.3 –3.9 –3.9\nOil-exporting countries 25.3 27.1 25.2 25.0 26.1 27.1 0.9 –3.1 0.6 2.5 0.8 0.6\nExcluding Nigeria 27.4 31.9 25.0 22.9 23.7 24.3 0.2 –1.5 4.0 7.1 0.9 0.7\nOil-importing countries 41.5 44.9 43.6 42.9 42.1 41.6 –5.2 –2.5 –1.8 –4.3 –4.3 –4.2\nExcluding South Africa 28.2 32.8 32.6 31.6 30.8 30.3 –6.4 –4.5 –4.5 –6.1 –4.9 –4.8\nMiddle-income countries 38.4 42.1 39.9 39.6 39.9 40.3 –1.5 –1.7 0.3 –0.4 –1.6 –1.5\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa 30.7 36.0 32.9 31.6 31.2 31.3 –2.2 –2.6 –1.4 –0.9 –2.6 –2.0\nLow-income countries 24.6 28.7 29.5 28.5 27.8 27.1 –8.0 –5.5 –4.8 –6.2 –5.3 –5.6\nExcluding low-income countries in fragile and\nconflict-affected situations 21.6 24.6 24.9 25.2 25.3 25.4 –7.9 –6.8 –5.9 –6.8 –6.7 –6.7\nCountries in fragile and conflict-affected\nsituations 25.1 27.6 28.2 27.8 28.2 28.5 –1.7 –3.8 –1.9 –1.9 –1.7 –2.3\nCFA franc zone 22.0 27.7 29.4 29.5 30.2 31.1 –3.8 –3.4 –3.9 –4.4 –5.1 –4.0\nCEMAC 20.4 25.8 26.1 26.4 27.8 29.2 –3.4 –2.5 –0.8 3.6 –1.2 –2.0\nWAEMU 23.0 28.8 31.2 31.1 31.4 32.0 –4.3 –3.9 –5.7 –9.2 –7.2 –4.9\nCOMESA (SSA members) 30.1 34.4 33.7 32.0 30.7 29.8 –5.7 –4.1 –3.7 –4.5 –3.8 –3.5\nEAC-5 27.4 29.2 28.5 27.8 27.3 26.9 –7.0 –5.1 –5.6 –6.2 –6.0 –5.9\nECOWAS 24.2 27.0 27.5 27.8 28.5 29.3 –1.0 –4.0 –2.4 –2.6 –2.4 –2.0\nSACU 64.6 72.3 68.4 68.9 69.2 69.9 –3.4 1.5 3.0 –0.7 –2.4 –2.6\nSADC 49.6 54.7 50.7 50.0 49.8 49.9 –3.4 –0.1 1.8 –0.8 –2.5 –3.0\nSee sources on page 16.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023\nLIGHT ON THE HORIZON? 21\nTable SA4. External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based and Reserves\nExternal Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based Reserves\n(Percent of GDP) (Months of imports of goods and services)\n2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024\nAngola 33.6 90.9 68.9 43.1 56.0 54.7 9.3 9.5 6.5 7.3 7.0 7.0\nBenin1 15.6 30.3 35.2 37.8 39.6 39.3 … ... ... ... ... ...\nBotswana 15.4 12.5 10.1 9.3 9.3 8.3 11.4 6.4 6.6 5.7 6.0 6.1\nBurkina Faso1 21.0 22.8 24.4 26.1 24.9 24.2 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nBurundi 19.5 17.5 19.9 19.6 27.9 30.8 2.5 1.0 2.3 1.3 1.9 2.3\nCabo Verde 78.4 129.6 119.3 106.9 96.2 91.6 5.7 7.6 6.7 5.6 6.0 5.9\nCameroon2 18.4 32.5 30.3 31.1 29.7 28.4 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nCentral African Republic2 29.2 36.3 32.8 34.4 31.4 30.4 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nChad2 24.2 28.2 24.3 22.4 20.9 20.8 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nComoros 17.0 23.2 24.7 27.1 32.9 36.2 7.1 7.9 9.0 6.5 7.5 7.9\nCongo, Democratic Republic of the 14.1 13.7 14.5 13.2 12.1 10.4 0.6 0.4 1.1 1.7 2.0 2.1\nCongo, Republic of 2 24.4 29.2 23.7 25.1 25.5 23.2 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nCôte d'Ivoire1 19.6 33.5 30.7 36.0 35.7 34.4 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nEquatorial Guinea2 8.8 15.4 12.2 10.0 9.0 6.1 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nEritrea3 62.2 … … … … … 2.8 … … … … …\nEswatini 8.8 15.2 15.2 17.2 20.2 21.5 3.7 3.1 3.1 2.5 3.3 3.4\nEthiopia 25.4 28.8 29.1 23.0 17.9 14.8 2.0 2.0 1.5 0.8 … …\nGabon2 29.8 49.0 36.1 34.8 39.0 39.2 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nThe Gambia 37.5 49.4 47.2 47.6 43.2 39.1 3.6 5.8 7.1 5.3 5.0 5.0\nGhana4 26.3 39.3 38.1 43.2 41.5 41.9 3.0 3.7 4.0 1.2 1.4 2.1\nGuinea 23.2 27.2 25.2 21.5 21.0 21.8 2.2 1.9 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.2\nGuinea-Bissau1 30.0 43.9 38.5 39.4 34.6 32.2 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nKenya 22.8 30.6 31.1 31.2 33.6 34.9 4.6 4.6 4.7 3.9 3.3 3.7\nLesotho 35.3 46.6 41.1 41.4 45.8 44.7 4.8 4.1 4.9 3.8 3.9 4.0\nLiberia 18.4 41.1 37.2 35.3 35.4 36.5 2.1 2.2 3.9 3.1 3.1 3.1\nMadagascar 23.5 35.9 33.2 33.7 36.3 37.0 3.4 4.8 4.5 4.1 4.0 3.9\nMalawi 19.4 31.8 30.9 31.5 27.2 32.1 2.5 0.8 0.5 0.6 2.3 3.3\nMali1 22.8 31.5 27.1 26.6 24.6 23.9 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nMauritius 13.3 20.2 23.3 19.4 19.7 17.6 8.4 14.4 12.8 11.8 9.2 8.8\nMozambique 63.8 90.7 83.3 71.0 64.9 66.6 3.5 4.7 2.6 2.8 1.9 1.9\nNamibia 12.2 18.8 14.5 16.7 17.2 16.4 3.4 4.1 4.5 4.7 4.8 5.0\nNiger1 18.4 33.0 31.5 32.5 29.7 29.0 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nNigeria 3.7 8.0 9.1 9.4 11.2 13.3 6.1 6.5 6.3 6.5 5.8 5.7\nRwanda 28.0 54.8 53.5 46.8 52.1 62.3 3.9 5.3 4.6 3.7 3.6 4.3\nSão Tomé & Príncipe 84.3 65.1 59.5 59.2 51.0 47.9 3.7 4.4 3.6 2.5 2.0 2.5\nSenegal1 32.9 48.9 45.9 47.0 43.6 39.7 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nSeychelles 34.4 35.4 38.3 29.4 30.6 33.3 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.4 3.5 3.5\nSierra Leone 31.6 48.3 48.3 48.9 56.2 53.4 3.2 4.6 5.6 4.2 3.6 3.3\nSouth Africa 15.0 23.4 18.6 18.8 21.0 21.0 5.8 6.4 5.5 5.4 5.0 4.6\nSouth Sudan 50.0 50.6 50.3 40.6 61.1 51.3 1.7 0.1 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9\nTanzania 25.9 28.4 28.8 27.3 26.4 26.9 4.8 5.3 4.0 3.7 4.0 4.1\nTogo1 13.3 29.0 25.7 26.1 25.4 26.1 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nUganda 16.6 29.4 27.9 26.0 25.8 26.2 4.6 4.3 4.7 3.1 3.1 3.4\nZambia5 26.4 66.6 53.9 36.8 … … 2.7 1.3 2.8 3.2 3.1 3.8\nZimbabwe6 31.7 26.5 19.8 22.5 21.8 14.9 0.5 0.1 1.3 0.2 0.0 0.0\nSub-Saharan Africa 16.5 26.4 24.6 23.6 25.2 24.8 5.2 5.0 4.7 4.4 3.9 3.8\nMedian 22.8 31.6 30.8 31.1 29.7 30.8 3.6 4.3 4.3 3.5 3.5 3.7\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa 24.3 36.3 33.7 31.4 31.2 29.5 4.3 3.9 3.7 3.2 3.0 3.0\nOil-exporting countries 11.2 20.3 19.8 18.2 21.7 22.6 6.3 6.2 5.7 6.3 5.7 5.7\nExcluding Nigeria 27.6 55.2 45.2 36.2 41.7 39.8 6.7 5.6 4.5 5.7 5.7 5.8\nOil-importing countries 20.2 29.7 27.0 26.6 26.7 25.7 4.4 4.4 4.1 3.5 3.1 3.0\nExcluding South Africa 23.5 32.6 31.1 30.1 28.9 27.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 2.6 2.4 2.5\nMiddle-income countries 14.6 25.0 23.0 22.5 25.3 25.5 5.8 5.8 5.3 5.3 4.8 4.7\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa 24.4 41.5 37.5 35.3 37.2 36.1 5.4 4.7 4.5 4.2 4.1 4.2\nLow-income countries 24.5 30.6 29.2 26.9 25.0 23.4 2.7 2.9 2.7 2.0 1.9 1.9\nExcluding low-income countries in fragile and\nconflict-affected situations 22.4 31.9 30.9 29.2 28.8 30.0 3.9 4.2 3.9 3.2 3.4 3.5\nCountries in fragile and conflict-affected\nsituations 11.1 17.4 17.6 16.8 17.7 17.6 4.8 4.8 4.6 4.4 3.6 3.4\nCFA franc zone 21.0 33.5 30.7 32.4 31.9 30.7 4.6 4.7 4.4 4.1 4.2 4.1\nCEMAC 20.8 32.6 27.9 27.8 27.9 26.8 4.2 3.3 3.0 4.1 4.6 4.8\nWAEMU 21.4 34.0 32.3 35.1 34.0 32.7 4.9 5.5 5.2 4.1 3.9 3.8\nCOMESA (SSA members) 22.0 29.7 28.6 26.0 24.7 22.7 3.1 3.1 3.1 2.5 2.3 2.3\nEAC-5 22.7 30.7 30.7 29.7 30.7 31.9 4.6 4.7 4.4 3.7 3.5 3.8\nECOWAS 9.9 18.6 19.2 19.7 22.1 23.2 5.1 5.3 5.2 4.8 4.0 4.0\nSACU 14.9 22.8 18.2 18.4 20.4 20.4 5.9 6.2 5.5 5.4 5.0 4.7\nSADC 20.4 32.1 26.8 25.0 26.9 25.8 5.7 5.6 4.8 4.9 4.6 4.3\nSee sources on page 16.\nOCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "source": "imf", "stratum": "imf", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/REO/AFR/2023/October/English/text.ashx"}